

CAPITALIST URBANIZATION IN TURKEY BETWEEN
THE 1920s AND THE EARLY 1990s:
AN ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATION

by

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ABSTRACT

Title: CAPITALIST URBANIZATION IN TURKEY BETWEEN THE 1920s
AND THE EARLY 1990s: AN ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATION

This study examines the relation between the development of capitalism in Turkey and urbanization through a period of seven decades. It aims to contextualize urban development as a complex social phenomenon within the broader framework of changing economic, social and political structures in order to provide an alternative reading of the history of urbanization in the Republican era.

The task required a questioning of theories on urbanization in capitalist economies by using information mostly gathered from secondary sources on Turkey's experience with rapid urbanization and its consequences. The survey on the economic and social context of urban development was presented in three major periods, with a historical account of the development of local governments and planning in Turkey, based on the transformation of municipal government schemes and programs dating from different periods. The historical development of urban transportation and housing production were also analyzed in connection with the state's political responses to the growing problems of rapid urbanization. The analysis was concluded with a survey on the development of squatting practice as the spontaneous response of the urban poor to shortage of urban housing after the Second World War.

ÖZET

Başlık: 1920’li VE 1990’lı YILLAR ARASINDA TÜRKİYE’DE KAPİTALİST KENTLEŞME: ALTERNATİF BİR BAKIŞ

Bu çalışma, yetmiş yıllık bir dönem içerisinde Türkiye’de kapitalizmin gelişimi ile şehirleşme süreci arasındaki bağlantıları incelemektedir. Kentleşmeyi karmaşık bir sosyal olgu olarak ele alıp, Cumhuriyet tarihi süresince dönüştürülen ekonomik, sosyal ve politik yapılar bağlamında farklı bir bakış açısıyla yorumlamayı hedeflemektedir.

Bu hedefe yönelik olarak çalışmaya, kapitalist kentleşme kuramlarının genel bir eleştirisi ile başlanmış ve Türkiye’de kentleşme ve yerel yönetimler yazınından elde edilen bilgiler bu kuramsal altyapı ışığında yeniden düzenlenmiş ve yorumlanmıştır. Kentleşmenin ekonomik ve sosyal bağlamı temel olarak üç ayrı döneme bölünerek incelenmiştir. Politik bağlamın dönüşümü ise Cumhuriyet’in yerel yönetim şemaları ve planlama faaliyetlerinin tarihsel gelişimi üzerinden aktarılmıştır. Kentsel alanda ulaşım ve konut üretiminin gelişimi, bu süreçleri derinden etkileyen ekonomik ve politik tercihler ile, hem kentli sosyal sınıfların, hem de devletin, hızlı kentleşme ve beraberinde gelen sorunlara karşı geliştirdikleri tepkiler bağlamında ele alınmıştır. Son olarak, Türkiye’nin metropollerinde İkinci Dünya Savaşı ardından gerçekleşen dönüşümlerde önemli bir etken olarak ortaya çıkan gecekondulaşma olgusu, devletin ve piyasa ekonomisinin sunduğu çözümlere erişimi yeterli seviyede sağlayamayan kentli yoksulların konut sıkıntısına karşı geliştirdikleri bir çözüm olarak ele alınmıştır.

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To the memory of Ahmet Priştina

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A research on the history of urbanization in Turkey requires a comprehensive study of the intersecting histories of national development, modernization and urbanization through a period of several decades. This paper claims that the development of the capitalist mode of production and social organization has been the primary historical motif in the transformation of the Turkish urban landscapes throughout the Republican period, since Turkey's efforts to construct a modern nation-state have been consistently founded upon the development of a capitalist economic system, despite the changes in the political environment and economic policies for economic development between 1920's and 1990's.¹

However, this proposition does not imply that the capitalist economy has been the single determinant each time a major wave of transformation has hit the Turkish cities and policies concerning urban development. Given the historical development of Turkish cities during the last eight decades of modern urbanism, a more accurate claim is that the responses given to political, economic and demographic pressures -both at the national and at the global levels- have been shaped by the state, holders of capital, and urban social classes to facilitate capitalist accumulation through the extraction of urban rent. An account of how these actions and compromises have given rise to specific kinds of urban transformations should

¹ Statist economic policies and the trade-protectionism of the 1930s are no exception to this generalization, as will be discussed in the subsequent chapters of the thesis. For a survey of the impact of statism on the national economy and its reception by the private sector, see Roger Owen and Şevket Pamuk, *A History of Middle East Economies in the Twentieth Century*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1999) pp. 16-22.

indirectly lead to a critical understanding of the relation between the economic system and the urbanization process in Turkey. The ultimate aim in writing this thesis is to provide an alternative reading of modern Turkey's experience with urbanization and economic development under the imperatives of capitalist accumulation.

The argument is developed first by referring to the general theories of capitalist urban development and the roles played by the actors involved in the process. Here, four characteristic components of capitalist urbanization are singled out for the sake of simplicity in the historical account of urban development: speculation –or speculative development, to be more precise-; production and distribution of urban rent; the role of the state in policy making, planning and execution; and finally the formation and influence of local and central interest groups, based on patronage relations.²

As a second step, a scheme for the periodization of urban development in Republican Turkey is proposed which considers the changes in local and central government systems, demographic pressures and political-economic priorities in policymaking. Through a study of urban dynamics of social, economic, and political change, the key question will be in which aspects and to which extent the case of Turkish cities can be integrated with the historical studies of capitalist urban development to enrich the common theoretical models.

² Alliances between state and capital in the form of legal and illegal cooperations also fall under the definition of the state's role.

Methodology and Sources

Any limit to the scope of a study on urbanization and the set of problems and policies related to it has to be set according to the tradeoff between generality and specificity of the project at hand.³ The social production of spatial arrangements of any scale – be it a single neighborhood, a whole city or a region – requires a conception of the built environment as a product and physical manifestation of social processes and relations, as Hall suggests in a playful paragraph:

In practice, the planning of cities merges almost imperceptibly into the problems of cities, and those into the economics and sociology and politics of cities, and those in turn into the entire socio-economic-political-cultural life of the time; there is no end, no boundary, to the relationships, yet one – however arbitrary – must be set. The answer here is to tell just so much about the world as is necessary to explain the phenomenon of planning: to seat it firmly, Marxian-fashion, on its socio-economic base, thus to begin the really interesting part of the historian's task.⁴

Once the urban landscape is perceived either as a “battleground” of conflicting common material and ideological interests or simply as a tangible product of various social dynamics, one becomes aware of the fact that the articulation of urban space and the problem of scope in research are methodological constructions, rather than strictly technical or esthetic problematics.⁵ An explanation of the events and processes altering the urban landscapes has to be inferred from an analysis

³ Hugh Stretton, *Urban Planning in Rich and Poor Countries* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 95.

⁴ Peter Hall, *Cities of Tomorrow*, updated edition, pp. 5, 6 (Cornwall: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 1996).

⁵ Tarık H. Şengül, *Kentsel Çelişki ve Siyaset, Kapitalist Kentleşme Süreçleri Üzerine Yazılar*, (Istanbul: WALD, 2001), p. 147. Also, see Stretton, *Urban Planning in Rich and Poor Countries*, p. 31 for a discussion of urban planning theories based essentially on consensus or conflict.

reaching beyond the levels of localities and separate social groups or classes.⁶ As Harvey suggests, the same set of words, signs, social processes, buildings and physical environments will assume different meanings depending on the historical context.⁷ A wholistic study of the relations giving shape to the built environment necessitates a broader framework for research incorporating different areas of social sciences. This research builds upon such a methodology that aims to integrate the facts and theories from sources traditionally divided into the areas of urban sociology, history, urban planning, and economics.⁸

As for the geographical scope of the research, specific sites and projects have been chosen to test the theorized construction through concrete evidence. There is a bias in selection here: The research incorporates cases which are ‘archetypes’ of their own sorts, i.e. cases which clearly fall under a certain category problematized in the theory and have had the most significant impact both on their localities and also on the discussions surrounding urban development. Given the disproportionate distribution of public and private investment over the geography of the Turkish Republic, it should not be totally surprising to observe that most of the examples mentioned to study the case of Turkey will be drawn from Istanbul and a few other Turkish metropolitan cities.

The research presented in this thesis is based on a number of sources from different academic disciplines, providing information and theories distilled from

⁶ Şengül, p. 42.

⁷ David Harvey, “On Countering the Marxian Myth – Chicago-style”, in *Spaces of Capital, Towards a Critical Geography* (New York: Routledge, 2001), p. 75.

⁸ However, there are some tools which help organize the pieces of information and analyses under certain categories, and make the whole historical survey seem more comprehensible. These tools are periodization; dividing up of historical information into political, economic and demographic spheres of knowledge; use of historical observation in a comparative framework as a test of the theoretical models.

different historical and geographical contexts. The theoretical background is constructed as a combination of the Marxist theories of urban development in the capitalist environment. The background information on the inner workings of the capitalist economy and class society completes the theoretical framework with secondary sources on the economy of capitalism and its socio-spatial implications, presented in the first chapter.

The second chapter presents a survey on the economic and social context of urban development in the Republican era, divided into three major periods. Most of the sources used for this survey are on the economic history of Turkey after 1923, although a short introduction to the late Ottoman context is also provided at the beginning of the chapter. The second chapter continues with a historical account of the development of local governments in Turkey, which makes use of writings on municipal government schemes, elections and programs dating from different periods.

In addition to the secondary sources on the social and economic dynamics shaping the Turkish cities, the publications by the Chamber of Architects, State Planning Organization and the State Institute of Statistics, articles and illustrations from the periodicals *Arkitekt*, *Mimarlık*, and a number of municipal publications make up the primary sources used mostly in the third chapter, where an exclusive focus on policies of transportation and housing is provided. The third chapter ends with a study on the historical development of squatting in Turkey after the Second World War.

Theoretical Background

The task of constructing a theoretical foundation for the study of urbanization in capitalist societies requires the juxtaposition of several theories of the state, urban development, and capital accumulation in the urban context, under the rules of market economies. The theoretical discussion starts out with a conception of the urban space and the role of the social groups including patronage relations. Then it moves on to the relevant theories of capitalist urban development where speculation and urban economic rent are discussed. The final part of the theory is a reflection on the role of the state to complete the discussion of the four components of capitalist urbanization indicated earlier.

The notion of a single urban space and its treatment in this thesis requires an understanding beyond the constructed compartmentalization of space in terms of the private and the public use or ownership. As new conflicts emerge over the production and ownership of space in urban areas, a new imperative for their study is to shift the focus of analysis to a different level accommodating the changes in “traditional conceptions of property rights” brought forth by new forms of “political organization of space.”⁹ A way to relate the private space to the public space is to consider the roles they play in the production of each other. With the increasing participation of privately owned urban development corporations in urban construction or renewal projects, Bentley claims that the production of publicly owned urban space has been much deprived of its professional significance in policymaking and urban planning, leaving it merely as a “leftover” from private

⁹ David Harvey, *Social Justice and the City* (Baltimore, Maryland: John Hopkins University Press, 1977), p. 308.

urban space.¹⁰ As examples discussed in the second and third chapters of the thesis will show, undertakers may turn previously public spaces into private or limited-access spaces through –usually state supported– urban development projects refusing any citizen participation, hence demands for democratic accountability. The transformation of urban space also occurs in the opposite direction: The private space constructed by individuals or corporations shape the experience of the public space both physically and functionally. Each squatter house, apartment building, shopping mall, gated community or high-rise office block alters the appearance and the individual's experience of the public space in relation with the space surrounding the construction. This fact is also reflected in the use of official zoning and land use regulations, through which the state aims to offer a certain level of protection for certain physical qualities of the urban built environment.

In order to avoid the pitfall of an essentially class-based analysis, an additional dimension to be recognized in the study of the urban processes is the use of a wider perspective which includes different social groups such as the elderly, women, children, minorities, pedestrians, single adults, extended families etc. as alternative groupings representing a multiplicity of different concerns and interests.¹¹ However, the framework of this study does not include the issues of these smaller groups exclusively. Social classes are theoretically constructed as historical processes shaped by individuals who occupy similar roles in the society through production relations; a study making use of a class-based approach should not

¹⁰ Ian Bentley, *Urban Transformations: Power, People and Urban Design* (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 184.

