THE IMPACTS OF IMPROVING EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT

ON THE EMPOWERMENT OF WOMEN

BURCU BAŞKURT

BOĞAZİÇİ UNIVERSITY

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THE IMPACTS OF IMPROVING EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT ON THE EMPOWERMENT OF WOMEN

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Burcu Başkurt

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DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

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ABSTRACT

The Impacts of Improving Educational Attainment

on the Empowerment of Women

We studied effects of 1997 Compulsory Schooling Reform in Turkey, which increased compulsory schooling from 5 years to 8 years on the empowerment of women. Individuals born before 1987 were not exposed to the reform, and the ones born in and after 1987 were affected. This cutoff created an environment suitable to use Regression Discontinuity (RD) Design to investigate causal effects of new law on the empowerment of women. We used data from TDHS and HLFS. We observed a significant increase in schooling of women in addition to the men in the households. Then, we found that educational difference and age difference between partners decreased resulting from the reform. Additionally, there were improvements in women's labor force participation, employment status, and wages. Women agreeing on the statement "Men are wiser." decreased, and there was an increase in ideal marriage age. Women get more help for setting dinner table, while less help for kitchen shopping. They have more money to spend, own less asset because of the reform. However, we observe an increase in agreement on some beating justifications especially about motherhood and wife duties, which can be a sign of strong social norms rooted in the patriarchal society. Overall, we observe significant improvements in education of women, which results in better employment status and wages. However, these improvements do not reflect themselves on the empowerment of women much. Strong traditional norms may be an obstacle in this way.

ÖZET

Eğitime Katılımı Geliştirmenin Kadınları Güçlendirme Üzerindeki Etkileri

1997 yılında Türkiye'de uygulanan ve zorunlu eğitimi 5 yıldan 8 yıla çıkaran Zorunlu Eğitim Reformu'nun kadınların güçlendirilmesi üzerindeki etkilerini inceledik. 1987 yılından önce doğanlar bu reformdan etkilenmezken 1987 yılında ve sonrasında doğanlar etkilendiler. Bu kesim yılı, reformun kadınları güçlendirme üzerindeki nedensel etkilerini anlamak amacıyla Regression Discontinuity (RD) Tasarımı'nı kullanmamız için uygun bir ortam yarattı. TNSA ve Hanehalkı İşgücü Anketi sonuçlarını veri seti olarak kullandık. Hem kadınların hem de erkek hanehalkı üyelerinin eğitimlerinde artış gözlemledik. Reform ile, partnerler arasındaki eğitim ve yaş farkında düşüş gördük. Ayrıca, reformun sonucunda kadınların iş gücüne katılımında, istihdam durumlarında ve maaşlarında gelişme olduğunu gördük. Erkeklerin daha bilge olduğuna inanan kadınların azaldığını ve kadınlar için ideal evlilik yaşının arttığını gösterdik. Kadınların reform sonrası yemek masası hazırlamada daha çok, mutfak alışverişi için daha az yardım aldıklarını gözlemledik. Yeni zorunlu eğitim yasası sonucunda, kadınların harcayacak daha çok paraları olduğunu ve varlıklarının azaldığını kanıtladık. Ancak, özellikle annelik ve eş olmalarıyla alakalı bazı konularda, fiziksel şiddeti haklı görmelerinde artış olduğunu gözlemledik, ki bunun sebebi toplumda köklenmiş sosyal normlar olabilir. Sonuç olarak, kadınların eğitimlerindeki gelişmeler, kadınların iş hayatlarına da yansıdılar. Ancak, bu gelişmelerin yansımalarına kadınları güçlendirmeye dair değişkenlerde rastlayamadık. Bunun sebebi, bu yoldaki güçlü sosyal norm engelleri olabilir.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Gender inequality is one of the most crucial obstacles to the development. Some disparities start even right at the birth and they branch out into health, education and labor market as the women age up. As a result, these women do not [1]have adequate opportunities to improve their skills, do have very limited choices in the labor market, and are lack of freedom of choice. Since the women construct approximately half of the world population[1] and more than half of Turkey's population,[2] then we are deprived of half of our potential.

That's why, gender empowerment is very important at the global level and "Achieving gender equality and empowering all women and girls" is an aim in "Sustainable Development Goals" declared in September 2015 by the United Nations (UN). Some indices explaining status of countries in terms of development are calculated and reported by United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) periodically. Currently, Turkey's Gender Inequality Index rank is 71 among 188 countries.[3] In calculation of this index, health condition, labor market participation and empowerment indicators of women are used, thus considering our rank, our situation is mediocre in terms of gender inequality, and there is room for development.

[1] Source: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL.FE.ZS/ as of 17.01.2017.
[2] Source: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL.FE.ZS?locations=TR as of 17.01.2017
[3] Source: http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/2016_human_development_report.pdf as of 27.10.2017.

As Table 1 shows, we see important discrepancies between men and women in terms of labor force participation, education, share in GNP, and political participation in Turkey.

Table 1. Summary Statistics of Turkey by Gender

Estimated gross national income per capita, female (2011 PPP$)	10,649
Estimated gross national income per capita, male (2011 PPP$)	27,034
Labour force participation rate, female (% ages 15 and older)	30.4
Labour force participation rate, male (% ages 15 and older)	71.4
Mean years of schooling, female (years)	7
Mean years of schooling, male (years)	8.8
Share of seats in parliament (% held by women)	14.9

Source: http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/TUR , as of 27.10.2017 .

According to last report, we fail to reach expected years of schooling for both males and females. Gross national income per capita of men is almost three times of women's gross national income per capita. Labor force participation of women is very limited. Lastly, share of seats in parliament held by women is only 14.9 percentage points of all seats. We need to improve these statistics to decrease the gender inequality in Turkey. Hence, the empowerment of women may be reached. So, we can consider the educational reform, which was implemented in the summer of 1997, which increased compulsory schooling from 5 years to 8 years as a very significant step in this way. Many women face with various obstacles in the way of voluntary education, usually originating from society's socially and religiously conservative foundations. This compulsory schooling law to ensure that every child completes a minimum 8 years of schooling benefited especially female children from conservative areas, where they would not be able to get this education without the reform making it voluntary. Better education may increase labor force participation of women and provide already employed women with better jobs. In this way, social

mobility would be facilitated, and status of women would be improved in both household and society. Educated women may be more conscious about fertility, family planning would be improved. Most importantly, these women may be raising their children in this way and improvement would be carried onto next generations, too. In this study, we investigate how this educational reform affected schooling attainment of women, and whether this schooling reform narrows or further exacerbates the existing educational and age differences between partners across genders. Additionally, we examine consequences of increased schooling on labor market outcomes for women, empowerment variables like household chores division, controlling actions women face, women's attitudes towards gender roles and physical violence. We use 2004 – 2015 waves of Household Labor Force Survey, which is nationally representative and provides us with detailed information about education and labor market outcomes. We also use 2008 and 2013 waves of Turkey Demographic and Health Survey, which is also nationally representative and contains detailed information about gender attitudes of women, individual and household characteristics.

The compulsory schooling reform is implemented in summer of 1997, and people who had not a primary school diploma by that date are exposed to the law. Thus, individuals born before January 1987 could drop out after 5 years while individuals born in and after January 1987 were obliged to complete at least 8 years of education. Benefiting from this cutoff, we used Regression Discontinuity (RD) Design in our study to calculate causal effect of the policy by comparing the groups treated and untreated. We assign treatment according to month of birth and birth date of respondents using HLFS and TDHS dataset, respectively. For identification, these groups, especially the ones around the cutoff, must not be systematically different

from each other except for being exposed to the compulsory schooling law. We checked it, and we observed no systematic difference other than the law. To prevent fuzziness originating from children who were sent to school earlier or later than legal age, we dropped 1986 and 1987 birth cohorts from our sample in some of our analyses.

The timing of the compulsory schooling reform was unexpected, hence its exogenity was ensured and it created a rapid rise in the mean years of schooling of both women and men but increase for former were higher. There were also spillover effects that even though individuals were not obliged, high school completion rate also increased for women because of the reform. Because increase in educational attainment were higher for women than men, educational difference between partners decreased as expected. According to our results, reform had a slight negative impact on age difference between spouses.

Our RD estimates show that the reform increased women in the labor force and ever worked by around 11 and 11.9 percentage points respectively. Additionally, wage worker women are rose by 2.3 percentage points. Monthly wages of women are increased by 5.8 percentage points approximately, and the reform had a negative impact on monthly wage difference between partners of 5.3 percentage points. We observed improvements in the work-related variables using IV framework, too.

For the second results part, we investigated gender attitudes of women and found that women agreeing on “Men are wiser” statement decreased and ideal marriage age for women rose because of the reform. When we consider household chores division, we investigated if they are responsible for the household chore alone or they get any help. The reform did not affect housework significantly. However, we found that women get less help for kitchen shopping which can be a positive sign

of right to speak as now women decide on what to buy for the household, and more help for setting dinner table. This may originate from that as women participate in labor force more, they have less time for cooking after work hence they may getting help for setting dinner table due to time constraints.

Asset holdings of women are decreased (especially car and house ownership, alone or jointly), while women's money holdings increased. There are alternative explanations of this situation, for example as women prefer to marry later than before, they start to accumulate money for investment possibly later. As they get more education and participate in the labor force more, they have higher earnings, thus they may have more money.

Women get more help for child care generally. Especially, their responsibility for helping children with homework diminishes. One possible explanation is that they have more money and less time, hence they may be sending their children to study centers after school to provide them with a better education.

Lastly, reform does not have much impact on beating justifications. However, women agreeing on physical violence justifications about neglecting children and arguing with husband increased due to the reform. This is probably a sign of patriarchal norms rooted in the society.

In the next section, we review the relevant literature. Description of the Compulsory Schooling Reform in 1997 follows this part. In Section 4, data and empirical methodology are explained and discussed. Results are demonstrated in Section 5, and Section 6 concludes.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Bargaining power of women is important for both household and society dynamics. As more bargaining power women have, their right to speak in their households will rise, and their status in the society will be improved. More importantly, as these consequences subsist, positive results will be persistent for next generations, too. That's why; disentangling determinants of bargaining power is crucial and earlier studies investigate these determinants, especially in the intra-household dynamics.

Duflo (2012) analyzes the mutualistic relationship between development and the empowerment of women. When women are empowered, depending on the channel by which they are empowered, they will be helping development process. These women may be better educated, or they are helped to participate in labor force more actively; hence they could be contributing social or economic development respectively. There are alternative channels, too. Human capital investment of women, i.e. educational attainment of women is found to be among important predictive factors of bargaining power. Doss (2013) discriminates between the measures of bargaining power of women, which are closely related to the empowerment of them, and outcomes affected by this power. She claims that education of women is among important determinants of bargaining power of women. Echevarria and Merlo (1999) defines a family model in which education of children are investment decisions. In Turkey, it is usually thought that social and psychological costs of educational attainment of girls are higher than the same costs for boys according to Tansel (2002). However, the model in the work of Echevarria

and Merlo (1999) is slightly different from the classic investment model in that, even though returns to education in terms of wage are usually less for women, parents will still invest in their daughters' education as much as they do for their sons, because they know that the education is an important determinant of bargaining power of women, and it will affect their wellbeing in their future households. Chiappori, Iyigun and Weiss (2006) stresses out the intra-marital allocations as an outcome of the bargaining power. They claim that the educational gap between spouses has an important effect on intra-household allocations. If there exists a high gender educational or income gap between partners, these couples usually have more children, they specialize in market and home production, and less women will be staying in the labor force. There will be less equal intra-marital allocations in these marriages. If there exist smaller gender educational and/or income gaps, these couples will have fewer children, usually both husband and wife stay in the labor force for a longer time, and intra-marital allocations will be more equal. Pollak (1994) investigates three basic models for intra-marital power distribution: Altruistic, cooperative, and non-cooperative bargaining models. He criticizes these models in that they present bargaining as a two-player game. In contrast, he claims that bargaining has more complex determinants like spouses' human capital investments i.e. education prior to marriage. Mabsout and Staveren (2010) use "decision making power" as the bargaining power measure in Ethiopia. Their aggregate model is a logistic model with Taylor like series functions to correct biased standard errors. They find that the education of women (in years of schooling form) is a statistically significant determinant of bargaining power.

Kırdar, Dayıoğlu and Koç (2012) study the effect of Compulsory Schooling Law implemented in 1997 on fertility and teenage marriages. As this reform

increased mean educational attainment of girls and women, they postpone their marriages. Hence, teenage marriages and births decrease because of the policy.

Erten and Keskin (2016) investigate women's empowerment especially from the aspect of domestic violence, and they start their analyses with the Compulsory Schooling Law implemented in 1997 in Turkey. They use Regression Discontinuity (RD) Design on Turkey's National Survey on Domestic Violence Against Women (NSDVW) wave of 2008 to estimate the causal effects of the reform on mainly domestic violence and find that the reform increased educational attainment of women approximately by one year for the whole sample, and more than one year for the ever-married sample. Assets owned by the household, formal employment of women are increased, and self-employment of women is decreased at a marginal but statistically significant level because of the reform. The reform increases the probability of agreeing with the statement "men should also do housework including cooking and cleaning" and it improves gender-equal attitudes among the women who are exposed to the reform. They find marginal but significant negative impacts on two statements: "Men can beat their partners in certain situations" and "Men in the family are responsible for women's behavior".

They test whether reform-induced educational improvement could break the cycle of violence which is transmitted inter-generationally and find that if mothers of the husbands did not experience domestic violence, incidence of domestic violence decreases, with no corresponding effect for husbands whose mothers experienced domestic violence. The reform improves gender-equal attitudes of women with mothers did not experience domestic violence, with no corresponding effect for women whose mothers experienced domestic violence. They also do some regional analyses and find that probability of being employed in formal and non-

agricultural sectors with relatively good benefits and working conditions increases for women grown in rural areas. For women grown in urban areas, there are no significant improvements in labor market outcomes. They also investigate impact of the reform on controlling actions women are exposed to and find no significant effect in the result of their regressions.

Güleşçi and Meyersson (2013) also start their analyses with the Compulsory Schooling Law implemented in Turkey in 1997. Individuals born on 1986 and earlier are exposed to this law, that's why Güleşçi and Meyersson (2013) use a Regression Discontinuity (RD) Design on a month-of-birth basis. Their data includes ever-married women from Turkish Demographic Health Survey (TDHS) wave of 2008. As a causal effect of this reform, decision making power of women increases especially over marriage, contraceptive use, and fertility. Authority of women about their marriage decisions increases by 20% and corresponding decision rights about contraceptive use increase by 12%. These women are less likely to marry and have children under legal age, and usually they experience better household conditions and husband characteristics. However, there are no significant effects on female labor force participation. Self-employment decreases, and women's home-maker role get less significant. They investigate women's gender role attitudes by benefiting from their ideas about some relevant statements. According to the results they get, women think that they can work if they want to and women put less importance on virginity on wedding night. They also study women's attitudes towards physical violence and find that women agree less on the beating justification of answering back their husbands.

Age of the women, especially age difference between partners may be important for bargaining power, so we investigate this issue in this work. Mabsout

and Staveren (2010) find that age of the women and age difference between partners are among statistically significant determinants of bargaining power in aggregate model. Also, Friedberg and Webb (2006) find that age difference is important in that it would change the components of household expenditures in accordance with preferences of the older partner and the partner who have the final say. When husbands report that they have the final say, household wealth is 4.07% higher for each year that the husband is older and 3.00% lower for each year that the wife is older, compared to when husbands report that wives have the final say.

Ownership of assets is another crucial determinant of bargaining power of women. Doss (2013) report that both the ownership of and control over assets are related to bargaining power. In this sense, assets brought to marriage and owned during marriage are important. Panda and Agarwal (2005) show that the joint/alone ownership of land and housing are among determinants of bargaining power in India. The definition of assets is different for different regions and studies. Doss (2006) reports both a measure of farmland and a measure of assets that includes farmland, savings, and business assets in a study of Ghana. As another example, Agarwal (1997) investigates bargaining power determinants in rural areas, and land is the most important and common asset to be considered. Fafchamps and Quisumbing (2005) report that in rural Ethiopia, distribution of the assets at the time of marriage is effective in determining allocation of intra-household bargaining power after marriage. They find that brides usually receive much smaller than grooms, and this inequality persists at the time of inheritance.

Income of women, especially relative to their husbands, is important for intra-marital allocation of bargaining power. Torun (2015) uses the Compulsory Schooling Law implemented in 1997 as we did with Local Average Treatment Effect

framework, and he finds that wage returns of this law are higher for women than men. Women move into jobs requiring higher skills in the formal sector and public sector after the implementation of the reform. However, as we find, bargaining outcomes do not change much. Doss (2013) report that income and employment (status in workplace, employment type) determine bargaining power of women. Friedberg and Webb (2006) use Health and Retirement Study for their article and investigate who has the final say in the household. They conclude that current and lifetime relative earnings have moderate but statistically significant effect on bargaining power allocation in the household. Samarakoon and Parundri (2015) investigate the relation between educational attainment of women and the empowerment of women, and to be able to prevent any endogeneity problem, they exploit exogenous variation in education level by using 1978 school year in Indonesia - which is longer than other school years, and people who are born on 1971 or earlier experienced this specific school year (if they had not dropped out of school earlier). They find that education creates positive fertility outcomes such that number of live births decreases, contraceptive use increases, and reproductive health practices improve. They report that education increases women's authority on household savings and ownership of household appliances, because educated women are more likely to work and have their own income and are more likely to bargain with their husbands for household expenditures. However, they do not find any evidence of an increase in decision making authority and asset ownership of women because of better educational attainment. Iyigun and Walsh (2007) use a model in which child rearing is more time costly for women and spousal preferences are the same. In this model, bargaining power depends on relative labor income of the partners. Hence, labor-leisure choice affects marital balance of power. They report

that if there is a lower gender gap, women labor force participation will increase, thus intra-marital bargaining power of women will be higher. In Güleşçi and Meyersson's study (2013), they find that because of socially conservative nature of Turkish society, even though female schooling increases, outcomes of it are very limited for labor force participation of women. For Pollak (1994), there are exogenous variables affecting women's bargaining power. Labor force participation of women (both prior to and during their marriages) and the time they have worked are important in determination of bargaining power. Also, Pollak (2005) claimed that not earnings but hourly earnings will create more bargaining power for women. He reports that if women earn more because of long working hours, she will not derive more bargaining power. However, if she has higher earnings because of higher hourly wage rate, she will have more bargaining power. For home production, more productive women will have more bargaining power. Mabsout and Staveren (2010) use relative contributions of partners to household expenditures as a proxy for relative wage of women in Ethiopia and they find that these contributions are statistically significant in determining women's bargaining power. According to Agarwal (1997), main part of the bargaining power is the ability to survive outside the household. He reports that one of the important determinants of bargaining power is employment or other income sources in rural areas. In the workplaces, women are constrained by the gender gap in education, information, and skills at the first place. He claims that as the education gap gets smaller and resulting wage gap also gets smaller, women will have more bargaining power

However, while education, income, employment, and asset ownership may potentially increase individual bargaining powers of women, their effect depends on the acceptance of the population. In other words, social norms and gender institutions

of the population have an important effect on bargaining outcomes and our results seems to be supporting this. Men usually want few rights for their wives to protect their own autonomy over the household, but they want more rights for their daughters to protect them against their husbands and to provide their grandchildren with a better education according to Doepke and Tertilt (2009). If former wins over the latter, then the empowerment of women will not have much support over society, especially from the men. In Turkey, thanks to Ataturk's reforms, the laws about women's status are changed from the Sharia to a secular civil code, which is adapted from Swiss civil law in 1926. While in the urban areas there is a radical change in the women's position and status in the society, there is very little actual change in the rural areas and fertility rates are still high (Abadan-Unat, 1978). Hence, women's traditional roles win over the rights brought by the new legislation. Agarwal (1997) reports that the "socially required responsibilities of women" will make employer suspicious of work performance of the women. Gender ideology of both partners is important, and they change across regions. Women's status in the household can be understood by looking at the controlling actions they are exposed by their husbands, their right to speak in their households and the help they get for household chores. If she is at a disadvantageous position at these aspects, then increasing individual bargaining power may not help much. Samarakoon and Parundri (2015) show that education is not adequate to change deeply rooted institutional norms in the society. Changes in bargaining power division in the households require changes in points of view of the individuals. For Pollak (1994), as women get accustomed to such social norms by socialization, they will not pursue and bargain for their interests as much as they should, they accept their positions much easily. Such gender institutions have cultural and social foundations. Iyigun and Walsh (2007) stress the importance of the

relative wages of women compared to their husbands for bargaining power. However, they mention that the inclination of society toward gender equality is important in such cases. If the society is not ready for these changes, bargaining outcomes will not be improved deeply by any intervention changing individual bargaining power. Agarwal (1997) also stresses the importance of the society households in, because social norms society accepts will have a significant impact on attitudes of household members towards gender equality. She says that intra-household dynamics will be determined, and bargaining power of women will be limited by these norms rooted in the society. Mabsout and Staveren (2010) find a paradoxical result that if the women reject institution of wife beating, their decision-making power is improved. However, if their husbands are inclined to wife beating and the women reject it, the decision-making power of women decreases, and vice versa. Mabsout and Staveren (2010) do not find any radical change in bargaining outcomes, hence they conclude that to increase gender empowerment, policies focusing on institutional norms/gendered institutions rather than individual bargaining power may be more effective.

CHAPTER 3

COMPULSORY SCHOOLING LAW

Education system in Turkey had three main components until 1997: Five years of primary schooling, three years of lower secondary schooling/junior high school and three years of upper secondary schooling/high school. Primary schooling was mandatory, while lower secondary and upper secondary schooling were voluntary. The Compulsory Schooling Law, in other words Basic Education Law No. 4306 (dated 18 August 1997) passed the Turkish parliament and compulsory schooling increased from five to eight years, which merged primary schooling and junior high school into "primary education". Hence, children usually attended school until age 14, starting from age 6. Traditional diploma, which was awarded after completion of fifth grade, was discarded, and new diploma to be given after completion of eighth grade replaced it.

It is usually said that timing of the new policy was related to the political developments of that time, and it was unexpected. Its implementation meant that after completing primary school, students were no longer able to attend religious lower secondary schools, which was in line with that period's political environment (Güleşçi and Meyersson 2013). There are other alternative explanations. For example, Dinçer Kaushal and Grossman (2014) claim that aim of the policy was to lower social and economic inequalities in Turkey to make our entrance into European Union easier. Through rapid implementation, educational gap between regions, between men and women and between urban and rural areas were meant to be decreased. The law covered children who had not completed grade 5 at the end of 1996-97 school year, who had not a primary school diploma yet. Hence, children

born before January 1987 could drop out after completing fifth grade, while children born in and after January 1987 had to continue school until completing eighth grade. Mandatory schooling was five years for children who started first grade before September 1993, and it was eight years for children who started first grade as of September 1993 and after. Even though some children start school at different ages, we assume that all children start school at age six, hence children born before January 1987 are not affected. However, the treatment status of the birth cohorts especially around the discontinuity is fuzzy because some children may start schooling earlier or later than legal age due to various reasons, we cannot be sure if they are affected or not. That's why we drop 1986 and 1987 birth cohorts from the dataset in some of our analyses to prevent fuzziness.

In 1996, prior to the implementation of new compulsory schooling policy, there were 6.4 million students attending primary (hence mandatory) schooling, and enrollment rate was 89.4 percentage points. Additionally, there were 2.6 million children who were attending lower secondary school causing an enrollment rate of 52.8 percentage points, and 2.1 million children who were in upper secondary schooling, making enrollment rate 38.5 percentage points at this level. Hence, total student population attending first eight years of schooling was 9 million approximately. The oldest cohort affected by the law started grade 6 in 1998-99 school year, and we saw an increase in the enrollment rates for the first time at that time. In 1998-99 school year, student population attending compulsory education level was increased more than 500.000, which is equal to 4.5 percentage points (Turkish Ministry of Education 2011). This increasing trend continued in the following years, in 2001, the population attending basic education reached to 10.5 million, and policy could reflect its total effect after four years (Turkish Statistical

Institute, 2012). There were also strong spillover effects for upper secondary schooling levels especially in urban areas. Number of students attending high school increased by 10.5 percentage points from 1997-98 schooling year to 2000-01 schooling year, and it increased by approximately 27 percentage points in the following three years (from 2000-01 school year to 2003-04 school year) (Kırdar, 2015).

New policy was referred as a "big bang" approach as an educational reform and required significant investment in education. The share of the Turkish Ministry of National Education in government investment budget increased from 15 percentage points in 1997 to 37.3 percentage points in 1998. Thanks to this increase, main measures of schooling quality like student-to-classroom and student-to-teacher ratios remained almost the same (Kırdar, 2015). During this period, to be able to provide higher number of students with proper education, thousands of new teachers were recruited and trained. Within few years after implementation, new classrooms were built, and number of classrooms was increased nearly by 30 percentage points. The government bought and distributed more than 56,000 computers to improve computer literacy especially in rural areas. As a support for rural families in need with children at compulsory schooling age, government provided them with required schoolbooks free of charge in 2001. Then, this policy covered all children at compulsory schooling age. Students from low-income families often received free-meals.

To improve education access in rural areas, bussing schemes were improved, more than 500.000 students were bussed to nearby schools, more than 600 boarding schools were founded, and some village schools were merged. (Kırdar, 2015).

CHAPTER 4

DATA AND EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY

4.1 Data and descriptive statistics

The data we use comes from the 2008 and 2013 rounds of the Demographic Health Survey (DHS) and 2004 – 2015 Household Labor Force Survey. In DHS, questions are directed mainly towards the women, majority of whom are ever married, while in HLFS, questions are asked to all household members. These datasets are nationally representative. The data in the DHS module is on both date-birth and year-of-birth of the respondents, while the module of HLFS includes only data on year-of-birth of respondents. This is important for our RD framework design.

Hacettepe Institute of Population Studies conduct DHS, and it provides detailed information about women's social life, health conditions, fertility behavior, their household characteristics, women's status in their family, and opinions about gender empowerment. We focus primarily on the variables about their educational attainment, labor force participation, asset ownership, and other factors relevant to their empowerment like opinions of women about marriage life, gender roles, and justifications of physical violence. Additionally, we created some partner-difference variables to see the effect of the policy on these differences. HLFS is conducted by Turkish Statistical Institute, and HLFS module has more respondents than DHS dataset (48,338,449 former and 4,839,929 latter), and while DHS dataset does not include much information about employment details of women, HLFS module has more variables about their careers. HLFS also comprises basic information about the

women and their partners, which allows us to create partner-difference variables again.

For DHS, biggest data windows comprise birth cohorts 1977 – 1996. Data windows get narrower by two years for the largest three, and by one year for others. Hence, other data windows we use are 1979 – 1994, 1981 – 1992, 1982 – 1991, 1983 – 1990, and 1984 – 1989. For HLFS dataset, beginning with 15-year data periods on each side of the discontinuity (1972-2001 birth cohorts around 1986-87), we used six different data intervals which gets narrower by two years on each side of the cut off at every new interval level, except for largest data window. The largest data window is three years bigger than the closest data window on each side of the cutoff. Hence, the time intervals we use in our regression analyses are 1972-2001, 1975-1998, 1977-96, 1979-94, 1981-92, and 1983-90. Students who did not complete fifth grade and do not have a primary school diploma by 1997 June are affected by the policy. Normally, children start schooling at age 6. That's why, children born after September 1986 who were in first grade in the 1993-94 school year were the first cohort covered by the policy normally. However, some children may start schooling earlier or later due to various reasons, hence covered group may change around 1986 – 1987 birth cohorts. That's why, we make additional analyses by dropping 1986-87 birth cohorts from our sample.

Table 2 and Table 3 show summary statistics on main characteristics of the respondent women for DHS and HLFS datasets, respectively. In Table 2, some basic descriptive statistics of women and their partners are shown.

Table 2. Summary Statistics of Women – TDHS

	All Women			Ever Married Women		
	Mean	SD	Obs	Mean	SD	Obs
Age	28.329	6.049	11,255	29.619	5.409	9,432
Age - Partner	34.069	6.379	9,085	34.069	6.379	9,085
Years of Schooling	7.092	4.248	11,254	6.473	4.084	9,431
Partner - Years of Schooling	8.073	3.282	9,371	8.073	3.282	9,371
Fraction Completed						
Grade 8	0.454	0.498	11,255	0.376	0.484	9,432
Grade 11	0.305	0.460	11,255	0.241	0.428	9,432
Educational Difference (in Years)	1.595	3.457	9,371	1.595	3.457	9,371
Age Difference (in Years)	5.513	4.112	9,085	5.513	4.112	9,085

Data comes from 2008-2013 TDHS pooled data. Women in this sample are are of ages 17-38.

