THE UNCONCEALEDNESS OF THE TRUTH:

A STUDY IN HEIDEGGERIAN UNDERSTANDING OF TRUTH

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Thesis Abstract

Ahmet Serhat Kılıkçıer, ‘‘The Unconcealedness of the Truth: A Study in Heideggerian Understanding of Truth’’

This thesis attempts to elaborate on different accounts of truth in Heidegger’s philosophy to investigate whether Heidegger’s understanding of Being as manifestness is metaphysically constructed. After this our investigation will continue with whether Heidegger’s understanding of Being in relation to his treatment of the notion of truth is open to hierarchies or not, keeping in mind Plato’s claim on “beingly beings” in *Republic*. To accomplish this I firstly expand on Heidegger’s notion of truth in his magnum opus *Being and Time.* Afterwards I try to elaborate on the later works of Heidegger to indicate the change in his thinking about the notion of truth and to unravel possible outcomes of Heideggerian reading of truth in its relation to ontology in the history of Western philosophy. According to the mainstream Heidegger scholarship, Heidegger was focused on the meaning of Being in his earlier period whereas he was engaged in the truth of Being in his later period. However Richard Capobianco claims that Heidegger always engaged in the truth of Being and in his later philosophy this motivation became clearer. Accordingly the manifestness of Being has a structural primordiality over our meaning-giving activities. In my view this is a very plausible argument. For beings to be subject of perception and to make sense to us, they have to be there, they have to be manifested. Something that is not ontologically manifested cannot have any ground to be and to be something. At the end of the thesis instead of reaching to conclusions I try to bring forth even more questions that will allow us to question Heidegger’s understanding of Being in relation to metaphysical hierarchies.

Tez Özeti

Ahmet Serhat Kılıkçıer, "Hakikatin Tezahür Etmesi: Heideggerci Hakikat Anlayışı Üzerine Bir Çalışma"

Bu tez Heidegger'in "tezahür etme olarak Varlık" anlayışının metafiziksel yani Varlığı hiyerarşilere açan bir felsefe olup olmadığını anlamak için, Platon'un *Devlet*'teki "varlıklı varlıklar" iddiasını akılda tutarak Heidegger'in felsefesindeki çeşitli hakikat algılarını araştırmaktadır. Bunu başarabilmek için öncelikle Heidegger'in başyapıtı *Varlık ve Zaman*'da geliştirmiş olduğu hakikat algısı üzerinde duracağız. Ardından Heidegger'in geç dönem çalışmalarına eğilerek, varlıkbilimindeki farklı hakikat algılarını Batı felsefesi tarihiyle ilişki içinde okumaya çalışacağız. Ana akım Heidegger literatürü erken Heidegger'in Varlığın anlamını, geç Heidegger'in ise Varlığın hakikatini soruşturduğunu kabul eder. Buna karşın Richard Capobianco Heidegger'in her daim Varlığın hakikati sorusunu yöndeldiğini ve fakat geç dönem çalışmalarında bu motivasyonun daha açık hale geldiğini iddia etmektedir. Buna göre Varlığın tezahür etmesi anlam verme edimlerimize karşılık her daim yapısal bir önceliklilik içindedir. Kanımızca bu iddia son derece makuldür. Kendisi varlıksal olarak tezahür etmeyen bir şeyin var olmaklığının ve şey olmaklığının bir tabanı olamaz. Tezin sonuç bölümündeyse, sonuçlara varmaktansa Heidegger'in Varlık anlayışının metafiziksel hiyerarşilerle ilişkisini sorgulamamıza olanak sağlayacak şekilde sorular oluşturuyouz.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

I guess that any Master's thesis in philosophy assumes an understanding about what philosophy is, about what an academically acceptable work in philosophy should look like. This being said, we might even go further to "guess" that every philosophical work contains meta-philosophical elements in it. By meta-philosophy I mean the study of what philosophy is instead of branches of philosophy such as ontology, ethics or aesthetics which focus on the nature of existence, the nature of right conduct and the nature of the beautiful respectively.[1] Here I will not try to expand on what I think on the nature of philosophy, how seriously it should be taken and how very seriously it should be contemplated about. As we will see in the following sections for Heidegger truth (what is unconcealed) is in a strong connection with untruth (what is concealed). Correspondingly, I will try to give a small sketch of the adventure this thesis experienced through the waving it encountered because from a Heideggerian point of view I guess the untold parts, in a way concealed parts of the thesis are as decisive as the told parts, the unconcealed parts. Thus in a way before I attempt to unconceal the truth (unconcealedness) of my thesis, I will introduce the concealedness within.

The initial purpose of this thesis was to investigate different theories on the being of nothing by looking at Parmenides' poem *On Nature*, Plato's famous dialogue *Sophist* and Heidegger's *Being and Time* as well as *What is Metaphysics* with some additional look at his later thought. My intention was to read Parmenides as one of the most determinative figures in the metaphysical thinking that has further developed by Plato

[1] In this context meta-philosophy is not a sub-set of philosophical studies but rather a ground that is presupposed by the respective subject matters of philosophical investigation such as ontology, ethics, and aesthetics.

and Aristotle. I was going to focus on the ideas such as "pervasiveness of Being" the idea that everything in every sense is a being and the limit of Being is itself, "inexhaustibility of Being" the idea that one way of looking at Being; scientific, artistic, political, individual and so on cannot explain, cannot give the meaning of Being. My plan was to attempt to make the claim that Parmenides' own arguments in the path of *aletheia* allow for an onto-homogenous understanding of being. By onto-homogeneity I mean an understanding of being that has not introduced any sort of hierarchy, determinations such as substance, essence or accidents and therefore an approach in which there are no ontological concepts that 'allow' one sort of being to be in a dependence relationship.[2] I think this approach consequently determines the ontological endeavor primordially as the acknowledgement of the beingness, manifestness of Being instead of initially categorizing Being and presenting a hierarchy towards Being. We can see this in the following Neo-Platonic systems rather clearly through of course the influence of Plato and Aristotle. The main idea that I was trying to refute was the claim that there are "beingly beings"; be it forms in the Platonic sense and ultimately the form of Good, the first unmoved mover of the Aristotelian philosophy or the One*(hen)* of Plotinus.[3] Accordingly my main argument would be that insofar as Being in its beingness taken as Being as Aristotle (that is investigating being qua being) would put it, cannot be the subject of a categorization, cannot be part of a metaphysical list (such as

[2] What I had in mind was primarily the vocabulary of 'substance and accidents' produced and developed by western metaphysicians which categorize beings and take substances as ontologically independent (that is things that do not need anything to be) and accident as dependent (that is things that need a substance to be) kind of beings. In the idea of 'power metaphysics', homogeneity is a term I use for my purposes but not as a concept that can be applied to Heideggerian ontology. However one might make the claim that a non-hierarchical structure can be homogenous. For example a classless society can be homogenous. In analytic tradition has a much more different connotation. Therefore I would like to point out that my usage of the word 'homogenous' is tentative and open to certain criticism. I thank Murat Baç and Ertuğrul Rufayi Turan for their remarks and contributions regarding this discussion.

[3] Plato. *Republic*. p.506d-518c.

there is Being and there is apples and there is redness) because investigating being as being requires primarily the acknowledgement of beingness of beings; that no matter what we will investigate, it will *be* a being and by extension nothing is a being when being is investigated as being. In other words, if the beings we address as being which includes are fundamentally encountered by us in their manifestness, then nothing should be addressed as a being as well.[4]

It seemed to me that a claim about the beingness of nothing would have to answer the further inevitable question "How come nothing is a being, in what way nothing is a being?" While Plato thought it is the difference, the negation of things such as a table's not being a cup that manifested the being of nothing, for early Heidegger it is the death of *Dasein* (there-being) in its attunement of angst that unravels the being of nothing. I thought inner lives, worlds of humans or ineffable experiences of human beings could be a manifestation of the beingness of nothing as long as our inner lives seem very nothingly in the sense that what causes the things we externalize, the reasons for our choices and the grounds for our desires are metaphysically hard to penetrate.[5] In other words, I contend that the answer to the question "what makes her will the way she willed it?" though could have neurological, psychological or socio-political answers the question of 'why' can still be posed further to the point that it seems the answer always evades us. Yet this would require an understanding of "power metaphysics" if you will

[4] Here by 'being' I mean the totality of entities, concepts, and things we, humans encounter. Seemingly nothing is also 'something' we encounter and therefore a being, either as something sensical or non-sensical.

[5] The reason I use the expression 'nothingly' is because I do not want to jump to the conclusion that inner life is a manifestation of nothing. Although the difficulty we have in penetrating our inner lives does not mean 'it is simply a manifestation of nothing' as long as our investigation is on the level of manifestness of things, entities and in general Beings. In this context, I think this a moderate claim that can be made.

as long as humans are not only beings with inner lives but beings within social, political, economic and psychological contexts and relations. By power metaphysics I mean an ontological investigation which takes beings in their manifestness and analyses different types of human interaction.[6] Humans will, desire with a great variety reasons, motives and they interact with each other in various social forms. So, I have realized that making the assertion that ineffable is a nothingly being would necessitate investigating the contextual tensions of the beingness of nothing. If it was possible in any way to claim that "there are no beingly beings and Being is Being homogenously in each and every occasion" this might bring a realm of possible answers to the question of "how do we as human beings relate to other beings?" How nothingly beings, that is how our inner lives, ineffables interact with each other was going to be the main topic of discussion at this part. And ultimately can one make the claim that while humans are beings of power which present hierarchies through value judgments; through likes and dislikes and so on this is not the "attitude" of Being, questioned ontologically.[7] Ultimately my purpose was

[6] This means that I take power metaphysics as a possible investigation that is against Cartesian metaphysics; the latter takes meaning-giving activities of humans as prior to manifestness of Being. So in this context, the usage of 'metaphysics' is meant as an investigation of being qua being in parallel to Heidegger's understanding of truth.

[7] What I mean here is while Being *is* just Being, humans seem to *power* Being. That is, again it seems to me humans' ontological conditions or to look at the issue from a Heideggerian point of view while Being encompasses the entirety of the manifestness of itself, humans are *being-there* by these totality of attitudes(including indifference) ,which I prefer to call power, to be. So my point is not to indicate a dichotomy but rather show that "as a being, humans seem to be beings of power" in their manifestness. Consequently I think the term "power" expresses the point I want to make about humans as beings and their relation to being in general as long as while "willing" might easily meant only the things humans desire; power signifies the "not doings, not makings" better as well as doings and makings. Additionally the term power allows me to give the rather hierarchical and value-making attributes of human beings. There are almost always "most importants, more importants, less importants and not importants at alls" for us. Although this is debatable, I presume our intentional nature that is our nature to be focused on this subject, or that entity, or so and so topic is a common attribute of humans (which is an idea mainly presented by phenomenologists such as Husserl). For example I think philosophical problems are more important than sports events. I also think chocolate flavor is better than strawberry flavor in terms of ice-creams. Our lives are full of this kind of "powerings of being." Nonetheless I presume my concept of "power metaphysics" could be refuted by a question such as "how power metaphysics is different than

to question the possibility of investigating the relation between a homogenous understanding of Being and beings of power (humans) while the homogeneity of Being is suggesting the non-hierarchical, non-categorical constitution of Being, power metaphysics is indicating the hierarchy-constituting attitude, hierarchy-making being of humans. My hope was to pose some questions which I guess is a good way to do or at least try to do philosophy. Nonetheless this was simply too much for a master thesis and I had to delimit the scope of my work. Consequently, I have tried to find a way of thinking, an idea that I was already embracing when I was presenting all these above mentioned claims.

With all this background in mind one might still ask "why Heidegger?" and "why Heideggerian understanding of truth?" Heidegger has dealt with the question of the meaning of Being in his studies and he has a rather destructive attitude towards philosophical orthodoxy that is constructed upon Cartesian metaphysics. The reason I chose the notion of truth is the importance of this concept for Heidegger's philosophy. I have found out thanks to Richard Capobianco's reading on the truth of Being in Heidegger that truth understood as unconcealment in Ancient Greek has the emphasis on the manifestness of Being instead of an understanding of Being that is constructed on a conscious subject's transcendental acts. In other words, according to Capobianco, Heidegger's understanding of truth irreducibly presupposes the structural priority of the

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the existentialia (the ontological structures that allows *Dasein* to be in a world and to relate to beings) of Heidegger which he talks about in *Being and Time?"* I think what differentiates power metaphysics from Heideggerian existentialia is that power metaphysics is built on the idea that humans are in part nothingly beings and this nothingly aspect of them is determinative in each and every relation they construct with other beings. I guess for the Heidegger of *Being and Time* as I shortly mentioned above although the notion of nothing is present, it is analyzed through the concept of *angst* (agony) that comes along with the realization of one's finitude, that is the fact that one is going to die eventually and therefore the concept of nothing is not as determinative as it is in power metaphysics.

manifestness of Being over our meaning-giving activities.[8] As long as my initial project was to develop a homogenous understanding of Being that defies the hierarchical structures of western metaphysics, Heidegger's conception of truth as unconcealedness was the plausible way to go.[9] After all, I have been deeply influenced by his ideas and my thoughts contain many aspects of his thinking. You might justifiably wonder as to why such a digressive introduction of the introduction is given. My humble aim in giving this seemingly irrelevant background is to show the reader that the discussion I will try to make in this study has the aim to approach the ontological framework of western philosophy in a critical way in order to construct a possible different analysis of the notion of nothing and therefore power relations constituted by humans.

Consequently, in this study I will evaluate Heidegger's understanding of truth throughout his work to make the claim that Heidegger's understanding of truth has a central importance in his philosophy of Being and his understanding of truth can be used to deflect certain criticisms which Heideggerian philosophy has encountered over the years.[10] In his works Heidegger attempted to overcome metaphysical thinking and I think a proper reading of Heidegger's understanding of truth can allow us to appreciate this attempt thoroughly. For Heidegger metaphysics is a mode of thinking that investigates 'B'eing instead of being.[11] This means that philosopher such as Plato and Aristotle questioned common and universal features of all beings. Concordantly

[8] By meaning-giving activities I think Capobianco refers mainly to sensation, perception and cognition which are the ontological sine qua non of Cartesian thought.

[9] I guess if Being is primordially homogenous, than we might question that the categorical and hierarchical approach; Neo-Platonist structures we encounter in the history of Western philosophy might be a projection of the human willing. Moreover throughout history of Western thought whether thinkers projected their own "hierarchizing attitudes" towards Being might be a question worthwhile to ask.

[10] I will shortly discuss this issue by referring to Herman Philipse's quietism criticism of Heidegger's understanding of technology in the final section.

