

THE ROLE OF THE EMPEROR IN POSTWAR JAPAN:  
AN ANALYSIS OF EMPEROR SHOWA'S ADDRESSES  
AT PARLIAMENT OPENINGS

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AT PARLIAMENT OPENINGS

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## DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

I, Reyhan Silingar, certify that

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## ABSTRACT

### The Emperor's Role in Postwar Japan:

#### An Analysis of Emperor Showa's Addresses at Parliament Openings

Japan has the oldest and yet still continuing monarchy in the world. Despite the change of the emperors along with Japanese history, the question remains the same: What precisely is the role of the emperor in a highly developed country with liberal democracy? This thesis will attempt to answer this continuously asked question with a discourse analysis of Emperor Showa's addresses at the opening ceremony of the National Diet (Japanese parliament) between 1947 and 1988. By putting forward the context of the Showa emperor, one of the most controversial figures in modern times in terms of the role he is believed to have played in the decade of Japanese expansionism during WW II, this thesis will argue that the emperor is not a mere symbolic figurehead. This thesis will ultimately prove with its empirical findings that the emperor serves the collective memory of Japan possessing an integrative power and thus contributes to the stabilization of the country.

## ÖZET

Savaş Sonrası Japonya'da İmparatorun Rolü:

İmparator Showa'nın Parlamento Açılışındaki Adreslerinin Analizi

Tarih boyunca dünyanın en eski ve hala devam eden monarşisine sahip olan Japonya'da imparatorlar sürekli değişmiştir. Fakat bir soru aynı kalmaktadır: İmparatorun liberal demokrasiye sahip çok gelişmiş bir ülkede rolü tam olarak nedir? Bu tez, sürekli sorulan bu soruyu, 1947 ve 1988 yılları arasında Japon Parlamentosu açılış törenlerinde imparator Showa'nın konuşmalarının söylem analizi ile cevaplamaya çalışacaktır. Bu tez, II. Dünya Savaşı sırasında Japon yayılmacılığında oynadığı düşünülen rol açısından sıkça tartışılan isimlerinden biri olan imparator Showa'nın hükümdarlığının içeriğini ortaya koyarak, imparatorun aslında sadece sembolik bir figür olmadığını göstermektedir. Bu tez nihai olarak imparatorun birleştirici bir güce sahip olduğunu, Japonya'nın kolektif hafızasına hizmet ettiğini ve dolayısıyla ülkenin istikrara kavuşmasına katkıda bulunduğunu ampirik bulgularıyla kanıtlamaktadır.

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## TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION.....	1
1.1 The emperor in context .....	1
1.2 Theoretical framework.....	13
1.3 Research questions.....	18
1.4 Methodology .....	18
1.5 The structure of the thesis .....	20
CHAPTER 2: THE POSTWAR EMPEROR SYSTEM .....	22
2.1 Introduction.....	22
2.2 The start of the postwar emperor system (1945-1989) .....	22
2.3 Toward the new Constitution.....	27
2.4 The new Constitution.....	30
2.5 Emperor as a symbol.....	33
2.6 Crisis without the Emperor .....	40
2.7 The formation of the enterprise state and the emperor system .....	50
2.8 The Meiji centennial and emperor ideology .....	54
2.9 Era name legislation and grass-roots conservatism .....	60
2.10 Suzuki's textbook problem and the rise of the Nakasone cabinet .....	62
2.11 Power and authority .....	70
2.12 The death of Emperor Hirohito.....	72
2.13 Conclusion .....	75

CHAPTER 3: THE SAFEGUARD IMPERIAL HOUSEHOLD AGENCY .....	76
3.1 Introduction.....	76
3.2 The Imperial Household Agency .....	77
3.3 The separation of court and government palace autonomy .....	80
3.4 The palace bureaucracy: Gatekeepers of the imperial will .....	82
3.5 The offices and personnel of the palace bureaucracy .....	87
3.6 Bureaucratic operatives of the emperor-in-court as emperor-in-public...	91
3.7 The inner side: Sanctuary of the emperor-in-chambers .....	96
3.8 The offices and officers of palace leadership.....	100
3.9 The new imperial institution, or still the old one? .....	103
3.10 Palace leaders and emperor’s duties as a symbol .....	114
3.11 Conclusion .....	121
CHAPTER 4: STAGE ONE: QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS .....	124
4.1 Introduction.....	124
4.2 Co-occurrence analysis .....	125
4.3 Hierarchical cluster analysis .....	132
4.4 Collocation analysis .....	137
4.5 Conclusion .....	139
CHAPTER 5: STAGE TWO: QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS .....	141
5.1 Introduction.....	141
5.2 Post-war recovery 1947-52 .....	142

5.3 Resurgent Japan: 1952-1973 .....	154
5.4 Toward the end of the Cold War period: 1973-1989 .....	191
5.5 Conclusion .....	198
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION .....	202
6.1 Introduction.....	202
6.2 Contribution to the literature.....	203
6.3 Limitations and suggestions for further research.....	208
REFERENCES: .....	209
APPENDIX A: LIST OF THE EMPEROR’S SPEECHES .....	223
APPENDIX B: THE CONSTITUTION OF THE EMPIRE OF JAPAN (1889)....	233
APPENDIX C: THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN .....	242

## LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Offices of the Imperial Household Ministry, 1945.....	88
Table 2. Imperial Household Ministry Officials, 1924-1942.....	89
Table 3. Personal Breakdown of the Ministry's Officials, 1943.....	90
Table 4. Official Salaries of the Leading Government and Court, 1939.....	91
Table 5. Terms in Nodes Clustered Within Community A and E.....	128
Table 6. Terms in Nodes Clustered Within Community B and C.....	129
Table 7. Terms in Nodes Clustered Within Community D and F.....	130
Table 8. Terms in Nodes Clustered Within Community H, I, and J.....	131
Table 9. Terms Within Clusters A.....	134
Table 10. Terms Within Clusters B to E .....	135
Table 11. Terms Within Clusters F to I.....	136
Table 12. Collocation Analysis of the Emperor's Speeches.....	138

# CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION

### 1.1 The emperor in context

Throughout the topsy-turvy transformations of the imperial system, the meaning of the emperor has undergone several changes: from a shaman-farmer, to the kami in absentia during the Tokugawa period, to the Manifest/Visible Deity during the Meiji period, reduction to a symbolic emperor (Shocho Tenno) at the end of World War II, and, finally, “an emperor for the masses” (Taishu Tenno).<sup>1</sup>

The changing nature of the emperor reflects that it is a dynamic topic, which is still being hotly debated both in and outside of Japan. Since the mid-nineteenth century, each era has coincided with the reign of an individual emperor, starting with the “Meiji” (Enlightened rule) from 1868 to 1912 and “Taisho” era subsequently. The “Showa” (enlightened harmony) era corresponded to the reign of Emperor Hirohito from 1926 to 1989. The “Heisei” era, which is translated as “achieving peace,” began in 1989 after Hirohito died and Akihito ascended to the throne from 1989 to 2019. The new imperial era is now named “Reiwa,” with Naruhito taking the throne in May 2019. Despite the change of the emperors along with the history, the question remains the same: What precisely is the role of the emperor in Japan? This thesis will attempt to answer this continuously asked question with a discourse analysis of the Showa Emperor’s addresses at the opening ceremony of the National Diet (Japanese parliament) between 1947 and 1988. By putting forward the context of the emperor, this thesis will argue that the emperor is not a mere symbolic figurehead. This thesis will prove with its empirical findings that the emperor serves the

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<sup>1</sup> Ohnuki-Tierney, “The Emperor of Japan as Deity(Kami),” 207.

collective memory of Japan possessing an integrative power and thus contributes to the stabilization of the country.

It is not odd to state that most of the studies tackled with the emperor's role in politics, due to Japan being a highly developed country with a liberal democracy and yet continuing the oldest monarchy in the world surviving the extreme challenge of the WW II, when the fact that the emperors' role is central to understanding the development of constitutional monarchy, parliamentary government, and Japanese statecraft in the modern era considered. One dominant opinion is that the Emperor's role is no more than a religious and cultural symbol. Herschel Webb, who contributed to the field with particularly analysing the Tokugawa Period, stressed that between the years 1600-1868, with the exception of the two decades preceding the Meiji Restoration, "emperors were not only politically impotent, but they were virtually imprisoned (in the imperial palace in Kyoto)."<sup>2</sup> Webb added, "The effective government of the time permitted the throne to retain certain ceremonial prerogatives, but the emperors had no true powers of state."<sup>3</sup> Ben Ami Shillony has too participated in the field questioning the role of the emperors in Japan. He puts forward that the historical role of the Japanese emperors was not the same as the kings and emperors in most other countries. Despite the dynasty being so sacred that no one could even dare to overthrow it in history, the emperors of Japan were, in fact, weaker than royals in other countries.<sup>4</sup> He accepts the fact that the imperial court of Japan adopted the trappings of the imperial court of China, however, it never administrated the state in the way that the Chinese monarchs did, putting forward this was the norm in Japan. In addition, the emperors of Japan could be minors or (unlike

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<sup>2</sup> Webb, *The Japanese Imperial Institution in the Tokugawa Period*, ix.

<sup>3</sup> Webb, *The Japanese Imperial Institution in the Tokugawa Period*, 4.

<sup>4</sup> Shillony, *The Emperors of Modern Japan*, 1.

in China) women (the daughters of emperors) with the throne reverting to the male line after their reign. Yet, “there was only one case, in 715, when a reigning empress, Gemmei, the daughter of an emperor and the widow of a crown prince, was succeeded by another woman, her daughter Genshō who was born from that prince”<sup>5</sup> states Shillony. In addition, unlike in other countries, where abdication of kings was an infrequent phenomenon, about half of the historic emperors (not including the mythical ones), despite their sacred position, resigned out of their own will or on the demands of the people in power in Japan.<sup>6</sup> This can be viewed even today when the emperor Akihito’s recent abdication is considered. David Titus, whose tremendous contribution has been a great benefit for building up Chapter 3 of the thesis, also agrees to the argument that the emperor was a mere ornament in actual politics, a powerless figurehead in the pre-war system,<sup>7</sup> analysing the imperial palace in which the emperor enjoys his unique place. However, he adds, the emperor continued being the superintendent of the supreme right of rule – he was perceived as the locus of final political authority.<sup>8</sup>

A counter view to particularly Shillony is illustrated by Herbert P. Bix concerning the emperor Showa. He articulates that;

while the rest of the world disassociated the emperor ‘any meaningful personal role’ in the decision-making process and insisted on seeing him as an impotent figurehead lacking notable intellectual endowments, he was actually smarter and shrewder than most people gave him credit for, and more energetic too.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Shillony, *The Emperors of Modern Japan*, 1.

<sup>6</sup> Shillony, *The Emperors of Modern Japan*, 1.

<sup>7</sup> Titus, *The Making of the ‘Symbol Emperor System’ in Postwar Japan*, 540.

<sup>8</sup> Titus, *The Making of the ‘Symbol Emperor System’ in Postwar Japan*, 540.

<sup>9</sup> Bix, *Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan*, 12.

He continues referring to the emperor Hirohito's case that "there is as much to be learned from what he does not say and do as what he does."<sup>10</sup> According to him, the emperor exerted a high degree of influence and was seldom powerless to act whenever he chose to and when he did not exercise his discretion to influence policy or alter some planned course of action, his decisions bore consequences.<sup>11</sup> He even claims that Hirohito was the "major protagonist" of the WWII, questioning the lack of emperor's war responsibility,<sup>12</sup> which was the general consensus at the Tokyo International Military Tribunal that has formed the legal foundation for the continuation of Japan's monarchy in the post war period. Shillony criticizes Bix's theory which is based on "the vast powers the emperor wielded, on the aggressive edicts, orders, and declarations he issued, and on the hawkish persons he appointed to leadership positions."<sup>13</sup> Shillony instead emphasizes that the Meiji Constitution established the emperor as a supreme ruler, invested him with the powers to declare war and determine policy, and gave him direct command over the armed forces. Bix claims that this derived from "the ancient notion that the emperor was the medium through which the gods worked their will."<sup>14</sup> Therefore, Hirohito was burdened with "enormous responsibilities from which he could have no escape so long as he ruled."<sup>15</sup> Yet the historic facts are different in the eyes of Shillony. "In both the ancient tradition and the modern practice, the emperors were symbolic rulers, sanctioning the policies of those whom they had officially 'chosen,' but who in fact gained power by their own means."<sup>16</sup> According to Kenneth J. Ruoff, too, only a few emperors are

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<sup>10</sup> Bix, *Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan*, 12.

<sup>11</sup> Bix, *Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan*, 12.

<sup>12</sup> Bix, *Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan*, 520.

<sup>13</sup> Shillony, "Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan by Herbert P. Bix," 142.

<sup>14</sup> Shillony, *Collected Writings of Ben-Ami Shillony*, 54.

<sup>15</sup> Shillony, *Collected Writings of Ben-Ami Shillony*, 442.

<sup>16</sup> Shillony, "Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan by Herbert P. Bix," 142.

thought to have served as actual rulers. He even exaggerates arguing that “it is not clear what significance the emperor held to the majority of Japanese before the modern era.”<sup>17</sup>

Bix was not alone in his arguments, however. David Bergamini, in *Japan's Imperial Conspiracy* published in 1971, criticized the emperor in the narrative of the World War II even before Bix,<sup>18</sup> proposing that the passive image of the emperor was, in fact, a total cover-up. Peter Wetzler's *Hirohito and War: Imperial Tradition and Military Decision Making in Prewar Japan* (1998)<sup>19</sup> also puts forward the view that the emperor's primary goal was to protect *kokutai* 国体(National Polity),<sup>20</sup> which was later mentioned by Bix in his book, concluding that the emperor partly shares the war responsibility.

It is not hard to guess that these discussions about the emperor's war responsibility have also achieved a certain popularity among the leftist scholars in Japan, who have also taken a negative position, criticizing the emperor particularly in terms of the failure for taking any responsibility for the war. Kojima Noboru's *Tenno*<sup>21</sup> published in 1974, Kawahara Toshiaki's study<sup>22</sup> published in 1983 and the co-authors Yamada Akira and Koketsu's book<sup>23</sup> published in 1991 could be the examples that can be referred. Perhaps Atsushi Akane criticized the emperor in his

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<sup>17</sup> Ruoff, *Japanese Symbol Monarchy in Japan's Postwar Democracy, 1945-95*, 3.

<sup>18</sup> Bergamini, *Japan's Imperial Conspiracy*.

<sup>19</sup> Wetzler, *Hirohito and War: Imperial Tradition and Military Decision Making in Prewar Japan*.

<sup>20</sup> The ideology of National Polity is that sovereign and people form one body. For further please see; Murakami Shigeyoshi 村上重, *Kokka Shintō* 国家神道 [*State shinto*]; Kiyohara Sadao 清原貞雄, *Kokutai Ronshi* 國體論史 [Historical study of national polity]; David Magarey, *Emperor and Nation in Japan*, 237-238.

<sup>21</sup> Noboru, *Tenno* 天皇 [The Emperor], 1-355.

<sup>22</sup> Kawahara, 天皇裕仁の昭和史 [Emperor Hirohito in the history of Showa]

<sup>23</sup> Akira and Atsushi, *Oso sugita seidan: shōwadenkō no sensō shidō to sensō sekinin* 遅すぎた聖断: 昭和天皇の戦争指導と戦争責任 [The sacred decision that came too late: Showa Emperor's war guidance and war responsibility].

article more than anybody, stating that the pre-war emperor system survived by accusing the Japanese Army with regards to the earlier war responsibility.<sup>24</sup> The rightist, who is also the relative of the Meiji Emperor and an instructor of Keio University, Takeda Tsuneyasu, however strongly believes that “from when the Meiji Constitution was promulgated until the present time, the emperor directly made a decision on national polity only once: the imperial decision to end the war in 1945.”<sup>25</sup> According to him, all other decisions were taken by the institutions that possessed the corresponding authority.<sup>26</sup>

Along with the role of emperors, the “emperor system” has also been the subject of debate. Before introducing the main arguments relating to the emperor system itself, it would be useful to demonstrate how Constitutional change shaped the direction of the emperor system and the debate surrounding it.

The pre-war emperor system (*tennosei*) ended in 1945 with the enactment of the new 1947 Constitution. The Meiji Constitution (The Constitution of the Empire of Japan) had been curated by the first prime minister, Ito Hirobumi (1841-1909) under the influence of the German Constitution<sup>27</sup> and promulgated in 1889 had bequeathed sovereignty to the emperor, presiding over all the branches of the government-executive, legislative, and juridical to the emperor.<sup>28</sup> According to the Constitution of Japan of 1947, however, the people of Japan are the state and sovereignty ultimately lies with them. A comparison of some of the salient elements of the Constitution of 1889 and the constitution of 1947 indicates the fundamental

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<sup>24</sup> Akane, *Gendai tennōsei no yakuwari no yakuwari wa doko ni aru no ka* 現代天皇制の役割の役割はどこにあるのか [Where is the role of the modern emperor system], 16.

<sup>25</sup> Takeda, “Did the Emperor of Japan really fall from being a ruler to a symbol?,” 2.

<sup>26</sup> Takeda, “Did the Emperor of Japan really fall from being a ruler to a symbol?,” 2.

<sup>27</sup> Ishii, *A History of Political Institutions in Japan*, 119; Takii, *The Meiji Constitution*, ix-48.

<sup>28</sup> Ishii, *A History of Political Institutions in Japan*, 112-121

difference between them, which, according to Jay Allen Schmidt, is the fact that prior to 1946, popular sovereignty was absent from Japan's historical experience.<sup>29</sup> An interesting point that Schmidt made is that the postwar document was created for the people of Japan. Conversely, the Meiji Constitution, also called as *kintei kempo* 欽定憲法 (*imperial bestowed Constitution*), was made by the ruling political oligarchs and handed down to the people by the emperor as a gracious gift. He adds: "The government used the emperor system in such a way that ministerial decisions would pass through imperial hands for the sake of legitimacy."<sup>30</sup> Ishii Ryosuke also states that the emperor "was used by the militarists as a shield against the criticism of their wrongful and illegal acts."<sup>31</sup>

The new Constitution also transformed the subject to citizen. Schmidt explains the idea of the subject in Japan briefly by stating that it was based on the relationship between the people and the emperor and the legitimacy that the emperor derived from the Constitution. Without the emperor, there would technically be no subjects in Japan.<sup>32</sup> According to Irokawa Daikichi, subject mentality ensures the survival of the system.<sup>33</sup> Schmidt makes a similar argument by stating that: "the subject mentality allows the emperor system to thrive today."<sup>34</sup>

In addition, the Constitution of 1889 focused on the emperor and his authority. The personal pronouns "we", and "our" refer to the emperor and his ancestral line. On the contrary, in the new Constitution, "we" and "our", indicate the Japanese people. The preamble to the 1889 Constitution establishes the sacred lineage of the emperor through no religion reference, which gives him the authority to issue

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<sup>29</sup> Schmidt, "The Role of the Japanese Emperor: Theory and Reality," 31.

<sup>30</sup> Schmidt, "The Role of the Japanese Emperor: Theory and Reality," 31.

<sup>31</sup> Ishii, *A History of Political Institutions in Japan*, 125.

<sup>32</sup> Schmidt, "The Role of the Japanese Emperor: Theory and Reality," 25.

<sup>33</sup> Irokawa, *The Subject Mentality*, 35.

<sup>34</sup> Schmidt, "The Role of the Japanese Emperor: Theory and Reality," 28.

Imperial Rescripts and the rights of sovereignty, which were inherited from his ancestors. At the end of the preamble, there is a provision, which declares that the emperor's ministers are to be responsible for carrying out the duties of the constitution on the emperor's behalf. Therefore, it appears that the emperor maintained his authority in principle. However, his ministers exercised it. Edwin O. Reischauer and Marius B. Jansen state: "the constitution naturally centred around the emperor and his authority, since a restoration of his supposedly direct rule had been justification for the overthrow of the Tokugawa."<sup>35</sup> In actuality, however, "the emperor was not expected to rule but to merely validate the decisions made by his ministers."<sup>36</sup>

According to Schmidt, the Meiji Constitution reduced words to the motivation of the political oligarchs of the Meiji Era. He further remarks that their idea was to use the emperor system as an ideological spoonful of sugar to help the people swallow the reforms and modernization in Japan.<sup>37</sup> They never intended the emperor to hold any political sway in Japan whatsoever. They wanted to hurry Japan along the road to reform by putting the longstanding beliefs of the people into a legal framework.<sup>38</sup> However, contrary to the emperor under Meiji Constitution, the postwar Constitution requires the emperor to obtain "the advice and approval of the cabinet" even to perform the ten acts in matters of state defined in article 7 (which includes promulgation of constitutional amendments, laws, cabinet orders, and treaties, convocation of the Diet, and the dissolution of the House of Representatives) as clearly stated above.<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> Reischauer & Jansen, *The Japanese Today: Change and Continuity*, 56.

<sup>36</sup> Reischauer & Jansen, *The Japanese Today: Change and Continuity*, 56.

<sup>37</sup> Schmidt, "The Role of the Japanese Emperor: Theory and Reality," 33

<sup>38</sup> Schmidt, "The Role of the Japanese Emperor: Theory and Reality," 33

<sup>39</sup> Ruoff, *Japanese Symbol Monarchy in Japan's Postwar Democracy, 1945-95*, 115.

Lastly, it is worthy to reflect Ruoff's view regarding the 1947 Constitution of Japan, which, according to him, was designed to remove the emperor from politics. He draws the conclusion that the new Constitution limited the emperor to performing ceremonial acts and adds: "Constitutions may change overnight but imperial practices and habits do not necessarily change so quickly."<sup>40</sup> He also argues that the Constitution of Japan does not explicitly forbid briefings or the emperor's making political statements and regards these grey areas being sources of contention. During the four decades from 1947 until his death in 1989, the emperor continued to be briefed on political matters on a regular basis by government ministers, although at least one prime minister had reservations about the constitutionality of this practice.<sup>41</sup>

With this constitutional change and debate in mind, if we now turn to the emperor system itself, the "emperor system" as a monarchy is often regarded as a source of stability and a necessary element in Japan's prosperity. With regards to the system itself, Mori Koichi puts forward the view that the emperor system served as "the key principle of social and political unification from the very beginning of the Meiji period."<sup>42</sup> He further remarks "Meiji Restoration leaders chose the emperor system as the principle by which to rule the nation and increase its wealth and military strength."<sup>43</sup> According to Yawata Kazuo, who is a conservative cultural critic, as cited by David McNeill, and the supporter of the emperor system stresses "tradition" and the emperor system as a "source of stability,"<sup>44</sup> "a key reason why Japan was able to make the post-war transition to peace and economic prosperity."<sup>45</sup> McNeill asserts that the success of post-war Japan is owing to the fact that the

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<sup>40</sup> Ruoff, *Japanese Symbol Monarchy in Japan's Postwar Democracy, 1945-95*, 115.

<sup>41</sup> Ruoff, *Japanese Symbol Monarchy in Japan's Postwar Democracy, 1945-95*, 115.

<sup>42</sup> Koichi, "The Emperor of Japan: A historical Study in Religious Symbolism," 522-565.

<sup>43</sup> Koichi, "The Emperor of Japan: A historical Study in Religious Symbolism," 522-565.

<sup>44</sup> McNeill, "What Role Japan's Imperial Family", 5.

<sup>45</sup> McNeill, "What Role Japan's Imperial Family", 5.

Japanese gathered around the Imperial family, who has a long historical tradition, to create a peaceful state. McNeil further remarks that Ivan Hall calls Japan's monarchy: the "ultimate linchpin of the myth of Japanese uniqueness and the lodestar for the most repressive ideas of racial superiority." He states that "keeping it around gives the ultra-right its sense of legitimacy."<sup>46</sup> Shillony is also lined up stating "despite their weakness, the Japanese emperors were the only ones who could bestow legitimacy on the actual rulers and provide them with coveted imperial titles."<sup>47</sup> The emperors legitimized the status quo, but they could also sanction change as Meiji emperor did following the Meiji Restoration of 1868 bestowing legitimacy on the new government and its sweeping reforms. Moreover, he adds that "the imperial institution hindered democracy by sanctioning the authoritarian state, but it also provided the stability which was needed for modernization."<sup>48</sup> Carol Gluck agrees by stating that; "In the first years after the Restoration, from 1868 to 1881, the new government invoked the imperial institution as the symbolic centre of the unified nation and displayed the young Meiji emperor as the personal manifestation of the recently wrought political unity."<sup>49</sup> There was no room in Japan for a charismatic dictator, like the 'great leaders' who appeared in other modernizing societies. owing to the essence of the sacred monarch.<sup>50</sup>

As hinted earlier, the Showa Emperor was one of the most controversial figures in modern times, in terms of the role he is believed to have played in the decade of Japanese expansionism during WWII leading to the 1941–1945 Asian-Pacific War. Becoming the 124th emperor of Japan at the age of twenty-five after the death of his

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<sup>46</sup> McNeill, "What Role Japan's Imperial Family", 5.

<sup>47</sup> Shillony, *The Emperors of Modern Japan*, 5.

<sup>48</sup> Shillony, *The Emperors of Modern Japan*, 2.

<sup>49</sup> Gluck, *Japan's Modern Myths: Ideology in the late Meiji Period*, 73.

<sup>50</sup> Gluck, *Japan's Modern Myths: Ideology in the late Meiji Period*, 73.

father and recording the longest imperial reign in Japanese history and the longest in recent world history, Hirohito marked the period from many respects as Japan experienced a great upheaval and change wrought by the 1929 Great Depression, a series of wars between 1931 and 1945 the “15 year War”<sup>51</sup> resulting in the devastation of the country as well as the destruction of the empire, a tremendous foreign occupation between 1931 and 1952, an unprecedented recovery from the ruins of war, and the country’s rapid development as an economic superpower.<sup>52</sup> The emperor who graduated from the Peers’ School at Tokyo at the age of eighteen and is proficient in Japanese and Chinese classics, both in French and English, in political science and history was only known by his citizens with his frequent tours in the rural districts.<sup>53</sup> However, he still remains a hotly debated figure both within Japan and overseas even today.

Having said that, one might also agree to the point made by Stephen S. Large that the “Emperor himself is lost in the mists of generalization”<sup>54</sup> and inference and the controversies with regards to his political role and place in history may never be resolved to everyone’s satisfaction due to inadequate information. Even if new material comes out, they do not include the personal writings of the Emperor himself like a diary he may have kept, personal letters, and the like and scholars are forced to rely on indirect resources comprising the memoirs and diaries of court officials, politicians, military men and foreign officials who interacted with the Emperor in one context or another, as well as on Japanese government documents and various

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<sup>51</sup> In historical studies of Japan, the term ‘15-year war’ is very commonly used as a convenient shorthand reference to the complex decade of the 1930s and the first half of the 1940s. According to Ienaga Saburo The Pacific War began with the invasion of China in 1931 and the events of the period 1931 to 1945 are inseparable. Ienaga Saburo, *The Pacific War, 1931–1945: A Critical Perspective on Japan’s Role in World War II*, xiii, 3.

<sup>52</sup> Large, *Emperor Hirohito and Showa Japan: A Political Bibliography*, 1.

<sup>53</sup> Gowen, *An Outline History of Japan*, 411-412.

<sup>54</sup> Large, *Emperor Hirohito and Showa Japan: A Political Bibliography*, 4.

secondary sources including biographies, histories, and so forth.<sup>55</sup>

The aim of this thesis is not questioning the war responsibility of the emperor. Amidst these discussions, this study aims to understand the role of the controversial figure by putting forward in which context he reigns as a “symbol”, through analysing his speeches at the opening ceremony of the National Diet (Japanese Parliament) between the years of 1947 and 1989. The track record of the previous studies does reveal that the emperor’s speeches, which have not been analysed until this point, are significant as a primary source to understand the role of the emperor in post war Japan.

One should acknowledge the notable contribution on discourse analysis conducted by Azuma Shoji, in which she examines the speech style of the late Japanese Emperor Hirohito during his long 8-year visit to the countryside in an attempt to encourage war-defeated Japanese between 1946-54. Shoji identifies that the emperor converged his speech style to that of listeners who were lower in social status, in accordance with the speech accommodation theory and further suggests that “the attribution of the meaning of the message is determined by the listener's evaluation of its appropriateness.”<sup>56</sup> However, this study little has limits to help better our understanding of the roles of emperors in Japan specifically due to its focus on the Occupation Period (1945-52), which creates a distorted view of the monarchy.

Put simply, the review of the extant literature on the topic clearly exhibits, it is still a topic which needs to be sufficiently investigated and analysed in order to put forward a full understanding particularly with an unbiased approach. Therefore, this thesis will attempt to fill some of the gap to further decipher the role of the emperor

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<sup>55</sup> Large, *Emperor Hirohito and Showa Japan: A Political Bibliography*, 4.

<sup>56</sup> Shoji, “Speech Accommodation and Japanese Emperor Hirohito,” 189-202.

from an interdisciplinary approach by analysing the opening speeches of the emperor at the National Diet from 1947 to 1988. In doing so, this study will put forward that the emperor is not a mere symbolic figurehead, but a figure who serves to the collective memory of Japan possessing an integrative power and thus contributes to the stabilization of the country.

## 1.2 Theoretical framework

This thesis will apply the method of Critical Discourse Studies (CDS) by first starting from its theoretical tenets, later illustrating its connection to power conceptions, and finally introduce multiplicity of approaches used in CDS.

Michel Foucault's Theory of Discourse is defined by Chris Weedon as;

ways of constituting knowledge, together with the social practices, forms of subjectivity and power relations which inhere in such knowledges and relations between them. Discourses are more than ways of thinking and producing meaning. They constitute the 'nature' of the body, unconscious and conscious mind and emotional life of the subjects they seek to govern.<sup>57</sup>

Discourse, a multidimensional social phenomenon, is used to refer to a wide-range of communicative outputs,<sup>58</sup> and is considered both a form of semiosis, i.e. the intersubjective production of meaning, and a form of social practice.<sup>59</sup> CDS “sets out to make visible through analysis, and to criticize, connections between properties of texts and social processes and relations (ideologies, power relations) [...]” where the context of language use reveals fundamental messages.<sup>60</sup> Norman Fairclough

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<sup>57</sup> Weedon, “Feminist Practice and Poststructuralist Theory,” 108.

<sup>58</sup> Van Dijk, *Society and Discourse: How Social Contexts Influence Text and Talk*, 67.

<sup>59</sup> Fairclough & Wodak, *Critical Discourse Analysis* in T. van Dijk (ed.), 258; Jessop, “Critical semiotic analysis and cultural political economy”, 161; Fairclough et al, “Discourse Studies: A Multidisciplinary Introduction.”

<sup>60</sup> Fairclough, *Critical Discourse Analysis*, 97.

and Ruth Wodak further highlights the fact that language use is a form of social practice implying a dialectical relationship between a discursive event and the components which frame it.<sup>61</sup> Moreover, discourse constitutes objects of knowledge and social identities of and relationships between groups of people.<sup>62</sup>

With this dialectical relationship in mind, CDS examines the power relations and ideologies which refer to “particular ways of representing and constructing society which reproduce unequal relations of power, relations of domination and exploitation.”<sup>63</sup> CDS, stem from Critical Linguistics (CL), an approach to linguistics, which takes a particular interest in power as a central theoretical issue<sup>64</sup> and traces back to Critical Theory which advocates socially-directed research aimed at “critiquing and changing society”<sup>65</sup> CDS recognizes language as a social action under the assumption that its analysis will provide insights into social issues due to the fact that they are constituted in language use, at least partially.<sup>66</sup>

Given the background above, a theory of power is required in CDS. Although the traditional conceptions generally recognize power as being able to make someone do something they do not want to do,<sup>67</sup> different definitions illustrate that power can have more complex meanings. Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz argue that power, indeed, has two faces. The first face is that power is totally embodied and fully reflected in “concrete decisions” or “in activity bearing directly upon their making.”<sup>68</sup>

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<sup>61</sup> Fairclough & Wodak, *Critical Discourse Analysis* in T. van Dijk (ed.), 258.

<sup>62</sup> Fairclough & Wodak, *Critical Discourse Analysis* in T. van Dijk (ed.), 258.

<sup>63</sup> Fairclough et al, “Discourse Studies: A Multidisciplinary Introduction,” 369-371.

<sup>64</sup> Flowerdew et al, “Advances in Discourse Studies,” 195.

<sup>65</sup> Wodak & Meyer, “Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis,” 6.

<sup>66</sup> Flowerdew et al, “Advances in Discourse Studies,” 11.

<sup>67</sup> Dahl, “The Concept of Power.”

<sup>68</sup> Bachrach & Baratz, “Two Faces of Power,” 7.

As they argue;

“Of course, power is exercised when A participates in the making of decisions that affect B. Power is also exercised when A devotes his energies to creating or reinforcing social and political values and institutional practices that limit the scope of the political process to public consideration of only those issues which are comparatively innocuous to A. To the extent that A succeeds in doing this, B is prevented, for all practical purposes, from bringing to the fore any issues that might in their resolution be seriously detrimental to A’s set of preferences”<sup>69</sup>

They put forward that “to the extent that a person or group - consciously or unconsciously -creates or reinforces barriers to the public airing of policy conflicts, that person or group has power.”<sup>70</sup> They also bring this fundamentally significant concept of the mobilization of bias into the discussion of power defining as;

...a set of predominant values, beliefs, rituals, and institutional procedures (‘rules of the game’) that operate systematically and consistently to the benefit of certain persons and groups at the expense of others. Those who benefit are placed in a preferred position to defend and promote their vested interests. More often than not, the ‘status quo defenders’ are a minority or elite group within the population in question. Elitism, however, is neither foreordained nor omnipresent: as opponents of the war in Viet Nam can readily attest, the mobilization of bias can and frequently does benefit a clear majority.<sup>71</sup>

Steven Lukes argues that power can be observed through conflict where, whether overt or covert, practices may embrace coercion, influence, authority, force, manipulation and so forth<sup>72</sup>. In this context, according to Lukes, power may be exercised over another party to getting him to do what he does not want to do. However, it is also likely to be viewed in terms of influencing, shaping or determining his “very wants.”<sup>73</sup>

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<sup>69</sup> Bachrach & Baratz, “Two Faces of Power,” 7.

<sup>70</sup> Bachrach & Baratz, “Two Faces of Power,” 8.

<sup>71</sup> Bachrach & Baratz, *Power and Poverty: Theory and Practice*, 43-44.

<sup>72</sup> Lukes, *Power*, 21-27.

<sup>73</sup> Lukes, *Power*, 27.

Finally, it is significant to cite the power division of Kenneth E. Boulding as he views divides power into three forms: First, coercive or destructive power where threats are a common form of practice; second, economic or productive power such as exchange and trade, which is based on a model of supplying or denying people materials whether they are desired or needed; and third, which will be this thesis base, integrative power such as building and maintaining relationships and social bonds based on love, amity, trust, and so on.<sup>74</sup>

Boulding maintains crucially that power within social structures is considered to comprise a mixture of all three forms mentioned above. However, power is maintained owing to the legitimation which is highly dependent on integrative power.<sup>75</sup> It would not be incorrect to state that related theories similarly signify the importance of legitimacy where its contestation and hence control inherently involves semiosis.

Finally, power also can be illustrated as hard and soft power.<sup>76</sup> While hard power coerces, and soft power co-opts. It is important to signify the fact that soft power relies on the ability of a state (or non-state actor) in order to influence others' behaviours and grounds on three main resources namely; its culture, its political values, and its foreign policies ( particularly when they are seen as legitimate and possessing moral authority).<sup>77</sup>

Having said that, CDS applies an interdisciplinary research in an attempt to

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<sup>74</sup> Boulding, *Three Faces of Power*, 15-251

<sup>75</sup> Boulding, *Three Faces of Power*, 130-261; Cox, *Universal Foreigner: The Individual and the World*, 352.

<sup>76</sup> Nye, *The Future of Power*.

<sup>77</sup> Nye, *The Future of Power*, 84.

elucidating power structures that exist within society.<sup>78</sup> CDS has, indeed, various approaches to discourse analysis, some of which are summarized below.

a) The dialectical-relational approach: A transdisciplinary approach which focuses on “the discursive aspect of contemporary processes of social transformation.”<sup>79</sup>

b) The discourse-historical approach: An inductive approach which attempts to integrate background information associated with a particular discourse to explicate discourses of prejudice.<sup>80</sup>

c) The socio-cognitive approach: An approach focusing on the relations between knowledge and discourse through the cognitive sciences and social psychology, and how social interactions and contexts condition the production, comprehension, and memorization of discourses.<sup>81</sup>

d) The corpus-based approach: An approach which employs computer- based methods of analysis such as text-mining from corpus linguistics affording both quantitative and qualitative perspectives from textual analysis.<sup>82</sup>

Another two approaches worthy to mention are the Dispositive Analysis approach<sup>83</sup> and the Social Actors Approach.<sup>84</sup>

Overall, due to CDS being a discipline committed to exploring the relationship between language and power along with the fact that the theories of power addressed above hinted the role of legitimation in pursuit of the maintenance

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<sup>78</sup> Fairclough & Wodak, *Critical Discourse Analysis* in T. van Dijk (ed.).

<sup>79</sup> Fairclough et al, “Discourse Studies: A Multidisciplinary Introduction,” 362.

<sup>80</sup> Fairclough et al, “Discourse Studies: A Multidisciplinary Introduction,” 364.

<sup>81</sup> Fairclough et al, “Discourse Studies: A Multidisciplinary Introduction,” 363-364.

<sup>82</sup> Fairclough et al, “Discourse Studies: A Multidisciplinary Introduction,” 365-366.

<sup>83</sup> Jäger & Maier, “Theoretical and methodological aspects of Foucauldian critical discourse analysis and dispositive analysis,” in Ruth Wodak and Michael Meyer (Eds), 34- 61.

<sup>84</sup> Leeuwen, “Discourse as the recontextualization of social practice: A guide,” 144-161.

of power as a social structure, which is often considered to rely a linguistic dimension, CDS is considered the best approach suitable to this study.

### 1.3 Research questions

This thesis will seek answers and insights into the following questions by analysing the speeches of the emperor at the National Diet Opening Ceremony from 1947 to 1988 in pursuant of putting forward context of the emperor's reign.

- What is the role of the emperor in post-war Japan between the years of 1947 and 1989?
- How did the emperor position himself in Japan?
- What precisely is the context of the emperor's reign?
- What is the role of the Imperial Household Agency in Japan and how does it function?
- Did the emperor possess any kind of power?

### 1.4 Methodology

This section explains the methodology for the analysis. This comprises of two stages: Stage one constitutes a quantitative analysis of textual data of the Emperor Showa's speeches from at the National Diet Opening Ceremony between the years of 1947 and 1989. In the second stage, a qualitative analysis will be conducted.

In stage one, a text mining software is employed in order to assess the emperor's speeches. The software used is KH Coder, open-source software which allows users to conduct quantitative content analyses and text-mining of text.<sup>85</sup> The analysis aims to assess what issues occur most frequently in the emperor's speeches as a basis for locating themes that the emperor most frequently discusses. Repetition of key terms is taken to be a measure of salience or emphasis in qualitative analysis

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<sup>85</sup> Higuchi, "KH Coder Reference Manual," 1-97.

and subject to further analysis. Themes are defined as clusters of terms within a community. The analysis's aim is to assess salient areas within the emperor's speeches and examine the concepts and issues these surrounds.

This stage is split into the following steps: First, speeches of the emperor from the National Diet Opening Ceremony from 1947 and 1988 will be collected and compiled into a dataset appropriate for the KH coder usage. Second, a co-occurrence analysis of centrality and community, a hierarchical cluster analysis and a collocation analysis will be conducted on the dataset to identify themes. Themes will be exhibited as clusters of terms within a community. This will be followed up with an examination of the collocations of identified themes.

By doing so, it is intended to identify themes in detecting areas in his speeches of high repetition, which is taken to reflect a degree of salience or at least emphasis. To do this, it requires a holistic analysis of Emperor's speeches to provide a basis by which the analysis can 'step down' in stages from the macro level to the micro-level of textual analysis, and hence this will ensure that it has been done without the researcher's arbitrarily selecting texts. The methodological approach to the analysis can be summarized as below.

For both stages, all texts, from the 1st session to the 113rd session of the National Diet, 107 speeches in total, were retrieved from archived speeches provided at "<http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/sangiin/main.html>." To note, emperor's speeches at the 14th, 54th, 63rd, 83rd, 103rd, 105th sessions of National Diet Opening Ceremony could not be collected due to them being missing. However, the data constitutes of speeches from every single year from 1947 to 1988, not a year missing. The list of the speeches which are analysed with dates and titles are provided in the Appendices. For a detailed explanation please refer to Appendix A.

Stage two provides the qualitative analysis of texts of research methodology using the discourse-historical approach, attempting to integrate background information associated with a particular discourse to explicate discourses of prejudice. Thus, the qualitative analysis will be supplemented by the findings in stage one and the themes identified through the quantitative analyses will be subject to qualitative analysis in order to understand the main patterns of usage for each keyword in a theme. Stage two will ‘zoom-in’ to the analysis of text specifically, to critically analyse the emperor’s speeches.

The aim of combining these two stages is demonstrating a holistic approach to understanding the context of the emperor’s reign. In doing so, the claims made in the qualitative analysis have more impact due to the fact that they relate to the historical background in stage one by affording greater detail in contextualizing and explaining the patterns of language use that have been identified in the analysis.

### 1.5 The structure of the thesis

This section explains the structure of this thesis following on from the introduction, theoretical framework, research questions and methodology provided above. First, Chapter 2 provides an overview of research into the post-war emperor system between the years of 1947 to 1989 in order to offer a historical background, in which a ‘symbol emperor’ has been created. Chapter 3 discusses the Imperial Household Agency in an attempt to understand the general character and functions of the long-standing institution. It introduces the imperial institution along with its history and organizational function. Chapter 4 constitutes the quantitative analysis of text carried out with the use of the text-mining software KH Coder in order to detect the themes that the emperor comments on. Following this, Chapter 5 comprises a qualitative

analysis throughout the emperor's speeches based on the analyses in Chapter 4 in order to identify the emperor's major themes, employing the discourse- historical approach to CDS. Finally, Chapter 6 offers a conclusion to this thesis summarizing its analytical findings and discussing the thesis' broader contributions to Discourse Studies, Japanese Studies, Political Science, and offers suggestions for future research and improvements along with the limitations experienced in this study.

With this, the thesis now turns to the Chapter 2, the post-war emperor system, which aims to explain the historical and political context upon which the analysis in Chapter 4 and 5 will be constructed. Finally, the thesis will be concluded in Chapter 6.

## CHAPTER 2

### THE POSTWAR EMPEROR SYSTEM

#### 2.1 Introduction

This chapter revolves around the questions of how the Japanese legally interpreted the emperor's role as a symbol, both in theory and in practice, how it was welcomed by the society and what kind of transformation was experienced by the emperor Showa. To do so, it starts dealing from the process of the Constitution of 1947 to the death of the emperor. In tracing back to the sixty-two years of the longest imperial reign in Japanese history that the Japanese people experienced the "upheavals of Showa" namely; World depression, the "Fifteen Year War," defeat, foreign occupation, rapid economic growth, and the two oil shocks, this chapter aims to give us an understanding of the system that the emperor was in from 1947 to 1989 in a broad sense. It will also build our knowledge in order to understand the discourses to be analysed both in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5.

#### 2.2 The start of the postwar emperor system (1945-1989)

The ties between Us and Our people have always stood upon mutual trust and affection. They do not depend on mere legends and myths. They are not predicated on the false conception that the emperor is divine, and that the Japanese people are superior to other races and fated to rule the World.<sup>86</sup>

With the *Tenno Ningsengen* 天皇人間宣言 (Declaration of Humanity) address of Emperor Hirohito, which was broadcast over national radio on January 1, 1946, the postwar emperor system made its start, after the surrender of Japan WW II. This

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<sup>86</sup> Hirohito, "Declaration of Humanity."

section will start with an analysis of this shocking speech which built the way to the new Constitution that defines the emperor as “symbol.”

According to Masanori Nakamura, the speech was issued when the issue of war responsibility became acute.<sup>87</sup> The rescript was first drafted by Harold G. Henderson, head of the Education, Religious, and Cultural Resources Division within GHQ’s Civil Intelligence and Education Section (CIE), and Reginald H. Blyth, and English professor at the Peers School. On the Japanese side, however, Yamanashi Katsunoshin, the president of the Peers School, Prime Minister Kijūrō Shidehara, Education Minister Maeda Tamon, and others are also stated to have examined and written comments on the Japanese and English texts.<sup>88</sup> According to Herbert Bix, the draft-translation-revision process imaged the interplay between the court, intent on defending the *kokutai*, the national polity of Japan, and American policymakers, who were ambivalent about the monarchy and believed that its reform was best approached indirectly.<sup>89</sup> Bix asserts that it stands out on the Japanese side that Emperor Hirohito was reluctant to deny his descent from the Sun Goddess, Amaterasu Omikami. He remarks that the emperor rather wanted to stress the union of monarchy and democracy since the Meiji period.<sup>90</sup> He further asserts that that was why he inserted, at the beginning of the rescript, the five articles of the Charter Oath of 1868—an oath his grandfather had sworn to Amaterasu Omikami rather than to the Japanese people and continues; in doing so, he pushed into the background the message that his relationship with the people was not based upon his supposed

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<sup>87</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 109.

<sup>88</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 109.

<sup>89</sup> Bix, “Inventing the ‘Symbol Monarchy’ in Japan, 1945-52,” 329.

<sup>90</sup> Bix, “Inventing the ‘Symbol Monarchy’ in Japan, 1945-52,” 329.

divinity that he publicly renounced once and for all time.<sup>91</sup> Even though Bix claims so, there is no viable resource to prove that the Charter Oath of 1868 had been sworn to Amaterasu Omikami. He further maintains that by taking the line that *shinai to keiai* 親愛と敬愛 (mutual trust and reverent affection) between the emperor and the people were the basis of the imperial system, they could downplay, without over explicitly repudiating, the Shinto foundation myths that few Japanese still believed in.<sup>92</sup>

That said, Bix continues arguing that Western press coverage of the rescript ignored the fact that Hirohito failed to refer to the doctrine that his sovereign powers of state derived from the Amaterasu Omikami, and rather covered that by issuing the rescript the emperor had become “one of the great reformers in Japanese history.”<sup>93</sup> Furthermore, MacArthur seems to have guided the speculation with his words as follows:

The emperor's New Year's statement pleases me very much. By it, he undertakes a leading part in the democratization of his people. He squarely takes his stand for the future along liberal lines. His action reflects the irresistible influence of a sound idea. A sound idea cannot be stopped.<sup>94</sup>

On the Japanese side however, the leading Japanese daily newspaper gave front-page coverage to the rescript. Banner headlines running horizontally across the front page of the Mainichi declared, “We Bestow an Imperial Rescript for the New Year,” “Ties of Trust and Affection,” “We are with the Nation.”<sup>95</sup> Moreover, Prime Minister Shidehara declared as follows:

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<sup>91</sup> Bix, “Inventing the ‘Symbol Monarchy’ in Japan, 1945-52,” 329.

<sup>92</sup> Akazawa, “Shocho tennosei no keisei to senso sekininron,” 46 as cited in Bix, “Inventing the ‘Symbol Monarchy’ in Japan, 1945-52,” 329.

<sup>93</sup> Bix, “Inventing the ‘Symbol Monarchy’ in Japan, 1945-52,” 330

<sup>94</sup> Bix, “Inventing the ‘Symbol Monarchy’ in Japan, 1945-52,” 330.

<sup>95</sup> Bix, “Inventing the ‘Symbol Monarchy’ in Japan, 1945-52,” 330.

We are deeply moved with awe at His Majesty's consideration. At the beginning of this rescript, His Majesty cited the Charter Oath of Five Articles that was promulgated in March 1868, and in which the development of democracy in our country already had its foundation. The intention of the Charter Oath became manifested only gradually: first came the Imperial Instruction of 1881 to open a Diet; next, the promulgation of the Meiji Constitution in 1889; then the development of parliamentary politics. Parliamentary politics in this country from the beginning has been based on these fundamental principles. The promise was there, and our parliamentary politics should have developed healthily. Unfortunately, in recent years the process was oppressed by reactionary forces.... The benevolent intention of the great Meiji Emperor was lost sight of. Now, however, we the nation have a new opportunity to start afresh.... We shall construct a new state that is thoroughly democratic, pacifistic, and rational. Thereby we shall set His Majesty's heart at ease. <sup>96</sup>

It is natural that both due to the fact that the emperor's voice was heard on the radio and the content of his New Year's address were a real shock to the Japanese.

