

THE EFFECTS OF POLITICAL IDEOLOGY ON INTERPERSONAL
INTERACTION: DOES EXPOSURE TO OPPOSING IDEOLOGY LEAD TO
RESOURCE DEPLETION?

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Thesis Abstract

Irmak Olcaysoy Ökten, “The Effects of Political Ideology on Interpersonal Interaction: Does Exposure to Opposing Ideology Lead to Resource Depletion?”

The present study compared conservatives and liberals’ use of self-regulatory resources and stereotypical knowledge while they anticipated an interaction with an opposing- or a similar-view other. Previous research indicated a relationship between conservatism (high level of resistance to change and opposition to equality in society) and intolerance for dissimilar ‘others’. In the present study, conservatives anticipating an interaction with an opposing-view other (i.e., a liberal person) were hypothesized to rely on their self-regulatory resources (and experience resource depletion as a result) more than liberals in the same situation (i.e., anticipating an interaction with a conservative person) and also more than both liberals and conservatives anticipating an interaction with ideologically similar other. The results showed that the amount of resource depletion experienced, operationalized by Stroop task performance, in these four conditions (conservative/liberal participant and opposing/similar-other) did not differ from one another. Nevertheless, conservatives had their outgroup and ingroup stereotypes (for ideological groups) more accessible than liberals in both similar and opposing-other conditions. In the opposing–other condition alone, as participants’ outgroup and ingroup stereotypes became more accessible, they experienced less resource depletion (i.e., showed better self-control), suggesting that stereotypes served an energy-saving function. Intergroup anxiety, ingroup identification, and chronic self-control strength did not have an effect on the relationship between political ideology and resource depletion. Implications of these findings were discussed.

Tez Özeti

Irmak Olcaysoy Ökten, “Politik İdeolojinin Kişilerarası Etkileşim Üzerine Etkisi:

Karşıt İdeolojiye Maruz Kalmak Kaynak Tüketimine Yol Açar mı?”

Bu çalışmada, muhafazakar ve liberallerin, karşıt veya benzer görüşlü bir kişiyle etkileşime gireceklerini öngördüklerinde, kendilerini denetleme kaynaklarını kullanımları ve stereotipik bilgileri karşılaştırılmıştır. Önceki araştırmalar muhafazakarlık (toplumsal değişime direnme ve eşitliğe karşıtlık) ve ‘ötekilere’ karşı hoşgörüsüzlük arasında bir ilişki olduğunu göstermiştir. Bu çalışmada, karşıt görüşlü (liberal) birisiyle etkileşime gireceğini öngören muhafazakarların, aynı koşuldaki (muhafazakar birisiyle etkileşime gireceğini öngören) liberallere ve benzer görüşlü birisiyle etkileşime gireceğini düşünen liberal ve muhafazakarlara oranla, kendini denetleme kaynaklarına daha fazla dayanacakları (böylece denetleme kaynaklarını tüketecekleri) varsayılmıştır. Sonuçlar, dört deneysel koşulun (muhafazakar/liberal katılımcı ve karşıt/benzer görüş) Stroop görevindeki performans ile ölçülen kaynak tüketimi miktarı açısından farklılaşmadığını göstermiştir. Ancak, muhafazakarların dış grup ve iç grup stereotiplerinin erişilebilirliğinin (ideolojik gruplar için), hem karşıt görüş hem de benzer görüş koşullarında, liberallerinkilerden daha yüksek olduğu bulunmuştur. Yalnızca karşıt görüş koşulunda, katılımcıların, iç ve dış grup stereotiplerinin erişilebilirliği arttıkça, kaynak tüketimleri azalmıştır (kendini denetleme performansı artmıştır) ve bu bulgu stereotiplerin enerjiyi koruma görevini ortaya koymuştur. Gruplararası endişe, iç grupla özdeşleşme ve kronik kendini denetleme gücü, politik ideoloji ile kaynak tüketimi ilişkisini etkilememiştir. Sonuçların olası etkileri tartışılmıştır.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

People frequently interact with those who agree with their ideological views in varying degrees, but also, with those who possess ideological views largely opposed to theirs. For a moment, imagine yourself in a place where you have to listen to an ideological argument that you are totally against. How would you feel in such a condition? Would you regard this argument as something you should show patience toward, with great self control, or just as a possible alternative argument, yet, unlike yours? Do you think your reaction to this situation would also be in line with your political ideology?

Despite several attempts at analyzing the psychological motives for political ideologies (e.g., Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003a; Jost et al., 2007), there is no specific analysis in the literature for the psychological effects stemming from an anticipated interaction with someone counter to one's political ideology. Regarding that 'tolerance for other's view' may vary as a function of political ideology in the liberalism-conservatism dimension as previous research showed (e.g., Greenberg et al., 1992), differential psychological effects may be expected as a result of being exposed to opposing ideology for people with different ideological convictions. In light of the resource depletion theory which defines self-control as a muscle that may be temporarily depleted after its operation (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000), the present research attempted to examine performance on an executive task preceded by exposure to an ideological view that is either consistent or inconsistent with one's own political view. Specifically, we proposed that, the amount of self-

regulatory effort typically exerted in the case of being exposed to *other* ideology should be related to the psychological motives underlying different political ideologies (i.e. conservatism and liberalism). Thus, subsequent executive control performance of individuals should be a manifestation of their tolerance for other's view, through their reliance on self-regulation during this exposure. Although there is no specific research on conservatism-liberalism and self-regulation in this sense, various previous studies using self-report and physiological measures revealed certain psychological underpinnings of conservatism (e.g., Amodio, Jost, Master, & Yee, 2007; Janoff-Bulman, 2009; Jost, Kruglanski, Glaser, & Sulloway, 2003a). Findings from this line of research are compatible with the hypothesis that, conservatives, compared to liberals, should rely on regulatory sources more, when exposed to opposing ideological views. In addition to this comparative analysis of self-regulation between conservatives and liberals, present study aimed to analyze the underlying mechanism leading to this hypothesized resource depletion. Thus, hyperaccessibility of the negative stereotypes related to the ideology of the interaction partner and perceived intergroup (i.e., inter-ideological) threat were proposed as possible mediators in this study. Besides, this study attempted to explore the effects of, first, perceived status of one's own political ideology in the society, and second, the level of one's identification with a specific ideological view on the expected resource depletion.

Political Ideology and Its Psychological Motives

In most of the empirical studies, the term 'political ideology' refers to an organization of political beliefs as Jost, Federico, and Napier (2009) illustrated. This

definition is quite broad as opposed to previous narrower definitions that underline the requirement of political sophistication for possessing a political ideology (Jost, 2006). This broad conceptualization by Jost and his colleagues paved the way for research on the cognitive, motivational and affective underpinnings of political ideology.

Before going into the details of the psychological factors underlying political ideology, it is useful to discuss the core aspects that differentiate liberal and conservative political views. The classical left–right dimension in conceptualizing ‘ideological view’ seems to correspond to the liberalism-conservatism dimension in the U.S. political system today; in other words, researchers use these terms almost interchangeably (Jost et al., 2009). Although the classical left-right divisions may not have explanatory power in all political contexts according to contemporary discussions of political scientists (see the argument for Turkey; Öniş, 2009), Jost and his colleagues (Jost et al., 2003a, 2003b) proposed two culture-free core aspects underlying ideological thinking, views about *change* and *equality*. That is to say, ‘conservatism’ is defined as a predisposition for preserving the established order and hierarchical structure in a society, while ‘liberalism’ is about openness to change and a regard for an egalitarian society. The present study adopted these critical core aspects as determinants of liberal and conservative political views in the Turkish context.

Although most of the social psychological research on ideology seems to focus on differential aspects of ideology such as authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, or conservatism, they only explain certain parts of a *whole* psychological organization underlying one’s political view. Jost and his colleagues’ (2003a) metaanalysis with 88 studies is valuable in the sense that it provides a parsimonious

explanation for the ideological polarization by identifying the two core dimensions, attitudes toward change and inequality. The concept of authoritarianism, usually measured by Altemeyer's Right Wing Authoritarianism scale (RWA; 1981), and the concept of conservatism, measured by Wilson and Patterson's (1968) C-Scale, were shown to be highly correlated in various studies (see Saucier, 2000). Nevertheless, it was Jost and his colleagues' (2003a) attempt which highlighted that, what these scales measure in common is the 'resistance to change' aspect of political conservatism. Moreover, the widely cited F scale (Fascism scale; Adorno et al., 1950) and Social Dominance Orientation scale (SDO; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) were shown to commonly measure the other core factor of conservative ideology - 'opposition to equality' - In other words, Jost and his colleagues brought together the previous studies that aimed to explain different motives of political ideologies and modeled a psychological structure underlying this social thinking, as a whole.

Despite there being a variety of research on the psychological underpinnings of political ideology, especially of conservatism, it is critical to select the factors that can be the basis for the implications of present research. Next, the factors that directly or indirectly contribute to the present study's hypotheses about conservatives' intolerance for the liberal views (as opposed to liberals' relative tolerance for conservative views) and its effect on regulatory depletion will be summarized.

Psychological Correlates of Conservatism and Indications of Intolerance for Other Views

Previous research showed that psychological motives differ in the liberalism-conservatism dimension. For instance, those with a conservative ideology scored higher in conscientiousness (Carney, Jost, Gosling, Niederhoffer, & Potter, 2008), personal need for structure, and need for cognitive closure (De Zavala, Cislak, & Wesolowska, 2010; Jost et al., 2007; Chirumbolo, 2002) than liberals. Conservatism was also associated with preservation of traditional values and intolerance for uncertainty (Jost et al., 2003a; Jost & Hunyady, 2005). The relationship between conservatism and the motive for the maintenance of status quo and avoidance of social threat was verified by various studies as well (Jost et al., 2007; Duckitt & Ficher, 2003). Jost et al. (2007) provided evidence showing that management of uncertainty (mediated by resistance to change) and threat (partially mediated by opposition to equality) predicts conservative rather than liberal ideology. On the other hand, liberalism was shown to be associated with greater regard for egalitarianism and social interdependence (Jost et al., 2003a) and also with openness to experience (Carney et al., 2008). That is to say, people with conservative and liberal political ideologies differ in terms of the psychological motives that are associated with these political orientations, as well.

Although recent social psychological attempts generally refrained from depicting a clear relationship between conservatism and intolerance for the ‘other’, the present study argued that findings of the studies analyzing the psychological correlates of conservative ideology actually indicate such a link. In the following, the findings that supported this main argument of the present study will be reviewed.

The Relationship between Authoritarianism, Social Dominance Orientation and Intolerance for “Other”

Various studies since the 1950s have showed that both authoritarianism and social dominance orientation predict prejudice towards out-groups (see Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Earlier attempts to show the link between authoritarianism and prejudice towards minority groups mainly assumed authoritarianism as a personality dimension (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950; Altemeyer, 1981, 1998). More recent models for the relationship between ideology and prejudice emphasized the situational as well as dispositional factors underlying this relationship (see dual process model; Duckitt, Wagner, du Plessis, & Birum, 2002). In this section, I will briefly review the studies indicating a relationship between prejudice towards outgroups and self-reported authoritarianism and social dominance orientation.

Adorno et al.'s (1950) theory of authoritarian personality and subsequent attempts to measure right wing authoritarianism (see RWA scale; Altemeyer, 1981) has had a strong impact on studies of ideology. In these earlier studies, RWA was found to be associated with prejudice towards certain groups such as homosexuals (Haddock, Zanna, & Esses, 1993) and homeless people (Peterson, Doty, & Winter, 1993). Moreover, authoritarians were shown to regard the world as a dangerous place and thus have a predisposition to perceive social threat in any situation (Altemeyer, 1988). This chronic predisposition to threat in authoritarians was supported by later empirical studies as well (Lavine et al., 1999; Lavine, Lodge, Polichak, & Taber, 2002). Recent models focused on situational factors in addition to the dispositional ones as leading to prejudicial views towards outgroup.

Apart from the level of authoritarianism, other elements of conservatism, such as social dominance orientation (SDO), were also shown to be related to intolerance for the 'other'. Although, as mentioned before, SDO and RWA are two distinct motives of conservative ideology (with about .20 correlation, see Jost et al., 2003a), they were both shown to be closely related to outgroup prejudice (see the metanalysis, Sibley & Duckitt, 2008). For instance, Duckitt and his colleagues (2002), in an American sample, found that RWA and SDO correlated with prejudice against various ethnic minorities. More recently, Asbrock, Sibley, and Duckitt (2010) conducted a longitudinal study to examine the link between SDO, RWA, and different forms of prejudice. Interestingly, while RWA scores predicted the change in prejudice against dangerous groups such as criminals and immoral people, SDO scores specifically predicted the change in prejudice against subordinate groups such as physically unattractive and mentally handicapped people. Importantly, SDO & RWA scores predicted the change in the prejudice towards those who were referred to as 'dissident' groups, such as political protestors, feminists, and gay right activists (who can be expected to have opposing ideological views to conservatives). These findings pointed out to a link between intolerance towards opposing (i.e., liberal) ideological views and conservatism in general.

As opposed to the earlier tendencies to assume RWA and SDO as dimensions of personality (i.e., as dispositional factors), a more recent dual process model underlined that both RWA and SDO are affected by motivational and situational factors (Duckitt, 2006). Duckitt and Fischer (2003) conceptualized RWA and SDO as dimensions of ideological evaluations, rather than personality characteristics or unchanging beliefs. Thus, they claimed that these factors should be very much related to situational factors, mainly, to the social threat in the situation. They

showed that level of authoritarianism is higher when a group is exposed to a social threat scenario compared to the condition with no threat scenario. Besides, previous research indicated that the authoritarian predispositions bring about prejudice and intolerance for *others'* view only in the presence of social threat (Feldman & Stenner, 1997). More specifically, Feldman and Stenner (1997) established that it is not the chronic authoritarianism per se that brings about intolerance for minority groups (i.e. Hispanics, Asians, blacks and homosexuals). They showed that perceived threat to one's political view (as measured by perceived ideological distance between liberalism-conservatism and a general fear of and anger towards political candidates of both views) and to national economy (attitudes towards the economical situation of the year before) strengthen the link between authoritarianism and prejudice. These studies indicated perceived threat in a certain situation or societal climate as the critical factor establishing the association between one's ideological view and attitudes towards the outgroups.

At this point, in the analysis of the relationship between conservatism/ authoritarianism and intolerance for other's view, it is very critical how one manipulates 'threat' as related to the inter-ideological relations and more importantly, how one measures the intolerance itself. Lavine et al. (2002), for instance, measured information bias (i.e., selectively attending to information consistent with one's views) of high and low authoritarians when they had just been reminded of their own mortality (a highly threatening event) versus not. They demonstrated that high authoritarians opted to expose themselves to information congruent with their political views but only in the presence of high threat (i.e., mortality salience). No such selective exposure effect was found for low authoritarians. Thus, participants' political ideology only made a difference when

they had just been threatened. One possible explanation for these results is that the mortality salience manipulation in the study may have triggered high authoritarians' uncertainty avoidance, and led these participants to cling to familiar, thus safe, political views (for the relationship between conservatism and uncertainty avoidance, see Jost et al., 2007). We argued that, in this experimental context, such preference (i.e., clinging to the familiar) did not appear in the no threat condition because experimental manipulation for information preference (selecting among pro, anti, and two-sided message conditions) was artificial that it could not evoke threat on its own. Therefore, we suggested that, differences between conservative and liberal participants in the level of political tolerance would be more salient in an experimental setting in which participants may perceive threat automatically as related to their ideological dispositions; that is, when threat is an integral feature of that setting. For instance, in a more recent study, high authoritarians perceived an argument about an ethnic outgroup (Turks in Germany) as more threatening and this led to higher prejudice levels towards this group (Cohrs & Ibler, 2009). That is, unlike Lavine et al. (2002) study which used mortality salience to manipulate threat, in Cohr & Ibler (2009) threat was an integral part of the study due to the fact that participants had to deal directly with the relevant threatening objects (Turks) as a part of the procedure. Similarly, in the present study, conservative participants were expected to automatically perceive an *ideological* threat as they anticipated a future interaction with a participant of the opposing ideological camp. Specifically, the anticipation of interacting with another person whose political views are opposed to their own should have been inherently threatening for conservative participants, making threat an integral part of the experimental setting. Therefore, there was no need to evoke an external (i.e., outside of the anticipated interaction) threat for

differences between conservative and liberal participants to emerge in terms of how they would handle this anticipated interaction (i.e., in an intolerant manner that leads to more depletion vs. a tolerant manner that leads to being less depleted). Thus, the current research implemented a procedure in which threat was integral to the anticipated interaction.

Indirect Evidence for the Relationship between Conservatism and Intolerance for Other's View

Apart from the line of self-report research reviewed above, there are few studies showing the psychological underpinnings of political ideology, and implying its possible relationship with intolerance to others' view. These studies are mainly those measuring implicit attitudes towards certain out-groups and those with neurological and behavioral measures, through which researchers can attribute certain cognitive styles to conservatives and liberals. Besides, we suggest that, characteristics such as avoidance of uncertainty and intolerance for ambiguity as associated with conservative ideology (Jost et al., 2003), and need for change and inclusiveness as predicting liberal ideology (Choma, 2008) may be considered as indirect signs of conservatism's relation to a prejudicial world view rather than liberalism'.

The relationship between conservatism and implicit prejudice was brought forward in a couple of studies. In their pioneering study, Cunningham, Nezlek, and Banaji (2004) attempted to model a relationship between ethnocentrism and cognitive rigidity. For the first time, in this study, the implicit prejudice towards black people, gays, Jewish people, poor people, foreigners (as measured by an implicit association task, IAT) were analyzed as possible correlates of right wing

authoritarianism and an indirect relationship (mediated by explicit ethnocentrism) between them was revealed. In an extensive research on the correlates of stereotyping, Nosek et al. (2007) showed that only conservatives implicitly prefer (categorize as more likable) individuals of higher status more than individuals of lower status. These findings pointed out to the conservatives' implicit, as well as explicit, preference for certain groups over others.

Recent research has also shown that there are both functional and structural differences in the brains of conservatives and liberals. Amodio, Jost, Mater, and Yee (2007) found that liberals show higher conflict related activity in anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) which is associated with conflict resolution (Fernandez-Duque, Baird, & Posner, 2000). Besides, in Amodio et al.'s (2007) study, liberals showed more automatic behaviors of resolving conflict in a behavioral measure of executive control (i.e., in No-Go trials of Go/No-Go task) compared to conservatives. Consistent with these findings, a more recent study indicated larger gray matter volume of ACC in liberals (Kanai, Feilden, Firth, & Rees, 2011), speculating that larger ACC may be specifically related to liberals' greater tolerance of ambiguity and conflict. All these studies which utilize measures other than self-report of participants imply conservatives' greater intolerance of opposing ideological views, compared to liberals.