[11] We will explain further this distinction between 'B'eing and being in our section on Capobianco as well.

metaphysics prioritized beings that are permanent and present over change that is brought forward by space and time. According to Heidegger metaphysical investigation did not only influenced western philosophy but western history and provided ground for the technological era that we live in. Although Heidegger embraced different perspectives towards metaphysics, in his later works which we elaborate in this study more heavily he was clearly critical about it. He thought we should "get over" metaphysics and be contemplative about the truth of Being.[12] Heidegger has a rich understanding of truth as *aletheia*, almost multifaceted one might say which he strongly related with the notions of freedom, art and technology. In accordance with Capobianco's reading of Heidegger, I argue ultimately that the ontological primordiality of the truth (unconcealedness) of Being is the definitive momentum in Heideggerian philosophy which indicates his approach to western metaphysics as well. For Heidegger Greek words and Greek experience of Being was a manifestation of this mode of unconcealedness which "structurally comes before our meaning-giving activities" as Capobianco would put it.[13] Heidegger, as we shall see, investigates many different Greek words in his studies with an emphasis on cultural context that the word was used in. This means that what Heidegger does with the Greek words is not simply an etymological treatment but rather an interpretation of the world in which the respective word emerged. This understanding of Heidegger is closely related to his take on aletheia as I will try to indicate. In parallel to Capobianco's reading of Heidegger I think

[12] Inwood M. *A Heidegger Dictionary*. p.126-128.

[13] In Greek, aletheia disclosedness, unconcealedness means disclosedness, unconcealedness, presence to somebody.' This means that in the Greek understanding as well, there is an observer to whom the observed being becomes present

I think that this aspect of aletheia in Greek does not undermine Heidegger's take on aletheia but rather affirms it. Heidegger does claim that Dasein has a specific relation to *Sein*, Being. However this does not mean that Dasein is the ontological reason of Being, the being-giver of Being as in the case of the Cartesian cogito. I thank Chryssi Sidiropoulou for her comments on this matter.

Unconcealedness *of Being* is *the truth of Being, the Being of Being* according to Heidegger. Moreover as I will try to explain in the following sections again following Capobianco's reading I think words such as *physis, aletheia, polis, hypokeimenon* had this primordial emphasis of unconcealedness, of manifestness for Heidegger. Thus one of the main claims I will try to substantiate in this thesis is that the primordiality of the manifestness of Being in Heidegger might allow us to appreciate his ideas on freedom, art and technology, better if not the entirety of his philosophy.

I think the charge of obscurantism against Heidegger's philosophy stems from a very metaphysical mindset and Capobianco's reading of Heidegger and acknowledging the centrality of truth as aletheia in the Heideggerian corpus might indicate the implausibility of this criticism.[14] I moreover defend that reading Heidegger in this way is a much more charitable reading than simply doom his philosophy to obscurantism. Capobianco claims that the core matter for Heidegger has always been Being and this did not change throughout his works.

Capobianco's Reading of Heidegger

In his book *Engaging Heidegger* Capobianco attempts to understand Heidegger as a whole and in order to accomplish such an end, he engages with many different works of Heidegger. Capobianco criticizes the readings of Heidegger which approaches his

[14] Obscurantsim in Heidegger is a critique notoriously brought up by Rudolph Carnap. In 1931 he criticized Heidegger's inaugural lecture *Was ist Metaphysik(What is Metaphysics)?* on the ground that sentences such as "Nothing nothings itself" are simply meaningless pseudosentences that violates logical grammar. For Carnap such pseudosentences are instances of metaphysical thinking as long as for him metaphysics produce propositions that violate verification principle. According to verification principle the truth of a sentence is based on how simple the words that contain the sentence are tested. Heidegger's take on this understanding of truth shall be introduced on the section 'Essencing Truth.' Philipse H. *Heidegger's Philosophy of Being*. p.10, 393.

philosophy from a Being-decentered point of view. Accordingly throughout his philosophy although certain inconsistencies and the focus of technical vocabulary changes Heidegger was always interested in one, ultimate, defining question: question of Being or in German *Seinsfrage.* Capobianco claims that contemporary analytic and postmodern readings of Heidegger devaluated the centrality of the word 'Being' in Heidegger studies and the fundamental matter for thought (*die Sache selbst*) was always Being in Heidegger.[15] Moreover it is important to make the distinction between Beyng (*Seyn*), Being itself (*Sein selbst*), Being as such (*Sein als solches*) and Being as Being (*Sein als Sein*) which were the names Heidegger give to his core matter of thinking with being as beingness (*Seiendheit*) which denotes the metaphysical approach towards Being. Admittedly in his career Heidegger used many different names to address the core matter of his thought but for Capobianco this in no way means that the focal point in his philosophy changed. Heidegger was simply trying to understand one, single topic which was Being:

> …*unconcealing* of beings (*aletheia*), the emerging of beings(*physis*), the *laying out* and *gathering* of beings(logos), the *unifying, unfolding* of beings(*hen*), the *presencing* of beings(*Anwesen*), the *lighting/clearing* of beings(*Lichtung*), the *freeing* of beings(*das Freie*);the *letting* of beings(*lassen*), the *giving* of beings(*Es gibt*),and the *appropriating or enowning* of beings(*Ereignis*). All of these names, and still others, say (*sagen*) and show (*zeigen*), in somewhat different ways, the primordial phenomenon. Or to put this in Heidegger's terms, all of these names are the Same (*das Selbe*), but not simply identical (*das Gleiche*) in an empty, purely formal, logical sense.[16]

[15] Capobianco gives example from Thomas Shehaan, Hurbert Dreyfus and Theodore Kisiel as they take *mitdasein*, Dasein' everyday coping activities and Dasein's factical thrown existence as the main issue of Heidegger's thought respectively. Capobianco R. *Heidegger's Truth of Being*. Catholic University of America. Washington D.C. September 2011. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LvlOxYocYwE.
As I said in the introduction part I will make the claim that Herman Philipse's reading of Being and Time could be read and refuted by the framework presented by Capobianco.

[16] Capobianco R. *Engaging Heidegger*. p.4.

Although it will take us the entire thesis to explicate Heidegger's understanding of Being, I think by looking at Capobianco's elaboration on the different names of Being in Heidegger we can easily indicate the definitive aspect of Heidegger's thinking. Each of the names indicates an ontological primordiality of, to use Capobianco's term, manifestness over humans meaning-giving activities. However this is not to say that what Heidegger attempted to accomplish in his entire philosophy to negate the subjectivist that is subject-centered ontology over objectivist ontology. For Heidegger the Greek experience of Being was vastly influential in his understanding of Being and quite determinative in the shaping of other approaches towards being throughout western metaphysics. As we will see in the later sections, the Greek experience of Being was not built on a dichotomy between objectivity and subjectivity for this distinction is presented through a Latinized form of Greek philosophy in later antiquity and Medieval philosophy. In the following sections we will also encounter some of these names and how they are related to Heidegger's understanding of freedom, art and technology.

In his paper *A Paradigm Shift in Heidegger Research* Thomas Sheehan alleges that Heidegger's newly English translated work *Contributions to Philosophy* causes a paradigm shift in Heidegger's philosophy and Being-question was never his main topic but rather his notion *Mitdasein* (co-openness) is.[17] However Capobianco rejects this view and claims: "No matter how many alternative formulations and poetic names Heidegger put into play over his lifetime to name Being-from *das Ereignis* to die

[17] Sheehan T. *A Paradigm Shift in Heidegger Research*. p. 183-202.

Lichtung- his core philosophical task was defined from beginning to end by the question of the originary, fundamental, unifying meaning of Being.[18]

Capobianco claims that Heidegger studies often confuse the main concern of Heidegger's philosophy. In order to avoid any misunderstandings between what Heideggerian take on being and metaphysical understanding of being, Being is written with a capital B when it is meant to indicate the Heideggerian sense of the word. Accordingly the traditional that is the metaphysical approach towards being is characterized by is-ness, whatness, 'sheer presence' or presentness of entities. This means metaphysical mode of thinking has a very specific temporal mode in its understanding of being. Universal, unchanging beings are prioritized over things with kinetic nature.[19] To clarify this issue we might think of Plato's theory of forms in which forms are regarded as the primary, unchanging, atemporal, universal sources of temporal, changing, perceptual/sensual entities. For Heidegger Platonic understanding of forms is a paradigmatic example of metaphysical approach towards being. In this approach what matters is how 'present' the things are, how resistant they are against temporality which is constructed on a linear mentality.[20]

Capobianco does not finish his categorization of different types of being by simply differentiating the metaphysical understanding of being from Heideggerian understanding of Being. For Heidegger, Capobianco suggests there is another mode of

[18] Capobianco R. *Engaging Heidegger*. p.7.
[19] By 'kinetic nature' I mean' *the presencing and absencing of beings'* instead of *presentness of beings* which denotes a resistance towards time as we see in Plato and Platonically influenced metaphysical theories. Capobianco R. *Heidegger's Truth of Being*. Catholic University of America. Washington D.C. September 2011. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LvlOxYocYwE.
[20] By this I mean time is regarded as a process from past to future and present has always had an ontological superiority over the other past and future according to Heidegger's reading of metaphysical understanding of time.

being that is equally important: Dasein. Dasein indicates "the human being as the ek-sisting, ek-static 'there' of Being; the being that corresponds (Gr., *legein/noein; homolegein*) to Being by letting beings be meaningfully in language (*die Sprache*). Dasein and Being are cor-relative and co-disclosive."[21] I think here we can see the primordiality of manifestness of things over our meaning-giving activities as long as Dasein is simply part of this manifestness but not the maker of it as a Cartesian subject; it is there and it is ek-static in its ontological constitution. That is Dasein is 'out there', in relation with beings other than itself.

After showing all the different names Heidegger used to address Being, Capobianco elaborates on different works of Heidegger, mostly later works to indicate that question of Being and therefore the meaning of Being was his core concern throughout his philosophy. In Le Thor seminars Heidegger constantly emphasizes that the core matter of his thinking was Being all along and this never changed. In 1969 Heidegger comments on his notorious turning *(die Kehre)* in his thinking:

> The thinking that proceeds after Being and Time, in that it gives up the word 'meaning of Being' in favor of 'truth of Being,' henceforth emphasizes the openness of Being itself, rather than openness of Dasein in regard to this openness of Being. This signifies 'the turn' (*die Kehre*) in which thinking always more decidedly turns to Being as Being.

This shift in Heidegger's philosophy is not to be understood as a metaphysical one. As we will see even in the section on *Being and Time* Heidegger has a pre-metaphysical understanding of truth based on the Greek word *aletheia* (unconcealedness).Capobianco thinks that for Heidegger the distinction between truth of Being and meaning of Being does not signify a radical change in Heidegger's thinking but rather a reconstruction of

[21] Capobianco R. *Engaging Heidegger*. p.9.

the core matter of his thought and a deepening of his thought. Heidegger simply realized the word 'meaning' was so loaded with subjectivist connotations(the kind of philosophy that prioritizes meaning-giving activities, or take meaning-giving activities as the starting point of philosophizing) so that the 'manifestness of Being' could not be properly clarified.[22] In other words, by changing his focus from the meaning of Being to truth of Being, "Heidegger was indeed only drawing out more fully his own fundamental insight that had been there all along."[23] For Capobianco, Heideggerian notion of meaning is to be understood as a response to Being by Dasein. So in Heideggerian terms, meaning does not indicate a performance or achievement of transcendentalist subjectivity."[24]

Capobianco therefore suggests that the main point of Le Thor seminars is *Being itself, Being as Being*. As Capobianco says: "…for Heidegger, *to eon*, Being names the unitary and unifying (*hen*, *das Eine*), temporal-spatial (*Ereignis*, *Lichtung*, *Gegnet)*, finite, negative (*a-letheia*), appearing/emerging/arising (*physis*) of beings in their beingness."[25]

While Capobianco discusses the notion of *Ereignis* in detail, I will try to expand on the Greek word aletheia with the intention of making a similar point; for in Heidegger's philosophy Being is addressed in many different names. I will initially elaborate on

[22] In *Metaphysics* theta ten Aristotle makes the claim that there are ways of speaking of Being: as categories, as the potentiality and actuality of these categories and as truth. For Capobianco this was the gist of Heidegger's core matter of thought; Being qua truth that is Being as aletheia, as manifestness. Capobianco R. *Heidegger's Truth of Being*. Catholic University of America. Washington D.C. September 2011. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LvlOxYocYwE.

[23] Ibid. As a matter of fact Capobianco makes the point that even in the course lectures given in 1920s Heidegger repeatedly emphasized that the proper locus of truth is the Being itself is its manifestness; and we take part both in the Being's unconcealment and its concealment.

[24] As Capobianco summarizes "…Only insofar as there is Being is there meaning." Ibid.

[25] Capobianco R. *Engaging Heidegger*. p.142.

Heidegger's analysis of truth in *Being and Time* and then I will explicate some core ideas of Heidegger from his course lecture *Parmenides* to clarify the Heideggerian take on Greek experience of Being and modern philosophy. Afterwards I will focus *On the Essence of Truth* which is regarded as the landmark of the turn (*die Kehre*) and then I will explain the account of truth that is presented after the turn in *Origin of the Work of Art* and *The Question Concerning Technology* in order to indicate the difference he made on the concept of truth and to appreciate his ideas on freedom, art and modern technology in relation to the concept of truth.

Throughout Heidegger's career the conception of truth and Being were always closely related to each other. The attempt to understand Heidegger's take on truth inevitably requires delving in into his ontology. As all great philosophers, his ideas caused great debate among philosophical community. His political affiliations are undoubtedly disturbing and how much one should regard Heidegger's political ideas related with his philosophical questions is yet to be answered. Personally, I think the relation between Heidegger's Nazism and his later thought is more intriguing inasmuch as we encounter a different Heidegger in some sense in the later works. In this study I will not engage Heidegger's political affiliations in connection to his philosophy of Being although as I said, this is a very intriguing subject.

As I said the reason that I chose Heidegger to analyze the concept of truth is that both the fundamental ontology he constructs in *Being and Time* and his theory of epochs which he developed in his later works allows us to look at western metaphysics in a

critical way which is also what I intend to do through power metaphysics.[26] In his inaugural lecture in 1929 entitled, *What is Metaphysics?* Heidegger asserts that "every metaphysical question encompasses the whole range of metaphysical problems."[27] I suggest that the readers should keep this idea in mind while reading this thesis. From time to time, Heidegger might seem as if he is making no sense in his sentences or sometimes revolves around the same issue over and over again. However, for Heidegger every metaphysical discussion encompasses the entirety of metaphysical problems. In the following sections of the thesis, Heidegger's understanding of the concepts freedom, thing, art and technology will be introduced. Moreover we will see how these different concepts are strongly connected and how making a discussion about one of it almost necessitates to make a discussion about the other. At the end as Capobianco suggests as well truth of Being as manifestness will be a unifying term in appreciating our presentation of different works of Heidegger.