¹¹ Stretton, p. 48.

necessarily omit the importance of the roles assumed by different social groups.¹² In fact, their issues become most significant when it comes to the discussion of the production and use of urban space. As will be explained in the following chapters, the common problematics of democratic representation, lobbying and redistribution of urban rent among various urban social groups require a more subtle approach than a rigid class-based analysis.¹³

Capitalism and the Built Environment

The relevance of the relation between capitalism and the built environment is presented in Harvey's argument stating that capitalism has its own distinct patterns imprinted on the physical landscape:

Capitalism struggles to create a physical landscape appropriate to its needs and purposes (both in production and consumption) at one point in time, only to find that what it has created becomes antagonistic to its needs at a future point in time. Part of the dynamic of capitalist accumulation is the necessity to build whole landscapes only to tear them down and build anew in the future.¹⁴

A further statement in the same vein surfaces also in Tafuri's works as he claims that "structured like a machine for the extraction of surplus value, in its own conditioning mechanisms the city reproduces the reality of the ways of industrial

¹² E. P. Thompson, Preface to *The Making of the English Working Class* (USA: Vintage Books, 1966), p. 11.

¹³ As the cities grow both in terms of population and geographical area, a certain set of social relations emerge, this time between those "formal and informal, legal and illegal alliances ... pressing for their claims" through the construction of a system of social activism or patronage relations. See Michael Dear, "Prolegomena to a Postmodern Urbanism" in *Urbanism in Managing Cities: The New Urban Context*, eds. Stuart Cameron & Simin Davoudi & Stephen Graham & Patsy Healy & Ali Madani Pour, p. 39 (Great Britain: John Wiley & Sons, 1995). Also, See İlhan Tekeli, "Popülist Politikalar, Kentsel Rant Ekonomisi ve Vatandaş Oluşturamayan Kentleşme Deneyi" in *Modernite Aşılırken Kent Planlaması* (Ankara: Imge Kitabevi Yayınları, 2000), p. 53 for a detailed discussion of the impact of patronage relations on the development of urban politics and economies in Turkey.

¹⁴ Harvey, "On Countering the Marxian Myth", in *Spaces of Capital, Towards a Critical Geography*, p.76.

production.”¹⁵ It is of vital importance to note that these arguments do not necessarily imply that the physical and social outcomes of capitalist urban development are always predictable. As Stretton shows in his survey, depending on the local conditions and policies employed, different market mechanisms may very well lead to similar effects on the urban space, whereas similar and historical conditions may yield completely different results in the long run.¹⁶

No two capitalist economies are the same in their configurations and capitalist societies are in a constant state of evolution due to the changes in the economic and political domains under the logic of capitalism. There are multiple reasons for this, including:

- The degree and direction of state intervention or regulation through formal planning institutions at the local and national scales,
- Historical stages in the development of capitalism within the local context accompanied by the development of state institutions and policies,¹⁷
- Historical background of each particular case (histories of state-capital cooperation, specificities of market configurations and their distinct courses of development).¹⁸

¹⁵ Manfredo Tafuri, *Architecture and Utopia: Design and Capitalist Development*, trans. Barbara Luigia La Penta (Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1999), p. 81.

¹⁶ Stretton, p. 43.

¹⁷ David Harvey, “The Marxian Theory of the State”, in *Spaces of Capital, Towards a Critical Geography*, pp. 281, 282.

¹⁸ The list can be expanded further depending on the desired level of detail and area of focus in research. For an exhaustive list of “contingencies” underlying variations in urban development, extracted from the studies provided in previous essays in the same volume, see Peter Marcuse and Ronald van Kempen, “Conclusion: A Changed Spatial Order” in *Globalizing Cities: A New Spatial Order?* (United Kingdom: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2000), p. 266.

The variety of historical cases makes it seemingly impossible to produce an all-embracing, deterministic theory on the workings of a capitalist city; however it is plausible to claim that all capitalist development has certain components which have a direct impact on the urban landscape and the everyday experience of the urbanite. Gaining an understanding of each one of these components would lead to an awareness of the various urban contradictions “internalized within particular objects or events.”¹⁹ Consequently, objects of enquiry such as historical land use patterns, zoning regulations, local politics, urban rent distribution, architectural styles and even urban lifestyles become separate domains of study, related to each other and to the whole study of urban development by a complex web of conflicts, crises and resolutions.²⁰ Since “spatial change is both a consequence and a cause of changes in the lives of urban residents,” a study of the changes in the built environment requires a conception beyond the formal “examination only of spatial patterns.”²¹ What follows from this approach has to be a historical enquiry based on the previously mentioned four components of capitalist urbanization, linking these separate domains as parts of the same whole.

A crucial part of the central thesis presented in this paper is that these components have varying degrees of impact depending on the contradictions and coalitions between and within interested parties. These parties typically include but are not limited to local and central ‘hegemony blocs,’ citizen groups, professional

¹⁹ Harvey, “On Countering the Marxian Myth”, in *Spaces of Capital, Towards a Critical Geography*, p. 76.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 76.

²¹ Marcuse and Kempen, p. 263.

organizations, and finally global forces.²² Although the growing influence of ‘globalization’ on localities has virtually added another dimension to the studies on urban development, this paper shares the argument that global capitalism is no more than an evolutionary step in the development of capitalism and its effect on the urban landscape are merely transformations of and/or additions to the existing historical layers of urban space.²³ Consequently, the study of recent urban transformations which are haphazardly treated as inevitable outcomes of the forces operating at a global scale can be integrated into a historical survey to shed light upon previous stages in the development of a particular city. In this respect, the development towards a physical and social geography of global capitalism may serve as a useful framework for a retrospective evaluation of the urban histories of capitalist societies, displaying “the socio-spatial structuring of the city which results from the interaction between past layers of socio-spatial organizations and present-day dynamics.”²⁴

Another argument shared by many authors, putting the blame for unsuccessful urban development on neo-liberal policies pursued after mid-80s for controlling inflation to stimulate economic growth, cutting public expenditures, privatization and marketization, indicates the need for a deeper understanding of how state policies adapt to the current conditions to provide the most efficient conditions for capital accumulation at every stage of capitalist development.²⁵ So, it is argued,

²² Şengül, pp. 33, 34.

²³ Marcuse and Kempen, pp. 265, 266.

²⁴ As the survey proceeds in the following chapters, the reader will be presented with examples on how in successive periods of urbanization in Turkey, the main actors of urban development have created their own historical-spatial layers in the urban setting. Christian Kesteloot, “Brussels: Post-Fordist Polarization in a Fordist Spatial Canvas” in *Globalizing Cities: A New Spatial Order?*, pp. 186, 187.

²⁵ Peter Ambrose, *Urban Process and Power*, p. 157.

that the internal motivation of capitalism to “accumulate for the sake of accumulation,” and the role of the state should be the basis of a discussion of different policy settings. Any technical or organizational changes in the mode of production within the capitalist economy are thus reflected upon the urban landscape by deepening “the pre-existing relations of the capitalist system” without creating “a different social order”.²⁶

Speculative development and redistribution of urban rent

The reasons behind speculation over urban property and the consequences of speculative development occupy an important place within the studies on urban development dealing especially with the second part of the twentieth century. Danielson and Keleş argue that the sharp increase in land prices –as a result of excessive demand for urban property- was further accelerated by “rampant land speculation”. Growing difficulties in implementing government plans for low-cost public housing and providing infrastructure to guide new settlements in a planned fashion were only two of the numerous negative results of the process Turkey started to experience with the 1950s.²⁷

In his reconstruction of the Marxian theories of rent and value, Harvey claims that land prices and land markets are vital for the emergence and continuation of any capitalist social-economic structure:

Capitalism cannot do without land price and land markets as basic coordinating devices in the allocation of land to uses ... First, land prices

²⁶ The case of the housing sector in Turkey after 1980 presents a case for this argument, which will be discussed in more detailed in the third chapter. Alexander Cuthbert, “Under the Volcano: Postmodern Space in Hong Kong” in *Postmodern Cities and Spaces*, ed. Katherine Gibson and Sophie Watson (Cornwall: Blackwell Publishers, 1995), p. 147.

²⁷ Michael N. Danielson and Ruşen Keleş, *The Politics of Rapid Urbanization, Government and Growth in Modern Turkey* (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc., 1985), pp. 195, 196.

could not exist without the monopoly power of private property in land and the capacity to appropriate rent which that power confers. Both rent and private property in land are socially necessary to the perpetuation of capitalism ... Only that kind of land-ownership that treats the land as a pure financial asset will do. All other forms of landed property must give way. The land must become a form of fictitious capital and be treated as an open field for the circulation of interest-bearing capital.²⁸

Since the price of any commodity reflects a certain degree of monopoly power over its ownership, his proposition connects to the definition of rent as “a form of surplus value” derived from monopoly power based on private ownership of the commodity.²⁹ In the urban context, the commodity in question may be a plot of land, a building, or any other form of ‘landed property’. The markets for urban property may show strong variance in their configurations, but in all forms, the management of urban land and services is of significant importance in the shaping of urban spatial arrangements.³⁰ The contradiction between “the exchange value” of an urban property conceived as a form of speculative investment and “the use value” intrinsic to the actual physical property in the setting of its price, as indicated by Şengül, is an important point for establishing the connection between price speculation, creation of urban economic rent and the difficulties faced by lower income groups in acquiring urban property.³¹ It is important to note that the primacy

²⁸ David Harvey, *The Limits to Capital*, new edition (London: Verso, 1999), p. 371.

²⁹ “The monopoly power that accrues to landowners through the private ownership of land is the basis of rent as a form of surplus value... The circulation of capital encounters a barrier in the form of landed property. The landowner can extract a tribute... in return for the use of land as a condition or means of production. The degree to which this barrier is manifest as the class power of landowners depends upon the historical circumstances.” Ibid., p. 73.

³⁰ Stretton lists “free trade, regulated private markets, public competition in private markets, public supply – private demand, and monopolist supply and administrative allocation of all land” as “the most common forms of dealing with the urban land.” Stretton, p. 43.

³¹ Şengül, pp. 42.

of “exchange value” in pricing urban property is reflected upon the urban space through speculation driven development projects, social - spatial segregation through pricing, and cycles of extraordinary growth and recession in the urban economies, as displayed by Ambrose in his discussion of speculative development in Britain.³²

Another area where urban rent is produced and redistributed is the provision of services such as transportation and housing construction.³³ In cases where such services are undertaken by private enterprises, the imperative to use the property or exclusive license in a profit-seeking way paves the way for a redistribution of the social wealth produced by the urban population. It is in this context that the following chapters will evaluate the handing over of urban public property and services to the private sector as part of the economic restructuring policies pursued after mid-eighties in most of the capitalist countries, including Turkey.³⁴

This complicated web of relations between urban property development, speculative pricing and reconfigurations in the distribution of rent leads one to consider the role of the state within the framework of “legal and illegal alliances” as mentioned above. The state’s response to rapid urbanization in Turkey should be considered as a reactive set of plans and policies geared toward short term implementation mostly, executed with insufficient resources, constrained by the lack

³² Ambrose, *Urban Process and Power*, pp. 56, 68, 192. An account of speculative housing construction and squatting in Turkey will be provided in the third chapter of the thesis in parallel with Ambrose’s discussion of speculation over certain types of space like residence, recreation and office space in England.

³³ Tekeli, “Popülist Politikalar, Kentsel Rant Ekonomisi ve Vatandaş Oluşturamayan Kentleşme Deneyi” in *Modernite Aşılırken Kent Planlaması* (Ankara: Imge Kitabevi Yayınları, 2000), p. 49.

³⁴ Danielson and Keleş, *The Politics of Rapid Urbanization*, p. 147. The impact of official policies for privatization of post-80s and the inadequacies in certain public services such as masshousing construction, proactive planning of urban development and the maintenance of a comprehensive urban transportation system will be covered with relation to their impacts on urban rent distribution in Turkish cities.

of trained personnel and an inefficient distribution of overlapping institutional powers among the cadres in charge of guiding urbanization.³⁵ This combination of failures has in turn made the state involvement in urban development vulnerable to populist policies and incidents of corruption, further decreasing the legitimacy and effectiveness of modern planning institutions.³⁶

Theories of the State

Castells sees the fundamental role of the state in urban governance as a political body intervening in the contradictions brought forth by the classed society living in the urban areas. These conflicts and contradictions in the urban setting are mainly rooted in the production and “collective consumption” of facilities and services, which are typically not distributed to all strata of society in a uniform fashion.³⁷ Public and private housing stock, health services, cultural events, commercial activities and facilities, urban amenities and transportation are all utilized by the urban population and it is around these “means of collective consumption” where the formal planning bodies operate to regulate their production and distribution.³⁸ Following the same logic, Castells defines the planning powers of the state as an “instrument of negotiation and mediation” between the conflicting demands and interests of the dominant classes and the “pressures and protests of the

³⁵Ibid., pp. 92, 191.