Needless to state that it was considered as an epoch-making time in history, which contributed to reshaping the emperor's image and creating a new imperial system. It is necessary here to cite Bix's point as he signifies that by emphasizing his qualities as a human being and asserting that the basis of his relationship with the people had always been one of trust and affection, the emperor, in effect, had inaugurated his own "adoration."<sup>97</sup> He also considers that the popular books and news articles followed and the photographic image manipulations that accompanied them as a necessary condition for the construction of the symbol monarchy as constitutional revision, which would come a few months later.<sup>98</sup> The emperor has been described as an extraordinary natural scientist, a "sage" (*tetsujin*), a "personality of great stature"

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<sup>96</sup> Sakamoto, *Shocho tennosei e no pafomansu: Showaki no tenno gyoko no henshen*, 96, as cited in Bix, "Inventing the 'Symbol Monarchy' in Japan, 1945-52," 330.

<sup>97</sup> Bix, "Inventing the 'Symbol Monarchy' in Japan, 1945-52," 330.

<sup>98</sup> Bix, "Inventing the 'Symbol Monarchy' in Japan, 1945-52," 330.

(idai na gojinkaku), and, above all, a “peace-loving, highly cultured intellectual” (heiwa aiko no bunkajin) who was “always with the people” in those writings.<sup>99</sup>

It is also crucial to mention the intellectual world of the subject. The historian Tsuda Sokichi has been the earliest post-surrender monarchy contributor with an article to the April 1946 issue of the new postwar intellectual journal *Sekai* after Hirohito’s address.<sup>100</sup> For Tsuda, the emperor was ‘our emperor’ who had to be loved, since ‘loving him is the most consequential form democracy can assume, the grand manifestation of a humanitarian spirit that will automatically find worldwide recognition.’<sup>101</sup> He argued that no emperor had ever been a divinity, that emperors are compatible with democracy, and that throughout most of Japanese recorded history, power and authority had always been divided between emperor and ruling class. Tsuda went on to argue that emperors had never ruled directly. In his view, it was “the great majority of the people, rather than the Showa emperor, who were mainly to blame for having led Japan astray.”<sup>102</sup> Despite the fact that Tsuda was attacked for blaming the people rather than their leaders for Japan’s predicament, many of his arguments “became pillars of the postwar orthodoxy on the throne.”<sup>103</sup>

Furthermore, it is significant to state that Hirohito affirmed the supreme importance of the imperial house by emphasizing his descent from the gods, even after Japan’s defeat and occupation. Before the emperor’s famous renunciation of

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<sup>99</sup> Noboru, *Ningen tenno*, as cited in Bix, “Inventing the ‘Symbol Monarchy’ in Japan, 1945-52,” 331.

<sup>100</sup> Tsuda, “Kenkoku no jijo to bansei ikkei no shiso,” 472-473, as cited in Bix, “Inventing the ‘Symbol Monarchy’ in Japan, 1945-52,” 331-332.

<sup>101</sup> Tsuda, “Kenkoku no jijo to bansei ikkei no shiso,” 472-473, as cited in Bix, “Inventing the ‘Symbol Monarchy’ in Japan, 1945-52,” 331-332.

<sup>102</sup> Tsuda, “Kenkoku no jijo to bansei ikkei no shiso,” 53-54, as cited in Bix, “Inventing the ‘Symbol Monarchy’ in Japan, 1945-52,” 332.

<sup>103</sup> Bix, “Inventing the ‘Symbol Monarchy’ in Japan, 1945-52,” 332.

divine status, he is stated to have told his vice-grand chamberlain, Kinoshita Michio (1887-1974) as follows: <sup>104</sup>

It is permissible to say that the idea that the Japanese are descendants of the gods is a false conception, but it is absolutely impermissible to call chimerical the idea that the emperor is a descendant of the gods.<sup>105</sup>

Wetzler rightly argues that though Hirohito disavowed the divine origins of the Japanese people, he reaffirmed the special symbolic relation between the imperial house and Japan's gods. <sup>106</sup> When the Japanese version of the Imperial Rescript denying the divinity of the emperor is analysed, it can clearly be seen that the emperor uses *Akitsumikami* 現御神 (living god), which is not the same kanji in *Kojiki* as it describes the emperor *Arahitogami* 現人神 (manifest deity), the living representative of a divine imperial line. <sup>107</sup> Emperor Hirohito's comment that he denied divinity but not his nature as manifest deity furthermore shows the undeciphered layers of the question.

### 2.3 Toward the new Constitution

Having mentioned the Humanity Declaration, which paved the way to a new Constitution, the ambiguity of the status and future of the emperor due to his war responsibility was raising the questions to be solved by GHQ. This section will attempt to describe the climate in the establishment process of the new Constitution in order to understand the birth of the "symbol monarchy".

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<sup>104</sup> Wetzler, *Hirohito and War: Imperial Tradition and Military Decision Making in Prewar Japan*, 3.

<sup>105</sup> Wetzler, *Hirohito and War: Imperial Tradition and Military Decision Making in Prewar Japan*, 3.

<sup>106</sup> Wetzler, *Hirohito and War: Imperial Tradition and Military Decision Making in Prewar Japan*, 3.

<sup>107</sup> William Wetherall, "Imperial Rescript denying divinity," *Yoshabunko.com*, 2019, [http://www.yoshabunko.com/empires/Imperial\\_rescript\\_1946-01-01.html](http://www.yoshabunko.com/empires/Imperial_rescript_1946-01-01.html).

Among the three choices of the US State Department to consider with regards to the future of the emperor system, the real tension involved the second and third choices: to preserve the system and use it to their advantage or to preserve the emperor system but suspend the emperor's power and authority. The first option, which was not carried into effect, was to abolish the system altogether.<sup>108</sup>

The Japanese, on the other hand, were deeply concerned that the emperor system was in danger of being dismantled by the Allies. Bix argues that the primary concern of nearly all conservatives, socialists, and liberal politicians was to preserve the *kokutai*, which, in their view, required a politically empowered emperor available for use in an internal crisis.<sup>109</sup> Nakamura states that long before the end of the war it had been Joseph Clark Grew's, an American career diplomat and one of the most illustrious ambassadors ever posted to Tokyo, contention that the emperor system would be the key to Japan's unconditional surrender.<sup>110</sup> Grew, who spent nearly ten years in Japan between 1932 and 1942, saw the accoutrements of the emperor system as being beneficial to Japan's development after the war.<sup>111</sup> One of Grew's significant arguments during this time was that he was not necessarily advocating that Hirohito should be preserved but he did argue that someone should be emperor. Grew was more concerned with the institution of the emperor system, not necessarily the emperor himself while MacArthur not only wanted to preserve the emperor system, but also wanted to keep Hirohito as the emperor. In the end, it was decided that the emperor system would remain intact and Hirohito would continue to reign as

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<sup>108</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 64.

<sup>109</sup> Bix, "Inventing the 'Symbol Monarchy' in Japan, 1945-52," 337.

<sup>110</sup> Grew was also the first U.S. Ambassador to Turkey (1927-1932) and signed the Turkish-American Treaty of Lausanne.

<sup>111</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 3.

emperor. The reasoning for this decision revolved around the fact that the emperor system and Hirohito himself would provide a measure of continuity for the Japanese people and allow them to recover from the pain of the war much easier.<sup>112</sup> Schmidt analyses it that once again the emperor system was used during a time of agonizing transition in Japan, which was practiced in the Meiji reforms.<sup>113</sup> Following the full debate and significant revision in the Diet, the new Constitution of Japan was promulgated on November 3, 1946 and went into effect on May 3, 1947. By then, the Imperial Household Ministry had become the *Kunaifu* 宮内府 (Imperial Household Office) and the number of its employees had been greatly reduced. The peerage had been abolished. The National Treasury had taken over the budget of the Imperial Household Office, and the state had taken title to the Imperial Museums, which now became National Museums. When the constitutional moment arrived, Hirohito sanctioned the most progressive reform ever presented to him. By his assent, he himself became a symbol of the nation that claimed descent from the “homogeneous” Yamato-race, and also a symbol of sovereignty, no longer a wielder of sovereignty.<sup>114</sup> Bix considers that the emperor gave his assent due to the fear: fear he would be pressured into abdication, and fear that with prolonged public discussion of his hesitancy would come an uncontrollable debate on republicanism, which would end in the Japanese monarchy itself-not just his own reign-being eliminated.

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<sup>112</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 61-64.

<sup>113</sup> Schmidt, “The Role of the Japanese Emperor: Theory and Reality,” 40.

<sup>114</sup> Bix, “Inventing the ‘Symbol Monarchy’ in Japan, 1945-52,” 340.

<sup>115</sup> Bix, “Inventing the ‘Symbol Monarchy’ in Japan, 1945-52,” 340.

## 2.4 The new Constitution

The new Constitution, enacted under the aegis of the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces (SCAP), included many reforms affecting both the position of the emperor as well as the political position of the Japanese people and organs of government. Though many occupation reforms were amended and some even reversed, the key articles of the Constitution affecting the relative position of the emperor and the expressed relationship between religion and state remain unchanged.<sup>116</sup> Below an overview of the important articles involved and the various perspectives related in the review is presented. Looking closer at each of them will enable us to define the political context in which Emperor Hirohito rehearsed his role. It will also give us insight into the political culture of early postwar Japan.

The first eight articles of the postwar Constitution specify the position and primary functions of the emperor. In addition to Article one, as further referred in the annex, these articles clearly stipulate the duties of the emperor and place him in a position subordinate to the Cabinet and Diet. Tetsuya Kataoka argues that the Japanese government largely saw the new Constitution as “a contract to take the place of the Potsdam Declaration when the latter proved to be useless in safeguarding the throne.” It had little to do with Japan's choice of democracy ...”

<sup>117</sup>Another significant argument belongs to Kosaka Masataka. He draws the conclusion with his remark that the new Constitution brought the status of the emperor in line with traditions that went back to the thirteenth century and earlier.<sup>118</sup>

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<sup>116</sup> Olson, “The Ritual Creation of a Symbol; A Rhetorical Analysis of Japanese Emperor Akihito’s Accession Rites,” 79.

<sup>117</sup> Kataoka, *Price of Constitution*, 39 as cited in Olson, “The Ritual Creation of a Symbol: A Rhetorical Analysis of Japanese Emperor Akihito’s Accession Rites,” 85.

<sup>118</sup> Masataka, “Showa Era,” 42 as cited in Olson, “The Ritual Creation of a Symbol: A Rhetorical Analysis of Japanese Emperor Akihito’s Accession Rites,” 85.

Kosaka continues “Emperors were rarely political; their purposes were subtler. In the ceremony, they gave meaning to the nation.”<sup>119</sup> Nevertheless, Kyoko Inoue asserts that the Americans at the time of the drafting of the Constitution failed to realize that his role was largely symbolic and limited to ratifying decisions.<sup>120</sup> Reischauer agrees with stating the new constitution focused in on the ambiguities and weaknesses of the old Constitution (see Appendix B).<sup>121</sup> “The emperor was unequivocally defined as the powerless symbol of the unity of the nation, which is in fact what he had long been.”<sup>122</sup> Schmidt also puts forward the same argument that there is little evidence to suggest the emperor of Japan, any emperor of Japan, had ever been much more than a virtually powerless symbolic presence.<sup>123</sup> The new constitution did not, in fact, change the emperor's status and role in a real way but merely defined his role as it had always been practised.<sup>124</sup> Bix considers that “Japan had indeed created a new variant of the genus “constitutional monarchy”- one that was in step with modernity, quite unlike the archaic, secretive, and morally corrupt institution still perpetuating itself in postwar Great Britain.”<sup>125</sup> While Bix associates Japan’s constitutional monarchy with “modernity”, he criticizes Britain’s postwar imperial institution by putting forward an extremely subjective and aggressive claim here. It should also be taken into consideration that the new Japanese constitution also left open the problem of the symbol monarchy’s place in Japanese national identity.<sup>126</sup> How the principles of monarchy and democracy were to be reconciled was one of the questions needed

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<sup>119</sup> Masataka, “Showa Era,” 42 as cited in Olson, “The Ritual Creation of a Symbol: A Rhetorical Analysis of Japanese Emperor Akihito’s Accession Rites,” 85.

<sup>120</sup> Inoue, *MacArthur’s Japanese Constitution*, 4.

<sup>121</sup> Reischauer & Jansen, *The Japanese Today: Change and Continuity*, 106.

<sup>122</sup> Reischauer & Jansen, *The Japanese Today: Change and Continuity*, 106.

<sup>123</sup> Schmidt, “The Role of the Japanese Emperor: Theory and Reality,” 40.

<sup>124</sup> Schmidt, “The Role of the Japanese Emperor: Theory and Reality,” 41.

<sup>125</sup> Bix, “Inventing the ‘Symbol Monarchy’ in Japan, 1945-52,” 341.

<sup>126</sup> Kinoshita Michio, “Seijo no goshinkyō,” 86, as cited in Bix, “Inventing the ‘Symbol Monarchy’ in Japan, 1945-52,” 342.

for clarification. Vice Grand Chamberlain Kinoshita Michio's interview to the editor of the magazine Choryu in 1946 shed a little light on what the emperor thought about the democratization of Japan. Kinoshita answered:

His Majesty thinks that to democratize Japan is to thoroughly carry out the spirit of the imperial house ever since antiquity. That is to say, for the emperor the heart of the imperial house is the heart of the people, and the way to democratize Japan is to make this spirit thoroughgoing.

Question: In order for us to ask the imperial house's heart to become the people's heart, I think, first, that the political form has to be one that allows the people's heart to develop.

Kinoshita: Yes, indeed. The imperial house has to become the spiritual center of the people rather than the center of politics. His Majesty the Emperor will ensure that politics by the people for the people is not wiped out from this country.

Question: From the form, it seems as though the emperor's powers of state might be narrowed. But in reality, they will actually be more fully expanded.

Kinoshita: Yes, indeed. <sup>127</sup>

As clearly seen above in the interview also confirmed by Hirohito, he believed he could remain the moral and spiritual center of the nation. It appears that he also identified himself rhetorically with the democratization process. However how he regards himself as the 'symbol' emperor rhetorically will be analysed in Chapters 4 and 5.

With that in mind, a second profound change created a new dynamic related to the debates over the accession ceremonies. The new Constitution in the Article XIX, which specifies freedom of religion, prohibits that the government from granting special privileges to any religion and from engaging in any kind of religious

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<sup>127</sup> Kinoshita Michio, "Seijo no goshinkyo," 86, as cited in Bix, "Inventing the 'Symbol Monarchy' in Japan, 1945-52," 342.

education or activity (See Appendix C). Helen Hardacre asserts that this article indeed can be seen as an extension of the 1945 Shinto Directive from SCAP prohibiting all state support of Shinto and ordering the removal of Shinto influence from schools.<sup>128</sup> In addition, according to Shillony, the new constitution also established the equality of sexes. It is stated in the Article 14 that, “there shall be no discrimination because of race, creed, sex, social status or family origin.” Shillony adds unlike the Meiji Constitution, the new constitution did not specify anything with regards to the gender of the emperor. However, the new Imperial House Law, which was enacted together with the constitution, preserved the male monarchy. Article 1 of that law stated that the throne “shall be succeeded by male descendants in the male line.” Thus, the exclusion of women from the throne was not abolished, but only shifted from the Constitution to a law. According to Shillony, it could be amended by a simple majority in the Diet now.<sup>129</sup>

## 2.5 Emperor as a symbol

This section will now explain the context that the emperor was officially a symbol. It will provide information regarding the practices of the “symbol emperor” in order to better understand the context of his speeches in the analysis Chapters.

It has been stated earlier in this chapter that “Declaration of Humanity” announcement shocked the whole country once it was released after the August 15, 1945 surrender broadcast which had forced the people to acknowledge defeat. Bix states that the infamous photograph of the Emperor and MacArthur taken by an American cameraman and run by all the leading Japanese newspapers on September 29 also created a sensation. He describes the photo shot from close up, illustrates the

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<sup>128</sup> Hardacre, *Shinto and the State, 1868-1988*, 26.

<sup>129</sup> Shillony, “Japanese Monarchy: Past and Present,” 9.

bespectacled emperor, in formal morning coat and striped trousers, standing as if at attention, necktie straight, and hands by his sides, while beside and towering over him is relaxed and casual MacArthur in an open-necked uniform, bereft of necktie or medals. He adds: “the general’s hands are on his lips and hidden from view and both men are looking ahead at the camera.”<sup>130</sup>

The popular view was that the photo hints that the emperor would soon abdicate. Bix describes Hirohito perfectly exemplifying the defeated nation, meanwhile, MacArthur portrayed completely relaxed and projected the confidence coming from victory. Thus, the emperor that the Japanese people saw there was not a living god but a mortal human beside a much older human to whom he was subservient. It is worthy to mention that with that single photograph, which only photographers certified by the Imperial Household Ministry could be permitted to record under normal circumstances, “a step was taken the emperor from the center of Japanese collective identity.”<sup>131</sup>

After all, the emperor undertook a series of tours to every prefecture of Japan on February 19, 1946, starting in Kawasaki, Yokohama, Yokosuka, and other places in Kanagawa Prefecture. During the regional tours which concluded with a visit to Hokkaido in 1954, the emperor not only encouraged workers to increase production in factories but soothed those who had been injured or who had lost loved ones in the war, consoled those whose homes had been destroyed in the air raids.<sup>132</sup> Needless to say, much of Japan was in ruins, and the emperor encouraged his starving and psychologically devastated countrymen to rebuild.<sup>133</sup> Thereafter he made monthly visits to the provinces accompanied by several Imperial Household officials and

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<sup>130</sup> Bix, *Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan*, 549-550.

<sup>131</sup> Bix, *Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan*, 550.

<sup>132</sup> Bix, *Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan*, 550.

<sup>133</sup> Ruoff, *Japanese Symbol Monarchy in Japan’s Postwar Democracy, 1945-95*, 178.

protected by Military Police jeeps. Nakamura states that before the war, the Japanese people had seen only the figure of the emperor in military uniform, sitting astride a white horse. However, now he shocked the people, showing up to them in a business suit, smiling and shaking hands.<sup>134</sup> While the mass media kept providing accounts of both the real emperor and imperial house, the emperor reached out to the people in person. Therefore, even harsh critics of the emperor system agreed that the popular welcome that greeted the emperor on each of these tours was overwhelmingly positive. The emperor's mixing with the people captured to transmit the emperor's new symbol image to his country people by the cameraman.<sup>135</sup> Nakamura adds that despite the fact that some were puzzled by his sudden transformation, the emperor certainly narrowed at a single stroke the distance between him and the people thanks to those tours.<sup>136</sup> The historian and political scientist Sakamoto Kojiro also dated the first imperial performance designed for the emperor to mix with the people to 19 February 1946, the start of the tours.<sup>137</sup>

That said, it is necessary to reveal that these imperial tours were not new to Japan as the same technique was indeed used by the framers of the Meiji Era so as to project the emperor as having immense popular appeal. This was achieved to a degree by a series of imperial tours in which the emperor set out to meet the people. Ruoff acknowledges that the Meiji government had the purpose of teaching the people that they were subjects of the emperor with a series of tours in 1872, 1876, 1878, 1880, 1881 and 1885.<sup>138</sup> Contrary to the post war imperial tours, however, the

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<sup>134</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 113.

<sup>135</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 113.

<sup>136</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 113.

<sup>137</sup> Ruoff, *Japanese Symbol Monarchy in Japan's Postwar Democracy, 1945-95*, 177.

<sup>138</sup> Ruoff, *Japanese Symbol Monarchy in Japan's Postwar Democracy, 1945-95*, 4.

Meiji emperor was completely untouchable, and these tours were supposed to instill in the people an understanding of the emperor as a father figure as clarified above. Also contributing to the emperor's popular status was the Constitution of 1889, the "Imperial Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors of 1882" and the "Imperial Rescript on Education of 1890."<sup>139</sup>

As the emperor's popularity rose, the inevitable happened. Nakamura states that not just some officials within GHQ warned that the imperial tours were a "strategic movement" aimed at maintaining the emperor system, but also the Japan Communist party, at its party convention, passed a resolution opposing the imperial tours, arguing that "The emperor is avoiding his own war responsibility."<sup>140</sup> The tours were even criticized by the Soviet Union, Australia and New Zealand in a meeting of the Far Eastern Commission in Washington. The next year, in 1948, the imperial tours ceased suddenly.<sup>141</sup>

According to Nakamura, the reason to end the tours is summarized below. From February to March 1948 the Japanese political situation had a dramatic change; the Socialist party cabinet of Katayama Tetsu resigned and was replaced by a Democratic party government under Ashida Hitoshi. Prime Minister Ashida judged that the emperor's great popularity in fact endangered the imperial institution. Therefore, he carried a change in the personnel surrounding the emperor within the Imperial Household, which he considered to have been the driving force behind the imperial tours. Ashida appointed Tajima Michiji, chairman of the Japan Scholarship Foundation, as grand steward of the Imperial Household and Mitani Takanobu, the

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<sup>139</sup> Schmidt, "The Role of the Japanese Emperor: Theory and Reality," 31.

<sup>140</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 113.

<sup>141</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 113.

Christian vice-president of the Peers School, as grand chamberlain. Tajima supported the idea that the emperor should assume moral responsibility for the war and abdicate. Ashida visited GHQ to receive MacArthur's opinion while making these appointments of the emperor's close attendants. MacArthur agreed to the point that the democratization of the court was necessary to avoid criticism from the Soviet Union with regards to the emperor system. Furthermore, it was anticipated that the final verdict in the Tokyo War Crimes Trial would be delivered in the autumn of that year. According to MacArthur, if the emperor maintained a too high profile it might rekindle discussion of the war crime issues. Thus, Tajima put a temporary stop to the imperial tours when he became grand steward of the Imperial Household.<sup>142</sup>

On November 12, 1948, the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal handed down guilty verdicts on twenty-five defendants, and on December 23 seven of them, including Tojo Hideki, were hanged. Nakamura argues that there was an intention to announce the emperor's abdication at the time of the verdicts on General Tojo and the other war suspects. However, MacArthur disagreed with the idea and led to its withdrawal asserting that the emperor could be instrumental in the occupation. The letter below to the general conveyed on his behalf by the grand steward which, might have been through PM Yoshida Shigeru may be the proof that MacArthur induced the emperor to abandon the idea:<sup>143</sup>

November 12, 1948

Excellency,

By Imperial command I have the honour to transmit to Your Excellency a message from His Majesty as follows:

"I am most grateful for the kind and considerate message Your Excellency was good enough to send me by Prime Minister Yoshida the other day. It is

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<sup>142</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 113-114.

<sup>143</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 114.

my lifelong desire to serve the cause of world peace as well as to promote the welfare and happiness of my people. I am determined now more than ever to do my best in concert with the people to surmount all difficulties and speed the national reconstruction of Japan.” (Remainder omitted- N.M) Michiji Tajima.<sup>144</sup>

Thus, the decision in order for the emperor not to abdicate was being tackled with secretly at the highest state policy-making level. Once his continued reign was assured, the emperor kept his imperial tours in 1949 until August 1954.<sup>145</sup>

That said, the discussion with regards to the emperor’s abdication appears to have re-emerged after new historical material of utmost significance that had been provided by the discovery of the unpublished diary of the Privy Seal Kido Koichi in 1987. It appears that the diary revealed that at the time of the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in September 1951, the emperor had resolved to take responsibility for the war and abdicate. Nakamura introduces a key portion of an entry made by Kido in his diary on October 17:

No matter how one looks at it, His Majesty bears the responsibility for losing the war. Therefore, once you thoroughly carried out the terms of the Potsdam Proclamation-in other words, when a peace treaty has been signed- I think it is most proper for you to take responsibility and abdicate for the sake of your imperial ancestors and for the nation...If you do not do this, the end result will be that only the Imperial Family will not have taken responsibility that an unclear mood will remain which, I fear might leave an eternal scar.<sup>146</sup>

Kido Koichi was in Sugamo prison in 1951. However, Nakamura states that the recommendation on abdication was through Matsudaira Yasumasa, the grand master of ceremonies of the Imperial Household Agency. In Kido’s diary on November 28,

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<sup>144</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 114.

<sup>145</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 114.

<sup>146</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 115-116.

1951, the emperor is stated to have entrusted the following message in response.

Kido wrote;

His Majesty himself wishes to abdicate. Both Tajima, the grand steward of the Imperial Household Agency, and Matsudaira, the grand master of ceremonies, are also of the same opinion: but I am very concerned that Prime Minister Yoshida alone takes an attitude of extreme indifference to this problem.<sup>147</sup>

after he learned Matsudaira's answer with regards to the emperor's abdication.

Nakamura argues that Prime Minister Yoshida might have been feared of political confusion erupting as a result. Kido kept this matter as top secret until April 1952, when the peace treaty went into effect. He wrote the following entry in his diary of April 4, 1952:

Prime Minister Yoshida was finally persuaded on the problem of the emperor's abdication and is now considering asking His Majesty to express his will on an occasion such as the anniversary of independence. But I understand that they are finding it very difficult to write a draft announcement because the state is somehow premised on the reign of His Majesty.<sup>148</sup>

Nakamura asserts that the emperor summoned the Grand Steward of the Imperial Household Tajima to make him take down the key points of a statement that he was going to read at the peace treaty ceremony on May 3. The expression "I deeply apologize to the nation for my responsibility for the defeat" appeared in a few places ultimately deleted due to the fact that one of his advisers opposed it judging it was not necessary for His Majesty to apologize in such strong terms. Ultimately, the

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<sup>147</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 115-116.

<sup>148</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 115-116.

emperor read out the following ambiguous expression at the ceremony commemorating the anniversary of the signing of the peace treaty: “At this time, reflecting on the past, judging from the public opinion, and pondering deeply, I decided to bear the heavy burden, despite my inadequacies, and am now constantly troubled as to whether I am equal to the task.”<sup>149</sup>

Nakamura continues with a comment that no one understood emperor’s implication and “deep ponderings” of him. However, those gathered before the Imperial Place to celebrate the restoration of independence with joyful cheers put a stop to the discussion of emperor’s abdication.<sup>150</sup>

## 2.6 Crisis without the Emperor

This section will explain the political turmoil that Japan experienced in the way of transforming the status of the emperor in practical terms. According to Bix Japan weathered the biggest national crisis without the help of the emperor. He further (argues that the rising generation of the LDP leaders drew the lesson that the monarchy was not needed as a crisis-control mechanism.<sup>151</sup> Looking deeper will enable us to create a link between his speeches and the context analysis.

On April 28, 1952, the peace treaty went into effect simultaneously with the U.S-Japan Security Treaty. Nakamura puts forward the view that thus, on one hand, Japan ended the American occupation in Japan after seven years and regained its sovereignty, on the other hand, however, with the Japanese-U.S. Security Treaty signed in 1951, the continuance of presence of U.S forces on Japanese soil was

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<sup>149</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 116.

<sup>150</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 117.

<sup>151</sup> Bix, *Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan*, 663.

compromised. Nakamura asserts further that according to the security treaty, Okinawa continued under direct U.S military control, and a network of bases was spread throughout the island. That led the progressive camp within Japan, centred on the Socialist party, criticizing the peace treaty as “semi-independence” and confronting the Yoshida cabinet, opposing the Security treaty as well as the U.S bases, and advocating an unarmed neutrality policy. The Yoshida cabinet however chose to maintain the Japanese- U.S. Security Treaty as the basis of Japan’s security, reducing military costs as far as possible and putting all the energy into the economic growth instead. That notwithstanding, conservative forces started to divide into pro- and anti-Yoshida groups. <sup>152</sup>Nakamura argues here that “Yoshida line” aggravated the relations with the Soviet Union and China. What is more ironic is that Yoshida line also narrowed Japan’s military and diplomatic options down. Therefore, the anti-Yoshida faction, centred on Hatoyama Ichiro and Kishi Nobusuke, resisted Yoshida’s policy of subordination to the United States and advocated an autonomous foreign policy instead. They also advocated bettering diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union as well as the revision of the constitution. The continued conflict between Yoshida and Hatoyama until 1954 resulted in the formation of the Japan Democratic Party by Hatoyama as president and Kishi as chief secretary.<sup>153</sup>

As stated earlier the approach towards the constitution had been criticized by Hatoyama. Therefore, it was Japan Democratic Party’s first objective to unite politically those forced advocating constitutional revision, backing it up with their argument that the constitution had been unjustly forced by the power of occupation forces and indeed an autonomous constitution ought to be enacted by Japanese.

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<sup>152</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 116.

<sup>153</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 117.

Nakamura argues however that the only objective was not the revision of the article 9. They also sought to change to an autonomous defense system based on remilitarization under the emperor transforming his status from “symbol” to “head of state.”<sup>154</sup> That said, Nakamura adds that the revision of the constitution would not be in pursuit of returning to the prewar system of imperial sovereignty by reason of the following aims of the constitutional revisionists as outlined by Watanabe. First, to increase the authority of the emperor as “the spiritual foundation of the Japanese nation.” Second, they wanted the emperor to be given added authority so as to grant pardons and ratify treaties, which are highly significant customary powers of monarchs. Third, they wanted to give the emperor the power to declare war and peace, proclaim states of emergency orders, and suspend Diet.<sup>155</sup>

After seven years in power, the Yoshida regime could not resist the Japan Democratic Party acting jointly both with the left and right wings and finally fell. It was replaced by the Hatoyama cabinet seeking to implement constitutional revision. Hatayoma’s efforts at revision did not help him however to succeed owing to fierce public opposition and resistance from the conservative group itself as revisions concerning the constitution require a vote of two-thirds or more of all the members of both houses of the Diet according to the present constitution. When the Socialist Party, which had been split between left and right wings, managed to unify their party in October 1955, the conservatives started too to strengthen their own unity. Liberal and Democratic parties established the Liberal-Democratic party (LDP)

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<sup>154</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 119.

<sup>155</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 122.

forming a coalition with Hatoyama Ichiro as its first president.<sup>156</sup> Nakamura assert that this marked the start of the two-party politics era, or the “1955 system.”<sup>157</sup>

The third Hatoyama cabinet made the revision of the constitution the main issue in the House of Councillors election in July 1956. However, the election resulted in failure again; there were sixty-one seats for the LDP versus forty-nine for the Socialists, five for the Ryokufukai, two for the Communists, and ten independent seats. Ultimately, the progressives secured over one-third of the seats in the Upper House. Nakamura correctly argues that if the LDP had obtained more than two-thirds of the seats at that time, the two distinguishing features of the Constitution namely articles 1 and 9 would have been revised. Therefore, the speed of Japan’s expansion of military power along with the campaign to make the emperor a head of state would have grown. He considers the background reason why the Japanese voters disapproved of the Hatoyama cabinet that the war memories of the Japanese people were still vivid in 1956. In addition, he notes that this marked a breakthrough in Japanese history making it almost impossible for the conservative governments to openly advocate the constitutional revision again.<sup>158</sup>

The Japanese media started to give large press coverage to the imperial house in 1958 as the engagement and marriage of the crown prince Akihito marked an important shift in the evolution of the monarchy with the help of the press.<sup>159</sup> Emperor Hirohito and empress Nagako opposed the marriage due to the fact that they believed the intended bride Mitchiko might not be able to handle the intricacies

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<sup>156</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 122.

<sup>157</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 123.

<sup>158</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 123.

<sup>159</sup> Bix, *Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan*, 661.

of palace customs. <sup>160</sup> Nakamura shows that the emperor is stated to have conveyed his opposition by stating, “Don’t you think it will be too difficult for someone who knows absolutely nothing about the customs of the palace?” <sup>161</sup> Bix confirms that the emperor was concerned about the maintenance of the imperial house’s ties to the Shinto considering Michiko’s Christianity however, what made him most worried was rather the break with tradition that the marriage connoted. Unlike Koizumi Shinzo (the former president of Keio Gijuku University, who was in charge of Crown Prince Akihito’s education) and Usami Takeshi (the grand steward of the Imperial Household), <sup>162</sup> Hirohito was opposed to every notion of an “open, popular monarchy.” <sup>163</sup>

A Japanese poll conducted in February 1959 illustrated 87 percent support for Akihito’s choice of a commoner. <sup>164</sup> With the support of Koizumi and others, the marriage of the crown prince and Michiko took place on April 10, 1959. Television stations mobilized all their resources, deploying 108 cameras and 1200 news gatherers to cover the commemorative parade took the couple from the Imperial Palace to the crown’s prince temporary palace following the wedding ceremony. It is estimated that 540,000 well-wishers crowded the route. <sup>165</sup> It is worthy to note what Nakamura puts forward that not dismissing the fact that families bought television sets to be able to watch the marriage parade, the television viewers averaged to an unprecedented level. In addition, Irokawa states that all the weekly magazines issued

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<sup>160</sup> Bix, *Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan*, 661.

<sup>161</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 124.

<sup>162</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 124.

<sup>163</sup> Bix, *Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan*, 661.

<sup>164</sup> Bix, *Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan*, 661.

<sup>165</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 124.

special editions for the occasion; their photo sections were filled with sections and even more news stories that the Daily newspapers published about the event.<sup>166</sup>

What was most interesting is that the article of the political scientist Matsushita Keiichi in the April 1959 issue of Chuo Koron, notes that the “Mitchii boom”, a boom referred to the marriage of the crown prince with Michiko, was undermining the divine image of the imperial family and creating a new image of the emperor that matched the spirit of the new constitution. He added that the social foundation of the monarchy had changed from the old to the new middle class. The imperial house was no longer an object of awe-it had become “a sacred family of stars beloved by the masses.”<sup>167</sup> Nakamura asserts that thus the intentions of the Koizumi and the others had indeed been accomplished as a transition had been affected from the prewar absolute emperor system to a mass monarchy.<sup>168</sup> The marriage of the crown prince was favoured by the younger generations’ understanding of the new constitution considering the fact that the article 24 of the constitution had stipulated that “Marriage shall be based on the mutual consent of both sexes.”<sup>169</sup> Therefore, it can be correctly argued that the “Mitchii boom”(referring to the marriage of the crown prince and Michiko) was also a social phenomenon reflecting the change in the Japanese people’s sense of values that accompanied high economic growth.<sup>170</sup>

That said, the revision attempts have started again when the Kishi Nobusuke cabinet, successor to the Hatoyama regime, began negotiating with the U.S

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<sup>166</sup> Irokawa, *The Age of Hirohito*, 109.

<sup>167</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 124.

<sup>168</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 124.

<sup>169</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 124-125.

<sup>170</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 124-125.

government to revise the Japanese U.S Security Treaty in order to develop a more autonomous diplomacy with the United States. What is more, in pursuit of the constitutional revision, the Kishi cabinet submitted a “Bill on Revision of the Law Concerning the Conduct of Policemen in the Performance of Their Duties” in 1958 to take the necessary action towards anticipated intensification of popular demonstrations. Furthermore, Kishi is stated to have said that he “was determined to revise the treaty in spite of opposition and thought that a revision of the Police Officers Law was absolutely essential in order to maintain public order.”<sup>171</sup>

The aim with this bill was to restrict the freedom of assembly, demonstration, and free speech by empowering police officers to question people, to conduct body searches, and to enter private land and buildings such as union offices, meetings, and lodgings. Sixty-five organizations, including the Socialist party and the labour federation Sohyo, formed the People’s Council to Prevent Revision of the Police Law and staged nationwide, unified demonstrations on five occasions in October and November in response to the issued bill. It was also reflected in the press that the newspapers and magazines wrote about the revival of the police arrogance. Owing to the ideals of “my-home-ism”, which supported the idea to give priority to family and private life and emerged with high economic growth, these slogans were more effectively spread and helped enhance popular opposition to the revision of the Police Duties Law. Nevertheless, the campaign evolved to the combination of the movement to overthrow the Kishi cabinet and oppose the revision of the Security Treaty. On 4<sup>th</sup> of November the government forced through a thirty-day extension of the Diet despite the resistance from the opposition parties. The next day, four million labour union members belonging to Sohyo and other federations that had participated

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<sup>171</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 125.

in the People's Council went on strike to show their opposition to the revision of the Police Law, which was the largest mass mobilization of the 1950s and gave a rise to a new state of affairs.<sup>172</sup>

Due to the heightening of opposition movements, the LDP's internal conflict intensified. After ten days of meetings between leaders of the Socialist party and the LDP, the Bill on Revision of the Police Officers' Performance of Duties Law was withdrawn so as to calm the opposition campaign and maintain the Kishi cabinet. The engagement of the crown prince was announced subsequently. Nakamura correctly argues that the "Mitschii boom" not only helped deflect the nation's attention from politics, but also was effective in temporarily postponing the merger of the anti-Police Law movement with the campaign against the revision of the Security Treaty.<sup>173</sup>

Having said that, Kishi signed in Washington, D.C., a renegotiated and more equitable Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. The old treaty of 1951 gave the U.S. the unrestricted right to station its military forces on Japanese territory, and there was no obligation for the U.S. to consult with the Japanese government in advance with regard to the dispatch of those forces.<sup>174</sup> However, with this new treaty signed on January 19, 1960, the U.S. promised to consult before committing its forces in Japan to military action. The previous treaty also failed to specify the length of time the treaty would remain in effect. The object of this revision was therefore to correct these defects and make it more equitable. American bases remained in Japanese soil, however, and the Japanese Self-Defence Forces were obliged to aid U.S. forces in the

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<sup>172</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 126.

<sup>173</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 127.

<sup>174</sup> Bix, *Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan*, 662.

event that Washington finds itself at war with some other Far Eastern nation (such as China), and that should other nation attack American bases in Japan.<sup>175</sup>

That said, ratification was resisted fiercely by the opposition parties within the Diet and by organized labour and student groups outside the Diet. Five hundred uniformed policemen were brought into the House of Representatives by the Kishi cabinet and the Liberal Democratic party. Therefore, Bix states that the vote on ratification was, indeed, forced. It was followed by a month of the largest demonstrations in Japanese history. The death of a student protester in a clash with the police in front of the Diet building was followed by calls for a general strike by a coalition of union federations and groups of private citizens.<sup>176</sup>

According to Bix, the whole ratification process was rather an emotional ordeal for the emperor.<sup>177</sup> Prime Minister Kishi was planning to ask the emperor to welcome President Eisenhower in person at Haneda Airport as he feared this June 15 struggle would affect the whole country. The emperor is clearly stated to have confirmed his firm resolve to go by saying, "It is my duty to welcome the President at Haneda no matter what dangers might arise."<sup>178</sup> Bix further argues that the emperor hoped to travel to Haneda and be seen riding back to the Palace with him in a limousine past crowds of cheering well-wishers until the very last minute.<sup>179</sup> Nakamura agrees that it would certainly have invited a rapturous welcome from the people, might have even gone further and discouraged the antitreaty forces.<sup>180</sup> Bix agrees by stating that Kishi would then have gotten his treaty renewed while the visit

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<sup>175</sup> Bix, *Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan*, 662.

<sup>176</sup> Bix, *Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan*, 662.

<sup>177</sup> Bix, *Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan*, 663.

<sup>178</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 129.

<sup>179</sup> Bix, *Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan*, 663.

<sup>180</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 129.

also would have helped the emperor raise his status as de facto “head of state,” without any constitutional revision.<sup>181</sup> However, the director of the National Police Agency notified Kishi that he had no confidence in his ability to protect the route from Haneda to the Imperial Palace. In addition, Director General Akagi Munenori, Minister of the Defence Agency, opposed calling out the Self Defence Forces on the day of the visit.<sup>182</sup> Thus, Kishi immediately cancelled the scheduled visit of President Eisenhower to Japan and Four days later the treaty went into effect automatically. The Kishi government resigned subsequently, “having accomplished their primary mission.”<sup>183</sup>

Thus, Bix claims that Japan weathered the biggest national crisis without the emperor’s help.<sup>184</sup> As Nakamura states no Self-Defense card was used either. However, the 1960 antitreaty struggle marked a major breakthrough both in the operation of conservative politics and the position of the emperor within the structure of political rule.<sup>185</sup> Bix concludes that the rising generation of the LDP leaders drew the lesson that the monarchy was not needed as a crisis-control mechanism. He further states that Hirohito’s “dream of someday regaining political relevance” remained only a dream,<sup>186</sup> without putting forward any citable source to prove his claim of Hirohito having that dream.

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<sup>181</sup> Bix, *Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan*, 663.

<sup>182</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 129.

<sup>183</sup> Bix, *Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan*, 663.

<sup>184</sup> Bix, *Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan*, 663.

<sup>185</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 129.

<sup>186</sup> Bix, *Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan*, 663.

## 2.7 The formation of the enterprise state and the emperor system

This section will explain the formation of a state system centred on large enterprises rather than relying on the traditional, authoritarian formula of imperial rule.<sup>187</sup> This will give us an idea to see the values changed through the economic growth, one of which appears to be the attitude towards the emperor.

Following the Kishi cabinet, the next cabinet was formed by the finance Ministry bureaucrat Ikeda Hayato, putting forward the motto of “tolerance and patience”, which made it a must after the anti-treaty movement lasted over a year and has been the largest of the postwar period. In the summer of 1959, Ikeda’s first priority was finding a solution to the Miike strike started with notifications of mass dismissals at the Mitsui Coal Mines.

Given the Japanese energy revolution shifting from coal to oil in the midst of high economic growth, both small and medium scale collieries were being forced to close down. Mining firms were also going under restructuring with dismissing workers and introducing new technology.<sup>188</sup>

The Mitsui Company’s notice for the dismissal of 1,278 miners at its Miike mines created a violent confrontation with the Miike miners’ union. Subsequently, the management locked out the miners, and their union responded by calling an indefinite strike. With the support of the national organizations of miners, the strike, which at the time seems to have been named “the confrontation of organized capital and organized labour,” reached a peak in July, after the settlement of the anti-treaty struggle.<sup>189</sup> Ultimately, the strike ended in the defeat of labour however, the

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<sup>187</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 132.

<sup>188</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 130.

<sup>189</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 131.

antitreaty struggle and the Miike deeply shocked the government and leaders of business and finance thus spurred LDP to change its political course. Nakamura concedes that Ikeda Hayato was the faithful successor to the Yoshida line unlike Hatoyama and his successor Kishi, both of whom, were Yoshida's political enemy indeed. Ikeda's policy was based on Japan's relationship with the United States. He gave profound priority to the economic growth while pursuing limited armament at the same time. He rather sought to govern by avoiding confrontations over the issues like strengthening policy on public order and constitutional revision. Ikeda is stated to have said that he was going to brighten up public sentiment with income doubling in running for president of the LDP Masaya considers it to be a change of pace and also a genuine reform.<sup>190</sup>

The Ikeda cabinet pursued a plan that promised to double the national income in ten years in December 1960. The Japanese economy continued to develop steadily since the "Jimmu boom"<sup>191</sup> of 1955-57, and a further supported in 1956 with Economic White Paper that Japan was "no longer in the postwar era." Moreover, the Jimnu boom was exceeded by "Iwato boom"<sup>192</sup> in 1959 continued until the end of 1961. Nakamura states that the long-term economic plan to double the national income took time owing to the antitreaty struggle and the Miike strike despite the fact that it had started earlier indeed under under Kishi cabinet.<sup>193</sup>

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<sup>190</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 131.

<sup>191</sup> The robust economy was nicknamed the Jimmu Boom referring to the Japanese first Emperor (Emperor Jimmu, accession traditionally dated 660 BC), indicating the fact that it marked the first truly widespread prosperity in Japan's history ; *Labour Situation in Japan and Its Analysis: General Overview 2015/2016*, 2.)

<sup>192</sup> Iwato refers to an episode from Japanese mythology occurring before the accession of the first Emperor, and indicates the fact that Japan had never known such a boom even during the Jimmu Boom years. *Labour Situation in Japan and Its Analysis: General Overview 2015/2016*, 2.)

<sup>193</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 131.

The speed of Japan's economic growth far exceeded the prime minister's expectations under the Ikeda cabinet with a nominal growth rate of 7.2 percent initially and 9 percent at the highest. However, Japan registered a real growth rate of 9.6 percent between 1952 and 1960. Sato Eisaku was the successor after Ikeda's death in 1964 and high growth rate did not stop.<sup>194</sup> According to the numbers, the growth rate between 1965 and 1970 reached 11.6 percent. Put simply, from 1955 until the first oil crisis of 1973, Japan continued to enjoy the growth rate of 15 percent compared to a rate of 6 to 9 percent for the other advanced industrialized countries. Therefore, the Japanese economy had expanded 5.8 times in eighteen years. Furthermore, in 1968 Japan made itself the second largest economy in the capitalist world.<sup>195</sup>

1960s saw Japanese style management based on the three pillars of lifetime employment, seniority wages, and enterprise unionism; and a system was centralized on large enterprises, establishing labour control. Nakamura puts it simply that government and large enterprises completed a political and social system that could control the nation without the need to rely on traditional, authoritarian formula of imperial rule. As specified earlier, Ikeda gave priority to the economic growth dismissing the fact that the LDP's Constitutional Research Group presented a report favouring it in July 1964. As a result, Ikeda's policy worked, noting that in the early 1960s Japan achieved full employment for the first time since the Meiji Restoration of 1868. Following that, the movements of social rebellion became noticeable in Japan from the late 1960s.<sup>196</sup> It is also vital to note that high economic growth

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<sup>194</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 131.

<sup>195</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 132.

<sup>196</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 132.

destroyed the rural village communities that had been the social foundation of the prewar emperor system. With that, on one side a new middle-class sense and anti-authoritarian values and egoism was developed, while many traditional values of the old middle class remained. Nakamura argues that a dual system of modern and premodern values took root in Japanese society.<sup>197</sup> The result of the public opinion surveys of the Showa Emperor in 1988 illustrates that whereas about 70 percent of the older generation (aged sixty and above) responded that they “feel respect” towards the emperor, about 70 percent of the younger generation (aged thirty and below) replied that they “do not feel anything” towards the emperor.<sup>198</sup> According to the reports of Harry Emerson Wildes, a former member of MacArthur’s staff, in January 1946 however, a public opinion poll had demonstrated that 90.1 percent favoured Hirohito, and that all but four of the eighty-nine political parties registered in Japan supported him. In a similar fashion, a poll conducted in 1951 had given him 90.3 percent support, with only the communists opposing him.<sup>199</sup>

Nakamura argues that it was even a common tendency in 1960s.<sup>200</sup> “The feelings of the Japanese towards the Emperor depend on when they were born. In other words, it is clearly determined by what sort of education their generation received regarding the emperor.”<sup>201</sup>

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<sup>197</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 133.

<sup>198</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 136.

<sup>199</sup> Mosley, *Hirohito Emperor of Japan*, 349.

<sup>200</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 136.

<sup>201</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 133.

## 2.8 The Meiji centennial and emperor ideology

This section will explain how the process for the Meiji Centennial sparked the rightists' will to pursue the constitutional revision once again along with other peak periods that the emperor returned to the spotlight.

Soon after his Cabinet formation, Sato Eisaku, came into power in November 1964, stated in his news conference that the spirit of the new constitution was becoming an integral part of the nation and it would be better for them to read the constitution once again. Clearly, this was particularly unexpected from his elder brother Kishi considering that Sato Eisaku is representing the image of a hard-line conservative. Sato clearly illustrates that the smooth management of the politics was his priority as someone who maintained to be in power for eight years from 1964 to 1972, being consistently negative toward the constitutional revision.<sup>202</sup>

In addition, it is worthy to mention that the emperor returned to the spotlight with the 1964 Tokyo Olympics and the early years of the high-speed economic growth. Irokawa states that with the economy rapidly heading toward the triumphant Iwato Boom, the emperor declared the opening of the games, and with well-orchestrated fanfare, reappeared on the world stage as the leader of a fully rehabilitated Japan.<sup>203</sup> Mosley claims that the emperor emerged for one happy moment during the Olympic Games by quoting his conversation with the United States Ambassador, Edwin O. Reischauer; "this is the happiest moment of my life. I fear I have been cut off too much from my people. This is the first time I have been to a public spectacle since 1957, and it is most enjoyable." He added; "But I don't

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<sup>202</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 133-134.

