

TURKISH TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS PROFESSIONALS IN ISTANBUL:  
GLOBALIZATION, COSMOPOLITANISM AND THE EMERGING ELITE

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Title: Turkish Transnational Business Professionals in Istanbul: Globalization, Cosmopolitanism and the Emerging Elite

Abstract: The neo-liberal economic transformation that was initiated in post-1980s Turkey has produced a Turkey in the 2000s that has been integrated to the global economy through processes such as the liberalization of the markets, privatization and opening to transnational economic actors and financial instruments. In this manner, starting from the 1990s, the increase, growth and expansion of foreign and multinational corporations in Istanbul has made possible the emergence of new business people, who are more connected to the globe in their daily lives.

These business people constitute a portion of a globally available population that has drawn the attention of academic and non-academic circles throughout the globe from 80's onwards. In the international sociological literature, this population is regarded as the "transnational elite" of the global era and their members are described as people who are embedded in exclusive transnational social networks, who are globally mobile, who share a global business culture and as people who have exclusive consumption practices.

As for the field research of this thesis, middle and high-ranking business professionals who are employed in foreign and multinational corporations in Istanbul which operate on regional/global levels were interviewed in-depth. In the thesis, these subjects are problematized as political and cultural members of localities and communities that straddle between the local and the global. Within the scope of the interviews, social relations and imaginations of these subjects were discussed through their personal histories and narratives regarding their "selves." Moreover, their personal opinions regarding contemporary socio-political issues at different geographical levels were discussed.

The aim of the thesis is to contextualize these subjects as national members of the secular Turkish elite and as the transnational members of the transnational professional elite. In this regard, it was discussed whether transnational exposure and experience contribute to the cultivation of cosmopolitan dispositions in regards to the public sphere. It has been observed that the use of socio-political typologies such as "white Turks," "neo-Kemalists," "Yuppies" that emphasize socio-political elitism/ indifference/hostility – although may proficiently describe many Turkish elite positions - oversees pluralist and egalitarian tendencies that can be cultivated within elite circles due to translocal interaction and exposure.

**Başlık:** İstanbul'daki Türk Ulusaşırı İş İnsanları: Küreselleşme, Kozmopolitanlık ve Yükselen Seçkinler

**Özet:** Türkiye'nin 1980 sonrası dönemde içine girdiği neo-liberal ekonomik dönüşüm; piyasaların liberalleşmesi, ulusaşırı ekonomik aktörlere ve finansal araçlara açılma, özelleştirme gibi süreçlerle 2000'ler Türkiye'sini küresel ekonomiye bütünleştirmiştir. Bu anlamda 1990'larla beraber İstanbul'da konumlanmış yabancı ve çok uluslu şirketlerin artması, büyümesi, operasyonlarının genişlemesi, İstanbul'da günlük hayat içinde dünyayla daha sık bir iletişim halinde olan yeni iş insanlarının ortaya çıkmasını mümkün kılmıştır.

Bu iş insanları aslında 1980'lerden başlayarak bugüne, dünya genelinde akademik ve akademi dışı çevrelerin ilgisini çeken küresel çaptaki bir nüfusun belirli bir kısmını oluşturmaktadır. Uluslararası sosyoloji literatüründe bu nüfus, küresel çağın "ulusaşırı seçkinleri" olarak kabul edilmekte ve ulusaşırı seçkin sosyal ağların üyesi olan, geniş bir coğrafyada hareket edebilen, küresel bir iş kültürünü paylaşan ve üst-düzey tüketim kalıpları olan kişiler olarak tasvir edilmektedir.

Bu tezin saha çalışması olarak, İstanbul'daki küresel/bölgesel ölçekte faaliyet gösteren yabancı ve çok uluslu şirketlerin orta ve üst düzey kadrolarında görev yapan iş insanlarıyla derinlikli görüşmeler yapılmıştır. Tezde, bu özneler yerel ve küresel arasında gidip gelen mekan ve toplulukların kültürel ve siyasal üyeleri olarak sorunsallaştırılmıştır. Görüşmeler kapsamında bu öznelerin daha geniş toplumla olan ilişki ve tahayyülleri; kişisel hayat hikayeleri ve "kendi"lerine ilişkin anlatılarından yola çıkarak tartışılmıştır. Bunun yanısıra görüşmecilerin farklı coğrafi boyutlardaki sosyo-politik güncel konulara ilişkin görüşlerine dair bilgiler edinilmiş ve tartışılmıştır.

Tezin amacı bu özneleri bir yandan Türkiye'nin laik seçkinlerinin ulusal üyeleri bir yandan da ulusaşırı profesyonel seçkinlerin üyeleri olarak sorunsallaştırmaktır. Bu bağlamda ulusaşırı deneyimlerin ve maruziyetin, kamusal alana yönelik kozmopolit değerlerin geliştirilmesine dair katkısının olup olmadığı tartışılmıştır. Bu bağlamda, "beyaz Türk," "neo-Kemalist," "Yuppie" gibi kamusal alana yönelik tavırlarında seçkinciliğe /düşmanlığa/ kayıtsızlığa vurgu yapan sosyo-politik tipolojilerin, birçok Türk seçkininin duruşunu etkili şekilde açıklıyor olmasına rağmen, seçkin çevrelerde yerelötesi etkileşim ve maruziyet sonucunda geliştirilebilecek çoğulcu ve eşitlikçi eğilimleri görmezden geldiği gözlemlenmiştir.

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## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION

The motivation for writing this thesis and for conducting the relevant research was born out of personal curiosity to understand the dynamics behind the formation of a sub-group of the elite in contemporary Turkey. This group is comprised of Turkish high-ranking business professionals who are employed by multinational and foreign corporations with branches or regional headquarters located in Istanbul.<sup>1</sup> In post-1980s Turkey, witnessing the emergence of new generations of elite whose members are affiliated with the globalized world academically and professionally, it is found sociologically interesting to understand what types of identities and dispositions they produce, taking into consideration the intensifying transnationalism in their everyday lives.<sup>2</sup>

Increasing transnationalism in everyday lives is a feature of globalization. Therefore, it is globally present. In this regard, there is a vast literature in the discipline of sociology, dispersed across a vast geography, which investigates different aspects of social life that is determined by globalization. One of these literatures discusses how transnational networks and flows have become spatially tangible in global and globalizing cities, defining urban

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<sup>1</sup> The Turkish language offers two words for denoting a citizen of Turkey: “*Türk*” and “*Türkiyeli*.” The subject of highly intricate debates in contemporary Turkey, “*Türk*” as a word can be used to designate both a “citizen of the Turkish Republic” and the peculiarities of the Turks as an “ethnic group.” On the contrary, “*Türkiyeli*” is a recently proposed denotation which refrains from imposing an epistemological relation between citizenship and ethnicity and rather emphasizes the relation between the citizen and that of the country of origin. The author of this thesis believes that this choice is a political one and he supports the popularization of the second alternative. However, currently, it is impossible to find the equivalence of this discursive *nuance* in the English language. Therefore, throughout the thesis, by “Turkish transnational professionals” the author will be implying “the citizens of the Turkish Republic.” However, for this thesis, it is also possible to argue that, inferring from the familial histories narrated in the interviews, the interviewees were “ethnic Turks” as well.

<sup>2</sup> The author of this thesis is a subject who is socio-culturally embedded into social networks which are dominated by highly-educated upper middle class (some satisfied with maintaining class privileges and some seeking upwards mobility) and upper class members (these already belong to the Turkish bourgeoisie). Many of these people are either middle and high-ranking business professionals (in their 30s and 40s) or potential candidates (in their 20s) for such occupational positions in the transnational business world.

social and economic conditions.<sup>3</sup> One other focuses on the emergence of transnational socio-economic classes, which are claimed to be globally present and it discusses the socio-economic, ideological and political features they share in common.<sup>4</sup> In a similar fashion, some studies focus on the transnationally mobile professional elite in the global cities.<sup>5</sup> Parallel to this trend in sociology, there are scholars who emphasize the need to conduct ethnographic research on sites, institutions and subjects, which enable understanding the impacts of globalization in customized local codes.<sup>6</sup> Another branch of the globalization literature is cultural studies, which focuses on the impacts of globalization on cultural space, goods, discourses and identities.<sup>7</sup>

Apart from the bodies of literature that are mentioned above, a specific literature aims to demonstrate how increasing transnationalism shapes the way subjects associate with the social, cultural, political and economic communities which surround them in differing geographical affinities.<sup>8</sup> In a similar way, this literature also focuses on how competences and

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<sup>3</sup> Saskia Sassen, *A Sociology of Globalization* (New York: Norton, 2007); Saskia Sassen, *The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo* (Princeton; New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1991); Brenda Yeoh, "Global/Globalizing Cities," *Progress in Human Geography* 23, (December 1999), pp. 607-616; Saskia Sassen, *Cities in a World Economy*, (Thousand Oaks; CA: Sage Publications, 1994); Charlotte Lemanski, "Global Cities in the South: Deepening Social and Spatial Polarisation in Cape Town," *Cities* 24, no. 6 (December 2007), pp. 448-461.

<sup>4</sup> Sassen, *A Sociology of Globalization*; Leslie Sklair, *The Transnational Capitalist Class* (Oxford; UK, Malden; Massachusetts: Blackwell, 2001); Leslie Sklair, "Conceptualising and Researching the Transnational Capitalist Class in Australia," *Journal of Sociology* 32 (August 1996), pp. 1-19.

<sup>5</sup> Jonathan Beaverstock, "Transnational Elites in Global Cities: British Expatriates in Singapore's Financial District," *Geoforum* 33, no. 4 (November 2002), pp. 525-538; Jonathan Beaverstock, "Transnational Elites in the City: British Highly-skilled Inter-company Transferees in New York City's Financial District," *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 31, no.2 (2005), pp. 245-268.

<sup>6</sup> John Hassard, Leo McCann, and Jonathan Morris, "At the Sharp End of New Organizational Ideologies: Ethnography and the Study of Multinationals," *Ethnography* 8 (September 2007), pp. 324-344; Fiona Moore, "Symbols of Organization: Informal Ways of Negotiating the Global and the Local in MNCs," *Global Networks: A Journal of Transnational Affairs* 4, no.2 (April 2004), pp.181-198; Tuomo Peltonen, "In the Middle of Managers: Occupational Communities, Global Ethnography and the Multinationals," *Ethnography* 8 (September 2007), pp. 346-360; Massimiliano Monaci, Mauro Mugati, and Marco Caselli, "Network, Exposure and Rhetoric: Italian Occupational Fields and Heterogeneity in Constructing the Globalized Self," *Global Networks* 3, no. 4 (2003), pp. 457-480.

<sup>7</sup> Ulf Hannerz, *Transnational Connections: Culture, People, Places* (London: Routledge, 1996); Arjun Appadurai, *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996); Mike Featherstone, ed., *Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization, and Modernity: A Theory, Culture & Society Special Issue* (London; Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1990).

<sup>8</sup> Anna Olofsson and Susanna Ohman, "Cosmopolitans and Locals: An Empirical Investigation of Transnationalism," *Current Sociology* 55 (November 2007), pp. 877-895; Florian Pichler, "'Down-to-Earth' Cosmopolitanism: Subjective and Objective Measurements of Cosmopolitanism in Survey Research," *Current Sociology* 57 (September 2009), pp. 704-732; Craig Calhoun, "'Belonging' in the Cosmopolitan Imaginary,"

dispositions that enable people to establish social relations with people from different socio-cultural, national and ethnic backgrounds are cultivated.<sup>9</sup> This literature focuses on the emerging forms of “cosmopolitanism,” the relation between transnationalism and cosmopolitan dispositions, different ways of experiencing globalization in regards to human capital, everyday forms of globalization and its impact on cosmopolitanism, and demonstrates social groups, which manifest “cosmopolitan” life styles.<sup>10</sup> There is also a branch of this literature that merges political and social theory on debates regarding cosmopolitanism.<sup>11</sup>

This study, by using the ethnographic method of in-depth interviewing, examines the narratives of Turkish transnational professionals on socio-cultural relations and society, and by doing so, it attempts to locate dispositions and competencies which are attributed to “cosmopolitans.” Hence, it traces the impact of the transnational experience and exposure in the making of cosmopolitan identities, if any such exist. This mostly meant learning about their professional, academic and familial experiences in foreign countries or their interactions with foreign people. However, in order to contextualize cosmopolitanism on the local scale, Turkish transnational professionals were taken as a part of the national secular West-oriented

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*Ethnicities* 3 (2003), pp. 531-553; Craig Calhoun, “Cosmopolitanism in the Modern Social Imaginary,” *Daedalus* 137, no. 3 (Summer 2008), pp.105-114; Florian Pichler, “How Real is Cosmopolitanism in Europe?,” *Sociology* 42 (December 2008), pp. 1107-1126. Tim Phillips, “Imagined Communities and Self-Identity: An Exploratory Quantitative Analysis,” *Sociology* 36 (August 2002), pp. 597-617.

<sup>9</sup> Konrad Gunesch, “Education for Cosmopolitanism: Cosmopolitanism as a Personal Cultural Identity Model for and within International Education,” *Journal of Research in International Education* 3 (December 2004), pp. 251-275; Ulf Hannerz, “Cosmopolitans and Locals in World Culture,” *Theory, Culture & Society* 7 (June 1990), pp. 237-251.

<sup>10</sup> Steven Vertovec and Robin Cohen, eds., *Conceiving Cosmopolitanism: Theory, Context, and Practice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); Bronislaw Szerszynski and John Urry, “Cultures of Cosmopolitanism,” *The Sociological Review* 50, no.4 (2002), pp. 461-481; Victor Roudometof, “Transnationalism, Cosmopolitanism and Glocalization,” *Current Sociology* 53, no.1 (2005), pp.113-35; Jonathan Corpus Ong, “The Cosmopolitan Continuum: Locating Cosmopolitanism in Media and Cultural Studies,” *Media, Culture & Society*, 31 (May 2009), pp. 449- 466; Robert Halsall, “The Rhetoric of Cosmopolitanism in the Global Corporation,” (Paper given at the “4<sup>th</sup> International Critical Management Studies Conference,” Judge Institute of Management, University of Cambridge, July, 2005).

<sup>11</sup> Timothy Brennan, “Cosmopolitanism and Internationalism,” *New Left Review, Second Series* 7 (2001), pp. 75-84; Ulrich Beck and Natan Sznaider, “Unpacking Cosmopolitanism for the Social Sciences: A Research Agenda,” *The British Journal of Sociology* 57, no.1 (2003), pp.1-23; Pheng Cheah and Bruce Robbins, eds., *Cosmopolitics - Thinking and Feeling beyond the Nation* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998); Ulrich Beck, “The Cosmopolitan Society and Its Enemies,” *Theory, Culture & Society* 19 (April 2002), pp.17-44; David Held, “Globalization and Cosmopolitan Democracy,” *Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice* 9, no.3 (1997), pp.309-314; Ulrich Beck, “The Cosmopolitan Perspective: Sociology of the Second Age of Modernity\*,” *The British Journal of Sociology* 51 (2000), pp.79–105.

elite and their identities and dispositions were investigated by prompting socio-cultural and socio-political narratives regarding everyday lives in Istanbul and Turkey's social, political and economic agenda. In this regard, it became possible to discuss the making of some Turkish identities against the background of cosmopolitanism and elitism, which required emphasizing their transnational and national features.

In the examples above, it is possible to see a contemporary interest in the relation between globalization, transnationalism and cosmopolitanism. In addition, it is also possible to see studies that have taken transnational elites as subjects. However, despite prominent studies on specific features of globalization, the sociological literature in Turkey lags behind those in the international realm. The most prominent studies in this sense are conducted in urban sociology, which investigates the socio-economic, political, and cultural impacts of globalization in big metropolises, being mainly Istanbul.<sup>12</sup> This literature is very much relevant to another stream of studies conducted for explaining how contemporary elite identities are spatially being constructed.<sup>13</sup> Upon calls that emphasize the lack of studies<sup>14</sup>, the first decade of the 2000s has witnessed an increasing academic and non-academic interest that focuses on social, economic, political and cultural formations within contemporary urban upper and middle classes, with special emphasis on matters like political antagonisms, socio-

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<sup>12</sup> Caglar Keyder and Ayse Oncu, *Istanbul and the Concept of the World Cities* (Istanbul: Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 1993); Caglar Keyder, ed., *Istanbul: Between the Local and the Global* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1999); Ayfer Bartu Candan and Biray Kolluoglu, "Emerging Spaces of Neoliberalism: A Gated Town and a Public Housing Project in Istanbul," *New Perspectives on Turkey* 39 (2008), pp.5-46; Caglar Keyder, "Globalization and Social Exclusion in Istanbul," *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* 29, no.1 (March 2005), pp.124-134; Ayda Eraydin, "The Impact of Globalisation on Different Social Groups: Competitiveness, Social Cohesion and Spatial Segregation in Istanbul," *Urban Studies* 45 (July 2008), pp.1663-1691.

<sup>13</sup> Didem Danis and Jean Francois Perouse, "Zenginligin Mekanda Yeni Yansimalari: Istanbul'da Guvenlikli Siteler," *Toplum ve Bilim* 104 (2005), pp. 92-103; Zeynep Maggonul, "Seckin" Semtin "Seckin" Sakinleri: Tesvikiye-Nisantasi (Istanbul: Kitabevi, 2005); David Behar and Tolga Islam, eds., *Istanbul'da Soylulastirma: Eski Kentin Yeni Sahipleri* (Istanbul: Bilgi Universitesi Yayinlari, 2006); Keyder, *Istanbul: Between the Local and the Global*; Bartu-Candan and Kolluoglu, "Emerging Spaces of Neoliberalism..."; Keyder, "Globalization and Social Exclusion...."

<sup>14</sup> Tanil Bora and Necmi Erdogan, "Zenginlik: "Zengin" Bir Arastirma Gundemi, "Yoksul" Bir Literatur," *Toplum ve Bilim*, no.104 (2005), pp. 3-12. For an evaluation of the business elite in the 1990s, see: Hayri Kozanoglu, *Yuppuiler, Prenslar ve Bizim Kusak* (Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinlari, 1993).

cultural distinction and polarization.<sup>15</sup> It is possible to talk about a continuing interest in the matter as studies that link social-class reproduction in globalizing Istanbul or secular elite and social aloofness have been recently published.<sup>16</sup> The growing interest in academics has started to produce academic works that cover Turkish transnational professionals through ethnographic methods<sup>17</sup>, and works that scrutinize the impact of globalization on the Turkish elite identity and discourses.<sup>18</sup>

One can see the growing interest in Turkey's contemporary urban social classes and globalization's impacts. It is also possible to see the studies above which converge with the content of this thesis by their choice of investigated subjects, methods, interview questions, and reviewed literature. However, these studies only indirectly explore the field of interest that was posed at the beginning of this section. More specifically, these studies do not aim to address the relation between transnational experience and exposure and self-narrated cosmopolitan identities and dispositions, and if they do, then they do not address how these shape the cosmopolitan identities and dispositions of Turkish transnational professionals by

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<sup>15</sup> Rifat Bali, *Tarz-i Hayattan Life Style'a, Yeni Seckinler, Yeni Mekanlar, Yeni Yasamlar* (Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinlari, 2002); Fusun Ustel and Birol Caymaz, *Seckinler ve Sosyal Mesafe* (Istanbul: Istanbul Bilgi Universitesi Sivil Toplum Calismalari Merkezi, 2009); Can Kozanoglu, *Yeni Sehir Notlari* (Istanbul: Iletisim Yayinlari, 2001); Yildiz Atasoy, "Cosmopolitan Islamists in Turkey: Rethinking the Local in a Global Era," *Studies in Political Economy* 71/72 (2003), pp.133–161; Nilufer Gole, "Secularism and Islamism in Turkey: The Making of Elites and Counter-Elites," *Middle East Journal* 51, no.1 (Winter 1997), pp.46-58; Mucahit Bilici, "Black Turks, White Turks: On the Three Requirements of Turkish Citizenship," *Insight Turkey* 11, no.3 (2009), pp.23-35; Beyza Sumer, "White vs. Black Turks: The Civilising Process in Turkey in the 1990s" (Unpublished MSc thesis, Middle East Technical University, 2003), <http://etd.lib.metu.edu.tr/upload/1038777/index.pdf> [23 March 2010]; Seda Demiralp, "White Turks, Black Turks: Islam, Class, and Race in Turkey" (Paper presented at the "67<sup>th</sup> Annual National Conference" of Midwest Political Science Association, The Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, Illinois, 02 April 2009), [http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p\\_mla\\_apa\\_research\\_citation/3/6/1/6/2/p361625\\_index.html](http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/3/6/1/6/2/p361625_index.html) [23 March 2010]; Ali Simsek, *Yeni Orta Sinif* (Istanbul: Leyla ile Mecnun Yayinlari, 2005); Secil Doguc, "Yeni Orta Siniflarin Gozunden Zenginlik ve Yoksulluk," *Toplum ve Bilim* no.104 (2005), pp.73-91; Jenny White, "The Ebbing Power of Turkey's Secularist Elite," *Current History* 106, no.704 (December 2007), pp.427-433; Kubra Parmaksizoglu, "Bobos in Turkey: Manifestations of the Bourgeois Bohemian Lifestyle in Istanbul" (Unpublished MA thesis, Bogazici University, 31 August 2009).

<sup>16</sup> Henry J. Rutz and Erol M. Balkan, *Reproducing Class; Education, Neoliberalism and the Rise of the New Middle Class in Istanbul* (New York-Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2009).

<sup>17</sup> Deniz Erkmen, "Deciphering Professionals: Transnationalism and Cosmopolitanism in Practice" (Unpublished Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 2009), <http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/63841> [25 June 2010]; Meltem Yilmaz Sener, "Turkish Managers as Part of the Transnational Capitalist Class," *Journal of World-Systems Research* 13, no.2 (2008), pp. 119-141, <http://jwsr.ucr.edu/archive/vol13/Sener-vol13n2.pdf> [16 December 2009].

<sup>18</sup> Sedef Arat-Koc, "(Some) Turkish Transnationalism(s) in an Age of Capitalist Globalization and Empire: "White Turk" Discourse, the New Geopolitics, and Implications for Feminist Transnationalism," *Journal of Middle East Women's Studies* 3, no.1 (Winter 2007), pp.35-57.

contextualizing these subjects as socio-culturally and socio-politically embedded elite in Turkey. In this sense, there is a lack of academic production, which investigates how occupational transnationalism can be converted into cosmopolitan identities and dispositions and how these cultivated cosmopolitanisms (if any) relate with communally and locally defined Turkish elite identities. This thesis aims both theoretically and empirically to contribute to the academic discussion on these themes.

### Organization of the Thesis

The next sections of this thesis are as follows: Chapter Two consists of a theoretical framework that aims at understanding and linking status groups, elites, forms of capital, transnational professionals, transnational experience and exposure and cosmopolitanism. In addition to this, the chapter is supplemented by examples from the relevant international literature mentioned above. Chapter Three presents a contextual framework for understanding Turkey and Istanbul in the age of globalization. In this regard, globalization's impact on the economy, urban social classes and urban space is discussed both theoretically and empirically. The second part of this chapter consists of theoretical and empirical discussions on the encounters of the secular Turkish elite and urban middle classes with the rising Islamic bourgeoisie and migrants in the urban space provided by Istanbul. At the end of the chapter, identities and discourses produced by the elite in regards to this encounter are discussed. Chapter Four consists of a presentation of the empirical study conducted for the thesis. Moreover, it is followed by various thematic sections, which include narratives from selected interviews and their analyses. Chapter Five consists of an evaluation of the findings from the fieldwork in regards to the research question and discussions in previous chapters. In this chapter, some recommendations for further studies are also included.

## CHAPTER TWO

### INTRODUCING CONCEPTUAL TOOLS FOR UNDERSTANDING GLOBALIZATION, TRANSNATIONALISM, COSMOPOLITANISM AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF SOCIAL STATUS AND EXPERIENCE

This chapter examines various literatures which may supply the conceptual tools for entering into the operationalization of two fundamental themes in this research. In this study, Turkish middle/high ranking business professionals, who have been employed or who are still employed at multinational and foreign corporations, constitute the object population. In this regard, these people carry three components embodied integrally in their individualities that need to be conceptualized separately for analytical purposes: being Turkish, being middle/high-ranking business professionals, and being transnational business professionals. In this chapter, the focus will be on the second and third components, and in the next chapter, these individuals will be contextualized within Turkey's (more particularly Istanbul's) socio-historical background and contemporary conjuncture.

#### Understanding Status and Capital

There is nothing new about discussing statuses. In a similar fashion to its epistemological cousin "class," "status" has been scrutinized exhaustively in the social science disciplines, for a long time and over a vast geography. However, class and status are still viable concepts that help in understanding contemporary social realities. It is believed that the influence of being a "high-level business professional" in our contemporary societies

goes far beyond its organizational and technical role and it may be regarded as a personal quality which is heavily loaded with “social status”- may carry pejorative or positive connotations depending on the social circle. Here of course by contemporary societies, industrial/ post-industrial capitalist economies and societies are being implied.

The earliest scholar to propose a systematic and coherent analysis of social status in modern capitalist society appears to have been Max Weber. Weber first defines “class”:

In our terminology, "classes" are not communities; they merely represent possible, and frequent, bases for communal action. We may speak of a "class" when (1) a number of people have in common a specific causal component of their life chances, in so far as (2) this component is represented exclusively-by -economic- interests in the possession of goods and opportunities for income, and (3) is represented under the conditions of the commodity or labor markets. [These points refer to "class situation," which we may express more briefly as the typical chance for a supply of goods, external living conditions, and personal life experiences (...) as determined by the power, or lack of such, to dispose of goods or skills for income in a given economic order. The term "class" refers to any group of people that is found in the same class situation.]<sup>19</sup>

Moreover, later he contrasts “status groups” to it:

In contrast to classes, status groups are normally communities. They are, however, often of an amorphous kind. In contrast to the purely economically determined "class situation" we wish to designate as "status situation" every typical component of the life fate of men that is determined by a specific, positive or negative, social estimation of honor. This honor may be connected with any quality shared by a plurality, and, of course, it can be knit to a class situation: class distinctions are linked in the most varied ways with status distinctions (...).But status honor need not necessarily be linked with a "class situation." On the contrary, it normally stands in sharp opposition to the pretensions of sheer property.<sup>20</sup> (Emphasis by this author)

So according to Weber, “class situation” works as an umbrella term, involving the living conditions and experiences of a person whose situation is constrained by his economic agency within the economic order, in our case, the capitalist market. In this regard, dispossessed and un-skilled workers who serve the capitalists in return for wages, or

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<sup>19</sup> Max Weber. “Class, Status, Party” in *Status Communities in Modern Society, Alternatives to Class Analysis*, ed. Holger R. Stub (Hinsdale; Illinois: The Dryden Press, 1972), p.45.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, p.50.

dispossessed and skilled bureaucrats who serve the state for salaries would be sharing the same class position with the members of their own group and together would constitute distinct classes from the class of the capital-possessors or the capitalists. Weber argues that the people who belong to the same class share similar “life-chances,” “economic interests” and positions regarding capital and labor markets. However, contrary to the class situation, which is “purely economically defined,” status situation is defined by the level or quality of “honor” that is socially attributed to it. In this way, “status groups” are defined by the honor that is socially attributed to the possessed “quality” of its members.

Weber elaborates further:

In content, status honor is normally expressed by the fact that above all else a specific style of life can be expected from all those who wish to belong to the circle. Linked with this expectation are restrictions on "social" intercourse (that is, intercourse which is not subservient to economic or any other of business's "functional" purposes).<sup>21</sup> (Emphasis by this author)

In this regard, the members of the same status group enjoys (either a low or high degree of) equivalent social honor that is attributed due to certain qualities they share. The status honor is manifested in a particular way of living or life style, which defines various restrictions on social interaction. Weber argues that “status stratification,” or hierarchy between different orders of status, is maintained by “a monopolization of ideal and material goods or opportunities” and especially the “distance and exclusiveness” that is enjoyed as a dimension of a “specific status honor” becomes mostly visible in the form of “material monopolies,” which translate as privileges or codes of clothing, eating, possessing arms, enjoying and practicing arts etc.<sup>22</sup> Thus by emphasizing the privilege of consumption Weber reaches a more simplified conclusion; “classes” are stratified according to their relations to

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<sup>21</sup> Ibid., pp.50-51.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., p.53.

the production and acquisition of goods; whereas "status groups" are stratified according to the principles of their consumption of goods as represented by special "styles of life".<sup>23</sup>

As can be seen in the passages above, life style and specific consumption habits are described by Weber to define the status groups of modern societies. Although Weber's analysis of status and his emphasis on life style and consumption were prescient for his time, his analysis needs to be further elaborated for adaptation to the contemporary reality of modern capitalist societies.

At this point, Bryan Turner's monograph *Status* becomes instrumental for adapting and elaborating the matter. In the introduction to his work, Turner chronologically traces how "status" has been scrutinized by sociologists and emphasizes three analytical distinctions in the preferred definitions of status so far: static vs. dynamic, ascribed vs. achieved, and subjective vs. objective.<sup>24</sup>

As opposed to Abercrombie et al.'s "descriptive account of status," in which Abercrombie associates "social status" with "social role" and defines social roles as "the bundles of socially-defined attributes and expectations associated with social positions," which he considers as static, Turner prefers an approach which takes status to be both "multi-dimensionally" determined and "hierarchically ranked in terms of greater or lesser privileges and prestige."<sup>25</sup> When taken in a multidimensional and hierarchic way, it becomes possible to talk about "tensions or contradictions between the various dimensions in status positions," by referring to such concepts as "status consistency" or "status crystallization" and "status panic," which take into consideration "social and economic change" and its impacts on social structuration.<sup>26</sup>

As for the second distinction, Turner explains that sociologists distinguish between

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<sup>23</sup> Ibid., p.55.

<sup>24</sup> Bryan Turner, *Concepts in Social Thought, Status*, ed. Frank Parkin (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), pp. 3-4.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., p.3.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid., p.3.

‘Ascribed status’ (which refers to certain attributes of persons over which they have little or no control, such as race, gender or age) and achieved status (which refers to the position which a person may achieve, for example through educational competition). It is often argued that whereas ascribed status is common in pre-modern societies, achieved status plays a far greater role in contemporary industrial society, where certain values or norms follow from a general commitment to equality, especially equality of opportunity for citizens.

In this regard, because some sociologists consider that the “contemporary societies place a greater emphasis on universalistic-achievement values” as contrary to the “particularistic-ascriptive” “traditional standards of prestige and honour,” some sociologists have come to describe modern society as a “credential society.” In this society, the emphasis is on “personal achievement” and, “educational success and the acquisition of credentials become crucial in the distribution of prestige and rewards.”<sup>27</sup>

At this stage, Turner proposes a definition of status: “a status is a position within the social structure by which an individual, according to various ascribed and achieved criteria, is evaluated by reference to prestige and honour.”<sup>28</sup> After this definition, he explains the third distinction, where one can talk about “self-perception of status” and “externally-defined status positions.” Thus, the “evaluation by reference to prestige and honour” involves both subjective and objective dimensions.<sup>29</sup>

The description above regards the “position of the individual” in society.<sup>30</sup> When left this way, it lacks certain features that were stated by Weber, such as life styles and consumption. In addition, in this definition, it is hard to see how people of different status within a society interact with each other. Thus by a close and critical reading of Weber’s work, Turner emphasizes the need to discuss “status groups,” which has been discussed by Weber as “integrated and combative social collectivities.”<sup>31</sup> Thus, discussing Weber’s

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<sup>27</sup> Ibid., p.4.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid., p.5.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., p.5.

<sup>30</sup> Ibid., p.5.

<sup>31</sup> Ibid., p.5.

analyses and notions, and referring to the contributions of Pierre Bourdieu, Turner proposes a definition:

A status group is (...) a collection of individuals who are organized to maintain or expand their *social privileges* by a mechanism of social closure to protect existing monopolies of privilege against outsiders, and by usurpation to expand the benefits by reference to proximate or superior status groups. The existence of status groups inevitably involves *social conflict and social struggle*, although these forms of social struggle may be frequently disguised or hidden.<sup>32</sup> (Emphases by this author)

Moreover, at the final stage, Turner proposes a definition where he combines “status of the individual” and the “status group”:

(...) by status I mean firstly a bundle of *socio-political claims* against society which gives an individual (or more sociologically a group) certain benefits and privileges, marking him or her off from other individuals or groups. These socio-political claims are to scarce resources, especially to educational, cultural, or symbolic resources. This cultural aspect of status gives rise to a second dimension, namely the notion of status as a *cultural lifestyle* which distinguishes a status group with a special identity in society.<sup>33</sup> (Emphases by this author)

Even though the notion of status group is sufficiently comprehensive, Turner includes one last conceptual distinction in his discussion by emphasizing the temporal factor in status congregations: the distinction between status communities and status columns or blocs. “A status community is... a genuine form of enduring community” in which “individuals enjoy” “over relatively long periods of time, certain broad attributes, such as language, culture or ethnicity.” By contrast, “status columns and blocs are more like associations or organizations in which individuals form organizational structures for specific purposes.”<sup>34</sup>

Discussing Weber and Turner supplies us with the fundamentals of understanding “status” and “status groups” as societal notions. In this manner, we started by distinguishing

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<sup>32</sup> Ibid., p.8.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid., p.11.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., p.12.

between status and class, and emphasized the “socially constructed” feature of “status.” Used in a positive way, Weber associates status with “privileges” and with by “social distinction.” Thus, status groups are comprised of individuals wielding certain qualities which supply them the privilege of social distinction.

Through the discussions of Turner, we learn that there are various distinctive approaches behind the operationalization of status. In this way, status needs to be seen as a reproduced category, which is influenced very much from the changes in the socio-economic structure of the society. The determination of statuses is multidimensional and they are hierarchical categories. Building upon Weber’s analysis of status and status groups, Turner emphasizes the possible plurality of the status groups within a society and the conflicting interrelation between different groups due to limited access to resources and privileges within a social entity such as the nation state. Thus, cultural lifestyles and consumption are manifestations of such differences, similar to what Weber suggests, but they reflect deeper-rooted differences such as “socio-political” claims.

Above, Turner’s emphasis on the value of acquired status in the contemporary society, which is also described as the “credential society” was discussed. The notion of “elite,” as discussed by Holger R. Stub, appears to be a notion that is functional for understanding the social legitimization behind the positive connotation of “status.” Stub makes the matter of power wielding an integral aspect of his discussion of elite:

The development of new social and economic roles, particularly in the professional and technical areas, has made it necessary to devise new ways of conceptualizing the existence of new forces of influence and power wielding in modern society. The concept of *elite* is a response to the inapplicability of older concepts in dealing with the new heterogeneity.<sup>35</sup> (Original emphasis)

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<sup>35</sup> Holger Stub, “Elites and Status Circles” in *Status Communities in Modern Society, Alternatives to Class Analysis*, ed. Holger Stub (Hinsdale; Illinois: The Dryden Press, 1972), p.253.

Here, the matter of “new forces of influence” emerges as an important analytical contribution. Stub believes that in modern society, power wielding cannot be restricted to socio-political groups such as the “ruling class” or “aristocracy.” He states that “the increase in specialization in technologically advanced societies has given rise to the need for expertise,” hence “expertise” has now become a new force of influence. In the technologically advanced societies, “exclusiveness” is increasingly associated with the wielding of expertise. Stub argues, “The expert gains his place on the basis of merit, and the most meritorious become members of the elite.” Contrary to the homogenous and restricted power-wielding groups of traditional societies, expertise as a “new force of influence” enables a “plurality” of power-wielding groups to emerge. Stub argues that “elite” means “best” and “in stratification studies it is used in a plural form to indicate that there are considerable numbers who are viewed as ‘best’ in their *particular* activity.” Thus, due to the plurality and interdependency of elite groups, the power of influence over decision-making processes turns out to be shared.<sup>36</sup>

Stub further argues that the “theoretical necessity for the use of the concept of elite” stems from the “attempt to handle the fragmentation of society at the upper middle levels of highly differentiated modern societies.” In a similar effort, the concept of “status community” has also been used. However, Stub underlines that “elite” indicates a more specific condition than “status community” does. Speaking in a Weberian jargon, “an elite is a positively honored or privileged status group,” and they can form status communities, but “a status community” per se “may be *either* positively or negatively privileged.”<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> Ibid., pp.253-254.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid., p.254.

Stub refers to Suzanne Keller,<sup>38</sup> who has divided various types of social leadership into five groups: ruling caste, aristocracy, the first estate, ruling class and strategic elites.

Keller explains “strategic elites” as in the following:

In this type of social leadership, several social strata supply personnel to leading social positions. Social functions are elaborated and specialized, and those in charge of these functions are recruited in a way adapted to their tasks. Merit regardless of other attribute – sex, race, class, religion, or even age- is the predominant justification for attaining elite positions or elite status. The notion of all around excellence or overall superiority is gone. *Strategic elites, are specialists in excellence...along with specialization, diversity, and impermanence of elites, new problems arise- those of cohesion and unity, morale, balance, and a new type of interdependence at the top. No single elite can outrank all others because no one elite knows enough about the specialized work of others.*<sup>39</sup> (Emphases by this author)

Although the association between “status” and “expertise,” or “exclusiveness” and “merit” must have become clear for the reader by now, it is necessary to discuss how “expertise” or “merit” is acquired. Actually, the definition of elite in the daily language seems to comprise of the means to become one: “the elite” is “a group of persons who by virtue of position or education exercise much power or influence.”<sup>40</sup> In a similar fashion to Merriam-Webster’s emphasis on education, Stub states, “since expertise is the prime basis for elite status, educational credentials have become the major criteria for entry into the sub-elites that provide the recruiting ground for the ‘strategic’ elites, to use Keller’s term.”<sup>41</sup> In the line of the discussions, it may be stated that acquirement of “educational credentials” provide the privilege of “entry into the sub-elites,” and the development of merits as competencies at expert level through available means provide the opportunity of acquiring a positively privileged social status which also embodies social influence.

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<sup>38</sup> Ibid., p.254. [Cites from Suzanne Keller, *Beyond the Ruling Class: Strategic Elites in Modern Society* (New York: Random House, 1963), p. 32.]

<sup>39</sup> Ibid., p.254.

<sup>40</sup> Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, s.v."elite.," <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/elite> [27 July 2010]

<sup>41</sup> Stub, “Elites and Status Circles,” p.255.

The discussion that has been conducted thus far has aimed to explain the basics of status as a notion in Sociology and the way it was developed and applied by various scholars. The acquired dimension of status has been investigated in order to emphasize the evaluation of status in contemporary societies. In this sense, the social notion of elite signifying positively privileged groups has been discussed to show that merit and expertise in contemporary societies and economies have been increasingly influential in terms of defining the social status of individuals.

In the light of the discussion above, it is necessary to emphasize that it is beneficial to apply Weber's notion of "status group" to the research at hand. In this sense, Turner's elaboration on Weber's notion is even more helpful. Taking status groups as social collectivities with certain "social privileges" is very important to see how certain privileges may conflict with the aspirations of other social collectivities, which would result in social conflict if the tension cannot be resolved. In this sense, when talking about status groups in a community in the contemporary world, social contestation should be taken as an integral dimension of the presence of the group as it becomes meaningful to talk about status groups if there is unequal conditions of access –"monopolization" in Weber's terms- to certain opportunities, goods and so on.

In this sense, we believe that, being foremost individuals in the meritocratic business environment, people with middle and high ranking professional careers at foreign and multinational corporations can be considered as a status group as explained by Weber. However, in this study, status group is taken to be a "positively honored" and "privileged" collectivity as Stub mentions, and they are considered as the merited members of this group, hence members of the business elite.

Moreover, understanding social prestige of the status group that these individuals constitute clearly becomes possible when they are contextualized within a "credential society," where the "validity" of social and cultural competencies becomes key factors behind

reproduction of social classes and socio-cultural distinctions. In the next chapter, this framework will be necessary to understand how it becomes possible to talk about “new” and “old” social classes, as in “new middle class” and “old middle class.”

It should be once more emphasized that it becomes only meaningful to talk about status groups when they are contextualized within a larger community. In this way, it may be possible to locate such groups as belonging to larger socio-economic classes or political communities. In this manner, in the next chapter, Turner’s depiction of status groups as conflicting and struggling over social privileges, differentiating in cultural life styles and socio-political claims will be helpful for understanding the current political position of the historically hegemonic elite of Turkey (West-oriented, secular) and its conflict (a mutual one) with the counter-hegemonic elite (the new Muslim elite), and for understanding the conflict within the hegemonic elite though a less stressed one (between the liberal and authoritarian fractions). Actually, Stub’s emphasis on understanding the contemporary political realm as a scene where there is a plurality of either interdependent or conflicting power-wielding groups complements Turner’s analysis. Also, Stub’s emphasis on expertise as a new form of influence also can be used to understand the close relation between academic and professional careers through which merited elite can lay claim to power in the contemporary “credential society” both on national and trans-national scales.

At this point, despite the fact that his approach for interpreting society may be considered as too “economized,” introducing Pierre Bourdieu’s conceptualization and operationalization of “capital” is necessary for understanding how the modern strategic elite are produced and how expertise can be regarded as a new form of influence. According to Bourdieu, “capital presents itself in three fundamental guises”:

as *economic capital*, which is immediately and directly convertible into money and may be institutionalized in the forms of property rights; as *cultural capital*, which is convertible, on certain conditions, into economic capital and may be institutionalized in the forms of educational

qualifications; and as *social capital*, made up of social obligations ('connections'), which is convertible, in certain conditions, into economic capital and may be institutionalized in the forms of a title of nobility.<sup>42</sup> (Original emphases)

Even though it is possible to make sense of the notion of “economic capital” in regards to the modus operandi of modern capitalism, “cultural capital” and “social capital” deserve further investigation. Bourdieu discusses cultural capital can be found in three forms: “embodied,” “objectified” and “institutionalized.”<sup>43</sup> The form of “embodied state” may be considered as the “long-lasting dispositions of the mind and body” and, according to Bourdieu, “the accumulation of cultural capital in the embodied state,” which “*presupposes a process of embodiment, incorporation,*” which requires the investment of personal labor and personal time by its owner or cultivator. Thus, the embodied capital becomes an “integral part of the person” and it cannot be “transmitted instantaneously (unlike money, property rights, or even titles of nobility) nor it “cannot be accumulated beyond the appropriating capacities of an individual agent.”<sup>44</sup>

Cultural capital provides various privileges to its owner. It is “predisposed to function as symbolic capital” due to its “disguised form” as compared to economic capital, thus it gets to be “unrecognized as capital and recognized as legitimate competence.” However, in “class-divided societies” where class members do not enjoy equivalent cultural and economic opportunities for self-cultivation or for next generation’s cultivation, being competent “secures share in the profits,” but in a less direct way than economic capital, due to the unequal distribution of cultivated cultural capital and it also provides its holder a symbolic “distinctness” within the broader community.<sup>45</sup> This works easiest through the technologies of the institutionalized state of cultural capital. In this manner, “institutional recognition” of

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<sup>42</sup> Pierre Bourdieu, “The Forms of Capital” in *Blackwell readers in sociology (volume 8): Readings in economic sociology*, ed. Nicole Woolsey Biggart, (Malden; Massachusetts: Blackwell, 2002), p.281.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, p.282.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, p.283.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.283-284.

cultivated cultural capital in terms of “academic qualification” gets to be approved as “a certificate of cultural competence which confers on its holder a conventional, constant, legally guaranteed value.” This way it becomes possible to establish “conversion rates between cultural capital and economic capital by guaranteeing the monetary value of a given academic capital.”<sup>46</sup>

The other convertible form of capital is that of “social.” Similar to the cultural capital functions as a symbol of competence, social capital functions as a symbol of creditability:

Social capital is the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition – or in other words, to membership in a group[11] – which provides each of its members with the backing of the collectivity-owned capital, a ‘credential’ which entitles them to credit, in the various senses of the word....The volume of the social capital possessed by a given agent thus depends on the size of the network of connections he can effectively mobilize and on the volume of the capital (economic, cultural or symbolic) possessed in his own right by each of those to whom he is connected.<sup>47</sup>

Bourdieu’s forms of capital are introduced in order to demonstrate that acquired status is a socio-economically and socio-culturally valorized matter. For an individual in the modern capitalist society that is intermeshed by corporations and their networks, familial background - as a part of social capital, recognized education - as a part of academic capital, and personal skills - as a part of cultural capital can become most critical assets especially for members of the middle class who do not own the means of production and hence need to be employed to maintain their livelihood. Being employed as an expert professional can promise serious returns of income –being a part of economic capital, and depending on the size of the institution, the level of responsibilities and granted authorization associated with the occupational status can function both as materially realized power and as symbolic capital.

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<sup>46</sup> Ibid., p.285.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid., p.286.

The administrative elite in the public enterprises and governmental institutions, such as undersecretaries, executive assistants or consultants, who are also considered as technocrats or bureaucrats; and the administrative elite in the private sector, such as executives, consultants, lawyers, can be considered as examples of the strategic elite about which Keller talks. Although the “social honor” attributed to these individuals is politically controversial, it is likely for people of such posts to acquire high economic and symbolic rewards due to their rare assets such as know-how, information, networks, and skills. Although, their occupation of such posts is always subject to change during times of turbulence of political support or declining profits, there is a “new force of influence” to be gained by cultivation of competence and merit.

#### High-ranking Business Professionals of the Global Era and Transnationalization

The ethnographic approach of Tuomo Peltonen to occupational communities and multinational corporations provides us with some concrete particularities of our status group, which can help understanding how they need to be distinguished from the majority of the white-collar employees in contemporary Turkey and from those in the pre-1980s era. Peltonen offers a social typology of the high-ranking business professionals in the corporate world, which seems to be globally applicable (although he specifies the sectors, he unfortunately does not specify the sizes of the corporations. Here it is assumed that he describes globally operating enterprises):

The high-ranking business professionals in corporate management, accounting and finance and management consulting have at their disposal cultural and economic resources incomparable to the upper echelon lifestyle of the corporate employees during the industrial age. They are the makers of the market economy and hence *enjoy a power elite status in the globalized world system* that is geared towards shareholder value and free market ideology (Aboulafia, 1998). *The high class of the new economy* inhabits the

business districts of global cities where it is offered opulent services and sites for conspicuous consumption that distinguish its members from the regular employee-consumers contenting themselves with a more frugal lifestyle (Sassen, 1998). *This new class is distinctively trans-national in its outlook, pursuing a similar lifestyle in different national contexts – a lifestyle marked with a detachment from the communities tied to a distinct place or task and instead characterized by a habitual movement from one place to another, all designed to create an impression of a ‘home’ for the privileged groups* (Bauman, 1998; Peltonen, 2006a). The new economy has meant not only mounting financial rewards for the elite of global capitalism, but it has also produced a profound gap between the rich and the advantaged and the rest of the participants in the corporate system.<sup>48</sup> (Emphases by this author)

Peltonen’s framing of the “elite of global capitalism” gives us the opportunity of going beyond the theoretical framework borrowed from the scholars of economic sociology and social stratification. In other words, this is to admit that sticking to Keller and Stub’s depiction of the elite or Bourdieu’s capital carries the risk of considering elites as a group of agents whose social statuses are defined solely through their functions of executing expertise. In this sense, a more socio-culturally embedded twist will enable incorporating Turner’s depiction of status groups with particular “cultural lifestyles” to our discussion.