Mean age of women is 28.32, while it is 29.62 for ever married women sample. Hence, on average, ever married women are older, which is an expected result. Following row of the table shows partners' average age, and it is 34.069. Naturally, this variable gives result for only ever married women.

In DHS dataset, all women and ever married women attend school for 7.092 years and 6.473 on average respectively. 45.4 percentage points of all women complete eighth grade and 30.5 percentage points of them complete eleventh grade. For ever-married women, mean eighth grade completion rate is 37.6 percentage points, while mean eleventh grade completion rate is 24.1 percentage points. Hence, educational variables show that when we reduce our sample to only ever married women, educational attendance decreases significantly.

On average, respondent's partners have 1.595 more years of schooling and they are 4.5 years older than the respondents.

In Panel A of Appendix B, Table B1, labor market outcomes for women are demonstrated using DHS dataset. Women ever in the labor force and women ever worked comprise 56.8 and 53.1 percentage points of all women respectively. When we reduce the dataset to include only ever married women, shares of women ever in

the labor force and women ever worked rise to 57.3 and 54.5 percentage points of this sample.

In Panel B of Appendix B, Table B1, domestic physical violence attitudes of women are summarized. These attitudes are studied by using some statements about beating justifications, and women are asked if they agree with these statements. These variables take value of "1" if respondents agree and "0" otherwise. For all variables under this heading, mean percentage of women who approve physical violence in case of relevant situation increases when we reduce the sample to only ever-married women. Hence, ever-married women justify physical violence easier compared to all women. Highest percentage of women justifies violence if women neglect children, which is 13.3 percentage points for all women and 14.4 percentage points for only ever married women. Second highest percentage of justification is found in the case of arguing with husband, which is approximately 9.9 percentage points for all women and 10.7 percentage points for ever married women sample.

Lowest justification percentage is found in the case of burning food, which is around 2 percentage points for both samples. Hence, women find physical violence acceptable most if they neglect their children or argue with their partners. If we consider the women who approve exposure of physical violence by their husbands for any justification we mentioned, they add up to around 17.4 percentage points of all women sample and 18.7 percentage points of ever married sample, hence it is higher for ever married sample again.

In Panel C, women's attitudes on their status compared to men are investigated using some relevant statements. As in Panel B, if women agree with these statements the variables take the value of "1" and "0" otherwise. Mean fractions of women who think that men should help them with housework, women

should be more active in politics and women do not need to be virgin on wedding night are distinguishingly high relative to other variables. Fraction of women who think that women do not need to be virgins on wedding night is 81.4 percentage points for all women and 82.9 percentage points for only ever married women. Women who think that women should be more active in politics is 79.5 percentage points of all women and 80.1 percentage points of only ever married women. Fraction of women who think that partners should help them with household chores is 69.4 percentage points for all women and 67.7 percentage points for only ever married women. Mean fraction of women who agree with that educating sons is more important than educating daughters, men are wiser and important decisions should be taken by men are significantly low relative to other gender-related variables. They are about 11.6 to 18 percentage points for all women and 12.3 to 18 percentage points for only ever-married women. Mean fraction of women who agree with other gender status related statements change between 28.6 and 44 percentage points. Additionally, ideal marriage age is 24.05 for all women, and it is 23.7 when we consider only ever married women. Hence, as expected, women who are ever married have a smaller ideal marriage age on average compared to all women.

In Panel D of Appendix B, Table B1, wealth outcomes of women like owning house, car, land or having money to spend are shown. These statistics indicate that around 25 percentage points of all women have their own money to spend, hence majority of women must depend on someone to be able to make any spending. This magnitude decreases to 21.4 percentage points when we reduce our sample to only ever-married women. 17 percentage points of all women report that they own a house, approximately 11 percentage points own a car and finally 8 percentage points states that they own land, alone or jointly with their partners. When we consider only

ever married women, these fractions rise to 20.8, 12.8 and 9 percentage points respectively. We created a variable showing if women have any asset we mentioned or not. The mean fraction of women who have any asset is 20.8 percentage points for all women and 24.8 percentage points for only ever-married women.

In Panel E of Appendix B, Table B1, household chores outcomes for women are indicated. These variables are dummy variables, and they take value of "0" if women are responsible for the relevant housework by herself and takes value of "1" otherwise. We consider ten different types of housework: Preparation of budget, setting dinner table, cooking, ironing, official business, shopping for kitchen, reparation, wiping, washing dishes, washing clothes. Furthermore, we take into consideration the additional variable we created showing fraction of women getting any help for any of the ten household chores mentioned above. For majority of the variables, mean percentage of women getting any help is around 50 to 60 percentage points. Mean fractions of women receiving help with preparation of budget, official business, shopping for kitchen, and reparation are about 85 to 95 percentage points. Average percentage of women receiving help with any of the household chores counted above is approximately 99 percentage points. Except for cooking and washing clothes, ever married women have slightly higher mean values for these house works; hence they are less responsible for them by themselves only, they get more help compared to all women. Only in cooking and washing clothes, we observe a slight reduction in mean values for ever married women sample.

In Panel F of Appendix B, Table B1, house works about childcare are summarized. Taking care of children has three main branches: Childcare at home, childcare outside and helping children with homework. We also created a dummy variable which takes value of "1" if women get any help for any of child care

activities. If women are responsible alone for all childcare activities, this variable will take value of "0". According to these values, 36.9 percentage points of all women gets help for child care at home, and it is 24.5 percentage points if we consider only ever married women. The women who gets help for children care outside is 56.1 percentage points, and when we exclude never married women from our sample, this magnitude drops to 47.4 percentage points of ever married women. 64.5 percentage points of all women gets help for helping children with their homework. If we consider only ever married women, this fraction drops to 57 percentage points. The holistic variable which comprises all child care activities gives the result that 76.9 percentage points of all women gets any help for at least one of the child care activities. If we consider only ever married women, this value drops to 71.5 percentage points. Overall, for all childcare activities, fraction of women getting help decreases when we exclude never married women.

In the last panel of Appendix B, Table B1, which is Panel G, controlling action outcomes are demonstrated. These controlling behaviors include preventing women from seeing their female friends, limiting women's contact with their families, insisting on knowing where they are, distrusting them with money, and accusing them with being unfaithful. Except for insisting on knowing where she is, mean fractions of women facing with controlling behaviors mentioned above are 4 to 10.6 percentage points. Mean fraction of women whose partners insist on knowing where they are being approximately 40 percentage points, which is much higher compared to other controlling behaviors. Proportion of women facing at least one of the controlling behaviors is 45.5 percentage points, and it decreases to 45.1 percentage when we reduce the sample to only ever-married women. Other than that, other fractions do not change much when we shrink the sample.

In Panel A of Table 3, basic descriptive statistics of women and their partners are demonstrated for HLFS dataset. Mean age of female respondents is 28.28, while it is 30.68 for ever married group. Thus, ever-married women are older on average. Partners' average age shown in the following row, and it is 32.128. This variable naturally calculated only for ever married women.

Table 3. Summary Statistics of Women - HLFS

Panel A: Age and Education						
	All Women			Ever Married Women		
	Mean	SD	Obs	Mean	SD	Obs
Age	28.283	6.945	1,123,521	30.679	6.064	792,965
Age - Partner	32.128	5.496	598,195	32.128	5.496	598,195
Years of Schooling	7.271	4.199	1,123,521	6.558	4.017	792,965
Partner - Years of Schooling	8.924	3.563	598,195	8.924	3.563	598,195
Fraction Completed						
Grade 8	0.490	0.499	1,123,521	0.373	0.484	792,965
Grade 11	0.323	0.467	1,123,521	0.251	0.433	792,965
Educational Difference (in Years)	1.517	3.499	598,195	1.517	3.499	598,195
Age Difference (in Years)	4.556	4.442	598,195	4.556	4.442	598,195
Panel B: Labor Market Outcomes						
	All Women			Ever Married Women		
	Mean	SD	Obs	Mean	SD	Obs
Women in the Labor Force	0.330	0.470	1,123,521	0.300	0.458	792,965
Women Working	0.281	0.450	1,123,521	0.267	0.442	792,965
Monthly Ln(Wage)	6.711	0.706	183,934	6.775	0.756	107,991
Women Wage Worker	0.174	0.379	1,123,521	0.144	0.351	792,965

Data comes from HLFS pooled data of 2004-2015 years. Women in this sample are are of ages 17-38.

All women and ever married women attend school for 7.271 years and 6.558 respectively for HLFS dataset. 49.0 percentage points of all women complete eighth grade and 32.3 percentage points of them complete eleventh grade. For ever-married women, mean eighth grade completion rate is 37.3 percentage points, while mean eleventh grade completion rate is 25.1 percentage points. Thus, educational variables show that when we reduce our sample to only ever married women, educational attendance decreases explicitly as in the prior DHS dataset summary statistics. Women's partners have 1.517 more years of schooling and they are 4.556 years older than the respondents on average.

4.2 Identification methods

Because of compulsory schooling law implemented in summer of 1997, compulsory schooling was five years for individuals born before January 1987 while people born in and after January 1987 were obliged to stay in school at least eight years, as we explained in detail in Chapter 3. Hence, this discontinuity is a benchmark to decide whether individuals are covered by the new law or not according to their birth cohorts. We use a regression discontinuity design by benefiting from this cutoff to estimate causal effect of education on gender empowerment by comparing the treated and untreated cohorts.

First identifying assumption of RD design is that the relation between assignment variable and outcome must be continuous. In this way, we will be able to get as close as possible to the discontinuity from both sides, and the cutoff will be only discontinuous part. We checked this assumption to see if policy influences balanced covariates and if there are any discontinuities, our results which are shown in detail in Chapter 4.3 indicate that this assumption holds; relation between years of schooling and year-of-birth or date-of-birth is continuous. Hence, structure of the dataset we use is proper for RD design. Second and crucial identifying assumption which ensures validity is that assignment near the cutoff is random, treatment and control groups near the cutoff will not indicate any systematic differences in pre-treatment characteristics and only systematic difference of them is compulsory schooling years. In our study, treatment is assigned according to date-of-birth and year-of-birth cohorts of the individual for DHS and HLFS dataset respectively, and people born in and after 1987 will be considered as treated. Manipulations of date-of-birth and year-of birth of individuals at the time of implementation of new compulsory schooling law are very hard and unlikely since they are determined and

announced much before the new policy. However, even though children start schooling at age 6 officially, there may be situations they start earlier or later due to various reasons, which creates uncertainty in the treatment status of individuals especially around the cutoff. This creates fuzziness in the treatment status around discontinuity, and to prevent fuzziness we will drop 1986 and 1987 birth cohorts in some of our analyses; otherwise, we would underestimate the policy effect. Last assumption is that timing of the policy should not be depending on any factor that has an impact on gender empowerment outcomes to ensure unbiasedness. If the timing was related to any unobserved characteristics affecting gender empowerment outcomes of women, then the estimates we get would be biased. For example, if policy was a response to an incidence which lowered educational attendance of women and changed their opinions about gender roles in favor of men, then we would get biased estimates. Considering that the motivation of the secular government to implement this policy was to prevent children from attending religious schools, we can say that timing of the policy was related to political motivations and independent of gender empowerment outcomes we will be investigating, as we explained in detail in Chapter 3. To sum up, all identifying assumptions of RD design hold.

We provide reduced-form estimates for all our variables, and additionally two-stage least-squares estimates for labor force participation and employment variables by using the discontinuity as an instrument for years of schooling by following previous research (Harmon and Walker,1995; Oreopoluos, 2006; Devereux and Hart,2010; Güleşçi and Meyersson, 2013).

Structure of our data fits RD design with the discontinuity, and identifying assumptions of this design hold, hence treatment assignment is as-good-as-random,

and we can use regression discontinuity design to estimate causal effects of school attendance on gender empowerment outcomes. To make estimations, we use local linear regressions (Imbens and Lemiuex 2008). Expected value of years of schooling depends on the year-of-birth and date-of-births, which determines exposure to the policy according to the cutoff.

Following Angrist and Pischke (2008), model specification can be written as:

$$E[Y_{0i}|x_i] = \alpha + \beta x_i$$

$$Y_{1i} = Y_{0i} + p$$

Here, expected outcomes in treated and untreated cases are calculated. For untreated case, a linear constant effects model is implemented, and for treated case, untreated outcome, and policy effect, p, are summed. Considering these two equations, our regression formula takes the form of:

$$y_i = \alpha + \beta x_i + pt_i + Z_i + \varepsilon_i$$

There exists a trend relation between assignment variable and outcome variable, and this trend may not be linear, and policy equation may be in the form of:

$$E[Y_{0i}|x_i] = f(x_i)$$

In this case, the equation of the control function on the forcing variable transforms to:

$$y_i = \alpha + f(x_i) + pt_i + Z_i + \varepsilon_i$$

In this equation, y_i represents the dependent variable. Our threshold is January 1987. Treatment status shown by t_i, and it is one if the running variable is on or above the threshold and zero otherwise. Forcing variable, in other words assignment or running variable is represented by x_i, which is date-of-birth for DHS dataset and year-of-

birth for HLFS dataset. Z_i represents control variables. Error term is ε_i. As we mentioned before, slope can vary on each side of the discontinuity. The control function, $f(x_i)$, is a n-order continuous polynomial function of x_i on each side of the discontinuity. Average treatment effect is shown by p, and it can be obtained if, $f(x_i)$ is continuous on each side of the cutoff.

As a crucial part of RD design, we must discriminate between the impact of the jump from the smooth function $f(x_i)$. So, as an identification strategy, we need to disentangle the time trends in the outcome variable, that's why we use policy interaction terms, which makes us able to use separate polynomials on the both sides of discontinuity. In this way, time trends can be different before and after the reform.

Different polynomial structures may give more efficient results depending on the extent of the data windows, whether the running variable is date-of-birth or year-of-birth, the data points available for the variable, and whether the time trend changes after the new policy or not. For HLFS dataset, biggest data window we use covers 15 years on each side of the discontinuity, which is 1972 – 2001. Other data windows are 1975 – 1998, 1977- 1996, 1979 – 1994, 1981 – 1992, 1983 – 1990. For DHS, data windows are 1977 – 1996, 1979 – 1994, 1981 – 1992, 1982 – 1991, 1983 – 1990, 1984 – 1989. Various birth-cohort data windows helped us to check the robustness of our results and to decrease the risk of misspecification. Choosing the sample as close as to the discontinuity is better to get the impact of new law but taking very close proximity to the discontinuity reduces the efficiency of estimates because the number of data points is smaller. That's why, we used higher and more flexible polynomial specifications for larger data windows, and when we use narrower ones, we used less flexible polynomial forms. The order of single and split polynomials goes up to four and two, respectively for the largest 4 time-intervals for

HLFS dataset. For the narrowest two ones, the orders of single and split polynomials go up to two and one, respectively. For DHS dataset, both single and split time trend polynomials are linear for narrowest 3 data windows and go up to quadratic for larger ones. With less flexible functional forms with narrower data windows, risk of misspecification is reduced.

Considering the fuzziness near the discontinuity and the fact that the jump is on more than one year, overfitting risk gets higher as degree of the polynomials increases and a very flexible form may not cover the jump impact around the cutoff. That's why, it is challenging to disentangle the time trend effect from the jump effect using a very flexible functional form.

To check the validity of our design and robustness of the results, we use birth month, childhood residence location, current NUTS1 residence, mother tongue of the respondent, and survey year (2008 or 2013) as control variables for DHS data. We use survey year (2004-2015) and current NUTS2 residence as control variables for the analyses using HLFS data. We cluster standard errors at the date-of-birth level for DHS dataset and year-of-birth level for HLFS dataset.

4.3 Preliminary checks

We used birth month of the respondent, residence of the respondent at age 12 (province, district, or subdistrict), NUTS1 region of the residence location, mother tongue of the respondent (Turkish, Kurdish, Arabic or other), and survey year (2008 or 2013) as control variables in the regressions using DHS data with the aim of improved efficiency. For HLFS dataset analyses, we used NUTS2 region of residence location of the respondents and survey year (2004 – 2015) as control variables.

The identifying assumption of the RD design to make estimates have a causal interpretation is that the distribution of years of schooling around the cutoff must be as good as random. In this way, predetermined variables which we control in regressions will be continuous around the cutoff. In other words, covariates must not be affected by the policy. Figure A1, A2, A3, A4 and Figure A5, A6, A7, A8, A9 in Appendix A show local averages of relevant variables showing predetermined characteristics drawn against the forcing variable, date birth for TDHS dataset covariates and birth year for HLFS dataset variables, respectively. We do not see any significant jumps and unexpected movements in these figures. Hence, the treatment does not affect them, there exists no systematic difference between treated and untreated groups other than the treatment, and internal validity is provided.

CHAPTER 5

RESULTS

Results of the empirical analyses are demonstrated in two separate divisions. In the first part, analyses made by using basic determinants of gender empowerment are shown, which are education of women, education and age difference between partners and detailed variables about employment of women. In the second part, share of women in division of labor for household chores and child care, which are variables indicating gender empowerment degree are investigated. Additionally, women's exposure to controlling behaviors by their partners and their opinions about justification of physical violence and other relevant statements about gender empowerment are analyzed.

5.1 Basic results

5.1.1 Schooling of women

Figure 1 and Figure 2 show the effect of the new policy on educational attendance of women, using data from 2013 DHS. On the first visual representation on both figures, mean educational years of women is shown, and to capture the women completed their education, we restricted the sample to include 1975-1993 birth cohorts. For the second analysis, to be able to capture all women completed eighth grade, considering the possibilities that some women may be sent school later than the legal age, they may be shown older on official records or they may fail the class and graduate later, we restricted the sample by dropping the women younger than

age 17. For the last case, which investigates the fraction of women completed eleventh grade, we restricted the sample to include women who are 20 years old or older. We used the same restriction criteria for the analyses using HLFS data and for the part studying schooling of the men in the households.



Figure 1 Effect of policy on schooling of women, including, TDHS

Mean education years for women jumps by approximately 1 years at the policy cutoff, controlling for time trends. Fraction completed eighth grade increases nearly by 10 percentage points. Even though the policy made attending school until eighth grade compulsory, there were also a small jump in the fraction completed eleventh grade, hence there were spillover effects at the post-compulsory schooling level. In Figure 2, same results are shown for 1986 and 1987 birth cohorts excluding case. When we drop the transition period, mean education years of women increases by 1.5 years. Fraction completed eighth grade increases by around 20 percentage

points, which is higher than prior case. Jump in fraction completed eleventh grade is almost the same with prior case.



Figure 2 Effect of policy on schooling of women, excluding, TDHS

Figure 3 and Figure 4 shows the same analysis results using HLFS data. Mean years of schooling increases slightly, and fraction completed eighth grade jumps by around 12 percentage points at the cutoff.



Figure 3 Effect of policy on schooling of women, including, HLFS

There is a visible increase of 2 percentage points on the fraction completed eleventh grade and it is a sign of slight post-compulsory spill-over effect. When we drop 1986 and 1987 birth cohorts, results in Figure 4 show that schooling of women increased by 0.3 years on average, and fraction completed eighth and eleventh grade increased by 16 and 5 percentage points respectively. Thus, dropping transition period makes educational improvement at the cutoff more visible.



Figure 4 Effect of policy on schooling of women, excluding, HLFS

We behold jumps in educational attainment and completion rate of compulsory schooling using both TDHS and HLFS data. These jumps were expected due to "big-bang" nature of the policy, and the results attained from two datasets are consistent with each other. To be able to make comments on main results, we also should examine impact of the new law on the men in the households.

In Appendix B, Table B2 and Table B3, effect of new compulsory schooling policy on women's educational attainment is shown which used DHS dataset and HLFS dataset respectively. On different panels, from A to F, different data windows around the cutoff are used, starting from narrowest one. For all analyses, outcomes for 1986 and 1987 birth cohorts including and excluding samples are shown separately. Because of the nature of the datasets, DHS data is clustered at the date of birth level, and HLFS dataset is clustered at the year of birth level. We must cluster

the data, because all the variables we consider are at the micro level while the policy variable is at the macro level. For DHS dataset, to be able to investigate the effect of new policy on educational attainment of women, we used regressions with single and split time trends, at linear and quadratic levels. For the narrowest three data windows, we used only linear time trends not to lose efficiency. Control variables are month of birth, survey year, childhood residence, the NUTS1 region current residence belongs, and mother tongue of the respondent. For HLFS dataset, we used regression with single and split time trends at linear, quadratic, cubic and quartic levels. For the narrowest two data windows, we used linear and quadratic time trends for single time trend case and only linear time trends for split time trend case. For other data windows, we extended time trend degree to quartic for single and to quadratic for split time trend case. Control variables are survey year and NUTS2 regions current residence of the respondents belong. We also checked if they are balanced around the cutoff to ensure the identifying assumption of our framework in Chapter 4.3.

When we look at Appendix B, Table B2, we see that women's educational attainment increases by around 0.54 - 0.97 years, statistically significant at 1% level. As we use larger data windows, results get bigger and more significant, especially for the largest two data windows: 1977 - 1996 and 1979 - 1994 birth cohorts. When we drop 1986 and 1987 birth cohorts out of the sample, estimates get more significant even for the narrowest data windows (1983-1990 and 1091-1992 interval), and coefficient estimates get bigger generally. In this case, regression results demonstrate that the new policy increases women's schooling by around 0.86 - 1.36 year.

Outcomes of regressions using HLFS ever-married sample in Appendix B, Table B3 demonstrate that women's years of schooling increase nearly by 0.26 –

0.56 years. For all data windows, we have statistically significant coefficients for various regression frameworks. If we drop 1986 and 1987 birth cohorts out of the sample to prevent fuzziness, coefficients get bigger, and they become more significant for all data windows. Transition period excluding sample results show that the policy increases women's educational attainment by around 0.46 – 0.79 years. These results are statistically significant for different regression frameworks and at various data windows; hence we can say they are robust.

In Appendix B, Table B2 and Table B3, effect of new compulsory schooling policy on completion of eighth grade is shown using DHS and HLFS datasets, respectively. For all of them, results are statistically significant for different functional forms at all data windows. In Appendix B, Table B2, results from DHS show that the new policy increased completion of eighth grade by 9 – 21 percentage points approximately. When we drop the transition period, coefficient estimates get bigger and policy's impact rises to 25 – 30 percentage points nearly.

In Appendix B, Table B3, regression results showing the effect of compulsory schooling policy on completion of eighth grade using HLFS dataset are shown. Like prior DHS dataset results, all coefficient estimates are statistically significant at usually 1% level. These results point out that completion of eighth grade increases by 6 – 18 percentage points. If we exclude the transition period from sample and do the same analysis, we observe that the coefficient estimates get bigger and rise to 12 – 27 percentage points. Considering the estimates are significant at different data windows and functional frameworks, we can tell they are robust.

5.1.2 Schooling of male household members

In Figure 5, using DHS dataset, a jump of approximately 0.7 years is observed at the cutoff on the mean years of schooling of male household members. Additionally, there exists a significant increase of 7 percentage points on the fraction of male household members completed eighth grade. Mean completion rate for male household members were higher than mean female completion rate, but the magnitude of the jump for former is smaller than the magnitude for the latter, so we expect education difference between partners to decrease.



Figure 5 Effect of policy on schooling of male household members, including, TDHS

In Figure 6, mean educational attainment increases by around 1.2 years. Eighth and eleventh grade completion rates rise by 13 percentage points and 9 percentage points approximately, hence post-compulsory spillover effects exist also for the male.



Figure 6 Effect of policy on schooling of male household members, excluding, TDHS

Figure 7 and Figure 8 show effect of policy on schooling of male household members using HLFS dataset. Mean education attendance of male household members increased by 0.2 years, and when we drop transition period out of the sample, the magnitude of the jump increases to 0.6 years. Fraction completed eighth grade and eleventh grade are 11 percentage points and 1 percentage points nearly. When we drop the transition period, these jumps increase to 17 percentage points and 8 percentage points respectively.



Figure 7 Effect of policy on schooling of male household members, including, HLFS



Figure 8 Effect of policy on schooling of male household members, excluding, HLFS

We have already observed the rise in both the female and male educational attainment, now we will research whether these rises resulted in reducing educational difference between partners for the benefit of women.

5.1.3 Educational and age difference between partners

The visual representations given in Figure 9 and Figure 10 are drawn for different data windows to see the change in the educational attainment difference between

partners using TDHS and HLFS data respectively.



Figure 9 Educational attainment difference, TDHS

All graphs have explicit jumps; hence they point to a reduced gender educational gap. Graphics showing the effect of the new policy on the age difference between partners are shown in Figure 11 and Figure 12 for TDHS and HLFS, respectively.



Figure 10 Educational attainment difference, HLFS



Figure 11 Age difference between partners, TDHS

We do not observe any significant jumps on the graphs, except for the two graphs drawn using narrowest two data bins of HLFS dataset. However, as we have very few data points on these graphs, we cannot claim that there exists a jump on age difference at the cutoff.



Figure 12 Age difference between partners, HLFS

Now, we will check the regression analysis results to see more detailed results. The estimates of the regression discontinuity analysis we made can be found in Appendix B, Table B4 and Table B5 for TDHS and HLFS datasets respectively, and they are compatible with the visual graphics in that the new policy decreased educational attainment difference between partners.

In Appendix B, Table B4, results of educational and age difference between partners are shown in the "partner-women" form. According to the analysis made by using TDHS dataset, educational difference between partners reduced by 0.58 – 0.78

years after the policy implemented. As we choose larger data windows, estimates get bigger and become more significant generally. If we drop the transition period out of the sample, policy's effect on the educational difference between partners get even more significant, and its magnitude increases to 1.05 – 1.54 years. Hence, educational difference between partners decreased by 0.52 – 1.54 years approximately after the policy implementation, depending on the data window and regression framework. Our results are robust as the transition period dropped case gives more significant and explicit results compared to the 1986 and 1987 birth cohorts including sample analysis. As we narrow our data window for the transition period excluding case, estimated coefficients get higher. Hence, the effect of the policy seems to be stronger around the discontinuity.

Results of regression discontinuity design when we used HLFS dataset points in Appendix B, Table B5 to a decrease in the gender educational gap, too. As this dataset is much bigger, especially for larger data windows, in addition to linear and quadratic time trends, we used cubic and quadratic time trends. For the narrower data windows, considering linear and quadratic time trends seems to be adequate. Results demonstrate that after the increase in the compulsory schooling, educational attainment difference between husbands and spouses decreased by 0.20 – 0.56 years approximately, and these results are statistically significant. If we drop 1986 and– 1987 birth cohorts out of the sample to prevent fuzziness, statistically significant evidence shows that the effect increases to 0.6 – 0.86 years. Hence, effect of the law gets bigger when we drop 1986 and 1987 birth cohorts out of the sample, as in the analysis used TDHS data.

Now, we will investigate regression results for age difference. Using TDHS dataset with different regression frameworks and different data windows, we do not

observe a significant effect in second part of Appendix B, Table B4. Even though there are estimates of 0.44 – 0.55 years of decrease in the age difference which are significant at 5% and 10% levels for the two narrowest data windows, the significance disappears as we drop the transition period out of the sample. For larger data windows, we observe very limited significant estimates and they disappear as we exclude the relevant birth cohorts to prevent fuzziness. For the largest two data windows, namely the ones comprising 8 and 10-year intervals on the both sides of the discontinuity, we observe estimates of 0.59 and 0.88 years of decrease for single linear time trend case, however as this regression framework is not adequate to comprise larger data windows' peculiarities, and the significance disappear as we use higher degrees of time trends, these results do not seem to be robust. Hence, we do not observe any effect of the policy on age difference between partners using TDHS dataset. Yet, the coefficient estimates are high, and the lack of significance seem to be originate from big standard errors.

For the HLFS dataset, as in the case of educational difference analysis, because our sample is very large especially for the bigger data windows, adding cubic and quartic time trends to our framework will be convenient. When we investigate results of regressions using smaller data windows, linear and quadratic time trend objects are adequate. In second part of Appendix B, Table B5, regression results for age difference using HLFS dataset are shown. We do get very limited significant coefficients for the sample including 1986 and 1987 birth cohorts, only significant coefficients we get are from single linear time trend cases for two largest data windows. However, when we drop the transition period out of the sample, we get many significant coefficients for different data windows at different time trend degrees, hence we can tell our results are robust for HLFS case. New compulsory

schooling policy reduced the age gap between partners by 0.7 – 0.41 years approximately, at 1% significance level. Effect not only gets more robust but also gets bigger as we drop 1986 and 1987 birth cohorts out of the sample. TDHS dataset is much smaller than HLFS dataset, hence results from the latter are more guiding for us. Considering this fact and that the results from HLFS are robust, we can claim that age difference between partners is reduced after the implementation of new policy.

