

THE ROLE OF THE MAINSTREAM NEWSPAPERS IN THE CONSOLIDATION OF
THE TURKISH NATIONAL IDENTITY: 1934-1937

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THE TURKISH NATIONAL IDENTITY: 1934-1937

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Title: The Role of the Mainstream Newspapers in the Consolidation of the Turkish National Identity: 1934-1937

This dissertation examines the role of the press in the consolidation and dissemination of the Turkish national identity in the single-party era with a social constructionist approach. Within the context of press-government relations and in line with the main peculiarities of Kemalist nationalism, the research takes a cross section and demonstrates how the Turkish national identity that was manufactured by the Kemalist power was represented, discursively reproduced and disseminated via the newspapers in the mid-1930s. The research is primarily based on a sample of newspaper articles retrieved from the archives of the Beyazıt State Library. The sample consists of articles published in *Cumhuriyet*, *Akşam*, and *Son Posta*, between 1934 and 1937. Data are analyzed complementarily by content analysis to describe the intensity, and discourse analysis to obtain an in-depth understanding of the framing of nationalist representations. It is observed that newspapers displayed very limited dissociations from the Kemalist arguments. The conclusion of this dissertation is that newspapers played a significant role in the dissemination and consolidation of the Turkish national identity in the single-party period, by mediating the underlying framework of the nation and by employing discursive practices that mostly ratified, reproduced, and diffused the discourses of Kemalist nationalism.

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Başlık: Türk Ulusal Kimliğinin Konsolidasyonunda Ana Akım Gazetelerin Rolü:

1934-1937

Bu çalışma, tek parti döneminde basının Türk ulusal kimliğinin konsolidasyonu ve yayılması sürecindeki rolünü sosyal inşacı bir yaklaşımla incelemektedir. Tek parti dönemindeki basın-iktidar ilişkileri çerçevesinde ve Kemalist ulusçuluğun temel nitelikleri doğrultusunda, çalışmada 1930'ların ortasından bir kesit alınmakta ve Kemalizm tarafından inşa edilmiş olan Türk ulusal kimliğinin gazetelerdeki temsili ve söylemsel olarak nasıl yeniden üretilip yayıldığı ortaya konmaktadır. Araştırma esas olarak Beyazıt Devlet Kütüphanesi gazete arşivinden elde edilen örnekleme dayanmaktadır. Örneklem, *Cumhuriyet*, *Akşam* ve *Son Posta* gazetelerinde, 1934 ile 1937 yılları arasında yayınlanmış olan haber ve yazılardan oluşmaktadır. Veri incelemesi için birbirini tamamlayan iki ayrı niteliksel yöntem kullanılmıştır. İçerik analizi yoğunluğu gözlemlenmeye olanak verirken, söylem analizi milliyetçi temsillerin nasıl çerçvelendiğini derinlemesine anlamaya olanak sağlamıştır. Bu dönemde gazetelerdeki içeriğin Kemalist argümanlardan neredeyse hiç ayrılmadığı gözlemlenmiştir. Bu çalışmanın ortaya koyduğu sonuç, tek parti döneminde gazetelerin Türk ulusal kimliğinin konsolidasyonuna ve yayılmasına dikkate değer bir katkı sağladıklarıdır. Gazeteler bunu bir yandan ulus fikrinin hayal edilmesine aracılık ederek, diğer yandan da Kemalist ulusçuluğun söylemlerini onaylayan, yeniden üreten ve yayan söylemsel pratikler kullanarak yapmışlardır.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

We need to understand this process of mediation, to understand how the meanings emerge, where and with what consequences. (...) We need to understand its politics: its vulnerability to the exercise of power; its dependence on the work of institutions as well as individuals; and its own power to persuade and to claim attention and response.

Roger Silverstone, *Why Study the Media?*¹

In March 2013, the question of how to define citizenship in the new constitution polarized society in Turkey when the Parliamentary Constitutional Reconciliation Commission suggested erasing any emphasis on ethnicity in defining citizenship. This would mean exclusion of the expression “Turkish” from the proposed new constitution. As a reaction, a group of three hundred intellectuals, including renowned scientists, historians, academicians, politicians, and writers opposed the proposal expressing their resentment in a statement that they released on 27 March 2013. In their statement, titled “Call for the Turkish Nation,” they said “the nation-state, which was founded by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, marking the continuing sovereign presence of the Turkish nation in Anatolia since the Ottomans and Seljuks, can’t be excluded from the new constitution.”²

In a similar manner, On 6 November 2006, an article in the newspaper *Radikal* reported that although 11 non-governmental organizations working on the amendment of Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code had tried to define what “Turk” meant, they could not

¹Roger Silverstone, *Why Study the Media?* (London: Sage, 1999), p. 18.

² “Group of intellectuals oppose excluding ‘Turkishness’ from new constitution,” *Today’s Zaman*, 27 March 2013, http://www.todayszaman.com/latest-news_group-of-intellectuals-oppose-excluding-turkishness-from-new-constitution_310969.html.

agree on a particular definition.³ In the weeks that followed, in the same newspaper, Neşe Düzel's interviews with prominent Turkish intellectuals Cemil Koçak, Niyazi Öktem, and Kemal Karpat were as significant as the news article itself, in the sense that they indicated the intellectuals' differing definitions of "Turk" and the "Turkish nation".

Throughout the interview Cemil Koçak underlined the manufactured character of the Turkish national identity and questionably argued that the definition of "Turkish nation" had occurred not earlier than the Sheik Sait rebellion in 1925 and that there had been no such thing defined as the Turkish nation prior to this event.⁴ As an answer to the question of "Who is a Turk?" Niyazi Öktem said that Turks were a new hybrid ethnic and cultural group that as a mixture of immigrants from Central Asia with the original Greek and Armenian inhabitants of Anatolia.⁵ Kemal Karpat's answer was that the Turkish nation was the Turkified Ottoman society which had protected the Ottoman experience and identity and which had been formed during the last 20 years of the Ottoman Empire. According to Karpat, the Turkish identity was the present identity which had inherited the Ottoman history, experience, and political-cultural legacy, including Islam.⁶

It is indeed a fact that contemporary Turkish citizens still face several definitions of the Turk in their daily lives, especially when they are exposed to the media. Moreover, the definition of Turkishness varies according to the communicative, historical, and political context in which it is depicted. In today's Turkey, for instance, official nationalism is in the process of being reshaped by the neo-Ottomanist discourse under the rule of the Justice and Development Party. Arsan and Yıldırım, in their recent research where they examine the reflections of neo-Ottomanist discourse in the Turkish news media, point out how the neo-

³Behzat Miser, "Sivil Toplum Örgütleri Türklük Tanımında Tıkandı," *Radikal*, 28 November 2006.

⁴Neşe Düzel, "Interview with Cemil Koçak," *ibid.*, 13 November 2006.

⁵"Interview with Niyazi Öktem," *Radikal*, 27 November 2006.

⁶"Interview with Kemal Karpat," *Radikal*, 4 December 2006.

Ottomanist discourse that is promoted by the current government is being disseminated, mediated and popularized via the media and popular cultural products.⁷

One can argue that the citizens' perceptions of "Turk" in different periods of the republican history certainly varied across various communication instruments. How was the Turkish national identity portrayed, for example, in the early republican newspapers? This is a crucial question that might lead to asking a number of other questions. How strong was the newspapers' support for the consolidation of the Turkish national identity? Did the degree of support vary according to different newspapers or according to different years? Is it possible to observe a portrayal of the Turkish national identity that had broken away from the official point of view? Research in the archives, an empirical study of texts, and a journey in between the lines can answer these and several other questions.

This dissertation is thus based on a cross-sectional study, which examines the texts published in *Cumhuriyet*, *Akşam* and *Son Posta*, between 1934 and 1937. The major goal of this study is to delineate the image of the Turk, to trace the nationalist discourse of the time, and to investigate the representation of the Turkish national identity that was disseminated and mediated via the mainstream newspapers of the early Republic, within the political and historical context of the era.

The years between 1934 and 1937 are selected and studied closely in order to understand the role that the mainstream newspapers played in the consolidation of the Turkish national identity in the single-party era. This time interval is significant in the sense that the 1930s saw the thorough consolidation of Kemalist power. By 1934, all of the republican reforms had been inaugurated. The post-1934 period especially can be identified as a period of rapprochement between the press and the government. Furthermore, not only were the

⁷ Esra Arsan and Yasemin Yıldırım, "Relections of Neo-Ottomanist Discourse in the Turkish News Media: The case of *The Magnificent Century*", *Journal of Applied Journalism and Media Studies* 3, no. 3 (2014).pp. 315-334.

strict press regulations consequential in this rapprochement, but also the proponent intellectuals and journalists in the mid-1930s were ready to undertake the role of serving the revolution. For example, the point of view that is reflected in Yakup Kadri's narration of the journal *Kadro* in his novel *Panaroma* is remarkable in terms of illustrating the attitude of proponent intellectuals at the time:

The objective of revolution is not something to be attained with its own motion. Its high principles are far from being truly appropriated in the minds (...) So there is a need to get the minds into the iron circle of the revolution (...) Who can forge the iron circle of the revolution? Certainly the advance guards, the raiders of Kemalism. And what else can their arms be, if not the mediums that diffuse ideas?⁸

As a period, the 1930s were chosen since the decade would provide a look at a relatively advanced vision of the consolidation of the official national identity. In order to grasp the contribution of the newspapers in this process, the context of the 1940s might have been misleading because of the impact of other possible intervening variables. For instance, the leadership of İnönü in the post-Atatürk period after 1938, the World War II context between 1939 and 1945; and later the transition to democracy within the post-war context would have hampered the study of the mediating role of the newspapers in the consolidation of Turkish national identity.

Throughout this dissertation, while examining the newspaper articles, national identity is approached as a historical concept, on the one hand, and as a signifying practice, on the other. National identity should be considered as a particular identity among various other cultural identities of any given fragmented subject. Therefore, this concept cannot be separated from the way we define culture. In this study the term "culture" in relation to

⁸ Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, *Panaroma* (Istanbul: Remzi, 1987), p. 218. "İnkılap davası öyle kendiliğinden yürümekte olan bir şey değildir. Ve bunun yüksek prensipleri henüz bütün kafalarda (...) tamamiyle yer tutmuş bulunmaktan uzaktır. (...) Şu halde, bunları sıkı bir inkılap mantığının demir çemberi içine almak ve hiç birine kaçacak en ufak bir delik bile bırakmamak zaruretine bugün, her zamankinden ziyade kanaat getirmemiz lazım gelir. Bu demir çemberi kimler dövecek? Bu demirin çemberini Kemalizmin akıncı gençlerinden başka kim dövebilir? Ve onların mücadele silâhları – bizim mecmua gibi – fikir organlarından başka ne olabilir?"

national identity is not discussed in its anthropological sense; that is, it does not refer to “the distinctive ways of life, the shared values and meanings, common to different groups.”⁹ It is rather described in line with Boccock “as a social practice rather than as a thing or a state of being (...) the set of practices by which meanings are produced and exchanged within a group.”¹⁰ Thus the basic premise of the dissertation is based on the consideration of national identity as a signifying process and as a system of representation. Accordingly, such an understanding necessarily directs the research toward the social constructionist approach. Within this context, because national identity is neither fixed nor unchangeable, the aim is not to reveal what Turkish national identity is but rather to examine how the practices by which meaning is produced function, with a specific emphasis on representation.

Throughout the dissertation, two main concepts are used repeatedly. These are national identity and nationalism. What is meant by national identity was explained above.

Nationalism, on the other hand, is discussed in the sense that Craig Calhoun explains, according to which, nationalism has three dimensions,

First there is nationalism as discourse: the production of cultural understanding and rhetoric which leads people throughout the world to think and frame their aspirations in terms of the idea of nation and national identity (...) Second, there is nationalism as project (...) Third there is nationalism as evaluation.¹¹

Keeping these dimensions in mind, the reader should be aware that this study is not an attempt to tell the history of Turkish nationalism, neither as a project nor as an evaluation.

Although the necessary information on Turkish nationalism as project is provided in order to frame the issue under discussion, the main concern remains the examination of the first dimension, i.e. nationalism as discourse. In addition, the attitude to approach nationalism and

⁹Robert Boccock, "The Cultural Formations of Modern Society," in *Formations of Modernity*, eds. Stuart Hall and Bram Gieben (Cambridge: Polity, 1992), p. 232.

¹⁰Ibid., p. 233.

¹¹ Craig Calhoun, *Nationalism* (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1997), p. 6.

national identity as discursive cultural constructions is supported with the idea that may be summarized with Benedict Anderson's phrase, "Imagined Communities."¹²

Anderson is one of the scholars of nationalism who approach nationalism and nation state as outcomes of modernization. According to this approach, it is argued that especially starting from the late eighteenth century, individual nation states started to emerge in line with the process of industrialization and modernization in Europe. While the formation of most of the early industrialized nation states was completed by the end of the nineteenth century; between 1900-1933, until the beginning of World War II, other nation states including Finland, Iran, Argentina, Russia, Uruguay, Czech Republic, Poland, Thailand, Ireland, Turkey, Colombia, and Mexico were established. In this second phase, nation building processes mostly were accompanied by efforts to construct newly defined national identities to be internalized by the people or the masses. As Centeno and Ferraro state, especially in Spain and Latin America, "previously existing collective identities were not congruent with the nation state."¹³ The previously existing collective identities of the Ottoman society were neither congruent with the newly established nation state of Turkey. So, Turkey did not represent a unique example in terms of its efforts to construct national identity. In similar countries in Europe or the Balkans, the press or any available medium of mass communication including cinema, radio, and books certainly played important roles in the process of transition to a nation state.

Nevertheless, the contribution of the press to the formation of Turkish nationalism had already started in the late Ottoman period. Referring to the developments in the press in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, David Kushner notes that the "Turkish national

¹²Benedict R. O'G Anderson, *Imagined Communities : Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso : NLB, 1983).

¹³Miguel A. Centeno & Agustin E. Ferraro, *State and Nation Making in Latin America and Spain: Republics of the Possible* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 18.

consciousness was awakened and provided the source for the Turkist movements of the later years.”¹⁴ The Ottoman press had a significant role especially in the development of Turkish as a print language. Besides, the experience of the Ottoman newspapers, especially the Committee of Union of Progress and its newspaper *Tanin*, had initiated a press tradition that instrumentally made use of the newspapers with the aim to shape the public opinion in line with the ruling elite’s political agenda.

Contemporary trends in social scientific research incline toward an appreciation of the interdisciplinary analysis of social phenomena. This dissertation has also an interdisciplinary nature, located at the crossing of history, cultural studies, and media and communication studies. According to Peter Burke, community and identity issues are among central concepts in history writing. On the issue of national identity, Burke states that “The formation of national identity in particular has stimulated a number of distinguished recent works (...) The power of memory, of imagination, of symbols – notably language – in the construction of communities is increasingly recognized.”¹⁵ On culture, he writes, “What used to be assumed to be objective, hard social facts like gender or class or community are now assumed to be culturally ‘constructed’ or constituted”¹⁶ (...) Historians increasingly recognize the power of the ‘imagined...’.”¹⁷ In line with Burke’s remarks, this dissertation is thus interested in cultural constructions in a particular period of time.

As said above, taking a social constructionist approach, the aim of this study is to examine how the practices by which meanings are produced function. In line with that aim, communication is thought to be a convenient practice to be studied in order to examine

¹⁴David Kushner, *Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Doğuşu (1876-1908)* (İstanbul: Kervan Yayınları, 1979), pp. 21-22. “Böyle tarihî ve kültürel tartışmaların ardında Türk millî duygusu ifadesini bulmuş, daha sonraki yılların Türkçü hareketine kaynaklık etmişti.”

¹⁵Peter Burke, *History and Social Theory* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1993), p. 57.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 119.

¹⁷Ibid., p.122.

national identity as a signifying process and as a system of representation. As James W. Carey points out,

to study communication is to examine the actual social process wherein significant symbolic forms are created, apprehended, and used (...) We create, express, and convey our knowledge of and attitudes toward reality through the construction of a variety of symbol systems.¹⁸

Accordingly, newspaper texts are thought to be suitable tools to observe the functioning of symbol systems in relation to national identity. However, in studying media representations, with its great concern about context, the research deliberately refrains from textual determinism. It should be clarified that this study not only focuses on representation and the symbolic or is concerned only with texts. Besides a discursive exploration of media messages, this study attempts to consider the social processes through which they are reconstructed, and to examine the context that shapes those discursive reconstructions in order to question the dynamics of social and cultural reproduction. Thereby, this study attempts to specifically focus on the newspapers' role both in the dissemination and mediation, and thereby in the consolidation of the Turkish national identity.

The concept of dissemination here is used as “an open-ended and indirectly interactive process of conveyance.”¹⁹ John Durham Peters theorizes communication by distinguishing between dialogue and dissemination.²⁰ According to Peters, as opposed to dialogue where “reciprocity and interaction” are central, dissemination should be understood as a process of “sowing of the seeds,” a metaphor that stands for delivering the message of the conveyor to an

¹⁸James W. Carey, "A Cultural Approach to Communication," in *McQuail's Reader in Mass Communication Theory*, ed. Denis McQuail (London: Sage, 2002), p. 42.

¹⁹Niall Brennan, Mehita Iqani, Neil Rathbone, "Communication and Dissemination", OPAALS Project Contract n° IST-034824, Version 3.0, 2009, <http://www.lse.ac.uk/media@lse/research/OPAALS/D9.4.pdf>, p. 9.

²⁰John D. Peters, *Speaking into the Air* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), p. 35.

anonymous audience.²¹ In this regard, this study argues that the nationalist discourses that were delivered to an anonymous national audience by the mainstream newspapers in the Kemalist single party era indirectly contributed to the construction of the national identity of individuals by setting off the leitmotifs of official nationalism in the social and cultural spheres.

While designing the empirical study, the decision to make use of newspaper texts as data was related to the concept of mediation too. The mainstream newspapers are thought to be the visible cultural expressions of nationalism (as discourse) since they mediate national identity as a daily experience for ordinary people. Thompson defines mediation as “the overall cumulative impact on social life of the existence of media institutions and their involvement in the circulation of symbols.”²² In Thompson’s terms, media are not evaluated as entities or things, but in terms of processes, movement of meaning. Within this framework, newspapers are acknowledged as always-already embedded in social systems of meaning, rather than as channels or technologies prior to symbolic interpretation.

So, dissemination and mediation concepts together allow appraising the contribution of the mainstream newspapers to the consolidation of the Turkish national identity in the Kemalist single party period. When the literacy rates and circulation numbers are considered, it is certainly not possible to argue that nationalist messages disseminated or mediated by the mainstream newspapers had been directly received and completely accepted by the individual citizens in early Republican Turkey.

According to the 1935 census in Turkey, the populationn fifteen years of age and over was 9,494,857 and the total number of literate people over the age of fifteen was

²¹John D. Peters, “Communication as Dissemination” in *Communication as... Perspectives on Theory*, ed. G. J. Shepherd, et al. (London: Sage, 2005), pp. 211-222.

²²John B. Thompson, *The Media and Modernity* (Cambridge: Polity, 2003), p. 232.

1,775,690.²³ So only 18.7 percent of the population over the age of fifteen was literate. Although the newspaper circulation rates between 1934 and 1937 are not known exactly, it is known that in 1932 the total circulation rates of *Cumhuriyet*, *Akşam*, and *Son Posta* were around 45,000 and the total circulations of national newspapers that were published in Turkish language were around 121,000.²⁴

However, as Weiker points out concerning the 1930s, even if circulation figures were exactly known, they would not indicate readership because single copies usually had served for more than a single reader.²⁵ It should be remembered that local and mainstream newspapers were placed and read in People's Houses, which were the regime's main propaganda and mobilization centers that operated from 1932 to 1951.²⁶ As Karpat states, the purpose of the People's Houses was "to bridge the gap between the intelligentsia and people by teaching the first of these the national culture (...), the second, the rudiments of civilization, and an indoctrination of the nationalist secular ideas of the Republican regime."²⁷ In this sense, although it is impossible to measure the success of People's Houses, many scholars agree that they played a crucial role in creating a national culture and forging a national identity for the new citizens of the new Turkish Republic.

As well as in People's Houses, in many other public places, such as coffee houses, barber shops, schools or work places, newspapers presumably reached a wider audience, not

²³ Turkish Statistical Institute, *Statistical Indicators 1923-2009* (Ankara: TUIK, 2009), p. 18.

²⁴ P. Di Roccalta, *Angora e Kemal Pascia Problemi Politici ed Economici Della Moderna Turchia*, A.R.E. Anonima Romana Editoriale, Roma 1932, pp. 126-128, cited in Rifat Bali, "Tek Parti Döneminde Gazete Tirajları", Accessed:10 December 2014, http://www.rifatbali.com/images/stories/dokumanlar/tek_partili_donemde_gazete_tirajlari.pdf.

²⁵ Walter F. Weiker, *Political Tutelage and Democracy in Turkey*, (Leiden: E.J: Brill, 1973), p. 31.

²⁶ All around Turkey, there were 55 People's Houses in 1933, 103 in 1936 and 210 in 1938 according to *C.H.P.18. Yıldönümünde Halkevlerive Halk Odaları* (Ankara: 1950), p.6-8, cited in *ibid.*, 40.

²⁷ Kemal Karpat, "The People's Houses in Turkey: Establishment and Groth", *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 17, No. 1-2, 1963, p. 55.

only through the act of reading but also through the act of hearing. Within the context of the era, two-step flow or multi-step flow of communication theories that underline the role of mediators or opinion leaders in the process of political communication may help to consider the newspapers' general role in the consolidation of the Turkish national identity. Depending on local differences, those mediators from different profiles are likely to have played a significant role in the interpretation of the printed words in daily life conversations via any kind of social interactions.

Moreover, in the 1930s, especially the so called *münevverler*, in other words the intellectuals or the enlightened or educated people of the period may certainly be considered amongst the secondary mediators of the national message. In the early Republican period, intellectuals were attributed by the regime a considerable role for educating the people in line with the republican principles. Alexandros Lamprou makes mention of this role by saying that

the intellectuals were considered model citizens, educated in the principles of the republic, cognizant of their duties and rights, devotees of the reform movement; in a word, citizens able to act as representatives of the republic. They were called the 'guiding element' that would 'enlighten' the people.²⁸

When the mediating role of the mainstream newspapers is considered, one should remember Roger Silverstone's remark on mediation that is "mediated communication must be understood as both producer and product of hierarchy."²⁹ In this sense, it can be argued that in the mid-1930s, the mediating role that the newspapers played was between the nation state, the RPP and the Kemalist rulers on the one hand, and the secondary mediators, i.e. intellectuals, and the people, on the other. While mediating the national message, newspapers had been both the producers and the products of the hierarchy between the state and society and between the secondary mediators and the society. The mediated communication via the

²⁸ Alexandros Lamprou, *Nation Building in Modern Turkey: The People's Houses, The State and the Citizen*, (Croydon: I.B. Tauris, 2015), p. 46.

²⁹ Roger Silverstone, "The Sociology of Mediation and Communication," in *The Sage Handbook of Sociology*, ed. Craig Calhoun et. al., (London: Sage, 2005), p. 190.

mainstream newspapers in the mid 1930s thereby sought to persuade the citizens for being Turkish, as well as hoped to make the constructed Turkish national identity real.

When the mass media environment of the mid 1930s is taken into account, television was non-existent, radio was still a luxury and the number of movie theatres was highly limited. When propaganda was considered, Webster had witnessed and reported that radio and cinema were “practically insignificant”.³⁰ In this sense, besides *Ülkü*, which was the main propaganda journal published by the Ankara People’s House and besides *Ulus*, which was officially published by the RPP, mainstream newspapers were deemed to be among the main sources of information that shaped the intellectuals’ perception of national identity. Under the authoritarian political atmosphere of the time, mainstream newspapers, rather than being sources of criticism, were overwhelmingly the most important media of information that disseminated and mediated nationalism alongside the official propaganda.

As a matter of fact, an ethnographic research based on oral history as a method of data elicitation would help to scrutinize and understand the human aspect of the issue. This would clarify in what ways the disseminated national message and discourses, which were put into circulation by the newspapers, were received and interpreted by ordinary people from different backgrounds, identities or localities. However, this goes far beyond the limits and scope of this research. In line with the social constructionist approach, this study has deliberately focused on the mediation, narration and discursive reproduction of the national message, rather focusing on its’ interpretation processes by the addressees or audience-citizens.

³⁰ Donald Everett Webster, *The Turkey of Atatürk Social Process in the Turkish Reformation* (Philadelphia: The American Academy of Social and Political Science, 1939), pp. 193-194.

Nevertheless, it is still possible to borrow from gender studies the premises of performativity theory.³¹ This dissertation inherently assumes that the mainstream newspapers play a role in setting the nationalizing norms by means of the interpellation, assumption, and performative constitution of nationality. Another inherent assumption is that the setting of the nationalizing norms helps to make ‘nationality’, which is indeed a contingency, appear natural. With the words of Billig, nationalism is a way of thinking or ideological consciousness in which “nations, national identities and national homelands appear as ‘natural’.”³² According to Billig, even in ordinary days, newspapers continually and unnoticedly contribute to the raising of this ideological consciousness, which he calls banal nationalism.³³ Within this framework, this research presupposes that the mainstream newspapers of the mid-1930s helped to constitute national identity both performatively and ideologically.

Together with that, in line with Thompson’s approach, this study acknowledges identity as a “reflexively organized symbolic project” that is integrated from a diversity of mediated experiences.³⁴ Given that national identity is formed reflexively, the researcher is aware that both the representations of national identity and the subject positions and identifications to national identity are open to change. Hall points out that “national identities are not things we are born with, but are formed and transformed within and in relation to

³¹ Judith Butler, "Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and Feminist Theory," in *Performing Feminisms: Feminist Critical Theory and Theatre*, ed. Sue-Ellen Case (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 1990).

³² Michael Billig, *Banal Nationalism* (London: Sage, 1995), p. 10.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 109.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 210.

representation.”³⁵ As Barker argues, “... as regulated ways of speaking about ourselves, identities are not arbitrary either. Rather they are temporarily stabilized by social practice.”³⁶

It has come to be argued that in Turkey, the main problem in relation to national identity arises from the attitude of the founding Kemalist elite towards society and the individual. The Turkish national identity that was pictured during the foundation period of the republic sought to erase both religious and geographical diversifications which had deep roots in the Ottoman Empire and to abolish social differentiations that had occurred as a result of the process of modernization. Thereby, the need to create the new man, or a new type of individual suitable to the new organization of society and politics was a priority for the Kemalist power.

Zafer Toprak points out that in the transition period from the Ottoman Empire to the Republic, Anatolia had lost nearly five million of its population as a result of the wars that had lasted for more than ten years. He also argues that unification and civilization of the remaining compound population through the creation of a new man had been the main purpose of the founders, letting the new nation state exclude plurality.³⁷ Within this context, rather than excluding, the construction of the Turkish national identity aimed at including all of the constituent groups of people of Anatolia under a common identity of Turkishness.³⁸

Accordingly, the founding elite tried to construct a monolithic national identity, the media representations of which can be examined within the scope of the early phase of modernity, when the state functioned in saying that what Ulrich Beck terms the “container of

³⁵Stuart Hall, "The Question of Cultural Identity," in *Modernity and Its Futures*, eds. Stuart Hall, David Held, and Tony McGrew (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), p. 292.

³⁶Chris Barker, *Cultural Studies Theory and Practice* (London: Sage, 2000), p. 248.

³⁷ Zafer Toprak, *Darwin'den Dersim'e Cumhuriyet ve Anıttropoloji*, (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2012), p. 539.

³⁸ Ibid.

society.”³⁹ As Beck quotes from Anthony Smith, the first phase of modernity can be described by “methodological nationalism, where society and state were conceived, organized and experienced as coextensive.”⁴⁰ Moreover, nation, state and society are approached as natural social and political forms. Indeed, the international political context at the 1930s that engendered the vulnerability of the newly founded nation state also influenced the implementation of methodological nationalism by the Kemalist elite.

Until 1934, even the Kemalist elite intellectuals were dissociating among themselves in terms of designating the features of the Turkish national identity. There were roughly three main groups, namely the conservative revolutionaries like Baltacıoğlu and liberal conservative but still modernist intellectuals like Ahmet Ağaoğlu; the pro-authoritarian *Kadrist*s, including Yakup Kadri, whose approach was close to collectivism and etatism; and those who were in the center like Recep Peker and Necip Ali. In 1933 they started to publish *Ülkü* that “introduced itself as reflecting the official state view.”⁴¹ According to Ertan Aydın,

The *Ülkü* group saw the inculcation of secular morality to the people as a basic precondition for democracy. Hence, the *Ülkü* elite preponderantly aimed at a cultural regeneration of the Turkish nation through the secular quest for new, revolutionary values by way of using the central notion of solidarism.⁴²

In this sense the secularization frame that *Ülkü* drew for Turkish national identity merged and mingled with unification and civilization objectives and substantially became the main determinant for the construction of the Turkish national identity in the mid 1930s.

By scrutinizing the role of the mainstream newspapers in the consolidation of the Turkish national identity between 1934 and 1937, this study hopes to contribute to the studies

³⁹Ulrich Beck, *What Is Globalization?* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000), p. 64.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ Ertan Aydın, “Peculiarities of Turkish Revolutionary Ideology in the 1930s: The *Ülkü* Version of Kemalism, 1933–1936,” *Middle Eastern Studies*, 40:5, (2004), pp.55-82.

⁴² *Ibid.*

on the history of modern Turkey and the history of Turkish press. Researches on modern Turkish history would certainly agree that the press played a significant role in the construction and consolidation of the Turkish national identity. However, what is striking is that academic works that specifically considers the role of the mainstream national newspapers do not exist. In this sense, this study will fill an important gap in the literature by serving as one of the first academic studies on this topic.

Throughout the dissertation, it is argued that the mainstream national newspapers contributed to the consolidation of the Turkish national identity by means of reaffirming the Kemalist vision of national identity and by reproducing the officially constructed discourses of Turkishness. However, as Toprak states, in the single-party period several privately owned journals remained important channels to express even oppositional opinions.⁴³ Thus in further researches, the representation of the Turkish national identity in the marginal rather than mainstream publications also may be studied in order to observe the plurality with respect to alternative attempts to construct a new identity for the citizens of the new Republic.

This study is based on primary source research in the newspaper archives in Beyazıt State Library. The discourses on national identity in the newspaper texts were located, collected, digitally recorded, stored, classified and translated in line with the needs of the research questions. Another contribution of this study is that it focuses equally on both text and context. While the archival research provided the primary sources in order to conduct a textual analysis, the historical contextual framework is enriched with other types of primary sources, such as the memoirs of the journalists of the era or parliamentary records.

In what follows, first a discussion of the theoretical concerns will be provided. Chapter Two provides a theoretical framework of the complex relation between nation, national identity and the media, with special emphasis on the concepts of representation and

⁴³Zafer Toprak, "Fikir Dergiciliğinin Yüzyılı," in *Türkiye'de Dergiler Ansiklopediler*, ed. Deniz İnel (İstanbul: Gelişim Yayınları, 1984), pp. 30-53.

signification. Accordingly, the dissertation's approach is discussed in relation to social theory by means of which the process of modernization is associated with the development of the intersection between nation and communication. Chapter Two also handles the methodological issues. Information on the research design is provided in detail in this chapter, including explanations about the selection of the time span, the sample, the primary sources, and data elicitation. Moreover, the rationale and implementation procedures of classical content analysis and discourse analysis methods are described.

Chapter Three provides the historical background for the research. First, the historical events and political circumstances surrounding the relation between the press and the single-party regime are depicted chronologically. While doing this, the political struggle between the Kemalists and the opposition is especially touched on in order to show how much the opposition was constricted in terms of the printed expression of dissident or critical ideas. Second, the legal arrangements that regulated the newspapers and the reasons for the rapprochement between the Kemalist power and the newspapers are extensively elaborated. Last, the mobilization of newspapers for Kemalist propaganda in the mid-1930s is examined.

The discourses in the newspaper texts in relation to national identity between 1934 and 1937 are analyzed and counted throughout the three consecutive chapters. Discourse analysis and classical content analysis are conducted in accordance with the classification of some specific discourse topics, on the basis of which Chapter Four, Chapter Five and Chapter Six are organized.

In Chapter Four, in line with the literature on Kemalist nationalism, newspapers' attitude towards race, Turkification, religion, and the representation of the minorities are examined utilizing related excerpts and frequency tables.

In Chapter Five, the representations and coverage of certain recurring themes, in other words, the leitmotifs that are featured in the coverage of the daily newspapers of the era are

examined. The reproduction of the Ottoman vs. Republican dichotomy, the representations of women, youth, children, the army, and Atatürk are elaborated in depth.

Last, in Chapter Six, Kemalist nationalism and the reproduction of the concept of nation in the daily newspapers are discussed by means of a detailed examination of the discursive practices in newspaper texts. In this chapter, it is demonstrated how the national community was represented, how “us” and “them” are imagined, how the concepts of “nation” and “national” were connoted, and what “Turks” and “Turkishness” signified.

In the last chapter, the findings of the research are evaluated in line with the theoretical framework and historical background.

CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODOLOGY

Theoretical Framework: Nationalism, National Identity, and Media

Modernization, Nation and Communication

In order to understand the historical relation between nation and communication, the social communications approach provides a suitable framework for the present research. The social communications literature that evolved in the 1980s derives mainly from the modernization approach to nationalism and stresses the role of communication processes in the development of nation states.

In the 1990s, theories of nationalism matured in line with a highly productive academic atmosphere in the social sciences literature. Early in the decade, the focus was on the origins and development of nations and nation states, and later on the reproduction of nationalism. By the second half of the 1990s, in the non-Western literature, post-colonial and/or subaltern studies started to contribute to the development of the literature on nationalism, by both challenging and extending the Western perspective.⁴⁴ However, during the 1990s, the focus mostly remained on the origins of nationalism or the construction or reproduction of national identity, and the context mostly remained the nation state as the space of identity.

However, by the end of the twentieth and beginning of the twenty-first centuries, in line with the meta-process of globalization, on the one hand, and the discussions of transnationalization, on the other, Western academic focus shifted to the question of how

⁴⁴ Claire Sutherland, *Nationalism in the Twenty-first Century: Challenges and Responses* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), pp. 24-40.

nationalism and nation building responded to the global cosmopolitan challenge. In Europe, during the first decade of the 2000s, attempts to construct a supranational European identity were especially influential while studying identity related issues. During the first decade of the new millennium, the academic literature on media and nationalism started to deal with the role of the media in the construction of, say, diasporic identities, transnational identities, global cosmopolitan identities or ethnic and local identities, in line with the rapid development of information and communication technologies and the economic and political concerns about the future of the nation state.

By the second decade of the twenty-first century, especially after the introduction of Web 2.0 technologies that allowed the involvement of the Internet users to generate content, the acceleration of digitization and the phenomenon of convergence shifted the focus of academic studies to the role of social media platforms in political participation and in political and cultural identity construction. The rise of the Web 2.0 technologies was also consequential in terms of dividing the discipline of media and communication studies into two areas of study, namely old or traditional mass media studies, on the one hand, and new or social media studies, on the other. Currently, while newspapers, radio and terrestrial, digital or satellite television are mostly associated with the old or traditional mass media. The Internet and all kind of social media or personalized media platforms are associated with the new media studies.

Within this context, the theoretical background of this study that focuses on the early years of the Republic of Turkey and that seeks to understand the role of the newspapers in the construction of national identity within the context of the nation state especially makes use of the modernization approach that was developed mostly during the 1990s. The social communications literature is indeed derived from the modernization approach, and more specifically, from the writings of Karl Deutsch, Ernest Gellner, and Benedict Anderson, who

highlight the role of communication in the formation of nation, national identity, and citizenship.

The earliest work on the social communications approach is Karl Deutsch's *Nationalism and Social Communication*, which was initially published in 1953.⁴⁵ Deutsch emphasizes the centrality of the communicative structures of interaction in the making of national consciousness and national will. He states that "peoples are held together from within by this communicative efficiency, the complementarity of the communicative facilities acquired by their members."⁴⁶ According to Schlesinger, the terms national consciousness and national will that are used by Deutsch may be termed "national identity" in today's idiom and he thinks that Deutsch sees national identity "as an outcome of the structural cohesion that comes about through social communication."⁴⁷ Deutsch also argues that modern nation states are likely to absorb or assimilate the languages and cultures of the subordinated ethnicities or national minorities within their borders. According to him, the general trend is for the disappearance of these ethnicities.

Another crucial work on the modernization approach to nationalism is Gellner's *Nations and Nationalism*.⁴⁸ Gellner argues that nationalism is an unavoidable outcome of industrial society. According to him, nation is a new social formation based on citizenship, necessitating a culturally homogenized organization of the population through a standardized education system.⁴⁹ Within this framework vernacularization is a crucial factor for the formation of nation states in terms of national awakening, national unification, effective

⁴⁵Karl Wolfgang Deutsch, *Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundation of Nationality*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1966).

⁴⁶Ibid., p. 98.

⁴⁷Philip Schlesinger, "The Nation and Communicative Space," in *Media Power, Professionals and Policies*, ed. Howard Tumber (London; New York: Routledge, 2000), p. 101.

⁴⁸Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism, New Perspectives on the Past* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983).

⁴⁹Ibid., p. 35.

citizenship, and administrative centralization. He writes “vernacular - the favored language used as an instrument in education- facilitates literacy.”⁵⁰ Thus, it is through his emphasis on the central education system, on cultural standardization and on the importance of literacy that Gellner acknowledges the link between nation and social communication. As Schlesinger points out, in Gellner’s account, “the culture of a nation is broadly identified with official culture.”⁵¹

Like Deutsch and Gellner, Benedict Anderson is also interested in the role of communication in the formation of national identity within the boundaries of the nation state. In *Imagined Communities*, focusing on the impact of print capitalism, he argues that “communication and media did facilitate the emergence of nations as imagined communities.”⁵² According to Anderson, print accounts for the major cognitive transformations that engender national communities. He thinks that print languages created “unified fields of exchange and communication,” they “gave a new fixity to language, “and they “created languages-of-power of a kind different from the older administrative vernaculars.”⁵³ Moreover, nationalist novels and newspapers are key vehicles in the process of imagining the nation because they provide the members of the imagined community with a calendrical consciousness.

Overall, the social communications approach considers the processes of communication in the development of nationalism and in the formation of the nation state during the transition from a traditional to a modern society. For example, in one of his articles, Şerif Mardin examines the modernization of communications in Turkey in line with Deutsch’s approach. From the viewpoint of social communications, Mardin examines how the

⁵⁰Ibid., p. 57.

⁵¹Schlesinger, "The Nation and Communicative Space," p. 103.

⁵²Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*.

⁵³Ibid., pp. 44-45.

movements of linguistic simplification in the Ottoman press contributed to the development of Turkish nationalism.⁵⁴ During the second half of the nineteenth century, the linguistic simplification in the Turkish press was an important factor in the development of Turkish nationalism. The movement partly contributed to the development of a Turkish national consciousness among the intellectual elites and to the further success of Turkish nationalism as a political project at the expense of all other identities under the Ottoman reign.

The role of the linguistic simplification movement in Turkish nationalism is much similar to the role of print languages that Gellner and Anderson discuss. Like Mardin, Niyazi Berkes also argues that, “the language now reaching the tongues of the people was, so to say, freed from religious association.”⁵⁵ Berkes adds that, during the Hamidian period, “The newspaper, the illustrated weekly, the novel became means of entertainment, means of arousing and satisfying curiosity, means of shattering the traditional view that learning and literacy were matters of embellishment, exclusive literary refinement, didactic teaching, or religious instruction.”⁵⁶ Thus, in the case of Ottoman/Turkish modernization, it was the development of Turkish as a print language that facilitated the creation of a forum for public debate, a unified field of exchange and contributed to the spread of books and printing in the Ottoman Empire.

Miroslav Hroch also puts special emphasis on Deutsch’s social communications approach while explaining the nation-building process in Europe. In his words, “Intellectuals can ‘invent’ national communities only if certain objective preconditions for the formation of a nation already exist. Karl Deutsch long ago remarked that for national consciousness to arise

⁵⁴Serif Mardin, "Some Notes on an Early Phase in the Modernization of Communications in Turkey," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 3, no. 3 (1961).

⁵⁵Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey* (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964), p. 279.

⁵⁶*Ibid.*, p. 281.

there must be something for it to become conscious of.”⁵⁷ Moreover, the emphasis put by Hroch on social communication in the development of nationalism is both remarkable and illuminating with respect to this research.

According to Hroch, there are three main phases in the development of national movements in Europe. In Phase A, he observes “scholarly inquiry into and dissemination of an awareness of the linguistic, cultural and social and sometimes historical attributes of the non-dominant group.”⁵⁸ In Phase B, he states “the project of creating a future nation, by patriotic agitation to ‘awaken’ national consciousness.”⁵⁹ In Phase C, he stresses a “mass movement,” “a full social structure,” where the movement differentiates out into “conservative-clerical, liberal and democratic wings, each with their own programmes.”⁶⁰ He also states that a successful national movement that comes out of all of these three stages acquires certain characteristics:“(1) a crisis of legitimacy, linked to social, moral and cultural strains; (2) a basic volume of vertical social mobility; (3) a fairly high level of social communication, including literacy, schooling and market relations; and (4) nationally relevant conflicts of interest.”⁶¹

As a postscript, Özkırımlı notes that the development of nationalism in Turkey exactly accords with Hroch’s three staged developmental model.⁶² Hroch’s nation-building process approach is also adopted by Erol Köroğlu in his examination of the development of

⁵⁷Miroslav Hroch, "From National Movement to the Fully-Formed Nation: The Nation-Building Process in Europe," in *Mapping the Nation*, ed. Gopal Balakrishnan (London and New York: Verso, 1996), p. 79.

⁵⁸Ibid., p. 81.

⁵⁹Ibid.

⁶⁰Ibid.

⁶¹Ibid., pp. 87-88.

⁶²Umut Özkırımlı, "Türkiye'de Gayriresmî Ve Popüler Milliyetçilik," in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce Cilt 4 Milliyetçilik*, eds. Murat Gültekinil Tanıl Bora (İstanbul: İletişim, 2002), p. 717.

Turkism.⁶³ Doğan Çetinkaya also refers to Hroch's approach in an article in which he examines the role of journalists in the making of public opinion and spread of nationalism in Turkey after 1908.⁶⁴ On the role of social communication in the nation formation, he says it is also important to consider Hroch's reminder:

The role of social communication cannot be observed as an isolated, all-embracing phenomenon (...) "The importance of these means of communication for nation formation was not an invariable entity, but rather grew with the progress of national movements and the intensification of national agitation."⁶⁵

The main concern of the social communications approach is thus the role of communication in a broader sense, rather than the role of the particular media messages in the construction of the idea of nation. This approach has a communication technology perspective that seeks to draw attention to what Chesebro and Bertelsen term, "the communication technologies themselves as powerful variables affecting human communication."⁶⁶ For example, as Gellner argues "The media themselves, the pervasiveness, standardized, one to many communication, which itself automatically engendered the core idea of nationalism, irrespective of what in particular is being put into the specific messages transmitted."⁶⁷

Gellner is right when we think of the relation between the media and the emergence of nation as a historical phenomenon. However, it is certain that media content also plays significant roles in maintaining the idea of nation in the minds of its members.

⁶³Erol Köroğlu, "From Propaganda to National Identity Construction: Turkish Literature and the First World War, 1914-1918" (Dissertation, Boğaziçi University 2003), p. 69. For the printed version on the study see *Türk Edebiyatı Ve Birinci Dünya Savaşı, 1914-1918: Propagandadan Millî Kimlik İnşasına* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004).

⁶⁴Y. Doğan Çetinkaya, "Orta Katman Aydınlar ve Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Kitleleşmesi" in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce Cilt 4 Milliyetçilik*, eds. Murat Gültekinil and Tanıl Bora (İstanbul: İletişim, 2002), pp. 91-102.

⁶⁵ Miroslav Hroch, "Modernization and Communication as Factors of Nation Formation," in *The Sage Handbook of Nations and Nationalism*, eds. Gerard Delanty and Krishan Kumar (London: Sage, 2006), p. 30.

⁶⁶James W. Chesebro and Dale A. Bertelsen, *Analyzing Media Communication Technologies as Symbolic and Cognitive Systems* (New York, London: Guilford Press, 1996), p. 22.

⁶⁷Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, p. 127.

Therefore, besides the social communications approach, the theoretical basis for the examination of the relation between media and the continuous reproduction of nation is crucial for this research.

Media and the Reproduction of Nation

We live as members of ethnic majorities and minorities, as members of regions or nations. We share values, and ideas and interests and beliefs and identify with those whose values, interests, beliefs are like our own. We share past, as well as the immediate present: our biographies intertwined with histories and fused by memory. We find our identities in the social relations that are imposed upon us and those that we seek. We live them out on a daily basis. We have a sense of a need to belong. And we need reassurance that we do indeed belong. We construct ideas of what that thing to which we belong is, and we define and make sense of it in the images that we have of it, or in those that are offered to us. We need constantly to be reminded, reassured that our sense of belonging and our involvement is worthwhile.

Roger Silverstone, *Why Study the Media?*⁶⁸

Gellner's phrase "Having a nation is not an inherent attribute to humanity, but it has now come to appear as such"⁶⁹ and Anderson's concept of "imagined community"⁷⁰ inevitably lead us to acknowledge that national identity is a social construction that need to be renewed in the minds of the members of the nation. Accordingly, one should ask how the continuous conceptualization of the nation is provided and what kind of a role do media play in the reproduction of the idea of nation and national identity.

Montserrat Guibernau provides important clues for the discussion referring to the features of national identity. He argues that the defining criteria of identity are "continuity

⁶⁸Silverstone, *Why Study the Media?*, p. 96.

⁶⁹Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, p. 6.

⁷⁰Anderson, *Imagined Communities*.

over time and differentiation from others.”⁷¹ Furthermore, he writes, “as a collective sentiment, national identity needs to be upheld and reaffirmed at regular intervals.”⁷²

Guibernau refers to the use of symbols, repetition of rituals, and to the role of the media as a tool of “reaffirmation” for the national identity. In this respect, the media contribute to maintain and renew the “nation”. At this point, especially Michael Billig’s work *Banal Nationalism* is illuminating.⁷³

Billig’s main consideration is the question of nation maintenance rather than nation formation. The question that lies at the centre of Billig’s notion of banal nationalism is “what happens to nationalism once the nation-state is established?”⁷⁴ According to him, we don’t forget our national identity because “nationalism does not disappear once it is established, it becomes something surplus to everyday life.”⁷⁵ He states that “we are constantly reminded that we live in nations: ‘our identity’ is continually being flagged.”⁷⁶ To Billig, the flagging of national identity is an idiom that refers to banal routines, for example, the routine words which take nation for granted. To strengthen his argument, Billig conducted an empirical survey based on a sample of ten newspapers on an ordinary day to show how newspapers remind readers about their national identity in the United Kingdom. He observes how the “unwaved flags” provide “banal remainders of nationhood”.⁷⁷

The unwaved flags that Billig examines may be thought of in parallel to ‘symbols’ and ‘rituals’ that Guibernau discusses as tools for the reaffirmation of national identity. In his

⁷¹Montserrat Guibernau, *Nationalisms: The Nation-State and Nationalism in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), p. 73.

⁷²Ibid.

⁷³Michael Billig, *Banal Nationalism* (London: Sage, 1995).

⁷⁴Ibid., p. 44.

⁷⁵Ibid.

⁷⁶Ibid., p. 93.

⁷⁷Ibid., p. 41.

study, Billig underlines some focal points in explaining the discourse of nationhood such as “Imagining “us” as the national community,” “Imagining the national homeland,” “Stereotyping ‘them’,” “Imagining a nation among nations” and “Syntax of hegemony”.⁷⁸ In his one-day survey of national dailies, it is in line with these points that Billig explains how the media reproduce banal nationalism. However, his banal nationalism evaluates nationhood as stable and constant. There is not an explicit concern about the possibility of an instable notion of nationhood that is subject to change according to different social and political contexts in different periods. But overall, what is important is that at the centre of Billig’s argument lies the idea that nation is consciously or unconsciously practiced in everyday life, especially through media consumption.

Similar to Billig, Reicher and Hopkins acknowledge that we are surrounded by nations, nationalism and national identity.⁷⁹ Accordingly, we can think of the media as a tool that constructs in people’s minds the presence of the idea of the nation in everyday life. At this point, Hall’s question is crucial “What representational strategies are deployed to construct our commonsense views of national belonging or identity?”⁸⁰ He offers the following five elements: the narrative of the nation, which provide a set of stories, images, landscapes, scenarios, historical events, national symbols and national rituals which stand for or represent the shared experiences; the emphasis on origins, continuity, tradition and timelessness; the invention of tradition; the foundational myth; the idea of a pure, original people or “folk”. According to Hall, “the narrative of the national culture” is told mainly around these five elements.

⁷⁸Ibid., pp. 70-92.

⁷⁹Stephen Reicher and Nick Hopkins, *Self and Nation : Categorization, Contestation and Mobilization* (London: Sage, 2001), p. vii.

⁸⁰Hall, "The Question of Cultural Identity," pp. 293-95.

Hall borrows the notion of “invention of tradition” from Hobsbawm and Ranger who evaluate the nation as “a comparatively recent historical innovation”.⁸¹ According to them, “nationalism, the nation-state, national symbols, histories and the rest” are all associated phenomena to nation.⁸² Within this context, they define the notion of ‘invented tradition’ as “a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behavior by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past.”⁸³ Thus, in the light of these arguments, one can think of the media as being among the tools of narrating the national culture and as channels to continuously present the “invented traditions”.

Cillia, Reisigl, and Wodak also propose some basic assumptions for the investigation of national identities.⁸⁴ Their first assumption is that “nations are to be understood as mental constructs, as ‘imagined political communities’.”⁸⁵ Second they assume that “national identities – conceived as specific forms of social identities– are discursively, by means of language and other semiotic systems, produced, reproduced, transformed and destructed.”⁸⁶ Third, in their view,

national identity can be regarded as a sort of habitus, that is to say as a complex of common ideas, concepts or perception schemes, (a) of related emotional attitudes intersubjectively shared within a specific group of persons; (b) as well as of similar behavioral dispositions; (c) all of which are internalized through “national” socialization.⁸⁷

⁸¹E. J. Hobsbawm and T. O. Ranger, *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 13.

⁸²Ibid.

⁸³Ibid., p. 1.

⁸⁴R. De Cillia, M. Reisigl, and R. Wodak, "The Discursive Construction of National Identities," *Discourse & Society* 10, no. 2 (1999).

⁸⁵Ibid., p. 153.

⁸⁶Ibid.

⁸⁷Ibid.

Fourth, “the discursive construction of nations and national identities always runs hand in hand with the construction of difference/distinctiveness and uniqueness (Hall, 1994, 1996; Martin, 1995).”⁸⁸ The fifth assumption is that,

there is no such thing as the one and only national identity in an essentializing sense, but rather that different identities are discursively constructed according to context, that is according to the social field, the situational setting of the discursive act and the topic being discussed.⁸⁹

To sum up, the theoretical framework of the study provides tools with which to think of the nation as a modern phenomenon, and thereby to think of the national culture and identity as social and discursive constructions. Accordingly, the need for the presence of the media as a mediator between the nation and its members to construct and maintain the idea of the nation becomes apparent. In studying media’s mediating role, the concept of “representation” is also crucial. Therefore, in the next part of this chapter, the relation between media, representation and national identity will be discussed.

Media, Representation and National Identity as Discourse

In this research, the imagining of the national community is approached as a collective cultural process. As Baldwin et al. point out, “It is about creating the nation through its representation to both members and outsiders.”⁹⁰ What is representation, then, and how does it function in the service of the reproduction of national identity? A cultural studies approach may help to answer such questions. At the core of this approach lays the recognition of language as a cultural process, with specific emphasis on discourse. Cultural studies’ basic

⁸⁸Ibid., pp. 153-54.

⁸⁹Ibid., p. 154.

⁹⁰Elaine Baldwin et al., "Culture and National Identity," in *Introducing Cultural Studies*, eds. Elaine Baldwin et al. (London: Pearson, 2004), p. 159.

assumptions are thus based on sociolinguistics and its method semiotic analysis. Baldwin et al. write that:

The events, objects, persons, emotions and so on that the language identifies are not discrete entities in human experience awaiting a label to be attached to them; they are constituted through language and the meanings given in language. In this way language stands for or represents that which it names.⁹¹

Accordingly, one can conclude that representation produces a version of the world; and that it is centrally involved in the construction of the world. Thereby, by applying the methods of linguistics to other social and human sciences, studies on the relation between communication, representation, and meaning are influenced by structuralism, post-structuralism, and semiotics.⁹²

On the basis of the cultural studies approach, one can argue that identities are discursive constructs. Stuart Hall defines discourse as:

(...) a group of statements which provide language for talking about –i.e. way of representing- a particular kind of knowledge about a topic. (...) Discourse is about the production of knowledge through language. But it is itself produced by practice: ‘discursive practice’ – the practice of producing meaning.⁹³

As Barker states, “Nations are not simply political formations but systems of cultural representation by which national identity is continually reproduced through discursive action.”⁹⁴ Accordingly, since discourse is both constructed and constructive, one can argue that national identity too is constructed through representation and its representation constructs.

⁹¹“Communication and Representation,” in *Introducing Cultural Studies*, eds. Elaine Baldwin, et al. (London: Pearson, 2004), p. 45.

⁹² Among them are Ferdinand de Saussure, Louis Althusser, Claude Levi Strauss, Roland Barthes, Noam Chomsky, Michel Foucault.

⁹³Stuart Hall and Bram Gieben, eds., *Formations of Modernity* (Cambridge: Polity, 2005), p. 291.

⁹⁴Barker, *Cultural Studies Theory and Practice*, p. 252.

According to Foucault, discourse is one of the systems through which power circulates and discursive formations produce a “regime of truth”. Foucault argues that “Truth isn’t outside power. (...) Each society has its regime of truth, its ‘general politics’ of truth; that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true.”⁹⁵ Deriving from Foucault, then, one can possibly approach the discourse of nation as a regime of truth in itself, with the knowledge that the power is constantly attempting to prove it as true. Thus the representation of national identity through discourse, also involves the construction of knowledge about “us” and “others” to be accepted by the members of the nation as true.

Discourses are thus signifying social practices which are produced and consumed by social actors and which are shaped by social context. Since discourses involve the production of ways of representing things, it would not be wrong to argue that they function through textual, conversational or visual signs and symbols. Discourses are therefore directly linked to meanings that are manufactured within context, and that are circulated through a number of means of communication, including the media. In the words of Williamson:

We feel a need to belong, to have a social ‘place’; it can be hard to find. Instead we may be given an imaginary one. All of us have a genuine need for social being, a common culture. The mass media provide this to some extent.⁹⁶

All in all, cultural studies provide us with tools to regard what Barker describes as “both individual identity and social formations as the unique historically specific articulations of discursive elements,”⁹⁷ as well as to acknowledge the role of the communication media in their constitution.

⁹⁵Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge : Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977* (New York Pantheon Books, 1980), p. 131.

⁹⁶Judith Williamson, "Meaning and Ideology," in *Mcquail's Reader in Mass Communication Theory*, ed. Denis McQuail (London: Sage, 2002), p. 301.

⁹⁷Barker, *Cultural Studies Theory and Practice*, p. 107.

Within this framework, in the empirical chapters of this study, the representation of the Turkish national identity in the newspapers of the single-party period is evaluated as both constructed and constructive discursive practices within the historical and political context of the period. In the following two chapters, the historical background for the empirical analysis is provided.

Methodology and Research Design

Aims and Objectives

The main objective of the empirical research is to observe the representation of the Turkish national identity in the newspapers of the single-party period, taking into consideration the political context of the period. Parallel to the research objective, media data are used as cultural indicators in two ways. On the one hand, the intensity in the newspaper articles is studied with classical content analysis method; on the other hand, the framing of the articles is analyzed with the discourse analysis method. Thereby, the empirical research allowed for an in-depth investigation of the representation of the Turkish national identity in the newspapers of the single-party period.

Research Questions

In line with the theoretical framework, two main research questions are posed. The first question is “To what extent did the newspapers in the single-party period reflect the official definition of the Turkish national identity?” and “How was the Turkish national identity represented in the newspapers of the single-party period?”

The Time Span

The analysis is done on the basis of three newspapers published between the years 1934 and 1937. 1934 is significant in two ways. First, the literature on the single-party press agrees that the main motivation of the Press Law that was adopted in 1934 mobilized the press in line with the republican principles. Thereby, by 1934, the newspapers had become extensions of the government. Second, the consolidation of the Republican People's Party (RPP) had been completed, as well as the that of institutions that contributed to the definition of the national identity.

Starting from 1934, a period of four years observation was established and the time span was limited to between 1934 and 1937, where the year 1937 signifies the last year of a completely "Kemalocentric" phase in the history of the Kemalist single-party regime.⁹⁸ In the literature on the Kemalist single-party era, 1938 is recognized as the year when İsmet İnönü enhanced power due to the health problems of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. 1938 is therefore often identified as the beginning of a new phase in which some of the central tenets of Kemalism were gradually challenged. For example, VanderLippe argues that in understanding the 1938-1950 periods, transition to multi-party politics is key and during this period "the limits of the discourse were redefined by establishing acceptable margins of deviation from the Kemalism mandated by the ruling party."⁹⁹

Thus, when the situation of the press-government relations and the attempts to construct a Turkish national identity that has been thoroughly shaped by a Kemalocentric interpretation of history are considered together, this specific time span that covers the 1934 -

⁹⁸ John M. VanderLippe, *The Politics of Turkish Democracy: İsmet İnönü and the Formation of the Multi-Party System, 1938-1950* (New York: SUNY Press, 2012), p. 4.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 5.

1937 interval can be described as the period that best allows tracing the role of the construction and consolidation of the Kemalist Turkish national identity in the newspapers of the single-party era.

Information on the Newspapers Scanned

Within the scope of the time span 1934-1937 specified for the empirical investigation, the content of three mainstream newspapers was scanned. In most of the resources on the history of the Turkish press, the most important newspapers of the period between 1931 and 1938 were identified as *Cumhuriyet (The Republic)*, *Akşam (The Night)*, *Tan (The Daybreak)*, *Son Posta (The Last Post)* and *Ulus (The Nation)*.¹⁰⁰ Among them, *Ulus* and *Tan* were excluded from the sample.

First of all, *Ulus* was officially affiliated with and owned by the Republican People's Party. It was a newspaper that was founded by the Kemalist rulers in order to express their own views and ideas.¹⁰¹ Together with *Ülkü*, *Ulus* certainly was the main channel of propaganda that directly disseminated the Turkish national identity. However it may not be considered as a 'mediator' between Kemalist rulers and citizens because it was rather an immediate, firsthand 'transmitter' of the national message. Whereas mediation occurs when there is interpretation processes while "shaping, selecting, editing, emphasizing and de-emphasizing according to the perceptions, expectations and previous experience"¹⁰² of those who inform the public. In this sense, together with the disseminating role of the newspapers, the mediating role also matters for meeting the objective of the research that is to understand

¹⁰⁰Hıfzı Topuz, *Türk Basın Tarihi* (Istanbul: Remzi, 2003), p. 162.

¹⁰¹ Hürriyet Konyar, *Ulus Gazetesi, CHP ve Kemalist İlkeler* (Ankara: Bağlam, 1999), p. 12.

¹⁰²James Watson and Anne Hill, *Dictionary of Media and Communication Studies* (London: Bloomsbury, 2012), p. 178.

the contribution of the mainstream newspapers in the 're'-presentation, 're'-production and 're'-construction of the Turkish national identity. Thus, an investigation of *Ulus* would not meet the objectives of the research since the aim of the study is to examine the impact of the official point of view on the unofficial mainstream newspapers.

On the other hand, because *Tan* was established in 1935, it would not be possible to make a comparative analysis between *Tan* and the other two newspapers starting from the year 1934; and second, because *Tan* was published by relatively oppositional journalists such as Sabiha-Zekeriya Sertel and Ahmet Emin Yalman, it did not represent the mainstream. Thus the sample consisted of three newspapers, namely *Cumhuriyet*, *Akşam*, and *Son Posta*.

Cumhuriyet was established in 1924 in Istanbul, with the mission to support the new regime and to ease the evolution of a pro-republican public opinion. The newspaper was named *Cumhuriyet* upon the request of Mustafa Kemal.

Yunus Nadi was the editor-in-chief and one of the three owners of the newspaper. *Cumhuriyet's* antecedents *Yeni Gün* (*New Day*, 1918-1920, Istanbul) and *Anadolu'da Yeni Gün* (*New Day in Anatolia*, 1920-1924, Ankara) which had served as propaganda tools for the *Kuvayı Milliye* (*Nationalist Forces*) during the years of the national struggle were also owned and published by Yunus Nadi. Other two shareholders were Zekeriya Sertel and Nebizade Hamdi,¹⁰³ both of whom resigned from partnership in later years.

Considering the intellectual and political atmosphere of the early 1920s and the major debates in the press of the period, *Cumhuriyet's* name and its place of publication were highly significant. First of all, a dichotomy could be observed between Ankara and Istanbul, as the two capital cities symbolizing the new and the old regimes respectively. According to Şapolyo, in Istanbul, publishing a newspaper under the name *Cumhuriyet* was both meaningful and congruent because for centuries it had been the capital city of the Ottoman

¹⁰³Aysun Köktener, *Bir Gazetenin Tarihi Cumhuriyet* (İstanbul: YKY, 2004), p. 13.

sultanate.¹⁰⁴ In those years, a domination of an anti-republican but pro-caliphate attitude could be observed in Istanbul press.¹⁰⁵ Neither *Cumhuriyet* nor its editors were welcomed by the journalist circles in the capital city of the old regime.

When it comes to the circulation rates, the total daily circulation rate in 1931 of all newspapers was approximately around 130,000, including the 32,000 of the daily newspapers published in Greek, Armenian, and French.¹⁰⁶ The population of Turkey was 14 million according to the 1927 census.¹⁰⁷ Within this context, the circulation of *Cumhuriyet* was around 7,000 by 1924, 8-9.000 by 1927, 25-28,000 by 1934 and 62,000 by 1939.¹⁰⁸ Taking into consideration the low literacy rates and the total population of the period, one could say that the circulation of the *Cumhuriyet* newspaper was high. However, due to the limited facilities of distribution, like those of other dailies, *Cumhuriyet* was mostly purchased by readers who lived in Istanbul and in neighboring cities.

Yunus Nadi remained as the editor-in chief until his death in 1945. From time to time, Zekeriya Sertel, Yakup Kadri, Abidin Daver, M. Nermi, Nadir Nadi and Şükrü Kaya wrote the leading articles. Among other writers were Ziya Gökalp, Aka Gündüz, Hasan Bedreddin, Reşat Ekrem Koçu, Ahmet Rasim, Peyami Safa, Ahmet Refik, İsmail Habib, Cenap Şahabettin, Vedat Nedim, Halit Ziya, Cevat Fehmi Başkut, Mümtaz Faik, Fuat Köprülü, and Halit Fahri.

¹⁰⁴Enver Benhan Şapolyo, *Türk Gazetecilik Tarihi Ve Her Yönü Ile Basın* (Ankara: Güven Matbaası, 1969), p. 228.

¹⁰⁵Köktener, *Bir Gazetenin Tarihi Cumhuriyet*, p. 17.; Alpay Kabacalı, *Türk Basınında Demokrasi*(Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı, 1994), pp. 107-26.

¹⁰⁶ Hasan Üstün, “Türkiye’de Gazete Dağıtımlarını Yaygınlaştırma Girişimleri 1930-1945”, *İletişim Fakültesi Dergisi*, no. 35, (2008), p. 109.

¹⁰⁷ Aytül Tamer and Alanur Çavlin Bozbeyoğlu, “1927 Nüfus Sayımının Türkiye’de Ulus Devlet İnşasındaki Yeri”, *Nüfusbilim Dergisi/Turkish Journal of Population Studies*, no.26, (2004),p. 85.

¹⁰⁸Köktener, *Bir Gazetenin Tarihi Cumhuriyet*, p. 22.

Cumhuriyet is still being published by Yeni Gün Haber Ajansı Basın ve Yayıncılık A.Ş as a joint enterprise. According to an official announcement published by the board of directors of the newspaper, with a 70 percent of the total share, its main shareholder is Cumhuriyet Vakfı. The remaining 30 percent of the shares are held by 18 different shareholders.¹⁰⁹

Son Posta was first published on 26 July 1930 in Istanbul by Zekeriya Sertel, Halil Lütfü Dördüncü, Selim Ragıp Emeç, and Ekrem Uşaklıgil. Among them, it was Zekeriya Sertel who undertook the mission to lead and shape the political attitude of the publication. In his memoirs, Sertel expressed this with the following sentence: “Those three were not adequately educated. None of them were university graduates. They were not capable of leading the opinion-related matters. I made up for their incompetence.”¹¹⁰

Sertel was distant from and critical at the RPP’s actions. He was unhappy with the oppression in the political sphere, especially with the impediments place by the regime to the right of establishing civic organizations. According to him, many people were uncomfortable with the single-party system and there was an immediate need to mediate the uneasiness of the public. Therefore, the title of the editorial in the first issue of *Son Posta* was “We are suffocating, we want some air!”¹¹¹ This article attracted attention and had a great impact on increasing the importance of the newspaper.

In this atmosphere, the foundation of *Serbest Fırka* (*Free Republican Party*) was highly appreciated by *Son Posta*, despite a remarkable conflict of ideas between the newspaper and the party. According to Sertel, *Son Posta* did not advocate the liberal policy of

¹⁰⁹“Cumhuriyet'ten Ethem Sancak açıklaması”, 27 December 2013.http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/turkiye/23159/Cumhuriyet_ten_Ethem_Sancak_aciklamasi.html.

¹¹⁰Zekeriya Sertel, *Hatırladıklarım* (Istanbul: Remzi, 2000), p. 167. “Her üçünün de öğrenimi yetersizdi. Hiç biri üniversiteyi bitirmemişti. Bir gazetenin fikir kısmını yönetebilecek durumda değildiler. Onların bu eksikliğini ben tamamlayacaktım.” (190)

¹¹¹*Ibid.*, p. 168. “Boğuluyoruz, biraz hava istiyoruz”

Serbest Fırka, but took side with the party in order to defend its potential to constitute an alternative to the single-party regime. Until the Press Law in 1931, *Yarın* and *Son Posta* were the two oppositional newspapers that supported *Serbest Fırka*. As Kabacalı writes, their adverse attitudes towards the RPP helped to attract a significant number of readers and it was roughly estimated that their joint circulation was around 80,000.¹¹² In addition, in İzmir *Hizmet (Service)*, *Halkın Sesi (People's Voice)*, *Yeni Asır (New Century)* and *Serbest Cumhuriyet (Free Republic)* also supported *Serbest Fırka*.¹¹³

In 1931, *Serbest Fırka* was shut down by the government. Afterward, Sertel, who defended statism, was arrested for insulting the owners of the Alpullu Sugar Factory. After Sertel was discharged, there emerged a disagreement among the partners of *Son Posta* around Sertel's anti-liberal attitude.¹¹⁴ First, Sertel left *Son Posta* and started to publish *Hayat Ansiklopedisi (The Encyclopedia of Life)*. Then, Halil Lütfü and Ekrem Uşaklıgil withdrew from partnership. Starting from 1936, Sertel and Lütfü joined Ahmet Emin Yalman to publish *Tan* with a new perspective.¹¹⁵ Selim Ragıp Emeç moved to the head of *Son Posta* and the newspaper continued until 1960s.

Without Zekeriya Sertel, under the management of Selim Ragıp Emeç *Son Posta* drastically departed from its earlier oppositional attitude towards the government.¹¹⁶ Due to its newly adopted moderate manner, *Son Posta* managed to survive despite the strict rules that governed the press of the period. Later with the transition to the multi-party regime, the newspaper supported the Democrat Party (DP). Furthermore, Selim Ragıp Emeç was elected

¹¹²Alpay Kabacalı, *Başlangıcından Günümüze Türkiye'de Matbaa Basın Ve Yayın* (İstanbul: Literatür, 2000), p. 189.

¹¹³*Türk Basınında Demokrasi*, p. 143.

¹¹⁴Sertel, *Hatırladıklarım*, p. 183.

¹¹⁵Ali Gevgilili, "Türkiye Basını," in *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, ed. Murat Belge (İstanbul: İletişim 1983), p. 216.

¹¹⁶Topuz, *Türk Basın Tarihi*, p. 164.; *100 Soruda Türk Basın Tarihi* (İstanbul: Gerçek Yayınevi, 1973), p. 157.

member of parliament from the DP in the elections of 1950, 1954, and 1957.¹¹⁷ Following the military coup in 1960, he has arrested and *Son Posta* was dissolved.

Akşam was established in 1918 in Istanbul by Kazım Şinasi Dersan, Necmettin Sadak, and Ali Naci Karacan. Later on, Falih Rıfkı Atay also joined the partnership. All of the founders were educated in the western style, and the publication policy of the newspaper was shaped according to the objective to create public opinion against the occupation of the country.

The historical and political context of 1918 was deeply influential on defining *Akşam*'s mission, which was mainly the "expression of opinions."¹¹⁸ The first issue of *Akşam* was published on 20 September 1918, right before the Mondros Treaty (30 October 1918) that signalled the dissolution and the defeat of the Ottoman Empire after World War I. The government was revoked, the Committee of the Union and Progress was abolished, and the British and French occupied Istanbul.

By the end of 1918, the major debates in the newspapers were focused on the possibility of either a British or US mandate. However, by 1920 the press was divided into two sides, one which defended diplomatic endeavors, and one which defended the nationalist armed struggle against the occupation of the country.¹¹⁹ *Akşam* remained in the second pro-Kemalist nationalist block, together with *Tevhid-i Efkâr (Unity of Ideas)*, *Vakit (Time)*, *İleri (Forward)* and *İkdam (Endeavour)*.¹²⁰

After the proclamation of the Republic in 1923, *Akşam* was among the supporters of the new regime. The newspaper's publication policy was re-shaped around the ideal to get the

¹¹⁷Boyutpedia, "Son Posta," Boyut Yayın Grubu, Accessed 15 November 2013, http://www.boyutpedia.com/default-ID~1319~aID~41209~link~son_posta.html.

¹¹⁸Nurhan Kavaklı, *Bir Gazetenin Tarihi Akşam* (Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2005), pp. 25-27.

¹¹⁹Ibid., p. 30.

¹²⁰Bilge Criss, *İşgal Altında İstanbul* (İstanbul: İletişim, 1993), p. 75.

public opinion with the new republican principles. Accordingly, new writers joined the newspaper and contributed to its content. Among them were Abdullah Cevdet, Ahmet Ağaoğlu, Ahmet Rasim, Ahmet Refik, Ali Ekrem, Ali Sami, Avram Galanti, Bekir Fahri, Celal Esat, Cemil Munis, Cevat Rüştü, Ekrem Emin, Hatemi Senih, Hikmet Şevki, İbrahim Fazıl, Mahmut Esat, Mahmut Ragıp, Mehmet İzzet, Mekki Sait, M. Selahattin, Mustafa Hulusi, Nurullah Ataç, Nusret Hüsnü, Refik Halit, Sait Tevfik, Selami İzzet, Selami Sabit, Süleyman Kani, Süleyman Süreyya and Vedat Örfi.¹²¹

One of the reasons for *Akşam*'s close relations with the government was Falih Rıfki Atay, who was elected member of parliament in the elections of the summer of 1923. Atay reported to *Akşam* from Ankara, and he was the one who informed the readers about the proclamation of the Republic.¹²²

Following the proclamation, the most important debate in the press was the issue of the caliphate. As opposed to other Istanbul newspapers, *Akşam* displayed an explicit and radical standpoint against the caliphate. For example, when Lütfü Fikri published an open letter in *Tanin* defending the caliphate in 10 November 1923, Necmettin Sadak responded in *Akşam*, reminding the readers that during the War of Independence, the Caliph had declared the combatants infidels.¹²³ In *Çankaya*, Atay wrote that *Akşam* had an important role in terms of accelerating the debates giving way to the abolition of the caliphate. Atay wrote, "In *Akşam*, Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu published an article which touched on the issues of the Caliphate and the dynasty.¹²⁴ This article informed the public about the conversations of the revolutionary group in the parliament to the effect that there was no place in the budget to pay

¹²¹ Osman Sevim, "Akşam Gazetesi 1 Ocak 1925 - 1 Temmuz 1925" (MA thesis, Istanbul University, 1981), cited in Kavaklı, *Bir Gazetenin Tarihi Akşam*, p. 52.

¹²² *Bir Gazetenin Tarihi Akşam*, p. 53.

¹²³ Kabacalı, *Türk Basınında Demokrasi*, p. 112.

¹²⁴ Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, "Meclis Ve Hanedan Bütçesi," *Akşam*, 26 Şubat 1924. "O aylarda Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu'nun *Akşam* gazetesinde Hilâfet ve Hanedan meselelerine temas eden bir yazısı çıkmıştı."

of the wages of the imperial family members, implying that there was still a great deal to be accomplished.”¹²⁵

According to Atay, this article caused turmoil in the parliament and irritated especially the reactionary representatives. According to him, as a severe response to the reactionary group’s agitations in the parliament, the Caliphate was abolished on 3 March 1924. When the republican revolutions are considered, it can be said that *Akşam* was a pioneering actor in the goal to attain a new westernized society.

In 1923 Falih Rifkî Atay left *Akşam* and joined *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* (*National Sovereignty*). In 1927, Ali Naci Karacan resigned from *Akşam*’s partnership. In 1928 Necmettin Sadak was elected member of parliament from the RPP. By 1930, *Akşam* was being managed by Necmettin Sadak and Kazım Şinasi Dersan and the newspaper was distant to *Serbest Fırka*.

By 1934, Enis Tahsin Til, Hilali Sıyman, Vâlâ Nurettin, Hikmet Feridun Es, Cemal Nadir, Sermet Muhtar, Selami İzzet Sedes, Cemalettin Bildik, Mustafa Ragıp Esatlı, Cemal Refik, and Şevket Rado were among the new contributors.¹²⁶ With regard to its contributors, who were well known publicists or men of letters of the period, it could be said that during the 1930s, *Akşam* was neither oppositional towards nor affiliated with the single-party regime. In 1947, Sadak became the minister of foreign affairs and resigned from *Akşam*. In 1957, Kazım Şinasi Dersan sold the newspaper to Malik Yolaç.