In his description, Peltonen emphasizes the emerging economic sectors of the global era, and the statuses enjoyed by high-ranking professionals of corporations that operate in such sectors. In this sense, as parallel to the change of age and technologies, the statuses of corporate executives have also changed. Peltonen describes the professionals as part of a “global power elite” who live and work in the “global cities” and enjoy luxury services. Moreover, instead of considering these people as a member of their national community, it is more logical to see them as a transnational status group, one that is globally mobile and privileged regardless of geographic constraints.

Peltonen’s description becomes further interesting when the Turkish business professionals that are the subjects of this study are considered as a part of the “elite of global

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<sup>48</sup> Peltonen, p. 350.

capitalism” or “global power elite” that live in the globalizing city of Istanbul. In this sense, not only the social group but also Istanbul as a spatial medium carries importance for understanding the integration to globalization as Peltonen describes mutually defining social and spatial changes.

Now in order to understand transnationalization as a component integral to globalizing business life, a brief look at the presentation of transnational business life to professionals must be taken. In the post-1980s world of globalization, business professionals at non-national corporations and business school students are exposed to a discourse that is increasingly transnational in scale and content. Corporations, management gurus, elite private sector retirees and academic textbooks increasingly emphasize the new conditions of the global era and the methods for adapting to this fast-flowing environment as professionals.<sup>49</sup>

In this manner, it is possible to find depictions of this new business life through a close reading of relevant business materials. A book written by two INSEAD professors, Susan C. Schneider and Jean-Louis Barsoux is helpful in the sense that it focuses on business management issues in the new business environment.<sup>50</sup>

As discussed above, today, high-level executives of internationally operating corporations interact with people from different countries and cultures in many ways. Schneider and Barsoux argue that traditionally the notion of “international manager” was used to denote the “expatriate manager,” who is a manager assigned to a business mission in another country for a couple of years by the country or home office. However, due to the sophistication of the management strategies of the corporations, and intensification of cross-country relations, in addition to the ex-patriates, there developed an increasing need for a new type of cosmopolitan, multilingual, multifaceted executive who can rapidly implement

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<sup>49</sup> Halsall, 2005.

<sup>50</sup> Susan C. Schneider and Jean-Louis Barsoux, “The ‘International Manager’” in *Managing across Cultures*, eds. Schneider and Barsoux (Prentice Hall Europe: Financial Times- Prentice Hall, 1997), p.157.

operations across national borders.<sup>51</sup> Rather limited to the extreme examples within this type of employment, “international manager” also is used for describing “an international elite of executives, drawn from the company’s operations worldwide, portrayed as members of a global commando or SWAT team, living out of airplanes and recognizable by their constant jetlag.”<sup>52</sup> However, the authors argue that the “rumors of existence of a “global” corporate manager as someone who pursues a “borderless career,” and whose corporate identity overrides that of country and even family,” somewhat distorts the reality because it has been found out that companies with such “international corps of executives” who are transferred frequently and multiple times experience difficulties while integrating into the “corporate mainstream.”<sup>53</sup>

In summary, in order to talk about internationalization of management, and intensification of foreign exposure in the business environment, we do not have to confine our imagination with *crème de la crème* business professionals. Management across the cultures, authors argue, is no more solely an issue for the “jet-setting elite, the corporate trouble-shooters, and battle-scarred expatriates,” so as the operations of corporations are becoming increasingly internationalized, the “offices of today” follow in the same manner.<sup>54</sup>

It is believed that in both Peltonen’s and Schneider and Barsoux’s descriptions of contemporary professional business life, there are two issues that need to be featured. One of them is the transnationalization of work. The work is trans-nationalized in the sense that, being an imperative of global capitalism, as corporations operate on a larger geographical territory, it becomes necessary for the employees (although differing for different work levels) to maintain relations with a plurality of workplaces and work colleagues, and this requires the trespassing of national boundaries for doing business. The other issue is the

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<sup>51</sup> Ibid., p.157.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid., p.157.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid., p.157.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid., Introduction, vii.

transnationalization of living, which is reflected into the way in which wide range of routine practices are carried out. As geographical mobility increases, the social networks and spatial media on which these business professionals operate become increasingly multi-cultural/multi-national/multi-ethnic, which force everyday practices to become transnationalized or trans-localized. This means that the more people are exposed to foreign cultures through practices involving travelling, consumption and interaction the more they need the competencies to be able to make sense of the foreign environments. Thus, it also becomes a necessity to talk about the matter of “cosmopolitanism,” which is the idea of seeing the whole world as one’s hometown.

As for the research agenda at hand, how the experiences of globalizing business life are incorporated into the subjective identities and preferences of high-ranking business managers, keeping in mind that they are the “elite” and “trans-locals” of the contemporary era is the main question. In this regard, having completed the investigation on status and capital, and having discussed briefly the environment of the transnational business life, now the discussion moves onto a third literature, which will complete the theoretical review for linking status, capital, transnationalization and cosmopolitanism.

### Thinking of Globalization as Transnational Experience and Exposure

Victor Roudometof’s article, “Transnationalism, Cosmopolitanism and Glocalization,” provides a theoretical framework that is crucial for this study. In the introductory part of his article, the author explains:

This essay is a contribution towards gaining conceptual clarity with regard to the task of conceptualizing (and distinguishing between) *transnationalism* and *cosmopolitanism*. My argument is that the *transnational experience* should be conceived as involving several layers ranging from the construction of *transnational social spaces* to the formation of transnational

communities. Hence, transnationalism's relationship to cosmopolitanism is less straightforward than what it might seem at first glance. The reality of *internal globalization (or glocalization)* is responsible for the transformation of people's everyday lives irrespective of whether they are transnational or not. Glocalization leads to two different versions of cosmopolitanism: first, a thick or rooted or situational cosmopolitanism and, second, a thin cosmopolitanism, whereby detachment allows for transcending the boundaries of one's culture or locale. I argue in favour of this second version and develop an operationalization of the cosmopolitan–local continuum in terms of different degrees of attachment to cultures, locales and regions.<sup>55</sup> (Emphases by this author)

Obviously, this introduction is loaded with concepts that are relevant for the study at hand. Before starting to investigate these concepts, it would be beneficial to go over Roudometof's agenda for his article. First, Roudometof emphasizes the distinction between transnationalism and cosmopolitanism. The second matter that Roudometof emphasizes is the scope and dynamics of "transnational experience." In the following paragraphs, it will be clarified how this concept can be operationalized for this study.

Roudometof argues that the notion of "transnationalism" emerged in the 1990s in an effort to describe the situation of immigrant populations that mostly had left Central America for joining the labor force in North America and Western Europe.<sup>56</sup> However, the way that Roudometof chooses to use the term has a wider and different scope. He argues:

The emerging reality of social life under conditions of internal globalization or glocalization is what should be properly understood as transnationalism. Transnationalism is an emergent property that is born out of internal globalization. It does not refer to qualitative feelings or attitudes of individuals, and it is not affected by what people think of it.<sup>57</sup>

The way that Roudometof chooses to define transnationalism brings forward another important concept "glocalization" or "internal globalization." From his definition it is possible to deduce that the conditions of experiencing transnationalism is not defined by the subjects, but it is a condition of experiencing that is defined structurally. He explains further:

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<sup>55</sup> Roudometof, p. 113.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid., p.115.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid., p.118.

To go beyond the conventional understanding of transnationalism as a facet of international migration, it is necessary to conceptualize transnational interactions as taking place among people and institutions in two or more separate ‘containers’ or nation-states. Internal globalization is the process of creating the room or the space for these interactions; that is, internal globalization provides the preconditions, the material and non-material infrastructure for the emerging spaces of human interaction. The resulting reality is *transnational social spaces* (Beck, 2000a) – spaces that, by definition, cannot be restricted to transnational labour markets (Portes, 2000). On the contrary, they can extend into other spaces, including spaces of transnational sexuality, popular music, journalism, as well as spaces fostering the construction of a multitude of identities (ranging from those based on gender to those based on race, religion, or ethnicity). Hence, the notion of transnational social space is considerably broader than the concept of transnational communities.<sup>58</sup> (Emphases by this author)

Deducing from Roudometof’s description, it is possible to claim that “internal globalization” is a process that provides new spatio-temporal media for transnational human interaction, which is called “transnational social spaces.” Apparently, the intention behind choosing the term “space” is related to the effort of containing both material and immaterial categories of interaction. As Roudometof states:

Transnational social spaces are constructed through the accelerated pace of *transnational practices* that become routine practices in social life... *transnational interactions* involve such routines as international calls, faxes, emails, satellite TV broadcasting, simultaneous media access through Internet sources and TV stations, international conferences, the different varieties of international tourism (ranging from recreational tourism to sex tourism or eco-tourism), as well as the everlasting formalized agreements and ongoing negotiations of a wide array of international organizations and non-governmental groups.<sup>59</sup> (Emphases by this author)

According to this description, transnational social spaces are constructed through transnational practices. The characteristics of these transnational practices, which make internal globalization possible, are their “everydayness” and presence on multiple media. Transnational practices become transnational interactions that consist of relations of

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<sup>58</sup> Ibid., pp.118-119.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid., p.119.

correspondence, which are established through diverse communication channels, locational congregations, transportation and organizational relations.

In “Network, Exposure and Rhetoric: Italian Occupational Fields and Heterogeneity in Constructing the Globalized Self,” Massimiliano Monaci, Mauro Magatti and Marco Caselli describe their findings of an empirical study, motivated by the general hypothesis, which claims, “(...) there is not a unique experience of globalization but there are many different experiences, and that this variety of experiences is crucial to understanding the changes that are unfolding in the so-called global (ized) world.”<sup>60</sup> In the article, Monaci et al. set their aim as the following: “Our intention in this article is to understand how people perceive and enact globalization on the basis of their distinctive individual experience and of their belonging to specific social contexts.”<sup>61</sup> More particularly they claim “(...) individuals’ transnational networks combine with other dimensions of their social experience to produce a self-perception of their own “global identity.””<sup>62</sup> In order to prove this, the authors pursue an empirical study based on semi-structured interviews conducted with 159 people employed in Milan. The authors believe that Milan is “the driving force of Italian cultural and economic collective life” and borrow the term “gravitational pole” (coined by Fujita et al.) in order to emphasize its further importance:

Such poles comprise international-intensive socio-economic contexts in which participants (big companies, small business entrepreneurs, other collective actors and individuals in pursuit of good openings for their life projects and professional careers) may benefit from disparate agglomeration effects with respect to resources such as infrastructure, availability of human and social capital, information flows, organizational innovations, and so forth. It is not, therefore, by accident that in our research several interviewees defined Milan as ‘the only really international Italian city’.<sup>63</sup>

Locating their site as Milan, authors “focus on the structures and social spaces of everyday life in four crucial occupational domains (economic operators, artists, media

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<sup>60</sup> Monaci et al., p.457.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid., p.457.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid., p.457.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid., p.458.

professionals and teachers) where people's professional action is somehow performed simultaneously along local and global axes.”<sup>64</sup> Furthermore, the authors believe that for the actors operating in the occupational fields that are chosen to be strategic:

(...) the construction of a sense of *global identity* – what here will be called the *globalized self* – is deeply affected by the intertwining of different aspects of actors' social experience in the *work setting*. This idea of a multidimensionality of the identity dynamics connected, on the one hand, with the perception of the globalization process and, on the other, with the concrete practices of managing its effects in the sphere of professional life constitutes the central thesis of this work.<sup>65</sup> (Emphases by this author)

As can be seen in the words of the authors, there are two main themes that need to be elaborated further: “The globalized self” and “work experience.” Understanding these two themes is essential for making sense of their research, hence for understanding the motivation behind our work here.

It would be appropriate to keep in mind the sequence of logic in the case that is examined. The authors want to make sense of the globalized world, and they suggest that the way that people experience it differs. Thus in order to understand the globalized world and the ongoing processes of globalization, we need to be able to make sense of the commonalities and the differences within the ways that people experience these processes and the ways that people socially identify themselves. Actually, this is an arduous task as we are interested in understanding the micro cosmos of subjectivities in their relation to the macro cosmos of social world. In order to be able to move between these two cosmos, the authors take the “self” to be

(...) neither conceived as an epiphenomenon of powerful and inexorable social mechanisms, nor as a psychic dimension separated and independent from the development of society. Rather, the self represents the *dynamic place of the subjective experience*: a reflective dimension inside which individual's thoughts and sentiments about outside reality and one's place in it, which appear to be the heart of the capacity of recognizing oneself and of

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<sup>64</sup> Ibid., p.457.

<sup>65</sup> Ibid., p.459.

acting in a relatively conscious way, take shape in relation with the dynamics of the different social spaces.

We therefore define the ‘globalized self’ as *the subjective experience of the globalization phenomenon*, namely the integral part of the self (as perception and self perception at the same time) that develops in the process through which individuals, with their peculiar repertoires of codes of meaning, come into direct or mediated contact with the globalizing elements of social life and reorganize materially and symbolically the experiences (relationships, behaviours, goals, belongings, cognitive schemes and values) of their daily life.<sup>66</sup> (Original emphasis)

The words of the authors can be summarized as follows: “Self” is a matter of “subjective experience.” Moreover, this subjective experience involves the processes of recognizing individual’s place in the social body and acting according to the role that is recognized. However, subjective experience is shaped in relation to all processes in the social spaces of which the subject is a part. Thus, “globalized self” is the particular subjective experience that is lived parallel to the “globalizing elements of social life.”

Having argued the theme of globalized self, the authors aim to justify their “choice of exploring the impact of globalization dynamics on the subjective experience with reference to spheres of social action coinciding with professional activities.”<sup>67</sup> In other words, what is the benefit of focusing on “professional activities”/“professional life”/“work experience” for understanding globalized selves? The authors believe that work experience is key feature for understanding both the making of the self and “globalizing elements of social life,” hence globalized selves:

(...) the experience of work remains relevant in constructing the subjective view of the surrounding world. It is precisely in the occupational arena, more than in the private sphere, that certain categories of actors are able to experiment and elaborate, with highly different modalities, a personal experience of the global transformations.<sup>68</sup>

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<sup>66</sup> Ibid., p.460.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid., p.460.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid., p.460.

Monaci et al. believe that there are two factors which may shape the conditions of experiencing the work. The first one is, “the role of the disembedded networks that economic and institutional organizations are increasingly creating.”<sup>69</sup> Furthermore;

By orienting our personal experience and structuring set of opportunities, these networks concretely insert the individual into different social spaces. In more concrete terms, this is to say that being a member of a multinational, an artist or an academic means to be structurally located within a global network that provides a number of opportunities. It is mainly (albeit not exclusively) through these channels that subjects can be connected to the global scale. Such networks display two primary features. First, they are mainly linked to the economic or institutional segments of social life, which suggests that individuals may enter them principally by means of their professional life. Second, they are created and reproduced through the use of symbolic tokens, exploiting what Augé calls *nonlieux* (non-places), which assure speedy and safe mobility of the people involved. (Original emphasis)<sup>70</sup>

The authors actually put forth a bundle of issues that is not closely scrutinized. It is rather apparent what sorts of access to disembedded networks, professional life may provide. As labor, commodities, capital and expertise are mobile, it is commonsense that certain people may need to interact in disembedded networks. However, we need to realize that the type of network in which someone is located might differ according to various factors: his employment conditions (self-employed, salaried professional etc.), the type of institution that he is employed in (public/private, governmental/non-governmental, multinational/national, profit-oriented/ not-for-profit etc.), the scale of operations of the institution (worldwide, local), and the degree of work-skills of the individual (high-skilled vs. low-skilled).

Here we have to assume that the authors are speculating about professionals who have the “opportunity” to interact transnationally. It seems that, and as mentioned by the authors, the “multinational corporate professional” fits this picture most adequately. Due to the type of institution in which he is employed and due to the geographic scale of operations in which

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<sup>69</sup> Ibid., p.461.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid., p.461.

this institution might be involved, these individuals become a part of a transnational entity, they have access to social networks of professionals harbored within this entity, and they enjoy/have to use the opportunities presented by information, communication and transportation technologies in order to maintain daily business tasks.

The second factor which shapes the conditions of experiencing work is the “symbolic and cultural resources that are available to specific actors for dealing with the surrounding and rapidly changing context.”<sup>71</sup> Furthermore;

Being globalized entails being in touch with fragments of different cultural worlds, irrespective of one’s own physical mobility, and this involves a number of problems with respect to the capacity of coping with such heterogeneity. Hence, when considering this side of the question, we have to distinguish various aspects. First of all, it is necessary to appreciate the cultural resources of the individual, namely, his or her formal education and skills in employing and manipulating cultural artefacts. From this standpoint, we could conclude that educational background is a crucial element in explaining the attitudes with which individuals will deal with cultural diversity. Second, we have to consider the subjects’ direct and concrete knowledge of different cultures. In this respect, we could assume that different cultural competences involve varying abilities to cope with the effects of globalization.<sup>72</sup>

This passage is important because the authors emphasize the relevance of “cultural competency” in the way that globalization is experienced in the work setting. Of course, as discussed above, the intensity of exposure to globalization is very different for different occupations. This comes to mean that, even though globalization is omnipresent, its subjective experience is highly variable. In this regard, there are many occupations with little access to globalizing agents such as transnational networks, commodities, markets, individuals or institutions. Contrary to these, there are such occupations in which transnational interactions over non-lieu spaces are routine.

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<sup>71</sup> Ibid., p.461.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid., p.461.

This discussion urges to be cautious before claiming a determinative relation between the “work setting” and the “work experience” in the making of the “globalized selves.” Because regardless of the degree of exposure to the globalizing agents in everyday work life, individuals can experience globalization and cultural “others” in their non-professional spheres, or they may accumulate cultural capital intellectually which will render them competent for making sense of the processes of globalization. This is why the authors claim that “the role played by professional belonging” needs to be “analysed by distinguishing (these) two different and partially contrasting factors,” which were discussed above.<sup>73</sup>

It is believed that by using the works of Roudometof and Monaci et al. in a complementary manner, a sufficient analytical map can be constructed for researching the relations between exposure, experience, identity and cosmopolitanism.

According to Roudometof,

(...) internal globalization means that large numbers of people around the globe are exposed to other cultures on a daily basis without crossing borders on a regular basis, simply through the variety of communication media (including satellite broadcasting, radio and other forms of communication). Furthermore, they might encounter immigrants, refugees, or tourists in their own locality. They might also encounter cultural artefacts and commercial establishments that bring other cultures into close proximity to their own (...) <sup>74</sup>

Above, Roudometof listed the objective conditions of internal globalization. However, in this study, we are especially interested in what type of subjectivities internal globalization makes possible. More specifically, we are interested in how contemporary subjects translate Roudometof’s internal globalization as social, political, cultural and economic attitudes. If internal globalization is taken to be a “stimulus,” then we expect to observe a subjective reaction that is a result of the subjective experience of the stimulus.

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<sup>73</sup> Ibid., p.461.

<sup>74</sup> Roudometof, p.121.

Although Roudometof's article is essential for understanding transnationalism objectively, it does not contribute to understanding the processes of subjectivity formation. We are able to contribute to the literature by merging Roudometof's analytical approach on the objective conditions of internal globalization with Monaci et al.'s study on the subjective experiencing of globalization.

In their article, Monaci et al. propose "three basic dimensions in the construction of globalized self" for understanding the determinative relation between globalization and subjectivity formation. Monaci et al. claim that "access to transnational networks of professional activity; exposure to the pressures of global context; and the competence in the rhetoric of globalization" are the determining factors behind the type of "subjective experience of globalization."<sup>75</sup>

The definition and operationalization of the three dimensions by the authors are as follows:

(...) we define *access to global networks* as the degree to which, within one's professional activity, the subjects take part in relational circuits and/or in forms of transnational association more or less institutionally structured, either directly (through travel and face-to-face contact) or in a mediated way (by means of information and communication technologies)."

(...) *exposure to global pressures* is (...) the intensity with which, in the management of their everyday professional practice, actors perceive their work conditions as subjected in a direct and 'unbuffered' way to the pressures and needs of adaptation determined by global dynamics.

(...) *competence in the rhetoric of globalization* defines the level of social actors' propensity to make a coherent sense of contemporary social reality and of their place inside it. (Original emphases)<sup>76</sup>

The three dimensions above can be summarized as access, exposure and competence.

The way that the authors operationalize these concepts actually emphasizes the role of power in the formation of subjectivity. To put it another way, having access is an "enabling" quality for the subject. The degree of coping with the externalities stemming from globalization is also an enabling quality. Having the competence of illustrating both the social consequences

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<sup>75</sup> Monaci et al., p. 462.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid., pp.462- 465.

of globalization and the subject's position within it is also an enabling quality as it allows the subject articulate to the hegemonic ideology.

Evaluated in these terms one can assume that the formation of the globalized self is very much in relation with the social, economic and cultural capital that the subject carries. These three categories of capital work as filters, which bestow "control" for the subject on the everyday impacts of internal globalization, hence define the type of globalized self.

The proliferation of the different levels of transnationalism around the globe leads to a bifurcation of attitudes among the public. Faced with the reality of transnational experience, members of the public might opt for an open attitude welcoming the new experiences or they might opt for a defensive closed attitude seeking to limit the extent to which transnational social spaces penetrate their cultural milieu. In the first instance, we speak of cosmopolitans, while in the second instance we speak of locals.<sup>77</sup>

As was discussed before and as is shown in the passage, transnational practices that take place as a dimension of social, economic, political and cultural activities due to an increasing pace of mobility and communication among different elements of the globe - which Roudometof calls "internal globalization" - produces transnational social spaces. Roudometof claims that this phenomenon needs to be taken as an objective transformation. Thus, although internal globalization brings the "growth of transnational spaces, social fields and networks," it does not qualitatively determine uniform transnational experience leading to clear-cut cosmopolitan attitudes.<sup>78</sup>

Above, two key works have been discussed in order to incorporate the notion of transnational experience to our discussion. So now, some points made above that are crucial for our understanding should be emphasized.

Roudometof discusses three phenomena: transnationalization, cosmopolitanization and glocalization. Although these phenomena resemble each other in a significant manner, Roudometof argues that they need to be considered separately. In this manner,

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<sup>77</sup> Roudometof, p. 128.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid., p.121.

transnationalization and glocalization do not automatically call for cosmopolitanization.

Taking cosmopolitanism as an attitudinal disposition, Roudometof suggests considering it as a bundle of dispositions which may vary in degree of openness, which makes sense, as it is not likely that people will carry ideas and beliefs with a concern for consistency. As for glocalization, he argues that this phenomenon is realized through the every-day experiences of people and does not require active transnational interaction for being exposed to it. This makes sense, and it is described as “banal” globalization.<sup>79</sup>

As for the purpose of this research, it is not critically important to detect whether transnationalization stems from glocalization or vice versa. The important thing is realizing how globalization as a phenomenon has broadened transnational social spaces, increased transnational interaction and intensified transnational experience.

In this regard, the contribution of Monaci et al. is crucial because they demonstrate that such a converging process as globalization can be very differently experienced by subjects who filter it through their subjective qualities. This means that it is not possible to talk about a commonly experienced globalization. It is believed that Roudometof would approve of this argument as he proposed that there would be at least two different bundles of attitudinal dispositions, cosmopolitans and locals which would reflect the difference in experiencing.

By combining the discussion on status and capital with what has been discussed in this section the following may be concluded: The way that subjects experience and react upon globalization is determined by how they are locally and trans-locally situated. In this case, it is necessary to see that when discussing the business elite, we are talking about a status group, which is distinctified from the majority of the local population in a privileged manner. Their privileged position is determined by the rarity of academic and social capitals, which define their social class and status.

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<sup>79</sup> Szerszynski and Urry, p.466.

However, what makes them distinct is not only a matter of degree of cultivation, personal reputation or social networks, but also a matter having influence on a broadening space through transnationalization. As discussed by Monaci et al., being able to surpass the social and cultural boundaries placed by local geography, they access global networks, they are exposed to the harsh effects of the globalizing world through regulation and they can cope with externalities to a significant extent. In this regard, they can be considered as the winning stratum of globalization. Monaci et al.'s investigation of the work setting for understanding the globalized selves is very meaningful, as the work setting is one of the few areas where the academic capital and skills of professionals become functional at optimal levels, hence their occupational statuses symbolize their cognitive skills and socio-cultural competence at trans-local levels.

Up to this point, how skills and capital define status, especially for middle classes in contemporary "credential societies" have been discussed. Moreover, the social and economic impacts of globalization interfere in how individuals' statuses are defined within their local communities have been examined. Shortly, it is believed that within the given conjuncture, those who can "soften" globalization "on their chests," are going to have the biggest chance of practicing social influence as compared to those standing unshielded before the flows of globalization.

The issue of cosmopolitanism or cosmopolitanization becomes very relevant to what has been discussed so far. In a conjuncture where categories of world, country, city and home can easily intertwine, there will be differentiation of experience and reaction between those who can function at various trans-local spaces and those who are stuck in their local space. This is actually what Roudometof and Monaci et al. demonstrate. Therefore, the last section of the chapter will investigate the integration of cosmopolitanism to the previous themes.

## Understanding Cosmopolitanism

Who are the cosmopolitans? Alternatively, what is cosmopolitanism? A literature review shows that cosmopolitanism is an issue that has been debated over decades.<sup>80</sup> However, the pace of globalization has caused a rising interest for the matter within academic circles. The difficulty of discussing cosmopolitanism derives from the fact that one can talk about multiple cosmopolitanisms. Here a variety of works will be examined to show how cosmopolitanism is defined and operationalized in this study.

In *Conceiving Cosmopolitanism: Theory, Context and Practice*, Steven Vertovec and Robin Cohen seek to investigate three core aspects regarding cosmopolitanism. They speculate on who the cosmopolitans may be, they list six theoretical perspectives for evaluating cosmopolitanism empirically, and they give examples of practices on the macro-scale, aiming to show how states may interact with each other in a way to perform “cosmopolitics.”<sup>81</sup> Deriving from the ways that the matter is discussed throughout the literature, Vertovec and Cohen claim that cosmopolitanism can be viewed from six theoretical perspectives:

1. A socio-cultural condition,
2. A kind of philosophy and a world view,
3. A political project towards building transnational institutions,
4. A political project for recognizing multiple identities,
5. An attitudinal or dispositional orientation,
6. A mode of practice or competence.<sup>82</sup>

In this study, we aim to combine “1,” “5” and “6.” Vertovec and Cohen give some more details on how they conceptualize these perspectives.

As a socio-cultural condition, the authors mean:

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<sup>80</sup> Vertovec and Cohen, pp.4-6.

<sup>81</sup> Ibid., p.7.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid., p.9.

The relative ease and cheapness of transportation across long distances, mass tourism, large-scale migration, visible multiculturalism in ‘world cities’, the flow of commodities to and from all points of the compass and the rapid development of telecommunications (including cheap telephone calls, satellite television, email and the Internet) have all wrought a socially and culturally interpenetrated planet, on a scale and intensity hitherto unseen.<sup>83</sup>

Vertovec and Cohen’s description is very much consistent with how Roudometof describes internal globalization. All of the tools and transformations that are mentioned in the passage above actually contribute to increasing transnational interaction hence, to the constitution of transnational social spaces. As for “5” and “6,” Ulf Hannerz needs to be introduced to the discussion.

Hannerz’s article “Cosmopolitans and Locals in World Culture” is apparently the most studied academic work in the discipline of sociology or cultural studies for scholars interested in understanding cosmopolitanism and culture. Hannerz claims “there is now a world culture,” and it is being “created through the increasing interconnectedness of varied local cultures, as well as through the development of cultures without a clear anchorage in any one territory.”<sup>84</sup> Eventually, there are there are two attitudes available for relating to this “global interconnected diversity”: cosmopolitans and locals.<sup>85</sup> Cosmopolitans, Hannerz believes, “have a special part in bringing about a degree of coherence” to this process.<sup>86</sup> In his article, Hannerz discusses this duality within the sphere of culture and cultural interaction.

Hannerz argues that the perspective of the cosmopolitan subject must entail relationships with a plurality of cultures and he must have a specific stance towards diversity.<sup>87</sup> Interpreted this way, cosmopolitanism “...is first of all an orientation, a willingness to engage with the Other. It is an intellectual and aesthetic stance of openness toward divergent cultural experiences, a search for contrasts rather than uniformity.”<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>83</sup> Ibid., p.9.

<sup>84</sup> Hannerz, “Cosmopolitans and Locals in World Culture,” p.237.

<sup>85</sup> Ibid., p.237.

<sup>86</sup> Ibid., p.249.

<sup>87</sup> Ibid., p.239.

Moreover, Hannerz adds another dimension and he argues that cosmopolitanism can also be seen as a “competence,” which he defines as “a state of readiness, a personal ability to make one’s way into other cultures, through listening, looking, intuiting and reflecting.”<sup>88</sup>

Hannerz elaborates more on how he perceives competence. He believes that competency of alien cultures requires a “sense of mastery,” which relates to the making of the self. He believes that as one’s understanding of the world expands, he acquires a stronger mastery. This mastery is actually a matter of having choice. He argues that the cosmopolitan may “construct his own unique personal perspective out of an idiosyncratic collection of experiences.” On the other hand, the cosmopolitan may choose to “surrender” to the alien culture, by accepting it as a “package deal.” However, he considers that even this surrender actually implies “personal autonomy vis-à-vis the culture where he originated,” as having the mastery, he may choose to “disengage from it.”<sup>89</sup>

Hannerz emphasizes geographical mobility as a cosmopolitan’s characteristic. He argues that “among the several cultures with which they are engaged,” one could be linked to a territorial kind, and which would be “encompassing the round of everyday life in a community.” In this sense, the perspective of the cosmopolitan may be formed on territorial experience that is determined by “periods of stays in different places.” However, he also argues that the individuals may be involved with cultures that are “carried by a transnational network rather than by a territory.” He believes that “the growth and proliferation of (...) cultures and social networks,” as mentioned in the second case, “in the present period,” is what “generates more cosmopolitans now than there have been at any other time.”<sup>90</sup>

Be it a matter of territorial or transnational experience, Hannerz believes geographical mobility is a defining aspect of cosmopolitanism. However, he warns before defining all

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<sup>88</sup> Ibid., p.239.

<sup>89</sup> Ibid., p.240.

<sup>90</sup> Ibid., p.241.

mobile social groups such as “tourists, exiles and expatriates” as cosmopolitans.<sup>91</sup> The present discussion on Roudometof also suggests that increasing transnational interaction through communication and transportation or formation of transnational social spaces do not guarantee the flourishing of cosmopolitanism. Hannerz again argues cosmopolitanism as a “stance,” in order to clarify what more than mobility cosmopolitanism necessitates: “Cosmopolitans tend to want to immerse themselves in other cultures, or in any case be free to do so. They want to be participants, or at least do not want to be too readily identifiable within a crowd of participants, that is, of locals in their home territory.”<sup>92</sup> He describes this situation as “proteanism,”<sup>93</sup> which emphasizes a stance of assimilating into the “home” crowd, either by adopting elements of it or surrendering to it completely.

According to Hannerz, among the three mobile groups, expatriates would be the one that we would “most readily associate with cosmopolitanism.”<sup>94</sup> He describes expatriates and (ex-expatriates) as “people who have chosen to live abroad for some period, and who know when they are there they can go home when it suits them.” Even though he warns that not all the expatriates live a model of cosmopolitanism, still they are people “who can afford to experiment, who do not stand to lose a treasured but threatened, uprooted sense of self.”<sup>95</sup>

The literature on cosmopolitanism owes much to the seminal work of Hannerz. Many scholars refer to his description of cosmopolitans in their works. However, throughout the literature we observe an effort to elaborate the dispositional qualities that are attributed to cosmopolitans by both diversifying and refining them. Fortunately, there are various authors who have aimed to synthesize the dispositions attributed to cosmopolitans, which are available in the literature. Broinslaw Szerszynski and John Urry; and Konrad Gunesch have come up with very similar yet slightly different sets of dispositions:

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<sup>91</sup> Ibid., p.241.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid., p.241.

<sup>93</sup> Ibid., p.240.

<sup>94</sup> Ibid., p.243.

<sup>95</sup> Ibid., p.243.

Table 1: Sets of Dispositions Attributed to Cosmopolitans

Szerszynski and Urry	Gunesch
“extensive <i>mobility</i> in which people have the right to ‘travel’ corporeally, imaginatively and virtually and for significant numbers they also have the means to so travel”	“the mobility to travel, with a discussion about whether this is sufficient”
“the capacity to <i>consume</i> many places and environments en route”	
“a <i>curiosity</i> about many places, peoples and cultures and at least a rudimentary ability to locate such places and cultures historically, geographically and anthropologically”	“a ‘ <i>connaissance</i> ’ with respect to (local) cultural diversity wherever possible, otherwise an interested ‘dilettantism’”
“an <i>openness</i> to other peoples and cultures and a willingness/ability to appreciate some elements of the language/culture of the ‘other’”	“a general willingness and openness towards engagement with cultural diversity, which yet allows for ‘dislike’”
“a willingness to take <i>risks</i> by virtue of encountering the ‘other’”	“an attitude not of the ‘typical tourist’, while the ‘occasional tourist’ accommodates fewer concerns”
“an ability to ‘ <i>map</i> ’ one’s own society and its culture in terms of a historical and geographical knowledge, to have some ability to reflect upon and judge aesthetically between different natures, places and societies”	
“ <i>semiotic</i> skill to be able to interpret images of various others, to see what they are meant to represent, and to know when they are ironic.” (Original emphases) <sup>96</sup>	
	“a straddling of the ‘global’ and the ‘local’ spheres, with a decisive impact of the global (‘world citizen’)”
	“a notion of ‘home’ that can be extremely varied, while it is no longer undisputedly the ‘home culture’, it also is not ‘everywhere’”
	“a critical attitude towards the (native) nation state, which can range between ‘rooted’ and ‘unrooted’ identity expressions.” (Original emphases) <sup>97</sup>

<sup>96</sup> Szerszynski and Urry, p.470.

<sup>97</sup> Gunesch, p.265.

As can be seen in the table, Hannerz's core values of willingness, openness and mobility are adopted by authors. In the list offered above, Szerszynski and Urry supplement Hannerz's emphasis on competence by cultural and semiotic qualities, whereas Gunesch sorts out rather socio-political dispositions that emphasize the notions of critical thinking and belonging. Szerszynski and Urry state that the cosmopolitan individual adopts some or all of the above-mentioned dispositions. Gunesch does not specify in this sense.

The scholars who are engaged in empirical research on cosmopolitanism do not adopt a rigid categorization of a duality of cosmopolitan vs. local as first argued by Hannerz. In spite of the fact that the typologies offered by Hannerz can be helpful as "ideal types," it is hard to derive from his work how scholars can operationalize these categories for empirical research as Hannerz's work is a cultural one and does not aim analytical viability. The most recent contributor on this manner is again Roudometof. He suggests that these typologies should be considered as "ideal types" only for analytical purposes and we should avoid confusing them with "stereotypes."<sup>98</sup> In this regard, some scholars have scrutinized these typologies and have come up with refined variations, which make it easier to categorize people sociologically.

Roudometof discusses the possibility of providing a framework for empirical research on cosmopolitanism without taking cosmopolitan and local as ends of a fixed polar duality but rather as a "cluster formed of several dimensions" placed at the opposite ends of a continuum which reserves room for transitivity.<sup>99</sup> In this sense, he argues that cosmopolitans and locals would diverge "with respect to the degree of attachment to locality, attachment to a state or country, attachment to and support of local culture and degree of economic, cultural and institutional protectionism."<sup>100</sup> This way, Roudometof would define consistent cosmopolitans to be less attached to locality, nationality or local and national culture. However, for the

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<sup>98</sup> Roudometof, p.124.

<sup>99</sup> Ibid., p.124.

<sup>100</sup> Ibid., pp.125-126.

fourth dimension, Roudometof argues that the attitude of individuals in this manner would be defined pragmatically.<sup>101</sup> This comes to mean that individuals would be acting in terms of the conjuncture, thus they may prefer the choices most beneficial to their political, social, cultural and economic self-interest.

### Considering Business Elite Transnationalism and Cosmopolitanism Together

Having discussed the differences in subjective experiencing of globalization and the tenets of cosmopolitanism, now it may be asked where the business elite fit in this picture. In a similar vein as Roudometof, Schneider and Barsoux emphasize, “The mere fact of operating across national boundaries does not mean that the minds of international managers are also travelling across boundaries.”<sup>102</sup> This is the reason why Roudometof emphasizes the necessity of distinguishing transnationalism and cosmopolitanism. Schneider and Barsoux continue:

It is sometimes questionable whether English-speaking, Hilton-based executives, with little local interaction, even warrant the international tag. This is internationalism on the “accidental tourist” model (where the key character traveling to Europe is greatly relieved to find McDonalds), making sure that nothing encountered abroad will differ too much from back home and bringing along all the supplies necessary for survival. International mobility does not necessarily enhance the ability to think internationally.<sup>103</sup>

The findings from the research of Monaci et al. are complementary to Schneider and Barsoux's reminder. One of the groups interviewed by Monaci et al. were “economic operators,” a group composed of corporate managers and financial operators working in Milan. Since many interviewees in this group were employed in “internationalized circuits of activity,” the authors feel the necessity of justifying this choice:

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<sup>101</sup> Ibid., pp.126.

<sup>102</sup> Monaci et al., pp. 157-158.

<sup>103</sup> Ibid., pp.157-158.

Focusing attention on subjects working in middle-large internationalized companies and financial services firms reflects the intention of exploring the dynamics of globalization exactly in those contexts of economic action where its symptoms appear to be most striking and its impacts, arguably, most penetrating.<sup>104</sup>

In this manner, the authors detected some similarities within this group in terms of their subjective experience of globalization. They claim that for these groups; “the ‘encounter’ between their own daily professional activity and globalization dynamics is expressed in two basic outcomes”: A structural and a symbolic kind. The structural kind is about their high “level of immersion in networks of transnational activity.” International trips, daily interaction with foreign “interlocutors” are a daily routine in the working experience, therefore “presenting a high degree of access to global networks of professional activity.” The symbolic outcome is relevant to self-identification.

These subjects have a tendency to perceive themselves “as a sort of global elite, an avant-garde that has a crucial role in the construction of a reality – the globalized world – that is considered and evaluated as a fundamentally economic phenomenon.” By considering globalization primarily as an economic phenomenon, these subjects demonstrate high rhetorical skills “in the strategies of intellectual organization and rationalization of the current changes.”<sup>105</sup> Access to transnational networks and rhetorical skills constitute two of the three dimensions that the authors claim to determine the type of subjective experience of globalization. The third, the degree of direct exposure to globalization, remains “restricted, extremely mediated and protected” due to the “high degree of simplification, standardization and objectification of professional practices in these occupational areas” despite “the remarkable and frequent involvement in relations and structures of transnational network.”<sup>106</sup>

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<sup>104</sup> Ibid., p.466.

<sup>105</sup> Ibid., p.466.

<sup>106</sup> Ibid., p.468.

In addition to the structural and subjective outcomes above, the authors collect some findings relevant to ideology. According to them, the economic actors are very much inclined “to offer retrospective justifications and forecasts about the future structured around the idea of the supremacy and legitimacy of the world free market.”<sup>107</sup> The authors argue that due to their high rhetorical skills in rationalizing the globalization processes and due to their low exposure to global pressures, economic actors “normalize and appraise” the “new global economic system,” “within the logic of economic action” by referring to themes such as “individualism, efficiency, natural market mechanisms.”<sup>108</sup>

Taking into account all of the observations above, the authors decide that the subjective experience of the globalization of these economic actors is “bounded and elitist cosmopolitanism.”

Undoubtedly, the activity of our economic actors is characterized by a nearly impressive frequency of international contacts, and often by a similarly high international mobility; at the same time, the occupational culture of which they are the bearer is no doubt valid and operates across national boundaries. Likewise, they exhibit an inclination to perceive themselves as belonging to a global and cosmopolitan elite, which is tied to supernational spaces and patterns of conduct and clearly distinguished from the social groups that (...) could be defined as localized lower classes.<sup>109</sup>

However, the authors argue that the qualities above do not translate automatically to the conditions and dispositions that are attributed to cosmopolitans. They believe that the cosmopolitanism of the economic actors is elitist because “it includes an accentuated tendency to depict and present oneself as belonging to a restricted global upper class that is manifestly separated from the rest of people by means of a common lifestyle and a set of behavior patterns.” What is important to see here is that the authors do not just argue over dispositions,

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<sup>107</sup> Ibid., p.468.

<sup>108</sup> Ibid., pp.468-469.

<sup>109</sup> Ibid., p.469.

narratives, but also take into consideration the type of lifestyle and practices that these individuals exercise.<sup>110</sup>

Monaci et al. shows that this cosmopolitanism is “restricted in three ways”:

- a) It is based on a ‘limited reflexivity’, framed in close connection with patterns of professional knowledge and conduct that are actually transnational but also extremely specialized and homogeneous, engendering an approach to reality (and to its global features) which develops mostly inside the neat, secure, and scarcely flexible boundaries of a prevalently pragmatic logic;
- b) It rarely implies immersion into the cultural diversity of ‘the other’, accepting or pursuing differences in a conditioned manner, that is to the extent that the manifestations of cultural diversity most distant from one’s cognitive and value references are either mediated/sterilized through the standardized meaning systems provided by the international financial community or by one’s corporate network, or (outside professional life) confined and kept under control within well delimited areas of experience (like those that are typically researched and appreciated by the ‘tourist’);
- c) Without being excluded, the bodily dimension and direct physically-intense involvement are strictly and selectively controlled. Economic actors often travel abroad and spend many of their working days across national boundaries; but their movements take place inside circuits and (non-) spaces (including certain areas of the so-called global cities) that are for the exclusive use of these social groups and that soften the need for subjective adaptation. In a sense, economic actors are always at home: they are given opportunities to move all around the world, but mainly within a set of well-known and predetermined life spaces (made of offices, computers with Windows software, airports, international hotels that serve continental breakfasts, air conditioning, English language and CNN news) that can minimize – if not obliterate – the cultural friction that is normally implied by travels.<sup>111</sup>

Monaci et al.’s depiction of “bounded and elitist cosmopolitanism” demonstrates how transnational experience is filtered through status and class situations of these subjects, or their “habitus”<sup>112</sup> in one sense, and result in a particular set of behaviours, which is in accordance with their distinctive social position in their own societies. However, the puzzling

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<sup>110</sup> Ibid., p.469.

<sup>111</sup> Ibid., pp.469-470.

<sup>112</sup> Pierre Bourdieu, “Structures, *habitus*, practices” in *The logic of practice*, trans. Richard Nice (Cambridge; UK : Polity Press and Oxford; UK : B. Blackwell, 1990), pp.52-65; Pierre Bourdieu, “The Habitus and the Space of Lifestyles” in *Distinction : a social critique of the judgement of taste*, trans. Richard Nice (London: Routledge, 1986), pp.169-226.

dimension of this matter stems from the fact that the “bounded and elitist cosmopolitanism” of Monaci et al. is an imperfect variation as compared to the model cherished by the international management discourse.

Schneider and Barsoux provide a diagram of Craig, in which three reactive paths that a “culture-shocked expat” may take are schematized.<sup>113</sup> In this sense, the new business environment hunches over the expat in the form of physical, sensory and cultural differences, and as these differences are mediated through personal experience it results in psychological symptoms, which are translated into reactions. Craig specifies three cultural types in accordance with the possible ways of reacting to the new environment: The “encapsulator,” the “cosmopolitan” and the “absconder.” The “encapsulator” adjusts to ex-patriate culture, encapsulates himself in a “culture bubble,” and maintains minimum contact with local culture and maximum contact with the expat culture. This type of reaction is considered the most common by Craig. In the cultural empathy model, the subject develops “empathy, tolerance, interest and acceptance” towards the new environment and gets to be involved in cross-cultural education and contact. By doing so, he adjusts to both expatriate culture and local culture and maintains equal contact with expat and local culture. This type of reaction is considered to make the most successful cultural adjustment. The last type is “Absconder” where the subject “falls in love with local culture, gives up allegiance to own culture, adapts life-style of local culture,” and by doing so he maintains minimum contact with expat culture and maximum contact with the local culture. As might be expected, this type of reaction is considered the rarest among the expats.<sup>114</sup>

Moreover, there are certain competencies which increase the chance of success in managing internationally. These are interpersonal skills, linguistic ability, motivation to live abroad (cultural curiosity), tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity, flexibility, patience and

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<sup>113</sup> Schneider and Barsoux, p.162. [Citing J.Craig, “Culture-shocked expat diagram” in *Culture Shock* (Singapore: Times Books International, 1979)]

<sup>114</sup> Ibid., p.162.

respect, cultural empathy, strong sense of self (or ego strength) and sense of humor.<sup>115</sup> From the list, it can be seen that cultural competence and cultural involvement are considered as key factors in success. In this sense we may emphasize the privilege that ownership of particular social and cultural capitals may bring in the creation of competence: “cultural diversity in family, early international experience, bilingualism, multiple roots” as catalysts in personality development, “analytical skills, professional skills, study in other cultures, interpersonal skills, languages” and “supportive spouse, adaptable spouse, “moveable children,” variety of interests” as catalysts in professional development.<sup>116</sup>

Considering the diagram presented by Craig as opposed to Monaci et al.’s “bounded and elitist cosmopolitanism,” the commonality of “encapsulators” happens to be in accordance with the way in which economic operators interact with the foreign milieu and transnational flows surrounding them. However, as we see, the diagram of Craig also emphasizes the possibility of other ways of interacting with the new environment. However, the rigidity of Monaci et al.’s typology, although helpful in understanding a majority, becomes impractical for understanding the authentic features of the possible minority within the business elite.

In Vertovec and Cohen, it is possible to find similar emphases on a transnational status group demonstrating similar characteristics with Monaci et al.’s economic operators or Schneider and Barsoux’s “McDonalders.” In their introductory chapter, Vertovec and Cohen discuss “who the cosmopolitans are.” Due to fact that the historical background relevant to the birth and development of both the concept and practices deserve a thorough assessment, it is beyond the limits of our study to include such information here. For the same reason, in their works (those not intended for explaining the epistemological roots and historical

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<sup>115</sup> Ibid., p.163.

<sup>116</sup> Ibid., p.174.

development of the matter) many of the authors suffice by giving a sketchy historical background of cosmopolitanism.