Previous research on the relationship between personality characteristics and political ideologies may also be considered as indirect evidence of conservatives' uneasiness towards 'other' views. Conservatives avoided uncertain domains such as abstract art (Wilson, 1973), complex music (Glasgow, Cartier, & Wilson; 1985), and complex poetry (Gillies & Campbell, 1985). Jost and his colleagues (2003a) suggested that such intolerance of ambiguity must be very much related to

intolerance of opposing views. Furthermore, conservatives' avoidance of uncertainty was also associated with their need for order, need for structure, and low levels of openness to experience as a personality variable (see Jost et al., 2007). In a structural equation modeling (SEM) analysis, Cornelis and van Hiel (2006) found evidence for the effect of needs for order and structure on prejudice and conservative thinking as mediated by RWA and SDO scores. Moreover openness to experience as a psychological correlate of liberalism was shown to be related to greater regard for egalitarianism (Thorisdottir, Jost, Liviatan, & Shrout, 2007). Such evidence of conservatives' intolerance of ambiguity and complexity, and preference for orderliness and simplicity (see Carney et al., 2008) as opposed to liberals' openness, cognitive flexibility, and complexity in thinking (Tetlock, 1983; Hinze, Doster, & Joe, 1997) may be interpreted generally as demonstrating conservatives' intolerance of 'deviators' from conservative world view.

All these self-report, neurological, and behavioral studies suggest a difference in the level of tolerance for the *other* as a function of one's political ideology. Nevertheless, there has been no specific study on whether conservatives' avoidance motivation and little tolerance for opposing views is a problem large enough to lead to important psychological effects such as temporary disruption in executive control following exposure to opposing ideological beliefs. This question was also important for determining the efficiency of negotiation between people with different ideological views, given the possibility that responding to a person with an opposing view might become cognitively demanding and self-depleting for a conservative, but not a liberal, person. In addition, this question was critical for determining ways of coping with such depletion and providing more efficient contexts of negotiation, as well.

The Relationship between Regulatory Focus, Political Ideology, and Executive Functions

Despite the fact that the present study did not rely on regulatory focus as a possible mediator of the relationship between political ideology and resource depletion (that is hypothesized to result from the anticipated interideological interaction), existing evidence showing the association between liberal ideology and approach orientation on one hand and between approach orientation and inhibitory functioning on the other, were supportive of hypotheses of the present study.

The distinct physiological basis of approach and avoidance mechanisms was previously shown in various studies (see Gray 1972, 1981) and conceptualized as behavioral activation (BIS) and inhibition systems (BAS) (see Carver & White, 1994). In addition to this empirical support for approach and avoidance systems, Higgins' theory of regulatory focus suggests that people chronically rely more on either prevention (of negative situations) or promotion (towards positive situations) system of motivation in interpersonal relationships (e.g., Higgins, Roney, Crowe, & Hymes, 1994).

Recent studies have shown the association of liberalism with an approach motivation and conservatism with an avoidance motivation. Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, and Baldacci (2008) found that liberals generally show an approach orientation by giving importance to social justice much more than conservatives (study 1) and avoidance motives were strongly related to RWA and SDO (study 2). Janoff-Bulman (2009) in her review, maintained that conservatives possess a protection orientation and are vigilant to group *differences*, which is consistent with their penchant for security. On the other hand, she highlighted that liberals are social egalitarians with a

promotion focus in interpersonal relationships and they are not attuned to intergroup differences as much as conservatives. Moreover, Rock and Janoff-Bulman (2010) showed that regulatory focus is the mechanism that mediates the relationship between political ideology and cognitive rigidity. More specifically, in a categorization task, conservatives showed highest levels of cognitive rigidity (i.e., category exclusion) when they were exposed to an avoidance prime (more than conservatives who received an approach prime and liberals in both conditions). Liberals' category inclusiveness did not change for approach and avoidance priming conditions. The results of this study also replicated earlier findings by showing the association between conservatism and avoidance motivation. Nevertheless, this study was limited in terms of showing the relationship between individuals' regulatory focus and their political ideology because ideology was measured at the end of the experiments. Still, studies showing the link between regulatory focus and political ideology provided a ground for the argument of the present study that people's views of the opposing ideology and the effects of encountering such opposition (e.g., in an interaction with someone who does not share their ideology) on their self-regulation was a function of psychological motives underlying conservative and liberal political ideologies. That is to say, because the liberals tend to operate primarily with an approach motivation, it was reasonable to assume that they will be more tolerant for the opposing view than conservatives who tend to operate with an avoidance motivation.

In a different line of research, a relationship between approach motivation and cognitive flexibility was demonstrated. Mainly, Friedman and Förster (2005) showed that priming people with approach-focus facilitates their performance in

tasks that require attentional flexibility (Stroop and 2-back tasks)¹. These findings were consistent with the hypotheses of the present study, by indicating that, cognitive flexibility (of which liberals were shown to have more than conservatives; e.g., Hinze, Doster, & Joe, 1997) brings about better performance in tasks of inhibitory regulation in general and this cognitive advantage may act as a buffer to resource depletion. In the following, I will briefly explain why the ‘resource depletion’ perspective was important in studying inter-ideological interactions.

A Resource Depletion Account of Inter-Ideological Interactions

Resource depletion theory is based on the idea that self-control is a limited resource (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). As it is limited, increase in self-regulatory effort leads to depletion of regulatory resources required for a subsequent task. There is abundant research indicating impairment in self-regulation (as a result of depletion) in tasks such as reasoning problems, inhibitory control for prepotent responses, maintaining a diet, and control of sexual behavior (see for reviews, Baumeister, Gailliot, DeWall, & Oaten, 2006; Burkley, Anderson, & Curtis, 2011; Dewall, Baumeister, Schurtz, & Gailliot, 2010). The question which behaviors may lead to this subsequent impairment was dealt by several researchers, as well. For instance, Vohs, Baumeister, and Ciarocco (2005) found that making choices among alternatives is an effortful act leading to resource depletion. Furthermore, resistance

¹ A contrary finding was found by Koch, Holland, and Knippenberg (2008) about the facilitative effect of avoidant focus on attentional flexibility when the difficulty of Stroop task was increased with an integrated time constraint (800 ms) for response. Nevertheless they used a questionable way of manipulating avoidance/approach. That is, they primed approach or avoidance with a specific motor action but approach action they imposed seems to require more energy than the avoidance action and this might be responsible for the results by itself.

to influence and generating counterarguments were found to be resource depleting actions (Burkley, 2008; Fennis, Janssen, & Vohs, 2010).

Resource depletion account was analyzed within the framework of cognitive and neuropsychological research as well. Persson, Welsh, Jonides, and Reuter-Lorenz (2007) showed that when tasks rely on common executive functions (e.g., for interference resolution: verb generation and letter detection tasks), exertion of control in one task temporarily depletes resources for the other task. Importantly, depletion was not observed when subsequent tasks do not measure the same specific executive processes as the preceding tasks. In general, lateral prefrontal cortex was the brain region associated with regulatory function in previous research. Specifically, increased activity in lateral prefrontal cortex was observed during the Stroop task (Zysset, Muller, Lohmann, & von Cramon, 2001), Go/No-Go task (Casey et al., 1997), and inhibition of imitation (Brass, Zysset, & von Cramon, 2001) in previous research.² Moreover, prefrontal cortex activation was found to be relying on glucose consumption more than the other regions of brain (see Gailliot & Baumeister, 2007). In line with this, Gailliot and Baumeister (2007) found that resource depletion is related to the level of glucose in the bloodstream, showing that self control results in lowering of glucose level and glucose consumption buffers resource depletion. All in all, these studies contributed to the notion that resource for specific executive functions are limited.

Importantly, previous research found evidence that interracial contact leads to depletion in a subsequent task measuring executive control, which is highly relevant to the proposal of this study (Richeson & Shelton, 2003; Richeson & Trawalter,

² What is common among these tasks are they are all measures of inhibitory function (see Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, Witzki, & Howerter, 2000).

2005). Specifically, Richeson and Shelton (2003) showed that White participants' implicit prejudice for Black people measured by IAT (implicit association task) predicted their performance in a task of executive inhibition (i.e., Stroop task) after interaction with a Black experimenter. Moreover, Richeson, Trawalter, and Shelton (2005) showed that as ingroup favoritism increased for one's own race, resource depletion after intergroup interaction increased, as well. In light of these findings and the direct and indirect evidence for conservatives' (vs. liberals') relative intolerance for the other, as explained above, we proposed that conservatives should experience resource depletion more severely than liberals after they were exposed to ideological views counter to their own.

Research on the neural responses underlying intergroup prejudice contributed to the resource depletion account by revealing the process leading to the depletion of resources. Richeson and Trawalter (2003) found that activity in the right middle frontal gyrus of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) predicts Stroop interference as a result of interracial interaction and this activity mediated the relation between implicit prejudice and executive functioning. On the other hand, no such activity in the dlPFC was observed for same race interactions. These findings showed that temporary disruption in inhibitory function of those with implicit prejudice for Black people was a result of these people's increased engagement in this function (evident in increased activity in dlPFC) previously, during exposure to black faces. These findings supported the present study's hypothesis on conservatives' more severe resource depletion when faced with opposing ideology compared to liberals, because we expected that conservatives' implicit prejudice for people with an opposing ideology would be higher than liberals.

Another study investigated neural responses while viewing the faces of the American democrat and republican presidential candidates (Kaplan, Freedman, & Iacoboni, 2007). They showed an increase in the activity of dlPFC and AC during viewing the photo of the candidate opposing one's own political view. Despite the finding that increase in dlPFC activation was similar in both democrat and republican participants, we suggested that this finding does not undermine the expected results of the present study (i.e., resource depletion specific to conservative participants' exposure to opposing view) for a couple of reasons. First, instead of a reaction towards a political ideology, their study was designed to measure the reaction towards certain political 'figures', Bush, Kerry, and Nader. In other words, this reaction was possibly derived from the earlier specific associations that participants had formed to these political figures instead of the pure political view itself. More specifically, the democrat participants might have various reasons for being intolerant towards Bush and his aggressive policies. For instance, the study was held only one year (2004) after Bush's invasion in Iraq and this might have rendered his aggressive policy hyperaccessible to democrat participants and thus triggered their intolerance towards Bush. Nevertheless, the present study aimed to measure the tolerance for the opposing view in general, not for a political figure that embodies specific actions serving a specific policy. Second, despite being overlooked by the researchers, there might be indications of a differentiation between republican and democrats' reactions in their study. For instance, a change in the activation of insula, which is associated with the emotion of disgust (see Wright, He, Shapira, Goodman, & Liu, 2004), was observed when republicans viewed Kerry's face, yet, such a change did not occur in case of democrats' viewing of Bush's face. Still, there seems to be a gap in the literature about the individual differences for neural correlates of

self-control in this regard. All in all, existing research on the self-control related activity in the brain supported the resource depletion account, despite being limited for speculating more on the specific effects of inter-ideological interaction.

Following Richeson and her colleagues' research on resource depletion after interracial interaction, further research supported the relationship between prejudice and ego depletion as well. Gordjin, Hindriks, Koomen, Dijksterhuis, and van Knippenberg (2004) examined the effect of internal motivation for suppressing stereotypes (i.e., being with a low or high internal suppression motivation for stereotypes) on self-control during a stereotyping task, by measuring resource depletion for a subsequent unrelated self-control task. They showed that suppressing stereotypes requires self-control (study 1), and it leads to depletion of resources for a subsequent self control task (study 2), but only for those with a low suppression motivation for stereotypes. Importantly, they presented the 'rebound effect' for suppressed stereotypical information as a possible explanation for resource depletion (study 3). Specifically, those with a low motivation for suppressing their stereotypical views showed higher accessibility of these stereotypes (than those with high motivation) in a lexical decision task, held after the stereotype task (i.e., describing a skinhead). Influenced by Moskowitz, Gollwitzer, Wasel, and Schaal's (1999) study showing that people with chronic egalitarianism can inhibit stereotypical information in an automatic manner and Gordjin et al.'s (2004) findings reviewed above, a more recent study found that people with high motivation to control prejudice exhibit less racial bias than those with low motivation to control prejudice in a Shooter task (in which speed of shooting a Black person with respect to a White person is measured) after their resources are depleted through an anagram task (Park, Glaser, & Knowles, 2008). These studies, in general, underlined that

chronic egalitarianism is a factor buffering resource depletion after exposure to highly stereotyped groups in a society. Given that liberals internalize a more egalitarian view of the society as opposed to conservatives, as reviewed above, this line of research constituted an indirect support for the expectations of the present study as well.

Possible Effects of Factors Other than Political Ideology on Self-Control in Inter-Ideological Interactions

The critical mechanism to analyze further in order to uncover the route to depletion involves differences in the experiences of people with different political ideologies when they are exposed to views opposing their own. In other words, in addition to the psychological factors underlying political ideologies listed in previous sections, some mediational factors may be suggested as leading to resource depletion as a function of the political ideology itself.

Accessibility of the Stereotypes for Opposing Ideology

Social psychologists frequently refer to stereotypes as ‘heuristics’ as they provide simple categorical information that facilitates and accelerates perception of the ‘other’ (see Allport, 1954; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002). Macrae, Milne, and Bodenhausen (1994) conceptualized stereotypes as ‘energy-saving tools’, showing that they facilitate information processing as well (i.e., when given as cues in an impression formation task, more resources are reserved for a simultaneous memory task). On the other hand, stereotyping was shown to be an *automatic* process in

various studies. For example, participants determined stereotypical words *faster* after they were primed with a stereotyped group compared to an irrelevant prime condition (Banaji & Hardin, 1996) and they *implicitly* associated negative attributes with a negatively stereotyped outgroup *faster* than with their ingroup in IAT (Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009). Paradoxically, however, suppression of this automatically activated information was shown to be difficult even when consciously intended, as it was shown to lead to a *rebound effect* (Macrae, Bodenhausen, & Milne, 1998; Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, & Jetten, 1994). More specifically, in the earlier research, one important consequence of suppressing stereotypical views was shown to be the hyperaccessibility of those stereotypical views (Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, & Jetten, 1994).

People may possess stereotypes of conservatives and liberals, like many other social categories, and such stereotypes should play an important role in navigating one's interactions with liberals and conservatives. This should especially be the case when the other person is a stranger about whom the only piece of information known is his/her political ideology, as will be the case for participants in the present study (Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). Despite the fact that in the present study participants were not explicitly asked to *suppress* their negative stereotypes for anticipated partner's political ideology, a couple of points was considered for precipitating suppression motivation. First, in the present study, the experimenter led participants to believe that they will engage in a political task together with an interaction partner later on. This procedure (collaboration in a task) should motivate the participants to prepare for behaving in a collaborative or at least proper manner in the upcoming interaction, thus motivating them to suppress the activated outgroup stereotypes in opposing view other condition. Another factor that should motivate

them to not rely heavily on (negative) outgroup stereotypes is belonging to a common ingroup (Boğaziçi University students), which the experimental setting also made salient (because the experiment was at Boğaziçi University). Moreover, given that universities generally provide a relatively liberal context as political views of university students are mostly liberal (see the data from Middle East Technical University in Turkey; Sakallı-Uğurlu & Glick, 2003), intolerance of opposing ideology is usually discouraged in this liberal climate. Thus, participants must be motivated to suppress the activated negative stereotypes for the political ideology of the future partner, in this situation.³

Previous research uncovered individual differences in hyperaccessibility of suppressed stereotypes (i.e., rebound effect). As mentioned previously, Gordjin et al. (2004) showed the hyperaccessibility of stereotypical items after they were asked to be suppressed, for those with a low stereotype suppression motivation. In a separate analysis, they also demonstrated that stereotype suppression requires self-control for those with low suppression motivation only. Adopting this logic, one might expect that conservative people, as they have a low motivation to behave in an egalitarian manner, would have a harder time trying to suppress their negative stereotypical reactions against an opposing political view and this effort would bring about resource depletion.

Besides this idea based on hyperaccessibility, attribution research also leads us to a similar expectation for the mediating effect of stereotype accessibility, despite offering a different explanation for such an effect. Gilbert, Pelham, and Krull (1988)

³ In order to be able to conclude that “liberal” stereotype for conservative participants (and vice versa) is hyperaccessible (not just accessible as a default condition), exposed ideology condition should make a difference in the accessibilities of these stereotypes. Specifically, hyperaccessibility account of this study is valid only for opposing view other condition as the motivation to suppress stereotypical view should be higher than it is in the same-view other condition.

showed that when people are *active* perceivers in a situation (i.e., managing one's own behavior for the upcoming task while trying to predict the future partner's behavior, as in the present study), they have less cognitive resources remaining for considering the situational constraints on other people's behaviors and correcting dispositional attributions accordingly. If this is the case in the present study, we expect that those who devote more resources for getting ready for the 'future interaction' (i.e., conservatives, as they are prone to avoid uncertainties in a situation, as explained in the previous sections) will rely on more automatic impressions, namely, on the stereotypical information for the future partner's ideology (so the stereotypical information will get activated). This cognitive effort due to being an active perceiver should bring about the subsequent resource depletion in this case. This "active perceiver" idea, as well as the "stereotype suppression / hyperaccessibility" idea mentioned above, both provided compelling reasons for why participants, but especially conservatives anticipating an interaction with a liberal partner, should experience resource depletion. These two ideas are also not mutually exclusive explanations for the predicted effect, but may work together. Nevertheless, hyperaccessibility hypothesis was tested in the present study because, first, it is more concrete and easier to operationalize than the active perceiver hypothesis, and second, active perceiver hypothesis may be rather related to intergroup anxiety view that will be reviewed in the next section.

In sum, in the present study, hyperaccessibility of the negative stereotypes for the political view of the partner was analyzed as a possible mediator for the hypothesized relationship between conservatism and resource depletion after an anticipated interaction with a liberal person. Based on the reviewed theories, this hyperaccessibility may either stem from the attempt for suppression (due to the task

demands) or the cognitive effort one has to show in order to evaluate the other's behavior and manage his/her own behavior for the upcoming task.⁴

Intergroup Anxiety

Stephan and Stephan (1985) defined intergroup anxiety as “(...) anxiety stemming from contact with out-group members.” (p. 158). Research showed that intergroup anxiety predicts prejudice towards outgroup members (Stephan, Diaz-Loving, & Duran, 2000; Stephan, Renfro, & Davis, 2002; Stephan, Ybarra, Martinez, Schwarzwald, & Tur-Kaspa, 1998). In other words, those who experience higher levels of intergroup anxiety during an interaction are more likely to have prejudicial views for these out-group members. Moreover, Van Zomeren, Fischer, and Spears (2007) found that intergroup anxiety enhances offensive action when an out-group member initiated contact.