5.1.4 Employment

In Appendix B, Table B6, employment variables regression results using DHS dataset are shown. In the first analysis, effect of the policy on women ever in the labor force is investigated. Results show that, we have statistical evidence that new compulsory schooling policy has a positive impact on women ever in the labor force. Starting from 1982 - 91 data windows, we have statistically significant coefficients as we use bigger data windows. Additionally, as we choose larger data windows, both level of statistical significance and magnitude of the effect, which changes between 6.7 – 12.5 percentage points, get bigger. When we drop the transition period out of the sample, strength of the impact increases, and impact gets more explicit and significant. Again, like in the prior case, statistically significant results are found in results using 1982 – 1991 and larger time intervals. Magnitude of the impact changes between 11.1 – 18.0 percentage points. Hence, new policy increased women ever in the labor force by 11.1 – 18.0 percentage points approximately. As we get statistically significant results for various data windows, polynomial functions and both transition period including and excluding cases, we can conclude that our results are robust.

Second column of Appendix B, Table B6 shows the regression results for the impact of new policy on women ever worked using DHS dataset. For the first analysis which uses 1986 – 1987 birth cohorts including sample, we have very few statistically significant results which are found only in 1977 – 1996 sample results, and they change between 7.9 – 8.5 percentage points. Because significance is valid only for one-time interval, this result is not robust. When we drop 1986 – 1987 birth cohorts out of the sample and do the same analysis again, we get more significant results; but their significance level is not very satisfying; majority of the coefficients are significant at 5% and 10% levels. Yet, because we have significant results for various data windows and functional forms, we have suggestive evidence that new policy had a positive effect on women ever worked; it increased women ever worked approximately by 11.9 – 17.6 percentage points.

In Appendix B, Table B7, policy's effect on employment-related variables of women is shown using HLFS dataset. In first two columns of the table, regression results about women in the labor force are demonstrated. Even though usually coefficients get bigger when we drop 1986 – 1987 birth cohorts, for both transition period including/excluding cases, we have very few significant coefficients. Hence, we cannot observe any effect of new policy on women in labor force.

Second part shows impact of the policy on women working. In first part, we have significant coefficients especially in the largest three data windows, and the magnitude of the effect is about 1.3 – 1.5 percentage points. However, because significant coefficients are very dispersed, and their significance is very changeable, we can say we have suggestive evidence of an increase in women working because of the policy. When we drop 1986 - 1987 birth cohorts and make the same analysis, both significance level and magnitude of resulting coefficients increase explicitly.

We have 1% - 5% significant coefficients in results of all data windows. Magnitude of the impact is around 0.8 – 2.1 percentage points. Considering these results, we have statistical and robust results that new policy increased women working by around 0.8 – 2.1 percentage points.

In third part of these results, impact of the policy on wage worker women is shown. In the first results, we have very limited and dispersed significant results, thus we do not observe any explicit impact of the policy. When we drop the transition period and do the same regressions, regression results show that in all time intervals, we have generally 1% and 5% significant coefficients whose magnitude change between 1.2 – 2.3 percentage points. Generally, this effect gets stronger when we use largest time intervals. Because these coefficients are significant at various data windows and functional forms, as well as transition period excluding case, we can conclude that these results are robust and new compulsory schooling policy increases wage worker women by 1.2 – 2.3 percentage points.

In Appendix B, Table B8, difference between partners regarding their labor force participation and employment status are shown in "partner – women" form. In the first part, regression results of difference regarding labor force participation are indicated. Even though we have a few significant coefficients especially in the narrower data windows, because they are very dispersed, we do not observe any clear result. When we drop the transition period, even though usually magnitude of the estimated coefficients increases, their significance disappears generally. Thus, we do not have any robust result in this case.

Second part of Appendix B, Table B8 shows the regression results about the effect of the policy on employment status difference between partners. Again, like in

the prior part, we have a few significant coefficients, but they are limited and very dispersed. When we drop 1986 and 1987 birth cohorts and make the same regression analysis again, usually both magnitude and significance of estimated coefficients increase. Almost all data windows, we have explicit significant results. In the first analysis, we have positive estimated significant coefficients. However, when we drop 1986 and 1987 birth cohorts and do the regressions again, we have significant negative coefficients in different data windows. For the narrowest data windows, we have positive significant estimations, however as for other data windows and functional forms we observe negative estimations, we have statistical evidence that employment status difference between partners decreased by around 1.1 – 1.7 percentage points.

In Appendix B, Table B9, regression results of variables related women's earnings are shown using HLFS dataset. First part demonstrates effect of the policy on women's monthly earnings. Transition period including sample does not provide us with any significant results. However, when we drop this period out of the sample and make same analysis again, we get 1% and 5% significant results in almost all data windows. Magnitude of these estimations change between 5.8 – 15.6 percentage points; they get bigger as we use larger time intervals. Considering these results are significant for transition period excluding sample at various time intervals and functional forms, we can conclude that this positive effect of the policy on women's wages is robust.

Second part of Appendix B, Table B9 demonstrates regression results of policy's impact on difference between partners regarding monthly wage in natural logarithmic form. This difference is showed in "partner – women" form. Like in the prior analysis, 1986 and 1987 birth cohorts including sample does not provide us

with any significant results. When we drop this period out of the sample and make same regressions again, we have significant results in almost all time-intervals. These results are significant at various levels, and their magnitude change between 5.3 – 7.3 percentage points. Hence, we have suggestive evidence that new compulsory schooling policy decreases monthly earning difference between partners by around 5.3 – 7.3 percentage points.

In Appendix B, Table B10, 2SLS results showing impact of one year of schooling increase on work variables using TDHS dataset are demonstrated. Without dropping transition period, women ever in the labor force increases by 15.4 – 54.0 percentage points, depending on functional specification and data window. Usually 1%, and some 5% significance levels are found in all data windows. When we drop the transition period, magnitude of the impact increases to 14.8 - 72.5 percentage points. Significance also increases. Thus, this result is robust and an increase of a year in women's schooling increases women2s participation in the labor force. Second part of Appendix B, Table B10 shows impact of one-year educational increase on women ever worked. According to these results, one year of increase in schooling creates a rise in women ever worked of 12.1 – 47.3 percentage points. If we drop transition period and make the same analysis again, magnitude slightly rises to 12.2 - 56.5 percentage points. Majority of the coefficients are significant at 1% and 5% levels at all data windows and different polynomial specifications, hence we conclude that this result is robust.

In Appendix B, Table B11, IV results of work variables are shown using HLFS data. They show impact of one-year schooling increase on relevant dependent variables. First part of the Appendix B, Table B11 shows impact of one-year increase of schooling on women in the labor force. Results of the first regression demonstrate

that an increase of one year in schooling increases women in the labor force significantly by 1.3 – 19 percentage points, however as significant coefficients are rare and dispersed, we cannot claim that there exists a significant impact. 1986 and 1987 birth cohorts dropped case regressions result in more significant coefficients changing between 2.5 – 20.9 percentage points (ppt), which are higher than the former case. Majority of these coefficients are significant at 1 and 5% levels at all data windows, hence we conclude that this impact is robust. Second part of Appendix B, Table B11 shows impact of one-year increase in schooling on women working. First regressions' results show that a rise of a year in schooling of women increases women working by 7.3 – 16.5 percentage points approximately. Even though these coefficients are significant at 1% level, because they are rare and dispersed, we do not have any robust result. In the next column, results of the regressions using 1986 and 1987 birth cohorts dropped sample are demonstrated. These results change between 11 and 12 percentage points. As they are significant at 1% and 5% at all data windows, we have the robust result that this impact is statistically significant. Hence, one-year increase in schooling of women creates a rise in both women in the labor force and women working.

5.2 Empowerment results

5.2.1 Gender role attitudes

We lack direct measures of bargaining power of women, yet variables showing gender-related attitudes of women would be useful in this aim. These variables are basically mirrors of women's status in both their family and the society they live in, because they originate from gender norms that draw the lines of women's bargaining

power. That's why, we will be discussing the effect of compulsory schooling policy on women's opinions on gender-related statements in detail in this section.

In Figures 13 14 15 and 16, visual representations of the change in the women's attitudes about the relevant variables after the policy are shown for 1977-1994 birth cohorts comprising 8-year intervals on both sides of the cutoff. We draw figures for both 1986-1987 birth cohorts including and excluding cases.

For "Men are wiser." statement, there exists a negative jump in Figure 13. Unexpectedly, we observe a negative jump on the variable "Men should help with household chores.", too.



Figure 13 Effect of policy on gender role attitudes, including

In Figure 14, we observe a jump at discontinuity on the graph of the statement “Wife does not have the right to express opinion.”, and this is the only jump in Figure 14.



Figure 14 Effect of policy on gender role attitudes 2, including

After dropping transition period out of the sample shown in Figure 15, only the jump seen in statement about household chores graph continues to exist and other jumps disappear. Additionally, after we drop the transition period and draw these figures again, there appears to be a slight positive jump on agreement on the

statement about women's going around without their husbands' permissions.



Figure 15 Effect of policy on gender role attitudes, excluding

In Figure 16, visual representations are drawn for the sample excluding 1986 and 1987 birth cohorts for the variables in Figure 14. Jump in the graph showing the agreement on statement about right to express opinion gets more explicit. After dropping the transition period out, we have a positive jump in the statement about virginity. Hence, more women think that virginity on wedding night is not so important. Also, we observe a positive jump on the statement about children education and more women put more importance on educating their sons relative to educating their daughters. However, we need to check the regression results to be sure.



Figure 16 Effect of policy on gender role attitudes 2, excluding

When we look at regression estimation results in Appendix B, Table B12,B13 and B14, we observe that the new compulsory schooling policy have no significant effect on majority of the variables. Güleşçi and Meyersson (2013) and Erten and Keskin (2016) also investigated women's perception of gender roles with a few common variables with our study, using 2008 TDHS dataset and Turkey's National Survey on Domestic Violence against Women (NSDVW) of 2008 respectively, hence we analyze the same variables with a larger/different dataset and different control variables and time trends.

Regression analysis of "Men should help household chores." statement in Appendix B, Table B12 shows that women who agree with this statement decreased by 7.1 to 10.7 percentage points at 5% and 10% significance level. Even though significance subsists in different data windows and functional forms, when we exclude transition period from the sample and do the same analysis again,

significance of all coefficients disappear. That's why, we cannot claim that these results are robust. Our results are matching with those the results found by Güleşçi and Meyersson (2013) in that they found no significant results. On the contrary, with a different dataset, Erten and Keskin (2016) found that men should also do the housework.

The regression results in Appendix B, Table B13 show that the women agreeing with the statement "Men are wiser." decreased by about 6.2 – 10.9 percentage points because of new compulsory schooling policy. Coefficients are bigger and more significant at 1983 – 1990 data window, and they get slightly smaller as we use larger data windows, but they are still significant at 5% or 10% levels. When we drop 1986 and 1987 birth cohorts out of the sample to prevent fuzziness, we have less significant coefficients, but they get bigger in the magnitude that policy's effect increases to 9.1 – 19.5 percentage points depending on data window and functional form. Looking at these results, we can claim that we have suggestive evidence of decreasing impact of the policy on women agreeing with this statement. This is an important step in women's attitudes about gender-related issues regarding gender equality. Güleşçi and Meyersson (2013) found no significant result on this area.

For ideal marriage age, results in Appendix B, Table B14 show that we do not get any suggestive evidence when we use 1986 and 1987 birth cohorts including sample. However, when we exclude transition period from the sample, we found that the new policy increased ideal marriage age by 0.77 to 1.14 years, though different functional form selections provide us with various significance levels changing between 1% and 10%. Considering these results, we have suggestive evidence that new compulsory education law increased ideal marriage age of women by 1.14 years

on average. This law resulted in an increase of 1.6 years and 1 year in years of education of women on average using DHS and HLFS dataset respectively. Thus, postponed marriage probably originated from higher education preferences.

We found no significant results on the statement about women's decision of working and virginity, but Güleşçi and Meyersson (2013) found that women should work if they wish to and they do not have to be virgins at the wedding night. Both we and Güleşçi and Meyersson found no significant result on the statement that "Women can go anywhere without husband's permission.", "Women should be more active in politics.", "Men should take important decisions.", "Women can argue with their spouses if they disagree." and "Educating daughters is as important as educating sons.". Erten and Keskin (2016) also found no significant results on the statement about women arguing with their partners.

Especially the decrease in the women who believe that men are wiser is a good sign for empowerment because it shows that the perception of women of themselves improved and they have more self-esteem after the new policy implementation. Even though ideal marriage age increase is not a direct measure of empowerment, considering the effect of the policy on educational attainment levels of the women, this increase may be a result of the rise in educational attainment levels of women. Hence, they are more voluntary to spend their time for their education thus investment in their human capital, instead of getting married. This is a positive step in the way of gender empowerment.

5.2.2 Money and asset holdings attitudes

Having own money to spend and asset ownership are crucial determinants of bargaining power in both household and society, because if women have their own money to spend or own any asset, they will not have to depend on someone to have their living probably. Here, we investigate impact of new policy owning house, car, or land jointly by partner or alone and having own money to spend.

Figures 17 and 18 demonstrate visual representations of new policy's impact on the relevant variables at 8-year intervals on both sides of the discontinuity. In Figure 17, we do not observe any suggestive evidence of a jump.



Figure 17 Effect of policy on money and asset holdings, including

Figure 18 shows the same graphs when we drop the transition period out of the sample, and we observe a slight negative jump on the last graph showing land

ownership. We need to check regression results in which we use control variables and different time trends to discriminate the compulsory schooling policy's impact.



Figure 18 Effect of policy on money and asset holdings, excluding

In Appendix B, Table B15, regression results for effect of the policy are shown, in which dependent variables are asset ownership jointly or alone. According to these results, women who own car jointly or alone decreases by 4.3 – 5.6 percentage points. When we drop the transition period out of the sample and do the same regressions again, estimated coefficients increase to 5.4 – 6.8 percentage points approximately, depending on the choice of functional framework and time interval. These results are significant at 5% and 10% level, and they are significant at largest two time-intervals. Majority of the coefficients are relatively high, but as standard errors are high, many of them get insignificant. Considering these points, we cannot claim that there exists a robust impact. Regression results showing policy's effect on joint asset ownerships are demonstrated in Appendix B, Table B16. According to

these estimations, this policy does not affect women's joint car ownership because we do not get any significant coefficient. In Appendix B, Table B17, regression results for women's alone asset ownership are shown. According to regression results, women's alone car ownership decreases around 3.5 – 3.6 percentage points because of new policy, and when we exclude the transition period, the decreasing impact rises to 3.9 – 4.3 percentage points. This impact is seen at largest two data windows and it is significant at 1% and 5% levels. Hence, we have suggestive evidence that women's alone car ownership decreases because of compulsory schooling law change.

In Appendix B, Table B15, regression results for house ownership of women (alone or jointly) are shown. Even though estimated coefficients are relatively high, due to high standard errors, we have very few significant coefficients, which are significant at 10% level. Hence, we do not have any evidence of a significant effect here. When we check the results for joint house ownership in Appendix B, Table B16 and alone house ownership in Appendix B, Table B17, we see relatively high but insignificant estimations again. Overall, we do not have any evidence of a significant impact of new policy on house ownership in all three cases.

Regression results showing policy's effect on land ownership of women (alone or jointly) are demonstrated in Appendix B, Table B15. A few of the estimations are significant, and they are usually in larger data windows. They show a decreasing effect of 2.2 – 3.0 percentage points approximately depending on the data window and functional form and are significant at 5% and 10% levels. Because we have significant coefficients only in one data window in both 1986 and 1987 birth cohorts including and excluding cases, we do not observe any robust effect. In Appendix B, Table B16, results for joint land ownership case are shown. The policy

has a reducing effect around 2.2 – 3.0 percentage points on joint land ownership. When we drop the transition period out of the sample, magnitude of the impact rises, and it gets nearly - 2.5 – 4.6 percentage points. These results are significant at 1% and 5% level. They are significant at different data windows and functional forms. When we drop the transition period, these coefficient estimates are still robust. Hence, we can conclude that we have statistical evidence that the policy has a reducing impact on joint land ownership of women. In Appendix B, Table B17, regression results for alone land ownership of women are indicated. We get no significant coefficient estimate here, thus the policy has no significant impact on alone land ownership of women.

We created a variable comprising ownership of all the assets we mentioned above, jointly, or alone. Results show that new policy decreases ownership of any asset by 5.4 – 6.6 percentage points, significant at 5% level. When we exclude transition period from the sample, coefficients get higher and effect of the policy rises to a decrease of nearly 5.5 – 8.7 percentage points. These results are significant at 5% and 10% levels at the larger data windows. They are significant for different data windows, various functional forms and both transition period including and excluding cases. Hence, we have suggestive evidence of decreasing effect of the policy on ownership of any asset of women, alone or jointly.

Results in Appendix B, Table B15 show that the women who have own money to spend increases by 3.1 – 7.8 percentage points approximately because of the new compulsory schooling law. When we drop 1986 and 1987 birth cohorts out of sample, this impact increases to 5.7 – 14.2 percentage points. These results are significant at 5% level for different data windows, various functional forms. Hence, they are robust, and we have statistical evidence that the policy change about

compulsory schooling increases women' ownership of money to spend by 5.7 – 14.2 percentage points approximately.

There are various channels that may create this result. Women's access to money increase because of the rise in labor force participation originating mainly from improved educational attainment. Also, the women's preferences may have changed in the way that now they prefer holding cash instead of buying assets to use or as an investment. Another possible explanation is that as the women spend more time in school instead of business life and marriage, they may put off asset ownership plans. However, the mean age of women in the sample is around 32 and it is 27 for ever married women sample. They are relatively young to save adequate money to buy any house, car, or land. Hence, if the women who are affected by the policy were considered when they are older, results would be different. Another potential explanation is that, women from especially lower socio-cultural environments usually do not work. Or even if they work, they work in jobs requiring more physical effort like cleaning, they usually do not have right to speak about their earnings, they give it directly to their husbands, fathers, brothers or whoever seems to be "responsible" of the household. As they get better education, they get better jobs and their right to speak in the households increase, and they will have higher earnings which they do not have to give anyone.

We can create other potential scenarios for effects of the policy on asset ownership of women. Overall, whatever the channel is, resulting effect of new policy is that asset ownership of women decreases while women's ownership of money to spend rises.

5.2.3 Share of household chores

Division of housework is an important sign of bargaining power and status of women especially in their household. As a result, we investigated whether they are doing certain household chores alone or they get any help. Visual representations of the connection between the dependent variables and the new policy are shown for 8-year intervals on both sides of the cutoff, separately for transition period including and excluding samples on Figures 19, 20, 21, 22 and A10.



Figure 19 Effect of policy on share of household chores, including

There are slight differences between former and latter analyses. “Cooking” variable has a jump at the cutoff at Figure 19, however, as can be seen in Figure 20, the jump disappears when we drop transition period out of the sample. Additionally, there exists a sharp decrease in the help women get for kitchen shopping, and it subsists even when we drop the 1986 – 1987 birth cohorts out of the sample. This

may be a sign of an improvement in the empowerment of women, because they have more right to speak in their households as a result. "Setting dinner table" variable has a positive jump at the cutoff for 1986 and 1987 birth cohorts excluding sample, hence women get more help for setting dinner table because of the reform.



Figure 20 Effect of policy on share of household chores, excluding

As seen in Figure 21, women get significantly more help for reparation, and this significance continues when we drop the transition period as seen in Figure 22.



Figure 21 Effect of policy on share of household chores 2, including



Figure 22 Effect of policy on share of household chores 2, excluding

When we consider the holistic variable showing whether the women getting help for any household chore, even though that the jump gets more explicit as we narrow the data window, jumps are still seeming to be insignificant in Figure A10 in Appendix A. However, we need to check the regression results with control variables and time trends to be able to make interpretations.

Normally, as education increases because of the compulsory schooling policy, fraction of women receiving help for household chores is expected to rise because of various channels potentially causing this rise. Women with more education would be more active in business life, hence they might not have enough time to cope with all household chores by themselves anymore. These women would earn more money as a reward of better education, and their opportunity of having helpers at home increases. Additionally, better education may make them more conscious about women rights, and they may defend themselves for more equal division of home labor. There are other potential explanations of this expectation. Regression results are shown in Appendix B, Table B18, Table B19 and Table B20.

On the contrary to expectations, we do not observe any significant impact on share of women getting help with household chores for majority of the household chores like preparation of budget, cooking, official business, ironing, wiping, washing dishes, and washing clothes. Additionally, we do not see any significant estimated coefficient in the analysis results of the specific variable which comprises all household chores.

We have suggestive evidence that women get more help with setting dinner table after implementation of the new policy. There is no significant coefficient for transition period including case, but when we drop this period out of the sample, majority of the estimated coefficients become significant. At the narrowest data

window which comprises of 1984 – 1989, magnitude of the effect is 7.9 percentage points for single time trend linear functional form and 8.7 percentage points for split time trend functional framework at 5% significance level. As we use larger data windows, coefficients are still significant usually. On average, policy's effects on this variable change between 4.1 – 9.2 percentage points. Hence, women get help for this household chore more often than before because of the compulsory schooling policy.

The policy has significant impact on division of labor for kitchen shopping. There is no significant coefficient for 1986 and 1987 birth cohorts including case, however when we drop this period out of the sample, we get many significant estimations. At the 1983 – 1990 data window, impact of the policy on shopping for kitchen is from – 3.6 to - 9.9 percentage points at 5% significance level. As we use bigger data windows, this significant effect changes between -5 and -16.9 percentage points. Hence, women are responsible for kitchen shopping alone more as an effect of the policy. This situation is a sign of increased right to speak of women at their household, hence this can be interpreted as an improvement in gender empowerment. Because policy's effect on shopping for kitchen and setting dinner table are significant for different functional forms at different data windows, these two impacts are robust.

When we investigate the results from analysis of "reparation" variable, we observe that the policy increases women getting help for reparation by 1.5 – 1.9 percentage points at 5% - 10% significance levels using different data windows and functional forms. However, as we drop the transition period out of the sample and do the same analysis again, significance of estimations disappear so all the estimated coefficients get insignificant. That's why, this effect is not robust.

We created a variable comprising all household chores which takes the value of "1" if women get any help for any housework and "0" otherwise. We do not see any significant coefficient in its regression results. Overall, except for setting dinner table and kitchen shopping, new compulsory schooling policy does not have any significant impact on any house work.

5.2.4 Children care responsibilities

Being responsible for children care is an important, time-consuming activity, which requires significant time and effort. That's why, we will investigate the impact of new compulsory schooling policy on women's share in child care. The visual representations showing the effect of new policy on dependent child care variables at 8 years intervals on both side of the discontinuity are shown in



Figure 23 Effect of policy on children care responsibilities, including

We observe a positive jump on the upper two graphics, for which dependent variables are children care at home and outside respectively. There seems to be a negative jump at homework help. Last figure shows the effect of law change on help women gets for any children care activity, and we do not observe a jump on this graph. We drop the transition period out of the sample to prevent fuzziness, and impact of the policy on children care responsibilities of women are demonstrated in Figure 24. Positive jumps in first two graphics showing children care at home and outside, and negative jump at helping children with homework become more explicit in this case.



Figure 24 Effect of policy on children care responsibilities, excluding

Also, the increasing jump in the last graphic demonstrating help women get for any children care activity become significant. Hence, the help women get for children care at home and outside increases, while it decreases for helping children

with homework after new policy implementation according to these graphics. However, to distinguish impact of the policy from other potential triggers, we need to check regression results with relevant control variables and time trend polynomials.

In Appendix B, Table B21, these regression results are demonstrated separately for 1986 and 1987 birth cohorts including and excluding samples. For the variable showing share of women in division of labor for children care at home, we observe high coefficients when we drop transition period out of the sample. However, as standard errors are very high, we do not get any significant result from this variable. Hence, we conclude that new compulsory schooling policy has no significant effect on women's responsibility of children care at home. In second regression group in Appendix B, Table B21, dependent variable is "child care outside". Hence, these regressions investigate whether women are responsible alone from child care outside, or they get any help. Like in the first regression group, we get high estimated coefficients, but they are not significant. Hence, we conclude that the policy change has no significant effect on women's share in child care outside.

"Helping children with homework" is used as dependent variable in third regression group of Appendix B, Table B21. For first regressions with transition period including sample, we have only a few significant estimated coefficients. Significant coefficients are in the results of regressions using largest two-time intervals, and they change between 6.9 – 10.4 percentage points, significant at 1% and 5% significance levels. When we drop the transition period out of the sample and make the same regressions again, estimated coefficients get much higher, they are around 8.9 – 21.5 percentage points depending on time interval and functional framework, and we get more significant estimated coefficients compared to prior results, yet they are relevant for a few data windows. Our results are significant at

different data windows and regression frameworks; hence they are robust. Hence, we have suggestive evidence that women getting help for helping children with homework increases by around 8.9 - 21.5 percentage points, less women are responsible for helping their children with their homework alone, they get more help for this activity. There are alternative explanations for this change. Women are educated better, and they actively participate in labor force more. That's why, their time and opportunity for helping their children with homework may decrease. In this case, other family members may be helping children, or because women usually earn more money, they may be sending their children to study centers as a support for their education after school.

When we do our regression analyses for the variable which comprises all household chores about children we mentioned above, we get high coefficients, but only very few of them are significant coefficient, which are found in the regression results for largest data window. As we use smaller data windows for our regressions, significance disappears. When we exclude 1986 and 1987 birth cohorts from our sample and make the same analyses again, we get higher and more significant coefficients, which change between 6.6 – 12.5 percentage points depending on different time intervals and functional forms, and they are significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level. Even though we have some significant coefficients at different data windows and functional frameworks, and their significance increases when we drop the transition period; because significant coefficients are only few and they are relevant only for largest two data windows, we may claim that we have suggestive evidence that because of the new policy, women get more help for household chores about children.

5.2.5 Controlling actions

In this part, we will investigate the impact of new compulsory schooling policy on incidence of controlling behaviors exerted on women by their partners using TDHS dataset waves of 2008 and 2013 survey years. We investigated five basic controlling actions: Partner prevents her from seeing female friends, limits her contact with her family, insists on knowing where she is, distrusts her with money and accuses her of being unfaithful. Additionally, we created a variable showing whether women face with any controlling action mentioned above. All these variables are dummy variables, hence they take the value of "1" if women face with relevant action and "0" otherwise.

In Figures 25 and 26, the effect of the policy on relevant dependent variables about controlling behaviors is shown for eight-year intervals on both sides of the cutoff.



Figure 25 Controlling actions, including

In Figure 25, we observe an increasing jump on the variable showing whether partner insists on knowing where she is and the variable comprising all controlling actions. In Figure 26, visual representations of the same effect are demonstrated for the sample excluding 1986 and 1987 birth cohorts. When we drop the transition period out of the sample, the positive and negative jumps seem to be more explicit for the variables “Partner insists on knowing where she is.” and “Partner limits her contact with her family.” respectively. Also, on the graph for which dependent variable is variable showing all controlling behaviors, the jump we observed before subsists. Additionally, we observe a slight negative jump on the graph of accusing action. However, as we do not know triggers of these jumps, doing a regression analysis in which relevant control variables and time trends are used would be more convenient.



Figure 26 Controlling actions, excluding

Regression results are shown in Appendix B, Table B22 and Table B23. When we do regression analysis by using control variables and different time trends at various data windows, we find no evidence that the new compulsory schooling law has a significant impact on incidence of "partner preventing her from seeing female friends" in Appendix B, Table B22. Even though coefficient estimates are relatively big and get bigger for transition period excluding sample, because of high standard errors, no coefficient estimate is significant. Erten and Keskin (2016) also investigated this issue, and their conclusion was matching with ours in that the new policy had no significant effect.

When we check the results from regression analyses in which dependent variables are "partner limits her contact with her family" and "partner insists on knowing where she is", we observe that the coefficient estimates are relatively moderate, and they are not significant. We do not have any statistical or suggestive evidences for these variables in Appendix B, Table B22, for both transition period including and excluding cases. Erten and Keskin (2016) also studied these variables, and they did not find and evidence of significant effect either.