In this manner Vertovec and Cohen focuses rather on some of the commonalities which are attributed to people who have been “labeled cosmopolitans” throughout history. We can summarize the authors’ discussion as follows: cosmopolitanism has been criticized to be only available to an elite, “those who have the resources to travel, learn other languages and absorb other cultures”; cosmopolites have been seen as “deviant,” “refusing to define themselves by location, ancestry, citizenship or language”; or have been subject to a lesser reaction by been stereotyped as being “privileged, bourgeois, politically uncommitted elites, associated with wealthy jet-setters, corporate managers, intergovernmental bureaucrats, artists, tax dodgers, academics, and intellectuals, all of whom maintained their condition “by the virtue of independent means, expensive tastes, and a globe-trotting lifestyle.”<sup>117</sup>

As a subset of the stereotype offered above, the authors also refer to another typology proposed by John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge, which takes business professionals as its subject. These people, estimated by the authors to be “some twenty million people worldwide” are considered as:

(...) a new global economic elite, a meritocratic but elusive ruling group, the “cosmocrats.” They are ‘people who attend business- school weddings around the world, fill up the business-class lounges at the international airports, provide the officer ranks of most of the world’s companies and international institutions, and, through their collective efforts, probably do more than anyone else to make the world seem smaller. (...) ‘Cosmocrats’ are defined by their attitudes and lifestyles rather than just their bank accounts. That separates them from the widest class of winners from globalization.<sup>118</sup>

Micklethwait and Wooldridge describe transnational meritocratic elite as a power-wielding group, who are distinctively mobile, and share similar attitudes and lifestyles. Their power do not stem solely from the economic capital that they hold. However, they are also the

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<sup>117</sup> Vertovec and Cohen, pp.5-6.

<sup>118</sup> Ibid., pg.6.

hegemonic actors who constitute the social networks in which global corporate policies are negotiated and business professionalism is reproduced. In a similar fashion, Leslie Sklair defines another group, the “transnational capitalist class,” as the ruling class in the global capitalist system. It is made up of transnational corporation executives and their local affiliates, globalizing bureaucrats, capitalist-inspired politicians and professionals, and consumerist elites. In this regard, the members of these four fractions are assumed to “have outward-oriented global rather than inward-oriented local perspectives on a variety of issues”; consider themselves “citizens of the world”; share “similar life-styles, particularly patterns of luxury consumption of goods and services.”<sup>119</sup> TNC executives and top business professionals can be considered as relevant for our study. According to Sklair, TNC executives are summoned around a “cohesive culture of global capitalist consumerism,”<sup>120</sup> whereas the top business professionals carry mixed orientations of “emergent global nationalism” and “economic neo-liberalism.”<sup>121</sup>

## Last Notes on Chapter Two

In the last two sections of this chapter, the notion of cosmopolitanism was investigated in order to show a particular way of experiencing trans-nationalization. Then examples were given from some scholars who have studied transnational business professionals as a community. In this sense, an interesting tension was detected.

Given the globalized conjuncture, people increasingly are exposed to material and immaterial flows which come outside of their local or national boundaries. In this sense, exploring the differences of the world is no longer a matter of privilege. However, high status groups comprised of trans-local elite such as the high-ranking business professionals who are

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<sup>119</sup> Leslie Sklair, “Conceptualising and Researching...” p.2.

<sup>120</sup> Ibid., p.4.

<sup>121</sup> Ibid., p.4.

employed in transnational corporations, still own privileges that distinguish them from the majority of their local and global populations. These people own the economic, social and cultural capital to make sense and use of the flows that are available in the global era. The global era requires that they become geographically more mobile, multi-culturally more competent and in ideological terms global(ism) - oriented.

When considered, the life styles and attitudes of these people are more likely to comply with Hannerz's cosmopolitanism than locally bounded and globally threatened populations. However, interestingly, many of the writers above who have focused on transnational high-status groups argue that the members of such groups, such as the business professionals, resemble more of a trans-national power wielding elite than contemporary cosmopolitans. In this regard, the transnational elite, although in close interaction with each other, are portrayed as maintaining lives too bounded and elitist to be considered as cosmopolitan, which requires genuine interest in encountering the differences of the world.

Against all this background, how can the story of Turkish high-ranking business professionals be described? How do they relate to their surrounding communities and localities as political and cultural subjects? Do they straddle the local and the global localities and communities? What do scholars miss when they focus on converging *transnational* elite groups given the thickness and authenticity of social, political, economic, geographic conditions of the *local*? The next two chapters seek to provide answers to such questions.

## CHAPTER THREE

### NEW SOCIAL IDENTITIES IN A NEW SPATIO-TEMPORALITY: GLOBALIZING ISTANBUL AND HIGH-RANKING BUSINESS PROFESSIONALS

The aim of the second chapter was to cover the relevant literatures in order to bring to the fore conceptual tools that can be used for understanding the formation of social peculiarities such as identities and dispositions within the population subjected to this study. In this regard, the basics of social status were discussed and later the dynamics of the globalizing business environment were incorporated in the discussion. In the end of the chapter, the particular ways that transnational business professionals can experience globalization were discussed. In this regard, works which describe the way transnational elite experience globalization were focused, and how cosmopolitanism fits into their *habitus* was questioned.

Therefore, this chapter will elaborate the particular processes pushing for the integration of Istanbul to the globalizing world and its contemporary outcomes, while discussing the authenticities of Turkey's politico-social history and its present day influence on the formation of elite identities and dispositions.

#### Understanding the Turkey of Globalization

Although the unique geographical location upon which the Republic of Turkey was founded has rendered inevitable an isolated way of living, both the Turkish state and the majority of its citizens remained isolated until the 1980s in regards to limited international interaction and institutionalization within such realms as science, technology, economy and culture. Although civilian and military politics always have demanded a minimum degree of

interaction and institutionalization, such experiences were limited to the access of privileged power circles as compared to the wider range reached at the times during its imperial predecessor.

Today, we mention less *internationalism*, which emphasizes bi-lateral or multi-lateral interaction of agents such as the nation states, nations, citizens etc., but more of *globalization*. This has evolved from a need to emphasize the increased intensity, diversity and frequency of the flows such as ideas, images, commodities, technologies and bodies travelling through space and time around the globe and determining the lives of the people, and even the order - more precisely, the disorder - of ecologies.

Clearly, it is possible to talk about globalization in a number of ways. For analytical purposes, one can distinguish between political, cultural, economic, ideological, social and even imagery globalizations. However, for the purpose of the study at hand, in this section, the focus will be given on globalization primarily as an outcome of the globalization of capitalism. In this way, the realm of economy steps fore as the main field of investigation. Actually, this preference has to do with the contemporary history of Turkey's articulation to globalization. This is to say, it is believed that the operations of global capitalism have been the prime reason behind being able to talk about a "Turkey of globalization." Thus, it is believed that the dynamics within the realm of economy and relevant political coalitions have initiated a Turkey of globalization.

The social, spatial, economic, ideological and political repercussions of the neo-liberal hegemony of the 1980s could be witnessed throughout the world. The hegemonic climate also has been decisive on the direction of transformations that took place in Turkey after the military coup of September 12, 1980. 1980 is regarded as a turning point in the political economy of Turkey as it marks the end of two decades of national developmentalism and the

beginning of an era of economic liberalization.<sup>122</sup> The era of national developmentalism which started in the 1960s was one era of state intervention and state planning which aimed at national development through industrialization by import substitution as complemented by economic and financial protectionism. In this era, “emerging industrialists, the big bureaucratic agencies responsible for implementing the national developmentalist model” and organized labor formed the backbone of the ISI coalition.<sup>123</sup>

The stabilization program of the International Monetary Fund, introduced by the then-ruling government on January 24, 1980, is considered to have been the defining framework of the new era of liberalization. The stabilization program of the IMF called for a structural adjustment in which, complemented by the new political sphere controlled by the military regime, Turkey’s new tenets of political economy were redefined. In this new political economy, economic liberalization, financialization and privatization became the major components of distinction from the previous era.<sup>124</sup> Private capital became the leading actor of the economy, as opposed to public sector and national regulation driven previous era, where the “global logic of capital” defined the “contours of the material world, ranging from the sites of investment to the patterns of consumption, from land development to building practices.”<sup>125</sup>

In this era of “liberalization and de-regulation,” “export-oriented industrialists, small and medium sized enterprises and the new neo-liberal bureaucracy” emerged as the new political economic coalition, while the IMF, the European Union and the World Bank became the most influential international institutions on the Turkish economy. Moreover, the “export-oriented big business” became transnational in operation, “forming alliance with growing

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<sup>122</sup> Rutz and Balkan, p.17.

<sup>123</sup> Ziya Onis and Fikret Senses, “Global Dynamics, Domestic Coalitions and a Reactive State: Major Policy Shifts in Post-War Turkish Economic Development” (ERC Working Papers 0706, Economic Research Center, Middle East Technical University, September, 2007), p.14.

<sup>124</sup> Rutz and Balkan, pp.20-23.

<sup>125</sup> Keyder, “The Setting” in *Istanbul: Between the Local and the Global*, p.13.

group of transnational investors.” As for the “internationalization of capital,”<sup>126</sup> it is possible to talk about a significantly increased incoming foreign direct investment especially from European and Middle Eastern countries, into sectors such as transport, storage, communications, financial intermediation and food manufacturing. Companies with international capital increased significantly in the 2000s, “wholesale and retail trade,” manufacturing, and “real estate, renting and business activities” being the prime sectors respectively.<sup>127</sup>

One last note should be added. As opposed to all these developments, the power of organized labor as compared to the previous era significantly was eroded, followed by the worsening of living conditions of the middle and lower-income strata, which were affected by the decline of the real wages during the most of 1980s, worsened by the inflationary 1990s and a couple of major financial crises. The socio-economic security of middle and lower income populations were hit as the employment declined via privatization of State Owned Enterprises, as the demand for employment rose by rapid de-ruralization, and as the export-oriented producers adopted sub-contracting practices, which encouraged informal employment. The IMF and the World Bank pressures on budget restraints throughout the 2000s also have prevented the development of social security and social welfare programs which could alleviate the risks of increased, urban poverty, urban unemployment and urban marginalization.<sup>128</sup>

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<sup>126</sup> Ibid., p.13.

<sup>127</sup> Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry Investment Support and Promotion Agency, *FDI in Turkey*, [http://www.invest.gov.tr/en\\_US/investmentguide/investorguide/Pages/FDIinTurkey.aspx](http://www.invest.gov.tr/en_US/investmentguide/investorguide/Pages/FDIinTurkey.aspx) [3 August 2010].

<sup>128</sup> Ayse Bugra and Caglar Keyder, “The Turkish Welfare Regime in Transformation,” *Journal of European Social Policy* 16 (August 2006) pp.211-228.

## Understanding the Istanbul of Globalization

Istanbul emerged to be the prime urban scene where the restructuring of the political economy of Turkey in the post-1980 era could be followed most clearly. Keyder proposes that the policy-makers intended Istanbul to acquire a “global city” status that would attract foreign capital. In this manner, their efficiency being dubious, certain regional and multinational projects, such as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Area and customs union as a push-off for full membership to the European Union, aimed to transform Istanbul into a transnational hub. After the oil boom, Istanbul began attracting Middle Easterners as tourists, business persons and merchants. Arab Banks were opened. The collapse of the Soviet Union was considered an opportunity for making Istanbul serve as the table for negotiation between the elite of Caucasian and the Turkic Republics and Westerners. The new export-driven political economy made it possible for the globally-oriented corporations, smaller foreign companies to start investing, and opening offices in Istanbul. The financial sector was the pioneer in integration to the liberal market, which invited “branch offices of foreign banks, foreign exchange dealers, leasing and insurance companies, fund managers, and a stock exchange, followed by generation of new domestic private banks.” In addition, introduction of new luxury accommodation and consumption services, e.g. five-star hotels, world cuisine restaurants; introduction of big shopping malls and fast food chains; organization of international art festivals, settling of international TV channels and printed media, accompanied by a flourishing domestic media complemented the new economic infrastructure.<sup>129</sup>

Keyder argues that the notion of “global city” in the academic literature defines the city within a specific political economy. In a hierarchy of function among cities, global cities

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<sup>129</sup> Keyder, “The Setting” in *Istanbul: Between the Local and the Global*, pp. 13-16.

are placed at the top in which “global control functions” and high-value adding “producer services catering to supranational clientele” predominate the investment and employment distribution. In this sense, he considers that Istanbul has experienced an economic transformation that is in accordance with the global city role. As of the end of the 1990s, one could talk about “a flourishing service sector in marketing, accounting, and management, telecommunications, banking and finance, transport, insurance, computers and data processing, legal services, auditing, accounting, consulting, advertising, design and engineering” and also a growth of employment in such sectors. What is more important is that “transnational (companies) have penetrated this sector through joint ventures, direct investment, and licensing,” where “some of this investment is...in the form of regional headquarters of transnational companies.”<sup>130</sup> However, writing in the conjuncture of the 1990s, Keyder argues that although Istanbul has experienced such economic transformation, it still lagged in terms of global connectedness due to the drawbacks in the transportation and communication infrastructure. Furthermore, policy-makers were reluctant in setting a coherent strategy for making up these deficiencies.

Writing a decade later than Keyder, Rutz and Balkan evaluate Istanbul’s agency during the era of globalization through a similar lens. In this regard, they define three processes through which Istanbul has been able to present a “globalizing cityscape.” These processes are commodification of culture as heritage, financialization, and privatization of media and communications.

“Commodification of culture as heritage” can be considered as an “economic strategy for globalizing Istanbul,” a process associated by the projects and policies of Dalan, who was the mayor then, which emphasizes the “material presence of cosmopolitan heritage.” The material presence of cosmopolitan heritage is reconstructed through re-emphasizing the “imperial and glorious” past of Istanbul as a “world city” during the reign of Byzantine and

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<sup>130</sup> Ibid., p.19.

Ottoman Empire, in Bartu-Candan's terms "marketed" as "the East in the West and the West in the East" and as the "gateway to the Orient,"<sup>131</sup> thus it is translated into a "symbolic currency in efforts to re-imagine Istanbul as a globalizing city." The authors argue that this heritage can be taken as a cultural capital for the globalizing city as "the culture industries of London, New York and other global cities were being recognized as assets of inestimable market value for attracting global corporate headquarters as well as symbolic value in their global images."<sup>132</sup>

Secondly, the presence of "global financial institutions" in Istanbul is discussed as an "indicator of globalizing city." Authors write that by the early 1990s, Istanbul began hosting "Turkish stock market, investment banks, insurance carriers, five-star international business hotels." In this regard, Maslak emerged as a new financial district "headquarters of some of the largest Turkish transnational corporations and banks" are located. The five-star international hotels catered to "businessmen, conventioners, and groups of tourists" and their presence was not limited to the district of Maslak.<sup>133</sup>

Thirdly, development of the variety of media, communication services and transportation services through privatization is considered an important infrastructural transformation. The rapid growth of the number of telephone subscribers through the 1980s, the growth of cellular phone usage, "purchase and use of personal computers, fax machines, and e-mail," penetration of satellite television, publishing of wide range of consumer and life style magazines, growth of travel industry and increasing rate of international travel from and to Istanbul, as a whole, made the connection between local inhabitants easier, and increased self-awareness as a part of the international realm, and connected residents to global networks of information and cultural exchange.<sup>134</sup>

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<sup>131</sup> Ayfer Bartu, "Who Owns the Old Quarters? Rewriting Histories in a Global Era" in *Istanbul: Between the Global and the Local*, p.32.

<sup>132</sup> Rutz and Balkan, pp. 25-26.

<sup>133</sup> Ibid., pp.26-27.

<sup>134</sup> Ibid., pp.27-28.

## Istanbul as a Globalizing City and New Social Agents

So far, a predominantly material story of Istanbul's articulation to globalization emphasizing the spatial transformation through economic, architectural, and technological categories has been given. However, there is also an immaterial side of the story, reflecting the substantive change in the way people live, which calls for social, cultural and political categories. Only by combining these two stories is it possible to understand the new urban setting relevant to this study.

Keyder and Oncu describe the Istanbul of 1990s as a globalizing city of the Third World.<sup>135</sup> No matter how systemic and self-driven globalization may seem, human agents need to be seen as the makers of policies and the managers of the capital, or as the auxiliaries, subordinates and victims of such decision-makers. In this regard, a process like Istanbul's integration to global capitalism becomes possible only with the accompanying social agents:

As in other globalizing cities of the third world, Istanbul also experienced the shock of rapid integration into transnational networks and markets and has witnessed the emergence of new social groups since the 1980s. A thin social layer constituting a new bourgeois and professional class, able to operate in global markets and remunerated at world scale, adopted the lifestyle and consumption habits of their transnational counterparts. The impact of this development on urban geography was rapid: globalized spaces of commerce and leisure emerged along with secluded residential areas on the outskirts of the city.<sup>136</sup>

Keyder's "new bourgeois and professional class" can be claimed to consist of the globalizing Turkish upper class and globalizing upper-middle class. These thin globalizing strata are distinguished from others with the same class positions, as they are capable of performing occupational functions in the corporate and social networks of global capital. They are also distinguished by their lifestyles and consumption habits, which call for trans-

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<sup>135</sup> Keyder and Oncu

<sup>136</sup> Keyder, "Globalization and Social Exclusion in Istanbul," p.124.

localized spaces, tastes and secluded ways of living. Their economic functions and socio-cultural preferences resemble their trans-national counterparts more than their nationals of same class or status situations.

Actually, the new class, which Keyder talks about, is part of a global phenomenon. Saskia Sassen discusses “emergent global classes” and she puts “transnational professional and executive class” among three global classes, the other two being transnational government officials and the immigrants.<sup>137</sup> Sassen believes that “the proliferation of worldwide activities and networks” which push for denationalization serves as an “operational infrastructure for corporate economic globalization.” The important aspect of this picture for this research is the fact that such globalization requires “vast numbers of professionals, managers, executives and technical staff members,” the majority of which is transnationally mobile. In this sense, Sassen argues that this “high-level workforce” can be represented as “a new transnational professional class.”<sup>138</sup>

Although Keyder mentions a new “bourgeois and professional class,” in order to understand the difference of their class positions within Turkish society, we suggest categorizing them as two classes, a new bourgeois class and a new professional class, which operate transnationally and complementarily. Considered this way, Sassen’s argues that the new transnational professional class “(...) is not centrally defined by its ‘relationship to the means of production’ (...) (but) this group is defined more by its control than by its ownership of the means of production. Whereas the older middle class was defined by its location within a vertically integrated bureaucracy, the location of today’s new professional class within a condition of bureaucratic disintegration suggests that its position within the economy has shifted.”<sup>139</sup>

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<sup>137</sup> Sassen, *A Sociology of Globalization*, p.169.

<sup>138</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.174-175.

<sup>139</sup> *Ibid.*, p.175.

Rutz and Balkan provide a description of the location and new position of this class saying the “emerging global new middle classes (...) represent a new historical phase of capitalist accumulation that differentiates them from national upper middle classes of the past. They move ‘closer’ to capital than to labor by means of participating more in the process of accumulating capital and less in their reliance on salary. They are stakeholders in the new economy and demonstrate the aspirations more of an upper class than of an industrial core middle class.”<sup>140</sup>

So at this point, we should empirically clarify what makes this globalized “high-level workforce” of the Turkish middle class distinct that qualifies them to be categorized as a part of a transnational class is that they are described to share lifestyle and consumption habits as their globalized bourgeoisie and transnational counterparts.

In the case of contemporary Turkey, the existence of a “new professional class” implies that there is a discrepancy (in terms of household income, academic formation, social networks etc) between the upper and lower ends of the middle class in, which contrasts with the homogeneity of the middle class of pre-1980s Turkey. Rutz and Balkan state that “during the neoliberal era, certain policies of dispossession such as state redistribution, financialization, and privatization created a new middle class in the globally integrated and fast growing economic sectors like exports, financial services, banking, tourism, media, advertising, accounting, and entertainment.”<sup>141</sup> According to the authors, the core middle class professionals, managers, and technicians of the national developmentalist era mostly were employed at “public institutions or state-owned enterprises.” However, “state employees differed in wages and other material and social capitals from their counterparts in the private sector and lacked the entrepreneurial credentials and opportunistic predispositions”

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<sup>140</sup> Rutz and Balkan, p.24.

<sup>141</sup> Ibid., p.19.

necessitated by the new economic climate of post-1980s .<sup>142</sup> As opposed to this situation, “many professionals and businessmen of the Turkish ‘new economy’ utilized their education and social connections to become part of the global ‘new economy,’ which was constantly creating new demand for specific occupations that required special individuals with special education.”<sup>143</sup>

It is important to emphasize that the notions of status and capital as discussed in Chapter Two help to decongest the theoretical limits imposed by class-based analysis. In other terms, in order to understand the genuineness of the new professionals and to be able to develop a more coherent analytical vocabulary, one needs to go beyond the production-ownership-based categories of Marxian class and focus on how Weberian uses of status can contribute to the matter. In this manner, the matter of “special education” needs to be seen as an important component of meritocracy reproduction, which enables considering the new professionals as a status group.

So what are the “beneficial” components of this “special education” that distinguish the old core middle class from the new one? Rutz and Balkan write that “speaking a foreign language, having a degree from a prestigious university (often abroad), being interested in the business culture, cultivating certain consumption habits, and being ready to adopt (or at least adapt to) ‘the American way of life’ or its French or German variants were among the most desired qualities in the new economy.”<sup>144</sup> The authors also believe that there has been an ideological divergence, as the members of the old middle class continued to be “ideologically committed to national developmentalism” whereas the professionals and businesspersons of the new era were at peace with the opportunities presented by neo-liberal capitalist globalization.<sup>145</sup>

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<sup>142</sup> Ibid., pp.23-24.

<sup>143</sup> Ibid., p.24.

<sup>144</sup> Ibid., p.24.

<sup>145</sup> Ibid., p.24.

The emphasis on “special education” required in the “new economy” and “social and cultural capital” as social distinguishers would automatically remind the reader of Stub’s meritocratic experts and Bourdieu’s forms of capital. This analysis suggests that the main axis of distinction between the old and the new middle classes was the difference between the content of their social and cultural capitals.

Focusing on the dynamics of “new professional class” formation in the 2000s, it is possible to argue that quality secondary and tertiary education are essential for defining the conditions of competition in the labor market. Besides personal merit, the human capital within the family is also a key factor which determines the ability to succeed in the exams to enter the highly competitive academic institutions. Being graduates of “prestigious” secondary and tertiary education institutions and maintaining stable academic profiles are usually regarded as the reflection of the merit status of the individual, which automatically defines the ranks for candidates willing to be employed in the selective private corporations. However, formal recognition of academic merit helps only to define the eligibility of the candidates, as the candidates are expected to pass the various human resource exams, case studies and interviews made in the selection process in order to receive job offers.

We must of course elaborate more on how “prestigious” education institutions should be considered in the case of Turkey. The prestige of these institutions is very much recognized in their historical success at producing educated subjects in compliance with the westernization, modernization and nation-making ambitions of the ruling classes in Turkey. Thus in addition to gaining skills and knowledge, cultural and ideological exposure are also intended. The prestigious schools in Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir are defined first by their historical stability, second by their alumni who have made it into elite circles in professional life (regarding both private and public occupations), third by their capability in presenting the students into a foreign language immersed curriculum, and fourth (this applies to private foreign high schools and top Anatolian high schools) by exposing the students to foreign

cultures in various ways, among their origins of teachers, foreign literature, and extra-curricular activities. Last but not least, their success in the placement of the graduates into undergraduate programs in the high-ranking universities in Turkey and abroad determine the symbolic value of these institutions, especially for the incoming generations of students and their families.

The matter of tertiary education is a bit more complicated as there are various ways that it can be fulfilled. Graduating from high-ranking universities in Turkey and abroad and later attending reputable graduate programs in Turkey and abroad strengthen the labor market advantages of graduates fundamentally. Secondary and tertiary education institutions contribute greatly to the formation of social networks. Having selective academic backgrounds create important opportunities for professionals in socializing with larger circles of professionals with similar backgrounds, even if they have no prior acquaintance. This works both in domestic and foreign social environments.

#### Status of the New Professional Class

In order to be able to make sense of the experiences and orientations of Turkish business professionals, they need to be contextualized particularly through their professional and socio-cultural positions. When the rest of Turkey's population is taken into account, it can be argued that the most defining feature of their "status group" is their "human capital,"<sup>146</sup> which can be regarded as an amalgam of academic, social and cultural capitals.

The human capital embodied by business professionals provides them factors of distinction in two spatial categories: As middle and high ranking professionals who have

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<sup>146</sup> Immanuel Wallerstein, "The Bourgeois(ie) as Concept and Reality" in *Race, nation, class : ambiguous identities*, Etienne Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein, trans. Chris Turner (London ; New York: Verso, 1991), pp.135-152.

pursued business careers at multinational corporations, they are trans-local agents who participate in multinational business networks and organizations, and they individually contribute to the “trans-localization” of such things as capital, organizations, human resources, operations, ideologies, and lifestyles. This agency also is exercised by their transnational counterparts, and it “trans-localizes” them socially and links them to trans-local organizations, cultures, subjects etc. present within the limits of “professional business life.”

Secondly, these subjects are embodiments of various forms of capital, which are accumulated during lifetime. Building on the opportunities presented by the familial class origins, socializing with the core and extended family, then proceeding through affiliation to educational and professional institutions and communities developing personal skills, “gusto”s, becoming members of gusto groups, and finally consuming goods, services and experiences parallel to basic needs and developed tastes all contribute to the accumulation of “human” capital. Due to the rarity of their cultivated academic, professional and organizational skills within their national academic and job markets, due to their potential influence (political, cultural and/or ideological) upon their social communities, and due to the initiative granted to them in their occupational positions, these subjects are social “rarities” who embody power, and enforce it if suitable conditions are supplied. Thus, these people are a part of the elite of their local and even national communities.

It is perfectly possible to argue that in contemporary Turkish society, or in any contemporary society of the globalized world, social exclusivity engenders trans-localization and/or trans-localization engenders exclusivity. Although this is doomed to remain an inconclusive discussion for now, it is necessary to demonstrate that not all those who are trans-local are elite or vice versa. In this sense, trans-locally mobile people such as the deported, refugees, migrants, seasonal workers, and low-skilled transportation workers do not enjoy elite privileges. In the same manner, the elite such as politicians, industrialists, artists, academics, and professionals who operate in a bounded geographical and social space may

not get as much exposed to/ as much experience/ have as much competence over spatial and social diversities or authenticities as the “trans-locals.”

The table below aims to list conditions serving as factors of distinction for high-ranking members of the “new professional class” in Turkey. The aim is to emphasize analytically the duality of the factors of distinction. Not neglecting the fact that this theoretical duality (could have been more of them as well) can empirically exist only in an integrated manner and in an embodied state, by the individual.

Table 2: Factors of Distinction for the High-ranking Members of Turkish “New Professional Class”

<p>Turkish high-ranking business professionals fulfill criteria for ranking among the elite of Turkey. This is because they own high levels of</p>	<p>More specifically;</p>
<p>academic (cultural) capital.</p>	<p>having undergraduate and graduate (mostly) degrees from high ranking domestic and foreign universities, they have been cultivated in recognized-privileged academic environments.</p>
<p>social capital.</p>	<p>having undergraduate and graduate (mostly) degrees from high ranking domestic and foreign universities, they are members of the alumni networks of these universities.</p>
<p>economic capital.</p>	<p>as business professionals, they enjoy steady incomes and bonuses, which place them in between upper-middle and middle-upper income levels in Turkey. Most of them enjoy the privilege of upward mobility.</p>
<p>symbolic capital.</p>	<p>having attained middle and high-level managerial positions, their ranking symbolizes their excellence in the Turkish business meritocracy, which requires owning relevant inter-personal, inter-cultural, managerial, technical, etc. skills.</p>

(Applies to some)	cultural capital.	As graduates of foreign language intensive high schools, they develop high competence in at least one foreign language and they are exposed to relevant cultural knowledge (arts, countries, cities, people, etc.)
(Applies to some)	social capital.	As graduates of foreign language intensive high schools, they are a part of the alumni networks.
Turkish high-ranking business professionals		More specifically:
belong to trans-local networks.		As employees of transnational corporations, they are members of transnational professional and corporate networks.
are involved in trans-local interactions.		As employees of transnational corporations, varying by job definition and level, they interact routinely with foreign colleagues and/or clients.
are trans-locally mobile.		As employees of transnational corporations, varying by job definition and level, they travel (both domestic and abroad) frequently.
own trans-local competence.		They are individuals with inter-personal and inter-cultural communication skills who can establish short and long-term relationships with people from different languages, ethnic, class, geographical etc. origins than their own.
(Applies to some)	have experience of living abroad.	Employed as expatriates for a part of their careers, they live in at least one foreign country for a couple of years.
In this sense, “trans-localness” is an integral and distinguishing aspect (from other local Turkish and foreign elite) of their individual social position and collective status groups.		

## Historical and Contemporary Dynamics of Elite Formation in Turkey

Having deciphered the factors of distinction of the high-ranking members of the Turkish new professional class, there is one last matter to be discussed before presenting the findings from the field. There seems to be no point in discussing the elite in Turkey unless their relation with the rest of their community is scrutinized. In this regard, discussing contemporary elite in Turkey goes beyond the limits of economic sociology and requires situating them socio-politically and socio-culturally. Considering that the process of elite formation in the Republic has been very influential in determining the nature of the Republic by diffusing into all aspects of social life, it becomes necessary to re-evaluate its political agency in the contemporary era.

One of the most radical policy decisions that were taken during the foundation of the Turkish Republic was the ambitious effort to cut the organic relation between the new Republic and its imperial predecessor. This effort was very much an outcome of the nation building process, which was conducted by a political clique that was composed of soldiers, bureaucrats, intellectuals, various professionals and locally influential figures. Even though there have always been dissonant motivations among the liberation process, the hegemonic ideology of the Turkish Republic was doubtlessly defined by M. Kemal Atatürk and his political allies. The governmental and socio-cultural “revolutions” that were undertaken by the Kemalist cadres in the early years of the Republic, aspired after establishing a West-oriented, modern, secular, developmentalist, the Republican Turkish state within the recently defined Turkish boundaries, and the new “Turkish nation” were expected to be both its *raison d’être* and protector.

The deportation of the imperial family from the country, the lack of an established national big bourgeoisie, and the authoritative pressures on heterodox ethnic and religious

communities made it possible for the Kemalist regime to engender its new elite as the new Kemalist ideology became hegemonic in all fields of public life. The new elite mainly consisted of the state-supported Istanbul industrialists, high-level diplomats, bureaucrats, parliamentarians, local Republican People Party leaders, army officers and highly in-demand professionals such as scientists, lawyers, medical doctors, and academics. The golden years for the monopoly of Kemalist ideology and Kemalist elite were the first three decades that followed the foundation of the Republic. Starting from 1950s, the conjuncture which made it possible for multi-party politics made it also possible for the expression of oppositional political and economic agendas, and socio-cultural identities. Even though the history of multi-party politics and democracy was severely damaged with coup d'états, where an open military intervention in each decade became almost habitual, today, the public sphere is shared and reproduced by plural ideologies and discourses.

Since the 1980s, the most challenging and wide spread mobilization against the hegemony of Kemalism, which was maintained by the West-oriented and secular elite, has been summoned by the rise of political Islam. Although political Islam was contested severely by the secular elite during the 1990s, the election successes of the Justice and Development Party during the 2000s could not be prevented. A party of coalition led by reformist Islamists with neo-liberal market preferences, it embraced the conservative Muslim population, promised that Turkey would join the European Union and guaranteed that the democratic rights and liberties of all citizens would be granted. The rise of the JDP was accompanied by the rising power of industrialists and business professionals of Anatolian origins, who prefer conservative lifestyles with Islamic priorities. Starting from the 1980s and being promoted during JDP's single-party government, neo-liberal economic policies and integration to global capitalism have even gained partial credit from certain portions of globally-oriented secular individuals such as professionals of the new economy sectors, journalists, artists, and some of the big Istanbul bourgeoisie.

In addition to political Islamism, the agenda, which has been pursued for the emancipation of Kurdish identity, which has political roots being older than the Republic, has also gained influence in the public sphere as a counter-hegemonic political ideology from the 1970s onwards. Where political Islam's primary concern is about the re-definition of the locus of politico-economic hegemony in accordance with the ideals of a conservative and Islamist population, the Kurdish identity movement challenges the status quo perception of Turkish nationalism and its implications for "Turkey's citizens," as citizenship rights are believed to be segregatively recognized, punishing those who emphasize lack of cultural freedom. Contemporary Islamist political cadres have been successful in articulating to the neo-liberal hegemony through a conservative vein, whereas the Kurdish political movement's ideological impact has been very much defined by democratization reforms taken in the course of the EU accession, by the new conjuncture of the Middle East and by the ongoing low-intensity armed struggle in Southeastern – eastern Anatolia between the Turkish army and the Workers Party of Kurdistan (PKK).

In light of the discussion above, today it is still possible to claim that the Kemalist ideology and relevant discourses maintain political, cultural and social power, though in a highly challenged and metamorphosed way. Although new political ideologies and socio-cultural references have gained recognition and power, the West-oriented and secular elite, who have dominantly been the supporters of Kemalist ideology, are the main power circles for the social, cultural and economic spheres of life in Turkey.

Counter-hegemonic movements have of course created their own elites. When studying the elite in contemporary Turkey, it has now become necessary to distinguish between the rising conservative Islamist elite and the secular elite. Although it is possible to talk about an elite with Kurdish ethnic origins, it is almost impossible to talk about a privileged status group in Turkey, whose primary concern is the emancipation of the Kurdish cultural identity. Contrary to this, it is possible to claim the existence of multiple privileged

status groups with conservative Islamist and secular agendas, who through political, economic and cultural means promote the proliferation of their lifestyles and values.

Gole explains the formation of elite and counter-elite in Turkey. She considers that secularism, as a “prerequisite of Westernization” was instrumental in the creation of the early Republican elite. In order to do that, the new nation state introduced a centralized, secularized and modernized national educational system. This way, the early Republican elite “used the Latin script, spoke “pure,” “original” Turkish, without a local accent, mastered Western languages (French being gradually replaced by English after the 1950s), and referred themselves to Western sources in science and literature.” Furthermore, Republican elite were “endowed with cultural capital rather than financial power,” were “faithful to the interests of the nation-state” and “dedicated to the values of secularism and progress.”<sup>147</sup>

Gole believes that the realm of habitus, cultural codes and life-styles constitute the media upon which the “power struggle between Republican elites and Islamists” take place. The author believes that in order to emphasize the inter-subjective level upon which this struggle and social stratification is maintained, the notion of “status-group” is more valid than “social class.”<sup>148</sup> This is to mean that the “urban middle and upper-middle classes in Turkey had access to education for several decades, and were located in the vicinity of the center of the production of values,” thus “they were able to empower themselves through the mastery of “Westernized” ways of life and idiom.”<sup>149</sup> On the other hand, contemporary Islamism as a form of counter-hegemonic mobilization emerged after the 1980s. Gole considers that the Islamist engineers, Islamist intellectuals, veiled Islamist women on university campuses, Islamist printed media all contributed to shifting Islam from the periphery to the center of intellectual debates.<sup>150</sup> Even though the “new Islamist counter-elites” have acquired social

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<sup>147</sup> Gole, p.50.

<sup>148</sup> Ibid., pp.51- 52.

<sup>149</sup> Ibid., p.52.

<sup>150</sup> Ibid., pp.53-56.

recognition and legitimacy through a process very similar to that of the Republican elite, -that of acquiring cultural capital through rational and universal education- their “ascendancy has reached its limits because of their provincial Muslim habitus.”<sup>151</sup>

By now, we have an idea about the dual nature of the elite in Turkey. However, turning back to where the discussion of the previous section, how can the elite of the new professional class be situated within this duality? Helvacioğlu defines a population in Turkey that demonstrates similar characteristics to Keyder’s “new bourgeois and professional class,” Sassen’s “new professional class,” and Rutz and Balkan’s “global new middle class”:

(...) since the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923, under the rubric of westernization there have been numerous developments in education, broadcasting, arts and urban restructuring which have created a stratum of society that is fully integrated with European and global trends. This group, which consists of professionals and new business people, has been most adaptive to globalizing trends. To borrow Appadurai’s concepts, they are the constitutive elements in the ethnoscapes of tourists, technoscapes of cellular phones, Internet and information technologies and mediascapes of art and entertainment. Although this group is the most visible indication of globalization, it remains a minority in relation to the overall national, social and political formations in Turkey.<sup>152</sup>

We believe that in the context of Turkey, these-globally adaptive “professionals and new business people” and more specifically the elite of the new professional class dominantly make up the members of the West-oriented and secular elite. Since the 1980s, although university graduate Islamist engineers, Islamist education (Imam Hatip schools, Koran schools, Light Houses, sponsoring waqfs), Islamist business (small and middle sized enterprises of the “Anatolian Tigers,” Islamist holding companies and financial institutions) and Islamist associations (MUSIAD) have been on the rise<sup>153</sup>, we believe it is hard to mention

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<sup>151</sup> Ibid., p.57.

<sup>152</sup> Banu Helvacioğlu, “Globalization in the Neighborhood from the Nation-State to Bilkent Center,” *International Sociology* 15, no.2 (June 2000), p.333.

<sup>153</sup> Atasoy, pp.133-157.

a significant Islamist bourgeois and upper middle class population who have been integrated into the global economy as members of the transnational classes.

Although this requires a longer debate, we will assume that there are historical, ideological and sociological reasons which have hindered such integration. It can be argued that these factors boil down to the center-periphery debate. Living in a Republic that is 87 years old, which has witnessed the passing of three to four generations, both the urbanization and cultural capitalization efficiency of the traditional-Islamist populations lagged behind those of the urban, west-oriented, secular middle classes.

### Political Variations of the Secular Elite

As discussed above, the incorporation of tenets of westernization and secularism into the modernization ambition of the “ideological state apparatus” in the early nation-building era reproduced secular-modernist urban upper and upper middle classes which were competent in Western cultures, languages and countries. Selective institutions (private and public) in secondary and tertiary education complied with the political elite’s ideological attachment to modernization through westernization and secularism. This also dominated the realm of professional life, as higher education was the means to acquire formal recognition of skills and knowledge which were necessary for white-collar occupations in the modern private (which constituted a small portion in employment) and public institutions.

However, this picture has become invalid with the global era. The global era in Turkey has witnessed the heterogenizing of the West-oriented secular upper and middle classes. It has been discussed in detail how the ingredients of social and cultural capital have determined status groups in the post-1980s Turkey, especially for the middle class. Economic and socio-cultural discrepancy in the class of “salarariat”/ white-collar workers, as argued by Rutz and

Balkan as the old and new middle class dichotomy, has become most visible by their labor market status. In a similar way, Hayri Kozanoglu also problematizes the conditions that provide social upward mobility to the members of the middle class. In this regard, he emphasizes the increasing competition within secondary and tertiary education during the 1980s and first half of the 1990s as schools, that were organically related to the globalized European countries and the United States were seen as adequate means for successful professional trajectories.

Despite studies, which recognize the socio-cultural and economic discrepancy within the urban secular middle class in Turkey, there is a lack of studies which concentrate on the dispositional and ideological variations within the secular elite. The analyses on the West-oriented secular elite of Turkey carry tendencies to consider the elite as a monolithic group. It is assumed by the members of prestigious academic and professional networks and by outsiders who observe the groups that this “imagined community” would demonstrate some sort of dispositional and ideological uniformity.<sup>154</sup>

Onis argues the trouble of discussing politics within the ideological field in Turkey. He believes that although distinctions such as “left-right” and “center-periphery” offer opportunities to understand the nature of Turkish politics, they remain short of grasping the contemporary alignments. For this matter, he proposes a conceptual categorization along the lines of “globalists” versus “anti-reform coalition.” Categorized this way, we believe that the elite of the new professional class, who are also part of a transnational class of professionals, with vested economic interests in globalization, with transnational socio-cultural affiliations through academic and professional circles, with skills and knowledge that can function in transnational environments, and with translocal consumption habits are expected to align as “globalists.”

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<sup>154</sup> Ustel and Caymaz, pp.4-6.

Categorized along this line;

The term ‘globalists’ refers to those segments of state and society which essentially have a positive view of globalization and see it as a phenomenon which provides opportunities for material improvement and the advancement of society in general. ‘Globalists’ tend to be ‘integrationist’ and ‘reformist’ at the same time. Those who hold a positive view of globalization also see European integration and Turkey’s EU membership as parallel and positive processes. ‘Europeanization’, in this context, becomes a mechanism, a framework or an intermediate route for a country like Turkey to cope effectively with and benefit from globalization. They also tend to be ‘reformist’, in the sense that they see economic and political reforms as a necessary condition in order to capitalize on the benefits of Europeanization and globalization.

In contrast, groups whom we categorize as defensive or inward-oriented nationalists have, by and large, a negative view of globalization. Their politics is based on fear, in the sense that they see globalization as a process leading to the erosion of national sovereignty, in turn generating partition and an inability to preserve the existing borders. Their conception of globalization is a negative process whose risks and associated inequalities far outweigh its potential benefits. Defensive nationalists also perceive globalization and Europeanization as parallel and complementary phenomena, but tend to view these processes in a rather negative fashion as working against the unity and the secular character of the Turkish state.

At the elite level, the ‘globalists’ camp would include secular liberals both within the state and society at large, moderate Islamists and Kurdish reformers. This bloc has become increasingly powerful in the post-Helsinki era, enjoying considerable public support on the basis of the expected material benefits of effective exposure to globalization and eventual EU membership. The defensive nationalist or anti-reform coalition, on the other hand, includes ultra-nationalists, hard-core Kemalists and radical Islamists as well as major labour unions.<sup>155</sup>

Despite the validity of this categorization, Onis warns against “falling into the trap of putting all these groups into the same basket and exaggerating the degree of their anti-reformism or euroscepticism.” In this sense, what is particularly interesting for us is the distinction between “secular liberals” and “hard-core Kemalists.” In this regard, Onis explains that ‘Kemalist hard-liners’, “who are extremely sensitive on issues like secularism and national sovereignty, at the same time favour Westernization.” In this regard, “they find

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<sup>155</sup> Ziya Onis, “Conservative globalists versus defensive nationalists: political parties and paradoxes of Europeanization in Turkey,” *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies* 9, no.3 (2007), p.251.

themselves in the awkward position of supporting Turkey's EU membership in principle, since opposition to the EU would signify an anti-Western stance inconsistent with the founding principles of the Turkish Republic. When it comes to reforms, however, they find themselves in a rather uncomfortable position.”<sup>156</sup>

According to Ustel and Caymaz, the anti-EU camp within highly educated, professional, urban middle class secular Turks (contains but not limited to the hard-core Kemalists of Onis) does not reject EU membership “categorically” and they use methodological/defensive discourses which criticize the process and the EU's stance. In this manner, there is a widespread pessimism regarding the “intention” of the EU in accepting Turkey as a member. Seen this way, the EU is mostly categorized as a monolithic entity. The present pessimism is intensified by personal encounters with the EU in daily life, which involve “burdens” during visa applications, or trading with European states.<sup>157</sup>

It is important to recognize that conjunctural changes are influential in maturing and manifesting the differentiations among the political dispositions of the secular elite. In the “post-ideological” globalizing environment of the post-1980s, the interpretations of Kemalism, for example, vary from official state ideology to more “civilianized” neo-Kemalist discourses.<sup>158</sup> In this environment, political dispositions that are associated with tenets such as Westernization, modernization, secularism, and nationalism are increasingly personalized and customized which causes “norm-lessness”<sup>159</sup> or new ideological diversifications. For example, in his categories Onis does not problematize “liberal neo-nationalism,” which articulates the tenet of Republican modernization to an economic ideology that emphasizes pride in the efficiency of economic articulation of Turkey to the global economy.<sup>160</sup> In this

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<sup>156</sup> Ibid., p.251.

<sup>157</sup> Ustel and Caymaz, p.13.

<sup>158</sup> Ibid., pp.9-10; Necmi Erdogan, “Neo-Kemalizm, Organik Bunalım ve Hegemonya” in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce: Kemalizm (II)*, eds. Tanil Bora and Murat Gültekingil (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002) p. 591.

<sup>159</sup> Ustel and Caymaz, p.10.

<sup>160</sup> Ibid., p.11.

regard, this ideology can easily correspond to “globalizer” variations of neo-Kemalist discourses. This explains how certain secular circles, which emphasize their nationalist dispositions, can actually support the neo-liberal economic policies of the JDP. On the contrary, the protectionist and nationalist variations (*ulusalci*) of “neo-Kemalist” discourses were most easily visible at the series of “Cumhuriyet Meetings” that took place during 2007, which was primarily intended to impede the JDP’s single-handed initiative for proposing the candidate for the post of Presidency. During these meetings both the “hardcore Kemalist” elite and many individuals and groups from various classes participated. However, the urban middle classes appeared to be the dominant social class of the meetings, which motivated some scholars and journalists to pursue socio-political debates on “the new middle classes.”<sup>161</sup>

The important side of these meetings was the clear emphasis on secularism, national sovereignty and self-sufficiency (ironically, the “Kemalist-leftist” slogan of the 1970s “*Tam Bağımsız Türkiye*” was reintroduced), which easily articulated to nationalist and anti-imperialist discourses, obviously demonstrating a stance against Turkey’s integration to the global economy and especially the European Union, at least under the leadership of the JDP. The discontent of a similar vein, which is still present, has also been demonstrated as some members of the neo-Kemalist journalist, scholar, and army elite were detained within the scope of the “Ergenekon” investigation, a so-called illegal organization aiming for a coup d’état and armed struggle.

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<sup>161</sup> Nese Duzel, “Pazartesi Konusmaları, Fuat Keyman: ‘Türkiye’de uc orta sınıf kavga ediyor’,” *Taraf*, 8 February 2010, <http://www.taraf.com.tr/nese-duzel/makale-fuat-keyman-turkiyede-uc-orta-sinif-kavga-ediyor.htm> [10 August 2010]; Devrim Sevimay, “Unlu sosyolog Sencer Ayata Mitingcilerin Profilini Çikardi: Meydanlardakiler 'yeni orta sınıf'tır,” *Milliyet*, 21 May 2007, <http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2007/05/21/siyaset/asiy.html> [10 August 2010]; Cengiz Candar, “Türkiye'nin yeni, hareketli orta sınıfları...,” *Hurriyet*, 22 May 2007, <http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/haber.aspx?id=6560128&yazarid=215>, [10 August 2010]; Sahin Alpay, “Yeni orta sınıf'ın siyasi eğilimleri,” *Zaman*, 29 May 2007, <http://www.zaman.com.tr/yazar.do?yazino=545229> [10 August 2010].

## Istanbul of Encounter: An Embracing Cosmopolis or a Polis of Polarizations?

So far, the effects of globalization on Turkey and specifically on Istanbul dominantly through the emergence of new material and immaterial world, which is accompanied by new social strata have been discussed. In order to be able to understand the political orientation of the globalizing elite of the urban middle class in Turkey, the historical role of the Republican elite and the social status of the urban middle class were examined. Finally, various ideological distinctions between the secular elite and of urban middle class were noted.

In the next chapter, the findings of my interviews with corporate professionals will be presented. Their experiences and dispositions towards the background constituted upon their social status and human capital will be discussed. In this regard, the aim will be to see what kind of socio-cultural and socio-political attitudes the elite of the new professional class, demonstrate. In this regard, it is believed that considering their self-reflections and opinions as opposed to those attributed to cosmopolitans can be regarded as a “litmus test” to understand how transnationalism is filtered through status and capital. Particularly of interest are the ways people who are embedded in transnational and multi-cultural environment of professional, academic and leisure networks reflect upon their encounters with local and national “Other”s: being the urban poor, conservative Islamists and Kurds.

