

Morale, Obedience, Discipline:
The Politics of Motivation in the Ottoman Great War

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A thesis presented to the

Atatürk Institute for Modern Turkish History
at Boğaziçi University

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

May 2019

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Abstract

“Morale, Discipline, Obedience: The Politics of Motivation in the Ottoman Great War”

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for Modern Turkish History at Boğaziçi University, 2019

Professor Nadir Özbek, Thesis Advisor

This thesis aims to deal with how the Ottoman government implemented the incentives to motivate its soldiers and non-conscripted youth. This thesis takes into consideration the fact the Ottoman army is not a homogenous formation; therefore, the various incentives were implemented for various groups of the Ottoman army.

My main aim of this thesis is to examine the government policies regarding the motivation, discipline and obedience of both conscripted soldiers and non-conscripted youth and to demonstrate the most fundamental notions by which the Ottoman soldiers were motivated during the World War I with keeping in mind the ethnic and religious heterorganic nature of the Ottoman Army.

In this thesis, I will seek answers to what policies the Ottoman government implemented to strengthen motivation, discipline and obedience of its soldiers and the non-conscripted youth between 1914-1918. Also, I will examine how these policies functioned.

24,500 words

Özet

“Moral, Disiplin, İtaat: Osmanlı Dünya Savaşı’nda Motivasyon Politikası”

Utku Akar, Yüksek Lisans Adayı, 2019

Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Atatürk İlkeleri ve İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü

Profesör Nadir Özbek, Tez Danışmanı

Bu tez, Osmanlı hükümetinin askerlerini ve askere alınmamış gençliği motive etmek için nasıl teşvikler uyguladığını ele almaktadır. Bu tez, Osmanlı Ordusunun homojen bir oluşum olmadığını dikkate almaktadır. Bu yüzden, Osmanlı Ordusunun farklı grupları için çeşitli teşvikler uygulanmıştır.

Bu tezin ana amacı, Osmanlı Ordusunun etnik ve dini heterorganic doğasına dikkate ederek, hem askere alınan hem de askere alınmamış gençlerin motivasyon, disiplin ve itaatlerine ilişkin devlet politikalarını incelemek ve I. Dünya Savaşı sırasında Osmanlı askerlerinin motive olduğu en temel kavramları göstermektir.

Bu tezde, Osmanlı hükümetinin 1914-1918 yılları arasında askerlerinin ve askere alınmamış gençliğin motivasyonunu, disiplinini ve itaatini güçlendirmek için hangi politikaları uyguladığı konusunda cevaplar arayacağım. Ayrıca, bu politikaların nasıl işlediğini de inceleyeceğim.

24.500 kelime

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Acknowledgements

There is a long list of persons that I should thank. I had not been helped, this thesis could have not finished. First and foremost, I want to offer my gratitude to my supervisor Nadir Özbek for the valuable insights he gave in his courses and during the writing process. Thanks to his excellent comments and guidance as well as his own studies, I could construct my thesis.

I wish to thank the jury members, Cengiz Kırılı and Hakkı Başgüney. who definitely shaped my thesis with their criticism and comments in the jury meeting. I would like to extend my sincere thanks to Cengiz Kırılı and other faculty members of the Institute who contributed to my world of reflection with their courses. I owe Tracy Lord Şen a double debt for her scrupulous readings of and on comments of the entire of my thesis.

I cannot express my thanks to my all my friends especially to Uğur Akpınar, Ezgi Kamalı, Beyiz Karabulut, Can Özsoy, Doruk Engin. I am also very indebted to my mother-father since they have always believed in me and supported my decisions.

I received financial support from TÜBİTAK 2210/A program. Without this financial support it would have been impossible for me to finish my thesis on time. I owe special thanks to TÜBİTAK for its financial support.

Introduction

The First World War, also known as the Great War, during which more than 70 million military personnel were mobilized, was one of the deadliest wars of the entire human history and precipitated major political change including in the Ottoman Empire. The empire's entry into the First World War turned out to be disastrous for her people. In that process, the Ottoman Army mobilized a total of almost 3.000.000 people between the years 1914 and 1918. Also, as most of the belligerent powers, the Ottomans attempted to motivate the conscripted soldiers both mentally and physically to maximize their effectiveness during the war. Since it is still unknown to what extent the Ottoman army succeeded in terms of the increasing effectiveness, discipline, obedience and motivation of the soldiers, the main aspiration of this thesis is to demonstrate the politics of motivation and discipline of the government during the First World War and to examine how this politics functioned in reality since the First World War was unique due to the fact that it lasted more than four years and the Ottoman government had to rely on a major part of the population for the mobilization.

In recent years, the subjects such as mobilization, propaganda, gender relations, daily life and home front during the World War I have been studied extensively by the historians. However, in the Ottoman studies, despite a few Ph.D. dissertations and books, the main interest of the Ottoman historians centered upon on the military history of the Ottoman Empire during the First

World War mostly without taking into the account of the experiences of the soldiers and officers. Therefore, this thesis, inspired by the recently developing literature mentioned above, aims to contribute social and cultural history of the Ottoman soldiers in the First World War. Since the motivation or esprit de corps issue of the Ottoman army has long been overlooked by the historians, this thesis aims to fill the gap in this field.

In this thesis, I will attempt to examine the government policies for disciplining and motivating the soldiers and the notions by which the Ottoman soldiers were motivated during the World War I. Although the official Turkish discourse indicates as the nationalism, religious zeal and patriotism as the main notions that motivated all the members of the Ottoman army, I hypothesize that the Ottoman soldiers had different notions of motivation since Ottoman army consisting of the soldiers from different nations and religions was not a homogenous formation.

In this thesis, the government's efforts for the motivation of the Ottoman soldiers and youth will be discussed in detail in light of the findings acquired through various archival documents, journals, and manuals. Through the archival research, I will be able to demonstrate the ways in which the Ottoman government's politics of the motivation of the soldiers functioned.

In this study, I will seek for answers to the questions below.

1: What policies did the CUP government of World War I implement to increase the motivation, discipline, patriotism, and obedience of the Ottoman soldiers between 1914-1918?

2: In which ways did Ottoman government's policies function?

In order to find suitable answers to these questions, I will discuss the role of various factors such as voluntary troops, religious propaganda, and charity policies. First, I will discuss the proclamation of Jihad and the role of voluntary regiments formed by the members of the Mevlevi and Bektashi orders and how this effected the motivation of the Ottoman soldiers. Then, I will study how the religious officials within the army such as Tabur and Alay İmams were used to strengthen the faith and bravery of the common soldiers. Finally, I will discuss the government policies such as providing assistance to the soldier families to boost the motivation of the soldier on the front

In the fourth chapter, my main focus will be the non-conscripted youth and how the CUP government worked to mobilize and prepare them for the war. First, paramilitary youth organizations of the War Ministry during World War I will be examined, and the particular importance will be applied to the Osmanlı Genç Dernekleri founded in 1916. In this chapter, I will study to what extent these organizations mobilized the youth and what type of methods were implemented to prepare the youth as motivated, disciplined, and obedient for the conscription.

Since this research is based on the primary sources written in the Ottoman Turkish, it requires a considerable knowledge of the Ottoman Turkish language. In the thesis, three types of primary sources will be evaluated to go through different aspects of this issue and get answers to the given research questions.

First primary source set, which will be used, is Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivleri in Istanbul. Also, ATASE stands as a solid archive on the subject; nevertheless, due to because of a specific timeline of the research topic and difficulty of receiving permission to conduct research, ATASE archives will not be used in this research. This deficit will be tried to be filled by more extensive research in Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivleri. In this archive, documents on desertion, muinsiz aile maaşı, volunteer troops and paramilitary young organizations will be selected and examined.

Second primary source type is selective works generally prepared for teaching soldiers some basic things about how to act in battle, and the bravery of Ottoman soldiers in history.¹ These works aimed to increase morale and bravery of the Ottoman soldiers at front. Since most of the Ottoman soldiers did not know how to read, the officers and battalion imams were asked to read instructive stories to their soldiers. Such books to be read to the enlisted men included Tarihte Osmanlı Neferi and Şanlı Asker Ali Çavuş. These works written in a simplistic language for the comprehension of the Ottoman soldiers give advice about how an ideal Ottoman soldier should behave.² Also, religious

1 Yücel Yanıkdağ, "Educating the Peasants: The Ottoman army and Enlisted Men in Uniform," *Middle Eastern Studies* 40, no. 6 (2004): 99.

2 Yücel Yanıkdağ, "Educating the Peasants: The Ottoman army and Enlisted Men in Uniform," *Middle Eastern Studies* 40, no. 6 (2004):100.

textbooks written by the members of the ulema such as İzmirli İsmail Hakkı and Ali Vahid Üryanizade to be used as lecture pamphlets within the army aimed to strengthen the faith and motivation of the Ottoman soldiers.³ Therefore, these textbooks and pamphlets will be examined in detail to elaborate and present the main indoctrination methods provided in these works.

Osmanlı Genç Dernekleri Mecmuası was the media outlet of the Genç Dernekleri served as the paramilitary young organization of the government. The need to found such an organization stemmed from the necessity to mobilize peasant and urban boys and to discipline (terbiye) them through the physical education before their conscription age. However, Osmanlı Genç Dernekleri was not only designed to prepare young people to the war physically. Also, it was aimed to strengthen the faith and motivation (maneviyat) of the young people. Osmanlı Genç Dernekleri Mecmuası also served for this purpose. Therefore, this journal will be studied to demonstrate indoctrination methods on the young people.

The historiography of the First World War has received important attention for the last decades. Before that, the First World War experience was studied as the part of history of the Turkish National Revolution. This historiography produced works in which the First World War experience was related to the National Independence War and history of CUP rather than autonomous field. Only non-historian intellectuals have written the Ottoman Great War experience such as Ahmed Emin Yalman.⁴

In recent years, many historians studied the Ottoman Great War experience as an autonomous field. Zafer Toprak's works contributed the social history of the First World War. His major work was on "National Economy" process during World War I. Also, he has published numerous articles on the social history of the First World War.⁵ His works inspired many historians to conduct in-depth research on the World War I.

3 Mehmet Beşikçi, *The Ottoman Mobilization of Manpower in the First World War: Between Voluntarism and Resistance*, (Leiden: Brill, 2012).

4 Ahmed Emin Yalman, *Turkey in the World War*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930).

5 Zafer Toprak, *Türkiye'de Milli İktisat, (1908–1918)*, (Ankara: Yurt Yayınları, 1982). Zafer Toprak, "Osmanlı Devleti' nin Birinci Dünya Savaşı Finansmanı ve Para Politikası, *ODTÜ*

Mustafa Aksakal's studies must also be mentioned here as the first attempt of new scholarship about how the Ottoman Empire entered World War I. Mustafa Aksakal, who examined both German and Ottoman archives, concludes after Balkan Wars no country wanted to ally with the Ottoman Empire except Germany; therefore, the Ottoman Empire chose Germany as ally. This proves that the CUP leaders were rational politicians. In another work on Jihad, Mustafa Aksakal proves Jihad was not made in Germany. Ottoman Empire did not need to be convinced to proclaim the Jihad by Germany. The proclamation of Jihad was the Ottoman Empire's own decision. ⁶

Mehmet Beşikçi discussed the mobilization of manpower during World War I. He studies how Ottoman Empire under total war conditions mobilized its manpower through the various methods. He first analyses classic methods such as the laws for the conscription and how these laws were implemented. Then he discusses the volunteer troops and how they were created to help war effort of the Ottoman Empire. Finally, he studies the Ottoman youth associations and how they were founded. Also, he analyses difficulties during the foundation and spread of these organizations. ⁷

Eric Jan Zürcher's studies were fundamental. He has written essays on various aspects of the Ottoman Great War. His inspiring essay revealed the experience of the ordinary Ottoman soldier. Also, he has drawn attention desertion issue which was ignored for long period by the historians. His works greatly contributed both military and social history of the World War I. ⁸

Stanford Shaw's two volume work should be mentioned here. It covers almost all aspects of the Ottoman World War experience. It is one of the serious

Gelişme Dergisi (1979–1980), pp. 205–238; Zafer Toprak, "Birinci Dünya Savaşı'nda İstanbul," *Dünden Bugüne İstanbul Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 2, 1994, pp. 239–242.

- 6 Mustafa Aksakal, *The Ottoman Road to War in 1914: the Ottoman Empire and the First World War*, (Cambridge University Press, 2008); Mustafa Aksakal, "'Holy War Made in Germany'? Ottoman Origins of the 1914 Jihad." *War in History* 18, no. 2 (2011): 184-199.
- 7 Mehmet Beşikçi, *The Ottoman mobilization of manpower in the First World War: between voluntarism and resistance*,
- 8 Erik J. Zürcher, "Little Mehmet in the Desert: The Ottoman Soldier's Experience," in Hugh Cecil and Peter Liddle (eds.), *Facing Armageddon: The First World War Experienced* (London: Leo Cooper, 1988), pp. 230–241;

attempts to write comprehensive history of the Ottoman World War. His attempt is quite difficult for one-man effort given diversity and intensity of the issues. In his work, he rarely uses secondary sources, and he almost completely relies on the primary sources. His approach presents only a descriptive account of certain issues such as Armenian question.⁹

Yiğit Akın's dissertation aims to examine the socio-economic and cultural dimensions of the home-front experience of the Ottoman people during World War. His work explores that new factors that war created such as mass conscription, a state-controlled economy, government requisitioning of grain and possessions, widespread shortages, forcible deportations and voluntary displacements, death, and grief. It focuses on how Ottoman dealt with these difficulties.¹⁰

The military history of World War I is still dominated by the Turkish General Staff, and almost all works is written by the officer-academics. The military history field is still quite underdeveloped at universities in Turkey. Also, there is lack of interest to the military history of the Ottoman World War I in global academic world. However, in recent years, Edward W. Erickson attempted to write comprehensive military history of the Ottoman war experience. He critically objected to some Eurocentric bias which underestimated the Ottoman war performance. In order to demonstrate Ottoman war performance, leadership, command, and doctrine in the Ottoman army was examined by Erickson.¹¹

This thesis argues that religion and charity were two most important factors in motivating soldiers. Army imams, volunteer troops and jihad played important role in the strengthening the motivation of soldiers. The jihad when applied domestically was successful and motivated outcast groups to join the war cause of the Ottoman Empire.

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- 9 Stanford J. Shaw, *The Ottoman Empire in World War I, vol. 1: Prelude to War*, (Ankara: Turkish Historical Society, 2006) and Stanford J. Shaw, *The Ottoman Empire in World War I, vol. 2: Triumph and Tragedy, November 1914–1916*, (Turkish Historical Society, 2008).
- 10 Yiğit Akın, "The Ottoman home front during World War I: everyday politics, society, and culture." Ph.D Dissertation, The Ohio State University, 2011.
- 11 Edward J. Erickson, *Ordered to Die: A History of the Ottoman Army in the First World War* (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 2001).

This thesis also states both Ottoman Strength League and Ottoman Youth League not only emphasized physical education but also moral education of the youth. The education of these leagues purposed to indoctrinate them specific ideas, shape their lifestyle under the specific principles, to strengthen their patriotism and to discipline them spiritually in order to train them as capable, brave, combatant, tenacious, powerful, motivated and obedient soldiers.

In short, my main aim of this work is to examine the government policies regarding the motivation, discipline and obedience of both conscripted soldiers and non-conscripted youth and to demonstrate the most fundamental notions by which the Ottoman soldiers were motivated during the World War I with keeping in mind the ethnic and religious heterorganic nature of the Ottoman Army. Due to time frame and sake of the research, selected policies and themes will be examined to be able comprehend the general policy of the Ottoman government apparatus toward the youth and soldiers.