All in all, when considered together, it would be not wrong to state that *Cumhuriyet*, *Son Posta* and *Akşam*, which constitute the sample of this study, constituted at the same time the mainstream of the Turkish press in the mid 1930s. This means that through their coverage, the nationalist discourses and national identity representations can be observed as typically

¹²⁵Falih Rifkî Atay, *Çankaya* (İstanbul: Bateş, 1980), p. 385. “Bu, meclisteki devrimci takımın bir cumhuriyet bütçesinde hanedan ve damat maaşlarının yeri olmadığı gibi, henüz yapılacak işler olduğunu imâ eden koridor hasbîahlerini halk efkârına aksettirici bir yazı idi.”

¹²⁶Kavaklı, *Bir Gazetenin Tarihi Akşam*, p. 83.

having been disseminated in the mainstream newspapers of the period. It is thereby possible to reflect on the role of the press in the consolidation of the Turkish national identity.

Rationale for the Methods Used

Since the research makes inferences about the signifying processes leading to the representation of the Turkish national identity in the newspapers, classical content analysis and discourse analysis are used together as the two appropriate and mutually completing methods for the practicality of the empirical investigation. While content analysis allowed the description of the intensity of some specific discursive practices, discourse analysis allowed describing the framing of the articles that represented the Turkish national identity.

As Weber writes, classical content analysis can be used to “reflect cultural patterns of groups, institutions or societies.”¹²⁷ Regarding the theoretical framework of the study, one can think that the representation of the Turkish national identity in the single-party period mainstream newspapers may actually reflect both the RPP’s and the newspapers’ attitude towards the construction of Turkish identity within the historical context of the era.

The classical content analysis method provides the research two main advantages. First of all, content analysis helps by reducing the complexity of the texts to be analyzed. It allows the making of systematic classification and, as Bauer puts it the “counting of text units distills a large amount of material into a short description of some of its features.”¹²⁸ This nature of classical content analysis certainly facilitates both analyzing large number of texts and eliminating the details within the texts that don’t fit the scope of the research question. For example, considering this research, because only specific variables were sought in the

¹²⁷Robert Philip Weber, *Basic Content Analysis* (Beverly Hills ; London: Sage, 1990), p. 9.

¹²⁸Martin Bauer, "Classical Content Analysis: A Review," in *Qualitative Researching*, eds. M. Bauer and G. Gaskell (London: Sage, 2000), pp. 132-33.

representation of national identity, content analysis helped to simplify the process of reading the texts.

The second advantage of content analysis is that it allows the making of objective inferences. The content analysis method's strength in objectivity stems from the replicable character of its procedures. As Hansen writes, "content analysis, because it follows clearly articulated rules and procedures, lays open to scrutiny the means by which textual meaning is dissected and examined."¹²⁹ Accordingly, in this study, descriptions based on the articles related to the representation of the Turkish national identity do not depend on the researcher's subjective interpretations of the texts. They rather depend on concrete statistical results. The strength of the method in objectivity is also underlined by Bauer. According to him, content analysis "is a technique for making inferences from a focal text to its social context in an objectified manner.(...) 'Objectified' refers to systematic, procedurally explicit and replicable procedures: it does not suggest a single valid reading of the texts."¹³⁰ Thus, any researcher who wishes to check the objectivity of this study may do it by following the same explicit procedures.

Content analysis, however, has two main weaknesses. First, whereas systematic classification and counting facilitate the analysis of texts, the opportunity to reach broader insights and capture nuances regarding the discourses may be lost. That issue is often indicated as a line of criticism about content analysis. As Hansen states, "in counting individual units and their frequency of occurrence, content analysis fails to capture the way in which meaning arises from the complex interaction of symbols in texts."¹³¹ This limits the researcher's tools for interpreting texts. Parallel to Hansen, Flick also points out the same

¹²⁹Anders Hansen, *Mass Communication Research Methods* (New York: New York University Press, 1998), p. 98.

¹³⁰Bauer, "Classical Content Analysis: A Review," p. 133.

¹³¹Hansen, *Mass Communication Research Methods*, p. 98.

weakness, arguing that “the method does not offer much opportunity to explore texts in order to develop ideas and insights. It can only support qualify or refute your initial questions.”¹³²

The second weakness of content analysis is discussed by Bauer. According to him, “content analysis tends to focus on frequencies, and so neglects the rare and the absent: considerate analysts introduce theoretical codes that may well show significant absences in the text (...) content analysis is biased towards present.”¹³³ This weakness might affect this study negatively in the sense that some important absences might strengthen the main argument. In order to overcome these problems, and to make broader explorations on the basis of the texts, discourse analysis constitutes the second part of the empirical research.

Discourse analysis is a data analysis method frequently used while conducting qualitative research in cultural and media studies. The theoretical basis of discourse analysis is social constructionist approach, which assumes that meaning is constructed in and through language. Therefore, any analysis of discourse that is not concerned with discussions on culture and its relation to ideology and power would be incomplete.

The search for the discourses of social, political, and economic power embedded in cultural constructions originated from the development of a multi-perspectival approach to the understanding of culture. In the mid-1960s, especially following the works of Raymond Williams and Edward Thompson, cultural enquiry distanced itself from the elitist conception of culture in favor of an understanding of “culture as ordinary”.¹³⁴ From then on, the concept “culture” started to be used with reference to the shared meanings and symbolic goods of everyday life. Cultural studies have developed arguments that revolve around the social and political consequences of constructing and disseminating specific representations of the

¹³²Uwe Flick, *An Introduction to Qualitative Research* (London: Sage, 1998), p. 117.

¹³³Bauer, "Classical Content Analysis: A Review," p. 148.

¹³⁴Especially E.P. Thompson's *The Making of the English Working Class* was groundbreaking

world. The reductionist and economically deterministic perspective of Marxism regarding culture was challenged by the debates about the place of culture in a social formation.¹³⁵ Especially Althusser's structuralist Marxism, Hall's concept "the circuit of culture" and Gramsci's concept "hegemony" were significant in terms of representing the move away from reducing social phenomena to any one level, or the "material mode of production".

Structuralism was the first movement to put language, culture, and representation in the foreground as autonomous practices, emphasizing their irreducible character. Stemming from theories on the language of philosophers like Wittgenstein, Volosinov, and Saussure, structuralism emphasized the place of signifying systems in cultural phenomena and was concerned with how cultural meaning is generated.¹³⁶

The philosophical and practical achievements of structuralism in social and cultural enquiry were later surpassed by post-structuralists like Derrida and Foucault. Against structuralists' synchronic method in analyzing culture, which is based on fixed binary oppositions, the post-structuralists argued that meaning is unstable and is the outcome of relationships between texts. In Foucault's works "power" and "discourse" are of central importance. According to him, power is dispersed through all levels of a social formation and is productive of social relations and identities. Therefore, in much of his works he is concerned with the historical investigation of power and the production of subjects through that power. He attempts to identify the historical conditions and determining rules of formation of regulated ways of speaking about objects, that is, discursive practices and discursive formations.

This movement brought about an understanding of language as both constructed and constitutive. Language is thought to be constructed because it is not a neutral medium for the

¹³⁵Barker, *Cultural Studies Theory and Practice*, pp. 55-87.

¹³⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 88-121.

formation of meanings and forms of knowledge. Language is thought to be constitutive because it constructs meaning and provides the means through which people form knowledge about themselves and the social world.

Thus social constructionists' concept of language includes writing system, spoken system, visual images, gestures, music, sound, objects and so on. They believe that signs make-up the meaning systems in cultures. Accordingly, as a method, discourse analysis is one of the two variants of social constructionist approach, together with semiotic analysis. While semiotic analysis is the scientific study of visual sign systems, discourse analysis is the scientific study of oral, verbal or textual discursive practices.

As Rosalind Gill states "a critical stance towards taken-for-granted knowledge and a conviction that knowledge is socially constructed are among the key features of the social constructionist approach."¹³⁷ This approach is based on what she describes as "recognition that the ways in which we commonly understand the world are historically and culturally specific and relative and, a commitment to exploring the ways that knowledge forms are linked to actions and practices."¹³⁸ Within this framework, a researcher who conducts discourse analysis should normally share the main assumptions of the social constructionist approach.

In cases where media data are used as cultural indicators in research projects, discourse analysis aims at providing in-depth knowledge on the framing of different stories or arguments for the same topic or on the framing of different topics for the same argument. While doing that, the researcher usually makes use of key concepts such as sign, signified, signifier, addresser, addressee, myth, metaphor, metonym, binary opposition, all of which are developed by the social constructionist tradition that is highly inspired by linguistics. The

¹³⁷Rosalind Gill, "Discourse Analysis," in *Qualitative Researching with Text Image and Sound*, eds. Martin W. Bauer and George Gaskell (London: Sage, 2000), p. 173.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

language of persuasion is also deconstructed throughout the analysis of the discursive practices. In this study, too, the representation of the national identity in the newspapers between 1934-1937 are elaborated on the basis of the main assumptions of social constructionism and with the help of the above mentioned key concepts.

Study Sample

The target population of this study was all the articles that contained the keywords “Turk” or “Turks” or “Turkish” or “Turkishness” or any other signifier denoting ethnic or religious groups in *Cumhuriyet*, *Akşam*, and *Son Posta* between 1934 and 1937. In order to reach a representative sample from that population, a two-fold process of systematic classification was followed.

In order to reach a manageable sample, the probability sampling method was used. Probability sampling may be in the form of any sampling method (simple random sampling, stratified sampling, cluster sampling, etc.) in which every element in the population has a known-zero probability of selection. As Mitchell remarks, “every element must have some chance of selection or else the characteristics of those elements cannot be represented by the sample, which may lead to bias in the estimation.”¹³⁹ Accordingly, to prevent the problem of bias, a stratified sampling technique was used and the availability of the material also was considered.

Accordingly, issues of *Cumhuriyet*, *Akşam*, and *Son Posta* published in the second six months of 1934, in the first six months of 1935, in the second six months of 1936 and in the first six months of 1937 were selected to reveal the texts to be analyzed. However, due to some problems with the libraries, some issues of *Akşam* are missing in the archives, and so in the sample. Table 1 shows the total number of months that were included build the sample:

¹³⁹Paul Mitchell, "Quantitative Analysis: Description and Inference" (London: London School of Economics and Political Science, 2003), pp. 2-3.

Table 1. The Research Sample

	<i>Cumhuriyet</i>	<i>Akşam</i>	<i>Son Posta</i>
1934	July		July
	August		August
	September		September
	October		October
	November	November	November
	December	December	December
1935	January		January
	February		February
	March	March	March
	April	April	April
	May	May	May
	June	June	June
1936	July	July	July
	August	August	August
	September	September	September
	October	October	October
	November	November	November
	December	December	December
1937	January	January	January
	February	February	February
	March	March	March
	April	April	April
	May		May
	June		June

After constructing the sample, the unit of analysis of the research was specified as the whole article, including the titles.¹⁴⁰ In these three newspapers and from the months specified, articles containing one or more of the following keywords were collected systematically: “Turk” or “Turks” or “Turkish” or “Turkishness”. Since the representation of national identity is also a matter of the representation of the minorities in any nation state, articles referring to other religious or ethnic communities were also collected. Any article referring to Armenians, Greeks, Jews, Kurds or Alewites was included in the/e sample.

Articles that contained “Turk” to signify the Republic of Turkey, referring to either political, economic or trade relations with foreign countries were eliminated. This was done in order to remain consistent with the main concern of the research, which is the examination of

¹⁴⁰The nature of the articles such as whether they are news article, informative article or commentary is introduced in the following pages.

the representation of the national identity as a cultural identity of any fragmented subject. For example, articles that contained expressions like “Turkish-Greek friendship (Türk-Yunan dostluğu)” or “Turkish-Italian trade relations (Türk-İtalyan ticari ilişkileri)” were excluded from the sample. Finally, a sample consisting of 832 articles was reached. Table 2 shows the distribution of those 832 articles from the three newspapers according to years.

Table 2. The Research Sample According to Years and Newspapers

		<i>Cumhuriyet</i>	<i>Akşam</i>	<i>Son Posta</i>	<i>Total</i>
YEAR	1934	95	27	47	169
	1935	78	20	51	149
	1936	116	50	96	262
	1937	116	38	98	252
	Total	405	135	292	832

Thus, the sample includes 405 articles from *Cumhuriyet*, 135 articles from *Akşam*, and 292 articles from *Son Posta*. These numbers allow stating that *Cumhuriyet* was the newspaper in the coverage of which the keywords “Turk” or “Turks” or “Turkish” or “Turkishness” were most present frequently. Table 3 also shows that *Cumhuriyet* has the highest share among the articles constituting the sample, with a percentage of 48.7 percent. Accordingly, since the articles were selected on the basis of some keywords, it can be argued that in *Cumhuriyet*, articles with reference to national identity were more frequent compared to *Son Posta* and *Akşam*. Thus, *Cumhuriyet* seems to have been more concerned with the issue of national identity.

Table 3. Distribution of the Articles in the Sample According to Newspapers

	Frequency	Percent
<i>Cumhuriyet</i>	405	48.7
<i>Akşam</i>	135	16.2
<i>Son Posta</i>	292	35.1
Total	832	100.0

As Table 3 shows, 169 articles from 1934, 149 articles from 1935, 262 articles from 1936 and 252 articles from 1937 constructed the sample. Additionally, Table 4 shows the distribution of the articles in the sample according to year. Accordingly, 20.3 percent of the articles were from 1934, 17.9 percent were from 1935, 31.5 percent were from 1936 and 30.3 percent were from 1937. It is thereby possible to argue that in 1936 and 1937, the keywords with which the research is concerned were more frequently used. This allows stating that the use of the sought keywords became increasingly frequent by 1936 and 1937.

Table 4. Distribution of the Articles in the Sample According to Years

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
1934	169	20.3	20.3
1935	149	17.9	17.9
1936	262	31.5	31.5
1937	252	30.3	30.3
Total	832	100.0	100.0

Last, Table 5 shows the distribution of the articles across different types. It can be observed that news articles constitute half of the sample. While columns or commentaries have a share of 24.3 percent, informative articles or serials have a share of 24 percent in the sample. It can thereby be concluded that, the use of the keywords in news articles were more frequent than in the other two types.

Table 5. Distribution of the Articles in the Sample According to Article Types

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
News Article	422	50.7	50.7
Column or Commentary	202	24.3	24.3
Informative Article or Serial	200	24.0	24.0
Other	8	1.0	1.0
Total	832	100.0	100.0

However, considering the limitations of the study, it is not possible to make further inferences since the research does not provide information on the total number of each article types but only provides information on the total number of articles with the sought key words.

Classical content analysis is conducted on the basis of those 832 articles following the construction of a coding frame composed of 45 questions. The coding sheet was prepared and data entry was done on SPSS software. All the coding was done by the researcher herself. The intra-coder reliability was tested on a sample of 50 articles prior to the start of the study. Some ambiguities were observed regarding the values in the coding frame, therefore they were redefined. This process was repeated until reaching mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories. The final coding was done accordingly.

The discourse analysis, on the other hand, was not based on all of the 832 articles that formed the sample. However, it was based on some excerpts selected from those 832 articles, according to the topics covered in the coding frame that previously had been developed for content analysis.

While constructing the corpus to be analyzed, those titles, sentences, or paragraphs that were significant in terms of reflecting the discursive practices in relation to national identity were compiled as data. Next, they were classified on the basis of the topics of analysis. Then they were translated in English with great care in order not to miss nuances. After that, the data analysis was realized in line with key semiotic concepts. In this way, the framing of the representations of national identity were examined to develop an in-depth understanding of the role of newspapers as mediators of nationalism in the single-party era.

CHAPTER 3

THE CONTEXT THAT SHAPED THE TURKISH PRESS IN THE 1930s

National Identity and the Development of Turkey as a Modern Nation State

Turkey's transition from an empire to a modern nation state provides a distinctive example for the literature on the formation of modern nation states. Ernst Gellner is one of the scholars of the existing literature who examines what is distinctive about Turkey. He writes:

I am about to do, namely, discuss the Turkish option, the Turkish path, to whatever that thing can be called modernity may be. My main point will be something like this: to stress the fascinating uniqueness of Turkey, or the multiple uniqueness of Turkey, and the interconnectedness of the various unique aspects of the Turkish political and social experience. The uniqueness is found in at least four fields: in religion, in state formation, in the pattern of nationalism, and in the diverse style of modernity. These four things overlap, of course, and are interconnected.¹⁴¹

Gellner seeks to find Turkey's uniqueness by comparing it to the Muslim world, to the eastern part of Europe and to Europe, respectively. He argues that the secularization theses of sociology that under the conditions of modernity and industrialization, secularization occurs do not apply to Muslim countries, except Turkey.¹⁴² In regards to the eastern part of Europe, he writes "nationalism was bound to create the greatest havoc because it required both political and cultural engineering," but in Turkey a political elite was already present.¹⁴³ In Europe, he explains, "in Italy and Germany, a self-conscious culture had to look for its

¹⁴¹Ernest Gellner, "The Turkish Option in Comparative Perspective," in *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey*, eds. Sibel Bozdogan and Resat Kasaba (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997), p. 233.

¹⁴²Ibid.

¹⁴³Ibid., p. 241.

political patron, in Turkey it was the other way around: the political elite were looking for a way out of a relative decline to find an ethnic group.”¹⁴⁴

Considering Gellner’s comparisons, it is possible to conclude that the distinctiveness of Turkey especially lay in the presence of the political elite who consciously sought to create a secular nation state and a new political system by adopting Western political principles. Among those political principles was nationalism, which necessitated a transformation into the consciousness of nationhood. Thus, the political elite had to manufacture a new Turkish national identity on the basis of what was present already, and needed some tools to realize that. Accordingly, one of the arguments of this project is that the newspapers were among those used.

In his study on Latin America, Martin-Barbero writes that the mass media “transformed the mass into the people and the people into the nation.”¹⁴⁵ According to him, the formation of mass culture has the dimension of “transforming the political ‘idea’ of nationhood into the daily experience and feeling of nationhood.”¹⁴⁶ One could argue that Martin-Barbero’s argument about Latin America is similar to the Turkish case, in the sense that both bring to mind the process which is described by George L. Mosse as “nationalization of the masses.”¹⁴⁷

By the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the main concern of the intellectual elites in Turkey was to prevent the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Besides those who defended Ottomanism and Islamism, the wave of Turkism was gaining ground in society, as a reaction against the independence movements of other nations in the Empire. Especially

¹⁴⁴Ibid., p. 242.

¹⁴⁵Jesus Martin-Barbero, "The Processes: From Nationalism to Transnationals," in *Media in Global Context: Reader*, ed. Annabelle Sreberny-Mohammadi (et al.) (New York: London ; New York : Arnold, 1997), p. 51.

¹⁴⁶Ibid.

¹⁴⁷George L. Mosse, *The Nationalization of the Masses : Political Symbolism and Mass Movements in Germany from the Napoleonic Wars through the Third Reich* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991).

after the Balkan Wars in 1911-12, which resulted in huge territorial losses in the Balkans, the idea of Ottomanism as an alternative was left behind. During World War I, which resulted in the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in 1918, Turkish nationalism became a political project. Finally, after the National War of Independence (1919-1923), the Republic of Turkey was proclaimed in 1923, signaling the birth of a new nation state.

From the modernization and Westernization perspectives, Turkey's transformation into a nation state is seen as part of the project of social engineering where the state elites drove the transition from an empire to a nation state.¹⁴⁸ As Bozdoğan and Kasaba put it,

The country's history of modernization and Westernization extended back to the institutional reforms of the late Ottoman era and epitomized by the establishment of a secular nation state under Kemalism in 1923, appeared to confirm all the expectations of the theoretical writings of this genre. Ottoman and Turkish modernization was seen to be succeeding an elite-driven, consensus based, institution building process that took its inspiration exclusively from the West.¹⁴⁹

In terms of the development of Turkey as a modern nation state, the problem of approach in historiography has been under constant debate. However, there is an obvious agreement on the acknowledgement of Turkish nationalism as a process from above. As Özkırımlı states,

a certain understanding of nationalism, the foundations of which were laid down in later periods of the Ottoman Empire by a group of intellectuals who were familiar with the Western culture, was adopted by the military bureaucracy which proclaimed the Republic, and it was imposed to the society.¹⁵⁰

According to Özkırımlı, with respect to the Turkish case, one can argue that the creation of the nation followed the creation of the state. Moreover, Özkırımlı adds that,

¹⁴⁸Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society* (New York: Free Press, 1958); Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961).

¹⁴⁹Sibel Bozdoğan and Resat Kasaba, *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey*, Publications on the Near East (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997), pp. 3-4.

¹⁵⁰Özkırımlı, "Türkiye'de Gayriresmî Ve Popüler Milliyetçilik," p. 713; *ibid.* "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun son dönemlerinde Batı kültürünü yakından tanıyan bir grup aydın tarafından temelleri atılan belirli bir milliyetçilik anlayışı, Cumhuriyet'i kuran akeî bürokrasi tarafından da benimsenir ve devlet kurumları aracılığıyla topluma empoze edilir."

“because such an understanding of nationalism sought a homogenous social structure, the founders rapidly attempted to erase social differences based on ethnicity, religion and class.”¹⁵¹

The attempt to create a homogenous society had two main dimensions: to break the ties with the Ottoman past and to adopt western norms such as positivism, secularism, and nationalism. The need to break the ties with the Ottoman past was due to the Empire’s social structure. The population under the Ottoman rule had been heterogeneous and composed of different ethno/religious communities. Furthermore, it was thought that the cosmopolitan structure of the old empire had been the main reason for its dissolution. Therefore the new nation state sought unification. Consequently, the official Kemalist ideology was developed around the idea of eliminating diversity. In the words of Robins and Aksoy,

The social engineering of the Kemalists sought to bring into existence new Turks, who would be defined by their difference from the Ottoman population (...) The old complexity of religions, ethnicities and languages was replaced by the modern and uniform space of the monochrome Republic.¹⁵²

While conceptualizing the new Turkish citizenship, as İçduygu et al. argues, the republican elites sought to construct “a unique, unchangeable and historic Turkish identity that would be made possible only by newly fabricating and imposing a new monolithic culture.”¹⁵³ Therefore, the most striking feature of Turkish national identity was its fabricated or as Kadioğlu calls, its “manufactured” character.¹⁵⁴ As opposed to the Ottoman era, the mission of the republican elite was to “transform subjects into citizens.”¹⁵⁵

¹⁵¹Ibid. “Söz konusu milliyetçilik anlayışı homojen bir toplum yapısı öngördüğünden, büyük bir hızla etnik, dinî, sınıfsal farklılıkların yok edilmesine girişilir.”

¹⁵²Kevin Robins and Asu Aksoy, "Deep Nation: The National Question and Turkish Cinema Culture," in *Cinema and Nation*, eds. Mackenzie and M. Hjort (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 206-07.

¹⁵³Ahmet İçduygu, Yılmaz Çolak, and Nalan Soyarık, "What Is the Matter with Citizenship? A Turkish Debate," *Middle Eastern Studies* 35, no. 4 (1999): p. 195.

¹⁵⁴Ayşe Kadioğlu, "The Paradox of Turkish Nationalism and the Construction of Official Identity.," *Middle Eastern Studies* 32, no. 2 (April 1996), pp.177-94.

It would not be wrong to argue that among the tools of creating this uniform space of monochrome republic, the newspapers of the era played a crucial role. Anthony Smith's reference to the role of the media in the creation of the nation state is especially significant in terms of laying the theoretical basis of this argument:

In looking at the role of the media in creating a certain uniformity within the nation-state, we are in essence looking at the process of nation-building, and at how the media are consciously brought into play to construct a "national" culture and a "national" community. Nation-states must have a measure of common culture and civic ideology, a set of common understandings and aspirations, sentiments and ideas that bind the population together in their homeland.¹⁵⁶

In the early republican period, then, the Turkish press was mobilized to construct "new Turks." Within this framework the reflections of the efforts of the Kemalist elite in the newspapers of the period will be examined. Accordingly, in the rest of this chapter, first, the historical background of the press and government relations will be examined, and then the interwar context will be provided.

Historical Background on the Press-Government Relations within the Political Context of the Single-Party Rule

The construction of Turkey as a modern nation state was a project accomplished in the single-party era. During the process of the construction of the nation state, the republican revolutions were shaped by nationalism and modernization problematics. In order to cope with any potential obstacles behind the fulfillment of the project, the founding Kemalist elite implemented authoritarian policies. Such policies, which shaped the essence of the relations between the state, society, and the individual, were at the same time determinative in the single-party regime's relations with the press of the period.

¹⁵⁵Ibid.,pp. 187-208.

¹⁵⁶Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity* (London: Penguin Books, 1991), p. 11.

The authoritarian attitudes of the single-party regime impeded in many ways the main function of the press, which is to mediate divergent opinions in society. The decisiveness of the government for the prevention of the development of any opposition discouraged the press from disseminating divergent ideas. Many incidents were determinant in the making of the relations between the government and the press. In this chapter, the limits set to the freedom of the press will be elaborated chronologically mostly around these incidents.

The Press in the Pre-Republican Period: 1919–1923

The Mondros Treaty on 31 October 1918 signified the dissolution of the Ottoman State, as well as the collapse of the three waves of thought that had dominated the press and the public opinion in the last decades of the empire, namely pan-Ottomanism, pan-Islamism, and pan-Turkism.¹⁵⁷ Following the Mondros Treaty, the country was occupied by Western powers but in 1919, the struggle for national liberation began. In this new situation, a new division in the press could be observed between those who defended the national struggle and those who did not.¹⁵⁸

A new generation of journalists who were mostly pro-nationalist flourished during these years. As Gevgilili points out, many young journalists established their own newspapers in the late 1910s, all of whom remained important figures in the Turkish press until 1960s.¹⁵⁹ In 1917 Ahmet Emin and Mehmet Asım established *Vakit (The Time)*; in 1918 Yunus Nadi established *Yeni Gün (New Day)*; Necmettin Sadak, Falih Rıfkı, Ali Naci and Kazım Şinasi established *Akşam (The Night)*; in 1919, Celal Nuri and Suphi Nuri brothers established *İleri*

¹⁵⁷Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, p. 431.

¹⁵⁸Nuri İnuğur, *Basın Ve Yayın Tarihi* (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 1999), p. 337.,

¹⁵⁹Gevgilili, "Türkiye Basını," p. 211.

(*Forward*). All of these were published in Istanbul and they supported the nationalist forces during the years of the national struggle.

In the early days of the national struggle, in order to control communication, Mustafa Kemal's first attempt was to seize the telegraph network.¹⁶⁰ At the beginning, the leading communication tool of the national liberation movement was *İrade-i Milliye (National Will)*. The newspaper was the voice of *Müdafaa-i Hukuk (Defense of the National Rights)* and its first issue was published on 14 September 1919. The newspaper was influential in terms of disseminating Mustafa Kemal's ideas, especially by publishing the records of the Sivas Congress. Later, by 10 January 1920, Mustafa Kemal started to publish *Hakimiyet-i Milliye (National Sovereignty)* in Ankara.¹⁶¹

A lot of newspapers that were being published in various cities in Anatolia supported of the national struggle. *Hukuk-u Beşer* in İzmir, *Öğüt* in Afyon, *Yeni Adana (New Adana)* in Adana, *Babalık (Prophet)* in Konya, *Ses (Voice)*, *Doğru Söz (True Word)* and *İzmir'e Doğru* in Balıkesir, *Albayrak (Red Flag)* in Erzurum, *Ahali (Community)* in Samsun and Edirne, and *Işık (Light)* in Giresun were among them.¹⁶²

On the other hand, there were many newspapers that criticized Mustafa Kemal. In Istanbul *İstanbul*, *Alemdar (Standardbearer)* and *Peyam-ı Sabah (Morning News)*, in Ankara *Tan (The Daybreak)*, *Sebil-ürreşat (Dispenser of True Path)*, *Anadolu'da Peyam-ı Sabah (Morning News in Anatolia)*, in Balıkesir *İrşad (Pointer of True Path)*, in Adana *Ferda (The Future)* opposed the national struggle.¹⁶³ They supported the Istanbul government.

¹⁶⁰Orhan Koloğlu, *Osmanlı'dan Günümüze Türkiye'de Basın* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1992), p. 61; *ibid*.

¹⁶¹ *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* later became the official publication of the Republican People's Party and by 1934 its name was changed to *Ulus*.

¹⁶²Gevgilili, "Türkiye Basını," p. 213.; İnuğur, *Basın Ve Yayın Tarihi*, pp. 354-61.

¹⁶³*Basın Ve Yayın Tarihi*, pp. 341-44 and pp. 62-63.

Actually, the support of the proponent newspapers was not sufficient enough to stand out against the anti-nationalist propaganda. As a measure, *Anadolu Ajansı* (The Anatolian News Agency) was established on 6 April 1920 in Ankara with the initiative of Mustafa Kemal and with the efforts of Halide Edip and Yunus Nadi. The agency served to inform the local and foreign public opinion about the developments related to the war of independence, as well as to prevent any potential agitation against the nationalist movement.¹⁶⁴ As İhsan Güneş points out, people in Anatolia were still mostly ignorant even about the occupation of Istanbul by the time of the opening of the Grand National Assembly on 23 April 1920.¹⁶⁵ To counteract the information being spread from Istanbul by the collaborators of the Allied forces, the *İrşad Heyeti* (The Commission of Guidance) was formed by the Grand National Assembly. Under the chairmanship of Yunus Nadi, the commission was entitled to administer propaganda affairs.

Another important development of the period was the foundation of the *Matbuat İstihbarat Müdüriyet-i Umumiyesi* (The General Directorate of Press and Information).¹⁶⁶ The aim was to organize the gathering and the dissemination of information centrally by the new executive body in Ankara. Güneş writes that the directorate's function was determined to be "promoting the movement and defending its rightness."¹⁶⁷ Following the opening of the Grand National Assembly, the directorate was legally institutionalized by law on 7 June 1920. Furthermore, the Directorate provided funding for the Anatolian press, excluding *Sebil-ürreşat*, which had an Islamist affiliation. This brought about the reactions of the Islamist representatives and to serious disputes in the Grand National Assembly. As Güneş remarks, in

¹⁶⁴Topuz, *100 Soruda Türk Basın Tarihi*, pp. 133-34.

¹⁶⁵İhsan Güneş, *Birinci Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Düşünce Yapısı* (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1997), p. 268.

¹⁶⁶Ibid., p. 277.

¹⁶⁷Topuz, *100 Soruda Türk Basın Tarihi*, p. 133.

this way, the funding of the newspapers were implemented, ensured the government intervention over the press, and the content of publications.¹⁶⁸

Meanwhile, the Ankara government had censored any kind of correspondence with Istanbul according to a bylaw dated 6 May 1920.¹⁶⁹ The bylaw aimed at preventing the access of any kind of official documents or periodical publications from Istanbul to Ankara. Censorship stations were installed in 26 provinces and districts accordingly. A new bylaw issued on 25 November 1923 terminated the implementation of the censorship. In this later bylaw it was emphasized that there was no longer need for press censorship since the occupation of Istanbul had ended by 7 November 1923.¹⁷⁰

During the War of Independence, the publication of some newspapers was suspended and some journalists were arrested on the basis of *Hıyanet-i Vataniye Kanunu* (The High Treason Law) dated 29 April 1920 and the *İstiklâl Mahkemeleri* (Independence Tribunals) dated 18 September 1920. The diffusion of any ideas in contradiction with the national movement was restrained accordingly.

It is thus possible to conclude that during the years between 1919 and 1923 four major practices were implemented to facilitate relations between the press and the national initiative lead by Mustafa Kemal: to inform people about the course and achievements of the liberation movement, to gain public support for the national struggle, to resist the anti-nationalist propaganda, and to establish the authority of the Ankara government throughout Anatolia, by challenging Istanbul government's legitimacy.

In addition to the struggles on the war fronts, the Kemalists faced heated debates in the parliament. In 1921, the Grand National Assembly was composed of two opposing groups,

¹⁶⁸Güneş, *Birinci Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi'nin Düşünce Yapısı*, p. 278.

¹⁶⁹Kabacalı, *Türk Basınında Demokrasi*, p. 94.

¹⁷⁰*Başlangıçtan Günümüze Türkiye'de Basın Sansürü* (İstanbul: Gazeteciler Cemiyeti Yayınları, 1990), pp. 101-09.

mainly differentiated by their approach towards the problem concerning the system of government.¹⁷¹ The first group was the group of *Müdafa-i Hukuk* (Defense of the National Rights), officially founded by Mustafa Kemal on 10 May 1921. This group's ultimate goal was to abolish the sultanate. In the process leading to the adoption of the Constitution, the group of *Müdafa-i Hukuk* had to struggle against their approach for nearly five months. The Kemalist could finally manage to postpone the sultanate-caliphate issues in the adoption of the *Teşkilat-ı Esasiye Kanunu* (The Constitution) in the parliament on 20 January 1921. Although the sultanate would continue, Article 1 of the Constitution stated that sovereignty would belong unconditionally to the nation. According to Niyazi Berkes, "its adoption ended the first round of the struggle between the Kemalists and their adversaries."¹⁷²

The opposition representatives officially formed a second group in the Grand National Assembly in July 1922. This group was composed of men who according to Mustafa Kemal, were "reactionaries" who sought Şeriat. Berkes writes that "the spirit of Şeriatism made itself felt frequently" in the assembly.¹⁷³

Following the end of the War of Independence on September 1922 and the Armistice of Mudanya on 11 October 1922, the Allies invited the Istanbul government to the Lausanne peace negotiations. The refusal of Great Britain to recognize Ankara government opened way to the abolition of the sultanate. In the words of Berkes,

On 30 October 1922, the Assembly revolted against the Padişah's pretensions to represent the country at the council of peace toward the establishment of which he had contributed nothing but harm. On 1 November 1922, Mustafa Kemal felt confident in proposing the abolition of the Sultanate.¹⁷⁴

¹⁷¹Mete Tunçay, *Türkiye'de Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması* (Ankara: Yurt Yayınları, 1981), p. 42.

¹⁷²Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, p. 446.

¹⁷³*Ibid.*, p. 447.

¹⁷⁴*Ibid.*, p. 451.

On 1 November 1922, the sultanate was officially abolished. However, the conflicts in the parliament between the secularists and the Şeriat supporters persisted.

Meanwhile on 6 December 1922, Mustafa Kemal announced that he would found a new political party, namely *Halk Fırkası* (People's Party), on the basis of the principle of populism. In January 1923, he met in İzmit with prominent journalists to discuss the caliphate issue and the name of the political party that he was intending to establish. Mustafa Kemal asked the journalists to prepare the public opinion for the forthcoming reforms.¹⁷⁵

The reflection of the disputes between the first and the second groups can be observed in the newspapers. The publication affiliated with the second group of the Grand National Assembly was Ali Şükrü Bey's *Tan*.¹⁷⁶ The newspaper started publication on 19 January 1923 for the expression and diffusion of the views of the second group. Trabzon representative Ali Şükrü, Isparta representative Cemal Paşa, Mersin representative Selahattin, Afyon Karahisar representative Mehmet Şükrü, Canik representatifs Şükrü and Ahmet Nazif, Çorum representative Abdürrahim Dursun wrote articles and critiques in *Tan*.¹⁷⁷ Only 68 issues were published before Ali Şükrü's death in March 1923. It was later understood that this had been a homicide, committed by Mustafa Kemal's bodyguard, Topal Osman. This incident increased tensions in the assembly between the first and the second groups.¹⁷⁸ In this tense atmosphere, in late March 1923, the assembly gathered to negotiate the amendment to the Treason Law, to declare illegal any attempt at a return of the sultanate.¹⁷⁹ It was clear that the opponents were

¹⁷⁵Nilgün Gürkan, *Türkiye'de Demokrasiye Geçişte Basın (1945-1950)* (İstanbul: İletişim, 1998), p. 35.

¹⁷⁶Tunçay, *Türkiye'de Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması*, p. 61.

¹⁷⁷Ibid.

¹⁷⁸Ahmet Demirel, *Ali Şükrü Bey'in Tan Gazetesi* (İstanbul: İletişim, 1996), p. 28.

¹⁷⁹Erik Jan Zürcher, *Turkey : A Modern History* (London ; New York: I.B. Tauris, 1998), p. 167.

becoming influential in the assembly. Thus, the Kemalists dissolved the first Grand National Assembly on 1 April 1923.¹⁸⁰

The Press and the Government: 1923-1925

As a result of the elections of June 1923, the Kemalist party barely held the majority in the new parliament that gathered on 11 August 1923. The new parliament approved the Treaty of Lausanne on August 23 and affirmed Ankara as the official capital city of the new state on October 13. On September 11, the People's Party was officially established. Following the formation of the second Grand National Assembly, Mustafa Kemal consolidated his political position and became ready to settle accounts with the opposition.¹⁸¹ On 29 October 1923, the proposal for the proclamation of the Turkish Republic was accepted by the majority in the assembly.

The abolition of the sultanate, the impact of the second group, discussions around the Lausanne peace conference, Ankara's being the new capital city, and the proclamation of the Republic were important developments that encouraged the press to mediate a range of conflicting opinions.¹⁸² Furthermore, some prominent figures, including Hüseyin Rauf (Orbay), Ali Fuat (Cebesoy), Adnan (Adıvar), Refet (Bele) and Kazım (Karabekir) who had not been present in the assembly on the day of the voting for the proclamation of the Republic were criticizing the decision as premature in their interviews in Istanbul newspapers. In the words of Zürcher, "The Istanbul papers took up their criticism with relish."¹⁸³ This turbulent

¹⁸⁰Feroz Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey* (London ; New York: Routledge, 1993), p. 53.

¹⁸¹Ibid.

¹⁸²Koloğlu, *Osmanlı'dan Günümüze Türkiye'de Basın*, p. 64.

¹⁸³Zürcher, *Turkey : A Modern History*, p. 174.

atmosphere motivated the Istanbul press towards permissiveness. In the days that followed, anti-republican feelings were expressed especially around the issue of the caliphate.

The question of the caliphate was agitated by the open letters sent to the press by the president of the Istanbul Bar Association, Lütfi Fikri, and by two prominent Indian Muslims, Aga Khan and Ameer Ali. The letters, which were published in *Tanin*, *İkdam*, and *Tevhid-i Efkâr* pleaded for a more influential position for the caliph. Thereupon, prime-minister İsmet Paşa sent an Independence Tribunal to Istanbul, charging Lütfi Fikri and the newspaper editors (Hüseyin Cahid, Ahmet Cevdet, Velid Ebüzziya and so on) with treason.¹⁸⁴ While Lütfi Fikri was sentenced to jail for five years, the newspaper editors were not convicted. This incident created tension between the Istanbul press and Ankara. According to Koloğlu, the government's severe reaction intimidated the press which led to an unresponsive attitude towards the abolition of the caliphate.¹⁸⁵ The İzmir meeting was also influential in such temperate conduct.

After the trial, the tribunal chairman İhsan Topçu called for a meeting between Mustafa Kemal and the newspaper editors to settle the tension. Ahmet Cevdet (*İkdam*), Hüseyin Cahit (*Tanin*), Celal Nuri (*İleri*), Necmettin Sadak (*Akşam*), Mehmet Asım (*Vakit*), Hüseyin Şükrü (*Tercüman-ı Hakikat*), and Ahmet Emin (*Vatan*) attended in the meeting which was held in Izmir on 4 February 1924. As a concluding remark of the meeting, Mustafa Kemal reminded the editors that the Republican regime had every right to ask journalists to disseminate and unite around the republican ideals.¹⁸⁶ The meeting reconciled journalists and the government, facilitating the public opinion to concede to the abolition of the Caliphate. Moreover, Lütfi Fikri's sentence was canceled.

¹⁸⁴Ibid., 175.

¹⁸⁵Koloğlu, *Osmanlı'dan Günümüze Türkiye'de Basın*, p. 64.

¹⁸⁶Topuz, *Türk Basın Tarihi*, p. 146.

Niyazi Berkes writes that “two incidents among several others carried Mustafa Kemal’s rage to the limit.”¹⁸⁷ The one was Aga Han and Ameer Ali’s attempts to be involved in the issue of caliphate; the other was the Caliph’s claim for a “Caliph Treasury.”¹⁸⁸ Thereby on 3 March 1924, the Grand National Assembly abolished the caliphate and deposed all members of the Ottoman dynasty.

Besides the Ottoman family members, some other opponents were also exiled. The Lausanne Peace Agreement had stipulated a general amnesty, on the basis of which the Grand National Assembly was entitled to agree on a list of 150 people who would be exempt from the amnesty. The assembly gathered on 16 April 1924, to decide on the 150 most-treacherous people to be expelled. The final list approved by the cabinet on 1 June 1924, included the names of 13 journalists, Mevlanzade Rifat (*Serbesti*), Sait Molla (*İstanbul*), Hafız İsmail (*Müsavat*), Refik Halid (*Aydede*), Ali Kemal (*Adalet*), Neyir Mustafa (*Teemin, Elyevm, Hakikat*), Giritli Ferit (*Köylü*), Ref’i Cevat (*Alemdar*), Pehlivan Kadri (*Alemdar*), Fanizade Ali İlmi (*Ferda*), Ömer Fevzi (*İrşad*), Hasan Sadık (*Doğru Yol*), and İzmirli Refet (*Köylü*).¹⁸⁹

According to Koloğlu, the situation of some of these journalists who were blamed for treachery was tragic. Some of them had perceived the Kemalist movement to be an initiative of the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). They had opposed Kemalists not because they were against the struggle for independence; rather, for its affiliation with the CUP. Thereby they had fallen in such a position that they appeared to be sympathizers of the Sultan and the occupying forces.¹⁹⁰

Another important meeting in the assembly was for the approval of the new constitution on 20 April 1924. Discussions related to the new constitution made it clear that

¹⁸⁷Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*, p. 4558.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

¹⁸⁹Emin Karaca, *150'likler*, eds. Toktamış Ateş, Kurtuluş Savaşı Kütüphanesi (Istanbul: Altın Kitaplar, 2007), pp. 123-42.

¹⁹⁰Koloğlu, *Osmanlı'dan Günümüze Türkiye'de Basın*, pp. 62-63.

controversies persisted inside both the assembly and the governing party. The Istanbul press was once again took side with the opponents.¹⁹¹ The political disagreement inside the People's Party resulted with the foundation of *Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası* (The Progressive Republican Party, PRP) on 17 November 1924, under the initiative of Ali Fuat Paşa, Sabit (Sağiroğlu), Kâzım Paşa, Adnan (Adıvar), Rauf (Orbay), and İsmail (Canbulat). Twenty-nine representatives joined the party. In the meantime, as Zürcher indicates, "The rumor that the new party would use the adjective 'Republican' led the People's Party to change its name to Republican People's Party" on 10 November 1924.¹⁹² Zürcher writes that the new party "stood for secular and nationalist policies, like the majority party, but it clearly opposed its radical, centralist and authoritarian tendencies. Instead it advocated decentralization, separation of powers and evolutionary rather than revolutionary change."¹⁹³

The Kurdish rebellion lead by Sheikh Said that broke out in the north of Diyarbakır in February 1925 brought an end to the organized opposition. On 4 March 1924, the assembly rapidly passed *Takrir-i Sükun Kanunu* (The Law for the Maintenance of Order), which gave the government absolute powers. Accordingly, all of the opponent publications were silenced. In March 1925, *Tevhid-i Efkâr*, *Son Telgraf*, *İstiklâl*, *Sebil-ürreşat*, *Aydınlık*, *Orak Çekiç*, *Toksöz*, *Sadayı Hak*, *İstikbâl*, *Kahkaha*, *Presse du Soir*, *Savha*, *Tanin*, *Resimli Ay*, and *Vatan* were closed. Furthermore, many journalists including Ahmed Emin and Ahmet Şükrü stood trial at the Elazığ Independence Tribunal, although they were acquitted. Hüseyin Cahit, who went through the Ankara Independence Tribunal sentence, was exiled to Çorum for an indefinite period of time. At the same tribunal Zekeriya Sertel was exiled to Sinop for three years, and Cevat Şakir to Bodrum. Several other journalists were also convicted. In the

¹⁹¹Cemil Koçak, "Siyasal Tarih (1923-1950)," in *Türkiye Tarihi 4 Çağdaş Türkiye 1908-1980*, ed. Sina Akşin (İstanbul: Cem, 1997), p. 98.

¹⁹²Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, p. 176.

¹⁹³Ibid.

meantime, the Progressive Republican Party was dissolved in June 1925. As Feroz Ahmad remarks, more than 500 people were sentenced to death by these tribunals.¹⁹⁴ Thus, the Sheikh Said rebellion was important for the establishment of the oppressive single-party rule.

Newspapers that survived were those that advocated the implementation of *Takrir-i Sükun*. For example, on 7 March, the leading article in *Cumhuriyet* expressed that this law was necessary for the future of the Republic against the Islamic reactionary threat.¹⁹⁵ In a similar manner, on 8 March in *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, holding the press was held responsible for the Sheikh Said rebellion; Yakup Kadri gave countenance for the restraint.¹⁹⁶

It is indeed possible to argue that until *Takrir-i Sükun*, there was a relatively free atmosphere for the expression of opposite views in the newspapers, despite the intense tension between the press and the government. Between 1923 and 1925, the republican government actually sought a consensus with the newspaper editors or tried to intimidate the press to take a temperate stance. However, after the Sheikh Said rebellion in 1925, there were no more available channels for the expression or dissemination of dissenting opinions. Other than reactionary opposition, publications with leftist tendency were also cleared away. In this way, in addition to *Vakit* and *Akşam* in Istanbul, Yunus Nadi's *Cumhuriyet*, and Mahmut Soydan's *Milliyet* became the leading newspapers. 1925 marked thus the beginning of a relatively unyielding determination for Kemalist domination.

¹⁹⁴Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, p. 58.

¹⁹⁵Hasan Türker, *Türk Devrimi Ve Basın 1922-1925* (İzmir: Dokuz Eylül Yayınları, 2000), p. 231.

¹⁹⁶*Ibid.*, p.231.

The Press and the Government: 1926-1930

From 1925 onwards, the Kemalist revolutions which signified the transition from a religious to a secular westernized society began. In September 1925, the dervish lodges were closed down. On 25 November 1925, the replacement of the fez with western style hats was legislated. In the first months of 1926, the European calendar, Swiss civil code, and Italian penal code were adopted, and all courtesy titles were abolished.¹⁹⁷ In the words of Bernard Lewis, “These reforms brought a renewal of activity by the opponents of the regime, who had been quiescent since the crushing of the Kurdish rebellion.”¹⁹⁸

The attempt to assassinate Mustafa Kemal in İzmir on 15 June 1926 presented another important opportunity to repress the opposition. The conspiracy was discovered by the police before Mustafa Kemal’s arrival in İzmir. The leader of the conspiracy was Ziya Hurşit, a former deputy who had opposed the abolition of the caliphate. The conspirators were arrested, tried at the Independence Tribunal assembled in İzmir and sentenced to death. According to Lewis, the İzmir conspiracy provided the opportunity to deal with other opposition figures.¹⁹⁹ Zürcher also writes that,

Mustafa Kemal as well aware of the capabilities of his opponents (...) still felt insecure. As long as the former leaders of the CUP and PRP were still around (...) they could exploit the prevailing discontent arising from the continuing bad economic situation and the unpopularity of the reforms.²⁰⁰

¹⁹⁷Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, p. 181. It was stated in Article 1 of the Law no 2590 dated 26 November 1934 that “Titles and appellations such as Agha, Haji, Hodja, Mullah, Sir, Mister, Pasha, Lady, Miss, His Nibs etc. are abolished. All male and female citizens shall be called merely by their names before law and in official documents.” “*Madde 1 - Ağa, Hacı, Hafız, Hoca, Molla, Efendi Bey, Beyefendi, Paşa, Hanım, Hanımefendi ve Hazretleri gibi lakap ve unvanlar kaldırılmıştır. Erkek ve kadın vatandaşlar, kanunun karşısında ve resmi belgelerde yalnız adlarıyla anılırlar.*”

¹⁹⁸Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* Bernard Lewis, 3rd ed., Studies in Middle Eastern History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 274-75.

¹⁹⁹Ibid., p. 275.

²⁰⁰Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History*, p. 182.

Thereby, almost all of the now opponent political figures were arrested on the accusation of supporting the conspiracy and planning a coup d'état. As a result, in the summer of 1926, the remnants of the opposition were eliminated. On 7 March 1927, the mission of the Independence Tribunals was terminated officially.

The prominent editors of the old days were now involved in professions other than journalism. For example, Ahmed Emin (Yalman) was in the automobile tire business, and Hüseyin Cahit (Yalçın) and İsmail Müştak (Mayakon) were working as commissioners of customs.²⁰¹

The political scene was now totally dominated by the RPP and following the elections that were held in fall 1927, the Grand National Assembly looked like the party group of the RPP. During the process leading to the elections, the newspapers had served as the RPP's propaganda tools. The following sentences were remarkable in terms of reflecting the newspapers' attitude: "We all voted for our Gazi's party" (*Cumhuriyet*, 3 August 1927); "All of Turkey, as a one unified body, votes for the candidates designated by Gazi" (*Vakit*, 3 September 1927).²⁰²

In 1927, the single-party rule was thus consolidated and Mustafa Kemal was in such a strong position that henceforth he was able to write the official history from his own point of view.²⁰³ On 15-20 November 1927, he delivered his famous *Nutuk* (Speech) to the congress of the RPP.

The press, already guided by the single-party ideology, became more dependent on the government starting from 1928. The adoption of the Latin letters in the assembly on 3

²⁰¹Kabacalı, *Türk Basımında Demokrasi*, p. 140.

²⁰²Tunçay, *Türkiye'de Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması*, p. 176. "Biz hepimiz reylerimizi Gazimizin Fırkasına verdik." "Bütün Türkiye tek bir vücut gibi Gazi'nin gösterdiği namzetlere rey veriyor." p.178

²⁰³Taha Parla, *Atatürk'ün Nutuk'u*, ed. Taha Parla, 4 vols., vol. 1, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Kültürün Resmi Kaynakları* (İstanbul: İletişim, 1994), p. 20.

November 1928 and the obligation to use the new script starting from 1 December, affected the newspapers. First of all, not only the editors but also the technicians in the printing sector - the typesetters, typographers, and page binders- were supposed to become literate in the new script. Second, the newspapers had to renew their printing hardware according to the new letters, which required large amounts of capital. Acquiring the necessary capital was only possible if the newspapers could increase their sales. However, now that the readers were suddenly illiterate in the new alphabet, circulation rates plummeted. Thus, the press faced an economic crisis because while expenses rose, and their incomes decreased. This decrease can be observed in Table 6, which shows the circulation figures of the first week of December 1928.

Table 6. Circulation Figures in December 1928

	1 December 1928		7 December 1928	
	Circulation	Sales	Circulation	Sales
<i>Cumhuriyet</i>	11,500	9,000	7,000	5,730
<i>Milliyet</i>	10,000	8,500	8,000	5,250
<i>İkdam</i>	8,000	5,839	5,000	3,120
<i>Vakit</i>	7,000	5,500	4,000	2,870
<i>Son Saat</i>	6,000	3,420	2,500	1,500
<i>Akşam</i>	4,000	2,000	3,000	1,340

Source: Orhan Koloğlu, *Osmanlı'dan Günümüze Türkiye'de Basın*, p. 65.

Nevertheless, the press endeavored to adapt itself to the new situation by demonstrating its loyalty to the Kemalist revolutions.²⁰⁴ Moreover, all around the world, 1929 was the year of the Great Depression. In these negative circumstances, in *Hakimiyet-i Milliye*, Yakup Kadri called for government funding in an article titled, “The Press Depression.”²⁰⁵The

²⁰⁴*Osmanlı'dan Günümüze Türkiye'de Basın*, p. 65.

²⁰⁵*Türk Basını Kuvayı Milliye'den Günümüze*, p. 64.

government started to provide financial support for the press and the publication sector. Table 7 shows the amounts of government funding according to newspaper in 1929.

Table 7. Government Funding for Support of Newspapers, 1929

	The amount applied for (TL)	The amount received (TL)
<i>Cumhuriyet</i>	10,000	2,250
<i>Milliyet</i>	9,000	2,000
<i>Vakit</i>	8,000	850
<i>İkdam</i>	8,000	1,200
<i>Son Saat</i>	7,500	800
<i>Akşam</i>	7,500	1,100
<i>Karağöz</i>	2,000	200
<i>Koroğlu</i>	2,000	200
<i>Haftalık Mecmua</i>	500	100
<i>Resimli Gazete</i>	500	100
<i>Resimli Ay</i>	300	100

Source: Alpay Kabacalı, *Başlangıcından Günümüze Türkiye’de Matbaa, Basın ve Yayın*, p. 175

The government funding was legislated on 27 March 1930. Law no. 1575 stipulated that premiums be paid to the owners of political newspapers for a period of three years.²⁰⁶ The criterion was defined according to printing methods. Those newspapers that were printed on rotary presses received 3,500 TL in 1929, 5,250 TL in 1930, and 7,000 TL in 1931.²⁰⁷ Consequently, the government funding made the press further dependent on itself. Some of the newspapers went bankrupt, including *Son Saat*, *Resimli Gazete*, and *İkdam*.²⁰⁸

Besides funding the newspapers, the government organizedly encouraged people to learn the new letters. Throughout the country, campaigns were run to increase the literacy

²⁰⁶Server İskit, *Türkiye’de Matbuat İdareleri Ve Politikaları* (Ankara: Başvekalet Basın ve Yayın Umum Müdürlüğü, 1943), p. 253.

²⁰⁷Kabacalı, *Başlangıcından Günümüze Türkiye’de Matbaa Basın Ve Yayın*.

²⁰⁸Ibid., p. 173.

rates. The transition to the new script was a great success. In two years, newspaper circulation rates began to rise again.

Meanwhile, new publications appeared. Ali Naci's *İnkılap (Revolution)*(1928), Faruk Gürtunca's *Her Gün (Every Day)* and Arif Oruç's *Yarın (Tomorrow)*(1929) were among the new newspapers of the time. Important magazines of the time that should be remembered were Yusuf Ziya's *Şule (Flame)* and *Akbaba (Condor)*, and Ahmet Cevdet's *Muhit (Milieu)*.²⁰⁹

1930 saw the formation of a relatively loosened atmosphere for the press. The development that was most influential on this was the foundation of the *Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası* (The Free Republican Party, FRP) under the leadership of Fethi Okyar on August 12. As Mete Tunçay states, the single-party government saw the necessity for the establishment of an alternative party for its own sake. According to Tunçay, the economic depression, the continuing small-scale uprisings in the eastern regions, the common discontent with the absolute rule, and the tendency of the government to present itself to the Western world were the primary factors for the creation of an artificial political opposition, controlled by the major party.²¹⁰

The FRP was welcomed with great enthusiasm by both society and the press. Its foundation brought about a relaxation in the press. Zekeriya Sertel's *Son Posta* and Arif Oruç's *Yarın*, that opposed the government, became the two most popular newspapers of the time. *Son Posta*'s opposition was much more moderate compared to that of the leftist *Yarın*, the sales of which reached 80,000.²¹¹ In İzmir, *Yeni Asır (The New Century)*, *Halkın Sesi (People's Voice)*, and *Hizmet (The Service)* advocated new liberal party.

²⁰⁹Enver Benhan Şapolyo, *Türk Gazetecilik Tarihi Ve Her Yönü İle Basın* (Ankara: Güven Matbaası, 1971), p. 236.

²¹⁰Tunçay, *Türkiye'de Tek Parti Yönetiminin Kurulması*, p. 247.

²¹¹Şapolyo, *Türk Gazetecilik Tarihi Ve Her Yönü İle Basın*, p. 236.

It is in fact possible to argue that two main reasons contributed to the credit of the FRP. On the one hand, people dissatisfied with the single-party regime needed an alternative, but this could have been any alternative, no matter what its political programme was. On the other hand, the rising Turkish bourgeoisie needed a liberal party, to open more room for private enterprises against the statist policies of the RPP. Therefore, the sympathy of the İzmir press towards the FRP was not surprising.

When it became clear that FRP was growing into the potential for real political power, the RPP became alarmed. As Karpas states, “Mustafa Kemal, who initially had professed neutrality with respect to both parties,” requested that Fethi Okyar close down the FRP.²¹² On 16 November 1930, Okyar unwillingly announced that the FRP had been dissolved. The experiment with the guided opposition only survived for four months.

The resentment that came into the open with the experience of the FRP made Mustafa Kemal take harsher measures to bring the country’s intellectual and social life under the direct control of the government. He already was aware of the people’s general discontent as the result of a long trip around the country. 1931 marked the beginning of the period in what all the independent social and cultural organizations were abolished.

Press and the Government: 1931-1938

In June 1931, the General Directorate of Press and Information was dissolved and on 25 July 1931 a new press law was promulgated.²¹³ Thereby, the government acquired the right to close down any publication in contradiction with the general policies. Arif Oruç’s opponent

²¹²Kemal Karpas, *Turkey's Politics the Transition to a Multi Party System* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1959), pp. 66-67.

²¹³In 1933, the General Directorate of Press was re-established.

newspaper *Yarın* was closed down accordingly. Furthermore, the penal law would be applied for press crimes.²¹⁴

Starting from 1931, it became more difficult to express ideas in contradiction with or opposite to the Kemalist policies. Consequently, the newspapers became the mediators of the Kemalist ideology. In the words of Zürcher, “Both the press and the educational institutions were mobilized to spread the Kemalist message.”²¹⁵ The content of the “Kemalist message” was determined in the party programme of 1931 as republicanism, secularism, nationalism, populism, statism, and revolutionism.

Nevertheless, dissident opinions could still be observed. For example, Ahmet Ağaoğlu, who was the former ideologue of the Free Republican Party, published *Akın* from 29 May to 24 September 1933. *Akın (Influx)* defended the Kemalist principles, except for statism and nationalism.²¹⁶ Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın, a former opponent, published *Fikir Hareketleri (Movements of Thought)*, from 1933 to 1940. This publication defended liberal-democratic ideas insofar as the circumstances allowed.²¹⁷ From 29 February to 25 April 1936, another former opponent, Ahmed Emin Yalman published *Kaynak (The Source)*, in the first issue of which he questioned the government’s constraints against political criticism.²¹⁸

The most noticeable publication of the 1930s was the magazine *Kadro*, which was published from 1932 to 1934. Those who published *Kadro* were a group of intellectuals called “cadrists.”²¹⁹ According to Hakkı Uyar, *Kadro* should be considered as a dissident

²¹⁴İskit, *Türkiye’de Matbuat İdareleri Ve Politikaları*, p. 267.

²¹⁵Zürcher, *Turkey : A Modern History*, p. 188.

²¹⁶Hakkı Uyar, *Tek Parti Dönemi Ve Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi* (İstanbul: Boyut, 1998), p. 143.

²¹⁷Ibid., pp. 143-44.

²¹⁸Ibid., p. 145.

²¹⁹Namely Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, Vedat Nedim Tör, Burhan Asaf Belge, İsmail Hüsrev Tökin and Şevki Yazman were members of this group.

publication, not because it opposed the dominant ideology but because it rather tried to develop an “alternative ideology” within it.²²⁰ As Karpat remarks, Kadro was dissolved “as a result of the suspicions of Marxism and communism which it aroused as soon as it started discussing social classes.”²²¹

1934 was another turning point in terms of re-defining the newspapers’ role in spreading the Kemalist ideology. Press law No. 2444, which was adopted on 1 June 1934, was the strongest and most comprehensive law to mobilize the press. On the basis of the new law, the General Directorate of Press and Information was authorized to assure the compatibility of national publications with the revolutionary principles and state policies, to prevent the dissemination of contradictory currents of idea, to introduce the new Turkey to foreign public opinion,²²² as well as to fight against the external negative propaganda against Turkey.²²³

On 25 May 1935, the first Press Congress gathered. The representatives of both daily and non-daily newspapers and magazines participated to the congress. In 1935, 38 daily political newspapers, 78 non-dailies, and 127 magazines in both Turkish and other languages were being published through Turkey. Table 2.3 shows the names of the delegates who participated in the congress as representatives of the daily political newspapers.

The General Director of Press, Vedat Nedim Tör, defined the function of newspapers in “the Turkey of Atatürk.” The newspapers’ mission was to serve as:

1. The strongest propaganda tools to spread revolutionary principles and ideals to the masses;
2. The guardians of the revolution’s achievements against reactionaries;
3. The genuine supporters and monitors for the revolutionary government;

²²⁰Uyar, *Tek Parti Dönemi Ve Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*, p. 148.

²²¹Karpat, *Turkey's Politics the Transition to a Multi Party System*, p. 71.

²²² La Turquie Kemaliste was published accordingly, starting from June 1934. For more information on the publication, see Çağla Elçin Aykaç, "Kemalist Utopia a Study of the Propaganda Magazine La Turquie Kemaliste (1934-1948)" (MA Thesis, Boğaziçi University, 2003).

²²³İskit, *Türkiye'de Matbuat İdareleri Ve Politikaları*, pp. 272-74.

4. The most effective schools for people's political, economic, and cultural education.²²⁴

Table 8. Delegates of Political Dailies in the First Press Congress of 1935

Place of Publication	Name of the Delegate	Name of the Newspaper
Ankara	Nasuhi Baydar	<i>Ulus</i> (former <i>Hakimiyet-i Milliye</i>)
İstanbul	Asım Us	<i>Kurun</i> (former <i>Vakit</i>)
İstanbul	Kemal Salih	<i>Cumhuriyet</i>
İstanbul	Ali Naci Karacan	<i>Tan</i>
İstanbul	Kazım	<i>Zaman</i>
İstanbul	Kazım Şinasi Dersan	<i>Akşam</i>
İstanbul	Rasim Us	<i>Haber</i>
İstanbul	Halil Lütfi	<i>Son Posta</i>
İstanbul	Primi	Representative for newspapers in French
İstanbul	Muzaffer	Representative for newspapers in German
İstanbul	Ligor Yaveridis	Representative for newspapers in Greek
İstanbul	Şamlıyan	Representative for newspapers in Armenian
İzmir	İsmail Hakkı Ocakoğlu	<i>Yeni Asır</i>
İzmir	Haydar Rüştü	<i>Anadolu</i>
İzmir	Sırrı Sanlı	<i>Halkın Sesi</i>
İzmir	Ömer Nakip	<i>Ulusalbirlik</i>
İzmir	Süreyya	<i>Yürgü</i>
İzmir	Abdi Sokullu	Representative for newspapers in French
Adana	Ferid Celal Güven	<i>Türk Sözü</i>
Adana	Ahmed Remzi Yüregir	<i>Yeni Adana</i>
Balıkesir	Kenan Akman	<i>Türk Dili</i>
Mersin	Fuad Akbaş	<i>Yeni Mersin</i>
Mersin	Hasan Basri	<i>Ege</i>
Konya	Ziya Çalık	<i>Ekekon</i>
Malatya	Necmeddin	<i>Ünal</i>

Source: Erdoğan Tamer (ed.), *Birinci Basın Kongresi* (Ankara: Basın Yayın Genel Müdürlüğü Yayınları, 1975), p. 9.

This congress thereby confirmed that the press was totally engaged with the RPP and that it would diligently champion its policies.²²⁵ Despite the slight differences in their perspectives, the RPP's official publication *Ulus*, Yunus Nadi's *Cumhuriyet*, Necmettin Sadak and Kazım Şinasi Dersan's *Akşam*, Hakkı and Tarık Us' *Vakit* (*Kurun*), and Selim Ragıp

²²⁴Ibid., p. 21.

²²⁵Çetin Yetkin, *Türkiye'de Tek Parti Yönetimi 1930-1945* (İstanbul: Altın Kitaplar, 1983), p. 71.

Emeç's *Son Posta* were the newspapers harmonious with the regime. Considering the relations between the press and the government, circumstances remained stable, even after Atatürk's death in 1938. Until the transition to the multi-party regime, the government restraint over the press persisted.

1931 and 1934 Press Laws: A Comparison

As previously discussed, the main objective of this study is to examine the representation of the Turkish national identity in the newspapers of the single-party period, taking into consideration the political context of the period between 1934 and 1937. Accordingly, the motivation behind the 1931 Press Law and 1934 Press Law were together influential in setting the legal basis of for the mobilization of newspapers for the Kemalist propaganda during this period.

In June 1931, the General Directorate of Press and Information was dissolved and on 25 July 1931 a new press law was adopted,²²⁶ the government acquired every right to close down any publication in contradiction with its general policies. For example, Arif Oruç's opponent newspaper *Yarın* was closed down accordingly. Furthermore, the penal law would be applied for press crimes.²²⁷ Starting from 1931, it thus became further difficult to express ideas in contradiction with or opposite to Kemalist policies. Consequently, the newspapers became the mediators of Kemalist ideology. As Zürcher writes, "Both the press and the educational institutions were mobilized to spread the Kemalist message."²²⁸ The content of

²²⁶ In 1933, the General Directorate of Press was re-established.

²²⁷ Server İskit, *Türkiye'de Matbuat İdareleri Ve Politikaları* (Ankara: Başvekalet Basın ve Yayın Umum Müdürlüğü, 1943), p. 267.

²²⁸ Erik Jan Zürcher, *Turkey: A Modern History* (London; New York: I.B. Tauris, 1998), p. 188.

the “Kemalist message” was determined in the party programme of 1931 as republicanism, secularism, nationalism, populism, statism, and revolutionism.

1934 marked another turning point in terms of re-defining the newspapers’ role in spreading Kemalist ideology. Press law No. 2444, which was adopted on 1 June 1934, was the strongest and most comprehensive law to mobilize the press. On the basis of the new law, the General Directorate of Press and Information was authorized to assure the compatibility of national publications with the revolutionary principles and state policies, to prevent the dissemination of contradictory currents of idea, to introduce the new Turkey to foreign public opinion,²²⁹ as well as to fight against the external negative propaganda against Turkey.²³⁰

The Law No.1881 of 1931 and the Law No.2444 of 1934 can indeed be differentiated from each other in terms of their main motivations. By adopting the 1931 Press Law, the single-party government simply aimed at suppressing the opposition against the policies of the RPP, on the one hand, and preventing the outrages towards the personalities of the party notables like İnönü, on the other. However, the 1934 Press Law had two main motivations, to resist the dissemination of the so called “*gayrimillî içtimai cereyanlar* (unnational waves of social thought)” of the era and spread Kemalist principles instead, and to promote the newly founded Republic to the outside world. The distinctions of the two laws can best be observed on the basis of the official reports of the deliberations in the Grand National Assembly.

As Mazıcı points out, during the negotiations of the 1931 Press Law, eighteen representatives of the assembly gave speeches that illustrated the “misuses” of the freedom of the press.²³¹ Especially, the subject matter of the speech that İsmet İnönü gave on 5 July 1931 in the Grand National Assembly can be summarized as “although the government respects the

²²⁹ La Turquie Kemaliste was published accordingly, starting from June 1934. For more information on the publication see Aykaç.

²³⁰ İskit, *Türkiye’de Matbuat İdareleri Ve Politikaları*, pp. 272-74.

²³¹ Nurşen Mazıcı, “1930’a Kadar Basının Durumu ve 1931 Matbuat Kanunu,” *Ankara Üniversitesi Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü Atatürk Yolu Dergisi* 18, no. 5 (1998); p. 145.

freedom of the press, some newspapers abuse it by publishing negative propaganda against the government.”²³² According to İnönü, this posed a serious threat to the future of the nation. The following excerpts from İnönü’s speech are illuminating in many ways, and here in terms of reflecting the spirit of the negotiations in the assembly:

It would be wrong to assume that without being defended, the nation can resist the negative effects of any determined propaganda... Children and the youth would become in the future, pessimistic and despairing men if they are continuously exposed to messages telling that they are governed in a bad way that everything is bad, that the nation has nothing to recognize as big, as good.²³³ (...) The issue of the freedom of the press is no more a governmental issue, it is a national issue.²³⁴ (...) First of all, the press should supervise each other. If sinister words and malevolent publications direct public opinion in a bad direction, the press that does not take part with them should side against them, should bravely fall on them, should continuously illuminate and clarify the public opinion. (...) Likewise those journalists who defend the regime in this country, those journalists who undertake the responsibility to bring up the public with republican convenance, know the tricks of their oblique colleagues better than all of us.²³⁵

The 1931 Press Law was indeed the consequence of the dissenting atmosphere that had started in 1929 and that rallied following the dissolution of the Liberal Republican Party (LRP). The period between 1929 and 1931 witnessed the global economic crisis of 1929, and the foundation and dissolution of the LRP in 1930, both of which encouraged the expression of opponent views. Especially the LRP experiment was consequential upon the government in

²³² Ibid.

²³³"T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi," (05.07.1931), Cilt 3, Devre 4, Fevkalade İçtima, p. 35. "Demek ki muayyen maksatla yapılan propagandaların tesiratına karşı milletin müdafaa edilmeksizin mukavemet edebileceğini zannetmek hatadır... Gençler ve çocuklar mütemadiyen fena idare olunduklarını, her şeyin fena olduğunu milletin büyük diye, iyi diye tanıyacak hiç bir şeyi olmadığını duya duya, okuya okuya yalnız bedbin ve meyas adamlar olur; milletin istikbalini idare edecek çocuklar genç yaşlarında bu kadar zehirli hava teneffüs ederek istikbale çıkarlarsa milletin atisinden nevmüt olmak lâzımdır."

²³⁴Ibid., p. 36. "(...) Matbuatın hürriyeti meselesi artık bir hükümet meselesi değil bir millet, meselesidir."

²³⁵Ibid., pp. 37-38. "(...) Bu mesele matbuat faaliyetindezafa taallük eden gizli ve dolaşık usulleri en iyi yine gazeteler bilir, milletin hayatına zarar veren istikametlere karşı salim kanaatte bulunan matbuat cesaretle mücadeleye mecburdurlar. Matbuat hürriyetinin zararlarını evvelâ arkadaşları olan diğer matbuatı bertaraf etmek mecburiyetindedir. Evvelen matbuat yekdiğerini murakabe etmelidir. Fena sözler, fena neşriyat memleketin efkârını fena istikamete sevkediğiyorsa buna iştirak etmeyen matbuat tek cephe olarak cesurane diğerlerinin üzerine atılmak, mütemadiyen efkârı umumiyeği tenvir etmek, zahirden kurtarmak lâzımdır."

terms of recognizing the dissent. For instance, in his memoirs İsmet İnönü wrote the following:

Let us consider all those accomplishments within a period of eight years. A secular republic, Ankara, becoming the capital city, the changing of the hat and letters, the civic law... the eastern uprising, all those men who were exiled... It was now obvious that we were unbelievably optimistic in assuming that all these had fallen into oblivion.²³⁶

Within this context, Arif Oruç's publication *Yarın* became the main source of severe criticism against the government even before the foundation of the LRP, and it later became the main supporter of the newly founded party. *Son Posta* with Zekeriya Sertel provided a space for resisting the attacks coming from the proponent journalists. For example, Ahmet Ağaoğlu published his thoughts on the LRP and responded to criticisms of the LRP (i.e. Yunus Nadi's taunts) in the pages of *Yarın* and *Son Posta*.²³⁷ Furthermore, the two leading opponent newspapers, namely *Yarın* and *Son Posta*, did not change their attitudes despite the government's pressures after the Menemen Incident and despite the closure of the *Türk Ocakları* (Turkish Hearths) and the Masonic Association that signified an institutionalized transition to a party-state; and did they not only struggle with the government, but also with the proponent press.²³⁸

Until the over-heating of the disputes between the oppositional and the proponent press that brought about the 1931 law, Mustafa Kemal did not intervene openly into the opposition newspapers. Unlike the previous periods, the opposition did not directly target the

²³⁶İsmet İnönü, *Hatıralar* (İstanbul Bilgi, 1992), p. 229. "Sekiz sene zarfında 1923'ten 1930'a kadar yapılan işleri düşünelim. Laik cumhuriyet, Ankara'nın başkent olması, ondan sonra şapka, harf değişikliği, Medeni Kanun.. bütün bunlar. şark isyanı, birçok adamın yerlerinden sürülmesi, bütün bunların üç beş sene bir rahatlık içinde tamamıyla unutulup geçmiş olduğunu zannetmekle, inanılmayacak bir iyimserlik havasına düşmüş olduğumuz anlaşıldı."

²³⁷Ahmet Ağaoğlu, *Serbest Fırka Hatıraları* (İstanbul İletişim 1994); Belge 1 p. 125; Belge 2 p.33; Belge 7 p. 55; Belge 8 p. 57; Belge 14 p. 83; Belge 15 p. 87; Belge 18 p. 97; Belge 19 p. 203; Belge 22 p. 19; Belge 23 p. 25.

²³⁸Nurettin Güz, *Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası Sonrası Basında Muhalefet Ve 1931 Matbuat Kanunu* (Ankara: Gazi Üniversitesi İletişim Fakültesi Yayını, 1993), p. 6.

new regime in line with a pro-Islamist attitude. The criticism took the new regime for granted and it was rather directed towards the RPP's anti-democratic policies.

The confessions of a prominent proponent writer and RPP deputy, Yakup Kadri, in his memoirs are illuminating in terms of portraying the attitude of the pro-governmental newspapers against the criticisms that were intensified following the dissolution of the LRP:

All of these incidents that threatened the Republican regime certainly did not emerge all of a sudden. Yes, none of us, including me as a journalist deputy from within the RPP who writes these sentences, none of us made self-criticism in order to objectively scrutinize the real causal factors for the tribulation of the new revolutionary order.²³⁹

Throughout June 1931, just before the negotiations of the 1931 Press Law in the assembly on 5 July, there were heated disputes between Zekeriya Sertel from *Son Posta* and Falih Rıfki from *Hakimiyet-i Milliye* (Ulus) and *Milliyet*; and between Arif Oruç from *Yarın* and Yunus Nadi from *Cumhuriyet*. While Sertel and Oruç were essentially criticizing the government for not being truly democratic, Falih Rıfki and Yunus Nadi responded to criticisms on behalf of the government. The point of the latter could be summarized with Falih Rıfki's words "Revolutions shall sustain with positive criticism. Negative criticism shall be considered treason,"²⁴⁰ which exactly reflects the main idea of the behind the 1931 Press Law.

On the other hand, the essence of the disputes totally changed direction in the last ten days of June and evolved into mutual personalized defamation campaigns, with the involvement of more and more journalists from both sides. The proponents blamed the opponents for misusing and abusing the freedom of the press. The new press law had come into force in this atmosphere and by August 1931, while Arif Oruç had stopped the

²³⁹Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, *Politikada 45 Yıl* (İstanbul: İletişim, 1999), p. 105.

²⁴⁰ Falih Rıfki Atay, "Bozgun Havası", *Milliyet*, 20 June 1931, cited in Güz, *Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası Sonrası Basında Muhalefet Ve 1931 Matbuat Kanunu*. "İnkılâplar müspet tenkitlerle yürür. Nefiy ve inkâr bozguncu tenkit, hıyanettir."

publication of *Yarın*, Zekeriya Sertel had resigned from *Son Posta*. Serious oppositional journalists were thereby dismissed.