On the other hand, previous studies showed a relationship between perceived threat and conservatism. For some time now, conservatives have been viewed as threat and anxiety-prone individuals, as reviewed previously (Altemeyer, 1988; Lavine et al., 1999; Lavine, Lodge, Polichak, & Taber, 2002; Wilson, 1973). More recently, Oxley et al. (2008) demonstrated that conservatives (those who support protective policies) were more sensitive to threatening stimuli by showing greater

⁴ Although the present study proposed that liberals in the opposing view condition should be less depleted than conservatives', that does not mean liberals will not experience any resource depletion in the opposing view condition. Liberals might assume that conservatives will have less tolerance for liberal view than vice versa. Therefore, they may experience a stereotype threat and thus negative stereotypes for liberal view may be activated (due to imagining a conservative partner stereotyping them) that will lead to a decrease in Stroop performance. Nevertheless, we proposed that this depletion should not be as much as conservatives' in the opposing view condition due to the reasons listed in the previous sections. Even though the present study does not specifically hypothesize that activation of self-relevant stereotypes will mediate the relationship between political ideology and resource depletion in the opposing view condition, the original data allowed us to test such possible relationship.

change in skin conductance levels, compared to liberals. Furthermore, increase in perceived threat (i.e. through mortality salience) was shown to lead to an increase in the level of conservatism (Cohen et al., 2005; Cohen et al., 2004; Landau et al., 2004). Thorisdottir and Jost (2011) put forward the relationship between threat perception and conservatism as mediated by the need for cognitive closure. In other words, when people perceived threat in an environment, they felt as lacking control and this ‘close-mindedness’ brought about the need for a conservative mental state. In sum, there seems to be a two-way relationship between perceived threat (or anxiety) in a situation and conservatism.

Taking into consideration the relationships between intergroup anxiety and prejudice for outgroups and between conservatism and anxiety/threat proneness, intergroup anxiety and threat was examined as possible mediators in this study. More specifically, intergroup anxiety felt in response to the anticipated interaction was hypothesized to be a mediator of the relationship between political ideology and resource depletion. Given that positive mood enables self regulation (see Tice, Baumeister, Shmueli, & Muraven, 2007), intergroup anxiety in the present study was thought to be one mechanism responsible for resource depletion by making self-regulation more difficult.

Regulatory Strength

In addition to the chronic egalitarian goals mentioned in a previous section, research has depicted several factors that affect resource depletion. Earlier studies showed that some people are better self controllers in general than others (e.g., Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 2004). Individual differences in self-regulation was

considered as an important factor to be controlled in the present study, as well. Gailliot, Plant, Butz, and Baumeister (2007) showed that those who have to engage in self-regulatory behaviors more in their lives show less resource depletion effects (also see for a review; Dewall, Baumeister, Schurtz, & Gailliot, 2010). Dvorak and Simons (2009) also demonstrated that regulatory strength moderated resource depletion. They found that good-controllers were able to buffer the depletion of regulatory resources (caused by an emotionally laden stimuli) and solve a subsequent regulation demanding anagram task as good as the control group. They speculated that regulatory strength (i.e., being a good controller) is about having better resources in general instead of having an automatic suppression system. Muraven (2010) later found out that self-control training through avoiding sweets and performing the handgrip task for two weeks improved performance in a self-control task (i.e., stop signal task). These findings all underlined the fact that some people are better self controllers in general and this was considered to influence the present study's results. Moreover, McCullough and Willoughby (2009) suggested that religiosity by itself enhances self-regulatory strength. Considering the possible relationship between conservatism and religiosity, chronic regulatory strength becomes a critical factor to be controlled in the present study. Therefore, a baseline measure of regulatory strength was taken in this study.

Strength of Identification with Political Ideology and Perceived Status of the Ideological Group in the Society

According to social identity theory, any threat to a value of one's identity leads one to become motivated to restore this value (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). If this is the case,

then one may claim that, for liberals, opposition to liberal view may constitute a threat to identity just as much as opposition to conservative view constitutes an identity threat for conservatives. Ouwerkerk, de Gilder, and de Vries (2000) showed that stronger identification with one's in-group leads to increase in the effort to restore the identity in case of an identity threat. Specifically, people who strongly identified themselves with their ingroup (i.e., group of psychology students) were motivated much more to restore their threatened identity when they were in the low status condition in terms of intelligence and increased their performance much more in an attention task (which was explained as an intelligence measure) compared to people in the high status condition. In another study, Giguere and Lalonde (2009) found that individuals who identified themselves with the Canadian nation showed more effort to restore their group identity in an anagram task that was presented as harder for Canadians than Americans (intergroup threat) and this effort was found to deplete their regulatory resources. That is to say, intergroup threat brought about increased self-regulatory effort for those who highly identified themselves with the group. Nevertheless, for low identifiers, there seems to be no such effortful control, as they seemed not to experience resource depletion. This line of research raised the possibility that those who identified themselves strongly with the liberal view may feel threatened by being exposed to counter-ideological view as much as those who are high identifiers of the conservative view.

On the other hand, perceived status of one's group in the society was another factor that was thought to affect the magnitude of this threat, experienced with such exposure, as well. Specifically, given that today the ruling party has a conservative (Islamic) ideology in Turkey, we suggested that the conservative participants may feel less threat in the opposing-view interaction condition than hypothesized, as their

ideology is already in power. On the other hand, if participants think that their political ideology has a lower status in the society compared to the opposing view, they may engage in self-regulation in the opposing view interaction condition, even if they adopt a liberal political view. Regarding these alternative effects, the strength of identification with one's ideological view and perceived status of the group in the society was explored in this study.

The Present Study

As reviewed above, despite the recent increase in the research on the psychological motives underlying political ideologies, psychological effects of these political ideologies seem still not to be the focus of psychological research. The present study is an attempt to examine the psychological effects of an anticipated future interaction with a person of similar or opposing ideology to one's own. More specifically, this study aims to test the possibility that differences in the levels of tolerance of others' view as a function of one's political ideology itself (i.e., liberalism and conservatism) may bring about differences in the levels of self-regulatory effort typically exerted in anticipation of an upcoming inter-ideological interaction. That is, preparing for an interaction with a person whose political view differs from one's own necessitates differing levels of self-regulatory effort depending on the participant's own political ideology (i.e., conservative vs. liberal). Various lines of research reviewed above lead to the idea that conservative participants would need to exert higher self-regulatory effort than liberal participants. Most critically, conservatives more than liberals would be faced with the challenge of suppressing their negative stereotypes of the opposing view, which would require inhibitory control. A situation requiring

more self-control typically results in more resource depletion in a subsequent control task (which relies on the similar executive function with previous control mechanism), as theories depicting self-control as a limited resource would suggest. In turn, conservatives should exhibit lower performance in the subsequent experimental task, as long as that task requires utilization of the same resources as anticipating the interaction does. Thus, we analyzed performance on an executive task measuring the mechanism of inhibitory control (see Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, Witki, & Howerter, 2000), consistent with the argument that it should be one's previous attempt in suppressing negative stereotypes (which may be manifested in the hyperaccessibility of these stereotypical views due to the rebound effect) and perceived threat from the anticipated interaction partner that would deplete the resources required for self-control in this case.

Considering conservative view's focus on intergroup differences, hierarchical view of society, and avoidance of societal and other kinds of change, conservative participants' resources of self-regulation should deplete when an interaction with a liberal person is anticipated. In other words, conservatives should rely more on regulatory resources (in order to deal with the perceived threat and activated negative stereotypes) in case of being exposed to opposing ideological views compared to being exposed to similar ideological views. Thus, the first hypothesis of the present study was that, conservatives in opposing view condition should perform *worse* than conservatives in the same view condition (i.e., anticipating an interaction with someone who shares their political views) in the subsequent inhibition task.

Moreover, regarding previous behavioral and neurological data on differences in the level of tolerance of *other* between conservatives and liberals, we suggested (as the main hypothesis of this study), that liberals exposed to conservative views

should deplete *less* regulatory resources than conservatives exposed to liberal views. As a result of this and in line with the resource-depletion view, the second hypothesis was that, liberals in the opposing view condition should perform *better* than conservatives in the opposing view condition in a subsequent executive control task.

Furthermore, Friedman and Förster (2005) found that people perform better at an inhibition task (Stroop task) after they were primed with approach as opposed to avoidance (study 1). In line with this finding and other findings on the relationship between liberalism and approach-oriented self-regulation (e.g., Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, & Baldacci, 2008), we suggested that being exposed to counter-ideological view should be more tolerable for liberals and thus lead to minimum resource depletion. Moreover, given that priming people with approach-related stimuli facilitates inhibitory function, we argued that priming liberal view (e.g., exposure to a liberal interaction partner) may specifically enhance executive control for those who do not regard this view as a threat, as well. Thus, third hypothesis was that, *best* performance of executive control should be seen in the group of liberals who are led to anticipate an interaction with someone with liberal views.

In addition to this comparative analysis of self-regulation between conservative and liberals, the present study aimed to examine the underlying mechanism leading to the hypothesized resource depletion. So participants' suppression of the negative stereotypes for the political ideology of the anticipated partner was analyzed as a possible mediating factor in this study. Taking the previous evidence on the rebound effect for the suppressed stereotypes into consideration (see Gordjin et al., 2004), hyperaccessibility of the negative stereotypes for the political view of the interaction partner was suggested as a manifestation of this attempted suppression. As explained before, conservatives should tend to regulate their

behavior towards opposing-view other before the interaction, due to thinking that they will engage in a political collaboration task. Paradoxically, however, conservative people's lower motivation to behave in an egalitarian manner may lead to difficulty suppressing their automatic reactions towards liberal view. If conservative participants have to devote more inhibitory resources than liberals, in order to suppress their negative stereotypes for the opposing-view other, the hyperaccessibility of these stereotypes should be higher for conservatives, as a result of the rebound effect. This hyperaccessibility of negative stereotypes of the liberal people in the eye of conservative persons may constitute the underlying factor explaining the relationship between political ideology and resource depletion after exposure to opposing ideology. Alternatively, as a consequence of being an active perceiver in the situation, participants may rely on the heuristic information of the other as they lack enough cognitive resources for more nuanced judgments (see Gilbert, Pelham, & Krull, 1988). Thus, the fourth hypothesis of the present study was that, as the negative stereotypes that apply to the interaction partner become more cognitively accessible, resource depletion for the self-control task (Stroop interference) will be more likely to occur.

Another possible underlying mechanism for the expected resource depletion was intergroup anxiety. Regarding that conservatives have a chronic predisposition to perceive threat (Altemeyer, 1988; Lavine et al., 1999; Lavine, Lodge, Polichak, & Taber, 2002), the expected resource depletion in the conservative-opposing ideology interaction condition might result from perceived intergroup threat in the situation. Thus, the fifth hypothesis was that, as intergroup anxiety felt in response to the anticipated interaction increases, resource depletion for the self-control task (Stroop interference) will be more likely to occur.

Furthermore, previous research implied that the level of identification with one's ideology and perceived status of one's ideological group in the society may be related to the perceived intergroup threat, thus, to the resource depletion (Ouwerkerk, de Gilder & de Vries, 2000; Giguere & Lalonde, 2009). The literature on these issues, reviewed above, implies that (a) as one's identification with his/her ideological group increases and (b) as one perceives the societal status of one's ideological group to be lower, it becomes more likely that one will experience depletion as a result of anticipating an interaction with a person of opposing ideological view. Ingroup identification and perceived status of other's ideology were thought to be possible moderators of the relationship between political ideology and resource depletion. However, these implications were more tentative than the focal hypotheses of the present research. In either case, there was reason to suspect that these variables would be related to the outcome of interest in the present study. Thus, they were measured and their effects were explored.

CHAPTER 2

METHOD

Participants

227 (152 female and 75 male) undergraduates from Boğaziçi University participated in this study. The manipulation of “ideology exposure” worked for 208 of these participants.⁵ (see Table 1).

Table 1. Number of Participants in the Study

Number of Participants			Number of Participants in the Data Analysis		
Exposed Ideology	Ideology of Participant		Exposed Ideology	Ideology of Participant	
	Conservative	Liberal		Conservative	Liberal
Conservative	61	52	Conservative	49	51
Liberal	57	57	Liberal	52	56

536 students enrolled in the introductory psychology and social psychology classes received an online battery including an extensive self-report measure of social/political conservatism (Appendix A). Individuals were ranked according to their mean scores of resistance to change and opposition to equality. Participants were invited to study via email, beginning from the ones who had highest and lowest

⁵ Manipulation check and the criteria of including the data in the analysis are detailed in the results section.

scores in both of the dimensions of conservatism.⁶ This criterion of selection was not shared with participants and a cover story was used, as detailed in the procedure section. Participants were randomly assigned to similar or opposing view other conditions. All participants signed an informed consent at the beginning of both the battery application and the experiment.

Design

A 2 (political ideology: liberal, conservative) x 2 (exposed ideology: similar, opposing) between-subjects design was used for this study.

Materials

The Online Battery

Political Ideology. The liberalism-conservatism score was determined by a social/political conservatism scale including items compiled from Social Dominance Orientation scale (Pratto et al., 1994), Right Wing Authoritarianism scale (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992), F scale (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950), Social and Cultural Attitudes scale (Küçeker, 2007), Egalitarianism-Inegalitarianism scale (Kluegel & Smith, 1983) and items measuring resistance to change employed by Jost et al. (2007). These items were selected to represent the

⁶ Participants who were identified as “conservatives” in this study got at least 3.11 and “liberals” got at most 2.44 out of 7 as a mean score of resistance to change and opposition to equality. Specifically, among conservatives, the least score for social/political resistance to change was 3.11 and the least score for social/political opposition to equality was 3.12 out of 7. Among liberals, the highest score for social/political resistance to change was 3.11 and the highest score for social/political opposition to equality was 3.06 out of 7.

two dimensions of conservatism: resistance to change and opposition to equality. These items (which were selected according to their cultural relevance and the aim of this study) were delivered to a separate sample of 342 Boğaziçi University students before its administration to the participants of this study. A factor analysis was held for these items. Thus, factor loadings appropriately measuring the two underlying dimensions of conservatism (resistance to change and opposition to equality; Jost et al., 2003a) were determined and a reliable scale of conservatism was composed (inter-item reliabilities in two different applications with a sample size of 165 and 196 respectively; resistance to change: $\alpha = .80, .83$, opposition to equality: $.90, .88$). Participants of this study received this newly developed social/political conservatism measure and responded to all the items in a 7-point scale (1: totally disagree, 7: totally agree) in an online battery. The composite score of the resistance to change and opposition to equality factors was applied in order to rank participants in terms of their conservatism scores (the higher the combined score of these two factors is, the more conservative the respondent's view is). In addition to this newly developed scale, participants filled in a 7-point self-placement scale for their political orientation (1: extremely liberal; 7: extremely conservative). However, preselection was based on the social/political conservatism scale alone.⁷

Strength of identification with political ideology (ingroup identification). One's level of identification with the political ideology was measured with the 10-item ingroup identification scale developed by Kirchler, Palmonari, and Pombeni (1994) and

⁷ Our main aim in including the self-placement item in the battery measure was to check whether participants' answers on this much briefer way of assessing conservatism would be consistent with what could be inferred from the longer scale. Of the 536 individuals who participated in the online battery phase of this study, only 100 individuals rated themselves 5 or more in the 7-point conservatism item. As it was not possible to recruit a large enough sample by considering both the results of conservatism scale and self placement item in the preselection, conservatism scale was used as the only criterion. As analyzed later on, consistency between the conservatism score and self-placement item did not change the findings concerning the main hypotheses of this study.

translated and adapted into Turkish by Hortaçsu (2000) (see for the complete list of Turkish items; Appendix B). Higher scores indicated higher ingroup identification. This scale was found to be a reliable measure of ingroup identification in these earlier studies (Cronbach's alphas were between .83 and .91). In the present study, the scale showed high reliability, as well ($\alpha = .90$).

Regulatory strength. Participants' baseline self-control strength was measured through a 36-item Brief Self Control Scale developed by Tangney, Baumeister and Boone (2004) and translated and adapted into Turkish by Coşkan (2010) (see Appendix E). This scale showed high reliability in these previous applications with Cronbach's alphas of .85 and .79. In the present study, this scale had high internal consistency ($\alpha = .86$), as well.

Participants responded to Political Ideology, Ingroup Identification and Perceived Status of Other measures on a 7-point scale (1: totally disagree; 7: totally agree) and Brief Self Control measure on a 5-point scale (1: not at all; 5: very much). All these mentioned measures were administered in the online battery, 2-3 weeks before the experiment took place.

The Experiment

Exposure to political ideology. In the “exposure to political ideology” phase of the experiment, participants were given the hard copy of a subset of the items in the social/political conservatism scale (similar with the one in the battery) ostensibly filled by another participant in a fashion indicating either a liberal or conservative view. This subset was determined based on the factor loadings, in other words, 5 items with highest factor loadings for opposition to equality and 5 items with highest

factor loadings for resistance to change factors were selected (Appendix F). Both opposition to equality and resistance to change scores of this interaction partner were 2 out of 7 on average in liberal-other and 6 out of 7 on average in conservative-other conditions.⁸ As a manipulation check, participants were asked to place this participant's view on a 7-point scale considering this person's responses in social/political conservatism scale. This procedure was useful for making participants attend to the items while reading and also for determining the participants who are unable to assess main elements of certain political ideologies and controlling for this effect of (lack of) ideological knowledge during data analysis. Before this task took place, the experimenter explained that the participant who filled in this scale was in the next room and that shortly these two participants would collaborate on a task concerning political ideologies.

Outgroup stereotype accessibility. Accessibility of the negative stereotypes for one's own and the other's political view was measured through a lexical decision task. In this task, participants were asked to judge whether a letter string was a legitimate Turkish word or a nonword as quickly as possible. The item list included 20 target words (10 negative stereotypical words for liberalism and 10 negative stereotypical words for conservatism), 10 control (negative nonideological) words, and 30 filler nonwords. The target and control words were determined through a pilot study with an independent group of 22 volunteers (11 liberal and 11 conservative student and nonstudent adults) who rated a list of 90 words via internet.⁹ These

⁸The score of liberalism/conservatism was between a moderate and an extreme score in order not to make participants suspicious about the real aim of the study and in order to prevent the effect to be the result of extremity per se.

⁹ The words were selected on the basis of a pre-pilot assessment in which 14 participants (university students) generated possible stereotypical words for conservatism and liberalism. In this pre-pilot assessment, participants were asked to generate their own political group's stereotypes for the outgroup

words were rated in terms of their descriptiveness in a stereotypical view. Each word was rated on a 5-point scale ranging from “extremely liberal” to “extremely conservative.” Besides, the participants rated their own ideological view in a 7-point self-placement scale (1: extremely liberal; 7: extremely conservative; see Appendix G for items and instructions). The item list for the lexical decision task in the actual study was determined according to an “outgroup stereotyping principle.” That is to say, outgroup stereotype accessibility in the actual study was determined according to the accessibility of the words that were rated as descriptive of the outgroup in this pilot study.¹⁰ In addition, 10 words rated as nonstereotypical by liberals and conservatives were selected as control words. During selection, in addition to their level of descriptiveness of liberalism-conservatism, frequency of the words was matched as closely as possible across all three categories in light of Göz’s (2003) previous research on Turkish word frequencies. The resulting list of words is given in Appendix H.