Historical Background of Ottoman Great War

§ 2.1 Balkan Wars and Their Aftermath

The Balkan Wars or the Balkan Catastrophe (Balkan Faciası) started an era in European history dominated by nationalism, rivalry among nations and war. These wars were the results of the desire of the newly emerged Balkan states to achieve national unity at the expense of the disintegrating Ottoman Empire and of lack of the determination of the Great Powers to enforce status quo established by the Treaty of Berlin in 1878. Also, while Russia helped Balkan states to overcome their intra-Balkan rivalries and create a pan-Balkan alliance (Balkan League) directed against the Ottoman Empire,¹ the Italian attack on the Tripoli province in the Ottoman North Africa encouraged member states of the Balkan league to launch an attack against Turks.²

The Balkan Wars consisted of two series of conflicts that mostly took place Macedonia and Thrace in 1912 and 1913. In the First Balkan War, four Balkan states which included Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia and Montenegro, defeated the Ottoman Empire and as a result of the war, the Balkan states captured and

1 Richard C. Hall, *The Balkan Wars 1912-1913: Prelude to the First World War* (London: Routledge, 2010), 21.

2 Syed Tanvir Wasti, "The 1912-13 Balkan Wars and the Siege of Edirne," *Middle Eastern Studies* 40, no. 4 (2004), 59.

partitioned almost all European territories of the Ottoman Empire among themselves.³

However, after the First Balkan War ended with the Treaty of London on 30 May 1913, the relations among the winners quickly deteriorated because of the disagreements over the division of the spoils. The growing disagreements and deteriorating relations led to a new war in the Balkans. Bulgarians, dissatisfied with its share of the spoils of the First Balkan War, started the Second Balkan War by attacking Serbian positions on the night of 29-30 June. However, Greek and Serbian armies repulsed Bulgarian attack and counter-attacked. Also, after the war began, Romania joined Greece and Serbia to resolve their border disputes over Dobruja.⁴

The collapse of the Balkan League and the beginning of the Second Balkan War created an opportunity for the CUP government to regain some of the territories lost in the First Balkan War. The main objective of the CUP government and Enver Pasha was the recovery of the Eastern Thrace and Edirne. On 29 July 1913, the Ottoman troops captured Edirne. With the increasing pressure of the Proclamation of a Provisional Turkish

Government of Western Thrace at Gumulcine by the Ottoman forces, Bulgaria had to accept Ottoman's peace terms which deprived Bulgaria of eastern Thrace.⁵

Balkan Wars resulted in huge casualties on each side. While the Bulgarians lost around 65,000 men, the Greeks 9,500, the Montenegrins, 3,000, and the Serbs at least 36,000, the Ottomans lost as many as 125,000 people. In addition, tens of thousands of civilians died from disease and other causes. Deliberate atrocities occurred throughout every theater of war.⁶

After the territories of Ottoman Empire in Europe had greatly been shrunk as a result of Balkan Wars, the nation states of Balkans initiated the ethnic

3 Hall, *The Balkan Wars 1912-1913*, ix

4 Ibid, 107.

5 Ibid, 119, 125-126.

6 Richard C. Hall, "Balkan Wars 1912-1913", in: 1914-1918-online. *International Encyclopedia of the First World War*, ed. by Ute Daniel, Peter Gatrell, Oliver Janz, Heather Jones, Jennifer Keene, Alan Kramer, and Bill Nasson, issued by Freie Universität Berlin, Berlin 2014-10-08.

homogenization campaign in their newly acquired regions. For this purpose, Greece and Bulgaria signed a population exchange treaty in 1913, which was the first international treaty for the solution of refugee-related problems by the population exchange.⁷ In September 1913, Ottoman government and Bulgaria also went to a settlement of the refugee issue by Istanbul Treaty.⁸ According to the population exchange protocol attached to Istanbul Treaty, a commission formed by Ottoman and Bulgarian officials was to be established, it would deal with the issues regarding the population exchange and the property left by the immigrants.⁹ By the help of Turkish-Bulgarian population exchange commission, 48.570 Muslim and 46.764 Bulgarian were exchanged.¹⁰ Nevertheless, only fifteen kilometers on either side of the border were covered by this population exchange.¹¹

Besides unofficial “encouragement” of immigration of Ottoman Empire and Balkan states, the idea of official population exchange agreement emerged out of necessity of getting rid of possible disloyal elements and of achieving ethnic and religious homogeneity. For this reason, both Ottoman and Greek governments carried out an ethnic cleansing operation against the minorities which they saw as the obstacle in their ethnic homogenization campaign.

Greece had begun to force Muslim population to emigrate even by the beginning of Balkan Wars. Greek army searched the houses of Muslims under the pretext of security reasons, and the Greek government increased the dose

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- 7 Fuat Dünder, *Modern Türkiye'nin Şifresi: İttihat ve Terakki'nin Etnisite Muhendisliği, 1913-1918* (Cağaloğlu, İstanbul: İletişim, 2013), 66.
- 8 Ahmet Efiloğlu, “1914 Osmanlı-Yunan Nüfus Mübadelesi Girişimi: İttihat ve Terakki'nin ve Yunanistan'ın Mübadele Politikaları,” *Tarih ve Toplum - Yeni Yaklaşımlar* 12, no.1 (2011), 48.
- 9 Erik Jan Zürcher, “The late Ottoman Empire as Laboratory of Demographic Engineering,” *Academia.edu*, accessed January 20 2019, http://www.academia.edu/5726057/The_late_Ottoman_Empire_as_laboratory_of_demographic_engineering, 7.
- 10 Stephen Ladas, *The Exchange of Minorities, Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey*, (New York: Macmillan Company, 1932), 15.
- 11 Yannis G. Mourellos “The 1914 persecutions and the first attempt at an exchange of minorities between Greece and Turkey.” *Balkan Studies* 26.2 (1985): 391

of the violence and pressure against the Muslim population to “encourage” them to move to Turkey.¹²

However, the policy of forceful expulsion was not unique to Greece. The CUP-led Ottoman government employed some methods including massacres, forced expulsion, boycott, terrorising Greek minority of Eastern Thrace and Aegean littoral until the late-1914. With a short research in the Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivleri (The Prime Minister's Ottoman Archives), it can be seen how the Ottoman government encouraged and helped the emigration of the Greek population. For instance, a cipher telegram sent from interior ministry to the province of Edirne on 1 April 1914 orders that the detachments from 2. and 3. Corps had to be assigned for the protection of Greek emigrants from Vize town because they were in danger of being attacked by Albanian refugees of the Balkan Wars.¹³ In another cipher telegram sent to the province of Edirne on 23 April 1914, it is stated that Greeks who wished to emigrate to Greece were bartering their livestock away to leave Turkey as soon as possible.¹⁴ These two like many similar documents from Ottoman archives demonstrate that many Greek living in the Eastern Thrace and Aegean littoral wished to leave the Ottoman Empire due to the fear of the retaliation of the Muslim refugees and Ottoman government accelerated Greek migration by providing means of protection. In the period from January 1914 to July 1915, 60,926 Greek left or were forced to flee from the Eastern Thrace.¹⁵

In this period, the Greek emigration was not limited to the Eastern Thrace. The wave of emigration gradually spread to the Marmara region and Aegean littoral because of increasing violence and pressure from not only Muslim refugees but also the CUP government. In early 1914, Mahmut Celal (Bayar) was assigned by Talat Pasha to Turkify the Aegean littoral, and he succeeded this forcing thousands of Greeks to flee the Aegean islands by means of veiled threats, intimidations and even massacres.¹⁶ Some Greek towns in the Aegean

12 Ahmet Efiloğlu, “1914 Osmanlı-Yunan Nüfus Mübadelesi Girişimi,” 49

13 Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi (BOA), Dahiliye Şifre Kalemi (DH. ŞFR), 39/138. (1 April 1914).

14 BOA, DH. ŞFR., 40/81. (23 April 1914).

15 Mourellos, “The 1914 persecutions,” 392

16 Erik Jan Zürcher, “The Late Ottoman Empire,” 7

littoral were raided and pillaged by the Muslim chetes mostly consisted of radicalized Muslim refugees from Balkans. In the spring of 1914, this type of violent actions escalated. In the Aegean littoral, some villages and towns like Çeşme, Edremit, Bergama, Menemen, Kemer and Ödemiş were harassed and attacked by the Muslim chetes causing the Greeks to flee. Also, in June 1914, the massacre of Phocaea was perpetrated by these irregular chetes.¹⁷ Alfred Van der Zee, Danish Consul at Izmir gives a detailed description of the destruction of the town:

Within a quarter of an hour after the assault had begun every boat in the place was full of people trying to get away and when no more boats could be had the inhabitants sought refuge on the little peninsula on which the lighthouse stands. I saw eleven bodies of men and women lying dead on the shore. How many were killed I could not say, but trying to get into a house of which the door stood ajar I saw two other dead bodies lying in the entrance hall. Every shop in the place was looted and the goods that could not be carried away were want only destroyed.¹⁸

According to Mathias Bjornlund, these gangs or chetes numbered 8.000-10.000 in the province of Aydin alone and they were mostly financed by the government.¹⁹ Many historians agree on that these acts of ethnic violence such as massacres, intimidations and forced displacements were not random actions of the Muslim muhajirs or chetes driven a desire for revenge. They were a part of CUP organized campaign of violent Turkification which deliberately targeted non-Muslim communities of the Ottoman empire.

Nevertheless, the ethnic cleansing through violence was not the only method of Turkification employed by the CUP government. Another reason of the refugee outflow from the Aegean and East Thrace regions was the growing boycott campaign against the Greek population. On June 23, 1914, Aydın

17 Emre Erol, "Makedonya Sorunu'nun Batı Anadolu'ya Sıçrayışı ve 1914 Rum Tehciri," *Toplumsal Tarih* 252 (Aralık 2014), 59.

18 Matthias Bjørnlund, "The 1914 cleansing of Aegean Greeks as a case of violent Turkification," *Journal of Genocide Research* 10, no. 1 (2008): 47.

19 Ibid, 46.

deputy Emanuel Emanuelidi Efendi and a group of Greek deputies requested the government to answer the reasons for the Greek emigration in the Aegean and Thrace regions. Emanuel Emanuelidi indicated that at least 150,000 Greeks had left their home, and the immovable property left by them had been distributed among the Muslim mujachirs. He mentioned about the boycott campaign, violent actions against the Greek population, the resettlement of Balkan wars refugees in the Greek villages and saw them as the main causes of the Greek emigration. In response to Emanuelidi Efendi's claims, the interior minister Talat Bey stated that after the influx of the muhajirs, some incidents took place which the government could not easily prevent. Also, he indicated that the Muslim muhajirs had been resettled in the Muslim villages, not in the Greek ones. Furthermore, Talat Bey completely rejected the existence of a boycott campaign against the Greek population.²⁰ These parliamentary proceedings, which I find very important, shows how the government and Greek MPs see the events differently. Although the Unionist government claims that there was no the involvement of the state in the persecutions against the Greek society, it is hard to believe that the mass migration of Greeks at this rate stemmed from the random violence actions of the Muslim muhajirs without the support of the government and the encouragement of Ottoman Greeks by their relatives in Greece and Greek government. There are many evidences demonstrating that the emptying of the Eastern Thrace and Aegean Littoral from the end of the Balkan Wars to the outbreak of World War I was a Turkification campaign organized by the Unionist government.

On the other hand, the Greeks who had emigrated to Greece forced the Muslim in Greece to move to Turkey. In return, Greeks in the Western Turkey were exposed to the retaliations of Muslim refugees. In such an environment where the violence was spiraling, Turkey and Greece came to the brink of war. In this period, the idea of the population exchange between Greece and Ottoman Empire which would accelerate the Turkification process came to the fore.²¹ The official population exchange proposal of CUP government was transmitted to Greek government by Galip Kemali, the Turkish ambassador

20 MMZC, İnikad: 26, Celse: 2, 23 June 1330 (6 July 1914).

21 Efiloğlu, "1914 Osmanlı-Yunan Nüfus Mübadelesi Girişimi," 50.

in Athens, and Venizelos, the Prime Minister of Greek government, accepted this proposal on 25 May 1914 on the condition that the exchange should be voluntary and a Mixed Turkish-Greek commission should also arrange for the exchange of the properties of the populations involved.²² Because of this decision, Venizelos would be accused of being the first perpetrator of a population exchange that damaged Megali Idea by uprooting thousands of Anatolian Greeks.²³ However, it seems that the motivations behind the decision of Venizelos were to evade throwing Greece into the war against the Ottoman Empire and to cease the persecution and forced migration of Greeks in the Eastern Thrace and Aegean littoral.²⁴

The former Ottoman Minister at Athens, Muhtar Bey, and the civil inspector Şükrü Bey was appointed as the members of the Ottoman delegation on the Commission and Muhtar Bey assumed the chairmanship of the Ottoman delegation.²⁵ On the other hand, on 26 June, the Greek government informed the Sublime Porte about the appointment of the Greek representatives on the Commission as well as the proposal regarding the neutral arbitration in case the Commission should be unable to reach a decision by majority vote.²⁶ According to the proposal of the Greek government, the arbitrator should be chosen by the Great Powers and he should be a citizen of a neutral country such as Sweden and Switzerland. The Ottoman government agreed to the presence of an arbitrator in the principle.²⁷ However, it stipulated a few conditions on the issue of the arbitrator. First, he should be chosen by the governments of two countries, not by the Great Powers. Second, the arbitrator would not

22 Ibid, 50.

23 Ayhan Aktar, "Homogenising the Nation, Turkifying the Economy: Turkish Experience of Populations Exchange Reconsidered," in *Crossing the Aegean: An Appraisal of the 1923 Compulsory Exchange between Greece and Turkey*, edited by Renée Hirschon. (Berghahn Books: Oxford, 2003), 83.

24 Ibid.

25 BOA, DH. ŞFR., 42/175. (2 July 1914).

26 Mourellos, "The 1914 Persecutions," 399.

27 Ibid, 400.

attend in the deliberations of the Commission and he would only adjudicate on the disputes which would be informed to him by the Commission.²⁸

The first session of the Commission was convened at the Governor Mansion, in Smyrna on 11 July 1914. On the behalf of Ottoman government, Muhtar Bey, Şükrü Bey and Server Cemal Bey (secretary) attended the session. On the other hand, M. Dimanas (İzmir Consulate of Greece) and M. Corbacioglu were elected as the representatives of the Greek delegation.²⁹ From the beginning, three fundamental subjects constituted the topics of the deliberations during each session; the conditions of emigration, the bases for the appraisal of properties of the exchangeable persons and the modalities of payment of indemnities, the terms of seeking arbitration.³⁰ Ottoman and Greek delegations hardly agreed on anything. The Greek delegation preferred that the emigration should be voluntary and the function of the Commission should be limited to the appraisal and pursuit of the properties of those who had already emigrated. They definitely opposed to a forced exchange which would cause a new wave of migration.³¹

However, the outbreak of the First World War completely changed the conditions of both countries. The Greek government abandoned the idea of exchange without solving the Aegean Islands problem. After the meetings in Izmir and Bucharest, on 5 November 1914, the Commission convened in Istanbul again. After that, the delegations met on 9, 12, 16 and 26 November. However, since the delegations could not agree on any issue, the Commission's mission came to an end without reaching an agreement.³²

§ 2.2 Ottoman Mobilization

By the end of Balkan Wars, the Ottoman Empire not only lost most of its territory in Europe but also huge chunk of its population in Europe. These lands conquered by the Balkan states had been under Ottoman rule for centuries.

28 Ibid.

29 Dündar, *Modern Türkiye'nin Şifresi*, 218.

30 Mourellos, "The 1914 Persecutions," 401

31 Ibid, 401-404.

32 Dündar, *Modern Türkiye'nin Şifresi*, 230.

Also, the war caused the migration of hundreds of thousands of Muslim refugees from their homes in the Balkans to Anatolia, İstanbul and East Thrace. Also, the war manifested the weaknesses of Ottoman army organization and lack of fighting skills, motivation, capacity, and training of the soldiers within the Ottoman Army. After the Balkan Wars, the reasons of the defeat were extensively discussed by the members of the army. Also, Enver Pasha, a leading Unionist and War Minister, forced hundreds of aged, high-ranking officers to retire from army.

Under these circumstances, the Ottoman government passed a temporary law for Military Service (Mükellefiyet-i Askeriye Kanûn-ı Muvakkati). The new law brought radical changes. It required all male Ottoman citizens whether Muslim or non-Muslim to perform military service. It was designed to conscript soldier as many as possible and aimed to tackle the problem of the exemptions by minimizing exemptions.³³

New law also aimed military service to extend to the different layers of the society. Non-Muslims were obliged to military service according to the new law. The law brought military service to 25 years, which would start after the recruits had reached twenty years of age and would end at the age of forty-five. They would serve the first twenty years in the active service (muvazzaf) and the last five years in territorial guards (müstahfız). Recruits had to serve actively “under arms (bilfil hizmet-i askeriye) for two years in the infantry and transportation classes.”³⁴ The real aim of the temporary law for military service was to get the maximum number of draftees from the population.