These “Others” can be encountered virtually by the way they are represented through audio-visual media. However, it is believed that the personal story of daily encounters in a spatial medium like Istanbul carries “thicker” value for the researcher. In the remaining two sections of this chapter, how conflicting this encounter has been will be demonstrated.

One can primarily talk about economic and socio-cultural stratification in Istanbul, which makes it possible to speak of minorities and majorities, defined by the type of socio-cultural networks people are embedded in and by people’s share from the economic

distribution. Some of the conditions of this stratification are determined by Istanbul's integration into global capitalism whereas some are determined by the authentic demographics of Turkey. Keyder describes globalizing Istanbul of the 2000s:

Gated communities, five-star hotels, the city packaged as a consumption artifact for tourists, new office towers, expulsion of small business from the central districts, beginnings of gentrification of the old neighborhoods, and world images on billboards and shop windows. What was visible in terms of the transformation of the built environment was the result of accelerated transnational flows of capital, commodities and images. These flows now dominate the field of social transformations heretofore accepted as delimited by national territory and influenced primarily by state policy. State-directed and state-enabled projects of homogenizing incorporation have lost their dominance in determining social and spatial change.<sup>162</sup>

(...)

The employment opportunities and social integration mechanisms of the previous period deteriorated, leading to growing inequality between the two poles of the social spectrum — in terms of incomes, spaces of residence, cultures of consumption and practices of everyday life. Indeed, the outward signs of income and consumption polarization in Istanbul are difficult to ignore. Poverty has become visible during the last decade, as well as obscene displays of wealth.<sup>163</sup>

Globalizing/ global cities consist of co-existing yet highly differing strata of people.

There are both winners and losers during the process of transformation. The insufficiency of the welfare mechanism that incorporate economically disadvantaged sections of the population allow for urban space and strata to be managed in accordance with the interests of the actors of global capitalism. In this regard, the neo-liberal urban governance of Justice and Development Party acts as a catalyst for the implementation of capital-oriented projects. For example, projects such as “Urban Regeneration Programs” force the replacement of the urban lower classes and engenders economic and social marginalization.

Integration to global capitalism influences people with different human capitals differently. Before the “thin social layer of new bourgeois and professional class” which

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<sup>162</sup> Keyder, “Globalization and Social Exclusion in Istanbul,” p.128.

<sup>163</sup> Ibid., p.124.

benefited from the integration of Turkey to global capitalism was discussed. Sassen notes that examples of this transformation are globally available:

New conditions of growth have contributed to elements of a new class alignment in global cities. The occupational structure of major growth industries characterized by the locational concentration of major growth sectors in global cities in combination with the polarized occupational structure of these sectors has created and contributed to growth of a high-income stratum and a low-income stratum of workers. It has done so directly through the organization of work and occupational structure of major growth sectors. And it has done so indirectly through the jobs needed to service the new high-income workers, both at work and home, as well as the needs of the expanded low-wage work force.<sup>164</sup>

So how, in a public sphere constituted on the spatiality of Istanbul, do two polar ends meet? It goes beyond the scope of this study to explain it from the majority's side, but an effort will be made to demonstrate the minority's side. Before focusing on the winners of globalization, briefly Istanbul's social transformation and its implications on the middle classes will be discussed. Sema Erder argues:

Istanbul has always been a destination for migrant populations, changing and cosmopolitan in its composition. Nonetheless, until the 1950s, the heterogeneity of its population was contained under a perceptual umbrella formulated as "urbanity," and the principal dimension of difference among its habitants was thought to derive from their confessional diversity. Until the 1950s, ethnicity referred to delineation of difference amends the non-Muslim population – a difference articulated at legal and institutional levels, Armenian, Greek, and Jewish populations were, however, seen as integral components of the city: constituting the very diversity that made Istanbul cosmopolitan.

After the 1950s, when Istanbul began to rapidly gain population, the composition and diversity of its population started to change radically. On the one hand, forced and voluntary emigration of the non-Muslim population and, on the other, a vast wave of immigration from Anatolia rendered Istanbul's population profile qualitatively different. Although the city became much more homogeneous from the point of view of religion, its cultural heterogeneity was maintained. Its new diversity, however, proved to be more difficult to accommodate and led to substantial social tension and conflict.<sup>165</sup>

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<sup>164</sup> Sassen, *The global city...*, p.13.

<sup>165</sup> Sema Erder., "Where do You Hail From?: Localism and Networks in Istanbul," in *Istanbul: Between The Global And The Local*, p.161.

What are the components of this social tension and conflict? Erder discusses how the “old urbanites of Istanbul” considered the new arrivals from Anatolia to be “peasants.” Although there had been previous waves of immigration from the Balkans in the early 1950s, this was considered orderly (due to the intervention of the government), in contrast to the immigration of the Anatolians, which was accompanied by the occupation of land, the construction of housing and the search for employment. More importantly, the life style of the newcomers was considered to be “alien” by the old urbanites, and it was “scrutinized in cultured discourse.” In the post-1980s Istanbul, which has become predominantly a Turkish-Islamic city not forgetting the increasing emphasis on “ethnic and confessional” identities, the “peasants in the city” have not ceased to be perceived as an urban problem.<sup>166</sup>

The politically important implications of “cultured discourses” is discussed by Ayse Oncu in her critical evaluation of humour magazines in the 1990s.<sup>167</sup> However, Oncu’s arguments are valid up to this day, excluding the cosmopolitan and romantic discourses of the 2000s, which embrace “multiculturalism” to a certain extent. Oncu discusses how in the era of globalization, encounters of the old Istanbulite with the immigrant, and the old middle class with the *nouveau riche* were manifested in highly culturalized discourses, which were essential to the making of Istanbulite middle class identities.

In cartoons, which parodied the stereotypes of immigrants, the immigrant combined “two central components in the dialogical imagination of an Istanbulite”:

On the one hand, the immigrant operates as a repository of negative attributes, through whom the refinements and distinctions of being an Istanbulite is reflexively understood. On the other, the immigrant operates as the invading outsider, whose unjustified presence in the city establishes, by extension, a seamless chronology for Istanbulites as the basis of their authenticity and moral superiority.<sup>168</sup>

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<sup>166</sup> Ibid., pp.161-163.

<sup>167</sup> Ayse Oncu, “Istanbulites and Others: The Cultural Cosmology of Being Middle Class in the Era of Globalism” in *Istanbul: between the Global and the Local*, pp.95-120.

<sup>168</sup> Ibid., p.97.

In addition to the matter of immigrants, Oncu argues that the end of the 1980s made possible “new channels of accumulation and upward mobility associated with the era of neo-liberalism,” which allowed for “a new category of rich in Istanbul.” From the perspective of the middle classes, however not only limited to them, this new wealth was marked by a “tasteless overconsumption.”<sup>169</sup>

Both the immigrants and the new rich have contributed to the construction of an “Istanbulite middle class mythology.” Oncu believes that this “mythology of an Istanbulite has lost its cultural moorings in the realm of taste and distinction emblematic of high culture shorn of its connotations of belonging and authenticity.” Contrasting itself with the “tasteless overconsumption of the rich and the vulgarity of the mass consumption in the lower classes” the mythology of distinction is re-created every day, through a culturally violent discursive struggle, aiming to regain a “middle ground” or “middle-class way of life” that will reconstitute the “system of distinctions and differences” with “visible signs and markers that distinguish the middle-class” which have “become increasingly subject to erosion” in the era of globalism and “neoliberal ethos of Istanbul.”<sup>170</sup>

#### Focusing on the Social Aloofness and Segregative Discourses of the Turkish Elite

Oncu’s study and arguments are very important in demonstrating how a “cultural mythology” has been produced by the urbanites as a reaction against sharing the same public sphere with people towards whom the self-ascribed urbanites felt no social or cultural affinity. Oncu’s study emphasizes the integral problem of the urban middle-class identity in the era of globalization and how members of this class reflect their exposure critically through particular

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<sup>169</sup> Ibid., p.110.

<sup>170</sup> Ibid., p.98, p.117.

imagery. It is important to note that it was not only the members of the urban mainstream middle class who expressed discontent of such daily and unfiltered encounter with the “realities of Turkey.” Members of the upper middle class and the upper classes, who can be distinguished from the mainstream middle class socio-economically and socio-culturally, also express discontent at having to share the urban space and public sphere with certain socio-cultural groups. Popular and academic references to the notion of “white Turkish identity” or “white Turkishness” and “white Turks” are revealing for understanding a more contemporary type of social aloofness. In addition, the discontent expressed against the “white Turk” notion can be taken as an indicator of a conflicting ideological environment among the elite circles.

The notion of “white Turkishness,” and the idea of using the “white vs. black” dichotomy to describe the conditions of elite was introduced by a Turkish journalist in 1992, and the terminology was later adopted by other journalists and social scientists and it remains viable up to this day. Demiralp argues that the notion was born as a result of the self-criticism of some members of the Turkish elite in the early 1990s.<sup>171</sup> Now that the notion has gained wider recognition, although its descriptive function remains somewhat underrated. Today it is possible to talk about three ways it is being used: It can function as an instrument of self-critique by an individual who assumes membership in an elite group he criticizes. It can function as a notion used by someone with “white Turkish” origins and qualities to criticize the attitude of white Turks while claiming no association with the criticized community. Finally, it can be used as a pejorative description or for simply criticizing the white Turks or white Turkishness by someone who remains in an irrelevant/uncategorized position or by someone who can be considered as a “black Turk,” someone who lacks the qualities of being “white.”

Although they remain under-investigated issues, “white Turkishness” and “white Turks” have been scrutinized both in academic and non-academic literatures. Before referring

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<sup>171</sup> Seda Demiralp.

to a couple of examples from these literatures, it is important to state that the “white Turk” issue can be approached in two separate or integrated ways: One of these is to define a population who meets “white Turk” ascriptions regardless of their relation to the rest of Turkish society. The other is to formulate practices and discourses which are associated with a certain identity and the way this identity is realized in respect to its interaction with its “unlikes.” In this manner, the second approach makes it possible to talk about a larger population who has been articulated to the white Turk identity, although the members do not constitute a homogenous status group.

Fitting more into the first approach, Bilici takes the “white vs. black Turk” dichotomy as a matter regarding citizenship, remaining within the disciplines of political history and political theory. Bilici argues that the “requirements of citizenship” in Turkey reflects the “cultural taste and conception of modernity particular to a small segment of Turkish society.”<sup>172</sup> Historically speaking, this small segment of Turkish society, who were “the political and cultural elite” who defined the political tenets of the new nation, were “mostly elite immigrants or of immigrant backgrounds, originally from the Balkans and the Caucasus,” which associated Muslimness with Turkishness, and they were “more urbanized, Westernized and secular than the local population of Anatolia, who were ‘still’ traditional, underdeveloped and ignorant of the challenges of modernity.”<sup>173</sup>

Defined by this minority, Bilici argues that there are “three components of Turkish national identity” which are “Muslimness, Turkishness and secularism.” Moreover, “any group that fails to meet all three requirements fails to achieve full citizenship” and therefore cannot qualify as “white Turks.”<sup>174</sup> In this regard, non-Muslim minorities, Bilici calls them “non-Muslim Turks” interchangeably, “do not qualify as Turks” but they are not “considered black Turks either,” they are somewhat “external to the nation.” However, although non-

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<sup>172</sup> Mucahit Bilici, p. 25.

<sup>173</sup> Ibid., p. 27.

<sup>174</sup> Ibid., p. 26.

Turkish Muslims, such as Kurds, and non-secular Turks, such as the religious people are considered as “integral to the nation,” their legitimacy in terms of citizens becomes disputable, on behalf of the founding ideology and its followers, if Kurdish identity or religious conservatism are regarded as inalienable dimensions of their politico-cultural existence and community association.<sup>175</sup>

So who is left to be called as ideal citizen? In this regard, white Turkishness and ideal Turkish citizenship seem to be integral to each other, which may imply a modern type of essentialism. More clearly, Bilici argues, “white Turks are ideal Turkish citizens not by any virtue of their own, but because they belong to the cultural milieu and the constitutive elite that initially defined the notion of Turkishness.” Considered this way, the ideal Turkish citizen seems to be more compatible with an aristocratic regime than a democratic one. However- disregarding the non-Muslim minority and the social embeddedness of the individuals-, thinking in a naively liberal manner, one may argue that there are also other qualifications of an ideal citizen, where the individual has an “opportunity” to prefer or acquire: “an ideal citizen identifies as Muslim, yet harbors reservations about the forms of Islam practiced by the majority of the people. An ideal citizen tends to subsume all ethnic identities—including his own, which is most likely non-Turkish—under the banner of Turkishness.”<sup>176</sup>

In summary, it may be stated that the “modernization-through-westernization” approach of the founding elite, who were organically (at least in terms of geographic origins) related to the Western world and championed French-type *laicism* and nationalism, an approach only shared by a power clique, has dominated the public sphere of the new Republic as the sole legitimate ideology. Also, in more sociological terms, “their headlong rush for modernity created the symbolic capital that allowed them to act as benefactors of the nation

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<sup>175</sup> Ibid., p. 30.

<sup>176</sup> Ibid., p. 34.

and the rightful inheritors of its resources.”<sup>177</sup> One last note should be added. It should not be forgotten that the rising political and economic power of the “black Turks” for the last couple of decades is very much integral to the process where the pillars of white Turkishness have become clearer as the “symbolic capital” of the champions of the establishment have become more severely challenged.

Although Bilici’s analysis has analytical insights, it remains limited and static for contextualizing the “white Turkishness” phenomenon sociologically. This is to mean that in order to be able to understand the emergence of “white vs. black dichotomy” as a contemporary social phenomenon fully, one needs not just to discuss who the “white and black Turks” may be, but also how these identities are produced. Sedef Arat-Koc’s analysis on the interplay between politico-cultural discourse, globalization and social classes serves us better for understanding the novelty and dynamism of this social confrontation.

Despite recognizing the “historical continuity of the elite” as suggested by Bilici, Arat-Koc emphasizes that there is something new to the matter of “white Turkishness.” In this regard, Arat-Koc regards “white Turkishness,”

to be directly related to the emergence of a transnational bourgeois class identity and a worldview among sections of the urban middle classes. Beyaz Türk discourses are articulated by one of the main social actors of neoliberal global capitalism in Turkey, a laik urban, new middle class. In addition to capitalist investors succeeding in the new economy of neoliberal globalized capitalism, the term has been used to refer to professionals in those sectors of the economy which gained new significance or priority: banking, finance, the ‘information sector,’ marketing, advertising and the media.<sup>178</sup>

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<sup>177</sup> Ibid., p. 35.

<sup>178</sup> Sedef Arat-Koc, “A Cultural Turn in Politics: Bourgeois Class Identity and White-Turk Discourses,” electronically acquired through e-mail on 17 May 2010, p.367-368. The following references to Sedef Arat-Koc’s chapter are based on an unpublished version of the published chapter, which was acquired electronically through personal e-mail correspondence with the author, due to the inability of this author to acquire the published chapter. Thus, the page numberings and the content of this specific work in the following citations do not comply with the numberings and the content in the published material. The published material’s general reference is as follows: Sedef Arat-Koc, “A Cultural Turn in Politics: Bourgeois Class Identity and White-Turk Discourses,” in *Hegemonic Transitions, the State and Crisis in Neoliberal Capitalism*, ed. Yildiz Atasoy (New York: Routledge, 2008), pp. 209-226.

Here, Arat-Koc asserts two claims that are crucial: She claims an “emerging transnational bourgeois class identity” and she claims the existence of a “new middle class” in Turkey. This approach is important in the sense that it demonstrates globalization’s impact on the social classes of Turkey. Therefore, Arat-Koc’s analysis should be distinguished from analyses which only cover the old “Kemalist core elite vs. the periphery” dichotomy. Arat-Koc believes “white Turkishness” to represent old and the new at the same time. This is to say that historically reproduced elitist-Orientalist attitude of the “Istanbul-based secular elites” towards the Anatolian population is complemented with the impact of globalization in the post-1980s era in all aspects of life, where global capitalism and neo-liberal policies become prime agents.<sup>179</sup>

Arat-Koc, too, draws attention to the way that white Turkishness can be used both as a self-ascribed and as an outsider’s critique. As these uses become inseparable with time it may be thought to “describe the lifestyle or the political affiliations of the new middle classes”<sup>180</sup> and refer to “an urban —preferably Istanbulite— segment of society defined as “modern” and “Western”” while excluding “the newly emergent Muslim bourgeoisie which has flourished since the 1980s.”<sup>181</sup>

“White Turkishness” manifests itself primarily as a hegemonic discourse in Turkish society. This discourse is shaped by “neoliberalism, pro-Westernism, and culturalism—more specifically, Orientalism—in formulating a presentation of Turkish society, Turkish politics, and Turkey’s place in the Middle East and the world.”<sup>182</sup> Arat-Koc distinguishes between the old and new elements of this discourse in order to emphasize the “specificity” of the discourse. In this regard, “the “old” element of Orientalism gains new meanings and dimensions as it articulates with neoliberalism and the geopolitics of the post-Cold War

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<sup>179</sup> Ibid., p. 369.

<sup>180</sup> Ibid., p. 368.

<sup>181</sup> Ibid., p. 368.

<sup>182</sup> Ibid., p. 369.

period.” Arat-Koc dates the emergence of Orientalism to the late Ottoman Empire, and emphasizes how Islam and various traditional institutions were considered as the prime factors causing the decline of the Ottoman Empire in the westernization process. As discussed before, this perspective was also integral to the Kemalist reforms taken in the early decades of the Republic. However, Arat-Koc states that neo-liberalism is a post-1980 phenomenon, and it has made possible the emergence of a “new” Orientalism. In this “new” Orientalism, “*beyaz Türk* discourses develop an ideological presentation of Turkey which attempts to distance and distinguish it from its Middle Eastern neighbours as a more “civilized,” European country.”<sup>183</sup>

According to Arat-Koc, the interpretation of pro-Westernism and the perceived requirements of the modernization process have changed. In this sense, “whereas the modernization project of the Kemalist ruling elite articulated westernization with nationalism and ideals of political and economic national independence, the present *beyaz Türk* position dismisses the politics of national independence” and “(...) it stresses global integration and aspires for Turkey to achieve a respectable global status, specifically with a membership in the European Union.”<sup>184</sup><sup>185</sup> It is believed that this component of “white Turkish” discourses is actually in line with the ambitions of the “globalizers” of Onis and the “liberal neo-nationalists” as discussed by Ustel and Caymaz.

Within the “white Turkish” discourse the emphasis here is on taking West-orientedness as a point of distinction, where the majority of the society- composed of all sorts of socio-cultural and socio-economic backgrounds-, who continue living in traditionally defined manners are seen as clear obstacles in the way of integration to the “civilized world.”

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<sup>183</sup> Ibid., pp. 369-370.

<sup>184</sup> Ibid., p. 370.

<sup>185</sup> It should be noted that as this thesis had been written, European Union was facing internal conflicts due to the financial crisis in Greece, and this caused distrust in Turkish public opinion in regards to the future and integrity of the Union.

Increasing frustration against the majority constitutes the basis of hostility within “white Turkish” discourses. In Arat-Koc’s terms:

(...) the primary identification (of the white Turks) is with Europe, the United States and a certain conception of ‘the West’ assumed to be at once the centre of ‘civilization’ and the centre of global capitalism. Inseparable from this identification is a tendency to distinguish, differentiate and distance the beyaz Türk self from others in Turkey who are seen to be standing in the way of connecting with ‘the West’ and interfering with the possibilities of transforming Turkish cities into ‘global’ ones.” What makes this differentiation different from earlier elitist discourses in Turkey which were articulated with nationalism is that the beyaz Türk discourse involves not just an arrogant but also an explicitly hostile approach to the ‘other Turks’ who do not fit into their vision of a new Turkey.<sup>186</sup>

Rifat Bali too problematizes “white Turkishness” and emphasizes its inherent hostility.

In this manner, Bali believes that as once it described “the cosmopolitan elite urban population who have been exposed to Western culture,” the “white Turk” concept has gained a political connotation over time: “Instead of solely describing the wealthy and cosmopolitan elite cultivated in the Western culture, it came also to implicate today’s determined champions of the Republic and Kemalism, which allow for no concessions in the secular nature of the Republic.”<sup>187</sup>

Bali believes that “the post-1980s elite of the single-party period have acted both as the present-day implementers of the modernizing mission of the Kemalist project and the champions of globalization.” They strongly desired Turkey to become a member of the “global village” and supported the American model of the melting pot approach for the co-existence of different ethnic identities.<sup>188</sup> Here Bali contrasts with Arat-Koc in emphasizing the Kemalist-orientation and the “modernizing” role of the post-1980s elite; however, he coincides with her in his emphasis on the pro-globalization attitude of the post-1980s elite.

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<sup>186</sup> Ibid., pp. 370-371.

<sup>187</sup> Bali, p. 330.

<sup>188</sup> Ibid., p. 358.

Bali continues by discussing that judging by apparel and behavior, there were two ways that the elite responded to those who did not seem to have internalized the Western cultural standards. The first one was an “Orientalist” reaction- pessimist, condescending and critical in tone- which placed the elite above and beyond Turkish society. The second one was a reaction to the rise of political Islam. According to Bali, in the political scene of the 1990s, the secular elite came to realize the severity of political Islam and witnessed that the project of Ataturk and other founding elite of the Republic actually might have failed to create the secular, “cosmopolitan” Turk who had internalized Western values and the principles of Ataturk. In this regard, the core Republican elite, comprised of bureaucrats, schoolteachers, army officers who were educated in Western styles, were deeply disappointed as they realized that the mission of the enlightenment of Anatolia also had failed.<sup>189</sup> Bali believes that this confrontation and disappointment is behind the pessimism of the secular elite. However, what is serious is that the disappointment and desperation recently have turned into hostility. In this regard, “the population who represented the failure of the social engineering project of Kemalist elite was considered as marginalizable, omittable, and sacrificable.”<sup>190</sup>

Deducing from the discussions that have been presented in this section so far, it is possible to state that the phenomenon of “white Turkishness” has been problematized by writers with efforts to describe how the secular and West-oriented Turkish elite has started regarding the rest of the population of Turkey, who do not resemble the “right” Turkish citizen that is proposed by the West-oriented modernizing ideology of Republican foundation. In this manner, it is possible to talk about historical continuities and discontinuities along this attitudinal disposition.

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<sup>189</sup> Ibid., p. 359.

<sup>190</sup> Ibid., p. 359. Although it is beyond the scope of this study it should be mentioned that Bali has emphasized that “...the elite who criticize Kemalism and the Republic had ironically met on common ground with their counterparts who they claim as Kemalists and too harsh on the conservative Muslims in terms of despising and underestimating the ordinary people,” p.360.

The continuity can be traced in the West-orientedness of the political and cultural agenda of the elite. Western civilization and the developed countries of the West still are regarded as the best examples that can be adopted by the ambition of Turkey's modernization. In this sense, communities which reject this cultural agenda, propose, and adopt other cultural references are regarded by the elite as "failures" or "false conscious."

The discontinuity in the ideological orientation, however, which distinctifies "white Turkishness," regards two matters. First, apparently, the social role, which the modernizing elite claimed for themselves, which emerged from an ideology of national solidarity that demanded "transformatory interaction" with other Turkish nationals according to a political and cultural agenda, has become obsolete. Today, those who insist on "other" political and cultural ideologies, identities, values or who solely exhibit different cultural and political life worlds in the public space are regarded as "losers" or "lost causes," with whom the "white Turks" avoid social interaction. In a conjuncture where traditional Republican hegemony is challenged by counter-hegemonic movements, the question is no longer how to "transform" the others but how to secure the cultural field and habitus of the traditional Republican hegemony.

The other discontinuity is manifested by the increasing role of globalization. Apparently, and as discussed in the contemporary elite formation of Turkey, some members of the Republican elites in Turkey, especially the members of the bourgeoisie and middle class professionals, have been successful in adapting to the new economic, social and cultural world of globalizing Turkey. In this manner, it is possible to suggest that the economic opportunities, cultural goods and social mobility offered by transnational markets, networks and institutions appeal more than that which can be offered by the confines of the national setting. In this sense globalization of Turkey and its cities is welcome.

What are the political and cultural outcomes of this change? This new attitude keeps West-orientedness and secularism both as political and cultural tenets; however, it becomes

culturally hostile to other identities. Arat-Koc's term "culturalization of inequalities" becomes relevant for explaining how the climate of hostility is produced discursively and ideologically. Encounters of elite with people of different socio-cultural and socio-economic backgrounds in urban space set the conditions for ostracization. Arat Koc argues that while "white Turkish" discourses

(...) exhibit a complete indifference to the class conditions of those marginalized, they involve an intense gaze on and obsession with describing and pathologizing the presumed culture and cultural differences of those defined as outsiders to globalized capitalist modernity. Produced mostly by the spokespeople of the new middle class in corporate media, there is a genre of writing in this period that obsesses in great detail in the urban culture, urban values, and refined tastes and lifestyles of sections of the urban middle classes and juxtaposing these with those of Kurds, Muslims, or peasants not deemed fitting into the image or lifestyles of a 'global city' such as Istanbul.<sup>191</sup>

Apparently, the "white Turkish" discourses display some sort of elitist transnationalism in which the members of the elite can regard themselves as socio-culturally integrated to a modernized/refined/cultivated transnational community usually associated with the Western world. This integration is very much enabled by the economic, social and cultural capitals of the elite, which allow for consuming the Western world, interacting with its members and travelling in it. However, in elitist transnationalism, this comes with a price of avoiding and pathologizing national/ local "unlikes" but being open to transnational/translocal "likes." In this sense, this is different from the defensive nationalism of neo-Kemalism as it allows for the forces of globalization to penetrate Turkey and allows for the intensification of transnational connections with the modernized world. However, it is similar in the way it designates European and American urban landscapes, culture worlds and science as the techno-cultural epitome of the current world while "Orientalizing" the local/national "unlikes" or "others." Without a doubt, this attitude is irrelevant to what is proposed by socio-

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<sup>191</sup> Arat-Koc, "A Cultural Turn in Politics...", p.374.

cultural cosmopolitanism. The elitist transnationalism of “white Turkish” identities and discourses in this sense appeal to the discontented urbanites of the translocally connected upper-middle class and upper class for whom the “*disappointing social reality* of Turkey” may consist of formerly rural or formerly Anatolian lower class population with synthetic (urban/ rural) ways of living who dominantly constitute the habitants of the ignoble and seamy “*gecekondu*” and/or “*varoş*” localities (a form of shanty town), especially marginalized migrant Kurds of rural origin who are likely to become “*kıro*”s (low-brows, rednecks) or “trouble-makers;” the population with conservative lifestyles especially the newly emerging (or visible) Islamist middle class, bureaucracy and bourgeoisie; and finally the “undeserving” winners of the post-1980s era, who lack the adequate cultural capital to handle their economic capital; and the nouveau riche, who are likely to become “*maganda*”s (louts).

## Conclusion

In the second chapter, status and capital were discussed, and it was argued that the high-ranking business professionals of transnational and foreign corporations have gained elite statuses due to their social and cultural capitals, which get to be functionalized as expertise in the growing global economy. It was demonstrated that acquiring high-ranks or managerial statuses in such occupational domains require cultivated skills. Complementary to these skills, attitudes also define the probability of success for international professionals. In this regard, there is a growing emphasis on cosmopolitanism. It is believed that professionals with cosmopolitan skills and attitudes such as, carrying an interest in being exposed to foreign work environments, being able to interact with colleagues from different cultural backgrounds and origins and maintain work relations etc. have greater chances of becoming successful in transnational business environments.

As discussed by Monaci et al., economic agents such as financial operators and corporate managers in globalizing sectors are not threatened by the dynamics of global economy and feel occupationally secure. Furthermore, they feel competent in interpreting/explaining the global processes, can articulate into various discourses of corporate business world and hence can justify global processes. On top of it all, these people have access to transnational networks, which provide them mobility and interaction with foreign counterparts and institutions, which increase their “line of sight” as socially, embedded actors. Against this background, they perceive globalization as a positive process for personal and social interests. As discussed in Chapter Two, this is integral to their class situations and the adequacy of their cultural and social capitals.

As discussed by Monaci et al., the way that such economic actors subjectively experience globalization is believed to produce a “bounded and elitist cosmopolitanism.” Considered by some authors as members of a transnational class in and for itself they are bounded in homogenous social circles and involved in practices, which do not impose them to leave their subjective “comfort zones.” In this mode of living, the place reserved for encountering *unsimilar* fields and habituses, which implies interacting with or being exposed to places, organizations, networks, practices, dispositions, images, discourses which belong to *unsimilar* modes of social living. In this regard, although they display transnational similarities and interactions, which bestow them cosmopolitan features, their attitudinal dispositions, social interaction, and social imagery remain bounded and elitist.

In the third chapter, the globalizing urban context of Istanbul and its impact on social groups were presented. Globalization has become important in the sense that it defines the new features of social privilege and distinction in a setting where integration to the transnational markets and socio-cultural networks has become irreversible. Istanbul received the focus, as Istanbul has been the primary spatial setting in Turkey that has articulated to transnational markets and socio-cultural networks. The changes in its material realm in the

post-1980s reflect the intensity of this integration. As a global phenomenon, the members of the new professional class were discussed also as being present in globalizing Istanbul. Moreover, the high-ranking members of the new professional class in Turkey were located as members of the elite. However, in order to be able to propose an affiliated ideological position, an attempt was made to locate them within the “thicker” context of elite formation in Turkey. In this manner, they were aligned with “globalizers,” who support political and economic reforms that enable Turkey’s integration to the global economy and particularly to the Western developed world.

Critical studies on Turkey’s globalizing elite identities and discourses emphasize their support for integration to the global economy and Western world, which suit the nature of the social and cultural capital, which trans-localizes them. In this manner, modernization through Westernization is also a valid goal for the globalizing elite. However, the intensification of the encounter between different cultural identities and social classes in the public sphere of big urban settings has brought new problems. On one side, there is the globalizing elite who have been integrated to the trans-local labor market, who have access to trans-local professional and academic networks, who consume foreign goods and services and who enjoy geographical mobility. As mentioned before, the globalizing Turkish bourgeoisie and the upper middle class professionals are among the constituents of this population. On the other side, the majority of the population has access only to geographically confined markets, networks, goods and services and they can afford confined geographical mobility. The majority of the constituents of this population belong either to the lower middle and lower classes, except for the emerging Islamist bourgeoisie: regional industrialists, land owners, and merchants.

Encounters in daily life and the visibility of both worlds in the mass media impose conditions where the fields and habituses of different social status groups and social classes intersect in the same public sphere. In this setting, the “white Turkish” reaction has been to

“culturalize” the “unlike,” which translates into hostility against various socio-cultural identity groups which are essentialized with anachronistic and inappropriate sets of dispositions, behaviours and discourses unfitting for modernizing/globalizing public spheres. Or it translates into some form of “Yuppie” or “globalizer” “non-engagement” on behalf of the urban elite, which can be managed by the opportunities presented by the increased spatial allocation of the urban setting among different status groups.<sup>192</sup>

The critical studies on the modernizing/globalizing elite concentrate on how increasing globalization has caused the polarization of economic classes and socio-cultural groups. Within this framework, the “capable” elite are portrayed as using symbolic, discursive, physical tools to maintain physical and psychological distance from those who lack the economic, social and cultural capitals, which are owned by the elite.

Although its implications are very much valid, this line of thought does not allow for discussing any possibility of social cohesion and solidarity between these polarized social groups. Does this framework really discuss the opportunities enabled by transnational exposure and experience that can allow Turkish subjects to approach their relation with their societies more critically? Does this framework really provide the opportunity of discussing subjective agencies? May cultivated subjective cosmopolitan dispositions clash with discourses and practices reproducing elitism of white-Turkishness?

In the next chapter, the findings of the field research, which aims to explain the tension between cosmopolitanism and elitism through personal experiences and opinions of Turkish high-ranking business professionals, will be demonstrated.

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<sup>192</sup> Keyder, *Istanbul: Between the Local and the Global*, p.196.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### THE TURKISH TRANSNATIONAL PROFESSIONAL CLASS IN ITS MAKING AND TRACING COSMOPOLITANISM

In the beginning of Chapter Two, status groups were discussed and it was decided that it is possible to describe the high-ranking business professionals in transnationally operating corporations as “status groups.” In both Chapter Two and Three, various connotations were suggested to address these people as a group. Taking them as the elite of the global era and global economy, the authors emphasized their “trans-local” character as an integral part of their elite status. In this sense, the trans-local character of their exclusivity stem from their transnationally valid human capital and their strategic positions at corporations of the global economy. We can give a summary of the names that have been suggested for categorizing these people: Peltonen’s “high class of the new economy,” Schneider and Barsoux’s “international managers,” Micklethwait’s “cosmocrats,” Sklair’s “transnational capitalist class,” Keyder’s “new bourgeois and professional class,” Sassen’s “transnational professional and executive class” and Rutz and Balkan’s “emerging global new middle classes.”

Despite their different agendas, these authors seek to problematize more or less the same population under different names. Considered as part of a global phenomenon, there are certain characteristics that are attributed to these people. At this point, it must be kept in mind that we are not concerned with the top notch within these groups who are obviously the globalized bourgeoisies throughout the world, but with individuals who primarily depend on their human capital for the maintenance of their influence. Hence, although their human capital and their economic capital, which they acquire as professionals, are bound to stay with them, their occupational power is dependent on their occupational functions and it is transient.

Thus, when they are not actively involved in business life their influence easily can become incomparable to those of the well-established bourgeoisies at the national and global levels.

In this regard, in this research, we are not concerned about the omnipotence of such elite. We are concerned about the emergence of a particular status group, whose every-day lives go beyond glocalization and are comprised of an active and conscious interaction with and exposure to transnational agents. What makes this interaction and exposure active and conscious is the strategic professional positions held by the subjects, which can be regarded as the status of their human capital at a trans-national labor market.

Described as a privileged group in regards to the socio-economic and socio-cultural stratification of their societies, the every-day lives of these individuals can be scrutinized according to two themes, elitism and cosmopolitanism. In this respect, Peltonen emphasizes their exclusivity due to human capital and transnationally shared, luxurious lifestyles marked by high mobility and cosmopolitan identities of belonging. Schneider and Barsoux emphasize multi-culturally competent international managers whose operational success is defined by their cosmopolitan adaptability being the opposite of “encapsulation.” Monaci et al. emphasizes “bounded and elitist cosmopolitanism,” in which elite professionals share lifestyles similar to what is discussed by Peltonen, they approve globalization and its functioning; however, they mentally and physically avoid becoming embedded into new localities, contrary to what would be expected from true cosmopolitans.

Keyder, Rutz and Balkan and Arat-Koc argue that this global phenomenon applies as well to the context of Turkey, where we can clearly talk about the emergence of a status group that these authors describe using a class-based epistemology. These individuals are employed as high-skilled professionals in the vibrant sectors of the new global economy, they enjoy the rewards of globalized consumer markets and they enjoy the privilege of living as detached from the urban “crowds.” However, Arat-Koc argues for a hostile discursive elitism which is

directed by members of the global middle class to “Others” in the context of Turkey, which resembles nothing similar to the cosmopolitan values and attitudes discussed in Chapter Two.

So how are we going to make sense of the subjective experiences and exposure of these professionals between trans-local and local levels? How are we going to situate their values, dispositional attitudes, and opinions in respect to the politico-social context of Turkey, Istanbul? With the narratives that will be presented in the remainder of this section, we hope to provide contextually embedded answers to these questions.

### Methodology and Details on the Fieldwork

In the fieldwork which was conducted for this thesis, 23 people were interviewed who, have pre-dominantly lived in Istanbul most of their lives. Interviews were selected according to non-probability sampling, as in this study we do not aim to represent Turkish transnational business professionals as a complete population. Rather, we try to understand how some of the “distinguished” members of this broad population experience transnationalism.

In this regard, a mixture of heterogeneous and snowball sampling methods was chosen. The call for interviews were announced via personal mailing, via mass mailing to high school alumni mail groups (Robert College, the German High School, Koç High School, Istanbul High School, Galatasaray High School, Boğaziçi University), and mass mailing through LinkedIn (a social medium on the internet linking professionals) to several groups. Replies to these mailings were evaluated and interviewees were in most cases selected after short correspondences. Mailings served for heterogeneity sampling, as it made it possible to reach people from diverse business sectors and companies. Snowball sampling accompanied this method and it proved to be the most feasible way to reach adequate interviewees, as the adequacy of interviewees is hard to predict and as it is hard to contact them (due to occupational positions and busy agendas) without the reference of a prior adequate

interviewee. In this regard, people referred by personal acquaintances and interviewees were contacted. However, given the limited time for research, the drawback of this method was that it restricted the already restricted interviewee list and the interviewees needed to be completed before being eligible to be referred to a next potential interviewee. Therefore, this process could easily consume two weeks of time on average.

The criteria set for guaranteeing “exclusivity” were as follows:

People who,

1. Are graduates of foreign language intensive high schools and universities in Turkey;
2. Have been working in the managerial levels of at regional/global foreign or multinational corporations OR  
Are working at regional/global foreign or multinational corporations at managerial levels;
3. Have travelled abroad and interacted with foreigners frequently for business purposes OR  
Travel abroad and interact with foreigners frequently for business purposes;
4. (Preferably) Have lived abroad for a while for academic and professional purposes;
5. Are above 35 years of age;
6. Currently reside in Istanbul.

The criteria above were set to ensure high levels of academic and professional meritocracy and intense transnational exposure and experience.<sup>193</sup> Among these 23 interviews, six were partially completed, and 17 were totally completed. Among the interviews, which are incomplete, five of them were intentionally left incomplete as during the interviews these interviewees were revealed as not fulfilling the criteria for the interviewee profile. Unfortunately, in the interviews which were conducted in the beginning phase, the same inadequacy was also present in some of the interviews which were completed. Therefore, among the 23 interviewees, 12 are believed to constitute the most adequate sub-group. The members of this sub-group were between 36-43 years of age, with the average age of 39, whereas the remaining interviewees had an average of 51. This

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<sup>193</sup> First criterion has been occasionally disregarded depending on fulfillment of rest of the criteria by the interviewee.

demonstrated that a highest age limit would actually be beneficial, as it would help restricting the number of generations that had to be dealt with. In our case, there were roughly two generations, the members of the younger generation who were born in the late 1960s and early 70s and the older being born in the late 50s and early 60s.

Among the interviews that were conducted with these 12 adequate interviewees, one remained incomplete, as the interviewee was ex-patriated to Asia. So, the passages in this chapter will be mostly cited from six people, four being dominant. The common features of these four interviewees are their current high occupational levels (either General Manager, or one of the highest Directors) at the Turkish branch of their corporations, past-experience as ex-patriates at high occupational ranks and having children. Citing from a limited number of people is also more of a necessity than a choice, as it is the most practical way to cover narratives thoroughly and enable the reader to build a more coherent understanding of the subjected people.

### Process of the Interviews

In the interviews, the interviewees were informed about the content of the thesis. For the interviews, a list of open and closed-ended questions that has been prepared beforehand was used to guide the conservations. During the course of the interviews, a couple of new questions were added to the list as well. In addition, some questions, which were detected to be leading, had to be changed with an effort to neutralize them. Therefore, in the final form, there were 48 questions, distributed into three sections. 20 open-ended and short answer questions were in the first section, and five multiple-choice questions that required prioritization between choices were in the second section. Moreover, in the third section, there were 23 short answer questions.

Although the interviews were designed in a structured way, the interviewees mostly were allowed to speak without interruption, hence making improvised and unstructured dialogues possible, and they were interrupted only when they seemed to be diverting from the information intended by the question. They were also interrupted when it seemed that the question was not clear. Some interviewees gave long answers, which could easily cover a couple of questions from the list. So when giving such answers the interviewees were allowed to speak without interruption. The interviews were dominantly monologues in which the interviewees exploited the chance to speak; however, there were many times in which follow-up questions or probes were used to acquire information that was more detailed or to disclose intimated answers. The interviews took an average of 2.5 hours to be completed. Some interviews were completed on one, some in two and some –rarely- on three occasions. The interviews were conducted face to face, and all except one were tape-recorded with the permission of the interviewee. The interviews were made in various places, in the personal offices of the interviewees, meeting rooms of their buildings, cafeterias or in cafés outside.

### Content of the Interviews

Although the interviewees were business people, the interviews did not aim to acquire information regarding their occupational or institutional operations in detail. The kind of information which was intended to be acquired can be listed as the following: In the first section, a chronological summary of personal history with emphasis on familial background, academic and professional experiences, information on mobility and work routine, and information on personal preferences regarding daily life consumption and leisure. In the second section, information on social circles of intimacy, socio-cultural profiles preferred for

entering into connection last, cultural and economic opinions regarding the world, Turkey and Istanbul, political preferences and socio-economic self evaluation.

### Producing the Turkish Elite I- The Social Reproduction of Human Capital and the Production of a Contemporary Status Group

It is known that in the conditions of political tutelage and economic liberalization that followed the military coup of 1980, rapid privatization, financialization and internationalization of economy and introduction of import-driven consumerism implied serious opportunities and rewards for those Turkish citizens who owned the socio-cultural capital necessary to join the workforce required by the employment generated by the emerging sectors of the new economy. Of course, those with sufficient purchasing power, being predominantly the members of the upper class, became the consumers of the free-market *at any cost*. Also with the utilization of financial instruments and private economic resources, in terms of entrepreneurship, they also became the winners of the neo-liberalized Turkish economy.

The narratives of our interviewees are informative about how the Turkish urban upper middle class was reproduced throughout this era of transformation. As emphasized by the discussions of Rutz and Balkan in Chapter Three, the Turkish middle class had to split into two strata, the old and the new. Moreover, according to the authors, the members of the “global new middle classes” were those who made use of their socio-cultural capital, skills accompanied by a mental framework that complied with the new economy. The social esteem that was attributed to the members of this group in the context of contemporary Turkish society is relevant to the value attributed to the particular composition of their economic, cultural, social and symbolic capitals.

Here, Ayla,<sup>194</sup> one of the directors at a global fast moving consumer goods company, talks about the socio-cultural and socio-economic similarities of her intimate circle of friends, in which she gives a picture of the distinctive qualities present in the making of the post-1980s Turkish urban upper middle class:

Ayla: I see a few similarities here. One of them is family backgrounds.

Me: How are they similar?

Ayla: They are mostly families consisting of white-collar workers, children of either middle or upper class parents. Educated parents with stable income (...) they are not particularly rich either, rather than being raised as heirs of multinational corporations, they are mostly children of middle class parents. Secondly, these parents have a certain view of life, and therefore they prefer to send their children either to private schools or to one of the prestigious public schools. Therefore, during these middle school and secondary education years, and within those settings the child starts to be exposed to international values. These children start to be exposed to the foreign foundations, if he/she studied in a French school like Galatasaray, then French, or American in Robert College, and to British foundations in British High School. Following these, if they choose to continue in one of that period's prestigious schools like Boğaziçi or METU, then their foundations are reinforced. In my college years, people who got their Master's degree abroad, or those having international experiences through exchange programs during high school or college years were considered to be qualified candidates by multinational companies. Therefore, within several dimensions: Companies look at some of your familial aspects, your education background including the positive assets acquired along the way like a Master's degree earned abroad, or an exchange program experience (...)<sup>195</sup>

Another informative narrative is provided by Bülent, who has worked for a long time in the same company as Ayla, and is currently the General Manager of a German pharmaceuticals company:

Bülent: The liberalization period in the late '80s and we being in college during that period were our luck. When we graduated from college between the years '85 and '90, especially some of the well-established companies

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<sup>194</sup> Interviewee names, which will be used in the next two chapters are pseudonyms.

<sup>195</sup> Ayla, interview by the author, tape recording, interviewee's workplace, Istanbul, Turkey, 26 April 2010.

preferred to hire us. I mean, we had a chance to work in one of those companies. If you think about it, today the people who have reached my job level are mostly the ones who started working in that 40-50 year-long standing companies in '80s Turkey. Among approximately 200 people, 80-90 are currently working as either the general directors or the assistant general directors.

Bülent: (...) We started in the '90s. The time of Ozal's liberal economy (...) We got a good education, we were more open-minded than others. We were members of a certain class and education style. METU, Boğaziçi, Bilkent, etc, were that period's most prestigious schools, and for the following 10-15 years we received further training in these multinational corporations and now here we are.

Bülent: (...) Among them (referring to his high school friends), I do not have many scientists or people with religious tendencies around me. I know them, I recognize them, but, say, we do not go on a vacation with them. We do go on holidays with the others (his close friends). There is an inner circle of friends. Let us say it is formed of 5-6 people. Besides them, there are about 20 people more, let us call them the second group. We get together with them maybe once or twice a year on different occasions. Their lifestyles, by lifestyles I mean not just their careers but (...)

Me: (...) What are the factors, which keep these people, close? Which things make these get-togethers enjoyable? From what I understand, your careers are similar.

Bülent: Not exactly. You are right though, our careers are similar. However, it is also important that the families get along well. When I look at their parents (referring to his and his friends' parents), I realize that they are, for the most part, public employees, engineers, and soldiers of moderate levels. They are employees from roughly similar financial levels but more liberal, not very conservative. They are rather secular Republicans. These people somehow provided education opportunities for their children by making sacrifices from their lives. They aspired to see their children grow up to live in better conditions. If you think about it, we are a group of people like that. We have been raised with unbelievably great resources. From the beginning, our greatest capital was our education and our intelligence. Therefore, to this date, we have achieved certain things by ourselves. Then again, if our parents had not made these investments in us, and we had not received that education, we would not be here. However, we did not inherit any of these; we strived for it, and contributed. My parents are not conservatives; therefore, we are somewhat distant to those groups. On the other hand, we were not like those people studying in Switzerland or in U.S financially at ease while driving expensive cars. We are different.<sup>196</sup>

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<sup>196</sup> Bülent, interview by the author, tape recording, interviewee's workplace, Istanbul, Turkey, 26 May 2010.

Ayla and Bülent's narratives can be taken as complementary to each other. It is an interesting coincidence that both interviewees chose to refer to the families of their friends in order to emphasize the similarities among the members of their intimate circles. In this regard, both interviewees emphasize the middle class position of the families. These families are dominantly composed of public sector employees, they are well educated and had stable household incomes. As discussed in Chapter Three, the middle class of the pre-1980 era in Turkey mostly constituted of public sector employees. In this regard, Ayla's father seems to be a major exception because he had been employed as the General Manager at a foreign bank in Istanbul.

Bülent and Ayla distinguish their families from those of the upper class.<sup>197</sup> Bülent emphasizes that the families had made self-sacrifices in order to be able to provide good educations for their children. Being of prime importance for middle class reproduction, Bülent and Ayla's generation have attended prestigious secondary and tertiary education institutions, mainly located at Istanbul and Ankara, and some had the chance to go abroad for undergraduate and graduate programs. Ayla emphasizes that the school environments were influential in exposing them to foreign cultures. Some of these people ended up working at multinationals.