First of all, the 1931 Press Law revoked the previous law that had stipulated premiums be paid to the owners of political newspapers. The law brought serious sanctions and thereby serious limitations to the freedom of the press.²⁴¹ For instance, the government's permission would be needed to start a new newspaper or journal, and its publishers were obliged to send two copies of every issue to the related local administrative chiefs. Only college (*yüksek okul*) graduates could be editors-in-chief and only high school (*lise*) graduates could own a newspaper. Those who were previously convicted for "serving the enemies" goals through their publications during the national struggle' would not be allowed to publish anymore. Both the owner and the editor in chief of a newspaper would be responsible for all the articles and news in the publication.

The penalty of "accusing without evidence" members of the Turkish Grand National Assembly or government or state officials would be imprisonment from three to six months. Any publication that promoted monarchy, caliphate, communism, or anarchism would be prohibited and violation of this rule would be imprisonment from six months to three years. Only official statements of state institutions or officers; and the bulletins of news agencies recognized by the government could be used as news source. In addition, the government would have the right to prohibit the distribution of any foreign publications. Most important of all, according to Article 50, it would be possible to close down newspapers on the basis of the decision of the Cabinet for publishing content that would harm the "general policy of the

²⁴¹Güz, *Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası Sonrası Basında Muhalefet Ve 1931 Matbuat Kanunu*, p. 134; Yavuz Güçtürk, "A Comparative Study of The Press Laws of 1909 and 1931" (MA Thesis, METU, 2005), pp. 94-99; Nurşen Mazıcı, "1930'a Kadar Basımın Durumu ve 1931 Matbuat Kanunu,"; Matbuat Kanunu No. 1881, 25 July 1931, available at http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/KANUNLAR_KARARLAR/kanuntbmmc010/kanuntbmmc010/kanuntbmmc01001881.pdf

country (*memleketin umumi siyasetine dokunacak neşriyat*).” Especially this article was totally open to interpretation, allowing government to abuse the law and violate the freedom of the press.

The spirit of the 1934 Press Law was different from that of the 1931 Law. On the basis of 1931 Law, criticism was already prohibited, so that dealing with the opposition’s criticisms was no more an issue of the agenda. However, by 1934, the government’s expectations from the press were not limited to praising of its policies in the pages of the newspapers. As stated below, the main objective behind the 1934 Law was to make use of the press as an instrument of the Kemalist nationalist propaganda. This objective can best be summarized with the speech of Şebn Karahisar representative Sadri Maksudi Bey in the assembly:

Between the nations, national waves of social thought influence each other, sometimes even impeding the evolvement of one another in a normal direction. (...) Today, none of the currents of idea constitute a threat for us, and we are not struck by fear in the long run. Nonetheless, various denational, incongruous currents with that of ours may one day result in unwanted situations. Such currents are also present inside. That’s why my proposal is intended to counter the waves that are contrary to the principles of nationality and democracy.²⁴²

Although most newspapers were privately owned, it was obvious that the government saw the press as a natural extension of the government. The speech of Muğla representative Şükrü Kaya, Minister of the Internal Affairs, summarized this attitude as follows:

All of our newspapers obtained the attributes of nationality and revolutionism in war zones. Most of their owners are among us and those who are not among us are with us mentally and conscientiously. The Grand National Assembly of Turkey and the Republican Government that rely upon its confidence are the brain of the national ideal. And our newspapers are its tongue. If the tongue cannot always express perfectly what the brain thinks, this is because of the distance between the brain and

²⁴² Republic of Turkey, "T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi," (26.05.1934), Cilt 22, Devre 4, İçtima 3, p. 271. "*Milletler arasında millî, içtimâî felsefe ve cereyanlar birbirine tesir icra etmekte, bir diğerinin normal istikamette inkişafına mâni olabilecek şekiller almaktadır. (...)Bu gün hiç bir cereyan, bizim için tehlike teşkil etmiyor ve uzun bir âti için de hiç bir korkumuz yoktur. Bununla beraber muhtelif gayrimillî, bizim cereyanımıza mugayir cereyanlar, bir gün gayrimatlûp neticeler vermesi ihtimalinin de mevcut olduğunu unutmamalıyız. Bu cereyanlar, dahilde de vardır. Onun için benim teklif ettiğim milliyet ve demokrasi esaslarına mugayir olan cereyanlarla mücadele şeklinde yazılmıştır.*"

the tongue, not because of the difference between feelings, ideas, goals and thoughts.²⁴³

The main objectives of the re-establishment of the General Directorate of the Press were described in the 1934 Press Law. Two articles illustrated the role attributed to the press as the extension of the government and in terms of disseminating nationalism. Article 1/B stated that The General Directorate of the Press would “Assure that the national press is in harmony with revolutionary principles, with the state policy and with the needs of the nation.”²⁴⁴ Article 1/D also allowed the Directorate “To take measures to actualize the attribute of the press to be the most important apparatus of indoctrination and training.”²⁴⁵

In line with these missions, the General Directorate even attempted to found a state-driven institution for the distribution of publications in order to enhance the success of the single-party’s press and culture policies. Although such an attempt was to no avail, it was important in terms of illustrating what Üstün describes as “the political power’s goal to broaden its sphere of influence all through the country.”²⁴⁶

Together with the two Press Laws, amendments made to the Penal Code were also significant. In 1936, articles were borrowed from the Fascist Italian Penal Code. The amendments intended not only to bar the working class from political activity, but also to resist unnationalist propaganda, especially on the basis of the articles 142, 161 and 163.

Article 142/1 stated that:

²⁴³Ibid., p. 273. “Bizim gazetelerimizin hepsi de millilik ve inkılâpçılık sıfatını harp meydanlarında kazanmışlardır. Sahiplerinin bir çoğu aramızdadır ve aramızda olmayanlar da fikren ve vicdanen bizimle beraberdirler.”

²⁴⁴ Republic of Turkey, "Matbuat Umum Müdürlüğü Teşkilâtına Ve Vazifelerine Dair Kanun," (Resmi Gazete, 29.05.1934).
“Millî matbuatın inkılâp prensiplerine, Devlet siyasetine ve millet ihtiyaçlarına uygun olmasını temin eylemek”

²⁴⁵Ibid. “Matbuatın en mühim bir telkin ve terbiye vasıtası olmak vasfını tahakkuk ettirmek için tedbirler almak”

²⁴⁶Hasan Üstün, "Türkiye'de Gazete Dağıtımını Yaygınlaştırma Girişimleri (1930-1945)," *İstanbul Üniversitesi İletişim Fakültesi Dergisi* 34(2008): p. 114.

Whoever makes propaganda with the purpose of establishing domination of one social class over others, exterminating any of the social classes, overthrowing any of the established basic economic or social orders of the country or totally exterminating the political or legal orders of the State, shall be punished by...²⁴⁷ (...) Whoever makes a propaganda to eradicate or weaken national feelings shall be punished by...²⁴⁸

Thus, while the 1931 law was still effective, the adoption of the 1934 Press Law and later the amendment on the Penal Code in 1936 brought about a suffocating period for the expression of opinion and for the freedom of the press. For example, about this period, Zekeriya Sertel wrote in his memoirs that the journalists were not able to express their opinions, “We were in fact suffocating especially during this period. Not only the freedom of the press but also all other democratic rights were abolished... The dictatorship was gradually consolidating.”²⁴⁹

As discussed above, Kemalist propaganda, both internal and external, and counter propaganda against the main currents of thought of the period, were also among the main targets of the 1934 Law. However, it is important to discuss the perception and interpretation of the concept of “propaganda” in the minds of both the intellectuals and politicians of the period. For example, Zekeriya Sertel, by using the term “propaganda,” evidently means the systematic spreading of ideas and/or information:

Moreover, a whole new external situation had also come out. Following Hitler’s accession to power, the propaganda of Nazism and fascism had accelerated and gained strength all over the country.... On the other hand, British and French propaganda was also permeating the country. They were trying to win the government and Turkish public opinion round. Both blocks were preparing for world war.²⁵⁰

²⁴⁷Duygun Yarsuvat, "Case on the Constitutionality of Articles 141 and 142 of the Penal Code," *Annales de la Faculté de Droit d'Istanbul* 18, no. 29-32 (1968): p. 581.

²⁴⁸Hıfzı Topuz, *Türk Basın Tarihi* (Istanbul: Remzi, 2003), p. 160. “Sosyal bir sınıfın diğer sosyal sınıflar üzerinde tahakkümünü tesis etmek veya sosyal bir sınıfı ortadan kaldırmak yahut memleket içinde mücesses iktisadi ve hukukî nizamları olan herhangi birini devirmek veya devletin siyasî ve hukukî nizanlarını topyekun yok etmek için her ne suretle olursa olsun propaganda yapan kimse... Millî duyguları yok etmek ve zayıflatmak için her ne suretle olursa olsun propaganda yapan kimse...”

²⁴⁹Zekeriya Sertel, *Hatırladıklarım* (Istanbul: Remzi, 2000), p. 214. “Yalnız basın özgürlüğü değil, bütün demokratik haklar kaldırılmıştı.(...) Diktatörlük gittikçe kuvvetleniyordu.” (p.214)

In today's idiom, various concepts are used to express different uses of the concept of "propaganda," such as public relations, lobbying, promotion,²⁵¹ presentation, advertising, flackery, and spin doctoring, could be equated with the term "propaganda" in the 1930s. For example, in his same speech at the Assembly, by using the term "propaganda," İsmet İnönü refers first to "opposition" and then to "adverse publicity:"

Today, the freedom of the press has gained importance when compared to a hundred years ago. I don't mean an increase in value; I mean an increase in hazardousness. In any given country, if it finds opportunity, propaganda is even capable of destroying a construction known as the strongest of all. (...) Today, a significant number of states develop mutual relationships with the condition to stop adverse propaganda about their countries.²⁵²

The prevention of adverse publicity in the international arena was among the duties of the General Directorate of the Press, as set in the 1934 Law No. 2444. For example, while stating the responsibilities of the General Directorate of the Press, article 1/F stated that the directorate would "assure the promotion of Turkey abroad and the struggle with adverse propaganda."²⁵³

In short, considering the various meanings of and references to the term "propaganda," it once again should clearly be stated that this study focuses on the single-party regime's efforts to spread especially Kemalist nationalism and Kemalist national identity in and

²⁵⁰Ibid., p. 215. "*Dış bakımdan da yepyeni bir durum vardı. Almanya'da Hitler iktidara geldikten sonra memlekette nazizm ve faşizm propagandası hızlanmış ve kuvvetlenmişti. (...) Bir yandan da İngilizler ve Fransızlar memleket içinde propaganda faaliyetine geçmişlerdi. Bunlar da Türk kamuoyunu kazanmaya çalışıyorlardı. İki blok da dünya savaşına hazırlanıyordu*"

²⁵¹ For example in the official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, what was meant in the 1930's by 'Propaganda of Turkey abroad' is expressed as the 'Promotion of Turkey abroad'. [Http://Www.Mfa.Gov.Tr/Promotion-of--Turkey-Abroad.En.Mfa](http://www.mfa.gov.tr/Promotion-of--Turkey-Abroad.En.Mfa).

²⁵² Republic of Turkey, "T.B.M.M. Zabıt Ceridesi," (05.07.1931) p. 35. "*Bilirsiniz ki propaganda bu asrın başlıca silâhlarından. Matbuat hürriyeti bu gün, 100 sene evvel zannolunduğundan daha ziyade ehemmiyet peyda etmiştir. Kıymeti bundan 100 sene evvelinden daha ziyade artmış değil aynı kıymettir. Tehlikesi daha ziyade artmıştır. Propaganda eğer müsait saha bulursa ibir memlekette, bir millete yıkılamıyacak zannolunan en kuvvetli bir binayı dahi yıkabilir. (...) bu gün bir çok Devletler hatta aralarında münasebet kurmak için yekdiğeri aleyhine propaganda yapılmamasını şart koyacak kadar ileri gitmişlerdir.*"

²⁵³ Republic of Turkey, "Matbuat Umum Müdürlüğü Teşkilâtına Ve Vazifelerine Dair Kanun." "*Memleket haricinde Türkiye'yi tanıttırmayı ve menfi propagandalarla mücadeleyle temin eylemek;*"

through the newspapers of the period. Therefore, the propaganda of Turkey abroad is not studied in depth. “Kemalist Propaganda” is used here to refer to an “internal” process of making Turkish citizens, as well as to the construction of an “internal” public opinion that follows the Kemalist movement, and that adopts the Kemalist way of national identification.

The Mobilization of Newspapers for Kemalist Propaganda within The Interwar Context

In what ways, if at all, was the Kemalist regime of the 1920s and 30s comparable to the fascist dictatorships in Europe? This question occupied the minds of many contemporary observers and has been (at least implicitly) asked by students of Turkish republican history ever since.

Fikret Adanır, 2001²⁵⁴

In *The Turkey of Atatürk* Donald Everett Webster asks, “Democracy or dictatorship – which is the form and content of the modern Turkish state?”²⁵⁵ With respect to this question, the chapter on the press in Webster’s book may, indeed, be read as a denial of Kemalism’s interest in “totalitarianism as a policy” for various reasons.²⁵⁶ While examining the press in the single-party period, Webster writes:

A nation the government of which is according to a single-party system might be expected to exercise complete state control of its press. (...) It is restrained but not controlled. Editorial and news content are not dictated, but the laws against printing anything which might prove inflammatory do impose a real restraint. The conditions are about much the same as in the more maturely democratic countries in wartime. (...) It is probably not an exaggeration to say that the effectiveness of the press is limited more by circulation problems than by control from above.²⁵⁷

²⁵⁴Fikret Adanır, "Kemalist Authoritarianism and Fascist Trends in Turkey During the Interwar Period " in *Fascism Outside Europe: The European Impulse against Domestic Conditions in the Diffusion of Global Fascism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), p. 313.

²⁵⁵Donald Everett Webster, *The Turkey of Atatürk Social Process in the Turkish Reformation* (Philadelphia: The American Academy of Social and Political Science, 1939), p. 162.

²⁵⁶Ibid., pp. 197-209.

²⁵⁷Ibid., p. 204.

Depending on the information provided in the previous sections of this chapter, and on the empirical research in the following chapters, this study agrees with Webster's evaluation. Considering the relations between the press and the government during the single-party period, one can observe strong efforts to oppress the opposition, but there is no evidence to rely on to be able to argue that Kemalists sought to directly control and mobilize the press. Therefore, it is possible to describe the early republican regime as "authoritarian" rather than "totalitarian." While Sunar and Sayarı describe it as "state-dominant mono party authoritarianism,"²⁵⁸ Zafer Toprak calls it "authoritarian modernism."²⁵⁹ Fikret Adanır states that "Kemalism was not fascist has been virtually the unanimous opinion of the Turkish academic community."²⁶⁰

With respect to democracy and plurality, the government policies were, thus, somewhere in between. Considering the strict regulations over the press, it is possible to argue that the regime was neither totalitarian, nor liberal. The brief chronology on the press-government relations in Turkey under the single-party rule makes it clear that the regime did not -or could not- create a strong monopolistic media directly controlled by the ruling party for the mobilization of the masses. The single-party regime was not even successful in moving the mainstream press to Ankara. However, it endeavored for the creation of an adherent press. In doing this, an important factor was the involvement of writers and journalists in government affairs as deputies. For example, in different periods between the years 1920 and 1938, around forty journalists including Falih Rıfkı Atay (*Ulus*), Yunus Nadi

²⁵⁸İlkay Sunar and Sabri Sayarı, "Democracy in Turkey: Problems and Prospects," in *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Southern Europe*, eds. Philippe C. Schmitter and Guillermo O'Donnell, Laurence Whitehead (Baltimore Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), p. 169.

²⁵⁹Zafer Toprak, "Türkiye'de 'Sol Faşizm' Ya Da Otoriter Modernizm 1923-1946," *Toplum ve Bilim* 100, no. Bahar (2004): p. 98.

²⁶⁰Adanır, "Kemalist Authoritarianism and Fascist Trends in Turkey During the Interwar Period " 313.

(*Cumhuriyet*), Asım Us and Hakkı Tarık Us (*Vakit*), Mahmut Soydan (*Milliyet, Politika, İnkılap*), Ahmet Cevdet (*İkdam*), Ahmet İhsan Tokgöz (*Servet-i Fünun*) were members of parliament.²⁶¹

Without doubt, the reasons for the Kemalist single-party rule's inability to mobilize the masses through the media were both the economic deficiencies and the low literacy rates. The priorities for the mobilization were mainly given to the People's Houses and the railroads. The People's Houses' role was especially significant in terms of serving as spaces of interaction between people and books, in terms of spreading the act of reading.



Figure 1. Books and Readers in People's Houses 1933-1941
Source: C.H.P. Halkevleri Halk Odaları Broşürü 1932-1942, TBMM Kütüphanesi.

As Figure 1 illustrates, in the mediation of People's Houses, the number of readers gradually increased from 149,949 in 1933 to 2,461,813 in 1940.²⁶² In addition to this, the

²⁶¹Kabacalı, *Türk Basınında Demokrasi*, p. 153.

privately owned radio station regulated by the Press Law of 1934 were monopolized and nationalized in 1938, and used for the dissemination of the Kemalist principles and national culture.²⁶³ However, the use of radio as a propaganda tool was also limited. On the other hand, the Ankara People's House journal *Ülkü (Ideal)* and the *Fikir Hareketleri (Movements of Thought)* were important tools for the diffusion of Kemalist populism.

Under the single-party rule, Mustafa Kemal repeatedly stated that the press freedom should not be abused and that the press should support the new regime. Furthermore, he continually called attention to the fact that otherwise there would be consequences.²⁶⁴ The regime did not directly prohibit freedom of opinion and admittedly tried to superintend the media as long as the circumstances allowed, and never took it under its direct control. However, it prevented the development of a milieu for divergent opinions to flourish and made use of the press by considering it as the government's natural extensions to promote Kemalist propaganda.

As Toprak writes, it is impossible to understand the single-party regime in Turkey without considering the developments in the continental Europe of the same period, in the sense that in the Europe of the 1930s, the authoritarian and totalitarian regimes that gained ground had completely rejected liberal state.²⁶⁵ Stephen J. Lee describes 'authoritarianism' generically as "a system of government which is based on heavily centralized control and which dilutes or dispenses with a properly functioning parliamentary democracy."²⁶⁶ Whereas, in describing "totalitarianism" he states that Friedrich and Brzezinski's definition

²⁶²Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, *C.H.P.Halkevleri Halk Odaları Broşürü 1932-1942*, Ankara: 1942, p. 45.

²⁶³Meltem Ahıska, *Radyonun Sihirli Kapısı* (İstanbul: Metis, 2005), pp. 141-42.

²⁶⁴Taha Parla, "Atatürk'ün Söylev Ve Demeçleri", ed. Taha Parla, vol. 2, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Kültürün Resmî Kaynakları* (İstanbul: İletişim, 1997), pp. 152-63.

²⁶⁵Toprak, "Türkiye'de 'Sol Faşizm' Ya Da Otoriter Modernizm 1923-1946," p. 94 and p.98.

²⁶⁶Stephen J. Lee, *European Dictatorships 1918-1945* (London and New York: Routledge, 2003), p. 298.

constitutes one of the influential views, which holds that totalitarianism described as “a combination of an ideology, a single-party typically lead by one man, a terroristic police, a communications monopoly, a weapons monopoly, and a centrally directed economy.”²⁶⁷ Accordingly, it would not be wrong to argue that while discussing the character of the regime in the single-party era, in Turkey press-government relations may be taken as a criterion when compared to other contemporaneous single-party rules in Europe.

Within this framework, it is important to discuss the internal Kemalist propaganda by locating it within the worldly historical context of the second half of the 1930s, which is mostly referred as the era of totalitarianism. In the words of Perry, “In the 1930s, the term *totalitarianism* was used to describe the Fascist regime in Italy, the National Socialist regime in Germany and the Communist regime in the Soviet Union.”²⁶⁸ Comparing the internal propaganda mechanisms of these three countries with that of Kemalism would be illuminating in order to stress the role that the mainstream newspapers played in the consolidation of nationalism and national identity in Turkey, specifically starting from 1934.

Indeed, in the newly founded Republic of Turkey, as well as in the totalitarian regimes of the period, propaganda was, as Koepnick writes, part of an “ideologically ambivalent attempt at producing mass culture from above.”²⁶⁹ Accordingly, a crucial first step to understanding propaganda would be to acknowledge it as a process of mass communication. Thereby, it would be easier to identify and compare the underlying motivations behind the propaganda processes in different countries with different ideologies.

²⁶⁷C.J. Friedrich and Z.K. Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy* (Cambridge: Mass, 1956)., cited in Lee, *European Dictatorships 1918-1945*, p. 298.

²⁶⁸Marvin Perry, "An Era of Totalitarianism," in *Western Civilization: A Brief History* (Boston: Wadsworth, 2013).

²⁶⁹Lutz p. Koepnick, "Engendering Mass Culture " in *Dark Mirror: German Cinema between Hitler and Hollywood* (Ewing, NJ: University of California Press, 2002).

Additionally, while comparing the propaganda processes of these four countries, approaching the process of propaganda as a discursive process also would be helpful since propaganda functions through the spreading of discourses to the masses. As Thwaites et. write,

discourse has four principal characteristics: (1) concrete social sites at and within which it circulates (institution); (2) roles for those who participate in it (functions of address); (3) power relations carried in those roles; (4) certain topics which tend to be spoken about there (themes).²⁷⁰

Accordingly, the comparison may be based on especially the above discussed first characteristic.

To begin with, when we compare the concrete sites within which the discourses of propaganda circulate in the countries in question, some similarities and some differences in relation to each country's propaganda mechanisms become apparent. In terms of Germany and Italy, Blum states that "Newspapers, publications, radio, and film were controlled in both fascist societies, but were used with uneven effectiveness by the leaders of the regimes."²⁷¹

In Germany, the most important social sites for the circulation of the discourses of propaganda were newspapers, cinema, and radio. Especially radio was used efficiently to convey the Nazi ideology. Blum points out that "radio manufacturers were urged to produce an affordable set, the 'People's Receiver,' and by 1939, 70 percent of German households (80 percent in cities) owned a radio."²⁷² However, in Turkey when efforts were made to nationalize the radio in 1936, it was not easily accessible to people and only about six percent of the total population owned a radio receiver. Ahiska writes that,

There were about 10,000 radio receivers in Turkey when the radio was nationalized. Although the total number reached 33,000 in 1938 and continued to increase; the number was still low in proportion to the overall population, about 16 million.

²⁷⁰Tony Thwaites, Lloyd Davis, and Warwick Mules, *Introducing Cultural and Media Studies a Semiotic Approach* (New York Polgrave, 2002).

²⁷¹George P. Blum, *The Rise of Fascism in Europe* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1998), p. 43.

²⁷²Ibid., p. 43.

Furthermore, 70 percent of the radio receivers were concentrated in the three big cities.²⁷³

In Hitler's Germany, although radio was given priority for mobilization, the press also was brought under state control. Joseph Goebbels was in charge of the media and the arts. Blum indicates that Goebbels "issued guidelines for newspaper editors and exercised direct supervision on content."²⁷⁴ As Lee states, in Germany,

between 1933 and 1945, for example, state-owned newspapers increased from 2,5 per cent to a total of 82 per cent. The German News Agency, or DNB, provided regulations for the presentation of news and all journalists were made responsible to the state rather than their editors.²⁷⁵

On the other hand, the Nazi film industry was a striking tool for propaganda for instance as Lee writes "keenly aware of popular culture's effectiveness, Goebbels, the Third Reich's propaganda master, particularly promoted films."²⁷⁶

Koepnick indicates that "Nazi mass culture, far from subverting the dictates of ideology, hoped to fabricate a new national community through American style consumerism."²⁷⁷ So indeed, the culture industry in Germany was so developed and institutionalized that it played a major role in the mobilization of the masses. Furthermore, it even led to the emergence of a new school of criticism, the Frankfurt School, the name given to a group of German intellectuals associated with the Institute for Social Research at the University of Frankfurt. The leading argument of the institute's work on German popular

²⁷³Meltem Ahiska, *Occidentalism in Turkey : Questions of Modernity and National Identity in Turkish Radio Broadcasting*, Library of Modern Middle East Studies (London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2010), p. 84.

²⁷⁴Ibid.

²⁷⁵Lee, *European Dictatorships 1918-1945*, p. 182.

²⁷⁶Ibid., p. 44.

²⁷⁷Koepnick, "Engendering Mass Culture," p. 94.

culture may be summarized as that the culture industry “stunted the political imagination” of German people, opening way to the rise of fascism.²⁷⁸

Following the framework provided by Thwaites, such an argument may be even further strengthened by a comparison between Italy and Turkey.²⁷⁹ In Italy under Mussolini, not only were all journalists compelled to register with the Fascist Journalist Association, but also the press office controlled news and censorship, leading to constant misinformation.²⁸⁰ For instance, according to Blum, when compared with Germany, Mussolini failed to recognize the potential of radio, nevertheless, “the fascist regime was only slightly more successful in the exploitation of film for propaganda.”²⁸¹ He adds that the government reached a wider audience by distributing documentaries to cinemas and to the leisure time Dopolavoro organization.

Similar to Turkey, Berezin writes “the Italian fascist regime that governed Italy from 1922 to 1943 aimed to create new men and women, a new ethos, a new culture.”²⁸² However, unlike in Turkey, in Italy the presence of mass society and, consequently, the presence of mass media in the real sense as a concrete site within which the discourses of propaganda circulated was an important factor in “manufacturing consent.” According to Blinkhorn, the fascism in Italy was a product of mass society, an agent of capitalism and an agent of modernization.²⁸³ He argues that rapid industrialization, urbanization, war, and demobilization

²⁷⁸John Storey, "The Frankfurt School," in *Cultural Theory and Popular Culture* (Harlow: Pearson, 2009), p. 64.

²⁷⁹Lloyd Davis Tony Thwaites, and Warwick Mules, "Introducing Cultural and Media Studies a Semiotic Approach," (New York Polgrave, 2002).

²⁸⁰Lee, *European Dictatorships 1918-1945*, p. 121.

²⁸¹Blum, *The Rise of Fascism in Europe*, p. 44.

²⁸²Mabel Berezin, *Making the Fascist Self: The Political Culture of Interwar Italy* (NY Cornell University Press, 1997),p. 4.

²⁸³Martin Blinkhorn, *Mussolini and Fascist Italy* (London: Routledge, 1994).

gave way to the restoration of a sense of identity by fascism and in fascist eyes.²⁸⁴ This was apparently succeeded by the fascist manipulation of the popular culture and the mass media. As John F. Ballard indicates, the fascist exploitation of the media was aimed at mobilizing support for Mussolini's policies, controlling all aspects of life in Fascist Italy and creating a "new" Italian and, as Pollard writes "the press by the 1930's had become standardized and staid as a result of the detailed directives issued by the Ministry of Popular Culture (...) The Ministry also controlled radio and cinema."²⁸⁵

Confirming Ballard, Berezin also underlines the mobilization of culture industries for Mussolini's project to forge a new identity:

The "fascist Project" was the set of actions and programs the regime undertook to accomplish its desired cultural ends. The regime "fascitized" Italy's principal cultural and social institutions. It reorganized schools, took over popular and elite artistic institutions from cinema to theater to publishing, controlled the press, and created a web of voluntary organizations that mobilized men and women of all ages.²⁸⁶

When it comes to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics under Stalin's rule, besides the press, even literature, painting, architecture, music and film were brought under direct government control for political propaganda to mobilize the masses.²⁸⁷ In the USSR, the propaganda activities were directed to erase what Acton says was "all that was bourgeois from state to religion and the family."²⁸⁸ For example, the mass media, especially the press and cinema were used for atheist propaganda and were given the task of converting people.²⁸⁹

²⁸⁴Mussolini and Fascist Italy, p. 55.

²⁸⁵John F. Pollard, *The Fascist Experience in Italy* (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 68.

²⁸⁶Berezin, *Making the Fascist Self: The Political Culture of Interwar Italy*, p. 5.

²⁸⁷Lee, *European Dictatorships 1918-1945*, p. 67.

²⁸⁸Edward Acton, "State and Society under Lenin and Stalin," in *Themes in Modern European History, 1890-1945*, ed. Paul Hayes (Florence, KY: Routledge, 1992), p. 163.

²⁸⁹David E. Powell, *Antireligious Propaganda in the Soviet Union* (Cambridge, Mass., and London: MIT Press, 1975), p. 34.

While comparing the Italian, German, and Soviet totalitarian models, Duygu Köksal argues that “Turkey’s republican elite cared about culture and the arts to the extent that they could be used, first for general political purposes and second for compensating for the ideological gaps and ambiguities concerning national culture and art.”²⁹⁰ According to her, the Kemalist regime did not go as far as the anesthetization of politics. This was partly due to the fact that the Turkey of the early 1930’s was far from being equipped with an urban mass culture industry supported with consumerism, mostly because the industrial modernization had not yet been accomplished. Industrialization and mass society were essential requisites both for the emergence of a mass culture and for a thorough transformation of society in line with the persisting westernization and modernization efforts.

Within this context, 1934 was also significant in that it introduced the industrialization breakthrough. Ahmet Emin Yalman summarized the impact of this process by saying that extensive reforms were initiated by the government party with the aim to counteract further the unpopularity of the regime. He wrote: “Two Five-Year Plans were adopted for the industrialization of Turkey. (...) The era had beneficial effects of a general character on public life, and proved to be at least a temporary remedy for evils created by the lack of freedom to criticize.”²⁹¹

Thus in the mid-1930s, at the outset of the industrialization plans, culture industries and mass culture were obviously missing. Therefore, Kemalist propaganda had to lean on the newspapers as the only mass communication medium in order distribute the nationalist message to fabricate a new national community. So, newspapers functioned as the concrete social sites at and within which the nationalist discourse could circulate.

²⁹⁰ Duygu Köksal, “Art and power in Turkey: Culture, aesthetics and nationalism during the single-party era”, *New Perspectives on Turkey*, 31, no.2 (2004), p. 93.

²⁹¹ Ahmet Emin Yalman, "The Struggle for Multi-Party Government in Turkey," *Middle East Journal* 1, no. 1 (1942): p. 49.

Following Thwaites, the comparison between Turkey and the totalitarian regimes of the interwar period also may be pursued on the basis of functions of address.²⁹² When the addressees of the discourse are considered, as discussed above, both in Germany and Italy, propaganda addressed a mass, industrialized, and mostly urbanized society composed of people who were already unified under a national identity, who at the same time had been the consumers of a common national popular culture for a long time. However, the propaganda in Turkey addressed a population that lacked a unified national identity, was mostly composed of immigrants from former Ottoman territories, mostly based in rural areas was far from the concept of consumption, and far from practicing a mass culture through the standardized products of culture industry.

On functions of address, when the addressers are considered, in Turkey, a striking point is that the proponent journalists of the Kemalist regime were people who already had internalized the exaltation of Turkishness by the new regime. At every turn, they accused any opponents of not being truly Turkish. For example, about the publishers of the opposition newspaper *Yılmaz*, Yunus Nadi wrote, “It is not certain whether they are Greek or Turkish or whether they are cross breeds.”²⁹³ In another case, Celâl Nuri tried to insult Ahmet Ağaoğlu by saying that he was actually a Russian and not a Turk. What is striking is that such verbal abuse was considered an assault by the related persons and their responses aimed to prove just the opposite. For instance, Ahmet Ağaoğlu responded to Celâl Nuri by saying that he was a true Turk from Qarabağ, and that in his mothers’, father’s, and ancestors’ veins, and so in his veins, only Turkish blood circulated.²⁹⁴ Furthermore, it is also possible to observe that the

²⁹²Tony Thwaites, Lloyd Davis, and Warwick Mules, *Introducing Cultural and Media Studies a Semiotic Approach* (New York Polgrave, 2002).

²⁹³Yunus Nadi, *Cumhuriyet*, “Büyük İşler Önünde Müz’iç Ayak Bağları, 22 June 1931, cited in Güz, *Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası Sonrası Basında Muhalefet Ve 1931 Matbuat Kanunu*, p. 55. “Yılmaz’ı çıkarınların Rum mu, Türk mü yoksa ikisinin karması mı olduğu belli değildir.”

²⁹⁴Ağaoğlu, *Serbest Fırka Hatıraları*, p. 184.

leading writers of the establishment had really embraced the history theses regarding the background of the Turks. For example, in his columns and in his memoirs Yakup Kadri promoted the constructed knowledge that “Turks founded a center of civilization wherever they settled.”²⁹⁵

Additionally, it is apparent that the mainstream newspapers were truly willing to promote nationalism, not only on the discursive level, but also in action. At this point, one the most conspicuous examples are provided in Ahmet Emin Yalman’s memoirs. Yalman stated that when he was working for *Tan*, on the annexation of Hatay in 1936, they “delightedly accepted to cooperate” with the Directorate for Intelligence in the Southern Borders.²⁹⁶ Thus it is obvious that journalists willingly contributed to the instrumental use of newspapers by the government for the benefit of the nation state and of nationalism. Furthermore, by internalizing the nationalist hegemony and by reproducing the nationalistic discourses, they also contributed to the process of consolidation of a new identity for the citizens.

The inter war context of the 1930s should always be taken into account in order to better understand the role of the press in contributing to the Kemalist nationalist interpellation. The Europe of the interwar period, according to Michael Mann is characterized by four major crises:

(...) the consequences of a devastating “world,” but in fact largely European, war between mass citizen armies, severe class conflict exacerbated by the Great Depression, a political crisis arising from an attempted rapid transition by many countries toward a democratic nation-state, and a cultural sense of civilizational contradiction and decay. (...) And all four played a more specific role in weakening the capacity of elites to continue ruling in old ways.²⁹⁷

²⁹⁵Karaosmanoğlu, *Politikada 45 Yıl*, p. 111. “*Türkler nereye gitmiş ise bir medeniyet merkezi kurmuşlardır (...)*”

²⁹⁶Ahmed Emin Yalman, *Yakın Tarihte Gördüklerim Ve Geçirdiklerim* (İstanbul: Pera, 1997), p. 1078.

²⁹⁷Michael Mann, *Fascists* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 23.

When Mann's final analysis is taken into account, what is also striking about the context of the 1930s is that this was indeed a period of new "myths" not only in Turkey but also in Europe. Krüger perfectly explains the role of "myth" in the period under discussion:

The resort to myths was an important aid in the struggle for state and nation in Europe after World War I. A myth could justify the whole challenging enterprise, mobilize the adherents, and win the people for a specific way to that aim of founding a state and even of preparing the basis of a new nation.(...) Myths could back persistently the efforts made to justify a new state and government and to mobilize the people in favor of it.²⁹⁸

Within this context, the contribution of newspapers to the Kemalist "revolutions" in the 1930s was indeed twofold: on the one hand, they functioned as the extensions of the government for the reinforcement of the nationalist propaganda in their explicit content; on the other hand, they implicitly contributed to the discursive reproduction of the nationalist "myths" and thereby promoted the regime's motivation to forge new identities.

When compared to the totalitarian regimes of the period, the most important similarity was the target to construct a "new man," impose a new identity, create, and diffuse a new official culture, and mobilize the masses in line with the new regime. However in Turkey, the regime's control over the communicative space was different from that of the totalitarian regimes of the time, mostly because of the absence of a previously formed industrial mass society and mass culture. In addition, the available technological infrastructure for propaganda was limited in Turkey. Newspapers were the only available mass media tools, whereas in totalitarian states, cinema and radio systems were far more developed and widespread. Additionally, unlike in totalitarian regimes, although the content of the newspapers was not directly dictated by the government, the press was incorporated into propaganda through legal arrangements and restrictions on freedom of the press.

²⁹⁸Peter Krüger, "State and Nation in the Peace Settlements of 1919-1920 Myth and Crisis," in *Formation and Disintegration of European States in the 20th Century* eds. Franz Knipping Antoine Fleury, Dušan Kováč, and Tomasz Schramm (Bruxelles: Peter Lang, 2012).

Thus the data collected from the archival newspapers between the years 1934 and 1937 are truly the outputs of a period of total engagement between the Kemalist regime and the press, and indeed were shaped by the context of 1930s.

CHAPTER 4

NEWSPAPERS' KEMALIST ATTITUDE TOWARDS RACE, TURKIFICATION AND THE REPRESENTATION OF MINORITIES

The Origins of Kemalist Nationalism

In that case, then, the first motto was Republicanism. There was nothing to argue in that. What was our second motto? Gazi called attention to the beginning of our activities; he reminded the first programme of the national movement, the *Misak-ı Milli*, which had awakened under his leadership in Anatolia, against the collapsing Ottoman Empire. This programme was bringing forward the issue and claim of the national frontier. The new Turkey is the name of a homeland, within the national frontiers of which nearly a hundred percent of the inhabitants are Turks. National frontier, national homeland, Turkish homeland... In that case then, our second motto arises per se: Nationalism. (...) Republicanism, Nationalism, Statism, Populism and Laicism, all in all, they didn't occur on their own and in an evolutionary manner, they were the creations of the revolution.

Ahmet Hamdi Başar, *Atatürk'le Üç Ay*²⁹⁹

Following the dissolution of the Free Republican Party, the general discontent that began to grow had impelled Mustafa Kemal to take a trip throughout Anatolia in November 1930. During the three months trip, he concentrated on defining the principles of the new regime together with İsmet İnönü, Recep Peker, Şükrü Kaya, Ahmet Hamdi Başar, Reşit Galip, Memduh Şevket, Hasan Âli, and others. Those principles later became the six arrows of the Republican People's Party in the 1931 program, and laid the foundation of Turkey's official ideology. However, the adoption of these principles in the 1931 congress was not accompanied with in-depth deliberations, leaving their contents ambiguous.³⁰⁰

²⁹⁹ Ahmet Hamdi Başar, *Atatürk'le Üç Ay ve 1930'dan Sonra Türkiye* (Ankara: Ankara İktisadi ve Ticari İlimler Akademisi Yayınları, 1981), p. 43. "Şu halde ilk şiar: "Cumhuriyetçilik" ti. Bunda kimse için söyleyecek başka bir şey yoktu. İkinci şiarımız neydi? Gazi yaptığımız hareketlerin ilk şuurlaştığı zamanlara nazarlarımızı çevirdi; ve çökmekte olan Osmanlı İmparatorluğu karşısında Anadolu'da kendi başkanlığında şuurlaşan millî hareketin ilk programını, "Misakı Millî"yi hatırlattı. Bu program bir millî hudut içinde hemen yüzde yüz Türklerle meskûn olan bir vatan ismidir. Millî hudut, millî vatan, Türk vatanı... Şu halde ikinci şiarımız kendiliğinden ortaya çıkıyor: "Milliyetçilik." (...) Cumhuriyetçiliği, Milliyetçiliği, Devletçiliği, Halkçılığı ve Lâyıklığı kendiliğinden ve bir tekâmül yolu ile yapmadık; bunlar inkılâbın eseri oldu."

As understood from the above quotation from Ahmet Hamdi Bařar, nationalism was basically based on the idea of a nation state as a geographical entity, complemented with people of ethnically Turkish origins, and as a project that began not earlier than the national struggle. Indeed, Bařar's introduction of nationalism and of other principles as the creations of the revolution reflects the official attitude, which can be summarized with the claim that the Kemalist revolution symbolized a total break with its predecessors. As Zürcher states, such an image is still being reproduced in popular literature.³⁰¹ However, in recent, revisionist academic literature, it has been argued that the Kemalist project had its roots in the Young Turk ideology.³⁰² Furthermore, such an argument currently is embraced by a significant number of scholars.

In this chapter, and in the two consecutive chapters, newspapers' nationalist discourses and the representations of national identity and Kemalist nationalism in *Cumhuriyet*, *Akřam*, and *Son Posta* are interpreted in line with the literature on Kemalist nationalism. A discourse analysis is conducted by depending upon the corpora constructed on the basis of the arrangements of excerpts revealed from the sample newspaper articles. In addition, a classical content analysis is conducted on the basis of a sample of 832 newspaper articles.

The corpora of the discourse analysis are considered to be the reflector to trace the pattern of nationalist discourses in the mid-1930s. Unlike the classical content analysis, the interpretations of data are much more dependent on the subjective judgments of the researcher, so they are hardly replicable. However, it should be noted that the discursive analysis throughout this chapter and the next two consecutive chapters is not concerned with the worry of representativeness and the search for generalizations. It should be remarked that

³⁰⁰Gencay řaylan İlhan Tekeli, "Türkiye'de Halkçılık İdeolojisinin Evrimi," *Toplum ve Bilim* 6-7, no. Yaz-Güz (1978): p.80.

³⁰¹Erik Jan Zürcher, "Kemalist Düşüncenin Osmanlı Kaynakları," in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce Cilt 2 Kemalizm*, eds. Murat Gültekingil and Tanel Bora (İstanbul: İletişim, 2001), p. 44.

³⁰²*Turkey : A Modern History*, p. 189.

as it should normally be expected from any qualitative research, the research objective is to gain an insight on the underlying motivations behind discourses. Thereby the target outcome is to develop an initial understanding about the pattern in relation to the representation of national identity and reproduction of nationalism.

Under the light of these reminders, throughout this chapter newspapers' Kemalist attitude towards race, Turkification and ethnic and religious minorities is specifically scrutinized within the scope of the relevant academic literature.

Kemalist National Identity and Race: The Ottoman Intellectual Legacy

Certainly, Kemalists owed much to the Ottoman intellectuals of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.³⁰³ Baskın Oran states, the contribution of the Young Ottoman bureaucrats to the centralization and westernization of the Ottoman Empire and their struggle for constitutionalism had laid the basis for patriotism in Turkey, as the elementary component of nationalism.³⁰⁴ Besides, Hans Kohn points out that the early Turkism that had triggered the development of a purified national language and the development of a Turkish interpretation of Islam served as the nucleus of westernization in Turkey.³⁰⁵ The role of late nineteenth century Turkist movements in the awakening of national consciousness is previously discussed. Together with these, the Turkist wave, which was influenced by the Western thought and lead by the Young Turks, provided a theoretical accumulation for the successor regime.

³⁰³Paul Dumont, "The Origins of the Kemalist Ideology," in *Atatürk and the Modernization of Turkey*, ed. Jacob M. Landau (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984), p. 30.

³⁰⁴Baskın Oran, *Atatürk Milliyetçiliği* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayinevi, 1990), p. 41.

³⁰⁵Hans Kohn, *Türk Milliyetçiliği*(Ankara1944), p. 38., cited in Ahmet Yıldız, *Ne Mutlu Türkiüm Diyebilene Türk Ulusal Kimliğinin Etno-Seküler Sınırları* (Istanbul: İletişim, 2001), p. 103.

Especially Ziya Gökalp, Ahmet Ağaoğlu, Yusuf Akçura, Fuad Köprülü and Mehmed Emin were important figures in the development of the idea of national unity, with their writings in the magazine *Türk Yurdu*, between 1908 and 1912. Nevertheless, such a theoretical accumulation was not totally convenient to be adopted by Kemalists in many ways.

Dumont points out that although the theoreticians of the Young Turk period had recognized that “the idea of an Islamic community was in contradiction to that of a nation,” they still appreciated religion as a “simple cultural factor in the national identity mixture.”³⁰⁶ On the other hand, from the perspective of the Young Turk leaders, the “Turan” ideal based on the racial factor was crucial for the Turkish nationalism. According to Dumont, the Kemalists’ decision to eliminate race, was due to the “fiasco” of the Young Turk leaders’ attempt to put the theory of ‘Turan’ into practice when the World War I broke out.³⁰⁷ Dumont remarks that the implementation of the rejection of religion and race was open to scrutiny. In his words, “The Kemalists, eager to assert their profile as a secular movement, totally eliminated Islam from their domination of the concept of the nation; in practice, however, they continued to give a certain consideration to religion.”³⁰⁸ According to him, the same applies for race.³⁰⁹ All in all, to Dumont, what made Kemalists refrain from adopting the Young Turk nationalism was thus mainly these two factors, namely the rejection of religion and the rejection of race.

While elaborating the disparity between the Young Turk and Kemalist nationalisms, what Dumont calls the “race factor” is called by Ahmet Yıldız as “irredentism on the basis of ethnicity.” Yıldız discusses irredentism as the distinguishing characteristic of Pan-Turkism and

³⁰⁶Dumont, "The Origins of the Kemalist Ideology," p. 30.

³⁰⁷Ibid.

³⁰⁸Ibid.

³⁰⁹Ibid., p. 31.

defines it as “the ideological and/or organizational utterance of the emotional affinity of a specific ethnic group towards the prosperity and well-being of an akin minority living outside the frontiers of the country.”³¹⁰ Yıldız states that Kemalism rejected irredentism by excluding Pan-Turkism from the official ideology, thereby diminishing the emphasis on the outside Turks.

The abolition of the Turkish Hearths in 1931 (Türk Ocakları, 1912-1931) can be interpreted as Kemalists’ absolute break with Pan-Turkist or Turanist inclinations among Turkish nationalists. Füsün Üstel points out that the understanding of nationalism that Turkish Hearths was represented was the concern with “all Turks.”³¹¹ In her words, their cancellation signified the “beginning of the transformation of nationalism into an ideal that was limited only with Anatolia.”³¹²

Notwithstanding the Kemalists denial of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries Ottoman intellectual legacy on the basis of religion and race/irredentism factors, there is a considerable amount of arguments that Kemalist nationalism was indeed shaped by the ideas of Ziya Gökalp, who was the former ideologue of the Committee of the Union and Progress.

For example, Murat Belge cites Turkish nationalism as the building block of the republican ideology, designating Ziya Gökalp as “its father.”³¹³ Whereas, according to Zürcher, designating Gökalp as the father of Turkish nationalism “partly reflects the truth.” To Zürcher, although being literally laic, Gökalp overemphasized Islam as the fundamental

³¹⁰Yıldız, *Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyebilene Türk Ulusal Kimliğinin Etno-Seküler Sınırları*, pp. 107-08 “*Muayyen bir etnik grubun kendi devlet sınırları dışında yaşayan akraba bir azınlığın refahına ve mutluluğuna dönük olarak hissettiği duygusal yakınlığın ideolojik ve/veya örgütsel ifadesidir.*”

³¹¹See “Ek 12 Türk Ocağı Yasası,” in Füsün Üstel, *İmparatorluktan Ulus Devlete Türk Milliyetçiliği: Türk Ocakları (1912-1931)* (İstanbul: İletişim, 1997), p. 162.

³¹²Ibid., p. 359.

³¹³Murat Belge, “Mustafa Kemal Ve Kemalizm,” in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce Cilt 2 Kemalizm*, ed. Murat Gültekinil Tanıl Bora (İstanbul: İletişim, 2001), p. 33.

factor of Turkish national identity.³¹⁴ Nevertheless, Zürcher states that, starting from 1923, Kemalist nationalism was closer to Gökâlþ's "cultural nationalism" rather than to Akçura's "ethnic" nationalism.³¹⁵

The impact of Ziya Gökâlþ's thought in Kemalism has been most exhaustively studied by Taha Parla.³¹⁶ Parla states that Gökâlþ criticized and rejected racist, ethnicist, geographical, religious, and individualistic types of nationalisms all at the same time, by developing his own definition of nation on the basis of "common education, culture and sentiments in an environment where the fundamental unifying factor is language."³¹⁷ Furthermore, he writes that Gökâlþ appreciates nationalism as the highest ideal in a society and as the guarantor of social solidarity.³¹⁸ In addition, as opposed to Zürcher, Parla argues that Gökâlþ considered religion only as a moral-normative system, and in the process of the synthesis in his thought, the precedence of religion lowered gradually.³¹⁹ Within this framework, according to Parla, Kemalist nationalism was in fact congruent with Gökâlþ's Turkism.³²⁰

Baskın Oran also states that with few differences, Atatürk nationalism can indeed be evaluated as the practice of the concept of "nation" defined by Ziya Gökâlþ around the idea of solidarism, the affinity between Gökâlþ and the new regime was mostly due to the transformations in Gökâlþ's ideas. As Oran states, in his later writings, Gökâlþ himself had completely rejected the racist legacy of the Committee of Union and Progress and

³¹⁴Erik Jan Zürcher, "Kemalist Düşüncenin Osmanlı Kaynakları," *ibid.*, p. 49.

³¹⁵*Ibid.*, p. 50.

³¹⁶Taha Parla, *Ziya Gökâlþ, Kemalizm Ve Türkiye'de Korporatizm* (İstanbul: İletişim, 1999).

³¹⁷*Ibid.*, pp. 74-75.

³¹⁸*Ibid.*, p. 78.

³¹⁹*Ibid.*, p. 79 and p. 208.

³²⁰*Ibid.*, p. 212.

concentrated on the inner frontiers of Turkey.³²¹ Ayhan Aktar also lays stress on Gökâlp's ability to realize a synthesis in his thought in the process of the transition from an empire to a nation state.³²²

By affirming Parla's analysis, Ayhan Aktar argues that in Gökâlp nationalism religion was not a prerequisite to be a Turkish nationalist, but rather "culture" and "citizenship" were.³²³ The ideological break from Gökâlp nationalism was realized in the mid-1920s, when the ideologues of the RPP brought the requisite of "ethnicity" in order to be a member of the national community.³²⁴ Consequently, the Kemalists argued that all the ethnic groups inhabiting in Anatolia for centuries were included in the Turkish ethnic identity, thereby excluding the non-Muslim minorities.³²⁵ Thus, on the basis of Aktar's arguments, one can conclude that what made Kemalists differ from Gökâlp was mainly the factor of ethnicity in defining the Turkish national identity.

To sum up, the origins of the Kemalist nationalism can be found in the Ottoman intellectual legacy, and most importantly in Ziya Gökâlp's thought. However, as was summarized above, there are different views in the treatment of the connections between Kemalist nationalism and Gökâlp's nationalism. Furthermore, it is apparent that the Kemalists broke themselves away from Ottoman intellectuals due to the circumstances. The rejection of the idea of Turan and the Kemalist concern with the inner frontiers of the new nation state were indeed the most apparent breakaway from the previous generation. On the other hand, elaborating the origins of Kemalist nationalism makes it obvious that the role of religion, race and ethnicity in the making of Turkish national identity needs to be further elaborated in the

³²¹Oran, *Atatürk Milliyetçiliği*, p. 55.

³²²Ayhan Aktar, *Varlık Vergisi Ve 'Türkleştirme' Politikaları* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2002), p. 60.

³²³Ibid., p. 62.

³²⁴Ibid., p. 63.

³²⁵Ibid., p. 102.

following sections. Before doing that, nationalism during the War of Independence will be evaluated.

So far, we have discussed race with reference to Dumont, stating that Kemalist nationalism had dissociated itself from the Young Turk nationalism with its “rejection of race.” This was due to the effort of Kemalist nationalism to move away from the Turan ideal by concentrating on the domestic frontiers of Turkey. This effort is indeed the equivalent of the anti-irredentism of Kemalist nationalism. Köker confirms this by arguing that with respect to international relations, the Kemalist nationalism principle reflects an anti-irredentist attitude.³²⁶ Yıldız also states that the internal -national interests were above all other considerations. According to Yıldız, Kemalist nationalism maintained its relations with Turks abroad only on a “cultural plane.”³²⁷

Notwithstanding the rejection of race on the basis of anti-irredentism, the issue existed as an integral concept of the emphasis on ethnicity. Especially in the 1930s in parallel to the consolidation and institutionalization of the Kemalist regime, a history thesis and language theories were constructed on the basis of racial factors. According to Günay Göksu Özdoğan, the history thesis that was approved under the leadership of Kemal Atatürk and the executive elites of the RPP strengthened the appropriation of a racist interpretation of national identity.³²⁸

Although being consequential in terms of putting forward the race factor in the discourses of national identity, the history thesis aimed at answering the question that Büşra Ersanlı raises: “What would be the common past of the newly defined Turkish nation?”³²⁹ This question is crucial, especially when Köker’s remark that the “Kemalist aim to convert the

³²⁶Köker, *Modernleşme Kemalizm Ve Demokrasi*, p. 150.

³²⁷Yıldız, *Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyebilene Türk Ulusal Kimliğinin Etno-Seküler Sınırları*, p. 109.

³²⁸Günay Göksu Özdoğan, *"Turan"Dan "Bozkurt"a Tek Parti Döneminde Türkçülük (1931-1946)* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2001), p. 35.

³²⁹Büşra Ersanlı Behar, *İktidar Ve Tarih* (İstanbul: Afa, 1992), p. 198.

public comprehension of the concept of nation, with the motive to purge the notion of its religious references” is considered.³³⁰ This point of view is mostly agreed on in the literature upon the single-party nationalism.

The Representation of Race in the Newspapers

Study reveals that the emphasis on race was rare in the language of the newspapers of the period under scrutiny. As Table 9 shows, in only 3.6 percent of the studied articles was “Turkish race” used as a phrase to identify the national community on the basis of racial connection. It is thereby possible to conclude that in the newspapers, to favor race as a propitious aspect of the national identity it is not a common attitude at all.

Table 9. Usage of the Phrase Turkish Race According to Newspapers, in percentages³³¹

			<i>Cumhuriyet</i>	<i>Akşam</i>	<i>Son Posta</i>	<i>Total</i>
Use of the Phrase “Turkish Race”	Yes	Count	16	6	8	30
		within Name of the Newspaper	4.0	4.4	2.7	3.6
	No	Count	389	129	284	802
		within Name of the Newspaper	96.0	95.6	97.3	96.4
	Total	Count	405	135	292	832
		within Name of the Newspaper	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

The signifier “race” is sometimes used in a limited manner to refer to the endurance of the nation: “Our race comes from a body of many thousand years. It is we who have knocked many centuries down. It is we who have trusted many unknown heads into holes.”

(*Cumhuriyet*, 7 December 1934, see Appendix 1); “Our race and language. This noble race

³³⁰Köker, *Modernleşme Kemalizm Ve Demokrasi*, pp. 150-51.

³³¹ The value of chi square obtained is 1.042, the degrees of freedom are 2, and the exact significance of the chi square is .594. This is well above the standard indicator of a significant result (alpha=.05).

was born in Altai and the steppes. It killed many and strangled many enemies. They told this fairy-tale to the tribes a thousand times. Its fame has become universal in the world.”

(*Cumhuriyet*, 8 December 1934, see Appendix 2)

In line with the Kemalist understanding of race that discussed above, the uses of “race” in the newspapers do not appear in the service of a systematic exclusion of some other people, but in the service of the construction of a national consciousness that was expected to be exempt from the Ottoman past: “Today’s conscious Turks discovered that their existence is connected with the origins of their races while they were searching for the depths of their historical existence. (*Cumhuriyet*, 31 December 1934, see Appendix 3); “Horsemanship is referred as one of the good qualifications of this race in the history of the Turkish race.” (*Son Posta*, 28 July 1936, see Appendix 4); “Athens was destroyed after the race of Alexander. The people from Rome disappeared with the destruction of Rome. However, the destruction of the ancient Turkish nations was different. The racial and cultural unity of the Turks was not affected by their destruction.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 27 January 1935, see Appendix 5)

As the next excerpt exemplifies, “race” rather initiated the inclusion of all those who were assumed to be the Turkish race: “All people coming from the same race, we will try to advance our country within the limits that we had determined, by giving hand to hand and being committed to our entity.” (*Son Posta*, 8 March 1935, see Appendix 6)

Nevertheless, the usage of the signifier “race” rarely refers to exclusion as in the following statement:

“Thank God, there is not any Turkish woman who would like to marry or who marries to a man from a different race. However, from time to time I hear about some Turkish guys who want to marry or who marry a woman from a foreign race.” (*Son Posta*, 31 December 1935, see Appendix 7)

Obviously having been inspired by the studies on the biologic racism of the period, some mentions of race appear to refer to the biological purification of the Turkish race, as

indicated in following excerpts: “The issue of sterilizing is brought forward again. Philosophy Professor Mustafa Şekip said: “Purification of the race is the essence. My intension is to prevent the reproduction of the abnormals” (*Son Posta*, 8 January 1937, see Appendix 8); “There are many disadvantages in having only one child. What should we do in order to make our race more beautiful?” (*Akşam*, 8 February 1937, see Appendix 9)

Tanıl Bora states that although biologic racism was not determinative on Turkish nationalism, Kemalist nationalism still appears to have been essentialist on the basis of cultural racism.³³² According to him, this is revealed in discourses that ascribe superiority to the Turkish nation. The following excerpts illustrate such discourses: “The first step and the first speed in every period! This is Turkishness!” (*Cumhuriyet*, 27 January 1935, see Appendix 10); “Turkish history possesses everything abundantly that seems good and beautiful to the human soul. The Turks are the best works of nature. Moreover, they feel responsible for representing and perpetuating goodness and beauty in history.” (*Son Posta*, 12 February 1935, see Appendix 11)

Similarly, some articles which reproduced knowledge on the superiority of Turks compared the Turkish nation to other nations: “I am convinced that Turkish people are as talented as and even more talented than westerners in music” (*Cumhuriyet*, 3 December 1934, see Appendix 12);

“No other nation in the world can make wonders with their arm strength as the Turkish people (...) Otherwise it would not have been possible for a nation to bring civilization to the whole world and to be the master of the whole world. It is obvious from scientific realities today that Turkish history is so vast that it cannot be compared to the histories of other nations.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 13 December 1936, see Appendix 13)

For instance, Suavi Aydın emphasized that for Kemalist nationalism, the concept of race was nothing but a misleading attempt. According to him, the aim behind the history thesis and language theory was to make people from diverse origins believe that they originally had been

³³²Bora, "İnşa Döneminde Türk Millî Kimliği," p. 179.

Turkish who, in time, had forgotten their Turkishness.³³³ In addition, Aydın said that race was a tool used to prove the Turkishness of each and every ancient populace of Anatolia. The racist paradigm did indeed arise in a specific period of Kemalist ideology, whereas it was far from being a leitmotif.³³⁴

While discussing “race” with respect to Kemalist nationalism, a problem appears to have been the meaning to what the concept corresponded. It was used to refer *ırk* (race) or *soy* (breed) or *nesep* (kin) or *nesil* (generation) or *millet* (nation) or *ethnisite* (ethnie) or *kavim* (tribe), depending on the context. Nevertheless, it is hard to discuss of Kemalist understanding of race as a tool for the systematic exclusion of some people; it was rather the opposite. This situation may become easier to understand if we remember Köker’s emphasis on the motive to purge the notion of nation of its religious references.

The Kemalist National Identity and Religion

Nationalism and Religion during the War of Independence

To gain insight into Mustafa Kemal’s understanding of nationalism, Taha Parla’s chronological discourse analysis of Atatürk’s speeches between the years 1920 and 1937 is crucial.³³⁵ Parla states that in 1920, the political dimension of Atatürk nationalism was limited to the protection of Anatolia and Rumelia, distant and respectful towards religion, respectful

³³³Suavi Aydın, "Nazan Maksudyan'ın Kitabı "Türklüğü Ölçmek" Üzerine," *Tarih ve Toplum* 242, no. 2 (2005): p. 157.

³³⁴*Ibid.*, p. 158.

³³⁵Taha Parla, *Kemalist Tek-Parti İdeolojisi Ve Chp'nin Altı Ok'u*, ed. Taha Parla, vol. Cilt 3, Türkiye'de Siyasal Kültürün Resmî Kaynakları (İstanbul: İletişim, 1995).

towards its neighbors' rights and independence, anti-imperialist in character; and it was clearly neither Pan-Islamist nor Pan-Turkist, not irredentist or aggressive.³³⁶

In 1922, the determinative factor for a nation is observed by Parla to have been the unity of identity and ideal; in 1924 a defensive nationalism emerged based on Turkey as the homeland; followed by in 1926 cultural nationalism.³³⁷ The first reference to the achievements of the "old Turkish civilization" is noticed in 1931, and in the same year, "Turks" are appreciated as a "big and noble nation."³³⁸ In addition, the "praising of Turk" on the basis of ethnic unity is discerned in 1937.³³⁹

Stemming from Parla's analysis, one can argue that Mustafa Kemal's perceptions of nation and nationalism varied according to the circumstances in which the Kemalist movement was shaped. What is striking is that, the emphasis on Turkish ethnicity or race is not apparent up until 1931. As Toprak writes, this was due to the fact that 1931 was a turning point in Turkish nationalism. By 1931, the regime had given start to institutionalizing efforts to make the people/nation internalize the Republican ideals against various opponent elements.³⁴⁰ Therefore, nationalist discourses during the war of independence were different from the discourses of the 1930s.

During the War of Independence, although being Muslim in majority, the inhabitants of Anatolia who supported the war were composed of different ethnic groups. As it is

³³⁶Ibid., pp. 182-83.

³³⁷Ibid., pp. 183-84.

³³⁸Ibid., p. 184 and p. 87.

³³⁹Ibid., p. 184.

³⁴⁰ Zafer Toprak, 1997 pp. 16-18 cited in Tanıl Bora and Nergis Canefe, "Türkiye'de Popülist Milliyetçilik," in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce Cilt 4 Milliyetçilik*, ed. Murat Gültekinil and Tanıl Bora (İstanbul: İletişim, 2002).

commonly argued, even the *Misak-ı Milli* mentioned ‘Ottoman-Muslim majority’ rather than “Turks.”³⁴¹

Such a fact had compelled Mustafa Kemal to compromise with several ethnic groups, including especially the Circassians and Kurds, on the one hand, and conservative-Islamic groups, on the other.³⁴² The outcome was successful in terms of uniting the Anatolian Muslims for the National Struggle on the basis of “common religion, shared history, and joint territory.”³⁴³ Accordingly, the ideas of national sovereignty, national homeland, and populism rather than Turkism were determinative in the substance of nationalism during the war years.

The nationalism of the war years, then, implied neither ethnic nor racial references. Nor did it imply the defense and salvation of the “mother land” by relying on whoever felt a member, and being Muslim in character, against the “Christian” enemy. As Eren Deniz Göktürk discusses, it is neither possible to argue that in the minds of those who supported the movement the target to establish a nation state was present; their target was indeed “the protection of the empire.”³⁴⁴ Therefore, the nationalism of the war years and the nationalism of the nation-state building process were not the same. This point actually explains the shifts in the discourses of Mustafa Kemal, which were discussed above with reference to Parla.

Accordingly, as Zürcher points out, the dominant discourse of the national struggle that pretentiously talked about “Turkish-Muslim” and “Ottoman-Muslim” rights, and “Turkish-Kurdish solidarity” was abandoned overnight.³⁴⁵ Ahmet Yıldız also states that the

³⁴¹Oran, *Atatürk Milliyetçiliği*, p. 122., Yıldız, *Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyebilene Türk Ulusal Kimliğinin Etno-Seküler Sınırları*, p. 98., Soner Çağaptay, *Islam, Secularism, and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who Is a Turk?* (London, New York: Routledge, 2006), p. 11., Ergun Özbudun, "Millî Mücadele Ve Cumhuriyetin Resmi Belgelerinde Yurttaşlık Ve Kimlik Sorunu," in *Cumhuriyet, Demokrasi Ve Kimlik*, ed. Nuri Bilgin (İstanbul: Bağlam, 1997), pp. 63-70.

³⁴²Oran, *Atatürk Milliyetçiliği*, pp.122-25.

³⁴³Çağaptay, *Islam, Secularism, and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who Is a Turk?*, p.11.

³⁴⁴Eren Deniz (Tol) Göktürk, "1919-1923 Dönemi Türk Milliyetçilikleri," in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce Cilt 4 Milliyetçilik*, ed. Murat Gültekinil Tamlı Bora (İstanbul: İletişim, 2002), p. 113.

³⁴⁵Zürcher, "Kemalist Düşüncenin Osmanlı Kaynakları," p. 49.

end of the National Struggle terminated the necessity for the ethnic-Muslim coalition and led to a need for a unified Turkish identity.³⁴⁶ This meant the beginning of Turkification process. Yıldız argues that the Kemalist revolution signified the effort of westernization through Turkification.³⁴⁷ The concept of Turkification is indeed crucial to grasp Kemalist nationalism in practice, within the effort to build up a new nation state.

The Kemalist Project, Religion and National Identity

The Kemalist attitude towards religion was paradoxical. As a means of structural transformation from an empire to a nation state, Kemalists tried to remove the dominance of religion, i.e. Islam, from the organization of civic, public and social life. However, in defining Turk, they favored and gave a preferential treatment to Muslim identity. In this section, then, this paradoxical relationship will be elaborated mainly around these two issues. In the first part of this section, the Kemalist rejection of Islam will be examined within the context of modernization and secularization objectives. In the second part, the Kemalist manner of conduct towards religious identities within the context of citizenship will be considered.

Modernization, Secularization, and Islam

The literature on Kemalism, including both the works that reproduce the official perspective and those that criticize it, agree on the fact that Kemalist nation building was a project inspired by the Western enlightenment tradition and was bound to its secularist attribute. As Feroz Ahmad states,

³⁴⁶Yıldız, *Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyebilene Türk Ulusal Kimliğinin Etno-Seküler Sınırları*, p. 102.

³⁴⁷*Ibid.*, p. 104.

Kemalists wanted to see Turkey transformed into a modern nation state which, in the words of Mustafa Kemal, would ‘live as an advanced and civilized nation in the midst of contemporary civilization’. Such a nation would have to be secular and rational, emphasizing science and modern education in order to create a modern industrial economy.³⁴⁸

Here, it is also necessary to quote Karpas, who says “The paramount goal was the creation of a national state, and the chief obstacle to it was Islam. To promote Islam and nationalism at the same time was to defeat its purpose.”³⁴⁹

Accordingly, despite the fact that the Muslim identity was favored in defining citizenship, the Kemalists did aim at removing Islamic references from individuals’ identity constructions in the process of transition from being a “subject of the Sultan” to being “a citizen of a nation state provided with rights and duties.” As it is mostly argued, for the Kemalist ideology, the nation and the state were identical notions. According to Köker, “This reflects the legitimization of people’s sovereignty as the *raison d’état* as opposed to the Ottoman dynastic willpower, on the basis of a Rousseauist understanding of social contract.”³⁵⁰

Consequently, Kemalists saw Islam as the symbol of the old regime and as the primary factor that had to be erased from the social and political life. Within this framework, the following quotation from Baskın Oran is important:

When Turkey was founded, its internal dynamic was far from being convenient to produce progress. In this country, the Kemalist intellectuals, equipped with western style education, realized the transition from *ümmet* to *millet* through a “revolution from above” by using the compelling power of the nation state, i.e. by changing the jurisprudence. Naturally, as in all other revolutions from above, this first modernization wave encountered an opposition from below: *Irtica* (Islamic reaction)³⁵¹

³⁴⁸Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey*, p. 53.

³⁴⁹Karpas, *Turkey's Politics the Transition to a Multi Party System*, p. 59.

³⁵⁰Köker, *Modernleşme Kemalizm Ve Demokrasi*, p. 155.

³⁵¹Baskın Oran, *Türkiye’de Azınlıklar* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2004), pp. 146-47. “Türkiye kurulduğunda, iç dinamiği ilerleme üretmeye hiç uygun olmayan bir ülkedir. Bu ülkede, Batı eğitimi görmüş Kemalist aydınlar (...) “yukarıdan devrim” le yani ulus devletin zorlayıcı gücünü kullanarak hukuku değiştirmek yoluyla zaman içinde Türkiye’de *ümmet’ten millet’e geçişi gerçekleştirmişlerdir.*”

So, the narration of the Kemalist nation-building process has come to be told upon the binary opposition between “Islam” and “the new secular Turkey.” In such a narration, Islam represents the “other,” i.e. the Ottoman past, the old regime, the ruining factor and the enemy of the new regime. The new secular Turkey represents progress, the luminous future, and the cure for all social, economic and political illnesses.

In accordance with this, Ahmet Yıldız writes that the Kemalist Turkish history thesis should be considered as having been a tool to develop a new national identity against the Islamic past. In the words of Yıldız, “Kemalist nationalism secularized the past in order to create a secular present.”³⁵² Thus the rejection of the Ottoman past brought along the rejection of Islam and vice versa. Similarly, according to Bora, with respect to Turkish nationalism, Islam was seen as having the potential to materialize the Ottoman past. “Islam was deemed to be outside of both the universality of the Western civilization and the originality of Turkish identity.”³⁵³

On the other hand, it should be noted that the discrepancy between the new, secular Turkey and the old Ottoman Empire also influenced on the Kemalist attitude towards the West and the outside world. For example, Tanıl Bora states that the Kemalist intellectuals had a love-hate relationship with the West, and this was due to the Ottoman past that was the simulacrum of the “other” in Turkish nationalism.³⁵⁴ In accordance with this, Kemal Karpat writes that:

Nationalism, moreover, became an outlet for expressing all the bitterness and pain caused by the downfall of an Empire (...) The generation which had witnessed in impotent despair the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire (...) expressed in nationalism its deep resentment and distrust of the outside world.³⁵⁵

³⁵²Yıldız, *Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyebilene Türk Ulusal Kimliğinin Etno-Seküler Sınırları*, p. 119.

³⁵³Bora, "İnşa Döneminde Türk Millî Kimliği," p. 184.

³⁵⁴Ibid., p. 183.

³⁵⁵Karpat, *Turkey's Politics the Transition to a Multi Party System*, p. 253.

This was indeed influential in terms of creating a paradoxical relationship between Turkey and the West. On the one hand, secularization and modernization targets were pursued in line with the Westernization project, but on the other hand Western countries signified a potential peril.³⁵⁶

To sum up, it should be noted that as Çağaptay writes, in the early Republican period, Islam's pivotal role in the formation of Turkish national identity clashed with Kemalism's understanding of the Turkish nation.³⁵⁷ On the one hand, this was due to the identification of Islam with the Ottoman regime. Thereby, the new regime pursued secularization in all aspects of society and state formation, in convenience with the modernization paradigm. On the other hand, the reactionary opposition against the Republican project was perceived as embodied in Islam. Thus Islam not only represented the old regime/the Ottoman past as the "other," but also representing the political trouble of the time. Nevertheless, as will be discussed below, the exclusion of the Islamic factor could not be thoroughly accomplished considering the Kemalist definition of national identity.

Religious Identities and Citizenship

"The Absolute Confession: "Turkish nation"= Muslim Turks." This was the title of Baskın Oran's article in *Radikal İki* on 16 November, 2008.³⁵⁸ Oran's article was a response to a speech by the Minister of National Defense, Vecdi Gönül, in which he said: "Think about it. If the Anatolian Greeks had continued in the Aegean or if Armenians had continued in many locations in Turkey, would it be possible for us to be a national state as we are

³⁵⁶ For further analysis of this paradox, see Taner Akçam, *Türk Ulusal Kimliği Ve Ermeni Sorunu* (İstanbul: İletişim, 1995), p. 86.; Tanıl Bora, *Milliyetçiliğin Kara Baharı* (İstanbul: Birikim, 1995), p. 245.

³⁵⁷ Çağaptay, *Islam, Secularism, and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who Is a Turk?*, p. 39.

³⁵⁸ Baskın Oran, "Kesin İtiraf: 'Türk Milleti' = Müslüman Türkler," *Radikal İki*, 16 November 2008.

today?”³⁵⁹ A discourse analysis of the title of Oran’s article reflects the fact that the Turkish nation has long been de facto conceived as composed of ethnically Turkish Muslim people, whereas until then, this fact had never been officially or de jure declared.

Confirming Oran’s argument and Vecdi Gönül’s confession, Karpas states that “During the Republic’s first two and a half decades, despite secularism, difference of religion was used to promote nationalistic goals.”³⁶⁰ This situation constitutes one of the main arguments in Ahmet Yıldız’s work, where he states “In Kemalist practice of nation building, the use of religion as a tool to reinforce nationalistic goals has never gained a de jure character; it has always appeared to be a derivation of practical considerations.”³⁶¹

In the official Kemalist literature, it has been argued that religion is excluded from the definition of the national identity, in parallel to the principle of laicism. This argument was strengthened further through the analysis of the sources that are commonly appreciated as the theoretical basis of the Kemalist nationalism. For example, in Afet İnan’s *Vatandaş İçin Medeni Bilgiler (Civil Information for the Citizen)*, it is not possible to observe any discourse favoring a Muslim identity as a requisite to being a Turkish citizen.³⁶²

However, in the last decades, many studies have been conducted on the basis of other sources, like the 1924 Constitution, civil-service law, citizenship law, law of settlement, immigration policies and so on, in order to trace the relation between Kemalist nationalism and religious identities other than Muslim. For example, after saying that according to many

³⁵⁹ The Turkish version of the quotation is “...Düşünün Ege’de Rumlar devam etseydi veya Türkiye’nin pek çok yerinde Ermeniler devam etseydi, bugün acaba böyle bir milli devlet olabilir miydik?”; cited in *ibid*.

³⁶⁰ Karpas, *Turkey's Politics the Transition to a Multi Party System*, p. 62.

³⁶¹ Yıldız, *Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyebilene Türk Ulusal Kimliğinin Etno-Seküler Sınırları*, p. 135.

³⁶² Afet İnan, *Medeni Bilgiler Ve Atatürk’ün El Yazmaları* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1969), pp. 20-21; cited in Levent Köker, “Kimlik Krizinden Meşruluk Krizine: Kemalizm Ve Sonrası,” *Toplum ve Bilim* 71, no. Kış (1996): p. 159; and in Özbudun, “Millî Mücadele Ve Cumhuriyetin Resmi Belgelerinde Yurttaşlık Ve Kimlik Sorunu,” pp. 67-69.

commentators excluding the religion factor from the definition of Turkish national identity is the indicator of the relentless modernization project, Köker argues that a closer look at the Kemalist ideology and practice helps to observe that religion is not so decisively excluded from the definition of national cultural identity.³⁶³

Within this context, for example, Ergun Özbudun takes into consideration the deliberations in the national assembly, regarding Article 88, which defined the requisites for Turkish citizenship in the 1924 constitution. During the deliberations, the situation of the ethnically non-Turkish Muslim groups was never discussed as opposed to the intense discussions about the situation of the non-Muslim groups.³⁶⁴ As a consequence of these deliberations, the first version of the article that was “Irrespective of religion and race, the inhabitants of Turkey are considered Turk”³⁶⁵ was changed to “Irrespective of religion and race, the inhabitants of Turkey are considered Turk, through the bond of citizenship.”³⁶⁶ To Özbudun, although granting non-Muslims with equal citizenship rights, the addition of “vatandaşlık itibariyle” to the article confirmed that they were not accepted as Turkish in the sociological sense.³⁶⁷

Mesut Yeğen interprets this addition in the same way as Özbudun. Moreover, according to Yeğen, this example opens way to refute the claims that there is an incongruity between Turkish citizenship in theory and Turkish citizenship in practice. Yeğen thinks that citizenship practices that excluded ethnically non-Turkish and non-Muslim people are by no

³⁶³Köker, "Kimlik Krizinden Meşruluk Krizine: Kemalizm Ve Sonrası," p. 159.