<sup>203</sup> Irokawa, *The Age of Hirohito*, 109.

think I am out of touch. I am very keen on television. I do not need to envy any more people who travel to different places. It has made all the difference to my life.”<sup>204</sup>

News related to the emperor steadily declined from 1962 to 1967, however increased with the year of Meiji centennial celebrations. The preparations took almost 2 years for the Sato cabinet to mark the anniversary by sponsoring tree-planting events, the construction of parks, the preservation and exaltation of history and the promotion of international understanding by sending young people abroad on sea voyages. With the participation of the Emperor and Empress, Prime Minister Sato, the diplomatic corps, and nine hundred youth representatives, the main ceremony held on October 23, 1968, paving the way for the success of Japan’s modernization since the start of the Meiji era.<sup>205</sup>

That said, the government set a Meiji Centennial Preparatory Council to plan the celebrations, appointing all twenty ministers of the Sato cabinet, twenty-five group representatives, as well as forty-two men of “learning and experience.” Nakamura highlights that the ultranationalist intellectual who served as the society’s ideological leader, Yasuoka Masahiro, was appointed to the centennial publicity committee, maintaining the success of the Meiji Emperor lay with the greatness of the Meiji Emperor. <sup>206</sup> That thesis became the guiding theme of the centennial celebrations. <sup>207</sup>

The process for the Meiji Centennial activated the rightists to pursue the constitutional revision once again. The rightist Kodama Yoshio, who was considered

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<sup>204</sup> Mosley, *Hirohito Emperor of Japan*, 350.

<sup>205</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 133.

<sup>206</sup> Brown, “Yasuoka Masahiro and the New Bureaucrats in Early Showa,” 286.

<sup>207</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 133.

to have financed the beginnings of the Liberal Democratic Party,<sup>208</sup> convened a lecture series for young students, and he is told to have delivered a speech in which he declared that, “The present constitution is only recognized as the basic law of the occupation. Even considered from a purely legal standpoint, the Meiji Constitution should be a living thing.” “We should quickly revise the constitution so that we can possess nuclear (weapons).”<sup>209</sup>

However, Nakamura states that the Japanese people could no longer be attracted by neither the imperial view of the past nor right-wing ideology of the Yasuoka and Kodama variety. That made the Sato government aim at the ideological mobilization of the nation by pursuing a modernization that brought growth and prosperity. Nakamura makes about of disputes that arose among the Japanese historians over whether it was this modernization theory or the emperor ideology that was the heart of the Meiji Centennial. Nakamura maintains that many of the participants saw emperor ideology as the focus, however the judgment was not correct. The main current was rather the modernization theory, with the supplementary role of the emperor ideology.<sup>210</sup>

Another peak period of news took place on September 27, 1971 when the emperor and empress took a seven-nation tour of Europe. Irokawa concedes that the trip inspired fond recollections of his European journey of fifty years before for the emperor. The emperor and the empress were welcomed by Queen Elizabeth and Prince Philip at Buckingham Place on their first night in England. Despite the fact that the emperor appeared delighted when he and the empress travelled the streets of

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<sup>208</sup> Soxon, “Yoshio Kodama; was Rightist,” *New York Times*,  
<https://www.nytimes.com/1984/01/18/obituaries/yoshio-kodama-was-rightist.html>

<sup>209</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 134.

<sup>210</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 135.

London in a horse-drawn carriage, the London Mail reported that the citizens of London responded, “with an ominous silence, as if they were witnessing a state funeral.” The emperor expressed his appreciation at a luncheon banquet held in his honour at the Elysee Palace by President Pompidou in France. In Germany, he shook hands with the president while in Belgium, the imperial couple celebrated with their fellow royal monarchs, the king and queen, at the royal palace in Brussels. In Holland, a thermos was thrown at the Emperor’s limousine and the glass window was smashed according to The Telegraph. Irokawa maintains that this act was in protest of the emperor’s failure to apologize for the deaths of 19,000 Dutch soldiers in Japanese internment camps during the Second World War. He adds that this incident was not reported in Japan in order for Japanese people believe that the emperor had received a rousing welcome from the Europeans.<sup>211</sup> Nakamura agrees to the argument by stating that despite the many warm official welcomes Emperor Hirohito received during the tour of Europe, he encountered noisy demonstrations of students and ordinary citizens reminding him of his war responsibility with shouts of “HiroHitler” and “Go Home Murderer.” Thus, Nakamura defines the European tour as a disappointment both for the Emperor and the Japanese government.<sup>212</sup>

Following the European tour, Emperor and empress paid a visit to the United States and met President Gerald Ford in October 1975. Nakamura suggests that plans for the emperor’s trip had started in 1973 under Tanaka cabinet. However, the visit postponed owing to the opposition of Director of the Imperial Household Agency Usami and others.<sup>213</sup> That said, President Richard Nixon wanted Hirohito to visit the

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<sup>211</sup> Irokawa, *The Age of Hirohito*, 113.

<sup>212</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 138.

<sup>213</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 139.

United States however, due to the fact that Vietnam War had still not ended, economic frictions were aggravating, and Japanese-U.S. relations were not in a satisfactory state.

Nakamura further details concerning the incident occurred in Japan in which Masuhara Keikichi, director general of the Defense Agency, resigned after speaking to the reporters about what the emperor had stated during an informal report to the throne. It appears that in May 1975, when Masuhara visited the palace to report on the situation in neighbouring countries and the condition of Japan's Self Defense Forces, the emperor is reported to have said: <sup>214</sup>

Why is the press writing the fourth Defense Build-up Plan, when the number of Self Defense Force units is actually smaller than the military forces of neighbouring countries? ... The problem of defense is very difficult, but it is important to defend the country. I want you to work hard to incorporate the good practices and not follow the bad practices of the former imperial military. <sup>215</sup>

Masuhara's public quotation led to Opposition charges that Masuhara was trying to use the Emperor's name to build support for greater defence spending. Despite the fact that Masuhara denied the charge and apologized for possibly having the Emperor, the Opposition parties demanded that the Prime Minister Tanaka dismiss him. Nakamura further adds that the nation was astonished that the emperor spoke in that way. Thus, the 1973 plan for the emperor's trip to the United States was postponed.<sup>216</sup> In 1974 however, President Ford, successor of Nixon, became the first American president to visit Japan while still in office. Emperor Hirohito visited the

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<sup>214</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 139.

<sup>215</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 139.

<sup>216</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 140.

United States the following year in return. Irokawa suggests that at the White House dinner welcoming him the emperor stated that;

The reason I had wished to visit your country for a long time was because... I wanted to express my gratitude to your people for the warm goodwill and assistance that your country extended to us in helping us rebuild our country immediately after the unfortunate war.<sup>217</sup>

Following the speech, the emperor continued his tour in high spirits, laughing cheerfully and displaying his personality side never witnessed in Japan.<sup>218</sup>

Upon his return to Japan on October 1975, the emperor held his first conference with fifty Japanese journalists, which was conducted at the Imperial house and lasted only thirty minutes. There the emperor was asked a profound question concerning the war responsibility and dropping of the nuclear bombs. The emperor responded creating a striking shock to the nation;

I cannot answer that sort of question because I have not truly studied the literature in this field, and so do not really understand the implications of those words. I feel it is very regrettable that nuclear bombs were dropped, and I feel sorry for the citizens of Hiroshima. But I could not help because it happened in wartime.<sup>219</sup>

Bix views that Hirohito's both European and America visits, together with his various press interview, helped the Japanese people reengage with the question of his

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<sup>217</sup> Irokawa, *The Age of Hirohito*, 113-114.

<sup>218</sup> Irokawa, *The Age of Hirohito*, 114; Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 140.

<sup>219</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 142.

war responsibility that had been buried for a long time ago. For Hirohito, however, the foreign tours and the interviews had no such effect.<sup>220</sup>

## 2.9 Era name legislation and grass-roots conservatism

This section presents the period when the emperor's status and the system of naming the eras were questioned once again. It also illustrates the unprecedented efforts of grass-roots conservatism towards the preservation of emperor system in Japan.

On November 10, 1976, Hirohito, seventy-five years old emperor, celebrated his fiftieth reign on the throne. About 7,500 attended to the state ceremony, including the emperor and empress, the crown prince and princess and the other members of the imperial family, Prime Minister Miki, the Speakers of the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors, the chief justice of the Supreme Court, and representatives of the diplomatic corps, held at the heavily guarded Tokyo Martial Arts Hall (Budokan). Noticeably, representatives of the Socialist and Communist Parties and several prefectural governors who were opposed in principle to honouring the first twenty years of the emperor's "Showa" reign, when he was at the height of his power, were absent. The Prime Minister wished the emperor a long life, praying for the prosperity of Japan during the ceremony. That said, the Japanese government started to prepare for the legalization of the system of era names with emperor turning into seventy-six. The main questions attempted to have been answered were whether the emperor status should die, the system of naming eras should end, and the "unbroken line of succession" should be destroyed or not. In pursuit of that, the government rushed to legalize the system of naming era names to ensure a smooth succession to throne. In addition, the religious sect *Seicho no Ie* 生

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<sup>220</sup> Bix, *The Making of Modern Japan*, 677.

長の家 (House of Growth), *Jinja Honcho* 神社本庁 (The Association of Shinto Shrines), and conservative Diet members also started a campaign to legalize the system of one era name for each emperor from around 1977. That was a consequence of the purpose of strengthening the authority of the monarchy.<sup>221</sup> As far as Bix was concerned, one of their main objectives was to mandate by law the use of era-names (such as Meiji, Taisho, Showa) in counting time in official documents.<sup>222</sup>

As mentioned above with this campaign the leaders aimed at strengthening the ties between the emperor and the nation, further enhancing the emperor's authority. They underline the use of the era names, dismissing the fact that it worked indirectly, by stating that it makes the people continually conscious of the emperor's existence, and was profoundly crucial in unifying national consciousness.<sup>223</sup> In June 1979, the Diet passed the "Era-Name Law", which could be defined as a measure that prescribed the use of each emperor's reign title to indicate contemporary time, and it went into effect in June 11.<sup>224</sup> Unsurprisingly, that took many years of debate, with the strategy of going from the local areas to the entire country. The activists organized a national "caravan" and applied pressure in prefectural assemblies to secure the passage of era-name resolutions. By December 1978, a large number of conservative prefectures has passed resolutions calling for the promotion of era-name legislation. Nakamura states that such a situation did not emerge since the war, and it gave the impression of strong grass-roots conservatism.<sup>225</sup>

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<sup>221</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 140-141; Bix, *The Making of Modern Japan*, 677-679.

<sup>222</sup> Bix, *The Making of Modern Japan*, 679.

<sup>223</sup> Irie Sukemasa Nikki, 1991, 17., as cited in Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 141

<sup>224</sup> Bix, *The Making of Modern Japan*, 679.

<sup>225</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 151.

That said, GHQ had ordered this institution of “imperial line” deleted from the revised Imperial Household Law three decades later. Herbert Bix claims that the reason that GHQ decided so was that the era-names system is not compatible with the spirit of the new constitution seeing as the emperor no longer ruled. Nevertheless, the bill became law and the notion of the uniqueness of the Japanese people was once again reaffirmed. <sup>226</sup>

#### 2.10 Suzuki’s textbook problem and the rise of the Nakasone cabinet

Suzuki Zenko succeeded after the Prime Minister Ohira, subsequent to his sudden death in June 1980. Considering his little accomplishments and the limited time in office, Suzuki only came into prominence with the textbook issue, which will be explained in this section. The emperor’s attitudes regarding the controversial issues of the period will also be viewed in this section.

Mid-1980s was the time for the Asian nations, that were once invaded and colonised by Japan, to achieve rapid economic growth, to make productivity gains, and, to find that their voices were heard in international affairs. Starting in fall 1981, the South Korean press criticized the wording of Japanese textbooks, which believed to have whitewashed Japanese militarism in China and Korea by calling it an “advance” rather than an “invasion”. It is true that Japan’s practices to misdescribe the colonial rule in Korea and China attracted worldwide attention. However, it was not before the following summer that China joined pushing Japan into the limelight Japan’s responsibility for the Asia-Pacific war. <sup>227</sup> To exemplify, the Chinese government issued a statement in July, condemning the Japanese government for this

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<sup>226</sup> Bix, *The Making of Modern Japan*, 679.

<sup>227</sup> Bix, *The Making of Modern Japan*, 680.

action. Furthermore, the government of South Korea also protested the description of Japanese colonial rule in Japanese textbooks and demanded it should be corrected the following month.<sup>228</sup>

Between 1980 and 1982, with the efforts of the Prime Minister Suzuki Zenko, some improvements were registered in Japan-China relations. However, those improvements were not enough to dismiss the fact that during the tenure of Suzuki's successor, Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro (1982-1987), Japan did not go any step further to defuse the mistrust cloud in the eyes of many Asian and Western people. Nonetheless, in August, the government agreed to rectify the textbook matter after he had resolved to achieve greater participation in international society for Japan. Furthermore, Japanese perceptions of the lost war continued to change over the next decade, and substantial progress was made under different LDP prime ministers. According to Nakamura, however, this was not the sort of problem that could be solved by simply changing "advance" back to "invasion."<sup>229</sup>

Bix suggests that like many other Japanese people, Hirohito was more concerned about Japan's deteriorating relations with the United States, which was hit by rising inflation. As the suspicion of the American citizens on country's stagnation under President Jimmy Carter grew, Republican Ronald Reagan was elected as president in 1980. It was that time that Reagan and his advisers intensified the nuclear arms race with the Soviet Union and inaugurated an aggressive policy of imperial interventions. Japan's elites responded by increasing defence spending on the premise. Bix views that the United States' global economic and military

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<sup>228</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 143.

<sup>229</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 143.

hegemony was declining. In pursuit of preparing Japan to stand on its own, Nakasone immediately sought to enhance relations with the Reagan administration, strengthening defence, and raising the annual military budget.<sup>230</sup>

That said, Bix asserts that Hirohito viewed Reagan's policies carried the danger of war.<sup>231</sup> According to the Emperor, the initiatives of Nakasone, who was able to maintain power for five years and skilfully weathered the two oil crises of 1973 and 1979, bore both positive and negative sides. According to the diary record of the grand chamberlain Irie Sukemasa, on October 17, 1982, Hirohito conveyed the message "If we do this, isn't there a danger of war with the Soviet Union? Go tell the director (of the Defence Agency) that I think so." after learning that the Reagan administration's request from Japan not only share the burden of air defence over its sea-lanes but also blockade of the Soya Strait. Further, on October 26, he is stated to have "confided" to Irie his concern that "If Japan increases the size of its armed forces, the Soviet Union might be provoked." Bix states that these were the last diary records of his last grand chamberlain, Irie.<sup>232</sup>

Nevertheless, Nakasone met Reagan in Washington and declared that Japan shared a common destiny with the United States, stating "The Japanese archipelago is an enormous unsinkable aircraft carrier pointed at the Soviet Union" in November 1983. Subsequent to his return, Nakasone asked the Diet for a "full settlement of accounts with postwar politics to challenge former taboos." Nakamura maintains that his political strategy was designed to have Japan play an international role commensurate with its status as a major economic power. This alone would not be enough as he also aimed at shifting Japan's conservative politics away from the

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<sup>230</sup> Bix, *The Making of Modern Japan*, 681.

<sup>231</sup> Bix, *The Making of Modern Japan*, 681.

<sup>232</sup> Isn, 214 as cited in Bix, *Hirohito and The Making of Modern Japan*, 681-682.

model of the 1960s and 1970s when it concentrated on economic growth, while leaving the defence to the Pax Americana.<sup>233</sup>

To sum up the Nakasone cabinet, one can view that the administrative reform was stressed, the national railways and Nippon Telephone and Telegraph Corporation were privatized, social spending on education and welfare was reduced, and growth of state expenditure was attempted to have been reduced. Nakamura states that, when the cabinets attempts viewed from an international perspective, “Nakasone’s politics were a response to the fashion for small government advocated by Reaganomics in the United States and Thatcherism in Great Britain.”<sup>234</sup>

It would be significant to mention regarding the controversial political issue that occupied the agenda in the early and mid-1980s, focused on the state protection for Yasukuni Shrine.<sup>235</sup> “There was no other prime minister who used the Word “state” as much as Nakasone”, states Nakamura, adding Prime Minister Nakasone appealed to party members to revitalize the power of state at a Liberal Democratic party seminar in the resort town of Karuizawa in the summer of 1985. Prime Minister is stated to declare that “if there is no place to express gratitude toward those who have died for their country, then who will offer their lives to state?” Ultimately and not surprisingly, Nakasone became the first prime minister of the postwar period to worship publicly at the Yasukuni Shrine.<sup>236</sup>

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<sup>233</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 143-144.

<sup>234</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 144.

<sup>235</sup> The Shrine, with the literal meaning “peaceful nation shrine” is a controversial Shinto monument located in Tokyo, Japan. It is dedicated to the spirits of soldiers and others who lost their lives fighting on behalf of the Japanese emperor. The Shrine has been a source of many controversies among them the inclusion of 14 Convicted Class-A War Criminals (crimes against peace), which were secretly enshrined in 1978. This move caused an intractable problem both inside and outside the Japan. For further please refer to Cheung, “Political Survival and Yasukuni in Japan's Relations with China.”

<sup>236</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 144-145.

Bix notes that despite Hirohito stopping visiting Yasukuni Shrine after 1975, he did not object to public officials worshipping at the Shrine where 2.4 million war dead souls from Meiji to the Pacific War enshrined within. He did not want to deepen domestic divisions over the issue of state support for Yasukuni either, which played a significant role in the support of emperor worship and militarism.<sup>237</sup> Cheung claims that the enshrinement of the Class-A war criminals also resulted in the dissatisfaction from the Emperor. *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* (Japan Economic Times) published a memorandum on its front page written by Tomita Tomohiko, the Grand Steward of the Imperial Household Agency, stating the emperor ceased his visits to Yasukuni due to his displeasure that the Class-A war criminals were enshrined in Yasukuni.<sup>238</sup>

It was December 15, 1945 that the U.S occupation forces had separated religion from the state with the “Shinto Directive”, and the Shrine was forced to end its official connection with the state. The following year, it was redefined as an independent “religious juridical person” certified by the governor of Tokyo. However, from 1969, right-wing LDP Diet members, members of the Bereaved Society of Japan, and the Association of Shinto Shrines started to press for the nationalization of Yasukuni Shrine. In addition, successive LDP governments tried to table a “Yasukuni Shrine Protection Bill” five times between 1969 and 1974.<sup>239</sup> However, as Nakamura and Bix state, on each occasion the bill was defeated after discussions with the opposition Socialist Party. In 1978, fourteen Class A war criminals, executed for “crimes against humanity”, including Tojo Hideki were secretly enshrined at Yasukuni. That made the state support issue for the Shinto

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<sup>237</sup> Bix, *Hirohito and The Making of Modern Japan*, 682.

<sup>238</sup> Cheung, *Political Survival and Yasukuni in Japan's Relations with China*, 32.

<sup>239</sup> Bix, *Hirohito and The Making of Modern Japan*, 682.

institution more controversial than ever. Moreover, that also made it impossible for Hirohito to visit the Shrine, which dignifies Japanese militarism and the “War of Greater Asia.”<sup>240</sup>

As his predecessor Suzuki, Nakasone’s objective was too to affect a symbolic strengthening of ties with the past. On August 15, 1985, he became the first postwar prime minister to worship at Yasukuni. His attempts to defuse the strong criticism that he encountered within Japan failed and indeed the criticism aggravated when South Korea and China added their voices. Thus, Nakasone stopped worshipping there.<sup>241</sup>

Bix continues with his argument that owing to Hirohito’s political concern to maintain peaceful relations both with China and Korea, he might have been relieved to see the Yasukuni Shrine bill shelved. However, he adds it is not convincing whether Hirohito gave importance to the ethical or constitutional dimensions of the issue seeing as the Yasukuni War Museum had transformed the Asia-Pacific War symbolically by removing the emperor from nearly all Showa-era exhibits.<sup>242</sup>

With that in mind, Hirohito’s sixtieth anniversary of reign was held in April 1986. It is worthy to mention that in spite of the fact that the previous celebration was on November 10, Nakasone moved it ahead by over six months to April 29, the day of the emperor’s birthday. Nakamura views the prime minister’s political strategy such that he aimed at getting elected for a third term by celebrating the sixtieth anniversary in April, playing the leading role in Tokyo Summit in May, and,

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<sup>240</sup> Bix, *Hirohito and The Making of Modern Japan*, 682; Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 145.

<sup>241</sup> Bix, *Hirohito and The Making of Modern Japan*, 683.

<sup>242</sup> Bix, *Hirohito and The Making of Modern Japan*, 683.

wining a third term with a big victory in the election of the House of Councillors in June.<sup>243</sup>

Two months after the Tokyo summit, on July 6, 1986, just as Nakasone intended, LDP won the elections and increased the total seat number in the House of Representatives from 250 to 304. He was elected for a third time in July, just as he intended. Following that, he set a term called “1955 system”, “stating that he would stretch out a hand to the left wing”, which soon provoked an attack from his own right.<sup>244</sup> Put simply, a group of ultra nationalist LDP Diet members formed the “Association of Those Concerned with Fundamental Problems of the State” in response to Nakasone’s diplomacy of “submission to foreign pressure” on issues like Yasukuni Shrine and the textbook revision. Moreover, Education Minister Fujio Masayuki made a speech at the Japan Press Club criticizing Prime minister for not having worshipped at the Yasukuni Shrine, which was the decision taken after the strong criticism received from China along with the textbook revision issue. Furthermore, he kept making controversial statement and got the South Korea’s reactions, which ultimately made Nakasone take the decision to fire him.<sup>245</sup>

However, there was another issue that broke Japan’s image in the United States. Ironically, that came from Nakasone himself as he made an appealing racist remark; “Japan is a society with a high level of formal schooling, and is becoming a considerably ‘intelligent’ society, far more so than a country like the United States. In the United States, where there are a considerable number of (literally, such types as)

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<sup>243</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 145-146.

<sup>244</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 146.

<sup>245</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 146; Bix, *The Making of Modern Japan*, 682.

Blacks, Puerto Ricans and Mexicans, it (the intelligence level of society) is, on average, still very low.” Criticism by the American media and the tension created in Japan made it inevitable for Nakasone to apologize on September 27 to the American people.<sup>246</sup>

Nakamura views the above-mentioned examples; the textbook issue and Nakasone’s racist remarks as illustrations of Japanese “self-centred racial consciousness” and adds that Japanese politicians and economic leaders showed “arrogance through success” throughout the 1970s. He further remarks that the nationalistic tide in Japanese society started to break from the time of Nakasone cabinet and the ceremony commemorating the emperor’s sixtieth year on the throne, as mentioned earlier, would exemplify that.<sup>247</sup>

With the ceremony, the Showa emperor became the longest living monarch in Japanese history as he reached his eighty-fifth birthday. A three-person symposium on “The Age of the Great Emperor Hirohito” in which former Tokyo University President and Member of the House of Councillors Hayashi Kentaro participated with critic Yamamoto Shichihei and Sophia University Professor Watanabe Shoichi was published on March 1985 issue of *Bungei shunju*. At this symposium, professor Watanabe commented that the sixtieth year of Showa was equivalent to England’s Victorian age: “In the Victorian era, when the Queen celebrated the fiftieth year of her reign, they called it ‘golden jubilee’; but when she reached her sixtieth year, the English coined a new word and celebrated the diamond jubilee. I think we are very fortunate to have such a head of state in our country.”<sup>248</sup>

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<sup>246</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 147; Bix, *The Making of Modern Japan*, 683.

<sup>247</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 147.

<sup>248</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 148.

It is interesting as wording such as “the great Emperor Hirohito” and “golden jubilee” were never used at the time of the fiftieth anniversary celebration. However, Nakamura shows that over the next decade the rhetoric of journalism changed to a considerable amount in addition to the passed resolutions by prefectural assemblies around the country in order to request that celebrations be held under the auspices of the prefecture to “Honour His Majesty the Emperor’s Sixtieth Year of Reign.”<sup>249</sup>

### 2.11 Power and authority

This section cites Prime Minister Nakasone’s remarks regarding the emperor in terms of power and authority. It is important to see the view of the Prime Minister’s evaluation regarding the symbol emperor, as he is believed to have always situated the emperor at the centre of “Japanese cultural identity.”<sup>250</sup>

Nakasone’s clear awareness of between the power and authority could be understood from his wordings as he overused the “state” and the “emperor.”<sup>251</sup> In his last summer seminar at Karuizawa, he is stated to have said that the emperor was a symbol of racial unity backed by a tradition of nearly two hundred years, adding:

As prime minister I often meet prime ministers and foreign heads of state. No one knows better than I how fortunate Japan is to have such a dual structure of worldly power (on the one hand) and authority in national unity (on the other). Superior persons might not always become prime minister.... However, the existence of the emperor transcends all that, and for this reason he is like a sun shining brilliantly in the universe.<sup>252</sup>

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<sup>249</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 148.

<sup>250</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 149.

<sup>251</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 149.

<sup>252</sup> Nakasone, 1987 as cited in Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 149.

It is, no doubt, striking what the prime minister said at the seminar. However, to continue with Nakasone's argument; the power and authority had been separated in Japan since antiquity, one should also mention that he was not dismissing the fact that the true form of the emperor was that of a "symbol" as specified in the constitution. Bix claims, however, that Nakasone also wanted to raise the emperor's status and enhance his authority with the objective of emperor becoming the symbol of the "state" rather than of high economic growth.<sup>253</sup> He did not disregard his ultimate objective even as he stepped down as prime minister. As Nakamura significantly cites:

The emperors of Japan were, from the very beginning, people of peace and culture. According to mythology, the arms-bearing emperors were only those from Emperor Jimmu to Emperor Keiko; the others who bore arms were the Meiji Emperor and his successors. Statues of all other emperors carry the wooden mace of peace.... The fact that, after the war, the emperor of Japan abandoned power and abandoned the properties of the Imperial Household therefore simply meant that he returned to the condition existing before Meiji. In short, the postwar emperor is the symbol of the Oriental way of thinking that having nothing makes one inexhaustible. For that reason, he is once again advancing with the people.... There is a worldly, secular prime minister, but above him is the emperor: a transcendent being who has a symbolic universal meaning. We must not forget that it is this dual structure that maintains the external authority and the domestic unity of Japan, as well as the functions of the state.<sup>254</sup>

This particular speech bears utmost importance. However, it is worthy to continue citing Nakamura's argument here as he asserts that Nakasone illustrated Japan's task for the twenty-first century to foster healthy patriotism, bringing harmony between Japan's cultural identity and internationalism.

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<sup>253</sup> Bix, *The Making of Modern Japan*, 683.

<sup>254</sup> Bungei Shunju, 1987, as cited in Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 149.

## 2.12 The death of Emperor Hirohito

Along with providing information with regards to the death of the Emperor, this section will also shed light on the fever that the country had towards the death of the emperor as well as the media covering the news related to the him.

Nakasone stepped down in late October 1987 and subsequently, on September 18, 1987, Hirohito, the eighty-six-year old emperor, was reported to have an undisclosed internal disease. He was soon hospitalized for surgery becoming the first emperor to have undergone such a procedure. The operation was reported to have been successful. However just a year later, on September 8, 1988, emperor was reported to have vomited blood and bitterly ill by the mass media. Crown Prince Akihito was informed that the emperor had cancer. Following that, until the emperor's death, Japanese nation had a strange prolonged grieving mood, which took specifically for one hundred and eleven days. All this grieving time, Japanese television followed the emperor's temperature, blood pressure, pulse and other vital signs. Starting on September 22, the Imperial Household Agency established twelve registry areas nationwide in order for the citizens to pray for him and sign their names in "get well" registers, which was soon followed by the local government's own registries. It is significant to note that by early November the numbers were reported to have reached by six million. It appears that the entire nation was in mourning as scheduled marriage ceremonies, sports meets, and autumn festivals were cancelled. Moreover, the department stores, banks and supermarkets hung their flags at half-mast and stopped selling celebratory goods such as red bean rice. In addition, television stations stopped showing "inappropriate" commercials.<sup>255</sup>

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<sup>255</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 150; Bix, *The Making of Modern Japan*, 684.

Considering the above-mentioned fever that the country had with the emperor, Nakamura calls for attention to the questions why Japanese people had that much sensitivity regarding the emperor and why it spread throughout Japan. He approaches his questions with the general causes stressed such as the strength of traditional feelings of emperor worship, the characteristic conformist behaviour of the Japanese, and the mobilization of the people by the mass media. However, Osamu puts forward that the phenomenon ought to be analysed in light of “the enterprise society and the LDP,” as well as the strength of their control.<sup>256</sup> It is crucially significant to note Watanabe’s argument of “self-strait” here. He defines it as the psychology of mass conformism emerged with the idea of “They are doing it over there, so we will do it too”, which was started by the companies such as department stores, banks, supermarkets and large enterprises and followed by other stores. Thus, Watanabe argues that there was nothing more than a form of commercial competition among firms. In accordance with his argument, he further continues that as a matter of fact, there was nothing related to the emperor worship.<sup>257</sup> The companies acted out of fear of right-wing attacks rather than for the sake of the emperor. In line with Watanabe’s argument, Irokawa (illustrates the Japanese mass media both Japan’s quasi-governmental public network and the private broadcasting networks suppressing any critical comments regarding the emperor or emperor system as a potential consequence of either fearing of being labelled “un-

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<sup>256</sup> Osamu, *Gendai Nihon Shakai no Kozo to tennosei- 'jishuku' to 'kicho' no shakaigaku*, 28-46 as cited in Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 151.

<sup>257</sup> Osamu, *Gendai Nihon Shakai no Kozo to tennosei- 'jishuku' to 'kicho' no shakaigaku*, 28-46 as cited in Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 151.

Japanese” or the belief that the entire Japanese population was uniformly in a state of sorrow. <sup>258</sup>

It should also be pointed out that LDP had strong regional control considering the fact that LDP Headquarters issued a notice to every prefectural association concerning the registry books wishing the emperor recovery, and even ordered the establishment of registry booths in certain places. Nakamura values Watanabe’s remarks with regards to his analysis on the phenomena of “registers” and “self-strait” and concedes that his success in his analysis lies in paying an explanation not merely in terms of the emotional, mystical factor of popular emperor worship, but also the distinctive characteristics of the state and society in contemporary Japan. <sup>259</sup>

In furtherance to the above reference, Irokawa also argues that some, particularly, students and young people in their teens and twenties remained indifferent, completely at odds with the mood depicted in the mass media. Thus, the significance of this phenomenon was either missed or ignored by the mass media on purpose. He further maintains that the media vigil around the dying emperor revealed the character of the relationship between the mass media and the emperor, which is crucially significant to note. <sup>260</sup>

When Hirohito was at death’s door, the Japanese media was refrained from discussing his and the monarchy’s role in Japanese military aggression. On the contrary, in Asia and Europe, emperor’s role in war was placed on the media coverage and the way Japanese officials avoided confronting with the past was being discussed. With this in the background, the emperor died at 6:33 in the morning of

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<sup>258</sup> Irokawa, *The Age of Hirohito*, 115.

<sup>259</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 151.

<sup>260</sup> Irokawa, *The Age of Hirohito*, 115.

January 7, 1989. Prime Minister Takeshita delivered the official eulogy and thus the Showa era ended.<sup>261</sup>

Immediately after Hirohito's death, NHK preceded its coverage with the videotape of the life of the emperor. The emperor applauding for the three little pigs at the Anaheim, California, Disneyland, or of the "sports heika" or "sports emperor," the family man emperor, the scholarly emperor, or again, of the kawaii or cute and innocent emperor. In short, the new emperor system from 1947, becoming what the media has sometimes called and "akarui tennosei" (literally, the bright and cheerful emperor system), or as Takahashi put it, the tennosei of lightness, cheerfulness, superficiality and banality, despite the fact that issues concerning the emperor might still prompt seem people to violence.<sup>262</sup>

### 2.13 Conclusion

This chapter attempted to answer the questions of how the Japanese legally interpreted the emperor's role as a symbol, both in theory and in practice, how it was welcomed by the society and what kind of transformation was experienced by the emperor, as set out in the introduction section of this Chapter, the discussion gave us an understanding of the Emperor system that evolved from 1947 to 1989. Nevertheless, this background information would not be sufficient in order to analyse the emperor's role. The imperial institution, along with its own change, played a role of shaping the emperor during the post-war period. No doubt deciphering its role hereafter would give us an evolving understanding with regards to the emperor's role.

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<sup>261</sup> Bix, *Hirohito and The Making of Modern Japan*, 685.

<sup>262</sup> Nakamura, *The Japanese Monarchy: Ambassador Joseph Grew and the Making of the "Symbol Emperor System," 1931-1991*, 152.

## CHAPTER 3

### THE SAFEGUARD IMPERIAL HOUSEHOLD AGENCY

#### 3.1 Introduction

This chapter introduces the general character and functions of the Imperial Household Agency by focusing on the historical and institutional aspects of it. Materials for this chapter are mainly collected from the official website of the Imperial Household Agency as well as the outstanding contributions of David Titus.

Despite the imperial institution's obvious centrality to prewar politics, and its continuing importance as an unchanging pole of Japanese national identity, as it has not been changed or removed, it can be assumed so, no one could discuss it until the occupation changed its status and created conditions which allowed scholars such as Titus to access the imperial records. Not neglecting the study conducted by Herschell Webb focusing on the Tokugawa period, this chapter will benefit from the existing tremendous contributions of Titus in order to cover the theoretical position of the imperial institution in the governing process, evaluation of the palace as a formal structure and as personnel between 1885 and 1945, along with the relation of the palace political process primarily during 1930s owing to the fact that he offers us a wealth of new information based on deep archival research, diaries, and also introduces several novel and challenging concepts to explain how the overall system worked in the prewar Japan. This chapter will not only cover above mentioned parts, but also shed light into the post war imperial institution. Titus, himself, describes despite the fact that he originally planned to conduct a study of the imperial institution in Japan after World War II, the study became a study of the prewar imperial institution. He views the reasons as follows: first, the internal structure of

the palace today is very close to what it had been as a matter of fact from 1885 to 1945 although the emperor's constitutional role has been drastically altered. Second, there is very little information in Japanese or English about the prewar palace, its leaders, and the imperial institution in politics despite the theoretical centrality of the imperial institution in politics. Third, the modernization of Japan between 1868 and 1945 was centrally managed; the articulated referent for modernization, political as well as economic and social was the imperial institution.

The aim of this chapter is to primarily consider the written sources at two points of time: Imperial Household Ministry (pre-war period), Imperial Household Office 1947-1949 and Imperial Household Agency from 1947 to present but mainly until the end of Showa and give a brief insight into it. By analysing the core institution in the prewar political process to the present times, this study will attempt to aid our understanding of the long-standing institution around which politics and society revolved but more importantly, over which the emperor reigned and kept its transcendental feature. That will also help us have an insight into Emperor's role in Japan taking into account the fact that the imperial institution has accommodated itself to the emperor's changing role throughout the history. Or to put it better, by analysing the process by which the imperial institution is positioned as one of the "administrative agencies", one can examine the positioning of the emperor under the Japanese Constitution.

### 3.2 The Imperial Household Agency

Today's *Kunai-chō* 宮内庁 (Imperial Household Agency) defines itself as an agency of the government of Japan, which is under the control of the Prime Minister and in charge of national affairs related to the Imperial Family and also keeps of the

Privy Seal and State Seal<sup>263</sup> of Japan.<sup>264</sup> In addition, A.A Stockwin views the Imperial Household Agency as one of the most powerful ministries under the pre-1945 system.<sup>265</sup> A very controversial scholar, Tsuda views that “The Japanese imperial house was generated from within the Japanese people and unified them.”<sup>266</sup> To travel back time a bit, in 1917, the biographer of Tanaka Mitsuaki, Imperial Household Minister from 1898 to 1909, however, describes the imperial palace as “a region of supreme scenic beauty, distant, far from the smoke of human habitations, in the verdant hills, above the blue expanse of sea... beyond the government, transcending, no one ever to invade its sanctity.”<sup>267</sup> In a similar fashion, Carol Gluck describes that the immediate custodian of the imperial person was the Imperial Household Ministry (Kunaisho), whose tight archival security keeps the secrets of palace management in the Meiji period too from public a view even today and adds that it sought to guard the autonomy of the palace and keep the emperor in high repute.<sup>268</sup> Finally, Shillony remarks and also justifies why this study is conducted by a foreigner too that the imperial institution of Japan, like Mt Everest or, to be geographically more accurate like Mt Fuji, is there, and cannot be ignored, adding it is soaring high, shrouded by mists, and better seen from afar. Therefore, he finds it easier for a foreigner to work on this subject, as he/she is less prone to having a political axe to grind.<sup>269</sup>

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<sup>263</sup> The seal is affixed to documents such as Imperial rescripts, proclamation sentences of laws, cabinet orders, treaties, instruments of ratification, ambassadors' credentials and their dismissal documents, documents of general power of attorney, consular commissions, letters authorizing foreign consuls, letters of appointment or dismissal of government officials whose appointment requires the Emperor's attestation, and letters of appointment of officials of the fourth court rank and upwards. It has “Tenno Gyoji” carved on it.

<sup>264</sup> “The Imperial Household Agency” Kunaicho 宮内庁, <http://www.kunaicho.go.jp/e-kunaicho/enkaku.html>

<sup>265</sup> Stockwin, “Why Japan Still Matters,” 117.

<sup>266</sup> Tsuda, 1946, as cited in Bix, “Inventing the “Symbol Monarchy” in Japan, 1945-52,” 332.

<sup>267</sup> Kojiro, *Tanaka Seisan-haku*, 293, as cited in Titus, *Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan*, 13.

<sup>268</sup> Gluck, *Japan's Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period*, 80.

<sup>269</sup> Shillony, *Collected Writings of Ben-Ami Shillony*, 23.

Having been in charge of administering the affairs of Japan's imperial family, including the official duties and the ceremonies and rites performed by the Emperor, the agency, or *kunaicho*, appears to be unique and secretive in a way when compared to the other conventional government agencies and ministries in Japan, or even in the world. No doubt that The Imperial Household Agency is in a position to have the most in-depth understanding and analysis of the views of the Imperial Family and the emperor. Despite the fact that it is positioned under the Prime Minister, it does not mean that it directly reports to the Prime Minister at the cabinet level. It also keeps its place as being a unique agency among the others, not getting affected by legislation that establishes it as an independent administrative institution. In order to grasp its role better, it is significant to dig further into its organization, functions and history in detail.

To begin with the historical background of the imperial palace which was named Imperial Household from around the eighth century AD up to the Second World War, according to the data of the official site of the Imperial Household Agency, the origin of the imperial institution can be traced back to the provisions on the government structure in the *Taihō Code*, which was enacted in 701 under the reign of Emperor Monmu.<sup>270</sup> Webb agrees to the antiquity of the institution stating that it is likely to be the oldest hereditary office in the world, adding that the exact age of the Japanese imperial throne is indeterminable.<sup>271</sup> Despite the fact that the Japanese mythology assigns the exact date to February 11, 660 B.C., the accession of the first emperor, modern scholarship supports the idea that nothing could be known about Japanese history at so early time.<sup>272</sup> Attempts to pinpoint further the origins of

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<sup>270</sup>“The Imperial Household Agency” *Kunaicho* 宮内庁, <http://www.kunaicho.go.jp/e-kunaicho/enkaku.html>

<sup>271</sup> Webb, *The Japanese Imperial Institution in the Tokugawa Period*, 9.

<sup>272</sup> Webb, *The Japanese Imperial Institution in the Tokugawa Period*, 9.

the imperial institution might have been failed. However, what is certain is that the institution is prehistoric in origin.

### 3.3 The separation of court and government palace autonomy

Given the long continuous history of the institution, one might rightly assume that the institution has gone through profound changes since the beginning as the emperor's role has also been drastically altered. Gluck maintains that in the first years after the Restoration, from 1868 to 1881, the new government invoked the imperial institution as the symbolic center of the unified nation and displayed the young Meiji emperor as the personal manifestation of the political unity.<sup>273</sup> Titus states that between 1868 and the creation of the cabinet system in 1885, Restoration governments were based on a union of court and palace, affairs with government and state affairs under a literal interpretation of direct rule. The first Restoration government of 1868 made no distinction between court and government.<sup>274</sup> Although the government organization established by the Instrument of Government (Seitaisho) of 21 April 1868 assigned an officer within a unified government to manage governmental functions concurrently with the court affairs, a "court affairs administrator later called a "court governor" was created in early 1869 only to be superseded by an "imperial household secretary" when the Imperial Household Ministry came into being on 8 July 1869.<sup>275</sup> However, restoration settlement period of 1868-89 experienced the inevitable consequence of the separation of the court and the government both structurally and legally despite the attempts of Motoda, who entered the Imperial Household Ministry in 1871 as imperial reader to the emperor

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<sup>273</sup> Gluck, *Japan's Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period*, 73.

<sup>274</sup> Masahi, *Tenno Showa Ki*, 38, as cited in Titus, *Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan*, 16.

<sup>275</sup> Titus, *Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan*, 17.

by the recommendation of one of the leading oligarchs,<sup>276</sup> Sasaki Takayuki, and the “Jiho”, a group of court advisers created by Motoda in pursuit of integrating court and government under a politically active emperor.<sup>277</sup> Ultimately, the court acquired its own autonomous bureaucracy.

With the concurrent promulgation of the Meiji Constitution, formally known as the Constitution of the Great Empire of Japan, and the Imperial House Law in 1889, the emperor became the center of the emerging national myths.<sup>278</sup> Considering the fact that the emperor's authority was further enhanced, the Meiji Constitution made Japan a constitutional monarchy in which the emperor was to exercise far-reaching prerogatives.<sup>279</sup>

Titus continues by asserting that traditional rites were implicit in this constitution, which termed the emperor “sacred and inviolable.” In direct command of the armed forces both in peacetime administration and in wartime operations, the emperor appointed all generals of the Army and admirals of the Navy. He also appointed all Ministers of State, including the Prime Minister. He exercised the legislative power with the consent of the Imperial Diet, declared war, made peace, and concluded treaties. He had discretionary powers to issue ordinances in times of emergency.<sup>280</sup>

Besides the emperor's increased physical proximity to the government, court affairs increasingly involved ritual practices or rites, which, according to Titus, historically had been exclusive to the court had been central to the imperial

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<sup>276</sup> Tokiomi, “Motoda Eifu,” as cited in as cited in Titus, *Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan*, 18.

<sup>277</sup> Titus, *Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan*, 18-22.

<sup>278</sup> Gluck, *Japan's Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period*, 72.

<sup>279</sup> Titus, *Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan*, 14-15.

<sup>280</sup> Titus, *Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan*, 15.

institution's social and political rule, making the public appearances of the emperor increasingly rigid.<sup>281</sup>

Titus thus views that the affirmations of an imperial presence unique to Japan's socio-political order were formalized. Palace autonomy and the union of the court and rites were paralleled by the union of the government and rule. In addition, the emperor and court ritualized, the government decided and executed. This division of functions was also complementary: the emperor and court legitimized government decisions.<sup>282</sup>

In short, the imperial prerogatives laid down in the constitution became institutionalized in a government structure over which the emperor reigned but did not rule: the civil and military bureaucracies, the imperial legislature, and the courts. The emperor once again transcendental prisoner as it has always been, but in a new and different political system which is "constitutional monarchy" based on imperial prerogative.

#### 3.4 The palace bureaucracy: Gatekeepers of the imperial will

It might be useful to represent the organizational roles created for the palace officials. It might even be more useful to begin with the schematization created for the emperor as a logical result of the theory of legitimacy and the institutional arrangements evolved by the Restoration settlement of 1868-89 that is put forward by Titus. According to Titus, there seems to have been two fundamental imperial roles: Emperor-in Court and Emperor-in-State. Whereas the Emperor-in-Public represented the imperial will in politics and society, The Emperor-in-Chambers was

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<sup>281</sup> Titus, *Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan*, 20.

<sup>282</sup> Titus, *Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan*, 15.

the emperor as a person who expressed his own will and ideas to those close to the throne.<sup>283</sup>

To go into particulars, Titus starts explaining the scope of the Emperor in Court with the need for the transcendence intensified by the great adjustments in Japanese society that were either planned or anticipated by the modernizing oligarchs after 1868. Clearly, Restoration leaders and their heirs attempted to make the Imperial Will a mystery by fostering an almost religious attachment to the imperial institution so as to mobilize all kinds of individuals and social groups around it.<sup>284</sup> It has been cited earlier that the emperor and his court were isolated from society at large and from the government for over 250 years during the Tokugawa order and thus the emperor restored his transcendental mystery to the vast majority of Japanese in the Meiji Period. With this in mind, due to the fact that the emperor had not ruled for centuries, the Japanese imperial institution had perhaps more potential than any other modern monarchy to become the symbol of the nation as a people, as distinct from the nation as state.<sup>285</sup> Titus continues to remark that this distinction is likely to have been the true basis for the separation of court and government and for the functional union of court and rites on the one hand and of government and rule on the other hand. By bringing this distinctive character out, the new imperial institution could be made to symbolize the unity and continuity of Japanese society and that is the reason why the emperor made a tour of the provinces, presided over an imperial poetry contest, or performed rites at one of the national Shinto Shrines. He simply symbolized the unity of the Japanese people, their shared cultural heritage and skills,

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<sup>283</sup> Titus, *Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan*, 51-52.

<sup>284</sup> Titus, *Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan*, 52-53.

<sup>285</sup> Titus, *Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan*, 53.

and their unique religious communality of which he was chief priest. Titus defines this as being Emperor-in-Court acting as Emperor-in Public.<sup>286</sup>

In addition, the Emperor-in-Court was also clothed for his new public function. The emperor and his court also displayed the ideal course of the modernization of Japan effectively, with the Western dress, the latest modes of transformation, investing in new manufacturing enterprises, supporting the modern educational facilities and distributing rewards to the those ideally introduced the western techniques to the Japanese society.<sup>287</sup>

In pursuit of managing the Emperor-in Court as Emperor-in-Public, the palace bureaucrats played the role of gatekeeping of the Imperial Will as their first duty of the palace bureaucracy. Sealing off the emperor's personal will was crucial in terms of making the Imperial Will the focal point of unquestioning popular esteem and reverence, as Titus describes. He further illustrates profound information here that the palace bureaucracy was divided into two components functionally: an outer side and an inner side so as to fulfil the duty. While the outer side contained the bureaucratic machinery in order to maintain the transcendental dignity of the emperor in society, giving place to the arrangement formal appearances of both the emperor and the imperial family members, writing and regulating publicity, managing the imperial estate, and financing of the imperial house as well as watching its own bureaucratic concerns, the inner side managed the Emperor-in-Court as Emperor-in-Chambers. The officials of the inner side were chamberlains, whose role appears to have been ambiguous to the public, which will be discussed in the later stages, valets, aides, tutors, ladies-in-waiting. Titus defines them as innermost guardians of the emperor's privacy given the immediate companions and

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<sup>286</sup> Titus, *Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan*, 53.

<sup>287</sup> Titus, *Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan*, 54.

servants to him. Put simply, they were, in fact, keeping the emperor's personal will and his human indiscretions from escaping into the public arena. It should be emphasized that the palace bureaucracy, with its outer and inner sides, aimed at ensuring only the emperor as a social paragon, as an ideal visible.<sup>288</sup>

The afore-mentioned arrangements serve to the ultimate goal to make the imperial institution the expression of all that was true, good and beautiful in the Japanese polity. Titus concedes that to do so, the court bore of utmost importance to be a model of the ideal polity and maintain itself as a social paragon.<sup>289</sup>

Of equal or perhaps more importance was the schematization of the Emperor-in-State. As demonstrated earlier in this chapter, the emperor kept being the transcendental source of state power, as being the source of legitimacy. What was new was that his theoretical and physical proximity to politics. Titus argues that as Emperor-in-State, the emperor was to express the Imperial Will in politics, and the Imperial Will was to be the referent for all acts of government. He continues that just as the court was responding to the Emperor-in-Court for maintaining the "ideal polity", the government was in charge of to the Emperor-in-State in terms of actuating the "real polity." It is necessary to highlight that the emperor here was not to be involved as a person but as an institution. The emperor was in charge of ratifying the decisions reached to him, making the final move in the prewar decision-making process. Thus, it signifies that a given policy was a legitimate decision of state having been sanctioned by the Imperial Will. Again, the Imperial Will in politics was the will of the "imperial line unbroken for ages eternal" but not the emperor's personal will.<sup>290</sup>

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<sup>288</sup> Titus, *Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan*, 54.