Moreover, both Bülent and Ayla emphasize the mindset of these families. Ayla explained that "the particular world-view" these families held had been influential in determining the academic trajectory of their children. Bülent explained that these families were rather liberal and had secular-Republican values. Furthermore, through self-sacrifice, they aimed for the upward mobility of their children. In this regard, Bülent emphasizes a very important matter. Although sponsored by their families largely, they were promoted as

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<sup>197</sup> At this point Ayla draws attention to the distinctive career trajectories that members of the upper class have taken despite the shared academic backgrounds of middle and upper class members: "(...) Generally they are not working in multinational companies. They either start their own business or take over the family business. Even if they have foreign education backgrounds, even if they have studied in private schools, they never planned to work in a multinational company and to become a man of the upper management."

meritocrats that depended dominantly on their “human capital.” Here we also see that this meritocratic workforce, some of which had international experience, have been the preferred choices of the multinationals.

As discussed in Chapter Two, Monaci et al. discuss the decisiveness of professional activities/occupational positions for understanding the “impact of globalization dynamics” on their subjective experiences.<sup>198</sup> In this respect, the authors emphasize the role of disembedded networks and human capital on determining the way that globalization would be experienced.<sup>199</sup> Above, was argued that globalization defines both the new common features of emerging privileged status groups and the new forms of distinction between less and more privileged status groups. In the narratives below, it is seen that such commonalities are readily visible in the discourses and socio-cultural practices of daily life:

Ayla: I think there is definitely a subculture...To be frank, I think multinational companies are lathes that shape people. Every multinational (company) has its own culture. Still, I mean as a person who is from X,<sup>200</sup> when you get together someone from Coca-Cola, you can set a common language, even the terms, and names are different, however, finally, you lead similar lifestyles.

Me: What are these similarities? Let me ask again.

Ayla: (Gives various organizational examples from business world)...Besides this, after all, there is a global common language, as well, I mean when you are chatting with people, you know, you are at a meeting with 20-30 participants. I’m trying to give a specific example. I went to a conference in Cape Town, South Africa, a few years ago. We were sitting at a table together, chatting, people just started to talk about, I mean, it was very popular then, “Desperate Housewives”... Let me say it came out that it was the favorite TV series of people of about ten different nationalities. What I mean is something like this. When these people sit together, they do not find it difficult to find a common topic of conversation. Your lifestyle, their lifestyles are somewhat alike. You talk about your kids likes, the films they like are the same. Here we are, “Does your kid like Hannah Montana? Mine likes “High School Musical.” I mean there is a common language.

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<sup>198</sup> Monaci et al., p. 460.

<sup>199</sup> Ibid., p.461.

<sup>200</sup> The author has intentionally changed the name of the firm.

Then, there are socially and businesswise topics in common, when you talk to each other. (...) <sup>201</sup>

In the narratives above, Ayla links three themes: Multicultural business environment shared life styles and shared discourses. In this regard, Ayla argues that people who have chosen to pursue business careers at multinational corporations are “sculpted” in ways that resemble each other. Although it deserves further attention, here we are not particularly concerned with the substance of common life styles and discourses. For us, the crux of the matter is the possibility of ways in which intensified transnationalism in professional lives can determine the dispositions and practices of Turkish transnational business professionals.

#### Producing the Transnational Elite I –Exposure and Experience, and Cultivating Cosmopolitan Dispositions

In Chapter Two, we presented Roudometof’s work by referring to his distinction between transnationalism and cosmopolitanism. This was most apparent in the way some authors described the boundedness and elitism of the members of transnational class. Schneider and Barsoux’s “Encapsulator” expat or “McDonalds’er” Western manager can be taken as the most caricaturistic but revealing examples of such life styles. However, it is also possible to find cases in which the Turkish transnational business professionals reflect their personal stories in which transnationalism or encounters with national “unlikes” have promoted cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitanism in this sense can be practiced at various levels between the local and the global.

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<sup>201</sup> Ayla, interview by the author, tape recording, interviewee’s workplace, Istanbul, Turkey, 26 April 2010.

The following narrative demonstrates how Burak perceives that being embedded in different economic and cultural circles at different spatial levels can contribute to cultivating distinctive dispositions:

Me: What I am curious about is, if you feel you are different from the people around you, what might have guided or say inspired you in this direction?

Burak: I have lived in and shared so many different environments. Like I mentioned, my father is a farmer, and I used to go the country every weekend. We used to go in the garden, and I have so many things in common with the people living there. On the other hand, I have coworker friends who live in the most luxurious neighborhoods, and I have commonalities with them as well. There are not many people in this range. There are people either born or raised in the city, with highbrow parents, and they follow that tradition, or there are people from the rural areas who continue their lives in that framework. I also lived in the US for about 6-7 years, which makes a difference.

Me: I was going to ask your opinion on whether or not living abroad had an influence on you.

Burak: A lot, surely.

Me: When you compare yourself to people who have not lived abroad?

Burak: I think I am very different in that sense. I mean, being in different environments in different periods of my life was my luck. I have lived in various places having various cultural values, and I have witnessed their beauty, their diversity, I have understood them, I felt them and shared them.<sup>202</sup>

Here, Burak emphasizes the contribution of being embedded in different social circles to his dispositions. As these social circles are situated between a range of localities and economic classes, they provide exposure to different socio-cultural fields and habituses. He approaches this diversity in a cosmopolitan openness and eclectically makes use of the socio-cultural repertoire that surrounds him.

In the following narrative, Zafer evaluates how transnational exposure has contributed to having a wider socio-political agenda than those who have remained local in Turkey:

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<sup>202</sup> Burak, interview by the author, tape recording, interviewee's workplace, Istanbul, Turkey, 22 April 2010.

Zafer: The greater your exposure, the more your values and your viewpoint change. I can clearly observe the difference between people who work in multinational companies who have lived abroad for a long time and the ones who have not been abroad.... We, people who live in Turkey, evaluate Turkey by our criteria. Especially, when you graduate from university, you know when you are at university, all the problems are discussed at dinner while saving Turkey, drinking raki, and everything is Turkey-centered. As Aziz Nesin said, as we have been brought up in Turkey with Turkish propaganda, we always evaluate ourselves by those criteria. However, when you go abroad, when you have a broader view, you have the opportunity to evaluate your experiences by international criteria. Here in Turkey, America is supposed to be responsible for everything, foreigners are responsible for Turkey's present situation, blah blah blah...When you put things together, you see that Turkey is an unimportant country in many ways, it is a small country. People in the world have other problems. When you go abroad, you find out what the academia's, people's, countries' priorities are, and then you can compare that with how shallow the topics are discussed here, in Turkey. We revolve around ourselves, how much time we lose with small things. While in other parts of the world in scientific and academic world the objectives have been set clearly, investments are made, they focus on these objectives, people are trained accordingly, we still discuss YOK's something, still discussing the head scarf... So the more your thing is open to the world, the more you are able to compare these. That makes you to make a more sound determination about your viewpoint, your activities and your priorities.<sup>203</sup>

Zafer's narrative stresses how transnational exposure may shape political priorities of a Turkish citizen. In this narrative, the information on how this happens remains implicit.

However, as far as he informs us, we know that it involves comparison and judgment.

Transnational exposure gives Zafer the opportunity to compare the different political agendas of different countries or communities, and allows him to redefine an agenda that transcends the locally or nationally embedded agendas that dominate the Turkish public sphere. For example, in Zafer's narrative we see that he develops critiques on the ethno-centricism and boundedness of political priorities. In a similar manner, Sacit argues that it is possible to categorize people in two ways:

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<sup>203</sup> Zafer, interview by the author, tape recording, interviewee's workplace, Istanbul, Turkey, 13 May 2010.

Sacit : There are two types of people everywhere. One who has been globalized and the other is not. Turkey's dilemma is the same. There is a discourse, it is a Turkish discourse, it is not open to certain things, it is very sure of others (...) about itself. It does not question. There are these types of people in every country. Others are the ones who try to understand what is going on in the world. If they cannot get it, they try to sort it out. (Laughing) I call them the "Global ones." They are open to all, they draw down their prejudices. In addition, firstly, they keep developing themselves.

Sacit : (...) There is baggage that people carry. The family in which they have been brought up, the society they are in, their education, and these are all in their own country, or they reflect their own culture. If people have not been exposed to other cultures, it is hard for them to interpret others, or to do business.

Me: Is the latter more universalized?

Sacit: One of them has a universal conceptualization of the "good" concept. Putting more stakeholders into consideration...The other is, whatever happens, self-centered. He is more inclined to be dissociated and to have conflicts.<sup>204</sup>

In a similar way to Zafer, Sacit also argues that it is possible for people to be left bounded in vision, if they are embedded in bounded social circles and experiences. In this respect the "openness" of people in embracing new ideas may be affected by factors ranging from family upbringing, school education to national culture. In this manner, "globalized people" are those who can be "open" to novelties and carry universal norms that consider the welfare of broader populations. Thus, apparently, transnational experience contributes to the cultivation of this type of openness:

Me: Suppose you are going through a district, do you ever get surprised by things that you see and say "What lives they lead!"

Sacit: I have already gone through that... When I started university education, I learned all about Istanbul. I think I had that period of surprise during my university years. But what triggered me to do it was spending a year in the USA, spending time in New York, experiencing such a cosmopolitan city life, and becoming aware of differences and also learning how they enrich your life, how educative, how instructive they are (...)

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<sup>204</sup> Sacit, interview by the author, tape recording, interviewee's workplace, Istanbul, Turkey, 31 March 2010.

Sacit: (...) Do you know what that richness is? For example, when you walk down Beyoğlu, you see it is not standardized, even in Beyoğlu you can lead 2-3 different lives. When you go to Kadıköy, you can lead 2-3 different lives. However, with what is provided by the scale economy, for example suppose you visit 20 different cities in England, you would be going to the same high street. Like in America, many cities resemble each other. What I mean by diversity is that. What I mean by richness is that. Everything is diverse. The food has is diverse, clothes are diverse, music is diverse, the culture is diverse and Istanbul is a splendid mosaic. The disconnection between a man from Alabama and from Carolina and a man from Quebec is unlike the disconnection between a man from Izmir, from Urfa or from Trabzon, this disconnection is of a different level. In Turkey, it is more distanced. Their coming together and forming different things (...)

Me: I see that you like this “mosaic” of the city.

Sacit: Yes, I do.<sup>205</sup>

Sacit, who had the chance to attend an American Field Service (AFS) Exchange Program after completing high school and before starting his undergraduate program at Boğaziçi University, said that he had lived in New York City with a Jewish family during the program. Living in a central district of Manhattan, he had had the chance to observe the socio-economic and socio-cultural diversity present in the city. He argued that this transnational experience was one of the primary factors that have motivated him to experience the socio-cultural and socio-economic diversity in Istanbul (moving from Ankara), get adapted to it and consider the presence of such diversity as an advantage in terms of its instructiveness and enrichment.

A more detailed and multi-layered narrative is provided by Bülent, which consisted of a similar subjective inference to that of Sacit. Bülent replies to the question that was aimed to investigate if geographical boundaries are determining for socio-cultural affinity:

Bülent: On the one hand, you all get excited while watching the Turkish National team play football or you support your own team, Beşiktaş. On the other hand, you question geographical boundaries, and you question the nation state. As nobody decides the place, they are born... Then what does national interest mean? The other meaning of national interest is to possess others' interests. I mean, while some win, others lose. Well, when you

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<sup>205</sup> Sacit, interview by the author, tape recording, interviewee's workplace, Istanbul, Turkey, 31 March 2010.

question all these, then a sense of belonging feels good; however, if that means to encroach on somebody, it is not worth winning the war, if it is only for your own benefit. That is interesting, it is also related to business life. Now, I am in a dilemma. I try to realize that. For example, can you get anywhere with the 'win-win' philosophy? In business life, it is too difficult. However, I try to establish environments. I wonder if something like that can be established between countries. I also experience something... For instance, when I am on a tour, when I chat with someone in a coffee house, I can have things in common. Overall, we share the same culture, the same thing. I like chatting with them. When I tour Turkey by motorbike... When I go to Egypt, for example, with a particular group of Egyptians I can chat for hours. Because I have realized that, we have things in common. I mean when you break the mold... I have mentioned my daughter, if my daughter can make friends with an Argentinean... Something like this may not have happened, and she could have been feeling hostility for them if we had been in war with them. However, when you bring people together in a different environment, they can easily make friends. I mean people who have been brought up in a similar way as me in Egypt (...) Someone whose father is a lawyer, whose daughter has studied law, she worked with me in the company. I felt that I shared the same culture with him when I was there. That is why I think cultural exchanges are very important. Look, now we are getting to an interesting point. That is why my children's experiences were quite different. They will be seeing the world from a different angle from now on because they have broken the molds at a very early age and have seen that those people are not at all different from them. I mean it has always, well; we say that (...) when we attend an international meeting/conference, people who get together around the same table are usually Greeks, Turks and Italians, and the Spanish. Well, my hometown is Kırklareli. When I see someone from Kırklareli, where my father was born, but I have never lived in Thrace... The sense of belonging is a good feeling. You feel safer and you have the sense of belonging, may be, you feel stronger. However, you think the other way round; you see that all these are created artificially, and that people are not different from each other. Because when you go to Egypt, you see some people who fall in with your view. Then I think that the people with whom I feel culturally close are not limited to geographical boundaries and while experiencing such things I think many people see it in the same way. I think it is something positive. So I believe that to participate in cultural exchange programs at early ages and later on is very useful... They have these programmers in universities now, and exporting, also, is something similar. The interaction of non-governmental organizations is also important. The more relation you have with other cultures, the more you go abroad, the less the differences will become, and I believe people will, in fact, find people with whom they feel close and they will find these cultures close to theirs.<sup>206</sup>

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<sup>206</sup> Bülent, interview by the author, tape recording, interviewee's workplace, Istanbul, Turkey, 8 June 2010.

Bülent's answer is loaded with different layers of encounters. His relationship with certain Egyptians during his ex-patriation in Egypt, his daughter's relationship with an Argentinean ex-patriate's child and his interaction with different nationals from Mediterranean region at business meetings have motivated him to question the validity of socio-cultural identities defined and bounded by localities. According to his story, his transnational experiences that consisted of daily personal interactions with other nationals have shown him that it is possible to establish social relations with foreigners by revealing their transnational cultural affinities. Of course, we should not neglect that in Bülent's case, transnational cultural affinity may be much determined by the equivalence of social statuses and human capital within the social circles mentioned. In this way, these people may simply be foreign equivalents of Bülent's social class and status in his own community. Nonetheless, Bülent considered it a privilege for his daughter to have had transnational exposure and interaction at an early age. In this regard, he argued that his daughter benefits from early transnational experience by establishing social relations with people from different cultural and geographical origins, hence having learned to minimize social boundaries built between different ascribed identities, in Bülent's case "nationality."

As, seen in Bülent's case, the transnational identities of Turkish business professionals influence not only their personal lives, but also those of the members of future generations. Ayla distinguishes herself from many of the Turks who attended the same college with her in the United States, but remained within their bounded native social circles. This reminds us again the McDonalds'er attitude of the international manager. In this manner, transnational experience do not always cultivate cosmopolitan dispositions; however, it provides the opportunity of interacting with the different. Ayla's engagement with the local foreign setting during both her college education and her ex-patriation carries similar opportunities of socialization for her children:

Ayla: I am lucky that I have lived in two different countries for a long time. four years, three years are long periods. I managed, in a way, to get into that inner circle in both countries. Of course, one advantage of it is to establish long-term friendships. For example, now I have an American friend, we have been friends for more than 20 years. Likewise, I have friends in Poland. After sometime, you find yourself in a multinational environment...These pass down. Now, my kids live with my friends. For example, my friend from my university years, visits me. My Pakistani American friend lives in America. My six year old daughter has started making friends with her children or I have very close Turkish-American friends in Turkey. They live in Bodrum but they're American, the other one is English, so and so. My child calls them uncle, aunty. I'm sure that will have an effect in her life. I mean, this is something that is passed down.<sup>207</sup>

As can be seen in the narratives above, depending on the level of engagement of the individuals with the social settings that surrounds them at differing localities, multicultural exposure can infiltrate into dispositions, ideologies and social networks of individuals in permanent ways. The plurality of experiences within “unlike” social circles and localities in this sense provide the possibility of comparing different dispositions and experiences which enable thinking, seeing, believing and behaving in “open” ways.

#### Producing the Transnational Elite II - Turkish Transnational Business Professionals as “Citizens of the World”

“World citizen” as an adjective may be used as a social attribution as well as one’s own discretion. Although it has its ideological roots in classical antiquity and medieval Islamic civilization, “world citizen” per se is known to have been used first by Garry Davis after the Second World War as a part of a political project aiming world government of world

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<sup>207</sup> Ayla, interview by the author, tape recording, interviewee’s workplace, Istanbul, Turkey, 14 April 2010.

citizens.<sup>208</sup> However, today, in its everyday use as a socially attributed adjective, it does not carry the pejorative connotation of the “rootles cosmopolitan” once used in the Soviet Republic as a euphemism in order to criticize the “unpatriotic” attitude of the Jews in the Soviet Republic.<sup>209</sup> Today, both as a social and self-attributed adjective it seems to imply the particular *competencies* of a person which can be valid in a spatial and social setting that goes beyond one’s original locality or community. More clearly, the matter of associating oneself with the socio-cultural and socio-economic environments within the borders of a particular spatial setting may inform us about the broadness of the socio-cultural and socio-economic environments within which one can be comfortable living and interacting, hence establishing satisfactory social *relations*. This particular spatial setting may be as local as a neighborhood or as broad as the entire world.

As a self-attributed adjective, it may also imply certain *values and attitudes* relevant to a trans-local mode of existing that might be cherished by that person. Even though some people might be born into more socially diverse environments than the others, the notion of “world citizen” emphasizes a “developed” perspective than an “inherited” one.

The issue of “world citizenship” or “being a citizen of the world” is also useful for understanding how people perceive themselves as members of a community broader than their nation. In this sense, it implies a civilian/secular and chosen type of *belonging* as contrary to a sense of belonging that is defined by the contingency of the place of birth embedded in local culture, ethnicity and confessions. When used in the political sense of the term, citizenship would imply the rights and *duties* of a world citizenry. Moral and political duties stemming from being members of the world community are more emphasized than the rights people would enjoy as being a member of the same community. In this sense, a world

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<sup>208</sup> Garry Davis, *Views From My Space: The Personal Blog Of World Citizen Garry Davis*, <http://www.worldservice.org/gdblog.html> [17 May 2010].

<sup>209</sup> Vertovec and Cohen, p.10.

citizen can feel responsibility towards humankind, or global ecology despite the possibility of clashing personal, communitarian, national and global interests.

Pictured in this way, one of the most symbolic notions that could be operationalized to understand the degree cosmopolitanism in transnational professionals was considered to be the notion of “world citizenship.” Some of the interviewees personally preferred to utilize this notion within their own narratives while some were asked to explain how they conceptualized it after choosing it through a provided list of identities that they considered most suitable for themselves.

Following narratives provide the chance to see how “world citizenship” or “cosmopolitanism” is conceptualized by some of the interviewees.

Me: Suppose we leave your story aside and try to come up with something more general. What can we infer from being a world citizen? What is a world citizen capable of doing or what would be his mentality?

Bülent: *He should be able to interact with different cultures and various countries. The fact that I worked multinationally, and that I have witnessed various cultures and countries in different periods, has quite helped me in this matter.* There are two examples: I went to Egypt and Belgium, I spent quite time there. Because working abroad is different from visiting a country as a tourist, I came to the realization that I can as well live there. Somehow, with the people there (...) Maybe it will not be as pleasant as living in Turkey; if you think about it, when you are starting a new life, I am sure it has its ups and downs. *However, I realized that I could survive living there.* Would I agree on moving to Egypt for the next ten years if I had to? I would not, but with the Italian, Greek, American, Australian and French, I would because I can communicate with them. And as long as I am with my family (...) *The second criterion is defining yourself as a member of a group, or expressing your own interests, are all contradictory to someone else's interests.* If you are able to put yourself in your counterpart's shoes in these kinds of negotiations (...) I am sure you have heard of the prisoner's dilemma. The 'win-win' story... I try to use it in international relations as well. *That is why I see myself as a world citizen.* If you think about it, when you accuse someone of something, you should be aware of his own reality at the same time. If you are unable to grasp his reality and create a solution that would make him feel better about himself, then your gains are only temporary. Maybe you can reach a mutually beneficial solution by

somewhat sacrificing from your comfort and luxury. *In my opinion, thinking like this, thinking beyond the national interests, is being a world citizen.*<sup>210</sup>

Bülent defines the competencies of a world citizen. He argues that the world citizen is someone who is able to interact with people from different countries and cultural backgrounds. In this sense, he believes that the type of living required by being an employee of a multinational or a foreign corporation has been beneficial for developing such competencies. Apart from travelling for business purposes, Bülent had to live in two countries, in Belgium (Brussels) and Egypt (Cairo). From his experiences, he is able to tell that he was capable of living and working in a foreign environment, where he had to maintain social relations of work and leisure with foreigners. Moreover, against this background, he predicts that he can establish relations with people from various countries, though here only the Western countries are expressed. His second emphasis is on the problematique of declaration of belonging to a particular group. Bülent argues that grouping implies prioritization of the interests of a particular group against those who remain outside it. When we talk about the interests of groups, this means that interests can clash and some are bound to lose. Bülent tells that the kind of international relations he supports are those in which each side wins. He believes that it is necessary to understand the needs and realities of others and provide solutions that will satisfy the needs of both sides even if this should mean concession or self-sacrifice. Otherwise, it is not possible to talk about long-term solutions. In this sense, Bülent considers that going beyond the interests of one's nation is characteristic of being a world citizen.

Here Bülent featured two aspects of the world citizen. The first is competence, the second one is a specific way of seeing. Bülent emphasizes that the kind of life required by being a transnational professional, which has enabled him to live in two countries and be internationally mobile, has demonstrated to him that he was competent of living in a foreign

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<sup>210</sup> Bülent, interview by the author, tape recording, interviewee's workplace, Istanbul, Turkey, 8 June 2010.

environment. Moreover, this means that it was *possible* to live in a foreign environment and it was *possible* to maintain relations with foreigners. He emphasized that living somewhere was different than experiencing the same place as a tourist. From this, we can deduce that he implied the impact of exposure or immersion into the locality. Living requires interacting and maintaining, while a tourist does not necessarily need to connect with a particular locality. For the tourist, the place is consumable through a preferred exposure level; however, being a resident requires being more embedded.

The second emphasis was on the limitations and logic of group identity. Bülent does not inform us about how he developed this perspective. However, he clearly demonstrated that group identity meant “winning at the expense of the others” and this did not allow finding long-term solutions for disputes between different groups. In this sense, self-sacrifice is acceptable if it promises a solution that is good for both sides in the long-term. Thus, this might require sacrificing from one’s own luxury, comfort and interest. However, a world citizen should be capable of doing it.

Me: What exactly do we mean when we talk about “being a world citizen”?

Ayla: I am surely proud of being Turkish. However, being born in Turkey, knowing Turkish as my native language, are not things that I worked for, and I was just born this way. I was born here, but I could have born in some other country as well. These are not the things that I achieved or worked hard for. Because of this, for me, they do not go beyond being mere facts about me. Yes, I am Turkish. OK. Do I love my country? I do, but I am not a fanatic. I see its flaws and positive sides. Am I being clear? I do not carry a blind nationalism with me. Therefore, the reason I have picked them (referring to the options she has picked on the answer sheet), I do not necessarily identify myself with the Turkish community. *Going back to the question of what I value the most, wherever you come from, or wherever in the world you may be, is being a functional person.* From all over the world, wherever you choose to go, but then any rich people would function on Fifth Avenue, New York. In my opinion, that is not being a world citizen. When you go inside Soweto, by the way, do you know where Soweto is? Johannesburg is a city with one of the highest crime rates in the world. You know the capital city of Southern Africa, and Soweto is a ghetto there. However, do not start imagining the ghettos; they are not like Turkey’s.

Soweto is a kind of place, where they are willing to kill someone for a dollar. *That is to say, when you enter Soweto, will you be able to start up a conversation with a local in Soweto? This is actually my description of being a world citizen. It's not staying at an insular hotel on Fifth Avenue or dining at a Turkish restaurant in Manhattan. That is not being a world citizen. I do not see it as something only geographic. Maybe I can describe it as this, as having a common culture that I am capable of sharing it with anybody from any social class in the world.*<sup>211</sup>

Ayla started with emphasizing the contingency of national identity by claiming the contingency of the birthplace. She argued that being Turkish is an inherited quality. It is not a quality that is achieved and labored for; hence merely is factual. Even though she “loves” her country, she said that she is not “fanatical” about it, meaning that she could evaluate its conditions objectively. Even though she adopted a certain kind of nationalism, this was not “blind” nationalism. Thus, she didn’t feel the need to emphasize her Turkish identity as presented in the list that is provided. Ayla went on to argue that world citizenship is the ability of being able to function anywhere in the world. However, she emphasized that it was really functioning “anywhere” in the world. In order to provide an example, she contrasted the Soweto district of Johannesburg and the 5<sup>th</sup> Avenue in New York City. By world citizenship, she emphasized the competence of being able to interact with a native of Soweto and not living an insulated life in a hotel in NYC or going to a Turkish restaurant in Manhattan. In this sense, world citizenship is not only the capability of living in a foreign setting, but being equipped with competence in a common, universal culture.

In her narrative, Ayla rejected “blind nationalism” and emphasized a type of nationalism, patriotism or “love of country” which reserved room for self-critique. More importantly, she distinguished between the inherited and acquired qualities of a person. In this sense qualities like “Turkishness” may be an empty signifier as it was not a matter of preference. What she appreciated about global citizenship was the competence of being able

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<sup>211</sup> Ayla, interview by the author, tape recording, interviewee’s workplace, Istanbul, Turkey, 26 April 2010.

to function anywhere in the world. However, she emphasized that this competence must allow for interacting with people from very diverse socio-cultural and socio-economic conditions. She disregarded “insulated” ways of living and she appreciated developing trans-local tastes.

Although she mentioned a universal culture, it is somewhat dubious that she actually means a universal culture that is shared by everyone. It is more likely to mean disposing a value, attitude and knowledge based cultural foundation - or “cultural capital”-, which allows for interacting with people from very diverse socio-cultural and socio-economic environments.

Zafer: I don't think there is such a thing. It's a good thing, being open to the world. To travel the world, being open to people, it's good, but being a citizen comes with codes, and the world is such a cosmopolitan place, and everywhere has different codes. However, if by being a world citizen, you mean carrying universal values, then yes, there is such a thing. If you describe it that way, then, world citizenship is a good thing, because there are overlapping values with which you can define the world citizen and citizenship. If you evaluate it solely based on values, then, there is a thing called world citizenship. I believe there is.

Me: In your opinion, what are those values?

Zafer: According to me, they are the given value of a human, having certain rights, predetermined values that drive relationships and life. Democracy, right to live and right to educate oneself should be within those rights. And once you have witnessed these, the life you are living in Turkey starts to clash with the life you should be living. This is the basic hardship felt by the people exposed to places abroad.<sup>212</sup>

It was rather interesting to see the way Zafer first responded to the question. His emphasis on the “invalidity” of world citizenship stemmed from a practical concern. Although he approved of a cosmopolitan openness and mobility, he argued that “citizenship” regards carrying certain “codes” that belonged to a particular place and community. In this sense, considering the cultural diversity of the humankind, it becomes impossible to be

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<sup>212</sup> Zafer, interview by the author, tape recording, interviewee's workplace, Istanbul, Turkey, 13 May 2010.

informed about all of the codes that exist. In this sense, Zafer's point is reasonable because he drew attention to the formal meaning of the notion. Continuing to brainstorm he argued that it becomes meaningful to talk about "world citizenship" if it implies "carrying universal values." Considered this way, he approved of the notion and he believed that there were people who shared such values.

By universal values, Zafer actually implied a humanist evaluation of universal rights and liberties. He also emphasized democracy as an integral element of these. Considering "world citizenship" in terms of universal human rights and liberties can be taken as a reference of cosmopolitanism in political theory. In this sense, one can talk about a world community, which provides equal opportunity to its world citizens for enjoying the rights, and liberties that stem from being human.

Zafer claimed that the main problem of people who are exposed to foreign countries (in this case, we assume that these are developed countries, where these rights and liberties are believed to be enjoyed at a higher degree), is seeing the discrepancy between those countries and Turkey in regards to respect for human rights and liberties. In this sense, the ability to compare Turkey to countries with more developed politico-legal practices caused Zafer to disapprove the conditions in Turkey.

In summary, Bülent emphasized the ability to establish and maintain social relations with people from different countries and cultures. In parallel to this, Ayla emphasized the importance of disposing "cultural capital," which allows interacting with people from diverse socio-cultural and socio-economic environments. Complementary to this, Ayla expressed disapproval of "insulated" ways of living. Zafer and Ayla emphasized evaluating the conditions in Turkey in comparison to those in other states. In this manner, we can argue that the disposition of national critique is common in both. Bülent's discontent with "national interest at the expense of other countries" stemming from confines set by group identities and his emphasis on democratic negotiation, long-term solutions, empathy and self-sacrifice seem

to be a manifestation of his aspiration for international cosmopolitanism. In this manner, Ayla's emphasis on the contingency of inherited qualities and her preference on seeing the acquired ones can be applied to a wide range of situations.

Zafer associates world citizenship with a politico-legal framework, and he accepted the validity of the notion, when universal human rights, liberties, democracy and their champions are taken into consideration. In this sense, having the knowledge of the discrepancy between developed countries and Turkey causes discontent for Zafer as a Turkish citizen. This might be simply a manifestation of concern for himself or a concern for a wider public, which may translate into a disposition of responsibility.

The definitions proposed by the interviewees are important in the sense that they reveal the interplay between the common definition of world citizenship and how the interviewees associated their subjective dispositions, values, and experiences with its objectified meaning. In this regard, it is important to see that the narratives of the interviewees complement the basic elements of world citizenship as discussed in the beginning of the section. They were also parallel to the cosmopolitan dispositions, which were demonstrated in Table 1 of Chapter Two. We consider that the way that world citizenship was interpreted by some of the interviewees reflected the way they had internalized various tenets of cosmopolitanism. In this sense, their references to their subjective realities do not try to re-interpret the notion in a distorted manner as could be expected from those living "bounded and elitist" cosmopolitanisms. On the contrary, within the circles of transnational professionals, it is possible to trace discourses of cosmopolitanism with particular emphases on anti-elitism and anti-boundedness. Moreover, we can see that these discourses are not solely theoretical but feed from subjective experiences stemming from transnational mobility, interaction, and exposure if not solely on objective knowledge.

## Producing the Turkish Elite II – Critiques and Self-Critiques on Elitism

The class-based denotations of transnational professionals seem to offer sociologically interesting and practical typologies for discussing them as members of global and national collectivities. However, it should be realized that class-based denotations are useful for understanding actors as a part of the economic structure in which they perform. However, when class-based denotations are used also to describe socio-cultural and ideological orientations, they may lack precision and risk overgeneralization. In this manner, this section aims to show that the “bounded and elite” or “upper class life style” that these individuals can afford does not always coincide with individualist/elitist/meritocratic dispositions and result in “bounded and elitist cosmopolitanisms.” When investigated, it is easy to see that these people are predominantly aware of their distinguished positions in the society. Especially those members who have witnessed upward mobility can contrast their class position with that of the older and rising generations. Thus, this “awareness” of mobility creates a subjective “uneasiness” in members who carry cosmopolitan dispositions.

Bülent: Hum, I don't like it, to be a member of a closed society, I mean, living in Kemer Country, sending your kids to a private school there, going on a holiday to Bodrum by plane, going abroad three times a year for skiing, and so on...In fact, I don't mean I don't do such things, but at the same time, I'll go to Diyarbakır, I'll meet our old watchman who is from Diyarbakır, we'll have tea, I'll walk around, then we'll sit at a café house and talk to people there. When I'm on a motorbike tour, I'll chat with people in the café house, I'll talk about my arm day anecdotes with someone else, I like such things, a very elitist manner rather annoys me. I mean, I think we're all equal, I'm in a different responsibility as I have had a better education but we are, the worker at the beginning of the line and I possess the same qualities, I only have more responsibilities about certain topics, sometimes his responsibilities are more important than mine, because the quality of the medicine has a (direct impact on) relation with a patient's health. They have defined the responsibility something like, I spend more time here (he means in his office), maybe I suffer more from headaches,

that's why they pay me more, it's all about that. But I don't see myself in a different place.<sup>213</sup>

Here, Bülent expressed disavowal for a certain type of luxurious living that may be considered within the schemes of the Turkish upper and upper middle class *habitués*, which are bounded in terms social diversity and practices. Although Bülent admitted that occasionally he preferred whiling away time in a luxurious manner, this did not prevent him from enjoying interaction and sharing with people from different socio-cultural backgrounds disregarding their socio-economic status. Although they seem to remain at a superficial level, apparently, he looked forward to having these kinds of occasions. Bülent argues that he was luckier than others for receiving the kind of education he had. However, he believed that this did not make him any better than a worker who works on the production line. Bülent argued that both of them have responsibilities, whose importance can change according to the matter in question.

Bülent: There are such people, when I think how I could define them then I differentiate myself from them, I don't mean this is good or bad. I always give my school background, being graduated from a Science High School, being in different environments, being in different countries, it is also important to work in the Sales department. You just go to a local shop, you meet people from different cultural groups. There are people who haven't had such an experience. I gave an example, remember, some people have grown up in a very hygienic environment: They go to private high schools, lives in Kemer Country, go to university in America or in Switzerland, He returns home and this kind of person also works for multinational companies. They can be more elitist. In a more closed environment, I mean. There are such people.<sup>214</sup>

Bülent felt the need to distinguish himself from those types of people whom he considered as living bounded and elitist lives. He believed that these people had been raised in “hygienic” conditions where they only interacted with people of limited social diversity. They

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<sup>213</sup> Bülent, interview by the author, tape recording, interviewee's workplace, Istanbul, Turkey, 8 June 2010.

<sup>214</sup> Bülent, interview by the author, tape recording, interviewee's workplace, Istanbul, Turkey, 8 June 2010.

received educations at quality institutions, they lived in gated communities and they enjoyed geographically mobile lives. In this regard, it is not possible to argue that multinational corporations have tendencies to recruit people by regarding their cosmopolitan virtues since “bounded and elitist” living people can make their ways into the same work environment as well. However, it seems that some people like Bülent benefit from the diversity of socio-cultural exposure and experiences they have while working at multinationals (in the case of Bülent, working in the sales department and working as an ex-patriate) in terms of developing lifestyles which are socio-culturally, socio-economically and spatially less bounded. Hence, it enables intercommunication between different class and status positions.

I was introduced to Bülent by Zafer. In the past, there was a time when they had worked at the same multinational corporation. Now both of them were employed as General Managers at different foreign companies. They were close friends and it was possible to trace similarities in their attitudes:

Zafer: Well, in fact, when we look at, we live in a small tank, it is that we talk among us. We live in a very small society. Our society is formed by our school friends and colleagues, people whom we frequently meet, a small circle, it is a core. Core environment, as I didn't attend high school here, of mine is university friends and colleagues. The places we go... By the way, I've taken up photography for almost a year, that's why I have been walking around the city and I like it. However, when we look, generally, the places visited are certain. In Beyoglu, in Levent, at Bosphorus, we spend our time at certain places, we socialize at these places. Because of this, (he means photography) I wander around Balat, Galata or Sultanahmet snapping some sights. It feels good. It's a different world. But when we go out with friends we, mostly, go to those places I have just mentioned.<sup>215</sup>

Above, Zafer self-critically evaluated and accepted the boundedness of his intimate social circle. This circle comprises of acquaintances from academic and professional networks. He also admitted that these people consumed specific parts of the urban setting. However, he

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<sup>215</sup> Zafer, interview by the author, tape recording, interviewee's workplace, Istanbul, Turkey, 13 May 2010.

mentioned how his amateur interest in photography helped him to pull away from this bounded social circle. The role of photography will be evaluated after the section below:

Me: If you had to live somewhere else, where would you live? And to what extent does Istanbul meet your expectations of such a city?

Zafer: Istanbul is a highly energetic city. I like such places, places with heterogeneous population, as well. I mean London is one of them, New York, as well. I like Rome very much, too. I mean a place, which hosts many things, which is lively, which has cultural activities, where you can have delicious food, which has beautiful people. However, I live in a quiet place, in the countryside by the nature. I enjoy the place. Then I like going to places like Beyoglu, Galata and having meals, taking photos, listening to good music there. So, Istanbul is one of the places I want to live in, however, firstly, I don't like some of the people. I don't like some things that I have to see and deal with everyday. Then, I don't like the ugliness, unaesthetic things that I see around. In fact, you don't notice these while living here but whenever I go abroad and return, they start disturbing me, then I think you are accustomed to these things, your brain says, "Ignore them." Where would I like to live? There is such a place, which has beautiful natural surroundings, where people respect each other, where they are civilized, which is lively.

Me: What do you mean by a heterogeneous and energetic place?

Zafer: What I mean by energy is that when you go out at 9p.m., you don't go into a dead city. Like in Darmstadt or in Geneva... Well, sort of, to listen to some jazz music, rock music, see a play or see a movie a city that leads its life. You can find such things easily in London, in New York, too...Heterogeneous and that means cities that you can get to various different things. Where you can meet different people, have a drink together and chat, make friends with, or, well, you can meet your different wishes.

Me: What do you mean by "different people"?

Zafer: I mean people from different cultures. Different cultures can be from different cultures exist in Turkey. Istanbul, in that way, is heterogeneous. That has good and very bad aspects. The bad aspect is, people's being disrespectful to each other or bringing their own traditions to Istanbul. Generally, these people are incongruous with these: by being proper, by showing good manners or aesthetically, there are things that irritate me. The good aspects are when you sit together, you have a good time, for example, I came across the head of the Gypsies thing while I was taking photos in Balat, and I took some photos of him. I had a very good time that day. I learned a lot from him. We talked about many things, politics, Romans, current events; there is a very different world there and not at all (...)<sup>216</sup>

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<sup>216</sup> Zafer, interview by the author, tape recording, interviewee's workplace, Istanbul, Turkey, 11 May 2010.

In the passages above, Zafer emphasized the cosmopolitan and metropolitan nature of cities like Istanbul, New York and Rome and why he was delighted with them. In this sense, he considered these cities as comparable to each other as they are all packaged with opportunities of social and cultural exposure, encounter, interaction and consumption for twenty-four hours a day. However, properness/ decency/ appropriateness/pleasantness of these settings also seemed to be important for Zafer. He was discontented with the “aesthetic” irregularities in the city and certain type of daily encounters. In this sense, his cosmopolitan openness seems to have its boundaries. The subtext of his discontent takes us to the matter of presence of internal migrants in the city. As explained by Oncu in Chapter Three, the presence of rural immigrants in Istanbul has always been perceived as an urban problem, especially by middle and upper class “Istanbulites,” whoever they are. This way, although not very explicitly mentioned by Zafer, the presence of this particular population seems to impede Istanbul from being an “aesthetic” city like Rome. Of course, this scenario resembles of the “white Turk” discursive approach as discussed by Arat-Koc. However, it would be pressing much to describe Zafer’s discourse as that of a “white Turk” because he described his fondness of particular dimensions of this “heterogeneity within our culture.” Although choosing controversial idioms like “the head of the Gypsy thing” (We assume that it is a neighborhood based cultural association for solidarity and assistance and we prefer taking his idioms as a form of colloquialism) he was delighted by running into a Romani local and be able to chat with him on various subjects. Zafer described his experience as delightful and informative. His delight might have been a manifestation of “Istanbulite romanticism,” aroused by running into a “resident of the cosmopolitan-imperial district” of *archeological* value. Or it might simply have been a manifestation of the cosmopolitan delight taken in the multi-cultural setting of Istanbul. In this picture, Zafer’s interest in photography provided him the means for encountering different lives in Istanbul. Either as the by-product or as the

objective, this activity quenched Zafer's thirst for aesthetics and interacting with socio-cultural heterogeneity to an extent possible.

Zafer: I believe that, the reason why we ask for heterogeneousness is we are born in a homogenous environment, that is why we demand the other. Even now, I look at my kids. They go to same school, with the same type of people. For example, we weren't brought up in the same way. I attended a state school. (...) My best friend was the doorman's child. I would go to his home. Now my daughters go to the college. They are all the same type of people. They live in similar places. They do similar activities. They come home, then they go to play tennis with the same people, they play basketball, again with the same lot. We are getting to homogeneous, being together with the same type of people. Maybe that's why we miss heterogeneousness. We were luckier in comparison to my children. I grew up in a district, there are no such places now. I mean my children don't go out into the street to play.

Me: What do you exactly mean by "same type"?

Zafer: Well, I mean, the parents are professionals, with high incomes, let's say university graduates(...) both parents have university educations, have been abroad, lived there, they like travelling, when you categorize, I should say, by the Nielsen scale, people of type A. For example, we visited some friends a few days ago, they live in a flat, it'll sound funny, but, my daughter asked, "Why do they live in a flat?" Then we thought about that question. And saw that none of our friends or theirs lives in a flat. It seemed interesting to them. They took the lift and that seemed interesting to them. And we realized that we are bringing them up in an aquarium, and now we are thinking how we can change this. Now I'll take them with me to Balat when I go snapping some photos (laughing), they'll see what it is like. As I have said, the truth is, they are with the same type of people everywhere, at school, at the gym, at the piano course, I mean rather far from typical Turkish people, they are brought up in that way. They are at primary school now; we have a chance to change it, now we're aware of it.<sup>217</sup>

Bülent : (*Bülent mentioned that the families in his neighborhood showed socio-cultural, socio-economic similarities. I interpreted that from what he had said upward mobility was understood in his generation and now he goes on*) (...) In fact, we witness that upward mobility, I mean at the moment, when it comes to our kids, I think it is the right way to bear that mobility in mind. During our last meeting, I mentioned that our kids are growing up in a hygienic environment. When we talk to each other as parents we say, "What will we do with them?" I mean, we were from middle class families. We used to play in the neighborhood. At least we had seen such things at school, even now, even if you make your own choice, you are friends with everyone because you know them, and you have spent time with them. (*Bülent tells that his school friends are from different types*

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<sup>217</sup> Zafer, interview by the author, tape recording, interviewee's workplace, Istanbul, Turkey, 13 May 2010.

*of families, his friends have different jobs and political views, they vary from being a scientist at NASA to being a follower of Fethullah, but they still get together at times)* However, now, while we are analyzing our children we have to ask why we are bringing them up in such an environment. I live in a house very close to the village called Y<sup>218</sup>, but my child has no interaction with a child from the village.<sup>219</sup>

In the passages above, Zafer and Bülent expressed their common concerns regarding their children. Despite their cosmopolitan orientations, they complained about the socio-economic and socio-cultural homogeneity of the social circles in which they were raising their children. These circles were comprised of people like themselves, well-educated professionals with high salaries, who had experienced foreign countries, who were used to travelling. Zafer argued that their children kept meeting “the same kind of people”- both family and children-wise- at the school and at extra-curricular activities. Thus, despite the human capital present in their lives, these children grow up unaware of the basic *realities* of Turkey, of the kind of lives maintained and situations experienced by the bulk of Turkey’s population. In this case, both Zafer and Bülent regard themselves as privileged, having acquired awareness of the socio-economic and socio-cultural diversity of Turkey at an early age by daily encounters. Seemingly, this awareness provided Zafer and Bülent the ability to empathize and respect if not tolerate other lives. Moreover, presumably, Zafer and Bülent’s children were born into a *habitus* of a higher class position than those of their parents. Being children of the old middle class who were born into a newly globalizing Turkey, Zafer and Bülent had the chance to interact with a more diverse population. However, due to the socio-economic, cultural and ethnic discrepancies rifted by neo-liberal globalization and manifested in the spatial urban polarization, now, although their children were transnationally exposed, they lived locally bounded. In this sense, Zafer and Bülent argued the necessity of being actively involved in infusing such awareness in their children.

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<sup>218</sup> Author encrypts the name.

<sup>219</sup> Bülent, interview by the author, tape recording, interviewee’s workplace, Istanbul, Turkey, 8 June 2010.

Despite the fact that Bülent and Zafer's awareness were cultivated through every-day encounters in the heterogeneity of their immediate settings starting from an early age, some members of their generation had been born into bounded and elite social circles. In Arzu's case, pulling away was not intentionally aimed at but has emerged as a by-product of a professional leisure pursuit:

Me: How do you think being a professional tennis player has affected your life?

Arzu: Believe me, it affected my life as much as school. Because it is something that has made me meet people from all walks, let's say more than AB+ class people. (Me: Really?) Sure, because many tennis players started their carrier as ball boys, that is, they used to be boys who collected balls. That's why when you go to a tennis tournament people you are together with members of a large mosaic. On one hand, there are some tennis players who are like you, who are encouraged by their families, have taken tennis lessons. On the other hand, there are others who have become good players by collecting balls behind you during the day and practicing playing tennis with each other at night and they play more than you do. Because tennis is their hope for their future, but for you it is just a hobby. That's why when you look at tennis coaches today, none are from families like ours. They are all from ordinary families, because it is their career. Their lives... For as it is an activity for that period. When I attended tournaments, I was travelling in Turkey, I used to go to various tournaments in summer, by staying at different places and meeting a lot of people, how right it would be to evaluate myself, but if I didn't become spoilt (Laughing), it is because of tennis. Tennis has a big effect in my life. I learned about the real life with it. (Me: I wasn't expecting such an answer) I wasn't really planning to tell you about it, but apparently, it is relevant in a way. (Laughing)<sup>220</sup>

### Producing the Turkish Elite III - The Cosmopolitanism of Turkish Transnational Business Professionals against the Political Conjuncture of Turkey

In Chapter Three, "white Turks" and the "white Turkish discourse" were discussed in detail. Arat-Koc writes that while the white Turkish discourse define its agents (the

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<sup>220</sup> Arzu, interview by the author, tape recording, interviewee's workplace, Istanbul, Turkey, 25 March 2010.

globalized, secular, urban new middle class carrying transnational bourgeois class identity) as members of a Western and civilized community, it culturalizes the Kurds, the poor and the Islamists as the traditional and Oriental “Other”s of modern Turkish society, which emphasizes a socio-cultural gap between these two status blocs that cannot be made up.

Against this background, it can be argued that in order to understand the limits of the cosmopolitanism of transnational business professionals it is necessary to see how they perceive the socio-cultural and socio-economic differences within their own societies. In this sense, openness to transnational socio-cultural diversity is expected to be complemented by openness to the local socio-cultural diversity. In addition, the support for globalization is expected to be complemented by awareness on the potential disadvantages it can create and present disadvantages it creates in certain spheres of human lives.