³⁶⁴Özbudun, "Millî Mücadele Ve Cumhuriyetin Resmi Belgelerinde Yurttaşlık Ve Kimlik Sorunu," pp. 66-67.

³⁶⁵ The Turkish version of the expression is as follows: “*Türkiye ahalisine din ve ırk farkı olmaksızın Türk ıtlak olunur.*”

³⁶⁶ The Turkish version of the article is as follows: “*Türkiye ahalisine din ve ırk farkı olmaksızın vatandaşlık itibariyle Türk ıtlak olunur.*”

³⁶⁷Özbudun, "Millî Mücadele Ve Cumhuriyetin Resmi Belgelerinde Yurttaşlık Ve Kimlik Sorunu," p. 67. Also see Soner Çağaptay, "Kim Türk, Kim Vatandaş? Erken Cumhuriyet Dönemi Vatandaşlık Rejimi Üzerine Bir Çalışma," *Toplum ve Bilim* 98, no. Güz (2003): pp. 5-6.

means to be evaluated as deviations from the official texts establishing the framework of Turkish citizenship.³⁶⁸ Furthermore, Yeğen argues that “Turkishness” and “Turkish citizenship” are not identical concepts, and some practices show that “Turkish citizenship” is something “less” than “Turkishness” in respect to the state.

As discussed above, besides the definition of Turkish citizenship in the constitution, civil-service law also provides the possibility to observe the exclusion of non-Muslim citizens from “Turkishness.” Within the framework of Turkification practices, Ayhan Aktar draws attention to the requisite for being appointed as a state officer that was précised in the law³⁶⁹ as being “Turk” rather than being a “Turkish citizen.” According to Aktar, this was a typical example of the discriminatory laws applied against non-Muslims.³⁷⁰

A comprehensive and detailed analysis of similar laws was conducted by Çağaptay. On the basis of his analysis on the legal arrangements about Ankara’s denaturalization and naturalization policies in the early republican period, He argues that the preferential treatment that was given to “Turks “gradually increased in the 1930s under the influence of the rising nationalist wave.³⁷¹ In his overall assessment, Çağaptay states that the dominant feature that could be observed in the application of the laws was “defining nationality by means of religion.”³⁷² In a separate article of his, another conclusion that Çağaptay reaches through the analysis of Kemalist immigration and resettlement policies is as follows:

It appears that High Kemalism had three definitions of the Turkish nation. The first of these was territorial. (...)The second definition, less inclusive than the first, was

³⁶⁸Mesut Yeğen, "Yurttaşlık Ve Türklük," *Toplum ve Bilim*, no.93, Yaz (2002), pp. 200-17.

³⁶⁹Memurin Kanunu, no. 788, dated March 18, 1926 which was in force until 1965; cited in Aktar, *Varlık Vergisi Ve 'Türkleştirme' Politikaları*, p. 119.

³⁷⁰*Ibid.*, p. 121.

³⁷¹Çağaptay, "Kim Türk, Kim Vatandaş? Erken Cumhuriyet Dönemi Vatandaşlık Rejimi Üzerine Bir Çalışma," p. 169. For the English version of the article, see "Citizenship Policies in Interwar Turkey," *Nations and Nationalism* 9, no. 4 (2003).

³⁷²"Kim Türk, Kim Vatandaş? Erken Cumhuriyet Dönemi Vatandaşlık Rejimi Üzerine Bir Çalışma."

religious. Due to the legacy of the *Millet* system, the Kemalists saw all Muslims in Turkey as Turks (...) The third and the least inclusive definition was ethno-religious. First, the high Kemalist praxis saw *only* those who were *ethnically Turkish* as Turks. Second, it used religion to classify non-Turks into two hierarchical categories as Muslims and non-Muslims.³⁷³

On the basis of immigration policies, similar statements have been made by Ahmet Yıldız. With reference to Bernard Lewis, Yıldız writes that the populations exchange between Turkey and Greece that was arranged after the Treaty of Lausanne did not refer to the exchange of Turks and Greeks, but rather to the exchange of Greek Orthodox Christians and Ottoman Muslims.³⁷⁴ Thereby, according to Yıldız, “Nationalism as a cultural system had to ask for help from the references of the religious-dynastic system, which it aimed to replace.”³⁷⁵ As a consequence, Yıldız discusses that “there has never been a through and through match between Turkish citizenship and Turkish national identity.”³⁷⁶

Thus, current discussions on the role of religion within the context of citizenship may be summarized mainly on three points. First, recent debates in the literature on Turkish national identity seem to have reached an understanding that despite the laicism principle of Kemalism, and as opposed to the Kemalist theoretical works that ignores religious factor in defining “nation,” in practice, the Muslim identity was favored while describing who was a Turk. The second point is that Kemalism never officially ignored the Muslim identity and that thereby there is no incongruity between theory and practice, since legal arrangements should be considered as sources for understanding Kemalism in theory. The third point may be

³⁷³“Reconfiguring the Turkish Nation in the 1930s,” *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 8, no. 2 (2002): pp. 75-76.

³⁷⁴Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* p. 348-49.; cited in Yıldız, *Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyebilene Türk Ulusal Kimliğinin Etno-Seküler Sınırları*, p. 135.

³⁷⁵*Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyebilene Türk Ulusal Kimliğinin Etno-Seküler Sınırları*, p. 135. “Kültürel bir sistem olarak ulusçuluk bu bağlamda yerini almayı hedeflediği dinî-hanedanî sistemin referanslarından yardım istemek zorunda kalmıştı.” “

³⁷⁶*Ibid.*, p. 140. “Türk vatandaşlığı ile Türk ulusal kimliği arasında hiçbir zaman birebir örtüşme söz konusu olmamıştır.”

summarized with the idea that Muslim Turks were favored and treated as “genuine” or “real” citizens while non-Muslims were treated as “constitutional” citizens by the official nationalism.

Official Nationalism and Turkification

The new Republic faced a complex issue of how to deal with the ethnic identities inherited from the Ottoman Empire. The list below shows the texture of Turkey’s population in the early Republican era may be helpful in conveying the complexity of the issue. In Turkey of 1920s, the population was composed of: ethnically Turkish and Muslim inhabitants; ethnically Turkish and Muslim immigrants; ethnically Turkish, Muslim but non-Sunni inhabitants (e.g. Alewites); ethnically non-Turkish but Muslim inhabitants (e.g. Kurds, Arabs, Lazes, Georgians, Circassians); ethnically non-Turkish, but Muslim immigrants (e.g. Albanians, Macedonians, Pomaks, Serb Muslims, Bosnians, Tatars); and ethnically non-Turkish and non-Muslim inhabitants (e.g. Jews, Greeks, and Armenians).

For Anatolia and Thrace, the 1920s were a decade of demographic change, in favor of the Muslim/Turkish majority. Keyder states that before World War I, 20 percent of the population living inside Turkey’s current borders had been non-Muslims, whereas this percentage decreased to 2.5 percent after the war.³⁷⁷ Thus, as Çağaptay states, the Ankara government had to build up a nation state by consolidating “as many of the country’s minorities as possible into the Turkish nation.”³⁷⁸ In the words of Çağaptay, “while the Kemalists increasingly saw the nation as an organic culture, defined through language and culture, this

³⁷⁷ Çağlar Keyder, *Türkiye’de Devlet Ve Sınıflar* (İstanbul: İletişim, 1989), p. 103.

³⁷⁸ Soner Çağaptay, "Race, Assimilation and Kemalism: Turkish Nationalism and the Minorities in the 1930s " *Middle Eastern Studies* 40, no. 3 (2004): p. 87.

meant, “the only way Kemalism could deal with those who were non-Turkish was through denial and assimilation.” That led to conflicts between Ankara and the minorities.”³⁷⁹

It is apparent that Çağaptay agrees with Aktar in studying the Turkification policies. Aktar’s fundamental argument is that according to the Kemalist understanding of nationalism, the scope of “us” was broadened by the effort to include the Muslim ethnic groups of Anatolia within the Turkish ethnic identity, while excluding non-Muslim minorities as “others.”³⁸⁰ Thereby, Aktar argues that Kemalist nationalism declared everyone “Turk,” but due to structural reasons it was not possible for non-Muslims to be Turkified, leading to a de facto classification of them as “minority” or “foreigner.”³⁸¹

On the other hand, Ahmet Yıldız argues that the exclusion of non-Muslims from the scope of “us” was also related to the memories of the national struggle. He claims that the national struggle had been organized mainly against the Armenians and Anatolian Greeks, since they had sought to make Anatolia the homeland for their own nationalisms.³⁸²

The issue with non-Muslim elements was not the only complication that the Kemalists faced in their efforts to create a homogenous national identity. It is possible to argue that besides the Muslim/non-Muslim duality, the differences between inhabitant/immigrant elements may be also considered. It would be not wrong to say that in the process of Turkification, ethnically non-Turkish Muslim immigrants, a group which was mostly composed of Albanians, Macedonians, Pomaks, Serb Muslims, Bosnians and Tatars were mild-tempered in terms of internalizing the Turkish national identity. For example, the Turkish or non-Turkish elements who had faced extermination in the newly independent

³⁷⁹ *Islam, Secularism, and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who Is a Turk?*, p. 39.

³⁸⁰ Aktar, *Varlık Vergisi Ve 'Türkleştirme' Politikaları*, p. 102.

³⁸¹ *Ibid.*

³⁸² Yıldız, *Ne Mutlu Türküm Diyebilene Türk Ulusal Kimliğinin Etno-Seküler Sınırları*, p.113.

Balkan states and the immigrants from the Black Sea basin had been forced to flee to Anatolia.³⁸³ They were willing to align themselves with their new country. However, the difficult elements were the ethnically non-Turkish autochthonous Muslim or non-Muslim inhabitants of Anatolia.

These groups claimed to pursue their own identities in their own homeland. As Çağaptay remarks, “the Kemalists expected that autochthonous Muslims would assimilate fast, too. (...) Yet the local Muslims did not have incentives similar to those of the immigrant Muslims to merge into the Turkish nation.”³⁸⁴ The Kemalist solution to the problem of autochthonous identities was thus two-fold: Non-Muslim and ethnically non-Turkish inhabitants were classified as “others,” and ethnically non-Turkish Muslim inhabitants’ ethnicities were simply “denied” and they were accepted as “Turkish”.

Within this framework, the Turkification policies were shaped separately for these two separate elements. Since non-Muslims were classified as “others” or “strangers,” they were excluded from the establishment via several mechanisms. The Turkification of the personnel in government offices, the Turkification of commercial and economic activities, the Turkification of capital accumulation, the Turkification of the ownership of real estate properties and some residential areas mainly targeted the exclusion of the non-Muslim elements as “others.”³⁸⁵ Besides such institutional policies of Turkification in economic and social spheres, efforts for the Turkification of non-Muslim ‘people’ were also present, especially around language issue. The “Citizen, Speak Turkish! (Vatandaş, Türkçe Konuş!)” campaign was significant within this framework.³⁸⁶ According to Çağaptay, The “Speak

383 Çağaptay, "Reconfiguring the Turkish Nation in the 1930s," p. 68.

384 Ibid., p. 69.

385 For a comprehensive study on Turkification in those areas see Aktar, *Varlık Vergisi Ve 'Türkleştirme' Politikaları*.

386 See ibid., p. 130.; M. Berk Balçık, "Milliyetçilik Ve Dil Politikaları," in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce Cilt 4 Milliyetçilik*, ed. Murat Gültekingil Tanıl Bora (2002), p. 782.; Rıfat N. Bali, *Cumhuriyet Yıllarında*

Turkish” campaign was an example to reaffirm the “ethnicity-through-language” attribute of Kemalist nationalism that “emerged as one of the primary bearers of Turkishness in the 1930s.”³⁸⁷

On the other hand, as was discussed above, the Turkification of ethnically non-Turkish Muslim identities was performed through denial. Besides nationalism, Kemalist populism was also influential on this aspect of the population. In the words of Bruinessen,

Populism became the ideological justification for a policy of nation building that denied the existence of a separate Kurdish (or Laz, Circassian) culture, and made the Kurds into Turks by decree. Historians were ordered to produce ‘scientific proof’ of the identity of the two nations.³⁸⁸

Besides Bruinessen, Mesut Yeğen grounds a deeper insight into the Kurdish issue:

The situation was apparent: By 1924, Turkish nationalism (...) was inviting Kurds to *become* Turks. A compulsory or “normal” assimilation practice would speedily be applied, yet in a short time, there would be no more need to invite Kurds to turn into Turks. The resistance of Kurds the fortification of the nation state and “generic (*soy*) Turkism” that had flourished within the authoritarian atmosphere of the 1930s led Turkish nationalism to ignore the ethnic (*kavmi*) presence of the Kurds.³⁸⁹

Thus, starting from 1920s, Kemalist nationalism endeavored to affiliate all of the diverse ethnic or religious identities with a “Turkish identity” through manifold Turkification attempts. Although being problematic regarding its consequences, there are still arguments

Türkiye Yahudileri Bir Türkleştirme Serüveni (1923-1945) (İstanbul: İletişim, 1999), p. 131. Turkification, language issue and “Citizen, Speak Turkish!” campaigns are further elaborated in Chapter VI.

³⁸⁷Soner Çağaptay, *Islam, Secularism, and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who Is a Turk?* (Oxon: Routledge, 2006), p. 64.

³⁸⁸Martin Van Bruinessen, *Agha, Shaikh, and State: The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan* (London: Zed Books, 1992), p. 274.

³⁸⁹Mesut Yeğen, “Türk Milliyetçiliği Ve Kürt Sorunu,” in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce Cilt 4 Milliyetçilik*, ed. Murat Gültekinil Tanıl Bora (İstanbul: İletişim, 2002), p. 884. “*Durum ortadadır: 1924’e gelindiğinde Türk milliyetçiliği kavmi mevcudiyetlerini olmasa da, bu mevcudietten kaynaklandığı farz edilen haklarını tanımayı reddettiği Kürtleri Türk olmaya davet etmektedir. Cebri ya da ‘normal’ bir asimilasyon pratiği hızla uygulamaya konacak, ancak bir süre sonar Kürtleri Türk olmaya ‘davet etmenin’ de gereği kalmayacaktır, Kürtlerin ulus devletin tahkim edilmesine gösterdiği direnç ve otuzların otoriteryan ikliminde halleşilen ‘soy Türkçülük’, Türk milliyetçiliğini Kürtlerin kavmi mevcudiyetini inkâr etmeye götürdü.*”

See also *Müstakbel Türk’ten Sözde Vatandaşa* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2006).

that such attempts are to be considered within the Kemalist engagement with the objective of modernization. As Ayhan Akman states,

In the Turkish experience, national identity was grounded not in an assertion of ethnic or racial purity, but in a modernist agenda of social and political transformation. On the whole, national identity was subservient to the project of rising to the level of modern civilization.³⁹⁰

Accordingly, one can conclude that throughout the 1930s, institutionalizing efforts to make people internalize Republican ideals, the process of transition from the Ottoman political and social structure to a new republican nation state and the modernist agenda were altogether consequential in the attempts to remove Islamic references in individuals' identity constructions, in the assimilation and Turkification practices, and thereby in the creation of a new national identity. Within this context, the representation of ethnic and religious minorities in the newspapers between 1934 and 1937, help to illustrate the dichotomies that were created in the form of "us" and "them," regarding the discourse and narration of nationalism as constructive of the official Turkish national identity.

The Representation of Ethnic and Religious Minorities in the Newspapers

...others, otherness, the Other. Capital O. The O signifies. It refers to the recognition that there is something out there that is not me, not of my making, not under my control; distinct, different, beyond reach, yet occupying the same place the same social landscape. (...) It is indeed in relation to media, to mediated communication and representation, that we increasingly have to position ourselves as moral subjects, for the Other appears to us often in no other guise...³⁹¹

Roger Silverstone, *Why Study the Media?*

In order to grasp the temperament of the Kemalist nationalism and its national identity conception, the consideration of both de facto and de jure implementations towards ethnic and

³⁹⁰ Ayhan Akman, "Modernist Nationalism: Statism and National Identity in Turkey," *Nationalities Papers* 32, no. 1 (2004): pp. 23-24.

³⁹¹ Silverstone, *Why Study the Media?*, pp. 135-40.

religious minorities is crucial. In this part of the chapter, it is argued that an in-depth examination of the newspapers discourses about the ethnic and religious minorities are as important to trace both the official and popular nationalist attitude with respect to them. Moreover, the discourses in question are to be treated as important clues in terms of exposing how the mechanisms of “othering” function through discursive practices.

Two excerpts indicate the general framing of the discourses under discussion. The first excerpt brings into the open how, in ordinary life, Greek, Armenian, and Jewish people are “othered” around the issue of a possible marriage between a Turkish man and a non-Turkish woman:

The issue of getting married to a non-Turkish girl (...) To tell the truth, I am definitely opposed to marriages between a Turkish man and a non-Turkish woman. I am afraid of misunderstandings, but especially Greek, Armenian and Jewish people come to our minds when we talk about those kinds of marriages. I respect all of these citizens one by one. However, there are differences of language, culture, religion, character, and custom between us although we live in the same country. (Hanımteyze) (*Son Posta*, 26 October 1934, see Appendix 14)

Here, it is manifestly expressed that what was meant by non-Turkish was not a foreigner, i.e. it is not a citizen of a foreign country that was signified, but rather a non-Muslim, Turkish citizens. The following excerpt is meaningful in terms of the reproduction of negative or disparaging knowledge about both Muslim and non-Muslim minorities with reference to history:

The domestic enemies and the traitors, too, cooperated with the foreign enemies. The minorities ran totally wild. Everybody, except the Turks, Muslim or Christian, was the enemy of the Turk. Some of the devilish domestic traitors, whom I could not call Turk, were cooperating with the domestic and foreign enemies as well. (*Cumhuriyet*, 19 May 1937, see Appendix 15)

It is thereby possible to observe that in reproducing collective memory or mediating collective norms and values on a daily basis, the pathic function of the signs through which the relationship between the addresser (newspapers) and the addressee (readers) is

constructed, operates on the basis of being Muslim Turks. In other words, by looking at the expressive and conative functions of the signs in these two examples (functions that construct the addresser and the addressee), it would be not wrong to argue that the newspapers indeed addressed Muslim Turks, as Muslim Turks themselves. They did not produce messages that address all Turkish citizens, irrespective of religion or ethnicity.

A similar operation of the same pathic function may be observed in the case of Terzibaşyan's work on Fuzuli, which was written in Armenian:

Were we going to learn our Fuzuli from an Armenian citizen? Would the publication of such a three volume work on Fuzuli not be suitable for Fuad Köprülü, for example? Why are the efforts of our intellectuals and writers not able to exceed the limits of essays and eventually pamphlets? (*Son Posta*, 29 April 1937, see Appendix 16)

It is obvious that the commentator considers Fuzuli as "ours," i.e. as the collective cultural asset of Turkish Muslims and reacted toward a work on him that was produced by just an "Armenian citizen," who, by no means could be assumed to be as Turkish as Fuat Köprülü. While Köprülü was referred to as "our" intellectual, Terzibaşyan was excluded from the scope of "our."

In the newspaper's speech of the period, the exclusion of non-Muslims from the scope of "us" was thus the underlying, dominant discursive practice, in both news articles and commentaries. Although this study is based on discourses rather than manifest opinions, it may still be useful to consider the judgments of the period's prominent newspaper editors on the issues around non-Muslims. Rıfat Bali's book *Cumhuriyet Yıllarında Türkiye Yahudileri* (*Jews of Turkey during Republican Years*) is informative since it provides the possibility of obtaining overall insight, specifically, into the coverage of issues with respect to the Jewish community. Numerous newspaper quotations in Bali's work demonstrate that in the process of cultural and economic Turkification after 1925 and throughout 1930's the press was very

active in terms of its effort to direct public opinion, propagate Turkification, and incite Muslims against non-Muslims.³⁹²

As understood from Bali's work, Necmettin Sadak and Vâ Nû (*Akşam, L'Akşam*), Ahmet Emin Yalman (*Vatan*), Ahmet Cevdet (*İkdam*), Yunus Nadi, Nadir Nadi and Peyami Safa (*Cumhuriyet, La République*), Yakup Kadri (*Milliyet, Le Milliet*), Mehmet Asım, Sadri Ertem and Yusuf Ziya (*Vakit*), Mim Hâlid (*Edirne Postası*) and writers of *Son Saat, Son Posta, Haber Akşam Postası, Yeni Asır, Edirne Milli Gazete* and *Hareket* were considerably influential in this process in their roles as opinion leaders.

The language issue became a matter of primary importance, as a significant dimension of the cultural Turkification that determined the discourses in the newspapers. As Bali states, starting from January 1928 under the initiative of the Dâr-ül-fünûn Law School Students Association, "Citizen, speak Turkish!" campaigns occasionally dominated the agenda in relation to non-Muslims in the early Republican period.³⁹³

The following excerpts reflect the common perspective to oblige non-Muslim citizens' to speak Turkish in public places: "Are you a Turk? Speak the Turkish language!" (*Son Posta*, 26 September 1934, see Appendix 17); "We live in Turkey! We want the Turkish language!" (*Cumhuriyet*, 18 November 1936, see Appendix 18); "A lesson to those who did not want to speak Turkish! The ancient church of Syrian Orthodoxes in Elaziz is giving all its prayers and sermons in pure Turkish" (*Cumhuriyet*, 2 April 1937, see Appendix 19); "It will be ensured that only the Turkish language is spoken in public spaces. The manager of the public house: "I cannot imagine another situation more inappropriate than Turkish citizen's talking in a language other than Turkish." (*Son Posta*, 1 March 1937, see Appendix 20)

³⁹²Bali, *Cumhuriyet Yıllarında Türkiye Yahudileri Bir Türkleştirme Serüveni (1923-1945)*, pp. 102-242. On anti non-Muslim articles in the newspapers of the period, see also Çağatay Okutan, *Tek Parti Döneminde Azınlık Politikaları* (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2004).

³⁹³Bali, *Cumhuriyet Yıllarında Türkiye Yahudileri Bir Türkleştirme Serüveni (1923-1945)*, p. 105. Ayhan Aktar reminds that "Citizen, speak Turkish!" campaigns were repeated occasionally till mid-1960's. See Aktar, *Varlık Vergisi Ve 'Türkleştirme' Politikaları*, p. 130.

The following excerpts are especially remarkable in terms of exposing the differentiation between “real Turks,” “citizens of Turkey,” “constitutional Turks,” and “political Turks”:

The Turkish Constitution accepts everyone as Turk without considering race and religious sect. The language of those who have been accepted to be Turkish is Turkish... however; it is a faulty behavior of our citizens still to speak another language in these lands. (*Son Posta*, 13 September 1934, see Appendix 21)

Answer to the question of a Jewish citizen. In a letter I received signed “a Jewish citizen,” it says: “I am Jewish, but I am also a Turk since I have grown up in Turkey. It is my responsibility to respond strongly if anything against to my dear country is said or if I find some occasions humiliating. He says so and goes on: When he went to one of the pastry shops in Beyoğlu on Friday, the girl serving at the counter asked him his order in French. He answered in Turkish since he speaks in Turkish even in his house. (...) Yes, dear reader! Do you know when everybody will speak in Turkish in Beyoğlu? 1- When snobbish Turks stop thinking that talking in French in Beyoğlu is a skill. 2- When the Levantines, who speak good Turkish, stop thinking that they become pure French by speaking in French. 3- When all our Jewish citizens behave like you and stop speaking aloud in a poor excuse for Spanish or French in private districts and giving headaches to us. 4- When all Jewish citizens, who are proud of being Turk and who love the Turkish language like you, feel anger and indignation as you have discussed you feelings in front of those who speak in French and when they reminded their cognates who spoke in French to speak in Turkish... (*Cumhuriyet*, 9 February 1935, see Appendix 22)

Every citizen who has been raised with the honor of being a real Turk, by living in this country, within the necessities of the organic law, has to at least speak Turkish to be a real Turk. (*Cumhuriyet*, 12 November 1936, see Appendix 23)

One of these letters informs us about an event at a Beyoğlu cinema. According to the letter, a Jewish family, consisting of seven members, continuously talked in French and Spanish during the movie. The reader who had written this letter said: “it was the Republican Day that night. The Turkish citizen Jews must have spoken Turkish as a civic duty, as a way of expressing their gratitude, as a way of showing respect to this most significant day of the Turks.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 18 November 1936, see Appendix 24)

The day when the republican citizens who are Turkish in political terms leave aside the languages they are using today and use only Turkish in their lives will come slowly... It is not correct to inhibit the citizens of the Turkish republic from speaking this and that language which is their mother tongue. With regard to the minorities living among them, it would be kind of the Turks to respect their mother tongue, which is the main communication tool between mother and the child. But what should really irritate us is... (..) French, which has become the Levantine language? There can be nothing more meaningless, ugly, ear splitting or annoying than Armenians and Greeks, in whose alphabet there is no letter l and who cannot produce the vowels of j and ş, talking in French in order to pretend they are European, western and modern.

Especially the Jews cannot be forgiven. Although they make the language of the country where they live their own language, they used to speak in a four-worded half-breed Spanish for a while and today Levantine French is used especially among their high class instead of Spanish. (Muhittin Birgen) (*Son Posta*, 4 March 1937, see Appendix 25)

Citizen, do not speak in French! ... However, the community that is called Levantine does not have a common mother tongue. Thus, I am hostile to this Levantine language which reminds us, the capitulations of the past, the separateness between the Turkish and non-Turkish, Muslim and Christian communities of the past. (Muhittin Birgen) (*Son Posta*, 4 March 1937, see Appendix 26)

The citizens talking in a language other than Turkish. The party is beginning to put a radical programme in order to raise these citizens to the level of their Turkish brothers in the cultural area. (*Cumhuriyet*, 11 March 1937, see Appendix 27)

In Turkey, there are we, the Turks, and the citizens of Turkey. It is only possible for citizens of Turkey to become Turkish by uniting under the language which constitutes unity in the ideal. For this reason, we invite them to respect the Turkish language with the purpose of taking our Turkish citizens into this clean entity. They can use those thousands of mixed languages, polluting the streets of Istanbul, as much as they wish. But while it is even the duty of a guest to respect the honor of the flag of the country where he/she is enjoying all pleasures of life, is it not the right of Turks to ask those, who cry out that they are members of this nation, at least to respect this language? (M. Nermi) (*Cumhuriyet*, 7 May 1937, see Appendix 28)

As a common attitude, newspapers occasionally and explicitly reminded non-Muslim “citizens their responsibilities toward the country, such as speaking Turkish: “Jews talking in the Turkish language. A new move in order to live with the Turkish culture.” (*Son Posta*, 16 September 1934, see Appendix 29); “Greek citizens, it is your turn (...) I have learned that the Greek Commission of Donation has not been able to collect a sum worth to mention although the Armenians collected 10,000 TL and the Jews a rather good amount.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 11 November 1934, see Appendix 30); “Let us speak in Turkish.”

A Pro-Turkish demonstration was held in synagogues. “It is as weird and shameful as talking in another language for a Frenchman in France to talk in another language as it is Turkish for a Jew in Turkey” (*Son Posta*, 27 September 1936, see Appendix 31); “Jews and the Turkish culture. Talking in Turkish among the Jewish people is a new attempt for living within the Turkish culture (...) The Balat Turkish Culture and Benevolent Institution wrote a

declaration about Jewish people's speaking in Turkish." (*Son Posta*, 10 September 1934, see Appendix 32).

Additionally, the newspapers also urged non-Muslims to donate money for the country's wellbeing. Non-Muslims were sometimes almost excessively appreciated for their contribution to or reconciliation with the modernizing moves and principles of the new regime: "The benevolent organization of our Jewish citizens. The charity organization for planes (*Tayyare Yardım Derneği*) formed by our Jewish citizens held a meeting in the Centre of Planes (*Tayyare Merkezi*) yesterday." (*Son Posta*, 15 July 1934, see Appendix 33)

"The concern of the Greek citizens about the country. Our Greek citizens too have formed an association in order to obtain maximum aid and continuous donation for the Association of Planes. We appreciate this concern and thank them." (*Cumhuriyet*, 22 July 1934, see Appendix 34); "Armenian citizens are buying two planes. The planes, which will be presented to the army, will be given the names of *Gazi* and *İsmet Paşa*." (*Cumhuriyet*, 14 August 1934, see Appendix 35); "The Armenian citizens have decided to find the aid as soon as possible. They had intended to gather against the danger likely to come from the air." (*Cumhuriyet*, 18 June 1935, see Appendix 36).

Such discursive practices create a hierarchy between non-Muslim citizens and Muslim journalists, who considered themselves to be real Turks, authorized to pass judgments on the "Turkishness" of "constitutional" citizens. Considering the signs' conative functions in the excerpts, it is possible to remark that the journalists imputed themselves a patronizing role vis-à-vis non-Muslim citizens.

Besides the "Citizen, speak Turkish!" campaigns, another important issue of the time was the new dress code. According to the Dress Regulations Act of 3 December 1934 (Law no. 2956) a ban was imposed on wearing religious attire other than in places of worship or at religious ceremonies, irrespective of the religion or belief concerned. Except for the highest

religious leader of each and every community, the law stipulated religious persons dress in a secular way in public places:

The religious dress code and the Greek priests. The last code prohibited religious people, no matter from whichever community, nation and religion they are, from wearing their religious dresses in public spaces and ordered them to wear those clothes only in their places of worship. It was not appreciated by the Greek Patriarchate in Istanbul and by our neighbors in Greece. (*Cumhuriyet*, 8 December 1934, see Appendix 37)

In the newspapers of the time, it is possible to observe that only those priests who responded positively were visible: “The priests are glad about the new dress law. The priest Toma Şigaher said, “Religion has nothing to do with clothes” (*Akşam*, 5 December 1934, see Appendix 38).

In addition, in the framing of such news, taking them as an example was advised to those who resist. “They should draw a lesson at least from Anglican priests! The issues, which will be discussed in the meeting of the Greek Patriarchate today, are looked forward to impatiently.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 8 December 1934, see Appendix 39)

It is also interesting to remark that none of the religious persons that are referred or addressed were Muslims, although the code applied them, too: “A religious leader dressing in a secular style immediately! The Syrian Orthodox deputy patriarch tells why he has adopted the revolution.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 19 December 1934, see Appendix 40); “The Pan-Orthodox congress that came together in 1923 in Istanbul. The priest decided to have a haircut and to change his dress. We publish the unabridged version of this document in the Greek language so that the priests read...” (*Akşam*, 21 December 1934, see Appendix 41); “A general order of the Fener Patriarchate. Religious people will not have beard and haircuts and they will not be able to stay in public spaces. The pope had a haircut and shave yesterday. (...) All religious people meet this code with pleasure and say that they are grateful to the republican

government which has given them the right to go out in secular dress.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 15 June 1935, see Appendix 42)

Another significant incident with respect to non-Muslims was the 1934 Thrace Events against Jews (*Trakya Olayları*). The Thrace Events took place simultaneously in Kırklareli, Lüleburgaz, Edirne, Babaeski, Uzunköprü, Çanakkale, and Gelibolu, starting from 21 June 1934. Some important developments were responsible for triggering the violence.³⁹⁴ Among these were the government’s disregard of Cevat Rifat Atilhan’s anti-Semitic journal, *Millî İnkılap* (*National Revolution*), the anti-Semitic wave that infiltrated into Turkey from Nazi Germany, and the Law of Settlement dated 14 June 1934 that stipulated the assimilation of the minorities (*İskân Kanunu*). Avner Levi points out that the press ignored the events for days, until the 4 July.³⁹⁵ Later, the newspapers mostly reproduced the official briefs, especially İsmet İnönü’s comments that denied the presence of anti-Semitism in Turkey.

As the following excerpts indicate, the underlying argument in the news was that there was nothing to be exaggerated: “The Minister of Internal Affairs went to Thrace. The inspection on the issue of Jews will be finished quickly. Prime Minister İsmet Paşa particularly said; Anti-Semitism does not exist in the Turkish mentality. We will not allow this kind of tendencies.” (*Son Posta*, 7 July 1934, see Appendix 43); “There is not any Jewish emigration from Thrace. The problem is solved and those who had come have begun to go back to their own places. A Jewish tradesman says: This is an event proving the lack of anti-Semitism in Turkey once more.” (*Son Posta*, 8 July 1934, see Appendix 44); “Jews coming from Thrace. Those who have come to our city are going back to their homes.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 9 July 1934, see Appendix 45)

³⁹⁴Bali, *Cumhuriyet Yıllarında Türkiye Yahudileri Bir Türkleştirme Serüveni (1923-1945)*., Aktar, *Varlık Vergisi Ve 'Türkleştirme' Politikaları.*, Okutan, *Tek Parti Döneminde Azınlık Politikaları.*, Haluk Karabatak, "1934 Trakya Olayları ve Yahudiler," *Tarih ve Toplum* 146(1996)., Avner Levi, "1934 Trakya Yahudileri Olayı: Alınamayan Ders," *ibid.*151., Zafer Toprak, "1934 Trakya Olaylarında Hükümetin Ve Chfnin Sorumluluğu " *Toplumsal Tarih* 34(1996).

³⁹⁵Levi, "1934 Trakya Yahudileri Olayı: Alınamayan Ders," p. 16.

As observed in the next excerpts, the responsibility of the Turkish groups who were involved in the events were either summarized as having taken “necessary measures against the situation” or not referred at all. The presence of anti-Semitism was acknowledged:

The inspection on the issue of the Jews is over. (...) According to the information we have got no assault had been done to the Jews in Thrace. Fifteen days ago, the Jews of Ayvalık and later Keşan and Uzunköprü went to Istanbul after selling their houses and goods with their own wills. If we look at Edirne in Thrace, known for its dense Jewish population, we see that the Jews here have been alarmed naturally by the migration attempts of the people from their nation for any reason in other places. The Jews here held many meetings in their clubs on the 30th day of last month and on the 1st day of this month. Afterwards, they decided to wait for the developments, withdrawing from the stock market. They went to their houses after closing their shops on Tuesday and hurried to the station the other day early in the morning after they had spent the whole night in fear without any reason. During this panic time the government took the strictest measures to prevent any event. Jews in Uzunköprü have boycotted the Turks since the twentieth day of the last month. The Turks took the necessary measures against the situation and established a firm under the names of a cooperation of vegetable sellers, a unity of cocoon producers. The Jews, realizing there was not any solution to the problem, began to emigrate on the 28th. Day, which was a Thursday, of the last month saying there was no bread there for them. They left Uzunköprü in five days. (*Cumhuriyet*, 12 July 1934, see Appendix 46)

The Jewish issue in Thrace. The Real Story of the Event is Told in the Written Notification that was Recently Issued. (...) It is comprehended that the hostility towards the Jews began with the Great War and continued during the Armistice and Independence War. After subsiding with the Republic, anti-Semitism infiltrated into the country from several parts of the world in the last years with new formulas and more strength. (*Son Posta*, 15 July 1934, see Appendix 47)

The Antakya Issue (Antakya Meselesi)³⁹⁶ is interesting in terms of the manifest references of non-Turkish Muslim identities as well as showing how judgments towards Alewite and Armenian identities were reconsidered with relative sympathy. In a congruous manner with Kemalist nationalism’s ignorance of the diverse Muslim ethnicities, in the

³⁹⁶ “During the years of the National Struggle, Hatay (Antakya) was excluded from the national frontiers of Turkey, with regard to the Ankara Agreement signed with France. When the French mandate in Syria was recognized by the League of Nations in September 1923, Hatay remained under the governance of the French Mandate. This situation continued till September 1936, when France gave independence to Syria. In October 1936 Turkey postulated for the independence of the Iskenderun Sanjak by giving a diplomatic note to France. France responded saying that she had no right to divide Syria. The problem was brought to the agenda of the League of Nations in December 1936 and in January 1937, and was solved by the reconciliation of Eden, the minister of foreign affairs of the United Kingdom”. Quoted from Feroz Ahmad Ahmet Kuyaş, Ahmet Ersoy, Cemal Kafadar, Asım Karaömerlioğlu, Şevket Pamuk, Zafer Toprak, Mete Tunçay, Özgür Türesay, *Tarih 1839-1939* (İstanbul: TÜSIAD, 2006), p. 360.

newspapers of the period, ethnically non-Turkish Muslim identities were almost invisible. There are two exceptions: they were overtly mentioned when the article referred to the Ottoman social structure or when the major mention of the article was about the situation in Antakya. In other words, non-Turkish Muslim identities become visible in cases related to the past or to the territories remaining outside of the official national borders of Turkey.

For instance, in the excerpt below, the signifier “Kurdish” was used with reference to a relative of Sheikh Said, who lived in Antakya. It is not surprising that in newspapers the Kurdish Hodja was qualified with the adjective “damned”:

The issue of reaction in Antakya. How did the radicals attack the young people wearing hats? The Kurdish Hodja, one of the relatives of Sheik Said, said: The Anatolian people had been Greeks in the past. Now they have turned back to their origins” (...) There is a damned Kurdish Hodja in Antakya named Kurdish Mehmed who had always been anti-Turk and anti-Turkish revolutions. The Kuseyri family, again one of the menaces and disgraces of this Turkish city, protects this damned man. (*Cumhuriyet*, 19 December 1934, see Appendix 48)

In the next two excerpts, the words “Kurdish” and “Albanian” were used with reference to the past: “The end of the Committee of Union and Progress. Kurdish Mustafa Paşa had begun to murder one by one.” (*Son Posta*, 1 May 1937, see Appendix 49); “The end of the Committee of Union and Progress. The Albanian Ömer attempted to reach his gun when he saw the pale community of Kandıra M.” (*Son Posta*, 17 May 1937, see Appendix 50). Such ethnic labels were rarely used in relation to current incidents of the time, but only used when telling historical narratives, as seen in these examples. This implies an impression that non-Turkish Muslim groups used to live in the country in the past, but they had almost disappeared in the present nation state. One exception is the Antakya case.

In the following excerpts, it is possible to observe that Kurds, Circassians, Alewites, Nuseyris and Shiites, who were invisible inside the national borders, become all visible around the issue of Antakya, which was located outside the national borders of the time. As is

observed in the next piece, the word “race” was used as the equivalent of the word “ethnie” that is used today:

The Turkish miracle in relation to the case of Hatay (...) This national and racial unity has been completely strengthened with the interest of the other races in this rightful action which was due to the sympathy created by the Turks in their environment. Alevis, Circassians, Armenians have aided this rightful Turkish case despite all discouragement and oppression. This situation, which it occurred after the discharging of the Ottoman Empire, again seems like a miracle and the fascinating unity of the Turk is obvious in this scene. (*Cumhuriyet*, 25 November 1936, see Appendix 51)

Furthermore, their support to the Turkish community living in Antakya was greatly appreciated by the newspapers. This support motivated the journalists to recognize the existence of diverse ethnic and religious identities, but still prompted them to argue that they were ‘Turkish’: “Disorder in the province. Both Kurdish people and the Circassians did not participate in the election.” (*Son Posta*, 16 November 1936, see Appendix 52); “The Kurds and the Circassians too told observers that they were Turkish and wanted independence together with the Turks.” (*Son Posta*, 13 January 1937, see Appendix 53); “The Turkishness of Nuseyris. They have been there since before the crusades. They are in no way Arabs.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 30 December 1936, see Appendix 54); “All the province is Turkish. The Alewites and the Circassians cry out “Long live Atatürk!” too in Antakya. The Kurds as well wear the hat.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 13 January 1937, see Appendix 55). “An issue we have to learn again: Shiism.” (*Son Posta*, 12 March 1937, see Appendix 56); “What is ‘Shiism’ which the French tried to awake in Syria although it is about to die out on its own under the consciousness of the Turkishness awakening gradually.” (*Son Posta*, 12 March 1937, see Appendix 57)

It is also noticeable that the Armenians’ pro-Turkish attitude in Antakya was greatly appreciated by the newspapers: “In Antakya, the Armenians, too, are in unity with the Turks. The minority in Halep are inclined towards Turkey.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 5 October 1936, see Appendix 58); “The Armenian communities in Antakya and Iskenderun. On the occasion of

their attachment to Turkishness, we will touch a little on the historical past.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 25 October 1936, see Appendix 59)

This appreciation is consequential in terms of gaining the journalists’ sympathy towards them. At the same time, this attitude led the journalists to recognize with appreciation the Armenian community living in Turkey: “The Alevis and the Jews, after the Armenians, in the issue of Antakya. Antakya and the Armenians living here made an auspicious work which may serve to repair the mistakes of the past.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 15 November 1936, see Appendix 60); “The Armenian Patriarch declared the sincere obedience of the Armenian citizens against the problem of Antakya-Iskenderun and the surrounding area, which has become a national problem for all Turkishness.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 21 November 1936, see Appendix 61); “The Istanbul Armenians are angry with the Taşnaks.” “The Turkish Armenians are on the side of their Turkish brothers on national issues. There is no place among us for those Armenians who do not accept this reality.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 20 January 1937, see Appendix 62)

References to the Armenians appeared in articles about the 1915 Events. In the tone of such articles it is possible to observe the recognition of the tragedy, but the main argument was still the exigency of the suppression of the rebellion of the Armenian. “A nation which can live with Turks in the most sincere way. Why did the Armenians, who lived with us in a friendly way for centuries and who had been treated so, rebel later?” (*Cumhuriyet*, 24 July 1934, see Appendix 63); “The Armenian problem. Abdülhamit ordered the intense banishment of rebellious Armenians who had been deceived by the Russian ambassador.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 6 October 1934, see Appendix 64); “Bloody Armenian problems in the Eastern cities. Abdülhamit quickly tried to prevent the events, but what was done could not be undone and much blood was spilled.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 25 November 1934, see Appendix 65); “The rebellion of Armenians. Whenever we were concerned about it, the Armenians said that we were being suspicious.” (*Son Posta*, 20 December 1936, see Appendix 66)

Additionally, the Armenians who were accused of having betrayed the Turks and who had left Turkey were represented as regretful by means of testimonials: “A Syrian student longing for Turkey says: ‘I would have been Turk if I had the chance’ The Armenians who fled are regretful.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 14 February 1935, see Appendix 67); “A sad adventure: the Armenians and Greeks leaving Turkey – Part 1. Do I know who am I? Here is an Armenian. It is as if we had been sent here for not serving as soldiers. Just then we could not return to the country. And now we are living in misery here.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 25 October 1936, see Appendix 68)

The following piece is especially significant in terms of demonstrating the efforts of *Cumhuriyet* to direct the public opinion towards the rightfulness of Turks in the extermination of the Armenians within the context of World War I:

A sad adventure: the Armenians and Greeks leaving Turkey – Part 3. It is not possible not to regret the end of the Armenians who had united with Turkish culture thoroughly. When we come to the adventures of the Greeks, especially those who are living in Anatolia, whose even prayers and Bibles are in Turkish, what can be more natural than both our and Armenians’ understanding the extra bitterness of this for both us and them. What was the reason for these events which have been recorded as unique by the history? A storm almost like Doomsday broke on an isolated part of the world and a flood and a fire followed it. All these disasters, cleaning out what is ahead, turned the world upside down in cooperation. When the storm stopped and the waters quieted we saw that many died and some of the others who were alive had been thrown away to the far reaches on the earth. How can it be possible to describe this disaster that took place in Turkey too together with some part of the world? The possibility of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire caused the small countries and communities besides the significant countries to fall to the ambition of benefiting by cheating, and made them blind. The Turk, who had been fighting with powerful enemies on every front everywhere, could not stop himself from the liveliness of rage when it was betrayed by the secret resistance movements fooled around by the major countries. (*Cumhuriyet*, 1 November 1936, see Appendix 69)

Another discursive practice regarding non-Muslims is visible in the area of criminal cases. As the following excerpt illustrates, when Turks were involved in such events, emphasis on their ethnic identity was played down: “The homicide of Okmeydanı. Lütfü claims that he did not injure anyone. (*Akşam*, 3 November 1934, see Appendix 70) However,

it was apparent that when non-Muslims were involved in criminal events, their religious identities were particularly underlined and emphasized: “A Jew took the bag of a girl by mugging and also kicked her. But he was arrested”. (*Son Posta*, 20 November 1934, see Appendix 71); “The Armenian who insulted Turkishness was found guilty and arrested.”³⁹⁷ (*Son Posta*, 11 April 1937, see Appendix 72)

The next excerpt is remarkable in terms of demonstrating how the acts of non-Muslim individuals were attributed to the whole non-Muslim community and how the newspapers imagined themselves in a position to reprehend them:

The Jew who does not speak Turkish punched someone. The first Criminal Court of Peace in Sultanahmet sentenced a 23-year old Jew named Yasef, the son of Bünyamin, to 15 days’ penalty of imprisonment last night. (...) Jasef was resented because of this warning: He said he would not speak in Turkish and he punched Ziya Bey at the same time. (...) *Son Posta*: We bring this issue to the attention of several Jewish institutions, which are engaged in Turkish culture. (*Son Posta*, 12 October 1934, see Appendix 73)

Last, some other noteworthy pieces were about Kurds. It has already been noted that non-Turkish but Muslim ethnic identities were almost invisible in the newspapers, except in articles referring to the past or other countries. A unique exception can be seen around the Dersim issue. In the articles on this event, the newspapers usually use the words “bandits,” “banditry,” “brigandage,” or “people of Tunceli” etc. in order to signify Kurds, while trying to legitimate the military operation carried out against them.

The typical language employed about Dersim can be illustrated by the following article where the reporter carefully refrained from using the word “Kurd.” It also shows how the Kurds were assumed to belong to the Turkish race:

I would like to repeat a conversation here gladly that I managed to have with an authorized and intellectual governor of Tunceli. This community of our race will be an

³⁹⁷ Cemil Koçak asserts that in the single-party period, law suits on the insultation of Turkishness were exclusively brought against non-Muslims. See Cemil Koçak, “Ayın Karanlık Yüzü Tek-Parti Döneminde Gayrimüslim Azınlıklar Hakkında Açılan Türklüğü Tahkir Davaları,” *Tarih ve Toplum* 1, no. 241 (2005): pp. 163-64.

example city with its modern governmental progresses and will be one of the developed cities of Anatolia.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 17 October 1936, see Appendix 74)

In accordance with the policies of the time, the general argument was that the Kurds were actually uncivilized Turks and that the newly founded Republic would civilize them.

Accordingly, Kurdishness was ignored for the most part as a separate entity:

Today everything proves that the Kurdish community, known as being from Dersim, is Turkish. Besides, during the last occasions they allusively said: “If you do not like us, send us to Turkestan”. All of the names in the tribe, which is difficult to change according to the community rules, are Turkish. Thus, there is no doubt in their Turkishness. (*Son Posta*, 19 June 1937, see Appendix 75)

In the next article, however, the discourse deviated from the dominant attitude claiming that the Dersim community was Turkish. In this example, the people of Dersim were openly insulted and presented as a separate group who were inferior to Turkish people:

Some people think that the people from Dersim are Turkish. I have never thought that they were Turkish. There is no nomadism, primitiveness, savagery, cruelty and barbarity in the Turkish character... Other than this, Turkish people and the people of Dersim and Turkish language and the language of Zazas are different according to their anthropologic qualities. I think, they are a special race who have been living among those step mountains for a long time and who are not yet civilized because nobody has touched them. (Y. Mazhar Aren) (*Cumhuriyet*, 29 June 1937, see Appendix 76)

When it comes to the frequencies, Table 10 shows that 15.4 percent of the articles in the sample mentioned ethnic or religious groups other than Turkish.

Table 10. References to Ethnic/Religious Groups According to Newspapers, in percentages

			<i>Cumhuriyet</i>	<i>Akşam</i>	<i>Son Posta</i>	Total
References to Ethnic/Religious Groups	Yes	Count	62	17	49	128
		Within Name of the Newspaper	15.3	12.6	16.8	15.4
	No	Count	343	118	243	704
		Within Name of the Newspaper	84.7	87.4	83.2	84.6
	Total	Count	405	135	292	832
		Within Name of the Newspaper	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

The table indicates no significant correlation between reference to ethnic/religious groups and the name of the newspaper.³⁹⁸ It is thereby possible to argue that all of them shared a similar attitude. Additionally, Table 11 shows that of all the articles that referred to ethnic or religious groups, 68.8 percent referred to Jews and/or Armenians and/or Greeks, and 25 percent to Muslim groups other than of Turkish origin. It is thereby possible to conclude that Christian groups were more frequently associated with “otherness” compared to non-Turkish Muslims. In addition, no significant relationship was found between the specific ethnic/religious groups that were referred and the name of the newspaper.³⁹⁹

Table 11. Specific Ethnic/Religious Groups that are mentioned According to Newspapers, in percentages

			<i>Cumhuriyet</i>	<i>Akşam</i>	<i>Son Posta</i>	Total
Which Ethnic/Religious Groups Are Referred?	Jews and/or Armenians and/or Greeks	Count	44	10	34	88
		within Name of the Newspaper	71.0	58.8	69.4	68.8
	Muslims other than Turkish Origin	Count	14	7	11	32
		within Name of the Newspaper	22.6	41.2	22.4	25.0
	Other or Unclear	Count	4	0	4	8
		within Name of the Newspaper	6.5	0	8.2	6.2
Total	Count	62	17	49	128	
	within Name of the Newspaper	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	

Table 12 shows all the articles that referred to ethnic or religious groups, thirty-two percent referred to them in terms of a recent or historical problem, meaning that their representation was associated with annoying matters in the past in one in every third article. In 18.8 percent, they were reminded of their duty to support the new regime, implying that they were not contributing enough to the evolution of the new Turkish society. In 17.2

³⁹⁸ The value of chi square obtained is 1.247, the degrees of freedom are 2, and the exact significance of the chi square is .536. This is well above the standard indicator of a significant result (alpha=.05).

³⁹⁹ The value of chi square obtained is 3.697, the degrees of freedom are 4, and the exact significance of the chi square is .449. This is well above the standard indicator of a significant result (alpha=.05).

percent, their contribution was appreciated, attributing them discrete peculiarities as Turkish citizens or implying that they might acquire the right to become members of the new Turkish society as long as they accommodated themselves to the new regime. In 27.3 percent, they were referred in terms of events like robbery or news about popular culture, meaning that their discreet identities were emphasized even around everyday issues. In 4.7 percent they were referred in the emphasis that the discrimination against them was unlikely to happen or to be true. The table also shows that there was no significant relationship between the way ethnic/religious groups were discussed and the name of the newspaper.⁴⁰⁰

Table 12. The Way Ethnic/Religious Groups are Mentioned according to Newspapers, in percentages

			<i>Cumhuriyet</i>	<i>Akşam</i>	<i>Son Posta</i>	Total
How are the Ethnic/Religious Groups Referred?	Denial of Discrimination	Count	1	1	4	6
		By Newspaper	1.6	5.9	8.2	4.7
	Appreciation for Their Support of the New Regime	Count	15	2	5	22
		By Newspaper	24.2	11.8	10.2	17.2
	Reminder of Their Obligation to Support The New Regime	Count	15	2	7	24
		By Newspaper	24.2	11.8	14.3	18.8
	About a Recent or Historical Problem	Count	14	6	21	41
		By Newspaper	22.6	35.3	42.9	32.0
	Other or News of the Day	Count	17	6	12	35
		By Newspaper	27.4	35.3	24.5	27.3
	Total	Count	62	17	49	128
		By Newspaper	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

On the other hand, Table 13 shows that there was a significant relationship between the specific ethnic/religious groups that were referred and the year.⁴⁰¹ As the table indicates,

⁴⁰⁰ The value of chi square obtained is 12.077, the degrees of freedom are 8, and the exact significance of the chi square is .148. This is well above the standard indicator of a significant result (alpha=.05).

the frequency of the references to Jews and/or Armenians and/or Greeks decreased gradually. They were most frequently referred in 1934, with a percentage of 86.2 percent, when, for example, the “Citizen, Speak Turkish Campaign” was in force; and less in 1937, with a percentage of 54.2 percent. On the other hand, the frequency of references to Muslims other than those of Turkish origin increased gradually. They were less frequently referred in 1934, with a percentage of 3.4 percent, and most in 1937 percentage of 35.4 percent, as a result of the Antakya issue, which dominated the national agenda.

Table 13. Specific Ethnic/Religious Groups that are Referred According to Years, in percentages

			1934	1935	1936	1937	Total
Which Ethnic/Religious Groups Are Referred?	Jews and/or Armenians and/or Greeks	Count	25	12	25	26	88
		Within Name of the Newspaper	86.2	80.0	69.4	54.2	68.8
	Muslims other than Turkish Origin	Count	1	3	11	17	32
		Within Name of the Newspaper	3.4	20.0	30.6	35.4	25.0
	Other or Unclear	Count	3	0	0	5	8
		Within Name of the Newspaper	10.3	0	0	10.4	6.2
	Total	Count	29	15	36	48	128
		Within Name of the Newspaper	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table 14 shows that of all the articles that referred to ethnic/religious groups, 59.4 percent were news articles.

At this point, it is noteworthy to explain why it is necessary to make a comparison between the frequencies of the coverage ethnic groups on the basis of article types. Anna McKane writes that “news stories arise from things that happen which are of interest to the

⁴⁰¹ The value of chi square obtained is 16.414, the degrees of freedom are 6, and the exact significance of the chi square is .012. This is below the standard indicator of a significant result (alpha=.05).

reader.”⁴⁰² On the other hand, columns or commentaries, including editorials, are newspaper formats that are indeed opinion pieces, which set out to manifestly persuade readers. Within this context, more precisely, editorials are meant to persuade readers to accept the publisher's opinion and especially “try to influence the opinion leaders of the community.”⁴⁰³ Informative articles or informative serials are pieces through which readers are provided with detailed and comprehensive information on a specific topic, such as historical stories, geographical writings or writings on scientific discoveries. These pieces were not argumentative and normally did not try to persuade readers.

Table 14. References to Ethnic/Religious Groups According to Article Types, in percentages

	News Article	Column or Commentary	Informative Article or Serial	Other	Total
Count	76	30	22	0	128
References to Ethnic/Religious Groups	59.4	23.4	17.2	0	100.0

Furthermore, Table 15 shows that of all the articles that referred to Jews and/or Armenians and/or Greeks, 53.4 percent were news articles. Of all those that referred to Muslims other than those of Turkish origin, 68.8 percent were news articles.

The discourse analysis of the related news revealed the journalists were motivated to cover ethnic and religious groups mostly in cases when the official nationalism perceived a threat or contribution in line with the course of the events. It also should be noted that from the perspective of the principles of journalism, news articles did not necessarily have a motivation to persuade the readers, although they may still have done that.

⁴⁰² Anna McKane, *News Writing* (London: Sage, 2006), p. 16

⁴⁰³ Murray Masterton, “Comments on Commentary and Opinion Writing”, Accessed on 20 November 2014, Available online at <http://dr.ntu.edu.sg/handle/10220/3037>.

Table 15. Specific Ethnic/Religious Groups that are Referred According to Article Types, in percentages

			News Article	Column or Commentary	Informative Article or Serial	Other
Which Ethnic/Religious Groups Are Referred?	Jews and/or Armenians and/or Greeks	Count	47	23	18	88
		Within Which Ethnic/Religious Groups are Referred?	53.4	26.1	20.5	100.0
	Muslims other than Turkish Origin	Count	22	6	4	32
		Within Which Ethnic/Religious Groups are Referred?	68.8	18.8	12,5	100.0

Being covered in the news is an indicator of newsworthiness and newsworthiness is indeed an act of judgment. In the case of the news coverage of especially ethnic or religious groups, it seems that the mainstream newspapers of the era intended to persuade the readers by appealing to emotions. Table 14 demonstrates that ethnic or religious groups were more frequently covered in news articles rather than in opinion pieces or informative articles; and news articles were used as persuasive pieces. So, on the basis of both Table 14 and Table 15, it is possible to argue that the judgment of the writers and reporters of the mid-1930s was shaped both by the official nationalism and the legal and political framework that regulated the press.

Table 16 shows that of all the articles that referred to ethnic/religious groups with appreciation for their support for the new regime, 86.4 percent were news articles. Of all those that referred to them around a recent or historical problem, 63.4 percent were news articles. These statistics together demonstrate that their support was indeed evaluated by the journalists as an unexpected courtesy by the minorities, and thereby it is evaluated as newsworthy. Of all those that remind the minority citizens for their obligation to support the new regime, 54.2 percent were columns or commentaries, meaning that the columnists positioned themselves

hierarchically over other ethnic/religious groups and behaved as the representatives of the new official Turkish identity.

Table 16. The Way Ethnic/Religious Groups are Referred According to Article Types, in percentages

			News Article	Column or Commentary	Informative Article or Serial	Other
How were the Ethnic/Religious Groups Referred?	Denial of Discrimination	Count	3	2	1	6
		Within How?	50.0	33.3	16.7	100.0
	Appreciation for Their Support of the New Regime	Count	19	2	1	22
		Within How?	86.4	9.1	4.5	100.0
	Reminder of Their Obligation to Support the New Regime	Count	10	13	1	24
		Within How?	41.7	54.2	4.2	100.0
	Related to a Recent or Historical Problem	Count	26	5	10	41
	Within How?	63.4	12.2	24.4	100.0	

Overall, on the basis of the literature and findings, it is possible to argue that although a claim for a totally new, secular state based on civic citizenship was implied in the official arguments of the early republican period, the discourses and framings in the newspapers demonstrated a discriminatory attitude, especially towards non-Muslim minorities, even in cases where they were praised. Although Islamic identity was almost totally obscured and almost never referred in the manifest content, the subtexts of the articles in which ethnic and religious groups were referred, indicate a new official Turkish identity which assumed the Muslim identity as the norm. Thereby, the newspaper texts discursively contributed to the

imagination of the nation on the basis of a common Muslim identity and excluded especially non-Muslim religious groups from that imagination.

CHAPTER 5

THE LEITMOTIFS OF OFFICIAL NATIONALISM AND THEIR COVERAGE IN DAILY NEWSPAPERS

Through this chapter, the coverage of certain recurring themes in *Cumhuriyet*, *Son Posta*, and *Akşam* will be interpreted within the political context of the single-party regime, and in line with the assumptions of the social constructionist approach. These are namely the Ottoman versus Republican dichotomy, women, youth and children, the army, and Atatürk. These recurring themes appear as significant leitmotifs of the official nationalism because as the sample reveals that they functioned as important components of the rhetoric and over-all narrative regarding the national identity construction.

As in the previous chapter, the discourse analysis is conducted by depending on the corpora constructed on the basis of the classification of excerpts revealed by the sample newspaper articles. A large number of newspaper texts are incorporated into the chapter to illustrate the relevant recurring themes. The frequency tables and cross tabulations, which are the outputs of the classical content analysis that depends upon a sample of 832 articles, are also associated with relevant discursive practices.

The Reproduction of the “Ottoman versus Republican” Dichotomy

The main motivation of the Kemalist project that was to create a modern, westernized nation state, which engendered in the narration of Turkish nationalism the binary opposition between “Ottoman” and “Republican” regimes was discussed above. Accordingly, in the newspapers of the era, the depictions of these two mutually exclusive or contradistinguished regimes developed around dichotomized representations. Certainly, while the Ottoman regime

was framed negatively, the Republican regime was framed positively. The articles narrated this dichotomy with reference to several topics.

First of all, the Ottoman period was portrayed as a period of illness or ignorance with respect to national identity. According to this perspective, the unification of the national community as a monolithic body in a form that favored the Turkish element was an important achievement for Turks:

The community was left with its own separate life during the empire period. Everyone was committed to his particular lifestyle. Some foreign intrusions even contributed to this separation by strengthening these particular lifestyles. Thus, the Ottoman Empire was like a patched bundle, where the color of some of its patches more eye-catching. (*Cumhuriyet*, 12 November 1936, see Appendix 77)

In addition, it was stated that in the Ottoman social structure, Turks had been humiliated while all other nations had been glorified. The following example is remarkable because it is one of the few excerpts in which non-Turkish Muslim communities were referred. However, it should be noticed that while referring them, the article tells about the past, since in the present Republican Turkey, they were assumed to be Turk.

It was shameful for most people to say “I am a Turk” in the Turkish lands. (...) The Arab was treated as the member of a blessed a group, the Albanian as the quintessence of bravery, the Circassian was appreciated as a portly and heroic person. When it came to the Turk... the Turk was treated as a stupid nation, a cowardly creature and an inferior example of a human. (*Son Posta*, 27 January 1937, see Appendix 78)

Yet the following example references to Alewites, which was also uncommon, considering the general attitude of silence towards them. However, regarding the date of the excerpt, it is obvious that the reason for the sympathy, which was constructed on the basis of the Ottoman-Republican dichotomy, coincided with the Antakya Issue, where the Alewites supported the Turkish side. Ultimately, Ottomanism was disparaged in this example too:

Today Ottomanism is destroyed. Now it is the Turks who have the sovereignty. Thus the rivalry between Sunnism and Alewitism is over. But maybe it is not only the rivalry between them that is over. Perhaps the Turks have started to recognize that Alewitism is something that is totally different from how it was portrayed so far from the eyes of the Ottomans. (*Son Posta*, 12 March 1937, see Appendix 79)

As represented in the articles, the Republican regime, as opposed to Ottoman, opened way for Turks to know about themselves, acquire a national conscience and self-esteem in every area, acknowledge their history, and be familiar with their historical heroes:

They even wanted to make us believe in the superstition that the Turk had no talent in economy. The republican government destroyed it successfully as well as many other superstitious traditions and myths. Not only did it destroy them, but also elevated the monument of the determination, persistence, talent and unending energy of the Turk in the eyes of friends and enemies. The grand Turkish revolution has made us familiar with ourselves in the field of economy as well. (*Son Posta*, 23 August 1934, see Appendix 80)

Our old history lessons were more or less the same. Turkishness was reflected as if it only contained Ottomanism. Those who wrote that history were unable to tell heroes like Cengiz or Timur. The real side of Turkish history was not exposed because of them. For instance, I did not learn about İskits being Turkish. (...) Today, people read and learn about the lives of these old Turkish clans. (*Son Posta*, 14 May 1935, see Appendix 81)

The next example is noteworthy as it is the sole excerpt that referred to Turkic communities living in Central Asia, as opposed to the distant attitude of the Republican nationalism toward Turkism. In this case, the aim was to make a claim for the Turkishness of Newruz, which was claimed by the Kurds:

Those who are used to seeing the vast existence of the Turk through the narrow windows of the Ottoman Palace assume that “Newruz” is a Shiite festival. No (...) it is something forgotten and meaningless for us, the Europeanized, urban Turks of the present. But Newruz is a festival that the Turkic communities consisting of an entire 30 million people living in Asia Minor and on the area where little Asia connects to Asia have never forgotten. (*Son Posta*, 22 March 1937, see Appendix 82)

The next two pieces are significant in terms of making a comparison between the Kemalist struggle and the 1908 revolution:

Before a new Turkish structure was formed with the republic, our level was almost nothing in the world. (...) it has not been a long time since the name “Turk” was used to ridicule. Europe used to look at us on their map as a gangrenous organ to be cut off. We possessed the name of “sick man” given by a western politician. Neither the reforms of Reşit Paşa nor the constitutional monarchy of the unionists saved us from this dishonorable situation. It was Atatürk who brought the sick man back among the nations as energetic, lively, and firmer than the rest and moreover, who made him get ahead of the others. (*Son Posta*, 10 April 1937, see Appendix 83)

The community was divided into two, between the hopeful ones and the hopeless ones. (...) the congresses of Erzurum, Sivas, Ankara, Eskişehir, Afyon, and Konya... The Turks conquered Anatolia once more from east to west (...) Because I was an experienced and conscious person during this period, I can tell you with authority: (...) they were only rebelling with rigid nerves and impatience at the last stage. This rebellion provided people with the consciousness of being Turkish, with a sense of being a dignified human. Anyone who heard this voice from his conscience followed the command immediately. Here is the real revolution, the real revival, the real national action. When compared to this, the 1908 movement appears to have been an ordinary conspiracy. (*Son Posta*, 9 May 1937, see Appendix 84)

Most important of all, in the newspapers of the era, while the “Ottoman” connoted backwardness, tardiness, underdevelopment and indolence, “Republican Turkey” connoted exactly the opposite: “There was nothing during the Empire period. The Republic has done everything.” (*Son Posta*, 12 May 1935, see Appendix 85) The image of the Republic was usually consolidated with reference to change, i.e. with an emphasis on development in every area designating the Republican regime as the underlying reason for the general wellbeing and progress of the nation: “Turkey, which was a reflector of weakness yesterday, is an example of progress and civilization today... it is our right to shout proudly ‘Happy is the one who says I am Turkish!’.”(*Son Posta*, 10 April 1937, see Appendix 86)

Within this context, the frequent use of metaphors as discursive practices is noteworthy. For instance, in the next excerpt, an explicit comparison between the Republican revolution and the Copernican revolution is significant: “The progress of young Turkey from the Islamist-Ottoman civilization into the laic-Turkish culture within the Kemalist revolution is a whole mentality and soul change like the Copernican revolution. This is a transfer from one pole to the other.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 12 November 1934, see Appendix 87) By means of metaphors, the new Turkey was likened to a healthy young man: “We are more powerful than ever. We are like a strong, fully grown, physically and mentally healthy man. I have been in Ankara for a few days and I have found an opportunity to listen to the heart of my country.”(*Son Posta*, 17 November 1936, see Appendix 88)

Additionally, in some articles, the Republican transformation was equated with the European Renaissance: “It was necessary to wait for centuries for the Turkish renaissance after the European Renaissance. The Turks have achieved their own renaissance in the period of Kâmal Atatürk.⁴⁰⁴ Now Turkey is not the old Turkey. Turkey has broken itself from its own Middle Age.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 8 December 1936, see Appendix 89)

In addition to the generalized depictions of a total transformation in a positive direction, the discourse of change also was reproduced around reference to betterment in many specific areas of social, economic, political and cultural life, even in international relations:

Which Turk does not like it...? One: Once, England did not care about our friendship. Two: England was our enemy at least for 30 years. Three: England seized our war ships that we had ordered from England by even selling the hair of Turkish girls. Four: England tried to destroy Turkey after the Great War. Five: England broke our national pride during the cease-fire years. ... Look, what one sees all through his/her life! 13 years' events that cannot be tolerated 130 years. Which Turk does not like or does not take pride in such words said by the Turkey of Atatürk to England which has a population of 515 million and whose lands cover one-fourth of the world and where the sunset is never seen: “We are ready to help you without waiting any return”. (*Cumhuriyet*, 25 July 1936, see Appendix 90)

For instance, the progress in sports was frequently covered in the newspapers and the comparison between the Ottoman and the Republican was continually kept alive: “Our sport life before and after the republic” (*Son Posta*, 29 October 1936, see Appendix 91); “A worldwide known saying: “As strong as a Turk!” (...) To tell the truth, although our sports have improved a lot during the last years, they have not progressed to a sufficient level yet. Nevertheless, compared to the past, the youth deal to more sports much or seem to do so.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 11 August 1936, see Appendix 92)

The following articles are remarkable in terms of illustrating how such comparisons were frequently made in other areas, too:

⁴⁰⁴ Mustafa Kemal is referred as “Kâmal Atatürk” in the original text, in line with the routine journalistic practice of the time.

Our education system in the republican period has developed so enormously that it cannot be compared with the education of the past periods. (...) Turkish industry has come into being in the republican era. During the sultanate period, we had no industry. The country at that time was only busy with producing raw material for the major industrial countries. Only foreign goods and foreign firms dominated our market. (*Akşam*, 29 October 1936, see Appendix 93)

The Eastern cities are preparing for a happy future (...) “Our Eastern cities are seriously heaven-like places that every Turk should see. The primary deficiency of these places is their having been neglected in the past periods. A brave and smart community lives on the Black Sea coast and the plateau parts of the Eastern region where the republican government works day and night for reconstruction and prosperity as soon as possible.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 9 November 1936, see Appendix 94)

The Turkish navigation, once one of the first class forces of the world, fell to the bottom ranks step by step due to the clumsy management of the Ottoman Empire. (...) The Turkish Navy is going to Malta today in order to express the belief of the Turks in the common peace court. (*Son Posta*, 17 November 1936, see Appendix 95)

While tracing the discourses that were more frequently preferred in framing the articles, the findings show that the new regime was seen in line with the idea of a positive change or progress in relation to national identity. In other words, keeping in mind that the sample consisted of only those articles with specific key words, the content analysis enables to observation around which major themes or in what scope the keywords were used. Table 17 shows that 35.7 percent of the articles referred to the Republican project or new direction/path, referring to the unfolding of a new manner or conduct in Turkish society or politics. Moreover, the table indicates no significant relationship between references to the Republican project or new direction/path and the name of the newspaper.⁴⁰⁵ Accordingly, it is noticeable that the discourses of change, progress, Republican project or new direction can be seen one in every three article, in all three newspapers. This reflects the presence of a common attitude in all of the newspapers, meaning that the achievements of the newly founded nation state and the performance of the government were equally promoted in the mainstream newspapers.

⁴⁰⁵ The value of chi square obtained is 5.656, the degrees of freedom are 2, and the exact significance of the chi square is .059. This is above the standard indicator of a significant result ($\alpha=.05$).

Table 17. References to Republican Project or New Direction/Path According to Newspapers, in percentages

			<i>Cumhuriyet</i>	<i>Akşam</i>	<i>Son Posta</i>	Total
References to “Republican Project” or “New Direction/Path”	Yes	Count	161	43	93	297
		By Newspaper	39.8	31.9	31.8	35.7
	No	Count	244	92	199	535
		By Newspaper	60.2	68.1	68.2	64.3
	Total	Count	405	135	292	832
		By Newspaper	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

So content analysis demonstrates that the idea of being in a positive transition is forcefully reproduced in the newspapers with a stress on the state of being Turk. This argument is further confirmed considering that in the articles reproducing the dichotomization between the Ottoman and the Republican regimes, the latter is always favored and represented positively.

Besides, Table 18 shows that there is a significant relationship between references to Republican project or new direction/path and year.⁴⁰⁶ As the table indicates, they were twice more frequently referred in 1934 and 1935 compared to 1936 and 1937.

Table 18. References to Republican Project or New Direction/Path According to Years, in percentages

			1934	1935	1936	1937	Total
References to “Republican Project” or “New Direction/Path”	Yes	Count	89	84	65	59	297
		Within Year	52.7	56.4	24.8	23.4	35.7
	No	Count	80	65	197	193	535
		Within Year	47.3	43.6	75.2	76.6	64.3
	Total	Count	169	149	262	252	832
		Within Year	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

By referring to Table 18, it can be argued that in 1934 and 1935, the main discursive practice regarding national identity was still based on a legitimization of the new nation state

⁴⁰⁶ The value of chi square obtained is 79.046, the degrees of freedom are 3, and the exact significance of the chi square is .000. This is well below the standard indicator of a significant result (alpha=.05).

on the basis of achievements and within the context of reform policies. Such a discursive practice designates indeed the secularizing, modernizing and westernizing revolutions and/or reform policies that were enacted until 1935. The agenda therefore was influential in determining both the framing of the articles and discourse themes regarding the consolidation of national identity.

Table 19 shows that in the content of 15.3 percent of the articles with a stress on Turkish national identity as a major reference, a comparison is done between the old (Ottoman) and the new (Republican) way of life or society or politics. Such a comparison dichotomizes “Ottoman” and “Republican” as mutually exclusive categories, i.e. binary opposites. The table indicates no significant relationship between comparison between old and new and the newspaper.⁴⁰⁷ This means that this narrative was present in all the three newspapers.

Table 19. Comparison between Old and New According to Newspapers, in percentages

			<i>Cumhuriyet</i>	<i>Akşam</i>	<i>Son Posta</i>	Total
Comparison between “Old (Ottoman)” and “New (Republican)”	Yes	Count	66	19	42	127
		By Newspaper	16.3	14.1	14.4	15.3
	No	Count	339	116	250	705
		By Newspaper	83.7	85.9	85.6	84.7
	Total	Count	405	135	292	832
		By Newspaper	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

However, Table 20 shows that there is a significant relationship between “comparison between old and new” and year. This comparison was most frequently referred in 1934, with a percentage of 25.4 percent.

⁴⁰⁷The value of chi square obtained is .656, the degrees of freedom are 2, and the exact significance of the chi square is .720. This is well above the standard indicator of a significant result (alpha=.05).

Table 20. Comparison between Old and New According to Year, in percentages

			1934	1935	1936	1937	Total
Comparison between “Old (Ottoman) and “New (Republican)”	Yes	Count	43	25	30	29	127
		By Year	25.4	16.8	11.5	11.5	15.3
	No	Count	126	124	232	223	705
		By Year	74.6	83.2	88.5	88.5	84.7
	Total	Count	169	149	262	252	832
		By Year	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

1934 was especially significant in terms of the promulgation of the Law of Surname. Moreover, women were given the right to vote and to hold office in the same year. It is clear that these two reforms together functioned as the intervening variables in 1934. Such a significant relationship demonstrates once again that secularizing, modernizing and westernizing revolutions and/or reform policies were influential in determining the discourse themes.

Moreover, Table 21 shows that in 99.2 percent of the articles that dichotomized the old and the new “old” was negatively attributed whereas “new” was positively attributed.

Table 21. The Nature of the Comparison between Old and New According to Newspaper, in percentages

			<i>Cumhuriyet</i>	<i>Akşam</i>	<i>Son Posta</i>	Total
Nature of the Comparison between “Old” and “New”	Old Negative – New Positive	Count	66	19	41	126
		Within Name of the Newspaper	100.0	100.0	97.6	99.2
	Other or Neutral	Count	0	0	1	1
		Within Name of the Newspaper	.0	.0	2.4	.8
	Total	Count	66	19	42	127
		Within Name of the Newspaper	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

In none of the articles is “old positively attributed and “new” is negatively attributed. In only one of 127 articles that referred to such a binary opposition, the comparison between “old” and “new” was neutral. The table also shows that there was no significant relationship

between the nature of the comparison between “old” and “new” and the name of the newspaper.⁴⁰⁸ This demonstrates that all three newspapers shared the same pro-republican stance and tried to contribute to the manufacture of consent for the new regime.

Table 22 shows that of all of the articles that made a comparison between the old and new, 52.8 percent were columns or commentaries. These mean that columnists and writers routinely and purposively made references to the new regime, praised its achievements and while doing this, they compared it to the old regime, which they disparaged. So they had the intent of persuading their readers along with the official perspective. In this sense, it is possible to argue that columns were instrumental in the promotion of the new regime in order to form a pro-republican public opinion.