In the lexical decision task, participants received letter strings in black in the center of a light grey computer screen one by one. The order of the words was

and outgroup’s stereotypes for their own political group. Only the words that were present in Göz’s (2003) Turkish word frequency dictionary were retained in order to make it possible to match their frequency of use in the Turkish language.

¹⁰ Specifically, conservatives in the actual study received 10 words as “outgroup stereotype words” which were rated as highly descriptive of liberalism by conservative participants in the pilot study. Liberals in the actual study received 10 words as “outgroup stereotype words” which were rated as highly descriptive of conservatism by liberal participants in the pilot study. While determining “ingroup stereotype words”, participants were encouraged to think from the perspective of the opposing-view others (i.e., liberals thought from the perspective of conservatives and conservatives thought from the perspective of liberals). For instance, conservatives were asked how descriptive these potential ingroup stereotype words were in the eyes of liberals (and vice versa). Conservatives in the actual study received 10 words as “ingroup stereotype words” which were rated as highly descriptive of conservatism (from the perspective of liberals) by conservative participants in the pilot study. Liberals in the actual study received 10 words as “ingroup stereotype words” which were rated as highly descriptive of liberalism (from the perspective of conservatives) by liberal participants in the pilot study. In a similar fashion, conservatives and liberals in the actual study received “nonstereotypical words” which were rated as descriptive of neither conservatism nor liberalism by participants sharing their own ideological view in the pilot study.

randomized individually. Participants were asked to judge whether this string is a legitimate Turkish word or nonword and respond by pressing on the instructed buttons (“L” for word and “A” for nonword stimuli) as quickly as possible. Before the experimental trials, participants received five practice trials with items irrelevant to the political words presented in the experimental trials. Stereotype accessibility was measured as the difference between the response latency for words of a certain ideological category (i.e., liberalism, conservatism) and control category (i.e., nonideological). DirectRT experimental software was used for presenting the stimuli and measuring response latencies.

Intergroup anxiety. Intergroup anxiety was measured through an adapted version of Stephan and Stephan (1985)’s scale of intergroup anxiety. The original version of this scale was shown to be a reliable ($\alpha = .86$) and valid (high construct validity, stereotyping predicted 24% of the variance in intergroup anxiety) measure (Stephan & Stephan, 1985). In this adapted version, the question of how the participants would feel in case of interacting with a person of an opposing ideological view than their own, compared to interacting with a person of a similar ideology to their own was asked. Participants responded on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all, 7= extremely) for each of 12 items, indicating to what extent they would feel nervous, awkward, anxious, uncertain, worried, threatened, friendly, at ease, comfortable, trusting, confident, and safe (last six items will be reverse coded). This scale was translated into Turkish (and backtranslated into English) by two independent translators in an earlier study (Kunduz, 2009) and was shown to be a reliable measure in a Turkish sample (with Cronbach’s alphas between .83 and .93). In the present study, it had high internal consistency, as well ($\alpha = .85$) (see Appendix I).

Perceived status of ideological group in the society. Perceived status of the group was measured with 4 items adapted from a scale used by Stephan et al. (2002). These items specifically measured the degree of difference between the perceived status of the in-group (those who have the same political ideology with the participant) and out-group (those who have the opposing political ideology with the participant). Scores indicated how much higher the participant perceived the status of the other ideological group compared to his/her own ideological group (higher scores indicated higher perceived status of other ideological group so in the results section this variable is worded as “perceived status of other”). The items were worded according to the ideology group the participant belongs to (see for the complete list of Turkish items; Appendix C and D). This scale was found to be a reliable measure of perceived status differences in an earlier study on prejudice between students with and without headcover (see Kunduz, 2009; with Cronbach alphas between .77 and .81). Nevertheless, in the present study, this scale had a low Cronbach’s alpha ($\alpha = .42$). When two items (second and third items) which showed the highest inter-item correlation and indicated the direction of the perceived status (not just the difference) were selected as indicators of perceived status of other, the Cronbach’s alpha increased to .51. Therefore, in order not to provide misleading conclusions, the planned analyses (mainly, exploration of the perceived status of other’s moderation of political ideology and resource depletion relationship) will not be reported.

Self-regulation (executive control). Executive control was measured with a Stroop task (Stroop, 1935). This task was used in various resource depletion studies (e.g. Richeson & Shelton, 2003; Richeson & Trawalter, 2005; Dalton et al., 2010), due to it being a task measuring the mechanism of inhibitory control (see Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, Witki, & Howerter, 2000). DirectRT experimental software was

used for exposing participants to Stroop stimuli and measuring vocal response times. Stroop stimuli, which was either the name of one of four colors (red, blue, yellow, green) or a string of X's in one of these colors (XXXX), was exposed in capital letters in the center of a light grey background.¹¹ The name of the color was one of congruent (e.g., the Turkish word for blue, “mavi,” in blue font) or incongruent versions (e.g., the Turkish word for green, “yeşil,” in yellow font). Participants were instructed to pronounce the color of the stimulus on the screen to the microphone as quickly as possible. All the stimuli appeared one by one with an intertrial interval of 1500 ms and they remained on the scene as long as the response was registered. For all three types of stimuli, there were 40 trials in total, presented in 10 blocks (4 of which were practice blocks) consisting of 12 trials each. There were no subsequent stimuli of the same trial type or color in this fixed order presentation. The experimenter coded whether each response was accurate, false or duplicate due to microphone error in a check list so that only accurate responses were included in the calculation of Stroop interference. Specifically, the term “Stroop interference” refers to the participants’ increased response latency due to their effort to inhibit their prepotent responses (i.e., word reading) and maintain the goal of the task (i.e., color naming). Stroop interference was calculated by subtracting the mean reaction times for the baseline trials (XXX) from the mean reaction times for incongruent trials (Richeson & Trawalter, 2005).

Lastly, participants answered a debriefing question about the real aim of the tasks. Additionally, they reported whether they had participated in a similar study

¹¹ X's in the baseline trials were equal to the color names in length (i.e., “mavi”: XXXX, “sarı”: XXXX, “yeşil”: XXXXX, “kırmızı”: XXXXXXX).

before. Their memory of having completed the social/political conservatism scale in the battery was assessed as well (see Appendix J).

Procedure

In the battery phase, participants received the social/political conservatism scale¹², Ingroup Identification Scale, and Brief Self Control Questionnaire in that order. Relatively liberal and conservative participants who were selected on the basis of their conservatism scores in this battery were invited to the experiment via email and randomly assigned to one of the exposed ideology conditions (similar-other or opposing-other) by the coordinator of the study. The experiment was conducted by an independent experimenter who was blind to the ideology of participant, exposed ideology or the aim of the study. Participants were invited to the lab one by one. After seating the participant, the experimenter asked him/her to sign a consent form informing about the Stroop task and the political ideology exposure phase of the experiment (Appendix K). In the consent form, these tasks were presented as part of two separate studies: one study on attention and another on “how knowing the view of a person before meeting him/her affects the interaction during a collaborative political task.” In this task, the consent form indicated that, participants would develop policies for some societal problems in Turkey together. The experimenter encouraged the participant to ask questions if anything was unclear before the experiment started.

¹² The order of the questions measuring the resistance to change and opposition to equality dimensions were randomized across participants.

Firstly, participants were asked to read the subset of social/political conservatism scale (hard copy) filled by “another” participant (i.e., alleged interaction partner) and rate the ideological view of that participant on the 7-point placement scale. This section of the experiment was self-paced in order to make sure that participants read all the items, nevertheless, decision of placement was encouraged to be completed within a minute. After this section, the experimenter asked the participant to complete the attention task before the other participant arrived for the (supposed) political interaction task. All participants received first the Stroop task, and second, the lexical decision task. After the four-minute-long practice phase of Stroop task, participants started the actual Stroop trials. The experimenter unobtrusively recorded the accuracy of their vocal responses in a check list. Participants then completed the lexical decision task. After the completion of this section, participants completed the Intergroup Anxiety Scale and Perceived Status Differences Scale and the debriefing form. Before they left, the experimenter requested the participants not to talk about the content of the experiment with anyone until they received the debriefing email. Participants were debriefed about the aim and results of this study (as a group, not individually) after the completion of data collection to prevent contamination.

CHAPTER 3

RESULTS

Data Preparation

Manipulation Check

Only the data of the participants who correctly identified the political ideology of the alleged “other” participant were included in the analyses. Application of this criterion resulted in the removal of 19 participants from the data set. Seventeen of these participants were conservatives, 1 was liberal, and 1 other liberal participant failed to make a guess about the ideology of other.¹³ None of the participants could state the real aim of the study in the debriefing questions.

Stroop Interference

For each participant, we computed a Stroop interference score by subtracting the mean vocal reaction time (RT) for baseline trials from the mean vocal RT for incongruent trials.¹⁴ In other words, higher Stroop interference scores indicated slower responses to incongruent Stroop trials compared to baseline trials.¹⁵

¹³ Of those 17 conservative participants, 9 incorrectly identified a conservative other as liberal, 4 incorrectly identified a conservative other as moderate, 1 incorrectly identified a liberal other as conservative, and 3 incorrectly identified a liberal other as moderate. 1 liberal participant incorrectly identified a liberal other as conservative.

¹⁴ Mean reaction time was 1242.52 ms for baseline trials, 1258.95 ms for congruent trials, and 1366.42 ms for incongruent trials.

¹⁵ Considering the argument of this study, higher Stroop interference of participants in one condition compared to those in the other condition would indicate more resource depletion (i.e., less ability to self-control) of the former group than the latter.

Only correct responses were included in calculating this score. Incorrect responses and double responses due to microphone error, which constituted 2.56% of all trials, were excluded. A technical difficulty occurred during recording the vocal responses of 9 participants so their data was removed from the analyses as well. No outliers, defined as z-scores above or below 3.29, were determined for Stroop interference.

Stereotype Accessibility

Mean RTs for each type of stimuli in the lexical decision task were computed. Unreasonably fast or slow responses, that is, trials for which the RT was faster than 200 ms or slower than 2000 ms (.48% of all word trials), were excluded. Outgroup stereotype accessibility of each participant was assessed by subtracting the mean RT for outgroup stereotype words from the mean RT for nonstereotypical words. In a similar fashion, mean RT for ingroup stereotype words was subtracted from the mean RT for nonstereotypical words in order to assess the ingroup stereotype accessibility of each participant (for a similar procedure see Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000).¹⁶ These scores were z-transformed and checked for outliers. As a result, the data of two conservative participants were removed from related analyses. One of these participants had an ingroup stereotype accessibility z-score over 3.29; and the other participant had both an ingroup and outgroup stereotype accessibility z-score over 3.29.

All variables had a normal distribution and no outliers other than the mentioned ones were detected for any of the variables.

¹⁶ Mean reaction time was 742.03 ms for outgroup stereotype words, 748.64 ms for ingroup stereotype words, and 727.53 ms for nonstereotypical words.

Comparisons between Conservatives and Liberals in Similar-Other and Opposing-Other Conditions

Comparisons in terms of Self-Control, Intergroup Anxiety, Ingroup Identification

Before analyzing the hypotheses, we analyzed the comparability of four experimental conditions (political ideology of participant: conservative, liberal; exposed ideology: similar view, opposing view) in terms of possible mediating and moderating variables of the study (self-control, intergroup anxiety and ingroup identification). Thus, a series of two-way between-subjects analyses of variance (ANOVA) were carried out.

When four experimental conditions were compared in terms of self-control, the main effect of political ideology of participant was found to be marginally significant, $F(1, 204) = 3.29, p = .07, \eta^2_p = .02$, indicating that the mean baseline self-control score of conservatives ($M = 3.23, SD = .46$) was almost significantly higher than the mean baseline self-control score of liberals ($M = 3.11, SD = .49$). The main effect of exposed ideology was not found to be significant, $F(1, 204) = .918, p = .34, \eta^2_p = .004$. The interaction effect was not significant, either, $F(1, 204) = 2.04, p = .15, \eta^2_p = .01$.

Intergroup anxiety scores were compared between experimental conditions, as well. The main effect of political ideology of participant was not significant, $F(1, 204) = .031, p = .86, \eta^2_p = .00$. There was no main effect of exposed ideology on intergroup anxiety, as well, $F(1, 204) = 1.27, p = .26, \eta^2_p = .006$. The interaction effect between political ideology of participant and exposed ideology was also not significant, $F(1, 204) = .008, p = .93, \eta^2_p = .00$.

Participants in four conditions were also equal in terms of identification with their own political group. There was no main effect of political ideology of participant, $F(1, 204) = .05, p = .82, \eta^2_p = .00$. The main effect of exposed ideology

was insignificant, $F(1, 204) = .06, p = .80, \eta^2_p = .00$. The interaction between political ideology of participant and exposed ideology was also not significant, $F(1, 204) = .08, p = .77, \eta^2_p = .00$.

In sum, four experimental conditions were found to be equal on intergroup anxiety and ingroup identification. Conservatives were generally higher in self-control than liberals in both similar and opposing-other conditions.

Comparison of Reaction Times in Stroop Task Trials

Before conducting the analyses for the hypotheses on “Stroop interference,” we compared general speed of participants in four experimental conditions in the Stroop task, in order to find out whether they actually experienced a Stroop interference.

RTs of participants were subjected to 3 (Stroop Trial Type: Baseline, Congruent, Incongruent) $\times$ 2 (Participant's Political Ideology: Conservative vs. Liberal) $\times$ 2 (Exposed Ideology: Similar vs. Opposing) mixed ANOVA, where trial type was a within-subjects factor and political ideology of the participant and exposed ideology were between-subjects factors (see Figure 1). A main effect of trial type was found, $F(2, 194) = 411.14, p < .0001, \eta^2_p = .68$. Bonferroni comparisons revealed that participants were significantly ($p < .05$) slower in incongruent trials ($M = 1366.42, SD = 146.96$) than both baseline trials ($M = 1242.52, SD = 129.20$) and congruent trials ($M = 1258.95, SD = 136.06$). These results revealed that participants actually showed Stroop interference, as their responses to incongruent trials were slower than their baseline responses. However, contrary to the nature of the Stroop effect (Stroop, 1935), participants did not show a Stroop facilitation effect (i.e., faster responses in congruent trials than baseline trials due to name-color congruency) as baseline trials were responded to significantly faster than congruent trials. There was also a main effect of political ideology of the participant on RTs, $F(2, 194) = 6.24, p$

= .01, $\eta^2_p = .03$, showing that conservative participants were generally slower in their responses collapsing across trial type ($M = 1313.14$, $SD = 177.13$) than liberal participants ($M = 1266.62$, $SD = 116.37$). No other significant main or interaction effect was found in this analysis.




Figure. 1. RTs for baseline, congruent, and incongruent trials in the Stroop Task. Experimental conditions are shown in the x-axis. The error bars indicate the SEMs.

Analyses for the Main Hypotheses

The mean and standard deviations of Stroop interference (dependent variable) in four experimental conditions are given in Table 2 (for illustrations, see Figure 2).

Table 2. Means (Standard Deviations) for Stroop Interference within the Experimental Conditions

Ideology of Participant	Experimental Conditions			
	Conservative		Liberal	
Exposed Ideology	Similar-other	Opposing-other	Similar-other	Opposing-other
Stroop Interference (General)	127.58 (78.29)	111.60 (65.07)	132.06 (56.57)	118.96 (62.60)
Stroop Interference (1 st Block)	124.18 (96.03)	121.08 (86.30)	134.25 (78.59)	125.53 (80.33)
Stroop Interference (2 nd Block)	132.74 (96.84)	101.72 (76.19)	129.21 (69.66)	113.36 (105.48)

Note. Values are RTs in ms.

In order to test the first hypothesis on the negative effect of anticipating an interaction with an opposing view other on self-control for conservative participants, independent samples t-test comparing conservative participant-conservative other and conservative participant-liberal other conditions in terms of self-control (Stroop interference) was conducted. Contrary to what is expected, no difference of Stroop interference was found between these two conditions, $t(96) = 1.10$, $p = .27$, $d = 0.22$.¹⁷ To further understand the lack of this predicted effect, Stroop blocks were separated into two (i.e., trials in the first block appeared first in the experiment, followed by those in the second block) and analyzed separately. This would allow one to see whether, for instance, the predicted effect was present earlier in the experiment (i.e., first block) but disappeared as the effect of anticipating the

¹⁷ As entering baseline self-control as a covariate did not affect the significance of the results in any of the analyses, these results are not reported.

interaction wore off with the passage of time. For the second block of the task, a marginally significant difference between conditions was found, $t(96) = 1.77$, $p = .08$, $d = .36$. However, this difference was counter to our hypothesis. Specifically, in the second block of the Stroop task, conservative participants in the opposing-other condition showed *less* Stroop interference than conservative participants in the similar-other condition.¹⁸ No difference between two conditions was found for the first block.

For analyzing the second hypothesis on the differential effect of anticipating an interaction with opposing view other on conservatives and liberals' Stroop interference, we ran another independent samples t-test. There was no significant difference between liberals and conservatives in the opposing-other condition in terms of Stroop interference, $t(94) = -.563$, $p = .57$, $d = -.12$.¹⁹ These groups did not differ in the first and second blocks of the Stroop task, either.

As for the third hypothesis on the better performance of liberal participant-liberal other condition compared to all the other conditions, a one-way ANOVA comparing four experimental conditions in terms of Stroop interference was conducted. This analysis yielded no significant difference between four experimental conditions in terms of Stroop interference, $F(3, 193) = .966$, $p = .41$, $\eta^2_p = .02$.²⁰

¹⁸ Moreover, in the conservative participant similar-other condition, participants responded slower to all types of Stroop trials in the second block of the task compared to first block of the task (baseline trials: $t(48) = -2.051$, $p < .05$, congruent trials: $t(48) = -2.93$, $p < .01$, incongruent trials: $t(48) = -1.92$, $p = .06$. In the conservative participant opposing-other condition, response latency for none of the trial types differed across two blocks of the task.

¹⁹ Although conservative participants in the opposing-other condition had higher mean RTs for all types of trials compared to liberal participants in the opposing-other condition, these differences did not reach significance.

²⁰ Nevertheless, when RTs to each trial type in the Stroop Task in four experimental conditions were compared with a series of one-way ANOVAs, a difference was found for RTs to baseline trials, $F(3, 194) = 3.30$, $p < .05$, $\eta^2_p = .05$. A Tukey's HSD revealed that, liberal participants in the similar-other condition ($M = 1228.55$, $SD = 103.32$) were faster than conservative participants in the similar-other condition ($M = 1281.80$, $SD = 142.99$) and also than conservative participants in the opposing-other condition ($M = 1278.59$, $SD = 163.86$) ($ps < .05$); but they were as fast as liberal participants in the conservative other condition ($M = 1249.01$, $SD = 124.89$) ($p = .77$). No significant difference for RTs to congruent and incongruent trials was found, (all $ps = \text{n.s.}$) although the pattern in the means was in the same direction.