Sharing the same urban and national public space with their townsmen, women or citizens is not usually a matter of choice for the individual. Even though the level of social interaction and exposure might be adjusted significantly (such as gated communities with private services of infrastructure and logistics, immigration, etc.). Except for the isolated super-rich, it cannot be completely prevented. Therefore, as in the case of any individual who is embedded in a social community, social embeddedness also imposes Turkish high-ranking business professionals to take stances regarding the community of which they perceive themselves as members. In our case, we are concerned about the stance that these elite hold regarding their socio-economic and socio-cultural dissimilars, such as the “Others” of white Turkish discourses as proposed by Arat-Koc. In this manner, white Turkish discourses adopt and promote a culturally essentialist and hostile stance. The defensive/reactionary nationalist stance as argued by Onis in Chapter Three also can become a mainstream stance for the secular Kemalist elite, which place secularism, state sovereignty, national security and national identity as its inalienable and primary tenets. The individualist and socially aloof,

pro-market meritocratic business elite stance that is attributed to the “Yuppies” of the 1990s also has serious validity.<sup>221</sup>

In a political environment that is shared among the defensive Kemalist and white Turkish discourses of the secular elite, the weight of the factions of indifference should not be ignored. However, it is also important to remember the third political way, distinguished by its reference to democratic rights and liberties and pluralist democracy. This stance can be considered as socio-culturally liberal; however, it is adopted by miscellaneous sections of the secular elite, which range from anti-capitalist socialists to free-market liberals. It is believed that the pluralist democratic stance is the real translation of cosmopolitanism into the realm of politics. In this regard, talking Turkish domestic politics can be regarded as the litmus test of the consistency of the cosmopolitanism of Turkish transnational business professionals. In this sense, both supporting globalization, “white Turkish discourse” reflects a transnational identity that is “culturalist,” “neo-liberal” and “pro-Westernist” whereas the cosmopolitan discourses reflect a transnational identity that is pluralist, democratic and universalist.

### The Conservative Muslim Elite

As discussed at the end of Chapter Three, the emergence and rise of the Islamist elite is perceived by the bulk of the secular and West-oriented elite as one of the biggest threats to the secular and modern tenets of the Republic. Actually, the question is more of a clash of “habituses,” as Gole says. The secular and West-oriented elite were both compliants and re-producers of the hegemonic and “legitimate” socio-cultural codes, which manage the visibility and political codes which manage the ideology within the public sphere. As these codes came to be politically contested by the conservative Islamists, the Kemalist elite response was

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<sup>221</sup> Kozaoglu, *Yuppiler, Prenslar ve Bizim Kusak*.

reactionary. The secularity of the public sphere was an integral dimension of the Republican project and it could not be contested. Today, the visibility of the conservative Islamists in the public sphere is very much disliked by the Kemalist or white Turkish sections of the middle and upper classes. Arat-Koc's culturalization operates here as Islamist lifestyles and references are regarded as manifestations of "regressive" minds, with reference to West-oriented modernization. The close foreign relations with the Middle Eastern countries are also perceived as a retreat from the modernization project. Moreover, the unprecedented capital accumulation of the Islamist bourgeoisie is very much disputed by the secular, West-oriented bourgeoisie and middle class.

In their study, Ustel and Caymaz argue that "increasing religious conservatism" is perceived as expanding at the expense of the field and habitus of modern life styles by some members of the highly educated, professional, secular, West-oriented elite in Turkey, and in this manner these people have come to perceive themselves as minorities and "elites." In this respect, some are more concerned by the security of secular regime. In this regard, some argue that there is a dichotomy of "rooted" and "new" elites within the political and economic spheres, the earlier acquiring their status through meritocratic competences but the latter through patronage of political power circles.<sup>222</sup>

We asked our interviewees about what they thought about the religious/conservative population in Turkey, whether there is any emerging influence group that discomforts them, and whether they feel that their lifestyles are being threatened. The goal in asking these questions was to find out how they perceive the conservative Islamist political and economic circles. The narratives below are some examples of how this population may be regarded by Turkish transnational professionals.

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<sup>222</sup> Ustel and Caymaz, pp. 38-43.

Ayla: Unless they dictate something against my personal rights, they don't bother me at all. In fact, I have respect for them. Because is something up to a person (...)<sup>223</sup>

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Bülent: Each era has its upwardly mobile groups. Ozal's period had its group, in this period, within the last ten years; we witness upwardly mobile groups who are in close relation with the current political government. I think that is normal. If all parties are struggling in fair and equal conditions, I think you have to fight against it. If you are not pleased with situation, wage your own struggle, do as they do, do better than they do, overtake (...) Join the elections, and you get prepared, too.<sup>224</sup>

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Arzu: (Talking about the conservatism in which the women live) I am not yet fully convinced that leading such lives is people's own choice. I'm not bothered at all by people's practicing their religious beliefs as Muslims. However, what really irritates me is a person's using this as political power, as a flag, as a symbol, to make it a theme of a group. What disturbs me is their using it more than a religious belief. In other words, I'm really disturbed when one's personal freedom is restricted by "you can't wear swimming suit on the beach, you can't walk around with an ice-cream in your hand during Ramadan,"...

Me: Do you think that secularism is threatened?

Arzu: No, it's not that dramatic.<sup>225</sup>

When asked about the primary problems of Turkey, Sacit replies as follows:

Sacit: While trying to liberalize conservatism, which is under pressure, things start becoming more conservative... Conservatism was under pressure in Turkey. Now the pressure has been released but conservatism doesn't move on. On the contrary, a heavier conservatism is coming down on our country. Of course, this is something based on religion, however that also brings about many other problems(...) People start losing their things to think, to question, an order of submission emerges. The enrichment now is misleading us. It look as if the wealthier people become, the more educated and the more informed they become, for the present situation this is not true, it doesn't contribute to society's cultural development or to the way of thinking. This constraint is reflected on all media of communication. The constraint which has been caused by the liberation of conservatism.

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<sup>223</sup> Ayla, interview by the author, tape recording, interviewee's workplace, Istanbul, Turkey, 26 April 2010.

<sup>224</sup> Bülent, interview by the author, tape recording, interviewee's workplace, Istanbul, Turkey, 8 June 2010.

<sup>225</sup> Arzu, interview by the author, tape recording, interviewee's workplace, Istanbul, Turkey, 25 March 2010.

Sacit: Is secularism in danger? I think there is such a danger. I think there is such a risk. Because when we look at what is going on, in other Islamic countries we see that it is a problem. Today it is a problem in Malaysia, it is a big problem in Iran, in Saudi Arabia, and it has never reached the right point. Moreover, I have such a concern related to the Islamist lifestyle. See, analytical thinking, questioning don't work when people become more conservative. Belonging and submission becomes primary and then it starts from the childhood and casts which don't know themselves, casts, which others think on behalf of them, are formed. This is a problem, I mean, the Islam dogma hasn't been overcome yet. However, Christianity has become more flexible. They haven't looked down on the Jews. However, Islam is becoming dominant space.<sup>226</sup>

In Sacit's narrative, it is possible to locate the conservative Muslims, as irrational/deluded or unaware communitarians who constitute the socio-cultural opposites of the rational and liberal West-oriented individuals. In this discourse, the Islamist identity emphasizes conservatism and they intertwine with the contemporary ruling group. It is also possible to detect a telescoping discourse where conservative Muslims are associated with political Islamists and their validity of conservatism as a voluntary choice is questioned. The subject positions as reflected through these discourses are not very different from the subject positions as reflected through "white Turkish" discourses. Sacit and Arzu seem to tolerate a cultural group which interferes with the westernization and modernization process of Turkey. It should be mentioned that this was a dominant approach in the interviewees of the older generations and there were many from the younger generation, which emphasized their concerns on "turban" as a political symbol, JDP's rising power and the newly emerged rich groups which are culturally close to the ruling group.

In a different fashion, Bülent and Ayla seem to perceive the conservative Muslims in a more neutral manner. This partially contrasts with approaches like Sacit's and Arzu's in that Bülent's and Ayla's discourses do not define conservatives as "lacking" or "disabled" as compared to Sacit and Arzu's discourses which resemble the official discourses of Kemalist

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<sup>226</sup> Sacit, interview by the author, tape recording, interviewee's workplace, Istanbul, Turkey, 31 March 2010.

modernization. Bülent considers the condition as one of political rivalry, and Ayla considers it from the point of individual liberties.

It seems that the reaction triggered by the presence of the conservative-Muslim population in the public realm does not really derive its strength from the hostility which designates conservative Muslims as “lacking” “Others,” but more from their “ability” to seize power. Actually, some of the interviewees use a sociologically informed language in which they problematize “otherness.” In this regard, Zafer said that: “It is a good thing that that the conservative-religious population is less the “Other” now, but in the same time it is not good that other people are becoming the new “Others”.” Likewise, Burak said that: “Their (implying conservative Muslims) current reaction stems from their repression in the past...Everything will settle down and everyone will mind their own business.”

The visibility of Islamist imagery in the public sphere is being watched cautiously. Put this way, it is possible to see the lack of proximity or organic connection between the social agents from the Islamist habitus and some of our interviewees, as they describe the conservative population as “out there” and they seem to build hypothetical connections too readily between the policies of the JDP as a political agent and the visibility of the conservative population in the public sphere. This can be argued to be present in the narratives of Arzu and Sacit. However, in this regard, it is necessary to distinguish between the skeptic/defensive and pluralist discourses. In the passages above, it is possible to trace internalized dispositions of liberal democracy where political rivalry between status-groups and the clashing of different life styles are regarded as ordinary. However, the modernist sensibilities in Kemalist discourses aim to marginalize the visibility of Islam from the public space as it opposes the “free-will” and “rationality” inherent in Turkish Republicanism. In a similar way, culturalism in “white Turkish” discourses would define the lifestyles of conservative Muslims as anachronistic and claim that their presence is inadequate in a modernizing Turkey.

It seems that Burak's story explains best the "straddling" of socio-economic and socio-cultural embeddedness that is required for developing a cosmopolitan openness and acceptance. What makes Burak's case different is his organic relation with both of the life worlds of clashing secular/modern and conservative/traditional social agents. Burak answered the question on the relation between geographical boundaries and socio-cultural affinity.<sup>227</sup> Moreover, he provided a self-evaluation that cut across different ways of living:

Burak: It is as if (...) I would say the neighborhood, but in the place I live there are the snob kind of rich people and I don't relate myself to them at all. On the other hand, among them I have close friends as well. To me, personality is what counts. Being financial equals does not necessarily mean being on the same spiritual grounds. For this reason, I cannot surely say the people from Istanbul, or Beykoz or Acarkent, because there are people in those neighborhoods that I don't approve of and that I feel distant to. If I think about my origins, the small town, then I have a lot in common with them. In that sense, I feel very cosmopolitan. I am able to share a lot with the people here, and I feel like I have so many cultural values and ideals common with my relatives living in Davuttepe, Mersin. I don't believe that there is one absolute truth; there are various points of view.

Me: Do you feel such cosmopolitanism around you?

Burak: I feel as if it's rather polarized around me.

Me: How is that?

Burak: It's like this: There are secular people, religious people, liberals, and socialists. Everybody is an unyielding advocate of a certain idea, and I am a secular person. OK, it's good, but being a secular should not mean that you don't believe in God, or you don't offer Friday prayer. I think if he wishes to, he should be able to offer prayer and still think of religion and state business as separate. On the other hand he should be able to drink one glass of raki if he really craves it at a dinner party of one of his beloved friends. I don't find all these things as particularly off, but there is a polarized situation like you are either this or that. Especially in Turkey (...)<sup>228</sup>

The interesting detail about those who perceive the conservative-Muslims population in a moderate tone (like Ayla and Burak) is that their emphasis on Ataturk or his principles

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<sup>227</sup> See Interview questions, Section 2, Question 2 in the Appendix.

<sup>228</sup> Burak, interview by the author, tape recording, interviewee's workplace, Istanbul, Turkey, 13 May 2010.

while explaining their ideological positions in other questions and still being able to recognize the presence of conservatism and Islamist identities within the public sphere as political or socio-cultural choices rather than impositions. For example in this way Burak defined himself as a liberal and an *Ataturkcu*, and he interpreted the tenets of *Ataturkculuk* as republicanism, populism and democracy. This is reminiscent of Ustel and Caymaz's discussion of customized Kemalism, and the fact that subjects are capable of offering their own interpreted versions of *Ataturkculuk*. Despite this, self-described "very liberals" like Sacit are capable of developing strong dispositions against religious identity affiliations in general, and especially for Muslims in Turkey. In his case, this might have had to do more with Sacit's "atheism" than his "Kemalism." However, within this mindset, religious affiliations are to be "bared" until they disappear from the public spheres if not from the private spheres whereas some others see it as an "alternative way of living" and as "there to stay."

In the light of the information above, it might be argued that despite their trans-local exposure and various cultivated cosmopolitan dispositions, some secular elite subjects have trouble in cultivating "open" and "welcoming" dispositions regarding socio-cultural "unlikes" within the national public sphere because they lack proximity to their socio-cultural circles and they see them as aliens expanding their own modes of living. In this regard, this alienation also is complemented with the political power of the JDP. However, some others develop dispositions that are more moderate as they interpret the visibility of conservative Muslims and their political actors as a natural outcome of the history of the Republic or because they have organic social links to subjects who are embedded in conservative Muslim life worlds, hence they do not perceive them as threats.

## Recognition of the Cultural Rights and Freedoms of the Kurds

The political matter in relevance to Kurds in Turkey, or the “Kurdish question” as it is currently called, can be seen as an intricate problem revolving around themes such as socio-cultural rights and liberties, the Turkish state cult, Turkish and Kurdish nationalisms, militarism and violence. The matter is too complicated to be discussed at length here. Therefore, in this study, the Kurdish question was restricted to its cultural dimension and the degree of willingness of the interviewees in regards to granting of the current socio-cultural demands of the Kurds as a fulfillment of their democratic rights were sought. The Kurdish question is believed to reveal the extent of local-level cosmopolitanism and the way subjects problematize their national identities. Depending on how they are associated with conditions of citizenship, national identities may support political agendas which allow for confined recognition of the demands of other ethno-cultural identities, as in the white-black distinction argued by Bilici.

In their own study, Ustel and Caymaz emphasize the lack of Kurdish presence within the social circles of their interviewees, which results in a lack of awareness on the Kurdish question. In this sense, it can be argued that their awareness is dominantly constituted upon following the mass media, which problematizes the Kurdish identity around news of political parties, and the low-intensity war. Alternatively, this awareness may be constituted upon daily life observations in which they may distinguish Kurds by stereotypical features but not get involved in any sort of interaction. In this regard, the Kurdish question is approached with different perceptions such as indifference, ethnicization or culturalization, deeds of “external powers,” regional underdevelopment, and feudalism, which are far from recognizing the matter as stemming from any sort of political and cultural repression. However interestingly, researchers observed that their interviewees were positive regards recognition of cultural rights and freedoms. However, the positive attitudes of the interviewees were reserved, pre-

emptive and pragmatic in nature and they were mostly inspired from multiculturalist policies implemented in the Western countries.<sup>229</sup>

The following narratives are replies to the question “What do you think about the recognition of the cultural rights and freedoms of the Kurds?”

Ayla: This is not a topic that I know in detail. However, my general principle in life says that there is no harm in liberties. Because when people are restricted, there are more objections and your vision is confined by the vision of the one who restricts you. The greater the restriction is, the worse it is I think on the one side. On the other hand, I don't want such freedom in which people can kill each other when they wish, I don't have such an anarchist approach. I think that in within a particular framework, people should have the right to their identity and to their own things. Therefore, I think constraints are not good for us. As I have just mentioned, I am not very sophisticated as far as this topic concerns.<sup>230</sup>

Bülent: If you look at the problem from the point of human rights and democratically, I think their demand for identity, I think they are right. Still, they shouldn't be making use of it in a different way. This isn't such a simple issue. If it were, it wouldn't have lasted for 30 years. Fear regarding religion is fundamentalism. Fear regarding the Kurdish issue is separatism (...). I never think separatism would be of use to anyone, to any side, you know we have just talked about global citizenship (...) That's why I think that any demand for identity recognition should be met unless it causes separatism (...) I have already said that, in this regard, the right to learn the mother tongue, to have certain rights, they have already gained some rights. I think that in this chaotic environment, these issues are agitated. The solution is not simple (...) If you ask for my limit, my limit is separatism. I think the real solution is something like in the USA. To be able to recognize cultural differences, however to be united economically, and to have uniformity regarding the democratic standards. And I think that the world will become one big state one day, in one way or the other. When you think in this regard, I'm against separatism. . . However, you know, I don't say this in a fascist way (...)<sup>231</sup>

Sacit: Well, you know, these are big mistakes, which have been made over a long period. If these rights and liberties were on the agenda before there was too much energy on the fault line then such tension would not be present today. Of course, economic problems are primary... However, the rise of their population within their present socio-economic structure has of course worsened the situation... I am not sure about the genuineness of these demands. I was talking about internal and external balances. If these demands genuinely stem from the inside (demanded by Kurdish citizens of

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<sup>229</sup> Ustel and Caymaz, pp. 25-31.

<sup>230</sup> Ayla, interview by the author, tape recording, interviewee's workplace, Istanbul, Turkey, 26 April 2010.

<sup>231</sup> Bülent, interview by the author, tape recording, interviewee's workplace, Istanbul, Turkey, 8 June 2010.

Turkey), I have no problems with meeting such demands. They should definitely be met and I think that can be managed. However, when this is used as a card against the state of Turkey that is a problem.<sup>232</sup>

The narratives of Ayla and Bülent are far from carrying nationalist concerns. This attitude also was present in the answers of other interviewees despite their emphases on their Turkish identities or that they were not very moderate in their answers regarding conservative Muslims. In one sense, the matter of the recognition of the cultural rights and freedoms of Kurds is easily articulated to a pluralist interpretation of democratic discourse. However, it should be noted that similar to the case in Ustel and Caymaz's study and similar to the case in the conservative Muslims, the lack of the presence of Kurds within the close social circles of the interviewees was manifested in their narratives.

Although Ayla claimed herself as a Turk who was committed to her national identity, this did not prevent her from applying her "principle" of personal freedom to the political public sphere of Turkey. Bülent's answer was somewhat ambivalent. Interestingly he disregarded the governmental separation of Kurdish geography as a political option because he believed that it contradicted with his idea of "global citizenship." In this manner, he believed that people should be looking to congregate under a common political authority which guaranteed democratic standards, respected cultural differences, and united its citizens within a common economy. In this manner, he approved of the citizenship system in the U.S. However, contrary to Bülent and Ayla, although Sacit recognized how Kurdish question had developed over the years, he was concerned about the genuineness of the demands for recognition. In this sense, Sacit straddled a principle-based and pragmatic discourse. Moreover, it is possible to see that he emphasized the problem of underdevelopment, which was interpreted by Ustel and Caymaz to be a variant of the official discourses, which disregard Kurdish question's political and cultural aspects.

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<sup>232</sup> Sacit, interview by the author, tape recording, interviewee's workplace, Istanbul, Turkey, 31 March 2010.

In Bülent and Sacit's narratives, it is possible to find the concern of "agitation" or the role of the "external powers." If these were to be the primary references in their narratives, it would be impossible to distinguish them from the defensive nationalist discourses. However, in all the narratives above, it is possible to see the premises which consider the demand for cultural rights and liberties as justifiable and natural. Going one step ahead, Zafer mentioned the tragedy of Armenians' during World War I, and stated that "We killed our own people," moreover brought to mind that recently it has been possible to learn that Kurds were killed in "Dersim" in the 1930s by the Turkish army. In regards to all these problems, he declared that, "When we learn to face such realities, we will have a chance to resolve them."<sup>233</sup> This stance can be taken as an example of critique of the nation state and internalization of democratic pluralism as attributed to cosmopolitan dispositions regarding the public sphere. Bülent's mention of the "world state" complements this deduction.

### Globalization

In Chapter Two, we discussed Monaci et al.'s article and referred to their findings. Their research has basically shown that social subjects who enjoy the benefits of access to transnational networks, of the filtered pressure of globalization due to their occupations, and of the knowledge of the globalizing world, in summary, of human capital adequate for functioning as agents in the global economy, perceived globalization as a positive phenomenon and they maintained bounded and elitist business and leisure lives which were transnationally mobile and interacting. These people were cosmopolitans in the sense that transnationalism at business and leisure had become an integral part of their lives. They are transnationally mobile, trans-locally exposed and trans-nationally interacting. However, their

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<sup>233</sup> Zafer, interview by the author, tape recording, interviewee's workplace, Istanbul, Turkey, 13 May 2010.

cosmopolitanism is considered bounded and elitist as they actually have little access to the “outside world.” In their case, the outside world is comprised of the ordinary locals of the cities abroad they have been to or have lived in, who neither operate in the transnational business world nor possess the competence of business lingua franca. In this way, the “outside world” is socio-culturally and socio-economically inferior/ different or unexplored. The outside world may also comprise of the spaces, which remain outside of transnational business networks. These local spaces are either intentionally avoided or not ready to be functionalized within the global economy. The transnational class and status group depictions, proposed by the other authors in Chapter Two complemented the findings of Monaci et al. by suggesting that members of transnational networks were distinguished as trans-local elite who shared more socio-culturally with each other than their national counterparts. Moreover, they held some sort of “power” as agents of transnational networks.

We discussed that the members of this group are present in Turkey as well. The transnationalism of the matter suggests that the propositions above should also apply to those in Turkey. However, in this study transnational business professionals were examined as political subjects embedded in socio-cultural networks and localities of business and leisure. Put this way, there are limited academic works which describe the political orientations of those professionals in Turkey. In this regard, we consider the “pro-globalization/reformer” Turkish elite typology of Onis, and “transnationally integrated and competent /indifferent to national politics” depiction of Keyder as contemporarily valid. Even though we can describe the transnational professionals as socio-economic and socio-cultural agents through taking the coinciding aspects of such typologies, the work at hand remains short in terms of helping to situate them as political agents and as members of locally embedded communities. Here are some narratives from the interviews that might be helpful:

Me: Do you consider globalization as beneficial or harmful?

Zafer: It has positive and negative aspects. The positive aspects are exposure to the world and become aware of what is going on. This is something good. On the other hand the differences should disappear. I mean who is disturbed by visiting China and seeing a Starbucks Coffee in the Forbidden City, nobody is disturbed by that. If you ask me there shouldn't be a Starbucks in the Forbidden City, however, when I see a Starbucks while I'm visiting China it pleases me, I go into the place and buy a cup of coffee whose taste is familiar to me. But this is my idea. Of course, some people may think differently. Normally, a Starbucks coffee shouldn't be in the Forbidden City. Right? (Laughters) A forbidden zone where nobody has been allowed in for many years (...) I mean, without losing cultural aspect, like everything, this has advantages and disadvantages.<sup>234</sup>

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Sacit: I guess you know what my answer is. I find it very useful. .. Borders are one of the biggest problems a country has. Religion as well (laughing) (...) I'm aware of the fact that globalization in its first stage caused the latter to become stronger, because people are frightened, when they are frightened, they look for shelter. However, that won't pass down more than two generations. I mean borders will be removed, I think.<sup>235</sup>

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Bülent: I find equilibrium theory very important. (...) Community relations and I think there is such factuality in the structure of the country (...) That is why I think globalization is something right, something that will bring equilibrium to the system. Of course, together with its substructures (...) Globalization will realize economic homogeneity; it does in one way or the other. If you look at the middle class in the developing countries in the last 20 years, income injustice has decreased; it has occurred much faster than in the socialist countries. I mean the wild capitalism, in a way, has realized the progress, which a socialist regime desires to realize. In addition, it has provided more development for the middle class, it helped middle class to attain a lot of service and facilities. I also think people can reach the information very easily, that is, if the opportunity for education is important, a person who has the internet even in a small village, can get the chance of education much more easily than before. I think globalization is something good. I think, these (...) well, are not very sincere (...) When I look at some powerful countries' practices in the west, I see that they are for the free market economy, they are for the globalization, they are trying to protect some of their interest in the course of events, in terms of trading equilibrium, for some other things I don't really think they are really sincere. However, I don't think this process is something to be obstructed. I find globalization useful as it helps to create a system in which all the people in the world can make use of some similar opportunities. On the

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<sup>234</sup> Zafer, interview by the author, tape recording, interviewee's workplace, Istanbul, Turkey, 13 May 2010.

<sup>235</sup> Sacit, interview by the author, tape recording, interviewee's workplace, Istanbul, Turkey, 31 March 2010.

other hand, I don't know what kind of equilibrium can be achieved. .. I don't believe that the world, with its large population with its rapid population growth, has adequate sources to provide for that development for its needs. That's why it has to go in a natural flow.<sup>236</sup>

The answers received from the interviewees demonstrated that globalization is a matter that professionals have hard time describing as it has very much become a part of their lives. This integration implies something different from “glocalization” and has much to do with the layers of the subjective experiencing of globalization. The fundamental premise is the inevitability of globalization. Second, experiences by glocalization and transnationalization make globalization an issue on which they have confidence elaborating. Third, either strongly or mildly, it is possible to regard Turkish transnational business professionals as a group that carries positive opinions regarding Turkey's integration to global markets and networks. In this sense, it is possible to argue that their human capital and transnational competence are key factors behind this support. So, Monaci et al.'s argument on the role of “access, exposure, competence” in determining the type of experience seems to be valid and applicable to the Turkish case. However, this being the fourth layer, it is very important to show in what ways these individuals picture globalization at a bigger extent. It is possible to argue that they have vested socio-cultural and economic interests in the globalization of Turkey. However, as seen from the answers above, it takes more than calculations of personal benefits to evaluate a complicated phenomenon like globalization. In this regard, the interviewees gave interesting answers which transcended personal concerns and evaluated globalization as a matter of the world.

As an example, Zafer supported globalization as a process in which people could gain awareness of things taking place throughout the world. However, he disregarded globalization as it imposes cultural convergence of consumerism as imposed by the hegemony of global

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<sup>236</sup> Bülent, interview by the author, tape recording, interviewee's workplace, Istanbul, Turkey, 8 June 2010.

capitalism (deduced from the “Starbucks” metaphor) and he was discontented by the risk of losing locally embedded meanings and cultural diversity around the world. Sacit emphasized a strong relation between globalization and the erosion of boundaries of states. In this regard he considered state boundaries and religions as the main “troubles” of humankind and he was optimistic that the boundaries of states would become completely obsolete within a duration of few generations. Finally, Bülent considered that, within the course of 20 years, globalization had “normalized” economic discrepancy throughout the world by enlarging the “middle strata” of the world and making it easier to access information and all sorts of services. Even though he did not believe in the political “sincerity” of all agents contributing to the process, he believed that globalization is leading to an environment where people of the world can enjoy common rights. Despite this positive image, he concluded by stating that the goal of development and increasing world population clash with the natural limits of the world, hence not sustainable and needs to be pulled down to an equilibrium.

The discussions pursued above demonstrate different ways of problematizing globalization and justifications in relevance to these problematizations. The point worth underlining is that, strong globalizers notwithstanding, it is possible to talk about a stance of “pro-globalization” among transnational professionals with critical reservations. In the narratives above, the criticisms were on the homogenization of cultures, political credibility of globalizing agents and ecological equilibrium. Regardless of the strength of the support, it is possible to see that for the transnational professionals “globalization” implies an irreversible and inevitable process, which determines the future of the peoples of the world and its ecology as a whole. In this sense, the emphasis is on its “converging” impact. Although political and economic convergence evokes forms of cosmopolitanism, convergence of cultures is contrary to the aspirations of cosmopolitanism. And Zafer indicated this to be a problem. Seen this way, it is possible to argue that both Bülent and Sacit evaluated globalization by explicitly referring to a future order which carried cosmopolitan features.

Similarly, Bülent's discontent with the convergence of cultures and the hegemony of consumerism in this sense can be argued to carry pluralist dispositions, which are thought to be political tenets of cosmopolitanism.

### Socio-economic Discrepancy

In Arat-Koc's analysis, the urban poor are the third category that constitute the "Other" of white Turkish discourses. In this regard, the urban poor are depicted as culturally bounded social groups that prevent Turkey's integration to the developed, globalized Western world. This perspective defines the urban poor as the pathology instead of defining them as symptoms of a systemic pathology, which reproduces poverty. In a different manner, we can expect the individuals who fit into the typology of "bounded and politically indifferent transnationals" to ignore or be unaware of urban poverty as well simply because they can afford to do so. Living detached from their localities or immersed in their gated communities, these extension of "cosmocrats" can almost produce their urban parallel realities.

However, the narratives of some of the interviewees explain that it is hard to consider these members of a transnational class as completely detached from their local and national realities, especially in terms of socio-economic discrepancies:

Me: What do you think Turkey's primary problems are?

Zafer: Distribution has become unfair, I mean income distribution. Between high and low-income groups... Together with the unfairness of the income, equality of opportunity has become corrupted. Turkey has diverted from being a social state, in terms of schools, hospitals. May be it has never really been a social state, I should say that I attended state school and I would like my daughter to go to a state school as well. However, luckily, I have a chance to send her to a private school. Because the level of education in the state schools is not possibly as good as they were when I was a student. This is corruption of the equality of opportunity. Today the school fee that I

pay for my daughter is 27,000 TL plus other expenses. How many can pay this amount? What do the parents of the children who aren't rich enough do? It is like the difference between the service you get from Social Security Hospitals and Private Acibadem Hospital. I think a serious inequality of opportunity is in question. (...)<sup>237</sup>

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Me: What do you think Turkey's primary problems are?

Arzu: Inequality in the distribution of income, weaknesses in administration and non-existence of the opposition (...)

Me: How does inequality in the distribution of income specifically bother you?

Arzu: What I really mean is this, of course, there is a distribution of income in every country, there is a pyramid of distribution of income, there is no problem with it, of course, there will be people who relatively earn more or who relatively earn less, there is a middle class etc. In every country, however, when you look at Turkey, the gap between them is very wide. I would like people to have minimum standards. For example, in Russia people could get bread, milk and medicine free, their basic needs, I mean in the countries of the Soviets. They met people's basic needs, even then. In the USA, there are very rich, very poor but still they have basketball courts, they have tennis courts, there are communities which help people, the state provides a level of standard. People have unemployment insurance like in some other countries. In my opinion, we treat the people at the bottom of the pyramid very harshly. I feel that they really suffer. Of course, this is something that depends on my own observation. Should the discrepancy be that large? I wish it weren't so. I also think at the top of the pyramid there is undeserved wealth and that is why there are problems at both ends. That could be balanced if the people at the top of the pyramid could give some of their wealth to the ones at the bottom. And I think the middle class is disappearing, they are going down. There used to be a concept of middle class, you are too young to know about it (Laughs) and I think this concept is disappearing and they are going down because when you look at the minimum salary, it is much more below than the amount necessary to survive.<sup>238</sup>

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Me: Do you ever say "Such a life they lead!" when you go by a district in Istanbul or when you hear about the life style of some people?

Arzu: When you go to the backstreets of some districts where very rich people live, they are such familiar sights that you are accustomed to them. I used to be shocked when I first moved here, for example, in Ankara it isn't

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<sup>237</sup> Zafer, interview by the author, tape recording, interviewee's workplace, Istanbul, Turkey, 13 May 2010.

<sup>238</sup> Arzu, interview by the author, tape recording, interviewee's workplace, Istanbul, Turkey, 25 March 2010.

the same. In Ankara there are less developed districts but you know them (...) in Istanbul it isn't like that. Urbanization is so bad that it is a city like a village. I mean, you enter a very beautiful apartment building, but you see that all their shoes are left outside, in front of the doors, the smell in the building is disgusting, so and so (...) Because it is actually a slum, which, has been converted into an apartment. Or you go down a street with villas and you go into the street behind it, it is a shantytown. At first, I found it really amazing. You say that wasn't Istanbul in my dreams; however, you get used to it.

Me: Well, is it irritating?

Arzu: In my opinion, it is irritating because it is upsetting to see the terrible conditions in which people are living. In one street, you witness the wealth, in the other street the poverty, you think, "Do these people deserve it?" That is why it is disturbing. It is not because it doesn't look good to me or because of my aesthetic concerns.<sup>239</sup>

Socio-economic discrepancy and socio-economic injustice were emphasized also by many interviewees as an urgent problem in Turkey. In Zafer and Arzu's narratives, the determining factors of the discrepancy and injustice were missing. However, they detected certain symptoms. The important aspect of these symptoms was their association to a systemic pathology, rather than being defined as pathologies per se. This understanding was revealed in Arzu's second narrative in a more solid way. Arzu's responses to my questions for understanding how urban "Others" were perceived by transnational professionals is consistent with her evaluation of discrepancy and injustice. One would expect white Turkish discourses to define urban poverty to be reproduced by particular types of living of the urban poor, but not as a systemic externality. In this sense, the rural-urban synthetic/ degenerated cultural codes, which define their habituses, would be regarded as the main problem behind their circumstances. However, individuals that carry pluralist dispositions that respect the right of distinct socio-cultural groups to maintain their livelihood are inclined to evaluate socio-economic injustice and discrepancies through a re-distributionist lens rather than a lens of white Turk hostility or Yuppie indifference.

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<sup>239</sup> Arzu, interview by the author, tape recording, interviewee's workplace, Istanbul, Turkey, 25 March 2010.

## What Is “White Turkishness” and Who Are the “White Turks”?

The high point of the interviews was doubtlessly the point where the interviewees were asked their opinions about what they thought about the concept of “white Turks” whether they found it useful as a social denotation. The answers were interestingly diverse and revealing. Here are some of them:

Me: What does the “white Turk” concept mean to you?

Bülent: We have mentioned people who live in their own shell. People who were born and grew up in a certain environment and keep living at certain standards.

Me: Do you think you are one of them?

Bülent: No, I don’t think I’m one of them.<sup>240</sup>

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Sacit: I think there is such a concept, definitely there is. I define White Turks as a part of the community who only demands things to run smoothly, but withholds from taking any necessary action, and as people who respect themselves, and others. They are honest people and they wish to respect the law, and they want everybody else to act that way. Then, why don’t they take any significant action? Because they are nonchalant. They are glad that they are living in Turkey. On the other hand they have other options as well. How can they get involved?... They don’t really have a chance to act any longer.

Me: Do you ever feel like you are a member of this group?)

Sacit: I will speak bluntly. Of course I do, how couldn’t I feel?<sup>241</sup>

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Me: There is a concept referred to as “white Turk,” have you ever heard of it?

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<sup>240</sup> Bülent, interview by the author, tape recording, interviewee’s workplace, Istanbul, Turkey, 8 June 2010.

<sup>241</sup> Sacit, interview by the author, tape recording, interviewee’s workplace, Istanbul, Turkey, 31 March 2010.

Arzu: You mean us? (Laughing) People who don't quite represent Turkey's average, rather a minority, who pursue a relatively prosperous life, who have better education, who have higher income levels. Basically the top of the pyramid... I can't say anything certain regarding their financial situation, but their most crucial characteristic is that they don't represent Turkey. They are not a widespread population. I wish they were, but I don't like to expand this definition to people who are unaware of Turkey's reality, who live in a very different fantasy world and deem it as Turkey. When I said "us," I didn't mean a group of people who live disjointed from Turkey. I see it as the blue collars versus the white collars. That is also a part of this reality; one of them works in the factory, and the other one in the office. To me the White Turks are a part of this differentiation.<sup>242</sup>

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Ayla: I find that term a little insulting, maybe because of what it suggests. Maybe the concept has evolved into something negative in time. A "white Turk" is someone who is detached from Turkey, who lives like a total Westerner. It's a concept, which pejoratively presents Turks with multinational aspirations. I don't think it's positive. My reasoning is, a person may be working in a multinational company and still relate to Turkey. There are people who are really good at keeping track of ordinary citizens,' the public's opinion, if that is what we mean by relating. I don't see these two as mutually exclusive. I went to Robert College, but before that, I got my primary school education in a public school. One of my classmates later became a driver. Being a "white Turk" has a different meaning, it's more like fate. Maybe there are examples that I'm not aware of, but I think that a group of people who studied in international schools are being labeled as such. "Oh, this is a "white Turk", he wouldn't understand a thing, he is unaware of Turkey's reality." This kind of labeling is fairly common in Turkey. We have a tendency to put people in a box and say this person goes here and that person goes there. Therefore, I don't find this term particularly likable.

Me: In that sense, do you see yourself as a part of this "labeled" group?

Ayla: Since I was opposed to this idea in the first place, of course I don't see myself as a part of it. I don't even think there is such a group. Because if you think about it (...) In this group they rather include people who have quite different backgrounds, for instance the holding owners' children are probably categorized as white Turks. However, like I mentioned before, I'm against making such categorizations, because there are people who are good at balancing these two. I mean tomorrow I can go to Amsterdam, and maybe the other day to Diyarbakir to work. I should be able to work efficiently in both of these settings, and, as a matter of fact I do. Therefore, this doesn't mean that I will not be able to connect with anyone in Diyarbakir and similarly become best buddies with the Dutch people. When I have a

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<sup>242</sup> Arzu, interview by the author, tape recording, interviewee's workplace, Istanbul, Turkey, 25 March 2010.

chance, I sit and talk with our distributors located all around the country, and have a nice chat about Turkey, or I can equally talk to someone from Amsterdam and say something like “this place was so beautiful five years ago.” I don’t particularly like actions that condescend, group or label other people. There is one more negative element about “white Turks”. If there is a “white Turk”, there must also be a “black Turk” and “white Turks” should be oppressing the “black Turks”. I don’t think such oppression exists in Turkey. The meaning of “white Turk” has roots in oppression. Then who are Turkey’s ‘blacks’? Are the ‘whites’ oppressing the ‘blacks’?

Me: I believe in your argument what you mean by ‘blacks’ are conservatives who face suppression of identity.

Ayla: Are they being suppressed?

Me: ...or the Kurds, the Alevis, etc.

Ayla: That would be an incorrect metaphor. I don’t think there is such an oppression in Turkey, in today’s Turkey. I don’t think there is a group who suffers from oppression similar to how blacks suffered from whites.<sup>243</sup>

The diverse ways that interviewees responded to the question actually demonstrate that there are three ways that transnational professionals associate with the notion of “white Turkishness.” Bülent considered the Turkish elite (dominantly composed of professionals with high academic capital) who maintain lives in homogenous socio-cultural networks and with bounded social interaction (described in detail in one of his earlier narratives used in this chapter) as “white Turks.” Put this way, Bülent distinguished himself from “white Turks,” although he accepted that there are such people even in his intimate social circles.

Contrary to Bülent, Arzu and Sacit readily accepted that the notion of “white Turk” represented them. However, Sacit’s description was too implicit for a sociological debate. He described that these were people who have a better vision of policies and laws than what is practiced by the status quo, but since they have stakes (probably in the form of social status and economic capital) in the status quo, they do not take reforming initiatives. In this sense, they remain outside the realm of active politics in Turkey and keep a cautious distance.

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<sup>243</sup> Ayla, interview by the author, tape recording, interviewee’s workplace, Istanbul, Turkey, 26 April 2010.

Although Sacit did not provide an explicit socio-cultural profile of these elite, it may be assumed that they resemble Sacit, as he too readily identified himself as a “white Turk.”

Although Arzu considers herself a “white Turk,” she takes the notion to categorize the elite in Turkey who hold the high economic, cultural and social capitals. This population is not homogenous as it consists of members of the upper class and most of the upper middle class however; Arzu believed that they constitute only a small minority in Turkey.

In this manner, “white Turkishness” is a quality to be aspired after. Interestingly she expressed discontent for being taken as an individual living in her bounded social circle detached from and indifferent in regards to the “realities” of Turkey. This kind of an elite isolation is not a quality to be aspired after. The third way of associating with the denotation is rejecting its validity, in the way Ayla did.

Ayla argued that this denotation aims pejoratively to describe a group of well-educated Turkish elite who are assumed to maintain Westernized and transnational lives in a way that is detached from the ordinary ways of living in Turkey. Furthermore, Ayla argued that it was assumed that the “white Turks” would interact better with a European than with a Turkish citizen. Ayla rejected the denotation as she considers that it is misleading to assume that one cannot be both trans-locally and locally competent as if these categories are mutually exclusive. She argues that both her personal stories and the stories of some of her acquaintances from the business circles refute this assumption. Ayla also epistemologically questioned the validity of this denotation. She argued that in order for “white and black” dichotomy to be valid, there have to be “black Turks” in Turkey. Upon our argumentative suggestions, she concludes that it is misleading to think that there is oppression (perhaps “otherization” is a more subtle and more fitting word) of identities in Turkey as strong as to refer to a “white & black” dichotomy.

The narratives of the interviewees given above suggest that these individuals actually have a familiarity with the denotation of “white Turk.” It was almost commonly recognized

that it refers to a group of well educated and better off Turkish elite. However, it is hard to argue that it has a commonly accepted “lexical” meaning. In the case of the interviews, the qualities that were attributed to the constituents of this socio-economic and socio-cultural category remained arbitrary and these were rather groped through subjective experiences of the interviewees. Yet, if its validity was not totally rejected as in the case of Ayla, the transnational professionals interviewed either were “white Turks,” as in the case of Arzu and Sacit or close to such individuals as in Bülent’s case. When considered as a denotation that describes these Turkish elite as living “elitist, bounded, indifferent, unaware and detached” lives, the interviewees either chose to distinguish themselves from individuals with such qualities or reject the validity of the denotation by referring to subjective experiences which refute the premises of this denotation.

Discussions on “white Turkishness” have shown us that the privileged socio-economic and socio-cultural statuses of Turkish transnational business professionals do not readily translate into dispositions and discourses which support bounded and elitist ways of living. On the contrary, there is a meritocratic discourse which argues in favor of a cosmopolitan identity that is, due to owned human capital, competent in functioning between the local and the trans-local while cutting across “boundaries” of diverse social, economic and cultural origins and statuses. The elite who wish prioritizing their cosmopolitan identities reject attributed schemes of elitism and try to emphasize their abilities or dispositions that enable them maintain unbounded lives.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### CONCLUSION

Both theoretically and empirically, this thesis presented a multilayered study. Thus, it is possible to conclude it by “peeling off” the layers that have been put on top of each other. In this sense, Turkish high-ranking transnational business professionals as subjects are at the core of this study.

In Chapter Two, first, professionals were defined as privileged status groups in modern societies. In this sense, the most highly merited members of different professional groups can be regarded as strategic elites. Their statuses are acquired through cultivating human capitals, which involve cultivated skills and expertise knowledge. In this sense, high-ranking transnational business professionals of the global era can be considered as members of their national elite and members of a transnational elite community.

The studies that have been addressed in Chapter Two emphasize the transnational feature of these elite. In this respect, the validity of a globally existing transnational class has been recognized by many scholars and as discussed in Chapter Four. There have been various attempts to designate this transnational social group: Peltonen’s “high class of the new economy,” Schneider and Barsoux’s “international managers,” Micklethwait’s “cosmocrats,” Sklair’s “transnational capitalist class,” Keyder’s “new bourgeois and professional class,” Sassen’s “transnational professional and executive class” and Rutz and Balkan’s “emerging global new middle classes.”

The common aspect of prominent critical studies which problematize transnational professionals is that they explain macro-scale phenomena with concerns relevant to disciplines such as political economy and economic sociology. In this sense, these studies

demonstrate a tendency to contextualize transnational professionals as agents whose primary function is to reproduce global capitalism. In this respect, these professionals are argued to be promoters of neo-liberal policies, global trade, free-market competition, the ideology of consumerism; producers of global business lingua franca, corporate cultures; members of transnational academic and professional networks; and adherents of transnational “bourgeois” life styles and global capitalist interests. Moreover, these subjects are seen as agents who contribute to the *convergence* of economic machinery and ideological codes of global capitalism through highly *institutionalized* ways. When transnational business professionals are evaluated in regards to their executive functions in corporations and in regards to their socio-cultural agencies in the transnational business community, these assertions are believed to be very much valid.

In less economically and more socio-culturally oriented studies, transnational professionals also are seen as agents who make the world seem a smaller place. In this regard, it is believed that these subjects produce some kind of “cosmopolitanism.” The cosmopolitanism of the transnational professionals implies that they are highly mobile, they are frequently and intensively exposed to foreign and transnational settings, they can globally function as demanded by their occupational objectives, and that they are competent in establishing formal and informal relations with foreign counterparts.

However, as discussed by referring to Vertovec and Cohen in Chapter Two, there are various ways to talk about cosmopolitanism. In this sense, when cosmopolitanism is taken as a socio-cultural condition created by globalization, it is true that the transnational professionals are among the few who are located at the nodes of networks of global flows. Similarly, when cosmopolitanism is seen as a particular mode of competence, it is again true that transnational professionals carry competencies such as “extensive mobility,” cultivating multicultural/multi-local tastes and consumption habits, “mapping” their societies in comparison to others, and “semiotic” skills to interpret signs of different cultures and places.

In this manner, cosmopolitanism also implies a dispositional orientation. According to Szerszynski and Urry, these dispositions include a “curiosity” to learn about and “openness” to interact with different “places, people and cultures” and a “willingness” to take risks by encountering different habituses. In addition to these, Gunesch argues that cosmopolitans “straddle” the local and the global, and identify themselves more dominantly as “world citizens.” This means that they can be critical of their nation states, in “rooted” and “unrooted” ways and diversify in terms of what they imply by “home” and “home culture.”

Against this background on dispositions and “ways of living,” some socio-cultural studies, which attribute “cosmopolitan” features to transnational professionals also critically, emphasize that they display “elite” features. “Elite” in this sense implies people who belong to this population live in homogeneous socio-cultural and socio-economic circles, which are comprised of members who resemble each other in terms of high human capital and life styles and live in “bounded” spaces which allow limited exposure to “ordinary” and heterogeneous social signs, discourses, etc., and interaction with people with “unlicensed” competencies. In this sense, these social circles may be transnational but are still homogenous in other ways.

Being original works of their literatures, Roudometof and Monaci et al.’s works provide analytical tools for making sense of how globalization might determine the ways subjective dispositions are being formed. In this sense basically Roudometof argues that increasing transnational experience may be converted into “open/welcoming” or “closed/defensive” attitudes in regards to new experiences that “penetrate” subjects’ “cultural milieu.” Those being the two ends of a single continuum, attitudes do not have to fit sharply and may “degree” regarding various themes such as “attachment to locality,” “attachment to a state or country,” “attachment to and support of local culture” and “degree of economic, cultural and institutional protectionism.” Roudometof’s debate is crucial in merging the themes of transnational experience and subjective dispositions regarding the public sphere.

However, it remains short of supplying the analytical tools for understanding how these two themes may relate to each other.

The analytical absence of these tools is partially compensated by the work of Monaci et al. The primary aim of Monaci et al. is to investigate “how people perceive and enact globalization on the basis of their distinctive individual experience and of their belonging to specific social contexts.”<sup>244</sup> In this regard, via semi-structured interviews, they concentrate on the relation between subjectively experienced globalizations and different work experiences and settings of subjects. Deriving from their field research, the authors argue that there are three basic dimensions which determine the “construction of the globalized selves”: “access to transnational networks of professional activity; exposure to the pressures of the global context; and the competence in the rhetoric of globalization.”<sup>245</sup> As contrasted to the cultural actors (artists, journalists, teachers), they find out that economic actors such as “corporate top managers” and “financial operators,” enjoy “high” levels of access to transnational networks of professional activity, lower levels of socio-economic uncertainty stemming from global dynamics and high levels of “rhetorical competence in framing the global age.”<sup>246</sup> In this regard, authors propose that economic actors experience globalization in a type of “bounded and elitist cosmopolitanism.”