<sup>289</sup> Titus, *Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan*, 54.

<sup>290</sup> Titus, *Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan*, 55.

Another imperative requirement is that emperor's personal will as Emperor-in-State ought to be invisible to the public view so as not to bear the consequences of getting the emperor's individual role challenged with partisanship in the case of allowing the public to know the preferences of the emperor on a sharply disputed issue prior to its resolution by the government. More than that, the imperial institution itself might be questioned.<sup>291</sup>

If we now turn to the discussion of the gatekeepers of the Imperial Will, it appears that they were not only palace bureaucrats, rather all political leaders of account: Ministry of State, generals and admirals of the Supreme Command, Privy Councillors, Elder Statesmen, and all others who by law or custom "advised and assisted" the emperor. However, it is noteworthy to state that it was mainly the responsibility of four palace officials to manage Emperor-in-State. Thus, the palace would remain the inviolable sanctuary of the emperor's personal will in politics.<sup>292</sup>

In a broad sense, the four palace officials were the Imperial Household Minister, the Grand Chamberlain, the Chief Aide-de-Camp, and the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. They were mainly in charge of ensuring the transcendental position of the throne both in politics and society. Titus puts forward that to do so, they had to assure that the Emperor-in-State as Emperor-in-Public appear as the representative of the Imperial Will in politics not to display Emperor's personal will publicly. They also needed to cooperate with the government leaders of the day arranging the public display and involvement of the Emperor-in-State.<sup>293</sup> As the respective roles of them require a great deal of attention, they will be touched on under another title in this chapter.

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<sup>291</sup> Titus, *Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan*, 55.

<sup>292</sup> Titus, *Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan*, 56.

<sup>293</sup> Titus, *Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan*, 56.

The structure both the emperor and the gatekeepers in as well as the functions of the Imperial Household Agency attempted to be covered above, the palace bureaucracy as the structure and the personnel between 1885 to 1945 shall henceforth be covered now.

### 3.5 The offices and personnel of the palace bureaucracy

Titus remarks that from the end of the Restoration settlement in 1889 to the end of 1945 only minor changes made in the functional domain and structure of the ministry.<sup>294</sup> With reference to the table created by Titus (see table 1) a list of ministry's offices in 1945 demonstrates the wide range of functions under its jurisdiction.

He claims that the structure of the palace bureaucracy did not particularly change after 1889. Of the twenty-eight offices in 1945, only one was completely new to the twentieth century which was Board of Prince Ri's Affairs.<sup>295</sup> Titus continues: Both the Minister's Secretariat and the General Affairs Bureau, created in 1908 and 1941 respectively, were organizational refinements of two or three secretarial divisions of 1886-89. Furthermore, Board of Rituals originated as a subdivision of the Board of the Ceremonies around 1880. Other offices were created and abolished according to the composition of the imperial family at any given time. The Board of the Empress Dowager's Affairs could exemplify that. Moreover, ad hoc offices such as palace construction bureaus, investigatory bodies, and the like were established and then terminated when their work was completed.<sup>296</sup>

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<sup>294</sup> Titus, *Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan*, 58.

<sup>295</sup> Titus, *Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan*, 59.

<sup>296</sup> Titus, *Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan*, 55.

Table 1. Offices of the Imperial Household Ministry, 1945

Title of Office	Date Created
Minister's Secretariat	1908
Board of Chamberlains	1884
Board of Ceremonies	1877
Board of Peerage Affairs	1877
Office of Imperial Mausolea	1878
Office of Archives	1883
Office of Court Physicians	1886
Office of Imperial Cuisine	1886
Office of the Privy Purse	1885
Office of Imperial Works	1885
Office of Imperial Stables	1886
General Affairs Bureau	1941
Bureau of Imperial Guards	1886
Board of Rituals	1939
Board of Empress's Affairs	1869
Board of the Crown Prince's Affairs	1889
Board of the Empress Dowager's Affairs	1869
Imperial House Audit Bureau	1889
Imperial Poetry Bureau	1888
Imperial House Museum	1886
Shosoin Curator's Office	1884
Bureau of Imperial Lands and Forests	1885
Peers School	1877
Peers School for Women	1885
Board of Prince Ri's Affairs	1911
Kyoto Office	1883
Office of Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal	1885
Office of Aides-de-Camp	1896

David Titus, *Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan* (Columbia University Press, 1974), 59.

Titus also draws the attention to the fact that one of the offices listed in table 1 was not formally included in the organizational chart of the Imperial Household Ministry, which is Aides-de-Camp. The Aides-de-Camp were organizationally reckoned members of the General Staff Office, and it was the military initiating their appointments rather than the palace bureaucracy. Given the Aides-de-Camp being a regular attendant on the emperor and members of the imperial family, they were operationally a part of the palace bureaucracy. Titus further gives the example of Ladies-in-Waiting as it has never been created as a formal part of the Imperial Household Ministry. According to Titus that does not dismiss the fact that they were

always Ladies-in-Waiting in the inner circle surrounding the Emperor-in-Chamberlers. Lastly, Titus maintains that there were also a number of Court Advisers, and Imperial Household Ministry Consultants who advised the court on such matters as finances, diplomat etiquette, Shinto ceremonies, and the distribution of honours.<sup>297</sup>

Management of the court was a comprehensive operation that a considerable bureaucracy was essential to maintain the imperial institution as a state within a state, as Titus argues. Therefore, he creates another table (see table 2) illustrating the lists at three-year intervals the total number of Imperial Household Ministry officials from 1924 to 1942, the numbers of persons in the two highest civil service categories of direct imperial appointee and imperial appointee for those years, and the number of officials in the Tokyo palace and the provincial offices for years in which these figures were available.<sup>298</sup>

Table 2. Imperial Household Ministry Officials, 1924-1942

Year	Total	Direct Imperial Appointees	Imperial Appointees	Other	Tokyo	Provinces
1924	4,749	8	101	4,640	-	-
1927	4,581	7	109	4,645	-	-
1930	4,992	8	111	4,803	-	-
1933	4,899	8	115	4,776	-	-
1936	5,145	6	134	5,005	-	-
1939	5,342	6	140	5,196	3,161	2,181
1942	5,677	8	133	5,536	5,536	2,468

David Titus, *Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan* (Columbia University Press, 1974), 61.

<sup>297</sup> Titus, *Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan*, 60.

<sup>298</sup> Titus, *Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan*, 60.

Titus further allocates sufficient time to display the personnel breakdown of the ministry's officials in 1943 (see table 3).

Table 3. Personal Breakdown of the Ministry's Officials, 1943

Direct imperial appointee or treated as such	9
Imperial appointee or treated as such	132
Executive appointee or treated as such	356
Official or treated as such	2,631
Attached staff	203
Staff	1,161
Employees	1,325
Total	5,817

David Titus, *Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan* (Columbia University Press, 1974), 61.

Titus observes that the Imperial Household Ministry ranked among the top structures in prewar Japan with the nine officials of direct appointee rank in 1943, and from six to nine of that rank from the 1920s. He further asserts that only the Foreign Ministry, whose minister and ambassador plenipotentiary were direct imperial appointees, and the armed forces, whose generals and admirals were also of that rank, outranked the Imperial Household Ministry in this respect. No other Ministry could outrank the Imperial Household Ministry in its ratio of direct imperial appointees to total personnel but the Foreign Ministry.<sup>299</sup>

Another point to take highly into consideration is that only the Prime Minister and the Speakers of the two houses of the Imperial Diet received higher official salaries than the Imperial Household Minister.<sup>300</sup> In addition, the maximum official salaries (yen per annum) of the leading officials of the government and court in 1939 (see table 4) were cited below:

<sup>299</sup> Titus, *Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan*, 62.

<sup>300</sup> Titus, *Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan*, 62.

Table 4. Official Salaries of the Leading Government and Court, 1939

Government	
Prime Minister	9, 600 ¥
Speaker of the House of Peers	7, 500
Speaker of the House of Representatives	7, 500
Ministers of State	6, 800
President of the Privy Council	6, 600
Ambassadors Plenipotentiary	6, 600
Admirals and generals	6, 600
Vice Ministers of State	5, 800
Court	
Imperial Household Minister	6, 800 ¥
Lord Keepers of the Privy Seal	6, 800
Chief-Aide-de-Camp	6, 600
Grand Chamberlain	6, 200

David Titus, *Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan* (Columbia University Press, 1974), 62.

Finally, according to Titus, there were, broadly speaking, fifty officials, twelve of these were direct imperial appointees in rank, at court between 1924 and 1943. They held concurrent posts in the government. However, it is significant to note that they were not on the Imperial Household Ministry's official roster.<sup>301</sup>

In view of all that has been mentioned with regards to the ranks and salaries of the imperial institution's officials so far, one can clearly suggest that the Imperial Household Ministry was a strong and prestigious bureaucratic organization. Having considered that, further analysis of institutional and personnel structure around the emperor in an attempt to tackle with the routine management of imperial dignity will hereafter be conducted.

### 3.6 Bureaucratic operatives of the emperor-in-court as emperor-in-public

Referring to the indicated outer and inner side components of the palace mentioned before, an in-depth analysis of the outer side bureaucracy can now be offered in this

<sup>301</sup> Titus, *Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan*, 62.

stage. According to Titus's review of the 1945 offices, the Minister's Secretariat, Office of Imperial Mausolea, Office of Archives, Office of the Privy Purse, Office of Imperial Works, General Affairs Bureau, etc., were all outer offices. The Minister's Secretariat was in charge of "secret" matters, the promotion, status, and retirement of ministry officials, pensions, correspondence, statistics, and reports for the Official Gazette, coordination of ministry offices and bureaus, investigations, the drafting of papers, and matters not assigned to other offices. The General Affairs Bureau was responsible for tackling with the arrangements for imperial tours, public announcements and photographs, and miscellaneous work for other ministry offices. The Imperial Guards Bureau handled the palace security, escorting imperial processions and other police functions, sanitation, air defence and fire-fighting. Foreign Affairs Section of the Board of Ceremonies was in charge of the reception of foreign dignitaries and protocol matters. Clearly, the outer side ensured Emperor-in-Court to act as Emperor-in-Public.<sup>302</sup>

Maintaining the 734 tombs and shrines of past emperors and imperial family members that were located in twenty-seven of the forty-seven local divisions of Japan fell under the Office of Imperial Mausolea. Titus states that these were physical reminders to the people that their heirs were a divine lineage, which had existed from "time immemorial." In addition, the Imperial Household Ministry also managed the Shosoin, repository of Japan's cultural treasures and court relics dating from the eighth century. Titus maintains that that is to emphasize the cultural centrality of the imperial line.<sup>303</sup> Furthermore, ancient court music was preserved by the music division of the Board of the Ceremonies.<sup>304</sup>

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<sup>302</sup> Titus, *Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan*, 64.

<sup>303</sup> Titus, *Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan*, 50.

<sup>304</sup> Titus, *Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan*, 64.

When it comes to the management of court finances, Titus signifies that nothing can better demonstrate the administrative nature of the outer side as well as the separation of court and government than the management of court finances in the Imperial Household Ministry. He puts forward that half of the Ministry's total personnel were engaged in the imperial estate and finance. Thus, it can be clearly understood that managing the financial operations of the palace was a major function of the outer side.<sup>305</sup>

The Meiji oligarchs strengthened the independent base of court organization by transferring a vast amount of state land to the imperial house and by placing the court finances under the sole jurisdiction of the palace bureaucracy, in an attempt to create a transcendental emperor during the Restoration settlement. In 1885, a Bureau of Imperial Lands was created to administer the vast public lands transferred to the management of the Imperial Household Ministry.<sup>306</sup> Profits from lands, forests, and capital investments were supplemented by sums allotted from the national treasury to meet the "imperial house expenditure." It is noteworthy to highlight that as early as 1869 the Civil Government had allotted a regular sum for court expenses. However, the expenses of the imperial family and the salaries of the Imperial Household Ministry personnel were paid by the Ministry of Finance. Nevertheless, from 1886 onward, a lump sum to cover all court expenses was granted to the Imperial Household Ministry. Furthermore, it is a crucial fact which should be emphasized that the Imperial Household Ministry was not accountable to the government for the use of the government allotment. The court had financial autonomy even with

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<sup>305</sup> Titus, *Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan*, 64.

<sup>306</sup> Titus, *Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan*, 65.

respect to monies granted from the national treasury.<sup>307</sup> Hence, from 1914, it even had its own bank, the Jugo Ginko.<sup>308</sup>

The Imperial Household Ministry was only accountable to itself for both revenues and expenditures. Only increases in the national treasury allotment required Diet approval. The court audit and budget were entirely distinct from the government's audit and budget and exclusively under the control of the Imperial Household Ministry.<sup>309</sup>

Imperial House Economic Council, created in 1891, was the chief advisory body on court financial operations. It consisted of the exclusive imperial house economic advisers appointed, the Imperial Household Minister, the Vice Minister, the Chief of the Privy Purse, and the Chief of the Bureau of Imperial Lands, which was in line with 1891 governing the council related regulations. The emperor was, however, to be present at council meetings, which appears to have been decided on regulations governing the management of the hereditary estate, designation of hereditary properties, general provisions concerning the imperial estate, capital investments, the amount and as well as the use of the current account, budget increases and decreases in the imperial estate and in capital investments, and regulations governing the court audit.<sup>310</sup>

Titus further express caution regarding the interpretation of the budgeting and accounting practices of the court, which was also found considerably more flexible than those of the government by Kuroda Hisata.<sup>311</sup> It is easy to guess that imperial lands and forest, imperial house capital, and all but untouchable government

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<sup>307</sup> Titus, *Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan*, 67.

<sup>308</sup> Titus, *Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan*, 68.

<sup>309</sup> Titus, *Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan*, 69.

<sup>310</sup> Titus, *Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan*, 69.

<sup>311</sup> Titus, *Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan*, 70; Hisata, *Tenno Ke no Zaisan*, 39-44.

disbursement gave the court the wherewithal for legal and administrative autonomy. However, Titus argues that how those resources were employed depended on who controlled the Imperial Household Ministry. What was more significant in his argument was that the palace bureaucracy could use court funds for political purposes. He supports this argument by stating that the secrecy of the financial operations could be circumstantial evidence that the court funds were not used strictly for court purposes.<sup>312</sup>

Logically, states Titus, Imperial Household Ministry would be anticipated to have also managed the affairs of social status, and, in fact, the Ministry did have control over the aristocracy. In 1878, the Councillors agreed to create five ranks, which were formalized in 1884: prince, marquis, count, viscount, and baron based on European practice. Thus, a modern aristocracy was centralized in the imperial house. Furthermore, a bureau within the Imperial Household Ministry established to manage the affairs of the aristocracy as early as 1887. In 1884 the Ministry was given custody of the family registers of the aristocracy. In 1886 the Ministry was charged with managing the hereditary property of the aristocracy. Finally, the Imperial Household Ministry Office responsible for the aristocracy was styled the Office of Peerage Affairs. It was north only in charge of the matters with regards to the aristocracy, but also the imperial family, princely families, and such families as the Korean royal house, including conferences of princes-of-the-blood and of princes as well as meetings of the Imperial Family Council. Supervision of personnel assigned to the imperial family, princes-of-the-blood, and princes as well as announcements of conferrals of court rank and peerage titles fell under the responsibility of it. Furthermore, it also handled the regulations governing the *Gakushuin* 学習院 (the

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<sup>312</sup> Titus, *Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan*, 70.

Peers School and the Peers School for Women), and preparation of the electoral list of counts, viscounts, and barons for the *Kizoku-in* 貴族院 (*the House of Peers*).<sup>313</sup> The Peers School, incidentally, was to train the sons of the aristocracy in service to the nation. With the attempts of Ito Hirobumi, who believed that the aristocracy existed to support the social order and to preserve the prosperity of the imperial house, the Peers School, where the cultural values of the new Japanese nation were taught with the education combined with both Eastern ethics and Western techniques, became a government school under the management of the Imperial Household Ministry in 1884.<sup>314</sup> Thus, the modern aristocracy came into being, discharging its public service function in several ways, one of which was clearly the Imperial Household Agency playing a considerable role in defining its bulwark functions as well as in managing its affairs.

### 3.7 The inner side: Sanctuary of the emperor-in-chambers

Titus puts forward that whereas some aristocrats possessed leading palace titles, others in lesser roles, were mainly active on the inner side of the Imperial Household Ministry as Chamberlains and Stewards.<sup>315</sup>

Besides the fact implied above with regards to the Chamberlains possessing mainly an aristocratic background, it should also be noted that the Chamberlains, who managed the inner court and liaison between the Emperor-in-Chambers and the Emperor-in-Public, also seems to have found a group cohesion in educational background seeing that twelve of the fifteen Chamberlains in 1943 graduated from prewar Japan's foremost university, Tokyo Imperial University. Their duties,

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<sup>313</sup> Titus, *Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan*, 70-71.

<sup>314</sup> Titus, *Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan*, 72.

<sup>315</sup> Titus, *Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan*, 74.

however, were not clearly outlined other than serving at the emperor's side in comparison with the bureaucrats of the outer side. Titus further remarks that the Imperial Household Ministry solely stated that the Board of Chamberlains "takes charge of matters at the side of the emperor."<sup>316</sup>

Despite the fact that the Imperial Household Ministry law did not specify the functions of the Board of Chamberlains, the ministry's regulations concerning divisions and sections, however, defined that the first section of the Board of Chamberlains, the Miscellaneous Section, tackled imperial lectures, audiences at court, court allowances and imperial gifts, imperial family records, custody of the board's seal, and matters not assigned to the other two sections. In addition, the Miscellaneous Section was also in charge of coordination with the Office of Aides-de-Camp to schedule audiences for military personnel. The second section, the Inner Court Section of the board, handled such matters as butlering. The third and last section, which was the Management Section, managed accounts and possessions of the imperial family.<sup>317</sup>

It is also significant to cite Irie Sukemasa's, Chamberlain to the emperor since 1934 and formerly a viscount, implications regarding the role of Chamberlains:

Outside there may be persons whom the emperor trusts deeply. Outside there may be persons whom the emperor respects. But those he considers just like the atmosphere, like the breezes, paying no heed that they are there – being just the same whether there or not – those are Chamberlains.<sup>318</sup>

Clearly, according to Irie's explanations, the Chamberlains played a constant companionship and messenger role, which might even involve helping the emperor

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<sup>316</sup> Titus, *Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan*, 75.

<sup>317</sup> Titus, *Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan*, 78-79.

<sup>318</sup> Irie Sukemasa, *Tenno Sama no Kanreki*, 242 as cited in Titus, *Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan*, 76.

collect marine life specimens or going to Taiwan to express the emperor's condolences on such occasions as the great earthquake of 1923.<sup>319</sup>

Another point needed to be emphasized is that according to Titus, Chamberlains held concurrent posts in the Imperial Household Ministry, which was evidently essential seeing as it was Chamberlains who had primary responsibility for managing access to the Emperor-in-Chambers and providing companionship to the emperor to the emperor and imperial family members. To exemplify, he indicates that of the fifteen Chamberlains in 1943, one was concurrently Grand Steward to the Empress, one headed a section of the Office of Court Physicians, and three were on the tutorial board for the children of the imperial family. Three Chamberlains also served concurrently as Master of Ceremonies owing to the fact that audiences granted to foreign dignitaries as well as the worship visits to the inner shrine were scheduled by the Board of the Ceremonies. Furthermore, one Chamberlain served concurrently as a secretary in the General Affairs Bureau, an outer Office concerned with imperial tours and public relations.<sup>320</sup>

In addition to the Chamberlains, there were also Ladies-in-Waiting and the Aides-de-Camp shared the function of regular attendance. The Ladies-in-Waiting, which had been members of the inner court throughout the recorded history in Japan, had a different function from the others in regular attendance: ensuring that there was an heir to the throne. When Showa emperor married in 1924, however, the old system and practices of Ladies-in-Waiting were abolished, and salaried women attendants replaced the “machines for producing the emperor's heirs.”<sup>321</sup>

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<sup>319</sup> Irie Sukemasa, *Tenno Sama no Kanreki*, 232-233, 238-239 as cited in Titus, *Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan*, 76.

<sup>320</sup> Titus, *Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan*, 78.

<sup>321</sup> Masashi, *Tenno Showa Ki*, 39; Kishidan, *Kunaicho*, 145 as cited in Titus, *Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan*, 80.

When it comes to the Aides-de-Camp, similar to the Chamberlains, they functioned as imperial messengers and regular attendants. However, unlike the Chamberlains linked the emperor and government, the Aides as messengers linked the emperor and military.<sup>322</sup> Yale Candee Maxon remarks regarding what the role of Aide-de-Camp entailed:

One other personal adviser, if he can be called so, on the Emperor's staff was the Chief Aide-de-Camp. Certainly he was the least helpful member, for he seems to have functioned as the eyes and ears of the General Staff rather than as the Emperor's trusted aide... The Chief Aide-de-Camp was at this time (1931) functioning as a General Staff informant in the Palace rather than as a discreet and devoted assistant to the Emperor in his difficult task of coordination.<sup>323</sup>

Titus continues that the Office of Aides was institutionally unique in the *Kunaisho* 宮内省 (Imperial Household Ministry) as the provisions governing the organization and duties of the Aides were established by Imperial Ordinance, not by the Imperial Household Ministry decree. Moreover, personnel assigned to the palace as Aides were listed in the Army and Navy rosters as well as in the official roster of the Imperial Household Ministry.<sup>324</sup> It indicates that the Aides were less court officials than representatives of the military at court.<sup>325</sup> The organization of the Office of Aides-de-Camp in 1943 was established by Imperial Ordinance, which was amended later in 1919 and 1920 and countersigned by the Prime Minister, Minister of the Army and Minister of the Navy but not by the Imperial Household Minister. In line with the provisions of the ordinance, the Imperial Household Minister only had minimal control over the Aides. Only the last provision gave a measure to the

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<sup>322</sup> Titus, *Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan*, 81.

<sup>323</sup> Maxon, *Control of Japanese Foreign Policy: A Study of Civil-Military Rivalry, 1930-1945*, as cited in Titus, *Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan*, 81.

<sup>324</sup> Titus, *Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan*, 81.

<sup>325</sup> Titus, *Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan*, 81.

Imperial Household Ministry: When the Chief Aide and Aides are at court they shall t-observe the regulations of the Imperial Household Ministry. “Ordinary services to the emperor” and “reporting and replying to the throne on military matters” were stated in the article 4 of the Ordinance.<sup>326</sup> Finally, according to Titus’s interview with Irie Sukamasa, only “the best” were allowed to become Aides. They were career military offices whose service at court was temporary, some were of aristocratic origin but all of them were graduates of the service academies.<sup>327</sup>

### 3.8 The offices and officers of palace leadership

As it has been introduced in a broad sense earlier, the palace officers in charge of coordinating and facilitating the palace advisory machinery, alongside with gatekeeping policies in the face of institutional pressures to declare the Imperial Will, were the Imperial Household Minister, the Grand Chamberlain, the Chief Aide-de-Camp, and the Lord Keepers of the Privy Seal. It has been conveyed that the Imperial Household Minister, as a head manager of the palace bureaucracy, mainly handled maintaining palace autonomy and the transcendental position of the Emperor-in-Court. The Grand Chamberlain was the emperor’s chief messenger in regular attendance, whose function was more ambiguous than the other three palace leaders. The Chief Aide-de-Camp was the emperor’s key adviser in the palace and linked the emperor with the operational commands of the Army and Navy. The Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal was the emperor’s principal palace adviser on political affairs. However, he was excluding the matters clearly under the jurisdiction of the military commands. While the Imperial Household Minister and the Grand

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<sup>326</sup> Titus, *Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan*, 82.

<sup>327</sup> Titus, *Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan*, 86.

Chamberlain, who were strictly court officers, were in charge of the Emperor-in-Court, the Chief Aide and the Privy Seal were adjunct palace officers responsible for the Emperor-in-State in his military and governmental capacities respectively.

The other three officer's role may be understood in their offices' sections in detail. However, there is a need to explain more regarding the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal. They always acted as liaison and negotiator between the throne and the political world outside the palace.<sup>328</sup> The Privy Seal was in charge of taking custody of the Imperial Seal and the Great Seal of State, rendering advice and assistance to the Imperial Seal and the Great Seal of State, and presiding over the proceedings of the Court Advisers.<sup>329</sup> Important to note that of the four leading palace officers, only Imperial Household Minister and the Privy Seal were in charge of “advising and assisting” the emperor, as were the Ministers of State. The Chief Aide, however, was empowered to “report and reply” to the throne, which, according to Titus , allowed him similar influence, and the generality of “rendering attendance at the emperor’s side” also allowed the Grand Chamberlain influence.<sup>330</sup> Finally, it is natural that owing to the fact the role of the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal entailed to be the chief link between court and the government, the Privy Seals as a group were the most highly positioned in terms of titles, the most accomplished in terms of prior government careers, and on average the most senior of the four leading palace officers.<sup>331</sup> Titus proves the fact that they were the most prestigious of the palace leaders and careers by supporting with the data. Of the fifteen Privy Seal between 1885 and 1945, four had been Prime Ministers; nine were Ministers of State, seven,

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<sup>328</sup> Titus, *Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan*, 171.

<sup>329</sup> Titus, *Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan*, 173.

<sup>330</sup> Titus, *Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan*, 174.

<sup>331</sup> Titus, *Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan*, 182.

including two presidents, had been Privy Councillors: and all but one was at one time members of the House of Peers.<sup>332</sup>

In addition, as demonstrated earlier again, these four leading officers managed the process of imperial ratification of political policies, which was the final act in the closed and bureaucratic political process, coordinating with the government leaders of the day, both civil and military and ensuring the imperial ratification to be an invisible process. There is a need to emphasize the fact that behind all four palace leaders, there were the Elder Statesman and Senior Retainers held primary responsibility for advising the Emperor-in-State.<sup>333</sup>

All four officers were members or partners of the oligarchy, as Titus concedes, it evolved from a group of autonomous political leaders to an unstable collection of institutionalized elites.<sup>334</sup> In addition, the career background of the palace leaders suggests that the palace leadership was composed predominantly of members of the House of Peers with considerable bureaucratic experience and achievement. They generally achieved high bureaucratic positions outside the palace prior to becoming palace leaders.<sup>335</sup> They were also linked by family ties not only among themselves but also with political and social leaders outside the palace.<sup>336</sup>

Finally, it is crucial to refer to Titus's examination of Kido Koichi's palace career. Kido had different palace posts, functioning as secretary, bureaucrat, and negotiator.<sup>337</sup> As Chief Secretary to the Privy Seal in 1932, Kido acted as a political liaison and information broker. As Director of Peerage Affairs in 1936, he was a

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<sup>332</sup> Titus, *Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan*, 172.

<sup>333</sup> Titus, *Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan*, 106.

<sup>334</sup> Titus, *Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan*, 106.

<sup>335</sup> Titus, *Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan*, 117.

<sup>336</sup> Titus, *Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan*, 116.

<sup>337</sup> Titus, *Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan*, 309.

“bureaucrat”, responsible for the day-to-day management of a specific official jurisdiction.<sup>338</sup> He was concurrently Chief Secretary to the Privy Seal until 1936. In 1941, Kido was a “negotiator”. As Lord Keepers of the Privy Seal, he was in charge of the emperor for negotiating Cabinet formations and advising on policies emanating from the institutions of imperial prerogative. He was the key negotiator in presenting a unified government policy to the emperor for ratification. Therefore, his primary associates were the emperor, the Ministers of State, and the other three leading palace officers.<sup>339</sup> Titus’s analysis on the extensive diary of Kido, revealing political associations and activities during the two periods he was in the palace: 1930 to 1937 and 1940 to 1945, concludes that those three roles that he headed were basic to palace politics.

### 3.9 The new imperial institution, or still the old one?

With the 3rd of May 1947 Constitution of Japan, the emperor and the imperial institution removed from the center of the political system of Japan and the emperor’s role reduced merely to the symbol of state and society, which necessitated a restructuring in the palace. *Kunaisho* 宫内省 (The Imperial Household Ministry) became the Imperial Household Office and further it was placed under the Prime Minister of Japan.<sup>340</sup> Disbanding the palace machinery for advising the emperor as supreme political authority both formal and informal had already entered into force before the new Constitution.<sup>341</sup> The constitutional provision that made all imperial house property state property resulted in the demise of the Imperial Household's

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<sup>338</sup> Titus, *Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan*, 194.

<sup>339</sup> Titus, *Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan*, 195.

<sup>340</sup> “The Imperial Household Agency,” *Kunaicho* 宫内庁, <http://www.kunaicho.go.jp/e-kunaicho/enkaku.html>

<sup>341</sup> Titus, “The Making of the 'Symbol Emperor System' in Postwar Japan,” 565.

Bureau of Imperial Lands and Forests. It was transferred to the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. The Imperial Museum at Ueno Park was turned over to the Ministry of Education. The Peers School and the Peers School for Women were removed from palace control and incorporated as independent institutions of higher education. The Palace Police Bureau was transferred to the jurisdiction of the Tokyo Metropolitan Police.<sup>342</sup> The staff numbers were dramatically reduced from an immediate post-war figure of over 6,200 to less than 1,500 and the organization was slimmed.<sup>343</sup>

That notwithstanding, Titus highlights that the cuts in personnel and the elimination of regular and adjunct palace offices that had sustained the political role of the throne under the Meiji Constitution, did not change the palace structure considerably as it is similar to what it had been in prewar times.<sup>344</sup> Despite the fact that the Law Establishing the Prime Minister's Office came into force on 1 June 1949 and *Kunaifu* 宮内府 (Imperial Household Office) resulted in a new name *Kunaicho* 宮内庁 (Imperial Household Agency), turning into an external agency of the Prime Minister's Office.<sup>345</sup> Titus argues that not enjoying the legal and structural autonomy from the Government like prewar days did not, however, make the organization of the palace completely different as clearly it resembles that of the prewar Ministry.<sup>346</sup>

For the sake of identification whether the organization of the palace resembled that of the prewar Ministry, the structure of the new imperial palace will be analysed along the way. As a result of the Central Government Reform which

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<sup>342</sup> Titus, "The Making of the 'Symbol Emperor System' in Postwar Japan," 565.

<sup>343</sup> "The Imperial Household Agency," *Kunaicho* 宮内庁, <http://www.kunaicho.go.jp/e-kunaicho/enkaku.html>

<sup>344</sup> Titus, "The Making of the 'Symbol Emperor System' in Postwar Japan," 566.

<sup>345</sup> "The Imperial Household Agency," *Kunaicho* 宮内庁, <http://www.kunaicho.go.jp/e-kunaicho/enkaku.html>

<sup>346</sup> Titus, "The Making of the 'Symbol Emperor System' in Postwar Japan," 566.

took effect on 6 January 2001 the Imperial Household Agency has been placed under the Cabinet Office. As a government organization placed under the Prime Minister, the Imperial Household Agency, like the prewar days, takes charge of the state matters concerning the Imperial House. Among the Emperor's acts in matters of state stipulated in Article 7 of the Constitution of Japan, the Agency also assists the Emperor in receiving foreign ambassadors and ministers and performing ceremonial functions. Headed by the Grand Steward and assisted by the Vice-Grand Steward, the Imperial Household Agency, also keeps the Privy Seal and State Seal.<sup>347</sup>

At a first glance, it seems that only five of the 28 offices and bureaus of the 1945 Imperial Household Ministry remained, which are namely Board of the Chamberlains, Board of the Ceremonies, Board of the Crown Prince's Affairs, Office of the Shosoin Treasure, and Kyoto Office of the Imperial Household.<sup>348</sup> However, as Titus also emphasizes, soon it becomes apparent that the present Director's Secretariat, which resembles the prewar Minister's Secretariat, has absorbed the prewar General Affairs and Imperial House Audit Bureau.<sup>349</sup> The senior staff of the Grand Steward's Secretariat are: Councillor, Supervisor of the Imperial Princes' Household Affairs, Treasurer of the Imperial Household, Medical Supervisor of the Imperial Household. The Secretariat Division appears to be responsible for matters pertaining to the Imperial Household Council, research and statistics on the Imperial Household system, receiving/shipping official documents, reviewing/submitting documents, matters pertaining to documents for official gazettes, and administration,

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<sup>347</sup> "The Imperial Household Agency," *Kunaicho* 宮内庁, <http://www.kunaicho.go.jp/e-kunaicho/enkaku.html>

<sup>348</sup> "The Imperial Household Agency," *Kunaicho* 宮内庁, <http://www.kunaicho.go.jp/e-kunaicho/enkaku.html>

<sup>349</sup> Titus, "The Making of the 'Symbol Emperor System' in Postwar Japan," 566.

payment, health preservation, and welfare for personnel.<sup>350</sup> The General Affairs Division that was absorbed by the Secretariat, however, is in charge of matters pertaining to tours for Their Majesties the Emperor and Empress, donations for disasters, granting business incentives to highly-rated social work entities, receiving articles for presentation, audiences, luncheons, tea ceremonies, visits from the general public to the Palace for both the New Year Greeting and His Majesty's Birthday, matters pertaining to press releases, matters pertaining to publicity, and volunteer work at the Imperial Palace and Akasaka Imperial Gardens. For household affairs pertaining to the imperial families of Prince Akishino, Prince Hitachi, Prince Mikasa and Prince Takamado the Imperial Prince's Household Affairs Division is stated to be responsible. Whereas the Accounting Division is responsible for the budget and settlement of accounts for expenses and incomes for the Imperial Household Economy Council and financial audit, the Supply Division is responsible for the management and inspection of equipment, consumable supplies, resources for repair and devices, and matters pertaining to the Museum of The Imperial Collections.<sup>351</sup>

The Board of Chamberlains (along with the Director's Secretariat, has absorbed the Office of Court Physicians as well as taking charge of matters formerly tackled by the Office of the Empress 'Affairs.<sup>352</sup> In a similar fashion, Board of the Chamberlains is headed by the Grand Chamberlain. Its senior staff are: Vice-Grand Chamberlain, Chamberlains, Chief Lady-in-Waiting, Ladies-in-Waiting, Chief Court Physician and Court Physicians. The Board takes charge of the daily life of Their

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<sup>350</sup> "The Imperial Household Agency," *Kunaicho* 宮内庁, <http://www.kunaicho.go.jp/e-kunaicho/enkaku.html>

<sup>351</sup> "The Imperial Household Agency," *Kunaicho* 宮内庁, <http://www.kunaicho.go.jp/e-kunaicho/enkaku.html>

<sup>352</sup> Titus, "The Making of the 'Symbol Emperor System' in Postwar Japan," 566.

Majesties the Emperor and Empress. It also keeps the Privy Seal and the State Seal.  
<sup>353</sup> The prewar Office of Imperial Mausolea and the prewar Office of Achieve have been consolidated into one Division of Archives and Mausolea.<sup>354</sup> Headed by the Director-General, Archives and Mausolea Department consists of the following divisions: The Archives Division, Compiling Division and the Imperial Mausolea and Tombs Division. Furthermore, five regional offices at Tama, Momoyama, Tsukinowa, Unebi and Furuichi, deal with the day-to-day affairs pertaining to Imperial Mausolea and Tombs in their respective areas.<sup>355</sup> The Archives Division is in charge of maintenance, registration, and archive of the Imperial family record, for archiving, repairing, transferring and reproducing documents and records such as ancient documents that have been passed from generation to generation in the Imperial family, for editing and maintaining the archives pertaining to the Imperial Household Agency, and for matters pertaining to the branch library of the National Diet Library in the Imperial Household Agency and Shosoin Treasure House. The compilation of historical texts for successive emperors and the Imperial families, and for matters pertaining to compilation and archive of the Historical Materials of the Imperial System and other documents are covered by the Compiling Division. And the Mausolea and Tombs Division is responsible for matters pertaining to the maintenance, investigation and study of the Imperial Mausolea and Tombs. In fact, the Imperial Mausolea and Tombs that exist in various districts are divided into five

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<sup>353</sup> “The Imperial Household Agency,” *Kunaicho* 宮内庁, <http://www.kunaicho.go.jp/e-kunaicho/enkaku.html>

<sup>354</sup> Titus, “The Making of the 'Symbol Emperor System' in Postwar Japan,” 566.

<sup>355</sup> “The Imperial Household Agency,” *Kunaicho* 宮内庁, <http://www.kunaicho.go.jp/e-kunaicho/enkaku.html>

administrative regions and are maintained by the regional offices at Tama, Momoyama, Tsukinowa, Unebi and Furuichi.<sup>356</sup>

Board of the Crown Prince's Household is headed by the Grand Master and its senior staff are: Chief Chamberlain, Chamberlains, Chief Lady-in-Waiting, Ladies-in-Waiting, Chief Physician and Physicians. The Board takes charge of the daily life of Their Imperial Highnesses the Crown Prince and Princess and Her Imperial Highness Princess Aiko. Similar to the prewar palace system, Board of the Ceremonies is headed by the Grand Master of the Ceremonies. One of the two Vice-Grand Masters of the Ceremonies is responsible for ceremonies, music and wild-duck netting. The Board's Music Department performs both Gagaku, i.e. ancient court music, and the western classical music. The other Vice-Grand Master of the Ceremonies is in charge of the Imperial Family's activities concerning fostering friendly relationship with foreign countries, such as Their Majesties' State visits to foreign countries and various court functions held for visiting foreign dignitaries.<sup>357</sup>

In the present Maintenance Division are included the prewar Office of Cuisine, Office of Imperial Works, and Office of Imperial Stables.<sup>358</sup> The Maintenance and Works Department is headed by the Director-General and consists of the following divisions and senior official: The Administration Division, Works Division, Gardens Division, Imperial Cuisine Division, Vehicles and Horses Division and the Superintendent of the Imperial Palace. In addition, three regional offices maintain the Imperial Villas in Nasu, Suzaki and Hayama, and another office looks after the East Gardens of the Imperial Palace. Alternately, the Administration

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<sup>356</sup> "The Imperial Household Agency," *Kunaicho* 宮内庁, <http://www.kunaicho.go.jp/e-kunaicho/enkaku.html>

<sup>357</sup> "The Imperial Household Agency," *Kunaicho* 宮内庁, <http://www.kunaicho.go.jp/e-kunaicho/enkaku.html>

<sup>358</sup> Titus, "The Making of the 'Symbol Emperor System' in Postwar Japan," 566.

Division is responsible for matters pertaining to the management of the national properties, both Imperial House Use Properties and the properties of the agency, whose authority the Imperial Household Agency owns. It is also in charge of the supervision of guest visits to the Imperial Palace and other premises, and the supervision of the construction of the Imperial Palace and other premises, epidemic prevention, sterilization and other health controls, and the cleaning and maintenance of office buildings and the Imperial Stock Farm. To maintain the national properties whose authority the Imperial Household Agency owns, the Works Division tackles with the matters pertaining to the construction, civil engineering and other works, water supply, electricity, gas and other accommodations. While the Gardens Division is responsible for matters pertaining to gardens, gardening, and planting, the Imperial Cuisine Division is responsible for banquets and tea ceremonies held during court events and for preparing and cooking daily meals for the Emperor and the Imperial family. The Vehicles and Horses Division deals with the matters pertaining to vehicles and horses and the Superintendent of the Imperial Palace is responsible for matters pertaining to the maintenance of the Imperial Palace including security and construction. Whereas the Intendant's Office for the Imperial Villas deals with the matters pertaining to the maintenance of Nasu Imperial Villa, Suzaki Imperial Villa and Hayama Imperial Villa, the Intendant's Office for the East Gardens of the Imperial Palace deals with the matters pertaining to the maintenance of the East Gardens of the Imperial Palace.<sup>359</sup>

The Shosoin, the treasure House in Nara Prefecture, preserves and studies the ancient treasures and Buddhist scrolls, many of which were housed in the Shosoin

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<sup>359</sup> “The Imperial Household Agency,” *Kunaicho* 宫内庁, <http://www.kunaicho.go.jp/e-kunaicho/enkaku.html>

since the eighth century. The Imperial Stock Farm in Tochigi Prefecture undertakes animal husbandry. Accordingly, the Office of the Shosoin Treasure House takes care of the storage and maintenance of the collections of the Shosoin Treasure House and Shogozo kyokan (Shogozo scrolls), and for the investigation, study, organization, repair, recovery and copying of the collections. It is also responsible for the management of the establishments and land of Shoso (main building), Shogozo warehouse and the east and west warehouses. The Imperial Stock Farm which is also headed by the Administration Division is responsible for feeding the livestock and producing agricultural and livestock products for the Imperial family and other associated jobs.<sup>360</sup>

As a local branch office of the Imperial Household Agency, the Kyoto Office handles the maintenance of the Imperial House Use Properties such as the Kyoto Imperial Palace, Kyoto Omiya Palace, Sento Imperial Palace, and Katsura and Shugakuin Imperial Villas, in addition to the areas around Momoyama, Tsukinowa, Unebi and Furuichi, where the Imperial Mausolea and Tombs are located. Finally, the Imperial Household Agency still runs its own hospital and The Hospital of the Imperial Household is the hospital that provides medical care to the Emperor and the imperial family. The hospital also provides medical care with the personnel of the Imperial Household Agency and the general public.<sup>361</sup>

Titus puts forward that although Shinto has been disestablished as a state religion, and there is no Board of Rituals in the Agency's formal organization, Shinto Ritualists, who are classified as 'inner court officials' along with laboratory assistants and other miscellaneous types, conduct Shinto rites at the three Shinto

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<sup>360</sup> "The Imperial Household Agency," *Kunaicho* 宫内庁, <http://www.kunaicho.go.jp/e-kunaicho/enkaku.html>

<sup>361</sup> "The Imperial Household Agency," *Kunaicho* 宫内庁, <http://www.kunaicho.go.jp/e-kunaicho/enkaku.html>

sanctuaries in the inner palace. Titus further asserts that these ‘officials’ are ‘evidently’ paid from the inner court account, which is considered ‘money in hand’ and not public funds for which the Agency is accountable. In addition, the Ritualists are not listed in the Government’s Official Roster. Thus, Titus supports the idea that Shinto rites are still a part of palace life even without enjoying the public visibility and importance they had had in prewar times.<sup>362</sup> It is significant to note the analysis of Titus that there were 25 Shinto ceremonies in the palace in 1965. 20 of these were precisely the same as in prewar times (as of 1942), 2 closely resembled prewar rites, and 3 were added due to special circumstances (the rites to the late Empress Dowager, rites on the 800th anniversary of the Emperor Nijo, and rites on the 1,200th anniversary of the Emperor Junnin).<sup>363</sup> Therefore, although Shinto rites are not prominent to the public and publicized by the palace or the media, it would be correct to agree to Titus’s point of Shinto rites continuing to play a role in the symbolic function of the imperial institution. Hence, the presence of Shinto rites and of Rituals in the palace mean that 16 of the 28 prewar palace offices have been retained regardless of formally or informally, in the palace.<sup>364</sup> Similar to Shinto, the same trend seems to have been followed in terms of poetry considering the fact that it is still alive at the palace despite the non-existence of the Imperial Poetry Bureau in today’s Imperial Household Agency organization chart. Monthly poems on fixed topics are presented at court by members of the imperial family and famous poets, with the emperor and empress present. Every January the ancient custom of the court poetry reading is held, with the emperor reciting his poem last. The crown prince and other members of the imperial family are present as well as those who qualified to

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<sup>362</sup> Titus, “The Making of the 'Symbol Emperor System' in Postwar Japan,” 566.

<sup>363</sup> Titus, “The Making of the 'Symbol Emperor System' in Postwar Japan,” 566-567.

<sup>364</sup> Titus, “The Making of the 'Symbol Emperor System' in Postwar Japan,” 567.

read their poems, and other men and women of letters and education. With this, as Titus argues, 17 of the 28 offices of the prewar Imperial Household Ministry functionally present at today's palace.<sup>365</sup>

When it comes to the imperial property, one cannot argue that the vast imperial estate is still there, which was a major source of revenue supporting palace autonomy in prewar Japan. Similarly, the Bureau of Imperial Lands and Forests, which the palace bureaucracy was required to maintain that estate, was disestablished. However, Titus views that “a diminished function still remains in the palace today: administration of imperial property.” He also takes into account that the physical presence of the imperial line throughout the country is also maintained by the palace's administration of 1,609 acres of land set aside for the 859 tombs, graves, and relics of past emperors and imperial relations in 33 of Japan's prefectures and municipalities.<sup>366</sup>

Today's palace organization does not consist of the followings: starting with the Office of Peerage Affairs seeing as the aristocracy has been abolished. The Office of the Privy Purse is also disestablished due to the fact that there is legally no privy purse. The Office of Palace Police is now managed by the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Office. The Board of the Empress Dowager's Affairs is not involved in the palace because she died. The Imperial House Museum has been transferred to the Ministry of Education. The Peers School and the Peers School for Women has been incorporated as independent schools. The Bureau of Imperial Lands and Forest, as stated earlier, has been transferred to the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. The Board of Prince Ri's Affairs does not exist as there is no Korean royal house under Japanese management today. The Office of Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and the

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<sup>365</sup> Titus, “The Making of the 'Symbol Emperor System' in Postwar Japan,” 567.

<sup>366</sup> Titus, “The Making of the 'Symbol Emperor System' in Postwar Japan,” 567-568.

Office of Chief Aide-de-Camp no longer formally exist in the palace today. Further analysis would shed light on the question whether they have completely gone or not.<sup>367</sup>

Titus states that the former aristocracy has a meeting in the palace even today, and they evidently maintain close ties. He further claims that children of the former aristocracy and of the present members of the imperial family still attend the Peers School and the Peers School for Women.<sup>368</sup> The palace has a budget that requires Household Agency maintenance and management, which will be discussed later in this stage. There is still land, albeit a small area compared to the prewar era, which is imperial house property in effect. Besides the imperial palace, the Household Agency has a distinct Office for managing at least one of the state properties left as ‘imperial use property’: Imperial Palace, Akasaka Imperial Grounds, Residence of Prince Hitachi, Nasu Imperial Villa, Suzaki Imperial Villa, Hayama Imperial Villa, Takanawa Imperial Residence, Goryo Bokujo (Imperial Stock Farm), Saitama Kamoba (Saitama Imperial Wilde Duck Preserves), Shinhama Kamoba (Shinhama Imperial Wild Duck Preserves), Kyoto Imperial Palace (including Omiya and Sento Palaces), Katsura Imperial Villa, Shugakuin Imperial Villa, Shoshin Repository, and Ryobo (Mausolea and Tombs). The Imperial Seal and the State Seal, formerly in the custody of the Privy Seal are now in the custody of the Board of Chamberlains.<sup>369</sup> The Grand Chamberlain seems to be the emperor’s chief link, along with the Director of the Household Agency, to the Government,

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<sup>367</sup> “The Imperial Household Agency,” *Kunaicho* 宮内庁, <http://www.kunaicho.go.jp/e-kunaicho/enkaku.html>

<sup>368</sup> Titus, “The Making of the 'Symbol Emperor System' in Postwar Japan,” 568.

<sup>369</sup> “The Imperial Household Agency,” *Kunaicho* 宮内庁, <http://www.kunaicho.go.jp/e-kunaicho/enkaku.html>

although that role does not involve ‘rendering advice and assistance at the side of the emperor’ as it did for the three chief officials of the prewar palace.<sup>370</sup>

The argument of the internal structures and functions of the palace today still bearing a strong resemblance to the prewar palace is supported considerably by Titus that he argues the palace has a wide range of cultural, traditional, moral, religious, and even political elements that can be used as resources to rearrange the symbolic content of the imperial institution in accordance with the changing conditions outside the palace. Put simply, what he wants to assert is that the humanized symbol emperor system of today has superseded the authoritarian and 'transcendental' emperor system of the Meiji Constitution, but it has by no means eliminated the various components of the imperial symbol acquired throughout history. The accretions of time and circumstance have been absorbed into the palace, giving it a breadth and depth of resources that will allow it to adjust to almost any conceivable swing in the trends of the times. Therefore, the discussion could go on that the imperial palace does not eliminate as much as it can but adjust. Even though those trends as of 1965 indicated further popularization, Titus maintains, the internal resources of the imperial institution are such that they could easily be made to adjust to conservative or progressive changes in external conditions, or that a progressive swing of the pendulum would bring on a revolution that would abolish the imperial institution.<sup>371</sup>

### 3. 10 Palace leaders and emperor's duties as a symbol

Until now, it has been argued that the structure of today's palace retains significant components of the prewar in the light of an in-dept analysis. It is time to turn the discussion to the palace leaders and the emperor's duties as a symbol now. Hence,

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<sup>370</sup> “The Imperial Household Agency,” *Kunaicho* 宫内庁, <http://www.kunaicho.go.jp/e-kunaicho/enkaku.html>

<sup>371</sup> Titus, “The Making of the 'Symbol Emperor System' in Postwar Japan,” 568.

how the imperial family and the emperor, himself, acted is a striking point to further discuss.