³⁶ Ibid., p.197. For a list of the ideal qualities of “good planning” practice, see İlhan Tekeli, “Plancının Meşruiyetini Oluşturmada Etik Sorunlar” in *Modernite Aşılırken Kent Planlaması* (Ankara: Imge Kitabevi Yayınları, 2000), p. 220.

³⁷ Manuel Castells, *City, Class, and Power*, trans. Elizabeth Lebas (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1978), p. 3.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 32.

dominated classes.”³⁹ As a result of these attempts at conflict resolution, the state in turn evolves to reflect the dynamics of capital accumulation, changing production relations and power struggles within society.⁴⁰ While Harvey replaces urban social movements of Castells’ theory with class struggle as the major force behind urban transformations, his treatment of the role played by the state does not deviate much from Castells’ logic.⁴¹ In both theories the state assumes an auxiliary position in the whole framework of urban processes, left only with a slot within the cycle of capital accumulation.⁴² In opposition to this role attributed to the state by Harvey and Castells, Şengül claims that a wholistic theory of urban development has to integrate the state power as the third actor in a synthetic theory which includes both capital accumulation and class struggle as the first two.⁴³ Since the tension between local and central authorities is a major recurring theme in the history of urban policymaking and management, a final addition to enrich the theoretical framework proposed by Şengül would be to preserve the distinction between the local and central governments as two different but interrelated locations of state power, most of the time competing for authority.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 87.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 48.

⁴¹ Harvey, “On Countering the Marxian Myth” in *Spaces of Capital, Towards a Critical Geography*, p. 79.

⁴² Şengül, p. 24.

⁴³ Ibid., p. 41.

Periodization

The following paragraphs aim to present an outline for the periodization of events and processes related to urban development. In order not to tell the same story twice, the following paragraphs are structured to rephrase only the contextual settings for the second chapter where a thematic analysis of urban dynamics of social-economic-political change will be presented.

The methodology for constructing the periodization is comprised of two levels in terms of defining historical periods. The identification and organization of the periods will be developed through a combination of the frameworks provided by Şengül, Tekeli, Gevgilili, and Mardin. Since the task requires an analysis in multiple dimensions, certain perspectives have to be identified to organize each period with its events, policies, laws and socio-economic context in itself. There are two major pitfalls which surface in the study and periodization of urban development in Turkey, the first one being a periodization based exclusively on modernization as the primary project of the Turkish state, and the second one being a generalizing approach focusing on the case of Istanbul and the periods of its development to tell the history of urban development in Turkey as a whole. While the second pitfall can be avoided by using an expanded framework to set the balance between the urban and national scales as two interrelated scopes for historical analysis, the first one requires more insight into the relation between modernization and developmentalism in Turkey.

As was stated previously, the history of urbanization in Turkey has to be evaluated as a process problematized in connection with national economic development and the state-sponsored project of modernization. As explained in the previous parts of this chapter, this thesis supports a conception of the state amidst the contradictions and struggles among society in general. The analyses of cases from

the history of urban development in Turkey, where the state intervention or regulation is little or completely lacking requires the scholar of urban history to reach at conclusions well beyond simple arguments of ‘the deficiencies of the state,’ or ‘the failure of modernization’. Even though the efforts for modernization are strictly related with the construction of a modern capitalist society, the literature on the history of urbanization in Turkey shows little attempt to cover modernization within the larger framework of capitalist development.

It is crucial to integrate the history of Turkish modernization -as a project to transform the mode of production and the productive forces inherited from the Ottoman past- into the history of national economic development to uncover the relational roles of the agents of urbanization. In order to explain this proposition, it is worthwhile to take the risk of over-conceptualization and refer once again to the Marxist theories of state and ideology briefly. A periodization –or a historical survey in general- focusing solely on the project of modernization implicitly emphasizes ideology over the “class positions” it expresses –and in turn, reproduces- and “the history of social formations, and thus of the modes of production combined in social formations, and of the class struggles which develop in them,” on which the formation of ideologies depends.⁴⁴ A further shortcoming of such an approach is that it leaves out the impact of what Althusser calls as the “repressive state apparatuses” in favor of the “ideological state apparatuses”.⁴⁵ Following Althusser’s logic, there is no state apparatus which functions exclusively on repression or ideology alone;

⁴⁴ Althusser goes on to argue that because of its dependence on the material conditions, “ideology has no history.” See, Louis Althusser, “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatus (Notes Towards an Investigation)” in *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*, trans. Ben Brewster, p. 107.

⁴⁵ Althusser lists the government, administration, army, police, courts, etc. as the repressive state apparatus, whereas family, education, religion, the political system, trade unions, communications and culture are listed among the ideological state apparatuses. See, *Ibid.*, p. 96.

is the early Republican era between 1923 and 1950; the second period covers the span of time between 1950 and 1980, whereas the third period covered in the survey is comprised of the years between 1980 and early 1990s. The analyses and surveys presented in the second and third chapters also make use of the late Ottoman heritage when necessary to trace the roots of certain issues related to urbanization and the development of local governments in Turkey.⁴⁸

⁴⁸ In a chronological study on the development of housing policies mass housing projects during the Republican era, Sey uses exactly the same scheme for periodization. See Yıldız Sey, "Cumhuriyet Döneminde Konut" in *75 Yılda Değişen Kent ve Mimarlık*, ed. Yıldız Sey, p. 273.

CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF URBANIZATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

This second chapter develops on the general outline provided in the periodization of the preceding chapter by singling out certain social and economic dynamics which have shaped the process of urban development in Turkey. The first part presents a historical account of the economic and political context of urbanization in Turkey divided into periods, including a short survey of what the early Republic had inherited from the late Ottoman Empire.

The second part deals with the development of urban governments throughout the Republican era and the role of state intervention by means of local governments and planning at different levels. The aim here is to trace the transformation of politics and state structures at the urban scale and their evolving relations with urban social classes and capital accumulation.

The third and final part of the chapter is exclusively on migration from rural to urban areas and its wider impact on the formation of interest groups, use and ownership patterns of urban property, and their reception by the state and urban social classes. Concluding comments on the consequent transformation of the built environment and the urban experience related to migration and its impact on the cities finalize this third part.

The Economic and Political Context of Urbanization in Turkey

The Late Ottoman Heritage

In an attempt to reconstruct the timeline stretching between 1923 and 1990s, one has to start with an account of what the Turkish Republic had inherited from the previous century. Contrary to the belief that the Ottoman state structure did not allow for any local forms of governmental organization, the Ottoman cities and their government were largely shaped by the relation between a strong central state located in Istanbul, and its local organizations which should be conceived as a structure stretching beyond a traditional definition of formal institutionalization based on the European history of local administrations.¹ Most of the bigger cities in the Empire were semi-independent entities informally governed by local political powers.² But the government of the city did not directly manifest itself in the physical realm through planning. This was not due to a lack of planning capabilities or lack of resources. Kuban relates this organic nature of the Ottoman city to an institutionalized favor for “the private space over non-private space” in the formation of the city and its physical development, thus creating a traditional lack of “cultural motivation” for urban planning in the European sense.³ The irregular patchwork of streets that developed through the “spontaneous activities of citizens” over several centuries emphasized accessibility rather than regularity and lacked any official

¹ Şengül, pp. 100, 101.

² Ibid., pp. 67, 68.

³ Doğan Kuban, *Istanbul an Urban History, Byzantion, Constantinopolis, Istanbul* (Istanbul: The Economic and Social History Foundation of Turkey, 1996), pp. 368, 369.

street names or house numbers until nineteenth century.⁴ The transportation within the city was mostly done by porters (*hamal*) until nineteenth century when carriages were introduced in Istanbul.⁵ These qualities of the built environment in the Ottoman city correspond well to a generalization of urban land use patterns in pre-capitalist urban societies. Although drawn from a completely unrelated urban historical background, Bentley's remarks on the "fine grain of mixed land uses" provides an insight into the relation between the Ottoman economic structure and the urban built environment:

In pre-capitalist situations, this (urban) pattern was highly constrained by the reliance on feet and on animals for transport. Everything had to be near to everything else, which meant that there was no practical alternative to a fine grain of mixed land uses: housing near work, shops and cultural facilities. In contrast, the dynamic of the capitalist land market, set free by the increasing mobility made possible for those who could afford transport innovations, led over time to an ever-broader zoning of land uses, so that purchasers of space who had different levels of buying power become more and more segregated from one another within the overall settlement fabric.⁶

By late 1840s, social and economic changes had already started to transform the visage of the Ottoman cities. Istanbul, being the imperial capital, experienced changes in its administration, transportation, housing construction and building regulations.⁷ The efforts for the modernization of the city served double purposes; on

⁴ This fact also indicates that the Ottoman state was far from the modern nation state's practice of formally coding citizens in space over the urban environment through various means such as maps, street names, house numbers, and census data.

⁵ Kuban, p. 369.

⁶ Ian Bentley, *Urban Transformations: Power, People and Urban Design* (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 77.

⁷ Yıldız Sey, "Cumhuriyet Döneminde Türkiye'de Mimarlık ve Yapı Üretimi" in *75 Yılda Değişen Kent ve Mimarlık* (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 1998), p.25.

the one hand they were of symbolic significance for the Ottoman Sultanate and its bureaucratic elites as part of the reforms; on the other, they were an important part of a general response to the demands for rationalization of the urban space and transformation of the mode of production to facilitate the circulation of the trade and finance capital.⁸

Since the early republican state structure and institutions have been built upon the reforms and modern institutions founded in the late Ottoman era, it is necessary to see the period between the years 1850 and 1923 as a period of experimentation with modern urbanism.⁹ The Anglo-Ottoman Trade Agreement of 1838 and the declaration of Tanzimat reforms in 1839 have been the two major events in the development of a new perspective regarding the government of Ottoman cities. The industrialization which was sponsored by the state as a “wholesale import process” and the intensification of trade activities based on imports by the upper classes signaled the emergence of a new set of economic relations and management which required the transformation of traditional forms of urban government, infrastructure, and urban morphology of the Ottoman city to fit in with the transforming production relations and social classes.¹⁰

⁸ The relations between these two sources of motivation and their impact on the cities will be discussed further in the chapter, as part of the historical development of local politics.

⁹ Keyder argues that “there was no overthrow of the Ottoman state structure after World War I; the new Turkish state took over with only slightly different personnel.” Çağlar Keyder, “Whither the Project of Modernity? Turkey in the 1990s” in *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey*, edited by Sibel Bozdoğan and Reşat Kasaba (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997), p. 40.

¹⁰ İlhan Tekeli, “19. Yüzyılda İstanbul Metropol Alanının Dönüşümü” in *Modernleşme Sürecinde Osmanlı Kentleri*, edited by Paul Dumont and François Georgeon, trans. Ali Berktaş (İstanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı, 1996), pp. 19, 20.

Before proceeding with the urban reforms of late nineteenth century, one has to look at certain changes in the urban administrative structure which took place within the first half of the century. One of the first institutions to be transformed was the *Şehremini* (“financial comptroller of the sultan’s buildings”) which was replaced by *Ebniye-i Hassa Müdürlüğü* (Office of Imperial Buildings) in 1831, which also assumed the duties of technical supervision of new constructions previously developed by the *Hassa Mimarları Ocağı*.¹¹ The centralization of urban government with the new system was further enhanced with the establishment of *Nafia Nezareti* (Ministry of Public Works) in 1849 which was to oversee the conduct of *Ebniye-i Hassa Müdürlüğü*. Contemporary laws and technical know-how was either directly imported from French sources, since the administrative model developed by Napoleon fit in very well with the Ottoman state’s reluctance to establish a municipal system granting local autonomies to the cities.¹² The urban reforms undertaken within this first half of the nineteenth century were carried out with foreign assistance provided by “imported” professionals such as Helmuth von Moltke who worked in the preparation of a development plan of the old city.¹³ The earliest regulation for urban development, *Ebniye Nizamnamesi* (Regulations for Building),

¹¹ Kuban, p. 381.

¹² As will be shown in the following parts of this chapter, such emphasis on a strong centralized state would be continued throughout the republican period as well. Danielson and Ruşen Keleş, *The Politics of Rapid Urbanization*, pp. 72, 73.