By the temporary law for military service, the Ottoman government aimed to create a efficient recruitment mechanism to meet the demands in case of a future mobilization. By reducing active service under arms to two years, the new law emphasized the importance of the training of draftees in modern warfare rather than number of recruits.³⁵

33 Beşikçi, *The Ottoman Mobilization of Manpower*, pp.106.

34 Akın, “The Ottoman Home Front during World War I: Everyday Politics, Society”, pp.17.

35 Beşikçi, *The Ottoman Mobilization of Manpower*, pp.106

The new law extensively restricted the exemption of university students, sole breadwinners, government officials, religious functionaries, non-Muslims, inhabitants of the capital city and students of religious seminaries (medrese). The abolition of exemptions was at the core of the new legislation. According to the Ottoman government, with the new law for military service, the Ottoman army would emerge as an equally formidable fighting force.³⁶

With the outbreak of World War I, which sparked with the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, the Ottoman government announced it would remain neutral. However, in case the war would spread to the Ottoman lands, the CUP government declared general mobilization and the call to arms on 2 August 1914.

When the mobilization was declared, men born in between 1891 and 1893 was already under arms. However, the mobilization required drafting those were fit for active service and between 24 and 45 years old, regardless of ethnicity and religion. In other words, when the mobilization was declared, the eligible men between 20 and 45 years old were required to join the army.³⁷

By October 1914, the Ottoman government managed to bring almost a half- million men under arms.³⁸ Behind the reason of the high turnout of draftees was Military Penal Law. According to the law, those who deserted and did not enlist would face severe punishments.³⁹ Due to the threat of capital punishment, the mobilization brought high turnout of enlistment. People rushed to conscription offices throughout the empire except a few provinces such as Yemen and Zor where the government authority was relatively weak.

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Although the Temporary Law for Military Service of 1914 aimed to enlarge the recruitment base by minimizing exemption list, there were still many

36 Akın, "The Ottoman Home Front during World War I: Everyday Politics, Society", pp.19

37 Beşikçi, *The Ottoman Mobilization of Manpower*, pp. 108.

38 Edward J. Erickson, *Ordered to Die: A History of the Ottoman Army in the First World War*, (Westport and London: Greenwood Press, 2001), pp.7

39 "Askeri Ceza Kanunu'na Müzeyyel Kanun-u Muvakkat," *Düstur*, II. Tertip, vol. 6, 6 August 1914: 981-982.

40 Akın, "The Ottoman Home Front during World War I: Everyday Politics, Society, and Culture, pp.20.

groups exempted from military service such as bureaucrats, policeman, governors, ambassadors, judges, muftis, workers employed in munitions factories, railroad workers and especially those wealthy enough to pay the exemption fee.⁴¹

The new law regarding the exemption fee (*bedel-i nakdi*), which was enacted on 6 March 1915, stated those who paid a fee of 50 gold lira would exempt from military service. For the majority of Ottomans, this was a very significant amount of money.⁴² The exemption fee practice never disappeared during the war years and its legal modifications were renewed.⁴³

The exemption fee option was only open to those who were in the active reserve (*ihtiyat*) and territorial reserve (*müstahfız*) categories. Those who were in active military service could not be exempted from the military service by paying the exemption fee. There was also discrimination between Muslims and non-Muslims. While the only untrained Muslim reservist were allowed to take exemption fee option, non-Muslim reservists, whether untrained or trained, could use it.⁴⁴

Although the temporary law for military service states that the government would not accept exemption fees after mobilization began, the deteriorated financial situation of the Ottoman Empire forced the government to accept the law of exemption fee which allowed the rich to evade military service. At the end, the Ottoman government declared that it would accept exemption fees from citizens instead of military service upon the declaration of general mobilization.⁴⁵

41 Beşikçi, *The Ottoman Mobilization of Manpower*, 146-147.

42 "Bedel-i Nakdi Kanunu," *Düstur*, II. Tertip, vol. 7, 6 March 1915, pp. 434-435.

43 Beşikçi, *The Ottoman Mobilization of Manpower*, 142.

44 Ibid.

45 Akin, "The Ottoman Home Front during World War I: Everyday Politics, Society, and Culture." pp. 38.

§ 2.3 Home Front

2.3.1 *Tekalif-i Harbiye*

The beginning of World War I led many countries including Ottoman Empire to seek new funds in order to finance the war effort. In 1914, it was impossible for Ottoman to finance the war with its budget revenue. The Balkan Wars had left a devastated economy and army, and Ottoman Empire had lost its most fertile territories in Balkans which caused the population and tax revenue decline in a substantial level. This situation led the Ottoman government to search the different sources of revenue for the mobilization of the army. Although Ottoman Empire had passed Harp Vergisi Kanunu (war tax law) on 25 August 1912, it could not be implemented because of the conditions of that period and the fact that the central authority was too weak to enforce the law immediately until the World War.

In order to deal with the extraordinary economic conditions during the wartime, Ottoman government passed respectively Harp Vergisi Law (war tax law) on 25 August 1912 and then Tekalif-i Harbiye law on 27 July 1914 which explains how this tax would be collected, of whom Tekalif-i Harbiye commissions would be consisted and how it would be decided where tax would be implemented.⁴⁶

With Harb Vergisi law, not only the tax rate of some existing had been raised but also the new taxes had been imposed. The first article of the law states that new taxes have been put in place to cover extraordinary war expenses and that existing taxes have been increased. In the second article, it is stated that property tax and dividend tax have been raised by 25 percent. On the other hand, in the article of law, a new tax is introduced which indicates that 3 percent tax will be levied on any kind of salaries, aids and allowances within the budget balance. In the fourth article, the amount to be taken from those who will pay bedel-i askeri has been increased by 10 Ottoman lira in accordance with the conscription law. Also, in the fifth article, the salt tax has been raised by 10 coins for a kilo excluding the Arab provinces that suffers

46 “Tekalif-i Harbiye'nin Suret-i Tarhı hakkında Kanun”, *Düstur*, II. Tertip, 6. Cilt, 4 Ramazan 1332 (27 June 1914), pp.1011-1012.

from the shortage of salt. While a tax increase is made for raki production in the sixth article, the next one indicates how and when these taxes will come into force. On the other hand, the travel allowances of the Ottoman officials are deducted between 5 percent and 10 percent in the eighth article. Finally, in the ninth article, the raise imposed on property, dividend, rakı, commutation fee (bedel-i askeri) and the new taxes mentioned in the third article are to be lifted when the government consider appropriate. Nevertheless, the ninth article also states that these changes will be implemented for three years at most.

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The ninth article shows that the Ottoman government considered that the war would not long last long when it issued the law because it planned to revoke these taxation changes within three years. However, the fact that the Ottoman government found itself in the middle of a new great after the years continuous conflict made this impossible.⁴⁸

While Harb Vergisi Law included the taxation changes given that the extraordinary financial difficulties of the war, Tekalif-i Harbiye mentioned the method of the seizure of the necessary material and food for the war effort on condition that the owners of these necessities would receive a receipt that specified the price of confiscated materials and food to be paid after the war.⁴⁹ The commodities such as goods, clothes, food, utensils and animals needed to meet the needs of the army during the war were confiscated by Tekalif-i Harbiye commissions with the condition to be paid later.

Tekalif-i Harbiye law passed before the mobilization of the war on 27 Temmuz 1914. In the first article of the law, it was stated that the law would be implemented in the districts determined by the military authorities after the announcement of the mobilization. This shows that Ottoman government should have considered that they were not able to stay outside of the war and

47 Harp Vergisi Hakkında Kanun”, *Düstur*, II. Tertip, 4. Cilt, 5 Ramazan 1330 (18 August 1912), pp.611-613.

48 Cemal Avcı, “Tekâlif-i Harbiye ile Tekâlif-i Milliye Vergilerinin Karşılaştırmalı Tanımı”, *Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Dergisi* Cilt XI , Mart 1995 , Sayı 31, pp. 223-238

49 Akın, "The Ottoman Home Front during World War I: Everyday Politics, Society, and Culture. “pp. 77-78

in case of the mobilization, they wanted to be ready to supply the enormous amount of the necessaries for the army.

As seen in the text of the law, the goods to be seized for military needs were not mentioned in detail. According to the law, Tekalif-i Harbiye commissions established in the specified regions would confiscate all the commodities excluding the people's needs. What was not mentioned here was how people's needs would be determined and how long the commodities left to people would last. These matters, which were not mentioned in the text, would cause great problems in the application of the law.⁵⁰

Tekalif-i Harbiye commissions would be consisted of the following members in each district that the law was applied; the highest civil, finance officials, a military member of the district, if not found, the district gendarmerie commander and two members selected from the municipality and administrative council.⁵¹

Tekalif-i Harbiye commissions had the right to confiscate all kinds of goods and supplies required by the army leaving a small amount sufficient for people to sustain their life. Before introducing the first Tekalif-i Harbiye law on 30 January 1913, it had taken into consideration that the commission would confiscate all kinds of materials and goods leaving 5 or 10 percent to the owners of goods and materials. However, the rate was turned into the sufficient amount later (ahalinin ihtiyacına yeterli miktar).⁵²

Another commission that would compose of members of the local administrative council, municipality, and local chamber of commerce would prepare a detailed list of the prices of all sorts of confiscated goods according to local

50 Cemal Avcı, "Tekâlif-i Harbiye", pp. 226.

51 "Tekalif-i Harbiye tarhı kararlaştırılan mıntıkanın en büyük mülkiye vemaliye memurları ile askeri yetkililerden bir zat ve bulunamadığı takdirde o mıntıkanın jandarma kumandanından ve meclis idare ve belediyeden seçilen birer azadan mürekkep olarak her mahalde bir Tekalif-i Harbiye Komisyonu teşkil edilecek..." "Tekalif-i Harbiye'nin Suret-i Tarhı hakkında Kanun", pp. 1011.

52 "Tekalif-i Harbiye'nin Suret-i Tarhı hakkında Kanun-u Muvakkat", *Düstur*, II. Tertip, 5. Cilt, 21 Safer 1331(30 January 1913), pp. 48-49. Cezmi Tezcan, "Tekalif-i Harbiye Kanunu", *Journal of Academic Studies*, May-Jul 2014, Vol. 16 Issue 61, pp.150.

market. The official records given by Tekalif-i Harbiye commission would bear the value of the confiscated goods calculated by these price lists.⁵³

In addition to these, the commissions with different functions such as Inspection (Teftiř) and Transport Vehicles for Army (Tedarik-i Vesait-i Nakliye) were also established. In rural areas, Tedarik-i Vesait-i Nakliye commission would consist of a provincial district governor, member of district administrative council, two members elected by the administrative council and reserve officer. Also, a veterinarian, blacksmith and clerk were sometimes added to the commission. The stationery expenses of the commissions were met by the districts.⁵⁴

The Law on Transport Vehicles (Tedarik-i Vesait-i Nakliye-i Askeriye Kanunnamesi) was used as a legal supplement to the Law on War Taxes (Tekalif-i Harbiye) to meet the needs of the army. The Transport Vehicles for the Army commissions were established to implement the requirements of the Law on Transport Vehicles published in 1889. The law required the seizure of the privately-owned vehicles and animals for the needs of the army during the mobilization period. According to the law, the General Army Staff had the authority to decide the type and quantity of these vehicles and the breeds of the animals and districts from which they would be collected. On the other hand, there were two categories of animals and vehicles that were exempted from the obligation of the law. While the first category was the animals and vehicles required by civilian and military officials to execute their duties, the second one was the animals either pregnant or used for breeding. Upon the declaration of the mobilization, The Transport Vehicles for the Army commissions established in districts would conduct the collection of animals and vehicles for the needs of army.⁵⁵ The task scope of the war taxes commissions (Tekalif-i Harbiye komisyonları) and The Transport Vehicles for the Army

53 “Tekalif-i Harbiye'nin Suret-i Tarhı hakkında Kanun”, pp.1012.

54 Cezmi Tezcan, “Tekalif-i Harbiye ve Tekalif-i Milliye Örneklerinde Savaş Dönemleri Mali Politikaları”, *Unpublished Ph.D Dissertation*, Ankara University, 2005, pp. 59.

55 Tedarik-i Vesait-i Nakliye-i Askeriye Kanunnamesi,” *Düstur*, I. Tertip, 6. Cilt, 12 Muharrem 1307 (8 September 1889), pp.430-444.

commissions were similar and seemed to have overlapped to a certain extent, they were the legal instruments of the separate laws.⁵⁶

The requisitioning policies of the Ottoman government such as *Tekalif-i Harbiye* constituted a significant component of the Ottoman war efforts. The requirement of feeding, clothing and equipping a large army without strong infrastructure and economy forced the Ottoman government to take extraordinary measures. Although *Tekalif-i Harbiye* as one of these measures positively affected the general performance of the Empire at the front, its negative effects overshadowed it. Not only the harsh and excessive requisitioning but also the abuses and corruption in the application of *Tekalif-i Harbiye* increased the general unrest against the law among the people leading them to question the legitimacy of the Ottoman state. It caused the blurring of the military-civilian distinction especially after the military takeover of the provisioning of the Empire since the civilians suffered due to this process as much as the soldiers at the front. Also, it imposed heavy financial and psychological burdens upon the people.

Tekalif-i Harbiye constituted an important reason for the postwar exhaustion of the Ottoman society while effecting the spread of hatred toward the Unionist leaders during the armistice period especially due to the abuses and corruption took place during the implementation of the law. The destruction bought by the extraordinary measures implemented during the war years such as *Tekalif-i Harbiye* caused the people to approach with suspicion the rising nationalist movements that emerged during the postwar period.

The last but not the least, the structure of *Tekalif-i Harbiye* commissions composed of mostly civilian officials and organized under the control of the civilian bureaucracy demonstrates that the civilian wing of the CUP under the leadership of Talat Pasha used *Tekalif-i Harbiye* to control and decrease the military's role in the provision of the army. However, the replacement of *Tekalif-i Harbiye* commissions with *İaşe Müdüriyet-i Umumiyesi* under the control of the Ministry of War reflects the rivalry between Enver and Talat Pashas.

56 Akin, "The Ottoman Home Front during World War I", pp. 79

2.3.2 *Ottoman Economy during World War I*

With the outbreak of war in 1914, the global economic and development integration were interrupted. The global trade collapsed, and the nations drifted to adopt protectionist and interventionist economy policies. In the European countries like the Ottoman empire, underwent massive transformations such as extensive state regulation, the substitution of market mechanisms by an administration of state officials, and growth of the technocracy.⁵⁷

The Ottoman case was quite different from the other countries. The outbreak of war changed the conjuncture which caused the rise of the state activity in the economic activities in both the Ottoman Empire and European nations due to the disruption of trade and investment and increasing war effort. However, the existence of the capitulations made impossible of the adjusting of the Ottoman economy to the new conditions by implementing the protectionist economy policies. Therefore, the abolition of the capitulations was a requirement for the Ottoman economy not only to implement their ideological economy plans but also to adjust themselves to the new conditions. After the abolition of the capitulations, the Young Turks began to implement the protectionist policies like many European countries. They imposed the protectionist tariffs. The tariffs were raised to 30 percent and in 1916, the Young Turks imposed a new kind of tariff system which was a selective one enabling them to impose different tariffs on different goods as opposed to the old system. The main of the adaptation of new tariff system to look out for the development of national economy. Also, the government intervened the export and founded Export Committee (İhracat Heyeti) in 1916. By the legislation that organized the exports, the government assumed the control of them. In the legislation, the prohibited goods and export free goods were collected under two different sections. During the World War I, another intervention of the

57 Matthias Blum, Jari Eloranta, Pavel Osinsky, "Organization of War Economies", in: 1914-1918-online, *International Encyclopedia of the First World War*, ed. by Ute Daniel, Peter Gatrell, Oliver Janz, Heather Jones, Jennifer Keene, Alan Kramer, and Bill Nasson, issued by Freie Universität Berlin, Berlin 2014-10-08.

Young Turk government to market mechanism was seen in the foreign exchange transactions. In order to protect exchange rate of Ottoman lira, the government intervened the foreign exchange transactions. A commission founded by the government determined the daily official exchange rates and prevent speculative money transfers.⁵⁸

Also, to develop the domestic industry, the Law on the Encouragement of Industry passed in 1913 was revised in favour of the Ottoman citizens. The activities of the Public Debt Administration were stopped, and the discharge of Ottoman debt was suspended.⁵⁹ The Great Powers protested these policies and did nothing more than that since they were preoccupied with the war.⁶⁰ The Ottoman government used the protectionist policies, most of which were the requirement of the war conditions, to make easier the capital accumulation among the Muslim Turks. Especially provisioning of Istanbul by the state intervention created an opportunity to concentrate the capital among the hands of Muslim notables and merchants.