Figure. 2. Stroop Interferences in general, for the first and second blocks of the Stroop Task. Experimental conditions are shown in the x-axis. The error bars indicate the SEMs.

Analyses for the Hypothesized Mediations and Moderations

Stereotype Accessibility

Next, we sought to investigate the hypothesized mediation of the effect of participant's political ideology on Stroop interference by stereotype accessibility.²¹ The mediation analyses were conducted only for opposing-other conditions as the relationship between political ideology and Stroop interference was hypothesized for opposing-other conditions only. As evident in the analyses above, the first requirement of this mediation analysis (i.e., a significant effect of political ideology on Stroop interference in the opposing-other condition) was not met (see Baron &

²¹ To remind at that point, “outgroup stereotype accessibility” was computed by subtracting the participants’ mean RT for outgroup stereotype words from their mean RT for nonstereotypical words. In a similar fashion, “ingroup stereotype accessibility” was computed by subtracting the participants’ mean RT for ingroup stereotype words from their mean RT for nonstereotypical words.

Kenny, 1986). However, the possibility of an inconsistent mediation model²² was analyzed. As a result of the regression analysis, political ideology of the participant (i.e., conservatism, entered as a dummy variable) in the opposing-other condition significantly predicted faster RTs to outgroup stereotype words, indicating increased accessibility of the outgroup (liberal) stereotype accessibility, $b = .56$, $t(100) = 6.76$, $p < .001$. Political ideology of the participant also explained a significant proportion of variance in outgroup stereotype accessibility, $R^2 = .31$, $F(1, 100) = 45.67$, $p < .001$. Moreover, outgroup stereotype accessibility in the opposing-other condition significantly predicted Stroop interference, indicating that the more accessible the outgroup stereotypes were, the less the Stroop interference was, $b = -.28$, $t(93) = -2.87$, $p < .01$. Outgroup stereotype accessibility also explained a significant proportion of variance in Stroop interference, $R^2 = .08$, $F(1, 93) = 8.23$, $p < .01$.

Taken together, these results constitute an inconsistent mediation of the effect of participant's political ideology on Stroop interference by outgroup stereotype accessibility (see Figure 3).

Although the mediation of the political ideology-Stroop interference relationship by ingroup stereotype accessibility was not hypothesized, such a possibility was tested for the sake of completeness through the same regression analyses as above. Political ideology of the participant (i.e., conservatism, entered as a dummy variable) in the opposing-other condition significantly predicted ingroup stereotype accessibility, indicating increased accessibility of the ingroup (conservative) stereotype accessibility, $b = .37$, $t(100) = 4.00$, $p < .001$ and explaining a significant proportion of variance in ingroup stereotype accessibility, $R^2 = .14$, $F(1, 100) = 15.99$, $p < .001$. Furthermore, ingroup stereotype accessibility in the opposing-other condition significantly predicted Stroop interference, indicating

²² Inconsistent mediation model suggests that the effect may be cancelled out because the relationships between the mediator and independent variable and between the mediator and dependent variable are in the opposite direction (MacKinnon, Fairchild, & Fritz, 2007).

that the more accessible the ingroup stereotypes were, the less the Stroop interference was, $b = -.25$, $t(93) = -2.46$, $p = .02$. Ingroup stereotype accessibility also explained a significant proportion of variance in Stroop interference, $R^2 = .05$, $F(1, 93) = 6.06$, $p < .02$. In sum, like outgroup stereotype accessibility, ingroup stereotype accessibility was also an inconsistent mediator of the relationship between political ideology and Stroop interference.




Figure 3. Outgroup and ingroup stereotype accessibility's inconsistent mediation of the relationship between political ideology and Stroop interference (in opposing-other conditions).

Notes. Values are beta coefficients which come from separate regression analysis.

* $p < .05$

** $p < .01$

*** $p < .001$

After that, we analyzed this model for similar-other condition, again for the sake of completeness.²³ Again, political ideology neither predicted Stroop interference, $b = -.03$, $t(99) = -.33$, $p = .74$, nor explained a significant proportion of variance in Stroop interference, $R^2 = .00$, $F(1, 99) = .11$, $p = .74$. Therefore an inconsistent mediation model was investigated. As was the case in the opposing-

²³ Even though both the relationship between political ideology and Stroop interference and mediators/moderators of this relationship was hypothesized regarding the opposing-other condition only, the related analyses were conducted for the similar-other condition, as well. Except the reported analyses for outgroup stereotype accessibility, neither of the analyses regarding mediation/moderation by intergroup anxiety, perceived status of other's ideology, and ingroup identification was found to be significant in the similar-other condition, therefore they are not reported.

other condition, political ideology (conservatism) significantly predicted the outgroup stereotype accessibility, $b = .49$, $t(102) = 5.73$, $p < .001$, and explained a significant proportion of variance in it, $R^2 = .24$, $F(1, 102) = 32.80$, $p < .001$. However, outgroup stereotype accessibility neither predicted Stroop interference in the similar-other condition, $b = -.03$, $t(98) = -.35$, $p = .72$, nor explained a significant variance in it, $R^2 = .00$, $F(1, 98) = .13$, $p = .72$. Next, an inconsistent mediation of ingroup stereotype accessibility was analyzed. Similarly, political ideology (conservatism) predicted ingroup stereotype accessibility, $b = .19$, $t(101) = 1.99$, $p < .05$, by explaining a significant proportion of variance in it, $R^2 = .04$, $F(1, 101) = 3.96$, $p < .05$. However, ingroup stereotype accessibility also did not predict Stroop interference, $b = .02$, $t(98) = .18$, $p = .85$, and did not explain a significant proportion of variance in it, $R^2 = .00$, $F(1, 98) = .03$, $p = .85$. In sum, in this model of political ideology and resource depletion relationship in the similar-other condition, there was neither mediation nor inconsistent mediation by outgroup or ingroup stereotype accessibility.

Intergroup Anxiety

The role of intergroup anxiety as a potential mediator of the relationship between political ideology and Stroop interference in the opposing-other condition was analyzed through regression analyses, as well. Participant's political ideology (entered as dummy variable) did not predict intergroup anxiety, $b = -.01$, $t(101) = -.06$, $p = .95$, and did not explain a significant proportion variance in intergroup anxiety scores, $R^2 = .00$, $F(1, 101) = .003$, $p = .95$. Likewise, intergroup anxiety did not predict Stroop interference, $b = .14$, $t(94) = 1.37$, $p = .17$ and did not explain a significant proportion variance in Stroop interference, $R^2 = .02$, $F(1, 94) = 1.87$, $p = .17$. In short, intergroup anxiety had no mediating role on the relationship between political ideology and Stroop interference in the opposing-other condition in general

(see Figure 4). Nevertheless, Pearson's correlation analysis within the experimental conditions showed that there was a significant positive correlation between intergroup anxiety and Stroop interference in the liberal participant-conservative other condition only, $r(46) = .29, p = .055$. That is, as the intergroup anxiety of liberal participants increased, their self-regulatory resources became more depleted while they were anticipating to interact with a conservative other. No significant correlation between intergroup anxiety and Stroop interference in other experimental conditions was obtained.




Figure 4. The relationship between political ideology, Stroop interference and intergroup anxiety (in opposing-other conditions).

Note. Values are beta coefficients which come from separate regression analysis.

Ingroup Identification

Ingroup identification was also analyzed as another potential moderator of the relationship between ideology and Stroop interference. At the first step, participant's political ideology (dummy variable) ($b = -.06, t(93) = -.62, p = .54$) and ingroup identification ($b = .14, t(93) = 1.39, p = .17$) did not explain a significant variance in Stroop interference, $R^2 = .02, F(2, 93) = 1.22, p = .33$. At the second step, the product of political ideology and ingroup identification did not significantly contribute to the prediction, $b = -.54, t(93) = -1.31, p = .19$, or explain a significant variance in Stroop

interference, $R^2 \text{ change} = .02$, $F(3, 92) = 1.33$, $p = .27$. Thus, ingroup identification did not moderate the relationship between ideology and Stroop interference.

Exploratory Analyses

Further Analyses on Stereotype Accessibility

For exploratory purposes, we compared RTs to outgroup stereotypes, ingroup stereotypes, and nonstereotypical words in the lexical decision task both between and within experimental conditions. Conservative participants generally tended to have higher outgroup stereotype accessibility ($M = 33.62$, $SD = 70.19$), $t(205) = 8.86$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.23$, and ingroup stereotype accessibility ($M = 5.96$, $SD = 70.19$), $t(205) = 4.19$, $p < .001$, $d = 0.58$, than liberal participants (outgroup stereotype: $M = -57.04$, $SD = 76.59$; ingroup stereotype: $M = -34.38$, $SD = 67.60$). Further analyses within experimental conditions showed that conservatives were faster in responding to outgroup stereotype words compared to nonstereotypical words in both opposing-other, $t(50) = -3.57$, $p < .001$, $d = -0.22$, and similar-other, $t(47) = -2.96$, $p < .01$, $d = -0.19$ conditions (see Table 3 for means and standard deviations and Figure 5 for the graph depicting these). In contrast, liberals were faster in responding to nonstereotypical words compared to outgroup stereotype words (opposing-other: $t(48) = -5.61$, $p < .001$, similar-other: $t(54) = 5.28$, $p < .01$). Moreover, whereas RTs for ingroup stereotype words did not significantly differ from nonstereotypical words for conservatives in either condition, liberal participants in both conditions responded faster to nonstereotypical words compared to ingroup stereotype words (opposing-other: $t(49) = 4.53$, $p < .001$, similar-other: $t(54) = 3.31$, $p < .01$). Also, in liberal participant-liberal other (similar view) condition, participants responded faster to ingroup stereotypes than outgroup stereotypes, $t(54) = 2.18$, $p < .05$.

Table 3. Means (Standard Deviations) for Reaction Times in Lexical Decision Task

Word Type	Experimental Conditions			
	Conservative		Liberal	
	Similar-other	Opposing-other	Similar-other	Opposing-other
Outgroup Stereotype	745.67 (128.66)	724.38 (138.26)	751.33 (101.60)	746.25(129.31)
Ingroup Stereotype	769.4 (146.84)	752.35(159.84)	734.48(109.17)	740.54(133.33)
Nonstereotypical	770.94(133.48)	759.47(174.14)	699.44(98.42)	684.16(102.02)

Note. Values are reaction times in ms.




Figure 5. RTs for outgroup, ingroup and nonstereotypical words. Experimental conditions are shown in the x-axis. The error bars indicate the SEMs.

When ingroup and outgroup stereotype accessibilities were compared, conservative participants in the liberal other condition showed higher outgroup stereotype accessibility ($M = 35.09$, $SD = 70.22$) than ingroup stereotype accessibility ($M = 7.12$, $SD = 64.08$), $t(50) = 3.53$, $p < .001$, $d = 0.42$. On the other hand, liberal participants in the liberal other condition showed higher ingroup stereotype accessibility ($M = -21.88$, $SD = 58.50$) than outgroup stereotype accessibility ($M = -49.74$, $SD = 73.18$), $t(54) = -2.81$, $p < .01$, $d = 0.42$. Outgroup and ingroup stereotype accessibilities did not significantly differ within any other condition (see Figure 6).²⁴

²⁴ The mean values in these analyses indicate outgroup (nonstereotypical RT-outgroup stereotype RT) or ingroup (nonstereotypical RT-ingroup stereotype RT) stereotype accessibilities. One point to remind here is that, there were two outlier participants in terms of stereotype accessibilities (one of whom was an outlier in terms of both ingroup and outgroup stereotype accessibilities and the other was an outlier in terms of ingroup stereotype accessibility alone) who were not outliers in terms of general RTs for outgroup, ingroup and nonstereotypical words. These participants' accessibility scores were excluded from the analyses regarding the related stereotype accessibility alone, namely, their general RTs were included in the general RT analyses. This is the reason why the difference between RTs that can be calculated from Table 3 does not match with the mean accessibility values reported here.




Figure 6. Outgroup and ingroup stereotype accessibilities. Experimental conditions are shown in the x-axis. The error bars indicate the SEMs.

Response Latency in Stroop Task

Although Stroop interference (i.e., latency for responding to incongruent trials compared to baseline trials), not general response latency in the Stroop task, is a measure of inhibitory function, further analyses on general response latency was conducted as liberals and conservatives differed in this aspect. As reported earlier, conservatives were generally slower in the Stroop task than liberals when exposed ideology condition was ignored (see the section: Comparison of Reaction Times in Stroop Task Trials). In order to investigate the mechanism underlying this slower reaction time, first of all, Pearson's correlation analyses were conducted between general Stroop RT and possible related variables (intergroup anxiety, ingroup

identification, self-control, outgroup stereotype accessibility, ingroup stereotype accessibility) within four experimental conditions (see Tables 4, 5, 6, 7). This resulted in numerous correlation figures and as many significance tests. Thus, one must interpret these correlations and their accompanying significance test results with caution, as the possibility that some significant correlations are due to chance cannot be ignored given that a large number of tests was conducted. One critical finding was that, in conservative participant-opposing-other condition there was a positive correlation between general Stroop RT and outgroup stereotype accessibility, $r(48) = .39, p < .01$; and between general Stroop RT and ingroup stereotype accessibility, $r(47) = .38, p < .01$. Based on these correlations, including the whole sample of this study, we analyzed whether stereotype accessibility is a mediator between political ideology and general Stroop RT. First of all, outgroup stereotype accessibility was analyzed as a possible mediator of the ideology and general Stroop RT relationship. Thus, a series of regression analyses were conducted as suggested by Baron and Kenny (1986). At the first step of this model, political ideology of the participant (i.e., conservatism, entered as a dummy variable) significantly predicted general Stroop RT, indicating conservatives' slower reaction in Stroop task, $b = .18, t(196) = 2.54, p < .05$. Conservatism also explained a significant proportion of variance in general Stroop RT, $R^2 = .31, F(1, 196) = 6.44, p < .001$. Second, conservatism significantly predicted outgroup stereotype accessibility, indicating more outgroup stereotype accessibility of conservatives compared to liberals, $b = .53, t(205) = 8.86, p < .001$, and explaining a significant proportion of variance in outgroup stereotype accessibility, $R^2 = .28, F(1, 205) = 78.50, p < .001$. Third, when conservatism was controlled in the first step of hierarchical regression, outgroup stereotype accessibility significantly contributed to the prediction of general Stroop RT, $b = .18, t(194) = 2.22, p < .05$. Outgroup stereotype accessibility also explained a significant proportion of variance in general Stroop RT, $R^2 = .06, F(1, 194) = 5.71, p < .01$. Lastly, when outgroup stereotype

accessibility was controlled at the first step of hierarchical regression, conservatism did not contribute to the prediction of general Stroop RT, $b = .08$, $t(194) = 1.01$, $p = .32$, nor did it explained a significant proportion of variance in response latency, $R^2_{change} = .005$, $F_{change}(2, 194) = 1.01$, $p = .31$. Taken together, these results indicated that outgroup stereotype accessibility fully mediated the relationship between conservatism and general RT in the Stroop task. Specifically, conservatives' slower reaction in the Stroop task compared to liberals was related to the higher accessibility of outgroup stereotypes in their minds.

After that, ingroup stereotype accessibility was analyzed as another possible mediator of the political ideology and general Stroop RT relationship. Conservatism significantly predicted ingroup stereotype accessibility, $b = .28$, $t(203) = 4.19$, $p < .001$, by explaining a significant proportion of variance in ingroup stereotype accessibility, $R^2 = .08$, $F(1, 203) = 17.57$, $p < .001$. However, when conservatism was controlled at the first step of hierarchical regression, ingroup stereotype accessibility did not significantly contribute to the prediction of general Stroop RT, $b = .11$, $t(193) = 1.58$, $p = .12$, and failed to explain a significant proportion of variance in general Stroop RT, $R^2_{change} = .01$, $F_{change}(2, 193) = 2.48$, $p = .12$. Thus, ingroup stereotype accessibility did not mediate the relationship between conservatism and general RT in the Stroop task.

Other Correlations within Experimental Conditions

In an exploratory fashion, the Pearson's correlations between all measures (Stroop interference, ingroup identification, intergroup anxiety, self-control, social/political resistance to change, social/political opposition to equality, outgroup stereotype accessibility and ingroup stereotype accessibility) within the experimental groups were carried out. We aimed to explore whether the pattern of correlations, especially involving experimental measures (which were subject to being influenced by the

manipulation), might differ between experimental conditions in a meaningful or interesting way. Next, some interesting results of these correlation analyses will be reported (for all results, see Table 4, 5, 6, and 7).

In the liberal participant-similar-other condition, ingroup stereotype accessibility was positively correlated with Stroop interference, $r(51) = .39, p < .01$. In other words, as the ingroup stereotypes of the liberals in the liberal other condition became more accessible, their Stroop interference increased. Again in this condition, ingroup stereotype accessibility was positively correlated with social resistance to change scores, $r(53) = .32, p < .05$. In other words, as liberal participants' social/political resistance to change scores increased (i.e., as they became closer to conservatives in this aspect), their ingroup stereotypes became more accessible if the interaction partner was a liberal.

On the other hand, in liberal participant-opposing-other condition, ingroup stereotype accessibility was negatively correlated with Stroop interference, $r(53) = -.32, p < .05$. Specifically, as the ingroup stereotypes of liberals anticipating an interaction with a conservative person became more accessible, their Stroop interference decreased. Besides, in this condition, social resistance to change score was negatively correlated with ingroup stereotype accessibility, $r(49) = -.42, p < .01$, indicating that, as liberals were closer to conservatives in terms of social/political resistance to change, their ingroup stereotypes became less accessible in this condition.

Outgroup stereotype accessibility and ingroup stereotype accessibility were positively correlated in the conservative participant-liberal other, $r(49) = .65, p < .001$; liberal participant-liberal other, $r(53) = .53, p < .01$; and the liberal participant-conservative other, $r(49) = .34, p < .05$, conditions. In other words, in these three conditions, participants' outgroup stereotype accessibility was higher as their ingroup stereotype accessibility was higher. The only exception was the conservative

participant-conservative other condition where this correlation was insignificant, $r(46) = .20, p = .18$.

Besides these findings, we found other within-group significant correlations between measures, which are more difficult to interpret and therefore should be approached with caution.²⁵ Next, some of these findings will be reported.

Ingroup identification was positively correlated with intergroup anxiety in conservative participant-liberal other, $r(50) = .31, p < .05$, and liberal participant-liberal other conditions, $r(54) = .36, p < .01$. Only in the liberal participant-liberal other condition, there was a positive correlation between ingroup identification and outgroup stereotype accessibility, $r(54) = .35, p < .01$, and ingroup identification and ingroup stereotype accessibility, $r(53) = .27, p < .05$.