¹³ Tekeli, “19. Yüzyılda İstanbul Metropol Alanının Dönüşümü” in *Modernleşme Sürecinde Osmanlı Kentleri*, p. 21.

declared in 1848, was based on the proposals and plans prepared by von Moltke to guide the city through its transformation into an industrial European capital.¹⁴

In the year 1855, a major twist occurred in the Ottoman officials' approach to urban government. The post of *Şehremaneti* was reinstituted in 1855 with a different vision this time. With the aid of *Intizam-ı Şehir Komisyonu* (Urban Regulations Commission) founded in 1856, a program for urban improvement was prepared which turned into *Nizamname-i Umumi*, a law which institutionalized the provision of modern urban services and the establishment of fourteen municipalities in Istanbul in the following year. In the meantime, drastic changes were taking place in terms of landownership in Istanbul. As an extension of *Tanzimat*'s policy of landownership, *Arazi Kanunnamesi* (Land Law) was passed in 1858 which facilitated the accumulation of vast urban land -previously owned by the traditional *vakıf* institutions- and systematized the distribution of land to private hands through the introduction of land deeds for the first time. Coupled with the regulations of *Ebniye Kanunu* (Building Law) of 1882, which empowered municipal councils to regulate building heights and street widths, a new regime of urban land use appeared. The new regime obviously favored the urban rich, as the membership in municipal councils required the payment of property tax on lands or buildings "above a certain level". Thus, these two laws, far from guiding urban development, provided the grounds for speculative building and land acquisition in and around Istanbul even before the Republican period.¹⁵

¹⁴ Kuban, p. 382, 384.

¹⁵ Tekeli, "19. Yüzyılda İstanbul Metropol Alanının Dönüşümü" in *Modernleşme Sürecinde Osmanlı Kentleri*, p. 23.

In line with the changes taking place in the urban environment and the regulations related to it, the era has also witnessed the introduction of new building techniques and an expansion in the typological repertoire especially with the apartments and row houses gaining popularity as a result of the changes in the population and the lifestyles of the citizens.¹⁶

Most of the urban renewal projects carried out between 1838 and 1908 were mostly easily applied in those densely populated neighborhoods of Istanbul which were destroyed by fires. However, planners were not really concerned about the spatial relations between the newly planned parts of the city and the rest of the historical fabric. The people living in these planned quarters of the city did not face sudden changes in their experience of the urban setting. The wider streets, provision of new urban services and the preservation of architectural diversity in new constructions did not alter the physical environment in a radical way.¹⁷ The procession of modern planning and urban renewal in late nineteenth century Istanbul went through a slow diffusion of modern standards and paradigms regarding the order and quality of the urban built environment. The technical sophistication, the level of achievement and the scope of urban reforms dating from this period are subject to debate but the changes in the economic and social life provide certain clues as to what sorts of problems and practices the new Republic would inherit from its predecessor.

¹⁶ Maurice M. Cerasi, *Osmanlı Kenti, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda 18. ve 19. Yüzyıllarda Kent Uygarlığı ve Mimarisi*, translated by Aslı Ataöv (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık Ticaret ve Sanayi A. Ş., 1999), p. 283.

¹⁷ Zeynep Çelik, *Değişen İstanbul: 19. Yüzyılda Osmanlı Başkenti* (İstanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı, 1996), pp. 66, 67.

1923 – 1950

Şengül argues that the period between 1923 and the second half of the 1950s saw predominantly “the urbanization of the nation state”. There is an important point to be made here: “The urbanization of the nation-state” is a functional notion which connects the two sides of public investment in the urban space.¹⁸ The most significant development projects of the period were the construction of Ankara as a modern capital for the new Turkish state, establishment of provincial governments, distribution of state economic enterprises among the Anatolian cities, and the construction of a transportation network throughout the Anatolian peninsula.¹⁹ Each one of these projects was also accompanied by ideological considerations where certain relations with the past were to be broken through the transformation of the relations of production and politics of space.²⁰ A major motivation behind these policies was the reaction to the economic policies of the last two Ottoman centuries, which left most of Anatolia undeveloped, and its people isolated from economic

¹⁸ Mardin argues that the Turkish state has also invested in the construction and expansion of a symbolism of its own power, especially in places where there has been no material investment in either public services or infrastructure. Thus, one can also think of a project for the nationalization of urban space as part of the “urbanization of the nation-state” to support the construction of “the myth of the state”. See, Şerif Mardin, “Görkemli Yapılar – Küçük Yapılar” in *Türk Modernleşmesi, Makaleler 4*, 9. print (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001), p. 361.

¹⁹ Şengül, p. 71.

²⁰ Even though Tekeli assesses the period between 1910 and 1927 as an era of “shy modernization” in terms of urban planning, he argues that following the legislative framework constructed throughout the 1930s, the planning powers of the state were set to pursue a project of “fundamentalist modernization”. See İlhan Tekeli, “Modernist Meşruiyet Çerçevesinin Yetersiz Kalışının Bir Örneği Olarak İstanbul’un İkinci Dünya Savaşı Sonrasındaki Büyüme Öyküsü” in *Modernite Aşılırken Kent Planlaması* (Ankara: Imge Kitabevi Yayınları, 2000), p. 74.

development, thus deprived of any capital accumulation.²¹ The plans for national economic development in this period were prepared to spread the investments evenly throughout the Anatolian peninsula, rather than pursuing an intensive and geographically concentrated public investment program. Almost all of the publicly owned industrial complexes were built in towns outside Marmara and Aegean Regions. These towns were inhabited by no more than 10,000 people and they were all connected to the national railway system for the delivery of raw materials and finished goods.²²

The economic policy of the years between 1923 and 1950s is characterized by the transition from the liberal economic outlook of the 1920s to the statist economic policy after 1930. The years between 1923 and 1930 were conceived as an experiment with liberal economic policies following the resolutions of the Izmir Economic Congress to transform the nation's productive forces in a liberal economic framework. The establishment of İş Bank in 1924 and the liberal Foreign Trade Regulation Law of 1929 were parts of the economic legislation which was aimed at encouraging free enterprise in the country.²³ Despite these resolutions, the absence of customs protection for five years dictated by the Lausanne Treaty and the impact of the World Great Depression of 1929 hindered the programs for private sector industrialization and eventually led the state to become an active agent in

²¹ Özcan Altaban, "Cumhuriyet'in Kent Planlama Politikaları ve Ankara Deneyimi" in *75 Yılda Değişen Kent ve Mimarlık*, (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 1998), p.43.

²² Ruşen Keleş, *Kentleşme Politikası*, (Ankara: Imge Kitabevi, 2002), p. 393.

²³ Özey Mehmet, "Turkey in Crisis: Some Contradictions in the Kemalist Development Strategy" in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, volume 15, no.1 (February, 1983) (Cambridge University Press, 1983): pp. 51-52.

industrialization through the establishment of state economic enterprises. During this period, two important changes took place in the countryside. The proliferation of *aşar* and the abolition of large rural landholdings through the new Civil Law were the two actions taken by the state to open up the rural economy to the rationale of capitalist production and to free up the much-needed labor for industrialization.²⁴

The period from 1930 to 1950 clearly shows a state regulated economy, implementation of statist policies promoting import substitution and the creation of a new bourgeoisie which would seize power through the new political parties founded after 1945. One should note here that the state's active involvement in the economic sphere did not aimed at creating competition for the private sector. Statist policies mostly created the infrastructural elements for capitalist economic development and capital intensive industries to sell materials with a very small profit margin to private industrialists, distributors and manufacturers. The resulting economic structure was that of a vertical integration between the private and public economic enterprises. In this sense, statism in Turkey served as a preliminary stage towards the constitution of a capitalist national economy based on national private capital.²⁵ The Turkish wartime economy fostered the accumulation of capital in the private sector through the tax and labor laws of the 1930s favoring the private investors and undertakers at the expense of the masses of wage-laborers.²⁶

²⁴ Ali Gevgilili, *Türkiye'de Kapitalizmin Gelişmesi ve Sosyal Sınıflar*, second edition (Ankara: Bağlam Yayıncılık, 1989), p. 46.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 48.

²⁶ The Labor Law of 1936 banned all labor unions, strike and collective bargaining. Ibid., pp. 48, 50.

The state-led industrialization drained most of the public funds and turned most of the investments away from urban development projects to planned national economic development through accelerated industrialization. This policy preference has had its direct impact on the relative level of success achieved through planning and mobilization at the national scale. However, the Republic's project for planned urban growth and gradual urbanization of the population was accompanied by the failures at the urban scale due to the lack of funding for public projects, the lack of qualified personnel to direct and oversee urban development and planning, and finally the soaring competition for the distribution of rent among the urban middle classes.²⁷

The real actors of urban development throughout these first decades of the Republic were the urban middle class and state bureaucracy whose needs and aims gave shape to both the legislative framework for urban management and the policy goals concerning national economic development.²⁸ Once again, the rush for accelerated industrialization demanded that the state funds be channeled to industrial development and infrastructural investments complementary to it, such as the extensive railway network connecting the rural areas to the large urban centers, instead of the necessary investments for urban facilities.

This trade-off had its impact on the transformation of the class structure as well. The urban middle classes became more and more vulnerable to "overurbanization" with the coming of the 1950s.²⁹ Throughout the 1930s statism

²⁷ Şengül, p. 74.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 70.

²⁹ Overurbanization is a concept used for rapid urbanization without the urban industrial basis to provide employment for the growing labor pool. For a more complete definition of "overurbanization"

was accompanied by a scheme for centralization of state powers but these two policies did not suffice to shatter the local networks of power. What this first period handed over to the late 1950s was a corporatist structure at the center and a web of power relations between the notables and small entrepreneurs at the local scale. Under the municipal government scheme employed until the 1960s, the centrally appointed governor acted as a representative of the center's interests, whereas the municipal board became the seat of the multitude of local interest groups.³⁰

Late 1950s – 1980

The second historical episode of urbanization in Turkey proceeded under the influence of three major transformations operating in close correlation with each other. These are the emergence of populist political discourses and practices under the multi-partite regime, the grande bourgeoisie's takeover of the state power and mass migration from rural areas to the major urban centers.

In the political arena, the 1950s saw the national bourgeoisie breaking up its political pact with the bureaucracy. Feeding on the capital accumulated through the protectionist policies of 1930s and the profits raised from the wartime economy, the trade bourgeoisie was by then powerful enough to make a claim to the powers of economic policy making.³¹ The movement did not face any difficulties in gaining support from the small scale producers scattered mostly in the rural areas, as it was

and its relevance for the Turkish case, see, Danielson and Keleş, *The Politics of Rapid Urbanization*, p. 38.

³⁰ Şengül, pp. 102, 103.

³¹ This change in the ownership of state power is conceptualized as “the direct rule of grand-bourgeoisie”. Gevgilili, pp. 50-52.

backed up by the populist rhetorics of “free market economy” and “preservation of local customs and traditional ways of life” against the state regulation of economy and the bureaucracy dictated modernization of the society.³² This popular support for the new policy was further motivated by the inability of the state to construct the “economic and social dynamics necessary for the rural population to break up its ties with the historical roots formed primarily through its traditional ways of living.”³³ Seen from this perspective, popular discontent with the state policies –which came to overthrow the governing party of the elite bureaucracy with the multi-partite regime– can also be seen as a manifestation of the uneven procession of modernization from the center to the periphery and the resulting crises of identity experienced by those who were provided with neither material benefits nor the ideological complement of “modern living.” One of the two immediate outcomes of this takeover of the state power was the construction of a new class alliance between small agricultural producers, rural bourgeoisie and the grand trade bourgeoisie.³⁴ The second outcome was the return to a liberal economic model emphasizing –and promising– economic development through an unregulated free market economy replacing the social stability and planned development of the previous era as the dominant paradigm for

³² Çağlar Keyder, *Türkiye’de Devlet ve Sınıflar*, trans. Sabri Tekay (Istanbul: İletişim Yayıncılık, 1989), p. 97.

³³ Ibid., p. 99.

³⁴ In an article written in 1957, Şerif Mardin claims that the 1950s’ move toward trade liberalization led to the “destruction” of the middle class, as it had done a hundred years ago with the liberalization of Ottoman economy, favoring foreign traders and non-muslim capitalists inside the empire. Mardin also argues that “the destruction of the middle class proceeds hand in hand with catastrophes” for the society as a whole. Şerif Mardin, “Türkiye’de Orta Sınıfların Üç Devri” in *Türk Modernleşmesi, Makaleler 4*, 9. print (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001), pp. 341, 342.

social organization.³⁵ However, this period of liberal economic policies did not last too long. By 1954, the government had already given the first signals of a shift to the import substitution model with a new law imposing restrictions on imports.³⁶ The dominance of central decision making on the distribution of public investment and the primacy of private capital in industrialization, both of which favored the Marmara region and specifically Istanbul for investment, eradicated the previous decades' efforts for the amelioration of regional disparities between Eastern and Western Anatolia.³⁷

Partly conditioned by the international economic conditions –as was the case also back in the 1930s- , the institutionalization of a new economic policy emphasizing “developmentalist efficiency” took a little more than five years, marking the beginning of a new and this time longer period of planned economy and state capitalism with the military intervention of 1960.³⁸ The military intervention developed on the import substitution policies by incorporating them into a larger economic context of planned economic growth through a nationally planned program

³⁵ Keyder, *Türkiye’de Devlet ve Sınıflar*, p. 114.