As Titus puts forward that 68.7 per cent of the 83 Imperial Household officials of section chief rank and above came from ‘the outside’ in 1943; they were officials who had at least one year’s experience outside the palace prior to the Imperial Household. He has deciphered that of these 83, 36 (43.4 per cent) had started out in the civil government bureaucracy, 12 (14.5 per cent) had come from the military, and 9 (10.8 per cent) came into the palace from other careers such as teaching. Only 26 of the 83 (31.3 per cent) were strictly court officials in their career. Fully 18.1 per cent of the 83 leading palace officers had had experience or careers in the Home Ministry, the bureaucratic component of imperial prerogative that had managed the civil police, local politics, shrines and temples in prewar Japan.<sup>372</sup> That said, the palace bureaucrats in 1962 bore similarities with their 1943 predecessors. As Titus draws our attention to the fact that of the 47 Imperial Household Agency officials of section chief rank and above in 1962, 32 (68.1 per cent) had come into the palace from the outside, and only 15 (31.9 per cent) were simply court careerists. One might easily argue that these percentages are almost exactly the same as those 1943. In 1962, 22 of the 47 (46.8 per cent) came from the civil government, 4 (8.5 per cent) came from military offices (although only 1 of the 4 was a graduate of the military academies), and 6 (12.7 per cent) came from other careers such as business, teaching and medicine.<sup>373</sup> As in 1943, those with prior careers in local government, the police and other components of the Home Ministry or its postwar equivalent were the most numerous of the outside officials, numbering 12 (25.5 per cent) of the 47 leading palace officers in 1962. In the same vein, as in 1943, none of the 1962

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<sup>372</sup> Titus, *Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan*, 87.

<sup>373</sup> Titus, “The Making of the ‘Symbol Emperor System’ in Postwar Japan,” 569.

leading palace officials had served in elective office (the Diet, Prefectural Assemblies, etc.). Finally, 59.0 per cent of the leading officials in 1943 had graduated from Tokyo University, as did 66.0 per cent of their 1962 successors.<sup>374</sup> Through the agency of bringing in officials from the outside, the Imperial Household Agency, like its predecessor, accounts bringing the emperor 'in line with the times.' Not only in pursuit of ensuring the responsiveness of the imperial institution to the trends of the times but also adapting the internal resources to respond to those external conditions, the imperial institution handles the management of those resources by officials brought into the palace from the outside.<sup>375</sup> Despite the non-existence of the category of special leading officials, the Household Agency's leading officials today might be as follows: The Director, Grand Chamberlain, Grand Steward to the Crown Prince, and Grand Master of the Ceremonies. The Deputy Director's involvement to the top leadership group might also be accepted.<sup>376</sup>

Usami Takeshi was the The Director of the Imperial Household Agency in 1962. Born in 1903, Usami had graduated from Tokyo Imperial University in political science in 1928. After 22 years in various local government and Home Ministry posts, Usami entered the palace in 1950 as Deputy Director. In 1953 he became Director and served until 1978. The Grand Chamberlain in 1962 was Mitani Takanobu (b. 1892). After graduating from Tokyo Imperial University in German law (1917), he went briefly into the Home Ministry and then transferred to the Foreign Ministry. Having served as Minister to Switzerland (1940) and Minister to France (1942), Mitani became Grand Chamberlain in 1948. The Grand Steward to the Crown Prince in 1962 was Suzuki Kikuo. Born in 1906, Suzuki graduated from

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<sup>374</sup> Titus, "The Making of the 'Symbol Emperor System' in Postwar Japan," 569-570.

<sup>375</sup> Titus, "The Making of the 'Symbol Emperor System' in Postwar Japan," 570.

<sup>376</sup> Titus, "The Making of the 'Symbol Emperor System' in Postwar Japan," 570.

the Department of Law, Tokyo Imperial University, in 1931 and then entered the Home Ministry. He served briefly as chief of two of the prewar Imperial Household Ministry's sections, then returned to local government positions. Apparently returning to the palace shortly after the war, Suzuki became Grand Steward to the Crown Prince in 1957. The Grand Master of the Ceremonies in 1962 was Harada Ken, who also graduated from Tokyo Imperial University (German law, 1918). Born in 1892, Harada was a career diplomat and entered the palace as Grand Master in 1957 directly from the Foreign Ministry. In addition, the Deputy Director, Uryii Nobuyoshi, was also a graduate of Tokyo Imperial University; he had served some 20 years in the prewar Home Ministry and its postwar equivalent before he became Deputy Director in 1953. In 1962, therefore, the palace was led by two career Home Ministry officials (or three if one adds the Deputy Director) and two career Foreign Ministry officials—all graduates of Tokyo Imperial University, all having had extensive experience on the outside. The Household Agency, like the prewar Imperial Household Ministry, is firmly under the control of outside bureaucrats—almost exclusively those from the Home Ministry and Foreign Ministry.<sup>377</sup>

Titus puts forward the following information: In 1973 the Director, Deputy Director, and Grand Steward to the Crown Prince were the same persons as in 1962. The Grand Chamberlain in 1973 was Irie Sukemasa. Having graduated from Tokyo Imperial University, Irie taught briefly and then entered the palace as a Chamberlain in 1934. He is the only palace leader since 1950 who did not come from the Home Ministry or Foreign Ministry and who might be categorized as a true court personage. Irie was a man of letters and master of the anecdote and the short essay. Since 1950 he had been known as the emperor's 'PR (public relations) man' and his

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<sup>377</sup> Titus, "The Making of the 'Symbol Emperor System' in Postwar Japan," 571.

writings have done much to popularize and humanize the imperial image, in much the same fashion as have the popular weeklies. The new Grand Master of the Ceremonies in 1973, Yukawa Morio (b. 1908), had served in the Foreign Ministry since 1933 and had come directly from that Ministry into the palace as Grand Master in January 1973 after 40 years on the outside. Including the Deputy officials in 1973 were all Tokyo Imperial University graduates; three came from the Home Ministry, one from the Foreign Ministry, and one was basically a career court official.<sup>378</sup>

Titus further supports that as in the case of the prewar palace leaders, all leading Household Agency officials were expected to end their public careers ‘at the side of the emperor.’ He states that he does not know any palace leaders who left the palace for other public office. As of 1975, the Director was 71 years of age, the Deputy Director was 70, the Grand Chamberlain 69, the Grand Steward 68, and the Grand Master 67. It would be reasonable to expect them expected to get retired. However, this shows that the postwar palace, like the prewar palace, continued to be led by officials with no further public or political aspirations which, according to the observations of Titus, would make them objective evaluators of the trends of the times with no personal interests at stake. “While none of the postwar palace leaders had held Cabinet posts or the equivalent prior to entering the palace, as did many prewar palace leaders, they have been prominent outside officials able to relate the palace and emperor to postwar Japanese society and politics.”<sup>379</sup>

To give a brief background regarding the leading officials of the Imperial Household Agency today, Shinichiro Yamamoto is the Grand Steward, aged 69, coming from the Home Ministry, graduated from Kyoto University and entered the

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<sup>378</sup> Titus, “The Making of the 'Symbol Emperor System' in Postwar Japan,” 571-572.

<sup>379</sup> Titus, “The Making of the 'Symbol Emperor System' in Postwar Japan,” 572.

Ministry. He served as a Vice Minister to the Cabinet office from 2008 to 2009 prior to his palace career.<sup>380</sup> When it comes to the Vice Grand Steward, Yoshihiko Nishimura, a police bureaucrat, is in charge of the position in the Imperial Household Agency. After graduating from Tokyo University in 1954, the National Regional Police Headquarters (currently the National Police Agency) entered the jurisdiction. He guarded security in the 69th year's Higashi Yasuda Auditorium incident and 72nd Asamama Sanso incident. He served as Head of the First Cabinet Security Office.<sup>381</sup>

Regarding the crucial budgetary matters, Titus asserts that the total imperial house budget in 1940 was \$ 6.7 million, most of which was obtained from the palace's autonomous resources; lands, forests, stocks, and bonds, while only one sixth was provided from the national treasury.<sup>382</sup> However, the entire imperial house budget today is provided from the national treasury and voted by the Diet. The 1965 budget for the imperial institution was \$ 13, 678,000, approximately \$ 9, 167, 000 earmarked for construction of the new palace and \$ 4, 511,000 for the normal operation of the palace and imperial family.<sup>383</sup> The budget is divided into four accounts: Court, Inner Court, Imperial Families, and Imperial Household Agency. The Court Account covers the expenses incurred by the emperor in performing his public functions as symbol as well as those incurred by other members of the imperial family in the course of their duties. The Inner Court Account is the 'cost of living' allowance for the emperor, empress, and the crown prince and his family. From this account are paid the emperor's research expenses, Prince kindergarten

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<sup>380</sup> Kunaichō chōkan ni Yamamoto jichō ga shōkaku," *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, [https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXLASDG15H40\\_V10C16A9EAF000/](https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXLASDG15H40_V10C16A9EAF000/)

<sup>381</sup> "Naikakukikikanrikan ni Nishimura-shi," *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* [https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXNASFS28010\\_Y4A220C1EB1000/](https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXNASFS28010_Y4A220C1EB1000/)

<sup>382</sup> Titus, *Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan*.

<sup>383</sup> Titus, "The Making of the 'Symbol Emperor System' in Postwar Japan," 572.

fees, and other personal or family expenses. The Imperial Families Account covers similar personal expenses for the members of the four other imperial houses. The Imperial Household Agency Account covers office expenses of officials attached to the four imperial houses.<sup>384</sup>

And according to Imperial Household Agency today, the expense for the Imperial Family is classified into three categories: Personal expenses, Allowance for Imperial Family Members and Palace-related Expenses which is also stated in the Imperial House Economy Law, Article 4. To start with the personal expenses, they are the expenses to be spent by the Emperor and inner-court members of the *Naitei-Kozoku* 内廷皇族 (Imperial Family) in order to cover the daily living and activities. The amount to be spent is stipulated by law and is determined as 324 million yen in FY 2018. These personal expenses are not public funds to be used and accounted for by the Imperial Household Agency in line with the Imperial House Economy Law, Article 4; and Law for the Enforcement of the Imperial House Economy Law, Article 7.<sup>385</sup>

In order that the Imperial Family is able to maintain a life style that befits its position, each member of the Imperial Family, excluding the Emperor and inner-court members of the *Naitei-Kozoku* 内廷家族 (Imperial Family) is provided with an annual allowance. The allowance for an Imperial Prince or an Imperial Princess who has an independent household is stipulated by law and is 30.5 million yen in FY2018.<sup>386</sup>

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<sup>384</sup> “The Imperial Household Agency,” *Kunaicho* 宫内庁, <http://www.kunaicho.go.jp/e-kunaicho/enkaku.html>

<sup>385</sup> “The Imperial Household Agency,” *Kunaicho* 宫内庁, <http://www.kunaicho.go.jp/e-kunaicho/enkaku.html>

<sup>386</sup> “The Imperial Household Agency,” *Kunaicho* 宫内庁, <http://www.kunaicho.go.jp/e-kunaicho/enkaku.html>

The total allowance for Imperial Family members amounts to 364 million yen in FY2018. The allowance for Imperial Family members is not public funds to be used and accounted for by the Imperial Household Agency according to the Imperial House Economy Law, Article 6; and Law for the Enforcement of the Imperial House Economy Law, Article 8. In accordance with the Imperial House Economy Law, Article 6, when a member of the Imperial Family establishes his/her independent household, or when a member of the Imperial Family leaves his/her Imperial status, a one-off allowance will be paid out.<sup>387</sup>

Palace-related Expenses are the expenses to be used for the Imperial Family's official duties, including ceremonies, state banquets, receptions, domestic and overseas visits. These expenses also include those for the management and maintenance of the facilities of the Imperial Palace and other properties. In FY2018 palace-related expenses amounts to 9.17 billion yen. The palace-related expenses are public funds to be accounted for by the Imperial Household Agency in accordance with the Imperial House Economy Law, Article 5. Lastly, the Imperial Household Agency Expenses cover the personnel and operational costs needed for the running of the Imperial Household Agency, which in FY2018 amounts to 11.47 billion yen.<sup>388</sup>

### 3.11 Conclusion

By analysing the core institution in the prewar political process to the present times, this chapter attempted to aid our understanding of the “pole star” around which politics and society revolved but more importantly, over which the emperor reigned and kept its transcendental feature.

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<sup>387</sup> “The Imperial Household Agency,” *Kunaicho* 宫内庁, <http://www.kunaicho.go.jp/e-kunaicho/enkaku.html>

<sup>388</sup> “The Imperial Household Agency,” *Kunaicho* 宫内庁, <http://www.kunaicho.go.jp/e-kunaicho/enkaku.html>

As put forward, there seems to have been two fundamental imperial roles: Emperor-in Court and Emperor-in-State. Whereas the Emperor-in-Public represented the imperial will in politics and society, The Emperor-in-Chambers was the emperor as a person who expressed his own will and ideas to those close to the throne. To manage Emperor-in Court as Emperor-in-Public, the palace bureaucrats played the role of gatekeeping of the Imperial Will as their first duty of the palace bureaucracy, dealing with the palace bureaucracy functionally in two components; an outer side and an inner side. While the outer side contained the bureaucratic machinery in order to maintain the transcendental dignity of the emperor in society, the inner side managed the Emperor-in-Court as Emperor-in-Chambers.

In addition, the palace officers in charge of coordinating and facilitating the palace advisory machinery, alongside with gatekeeping policies in the face of institutional pressures to declare the Imperial Will, were introduced as the Imperial Household Minister, the Grand Chamberlain, the Chief Aide-de-Camp, and the Lord Keepers of the Privy Seal.

Furthermore, it has been put forward that the structure of the palace bureaucracy did not particularly change after 1889. The argument of the internal structures and functions of the palace today still bearing a strong resemblance to the prewar palace is also put forward in detail. Moreover, in view of all that has been mentioned with regards to the personnel and organizational function of the imperial institution's officials so far, one can clearly suggest that the Imperial Household Ministry is a strong and prestigious bureaucratic organization.

Finally, thus far no specific resource suggested the reference of who is preparing the speeches of the Emperor and who decides the topic or main messages of his addresses. Having contacted the Imperial Household Agency, the information

provided was that the emperor's speeches, which will be analysed hereafter both in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, are rather drafted by the Imperial Household Agency. Though they did not reveal the division, one might correctly think that the top positions of the period might have been in charge of the speeches of the emperor.

## CHAPTER 4

### STAGE ONE: QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

#### 4.1 Introduction

This chapter constitutes stage one of the research methodology in order to analyse the emperor's speeches at the National Diet opening ceremony between 1947 and 1988. In this stage, a text mining software, KH Coder (an open-source software which allows users to conduct quantitative content analyses and text-mining of text) has been employed to the data (speeches) in order to assess what issues occur most frequently in the emperor's speeches as a basis for locating themes that the emperor most frequently discusses. Repetition of key terms is taken to be a measure of salience or emphasis in qualitative analysis and subject to further analysis. Themes are defined as clusters of terms within a community. The analysis's aim is to assess salient areas within the emperor's speeches and examine the concepts and issues these surrounds.

All texts, from the 1st session to the 113rd session of the National Diet, 107 speeches in total, were retrieved from archived speeches provided at 国会会議録検索システム <http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/sangiin/main.html>. To note, emperor's speeches at the 14th, 54th, 63rd, 83rd, 103rd, 105th sessions of National Diet Opening Ceremony could not be collected due to them being missing. However, the data constitutes speeches from every single year from 1947 to 1988, without a year missing. The detailed data explanation is provided in Appendix A.

To do so, this chapter is separated into three subsections: 4.2 comprises the results of the COA (Cooccurrence Analysis), 4.3 provides the results of the HCA (Hierarchical Cluster Analysis), and 4.4 constitutes the Collocation Analysis,

while a conclusion of stage one of the analysis is provided in 4.5. Following this, a qualitative analysis will be carried out in Chapter 5, stage 2.

## 4.2 Co-occurrence analysis

In Linguistics, a co-occurrence analysis (COA) measures the range of individual co-occurrence of a word in the same sentence.<sup>389</sup> Buzydlowski defines that co-occurrence analysis is the “counting of paired data within a collection unit”. He maintains that buying shampoo and a brush at a drug store is an example of co-occurrence, where the data is the brush and the shampoo, and the collection unit is the particular transaction.<sup>390</sup> Put simply, the aim here is based on the idea that words with similar meanings will tend to occur in similar contexts, and hence word co-occurrence statistics can provide a natural basis for semantic representations.<sup>391</sup>

KH Coder, the open-source software used in this thesis, does not set the parameter at the sentence, but instead measures individual co-occurrences for a given word with a parameter of ten words preceding and proceeding a given instantiation.<sup>392</sup> Words which are measured as such are selected based on frequency in the dataset where the most frequent words are then subject to a COA.<sup>393</sup>

COA measures ‘centrality’ or ‘communities’ and are visualized as co-occurrence networks in KH Coder.<sup>394</sup> Communities constitutes the networks, which consist of a set of ‘nodes’ (or vertices) which represent system units and are usually depicted as circles, which are concatenated by lines, denoted as ‘edges’ which represent the links between them.<sup>395</sup>

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<sup>389</sup> Harris, “Co-Occurrence and Transformation in Linguistic Structure,” 284.

<sup>390</sup> Buzydlowski, “Co-Occurrence Analysis As a Framework for Data Mining,”

<sup>391</sup> Bullinaria & Levy, “Extracting Semantic Representations From Word Cooccurrence Statistics: A Computational Study.”

<sup>392</sup> Higuchi, “KH Coder 3 Reference Manual,” 50-55.

<sup>393</sup> Higuchi, “KH Coder 3 Reference Manual,” 50-55.

<sup>394</sup> Higuchi, “KH Coder 3 Reference Manual,” 50-55.

<sup>395</sup> Clauset et al., “Finding Community Structures in Very Large Networks,” 1.

In this thesis, nodes represent frequently used terms in the emperor's speeches and edges represent the co-occurrence of two nodes (terms) at a higher frequency relative to other terms in the network. The bigger the node the higher the frequency of the term in it, the thicker the edge (the line connecting different nodes) the stronger the co-occurrence between nodes.<sup>396</sup> According to Chris G. Pope, such analyses attempt to measure the flow of information within a given network, such as in a social network for reasons ranging from market purposes to security concerns such as drone warfare.<sup>397</sup> They may also be applied to financial markets or to understand the rate and route of infestation, et cetera.<sup>398</sup> As Ulrik Brandes asserts, it essentially is an indicator for the most important nodes (vertices) based on network flow in a given network where 'importance' is measured and quantified in different ways.<sup>399</sup>

In addition, communities are considered to be "the division of network nodes into groups within which the network connections are dense, but between which they are sparser."<sup>400</sup> Therefore, Pope maintains that communities therefore reflect topological relationships between elements in the network and may represent a wide variety of entities dependent on what the network represents.<sup>401</sup> Furthermore, Lancichinetti et.al exemplifies that communities may be used to identify and profile groups of individuals in a social network whether for economic, security, or political reasons, sets of Web pages on a given topic, information over purchases for an online retailer or pathways in metabolic networks, et cetera.<sup>402</sup>

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<sup>396</sup> Higuchi, "KH Coder 3 Reference Manual," 50-55.

<sup>397</sup> Pope, "Bringing Back 'Japan': Prime Minister Abe's Political Rhetoric in Critical Perspective," 91.

<sup>398</sup> Clauset et al., "Finding Community Structures in Very Large Networks."

<sup>399</sup> Brandes, "Network Positions: Methodological Innovations."

<sup>400</sup> Newman & Girvan, "Finding and Evaluating Community Structure in Networks," 1.

<sup>401</sup> Pope, "Bringing Back 'Japan': Prime Minister Abe's Political Rhetoric in Critical Perspective," 93.

<sup>402</sup> Lancichinetti et al., "Detecting the overlapping and hierarchical community structure in complex networks

This thesis adopts the ‘modularity’ approach to centrality to detect community users, which KH Coder provides as the community measurement. In doing so, the study aims to identify the most significant - that is rhetorically profound-terms used in the emperor’s speeches in the view of highlighting in further stages of the analysis salient issues revealed between the years of 1947 to 1988. The question here is not, however, ‘what is the most commonly used term’, but rather ‘what group of terms are frequently in proximity to each other’, in order to assess area of discourse impact or emphasis.

This section provides the results of the COA. First, the results are visualized as a co-occurrence network in Figure 1 to illustrate the modularity community measure. Following this the translation of every node is provided in tables separated generally by communities and explained.




Fig. 1: Modularity community of terms within co-occurrence network for the emperor’s speeches.

Here, the different colours represent different communities. The thicker the edge the stronger the co- occurrence, while dotted lines signify inter-community links. In Figure 1, every node is given an individual label. These were added by the author to translate each term into English, which are tabulated and provided below (see table 5, table 6, table 7, and table 8). The letter in upper case indicates the community while the letter in lower case simply marks the word. All major communities are examined and summarized, with the more obvious connectors within and across communities discussed in terms of what theme can be drawn out from the results.

Table 5: Terms in Nodes Clustered Within Community A and E

Ref	Word	Reading	Basic Meaning
Community A			
a	国民	Kokumin	Nation
b	国会	Kokkai	National Diet
c	国権	Kokken	State Power
d	最高	Saikou	Highest
e	機関	Kikan	Organization
f	使命	Shimei	Mission
g	遺憾	Ikan	Regret/hesitation
h	信託	Shintaku	Trust
i	審議	Shingi	Deliberation
j	望む	Nozomu	Wish
k	果たす	Hatasu	Fulfil
l	切に	Setsuni	Eagerly/ Earnestly
m	当面	Toumen	Current
n	問題	Mondai	Problem
Community E			
a	協力	Kyouryoku	Cooperation
b	守る	Mamoru	Protect /Respect
c	法律	Kenpou	Constitution
d	民主	Minshu	Democracy
e	お互いに	Otagaini	Each other
f	各自	Kakuji	Each one
h	最善	Saizen	The very best
i	相	Sou	Together

Community A, which is coloured into pink, centres on ‘Nation’ and ‘National Diet’. ‘Nation’ itself has the highest modularity centrality. Community E links to Community A, coloured yellow, through the node term ‘the very best’ which links to ‘accomplish’ and ‘each one’. The other term in Community E is ‘cooperation’ and it is likely to reflect the “Diet and Nation accomplish the very best with the cooperation.” Due to this, Community A may be summarized as centred on the theme of ‘Nation and National Diet’, the two entities that the emperor’s speech is addressed.

Table 6: Terms in Nodes Clustered Within Community B and C

Ref	Word	Reading	Basic Meaning
Community B			
a	臨む	Nozomu	To face/to deal with
b	親しい	Shitashii	Close
c	代表	Daihyou	To represent
d	諸君	Shokun	Nation/You
d	一堂	Ichidou	Same building/room
F	開会	Kaikai	Opening
G	本日	Honjitsu	Today
H	深い	Fukai	Deep
I	喜ぶ	Yorokobu	To be pleased
Community C			
A	喜び	Yorokobi	Joy
B	耐える	Taeru	Cannot stand
C	我が国	Wagakuni	Our Country
D	国際	Kokusai	International

Community B (coloured yellow) and C (coloured red) show one cross-community connection with ‘to be pleased’ (yorokobu) linked with ‘you, nation’ (shokun). The other terms in community are; ‘to lose’, ‘our country’ and ‘international’. Although it may literally mean ‘to endure/unable to stand’ however, when it is combined with ‘to be pleased’, it becomes ‘cannot contain my joy’. Here, it reflects that community B

represents ‘nation / you’ while community C depicts issues concerning ‘our country’ i.e. ‘Japan’ and ‘international’. Both communities are taken together to represent ‘Nation, Japan and Internationalism.’

Table 7: Terms in Nodes Clustered Within Community D and F

Ref	Word	Reading	Basic Meaning
Community D			
A	努力	Doryoku	Effort
B	続ける	Tsudzukeru	To continue
C	多	Ta	Many
D	発展	Hatten	Development
E	経済	Keizai	Economy
F	民生	Minsei	Public Welfare
G	内	Nai	Inside
H	成果	Seika	Achievement
I	安定	Antei	Stable
J	生活	Seikatsu	Life
K	外国	Gaikoku	Foreign Countries
L	友好	Yuukou	Friendship
M	深める	Fukameru	To deepen
N	親善	Shinzen	Goodwill
O	処す	Shosu	To treat
Community F			
A	世界	Sekai	World
B	平和	Heiwa	Peace
C	信頼	Shinrai	Trust
D	高める	Takameru	To increase

Here, community D (coloured dark green) centres on ‘effort’ and linked to community F (coloured purple) through ‘world’, which is linked to ‘peace’. Community F involves terms ‘trust’ and ‘to increase’ while community D consists of the terms, ‘development’, ‘economy’, ‘friendship’, ‘stable’, ‘public welfare’, ‘inside’ and so forth. Both communities are taken together to represent ‘Effort for World Peace’ and effort for the issues occurring inside the country such as economy, development, public welfare, and so forth. It can be summarized as “effort for the inside and outside.”

Table 8: Terms in Nodes Clustered Within Community H, I, and J

Peripheral Communities			
Ref	Word	Reading	Basic Meaning
Community H			
A	対処	Taisho	Coping
B	内外	Naigai	Inside and outside
C	情勢	Jousei	Situation
D	多端	Tatan	Many items
Community I			
	迎える	Mukaeru	Welcome
A	議員	Giin	Congressmen
B	選挙	Senkyo	Election
Community J			
A	思う	Omou	To think
B	国運	Kokuun	National Luck
C	要する	Yousuru	Need
D	今後	Kongo	From now on
E	いつ(一層)	Itss (Issou)	Much more

The peripheral communities are not summarized due to their small size and relative isolation. However, overall, the co-occurrence networks illustrate which words are most prevalent and to what words they most prevalently link. These links are established between nodes while communities are groups of nodes(themes) which share a higher density of edges (connections) between each other. A higher density of links suggests that there are strong connections between many words within a group, which is why it is investigated further in separate analyses.

An examination of which words share correlations is necessary to be able to identify any running themes. Therefore, a number of observations necessitate further investigation. Firstly, as shown in Figure 1, ‘Nation’ and ‘National Diet’ correlates with a number of also relatively central terms, all of which exhibit relatively high centrality. The thematic element of ‘Nation’ and ‘National Diet’ appear to be a central concept or entities connecting to message in the emperor’s speeches. Added

to this is the tasks the emperor considers or more appropriately ‘urges’ to be done, dubbed ‘effort’, which is clearly linked together in the co-occurrence network. Another within-community observation is that ‘effort’ is linked curiously to ‘to continue’ and is also linked to ‘development’, ‘economy’, and ‘stable.’ That is, while ‘effort’ itself is connected to the world outside, it also appears to be connected to the national level. Furthermore, efforts need to be continued for a stable economy and development of the country.

Having said that, turning now to the Hierarchical Cluster Analysis.

#### 4.3 Hierarchical cluster analysis

A HCA produces “a nested data set in which pairs of items or clusters are successively linked,”<sup>403</sup> where “in order to cluster the items in a data set, some means of quantifying the degree of association between them is required”, denoted as distance.<sup>404</sup> This command enables us to find and analyse which combinations or groups of words have similar appearance patterns using hierarchical cluster analysis. The analysis results are displayed in a dendrogram( see Figure 2). This command helps us produce results that are easy to interpret. This analysis also uses the matrix generated with the [Export Document-Word Matrix] command, with the variables for positions and document lengths removed.<sup>405</sup> Put simply, an algorithm that groups similar objects into groups called clusters where each cluster is distinct from each other cluster, and the objects within each cluster are broadly similar to each other will be applied. Thus, this section provides the results of the HCA. The translations

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<sup>403</sup> Rasmussen, “Clustering Algorithms, in William B. Frakes, and Ricardo Baeza-Yates (Eds).”

<sup>404</sup> Rasmussen, “Clustering algorithms, in William B. Frakes, and Ricardo Baeza-Yates (Eds).”

<sup>405</sup> Higuchi, “KH Coder 2 Reference Manual.”

are provided in individual tables and explained below with a summary of overall observations. Firstly, Figure 2 provides the results of the HCA, below.




Fig. 2. Hierarchical cluster analysis of the emperor's speeches

Colours of different clusters represent distinct groups that are assigned automatically to clusters which share more similarities than others. Brief translations are given next to every term while the terms and cluster groups themselves are labelled. Details of every term in the HCA are provided in the tables (see table 9, table 10 and table 11) below.

Table 9. Terms Within Clusters A

Cluster A		
Word	Reading	Basic Meaning
迎える	Mukaeru	To Welcome
議員	Giin	Congressmen
選挙	Senkyo	Election

Cluster A comprises the terms ‘to welcome’, ‘congressmen’, and ‘election.’ ‘Congressmen’ are likely to be ‘welcomed’ to the National Diet after the ‘election’, suggesting that the terms are predominantly used together.

Cluster B points to ‘National Diet’ gathering while Cluster C demonstrates the link between ‘development’, ‘economy’, and ‘public welfare’ inside the country, as when conjugated it refers to the tasks of the Diet. Cluster D displays numerous terms located in Community J above. Several of these terms reflect the ‘national luck’ and ‘trust’ which, according to the emperor, should be increased. The emperor addressing to the audience and the use of the humble form of the verb ‘to think’ needs further investigation, which will be taken into consideration in Chapter 5. With that in mind, two notable terms emerge in the emperor’s speeches; ‘international’ and ‘world peace’ to be ‘accomplished’ from his perspective.

Table 10. Terms Within Clusters B to E

Cluster B		
Word	Reading	Basic Meaning
国民	Kokumin	Nation
国会	Kokkai	National Diet
諸君	Shokun	Nation/You
親しい	Shitashii	Close
開会	Kaikai	Opening
本日	Honjitsu	Today
臨む	Nozomu	To face/To deal with
代表	Daihyou	To represent
一堂	Ichidou	Same building/room
会	Ai	To meet
喜ぶ	Yorokobu	To be pleased
深い	Fukai	Deep
Cluster C		
発展	Hatten	Development
経済	Keizai	Economy
民生	Minsei	Public Welfare
内	Nai	Inside
Cluster D		
信頼	Shinrai	Trust
高める	Takameru	To increase
今後	Kongo	From now on/Hereafter
思う	Omou	To think
いつ	Its (issou)	Much more
国運	Koun	National luck
要する	Yousuru	To need
Cluster E		
努力	Doryoku	Effort
続ける	Ttsudzukeri	To continue
多	Ta/oo	Many
繁栄	Hanei	Prosperity
世界	Sekai	World
平和	Heiwa	Peace
喜び	Yorokobi	Joy
耐える	Taeru	Unable to stand
わが国	Wagakuni	Our Country
国際	Kokusai	International
達成	Tassei	Accomplish
國	Koku	Empire

Table 11. Terms Within Clusters F to I

Cluster F		
Word	Reading	Basic Meaning
対処	Taisho	Coping
情勢	Jousei	Situation
内外	Naigai	Inside and outside
現下	Genka	Present
多端	Tatan	Many items
Cluster G		
親善	Shinzen	Goodwill
友好	Yuukou	Friendship
外国	Gaikoku	Foreign countries
深める	Fukameru	To deepen
処す	Shosu	To treat
協力	Kyouryoku	Cooperation
相	Sou	Together
図る	Hakaru	To work/to plan
安定	Antei	Stable
向上	Koujou	Improvement
生活	Seikatsu	Life
Cluster H		
最善	Saigen	The very best
果たす	Hatasu	To work
各自	Kakuji	Each one
お互いに	Otagaini	Each other
民主	Minshu	Democracy
憲法	Kenpou	Constitution
守る	Mamoru	To protect/respect
Cluster I		
当面	Toumen	Current
審議	Shingin	Deliberation
問題	Mondai	Problem
信託	Shintaku	Trust
果たす	Hatasu	To work
使命	Shimei	Mission
遺憾	Ikan	Regret/Hesitation
機関	Kikan	Organ/Institution
最高	Saikou	Highest
望む	Nozomu	Wish
切に	Setsuni	Eagerly /earnestly

Cluster F exhibits ‘many items’, and ‘problems’ occurred ‘inside and the outside’, showing similar relation exhibited between Community H in the co- occurrence network. Cluster G can correctly be summarized as two themes; ‘friendship with foreign countries’ and ‘improvement of the stable life’ while Cluster H focuses on ‘democracy’ and ‘constitution’, which is linked closely with ‘protect’. Finally, Cluster I illustrate the ‘mission’ of the ‘institution’ , which is National Diet, here in this speech.

Overall, the co-occurrence network and HCA, both using different approaches, point to a number of themes. Comparing the two results, it can be seen that both are revealing the same results in the same direction. However, the collocation analysis will be conducted to further examine the themes that the emperor comments on and around hereafter.

#### 4.4 Collocation analysis

The collocation analysis aims to provide further descriptive data of the findings to identify areas in the emperor’s speech that will be the focus of the second stage of analysis. To do this, a KWIC (Key Word in Context) Concordance function is carried out on the keywords identified in the COA and HCA. Using the Collocation Stats window, it is easy to determine which words appear frequently before and after the target word (or node word).<sup>406</sup> This function lists every instantiation of a keyword in the dataset, and also provides a list of the most frequent collocations for the keyword based on a parameter of five words preceding and proceeding every instantiation.<sup>407</sup>

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<sup>406</sup> Higuchi, “KH Coder 2 Reference Manual.”

<sup>407</sup> Higuchi, “KH Coder 2 Reference Manual.”

The top 24 collocations for the keywords (node words) are provided in table 12 below with their respective spellings and definitions.

Table 12. Collocation Analysis of the Emperor's Speeches

Number	Collocation	Reading	Meaning
1	全国民	Zenkokumin	Whole nation
2	開会式	Kaikaishiki	Opening ceremony
3	最高機関	Saikō kikan	Highest institution
4	諸外国	Shogaikoku	Foreign countries
5	諸情勢	Shojousei	Various situations
6	諸問題	Shoumondai	Problems
7	安定向上	Anteikoujou	Stability improvement
8	国民生活	Kokuminseikatsu	National life
9	相協力	Shoukyouryoku	Mutual cooperation
10	世界平和	Sekaihewa	World peace
11	友好親善	Yuukoushinzen	Friendship and goodwill
12	新議員	Shingiin	New member
13	諸原則	Shogensoku	Principles
14	民主主義	Minshushugi	Democracy
15	国際情勢	Kokusajousei	International affairs
16	衆議院議員総選挙	Shugiingiinsosenkyou	House of Representatives general election
17	国際社会	Kokusaishakai	International Society
18	参議院議員通常選挙	Sangiingiintsuujousenkyou	House of Councillors Regular Election
19	日本国憲法	Nihonkokukenpou	The Constitution of Japan
20	国際的地位	Kokusaitekichii	International status
21	友邦諸国	Yuuhoushokoku	Friend countries
22	国民福祉	Kokuminfukushi	National welfare
23	維持増進	Ijizoushin	Maintenance and promotion
24	全国民諸君	Zenkokuminshokun	All people

Based on the findings, 'whole nation' and 'opening ceremony' are the most frequently used collocations respectively. Does the emperor see the opening

ceremony as an opportunity to meet the whole nation? ‘Highest institution’ ranks third. Emperor using ‘highest institution’ in pursuant to the legitimization of the Kokkai can be reasonably understood during the occupation period. This result shows that the emperor always needed the necessity to refer to it in almost every speech. Fourth is the ‘foreign countries.’ It is followed by ‘various situations.’ Are various situations related to foreign countries? Next, the emperor frequently uses ‘problems’, followed by ‘stability improvement’. Do the ‘problems’ block the ‘stability improvement’ of the country? In order for these questions to be addressed and answered as well as the examination of the other collocations in the context, the next chapter seeks to further analyse.

#### 4.5 Conclusion

Thus, stage one of the research methodology separated into three subsections COA (Cooccurrence Analysis), HCA( Hierarchical Cluster Analysis), and Collocation Analysis are completed. The three analysis were fruitful in providing themes. Based on the results of the Cooccurrence Analysis themes such as; ‘Nation and National Diet’, ‘Cooperation’, ‘Our Country (Japan) and Internationalism’, ‘Effort’, ‘World Peace’, ‘Trust’, ‘Economy’, ‘Friendship’, ‘Development’, ‘Public Welfare’ and ‘Stability’ were detected. The results of the Hierarchical Cluster Analysis were in the same direction with the COA, sharing the same themes but also highlighting the “Election”, ‘Democracy’, ‘Constitution’, ‘Mission of the institution’, referring to the National Diet, ‘Problems inside and outside’, which were also shared with the COA. The Collocation analysis further provided us with 24 themes such as the ‘whole nation’, ‘opening ceremony’, ‘highest institution’, ‘foreign countries’, ‘stability improvement’ ‘domestic and international problems’ and so forth.

As mentioned above, these identified themes, which were consistent with each other, contributed to us in terms of delineating the significant topics on which the emperor comments on or around. It clearly suggests the themes that the emperor comments on. These analysed themes, however, narrows down this parameter to analyse explicitly what arguments or messages are made by the emperor through the themes themselves. It does suggest a picture based on analytical assumptions. However, it is hard to see the whole picture with only one method. A detailed micro-analysis of the text that addresses the arguments wholly based on the historical context will be required.

Thus, having carried out the text-mining analysis in this chapter, qualitative analysis, which will be conducted hereafter, aims to provide more descriptive detail of the salient areas of the emperor's speeches. To do so, Discourse-Historical Approach will be employed. The analysis is based on the supposition that themes identified using quantitative techniques are indicative of salient areas of the emperor's speeches, and hence set a wide parameter to conduct an explorative, broad-ranging analysis around such areas. By doing so, the picture that the quantitative analysis presented will get clearer in the readers' eyes. It will also give a compelling evidence for the researcher to answer the research questions of this thesis.

## CHAPTER 5

### STAGE TWO: QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS

#### 5.1 Introduction

This chapter provides the qualitative analysis of the emperor's speeches at the Opening ceremony of the National Diet in Japan. The major themes of usage derived from the quantitative analysis were exhibited in Chapter 4 to a large extent. In light of the quantitative analysis results, it will be deepened at the micro level in this section in order to have a thicker description. Discourse- Historical Approach will help us contextualise the findings of Chapter 4 hereafter.

A quick glance at the speeches would reveal that the emperor has clearly a structure composed of 3 main parts; an introduction to the speeches expressing his pleasure to take part in the opening ceremony and to be with all *Zenkokumin o daihyō suru shokun* 全國民を代表する諸君 (the people representing the whole nation), a body paragraph presenting the agenda of the country, and a conclusion emphasizing his 'wishes' from "Kokkai" (National Diet / Parliament). The main goal in this stage is situating the themes derived from stage one in their historical context. In addition, this stage will examine the discourse of particular importance in history. In pursuance of analysing the speeches against their context, this study will examine the years from 1947 to 1988, separating into three subsections as Post-war Recovery (1947-52), Resurgent Japan (1952-1973) and Toward the end of the Cold War Period (1973-1989) respectively. Thus, it will be easier for the reader to follow and see a pattern in the periods both politically and economically different.

Following this a discussion will be carried out and a conclusion will be provided in Chapter 6.

## 5.2 Post-war recovery 1947-52

This section will tackle with the speeches in the Occupation and Reconstruction period of Japan. The main narrative of this period runs from MacArthur's arrival, the emperor's "declaration of humanity", which was mentioned in Chapter 2, the 1947 Constitution, the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951. Japan was reborn from its ashes and stepping towards to a completely different Japan, along with a 'human' emperor.

The first speech delivered on 23 June 1947, would reveal that the emperor focuses on the legitimization of the Kokkai 国会 (National Diet ) as he states that "as it is evident in the Japanese Constitution, Kokkai is the highest institution of the nation and the only legislative body of the country." Adding that "the foundation of our future development lies in the proper operation of the Kokkai", he urges the proper function of the national Diet to be ensured. Furthermore, it is also clear that the emperor acknowledges that the Japanese Constitution downgrades the emperor's status to that of a 'symbol emperor' with no political control by illustrating the Constitution as evidence. The emperor concludes his speech confirming that the nation faces an unprecedented serious economic crisis and he declares that *wareware nippon kokumin* われわれ日本国民 (We, the Japanese nation ) should unify and overcome the crisis and succeed in the construction of peaceful nationals and cultural states based on 'democracy.' "We, the Japanese Nation" and *wagakuni* わが国 (Our Kingdom/Country) no doubt, are used to exhibit the unity. As it can be seen later that the emperor focuses on this 'democracy', 'cultural states', and 'peaceful nationals' almost in every speech.

In a similar vein, on 23rd of January 1948, the emperor revolves around the same themes with just one noticeable difference that "asking the world for faith"

happens to be Japan's another task in the upcoming years. In addition, it is striking that the emperor uses *watakushi* わたくし (I), presenting his speech in "futsuukei" (informal language), which clearly creates a contradiction. With 'I', he becomes 'human.' and with informal language he still claims that he is superior. Another noteworthy point is that while he urges the Japanese citizens to 'recognize' the period, he also urges the National Diet to fully achieve its mission as the highest organ of the State Power and that the people, with due recognition of the current period or more appropriately situated in the country, to show their best efforts for the rehabilitation of "our fatherland" (Japan), which was partly the main message of the previous speech. It is formed as the last paragraph of the second address and will keep its place in every speech analysed hereafter.

When the third speech delivered in the same year as above, dated on the 23rd of November analysed, one can quickly realize the fact that the emperor brings the "Allied Powers" theme on the table for the first time. He does mention that Japan should ask the "world" for faith earlier, however, "the assistance and favour of the Allied powers" appear quite significantly and prominently. Another significant point is that "returning as a member of the international community" and "winning the trust of the entire world" phrases that the emperor uses clearly highlight the fact that Japan should regain its status as a member of the International Community, which was lost along with the trust of the world. Emperor clearly directs the 'Nation' and 'National Diet' towards the global goals.

Having said that, the emperor has some specific implications that can be interpreted as clues to a humanizing emperor icon in contrast to a God-like deity. After using 'I' for the first time in his previous speech, one can quickly realize the fact the emperor shifts his language from futsuukei (informal language) to teineigo

(formal language) in his 3<sup>rd</sup> speech. Moreover, *to omoimasu* と思います (I think), which is not used before, appears. In linguistics, “Think” is one of the six primitive mental predicates in the Natural Semantic metalanguage theory<sup>408</sup> and thinking is a basic mental concept.<sup>409</sup> Verbs which refer to mental processes usually involve a human participant, which is the “Cognizer.”<sup>410</sup> Owing to the “Congizer” being the emperor here, it can be inferred that the God-like figure becomes a ‘human.’ An emperor who shows an executive power fades away and an emperor expressing his opinion and emotions as a human or a citizen of the country emerges.

The 4th opening ceremony of the National Diet on 23rd December 1948 witnesses the emperor highlighting Japanese citizens continued their efforts to build the ideal ‘democratic’ and ‘cultural nation’ based on the spirit of the new Constitution, after the enactment of the Japanese Constitution. With that in mind, the emperor declares that “in order to occupy an honourable position in the international community as a democratic, freedom-loving nation, I think ‘we’ have to continue to make more efforts and show the accomplishment to the whole world as a clear fact.” The emperor clearly keeps including himself in the duties with *watashitachi* 私たち (we) and not exercising executive power but rather showing an integrative power while getting humanized with “I think” and “I think we have to.” What bears utmost importance however is that whilst concluding his speech with the “Kokkai” being the highest institution of the nation’s right, he expresses his desire for the National Diet to achieve the eternal “ideals” of Japan as well as “raising its authority” and being aware of its responsibilities.

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<sup>408</sup> Goddard & Wierzbicka, “Meaning and Universal Grammar: Theory and Empirical Findings.”

<sup>409</sup> Fortescue, “Thoughts about Thought.”

<sup>410</sup> Halliday & Cristian, “An Introduction to Functional Grammar.”

Tracing back the reason why the emperor wishes the National Diet to raise its authorities in a sudden, one might remember the Showa Denko Incident. To recall, the Katayama Cabinet resigned on 10 February 1948, although the coalition of Japanese Socialist Party/Democrats/Cooperative party remained intact, with Ashida from the Democratic Party taking over as Prime Minister. Meanwhile, support for Yoshida Shigeru was growing in the Diet, and there was a criticism from both the left and right of the coalition government's inability to control inflation. Matsumoto and the leftists of the JSP during the summer of 1948 were demanding not only an early dissolution of the Lower House but also that the party should withdraw from supporting the coalition in order to disassociate it from the policies of the Ashida government. Nevertheless, members of the Ashida cabinet were accused of receiving bribes from Showa Denko, a fertilizer manufacturer.<sup>411</sup> The allegations of the corrupt practice led the Ashida cabinet to resign in September and arrests of sixty-four people including Ashida himself. Yoshida took over as prime minister subsequently. However, seeing as his support base in Lower House was not strong, Yoshida passed a resolution of no confidence in his cabinet on 23 December 1948 and a general election was called for 23 January 1949.<sup>412</sup> Therefore, one might clearly attribute the emperor's "warning" to the issues occurred from the above-mentioned incident. In addition, he also sets an unmeasurable target stating, "to achieve eternal ideals of the country," which is also repeated in the following speech. How and on what base one can measure the 'ideal' of the country, one might question.

In the 5th opening ceremony on 19 March 1949, emperor recognizes the steps taken towards the goals previously set or confirmed by himself. In addition, he

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<sup>411</sup> T. McDonald & S. McDonald, *Paul Rusch in Postwar Japan*.

<sup>412</sup> Neary, *The Buraku Issue and Modern Japan: The Career of Matsumoto Jiichiro*, 152.

expresses his happiness and gratitude for the fact that the “Nationals’ life finally began showing signs of improvement with the favour and aid of the Allied Powers.” He again hopes all of the nationals will cooperate with each other to achieve perfectly the ideals of “our country” as well as the Diet doing its best.

To go on, on November 1, 1949, the emperor conveys his appreciation toward the steadily raising construction of a democratic cultural state based on the ideals of the Japanese Constitution with the favour and assistance of the Allied Powers. He adds “However, we, Japanese nation must make an effort in order for Japan to overcome many of the social and economic difficulties facing us today, to truly achieve its purpose and earn the trust of the world.” To recall the economic and social difficulties that the emperor states, following the Showa Denko scandal and the forced resignation of the Democratic-Socialist coalition government that succeeded Katayama in late 1948, as mentioned earlier, as well as the brief second Yoshida cabinet and a whirlwind election campaign, Yoshida Shigeru returned to Office during January 1949. The election repudiated the middle-of-the-road Socialists and Democrats; their joint strength fell from 242 seats to 138 in the 466-seat Diet, and then to 105 when 33 Democrats joined Yoshida’s Democratic Liberals. Ironically, the Socialist leader and former Prime Minister Katayama Tetsu were defeated in the Yoshida landslide.<sup>413</sup> However, the political atmosphere was tense and as Calder defines it “foreboding.”<sup>414</sup> Yoshida’s position was delicate due to the nine-point economic stabilization plan-the essence of the so-called “Dodge Line” transmitted to the Japanese government on December 19, 1948, by Douglas MacArthur for implementation.<sup>415</sup> The economic stabilization reform received its

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<sup>413</sup> Calder, *Crisis and Compensation: Public Policy and Political Stability in Japan*, 77.

<sup>414</sup> Calder, *Crisis and Compensation: Public Policy and Political Stability in Japan*, 77.