Moreover, Heidegger is a philosopher who is unique in his style as well as in his thinking. As I mentioned earlier many scholars criticized him for being deliberately obscure, even unintelligible and yet as we will see in this thesis, studying Heidegger inescapably makes one question various branches of philosophy from ontology to ethics, from epistemology to philosophy of religion. As long as he tries to overturn Western Metaphysics and insofar as he presents an analysis of the core vocabulary that has been

[26] By power metaphysics I do not mean a Heideggerian sort of investigation but rather a type of investigation that can use Heidegger's understanding of truth (unconcealedness) of Being. Moreover Heidegger as a philosopher who is very critical of metaphysical thinking, especially in his later works would not accept a type of 'metaphysics.' My intention in using the word 'metaphysics' is to indicate that power metaphysics is an ontological investigation that accepts Aristotle's definition, investigation of being qua being.' I presume that such an investigation on the basis of the idea of truth, manifestness of Being might lead to an idea of the being of nothing as long as nothing is also a concept, a term, an experience that is manifested to us.

[27] Heidegger M. *Basic Writings: What is Metaphysics?* p.93.

used in most of the prominent metaphysical works in the entirety of Western thinking until his time, such as cause, thing, freedom Heidegger can be read as a challenge to the way we are used to doing philosophy. Also Heidegger's philosophy could be read as an attempt to bring forth new ways of looking at philosophical concepts in order to pave new paths of thought.[28] And finally it is important to keep in mind that our purpose is neither to make a historiographical point (Greek aletheia should be read as such and such) nor to undermine Heidegger's theory of epochs in its totality but to understand Heidegger's analysis of truth so that keeping in mind the concealed part of the thesis to ask the question "Can manifestness of Being, can truth of Being be resonating throughout the destining epochs and if so what kind of critique of Western philosophy could be pursued accordingly?"[29]Our purpose then is to ask a question.

[28] It's important to note that my intention in the conclusion part is not to conclude anything but rather try to concretize the questions I asked in this section to understand whether a connection could be built between Heideggerian ontology and onto-homogenous understanding of Being.

[29] After all such criticisms have been brought against Heidegger's understanding of truth which does not accept the understanding of aletheia primarily as uncoveredness, unconcealedness. Friedlander claimed that it is not clear whether *alethes* comes from *a-* and *lanthanein* and even if it does, Homer and Hesiod hardly uses that meaning of aletheia. There are three main senses: the correctness of speech and belief(epistemological); the reality of Being(ontological); the genuineness, truthfulness and conscientiousness of an individual or character(existential). Inwood M. A Heidegger Dictionary. p.14.

CHAPTER 2

GENERAL DISCOURSE OF BEING AND TIME

In his magnum opus *Being and Time*, Heidegger contends that due to the forgetfulness that is *caused* by the mode of thinking Western Metaphysics brought fore, the question of Being (*Seinsfrage*) is forgotten. Heidegger presents a critique of modern philosophy and claims that modern philosophy is enrooted in a metaphysical mode of thinking and claims that modern philosophy has a tendency to treat human beings as if they are objects like any other. In parallel to this, Heidegger thinks that because of this way of looking at humans, the question of Being has been forgotten and we simply have forgotten to pose the primordial question, the question of Being. Heidegger thinks modern philosophy is ontologically insufficient because it is stuck with the humanism of classical anthropology which takes man either as the image of God or as a rational animal.[30]For Heidegger, humanism is an idea that takes man as the rational being among other beings and it is exclusively concerned with 'b'eings rather than Being and its relation to Dasein. This means that for Heidegger humanism is metaphysics.[31] Moreover Heidegger associates his understanding of humanism with anthropology which is mainly relating with the world in an object-like manner.[32] So Heidegger thinks anthropology is

[30] Glendinning S. *On Being with Others*. p.45.

[31] "Every humanism is either grounded in a metaphysics or is itself made to be the ground for one. Every determination of man that already presupposes an interpretation of beings without asking about the truth of Being, whether knowingly or not, is metaphysical." Heidegger M. *Letter On Humanism*. p.225, 226.

[32] As Michael Inwood has it "humanism fails to recognize that man is not only one being among others, but the being that opens up a WORLD, or beings as a whole in the first place. For humanism, man is the spoilt child who thinks all the toys in the shop are for him. For Heidegger, man is the entrepreneur who founded and sustains the toyshop by resisting the temptation to consume its contents. Inwood. M. *A Heidegger Dictionary.* p. 101,102.

a humanist investigation that prioritizes the human perspective, and similar to Cartesian ontology disregards the primordiality of the manifestness of Being.

Heidegger thinks this humanistic approach towards man causes philosophical problems to be epistemologized and subject-object dualism becomes the paradigmatic approach towards philosophical problems. As Glendinning says: "With the subject/object dualism, philosophy takes on a characteristically epistemological orientation." Henceforth the fundamental problem of philosophy is the problem of the transcendence of the human 'subject.'[33] For Heidegger, once the object-subject dichotomy is built philosophy becomes a matter of investigating "how can a proximally isolated and worldless subject reach beyond itself into realms which are other and external."[34]

In opposition to modern philosophy's objectifying attitude towards man Heidegger addresses man as Dasein. However Dasein is not simply identical to man. As Glendinning says:

> …'Dasein' is not simply another name for man or human being or person, but re-inscribes within an ontologically appropriate setting what is named by, but misconceived in, the discourses with those other names. That is, 'Dasein 'is defined as that entity for which its own Being is 'not a matter of difference' to it-and whose characteristic tendency is to *misinterpret* its own being…[35]

Heidegger tries to present an analysis of the ontological structures that allow Dasein to be in a world and to relate to beings. Consequently there are two main different modes that allow Dasein to relate to beings; objective presence (*Vorhandenheit*) and handiness

[33] Glendinning S. *On Being with Others*. p.46.
[34] Ibid., p.46.
[35] Ibid., p.47.

(*Zuhandenheit*). While objective presence indicates the relation that is constructed through the vocabulary of four types of causes, handiness refers to the ways of relation humans engage in on the basis of using and producing. Therefore one of the main arguments of *Being and Time* is that objective presence is a secondary mode of relating to beings which is built on handiness and throughout western metaphysics objective presence has always been prioritized over handiness. For Heidegger this act of prioritization has resulted in the forgetfulness of the question of Being.

The Analysis of Truth in Being and Time

In the section, *Dasein Disclosedness and Truth* Heidegger first discusses the traditional ways of understanding of truth and then he tries to deconstruct the primordial meaning of truth. He begins by quoting from Parmenides in order to indicate that truth and Being have been associated in the history of Western philosophy for a long time: *to gar auto noein estin te kai einai ; for thought and being are the same thing*[36]. Accordingly Parmenides was in a way forced to attend, to hearken that which showed itself in itself.[37] Likewise Aristotle defines philosophy as the science of truth. Right after this presentation of the strong link between truth and Being we see Heidegger claiming that the truth that is talked about in ancient texts is not simply signifying things (*Sache*).[38] I think this is rather telling inasmuch as in the following sections where we expand on Later Heidegger's understanding of truth, this awareness of the truth as something that "compels" and something that "shows itself" will be a prominent Leitmotiv. However,

[36] Heidegger M. *Being and Time*. p.196.
[37] Even here, in later Heidegger the primordiality of manifestness of Being is visible. This motive will also be mentioned in Heidegger's treatment of Parmenides and the issue of the claim of Being.
[38] Heidegger M. *Being and Time*. , p.197.

Early Heidegger tends to substantiate his claims through focusing on his perception of Dasein. We shall also talk about this distinction in the following sections.

Heidegger continues his investigation by asking the question whether indeed truth and Being are strongly connected and if they are connected what is the relation between this connection and his method fundamental ontology as the analytic of Dasein. Heidegger professes that through an elaboration on the traditional conception of truth, the primordial ontological foundations of truth can be unraveled. To him, there are three main conceptions of the essence of truth in traditional philosophy:

1. The "locus" of truth is the proposition (judgment).
2. The essence of truth lies in the "agreement" of the judgment with its objects.
3. Aristotle, the father of logic, attributed truth to judgment as its primordial locus, he also started the definition of truth as judgment.[39]

According to Heidegger, these traditional accounts of truth has transformed in various versions throughout Western thinking. As a matter of fact, the Aristotelian idea that experience of the soul is *homoiosis* and for Heidegger this assimilation between representations and things is not intended as the essential definition of truth. Consequently what was represented by the word *homoiosis* in the Greek context turned into *adequatio* in the Latin world and therefore correspondence in modern philosophy. Still, as Heidegger points out there are several ways of relating and not every relation is a correspondence and more importantly in medieval terms how *intellectus* and *res* can be related if they are not of the same species is a question yet to be answered. This question has been asked and is still being asked in epistemological investigations. However Heidegger is rather hesitant to find an epistemological solution to this tension between

[39] Ibid., p.198.

intellectus and *res*. In his words "*How is the relation between an ideal being and a real thing objectively present to be grasped ontologically*?"[40]

Heidegger questions the nature of the concept of agreement. What does it mean for two different things to be in agreement with each other? Apparently agreement is a kind of relation but then again there are different types of relations and not all kinds of relations are apt to be called as agreement. "Agreement has the relational character of "with regard to."[41] Here we encounter a "sense (with regard to)" of agreement. Heidegger offers an example from numbers to explain this. The number 6 agrees with 16 minus 10 but in some specific sense, namely equality. So in what sense *intellectus* and *res* agree with each other? According to the traditional view what is true is knowledge and knowledge is judging but again, the nature of this correspondence that somehow connects two types of different entities remains hidden.

Heidegger attempts to unravel the "sense" of the ontological nature of the relation between representations and things and reaches the idea that a sort of discovering has to be operative for one to know something. When we know something we know it because the thing, being itself, is opened to us. When I endow a set of meaning to a certain object, this act of setting a meaning cannot be accomplished without the being itself allowing itself to be discovered. Therefore for Heidegger the propositional understanding of truth is grounded by this being-discovering. Heidegger finishes this part of the discussion by concluding that this discovering can only be possibly on the ground of being-in-the-world.

[40] Ibid., p.200.
[41] Ibid., p.199.

In his investigation of the *Primordial Phenomenon of Truth and the Derivative Character of the Traditional Concept of Truth*, Heidegger points out that the Greek word aletheia which is translated as truth most of the time has a very specific meaning. The word aletheia derives from the negation of the verb *lanthanein* which means being overlooked, going unnoticed. Therefore for Heidegger taking correspondence as the fundamental meaning of truth is not appropriate. As he sees it, the tradition that translates the word aletheia solely as truth is simply overlooking the pre-philosophical meaning of aletheia. However, it is important to point out that when Heidegger mentions "pre-philosophical" use of a term, he means the use of a word before metaphysical thinking dominated the world of thought.[42] We will see this in his course lecture on Parmenides as well when he argues that for the Presocratic thinkers the meanings of the words they used in their works were very similar or if not similar simply the same with the daily usage of the words in antiquity before we arrive to the time of Plato.

After establishing the meaning of truth first as discovering (discovering of Dasein) and then unconcealedness, Heidegger emphasizes that disclosedness of the world is the most primordial sense of truth which Dasein as discoveredness is based on and therefore propositional truth is based on Dasein as discoveredness. Here we encounter a decisive Heideggerian idea which will come across in the later works as well: Dasein is "*in the truth.*"[43] By this Heidegger means that in the disclosedness or, as Capobianco puts it, in the manifestness of things, Dasein is a part of manifestness and manifested.

[42] Ibid., p.202.
[43] Ibid., p.203.

According to Heidegger the statement Dasein is in the truth can be summarized in these ways:

1. *Disclosedness in general* belongs essentially to the constitution of being of Dasein…the being of Dasein and its disclosedness belong equiprimordially to the discoveredness of innerworldly beings.
2. *Thrownness* belongs to the constitution of being of Dasein as a constituent of its disclosedness.
3. *Project* belongs to the constitution of being of Dasein: disclosive being toward its own potentiality- of-being.
4. *Falling prey* belongs to the constitution of being of Dasein…Beings are not completely concealed, but precisely discovered, and at the same time distorted. They show themselves, but in the mode of illusion. Similarly, what was previously discovered sinks back again into disguise and concealment. *Because it essentially falls prey to the world, Dasein is in untruth in accordance with its constitution of being.*[44]

So Heidegger thinks that to profess that Dasein is in the truth also, in his words, equiprimordially means to claim that Dasein is also ontologically in untruth. In my view, this idea of being both in truth and untruth although with subtle differences is a motivation in Heidegger that is visible in his later works as well. As a matter of fact Heidegger thinks this is the exact reason why Parmenides was presented with two paths by the goddess; aletheia discovering and concealment are two states of Dasein that indicate its being in both in truth and untruth.

Heidegger therefore summarizes the two main conclusions that arise from his existential and ontological analysis of the phenomenon of truth:

1. Truth in the most primordial sense is the disclosedness of Dasein to which belongs the discoveredness of innerworldly beings.
2. Dasein is equiprimordially in truth and untruth.[45]

[44] Ibid., pp.203, 204.
[45] Ibid., p.205.

Moreover, Heidegger alleges that the propositional understanding of truth was never defended by Aristotle as the primordial meaning of truth. The double possibility of truth which is being capable of being both the unconcealment and concealedness in Dasein's comportments was the truth of logos and Aristotle never identified truth with pure thought. Heidegger emphasizes that the centrality of the meaning of truth definitely does not lie in its propositional nature. On the other hand the propositional mode of truth is based on the discovering mode of Dasein and Dasein's being-in-the-world. By connecting truth with the structures that allow Dasein to be in the world Heidegger makes an even more intriguing argument: "Understood in its primordial sense, truth belongs to the fundamental constitution of Dasein."[46] Now let's try to elaborate what this means.

In Heidegger's view, inasmuch as Dasein is *essentially* in the truth, we cannot make the claim that the law of gravity, any law of contradiction or any physical law was not before there was Dasein to discover them in their disclosedness. This means before Dasein, there was no truth. I presume one might argue that what Heidegger tries to say here is not simply phenomenological but phenomenalist as well.[47] In the following

[46] Ibid., p.208.

[47] By phenomenalism I mean the reductionist attitude that perception and cognition is the only and ultimate source humans' meaning-giving activities; the idea that no matter what we experience we experience 'as humans' and this is the limit of human experience. That is in phenomenalist framework experience is the ontological source of everything we give meaning to; so everything that is given meaning by humans are constructed by humans. On the other hand by phenomenology I mean the idea that although 'experiencing things as human' is a limitation of human experience, the ontological origin of the very experience is not human made and therefore the meaning of this origin is not human made and experienced as an entity. So by 'phenomenalism' I do not mean the epistemological theory that limits everything to phenomena but rather I intend to indicate the idea that takes the thinking subject as the exclusive producer of beings and moreover rejects the manifestness of Being. As I will expand on in the following pages I think Heidegger's understanding of truth (aletheia) and truth as the ontological foundation of first worldliness then Dasein's discovering activities could be taken as an example of the phenomenological attitude.

sections we will try to compare this idea with Heidegger's later account of truth in order to understand whether this is indeed the case. However, even in his earlier period we can see how Heidegger criticizes metaphysical understanding of temporality by developing a new or, rather, by remembering a forgotten account of truth. If Dasein is indeed in the essence of truth, then eternal truths can only be *proven* as long as Dasein's eternity can be proven. Here we encounter a critique of universalism and most probably a critique of Platonism that is presented through the fundamental ontology Heidegger tries to explicate in his study. So for Heidegger Dasein is a radically temporal being and it is not exclusively relate to beings on the level of objective presence. Objective presence has been imposed as the paradigmatic way of relating to beings by western metaphysicians and the universalist notion of truth (the notion of truth that is determined by presentness of correspondence instead of kinesis of the world) is a derivative one in the sense that it is based on unconcealedness of the world rather than correspondence.