³⁶ M. Melih Pınarcıoğlu and Oğuz Işık, *Nöbetleşe Yoksulluk, Sultanbeyli Örneği* (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002), p. 99.

³⁷ Ruşen Keleş, *Kentleşme Politikası*, p. 393.

³⁸ Çağlar Keyder, “Whither the Project of Modernity? Turkey in the 1990s” in *Rethinking Modernity and National Identity in Turkey*, p. 40. For an in-depth analysis of the roles played by the military and intelligentsia prior to and after the intervention of 1960 see Kemal H. Karpat, “The Military and Politics in Turkey, 1960-64: A Socio-Cultural Analysis of a Revolution” In *American Historical Review*, volume 75, no. 6 (October 1970) (American Historical Association, 1970): pp. 1654-1683.

of industrialization that provided protection for urban industries and secured a domestic market for the local industries.³⁹

This twist in economic policy, brought forth by the urban bourgeoisie as a reaction to laws and regulations providing state support for agriculture, hence favoring rural merchants and agricultural producers, was also accompanied by a new legislative framework for the state's planning powers, both at the national and urban scales.⁴⁰ Despite the growing concerns about a planned national economy after 1960, the state remained reluctant to intervene at the urban scale, leaving the process of urbanization at the hands of local interest groups comprised of small producers and merchants who were to become the new agents of urban development as opposed to the urban development of the previous years, lead mostly by the state and wage earning middle classes.⁴¹

Even though the year 1960 may seem to be a turning point in many spheres of social and economic life, the dynamics set in motion during the 1950s such as migration, squatting, and the rent-seeking behavior of both the new urban poor and the urban middle class would continue to transform the urban environment throughout the following years.⁴² The newly formed alliance between international capital, national industrial capital, the state bureaucracy and the organized labor with

³⁹ Keyder, *Türkiye'de Devlet ve Sınıflar*, p. 109.

⁴⁰ Keyder claims that planning as a tool of economic development was also recommended by the World Bank and OECD in their reports on Turkey by the late 1950s. See, Keyder, *Türkiye'de Devlet ve Sınıflar*, p. 105.

⁴¹ Şengül, p. 73.

⁴² The waves of migration from rural areas to big cities that started as early as 1945 and the consequent politics of urban rent extraction and distribution are dealt with in the second chapter of the thesis.

their compatible interests paved the way for the emergence of a new model of capital accumulation in the urban environment which was to remain intact until the 1980s.⁴³ Boratav and Yeldan define the timeline between 1972 and 1979 as a period of “the deepening of the industrialization strategy based on import substitution” which extended the “evolution of the inward-looking, domestic demand-led industrialization” of the last two decades. Until the 1980s the state had been a major actor in the economic life with its investments in heavy manufacturing and also as a producer of commodities through state economic enterprises. However, as mentioned before, the economy of import substitution “enabled industrialists to capture oligopolistic profits and rents” created in the protected domestic market with the help of the “artificially” cheap intermediate goods produced by state economic enterprises. In return for the stable domestic market and a “repressed financial system” strictly regulated by the state, the urban industrialists did not resist an increase in wages and subsidies for agricultural production. This web of economic relations between the industrial capital, urban wage earners, bureaucratic elites, and agricultural labor was the basis of a large alliance of social classes which lasted until 1976, when the “foreign exchange crisis of 1977-1980” disturbed political and social stability leading to the economic stabilization package of 1980 enforced by three years of right-wing military regime.⁴⁴ The “grants economy” established through state economic enterprises, customs protections, bureaucratic regulation, and capitalist cooperation had given rise to some fundamental problems and

⁴³ Çağlar Keyder, *Türkiye’de Devlet ve Sınıflar*, p. 119.

⁴⁴ Erinc Yeldan and Korkut Boratav, *Turkey, 1980-2000: Financial Liberalization, Macroeconomic (In)-Stability, and Patterns of Distribution*, working paper, version December, 2001, pp. 4,5.

contradictions would persist even in the following decades. The unnatural distribution of income regulated by the central bureaucracy created a “Turkish economic elite” receiving forty percent of all national income, the regulation of prices and markets increased black market activity, and finally caused a widening gap between the income levels of laborers –industrial and agricultural alike- and professionals in the service sectors such as finance and commerce.⁴⁵ The increasing inequalities in income distribution, which increased the numbers of the urban poor every day, and the institutionalization of black market activities and bribery in this period laid the foundations for the problems to come with the 1980s and 1990s.

1980 – Early 1990s

The year 1980 is considered to be a breakpoint in many respects. The first half of the 1980s saw a significant amount of economic and social policy changes following the military intervention of 1980 and the interruption of the democratic system for three years. However, it is claimed that the military intervention was a suppressive action taken against a combination of economic and social crises. In response to the economic crisis which loomed by the late 1970s, the government passed a “radical policy package” to liberalize the import substitution economy of the previous two decades⁴⁶. The policy package of January 24, 1980, was prepared in accordance with the demands and suggestions of IMF, aiming to “stabilize” and “liberalize” the Turkish economy. When the organized working classes sided against

⁴⁵ Özey Mehmet, “Turkey in Crisis: Some Contradictions in the Kemalist Development Strategy” in *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, volume 15, no.1 (February, 1983) (Cambridge University Press, 1983): pp. 57-58.

⁴⁶ Owen and Pamuk, p. 117.

the execution of the program, the case only got worse. As the crisis deepened the government proved unable to assert its political rule in the face of the popular protests and escalating social unrest; the army intervened to fill in the vacuum of power.⁴⁷ The military regime of the following three years aimed to violently suppress any political resistance and to create the appropriate conditions for the implementation of the new economic policy.⁴⁸ These three years laid the foundations for a new period of trade liberalization, abandonment of planning practices at the local and national scale and the emergence of a new configuration for the distribution of urban rent.

The military regime of 1980 saw all kinds of local organizations as potential sources of threat against the central power of the state. All elected municipal mayors, councils, and planning bureaus -all of which were criticized of having become increasingly political in their discourses during the 1970s- were dismissed immediately after the intervention. These were replaced with “provincial governors, retired army officers, or bureaucrats from the central government” directly appointed either by the Ministry of the Interior or the provincial governors, while the authorities of the municipal councils were transferred to the all-appointed standing committees.⁴⁹ Just before the return to “a restricted parliamentary system”, a two-tiered municipal system was reinstituted with the passing of the constitution of 1982,

⁴⁷ Metin Heper, introduction to *Local Government in Turkey, Governing Greater Istanbul*, edited by Metin Heper (Great Britain: Routledge, 1989), p. 2.

⁴⁸ Oktay Ekinici, *Istanbul’u Sarsan 10 Yıl (1983-1993)* (Istanbul: Anahtar Kitaplar Yayınevi, 1994), p. 33.

⁴⁹ Danielson and Keleş, *The Politics of Rapid Urbanization*, p. 96.

which distributed the powers and responsibilities of urban government at the levels of metropolitan and district municipalities.⁵⁰

Under the new paradigms of trade liberalism, privatization of state economic enterprises, deregulation of capital markets along with decentralization of the polity -however limited and arbitrary in scope- and export oriented economic policies, the era's policies for national economic development brought forth a new actor in the transformation of the urban built environment and its administration. As the government's investment funds were gradually shifted away from industrial development to provision of urban services and infrastructure, the private holders of capital turned their investments to major cities of Western Turkey. The renewed attraction of speculative development and rent turned large holdings of capital into the prime actors of urban change, leading to the creation of yet another historico-spatial layer of urban development, this time marked by the "urbanization of capital".⁵¹ As a result of the post-1980 regime's distanced approach to planning of any scale, both public and private investments tended to concentrate in the western part of Anatolia, leading to the sharpening of regional differences between the East and the West, which once again propped the influx of rural immigrants to the metropolitan centers of the West.⁵²

⁵⁰ Heper, introduction to *Local Government in Turkey, Governing Greater Istanbul*, p. 8. More detail on this institutional reform is provided in this chapter within the context of the historical development of local governments in Turkey.

⁵¹ Şengül, pp. 86, 87.

⁵² Owen and Pamuk, p. 124.

The Development of Local Governments and Planning in the Republican Era

The historical survey of urban governments in Turkey to be presented in the following paragraphs is comprised of three main elements. The first two of these are the changing roles of the local and central state institutions vis-à-vis the agents of urban development dominant in each period and the planning institutions which reflect in their programs and projections the state's choices on whether or not to intervene –directly or indirectly- in the national development process at the urban and national scales. In those areas where the state chose to intervene, the methods and ruling paradigms were usually manifest in the programs, and these make up the third element of the survey.

The fundamental law of the Turkish Republic which formally established the municipalities was Law 1580 of 1930.⁵³ The main responsibilities of the municipalities were drafted as the regulation and provision of “civil and common needs of the urban population”. The law also commanded municipalities “to provide for their health, safety, and welfare, and to prevent deterioration of urban order”.⁵⁴ The reason behind the passing of this law was that the municipalities in their previous conditions were seen by the central state to be “unable to cope with the modernization process”, which implied that the municipal system before 1930 - mostly dominated by the local petit-bourgeoisie and the traditional social groups

⁵³ This new law replaced a temporary law passed in 1913 governing the provincial administrations. Ruşen Keleş, “Yerel Demokrasi ve Yasal Sınırları” in *Kent ve Siyaset Üzerine Yazıları (1975-1992)* (Istanbul: IULA-EMME, 1993), pp. 14, 15.

⁵⁴ A detailed list of municipal functions in the Law 150 includes protecting “human health, public safety, and social welfare;” controlling “the prices of food and services;” establishing “public libraries, playgrounds,...public squares, hospitals, nurseries, orphanages, slaughterhouses, wholesale markets, racetracks, and stadiums;” and preparing “master plans”. Danielson and Keleş, *The Politics of Rapid Urbanization, Government and Growth in Modern Turkey*, p. 77.

holding power at the local scale- had provided a certain degree of autonomy against the single party regime of the center.⁵⁵ Thus, the law reflected the state's tendency to keep the administrative power at the center and to control local governments through the revenues transferred from the center, since the municipalities were assigned no independent sources of income under the law of 1930.⁵⁶

In these early years of the Republic, several laws were issued to regulate urban development and certain issues related to it. The first law for the regulation of urban environment and land-use pattern dates back to 1924 (Law 486) which gave municipalities the authority to demolish illegal constructions after securing a court order. With the Public Hygiene Law of 1930 (*Umumi Hıfssısha Kanunu*, Law 1593, the municipalities gained more power over urban land-use as the law introduced a legal distinction between residential and industrial zones in order to protect public health by keeping residential parts of the city away from any industrial waste or hazards. The Law for the Construction of Ankara, (*Ankara'nın İmarı için Kanun*, no. 1351) passed in 1928 and the Municipal Construction and Roads Law (*Belediye Yapı ve Yollar Kanunu*, Law 2290) of 1933 were some of the laws which were parts of a fragmented legal framework developed through the first two decades of the Republic to address specific issues related to urban development, though lacking the conception of an exhaustive legal layout for urbanization.⁵⁷

⁵⁵ İlhan Tekeli, "Cumhuriyet'in Altmış Yıllık Belediyecilik Deneyinin Değerlendirilmesi Üzerine" in *Belediyecilik Yazıları (1976-1991)* (İstanbul: IULA-EMME, 1992), p. 136.

⁵⁶ Danielson and Keleş, *The Politics of Rapid Urbanization, Government and Growth in Modern Turkey*, p. 74.

⁵⁷ Mehmet Çubuk, *İmar Mevzuatından Şehircilik Mevzuatına Türk Şehirciliğine Sistemik bir Yaklaşım Denemesi*, (İstanbul: Mimar Sinan Üniversitesi Baskı Atölyesi, 1999) pp. 12, 13.