The specifications listed by Monaci et al. for the “bounded and elitist cosmopolitanism” of economic operators coincide greatly with the justifications above. It should be realized that the importance of this study is actually its emphasis on how professionals of globally integrating sectors and occupations make use of their human capitals in order to maintain transnationally integrated lives, and hence emerge as the privileged status group of the global era. In this regard, the socio-economic and socio-cultural security of the

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<sup>244</sup> Monaci et al., 2003, pg 457

<sup>245</sup> *Ibid.* 462

<sup>246</sup> *Ibid.* 463

privileged status group converts more easily to a form of ‘openness/welcomingness’ to transnational experiences.

Can it be argued that there are business professionals in Turkey who share similar academic and professional features with these transnational professionals? In the era of post-1980 global neo-liberalism, Istanbul has become a globalizing city. It is possible to see global flows at the level of everyday. This trend has diversified the business environment as well. The investments of international and private capital and financialization have turned Istanbul into a space of transnational interests. Today, this transformation manifests itself in the form of regional headquarters or branches of global corporations or their affiliated local subsidiaries operating in the emerging sectors of the global economy which employ important levels of high-skilled workforce in Istanbul. In this business environment, it is possible to identify a population of Turkish business professionals who are connected to the world like their counterparts. These have attended similar high-schools, under-graduate and graduate schools as their transnational counterparts, they work in the same global firms either domestically or as ex-patriates, they travel abroad frequently for business purposes, they establish formal and informal relations with foreign counterparts, and maintain them. Apart from these, it is possible to argue that dominantly Turkish transnational professionals consume their leisure time and income by travelling abroad and they raise their children according to the prospected competitive challenges from international candidate pools in the academic and professional spheres.

As explained above, Turkish high-ranking business professionals at foreign corporations can be compared to their transnational counterparts in terms of transnational exposure and experience. In this sense, the “elitist and bounded cosmopolitanism” that has been proposed to describe the perceptions, behaviors and lifestyles of transnational professionals should be valid for describing Turkish transnational professionals as well.

The literature that was scrutinized in Chapter Two and summarized above constitutes the theoretical basis of this study. However, it has a lack. Even though the literature above as a whole is able to propose descriptions of economic functions, perceptions, life styles of elite professionals in regards to the global context, these refrain from investigating whether globalization, in the form of transnational experience and exposure, influence cultivation of cosmopolitan dispositions, be they elitist and bounded or not.

This is the dimension to which this study aims to contribute. This study focused on Turkish high-ranking transnational business professionals as subjects. Moreover, although the interviewees were selected in regards to their occupational status and type of corporations employed, this study did not primarily aim to understand their work settings and professional identities. Instead, complemented by the knowledge of their academic backgrounds, their occupational status and corporations were taken as signifiers of “class and status situations.” In this regard, these people were considered as emerging members of the Turkish economic elite - hence a status group within national elites; and members of the Turkish upper-middle class or higher segments - who are exposed immensely to transnational settings, operating in transnational networks, engaged in frequent transnational social interactions, and highly mobile (both nationally and internationally). Thus, differing from the studies reviewed above, this study problematizes Turkish transnational business professionals as socio-politically and socio-culturally embedded subjects whose embeddedness straddles the local and the transnational communities and spaces. In this sense, they were seen as both members of the transnational business community and members of the new elite of globalizing Turkey.

At this stage, there are two challenges. One of the challenges is that, as discussed above, there is a lack in the international literature about the impact of transnational experience and exposure in determining dispositions that regard the public sphere within which transnational professionals regard themselves as political and cultural members of. In this regard, various academic works and non-academic works that focus on elites tend to

portray them as detached from the larger cultural and political communities which surround them. Even though this portrayal may be true for reflecting the boundedness and exclusivity of their social circles, these studies still presuppose that the subjective dispositions of the elites regarding the public sphere coincide with their observable practices of daily life. In this sense, these studies do not problematize the possibility of identities which may be products of “exclusive” statuses and “welcoming” dispositions, and their further social implications.

The second challenge stems from the authentic conditions of Turkey and the way Turkish academic literature has developed. Researching the elites in contemporary Turkey is a tough mission because the literature that has focused on the elite of Turkey has been dominated by critical analysis of the “Republican” elite and it has not sufficiently responded to the emergence of new groups in the post-1980s era. Determination of this academic trend, of course, has much to do with the dominance of the Republican elite throughout the history of the Turkish Republic. So how could the emergence of contemporary globalizing elite be discussed?

In the case of Turkish high-ranking transnational professionals, their socio-economic and socio-cultural exclusivity is actually a matter of cultivation of human capital and social class origins. In the case of Turkey, historically, the cultivation of human capital has been very much defined by the modernization goals of Republic’s founding elite. These elite incorporated politico-cultural principles of Westernization and secularization into their modernizing institutions, in an effort to ensure the ideological loyalty of Republic’s potential cultural, economic, political and technical elite of the rising generations. In this sense, due to the peculiarity of historical sociology of the Turkish Republic, the cultivation of human capital and the production of a national elite capable of performing in the institutions and social circles of the Western developed world have been limited mainly to the urban, secular, West-oriented middle and upper classes, due to their economic capacity for supporting

academic cultivation of rising generations, and due to their cultural and ideological dispositions.

So how do the Turkish transnational professionals fit this picture? On one side, there is an increasingly cosmopolitanizing feature of the contemporary elite identities of Turkish transnational business professionals. Moreover, even though the experiences of transnational professionals are claimed to be “bounded and elitist,” they are described as cosmopolitans who can interact easily with people of different socio-cultural and socio-economic origins, and easily adapt to foreign and multi-cultural environments. However, on the other side, domestic studies that focus on the formation of contemporary secular elite in Turkey emphasize their bounded social circles, ways of living and exclusionary discourses. Being an authenticity of Turkey, the identities of the contemporary secular, West-oriented and pro-globalization Turkish elite is claimed to be constituted reflexively by clashing with “different” socio-cultural identities of the Kurds, conservative Muslims, and Anatolian rural migrant, and disregarding the socio-economic conditions of the urban poor. Today, this attitude, which is called to be “white Turkish,” is constituted upon a background of high urban spatial polarization and rise of the conservative Muslim bourgeoisie. Some critical authors distinguish between “white Turkish” and neo-Kemalist discourses and identities in an effort to emphasize the exclusionary and “nationally defensive” feature of the latter as compared to the exclusionary but “globally open” feature of the former.

In this regard, in this study, it was aimed to discuss the making of the dispositions of Turkish high-ranking transnational professionals in regards to the public sphere and discuss these against the background of the dilemma between exclusionary/defensive and cosmopolitan/pluralist, integrationist political identities. It was believed that for subjects who are embedded in transnational business networks, it would be possible to use the opportunity of transnational experience and exposure as a means for constructing political and cultural identities that carry cosmopolitan dispositions, which could be sorted out from their

narratives. On contrary to the dispositions of culturalism/ essentialism, hostility/ defensiveness and indifference that could be found in the “white Turkish,” “neo-Kemalist” and “Yuppie” discourses, those who have cultivated cosmopolitan identities would offer discourses that manifest the dispositions for cultural pluralism, economic re-distribution, and political negotiation.

During the interviews, the first thing noticed was the particular “class awareness” of various subjects. Although, the interviewees had dominantly been born into families of the middle class, they had undergone upwards mobility during their academic and professional careers. In this sense, some distinguished themselves from their upper class acquaintances, and emphasized that their privileged status within the Turkish business world is an outcome of their cultivated human capitals and family support. However, in terms of income segmentation, some regarded their household income among the upper level segments. In this sense, exposure to the foreign world at an earlier age was a feature of socio-cultural distinction among the academic and professional pools of candidates. Apparently, those who have made it to the high-ranks of the transnational business world, mostly through academic settings, made use of their exposure to the foreign world in their professional careers.

Personal narratives demonstrated that increasing transnational experience and exposure have actually determined dispositions and opinions in particular ways: Zafer emphasized that those who remain in bounded circles in Turkey with limited transnational exposure also remained bounded in terms of political vision. Complementary to that, Sacit emphasized that he believed that “globalized people” were more capable of cultivating dispositions that recognize the welfare of broader populations, and that his foreign country experiences and exposure have been crucial in making him recognize and respecting the socio-cultural diversity in Turkey and specifically Istanbul. Bülent emphasized that transnational interaction had enabled him to see that he could actually establish intimate relationships with people from other countries, and that cultural interaction was a good means

for establishing peaceful inter-cultural relationships. Moreover, it was also observed how some interviewees regarded themselves as “world citizens” and how their justifications for this attribution made visible some of their cosmopolitan competencies and dispositions. Furthermore, some interviewees narrated clear critiques on both their exclusive ways of living and how this way of living was becoming a dominant trend for households with similar status and class situations in Istanbul. In this sense, it was debated how the increasingly homogenous social circles within which the rising generations of these families interact actually limited their exposure to the larger urban community, and how parents like the interviewed ones were actually discontented with this type of social boundedness.

Aiming for “white Turkish” anxieties, opinions regarding conservative Muslims, Kurds, urban “others,” globalization and “white Turkishness” were inquired. In this part, the responses of the interviews varied and there were both consistent and inconsistent ones in terms of “openness.”

Overall, it was observed that people were not defensive in regards to the Kurdish identity and considered that their cultural demands should be granted. However, some emphasized that this should not be taken to the extent of a bi-federal Turkey. In this regard, some people emphasized their approval of the American citizenship model. As for conservative Muslims, it was possible to run across a wide range of dispositions, with liberal, skeptic and reactionary emphases. However, in this regard, the reaction was not directed to conservative Muslims per se, but to the rising politico-economic hegemony of the governing Islamist elite. More specifically, the reaction was directed against sectarianism and favoritism concerning public matters, rather than a perceived threat of the Shari’ a. However, some also were skeptical about the validity of religious practice, such as veiling, as self-choice as opposed to “impositions.”

In terms of the economy, it was possible to see that many interviewees were concerned about the socio-economic discrepancy throughout the world. Although this was not always

their first concern regarding Turkey, it was observed that growing socio-economic discrepancy in Turkey was seen as a crucial problem, too. In this sense, poverty and urban “Others,” were not disregarded in a neo-liberal discourse of indifference and hostility, but were seen as victims of socio-economic injustice.

In this sense, globalization was mostly described as an inevitable process, with advantageous and disadvantageous aspects. Among some listed disadvantages were global consumerism’s impact on local cultures, global inter-dependency, economic polarization and ecological decay. Among advantages, easiness and cheapness of acquiring information and travelling were listed. Cosmopolitan in tone, the advantages of increased cultural interaction and the erosion of borders between states were approved.

Complementary to the objective transformation of Istanbul in the post-1980s, Istanbul was also described by the interviewees as a globalizing or globalized city, which is considered to host intense global flows. In terms of “bodies” these flows include, tourists, artists, business people such as ex-patriates and other transnational professionals. The interviewees were content with this aspect of Istanbul, but some emphasized that it still lags behind global cities and certain metropolises in terms of such things as of a inhabiting foreign population, diversity of cultural events and institutions, protection of historical milieu, maintenance of urban infrastructure. However, Istanbul’s cosmopolitanism in terms of cultural diversity of its inhabitants and its historical legacy was a recognized and cherished aspect. Overall, Istanbul was seen as a city in which high-ranking Turkish transnational professionals were fond of living.

As for the denotation of “white Turkishness,” answers varied depending on how the term “white Turk” was subjectively defined by the interviewees. In this regard, the common feature of “white Turkishness” was that it referred to an exclusive group of Turks. However, some considered this denotation as critical or pejorative and considered themselves as outside of its signified population. Some accepted their “white Turkishness” as implying a type of

socio-economic or competent exclusiveness. The third stance was rejection of the denotation as an invalid pejorative political/cultural typology. In this manner, people apparently considered themselves as belonging to the population that is signified but they rejected the typological features by demonstrating how they personally diverged from them.

So what can be concluded from this study? First, this study demonstrates the necessity and toughness of researching contemporary status groups in Turkey. There is an emerging need to specify emerging social groups in globalizing Turkey. However, it is also essential to use a finely adjusted lens, which is possible through ethnographic methods, in order to be able to understand on which features these groups convene.

In this research, members of transnational professional class were problematized. However, it was observed that high-ranking careers in foreign or multinational corporations did not ensure “transnationalized” lives. Transnationalism is a matter of globalization. Moreover, in the case of Turkey, true business transnationalism started with the professionals who started off in the post-1980s globalizing business environment, which was only located in Istanbul. In this sense, although it is easy to find Westernized business professionals in Turkey, it requires a fine-adjusted lens to find the “transnationalized” business elite.

Second, observations in this regard demonstrate that it is possible to find Turkish high-ranking transnational business professionals in Istanbul whose members sociologically coincide with the population that is delineated as “transnational professional class.” However, as a globalizing city, Istanbul is different from globalized cities such as New York, London, and Tokyo in that it does not host a large foreign community. In this regard, for Turkish professionals to become transnationalized, they need to have studied in globalized cities or they need to have lived as ex-patriates in globalized cities or corporations with high levels of international employees because “glocalized” daily interactions or frequent short-length travels provide only limited opportunities for meaningful transnational interaction and exposure. Hence, these are mostly “bounded.”

Third, observations on “transnationalized” professionals demonstrate that Monaci et al.’s thesis, which relates human capital and subjectively experienced globalizations in the work setting can be taken as a basis for understanding the cultivation of cosmopolitan dispositions. However, it needs to be improved in order to be applied to other spheres of daily life. In this sense, globalization, when filtered through the competencies of human capital in a way not endangering subjects’ socio-economic security, and intensified by transnational experience and exposure, can produce cosmopolitan dispositions that cherish socio-cultural diversity and wish to eradicate socio-economic discrepancies both within local and trans-local communities. Of course, the cultivation of such dispositions is heavily dependent on the “peaceful” interaction of the subjects with the different identities that are available to them at the local and trans-local levels. It is believed that among the interviewees, such cases were found.

Fourth, it is worth re-emphasizing that studies in the international literature that focus on cosmopolitanism for understanding political and cultural dispositions are dominantly macro-level surveys that are quantitatively and statistically measured, hence capable of evaluating relations only between various variables and mostly by borrowing data from previously conducted researches such as the World Value Survey. Moreover, those researches that are conducted through ethnographic methods and evaluated qualitatively focus on the relation of cultural imagination and identities with glocalization. Finally, those studies which problematize cosmopolitanism politically remain highly theoretical or focus on such issues as the relations of international institutions.

Fifth, it was mentioned in the Introduction that there is an increasing academic interest in the elite in Turkey. Unfortunately those studies, which problematize “white Turkishness” have already become repetitive. In this sense, the work of Arat-Koc is interesting in the sense that it incorporates themes of globalization and transnationalism into the “white Turkish” debates on distinction. However, empirically, even that remains short of covering the

extensive field. On the other hand, those elite studies which are empirically strong focus on the historical dichotomy of Republican elite and Islamic counter-elites, and these have very different agendas that focus on realignment of hegemonic blocs in Turkey.

Finally, as aimed at this study, in order to evaluate the impacts of the global era on social groups, ethnographic researchers need to find ways that demonstrates the way subjectivities are formed between the local and the global levels. Moreover, in doing so they need to display how dispositions, opinions and practices relate to each other. The multi-layered approach in this study aimed to show how themes such as transnationalism, cosmopolitanism and elitism could be examined at different levels. In this sense, it was aimed to be shown that how transnational and national typologies that examine similar populations could remain short in displaying subjectivities. In this sense, as in this study, it is possible to find consistent and inconsistent cosmopolitanisms, which may contradict, co-exist or reproduce elitist identities. Only studies which approach individuals as locally and globally embedded subjects can quench the thirst of knowledge in this field.

## APPENDIX A: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

### I.BÖLÜM:

1. Şimdiye kadar eğitim ya da iş için hangi ülkelerde, hangi şehirlerde yaşadınız?
2. Ne tür firmalarda ne kadar süreyle çalıştınız?
3. (Yurtdışında çalıştıysanız) Türkiye'ye neden döndünüz?  
(Yurtdışında çalışmadıysanız) Yurtdışında herhangi bir pozisyonda çalışmayı düşündünüz mü?
4. (Yurtdışında çalıştıysanız) (Yurtdışında yaşadysanız)  
Yurtdışındaki iş ortamınızla, Türkiye'deki arasında ne tip farklılıklar ve benzerlikler var?
5. İşiniz gereği yurtdışıyla ne yoğunlukta bir ilişki içerisindeyiz? (Günlük temaslarınız ne düzeydedir?)
6. Senede iş ya da tatil için yurtdışına kaç kez çıkıyorsunuz? Ne zamandan beri? Nereleri görme fırsatınız oldu?
7. (Yurtdışında okuduysanız)  
Okul ortamında hangi ülkelere insanlarla yakın ilişkiler kurdunuz?
8. (Yurtdışında okuduysanız)  
Okul ortamında tanıştığınız yabancılarla hala iletişim halinde misiniz?
9. İş ortamında tanıştığınız yabancılarla iş dışında ilişkiler kurdunuz mu?
10. Sizinle sosyal ve kültürel açıdan benzeşen en çok sayıda insanı bir arada toplayan çalışma ortamınız neresi olmuştur? Hangi açılardan benzeştığınızı düşünüyorsunuz?
11. Sizce profesyonel hayatta dünyanın herhangi bir yerinde çalışabilecek insanlar var mı?  
Ne tür özellikler taşıyorlar? Kendinizi onlardan biri olarak görüyor musunuz?
12. Sizin için bir şehir ya da ülkede yaşamayı çekici kılan unsurlar nelerdir?
13. İstanbul bunları ne derecede karşılıyor?
14. İstanbul'da en çok hangi çevrelerden insanlarla iş dışı ilişkiler yürütüyorsunuz?
15. İstanbul'da hangi semt ya da mekanlarda bulunuyorsunuz?
16. İyi bir tatil için nereye gitmek ve orda ne yapmak istersiniz?
17. Gündemi takip edebiliyor musunuz? Hangi kanallardan?
18. Kültür ve sanat aktivitelerini takip eder misiniz?

19. Kitap okumaya fırsat buluyor musunuz? Ne tip kitapları tercih ediyorsunuz?

20. Etkinliklerine katıldığınız ya da üyesi olduğunuz organizasyonlar var mı?

## II. BÖLÜM:

Şimdiye kadar iş yaşamından tanıştığınız ve tanışabileceğiniz kişileri göz önünde bulundurursak, aşağıdakilerden hangisiyle daha çok sosyal ve kültürel değer paylaştığınızı düşünüyorsunuz? Nedenini açıklayabilir misiniz?

- a) İstanbul'da çalışmakta olduğunuz ya da zamanında çalışmış olduğunuz bir şirketin diğer elemanları
- b) Çalışmakta olduğunuz şirketin yurtdışındaki ofislerinde yönetici mevkilerde çalışan elemanları
- c) İstanbul'da hizmet veren diğer yabancı/küresel şirketlerin orta / üst düzey yöneticileri (Bu kişinin Türk ya da yabancı olması farkeder mi?)
- d) Türkiye'nin yerli holdinglerindeki orta/üst düzey yöneticiler
- e) Sizinle aynı lise ya da üniversiteden mezun olmuş olup özel sektörde yönetici pozisyonunda çalışanlar
- f) Bunlardan hiçbiri.

Kişiler kendilerini belirli bir coğrafyada yaşayan insanlarla, kültürel açıdan, bu coğrafyanın dışında yaşayan insanlara göre daha yakın hissediyor olabilirler. Böyle bir durum sizin için de geçerli olabilir. Sizin için aşağıdaki gruplardan hangisi böyle bir kültürel yakınlık hissettiğiniz insanlarla en iyi şekilde örtüşür? Nedenini açıklayabilir misiniz?

- a) Sizinle aynı muhitte ya da belirli bir muhitte yaşayan insanlar
- b) Sizinle aynı şehirde ya da belirli bir şehirde yaşayan insanlar
- c) Belirli bir ülkenin belirli bir bölgesinde yaşayan insanlar
- d) Sizinle aynı ülkede ya da belirli bir ülkede (ya da ülkelerde) yaşayan insanlar
- e) Ülkeleri aşan belirli bir bölgede yaşayan insanlar
- f) Belirli bir kıtada (ya da kıtalarda) yaşayan insanlar
- g) Dünya'da yaşayan insanlar

h) Bunlardan hiçbiri. Kültürel yakınlık hissettiğim insanları coğrafi ölçütlerle anlatabilmem mümkün değil.

Aşağıdakilerden hangisiyle daha çok sosyal değer ve kültürel ilgi alanı paylaştığınızı düşünürsünüz? Nedenini açıklayabilir misiniz?

- a) Akrabalık ilişkiniz olan insanlar
- b) Aile dostlarınız
- c) Mezunu olduğunuz lisenin diğer mezunları
- d) Mezunu olduğunuz üniversitenin diğer mezunları (Bu kişinin Türk ya da yabancı olması farkeder mi?)
- e) İş yaşamında tanışmış olduğunuz insanlar (Bu kişinin Türk ya da yabancı olması farkeder mi?)
- f) İş dışında mensubu olduğunuz ya da çalışmalarını takip ettiğiniz oluşumlardan insanlar (takım/grup/kurum/dernek/parti)
- g) Bunlardan hiçbiri.

Kendinizi öncelikle aşağıdakilerden hangileriyle tanımlarsınız?

- a) Anne/Baba olmak
- b) Kadın/ Erkek olmak
- c) Ana dili .... olmak
- d) ..... milletinin mensubu olmak
- e) .....’ de doğmuş olmak
- f) ..... dinine tabi olmak
- g) .....lisesinin mezunu olmak
- h) .....üniversitesinin mezunu olmak
- i) Çalışan bir insan olmak
- j) ..... düzey yönetici olmak
- k) .....’de çalışıyor/çalışmış olmak
- l) Siyasi kaygılar/ değerler olarak ..... sahip olmak
- m) Gelir seviyesi .... olmak
- n) Kültürel/ sanatsal derinliğe sahip olmak
- o) .... yapmakla ilgilenen biri olmak
- p) .... iyi yapan/ anlayan biri olmak
- q) Dünya vatandaşı olmak
- r) Yerel halkın parçası olmak
- s) Anadolu’lu olmak
- t) Avrupalı olmak
- u) Orta doğulu olmak
- v) Özerk bir birey olmak

Herhangi bir tanıdığınızın aracılığı olmaksızın biriyle tanıştığınızı varsayalım. Bu kişiyle sosyal ilişki kurabilmenizde aşağıdakilerden hangileri engelleyici/ teşvik edici olabilir?

- a) Dini
- b) Ana dili
- c) Etnik kökeni
- d) Doğduğu yer
- e) Ekonomik durumu
- f) Politik görüşü
- g) Eğitim geçmişi
- h) Kültürel derinliği
- i) Mesleki kariyeri
- j) Tanıdıkları
- k) Yetenek ve becerileri
- l) İş dışındaki ilgi alanları

### III.BÖLÜM:

1. Dünya genelinde tüm ülkelerin sorunu olduğunu düşündüğünüz konular var mı?
2. Küreselleşmeyi yararlı ya da zararlı buluyor musunuz?
3. Sizce Türkiye dünya ile ne kadar iletişim halinde?
4. Peki İstanbul?
5. Türkiye'nin önde gelen sorunları arasında neleri görüyorsunuz?
6. Türkiye'nin hangi bölgenin ülkeleriyle ya da hangi tip ülkelerle siyasi yakınlık içinde olmasını isterdiniz?
7. Avrupa Birliği'yle ilişkiler konusunda ne düşünüyorsunuz?
8. Türkiye'nin IMF ve Dünya Bankası gibi kuruluşlarla kurduğu ilişkiler hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz?
9. Türkiye ekonomisi dünyadaki ekonomik aktörlere, piyasalara ne derece açık olmalıdır?
10. Yabancıların Türkiye'de çalışabilmesi hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz?
11. Yabancıların Türkiye'de gayrimenkul satın alabilmesi hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz?
12. Küreselleşme sizce kültürleri nasıl etkiliyor?

13. Türkiye’de siyasal, sosyal, ekonomik ağırlığı olan ve varlığı sizi rahatsız eden kesimler var mı?
14. Türkiye’deki dindar kesim hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz?
15. Kürtler’in kimlik talepleri hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz?
16. Türkiye’de kimlikler konusunda birçok tartışma yapılıyor. Siz kendinizi ait hissettiğiniz gruplar üzerinde bir baskı olduğunu düşünüyor musunuz?
17. “Beyaz Türk” kavramı hakkında ne düşünüyorsunuz?
18. Demokratikleşmeden ne anlıyorsunuz? Doğru bir demokratikleşme süreci nasıl olmalıdır?
19. Herkesin oyunun aynı sayılması sizin için kabul edilebilir bir durum mu?
20. Siyasal olarak kendinizi nerede belirlersiniz?
21. Sosyo-ekonomik açıdan hangi tabakadasınız?
22. İstanbul’da yaşadığınız süre zarfında size “Böyle bir yer mi varmış?” ya da “Böyle yaşayan insanlar mı varmış?” dedirten, şaşırtan deneyimleriniz oldu mu?
23. Türkiye’de mağdur olduğunuzu düşündüğünüz kesimler var mı?

APPENDIX B: ORIGINAL TRANSCRIPTIONS OF THE CITED INTERVIEW  
PASSAGES (IN THE ORDER OF CITATION)

1. **Ayla:** ... Birkaç benzerlik olduğunu görüyorum. Bir tanesi, aile backgroundları genelde benziyor diye düşünüyorum.

**Deniz :** Nasıl bir şey o benzerlik?

**Ayla:** Genelde, white collar aileler, yani memur diyebileceğimiz ama hani orta ve üst düzey memur ailesinin çocukları...Düzenli income'ı olan anne babalar. Eğitimli anne babaların çocukları. Öyle aşırı zengin aileler değil, mesela multinationallardaki şeylere baktığın zaman hani holding sahipleri, işte böyle vellaht gibi yetişmiş çocuklardan ziyade, biraz daha hani böyle orta düzey ailelerin çocukları oluyor. İkincisi, bu ailelerin belirli bir hayat görüşü olduğu için, genelde çocuklarını, ya bir kolejde ya da bir özel okulda, iyi bir Anadolu lisesinde falan okutmuş oluyorlar. Dolayısıyla... orta okul ve lise olarak adlandırılan süreçte, çocuk uluslararası bir şeylere expose olmaya başlamış oluyor. İşte Fransız okuluna gittiyse veya Galatasaray'a gittiyse bir Fransız kültürüne, işte Robert Kolej'e gittiyse Amerikan kültürüne, British High School'a gittiyse İngiliz kültürüne gibi bir formasyona girmeye başlıyor. Ondan sonra da genelde, işte Boğaziçi gibi, ODTÜ gibi o zamanın gözde okullarında biraz bunlar pekiyor. Zaten de hani bunun getirdiği süreçte, insanlar ya bir yurt dışına mastera gidiyorlar, ya işte üniversite sırasında değişim programlarından birine veya lise sırasında değişim programlarından birine gidip arada bir de uluslararası experience koydukları zaman, multinationallar için iyi bir malzeme olurlardı bizim zamanımızda. Dolayısıyla hani birkaç boyutta; ailesel özelliklerden eğitim sürecine, o eğitim sürecinde kendine kattığı bazı artı değerlere, işte yurtdışında master yapmak gibi veya üniversiteye gitmek gibi veya işte değişim programına katılmak gibi bir takım artı değerlere... bakıyor şirketler...

2. **Bülent:** Bizim şansımız şu, 80'den sonraki liberalleşme, bizim o dönemde üniversitede olmamız, işte 85-90 dönemi, biz üniversiteden çıktığımız zaman özellikle birtakım köklü şirketler de bizleri tercih etti. Yani bizim o şirketlerde işe girme şansımız oldu. Bakarsan bugün, benim pozisyonuma gelmiş bir çok çevremdeki insan hep o zamanki Türkiye'de kökleşmiş 40-50 senelik multinational'lardan çıkan insanlardır. ...Yaklaşık 200 kişiden 80-90 kişi şu anda genel müdür, genel müdür yardımcısı pozisyonlarında...

...

**Bülent:** Şimdi bizim 90'lı dönemlerde, ordan başladık, Özal'ın liberal ekonomisi, sonra iyi bir eğitim aldık zaten daha açık görüşlüydük, belli sınıftan, belli eğitim tarzıyla geldik, ODTÜ, Boğaziçi, Bilkent falan, o dönemin iyi okulları ve ondan sonraki 10-15 sene biz de bu tip kökleşmiş multinational'larda yetişerek sonra ilerledik ve şu anda bu konumdayız.

...

**Bülent:** Şu anda o gruptan (lise arkadaşlarından bahsediyor) mesela bilim adamı olanlar çok fazla benim çevremde değil, çok fazla dinsel eğilimleri olanlar benim çevremde değil. Biliyorum, tanıyorum, yılda bir iki kere belki onları da görüyorum ama çok fazla onlarla... atlayıp tatile gitmiyoruz. Diğerleriyle (daha yakın olduğu arkadaş grubu) atlayıp tatile gidiyoruz... Çekirdek grup var...Mesela diyelim 5-6 kişi, onun dışında 20 kişiye varan bir ilk şey var, ikinci grup diyeyim, onlarla yılda bir iki kere değişik ortamlarda bir araya...Bunların daha böyle bir hayat tarzı, hayat tarzı da derken ne diyeceksin, sadece kariyer de değil işte orada...

**Deniz :** .... Yani bu insanları yakın tutanlar neler oluyor? Yani birlikte zaman geçirmeyi zevkli kılan ortaklıklar nedir?... Kariyerler benziyor anladığım kadarıyla?

**Bülent:** Pek benzemiyor aslında...Doğru diyorsun kariyerler de benziyor... Ailelerin anlaşması da önemli... Ama bu insanların ailelerine baktığım zaman (Kendinin ve arkadaşlarının ailelerinden bahsediyor) genelde zamanın memur, orta halli ailelerini, işte asker ailesi, memur ailesini, mühendis olsun, ücretli çalışan ailesi filan gibi, yaklaşık aynı seviyede, işte daha ...liberal, çok muhafazakar değil, daha laik cumhuriyetçi falan filan tarzı insanlar bunlar. İşte bunlar çocuklarının eğitimi için belki kendilerinden fedakarlık yaparak onları bir şekilde imkanlar sağlamışlar. Çocuklarının kendilerinden daha iyi olmasını istemişler. Şu anda bizde sanki öyle bir ekibiz aslında baktığın zaman...Ne büyük imkanlarla yetişmiş bu insanlar... yani baktığın zaman bizim hayata başlarken aslında en büyük sermayemiz, kendi eğitimimiz ve kendi zekamızdı. Dolayısıyla birtakım şeyleri bugüne gelene kadar kendimiz yaptık, ulaştığımız yere kendimiz geldik denebilir. Ama tabii ki ailemiz bize o yatırımı yapmasaydı, oralarda okumasaydık, buralara gelemezdik. Hazır bir şeye konmadık, kendimiz üzerine bir şey kattık genelde. Aile muhafazkar değil o yüzden o kesimlere biraz uzağız. Ama çok da açık, yani açık derken, bir İsviçre’de ya da Amerika’da rahat rahat okutulmuş, altına işte son model araba çekilmiş filan tarzda da hiçbirimiz yaşamadı. Biz böyle bir ekibiz.

3. **Ayla:** Bence kesin bir subculture var...Multinationalların insanları soktuğu bir torna olduğunu ben düşünüyorum açıkçası...Her multinational’ın kendi kültürü var ama mesela hani X’den birisi olarak Coca Cola’dan birisiyle oturduğumda da bir ortak dil yakalayabiliyorsun çünkü, belki terimler farklı, belki isimler farklı ama sonuçta lifestyle olarak benziyorsun.

**Deniz :** O benzerlik nasıl bir şey mesela, tekrar sormuş olayım?

**Ayla:** (Organizasyonel yapıyla ilgili çeşitli örnekler veriyor)...Onun ötesinde bir global ortak dil var zaten insanlarla konuşurken, mesela şey yapabiliyorsun hani, mesela 20-30 kişilik katılımlı bir toplantıya gittin, ya spesifik bir örnek veriyorum sana, bundan 3-4 yıl önceydi, Cape Town, Güney Afrika’da, 30-40 kişi bir masada oturuyoruz, muhabbet ediliyor, direk şey konusu açıldı, o zamanlar çok modaydı; “Desperate

Housewives”... Şöyle söyleyeyim, on tane nationality’den insanın hepsinin favorite dizisinin bu olduğu ortaya çıktı. Sub-culture dediğim biraz bu, yani ... Yani şunu demek istiyorum, o insanlar bir masa etrafına geldiklerinde ortak konu bulmakta zorlanmıyorlar. Benim hayatım, senin hayatın üç aşağı beş yukarı benziyor. Şey bile benziyor yani, mesela çocuklarını konuşuyorsun, çocuklarının sevdiği filmler de aynı. Ha işte, “sizinki de onu mu seviyor, sizinki de Hannah Montana’ya mı hayran? Aa, benimki High School Musical’ı daha çok seviyor falan diye ortak bir language’den konuşuyorsun. O yüzden social olarak da ortak konu çok var, business olarak da ortak konu var, konuştuğun zaman...

4. **Deniz** :Peki şunu merak ediyorum ben, eğer siz çevrenizden daha farklı olduğunuzu düşünüyorsanız böyle bir duruş konusunda, sizce bunu sağlayan size şey nedir? Yönlendirmiş olan, ilham veren?

**Burak**: Ya o şeydir, çok farklı ortamlarda yaşadım ben yani hem yaşadım paylaştım da. İşte dediğim gibi babam çiftçi, ben her hafta sonu köye giderdim, bahçeye giderdik, orada... yaşayan insanlarla da paylaştığım birçok şey var. Öbür yandan en sosyete muhitte oturan ve benim iş arkadaşım olan arkadaşlarım da var ve onlarla da bir şey paylaşıyorum. Bu range’de çok insan yok. Yani ya hakikaten şehirde doğmuş, büyümüş, annesi babası zaten çok kültürlü ve o ortamdan gelen insanlar, o tradition’ı devam ettiriyor ya da daha böyle işte rural şeyde kalmış işte o çerçevede hayatını devam ettiren insanlar var.... Bir de Amerika’da yaşamışım 6-7 sene, onun getirdiği apayrı bir şey var.

**Deniz** :Yabancı ülke görmüş olmanızın bir etkisi olduğunu düşünüyor musunuz diye soracaktım ben de...

**Burak**: Çok, tabii, mutlaka.

**Deniz** : Yani kendinizi bunu yapmamış kişilerle karşılaştırınca...

**Burak**: Çok farklı olduğunu düşünüyorum. Yani hani artık o benim için bence bir şans işte ama hayatımın belli evrelerinde çok farklı alanlarda bulundum. Çok farklı yerlerde, farklı kültürel değerleri olan yerlerde bulundum ve hepsinin güzelliğini, farklılığını gördüm, anladım, hissettim, paylaştım....

5. **Zafer**: ...Exposure arttıkça insanın genel değer yargıları ve dünyaya bakış açısı değişiyor. Uluslararası şirketlerde çalışan özellikle yurt dışında çok yaşamış insanlarla gitmeyen arasında o farkı çok net gözlemiyorum. ....Türkiye’deki insanlar, biz kendi dünyamız içerisinde Türkiye’yi değerlendiriyoruz.... Özellikle üniversiteden sonra, üniversitede veya hani Türkiye’yi kurtarıırken rakı sofrasında her şey Türkiye odaklıdır bizde. Aziz Nesin’in dediği gibi Türkiye,Türk propagandası yapılarak büyüdüğümüz için biz hep kendimizi oradan değerlendiriz. Halbuki yurt dışına çıktığınız zaman daha geniş perspektifte baktığınız zaman, daha uluslararası düzeyde değerlendirme imkanı buluyorsunuz yaşadıklarınızı. Her şey Amerika’nın

sorumluluğudur burada, bakarsınız, Türkiye'nin bu hale düşmesinden yabancılar sorumludur bla bla bla. Bir sürü şeyi koyarsınız, halbuki baktığınız zaman Türkiye gayet de önemsiz bir ülke çoğu açıdan, küçücük bir ülke. Dünya'daki insanların başka problemleri var. Veya Türkiye'de konuşulan şeylerin ne kadar kendi içerisinde sığ, kendi ufak çevresinde vakit kaybettiğimiz, kendi etrafımızda döndüğümüzü, yurt dışına gittiniz zaman, oradaki ülkelerin, insanların, bilimsel çevrelerin, neye önceliklendirme yaptığını gördüğünüz zaman bunu karşılaştırabiliyorsunuz. Bilimsel, akademik dünyada artık, dünya net kendi hedeflerini koymuş, oraya doğru yatırım yapıp oraya doğru odaklanıp oraya göre insan yetiştirirken biz burada hala YÖK'ün bilmemesini tartışıyor oluyoruz veya başörtüsünü tartışıyor oluyoruz. Dolayısıyla...dünyaya şeyiniz açıldıkça, bunları karşılaştırıp compare edebilme yetiniz artıyor. Bu da sizin hayata bakışınızı, yaptığınız aktiviteleri, önceliklerinizi bence daha sağlıklı belirlemenizi sağlıyor.

6. **Sacit:** İki tip insan var her yerde. Bir globalleşmiş adam, bir globalleşmemiş adam...Türkiye'nin de .. aynı ikilemi. Yani bir söylem vardır, Türk söylemidir, bazı şeylere kapalıdır, bazı şeylerden de çok emindir.. kendisiyle ilgili. Sorgulamaz. Her ülkede bu tip insanlar var. Diğerleri de olan biteni anlayan, anlamadığı zaman da anlamaya çaba gösteren tipler. (Gülerek) Bunlara da ben global tipler diyorum. Yani her şeye açık ve önyargısını mümkün olduğu kadar aşağıya çekiyor. Ve önce kendini geliştirmeye, sürekli devam ediyor.
7. **Sacit:** Taşdıkları bagaj var insanların. İçinde yetiştikleri aile, içinde buldukları toplum, gördükleri eğitim ve bunlar çok kendi ülkelerine ya da kendi kültürlerine has yetiştirme tarzları. Ve çok kapalı kaldıysa bunun içinde hem başkasını anlama ihtimali zor hem iş yapma ihtimali zor.

**Deniz:** Diğeri daha evrensel bir şey mi oluyor?

**Sacit:(...)** Bir tanesinde daha evrensel bir iyi kavramı var. Daha çok paydaşı göz önünde bulunduran. Diğeri ise daha çok ne olursa olsun ben odaklı. Daha çabuk ... ayrışmaya ve çatışmaya girmeye yatkın.

8. **Deniz :** İstanbul'da bir yerden geçtiğinizi düşünelim. "Böyle de hayatlar mı varmış?" dediğiniz, şaşırduğunuz anlar oluyor mu?

**Sacit:** Bence o evreyi ben geçeli bayağı oluyor....İstanbul'a gelip üniversite okumaya başladıktan sonra zaten İstanbul'un çok içini dışını bilip çıktım. Üniversite yıllarında bence geçti o şaşırma devresi. Ama mesela onu yapmayı tetikleyen şey beni, bir sene Amerika'yı yaşayıp, New York gibi kozmopolit bir hayatı yaşayıp, farklılıkların farkına

varmak ve bunun hayatı zenginleştirdiğini, öğrettiğini, eğittiğini görmek...

....

**Sacit:**... O zenginlik ne biliyor musun? Beyoğlu'nu bile yürüdüğün zaman, standardı yok Beyoğlu'nun yani Beyoğlu'nda bile üç-dört farklı hayat yaşayabilirsin. Kadıköy çarşıya gittiğinde üç-dört farklı hayat yaşayabilirsin. Ama bu, ölçek ekonomisinin getirdiği şeylerle, mesela İngiltere'de yirmi şehire git, aynı highstreet'e gidilir. Amerika'da da bir çok büyük şehir yine birbirine benzerlik gösteriyor. O çeşitlilikten kastım o. Zenginlikten kastım o. Her şey çok çeşitli. Yemek çok çeşitli, giyecek çok çeşitli, müzik çok çeşitli, kültür çok çeşitli ve İstanbul müthiş bir mozaik. Yani Alabama'dan gelmiş adamla Carolina'dan gelmiş adamla, Quebec'ten gelmiş adam arasındaki kopuklukla; Urfa'dan, İzmir'den ve Trabzon'dan gelmiş adamdaki kopukluk çok farklı düzeydeki bir kopukluk. Bence Türkiye'deki çok daha uzak. Onların bir araya gelip farklı şeyler oluşturması burada.

**Deniz :** Bu mozaik halini sevdiğinizi anlıyorum?

**Sacit:** Evet.

9. **Bülent:** ... Bir yandan Türkiye milli maçı izlerken heyecanlanıyorsun, destekliyorsun, ya da kendi takımını tutuyorsun Beşiktaş'ı. Ama bir yandan da coğrafi sınırları sorguluyorsun, ulus devleti sorguluyorsun... Hiçbir kimse kendi doğduğu yere kendisi karar veremediğine göre... O zaman ulusal çıkarın anlamı ne? Ulusal çıkarın anlamı başka bir insanın çıkarını elinden almak demek. Yani birisinin kazanırken başka birisinin kaybetmesi demek. Ya bunları sorguladığın zaman da, o zaman belli bir yere ait olmak güzel ama eğer karşı tarafın hakkını eğer ele geçirmekse bu, savaşta kazanmanın çok da fazla bir değeri kalmıyor sadece kendi tarafına bir avantaj sağlıyorsa. Enteresan, iş hayatıyla da bağlantılı. Şu an bunun dilemma'sını yaşıyorum, mümkün olduğu kadar onu yerine getirmeye çalışıyorum. Mesela acaba kazan-kazan felsefesiyle bir yere gidilebilir mi? İş hayatında çok zor. Ama... ben ortamlar yaratmaya çalışıyorum. Acaba ülkeler arasında böyle bir şey yapılabilir mi?

Şunu da gördüm ben aynı zamanda...Tura çıktığım zaman, orda kahvede birisiyle bir çay içip sohbet ettiğim zaman adamla ortak bir şeyler yakalayabiliyorum. Sonuçta aynı kültürü aynı şeyi paylaşıyoruz. Ben onlarla sohbet etmekten de hoşlanıyorum...Türkiye'de motor turuna çıktığım zaman. Ama aynı zamanda Mısır'a gittiğim zaman da Mısır'ın belli bir kitlesiyle oturup mesela saatlerce de muhabbet edebiliyorum. Onlarla da belirli bir şey paylaştığımı görmeye başladım çünkü. Yani kalıpları kırdığım zaman.. İşte kızımдан bahsetmişim, kızımın bir Arjantinli arkadaşı olabiliyorsa...Hiç böyle bir şey olmayabilir ve Arjantin'e düşman bile olabilirdi eğer aramızda bir savaş olsaydı. Ama farklı bir ortamda aynı insanı bir araya getirdiğin zaman...çok rahat

arkadaş kalabiliyorlar. ..Mısır'ın biraz benim gibi yetişmiş çevresi diyeyim. Yani babası hakimmiş, kızı da işte avukatlık okumuş, benim şirketteki avukatımdı. Mesela onunla yaklaşık aynı kültürü paylaştığımı hissettim orda... O yüzden bence kültürel exchange'ler çok önemli. O yüzden aslında bak enteresan bir noktaya geliyoruz. O yüzden benim çocuklarımla yaşadığı tecrübeler çok farklıydı, dünyaya farklı bir şekilde bakıyor olacaklar bundan sonrasında çünkü onlar o kalıpları çok genç yaşta kırdılar ve o insanların da kendilerinden hiç farklı olmadığını gördüler . Hep şeydir biz bunu söyleriz...pek çok toplantıya gittiğimiz zaman biz uluslararası ortamlardaki mesela aynı masada ne olursa olsun buluşan insanlar genelde Yunanlılar, Türkler işte...İtalyanlar, İspanyollar'dır. Tabii ki benim sonuçta kendi memleketimdeki diyeyim, Kırklareli'yi görünce, benim memleketim bu arada Kırklareli, babamın doğduğu yer, ben hiç oturmam ama Trakya'da....Bir yere ait olmak güzel bir şey. İnsan kendini daha bir korunmalı.. daha bir gruba ait hissediyorsun, daha bir güçlü hissediyorsun belki kendini. Ama aslında öbür türlü düşündüğün zamanda bunlar aslında suni olarak yaratılmış şeyler olduğunu ve aslında insanlar arasında çok da fazla bir fark olmadığını görüyorsun. Çünkü Mısır'a gittiğinde, yine senin düşünce yapında bir takım insanlar görüyorsun. O zaman ben baktığım zaman, kültürel yakınlık hissettiğim insanların coğrafi ölçütlerle sınırlı olduğunu zannetmiyorum ve genelde de bu tip tecrübeler yaşayacak her türlü insanın da böyle düşüneceğini bir yerden sonra düşünüyorum. Bunun da pozitif bir şey olduğunu düşünüyorum. O yüzden de çok fazla hem genç dönemde hem de sonrasında işte kültürel exchange programlarının çok faydalı olduğunu düşünüyorum. ...Üniversitelerde şimdi yapıyorlar ya, ya da işte ihracat da böyle bir şey. Sivil toplum örgütlerinin birbirleriyle interaction'ı da çok önemli bir şey. Ne kadar çok yurt dışıyla, farklı kültürlerle karşılıklı iletişim olursa, farkların da azalacağına ve insanların gerçekte oralarda da kendi kültürlerine, kendine yakın kişiler bulabileceklerini düşünüyorum...

10. **Ayla:** Benim şansım iki ülkede de uzun yıllar yaşadığım için, 4 yıl 3 yıl, uzun süreler, o inner circle'a ikisinde de girmeyi başardım bir şekilde. Bunun tabii bir faydası da çok uzun vadeli dostluklar oluyor. Şu anda mesela amerika'dan 20 yıl öncesinden arkadaşlarım var, Polonya'dan var. Bir süre sonra çevren de multinational olarak sürüyor... Bu biraz nesilden nesile de geçiyor. Şimdi benim çocuklarımla da şu anda benim arkadaşlarımla yaşıyorlar. Mesela 6 yaşındaki kızım, Amerika'dan üniversite arkadaşım geliyor, Pakistan kökenli ama Amerikan vatandaşı, Amerika'da yaşıyor, onun çocuklarıyla arkadaşlık kurmaya başlıyor veya işte benim burada çok yakın Türk-Amerikan dostlarımla var, Bodrum'da yaşıyorlar ama aslında Amerikalılar, işte biri İngiliz falan, onlar hani böyle, teyzesi amcaları öyle insanlar oluyor. Eminim onun hayatında da bunun yansımaları olacak. Yani bu biraz nesilden nesile geçen bir şey bence diye düşünüyorum.
11. **Deniz :** ...Dünya vatandaşı olmaktan, sizin hikayenizden çıkıp daha genel bir şey anlamam gerekirse, ne anlamamız gerekir? Dünya vatandaşı

olabilen biri ne yapabiliyordur? Ya da nasıl bir kafa yapısına sahiptir belki?