After making the claim that if a radically temporal being such as Dasein which is not simply limited by the objective presence that is imposed on our ways of thinking by western metaphysicians is essentially in the truth then the idea of a truth that is based on a universalist paradigm is a derivative one. Heidegger mentions that what he is trying to say here is in no way a defense of subjectivist relativism, namely because there was no truth before there was Dasein everything is shaped and came into existence according to Dasein's arbitrary will. Heidegger argues that it is the discovering comportment that lets being to be disclosed and this is not a matter of Dasein's arbitrary act of meaning-giving.

In parallel to the idea of truth as concealedness, Heidegger questions the reason for the presupposition of truth. He asserts it is because of the truth that Dasein is in the truth:

"We do not presuppose truth, but *truth* makes it ontologically possible that we can *be* in such a way that we "presuppose" something. Truth first *makes possible* something like presupposition. I think that here we can see what Capobianco is arguing about the entirety of the Heideggerian corpus. Manifestness, unconcealedness as truth has a primordiality for Dasein in order to presuppose something. Unconcealedness of things, *including Dasein,* makes it possible to give meaning to things and to relate to them, again including other Dasein. Therefore, the presupposition of truth is inescapable insofar as Dasein's own being is because of Dasein's comportment to truth: "We have to "make" the presupposition of truth because it is already "made" with the being of the "we." On these grounds I think Heidegger is not a phenomenalist. Heidegger does not reduce the world Dasein experiences to meaning-giving activities. For him After all, the world's disclosedness allows Dasein as discoveredness to *be*.

Heidegger reinforces his point by making a reference to the skeptical arguments that simply are incapable of appreciating Heidegger's claim on truth: "A skeptic can no more be refuted than the being of truth can ever be "proved." If the skeptic, who denies the truth, factically is, he does *not even need* to be refuted." This is to say for a skeptic to doubt truth would amount to denying the very existence, very Dasein of herself and this is simply impossible insofar as a "questioning" is being made as a Dasein. Unconcealedness as the primordial meaning of truth is not a matter of presupposition and therefore it cannot be a matter of argumentation. For Heidegger there is nothing to prove here.[48] The propositional understanding of truth, as we have mentioned already is based on the discoveredness of Dasein and discoveredness of Dasein is built on

[48] When we expand on Heidegger's understanding of certainty through expanding on the transformation of the aletheia in Western philosophy in the next section, this point on 'proving' will become clearer.

unconcealedness. It is important to point out that what Heidegger does here is in no way to construct a foundationalist account of truth. This is why he always emphasizes the equiprimordiality of truth and untruth. As we will see in the analysis we offer in the following sections the idea of certainty which is founded on a Latinized mentality is not operative in the Heideggerian understanding of truth.[49] For Heidegger the being of truth is in a primordial connection with Dasein and "Being and truth "are" equiprimordially."

[49] By 'Latinized' Heidegger means the mode of thinking that is based on the manifestness of things that started to transform to a subject based, proto-Cartesian mode of thinking. According to Heidegger the word aletheia transformed into *veritas* in the Latin world. While aletheia is not fundamentally something connected to correspondence and therefore something opened to refutation, veritas is primarily about correspondence and therefore something open to refutation.

CHAPTER 3

PARMENIDES COURSE LECTURE

In the winter semester of 1942-1943, Heidegger gave a lecture course on Parmenides and Heraclitus in which I think he presents many of his core ideas about modern philosophy, the Greek world and experience of Being and aletheia. In this section I will summarize some of the ideas presented in this course lecture in order to give a sense of later Heidegger's approach to truth as unconcealedness.

In the beginning of the lecture Heidegger makes a distinction between knowing and essential knowing. According to it knowing is used as "being acquainted with something and its qualities."[50] This type of knowing is based on the handiness of things, their usability and constitutes itself on the paradigm of "mastering." For Heidegger this type of knowing is violating being through constantly surpassing it. On the other hand essential knowing indicates an attitude directed towards the ground of Being. In Heidegger's own words essential knowing "intends Being." This means essential knowing is not based on cognitive mastering and therefore dominating things as we see in scientific ways of relating to things. On the contrary essential knowing is rather an attitude that does not subjugate being and it is a "thoughtful heedfulness" which does not dissect being on the paradigm of attributes and on the basis of usability.[51] Heidegger continues his claim by saying in this attentive mode and in a holistic way of thinking we encounter/realize the claim of Being, which is out of the context of objectivity. Without

[50] As we shall see, the heuristic mode of knowing will be visible in the beginning of his lecture *Question Concerning Technology.*

[51] Approaching things on the framework of usability is a subject which will be further expanded on in the sixth section.

the claim of Being thinking would be empty and Parmenides' knowledge of his propositions would be unjustified.[52]

According to Heidegger when we read Parmenides' poem *On Nature,* the goddess of truth is not a *representation* of truth but rather "the truth-itself-is the goddess."[53] This means that there are no two separate things in the poem one is truth and the other is the goddess that represents it. Truth is experienced as goddess. For Heidegger this common Greek feature of taking divinities as identical to their manifestations seems strange to us because we normalized separating the mythical aspects of a work from its logos (reason, rational) aspects. We tend to focus on the system of a thinker, in this case the didactic aspects of Parmenides' poem.

After maintaining the identity of *mythos* and *logos* in pre-Platonic times Heidegger points out that the literal meaning of aletheia is unconcealedness.[54] However, for Heidegger mere literal translation does not amount to really translating. Translating requires being transported to the experience of the respective context, history and society in this case unconcealedness as experienced by Greeks.[55] Nonetheless, what modern philosophers understood from truth stemmed from the Latin word *certitudo* is substantially different from the Greek experience of aletheia. Accordingly, "Descartes stamps the essence of veritas" as certainty. This was not the Greek way of experiencing

[52] Martin H. *Parmenides*. p.4.
[53] Ibid., p.5.
[54] For Heidegger the attempt to try to understand mythos with the help of mythology that is form a modern point of view; mythos as story is "a procedure equivalent to drawing water with the aid of a sieve…mythos-ical is the disclosure and concealment contained in the disclosing-concealing word, which is the primordial appearance of the fundamental essence of Being itself. The terms death, night, day, the earth, and the span of the sky name the essential modes of disclosure and concealment."
[55] Martin H. *Parmenides*. p.11.

aletheia: "Anything resembling the self-certitude of the self-conscious subject is alien to Greeks."[56] So from a Heideggerian point of view, it does not make sense to read the Greek world from a Cartesian point of view. Nonetheless this does not mean that for Heidegger the Greeks were purely and perfectly ontological in their philosophy and in their experience of Being. After all, for Heidegger, metaphysical mode of thinking stemmed in antiquity as well. Capobianco summarizes one of the seminars Heidegger gave in Le Thor in 1969:

> …the originary Greek experience of a being was as *phenomenon,* pure appearing or 'what shows itself from itself.' In the most fundamental sense, a being is 'pure phenomenon' that is 'named' or made manifest in language by the human being. But when naming becomes 'making a proposition,' a being becomes the about-which-something-is-said; a being becomes (in the Greek) *hypokeimenon,* the subject of predication (or the subject of attributes). In modern philosophy, as in Kant's philosophy, 'phenomenon' is narrowed further to mean a mental 'object' for a 'subject.' Heidegger sums up this difference simply: 'For the Greeks, things appear. For Kant, things appear to me'…The Greek philosophers were 'compelled to ask to question concerning what is present *as* what is present [Anwesenden als Anwesenden].' But even among the Greeks, this question soon devolved into the fundamental metaphysical question about 'the being of beings'…The Greek thinkers, who in their attentiveness were 'more Greek than Greeks,' had a glancing insight into Being *as Being,* Being as *Aletheia,* Being as *Logos*..[57]

Heidegger defines phenomenon as something that shows itself from itself. That is, phenomena are present unthematically in our everyday experience inasmuch as we do not think about substantiality and accidentality in our everyday experience. For Heidegger we hardly ever focus on this ontological background of universalities, namely spatiality, temporality. However, they are present and without these ontological features we cannot relate to entities. In other words, the universalities are present

[56] Ibid., p.19.
[57] Capobianco R. *Engaging Heidegger*. pp.17, 18.

unthematically; because we do not focus on them normally and they are the ground of the meaning of the phenomena.[58] Here I think that we can see the emphasis on 'manifestness' as 'showing itself' in parallel to Capobianco's reading. For Heidegger self-showing is the primary meaning of phenomenon.

Furthermore Heidegger claims that the determination that humans are a rational animal which stemmed from Greek antiquity is generally interpreted either on the basis of later antiquity and the Roman Empire or modern times. Nonetheless the idea "*zoon logon echon*" does not primordially signify the life of a rational being but rather a being which "emerges from itself, and within this emerges in such a way that in this emerging (*physis*), and for it, it has the word.[59] Here we see again Heidegger is emphasizing the meaning of a determination through the manifestness, the being of the subject matter before its metaphysically oriented connotations. Accordingly, "zoon" taken in the biological sense is a metaphysical outcome, interpretation of the words. Primordially *zoon logon echon* emphasizes "a being whose Being is determined by *physis*, by emergence and self-opening."[60] So, in the framework of Greek experience of Being human's manifestness is the determinative aspect of Being.

[58] Heidegger M. *Being and Time*. p.25.
[59] Heidegger M. *Parmenides*. p.68.
[60] Ibid., p.68.

CHAPTER 4

ESSENCING TRUTH

In his celebrated paper, *On the Essence of Truth,* Heidegger tries to unravel what we do understand by truth, what are the derivative meanings of truth and ultimately what truth essentially is. Initially we encounter an analysis of truth that is quite similar to the one we have explained in *Being and Time*. Yet, the more we penetrate the text we find that Heidegger is putting forward a notion of truth that is fundamentally connected to his idea of freedom. In this thesis we also see that the term Dasein is elaborated upon and concepts such as 'mystery' and 'clearing' (*Lichtung*) are used. Arguably, Heidegger is changing the way he philosophizes on the same question he has already focused on *Being and Time*: *Seinsfrage*.

At the very beginning of his paper, he points out that there are indeed several modes, kinds of truth and what he is going to focus on will be the very essence that makes all kinds of truth truth in each and every instance. Clearly there is an understanding of truth that is constructed by common sense; however for Heidegger commonsense is clearly not the standard of philosophy as long as commonsensical views have certain apathy towards the language of philosophy. In parallel to the misunderstandings we got used to in our daily life about the notion of truth Heidegger concludes the introduction section with a questioning which resembles Meno's paradox: "…But in calling for the actual "truth" we must already know that truth as such means. Or do we know this only by

"feeling" and "in a general way"? But is not such vague "knowing" and our indifference regarding it more desolate than sheer ignorance of the essence of truth?"[61]

Heidegger, similar to the way he expanded on *Being and Time* claims there are three meanings of the usual concept of truth: Truth as actuality which means truth is the thing that corresponds to what is actual, what is actually present. Truth as the opposite of semblance which amounts to a kind of originality in opposition to an imitation: true leather instead of artificial leather and truth as the attributes of statements, as the opposite of falsity. For example, the statement "these words signify an example for the explanation of Heidegger's account of truth" is true in opposition to "these words are about the nature of orange juice." Accordingly, we encounter two different accounts of accordance in the traditional understanding of truth: truth as the correspondence between the statement and its object in a proposition and truth as matter. Heidegger thinks this account of truth became dominant due to Aquinas' formula: *veritas est adequatio intellectus ad rem.* For Heidegger the idea of a correspondence either between mind (intellect) and matter or between statement and matter is theological in its origin:

> …In order to recognize this we must trace the usual formula for the ordinary concept of truth back to its most recent (i.e. medieval) origin. *Veritas* as *adequatio rei ad intellectum* does not imply the later transcendental conception of Kant- possible only on the basis of the subjectivity of man's essence- that "objects conform to our knowledge." Rather it implies the Christian theological belief that, with respect to what it is and whether it is, a matter, as created (ens creatum), is only insofar it corresponds to the idea preconceived in the *intellectus divinus*., i.e., in the mind of God, and thus measures up to the idea(is correct) and in this sense is "true." The *intellectus humanus* too is *ens creatum*. As a capacity bestowed upon many by God, it must satisfy its idea.[62]

[61] Heidegger M. *Basic Writings. On the Essence of Truth*. p.116.
[62] Ibid., p.118.

This means that in the medieval context, for something to exist it has to be thought by God. For Heidegger the idea of correspondence was rooted in an idea of correspondence with God's thought in which God is regarded as the paradigmatic being-giver. However this is not the end of the story. Heidegger claims this idea of correspondence can also be supplied with the exchange of God with a world order. The correspondence between world order and things is what we call "logical" for Heidegger. In this case, God as the ground of the correspondents is dethroned by reason. Accordingly concepts have "rational essences" which allow them to be in accord with reason.

Heidegger claims that the traditional account of truth either theologically or rationally conceptualized, excludes untruth, which is seen as falsity with regard to the essence of truth. That is to say, the traditional concept of truth is constructed in such a way that non-accordance is taken as an expression of falsity and the exact opposite of truth. In the following sections, Heidegger defies this understanding of untruth as the very opposite of truth and as alien to the essence of truth. We shall also see this subject come to the fore again and again in the following works of Heidegger.

In the next section, *The Inner Possibility of Accordance* Heidegger continues digging the foundation of the essence of truth. He mentions that there are several instances of accordance and yet none of them are adequate to give us a satisfactory ground for the essence of truth; The statement the coin is round can be in accordance however, the statement is not made of round-like properties or it does not have anything to do with roundness. Here Heidegger points out that it is rather the relational character that determines the essence of the accordance instead of its propositional attributes as long as no proposition shares a commonality with the thing it is related. In these relations we

encounter a presenting (in our example the presenting of the coin) which we comport ourselves to. Therefore things are in opening that is somehow structured by comportment. This is to say, when things appear to us, they always appear to us "in a context, with a set of meanings." I think Heidegger conceptualizes "opening" or "a field of opening" to characterize the presentness of things which is "related" by the comportments to indicate the structural primordiality of manifestness of things over our meaning-giving activities.