There was a negative correlation between social opposition to equality scores and outgroup stereotype accessibility only in the conservative participant-conservative other condition, $r(46) = -.32, p < .05$. That is to say, as conservatives were higher in opposition to equality and were anticipating to interact with a conservative other, they were less likely to have their outgroup stereotype accessible.

²⁵ As the number of Pearson's correlations can be seen in Tables 4, 5, 6, and 7, one should keep in mind that the probability of making type 1 errors was highly probable in these statistical analyses.

Table 4. Correlations within the Conservative Participant – Conservative Other Condition

	Stroop Interference	Response Latency (General)	Ingroup Identification	Intergroup anxiety	Brief Self Control	Social Resistance to Change	Social Opposition to Equality	Outgroup Stereotype Accessibility	Ingroup Stereotype Accessibility
Stroop Interference	1								
Response Latency (General)	.267	1							
Ingroup Identification	.133	.134	1						
Intergroup anxiety	-.065	.063	.170	1					
Brief Self Control	.266	.116	-.076	-.037	1				
Social Resistance to Change	.126	.225	-.078	.130	-.047	1			
Social Opposition to Equality	.246	.025	-.205	-.101	.026	.141	1		
Outgroup Stereotype Accessibility	-.070	.233	.213	-.181	-.142	-.106	-.321*	1	
Ingroup Stereotype Accessibility	-.198	-.087	-.139	-.140	.085	-.101	.002	.196	1

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$

Table 5. Correlations within the Conservative Participant –Liberal Other Condition

	Stroop Interference	Response Latency (General)	Ingroup Identification	Intergroup anxiety	Brief Self Control	Social Resistance to Change	Social Opposition to Equality	Outgroup Stereotype Accessibility	Ingroup Stereotype Accessibility
Stroop Interference	1								
Response Latency (General)	.193	1							
Ingroup Identification	.015	.082	1						
Intergroup anxiety	.043	.065	.312*	1					
Brief Self Control	.003	.124	.145	.059	1				
Social Resistance to Change	-.071	.112	.156	-.030	.050	1			
Social Opposition to Equality	-.228	.086	-.060	-.265	.160	-.011	1		
Outgroup Stereotype Accessibility	-.168	.395**	.211	.060	.146	.115	.046	1	
Ingroup Stereotype Accessibility	-.174	.379**	.198	.198	.111	.018	.000	.649**	1

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$

Table 6. Correlations within the Liberal Participant –Liberal Other Condition

	Stroop Interference	Response Latency (General)	Ingroup Identification	Intergroup anxiety	Brief Self Control	Social Resistance to Change	Social Opposition to Equality	Outgroup Stereotype Accessibility	Ingroup Stereotype Accessibility
Stroop Interference	1								
Response Latency (General)	.428**	1							
Ingroup Identification	.176	.375**	1						
Intergroup anxiety	-.176	-.015	.364**	1					
Brief Self Control	-.134	-.016	-.015	-.065	1				
Social Resistance to Change	-.020	-.030	.110	.097	.128	1			
Social Opposition to Equality	.219	.054	-.041	-.067	-.025	.265	1		
Outgroup Stereotype Accessibility	.045	.012	.347**	.101	-.009	.172	.021	1	
Ingroup Stereotype Accessibility	.394**	.120	.273*	.193	-.175	.317*	.113	.394**	1

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$

Table 7. Correlations within the Liberal Participant –Conservative Other Condition

	Stroop Interference	Response Latency (General)	Ingroup Identification	Intergroup anxiety	Brief Self Control	Social Resistance to Change	Social Opposition to Equality	Outgroup Stereotype Accessibility	Ingroup Stereotype Accessibility
Stroop Interference	1								
Response Latency (General)	.232	1							
Ingroup Identification	.046	.318*	1						
Intergroup anxiety	.285	.033	.135	1					
Brief Self Control	-.080	.021	.007	-.173	1				
Social Resistance to Change	.068	.076	-.107	-.073	.180	1			
Social Opposition to Equality	-.046	-.139	.009	-.077	-.075	.420**	1		
Outgroup Stereotype Accessibility	-.452**	-.056	.202	-.042	.259	.003	.061	1	
Ingroup Stereotype Accessibility	-.323*	.073	.028	-.241	.078	-.421**	-.128	.337*	1

* $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$

CHAPTER 4

DISCUSSION

The present study was an attempt to contribute to the literature on the psychological motives underlying political ideologies. Specifically, we analyzed whether conservatives and liberals differ in how their self-regulatory resources are affected (i.e., to what extent their resources were depleted) in anticipation of an upcoming interaction with an opposing view other, compared to anticipating an interaction with a similar view other. Moreover, the role of various individual difference variables, such as baseline self-control, intergroup anxiety and ingroup identification, in the relationship between political ideology and self-regulatory resources was investigated. We also examined the extent to which ingroup and outgroup stereotypes became accessible as a result of anticipating an interaction and whether such accessibility played any role in the political ideology-resource depletion relationship. Finally, capitalizing on the wealth of information collected from these participants, various exploratory analyses were conducted.

Interpretation of Analyses for the Main Hypotheses

As mentioned earlier in detail, research from political psychology, political science, social and personality psychology, and social neuroscience directly and indirectly shows that conservatives are more intolerant towards “others” (i.e., outgroup members, deviators from their own norms, etc.) than liberals. Conservatives tend to support a hierarchical view of society besides resisting change, being intolerant of

ambiguity and deviators from the social order, while liberals are rather motivated to support equality, change, and tolerance (e.g., Jost et al., 2003a; Van Hiel, Onraet, & De Pauw, 2010). In parallel with this motivational differentiation, liberals were shown to be physiologically more tolerant of conflict compared to conservatives (Amodio et al., 2007).

The present study was based on the resource depletion account of self-regulation. This theory relies on the idea that self-control is a limited resource and increased use of self-regulatory resources in a situation leads to decreased self-control in a subsequent independent task (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). The most relevant study to the proposals of the present study was conducted by Richeson and Shelton (2003) and showed that implicit prejudice among White American participants towards Black people predicts self-regulation (i.e., Stroop inhibition) in the presence of a Black experimenter. Although there was no direct behavioral evidence in the literature that conservatives and liberals differ in their self-regulatory effort in an anticipation of an upcoming interaction with an opposing view other, the research from various fields of social science contributed to the construction of hypotheses of this study: (a) conservatives in opposing-other condition should perform *worse* than conservatives in the similar-other condition (i.e., anticipating an interaction with someone who shares their political views) in the subsequent executive control task and (b) liberals in the opposing-other condition should perform *better* than conservatives in the opposing-other condition in a subsequent executive control task. Moreover, based on the idea that approach orientation (which was found to be more prevalent among liberals, see Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, & Baldacci, 2008) should lead to less reliance on self-control in the opposing-other condition, we hypothesized that (c) the *best* performance of executive control should

be seen in the group of liberals who anticipated an interaction with another liberal person.

Findings Regarding Comparisons between Liberals and Conservatives in Liberal Other and Conservative Other Conditions

Before conducting the analyses on these main hypotheses, the comparability of four experimental conditions in terms of other variables measured in this study (i.e., self-control, intergroup anxiety and ingroup identification) was investigated.

Conservatives and liberals in general were found to be different only in terms of “self-control” variables. In particular, conservatives showed almost higher levels of self-control than liberals in general. Previous studies already implied that conservatives are better self-controllers, by showing a link between religiosity and self-control (McCullough & Willoughby, 2009). Nevertheless, when self-control was controlled in the analyses of hypotheses, results remained not significant. The four experimental groups did not differ in any other aspects.

In all four conditions, participants experienced Stroop interference (i.e, they gave slower responses to incongruent trials compared to baseline trials). Yet, in none of the conditions was Stroop facilitation (faster response to congruent trials compared to baseline trials) observed. In parallel to these findings, MacLeod and McDonald (2000) claimed that there is an asymmetry in the processes of facilitation and interference in the Stroop task. According to these researchers, congruent trials are unique as one cannot differentiate whether participants read the word aloud or named the color of the stimulus, in the correct responses. They proposed ‘inadvertent reading’ hypothesis, indicating that Stroop facilitation is a result of participants’

accidental reading of the color of the stimulus and their failure to maintain the goal of the task (i.e., color naming, not color reading) in the congruent trials. Stroop interference, on the other hand, is an outcome of the competition between two separate dimensions of a stimulus (i.e., color and word) and correct responses in the incongruent trials clearly indicate that participants named the color of the stimulus by inhibiting their propensity to read the word (Kane & Engle, 2003). This is shown as one of the reasons why Stroop interference and Stroop facilitation are the result of the different processing systems. The findings of this study also support this account of dissociation between Stroop facilitation and Stroop interference, as results did not indicate Stroop facilitation but did indicate Stroop interference.

Findings Regarding the Main Hypotheses

The first hypothesis about conservatives' self-regulatory resources being more depleted in the opposing-other condition compared to similar-other condition was not supported. In general, conservatives showed similar performances in the Stroop task in these two conditions. However, contrary to the expectations of this study, in the second block of the Stroop task, conservatives who anticipated an interaction with a liberal other were *less* depleted (showed less Stroop interference) than those who anticipated an interaction with a conservative other. Moreover, in the latter group, reaction time to all types of stimuli significantly increased in the second block compared to the first block of the task.

The second hypothesis about less resource depletion of liberals than conservatives in the opposing view other condition was not supported, as well. Conservative participants in opposing-other condition performed as well as liberals

in opposing view other condition, indicating that both groups maintained an equal amount of self-regulatory resources in anticipation of an inter-ideological interaction. There were also no differences when performances were compared in two blocks of the Stroop task.

The third hypothesis on the liberal participant and liberal-other condition showing the best performance in all conditions was also not supported. Performance in Stroop task (Stroop interference) did not differ between four conditions. The only difference between four conditions was in terms of the reaction time to baseline trials, indicating that liberals in both similar and opposing-other conditions responded to baseline trials faster than conservatives in similar and opposing-other conditions.

Why Were the Main Hypotheses Not Supported?

Contrary to the first hypothesis, conservatives showed similar Stroop interference (i.e., resource depletion) in opposing and similar-other conditions. At first sight, this may indicate that the manipulation of getting participants to anticipate an interaction did not work for these conditions. Nevertheless, interestingly, when conservatives anticipated an interaction with a liberal other, they showed a far lesser amount of resource depletion in the second block of the task, compared to the first block. This performance also differs from conservative participant and similar-other condition in which reaction time to all types of stimuli was slower at the second block compared to the first block, indicating a fatigue effect. The literature on conservatives' attitudes towards opposing view others as reviewed in the introduction part of this thesis does not allow us to interpret in a meaningful way why conservatives became better at the

last part of the task (which, from their perspective, is just before the interaction took place). Therefore, we suggest that further investigations should be conducted on the possible cognitive strategies conservatives employ, during the process of inter-ideological interaction.

The analysis of the second hypothesis (i.e., the main point of interest in this study) on the comparison of liberals and conservatives in terms of their resource depletion in anticipation of an inter-ideological interaction yielded insignificant results, as well. One could speculate on a couple of possible explanations for why conservatives and liberals did not differ in terms of self-regulation in the opposing-other condition.

One possible explanation is that, conservative people rely on as much self-regulatory resources as liberal people when they anticipate an inter-ideological interaction. That is to say, liberal people are as much intolerant of opposing view others as conservatives are (or conservative people are as tolerant of opposing view others as liberals are). In parallel to this idea, Kaplan, Freedman, and Iacomoni (2007) found that while viewing the facial photograph of a presidential candidate of the opposing view, both liberals and conservatives showed increasing activity in DLPFC (dorsolateral prefrontal cortex) and AC (anterior cingulate cortex) which are the brain regions responsible for cognitive and emotional regulation, respectively. Despite the diverse literature indicating a specific relationship between liberalism and political tolerance, in the present study, liberals may indeed have relied on their regulatory resources while anticipating an interaction with a conservative other just as much as conservatives did.

The findings of Kaplan et al. (2007) suggest that while liberals may not differ from conservatives in their initial responses to opposing view others, the increased

tolerance of liberals towards opposing view others that is documented in the literature may require cognitive effort. In other words, liberals may still be behaviorally more tolerant towards the opposing view other than conservatives; yet, this tolerance may have a cognitive cost. Skitka et al. (2002) showed that, whereas liberals were more tolerant than conservatives towards people with AIDS (those who are responsible for their condition), the level of tolerance became similar for people of both political ideologies when a cognitive load was induced. The authors referred to this phenomenon as “corrective processing,” suggesting that tolerance shown by liberals requires cognitive resources to correct an automatic reaction of intolerance. If this is the case, in this study, liberals may have spent their cognitive resources for corrective processing and as a result of this, performed poorer than they would actually perform (and as equal to conservatives) in the Stroop task. On the other hand, Muraven, Shmueli, and Burkley (2006) showed that in certain circumstances such as having information about the upcoming regulation task, participants may allocate their cognitive resources accordingly and perform poorer than their actual capacity. To put it differently, they demonstrated participants’ motivation to conserve self-control resources when exertion of self-control in near future was anticipated. In the present study as well, liberal participants may have allocated their cognitive resources for upcoming interaction task more than conservative participants. For example, liberal participants may have thought that they should act as appropriate to their egalitarian view (which may require their exertion of self-control) in the political interaction task with an opposing-other in near future. Thus, they may have conserved their self-control resources, and performed poorer in the Stroop task than they would perform without such anticipation. Future studies should

investigate these suggestions, for instance, by adding control groups to the experimental design.

Lastly, liberal participants in the similar-other condition did not show the expected best performance among four experimental conditions. As it will be discussed later (see the section; The Relationship between Liberals' Ingroup Stereotype Accessibility and Resource Depletion), within the liberal participant-similar-other condition some other dynamics such as "within-group comparison" may have taken place, as resource depletion was positively correlated with ingroup stereotype accessibility, only in this condition. Therefore, contrary to expectations, the salience of their political ideology may have failed to evoke liberals' approach motivation and boost their performance in the Stroop task.

Interpretation of Analyses for Hypothesized Mediators and Moderators

As the first three hypotheses were not supported by the findings, it became largely unnecessary to carry out analyses for the fourth and fifth mediation hypotheses, at first sight. Still, mediation and moderation analyses brought about some interesting results that will be covered in the following sections.

Stereotype Accessibility

The most striking findings of the present study was on the relationship between political ideology, outgroup stereotype accessibility and resource depletion. As no relationship was found between political ideology and resource depletion, the hypothesis on outgroup stereotype accessibility's being a possible underlying factor

of this proposed relationship was apparently not supported. Nevertheless, mediation analysis showed that outgroup stereotype accessibility was still an “inconsistent mediator” of this relationship, as conservatism led to higher outgroup stereotype accessibility; and outgroup stereotype accessibility led to less Stroop interference. Thus, these relations with opposite directions cancelled each other out and the relationship between political ideology and resource depletion in the opposing-other condition disappeared.

More specifically, as expected, conservatives’ accessibility of stereotypes for liberals was higher than liberals’ accessibility of stereotypes for conservatives. Nevertheless, contrary to the expectations of this study, this accessibility predicted resource depletion in a negative way. In other words, as participants’ outgroup stereotypes were more accessible, their resources were less depleted. In the introduction chapter of this study, it was hypothesized that outgroup stereotype accessibility would be a manifestation of the effort one exerts to repress the stereotypes in accordance with the rebound hypothesis of stereotyping (Macrae et al., 1994). Nevertheless, as conservatives’ outgroup stereotype accessibility did not differ in the opposing-other and similar-other conditions, this accessibility seems not to be due to a rebound after suppression, but a general pattern of stereotypical thinking.²⁶ Besides, taking into account that lexical decision task was carried out after the Stroop task, it may well be the case that conservatives did not have enough cognitive resources to suppress their stereotypes, while liberals, may have allocated their resources for stereotype suppression. In other words, conservatives may have relied on their self-control resources in the Stroop task more than liberals and may have had less resources of self-control left for stereotype suppression. On the other

²⁶ There are various studies in the literature using lexical decision task in order to measure stereotype accessibility directly (not as an outcome of the rebound effect), as well (e.g., Rudman, Ashmore, & Gary, 2001; Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 2001).

hand, liberals may have conserved their self-control resources for stereotype suppression, if they thought it was necessary for consensus in the upcoming political task. We think these speculations are worth consideration and future investigation.

As analyzed in an exploratory fashion, general response patterns of conservatives and liberals also strengthened the findings on outgroup stereotype accessibility. For conservatives in both opposing and similar-other conditions, stereotypes for outgroup ideology were more cognitively accessible than nonideological (control) words as they were faster to respond to outgroup stereotype words than nonideological and ingroup stereotype words in the lexical decision task. For liberals in both conditions, on the other hand, both outgroup and ingroup stereotype words were less cognitively accessible than nonstereotypical words, as they were significantly faster in responding to the former. These findings support the argument that liberals successfully suppressed their stereotypical thoughts both for the outgroup (conservatives) and the ingroup (liberals). This brings us to the question of whether it actually required cognitive effort to suppress these stereotypical thoughts for liberals.

Different lines of research offer different answers to the question of whether it is automatic or cognitively effortful for liberals to suppress their stereotypical thoughts. Some researchers showed that for certain people controlling prejudice is an automatic process. Park, Glaser, and Knowles (2008) found that people with egalitarian motives of controlling prejudice do not experience cognitive depletion stemming from prejudice. In a different line of research, Wright and Baril (2011) showed that the level of “individualizing” foundation of morality (i.e., harm and fairness) remains the same for both liberals and conservatives, after the depletion of self regulatory resources. However, conservatives’ prioritization of “binding”

foundations of morality (i.e., ingroup, authority, and purity), which could be thought of as related to prejudicial thinking towards certain groups, decreased after a cognitive load was induced. Consistent with these findings, one may conclude, at least in certain circumstances, that egalitarianism is more automatic than discriminative thinking. On the other hand, the findings of the study by Skitka et al. (2002) supported that tolerance towards some groups is cognitively effortful. As mentioned before, they showed that liberal participants' tolerance for people with AIDS who were responsible for their health condition significantly dropped after a cognitive load. If liberals exert cognitive effort to be tolerant in some conditions, suppression of related stereotypical thoughts in these conditions may be effortful for them, as well. In the present study, if it was effortful for liberals to suppress their stereotypes for conservatives, they may have spent their regulatory resources on this suppression process and performed poorer than they would actually perform in the Stroop task, as suggested previously. On the other hand, if it was automatic for liberals to suppress their stereotypes for conservatives, stereotype suppression should not have affected their Stroop performances and they should have just relied on a similar amount of regulatory resources as conservatives in the opposing-other condition. That is to say, further studies should be conducted in order to make clear whether it is cognitively effortful for liberals to suppress their stereotypes for conservatives.²⁷

Ingroup stereotype accessibility was also an inconsistent mediator of the political ideology and resource depletion relationship in the opposing-other

²⁷ To what extent the person could be held responsible for his/her situation may be explanatory for liberals' cognitive effort in suppression of stereotypes for that person, as Skitka et al. (2002) suggested. If that is the case, it may be a good idea to investigate, to what extent liberals perceive conservatives as "responsible" for their support for conservative ideology (i.e., if ideology is perceived as being more about an independent choice of self or an outcome of social exposure such as family influences).

conditions. To put it differently, conservatism predicted higher accessibility of ingroup stereotypes, which in turn predicted less resource depletion (i.e., less Stroop interference). The possible reasons for conservatism, outgroup stereotype accessibility, and resource depletion relationship suggested above may apply to this finding, as well. To restate them briefly, conservatives may have devoted their regulatory resources to Stroop task and as a result, had ingroup stereotypes, as well as outgroup stereotypes, in their minds more accessible than liberals. Liberals, on the other hand, may have engaged in stereotype suppression more than conservatives and performed less than their actual capacity at the Stroop Task, assuming that such suppression requires cognitive effort, as I discussed above.