With the outbreak of World War I, not only the Ottoman economy had to turn sharply inward but also the Ottoman government used the outbreak of war as an opportunity to create national bourgeoisie class. The purpose of the abolition of the capitulations was not only to reduce the foreign stranglehold on the Ottoman economy but also in parallel national economy policies.⁶¹

During the war years, the Young Turk government aimed to undermine the economic domination of the non-Muslims in the economic sphere economy by transferring assets to Muslim Turks and encouraging their participation in the economy with government contracts and subsidies. The deportation process of Armenians gave some opportunities to the state to extirpate them from the economy since Armenian subjects like other non-Muslims

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- 58 Zafer Toprak, *Türkiye’de “Milli İktisat” 1908–1918*, (Ankara: Yurt Yayınları, 1982), pp. 114–129.
 59 Şevket Pamuk *Uneven Centuries: Turkey’s Economic History since 1820*, (Princeton University Press, 2018), 171.
 60 Erik Jan Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004), pp.125.
 61 Caroline Finkel, *Osman’s Dream: The History of the Ottoman Empire*, (New York: Basic Books, 2007), 536.

dominated the economy, and after deportations, they left their properties which were confiscated by the state during this period.

After the deportation of the Armenians, the properties left by the Armenians were distributed to Muslim persons or institutions with low prices or without any cost in order to create a national Muslim bourgeoisie. The shops, firms and factories of Armenians were transferred to Muslims. The stores and shops were mostly given to young individuals who were eager to trade.⁶²

Due to the most allied embargo around the Mediterranean, the immediate impact of the Ottoman entry into the war was the disruption of external trade. After the Ottoman Empire's entry into the war, the amount of external trade had declined approximately by 80 percent. Also, the mobilization increased the consumption of the army so that the government had to take measures to restrict or organize the exports.⁶³ In short, the extraordinary conditions created by the war such as the disruption trade, provisioning problem and increasing consumption of the army forced the Ottoman government to take protectionist and interventionist measures. The substitution of market mechanisms by the administration of state officials and protectionist policies created a suitable environment for the Young Turk government to implement national economy policies.

Not only the policies of the Young Turk government but also the war conditions itself caused the rapid capital accumulation and wealth among the members of the group such as the merchants. Especially provisioning Istanbul and the environment of shortages created a situation in which capital accumulation by the different groups linked to the Young Turks could be observed. For most of World War I, the main problem of provisioning Istanbul was lack of space on the railway connecting central Anatolia to Istanbul and in ships

62 Taner Akçam, *Ermeni Meselesi Hallolunmuştur: Osmanlı Belgelerine Göre Savaş Yıllarında Ermenilere Yönelik Politikalar*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2008), 227-229.

63 Pamuk, *Uneven Centuries*, 172-173.

arriving from the Black Sea. The shortages in the capital provided an opportunity for the Young Turks leadership to allocate railway truck space and shipping permits to the Muslim-Turkish merchants linked to the Young Turks.⁶⁴

Before the war, due to the semi-colony status and weakness of internal integration of the Ottoman economy, the economy connection of the commercial centers of the Empire with the other part of the country was very limited. For example, the wheat transportation from the Central Anatolia to İstanbul was much more expensive than importing it from New York. Thus, İstanbul's flour need was mostly being provided from the Europe and America. Since the outbreak of war caused the closing of the external trade roads, the Anatolian producers replaced the place of the European and American suppliers.⁶⁵ Therefore, many regions which produced for the subsistence began to produce for the market and the Ottoman regions economically integrated. Thanks to the increase of the demand for agricultural products and continuously rising prices, a rich landowner class emerged in the Anatolia linked to the Young Turks. In a short period, the internal trade was nationalized and the Muslim merchant-landowner class in the rural area consolidated its power.⁶⁶ However, the government's maximum intervention in the procurement process in 1916 caused the producers to be affected adversely by this policy. Especially small producers had to sell most of the products to the government agents at fixed prices.⁶⁷

On the other hand, due to black-marketeering, hoarding and speculation by merchants, shopkeepers, storekeepers and even consumers, shortages began to emerge leading to the sharp increases in the prices, especially in the

64 İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Birinci Dünya Savaşındaki Ekonomik Düzenlemeleri içinde İase Nezareti ve Kara Kemal Beyin Yeri", in I. Tekeli and S. İlkin, *Cumhuriyetin Harcı, Cilt 2: Koktenci Modernitenin Ekonomik Politikasının Gelişimi*, (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi, 2010), 12.

65 Korkut Boratav, *Türkiye İktisat Tarihi, 1908-2007*, (İstanbul: İmge Kitabevi, 2008), 27-28.

66 Toprak, *Türkiye'de "Milli İktisat" 1908-1918*, 347-348.

67 Şevket Pamuk, "The Ottoman Economy in World War I," in *The Economics of World War I*, ed. by Stephen Broadberry and Mark Harrison, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 122-123

urban centers. The sharp increases in the prices after 1915 caused black-marketers and speculators to make huge fortunes.⁶⁸ In response to this, Committee on Prevention of Profiteering (Men-i İhtikar Komisyonu) was founded in May 1917 by the government. The activities of the Committee against the speculation mostly effected non-Muslim merchants. Its activities led to the elimination of the non-Muslim merchants since most of them faced criminal penalty or prison sentence while Muslim merchants continued their capital accumulation and increased their activities on the market with the elimination of non-Muslims.⁶⁹

Besides transporting, another provisioning problem was the distribution and trade of the commodities. The guild organizations under the control of Kara Kemal Bey undertook the distribution and trade of scarce commodities. For this purpose, a trade organization named Committee of Special Trade (Heyet-i Mahsusa-i Ticariyye) under the supervision of Kara Kemal Bey was founded to conduct the trade of scarce commodities. The committee undertook the trade of various commodities such as sugar, wheat, gas oil, olive and bulgur and used the profit as the founding capital of national joint stock companies. Also, half of founding capital of these companies were provided by the Muslim merchants and artisans. The tradesmen who were linked to the Young Turks and Kara Kemal Bey managed these companies, and Muslim-Turkish tradesman turned into the investors since the committee enforcedly sold the common stocks of the national companies to them. Thanks to the privileges granted by the government, these companies would enter a rapid capital accumulation process.⁷⁰

Efforts within the framework of national economy policies were also manifested in the banking field. The Young Turk government promoted the development of national banking in order to strengthen national capital instead of European capital indicating the foundation of a national bank whose capital would be provided by the Turks was a requirement for the economic inde-

68 Şevket Pamuk, "The Ottoman Economy in World War I", pp.122-123

69 Toprak, *Türkiye'de "Milli İktisat" 1908-1918*, 294-301

70 Toprak, *Türkiye'de "Milli İktisat" 1908-1918*, 270- 282, 348-349.

pendence of the Empire. Another reason for such an attempt was the worsening relations between the Ottoman Bank and government.⁷¹ The public also supported the establishment of a national bank. Under such circumstances, Osmanlı İtibar-ı Milli Bankası was founded in early 1917. The bank's founding capital was 4 million Ottoman liras and its operating period was limited to 30 years. Also, the equity shares of the bank were only open to the purchase of the Ottoman citizens. Besides normal banking facilities, its another main purpose was to finance various state and private enterprises.⁷²

However, İtibar-ı Milli Bankası was not the only bank established during the Second Constitution period. Between 1908 and 1923 years, 24 banks in total were established, 11 in Istanbul and 13 in the various cities of Anatolia. The widespread national banking movement, starting from Western Anatolia outside Istanbul, continued in regions such as Konya, Kayseri, Niğde, Bor and Karaman. During the Second Constitution period especially after the outbreak of the war, Muslim merchants and artisans gained bargaining power against non-Muslim and foreigner merchants, and also their activities gradually increased in the sectors such as banking, exchange and brokerage.⁷³

In short, the outbreak of the war created a suitable environment for the Young Turks to implement their national economy policies. The abolition of the capitulations was the first step taken on the path, which was realized by the outbreak of the war. On the other hand, the war itself required to the implementation of the interventionist policies. However, the Young Turks devised them for the concentration of wealth in the hands of Muslim notables. Also, the Muslims were encouraged to be entrepreneurs, and the non-Muslims were tried to be eliminated from the economy at each opportunity.

The outbreak of the war created a different conjuncture that forced the government to adopt protectionist and interventionist economic policies. On the other hand, the abolition of capitulations and the creation of Muslim-Turkish

71 Suat Oktar and Arzu Varlı, "İttihat ve Terakki Döneminin Ulusal Bankası: Osmanlı İtibar-ı Milli Bankası," *Marmara Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Dergisi* Vol. 27, no. 2 (2009): 1-20.

72 Vedat Eldem, *Harp ve Mütareke Yıllarında Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Ekonomisi*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1994), pp. 126-127.

73 Toprak, *Türkiye'de "Milli İktisat" 1908-1918*, 151-164.

bourgeoisie was the ideological decisions of the Young Turks, but these decisions were affected by the conjecture changes, not forced upon by them. That is, these two decisions of the Young Turks elite were conscious actions realized by the conjecture changes in the world, which was the outbreak of the World War. Finally, it can be argued that with the help of the intellectuals and certain individuals such as Kara Kemal, the Young Turks devised the interventionism, which was the result of the outbreak of the war, for the creation of national Muslim bourgeoisie. Also, they extirpated non-Muslims from the economy by transferring assets to Muslim Turks and encouraging their participation with government contracts and subsidies.

Overall, the national economy policies of the Young Turks have been successful. Within a short period, they managed to organize the country economically and socially and laid the foundations of a new national bourgeoisie class. However, the grand scale corruption that had been witnessed during the war caused the war profiteers to acquire huge fortunes and this drew very adverse reactions from the public.

2.3.3 *The Refugee Crisis and Population Engineering*

World War I caused huge refugee crisis within the borders of the Ottoman Empire. Thousands of people left their homes in front of the advance of the Allied Armies. First refugee movement started right after the Russia had declared war to the Ottoman Empire. The Muslim peasants living in the Ottoman-Russia border left their homes and crossed the border.⁷⁴

Refugee movements continued into 1915. As the Russian advanced into the East Anatolia provinces, Muslim population living in these areas left their homes and poured into neighboring provinces. the subsequent inter-ethnic violence between Muslim and Armenian near Van province triggered the migration of huge chunk population of Van into other provinces.⁷⁵

74 Süleyman İzzet Yeğınatı, *Büyük Harbin Başında 2. İhtiyat ve Nizamiye Süvari Tümenleriyle Aras Cenup Müfrezesinin Muharebeleri*, (Istanbul: Askeri Matbaa, 1939), 21.

75 Akin, "The Ottoman Home Front during World War I: Everyday Politics, Society, and Culture", pp.242.

However, the worst year for the refugees was 1916. When the Russian Army began its advance toward the provinces of the East Anatolia and with the fall of cities and towns on its way such as Erzurum, Bitlis, Rize, Erzincan, and Trabzon, many Muslim residents of these cities and towns followed the retreating Ottoman Army. Many of them feared the Russian cruelty and the retribution of the Armenian bands and left their home to evade any potential harm that might be inflicted on them by the advancing foes. Many people preferred becoming a refugee rather than facing enemy occupation.⁷⁶

In order to deal with the enormous refugee problem, the Ottoman government established a new agency the Directorate of Tribes and Refugees (Aşair ve Muhacirin Müdüriyet-i Umumiyesi) in 1916. The duty of this new agency was to regulate the refugee flow, organize the dispatch and settlement of incoming refugees and keep track of the refugee population. In short, the main duty of agency was to keep the refugee problem under control.

76 Ibid, 243.

The Efforts for the Soldier Motivation in the Ottoman Great War

During the World War I, the Ottoman Empire implemented various methods to increase the motivation, obedience, and discipline of its soldiers. This chapter aims to present these methods and how they were implemented. In this chapter, it will be studied government policies such as the proclamation of the Jihad, pamphlets, volunteer troops, army imams and muinsiz aile maaşı worked to strengthen the motivation of soldiers. This chapter analyses the various factors and how they were implemented to increase the motivation, obedience and discipline of the soldiers.

Until recently, the scholarship on Cihad-ı Ekber argued that it was designed in Germany and Germany convinced the Ottoman Empire to declare Cihad to instigate revolts within the dominions of the Allied powers such as India. However, new literature on Jihad proved that the proclamation of Cihad-ı Ekber was own decision of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Empire did not need Germany to convince for the proclamation of the Cihad-ı Ekber. Also, new literature also stated that the Cihad-ı Ekber appealed to not only the Muslims living within the dominions of the Allied Powers but also the citizens of the Ottoman Empire.

On the other hand, volunteer troops not only participated the war because of the religious reasons. New literature shows us that money, rank and autonomy was also important for the volunteers to answer the war call.¹

Also, the charity was another factor that effected the motivation of soldiers. New literature on charity proves that the Ottoman government and semi-official charity organizations helped the soldier families to boost the motivation of the soldiers on the front.

In short, this chapter argues that the Ottoman soldiers had different notions of motivation since Ottoman army consisting of the soldiers from different nations and religions was not a homogenous formation.

§ 3.1 The Role of the Religion and Other Factors in Maintaining Discipline, Motivation and Obedience of the Ottoman Soldier

This part of the chapter seeks to demonstrate how Cihad-ı Ekber and other religious motifs were used to increase the motivation, discipline and obedience of the Ottoman soldiers during the World War I by examining general policies of the Ottoman government. Religious motifs seem to have played an important role in increasing both the obedience and motivation of the Ottoman troops, especially in coping with the unpredictable and uncontrollable nature of the battlefield.² Since the Anatolian peasants constituted the backbone of the Ottoman Army, despite the rhetoric of the inclusion of the non-Muslims after the declaration of the Second Constitution, Islamic motifs, symbols and themes played an important role in motivating the masses. Nationalist and patriotic messages were not completely ineffective. However, they only

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- 1 For volunteer troops, see Mehmet Beşikçi, *The Ottoman Mobilization of Manpower in the First World War*.
 - 2 Mehmet Beşikçi, "Domestic Aspects of Ottoman Jihad: The Role of Religious Motifs and Religious Agents in the Mobilization of the Ottoman Army, in *Jihad and Islam in World War I*, edited by Eric Jan Zürcher, (Leiden: Leiden University Press), pp. 97.

appealed to the educated class of the Ottoman Army.³ As Erik-Jan Zürcher has stated,

Most of the empire's soldiers hailed from Anatolia and, therefore, when the need to mobilize the population in times of war emerged appealing to the religious worldview of the peasant population of Anatolia made good sense.⁴

In this part of the chapter, it will be firstly examined what Jihad is and how and why it was proclaimed. Then, the other religious policies of the Ottoman government will be examined to demonstrate how the Ottoman government tried to keep the troops' morale high by the domestic motifs of the Jihad. Finally, how the proclamation of Cihad was effective among the Muslim population of the Ottoman Empire and how volunteer troops founded after the Ottoman entry into World War I operated to increase the motivation of both general public and Ottoman soldiers.

After the Ottoman entry into World War I, Ottoman government took some measures to increase the morale both army and civilians. One of these measures was to declare holy war (Cihad-ı Ekber) to gain the loyalty its subjects especially Arab, Kurdish tribes within the vast Empire. Mustafa Aksakal elegantly summarizes how the holy war was proclaimed:

The Jihad proclamation was first deliberated upon, then prepared in the form of five legal opinions or fetvas (fatwā), endorsed by 29 religious authorities, blessed formally by the sultan, received by the members of the Ottoman chamber of deputies presented in a closed ceremony to political, military and religious dignitaries on 11 November, and then, with great fanfare on 14 November, a Saturday, read out publicly by the Custodian of the Fetva (Fetva Emini), Ali Haydar Efendi,

3 Faik Tonguç, *I. Dünya Savaşında Bir Yedek Subayın Anıları*, (İstanbul: İş Bankası Yayınları, 2015).

4 Erik-Jan Zürcher, "Islam in the Service of the Caliphate and the Secular State", in Erik-Jan Zürcher, *The Young Turk Legacy and the Nation Building* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010), pp. 277–278.

to a large crowd assembled outside the Mosque of Mehmed the Conqueror.⁵

He demonstrates that all of these took time not a single day but rather over the course of several weeks. The proclamation of Jihad was mostly seen that it was planned by Germany. Until recently, scholars have argued that Germany had abused the religious authority of the Ottoman Sultan to proclaim Jihad in order to instigate the revolt within the Muslim colonies of the Entente powers. However, Ottoman government did not need Germans to convince them about the advantages of the proclamation of Jihad.⁶ Jihad was always within the “cultural register of the Ottoman state”.⁷ As Mustafa Aksakal argued;

The state’s use of Jihad in 1914, moreover, was far from unprecedented. Ottoman history shows us that the centralized state, along with its religious authorities, military and political leaders, and – beginning in the mid-nineteenth century with the emergence of the institutions of mass society and its outlets – newspaper editors, journalists and intellectuals understood and employed the powerful ideological energies that “Jihad” could mobilize.⁸

Ottoman Jihad appealed not only external audience such as Muslims living under the British and French domination but also internal audience such as Laz, Kurdish and Arab population of the Ottoman Empire. On the other hand, since uneducated Anatolian peasant adults constituted the backbone of the Ottoman Army, Ottoman government aimed to increase their morale by the proclamation of Jihad.⁹ The Ottoman government used Jihad as both a propaganda tool and a mobilization strategy within its vast borders.