In Appendix B, Table B23, on the first and second columns, effect of the policy on the variable showing partner distrusting women with money is shown. Excluding the transition period increases coefficients generally, however we have very limited significant coefficients which are estimated using single linear time trend functional form regressions in larger data windows. This functional form by itself does not give robust results if more complex functional form regression results do not support it, hence we cannot conclude for any significant impact of new policy on this variable.

In Appendix B, Table B23 on the third and fourth columns, coefficient estimates coming from regression analysis of dependent variable "partner accuses her of being unfaithful" do not show any significant evidence. Coefficients are relatively small, and they are insignificant for both 1986 and 1987 birth cohorts including and excluding cases. Erten and Keskin (2016) worked on this variable too, and they found no evidence of any effect of the policy on this variable, which is consistent with our findings.

Our findings in about the women who face with at least one of the mentioned controlling behaviors are shown in last two columns of Appendix B, Table B23. These results reflect that although estimated coefficients are high especially when we drop the transition period out, as standard errors are not small, we do not have any significant estimated coefficient. Thus, we do get no significant evidence for this holistic variable. Overall, we found no significant evidence on controlling variables.

5.2.6 Attitudes towards physical violence

Changes in women's opinions about justification of physical violence after the policy change will be investigated in this part. Physical violence may hurt women both psychologically and physiologically. Approving such a harm to oneself is a sign of lack of self-confidence and desperation originating from the disempowerment of women. Raising children in such an environment may result in psychologically unhealthy generations and violence may root in society. That's why, empowering women is crucial for not only current generation but also next generations. We will be investigating five basic beating justifications consisting of women neglect children, go out without telling her husband, argue with husband, burn the food, refuses to have intercourse. Additionally, we created a variable that shows if women

agree with any of the justifications mentioned above. This variable takes the value of "1" if respondents agree with at least one of the specified reasons, and "0" otherwise. Figure 27, which is drawn for the birth cohorts of 1977-96, meaning 8-year intervals on both sides of the discontinuity, presents the relation between variables about the physical violence and the policy change by using birth date. Figure is drawn by using all the sample, while we excluded 1986 and 1987 birth cohorts from the sample when we draw Figure 28.



Figure 27 Effect of policy on attitudes towards violence, including

For beating justifications that wife neglecting her children and wife goes out without telling children, we observe significant increasing jumps in Figure 27. Former jump subsists when we drop 1986 and 1987 birth cohorts, while latter jump disappears as shown in Figure 28. In Figure 27, there are increasing but insignificant jumps in visual representations showing effect of the policy on agreeing on beating justifications that wife argues with husband, wife burns the food and any variable

comprising any justification. When we drop transition period, these jumps get more explicit and significant, as shown in Figure 28. There exists no jump on the graph showing impact of new policy on beating justification that wife refuses to have intercourse for both transition period including and excluding cases.



Figure 28 Effect of policy on attitudes towards violence, excluding

However, regression analyses with relevant control variables and time trend polynomials would give more accurate results. Appendix B, Table B24 and Table B25 demonstrate regression results showing impact of new policy on beating justifications for ever married women. In Appendix B, Table B24, first columns show regression results where dependent variable is beating justification that women neglect her children. First, results are shown for transition period including case, and estimated coefficients are around 2.6 – 3.0 percentage points. However, they are very few and significant at only 10%. However, when we drop 1986 and 1987 birth cohorts out of the sample and do the same analysis again, we have significant

estimations at all data windows for different time trend polynomial specifications. Magnitude of the estimations increases to 4.7 – 16.9 percentage points depending on regression frameworks and sample sizes. Because policy's impact on this statement is significant at 1% and 5% at different functional frameworks, we can tell this effect is robust. So, we statistically proved that more women agree on the statement that beating was justified if women were neglecting her kids. This may be a result of strong social norms about "motherhood duties" which rooted in society deeply and cannot be changed by an educational policy in such a short time. Güleşçi and Meyersson (2013) also studied this variable, and they did not find any statistical evidence on this area.

In the second part of Appendix B, Table B24, regression analysis results for the statement "beating is justified if women go out without telling her husband" are indicated. Transition period including sample does not give any significant estimation. When we drop transition period, we get only one significant coefficient, thus we do not have any robust result. We conclude that new policy has no significant impact on this beating justification.

In last part of Appendix B, Table B24, regression results showing impact of the policy on the statement "beating is justified if women argue with husband" are demonstrated. When we use the sample including 1986 and 1987 birth cohorts, we get no significant estimation. When we drop these two birth cohorts out of the sample and do the regressions again, we get a few significant estimations for largest two time-intervals. These estimations change between 3.0 – 4.6 percentage points and they are significant at 5% and 1% significance levels. Because significant results are a few and found only in two data windows, we have suggestive evidence that

women agreeing on this statement increased. Güleşçi and Meyersson (2013) investigated this, and they found negative results.

In Appendix B, Table B25, for "Beating is justified if women burn the food" statement, we observe very few significant coefficients. Because significant regression results are very rare for both transition period including and excluding cases, we conclude that new policy has no significant impact on agreement on beating justification that women burn the food. Second part of Appendix B, Table B25 demonstrate regression results for the statement "Beating is justified if women refuse to have intercourse". We have no significant coefficient for any polynomial specification at any data bin, hence we conclude that new policy has no significant impact on agreement on this statement. Güleşçi and Meyersson (2013) also found no significant results for these two statements

Lastly, in last columns of Appendix B, Table B25, regression results for which dependent variable is the holistic variable comprising all beating justifications are demonstrated. In the first results where all sample is used, we have no significant estimated coefficient. When we drop 1986 and 1987 birth cohorts and do the same analysis again, even though estimated coefficients are usually positive and relatively big, as standard errors are high, we have very few significant coefficients which are significant at 10% significance level.

Thus, significant results are not robust, and we conclude that new policy has no significant impact on this variable comprising all justifications.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

The aim of this thesis is to investigate the impact of the 1997 Compulsory Schooling Reform which exogenously increased compulsory schooling from 5 years to 8 years on the empowerment of women in Turkey. We used regression Discontinuity (RD) Design which makes us able to estimate causal effects of the reform on various aspects of gender empowerment. We used TDHS and HLFS datasets; former provided us with various variables regarding the empowerment of women and bargaining power of women, while latter is advantageous that sample size of HLFS is much higher and it provides us with diverse employment-related variables. Main contribution of this paper to evaluate effect of the schooling increase on not only differences between partners regarding some basic characteristics affecting bargaining power of women especially in the household, but also various groups of variables related to the empowerment of women in a developing-country context where socially conservative, patriarchal norms dominate with relatively low levels of women's empowerment.

We find that the reform created to a rise of slightly over a year of schooling for the women in our sample, and women completed eighth grade increased by around 27 percentage points. Furthermore, this reform decreased the education difference between partners by 1 – 1.3 years and age difference between partners by 0.3 – 0.5 years approximately. These variables are considered as important determinants of bargaining power of women, hence negative impact of the reform on these variables seems to be an improvement for the empowerment of women. Because of new law, women ever in the labor force increases by around 13

percentage points. We have suggestive evidence of a rise of 12 percentage points in women ever worked. This reform has a positive effect on wage worker women and women currently working of 2 percentage points. Monthly wages of women are increased by 5.8 percentage points approximately, and the reform had a negative impact on monthly wage difference between partners of 5.3 percentage points. We also observe the effects of increase of a year in schooling of women on employment variables using IV framework. Increasing compulsory schooling improved women's employment from various aspects. As women are educated better, women's employment probability rises substantially, they have more opportunities in the labor market, and the ones who are already employed have more chance to get better jobs.

The progress we observed in the schooling outcomes is reflected on empowerment outcomes to a limited degree. We found that women agreeing on "Men are wiser" statement decreased by 9.1 to 19.5 percentage points, and ideal marriage age for women rose by 0.7 to 1.1 years after the reform. When we consider household chores, we observe almost no improvement that will create a more equal division of housework in the household. We document that the help women get for kitchen shopping is decreased by 5 to 16.9 percentage points which is an increased of right to speak and the help they get for setting dinner table increased by 4.1 to 9.2 percentage points. As women are more actively participate in the labor force after the reform, they may have less time for household chores, and this may be the reason of increased help women get for dinner table setting.

Asset holdings of women diminish by 5.5 to 8.7 percentage points, and women's own money holdings rise by 5.7 to 14.2 percentage points. We can think of alternative explanations of this situation, for example now women's ideal age of marriage increased, thus they prefer to marry later than before, and they start to

accumulate money for investment later. That's why, they have more money and less asset holdings on average. Additionally, women usually get more education, and their labor force participation also increase. Hence, they have own money to spend now.

Women's responsibility for children care decreases. Specifically, the help they get for helping children with homework increases by 9 to 21 percentage points. One possible channel of this change is that as women work and have more money and less leisure time, they may be sending their children to study centers after school.

Reform does not change agreement on beating justifications much. However, physical violence justifications about neglecting children and arguing with husband are supported more after the reform. Hence, certain social norms are very resistant to change, and more education will not be adequate to modify individuals' perspectives by itself.

Overall, according to our findings, compulsory schooling reform had positive impacts on schooling of women, and difference between women and their partners decreased in terms of both education and age. As a result, we observe strong economic empowerment improvements. Nevertheless, progress in women's bargaining power in their households was very limited. Yet, we document that changing opinions of women about gender roles, share of women in household chores, child care responsibilities are possible even though these changes are limited. After more time, rooted social norms and traditions may also be modified. More women work and make their own living, women's dependence on anyone gets weaken. These women will probably raise their children in this way, and next generations will witness deep alterations in social structure of the society.

APPENDIX A

SUPPLEMENTARY FIGURES



Figure A1 Mother tongue of women, sample 1977-1996



Figure A2 Childhood place of women, sample 1977-1996



Figure A3 NUTS1 regions of women 1, sample 1977-1996



Figure A4 NUTS1 regions of women 2, sample 1977-1996



Figure A5 NUTS2 regions of women 1, sample 1977-1996



Figure A6 NUTS2 regions of women 2, sample 1977-1996



Figure A7 NUTS2 regions of women 3, sample 1977-1996



Figure A8 NUTS2 regions of women 4, sample 1977-1996



Figure A9 NUTS2 regions of women 5, sample 1977-1996



Figure A10 Effect of policy on share of any household chore

APPENDIX B

SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES

Table B1. Summary Statistics of Women 2, TDHS

	Panel A: Labor Market Outcomes					
	All Women			Ever Married Women		
	Mean	SD	Obs	Mean	SD	Obs
Women Ever in the Labor Force	0.568	0.495	11,255	0.573	0.495	9,432
Women Ever Worked	0.531	0.499	11,255	0.545	0.498	9,432
	Panel B: Domestic Violence Attitudes					
	All Women			Ever Married Women		
	Mean	SD	Obs	Mean	SD	Obs
Beating is justified if wife…						
neglects her children.	0.133	0.339	11,201	0.144	0.351	9,383
goes out without telling husband.**	0.056	0.229	6,371	0.064	0.245	4,552
argues with husband.	0.099	0.298	11,201	0.107	0.309	9,348
burns the food.	0.023	0.151	11,228	0.026	0.158	9,410
refuses to have intercourse.	0.048	0.213	11,118	0.053	0.223	9,343
At least one of the reasons above.	0.174	0.378	11,011	0.187	0.390	9,250
	Panel C: Attitudes on Women's Status Relative to Men					
	All Women			Ever Married Women		
	Mean	SD	Obs	Mean	SD	Obs
Men should help with household chores	0.694	0.461	11,220	0.677	0.468	9,401
Women should not work if they have sr	0.348	0.476	11,080	0.318	0.466	9,297
A woman may go anywhere without hu	0.286	0.452	4,817	0.276	0.452	4,817
Men are wiser.*	0.180	0.384	4,683	0.180	0.384	4,683
Women should be more active in politic	0.795	0.404	10,122	0.801	0.399	8,441
Women don't need to be virgins on wed	0.814	0.389	10,855	0.829	0.377	9,116
Important decisions should be taken by	0.159	0.365	11,200	0.172	0.377	9,382
Wife does not have the right to express	0.446	0.497	4,805	0.446	0.497	4,805
Educating sons is more important than e	0.116	0.320	11,215	0.123	0.328	9,395
Ideal marriage age**	24.045	3.677	6,106	23.700	3.625	4,345
	Panel D: Wealth Outcomes					
	All Women			Ever Married Women		
	Mean	SD	Obs	Mean	SD	Obs
Have money to spend	0.254	0.436	6,351	0.217	0.412	4,536
Own house	0.175	0.380	6,386	0.208	0.406	4,563
Own car	0.106	0.308	6,385	0.128	0.334	4,562
Own land	0.082	0.275	6,386	0.095	0.293	4,563
Own any asset	0.207	0.305	6,385	0.248	0.432	4,562

Panel E: Household Chores Outcomes						
	All Women			Ever Married Women		
	Mean	SD	Obs	Mean	SD	Obs
Preparation of budget	0.935	0.247	11,233	0.941	0.411	9,418
Setting dinner table	0.583	0.493	11,243	0.600	0.490	9,424
Cooking	0.601	0.490	11,248	0.565	0.496	9,428
Ironing	0.561	0.496	11,249	0.565	0.496	9,428
Official business	0.919	0.273	11,245	0.927	0.260	9,426
Shopping for kitchen	0.857	0.350	11,235	0.858	0.349	9,419
Reparation	0.972	0.164	11,245	0.974	0.159	9,425
Wiping	0.566	0.496	11,241	0.572	0.495	9,423
Washing dishes	0.567	0.495	11,245	0.567	0.496	9,425
Washing clothes	0.580	0.494	11,246	0.556	0.497	9,425
Any household chore	0.990	0.100	11,205	0.991	0.096	9,398
Panel F: Child Care Outcomes						
	All Women			Ever Married Women		
	Mean	SD	Obs	Mean	SD	Obs
Not only the women is responsible for…						
child care at home.	0.369	0.483	10607	0.245	0.430	8787
child care outside.	0.561	0.496	10456	0.474	0.499	8636
helping children with homework.	0.645	0.479	9168	0.570	0.495	7348
At least one of the child care activities.	0.769	0.421	9067	0.715	0.451	7247
Panel G: Controlling Action Outcomes						
	All Women			Ever Married Women		
	Mean	SD	Obs	Mean	SD	Obs
Partner…						
prevents her from seeing female friends	0.106	0.308	9711	0.105	0.307	9412
limits to contact with her family.	0.072	0.258	9712	0.072	0.259	9413
insists on knowing where she is.	0.397	0.489	9706	0.392	0.488	9407
distrusts her with money.	0.058	0.234	9704	0.059	0.236	9405
accuses her of being unfaithful.	0.040	0.197	9704	0.041	0.198	9405
At least one controlling action	0.455	0.498	9675	0.451	0.498	9376

Data comes from 2008-2013 TDHS pooled data. Women in this sample are are of ages 17-38. For the variables with "*", only data from 2008 survey is available. For the variable with "**", only data from 2013 survey is available.

Table B2. Schooling of Women, TDHS

	Effect of Policy on Years of Schooling of Women		Effect of Policy on Completion of Grade 8	
	Including 1986-87	Excluding 1986-87	Including 1986-87	Excluding 1986-87
A) 3 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1984-1986 & 1987-1989 Birth Cohorts)				
Single Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	0.167	1.015*	0.089***	0.259***
	[0.293]	[0.561]	[0.032]	[0.080]
Split Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	0.195	1.025*	0.094***	0.258***
	[0.284]	[0.558]	[0.030]	[0.079]
Obs	2,692	1,788	2,692	1,788
B) 4 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1983-1986 & 1987-1990 Birth Cohorts)				
Single Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	0.315	0.864**	0.133***	0.271***
	[0.251]	[0.398]	[0.029]	[0.052]
Split Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	0.314	0.840**	0.134***	0.266***
	[0.248]	[0.393]	[0.028]	[0.050]
Obs	3,565	2,661	3,566	2,662
C) 5 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1982-1986 & 1987-1991 Birth Cohorts)				
Single Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	0.650***	1.349***	0.174***	0.305***
	[0.248]	[0.346]	[0.030]	[0.045]
Split Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	0.584**	1.230***	0.166***	0.285***
	[0.239]	[0.326]	[0.029]	[0.040]
Obs	4,419	3,515	4,420	3,516
D) 6 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1981-1986 & 1987-1992 Birth Cohorts)				
Single Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	0.709***	1.242***	0.182***	0.282***
	[0.227]	[0.290]	[0.027]	[0.039]
Quadratic				
Policy	0.636***	1.132***	0.174***	0.269***
	[0.218]	[0.274]	[0.026]	[0.036]
Split Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	0.650***	1.146***	0.176***	0.269***
	[0.219]	[0.275]	[0.026]	[0.036]
Quadratic				
Policy	0.195	0.897	0.103***	0.254***
	[0.323]	[0.649]	[0.034]	[0.075]
Obs	5,306	4,402	5,307	4,403
E) 8 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1979-1986 & 1987-1994 Birth Cohorts)				
Single Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	0.957***	1.436***	0.214***	0.293***
	[0.191]	[0.209]	[0.024]	[0.030]
Quadratic				
Policy	0.870***	1.321***	0.200***	0.274***
	[0.179]	[0.192]	[0.022]	[0.026]
Split Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	0.881***	1.329***	0.202***	0.275***
	[0.180]	[0.191]	[0.023]	[0.025]
Quadratic				
Policy	0.321	0.837*	0.131***	0.248***
	[0.288]	[0.432]	[0.032]	[0.054]
Obs	7,010	6,106	7,011	6,107

F) 10 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1977-1986 & 1987-1996 Birth Cohorts)				
Single Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	1.043***	1.439***	0.221***	0.282***
	[0.176]	[0.195]	[0.022]	[0.026]
Quadratic				
Policy	0.975***	1.359***	0.207***	0.264***
	[0.164]	[0.178]	[0.020]	[0.022]
Split Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	0.976***	1.354***	0.209***	0.264***
	[0.164]	[0.177]	[0.020]	[0.022]
Quadratic				
Policy	0.545**	1.100***	0.166***	0.280***
	[0.256]	[0.337]	[0.029]	[0.042]
Obs	8,830	7,926	8,831	7,927

Calculations are based on 2013 Demographic and Health Survey data, by month of birth. value of one if year of birth is greater than 1987. Each cell is the outcome of the specified regression, and relevant standard errors are given. Control variables are month of birth, survey year, childhood residence, the NUTS1 region current residence belongs, and mother tongue of the respondent, as well as time trend variables as specified in the table. Statistical significance is * at 10 percent level, ** at 5 percent level, and *** at 1 percent level. Clusters are at birth date level. Single time trends are specified as "t" for linear and "t+ t*t" for quadratic type. Split time trends are specified as "t*new policy" for linear and "(t+t*t)*new policy" for quadratic type.

Table B3. Schooling of Women, HLFS

	Effect of Policy on Years of Schooling of Women - HLFS		Effect of Policy on Fraction Completed Grade 8 - HLFS	
	Including 1986-87	Excluding 1986-87	Including 1986-87	Excluding 1986-87
A) 4 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1983-1986 & 1987-1990 Birth Cohorts)				
Single Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	0.316	0.644**	0.116***	0.218***
	[0.193]	[0.192]	[0.032]	[0.027]
Quadratic				
Policy	0.296**	0.607***	0.113***	0.213***
	[0.092]	[0.048]	[0.026]	[0.009]
Split Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	0.298***	0.608***	0.095***	0.194***
	[0.079]	[0.044]	[0.027]	[0.008]
Obs	351,305	256,069	351,305	256,069
B) 6 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1981-1986 & 1987-1992 Birth Cohorts)				
Single Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	0.396**	0.622***	0.143***	0.213***
	[0.141]	[0.137]	[0.032]	[0.020]
Quadratic				
Policy	0.403**	0.672***	0.138***	0.207***
	[0.162]	[0.150]	[0.028]	[0.010]
Split Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	0.394**	0.658***	0.124***	0.195***
	[0.148]	[0.155]	[0.029]	[0.008]
Obs	509,188	413,952	509,188	413,952
C) 8 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1979-1986 & 1987-1994 Birth Cohorts)				
Single Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	0.411***	0.573***	0.156***	0.210***
	[0.131]	[0.178]	[0.029]	[0.016]
Quadratic				
Policy	0.467**	0.706***	0.151***	0.206***
	[0.167]	[0.135]	[0.027]	[0.012]
Cubic				
Policy	0.351	0.660***	0.103***	0.183***
	[0.211]	[0.211]	[0.023]	[0.010]
Quartic				
Policy	0.308*	0.606***	0.100***	0.178***
	[0.146]	[0.157]	[0.022]	[0.008]
Split Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	0.446**	0.683***	0.142***	0.200***
	[0.173]	[0.162]	[0.028]	[0.010]
Quadratic				
Policy	0.234***	0.530***	0.069**	0.176***
	[0.073]	[0.114]	[0.025]	[0.008]
Obs	652,577	557,341	652,577	557,341
D) 10 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1977-1986 & 1987-1996 Birth Cohorts)				
Single Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	0.392**	0.507**	0.162***	0.206***
	[0.146]	[0.217]	[0.026]	[0.012]
Quadratic				
Policy	0.526***	0.756***	0.158***	0.206***
	[0.169]	[0.128]	[0.026]	[0.012]
Cubic				
Policy	0.393*	0.646***	0.122***	0.132***
	[0.202]	[0.173]	[0.026]	[0.008]
Quartic				
Policy	0.346**	0.606***	0.117***	0.125***
	[0.163]	[0.152]	[0.025]	[0.016]
Split Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	0.486**	0.716***	0.152***	0.202***
	[0.191]	[0.168]	[0.026]	[0.011]
Quadratic				
Policy	0.264***	0.520***	0.087***	0.179***
	[0.087]	[0.115]	[0.027]	[0.008]
Obs	774,771	679,535	774,771	679,535

E) 12 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1975-1986 & 1987-1998 Birth Cohorts)				
Single Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	0.296*	0.348	0.178***	0.215***
	[0.166]	[0.244]	[0.025]	[0.018]
Quadratic				
Policy	0.566***	0.796***	0.178***	0.248***
	[0.172]	[0.129]	[0.035]	[0.021]
Cubic				
Policy	0.451**	0.693***	0.186***	0.275***
	[0.201]	[0.165]	[0.038]	[0.018]
Quartic				
Policy	0.370**	0.608***	0.155***	0.257***
	[0.162]	[0.136]	[0.034]	[0.019]
Split Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	0.486**	0.711***	0.168***	0.226***
	[0.207]	[0.182]	[0.029]	[0.016]
Quadratic				
Policy	0.290***	0.524***	0.148***	0.252***
	[0.092]	[0.105]	[0.031]	[0.011]
Obs	877,896	782,660	560,481	506,076
F) 15 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1972-1986 & 1987-2001 Birth Cohorts)				
Single Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	0.025	-0.029	0.170***	0.198***
	[0.153]	[0.210]	[0.022]	[0.016]
Quadratic				
Policy	0.553***	0.780***	0.178***	0.246***
	[0.174]	[0.129]	[0.035]	[0.022]
Cubic				
Policy	0.489**	0.694***	0.181***	0.250***
	[0.181]	[0.143]	[0.034]	[0.020]
Quartic				
Policy	0.363*	0.608***	0.171***	0.281***
	[0.189]	[0.168]	[0.040]	[0.029]
Split Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	0.376*	0.582***	0.162***	0.216***
	[0.210]	[0.182]	[0.028]	[0.015]
Quadratic				
Policy	0.259**	0.468***	0.143***	0.229***
	[0.094]	[0.115]	[0.027]	[0.014]
Obs	1,020,162	924,926	693,876	639,471

Calculations are based on Household Labor Force Survey Data from 2004 to 2015 by year of birth. Dummy used for new policy takes value of one if year of birth is greater than 1987 and zero otherwise. Each cell is the outcome of the specified regression, and relevant standard errors are given. Control variables are survey year and the NUTS2 region current residence belongs, as well as time trend variables as specified in the table. Statistical significance is * at 10 percent level, ** at 5 percent level, and *** at 1 percent level. Clusters are at birth date level. Single time trends are specified as "t" for linear and "t+ t*t" for quadratic type. Split time trends are specified as "t*new policy" for linear and "(t+t*t)*new policy" for quadratic type.

Table B4. Educational and Age Difference between Partners, TDHS

	Education Difference Between Partners		Age Difference Between Partners	
	Including 1986-87	Excluding 1986-87	Including 1986-87	Excluding 1986-87
A) 3 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1984-1986 & 1987-1989 Birth Cohorts)				
Single Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	-0.314	-1.762**	-0.535*	-0.027
	[0.299]	[0.816]	[0.292]	[0.851]
Split Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	-0.347	-1.703**	-0.552*	0.044
	[0.285]	[0.837]	[0.294]	[0.843]
Obs	2,315	1,516	2,272	1,488
B) 4 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1983-1986 & 1987-1990 Birth Cohorts)				
Single Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	-0.548*	-1.529***	-0.440*	-0.001
	[0.278]	[0.571]	[0.259]	[0.540]
Split Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	-0.588**	-1.523**	-0.520**	-0.058
	[0.270]	[0.592]	[0.248]	[0.513]
Obs	3,042	2,243	2,982	2,198
C) 5 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1982-1986 & 1987-1991 Birth Cohorts)				
Single Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	-0.611**	-1.288***	-0.103	0.568
	[0.258]	[0.452]	[0.254]	[0.405]
Split Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	-0.604**	-1.197***	-0.187	0.518
	[0.249]	[0.455]	[0.236]	[0.379]
Obs	3,746	2,947	3,677	2,893
D) 6 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1981-1986 & 1987-1992 Birth Cohorts)				
Single Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	-0.611***	-1.095***	-0.097	0.399
	[0.232]	[0.364]	[0.228]	[0.333]
Quadratic				
Policy	-0.645***	-1.148***	-0.230	0.298
	[0.236]	[0.397]	[0.220]	[0.343]
Split Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	-0.649***	-1.116***	-0.215	0.310
	[0.231]	[0.388]	[0.216]	[0.335]
Quadratic				
Policy	-0.357	-1.535*	-0.565*	0.600
	[0.308]	[0.790]	[0.304]	[0.757]
Obs	4,455	3,656	4,362	3,578
E) 8 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1979-1986 & 1987-1994 Birth Cohorts)				
Single Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	-0.752***	-1.142***	0.138	0.591**
	[0.220]	[0.301]	[0.219]	[0.287]
Quadratic				
Policy	-0.708***	-1.077***	-0.151	0.255
	[0.216]	[0.319]	[0.211]	[0.299]
Split Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	-0.739***	-1.079***	-0.080	0.345
	[0.212]	[0.314]	[0.208]	[0.294]
Quadratic				
Policy	-0.524*	-1.448***	-0.449	0.409
	[0.281]	[0.546]	[0.290]	[0.571]
Obs	5,736	4,937	5,604	4,820

F) 10 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1977-1986 & 1987-1996 Birth Cohorts)				
Single Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	-0.763***	-1.055***	0.426**	0.879***
	[0.192]	[0.244]	[0.213]	[0.266]
Quadratic				
Policy	-0.774***	-1.126***	-0.077	0.300
	[0.202]	[0.286]	[0.203]	[0.273]
Split Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	-0.782***	-1.071***	0.074	0.468*
	[0.192]	[0.275]	[0.200]	[0.267]
Quadratic				
Policy	-0.644**	-1.366***	-0.354	0.388
	[0.260]	[0.474]	[0.276]	[0.482]
Obs	6,947	6,148	6,762	5,978

Calculations are based on 2013 Demographic and Health Survey data, by month of birth. value of one if year of birth is greater than 1987. Each cell is the outcome of the specified regression, and relevant standard errors are given. Control variables are month of birth, survey year, childhood residence, the NUTS1 region current residence belongs, and mother tongue of the respondent, as well as time trend variables as specified in the table. Statistical significance is * at 10 percent level, ** at 5 percent level, and *** at 1 percent level. Clusters are at birth date level. Single time trends are specified as "t" for linear and "t+ t*t" for quadratic type. Split time trends are specified as "t*new policy" for linear and "(t+t*t)*new policy" for quadratic type.