Despite things' presentness, their opening is taken fallaciously as being throughout Western thinking for Heidegger, it allows us to indicate the insufficiency of the traditional concept of truth to penetrate the very essence of truth. After all, for Heidegger a statement is only possible if things are present, opened up and 'there':

> Thus the traditional assignment of truth exclusively to statements as the sole essential locus of truth falls away. Truth does not originally reside in proposition. But at the same time the question arises as to the ground of the inner possibility of the open comportment that pregives a standard, which possibility alone lends to propositional correctness the appearance of fulfilling the essence of truth at all.[63]

After indicating the inadequacy of the propositional account of truth, Heidegger asks the question, how is this comportment possible? Heidegger gives us an incredibly intriguing answer: *The essence of truth is freedom.* Accordingly, Heidegger rejects the metaphysical kind of truth, which, as we have mentioned before, excludes all kinds of untruth (lies, deception, illusions…) from the essence of truth and takes truth as something eternal, indestructible and exempt from any kind of human fragility. For Heidegger the essence of truth is connected with freedom and unlike Western metaphysics posits, it is very fragile.

[63] Ibid., pp.122,123.

In the section, *The Essence of Freedom,* Heidegger warns us to be careful for a "transformation of thinking" will take place to appropriately appreciate his account of freedom. Accordingly, freedom "lets being be", opens itself as letting beings be. However, Heidegger emphasizes that this in no way means to claim that freedom is a sort of total indifference towards beings. As he already conceptualized this idea in *Being and Time,* "to let be" refers to the unconcealedness of beings:

> …To let be-that is, to let beings be as the beings which they are- means to engage oneself with the open region and its openness, as it were, along with itself. Western thinking in its beginning conceived this open region as *ta aletheia*, the unconcealed. If we translate *aletheia* as "unconcealment" rather than "truth", this translation is not merely more literal; it contains the directive to rethink the ordinary concept of truth in the sense of the correctness of statements and to think it back to that still uncomprehended disclosedness and disclosure of beings…[64]

For Heidegger, freedom as letting-be allows Dasein to comport itself as a whole. This means for Heidegger, freedom is in no way an attribute of human beings, or refers to the caprices, arbitrary will of human beings but on the contrary human beings are claimed by freedom itself: "considered in regard to the essence of truth, the essence of freedom manifests itself as exposure to the disclosedness of beings."

Heidegger thinks Dasein is an ecstatic being which means Dasein is always already ahead of itself, or outside of itself. As one can see from the exposition in *Being and Time*, this means for Heidegger, Dasein is always already in relation with things other than itself. As a matter of fact, Heidegger claims that the historical man emerges when the question of unconcealment is asked. This is a very decisive idea in Heideggerian thinking inasmuch as we see how Heidegger connects historicality, with the question of Being, with truth that is unconcealedness which manifests itself in the letting beings be

[64] Ibid. , p.125.

as freedom. I think in this idea we can see how for Heidegger not only Dasein, but unconcealment of beings in general and therefore truth is something radically historical:

> History begins only when beings themselves are expressly drawn up into their unconcealment and conserved in it, only when this conservation is conceived on the basis of questioning regarding beings as such. The primordial disclosure of being as a whole, the question concerning beings as such, and the beginning of Western history are the same; they occur together in a "time" which, itself unmesurable first opens up the open region for every measure…The rare and simple decisions of history arise from the way original essence of truth essentially unfolds.[65]

Accordingly, this very first experience of unconcealment, Being expresses as a whole, as physis, the Greek term for nature. We shall see Heidegger expanding on this notion even more in his paper, *Origin of the Work of Art* and *Question Concerning Technology*. Heidegger continues to expand on his notion of freedom by arguing that as long as freedom is letting beings be, the essence of truth in no way lies on a validity relation between an object and a subject and it is not about a proposition's being true. Yet for Heidegger since truth is essentially freedom, it is also interrelated to untruth. Indeed, because freedom is not essentially human-making but rather man is possessed by freedom and therefore truth, untruth is not primordially an expression of human failures but rather an essential part of truth as long as the notion of unconcealment as truth brings forth concealment as untruth. Therefore for Heidegger the discussion of untruth is not a sidestep that will keep us away from our aim to unravel the essence of truth but rather it is a necessary step which also allows untrue propositions to be the opposite of the true positions in the first place.

After establishing the idea that the essence of truth manifests itself as freedom, as letting beings be, Heidegger, in parallel to his conception of Dasein in *Being and Time*,

[65] Ibid., pp.126,127.

claims that Dasein attunes to Being as a whole. For him, this attunement does not refer only to feelings or only to experience. This is because Dasein as a being always engaged in the attunement, in the disposition is unaware of the essence of the attunement, the disposition. Freedom as letting beings be is a disposition. The dispositional character of Dasein manifests itself in all its engagements to beings and these engagements are expressing the historical character of Dasein. At this point, Heidegger makes an interesting point which connotes the ideas he will express in *The Question Concerning Technology:*

> The openedness of being as a whole does not coincide with the sum of all immediately familiar beings. On the contrary: where beings are not very familiar to man and are scarcely and only roughly known by science, the openedness of beings as a whole can prevail more essentially than it can where the familiar and well-known has become boundless, and nothing is any longer able to withstand the business of knowing, since technical mastery over things bears itself without limit. Precisely in the leveling and planning of this omniscience, this mere knowing, the openedness of beings gets flattened out into the apparent nothingness of what is no longer even a matter of indifference, but rather is simply forgotten…from the point of view of everyday calculations and preoccupations this "as a whole" appears to be incalculable and incomprehensible.[66]

Heidegger stresses the finite horizon of Dasein and its attempts to become omniscient through the means of science simply strengthens its forgottenness of the opening of Being as a whole, the experience of *physis* that is. For Heidegger Dasein is not just dispositioning itself and knowing truth of beings particularly but it introduces concealment due to its particular comportments. This means because unconcealment is always an unconcealment of a particular thing it always brings concealment into the fore as well.

[66] Ibid., p.129.

The notion of forgetfulness which Heidegger already discussed in *Being and Time,* appears here as well. For him, Dasein not only forgets that something is forgotten through its modes of attunement but it forgets what it has forgotten as well. Heidegger calls this phenomenon mystery. Mystery is the "proper non-essence of truth" and although talking about a "non-essence" of truth seems paradoxical, Heidegger claims the non-essence of truth as untruth is indeed the unexperienced domain of the truth of Being not merely beings). The dominance of mystery that is the concealing of the concealing amounts to Dasein's being left with the unessential essence of truth. In other words, Dasein, by getting away from the essence of truth which is freedom not as human caprice but as beings' letting be Dasein forgets that truth is unconcealedness and starts to take beings in its own standard. That is, when Dasein fall for the idea that freedom is primordially about human caprice, it thinks of itself as the producer of the truth, of the manifestness. This I presume also means that by falling into mystery Dasein forgets that Being is opened as a whole, as physis and in this state Dasein starts to do metaphysics. The ascent of untruth nonetheless is due to the errancy (fallibility) which is a part of Dasein's condition. For Heidegger all modes of comportments have a mode of erring but in its essence errancy which dominates historically has the possibility of putting Dasein in the right course:

> …The errancy in which any given segment of historical humanity must proceed for its course to be errant is essentially connected with the openness of Dasein. By leading him astray, errancy dominates man through and through. But, as leading astray, errancy at the same time contributes to a possibility that man is capable of drawing up from his ek-sistence-the possibility that, by experiencing errancy itself and by not mistaking mystery of Dasein, he *not* let himself be led to astray.[67]

[67] Ibid., p.134.

In parallel to this, Heidegger claims that Dasein somehow oscillates between truth and untruth. Untruth is an essential part of truth and through the domination of errancy, Heidegger thinks, we fall into the metaphysical mode of thinking. The abstract question of being that is investigating the *being* of beings, universally produced what we call philosophy which was later addressed as metaphysics according to Heidegger. The more we are subsumed by mystery which brought errancy in every compartment we have the far away we get from the question of Being as the question of truth of Being. In the metaphysical era, essence is primarily taken as *quidditas* (whatness) or *realitas* (material content) while truth is taken as an attribute of knowledge.[68] In the question of the truth of essence, essence is taken as a word by metaphysical mindset. Therefore, Heidegger tries to unravel the historical path the question of Being has taken by looking at the primordial meaning of the essence of truth. With the overcoming of mystery, that is forgetfulness of the forgotten; unconcealment of Being, errancy dominates human compartments and leads us astray. Heidegger finally summarizes his intentions:

> …The present undertaking takes the question of the essence of truth beyond the confines of the ordinary definition provided in the usual concept of essence and helps us to consider whether the question of the essence of truth must not be, at the same time and even first of all, the question concerning the truth of "essence" philosophy thinks Being. In tracing the inner possibility of the correctness of statements back to the eksistent freedom of letting-be as its "ground," likewise in pointing to the essential commencement of this ground in concealing and in errancy, we want to show that the essence of truth is not the empty "generality" of an "abstract" universality but rather that which, self-concealing, is unique in the unremitting history of the disclosure of the "meaning" of what we call

[68] By metaphysical era Heidegger means the time the mode of thinking that is flourished by Plato and Aristotle come forward. As we mentioned earlier metaphysical thinking is a mode of thought that investigates Being instead of beings and moreover it is also the reason of forgetting the question of Being or truth of Being (as later Heidegger would probably put it).

> Being-what we for a long time have been accustomed to considering only as being as a whole.[69]

I think this exposition allows us to reconsider the meaning of truth in Heidegger and how he conceptualized his term, Dasein. In parallel to Richard Capobianco's point about Heidegger's notion of truth, we can see here that Heidegger uses Dasein as the structural primordiality that is manifested before the meaning–giving activities of man (i.e. transcendentalist subjective conditions) and Heidegger attempts to take Being qua manifestness, qua unconcealedness in this lecture. As he points out:

> …in its decisive steps, which lead from truth as correctness to ek-sistent freedom, and from the latter to truth as unconcealedness and as errancy, it accomplishes a change in the questioning that belongs to the overcoming of metaphysics. The thinking attempted in the lecture comes to fulfillment in the essential experience that a nearness to the truth of Being is first prepared for historical man on the basis of the Dasein into which man can enter. Every kind of anthropology and all subjectivity of man as subject are not merely left behind-as it was already in Being *and Time*-and the truth of Being sought as the ground of a transformed historical position; rather, the movement of the lecture is such that it sets out to think from this other ground(Dasein). The course of the questioning is intrinsically the way of a thinking which, instead of furnishing representations and concepts, experiences and tests itself as a transformation of its relatedness to Being.[70]

[69]Heidegger M. *Basic Writings: On the Essence of Truth*, pp.136, 137.
[70] Ibid., pp.138.

CHAPTER 5

UNCONCEALEDNESS AND ART

In his public lecture *Origin of the Work of Art* Heidegger attempts to find out the essence of the artwork. Here again we encounter the idea of truth as unconcealedness and moreover art's essential relation to it. Heidegger initially focuses on the notions art, artist and artwork in order to understand which one is essential and determinative in understanding the essence of the artwork. After making the claim that it is not the artist that brings art to life as the orthodox thinking accepts, but rather that the art itself that connects art and the artist is the essence of the artwork, he expands on the thingly nature of art in as much as in one way or other artworks are things. To elaborate on this, Heidegger explains the different takes that have been presented throughout the history of Western thinking about the nature of the thing. He claims that there is a much more fundamental sense of thing which shows itself in the concealment of things in opposition to the theories on the nature of things that are presented so far. Afterwards, Heidegger introduces the notions of earth and world to explain further the relationship between artwork and unconcealedness. At the final part of the lecture we encounter Heidegger's theory of epochs which is a definitive aspect of his later thinking.

Heidegger begins his discussion by making clear what he means by the word origin. For him origin is the essence, or source of essence of things. What is the origin of the work of art then? Is it the artist or is the work that gives the essence to the artwork? Heidegger suggests that neither of these is the answer to the question of the origin of the artwork but some third thing which is much more fundamental, much primordial that

allows work to be work and artist to be artist, that is art itself. Accordingly art is in an almost circular relation with the work and the artist; the work is fed by the artist and vice versa, art opens itself in artwork and artwork opens itself in art. In the Heideggerian context this circular attitude in thinking in no way signifies a weakness but rather the very strength of thought in as much as the explanations are made without the need of higher concepts as metaphysicians do I presume.

According to Heidegger, one thing is for sure and that is that all kinds of works in general and the works of art specifically have a thingly character:

> …The thingly element is so irremovably present in the artwork that we are compelled rather to say conversely that the architectural work is in stone, the carving is in wood, the painting in color, the linguistic work in speech, the musical composition in sound. "Obviously", it will be replied. No doubt. But what is this self-evident thingly element in the work of art?[71]

For Heidegger there are three main accounts of thingness that dominated Western thought. The first interpretation of thing was the thing as the bearer of predicates, properties. For the Greeks this was called *to hypokeimenon*, that which underlies the properties and the properties were called *ta symbebekota* in Aristotle's *Categories*. However, according to Heidegger the moment this idea of thing which was built on the experience of the Being of beings in the sense of presence started to become Latinized the idea of the thingness of the thing became clearer and less rich in the ontological sense[72]:

> According to current opinion, this definition of the thingness of the thing as the substance with its accidents seems to correspond to our natural outlook of things-our way of addressing ourselves to things and speaking about

[71] Heidegger M. *Basic Writings: The Origin of the Work of Art*. p.145.
[72] By 'less rich in the ontological sense' I mean the prevalent understanding of Being as aletheia, as manifested become less visible in the Roman world through Latin translations of the Greek words.

> them-has adapted itself to this common view of the thing. A simple propositional statement consists of the subject, which is in the Latin translation, hence already a reinterpretation, of hypokeimenon, and the predicate, in which the thing's traits are stated of it. Who would have the temerity to assail these simple fundamental relations between sentence structure and thing-structure? Nevertheless, we must ask: Is the structure of a simple propositional statement (the combination of subject and predicate) the mirror image of the structure of the thing (of the union of substance with accidents)? Or could it be that even the structure of the thing as thus envisaged is a projection of the framework of the sentence?[73]

As we saw in his Parmenides course lecture as well, the idea of the Latinized version of Greek words is much more metaphysical (that is unfaithful to the understanding of Being based on the truth /manifestness of Being) than the pre-philosophically used Greek origin.[74] As the words are Latinized they lost an important sense of their meaning characteristic motivation in Heidegger's philosophy. The more we expand on his theory of epochs in the following pages, the clearer it will become for Heidegger's reasons to think this. Notwithstanding his reason, he claims that the interpretation of the thing as the accumulation of traits is not natural at all and because this idea of thing became so dominant in our daily life, we have forgotten its unfamiliarity to us:"What seems familiar to us is probably just something familiar in a long tradition that has forgotten the unfamiliar source from which it arose." Heidegger continues to criticize this account of the thing by pointing out that in this account, beings and things cannot be

[73] Heidegger M. *Basic Writings: The Origin of the Work of Art*. p.149.