5 Mustafa Aksakal, “The Ottoman Proclamation of Jihad”, in *Jihad and Islam in World War I*, edited by Eric Jan Zürcher, (Leiden: Leiden University Press, 2010), pp. 56

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid.

8 Ibid, 54.

9 Beşikçi, “Domestic Aspects of Ottoman Jihad: The Role of Religious Motifs and Religious Agents in the Mobilization of the Ottoman Army, in *Jihad and Islam in World War I*, edited by Eric Jan Zürcher, (Leiden: Leiden University Press), pp. 95-96.

After the proclamation of Jihad and Ottoman entry into World War I, the number of Jihad pamphlets published to explain Jihad to the soldiers and public increased remarkably.¹⁰ Such pamphlets were written in simple language that everybody could understand. By citing relevant verses from the Koran and the hadith of the Prophet Muhammad, they pointed out military service as a binding religious duty (farz-ı ayn) for all Muslims during the general mobilization. (Nefir-i Amm).¹¹ İsmail Faik states that although joining Jihad is not compulsory (farz-ı kifaye) for all Muslim under the normal condition, specific time and place (icabet-i zaman ve zemin) makes it compulsory for all Muslim (farz-ı ayn).¹²

Another pamphlet which was anonymous and titled Cihâd-ı Mukaddes Farzdır stated that not only battlefield but also the entire country constituted battlefield and argued that “it is a binding religious duty to kill secretly or openly the infidels who reside wherever in your country as invaders.”¹³

Also, a dramatic increase occurred during the war in the number of religious manuals/pamphlets which give information about praying, fasting, performing ablution and other necessities of Islam.¹⁴ Such religious manuals were meant to have a double function. First function, as stated above, was to provide Ottoman Muslim soldiers with a basic religious (Islamic and Sunni) education. Other function was to remind potential draftees, enlisted men and also officers why “military service was also a religious duty and why a good Muslim also needed to be a good soldier and vice versa.”¹⁵ Moreover, these religious pamphlets written by the members of the ulema to be used as lecture

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- 10 For a short bibliographical survey of these jihad pamphlets; see Abdullah Taha İmamoğlu, “I. Dünya Savaşına Bibliyografik Bir Katkı, in H. Çetin and L. Erdemir (eds.), *100. Yılında I. Dünya Savaşı ve Mirası Bildiri Kitabı, Volume 1* (Çanakkale: Çanakkale Valiliği Yayınları, 2015), pp. 151–179
- 11 See, for example, İsmail Faik, *Cihad* (İstanbul: Koçunyan Matbaası, 1915), pp. 1-2. Halil Hilmi, *Cihadda İslamın Vazifesi* (İstanbul: Necm-i İstikbal Matbaası, 1914), pp. 7.
- 12 İsmail Faik, *Cihad* (İstanbul: Koçunyan Matbaası, 1915), pp. 2
- 13 Mehmet Beşikçi, *The Mobilization of Manpower*, pp. 75
- 14 For example, see Üryanazade Ali Vahid, *Askerin İlm-i Hali*, (İstanbul: Ahmed İhsan ve Şürekası, 1917).
- 15 Beşikçi, “Domestic Aspects of Ottoman Jihad: The Role of Religious Motifs and Religious Agents in the Mobilization of the Ottoman Army”, pp.99.

pamphlets within the army aimed to strengthen the faith and motivation of the Ottoman soldiers.

The Ottoman government and War Ministry commissioned these pamphlets; which means the Ottoman government opened a way to be filled by the Islamic discourse in order to increase the motivation and obedience of the troops. Members of the ulema such as Ömer

Fevzi, Üryanizade Ali Vahid or İzmirli İsmail Hakkı, who were chosen to write motivation and Jihad pamphlets had a good relationship with the CUP and this provided them to be chosen to write pamphlets.

Pamphlets were generally prepared for teaching soldiers some basic things about how to act in battle, and the bravery of Ottoman soldiers in history. These works aimed to increase morale and bravery of the Ottoman soldiers at front. Since most of the Ottoman soldiers did not know how to read, the officers and battalion imams were asked to read instructive stories to their soldiers.¹⁶ Such books to be read to the enlisted men included *Tarihte Osmanlı Neferi* and *Şanlı Asker Ali Çavuş*. These works written in a simplistic language for the comprehension of the Ottoman soldiers give advice about how an ideal Ottoman soldier should behave.

Ottoman officers, when they are off duty, devoted themselves to increase the moral of their men. They gave lectures which emphasized desertion against religion.¹⁷

In *Şanlı Asker Ali Çavuş*, the author starts; “the spirit of the military service is obedience and bravery.”¹⁸ He argues that obedience is a fundamental stone of the military service and it should be performed no matter what. He adds that obedience should not be only shown at barracks and training. Obedience should be shown to law and order, either.¹⁹

Another pamphlet commissioned by the War Ministry is *Tarihte Osmanlı Neferi* written by the historian Ahmed Refik. According to Ahmed Refik,

16 Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *Suyu Arayan Adam*, (İstanbul: Remzi, 1997), p.102.

17 Beşikçi, *The Mobilization of Manpower*, 285.

18 “*Askerliğin ruhu itaat ve cesarettir.*” İsmail Hakkı, *Şanlı Asker Ali Çavuş*, (İstanbul: Tanin Matbaası, 1914), pp.1

19 Ibid.

Ottoman soldier gained great fame in history. Ottoman soldier is religious, brave, patient, tenacious and obedient. A religious obedience guides Ottoman soldier to the route of magnificent.²⁰

Also, he explains how the Ottoman soldier created wonders in history, defeated his enemies and narrates the heroic achievements of the Ottoman soldier. The main purpose of this book was to inspire the Ottoman soldiers of World War I by narrating the heroism of their ancestors.

Not all pamphlets were written in the format of short prose, the CUP government also commissioned poetry books to be easily memorized by the soldiers. One of these books was *Ordumuza Armağan: Ordunun Tekbiri, Cihad-Ekber Destanı, Gökten Ses* written by Feyzullah Sacid. This book included poems to be memorized easily by the soldiers. It was published as collections of poems, which are quite short, simple and easy. Revenge was one of the important motif to increase motivation and obedience in this book:

Millions of Muslim
 Waits revenge
 Cannonballs continues
 Sprinkles blood and fire
 Allah Ekber!²¹

Here is another example:

O the army of Islam, the army of revenge!
 March, overtake, attack, go beyond
 Never mind deserts, nor mountains and stones
 Time is up: Attack!

20 “*Tarihte Osmanlı neferi pek büyük bir nam kazanmıştır. Osmanlı neferi dindar, cesur, sebatkar, mütehammil, fedakar ve mutidir. Dini bir itaat Osmanlı neferini harikalar ibrazına sevk eder.*” Ahmet Refik, *Tarihte Osmanlı Neferi*, (İstanbul: Matbaa-yı Askeriye, 1915), pp. 2.

21 Feyzullah Sacid, *Ordumuza Armağan: Ordunun Tekbiri, Cihad-I Ekber Destanı, Gökten Ses*, (İstanbul: İkbal Kitaphanesi, 1914).

So let hell break loose²²

Other pamphlets such as *Gazilere Armağan*, *Orduda Terbiye-i Maneviye ve Ruhiye*, *Mefkûre-i Vatan Orduda İman*, and *Osmanlı Efrâdına Maneviyat-ı Askeriye Dersleri* directly aimed to increase motivation and obedience of the troops. However, since most of the Ottoman soldiers were illiterate, the contents of these pamphlets were summarized by the military imams and reserve officers.²³

In *Gazilere Armağan*, the author of the book cited relevant verses from the Koran and the hadith of the Prophet Muhammad to support his arguments. He emphasized and discussed the concepts such as dutifulness, obedience to the commander, martyrdom, murder, suicide, health by using the hadiths and verses from the Koran to increase the discipline, obedience and motivation of the soldiers.²⁴ However, like other pamphlets, this one was explained to soldiers by the religious officials in the army.

Another type pamphlets were written in terms of question- answer style. This type of pamphlets aimed the specific knowledge about how to act, salute, and train to get memorized by the soldiers. One of the examples of these pamphlets was *Terbiye-i Askeriye* prepared by Navy Ministry. *Terbiye-i Askeriye* included the questions and answers about official training, ranks, official saluting on ships, cloth regulations and keeping the cloths clean.²⁵ This type pamphlets and manuals determined to increase discipline and obedience of the soldiers by teaching how to behave in the army or navy.

The proclamation of Jihad motivated various groups from different ethnic identities to support the war effort of the Ottoman government. These groups can be divided into three: prisoners, tribes and religious orders. Ottoman government welcomed the contribution to the war effort from these groups. The Jihad, religious discourse and other factors such as money and power relationship with the government motivated these groups to participate the war cause

22 Beşikçi, "Domestic Aspects of Ottoman Jihad: The Role of Religious Motifs and Religious Agents in the Mobilization of the Ottoman Army", pp. 111.

23 Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *Suyu Arayan Adam*, pp. 102.

24 İzmirli İsmail Hakkı, *Gazilere Armağan*, (Matbaa-yı Askeriye, 1916).

25 *Terbiye-i Askeriye*, (İstanbul: Matbaa-yı Bahriye, 1918).

of the CUP government. These groups constituted the backbone of the Ottoman volunteer troops during World War I. In this part of the chapter, it will be examined how these groups were motivated to join the war cause of the Ottoman government. Also, I seek to demonstrate how these groups operated and contributed the war effort of the Ottoman government.

A major source of volunteers came from the prisoners throughout the war. They provided a potential source of the volunteers for the guerrilla armed bands organized by the Ottoman secret organization (Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa) which not only assumed the role in spreading propaganda to incite revolt among Muslim population in India, Russia, Iran, Morocco and Egypt but also engaged in guerrilla warfare during the war.²⁶ It was financed mainly by the secret fund of the War Ministry.²⁷

After the declaration of mobilization, it was not easy for the Secret Organization to find necessary manpower which would conduct guerrilla warfare missions against the enemy. Therefore, they relied on prisoner volunteers. After the Ottoman government decided that it would accept the formation of armed bands out of the volunteer prisoners, many prisoners embraced the offers of release and amnesty in return for voluntary military service. Prisoners began to send telegrams to the related ministries, expressing their wishes to participate the Jihad voluntarily.²⁸

Another group that contributed the war effort of the government voluntarily was Kurdish and Arab-Bedouin groups. With the relative autonomy, they

26 Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa was founded by Enver Pasha and it was based on the model of Balkan paramilitary groups. For the studies on Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa, see Philip H. Stoddard, "The Ottoman Government and the Arabs, 1911 to 1918: A Preliminary Study of the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa" (Ph.d. dissertation, Princeton University, 1963) ; Ahmet Tetik, *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa (Umur-i Şarkıyye Dairesi) Tarihi: Cilt 1: 1914-1916*, (İstanbul: İş Bankası Yayınları, 2014); Arif Cemil, *Birinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Teşkilât-ı Mahsusa*, (İstanbul: Arba Yayınları, n.d.).

27 Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Partiler*, vol. 3, p. 343.

28 For a few examples, see BOA, DH.EUM.VRK. ,13/ 83, 11 November 1914, from Bodrum; BOA, DH.EUM.VRK., 13/ 84, 17 November 1914, from Yozgat; BOA, DH.EUM.VRK, 13/86, 18 November 1914, from Karahisar; BOA, DH.EUM.ADL. 21/22, 27 June 1916, from Yozgat; BOA, DH. ŞFR., 48/93, 21 December 1914, from Diyarbakir; BOA, DH.EUM.ADL., 25/8, 3 October 1916, from Urfa; BOA, DH.EUM.ADL., 24/22, 20 September 1916, from Isparta.

fought against the enemy on the behalf of the Ottoman government. However, the religious discourse was one of the reasons why they volunteered to fight for the Ottoman government. Granting medals and decorations to chiefs were other incentives which encouraged them to volunteer. This method had also been used commonly by the Ottomans to garner the support of Arab-Bedouin tribes.²⁹ On the other hand, money incentives motivated such tribes to participate the cause of the Ottoman government. As Mehmet Beşikçi stated;

As far as tribal volunteers were concerned, monetary payments in the form of a reward such as gold were more systematic. These rewards were offered in higher amounts both before service as an incentive to volunteer, and as rewards for performing a duty in order to solidify the bond of voluntary unity. As a volunteer recruitment strategy towards tribes, the Ottomans apparently used money as commonly as they used the discourse of the brotherhood of Islam.³⁰

Also, the fact that Ottoman government behaved them as peripheral power holder was another factor that motivated them to volunteer.³¹

During the World War I, many religious circles were hesitant to support CUP's policies, some religious orders such as Mevlevis and Bektashis supported CUP's war policies. They showed their support by forming volunteer troops consisted of dervishes in order to increase the moral of the soldiers at the front. They promoted CUP's policies on the popular level through their local networks.

The Mevlevis had close ties with the CUP-dominated state authority during the Second Constitutional Era. Even Sultan Mehmed Reşad V was a follower of the Mevlevi Order and he suggested the establishment of the Mevlevi Volunteer Battalion (Mevlevi Gönüllü Taburu) to raise troop morale on the battlefield.³² The volunteer battalions "would carry the spiritual influence of the order directly to the front, among troops who were often conscripted from

29 Falih Rıfkı Atay, *Zeytinadağı*, (İstanbul: Pozitif Yayınları, 2018), pp. 84-85.

30 Beşikçi, *The Ottoman Mobilization of Manpower in the First World War*, 185

31 Ibid, pp. 184.

32 Beşikçi, *The Ottoman Mobilization of Manpower in the First World War*, pp.189-190.

provinces not noted for their enthusiastic support of the Unionist government.”³³ Also, the Mevlevi Volunteer Battalion were used as a propaganda tool to motivate the general public to participate the army as volunteer. Harb Mecmuası, the main propaganda outlet of the Ottoman Army, printed extensive coverage to the activities of the Mevlevi in the army and published many photographs.³⁴

The Mevlevi Volunteer Battalion was given the under the command of the Fourth army and was sent to Damascus in 1915 where the commander of the Fourth Army, Cemal Pasha, set up his headquarters. In Damascus, they were assigned to non-combatant duties such as “transportation, construction, and guard duty.”³⁵ On the other hand, they conducted religious rituals and delivered sermons to increase the morale of troops.³⁶

Like Mevlevi, the Bektashi order had strong relationships with the CUP government which facilitated political cooperation between the two groups before and after the declaration of the Constitution. The Bektashi Volunteer Regiment (Bektaşî Gönüllü Alayı or Mücâhidîn-1 Bektaşîyye) was formed in 1915, under the leadership of Çelebi Cemaleddin Efendi, the sheikh of the Hacı Bektaş lodge during the war. Mehmet Beşikçi argues “the main purpose of the unit was to draw on the religious and moral influence in order to increase morale among the troops and society in general.”³⁷ The Ottoman state authorized only the Mevlevi and Bektaşî orders to recruit volunteers. The main reason of this policy was to create the suitable ground for The Bektashi Volunteer Regiment to recruit and motivate Anatolian Alevis to participate the holy war.³⁸

33 Philip H. Stoddard, “The Ottoman Government and the Arabs, 1911 to 1918: A Preliminary Study of the Teşkilat-1 Mahsusa” (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1963), pp.71.

34 Harb Mecmuası, no. 5 (February 1331/1916), p. 752; Harb Mecmuası, no. 9 (May 1332/1916), p. 133; Harb Mecmuası, no. 10 (June 1332/1916), p. 148; Harb Mecmuası, no. 19 (May 1333/1917), p. 294.