Table B5. Educational and Age Difference between Partners, HLFS

	Education Difference Between Partners		Age Difference Between Partners	
	Including 1986-87	Excluding 1986-87	Including 1986-87	Excluding 1986-87
A) 4 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1983-1986 & 1987-1990 Birth Cohorts)				
Single Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	-0.376	-0.676***	-0.138	-0.247
	[0.218]	[0.143]	[0.088]	[0.163]
Quadratic				
Policy	-0.271**	-0.532***	-0.145	-0.371***
	[0.102]	[0.046]	[0.108]	[0.066]
Split Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	-0.279***	-0.539***	-0.136	-0.374***
	[0.072]	[0.053]	[0.099]	[0.062]
Obs	122,210	91,829	122,210	91,829
B) 6 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1981-1986 & 1987-1992 Birth Cohorts)				
Single Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	-0.492**	-0.728***	-0.005	0.065
	[0.168]	[0.061]	[0.101]	[0.190]
Quadratic				
Policy	-0.394**	-0.689***	-0.144	-0.274***
	[0.156]	[0.079]	[0.112]	[0.034]
Split Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	-0.391***	-0.678***	-0.101	-0.242***
	[0.124]	[0.068]	[0.122]	[0.053]
Obs	190,658	160,277	190,658	160,277
C) 8 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1979-1986 & 1987-1994 Birth Cohorts)				
Single Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	-0.514***	-0.686***	0.202	0.375
	[0.134]	[0.061]	[0.153]	[0.231]
Quadratic				
Policy	-0.473**	-0.774***	-0.143	-0.250***
	[0.172]	[0.094]	[0.113]	[0.040]
Cubic				
Policy	-0.452**	-0.791***	-0.225*	-0.392***
	[0.186]	[0.105]	[0.126]	[0.065]
Quartic				
Policy	-0.276*	-0.554***	-0.151	-0.350***
	[0.132]	[0.068]	[0.114]	[0.048]
Split Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	-0.445***	-0.733***	-0.037	-0.154
	[0.143]	[0.087]	[0.146]	[0.091]
Quadratic				
Policy	-0.215***	-0.470***	-0.139*	-0.426***
	[0.054]	[0.079]	[0.070]	[0.069]
Obs	262,027	231,646	262,027	231,646
D) 10 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1977-1986 & 1987-1996 Birth Cohorts)				
Single Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	-0.463***	-0.576***	0.412**	0.640***
	[0.114]	[0.061]	[0.168]	[0.221]
Quadratic				
Policy	-0.486**	-0.765***	-0.124	-0.200***
	[0.174]	[0.095]	[0.105]	[0.059]
Cubic				
Policy	-0.522***	-0.832***	-0.163	-0.226***
	[0.175]	[0.089]	[0.109]	[0.071]
Quartic				
Policy	-0.362**	-0.696***	-0.175	-0.364***
	[0.164]	[0.086]	[0.137]	[0.071]
Split Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	-0.423***	-0.685***	0.049	-0.052
	[0.145]	[0.085]	[0.150]	[0.096]
Quadratic				
Policy	-0.289***	-0.611***	-0.120	-0.355***
	[0.080]	[0.074]	[0.091]	[0.085]
Obs	332,173	301,792	332,173	301,792

E) 12 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1975-1986 & 1987-1998 Birth Cohorts)				
Single Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	-0.379***	-0.449***	0.536***	0.768***
	[0.111]	[0.088]	[0.172]	[0.213]
Quadratic				
Policy	-0.507**	-0.788***	-0.119	-0.172**
	[0.187]	[0.111]	[0.091]	[0.079]
Cubic				
Policy	-0.564***	-0.859***	-0.086	-0.090
	[0.167]	[0.084]	[0.105]	[0.085]
Quartic				
Policy	-0.399**	-0.727***	-0.169	-0.313***
	[0.174]	[0.088]	[0.143]	[0.068]
Split Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	-0.369**	-0.618***	0.086	-0.032
	[0.150]	[0.096]	[0.149]	[0.090]
Quadratic				
Policy	-0.327***	-0.663***	-0.039	-0.204**
	[0.088]	[0.069]	[0.104]	[0.091]
Obs	400,624	370,243	400,624	370,243
F) 15 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1972-1986 & 1987-2001 Birth Cohorts)				
Single Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	-0.263**	-0.299***	0.720***	0.957***
	[0.103]	[0.088]	[0.184]	[0.218]
Quadratic				
Policy	-0.533***	-0.796***	-0.080	-0.084
	[0.189]	[0.108]	[0.084]	[0.118]
Cubic				
Policy	-0.532***	-0.789***	-0.081	-0.103
	[0.163]	[0.086]	[0.095]	[0.070]
Quartic				
Policy	-0.510**	-0.873***	-0.129	-0.173**
	[0.197]	[0.119]	[0.120]	[0.081]
Split Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	-0.289*	-0.530***	0.178	0.050
	[0.153]	[0.097]	[0.151]	[0.091]
Quadratic				
Policy	-0.298***	-0.603***	0.003	-0.172**
	[0.085]	[0.070]	[0.105]	[0.083]
Obs	513,798	482,917	513,298	482,917

Calculations are based on Household Labor Force Survey Data from 2004 to 2015 by year of birth. Dummy used for new policy takes value of one if year of birth is greater than 1987 and zero otherwise. Each cell is the outcome of the specified regression, and relevant standard errors are given. Control variables are survey year and the NUTS2 region current residence belongs, as well as time trend variables as specified in the table. Statistical significance is * at 10 percent level, ** at 5 percent level, and *** at 1 percent level. Clusters are at birth date level. Single time trends are specified as "t" for linear and "t+ t*t" for quadratic type. Split time trends are specified as "t*new policy" for linear and "(t+t*t)*new policy" for quadratic type.

Table B6. Work Variables, TDHS

	Women Ever in the LF		Women Ever Worked	
	Including 1986-87	Excluding 1986-87	Including 1986-87	Excluding 1986-87
A) 3 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1984-1986 & 1987-1989 Birth Cohorts)				
Single Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	0.016	0.152	0.024	0.157
	[0.033]	[0.101]	[0.037]	[0.112]
Split Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	0.023	0.159	0.036	0.166
	[0.033]	[0.100]	[0.035]	[0.109]
Obs	2,692	1,788	2,692	1,788
B) 4 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1983-1986 & 1987-1990 Birth Cohorts)				
Single Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	0.043	0.139**	0.043	0.127*
	[0.029]	[0.057]	[0.034]	[0.070]
Split Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	0.051*	0.148**	0.055*	0.138*
	[0.028]	[0.057]	[0.033]	[0.070]
Obs	3,566	2,662	3,566	2,662
C) 5 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1982-1986 & 1987-1991 Birth Cohorts)				
Single Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	0.075***	0.174***	0.076**	0.167***
	[0.029]	[0.049]	[0.032]	[0.057]
Split Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	0.076***	0.171***	0.078**	0.078**
	[0.029]	[0.053]	[0.032]	[0.032]
Obs	4,420	3,516	4,420	3,516
D) 6 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1981-1986 & 1987-1992 Birth Cohorts)				
Single Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	0.069***	0.134***	0.062**	0.115**
	[0.026]	[0.041]	[0.029]	[0.047]
Quadratic				
Policy	0.068**	0.129***	0.063**	0.111**
	[0.027]	[0.044]	[0.030]	[0.050]
Split Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	0.070***	0.131***	0.065**	0.112**
	[0.026]	[0.044]	[0.030]	[0.050]
Quadratic				
Policy	0.050	0.239**	0.053	0.227*
	[0.035]	[0.095]	[0.039]	[0.119]
Obs	5,307	4,403	5,307	4,403
E) 8 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1979-1986 & 1987-1994 Birth Cohorts)				
Single Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	0.062**	0.099***	0.049*	0.075**
	[0.025]	[0.035]	[0.027]	[0.038]
Quadratic				
Policy	0.075***	0.116***	0.062**	0.090**
	[0.024]	[0.036]	[0.026]	[0.038]
Split Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	0.073***	0.112***	0.061**	0.087**
	[0.024]	[0.036]	[0.026]	[0.039]
Quadratic				
Policy	0.058*	0.172**	0.064*	0.064*
	[0.032]	[0.073]	[0.037]	[0.037]
Obs	7,011	6,107	7,011	6,107

F) 10 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1977-1986 & 1987-1996 Birth Cohorts)				
Single Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	0.087***	0.125***	0.063**	0.088***
	[0.024]	[0.032]	[0.025]	[0.033]
Quadratic				
Policy	0.112***	0.158***	0.086***	0.116***
	[0.022]	[0.030]	[0.023]	[0.032]
Split Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	0.108***	0.152***	0.083***	0.111***
	[0.022]	[0.030]	[0.023]	[0.032]
Quadratic				
Policy	0.046	0.107*	0.056*	0.114*
	[0.030]	[0.059]	[0.033]	[0.067]
Obs	8,831	7,927	8,831	7,927

Calculations are based on 2013 Demographic and Health Survey data, by month of birth. value of one if year of birth is greater than 1987. Each cell is the outcome of the specified regression, and relevant standard errors are given. Control variables are month of birth, survey year, childhood residence, the NUTS1 region current residence belongs, and mother tongue of the respondent, as well as time trend variables as specified in the table. Statistical significance is * at 10 percent level, ** at 5 percent level, and *** at 1 percent level. Clusters are at birth date level. Single time trends are specified as "t" for linear and "t+ t*t" for quadratic type. Split time trends are specified as "t*new policy" for linear and "(t+t*t)*new policy" for quadratic type.

Table B7. Work Variables, HLFS

	Women in the LF		Women Working		Women Wage Worker	
	Including 1986-87	Excluding 1986-87	Including 1986-87	Excluding 1986-87	Including 1986-87	Excluding 1986-87
A) 4 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1983-1986 & 1987-1990 Birth Cohorts)						
Single Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	0.002	0.016	0.005	0.015***	0.007*	0.016***
	[0.006]	[0.014]	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.003]	[0.002]
Quadratic						
Policy	0.003	0.019**	0.005	0.015***	0.006**	0.016***
	[0.004]	[0.006]	[0.003]	[0.002]	[0.003]	[0.001]
Split Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	0.003	0.019**	0.005	0.015***	0.006**	0.016***
	[0.004]	[0.006]	[0.003]	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.001]
Obs	293,795	212,773	332,453	242,152	332,453	242,152
B) 6 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1981-1986 & 1987-1992 Birth Cohorts)						
Single Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	-0.004	-0.002	0.004	0.009	0.007	0.012
	[0.015]	[0.027]	[0.007]	[0.013]	[0.006]	[0.013]
Quadratic						
Policy	0.003	0.013**	0.008*	0.018***	0.010	0.020**
	[0.006]	[0.006]	[0.004]	[0.005]	[0.006]	[0.007]
Split Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	0.001	0.011	0.008	0.017**	0.009	0.019*
	[0.009]	[0.010]	[0.005]	[0.007]	[0.007]	[0.009]
Obs	422,027	341,005	481,293	390,992	481,293	390,992
C) 8 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1979-1986 & 1987-1994 Birth Cohorts)						
Single Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	-0.012	-0.014	-0.007*	-0.007	0.003	0.005
	[0.018]	[0.029]	[0.004]	[0.005]	[0.009]	[0.016]
Quadratic						
Policy	0.003	0.012*	-0.001	0.003	0.012*	0.021***
	[0.006]	[0.006]	[0.002]	[0.002]	[0.006]	[0.006]
Cubic						
Policy	0.001	0.010	-0.005**	-0.002	0.010	0.020**
	[0.006]	[0.007]	[0.002]	[0.004]	[0.007]	[0.008]
Quartic						
Policy	0.001	0.013	-0.003	0.003	0.008	0.018**
	[0.007]	[0.008]	[0.002]	[0.004]	[0.006]	[0.008]
Split Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	-0.000	0.009	0.003	0.008***	0.010	0.019**
	[0.010]	[0.009]	[0.003]	[0.002]	[0.008]	[0.008]
Quadratic						
Policy	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.005	0.015*
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.003]	[0.007]
Obs	534,949	453,927	615,113	524,812	615,113	524,812
D) 10 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1977-1986 & 1987-1996 Birth Cohorts)						
Single Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	-0.024	-0.032	-0.002	-0.003	-0.003	-0.006
	[0.019]	[0.027]	[0.011]	[0.016]	[0.012]	[0.018]
Quadratic						
Policy	0.002	0.010	0.013***	0.021***	0.014**	0.021***
	[0.006]	[0.008]	[0.004]	[0.004]	[0.006]	[0.005]
Cubic						
Policy	-0.001	0.004	0.007*	0.013**	0.011	0.019***
	[0.005]	[0.008]	[0.004]	[0.005]	[0.006]	[0.006]
Quartic						
Policy	0.004	0.018**	0.006	0.014**	0.010	0.019**
	[0.008]	[0.007]	[0.004]	[0.005]	[0.006]	[0.007]
Split Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	-0.003	0.005	0.010	0.018**	0.010	0.018*
	[0.010]	[0.009]	[0.007]	[0.006]	[0.009]	[0.008]
Quadratic						
Policy	0.000	0.000	0.003	0.010*	0.007*	0.016**
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.003]	[0.005]	[0.004]	[0.007]
Obs	625,281	544,259	728,209	637,908	728,209	637,908

E) 12 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1975-1986 & 1987-1998 Birth Cohorts)						
Single Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	-0.034	-0.045	-0.013	-0.019	-0.014	-0.021
	[0.021]	[0.028]	[0.012]	[0.016]	[0.013]	[0.017]
Quadratic						
Policy	0.004	0.011	0.013***	0.021***	0.015**	0.023***
	[0.006]	[0.008]	[0.004]	[0.003]	[0.006]	[0.005]
Cubic						
Policy	-0.004	-0.001	0.009**	0.015***	0.011*	0.017***
	[0.005]	[0.008]	[0.004]	[0.003]	[0.006]	[0.005]
Quartic						
Policy	0.000	0.008	0.007*	0.015***	0.009	0.018**
	[0.006]	[0.007]	[0.004]	[0.004]	[0.006]	[0.006]
Split Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	-0.004	0.005	0.007	0.014*	0.008	0.015*
	[0.011]	[0.009]	[0.007]	[0.007]	[0.009]	[0.009]
Quadratic						
Policy	0.000	0.000	0.005	0.012**	0.006	0.013*
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.003]	[0.005]	[0.004]	[0.006]
Obs	708,984	627,962	821,779	731,478	821,779	731,478
F) 15 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1972-1986 & 1987-2001 Birth Cohorts)						
Single Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	-0.052***	-0.068***	-0.028**	-0.038**	-0.030**	-0.041**
	[0.019]	[0.023]	[0.011]	[0.014]	[0.012]	[0.015]
Quadratic						
Policy	0.006	0.013	0.013***	0.020***	0.015***	0.023***
	[0.008]	[0.011]	[0.004]	[0.004]	[0.005]	[0.005]
Cubic						
Policy	-0.010*	-0.012	0.006*	0.010**	0.009	0.012**
	[0.005]	[0.009]	[0.003]	[0.004]	[0.005]	[0.005]
Quartic						
Policy	0.001	0.009	0.009*	0.017***	0.011	0.019**
	[0.006]	[0.007]	[0.004]	[0.005]	[0.007]	[0.007]
Split Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	-0.007	0.002	0.003	0.009	0.003	0.010
	[0.010]	[0.008]	[0.007]	[0.006]	[0.009]	[0.008]
Quadratic						
Policy	0.000	0.000	0.002	0.007	0.002	0.007
	[0.000]	[0.000]	[0.004]	[0.006]	[0.005]	[0.007]
Obs	827,459	746,437	964,045	873,744	964,045	873,744

Calculations are based on Household Labor Force Survey Data from 2004 to 2015 by year of birth. Dummy used for new policy takes value of one if year of birth is greater than 1987 and zero otherwise. Each cell is the outcome of the specified regression, and relevant standard errors are given. Control variables are survey year and the NUTS2 region current residence belongs, as well as time trend variables as specified in the table. Statistical significance is * at 10 percent level, ** at 5 percent level, and *** at 1 percent level. Clusters are at birth date level. Single time trends are specified as "t" for linear and "t+ t*t" for quadratic type. Split time trends are specified as "t*new policy" for linear and "(t+t*t)*new policy" for quadratic type.

Table B8. Difference between Partners Regarding Employment Variables

	LF Participation Difference between Partners		Current Employment Status Difference between Partners	
	Including 1986-87	Excluding 1986-87	Including 1986-87	Excluding 1986-87
A) 4 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1983-1986 & 1987-1990 Birth Cohorts)				
Single Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	0.009**	0.006	0.013**	0.010***
	[0.003]	[0.005]	[0.004]	[0.001]
Quadratic				
Policy	0.011***	0.008	0.012***	0.010***
	[0.002]	[0.004]	[0.003]	[0.002]
Split Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	0.011***	0.008	0.011***	0.010***
	[0.001]	[0.004]	[0.002]	[0.002]
Obs	89,827	67,844	122,229	91,840
B) 6 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1981-1986 & 1987-1992 Birth Cohorts)				
Single Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	0.010***	0.009	0.006	-0.001
	[0.003]	[0.006]	[0.006]	[0.006]
Quadratic				
Policy	0.004	-0.005	0.002	-0.009
	[0.004]	[0.007]	[0.005]	[0.005]
Split Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	0.006	-0.004	0.002	-0.009
	[0.005]	[0.008]	[0.004]	[0.005]
Obs	143,070	121,087	190,682	160,293
C) 8 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1979-1986 & 1987-1994 Birth Cohorts)				
Single Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	0.005	0.002	-0.000	-0.008
	[0.004]	[0.006]	[0.006]	[0.006]
Quadratic				
Policy	0.000	-0.010	-0.003	-0.013**
	[0.005]	[0.007]	[0.006]	[0.005]
Cubic				
Policy	0.010**	0.007	0.009**	0.002
	[0.003]	[0.004]	[0.004]	[0.004]
Quartic				
Policy	0.010**	0.004	0.008*	-0.001
	[0.004]	[0.008]	[0.004]	[0.007]
Split Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	-0.000	-0.012	-0.004	-0.015**
	[0.005]	[0.007]	[0.005]	[0.005]
Quadratic				
Policy	0.016***	0.015	0.012***	0.006
	[0.003]	[0.010]	[0.003]	[0.010]
Obs	199,921	177,938	262,055	231,666
D) 10 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1977-1986 & 1987-1996 Birth Cohorts)				
Single Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	0.011**	0.011*	0.006	0.003
	[0.004]	[0.006]	[0.005]	[0.006]
Quadratic				
Policy	-0.000	-0.009	-0.004	-0.014**
	[0.004]	[0.006]	[0.005]	[0.005]
Cubic				
Policy	0.003	-0.005	0.000	-0.012
	[0.004]	[0.007]	[0.006]	[0.007]
Quartic				
Policy	0.006	-0.003	0.005	-0.006
	[0.004]	[0.008]	[0.006]	[0.007]
Split Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	0.002	-0.008	-0.002	-0.011**
	[0.005]	[0.007]	[0.004]	[0.005]
Quadratic				
Policy	0.009**	-0.000	0.005	-0.006
	[0.004]	[0.010]	[0.005]	[0.009]
Obs	257,159	235,176	332,203	301,814

E) 12 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1975-1986 & 1987-1998 Birth Cohorts)				
Single Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	0.020***	0.023***	0.012**	0.013*
	[0.005]	[0.007]	[0.005]	[0.006]
Quadratic				
Policy	-0.001	-0.011	-0.004	-0.014**
	[0.005]	[0.007]	[0.005]	[0.005]
Cubic				
Policy	-0.003	-0.013	-0.004	-0.017**
	[0.005]	[0.008]	[0.007]	[0.007]
Quartic				
Policy	0.004	-0.005	0.002	-0.010
	[0.004]	[0.009]	[0.006]	[0.007]
Split Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	0.008	-0.000	0.001	-0.005
	[0.006]	[0.007]	[0.004]	[0.005]
Quadratic				
Policy	0.002	-0.013	-0.001	-0.015
	[0.005]	[0.012]	[0.006]	[0.010]
Obs	313,747	291,764	400,659	370,270
F) 15 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1972-1986 & 1987-2001 Birth Cohorts)				
Single Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	0.028***	0.033***	0.018***	0.021***
	[0.005]	[0.007]	[0.005]	[0.006]
Quadratic				
Policy	0.001	-0.006	-0.002	-0.011**
	[0.005]	[0.006]	[0.005]	[0.005]
Cubic				
Policy	0.001	-0.007	-0.002	-0.011**
	[0.005]	[0.006]	[0.005]	[0.005]
Quartic				
Policy	-0.002	-0.017*	-0.003	-0.021**
	[0.006]	[0.010]	[0.007]	[0.009]
Split Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	0.013**	0.006	0.005	-0.000
	[0.006]	[0.007]	[0.004]	[0.005]
Quadratic				
Policy	0.004	-0.008	0.000	-0.010
	[0.005]	[0.011]	[0.005]	[0.008]
Obs	409,536	385,417	513,339	482,950

Calculations are based on Household Labor Force Survey Data from 2004 to 2015 by year of birth. Dummy used for new policy takes value one if year of birth is greater than 1987 and zero otherwise. Each cell is the outcome of the specified regression, and relevant standard errors are given. Control variables are survey year and the NUTS2 region current residence belongs, as well as time trend variables as specified in the table. Statistical significance is * at 10 percent level, ** at 5 percent level, and *** at 1 percent level. Clusters are at birth date level. Single time trends are specified as "t" for linear and "t+ t*t" for quadratic type. Split time trends are specified as "t*new policy" for linear an "(t+t*t)*new policy" for quadratic type.

Table B9. Wage Variables

	Monthly Ln(Wage)		Monthly Ln(Wage) Difference between Partners	
	Including 1986-87	Excluding 1986-87	Including 1986-87	Excluding 1986-87
A) 4 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1983-1986 & 1987-1990 Birth Cohorts)				
Single Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	-0.004	0.056	0.007	-0.019
	[0.021]	[0.052]	[0.012]	[0.030]
Quadratic				
Policy	0.002	0.105**	0.003	-0.050
	[0.031]	[0.036]	[0.020]	[0.033]
Split Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	-0.001	0.106**	0.005	-0.049
	[0.030]	[0.036]	[0.019]	[0.034]
Obs	23,080	17,372	13,917	10,666
B) 6 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1981-1986 & 1987-1992 Birth Cohorts)				
Single Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	-0.018	-0.001	0.009	-0.002
	[0.023]	[0.047]	[0.012]	[0.025]
Quadratic				
Policy	0.019	0.104***	-0.009	-0.053**
	[0.034]	[0.022]	[0.019]	[0.022]
Split Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	0.009	0.094***	-0.005	-0.051*
	[0.036]	[0.022]	[0.020]	[0.023]
Obs	36,145	30,437	21,944	18,693
C) 8 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1979-1986 & 1987-1994 Birth Cohorts)				
Single Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	-0.027	-0.019	0.013	0.009
	[0.022]	[0.039]	[0.016]	[0.027]
Quadratic				
Policy	0.024	0.095***	-0.024	-0.072**
	[0.033]	[0.024]	[0.022]	[0.024]
Cubic				
Policy	0.010	0.076**	-0.009	-0.052*
	[0.032]	[0.030]	[0.020]	[0.028]
Quartic				
Policy	0.003	0.120***	0.014	-0.020
	[0.036]	[0.028]	[0.015]	[0.025]
Split Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	0.012	0.089***	-0.015	-0.065**
	[0.037]	[0.020]	[0.024]	[0.025]
Quadratic				
Policy	-0.018	0.124***	0.023*	-0.020
	[0.028]	[0.037]	[0.013]	[0.036]
Obs	50,368	44,660	30,792	27,541
D) 10 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1977-1986 & 1987-1996 Birth Cohorts)				
Single Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	-0.051*	-0.054	0.007	0.001
	[0.025]	[0.041]	[0.014]	[0.022]
Quadratic				
Policy	0.030	0.098***	-0.022	-0.063**
	[0.035]	[0.024]	[0.021]	[0.028]
Cubic				
Policy	0.025	0.092***	-0.007	-0.039
	[0.034]	[0.028]	[0.018]	[0.024]
Quartic				
Policy	0.009	0.109***	0.002	-0.045
	[0.036]	[0.031]	[0.019]	[0.027]
Split Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	0.005	0.080***	-0.023	-0.073***
	[0.040]	[0.020]	[0.023]	[0.023]
Quadratic				
Policy	-0.004	0.135***	0.020	-0.036
	[0.031]	[0.031]	[0.017]	[0.032]
Obs	64,151	58,443	39,335	36,084

E) 12 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1975-1986 & 1987-1998 Birth Cohorts)				
Single Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	-0.090***	-0.106**	0.017	0.015
	[0.032]	[0.047]	[0.014]	[0.021]
Quadratic				
Policy	0.039	0.112***	-0.022	-0.060*
	[0.039]	[0.023]	[0.020]	[0.029]
Cubic				
Policy	0.043	0.117***	-0.020	-0.057**
	[0.037]	[0.027]	[0.020]	[0.025]
Quartic				
Policy	0.011	0.097**	0.002	-0.035
	[0.035]	[0.035]	[0.016]	[0.028]
Split Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	-0.015	0.058**	-0.017	-0.065***
	[0.045]	[0.024]	[0.023]	[0.022]
Quadratic				
Policy	0.011	0.152***	0.007	-0.063*
	[0.034]	[0.030]	[0.018]	[0.033]
Obs	77,224	71,516	47,313	44,062
F) 15 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1972-1986 & 1987-2001 Birth Cohorts)				
Single Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	-0.156***	-0.185***	0.021	0.021
	[0.038]	[0.053]	[0.014]	[0.020]
Quadratic				
Policy	0.047	0.118***	-0.011	-0.035
	[0.040]	[0.022]	[0.018]	[0.029]
Cubic				
Policy	0.044	0.116***	-0.020	-0.057**
	[0.038]	[0.022]	[0.019]	[0.021]
Quartic				
Policy	0.039	0.138***	-0.016	-0.062*
	[0.043]	[0.038]	[0.021]	[0.032]
Split Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	-0.057	0.015	-0.016	-0.064***
	[0.049]	[0.027]	[0.023]	[0.022]
Quadratic				
Policy	0.012	0.156***	0.010	-0.056*
	[0.035]	[0.027]	[0.017]	[0.030]
Obs	97,352	91,644	59,003	55,752

Calculations are based on Household Labor Force Survey Data from 2004 to 2015 by year of birth. Dummy used for new policy takes value of one if year of birth is greater than 1987 and zero otherwise. Each cell is the outcome of the specified regression, and relevant standard errors are given. Control variables are survey year and the NUTS2 region current residence belongs, as well as time trend variables as specified in the table. Statistical significance is * at 10 percent level, ** at 5 percent level, and *** at 1 percent level. Clusters are at birth date level. Single time trends are specified as "t" for linear and "t+ t*t" for quadratic type. Split time trends are specified as "t*new policy" for linear and "(t+t*t)*new policy" for quadratic type.