<sup>415</sup> Calder, *Crisis and Compensation: Public Policy and Political Stability in Japan*, 79.

name from Joseph Dodge, president of the Bank of Detroit, appointed by Washington to monitor the progress of the Japanese government in implementing the program. In a broad sense, the plan - calling for a balanced budget, strengthened tax collections, and stringent curbs on Reconstruction Finance Bank loans - was designed to break the back of Japanese inflation and provide the basis for stable economic growth.<sup>416</sup> Calder asserts that the political problem for Yoshida was the plan's strong tension with the campaign pledges in the 1949 elections of Yoshida's Democratic Liberal party. He further states that it also required sharp deflationary policies, including a tight budget that ultimately required firing 30 per cent of all government employees, who were represented by increasingly powerful unions generally favoured by the Left. Above mentioned economic weakness and the magnitude of the policy demands placed on an already weak economy by the Dodge Line rationalization measures intensified a political crisis that by 1949 Japan could only return to 53 per cent of its 1937 level of mining and manufacturing production, compared to 78 per cent in West Germany.<sup>417</sup> One needs to highlight that Japan was being squeezed out of pre-war markets in textiles and hemmed in severely by the currency and trade barriers of other nations.<sup>418</sup> Therefore, all observers agree that the period between the onset of the Dodge Line in February 1949 and the outbreak of the Korean War was one of the tensest in post-war Japanese history. As inflation was rampant, the cities were jammed with people due to immigration and demobilization, wages were low, and wildcat strikes were common.

In addition, during the summer and fall of 1949, Calder puts forward that more than 100,000 workers were dismissed from the Japan National Railways alone,

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<sup>416</sup> Calder, *Crisis and Compensation: Public Policy and Political Stability in Japan*, 79.

<sup>417</sup> Calder, *Crisis and Compensation: Public Policy and Political Stability in Japan*, 79.

<sup>418</sup> Calder, *Crisis and Compensation: Public Policy and Political Stability in Japan*, 79- 80.

and many more were released nationwide, leading a sharp wave of labour unrest. On July 6, 1949, the dismembered body of Shimoyama Sadanori, president of the Japan National Railways, was found beside a railroad track in suburban Tokyo, two days after he had handed out dismissal notices to 37,000 railroad employees. Ten days later a driverless train rammed at full throttle into Mitaka station, also suburban Tokyo, resulting in the six bystander's death. On August 17, another train was derailed, apparently due to sabotage, at Matsukawa in Fukushima Prefecture, deepening further the spectre of labour violence looming over Japan.<sup>419</sup> Clearly, by stating "the economic and social difficulties" the emperor refers to the above-mentioned context. Furthermore, the underlying reason for the emperor urging all the citizens to 'cooperate' can fairly be understood. "Earning the trust of the world" was also essential when the trade barriers of other nations along with the other difficulties that Japan faced economically is also considered.

The speech of the 7th session of the National Diet Opening Ceremony held on December 15, 1949, is on the same line with the previous one to a large extent. The emperor uses *reconstruction of the country* 祖国復興 (sokokufukkō) in a few places where he urges his citizens to do their best to rebuild the country is a salient point.

When the emperor speaks at the National Diet Opening Ceremony took place on 13th of July 1950, he expressed his happiness to meet the new members of the House of Councilors from ordinary elections. Again to trace back, in 1949, as Andrew L. Oros states, the JSP was routed in the general election, with its number of seats dropping precipitously from 143 to 48. Oros further states that by contrast, the Democratic Liberal Party increased its number of seats from 151 to 264, an absolute

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<sup>419</sup> Calder, *Crisis and Compensation: Public Policy and Political Stability in Japan*, 80.

majority. Not all of the losses of the JSP went right, however. The Japanese Communist Party(JCP) increased its number of seats nearly tenfold, from only 4 to 35.<sup>420</sup> The emperor clearly welcomes the new members of the cabinet in his speech. Subsequently, he continues urging the previous targets, mentioned earlier, to be accomplished with a particular focus on the goal of being able to return as a member of international society *ichinichi mo hayaku* 一日も早く (as soon as possible.)

As on June 25, 1950, warfare erupted on the Korean peninsula, and the United States intervened. Makoto Iokibe argues that Washington lost interest in enforcing Japan's demilitarization and started to hope that Japan would become a military ally in the fight against communism.<sup>421</sup> John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State, paid a visit to Japan in January 1951 with the objective of negotiating a peace treaty. Yoshida, back in power, promised only to lightly arm Japan under strict civilian control.<sup>422</sup> With the urgency of the war situation and the dispatch of numerous American troops who had been stationed in Japan, General MacArthur addressed a directive to Yoshida Shigeru on 8 July approving the creation of a 75,000-person National Police Reserve in Japan and an 8,000-person expansion for maritime safety. On 10 August the Japanese Government promulgated and put into effect the Police Reserve Act, within the framework of the Potsdam Declaration.<sup>423</sup> In response to the letter of MacArthur, Prime Minister Yoshida's created the National Police Reserves in 1950. In addition, a split occurred in the labour union movement as a more moderate current emerged in opposition to the militant leftists, with the organization of such groups as the anti-communist Democratization League

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<sup>420</sup> Oros, *Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity, and the Evolution of Security Practice*, 57

<sup>421</sup> Iokibe, "Japan Meets the United States for the Second Time," in *Showa the Japan of Hirohito*, 105.

<sup>422</sup> Iokibe, "Japan Meets the United States for the Second Time," in *Showa the Japan of Hirohito*, 105.

<sup>423</sup> "Modern Japan in Archives," National Diet Library, <https://www.ndl.go.jp/modern/e/cha5/description13.html>

(Mindō). Then, in July 1950 (Showa 25), the General Council of Trade Unions of Japan (Sohyō) was formed, centred on the Mindō. Sohyō then became the nucleus of the postwar labour movement in Japan and acted as the umbrella organization for nearly half of all organized workers.<sup>424</sup> These should be the “recent domestic and foreign circumstances” in which the emperor considers further efforts are essential in order to “comply with the principles of the Constitution.” However, of the equal significance lies in his concluding sentences whilst he hopes “the National Diet fulfils the mission as the highest institution of national rights” as earlier, he also urges all of the people to cooperate with each other to fully achieve the ideals of our country, “striking a variety of difficulties without obstructing the way.” That was clearly a message to the Nation and National Diet exclusively.

In the same year on November 22, which is the 9th session of the National Diet, the emperor emphasizes the “unchanging” favour and assistance of the Allies under the “Constitution of Japan wishing everlasting peace”, which should be abided by. Furthermore, he declares that “the signs that our country will return to international society has finally come to light.” This could also be attributed to the U.S. intervention to South Korea in pursuant of saving the country from Communist invasion, which accelerated Department of State attempts to restore Japan to a respected international position, and make that country a prosperous ally of the United States. The U.S military had placed \$40 million in special procurement orders with Japanese firms, and the amount grew to a total of \$4 billion by June 1954.<sup>425</sup> By fall 1950, the Japanese economy had begun to recover, labour unrest had diminished, and the overall sense of economic crisis over the nation only six months

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<sup>424</sup> “Modern Japan in Archives,” *National Diet Library*, <https://www.ndl.go.jp/modern/e/cha5/description13.html>

<sup>425</sup> Calder, *Crisis and Compensation: Public Policy and Political Stability in Japan*, 81.

before had begun to abate.<sup>426</sup> The emperor must be referring to the temporary economic recovery with the Korean War boom.

On January 25, 1951, in the 10th session of the National Diet Opening Ceremony the emperor states that “five years have already passed since the end of the war and we have revealed that the reconstruction of Japan is one step further and the lives of the people have gradually shown a sign of stability.” The emperor highlights that this is the result of the Japanese people’s continued efforts under the ‘Japanese Constitution wishing eternal peace’, as well as being given unchanging favour and assistance of the Allies. He continues: “The situation in the world is still changing” adding; “however the day when Japan can occupy trust of the world as a cultural democratic state and be able to return as a member of the international community is getting closer gradually.” The emperor clearly gives hope to the nation as well as urging them to work cooperatively with each other tightening the foundation of stability and reconstruction of Japan.

In 1951 August 16, however, the emperor constitutes the body part of his speech on reminding the forthcoming Peace Conference; putting it into words as “the peace aircraft is finally ready for the action thanks to the consideration of the concerned countries.” To put it into the historical context; the concerned countries clearly represent the United States and the United Kingdom. The U.S Government officially invited Japan to the San Francisco Conference on July 20, 1951, and Japan accepted the invitation on July 22, 1951.<sup>427</sup> The emperor also hopes that “under the Constitution of Japan wishing eternal peace, Japanese citizens will bear the poverty and endure hardship, in accordance with the massive undertaking of the rebirth of the country, with unchanging favour and assistance of the Allied Powers.”

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<sup>426</sup> Calder, *Crisis and Compensation: Public Policy and Political Stability in Japan*, 81.

<sup>427</sup> van Aduard, *Japan: From Surrender to Peace*, 202.

The emperor's address on October 11, 1951, appears to be heavily focused on the Peace Treaty, for which he was preparing his citizens for a long time. He clearly calls his citizens to ratify the San Francisco peace treaty but also warned "many difficulties" would accompany the restoration of full sovereignty to Japan. He declares that "we have to expect difficulties as we stand alongside other peace-loving democratic countries," and adds that "I think it is necessary at this moment for all the Japanese people to renew their appreciation for the goodwill and assistance granted Japan by the Allied powers since the end of war and to cause a resolution of immovable decision to be dealt with in the future." He further states: "I wish the Diet, as the highest organ of the state, should discharge its mission thoroughly in deliberating on bills in preparation for the full independence of our country." The Emperor's address seems to be carefully framed in a plain attempt to avoid any implication that he influences legislation by the Diet. It left little doubt, however, that imperial circles definitely espoused the cause of the treaty-opposed bitterly by the Communists and some Left-Wing Socialists. It is noteworthy to mention, however, that the Emperor made no allusion to the companion security agreement under which the United States undertakes the defence of Japan continuing to keep a garrison of bases.

Under the Allied occupation, as it can even be clearly understood from the emperor's speeches until this point, Japan committed itself to join the democratic countries and concentrate its energy on peaceful economic development, whilst developing firm 'security ties with the U.S' and 'minimum forces for self-defence'. Kazuhiko Togo views that "Japan's decision to side with America and other democracies meant putting Japan in the basket of 'adversarial' countries for the

Soviet Union”<sup>428</sup> and this might be referred by the emperor when he stated “we have to expect difficulties as we stand alongside other peace-loving democratic countries.” Regarding the emperor’s call for renewing the appreciation towards the favour and assistance of the Allied Powers, one might easily recall the fierce disagreement within the JSP over the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the first security treaty with the United States, which split the party into right and left wings.<sup>429</sup>

During this Post-war Recovery period, it can be clearly seen that emperor shifts his executive power to an integrative power. Despite the fact that he becomes ‘human’ with his language, he still urges his people. He clearly urges his people to acknowledge the Constitution, to better the economy and international status regaining the trust of the entire world, implying that that is the only way to do so. He clearly shows his side by encouraging the collaboration with the Allied Powers. In addition, he prepares his people for the Peace Treaty making no allusion to the Security treaty, and asks them to approve without obstructing the way. However, he also warns them that he expects problems to occur while siding with the Allied Powers, meaning the diplomacy should be watched out. He confirms the improvement, appreciate the steps taken and asks his people to continue the efforts shown to accomplish the ideal of the country. Last but not least, he uses this *bunkakokka* 文化國家 (cultural states) theme that was not prominent in the quantitative analysis, which might imply Japan’s new international status in the eyes of the emperor.

With this in mind, turning the analysis to the politics of Prosperity period.

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<sup>428</sup> Togo, *Japan’s Foreign Policy, 1945-2009: The Quest for a Proactive Policy*, 231.

<sup>429</sup> Oros, *Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity, and the Evolution of Security Practice*, 57.

### 5.3 Resurgent Japan: 1952-1973

During this Post-war political and economic prosperity period, Japan accepted the bilateral United States-Japan Mutual Security Treaty in exchange for the end of the American occupation and placed itself under the military protection of the U.S., agreeing to abide by an extensive embargo on trade with the People's Republic of China. In addition to recognizing Chiang Kai-shek as the government of China diplomatically, Japan limited its dealings with the Soviet Union.<sup>430</sup>

These exchanges with the U.S. were not the only factors that shaped Japan, however. American wars with Korea (in the 1950s) and Indochina (in the 1960s) also resulted in the U.S. shaping its foreign policy for Japan. Both wars played a fundamental role boosting the Japanese economy as Japan served as an industrial and military supplier for the U.S., and also expanded its investments and exports with the support of America. It is not hard to guess that these developments were linked with the American encouragement for the remilitarization of Japan. Before the peace treaty was in effect, American forces were fighting in Korea. Linking with this, the U.S had the Japanese establish their Self Defense Force in 1954. Thus, Japan regained its military power and possessed the industrial base for nuclear weapons and a rapid expansion of its military equipment was seen, contradicting to the Constitution forbidding rearmament.<sup>431</sup>

These developments gave birth to Japanese resistance, however. Protests were mainly against the attempts of political and cultural recentralization sought by the Japanese government. The most intense opposition to the government policies

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<sup>430</sup> Livingston, Moore & Oldfather, *Postwar Japan 1945 to Present*, 227.

<sup>431</sup> Livingston, Moore & Oldfather, *Postwar Japan 1945 to Present*, 227.

directed the Japanese-American security treaty system.<sup>432</sup> Japan's successful economic recovery and rising nationalist sentiments on both sides of the Pacific led ultimately to security treaty revision between the U.S.- Japan in 1960.

Amidst these developments, perhaps economic developments were the most widely discussed. Between the period of 1952-1973, Japan came to a level of competing successfully in global markets, selling a wide assortment of industrial goods, particularly the goods requiring high technological skill. Ultimately, Japan grew the antagonism towards itself due to its aggressive export strategy in American and Western European markets.<sup>433</sup> Akaha Tsuneo puts forward that from the end of 1960s to the end of the 1970s, Japan dealt with the external disturbances, surviving a series of external shocks: the Nixon Doctrine (announced in Guam in 1969), the 1971 U.S.- China rapprochement, the 1971 New Economic Policy of the United States and so forth.<sup>434</sup>

Based on the broad narrative of this period constituted above, this section will now analyse the speeches in a micro level between 1952 and 1973, tracking their respective context.

The 13th session of the National Diet takes place on January 22, 1952. The emperor significantly highlights that “Regarding peace treaty, we have already passed the approval of the National Diet, have ratified it and now waiting for it to come into effect.” He clearly demonstrates his approval and calls for collaboration. He then declares that “in order to contribute to the development of international peace and democracy, along with Japan's constitution wishing eternal peace, Japan's prosperity, parallel to the countries of the world, Japanese people's responsibilities

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<sup>432</sup> Livingston, Moore & Oldfather, *Postwar Japan 1945 to Present*, 227.

<sup>433</sup> Livingston, Moore & Oldfather, *Postwar Japan 1945 to Present*, 227.

<sup>434</sup> Tsuneo, “U.S.-Japan Relations in the Post-Cold War Era: Ambiguous Adjustment to a Changing Strategic Environment” in *Japanese Foreign Policy Today*, 178-179.

are crucial.” In addition, the emperor calls all his citizens for renewing their appreciation for the favour and the aid of the Allied countries, which have been sent to Japan for a long time not less than six years. He also emphasizes that he wishes the citizens to further solidify the immovable determination to overcome many of the difficulties in the future, with the ambition and pride of New Japan Construction. Clearly, the emperor implies that he foresees many impending difficulties, just as in his previous speech. And again as he did in his previous speeches, he concludes with the same note that he hopes the National Diet and the Japanese citizens to fulfil the mission doing their best and respect the principles of the Constitution.

When the historical context of this speech considered, Kimie Hara concedes that in September 1951, against the background of the mounting cold war in Asia, Japan signed a peace treaty with forty-eight countries and returned to the international community as a member of the Western bloc.<sup>435</sup> Tadashi points out that when the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty of 1951 was submitted to the Japanese Diet for approval, it was strongly opposed by the Socialists who represented the neutralist-pacifist segment of the public as well as the reformist Left. Despite the fact that they were split into the right and left wings over the issue of approving the “partial” peace treaty, as they described, they were united, however, in opposing the security treaty.<sup>436</sup> The conservatives accepted the security treaty. However, that did not mean that they were in a total agreement. There was among them considerable discontent with its “unilateral” character which seemed to be “unbecoming” for a sovereign nation. One major issue is concerned that the security treaty of 1951 appointed the United States the right to dispose of its military forces in and around

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<sup>435</sup> Hara, “50 Years from San Francisco: Re- Examining the Peace Treaty and Japan’s Territorial Problems,” 1-23.

<sup>436</sup> Tadashi, “The Problem of Security Treaty Revision in Japan’s Relations with the United States: 1951-1960,” 38-39.

Japan with no imposing any legal responsibility to defend Japan. Aruga Tadashi maintains that the treaty provided merely that the military forces “may be utilized to contribute” to the security of Japan. Furthermore, the United States, while assuming no definite responsibility to defend Japan, gained the right to use its forces in Japan for purposes not directly related to the defence of Japan. Questions raised with regards to the particular phrase that its forces “may be utilized to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East” suggested the possibility that Japan could be used by the United States as a base for offensive operations. This above-mentioned unilateral character was the major source of dissatisfaction for conservative nationalists. The treaty contained an article which provided that the U.S, forces could be utilized “at the express request of the Japanese government” to put down “large-scale internal riots and disturbances in Japan.” Tadashi asserts that despite the fact that many Japanese conservatives were then afraid of indirect aggression by the communist neighbours, it would be wrong to state that they were comfortable with such a provision which reminded them of the impotence of their nation. Tadashi further maintains that Premier Shigeru Yoshida's conservative rivals, expressing conservative nationalism, advocated rearmament through constitutional revision, reexamination of reforms introduced under the occupation, and the diplomatic quest for more independence, which included revisions in the security arrangement with the United States.<sup>437</sup> Yoshida, however, wanted to follow a different strategy that instead of following nationalist sentiment to quest for more independence in military and foreign affairs, he aimed at concentrating Japanese energy to economic reconstruction.<sup>438</sup> Thus, on 26 October

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<sup>437</sup> Tadashi, “The Problem of Security Treaty Revision in Japan’s Relations with the United States: 1951-1960,” 39.

<sup>438</sup> Tadashi, “The Problem of Security Treaty Revision in Japan’s Relations with the United States: 1951-1960,” 39.

and 18 November 1951 the treaty was accepted by the two houses of the Japanese Kokkai (National Diet) and it was formally approved by the Emperor 19 November 1951. The emperor is likely to mean the difficult and complex situation between Japan and the Soviet Union and perhaps feels the need to call for collaboration in this context.

As on 13th of July 1950, (8th session of the National Diet), the emperor, on his address on November 8, 1952, which is 15th session of the National Diet Opening Ceremony, he welcomes the new members of the House of Representatives general elections first. Then quickly confirms that the Peace Treaty went into effect on April 28th that year and adds; “Japan again as an independent state restores diplomatic relations with many friendly nations, and within it, it shows results in economic development and stability of civil life.” He then adds that it is thanks to the constant efforts of many people over the years for the economic development and the stability of civilian life. *Shikashinagara* しかしながら (however), he continues, “in the recent internal and external circumstances, further efforts are still required hereafter in order to gain the trust of the world countries as a member of the international community and to lead Japan's luck to prosperity more and more.” Thus, the emperor approves the Peace Treaty, without making any remarking regarding the Security Treaty, which concurrently went into effect. However, he still urges Japan to gain the trust of the world, which will lead Japan to an economic prosperity and stability from his perspective.

With regards to the internal and external circumstances, it is reasonable to start with the Hatoyama faction of the Liberal party, which began political activities in January 1952.<sup>439</sup> The next month on February 8 1952, another essentially

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<sup>439</sup> Calder, *Crisis and Compensation: Public Policy and Political Stability in Japan*, 84.

conservative group, the Japan Reform Party was founded. Declaring itself as a party to counter the Liberal Party, the Japan Reform Party released a set of policies, including ensuring Japan's independence and self-defense, fostering the public spirit in order not to tilt toward either far left or far right, and implementing progressive reform and socialistic policy measures.<sup>440</sup> In April, however, the Japan Reconstruction League (Nihon Saiken Renmei) was formed, with Kishi Nobusuke as chairman.<sup>441</sup> Calder concedes that all of these groups vigorously challenged the preeminence of Yoshida, during a time that the Allied occupation was coming to an end, and clearly intensified the political turbulence of the period.<sup>442</sup> However, a major event in early 1952 is that the San Francisco Peace Treaty and the U.S., and the Japan Security came into force concurrently, which was mentioned above, restoring Japan's independence as an ally of the United States on April 28, regardless of the cabinet discussions<sup>443</sup> also referred by the emperor himself too. It is also significant to mention the confrontation between Yoshida and Hatoyama after Hatoyama and many other influential political figures who had been purged from public office returned to politics. These politicians intensified their efforts to oust Prime Minister Yoshida from power. Prime Minister Yoshida, however, countered the move by dissolving parliament without any previous announcement on 28 August 1952.<sup>444</sup>

Following the dissolution, the Liberal Party was divided toward a general election to a large extent. Liberal Party President and Prime Minister Yoshida

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<sup>440</sup> "Modern Japan in Archives," *National Diet Library*, <https://www.ndl.go.jp/modern/e/cha5/description13.html>

<sup>441</sup> Calder, *Crisis and Compensation: Public Policy and Political Stability in Japan*, 84.

<sup>442</sup> Calder, *Crisis and Compensation: Public Policy and Political Stability in Japan*, 84.

<sup>443</sup> "Modern Japan in Archives," *National Diet Library*, <https://www.ndl.go.jp/modern/e/cha5/description13.html>

<sup>444</sup> "Modern Japan in Archives," *National Diet Library*, <https://www.ndl.go.jp/modern/e/cha5/description13.html>

instructed the party's leadership to take tough measures against Ishibashi Tanzan and Kono Ichiro for making critical comments on Yoshida in their election campaign provided that they continued to hinder his efforts to promote party unity toward the election. Finally, on September 29, Ishibashi and Kono were expelled from the Liberal Party.<sup>445</sup> However, intraparty confrontation continued to intensify as a motion of no-confidence against Ikeda Hayato, Minister of International Trade and Industry. Hatoyama sent a letter to Yoshida asking for mutual "perseverance" and an immediate nullification of the party's earlier decision to oust Ishibashi and Kono from the party. Thus, on 16 December, the two were allowed to re-join the Liberal Party.<sup>446</sup>

The fourth administration of Prime Minister Yoshida was launched on 30 October 1952. According to Calder, the Liberal party narrowly retained its majority in the Diet. Calder concedes that whereas all thirty-five JCP Dietmen lost their seats, both the Left and the Right Socialists remained viable political forces, and opponents of Yoshida on the Right were significantly strengthened. On the right, both ex-Colonel Tsuji Masanobu, who was considered to be the strategist behind the conquest of Singapore, and Kuhara Fusanosuke, the former Manchurian industrialist, were elected to the Diet by heavy majorities, which indicated, according to Robert Scalapino, "an ominous sign of the time."<sup>447</sup> The emperor clearly refers to the election when he welcomes the new members of the Cabinet. The above-mentioned circumstances might be the trends referred to in the emperor's speech.

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<sup>445</sup> "Modern Japan in Archives," *National Diet Library*, <https://www.ndl.go.jp/modern/e/cha5/description13.html>

<sup>446</sup> "Modern Japan in Archives," *National Diet Library*, <https://www.ndl.go.jp/modern/e/cha5/description13.html>

<sup>447</sup> Calder, *Crisis and Compensation: Public Policy and Political Stability in Japan*, 84.

Again on June 16, 1953, the emperor welcomes the new members of the House of Representatives general elections and members of Councilors ordinary elections. To put it into the context, the newly formed fourth Yoshida cabinet lasted only six months. Calder maintains that the Opposition was continually attacking the Yoshida government due to its restrictions on trade with China along with its plan to scrap occupation reforms by centralizing the police and educational systems.<sup>448</sup> In the meantime, the Hatoyama supporters periodically withheld support from Yoshida, weakening his political position. It is also worthy to mention that Yoshida's calling a Socialist legislator a *baka* 馬鹿 damn fool or more appropriately "stupid" in February led the anti-Yoshida Conservatives to join the Socialists to pass a Diet resolution censuring him and enforcing new elections. Michael Schaller puts forwards that ultimately twenty-two of the Hatoyama rebels and other conservative dissidents voted for a no-confidence motion introduced by the Opposition, bringing down the government. In subsequent elections, held on April 19, 1963, Yoshida's Liberals lost their majority in the Diet and were forced into a precarious and unstable alliance with the right-oriented Kaishinto. According to Schaller, he continued to lead a ruling coalition, however, his power weakened. Through the rest of 1953, this turmoil in conservative ranks continued.<sup>449</sup>

That said, the emperor's body part of the speech on June 1953 focuses on Japan returning as a member of the international community since the Peace Treaty came into force, and in the condition of the international situation change, continuing to acquire the trust and friendship of the other friendly countries of the world. "However", states the emperor, as earlier, "in order to adhere to the spirit of the

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<sup>448</sup> Calder, *Crisis and Compensation: Public Policy and Political Stability in Japan*, 84.

<sup>449</sup> Schaller, *Altered States: The United States and Japan Since the Occupation*, 63.

Constitution of Japan wishing eternal peace, to deal with the trends of domestic and foreign affairs, and to lead Japan's luck more and more prosperously, a lot of effort is required in the future." He concludes his remarks with a similar note as the previous speeches but different somehow as he states that "I hope that all the citizens will "renew" their immovable determination to deal with the issues in the future, and strive for the construction of a democratic nation and contribute to the development of international peace." The emperor seems to have used this *aratanishi* 新たに (renew) wording when he urged his citizens with regard to the appreciation for the goodwill and assistance of the Allied Powers earlier twice. Now, it appears that he urges "renewing" related to future issues to be dealt with. Another interesting point is that after the peace treaty came into effect, the previous speech along with this one does not state "Allied Powers" but instead it has been shifted to acquiring the trust and friendship of the "other friendly countries."

On October 29, 1953, the emperor declares that "our country has become increasingly friendly with many countries, steadily building up the ground in the World" and appreciate that the citizens are constantly enduring the successive disasters rare in recent years, enduring hardships, constantly striving for stabilization of business and economic development. Given that the death of the Soviet Leader and the Korean armistice signed on July 27, 1963, the Japanese Diet passed a resolution concerning the "promotion of Sino-Japanese trade." This Diet resolution demanded that Japanese government temporarily bring down the trade restrictions to a level 'as low as the Western European countries'." Chihiro Hosoya argues that the truce in Korea heightened the expectations of Sino-Japanese trade in Japanese economic circles, and adds that the Sino-Japanese trade issues increasingly became

one of the significant issues in Japanese domestic politics.<sup>450</sup> It would be a strong argument the emperor referred to this in his speech. Furthermore, he mentions the successive disasters; the North Kyushu Flood and Wakayama Flood occurred on 20th of June 1953 and on 18th of July 1953 respectively. There is a need to highlight that the emperor did not make any remarks with regards to the previous disasters occurred earlier.

To continue, the 18th session of the National Diet opening ceremony took place on November 30, 1953, in which the emperor delivers his points comparatively straightforward. “This year” he states, “in addition to the succession of extraordinary disasters, there are various important issues in internal affairs and diplomacy, and it is often my great pleasure to meet with your main house to discuss the urgent matters involved.” He then adds that; “I hope the National Diet will fulfil its mission as the highest authority of the state power to cope with the current important moment, overcome many obstacles and bring prosperity in the future.” There seems to be a rush in his speech compared to the previous ones. What were the “various issues in internal affairs and diplomacy” that the emperor urges the national Diet to solve along with the many obstacles needed to be overcome? In addition, one might also want to recall back the “current important moment” that the emperor refers in his speech. Hosoya states that despite Japan’s increased interest in promoting trade with the PRC, the Japanese government’s official negotiations with the U.S concerning the restrictions on trade with the PRC had not begun until October 1953 when Finance Minister Ikeda Hayato conducted a series of talks with Walter Robertson,

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<sup>450</sup> Hosoya, “From the Yoshida Letter to The Nixon Shock,” 23 in Iriye & Cohen, *The United States and Japan in Postwar World*.

assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs.<sup>451</sup> In the meantime, a nongovernmental trade agreement was being negotiated in Beijing.<sup>452</sup> This resulted in an agreement on October 29, the date when the emperor delivered his previous address, for an exchange of trade representatives between the two countries.

It was not the only issue, however. As in the spring of 1953, when bilateral negotiations began over accepting U.S. financial support using the Mutual Security Act passed earlier that year, Japan had been forced to produce a long-term defence plan. The negotiations on the Japanese government's defence build-up plan had also continued. Despite the plan called for the same number of divisions as requested by the U.S. side, the total number of forces was limited to 180,000 ground troops or about half the number requested. Kazuya maintains that Ikeda explained the lower number of forces as a reflection of domestic conditions on the grounds of the existence of the peace constitution, the strong pacifist feelings in Japan, the poor quality of life in Japan, and the lack of a draft system. Ikeda also argued that in light of America's naval, army, and air power in the region, a ground force of that level would be enough for Japan to defend itself.<sup>453</sup> Notwithstanding, negotiations for the new Japan-US agreement were in progress in November, a statement from Foreign Minister Okazaki Katsuo at the end of November 1953 sought to clarify the government's position on the China trade.<sup>454</sup> Perhaps these were what made the emperor concerned regarding the country's current matters.

On January 25, 1954, the emperor opens the National Diet confirming that

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<sup>451</sup> Hosoya, "From the Yoshida Letter to The Nixon Shock," 23 in Iriye & Cohen, *The United States and Japan in Postwar World*.

<sup>452</sup> Sakamoto Kazuya, "Conditions of an Independent State: Japanese Diplomacy in the 1940s," p. 57, in Iokibe, *The Diplomatic History of Postwar Japan*.

<sup>453</sup> Kazuya, "Conditions of an Independent State: Japanese Diplomacy in the 1940s," p. 57, in Iokibe, *The Diplomatic History of Postwar Japan*.

<sup>454</sup> Braddick, *Japan and the Sino Soviet Alliance, 1950-1964: In the Shadow of the Monolith*, 110.

since the end of the war the citizens endured the most difficult times and since the conclusion of the Peace Treaty Japan has made good relations with foreign countries on a daily basis and built up its international position. However, he adds that “we have to withstand all the hardships from now on and overcome many obstacles in the age in order to build the development of national luck and have hope in the future in light of the past.”

To track his speech, in December 1953, the Yoshida government, reflecting the Asian Economic Council’s proposals, announced its basic for “economic aid to Southeast Asia in a Cabinet decision in an attempt to achieve “economic” foreign policy, focused particularly on the countries of Southeast Asia, whose demands for Japan goods were very high, yet whose economies were impoverished.<sup>455</sup> Thus, it can be well said that through the agency of this announcement Japan’s post-war relations with Southeast Asia started.<sup>456</sup> This might draw the international position that the emperor refers to.

On November 30, 1954, the emperor opens the National Diet and states that Japan is acquiring the trust and friendship of the world by the efforts of the people for two years after restoring diplomatic relations with the friendly countries as an independent state. He then states that: “However, a lot of effort is required hereafter in order for Japan to develop truly as a democratic cultural state.” He then emphasizes that he hopes the whole people will make further efforts to renew their thoughts and make further efforts for the prosperity of the country and world peace.

To constitute the historical context of the delivered speech, conservative ranks intensified early in 1954 by the shipbuilding scandal-the first major political corruption case of the post-Occupation era-, in which Yoshida had to intervene

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<sup>455</sup> Sudo, *Japan’s ASEAN Policy: In Search of Proactive Multilateralism*, 37.

<sup>456</sup> Sudo, *Japan’s ASEAN Policy: In Search of Proactive Multilateralism*, 18.

personally to prevent the arrest of the Liberal Party's general secretary, Sato Eisaku.<sup>457</sup> However, the arrest of Liberal Party lawmaker Arita Jiro was granted on February 23, by House of Representatives.<sup>458</sup> In addition, Prime Minister Yoshida's political base rapidly weakened due to the worsening economic situation. The political situation became fluid, with the conservatives manoeuvring against Yoshida to come together and form a unified party.<sup>459</sup> Amidst of these, the Bikini Incident, No. 5 "Daigo FukuryuMaru" fishing boat contaminated by nuclear fallout from U.S. thermonuclear bomb test on Bikini Atoll, occurred in March 1954. This damaged the Japan-U.S. relations and even further weakened the Yoshida government. It is not hard to imagine that its plight caused outrage among the Japanese public, specifically among antinuclear pacifist and those with anti-American sentiments. Kazuya further puts forward that the U.S embassy reported to the U.S. that bilateral relations had reached their worst point in the ten years of the postwar era.<sup>460</sup>

The international situation also changed dramatically in Japan in 1954. Following the truce reached in the Korean War in 1953 and the peace agreement in the Indochina War in July, military tensions in the Far East decreased substantially. Kazuya further asserts that with this the overt East-West clash appeared to have come to an end in Asia, with competition shifting to long-term economic development. Owing to this, as a matter of fact, the U.S. could exhibit more interest in the political and economic stability of its alliance partners, with Japan included.<sup>461</sup>

Subsequently, a consensus was formed within the U.S. government that for

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<sup>457</sup> Calder, *Crisis and Compensation: Public Policy and Political Stability in Japan*, 84.

<sup>458</sup> "Modern Japan in Archives," *National Diet Library*, <https://www.ndl.go.jp/modern/e/cha5/description13.html>

<sup>459</sup> Kazuya, "Conditions of an Independent State: Japanese Diplomacy in the 1940s," p. 57, in Iokibe, *The Diplomatic History of Postwar Japan*.

<sup>460</sup> Kazuya, "Conditions of an Independent State: Japanese Diplomacy in the 1940s," p. 57, in Iokibe, *The Diplomatic History of Postwar Japan*.

<sup>461</sup> Kazuya, "Conditions of an Independent State: Japanese Diplomacy in the 1940s," p. 58, in Iokibe, *The Diplomatic History of Postwar Japan*.

the time being it was necessary to focus on Japan's political and economic stabilization and to relax demands for rearmament. In the summer of 1954, a review of the U.S. policy toward Japan was conducted at the initiative of ambassador to Japan John M. Allison and his staff. This seems to have become the basis of a new basic policy on Japan (NSC 5516/1) in the spring of 1955. Kazuya further adds that this paper ensured the principle that the U.S. government would not demand the rearmament of Japan at the expense of Japan's political and economic stability and should allow Japan to decide for itself the size and the shape of its rearmament program. It also removed any reference to concrete numbers relating to force levels.

<sup>462</sup> One should also mention the resignation of Yoshida Cabinet in December. In addition, on December 10, 1954, Hatoyama Ichiro took office as prime minister.<sup>463</sup>

On January 21, 1955, in the 21st session opening ceremony of the National Diet, the emperor creates the body part of his speech focusing on the fact that since Japan has returned to the international community, it has steadily recovered diplomatic relations with the countries, exerting efforts to achieve peace in the world steadily, and within the framework of economic development, stabilization of civilian life. According to him, these were due to the constant efforts of the people. The emperor keeps warning as before that "it will be necessary to make such efforts in the future, in order for Japan to overcome many difficulties expected further and lead the country to prosperity and deepen the trust in the world."

When the emperor states that "Japan has steadily recovered diplomatic relations with the countries", he clearly means the restoration of relations with the

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<sup>462</sup> Kazuya, "Conditions of an Independent State: Japanese Diplomacy in the 1940s," 58, In Iokibe, *The Diplomatic History of Postwar Japan*.

<sup>463</sup> "Modern Japan in Archives," *National Diet Library*, <https://www.ndl.go.jp/modern/e/cha5/description13.html>

Soviet Union, which appears to have been a politically attractive issue in 1954. In contrast to Yoshida, Kazuya states, popular Hatoyama viewed the establishment of relations with the Soviet Union, which even the diplomatically skilled Yoshida was unable to pull off, as a major foreign issue that was easy for people to expect and welcome. Furthermore, Hatoyama viewed the necessity for a change in the “overly pro-U.S.” foreign policy of his predecessor based on both his political views and the public opinion trends. He agreed to the point that cooperation with the U.S. was an absolute necessity, however, there also seems to have been an inclination witing the Hatoyama cabinet to keep a slight distance from the United States and pursue more autonomous diplomacy. In January 1955, the Soviet Union approached the Japanese government to open informal discussion on the normalization of relations. Hatoyama responded to the Soviet by deciding to formally start discussions.<sup>464</sup>

In the same year on April 15, the emperor expresses his happiness that the National Diet welcomes new members of the House of Representatives general election and works on new economic development and the stability of the civilian life with new preparedness and power. Just as the government focusing on economic development, so was the emperor’s speech, but what does the emperor mean by stating the “new preparedness and power?” As Prime Minister Hatoyama dissolved the House of Representatives on 24 January 1955, the Japan Democratic Party achieved a major coup in the general election held following the Diet dissolution and secured the largest number of seats in the House of Representatives. It is highly likely that the emperor means this change in the Diet with the ‘new preparedness and power.’ It is also important to give this detail that after the election, calls from the business community to unify the two conservative parties increased in the wake of

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<sup>464</sup> Kazuya, “Conditions of an Independent State: Japanese Diplomacy in the 1940s,” 59, in Iokibe, *The Diplomatic History of Postwar Japan*.

the increasing influence of leftist-oriented Socialists and the integration of two Japan Socialist Party faction. In April, Miki Bukichi of the Japan Democratic Party officially demonstrated his support behind the proposed unification of the two conservative parties. Although there is little evidence to suggest that the emperor supports this unification, it is worthy to consider.<sup>465</sup>

On December 2, 1955, the emperor highlights that “Japan is recovering its diplomatic relations with friendly countries as an independent nation, and is gaining the trust and friendship of the world increasingly with the efforts of the people here over three years.” It is reasonable to attribute this to the negotiations carried out with the Soviet on June 5, 1955. The main issues handled were the repatriation of Japanese held by the Soviet Union, the fisheries dispute, the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, and Japan’s joining the United States. Ultimately, there was no solution. In addition, it is significant to mention that on 15 November, the Liberal Party and the Japan Democratic Party merged, creating the Liberal Democratic Party,<sup>466</sup> which was not implied in any way in the emperor’s speech. The emperor also adds that “I think it will require much more effort in the future for Japan to further develop its economy, stabilize the welfare of its people, and to lead the nation's luck and to deepen its faith in the world as a democratic cultural state.”

In the meantime, 1955 was the epoch-making year in the history of the Japanese economy as in this year, per capita GNP surpassed the pre-war level. Although compared with European countries, Japan’s major industrial products were still labour-intensive goods such as textile, chemical fertilizer, merchandise ship, and radio etc. In addition, 1955 was the first year for the Japanese economy to attain the

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<sup>465</sup> “Modern Japan in Archives,” *National Diet Library*, <https://www.ndl.go.jp/modern/e/cha5/description13.html>

<sup>466</sup> Kazuya, “Conditions of an Independent State: Japanese Diplomacy in the 1940s,” 60, in Iokibe, *The Diplomatic History of Postwar Japan*.

simultaneous equilibrium both internally and externally. The external current account was almost in balance and the domestic prices were stable. In this sense, 1955 was the starting year of the post-war high economic growth. The Economic White Paper in 1956 described these economic situations as; “The post-war period has gone already. Future economic growth will be achieved by modernization and technological innovation.”<sup>467</sup> Supposedly, this is where “further efforts” are required.

The emperor opens the National Diet on January 25, 1956, stating;

It is a tireless effort of the people that Japan is steadily deepening harmony with foreign countries in recent years and showing its achievements in the rise of culture, industry and economy and the stability of people’s lives in the inside.

“However” he adds, “because there are many domestic and international issues, I think that it will take many more efforts in order for Japan to deepen its faith in the world and to develop national luck hereafter more than ever.

On November 15, 1956, the emperor welcomes a new member of the House of Councilors General Election. Subsequently, he declares;

It has already been four years since Japan returned to the international community, and while it has been deepening diplomatic relations with friendly countries, owing to the constant efforts it has been bringing about the development of culture and economy and the stability of the people’s life.

“However”, he adds, “I think it will require a lot of effort in the future in order to cope with the trend of the international situation and to boost the national luck and increase the welfare of the people.”

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<sup>467</sup> Sadahiro, “The Japanese Economy During the Era of High Economic Growth Retrospect and Evaluation”, 9.

Katsuo Okazaki, a former career diplomat and an active member of the Liberal Democratic party, states that as of 1956, Japan has resumed normal diplomatic ties with most of the countries of the World, except the Communist nations. Thus, the first post-independence objective has been almost completely attained.<sup>468</sup> However, hereby stating “the trend of the international situation,” the emperor is most likely to refer to the situation with regard to the Soviet Union. As suggested before, the negotiations opened with the Soviet Union in London and ended in a stalemate in March 1956 due to Japanese insistence upon the repatriation of her nationals detained by the Soviet Union and the return of the southern Kurile Islands.<sup>469</sup> The Soviet Union countered by a ban on fishing in important northern Pacific waters. Negotiations in Moscow in May of 1956 produced a modified lifting of the fishing ban and paved the way to a resumption of formal treaty negotiations, with Prime Minister’s Hatoyama’s trip to Moscow in October 1956.<sup>470</sup> Finally, 19 October, Japan and the Soviet Union signed the Japanese-Soviet Joint Declaration, which marked the restoration of their diplomatic relations.<sup>471</sup> Of the equally significant importance was probably the Japan-Soviet Joint Declaration. While maintaining the diplomatic ties, as the Vice Minister of Finance of Japan, Kuroda claims, in 1956, that the economic white paper declared: “Japan is no longer in the post-war period.”<sup>472</sup> It can be viewed from the emperor’s speech that he no longer urges the Kokkai or the citizens to improve the economy but rather to “increase the welfare of the people.” It is well justifiable that Japan was having its “Jinmu Boom”,

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<sup>468</sup> Okazaki, “Japan’s Foreign Relations,” 159.

<sup>469</sup> Okazaki, “Japan’s Foreign Relations,” 160.

<sup>470</sup> Okazaki, “Japan’s Foreign Relations,” 160-161.

<sup>471</sup> “Joint Compendium of Documents on the History of Territorial Issue between Japan and Russia”, *Ministry of Foreign Affairs* 外務省,

<https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/russia/territory/edition92/period5.html>

<sup>472</sup> Minohara & Iokibe, *The History of US-Japan Relations: From Perry to the Present*, 289.

long period economic boom over 1956 to 1957 (31 months). The noticeable characteristic of this boom was that the Japanese economy was driven by the high private investment, which meant that the Japanese economy rode on the high growth path around this year. Moreover, in 1959, the stronger boom (42 months), “Iwato Boom” was actualized, in which the boom synchronized throughout the economy.<sup>473</sup>

In addition, the 26th session of the National Diet opening ceremony takes place on January 30, 1957, in which the emperor highlights the fact that Japan became a member of the United Nations. The unanimous approval of Japan’s U.N. membership at U.N. General Assembly was on December 18, 1956,<sup>474</sup> and thus Japan became the 80<sup>th</sup> member of the United Nations. In addition, he states that “it is due to the citizen’s constant efforts that Japan has made further progress on economic development and the stability of the people’s welfare.” He concludes again stating; “I think that it will still take a lot of effort in the future in order for Japan to cope with various situations inside and outside of Japan and to further enhance the credibility of the world, with the aim of prospering national luck.” It is significant at this point to recall back that in October 1956, an agreement was reached on the normalization of relations between the U.S.S.R and Japan.<sup>475</sup> That said, on the internal political side, on December 23, 1956, after Hatoyama Ichiro, the Japanese administration was taken over by the short-lived cabinet of Ishibashi Tanzan, which was too short to achieve any substantial result.<sup>476</sup>

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<sup>473</sup> Sadahiro, “The Japanese Economy During the Era Of High Economic Growth Retrospect and Evaluation”, 9.

<sup>474</sup> “Modern Japan in Archives,” *National Diet Library*, <https://www.ndl.go.jp/modern/e/utility/chronology.html>

<sup>475</sup> Livingston & Moore et al., *Postwar Japan 1945 to Present*, 318.

<sup>476</sup> “Modern Japan in Archives,” *National Diet Library*, <https://www.ndl.go.jp/modern/e/utility/chronology.html>

On first of November 1957, the emperor declares that; “It has been due to the favour of friends and the constant efforts of the people that we have been appointed as a non-permanent member of the Security Council after waging out a year since joining the United Nations in the past.” He then warns that “However, there are many problems that need to be solved in domestic politics or diplomacy, and I think it is necessary to further establish the international peace while further prospering the economy and stabilizing the people’s lives in the future.”

In light of the emperor’s speech, it would be reasonable to recall back the domestic politics and diplomacy first. On February 25 1957, following the resignation of Ishibashi due to his illness, the Foreign Minister, Kishi Nobusuke, took over the premiership with most of the other ministers remaining in their seats. In diplomacy, Kishi tried to strike a balance between the Yoshida line and the Hatoyama/Ishibashi line. Junko Tomaru claims that Kishi formulated the ‘Three Principles’ of Japan’s foreign policy based on the prototype pursued during the Yoshida period namely; 1) support of the UN, 2) cooperation with the Free World and 3) firm standing as a member of ‘the Asian family of nations.’<sup>477</sup>

In pursuant of the principle 1, the Kishi administration applied for and achieved in having Japan elected as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council,<sup>478</sup> which the emperor mentions in his speech, and appreciates the efforts regarding it. In this respect, Kishi reassured the US that Japan would not approach the communist bloc and therefore Kishi’s diplomatic stance and strong domestic leadership was welcomed by the U.S. However, Kishi was as a matter of fact aiming at an independent and ‘equal-footed’ relationship with the US, which was reflected in his intention to revise the US-Japan Security Treaty. As Tomaru maintains that

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<sup>477</sup> Tomaru, *The Postwar Rapprochement of Malaya and Japan 1945-61*, 165.

<sup>478</sup> Tomaru, *The Postwar Rapprochement of Malaya and Japan 1945-61*, 165.

Kishi raised three main issues as immediate tasks for his government; promotion of friendly relations with Asian countries, economic diplomacy and adjustment of Japanese-American relations.<sup>479</sup> It would not be reasonable to state that these immediate tasks are not completely irrelevant to what the emperor states.

On January 25 1958, the emperor declares that "Japan is making more and more diplomatic relations with friend countries in the recent years, working on the solution of international problems at a steady pace and raising its trust." Clearly, he is satisfied with the solutions to the problems. He further states that "In addition, I am deeply pleased that all the citizens are constantly making continuous efforts to develop the economy and the stability of the people under the difficult conditions of the present." He then warns again "However, I think it will take more effort hereafter to cope with various situations inside and outside, to lead the nation's luck to prosperity further, and to contribute to the achievement of world peace." The emperor again warns the National Diet regarding "difficult conditions."

On June 17, 1958, the emperor welcomes new members in the lower house of parliamentary elections who will deal with the current and foreign affairs with new determination and deliberate various issues in the near term for the development of the Japanese economy and the stability of the people's life. This seems to have been constructed rather differently compared to the other election-related references. The emperor clearly means the inauguration of second Kishi Nobusuke Cabinet took over on June 12 right before his speech. Hence it is not wrong to assert that he seems to have been satisfied with this seeing that he uses "new determination" wording. In addition, one might also suggest that the emperor confirms that Japan needs a new determination to deal with current and foreign affairs. He then hopes "the National

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<sup>479</sup> Tomaru, *The Postwar Rapprochement of Malaya and Japan 1945-61*, 165.

Diet to fulfil its mission as the highest institution of national rights without hesitation and will respond to the trust of the people.” Here, another wording *kokumin no shintaku ni kotaeru* 国民の信託にこたえる (responding to the trust of the people) needs to be underlined. Moreover, despite the fact that it was the routine of the emperor to conclude his speeches with a wish of respecting principles of the Constitution, there appears to be no word regarding the Constitution.

On September 30 1958, the emperor expresses his happiness that the Diet is deliberating on the various issues to be dealt with soon in order to cope with the current domestic and foreign affairs and finally deepen Japan’s diplomatic relations with each country, and to aim for the prosperity of the Japanese economy and the enhancement of the national welfare. Then he adds “Here, I hope that the Diet, as the highest authority of the state, will do its best to achieve its mission.” Once again, there seems to be nothing concerning the Consitution of Japan, which was the emperor’s routine.