**Bülent:** *Değişik kültürlerle, değişik ülkelerle interaction'a girebilmesi lazım. Benim multinational'da çalışmış olmam, belirli dönemlerde pek çok ülkeyi, pek çok kültürü görmüş olmam bu konuda bana yardımcı oldu. İşte iki tane örnek var Mısır'a ve Belçika'ya gittim, daha fazla vakit de geçirdim. Çünkü turist olarak gitmekle yaşamak tabii farklı şeyler. Yani oralarda da yaşamımı sürdürebileceğimi gördüm. O insanlarla da bir şekilde... Belki Türkiye'de olduğu kadar keyifli olmasa da bir açıdan sonra yeni bir hayata başlıyorsun, farklı zorlukları artıları var. Ama orada da yaşamımı sürdürebileceğimi gördüm. Yani Mısır'da on sene kalmak zorunda olsam kalır mıydım? Kalabilirdim de sonuçta ama gidiyorsun işte İtalyan'la, Yunanlı'yla, Amerikalı'yla, Avusturyalı'yla Fransız'la...hayatımı sürdürebilirim, iletişimasyonu kurabiliyorum. Ailemle beraber olduğum sürece...İkinci kriter ise belirli bir gruba ait olduğumu söylemeye başladığın zaman, kendi çıkarından bahsettiğin zaman, o zaman başka birinin çıkarına aykırı demek...Eğer bu tür negotiation'larda karşı tarafı da düşünebiliyorsan... Prisoner's dilemma'yı duymuşundur...Win-win hikayesi...Ben uluslararası ilişkilerde de biraz öyle düşünmeye çalışıyorum açıkçası. O yüzden de kendimi dünya vatandaşı olarak hissediyorum. Yani gidip baktığın zaman bir adamı belirli bir konuda suçladığın zaman, o adamın da gerçekliğini görmem lazım. Eğer sonuçta sen onun gerçekliğini anlamayıp onun da kendisini iyi hissedeceği bir çözüm yaratmazsan sonuçta senin kazancın da geçici olacaktır sadece...Belki biraz kendi rahatından ve lüksünden belki fedakarlık etmek, ortak iyi sonuca ulaşmaktır. Bence böyle düşünmek, ulusal çıkarların ötesinde düşünmek, dünya vatandaşı olmaktır.*

12. **Deniz :** Dünya vatandaşı olmaktan tam neyi anlıyoruz?

**Ayla:** Tabii ki hani Türk olmaktan çok gurur duyuyorum ama hani benim için Türkiye'de doğmuş olmak, Türkçe'nin anadilim olması, ya bunlar benim yaptığım bir şeyler değil zaten hani sonuçta ben böyle doğmuşum. Burada doğmuşum, burada doğmayabilirdim de bambaşka bir ülkede de doğabilirdim. Kendi kendime achieve ettiğim bir şey değil bence onlar. Emek verdiğim bir şey değil. O yüzden benim için fact olmaktan öteye geçemiyorum. Hani ben Türk'üm ama tamam OK, ülkemi seviyor muyum? Çok seviyorum ama hani fanatik de değilim, kusurlarını da görüyorum, iyi taraflarını da görüyorum anlatabiliyor muyum? Böyle bir blind bir nationalism'im yok benim. Dolayısıyla hani onları seçmememin sebebi (soru kağıdındaki şıklardan bahsediyor), ben kendimi illa hani Türklük'le özdeşleştirmiyorum. Dünya vatandaşına da oradan bağlayabilirim, yani benim esas önem verdiğim şey, nereden gelersen gel dünyanın her yerinde ben bir şekilde function edebilecek bir insan olmak. Dünyanın neresine gidersen git ama yani hani illa New York Fifth Avenue'de parası olan herkes function eder. Benim için o demek değil dünya vatandaşı, hani Soweto'ya girdiğin zaman, Soweto'nun ne olduğunu biliyor musun bu arada? ... Johannesburg dünyanın crime açısından en kötü şehirlerinden biri. Güney Afrika'nın başkenti biliyorsun, Soweto'da

oranın gecekondulu mahallesi. Ama hani gözünün önüne şey gecekondulu mahalleleri gelmesin, Türkiye'deki gibi değil.... Gecekondulu mahallesi hani bir dolar için adam öldürülen bir yer Soweto. Yani Soweto'ya girdiğin zaman, Soweto'da bir insanla konuşacak konu bulabiliyor musun? Dünya vatandaşı olmak tanımım benim bu aslında. Yoksa hani gidip işte dediğim gibi Fifth Avenue'de insüler bir otelde kalmışsın veya işte Manhattan'da Türk restoranında yemek yemişsin. Bu benim için dünya vatandaşı olmak değil. Sadece geographic bir şey olarak görmüyorum bunu, belki şöyle tanımlayabilirim, dünyanın her yerindeki insanlarla paylaşabileceğim bir ortak kültürün olması. Ve her sosyal seviyeden insanla diyeyim.

13. **Zafer:** Ben inanmıyorum öyle bir şeye ya. Dünyaya açık olmak güzel bir şey. Dünyayı gezmek, insanlara açık olmak güzel bir şey ama vatandaş olmak demek bence bazı kodları taşıyor olmak demek ve dünya o kadar kozmopolit ki o her yerin kodu ayrı ama universal değerleri taşımak adına dünya vatandaşlığı diyorsanız, OK, öyle bir şey var gerçekten... O anlamda derim. Eğer o anlamları yüklerseniz dünya vatandaşlığı doğru bir şey. Çünkü dünya vatandaşlarını, vatandaşlığını tanımlayabileceğiniz kesişen belli değerler var. Eğer değerler bazında dünya vatandaşlığını değerlendiriyorsanız öyle bir şey var. İnanıyorum.

**Deniz :** Sizce nedir o değerler?

**Zafer:** Bence o değerler gerçekten insanın değerli olması, insanın belli hakları olması, ilişkileri belirleyen, hayatı belirleyen temel değerlerinin adının konmuş olması, hani bunun içerisine demokrasi giriyor, yaşama hakkı, öğrenme hakkı... Bunları da dünyada gördükçe hani burada bu sefer şey çatışması başlıyor, Türkiye'de yaşadıklarınızla, olması gereken veya olan yerleri gördükçe onun çatışması başlıyor buradaki. Dışarıya çok expose olan insanların temel sıkıntısı da o.

14. **Bülent:** Ya şey olmak hoşuma gitmiyor benim, yani sadece işte kapalı bir çevrenin adamı olmak, Kemer Country'de oturup çocuklarını işte ordaki koleje gönderip ondan sonra uçakla Bodrum'a tatile gidip ya da işte yılda üç kere Avrupa'ya çıkıp kayak yapıp falan filan... Sonuçta bunlar da yapmadığım şeyler değil ama aynı zamanda da işte Diyarbakır'a gideceğim, orada benim eski bekçi Diyarbakırlı onunla buluşacağım, orada işte çay kahve içeceğiz, ben turlayacağım ondan sonra kahvede oturup milletle sohbet edeceğim ya da işte motor turunda oradaki adamlarla (kahvedekiler?) geyik yapacağım, işte başka birisiyle asker muhabbeti yapacağım falan bu tip şeyler benim hoşuma gidiyor, çok elitist tavır böyle beni rahatsız ediyor. Yani benim şeyim sonuçta, herkes aynı, bir şekilde ben daha şanslı daha iyi bir eğitim aldığım için şu anda işte daha farklı bir sorumluluğum var ama hattın başında çalışan işçiyle ben aynı ...özelliklere sahibim, sadece benim sorumluluğum daha fazla bazı konularda, bazen de onun sorumlulukları daha önemli çünkü o ilacın kalitesi işte bir hastanın hayatıyla ilgili bir şey. Ama bu sorumluluğa böyle bir şey yapmışlar, ben daha fazla burada vakit

geçiriyorum (bürosunu kastediyor) daha fazla belki başım ağrıyor, o yüzden bana biraz daha fazla para veriyorlar bununla ilgili. Ama ben kendimi farklı bir yere koymuyorum.

15. **Bülent:** Böyle kişiler var bunları nasıl bir tanıma oturabilirim diye baktığım zaman, kendimi belki orda farklılaştırıyorum, bu iyi ya da kötü değil. Hep işte Fen lisesi örneğini, farklı ortamlarda bulunmuş olmamı, farklı ülkeye gitmiş olmam, Satış'ta çalışmış olmak önemli. Çünkü gidiyorsun en azından bakkalla en azından bir şeye giriyorsun, farklı kültürel gruptan insanlarla ilişkiye geçmiş olmak önemli, bunu yapmamış olanlar var. Bir örnek vermişim, çok hijyenik ortamda büyümüş olanlar var: Kolej'e gidiyor, Kemer Country'de oturuyor, üniversitede Amerika'ya ya da İsviçre'ye gidiyor, geliyor, bu tip insanlar da multinational'larda çalışmaya başlayabiliyor. Bunlar biraz daha fazla elitist olabiliyor. Daha kapalı çevre yani... Bu tip insanlar da var.

16. **Zafer:** Aslında baktığınız zaman bir ufak akvaryumda yaşıyoruz yani, o kendi aramızda da konuştuğumuz bir şey. Çok ufak bir çevre içerisinde yaşıyoruz. Genelde çevremiz iş ve okuldan oluşan çok yakın bir çevre hani, çok sık görüştüğümüz ve ufak çember, core çember o. Core çevre, ben liseyi de burada okumadığım için üniversite artı işten oluşan bir çevre. Gittiğimiz yerlerde... Bu arada ben yaklaşık bir senedir falan fotoğrafçılığa da merak saldığım için, İstanbul'un çok yerini dolaşma imkanı buluyorum ve bundan keyif alıyorum. Ama genel anlamda baktığınız zaman, gidilen yerler de çok belli. Hani, Beyoğlu, Levent, Boğaz, belli çevreler arasında zamanımızı geçiriyoruz, sosyal hayatımızı.... Bundan dolayı mesela (Fotoğrafçılıktan bahsediyor.) Balat'ı, Galata'sı, Sultanahmet'i vesairesinde de fotoğrafçılık imkanım oluyor. O da keyif verici, o da farklı bir dünya. Ama hani arkadaşlarla çıktığımız zaman genelde bu dediğim yerlerde...

17. **Deniz :** İstanbul dışında bir yerde yaşamak zorunda olsaydınız, nerede yaşamak isterdiniz? Ve bu tip bir yerden beklentilerinizi İstanbul ne derecede karşılıyor?

**Zafer:** İstanbul her şeyiyle birlikte enerjisi olan bir yer. Ben yüksek enerjisi olan yerleri seviyorum ve heterojen yerleri seviyorum. Yani bir Londra bunlardan bir tanesi, New York bunlardan diğeri. Roma'yı çok severim. Ya bir çok şeyi içinde barındıran, enerjisi olan hayatı olan, kültürel kısmı olan, güzel yemeği olan, güzel insanları olan yerleri seviyorum. Bunun yanında İstanbul'da ben çok doğanın içerisinde, çok sakin bir yerde yaşıyorum. O da bana çok keyif veriyor. Ama hani ondan sonra da çıkıp, işte ne bileyim Beyoğlu'nda, Galata'da bir şey yemek veya fotoğraf çekmek, güzel müzik dinlemek de hoşuma gidiyor. Dolayısıyla İstanbul yaşamak isteyeceğim güzel yerlerden bir tanesi ama hani bir insanların bir kısmını sevmiyorum, burda her gün sokakta karşılaşmak zorunda ve deal etmek zorunda olduğum bir grup şeyi

sevmiyorum. İki, bir de bu, çirkin, estetikten uzak, etrafta gördüğüm çirkinlikleri sevmiyorum. Onu burada yaşarken aslında çok fazla görmüyoruz ama ne zaman yurt dışına gidip gelsem onlar işte bir süre gözümü batıyor ondan sonra tekrar heralde göz alışıyor, beyin “Onlara dikkat etme” diyor. Nerede yaşamak isterdim?... Böyle bir çok yer var, doğasının güzel olduğu, insanların birbirine saygılı, medeni olduğu, aynı zamanda enerji olan bir yer.

**Deniz :** Bu heterojenlikten ve enerjiden kastımız nedir?

**Zafer:** Enerjiden kastım şu, sonuçta saat 9’da dışarı çıktığınız zaman, ölü bir şehre çıkmıyorsunuz Darmstadt’taki gibi veya Cenevre’deki gibi. İşte ne bileyim, caz dinlemek istiyorsanız caz, rock dinlemek istiyorsanız rock, tiyatroya, sinemaysa, hayatını yaşayan bir şehirden kastediyorum. Bu tip şeyi Londra’da çok rahat bulabiliyorsunuz, New York’ta da... Heterojen ve bu da aslında çeşitli farklılıklara ulaşabileceğiniz şehirler. Farklı insanlarla tanışıp, onlarla iki kadeh bir şey içip konuşabileceğiniz, arkadaşlık edebileceğiniz ve ya işte farklı isteklerinizi karşılayabileceğiniz bir şehir.

**Deniz :** Farklı insanlar deyince ne geliyor aklınıza?

**Zafer:** Farklı kültürden insanlar aslında kastettiğim. Farklı kültür, kendi kültürümüz içerisindeki farklı kültürler de olabilir. Yani aslında o anlamda İstanbul heterojen. Bunun güzel tarafları var, çok kötü tarafları da var. Kötüsü şu, sokakta gelirken insanların birbirine saygısız olması ve ya işte belli kendi backgroundlarına, kendi alışkanlıklarına çok buraya getirmeleri. ...Sonuçta da genel kurallar içerisinde, genel saygı kuralları içerisinde, estetik kuralları içerisinde aykırı düşmeleri, beni rahatsız eden şeyler var. Güzel tarafları da, hani buraya oturup konuştuğunuz zaman, mesela ben fotoğraf için en son gittiğimde bu Çingeneler şeyinin başkanıyla fotoğraflarını çektim, onunla konuştum. Çok da keyifli bir yarım gün geçirdim. Bir sürü de şey öğrendim adamdan.... Tesadüfen Balat’ta fotoğraf çekerken adam, Roman şeylerinin başkanıymış, işte bir sürü şey konuşuyorsunuz, siyaset, Romanlar, neler oluyor neler bitiyor, çok farklı bir dünya orada ve hiç...

18. **Zafer:** .... Biz, hani heterojenlik... aramızda biraz da aslında çok homojen bir ortam içerisinde yaşamaya başlamamızdan kaynaklanıyor bence o arama. Şimdi hele ben kendi çocuklarıma bakıyorum, aynı tip okula gidiyorlar, aynı tip insanlarla. Biz mesela öyle büyümedik, ben devlet ilkokulundaydım... en yakın arkadaşım kapıcının çocuğuydu. Biz onun evine giderdik. Şimdi benim kızlarım koleje gidiyor. Hepsi aynı tipte insanlar. Aynı tip yerlerde yaşıyorlar. Aynı tip aktiviteler yapıyorlar. Oradan eve geliyorlar, oradan tenise gidiyorlar yine aynı tip insanlarla, oradan baskete gidiyorlar aynı tip insanlarla. Hani çok homojenleşiyor aslında şeyimiz, aynı grup insanlar birbiriyle görüşmeye başlıyor. Belki bu heterojenliği aramızda belki birazcık ondan. Biz biraz daha şanslıydık, benim çocuklarıma göre, farklı insanlarla beraber büyüdük. Ben sonuçta mahallede büyüdüm, şimdi mahalle de yok, yani çocuğum mahalleye çıkıp oynayamıyor.

**Deniz** : Aynı tipten kastımız nasıl bir şey tam olarak?

**Zafer**: Ya işte, ne bileyim, anne baba genelde profesyonel hayatta çalışan, gelir seviyeleri işte A sınıfı, genelde üniversite mezunu diyeyim... genelde anne babanın ikisi de mezun, yurt dışını görmüş, yaşamış, seyahat eden, yani hani sınıflandırma yaptığınız zaman, Nielsen sınıflandırmasında A şeyindeki insanlar. Yani, mesela komik gelecek ama şey benim kızım apartmanda – biz apartmanda büyüdük, biz şimdi villa tipi yerde yaşıyoruz- geçen gün birisine gittik, “Niye apartmanda oturuyorlar?” dedi çünkü sonra düşündük ki ne bizim ne arkadaşımızın ne de onun arkadaşlarının hiçbirisi apartmanda yaşamıyor. Apartmanda yaşamak, apartman enteresan geldi, asansöre bindiler, çıktılar falan. Sonra farkettiler ki eşimle, hani, biz gerçekten akvaryumda büyümeye başlıyoruz, şimdi onu nasıl çeşitlendiririz onun şeyindeyiz. Ben şimdi hafta sonu fotoğraf çekimine, Balat’a falan götüreceğim onları ki oraları (gülerek) da görsünler. Ama dediğim gibi şöyle bir gerçek var. Okul dediğim gibi aynı tip insanlar, oradan spora gidiyorlar aynı tip insanlar, piyano kursuna gidiyor, aynı tip insanlar, yani çok böyle şey Türkiye’den de biraz uzak, genelinden, bir şekilde büyüyorlar. Daha ilkokuldalar, çeşitlendirme imkanımız var, en azından biz onun farkındayız şu anda.

19. **Bülent**:... *(Bülent yakın çevresindekilerin ailelerin de sosyo-ekonomik ve sosyo-kültürel benzerlikler gösterdiğinden bahsetmişti. Anlattıklarından kendi kuşağında bir upward mobility’nin anlaşıldığını yorumlamıştım. Bunun üzerine devam ediyor)* Aslında bu geçişi görüyoruz şu anda yani, aslında bizim kendi çocuklarımıza da bağlarken de yine bu geçişi düşünerek bağlamak daha doğru gibi geliyor. Çünkü geçen görüşmemizde bahsetmiştim yani çocuklar hep aynı hijyenik ortamda yetişiyor, kendi aramızdaki konuşmalarda “Ne olacak bunlar?”.... Yani biz daha bir orta sınıftan geliyorduk, mahallede büyümüştük, en azından okulda bu tip şeylerle karşılaşmıştık, şu anda yine kendi tercihini yapsan bile herkesle dostun, arkadaşsın çünkü tanıyorsun, beraber vakit geçirdin *(Bülent, lisedeki okul arkadaşlarının farklı çevrelerden geldiğini, şu anda aralarında farklı mesleklerle uğraşanların olduğunu - “NASA’da profesör de var, Fethullahçı da var “- ve farklı politik çizgilerde duranların olduğundan, buna karşın hala belirli aralıklarla görüştiklerinden bahsetmişti.)* ama şimdi bizim çocuklarımızı bence analiz ederken, yine bence bizim onları hangi ortamda yetiştirdiğimize bakmak lazım. Yani ben şu anda Y’nin köyünde oturuyorum ama benim oğlumun yandaki köyden ailenin çocuğuyla herhangi bir interaction’ı yok.

20. **Deniz** : Onun (profesyonel tenisin) yaşamımızda nasıl bir etkisi vardı sizce?

**Arzu**: Valla, en az okul kadar etkisi vardı bence. Çünkü o beni belki işte o daha soyutlu ve tanımlı AB+ sınıfı diyeyim çevreden aslında çok daha tüm Türkiye mozaiğiyle tanıştıran bir şeydi benim hayatımda. (Deniz :

Öyle mi?) Tabii, çünkü tenisteki büyük tenisçilerin çok büyük bölümü ball-boyluktan yetişmedir, yani top toplayıcılarıdır, dolayısıyla turnuvalara gittiğiniz zaman birlikte olduğunuz insanların mozaigi çok geniştir. Hani sizin gibi ailesinin gücüyle de raketini almış, tenis dersi almış oynayanlarla, orada sizin arkanızda top toplayıp geceleyn birbirleriyle oynayarak bir yerlere gelmiş ve hepsi de sizden çok daha oynayan çocuklardır onlar. Çünkü onlar için o bir gelecek umududur, sizin içinse bir hobidir. Dolayısıyla bugün tenis camiasındaki, şu anda mesela hoca seviyesine baktığınızda, hiç bizim gibi ailelerden gelen kimse yoktur. Hepsi onlardır, çünkü o onların kariyeridir. Hayatıdır. Bizler içinse o dönemdeki bir etkinliktir. Dolayısıyla ben hani o turnuvalarda gezerken Türkiye'yi, yazları biz komple turnuva gezerdik, çok çeşitli yerlerde kalıp çok çeşitli insanlarla tanışma fırsatımız olduğu için, benim belki de, hani kendimi en azından değerlendirmem ne kadar doğrudur bilemem ama, çok şımarık olmadıysam öyle söyleyeyim (gülerek)...Tenisin hayatımdaki rolü çok büyüktür bence. Gerçek hayatı göstermesi adına bana. (Deniz : Hiç böyle bir cevap beklemiyordum.) Evet yani aslında hiç aklıma gelmemiştii anlatmak bu seni ilgilendiren bir şey olmuş. (gülerek)

21. **Ayla:** Onlar benim kişilik haklarıma aykırı bir şey dikte etmedikleri sürece beni hiç rahatsız etmiyorlar. Yani sonuçta son derece de saygı duyuyorum. Çünkü din kişiyile ilgili bir şey....
22. **Bülent:** Her dönemin belli yükselen kesimleri var. Özal döneminin de yükselen kesimleri vardı, bu dönemde de son 10 senede işte, şu andaki mevcut politik iktidara yakın olan kesimlerin yükseldiğini görüyoruz....Bunun doğal bir şey olduğunu düşünüyorum. Eğer mücadele şartları adil ve eşitse, buna karşı mücadele edilmesi gerektiğini düşünüyorum....Şikayetçiyse, koy mücadeleyi ortaya, sen de onun gibi yap, sen daha iyisini yap ve ele geçir...Seçime gir, hazırlan sen de.
23. **Arzu:** Bu insanların gerçekten kendi seçimleriyle öyle bir hayat yaşadıkları hakkında tam bir ikna sürecini tamamlayabilmiş değilim. Yani insanların Müslüman olması ve dinlerini tatbik etmeleriyle ilgili en ufak bir rahatsızlığım yok ama bunu bir siyasal güç, bunu bir bayrak, bunu bir simge, bunu bir topluluğun teması haline getirmeye başladıkları nokta beni rahatsız ediyor. Bunu kendi dinlerinden öte bir şey olarak kullanmaya başladıkları için rahatsız oluyorum. Yani işte, o plajda mayo giyemezsin, Ramazan'da elinde dondurmayla gezemezsin noktalarına geldiği zaman... İnsanların özgürlüklerini kısıtlamaya geldiği zaman ki böyle bu kesim malesef, o beni çok rahatsız ediyor.

**Deniz :** Laiklik tehlikede mi peki?

**Arzu:** O kadar da dramatik değil (...)

24. **Sacit:** Baskı altındaki muhafazakarlaşmayı özgür hale getirirken çok daha muhafakar hale gelmeye başlaması... Türkiye'deki muhafakarlık baskı altındaydı. Şimdi, bu baskı ortadan kalkıyor ama muhafazarlık adım atmıyor, tam tersi daha karanlık bir muhafazarlık çöküyor ülkenin üstüne. Bu tabii din odaklı bir şey ama bunun yanında birçok başka problemi de getiriyor. İnsanlar düşünme, sorgulama şeylerini yitirmeye başlıyorlar, itaat düzeni oluşuyor... Şu andaki zenginleşme bizi yanıltıyor. İnsanlar zenginleştikçe biraz daha bilgi görgü sahibi olurlar gibi duruyorlar ama yok öyle bir gerçekten ne toplumun bence düşünme tarzında ne de kültürel gelişimine katkıda bulunmuyor şu anda. Bütün iletişim araçlarına yansıyor bu baskı. Muhafazarlığın serbestleştikten sonra ortaya koyduğu baskı.

**Sacit:** Laiklik tehlikede mi? Bence böyle bir tehlike var. Öyle bir risk var. Çünkü olana baktığımız zaman, İslam ülkelerinde bunun bir sorun olduğunu görüyoruz. Bugün Malezya'da da sorun, İran'da büyük bir sorun, Suudi Arabistan'da zaten hiçbir zaman doğru noktaya gelmemiş iş. Artı, İslami kesimle ilgili şöyle bir endişem var benim, hani analitik düşünce yapısı, sorgulama, işte olmuyor muhafazarlaşınca insanlar. İtaat etme ve bir gruba ait olma her şeyin önüne çıkıyor ve o zaman çocukluktan bu iş etki etmeye başlıyor ve kendini tanımayan, başkaları kendi yerine düşünen kastlar oluşuyor. Bu bir problem, yani İslam dogması aşılmadı hala... Ama Hristiyanlık'ı esnetmişler. Yahudiler'i küçük görmemiş. Ama Müslümanlık hızla hakim oluyor.

25. **Burak:** Sanki o... Muhit diyeceğim yani ama... Yaşadığım yerde zengin züppe de oturuyor ve hiç onlara yakın hissetmiyorum kendimi ama çok yakın arkadaş olduğum insanlar da oturuyor yani o... kişilik benim için daha önemli hani şey anlamında... maddi seviyede aynı yerde olmak manevi şekilde aynı yerde olmayı gerektirmiyor. O yüzden ne İstanbul diyebilirim ne de işte Beykoz veya Acarkent'te yaşayanlar diyebilirim çünkü hiç tasvip etmediğim ve kendimi uzak hissettiğim insanlar da var. İşte köyüm memleketim desem, onlarla da paylaştığım birçok şey var. Böyle çok kendimi şey hissediyorum, kozmopolit hissediyorum bu anlamda, yani burdaki birçok insanla paylaştığım şey de var ama Mersin'deki Davuttepe köyündeki yaşayan akrabalarım ile da paylaştığımı hissettiğim birçok kültürel değer ve doğru var. Zaten bir tane doğru olduğuna inanmıyorum, bakış açıları olduğuna inanıyorum...

**Deniz :** Peki bu kozmopolitlik durumu, çevrenizde hissediyor musunuz böyle bir yaklaşım?

**Burak:** Biraz daha şey hissediyorum çevremde daha polarize olmuş diye hissediyorum.

**Deniz :** Nasıl bir şey o?

**Burak:** Ya şöyle, işte laikler var, dinciler var, liberaller var, sosyalistler var... Herkes bir görüşün yılmaz savunucusu ve ben laikim, tamam güzel ben de laikim bu laik demek ama allah'a inanmam veya işte Cuma namazına gitmem anlamına gelmemesi lazım, bence isteyen görüşüne göre Cuma namazına da gidebilmeli ama öbür yandan da din ve devlet işlerinin ayrı olmasına da inanmamı, öbür yandan da ne bileyim işte çok sevdiği bir arkadaşının akşam yemeğinde canı çekti diye bir kadeh rakı da içebilmeli. Bana bunların hepsi off gelmiyor ama ya biridir ya öbürüdür diye bir polarize durum var. Özellikle Türkiye'de diye düşünüyorum.

26. **Ayla:** Bu çok detayını bildiğim bir konu değil. Ama genel benim hayattaki prensibim özgürlükten zarar gelmez yönünde. İnsanları çünkü kısıtlamaya çalıştıkça oradaki tepki artıyor ve kısıtlayanın vizyonuyla kısıtlı kalıyorsun. Ne kadar kısıtlama o kadar kötü diye düşünüyorum bir yandan. Tabii şöyle bir kısıtlama olmalı hani her şey serbest olsun, dışarıda isteyen birbirini öldürsün kadar anarşist bir yaklaşımım da yok ama hani belli bir şey çerçevesinde herkesin kendi kimliğine kendi şeyine hakkı olduğunu düşünüyorum. Dolayısıyla kısıtlamaya çalışmanın bize fayda getirmediğini düşünüyorum. Ama dediğim gibi çok da sofistike bilgim olan bir konu da değil.

27. **Bülent:** Demokrasi ve insan hakları açısından bakarsan, kimlik taleplerinin doğru olduğunu düşünüyorum. Ama yine de bunu farklı şekilde kullanmamaları lazım. Bu konu o kadar kolay bir konu değil. Olsaydı zaten 30 senedir devam etmezdi... Dindeki korku irtica, Kürt konusundaki korku bölünme. Ben hiçbir zaman, sonuçta dünya vatandaşlığından bahsettik, bölünmelerin bir artı getireceğini düşünmüyorum. Hiçbir tarafa, hiçbir kimseye... O yüzden bölünmeye götürmeyecek her türlü kimlik talebinin ben karşılanması gerektiğini düşünüyorum. Demin kültürlerin de zaten devam ettirilmesi gerektiğini söyledim. Ya burda sonuçta, ana dilin öğretilmesi, işte bilmem ne hakkına sahip olması falan filan, zaten bir çok haklar verildi, verilmeye de devam ediyor. Ben bu konuların şu andaki karmaşa ve toz bulutu arasında ajite edildiğini düşünüyorum. Çözüm çok kolay değil.... Eğer bir limit soruyorsan, limit bence bölünmedir. Çünkü ben doğru tarzın Amerika Birleşik Devletleri gibi olduğunu düşünüyorum. Avrupa Birleşik devletleri gibi olduğunu düşünüyorum. Yani kültürel farklılıkları koyup ekonomik açıdan birliktelik sağlanması, demokratik standartlarda birliktelik sağlanması ve bir gün de zaten dünyanın da tek bir yer haline geleceğine inanıyorum, bir şekilde. Böyle baktığın zaman, ben bölünme karşıtıyım.... Ama yani bunu faşizan bir şekilde söylemiyorum.

28. **Sacit:** Valla işte büyük hatalar bunlar, uzun yıllar yapılmış. Çok fay hattında enerji birikmeden bu haklar ve özgürlükler gündemde olsaydı, bugün bu gerginlik bu aşamada olmazdı. Ekonomik olarak problemler tabii her şeyden önce geliyor. Nüfusun yanlış tarafı çoğalıyor derken, bu

Kürtler'e özgü bir şey değil, o sosyo-ekonomik yapının, öyle bir coğrafya içinde çok hızlı çoğalması sorunu tabii büyütmüş. Şu anda, evet, Türkiye'ye zararlı. O hani oyunun kuralları yeniden yazılacak ya, Türkiye'nin elini zayıflatan bir konu bence bu şu anda. Feodal yapının içinde yer alırken böyle bir kambur da girecek işin içine... Taleplerin ne kadar doğal olduğu konusunda kafamda soru işareti var, o iç ve dış dengelerden bahsediyorum ya, yüzde yüz iç odaklı olsa bunun karşılanmasıyla zaten hiç problemim yok. Kesinlikle karşılanmalı ve yönetilebileceğini düşünüyorum. Ama bu bir kart olarak Türkiye devletinin karşısına çıktığında, sorun...

29. **Deniz**: Küreselleşmeyi yararlı ya da zararlı buluyor musunuz?

**Zafer**: ...Ya globalleşmenin artıları ve eksileri var. Globalleşmenin artısı... insanların dünyaya açılıp dünyadaki olan şeylerin farkındalığına varması iyi bir şey ama öbür tarafta da... farklılıkların da yok olmaması lazım. Yani Çin'de yasak şehre gidip Starbucks'ı görmek şimdi kimisini rahatsız ediyor, kimisini rahatsız etmiyor. Bence Yasak Şehir'de Starbucks olmaması lazım ama Çin'de gezerken Starbucks gördüğüm zaman da hoşuma gidiyor, gidip oradan bildiğim kalitede, sevdiğim bir kahveyi alabiliyorum. Ama kişisel fikrim bu tabii ki herkes farklı düşünebilir ama Yasak Şehir'de de Starbucks olmaz yani. Tamam mı? (Gülüşmeler) İnsanların girmedığı, yasak olan bir yere, yıllarca kimsenin girmedığı... İşte o kültürel şeyi kaybetmeden bence yani her şeyin olduğu gibi bunun da artısı ve eksisi var.

30. **Sacit**: Cevabını biliyorsun heralde. Çok yararlı buluyorum.... Dünyanın başındaki en büyük belalardan biri bence ülke sınırları. Din de önemli bir (gülerek)... Küreselleşmenin ilk aşamada ikincisini biraz güçlendirdiğinin farkındayım çünkü insanlar korkuyorlar, korkunca da sığınacak bir yer arıyorlar. Ama onun en fazla iki jenerasyon süreceğini düşünüyorum ben. Yani sınırlar da kalkacak bence...

31. **Bülent**: Denge teorisini çok önemli buluyorum.... Toplumsal ilişkiler ve ülkelerin yapısında da böyle bir gerçeklik olduğu kanaatindeyim.... O yüzden küreselleşmenin, sistemi dengeye getirmesi açısından doğru bir şey olduğunu düşünüyorum. Tabii bütün alt durumlarıyla beraber. Küreselleşme ekonomik homojenliği getirecek, getiriyor bir şekilde. Ya çünkü işte geçtiğimiz 20 yıldaki, gelişmekte olan ülkelerdeki orta direktikleri düşünürsen... gelir adaletsizliğinin azalmasını, bence bu sosyalist rejimle yönetilen ülkelerdekinden çok daha hızlı bir şekilde oldu. Yani vahşi kapitalizm bir şekilde sosyalizmin aslında istediği şeyleri yapar hale geldi ve o orta seviyedeki insanların daha çok gelişmesini, pek çok hizmet ve servise ulaşmasını sağladıklarını düşünüyorum. Artı insanların çok daha rahat bilgiye ulaşabildiklerini, ne bileyim ben, artık köyde bile internete ulaşan bir kişinin aslında, eğer önemli olan şey eğitim fırsatıysa, ona eskisinden daha kolay ulaşabildiğini düşünüyorum. Baktığın zaman globalizmin iyi bir şey olduğunu düşünüyorum. Şeylerin çok samimi olduğunu düşünmüyorum

Batı'daki kuvvetli ülkelerin şu anda yaptığı bazı uygulamaları gördüğün zaman aslında, tamamen serbest pazar ekonomisinden yana oldukları, globalizmden yana olduklarını, şu anda çıkarlarının karşısında bazı gelişmeler yaşandıkça aslında, bazı dengeler korumaya çalıştıkları için, işte free trade açısından, şu açısından, bu açısından, samimi olduklarını düşünmüyorum. Ama artık engellenecek bir süreç olmadığı kanaatindeyim. Sonuçta bu tip işte dünyadaki bütün insanların ortak haklardan faydalanabilecekleri bir sisteme doğru götürdüğü için küreselleşmeyi yararlı buluyorum. Ama bir yandan da nasıl bir dengeye ulaşacağını bilmiyorum...dünyanın bu kadar nüfusla ve bu artış hızıyla bu tip bir kalkınmayı kaldırabilecek kaynaklara sahip olmadığını düşünüyorum. O yüzden doğal bir dengeye girmesi lazım.

32. **Deniz:** Türkiye'nin önde gelen sorunları arasında neleri görüyorsunuz?

**Zafer:** Dağılım ciddi anlamda bozulmuş durumda. Gelir dağılımı... Üstle alt... Gelir dağılımıyla beraber fırsat eşitliği de bozulmuş durumda. Hani bu okulla, hastane vs. sosyal devletten ciddi anlamda sapmış durumda Türkiye. Belki hiçbir zaman çok fazla değildi ama şunu söyleyeyim ben devlet ilkokuluna gittim kızımın da devlet ilkokuluna gitmesini istedim. Ama Allah'tan imkanım var koleje gönderiyorum şimdi. Çünkü devlet okullarında bizim zamanımızdaki gibi iyi eğitim olma ihtimali düşük. Bu bir fırsat eşitliğinin bozulmasıdır. Bugün kolej 27.000 lira, 27.000 lira artı bilmemneleri. Bunu kaç kişi verir? Veremeyen çocukların aileleri ne yapar? Veya sosyal sigortalar hastanesine gitmekle Acıbadem'de aldığın hizmetin farklılığı gibi. Bence ciddi bir kesimde fırsat eşitsizliği söz konusu.

33. **Deniz:** Türkiye'nin önde gelen sorunları arasında neleri görüyorsunuz?

**Arzu:** Gelir seviyesindeki dağılım eşitsizliği, yönetsel zaaflar ve düzgün bir muhalefetin olmayışı...

**Deniz:** Gelir dağılımındaki eşitsizlik tam olarak sizi nasıl rahatsız ediyor?

**Arzu:** Şunu kastediyorum aslında orada, her ülkede tabii ki bir dağılım var, bir gelir dağılımı piramidi var, onda hiçbir sorun yok bence. Tabii ki her ülkede daha zenginler, görece olarak daha az kazananlar, orta sınıf vs. olacak. Ama Türkiye'ye baktığımız zaman buradaki uçurum çok fazla ve de ben arzu ederdim ki bir minimum standardı olabilsin insanların. Atıyorum işte minimum da Rusya'da ekmeği sütü ilacı bedava veriyordu adam. Neden? Çünkü belirli bir temel ihtiyaçları en azından, komünist dönemden bahsediyorum, o dönemde dahi temel ihtiyaçlarını karşılıyordu. Dolayısıyla hani Amerika'da da çok zenginler ve fakirler var ama yine de basket sahaları var, tenis kortları var, komüniteler var insanlara yardım eden. Hani belirli bir level of standard'ı devlet sağlıyor aslında. İşsizlik sigortası yapıyor bazı ülkeler, gibi gibi. Biz piramidin en altına çok harsh davranıyormuşuz gibi geliyor bana ve o piramidin altı gerçekten çok sürünüyor gibi hissediyorum. Yani bu tabii ki gözlemsel

bir şey söylediğim ama hani bu kadar uçurum olması şart mıydı, keşke bu kadar olmasaydı diye açıkçası düşünüyorum. Bir de tepede de hak edilmemiş zenginliklerin olduğunu düşünüyorum. O yüzden iki uçta da sakat olduğumuz yerler olduğunu düşünüyorum. Üstteki biraz alta verse de biraz da dengelense gibi bir şey düşünüyorum ve zaman içerisinde de orta sınıfın gittikçe yok olduğunu, aşağıya doğru indiğini... Eskiden hani bir ortadirek kavramı vardı, senin yaşı genç bilmeyebilirsin belki ama (gülerek), ortadirek kavramının gittikçe yok olup direğin dibine doğru indiğini düşünüyorum. Çünkü asgari maaşlara baktığımız zaman en azından gerçekten yaşanabilecek seviyelerin bayağı altında noktalarda bazı rakamlar.

34. **Deniz:** İstanbul'da bir yerden geçerken ya da birtakım yaşamlar hakkında bir şeyler duyduğunuzda, "Böyle de yaşamlar mı varmış? Burası İstanbul mu?" dediğiniz oluyor mu?

**Arzu:** Çok zengin semtlerin bir sokak arkasına geçtiğiniz zaman o kadar sıklıkla gördüğünüz manzara ki artık şaşırtmıyor noktasına geldi. Ama ilk başta İstanbul'a taşındığımda bu beni çok şaşırtıyordu çünkü mesela Ankara'da öyle değildir.... Ankara'da da daha az gelişmiş semtler vardır ama onları bilirsiniz... İstanbul öyle değil. İstanbul o kadar kötü şehirleşmiş bir şehir ki köyden şehir olmuş gibi. Dolayısıyla yani böyle şahane şık bir apartmana giriyorsunuz bütün ayakkabılar kapının önünde duruyor, iğrenç bir koku var apartmanda falan... Çünkü gecekondudan bozulup yapılmış. Ya da çok zengin bir sokak, villalar var, bir arkasına geçiyorsun, komple gecekondu... Yani onlar beni çok şaşırtıyordu ilk başta hani nasıl bir İstanbul hayatı bu? Benim gözümdeki İstanbul bu değildi filan falan gibi ama daha sonra alıştıyorsun, artık şaşırmamayı...

**Deniz:** Rahatsız edici mi peki?

**Arzu:** Şöyle rahatsız edici bence, insanların o kadar kötü şartlarda yaşadığını görmek üzdüğü için rahatsız edici bence yani. Burada böyle bir zenginlik varken bir sokak arkasındaki bu hayat bu insanlara reva mı diye bir hani bakış açısı taşıdığı için rahatsız edici. Yoksa benim görüntümü bozduğu için ya da o tip kaygılardan ötürü değil.

35. **Deniz :** Beyaz Türk kavramı size ne ifade ediyor?

**Bülent:** Beyaz Türk kavramı biraz önce kendi kabuğunda yaşayan insanlardan bahsetmiştik. Belirli bir çevrede doğup büyüüp belirli standartlarda yaşamını devam ettiren kişiler.

**Deniz :** Siz kendinizi onlardan görüyor musunuz?

**Bülent:** Ben kendimi onlardan görmüyorum (...)

**Deniz :** Arkadaşlarınız peki, yakın olduğunuz insanlar?

**Bülent:** Bazı arkadaşlarım arasında olduğunu düşünüyorum.

36. **Sacit:** Var bence böyle bir kavram, kesinlikle var. Ve benim beyaz Türk tanımım yani işte, işlerin doğru yürümesini isteyen ama bu yönde çok dramatik aksiyon almayan, bunu sadece talep eden, kendine ve başkalarına saygılı bir kesim var. Kendileri dürüst ve saygılı yaşamak istiyorlar kanunlara, başkalarının da öyle olmasını istiyorlar... Şöyle, neden çok önemli bir aksiyon almıyorlar? Tuzları kuru çünkü ve Türkiye’de yaşamaktan memnunlar ama başka seçenekleri de var hayatta hepsinin... Nasıl angaje olabilirler?... – Angaje olma ihtimalleri pek yok artık.

**Deniz :** Parçası olarak hissettiğiniz oluyor mu?

**Sacit:** Oluyor tabii, oluyor canım, olmaz olur mu? Çok net olarak söyleyeyim.

37. **Deniz :** Beyaz Türk diye bir tanım var, bilmiyorum siz duydunuz mu?

**Arzu:** Bizler. (gülerek) Biz yani.... Yani bence Türkiye’nin tam gerçeğini de temsil etmeyen, çok azınlığını oluşturan, relatively daha rahat bir hayat yaşayan, daha iyi eğitim almış, daha gelir seviyesi yüksek, piramidin tepesi aslında... Zenginlik seviyesi hakkında bir fikrim yok ama bence en önemli kriter Türkiye’yi temsil etmiyor olmaları. Yani yaygın bir popülasyondan söz etmiyor olmamız bence. Keşke daha yaygın olsa. Ama şeyde çok çekinirdim yani Türkiye’yi temsil etmiyor ama Türkiye gerçeğini bilmiyor, bambaşka bir dünyada hayal dünyasında yaşıyor, onu da Türkiye zannediyor, filan gibi yerlere doğru en azından kendi adıma götürmek istemezdim. Hani, ben bizler derken hani Türkiye’den kopuk bir hayat yaşayan bir grubu kastederek söylemiyorum bunu. Hani blue collar, white collar var, nedir onlar aslında, onun gibi bir şey gibi bakıyorum ben yani. Hani o da o gerçeğin parçası, biri fabrikada çalışıyor biri ofiste çalışıyor. Ben öyle bir ayırım gibi düşünüyorum beyaz Türkler’i.

38. **Ayla:** Bana biraz aşağılayıcı geliyor yani belki biraz içi öyle doldurulduğu için. Belki başta öyle başlamadı ama sanki böyle Türkiye’den kopuk, tam Batılı gibi yaşayan yani biraz şey bi kavram gibi aslında hani multinational olmaya çalışan Türkleri bence kötü gösteren bir kavram. İyi bir şey olduğunu düşünmüyorum ben. Neden böyle düşünüyorum diye şey yapıyorsan, bir insan çok multinational bir şekilde çalışıp ama Türkiye’ye de çok yakın olaibl. Türkiye’de eğer bir sokaktaki insanın nabzını tutmaksa bunu çok iyi yapan insanlar da var. İkisini birbirine mutually exclusive görmüyorum. Sonuçta ben Robert Kolej’e gittim ama ondan önce de devlet ilkokuluna gittim. Yanımdaki aynı sırada oturduğum arkadaşlarımdan biri sonra minibüs şoförü oldu falan yani bu böyle bir şey değil hani, beyaz Türk bir yazgı gibi sanki.

Belki öyle insanlar da olaabilir yani onu da bilmiyorum ama biraz sanki ben yaftalanmaya çalıştığımı belirli bir kesimin, biraz international, biraz iyi okullarda okumuş bilmemne, “A, bu beyaz Türk zaten bir şeyden anlamaz, Türkiye gerçeklerinden habersizdir zaten.” diyip yaftalandığını düşünüyorum. Türkiye’de böyle yaftalamalar çok oluyor yani insanları bir kutuya koyup bunlar budur, bunlar budur demek gibi bir eğilimimiz var. O yüzden pek sempatik bulduğum bir kavram değil şahsen.

**Deniz:** Siz kendinizi de bu yaftalanmaya çalışan grubun içinde hissediyor musunuz bu anlamda?

**Ayla:** Ya ben buna baştan tepkili olduğum için yani bu grubun içinde hissetmiyorum tabii ki. Böyle bir grup olduğunu bile düşünmüyorum bu arada. Yani çünkü sonuçta (...) Muhtemelen bu grubu artı bazı insanlar daha vardır hani bizim bu anlattığımız backgroundun dışında insanları koymaya çalışıyorlar mesela işte holding sahiplerinin çocukları falan da (gülerek) falan da beyaz Türk grubuna giriyordur. Ama dediğim gibi ben insanları böyle kategorize etme yaklaşımlarına genelde karşıyım. Çünkü sonuçta her insan bir birey ve hani bunları çok güzel dengeleyen insanlar da var yani sonuçta yarın Amsterdam’a gidebilirim ama öbür gün de Diyarbakır’da işim olabilir benim sonuçta. Her ikisine de gittiğim zaman efektif bir şekilde işimi yapabilmeliyim ki yapıyorum da. Yani dolayısıyla hani oradaki insanla diyalog kuramayacağım, ama yok Amsterdam’daki Hollandalı’yla sular seller gibi anlaşacağım diye bir şey yok. Ya ben gittiğim zaman Türkiye’nin çeşitli yerlerindeki distribütörlerimizle de oturuyorum gayet güzel Türkiye sohbeti yapıyorum veya işte Amsterdam’daki adamla da oturup “Ya burası da beş sene önce ne güzeldi.” falan muhabbeti yapabiliyorum. Yani sonuçta şeyin biraz böyle küçümseme içeren, insanları gruplayıp yaftalanmaya çalışan şeylerden pek hoşlanmıyorum. Bir de beyaz Türk’te güzel olmayan bir şey daha var. Beyaz Türk olması için bir de zenci Türk olması lazım. Beyaz Türkler’in de zenci Türkler’i oppress ediyor olması lazım. Türkiye’de ben böyle bir oppression olduğunu da düşünmüyorum. Yani biraz oralardan çıkan bir kavram bu.... Türkiye’nin zencisi kim o zaman? Beyazlar zencileri oppress mi ediyor?

**Deniz:** Bu tartışmadaki zenciden kasıt daha ziyade sanırım muhafazakar yaşıyan kesimler, kimlik sıkıntısı çekenler...

**Ayla:** Oppression altındalar mı?

**Deniz:** Ya da Kürtler, Aleviler falan..

**Ayla:** O benzetme bana yanlış bir benzetme gibi geliyor. Ben öyle bir oppression olduğuna inanmıyorum Türkiye’de. Sonuçta şu anın Türkiye’sinde. Zencilerin beyazlar altında ezildiği anlamda bir oppression yaşıyan bir kesim olduğuna inanmıyorum.

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