Table B10. Work Variables IV Results – TDHS

	Women Ever in the LF		Women Ever Worked	
	Including 1986-87	Excluding 1986-87	Including 1986-87	Excluding 1986-87
A) 3 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1984-1986 & 1987-1989 Birth Cohorts)				
OLS				
	0.143***	0.148***	0.121***	0.122***
	[0.027]	[0.036]	[0.027]	[0.036]
2SLS				
Single Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	0.174	0.585	0.265	0.607
	[0.359]	[0.413]	[0.400]	[0.434]
Split Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	-0.762	-3.694	0.386	0.643
	[2.255]	[9.670]	[0.384]	[0.417]
Obs	2,692	1,788	2,692	1,788
B) 4 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1983-1986 & 1987-1990 Birth Cohorts)				
OLS				
	0.156***	0.165***	0.129***	0.131***
	[0.025]	[0.030]	[0.025]	[0.030]
2SLS				
Single Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	0.325	0.513**	0.320	0.469*
	[0.220]	[0.229]	[0.253]	[0.253]
Split Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	0.284	0.986	0.413*	0.521**
	[0.506]	[0.634]	[0.248]	[0.260]
Obs	3,566	2,662	3,566	2,662
C) 5 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1982-1986 & 1987-1991 Birth Cohorts)				
OLS				
	0.154***	0.157***	0.132***	0.133***
	[0.022]	[0.026]	[0.022]	[0.026]
2SLS				
Single Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	0.432***	0.570***	0.434**	0.549***
	[0.167]	[0.177]	[0.181]	[0.185]
Split Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	0.352	0.740*	0.473**	0.565***
	[0.358]	[0.394]	[0.194]	[0.211]
Obs	4,420	3,516	4,420	3,516
D) 6 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1981-1986 & 1987-1992 Birth Cohorts)				
OLS				
	0.161***	0.166***	0.140***	0.142***
	[0.020]	[0.022]	[0.020]	[0.022]
2SLS				
Single Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	0.382***	0.475***	0.339**	0.409**
	[0.144]	[0.156]	[0.144]	[0.168]
Quadratic				
Policy	0.390**	0.482***	0.361**	0.413**
	[0.156]	[0.174]	[0.156]	[0.187]
Split Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	0.431	0.725**	0.369**	0.418**
	[0.268]	[0.314]	[0.153]	[0.186]
Quadratic				
Policy	0.397***	0.487***	0.518	0.892*
	[0.153]	[0.172]	[0.314]	[0.535]
Obs	5,307	4,403	5,307	4,403

E) 8 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1979-1986 & 1987-1994 Birth Cohorts)				
OLS				
	0.150***	0.151***	0.133***	0.134***
	[0.018]	[0.020]	[0.018]	[0.020]
2SLS				
Single Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	0.292**	0.338***	0.228*	0.255**
	[0.117]	[0.126]	[0.124]	[0.129]
Quadratic				
Policy	0.374***	0.424***	0.311**	0.330**
	[0.122]	[0.134]	[0.129]	[0.139]
Split Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	0.453**	0.608***	0.300**	0.315**
	[0.198]	[0.226]	[0.127]	[0.139]
Quadratic				
Policy	0.359***	0.408***	0.486*	0.688*
	[0.121]	[0.132]	[0.288]	[0.368]
Obs	7,011	6,107	7,011	6,107
F) 10 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1977-1986 & 1987-1996 Birth Cohorts)				
OLS				
	0.149***	0.150***	0.135***	0.136***
	[0.016]	[0.017]	[0.015]	[0.016]
2SLS				
Single Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	0.393***	0.442***	0.286**	0.312***
	[0.117]	[0.125]	[0.117]	[0.119]
Quadratic				
Policy	0.540***	0.599***	0.414***	0.439***
	[0.111]	[0.121]	[0.113]	[0.121]
Split Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	0.355**	0.428***	0.396***	0.420***
	[0.144]	[0.161]	[0.111]	[0.121]
Quadratic				
Policy	0.517***	0.576***	0.337*	0.408*
	[0.110]	[0.119]	[0.198]	[0.243]
Obs	8,831	7,927	8,831	7,927

Calculations are based on 2013 Demographic and Health Survey data, by month of birth. value of one if year of birth is greater than 1987. Each cell is the outcome of the specified regression, and relevant standard errors are given. Control variables are mont of birth, survey year, childhood residence, the NUTS1 region current residence belongs, and mother tongue of the respondent, as well as time trend variables as specified in the table. Statistical significance is * at 10 percent level, ** at 5 percent level, and *** at 1 percent level. Clusters are at birth date level. Single time trends are specified as "t" for linear and "t+ t*t" for quadratic type. Split time trends are specified as "t*new policy" for linear and "(t+t*t)*new policy" for quadratic type.

Table B11. Work Variables IV Results – HLFS

	Women in the LF		Women Working	
	Including 1986-87	Excluding 1986-87	Including 1986-87	Excluding 1986-87
A) 4 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1983-1986 & 1987-1990 Birth Cohorts)				
OLS				
	0.181***	0.193***	0.108***	0.120***
	[0.021]	[0.025]	[0.018]	[0.021]
2SLS				
Single Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	0,017	0,073	0,043	0,069*
	[0.022]	[0.017]	[0.014]	[0.059]
Quadratic				
Policy	0,027	0,089***	0,044	0,071***
	[0.010]	[0.017]	[0.015]	[0.022]
Split Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	0,032	0,098***	0,053	0,077***
	[0.019]	[0.023]	[0.013]	[0.020]
Obs	351,305	256,069	351,305	256,069
B) 6 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1981-1986 & 1987-1992 Birth Cohorts)				
OLS				
	0.187***	0.197***	0.118***	0.128***
	[0.018]	[0.020]	[0.017]	[0.018]
2SLS				
Single Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	-0,028	-0,009	0,028	0,042
	[0.010]	[0.017]	[0.015]	[0.022]
Quadratic				
Policy	0,022	0,063***	0,058	0,087***
	[0.007]	[0.010]	[0.018]	[0.011]
Split Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	0,008	0,056**	0,065	0,087**
	[0.016]	[0.035]	[0.014]	[0.015]
Obs	509,188	413,952	509,188	413,952
C) 8 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1979-1986 & 1987-1994 Birth Cohorts)				
OLS				
	0.190***	0.192***	0.139***	0.133***
	[0.016]	[0.021]	[0.014]	[0.015]
2SLS				
Single Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	-0,077	-0,067	0,045	-0,033
	[0.007]	[0.010]	[0.018]	[0.011]
Quadratic				
Policy	0,021**	0,058***	0,007	0,015***
	[0.015]	[0.023]	[0.013]	[0.004]
Cubic				
Policy	0,010	0,055**	0,049	0,011***
	[0.025]	[0.005]	[0.017]	[0.004]
Quartic				
Policy	0,011	0,073**	0,031	0,017**
	[0.007]	[0.015]	[0.022]	[0.010]
Split Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	0,000	0,045**	0,021**	0,041**
	[0.018]	[0.029]	[0.014]	[0.027]
Quadratic				
Policy	0,008	0,013	0,001	0,081*
	[0.010]	[0.017]	[0.015]	[0.072]
Obs	679,535	557,341	679,535	557,341

D) 10 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1977-1986 & 1987-1996 Birth Cohorts)				
OLS				
	0.188***	0.198***	0.131***	0.139***
	[0.018]	[0.017]	[0.014]	[0.014]
2SLS				
Single Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	0,148	0,155***	0,012	0,015
	[0.022]	[0.017]	[0.014]	[0.017]
Quadratic				
Policy	0,013***	0,049***	0,082***	0,102***
	[0.003]	[0.005]	[0.018]	[0.009]
Cubic				
Policy	0,008	0,031**	0,057**	0,098***
	[0.029]	[0.011]	[0.018]	[0.017]
Quartic				
Policy	0,034*	0,144***	0,051**	0,112***
	[0.023]	[0.009]	[0.023]	[0.002]
Split Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	0,020	0,025**	0,066	0,089**
	[0.024]	[0.009]	[0.058]	[0.048]
Quadratic				
Policy	0,000	0,000	0,034	0,056
	[0.002]	[0.019]	[0.022]	[0.037]
Obs	774,771	679,535	774,771	679,535
E) 12 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1975-1986 & 1987-1998 Birth Cohorts)				
OLS				
	0.193***	0.202***	0.136***	0.143***
	[0.014]	[0.015]	[0.013]	[0.012]
2SLS				
Single Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	0,191***	0,209***	0,073	0,088
	[0.029]	[0.016]	[0.018]	[0.017]
Quadratic				
Policy	0,022*	0,044***	0,073***	0,085***
	[0.015]	[0.012]	[0.035]	[0.016]
Cubic				
Policy	0,022	0,004***	0,048	0,055***
	[0.023]	[0.001]	[0.032]	[0.018]
Quartic				
Policy	0,001	0,031**	0,045	0,058**
	[0.025]	[0.014]	[0.031]	[0.038]
Split Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	0,024*	0,022*	0,042	0,062**
	[0.021]	[0.018]	[0.014]	[0.044]
Quadratic				
Policy	0,000	0,000	0,034	0,048*
	[0.021]	[0.038]	[0.035]	[0.040]
Obs	877,896	782,660	877,896	782,660

F) 15 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1972-1986 & 1987-2001 Birth Cohorts)				
OLS				
	0.194***	0.202***	0.139***	0.146***
	[0.014]	[0.013]	[0.011]	[0.011]
2SLS				
Single Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	0,306***	0,343***	0,165***	0,192**
	[0.026]	[0.009]	[0.034]	[0.018]
Quadratic				
Policy	0,034*	0,053**	0,073***	0,081***
	[0.029]	[0.034]	[0.034]	[0.018]
Cubic				
Policy	0,055	0,048	0,033	0,041
	[0.026]	[0.011]	[0.033]	[0.014]
Quartic				
Policy	0,006	0,032***	0,053	0,061***
	[0.027]	[0.008]	[0.034]	[0.014]
Split Time Trends				
Linear				
Policy	0,043	0,009*	0,019	0,042
	[0.014]	[0.007]	[0.016]	[0.022]
Quadratic				
Policy	0,000	0,000	0,014	0,031
	[0.015]	[0.009]	[0.018]	[0.041]
Obs	1,020,162	924,926	1,020,162	924,926

Calculations are based on Household Labor Force Survey Data from 2004 to 2015 by year of birth. Dummy used for new policy takes value o one if year of birth is greater than 1987 and zero otherwise. Each cell is the outcome of the specified regression, and relevant standard errors are given. Control variables are survey year and the NUTS2 region current residence belongs, as well as time trend variables as specified in the table. Statistical significance is * at 10 percent level, ** at 5 percent level, and *** at 1 percent level. Clusters are at birth date level. Single time trends are specified as "t" for linear and "t+ t*t" for quadratic type. Split time trends are specified as "t*new policy" for linear and "(t+t*t)*new policy" for quadratic type. For Labor Force Participation, Data until 2013 survey is used.

Table B12. Effect of Policy on Gender Role Attitudes

	Men should help with household chores.		Women should not work if they have small children.		A woman may go anywhere without husband's permission.*	
	Including 1986-87	Excluding 1986-87	Including 1986-87	Excluding 1986-87	Including 1986-87	Excluding 1986-87
A) 3 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1984-1986 & 1987-1989 Birth Cohorts)						
Single Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	-0.063	0.047	-0.023	-0.057	-0.109*	-0.073
	[0.045]	[0.083]	[0.037]	[0.100]	[0.056]	[0.093]
Split Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	-0.071	0.059	-0.021	-0.035	-0.092	-0.017
	[0.046]	[0.082]	[0.039]	[0.102]	[0.057]	[0.102]
Obs	2,327	1,524	2,291	1,502	948	631
B) 4 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1983-1986 & 1987-1990 Birth Cohorts)						
Single Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	-0.072*	-0.038	-0.051	-0.115*	-0.092*	-0.073
	[0.037]	[0.057]	[0.032]	[0.063]	[0.050]	[0.093]
Split Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	-0.071*	-0.006	-0.038	-0.074	-0.066	-0.017
	[0.038]	[0.057]	[0.033]	[0.062]	[0.051]	[0.102]
Obs	3,053	2,250	3,008	2,219	1,264	948
C) 5 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1982-1986 & 1987-1991 Birth Cohorts)						
Single Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	-0.071**	-0.051	-0.037	-0.059	-0.068	-0.026
	[0.034]	[0.044]	[0.030]	[0.051]	[0.045]	[0.073]
Split Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	-0.084**	-0.057	-0.038	-0.057	-0.041	0.023
	[0.034]	[0.045]	[0.031]	[0.055]	[0.045]	[0.081]
Obs	3,762	2,959	3,710	2,921	1,527	1,210
D) 6 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1981-1986 & 1987-1992 Birth Cohorts)						
Single Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	-0.059*	-0.036	-0.035	-0.050	-0.024	0.047
	[0.031]	[0.039]	[0.028]	[0.043]	[0.045]	[0.068]
Quadratic						
Policy	-0.078**	-0.054	-0.045	-0.067	-0.029	0.054
	[0.033]	[0.044]	[0.031]	[0.049]	[0.047]	[0.087]
Split Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	-0.075**	-0.047	-0.042	-0.059	-0.006	0.084
	[0.033]	[0.043]	[0.030]	[0.048]	[0.045]	[0.085]
Quadratic						
Policy	-0.107**	-0.059	-0.010	0.012	-0.088	0.008
	[0.049]	[0.099]	[0.043]	[0.104]	[0.058]	[0.220]
Obs	4,459	3,656	4,393	3,604	1,813	1,496
E) 8 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1979-1986 & 1987-1994 Birth Cohorts)						
Single Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	-0.029	0.005	-0.027	-0.029	-0.024	0.023
	[0.026]	[0.030]	[0.025]	[0.035]	[0.039]	[0.052]
Quadratic						
Policy	-0.051*	-0.014	-0.029	-0.033	-0.037	0.044
	[0.030]	[0.037]	[0.028]	[0.041]	[0.048]	[0.085]
Split Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	-0.047	-0.008	-0.028	-0.029	-0.005	0.069
	[0.029]	[0.035]	[0.027]	[0.040]	[0.042]	[0.079]
Quadratic						
Policy	-0.098**	-0.061	-0.041	-0.077	-0.059	0.105
	[0.044]	[0.073]	[0.038]	[0.075]	[0.054]	[0.208]
Obs	5,739	4,936	5,663	4,874	2,377	2,060

F) 10 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1977-1986 & 1987-1996 Birth Cohorts)						
Single Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	-0.019	0.014	-0.038*	-0.045	-0.012	0.027
	[0.023]	[0.025]	[0.023]	[0.029]	[0.037]	[0.047]
Quadratic						
Policy	-0.042	-0.001	-0.028	-0.028	-0.032	0.049
	[0.028]	[0.033]	[0.027]	[0.038]	[0.049]	[0.084]
Split Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	-0.039	0.003	-0.034	-0.034	0.006	0.075
	[0.027]	[0.031]	[0.026]	[0.036]	[0.041]	[0.080]
Quadratic						
Policy	-0.086**	-0.041	-0.030	-0.038	-0.030	0.162
	[0.039]	[0.058]	[0.036]	[0.067]	[0.053]	[0.208]
Obs	6,949	6,146	6,862	6,073	2,915	2,598

Calculations are based on 2008 and 2013 Demographic and Health Survey data, by date of birth. Only ever-married women are considered. Dummy used for new policy takes value of one if year of birth is greater than 1987. Each cell is the outcome of the specified regression, and relevant standard errors are given. Control variables are month of birth, survey year, childhood residence, the NUTS1 region current residence belongs, and mother tongue of the respondent, as well as time trend variables as specified in the table. Statistical significance is * at 10 percent level, ** at 5 percent level, and *** at 1 percent level. Clusters are at birth date level. For the variables with "*", only data from 2008 survey is available. Single time trends are specified as "t" for linear and "t+ t*t" for quadratic type. Split time trends are specified as "t*new policy" for linear and

Table B13. Effect of Policy on Gender Role Attitudes

	Men are wiser.*		Women should be more active in politics.		Women don't need to be virgins on wedding night.		Men should take important decisions.	
	Including 1986-87	Excluding 1986-87	Including 1986-87	Excluding 1986-87	Including 1986-87	Excluding 1986-87	Including 1986-87	Excluding 1986-87
A) 3 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1984-1986 & 1987-1989 Birth Cohorts)								
Single Time Trends								
Linear								
Policy	-0.043	-0.078	0.020	0.068	-0.004	0.068	-0.012	0.052
	[0.048]	[0.139]	[0.031]	[0.094]	[0.048]	[0.076]	[0.032]	[0.065]
Split Time Trends								
Linear								
Policy	-0.063	-0.076	0.011	0.056	-0.011	0.086	-0.011	0.054
	[0.045]	[0.136]	[0.031]	[0.092]	[0.047]	[0.080]	[0.033]	[0.070]
Obs	926	618	2,062	1,363	2,248	1,476	2,322	1,520
B) 4 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1983-1986 & 1987-1990 Birth Cohorts)								
Single Time Trends								
Linear								
Policy	-0.096**	-0.195**	0.022	0.036	0.008	0.049	-0.014	0.003
	[0.040]	[0.076]	[0.027]	[0.065]	[0.040]	[0.054]	[0.027]	[0.040]
Split Time Trends								
Linear								
Policy	-0.107***	-0.185**	0.012	0.025	0.003	0.066	-0.013	0.008
	[0.039]	[0.079]	[0.029]	[0.066]	[0.042]	[0.059]	[0.028]	[0.046]
Obs	1,241	933	2,711	2,012	2,949	2,177	3,052	2,250
C) 5 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1982-1986 & 1987-1991 Birth Cohorts)								
Single Time Trends								
Linear								
Policy	-0.092**	-0.153**	0.035	0.062	-0.001	0.023	0.004	0.034
	[0.037]	[0.063]	[0.026]	[0.048]	[0.035]	[0.045]	[0.024]	[0.032]
Split Time Trends								
Linear								
Policy	-0.108***	-0.151**	0.032	0.066	-0.011	0.023	0.002	0.034
	[0.037]	[0.068]	[0.027]	[0.050]	[0.036]	[0.049]	[0.026]	[0.036]
Obs	1,505	1,197	3,347	2,648	3,637	2,865	3,761	2,959
D) 6 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1981-1986 & 1987-1992 Birth Cohorts)								
Single Time Trends								
Linear								
Policy	-0.052	-0.062	0.024	0.033	0.007	0.035	-0.006	0.007
	[0.036]	[0.054]	[0.024]	[0.041]	[0.032]	[0.038]	[0.022]	[0.027]
Quadratic								
Policy	-0.094**	-0.124**	0.026	0.046	-0.004	0.031	-0.009	0.006
	[0.037]	[0.066]	[0.026]	[0.044]	[0.034]	[0.042]	[0.025]	[0.034]
Split Time Trends								
Linear								
Policy	-0.085**	-0.091**	0.022	0.040	-0.005	0.033	-0.008	0.006
	[0.036]	[0.043]	[0.025]	[0.043]	[0.033]	[0.041]	[0.024]	[0.033]
Quadratic								
Policy	-0.109**	-0.174**	0.038	0.133	-0.021	0.065	0.015	0.117
	[0.048]	[0.071]	[0.035]	[0.111]	[0.049]	[0.099]	[0.037]	[0.073]
Obs	1,784	1,476	3,950	3,251	4,304	3,532	4,456	3,654
E) 8 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1979-1986 & 1987-1994 Birth Cohorts)								
Single Time Trends								
Linear								
Policy	-0.036	-0.030	0.019	0.024	0.016	0.038	-0.012	-0.008
	[0.029]	[0.040]	[0.023]	[0.035]	[0.027]	[0.032]	[0.018]	[0.021]
Quadratic								
Policy	-0.086**	-0.109**	0.013	0.020	0.008	0.041	-0.014	-0.008
	[0.037]	[0.047]	[0.026]	[0.040]	[0.030]	[0.037]	[0.021]	[0.027]
Split Time Trends								
Linear								
Policy	-0.079**	-0.071*	0.012	0.020	0.007	0.042	-0.013	-0.008
	[0.033]	[0.040]	[0.025]	[0.039]	[0.029]	[0.036]	[0.021]	[0.026]
Quadratic								
Policy	-0.097**	-0.080	0.045	0.120	-0.023	0.028	-0.000	0.038
	[0.044]	[0.153]	[0.034]	[0.082]	[0.043]	[0.073]	[0.032]	[0.054]
Obs	2,330	2,022	5,111	4,412	5,548	4,776	5,731	4,929
F) 10 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1977-1986 & 1987-1996 Birth Cohorts)								
Single Time Trends								
Linear								
Policy	-0.010	0.008	0.021	0.027	0.022	0.040	-0.003	0.004
	[0.028]	[0.036]	[0.020]	[0.028]	[0.025]	[0.029]	[0.017]	[0.018]
Quadratic								
Policy	-0.073*	-0.085	0.008	0.012	0.008	0.037	-0.013	-0.007
	[0.037]	[0.062]	[0.024]	[0.036]	[0.028]	[0.035]	[0.020]	[0.026]
Split Time Trends								
Linear								
Policy	-0.062*	-0.043	0.008	0.015	0.009	0.041	-0.009	-0.002
	[0.032]	[0.059]	[0.023]	[0.034]	[0.027]	[0.034]	[0.019]	[0.025]
Quadratic								
Policy	-0.092**	-0.041	0.037	0.089	-0.017	0.039	-0.007	0.017
	[0.043]	[0.155]	[0.031]	[0.068]	[0.039]	[0.062]	[0.030]	[0.050]
Obs	2,861	2,553	6,220	5,521	6,714	5,942	6,942	6,140

Calculations are based on 2008 and 2013 Demographic and Health Survey data, by date of birth. Only ever-married women are considered. Dummy used for new policy takes value of one if year of birth is greater than 1987. Each cell is the outcome of the specified regression and relevant standard errors are given. Control variables are month of birth, survey year, childhood residence, the NUTS1 region current residence belongs, and mother tongue of the respondent, as well as time trend variables as specified in the table.Statistical significance is * at 10 percent level, ** at 5 percent level, and *** at 1 percent level. Clusters are at birth date level. For the variables with "*", only data from 2008 survey is available. Single time trends are specified as "t" for linear and "t+ t*t" for quadratic type. Split time trends are specified as "t*new policy" for linear and "(t+t*t)*new policy" for quadratic type.

Table B14. Effect of Policy on Gender Role Attitudes

	Wife does not have the right to express opinion.*		Educating sons is more important than educating daughters.		Ideal marriage age**	
	Including 1986-87	Excluding 1986-87	Including 1986-87	Excluding 1986-87	Including 1986-87	Excluding 1986-87
A) 3 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1984-1986 & 1987-1989 Birth Cohorts)						
Single Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	0.066	-0.214	-0.009	-0.055	-0.612*	0.321
	[0.071]	[0.149]	[0.024]	[0.077]	[0.307]	[0.593]
Split Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	0.070	-0.191	-0.015	-0.052	-0.614**	0.324
	[0.075]	[0.166]	[0.023]	[0.078]	[0.307]	[0.598]
Obs	945	628	2,326	1,522	1,661	1,102
B) 4 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1983-1986 & 1987-1990 Birth Cohorts)						
Single Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	0.099	0.053	-0.007	-0.021	-0.327	0.472
	[0.064]	[0.113]	[0.020]	[0.047]	[0.293]	[0.455]
Split Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	0.127*	0.128	-0.005	-0.001	-0.301	0.470
	[0.067]	[0.112]	[0.021]	[0.048]	[0.284]	[0.433]
Obs	1,262	945	3,055	2,251	2,189	1,630
C) 5 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1982-1986 & 1987-1991 Birth Cohorts)						
Single Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	0.068	-0.015	-0.005	-0.011	-0.082	0.759*
	[0.061]	[0.107]	[0.019]	[0.036]	[0.273]	[0.388]
Split Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	0.106*	0.065	-0.006	-0.002	-0.051	0.771**
	[0.061]	[0.105]	[0.020]	[0.039]	[0.259]	[0.371]
Obs	1,528	1,211	3,764	2,960	2,749	2,190
D) 6 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1981-1986 & 1987-1992 Birth Cohorts)						
Single Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	0.012	-0.098	-0.003	-0.004	0.120	0.912***
	[0.056]	[0.088]	[0.018]	[0.029]	[0.261]	[0.334]
Quadratic						
Policy	0.087	0.017	0.001	0.012	0.149	0.930***
	[0.060]	[0.108]	[0.019]	[0.034]	[0.242]	[0.308]
Split Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	0.074	0.021	-0.001	0.012	0.148	0.915***
	[0.057]	[0.097]	[0.019]	[0.033]	[0.242]	[0.310]
Quadratic						
Policy	0.064	-0.285	-0.010	-0.012	-0.535	0.307
	[0.085]	[0.219]	[0.025]	[0.078]	[0.333]	[0.695]
Obs	1,814	1,497	4,460	3,656	3,316	2,757
E) 8 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1979-1986 & 1987-1994 Birth Cohorts)						
Single Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	0.019	-0.053	0.008	0.016	-0.213	0.087
	[0.046]	[0.060]	[0.017]	[0.025]	[0.256]	[0.317]
Quadratic						
Policy	0.089	0.013	0.013	0.030	-0.181	0.100
	[0.063]	[0.109]	[0.019]	[0.030]	[0.212]	[0.263]
Split Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	0.094*	0.073	0.013	0.033	-0.180	0.085
	[0.053]	[0.084]	[0.018]	[0.029]	[0.212]	[0.263]
Quadratic						
Policy	0.054	-0.241	-0.019	-0.027	-0.052	1.146**
	[0.083]	[0.204]	[0.024]	[0.059]	[0.310]	[0.524]
Obs	2,377	2,060	5,738	4,934	4,399	3,840

F) 10 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1977-1986 & 1987-1996 Birth Cohorts)						
Single Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	0.030	-0.021	0.012	0.020	-0.395	-0.249
	[0.042]	[0.054]	[0.016]	[0.021]	[0.239]	[0.283]
Quadratic						
Policy	0.059	-0.047	0.010	0.024	-0.361*	-0.225
	[0.062]	[0.104]	[0.019]	[0.030]	[0.197]	[0.233]
Split Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	0.108**	0.099	0.013	0.031	-0.361*	-0.237
	[0.051]	[0.083]	[0.018]	[0.029]	[0.193]	[0.227]
Quadratic						
Policy	0.045	-0.218	-0.004	0.021	0.029	0.884**
	[0.079]	[0.194]	[0.024]	[0.054]	[0.294]	[0.423]
Obs	2,915	2,598	6,947	6,143	5,610	5,051

Calculations are based on 2008 and 2013 Demographic and Health Survey data, by date of birth. Only ever-married women are considered. Dummy used for new policy takes value of one if year of birth is greater than 1987. Each cell is the outcome of the specified regression, and relevant standard errors are given. Control variables are month of birth, survey year, childhood residence, the NUTS1 region current residence belongs, and mother tongue of the respondent, as well as time trend variables as specified in the table. Statistical significance is * at 10 percent level, ** at 5 percent level, and *** at 1 percent level. Clusters are at birth date level. For the variables with "*", only data from 2008 survey is available. Single time trends are specified as "t" for linear and "t+ t*t" for quadratic type. Split time trends are specified as "t*new policy" for linear and (t+t*t)*new policy for quadratic type.

Table B15. Effect of Policy on Money and Asset Holdings

	Have Money to Spend (Alone or Jointly)		Own House (Alone or Jointly)		Own Land (Alone or Jointly)		Own Any (Alone or Jointly)	
	Including 1986-87	Excluding 1986-87	Including 1986-87	Excluding 1986-87	Including 1986-87	Excluding 1986-87	Including 1986-87	Excluding 1986-87
A) 3 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1984-1986 & 1987-1989 Birth Cohorts)								
Single Time Trends								
Linear								
Policy	0.046	0.124	0.003	-0.037	-0.020	-0.048	-0.058	-0.161
	[0.048]	[0.148]	[0.032]	[0.086]	[0.020]	[0.050]	[0.044]	[0.119]
Split Time Trends								
Linear								
Policy	0.052	0.123	0.002	-0.035	-0.017	-0.046	-0.059	-0.159
	[0.047]	[0.149]	[0.032]	[0.084]	[0.019]	[0.049]	[0.043]	[0.117]
Obs	1,368	886	1,375	892	1,375	892	1,375	892
B) 4 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1983-1986 & 1987-1990 Birth Cohorts)								
Single Time Trends								
Linear								
Policy	0.077*	0.148	-0.008	-0.046	-0.019	-0.028	-0.041	-0.050
	[0.046]	[0.098]	[0.029]	[0.029]	[0.018]	[0.038]	[0.040]	[0.078]
Split Time Trends								
Linear								
Policy	0.075*	0.130*	-0.010	-0.050	-0.017	-0.026	-0.040	-0.046
	[0.044]	[0.086]	[0.028]	[0.028]	[0.017]	[0.036]	[0.038]	[0.074]
Obs	1,777	1,295	1,785	1,302	1,785	1,302	1,784	1,301
C) 5 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1982-1986 & 1987-1991 Birth Cohorts)								
Single Time Trends								
Linear								
Policy	0.075*	0.142**	-0.016	-0.045	-0.007	-0.000	-0.026	-0.018
	[0.040]	[0.061]	[0.024]	[0.047]	[0.019]	[0.036]	[0.037]	[0.065]
Split Time Trends								
Linear								
Policy	0.078**	0.111**	-0.015	-0.043	-0.012	-0.012	-0.031	-0.025
	[0.039]	[0.052]	[0.024]	[0.046]	[0.019]	[0.036]	[0.036]	[0.063]
Obs	2,856	1,735	2,227	1,744	2,227	1,744	2,226	1,743
D) 6 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1981-1986 & 1987-1992 Birth Cohorts)								
Single Time Trends								
Linear								
Policy	0.075*	0.101**	-0.017	-0.040	-0.020	-0.027	-0.027	-0.021
	[0.038]	[0.050]	[0.023]	[0.040]	[0.016]	[0.026]	[0.031]	[0.048]
Quadratic								
Policy	0.075**	0.096**	-0.016	-0.039	-0.025	-0.038	-0.030	-0.072**
	[0.037]	[0.041]	[0.023]	[0.039]	[0.016]	[0.027]	[0.031]	[0.026]
Split Time Trends								
Linear								
Policy	0.076**	0.096**	-0.017	-0.040	-0.025	-0.038	-0.030	-0.025
	[0.037]	[0.040]	[0.023]	[0.039]	[0.016]	[0.027]	[0.031]	[0.048]
Quadratic								
Policy	0.056	0.129	-0.003	-0.067	0.009	0.066	-0.050	-0.097**
	[0.055]	[0.147]	[0.031]	[0.088]	[0.022]	[0.061]	[0.047]	[0.035]
Obs	2,623	2,141	2,636	2,153	2,636	2,153	2,635	2,152
E) 8 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1979-1986 & 1987-1994 Birth Cohorts)								
Single Time Trends								
Linear								
Policy	0.018	0.080**	-0.038	-0.068*	-0.028**	-0.038*	-0.070**	-0.094**
	[0.035]	[0.039]	[0.023]	[0.036]	[0.013]	[0.020]	[0.030]	[0.042]
Quadratic								
Policy	0.034**	0.054**	-0.033	-0.062*	-0.029**	-0.039**	-0.062**	-0.081*
	[0.015]	[0.023]	[0.023]	[0.036]	[0.013]	[0.020]	[0.029]	[0.042]
Split Time Trends								
Linear								
Policy	0.031**	0.057**	-0.036	-0.065*	-0.030**	-0.041**	-0.066**	-0.087**
	[0.0314]	[0.022]	[0.023]	[0.037]	[0.013]	[0.020]	[0.029]	[0.042]
Quadratic								
Policy	0.089*	0.175*	0.002	-0.031	-0.012	-0.019	-0.013	0.017
	[0.049]	[0.100]	[0.028]	[0.060]	[0.020]	[0.044]	[0.042]	[0.083]
Obs	3,330	2,848	3,350	2,867	3,350	2,867	3,349	2,866
F) 10 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1977-1986 & 1987-1996 Birth Cohorts)								
Single Time Trends								
Linear								
Policy	0.017	0.104***	-0.007	-0.013	-0.022	-0.026	-0.057**	-0.069**
	[0.031]	[0.033]	[0.022]	[0.031]	[0.014]	[0.020]	[0.028]	[0.031]
Quadratic								
Policy	0.042	0.040	-0.013	-0.027	-0.022*	-0.025	-0.050*	-0.059**
	[0.032]	[0.045]	[0.021]	[0.032]	[0.013]	[0.019]	[0.028]	[0.020]
Split Time Trends								
Linear								
Policy	0.037	0.031	-0.011	-0.021	-0.023*	-0.028	-0.054**	-0.062**
	[0.031]	[0.044]	[0.021]	[0.031]	[0.013]	[0.019]	[0.027]	[0.026]
Quadratic								
Policy	0.068	0.100	-0.027	-0.085	-0.025	-0.043	-0.044	-0.055*
	[0.044]	[0.082]	[0.026]	[0.052]	[0.018]	[0.037]	[0.038]	[0.035]
Obs	3,995	3,513	4,019	3,536	4,019	3,536	4,018	3,535

Calculations are based on 2008 and 2013 Demographic and Health Survey data, by date of birth. Only ever-married women are considered. Dummy used for new policy takes value of one if year of birth is greater than 1987. Each cell is the outcome of the specified regression, and relevant standard errors are given. Control variables are month of birth, survey year, childhood residence, the NUTS1 region current residence belongs, and mother tongue of the respondent, as well as time trend variables as specified in the table. Statistical significance is * at 10 percent level, ** at 5 percent level, and *** at 1 percent level. Clusters are at birth date level. Only ever-married women who are 18 years old or older are considered. Single time trends are specified as "t" for linear and "t+ t*t" for quadratic type. Split time trends are specified as "t*new policy" for linear and "(t+t*t)*new policy" for quadratic type.