Although Kishi was careful not to propose security treaty revisions even after becoming prime minister in 1957 and worked to cement cooperative bilateral ties for a new age in Japan-US relations, it was MacArthur who first suggested the possibility of a new treaty to Japanese officials.<sup>480</sup> Thus the treaty revision process for Kishi officially began, which may be what the emperor refers to when he states “deliberating on the various issues to be dealt with soon”. In July 1958, Foreign Minister Aiichiro Fujiyama conferred several times with MacArthur on security matters. In their meeting of July 30, MacArthur stated that there were two ways of modifying the existing security arrangement: one was to supplement the present

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<sup>480</sup> Tadashi, “The Problem of Security Treaty Revision in Japan’s Relations with the United States: 1951-1960,” 46.

treaty by a series of new agreements on particular issues, and the other was to replace it by a new treaty of greater mutuality. The ambassador MacArthur asked Fujiyama whether the Japanese government would prefer a new treaty of mutual assistance type if it was possible to devise such a treaty compatible with the Japanese Constitution. However, Fujiyama replied that he would like to consult the Prime Minister before answering the question. After Fujiyama's return from the U.N. General Assembly, Kishi himself held a meeting with MacArthur on August 25, expressing his preference of a new treaty, observing that only a new treaty could put U.S.-Japanese relations on a firm and stable basis. Although the ambassador was certainly confident that the U.S would respond favourably to the proposal of negotiating a new security treaty, John Foster Dulles was hesitant to agree as far as he conveyed to a Japanese diplomat. Ultimately, he took the matter to Eisenhower, who had persuaded Dulles to agree.<sup>481</sup>

Finally, Tadashi argues that the joint communique issued by Dulles and Fujiyama in September announced:

Foreign Minister Fujiyama stated that with the re-established position of Japan in the intervening years, the situation has now evolved to where it would be advantageous to re-examine the present security arrangements.... It was agreed that the two governments would consult further on this matter through diplomatic channels following Mr. Fujiyama's return to Tokyo.<sup>482</sup>

In short, this might be the improvements that the emperor implies and the "issues to be dealt with soon."

On January 26, 1959, the emperor delivers his speech with appreciating that "Japan is increasingly making friendship with other countries more and more and

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<sup>481</sup> Tadashi, "The Problem of Security Treaty Revision in Japan's Relations with the United States: 1951-1960," 46.

<sup>482</sup> Tadashi, "The Problem of Security Treaty Revision in Japan's Relations with the United States: 1951-1960," 46.

contributing to the achievement of world peace.” Apart from hoping the citizens to continue their efforts to develop the economy and improve their lives, he warned that the situation inside and outside is still serious. “I think that it is necessary to make such efforts in the future to deepen the trust of the world which leads the country to prosperity.” On October 8, the government presented its proposed revision of the Police Official Duties Execution Act to Diet.<sup>483</sup> Due to the recent history as well as memories of the wartime “Thought Police,” opposition to the 1958 Police Duties bill seems to have been spread rapidly. It could be easily related to the daily lives of the people, and the mass media were nearly unanimous in criticizing the bill. Therefore, there was little difficulty in drawing large crowds of protesters.<sup>484</sup> The Japan Socialist Party and various labour bodies formed a People’s Council against the Police Duties Bill eight years after it was introduced, and by the first united action on November 5, they were able to mobilize six million workers in a protest strike and ten million people in mass actions nationwide. Thus, on November 22, the administration worked out a compromise with the Japan Socialist Party to have the bill shelved.<sup>485</sup> This made the situation serious in the country, as the emperor also implies.

On June 15, 1959 the speech delivered by the emperor is relatively short as he first welcomes the new members of the House of Councilors election and concludes with the hope that the Diet will renew the determination developing the future of the national luck, fulfilling its mission without hesitation and contributing to the achievement of world peace and responding to the trust of the people. However, on

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<sup>483</sup> “Modern Japan in Archives”, *National Diet Library*,  
<https://www.ndl.go.jp/modern/e/utility/chronology.html>

<sup>484</sup> Uemura, *Organizing the Spontaneous: Citizens Protest in Postwar Japan*, 173.

<sup>485</sup> “Modern Japan in Archives”, *National Diet Library*,  
<https://www.ndl.go.jp/modern/e/utility/chronology.html>

September 27, 1959, the emperor opens the Diet with declaring that “The damage caused by the successive heavy rains and typhoons this year is extremely large, and its relief and reconstruction are now urgent tasks.” The emperor refers to the large typhoon caused severe flooding in the Isewan area of Japan in September. In addition, presenting the people the urgent task, the emperor states that “there are various important issues in internal affairs diplomacy” and thus he urges the Diet to work on deliberations on the various matters.

When the important issues of 1959 considered, one might remember former Prime Minister Ishibashi’s visit to P.R. China on September 7. Shibashi visited the People’s Republic of China and met with Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai. After the meeting, the two issued a joint statement, which called for Japan and P.R. China to make efforts to normalize their relations. Ishibashi proposed that four countries -- Japan, P.R. China, the United States and the Soviet Union -- form a peace alliance, an idea he had long cherished. These improvements might be what the emperor refers to.

On January 30, 1960, the emperor delivers his speech by first appreciating the fact that Japan is increasing its diplomatic relations with its friendly countries and working to achieve world peace. He then maintains that “In addition, while improving the welfare of the people and the development of the economy, the disasters in the world are steadily achieving recovery with the people’s continuous efforts on the other hand.” “However”, he continues, “I think that it will take much more efforts to cope with domestic and foreign affairs, to further prosperity of Japan’s national luck, and to deepen the trust of the world.” What needs to be highlighted here is that the emperor concludes his remarks as before. “Here, the National Diet, as the highest authority of the state, fulfils its mission without

hesitation, and I sincerely hope that all the people will follow the principles of the Constitution and cooperate with each other to do their best.” Mentioning the principles of the Constitution was last in the context of the emperor’s speech delivered on January 25, 1958. Since then it is the first time that he preferred mentioning it.

When the “increasing its diplomatic relations with its friendly countries”, “domestic and foreign affairs” and the returned “principles of the Constitution” considered, one quickly recalls back the new Japan-U.S. Security Treaty in Washington was signed on January 19, 1960.<sup>486</sup> Kitaoka Shinichi argues that after Kishi signed the mutual security treaty and returned from the U.S., he thought of dissolving the Diet and holding an election. However, Kishi was forced to abandon this plan. Shinichi points out that had the election been held, it is likely that the LDP would have been successful and the new treaty would have been ratified easily.<sup>487</sup> This clearly exhibits that the ratification process would bear “much more efforts to cope with domestic and foreign affairs” as the emperor states.

The speech delivered by the emperor on the 35th session of the National Diet, on July 18, 1960, constitutes its focus on the constitution:

At present, when the situation inside and outside the country is so serious, I believe it is very urgent and necessary for the whole nation to cooperate together to protect the ideal of the democracy which is the ideal of the constitution, to work on the development of the economy and the stability of the people’s lives and to contribute to world peace increasing the trust of our fellow nations.

The chaos emerged in the ratification of the treaty in the spring and early summer of 1960 could be attributed to the emperor’s speech. Shinichi puts forward that the

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<sup>486</sup> “Modern Japan in Archives,” *National Diet Library*, <https://www.ndl.go.jp/modern/e/utility/chronology.html>

<sup>487</sup> Shinichi, *The Political History of Modern Japan*, 114.

deliberations on the treaty were held up by opposition from the Socialist Party and demonstrations began to grow outside around the Diet building. Kishi decided to call in the police to preserve order within the Diet, and forced through a fifty-day extension of the Diet session and then, immediately after that (in the absence of the Socialist Party) went ahead with the ratification of the treaty.<sup>488</sup> It is not hard to imagine that the forced treaty caused unprecedented demonstrations outside the Diet building. As stated before in Chapter 2 too, on June 15, 1960, a female student from Tokyo University was killed during the protests and the leftist student demonstrations grew forcing the decision the next day to request the cancellation of President Eisenhower's visit set to begin on June 19. Following the exchange of ratified copies of the treaties on the morning of June 23, Kishi announced his resignation.<sup>489</sup>

October 18, 1960, the emperor delivered his speech almost the same as the previous speech, with only one different phrase; *Junpō no seishin o omonji* 遵法の精神を重んじ (esteem the principle of obeying the laws). “At this moment, when the domestic and internal situation is grave,” Hirohito declares that, “I think it is very important for the people to esteem the principle of obeying the laws, to cooperate with each other, and to make the utmost efforts for promoting the national fortune in accordance with the principles of democracy.” He clearly alludes to the assassination of Japan Socialist Party Chairman Asanuma Inejiro at Hibiya Public Hall on October 12 and the disruptive political atmosphere since then.

It is interesting that this speech was regarded as the nearest approach to direct intervention by the Emperor in a situation of grave national concern since he

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<sup>488</sup> Shinichi, *The Political History of Modern Japan*, 116.

<sup>489</sup> Shinichi, *The Political History of Modern Japan*, 116.

renounced the divinity of the sovereign in January, 1946, as reflected in the West media on October 19, 1960,<sup>490</sup> with the headline of “Hirohito Appeals For Public Order.” Emperor’s speech clearly “appeals for public order”, however it would not be true to consider this speech as the nearest approach to direct intervention seeing that the speech is in the same line with the previous ones.

The emperor opens the Diet on December 10, 1960 stating “It is necessary for the Diet to deal with the current and foreign affairs, to improve the international status of Japan, to renew economic determination and to discuss the immediate problems in order to measure economic development and the stability of the people’s life.” As the reader can clearly be aware that the emperor’s speech focuses on the economic aspects of the immediate problems.

By the middle of the 1960s, an economically developed Japan was facing pressures from the Western countries and developing countries alike for playing a greater international role commensurate with its economic status.<sup>491</sup> It is worthy to consider the fact that 1960 was the year of the Doubling National Income Plan, which is evaluated as the most excellent plan in the history of the economic Plan in Japan. 1960 was also the year of import liberalization. Subsequently, on December 27 1960, the government adopted the plan to double people's incomes officially.<sup>492</sup>

On January 28, 1961, the emperor declares that the fact that Japan has been deepening friendship with other countries in recent years and contributing to the achievement of world peace is a pleasure. In addition, he expresses his appreciation that the whole nation is working together to protect the true principles of democracy,

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<sup>490</sup> “Hirohito Appeals for Public Order: Emperor, In Speech to Diet, Urges...”, The New York Times, 5.

<sup>491</sup> Sadahiro, “The Japanese Economy During the Era of High Economic Growth Retrospect and Evaluation”, 19.

<sup>492</sup> Sadahiro, “The Japanese Economy During the Era Of High Economic Growth Retrospect and Evaluation”, 9-10.

the ideal of the Constitution, and making constant efforts to develop the economy and improve life. He continues; “I think it will take some time in the future to cope with various situations inside and outside, to lead the nation's luck to prosperity and to improve the world’s trust. “In a similar vein, on September 27, 1961, the emperor constitutes the body part of his speech stating:

The current international situation is truly multilateral, and it has been finally added that Japan has deepened diplomatic relations with each country and contributed to the maintenance of world peace. In addition, I think that it is important to aim for the rapid recovery of the disasters and to make the economic development of our country even more solid and to further improve the welfare of the people.

Following in the footsteps of his predecessor, in November 1961 Prime Minister Ikeda went on a four-nation tour of Southeast Asia. Ikeda apparently perceived that as one of the three key pillars of his foreign policy, Japan should also assist Asia. In particular, he viewed Southeast Asia as a region that Japan should help industrialize and develop into a market for Japanese goods. In the sphere of trade with China, Japan had suffered drawbacks attributable to the inflexible foreign policy stance China adopted following the Nagasaki national flag incident of 1958 and its own Great Leap Forward campaign. Through the mediation of Kenzo Matsumura and Tatsunosuke Takasaki, Ikeda successfully restarted trade with China based on policies that separated politics and economics in 1961.<sup>493</sup>

On January 17, 1962, the emperor opens the Diet as follows:

The current international situation is quite diverse, but in the meantime, Japan is deepening its friendship with each other and looking at improving its international status. In addition, I believe that the whole nation is making continuous efforts in their respective work areas and steadily achieving their results for the improvement of the welfare of the people and the development of the economy.

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<sup>493</sup> Iokibe, “Diplomacy in Occupied Japan: Japanese Diplomacy in the 1948,” 18. in *The Diplomatic History of Postwar Japan*.

Clearly, the emperor signifies the improvement in the international relations. In a similar fashion, on August 8, 1962, the emperor emphasizes the international situation as he states that Japan has been deepening its friendships with other countries and is looking at improving its international status in response to the current international environment. Furthermore, he adds: “In the inner world, the whole nation cooperates together to protect the ideal of the democracy, which is the ideal of the constitution, and constantly strives to improve the stability of people and economic development.”

Towards the end of the 1960s, Japan’s trust in the U.S substantially diminished as a result of the Vietnam war. Reaction in Japan to the American intervention in the Vietnam war was negative due to Japan’s pacifist principles and its apparent emotional closeness to Vietnam as a fellow Asian country. In 1962, an improvement was seen in the normalization process of Japan’s relations with South Korea as Japanese Foreign Minister Ohira managed to bring compensation talks between the two countries to a conclusion, with leaving some matters to be settled. Regarding Japanese-Chinese relations, Ikeda also sought for improving the relations and argued that it was unnatural for Japan not to maintain diplomatic relations with China and proposed a line of separating politics and economics so as to justify a normalization of relations.<sup>494</sup> Susanne Klien argues that in 1962 Ikeda changed his original stance of pure mercantilism in policy to activism in international politics with the aim of ensuring acceptance of Japan in the international community.<sup>495</sup>

Considering the enormous growth rate Japan exhibited, it is easy to understand the ambition of Ikeda. However, according to Watanabe, the year 1962

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<sup>494</sup> Klien, *Rethinking Japan's Identity and International Role: An Intercultural Perspective*, 80.

<sup>495</sup> Klien, *Rethinking Japan's Identity and International Role: An Intercultural Perspective*, 77.

was opposition to Ikeda's emphasis on high-speed growth became stronger. Ikeda understood this and shifted his emphasis to structural improvements for agriculture and small business.<sup>496</sup> Therefore, the "current international situation was diverse", as the emperor states, and Japan was deepening its friendship with the other countries and looking at improving its international status. The emperor's speech fundamentally reflects the country's situation.

The 43rd session of the National Diet speech delivered on January 23, 1963, was no different than the previous one. However, on October 17 1963, although the emperor speaks in the same line, he declares that Japan is in the process of deepening its friendships with foreign countries, working hard to solve international problems, and raising the trust of the world.

On December 10, 1963, the emperor declares that the National Diet welcomes a new member of the House of Representatives general election, with new determination, copes with various situations inside and outside the country, aims to improve the international status of Japan, and to promote economic development and the stability of the people's life. The speech delivered on January 20, 1964, and on November 20, 1964, seem to be almost in the same direction. However, on November 1964, the emperor declares that;

Even though the current international and domestic situation is truly multilateral, I am deeply pleased that all the citizens are dealing with it, deepening their friendship and goodwill with foreign countries, and trying to improve and stabilize people's lives.

It is interesting that at the National Diet opening ceremony the emperor does not mention anything particularly related to the Tokyo Olympics opened on the 10th of October and concluded on 27 October 1964, which are often referred to as Japan's

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<sup>496</sup> Watanabe, *The Prime Ministers of Postwar Japan, 1945-1995: Their Lives and Times*, 133.

return to the international community. However, he clearly refers to the broad spectrum of developments on both domestic and international front, taking place at the height of the Cold War. First, an American nuclear submarine wanted permission to enter a Japanese harbour for shore leave and restocking of supplies in August 1964, which caused uproar across the political spectrum when the government granted permission. Second, the People's Republic of China detonated their first nuclear weapon on October 16, 1964, during the Olympiad itself.<sup>497</sup> Despite the collective sense of shock and disappointment felt inside Japan, the emperor appreciates his citizens' efforts dealing with those issues.

In addition, the emperor's speech On January 21, 1965, was no different from the previous years. However, he opens the Diet on July 30, 1965, with a straightforward statement: "In order to improve the international position and to promote economic development and the stability of people's livelihoods, it is necessary for the Diet to work on deliberations on the various issues to be solved." One of the deliberations on the various issues that the emperor refers might probably be Okinawa. In 1965 Prime Minister Eisaku Sato made a prime ministerial visit to Okinawa after the war for the first time on 19<sup>th</sup> of August, 1965, after the speech of the emperor, when Sato remarked that as long as Okinawa was not returned to Japan, the war had not ended.<sup>498</sup>

The speeches delivered on October 11, 1965, and on January 27, 1966, were no different than the previous speeches as the emperor confirms that "the current situation is truly tremendous" in accordance with the others. The speeches on July 12, 1966, and on December 3, 1966, also show no difference or any critical different

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<sup>497</sup> Droubie, "Phoenix arisen: Japan as peaceful internationalist at the 1964 Tokyo Summer Olympics," 2311.

<sup>498</sup> Klien, *Rethinking Japan's Identity and International Role: An Intercultural Perspective*, 80.

discourse. On March 14, 1967, however, the emperor again addresses an issue or issues for the National Diet to solve.

However, I think that further efforts are required to cope with various situations both inside and outside and lead the country to prosperity and enhance the trust of the world. At this time, I hope the National Diet strives to deliberate on the issues facing us, as a top authority of national rights, to fulfil its mission without regret and to meet the trust of the people.

As put forward earlier, Sato raised the Okinawa issue to the U.S. Although it was agreed to give Japan a greater voice in Okinawan affairs, no specific commitment made in regard to returning Okinawa to Japan. Sato made a visit to the U.S. again in 1967 and an agreement was reached to finalize in two or three years the date for the return of Okinawa to Japan.<sup>499</sup>

Although there was no different discourse in the speech delivered on July 27, 1967 by the emperor, on December 5, 1967, the emperor states that “I am deeply pleased that Japan overcomes many difficulties, works for the stability of the people’s lives and the development of the economy, and is committed to the peace and prosperity of the world.” He adds, “However, various situations inside and outside the country are extremely extreme.” To recall back, the urban population growth and increased urban problems and the negotiations aimed at forming a consensus on a decision to repatriate Okinawa within the next two to three year were the topic hotly debated in the country at that time.<sup>500</sup>

The speeches on January 27, 1968, on August 3, 1968 on December 11, 1968 give the same message fundamentally on the pleasure of the emperor that although the current international situation is extremely extreme, Japan deepens friendship

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<sup>499</sup> Hane, *Peasants, Rebels, Women, and Outcastes: The Underside Of Modern Japan*.

<sup>500</sup> Iokibe, *Fifty Years of Japanese Diplomacy*; Hane, *Peasants, Rebels, Women, and Outcastes: The Underside of Modern Japan*.

goodwill and friendship with foreign countries and contributes to the achievement of world peace more deeply in the meantime. However, on January 27, 1969, he describes the internal and external situations as *fukuzatsu* 複雑 (complicated). Regarding the internal situation, one might consider that in 1968-69 at the peak of the anti-war protests, student radicals at more than half of all Japanese college campuses gathered and launch unprecedented strikes and boycotts in pursuit of protesting tuition. They also demanded curriculum reform as well as a greater role in university governance. Regarding the external issues, the start of 1969 could be introduced as a sign of the new climate in bilateral relations, which came with the textile issue. Prime Minister Sato discussed Japanese voluntary restraints on exports of textile products to the U.S. at a summit meeting with President Nixon. The U.S. pledged himself to implement restraints. However, the Japanese did not believe such a promise to have been made. Kitaoka further asserts that the Americans grew increasingly distrustful when Japan did not introduce such restraints after many months.<sup>501</sup> The “complicated external situations” that the emperor refers can well be attributed to this new climate.

On December 1, 1969, (62nd session of the National Diet) the emperor significantly states that “I am glad that the return of Okinawa, which is the aspiration of all the people, has recently come to fruition.” Clearly, he refers to the recent development. In November, Prime Minister Sato visited President Nixon and the two leaders agreed on 1972 as the date for Okinawa’s reversion to Japan.<sup>502</sup> Bix claims that sentiment inside Japan had built up around the issue of the return of Okinawa, a Japanese island held in trust by the U.S. since 1945.<sup>503</sup> He further concedes that Sato

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<sup>501</sup> Kitaoka, “Diplomacy and the Military in Showa Japan,” 169, in Gluck & Graubard, *Showa the Japan of Hirohito*.

<sup>502</sup> Hane, *Peasants, Rebels, Women, and Outcasts: The Underside Of Modern Japan*.

<sup>503</sup> Livingston&Moore et.al, *Postwar Japan 1945 to Present*, 273.

obtained the reversion promise “without nuclear arms and with a status basically similar to that of Japan proper.”<sup>504</sup> Subsequently, on November 25, 1970, the emperor welcomes the newly elected member from Okinawa first.

Again on January 22, 1971, the emperor describes the internal and external situations as “complicated.” In 1971 President Nixon’s move to make a visit to Beijing the following year naturally took Japan completely by surprise and put it into a state of shock. In addition, Nixon announced that new economic measures would be introduced such as a 10% tax rate on all imports or a temporary freeze on the Yen-dollar exchange rate. As these measures came out of the blue and represented a complete reversal in line, the shock was all the greater to Japan. The series of events is commonly referred to as the “Nixon shocks” and this might be what the emperor refers to.<sup>505</sup>

On October 18, 1971, the emperor constitutes his introduction by stating that *Genka no naigai no jōsei wa, kiwamete tatandearimasu* 現下の内外の情勢は、きわめて多端であります (The current situation inside and outside the country is extremely extreme). Perhaps the emperor refers to the Nixon shock as the U.S had not consulted Japan beforehand with regards to its change in line towards China. Klien argues that it was the worst scenario for Japanese diplomacy.<sup>506</sup> In addition, on August 15, the U.S. devalued the dollar and unilaterally imposed a ten percent surcharge on foreign imports into the United States, with Japanese goods a principal target.<sup>507</sup> Axelbank claims that the U.S sought “voluntary” restrictions on Japanese imports while enjoying greater freedom for its investment in Japan.<sup>508</sup> What

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<sup>504</sup> Livingston&Moore et.al, *Postwar Japan 1945 to Present*, 288.

<sup>505</sup> Klien, *Rethinking Japan's Identity and International Role: An Intercultural Perspective*, 81.

<sup>506</sup> Klien, *Rethinking Japan's Identity and International Role: An Intercultural Perspective*, 81.

<sup>507</sup> Axelbank, “Will Japan Rearm?”, 301, in Livingston&Moore et.al, *Postwar Japan 1945 to Present*.

<sup>508</sup> Axelbank, “Will Japan Rearm?”, 301, in Livingston&Moore et.al, *Postwar Japan 1945 to Present*.

complicated matters for the Japanese government more was the fact that under Sato, Kishi and Fukuda's diplomatic relations had been maintained with Taiwan and how to make both Taiwan and the U.S relations compatible was the dilemma for Japan.

<sup>509</sup> That said, another issue Japan faced was that Nixon urged Japan to step up Japan's military expenses so that it could fulfil a more active role in the field of security. As the emperor states the year 1971 was difficult for Japan, in almost all respects as Klien would also agree. <sup>510</sup>

On January 29, 1972, the emperor declares that "It is truly joyful that the reintegration of Okinawa, the desire of the people, has finally come near realization. I am thinking of the hardships of the Okinawa compatriots and welcoming them warmly", showing his integrative power significantly. In addition, "the current domestic and international situation is extremely fluid and there are many things," he said. Nevertheless, in 1972, when the U.S returned administrative rights over Okinawa to Japan, the U.S. military remained in Okinawa to defend the "free world."

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Although on July 6, 1972, the emperor does not specify any issue exclusively, on October 28, 1972, the emperor again defines the domestic and foreign situation as *hendō suru* 変動する (fluctuating). Iokibe argues that great shocks can be an impetus to inspired action. In September 1972, Prime Minister Tanaka visited China and succeeded in re-establishing Japan-China diplomatic ties ahead of the US. Having destroyed the spirit of bilateral coordination, the US had no reason to voice objections when Japan turned to an independent path of diplomacy and began

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<sup>509</sup> Klien, *Rethinking Japan's Identity and International Role: An Intercultural Perspective*, 81.

<sup>510</sup> Klien, *Rethinking Japan's Identity and International Role: An Intercultural Perspective*, 81.

<sup>511</sup> Inoue, *Okinawa and the U.S. Military: Identity Making in the Age of Globalization*, xiv.

pursuing the expansion of its own diplomatic horizons. The following year would see the Tanaka Cabinet also restore diplomatic ties with North Vietnam.<sup>512</sup>

When all the speeches between the years of 1952- 1973 are analysed against their historical context, it can be viewed that the emperor's speeches are all in line with the agenda of the country. He does not simply open the National Diet, but instead sets the agenda in a broad sense that the National Diet needs to tackle with. He reveals that he is aware of the improvements made in the country along with the efforts given by both the Nation and National Diet. However, he keeps urging his citizens when he is given the chance.

When it is necessary, as the Peace Treaty example would reveal that, the emperor calls for the National Diet and the citizens to collaborate on the things he acknowledges and approves. When it is a controversial issue, for instance; Security Treaty, he refrains from commenting. Keeping his silence, he implies that he acknowledges. When it is the case, he shows his integrative power as in Okinawa's return would reveal.

He comments on the disasters that affect the country. One would expect him to make a particular remark regarding the 1964 Olympics as they elevated Japan's international position. It is also surprising that his speech does not include the themes such as "international" and "cultural states" as almost all of his previous speeches showed some kind of "internationalism." However, the emperor's speech rather concentrates on the domestic and international problems of the country. It clearly shows that dealing with the nuclear developments of the People's Republic of China was more significant to refer in the eyes of the emperor.

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<sup>512</sup> Iokibe, *The Diplomatic History of Postwar Japan*, 21.

#### 5.4 Toward the end of the Cold War period: 1973-1989

The main narrative during this period was constituted by the 1973-74 oil crisis, a shift to high technology industries, advancing to the front rank as a global economic power by the end of the 1970s, and reassessing its goals and reorient its national purposes and position in light of new favourable conditions and ultimately the end of cold war period in 1989.

On January 1973, after welcoming the new members of the National Diet, the emperor directly states that “the fact that the National Diet continues to make constant efforts for the peace of the world and for the reflection of our country is deeply pleasing.” In a similar fashion, On January 21, 1974, the emperor declares that:

Diet is making continuous efforts to contribute to the improvement of national welfare and the realization of world peace. However, the current situation of domestic and foreign affairs is extremely extreme. In the meantime, in order to improve the stability of the people's lives and strengthen friendship relations with other countries, I think that it is necessary for all the people to cooperate and to make further efforts hereafter.

Looking back, this speech can well be understood with the developments in that year. Japanese companies scrambled in earnest to defend their export competitiveness from the impact of the strengthened yen but were hit doubly hard when the Oil Crisis arrived in October 1973. Not only did oil prices climb sharply, but the Arab oil-producing nations declared an embargo on supplies to unfriendly nations.<sup>513</sup>

On July 29, 1974 , and on December 14, 1974 there seems to be no different discourse as the discourse of the emperor on January 24, 1975: “The fact that the

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<sup>513</sup> Iokibe, *Fifty Years of Japanese Diplomacy*, 31.

National Diet continues to make constant efforts to contribute to the improvement of public welfare and realization of world peace is deeply pleasing.” However, he does not mention any difficulties that the country is facing.

Whereas there is no significant implication on September 12, 1975, the emperor opens the Diet on January 23, 1976 declaring as follow:

I think that it is necessary for Japan to make further efforts in order to work together to improve the progress of the United Nations and to improve the national welfare at this time inside, to deepen friendship and goodwill with other countries and contribute to the establishment of world peace outside while the current situation inside and outside the country is extremely tough.

In addition, on September 21, 1976, the emperor declares that there are various situations at home and abroad. That said, On December 27, 1976, the emperor again frames the foreign and domestic circumstances as “fluctuating”. Klien, however, views toward the end of 1976 as a period when things almost seemed to revert to the Cold War state of affairs: specifically, when Prime Minister Miki resigned and his successor Fukuda took up the office. Klien maintains that at the beginning of his administration Fukuda practised “omnidirectional peace diplomacy” which implied maintenance of Japan’s security pact with the United States and efforts to improve relations with China and the Soviet Union. Klien suggests that the concept of omnidirectional peace diplomacy also need to be seen against the background of Japan’s lack of natural resources. Klien further argues “Putting this idealistic principle into practice, however, proved more difficult, given the slow pace with which traditional attitudes changed, as illustrated by the reluctance of the Soviet Union to make any compromises during the fishery negotiations between the two countries. Against this background of a temporary freeze on Japanese-Soviet relations, Japan put emphasis on its relations with the U.S. and China, a pattern that

Klien resembled the earlier Cold War years.<sup>514</sup> Notwithstanding, closer cooperation in the Asian and Pacific region exhibited that the Cold War day was over. The emperor clearly frames it well by saying “fluctuating.”

On January 31, 1977, there appears to be a speech similar to the previous speech to a large extent as there is only approximately one month between the two, with one profound discourse: *Shogaikoku to no yuukoushinzen noijizoushin wo hakaru* 諸外国との友好親善の維持増進を図る (to work on the maintenance and promotion of friendly relations with foreign countries). In addition, the emperor opens the 81st session of the Diet on July 30, 1977 profoundly straightforward as he first welcomes the new members of the House of Councilors General Election and then directly closes stating “Here, I hope the National Diet, as the supreme body of the state power, will cope with the current situation and foreign affairs, fulfill its mission without hesitation, and respond to the trust of the people.” However, on September 29, 1977 he declares that “I think that it is extremely important to deal with various situations inside and outside the present day, to cooperate with the whole people, to improve the stability of the people's lives, and to work on the maintenance and promotion of friendly relations with other countries.” It appears that he repeats the same sentence and the same phrase *Sho gaikoku tome yūkō kankei no iji zōshin ni tsutomeru* 諸外国とめ友好関係の維持増進に努める (strive to maintain and promote friendly relations among foreign countries) with a different verb as *hakaru* 図る (to work, to attempt) is replaced with *tsutomeru* 努める (to strive, to endeavour).

When the political context of 1977 is considered, to be able to grasp the emperor’s 1977 discourse, it is fundamental to illustrate the Fukuda doctrine, which

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<sup>514</sup> Klien, *Rethinking Japan's Identity and International Role: An Intercultural Perspective*, 81.

is postwar Japan's codification of its foreign policy principles towards Southeast Asia, announced in August 1977, which constituted an essential step in regional cooperation and integration. The main points of the Fukuda doctrine exhibited by Klien as follows: First, Japan should not only maintain relations with the Asian countries at a political and economic level. It is also expected to interact in the cultural and social level. Second, Japan would not turn into a great military power. Third, Japan would make active efforts at increasing solidarity and cooperation with the member states of ASEAN and would also try to contribute to more integration and understanding within ASEAN itself.<sup>515</sup> This might be the first step in Japan's diplomacy beyond its customary focus on economic matters and why the situations are both inside and outside are fluctuating. However, the actual point is that here emperor's discourse seems to be in accordance with the Fukuda Doctrine as he clearly states the importance of maintaining international relations (friendship).

Although the emperor uses *sekai no heiwa* 世界の平和 (world peace) wording most of the time, on the 84th session of the National Diet (on January 21, 1978), however, he particularly refers to *jinrui no heiwa to hanei ni kōken suru* 人類の平和と繁栄に貢献する (contributing to humanity peace and prosperity). Here, he wished Japan to contribute to the prosperity of the whole world. One might recall back Fukuda's statement on September 20, 1978, as he declares that:

As the interdependent relations in the international community are rapidly deepening today, and, further, as our country's national power is increasing, our diplomacy has entered a new era in which it can no longer be content with simply reacting passively to developments in the world and adjusting to them... The time has come that our country should play a bigger positive role for world peace, for world prosperity.<sup>516</sup>

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<sup>515</sup> Klien, *Rethinking Japan's Identity and International Role: An Intercultural Perspective*, 84.

<sup>516</sup> Edstrom, *Japan's Evolving Foreign Policy Doctrine: From Yoshida to Miyazawa*, 93.

It can be clearly detected that Fukuda's speech is in line with the emperor's speech until this time and with the above wording as he also states, "world peace and prosperity." However, there is one specific detail needs to be mentioned. The emperor instead of prefers using *Jinrui* 人類 (human) instead of using "world", which was not his routine. He clearly approves Japan's new foreign policy strategies and supports the idea, situating himself in the position of welcoming all the human race and wishing for their prosperity. On September 18, 1978, the emperor speaks very clearly and identify the same tasks as he declares: "I think that it is extremely important to cope with various situations at home and abroad, to improve the stability of the people's lives and to promote friendly relations with other countries." Although Japan-China Peace and Friendship Treaty signed on 12nd of August 1978, the emperor does not seem to have specified anything. In addition, the speech delivered by the emperor on the 86th session of the National Diet which held on December 6, 1978, repeats the same message as the previous one and even shorter than that.

On January 25, 1979, the emperor again declares that;

I hope the Diet, as the highest authority of the state, copes with the current situation inside and outside the country, fulfils its mission without hesitation in order to improve the stability of the people's life and maintain and promote friendship with foreign countries and responds to the trust of the people.

Again, on September 2, 1979, after welcoming the new members of the House of Representatives general elections, the emperor merely states that: "Here, I hope National Diet, as the highest institution of national rights, copes with various problems both inside and outside the immediate future, fulfils its mission without

hesitation and meets the trust of the people.” As it can be viewed clearly, the emperor does not specify anything related to external goals, world peace, etc.

The emperor speaks at the same length and gives the same message to a large extent on November 14, 1979, and November 27, 1979, respectively. On the 91st session of the National Diet, on January 25, 1980 the emperor declares that;

The fact that the National Diet continues to make constant efforts for the peace of the world and for the prosperity of our country for many years is deeply pleasing. In order to cope with the strict current domestic and foreign circumstances, to improve the stability of the people's lives, to maintain and promote friendship goodwill with foreign countries, it is important for all the people to cooperate further and make further efforts.

It was the period that the state of Cold War tension heightened. In 1979 the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan drew a sharp outcry from the US and other nations of the West. Despite the fact that by that time Japan had effectively restored Japan’s identity as a member of the Western camp, Japanese diplomacy through the 1970s had been oriented toward achieving autonomy from the US and expanding Japan’s diplomatic horizons. There, Japanese Prime Minister, Ohira joined the U.S. President, Jimmy Carter in declaring a boycott against the Moscow Olympics and implementing economic sanctions against the Soviet Union. Thus, the above mentioned circumstances could be what the emperor regarded as *kibishii* 厳しい (strict).

On July 22 1980, the emperor welcomes new members of the House of Representatives general elections and members of the House of Representatives ordinary elections. He then adds that “It is deeply pleasing that the Diet has been making continuous efforts for the peace of the world and the prosperity of our country for many years.” He emphasizes the peace for the world and prosperity for Japan, but not necessarily prosperity for the world. On October 3, 1980, he makes a

similar comment as he states; “It is deeply pleasing that the Diet has been making continuous efforts to contribute to the improvement of people’s lives and the realization of world peace for a long time and to improve our international status”.

While on January 26, 1981, he merely states; “It is deeply pleasing that the National Diet has been making continuous efforts to improve national life and maintain and strengthen friendship with foreign countries for many years.” His main message is focused on national life and friendship with foreign countries.

On September 25, 1981, however, he declares that “I think it is extremely important to cope with the current internal and external circumstances and work to improve the stability of people's lives and achieve world peace.”

While the emperor repeats his speeches until the 113th session of the National Diet Opening Ceremony, it is noticeable that he does not make any allusion to Prime Minister’s Yasukuni Shrine worship on August, 15, 1985. Kenneth B.Pyle explains that from the time Nakasone took office in 1982, he wanted to set out to restore national pride and self-confidence, adopting an active role in international politics. In order to restore pride in Japan’s modern history, Nakasone elaborated on the importance of the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo, the Shinto shrine established in the prewar era to honor Japan’s modern war dead. While Japanese could not agree whether it was acceptable for prime ministers and cabinet members to worship formally at Yasukuni Shrine due to the possibility that it may seem to honor Japan’s imperialist past and infringe on the postwar constitution’s separation of religion and the state, for Nakasone it was symbolically significant as it offered a way of putting aside WWII as national shame and embarrassment. For Nakasone, it was rather a time to achieve a consensus on this issue in order for the Japanese state and the Japanese people walk proudly in the world. Thus, he became the first prime minister to offer

prayers at the Yasukuni Shrine, with fifteen cabinet members and 172 LDP Diet members. One needs to highlight that he also made a contribution from the official funds. It is not hard to guess that his worship both at home and in China and Korea led to immense controversy and noisy protests and even evoked the suspicion that he intended to revive prewar nationalism.<sup>517</sup>

On July 19, 1988, the emperor apologizes for not attending the opening ceremony of the National Diet as the emperor's health condition got worse. In September 1987, the emperor underwent surgery to treat a swollen pancreas and in September 1988, he collapsed with internal bleeding. On January 7, 1989 the emperor died, symbolizing the Showa era.

Overall, it can be seen that the emperor once again constitutes his speeches according to the circumstances of his country. He approves and supports the idea of Japan being active in the international arena, following different foreign policy strategies, and raising its status with the help of economic developments. He reveals when he sees the circumstances 'intense', 'hard', or 'fluctuating'. He appreciates the steps taken, as though he is watching over and evaluating the accomplishments, although he was not active in the last years as he was sick.

## 5.5 Conclusion

This chapter provided a qualitative analysis of the emperor's speeches at the Opening ceremony of the National Diet in Japan. In light of the quantitative analysis results, it offered us a micro level of understanding. The analysis contextualised the findings of Chapter 4, enabled us to have a thicker description, employing the discourse-historical approach to CDS.

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<sup>517</sup> Pyle, *The Making of Modern Japan*, 275.

In a clear-well put structure composed of 3 main parts, the emperor seems to express his pleasure to take part in the opening ceremony and to be with all the people representing the whole nation. This introduction part of his speeches also witnesses the emperor welcoming new cabinet members after the elections. With his body paragraph of his speech, the emperor presents the agenda of the country, sets out the targets regarding the country's situation in a broad sense and with his conclusion, the emperor directs his speeches to the entities; Kokkai (National Diet / Parliament) and citizens, calling them to act in a cooperation and accomplish the missions of Japan.

The main goal in this stage was situating the themes derived from stage one in their historical context. In addition, this stage examined the discourse bearing particular importance in history. To do so, this study examined the years from 1947 to 1989, separating into three subsections as Post-war Recovery (1947-52), Resurgent Japan (1952-1973) and Toward the end of the Cold War Period (1973-1989) respectively. Thus, it attempted to make it easier for the reader to follow and see a pattern in the periods.

Based on the quantitative and qualitative analysis of the speeches in the three above-mentioned periods, one might clearly see that emperor delivers his speech in accordance with the developments and conditions of the country. He does not seem to be indifferent to the updates of the country diplomatically, economically, and politically. The themes delivered from the quantitative analysis would not give us the luxury to see in-depth results. When tracked, it can easily be said that the emperor appears to draw a person who realizes the developments and conditions of Japan. While driving his human side forward, he does not necessarily become someone who can simply be defined as a figurehead. If that was the case, he would not feel the need to urge his citizens during the occupation period to better the conditions of the

country, calling for cooperation and fasten the war recovery with ensuring Japan's stability. He clearly urges his people to acknowledge the Constitution, encourages his citizens for the collaboration with the Allied Powers, and better the economy and international status regaining the trust of the entire world. In addition, he prepares his people in the Peace Treaty process and asks them to cooperate, warning them for the impending problems at the same time, playing the role of protector "father."

Yet, this does not seem the figure of the occupation period only. The same can be observed both in the resurgent period and toward the end of the Cold War too. Japan experienced large protests in the ratification process of the Security Treaty between Japan and the U.S. During these controversial times, not making a direct allusion to the Treaty, the emperor confirms that the country is dealing with "important issues in internal affairs diplomacy" and then calling for cooperation. When Japan creates diplomatic bonds with another country, the emperor voices his happiness that Japan is deepening its relations with the friend countries. One could easily consider that the emperor supports the step taken, and illustrates he observes, confirms and approves.

Along with these, the emperor shares his sadness regarding the disasters faced by Japan. While he does not elaborate on the Olympics, however, he expresses his happiness for the membership of the United Nations along with the return of the Okinawa. In fact, it seems that he contemplates the steps taken towards the Okinawa issue particularly. It can be concluded here that some issues are earthly affairs for the emperor, while some are like Okinawa and international status and legitimation of the National Diet, which takes its place in every single speech.

To conclude, in accordance with the analyses in Chapter 4, the emperor routinely establishes links between the international and the national in terms of

national response to international status change as well as makes links between “economy”, “public welfare” and “maintenance of the friendship with the foreign countries” by implying that the sustainability of one is essentially predicated on the other being stable. He feels the need to state that the National Diet is the owner of the state power. However, themes that were not frequently eminent in the quantitative analysis show that the qualitative analysis enabled us to have a clear picture and let us also consider the unsaid things by the emperor along the way.

## CHAPTER 6

### CONCLUSION

#### 6.1 Introduction

The introduction chapter, Chapter 1, of the thesis offered a debate on the role of the emperor showing the need of further studies, a theoretical framework, research questions and a methodology adopted for the thesis. Chapter 2 provided an overview of research into the post-war emperor system between the years of 1947 to 1989 in order to set a historical background, in which the status of the emperor was transformed from 1947 to 1989. Chapter 3 constituted the Imperial Household Agency. It introduced the imperial institution with its history and organizational function. It was significant to understand the character and change of the institution, who prepared the speeches of the emperor. Chapter 4 offered the quantitative analysis of speeches carried out with the use of the text-mining software KH Coder that identified the salient themes that the emperor comments on and around. Following this, Chapter 5 demonstrated the results of a qualitative analysis throughout the emperor's speeches based on the analyses in Chapter 4 in order to delve into the emperor's major themes, employing the discourse-historical approach to CDS. The study showed the links between the historical context and the themes detected in the previous chapter, enabling us to have a clear picture and to also consider the unsaid things by the emperor in a micro level. Finally, Chapter 6, hereafter, will offer a conclusion to this thesis summarizing its findings and discussing the thesis' broader contributions to the existing literature, and offering suggestions for future research and improvements along with the limitations experienced.

## 6.2 Contribution to the literature

To begin, after the Humanity Declaration on January 1, 1946, Japanese legally interpreted the emperor's role as a symbol. Both in theory and in practice, the status of the emperor has experienced a change from the process of enacting the Constitution of 1947 to the death of the emperor. By analysing the core institution, around which politics and society revolved and over which the emperor reigned and kept its transcendental feature, from the pre-war political process to the present times, our understanding toward the emperor has also evolved. In this respect, the findings of David Titus allowed us to consider the two fundamental imperial roles: Emperor-in Court and Emperor-in-State. In pursuant to manage Emperor-in Court as Emperor-in-Public, the palace bureaucrats played the role of gatekeeping of the Imperial Will as their first duty of the palace bureaucracy, dealing with the palace bureaucracy functionally in two components; an outer side and an inner side. While the outer side contained the bureaucratic machinery in order to maintain the transcendental dignity of the emperor in society, the inner side managed the Emperor-in-Court as Emperor-in-Chambers, the emperor as a person who expressed his own will and ideas to those close to the throne.

In addition to the mechanism behind the emperor, the organizational structure and function of the palace demonstrated that the palace bureaucracy did not particularly change either after 1889 or after 1947. It is hard not to agree the argument that internal structures and functions of the palace even today still bears a strong resemblance to the pre-war palace. All analysed information with regards to the imperial institution so far clearly suggested that the imperial institution is a strong and prestigious bureaucratic organization. Unlike the British monarch, as

Titus suggests, “personality” had very little to do with the functioning of the emperor,<sup>518</sup> and this can still be regarded the same. From this standpoint, analysing the imperial institution would help understand the role of the emperor in Japan as analysing the emperor would help understand the role of the imperial institution, particularly when the fact that the speeches of the emperor is drafted by the Imperial Household Agency taken into account.

Thus, in an attempt to answer the questions, set out in Chapter 1, with stage one of the research methodology, in Chapter 4, three analysis; COA (Cooccurrence Analysis), HCA( Hierarchical Cluster Analysis), and Collocation Analysis were conducted. All of them were fruitful in providing themes. Based on the results of the Cooccurrence Analysis themes such as; ‘Nation and National Diet’, ‘Cooperation’, ‘Our Country (Japan) and Internationalism’, ‘Effort’, ‘World Peace’, ‘Trust’, ‘Economy’, ‘Friendship’, ‘Development’, ‘Public Welfare’ and ‘Stability’ detected. The results of the Hierarchical Cluster Analysis were in the same direction with the COA, sharing the same themes but also highlighting the “Election”, ‘Democracy’, ‘Constitution’, ‘Mission of the institution’, referring to the National Diet, ‘Problems inside and outside’, which were also shared with the COA. The Collocation analysis further provided with 24 themes such as the ‘whole nation’, ‘opening ceremony’, ‘highest institution’, ‘foreign countries’, ‘stability improvement’ ‘domestic and international problems’ and so forth.

As mentioned earlier, these identified themes, which were consistent with each other, contributed us in terms of delineating the significant topics on which the emperor comments on or around. It clearly partly answered the question on which

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<sup>518</sup> Titus, *Palace and Politics in Prewar Japan*, 11.

themes the emperor comments on. These analysed themes, however, did not suggest the whole picture. Therefore, a detailed micro-analysis of the text that addresses the arguments wholly based on the historical context, were carried out.

Having carried out the text-mining analysis, employing the Discourse-Historical Approach to the speeches from 1947 to 1989, separating into three subsections as Post-war Recovery (1947-52), Resurgent Japan (1952-1973) and Toward the Cold War Period (1973-1989) respectively, a thicker description has been offered to the readers. In a clear put together structure composed of 3 main parts, the findings demonstrated that the emperor expresses his pleasure to take part in the opening ceremony and to be with all the people representing the whole nation. The introduction part of his speeches also witnesses the emperor welcoming new cabinet members after the elections. With his body paragraph of his speech, the emperor presents the agenda of the country, sets out the targets regarding the country's situation in a broad sense and with his conclusion, the emperor directs his speeches to the entities; Kokkai (National Diet / Parliament) and citizens, calling them to act in a cooperation and accomplish the missions of Japan.

Based on both the quantitative and qualitative analysis of the speeches in the three above-mentioned periods, it is apparent that emperor delivers his speech in accordance with the developments and conditions of the country. It would be fair to say that Japan in post-war period could well be tracked by the speeches of the emperor. He does not seem to be indifferent to the updates of the country. When tracked, it can easily be said that the emperor appears to draw a person who realizes the developments and conditions of Japan. While driving his human side forward, he does not necessarily become someone who can simply be defined as a figurehead. If that was the case, he would not feel the need to urge his citizens during the

occupation period to better the conditions of the country, calling for cooperation and fasten the war recovery with ensuring Japan's stability. He clearly urges his people to acknowledge the Constitution, encourages his citizens for the collaboration with the Allied Powers, and better the economy and international status regaining the trust of the entire world. In addition, he prepares his people in the Peace Treaty process and asks them to cooperate, warning them for the impending problems at the same time, playing the role of protector "father", just as the *kokutai* ideology would suggest; the emperor is the father of the Japanese nation.

This figure seems to be the same both in the resurgent period and toward the end of the Cold War too. As mentioned earlier, Japan experienced large protests in the ratification process of the Security Treaty between Japan and the U.S. During these controversial times, not making a direct allusion to the treaty, the emperor confirms that the country is dealing with "important issues in internal affairs" and then calling for cooperation. When Japan creates diplomatic bonds with another country, the emperor voices his happiness that Japan is deepening its relations with friend countries. One could easily consider that the emperor supports the step taken, and illustrates he observes, confirms and approves.

Furthermore, the emperor routinely establishes links between the international and the national in terms of national response to international status change as well as makes links between "economy", "public welfare" and "maintenance of the friendship with the foreign countries" by implying that the sustainability of one is essentially predicated on the other being stable. He feels the need to state that the National Diet is the owner of the state power.

Along with these, the emperor shares his sadness regarding the disasters faced by Japan. While he does not elaborate on the Olympics, however, it has been seen

that he expresses his happiness for the membership of the United Nations along with the return of the Okinawa. In fact, it seems that he contemplates the steps taken towards the Okinawa issue particularly. It can be concluded here that some issues are earthly affairs for the emperor such as Olympics, while some are like Okinawa and international status and legitimation of the National Diet, which takes its place in every single speech.