35 Engin Öncüoğlu, “Osmanlı Ordusunda Gönüllü Tarikat Alayları” (MA thesis, Hacettepe University, 2004), pp. 120.

36 Beşikçi, *The Ottoman Mobilization of Manpower in the First World War*, pp.191.

37 Beşikçi, *The Ottoman Mobilization of Manpower in the First World War 192-193*.

38 Ibid.

I agree with the new literature that the proclamation and implementation of Jihad was domestically successful. With the proclamation of Jihad, the Ottoman government accessed different outcast groups and managed to mobilize them to the certain extent. Outcast groups such as Arab-Bedouin, Kurdish and Shia tribes, and prisoners replied the holy war call of the government positively and supported the war cause of the Ottoman government.

Also, pamphlet literature and volunteer troops consisted of members of the religious orders increased the motivation and strengthened the fighting endurance of the troops at field. Pamphlets commissioned by the government or War Ministry contributed in increasing the motivation, obedience and discipline of the soldiers to the certain extent.

§ 3.2 Army İmams

During 19th century, as part of the legitimating purposes of military reformation with the religious discourse, the religious officials such as imams was employed as tenured within the army to increase modern military discipline and combat motivation of the soldiers. With the employment of the religious officials, the Ottoman state gave an important military duty in the transformation of conscripted human mass into the disciplined and obedient soldiers.³⁹ Also, they worked to solve the desertion problem within the Ottoman army by the sermons and indoctrination.

During the Balkan War, the reluctance to fight and low morale of Muslim and non-Muslim troops alike was observed as a general problem for the whole Ottoman army by both European observers and Ottoman authorities. The physical and mental training period before

being sent to the front during the Balkan War was usually not sufficient. That was the situation of the Ottoman army in terms of discipline and motivation during the Balkan Wars.

39 Mehmet Beşikçi. "Askeri Modernleşme, Askeri Disiplin ve Din: Düzenli Kitle Orduları Çağında Osmanlı Ordusunda Tabur İmamları." *Akademik İncelemeler Dergisi* 11, no. 1 (2016): 7-8.

After the Balkan Wars, when the Ottoman army underwent major transformation, the duty of army imams was redefined. Their duties varied from teaching Turkish to giving sermons to increase the motivation of soldiers.⁴⁰ In the new system, each battalion would have a tabur imamı which served under the authority of regiment imam (alay imamı). After the declaration of mobilization on 2 August 1914, the need for post remarkably increased and additional posts were introduced for army imams.

Army imams were supposed not only to increase the motivation of soldiers but also provide the troops with basic religious education. In his memories, Vasfi Sarısözen, who served in the Ottoman army as a reserve officer during the war, indicates how the commander of the third army punished a battalion imam after finding the religious knowledge of the soldiers very inadequate. He ordered the battalion imam to be imprisoned.⁴¹

The Ottoman authorities used the help of army imams when desertion rates increased, or discipline dissolved on the battlefield. In his memories, Sami Yengin, who served in Syria-Palestine front, narrates how an army imam gave sermon to them to discourage them from desertion.⁴² The Ottoman authorities frequently used army imams to preach against desertion. In 1918, the Ottoman War Ministry set up a special task force consisted of army imams which would give sermons against desertion, performed by a group of mobile imams sent from Istanbul to the battlefronts.⁴³ In these sermons, it was emphasized that the “desertion was a great sin forbidden by Islam.”⁴⁴

40 “Alay ve Tabûr İmamlarının Vezâif-i Tadrîsiyyeleri Hakkında Nizâmname”, *Düstur*, II. Tertib, vol. VI, 26 October 1914, pp. 332-333.

41 Vasfi Şensözen, *I. Dünya Savaşı Yılları ve Kafkas Cephesi Anıları*, edited by Saro Dadyan (İstanbul: Okuyan Us Yayınları, 2013), p. 124.

42 Sami Yengin, *Drama'dan Sina-Filistin'e Savaş Günlüğü (1917-1918)*, (Ankara: Genelkurmay Basımevi, 2007), p. 79.

43 Ibid.

44 Beşikçi, “Domestic Aspects of Ottoman Jihad: The Role of Religious Motifs and Religious Agents in the Mobilization of the Ottoman Army”, p. 105

§ 3.3 Charity as a Method in Maintaining Motivation of Soldiers

The most important way to support soldier's family during World War I was charity. Charitable campaigns for soldiers' families were organized mostly by semi-official voluntary organizations especially by National Defence League. Poor-relief charity functioned not only to take care of the families of the soldiers but also to increase fighting endurance and motivation of the soldiers at front. In this part of the chapter, it will be analyzed how the charity and other methods served both poor-relief and maintaining the motivation of the soldiers.

Muinsiz is a term used for person who does not a person to look after his family except himself. Before World War I, muinsiz were exempt from military service in regular troops. However, they were enlisted in the reserve troops (redif) according to the new recruiting law of 1909.⁴⁵ When they were called up for military service with the declaration of the mobilization during the Balkan Wars, the Ottoman government passed a new law which dealt with the allowances to be given to muinsiz reserve soldiers. The law only consisted of three articles which stated the family of a muinsiz was to receive 30 kuruş per month.

According to article 49 of new military law in 1914, Ottoman state resolutely abolished the exemption of the so-called muinsiz from active service and the Interior Ministry informed provincial administrations about the change. During World War I, the Ottoman government tried to take care of muinsiz families by giving payment monthly since they were the sole breadwinners in their families and their conscription would severe would cause severe financial hardships for them.⁴⁶

Another reason to take care of families whose sole breadwinners were enlisted was to make sure not to desert due to the possible difficult conditions of

45 Nicole A.N.M. van Os, "Taking Care of Soldiers' Families: The Ottoman State and the Muinsiz alle [sic] maaşı," in Zürcher (ed.), *Arming the State: Military Conscription in the Middle East and Central Asia* (I.B Tauris: London, 1999), pp. 96-97

46 Beşikçi, *The Ottoman Mobilization of Manpower*, pp.142-143.

their families. However, the Ottoman government faced many difficulties taking care of soldiers' families in need of support after the mobilization was declared. Provinces demanded money to pay the families of muinsiz.⁴⁷ Also, the corruption emerged in the payment of the allowances.⁴⁸ Finally, in a telegram sent to the provinces by the Interior ministry, the Ministry ordered that the bureaucrats who made corruption in the payment of allowances to the muinsiz families caused the soldiers to desert their troops. Therefore, those who make corruption in the payments will be directly sent to the Court Martial (divan-ı harb).⁴⁹

In short, another aspect of taking care of muinsiz family was to motivate their sole breadwinners at front. Ottoman government was aware of the necessity of taking care of soldier families not to blur soldier's mind and to make sure that their families were taken cared well. However, as the war became prolonged and drafted men remained in service for years, their families suffered a lot. Muinsiz aile allowance only decreased their suffering to a certain extent.

National Defence League is a society established in İstanbul on 1st February 1913 to help people affected by the Balkan Wars. The society used the donations to support the army and soldier families. After the Balkan Wars, it aimed to change its status to improve the living condition of the Ottoman society. However, the outbreak of World War I caused National Defence League to allocate to the command of the army. National Defence League was a semi-official voluntary organization. It was to be above political parties and to serve the national cause.⁵⁰ Like the Navy League and the Ottoman Red Crescent Society, it was to be an umbrella organization. However, most of the society's important members were Unionist.⁵¹

47 BOA. DH. İ. UM / 4 - 41, 2 May 1916.

48 BOA. DH. İ. UM / 88 - 4, 2 March 1916.

49 BOA. DH.UMVM / 124 - 42, 1 November 1916.

50 Ayşe Zamacı, *Müdafaa-ı Milliye ve Faaliyetleri*, (Unpublished Ph.D Dissertation: Trakya Üniversitesi, 2015), pp. 6-7.

51 Nadir Özbek, "Defining the public sphere during the late Ottoman Empire: War, mass mobilization and the young Turk regime (1908-18)." *Middle Eastern Studies* 43, no. 5 (2007): 795-809.

The agenda of National Defence League was to engage in fundraising whose the main income came from. However, the Defence League implemented other methods to increase its revenues. The League played a key role in providing several needs of poor families that emerged with the effects of war, especially soldier families. The League helped poor soldier families in the various ways.

Since Muinsiz Aile allowances were not enough for the subsistence of poor soldier families, the National Defence League also helped these families in many ways. Given the limits of state welfare, the Ottoman government relied on the efforts of the semi-official civil society organizations such as the National Defence League to help poor soldier families. The National Defence League helped not only by organizing relief for civilians on the home front but also by boosting motivation of soldiers on the front.⁵²

During World War I, one of the major hardships that poor soldier families faced was to pay the rent of their houses. As a solution to this problem, the government took a measure to protect soldier families by passing a law called *Seferberlik Müddetince Efrâd ve Zâbitânın Taht-ı İsticârında Bulunan Meskenlere ve Hukuk-u Tasarrufiyelerinin Te'minine Dâir Kanûn-ı Muvakkat*. According to this law, no landowner could force to get soldier families out of their houses that they rented. However, the rent of these houses could be demanded by their owners.⁵³ After the passage of this law, the National Defence League assumed the responsibility of the rents of these houses throughout the country. However, as of 1916, the increasing rent expenses began to force the capacity of the League. Thus, the War Ministry intervened and contributed the payment of the rents.⁵⁴

52 Nazan Maksudyan, *Civilian and Military Power (Ottoman Empire)*, in: 1914-1918-online. *International Encyclopedia of the First World War*, ed. by Ute Daniel, Peter Gatrell, Oliver Janz, Heather Jones, Jennifer Keene, Alan Kramer, and Bill Nasson, issued by Freie Universität Berlin, Berlin 2017-02-01

53 "Seferberlik Müddetince Efrâd ve Zâbitânın Taht-ı İsticârında Bulunan Meskenlere ve Hukuk-ı Tasarrufiyelerinin Te'minine Dâir Kanûn-ı Muvakkat", *Dustur*, II. Tertip, vol.7 pp.530.

54 Ayşe Zamacı, *Müdafaa-ı Milliye ve Faaliyetleri*, pp. 164.

Also, the National Defence League started a huge campaign for the soldier families with the help of *Tasvir-i Efkar*. In order to explain the necessity of the campaign, a long article was published by the *Tasvir-i Efkar*. According to the article, it was pointed out that while soldiers were fighting at the front for the defense of the country, the public should also help the families of these soldiers. These two institutions began fundraising for the soldier families.

The Women's Society for Helping Soldiers' Families (*Asker Ailelerine Yardımcı Hanımlar Cemiyeti*) was an association founded by the initiative of the wives and daughters of Ottoman and German officers.⁵⁵ The society was quite active and vocal among the other philanthropic organizations. The main aim of the organization was to help families of soldiers, especially those whose sole breadwinner(muinsiz) were conscripted by the army. In order to help muinsiz soldier families, the society organized fundraising campaign and collected donations from various organizations.⁵⁶ For instance, 307.800 kuruş was allocated to the organization by the Istanbul Prefecture.⁵⁷

The society distributed food products from its branches which was acquired through money from fundraising and donations to soldier's wives who applied and could prove their right to assistance.⁵⁸ However, the society's activities were limited to İstanbul and after a period, its activities were halted since the difficulties in the procurement of food increased immensely.

The Women's Society for Helping Soldiers' Families like other philanthropic organizations aimed to boost the motivation of soldiers by helping their families who were left behind without sole breadwinner(muinsiz). One of the main aims of the society was to help the muinsiz families and to increase

55 "Asker Âilelerine Yardımcı Heyeti", *Tasvir-i Efkar*, 11 January 1915, pp.3

56 Nicole A.N.M Os, "Aiding the Poor Soldiers' Families: The Asker Ailelerine Yardımcı Hanımlar Cemiyeti", *İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Türkiyat Mecmuası* 21/2 (2011), pp. 264.

57 Nadir Özbek, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda 'Sosyal Yardım' Uygulamaları, 1839-1918", *Toplum ve Bilim*, Kış 1999/2000, pp.111-132.

58 Nazan Maksudyan, *Civilian and Military Power (Ottoman Empire)*, in: 1914-1918-online. *International Encyclopedia of the First World War*, ed. by Ute Daniel, Peter Gatrell, Oliver Janz, Heather Jones, Jennifer Keene, Alan Kramer, and Bill Nasson, issued by Freie Universität Berlin, Berlin 2017-02-01

MORALE, OBEDIENCE, DISCIPLINE

endurance of their sole breadwinner on the front by preventing them from deserting thanks to taking care of their families.

Pre-Military Education of the Ottoman Youth

The World War I, also known as the Great War was a multi-fronted war of attrition, which required to the mobilization of every sources of the belligerent countries. During the World War, the lines between battlefield and home front blurred than ever before. The war required not only permanent mobilization of the population but also wisely usage of the sources at the disposal. As one of the belligerent nations of the World War I, the Ottoman Empire attempted to utilise the manpower through the mobilization. However, the mobilization of the manpower at the disposal constituted only one stage of the necessities of an exhaustive total war, which required new means to replace lost manpower with the next generation. This motive lay behind the establishment of the youth associations within the Ottoman Empire. Although the first youth associations connected with the Ottoman government had been founded before the World War I, the outbreak of war excessively increased the importance of the youth associations.

One of the major challenges that the Ottoman government faced during World War I was to not only maintain the permanent mobilization but also increase discipline, motivation and obedience of the youth population before the conscription. The necessity to give militaristic education to the Ottoman youth before the conscription age was born out of the pressing needs of the total war. During the World War I, the Ottoman military officials implemented various methods such extended military training under the control of

the different associations to help the war effort. This extended training period would include both physical and mental education of the youth before the active military service.

The existing literature on Ottoman Youth Associations in Ottoman-Turkish historiography mostly focused on either institutional history of the associations or the examination of the physical education that had been given in these associations.¹ In the recent years, many researches have been done on the Ottoman youth associations. Zafer Toprak's short essay on the youth associations have pioneered the next researches. However, most of these works lacked comprehensive and in-depth analysis and just presented the related archival documents on the institutional histories of the youth associations that they worked on. Therefore, these studies remained limited in scope and descriptive. Nevertheless, with the changing tendencies in the historiography, more recent studies approached the subject from the different perspective. For instance, while the studies of Yaşar Tolga Cora and Yiğit Akın examine the paramilitary youth associations in terms of the concepts such as bio-politics, nation-building, militarization and masculinization without paying attention to the extraordinary circumstances of the World War I, Mehmet Beşikçi, on the other hand, argues that the World War I period, with its specific conditions

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- 1 For the earlier descriptive works on the paramilitary youth associations, see Zafer Toprak, "İttihat ve Terakki'nin Paramiliter Gençlik Örgütleri," *Boğaziçi University Journal: Humanities*, vol. 7 (1979), pp. 95–113; Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Partiler*, vol. 3, (İstanbul: Hürriyet Vakfı Yayınları, 1989), pp. 295–300; Mustafa Balcıoğlu, "Osmanlı Genç Dernekleri," in Mustafa Balcıoğlu, *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa'dan Cumhuriyet'e*, (Ankara: Asil Yayın, 2004), pp. 198–208; Sadık Sarısaman, "Birinci Dünya Savaşı Sırasında İhtiyat Kuvveti Olarak Kurulan Osmanlı Genç Dernekleri," *OTAM: Ankara Üniversitesi Osmanlı Tarihi Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi Dergisi*, no. 11 (2000), pp. 439–501. For the recent historiography, see Mehmet Beşikçi, *The Ottoman Mobilization of Manpower in the First World War: Between Voluntarism and Resistance*, (Leiden: Brill, 2012), pp.203–247; Yaşar Tolga Cora, "Asker-Vatandaşlar ve Kahraman Erkekler: Balkan Savaşları ve Birinci Dünya Savaşı Dönemlerinde Beden Terbiyesi Aracılığıyla İdeal Erkekliğin Kurgulanması," in *Erkek Millet Asker Millet: Türkiye'de Militarizm, Milliyetçilik, Erkek (lik) ler*, ed. by Nurseli Yeşim Sünbuloğlu, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2013), pp. 45–74; Sanem Yamak Ateş, *Asker Evlatlar Yetiştirmek: II. Meşrutiyet Dönemi'nde Beden Terbiyesi, Askerî Talim ve Paramiliter Gençlik Örgütleri*, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2012); Erol Akcan, "İttihat ve Terakki Fırkası'nın Paramiliter Gençlik Kuruluşları", (Ph. D Dissertation, Selçuk University, 2011).

and urgent needs, had its own unique and significant impact on the evolution of paramilitary youth associations. Although these recent studies have examined in the broader context than the earlier studies, moral education of the youth for the militaristic purposes have only received tangential attention.