Table B16. Effect of Policy on Money and Asset Holdings (Jointly)

	Own Car (Jointly)		Own House (Jointly)		Own Land (Jointly)	
	Including 1986-87	Excluding 1986-87	Including 1986-87	Excluding 1986-87	Including 1986-87	Excluding 1986-87
A) 3 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1984-1986 & 1987-1989 Birth Cohorts)						
Single Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	-0.015	-0.057	0.024	0.041	-0.018	-0.037
	[0.034]	[0.068]	[0.027]	[0.068]	[0.016]	[0.028]
Split Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	-0.016	-0.050	0.022	0.041	-0.018	-0.037
	[0.034]	[0.068]	[0.026]	[0.068]	[0.016]	[0.028]
Obs	1,733	1,152	1,733	1,152	1,733	1,132
B) 4 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1983-1986 & 1987-1990 Birth Cohorts)						
Single Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	-0.018	-0.035	0.007	-0.017	-0.019	-0.031
	[0.028]	[0.040]	[0.023]	[0.045]	[0.014]	[0.023]
Split Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	-0.018	-0.035	0.005	-0.017	-0.019	-0.031
	[0.028]	[0.040]	[0.022]	[0.045]	[0.014]	[0.023]
Obs	2,283	1,702	2,284	1,703	2,284	1,703
C) 5 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1982-1986 & 1987-1991 Birth Cohorts)						
Single Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	-0.022	-0.032	0.000	-0.018	-0.018	-0.025
	[0.027]	[0.034]	[0.021]	[0.035]	[0.013]	[0.022]
Split Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	-0.021	-0.032	0.000	-0.018	-0.019	-0.026
	[0.026]	[0.034]	[0.020]	[0.035]	[0.013]	[0.022]
Obs	2,866	2,285	2,867	2,286	2,867	2,286
D) 6 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1981-1986 & 1987-1992 Birth Cohorts)						
Single Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	-0.024	-0.033	-0.005	-0.022	-0.029**	-0.045**
	[0.023]	[0.027]	[0.019]	[0.031]	[0.012]	[0.018]
Quadratic						
Policy	-0.023	-0.032	-0.005	-0.022	-0.030**	-0.046**
	[0.023]	[0.026]	[0.019]	[0.031]	[0.012]	[0.018]
Split Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	-0.023	-0.033	-0.005	-0.022	-0.030**	-0.045**
	[0.022]	[0.027]	[0.019]	[0.031]	[0.012]	[0.018]
Quadratic						
Policy	-0.020	-0.038	0.015	-0.002	-0.002	0.016
	[0.033]	[0.060]	[0.024]	[0.059]	[0.018]	[0.042]
Obs	3,451	2,870	3,452	2,871	3,452	2,871
E) 8 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1979-1986 & 1987-1994 Birth Cohorts)						
Single Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	-0.027	-0.036	-0.030	-0.057**	-0.029***	-0.039***
	[0.020]	[0.022]	[0.018]	[0.026]	[0.010]	[0.013]
Quadratic						
Policy	-0.026	-0.035	-0.030	-0.057**	-0.029***	-0.039***
	[0.019]	[0.022]	[0.018]	[0.026]	[0.010]	[0.013]
Split Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	-0.026	-0.035	-0.030	-0.057**	-0.029***	-0.039***
	[0.019]	[0.022]	[0.018]	[0.026]	[0.010]	[0.013]
Quadratic						
Policy	-0.019	-0.027	0.025	0.019	-0.019	-0.033
	[0.030]	[0.044]	[0.022]	[0.042]	[0.016]	[0.030]
Obs	4,581	4,000	4,582	4,001	4,582	4,001
F) 10 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1977-1986 & 1987-1996 Birth Cohorts)						
Single Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	-0.021	-0.025	-0.013	-0.025	-0.022**	-0.025**
	[0.018]	[0.019]	[0.016]	[0.021]	[0.009]	[0.012]
Quadratic						
Policy	-0.020	-0.024	-0.014	-0.025	-0.022**	-0.025**
	[0.017]	[0.019]	[0.016]	[0.021]	[0.009]	[0.012]
Split Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	-0.020	-0.024	-0.014	-0.025	-0.022**	-0.025**
	[0.017]	[0.019]	[0.016]	[0.021]	[0.009]	[0.012]
Quadratic						
Policy	-0.021	-0.031	-0.012	-0.055	-0.028**	-0.046**
	[0.026]	[0.036]	[0.022]	[0.037]	[0.014]	[0.022]
Obs	5,856	5,275	5,857	5,276	5,857	5,276

Calculations are based on 2008 and 2013 Demographic and Health Survey data, by date of birth. Only ever-married women are considered. Dummy used for new policy takes value of one if year of birth is greater than 1987. Each cell is the outcome of the specified regression, and relevant standard errors are given. Control variables are month of birth, survey year, childhood residence, the NUTS1 region current residence belongs, and mother tongue of the respondent, as well as time trend variables as specified in the table. Statistical significance is * at 10 percent level, ** at 5 percent level, and *** at 1 percent level. Clusters are at birth date level. Only ever-married women who are 18 years old or older are considered. Single time trends are specified as "t" for linear and "t+ t*t" for quadratic type. Split time trends are specified as "t*new policy" for linear and "(t+t*t)*new policy" for quadratic type.

Table B17. Effect of Policy on Money and Asset Holdings (Alone)

	Own Car (Alone)		Own House (Alone)		Own Land (Alone)	
	Including 1986-87	Excluding 1986-87	Including 1986-87	Excluding 1986-87	Including 1986-87	Excluding 1986-87
A) 3 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1984-1986 & 1987-1989 Birth Cohorts)						
Single Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	-0.030*	-0.059	-0.030*	-0.051	0.001	-0.023
	[0.018]	[0.052]	[0.015]	[0.050]	[0.007]	[0.022]
Split Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	-0.029	-0.066	-0.028*	-0.056	0.001	-0.025
	[0.018]	[0.051]	[0.015]	[0.052]	[0.007]	[0.022]
Obs	1,733	1,152	1,733	1,152	1,733	1,152
B) 4 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1983-1986 & 1987-1990 Birth Cohorts)						
Single Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	-0.017	-0.006	-0.016	-0.002	-0.000	-0.012
	[0.018]	[0.041]	[0.016]	[0.041]	[0.007]	[0.016]
Split Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	-0.017	-0.006	-0.015	-0.002	-0.000	-0.012
	[0.017]	[0.041]	[0.015]	[0.042]	[0.007]	[0.016]
Obs	2,283	1,702	2,284	1,703	2,284	1,703
C) 5 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1982-1986 & 1987-1991 Birth Cohorts)						
Single Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	-0.015	-0.009	-0.010	0.006	0.007	0.007
	[0.016]	[0.031]	[0.014]	[0.029]	[0.007]	[0.013]
Split Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	-0.017	-0.009	-0.010	0.006	0.006	0.007
	[0.015]	[0.031]	[0.014]	[0.029]	[0.006]	[0.013]
Obs	2,866	2,285	2,867	2,286	2,867	2,286
D) 6 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1981-1986 & 1987-1992 Birth Cohorts)						
Single Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	-0.022	-0.022	-0.009	0.003	0.005	0.003
	[0.015]	[0.025]	[0.014]	[0.024]	[0.006]	[0.010]
Quadratic						
Policy	-0.022	-0.023**	-0.009	0.003	0.004	0.003
	[0.014]	[0.010]	[0.013]	[0.023]	[0.006]	[0.010]
Split Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	-0.022	-0.023	-0.009	0.003	0.004	0.003
	[0.014]	[0.025]	[0.013]	[0.024]	[0.006]	[0.010]
Quadratic						
Policy	-0.025	-0.035**	-0.027	-0.033	0.008	0.014
	[0.021]	[0.011]	[0.016]	[0.063]	[0.008]	[0.024]
Obs	3,451	2,870	3,452	2,871	3,452	2,871
E) 8 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1979-1986 & 1987-1994 Birth Cohorts)						
Single Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	-0.036***	-0.043**	-0.012	-0.006	0.001	-0.002
	[0.013]	[0.019]	[0.012]	[0.018]	[0.006]	[0.008]
Quadratic						
Policy	-0.035***	-0.043**	-0.012	-0.006	0.001	-0.002
	[0.013]	[0.019]	[0.012]	[0.018]	[0.005]	[0.008]
Split Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	-0.036***	-0.043**	-0.012	-0.006	0.001	-0.002
	[0.013]	[0.019]	[0.012]	[0.018]	[0.005]	[0.008]
Quadratic						
Policy	-0.013	0.005	-0.013	0.006	0.005	0.002
	[0.018]	[0.043]	[0.016]	[0.041]	[0.007]	[0.018]
Obs	4,581	4,000	4,582	4,001	4,582	4,001
F) 10 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1977-1986 & 1987-1996 Birth Cohorts)						
Single Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	-0.035***	-0.040***	-0.007	-0.001	-0.003	-0.007
	[0.011]	[0.015]	[0.011]	[0.015]	[0.005]	[0.007]
Quadratic						
Policy	-0.035***	-0.039***	-0.008	-0.002	-0.003	-0.007
	[0.011]	[0.015]	[0.011]	[0.014]	[0.005]	[0.007]
Split Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	-0.035***	-0.040***	-0.008	-0.002	-0.003	-0.007
	[0.011]	[0.015]	[0.011]	[0.014]	[0.005]	[0.007]
Quadratic						
Policy	-0.027*	-0.032	-0.014	-0.002	0.004	0.001
	[0.016]	[0.031]	[0.015]	[0.030]	[0.006]	[0.013]
Obs	5,856	5,275	5,857	5,276	5,857	5,276

Calculations are based on 2008 and 2013 Demographic and Health Survey data, by date of birth. Only ever-married women are considered. Dummy used for new policy takes value of one if year of birth is greater than 1987. Each cell is the outcome of the specified regression, and relevant standard errors are given. Control variables are month of birth, survey year, childhood residence, the NUTS1 region current residence belongs, and mother tongue of the respondent, as well as time trend variables as specified in the table. Statistical significance * at 10 percent level, ** at 5 percent level, and *** at 1 percent level. Clusters are at birth date level. Only ever-married women who are 18 years old or older are considered. Single time trends are specified as "t" for linear and "t+ t*t" for quadratic type. Split time trends are specified as "t*new policy" for linear and "(t+t*t)*new policy" for quadratic type.

Table B18. Effect of Policy on Share of Household Chores

	Preparation of budget		Setting dinner table		Cooking	
	Including 1986-87	Excluding 1986-87	Including 1986-87	Excluding 1986-87	Including 1986-87	Excluding 1986-87
A) 3 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1984-1986 & 1987-1989 Birth Cohorts)						
Single Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	0.022	-0.016	0.002	0.079**	-0.027	0.003
	[0.023]	[0.050]	[0.024]	[0.039]	[0.019]	[0.063]
Split Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	0.024	-0.016	-0.000	0.087**	-0.026	0.019
	[0.022]	[0.051]	[0.026]	[0.039]	[0.020]	[0.063]
Obs	2,330	1,527	2,329	1,526	2,332	1,528
B) 4 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1983-1986 & 1987-1990 Birth Cohorts)						
Single Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	0.011	-0.026	0.004	0.050	-0.025	-0.011
	[0.020]	[0.036]	[0.021]	[0.031]	[0.018]	[0.043]
Split Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	0.013	-0.025	0.005	0.060*	-0.024	-0.000
	[0.020]	[0.038]	[0.022]	[0.030]	[0.020]	[0.048]
Obs	3,057	2,254	3,057	2,254	3,060	2,256
C) 5 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1982-1986 & 1987-1991 Birth Cohorts)						
Single Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	0.018	0.004	0.006	0.038	-0.027	-0.023
	[0.019]	[0.029]	[0.019]	[0.026]	[0.018]	[0.035]
Split Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	0.015	-0.006	0.006	0.047	-0.037*	-0.036
	[0.018]	[0.029]	[0.021]	[0.029]	[0.020]	[0.042]
Obs	3,743	2,940	3,743	2,940	3,746	2,942
D) 6 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1981-1986 & 1987-1992 Birth Cohorts)						
Single Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	0.016	0.002	0.017	0.052**	-0.014	0.000
	[0.017]	[0.026]	[0.017]	[0.023]	[0.016]	[0.027]
Quadratic						
Policy	0.012	-0.009	0.018	0.062***	-0.028	-0.020
	[0.017]	[0.026]	[0.019]	[0.023]	[0.018]	[0.033]
Split Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	0.013	-0.006	0.018	0.063***	-0.026	-0.014
	[0.017]	[0.026]	[0.019]	[0.023]	[0.017]	[0.032]
Quadratic						
Policy	0.008	-0.040	-0.016	0.056	-0.022	0.033
	[0.023]	[0.052]	[0.029]	[0.055]	[0.022]	[0.067]
Obs	4,440	3,637	4,440	3,637	4,443	3,639
E) 8 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1979-1986 & 1987-1994 Birth Cohorts)						
Single Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	0.019	0.013	0.013	0.032*	-0.009	0.004
	[0.014]	[0.019]	[0.015]	[0.018]	[0.015]	[0.023]
Quadratic						
Policy	0.016	0.004	0.010	0.035	-0.027	-0.019
	[0.015]	[0.021]	[0.018]	[0.023]	[0.017]	[0.029]
Split Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	0.017	0.006	0.011	0.036	-0.025	-0.016
	[0.015]	[0.020]	[0.017]	[0.022]	[0.017]	[0.028]
Quadratic						
Policy	0.008	-0.027	0.009	0.092**	-0.021	0.014
	[0.021]	[0.039]	[0.026]	[0.043]	[0.022]	[0.058]
Obs	5,721	4,918	5,723	4,920	5,726	4,922

F) 10 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1977-1986 & 1987-1996 Birth Cohorts)						
Single Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	0.011	0.002	0.016	0.032**	0.002	0.017
	[0.014]	[0.017]	[0.014]	[0.016]	[0.014]	[0.020]
Quadratic						
Policy	0.012	0.000	0.014	0.040*	-0.030*	-0.025
	[0.015]	[0.019]	[0.017]	[0.022]	[0.018]	[0.029]
Split Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	0.010	-0.002	0.016	0.041**	-0.025	-0.018
	[0.014]	[0.019]	[0.016]	[0.021]	[0.016]	[0.027]
Quadratic						
Policy	0.012	-0.013	0.006	0.075**	-0.020	0.013
	[0.020]	[0.035]	[0.024]	[0.036]	[0.022]	[0.053]
Obs	6,912	6,109	6,915	6,112	6,918	6,114

Dummy used for new policy takes value of one if year of birth is greater than 1987. Each cell is the outcome of the specified regression, and relevant standard errors are given.Calculations are based on 2008 and 2013 Demographic and Health Survey data, by date of birth. Only ever-married women are considered. Control variables are month of birth, survey year, childhood residence, the NUTS1 region currentresidence belongs, and mother tongue of the respondent, as well as time trend variables as specified in the table. Statistical significance is * at 10 percent level, ** at 5 percent level, and *** at 1 percentlevel. Clusters are at birth date level. Single time trends are specified as "t" for linear and "t+ t*t" for quadratic type. Split time trends are specified as "t*new policy" for linear and "(t+t*t)*new policy" for quadratic type.

Table B19. Effect of Policy on Share of Household Chores

	Ironing		Official business		Shopping for kitchen		Reparation	
	Including 1986-87	Excluding 1986-87	Including 1986-87	Excluding 1986-87	Including 1986-87	Excluding 1986-87	Including 1986-87	Excluding 1986-87
A) 3 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1984-1986 & 1987-1989 Birth Cohorts)								
Single Time Trends								
Linear								
Policy	0.033	0.022	0.012	-0.014	-0.013	-0.149*	0.018	0.008
	[0.022]	[0.052]	[0.027]	[0.051]	[0.036]	[0.078]	[0.012]	[0.027]
Split Time Trends								
Linear								
Policy	0.029	0.034	0.015	-0.015	-0.005	-0.134*	0.019	0.012
	[0.023]	[0.053]	[0.026]	[0.052]	[0.034]	[0.074]	[0.011]	[0.025]
Obs	2,332	1,528	2,331	1,527	2,329	1,527	2,332	1,528
B) 4 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1983-1986 & 1987-1990 Birth Cohorts)								
Single Time Trends								
Linear								
Policy	0.019	-0.012	0.002	-0.031	-0.022	-0.099**	0.017	0.011
	[0.019]	[0.035]	[0.024]	[0.036]	[0.030]	[0.048]	[0.011]	[0.019]
Split Time Trends								
Linear								
Policy	0.015	-0.005	0.005	-0.035	-0.018	-0.099**	0.018	0.014
	[0.020]	[0.037]	[0.024]	[0.037]	[0.029]	[0.049]	[0.011]	[0.020]
Obs	3,060	2,256	3,059	2,255	3,057	2,255	3,060	2,256
C) 5 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1982-1986 & 1987-1991 Birth Cohorts)								
Single Time Trends								
Linear								
Policy	-0.003	-0.053	0.001	-0.019	-0.019	-0.068**	0.019*	0.018
	[0.019]	[0.032]	[0.022]	[0.032]	[0.028]	[0.033]	[0.010]	[0.017]
Split Time Trends								
Linear								
Policy	-0.009	-0.051	-0.001	-0.031	-0.027	-0.089**	0.019*	0.019
	[0.020]	[0.034]	[0.022]	[0.031]	[0.027]	[0.044]	[0.010]	[0.017]
Obs	3,746	2,942	3,745	2,941	3,741	2,939	3,744	2,940
D) 6 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1981-1986 & 1987-1992 Birth Cohorts)								
Single Time Trends								
Linear								
Policy	0.010	-0.013	0.009	0.001	-0.012	-0.038	0.016*	0.012
	[0.018]	[0.027]	[0.020]	[0.027]	[0.026]	[0.038]	[0.009]	[0.014]
Quadratic								
Policy	-0.003	-0.028	0.003	-0.017	-0.014	-0.045**	0.015*	0.011
	[0.019]	[0.029]	[0.020]	[0.027]	[0.026]	[0.020]	[0.009]	[0.013]
Split Time Trends								
Linear								
Policy	-0.001	-0.022	0.006	-0.013	-0.012	-0.043**	0.015*	0.011
	[0.018]	[0.028]	[0.020]	[0.027]	[0.026]	[0.020]	[0.009]	[0.013]
Quadratic								
Policy	0.011	-0.041	-0.003	-0.108*	-0.023	-0.169**	0.019	0.030
	[0.026]	[0.063]	[0.029]	[0.059]	[0.037]	[0.085]	[0.013]	[0.030]
Obs	4,443	3,639	4,442	3,638	4,438	3,636	4,441	3,637
E) 8 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1979-1986 & 1987-1994 Birth Cohorts)								
Single Time Trends								
Linear								
Policy	-0.001	-0.022	0.004	-0.005	-0.012	-0.027**	0.017**	0.015
	[0.015]	[0.019]	[0.017]	[0.022]	[0.022]	[0.013]	[0.008]	[0.011]
Quadratic								
Policy	-0.018	-0.045**	-0.001	-0.018	-0.016	-0.036**	0.015*	0.012
	[0.017]	[0.022]	[0.018]	[0.022]	[0.023]	[0.014]	[0.008]	[0.011]
Split Time Trends								
Linear								
Policy	-0.018	-0.041*	0.001	-0.016	-0.015	-0.035**	0.015*	0.013
	[0.016]	[0.021]	[0.017]	[0.022]	[0.022]	[0.013]	[0.008]	[0.011]
Quadratic								
Policy	0.019	0.009	-0.003	-0.064	-0.022	-0.107	0.018	0.021
	[0.023]	[0.047]	[0.025]	[0.040]	[0.034]	[0.066]	[0.012]	[0.023]
Obs	5,726	4,922	5,725	4,921	5,721	4,919	5,724	4,920
F) 10 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1977-1986 & 1987-1996 Birth Cohorts)								
Single Time Trends								
Linear								
Policy	0.016	0.009	0.010	0.009	-0.020	-0.035	0.007	0.000
	[0.013]	[0.016]	[0.016]	[0.020]	[0.020]	[0.025]	[0.008]	[0.010]
Quadratic								
Policy	-0.013	-0.033	-0.001	-0.016	-0.025	-0.050**	0.009	0.004
	[0.016]	[0.021]	[0.017]	[0.020]	[0.022]	[0.024]	[0.008]	[0.009]
Split Time Trends								
Linear								
Policy	-0.008	-0.021	0.003	-0.012	-0.025	-0.049*	0.006	-0.000
	[0.015]	[0.020]	[0.016]	[0.020]	[0.020]	[0.028]	[0.008]	[0.010]
Quadratic								
Policy	0.001	-0.019	-0.002	-0.053	-0.021	-0.093**	0.020*	0.022
	[0.023]	[0.040]	[0.024]	[0.038]	[0.030]	[0.040]	[0.011]	[0.019]
Obs	6,918	6,114	6,917	6,113	6,913	6,111	6,916	6,112

Dummy used for new policy takes value of one if year of birth is greater than 1987. Each cell is the outcome of the specified regression, and relevant standard errors are given.Calculations are based on 2008 and 2013 Demographic and Health Survey data, by date of birth. Only ever-married women are considered. Control variables are month of birth, survey year, childhood residence, the NUTS1 region currentresidence belongs, and mother tongue of the respondent, as well as time trend variables as specified in the table. Statistical significance is * at 10 percent level, ** at 5 percent level, and *** at 1 percentlevel. Clusters are at birth date level. Single time trends are specified as "t" for linear and "t+ t*t" for quadratic type. Split time trends are specified as "t*new policy" for linear and "(t+t*t)*new policy" for quadratic type.

Table B20. Effect of Policy on Share of Household Chores

	Wiping		Washing dishes		Washing clothes		Any housework	
	Including 1986-87	Excluding 1986-87	Including 1986-87	Excluding 1986-87	Including 1986-87	Excluding 1986-87	Including 1986-87	Excluding 1986-87
A) 3 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1984-1986 & 1987-1989 Birth Cohorts)								
Single Ting								
Linear								
Policy	-0.002	-0.020	0.018	0.062	0.008	0.056	0.004	0.020
	[0.022]	[0.041]	[0.024]	[0.072]	[0.017]	[0.055]	[0.006]	[0.014]
Split Time Trends								
Linear								
Policy	-0.005	-0.023	0.015	0.074	0.007	0.061	0.005	0.022
	[0.023]	[0.043]	[0.025]	[0.075]	[0.018]	[0.057]	[0.006]	[0.013]
Obs	2,329	1,526	2,329	1,526	2,329	1,526	2,321	1,521
B) 4 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1983-1986 & 1987-1990 Birth Cohorts)								
Single Time Trends								
Linear								
Policy	-0.006	-0.017	0.001	-0.008	-0.010	-0.023	0.000	0.001
	[0.018]	[0.031]	[0.021]	[0.044]	[0.014]	[0.032]	[0.005]	[0.011]
Split Time Trends								
Linear								
Policy	-0.006	-0.016	0.001	0.009	-0.012	-0.021	0.001	0.001
	[0.020]	[0.033]	[0.022]	[0.046]	[0.016]	[0.037]	[0.005]	[0.009]
Obs	3,057	2,254	3,057	2,254	3,057	2,254	3,048	2,248
C) 5 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1982-1986 & 1987-1991 Birth Cohorts)								
Single Time Trends								
Linear								
Policy	0.001	0.002	0.008	0.011	-0.022	-0.049	0.001	0.002
	[0.017]	[0.027]	[0.020]	[0.038]	[0.016]	[0.031]	[0.005]	[0.009]
Split Time Trends								
Linear								
Policy	0.001	0.005	0.006	0.022	-0.035*	-0.069*	0.001	0.001
	[0.018]	[0.028]	[0.022]	[0.041]	[0.018]	[0.037]	[0.005]	[0.007]
Obs	3,743	2,940	3,743	2,940	3,743	2,940	3,730	2,930
D) 6 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1981-1986 & 1987-1992 Birth Cohorts)								
Single Time Trends								
Linear								
Policy	0.013	0.024	0.011	0.018	-0.007	-0.011	0.002	0.004
	[0.015]	[0.020]	[0.018]	[0.030]	[0.014]	[0.023]	[0.005]	[0.007]
Quadratic								
Policy	0.007	0.016	0.007	0.020	-0.021	-0.032	0.000	0.000
	[0.017]	[0.024]	[0.020]	[0.034]	[0.016]	[0.029]	[0.005]	[0.006]
Split Time Trends								
Linear								
Policy	0.009	0.019	0.008	0.023	-0.019	-0.029	0.001	0.001
	[0.017]	[0.023]	[0.020]	[0.034]	[0.015]	[0.028]	[0.005]	[0.006]
Quadratic								
Policy	-0.011	-0.022	0.009	0.064	-0.004	-0.010	-0.002	0.004
	[0.025]	[0.052]	[0.027]	[0.073]	[0.020]	[0.064]	[0.007]	[0.014]
Obs	4,440	3,637	4,440	3,637	4,440	3,637	4,427	3,627
E) 8 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1979-1986 & 1987-1994 Birth Cohorts)								
Single Time Trends								
Linear								
Policy	0.006	0.009	0.007	0.009	-0.005	-0.007	0.005	0.009
	[0.013]	[0.017]	[0.016]	[0.023]	[0.012]	[0.018]	[0.004]	[0.006]
Quadratic								
Policy	0.000	0.002	-0.000	0.004	-0.024*	-0.033	0.002	0.004
	[0.015]	[0.020]	[0.019]	[0.030]	[0.014]	[0.023]	[0.004]	[0.005]
Split Time Trends								
Linear								
Policy	0.001	0.003	0.001	0.007	-0.022	-0.030	0.003	0.005
	[0.015]	[0.019]	[0.018]	[0.029]	[0.014]	[0.022]	[0.004]	[0.005]
Quadratic								
Policy	-0.001	0.009	0.016	0.067	-0.013	-0.029	-0.002	0.001
	[0.023]	[0.042]	[0.025]	[0.058]	[0.020]	[0.053]	[0.006]	[0.010]
Obs	5,723	4,920	5,723	4,920	5,723	4,920	5,708	4,908
F) 10 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1977-1986 & 1987-1996 Birth Cohorts)								
Single Time Trends								
Linear								
Policy	0.015	0.022	0.015	0.021	0.014	0.023	-0.003	-0.005
	[0.012]	[0.015]	[0.015]	[0.019]	[0.012]	[0.016]	[0.005]	[0.007]
Quadratic								
Policy	0.005	0.009	0.007	0.016	-0.020	-0.025	-0.001	-0.001
	[0.015]	[0.019]	[0.019]	[0.029]	[0.014]	[0.022]	[0.004]	[0.005]
Split Time Trends								
Linear								
Policy	0.009	0.014	0.008	0.021	-0.013	-0.013	-0.004	-0.006
	[0.014]	[0.018]	[0.018]	[0.027]	[0.013]	[0.021]	[0.004]	[0.005]
Quadratic								
Policy	-0.006	-0.004	0.007	0.045	-0.026	-0.052	0.004	0.011
	[0.021]	[0.036]	[0.024]	[0.053]	[0.020]	[0.048]	[0.006]	[0.008]
Obs	6,915	6,112	6,915	6,112	6,915	6,112	6,899	6,099

Dummy used for new policy takes value of one if year of birth is greater than 1987. Each cell is the outcome of the specified regression, and relevant standard errors are given.Calculations are based on 2008 and 2013 Demographic and Health Survey data, by date of birth. Only ever-married women are considered. Control variables are month of birth, survey year, childhood residence, the NUTS1 region currentresidence belongs, and mother tongue of the respondent, as well as time trend variables as specified in the table. Statistical significance is * at 10 percent level, ** at 5 percent level, and *** at 1 percentlevel. Clusters are at birth date level. Single time trends are specified as "t" for linear and "t+ t*t" for quadratic type. Split time trends are specified as "t*new policy" for linear and "(t+t*t)*new policy" for quadratic type.