Intergroup Anxiety

Intergroup anxiety was another variable which was proposed to mediate the relationship between political ideology and resource depletion. Previous studies showed that intergroup anxiety enhances offensive actions towards the members of the outgroup (Van Zomeren, Fischer, & Spears, 2007). Research also showed that conservative people tend to be anxiety-prone which could even be observed in their skin conductance levels when they were exposed to threatening images (Oxley et al., 2008). Taking into account these findings relating conservatism and attitudes towards outgroups to anxiety, intergroup anxiety was proposed to be a possible mediator of the relationship between political ideology and resource depletion in the experimental setting of the present study. Nevertheless, intergroup anxiety was found to be related to neither political ideology of the participant, nor resource depletion in this study.

One possible explanation for these insignificant results is the social desirability bias in answering the intergroup anxiety scale. Although Stephan et al. (2002) found that intergroup anxiety is correlated with ingroup identification and negative stereotyping, in the present study, intergroup anxiety was correlated only with ingroup identification²⁸, not with outgroup stereotype accessibility. we suggest that the explicitness of the scale may have rendered it vulnerable to social desirability bias. As participants anticipated that they would engage in a political collaboration task with another participant about whom they reported their feelings, they might have underreported their level of intergroup anxiety. Moreover, low level of intergroup anxiety may stem from perceived safety of the experimental context which is a university lab. Possibly due to those reasons, the four experimental conditions did not differ in terms of intergroup anxiety and expected correlations with intergroup anxiety did not reach significance.

Perceived Status of Other and Ingroup Identification

Perceived status of other was explored as a possible moderator of the relationship between political ideology and resource depletion in the opposing-other condition. The idea was that; as the ruling party in Turkey is a conservative party currently, liberals' anticipation of interacting with a conservative other may render their perception of having a "lower status" in the society salient. Thus, they may feel threatened and engage in self-regulation as much as conservatives in the opposing-other condition.

²⁸ This correlation was significant in three of the four experimental conditions (except for the liberal participant-conservative other condition).

Nevertheless, Perceived Status Difference Scale used in the present study was found to be unreliable. Therefore, analyses about the effect of “perceived status of other” on the relationship between political ideology and resource depletion were not reported.²⁹

Ingroup identification was the last variable which was explored as a possible moderator of the ideology and resource depletion relationship. The study by Giguère and Lalonde (2009) showed that, in case of identity threat, higher ingroup identification leads to higher self-regulatory effort. Consistent with this study and studies such as those on social identity theory suggesting the relationship between ingroup identification and motivation to restore identity in case of identity threat (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1979), we explored whether identification with one’s political ideology may have an effect on the relationship between political ideology and resource depletion. However, ingroup identification did not moderate this relationship. This was the case most probably because participants may have not felt any threat to their identities in this study’s experimental setting and so may have not relied on their regulatory resources to protect their group identities.

Other Comparisons between Conservatives and Liberals and Some Questions to Answer

After the analyses of the main hypotheses and hypotheses on mediators and moderators, some extra analyses were conducted in order to explore the relationships

²⁹ When we still analyzed perceived status of other’s possible moderation of the relationship between political ideology and resource depletion, the results were insignificant. Actually, an interesting finding coming from this unreliable Perceived Status Difference measure was that, liberals, compared to conservatives, were more likely to perceive the social status of opposing ideological group as higher than their own group. Yet, we do not put forward an argument on this finding in order not to lead to misleading judgements.

between all the variables measured in this study. Some of these analyses brought about interesting results that are worth consideration and discussion.

Why are Conservatives Generally Slower than Liberals at the Stroop Task?

Conservatives' responses were found to be generally slower at the Stroop task (i.e., collapsing across trial type), compared to liberals' responses, independent of the exposed ideology condition. Further analyses showed that the relationship between conservatism and general slowness in Stroop task was fully mediated by outgroup stereotype accessibility (when exposed ideology condition was ignored). That is, conservatives' higher response latency in Stroop task compared to liberals stem from the higher accessibility of outgroup stereotypes in their minds. Although the existing literature does not provide us information regarding the extent to which conservatives' slowness in their responses when their outgroup stereotypes are accessible is strategic, we think this finding provides an interesting point to speculate on.

Keeping in mind that general slowness in Stroop task does not indicate inhibitory self-regulation, one possible interpretation of this result is that conservatives may have responded to all types of trials with more caution when they had outgroup stereotypes more accessible in their minds. As stereotypes are known as cognitive heuristics and energy-savers (Macrae et al., 1994), having them more accessible in mind may not be directly associated with a general slowing down in the Stroop task, but instead may save the person cognitive resources that they can then devote to the Stroop task. Moreover, as explained, higher accessibility of stereotypes does not seem to be an outcome of stereotype suppression (i.e., rebound effect) in

this study, as stereotype accessibility was found to be related with self-regulation (Stroop interference) in a negative way. Thus, there seems to be another factor underlying this conservative-specific slowing down such as strategic responding. This strategic responding may stem from the motivation to increase accuracy for the sake of response speed. Yet, results showed that the congruency-incongruency of trials did not affect conservatives' reaction times differently than it affected liberals' reaction times. Therefore, this relationship between general slowness in response and conservatism requires further investigation.

The Relationship between Liberals' Ingroup Stereotype Accessibility and Resource Depletion

The relationship between Stroop interference and ingroup stereotype accessibility was in the opposite directions in liberal participant-opposing-other and liberal participant-similar-other conditions. Specifically, when liberal people anticipated interacting with a conservative other, the higher the accessibility of ingroup stereotypes, the less resource depletion they experienced. Yet, when liberal people anticipated interacting with a liberal other, as accessibility of ingroup stereotypes was higher, participants experienced more resource depletion.

In the former condition, having the ingroup stereotypes more accessible in their minds (which might serve the function of imagining how they are in the eyes of conservatives) may have helped liberals to deal with the anticipated interaction with opposing-other, and thus to have less self-regulatory resources depleted. Besides, in this condition, as social/political resistance to change scores of participants were higher (as participants were closer to conservatives in this dimension), ingroup

stereotypes were less accessible. That is, as liberalism becomes less extreme, participants were worse at accessing the stereotypes of their ingroup. This may be the case because as the ideological difference between the participant and the anticipated interaction partner decreased, perceived threat of being stereotyped might have also decreased and this might have rendered ingroup stereotypes less accessible than the conditions in which political ideology of the participant and anticipated partner are polarized. Although, resistance to change was not found to be directly and significantly related to resource depletion in this study, we suggest that, the relationship between liberalism, ingroup stereotype accessibility, and resource depletion in anticipating interaction with an opposing-other should be investigated in further studies.

On the other hand, in the latter (liberal participant-liberal other) condition, some other dynamics that are harder to speculate on may have come into play. For instance, some ingroup (liberal) stereotyping mechanism, stemming from a comparative judgment between self and other (i.e., either seeing the other as more liberal than the self or vice versa) may have worked in parallel with the self-regulatory mechanism. That is, liberal participants may have engaged in a comparison between self and anticipated liberal partner, leading to a self-regulatory mechanism evoking both ingroup stereotypes and resource depletion. Also, as participants in this condition were closer to conservatives (i.e., got higher scores) in terms of social/political resistance to change dimension of conservatism, they had ingroup (liberal) stereotypes more accessible. Despite the fact that resource depletion again was not directly related to resistance to change in this study, it may be worth conducting further investigation on the relationship between seeing the other as more (or less) liberal than the self, ingroup (liberal) stereotype accessibility,

and resource depletion. Moreover, further studies should investigate whether such comparative judgments within the same ideological group have any effect on the kinds of variables investigated in this study. Also, comparison of ingroup stereotyping before and after the exposed ideology manipulation would make clear to what extent the level of ingroup stereotype accessibility is an outcome of the anticipated interaction partner's ideology or a default condition.

Limitations and Future Directions

As the present study was the first and only study on inter-ideological tolerance that uses cognitive measures that we know of, rendering such quasi-experimental design feasible led to certain limitations as I will describe next.

First of all, one possible limitation of this study is the sample of university students. Skitka et al. (2002) underlined that as most of the students do not work, pay taxes, and so on, their political ideologies may have not matured yet. Moreover, as mentioned in the introduction chapter, the university in general (and in particular, Boğaziçi University) provides a liberal context in which people of different ideologies contact with each other frequently. This liberal context may have contributed to both conservatives and liberals having a high motivation for tolerance towards the opposing view in the experiment. Besides, these participants were not polarized in terms of ideology as participants' scores in the battery phase of this study were closer to the liberal side of the continuum and as we used a preselection procedure similar to median-split (the median score did not exactly indicate the medium of left-right ideology continuum). Therefore, the results of this study should

not be generalized to the population such as to those with extremist political ideologies or those functioning in a more conservative context in their daily lives.

Another issue about the characteristic of the sample is that, the participants of this study were the students of Boğaziçi University which admits students who are in the 99th percentile of the university entrance exam. So these participants may have a particularly high level of capacity in self-regulation in general, so their reliance on self-regulation may have not been differentiated between experimental conditions (i.e., the experimental manipulations may have failed to create large enough differences in participants' self-regulatory mechanisms). The difficulty of the self-regulation measure may be manipulated in future studies, for instance, by increasing the number of congruent trials in the Stroop task (see Hutchison, Smith, & Ferris, 2012), thereby making it more sensitive to smaller differences in the experiment.

One other issue is the presentation order of the tasks. In this study, participants received the Stroop task before the lexical decision task. This procedure necessitates some caution in interpreting stereotype accessibility's (as measured by the lexical decision task) mediation of political ideology and resource depletion (as measured by the Stroop task) relationship. Specifically, this regression analysis should be interpreted by considering that the Stroop task may have affected the following lexical decision task in some way, such as leading to a cognitive depletion or a strategy (e.g., resource allocation for future task). Future studies should minimize such effect by distancing these two tasks, but by making sure that the cognitive processes due to the anticipation of the future interaction are not disrupted.

Despite the fact that the dependent variable of this study (i.e., resource depletion) was measured through a cognitive and implicit way, some variables that were thought to be possible mediators/moderators were measured via self-report

techniques. These measures may have been susceptible to social desirability bias, as mentioned before. Especially, participants may have the tendency to underreport their intergroup anxiety in this liberal context. In some previous studies as well, contrary to expectations, anxiety measured by self-report did not predict resource depletion (Johns et al., 2008). So it may be better to measure intergroup anxiety in a more implicit way in the future studies. Moreover, some other emotions such as anger and frustration that may be hypothesized as regulated during such interaction may be controlled in further studies, as well.

This study limited the possible mechanisms underlying resource depletion to intergroup anxiety, stereotype accessibility, perceived status of other, and ingroup identification. Nevertheless, there may be other mechanisms such as intergroup contact which can be important for explaining variation in inter-ideological tolerance (see for a similar discussion, Hodson & Busseri, 2012). Future studies should control for the effect of intergroup contact, which may have been quite responsible for the similarity of liberals and conservatives in terms of inter-ideological tolerance (i.e., resource depletion) in this study, as both groups have the opportunity to contact opposing view others in positive (or at least non-threatening) situations this liberal university context.

Lastly, one should take into account that, political ideology was operationalized in terms of two dimensions in this study, which are “resistance to change” and “opposition to equality” (Jost et al., 2003). In multiparty political systems, such as Turkey’s, it may be more appropriate to conceptualize liberalism and conservatism by considering some other personal and social dimensions. Specifically, in the Turkish context, multiplicity of political parties may be related to the multiplicity of political ideologies on the liberalism-conservatism axis. Therefore,

some dimensions that may be thought of as more peripheral (or already embedded in resistance to change or opposition to equality dimensions) by the Western tradition (see Jost, 2006), such as attitudes towards military, may have become critical by themselves in the conceptualization of political ideology in this specific context. At this point, it would be critical to identify the political groups that are ideologically polarized in certain political and cultural contexts. This identification would certainly pave the way to the ultimate aim of the present study, which is providing a common ground for negotiation for people of different ideologies. Thus, we would be able to give a more complete answer to the starting question of this study; how interacting with an opposing view other affects us in our everyday lives.

Concluding Remarks

Tolerance for persons who do not share one's ideological worldview is the foundation of a truly democratic society. However, such tolerance is not always natural or easy to display. Being tolerant of ideologically dissimilar others in an interpersonal interaction may require the involved parties to devote psychological resources to regulating their prejudicial reactions. For instance, a genuinely cooperative inter-ideological interaction between two people of differing views may require each party to move past their stereotypes (i.e., inhibit stereotypical knowledge that is activated by exposure to the other person and his/her view) and focus on individuating properties of the other person and the task at hand. Likewise, the fear of being stereotyped by the other person may consume psychological resources and get in the way of having a beneficial and positive interaction.

In an investigation of these processes, this study examined conservatives and liberals' political tolerance for each other's ideology, by proposing that, people's self-regulation while they anticipated an interaction with an opposing- or a similar-view other would be a manifestation of their tolerance for these actors. Consistent with resource depletion theory which defines self-control as a limited resource that gets depleted after continuous exertion, we proposed that an increase in self-regulation while anticipating an interaction with an opposing-other would bring about resource depletion, which would definitely prevent efficient communication between people of different ideologies. Such anticipatory self-regulation should be more necessary for conservatives interacting with liberals (than liberals interacting with conservatives) due to the documented tendency of conservatives to be less tolerant of dissimilar others. Even though our hypotheses regarding conservatives' tendency to regulate themselves (and experience resource depletion) more than liberals during anticipating to interact with an opposing-other were not supported by the data, conservatives' outgroup and ingroup stereotypes (about ideological groups) became more accessible than liberals. This provided important clues for inter-ideological communication, mainly that examining resource depletion by itself may not go very far in differentiating the kinds of combinations (of the person's own ideological orientation and that of his/her interaction partner's) studied here; but it may fulfill that purpose when considered together with stereotype accessibility. Future studies should bring to light how the processes of stereotyping (i.e., utilization of stereotypes mostly by conservatives and inhibition of them by liberals) could be related to political tolerance and affect inter-ideological communication in practice which is the *sine qua non* of a democratic society. We hope that the present study will contribute to and encourage increased attention to this domain of inter-

ideological communication which, we are convinced, is absolutely worth continuous research effort in the near future.

Appendix A

Social/Political Conservatism Scale

Aşağıda, çeşitli toplumsal olaylara dair tepkilerinizle ilgili ifadeler bulunmaktadır. Lütfen dikkatlice okuyunuz ve her ifadeye ne kadar katıldığınızı 1'den 7'ye kadar olan ölçekte işaretleyiniz.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Kesinlikle			Ne katılıyorum			Kesinlikle
Katılmıyorum			ne katılmıyorum			katılıyorum

1. Gelir dağılımı eşit hale getirilmemelidir çünkü insanların kabiliyetleri eşit değildir.
2. Gelir dağılımı daha eşit olmalıdır çünkü herkesin topluma katkısı eşit derecede önemlidir.
3. İnsanlar iki sınıfa ayrılabilir: güçlü ve zayıf.
4. Devletin istikrarının korunması için yeni partilerin kurulmasına sınırlandırmalar getirilmelidir.
5. Eğer bazı gruplar yerlerini korusalardı daha az sorunumuz olurdu.
6. Eğer insanlara daha eşit bir şekilde davransaydık daha az sorun yaşayan bir toplum olurduk.
7. Toprak bütünlüğümüzün korunması kişisel çıkarlardan daha önemlidir.
8. Aşağı seviyedeki gruplar yerlerini bilmelidirler.
9. Bazı grupların tepede diğerlerinin aşağıda olması muhtemelen iyi bir şeydir.

10. Bu belalı zamanlarda kanunların kimsenin gözyaşına bakılmadan uygulanması lazım, özellikle işleri karıştıran devrimci ve provokatörlere karşı.
11. Gelir dağılımı daha eşit olmalıdır çünkü her ailenin yemek, barınak gibi temel ihtiyaçları aynıdır.
12. Batılılaşma sevdası kültürümüzün ve kimliğimizin asimile olmasına yol açacak.
13. Eğer gelir dağılımı daha eşit olsaydı insanları daha çok çalışmaya motive eden bir sebep kalmayacaktı.
14. Ülkemizin ihtiyacı daha çok medeni haktan ziyade daha katı bir hukuk ve düzendir.
15. Toplumsal grupların eşit olması iyi bir şey olurdu.
16. Hiçbir grup toplumda baskın olmamalıdır.
17. Toplumsal ahlakımıza ve geleneksel inançlarımıza zarar veren unsurlardan mutlaka kaçınmalıyız.
18. Toplumsal grupların eşitliği amacımız olmalıdır.
19. Toplumda örf ve adetlerimizin korunması değişen dünya düzenine uyum sağlamaktan daha önemlidir.
20. Bazı gruplar diğer gruplardan daha fazla yaşam hakkına sahip olabilir.
21. Tüm gruplara hayatta eşit şans tanınmalıdır.
22. Ülkenin durumu giderek ciddileşmektedir, sorun çıkaranların temizlenmesi bizi yeniden doğru yola ulaştırmak için en güçlü çözüm olacaktır.
23. Bir sürü insan ekmek bile bulamazken beş yıldızlı otellerde tatil yapmak bir insana yakışmaz.

24. Gelirleri eşitlemek için gayret etmeliyiz.
25. Gelir dağılımının daha eşit hale getirilmesi sosyalizm demektir ve bu kişisel özgürlükleri engeller.
26. Devlet gücü azınlıkta bile olsalar insanların sesini kısmak için kullanılmamalıdır.