The authority given to municipalities for the regulation of the urban built environment was extended with the Town Planning Law of 1957 to include building regulations, zoning measures, and residential densities. The Law also required municipal supervision over new constructions to make sure that development follows the municipal plans and regulations. However, due to insufficient funding and shortage of trained personnel to oversee new urban development, most of the municipalities failed to prepare these maps and plans for zoning. With the construction permits as the only tool for planning resting in the hands of municipalities, the legislation provided ample opportunities for corruption of the few building inspectors, higher ranking bureaucrats and even elected municipal officials.⁵⁸

During the 1950s, the influence of the local groups like small merchants, speculative developers and craftsmen was brought back into the formal organization of municipalities, which was part of the program promoted by the Democratic Party before its election. Even though the Party did not make significant changes in the legal codes and the formal structure of local governments, local groups and small entrepreneurs managed to get more representation in the municipal councils, which gave them the opportunity to defend their interests at the local level, whereas the growing grand-bourgeoisie was dominant within the organs of the central state.⁵⁹

⁵⁸ Danielson and Keleş, *The Politics of Rapid Urbanization, Government and Growth in Modern Turkey*, pp. 196, 197.

⁵⁹ İlhan Tekeli, "Cumhuriyet'in Altmış Yıllık Belediyecilik Deneyinin Değerlendirilmesi Üzerine" in *Belediyecilik Yazıları (1976-1991)* (İstanbul: IULA-EMME, 1992), p. 136.

Such “division of labor” remained intact until 1973.⁶⁰ Under Law 507 of 1964, the small entrepreneurs managed to organize and represent themselves at the local scale to defend their interests and guarantee their access to portions of the rent produced in the city. Since most of the policymaking which concerns the conduct of this social group takes place at the local level within the municipal organs, the prime objective behind these merchants’ associations has been to exert control over the municipal governments. Left outside the control of the municipal mayor and without facing serious resistance by associations of consumers and workers, the small urban entrepreneurs managed to use the municipal council as a tool for the maximization of rent. According to the data from 1976, the level of participation of the small entrepreneurs and speculative property developers showed only very little variation across municipalities held by different political parties. The legal framework provided by Law 1580 of 1930 and Law 507 of 1964 made it possible to raise barriers against new entrants into the markets controlled by local associations of entrepreneurs, and to intervene officially in the process of setting the maximum price for certain commodities and services. Having such power over the life in urban centers, these professional organizations were under the supervision of the Ministry of Commerce, making them totally immune to the regulatory powers of municipalities.⁶¹

The local elections of 1973 brought the social democrats to power in metropolitan cities for the first time; the following years saw the formulation of a

⁶⁰ İlhan Tekeli, “Yerel Yönetimlerde Demokrasi ve Türkiye’de Belediyelerin Gelişimi” in *Belediyecilik Yazıları (1976-1991)* (İstanbul: IULA-EMME, 1992), p. 10.

⁶¹ İlhan Tekeli, “Yerel Politikada Küçük Girişimci Egemenliği” in *Belediyecilik Yazıları (1976-1991)* (İstanbul: IULA-EMME, 1992), pp. 53-55, 59.

new understanding of municipal government being developed through practice.⁶²

Unlike the system of the previous decades, the new municipal governments were putting more emphasis on the democratic participation of urban masses including the urban poor and middle-class wage earners.⁶³ What complicated the task of this movement were the recurring clashes between the right-wing central government and the social democratic cadres of the metropolitan municipalities.⁶⁴ In the absence of the laws granting sufficient funding, the problem of budget deficits at the local scale led to an open political conflict between the local and central governments and the problem persisted after the local elections of 1977 when social democrats were elected once again in most of the metropolitan cities.⁶⁵ Even though the Constitution of 1961 had put the central government under obligation to provide sufficient financial sources in line with the municipalities' responsibilities, metropolitan municipalities had been consistently deprived of their legal right to obtain funding from the central government.⁶⁶ To remedy the financial problems, some

⁶² Tekeli, "Yerel Yönetimlerde Demokrasi ve Türkiye'de Belediyelerin Gelişimi" in *Belediyecilik Yazıları (1976-1991)*, p. 10.

⁶³ For a news coverage on the program of Ahmet İsvan, who was elected municipal mayor of Istanbul in 1973, see Zeki Sayar, "Belediye Seçimleri Münasebetiyle", *Arkitekt*, volume 42, no. 352, pp. 163, 164.

⁶⁴ This new understanding of municipal government –labeled as *toplumcu belediyecilik*– was developed through the experience of the period between 1973-1977 and was founded upon the principles of being democratic, liberal, and productive; regulating collective consumption, supporting coherence in conduct and raising independent funds at the urban scale to be reinvested in urban services. For a detailed description of program of *toplumcu belediyecilik*, see İlhan Tekeli, "Yeni (1977) Belediye Seçimlerine Giderken" in *Belediyecilik Yazıları (1976-1991)* (Istanbul: IULA-EMME, 1992), pp. 88-91.

⁶⁵ İlhan Tekeli, "Yerel Yönetimlerde Demokrasi ve Türkiye'de Belediyelerin Gelişimi" in *Belediyecilik Yazıları (1976-1991)*, p. 11.

⁶⁶ Under the legislation in effect between 1948 and 1981, the local governments received only local revenues from "licence taxes, user fees, fines, charges for permits and income from municipal

municipalities chose to postpone payments to central state agencies such as *Sosyal Sigortalar Kurumu* (Social Security Institution), along with efforts to find productive ways to raise funding.⁶⁷

Within the period from the military intervention of 1980 and the first local elections thereafter, which took place in 1984, a number of important structural adjustments were made in the municipal system. These changes were based on Law 2972 (Local Governments Election Law, passed in November 1984) and Law 195 (Metropolitan Municipalities Law, passed in March 1984), both of which referred to Article 127 of the new Constitution enacted in 1982 by the National Security Council, which said that “a special administrative structure may be constituted”.⁶⁸ The central funding for municipalities was greatly expanded; small municipalities which emerged around the metropolitan centers were united under greater metropolitan municipalities; a law on social housing was passed which gave primacy to cooperatives for the construction of urban housing. Due to the implementation of the economic policy package of 25 January, 1980, the municipalities were made increasingly reliant on small entrepreneurs for the provision of urban services, since

utilities, city hospitals, cemeteries, and city-owned economic enterprises”, the sum of which made up less than half of the total municipal budget. The rest was financed by shares from central taxes and aids or loans from the central government. For more accurate figure on the municipal budgets, see, Danielson and Keleş, *The Politics of Rapid Urbanization, Government and Growth in Modern Turkey*, pp. 83, 84.

⁶⁷ İlhan Tekeli, “Yerel Yönetimlerde Demokrasi ve Türkiye’de Belediyelerin Gelişimi” in *Belediyecilik Yazıları (1976-1991)*, pp. 12, 13.

⁶⁸ Güngör Erdumlu, *Büyük Şehir Belediyeleri Araştırması*, (Ankara: Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı, Yayın ve Temsil Dairesi Başkanlığı Yayın ve Basım Şube Müdürlüğü Matbaa Birimi, June 1993) pp. 49-51.

the economic program did not allow for large scale capital investments by the local governments.⁶⁹

The ideology and practice of the municipal administration after the local elections of 1984 was dominated by the Motherland Party (ANAP) ruling at the center and also in all metropolitan cities. Within the first four years after 1984, the municipalities were endowed with even more financial sources than the previous four years.⁷⁰ However these additional financial sources were not financed by revenue generated at the urban scale. The direct transfer from the national budget by the central government was a political indication of the ruling party's aim to gain the support of the urban classes which had already outnumbered the rural population by then.⁷¹

After 1984, the metropolitan system established by the military regime was divided into two levels of greater city municipalities and district municipalities. Far from creating economies of scale in the provision of urban services and a rational division of labor between two interrelated levels, the structural change created a new arena of contradiction between district municipalities and metropolitan municipalities.⁷² Since the Motherland Party was not expecting to win the local

⁶⁹ İlhan Tekeli, "Yakın Geçmişten Bugüne, Belediye Programlarının Oluşumu" in *Belediyecilik Yazıları (1976-1991)* (İstanbul: IULA-EMME, 1992), p.102.

⁷⁰ With the Law 3239 passed in 1985, the municipalities received 17.7 percent of the national budget by 1986, which is twice the budget allocated for municipalities back in 1975. One fifth of the increased municipal budget was financed by debt, and 80 percent of this was foreign debt. Ibid., p.102.

⁷¹ Ibid., p.103.

⁷² For a map of the districts under the authority of Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, see Appendix I, p. 97.

elections of 1984 at the metropolitan municipality level, the new system was carefully constructed so as to provide the district municipalities with a certain degree of autonomy against political domination by metropolitan municipalities. After the candidates of the Motherland Party won metropolitan municipalities of Ankara, Istanbul, and Izmir, this balance was changed with a governmental ordinance to entrust the metropolitan municipalities with much more power and control.⁷³ With the new municipal system, the metropolitan municipality had total control over the conduct of the districts, leaving no space for democratic participation at smaller municipal subdistricts, thus eliminating the most desirable outcome of this reconfiguration in local administration.⁷⁴ As Erkip argues in retrospect, the new municipal system did not contribute to the means of democratic representation of citizen groups at the level of district municipalities despite the changes in the structure and legal framework. In addition to this, the transfer of planning land use and regulation of new development to district and metropolitan municipalities made “urban land more available for big construction companies” instead of encouraging the participation of planning professionals at local levels.⁷⁵

The establishment of the new metropolitan system was coupled with the dismissal of Metropolitan Master Planning Bureaus.⁷⁶ With Law 3030 passed in

⁷³ Heper, introduction to *Local Government in Turkey, Governing Greater Istanbul*, pp. 6, 7.

⁷⁴ Tekeli, “Yakın Geçmişten Bugüne, Belediye Programlarının Oluşumu” in *Belediyecilik Yazıları (1976-1991)*, pp. 103, 104.

⁷⁵ Feyzan Erkip, “Global Transformations Versus Local Dynamics in Istanbul, Planning in a Fragmented Metropolis” in *Cities*, volume 17, no. 5 (Great Britain: Pergamon, 2000), p. 374.

⁷⁶ İlhan Tekeli, “Yakın Geçmişten Bugüne, Belediye Programlarının Oluşumu” in *Belediyecilik Yazıları (1976-1991)*, p. 107.

October 1984, metropolitan municipalities were given the authority, to prepare master plans and to supervise the implementation plans prepared by the subdistrict municipalities, while the central government kept its tutelage over local governments with Laws 3194 and 3394.⁷⁷ These laws had given the Ministry of Reconstruction and Settlement (*Bayındırlık ve İskan Bakanlığı*) the power to reject or authorize projects and plans prepared at the local scale without even consulting with the municipalities.⁷⁸ Politically legitimized as part of a greater project for decentralization, the authority for urban master planning had been transferred to municipalities, which enabled the interested parties presented in municipal councils to modify land use regulations for speculative development without any demographic or physical planning restraints. In addition to this, an attempt was also made to authorize private bureaus for the granting construction permits; the attempt was prevented by the decision of the Constitutional Court.⁷⁹

The governments of Motherland Party also decentralized the councils responsible for the preservation of natural and cultural heritage through a change in the Law 2863 in 1986. The number of academic professionals in these councils was reduced and the newly appointed state bureaucrats put the councils under political pressure from the center.⁸⁰ The massive demolitions undertaken in Tarlabası in 1985

⁷⁷ Orhan Göçer, *Metropolitan Planlama*, (İstanbul: Yıldız Üniversitesi Matbaası, 1990) pp. 107, 108.

⁷⁸ The article concerning this authority of the Ministry has been cancelled by the Constitutional Court as late as 1991. See Ruşen Keleş, “Belediyeciliğimizde Son Gelişmeler ve Yerel Özerklik” in *Kent ve Siyaset Üzerine Yazıları (1975-1992)* (İstanbul: IULA-EMME, 1993), pp. 250, 251.

⁷⁹ İlhan Tekeli, “Yakın Geçmişten Bugüne, Belediye Programlarının Oluşumu” in *Belediyecilik Yazıları (1976-1991)*, p. 104.

⁸⁰ Yücel Gürsel, “Deformasyonlar” in *Demokratikleşme Sürecinde Kent ve İnsan* (İstanbul: E Yayınları, 1990), p. 90.

were a result of these changes and an ideological outlook which did not care to preserve historical heritage if it was not considered to be of “Turkish” or “Islamic” origins.⁸¹

In contrast to the principle of “productive municipal government” of the 1970s’ social democrats, the Motherland Party municipalities employed a policy of privatization at the national scale, which surfaced as outsourcing of urban services and infrastructure construction to private companies through bidding.⁸² The municipalities under ANAP invested heavily in the construction of urban infrastructure largely financed with foreign debt. However, most of these projects concerning waste disposal and transportation were developed without public participation, coordination, and sufficient planning.⁸³

⁸¹ İlhan Tekeli, “Yakın Geçmişten Bugüne, Belediye Programlarının Oluşumu” in *Belediyecilik Yazıları (1976-1991)*, pp. 104, 105.