[74] For Heidegger the Greek words such as, *mythos*, *polis, eudaimonia, paideia, politeia* have a strong connection with aletheia which is faded when these words and the experience of being that comes along with them are translated into Latin. For example the word *polis* is translated as *res republica* in Latin. According to Heidegger *res republica* for the Romans means "that which concerns the organized and established people, what is most their 'business.' On the other hand *polis* does not signify organization of people: "…the essence of Greek *polis* is grounded in the essence of *aletheia*. A simple reflection, even if our focus is elsewhere, must still lead us to suspect this connection between *aletheia* and *polis.* That is, if aletheia as unconcealedness determines all beings in their presence (and that means, for the Greeks, precisely in their Being), then certainly the polis too, and above all, has to stand within the domain of this determination by *aletheia*, provided the *polis* does indeed name that in which the humanity of Greeks has the center of its Being." Heidegger M. *Parmenides*. p.89.

differentiated. Moreover, in this account the self-contained character of the thing is not preserved, the thingly character of the thing is not unraveled and the thingness of the thing is attempted to be explained simply by reference to other things. As we have mentioned before, the attempt to explain a phenomenon by referring to other higher concepts is unacceptable for Heidegger. He considers this as an assault on Being.

The second interpretation of the thingness of thing is taking the thing as the summation of sensations/perceptions, as *aistheton*. However, for Heidegger this account of thing is as untenable as the first one. Just like we encountered in the first interpretation of the thing, here the thingness of the thing is defined in such a way that it can be demonstrated in every instance. Furthermore, again as we saw in the first interpretation, this account overlooks "the thingly character of the thing." Heidegger substantiates his claim by pointing out that what we primordially encounter is not sensations but rather things: "We never really first perceive a throng of sensations, e.g., tones and noises, in the appearance of things-as this thing-concept alleges; rather we hear the storm whistling in the chimney, we hear the three motored plane, we hear the Mercedes in immediate distinction form the Volkswagen. Much closer to us than all sensations are the things themselves."[75] Heidegger thinks that although this interpretation is not as much an assault to Being as the first interpretation it is way too physical and as we said overlooks the thingly character of the thing.

The third interpretation of thing takes thing as formed matter.[76] Heidegger mentions that this account is as old as the other two accounts we have presented above. Here thing

[75] Ibid., p.152.

[76] The famous four types of causes that are put forward by Aristotle: material cause, formal cause, efficient cause and final cause. If we take a wooden table as an example in order to explain the four

is taken as a composition of *hyle* (matter) and *morphe* (form). Accordingly, Heidegger thinks this understanding of thing is in line with traditional aesthetics. Yet for him, this does not mean we are getting closer appreciating the thingness of the thing. The problem is, if we take the thing as the synthesis of form and matter, a question which is very similar to the question we have posed already in the beginning of our investigation will come forth again: "Where does the matter–form structure have its origin-in the thingly character of the thing or in the workly character of the artwork?"

Heidegger claims that the third account of thing is regarding thing on the paradigm of equipmentality and this idea of equipmentality arises from the sense of usefulness that is permeated in the idea of thing as formed matter. This means that when we are to engage with things as formed matter, our focus is based on the usefulness of the thing rather than the thingness of the thing. For example, a pair of shoe allows you to walk easily without hurting your feet; a cup allows you to hold certain liquids intact. These purposes, such usefulnesses determine these things' nature; determine them on the framework of equipment. Therefore a formed matter is always understood in relation to its end, the thing as formed matter is not based on its thingness but rather its equipmentality with respect to the usefulness that has been assigned to it. Heidegger

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causes the carpenter would be the efficient cause who carves and shapes the wood to make a table out of it, the idea of table in the carpenter's mind would be the formal cause whereas the wood itself would be the material cause and the purpose to make a table would be the final cause. In *Being and Time* Heidegger claims that the problem with this understanding of causality is not that it is only applied to things but to human being as well. For Heidegger, treating human being in terms of four types of causes is an indication of metaphysical thinking which was promoted by Plato and Aristotle. However we should point out that four types of causality was not an approach towards causality that is embraced by all Greek philosophers. After all, the Presocratic philosophers did not have such a conception of causality. I presume that Heidegger took Aristotle as a paradigmatic case for the Greek thinking insofar as the four types of causality influenced greatly the history of western metaphysics. I thank Chryssi Sidiropoulou for her remark and contribution regarding this discussion.

argues that this interpretation of thing as formed matter is accepted by religious faith as well in medieval philosophy while the synthesis of matter and form is taken as the outcome of God's creation. Moreover according to Heidegger the interpretation of thing as formed matter normalized more and more and when we reached modernity, regarding things as formed matter become self-evident. For Heidegger all three of these interpretations of thing resulted in blocking the way that goes to the thingly character of thing:

> These three modes of defining thingness conceive of the thing as bearer of traits, as the unity of a manifold of sensations, as formed matter. In the course of the history of truth about beings, the interpretations mentioned have also entered into combinations, a matter we may now pass over. In such combinations, they have further strengthened their innate tendency to expand so as to apply in the same way to thing, to equipment, and to work. Thus they give rise to a mode of thought by which we think not only about thing, to equipment, and work but about all beings in general. This long-familiar mode of thought preconceives all immediate experience of beings. The preconception shackles reflection on the Being of any given being. Thus it comes about that prevailing thing-concepts obstruct the way toward the thingly character of the things as well as toward the equipmental character of equipment, and all the more toward the workly character of the work.[77]

Heidegger continues his argument by claiming that the predominant thing-concept is the third interpretation of thing that is thing as formed matter. As we already pointed out, for Heidegger this explanation does not give us the thingly nature of the thing and hence there is a much more primordial sense of the thing. To indicate this, Heidegger expands on the equipmental quality of equipment. Here Heidegger chooses the example of Van Gogh's famous painting in which peasant shoes are depicted. "The equipmental quality of equipment consists in its usefulness"[78] and yet looking at the painting from this framework we cannot make a sense of it. The shoes are there and in terms of its

[77] Heidegger M. *Basic Writings: The Origin of the Work of Art* p.156.
[78] Ibid., p.159.

usefulness all we see is leather, nails, thread and so on. It seems the equipmentality of the thing does not open for us the thingly aspect of the thing. Yet Heidegger digs deeper to find out what grounds the equipment and claims thingness of the thing manifests itself through earth:

> From the dark opening of the worn insides of the shoes the toilsome tread of the workers stares forth. In the stiffly rugged heaviness of the shoes there is the accumulated tenacity of her slow trudge through the far-spreading and ever-uniform furrows of the field swept by a raw wind. On the leather lie the dampness and richness of the soil. Under the soles stretches the loneliness of the field-path as evening falls. In the shoes vibrates the silent call of earth, its quiet gift of the ripening grain and its unexplained self-refusal in the fallow desolation of the wintry field. This equipment is pervaded by uncomplaining worry as to the certainty of bread, the worldless joy of having once more withstood want, the trembling before the impending childbed and shivering at the surrounding menace of death. The equipment belongs to *earth*, and it is protected in the *world* of the peasant woman. From out of this protected belonging the equipment itself rises to its resting-within-itself.[79]

Here we encounter two core notions; earth and world in the explanation of Van Gogh's painting. According to Heidegger, earth and world exist for the peasant woman. The usefulness of the shoes amounts to nothing without the world and earth that allow shoes to be manifested. In the painting, the pair of peasant shoes emerges into the unconcealment of its Being. As we already said, the Greeks called this aletheia. Heidegger warns us that we should not fall for the idea that this disclosedness is our making. The peasant women's relationships with the soil, her concerns regarding the soil fertility, her pains which are primordial to the equipmental context of the shoes are disclosed through Van Gogh's painting.

What we can conclude from Heidegger's treatment of Van Gogh's painting is that the work of art does not essentially give us the essence of equipment based on the idea of

[79] Ibid., p.159.

thing as formed matter. In the work of art we encounter the unconcealment of Being in artwork's own way. The work of art, truth (unconcealedness) of beings sets (to bring to stand) itself to work. In the following sections Heidegger expands on the notion of world and earth to explicate this "setting-itself-to-work?"[80]

In the section, *The Work and Truth,* Heidegger tries to substantiate his claim on the meaning of the Greek word aletheia with its relation to the investigation into the thingly nature of thing to understand the origin of the work of art. He also mentions that the entire art industry is focused on the object-being of the works instead of their work-being. I guess this is because for Heidegger art industry deals with what kind of aesthetic value the art "object" has whereas for his investigation, what kind of world the artwork opens up is much more primordial and definitive.

Similar to the example he gave of Van Gogh's painting Heidegger explicates his terms 'world' and 'earth' with the example of a Greek temple. Here we again see that the notion of unconcealment and concealing is very important to him and what matters is not the architectural properties of the temple but rather that which opens up and that which darkens. For Heidegger in a Greek temple we encounter not simply walls, stones and columns, but rather the very existence of God manifests itself through the temple. As we have mentioned in the section *Essencing Truth,* Heidegger regards the Greek temple example as an instantiation of the physis as the manifestation, emerging as a totality. Earth as the foundation of this manifestation opens itself as a sheltering agent:

> Standing there, the building rests on the rocky ground. This resting of the work draws up out of the rock the obscurity of that rock's bulk yet spontaneous support. Standing there, the building holds its ground against

[80] Ibid., p.165.

> the storm raging above it and so first makes the storm manifest in its violence. The luster and gleam of the stone, through itself apparently glowing only by the grace of the sun, first brings to radiance the light of the day, the breadth of the sky, the darkness of the night. The temple's firm towering makes visible the invisible space of air. The steadfastness of the work contrasts with the surge of the surf, and its own repose brings out the raging of the sea. Tree and grass, eagle and bull, snake and cricket first enter into their distinctive shapes and thus come to appear as what they are. The Greeks early called this emerging and rising in itself and in all things *physis*. It illuminates also that on which and in which man bases his dwelling. We call this ground the earth. What this word says is not to be associated with the idea of a mass of matter deposited somewhere, or with the merely astronomical idea of a planet. Earth is that whence the arising brings back and shelters everything that arises as such. In the things that arise, earth occurs essentially as the sheltering agent.[81]

Accordingly the temple opens up a world, as the shoes in Van Gogh's painting do. Yet the disclosure of a world is not the only unconcealment that is operative in the temple. Earth as the place we reside opens itself through the temple. For Heidegger the temple does not imitate the being of God but through the temple God presences. We can see a very similar motive in the previous section on Parmenides course lecture in which Heidegger deals with the goddess of truth in Parmenides' poem. There again we did not have a representation relationship between two things but rather something concealed unconcealing itself.

It is important though to point out that for Heidegger the world does not mean the totality of everything present and calculable. The world does not denote the sum of our representations, either. *The World worlds.* This means that the world is disclosed and our experiences within in it from our birth to our death make the world world, make it manifest. Similar to the ideas we see in *Being and Time* Heidegger differentiates the Dasein if you will who have a world from the Dasein who don't. Accordingly the

[81] Ibid., p.167.

peasant woman has a world because "she dwells in the overtness of beings." In his earlier period, Heidegger argues that because other beings do not have the awareness of "being towards death" they were not Dasein. Here Heidegger, I think, makes a similar point with a different reason. Animals, stones do not have a world because world is not opened to them as it is opened to the peasant women. I think that if we recall Capobianco's presentation of Dasein, it might be help us to understand what Heidegger means here. Dasein is co-disclosive with Being. Dasein does not simply see but it looks. It is not a being only but also a being that asks question and interacts with Being. Dasein asks the question of Being. Peasant women is not simply there but as the beings around her opens to her, she opens to them, uses them, ignores them, gives meaning to them and makes them unconcealed. Nonetheless I think it is very important to again make the point that Heidegger does not tell us that the world is human's making. He is actually quite clear that the case is exactly the other way around:

> But it is not we who presuppose the unconcealment of beings; rather, the unconcealment of beings (Being) puts us into such a condition of being that in our representation we always remain installed within and in attendance upon concealment. Not only must that *conformity* with which a cognition orders itself be already in some way unconcealed. The entire *realm* in which this "conforming to something" goes on must already occur as a whole in the unconcealed; and this holds equally of that which *for* which the conformity of a proposition to a matter becomes manifest. With all our correct representations we would get nowhere, we could not even presuppose that there already is manifest something to which we can conform ourselves, unless the concealment of beings had already exposed to us, placed us in that cleared realm in which every being stands for us and from which it withdraws.[82]

Heidegger continues to emphasize this point by claiming that though it might look otherwise "Beings are never of our making, or even merely our representations." As we

[82] Ibid., p.177.

can see this motive of primordiality of Being's truth, unconcealment comes up again and again in the Heideggerian corpus as Capobianco defends too. Afterwards Heidegger claims unconcealment (truth) is not something propositional and not a predicate, a property of something. Similar to the points he made in *On the Essence of Truth* Heidegger claims that each unconcealment is a concealing. Accordingly for him "truth is in its essence, is untruth." Heidegger does not mean here that truth is essentially falsity but he tries to depict the strife between earth and world. To him, this conflict between earth and world manifests itself in the art work. Heidegger thinks that, taken in this sense, truth is not something static, stable and atemporal but rather active and temporal: Truth is a happening. If we remind ourselves of the temple example, there Heidegger claimed that God is being there through the being of temple. Heidegger claims that in the artwork Being unconceals as a whole within the strife between world and earth: *"Beauty is one way in which truth essentially occurs as unconcealment."* Here we see that Heidegger understands truth through art as unconcealment.

In the section *Truth and Art,* Heidegger investigates the notion of creation as long as when we talk about a work we talk about something created. He questions whether the creator, the artist could be the origin of the work of Art. Heidegger expands on the Greek word *techne* (which he will do again in *Question Concerning Technology*). Accordingly *techne* does not denote craftsmanship per se but it is a mode of knowing. For the Greeks knowing always contains aletheia, unconcealment, revealing of Beings. Therefore when the work is becoming the work truth becomes and happens.

Moreover Heidegger claims that truth as happening is self referential and reveals itself in the clash between clearing and double-concealing:

> Truth is un-truth, insofar as there belongs to it the reservoir of the not-yet-revealed, the un-covered, in the sense of concealment. In unconcealment, as truth, there occurs also the other "un" of a double restraint and refusal. Truth essentially occurs as such in the opposition of clearing and double concealing. Truth is the primal strife in which, always in some particular way, the open region is won within which everything stands from which everything withholds itself that shows itself as a being…[83]

Here we see that for Heidegger just like we saw in the previous section regarding *On the Essence of Truth,* truth in its essence contains untruth and is always particularized and situated. For Heidegger there are several ways of truth's happenings and these happenings are coming into being as historical: truth can establish itself as work, as the act that constitutes political state, as essential sacrifice and as a thinker's questioning. On the other hand, science for Heidegger is not an establishment of truth because it is not something foundational and original but rather science is a "cultivation of a domain of truth that is already opened" by philosophy.