When the integrative theory of power suggested by Boulding is considered, the imperial institution, the emperor as an institution, or the persona of the emperor can be regarded as possessing it seeing as it is “the capacity to build organizations, to create families and groups, to inspire loyalty, to bind people together, to develop legitimacy.”<sup>519</sup> According to Boulding, it embodies cooperation and reciprocity, friendship and collective identity, the growth of a sense of community, the ability to create and pursue constructive images of the future together, and the belief that one’s own welfare is increased through an increase in the welfare of others. Drawing on his background in systems theory, economics, and peace research, Boulding concludes, the functional social and political systems can only be constructed on the normative basis of these integrative power relations, which was ensured by the imperial institution and the emperor in Japan.

To conclude, from 1947 to 1989 the emperor positions himself, or the persona of the emperor is positioned, in the way that he is not a simple figure head. He serves to the collective memory of Japan possessing an integrative power and thus contributes to the stabilization of the country.

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<sup>519</sup> Boulding, *Three Faces of Power*, 25.

### 6.3 Limitations and suggestions for further research

The sensitivity of the issue has been one of the drawbacks experienced along the way. However, the lack of in-depth interviews with the Imperial Household Agency or the diplomats of Japan was the limitations of this study as the thesis mostly relied on the secondary resources particularly in Chapter 3. Analysing the role of the emperor from 1989 to 2019 could further be a tremendous contribution to the literature.

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## APPENDIX A

## LIST OF THE EMPEROR'S SPEECHES

All texts were collected from the 国会会議録検索システム website  
<http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/sangiin/main.html>

<b>National Diet Opening Ceremony Sessions (with Numbers)</b>	<b>Date in Japanese</b>	<b>Dates in English</b>
第 1 回	昭和 22 年 6 月 23 日	June 23, 1947
第 2 回	昭和 23 年 1 月 21 日	January 21, 1948
第 3 回	昭和 23 年 11 月 8 日	November 8, 1948
第 4 回	昭和 23 年 12 月 2 日	December 2, 1948
第 5 回	昭和 24 年 3 月 19 日	March 19, 1949
第 6 回	昭和 24 年 11 月 1 日	November 1, 1949
第 7 回	昭和 24 年 12 月 15 日	December 15, 1949
第 8 回	昭和 25 年 7 月 13 日	July 13, 1950
第 9 回	昭和 25 年 11 月 22 日	November 22, 1950

<b>National Diet Opening Ceremony Sessions (with Numbers)</b>	<b>Date in Japanese</b>	<b>Dates in English</b>
第 10 回	昭和 26 年 1 月 25 日	January 25, 1951
第 11 回	昭和 26 年 8 月 16 日	August 16, 1951
第 12 回	昭和 26 年 10 月 11 日	October 11, 1951
第 13 回	昭和 27 年 1 月 22 日	January 22, 1952
第 14 回	-	-
第 15 回	昭和 27 年 11 月 8 日	November 8, 1952
第 16 回	昭和 28 年 6 月 16 日	June 16, 1953
第 17 回	昭和 28 年 10 月 29 日	October 19, 1953
第 18 回	昭和 28 年 11 月 30 日	November 30, 1953
第 19 回	昭和 29 年 1 月 25 日	January 25, 1954
第 20 回	昭和 29 年 11 月 30 日	November 30, 1954

<b>National Diet Opening Ceremony Sessions (with Numbers)</b>	<b>Date in Japanese</b>	<b>Dates in English</b>
第 2 1 回国会	昭和 30 年 1 月 21 日	January 21, 1955
第 22 回	昭和 30 年 4 月 25 日	April 25, 1955
第 23 回	昭和 30 年 12 月 2 日	December 2, 1955
第 24 回	昭和 31 年 1 月 25 日	January 25, 1956
第 25 回	昭和 31 年 11 月 15 日	November 15, 1956
第 26 回	昭和 32 年 1 月 30 日	January 30, 1957
第 27 回	昭和 32 年 11 月 1 日	November 1, 1957
第 28 回	昭和 33 年 1 月 25 日	January 25, 1958
第 29 回	昭和 33 年 6 月 17 日	June 17, 1958
第 30 回	昭和 33 年 9 月 30 日	September 30, 1958
第 31 回	昭和 34 年 1 月 26 日	January 26, 1959

<b>National Diet Opening Ceremony Sessions (with Numbers)</b>	<b>Date in Japanese</b>	<b>Dates in English</b>
第 32 回	昭和 34 年 6 月 25 日	June 25, 1959
第 33 回	昭和 34 年 10 月 27 日	October 27, 1959
第 34 回	昭和 35 年 1 月 30 日	January 30, 1960
第 35 回	昭和 35 年 7 月 18 日	July 18, 1960
第 36 回	昭和 35 年 10 月 18 日	October 18, 1960
第 37 回	昭和 35 年 12 月 10 日	December 10, 1960
第 38 回	昭和 36 年 1 月 28 日	January 28, 1961
第 39 回	昭和 36 年 9 月 27 日	September 27, 1961
第 40 回	昭和 37 年 1 月 17 日	January 17, 1962
第 41 回	昭和 37 年 8 月 8 日	August 8, 1962
第 42 回	昭和 37 年 12 月 10 日	December 10, 1962
第 43 回	昭和 38 年 1 月 23 日	January 23, 1963

<b>National Diet Opening Ceremony Sessions (with Numbers)</b>	<b>Date in Japanese</b>	<b>Dates in English</b>
第 44 回	昭和 38 年 10 月 17 日	October 17, 1963
第 45 回	昭和 38 年 12 月 10 日	December 10, 1963
第 46 回	昭和 39 年 1 月 20 日	January 20, 1964
第 47 回	昭和 39 年 11 月 20 日	November 20, 1964
第 48 回	昭和 40 年 1 月 21 日	January 21, 1965
第 49 回	昭和 40 年 7 月 30 日	July 30, 1965
第 50 回	昭和 40 年 10 月 11 日	October 11, 1965
第 51 回	昭和 41 年 1 月 27 日	January 27, 1966
第 52 回	昭和 41 年 7 月 12 日	July 12, 1966
第 53 回	昭和 41 年 12 月 3 日	December 3, 1966
第 54 回	-	-
第 55 回	昭和 42 年 3 月 14 日	March 14, 1967

<b>National Diet Opening Ceremony Sessions (with Numbers)</b>	<b>Date in Japanese</b>	<b>Dates in English</b>
第 56 回	昭和 42 年 7 月 27 日	July 27, 1967
第 57 回	昭和 42 年 12 月 5 日	December 5, 1967
第 58 回	昭和 43 年 1 月 27 日	January 27, 1968
第 59 回	昭和 43 年 8 月 3 日	August 3, 1968
第 60 回	昭和 43 年 12 月 11 日	December 11, 1968
第 61 回	昭和 44 年 1 月 27 日	January 27, 1969
第 62 回	昭和 44 年 12 月 1 日	December 1, 1969
第 63 回	-	-
第 64 回	昭和 45 年 11 月 25 日	November 25, 1970
第 65 回	昭和 46 年 1 月 22 日	January 22, 1971
第 66 回	昭和 46 年 7 月 17 日	July 17, 1971
第 67 回	昭和 46 年 10 月 18 日	October 18, 1971

<b>National Diet Opening Ceremony Sessions (with Numbers)</b>	<b>Date in Japanese</b>	<b>Dates in English</b>
第 68 回	昭和 47 年 1 月 29 日	January 29, 1972
第 69 回	昭和 47 年 7 月 6 日	July 6, 1972
第 70 回	昭和 47 年 10 月 28 日	October 28, 1972
第 71 回	昭和 48 年 1 月 27 日	January 27, 1973
第 72 回	昭和 49 年 1 月 21 日	January 21, 1974
第 73 回	昭和 49 年 7 月 29 日	July 29, 1974
第 74 回	昭和 49 年 12 月 14 日	December 14, 1974
第 75 回	昭和 50 年 1 月 24 日	January 24, 1975
第 76 回	昭和 50 年 9 月 12 日	September 12, 1975
第 77 回	昭和 51 年 1 月 23 日	January 23, 1976
第 78 回	昭和 51 年 9 月 21 日	September 21, 1976
第 79 回	昭和 51 年 12 月 27 日	December 27, 1976

<b>National Diet Opening Ceremony Sessions (with Numbers)</b>	<b>Date in Japanese</b>	<b>Dates in English</b>
第 80 回	昭和 52 年 1 月 31 日	January 31, 1977
第 81 回	昭和 52 年 7 月 30 日	July 30, 1977
第 82 回	昭和 52 年 9 月 29 日	September 29, 1977
第 83 回	-	-
第 84 回	昭和 53 年 1 月 21 日	January 21, 1978
第 85 回	昭和 53 年 9 月 18 日	September 18, 1978
第 86 回	昭和 53 年 12 月 6 日	December 6, 1978
第 87 回	昭和 54 年 1 月 25 日	January 25, 1979
第 88 回	昭和 54 年 9 月 3 日	September 3, 1979
第 89 回	昭和 54 年 11 月 14 日	November 14, 1979
第 90 回	昭和 54 年 11 月 27 日	November 27, 1979
第 91 回	昭和 55 年 1 月 25 日	January 25, 1980

<b>National Diet Opening Ceremony Sessions (with Numbers)</b>	<b>Date in Japanese</b>	<b>Dates in English</b>
第 92 回	昭和 55 年 7 月 22 日	July 22, 1980
第 93 回	昭和 55 年 10 月 3 日	October 3, 1980
第 94 回	昭和 56 年 1 月 26 日	January 26, 1981
第 95 回	昭和 56 年 9 月 25 日	September 25, 1981
第 96 回	昭和 57 年 1 月 25 日	January 25, 1982
第 97 回	昭和 57 年 12 月 3 日	December 3, 1982
第 98 回	昭和 58 年 1 月 24 日	January 24, 1983
第 99 回	昭和 58 年 7 月 19 日	July 19, 1983
第 100 回	昭和 58 年 9 月 9 日	September 9, 1983
第 101 回	昭和 59 年 2 月 6 日	February 6, 1984
第 102 回	昭和 60 年 1 月 25 日	January 25, 1985
第 103 回	-	-

<b>National Diet Opening Ceremony Sessions (with Numbers)</b>	<b>Date in Japanese</b>	<b>Dates in English</b>
第 104 回	昭和 61 年 1 月 27 日	January 27, 1986
第 105 回	-	
第 106 回	昭和 61 年 7 月 24 日	July 24, 1986
第 107 回	昭和 61 年 9 月 11 日	September 11, 1986
第 108 回	昭和 62 年 1 月 26 日	January 26, 1987
第 109 回	昭和 62 年 7 月 6 日	July 6, 1987
第 110 回	昭和 62 年 11 月 6 日	November 6, 1987
第 111 回	昭和 62 年 11 月 27 日	November 27, 1987
第 112 回	昭和 63 年 1 月 25 日	January 25, 1988
第 113 回	昭和 63 年 7 月 19 日	July 19, 1988

Source: Author, 2019

## APPENDIX B

### THE CONSTITUTION OF THE EMPIRE OF JAPAN (1889)

#### Imperial Oath Sworn in the Sanctuary in the Imperial Palace (Tsuge-bumi)

We, the Successor to the prosperous Throne of Our Predecessors, do humbly and solemnly swear to the Imperial Founder of Our House and to Our other Imperial Ancestors that, in pursuance of a great policy co-extensive with the Heavens and with the Earth, We shall maintain and secure from decline the ancient form of government.

In consideration of the progressive tendency of the course of human affairs and in parallel with the advance of civilization, We deem it expedient, in order to give clearness and distinctness to the instructions bequeathed by the Imperial Founder of Our House and by Our other Imperial Ancestors, to establish fundamental laws formulated into express provisions of law, so that, on the one hand, Our Imperial posterity may possess an express guide for the course they are to follow, and that, on the other, Our subjects shall thereby be enabled to enjoy a wider range of action in giving Us their support, and that the observance of Our laws shall continue to the remotest ages of time. We will thereby to give greater firmness to the stability of Our country and to promote the welfare of all the people within the boundaries of Our dominions; and We now establish the Imperial House Law and the Constitution. These Laws come to only an exposition of grand precepts for the conduct of the government, bequeathed by the Imperial Founder of Our House and by Our other Imperial Ancestors. That we have been so fortunate in Our reign, in keeping with the tendency of the times, as to accomplish this work, We owe to the glorious Spirits of the Imperial Founder of Our House and of Our other Imperial Ancestors.

We now reverently make Our prayer to Them and to Our Illustrious Father, and implore the help of Their Sacred Spirits, and make to Them solemn oath never at this time nor in the future to fail to be an example to our subjects in the observance of the Laws hereby established.

May the heavenly Spirits witness this Our solemn Oath.

#### Imperial Rescript on the Promulgation of the Constitution

Whereas We make it the joy and glory of Our heart to behold the prosperity of Our country, and the welfare of Our subjects, We do hereby, in virtue of the Supreme power We inherit from Our Imperial Ancestors, promulgate the present immutable fundamental law, for the sake of Our present subjects and their descendants.

The Imperial Founder of Our House and Our other Imperial ancestors, by the help and support of the forefathers of Our subjects, laid the foundation of Our Empire upon a basis, which is to last forever. That this brilliant achievement embellishes the annals of Our country, is due to the glorious virtues of Our Sacred Imperial ancestors, and to the loyalty and bravery of Our subjects, their love of their country

and their public spirit. Considering that Our subjects are the descendants of the loyal and good subjects of Our Imperial Ancestors, We doubt not but that Our subjects will be guided by Our views, and will sympathize with all Our endeavors, and that, harmoniously cooperating together, they will share with Us Our hope of making manifest the glory of Our country, both at home and abroad, and of securing forever the stability of the work bequeathed to Us by Our Imperial Ancestors.

Preamble [or Edict] (Joyu)

Having, by virtue of the glories of Our Ancestors, ascended the throne of a lineal succession unbroken for ages eternal; desiring to promote the welfare of, and to give development to the moral and intellectual faculties of Our beloved subjects, the very same that have been favored with the benevolent care and affectionate vigilance of Our Ancestors; and hoping to maintain the prosperity of the State, in concert with Our people and with their support, We hereby promulgate, in pursuance of Our Imperial Rescript of the 12th day of the 10th month of the 14th year of Meiji, a fundamental law of the State, to exhibit the principles, by which We are guided in Our conduct, and to point out to what Our descendants and Our subjects and their descendants are forever to conform.

The right of sovereignty of the State, We have inherited from Our Ancestors, and We shall bequeath them to Our descendants. Neither We nor they shall in the future fail to wield them, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution hereby granted.

We now declare to respect and protect the security of the rights and of the property of Our people, and to secure to them the complete enjoyment of the same, within the extent of the provisions of the present Constitution and of the law.

The Imperial Diet shall first be convoked for the 23rd year of Meiji and the time of its opening shall be the date, when the present Constitution comes into force.

When in the future it may become necessary to amend any of the provisions of the present Constitution, We or Our successors shall assume the initiative right, and submit a project for the same to the Imperial Diet. The Imperial Diet shall pass its vote upon it, according to the conditions imposed by the present Constitution, and in no otherwise shall Our descendants or Our subjects be permitted to attempt any alteration thereof.

Our Ministers of State, on Our behalf, shall be held responsible for the carrying out of the present Constitution, and Our present and future subjects shall forever assume the duty of allegiance to the present Constitution.

## Chapter I.

### The Emperor

Article 1. The Empire of Japan shall be reigned over and governed by a line of Emperors unbroken for ages eternal.

Article 2. The Imperial Throne shall be succeeded to by Imperial male descendants, according to the provisions of the Imperial House Law.

Article 3. The Emperor is sacred and inviolable.

Article 4. The Emperor is the head of the Empire, combining in Himself the rights of sovereignty, and exercises them, according to the provisions of the present Constitution.

Article 5. The Emperor exercises the legislative power with the consent of the Imperial Diet.

Article 6. The Emperor gives sanction to laws, and orders them to be promulgated and executed.

Article 7. The Emperor convokes the Imperial Diet, opens, closes, and prorogues it, and dissolves the House of Representatives.

Article 8. The Emperor, in consequence of an urgent necessity to maintain public safety or to avert public calamities, issues, when the Imperial Diet is not sitting, Imperial ordinances in the place of law.

(2) Such Imperial Ordinances are to be laid before the Imperial Diet at its next session, and when the Diet does not approve the said Ordinances, the Government shall declare them to be invalid for the future.

Article 9. The Emperor issues or causes to be issued, the Ordinances necessary for the carrying out of the laws, or for the maintenance of the public peace and order, and for the promotion of the welfare of the subjects. But no Ordinance shall in any way alter any of the existing laws.

Article 10. The Emperor determines the organization of the different branches of the administration, and salaries of all civil and military officers, and appoints and dismisses the same. Exceptions especially provided for in the present Constitution or in other laws, shall be in accordance with the respective provisions (bearing thereon).

Article 11. The Emperor has the supreme command of the Army and Navy.

Article 12. The Emperor determines the organization and peace standing of the Army and Navy.

Article 13. The Emperor declares war, makes peace, and concludes treaties.

Article 14. The Emperor declares a state of siege.

(2) The conditions and effects of a state of siege shall be determined by law.

Article 15. The Emperor confers titles of nobility, rank, orders and other marks of honor.

Article 16. The Emperor orders amnesty, pardon, commutation of punishments and rehabilitation.

Article 17. A Regency shall be instituted in conformity with the provisions of the Imperial House Law.

(2) The Regent shall exercise the powers appertaining to the Emperor in His name.

## Chapter II.

### Rights and Duties of Subjects

Article 18. The conditions necessary for being a Japanese subject shall be determined by law.

Article 19. Japanese subjects may, according to qualifications determined in laws or ordinances, be appointed to civil or military or any other public offices equally.

Article 20. Japanese subjects are amenable to service in the Army or Navy, according to the provisions of law.

Article 21. Japanese subjects are amenable to the duty of paying taxes, according to the provisions of law.

Article 22. Japanese subjects shall have the liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits of the law.

Article 23. No Japanese subject shall be arrested, detained, tried or punished, unless according to law.

Article 24. No Japanese subject shall be deprived of his right of being tried by the judges determined by law.

Article 25. Except in the cases provided for in the law, the house of no Japanese subject shall be entered or searched without his consent.

Article 26. Except in the cases mentioned in the law, the secrecy of the letters of every Japanese subject shall remain inviolate.

Article 27. The right of property of every Japanese subject shall remain inviolate.

(2) Measures necessary to be taken for the public benefit shall be any provided for by law.

Article 28. Japanese subjects shall, within limits not prejudicial to peace and order, and not antagonistic to their duties as subjects, enjoy freedom of religious belief.

Article 29. Japanese subjects shall, within the limits of law, enjoy the liberty of speech, writing, publication, public meetings and associations.

Article 30. Japanese subjects may present petitions, by observing the proper forms of respect, and by complying with the rules specially provided for the same.

Article 31. The provisions contained in the present Chapter shall not affect the exercises of the powers appertaining to the Emperor, in times of war or in cases of a national emergency.

Article 32. Each and every one of the provisions contained in the preceding Articles of the present Chapter, that are not in conflict with the laws or the rules and discipline of the Army and Navy, shall apply to the officers and men of the Army and of the Navy.

### Chapter III.

#### The Imperial Diet

Article 33. The Imperial Diet shall consist of two Houses, a House of Peers and a House of Representatives.

Article 34. The House of Peers shall, in accordance with the ordinance concerning the House of Peers, be composed of the members of the Imperial Family, of the orders of nobility, and of those who have been nominated thereto by the Emperor.

Article 35. The House of Representatives shall be composed of members elected by the people, according to the provisions of the law of Election.

Article 36. No one can at one and the same time be a Member of both Houses.

Article 37. Every law requires the consent of the Imperial Diet.

Article 38. Both Houses shall vote upon projects of law submitted to it by the Government, and may respectively initiate projects of law.

Article 39. A Bill, which has been rejected by either the one or the other of the two Houses, shall not be brought in again during the same session.

Article 40. Both Houses can make representations to the Government, as to laws or upon any other subject. When, however, such representations are not accepted, they cannot be made a second time during the same session.

Article 41. The Imperial Diet shall be convoked every year.

Article 42. A session of the Imperial Diet shall last during three months. In case of necessity, the duration of a session may be prolonged by the Imperial Order.

Article 43. When urgent necessity arises, an extraordinary session may be convoked in addition to the ordinary one.

(2) The duration of an extraordinary session shall be determined by Imperial Order.

Article 44. The opening, closing, prolongation of session and prorogation of the Imperial Diet, shall be affected simultaneously for both Houses.

(2) In case the House of Representatives has been ordered to dissolve, the House of Peers shall at the same time be prorogued.

Article 45. When the House of Representatives has been ordered to dissolve, Members shall be caused by Imperial Order to be newly elected, and the new House shall be convoked within five months from the day of dissolution.

Article 46. No debate can be opened and no vote can be taken in either House of the Imperial Diet, unless not less than one-third of the whole number of Members thereof is present.

Article 47. Votes shall be taken in both Houses by absolute majority. In the case of a tie vote, the President shall have the casting vote.

Article 48. The deliberations of both Houses shall be held in public. The deliberations may, however, upon demand of the Government or by resolution of the House, be held in secret sitting.

Article 49. Both Houses of the Imperial Diet may respectively present addresses to the Emperor.

Article 50. Both Houses may receive petitions presented by subjects.

Article 51. Both Houses may enact, besides what is provided for in the present Constitution and in the Law of the Houses, rules necessary for the management of their internal affairs.

Article 52. No Member of either House shall be held responsible outside the respective Houses, for any opinion uttered or for any vote given in the House. When, however, a Member himself has given publicity to his opinions by public speech, by documents in print or in writing, or by any other similar means, he shall, in the matter, be amenable to the general law.

Article 53. The Members of both Houses shall, during the session, be free from arrest, unless with the consent of the House, except in cases of flagrant delicts, or of offenses connected with a state of internal commotion or with a foreign trouble.

Article 54. The Ministers of State and the Delegates of the Government may, at any time, take seats and speak in either House.

## Chapter IV.

### The Ministers of State and the Privy Council

Article 55. The respective Ministers of State shall give their advice to the Emperor, and be responsible for it.

(2) All Laws, Imperial Ordinances, and Imperial Rescripts of whatever kind, that relate to the affairs of the state, require the countersignature of a Minister of State.

Article 56. The Privy Councillors shall, in accordance with the provisions for the organization of the Privy Council, deliberate upon important matters of State when they have been consulted by the Emperor.

## Chapter V.

### The Judicature

Article 57. The Judicature shall be exercised by the Courts of Law according to law, in the name of the Emperor.

(2) The organization of the Courts of Law shall be determined by law.

Article 58. The judges shall be appointed from among those, who possess proper qualifications according to law.

(2) No judge shall be deprived of his position, unless by way of criminal sentence or disciplinary punishment.

(3) Rules for disciplinary punishment shall be determined by law.

Article 59. Trials and judgments of a Court shall be conducted publicly. When, however, there exists any fear, that such publicity may be prejudicial to peace and order, or to the maintenance of public morality, the public trial may be suspended by provisions of law or by the decision of the Court of Law.

Article 60. All matters that fall within the competency of a special Court, shall be specially provided for by law.

Article 61. No suit at law, which relates to rights alleged to have been infringed by the illegal measures of the administrative authorities, and which shall come within the competency of the Court of Administrative Litigation specially established by law, shall be taken cognizance of by Court of Law.

## Chapter VI.

### Finance

Article 62. The imposition of a new tax or the modification of the rates (of an existing one) shall be determined by law.

(2) However, all such administrative fees or other revenue having the nature of

compensation shall not fall within the category of the above clause.

(3) The raising of national loans and the contracting of other liabilities to the charge of the National Treasury, except those that are provided in the Budget, shall require the consent of the Imperial Diet.

Article 63. The taxes levied at present shall, in so far as they are not remodelled by a new law, be collected according to the old system.

Article 64. The expenditure and revenue of the State require the consent of the Imperial Diet by means of an annual Budget.

(2) Any and all expenditures overpassing the appropriations set forth in the Titles and Paragraphs of the Budget, or that are not provided for in the Budget, shall subsequently require the approbation of the Imperial Diet.

Article 65. The Budget shall be first laid before the House of Representatives.

Article 66. The expenditures of the Imperial House shall be defrayed every year out of the National Treasury, according to the present fixed amount for the same, and shall not require the consent thereto of the Imperial Diet, except in case an increase thereof is found necessary.

Article 67. Those already fixed expenditures based by the Constitution upon the powers appertaining to the Emperor, and such expenditures as may have arisen by the effect of law, or that appertain to the legal obligations of the Government, shall be neither rejected nor reduced by the Imperial Diet, without the concurrence of the Government.

Article 68. In order to meet special requirements, the Government may ask the consent of the Imperial Diet to a certain amount as a Continuing Expenditure Fund, for a previously fixed number of years.

Article 69. In order to supply deficiencies, which are unavoidable, in the Budget, and to meet requirements unprovided for in the same, a Reserve Fund shall be provided in the Budget.

Article 70. When the Imperial Diet cannot be convoked, owing to the external or internal condition of the country, in case of urgent need for the maintenance of public safety, the Government may take all necessary financial measures, by means of an Imperial Ordinance.

(2) In the case mentioned in the preceding clause, the matter shall be submitted to the Imperial Diet at its next session, and its approbation shall be obtained thereto.

Article 71. When the Imperial Diet has not voted on the Budget, or when the Budget has not been brought into actual existence, the Government shall carry out the Budget of the preceding year.

Article 72. The final account of the expenditures and revenues of the State shall be verified and confirmed by the Board of Audit, and it shall be submitted by the Government to the Imperial Diet, together with the report of verification of the said board.

(2) The organization and competency of the Board of Audit shall of determined by law separately.

## Chapter VII.

### Supplementary Rules

Article 73. When it has become necessary in future to amend the provisions of the present Constitution, a project to the effect shall be submitted to the Imperial Diet by Imperial Order.

(2) In the above case, neither House can open the debate, unless not less than two-thirds of the whole number of Members are present, and no amendment can be passed, unless a majority of not less than two-thirds of the Members present is obtained.

Article 74. No modification of the Imperial House Law shall be required to be submitted to the deliberation of the Imperial Diet.

(2) No provision of the present Constitution can be modified by the Imperial House Law.

Article 75. No modification can be introduced into the Constitution, or into the Imperial House Law, during the time of a Regency.

Article 76. Existing legal enactments, such as laws, regulations, Ordinances, or by whatever names they may be called, shall, so far as they do not conflict with the present Constitution, continue in force.

(2) All existing contracts or orders, that entail obligations upon the Government, and that are connected with expenditure, shall come within the scope of Article 67.

Source:

<https://history.hanover.edu/texts/1889con.html>

## APPENDIX C

### THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN

Promulgated on November 3, 1946

Came into effect on May 3, 1947

We, the Japanese people, acting through our duly elected representatives in the National Diet, determined that we shall secure for ourselves and our posterity the fruits of peaceful cooperation with all nations and the blessings of liberty throughout this land, and resolved that never again shall we be visited with the horrors of war through the action of government, do proclaim that sovereign power resides with the people and do firmly establish this Constitution. Government is a sacred trust of the people, the authority for which is derived from the people, the powers of which are exercised by the representatives of the people, and the benefits of which are enjoyed by the people. This is a universal principle of mankind upon which this Constitution is founded. We reject and revoke all constitutions, laws, ordinances, and rescripts in conflict herewith.

We, the Japanese people, desire peace for all time and are deeply conscious of the high ideals controlling human relationship, and we have determined to preserve our security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world. We desire to occupy an honored place in an international society striving for the preservation of peace, and the banishment of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance for all time from the earth. We recognize that all peoples of the world have the right to live in peace, free from fear and want.

We believe that no nation is responsible to itself alone, but that laws of political morality are universal; and that obedience to such laws is incumbent upon all nations who would sustain their own sovereignty and justify their sovereign relationship with other nations.

We, the Japanese people, pledge our national honor to accomplish these high ideals and purposes with all our resources.

#### Chapter I

##### The Emperor

Article 1. The Emperor shall be the symbol of the State and of the unity of the People, deriving his position from the will of the people with whom resides sovereign power.

Article 2. The Imperial Throne shall be dynastic and succeeded to in accordance with the Imperial House Law passed by the Diet.

Article 3. The advice and approval of the Cabinet shall be required for all acts of the Emperor in matters of state, and the Cabinet shall be responsible therefor.

Article 4. The Emperor shall perform only such acts in matters of state as are provided for in this Constitution and he shall not have powers related to government. The Emperor may delegate the performance of his acts in matters of state as may be provided by law.

Article 5. When, in accordance with the Imperial House Law, a Regency is established, the Regent shall perform his acts in matters of state in the Emperor's name. In this case, paragraph one of the preceding article will be applicable.

Article 6. The Emperor shall appoint the Prime Minister as designated by the Diet. The Emperor shall appoint the Chief Judge of the Supreme Court as designated by the Cabinet.

Article 7. The Emperor, with the advice and approval of the Cabinet, shall perform the following acts in matters of state on behalf of the people:

Promulgation of amendments of the constitution, laws, cabinet orders and treaties.

Convocation of the Diet.

Dissolution of the House of Representatives.

Proclamation of general election of members of the Diet.

Attestation of the appointment and dismissal of Ministers of State and other officials as provided for by law, and of full powers and credentials of Ambassadors and Ministers.

Attestation of general and special amnesty, commutation of punishment, reprieve, and restoration of rights.

Awarding of honors.

Attestation of instruments of ratification and other diplomatic documents as provided for by law.

Receiving foreign ambassadors and ministers.

Performance of ceremonial functions.

Article 8. No property can be given to, or received by, the Imperial House, nor can any gifts be made therefrom, without the authorization of the Diet.

## Chapter II

### Renunciation of War

Article 9. Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of

the state will not be recognized.

### Chapter III

#### Rights and Duties of the People

Article 10. The conditions necessary for being a Japanese national shall be determined by law.

Article 11. The people shall not be prevented from enjoying any of the fundamental human rights. These fundamental human rights guaranteed to the people by this Constitution shall be conferred upon the people of this and future generations as eternal and inviolate rights.

Article 12. The freedoms and rights guaranteed to the people by this Constitution shall be maintained by the constant endeavor of the people, who shall refrain from any abuse of these freedoms and rights and shall always be responsible for utilizing them for the public welfare.

Article 13. All of the people shall be respected as individuals. Their right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness shall, to the extent that it does not interfere with the public welfare, be the supreme consideration in legislation and in other governmental affairs.

Article 14. All of the people are equal under the law and there shall be no discrimination in political, economic or social relations because of race, creed, sex, social status or family origin.  
Peers and peerage shall not be recognized.  
No privilege shall accompany any award of honor, decoration or any distinction, nor shall any such award be valid beyond the lifetime of the individual who now holds or hereafter may receive it.

Article 15. The people have the inalienable right to choose their public officials and to dismiss them.  
All public officials are servants of the whole community and not of any group thereof.  
Universal adult suffrage is guaranteed with regard to the election of public officials. In all elections, secrecy of the ballot shall not be violated. A voter shall not be answerable, publicly or privately, for the choice he has made.

Article 16. Every person shall have the right of peaceful petition for the redress of damage, for the removal of public officials, for the enactment, repeal or amendment of laws, ordinances or regulations and for other matters; nor shall any person be in any way discriminated against for sponsoring such a petition.

Article 17. Every person may sue for redress as provided by law from the State or a public entity, in case he has suffered damage through illegal act of any public official.

Article 18. No person shall be held in bondage of any kind. Involuntary servitude, except as punishment for crime, is prohibited.

Article 19. Freedom of thought and conscience shall not be violated.

Article 20. Freedom of religion is guaranteed to all. No religious organization shall receive any privileges from the State, nor exercise any political authority.

No person shall be compelled to take part in any religious act, celebration, rite or practice.

The State and its organs shall refrain from religious education or any other religious activity.

Article 21. Freedom of assembly and association as well as speech, press and all other forms of expression are guaranteed.

No censorship shall be maintained, nor shall the secrecy of any means of communication be violated.

Article 22. Every person shall have freedom to choose and change his residence and to choose his occupation to the extent that it does not interfere with the public welfare.

Freedom of all persons to move to a foreign country and to divest themselves of their nationality shall be inviolate.

Article 23. Academic freedom is guaranteed.

Article 24. Marriage shall be based only on the mutual consent of both sexes and it shall be maintained through mutual cooperation with the equal rights of husband and wife as a basis.

With regard to choice of spouse, property rights, inheritance, choice of domicile, divorce and other matters pertaining to marriage and the family, laws shall be enacted from the standpoint of individual dignity and the essential equality of the sexes.

Article 25. All people shall have the right to maintain the minimum standards of wholesome and cultured living.

In all spheres of life, the State shall use its endeavors for the promotion and extension of social welfare and security, and of public health.

Article 26. All people shall have the right to receive an equal education correspondent to their ability, as provided by law.

All people shall be obligated to have all boys and girls under their protection receive ordinary education as provided for by law. Such compulsory education shall be free.

Article 27. All people shall have the right and the obligation to work. Standards for wages, hours, rest and other working conditions shall be fixed by law. Children shall not be exploited.

Article 28. The right of workers to organize and to bargain and act collectively is guaranteed.

Article 29. The right to own or to hold property is inviolable. Property rights shall be defined by law, in conformity with the public welfare. Private property may be taken for public use upon just compensation therefor.

Article 30. The people shall be liable to taxation as provided by law.

Article 31. No person shall be deprived of life or liberty, nor shall any other criminal penalty be imposed, except according to procedure established by law.

Article 32. No person shall be denied the right of access to the courts.

Article 33. No person shall be apprehended except upon warrant issued by a competent judicial officer which specifies the offense with which the person is charged, unless he is apprehended, the offense being committed.

Article 34. No person shall be arrested or detained without being at once informed of the charges against him or without the immediate privilege of counsel; nor shall he be detained without adequate cause; and upon demand of any person such cause must be immediately shown in open court in his presence and the presence of his counsel.

Article 35. The right of all persons to be secure in their homes, papers and effects against entries, searches and seizures shall not be impaired except upon warrant issued for adequate cause and particularly describing the place to be searched and things to be seized, or except as provided by Article 33. Each search or seizure shall be made upon separate warrant issued by a competent judicial officer.

Article 36. The infliction of torture by any public officer and cruel punishments are absolutely forbidden.

Article 37. In all criminal cases the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial tribunal. He shall be permitted full opportunity to examine all witnesses, and he shall have the right of compulsory process for obtaining witnesses on his behalf at public expense. At all times the accused shall have the assistance of competent counsel who shall, if the accused is unable to secure the same by his own efforts, be assigned to his use by the State.

Article 38. No person shall be compelled to testify against himself. Confession made under compulsion, torture or threat, or after prolonged arrest or

detention shall not be admitted in evidence.

No person shall be convicted or punished in cases where the only proof against him is his own confession.

Article 39. No person shall be held criminally liable for an act which was lawful at the time it was committed, or of which he has been acquitted, nor shall he be placed in double jeopardy.

Article 40. Any person, in case he is acquitted after he has been arrested or detained, may sue the State for redress as provided by law.

## Chapter IV

### The Diet

Article 41. The Diet shall be the highest organ of state power, and shall be the sole law-making organ of the State.

Article 42. The Diet shall consist of two Houses, namely the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors.

Article 43. Both Houses shall consist of elected members, representative of all the people.

The number of the members of each House shall be fixed by law.

Article 44. The qualifications of members of both Houses and their electors shall be fixed by law. However, there shall be no discrimination because of race, creed, sex, social status, family origin, education, property or income.

Article 45. The term of office of members of the House of Representatives shall be four years. However, the term shall be terminated before the full term is up in case the House of Representatives is dissolved.

Article 46. The term of office of members of the House of Councillors shall be six years, and election for half the members shall take place every three years.

Article 47. Electoral districts, method of voting and other matters pertaining to the method of election of members of both Houses shall be fixed by law.

Article 48. No person shall be permitted to be a member of both Houses simultaneously.

Article 49. Members of both Houses shall receive appropriate annual payment from the national treasury in accordance with law.

Article 50. Except in cases provided by law, members of both Houses shall be exempt from apprehension while the Diet is in session, and any members

apprehended before the opening of the session shall be freed during the term of the session upon demand of the House.

Article 51. Members of both Houses shall not be held liable outside the House for speeches, debates or votes cast inside the House.

Article 52. An ordinary session of the Diet shall be convoked once per year.

Article 53. The Cabinet may determine to convoke extraordinary sessions of the Diet. When a quarter or more of the total members of either House makes the demand, the Cabinet must determine on such convocation.

Article 54. When the House of Representatives is dissolved, there must be a general election of members of the House of Representatives within forty (40) days from the date of dissolution, and the Diet must be convoked within thirty (30) days from the date of the election.

When the House of Representatives is dissolved, the House of Councillors is closed at the same time. However, the Cabinet may in time of national emergency convoke the House of Councillors in emergency session.

Measures taken at such session as mentioned in the proviso of the preceding paragraph shall be provisional and shall become null and void unless agreed to by the House of Representatives within a period of ten (10) days after the opening of the next session of the Diet.

Article 55. Each House shall judge disputes related to qualifications of its members. However, in order to deny a seat to any member, it is necessary to pass a resolution by a majority of two-thirds or more of the members present.

Article 56. Business cannot be transacted in either House unless one-third or more of total membership is present.

All matters shall be decided, in each House, by a majority of those present, except as elsewhere provided in the Constitution, and in case of a tie, the presiding officer shall decide the issue.

Article 57. Deliberation in each House shall be public. However, a secret meeting may be held where a majority of two-thirds or more of those members present passes a resolution therefor.

Each House shall keep a record of proceedings. This record shall be published and given general circulation, excepting such parts of proceedings of secret session as may be deemed to require secrecy.

Upon demand of one-fifth or more of the members present, votes of the members on any matter shall be recorded in the minutes.

Article 58. Each House shall select its own president and other officials.

Each House shall establish its rules pertaining to meetings, proceedings and internal discipline, and may punish members for disorderly conduct. However, in order to expel a member, a majority of two-thirds or more of those members present must pass a resolution thereon.

Article 59. A bill becomes a law on passage by both Houses, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution.

A bill which is passed by the House of Representatives, and upon which the House of Councillors makes a decision different from that of the House of Representatives, becomes a law when passed a second time by the House of Representatives by a majority of two-thirds or more of the members present.

The provision of the preceding paragraph does not preclude the House of Representatives from calling for the meeting of a joint committee of both Houses, provided for by law.

Failure by the House of Councillors to take final action within sixty (60) days after receipt of a bill passed by the House of Representatives, time in recess excepted, may be determined by the House of Representatives to constitute a rejection of the said bill by the House of Councillors.

Article 60. The budget must first be submitted to the House of Representatives.

Upon consideration of the budget, when the House of Councillors makes a decision different from that of the House of Representatives, and when no agreement can be reached even through a joint committee of both Houses, provided for by law, or in the case of failure by the House of Councillors to take final action within thirty (30) days, the period of recess excluded, after the receipt of the budget passed by the House of Representatives, the decision of the House of Representatives shall be the decision of the Diet.

Article 61. The second paragraph of the preceding article applies also to the Diet approval required for the conclusion of treaties.

Article 62. Each House may conduct investigations in relation to government, and may demand the presence and testimony of witnesses, and the production of records.

Article 63. The Prime Minister and other Ministers of State may, at any time, appear in either House for the purpose of speaking on bills, regardless of whether they are members of the House or not. They must appear when their presence is required in order to give answers or explanations.

Article 64. The Diet shall set up an impeachment court from among the members of both Houses for the purpose of trying those judges against whom removal proceedings have been instituted.

Matters relating to impeachment shall be provided by law.

## Chapter V

### The Cabinet

Article 65. Executive power shall be vested in the Cabinet.

Article 66. The Cabinet shall consist of the Prime Minister, who shall be its head, and other Ministers of State, as provided for by law.

The Prime Minister and other Ministers of State must be civilians.  
The Cabinet, in the exercise of executive power, shall be collectively responsible to the Diet.

Article 67. The Prime Minister shall be designated from among the members of the Diet by a resolution of the Diet. This designation shall precede all other business. If the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors disagree and if no agreement can be reached even through a joint committee of both Houses, provided for by law, or the House of Councillors fails to make designation within ten (10) days, exclusive of the period of recess, after the House of Representatives has made designation, the decision of the House of Representatives shall be the decision of the Diet.

Article 68. The Prime Minister shall appoint the Ministers of State. However, a majority of their number must be chosen from among the members of the Diet. The Prime Minister may remove the Ministers of State as he chooses.

Article 69. If the House of Representatives passes a non-confidence resolution, or rejects a confidence resolution, the Cabinet shall resign en masse, unless the House of Representatives is dissolved within ten (10) days.

Article 70. When there is a vacancy in the post of Prime Minister, or upon the first convocation of the Diet after a general election of members of the House of Representatives, the Cabinet shall resign en masse.

Article 71. In the cases mentioned in the two preceding articles, the Cabinet shall continue its functions until the time when a new Prime Minister is appointed.

Article 72. The Prime Minister, representing the Cabinet, submits bills, reports on general national affairs and foreign relations to the Diet and exercises control and supervision over various administrative branches.

Article 73. The Cabinet, in addition to other general administrative functions, shall perform the following functions:

Administer the law faithfully; conduct affairs of state.

Manage foreign affairs.

Conclude treaties. However, it shall obtain prior or, depending on circumstances, subsequent approval of the Diet.

Administer the civil service, in accordance with standards established by law.

Prepare the budget, and present it to the Diet.

Enact cabinet orders in order to execute the provisions of this Constitution and of the law. However, it cannot include penal provisions in such cabinet orders unless authorized by such law.

Decide on general amnesty, special amnesty, commutation of punishment, reprieve, and restoration of rights.

Article 74. All laws and cabinet orders shall be signed by the competent Minister of State and countersigned by the Prime Minister.

Article 75. The Ministers of State, during their tenure of office, shall not be subject to legal action without the consent of the Prime Minister. However, the right to take that action is not impaired hereby.

## Chapter VI

### Judiciary

Article 76. The whole judicial power is vested in a Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as are established by law.

No extraordinary tribunal shall be established, nor shall any organ or agency of the Executive be given final judicial power.

All judges shall be independent in the exercise of their conscience and shall be bound only by this Constitution and the laws.

Article 77. The Supreme Court is vested with the rule-making power under which it determines the rules of procedure and of practice, and of matters relating to attorneys, the internal discipline of the courts and the administration of judicial affairs.

Public procurators shall be subject to the rule-making power of the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court may delegate the power to make rules for inferior courts to such courts.

Article 78. Judges shall not be removed except by public impeachment unless judicially declared mentally or physically incompetent to perform official duties. No disciplinary action against judges shall be administered by any executive organ or agency.

Article 79. The Supreme Court shall consist of a Chief Judge and such number of judges as may be determined by law; all such judges excepting the Chief Judge shall be appointed by the Cabinet.

The appointment of the judges of the Supreme Court shall be reviewed by the people at the first general election of members of the House of Representatives following their appointment, and shall be reviewed again at the first general election of members of the House of Representatives after a lapse of ten (10) years, and in the same manner thereafter.

In cases mentioned in the foregoing paragraph, when the majority of the voters favors the dismissal of a judge, he shall be dismissed.

Matters pertaining to review shall be prescribed by law.

The judges of the Supreme Court shall be retired upon the attainment of the age as fixed by law.

All such judges shall receive, at regular stated intervals, adequate compensation which shall not be decreased during their terms of office.

Article 80. The judges of the inferior courts shall be appointed by the Cabinet from a list of persons nominated by the Supreme Court. All such judges shall hold office for a term of ten (10) years with privilege of reappointment, provided that they shall be

retired upon the attainment of the age as fixed by law.

The judges of the inferior courts shall receive, at regular stated intervals, adequate compensation which shall not be decreased during their terms of office.

Article 81. The Supreme Court is the court of last resort with power to determine the constitutionality of any law, order, regulation or official act.

Article 82. Trials shall be conducted and judgment declared publicly.

Where a court unanimously determines publicity to be dangerous to public order or morals, a trial may be conducted privately, but trials of political offenses, offenses involving the press or cases wherein the rights of people as guaranteed in Chapter III of this Constitution are in question shall always be conducted publicly.

## Chapter VII

### Finance

Article 83. The power to administer national finances shall be exercised as the Diet shall determine.

Article 84. No new taxes shall be imposed or existing ones modified except by law or under such conditions as law may prescribe.

Article 85. No money shall be expended, nor shall the State obligate itself, except as authorized by the Diet.

Article 86. The Cabinet shall prepare and submit to the Diet for its consideration and decision a budget for each fiscal year.

Article 87. In order to provide for unforeseen deficiencies in the budget, a reserve fund may be authorized by the Diet to be expended upon the responsibility of the Cabinet.

The Cabinet must get subsequent approval of the Diet for all payments from the reserve fund.

Article 88. All property of the Imperial Household shall belong to the State. All expenses of the Imperial Household shall be appropriated by the Diet in the budget.

Article 89. No public money or other property shall be expended or appropriated for the use, benefit or maintenance of any religious institution or association, or for any charitable, educational or benevolent enterprises not under the control of public authority.

Article 90. Final accounts of the expenditures and revenues of the State shall be audited annually by a Board of Audit and submitted by the Cabinet to the Diet, together with the statement of audit, during the fiscal year immediately following the

period covered.

The organization and competency of the Board of Audit shall be determined by law.

Article 91. At regular intervals and at least annually the Cabinet shall report to the Diet and the people on the state of national finances.

## Chapter VIII

### Local Self-Government

Article 92. Regulations concerning organization and operations of local public entities shall be fixed by law in accordance with the principle of local autonomy.

Article 93. The local public entities shall establish assemblies as their deliberative organs, in accordance with law.

The chief executive officers of all local public entities, the members of their assemblies, and such other local officials as may be determined by law shall be elected by direct popular vote within their several communities.

Article 94. Local public entities shall have the right to manage their property, affairs and administration and to enact their own regulations within law.

Article 95. A special law, applicable only to one local public entity, cannot be enacted by the Diet without the consent of the majority of the voters of the local public entity concerned, obtained in accordance with law.

## Chapter IX

### Amendments

Article 96. Amendments to this Constitution shall be initiated by the Diet, through a concurring vote of two-thirds or more of all the members of each House and shall thereupon be submitted to the people for ratification, which shall require the affirmative vote of a majority of all votes cast thereon, at a special referendum or at such election as the Diet shall specify.

Amendments when so ratified shall immediately be promulgated by the Emperor in the name of the people, as an integral part of this Constitution.

## Chapter X

### Supreme Law

Article 97. The fundamental human rights by this Constitution guaranteed to the people of Japan are fruits of the age-old struggle of man to be free; they have

survived the many exacting tests for durability and are conferred upon this and future generations in trust, to be held for all time inviolate.

Article 98. This Constitution shall be the supreme law of the nation and no law, ordinance, imperial rescript or other act of government, or part thereof, contrary to the provisions hereof, shall have legal force or validity.

The treaties concluded by Japan and established laws of nations shall be faithfully observed.

Article 99. The Emperor or the Regent as well as Ministers of State, members of the Diet, judges, and all other public officials have the obligation to respect and uphold this Constitution.

## Chapter XI

### Supplementary Provisions

Article 100. This Constitution shall be enforced as from the day when the period of six months will have elapsed counting from the day of its promulgation.

The enactment of laws necessary for the enforcement of this Constitution, the election of members of the House of Councillors and the procedure for the convocation of the Diet and other preparatory procedures necessary for the enforcement of this Constitution may be executed before the day prescribed in the preceding paragraph.

Article 101. If the House of Councillors is not constituted before the effective date of this Constitution, the House of Representatives shall function as the Diet until such time as the House of Councillors shall be constituted.

Article 102. The term of office for half the members of the House of Councillors serving in the first term under this Constitution shall be three years. Members falling under this category shall be determined in accordance with law.

Article 103. The Ministers of State, members of the House of Representatives and judges in office on the effective date of this Constitution, and all other public officials who occupy positions corresponding to such positions as are recognized by this Constitution shall not forfeit their positions automatically on account of the enforcement of this Constitution unless otherwise specified by law. When, however, successors are elected or appointed under the provisions of this Constitution, they shall forfeit their positions as a matter of course.

Source:

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