On the other hand, this chapter solely focuses on mental and ethical education of the youth associations in the Ottoman Empire and how these youth associations functioned to strengthen patriotism, obedience, motivation and bravery of the Ottoman youth. Although the chapter shortly presents the institutional histories of Ottoman Strength League and Ottoman Youth League, its main focus is to examine the moral and ethical education process of these associations.

§ 4.1 Ottoman Strength League

The catastrophe of the Balkan Wars constituted a turning point which led the Committee of Union and Leaders to think about the role of physical and mental education of the youth and search new ways to prepare young boys of pre-military age for military service within the Ottoman Empire. The defeat of the Ottoman armies in the Balkan was connected to health, low morale and physical incapability of the Ottoman soldiers.²

This situation led the Ottoman authorities to emphasize the importance of the physical and mental education of the youth and to plan for preparing them for military service in a soldierly way.³ Nevertheless, this approach had already gained momentum after the 1908 Revolution. During the first years of Second Constitution period, boy scouting (keşşaflık) had been introduced to the Ottoman public by the articles of Ragıp Nureddin published in *Say ve Tettebbu* journal. Also, in the upcoming years, new boy scouting societies were founded in Istanbul.⁴

2 Beşikçi, *The Ottoman Mobilization of Manpower*, pp. 206-207.

3 Beşikçi, *The Ottoman Mobilization of Manpower*, pp. 207

4 Zafer Toprak, "İttihat ve Terakki'nin Paramiliter Gençlik Örgütleri", *B. Ü Beşeri Bilimler Dergisi*, No.7 (1979), pp. 95. For other works on the boy scouting in the Ottoman Empire, see Zafer Toprak, "Türkiye'de İzçiliğin İlk Evresi: II. Meşrutiyet'ten Mütareke Yıllarına," *Tombak*, no. 24 (February 1999), pp. 19-27.

The first paramilitary organization established under the influence of CUP was the Turkish Strength Association (Türk Gücü Derneği). The association was established in June 1913 as a sub-organization of the Turkish Hearths Society (Türk Ocağı), which was a pro-CUP nationalist literary organization. Most of the leading members of the association were also members of the CUP such as Colonel Cemal Bey (Cemal Paşa), Ziya Gökalp and Dr. Tevfik Rüşdü (Aras).⁵ Its major objective was to “improve the health of Turks, reinforce their physical strength, and raise active generations as a contingency in times of hardships.”⁶

However, the Turkish Strength Association functioned as a private club rather than appealing to the wider public within the Ottoman Empire. The approval of the administrative board of the association and taking an oath required for the membership to the association. Also, the members of the association had to pay an acceptance fee and a monthly payment.⁷ Until May 1914, twenty-six branch of the Turkish Strength Association was established throughout Anatolia and Thrace.⁸ After the declaration of the World War I, although the activities continued, it remained virtually ineffective and more extensive and widespread associations such as Ottoman Strength League and Ottoman Youth League assumed the role of the Turkish Strength Association.⁹

The attempts for turning boy scouting associations into a more centralized and extensive organization, which targeted the whole young population of the Ottoman Empire, intensified in 1914. A proposal was made to the Council of the Minister on 30 March 1914 to establish a youth organization by the Minis-

5 Ateş, *Asker Evlatlar Yetiştirmek*, pp.234-242

6 Cüneyd Okay, “Sport and Nation Building: Gymnastics and Sport in the Ottoman and the Committee of Union and Progress, 1908–1918,” *The International Journal of History of Sport*, vol. 20, no. 1 (March 2003), p. 153.

7 Beşikçi, *The Ottoman Mobilization of Manpower*, pp. 208

8 Ateş, *Asker Evlatlar Yetiştirmek*, pp.238.

9 *Ibid*, 261.

try of War (Harbiye Nezareti). This proposal was accepted, and a new association was officially established with the name of the Ottoman Strength League on 27 May 1914.¹⁰

Enver Pasha, the Ottoman Minister of War, was among the founders of the League. He invited Harold Parfitt, who led the boy scouting organization in Belgium from 1909 onwards, for the initial organization and supervision of the League.¹¹ As stated in its regulation and its instruction manual, the Ottoman Strength League would remain as appurtenant to it. Its main objective, as stated in its regulation, was to “prepare the youth, both physically and spiritually, for the protection of the motherland, and educate them to have strong patriotic character until death.”¹²

The Ottoman Strength League aimed to enlist young boys below the minimum age for military service. According to its regulation, those who were between twelve and seventeen years old would be accepted to the Boy Scouting League (İzcilik Dernekleri), which constitute the preparatory branch of the Ottoman Strength League. On the other hand, other young boys above the age of seventeen would join the ‘actual’ Ottoman Strength League. Their training and education would be conducted according to the principles regulated by the Ministry of War. While it was compulsory for public schools, both secular and religious, to establish a division of the Ottoman Strength League, the participation of non-Muslim and non-public schools in the League was not compulsory, but it was left the freedom and desire (ihtiyar ve arzu) of these schools to join the organization of the League.¹³

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- 10 Erol Akcan, “İttihat ve Terakki Fırkası'nın Paramiliter Gençlik Kuruluşları”, (Ph. D Dissertation, Selçuk University, 2011), pp. 172.
- 11 Cüneyd Okay, “Sport and Nation Building: Gymnastics and Sport in the Ottoman State and the Committee of Union and Progress, 1908–1918”, pp. 153-154.
- 12 “Osmanlı Güç Dernekleri Hakkında Nizamname (28 May 1914)”, *Düstur* II. Tertib, Cilt 6, (İstanbul: Matbaa-i Amire, 1916), pp. 751.
- 13 “Osmanlı Güç Dernekleri Hakkında Nizamname (28 May 1914)”, *Düstur* II. Tertib, Cilt 6 pp. 751-752.

The chief of the recruiting office branch of the region in which a branch of the League was located would be responsible from the supervision of the activities of the branch. They were also supposed to promote the establishment of the new branches and inspect them once a year.¹⁴

License would be issued to the young boys who had proven that they had prepared for military service by passing various exams and drills. Those who became entitled to receive the license would have several privileges. From the young boys who received this reference, those who turned eighteen years old would be sent to the barracks which they desired within their region before the draft. They could not be deployed to extremely hot provinces such as Hicaz and Yemen (bilad-ı harre) without their request. Also, they could promote to the rank of corporal four month earlier than the others.¹⁵

The Strength League's program published in 1914 reveals the significant information about the planned activities of the League. It put an emphasis on not only physical education but also moral education of the pre-military aged young boys. The program prepared for six month of period covers the activities such as moral education (terbiye-i ahlakiye), topography education, physical education, and military exercises, both armed and unarmed.¹⁶

In the program, the contents of moral education courses that were planned to be carried out at the branches of the League were explained in detail. Moral education was seen as an inseparable part of physical and military education for training of the young boys. First moral education course would be about the duties of a young men against himself, his fellow friend, his parents, elders and motherland, and the importance of personal hygiene. In the next course, the character skills desired to be strengthened such as bravery, patience, courage, loyalty would be covered. Also, the guides would lecture on the famous battles of Ottoman Empire to inspire the nationalistic and patriotic sentiments among the youth. According to the Strength League's program, the young boys needed to be obedient and aware of their duties against the law, the order,

14 Ibid, pp. 752-753.

15 Mehmet Beşikçi, "Birinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Paramiliter Dernekler", *Tarih ve Toplum Yeni Yaklaşımlar*, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul 8 (2009), pp. 58-59.

16 *Güç Dernekleri'nin Programı*, (İstanbul: Matbaa-ı Askeriye, 1914).

the state, soldiers, the police, the gendarmerie and their superiors. In the final course, in order to increase the moral of the youth, the guides or teachers would mention about important battles of the Ottoman Empire.¹⁷ The courses that had been explained in the League's program was named moral and national education (terbiye-i maneviye ve vataniye) in the instruction manual of the Ottoman Strength League and it was decided that this courses needed to be given according to the rules and programs implemented in the general scientific institutions (müessesat-ı umumiye-i ilmiye).¹⁸

However, the Ottoman Strength League could not operate as effective as expected. Although the necessity of permanent mobilization and popular war support paramilitary young organizations with the entry of Ottoman Empire into the Great War increased the importance of paramilitary youth associations, the Ottoman Strength League could not become an efficient association and accomplish its objectives due to the number of reasons. The major reason for the ineffectiveness of the Ottoman Strength League was that it almost solely functioned within the Ottoman school system. Given that a small percentage of Muslim children of school age received primary education at the period, it is difficult to understand why the Ottoman Strength League could not to the rest of the Ottoman youth.¹⁹ Also, the outbreak of the First World War and the declaration of the mobilization by the Ottoman government undermined the objectives of the Ottoman Strength League since the Ministry expected voluntary initiatives on the part of civilians in small towns and villages. The fact that each male older than twenty years old was conscripted with the declaration of mobilization caused that voluntary initiatives on the part of civilians never materialized and the authorities could not carry out a systematic campaign to stimulate wider popular participation.²⁰

17 *Güç Dernekleri'nin Programı*, (İstanbul: Matbaa-yı Askeriye, 1914). pp. 14, 18, 22, 29.

18 *Harbiye Nezaretine Merbut Osmanlı Güç Dernekleri Talimatı*, (İstanbul: Matbaa-ı Askeriye, 1914), pp.4.

19 For the statistical information on the education of the late Ottoman period, see Mehmet Ö. Alkan (ed.), *Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e Modernleşme Sürecinde Eğitim İstatistikleri, 1839–1924*, (Ankara: Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü, 2000).

20 Mehmet Beşikçi connects the ineffectiveness of the Ottoman Strength League to lack of the voluntary action of civilians and the limitedness of the Ottoman school system. Although we

§ 4.2 Ottoman Youth League

The Ottoman Youth League established in 1916 was a paramilitary youth organization which followed the example their contemporary German counterpart, the German Youth Associations (Jungdeutschlandbund). However, its preparations for its establishment had already begun earlier that year by Von Hoff, who had been appointed to the role advisor-trainer and general inspector (müfettiş-i umumi) of the Young League on the suggestion of Marshal Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz by the Ottoman government.²¹

Von Hoff had worked under the supervision of the famous Colmar von der Goltz in Germany and he was recommended to the Ottoman Ministry of War by him. Colmar von der Goltz had worked for the modernisation of the Ottoman Army during the Hamidiye era and his famous work *The Nation in Arms* (Das Volk in Waffen) was translated into Ottoman-Turkish in 1884 even before its translation into English. His ideas were admired by the young CUP leadership until the end of the World War I.²² Also, he became influential in the shift from the Ottoman Strength League to the Ottoman Youth League. According to Von der Goltz, Ottoman Strength League and other similar associations were boy scouting clubs that participated recreative sports. He argued that there should be a reserve army which consists of the strong youth behind the strong army. Therefore, he offered a plan for the establishment of a new paramilitary youth association to the Ottoman Ministry of War.²³

Although there were certain similarities between the objectives of the Strength League and Youth League, the Ottoman Youth League were established with the aim of collecting a much wider young mass under a military

agree that the limitedness of the school system undermined the effectiveness of the Ottoman Strength League, he seems to forget that lack of the voluntary action was related to the declaration of the mobilization itself. Ottoman Strength League was established before the declaration of the mobilization, and it was not organized to function under the war conditions. For his explanations on the ineffectiveness of the Ottoman Strength League, see Mehmet Beşikçi, *The Ottoman Mobilization of Manpower*, pp. 212-217.

21 Sadık Sarısaman, “Birinci Dünya Savaşı Sırasında İhtiyat Kuvveti Olarak Kurulan Osmanlı Genç Dernekleri”, pp. 443-444.

22 Beşikçi, *The Ottoman Mobilization of Manpower*, pp. 217-218

23 Ateş, *Asker Evlatlar Yetiştirmek*, pp. 343.

organization and discipline. The Ottoman authorities were aware of the necessity of the moral and physical education of the young population since the war demanded the total mobilization of both adults and young boys. In order to accomplish the war objectives, the permanent mobilization and preparation of each layer of the male population for the war was compulsory for the Ottoman government. As Von Hoff stated, Germany and other nations which have youth associations owed some of military, economical and administrative accomplishments to his own youth associations:

Especially during the wartime, the nations that had Youth League organization have greatly benefited from them. The young boys who live in the countries that have such organizations not only spared their free time to help various assignments which belong to the soldiers who go to the front but also provided that thousands of soldiers were able to engage in the front by contributing the hinterland logistical effort. After the German occupation, the members of the Youth League who work in Belgium voluntarily probably became a superior agent of action than trained soldier in terms of tenacity and enthusiasm (azim ve heves).²⁴

As highlighted above, one of the objectives expected from the Ottoman Youth League was to mobilize the Ottoman youth to contribute the war effort as in Germany. However, the harsh realities of the Ottoman Empire made impossible to realize the expected effectiveness of the Ottoman Youth League. In fact,

24 “Bilhassa harb zamanında muntazam genç Dernekleri teşkilatına sahip olan milletler bunlardan büyük yararlar görmüşlerdir. Bu tür derneklere sahip olan ülkelerdeki gençler ders saatleri dışındaki vakitlerini cebheye giden askere aid, birçok işlere yardımcı olmaya ayırdıkları gibi, cephe gerisinde menzil Hizmetinde de binlerce askerin vazifesini görerek bunların cephede meşgul olabilmesini temin etmişlerdir. Alman işgalinden sonra Belçika’da gönüllü olarak çalışan genç dernekleri üyeleri azim ve heves itibariyle belki de yetmiş askere bile üstün bir faaliyet unsuru durumuna gelmişlerdir”. Von Hoff, “Alman Gençleri'nin Harb Hizmetinde İstihdamı”, *Osmanlı Genç Dernekleri Mecmuası*, No:4, December 1917, pp.12.

the League itself caused social and economic problems within the Ottoman Empire.²⁵

Also, they had realized that their objective for the mobilization of the youth could not be accomplished with the existing school system of the Ottoman Empire since the illiterate and unschooled peasant boys constituted the backbone of the young male population. Therefore, any organization which excluded the unschooled young male population from the military education before the national service was doomed to fail from the beginning. Von Hoff was aware of the need to target the unschooled young males for the success of the Ottoman Youth League as she highlighted in the first number of the League's journal:

In a country where only twenty young people out of a hundred could go to school, the Youth League is very significant and primarily necessary. Those eighty unschooled boys actually constitute the most important mass; therefore, these young boys should be benefited from the Youth League. Few sports clubs of schools can be any important value for disciplining (terbiye) the nation.²⁶

Therefore, the temporary law for the league made it clear that all young male Ottomans, Muslims and non-Muslims alike, had to participate the activities of the local branches of the Ottoman Youth League.²⁷ Also, all boy scouting clubs in the empire were required to become the branches of the Ottoman Youth League by accepting its leadership, supervision, law and regulations.²⁸

25 Due to the scope of this studies, the social and economic problems stemmed from the activities of the Ottoman Young League will not be covered. For the relevant information, see Mehmet Beşikçi, *The Ottoman Mobilization of Manpower*, pp. 235-245

26 "Yüz gençten yirmisinin okula gidebildiği bir ülkede, Genç Derneği çok önemli ve gereklidir. Seksen okula gitmeyen genç en önemli kitleyi oluşturur. Bu yüzden, bu gençler Genç Dernekleri'nden yararlanmalıdır. Okulların bir kaç spor klübü milletin Terbiyesi için önemli olabilir." Von Hoff, "Genç Dernekleri'nin Şimdiye Kadar Teşkilât ve Tevsii", *Osmanlı Genç Dernekleri Mecmuası*, no. 1, September 1917, pp.8.

27 "Genç Dernekleri Hakkında Kanun-ı Muvakkatı (17 April 1916)", *Düstur*, II. Tertib, Cilt 6, pp. 898.

28 Beşikçi, *The Ottoman Mobilization of Manpower*, pp. 220.

This situation provided an opportunity for the Ministry of War to supervise and increase its authority over the especially non-Muslim boy scouting clubs within the Ottoman Empire.