Truth established in the work arises from the strife between world and earth. While world sets up the work the earth (self-secluding) sets forth it. This means that the earth through the worker or the artist conceals whereas the world opens up itself and unconceals. For Heidegger this strife is not defined by a rift that separates the opponents but rather reveals the intimacy of their belonging to each other. Thus the real force that unravels the truth of the work is not the worker's or the artist's intentions but rather this strife: "…the illusion that artistic creation is also an activity of handicraft. It never is. But it is at all times a use of the earth in the fixing in the place of truth in the figure. In contrast, the making of the equipment never directly effects the happening of truth. The production of equipment is finished when a material has been so formed as to be ready

[83] Ibid., pp.185,186.

for use. For equipment to be ready means that it is released beyond itself, to be used up in usefulness."[84]

In the final part of his lecture Heidegger presents his theory of epochs. Being has opened up differently in different epochs: after the Greek experience of Being which was Being as aletheia, in the Middle ages Being is opened up as God's creation. Afterwards in modern times Being became the subject of calculation. What is crucial here is that for Heidegger all these openings are manifestations of Being and they established their own mode of truth through and through: "At each time a new and essential world erupted. At each time the openness of beings had to be established in beings themselves by fixing in place of truth in figure. At each time there happened unconcealment of beings."[85]

[84] Ibid., p.189.
[85] Ibid., p.201.

CHAPTER 6

UNCONCEALEDNESS AND TECHNOLOGY

Heidegger begins his lecture *The Question Concerning Technology* by warning us. He warns us about the way we follow his discussion and the way he is going to question the essence of technology. Accordingly we should be attentive to the general discussion, not particular sentences and not certain motives that are going to be mentioned. I presume even this beginning tells us something about how Heidegger looks at philosophical discussions, namely heuristically rather than analytically and moreover this heuristic motivation very much resembles his concept "essential knowing" that he presented in the Parmenides course lecture. It is important to keep in mind that Heidegger's arguments should be taken within the entirety of the discussions. A similar and rather extended version of this idea could be seen in Simon Critchley's paper, "Heidegger for Beginners" in *Heidegger's Being and Time.* Understanding Heidegger requires penetrating the entirety of his corpus but not only the early works or exclusively the later works or read him backwards as Reiner Schürmann suggests.[86] This of course can be regarded as a reading of Heidegger which takes his philosophy in general as consistent and continuous throughout his corpus; as we mentioned, a reading also accepted by Capobianco.

The investigation about technology will be built on a free relationship according to Heidegger. Free relationship denotes the opening of the essence of the subject matter, in this case technology. Again in these lines, a critique of a subjectivist philosophy is visible. The essence of technology will be freely related if it opens "human existence to

[86] Critchley S. and Schürman R. *On Heidegger's Being and Time*. p.9

the essence of technology."[87] As we can see here I think in Heidegger's expressions one can observe the emphasis on what he tries to engage in is not thinking subject's own making.

After Heidegger makes his point about the free relation, he makes a very similar point on the essence of technology which he did in the previous section about the essence of art. The essence of a thing, of a subject matter, is not the thing, but the subject matter itself. In terms of technology, the essence of technology is not technological.[88] Moreover the opposite is true as well. The essence of technology is in no way something technological. Interestingly enough, here we might see a deflection of the third man argument which is brought forward by Plato himself against his metaphysical account. Heidegger's attempts to overcome metaphysics thus become visible in his account of essence as well.

There are two orthodox takes on the essence of technology: Technology is a means to an end and technology is a human activity. Apparently these definitions are in tandem or even complementary as long as pursuing an end to achieve a mean is intrinsically a human activity. Heidegger labels the first definition as the instrumental and the second as the anthropological definition of technology. Indeed, Heidegger thinks that these definitions and especially the instrumental definition are so well-fitted that they are even applicable to examples of modern technology. For Heidegger the more we want to master technology, the more it gets out of human control. If we keep in mind that Heidegger deals with the unconcealedness of things, in this context technology, the

[87] Heidegger M. *The Question Concerning Technology*. p.3.
[88] So for Heidegger, although we are surrounded by technology, we are not familiar with its essence that is with what makes technology technology.

claim about the illusion of control on technology is in no way surprising, I presume. This illusion is simply an outcome of the subjectivist mentality that presupposes phenomena are subject's making.

Heidegger continues his presentation by arguing that these orthodox definitions of technology are adequate. For him in terms of these definitions we are not in a free relationship with the essence of technology due to the fact that these definitions of technology almost pretends as they signify the primordial meaning, the essence of technology while they are built on much more fundamental notion of technology. This means instrumental nature of technology obviously lies through and through on something else. Instrumentality with its teleological aspect in it brings causality into play. Causality brings the ends together, the steps to reach an end together. In Western thought the origin of instrumentality can be traced back to the fourfold causality which we encounter in Aristotle's *Physics.*

Yet, Heidegger is not satisfied with this answer and he insists on the question: What is cause then, is it something given form the heavens? Yes instrumentality made us question the fourfold causes…But what connects causes together, what is causality's essence? In the Western tradition, efficient cause seems to become the paradigmatic mode of causality. Heidegger points out that the Latin word *causa* is etymologically rooted in *cadere* which means to fall. So in the Latin root of the word cause we encounter a sort of "falling out as a result of such and such."[89] Nevertheless in the Greek version of the word we do not see anything of this sort. The word *aition* signifies a being indebted. In addition, in Aristotle's mentality all four causes are responsible for the thing

[89] Heidegger M. *The Question Concerning Technology.* p.7.

that came out in the open. Accordingly, not only matter *(hyle)* and aspect *(eidos)* are responsible for the chalice but *telos* as well:

> The telos is responsible for what as matter and for what as aspect are together co-responsible for the sacrificial vessel." This means telos is more responsible than the material and formal cause. Finally, Heidegger mentions the silversmith which appears like to efficient cause but is not the efficient cause as long as … "in working, brings about the finished sacrificial chalice as if it were the effect of a making…[90]

From the investigation that is made so far, we understand that all four causes are responsible but the "source of unity" that makes all these causes responsible is unclear. Again focusing on the Greek context Heidegger claims that the four causes are responsible to the thing's lying readiness that came about: "Lying before and lying ready *(hypokeisthai)* characterize the presencing of something that presences. The four ways of being responsible bring something into appearance. They let it come forth into presencing. They set it free to that place and so start it on its way, namely, into its complete arrival. The principal characteristic of being responsible is this starting something on its way into arrival."[91] Therefore we see that technology's instrumental roots do not lie in the apparent usefulness of the thing but rather causality which arises from thing's being indebted to and causes being responsible of the presencing of the thing. Heidegger uses the word "to occasion" to identify the character of this presencing. For Greeks all these occasionings are part of poiesis which indicates the bringing forth of the concealment towards unconcealed.

For Heidegger the Greek word *poiesis* (bringing forth) has a very definitive place in the Greek experience of Being. The four causes are within this bringing forth as well as

[90] Ibid., p.8.
[91] Ibid., p.9.

physis which we mentioned in the previous section. Indeed physis, "the arising of something out of itself" is the poiesis par excellence.[92] In contrast to the bringing forth of physis, in the case of an artist we encounter a brining forth not within but through the artist. At this point Heidegger connects the discussion with truth (unconcealedness). Accordingly:

> ….Occasioning has to do with the presencing of that which at any given time comes to appearance in bringing-forth. Bringing-forth brings hither out of concealment forth into unconcealment. Bringing forth comes to pass only insofar as something concealed comes into unconcealment. This coming rests and moves freely within what we call revealing.[93]

Contrary to this, modern technology does not fit with this picture one might say. Truly there is something different about it. Modern technology is based on modern physics hence it is incomparable to earlier understandings of technology because for Heidegger earlier understandings of technology was not based on standing reserve but on *poiesis* as we will see. And yet, modern physics is dependent on technical apparatus and its development. It seems that modern technology and physics are on a mutual relationship. But what is this essence of modern technology, what is essential about it that puts physics, exact science in use?

Heidegger argues that modern technology is a revealing but not as *poiesis* rather as standing reserve. The kind of "technology" that precedes modern technology is similar to modern paradigm though it is not revealing as standing reserve:

> The revealing that rules in modern technology is a challenging, which puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy that can be extracted and stored as such. But it does not hold true for the old windmill as well? No. Its sails do indeed turn in the wind; they are left entirely to the wind's

[92] Ibid., p.10.
[93] Ibid., p.11.

> blowing. But the windmill does not unlock energy from the air currents in order to store it.[94]

Heidegger furthermore claims that "agriculture is now the mechanized food industry." The character of the revealing is transformed into the form of energy supplier. Heidegger also mentions that an intense economic mentality is operative in this revealing as standing reserve. After contrasting the revealing of the river Rhine through Hölderlin's poem and as a river used for water supply Heidegger says there are several ways of revealing in modern technology: unlocking, transforming, storing, distributing, and switching about. Moreover, transformation of nature into energy does not simply stop when the goal is achieved but repeats itself over and over again in a regulating, organized way; not haphazardly. This sort of unconcealment is standing reserve. This means what is concealed does not stand any more as object against us. Standing reserve does not simply signify "stocking." The unconcealment of modern technology as standing reserve manifests itself as "orderability." This is why Hegel's definition of the machine as an autonomous tool does not fit to the revealing of standing reserve for Heidegger. In this picture the machine is unautonomous "for it has its standing only from the ordering of the orderable."[95]

Heidegger argues that standing reserve as the revealing of modern technology is a challenging. However this revealing as any other revealing is not in men's control. That is to say man is not controlling unconcealment itself. However man contributes this revealing as standing reserve:

> …precisely because man is challenged more originally than are the energies of nature i.e., into the process of ordering, he never is transformed into mere

[94] Ibid., p.14
[95] Ibid., p.17.

> standing-reserve. Since man drives technology forward, he takes part in ordering as a way of revealing. But the unconcealment itself, within which ordering unfolds, is never a human handiwork, any more than is the realm through which man is already passing every time he as a subjects relates to an object.[96]

Here we see again that Heidegger's emphasis on the non-subjectivist origin of his perspective. It is important to point out that Heidegger always reinforces his arguments from an historical context. As I mentioned in the introduction section the perception of truth as unconcealedness is quite visible in the Greek world and the primordial manifestness of unconcealment, I presume, allows Heidegger to build sentences about revealing such as…"that which has already claimed man and has done so, so decisively that he can only be man at any given time as the one so claimed."[97] This means revealing as the realm of unconcealedness claims men. Heidegger is quite clear on the non-man-madeness of unconcealment. As a matter of fact even when man contradicts the call of unconcealment, man responds to the call of concealment which is hand in hand with unconcealment as we saw in the previous sections.

Heidegger argues that the essence of modern technology is enframing. Enframing is "the challenging that gathers man to order the self-revealing as standing-reserve." He accepts that it might seem peculiar to use enframing in this way, as the essence of modern technology. But if we look at what Plato did we shall see that great thinkers tend to give radically new meanings to the words; the usage of the word eidos changed dramatically with the Platonic influence. *Eidos* was denoting exterior, visible aspects, appearances of things whereas in Plato it means almost the opposite. Eidos is that which

[96] Ibid., p.18.
[97] That is Being as unconcealment claims men.

cannot be seen, cannot be sensed/perceived and yet that which is the ground of all sensations/perceptions.

Although the word is filled with metaphysical connotations I think we might also consider Heidegger a philosopher who investigates 'essences' of things, in this case essence of technology. Of course this is not to say that Heidegger is an essentialist in any way. However, he does have an understanding of essence. As we see in his take on technology, the essence of technology is not any particular technological development. For Heidegger the essence of technology is a 'mode of manifestness' namely Enframing. Heidegger continues his discussion by clarifying the meaning of Enframing. It is not the totality of the technological activities or developments. Yet technological activities "respond" to Enframing. With the play he did on "*stellen*" Heidegger claims poiesis and Enframing are related in their essence. Accordingly both are ways of aletheia: "…In Enframing, that unconcealment comes to pass in conformity with which the work of modern technology reveals the real as standing-reserve." As we can see a very similar motivation comes up again and again in Heidegger's works. Untruth (concealedness) was essentially related to truth (unconcealedness) in *Being and Time, On the Essence of Truth* and *Origin of the Work of Art*. Truth is primordially unconcealedness and every mode of unconcealedness is essentially related.

The ordering attitude is manifested initially in modern physics as an exact science and therefore nature is turned into a force that is purely calculable. For Heidegger, experimental physics is a subset of physics; experimental physics is guided by physics as long as the required presuppositions about the nature of nature have already done to take it as a subject of calculation:

> …Because physics, indeed already as pure theory, sets nature up to exhibit itself as a coherence of forces calculable in advance, it therefore orders its experiments precisely for the purpose of asking whether and how nature reports itself when set up in this way.[98]

At this point Heidegger poses the question whether technology gives essence to physics or the other way around. For him the essence of modern technology is elusive even if some of the most concrete exemplifications of it had been revealed in his time However although the history of modern physical science precedes the development of machine-power technology, the essence of modern technology permeates retrospectively. Heidegger makes this peculiar claim, keeping Greek thinkers in mind:

> All coming to presence, not only modern technology, keeps itself everywhere concealed to the last. Nevertheless, it remains, with respect to its holding sway, that which precedes all: the earliest. The Greek thinkers already knew of this when they said: That which is earlier with regard to the arising that holds sway becomes manifest to us men only later. That which is primarily early shows itself only ultimately to men. Therefore, in the realm of thinking, a painstaking effort to think through still more primally what was primally thought is not the absurd wish to revive what is past, but rather the sober readiness to be astounded before the coming of what is early.[99]

I think it is important to point out that Heidegger's constant references to the Greek experience of Being, as we can see in the above passage as well as in *Origin of the Work of Art*, are not meant to be a praise to revive the past but rather to be historically and hermeneutically aware of the concepts he is talking about.

Enframing challenges nature to be orderable as standing reserve. Correspondingly, physics focuses on an object in such a way that nature becomes "a system of information" that is calculable. Neither causality as occasioning nor causality in its fourfold manner is effective on this progress. It is an illusion that modern technology is

[98] Heidegger M. *The Question Concerning Technology.* p.21.
[99] Ibid., p.22.

ultimately applied science. Modern technology's essence, Enframing, takes control of physics not vice versa.

Still, the answer to the question "what is Enframing?" needs further investigation. Enframing is nothing technological. It is not something machine-like or anything of the sort. Heidegger made a similar point about the essence of technology in the beginning of the investigation as we pointed out. Enframing is the manner "real reveals itself as standing-reserve." This revealing is neither human doing nor is it completely out of human doing. I presume the reason Heidegger uses such an expression is because everything we investigate from his point of view is being, including humans. In their manifestness everything is a manifestation:"Enframing is the gathering together that belongs to that setting-upon which sets upon man and puts him in position to reveal the real, in the mode of ordering, as standing-reserve."[100] Thus the real becomes standing-reserve.