Table 22. Comparison between Old and New, According to Article Type, in percentages

	News Article	Column or Commentary	Informative Article or Serial	Other	News Article
Count	33	67	24	3	127
Within Comparison Between “Old” and “New”	26.0	52.8	18.9	2.4	100.0

Apart from the comparison between the old and the new, in one in every three articles with a reference to nationalism and/or national identity; readers were reminded of the advances in the Turkish society. As Table 23 shows, 35.6 percent of the articles referred to change or progress, referring to a positive development in Turkish society or politics. The table also shows that there was a significant relationship between discussion of change or

⁴⁰⁸ The value of chi square obtained is 2.040, the degrees of freedom are 2, and the exact significance of the chi square is .361. This is well above the standard indicator of a significant result (alpha=.05).

progress and the newspaper.⁴⁰⁹ In *Cumhuriyet* and *Akşam* they were slightly more frequently referred than in *Son Posta*.

Table 23. References to Change or Progress According to Newspaper, in percentages

			<i>Cumhuriyet</i>	<i>Akşam</i>	<i>Son Posta</i>	Total
References to "Change" or "Progress"	Yes	Count	161	50	85	296
		By Newspaper	39.8	37.0	29.1	35.6
	No	Count	244	85	207	536
		By Newspaper	60.2	63.0	70.9	64.4
	Total	Count	405	135	292	832
		By Newspaper	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Additionally, Table 24 shows that there was a significant relationship between references to change or progress and year.⁴¹⁰ As the table indicates, they were twice more frequently referred in 1934 and 1935 compared to in 1936 and 1937.

Table 24. References to Change or Progress According to Years, in percentages

			1934	1935	1936	1937	Total
References to "Change" or "Progress"	Yes	Count	91	77	76	52	296
		By Year	53.8	51.7	29.0	20.6	35.6
	No	Count	78	72	186	200	536
		By Year	46.2	48.3	71.0	79.4	64.4
	Total	Count	169	149	262	252	832
		By Year	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

This shows once again that the republican project's reform policies were promoted as they were implemented. However, once they were completed in 1935, the enthusiasm about the reforms gradually decreased.

⁴⁰⁹ The value of chi square obtained is 8.536, the degrees of freedom are 2, and the exact significance of the chi square is .014. This is below the standard indicator of a significant result (alpha=.05).

⁴¹⁰ The value of chi square obtained is 70.944, the degrees of freedom are 3, and the exact significance of the chi square is .000. This is well below the standard indicator of a significant result (alpha=.05).

Returning to an analysis of the narration of the binary opposition in question, other significant discursive practices can be observed. For instance, it can be seen that in order to reaffirm the merits of the Republican regime as opposed to the Ottoman regime's weaknesses, category entitlements were used to construct consensus around the issue. Category entitlements appeared as in Potter's words, "certain categories of actors are treated as entitled to know particular sorts of things, and their reports and descriptions may thus be given special credence."⁴¹¹ In this case, foreign papers that are mostly published in Western countries were quoted frequently: "Turkey is not the old Turkey!" Wrote a significant article of *Gazette Worcester*: "Atatürk tries to change an agricultural country with a poor economy into a nation with the highest culture of the world." (*Cumhuriyet*, 19 August 1934, see Appendix 96); "The Dead and the Vigorous Turkey" a significant article of *Lö Nuvelist*: "It used to be said that Turkey would never change and would die without progress. However, it has not died. It has changed totally. How did this happen?" (*Cumhuriyet*, 25 October 1934, see Appendix 97); "An American magazine praises Turkey. The magazine "Asia" writes that great progress is seen even in the farthest reaches of our country." (*Cumhuriyet*, 11 August 1936, see Appendix 98)

Accordingly, some Western actors such as statesmen, intellectuals, or scientists also were given special credence and their opinions were highly appreciated when comparing the old and the new Turkey. This kind of a language of persuasion is also called a testimonial or "plain folks." The next piece is significant in terms of illustrating the testimonials:

The Swiss professor M. Maş begins his words by drawing the general overview of the republican Turkey and the main elements of the government of Atatürk and then talks about the present social situation of Turkish women. "Imagine that the veils were thrown away with a single sign and the women rushed to cafes to drink sitronad through a straw crossing their legs under the bewildered looks of men. No, there was a transition period there too. There was a period of scarves before the period of hats and the scarf period in the villages lasted a long time. Women hide their faces

⁴¹¹Jonathan Potter, *Representing Reality : Discourse, Rhetoric and Social Construction* (London ; Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1996), p. 114.

unconsciously when a man approaches. Modesty is still kept in cities, similar to villages. You can observe it even in the poor creatures who work in the factories during the day and sing in the bars at nights. The slaves of fashion, you should learn well that the elegant Turkish women of Istanbul are able to follow the fashion without being tasteless. The revolution in the civil life was realized with the acceptance of the Swiss Civil Code in February 1926. Thus, Turkish women have the same rights as our women now. They are even luckier because they are hired for jobs without the rivalry of men since the demand is supplied. There are women doctors, journalists, seven lawyers, many civil servants and 13 municipal police in Istanbul. Women with ambition and a real intelligence designate the intellectual treasures exported from the west. Their saloons are not the harems of the past but mostly the meeting place of those of Rambouillet lovers. The public is undergoing the same development. (*Son Posta*, 30 July 1934, see Appendix 99)

It is no coincidence that such techniques of persuasion appeared in the newspapers of the era, especially within the context of 1934 Law, according to which the press was invited to support and actively participate in the external propaganda of the new Turkey. For instance, another significant example is as follows: “The lies about us will be prevented (...) a French newspaper wrote about Tevfik Rüştü B. while reporting about these meetings: “Ottoman?” it has been years since Ottomanism was replaced with the living Turkey.” (*Son Posta*, 7 August 1934, see Appendix 100)

Another important discursive practice that can be observed while constructing a binary opposition between the past and the present was the reference to secularization. In this sense, the following piece on the Atatürk statue in Samsun is remarkable:

The statue in Samsun... We should not see it only as history. We should see it as a symbol of the bankruptcy of the medrese which had prohibited statues to the Turk for a thousand years and as a symbol of the compensation for the disappointment of art lasting for a thousand years. It is a statue made for the memory of the grand victory and it stands side by side with the creator of the great victory. The corpse of the mentality which deprived the Turk statue is buried under that monument. That statue is not only a statue, but also the end of the negativity of the past and the beginning of the positivity of the eternal future. (*Cumhuriyet*, 19 May 1937, see Appendix 101)

This excerpt analyzes the symbolic meaning of the statue within the context of secularization, while seeking to establish a new regime of truth. In his study on the Atatürk statues and the visualization of the official history, Faik Gür writes that the Atatürk statues

symbolized the termination of the Ottoman regime's approach towards the art of sculpture, which was shaped by religious precepts.⁴¹² Thus in the above quoted excerpt, it is possible to observe how this is appreciated and confirmed by *Cumhuriyet*.

Additionally, a recurring discursive subtheme theme that can be observed in relation to the Ottoman versus Republican dichotomy was formed around the Modernization-Europeanization-Westernization narrative. This narrative comes into focus especially around comparisons between the old and the new ways of life, or the old and the new tastes. In the content of 7.6 percent of the articles, Westernization was referred as a process of either adopting Western styles or Western norms, or abandoning Eastern styles or Eastern norms in relation to the formation of Turkish identity.

The modern, secular way of life that was promoted by the Republic was deeply appreciated in such cases and in most of the related excerpts this trilogy affirms the Ottoman versus Republican dichotomy:

During the last periods of the Ottoman Empire, when accounts were being settled, new Turkishness that protected and preserved its national life appeared to be a community that agreed on the principle of following the European style completely. Now here, there is a more advanced, laic life than in the most advanced European countries. Here, religion is completely independent in its own field. It does not interfere in the other beliefs and it is completely separate from governmental issues. (*Cumhuriyet*, 5 April 1935, see Appendix 102)

I went to Europe for the first time in 1909. At that time, when the spoke in Turkey, they were referring to a middle age empire with a community wearing fez, living in haremlik-selamlık and governed by the sultan and the caliph. We were not Europeans but Asians for them. (*Cumhuriyet*, 18 July 1936, see Appendix 103)

Especially taste in music was represented as the indicator of Europeanization and Westernization. The Kemalist reforms in music were thereby supported and propagated by the newspapers: "Turkish music is modernizing eventually too. The awkward voice presented to our ears as the Turkish style music had lately become unsuitable to none of our

⁴¹²Faik Gür, "Atatürk Heykelleri Ve Türkiye'de Resmî Tarihin Görselleşmesi," *Toplum ve Bilim* 90, no. Güz (2001): p. 153.

characteristics.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 3 December 1934, see Appendix 104); “The old music was neither Turkish nor western! (...) The young Turkey, which was looking for a new life and a new world, would not be humiliated with it.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 19 January 1935, see Appendix 105)

The new modern style of home decoration was also represented as a sign of the civilizing Republican move, on the basis of which an opportunity to compare the old and the new regimes was created:

The last Turkish salon of the sultanate period was a freak. By losing its national conscience but also being unable to westernize in any way, it was a great subject matter for those such as Pierre Loti. It turned into a monstrosity, consisting of millions of unrelated objects. (...) Today, our salon is completely modern. Objects related to foreign art and representing specific artistic periods are exhibited in cabinets. (*Cumhuriyet*, 26 November 1936, see Appendix 106)

While comparing the old days to the present, the Republican regime was also represented as the cure for long-lasting problems of the country, e.g. the conflict in Dersim: “The last house of feudality is being destroyed. The new soul, civilization and progress will be dominant in Tunceli, as in every corner of Turkey.” (*Son Posta*, 17 June 1937, see Appendix 107) In such cases, the discourse of progress or change was present as a cover to obscure the identity dimension of the problem. Within this framework, the following examples demonstrate how the official attitudes and discourses in relation to the construction of the national identity were reproduced in the newspapers.

Against Dersim, the Ottoman Empire could do almost nothing with its famous laziness, neither in the past nor during its late periods. (...) The governors of Dersim could never leave their positions on their own under the effects of centuries. A struggle like the present one was necessary: it is true that the Republic is putting everything in order. (*Son Posta*, 19 June 1937, see Appendix 108)

From now on, Dersim will be a city like the other cities of Turkey. The people there, like Turks everywhere, will be busy with their own work and they will be hardworking elements assisting the spread of European civilization throughout Asia. (*Son Posta*, 19 June 1937, see Appendix 109)

All in all, from education to urbanization, from navigation to the recognition of Turkishness, the newspapers' common narrative on changes and advances in many societal spheres was based closely on the "Ottoman versus Republican" dichotomy. Related discursive practices could be observed in nearly one in every third newspaper article with a reference to national identity. The mainstream newspapers commonly represented the Ottoman regime as stagnant, degenerate, passive and backward and the Republican regime as progressive, beatemest, active and toward looking. In some cases, this representation was further supported with a subtheme, namely that of the modernization, Europeanization and Westernization trilogy. The Ottoman and Republican regimes were discursively constructed as mutually exclusive binary opposites especially when covering the reform policies. So, this recurring discourse theme that the mainstream newspapers utilized in their coverage served as an important component while constructing the official national identity in the mid-1930s.

As a final note, in the construction of the dichotomy in question, the discussion of women's rights as the gift or favor of the Republican regime appears to have been an important element or indicator of progress. The women's issue, as a discourse theme, is discussed separately in the next section.

The Representation of Women in Relation to the National Identity

In the manufacturing of the Kemalist national identity, references to women had a significant gravity. A generally accepted discourse of Kemalism was that women were conceded rights from above. This dominant discourse has for long been criticized and rejected by feminist intellectuals, who take into consideration the first wave feminist movements that were effective in Turkey during the first two decades of the twentieth century.⁴¹³

⁴¹³Şirin Tekeli, "Birinci Ve İkinci Dalga Feminist Hareketlerin Karşılaştırılmalı İncelemesi Üzerine Bir Deneme," in *75 Yılda Kadınlar Ve Erkekler*, ed. Ayşe Berktaş Hacımiraçoğlu (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı 1998).

For instance, according to Ayşe Saktanber, the Kemalist argument that developed around the discourse of the concession of rights, implying a relationship of patronage between the state and women rendered the latter in a passive position. Saktanber argues that “such a discourse functioned as an ideological element that kept women from turning into active political individuals.”⁴¹⁴ Moreover, she writes that a second common discourse in relation to women’s rights was that they were approached as half of the population. According to her, in the early republican period, “although the equality between men and women was appreciated in terms of citizenship, this prevented dealing with problems in social life on the basis of gender differences.”⁴¹⁵

Within this framework, when the newspapers’ framings of women’s rights issue are examined, it is possible to observe that the same Kemalist discourse was affirmed, reproduced and diffused: “The Turkish woman has taken the most significant of rights. Turkish women are in great happiness and excitement.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 6 December 1934, see Appendix 110); “The right of voting and being elected given to Turkish women. Our women will use this right, which is desired by the women of many nations, more efficiently than men.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 6 December 1934, see Appendix 111); “Impressions from the congress. The victory of Turkish women. Yesterday, the women of the world applauded Turkish women who had been emancipated by Atatürk.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 19 April 1935, see Appendix 112), “The last decision of our party has given Turkish women a status superior to all nations in social and political life.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 5 December 1935, see Appendix 113)

Moreover, the discourse is further intensified with additional information and comments. For example, the sentence of a woman interviewed in the next excerpt is

⁴¹⁴ Ayşe Saktanber, "Kemalist Kadın Hakları Söylemi," in *Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce Cilt 2 Kemalizm* ed. Murat Gültekingil Tanıl Bora (İstanbul: İletişim, 2001), p. 325.

⁴¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 328-29.

remarkable. Her saying “if the ones, who gave us the right, call us” indicates that she still did not assume herself able to be “the one who could call women” despite having acquired the right to be a member of parliament.” The rightful joy of our women. Turkish women will be successful at the desk of the grand assembly too. “We will run for the defense of the country if the ones, who gave us the right of being a member of the assembly, call us for war.” (*Akşam*, 9 December 1934, see Appendix 114).

The issue of women’s rights was often covered as a subtheme under the discursive reproduction of the Ottoman versus Republican dichotomy:

The Republican regime has every right to be proud for giving back the rights of Turkish women, which had been stolen and grudged, among the other thousands of favors it has done in Turkey. There is no doubt in Turkey’s being a major country. (*Cumhuriyet*, 23 February 1935, see Appendix 115);

“The life styles of Turkish women have changed. The Turkish woman of today is free as a human and free in her ideas and behavior.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 26 December 1936, see Appendix 116);

One of the galleries in the exhibition will be the gallery of Turkish women. The paintings in one of the corners of the gallery will describe Turkish women in the Ottoman period. What kind of rights did the Turkish revolution give to Turkish women? There will be some paintings exploring this idea in another corner of the gallery. (*Akşam*, 7 November 1934, see Appendix 117)

In such cases, the Ottoman period was handled as a period of negligence toward the existence of women in the public sphere. As seen in the next excerpt, such an argument was often fortified with a discursive practice by the means of which women were addressed directly:

Turkish woman, you should be happy and proud! Because ten years ago chador used to hide your body, the veil used to hide your face, isolation used to hide your identity and the harem used to hide your existence from the rest of the world like a shame. (...) In ten years’ time, you have left the harem, destroyed the cage, thrown away the cover and torn the veil. The sultanate thought you were only worthy of street cleaning and counting stamps in the post office when the men were away in the war. On the other

hand, the Republican regime has placed you near the men, if you like, elevated you to the level of men. (*Cumhuriyet*, 7 February 1935, see Appendix 118)

On the women's issue, the comparison between the Ottoman and the Republican periods can be observed in the following excerpt, around the metaphor of radium. On the basis of that metaphor, other metaphors were also put into action, such as "treasure" that had been discovered by the Republic and "cage" that had imprisoned women during the Ottoman periods.

Radium and Turkish women (...) Why does radium remind me of Turkish women? Let me explain: Radium has always been in nature, but was not known. Likewise, Turkish woman was a treasure in society, but her value was not appreciated. Before radium was discovered there was a hypothesis in the science world. They believed that elements like iron, plumbic or copper did not and could not mix with each other. According to this hypothesis only iron could be produced from iron and plumbic from plumbic. There was an opinion like this about Turkish women. According to this opinion, she was like an elegant bird living in a cage and she could only give birth to little nightingales like herself and she was not capable of giving birth to modern women playing modern roles in life, pursuing her duties or being successful. (*Cumhuriyet*, 8 June 1937, see Appendix 119)

In order to build a public opinion around the women's issue, the newspapers often shared the statements of the officials by means of giving a lot of space to their speeches. The newspapers thereby functioned as mediators in the process of the manufacturing of popular consent:

Turkish woman in peace and war... the place and the duties of women in all these works are highlighted with their deepest meaning in the short statements of Atatürk. We have solved the problem of women by regarding them as the half of the community life. Men constitute only the half of social life in every area from family life to national life. (*Cumhuriyet*, 1 May 1935, see Appendix 120)

Nuri Conker, one of the deputy chairmen of the general assembly, gave a speech after this congress. He said: Poor women are portrayed being women who have nothing in this context. On the contrary, the creature called woman is an elevated entity. She cannot be poor. To call her poor is to call all humanity coming out of her poor. If humanity is poor, calling women poor can be seen as proper. Is this the reality? Is it possible to call her poor, if she raised all the people who have worked and have become rich, successful and made the others rich materially and morally? Is it not true to call them ungrateful those who call her poor? For the Republic of Turkey, woman is an elevated and honorable entity in the highest position and over everything today as

she has been so all throughout Turkish history. We have to show our respect to Turkish woman by standing in front of her whose significant existence and virtue have been forgotten recently. (*Akşam*, 1 May 1935, see Appendix 121)

Nevertheless, some hesitations were voiced as in the following excerpt that called attention to the difference between holding and using rights: “This is the problem: Will Turkish woman be able to make use of her rights? Making use of rights is something different from having rights.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 6 December 1934, see Appendix 122)

Saktanber also discusses that Kemalism developed an understanding of “Republican woman” as a symbol of modernization.⁴¹⁶ The “Republican woman” stereotypes were often portrayed in the articles as role models for the women of the nation. Those women usually had professions, were always visible in public life, and they were represented as being devoted to the Republic. They thereby semiotically functioned as the metonyms of Turkish women. Here are some examples: “A Turkish girl in America! Selma, the granddaughter of Namık Kemal, has succeeded in introducing Turkey and its revolutions at numerous conferences, by going to America five times.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 4 June 1935, see Appendix 123); “Ms. Melahat, the Turkish female equestrian who took part in the competitions in Peşte, took good scores in this competition and proved to the whole world that the Turkish woman is successful in this area, too.” (*Akşam*, 29 June 1935, see Appendix 124); “Ms. Melahat is back from Germany. The Turkish woman who had won the first place seven times said, “I have fallen off 52 times, but even the most frightening accidents did not discourage me” (*Akşam*, 19 October 1936, see Appendix 125); “Among the working women: The first woman pharmacist of Turkey, Ms Belkıs, tells about her life.” (*Son Posta*, 23 March 1937, see Appendix 126); “The success of a Turkish girl in the American art world.” (*Son Posta*, 8 May 1937, see Appendix 127)

⁴¹⁶Ibid., p. 327.

Female pilots especially were given credence because their semiotic function was not only limited to being metonyms of Turkish women, but also metonyms of the entire Republican project: “The Turkish girl flying a glider says: “My ideal? To see an air fleet composed of Turkish girls in our skies. I feel almost sick and a great deficiency when I am not flying.” (*Akşam*, 30 April 1937, see Appendix 128); “Sabiha Gökçen is an example not only for young Turkish women, but also for all Turkish youth.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 31 May 1937, see Appendix 129); “The Turkish winged Amazon. Sabiha Gökçen, our air heroine, gave homage to Atatürk in Yalova. (...) Gökçen, while you fly with the unbroken wings of Turks, we Turkish women who are your sisters, will try to be successful on the land and on the sea besides the air and try to deserve the high dignity of Turkishness.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 23 June 1937, see Appendix 130)

Another crucial discourse observed in the newspapers functioned through comparisons between Western and Turkish women. The underlying argument of such comparisons appears to have been that thanks to the Republic, Turkish women were way beyond women of the Western countries: “Meetings with the women of the world. ‘We seriously admire Turkish women’ an English woman said.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 10 April 1935, see Appendix 131); ‘Bulgarian women are jealous of Turkish women.’ A woman journalist said: “We are behind Turkish women and we are jealous of them.” (*Son Posta*, 22 September 1936, see Appendix 132)

When this argument is examined intertextually, it is possible to remark that it functioned as a concrete indicator of the possibility of the realization of the Kemalist objective to reach and go beyond Western level of civilization. At the same time it also displays the self-orientalist perception of the newspapers that Turkish elements were indeed imagined to be hierarchically in a lower position vis-à-vis Western elements, and that the women’s issue represented a deviation from normality:

Turkish woman, be happy and proud! The French newspaper *Le Matin* published the photograph above and wrote in big letters yesterday: “French women should

vote!”...While this photograph was published in famous French newspapers, we publish the names and the photographs of the women who were nominated to the position of deputy members by Kemal Atatürk. French women are even deprived of the right to vote for the municipality, let alone the right to be elected deputy member. Turkish women, you should be happy and proud of being raised above French woman, who are the mother of liberty, in ten years. (*Cumhuriyet*, 7 February 1935, see Appendix 133)

Besides, the women’s issue was framed along with the discourse of the re-possession of the national conscience, which had been forgotten for centuries under the influence of Islam during the Ottoman rule. In line with this discourse, references were made to social life in Central Asia, the original homeland of pre-Islamic Turks of thousands of years earlier:

There has been no period in Turkish history in which you could see Turkish women addicted to adornment. Turkish women could be seen going to war riding horses next to men, ploughing and harvesting, doing the works of the nation during the periods when our ancestors became famous in thousands of countries. (*Akşam*, 8 December 1934, see Appendix 134)

In this way, women’s rights were represented as both the symbol of re-secularization and re-nationalization, as an appropriate part of the re-acquisition of the Turkish national essence:

The high position of women during the entire existence of Turks. Women constitute half of this huge nation. The Turkish woman is an entity on her own as the daughter, mother, and the minister of the internal affairs of the house. It was the same in the darkness of veils and in the slavery of seclusion until recently. Today, after the Turkish woman has gained all her rights, it is even better than before. The history is there! The Turkish woman is an elevated entity who has influence in keeping the nation in order. The place of the woman was on the right of the khan in the national council and her word could be said to have been superior to that of the khan’s. (*Cumhuriyet*, 23 February 1935, see Appendix 135)

Another topic of discussion with respect to the representation of Turkish women was the issue of physical appearance. The next two excerpts are significant in terms of exposing the newspaper’s concerns about the physical proportions of Turkish women: “Do some Turkish girls have deficient bodies?” (*Son Posta*, 30 November 1934, see Appendix 136); “The bodies of our women... Are they beautiful or do they have deformities? The average

body proportions of Turkish women matches those of American women.” (*Son Posta*, 13 July 1934, see Appendix 137). Another excerpt reflects the anger regarding the accusation that Turkish women were ugly, glorifying their moral characteristics.

An Italian newspaper has been disparaging Turkish women recently. Writing that “The disfigurement of Turkish women, who have been seen as figures in novels, lived in songs, and loved by many, was revealed when she threw away her turban.” The newspaper concluded its comment saying that “Turkish women are ugly!” We have a word to say to this newspaper: Signor! The Turkish woman is the friendliest woman in the world. She is unique in her fidelity to her man, her meticulousness about her home, and her motherhood. We would never trade her for your beauty. (*Son Posta*, 25 January 1935, see Appendix 138)

For instance, in all the excerpts on physical appearance, it is likely that “Turkish women” as an abstract concept were approached as a monolithic group of individuals, composed of identical peculiarities both physically and morally. The next excerpt, on the other hand, is noteworthy since it argues that Turkish women are supposed to be modest physically, and that they should not adorn themselves as befit the ideal of the “Republican woman”:

The coquette woman and the working woman. One of the newspapers used this headline in large letters in order to share the happiness of women: “the coquette woman of yesterday is a member of the parliament today...” We think that our friend is wrong... The Turkish woman has never been coquette and she should not be! (*Aksam*, 8 December 1934, see Appendix 139)

In the framing of all the related excerpts, the male gaze appears to have been the agent that shaped the discourse. Moreover, the male gaze seems to have created hierarchy, implying that the male journalist was superior to his female object, possessing the right to impose on women his ideas on how to behave or how to appear. In the following excerpt, the advice to women was most probably written by the columnist himself, who tried to downplay his self-interest in the story that he told. The letter said to have been posted by a village woman seems to have been spurious:

The advice of a village woman to our ladies... From now on we have to take suitable steps knowing the meaning of this huge advance. It is not a suitable time to follow

fashion. Creative Turkish women should not remember or copy it. We should protect our national economic existence. Let us make our hands the translators of the beauties emanating from our souls. Let us embroider. Let us send our embroideries as examples everywhere. (*Son Posta*, 12 February 1935, see Appendix 140)

When it comes to the frequencies of the discourse theme under scrutiny, it is found that of all the articles that referred to national identity or nationalism in their manifest content, 9.8 percent also referred to Turkish woman or women. The most significant finding is that in 71.2 percent of the articles that referred to woman or women, women were referred around the issue of the legal rights conceded to them or their involvement in public life. This is illustrated in Table 25, which indicates no significant relationship between the way “woman” or “women” were referred, along with the name of the newspaper.⁴¹⁷ This means that for all the three mainstream newspapers, discussing women openly had an instrumental role in promoting the new regime and in constructing a modern national identity on the basis of concession of rights or involvement in public life.

Table 25. The Way “Woman/Women” are Referred According to Newspapers in Percentages

			<i>Cumhuriyet</i>	<i>Akşam</i>	<i>Son Posta</i>	Total
How “Woman/Women” are Referred to	Rights or Involvement in Public Life	Count	29	13	15	57
		Within Name of the Newspaper	72.5	86.7	60.0	71.2
	Other	Count	11	2	10	23
		Within Name of the Newspaper	27.5	13.3	40.0	28.8
	Total	Count	40	15	25	80
		Within Name of the Newspaper	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

⁴¹⁷ The value of chi square obtained is 3.316, the degrees of freedom are 2, and the exact significance of the chi square is .191. This is well above the standard indicator of a significant result (alpha=.05).

To gain a further insight into the representation of the Turkish national identity in terms of women, it may be illuminating to make a comparison between the discursive practices of the following three excerpts in which ordinary women are referred:

A patriotic Turkish woman. She has donated all her fortune to the Turkish Association of Planes (*Cumhuriyet*, 5 May 1935, see Appendix 141)

The offering of a Turkish woman for the military... Emine, who had longed for a child, years ago, gave birth to a boy and called him Musa.... She said, "If my son grows up and becomes this age and becomes a soldier, I will sacrifice a ram for the war office. (*Son Posta*, 14 August 1936, see Appendix 142)

A mother who wants to kill her children. We wonder whether this miserable woman is insane. The day before yesterday, a social tragedy made one shiver. (*Son Posta*, 6 August 1934, see Appendix 143)

It can be observed that the women in the first two excerpts are referred to as "Turkish woman." It is clear that ordinary women are qualified as Turkish and are given place in the newspaper pages when they perform a behavior worthy of commendation. Whereas, as third excerpt illustrates, the emphasis on the "Turkish"ness of the woman is effaced because of her disgraceful behavior. Labeling a woman "Turkish" thus is a discursive practice that is used only if the woman under consideration possesses morally upright virtues. Accordingly, ordinary women could only be considered worthy to be referred "Turkish" by performing behavior approved of by the journalists, who tacitly positioned themselves as the mediators of the national ethics. As a final remark, it may thus be illuminating to quote from Fatmagül

Berktag:

Henceforth, is no longer religion or tradition that determines the behavioral conduct for women, it is rather the nation state itself. (...) Now that the "Ottoman," the bygone father has perished, who used to impede "Turk" to reach his age of consent by suppressing his "inner substance"; the "new man" is supposed to be liable to the state, and the "new woman" to the "new man".⁴¹⁸

⁴¹⁸ Fatmagül Berktag, "Doğu İle Batının Birleştiği Yer: Kadın İmgesinin Kurgulanışı," in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce Cilt 3 Modernleşme ve Batıcılık*, ed. Murat Gültekinil and Tanıl Bora (İstanbul: İletişim, 2002), pp. 278-79. "Artık kadınlar için doğru olan davranış kalıplarını belirleyen din ya da gelenek değil, ulus devletin kendisidir. (...) 'Türkün cevherini baskı altında tutarak rüşdünü engelleyen heyula, Osmanlı', mazideki baba, artık olmadığına göre, 'yeni adam' devlete, 'yeni kadın' da 'yeni adam'a bağlılıkla yükümlüdür."

So, the representation of “Turkish woman / women” as a discursive subtheme mainly had a function of strengthening other discursive practices, such as the “Ottoman versus Republican” dichotomy, the myth of resurrection, and the framing of the new Republic in relation to Westernization, modernization, and Europeanization processes. In addition, the portrayal of the new Turkish Woman conveyed patriarchal norms, according to which women were represented as objects rather than subjects of historical and social change.

The Representation of Youth and Children

Physical training will be very efficacious for the Turkish youth. Thanks to physical training, both the military and all the youth will become healthy and thereby provide valuable service to the country. In addition to that, physical training will be a suitable incentive to keep the youth away from moral depravation.

İsmet İnönü, 1923⁴¹⁹

In the construction of the Turkish national identity, children and youth especially were attributed crucial roles in the wellbeing and permanence of the nation state. As Chris Barker remarks, “Youth is not a universal category of biology. (...) As a cultural construct, the meaning of youth alters across time and space according to who is being addressed by whom. Youth is a discursive construct.”⁴²⁰ Yiğit Akın writes that physical education and sport policies in the early Republic should be approached as a component of social policy within the context of the evolution of the modern state.⁴²¹

⁴¹⁹İsmet İnönü’s speech published in a sports magazine in 1923. Quoted in Yiğit Akın, “Cumhuriyet Döneminde Beden Terbiyesi Ve Spor Politikaları,” *Toplum ve Bilim* 103(2005): p. 59. “İdmanın Türk gençliği için pek çok faydaları olacak, gerek ordu ve gerek bütün gençler idman sayesinde iyi bir sıhhat sahibi olarak vatana ve memlekete kıymetli hizmet edecekler ve idman gençleri mesavi-i ahlâkiyeden kurtarmak için iyi bir amil olacaktır.”

⁴²⁰Barker, *Cultural Studies Theory and Practice*, pp. 375-76.

⁴²¹Akın, “Cumhuriyet Döneminde Beden Terbiyesi Ve Spor Politikaları,” p. 55.

Akın argues that such policies retained similarities to those in the rest of the world, in the sense that “the physical training activities were designed as powerful tools of equipping the youth with the necessary physical and mental skills for military service and industrial development.”⁴²² By examining the concept of youth in the newspapers of the mid-1930s, it is observed that in line with the political context of the period, youth were imagined or addressed by the nation state as a homogenous group of mostly male individuals, whose main duty was to pursue physical health in order to serve as potential citizens and soldiers whenever the country needed them:

Ankara Stadium and Turkish sport... This stadium is a temple to raising Turkish generations for their ideals of national future and at the same time a symbol to lead the Turkish youth ... To turn the Turkish nation into an energetic entity consisting of brave and fit men and women from childhood and youth. (*Cumhuriyet*, 13 January 1937, see Appendix 144)

A remarkable discursive practice around the issue at stake is that the newspapers’ messages addressed to the youth often aimed to get them do something. One should remember that any act of communication has three main components: the addresser communicates a message to an addressee. For instance, according to Jacobson’s model of communication, every communicative act tends to emphasize one or more of its constituent dimensions and that addressee-centered communication is directive.⁴²³ The following pieces are remarkable in terms of illustrating this discourse in relation to the addresser-addressee relationship and functions of address. The youth were often addressed in terms of the necessity of discipline and they were given advice by journalists on the indispensability of sports, i.e. the communicative act is often addressee centered and directive:

Sports have an importance for Turks as great as food. Can a nation rise without doing sports? It makes the softening arms and narrowing chests like steel. Sports, always sports! My son! The sportsman is a soldier: orders must be carried out! Sportsmen are

⁴²²Ibid., p. 56 and the abstract in English in p.290.

⁴²³Arthur Asa Berger, *Essentials of Mass Communication Theory*, (London: Sage, 1995), pp. 14-16.

always the first in the world. It makes the body active, sports, always sports! Let your muscles be stretched, your blood be boiled. You will get younger; let us do sports summer and winter! The child who does not do sports cannot be a Turk. If you wish, ask the world. Sports, always sports! (*Cumhuriyet*, 26 August 1936, see Appendix 145)

Advice to the Turkish youth: You should love your health, country, work, and nature. Sport is the magical spell for eternal youth. It is a shame not to be fit. It is necessary to stay healthy while getting older. A young head can only stand on fit and strong shoulders. No one likes those who do not seem attractive. If something is beautiful, it is liked. Sit straight, speak honestly. (*Cumhuriyet*, 19 May 1937, see Appendix 146)

Advice to the Turkish youth: a beautiful person is a good person. Your most precious commodity is your body. Healthy body-healthy head-beautiful person. Two conditions for beauty: cheerfulness and movement. Be cheerful: you will stay young. We will all laugh today. Health is the greatest happiness. A fit body is the greatest work of nature. Try to be perfect. There is a doctor everywhere where there's not daylight. (*Cumhuriyet*, 19 May 1937, see Appendix 147)

This kind of a directive communicative act was common in the 1930s. The RPP's policies regarding the organization of the youth were influenced by the European totalitarian regimes: "The youth are becoming attached to the organization. The youth of the country will be educated under a strict discipline. Special contests are being organized for 18-years old." (*Son Posta*, 8 December 1934, see Appendix 148)

For example, in Italy, Mussolini's Cultural Revolution, which was part of a broader totalitarian society project, sought to create the "new man," defined as masculine, belligerent and brave.⁴²⁴ The Republican regime's image of the youth possessed similar features. In the 1935 Congress of the RPP, the issue of sports and youth organization appeared an important point of discussion. In 1936, sports issues were directly linked to the RPP central administration, and starting from 1938, the school boys were obliged to participate in physical training.⁴²⁵

⁴²⁴ Ahmet Kuyaş, *Tarih 1839-1939*, p. 374.

⁴²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 354.

Additionally, as the potential defenders of the country, the youth were often referred in the newspapers with regard to military duty and soldiership:

A Turkish youth says... I have received a letter from a young person named Turgut Evren, one of my precious readers, written in an excited manner suitable for a faithful Turkish youth. ... Older people like me cannot express the feelings of the Turkish youth, who will fight against the enemy, God bless, when there is a war tomorrow, with the same honest excitement. (*Cumhuriyet*, 18 July 1936, see Appendix 149)

Being a soldier was represented as a natural, inevitable step in the development of the masculine Turkish identity:

The Turkish soldier. The child becomes a man listening to the advice of his ancestors and finds himself in the famous army! The Turkish youth becomes soldier. Being a soldier is difficult. I think, soldiership is the only religion for the nation. The motherland is saved in this way, the Turkish youth becomes a soldier. (*Cumhuriyet*, September 27, 1936, see Appendix 150)

Accordingly, the military school and the army are given special importance and they are often referred in relation to Turkish youth. These institutions are represented as if they were sacred or magical places that function to manufacture the prototype of the Turkish masculinity: "The Turkish army is such a school that the Turkish youth becomes steel in its fire."(*Cumhuriyet*, 17 May 1935, see Appendix 151)

Among the heroes of today and tomorrow. The Turkish youths coming from all over the country and the world are busy with the term preparations for the Military School. This building was not constructed for staying empty. When there is no action here there is only agony. (*Cumhuriyet*, 24 May 1937, see Appendix 152)

Young Turkish military officers (...) All were equal: there was no way to distinguish their faces. These a few hundred brave Turkish young men were like as if they had lost their identities. I thought the whole country was parading in front of me! (*Son Posta*, 2 September 1936, see Appendix 153)

On the other hand, unlike in the references to sports, it is possible to observe that sometimes journalists did not directly expose themselves as consultants, but they usually appear to have been reproducing and mediating the advices of Atatürk. The reproduction of the official perspective toward youth was thereby realized:

The Institute of the Turkish Bird (Türk Kuşu)⁴²⁶ was opened with a speech by Atatürk... The Turk, who walks around the mountains, forests, plains, seas, and every corner of the country with self-confidence and knowledge should be able to do so under the skies of the country. It only begins with making the Turkish youth from their childhood accustomed to racing with the birds in the skies of the country. ... The Turkish child: You will take your place quickly in the highest position waiting for you in the skies, as you do in every area. Our real friends will be happy about this. So will be the Turkish nation. (*Akşam*, 4 May 1935, see Appendix 154)

Atatürk called the Turkish youth to duty!... after the opening ceremony, the grand leader called Turkish youth to take the elevated and precious places on the land waiting for them as well as in the air and in the sea, while he was giving a precious speech. (*Son Posta*, 4 May 1935, see Appendix 155)

Atatürk entrusts the Turkish youth with the republic. He says: The result that we have in our hands today is the awakening of the national calamities we had bore for centuries and the compensation of the blood that had been spilled in every corner of this country. I entrust the Turkish youth with this result. (*Son Posta*, 29 October 1936, see Appendix 156)

In addition, the youth were imagined to be the future Turkish generation equipped with all the necessary qualifications to ensure the endurance of not only the nation state, but also the revolutionary principles: “The Turkish youths who have been raised by Atatürk will prove that they are the elements of the Turkish revolution by trying to be like İbni Sina.⁴²⁷” (*Son Posta*, 22 June 1937, see Appendix 157); “Turkish intelligence, taste, and art would work uninterruptedly and mature the essence provided. The most beautiful works of the Atatürk era could be presented to the appreciation and the taste of the future only by the Turkish youths who have been educated.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 20 June 1937, see Appendix 158)

On every possible occasion, the Turkish youth were addressed and/or interpellated by Mustafa Kemal and the newspapers functioned as mediators that delivered Mustafa Kemal’s messages to the youth: “A night in the public house of Ankara. The significant speech of

⁴²⁶Türk Kuşu is a flight school that was founded by Mustafa Kemal on May 3, 1935.

⁴²⁷ In Atatürk’s speech İbni Sina is presumably referred as an inspiring Eastern philosopher, who was influential in the development of Western science. İbni Sina (980-1037), known as Avicenna in the West, is described in the Encyclopedia Britannica as follows: “The most famous and influential of the philosopher-scientists of the medieval Islamic world. He was particularly noted for his contributions in the fields of Aristotelian philosophy and medicine. He composed the *Kitāb al-shifā* (Book of the Cure), a vast philosophical and scientific encyclopaedia, and *Al-Qānūn fī al-ṭib* (The Canon of Medicine), which is among the most famous books in the history of medicine.”

Atatürk to the youth: “I am happy to entrust this country to you one day, to a youth like you who knows me well. It is my right to ask you to follow my target while I am still alive.” (*Akşam*, 1 April 1937, see Appendix 159); “Atatürk guided the youth once more. The meeting at the Commerce School took place last night. The grand chief expressed his trust in the youth. Our prime minister praised especially the students. (*Cumhuriyet*, 17 January 1937, see Appendix 160)

Children were also given the responsibility to maintain the country and to guarantee the future of the nation:

Namık Kemal used to cry whenever he saw the army or Turkish children. Mr. Ubeydullah, the deputy of Beyazıt, told me. I asked its reason. He said: “Is it possible not to be excited and not to cry if you see these two great entities?” That is true. People think and feel a lot when they look at the meaningful faces of the school children, the owners of tomorrow. (*Son Posta*, 24 October 1936, see Appendix 161)

However, unlike the youth who were mostly referred in terms of physical health and being soldiers, children were often referred in terms of modern, secular and standardized education: “A common education for the nation’s children. No matter which class they are from, they should be given a ‘common education’.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 16 May 1935, see Appendix 162). “An elementary school in this region of Çukurova would be a sun eternally shining. The small and cute Ceyhan, from whose lands thousands of gold are produced, would be a garden of happiness for Turkish children.” (*Son Posta*, 13 January 1935, see Appendix 163). “The need for a grand revolution in the primary education. We have to prepare an independent and more detailed primary school programme especially beneficial for workmanship for the children who have no opportunity to have further education after primary school.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 29 May 1937, see Appendix 164)

Sometimes economically disadvantaged children were portrayed. As a national mission, readers were invited to concern their situation since they were imagined to be the children of the whole nation: “A duty of compassion waiting for every Turk. The war of

protecting the poor Turkish children.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 28 November 1936, see Appendix 165); “Turkish children and the primary education (...) Ahmed is only 10 years old. He tries to earn money in order to run his home and to send his seven year old brother to the school.” (*Son Posta*, 5 January 1935, see Appendix 166)

Last, on some occasions, journalists directly addressed children in order to inculcate into their minds the idea of nationhood and the ideal of Turkish nationalism:

The Illustrated Article: The most beautiful flag of the world is the Turkish flag. ... Turkish children, think about your history. Remember that in the places, deprived of the protection of the Turkish flag, the Turkish community gets weak as well. Embrace your flag with all your strength because its life is above all our lives. (*Son Posta*, 23 April 1937, see Appendix 167)

The National Sovereignty and Children’s Holiday. For children: National sovereignty is an ideal. For this ideal to be realized, you and the next generation must comprehend its meaning completely. You love Atatürk and pay your debt to him as much as you understand its meaning well and completely. Because this is his ideal. For adults: This is the first day of the children’s week. I wish celebrating children’s year instead of a week and there had been an extra hour in everyday of the year for children. When we turn the necessity of work into a national religion, we will have done the nicest service for this beautiful country. (*Son Posta*, 23 April 1937, see Appendix 168)

When the frequency of topics are examined, Table 26 shows that 8.2 percent of the articles with a nationalist framing, refer to youth or children in relation to national identity.

Table 26: References to Youth or Children According to Newspapers, in Percentages

			<i>Cumhuriyet</i>	<i>Akşam</i>	<i>Son Posta</i>	Total
References to “Youth” or “Children”	Yes	Count	45	7	16	68
		Within Name of the	11.1	5.2	5.5	8.2
	No	Count	360	128	276	764
		Within Name of the	88.9	94.8	94.5	91.8
	Total	Count	405	135	292	832
		Within Name of the Newspaper	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

In most of these articles, youth are referred as abstract age groups referred as the addressees informed about the desired peculiarities of national identity in terms of moral

values or physical appearance. The table also shows that there is a significant relationship between references to youth or children and the name of the newspaper.⁴²⁸ In *Cumhuriyet*, they are more frequently referred than in *Akşam* and *Son Posta*. In this respect, it can be said that *Cumhuriyet* took upon itself the mission of delivering the national message to the youth more voluntarily than the other two mainstream newspapers. It should not be forgotten that Yunus Nadi, the editor-in-chief of the newspaper was at the same time the Muğla deputy of the RPP, and therefore *Cumhuriyet* occasionally used to be more openly dedicated to supporting the policies of the party.

Table 27 shows that there is a significant relationship between the references to youth or children and year.⁴²⁹ They were most frequently referred in 1937. For instance, the priority that was given to the physical training of the youth could be observed in RPP's *People's Houses 1937 Anniversary Leaflet*, which reported the annual performance of people's houses.⁴³⁰ Consequently, on June 1938, The Law of Physical Training was adopted and General Directorate of Physical Training was established accordingly.⁴³¹ In the *People's Houses 1932-1942 Decadal Performance Leaflet*, Law No. 3961 was introduced as follows:⁴³²

In the making of the People's Houses, sports and physical training are handled as important elements related to our cause of national culture and significant efforts are made. Then, it was decided to spread this ideal throughout the country by founding a

⁴²⁸ The value of chi square obtained is 9.087, the degrees of freedom are 2, and the exact significance of the chi square is .011. This is below the standard indicator of a significant result (alpha=.05).

⁴²⁹ The value of chi square obtained is 10.186, the degrees of freedom are 3, and the exact significance of the chi square is .017. This is below the standard indicator of a significant result (alpha=.05).

⁴³⁰ *Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi Genel Sekreterliği, 1937 Yıldönümü Broşürü Geçen Yılda Halkevleri Nasıl Çalıştı?*(Ankara, 1938).

⁴³¹ *Beden Terbiyesi Kanunu No. 3961, 29.6.1938*, http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/tutanaklar/KANUNLAR_KARARLAR/kanuntbmmc018/kanuntbmmc018/kanuntbmmc01803530.pdf

⁴³² C.H.P, *Halk Evleri ve Halk Odaları 1932-1942*(Ankara, 1942).

related institution. Accordingly, the RPP nationalized physical training by the Law of Physical Training.

Table 27. References to Youth or Children According to Years, in Percentages

			1934	1935	1936	1937	Total
References to "Youth" or "Children"	Yes	Count	12	8	16	32	68
		Within Year	7.1	5.4	6.1	12.7	8.2
	No	Count	157	141	246	220	764
		Within Year	92.9	94.6	93.9	87.3	91.8
	Total	Count	169	149	262	252	832
		Within Year	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

1937 was therefore significant in the sense that during this whole year, the training of youth and especially physical training were major issues for the RPP and thereby the newspapers often brought the issue onto the agenda.

Thus one can conclude that the newspapers shared and promoted the regime's perspective on the youth and agenda about the youth. In line with the interwar context of the 1930s, the youth were given the mission to guarantee the present and future existence and maintenance of both the state and the regime. The regime addressed the Turkish youth with a directive tone and the newspapers mediated the regime's directives and advices. By serving as communicative grounds of meaning, the newspapers called both youth and children to social interaction on the basis of their roles as the nation's children. In this sense, the "Youth and children" as a discursive subtheme was crucial for the consolidation of the Turkish national identity via the mainstream newspapers.

The Representation of Armed Forces

In the newspapers of the 1930s, the army, a considerable actor in the reproduction of nationalism, was often represented as both the source and guarantor of the national

independence and sovereignty. The following excerpt reflects the underlying discourse with regard to its central role: “Always the army! Rights can only be attained and protected by weapons. There is no other way to protect them! ... The Turkish infantry proceeds with strong steps that shake the ground.” (Mahmut Esad Bozkurt, *Son Posta*, 18 August 1936, see Appendix 169) This excerpt is from an editorial written for *Son Posta* by Mahmut Esat Bozkurt who, as a lawyer and a theoretician, was one of the leading figures of the founding elite.

In an article on the relation between militarism and Turkish nationalism, Altınay and Bora remind that militarism and nationalism had become intertwined ideologies not only in Turkey, but also in the development of all modern nation states.⁴³³ They added that in Turkey, unlike in other nation states, starting from the period of Atatürk, the army had been ascribed a super ordinate status as the guardian of the “regime”.⁴³⁴ The army was usually represented accordingly as “the dear child of the regime” (*Son Posta*, 23 August 1934, see Appendix 170). In the newspapers discourses, the army was referred as an institution esteemed by the whole nation. For instance, the coverage of the RPP’s 1936 Party Congress was an occasion to remember this esteemed institution: “The trust and respect submitted to the army by the Party Congress are the most honest feelings of the whole nation, all Turkishness.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 17 May 1935, see Appendix 171); “The National Party declared its trust and respects to the brave Turkish army” (*Cumhuriyet*, 16 May 1935, see Appendix 172).

In another article on a possible aerial attack, a threat that was often brought onto the agenda within the interwar context was the government’s attention to the army: “The issues related to the Turkish army and the navy will be handled by the government budget in an

⁴³³ Ayşe Gül Altınay and Tanıl Bora, "Ordu, Militarizm Ve Milliyetçilik," in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce Cilt 4 Milliyetçilik*, eds. Murat Gültekinil, Tanıl Bora (İstanbul: İletişim, 2002), pp. 140-41.

⁴³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 140.

attentive way from now on as it always has been.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 20 June 1935, see Appendix 173).

Additionally, as can be observed in the following statement, the army appears to have been approached as a fourth element in the equation nation state party:

Trust and respect for the brave army (...) The Turkish army is the apple of the eye of the Turkish nation. The army and the nation are not separate entities. The army takes its power from the nation. The nation gives life and blood to the army. The army depends upon the nation and the nation trusts the army. (...) The Turkish army is not only the protector of the order and the guardian of the peace: The Turkish army is the vanguard of the revolution and the flag bearer of the modernizing attempts. (*Cumhuriyet*, 17 May 1935, see Appendix 174)

Furthermore, as a discursive practice, in the news articles the whole Turkish nation or all citizens were represented as firm and fervid admirers of the army. Thereby, love for the army was normalized and became a common value: “The parade was yesterday. Millions of citizens applauded the Turkish army for hours. A complete vividness was obvious among the army. We can be proud of our motor vehicles.” (*Akşam*, 17 August 1936, see Appendix 175). “The heroic Turkish army is always powerful! Turkish nation, with its generous soul and generous hand, revealed its love for its army again by presenting 26 planes this year.” (*Son Posta*, 21 August 1934, see Appendix 176). “Our grand festival! Istanbul came together with the heroic army that had saved its life ten years ago today.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 6 October 1934, see Appendix 177).

The army is represented as a symbol that stands for the heroic history of the Turks. Accordingly, the army was portrayed as an institution through which the knowledge about the continuity between all the previous Turkish states was maintained:

The soldiers of Gazi Mustafa Kemal are just like the soldiers of Mete, Attilâ, Alp Aslan, Timur, Yıldırım and Yavuz in terms of bravery. They are even more conscious and altruistic heroes... Now, the Republican government equips these innate features of Turkish people with modern arms and scientific knowledge. (From an informative serial by Abidin Daver on Çanakkale War titled “Bayonet to Bayonet with the Turks in Çanakkale” *Cumhuriyet*, 7 November 1934, see Appendix 178)

Turkish armies... The Turkish army is not a simple army. It is an entity which has affected the whole world history and decided on its destiny. The army is making maneuvers and it is as if Turkish history and the whole history are watching it. The campaign of Italy, Vienna, Mohaç, Kosovo, Belgrade, Çaldıran, Egypt, Rumelia... A whole history is saluting the army. It is its custom to make the entire world salute itself (...) nothing in the world can be more glorious than it (From an informative article by Mahmut Esat Bozkurt titled “On the Occasion of Simulated Military Operations in İzmir,” (*Son Posta*, 24 October 1936, see Appendix 179)

The national cheers in this house of heroism and knowledge, which raised 25,000 military officers and a unique leader in a hundred years, is brilliant evidence displaying the great nobility of the Turkish army, its bravery, knowledge and the degree of its belief. (From a commentary column on the national feast celebrations of August 30 1934, *Son Posta*, 3 September 1934, see Appendix 180)

Last, it was also a frequent discursive practice to represent the army with positive qualifications through repetitive attributions such as “heroism,” “strength,” “nobility”: “The heroic Turkish navy” (*Cumhuriyet*, 16 November 1936, see Appendix 181); “Our heroic army paraded with all its vehicles and it was praised a lot. (...) Long live the Turkish army!” (*Akşam*, 17 October 1936, see Appendix 182); “The belief which was inspired by the heroic Turkish army” (*Cumhuriyet*, 3 November 1936, see Appendix 183); “Our army which has fought many attacks off is combative and strong more than ever. ... Every Turk should take pride in his/her army!” (*Son Posta*, 2 March 1935, see Appendix 184)

The army furthermore was indicated as the “best” among all other armies. In this respect, the representation of this institution and its members functioned as an element to imagine the nation among other nations, as well as a discursive practice to reaffirm the self esteem: “The military maneuvers are over. Our army has proved once more that it is one of the best armies” (*Akşam*, 16 October 1936, see Appendix 185). “Turkish soldiers are the best among those 400 millions who are the adherents of the treaties” (*Akşam*, 25 March 1935, see Appendix 186). “Respect for the army and the flag! (...) the heads are erect, the chests are swelled with pride and the feet are vigorous... the soldiers, Turkish soldiers, are going for their duties at the Gates of the country.” (*Son Posta*, 23 July 1936, see Appendix 187).

Table 28 shows that 10.8 percent of the articles refer to army or military power or soldiers in relation to national identity. The table indicates no significant relationship between references to army or military power or soldiers and the name of the newspaper.⁴³⁵

Table 28. References to Army or Military Power or Soldiers According to Newspapers, in Percentages

			<i>Cumhuriyet</i>	<i>Akşam</i>	<i>Son Posta</i>	Total
References to "Army" or "Military Power" or "Soldiers"	Yes	Count	44	17	29	90
		Within Name of the Newspaper	10.9	12.6	9.9	10.8
	No	Count	361	118	263	742
		Within Name of the Newspaper	89.1	87.4	90.1	89.2
	Total	Count	405	135	292	832
		Within Name of the Newspaper	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

So, on the basis of newspaper coverage; one can observe that the references to army constituted an important discursive subtheme while envisioning the Turkish national identity in the mid-1930s. The apprehension of a military threat in the 1930s certainly played a crucial role in attaching importance to army. All in all, the army was represented as an institution that connected the present Turkish state to earlier ones, as a mythic symbol that signified the heroic character of the Turks, as a pioneer of modernization and as a an agent of history that was expected to guarantee the survival and continuation of the new regime.

The Representation of Atatürk

Atatürk is an autocratic and charismatic leader. This is at the same time his own psychology and philosophy. He thereby met the needs of his period, society (or his political class). (...) I call it a problem because

⁴³⁵ The value of chi square obtained is .679, the degrees of freedom are 2, and the exact significance of the chi square is .712. This is well above the standard indicator of a significant result (alpha=.05).

in modern Turkey, beyond modest symbolisms, Atatürkism/Kemalism is a cult of personality, a phenomenon of worshipping a hero rather than a reasonable respect for or adherence to an important historical-political person, a national hero.⁴³⁶

Taha Parla, *Atatürk'ün Nutuk'u*

The creation of the cult of Atatürk began in the single-party period, in line with the need to construct new symbols and images in order to replace the old ones. The first Atatürk statue that was placed in Sarayburnu, in the Eminönü district of İstanbul, on 3 November 1926 was the first in Turkey, of a statue of a person/leader.⁴³⁷ As Parla states, when the discourse of Atatürk's famous *The Speech* is examined, it can be observed that he was personally involved in the constitution of the worshipping of the "I-hero".⁴³⁸

Hasan Ünder writes that the people of the period, whom he calls the "Generation of 1908" who had experienced consecutive defeats in the Balkan Wars and in the World War One and who had gone through the menace of Sevres and the invasion of İstanbul and Anatolia, had for long been waiting for a national hero, a savior. Mustafa Kemal met their expectation.⁴³⁹

Thus, in the newspapers of the period, the image of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was formed accordingly: "It is a success obtained by the generation of Gazi Mustafa Kemal to take our glorious flag around, in the center of Paris in France. How happy we are!" (*Cumhuriyet*, 5 August 1934, see Appendix 188): "Gazi Atatürk, who is the head of our whole national existence. He is the enormous torch of every house and the life and blood of the heart of every Turk." (*Cumhuriyet*, 24 February 1935, see Appendix 189); "Impressions from the congress. The victory of Turkish women. Yesterday, the women of the world applauded

⁴³⁶Parla, *Atatürk'ün Nutuk'u*, 1, pp. 174-75.

⁴³⁷Gür, "Atatürk Heykelleri Ve Türkiye'de Resmî Tarihin Görselleşmesi," p. 160.

⁴³⁸Parla, *Atatürk'ün Söylev Ve Demeçleri*, 2, p. 248.

⁴³⁹Hasan Ünder, "Atatürk İmgesinin Siyasal Yaşamdaki Rolü," in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce Cilt 2 Kemalizm*, ed. Murat Gültekinil Tanıl Bora (İstanbul: İletişim, 2001), p. 140.

Turkish women who had been saved by Atatürk.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 19 April 1935, see Appendix 190); “The commander who saved Istanbul and Turkey in Çanakkale was not Liman Paşa, as a German newspaper claimed, but the great savior Atatürk, who always confronted the disasters of the nation.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 26 April 1935, see Appendix 191).

Moreover, the following excerpt illustrates how in some cases Mustafa Kemal was transformed metonymically to stand for the national essence of Turks in order to describe the merits of the Kemalist revolution:

Gazi Mustafa Kemal, a grand savior, emerged from the essence of the Turk. He saved the independence of the Turkish nation from both the external enemies and the internal enemies. Then, the name of the Turk became brighter and higher than the brightest and the highest stars. The nations which had scorned us before could not share our friendship after the order created by Gazi. (*Cumhuriyet*, 23 July 1934, see Appendix 192)

In line with the same discourse, Mustafa Kemal was constantly cited with appreciation and gratitude on every occasion: “Our prime minister gave a significant speech in the assembly. “It is a unique opportunity in the flow of the everlasting history and a priceless blessing of the national Turkish government to have a leader like Mustafa Kemal”.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 5 July 1934, see Appendix 193). “How happy who has an Atatürk. Atatürk was just like a sun today on the pulpit of the nation.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 2 November 1936, see Appendix 194). “Long live modern Turkey and Atatürk who created it.” (*Akşam*, 16 April 1937, see Appendix 195). “Atatürk is an example for us everywhere and for everything. As the whole nation, we cannot find the right words to express our feelings, our heartfelt gratitude for everything he has done.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 14 June 1937, see Appendix 196).

The following excerpts illustrates he was sometimes represented as a super physical, saintly person, or as a divine king: “It is such a heart that it takes the power of beating, living, believing, and getting excited from the same holy source, Atatürk.” (*Son Posta*, 22 July 1935, see Appendix 197); “No fire could melt the strength in him. He showed the most universal power to humanity” (*Cumhuriyet*, 8 December 1934, see Appendix 198). “Let us bow our

heads with respect and gratitude in front of the Grand Leader, who has done 18 centuries' works in 18 years." (*Son Posta*, 17 May 1937, see Appendix 199); "The answer of a village boy to the question of 'Who is your father?': Atatürk. Apparently village children call their fathers as 'ağam'. The attribution of fatherhood as a holy attribution is given to Atatürk..." (*Son Posta*, 27 March 1937, see Appendix 200). "He trampled the revolting communities of the Empire and accepted being a part of a nation as the greatest happiness. The nation enthroned him, raising him on their hands." (*Cumhuriyet*, 19 May 1937, see Appendix 201); "ATATÜRK: Turkey has created a fabulous hero. The impressions of a Yugoslavian journalist: God has sent this man full of creative powers to the earth, investing him with a special duty in the Near East." (*Cumhuriyet*, 1 May 1937, see Appendix 202).

As observed above, the discourses on Mustafa Kemal's genius, extraordinary talents and divine peculiarities were further reinforced in the newspapers' discourses by means of category entitlements or testimonials, i.e. foreigners' opinions: "Interview with the King of Yugoslavia. "I love this genius man very much, Gazi, who had an enormous struggle" (*Cumhuriyet*, 7 July 1934, see Appendix 203); "I asked the colonel: Have you adapted yourself to the Turkish customs? Thanks to Atatürk, your country has turned into one of the most modern countries. I do not see a difference between Turkish and English customs." (*Akşam*, 20 September 1936, see Appendix 204); "A significant article in the *Daily News* about the last visit. "Atatürk deserves the title of the Grand Turk." (*Akşam*, 9 September 1936, see Appendix 205); "The significant declaration of M. Stoyadinociç: Atatürk, well-matching with his name, is the father of new Turkey." (*Akşam*, 3 November 1936, see Appendix 206); "The impressions of our honorable guest: I have admired the genius, especially the political genius of Atatürk." (*Son Posta*, 19 March 1937, see Appendix 207).

It can also be observed that the title "Grand leader" stands for Mustafa Kemal and it appears to be a journalistic norm to refer to him with honor and glorify his attributes: "Atatürk

has been re-elected the president unanimously. The Grand leader has taken the oath to serve the advancement and protection of the country.” (*Son Posta*, 2 March 1935, see Appendix 208); “The Grand leader is in Istanbul. Istanbul, excited with the victory of Hatay, is greeting its father who gave this victory to Hatay.” (*Son Posta*, 5 June 1937, see Appendix 209); “We congratulate the Grand leader for the victory at Hatay. Istanbul is reuniting with Atatürk today.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 5 June 1937, see Appendix 210); “The future of our national hero. Istanbul greeted the creator of our great victories with enormous ceremony and demonstration.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 6 June 1937, see Appendix 211); “A sublime act by Atatürk. The Grand leader has donated his precious farms, factories, buildings to the nation. The Grand Assembly met this unique behavior with gratitude between excited cheers and applause.” (*Son Posta*, 13 June 1937, see Appendix 212)

The etymology of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s name occasionally was discussed. The first occasion involved his surname, Atatürk, which he adopted according to the Surname Law dated 21 June 1934: “Why did we name him ‘Atatürk’? We named him Atatürk [the ancestor of the Turk] because we did not know any other ethnicity clearer than Turkishness and any other title more noble than being an ancestor.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 27 November 1934, see Appendix 213)

A common discursive practice is the implication that the surname “Atatürk” was ascribed to him by the whole nation, and it was legitimized with reference to Turkishness. As can be observed in the following excerpts, the word “Ata” furthermore was confirmed as being originally Turkish. It is thereby proved that Mustafa Kemal had become a real symbol of the nation’s ancient origins: “The word ‘Ata’ is as old as Turkishness and it is ours as much as Atatürk.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 26 August 1936, see Appendix 214); “No word other than ‘Ata’ can express a grand existence, a mastership which has always been free more accurately and

more lively. There is the expression of the essence of Turkishness, its magic, strength and bravery in this name.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 10 October 1936, see Appendix 215)

Accordingly, the second occasion to debate on the etymology of Mustafa Kemal’s surname is the language theses, which claimed the genuineness of some words as Turkish. Thus, “Kemal” was replaced with “Kamal” in the official notifications that were sent to the newspapers on a daily basis, in order to bring the leader’s name in line with the efforts of spreading the original Turkish initiative:

Kamal means “army” and “castle” in Turkish. We saw that the real name of the leader Atatürk was written as “Kamal” in today’s notification. The reason and the base of it were understood with the research on this issue. According to the information we gained, the name “Kamal” that Atatürk carries is not an Arabic name and it does not have the same meaning as the word “Kemal”. The real name of Atatürk maintained is “Kamal” which means “army and castle” in Turkish. (*Son Posta*, 5 February 1935, see Appendix 216)

Table 29 shows that 21.2 percent of the articles refer to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in relation to national identity. This percentage demonstrates that the Mustafa Kemal figure constituted an important component of the discursive construction of the Turkish national identity.

Table 29. References to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk According to Newspapers, in percentages

			<i>Cumhuriyet</i>	<i>Akşam</i>	<i>Son Posta</i>	Total
References to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk	Yes	Count	107	30	39	176
		By Newspaper	26.4	22.2	13.4	21.2
	No	Count	298	105	253	656
		By Newspaper	73.6	77.8	86.6	78.8
	Total	Count	405	135	292	832
		By Newspaper	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Furthermore, there is a significant relationship between the references to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the name of the newspaper.⁴⁴⁰ The findings also demonstrate that compared to the other two newspapers, *Cumhuriyet* more closely covered Mustafa Kemal in relation to national identity. This might have been due to the close relationship, even companionship, between Mustafa Kemal and the newspaper's editor-in-chief Yunus Nadi.

Moreover, Table 30 shows that 92 percent of the articles that refer to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk treated him with appreciation or gratitude. In none of the articles was he negatively criticized. It is thus possible to argue that the newspapers profoundly promoted him as a hero, thereby contributing to the construction of the myth of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk as the savior or endower of Turkish national identity. The table also demonstrates that *Cumhuriyet* was the newspaper in the coverage of which Mustafa Kemal was most excessively acclaimed and praised.

Table 30. The Way Mustafa Kemal Atatürk is Referred to According to Newspapers, in percentages

			Cumhuriyet	Akşam	Son Posta	Total
Manner in which Mustafa Kemal Atatürk is Referred to	Appreciation or Attitude	Count	103	22	37	162
		By Newspaper	96.3	73.3	94.9	92.0
	Other or Neutral	Count	4	8	2	14
		By Newspaper	3.7	26.7	5.1	8.0
	Total	Count	107	30	39	176
		By Newspaper	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

To sum up, in the newspapers of the period, Mustafa Kemal was almost always referred as the savior in every area and as the benefactor of the national existence. Needless to say, all the attributes to Mustafa Kemal do indeed mediate the imagination of the national


⁴⁴⁰ The value of chi square obtained is 17.471, the degrees of freedom are 2, and the exact significance of the chi square is .000. This is well below the standard indicator of a significant result ($\alpha=.05$).

community and interpellate readers as the faithful followers of the nation’s “Grand Leader”. As a matter of fact, newspapers’ discourses provide veritable data to confirm the argument that Mustafa Kemal was sanctified in order to compensate for the lack of divinity in the process of secularization.

While concluding Chapter 5, an overall assessment on the coverage of the subthemes that appeared in the newspapers as the leitmotifs of the Turkish national identity may be illuminating. Table 31 provides a summary of the frequencies of all the discursive subthemes that were elaborated above, throughout this chapter.

On the basis of Table 31, it is possible to juxtapose the emphasis or prominence given to some specific themes in relation to the representation of Turkish national identity.

Table 31. Frequency of Discursive Subthemes in Relation to National Identity



As the table illustrates, the appreciation of the Republican project that provided a new direction or path for Turks advancing in the course of history, and references to a positive

change or progress for the existence and well-being of Turks appear to have been the two most frequently referred discursive themes. So the Turkish national identity is most excessively imagined in line with these two approved progressive processes.

The frequency of these two interrelated themes is followed by the frequency of the portrayal of the mythic figure of Mustafa Kemal, who was shown as the heroic initiator of the commended Republican way of existence. The comparison between the old and the new ranked in the fourth place, demonstrating how the newly constructed Republican Turkish national identity was, above all, the opposite of what it had preceded. The remaining subthemes were more or less equally referred to in relation to national identity, namely the army, women, and youth or children, which were portrayed in line with the idea of a positive change, as elaborated with the help of discourse analysis. Accordingly, women were instrumentally used as the subjects of this positive change, the Army as its provider and guardian, and the Youth as its future custodians. Last, the references to Westernization also indicate a new style for the living of the new Turkish citizen.

CHAPTER 6

OFFICIAL NATIONALISM AND THE REPRODUCTION OF NATION IN DAILY NEWSPAPERS

In *Banal Nationalism*, Michael Billig argues that in the reproduction and maintenance of national identity, the construction of the national “we” helps to categorize the self in terms of the first person plural.⁴⁴¹ He states that the uses of “us” and “we” do not only reproduces knowledge of the particular characteristics or attributes of the national community, but also contributes to imagine nationality as a differentiating entity in a world of nation states.

In this chapter, first, the framing and the frequency of the discourses of “us” and “we” will be discussed on the basis of the findings that are obtained through the implementations of discourse analysis and classical content analysis. Besides references to “nation” and “national,” the representation of “Turks” and “Turkishness” are scrutinized and comprehensively discussed.

Newspapers and the Representation of the National Community: Findings and Discussion

The Imagination of “Us” as the National Community

In the newspapers of the period under scrutiny, the “we” discourse is often used as the binary opposite of the representations of “others,” which appear in the form of foreign public opinion. For example, a headline in *Son Posta*, “We assume that the whole world recognizes us but it is not the reality: Especially America does not have an idea about us” (29 May 1935,

⁴⁴¹Billig, *Banal Nationalism*, p. 70.

see Appendix 217) truly illustrates that the discourse of “we” is like an expectable manifestation of a strong desire to be known and recognized by the citizens of other countries.

A similar headline in *Cumhuriyet* “An honest and friendly article about us was published in Kahire in the famous *Mecelleti* magazine” (30 March 1935, see Appendix 218) also reflected the same attitude, where the newspaper equated its own identity with that of both the newly proclaimed nation state and its citizens. Moreover, in *Cumhuriyet*, the usage of “our revolution” as in the case of “Our revolution of music”. “Atatürk will be successful in this, too” says an article published in a foreign newspaper” (25 December 1934, see Appendix 219), or “Our revolution and the world public opinion. The significant articles of three foreign newspapers” (12 January 1935, see Appendix 220) attributes the revolutions of the Kemalist project to the whole national community. Thereby, the intangible national community is discursively assumed to have a bodily form, to be a lump sum by implying that “Everyone is taking part in it.” That is, such a discourse thus helps to provide the idea that everyone claimed the guardianship of the Kemalist revolutions.

The “we” discourse not only reproduced the expressions of the desires for being known and recognized, and for interpellating each and every citizen but also for being appreciated by “others”. For instance, a quotation from *Son Posta* perfectly illustrates the desire to be appreciated, especially by the West: “How did we manage to cope with the war? The war changed the views of even the Germans, who did not like us. The German Ambassador, who regarded the Turks as a burden, told me one day in the Embassy after the Çanakkale victory: ‘We have to admit that we did not know you as well as you deserved’.” (5 December 1936, see Appendix 221).

Sometimes, efforts were made to compensate for the lack of self-esteem and insecurity of the nation is tried with the help of the language of persuasion, especially by making use of testimonials, as in *Cumhuriyet*: “Our revolutions and the friend Russia. ‘The new Turkish

revolutions are precious' *Journal dö Moscou* says: 'The real friends of Turkey follow all these with great pleasure'." (31 December 1934, see Appendix 222). Media and communication studies indicate that while endorsing an idea, media messages often show third parties testifying about its value, and that the readers tend to believe them because they appear to be a neutral third party.⁴⁴² For instance, some other times testimonials are used to provide legitimacy and credibility, as in *Akşam*, "TIMES finds our concerns about Sancak Turks honest"(14 January 1937, see Appendix 223).

Furthermore, in the case of the discourses where the testimonials were used to re-affirm Turks' self-esteem, what is striking is that Western countries are almost always used as the third parties, as in *Cumhuriyet*: "What is their comment on our cavalry? Turkish cavalry are astonishingly fast. According to a German newspaper it is the intense determination of the Turk about being victorious which makes them successful with ordinary horses" (18 July 1936, see Appendix 224). Such discourses thereby unintentionally created a hierarchy between those countries and the newly founded Republic of Turkey, sub-textually positioning the former in a higher position than the latter. Moreover, such discourses did indeed reproduce orientalism⁴⁴³ in the sense that they reconfirmed the dichotomy between the West and the East. However, this brings about a paradox: in the newspaper texts, while the new Republic claims for recognition as a Western country were promoted, in the subtext of the articles, the discursive practices stemming from nationalism holds the "us/we" of Turkey as identical with the Orient, although the term 'Orient' is never pronounced.

However, when the foreign public opinion appears to have been hostile, unfriendly or antagonistic, the discourse of "us" was used by the journalists as a mechanism to defend the rightfulness of the national community or to express the "common" reaction against "others".

⁴⁴²"Introduction to Media Literacy".

⁴⁴³Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1985).

In doing this, newspapers imply that their readers shared the same sentiments, as in *Son Posta*: “The Bulgarians are complaining about us. They do not like our and the Greeks’ mentality. However, it is their mentality which is unlikely to be appreciated.” (23 January 1935, see Appendix 225).

Furthermore, in such cases, “argumentum ad hominem” was preferred while addressing the national community. That is, the newspaper responded to an argument by attacking the opponent instead of addressing the argument itself, as in *Son Posta*: “We are furious about those foreigners who constantly say that Turkish intellectuals and youth are xenophobic, fanatic nationalist and racist.” (2 July 1936, see Appendix 226) Such a discursive practice works indeed on the belief that “if there’s something wrong or objectionable about the messenger, the message must also be wrong.”⁴⁴⁴ For instance, in *Son Posta* “Provocations against Turkishness are still going on in Bulgaria. However, we say ‘It is the hurt dog that howls’ and let it go” (19 May 1935, see Appendix 227); and “The Armenians abroad are getting prepared for a state of propaganda against us. Look at this delirium! They say we are getting prepared to massacre the Armenians in Antakya and Iskenderun!” (11 November 1936, see Appendix 228), exemplify this tendency.

In addition, adjectives with negative connotations were also used to reject the Person rather than the argument, as in *Son Posta*:

Klod Farer does something stronger than publication. Since he is a bad writer who is not read anymore, he has began to give conferences to the French youth instead of making publications against us. These conferences can affect a huge community who will constitute the French community of tomorrow.” (16 January 1937, see Appendix 229).

Other examples are as follows: “The absurd remarks by our enemies in Syria. They say we will realize the new Project of Faysal.” (*Son Posta*, 12 March 1937, see Appendix 230); “They say Sinan was Greek! The answer given by a writer of ours to the nonsense claim

⁴⁴⁴Ibid.

full of mistakes in a Greek newspaper and historical discussions.” (*Son Posta*, 7 May 1937, see Appendix 231)

Another discursive practice was that the “we” discourse, which identifies the self with the nation state and national territory, and helps to imagine the nation among other nation states, as in *Cumhuriyet*: “Why do our friends keep silent? We complain about the Greeks, who are the friends of Turkey, not enemies!” (12 July 1934, see Appendix 232), and in *Son Posta* “National propaganda begins: The false statements about us will be counteracted and activities will be undertaken in order to publicize the country to the whole world” (7 August 1934, see Appendix 233). In such discourses the usage of “us” or “we” signifies the whole nation state, and assumes the readers are a unified body of citizens of the nation state.

In the following excerpts, it is possible to observe how “we” was equated with “Turkey” or the “Country”: “Who can defeat us as long as the Turkish army stays as the guard of this wish?” (*Son Posta*, 2 March 1935, see Appendix 234); “Beginning from last night, we have guaranteed our Mediterranean door” (*Akşam*, 21 July, 1936, see Appendix 235); “We take serious precautions along our Southern border” (*Cumhuriyet*, 3 April 1937, see Appendix 236).

In all these excerpts, the actions of the nation state in the international arena are presented as the actions of the members of the nation state, implying that the citizens of the nation naturally do confirm such actions, underlining an implicit concern about “common destiny,” *Son Posta* said, “The final act of the world war. The German democrats wanted to abandon alone, saying “Turkey has to look after himself” (2 March 1937, see Appendix 237) and in *Cumhuriyet* “Antakya is ours! We recommend that the Turkish nation and the people from Antakya to keep calm. It is not possible for us to give up the sovereignty of this region.” (1 October 1936, see Appendix 238). Such a discursive practice equates the people with both the government and the state and thereby reproduces the hegemony of the nation state over

society, locating all its members within an undiversified unity. Two significant examples are the followings: “The issues of Antakya and Iskenderun were discussed again in the League of Nations. “We want our rights and we can take them” (*Son Posta*, 3 October 1936, see Appendix 239); “We are right nationally and according to the treaties. International law is with us. Then, will they listen to these? When the right time comes, yes!” (*Son Posta*, 6 November 1936, see Appendix 240)

Additionally, in cases where a particular referent is signified as “ours,” not only is the connection between the self and the nation reinforced, but also the imagination of the self as a national entity is re-mediated. In order to illustrate this argument, the following examples are illuminating: “Our Prime Minister delivered a significant speech” (*Cumhuriyet*, 6 July 1934, see Appendix 241); “The number of our scientists increases. Today, several of our engineers who are specialists in every area are on duty (*Son Posta*, 8 August 1934, see Appendix 242), “Our people’s houses are three years old now and their number has increased to 103” (*Cumhuriyet*, 24 February 1934, see Appendix 243)

The discourse that is constructed around the word “our” becomes more and more significant when it is used in relation to the official institutions of the state. The following examples illustrate how the apperception of the members of the nation state stiffened around the identification with the national army, navy, or government: “The treaty was signed last night and our army occupied the straits towards the morning.” (*Son Posta*, 21 July 1936, see Appendix 244); “While we send our navy to the Mediterranean” (*Son Posta*, 17 November 1936, see Appendix 245); “The victory of our government! Atatürk congratulated the Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Relations, and our delegates.” (*Akşam*, 25 January 1937, see Appendix 246)

In some cases “our” was used to assume to have a common essence that was a national essence that suited the modernization of the country: “Our national love for aviation.