Table B21. Effect of Policy on Children Care Responsibilities

	Child Care at Home		Child Care Outside		Helping Children with Homeworks		Child Care - Any	
	Including 1986-87	Excluding 1986-87	Including 1986-87	Excluding 1986-87	Including 1986-87	Excluding 1986-87	Including 1986-87	Excluding 1986-87
A) 3 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1984-1986 & 1987-1989 Birth Cohorts)								
Single Time Trends								
Linear								
Policy	-0.032	0.101	-0.058	-0.035	0.043	0.215**	0.053	0.009
	[0.033]	[0.085]	[0.038]	[0.109]	[0.060]	[0.096]	[0.050]	[0.089]
Split Time Trends								
Linear								
Policy	-0.034	0.108	-0.059	0.003	0.037	0.180*	0.052	0.004
	[0.034]	[0.089]	[0.039]	[0.094]	[0.063]	[0.099]	[0.051]	[0.086]
Obs	1,868	1,216	1,832	1,197	1,281	847	1,277	844
B) 4 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1983-1986 & 1987-1990 Birth Cohorts)								
Single Time Trends								
Linear								
Policy	-0.041	0.004	-0.060	-0.053	0.041	0.116	0.064	0.056
	[0.029]	[0.060]	[0.064]	[0.070]	[0.050]	[0.070]	[0.040]	[0.056]
Split Time Trends								
Linear								
Policy	-0.047	-0.002	-0.075**	0.198	0.036	0.102	0.059	0.042
	[0.030]	[0.065]	[0.035]	[0.192]	[0.052]	[0.072]	[0.042]	[0.057]
Obs	2,464	1,812	2,416	1,781	1,714	1,280	1,707	1,274
C) 5 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1982-1986 & 1987-1991 Birth Cohorts)								
Single Time Trends								
Linear								
Policy	-0.008	0.058	-0.029	0.011	0.034	0.072	0.042	0.013
	[0.027]	[0.044]	[0.033]	[0.058]	[0.044]	[0.058]	[0.036]	[0.050]
Split Time Trends								
Linear								
Policy	-0.017	0.049	-0.059*	-0.038	0.023	0.048	0.046	0.022
	[0.028]	[0.051]	[0.033]	[0.061]	[0.045]	[0.057]	[0.037]	[0.047]
Obs	3,053	2,401	2,996	2,361	2,186	1,752	2,171	1,744
D) 6 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1981-1986 & 1987-1992 Birth Cohorts)								
Single Time Trends								
Linear								
Policy	-0.014	0.027	-0.031	-0.003	0.059	0.108**	0.034	0.006
	[0.024]	[0.036]	[0.030]	[0.047]	[0.039]	[0.046]	[0.033]	[0.044]
Quadratic								
Policy	-0.020	0.030	-0.067**	-0.052	0.036	0.071	0.037	0.008
	[0.026]	[0.044]	[0.031]	[0.051]	[0.040]	[0.047]	[0.033]	[0.040]
Split Time Trends								
Linear								
Policy	-0.021	0.026	-0.062**	-0.046	0.041	0.072	0.036	0.007
	[0.025]	[0.043]	[0.031]	[0.051]	[0.040]	[0.046]	[0.034]	[0.041]
Quadratic								
Policy	-0.041	0.109	-0.067	-0.021	0.016	0.101	0.066	0.050
	[0.036]	[0.098]	[0.042]	[0.113]	[0.065]	[0.105]	[0.055]	[0.088]
Obs	3,674	3,022	3,609	2,974	2,688	2,254	2,676	2,243
E) 8 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1979-1986 & 1987-1994 Birth Cohorts)								
Single Time Trends								
Linear								
Policy	0.017	0.065**	0.025	0.082	0.084**	0.132***	0.024	0.079**
	[0.022]	[0.030]	[0.029]	[0.081]	[0.034]	[0.039]	[0.031]	[0.040]
Quadratic								
Policy	0.001	0.053	-0.023	0.024	0.052	0.089**	0.004	0.054***
	[0.024]	[0.037]	[0.029]	[0.042]	[0.036]	[0.041]	[0.030]	[0.015]
Split Time Trends								
Linear								
Policy	0.006	0.059	-0.014	0.035	0.059*	0.093**	0.014	0.066**
	[0.024]	[0.036]	[0.029]	[0.041]	[0.035]	[0.040]	[0.031]	[0.025]
Quadratic								
Policy	-0.053*	0.014	-0.102**	-0.136	-0.001	0.004	0.095*	-0.128*
	[0.032]	[0.075]	[0.040]	[0.089]	[0.057]	[0.081]	[0.048]	[0.069]
Obs	4,793	4,141	4,712	4,077	3,629	3,198	3,611	3,178
F) 10 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1977-1986 & 1987-1996 Birth Cohorts)								
Single Time Trends								
Linear								
Policy	-0.007	0.107	0.077	-0.006	0.160***	0.229***	0.099***	0.173***
	[0.021]	[0.096]	[0.068]	[0.033]	[0.031]	[0.034]	[0.029]	[0.034]
Quadratic								
Policy	0.014	0.073	-0.016	0.036	0.069**	0.113***	0.023	0.078**
	[0.024]	[0.076]	[0.029]	[0.041]	[0.035]	[0.040]	[0.030]	[0.034]
Split Time Trends								
Linear								
Policy	0.034	0.094	0.013	0.070*	0.104***	0.149***	0.063**	0.125***
	[0.023]	[0.084]	[0.028]	[0.038]	[0.033]	[0.038]	[0.030]	[0.032]
Quadratic								
Policy	-0.060*	-0.020	-0.098**	-0.115	-0.014	-0.033	-0.090**	-0.110*
	[0.031]	[0.070]	[0.038]	[0.079]	[0.053]	[0.072]	[0.045]	[0.060]
Obs	5,910	5,254	5,811	5,176	4,630	4,196	4,596	4,163

Calculations are based on 2008 and 2013 Demographic and Health Survey data, by date of birth. Only ever-married women are considered. Dummy used for new policy takes value of one if year of birth is greater than 1987. Each cell is the outcome of the specified regression, and relevant standard errors are given.Control variables are month of birth, survey year, childhood residence, the NUTS1 region current residence belongs, and mother tongue of the respondent, as well as time trend variables as specified in the table. Statistical significance is * at 10 percent level, ** at 5 percent level, and *** at 1 percent level. Clusters are at birth date level. Only ever-married women who are 18 years old or older are considered. Single time trends are specified as "t" for linear and "t+ t*t" for quadratic type. Split time trends are specified as "t*new policy" for linear and "(t+t*t)*new policy" for quadratic type.

Table B22. Effect of Policy on Controlling Actions

	Partner prevents her from seeing female friends.		Partner limits her contact with her family.		Partner insists on knowing where she is.	
	Including 1986-87	Excluding 1986-87	Including 1986-87	Excluding 1986-87	Including 1986-87	Excluding 1986-87
A) 3 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1984-1986 & 1987-1989 Birth Cohorts)						
Single Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	-0.014	-0.095	-0.002	-0.019	-0.016	0.141
	[0.033]	[0.064]	[0.026]	[0.055]	[0.041]	[0.098]
Split Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	0.002	-0.073	0.006	-0.007	-0.017	0.150
	[0.031]	[0.062]	[0.025]	[0.054]	[0.039]	[0.095]
Obs	2,330	1,528	2,330	1,528	1,525	2,325
B) 4 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1983-1986 & 1987-1990 Birth Cohorts)						
Single Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	-0.008	-0.031	0.006	0.008	-0.024	0.030
	[0.027]	[0.050]	[0.022]	[0.041]	[0.036]	[0.063]
Split Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	0.001	-0.035	0.013	0.014	-0.027	0.031
	[0.027]	[0.047]	[0.021]	[0.040]	[0.035]	[0.061]
Obs	3,062	2,260	3,062	2,260	3,057	2,257
C) 5 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1982-1986 & 1987-1991 Birth Cohorts)						
Single Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	0.001	-0.002	0.009	0.012	-0.007	0.043
	[0.024]	[0.038]	[0.022]	[0.033]	[0.034]	[0.054]
Split Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	0.009	-0.008	0.015	0.014	-0.008	0.051
	[0.024]	[0.036]	[0.021]	[0.033]	[0.033]	[0.051]
Obs	3,772	2,972	3,772	2,970	3,767	2,967
D) 6 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1981-1986 & 1987-1992 Birth Cohorts)						
Single Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	-0.015	-0.033	0.002	-0.004	-0.037	-0.028
	[0.022]	[0.032]	[0.020]	[0.028]	[0.031]	[0.048]
Quadratic						
Policy	-0.012	-0.044	0.009	0.003	-0.034	-0.010
	[0.023]	[0.033]	[0.020]	[0.029]	[0.031]	[0.050]
Split Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	-0.010	-0.042	0.010	0.003	-0.036	-0.015
	[0.023]	[0.032]	[0.019]	[0.028]	[0.031]	[0.049]
Quadratic						
Policy	0.009	-0.060	0.005	-0.010	-0.004	0.181*
	[0.031]	[0.075]	[0.029]	[0.061]	[0.044]	[0.096]
Obs	4,469	3,667	4,469	3,667	4,463	3,663
E) 8 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1979-1986 & 1987-1994 Birth Cohorts)						
Single Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	-0.023	-0.041	-0.005	-0.014	-0.017	0.003
	[0.019]	[0.025]	[0.017]	[0.021]	[0.028]	[0.038]
Quadratic						
Policy	-0.011	-0.034	0.002	-0.010	-0.019	0.010
	[0.020]	[0.025]	[0.017]	[0.023]	[0.029]	[0.040]
Split Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	-0.011	-0.036	0.003	-0.009	-0.018	0.011
	[0.019]	[0.024]	[0.017]	[0.023]	[0.028]	[0.039]
Quadratic						
Policy	-0.008	-0.075	0.004	-0.013	-0.023	0.058
	[0.028]	[0.053]	[0.026]	[0.046]	[0.040]	[0.077]
Obs	5,751	4,949	5,751	4,949	5,745	4,945

F) 10 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1977-1986 & 1987-1996 Birth Cohorts)						
Single Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	-0.020	-0.033	-0.008	-0.017	0.005	0.028
	[0.018]	[0.022]	[0.015]	[0.018]	[0.025]	[0.032]
Quadratic						
Policy	-0.012	-0.036	-0.002	-0.015	-0.008	0.024
	[0.020]	[0.024]	[0.017]	[0.021]	[0.027]	[0.036]
Split Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	-0.009	-0.033	0.000	-0.013	-0.001	0.032
	[0.019]	[0.022]	[0.016]	[0.020]	[0.025]	[0.034]
Quadratic						
Policy	-0.009	-0.067	0.009	-0.002	-0.038	0.011
	[0.027]	[0.045]	[0.023]	[0.037]	[0.036]	[0.065]
Obs	6,960	6,158	6,960	6,158	6,952	6,152

Calculations are based on 2008 and 2013 Demographic and Health Survey data, by date of birth. Only ever-married women are considered. Dummy used for new policy takes value of one if year of birth is greater than 1987. Each cell is the outcome of the specified regression, and relevant standard errors are given. Control variables are month of birth, survey year, childhood residence, the NUTS1 region current residence belongs, and mother tongue of the respondent, as well as time trend variables as specified in the table. Statistical significance is * at 10 percent level, ** at 5 percent level, and *** at 1 percent level. Clusters are at birth date level. Single time trends are specified as "t" for linear and "t+ t*t" for quadratic type. Split time trends are specified as "t*new policy" for linear and "(t+t*t)*new policy" for quadratic type.

Table B23. Effect of Policy on Controlling Actions

	Partner distrusts her with money.		Partner accuses her of being unfaithful.		Women faces with at least one controlling action.	
	Including 1986-87	Excluding 1986-87	Including 1986-87	Excluding 1986-87	Including 1986-87	Excluding 1986-87
A) 3 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1984-1986 & 1987-1989 Birth Cohorts)						
Single Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	0.001	0.017	-0.038	-0.048	0.013	0.116
	[0.020]	[0.050]	[0.025]	[0.043]	[0.046]	[0.110]
Split Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	-0.001	0.023	-0.037	-0.051	0.016	0.120
	[0.020]	[0.054]	[0.024]	[0.041]	[0.044]	[0.106]
Obs	2,328	1,526	2,328	1,528	2,320	1,522
B) 4 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1983-1986 & 1987-1990 Birth Cohorts)						
Single Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	-0.002	0.002	-0.014	0.018	0.007	0.041
	[0.018]	[0.035]	[0.020]	[0.029]	[0.041]	[0.068]
Split Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	-0.001	0.013	-0.016	0.010	0.009	0.043
	[0.018]	[0.036]	[0.020]	[0.030]	[0.040]	[0.066]
Obs	3,059	2,257	3,059	2,259	3,049	2,251
C) 5 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1982-1986 & 1987-1991 Birth Cohorts)						
Single Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	-0.013	-0.030	-0.013	0.009	0.014	0.041
	[0.016]	[0.022]	[0.018]	[0.022]	[0.039]	[0.059]
Split Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	-0.011	-0.015	-0.014	0.003	0.019	0.049
	[0.016]	[0.023]	[0.018]	[0.024]	[0.037]	[0.056]
Obs	3,768	2,968	3,768	2,968	3,757	2,959
D) 6 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1981-1986 & 1987-1992 Birth Cohorts)						
Single Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	-0.018	-0.039**	-0.016	-0.002	-0.019	-0.031
	[0.014]	[0.018]	[0.016]	[0.018]	[0.035]	[0.052]
Quadratic						
Policy	-0.012	-0.012	-0.016	-0.005	-0.007	-0.006
	[0.015]	[0.017]	[0.016]	[0.020]	[0.035]	[0.053]
Split Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	-0.014	-0.015	-0.016	-0.007	-0.011	-0.012
	[0.014]	[0.018]	[0.016]	[0.019]	[0.034]	[0.052]
Quadratic						
Policy	-0.000	-0.007	-0.024	0.012	0.024	0.143
	[0.021]	[0.039]	[0.023]	[0.047]	[0.051]	[0.110]
Obs	4,465	3,663	4,465	3,665	4,453	3,655
E) 8 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1979-1986 & 1987-1994 Birth Cohorts)						
Single Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	-0.027**	-0.039**	-0.018	-0.010	-0.006	-0.005
	[0.013]	[0.018]	[0.014]	[0.015]	[0.030]	[0.040]
Quadratic						
Policy	-0.012	-0.012	-0.015	-0.007	0.002	0.009
	[0.013]	[0.017]	[0.015]	[0.016]	[0.031]	[0.043]
Split Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	-0.016	-0.015	-0.015	-0.009	0.002	0.009
	[0.013]	[0.017]	[0.014]	[0.016]	[0.030]	[0.041]
Quadratic						
Policy	-0.009	-0.008	-0.025	-0.011	0.001	0.034
	[0.018]	[0.038]	[0.020]	[0.031]	[0.044]	[0.082]
Obs	5,745	4,949	5,745	4,945	5,729	4,931

F) 10 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1977-1986 & 1987-1996 Birth Cohorts)						
Single Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	-0.021*	-0.027*	-0.019	-0.015	0.008	0.014
	[0.012]	[0.015]	[0.012]	[0.013]	[0.028]	[0.035]
Quadratic						
Policy	-0.007	-0.004	-0.017	-0.012	0.014	0.027
	[0.012]	[0.016]	[0.014]	[0.015]	[0.029]	[0.039]
Split Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	-0.009	-0.002	-0.017	-0.015	0.017	0.030
	[0.012]	[0.015]	[0.014]	[0.014]	[0.028]	[0.037]
Quadratic						
Policy	-0.019	-0.025	-0.020	-0.005	-0.009	0.003
	[0.017]	[0.032]	[0.019]	[0.028]	[0.040]	[0.068]
Obs	6,952	6,150	6,951	6,151	6,930	6,132

Calculations are based on 2008 and 2013 Demographic and Health Survey data, by date of birth. Only ever-married women are considered. Dummy used for new policy takes value of one if year of birth is greater than 1987. Each cell is the outcome of the specified regression, and relevant standard errors are given. Control variables are month of birth, survey year, childhood residence, the NUTS1 region current residence belongs, and mother tongue of the respondent, as well as time trend variables as specified in the table. Statistical significance is * at 10 percent level, ** at 5 percent level, and *** at 1 percent level. Clusters are at birth date level. Single time trends are specified as "t" for linear and "t+ t*t" for quadratic type. Split time trends are specified as "t*new policy" for linear and "(t+t*t)*new policy" for quadratic type.

Table B24. Effect of Policy on Attitudes towards Physical Violence

Woman..	...neglects her children.		...goes out without telling husband.*		...argues with husband.	
	Including 1986-87	Excluding 1986-87	Including 1986-87	Excluding 1986-87	Including 1986-87	Excluding 1986-87
A) 3 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1984-1986 & 1987-1989 Birth Cohorts)						
Single Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	0.014	0.157***	0.010	0.067*	-0.033	0.023
	[0.027]	[0.057]	[0.025]	[0.037]	[0.022]	[0.046]
Split Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	0.022	0.169***	0.015	0.067*	-0.033	0.026
	[0.027]	[0.055]	[0.024]	[0.038]	[0.023]	[0.046]
Obs	2,321	1,520	1,370	889	2,314	1,520
B) 4 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1983-1986 & 1987-1990 Birth Cohorts)						
Single Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	0.010	0.064*	-0.004	-0.001	-0.019	0.024
	[0.023]	[0.039]	[0.020]	[0.027]	[0.018]	[0.029]
Split Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	0.014	0.064	-0.002	-0.008	-0.022	0.020
	[0.024]	[0.042]	[0.020]	[0.030]	[0.019]	[0.031]
Obs	3,050	2,249	1,780	1,299	3,039	2,245
C) 5 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1982-1986 & 1987-1991 Birth Cohorts)						
Single Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	0.028	0.081***	0.010	0.024	-0.005	0.039
	[0.022]	[0.031]	[0.018]	[0.023]	[0.018]	[0.025]
Split Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	0.029	0.075**	0.011	0.018	-0.008	0.035
	[0.022]	[0.033]	[0.018]	[0.025]	[0.018]	[0.026]
Obs	3,760	2,959	2,220	1,739	3,746	2,952
D) 6 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1981-1986 & 1987-1992 Birth Cohorts)						
Single Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	0.020	0.052**	0.019	0.038**	-0.010	0.020
	[0.019]	[0.026]	[0.016]	[0.018]	[0.016]	[0.022]
Quadratic						
Policy	0.020	0.047	0.015	0.028	-0.011	0.022
	[0.020]	[0.029]	[0.016]	[0.019]	[0.017]	[0.025]
Split Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	0.021	0.047	0.017	0.029	-0.011	0.020
	[0.020]	[0.029]	[0.016]	[0.019]	[0.017]	[0.024]
Quadratic						
Policy	0.021	0.144**	-0.000	0.001	-0.022	0.044
	[0.029]	[0.064]	[0.027]	[0.048]	[0.026]	[0.060]
Obs	4,454	3,653	2,629	2,148	4,436	3,642
E) 8 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1979-1986 & 1987-1994 Birth Cohorts)						
Single Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	0.030*	0.056***	0.008	0.014	0.005	0.033*
	[0.017]	[0.020]	[0.014]	[0.015]	[0.014]	[0.017]
Quadratic						
Policy	0.028	0.052**	0.007	0.010	0.005	0.038**
	[0.018]	[0.023]	[0.014]	[0.016]	[0.015]	[0.019]
Split Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	0.030*	0.052**	0.007	0.008	0.005	0.037**
	[0.018]	[0.023]	[0.014]	[0.016]	[0.015]	[0.018]
Quadratic						
Policy	0.013	0.066	0.017	0.042	-0.026	0.010
	[0.027]	[0.050]	[0.024]	[0.034]	[0.023]	[0.040]
Obs	5,734	4,933	3,341	2,860	5,709	4,915

F) 10 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1977-1986 & 1987-1996 Birth Cohorts)						
Single Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	0.026*	0.041**	0.014	0.021	0.008	0.030**
	[0.015]	[0.019]	[0.013]	[0.014]	[0.013]	[0.014]
Quadratic						
Policy	0.027	0.047**	0.011	0.016	0.013	0.046***
	[0.017]	[0.022]	[0.013]	[0.015]	[0.014]	[0.017]
Split Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	0.028*	0.043**	0.012	0.015	0.012	0.043**
	[0.016]	[0.022]	[0.013]	[0.015]	[0.014]	[0.017]
Quadratic						
Policy	0.022	0.069	0.008	0.011	-0.019	0.018
	[0.025]	[0.044]	[0.022]	[0.030]	[0.021]	[0.035]
Obs	6,942	6,141	4,009	3,528	6,915	6,121

Calculations are based on 2008 and 2013 Demographic and Health Survey data, by date of birth. Only ever-married women are considered. Dummy used for new policy takes value of one if year of birth is greater than 1987. Each cell is the outcome of the specified regression, and relevant standard errors are given. Control variables are month of birth, survey year, childhood residence, the NUTS1 region current residence belongs, and mother tongue of the respondent, as well as time trend variables as specified in the table. Statistical significance is * at 10 percent level, ** at 5 percent level, and *** at 1 percent level. Clusters are at birth date level. Single time trends are specified as "t" for linear and "t+ t*t" for quadratic type. Split time trends are specified as "t*new policy" for linear and (t+t*t)*new policy for quadratic type.

Table B25. Effect of Policy on Attitudes towards Physical Violence

Woman..	...burns the food.		..refuses to have intercourse.		Agree at least one specified reason.	
	Including 1986-87	Excluding 1986-87	Including 1986-87	Excluding 1986-87	Including 1986-87	Excluding 1986-87
A) 3 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1984-1986 & 1987-1989 Birth Cohorts)						
Single Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	-0.012	0.002	-0.011	0.006	-0.017	0.070
	[0.009]	[0.020]	[0.012]	[0.032]	[0.032]	[0.066]
Split Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	-0.014	-0.003	-0.011	0.005	-0.015	0.072
	[0.008]	[0.019]	[0.011]	[0.033]	[0.032]	[0.065]
Obs	2,327	1,525	2,312	1,515	2,293	1,504
B) 4 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1983-1986 & 1987-1990 Birth Cohorts)						
Single Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	-0.009	0.001	-0.012	-0.003	-0.016	0.018
	[0.007]	[0.013]	[0.010]	[0.021]	[0.028]	[0.046]
Split Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	-0.011	-0.004	-0.011	-0.002	-0.018	0.009
	[0.007]	[0.013]	[0.011]	[0.024]	[0.028]	[0.047]
Obs	3,057	2,255	3,039	2,242	3,011	2,222
C) 5 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1982-1986 & 1987-1991 Birth Cohorts)						
Single Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	-0.009	-0.004	-0.010	-0.003	0.007	0.054
	[0.007]	[0.011]	[0.010]	[0.017]	[0.025]	[0.037]
Split Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	-0.013*	-0.010	-0.007	0.005	0.003	0.043
	[0.007]	[0.013]	[0.010]	[0.018]	[0.025]	[0.039]
Obs	3,768	2,966	3,746	2,949	3,715	2,926
D) 6 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1981-1986 & 1987-1992 Birth Cohorts)						
Single Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	-0.008	-0.003	-0.010	-0.005	0.001	0.031
	[0.006]	[0.008]	[0.009]	[0.015]	[0.023]	[0.030]
Quadratic						
Policy	-0.008	-0.001	-0.006	0.004	-0.000	0.028
	[0.006]	[0.010]	[0.009]	[0.016]	[0.023]	[0.033]
Split Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	-0.009	-0.003	-0.006	0.003	-0.000	0.026
	[0.006]	[0.009]	[0.009]	[0.016]	[0.023]	[0.033]
Quadratic						
Policy	-0.020**	-0.025	-0.009	0.036	-0.015	0.042
	[0.010]	[0.019]	[0.013]	[0.039]	[0.033]	[0.080]
Obs	4,465	3,663	4,440	3,643	4,402	3,613
E) 8 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1979-1986 & 1987-1994 Birth Cohorts)						
Single Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	0.001	0.011	-0.002	0.007	0.015	0.042*
	[0.006]	[0.008]	[0.008]	[0.012]	[0.020]	[0.023]
Quadratic						
Policy	0.001	0.012	-0.003	0.006	0.014	0.044*
	[0.005]	[0.007]	[0.009]	[0.013]	[0.020]	[0.025]
Split Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	0.001	0.011	-0.001	0.008	0.014	0.042*
	[0.005]	[0.007]	[0.008]	[0.013]	[0.020]	[0.025]
Quadratic						
Policy	-0.021**	-0.025	-0.010	0.014	-0.018	0.012
	[0.009]	[0.016]	[0.012]	[0.029]	[0.031]	[0.055]
Obs	5,745	4,943	5,713	4,916	5,667	4,878

F) 10 Year Intervals on Both Sides (1977-1986 & 1987-1996 Birth Cohorts)						
Single Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	0.003	0.010	0.001	0.008	0.012	0.031
	[0.005]	[0.006]	[0.008]	[0.010]	[0.018]	[0.020]
Quadratic						
Policy	0.003	0.014**	-0.003	0.004	0.018	0.045*
	[0.005]	[0.007]	[0.008]	[0.012]	[0.019]	[0.024]
Split Time Trends						
Linear						
Policy	0.003	0.013*	-0.000	0.008	0.016	0.039*
	[0.005]	[0.007]	[0.008]	[0.012]	[0.018]	[0.023]
Quadratic						
Policy	-0.016**	-0.015	-0.006	0.018	-0.006	0.031
	[0.008]	[0.014]	[0.011]	[0.024]	[0.028]	[0.048]
Obs	6,956	6,154	6,918	6,121	6,859	6,070

Calculations are based on 2008 and 2013 Demographic and Health Survey data, by date of birth. Only ever-married women are considered. Dumm used for new policy takes value of one if year of birth is greater than 1987. Each cell is the outcome of the specified regression, and relevant standar errors are given. Control variables are month of birth, survey year, childhood residence, the NUTS1 region current residence belongs, and mother tongue of the respondent, as well as time trend variables as specified in the table. Statistical significance is * at 10 percent level, ** at 5 percent level and *** at 1 percent level. Clusters are at birth date level. Single time trends are specified as "t" for linear and "t+ t*t" for quadratic type. Split time trends are specified as "t*new policy" for linear and (t+t*t)*new policy for quadratic type.

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