After his attempt to unravel the essence of Enframing Heidegger puts forward a new idea which is quite determinative in his later thinking: Destining, the sending-that-gathers which is the essence of all history. Presumably this is a Post-Hegelian idea which takes history as something destined. Accordingly human activities are not history. Destining sends the sets of experiences or the conditions of the experiences of the respective epoch. In parallel to this, every revealing is a destining.

Can we say there is a difference between Being's manifestness/essence (in the non-metaphysical sense) and Being's meaning for Heidegger? As we pointed out for Capobianco, this is the case. That is, Heidegger does not distinguish the meaning of

[100] Ibid., p.24.

Being with truth of Being but he was simply realizing something that is already there in his thinking.[101]While meaning is the outcome of the transcendental ego, manifestness/unconcealedness is the realm that belongs to the ontological, to unrevealing? If we are to make a commonsensical definition of essence we would say it is that which makes a thing that thing. I think we should be careful here. It seems to me even in this orthodox definition conscious subject with transcendental capabilities is not what makes that thing that thing. As we see in the other works of Heidegger we have discussed so far, the being, the there of the thing has to *be* in order to make sense by the transcendental capabilities.

Heidegger has been criticized for being a determinist and quietist about the development of modern technology and its revealing through Enframing.[102] However, I think Heidegger is certainly neither a determinist nor a quietist. His notion of destining is often times compared with the Hegelian *Geist.* This is certainly not the case. For Heidegger the type of philosophy Hegel does is based on Cartesianism which is an extension of the metaphysical thinking. This means I think that for Heidegger, Hegel does not fundamentally focuses on the unconcealedness of things and deals with being on an abstract level initially rather than a historical one. I presume while one can see each discussion of Heidegger contains an interpretation of the respected historical context that the subject matter has evolved and firstly discussed, Hegel is capable of

[101] See p.21.

[102] Herman Philipse thinks that for Heidegger technology is a fate and it cannot lead to any fruitful discussion. Therefore Heidegger is a quietisit about technology. Philipse H. *Heidegger's Philosophy of Being*. p.309. I do not see how this criticism would work. Heidegger is constantly emphasizing that he is talking about the unconcealment of Being which is not something man made and he thinks that destining signifies the historical nature of Being. I think if Heidegger was investigating the transcendental condition of the conscious subject then he might be regarded as a quietist and determinist as long as his discourse would be built upon "I"'s will, desire and its determinism.

writing pages about the existence of external world with solely using abstract notions. Heidegger tries to penetrate the unconcealedness of things and he clearly claims destining is not an enforcing fate though the word has that deterministic connotation. Humans are as free as they are in the realm of destining and as they hearken it. Destining is not a fate that means "inevitableness of an unalterable course." Moreover Heidegger makes a very similar case we already have seen On *the Essence of Truth*; freedom is not about human caprice and not about the "causes" that guide human willing. Freedom and truth are closely related and all revealing comes with a concealing: "All revealing belongs within a harboring and a concealing. But that which frees-the mystery-is concealed and always concealing itself."[103]

When we think about the essence of technology, we experience Enframing as a destining of revealing. Indeed considering the essence of technology makes us "taken into a freeing claim." However each revealing of destining inherits a danger within; after all, man always may misinterpret destining of revealing. For example in the theological framework, God is taken as the causality of making and the essential origin of causality is left unthought. Correspondingly man might take this ordering as his standard as we can see in western metaphysics. Another similar example for this misinterpreting destining might be taking nature as something calculable and by the correctnesses of these calculations concealing the true.

For Heidegger destining's permeation as Enframing is not simply a danger but it is the danger, danger as such. Enframing, being the greatest danger, shows itself in two ways: The fall that is man himself is taken as standing-reserve and the illusion that man thinks

[103] Heidegger M. *Question Concerning Technology.* p.25.

himself the lord of the earth. Enframing is a claim and man doesn't see this. Even more importantly, Enframing does not solely threaten man's relation to its essence but it dominates all kinds of revealing as ordering. Enframing obscures poiesis. Thus Enframing not only conceals poiesis but revealing itself and truth as well. The danger is not technology but its essence which is a mystery. The real threat is that enframing might prevent us from experiencing a more primal truth. However, by making a reference to Hölderlin he reminds us that danger and saving power go hand in hand. By "saving" Hölderlin means bringing it to its essence according to Heidegger. If Hölderlin is right then Enframing cannot obscure, dominate all revealing. Here we again see the openness to possibilities than deterministic dogmatism in Heidegger's thinking. However the question is yet to be answered: How come saving power that is bringing revealing to its essence, bringing revealing to genuine revealing flourishes where the danger comes out?

According to Heidegger we have to return to our initial question to understand the nature of saving power; technology's essence. So far in the discussion essence is understood as the "common genus." Yet what Heidegger means by Enframing is not a Platonic form and those kinds of technological instantiations that participate in it. Also enframing is not a general concept that encompasses the entirety of technology. Enframing is a revealing; a revealing with the character of destining just like poiesis. Nevertheless Enframing as Heidegger pointed out is a revealing that darkens the revealing of poiesis.

After a discussion on the meaning of essence in Socrates and Plato Heidegger claims that essence is about enduring and only through granting something can endure: "All

essencing endures…*Only what is granted endures. That which endures primally out of the earliest beginning is what grants."*[104]Heidegger again emphasizes that man does not invent or make destining, in particular destining of the presence of technology because there is no man out of relations and contextualities. But if Enframing as the extreme danger comes to presence not only for man but for all revealing as Heidegger asks should this be still called "granting?" This granting "takes" man to revealing and in this granting, revealing of the saving power lies as well.

Along as we see technology as something to be mastered, we are missing its essence: "The essence of technology is in a lofty sense ambiguous. Such ambiguity points to the mystery of all revealing, i.e., of truth."[105] Enframing both jeopardizes revealing's own essence, truth and allows saving power to appear. Accordingly, questioning technology is questioning truth's essence.

Human activity cannot directly stand against the extreme danger presented by Enframing. Still human reflection on the saving power's higher nature and its relation to Enframing is possible. At the last part of the discussion Heidegger makes claims that remind of the *Origin of the Work of Art* about art and the poetical in Greek mindset. Accordingly art was regarded as a techne because it was a revealing that belonged to poiesis. Recalling what Plato said about the poetical, "that which shines forth most purely" Heidegger questions whether art can bring the saving power. For him confrontation with the essence of technology will be in the realm of art because it is both fundamentally different from technology and still akin to the essence of technology. In

[104] Ibid., p.30.
[105] Ibid., p.33.

his last sentences we see that Heidegger is warning us about the danger and tells us to be cautious about it through thinking. We do not reach concrete conclusions and "certainly" we are not certain about the essence of technology we have questioned: The closer we come to danger, the more brightly do the ways into saving power begin to shine and the more questioning we become. For questioning is the piety of thought.[106]

[106] Ibid., p.35.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

In conclusion I elaborated on Capobianco's reading of Heidegger. I find his analysis valuable both because it offers a charitable reading of Heidegger and also because it questions the possibility of power metaphysics. Capobianco claims that for Heidegger the manifestness of things is primordial compared to meaning-giving activities. This reading stems from Heidegger's treatment of the Greek word aletheia. Correspondingly Heidegger claims that the notion of truth is fundamentally based on unconcealment of Being and the account of truth that is based on correspondence of mind and object is a derivative account of truth for this reason. In his lecture *On the Essence of Truth*, Heidegger defends that freedom is not ontologically based on human caprice but rather the letting-be of Being. The *Parmenides* course lecture analyses different Greek words and argues that aletheia had a great centrality in the Greek world and the Greek experience of Being. In *On the Origin of the Work of Art*, Heidegger argues that art is an extension of aletheia, unconcealedness. In the *Question Concerning Technology*, he claims that the essence of technology is Enframing which is a mode of revealing that presents things as objects of energy reserve. In all these works, in agreement with Capobianco's emphasis on the notion of truth and truth of Being in Heidegger we see that the manifestness of Being is primordial to humans' meaning-giving activities. For Heidegger ontological prioritization of meaning-giving activities is an outcome of Cartesian subjectivism.

The idea that Heidegger presents his ideas in a dogmatic way seems rather strange to us.[107] The source of this criticism arises from a seemingly Popperian point of view and yet clearly neither Heidegger's nor our intention is to do science. While for science it makes perfect sense to look for fallible propositions, Heidegger criticizes our commonsensical, logically oriented (or should I say dominated) language in several occasions. I mean, do not philosophers crave to present their ideas as if they are indisputable, especially if they are doing metaphysics? Therefore it seems to me that the problem is treating fallible arguments as infallible.

I think that Heidegger with his understanding of truth as unconcealedness gives us the possibility to look at philosophy from an entirely different perspective. As Capobianco indicates, Heidegger uses several different words to name Being but I think unconcealedness or, to use Capobianco's choice of words, manifestness, remains central to his philosophy. Even from a commonsensical point of view which as we saw Heidegger would not approve, making the claim that something is a be-ing and not manifested, unconcealed, is absurd. We do no experience life as sets of 'things that are concealed, non-manifested' phenomena. And yet unconcealed beings presuppose an unconcealed-ness which one might say resembles the metaphysical mode of thinking.

In all the works we engaged with here, *Being and Time, On the Essence of Truth, Origin of the Work of Art and Question Concerning Technology*, manifestness of Being or manifestness of manifestness has an ontological primordiality. We encounter the idea that truth in its original meaning is unconcealedness and this unconcealedness is not a product of a subject with the world of objects and transcends itself to relate with and

[107] Again, a critique from Herman Philipse. Philipse H. *Heidegger's Philosphy of Being*. p.300.

give meaning to entities. That is truth as unconcealedness is the manifestness of Being not a property of an epistemological relation. We see this motivation in both similar and different forms in the works of Heidegger we elaborated on: In *Being and Time* this motivation is presented by the disclosedness of the world which is the primordial mode of truth. In *On the Essence of Truth*, Heidegger proposed the idea of freedom as letting beings be but not as human willing. In the *Origin of the Work of Art*, Heidegger claimed that through art truth unconceals itself in its own way. Finally in *Question Concerning Technology*, Heidegger presented truth as mystery and revealing. It seems to me that Heidegger's different names for Being can be read as different modes of manifestnesses which always are primary to our meaning giving activities. In parallel with Capobianco's reading of Heidegger we might say none of these names are more primordial over another.

I guess that the attempt to make a charitable reading of Heidegger might raise many counter-arguments. A long as I do not read in German or Greek I will not engage with any of the possible discussions that might claim that Heidegger unjustifiably plays with German words or misinterprets Greek words and Greek historical context or even worse; manipulates German and Greek words for his purposes. Still, after reading our presentation one might have the question whether the writer of this thesis is a Heideggerian and whether he thinks Heidegger philosophized in a dogmatic way. As I mentioned in the introduction part, my ideas are intensely influenced and inspired by Heidegger's way of thinking. My intention in doing this investigation was to question whether Heidegger's reading of Western philosophy and his treatment of the history of

Being as epochal destiny might be fruitful for my onto-homogenous, anti-hierarchical reading of Being and thus the metaphysics of power I try to develop.

As Capobianco argues, for Heidegger the most decisive definition of truth in Aristotle was Being as Truth that is Being as unconcealedness. If this is the case then can we say that for Heidegger the question of meaning is not something to be epistemologically solved by using subject-object dichotomies but rather there is an oscillation/tension between unconcealment and concealment, earth and world, *poiesis* and standing-reserve? Is it possible to read of Aristotle based on his (Heidegger's) own definition of Being qua unconcealment that *hypokeimenon* and *symbebekota* are both simply manifested and therefore the Latinized version of *hypokeimenon* as *substantia* and then essence is 'as beingly as' the properties predicated on the subject matter. It seems through Heidegger emphasis on unconcealment of Being, we might construct a possibly new ontological framework that will not allow us to take philosophy as an investigation of essences. One may dismiss such questions by claiming that there should be *kinds* of manifestnesses. But this is exactly the point we try to stand against. Asking for kinds of manifestness is not approaching Being *as manifestness*. Thus this refutation would be metaphysical in the sense of presenting kinds and hierarchies towards Being. Additionally, I think the strong connection between truth and untruth; unconcealedness and concealedness and the acceptance of the being of nothing could be a starting point to take Heidegger's ontology as an anti-hierarchical approach towards Being. As Capobianco says: "…for Heidegger, *to eon*, Being names the unitary and unifying (*hen, das Eine*), temporal-spatial (*Ereignis, Lichtung, Gegnet),* finite, negative (*a-letheia*),

appearing/emerging/arising (*physis*) of beings in their beingness."[108] For Heidegger as we already mentioned none of these names are more primordial because they indicate "the same" and yet not identical. It seems the different names of Being in Heidegger are not *kinds* of manifestnesses in the categorical sense.

Are we then allowed to ask the question of the nature of manifestness? Is this a legitimate question? Keeping in mind our homogenous reading of Being, shouldn't we say, 'Truly, what doesn't manifest itself? Thoughts, badly written thesis, fallacies, and corrupted politicians… I think that if we accept the Heideggerian understanding of the truth of Being in relation to Capobianco's remarks we can make the claim that insofar as the truth of Being is the unconcealment, the manifestness of Being; our ontological investigations should be constructed on the acknowledgement of this 'truth.' If Being is ontologically and primordially 'Being' without any categorization, any determination that hierarchize one type of being over another (as long as in this approach the emphasis is not on the types of being) I think that power metaphysics might make sense. After all, beings, taken in their manifestness, nothing might be acknowledged as a being as well. Nonetheless only one thing seems certain to me: questions remain and even reproduce. In terms of history of philosophy we might ask can we make the claim that western metaphysics is built on hierarchization/categorization of Being? In terms of philosophy of religion yet other questions might be posed: what kind of theoretical framework would come out if we are to accept this anti-hierarchical approach towards Being and to contemplate on monotheistic God? Can this approach become a type of defense for monistic accounts about the Being of God? Moreover in terms of Heidegger literature

[108] Capobianco R. *Engaging Heidegger*. p.142.

we might ask the question if manifestness of Being that is truth of Being unravels itself through different names, can we take Heidegger's theory of epochs as an explanation of how aletheia, physis, freedom was historically treated metaphysically and therefore forgotten? *Is history of Being the history of the hierarchization of Being and can a homogenous account of Being dehierarchize beingness of Being?* As I pointed out it seems to me with the help of Capobianco's treatment of Heidegger, Heidegger's account of truth can be taken in parallel to this onto-homogenous that is non-hierarchical account of Being to possibly develop a theory on the being of nothing. I hope these questions and presumably many more will unravel or, to use the Heideggerian term, will open themselves to us for a more contemplative and deep philosophy.

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