Yesterday, 100,000 people celebrated Air Day.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 15 March 1937, see Appendix 247) In some other cases, it was used to refer to a common national intellectual heritage: “We have lost Hamid. Our significant poet passed away following a short-lived illness at 01:05 last night. A glorious funeral ceremony will be organized for the grand Turkish literary figure who enlightened Turkish literature for a century.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 13 April 1937, see Appendix 248)

When it comes to claim for the Turkishness of a geographic region, the discourse of “our” becomes apparent. In such cases, the claim of a common history and a common future was used as proof. This can be illustrated with the following three examples: “The meaningless anger of our Bulgarian friends. Our answer: “Yes, Edirne will be the eternal monument of Turkishness looking towards the West” (*Cumhuriyet*, 6 July 1934, see Appendix 249); “Slandorous Bulgarian journalists are still complaining. The provocateurs of the Thrace Committee should learn this: Thrace is ours, as it always has been.” (*Son Posta*, 8 August 1934, see Appendix 250); “The honorable day of our beautiful Edirne. Edirne is the door of Turkishness opening to the West and the mosque of Sultan Selim is the monument of Turkishness looking towards the western civilization. It will always be so. We have taken an oath for it!” (*Cumhuriyet*, 25 November 1934, see Appendix 251) It is thereby possible to observe that when the uses of “our” carried historical references, they contribute to imagine the nation as an old and everlasting entity, sharing a common past and a common future.

One can observe in the newspapers of the period that the celebrations for the anniversaries of some specific institutions or events also created occasions to emphasize the idea of a common past, a common present, and a common future. In such cases, the discourse of “our” further consolidates that idea and not only the Republican, but also the pre-Islamic and the Ottoman history were embraced: “May 19 is the beginning of the miracle directing our present and future life” (*Cumhuriyet*, 19 May 1937, see Appendix 252); “Today is the anniversary day of the victory of Lausanne! We will have a ceremony at the university to

commemorate our great day.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 24 July 1934, see Appendix 253); “Let us remember something while we celebrate the first day of spring: Today is the oldest independence day of Turks” (*Son Posta*, 22 March 1937, see Appendix 254); “The Turkish military officers were glorified during the celebrations of the Military School, our hundreds of year old home yesterday.” (*Son Posta*, 31 August 1934, see Appendix 255)

Additionally, the uses of “our,” often helps to differentiated the self from “others,” through mechanisms of hegemony and fabulation. The following excerpt, for example, tried to construct a hegemonic consensus against the Kurdish tribes’ uprisings in Tunceli in 1934, by interpellating the reader as the natural supporter of the government, on the basis of the suppression of the revolt for the good of “us,” the national community. In that case, the so-called “banditry in Tunceli” that indeed referred to the Kurdish rebellion in Dersim, constructed the people living inside the same national frontiers with the readers, as “others”: “The banditry in Tunceli is about to die. Our planes bombed the last bunkers of the bandits.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 26 June 1937, see Appendix 256)

In addition, around the word “our,” the internationally recognized achievements of some members of the nation are metonymically used to refer to the whole nation, i.e. such individual achievements are represented by the newspapers as the collective achievements of the nation as a whole. “The brilliant grades that our cavalry earned in Europe” (*Akşam*, 29 June 1935, see Appendix 257); “Yesterday, the words “Bravo Turks!” resonated through the Olympic Stadium. Our flag was raised on the Olympic pole while the national anthem was being played” (*Son Posta*, 12 August 1936, see Appendix 258); “Our first Olympic victory. 100,000 people saluted our flag and listened to our national anthem on the historical day when the Turkish power, revealing itself in Yaşar’s arms, raised our flag high on the pole” (*Cumhuriyet*, 15 August 1936, see Appendix 259).

In nearly all the related examples, the metonymy not only operated on the idea of success, but also on the idea that the positive attributes of the Turkish sportsmen, both physical and moral, were indeed the indicators of the character traits of all the members of the nation: “The Turkish sportsman has won the sympathy of the world. Our youth has been example to 51 nations with its upbringing, politeness and discipline and has glorified the name ‘Turkish’.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 11 September 1936, see Appendix 260); “The victory of our wrestlers. The competitions held in the country of the masters of wrestling proved once more the strength of the Turk and that his victories were not a coincidence.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 24 February 1937, see Appendix 261)

Sometimes the “us” discourse functioned in the form of other type of metonyms, i.e. in some cases; some attributes of some members of the nation were associated with the whole nation. Despite the invisibility of Muslim affiliation in the imagination of “us” in the newspapers of the era, the following example is eye-catching in terms taking the Muslim affiliation for granted while discussing “us”:

“Christmas is coming, but it is none of our business. Some families, who are not aware of the religious context of Christmas, have begun to decorate trees and give presents to their children that night. It is snobbery introducing this Christian tradition to us on purpose, and negligence without knowing its origins.” (*Son Posta*, 20 December 1936, see Appendix 262)

In the newspapers of the period, another important discursive practice is that the uses of “us” or “we” were frequently rendered the members of the national community responsible for transforming in line with the Republican project or striving for the betterment of its assets: “How can we dignify Turkish tapestry? Exhibitions can be useful for the development of our tapestry which has been affected by the Great Depression” (*Cumhuriyet*, 14 September 1936, see Appendix 263); “We will shape the ‘interior’ of the Turkish house. How will we obtain the style of Atatürk’s period, which means the Turkish soul penetrating into Turkish house?” (*Cumhuriyet*, 19 June 1937, see Appendix 264).

When we look at the newspapers of the period in question, the “us” or “we” discourse is frequently observed in the articles. Such discourse functions indeed as an identification mechanism that created a tie or connection between the journalist (addresser) and the reader (addressee), on the grounds of being members of the same nation state.

The study reveals that one of every five article that with a nationalist reference contained” us” or “we” discourse in its title and such a frequency indicated the newspapers’ national identification with the national community. Table 32 shows that 20.6 percent of the titles of the articles investigated contained the words “us” or “we.” Such a discourse is also important in terms of interpellating the readers as subjects of the national community. Table 32 also demonstrates that there was no significant relationship between the use of “us” or “we” in the title of the articles and the name of the newspaper.⁴⁴⁵ This means that, all the three newspapers used to share similar attitudes.

Table 32. The Usage of “Us” and “We” According to Newspaper, in percentages

			<i>Cumhuriyet</i>	<i>Akşam</i>	<i>Son Posta</i>	Total
Use of “Us/We” in the Title		Count	79	26	66	171
	Yes	By Newspaper	19.5	19.3	22.6	20.6
	No	Count	326	109	226	661
		By Newspaper	80.5	80.7	77.4	79.4
	Total	Count	405	135	292	832
		By Newspaper	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

As Table 33 demonstrates, of the articles that refer to “us” or “we” in their titles, 60.2 percent are news articles. While 22.2 percent were informative articles or serials, 17.0 percent were columns or commentaries. The usage of the first person plural pronouns “us” and “we”

⁴⁴⁵ The value of chi square obtained is 1.162, the degrees of freedom are 2, and the exact significance of the chi square is .559. This is well above the standard indicator of a significant result (alpha=.05).

subsumed and interpolated the Turkish citizens and simultaneously helped to imagine and marginalize “they” or “them,” meaning that the news writers’ own identity also was positioned in line with the national group.

Table 33. The Usage of “Us” and “We” According to Article Types, in percentages

	News Article	Column or Commentary	Informative Article or Serial	Other	Total
Count	103	38	29	1	171
Within Use of “Us/We” in the Title	60.2	22.2	17.0	.6	100.0

As De Cilia et al. state, “linguistic studies usually distinguish between an addressee-inclusive and addressee-exclusive “we,” and between a speaker-inclusive and speaker-exclusive “we”.⁴⁴⁶ In case of the news articles analyzed here, the use of “us” and “we” discourse is definitely both addressee inclusive and speaker inclusive. Table 32 illustrates that the usage of “us” and “we” , as both addressee and addresser inclusive, was used excessively especially in news articles that were normally expected to be impartial and objective since they are not opinion columns that manifestly set out to persuade were written from a nationalistic point of view. So, one can argue that especially news articles were instrumental in the construction of the national identity on the basis of the reproduction of the “us” and “we” discourse.

⁴⁴⁶R. De Cillia, M. Reisigl, and R. Wodak, "The Discursive Construction of National Identities," p.165

References to “Nation” and “national”

“Nation” is an abstract concept that implies the past, present, and future members of the nation, on the basis of language, history, and culture, in an infinite apprehension of time.⁴⁴⁷ In this section of the study, references to and representations of the “Turkish nation” in the newspapers of the single-party period are examined in order to illustrate how the past, the present, and the future members of the nation state were imagined in the mainstream newspapers.

In the discourses of the newspapers under scrutiny, the Turkish nation, as a separate entity was imagined to share a glorious history, the value of which had to be acknowledged by others. A typical excerpt that reflects such a discourse is the following:

When the Grand Duke Nikola conquered Trabzon he entered the city with an enormous regiment. At the gate of the city a Greek woman threw a Turkish flag to the ground for him to run over with his horse. The Grand Duke stopped riding, took the flag from the ground and said “No flags can be humiliated. Especially the flag of the Turkish nation...” (*Cumhuriyet*, 30 October 1936, see Appendix 265)

It is almost always implied that the “Turkish nation” possessed some essential and everlasting virtues. For example, the sentence “The enormous stages of independence wars, victories, and the major revolutions have always arisen from the unique abilities of the Turkish nation.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 29 October 1936, see Appendix 266) perfectly illustrates this essentialist perspective. “Turkish nation cannot live without independence.” (*Son Posta*, 4 January 1937, see Appendix 267); “The congress of the sultana grape: ‘Turkish nation is always strong’.” (*Son Posta*, 12 March 1937, see Appendix 268) and “The great excitement of the great nation (...) As long as the Turkish nation exists Çanakkale will always be defended and no one will ever be able to trespass it” (*Son Posta*, 22 July 1936, see Appendix 269) are other similar examples.

⁴⁴⁷Levent Köker, *Modernleşme Kemalizm Ve Demokrasi* (İstanbul: İletişim, 1995), p. 155.

Additionally, “Turkish nation” as a uniform entity was represented in line with the idea that it had collectively overcome jeopardy in the past, as can be observed in these excerpts: “Sevres was going to destroy the Turkish nation with 500 percent probability” (*Cumhuriyet*, 9 April 1935, see Appendix 270); “This is the anniversary of the day when the Turkish nation, which had been attacked from inside and outside, declared its independence.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 23 April 1937, see Appendix 271) According to the newspapers’ discourses, in the present, the Turkish nation was collectively experiencing a positive transformation. Furthermore, this positive transformation reinforces the imagination of the nation within the broader context of both human civilization and the international system of nation states: “The progress of the Turkish nation in every area was especially beneficial and fortunate for all humanity.” (*Son Posta*, 23 August 1934, see Appendix 272); “The high status that the Turkish nation has won in international arena.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 19 September 1934, see Appendix 273)

Another important discursive practice that is often encountered in the articles appears in the form of referring to the Turkish nation in the third person singular, as in the following excerpts: “The Turkish nation has revealed the confidence once more that Atatürk expected” (*Cumhuriyet*, 9 February 1935, see Appendix 274); “The Turkish nation is completely ready for May 19 in order to be able to celebrate it giving its whole meaning.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 19 May 1937, see Appendix 275) This discourse implies the idea of acquiring a uniform entity, with reference to the state of being one unified whole in the form of a nation: “We definitely believe that the Turkish nation will accomplish this necessity related to the protection and security of the country quickly and completely” (*Cumhuriyet*, 20 June 1935, see Appendix 276); “At this kind of critical time, the Turkish nation becomes an integral entity behind Atatürk and the government of Turkish Republic.” (*Son Posta*, 7 January 1937, see Appendix 277)

This kind of signification constructs a mythic relationship where the nation state is taken for granted as the embracing social and political system, in which the dominant identity is considered to be the national one that stands metonymically for all of the members living in this system: “The integral country and the high, integral Turkish nation” (*Cumhuriyet*, 8 July 1934, see Appendix 278); “The Turkish army is proud of coming from the Turkish nation and the Turkish nation is proud of creating the bravest army in the world. Every nation loves and respects its army but no other nation can compete with us in this respect.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 17 May 1935, see Appendix 279)

All in all, the Turkish nation in third person singular is thought to behave as a one unified body, to be devoted for the good of the nation state, assented to the new regime and consented to its authority and its leader: “Our borders have a glorious and strong guardian: the whole Turkish nation” (*Son Posta*, 10 April 1937, see Appendix 280); ““The Turkish nation is ready to sacrifice all its possessions for Atatürk, the grand leader’.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 12 June 1937, see Appendix 281); “The whole Turkish nation will celebrate it on Sunday” (*Son Posta*, 29 January 1937, see Appendix 282)

Having discussed above the framing of the phrase “Turkish nation,” the discussion now turns to the frequency of its use. Table 34 shows that in 14.5 percent of the articles “Turkish nation” was used as a phrase to refer the national community. Table 34 also shows that there was a significant relationship between the use of the phrase “Turkish nation” and the name of the newspaper.⁴⁴⁸ The study reveals that in *Cumhuriyet*, it was more frequently used when compared to *Akşam* and *Son Posta*. *Cumhuriyet* seems to have contributed more to the construction of a metonymic, personified “Turkish nation” that to stand for all Turks. On the personification of nations, De Cilia et al. write,

⁴⁴⁸ The value of chi square obtained is 15.646, the degrees of freedom are 2, and the exact significance of the chi square is .000. This is well below the standard indicator of a significant result (alpha=.05).

Metonymies enable the speakers to dissolve individuals, and hence volitions and responsibilities, or to keep them in the semantic background. Abstract entities – as for example nations – are given a human form through the use of personification (anthropomorphization) which links different semantic fields.⁴⁴⁹

So the coverage of *Cumhuriyet*, by means of more excessively representing the abstract entity of the Turkish nation as if were an integral human form, as a person that signifies the unity and integrity of the national individuals, reaffirmed the newspaper’s loyalty and liability to the official ideology.

Table 34. The Usage of the Phrase “Turkish Nation” According to Newspapers, in percentages

			<i>Cumhuriyet</i>	<i>Akşam</i>	<i>Son Posta</i>	Total
Use of the Phrase “Turkish Nation”	Yes	Count	79	13	29	121
		By Newspaper	19.5	9.6	9.9	14.5
	No	Count	326	122	263	711
		By Newspaper	80.5	90.4	90.1	85.5
	Total	Count	405	135	292	832
		By Newspaper	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Furthermore, as Table 35 shows, of all the articles that use the phrase “Turkish nation,” 44.6 percent were news articles and 39.7 percent were columns or commentaries. It was stated above that the “us” and “we” discourse was used in 60.2 percent of the news articles and 22.2 percent of the columns or commentaries, and 17.0 percent of informative articles or serials. When compared, one can see that opinion writers were more eager to embrace and reproduce the personification of the Turkish nation as a discursive practice.

⁴⁴⁹R. De Cillia, M. Reisigl, and R. Wodak, "The Discursive Construction of National Identities," p.165.

Table 35. The Usage of the Phrase “Turkish Nation” According to Article Types, in percentages

	News Article	Column or Commentary	Informative Article or Serial	Other	Total
Count	54	48	18	1	121
Within Use of the Phrase “Turkish Nation”	44.6	39.7	14.9	.8	100.0

In addition, the reproduction of nation also was mediated by the frequent use of the adjective “national”. The uses of this adjective imply different connotations in different contexts. For example, in the following excerpts, they connote the construction of collective memory or the invention of traditions or rituals: “The statue of Kubilay is on the plinth. The first national monument is being constructed.” (*Son Posta*, 10 July 1934, see Appendix 283); “This is the day of national excitement. We celebrate the grand victory.” (*Son Posta*, 30 August 1934, see Appendix 284); “Why do we celebrate national festivals? (...) These national days are the times for the nation and the army to come together and to unite in ideals and ideas or to reveal a desire.” (*Son Posta*, 3 September 1934, see Appendix 285); “Atatürk honored the national dress ball.” (*Son Posta*, 7 December 1936, see Appendix 286).

Another context where the adjective “national” was frequently used is related to the economic Turkification or nationalization of the economy. In this case, “national” signifies the “local,” the “domestic” i.e. “Turkish” as the opposite of “foreign” or “foreigner.” In other words, as a reaction to the economic situation under *Duyun-u Umumiye* (Ottoman Public Debt Administration) in the late Ottoman era, “the state of being national” was promoted on the basis of the exclusion of foreign capital and goods as well as foreign work force in the economic, financial, and commercial spheres. This can be illustrated with an excerpt from *Cumhuriyet*:

The speech of Celal Bayar via the radio: “To say Turkey belongs to Turks means to own national assets!” Our minister of economy has explained the national economization policy with its most significant parts and said: “The happiness of the nation depends on the balance of the payments and it depends on the demand for Turkish goods.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 19 December 1936, see Appendix 287)

Moreover, as observed in the following example, the resistance to give consent to become national was considered to be a departure from what was ethically acceptable:

“It is a national liability of the owner of a foundation to check the nationality of the workers in his foundation and to dismiss the foreigners if he finds any. (...) There is a possibility to put penalty on the contractors who employ foreigners instead of Turkish workers.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 3 May 1935, see Appendix 288)

Additionally, another significant context in which “national” was often used was the context of modernization or Westernization. In this case, “national” implied at the same time national culture, authenticity, or originality: “A new direction is being given to the National music.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 7 November 1934, see Appendix 289); “A national music will be born!” (*Cumhuriyet*, 12 November 1934, see Appendix 290); “The programme for producing a national Turkish opera” (*Cumhuriyet*, 28 February 1935, see Appendix 291). As can be observed in the excerpts, the adjective “national” was most often used with reference to music: “One of the managers of the radio firm, Mr. İsmail İsa went to Ankara. He returned back to our city receiving some directives. From now on, Turkish national music adapted to Western style music will be broadcasted via the radio.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 7 November 1934, see Appendix 292)

In the words of Tekelioğlu, in the 1930’s, “to create a new national music for the Turks, Ottoman (Eastern) music was to be discarded; folk music was to be the primary source; and musical reform was to be based on Western music and its harmony.”⁴⁵⁰

Accordingly, when used with reference to music, the discourse of “national” connoted “Turkish,” “local” and “Western” all at the same time: “This is the issue, the deficiency of

⁴⁵⁰Orhan Tekelioğlu, “Modernizing Reforms and Turkish Music in the 1930s,” *Turkish Studies* 2, no. 1 (2001): pp. 94-95.

which is the most obvious one among the significant steps taken for changing and modernizing the country. For the European way of thinking, depriving of a single national opera is not an understandable and explainable issue.” (*Son Posta*, 16 September 1936, see Appendix 293)

Furthermore, as the quotation below indicates, the involvement of the newspapers in the reproduction of the idea of the necessity for a national music was not only limited with mediation or representation. *Cumhuriyet* diligently contributed to its composition by organizing a national song contest:

“On the way of the new revolution. We organize a huge national song contest. The songs in this huge contest which we are organizing in order to discover the examples of pure Turkish music will be classified by a grand jury and then will be evaluated by the listeners in a concert.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 27 December 1934, see Appendix 294)

The following quotation by Ercüment Ekrem Talu is also remarkable in terms of demonstrating *Cumhuriyet*'s involvement in the matter with the national music project:

Nationality is a compact entity like civilization. None of it can be broken into pieces. That old fashioned music could not live among us while our scripture, language, dressing and everything were Turkish and modern. It was a humiliation for us, like the old fez and İstanbulin. Moreover, like the improvisations in theater, there was a damned type of music called gazel in our deceased music. When it was sung in an open place, it scared all the animals from crows to the owls and made all the dogs from surrounding districts howl with anger. (Ercüment Ekrem Talu) (*Cumhuriyet*, 3 October 1934, see Appendix 295)

It is also possible to observe that in some cases, the adjective “national” designates some collective exigencies in order to be able to provide the permanence of the nation state. Moreover, national duties include reaching and passing beyond the Western level of civilization, as indicated by the Kemalist project:

It is our national mission to be one of the grand countries of culture with economic development, intellectual and mental successes, and art works and to be European value in science, art, economy and technique like politics and soldiery. We have to be totally independent in our development and prove that we also have something to teach them although there will be the affect of the west in this development as well. (*Cumhuriyet*, 12 November 1934, see Appendix 296)

Thereby, the readers were once again interpellated as national subjects and are invited to contribute to or fulfill their obligations towards the preservation of the national assets and the national habitus: “A national duty. Let us increase our support for the Turkish Association of Planes” (*Cumhuriyet*, 25 August 1934, see Appendix 297); “How can we establish a national culture?” (*Cumhuriyet*, 1 August 1934, see Appendix 298); “National defense above everything. Knowledge, progress, prosperity, pleasure; all of these are the right and privilege of those who have a complete national defense.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 7 November 1934, see Appendix 299)

When it comes to analyzing the frequency of the adjective “national,” as shown in Table 36, in 12.4 percent of the articles the word “national” was used as a general term to qualify any person, place, thing, quality, idea or action.

Table 36. The Usage of “National” as Qualifier According to Newspapers, in percentages

			<i>Cumhuriyet</i>	<i>Akşam</i>	<i>Son Posta</i>	Total
Use of “National” as Qualifier	Yes	Count	72	12	19	103
		By Newspaper	17.8	8.9	6.5	12.4
	No	Count	333	123	273	729
		By Newspaper	82.2	91.1	93.5	87.6
	Total	Count	405	135	292	832
		By Newspaper	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Additionally, the same table shows that there is a significant relationship between the use of “national” as a qualifier and the name of the newspaper.⁴⁵¹ In *Cumhuriyet* it is more

⁴⁵¹ The value of chi square obtained is 21.681, the degrees of freedom are 2, and the exact significance of the chi square is .000. This is well below the standard indicator of a significant result (alpha=.05).

frequently used than in *Akşam* and *Son Posta*. Once again, *Cumhuriyet* appears to have been more involved in the process of discursive reproduction of national identity.

In addition, Table 37 demonstrates that in nearly half of the columns and commentaries and in more than one third of news articles such a qualifier was used.

Table 37. The Usage of “National” as Qualifier According to Article Types, in percentages

	News Article	Column or Commentary	Informative Article or Serial	Other	Total
Count	40	49	14	0	103
Within Use of “National” as Qualifier	38.8	47.6	13.6	.0	100.0

Opinion pieces seem to have been more frequently used while providing a national attribute to things. This means that opinion writers more frequently set out to persuade readers on the basis of the national quality of their objects of discussion.

So, in the coverage of the mainstream newspapers of the era, references to both “nation” and “national” may be evaluated as having been discursive practices that had the function of designating, or as processes of naming the nation. These help to generalize and personalize the nation, including all its related objects or ideas, as a metonymic prototypical identity that stood for the whole nation.

The Representation of “Turks” and “Turkishness” in the Newspapers of the Period: Findings and Discussion

References to “Turk”

In this section of the chapter, first, the uses of the words “Turk,” “Turkishness,” and “Turks” in noun form and adjective form were sought to observe the contexts in which they

were used. Second, the peculiarities or qualifications attributed to Turkish subjects or objects are explored. Last, references to Turks living or residing outside the national frontiers of Turkey are examined.

To begin with, Tanıl Bora's interpretation in relation to the uses of "Turk" in singular noun form is useful. Bora states that in the single-party period "a discourse, which rendered the state of being Turk a source of self confidence as an ontological value itself, became entrenched. The enormously extensive use of the word 'Turk' as a subject-noun is an indicator for that."⁴⁵² He adds that "reminding and praising to Turk his Turkishness became the substantive effort of nationalism."

The motivation behind this effort may also be evaluated with reference to Duygu Köksal. According to Köksal, the Kemalists tried to develop an inclusive concept of "the Turkish ethnîe" and tried to "include more and more members into this ethnîe rather than excluding people on the basis of race."⁴⁵³ So the emphasis on Turkishness, addressing the readers as "Turk" and imagining "Turk" as a self-proclaimed entity may be considered as have been practices to reaffirm and disseminate a new identity based on the Turkish ethnîe. Within this framework, it would be not wrong to state that the newspapers of the single-party period functioned as efficient tools in terms of mediating, further strengthening and diffusing the use of "Turk" as a subject-noun.

The following excerpts that refer to "Turk" as a subject-noun can be evaluated as examples of the search for self-confidence inherent to Turkish nationalism: "The high character of the Turk was seriously discussed in a conference in Sweden" (*Son Posta*, 14 November 1934, see Appendix 300); "It is the special quality of the Turk to accelerate quickly and to recompense the missing. We have inexhaustible trust in ourselves" (*Akşam*, 5

⁴⁵² Tanıl Bora, "İnşa Döneminde Türk Millî Kimliği," *Toplum ve Bilim* 71, no. Kış (1996): p. 189.

⁴⁵³ Duygu Köksal, "Art and power in Turkey: Culture, aesthetics and nationalism during the single-party era", *New Perspectives on Turkey*, no.31, Fall (2004): p. 97

May 1935, see Appendix 301); “The Turk cannot be delivered from hand to hand. We would like to tell that the Turk is not an object to be delivered from hand to hand to those who does not want to understand” (*Son Posta*, 25 September 1936, see Appendix 302).

The problem with self-confidence with regard to the Turkish national identity is an important point that is often underlined in the literature on Turkish national identity. For example, on the national mood in Turkey, Taner Akçam states that it “fluctuates wildly between exaggerated self-importance, deprived from being the descendants of a ‘great empire,’ on one hand, and a chronic lack of self-confidence and an inferiority complex on the other.”⁴⁵⁴ However, when the above excerpts are considered, one can observe that the discursive representations of the Turk in relation to self confidence in the early Republican era did not stem from self-confidence with regard to the Ottoman period. This was rather a discursive practice that seems to have been a reaction to the term “Turk” having been used as an inferior entity in the Ottoman period. While referring to Ottoman society, Binnaz Toprak reminds that “The term ‘Turk’ became the symbol of the uneducated and uncivilized peasants.”⁴⁵⁵ So, the excessive use of the Turk rather attempts to erase this self-perception.

On the other hand, in some narrations, “Turk” as a signifier was used to construct a binary opposition between Turks and Europeans on the basis of historical references: “It begins with the defiance of Çanakkale that the Turk is respected in Europe” (*Son Posta*, 6 December 1936, see Appendix 303). Another significant quotation perfectly illustrates how the “Turk” and the “European” were positioned as mutually exclusive military categories in relation to reel politik:

The curse of the Turk. 1914 is the year. This is the 17th day of Ramadan. It is July 27, 1320, according to the Muslim calendar. I have read a future article in *Tanin*. Here is the title: The Curse of the Turk... the writer tells about every grief of ours and reveals the centuries old vengeance in the heart of every Turk in his nearly two column article! How nice it is summarized in the article the European ambitions fighting with

⁴⁵⁴ Taner Akçam, *From Empire to Republic* (London: Zed Books, 2004), p. 39.

⁴⁵⁵ Binnaz Toprak, *Islam and Political Development in Turkey* (Leiden: E.J. Brill-Leiden, 1981), p.61.

each other like crocodiles or rhinoceroses forgetting humanity and the mind. Yes, they used to attack us for centuries finding pretexts and lies. Now they are eating each other! (*Akşam*, 26 November 1936, see Appendix 304)

In most cases the signifier “Turk” appears to have been a metonymic pseudo-individual that stood for the whole country: “A responsibility for Turk. Mobilization of protecting the poor Turkish children.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 28 November 1936, see Appendix 305) In most cases, this pseudo-individual affirms the positive connotation of the term as opposed to its earlier negative connotations in Europe during Ottoman Empire: “A new area for the industrial success of the Turk: Aviation (*Cumhuriyet*, 2 June 1935, see Appendix 306); “As much brave as just suitable for the Turk...” (*Cumhuriyet*, 23 July 1936, see Appendix 307); “The victory of the Turk is not a coincidence!” (*Cumhuriyet*, 30 January 1937, see Appendix 308); “The Turk wanted to forget the past...!” (*Cumhuriyet*, 23 January 1937, see Appendix 309)

Furthermore, it is apparent that the use of “Turk” in singular noun form is at the same time the equivalent of “Turkish nation,” which was imagined as an abstract, collective, and everlasting historical entity, possessed and shared by the members of the national community: “You cannot ask the destination of the water whose spring is obvious. We come from the Turk and we will always be Turk.” (*Son Posta*, 15 December 1934, see Appendix 310); “Did the Turk, who outgrew his cradle in Altai, leave any place on the earth unoccupied? (...) There were some days the earth felt small for the Turk.” (*Son Posta*, 8 March 1935, see Appendix 311); “This time, let us listen about Antakya, the holy land of the Turk, from Evliya Çelebi.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 5 October 1936, see Appendix 312)

As a discursive practice, sometimes the “Turk” refers to the “State of Turkey.” In this case the term was attributed a diplomatic mission and is expected to defend Turkey’s rights against other nation states within the international system: “The words of the Turk for the Straits. The Turk says: ‘My doors are closed. I open it to whom I like and I am capable of

that.’ The two Straits and the seas between them are the expression of a certain domination and independence.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 10 July 1936, see Appendix 313)

In some cases, the “Turk” signifies any domestic element of the nation state, as can be observed in the following examples: “Turkey belongs to Turks! Foreigners cannot be employed here if Turks cannot find jobs. We cannot think of the situation of foreigners unless the Turk is satisfied. Everybody should learn this by heart.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 3 May 1935, see Appendix 314); “Business sources for the Turk from Central Anatolia” (*Son Posta*, 10 April 1936, see Appendix 315); “Even the bread of the residents of Istanbul was not produced by the Turk!” (*Son Posta*, 15 January 1937, see Appendix 316) However, in some other excerpts, it obviously signified an ethnic identity that excludes both non-Muslim minorities and citizens of foreign countries, i.e. ethnically non-Turkish bourgeoisie: “The Turk cannot be the minority while he is the majority!” (*Son Posta*, 25 September 1936, see Appendix 317); “Let us think about Istanbul. The place of the Turk in the city is getting weaker.” (*Son Posta*, 8 November 1936, see Appendix 318); “In order to protect the Turk in Istanbul (...) we first of all need economic capital. The Turk is weak in economic capital.” (*Son Posta*, 11 November 1936, see Appendix 319)

The frequency of the use of such discourse in relation to national identity in the mainstream newspapers is remarkably high. As Table 38 shows, in 33.7 percent, i.e. in one third of the articles analyzed, the word “Turk” is used as signifier in singular noun form to denote all Turks. So this is one of the most frequently used discursive practices in relation to the representation of the national identity in the mid 1930s. The table also shows that there is a significant relationship between the use of “Turk” as a signifier in singular noun form to denote all Turks and the name of the newspaper.⁴⁵⁶

⁴⁵⁶ The value of chi square obtained is 6.281, the degrees of freedom are 2, and the exact significance of the chi square is .043. This is below the standard indicator of a significant result (alpha=.05).

Table 38. The Usage of “Turk (singular)” According to Newspapers, in percentages

			<i>Cumhuriyet</i>	<i>Akşam</i>	<i>Son Posta</i>	Total
Use of “Turk (Singular)” to Refer All Turks	Yes	Count	151	35	94	280
		By Newspaper	37.3	25.9	32.2	33.7
	No	Count	254	100	198	552
		By Newspaper	62.7	74.1	67.8	66.3
	Total	Count	405	135	292	832
		By Newspaper	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

The table indicates that in *Cumhuriyet* and *Son Posta* such a signifier was used more frequently compared to *Akşam*. In this sense, these two newspapers seem to have been more actively contributed to the process of the consolidation of the national identity.

The study also reveals that there was a significant relationship between the use of “Turk” as a signifier in singular noun form to denote all Turks and year. As Table 38 indicates, such a signifier was less frequently used in 1934 and most frequently used in 1936. It also was more frequently used in 1936 and 1937 compared to 1934 and 1935. This situation may further be elaborated with reference the speeches of Atatürk for the opening of the Grand National Assembly.

Table 39. The Usage of “Turk (singular)” According to Years, in percentages

			1934	1935	1936	1937	Total
Use of “Turk (Singular) to Refer All Turks	Yes	Count	23	45	120	92	280
		Within Year	13.6	30.2	45.8	36.5	33.7
	No	Count	146	104	142	160	552
		Within Year	86.4	69.8	54.2	63.5	66.3
	Total	Count	169	149	262	252	832
		Within Year	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

When the transcript of the 1 November 1933 opening speech of the Grand National Assembly that was delivered by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk is examined, the term “Turk” is was not used at all, neither in singular noun form nor as a qualifier. When the 1 November 1934 speech is scrutinized, it can be observed that the term “Turk” in singular noun form was not used at all, but it was used three times as a qualifier. When the transcript of the 1 November 1935 speech is examined, it can be observed that “Turk” in singular noun form was used one time, and three times as a qualifier. When the 1936 speech is examined, it can be observed that “Turk” in singular noun form was not used at all but it was used one time in plural noun form and 11 times as a qualifier.

Atatürk’s opening speeches just constitute a minor example in order to illustrate the official discourse. Nevertheless, these texts provide the opportunity to observe that the frequency of the use of the discursive practice with regard to the reproduction of the national identity in the newspapers seem to have been relational with the official discourse that was put into circulation according to year. Certainly, the official discourse was not fixed and also varied according to the context within which it was produced. Therefore, it is also possible to argue that this table at the same time demonstrates the long term consequences of the 1934 press law in the mobilization of the press.

On the other hand, Table 40 shows that the use of “Turk” as a signifier in singular noun form to denote all Turks was almost equally distributed between different types of articles. So in the process of the internalization of a common metonymic national entity, the term “Turk” in singular noun form was equally referred in the news articles for reporting recent developments by referring to an abstract personified agent; in the opinions pieces as a persuasive appeal to emotions and in informative articles for providing a further meaning to it, thereby creating a new cognitive state or pattern of identity.

Table 40. The Usage of “Turk (singular)” According to Article Types, in percentages

	News Article	Column or Commentary	Informative Article or Serial	Other	Total
Count	94	93	89	4	280
Use of “Turk (Singular)” to Refer All Turks	33.6	33.2	31.8	1.4	100.0

In addition to the uses of “Turk” in singular noun form, another frequent signifier appears to have been the word “Turkishness”: “The reality which cannot be debated: the Turkishness of Hatay” (*Cumhuriyet*, 29 December 1936, see Appendix 320); “Iskenderun was founded by Turks a century ago. No one should be suspicious of the Turkishness of the place looking at the Armenian immigrants who have been placed here recently and the Alevis working in the fields.” (*Son Posta*, 2 January 1937, see Appendix 321) As the excerpts illustrate, “Turkishness” was sometimes used to denote the Turkish attribute of a location. Additionally, it was used to denote the Turkish attribute of some historical figures too: “The villagers of Ağırnas say: ‘Those who deny the Turkishness of Mimar Sinan and claim that he is of their nationality should first prove that they are Greek’.” (*Son Posta*, 3 June 1937, see Appendix 322) In both cases, the “Turkishness” of places or people was represented as something that was to be appropriated by all Turks and recognized by the whole world:

While he was talking about İbni Sina, Professor Şemseddin (Günaltay) said: No one can doubt his Turkishness. Because he wrote his works in Arabic, he is claimed to be Arab and because he wrote some of his pamphlets in Persian he is claimed to be a Persian intellectual. İbni Sina’s writing his works in Arabic, which was the common language of culture of the Muslim world, cannot be a reason for doubting his Turkishness. (*Son Posta*, 22 June 1937, see Appendix 323)

In addition, as observed in the excerpts below, Turkishness was represented as something that had a quantitative aspect, i.e. as something measurable. Some discursive practices function around an imagined binary opposition between “full Turkishness,” which rendered its holders loyal citizens, and “meager Turkishness,” which rendered its holders treacherous. “The most anti-Turk newspaper among Bulgarian newspapers is *Medeniyet*

published in Arabic letters (...) the degree of their Turkishness and the degree of their Muslim affiliation of the editor-in-chief and other writers of the newspaper is dubious because their names always end with ‘of’.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 12 November 1936, see Appendix 324)

In addition to the quantitative aspect, “Turkishness” often functioned to promote the idea of continuity in time and space: “The language which is assumed to be difficult for the use of the people living today will be the pure mother language of tomorrow’s Turkishness: Congratulations!” (*Cumhuriyet*, 19 August 1934, see Appendix 325); “Turkish cartography is 25 years old today. The anniversary of the establishment of cartography is being celebrated. Turkishness has worked on its development for centuries”. (*Cumhuriyet*, 30 May 1935, see Appendix 326); “The area where Turkishness expanded and established its grand union has an astonishing size.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 26 January 1935, see Appendix 327)

“Turkishness” was sometimes represented as independent from both time and space, especially the national space, i.e. the national territory. In such cases, it referred to a general idea, a value or a virtue that is temporally and spatially fluid. It was an asset pursued that was worth every effort to keep alive, even in faraway lands: “The Turkish colony living in Berlin holds activities from time to time glorifying Turkishness” (*Akşam*, 11 November 1934, see Appendix 328); “An old priest, Çakır Mihai, defending Turkishness in Romania has been working for 50 years to prevent the assimilation of Christian Turks” (*Akşam*, 2 April 1935, see Appendix 329); “How do the Turks in America live? (...) They work hard in order to make their children cling to their Turkishness, give them Turkish names, and try to pass on Turkish culture on them.” (*Akşam*, 28 September 1936, see Appendix 330)

In order to promote the argument that the national community had been elevated thanks to the Republican regime, “Turkishness,” as an abstract concept, also refers to a present state of being, a civilized moment in the course of history, which was shared by all the members of the nation: “The period of Atatürk is the period of prosperity and eminency of Turkey and

Turkishness”. (*Cumhuriyet*, 29 October 1936, see Appendix 331); “Our modern culture has arisen on the foundations of Turkishness. Our government, nation, science, literature, art, economy and technical power also have started to grow.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 12 November 1934, see Appendix 332); “Many discoveries in the name of Turkishness are predestined for us, the Turks of the twentieth century. We have discovered many talents and virtues for the Turks in the areas of language, culture, history, and the areas belonging to humanity.” (*Son Posta*, 10 April 1937, see Appendix 333)

Furthermore, “Turkishness” refers to the conscience of being Turkish, which had been recently recognized thanks to the new regime, and which had to be preserved at all cost. It was also an attribute of which its holders were supposed to be proud: “The value of Turkishness is great (...) however; we have not been able to get rid of the seal of Ottomanness whatever we did. We have begun to expose our Turkishness just recently.” (*Son Posta*, 15 December 1934, see Appendix 334); “The war of Turkishness is the war of language” (*Cumhuriyet*, 19 December 1934, see Appendix 335); “This sum means destroying Turkishness in the province.” (*Son Posta*, 12 January 1937, see Appendix 336); “I imagined the solid motherland. At that moment, I took pride in my existence and in my Turkishness once more.” (*Son Posta*, 2 September 1936, see Appendix 337) However, the conscience of being Turkish might be lost if Turkish style education is not provided for children and if they were exposed to foreign language and culture:

Those who were born as Turk should die as a Turk! The way of raising your children against Turkish mentality can ruin the essence of Turkishness on day! All of the fathers should be afraid of that! If you will send your children to a foreign school without following my advice, at least keep an eye on them. (...) Otherwise, his end will be awful. Both you and Turkishness will be deprived of a son.” (*Son Posta*, 30 December 1934, see Appendix 338)

Besides, “Turkishness” was also represented as the common asset of the national community, which needed to be promoted in the international arena. Those who were ignorant

of it were expected to understand and appreciated it: “The victory of Turkish cavaliers. No need to mention what a significant propaganda is these achievements for Turkey and Turkishness.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 6 June 1935, see Appendix 339); “This Larousse Universal is really funny on the issues related to Turkey and Turkishness (*Cumhuriyet*, 12 July 1936, see Appendix 340); “Hammer’s differentiation of Turkishness and Turkmenness depending on religion is incorrect.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 19 January 1937, see Appendix 341) Moreover, in such a context, such a discursive practice reinforces the idea that the Western civilization finally appreciates the merits of Turks”:

English people made friends with the Turkish State. The new purely Turkish State is born from the Turkish soul. (...) Now, the English thrust out his hand with confidence to the Turkish soldier, in other words to Turkishness.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 4 September 1936, see Appendix 342)

When it comes to the frequency of the use of such discourse, as Table 41 illustrates, in 10.7 percent of the articles the word “Turkishness” was used as a signifier to denote an abstract concept that was expressive of the quality or state of being Turkish.

Table 41. The Usage of “Turkishness” According to Newspapers, in percentages

			<i>Cumhuriyet</i>	<i>Akşam</i>	<i>Son Posta</i>	Total
Use of “Turkishness”	Yes	Count	59	6	24	89
		By Newspapers	14.6	4.4	8.2	10.7
	No	Count	346	129	268	743
		By Newspapers	85.4	95.6	91.8	89.3
	Total	Count	405	135	292	832
		By Newspapers	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

The table also indicates that there is a significant relationship between the use of the signifier “Turkishness” and the name of the newspaper.⁴⁵⁷ In *Akşam*, it is less frequently used compared to *Cumhuriyet* and *Son Posta*. Once again, *Akşam* seems to be more distant in terms of the nationalist discourse and more neutral in tone.

Additionally, as Table 42 shows, of all the articles that used “Turkishness,” 43.8 percent were columns or commentaries. This means that the opinion writers were attempting to persuade readers about the presence of “Turkishness” as a common state of being or as a distinctive, idiosyncratic virtue or asset that every Turk should be aware of. This is significant in terms of indicating the columnists’ effort to disseminate the nationalist message.

Table 42. The Usage of “Turkishness” According to Article Types, in percentages

	News Article	Column or Commentary	Informative Article or Serial	Other	Total
Count	25	39	25	0	89
Within Use of “Turkishness”	28.1	43.8	28.1	.0	100.0

Besides “Turkishness,” the word “Turks” as a signifier was often used in plural noun form in several contexts. One of these contexts, as exemplified in the following excerpt, puts stress on Turks having sufficient national conscience in terms of pursuing national identity as independent from time and context: “A point of view about the historical structures of Turkish identity. Those who say ‘The Turks have lost their identity easily, they are easily assimilated’ and those who bring forward the examples of the Jews and the Arabs are the ones who cannot comprehend our historical integrity.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 25 January 1935, see Appendix 343)

⁴⁵⁷ The value of chi square obtained is 13.754, the degrees of freedom are 2, and the exact significance of the chi square is .001. This is well below the standard indicator of a significant result (alpha=.05).

Moreover, as indicated in the next excerpt, it was implied that in cases when national identity had been forgotten, a tragic end is awaiting for Turks:

The Christian Turks. There are many Turks everywhere around Europe who have forgotten their language (...) According to the writing of a journalist from Bokovina, these poor people are in extremely poor conditions and they have a huge problem of infectious diseases. (*Akşam*, 9 March 1935, see Appendix 344)

Sometimes when “Turks” were mentioned; the capacity of Turks to pursue their own national interests was indicated. In such cases, it can be noticed that “Turks” denoted the nation and state equation: “Only the Turks know and provide the Turkish economy and its benefits.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 17 August 1934, see Appendix 345) Most important of all, some ways of behaving that were attributed by the journalists to Turks, stand metonymically for all the individuals of the community. The idea that was mostly promoted was that the Kemalist reforms, such as the change in dress code, suits indeed the essence of Turks: “We the Turks cannot think of a relationship between the secret love for God in the depths of the heart and the clothes on the body.” (*Akşam*, 9 December 1934, see Appendix 346) Furthermore, as the following quotation indicates, it was argued that Turks were provided with opportunities to go beyond their limitations thanks to the Kemalist transformation:

We, the Turks, have always been afraid of leaving where we were born until recently. The word “expatriation” negatively meant adventure and moving away from where we were was a bad surprise of fortune for us. God bless Atatürk. He made Ankara the capital city thus the İstanbulites have begun to overcome this fear. Now, we are getting used to travelling. (*Son Posta*, 14 September 1936, see Appendix 347)

As it can be observed in Table 43, in 37.6 percent of the articles the word “Turks” was used as signifier in plural noun form to denote all Turks. Besides, while the same table shows that there was no significant relationship between the use of “Turks” as a signifier in plural

noun form to denote all Turks and the name of the newspaper,⁴⁵⁸ whereas a significant relationship can be observed between such a signifier and the year.⁴⁵⁹

Table 43. The Usage of “Turks (plural)” According to Newspapers, in percentages

			<i>Cumhuriyet</i>	<i>Akşam</i>	<i>Son Posta</i>	Total
Use of “Turks (Plural)” to Refer All Turks	Yes	Count	149	63	101	313
		By Newspapers	36.8	46.7	34.6	37.6
	No	Count	256	72	191	519
		By Newspapers	63.2	53.3	65.4	62.4
	Total	Count	405	135	292	832
		By Newspapers	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

As Table 44 indicates, “Turks” as a signifier was more frequently used in 1936 and 1937 compared to 1934 and 1935. This demonstrates that, as in the case of the usage of the term “Turk” in singular noun form, the frequency of the usage of this discursive practice doubles in line with specific discursive practices that were formed and disseminated by the official nationalism.

Table 44. The Usage of “Turks (plural)” According to Years, in percentages

			1934	1935	1936	1937	Total
Use of “Turks (Plural)” to Refer All Turks	Yes	Count	34	39	125	115	313
		Within Year	20.1	26.2	47.7	45.6	37.6
	No	Count	135	110	137	137	519
		Within Year	79.9	73.8	52.3	54.4	62.4
	Total	Count	169	149	262	252	832
		Within Year	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

⁴⁵⁸ The value of chi square obtained is 5.970, the degrees of freedom are 2, and the exact significance of the chi square is .051. This is above the standard indicator of a significant result (alpha=.05).

⁴⁵⁹ The value of chi square obtained is 48.640, the degrees of freedom are 3, and the exact significance of the chi square is .000. This is well below the standard indicator of a significant result (alpha=.05).

Additionally, as Table 45 shows, of all the articles that used “Turk” as a signifier in singular noun form to denote all Turks, 47.3 percent were news articles. This means that journalists treated information, facts and assumptions about Turks as newsworthy, thereby providing readers with a notion of feeling Turk through association.

Table 45. The Usage of ‘Turks (plural)’ According to Article Types, in percentages

	News Article	Column or Commentary	Informative Article or Serial	Other	Total
Count	148	72	92	1	313
Within Use of “Turks (Plural)” to Refer All Turks	47.3	23.0	29.4	.3	100.0

In addition to the uses of “Turk(s)” in noun form, it is also possible to observe that the word “Turkish”⁴⁶⁰ was often used in adjective form to qualify certain objects. When qualified as Turkish, objects, goods, products, or humans acquired a national attribute, implying that they were owned by or represent the whole nation: “A success to be proud of! Whole Denmark drinks Turkish wine!” (*Cumhuriyet*, 22 July 1934, see Appendix 348); “Turkish flag on Paris streets” (*Cumhuriyet*, 1 August 1934, see Appendix 349); “Turkish caricature. A page spared for Turkish humor in a German newspaper.” (*Akşam*, 9 November 1934, see Appendix 350) “Turkish cavaliers are riding from one victory to another.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 24 June 1937, see Appendix 351) It is remarkable to observe that the objects that are qualified as ‘Turkish’ most often symbolically represent a progressive move towards modernization, and were related to recognition in the West.

One can thereby observe that the adjective “Turkish” was most often used to qualify the nationality of things or persons in the international arena. Moreover, in the following excerpts where the testimonials of the Western countries are cited, the familiar discursive

⁴⁶⁰ It should be noted that, “Turk” in adjective form becomes ‘Turkish’ when it is translated to English. In Turkish however, in both noun and adjective forms the word is used as ‘Türk’.

practice that reflects the need for self-confidence may be observed: “The Turkish Lira is the most reliable money.” This is an article from an English magazine that says this” (*Cumhuriyet*, 7 July 1934, see Appendix 352); “The Turkish Lira in the foreign countries is as precious as marriageable girls” (*Son Posta*, 14 June 1935, see Appendix 353) , “The ideas of Germans about Turkish football. Those who think that we were disgraced in Berlin should read this article.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 17 August 1936, see Appendix 354)

Sometimes, “Turkish” was used to underline the Turkish qualification of some professionals, rendering them as the common asset of the national community: “Turkish architects” (*Cumhuriyet*, 17 August 1934, see Appendix 355); “Independence for Turkish engineering” (*Cumhuriyet*, 3 September 1934, see Appendix 356); “The invention of the Turkish engineer” (*Cumhuriyet*, 4 September 1934, see Appendix 357). Within the intertextual framework of ‘national independence’, this is at the same time a discursive practice that helped accentuating the importance of possessing successful domestic experts or domestic workers in some specific areas: “It is the right of the Turkish worker to work in Turkey. He is the one who will be willing to defend the motherland in the future” (*Cumhuriyet*, 3 May 1935, see Appendix 358); “The rights and the honor of Turkish surgeons” (*Cumhuriyet*, 7 May 1935, see Appendix 359); “The prime minister continues to guide Turkish farmers” (*Son Posta*, 20 October 1936, see Appendix 360); “The first ship made by Turkish workers on Turkish benches” (*Son Posta*, 17 November 1936, see Appendix 361).

Within the perspective of modernization, some specific areas that had been thought to be rehabilitated or improved were also mentioned as “Turkish.” Such a discourse implied that their betterment was for the good of the whole nation: “The Civilized Turkish family” (*Cumhuriyet*, 2 March 1935, see Appendix 362); “Turkish culture is in the stage of evolution” (*Son Posta*, 15 January 1935, see Appendix 363); “The remedial measures of Turkish sports”

(*Akşam*, 27 December 1936, see Appendix 364); “The rejoicing development of Turkish mining” (*Cumhuriyet*, 14 June 1937, see Appendix 365); “Measures taken to cheer Turkish village” (*Son Posta*, 16 February 1937, see Appendix 366); “The precautions taken for the well-being of Turkish mothers” (*Son Posta*, 12 July 1936, see Appendix 367); “The regularity of the Turkish Naval officers is appreciated in the ally country” (*Akşam*, 30 November 1936, see Appendix 368).

It also should be noted that such a discursive practice reflects the desire and support for the betterment of any area or institution that was “Turkish,” in order to reach complete modernization: “The competition, that we had organized for supporting the Turkish wings, was appreciated and aroused interest” (*Son Posta*, 3 June 1935, see Appendix 369); “A regular pool by all means is needed for Turkish swimmers” (*Son Posta*, 17 February 1937, see Appendix 370); “We are in need of a Turkish opera...” (*Son Posta*, 16 September 1936, see Appendix 371); “We are about to work for the Turkish villages and the villagers” (*Cumhuriyet*, 2 April 1935, see Appendix 372).

In addition, “Turkish” is sometimes used to define culture in its anthropological sense, i.e. to refer to distinctive folkloric characteristics or artifacts of the national group: “Turkish culture and existence in the Far East” (*Son Posta*, 31 January 1935, see Appendix 373); “Investigations that took up two months among Turkish tribes. Mr. Ziya, the manager of the art academy, is telling about his significant research in the area of folklore” (*Cumhuriyet*, 15 September 1934, see Appendix 374); “Turkish houses in Kayseri. These old Turkish art works possess a 240 year history and high artistic value.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 2 January 1937, see Appendix 375)

In the discourses of the newspapers, “Turkish” also qualified things with reference to history. Sometimes in relation to wars, from most ancient to most recent: “Turkish machine guns caused great difficulties among the lines of the discharging forces” (*Cumhuriyet*, 7

November 1934, see Appendix 376); “In Chinese lands, which used to listen to the roaring of Turkish horses once like music of strength, now the Japanese sing imperialist songs.” (*Son Posta*, 12 February 1935, see Appendix 377); “Kutulammare is a Turkish victory; it has no connection with Germans!” (*Cumhuriyet*, 17 June 1935, see Appendix 378)

“Turkish” was most often used in order to label the Republican regime, in order to specify and reaffirm its Turkish peculiarity: “The defense of the Turkish Revolutionary Regime” (*Cumhuriyet*, 31 July 1934, see Appendix 379); “The Museum of Turkish Revolution has purchased another new glass cabinet” (*Son Posta*, 19 February 1935, see Appendix 380); “The character of the Turkish revolution: westernization, absolute independence in the country, mutual rights and duties between the government and the society.”(*Cumhuriyet*, 2 June 1935, see Appendix 381); “The essence of the Turkish revolution and the role of the people who support villagers.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 3 June 1935, see Appendix 382)

Furthermore, implying the decisiveness for the sustainability of the new regime, the youth and children of the national community were also always described as “Turkish”: “The speech between General Dirik and a Turkish child in the Beylerbeyi Festival” (*Cumhuriyet*, 5 September 1934, see Appendix 383); “The prayer of Turkish children” (*Cumhuriyet*, 5 September 1934, see Appendix 384); “The emotions of Turkish school children. “Our Ancestor gave the first order that day.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 19 May 1937, see Appendix 385)

The responsibilities of the youth and children toward the nation state were taken for granted on the basis of their being “Turk” as the source and meaning of their existence: “Not only the present Turkish generation but also the future Turkish generations have unending responsibilities in order to glorify this dear country as much as it deserves.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 13 August 1934, see Appendix 386); “The greatest gift from Atatürk to this country is the people he raised to serve the nation in every area. Was not it for this purpose that Atatürk entrusted

the republican regime to Turkish youth at his famous speech?” (*Cumhuriyet*, 4 March 1935, see Appendix 387)

“Turkish” was at the same time an adjective that was frequently used in relation to the contested identity of Antakya. It was a discursive practice that was performed to declare with certitude that Antakya belonged to the Turkish community: “Iskenderun and Antakya cannot stay under mandate. The Turkish land should govern itself” (*Son Posta*, 24 September 1936, see Appendix 388); “Another just voice! “Turkish Iskenderun is the security key of Anatolia”” (*Cumhuriyet*, 10 January 1937, see Appendix 389); “Hatay, an old and truly Turkish city, has produced many Turkish intellectuals and poets” (*Cumhuriyet*, 12 January 1937, see Appendix 390); “Colonialists cannot behave as they wish on Turkish lands (*Son Posta*, 16 January 1937, see Appendix 391); “Turkish goods are being looted. Turkish students who are compelled to study Arabic have dropped out of their schools.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 2 April 1937, see Appendix 392)

When it comes to the frequencies of the employment “Turk” or ‘Turkish’, Table 46 shows that in 72.1 percent of the articles, the words “Turk” or ‘Turkish’ are used in adjective form to qualify any person/people or institution or goods or anything else. This percentage is high in terms of indicating the stress put on the ‘Turkish’ nature of the objects qualified. The table also shows that there was a significant relationship between the use of “Turk” or ‘Turkish’ as qualifiers and the name of the newspaper.⁴⁶¹ As the same table indicates, the use of such qualifiers is more frequent in *Cumhuriyet* than in *Akşam* and *Son Posta*. *Cumhuriyet*’s proximity to nationalism can one more time be observed, in the sense that it more extensively reproduced the discursive practices through which national state of being was cognitively constructed and disseminated by means of the repetition of words that reminded readers of their ethnic-national identities.

⁴⁶¹The value of chi square obtained is 12.821, the degrees of freedom are 2, and the exact significance of the chi square is .002. This is below the standard indicator of a significant result ($\alpha=.05$).

Table 46. The Usage of “Turk/Turkish” According to Newspapers, in percentages

			<i>Cumhuriyet</i>	<i>Akşam</i>	<i>Son Posta</i>	Total
Use of “Turk/Turkish” as Qualifiers	Yes	Count	315	88	197	600
		By Newspapers	77.8	65.2	67.5	72.1
	No	Count	90	47	95	232
		By Newspapers	22.2	34.8	32.5	27.9
Total	Count	405	135	292	832	
	By Newspapers	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	

Additionally, Table 47 shows that of all the articles that used “Turk” or “Turkish” as qualifiers, 45.8 percent were news articles. While 26.3 percent were informative articles or serials, 27.2 percent were columns or commentaries. This reveals that as a journalistic practice, especially when reporting news, the functions of address and the discourse that framed the news texts worked on the basis of an emphasis on things being Turkish. In this sense, reporters reported on “Turkish” objects, goods, products or humans because the readers, i.e. the addressees are Turkish, too.

Table 47. The Usage of ‘Turk/Turkish’ According to Article Types, in percentages

	News Article	Column or Commentary	Informative Article or Serial	Other	Total
Count	275	158	163	4	600
Within Use of “Turk/Turkish” as Qualifiers	45.8	26.3	27.2	.7	100.0

Another important discursive practice with respect to the representation of the Turkish national identity in the newspapers of the period was to attribute to Turks or the Turkish nation some generalized qualifications from an essentialist point of view: “King Alexander says ‘the Turkish nation is a dignified, manly nation which fights but does not make

intrigues’.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 7 July 1934, see Appendix 393); “The Turk is sensitive to even one eye drop. (...) The Turk is disgusted with treachery even if it is profitable.” (*Son Posta*, 12 February 1935, see Appendix 394); “Our women are soldiers, too, since there is no disloyalty in Turks.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 19 April 1935, see Appendix 395); “Turkish people do not break their promises!” (*Cumhuriyet*, 31 January 1937, see Appendix 396); “An eternal monument at Belgrade Castle symbolizing the good soul of the Turkish people” (*Son Posta*, 19 April 1937, see Appendix 397); “They have realized the bravery of the Turkish people now.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 14 May 1937, see Appendix 398)

As can be observed in the quotations, those generalized qualifications were always positive attributes, without any exceptions. Bravery, loyalty, moral, and physical strength and national conscience were the qualifications most favored and most often emphasized: “It is an ambition for them to make Turkish flag hoisted up the honor pole and to make the saying ‘Be strong like a Turk’ repeated.” (*Akşam*, 19 October 1936, see Appendix 399); “Ankara is the proof of the strength of Turkish willpower” (*Son Posta*, 11 November 1936, see Appendix 400); “The fact that the Turk is unable to live without independence and how Adana freed itself from the difficult situation during the independence war will be expressed at the ceremony this year.” (*Son Posta*, 4 January, 1937, see Appendix 401)

One can observe that another related discursive practice is the stress put on the ameliorating effect of the republican transformation: “The brave Turk (...) In the Ottoman period, there were some people who scorned Turkish people. They defined Turkish people as ‘under-developed,’ ‘unintelligent,’ and ‘incompetent,’ and ‘bigot’ but they could not call them ‘coward’.” (*Son Posta*, 21 February 1935, see Appendix 402) The following quotation also constructs knowledge on the regenerative effect of the Republic:

There are many examples in Turkish history fusing greatness and refinement, grandeur and elegance together at the same time. What a gorgeous monument it would be for those who were looking for imaginary principals of morality, if a book titled *‘Turkish*

Character' was written after gathering all those examples completely and sifting through a filter. (*Son Posta*, 12 February 1935, see Appendix 403)

On the other hand, some texts especially aimed to designate how a Turk ought to be and the answer was provided by following the guidance of the official nationalism:

Happy is who says I am a Turk!" (...) The Turk puts his Turkishness before everything. However, it is a part of his manhood not to scorn any nation which is not Turkish. The Turk is strict nationalist but not chauvinist. Nationalism is not an obstacle for free thinking or for a free world view but chauvinism is the final stage of short termed and evil thoughts in the world. (*Cumhuriyet*, 13 August 1934, see Appendix 404)

In addition to such generalized qualifications, some specific actors were separately qualified, too. For example, Turkish women, Turkish youth, and the Turkish army were frequently attributed positive characteristics: "The heroic Turkish army does not have an equal" (*Akşam*, 18 October 1936, see Appendix 405); "The altruistic Turkish women take place in the army, too" (*Cumhuriyet*, 4 November 1936, see Appendix 406); "The young, determined, heroic students of the Turkish bird, the Turkish youth, and the Turkish soldiers have come together here today in order to commemorate the martyrs who died for the life and independence of the country." (*Son Posta*, 31 October 1936, see Appendix 407)

Because the phrase "Turkish Youth" almost always implied young male individuals, the essential positive character traits of "all Turkish girls" were separately narrated:

TURKISH GIRL. Everyone rational should know this. Women do not separate from men in times of war. The Turkish girl stays in her house only when there is peace. She rushes to the fires of the artillery when there is war. Learn this: there is no difference between men and women during war. Everyone takes up arms quickly from, seven to seventy. Turk fights in the forest or on the mountain without fear. During war the Turkish girl gets ahead of men. She is used to carrying her love for her country in her heart. She worked like a man in the Anatolian war. You have no fear, take our revenge. Read more than the men, o! Turkish girl, Turkish girl! (*Cumhuriyet*, 2 June 1937, see Appendix 408)

However, Turkish men were not usually separately qualified since being a "Turk" already implied being a male in the first place. Nevertheless, as the next excerpt indicates,

Turkish men are exclusively referred in their roles as “wonderful husbands,” for whom women should be grateful: “The recipe for happiness in marriage. The most wonderful husband in the world: Turkish man... It is happiness to have a husband in these stressful days.” (*Akşam*, 4 February 1937, see Appendix 409)

An examination of the frequency of such discourses reveals that nearly in one of every three articles “Turk(s)” or “Turkish people” were attributed some characteristics or traits. This proportion seems significant in terms of reflecting the newspapers’ endeavor to assert the Turkish identity. Table 48 shows that in 29 percent of the articles, Turk(s) or Turkish people were qualified with qualifiers to denote any quality attributed or presented as inherent to them. It is also observed that there is no significant relationship between the attribution of certain qualities to Turks(s) or Turkish people and the name of the newspaper.⁴⁶² Thus in nearly one third of articles with nationalistic content, national identity was promoted from an essentialist point of view.

Table 48. Qualification of “Turk(s)/Turkish People” According to Newspapers, in percentages

			<i>Cumhuriyet</i>	<i>Akşam</i>	<i>Son Posta</i>	Total
Are “Turks/Turkish People” Qualified?	Yes	Count	132	32	77	241
		By Newspapers	32.6	23.7	26.4	29.0
	No	Count	273	103	215	591
		By Newspapers	67.4	76.3	73.6	71.0
	Total	Count	405	135	292	832
		By Newspapers	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Additionally Table 49 shows that 87.1 percent of the articles that qualify Turk(s) or Turkish people attributed them positive characteristics or traits. In none of the articles, they were qualified negatively. In 12.9 percent of the articles the qualifiers had neutral denotations.

⁴⁶² The value of chi square obtained is 5.362, the degrees of freedom are 2, and the exact significance of the chi square is .068. This is above the standard indicator of a significant result (alpha=.05).

The table also shows that there is no significant relationship between the nature of the qualities attributed to Turk(s) or Turkish people and the name of the newspaper.⁴⁶³

Table 49. The Way ‘Turk(s)/Turkish People’ are Qualified According to Newspapers, in percentages

			<i>Cumhuriyet</i>	<i>Akşam</i>	<i>Son Posta</i>	Total
How Are “Turks/Turkish People” Qualified?	Positively	Count	117	24	69	210
		By Newspapers	88.6	75.0	89.6	87.1
	Other or Neutral	Count	15	8	8	31
		By Newspapers	11.4	25.0	10.4	12.9
	Total	Count	132	32	77	241
		By Newspapers	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

This means that all three newspapers were similar in this attitude because in line with the problem with self-confidence, discussed above, the nationalist discourse of the era had aimed to affirm Turks as honorable people.

In the articles within which “Turk” was used as signifier, sometimes the main referent appears to be Turks who lived outside of the frontiers of the nation state: “The Turks who have come and who will come from strange lands to the motherland.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 27 October 1936, see Appendix 410) Those were people who did not (yet) possess Turkish citizenship but who were imagined as akin groups, on the basis of an ethnic bond. They appeared in the news sometimes as people immigrating to Turkey: “The Turks trying to emigrate from Bulgaria to the motherland are distressed with the difficulties.” (*Son Posta*, 24 March 1935, see Appendix 411); “Bulgarian Turks are immigrating to the motherland. Our minorities are under pressure there, thus the Turks are escaping in panic to Turkey.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 1 August 1934, see Appendix 412); “The result of the pressure on Bulgarian

⁴⁶³ The value of chi square obtained is 4.891, the degrees of freedom are 2, and the exact significance of the chi square is .087. This is above the standard indicator of a significant result (alpha=.05).

Turks. Immigration continues on. We ask the Bulgarians to behave friendly.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 10 August 1934, see Appendix 413)

Furthermore, the journalists welcomed them with a hospitable discourse, representing them as “true Turks,” which meant being ethnically Turk, and representing the situation as a happy opportunity for them to pursue their lives in the service of the country: “50.000 immigrant Turks will come. Precautions taken to make the new citizens settle down easily.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 10 July 1934, see Appendix 414); “The immigrants say: We have come to serve the motherland. The Keçiören Turks coming from Bulgaria are in great happiness.” (*Akşam*, 18 April 1935, see Appendix 415)

In the newspapers of the period, the interest in Turkish groups living outside of the national frontiers of Turkey was revealed mostly related with the situation in Bulgaria and in Antakya, both of which were contended geographies: “The Bulgarian Turks do not have an admirable life.” (*Son Posta*, 3 August 1934, see Appendix 416); “The poor people from our race in Bulgaria” (*Cumhuriyet*, 2 January 1935, see Appendix 417); “Our poor cognates! Bulgarian Turks give all their possessions in return for getting a refugee passport.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 25 December 1934, see Appendix 418); “The Sancak Turks as an integral entity are trying to take their rights.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 3 October 1936, see Appendix 419); “The Sancak Turks are celebrating our national festivals in great excitement despite all the pressures. (*Akşam*, 4 October 1936, see Appendix 420)

In 1934 and 1935, the oppression that the Turkish minority faced in Bulgaria was frequently discussed. In Bulgaria, following the coup d’état of May 19 1934, the Turks and other Muslim communities faced heavy assimilation policies, including the reduction of the number of Turkish schools, banning Turkish periodicals, political parties, and any organizations with an ethnic basis.⁴⁶⁴ Immigrating to Turkey was framed as a means of

⁴⁶⁴ See Elena Marushiakova and Vesselin Popov, “The Muslim Minorities in Bulgaria”, <http://www.balkanethnology.org/files/library/E%20&%20V/Muslims.pdf>, accessed 15 December 2014.

salvation from the oppression and cruelty the Turks have been facing: “The Thrace Committee in Bulgaria has gone out of control. Turks are being tortured, revenge cries are heard, but there is no voice from the Bulgarian government.” (*Son Posta*, 25 August 1934, see Appendix 421); “The policy of assimilating Turks in Bulgaria is going on. There is no permission for instruction in Turkish in many Turkish schools.” (*Son Posta*, 17 June 1935, see Appendix 422) Additionally, it can also be observed that sometimes the description “people from our race” was used in relation to the Turkish community in Bulgaria, in order to denote the common ethnic bond: “The unarmed people from our race were shot in the province. Five Turkish young men were wounded. The situation is serious. The tyranny and oppression against the people from our race is at the last stage.” (*Son Posta*, 2 January 1936, see Appendix 423)

On the other hand, in 1936 and 1937, the political situation in Antakya appears to have been consequential in terms of drawing journalists’ attention to the living conditions of Turks in the region: “The Turks in Iskenderun-Antakya, in the bosom of the motherland, cannot beg for the right to be minority as if it is given as a favor by this and that country.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 25 September 1936, see Appendix 424); “Can Arabic be the official language in a Turkish country? The Turks are continually pressured by the municipal police forces, which are in the hands of foreign authorities.” (*Aksam*, 3 October 1936, see Appendix 425); “Pressure in Antakya. The rights of Turks are constantly violated. As a result of systematic activities of French officers the Turks from the South lose their lands slowly.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 9 October 1936, see Appendix 426); “Are the Sancak Turks who wear hats under pressure?” (*Son Posta*, 19 October 1936, see Appendix 427); “How are the Sancak Turks pressured economically?” (*Cumhuriyet*, 27 October 1936, see Appendix 428)

It is apparent that in line with the political attitude, the journalists sought to provide evidence to consolidate the legitimacy of Turkey’s claims: “Anti-Turks are being employed in

Antakya and Iskenderun.” (*Akşam*, 7 November 1936, see Appendix 429); “Fights have begun in Antakya... The Turks are getting impatient.” (*Akşam*, 18 November 1936, see Appendix 430); “There is excitement in Hatay! The colonial government is not allowing Turks even to express their ideas.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 8 January 1937, see Appendix 431)

In the news about Antakya, the emphasis put on the protection of the Turkish national identity and the frequency of the “we” discourse implying the identification of the journalists with the nation state is as expected: “Our last diplomatic note was written in a open and definite language. We want rights for the Sancak Turks.” (*Akşam*, 21 November 1936, see Appendix 432); “We want liberty and independence for the Hatay Turks.” (*Son Posta*, 28 November 1936, see Appendix 433); “The pressure on the Turks in Antakya and Iskenderun is beyond acceptable limits.” (*Akşam*, 1 December 1936, see Appendix 434); “A felonious propaganda has begun in Antakya. People are convinced that to take the goods and the lives of Turks is legitimate.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 13 March 1937, see Appendix 435)

In addition to the Turks living in Bulgaria and Antakya, several other ethnically Turkish communities living in different geographies were also considered: “The Turkish language and the Gagavuz Turks. We have an eternal monument in Romania consisting of 150,000 people who have remained Turk through centuries, although they are Christian.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 1 August 1934, see Appendix 436); “Our people in Montrö. I am looking for Turkish propaganda in Europe.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 23 August 1936, see Appendix 437)

Moreover, those Turks are usually appreciated for their liabilities to the republican regime and for their decisiveness in protecting their national identity “How do the Turks on Cyprus live? The Cyprus Turks immediately recognize all the revolutions realized in Turkey.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 20 September 1936, see Appendix 438); “How do the Turks in America live? All of them have a photograph of Atatürk in their houses. They all long for their country.” (*Akşam*, 28 September 1936, see Appendix 439); “Bravo to the Rhodes Turks! They have not

allowed the professor betraying Turks live among themselves. Mahmut Hoca went to Egypt with his followers.” (*Son Posta*, 9 October 1936, see Appendix 440)

Table 50 shows that in approximately one in every four articles under scrutiny, the Turks outside of Turkey were referred. As indicated in Table 50, the Turks outside of Turkey were referred to in 27.8 percent of the articles in the sample.

Table 50. References to Outside Turks According to Newspapers, in percentages

			<i>Cumhuriyet</i>	<i>Akşam</i>	<i>Son Posta</i>	Total
References to Turks Outside of Turkey	Yes	Count	103	53	75	231
		By Newspapers	25.4	39.3	25.7	27.8
	No	Count	302	82	217	601
		By Newspapers	74.6	60.7	74.3	72.2
	Total	Count	405	135	292	832
		By Newspapers	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

It is also observed that there is a significant relationship between references to Turks outside of Turkey and the name of the newspaper.⁴⁶⁵ In *Akşam*, 39.3 percent of the news with a reference to national identity referred to Turks outside of Turkey, while this percentage is 25.4 for *Cumhuriyet* and 25.7 for *Son Posta*. It seems that on the basis of ethnic bound, *Akşam* was more greatly concerned with Turks living outside of Turkey. Not only citizenship but also ethnic kinship was thereby considered important with regard to national identity.

Table 51 shows that there is a significant relationship between references to Turks outside of Turkey and the year.⁴⁶⁶ The table indicates that Turks outside of Turkey were most

⁴⁶⁵The value of chi square obtained is 10.622, the degrees of freedom are 4, and the exact significance of the chi square is .005. This is well below the standard indicator of a significant result (alpha=.05).

⁴⁶⁶The value of chi square obtained is 62.134, the degrees of freedom are 3, and the exact significance of the chi square is .000. This is well below the standard indicator of a significant result (alpha=.05).

frequently referred in 1937, with a percentage of 43.5 percent, and less in 1935, with a percentage of 12.8 percent.

Table 51. References to Outside Turks According to Years, in percentages

			1934	1935	1936	1937	Total
References to Turks Outside of Turkey	Yes	Count	26	19	114	72	231
		Within Year	15.4	12.8	43.5	28.6	27.8
	No	Count	143	130	148	180	601
		Within Year	84.6	87.2	56.5	71.4	72.2
	Total	Count	169	149	262	252	832
		Within Year	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

This table also demonstrates that when compared to the immigration from Bulgaria, which was on the national agenda especially on 1934 and 1935, the Antakya issue in 1936 was given much more attention by the mainstream newspapers, in the sense that it carried importance on the basis of not only ethnic kinship, but also geographical claims of the nation state. So, the Antakya issue had a spatial dimension with regard to national identity, therefore in 1936, the mainstream newspapers published many more articles with reference to Turks living outside of Turkey.

Last, as Table 52 shows, the study reveals that of all the articles that referred to Turks outside of Turkey, 73.2 percent are news articles. This illustrates that events related to outside Turks were especially reported and discussed as a national issue via news articles.

Table 52. References to Outside Turks According to Article Types, in percentages

	News Article	Column or Commentary	Informative Article or Serial	Other	Total
Count	169	32	30	0	231
Within References to Turks Outside of Turkey	73.2	13.9	13.0	.0	100.0

The newspapers in the single-party era were important channels with respect to the formation of the imagination of the national community. The intensity of specific discursive practices is remarkable. For example, in the titles of three out of four articles analyzed, the words “Turk” or “Turkish” were used. Similarly, in the titles of one out of five articles, the use of the “us/we” discourse was observed. Such and similar ratios contribute to confirm that some crucial words were repetitively prioritized in the titles while reproducing the idea of “nation”.

While concluding this chapter, on the basis of the findings it is possible to argue that the underlying arguments about the relation between media and the reproduction of nation were set in the pages of the mainstream newspapers. Particularly, the mainstream newspapers of the era served as tools in constructing in people’s minds the presence of the idea of nation in everyday life. The newspapers did this not only because they were pervasive and standardized technologies of communication that engendered the core idea of nationalism and that facilitated the imagination of the nation. They mediated the idea of nation by forming national narratives, as well as by reproducing images and discursive practices. Thereby, they rendered “nation” as a habitus, i.e. as a natural and universal mode of life by interpellating their readers as the subjects of the national ideology, or by addressing and presenting them to recognize themselves as already there, in the role the nationalist call offered them.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

(...) the newspaper reader, observing exact replicas of his own paper being consumed by his subway, barbershop, or residential neighbors is continually reassured that the imagined world invisibly rooted in everyday life. (...) fiction seeps quietly and continuously into reality, creating that remarkable confidence of community in anonymity which is the hallmark of modern nations”.

Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*⁴⁶⁷

This study discussed the contribution of the newspapers to the reinforcement of national consciousness, as well as to the dissemination, mediation and consolidation of the Turkish national identity in the Kemalist single-party period. Considering the political and social transformations in the 1920s and 1930s, the single-party period was one of rapid transition from an imperial to a national identity in line with the process of nation formation.

On the basis of the history of press-government relations, it was observed that Mustafa Kemal and the founding Kemalist elites of the single-party period were well aware of the crucial role of the press in allowing the public opinion to appropriate the republican principles in general and make the people adopt the national identity in particular. They thereby tried to compel the press to promote their project of creating a new nation state, distinguishing themselves from the ancient regime, and oppositional views and groups.

The 1930s were especially significant in terms of the consolidation of the Kemalist regime, as a consequence of which efforts to define a new national history; a new national language and a new Turkish citizen were institutionalized. The target of secularization and the

⁴⁶⁷ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, pp.35-36.

target of acquiring self-confidence were the two determinative factors in the institutionalization of such efforts.

The totalitarian atmosphere of the interwar context in Europe provided a suitable milieu for the Kemalist elite to eliminate dissidents in implementing modernizing, westernizing, and secularizing reforms. The authoritarian Kemalist attitude generated a press that was guided by the government to a great extent. Although the regime did not or could not directly control the newspapers, the 1931 Press Law and the 1934 Law for the Organization of the General Directorate of the Press together engendered newspapers that reproduced the official Kemalist discourses with regard to the dissemination and mediation of nationalism and the national identity.

In the mid-1930s, both literacy rates and newspaper circulations were limited. Even so, newspapers were still the most widespread, prevalent, and effective mass communication tools. The newspapers' role was important in terms of mediating nationalism by means of setting the agenda, designating the dominant discourses, and determining and shaping the ground for people's perceptions of the national identity.

Throughout the study, it was argued that the Kemalist policies vis-à-vis the citizen and society and the Kemalist modernizing reforms determined the context that shaped both the discursive act and the specific discursive themes being discussed in the newspapers, so that newspapers' discursive practices were themselves constructed. However, they also were constitutive since they presumably contributed to the representation, reproduction and consolidation of the framework of the Turkish national identity in line with the official context. Accordingly, the representations of the national identity in the newspapers produced meaning and knowledge about, as well as versions of, the national identity. Furthermore, the discursive practices in the newspapers functioned as conveyors in the development of the Republican regime of truth, by producing the underlying assumptions about the nation and the

state. The newspapers produced knowledge about “us” and “others” to be accepted by the members of the nation state as true.

The research thus provided an opportunity to describe how the Turkish national identity was represented in the mainstream newspapers of the single-party era, and reveal the role that the newspapers’ played in the reproduction and consolidation of the Turkish national identity. Accordingly, two main dimensions came forward with regard to the function and contribution of the newspapers’ discourses in imagining the nation, namely temporal and spatial dimensions.

The temporal dimension was formed on the basis of the discourses that helped to imagine the nation by locating it across time and by placing the nation within the course of history. In this sense, discourses with reference to the past, the present, and the future of the nation played a significant role. For instance, representations of the new Republican Turkey as a move forward, as a progressive step in the history of the Turks, were significant. In the newspapers of the period, the Ottoman versus Republican binary opposition was frequently posed in the articles. It was seen that discourses that reproduced this dichotomy served as important elements in constructing knowledge about the merits of the new regime in relation to the construction of a new, self-reliant, modern and secular identity. In addition, discourses that reproduced the history and language thesis were also crucial while forming this temporal dimension.

The spatial dimension, on the other hand, was formed on the basis of the discourses that helped to imagine the nation by locating it across the space, by representing Turkey as a concrete and common geographical place to speak about as “ours.” For instance references to inside and outside geographies or discourses which lead to imagine Turkey as a nation among other nations were crucial in this sense. The newspapers’ discourses accordingly represented and mediated the Turkish national identity on the basis of difference, commonality,

confidence and simple acknowledgement of its existence. The Turkish national identity was represented with a stress on difference from others, both spatially and temporally; namely as different from the West, from the rest of the world, from other nations, and as differentiated especially from the Ottoman identity.

Being Turkish was represented with reference to commonality and unity, both temporally and spatially; i.e. by stressing commonality with the ancient Turks and with Turks in other countries. It was demonstrated that in the newspapers of the era references to nation did mostly refer to an abstract concept that implied the past, present, and future members of the nation. In its concrete reality, the Turkish nation was represented as a unified entity, attributed with some essential merits and provided with some crucial roles in the presence and permanence of the nation state. The Turkish nation also was presented as consenting to the will and power of its rulers. The uses of the adjective “national” further consolidated the implications of collectivity, as well as the implications of common assets and common goods. Furthermore, the concern of the newspapers for the ethnically Turkish groups living outside of the national territories was demonstrated. This concern, however, was never directed towards Turkic communities of Central Asia, but towards the Turkish communities in former Ottoman provinces.

Discourses that placed emphasis on self-confidence and assurance had spatial and temporal dimensions, too. On the spatial level, by means of comparing the new, Republican Turks with the Westerners on the basis of progress, i.e. a stress on women’s rights was instrumental in terms of contributing to the construction of a self-assured Turkish identity. On the temporal level, the Republican Turks also were represented as more advanced civilized and self-assured people when compared to the Ottomans. Yet it was observed that the Turks and Turkish nation were always attributed positive characteristics. Moreover, by examining the references to “Turk” in singular noun form, we have recognized the search for self-

esteem, and noticed that “Turk” as signifier had several different connotations, in the sense that it implied domesticity, ethnicity or the nation state. Frequent uses of “Turkishness,” were seen as an attribute that was subject to be measured or as an abstract concept that implied continuity in time and space, and represented as an asset elevated by the republican regime.

The newspapers contributed to the simple acknowledgement of the existence of the Turkish nation also both temporally and spatially. The discourses of “us,” “we” or “ours” functioned as discursive practices that took nation for granted, and that constructed a connection between the newspapers and readers on the ground of a common natural habitus, which appeared to be the nation state. Such uses reinforced the imagination of sharing a common past and future. They also implied that members of the national community did or should agree on common interests, unite around common desires, common anger or pride. They directed readers to identify themselves with their country and be responsible for contributing or adapting themselves to the republican transformation. They also provided clues to observe which specific attributes were associated with the whole nation.

The analysis of the discourses of the mainstream newspapers in the single-party period, revealed peculiarities of the official Turkish nationalism and the official description of the Turkish national identity within the political context of the Kemalist single-party era. The mainstream newspapers not only helped disseminate, mediate and even propagate the official representation of the national identity, but also excluded some crucial representations. It is also necessary to think about what was absent in the framing of the nation and national identity. For instance, open references to Islam and the Muslim identity, and references to social class were completely absent. Additionally, references to the dissident elements of the regime, except for the Dersim events that were mostly covered from the perspective of modernization, were absent too.

In addition, it was asserted that the relation between the journalists and the readers were constructed on the basis of being of the Turkish ethnicity, not explicitly but implicitly connoting Muslim identity, thereby discursively excluding non-Muslim citizens from this relationship. It also was possible to demonstrate how non-Muslim communities were “othered” or treated as simply constitutional citizens rather than as “real” Turks. In addition to this, non-Turkish Muslim identities such as Kurds and Arabs were referred overtly only when the article touched on the past or to the outside of the national territories. So the discursive representation and reproduction of the Turkish national identity brought along not only the ignorance of ethnically non-Turkish Muslim identities, but also the exclusion of non-Muslim individuals and communities. All in all, the newspapers’ representation of “Turk” and “us” comprised Muslim Turks or those other immigrant Muslims who did not resist internalizing the Turkish identity, and who were treated as real Turks. Within the territories of the nation state, while non-Muslims were treated as constitutional Turks, the presence and identity of Kurds were almost completely disregarded.

Moreover, in the newspapers, both “nation” and “Turk” were often represented as abstract concepts and real-life human stories were almost obscured. References to the nation as a one, unified body and references to Turks in general were present in the coverage; however, except for some idealized Republican women or successful individuals, representations of even ethnically Turkish concrete common individuals were absent. In the newspapers of the period, people were portrayed as though they were all together and cordially devoted to the republican ideals, and as though they yearned to adapt themselves to the new, secular nation state with one accord. The representations of ordinary concrete Turkish human beings as agents of the social and political life were not present. While reporting real life stories such as criminal news or fraud events, the national identity of the responsible individuals were never mentioned, except when they were minority citizens.

The findings confirmed the initial argument that the newspapers of the mid-1930s should be considered among the primary sources to trace the leitmotifs, discourses, and principles of the official nationalism of the Kemalist single-party era. 1930s were especially significant in terms of the priority that Mustafa Kemal attached to culture alongside the construction of the nation and national identity. Studies on the history and language of Turks were also meant to contribute to the international recognition and prestige of Turks via the presentations in the international congresses of archeology, history and philology.⁴⁶⁸ Thereby, among other things, the coverage and international reflections of the claims and discourses of history and language theses in the newspapers of the period are also worth mentioning in terms of how to demonstrate the role of the newspapers in the reproduction, dissemination and mediation of the national identity.

Additionally, it also was elaborated how mainstream newspapers reproduced the official attitude towards women, youth, children, and army. In conformity with the official stance towards these components of national identity, findings demonstrated that the newspapers frequently framed these sub-themes with reference to national identity from the perspective of positive progress or change towards economic, industrial, and cultural modernization. Together with the mystification of Atatürk these elements came into prominence as considerable sub-themes in the making of the official Kemalist nationalism. A strong emphasis was put on the progressive merits of the Republican regime while trying to manufacture the consent of the people in adopting a new identity with an emphasis on the elevation of Turkishness.

The comprehensive content analysis and discourse analysis provided meaningful data to argue that in the mainstream newspapers, themes and discourses with regard to national identity and the tone of nationalism in the articles were mostly in keeping with the agenda or

⁴⁶⁸ Zafer Toprak, , *Darwin'den Dersim'e Cumhuriyet ve Anmtropoloji*, p. 470.

with the current events. Rather than disseminating a predetermined ideological and theoretical framework, newspapers adjusted their standpoints along with the circumstances, except from disseminating the assertions of history and language thesis as predetermined discourses. Cross comparisons on the basis of years put forth that the newspapers concurrently covered certain modernizing Republican reforms or urged on certain policies, such as the national claims on Hatay and the issue of the physical training of the youth.

Some similarities and differences between *Cumhuriyet*, *Akşam*, and *Son Posta* were present on the basis of the intensity of specific discourses. It was observed that in general, *Cumhuriyet* notably more intensely promoted and was comparatively more dedicated to the reproduction of the discourses with reference to the Turkish national identity. Yunus Nadi's involvement in the RPP as a member of the parliament and the close relations with Mustafa Kemal might have been influential in terms of determining the extent of the devotion of the newspapers. Nevertheless, the research demonstrated that the other two newspapers' contributions were also significant.

Comparison between different types of articles, revealed different journalistic attitudes and practices in handling some specific issues with regard to national identity. While some discourse themes and discursive practices were mostly evident in news articles, such as references to ethnic/religious groups or Turks in other countries, some other discursive practices, such as the usage of "Turkishness" or comparison between old and new life styles were clearest in opinion pieces. It is thereby understood that columnists attributed greater importance to some specific themes and tried to persuade their readers accordingly with regard to the consolidation of the national identity. They presumably might have considered themselves as missionary mediators between the state and the people, attributing their position as intellectuals a hierarchical superiority over ordinary citizens.

All in all, in the 1930s, within the context of a broader paradigm that was shaped by the targets of modernity and nation-state formation, the Republican elites sought a homogenous and secular national identity. The mainstream newspapers of the era contributed to its reproduction and consolidation, especially by means of dissemination and mediation of the national message. Indeed, the efforts and search for constructing a new national identity in the 1930s were in conformity with the rest of the world, especially when the interwar context and the rise of the totalitarian regimes in Europe are considered.

This dissertation, which used the archival mainstream newspapers as primary sources, is the first study to attempt an extensive and systematic elaboration of the nationalist discourses and national identity representations on the basis of mainstream newspaper texts of the period in question. Furthermore, it may be argued that this dissertation's originality also comes from its consideration of the newspapers as significant tools in the reproduction, dissemination and mediation and of nationalism and national identity in the Kemalist single-party period.

This study should be evaluated, however, as an attempt to describe only a fragment of the mainstream newspapers' discourses of the era on the basis of a cross-section with regard to the reproduction of national identity. It thereby allows commenting on the characteristics of the time interval between the years 1934 and 1937 from both diachronic and synchronic perspectives. From diachronic perspective, the mid-1930s should be considered as the peak years for the consolidation of the national identity because the republican reforms were complemented, Kemalist nationalism was matured and the press had become quite containable by the regime. In addition, Mustafa Kemal was still actively shaping the quest for a national culture. Besides, in this the period the construction of a new man was not only the main agenda in Turkey but also in other countries such as Germany, Italy and Soviet Russia. On the other hand, from a synchronic perspective, the nationalist language of the mainstream

newspapers had functioned as working system with regard to the dissemination and mediation of the nation. On the basis of the data and findings, it would be not wrong to conclude that the underlying frame that was drew for the Turkish national identity in the mid1930s has endured for so long and dominated the nationalist discourses in the mainstream media.

Today, in 2015, the world paradigm of the 1930s is no more valid and democratic citizenship on the basis of the appreciation of cultural diversity is being promoted in a global political context. Accordingly, in the last decades, the official hegemonic nationalist discourses that had long been thought in the schools, internalized by the media, reproduced by the popular culture, and so on were reconsidered through deconstructive methods, with an attempt to go beyond the official production and reproduction of knowledge. In doing that, history was revisited on the basis so far ignored sources. This dissertation may thus be considered as a contribution to an in-depth analysis of Republican newspapers and the rewriting of this history.

As a final word, readers should be reminded that media and communication studies are usually concerned with either the producers/encoders of the messages, i.e. journalists or media professionals; the texts/messages themselves; the media as technology or institution through which the messages are transmitted; or the receivers/decoders, i.e. audiences or readers. Hence the researcher does not claim to have covered everything that could be covered or to have said everything that could be said on this particular subject matter.

This study thus is mainly concerned with the interpretation of the texts/messages of specific mainstream newspapers in a limited time span, within a specific context and with a particular interest. It thus goes without saying that this constitutes the major limitation and weakness of this study, since all other constituents of the communication process with regard to the construction and consolidation of the Turkish national identity are still there as potential research areas to be addressed in future studies.

APPENDIX

ORIGINAL NEWSPAPER EXERPTS THAT CONSTRUCT THE CORPUS OF
DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

- 1) Soyumuz Bulutları delib geçse çok mu bir gün oyumuz Kaç bin yılın gövdesinden kopub gelmiş soyumuz Nece nece yüzyılları biz devirmiş yıkmışız Nece ünsüz kuru başı kovuklara tıkmışız (*Cumhuriyet*, 7 Aralık 1934)
- 2) Soyumuz, Dilimiz Bu ulu soy Altaylarda, bozkırlarda doğmuştur Nicesini tepelemiş nice düşman boğmuştur Onu tutup anlatmışlar budunlara bin masal Onun ünü olup kalmış yer yüzünde acunsal (*Cumhuriyet*, 8 Aralık 1934)
- 3) Bugünün uyanık ve erimli Türkleri tarihsel dirimlerinin derinlerini araştırdıkça varlıklarının, canlarının kendi ırklarının köklerine bağlı olduğunu gördüler. (*Cumhuriyet*, 31 Aralık 1934)
- 4) Türk ırkının tarihinde binicilik bu ırkın mümeyyiz vasıflarından biri olarak zikredilir. (*Son Posta*, 28 Temmuz 1936)
- 5) İskender ulusu ile Atina silindi. Romanın yıkılışı ile Romalılık kalktı. Fakat eski Türk uluslarının yıkılması böyle olmadı, onların yıkılışı ile Türkün sopsal ve kültürel birliği sarsılmadı. (*Cumhuriyet*, 27 Ocak 1935)
- 6) Varlığımıza bağlanarak kendimize seçtiğimiz sınırlar içinde, hep bir soydan gelmiş insanlar, başbaşa verip elbirliği ederek yurdu yükseltmeğe çalışacağız. (*Son Posta*, 8 Mart 1935)
- 7) Allaha şükür yabancı ırktan bir erkekle evlenmek isteyen veya evlenen Türk kadını yoktur. Fakat arasıra yabancı ırktan bir kızla evlenmek isteyen veya evlenen gençlerimizi işitirim. (*Son Posta*, 31 Aralık 1935)
- 8) Kısırlaştırmak meselesi tekrar ortaya atıldı Felsefe Profesörü Mustafa Şekib “İrkin tasfiyesi esastır. Maksadım Anormal adamların üremesine mâni olmaktır” diyor. (*Son Posta*, 8 Ocak 1937)

- 9) Tek çocuk yapmanın birçok mahzurları vardır Neslimizi güzelleştirmek için nelere başvurmalıyız? (*Akşam*, 8 Şubat 1937)
- 10) Her çağda ilk adım ve ilk hız! İşte Türklük budur! (*Cumhuriyet*, 27 Ocak 1935)
- 11) İnsan ruhuna iyi ve güzel görünen herşey Türk tarihinde bol bol vardır. Türk, tabiatın en iyi eseri olmakla kalmamış, iyiliği ve güzelliği tarihte de yaşatmayı, temsil etmeyi adeta kendine borç bilmiştir. (*Son Posta*, 12 Şubat 1935)
- 12) Şuna kaniim ki Türkler musikide garplılar kadar, hatta onlardan daha istidatlıdır. (*Cumhuriyet*, 3 Aralık 1934)
- 13) Türk tarihinin hiçbir milletin tarihile kıyas edilemeyecek derecede bir enginlik arzietmekte olduđu bugün ilmi realitelerle anlaşılmalıdır. (*Cumhuriyet*, 13 Aralık 1936)
- 14) Türk Olmıyan Kızla Evlenme Meselesi (...) Açıkça söylemek lâzımsa Türk olmıyan kadınla bir Türk erkeğinin evlenmesine sarıh surette aleyhtarım. Maksadım yanlış anlaşılmasın, bu şekilde izdivaçtan bahsedildi mi hatıra en ziyade, rum, ermeni ve Musevi gelir. Bu vatandaşların hepsine ayrı ayrı hürmet ederim. Fakat bir memlekette yaşamakta olmaklığımıza rağmen aramızda dil, hars ve din farkı vardır, karakter ve âdet farkı vardır. (Hanımteyze) (*Son Posta*, 26 Ekim 1934)
- 15) Dahilî düşmalar da, vatan hainleri de dışarıdan gelen düşmanlarla elele vermişlerdi. Ekalliyetler müthiş bir surette azmışlardı. Türkten başka herkes, müslüman ve hıristiyan herkes Türke düşmandı. Hatta Türke ve Türklüğe düşman olan vatan haini bazı – bunlara Türk demeğe dilim varmıyor – mel'unlar da açık veye gizli harici düşmanla çalışıyorlardı. (*Cumhuriyet*, 19 Mayıs 1937)
- 16) Fuzulimizi bir Ermeni vatandaştan mı öğrenecektik? Fuzuli hakkında böyle üç ciltlik bir eser neşri mesela bir Fuat Köprülüye düşmez mi idi? Niçin bizim fikir ve kalem

- sahiplerimizin gayretleri makale ve nihayet risale hududunu geçemiyor? (*Son Posta*, 29 Nisan 1937)
- 17) Türk müsün? Dilini Türkleştir! (*Son Posta*, 26 Eylül 1934)
- 18) Türkiyedeyiz Türkçe isteriz! (*Cumhuriyet*, 18 Kasım 1936)
- 19) Türkçe konuşmak istemiyenlere bir ders! Elâzizdeki Süryanii kadim kilisesi, bütün dualarını ve vaizlerini öz Türkçe ile yapıyor (*Cumhuriyet*, 2 Nisan 1937)
- 20) Umumî yerlerde yalnız Türkçe konuşulması temin edilecek Halkevi Reisi: “Türk vatandaşının Türkçeden gayri bir lisanla konuşması kadar çirkin bir şey tasavvur edemem” diyor. (*Son Posta*, 1 Mart 1937)
- 21) Teşkilat-ı Esasiye kanunumuz cins ve mezhep ayırmaksızın herkesi Türk olarak kabul etmiştir. Bu şekilde Türklüğü kabul edilenlerin de dilleri Türkçedir. (...) Fakat yutttaşlarımızın bu topraklar üzerinde hâlâ başka bir dil konuşmaları kadar hatalı bir hareket olamaz. (*Son Posta*, 13 Eylül 1934)
- 22) Bir Musevi yurttaşın sualine cevap Musevi bir vatandaş imzasile aldığım bir mektupta “Museviyim: fakat Türkiyede büyüdüğüm için Türküm ve çok sevdiğim vatanımın aleyhinde bir şey söylenir yahud gözüme çarpan bazı vak’alar izzeti nefsimde dokunacak mahiyette olursa şiddetle mukabele etmek borcumdur” denildikten sonra yurttaşımız Cuma günü Beyoğlundaki pastahanelerden birine girdiği zaman, büfedeki kızın, kendisine istediğini Fransızca olarak sorduğunu, kendisi evde bile Türkçe konuştuğu için kıza Türkçe cevap verdiğini söylüyor ve diyor ki: (...) Evet muhterem okuyucu, Beyoğlundaki herkes ne vakit Türkçe konuşacaktır bilir misiniz? 1- Züppe Türkler, Beyoğlu’nda Fransızca konuşmayı bir marifet sanmaktan, 2- Pekâla Türkçe bilen tatlısu frenkleri, Fransızca konuşmakla halis muhlis Parisli olduklarını zannetmekten, 3- Musevi vatandaşlarımızın hepsi sizin gibi davranıp da umumi mahallelerde bağıra bağıra İspanyolca bozuntusu veya Fransızca konuşarak kafamızı

şışirmekten, 4- Fransızca konuşanlar karşısında duyduğunuzdan bahsettiğiniz asabiye ve infiali, sizin gibi Türk olmakla iftihar eden ve türkçeyi seven bütün Musevi vatandaşlar da duydukları ve fransızca konuşan soydaşlarına hemen türkçe konuşmalarını ihtar ettikleri zaman... (*Cumhuriyet*, 9 Şubat 1935)

23) Bu vatanda oturarak Türk ana yasasının tarifi mucibince hakiki Türk olmak şerefini ihraz etmek payesine yükseltilmiş her vatandaş, içtimal manasının bütün hakikatile Türk olmuş olmak için lâakal Türkçe konuşmak mecburiyetindedir. (*Cumhuriyet*, 12 Kasım 1936)

24) Bu mektuplardan birisi, yedi kişiden mürekkeb bir Musevi ailesinin, bir Beyoğlu sinemasında bağıra bağıra mütemadiyen fransızca ve ispanyolca konuştuklarını bildiriyor. Bu mektubu yazan okuyucum, “O gece Cumhuriyet bayramı idi, Türk vatandaşı olan bu Musevilerin hiç olmazsa Türklerin en büyük bayramına hürmetle türkçe konuşmaları vatandaşlık ve vicdan borçları idi” diyor. (*Cumhuriyet*, 18 Kasım 1936)

25) Siyasi manada Türk olan cumhuriyet yurddaşlarının yavaş yavaş, bugün kullandıkları dilleri bırakarak, hayat dili olarak münhasıran türkçeyi kullanacakları gün elbet gelecektir. (...) Bence Türk cumhuriyeti yurddaşlarını, ana dilleri olan şu ve bu dili konuşmaktan menetmek pek te doğru bir şey değildir. Ana ile çocuk arasında anlaşma vasıtası olan ana diline hürmet etmekle Türkler, kendi aralarında yaşayan azlıklara karşı dürüst bir muamelede bulunmuş olurlar. (...) Fakat asıl sinirimize dokunması lâzım gelen, (...) Levanten dili olan Fransızca ana dilinde I harfi bulunmıyan J ve Ş seslerini çıkaramıyan Ermenilerle Rumların, frenklik, Avrupalılık, medenilik taslamak için fransızca konuşmaları kadar manâsız, çirkin, kulak yırtan ve sinir yıpratıcı bir şey daha yoktur. (...) Hele Yahudilere gelince, her buldukları memlekette oranın dilini kendilerine ana dili yapıp ta Türkiyede bir vakitler dört kelimelik İspanyolca kırması

- bir dil kullanmış ve bugün de onun yerine, bilhassa yüksek sınıf arasında, Levanten Fransızcasını kullanmaya başlamış olmalarını affetmek imkânsızdır. (Muhittin Birgen) (*Son Posta*, 4 Mart 1937)
- 26) Vatandaş, Fransızca konuşma! (...) Fakat, Levanten isminde bir millet, böyle bir millet içinde bir anadili bulunmadığına göre, bize geçmişin kapitülasyonunu, geçmişin Türk, gayri-Türk, müslüman – hıristiyan ayrılıklarını hatırlatan bu Levanten dilinin düşmanıyım. (Muhittin Birgen) (*Son Posta*, 4 Mart 1937)
- 27) Türkçeden başka dil konuşan vatandaşlar Bunların hars sahasında diğer Türk kardeşleri derecesine getirilmesi için Parti esaslı bir programla faaliyete geçiyor (*Cumhuriyet*, 11 Mart 1937)
- 28) Türkiyede biz Türkler ve bir de Türkiyeli olan yurddaşlar vardır. Türkiyelilerin Türk olması ancak, ülküde birliği yapan dilde birleşmelerile olur. Bunun içindir ki Türkiyeli yurddaşlarımızı bu tertemiz varlık içine almak gayesile Onları Türk diline saygıya davet ediyoruz. İstanbul sokaklarını kirleten binbir karışık dilleri başka yerlerde istedikleri kadar söyleyebilirler. Lâkin Türkiye’de hayatın bütün zevkini tatarak altına sığındıkları bayrağın şerefine riayet etmek te bir misafir için bile borç iken, o sancağın tâbii, o milletin ferdi olduğunu sırası gelince haykırarlardan hiç olmazsa bu dile hürmet istemek te Türklerin hakkı değil midir? (M. Nermi) (*Cumhuriyet*, 7 Mayıs 1937)
- 29) Museviler arasında Türkçe Konuşmak Türk Kültürle Yaşamak İçin Yeni Bir Hamle (*Son Posta*, 16 Eylül 1934)
- 30) Rum vatandaşlar, sıra size geldi (...) Öğrendiğime göre Ermeniler on bin lira, Museviler de epey bir para topladıkları halde, Rumların iane komisyonu henüz zikre değer bir yekûn elde edememiştir. Halbuki Rumlar Türklerden sonra İstanbulun en kalabalık unsurudur. İçlerinde birçok meşhur zenginler de vardır. (...) Geçenlerde, bu

- sütunlarda Yunan ve hatta Rum zenginlerinin Yunanistana milyonlar hediye ettiklerinden bahsetmişim. Cumhuriyet vatandaşı İstanbullu Rumların da yurtlarının müdafası için fedakârlıktan kaçınmıyacaklarını şüphesiz addediyoruz. (*Cumhuriyet*, 11 Kasım 1934)
- 31) “Türkçe konuşalım” Sinagoglarda Türkçe lehine tezahürat yapıldı “Fransada bir Fransızın başka bir lisanla konuşması ne kadar gülünç ise, Türkiyede bir Musevinin Türkceden başka bir lisan kullanması o kadar garip ve o derecede ayıptır.” (*Son Posta*, 27 Eylül 1936)
- 32) Museviler ve Türk Harsı Musevîler arasında Türkçe Konuşmak Türk Kültürile Yaşamak İçin Yeni Bir Hamle (...) Balat Türk Kültür ve Yardım Cemiyeti Musevilerin Türkçe konuşmaları hakkında bir beyanname kaleme almıştır. (*Son Posta* 10 Eylül 1934)
- 33) Musevi Vatandaşlarımızın Yardım Derneği Musevi vatandaşlarımızın teşkil ettikleri tayyareye yardım derneği dün Tayyare merkezinde toplanmıştır. (*Son Posta*, 15 Temmuz 1934)
- 34) Rum vatandaşların memleket alâkası Tayyare Cemiyetine azami şekilde yardım ve devamlı iane temini için Rum vatandaşlarımız da aralarında bir dernek teşkil etmişlerdi. (...) Vatan için gösterilen bu alâkayı şükranla karşılar, kendilerine teşekkür ederiz. (*Cumhuriyet*, 22 Temmuz 1934)
- 35) Ermeni vatandaşlar iki tayyare alıyorlar Orduya hediye edilecek olan bu tayyarelere Gazi Hz. ile İsmet Paşanın ismi verilecek (*Cumhuriyet*, 14 Ağustos 1934)
- 36) Ermeni vatandaşlar Hava tehlikesine karşı yapılacak yardımı bian evvel neticelendirmeğe karar verdiler (*Cumhuriyet*, 18 Haziran 1935)
- 37) Ruhani giyimleri kanunu ve Rum papazları Hangi topluluktan, hangi ulustan, hangi dinden olurlarsa olsunlar, ruhanî adamların, kadınların, ruhaniliği gösteren

- üstlüklerini (elbiselerini) yalnız tapıncaklarında (mabedlerinde) giyip dışarıda taşımamalarını bildiren son kanun nedense İstanbulda Rum patrikhanesinin, Yunanistanda da komşularımızın hoşlarına gitmemiş (*Cumhuriyet*, 8 Aralık 1934)
- 38) Papaslar yeni kıyafet kanunundan çok memnun Papas Toma Şigaher “Dinin kıyafetle bir alâkası olamaz” diyor (*Akşam*, 5 Aralık 1934)
- 39) Anglikan papazlarından bari ibret alsalar! Rum patrikhanesinin bugünkü içtimada görüşeceği şeyler merakla bekleniyor. (*Cumhuriyet*, 8 Aralık 1934)
- 40) Derhal sivil giyinen bir din reisi! Süryani Patrik vekili inkılâbı niçin benimsediğini anlatıyor (*Cumhuriyet*, 19 Aralık 1934)
- 41) 1923 de İstanbulda toplanan “Panortodoks kongresi” papas saçlarının kesilmesine ve kıyafetlerinin değişmesine karar vermişti. Bu vesikanın rumca metinlerini aynen neşrediyoruz ki papaslar okusun... (*Akşam*, 21 Aralık 1934)
- 42) Fener Patrikhanesinin mühim bir tamimi Ruhaniler sakal ve bıyıklarını tarş ettirmeyecekler, umumî yerlerde oturamayacaklar – Papa Eftim dün saçını ve sakalını kestirdi (...) Bu yasayı bütün ruhaniler memnuniyetle karşılamakta ve kendilerini de sivil kıyafetle gezmek hakkına nail ettiği için Cuhuriyet hükûmetine sonsuz derecede minnettar olduklarını söylemektedirler. (*Cumhuriyet*, 15 Haziran 1935)
- 43) Dahiliye Vekili Trakyaya Geçti Musevîler Meselesinin Tahkikatı Çok Çabuk Bitirilecek (Başvekil İsmet Paşa) bilhassa demişlerdi ki: - Yahudi aleyhtarlığı Türkiye matai ve zihniyeti değildir. (...) Böyle cereyanlara katiyen müsaade etmiyeceğiz. (*Son Posta*, 7 Temmuz 1934)
- 44) Trakyada Bir Yahudi Muhacereti Yoktur Mesele Halledilmiş Ve Gelenler De Yerlerine Dönmiye Başlamışlardır Bir musevi Tüccar Diyor Ki: (...) Türkiyede Yahudi düşmanlığı mevcut olmadığını bir kez daha teyid eden bir hâdisedir. (*Son Posta*, 8 Temmuz 1934)

- 45) Trakya'dan gelen Yahudiler Şehrimize gelenler yerlerine dönüyorlar (*Cumhuriyet*, 9 Temmuz 1934)
- 46) Museviler meselesi tahkikatı bitti (...) Aldığımız malumata nazaran yahudilere Trakya'da hiçbir tecavüz vuku bulmamıştır. (...) Bundan onbeş gün evvel Ayvalık ve daha sonraları da Keşan ve Uzunköprü yahudileri kendi arzularile evlerini, eşyalarını satarak İstanbul'a gitmişlerdir. Trakya'da Yahudi kesafetiyle tanınmış Edirneye gelince; oralarda herhangi bir sebeple millettaşlarının hicrete kalkışmaları bittabî Edirne yahudilerini telâşa düşürmüş ve bura yahudileri geçen ayın otuzuncu ve bu ayın birinci günleri kulüplerinde sık sık toplantılar yapmış ve müteakiben borsadan çekilmek suretile vaziyetin alacağı şekle intizarı kararlaştırılmış ve salı günü dükkânlarını kapıyarak evlerine çekilmişler ve ortada hiçbir şey olmadığı halde o geceyi müthiş bir korku içinde geçirerek sabah erkenden istasyona akın etmişlerdir. Bu panik esnasında hükûmet herhangi bir hadiseye meydan vermemek için en sıkı tedbirleri almış bulunuyordu. (...) Uzunköprüde yahudiler geçen ayın yirmisinden itibaren Türklere boykot yapmışlardır. Bu vaziyet karşısında Türkler de icap eden tedbirleri almış, bir sebzeçiler kooperatifi, kozacılar birliği namı altında bir şirket vücade getirmişler ve vaziyetin sökmeyeceğini anlıyan yahudiler geçen ayın yirmisekizine rastlıyan perşembe günü (bize burada ekmek kalmadı) diyerek muhacerete başlamışlar ve beş gün zarfında Uzunköprü'ü terketmişlerdir. (*Cumhuriyet*, 12 Temmuz 1934)
- 47) Trakya'da Yahudi Meselesi Neşredilen Tebliğde Hâdisenin İç Yüzü Anlatılıyor (...) Anlaşıldığına göre Trakya'da Yahudi aleyhtarlığı büyük harpte başlayarak mütareke ve istiklâl mücadelesi zamanlarında devam etmiş ve cumhuriyet zamanında bir müddet yatıştıktan sonra son seneler zarfında dünyanın muhtelif yerlerinde antisemitizm yeni formüllerle ve daha şiddetli olarak memlekete girmiştir. (*Son Posta*, 15 Temmuz 1934)

- 48) Antakyadaki irtica hadisesi Yobazlar şapka giyen gençlere nasıl saldırdılar Şeyh Saidin akrabasından olan Kürd hoca “Anadolu halkı evvelce Rumdu, şimdi gene asıllarına döndüler demiş” (...) Antakyada Kürd Mehmed namında, ötendenberi Türklük ve Türk inkılâbları aleyhtarlığıle geçinen mel’un bir Kürd hoca vardır. Gene bu Türk şehrinin başbelâlarından ve yüzkaralarından olan Kuseyri ailesi bu mel’unu himaye eder. (*Cumhuriyet*, 19 Aralık 1934)
- 49) İttihat ve Terakkinin Sonu Kürt Mustafa Paşa ilk cinayetlerini birer birer işlemeğe başlamıştı (*Son Posta*, 1 Mayıs 1937)
- 50) İttihat ve Terakkinin Sonu Arnavut Ömer benzi uçmuş Kandıra M. umumîsini görünce elini silahına attı (*Son Posta*, 17 Mayıs 1937)
- 51) Hatay davası Münasebetile Türk mucizesi (...) bu millî ve ırkî vahdet, Türkün ötendenberi bütün muhitinde yaratageldiği sempati icabile diğer ırkların bu çok haklı Türk davasına gösterdikleri canlı alâka ile bütün bütün kuvvetlenmiş oldu. Aleviler, Çerkezler, Ermeniler bütün makûs teşvik ve tazyiklere rağmen hep bu haklı Türk davasına muzaheret ettiler. Osmanlı imparatorluğunun tasfiyesinden sonra bir daha tahakkuk eden bu keyfiyet, gözlerimizin önüne yeniden mucizenin mucizesi sayılmak değerinde bir manzara açıyor, ve bu manzarada Türkün toplayıcı cazibesi görülüyor. (*Cumhuriyet*, 25 Kasım 1936)
- 52) Sancakta karışıklıklar çıktı Kürtler ve Çerkesler de seçime girmediler (*Son Posta*, 16 Kasım 1936)
- 53) Kürt ve Çerkesler de müşahitlere Türk olduklarını, Türklerle birlikte İstiklâl istediklerini söylediler. (*Son Posta*, 13 Ocak 1937)
- 54) Nuseyrilerin Türklüğü Onlar haçlı seferinden evvel de vardı, Arab olmalarına ise imkân yoktur (*Cumhuriyet*, 30 Aralık 1936)

- 55) “Bütün Sancak Türktür!” Antakyada Alevîler ve Çerkezler de “Yaşasın Atatürk!” diye haykırıyolar Kürtler de şapka giydiler (*Cumhuriyet*, 13 Ocak 1937)
- 56) Yeniden öğrenmeye mecbur olduğumuz bir mesele: Alevilik... (*Son Posta*, 12 Mart 1937)
- 57) Türklüğün yavaş yavaş uyanan şuuru ile kendi kendine sönüp gitmekte olduğu halde Fransızlar tarafından Suriyede yeniden uyandırılmasına çalışılan “Alevilik” nedir? (*Son Posta*, 12 Mart 1937)
- 58) Antakyadaki Ermeniler de Türklerle birlik Halebdeki ekalliyetler Türkiyeye mütemayil (*Cumhuriyet*, 5 Ekim 1936)
- 59) Antakya, İskenderun ve havalisi Ermenilerinin Türklüğe bağlılıkları hadisesi vesilesile o kasırganın diğer safhalarına da bir nebze temas edeceğiz. (*Cumhuriyet*, 25 Ekim 1936)
- 60) Antakya meselesinde Ermenilerden sonra Aleviler ve Museviler Antakya ve havalisi Ermenileri bütün Türkiye de uyandırdıkları bu fikir ve hislerden dolayı belki geçmişin hatalarını tamire vesile teşkil edecek çok hayırlı bir iş görmüşlerdir. (*Cumhuriyet*, 15 Kasım 1936)
- 61) Ermeni Patriki Mesrup Naroyan, bütün Türklük için milli bir dava olan Antakya – İskenderun ve havalisi meselesine karşı Ermeni vatandaşlarımızın samimî bağlılıklarını (...) ifade etmiştir. (*Cumhuriyet*, 21 Kasım 1936)
- 62) İstanbul Ermenileri Taşnaklara ateş püskürüyor “Türkiye Ermenileri milli davalarda Türk kardeşleriyle beraberdirler. Bu hakikati kabul etmiyen Ermenilerin aramızda yeri yoktur” (*Cumhuriyet*, 20 Ocak 1937)
- 63) Türklerle en samimi yaşayabilen bir millet Asırlarca bizimle kardeşçe yaşayan ve öyle muamele gören Ermeniler sonra niçin isyan ettiler? (*Cumhuriyet*, 24 Temmuz 1934)

- 64) Ermeni meselesi Abdülhamit Rus sefirine kanarak asi Ermenilerin şiddetli tenkilini emretmişti (*Cumhuriyet*, 6 Ekim 1934)
- 65) Şark Vilâyetlerinde kopan kanlı Ermeni hâdiseleri Abdülhamit sür'atle vakaların önüne geçmeğe çalıştı, fakat olan oldu ve çok kan aktı (*Cumhuriyet*, 25 Kasım 1934)
- 66) Ermenilerin isyanı Biz endişe ettikçe ermeniler: "Vehme kapılıyorsunuz!" cevabını veriyorlardı (*Son Posta*, 20 Aralık 1936)
- 67) Türkiyeye hasret Bir Suriyeli talebe "İmkân bulsaydım Türk olurdu!" diyor Kaçan Ermenilerin de içleri yanıyor (*Cumhuriyet*, 14 Şubat 1935)
- 68) Hazin bir macera: Türkiyeden giden Rumlar ve Ermeniler -1- (...) –Bilir miyim ben kimim? İşte bir Ermeni. Sankim asker olmıyalım diye memleketten buralara düşmüştük. Derken memlekete dönemez olduk, ve işte maskara gibi buralarda sürünüp gidiyoruz. (*Cumhuriyet*, 25 Ekim 1936)
- 69) Hazin bir macera: Türkiyeden giden Rumlar ve Ermeniler -3- (...) Hele Türk millî kültürile adamakıllı kaynaşmış olan Ermenilerin sürüklenmiş oldukları akıbete teessüf etmemek elde değildir. Bilhassa Anadolu içindekilerinin İncilleri ve ibadetleri bile Türkçe olan Rumların maceralarına gelince -bunun onlar hesabına ve bizim hesabımıza- ayrıca yürekler acısı olduğunu bugün, onların da bizlerin de pek iyi anlamakta bulunmaktığımızdan daha tabîî ne olabilir? Tarihin nâdir kaydettiği bu hâdiselerin sebebi neydi meselesine gelince: Dedik ki kürenin boşluklar içinde yüzen bir merhalesinde adeta kıyamet kopuyor denilecek bir kasırga zuhur ederek onunla mütefarık bir tufan ve bir yangın meydana aldı, önüne ne geldise silip süpürecek savletlerle saldıran bu afetler elbirliği ederek ortalığı hercümerc ettiler. Fırtına durarak sular durulduğu zaman gördük ki olan olmuş, ölen ölmüş, kalanların bir kısmı dünyanın dört köşesine atılmıştı. Dünya sathının bir kısmile beraber Türkiye parçasında da cereyan etmiş olan bu faciayı başka türlü anlatmak nasıl mümkün

- olsun? Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun inhilâli ihtimali büyük devletlerden başka küçük millet ve cemaatleri de yağma Hasanın böreği ihtirasile gürültüde gûya külah kapmak hevesine düşürmüş ve adeta akıllarını başlarından almıştı. Her tarafta ve her cephede kuvvetli düşmanlarla çarpışan Türk, bazı büyük devletlerin oyuncağı komitacıların arkadan vuran hıyanetleriyle karşılaşınca canhevlile müterafık kutsî bir gadab ve hiddetin feveranlarına tutulmaktan kendini alamadı. (*Cumhuriyet*, 1 Kasım 1936)
- 70) Okmeydanı Cinayeti. Lûtfi kendisinin kimseyi yaralamadığını iddia ediyor. (*Akşam*, 3 Kasım 1934)
- 71) Yahudi Karmanyolacı Bir Kızın Çantasını Kaptı, Bir De Tekme Savurdu, Fakat Tutuldu (*Son Posta*, 20 Kasım 1934)
- 72) Türklüğe hakaret eden Ermeni mahkûm oldu ve tevkif edildi. (*Son Posta*, 11 Nisan 1937)
- 73) Türkçe Konuşmayan Musevî Üstelik Bir de Karşısındakine Yumruk Attı Dün akşam Sultanahmet sulh birinci Ceza mahkemesi , Bünyamin oğlu Yasef isminde 23 yaşında bir Musevi gencini 15 gün hapis cezasına mahkum etmiştir. (...) Yasef Efendi bu ihtardan gücenmiş: - Türkçe konuşmayacağım demiş ve aynı zamanda Ziya beye bir de yumruk indirmiştir. (...) *Son Posta*: Bu hadiseyi Türk kültürile uğraşan muhtelif Musevi teşekküllerinin nazarı dikkatine koyuyoruz. (*Son Posta*, 12 Ekim 1934)
- 74) Binaenaleyh Tuncelinin salâhiyyettar, mütefekkir bir âmirile yapmağa muvaffak olduğum hasbiahli burada zevkle tekrar edebilirim ki, ırkımızdan, bizden olan bu havali, idareciliğin modern terakkilerile bir örnek il olacak ve Anadolu mamurelerine katılacaktır. (*Cumhuriyet*, 17 Ekim 1936)
- 75) Bugün, herşey, Dersimli diye tanıdığımız bu Kürt cemiyeti halkının Türk olduğunu gösterir. Zaten, son vukuat esnasında onlar da bunu “beğenmiyorsanız, bizi Türkistana iade ediniz!” tarzındaki kinayelerile kendileri de söylüyorlar. Bütün aşiret isimleri –

- ki bu cemiyet nizamına göre bu isimler pek güç değişir – türkçedir. (...) Şu halde, bunların Türkoğlu Türk olduklarına şüphe yoktur. (*Son Posta*, 19 Haziran 1937)
- 76) Dersimlileri Türk sananlar var. Ben de onları hiçbir zaman Türk sanmıyorum... Türkte bedevilik, iptidailik, vahşet, merhametsizlik ve kan içicilik seciye halinde mevcut olamaz... Bundan başka antropolojik evsafile Türk başkadır, Dersimli başkadır, türkçe başkadır, zaza dili başkadır. Bunlar – benim kanaatimce – tarihin pek eski zamanlarından beri o sarp dağlarda barınan, ve kimse el değdirmediği için mümkarîz olmıyan hususi bir ırktandır. (Y. Mazhar Aren) (*Cumhuriyet*, 29 Haziran 1937)
- 77) İmparatorluk devrinde her cemaat kendi hususî hayatına terkolonmuştu, ve herkes bu hususî hayatına bağlıydı. Hatta harici tesirlerle bu hususî hayata daha ziyade benlik verdirici gayretler de eksik değildi. Öylece Osmanlı İmparatorluğu bazı parçalarının rengi daha ziyade göze çarpan bir yamalı bohça gibiydi. (*Cumhuriyet*, 12 Kasım 1936)
- 78) Türk topraklarında “Türküm” demek birçok kimselerce ayıp sayılıyordu. Arap mübarek bir kavm, Arnavut besa dediği zaman yeri göğü oynatan bir şecaat harikası, Çerkes levent vücutlu, kahraman insandı, Türke gelince... (...) Türk aptal bir millet, korkak bir mahlûk, aşağı bir insan nümunesi idi. (*Son Posta*, 27 Ocak 1937)
- 79) Bugün Osmanlılık yıkılmıştır. Bugün hâkim olan Türktür; şu halde Sünnilikle Alevîlik arasında mücadele de bitmiştir. Fakat sade Sünnilik ile Alevîlik arasında mücadele bitmiş değil, belki de, Türk bakımından Alevîliğin, Osmanlının dilile anlatılmış olan Alevîlikten büsbütün başka bir şey olduğu görülmeğe başlamıştır. (*Son Posta*, 12 Mart 1937)
- 80) Türkün iktisat sahasında kabiliyeti olmadığı hurafesini kendi dimalarımızda bile yerleştirmek istemişlerdi. Cumhuriyet hükümeti, birçok batıl ananeler, ve hurafeler gibi bunu da muvaffakiyetle yıktı. Ve yalnız yıkmakla kalmadı. Onun yerine Türkün azmini, sebatını, kabiliyetini, ve tükenmez enerjisini eserleri ile bir abide halinde

dostun, düşmanın gözü önünde yükseltti. Büyük Türk inkılâbı iktisat sahasında da bize kendi kendimizi tanıttı. (*Son Posta*, 23 Ağustos 1934)

81) Bizim eski tarih derslerimiz de aşağı yukarı buna benziyordu ve Türklük osmanlılıktan ibaret imiş gibi gösteriliyordu. Cengiz ve Timur gibi cihangirlerden bahsedememek, o tarihi yazanların, okutanların elinden gelemezdi. Lâkin bu adamların yaptıkları işler münasebetile olsun Türk tarihinin gerçek tarafı gösterilmezdi. Meselâ ben mektepte iken, İskitlerin Türk olduğunu öğrenememiştim. (...) Bugün o Türk zümrelerinin hayatı okunuyor, belleniyor. (*Son Posta*, 14 Mayıs 1935)

82) Türkün geniş varlığını Osmanlı sarayının dar penceresinden görmeğe alışmış olanlar zannederler ki “Nevruz” bir Şîi bayramıdır. HAYIR. (...) Bugünkü bizler, Avrupalılaştırmış salon Türkleri için, artık unutulmuş ve hiç manâsı kalmamış bir şey, fakat, Nevruz, aralarında siyasi bir iki çizgi bulunmasına rağmen, küçük Asya ile, küçük Asyanın büyük Asyaya yapıştığı sahada, yekpare otuz milyonluk bir kitle teşkil eden Türk kitlelerinin hiç unutmadıkları bir bayramdır. (*Son Posta*, 22 Mart 1937)

83) Cumhuriyetle beraber yeni Türk bünyesi teşekkül etmezden önce dünya camiasındaki mevkiimiz hemen hemen hiçle müsavi idi. (...) Türk ismi, başkalarınca, tezyif makamında sıfat olarak kullanıldığı zamanlar henüz pek uzak değildir. Avrupa, kendi haritasında bize, kangren olup da kesilmesi iktiza eden bir uzuv nazarile bakıyordu. Garplı bir devlet adamının bize taktığı “Hasta adam” lâkabını uzun zaman taşıdık. Ve bu haysiyet kırıcı vaziyetten bizleri ne Reşit Paşanın tanzimatı ne de İttihatçıların meşrutiyeti kurtardı. Hasta adamı dipdiri, kanlı, canlı ve hepsinden daha sağlam olarak yeniden milletler arasına katan ve bununla da kalmayıp ön safa geçiren Atatürk oldu. (*Son Posta*, 10 Nisan 1937)

- 84) Millet, ümitsizlerle ümitliler halinde ikiye bölünmüştü. (...) Erzurum kongresi, Sivas kongresi, Ankara, Eskişehir, Afyon, Konya... Anadolu'da türklük, şarktan garbe doğru yeni ve seri bir istilâ daha yaptı: Arkasını Türkün geldiği diyarlara, Asya ortalarına çevirmiş ve sanki orada yaşayan tarihten ve sayısı meçhul Türk kütlelerinden yeni kuvvetler almış gibi, yeni bir istilâ yaptı. (...) Bu devri artık tecrübeli ve şuurlu bir Türk olarak yaşamış olduğum için, salâhiyetle söyleyebilirim: (...) Yalnız gerilmiş sınırlar son haddine gelmiş bir sabırsızlıkla, sadece isyan ediyorlardı. Bu isyan emri herkesin vicdanında yaşayan bir Türklük şuuru, bir insanlık ve efendilik duygusu veriyordu. Bir asker gibi vicdanından bu emrin sesini işiden herkes, ona derhal itaat etti. İşte asıl ihtilâl, asıl kıyam, asıl milli hareket budur. 908 hareketi bunun yanında alelâde bir komplo idi. (*Son Posta*, 9 Mayıs 1937)
- 85) İmparatorluk Devrinde Bir şey Yoktu Cumhuriyet Herşeyi Yaptı (*Son Posta*, 12 Mayıs 1935)
- 86) Dün acze makes olan Türkiye, bugün terakki ve medeniyet hususunda başkalarına örnek olmaktadır. (...) Göğsümüzü kabarta kabarta bağırarak hakkımızdır: Ne mutlu Türküm diyene! (*Son Posta*, 10 Nisan 1937)
- 87) Genç Türkiyenin Kemalist inkilâpla İslam-Osmanlı medeniyetinden laik-Türk kültürüne geçişi Kopernik inkilâbına benzer tam bir fikir ve ruh değişikliğidir. Bu bir kutuptan büsbütün öbür kutba geçme hareketidir. (*Cumhuriyet*, 12 Kasım 1934)
- 88) Her zamandan kuvvetliyiz Güçlü, kuvvetli, pişkin, manen ve maddeten sıhhatli bir erkek gibiyiz. Birkaç gündür Ankaradayım, yurdumun kalbini dinlemek fırsatını buldum. (*Son Posta*, 17 Kasım 1936)
- 89) Avrupa rönesansından sonra Türk rönesansına asırlarca intizar etmek lâzımdı. Türkler kendi rönesanslarına Kamâl Atatürk devrinde kavuşmuşlardır. Şimdiki Türkiye bir

vakitki eski Türkiye değildir. Türkiye de kendi kurunu vustasından çıkmış, ondan kurtulmuştur. (*Cumhuriyet*, 8 Aralık 1936)

90) Hangi Türkün hoşuna gitmez ki... (...) İngiltere, bir zamanlar, bizim dostluğumuza metelik bile vermezdi: bir! İngiltere en az otuz senedir bize düşman kesilmişti: iki! İngiltere Türk kızlarının saçlarını bile satarak İngiliz tezgâhlarına ısmarladığımız harp gemilerimizi gasbetmişti: üç! İngiltere büyük harbden sonra Türkiyeyi yok etmeğe çalışmıştı: dört! İngiltere mütareke yıllarında milli izzeti nefsimizi fena halde kırmıştı: beş! (...) Bakınız insan yaşayınca neler görüyormuş? 13 yıl içinde 130 senenin havsalasına sığmayacak işler! Ufuklarında güneş batmıyan, arazisi dünyanın bir çeyreğini kaplıyan 515 milyon nüfuslu İngiltereye Atatürk Türkiyesinin – Ben karşılık bile istemeden sana yardıma hazırım: demesi, Allah aşkına söyleyin, hangi Türkün hoşuna gitmez, hangi Türkün gururunu okşamaz! (*Cumhuriyet*, 25 Temmuz)

91) Cumhuriyetten evvelki ve sonraki spor hayatımız (*Son Posta*, 29 Ekim 1936)

92) Bütün dünyaya Mâl olmuş söz: Türk gibi kuvvetli! (...) Doğrusunu söylemek lâzım gelirse spor işlerimiz son senelerde bir hayli ilerilemiş olmasına rağmen bir türlü yoluna da girememiştir. Eskisine nispetle memlekette gençlik kıyas olunamayacak kadar çok sporla uğraşıyor, yahud uğraşıyor görünüyor. (*Cumhuriyet*, 11 Ağustos 1936)

93) Cumhuriyet devrinde maarifimiz eski devirlerin maarifile kıyas kabul etmiyecek derecede ilerilemiştir(..) Türk sanayii Cumhuriyet devrinde doğmuştur. Saltanat devrinde sanayi hiç mesabesinde idi. Osmanlı imparatorluğu zamanında memleket, büyük sanayi memleketlerine ancak hammadde yetiştirmekle meşgul idi. Piyasamıza yalnız ecnebi malları ve ecnebi müesseseleri hâkim bulunuyorlardı. (*Akşam*, 29 Ekim 1936)

- 94) Doğu vilâyetleri mes'ud bir istikbale hazırlanıyor (...) “-Doğu illerimiz cidden her Türkün görmesi lâzım gelen cennet gibi yerlerdir. Buraların başlıca kusuru geçen devirlerde ihmal edilmiş olmasıdır. Cumhuriyet hükûmetinin en yakın bir imar ve refaha kavuşturmak için geceli gündüzlü çalıştığı Doğu diyarının Karadeniz kıyılarında ve yayla kısmında merd ve zeki bir halk yaşamaktadır.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 9 Kasım 1936)
- 95) Bir zamanlar dünyanın birinci sınıf kuvvetleri sırasında gelen Türk denizciliği, Osmanlı imparatorluğunun müzepzep idaresi sayesinde, geriliye geriliye sonuncu dereceleri bulmuştu. (...) Türk donanması, bugün Maltaya müşterek sulh davasına Türkün inancını ifade etmek için gidiyor. (*Son Posta*, 17 Kasım 1936)
- 96) Türkiye, eski Türkiye değildir! Gazette Worcester'in mühim bir yazısı. “Gazi; iktisadi geri olan bir ziraat memleketini, cihanın en yüksek kültür derecesine varmış bir millet haline sokmak azmindedir.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 19 Ağustos 1934)
- 97) “Ölü ve canlı Türkiye” Lö Nuvelistin mühim bir makalesi “Eskiler Türkiyenin değişmeyeceğini ve değişmeden öleceğini ilân etmişlerdi. Halbuki o ölmedi, değişti, hem de baştan aşağı. Bu nasıl oldu?” (*Cumhuriyet*, 25 Ekim 1934)
- 98) Bir Amerika mecmuası Türkiyeyi methediyor “Asya” mecmuası memleketimizin en uzak köşelerinde bile büyük bir terakki eseri görüldüğünü yazıyor (*Cumhuriyet*, 11 Ağustos 1936)
- 99) (İsviçreli profesör) M. Malş söze, cumhuriyet Türkiyesinin umûmi manzarasını ve Gazi idaresinin ana unsurlarını çizmekle başlamış, sonra Türk kadınının bugünkü içtimai vaziyetini şöyle anlatmıştır: “Tasavvur edilmelidir ki, yapılan bir tek işaret üzerine, peçeler hemen atılmış, kadınlar hemen kahvelere koşarak erkek vatandaşlarının şaşkın nazarları altında, bacak bacak üzerine atıp çöple sitronad içmişlerdir. Hayır, orada da bir intikal devresi geçirildi. Şapka devresinden evvel, baş

atkısı devresi görüldü, ve bu baş atkısı köylerde kaldı. Erkekler yanaştığı zaman hemen gayri iradi bir hareketle yüzler örtülüyor. Şehirde de, köyde olduğu veçhile, hayâ muhafaza edilmiştir. Bunun asarını gündüz fabrikalarda çalışan ve gece meyhanelerde şarkı söyleyen zavallı mahlûklarda bile görürsünüz. Modanın esiri olan sizler şunu da iyi belleyiniz ki İstanbulun zarif kadınları zevki selim hududunu aşmadan son modayı tatbika muvaffak oluyorlar. Medenî hayattaki inkılâp 1926 şubatında İsviçre kanunu medenisindeki kayıtların kabulü ile husule geldi. Şu halde kadın bizdeki kadınların aynen hukuklarına maliktir. Hatta daha talilidir. Çünkü talep arza teveffuk ettiğinden erkeklerin rekabetine uğramadan serbest mesleklere kabul ediliyor. İstanbul'da kadın olan doktorlar, gazeteciler, yedi avukat, birçok memurlar ve onüç tane zabıtai ahlâkiye memuru vardır. Kadınlar hırsla ve hakiki bir zekâ ile garpten nakledilen fikrî servetleri bel'ediyorlar. Salonları eski harem değil, ekseriya bir Rambouillet-bediiat perestlerin içtimatgâhıdır. Halk arasında da aynı inkişaf vardır.” (*Son Posta*, 30 Temmuz 1934)

100) Hakkımızdaki Yalan Safsataların Önüne Geçilecek (...) Fransız gazetelerinden bir tanesi bu görüşmelerden bahsederken Tefik Rüştü B. hakkında şu kelimeleri yazdı: “Osmanlı Hariciye Nazırı”. Halbuki köhne Osmanlılık devrileli, yerine canlı Türkiye geçeli yıllar olmuştu. (*Son Posta*, 7 Ağustos 1934)

101) SAMSUNDAKİ HEYKEL (...) Hatta sadece bir tarih gibi de değil, ona asıl bin şu kadar yıl Türke heykeli haram eden medresenin tecessüm etmiş iflâsı ve bin şu kadar yılın san'at hüsrânını kapıyan bir sembol gibi bakmalıyız. Büyük zaferin hatırası için, büyük zaferi yaratanla beraber yükselen o abidenin en altında Türkü heykelden mahrum eden zihniyetin cesedi bir pestil gibi ezilerek yatıyor. O heykel yalnız heykel değil dündeki uzun menfinin sonu ve sonsuz yarındaki müspetin başıdır. (*Cumhuriyet*, 19 Mayıs 1937)

- 102) Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun son hesaplarının görülmesi arasında kendi ulusal hayatını koruyan ve kurtaran yeni Türklük ise yaşayışında doğrudan doğruya Avrupa gidişini kendisine düstur tutan bir topluluk oldu. Burası şimdi Avrupanın en ileri devletlerinden daha ileri bir lâik hayat yaşıyor. Burada din kendi alanında baştan başa özemendir (hürdür), ancak başkasının inanına karışmaz, ve hele devlet işlerinden tamamen ayrılmıştır. (*Cumhuriyet*, 5 Nisan 1935)
- 103) İlk defa Avupaya 909 senesinde çıkmışım. O zamanlar buralarda Türkiye denildiği zaman, fesli püsküllü, haremlikli selâmlıklı, sultanlı halifeli bir orta tarih imparatorluğundan bahsedilirdi. Biz Avrupalı değil, Asyalı idik. (*Cumhuriyet*, 18 Temmuz 1936)
- 104) Türk musikisi de nihayet medeni kılığa giriyor. Son zamanlarda alaturka musiki diye kulaklarımıza sunulan ses herzeni bizim hiçbir hususiyetimize uymaz olmuştu. (*Cumhuriyet* 3 Aralık 1934)
- 105) Eski musiki, ne Türk, ne de Şark musikisidir! (...) Yeni bir hayata koşan, yeni bir acun varlığını almağa çalışan genç Türkiye, onunla beraber bir köşeciğe sinip, bir rafın üstünde büzülüp kalamazdı. (*Cumhuriyet*, 19 Ocak 1935)
- 106) Saltanat devrinin son Türk salonu bir u'cube idi, milli şuurunu tamamile kaybetmiş fakat bir türlü garbli de olamıyarak Piyer Loti gibilere mükemmel bir mevzu olmuştu. Bir binbir çeşit gayri mütecanis eşyanın yekdiğerine tuhaf tuhaf bakışan örneklerinden vücade gelmiş bir garibe halini almıştı. (...) Bugünkü salonumuz tamamile moderndir. Yabancı san'atlar ve muhtelif tarihleri alâkadar eden biblolar vitrinlerdedir. (*Cumhuriyet*, 26 Kasım 1936)
- 107) Derebeyliğin son ocağı da yok ediliyor Türk camiasının her bucağında olduğu gibi, Tuncelinde de yeni ruh, medeniyet ve terakki ruhu hâkim olacaktır (*Son Posta*, 17 Haziran 1937)

- 108) Dersimliye karşı Osmanlı imparatorluğu, o meşhur atalet ve betaaiti neticesi olarak, ne eski ne de yeni ve son tarihinde hemen hemen hiç bir şey yapamamıştır. (...) Dersim beyleri, asırların tesiri altında bir türlü, kendiliklerinden bu derebeyliğini terkedemezlerdi. Bu defaki gibi bir mücadele muhakkaktı: cumhuriyetin de her işi sıraya koyduğu malumdur. (*Son Posta*, 19 Haziran 1937)
- 109) Bundan sonra Dersim de Türkiye'nin bütün vilâyetleri gibi bir vilâyet olacak ve orada da insanlar, her taraftaki Türkler gibi kendi işleri ve güçleri ile meşgul olup yeni Türkiye'nin elile şarka doğru yuvarlanıp giden medeniyet dalgası içinde, Avrupa medeniyetinin Asyaya doğru intişarına yardım eden çalışkan unsurlar olacaklardır. (*Son Posta*, 19 Haziran 1937)
- 110) Türk kadını hakların en büyüğünü aldı Türk kadını sevinç ve heyecan içinde (*Cumhuriyet*, 6 Aralık 1934)
- 111) Türk kadınına verilen seçme ve seçilme hakkı Kadınlığımız pek çok milletler kadınlarının hasret çektikleri bu hukuku erkeklerden daha iyi kullanacaklardır! (*Cumhuriyet*, 6 Aralık 1934)
- 112) Kongreden intibalar Türk kadınının zaferi Dün bütün dünya kadınlığı Atatürk'ün esareten kurtardığı Türk kadını alkışladı. (*Cumhuriyet*, 19 Nisan 1935)
- 113) Fırkamızın bu son kararı Türk kadınına içtimai ve siyasi hayatta bütün ulusların üstünde yer vermiştir. (*Cumhuriyet*, 5 Aralık 1935)
- 114) Kadınlarımızın haklı sevinci Türk kadını Meclis kürsüsünde de muvaffak olacak "Bize mebusluk hakkını verenler "Asker olacaksınız" derlerse derhal vatan müdafasına koşarız" (*Akşam*, 9 Aralık 1934)
- 115) Cumhuriyet rejimi, Türkiyede yaptığı binbir iyilik içinde, yalnız Türk kadınının çalınmış ve esirgenmiş haklarını kendisine vermek işile övünse, yeri ve yeterliği vardır. Türk'ün büyük bir ulus olduğunda kuşku yoktur. (*Cumhuriyet*, 23 Şubat 1935)

- 116) Türk kadınının hayat şartları deęişmiştir Bugünkü Türk kadını insanî hürriyetine sahip, fikir ve hareketlerinde tamamilen hür ve serbesttir (*Cumhuriyet*, 26 Aralık 1936)
- 117) Sergideki pavyonlardan biri de, Türk kadını pavyonu olacaktır, pavyonun bir köşesindeki tablolar, Osmanlı imparatorluğu devrinde Türk kadınına ifade edecektir. Türk inkılâbı Türk kadınına hangi hakları verdi? Pavyonun dięer bir köşesinde de bu fikri ifade eden tablolar bulunacaktır. (*Akşam*, 7 Kasım 1934)
- 118) Türk kadını sevin ve kıvanç duy! Dün gelen, Fransızca Le Matin gazetesi şu yukarıdaki resmi basmış, altına da iri yazılarla “Fransız kadını rey vermelidir” sözünü yazmış. (...) Meşhur Fransız gazetesinde bu resim çıkarken Türk gazetelerinde Kamâl Atatürkün sayılam namzedi gösterdiği Türk kadınlarının isimlerini ve resimlerini basıyoruz. Fransız kadını sayılam seçilmek söyle dursun belediyeci seçmek hakkından bile mahrumdur. (...) Türk kadını sevin ve kıvanç duy ki Kamâl Atatürk seni, on sene içinde, hürriyetin anası olan Fransanın kızlarından daha yükseklere çıkardı. (*Cumhuriyet*, 7 Şubat 1935)
- 119) Radium ve Türk kadını (...) Radiumun Türk kadınına hatırlatması neden mi diyeceksiniz. Müsaadenizle izah edeyim: Radium tabiatte ezeldenberi vardı, fakat bilinmiyordu. Türk kadını da cemiyette bir cevherdi, lâkin kadri takdir olunmuyordu. Radium keşfolunmadan önce ilim âlemi bir nazariyeye bağlıydı. Demir, kurşun, bakır gibi unsurların birbirine inlâb etmediği ve edemeyeceği söyleniyordu. Bu nazariyeye göre demirden ancak demir, kurşundan da ancak kurşun çıkabilirdi. Türk kadını için de buna benzer bir kanaat besleniyordu ve onun ancak kafeste yaşayan zarif bir kuşa benzediği, kendinden gene kendine benzer bülbülcükler teselsül edebilip medenî hayatta medenî roller oynayacak, vazifeler görecek, işler başaracak (kadın) ın o dışiden doğamıyacağı iddia olunuyordu. (*Cumhuriyet*, 8 Haziran 1937)
- 120) Barışta ve savaşta Türk kadını (...) Bütün bu işlerde kadının yeri ve ödevi (vazifesi) ne olabileceği ise Atatürkün kısa sözlerinde en derin anlamlarile parlatılmış bulunmaktadır.

Biz kadın sorumlunu, kadın topluluk (cemiyyet) hayatını tamlıyan bir yarım sayılmasile çözdük. Erkek toplu insan hayatının yarısıdır. Evbarktan (aileden) başlayarak ulusal hayata kadar her yerde ve her alanda. (*Cumhuriyet*, 1 Mayıs 1935)

121) Bu konferanstan sonra Kamutay başkan vekillerinden Nuri Conker, bir nutuk söylemiştir Nuri Conker demiştir ki: “- Yoksul kadın burada hiç bir şeyi olmayan kadın anlamında alınmıştır. Halbuki kadın denilen varlık, bizatihi yüksek bir varlıktır. Onun yoksulluğu olamaz. Kadına yoksul demek, onun bağrından kopup gelen bütün beşeriyetin yoksulluğu demektir. Eğer beşeriyet bu halde ise, kadına yoksul demek reva görülebilir. Hakikat bu mudur? Eğer kadın dünyada çalışan, muvaffak olan, zengin olan, maddî ve mânevî zengin eden insanları yetiştirmiş ise ona yoksul sıfatı verilebilir mi? Verenler varsa, onlara “nankör” denirse doğru olmaz mı?. Bizce, Türkiye cumhuriyeti anlamınca kadın, bütün Türk tarihinde olduğu gibi, bugün de en muhterem mevkide, herşeyin üstünde yüksek ve şerefli bir mevcudiyettir. Büyük varlık ve faziletleri yakın zamana kadar unutulmuş olan Türk kadınlığına ayağa kalkarak hürmetlerimizi göstermeliyiz.” (*Akşam*, 1 Mayıs 1935)

122) Şimdi mesele şudur: Türk kadını kendisine verilen hukuktan istifade edebilecek mi? Zira hukuk sahibi olmak başka şeydir, onu kullanabilmek te başka şeydir. (*Cumhuriyet*, 6 Aralık 1934)

123) Amerikada bir Türk kızı! Namık Kemalın torunu Selma 5 defa Amerikaya giderek sayısız konferanslarla Türkiyeyi ve inkılâplarını tanıtmaya muvaffak oldu (*Cumhuriyet*, 4 Haziran 1935)

124) Peştedeki müsabakalara hususî surette iştirak eden Türk kadın binici bayan Melâhat da bu müsabakada iyi bir derece almış ve Türk kadınının bu sahada da muvaffak olduğunu bütün dünyaya anlatmıştır. (*Akşam*, 29 Haziran 1935)

- 125) Bayan Melâhat Almanyadan döndü Yedi kerre birinçilik kazanan Türk kadını “52 defa düştüm, fakat en müthiş kazalar bile cesaretimi kırmadı” diyor (*Akşam*, 19 Ekim 1936)
- 126) Çalışan kadınlar arasında: 5 Türkiyenin ilk kadın eczacısı bayan Belkis hayatını anlatıyor (*Son Posta*, 23 Mart 1937)
- 127) Bir Türk kızınının Amerika san’at âleminde kazandığı muvaffakiyet (*Son Posta*, 8 Mayıs 1937)
- 128) Plânörcü Türk kızını anlatıyor.. “İdealim mi? Göklerimizde Türk kızlarından mürekkep hava filosu görmek!” “Uçmadığım günler âdeta rahatsız oluyorum kendimde çok büyük bir eksiklik hissediyorum!” (*Akşam*, 30 Nisan 1937)
- 129) Sabiha Gökçen yalnız Türk kadın gençliğine değil, alelittlak bütün Türk gençliğine misaldir (*Cumhuriyet*, 31 Mayıs 1937)
- 130) “Türkün kanadlı Amazonu” Hava kahramanımız Sabiha Gökçen Yalovada Atasına tazimlerini sundu (...) Gökçen, sen Türkün kırılmamış kanadlarını göklerde açarken senin öz kardeşlerin olan biz Türk kadınları da havada olduğu gibi karada, ve denizde de başarılar kazanmağa ve Türklüğün yüksek şerefine layık olmağa çalışacağız. (*Cumhuriyet*, 23 Haziran 1937)
- 131) Dünya feministlerle görüşmeler “Biz Türk kadınlarına cidden gıpta ediyoruz” Bir İngiliz kadını diyor ki “Erkekler, bilhassa genç erkekler süslenmiyor, kendilerini beğendirmek istemiyorlar mı?” (*Cumhuriyet*, 10 Nisan 1935)
- 132) Bulgar kadınları Türk kadınlarını kıskanıyor Bulgar gazetecileri dün gittiler. Bir gazeteci kadın: “Türk kadınlarından geriyiz, onları kıskanıyoruz” diyor. (*Son Posta*, 22 Eylül 1936)
- 133) Türk kadını sevin ve kıvanç duy! Çünkü on sene evvel çarşaf endamını, peçe yüzünü, kafes benliğini, harem varlığını bir ayıp gibi dünyadan gizliyordu. (...) On sene içinde, sen haremden çıktın, kafesi kırdın, çarşafı attın, peçeyi yırttın. Savaş günlerinde erkek

kalmadığı için saltanat seni yalnız sokak süpürücülüğüne ve posta gişesinde pul saymağa lâıyk görmüştü. Cumhuriyet rejimi ise, seni erkeğin yanına oturttu –gücüne gitmezse diyeyim ki – erkeğin yanına yükseltti. (*Cumhuriyet*, 7 Şubat 1935)

134) Süs kadını İş kadını Gazetelerden biri, kadınların sevincini belirtmek için kocaman başlığına şunu yazmıştı; “Dünün süs kadını, bugünün ulus saylavı...” Biz diyeceğiz ki arkadaşımız yanılmış... Türk kadını cuda süs kadını değildir, olmamıştır, olmamalıdır. (...) Bütün Türk tarihi süreğince, kadını, süs düşkünü görebileceğimiz bir devir yoktur. Türk kadını, atalarımızın binbir ülkede ün saldıkları çağlarda, erkekle yanyana ata binip savaşa gider, tarla sürüp ekin biçer, ulusla ulus işlerinde hep bir arada çalışır çabalar görürüz. (*Akşam*, 8 Aralık 1934)

135) Türk varlığında Türk Kadınının Yüksek yeri (...) Düşünmelidir ki bu büyük ulusun yarısını Türk kadınlığı doldurur. Türk kadını kız olarak, ana olarak, evin barkın iç bakamı olarak başlı başına bir varlıktır. Düne kadar peçelerin karanlığı ve kafeslerin zindanı içinde iken de bu böyle idi. Türk kadınının bütün haklarını eline aldığı bugün ise bu, elbette daha çok böyledir. Tarih ortadadır, Türk kadını ulusu çekip çevirmekte sözü geçen yüksek bir yaratıktır. Ulus divanında Türk kadınının yeri hakanın sağ yanı idi, ve denebilir ki onun sözü de hakanınkinden üstündü. (*Cumhuriyet*, 23 Şubat 1935)

136) Türk Kızlarının Bazılarında Vücut Kusurlu Mu? (*Son Posta*, 30 Kasım 1934)

137) Kadınlarımızın Vücutları.. Güzelleşiyor Mu, Yoksa Bozuluyor Mu Acaba? Türk Kadının Vasatı Vücut Ölçüleri Amerikalılarınkine Uyuyor. (*Son Posta*, 13 Temmuz 1934)

138) Geçenlerde bir İtalyan gazetesi Türk kadınına parmağına dolamıştı. Romanlara giren, türkülerde yaşayan, güzelliği gönüllerde yer eden Türk kadınının bürgüyü, çarşafı attıktan sonra, biçimsizliği, ortaya çıktığını yazarak sözünü şöyle bağladı: - Türk kadını çirkindir! Bu gazeteciye verilecek karşılığımız var: - Sinyor! Türk kadını yeryüzünün en

canayakın kadınıdır. Erkeğine bağlılığı, yuvasının üzerine titreyişi, ve çocuklarına ana oluşile kadınıdır, eşsiz ve biriciktir. Biz onu sizin ve sizin gibilerinizin güzellerine değişmeyiz. (*Son Posta*, 25 Ocak 1935)

139) Süs kadını İş kadını Gazetelerden biri, kadınların sevincini belirtmek için kocaman başlığına şunu yazmıştı; “Dünün süs kadını, bugünün ulus sayılavı...” Biz diyeceğiz ki arkadaşımız yanılmış... Türk kadını cuda süs kadını değildir, olmamıştır, olmamalıdır. (...) Bütün Türk tarihi süreğince, kadını, süs düşkününü görebileceğimiz bir devir yoktur. Türk kadını, atalarımızın binbir ülkede ün saldıkları çağlarda, erkekle yanyana ata binip savaşa gider, tarla sürüp ekin biçer, ulusla ulus işlerinde hep bir arada çalışır çabalar görürüz. (*Akşam*, 8 Aralık 1934)

140) Bir köy kadınının Bayanlarımıza Öğüdü (...) Artık biz kadınlar bu koca yükselmenin ne demek olduğunu bilerek adımlarımızı arkadaşlarımıza uygun sağlamlıkla atmamız. Moda peşinde koşmanın zamanı geçti. Onu yaratıcı Türk kadını hatırlamamalı, kopya etmemeli. İktisadi milli varlığımızı korumamız. Ruhumuzdan kopan inceliklere ellerimizi tercüman yapalım, işliyelim. İnce el işlerimizi, oyalarımızı etrafa numune olarak gönderelim. (*Son Posta*, 12 Şubat 1935)

141) Hamiyetli bir Türk kadını Bütün servetini tayyare cemiyetine verdi (*Cumhuriyet*, 5 Mayıs 1935)

142) Bir Türk Kadınının Askerlik adağı (...) Bir çocuğu olmasını isteyen ve özliyen Emine en son bir erkek çocuk doğurmuş, buna da Musa adını koymuştur. (...) –Eğer benim oğlum da büyür de bu yaşa gelirse ve asker olursa askerlik şubesine bir koç adağım olsun demiştir. (*Son Posta*, Ağustos 14 Ağustos 1936)

143) Çocuklarını öldürmek isteyen ana. Üç çocuğunu denize atan bu bedbaht acaba deli midir? Evvelki gün bir içtimai facia hepimizin tüylerini diken diken etmişti. (*Son Posta*, 6 Ağustos 1934)

- 144) Ankara stadyomu ve Türk sporu (...) bu stadyom Türk nesillerinin milli istikbâl idealleri için yetiştirecek bir mabed, ve aynı zamanda, Türk gençliğine gideceği yolu işaret eden bir semboldür. (...) Türk milletini, çocukluktan ve gençlikten itibaren, gözü pek, vücudu pek, ruhu pek erkeklerden ve kadınlardan mürekkep zinde bir varlık haline getirmek. (*Cumhuriyet*, 13 Ocak 1937)
- 145) Sporun Türk için var gıda kadar değeri, Spor yapmayan millet hiç gider mi ileri?.. Yumuşayan kolları, daralan göğüsleri, Çelik gibi yapıyor; Spor, daima spor!.. Oğlum!.. Elbet pas tutar işlemiyen demirler; Sporcu bir askerdir: Dinlenmeli emirler!..Sporcular dünyada hep birinci gelirler; Gövdeyi dinc yapıyor; Spor, daima spor!.. Pazılarının gerilsin, kanın kaynasın biraz, Daha gürbüz olursun: Spor yapmalı kış, yaz!.. Spor yapmayan çocuk Türk oğlu Türk sayılmaz; İstersen dünyaya sor: Spor, daima spor!..(*Cumhuriyet*, 26 Ağustos 1936)
- 146) Türk gençliğine öğüdler: Sıhhatini seveceksin, vatanını seveceksin, işini seveceksin ve tabiatı seveceksin. Spor ebedi gençliğin tılsımıdır. Vücudu güzel tutmamak ayıb işlemektir. Gençlikten ihtiyarlığa sağlık saklamalıdır. Genc bir baş ancak dinc omuzlar üzerinde durabilir. Göze güzel görünmeyi gönül çekmez. Her güzel şey sevilir. Dik otur, doğru konuş. (*Cumhuriyet*, 19 Mayıs 1937)
- 147) Türk gençliğine öğüdler: Güzel insan iyi insandır. EN büyük servetiniz vücudünüzdür. Sağlam vücut – sağlam kafa – güzel insan. Güzelliğin iki şartı: Neş'e ve hareket. Şen ol: Genc kalırsın. Bugün hep güleceğiz. Sıhhat en büyük saadettir. Sportmen bedeni tabiatın en mükemmel eseridir. Mükemmel olmaya çalış. Işığın girmediği yere doktor girer. (*Cumhuriyet*, 19 Mayıs 1937)
- 148) Gençlik Teşkilâta Bağlanıyor Yurd Gençleri Kuvvetli Bir Disiplin Altında Yetiyecek On Sekizini Bitirenler İçin Umumî Müsabakalar Tertib Ediliyor (*Son Posta*, 8 Aralık 1934)

- 149) Bir Türk genci diyor ki... Aziz okuyucularımdan Turgut Evren isminde bir gençden, imanlı bir Türk gencine yaraşan yüksek ateş ve heyecanla yazılmış bir mektub aldım. (...) Yarın, Allah göstermesin, silâh patladığı zaman, yurdu korumak için düşman süngülerine göğsünü siper edecek olan Türk gencinin hislerini, bizim gibi yaşını başını almışlar aynı samimi heyecanla ifade edemezler. (*Cumhuriyet*, 18 Temmuz 1936)
- 150) Türk Askeri Çocuk ata pendini Dinleyip adam olur: Büyüyünce kendini Şanlı orduda bulur!.. Türk genci asker olur!.. * Askerlik kıldan ince, Kılıcdan da keskindir!.. Lâyık millete bence Yalnız askerlik dindir!.. Vatan böyle kurtulur; Türk genci asker olur!.. * Askerlik yüreğimde Silinmiyen dilektir!.. Bu şeref vardır kimde?.. En muhterem meslektir!.. Emek verir, yorulur, Türk genci asker olur!.. * Asker kurtarır ancak Bir milleti göçerken!.. Hele şu zabite bak: Anlı, şanlı geçerken “Bu kim?..” diye sorulur!.. Türk genci asker olur!.. (*Cumhuriyet*, 27 Eylül 1936)
- 151) Türk ordusu öyle bir okuldur ki, Türk gençliği onun ateşinde, onun potasında çelikleşir. (*Cumhuriyet*, 17 Mayıs 1935)
- 152) Bugünün ve yarının kahramanları arasında. Yurdun ve Dünyanın dört yanından koşup gelen Türk gençleri Yedek Yarsubay okulunda yeni devre hazırlığı “Bu bina boş kalmamak için yapılmıştır. Burada hareket dindiği gün azab sonsuzdur” (*Cumhuriyet*, 24 Mayıs 1937)
- 153) Genç Türk Subayları (...) Hepsi eşti: Hiç birinin çehresini diğerinden ayırt etmek imkânı yoktu. Bu birkaç yüz, yiğit Türk delikanlısı ferdiyetlerini kaybetmiş gibi idiler. Gözlerimin önünden yekpare vatan geçiyor sandım! (*Son Posta*, 2 Eylül 1936)
- 154) Türk kuşu kurumu Atatürkün nutkile açıldı. (...) Türk; yurdun dağlarında, ormanlarında ovalarında, denizlerinde, her bucağında, nasıl bir bilgi ve kendine güvenle yürüyor, dolaşıyorsa, yurdun asuğmanında da, aynı suretle dolaşabilmelidir. Bu ise, Türkü, çocukluğundan, vatan kuşlariyle, vatan havası içinde yarışa alıştırmakla başlar.