The Youth League targeted the young male population between 12 and 20 years old. The organization of the Youth League was divided into two sub-associations. one being called Gürbüz Derneği included youth between the ages of 12 and 17. Other association called Dinç Derneği youth from the age of 17 to the age of conscription.²⁹ The League aimed to equip the young male population with necessary military, moral and skills before the conscription. Each sub-association would give specific education which was appropriate for the age span of its participants. While the education in the Gürbüz Derneği would be conducted by the school teachers or guides (rehberler) who would be trained by the general inspectorship of the Ottoman Youth League, it was required that army, navy or petty officers would carry out the activities and education in the Dinç Derneği.³⁰ The Gürbüz Derneği section would choose its guides from the school teachers and other civilians authorized by the general inspectorship, the participants of the Dinç Derneği would be organized as squadron and company and receive the same training conducted in the army.³¹ This demonstrates that the Dinç Derneği section of the Ottoman Youth League organized its program according to the immediate conditions of war and planned to train its participants for the urgent military needs.³²

Although the CUP desired the Youth League to form its own militia organization, Von Hoff wanted to keep the Ottoman Youth League out of the politics. In his first article published by the Osmanlı Genç Dernekleri Mecmuası, he had already made his stance clear on this issue:

The nation's education (terbiye) is a national issue, not political. Therefore, we, definitely unfamiliar with any politics in the Ottoman Young League, do not speak of politics amongst the guides or young boys and

29 Genç Dernekleri Hakkında Kanun-ı Muvakkatı (17 April 1916)", *Düstur*, pp.898.

30 Ibid.

31 Mustafa Balcioğlu, "Osmanlı Genç Dernekleri", pp. 206-207.

32 Beşikçi, *The Ottoman Mobilization of Manpower*, pp. 223

work with any political party. We follow only one objective by remaining completely neutral: That is, it is to help the nation, work for advancing of the nation and endeavour for educating young boys who are deprived of going to school before everything.³³

The youth associations founded before the Ottoman Young League such as Turkish Strength League and Ottoman Strength League were clearly related to the Committee of Union and Progress. The leading founders of these associations were the members of the CUP, either. From spring 1917, the CUP tried to use the Ottoman Youth League as a tool for its political intentions with some suggestions. However, von Hoff was against the politicization of these organizations and resisted to work on behalf of the CUP. This led him to be dismissed from his duties to return to Germany in April 1918.³⁴

The aim of the education on Ottoman Youth League was to strengthen the youth not only physically but also to discipline them mentally, spiritually and ethically. The education of Ottoman Youth League on this path purposed to indoctrinate them specific ideas, shape their lifestyle under the specific principles, to strengthen their patriotism and to discipline them spiritually (*ruhi terbiye*) in order to train them as capable, brave, combatant, tenacious, powerful, motivated and obedient soldiers, who would be ready to fulfil their duties against the motherland.³⁵

33 “*Milletin terbiyesi, politik değil ulusal bir konudur. Bu nedenle, biz, Osmanlı Genç Derneği’nde hiç bir politikaya aşına değiliz, rehberler ve gençler arasında politikadan bahsetmiyoruz ve herhangi bir parti ile çalışmıyoruz. Tamamen tarafsız kalarak sadece bir hedefi takip ediyoruz, o da millete yardım etmek, milletin ilerlemesi için çalışmak ve herşeyden önce okula gitmekten mahrum olan genç erkekleri yetiştirmek için gayret göstermektedir.*” Von Hoff, “Mukaddime”, *Osmanlı Genç Dernekleri Mecmuası*, No:1, September 1917, pp.1-2.

34 Von Hoff was forced to comply the demands of the CUP and clearly indicated that the Ottoman Youth League belonged to the youth and the politicization of the League was a murder (*bu bir cinayettir*). Sadık Sarısamam, “Birinci Dünya Savaşı Sırasında İhtiyat Kuvveti Olarak Kurulan Osmanlı Genç Dernekleri”, pp. 465-466.

35 Enver Pasha, “Beyanname,” *Genç Dernekleri Teşkili Hakkında Kanun-ı Muvakkat ve Talimname*, (İstanbul: Matbaa-ı Askeriye, 1916), pp.10. Enver Pasha stated that it was possible to obtain the victories by training the youth of the nation as patient against hardship, brave, courageous and character-wise.

Mental and ethical education were mainly given through the conversation sessions (ahlaki musahabe) specially designed for this purpose and the articles published by the media organ of Ottoman Youth League. Through the conversation sessions, the counsellors of Ottoman Youth League would instill love of country and nation, give the youth a number of qualities to defend the homeland against the enemy, teach to comply with the law and sovereign and introduce them with some important personality traits such as dignity, honour and virtue. In order to upskill the youth enlisted to the League, the guides and supervisors would serve the youth as a model (nümune-i imtisal) by their actions and behaviors. These conversation sessions would be organized during training breaks once a week.³⁶

In addition to the conversion and training sessions, the monthly journal of the League published a number of articles, aiming to strengthen motivation, obedience and discipline of the youth.³⁷ In these articles, which were mostly written by Von Hoff and Selim Sırrı (Tarcan), various issues about physical education, ethics, training, hygiene and discipline were discussed. Moral and ethical education of the Ottoman youth was one of the main issues addressed in the journal whose authors emphasized the significance of the moral, intellectual and ethical education no less than the physical education. Selim Sırrı pointed out that motivated and disciplined youth could die for their motherland or friends and keep their will under control in times of danger. However, those who are deprived of moral education act “like an automatic machine” and desert the colours at the first opportunity.³⁸

In order to mobilize the youth and prepare them to fight and die for the motherland mentally and physically, the Ottoman Youth League purposed to

36 Selim Sırrı, “Genç Derneklerinde Terbiye-i Ahlakiye”, *Osmanlı Genç Dernekleri Mecmuası*, No:2, October 1917, pp. 9-12.

37 The Ottoman Youth League published a monthly journal, *Osmanlı Genç Dernekleri Mecmuası*, the first issue of which appeared on 1 September 1917 and its first twelve issues were published regularly; the number of total issues was 26, the last one being published on 1 July 1920. Also, the league also occasionally published some pamphlets about various subjects such as hygiene and physical education in order to explain its purposes and activities to public.

38 Selim Sırrı, “Genç Derneklerinde Terbiye-i Ahlakiye”, pp.9.

train patriotic youth generation who were ready to give their life for the Ottoman motherland. To accomplish this aim, the authors of Ottoman Youth League Journal discussed the motherland (vatan) concept in detail to instill them love of country and nation. In the articles published by Ottoman Youth League Journal, Selim Sırrı explains the significance of the motherland and why one should sacrifice one's life for it. Having discussed how one's love for motherland take shape, he explains the spirituality of the motherland and points out what makes the soil of motherland unique is things hidden beneath it. According to him, the youth shall be connected to those who live before them and those who will live after him and the soil of motherland realizes this chain of order. Also, he adds that the nations which forgot its dead forget its history and traditions, and those who forget history and traditions cannot be patriotic.³⁹

Obedience and discipline concepts also received particular emphasis during the operation of the Ottoman Youth League. According to the perspective of the League, the ideal Ottoman young was supposed to be obedient, loyal, patriotic. The Youth League sought to inculcate its participants with obedience through acceptance of following orders and behaving in an orderly way.⁴⁰ However, as Mehmet Beşikçi stated, what Von Hoff and Selim Sırrı meant by obedience was "a deliberate awareness of one's duties" rather than blind submission to authority.⁴¹ At the same time, another primary aim of the League was to train mentally, physically and ethically disciplined soldiers of future.⁴² According to Von Hoff, those who had received this type of discipline would take up arms to protect the motherland in case of danger.⁴³

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- 39 Selim Sırrı, "Vatanın Ruhaniyeti 2", *Osmanlı Genç Dernekleri Mecmuası* No:3 November 1917, pp. 6-8.
- 40 Von Hoff, *Osmanlı Genç Dernekleri Ehemmiyeti, Maksadı Nedir, Ne Suretle Çalışacaktır?* (İstanbul: Evkâf-ı İslâmiye Matbaası, 1334/1918), pp. 6.
- 41 Beşikçi, *The Ottoman Mobilization of Manpower*, pp. 222-223.
- 42 Von Hoff, "Gençlik ve Harb", *Osmanlı Genç Dernekleri Mecmuası* No: 6 February 1918, pp. 1.
- 43 "...Böyle bir terbiyeye tabi olarak yetişen gençlerin vatan tehlikede olduğu zamanda silaha sarılıp onu muvafakiyetle müdafaa edebilecekleri de şüphesizdir." Von Hoff, *Osmanlı Genç Dernekleri Ehemmiyeti, Maksadı Nedir, Ne Suretle Çalışacaktır?*, pp. 6.

On the other hand, Ottoman Youth League Journal paid quite important attention to history and geography. They used history and geography to strengthen patriotism among the youth. According to Selim Sırrı, great motherland (büyük vatan) consists of material motherland (maddi vatan) and spiritual motherland (manevi vatan). Material motherland composes of rivers, cities, soil, plains, mountains and forests, and geography teaches the youth beauties and borders of material motherland. Also, it strengthens national ideas to protect motherland among youth and attach them to it more strongly.⁴⁴ He emphasizes the importance of the geography knowledge of the motherland and visiting historical places left by the ancestors in order to increase love for the country and nation.⁴⁵

Besides material factors, spiritual factors, which are history and traditions, play an important role in increasing loyalty of the youth to the motherland. Selim Sırrı states that learning history of Ottoman motherland awakens heroism among the youth and encourage them to work for the salvation of the motherland.⁴⁶ On the other hand, Von Hoff proposes that the guides should prepare trips to the historical areas and teach the youth about the heroism of their ancestors.⁴⁷ A similar proposition was also made by Vedat Örfi. He supposes that the guides should teach the youth about the glorious memoirs of the past, the stories of the great heroes and important incidents in history.⁴⁸

Character traits desired to be empowered among the youth such as heroism, bravery, self-sacrifice, adeptness and patience were mostly covered by the articles under the main title named Mental Education (Ruhi Terbiye). Most of these articles were written by Selim Sırrı and through these articles, he aimed to implant good character skills such as patience, friendship, righteousness, struggle. Also, these articles were mostly written for robust young (gürbüzler)

44 Selim Sırrı, "Maddi ve Manevi Vatan", *Osmanlı Genç Dernekleri Mecmuası* No:5 January 1918, pp.7-8

45 Selim Sırrı, "Alman Jimnastikleri: Yan'a Göre Jimnastiğin Gayesi: Vatan Şarkıları- Jimnastik Seyranları", *Osmanlı Genç Dernekleri Mecmuası* No:2 October 1917, pp. 5-6.

46 Selim Sırrı, "Maddi ve Manevi Vatan", pp.9

47 Von Hoff, "Çocuklarla Yapılacak Gezintilere Aid Bazı Misal", *Osmanlı Genç Dernekleri Mecmuası* No:5 January 1918, pp. 5.

48 Vedat Örfi, "Rehber ve Rehber Muavinlerinin Vezaiifi", *Osmanlı Genç Dernekleri Mecmuası* No:16 September 1919, pp. 20-21.

because they were younger than vigorous ones (dinçler) and easier to shape their minds. Even, some articles started as Dear Robust Youth (Sevgili Gürbüzler). This demonstrates that Ottoman Youth League aimed not only the urgent mobilization of the male population for the military purposes but also the long-term character education of the young Ottoman Youth population for the future. Therefore, the education of Gürbüzler and Dinçler differed substantially.

In an article named Sabır ve Sebat (patience and persistence), Selim Sırrı argued that patience does not mean to bear bad ideas and opinions or to submit everything. According to him, this type of behavior can be called emotionlessness not patience. Patience is not only to endure pain and face disasters but also to struggle in front of the calamities. On the other hand, persistence was defined to follow a purpose or idea systemically and accomplish targets that one can face in the life.⁴⁹

Another personal skill, which wanted to be developed, among the youth was bellicosity (mücadelecilik). In the article written on this concept, it has been suggested that each stage and layer of life is a struggle, and in order to be successful, one should work with patience and tenacity and be skillful, strong, healthy, active and man of action. Also, in the article, it has been argued that the biggest struggle that one can face is with internal enemy (iç düşman), which can be defined as self (nefs). On the other hand, according to the author of the article, Selim Sırrı, one's external enemy is bad friends; however, it is easier to avoid external enemy (dış düşman) than internal enemy. Also, in this article, Selim Sırrı pointed out that having a strong character was the number one priority for being a robust (gürbüz).⁵⁰

Friendship was another concept that was discussed in the journal. In the articles written on friendship, Selim Sırrı discusses to whom one can call friend (dost). According to him, a good friend should be a person who would be with his friends whether good or bad days, help his friend in the difficult conditions, keep his friend's secrets. Also, Selim Sırrı indicates that one should

49 Selim Sırrı, "Sabır ve Sebat", *Osmanlı Genç Dernekleri Mecmuası* No:11 July 1918, pp.1-3.

50 Selim Sırrı, "Mücadele", *Osmanlı Genç Dernekleri Mecmuası* No:8, April 1918, pp.4-5

be careful while choosing a friend in case he is liar, dangerous and hypocrite.

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On the other hand, it has been recommended to the youth to be curious. Through the curiosity, it has been argued that memory of the youth would prosper, their knowledge would increase, their morality would strengthen; however, on the condition that this feeling is abused, it would affect spirit and mind negatively according to the article. Therefore, it has been expressed that it is a bad habit to try to learn the secret of everyone.⁵²

§ 4.3 Conclusion

On the other hand, it is partly true that World War I had its own unique and significant impact on the evolution of paramilitary youth associations with the specific and urgent needs; however, one should mind the first paramilitary youth associations attached to the Ministry of War was founded before the declaration of mobilization. Its primary aim was not to create a reserve army consisted of the youth. Therefore, one should keep in mind that World War I was unique event that required a shift from the boy scouting to the reserve army. However, this transformation did not completely alter the primary objective of the paramilitary youth association which was to train the youth physically and mentality for the long-term needs.

In short, the aim of the education both in two association focused on to strengthen the youth not only physically but also to discipline them mentally, spiritually and ethically. The education on this path purposed to indoctrinate them specific ideas, shape their lifestyle under the specific principles, to strengthen their patriotism and to discipline. The conditions of the mobilization partly altered the primary objectives of the paramilitary youth associations. However, their main objectives, as mentioned above, mostly remained same.

51 Selim Sırrı, "Dostluk: Dostlarla Râbitamız-Dostlara Neden Muhtacız? -Dostlardan Ne Beklenir?", *Osmanlı Genç Dernekleri Mecmuası*, No:12 August 1918, pp. 1-2.

52 Selim Sırrı, "Merak", *Osmanlı Genç Dernekleri Mecmuası* No: 9, May 1918, pp. 13.

Conclusion

World War I caused the death of millions of people from each belligerent power. It was what could be defined as “total war”. Home front and front blurred during World War I. Ottoman Empire almost mobilized 3.000.000 people between the years 1914 and 1918. In order to increase the effectiveness of the soldiers, the Ottoman government attempted to motivate the conscripted soldiers.

Religion and charity were two main factors for the motivation of soldiers. Army imams, volunteer troops and jihad played important role in the strengthening the motivation of soldiers. However, since Ottoman army consisting of the soldiers from different nations and religions, it was not a homogeneous formation. Therefore, Ottoman soldiers had different notions of motivation.

The jihad was used to both increase the motivation of the conscripted soldiers and access different outcast groups. I believe the proclamation of jihad was successful. The Ottoman government accessed various outcast groups and managed to mobilize them to certain extent. Also, with the help of pamphlets, the jihad helped to increase the motivation of the conscripted soldiers.

Pamphlet literature and volunteer troops consisted of members of the religious orders increased the motivation and strengthened the fighting endurance of the troops at field. Pamphlets commissioned by the government or

War Ministry contributed in increasing the motivation, obedience and discipline of the soldiers to the certain extent

During World War I, poor-relief charity both helped the families of soldiers and strengthened the fighting endurance of soldiers at front. Soldiers who were aware of their families' improving condition thanks to charity would fight with the strengthened motivation. The organizations such as National Defence League helped boosting the motivation of soldiers by helping their families.

The Ottoman government also aimed to increase the motivation, obedience and discipline of the non-conscripted youth. The organizations such as Ottoman Youth League and Ottoman Strength League were founded for this purpose.

The formation of these associations was related to the World War I. Specific and urgent needs of World War I affected the evolution of these associations. World War I required the shift from Ottoman Youth League to Ottoman Strength League. However, this transformation did not completely alter the primary aim of these associations which was to train the youth both physically and mentally. The mobilization allowed to spread the branches of these association all around the country.

The education on these associations aimed to instill various ideas, to strengthen patriotism of the youth, and to increase discipline and obedience. These associations purposed to discipline the youth mentally, ethically and morally.

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