⁸² Ibid., p. 105.

⁸³ Ibid., p. 106.

CHAPTER III

URBAN TRANSPORTATION AND HOUSING PRODUCTION

This third chapter deals with two specific domains of policy making which were left out in the previous chapter to be discussed in more detail. Transportation and housing production became the most pressing issues concerning local and central governments especially after the Second World War, both of which are directly related with the creation and redistribution of urban rent.

The first part deals with the development of transportation policies at the urban and national scales, and their impact on the urban built environment in metropolitan cities of Turkey. As transportation is one of the most important guides for new settlements in the city, it is a field where the state agencies and local governments have significant opportunities for shaping the future growth of the city. Urban transportation is also one of the key urban services related to the physical structure of the built environment. Public transportation policies, traffic regulation and the balance between different means of transit such as ferries, railways, or motorcars are of direct importance for the quality of the built environment and also the experience of urban dwellers. The discussion on urban transportation focuses on the postwar era when Turkey saw an abrupt change in transportation policies in favor of highways instead of rail transit. During the decades following 1950s, transportation became an increasingly important factor in the conflicts between central and local governments, mostly due to the rent and speculation on urban property created by transportation policies.

The second part of the chapter deals with the historical development of housing construction in the Republican period. Very much like transportation,

housing has to be evaluated as a determinant of the urban built environment which both shapes the city and also affects the lives of the citizens according to the availability and quality of the housing stock. As will be shown in more detail later in the chapter, the economy of housing production underwent various transformations throughout the Republican era and comprised a sizable portion of the spatial layers created by different actors after the Second World War. Previously, the construction of housing was mostly restricted by insufficient funding and technological difficulties -both in public and private projects- but the shortage of formal housing production reached alarming levels towards the end of 1940s as the migration to cities created a boom in the demand for reasonably priced formal housing, which the governments could meet neither with an adequate supply of already existing housing stock nor new large scale social housing projects. Thus different social classes found their own spontaneous solutions to the problem of housing. As one of the most common example for these solutions, the development of the informal housing sector is presented in a separate part at the end of the chapter.

The Development of Policy and Practice in Transportation

Transportation Policies of the Early Republican Era

The Republic inherited a transportation system which was dominated by an incomplete network of railroads constructed and owned by foreign companies.¹ Transportation by sea was also carried out largely by foreign companies and smaller

¹ For a map of the Anatolian railroad network in 1915, see Appendix II, p.98.

scaled local entrepreneurs.² Motorways were even less developed than the other two common transportation methods, as the technology concerning the use of motorways was still under development in 1920s.³

The state's first move was to expand the railroads through nationalization of foreign owned lines including suburban railways, trolleys, and ferry lines, which meant that between the years 1928 and 1948, 4,060 kilometers of railroads were acquired from foreign companies. The state also extended railway coverage by investing in the construction of new lines to connect Anatolian cities with major port cities, adding 3,383 kilometers to the already existing network.⁴ By doing so, the state aimed to create a passage to the Eastern Anatolian provinces, and due to the absence of private capital large enough to undertake such huge infrastructural investments, the goal was accomplished by using public financial sources. Founded on 23 May, 1927, *Devlet Demiryolları ve Limanları İdaresi Umumiyesi* (State Department of Railways and Harbors) was in charge of the acquisition, construction, and management of both railway transit and harbors. The Department was later converted to a state economic enterprise and renamed as *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Devlet Demiryolları* (Turkish Republican State Railways) with Law 6186 in 1953. The development of railways has remained an official policy within the first two Five

² For a detailed account of public transportation in late nineteenth century Istanbul, see Zafer Toprak, "İstanbul'da Mekan ve Sayısal İlişkiler" in *Essays in Honour of Aptullah Kuran*, edited by Çiğdem Kafescioğlu and Lucienne Thys-Şenocak (Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1999), pp. 453-459.

³ Ali Türel, "Kent ve Ulaşım" in *75 Yılda Değişen Kent ve Mimarlık*, ed. Yıldız Sey (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 1998), p. 169.

⁴ This was also an important part of the policy for industrial development in Anatolian provinces. For an example on the use of rail transit for the distribution of industrial production, see Erol Tümertekin, "The Iron and Steel Industry in Turkey" in *Economic Geography*, vol. 31, no. 2 (April, 1955) (Clark University, 1955) p. 181.

Year Plans as a tool for the distribution of economic development evenly among the regions of Anatolia.⁵ However, the state has continued to be an important actor in the transportation sector both at the urban and national scales in the construction of infrastructure and provision of transit services through its economic enterprises as well as public agencies until late 1980s.⁶

After World War II, public investment shifted away from railways to the construction of an extensive motorway system funded by foreign credits to a large extent. By doing so, any programs for the improvement of rail transit were abandoned in favor of motorway construction all over the country, sometimes without any feasibility studies such as the motorways between Ankara-Gerede and Izmir-Çeşme.⁷ This change in the investment policy had some very important consequences reaching beyond the limited scope of transportation at the urban and national scales.

As the railway system lost its importance in the distribution of public investment, it started to lose gradually much of its popularity to other means of transportation. While the share of rail transit in the total number of passengers per kilometer was twenty-four percent in 1955, this figure had gone down to 7.6 percent in 1970 and 4.5 percent in 1990. In contrast to this decline in the demand for rail

⁵ Erdumlu, pp. 57, 58. See Appendix III, p. 99, for a detailed list of the railroad constructions from 1860 to 1964.

⁶ Türel, p. 155.

⁷ Ibid., p. 169.

transit, the figures for motorway transit had gone up from 73.1 percent in 1955 to 91.4 percent in 1970 and 94.6 percent in 1990.⁸

Following the initial public investment in infrastructure for ground and sea transportation, the activity of the private sector has been increasing over the years. While transportation via motorways was immediately dominated by small entrepreneurship, sea transportation was and still is carried out by larger capitalists as it requires more capital investment in facilities and ships.⁹

The Crisis in Urban Transportation after the Second World War

Until the late 1950s, the state investment in urban public transportation was able to meet the demand, whereas the deteriorating financial conditions of the local governments in the following decades and the budget restraints imposed on the municipal governments made it impossible for the governments to meet the increasing demand created by rapid urbanization. Small urban entrepreneurs stepped in to fill in the gap and introduced informal transportation services via minibuses and *dolmuş* (group taxis).¹⁰ The increase in private car ownership added to the traffic congestions experienced in the metropolitan cities since neither municipal nor central governments realized improvements in motorways or created parking facilities to contain the ever increasing numbers of vehicles in the cities.¹¹ The establishment of

⁸ Ibid., p. 158.

⁹ Ibid., p. 169.

¹⁰ İlhan Tekeli, "Türkiye'de Cumhuriyet Döneminde Kentsel Gelişme ve Kent Planlaması" in 75 *Yılda Değişen Kent ve Mimarlık*, ed. Yıldız Sey (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 1998), p. 16.

¹¹ Danielson and Keleş, *The Politics of Rapid Urbanization, Government and Growth in Modern Turkey*, p. 148.

the factories of Anadolu in 1967, Renault and Fiat-TOFAŞ (*Türkiye Otomobil Fabrikaları Anonim Şirketi*) in 1971 facilitated car ownership for Turkish masses, especially in a period of strict import restrictions. Parallel to the decrease in the demand for rail transit, private car ownership in Istanbul increased from 45,767 to 137,771 between 1960 and 1970. The number of private cars had gone up to 774,252 in 1980 and finally to an estimated 1,650,000 in 1990.¹²

Uncontrollable urban sprawl in areas beyond the reach of urban services and public facilities combined with the lack of sufficient public transportation made it clear that it would be impossible to provide urban transportation even with the sum of private and public mass transportation. The geographical dispersion of the urban area created by the squatter settlements added extra costs and technical difficulties to the provision of transportation services to these irregular settlements.¹³

After the local elections of 1973, the social democrats who won all metropolitan municipalities increased the size of the bus fleets and introduced shuttle services by privately owned busses. This increased the share of busses in urban transportation at a time when the municipalities of European cities were also trying to fight traffic congestion by a return to public mass transportation. In 1978, the Municipality of Ankara under Mayor Ali Dinçer launched a new program for public transportation. This program sought to increase the size of the bus fleet by purchasing over 200 new buses and by transferring buses, which were previously operated by central government's ministries for the daily transportation of their workers, to the municipality. The construction of special bus lanes served to speed up

¹² Türel, p. 161.

¹³ Danielson and Keleş, *The Politics of Rapid Urbanization, Government and Growth in Modern Turkey*, p. 149.

the service and the combination of these actions have led to a seventy percent increase in the usage of municipal buses, followed by a dramatic decrease in the demand for group-taxis and minibus operators after 1978 in Ankara. What followed this success in Ankara was the municipality's decision to terminate all *dolmuş* services in the city in 1979. However since the drivers of minibusses and group-taxi operators had already become powerful local interest groups, organized under professional associations of their own, the services could be terminated only in 1983, the last year of the military regime.¹⁴

Throughout the second half of the Republican period, state agencies and local governments tried to cope with the increasing demand for adequate urban transportation with too little funding reserved for feasible projects. The limited resources have mostly failed to provide satisfactory results due to the institutional complexity among and inside state agencies with the authority to implement decisions concerning national transportation policies and the regulation of urban traffic. The conflicts and lack of coordination between central agencies such as *Karayolları Genel Müdürlüğü* (General Directorate of Highways) operating under the Ministry of Public Works, *Türkiye Denizcilik Bankası* (Turkish Maritime Bank, in charge of Istanbul's ferry services), *Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Devlet Demiryolları*, operating under the Ministry of Transportation and Communications, *Trafik Genel Müdürlüğü* (Traffic Directorate within the Ministry of Interior), and the Ministry of Reconstruction and Resettlement made it extremely difficult for local governments to develop their own solutions independently. The complex structure provided a fertile

¹⁴ Danielson and Keleş, *The Politics of Rapid Urbanization, Government and Growth in Modern Turkey*, pp. 153, 154.

ground for lobbying by pressure groups and corruption on matters regarding transportation policies.¹⁵

Like many other metropolises of the world in the post-war period, Istanbul's spatial patterns of business and residential districts have been shaped increasingly "around the needs and possibilities of the car."¹⁶ Among the major urban projects realized in Istanbul after 1950, one can list three important examples in terms of their impact on transportation in Istanbul.

The first example is a series of demolitions and new constructions carried out between 1956 and 1960 under direct orders from the Prime Minister Adnan Menderes. Using the new Reconstruction Law (*İmar Yasası*, Law 6785) and Property Appropriation Law (*İstimlak Yasası*, Law 6830) of 1956, Menderes set out to apply his politically motivated vision of a city with wide boulevards and public squares. The project -based on the Master Plan prepared initially by Henri Prost, and modified by the Istanbul Municipality under Lütfi Kırdar- was revised predominantly by highway engineers and Menderes himself, cost the national budget more than twice the sum of financial resources allocated for all municipalities throughout Turkey.¹⁷ The executors of the plan did not have the slightest consideration for the preservation of the historical urban fabric in Eminönü, Unkapanı, Karaköy, Beyazıt, Aksaray, and

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 153.

¹⁶ Mehmet Ocakcı, "Commuting to the Istanbul Historical Core: The case of Industrial Employees" in *European Planning Studies*, volume 9, no. 1 (2001) (Taylor & Francis Ltd, 2001), p. 119.