Appendix B

Ingroup Identification Scale

Aşağıdaki soruları yanıtlarken lütfen sizinle benzer politik görüşe sahip arkadaşlarınızı düşünüp aşağıdaki ifadelere ne derece katılıp katılmadığınızı belirtin.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Kesinlikle			Ne katılıyorum			Kesinlikle
Katılmıyorum			ne katılmıyorum			katılıyorum

1. Benimle benzer politik görüşe sahip arkadaşlarım benim için çok önemlidir.
2. Benimle benzer politik görüşe sahip arkadaşlarımla özdeşleşirim.
3. Kendimi benimle benzer politik görüşe sahip arkadaşlarıma yakın hissederim.
4. Benimle benzer politik görüşe sahip arkadaşlarıma sahip olduğum için mutluyum.
5. Kendimi benimle benzer politik görüşe sahip arkadaş grubumun bir üyesi olarak görüyorum.
6. Benimle benzer politik görüşe sahip arkadaşlarım benimle aynı ilgilere sahiptir.
7. Yaşam değerlerim benimle benzer politik görüşe sahip arkadaşlarımdan değerleri ile aynı doğrultudadır.
8. Kendimi benimle benzer politik görüşe sahip arkadaşlarıma benzer görüyorum.
9. Benimle benzer politik görüşe sahip arkadaşlarımla aynı sorunları paylaşıyorum.
10. Benimle benzer politik görüşe sahip arkadaşlarım beni olduğum gibi kabul eder.

Appendix C

Perceived Status Difference Scale (for Liberal Participants)

Simdi size toplumda bazi kesimleri nasil gordugunuze iliskin sorular soracagiz.

Lutfen ekranda goreceginiz ifadeleri dikkatlice okuyunuz ve her ifadeye ne kadar katildiginizi 1'den (Kesinlikle katılmıyorum) 7'ye (Kesinlikle katılıyorum) kadar olan olcekte isaretleyiniz.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Kesinlikle Katılmıyorum			Ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum			Kesinlikle katılıyorum

1. Bu toplumda liberal (özgürlükçü) öğrencilerin dahil olduğu kesimle muhafazakar öğrencilerin dahil olduğu kesim arasında büyük bir statü (toplumsal konum) farkı vardır.
2. Türkiye’de, muhafazakar öğrencilerin dahil olduğu kesimin liberal (özgürlükçü) öğrencilerin dahil olduğu kesimden daha fazla politik gücü vardır.
3. Toplumda muhafazakar öğrencilerin dahil olduğu kesim, liberal (özgürlükçü) öğrencilerin dahil olduğu kesimden ekonomik olarak çok daha iyi durumdadır.
4. Toplumda liberal (özgürlükçü) öğrencilerin dahil olduğu kesim ve muhafazakar öğrencilerin dahil olduğu kesim arasındaki statü (toplumsal konum), güç ve varlık farkları azalmaktadır.

Appendix D

Perceived Status Difference Scale (for Conservative Participants)

Simdi size toplumda bazi kesimleri nasil gordugunuze iliskin sorular soracagiz.

Lutfen ekranda goreceginiz ifadeleri dikkatlice okuyunuz ve her ifadeye ne kadar katildiginizi 1'den (Kesinlikle katılmıyorum) 7'ye (Kesinlikle katılıyorum) kadar olan olcekte isaretleyiniz.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Kesinlikle			Ne katılıyorum			Kesinlikle
Katılmıyorum			ne katılmıyorum			katılıyorum

1. Bu toplumda muhafazakar öğrencilerin dahil olduğu kesimle liberal (özgürlükçü) öğrencilerin dahil olduğu kesim arasında büyük bir statü (toplumsal konum) farkı vardır.
2. Türkiye’de, liberal (özgürlükçü) öğrencilerin dahil olduğu kesimin muhafazakar öğrencilerin dahil olduğu kesimden daha fazla politik gücü vardır.
3. Toplumda liberal (özgürlükçü) öğrencilerin dahil olduğu kesim, muhafazakar öğrencilerin dahil olduğu kesimden ekonomik olarak çok daha iyi durumdadır.
4. Toplumda muhafazakar öğrencilerin dahil olduğu kesim ve liberal (özgürlükçü) öğrencilerin dahil olduğu kesim arasındaki statü (toplumsal konum), güç ve varlık farkları azalmaktadır.

Appendix E

Brief Self Control Scale

1	2	3	4	5
Beni hiç yansıtmıyor				Beni tamamen yansıtıyor

1. Baştan çıkarmalara/ayartmalara karşı direnmekte başarılıyım.
2. Kötü alışkanlıklarımın üstesinden gelmekte zorluk çekerim.
3. Tembelim.
4. Uygunsuz şeyler söylerim.
5. Asla kontrolümü kaybetmeme izin vermem.
6. Kendim için kötü olan bazı şeyleri eğlenceli ise yaparım.
7. Plan programa uymam konusunda insanlar bana güvenir.
8. Sabahları kalkmak benim için zordur.
9. Hayır demekte zorlanırım.
10. Çoğu zaman fikrimi değiştiririm.
11. Aklımdakini o an söyleyiveririm.
12. İnsanlar beni fevri/dürtüsel olarak tanırlar.
13. Kendim için kötü olan şeyleri reddederim.
14. Çok fazla para harcarım.
15. Herşeyi/her yeri düzenli bırakırım.
16. Zaman zaman nefsimi düşkünümdür.

17. Daha öz disiplinli olabilmeyi isterdim.
18. Güvenilir biriyimdir.
19. Duygularım beni oradan oraya götürür.
20. Bir sürü şeyi anlık kararlar vererek yaparım.
21. Pek iyi sır tutamam.
22. İnsanlar katı bir öz disipline sahip olduğumu söyler.
23. Sınavlara yumurta kapıya dayanınca tüm gece boyunca çalışırım.
24. Kolay kolay cesaretim kırılmaz.
25. Bir konuda harekete geçmeden evvel düşünmeye zaman ayırsam daha iyi olurdu.
26. Sağlıklı yaşam tarzı sürdürürüm.
27. Sağlıklı yiyecekler yerim.
28. Keyif ve eğlence beni bazen işten alıkoyar.
29. Odaklanmakta (konsantrasyon sağlamakta) güçlük çekerim.
30. Uzun süreli hedeflere ulaşmak için etkin bir şekilde çaba gösteririm.
31. Bir şeyin yanlış olduğunu bilsem de bazen o şeyi yapmaktan kendimi alıkoyamam.
32. Sıklıkla tüm alternatifleri gözden geçirmeden harekete geçerim.
33. Kolaylıkla soğukkanlılığımı yitirim.
34. Çoğunlukla insanların konuşmasını bölerim.
35. Bazen aşırı alkol alır ya da uyuşturucu madde kullanırım.
36. Her zaman dakiğimdir.

Appendix F

Political Ideology Exposure

Liberal Other Condition

Aşağıda, çeşitli toplumsal olaylara dair tepkilerinizle ilgili ifadeler bulunmaktadır. Lütfen dikkatlice okuyunuz ve her ifadeye ne kadar katıldığınızı 1'den 7'ye kadar olan ölçekte işaretleyiniz.

1. Hiçbir grup toplumda baskın olmamalıdır.
1 Kesinlikle katılmıyorum 2 3 4 Ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum 5 6 Kesinlikle katılıyorum 7
2. Eğer insanlara daha eşit bir şekilde davransaydık daha az sorun yaşayan bir toplum olurduk.
1 Kesinlikle katılmıyorum 2 3 4 Ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum 5 6 Kesinlikle katılıyorum 7
3. Devletin istikrarının korunması için yeni partilerin kurulmasına sınırlandırmalar getirilmelidir.
1 Kesinlikle katılmıyorum 2 3 4 Ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum 5 6 Kesinlikle katılıyorum 7
4. Toprak bütünlüğümüzün korunması kişisel çıkarlardan daha önemlidir.
1 Kesinlikle katılmıyorum 2 3 4 Ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum 5 6 Kesinlikle katılıyorum 7
5. Gelirleri esitlemek için gayret etmeliyiz.
1 Kesinlikle katılmıyorum 2 3 4 Ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum 5 6 Kesinlikle katılıyorum 7
6. Toplumda orf ve adetlerimizin korunması değişen dünya düzenine uyum sağlamaktan daha önemlidir.
1 Kesinlikle katılmıyorum 2 3 4 Ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum 5 6 Kesinlikle katılıyorum 7
7. Toplumsal ahlakınıza ve geleneksel inançlarınıza zarar veren unsurlardan mutlaka kaçınılmalıdır.
1 Kesinlikle katılmıyorum 2 3 4 Ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum 5 6 Kesinlikle katılıyorum 7
8. Gelir dağılımı eşit hale getirilmemelidir çünkü insanların kabiliyetleri eşit değildir.
1 Kesinlikle katılmıyorum 2 3 4 Ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum 5 6 Kesinlikle katılıyorum 7
9. Batılasmaya sevdası kültürümüzün ve kimliğimizin asimile olmasına yol açacak.
1 Kesinlikle katılmıyorum 2 3 4 Ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum 5 6 Kesinlikle katılıyorum 7
10. Devlet gücü azınlıkta bile olsalar insanların sesini kısmak için kullanılmamalıdır.
1 Kesinlikle katılmıyorum 2 3 4 Ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum 5 6 Kesinlikle katılıyorum 7

Conservative Other Condition

Aşağıda, çeşitli toplumsal olaylara dair tepkilerinizle ilgili ifadeler bulunmaktadır. Lütfen dikkatlice okuyunuz ve her ifadeye ne kadar katıldığınızı 1'den 7'ye kadar olan ölçekte işaretleyiniz.

1. Hiçbir grup toplumda baskın olmamalıdır.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Kesinlikle			Ne katılıyorum			Kesinlikle
katılmıyorum			ne katılmıyorum			katılıyorum

2. Eger insanlara daha esit bir şekilde davransaydık daha az sorun yaşayan bir toplum olurduk.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Kesinlikle			Ne katılıyorum			Kesinlikle
katılmıyorum			ne katılmıyorum			katılıyorum

3. Devletin istikrarının korunması için yeni partilerin kurulmasına sınırlandırmalar getirilmelidir.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Kesinlikle			Ne katılıyorum			Kesinlikle
katılmıyorum			ne katılmıyorum			katılıyorum

4. Toprak bütünlüğümüzün korunması kişisel çıkarlardan daha önemlidir.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Kesinlikle			Ne katılıyorum			Kesinlikle
katılmıyorum			ne katılmıyorum			katılıyorum

5. Gelirleri esitlemek için gayret etmeliyiz.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Kesinlikle			Ne katılıyorum			Kesinlikle
katılmıyorum			ne katılmıyorum			katılıyorum

6. Toplumda orf ve adetlerimizin korunması değişen dünya düzenine uyum sağlamaktan daha önemlidir.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Kesinlikle			Ne katılıyorum			Kesinlikle
katılmıyorum			ne katılmıyorum			katılıyorum

7. Toplumsal ahlakımıza ve geleneksel inançlarımıza zarar veren unsurlardan mutlaka kaçınmalıyız.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Kesinlikle			Ne katılıyorum			Kesinlikle
katılmıyorum			ne katılmıyorum			katılıyorum

8. Gelir dağılımı esit hale getirilmemelidir çünkü insanların kabiliyetleri esit değildir.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Kesinlikle			Ne katılıyorum			Kesinlikle
katılmıyorum			ne katılmıyorum			katılıyorum

9. Batılılaşma sevdası kültürümüzün ve kimliğimizin asimile olmasına yol açacak.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Kesinlikle			Ne katılıyorum			Kesinlikle
katılmıyorum			ne katılmıyorum			katılıyorum

10. Devlet gücü azınlıkta bile olsalar insanların sesini kısmak için kullanılmamalıdır.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Kesinlikle			Ne katılıyorum			Kesinlikle
katılmıyorum			ne katılmıyorum			katılıyorum

Appendix G

Pilot Study for Determining Stereotypical Words in the Lexical Decision Task

Lütfen size göre aşağıdaki kelimelerin liberal veya muhafazakar politik görüşü ne derece temsil ettiklerini verilen ölçekte işaretleyiniz.

	Son derece liberal	Liberal	Ne liberal Ne muhafazakar	Muhafazakar	Son derece muhafazakar
zevksizlik					
yasaklama					
bencil					
cıvık					
düzensizlik					
asosyal					
kıskanç					
statükocu					
unutkan					
şaşkın					
suratsız					
anarşi					
belirsizlik					
katı					
sadakatsizlik					
gevezelik					
anlayışsız					
çaresiz					
asimilasyon					
milliyetçi					
acelecilik					
tembel					
kapitalist					
aptal					
cezalandırma					
donuk					
radikal					
hiyerarşi					
başarısız					
isyancı					
kalpsiz					
dinsizlik					
darbeci					
beceriksiz					
yobaz					
cahil					
kanunsuzluk					
oburluk					

tutucu					
ayarsız					
kuralsız					
tepkisiz					
istikrarsızlık					
utangaçlık					
yorgunluk					
geri zekalı					
acımasızlık					
kontrol					
ahlaksız					
dalgın					
bölücü					
huysuzluk					
düşüncesiz					
saldırgan					
parağöz					
süslü					
kaos					
çirkin					
köktenci					
dayanıksız					
kolaycılık					
hainlik					
dar görüşlü					
emir					
inançsız					
bağnaz					
gericilik					
kaba					
dejenere					
askeri					
dengesizlik					
kuralcı					
çokbilmiş					
saygısız					
mahzun					
huysuzluk					
ayrılıkçı					
yozlaşma					
içkici					
esneklik					
merhametsiz					
önyargı					
irticacı					
dağılmak					
sıkkın					
saf					

düzencilik					
dikkatsizlik					
kaskafa					
bozulma					

Lütfen kendi politik görüşünüzü verilen ölçekte işaretleyiniz.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Son derece
liberal

Son derece
muhafazakar

Appendix H

Stereotypical and Nonstereotypical Words in the Lexical Decision Task

Political Ideology of the Participant	Word Type		
	Stereotypical for Conservatism	Stereotypical for Liberalism	Nonstereotypical
Conservative	kuralcı	boşboğaz	sıkkın
	utangaçlık	dinsizlik	huysuzluk
	köktenci	isyancı	acelecilik
	bağnaz	cıvık	asosyal
	yobaz	gevezelik	dikkatsizlik
	yasaklama	inançsız	merhametsiz
	milliyetçi	anarşi	mahzun
	irtica	bencil	donuk
	tutucu	kapitalist	dalgın
	radikal	belirsizlik	zevksizlik
Liberal	statükocu	dejenere	unutkan
	gericilik	ayarsız	acelecilik
	kuralcı	dinsizlik	oburluk
	bağnaz	cıvık	dikkatsizlik
	köktenci	isyancı	sıkkın
	anlayışsız	kuralsız	acemi
	yobaz	anarşi	beceriksiz
	hiyerarşi	kapitalist	dengesizlik
	önyargı	düzensizlik	tembel
	tutucu	radikal	dalgın

Appendix I

Intergroup Anxiety Scale

Simdi size toplumda bazi kesimleri nasıl gordugunuze iliskin sorular soracagiz.

Lutfen ekranda goreceginiz ifadeleri dikkatlice okuyunuz ve her ifadeye ne kadar katildiginizi 1'den (Kesinlikle katilmiyorum) 7'ye (Kesinlikle katiliyorum) kadar olan olcekte isaretleyiniz.

Sizin politik görüŖünüze ters bir politik görüŖe sahip bir insanla biraradayken, kendi politik görüŖünüze sahip bir insana kıyasla, kendinizi nasıl hissedersiniz?

1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Hiç deęil						Son derece

1. Gergin
2. ArkadaŖça
3. Kararsız
4. Rahat
5. EndiŖeli
6. Güven duyan
7. Tehlikede
8. Kendinden emin
9. Tuhaf
10. Güvende (emniyette)
11. Kaygılı
12. Huzurlu

Appendix J

Debriefing Questions

1. Sizce bu deneyin amacı nedir? Lütfen bu deneyin konusu muhtemel hipotezleri ve prosedürü vs. için tüm tahminlerinizi yazınız.

2. Daha önce buna benzer bir deneye katılmış mıydınız? Cevabınız evetse hangi açıdan benzediğini lütfen belirtiniz.

Appendix K

Informed Consent Form

Bilgilendirilmiş Olur Formu

Araştırmayı destekleyen kurum: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Psikoloji Bölümü
Araştırmanın konusu: “Politik uzlaşma” & “Dikkat süreçleri”
Araştırmacıların adı: Irmak Olcaysoy
Adres: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, Psikoloji Bölümü, 34342 Bebek-İstanbul
E-posta: irmakolcaysoy@gmail.com

Sayın Katılımcı,

Bu araştırmada iki ayrı çalışma için veri toplanması amaçlanmaktadır. Bunlardan ilki bir politik uzlaşma çalışmasıdır. Bu aşamada, bir politik uzlaşma alıştırmasında ortak çalışacağınız diğer katılımcının doldurduğu politik ideoloji ölçeğini okumanız ve bu katılımcının ideolojisini tahmin etmeniz istenecektir. Politik uzlaşma alıştırmasında bu diğer katılımcı ile Türkiye’deki politik bir mesele üzerine çözüm üretmeniz istenecektir. Bu çalışma toplam yarım saat sürecektir. İkinci çalışma bir dikkat çalışmasıdır. Bu çalışma yaklaşık 10 dakika sürecektir. Çalışmaların tamamlanmasının ardından ilgili birkaç form doldurmanız istenecektir.

Çalışmaya katılmak tamamıyla isteğe bağlıdır. Bu formu imzalamama ve çalışmaya katılmama hakkınız her zaman geçerlidir. Formu imzalarsanız dahi kendinizi rahat hissetmediğiniz an çalışmayı bırakabilirsiniz. Bu durumda kredi alma hakkınızı kaybetmeyeceksiniz.

Çalışmanın hiçbir aşamasında isimler kullanılmayacaktır. Size ait olan veriler bir numarayla eşleştirilip isimsiz olarak saklanacaktır. Tek isimli belge, üzerinde isminiz ve imzanız bulunan bilgilendirilmiş olur formu olacaktır.

Deneye katılmanız karşılığında size (eğer PSY 101 ya da PSY 241/242 dersi öğrencisi iseniz) PSY 101 ya da PSY 241/242 dersinden 1 kredi verilecektir. Sormak istediğiniz bir soru varsa lütfen deneyi yapan kişiye sorunuz.

Bu çalışmaya katılmak için, lütfen aşağıdaki “İzin Formu”nu doldurup imzalayınız. Eğer 18 yaşından küçük iseniz, lütfen bu formu velinize imzalatıp araştırmacıya teslim ediniz.

Çalışma hakkındaki bilgilendirmeyi okudum ve anladım. Formun bir örneğini aldım/almak istemiyorum.

Çalışmaya katılmak istiyorum ☐ istemiyorum ☐

Velisi veya vasinin adı, soyadı ve imzası:

..... (18 yaşından küçük katılımcılar için)

Bilgilendirilmiş Olur Formu'nun bir örneđi tarafıma verildi.

Adı Soyadı:.....

İmzası:.....

Adresi:.....

Telefonu:

E-posta:

Tarih (gün/ay/yıl):...../...../.....

Gerektiğinde ulaşılabilir telefonlar:

Irmak Olcaysoy: 0212 359 6757

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