- (...) Türk çocuđu: Her işte olduđu gibi, havacılıkta da, en yüksek düzey gökte seni bekliyen yerini, az zamanda, dolduracaksın. Bundan, gerçek dostlarımız sevinecek, Türk ulusu mutlu olacaktır. (*Akşam*, 4 Mayıs 1935)
- 155) Atatürk Gençliđi Vazifeye Çađırdılar! (...) Açılıştan sonra Yüce Önder Atatürk çok değerli bir söylev vererek, Türk gençliđini, karada ve denizde olduđu gibi havada da kendisini bekleyen yüksek ve değerli yerini almaya çađırdılar. (*Son Posta*, 4 Mayıs 1935)
- 156) Atatürk Cumhuriyeti Türk gencine emanet ediyor. Atatürk diyor ki: Bugün vâsıl olduđumuz netice, asırlardan beri çekilen milli musibetlerin intibahı ve bu aziz vatanın her köşesini sulayan kanların bedelidir. Bu neticeyi Türk gençliđine emanet ediyorum. (*Son Posta*, 29 Ekim 1936)
- 157) Atatürkün yetiştirdiđi Türk gençleri, İbni Sinâ gibi yükselmeđe çalışmakla Türk inkılâbının fedâkar birer unsurları olduklarını isbat etmiş bulunacaklardır. (*Son Posta*, 22 Haziran 1937)
- 158) Zira bu esas üzerinde Türk zekâsı, Türk zevki, Türk san'atı fasılasız surette işleyip duracak ve elde edilen esası tekemmül ettirecektir. Ancak böyle yetişen türk gençleri tarafındandır ki Atatürk devrinin en güzel eserleri geleceđin takdir ve zevkine hediye edilebilir. (*Cumhuriyet*, 20 Haziran 1937)
- 159) Ankara Halkevinde bir gece Atatürkün gençliđe yüksek hitabetleri “Bir gün bu memleketi sizin gibi beni anlamış bir gençliđe tevdi edeceđimden çok mesudum, fakat beraber yaşadığımız müddetçe hedefime yürümenizi hepinizden istemek meşru bir hakkımdır” (*Akşam*, 1 Nisan 1937)
- 160) Atatürk gençliđi bir daha irşad ettiler. Dün gece Ticaret mektebinin müsameresi çoşkun bir tezahür halini aldı. Büyük Şef gençliđe inancını söyledi. Başvekilimiz talebelere bilhassa iltifatta bulundu. (*Cumhuriyet*, 17 Ocak 1937)

- 161) Namık Kemal: Ne zaman orduyu görse, Ne zaman mektep çocuklarını görse,
Ağlarmış; bunu bana Beyazıt sayılavı Bay Ubeydullah anlattı. Sebebini sordum. “Bu iki büyük varlığı görüp te heyecana gelmemek ve gözyaşı dökmemek mümkün mü?” dedi. Çok doğru. Mektep çocuklarının, yarının sahiplerinin manalı yüzlerine bakınca neler duyulmaz. Neler düşünülmez ki? (*Son Posta*, 24 Ekim 1936)
- 162) Tek terbiye Budun çocuklarına, hangi sınıftan olurlarsa olsun “tek terbiye” vermek gerektir (*Cumhuriyet*, 16 Mayıs 1935)
- 163) Şu hale nazaran bir orta mekteb Çukur ovanın bu kısmında mütemadiyen parlayan bir güneş olacaktır. Topraklarında her sene yüzbinlerce altın yaratan sıcak ve şirin Ceyhan Türk çocuklarına bir saadet bahçesi olacaktır. (*Son Posta*, 13 Ocak 1935)
- 164) İlk tedrisatta büyük bir inkılâb lüzumuna dair İlkmektebden ileride tahsiline devam imkanı bulamıyan çocuğa daha etraflı ve bilhassa ameliliğiyle faydalı müstakil bir ilmekteb programı yapmağa mecburuz. (*Cumhuriyet*, 29 Mayıs 1937)
- 165) Her Türkü bekliyen bir şefkat vazifesi Yoksul Türk çocuğunu koruma seferberliği. (*Cumhuriyet*, 28 Kasım 1936)
- 166) Türk Çocuğu Ve İlk Tahsil On Yaşındaki Aile Babasını Tanıyor musunuz? Ahmed, Ömrünün Henüz Onuncu Yılındadır. Evini Geçindirmek Ve Yedi Yaşındaki Küçük Kardeşini Okutmak İçin Para Kazanmıya Uğraşıyor. (*Son Posta*, 5 Ocak 1935)
- 167) Resimli Makale: Dünyanın en güzel bayrağı Türk bayrağıdır. (...) Türk çocuğu, tarihini düşün, Türk bayrağının himayesinden mahrum kalan yerlerde Türk cemiyetinin de söndüğünü hatırla, ve bütün kuvvetinle bayrağına sarıl, onun hayatı hepimizin hayatının da üstündedir. (*Son Posta*, 23 Nisan 1937)
- 168) Millî Hâkimiyet ve Çocuk Bayramları Çocuklara: Millî hâkimiyet bir ülküdür. Bu ülkünün tahakkuk etmesi için sizlerin ve sizlerden sonra gelecek nesillerin bundaki mânayı iyi ve tamam anlamaları lâzımdır. Bu mânayı ne kadar iyi ve tamam anlarsanız

Atatürkü o kadar çok seversiniz, ona karşı borcunuzu o kadar güzel ödemiş olursunuz. Çünkü bu ülkü onun ülküsüdür. Büyüklere: Bugün çocuk Haftasının ilk günüdür. Gönül isterdi ki çocuk haftası değil, çocuk senesi yapılsın, senenin bütün günlerinde ayrıca bir çocuk saati olsun. İşte böyle çalışmak lüzmunu millî bir iman haline getirdiğimiz gündür ki bu güzel Türk vatanına en büyük bir hizmeti ifa etmiş oluruz. (*Son Posta*, 23 Nisan 1937)

169) Ordu, gene ordu, hep ordu! Hak silâhla alınıyor ve mutlaka gene silâhla bekleniyor, Onu korumanın başka yolu yok! (...) Türk piyadesi yerleri yırtan sert adımlarla ilerliyor. (*Son Posta*, 18 Ağustos 1936)

170) Ordu rejimin sevgili evlâdıdır (*Son Posta*, 23 Ağustos 1934)

171) Parti Kurultayının orduya sunduğu güven ve saygı, bütün ulusun, bütün Türklüğün en yürekten kopan duygularıdır. (*Cumhuriyet*, 17 Mayıs 1935)

172) Ulusal Parti yiğit Türk Ordusuna güven ve saygılarını bildirdi (*Cumhuriyet*, 16 Mayıs 1935)

173) Devlet bütçesi Türk ordusunun karasına ve denizine dokunan işleri şimdiye kadar olduğu gibi bundan sonra da kendilerine yaraşan özenle görüp giderecektir. (*Cumhuriyet*, 20 Haziran 1935)

174) Yiğit orduya güven ve saygı (...) Türk ordusu Türk milletinin göz bebeğidir. Ordu ile ulus birbirinden ayrı şeyler değildir. İkisi birdir, bir tek varlığın iki ayrı adıdır. Ordu gücünü ulustan alır. Ulus orduya can ve kan verir. Ordu ulusa dayanır, ulus da orduya güvenir. (...) Türk ordusu yalnız düzenin koruyucusu, yalnız sükûn ve intizamın bekçisi değildir: Türk ordusu inkılâbın öncüsü, ileri hamlelerin bayraktarıdır. (*Cumhuriyet*, 17 Mayıs 1935)

- 175) Geçit resmi dün yapıldı Binlerce vatandaş Türk ordusunu saatlerce alkışladı Orduda tam bir zindelik göze çarpıyordu Motörlü vasıtalarımızla ifitihar edebiliriz (*Akşam*, 17 Ağustos 1936)
- 176) Kahraman Türk Ordusu Her Zaman Kuvvetlidir! Milletın Cömert Gönlü ve Cömert Eli, Bu Yıl Da Orduya 26 Tane Tayyare Vermek Suretile Ordusunu Sevdiğini Yine Gösterdi (*Son Posta*, 21 Ağustos 1934)
- 177) Büyük Bayramımız! İstanbul, on sene evvel bugün kendisini kurtaran kahraman orduya kavuşmuştu (*Cumhuriyet*, 6 Ekim 1934)
- 178) Kahramanlık itbarile Metenin, Attilânın, Alp Aslanın, Timurun, Yıldırımın, Yavzun askerleri ne ise Gazi Mustafa Kemalın askerleri de odur; hatta daha şuurlu ve daha fedâkar kahramanlardır... Cumhuriyet İdaresi şimdi Türkün bu fitrî meziyetlerini asrın silâhları ve fennin bilgileri ile teçhiz etmektedir (*Cumhuriyet*, 7 Kasım 1934)
- 179) Türk Orduları (...) Türk ordusu, uluorta bir ordu değil; Bu herhangi bir ordu değil: Bütün bir tarihi, Bir dünya tarihini önüne katmış, Onun bahtını tayin etmiş bir varlıktır. (...) Ordu manevralarda; Ve sanki Türk tarihi, Bütün bir tarih ayakta: İtalya seferleriyle, Viyanalarile, Mahaçlarile, Kosovalarile, Belgratlarile, Pirotlarile, Çaldıranlarile, Mısırlarile, Rumeliye geçişleriyle ayaktaadır! Bütün bir tarih ayakta, Orduyu selâmlıyor. Kendini bütün acuna selâmlatmak zaten onun huyudur. (Mahmut Esat Bozkurt) (*Son Posta*, 24 Ekim 1936)
- 180) Yüz yılda bu yurda (25) bin zabıt ve misli bulunmaz bir Gazi yetiştiren bu kahramanlık ve bilgi yuvasında yapılan millî tezahürat, Türk ordusunun yüksek asaletini, cesaret, bilgi ve inan kudretini gösteren çok parlak bir delildir. (*Son Posta*, 3 Eylül 1934)
- 181) Kahraman Türk donanması (*Cumhuriyet*, 16 Kasım 1936)

- 182) Kahraman ordumuz bütün vesaitile bir resmi geçit yaptı ve çok alkışlandı (...) – Yaşa Türk ordusu (*Akşam*, 17 Ekim 1936)
- 183) Kahraman Türk ordusunun telkin ettiği iman (*Cumhuriyet*, 3 Kasım 1936)
- 184) Nice saldırılara karşı koyan ordumuz, bugün her vakitten çok daha dövüşken, her vakitten çok daha güçlüdür. (...) Er Türk erlerden doğan ordusile öğünsün! (*Son Posta*, 2 Mart 1935)
- 185) Manevralar bitti Ordumuz en yüksek orduların seviyesinde olduğunu bir daha isbat etti (*Akşam*, 16 Ekim 1936)
- 186) Türkler muahedelere taraftar 400 milyon blokun en iyi askeridir (*Akşam*, 25 Mart 1935)
- 187) Orduya, bayrağa hürmet! (...) Başlar dik, göğüsler kabarık, ayaklar dinç... Neferler, Türk neferleri, yurdun kapılarında vazife almağa gidiyorlar. (*Son Posta*, 23 Temmuz 1936)
- 188) Şanlı bayrağımızı, Parisin ve Fransanın kalbinde böyle başı dimdik, yukarıda gezdirebilmek şerefi, Gazi Mustafa Kemal'in nesline nasip olan bir mazhariyettir. Ne mutlu bize! (*Cumhuriyet*, 5 Ağustos 1934)
- 189) Bütün ulusal varlığımızın başı olan Gazi Atatürk. O her ocağın büyük maşalası (meş'alesi), her Türkün yüreğinin canı ve kadınıdır. (*Cumhuriyet*, 24 Şubat 1935)
- 190) Kongreden İntibalar. Türk Kadınının Zaferi. Dün bütün dünya kadınlığı Atatürk'ün esaretten kurtardığı Türk kadını alkışladı. (*Cumhuriyet*, 19 Nisan 1935)
- 191) Çanakkalede İstanbulu ve Türkiyeyi kurtaran kumandan, bir Alman gazetesinin iddia ettiği gibi Liman Paşa değil milletin felâketlerine karşı daima göğüs germiş olan büyük kurtarıcı Atatürktür (*Cumhuriyet*, 26 Nisan 1935)
- 192) Fakat Türkün özünden bir yüce kurtarıcı Gazi Mustafa Kemal yetişti. O dış düşmanların elinden Türk budununun istiklâlini iç düşmanların elinden de Türk

- milletinin hürriyetini kurtardı. Ondan sonra Türk ismi, göklerdeki en parlak ve en yüksek yıldızlardan daha parlak ve daha yüksek oldu. Evvelce bize yan bakan milletler, yüce Gazinin kurduğu düven üzerine dostluğumuzu paylaşamaz oldular. (*Cumhuriyet*, 23 Temmuz 1934)
- 193) Başvekilimiz Mecliste mühim bir nutuk söyledi “Millî Türk devletinin Mustafa Kemal gibi bir reise malik olması, ebedî tarihin cereyanında bulunmaz bir fırsat ve pahası ölçülmez bir nimettir” (*Cumhuriyet*, 5 Temmuz 1934)
- 194) Ne mutlu başında bir Atatürkü olana (...) Atatürk bugün millet kürsüsünde tıpkı bir güneşti. (*Cumhuriyet*, 2 Kasım 1936)
- 195) Yaşasın modern Türkiye ve onu yaratan Atatürk (*Akşam*, 16 Nisan 1937)
- 196) Atatürk bize her yerde ve her şeyde örnek oluyor Onun bütün iyiliklerine karşı milletce hepimizin kalblerimizden coşan şükran dugularını ifade edecek kelimeyi cidden bulamıyoruz (*Cumhuriyet*, 14 Haziran 1937)
- 197) Bir kalb ki çarpmak, yaşamak, inanmak ve coşmak kudretini aynı kutsal kaynaktan, ATATÜRK'ten alıyor. (*Son Posta*, 22 Temmuz 1935)
- 198) Tek bir ateş eritmemiş onda olan perkliği O göstermiş adamlığa en evrensel erkliği (*Cumhuriyet*, 8 Aralık 1934)
- 199) On sekiz sene içinde 18 asırlık iş gören Büyük önderin huzurunda hürmetle, şükranla baş eğelim (*Son Posta*, 17 Mayıs 1937)
- 200) Bir köy çocuğunun “Baban kim” sualine verdiği cevap: Atatürk “Meğer köy çocukları babalarına “ağam” derlermiş, baba vasfı, mukaddes bir vasıf olarak Atatürke verilmiş...” (*Son Posta*, 27 Mart 1937)
- 201) O, İmparatorluğun mansıplarını ayak altına aldı Ve millet ferdi olmağı en büyük bahtiyarlık olarak kabul etti. Millet kendisini elleri üstünde yükselterek başına tac eyledi (*Cumhuriyet*, 19 Mayıs 1937)

- 202) ATATÜRK “Türkiye bir tali eseri olarak esatirî bir kahraman yaratmıştır” Bir Yugoslav gazetecisinin intibaları “Kudreti Rabbaniye; yaratıcı kudretlerle dolu bu adamı, tabiri caizse, Yakınşarka hususî bir vazife ile tavzif ederek yer yüzüne göndermiştir.” (*Cumhuriyet*, 1 Mayıs 1937)
- 203) Yugoslavya Kralı ile bir mülâkat “Gaziyi, devasa bir mücadele yapan bu dâhi adamı çok severim” (*Cumhuriyet*, 7 Temmuz 1934)
- 204) Kolonele sordum: - Türk âdetlerine kendinizi adapte ettiniz mi? – Atatürkün sayesinde memleketiniz en modern memleketler arasına girmiştir. Ben Türk âdetlerle İngiliz âdetleri arasında hiçbir fark görmüyorum. (*Akşam*, 20 Eylül 1936)
- 205) Daily Telegrafın son ziyarete ait mühim bir makalesi Atatürk sade ismen değil, hakikaten de büyük Türk ünvanını hak etti (*Akşam*, 9 Eylül 1936)
- 206) M. Stoyadinociçin mühim beyanatı Atatürk ismi gibi yeni Türkiyenin babasıdır (*Akşam*, 3 Kasım 1936)
- 207) Muhterem misafirimizin intibaları “Atatürkün dehâlarına ve bilhassa siyâsî dehalarına hayran oldum” (*Son Posta*, 19 Mart 1937)
- 208) Atatürk, İttifakla Tekrar Cümhur Reisliğine Seçildiler Yüce Önder, Yurdun Yükselmesi ve Korunması İçin And İçti (*Son Posta*, 2 Mart 1935)
- 209) Büyük Önder İstanbulda Hatay zaferile coşan İstanbul, bu zaferi kazandıran Türk Atasını büyük sevinç ve heyecanla karşılıyor (*Son Posta*, 5 Haziran 1937)
- 210) Hatay Zaferi Ulu Öndere Kutu Olsun! İstanbul Atatürke bugün kavuşuyor (*Cumhuriyet*, 5 Haziran 1937)
- 211) Millî Kahramanın istikbali İstanbul büyük zaferlerimizin dâhi yaratıcısını muazzam merasim ve tezahüratla karşıladı (*Cumhuriyet*, 6 Haziran 1937)
- 212) Atatürkün ulvî bir hareketi Büyük Önder milyonlar değerindeki çiftliklerini, fabrikalarını, binalarını millete hediye ettiler Meclis coşkun tezahürat ve alkışlar

- arasında Atatürk'ün bu eşsiz hareketlerini şükranla karşıladı (*Son Posta*, 13 Haziran 1937)
- 213) Ona niçin Atatürk dedik? (...) Türklükten daha temiz soy, atalıktan daha yüce boy tanımıyorduk da onun için. (*Cumhuriyet*, 27 Kasım 1934)
- 214) Ata kelimesi Türklük kadar eskidir ve Atatürk kadar bizimdir (*Cumhuriyet*, 26 Ağustos 1936)
- 215) Büyük bir varlığı, yüksek bir sahipliği, daima hür yaşamış bir efendiliği hiçbir kelime “Ata” sözünden daha doğru, daha canlı ifade edemez. Bu isimde Türklüğün cevheri, tılsımı, bükülmez kolunun ve dönmez yüzünün ifadesi vardır. (*Cumhuriyet*, 10 Ekim 1936)
- 216) Kamâl Türkçe Ordu ve Kale Demektir Bugünkü tebliğde önder Atatürk'ün öz adının Kamâl olarak yazılmış olduğunu gördük. Bu hususta yaptığımız tahkikten böyle yazılışın sebep ve temeli anlaşıldı. İstihbaratımıza nazaran, Atatürk'ün taşıdığı Kamâl adı bir arabca kelime olmadığı gibi, arabca Kemal kelimesinin delâlet ettiği manada da değildir. Atatürk'ün muhafaza edilen özadı, Türkçe “ordu ve kale” manasına olan “Kamâl”dır. (*Son Posta*, 5 Şubat 1935)
- 217) Biz Zannediyoruz Ki Bütün Dünya Bizi Tanıyor Hayır, Yanlış: Bilhassa Amerika Bizi Hiç Bilmiyor (*Son Posta*, 29 Mayıs 1935)
- 218) Kahirede, meşhur Mecelleti mecmuasında bize dair çok samimi ve dostça bir yazı çıktı (*Cumhuriyet*, 30 Mart 1935)
- 219) Musiki İnkılabımız “Atatürk bu işte de muvaffak olacak” Bir ecnenebi gazetesinde çıkan makale (*Cumhuriyet*, 25 Aralık 1934)
- 220) İnkılabımız ve dünya efkarı Üç ecnebi gazetesinin mühim makaleleri (*Cumhuriyet*, 12 Ocak 1935)

- 221) Harbi Nasıl İdare Ettik? Harp bizi sevmiyen Almanların bile fikirlerini deęiřtirmiřti
Türkü bir yük olarak telâkki etmiř olan Alman sefiri bile Çanakkaleden sonra bir gün
sefarethanede bana: “İtiraf etmeliyiz ki biz sizi lâıyk olduęunuz derecede
tanıyamamıřız” demiřti (*Son Posta*, 5 Aralık 1936)
- 222) İnkılâblarımız ve dost Sovyetler “Yeni Türk inkılâblarının kıymeti çok büyüktür”
Journal dö Moscou “Türkiyenin öz dostları bunları büyük bir memnuniyetle tahip
ediyorlar” diyor (*Cumhuriyet*, 31 Aralık 1934)
- 223) Times, Sancak Türkleri hakkındaki endiřelerimizi çok samimi buluyor (*Akřam*, 14
Ocak 1937)
- 224) Binicilerimiz için ne diyorlar? Türk Süvarileri hayrete deęer bir hızla ilerliyorlar Bir
Alman gazetesine göre, Türkleri vasat derecedeki atlarla bu kadar muvaffak eden
Türkün muzaffer olmak hususundaki derin azmidir (*Cumhuriyet*, 18 Temmuz 1936)
- 225) Bulgarlar bizden řikayetçi Yunanlılarla bizim zihniyetimizi beęenmiyorlar Halbuki
Asıl Beęenilmeyecek Zihniyet Onlardadır (*Son Posta*, 23 Ocak 1935)
- 226) Hiddetimiz Böylelerinedir! Bazı yabancılar dillerine dolamıřlardır: Türk münevverleri,
Türk gençlięi ecnebi düşmanıdır... müfrit milliyetperverdir... řoven'dir, derler. (*Son
Posta*, 2 Temmuz 1936)
- 227) Bulgaristanda Türklüęe Karşı Tahrikler Hâlâ Devam Ediyor Mamafih “Yarası Olan
Gocunur” Der Ve Geçeriz (*Son Posta*, 19 Mayıs 1935)
- 228) Hariçteki Ermeniler aleyhimizde propaganda seferberlięine çağrılıyor Hezeyana bakın:
Antakya ve İskenderundaki Ermenileri katliâma hazırlanıyormuřuz! (*Son Posta*, 11
Kasım 1936)
- 229) Klod Farer neřriyattan çok daha kuvvetli birřey yapıyor. Artık okunmayan kötü bir
muharrir olduęu için aleyhimizde neřriyat yapacak yerde iři Fransız gençlięine
konferans vermeęe döktü. Bu konferanslar, yarınki Fransız efkârı umumiyesini teřkil

- edecek olan büyük bir zümreyi Türklük aleyhine hazırlıyabilir. (*Son Posta*, 16 Ocak 1937)
- 230) Suriyede düşmalarımızın yeni yaveleri Faysalın projesini tahakkuk ettirecekmişiz!
(*Son Posta*, 12 Mart 1937)
- 231) Sinan Yunanlı imiş! Bir Atina gazetesinin baştanbaşa yanlışlarla dolu gülünç iddiası ve tarihî bahisler muharririmizin verdiği cevap (*Son Posta*, 7 Mayıs 1937)
- 232) Dostlarımız niçin susuyorlar? Türkiye'nin düşmanları değil dostları olan Yunanlılardan şikayetçiyiz! (*Cumhuriyet*, 12 Temmuz 1934)
- 233) Yurt Propagandası Başlıyor: Hakkımızdaki Yalan Safsataların Önüne Geçilecek Memleketi Bütün Dünyaya Tanıtmak İçin Faaliyete Girişiliyor (*Son Posta*, 7 Ağustos 1934)
- 234) Ordumuz bu dileğin bekçisi olarak kaldıkça sırtımızı kim yere getirebilir? (*Son Posta*, 2 Mart 1935)
- 235) Dün gecedен itibaren Akdeniz kapımızı emniyet altına aldık (*Akşam*, 21 Temmuz 1936)
- 236) Cenub hududumuzda çok ciddî tedbirler alıyoruz (*Cumhuriyet*, 3 Nisan 1937)
- 237) Cihan Harbinin Son Perdesi Alman demokratları “Türkiye kendi başının çaresine bakmalıdır” diyerek bizi yalnız bırakmak istiyorlardı (*Son Posta*, 2 Mart 1937)
- 238) Antakya bizimdir! Büyük Türk milletine ve Antakyalılara sükûn tavsiye ederiz İskenderunun muhtariyeti şartile metbuluğundan vazgeçtiğimiz Suriyeye bu mıntıkanın hükümranlığını vermemize imkân yoktur (*Cumhuriyet*, 1 Ekim 1936)
- 239) Antakya ve İskenderun meselesi Milletler Cemiyetinde tekrar görüşüldü “Hakkımızı İstiyoruz, Alabiliriz de” (*Son Posta*, 3 Ekim 1936)

- 240) Ulusal bakımdan haklıyız, muahedeler bakımından haklıyız, arsiulusal hak bizimle beraber. O halde bunları dinliyecekler mi? Saati çalınca elbette! (*Son Posta*, 6 Kasım 1936)
- 241) Başvekilimiz mühim bir nutuk söyledi (*Cumhuriyet*, 6 Temmuz 1934)
- 242) Fencilerimiz Artıyor Bu Gün Her Sahada Mütéhassıs Bir Çok Mühendislerimiz İş Başındadır (*Son Posta*, 8 Ağustos 1934)
- 243) Halkevlerimiz 3 yaşına bastı, Sayıları 103 oldu (*Cumhuriyet*, 24 Şubat 1934)
- 244) Mukavele dün gece imzalandı ve ordumuz sabaha karşı Boğazları işgal etti (*Son Posta*, 21 Temmuz 1936)
- 245) Donanmamızı Akdenize doğru uğurlarken (*Son Posta*, 17 Kasım 1936)
- 246) Hükümetimizin zaferi Atatürk, Başvekil Hariciye vekilini ve murahhaslarımızı tebrik ettiler (*Akşam*, 25 Ocak 1937)
- 247) Milletimizdeki büyük havacılık aşkı Dün Hava bayramında 100 bin kişi hazır bulundu (*Cumhuriyet*, 15 Mart 1937)
- 248) Hâmidî kaybettik Büyük şairimiz kısa bir hastalıktan sonra dün gece saat biri beş geç vefat etti Tam bir asırdanberi Türk edebiyatına bir güneş gibi feyiz ve nur veren Ulu Türk edibine mutantan bir cenaze merasimi yapılacaktır (*Cumhuriyet*, 13 Nisan 1937)
- 249) Bulgar dostlarımızın manasız hiddeti Bizim cevabımız: “Evet, Edirne ebediyen Türklüğün garbe bakan abidesi olacaktır” (*Cumhuriyet*, 6 Temmuz 1934)
- 250) Müfrit Bulgar Gazetecileri Hâlâ Söyleniyorlar Trakya Komitesinin Tahrikçileri Şunu İyi Bilsinler Ki: Trakya, Bugün Olduğu Gibi Her Zaman Türkiyenin Öz Parçasıdır (*Son Posta*, 8 Ağustos 1934)
- 251) Güzel Edirnemizin yüce günü Edirne Türklüğün Avrupaya açılan kapısı, Sultan Selim Türklüğün Garp medeniyetine bakan abidesidir ve daima, ebediyen böyle olacaktır. Bunun için ant içmişizdir! (*Cumhuriyet*, 25 Kasım 1934)

- 252) Bugünkü ve yarınki hayatımıza istikamet veren büyük harikanın başlangıcı 19 Mayıs'tır (*Cumhuriyet*, 19 Mayıs 1937)
- 253) Lozan zaferi Bugün; bu büyük günümüzün yıldönümünü kutlulamak için Üniversitede merasim yapılacak. (*Cumhuriyet*, 24 Temmuz 1934)
- 254) Baharın ilk gününü kutlularken hatırlıyalım: Bugün Türkün en eski kurtuluş bayramıdır (*Son Posta*, 22 Mart 1937)
- 255) Yüz Yıllık Yuvamız Dün Harbiye Mektebi Kutlulanırken Türk Zabiti De Tebcil Edildi (*Son Posta*, 31 Ağustos 1934)
- 256) Tuncelindeki şekavet can çekişiyor Tayyarelerimiz şakilerin son sığınaklarını da bombaladı (*Cumhuriyet*, 26 Haziran 1937)
- 257) Süvarilerimizin Avrupada kazandıkları parlak dereceler (*Akşam*, 29 Haziran 1935)
- 258) Olimpiyad stadı dün "Bravo Türk!" sesleriyle çınladı İstiklal Marşı Çalınırken Bayrağımız Olimpiyad Direğine Çekildi (*Son Posta*, 12 Ağustos 1936)
- 259) İlk Olimpiyad zaferimiz Yaşarın çelik kollarında tecelli eden Türk gücünün şeref direğine bayrağımızı çektiği tarihi gün 100.000 kişi ayağa kalkıp şapkalarını çıkarmış, bayrağımızı selamlıyor ve marşımızı dinliyordu (*Cumhuriyet*, 15 Ağustos 1936)
- 260) Türk sporcusu dünya milletlerinin muhabbetini kazanmıştır. Gençlerimiz, terbiye, nezaket ve disiplin noktasından 51 millete örnek olmuşlar Türk ismini yükseltmişlerdir. (*Cumhuriyet*, 11 Eylül 1936)
- 261) Güreşçilerimizin zaferi Güreş üstadlarının memleketinde yapılan müsabakalar, Türkün kudret ve kuvvetini ve kazandığı galebelerin tesadüfi olmadığını bir daha isbat etti (*Cumhuriyet*, 24 Şubat 1937)
- 262) Noel geliyor, fakat bundan bize ne? Noelin dini mahiyetinden haberi olmıyan bazı aileler o gece evlerinde ağaç dikip süslemeyi ve çocuklarına hediye almayı âdet

- edinmeye başladılar. Hıristiyan ilinin icap ettirdiği bu âdeti bize bilerek sokmak züppelik, bilmiyerek sokmak ta gaflettir. (*Son Posta*, 20 Aralık 1936)
- 263) Türk halıcılığını nasıl yükseltebiliriz? Dünya buhranından müteessir olan halıcılığımızın inkişafında sergilerin çok faydası dokunabilir (*Cumhuriyet*, 14 Eylül 1936)
- 264) Türk evinin “içi”ni yaratacağız Türk evinin içine Türk ruhunun sinmesi demek olan üslûbü, daha doğrusu “Atatürk devri” üslûbunu nasıl kazanacağız! (*Cumhuriyet*, 19 Haziran 1937)
- 265) Türk düşmanlığı ifade eden âbidelere dair (...) Grandük Nikola Trabzonu zaptettiği zaman büyük bir alayla şehre giriyormuş. Şehre tam gireceği sırada bir Rum kadını Grandükün önüne, atile çiğnemesi için bir Türk bayrağı atmış. Bunun üzerine Grandük Nikola atını durdurmuş, bayrağı yerden kaldırtmış ve yaverine vererek demiş ki “Hiçbir milletin bayrağı tahkir edilemez. Bilhassa türk milletinin bayrağı asla...” (*Cumhuriyet*, 30 Ekim 1936)
- 266) Filhakika Kurtuluş ve İstiklâl zaferleri ve büyük inkılâbların dev merhaleleri hep Türk milletinin eşsiz kabiliyeti üstünden yükselmişlerdir. (*Cumhuriyet*, 29 Ekim 1936)
- 267) Türkün hiç bir zaman istiklâlsiz yaşayamayacak yaradılıştta olduğu (...) (*Son Posta*, 4 Ocak 1937)
- 268) Çekirdeksiz üzüm kongresi “Türk milleti her zaman kuvvetlidir” (*Son Posta*, 12 Mart 1937)
- 269) Büyük Milletin Büyük Heyecanı (...) Onun taze can aşılacağı Türk milleti varken Çanakkale her zaman müdafaa edilecek, oradan hiç bir vakit, hiç kimse geçemiyecektir. (*Son Posta*, 22 Temmuz 1936)
- 270) Sevr yüzde 500 Türk milletini öldürecekti (*Cumhuriyet*, 9 Nisan 1935)

- 271) Bu içeriden ve dışarıdan hayatına suikasdler yapılan Türk milletinin kendi hakimiyetini kendi eline aldığı günün bayramıdır (*Cumhuriyet*, 23 Nisan 1937)
- 272) Türk milletinin her suretle yükselmesinde insanlık umumi olarak ancak hayır ve menfaat görür. (*Son Posta*, 23 Ağustos 1934)
- 273) Türk milletinin Milletler arası Hayatında kazandığı Yüksek mevki (*Cumhuriyet*, 19 Eylül 1934)
- 274) Türk ulusu Atatürkün istediği itimadı bir kere daha gösterdi (*Cumhuriyet*, 9 Şubat 1935)
- 275) Türk milleti 19 Mayıs hakikî manasını verebilmek için bu yıl topyekûn hazırlanmış vaziyettedir. (*Cumhuriyet*, 19 Mayıs 1937)
- 276) Bizim kesin inanımız vardır ki Türk milleti yurdun korunmasına ve güvenine (emniyetine) dokunan bu gereklîği az zamanda ve tam tamına yerine getirecektir. (*Cumhuriyet*, 20 Haziran 1935)
- 277) Böyle nazik zamanlarda Türk milleti Atatürkün ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti hükûmetinin arkasında yekpâre bir varlık halindedir. (*Son Posta*, 7 Ocak 1937)
- 278) Yekpare vatan ve yüksek seviyeli yekpare millet (*Cumhuriyet*, 8 Temmuz 1934)
- 279) Türk ordusu Türk ulusundan olmakla, Türk ulusu da dünyanın en yiğit ordusunu yaratmakla övünürler. Her ulus kendi ordusunu sever sayar; fakat bu sevgi ve saygıda hiçbir ulus bizimle yarışamaz. (*Cumhuriyet*, 17 Mayıs 1935)
- 280) Hududumuzun şanlı ve kolu bükülmez bir bekçisi vardır: Bütün Türk Milleti (*Son Posta*, 10 Nisan 1937)
- 281) Bütün Doğunun gösterdiği tezahür “Türk milletinin Ulu önder için bütün varlıklarını fedaya hazır olduklarını gösterir” (*Cumhuriyet*, 12 Haziran 1937)
- 282) Pazara Bütün Türk Milleti Bayram Yapacak (*Son Posta*, 29 Ocak 1937)
- 283) İlk Millî Âbide Yapılırken Kubilây Heykeli Tezgâhta (*Son Posta*, 10 Temmuz 1934)

- 284) Milli Heyecan Günündeyiz Büyük Zaferi Kutluyoruz (*Son Posta*, 30 Ağustos 1934)
- 285) Millî Bayramlar Niçin Kutlulanırlar? (...) Bu millî günler, milletle ordunun yanyana gelmesi, ülkü ve düşünce birliğile sevinç kaynaşmaları, yahut bir isteğin açığa vurulması içindir. (*Son Posta*, 3 Eylül 1934)
- 286) Atatürk, Millî kostümlü baloyu şerefliendirdiler (*Son Posta*, 7 Aralık 1936)
- 287) Celâl Bayarın radyoda nutku “Türkiye Türklerindir demek millî varlıklara sahip olmak demektir!” İktisat Vekilimiz, milli tasarruf siyasetini en mühim noktalarile izah etti ve “yurdun mes’udiyeti tediye muvazenesine, bu da türk malına olan rağbete dayanır” dedi. (*Cumhuriyet*, 19 Aralık 1936)
- 288) Kourdurduğu yapıda çalışanların, kendi yurddaşları olup olmadığını araştırmak ve aralarında yabancı, sığıntı kimseler bulunduğunu görünce bu gibilere yol verdimek, yapı sahibinin ulusal bir borcudur. (...) Türk işçi yerine yabancı kullanan müteahhidlerin yolsuz edilmeleri mümkündür. (*Cumhuriyet*, 3 Mayıs 1935)
- 289) Millî musikiye yeni bir yön veriliyor (*Cumhuriyet*, 7 Kasım 1934)
- 290) Millî musiki doğacaktır! (*Cumhuriyet*, 12 Kasım 1934)
- 291) Ulusal bir Türk operası yaratmak için program (*Cumhuriyet*, 28 Şubat 1935)
- 292) Garb tekniğine göre hazırlanmış milli Türk musikisinin radyoda yer alması için Ankaraya gitmiş ve direktif almış olan radyo şirketi müdürlerinden İsmail İsa Bey dün şehrimize dönmüştür. (*Cumhuriyet*, 7 Kasım 1934)
- 293) Memleketi değiştirmek, medenileştirmek sahasında yapılmış olan büyük şeyler arasında eksikliği en çok göze çarpan şey budur. Bir Avrupalı kafası için, bir milletin bir tek olsun operaya sahip olamayışı, hiçbir surette ne anlaşılır, ne de izah edilir bir şey değildir. (*Son Posta*, 16 Eylül 1936)
- 294) Yeni İnkılâb yolunda Büyük bir ulusal musiki müsabakası açıyoruz Öz Türk musikisinin örneklerini bulmak için yaptığımız bu büyük müsabakaya dahil olan eserler

- evvelâ büyük bir jüri tarafından tasnif ve sonra büyük bir konserde halk tarafından intihab edilecektir (*Cumhuriyet*, 27 Aralık 1934)
- 295) Medeniyet bir bütün olduğu gibi, milliyet de bir bütündür. Her ikisi de parçalanamaz. Yazımız, dilimiz, kıyafetimiz, herşeyimiz Türk ve medeni iken, hacıbaba kılıklı o musiki aramızda yaşıyamazdı. Sonra bu bizi, eşe dosta karşı, rahmetli fesle istanbulin gibi gülünç ediyordu. Hele tiyatro san'atında tulûat ne ise, bizim müteveffa musikide de gazel denilen bir Allahın belâsı vardı ki, açık yerde okunacak olursa, vitanelerden baykuşlara ürkütüb kaçırrır, yedi mahallenin köpeklerini sinirlendirip uluturdu. (Ercüment Ekrem Talu) (*Cumhuriyet*, 3 Ekim 1934)
- 296) İktisadi inkişafı, fikri-ruhi başarmalarla ve san'at eserleriyle, büyük kültür milletleri arasında tamamen müsavi mevki almak, siyaset ve askerlikte olduğu gibi ilimde, san'atta, iktisat ve teknikte de Avrupai bir kıymet olmak, milli ülkümüz oldu. Bu ilerleme ve ilerleyerek yükselme yolunda Garbin tesiri olacaksa da, yapacağımız inkişafı tam istilâl göstermek, bizim de onlara öğretecek şeylerimiz ve iştihaklarımız olduğunu ispat etmek (zorundayız) (*Cumhuriyet*, 12 Kasım 1934)
- 297) Millî bir vazifemiz Tayyare Cemiyetine yardımı artıralım (*Cumhuriyet*, 25 Ağustos 1934)
- 298) Millî Kültür nasıl kurulur? (*Cumhuriyet*, 1 Ağustos 1934)
- 299) Her Şeyden Evvel Millî Müdafaa İrfan, terakki, refah, zevk; bütün bunlar Millî Müdafası tam olanların hakkı ve nasibidir (*Cumhuriyet*, 7 Kasım 1934)
- 300) Türkün Yüksek Seciyesi İsveçte Verilen Bir Konferansta Ehemmiyetle Söz Mevzuu Oldu (*Son Posta*, 14 Kasım 1934)
- 301) Çabuk ilerlemek, kaybolanı hızla önlemek Türkün özel sanıdır. Kendimize tükenmez güvenimiz var. (*Akşam*, 5 Mayıs 1935)

- 302) Türk elden ele devredilemez Türkün elden ele devredilir bir meta olmadığını, bunu anlamak istemeyenlere anlatmak isteriz (*Son Posta*, 25 Eylül 1936)
- 303) Türkün Avrupada hürmet görmesi Çanakkale müdafaasile başlar (*Son Posta*, 6 Aralık 1936)
- 304) Türkün âhi Yıl 1914 Bugün ramazanın on yedisi. Rumî tarih de şu: 27 Temmuz 1320 (Tanin) de bir başmakale okudum. İşte adı: Türkün âhi... İki sütuna yakın yazı içinde muharrir hangi acımızı söylemiyor, hangi Türk kalbinin asırlık hıncını ortaya koymuyor!. Bugün insanlığı, aklı filân unutup ta timsahlar gibi, gergedanlar gibi birbirine giren Avrupa ihtirasları makalede ne güzel hulâsa edilmiş! Evet asırlardan beri bin bir yalan, bin bir bahane bularak bize saldırırlardı. İşte şimdi birbirlerini yiyorlar!. (*Akşam*, 26 Kasım 1936)
- 305) Her Türkü bekleyen bir şefkat vazifesi Yoksul Türk çocuğunu koruma seferberliği (*Cumhuriyet*, 28 Kasım 1936)
- 306) Türkün endüstri Başarıcılığına yeni Bir alan: Uçakçılık (*Cumhuriyet*, 2 Haziran 1935)
- 307) Tam Türke yaraşan civanmerdlikle... (*Cumhuriyet*, 23 Temmuz 1936)
- 308) Türkün zaferi herhangi bir tesadüf eseri değildir! (*Cumhuriyet*, 30 Ocak 1937)
- 309) Türk geçmişi unutmak istiyordu...! (*Cumhuriyet*, 23 Ocak 1937)
- 310) Kaynağı belli olan suyun nereye aktığı sorulmaz. Türkten geldik, Türke gidiyoruz. (*Son Posta*, 15 Aralık 1934)
- 311) Altaylardaki beşiğine sığamayan Türk yeryüzünde yayılmadık yer bırakmış mı idi? (...). Gün oldu ki yeryüzü Türke dar gelmeye başladı. (*Son Posta*, 8 Mart 1935)
- 312) Türkün kutlu beldeleri Antakyayı bir de Evliya Çelebiden dinliyelim (*Cumhuriyet*, 5 Ekim 1936)

- 313) Boğazlar davasında Türkün sözü Türk derki: “Kapılarım kapalıdır. İstedığıme istediğim gibi açarım ve buna muktedirim.” Boğazlar ve Boğaz suları Türkün tam hâkimiyet ve istiklâlinin ifadesidir (*Cumhuriyet*, 10 Temmuz 1936)
- 314) Türkiye Türklerindir! (...) Burada onlar iş bulmadıkça, yabancılar iş alamaz. Türkün karnı doymadıkça yabancı kursaklar düşünülemez. Bunu iyice bellemek gerekir. (*Cumhuriyet*, 3 Mayıs 1935)
- 315) Orta Anadolu Türküne iş kaynakları (*Son Posta*, 10 Nisan 1936)
- 316) İstanbul halkının ekmeği bile Türk elinde değildi! (*Son Posta*, 15 Ocak 1937)
- 317) Türk Ekseriyetken Ekalliyet Olamaz! (*Son Posta*, 25 Eylül 1936)
- 318) İstanbulu düşünelim Şehirde Türkün mevkii zayıflıyor. (*Son Posta*, 8 Kasım 1936)
- 319) İstanbulda Türkü Korumak için (...) İktisadi iş evvela sermaye demektir; Türkte bu çok azdır. (*Son Posta*, 11 Kasım 1936)
- 320) Münakaşa götürmeğe tahammülü olmıyan hakikat: Hatay’ın Türklüğü (*Cumhuriyet*, 29 Aralık 1936)
- 321) İskenderun bir asır evvel Türkler tarafından kurulmuştur. Son zamanlarda buraya yerleştirilmiş ermeni muhacirleriyle bahçelerde amelelik eden Alevilere bakarak mıntıkanın Türklüğünden şüpheyeye düşmemeli. (*Son Posta*, 2 Ocak 1937)
- 322) Ağırnas köylüleri “Mimar Sinanın Türklüğünü inkâr ederek ona sahip çıkanlar önce kendi şahsiyetlerinin Yunan ırkından olduğunu ispat etsin” diyorlar. (*Son Posta*, 3 Haziran 1937)
- 323) Profesör Şemseddin (Günaltay) İbni Sinâdan bahsederken: Türklüğünden şüphe edilemez – O, dedi, eserlerini Arapça yazdığı için, onun bir Arap feylezofu, ve bazı risalelerini de Farsça yazdığı için Acem âlimi olduğu iddia ediliyor. (...) İbni Sinâ’nın da eserlerini; müslüman âleminin, müşterek kültür dili olan Arapça ile yazmış olması, onun Türklüğünden şüphe için bir sebep sayılamaz. (*Son Posta*, 22 Haziran 1937)

- 324) Bulgarisanlı gazeteler arasında an fazla Türk düşmanı olan, Arap harflerile çıkan “Medeniyettir”(…) Başmuharririnin ve sairesinin isimleri hep “of” ile bittiği için Türklüklerinin de, müslümanlıklarının da derecesi kendiliğinden anlaşılan bu feiletlû gospodinlerin ve reşadetlû “of” ların işleri güçleri cer, dinleri imanları levadan ibarettir. (Cumhuriyet, 12 Kasım 1936)
- 325) Bugünkü yaşayanlar için kullanılması güç sayılan dil, yarınki Türklüğün katkısız özdili olacak. Seviniyoruz: Önümüz açık, gözümüz aydın. (Cumhuriyet, 19 Ağustos 1934)
- 326) Türk Haritacılığı bugün 25 yaşına giriyor. Türklüğün asırlarca inkişafına çalıştığı bu fennin bizde son kuruluş günü kutlulanıyor. (Cumhuriyet, 30 Mayıs 1935)
- 327) Türklüğün yayıldığı ve büyük birliğini kurduğu alan (saha) kilometre sayımı ile şaşılabacak bir genişliktedir. (Cumhuriyet, 26 Ocak 1935)
- 328) Berlinde bulunan Türk kolonisi, vakit vakit Türklüğü yükselten tezahürlerde bulunmaktan geri kalmıyor. (Akşam 11 Kasım 1934)
- 329) Romanyada Türklük müdafii ihtiyar bir papas Profesör Çakır Mihai hıristiyan türklerin başka millete temessül etmemeleri için 50 yıldanberi çalışıyor (Akşam, 2 Nisan 1935)
- 330) Amerikadaki türkler nasıl yaşıyorlar? (...) Bunlar çocuklarını Türklüğe bağlamak için didiniyorlar, onlara Türkçe isimler verip Türk harsını aşılamağa çabalyorlar. (Akşam, 28 Eylül 1936)
- 331) Atatürk devri, Türkiyenin ve Türklüğün feyiz ve itilâ devridir. (Cumhuriyet, 29 Ekim 1936)
- 332) Türklüğün temelleri üstünde yükselecek asri kültürümüz, ve bununla, devlet, millet, ilim, edebiyat, san’at, iktisat ve teknik kuvvetlerimiz kendi büyüme yollarını tuttu. (Cumhuriyet, 12 Kasım 1934)
- 333) Yirminci asrın Türkleri olan bizler için Türklük namına yapılacak bir çok keşifler mukaddermiş. Dilde, kültürde, tarihte, hulâsa insanlığın bütün insanlığa dair faaliyet

- sahalarında Türk için bir çok meziyetler ve faziletler keşfettik. (*Son Posta*, 10 Nisan 1937)
- 334) Türklüğün Değeri Çok Yücedir (...) Ancak ne yapsak Osmanlılık damgasını üstümüzen atamıyorduk. Türklüğümüzü ancak şimdi açığa vurabiliyoruz. (*Son Posta*, 15 Aralık 1934)
- 335) Türklük savaşı dil savaşıdır (*Cumhuriyet*, 19 Aralık 1934)
- 336) Bu yekunun ifade ettiği mana şudur. Sancakta Türklüğü imha etmek. (*Son Posta*, 12 Ocak 1937)
- 337) Gözlerimin önünden yekpare vatan geçiyor sandım. Ve o dakika, varlığımla, Türklüğümle ben bir kere daha iftihar ettim. (*Son Posta*, 2 Eylül 1936)
- 338) Türk doğanlar Türk olarak ölmelidirler! Adınızı taşıyanlar, Türk kafasına aykırı yetişmeleri, birgün Türklüğün temelini sarsabilir! Bu korkuyu, bütün babalar içinizde taşımahınsınız! Öğüdümü dinlemeyip, çocuğunuzu yine yabancı okula verecekseniz, hiç olmazsa onu gözünüzün önünden uzak tutmayınız. (...) Yoksa sonu kötüdür. Hem siz, hem de Türklük irişkin kafalı birer oğuldan olursunuz... (*Son Posta*, 30 Aralık 1934)
- 339) Türk süvarilerinin zaferi Bu muvaffakiyetlerin Türkiye ve Türklük için ne büyük bir propaganda olduğunu söylemeye lüzum var mı? (*Cumhuriyet*, 6 Haziran 1935)
- 340) Şu Laurusse Universal yok mu, Türklüğe ve Türkiye'ye taallûk eden bahislerde gerçekten komik. (*Cumhuriyet*, 12 Temmuz 1936)
- 341) Fakat Hammerin Türklükle Türkmenliği böyle din farkile tefrik etmesi hatalıdır. (*Cumhuriyet*, 19 Ocak 1937)
- 342) İngiliz milleti artık Türk milletinin ruhundan doğan ve hakikaten Türk olan bir devletle dostluk tesis etmiş olunuyordu ve Türklüğün şerefini Çanakkalede koruyan Büyük Askerin şimdi bütün Türklüğü temsil ettiğini görerek tam bir itimadla elini ona, yani Türklüğe uzatıyordu. (*Cumhuriyet*, 4 Eylül 1936)

- 343) Türk benliğinin tarihsel temellerine bir bakış “Türkler benliklerini kolaylıkla yitirirler, kolaylıkla emilirler” diyenler ve Araplarla Yahudileri öne sürenler bizim tarihsel bütünlüğümüzü kavrayamayanlardır. (Cumhuriyet, 25 Ocak 1935)
- 344) Hıristiyan Türkler Avrupanın birçok yerinde dillerini kaybetmiş Türkler var (...) Bu zavallılar Bokovinalı bir gazetecinin yazdığına göre, son derece sefalet içinde vakit geçirmekte ve aralarında pek müthiş bir surette sari hastalıklar hüküm sürmektedir. (Akşam, 9 Mart 1935)
- 345) Türk iktisat ve menfaatini ancak Türkler bilir ve Türkler temin edebilir. (Cumhuriyet, 17 Ağustos 1934)
- 346) Bu deveyi gütmeyen ... Biz türkler, yüreğin derinlerinde gizli yüksek Tanrı duygularile gövde dışındaki giyim kuşam arasında bir ilişki düşünemeyiz. (Akşam, 9 Aralık 1934)
- 347) Biz Türkler, yakın zamanlara kadar, doğduğumuz yerden dışarı çıkmaktan çok korkardık. “Gurbet” kelimesi, bizim için korkunç bir sergüzeşt manâsı ifade eder, yerimizden kıpırdamak mecburiyeti bize en ağır bir talih cilvesi gibi gelirdi. Allah Atatürkten razı olsun, İstanbulu Ankaraya taşıdı da İstanbulunun nihayet bu korku damarı çatladı. Şimdi seyahate alışıyoruz. (Son Posta, 14 Eylül 1936)
- 348) Öğünülecek bir muvaffakiyet Bütün Danimarka Türk şaraplarını içiyor! (Cumhuriyet, 22 Temmuz 1934)
- 349) Paris caddelerinde Türk bayrağı (Cumhuriyet, 1 Ağustos 1934)
- 350) Türk karikatürcülüğü Bir Alman gazetesinin Türk mizahına dair neşrettiği sahife (Akşam, 9 Kasım 1934)
- 351) Türk süvarileri zaferden zafere koşuyorlar (Cumhuriyet, 24 Haziran 1937)
- 352) “Türk parası en sağlam paradır” Bir İngiliz mecmuasinin yazdığı makale (Cumhuriyet, 7 Temmuz 1934)

- 353) Dışarıda Türk Lirası Gelinlik Kızlar Gibi Kıymetli (*Son Posta*, 14 Haziran 1935)
- 354) Türk futbolu hakkında Almanların düşünceleri Berlinde rezil olduk diyenler bu yazıyı ibretle okusunlar (*Cumhuriyet*, 17 Ağustos 1936)
- 355) Türk Mimarları (*Cumhuriyet*, 17 Ağustos 1934)
- 356) Türk mühendisliğine İstiklâl (*Cumhuriyet*, 3 Eylül 1934)
- 357) Türk mühendisinin icadı (*Cumhuriyet*, 4 Eylül 1934)
- 358) Türk işçisinin, Türkiyede çalışmak hakkıdır. Yarın, öbürgün yurdu müdafaaya koşacak odur. (*Cumhuriyet*, 3 Mayıs 1935)
- 359) Türk hekimlerinin Hakları ve şerefleri (*Cumhuriyet*, 7 Mayıs 1935)
- 360) Başvekil Türk çiftçisini irşada devam ediyor (*Son Posta*, 20 Ekim 1936)
- 361) Türk tezgâhlarında Türk işçisinin yaptığı ilk gemi (*Son Posta*, 17 Kasım 1936)
- 362) Medenî Türk ailesi (*Cumhuriyet*, 2 Mart 1935)
- 363) Türk Kültürü Tekâmül Merhalesinde (*Son Posta*, 15 Ocak 1935)
- 364) Türk sporunun kurtulma çareleri (*Akşam*, 27 Aralık 1936)
- 365) Türk kömürcülüğünün mes'ud inkişafı (*Cumhuriyet*, 14 Haziran 1937)
- 366) Türk köyünü Şenlendirmek için Alınan tedbirler (*Son Posta*, 16 Şubat 1937)
- 367) Türk analarının Sıhhatleri için Alınan tedbirler (*Son Posta*, 12 Temmuz 1936)
- 368) Türk bahriyelilerinin intizamı dost memlekette takdirle karşılandı (*Akşam*, 30 Kasım 1936)
- 369) Türk Kanadlarını Yükseltmek İçin... Açtığımız Müsabaka Alâka ve Takdirle Karşılandı (*Son Posta*, 3 Haziran 1935)
- 370) Türk yüzücülerine mutlaka nizamî bir havuz lâzımdır (*Son Posta*, 17 Şubat 1937)
- 371) Bir Türk operasına Muhtacız... (*Son Posta*, 16 Eylül 1936)
- 372) Türk köy ve Köylüsü için Çalışmaya doğru (*Cumhuriyet*, 2 Nisan 1935)
- 373) Uzak Şartkta Türk Harsı ve Varlığı (*Son Posta*, 31 Ocak 1935)

- 374) Türk aşiretleri içinde iki ay süren tetkikat Konservatuvar Müdürü Ziya Bey folklor sahasında yaptığı ehemmiyetli araştırmaları anlatıyor (*Cumhuriyet*, 15 Eylül 1934)
- 375) Kayseride Türk evleri Bu eski Türk eserleri 240 senelik bir tarihe ve yüksek san'at kıymetine maliktir. (*Cumhuriyet*, 2 Ocak 1937)
- 376) Türk makineli tüfekleri, ihraç kuvvetlerinin hatları arasında büyük boşluklar vücude getirtiyordu! (*Cumhuriyet*, 7 Kasım 1934)
- 377) Vaktile türk atlarının kişnemesini bir kudret musikisi olarak dinlemeğe alışmış olan Çin topraklarında şimdi Japonlar emperyalist teraneler terennüm ediyorlar. (*Son Posta*, 12 Şubat 1935)
- 378) Kûtülâmmare Türk zaferidir, Almanlarla ilişiği yoktur! (*Cumhuriyet*, 17 Haziran 1935)
- 379) Türk İnkılâp Rejiminin Müdafaası (*Cumhuriyet*, 31 Temmuz 1934)
- 380) Türk Devrimi Müzesi Bir Camlı Dolab Daha Kazandı (*Son Posta*, 19 Şubat 1935)
- 381) Türk devrimi karakteri bakımından şöyledir: Doğu medeniyetinden Batı medeniyetine geçmek, ülkesinde kayıtsız şartsız egemen olmak, devlet ve sosyete nizamında karşılıklı hak ve ödevlere yer vermek (...) (*Cumhuriyet*, 2 Haziran 1935)
- 382) Türk devriminin özü ve köycülüğün rolü (*Cumhuriyet*, 3 Haziran 1935)
- 383) Beylerbeyi festivalinde General Dirikle bir Türk yavrusunun sözleri (*Cumhuriyet*, 5 Eylül 1934)
- 384) Türk çocuğunun duası (*Cumhuriyet*, 5 Eylül 1934)
- 385) Mekteb sıralarındaki Türk çocuklarının tahassüsleri "Atamız tarihe ilk emrini o gün verdi" (*Cumhuriyet*, 19 Mayıs 1937)
- 386) Bu sevgili yurdu, lâyük olduğu yüceliğe vardırmaq için, yalnız yaşayan Türk soyuna değil, gelecek Türk soylarına da bitmez tükenmez işler vardır. (*Cumhuriyet*, 13 Ağustos 1934)

- 387) Zaten Atatürk'ün bu yurda en büyük armağanlarından biri her yönde ulusun hizmet görecek adamlar yetiştirmesidir. Hep bu maksadla değil miydi ki Atatürk meşhur tarihsel söylevinde Cumhuriyet rejimini Türk gençliğine emanet etmişti? (*Cumhuriyet*, 4 Mart 1935)
- 388) İskenderun ve Antakya manda altında kalmaz Türk toprağı kendi kendini idare etmelidir! (*Son Posta*, 24 Eylül 1936)
- 389) Bir insaflı ses daha! “Türk İskenderun Anadolu'nun emniyet anahtarıdır” (*Cumhuriyet*, 10 Ocak 1937)
- 390) Eski ve tam bir Türk yurdu olan Hatay pek çok Türk âlim ve şairi yetiştirmiştir (*Cumhuriyet*, 12 Ocak 1937)
- 391) Türk toprağında müstemlekeci at oynatamaz (*Son Posta*, 16 Ocak 1937)
- 392) Türk malları yağma ediliyor Mekteplerde arapca okumağa icbar edilen Türk talebeleri mektebe gitmekten vaz geçtiler (*Cumhuriyet*, 2 Nisan 1937)
- 393) Kral Aleksandr Hz.”Türk milleti döğüşen fakat entrika yapmıyan, asil erkek bir millettir” diyorlar (*Cumhuriyet*, 7 Temmuz 1934)
- 394) Türk, bir tek gözyaşı önünde, coşkun deryalarla karşılaşmış serçe gibi küçülür. (...) Türk, kendine en yüksek kazanç temin etse bile, ihanetten iğrenir. (*Son Posta*, 12 Şubat 1935)
- 395) Türkten kancık yetişmediğine göre bizim kadınıımız da erdir. (*Son Posta*, 2 Mart 1935)
- 396) Türk, verdiği sözden dönmez! (*Cumhuriyet*, 31 Ocak 1937)
- 397) Beldrad kalesinde Türkün iyi ruhunun Ebedi bir âbidesi (*Son Posta*, 19 Nisan 1937)
- 398) Türkün civanmerdliğini şimdi anlıyorlar (*Cumhuriyet*, 14 Mayıs 1937)
- 399) Türk bayrağını şeref direğine çektiirmek ve Türk gibi kuvvetli ol, sözünü tekrarlatmak onlar için bir emeldir (*Akşam*, 19 Ekim 1936)
- 400) Ankara Türk irade kuvvetinin ispatıdır (*Son Posta*, 11 Kasım 1936)

- 401) Bu yıl yapılacak merasimde Türkün hiç bir zaman istiklâlsiz yaşayamayacak yaradılıştta olduđu ve Adananın istiklâl savaşında müşkül vaziyetten kendini nasıl kurtardığı tebarüz ettirilecek (*Son Posta*, 4 Ocak 1937)
- 402) Yürekli Türk (...) Osmanlı gününde, Türk adını anarken dudak bükenler, omuz silkenler oldu. Bunlar Türke “geri” dediler, “kafası yontulmamış” dediler, “eli işe ermez” dediler, “Yobaz” dediler. Ancak “Yüreksiz” diyemediler. (*Son Posta*, 21 Şubat 1935)
- 403) Türk tarihinde azametle inceliği, heybetle zerafeti bir anda ve bir arada kaynaştırıveren neler, ne örnekler vardır? Eğer bunlar iyiden iyi toplanıb, süzgeçten geçirilib Türk karakteri adlı bir kitab yazılsa, beşeri ahlâk için muhayyel temeller arayanlar için ne göz kamaştırıcı bir âbide olurdu. (*Son Posta*, 12 Şubat 1935)
- 404) “Ne mutlu Türküm diyene!” (...) Türk, Türklüğünü herşeyden üstün tutar. Böyle olduđu halde, hiçbir Türk olmıyan milleti kendinden aşağı görmemek erkekliğindedir. Türk kuvvetli milliyetçidir, ancak şoven değildir. Milliyetçilik, geniş düşünüşe, geniş görüşe engel değildir, ama şovenlik yeryüzünde kısa ve kötü görücülüğün en son kertesidir. (*Cumhuriyet*, 13 Ağustos 1934)
- 405) Kahraman Türk ordusunun eşi yok (*Akşam*, 18 Ekim 1936)
- 406) Fedakâr Türk kadını orduda da rol alıyor (*Cumhuriyet*, 4 Kasım 1936)
- 407) Türkkuşunun genç, azimkâr, kahraman talebeleri, Türk gençleri, Türk askerleri, bugün, buraya, vatanın hayat ve istiklâli uğrunda can veren şehitlerin ruhlarını taziz için toplanılmıştır. (*Son Posta*, 31 Ekim 1936)
- 408) TÜRK KIZI Aklı olan başında Bunu bilmeli gayrı: Kalmaz yurd savaşında Kadın, erkekten ayrı!.. * Türk kızı, barış varsa Durur girip evine!.. Atılır cenk çıkarsa Topların alevine!.. * Bilin: Ayırd edilmez Savaşta kadın, erkek!.. Millet silâhlanır tez Yediden yetmiş dek!.. * Türk oğlu dağda, taşta Vuruşur, durmaz geri!.. Türk kızı da savaşta

- Geri bırakır eri!.. * Taşımıya alıştı Yurd aşkını kalbinde!.. Erkek gibi çalıştı Anadolu harbinde!.. * Yoktur kalbinde korku: Alırsın hıncımızı!.. Erkekten fazla oku, Ey Türk kızı; Türk kızı!.. (*Cumhuriyet*, 2 Haziran 1937)
- 409) Evlilikte saadet reçetesi Dünyanın en mükemmel kocası: Türk erkeği... Bu buhranlı günlerde bir kocaya malik olmak saadettir (*Akşam*, 4 Şubat 1937)
- 410) Yad illerden Ana toprağa gelen Ve gelecek Türkler (*Cumhuriyet*, 27 Ekim, 1936)
- 411) Bulgaristandan Ana Vatana Dönmek İstiyen Türkler Bir Yığın Muamele Yüzünden Bin Bir Zorluk İçinde Bunılıyorlar (*Son Posta*, 24 Mart 1935)
- 412) Bulgarya Türkleri ana vatana iltica ediyorlar! Ekalliyetimiz tazyik altındadır ve bu yüzden Türkler panik halinde Türkiye'ye kaçıyorlar (*Cumhuriyet*, 1 Ağustos 1934)
- 413) Bulgaristan Türkleri Tazyik neticesi hicret devam ediyor Bulgarlardan dostluğa yakışır yola dönmelerini istiyoruz (*Cumhuriyet*, 10 Ağustos 1934)
- 414) 50.000 muhacir gelecek Yeni vatandaşların kolaylıkla yerleşerek müstahsil vaziyete geçebilmeleri için alınan tedbirler (*Cumhuriyet*, 10 Temmuz 1934)
- 415) Göçmenler "Ana vatana hizmete geldik" diyorlar Bulgaristandan gelen Keçiören Türkleri büyük sevinç içinde (*Akşam*, 18 Nisan 1935)
- 416) Bulgaristan Türkleri Her Halde Gıpta Edilecek Bir Hayat Yaşamıyorlar (*Son Posta*, 3 Ağustos 1934)
- 417) Bulgaristandaki zavallı soydaşlarımız (*Cumhuriyet*, 2 Ocak 1935)
- 418) Zavallı soydaşlarımız Bulgaristan Türkleri bir muhacir pasaportu almak için bütün malk mülklerini veriyorlar (*Cumhuriyet*, 25 Aralık 1934)
- 419) Sancak Türkleri haklarını istihsal için yekpare bir varlık halinde çalışmakta devam ediyor (*Cumhuriyet*, 3 Ekim 1936)
- 420) Sancak Türkleri bütün tazyiklere rağmen millî bayramlarımızı büyük tezahürlerle kutluyorlar (*Akşam*, 4 Ekim 1936)

- 421) Bulgaristandaki Trakya Komitesi Gemi Azıya Aldı Türkler Zulüm Görüyor, İntikam Yaygaraları Savruluyor, Fakat Bulgar Hükûmetinde Ses Yok (*Son Posta*, 25 Ağustos 1934)
- 422) Türkleri Bulgarlaştırma Siyaseti Aldı Yürüdü Birçok Türk Mekteplerinde Hiç Türkçe Tedrisat Yaptırılmıyor (*Son Posta*, 17 Haziran 1935)
- 423) Sancakta silâhsız ırkdaşlarımıza ateş edildi. 5 Türk genci yaralandı. Vaziyet çok elimdir İrkdaşlarımıza karşı zulüm, tazyik son dereceyi buldu (*Son Posta*, 2 Ocak 1936)
- 424) İskenderun-Antakya Türkleri Anavatanın böğründe gûya şunun bunun lûtf ve himmetile elde edilmiş olacak ekalliyet hakkı dilenciliği etmek vaziyetine düşemezler, düşürülemezler (*Cumhuriyet*, 25 Eylül 1936)
- 425) Türk memleketinde resmî muamele arapça olur mu? Yabancıların elinde bulunan zabıta Türkleri mütemadiyen tazyik ediyor (*Akşam*, 3 Ekim 1936)
- 426) Antakyada tazyik. Türklerin hakları boyuna çiğneniyor Fransız memurlarının sistematik hareketleri neticesinde cenub Türklerinin arazileri de yavaş yavaş ellerinden çıkmağa başladı (*Cumhuriyet*, 9 Ekim 1936)
- 427) Şapka giyen Sancak Türkleri tazyik mi ediliyor? (*Son Posta*, 19 Ekim 1936)
- 428) Sancak Türkleri iktisaden nasıl eziliyorlar? (*Cumhuriyet*, 27 Ekim 1936)
- 429) Antakya ve İskenderunda Türk aleyhtarları iş başına getiriliyor (*Akşam*, 7 Kasım 1936)
- 430) Antakyada çarpışmalar başladı (...) Türklerin sabrı tükeniyor (*Akşam*, 18 Kasım 1936)
- 431) Hatayda galeyan var! Türkleri fikirlerini söylemeğe bile bırakmayan müstemleke idaresi (*Cumhuriyet*, 8 Ocak 1937)
- 432) Son notamızı çok açık ve kesin lisanla yazılmıştır Sancak Türklerinin hakkını istiyoruz (*Akşam*, 21 Kasım 1936)
- 433) Hatay Türkleri için hürriyet, istiklâl istiyoruz (*Son Posta*, 28 Kasım 1936)

- 434) Antakya ve İskenderunda Türklere yapılan tazyik tahammülün fevkindedir (*Akşam*, 1 Aralık 1936)
- 435) Hatayda caniyane bir propaganda başladı Türklerin mal ve canlarının helâl olduğu telkin ediliyor (*Cumhuriyet*, 13 Mart 1937)
- 436) Türkçe ve Gagavozlar Romanya'da hıristiyan olduğu halde asırları yenerek Türk kalmış 150.000 kişiden mürekkep ölmez bir abidemiz var! (*Cumhuriyet*, 1 Ağustos 1934)
- 437) Montröde bizimkiler. Türk arıyorum – Avrupada Türk propagandası (*Cumhuriyet*, 23 Ağustos 1936)
- 438) Kıbrıs adasındaki Türkler nasıl yaşıyorlar? Kıbrıs Türkleri, Türkiyede yapılan bütün inkılâbları derhal benimsiyorlar (*Cumhuriyet*, 20 Eylül 1936)
- 439) Amerikadaki Türkler nasıl yaşıyorlar? Hepsinin evinde Atatürkün bir fotoğrafı vardır. Hepsi memleket hasreti içindedir. (*Akşam*, 28 Eylül 1936)
- 440) Aferin Rodos Türklerine! Türke hıyanet eden hocayı aralarında yaşatmadılar Mahmut Hoca etrafındakilerle beraber Mısır yolunu tuttu (*Son Posta*, 9 Ekim 1936)

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