¹⁷ See Appendices IV-VII, p. 99-102, for excerpts from the Istanbul Master Plan of 1943.

other parts of the historic core which got their share of large scale demolitions.¹⁸

Today, the opening up of such wide motorways in the oldest parts of the city cannot be explained with a demand created by private car ownership; on the contrary, such encouragement for the use of motor vehicles instead of other means of public or private transportation has been one of the factors behind the increase in private car ownership in the following decades.¹⁹

The second example for the projects which led to increased motorway usage and hence traffic congestion in Istanbul is the construction of the *Boğaziçi Köprüsü* (Bosphorus Bridge). During the Republican period, the idea of a bridge connecting the two sides of Istanbul was formulated officially for the first time in 1933. In their urban planning proposals, Agache and Lambert proposed a railroad bridge over Bosphorus; in 1937, another urban planning expert, Martin Wagner claimed that the projected population increase in Istanbul should not make a bridge necessary, since the capital had been moved to Ankara. In the same year, Henri Prost who was commissioned by the municipality, argued that a motorway bridge should not be needed in the near future for Istanbul.²⁰

¹⁸ Doğan Kuban, *İstanbul Ansiklopedisi, Tarih Vakfı* 1995, quoted in Mete Tapan, "İstanbul'un Kentsel Planlamasının Tarihsel Gelişimi ve Planlama Eylemleri" in *75 Yılda Değişen Kent ve Mimarlık*, ed. Yıldız Sey (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 1998), pp. 80-83. For testimonies by Doğan Kuban, Kemali Söylemezoğlu, Behçet Ünal, Asım Mutlu, and Turgut Cansever on "Menderes operations", see Oktay Ekinci, "Menderes'in Yıkımlarını Anımsamak..." in *Dünden Bugüne İstanbul Dosyaları* (İstanbul: Anahtar Kitaplar Yayınevi, 1995), pp. 67-70. For aerial photographs of the demolitions in Unkapanı and Aksaray, refer to Appendix VII, p. 104, and Appendix IX, p. 105.

¹⁹ Oktay Ekinci, "Planlı Kentleşmeden Plansız Büyümeye" in *Dünden Bugüne İstanbul Dosyaları* (İstanbul: Anahtar Kitaplar Yayınevi, 1995), p. 64.

²⁰ Mimarlar Odası Boğaz Köprüsü Komitesi, *Boğaz Köprüsü Üzerine Mimarlar Odası Görüşü*. (İstanbul, 1968), p. 29.

When the 1950s arrived two important laws were passed which were of indirect importance for the construction of the bridge. In 1953, Law 6150 was passed which allowed the commissioning of the preparation of “special projects” to specific firms. Law 7054, passed four years later, made it possible for these firms to undertake constructions themselves.

The first company to apply for a feasibility study on the Bosphorus Bridge was De Leuw Carther and Co. which published its project report titled “A Bosphorus Strait Bridge and Connecting Highway System” (*Boğaziçi Köprüsü ve Çevre Yolları Projesi*) in 1956.²¹ In 1958, the project was approved by the Ministry of Public Works and integrated into the planning framework for Istanbul. The bridge would be constructed by the U.S. Steel Company according to the plan prepared by the Steinmann Company. The following year, Bosphorus Bridge appeared in the Reconstruction Plan commissioned to the German urban planner H. Högg by the government of Adnan Menderes. Since Högg was also responsible for the translation of Menderes’ haphazard urban renewal project into formal planning language, the Bosphorus Bridge can be seen as a part of the greater project in encouraging the use of highways for urban, national, and even transnational transportation. Högg’s plan proposed three concentric ring roads to intersect in *Mecidiyeköy* on the European side and cross the Bosphorus via the bridge to be constructed between Ortaköy and Beylerbeyi.²² However, the project which was open for bidding until 16 May, 1960

²¹ Ibid., p. 30.

²² Ibid., p. 32.

was cancelled by the military government after the intervention of 1960 on the grounds that “an investment of this scale should not be done with foreign credit”.²³

The project which was put aside for three years resurfaced as part of the urban plan proposed by Luigi Piccinato in 1962. Unlike the previous plan prepared by Henri Prost in late 1930s which respected the radial growth of the city, Piccinato’s plan foresaw a linear growth model for the future development of Istanbul and employed the Bosphorus Bridge as an important feature for the decentralization of the city into its hinterland.²⁴ As a project of great attraction for foreign capital and prestige for the government of *Adalet Partisi* (Justice Party), the construction finally began in 1970 and took three years to be finished. In the meantime, the project continued to be criticized for various reasons. In a publication prepared by the Chamber of Architects, the project was said to be in contradiction with the plan for the decentralization of Istanbul. It was seen as an inefficient investment which would create even more traffic congestion and building concentration in the urban centers. Furthermore, the academic circles of planners and architects argued that the system of ring roads would create massive destruction of the city’s green areas and open up new spaces for speculation over urban property.²⁵

The third example for the projects concerning urban transportation is the “Essen Plan” commissioned by the mayor of metropolitan municipality, Bedrettin

²³ Ekinci, *İstanbul’u Sarsan On Yıl, 1983-1993*, pp. 25, 26.

²⁴ Tapan, “İstanbul’un Kentsel Planlamasının Tarihsel Gelişimi ve Planlama Eylemleri” in *75 Yılda Değişen Kent ve Mimarlık*, pp. 79, 83, 84.

²⁵ “Boğaz Köprüsü, İstanbul’u Beton Çölü Haline Getirecektir!”, *Arkitekt*, volume 39, no. 338, October 1969, p. 51. See Appendix X, p. 106 for a reproduction of the original newsarticle.

Dalan in 1985.²⁶ The plan included the construction of a new highway system between Beşiktaş and Samatya, opening up of Piyalepaşa for high-rise office buildings and a third bridge over Bosphorus to facilitate transportation to the new business districts around İhlamur Valley, Haliç, Dolapdere and Piyalepaşa. Despite popular protests and Law 2863 of 1983 which commanded the preservation of Tarlabası district as historical heritage, the Metropolitan Municipality applied a reconstruction plan in the area.²⁷

All three of these projects shared the argument that the operations were necessitated by the need for new urban motorways and that the construction of new roads, bridges, wider boulevards, and alternative traffic routes through or around the urban core would decrease traffic congestion. However, the statistics mentioned in the beginning of this chapter indicate that the primacy given to commuting via private cars has only served to create even more congestion. Furthermore, the ring roads have opened up new lands to construction, squatting and speculative development. Instead of creating solutions for transportation problems at the urban scale, the projects and policies have been instrumental in the reconfiguration of urban rent distribution. In the post-1980s era, foreign capital has become a much more active participant in the urban affairs as a financial source and also as a competitor in the “market” for urban development including the construction of new housing, officespace and urban infrastructure. As shown in this part of the chapter, the

²⁶ The plan was called “Essen Plan” because Bedrettin Dalan claimed that it was prepared by the University of Essen. However, upon a letter sent to the university by The Chamber of Architects, the president of the university denied that any part of the plan was prepared by the university. Ekinci, *İstanbul’u Sarsan On Yıl, 1983-1993*, p. 77.

²⁷ Yücel Gürsel, “Tarlabası’na Ağıt” in *Demokratikleşme Sürecinde Kent ve İnsan* (İstanbul: E Yayınları, 1990), pp. 82-84.

transportation policies have had a significant impact on the urban morphology of the Turkish metropolises by transforming the urban fabric. These transformations have taken place both in previously occupied residential areas and business centers, but also in the locations of new settlements, legal and illegal alike.

The Production of Housing: Housing Policy and Development in the Republican Era

Housing construction and the spatial characteristics of residential areas make up an important part of urban planning. A single house has more functions than just providing shelter to its owners. In the capitalist city, it is also a form of investment, a commodity which is produced and consumed; in the hands of “trader developers”, it serves to the extraction of rent on urban land. In theory, the production costs of housing stock in a city is an important element in the urban economy as the housing costs determine the cost of the reproduction of urban labor, and that is the real wage of the urban worker.²⁸ When the costs for housing are too high, either because of inflated prices on urban land or speculative activities on the part of landowners and housing developers, the urban workers must get better jobs with higher wages. In cases where the urban economy cannot offer such prosperity and social mobility to its inhabitants, crisis hits the city.

A crisis in urban housing involves more than just a shortage of shelter for the urban dweller. As an integral part of the individual’s life but also a considerably large portion of the urban built environment, problems in housing need to be evaluated beyond simple quantitative considerations. The quality of the urban pattern

²⁸ Manuel Castells, *City, Class, and Power*, pp. 32, 39.

and the quality of the lives of the citizens are directly linked to the quality of the housing stock. This makes housing an intersection point between private and public spaces. Once the dominant production relations and policy choices materialize in the housing stock, it may possibly outlive the historical context which produced it, only to be replaced by a new spatial layer of housing. Even in the case of replacement, certain spatial characteristics such as land use, zoning and land plot sizes remain mostly unchanged for a longer time.²⁹ These aspects of housing construction and policies defy simple quantifications and the markets for urban land or property development do little to correct inefficiencies or inequalities once built into the housing stock.³⁰ When the market mechanism fails to improve or expand the housing stock for all urban social classes, the state assumes the role of providing adequate shelter for the disadvantaged. As a brief look at the history of housing in Turkey indicates, this can be done either via public social housing projects planned according to certain economic and aesthetic considerations, or by relying on “spontaneous solutions” created by private developers of any size.³¹ In this respect, the Republican period can be crudely divided into two periods which show significant differences in terms of residential planning, housing policies, production relations in property development and the qualities of the actual physical artifact.

The architectural discourse on housing of the period until the 1950s, suggested two main residential typologies to be avoided in the construction of new

²⁹ Stretton, p. 41.

³⁰ Ibid., pp. 36-37.

³¹ İlhan Tekeli, “Bir Ülkede Konut Sorununun Yanlış Tanımlandığı Konusunda Kuşkular Belirdi mi Konut Sorunu Çözüme Yaklaşmış Demektir” in *Mimarlık*, no. 260 (November, 1994) (Ankara: TMMOB Mimarlar Odası, 1994): pp. 27, 28.

housing. Apartment blocks were seen as a potential source of “political radicalism” due to the “unhealthy” and ethically inappropriate conditions they provided to the ideal nuclear family of the Republic. Throughout the 1930s and 1940s public opinion was negative about apartments and their owners. The early Republican apartments called *kira evi* (rental house) and their owners were widely seen as people who got their wealth either by exploiting the scarcity caused first by the World Great Depression, and then by the Second World War. Consequently the *kira evi* symbolized an investment in urban property which was acquired with capital accumulated in suspicious ways.³² The official opinion about apartment buildings did not deviate much from this generally negative set of mind. The Municipal Tax Law of 1933 treated apartments as semi-private spaces which were constructed for commercial purposes; consequently, the property taxes on these “types of investment” were higher than the taxes on an average single family house of the time.³³

The second residential typology frequently attacked as a contrasting image to the “modern life” of the Republican citizen was *konak*. The traditional larger dwelling which was usually inhabited by extended families was often associated with the characteristics of a private space of a bygone era. The bureaucratic elites and the urban trade bourgeoisie of Istanbul had already gone through a transformation in their family sizes and life standards which was also reflected in the typological

³² Murat Balamir, “‘Kira Evi’nden ‘Kat Evleri’ne Apartmanlaşma: Bir Zihniyet Dönüşümü Tarihçesinden Kesitler” in *Mimarlık*, no. 260 (November, 1994) (Ankara: TMMOB Mimarlar Odası, 1994), p. 29. See Appendix XI, p. 107 for the plan and a photograph of *B. Osman Kira Evi* in Ankara, an example for the rental houses constructed in the 1930s.

³³ Ibid., p. 30.

repertoire of housing in the last quarter of the nineteenth century.³⁴ After the declaration of the Republic, the task of the Republican elite was now to construct a new private space for the monogamous nuclear family which would exist in harmony with the public space of the modern Republic.³⁵ As the architect Behçet Ünsal proudly declared in 1935, “the object of the new (Republican) architecture” was residential architecture.³⁶ In most of the professional discussions on the morphology of the new housing, there was a mixture of architectural references imported from the West. The common grounds was that the image of the new house had to be one of a hygienic, economic, comfortable and undeniably modern dwelling with all its amenities and appliances to suite the new life of the modern citizen.³⁷

Another law passed in 1940 required that “the properties developed in cities and villages should be as low as possible”. However, ideological considerations alone do not suffice to provide the material conditions that allowed such low density housing as seen in the urban spatial layer of the early Republican years. The lack of capital, outdated construction technologies, labor intensive construction techniques, and the shortage of qualified labor set the limits for new housing development in terms of physical scale.³⁸ In the face of the financial restraints on import materials

³⁴ Atilla Yücel, “İstanbul’da 19. Yüzyılın Kentsel Konut Biçimleri” in *Housing and Settlement in Anatolia: A Historical Perspective*, edited by Yıldız Sey (İstanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı, 1996), pp. 299-301.

³⁵ Balamir, p. 32.

³⁶ Yıldız Sey, “Cumhuriyet Döneminde Konut” Cumhuriyet’in Kent Planlama Politikaları ve Ankara Deneyimi” In *75 Yılda Değişen Kent ve Mimarlık*, p. 278.

³⁷ Sibel Bozdoğan, *Modernism and Nation Building, Turkish Architectural Culture in the Early Republic*. (Singapore: University of Washington Press, 2001). pp. 204-207, 216.

³⁸ Ibid. pp. 188, 189.

and lack of technical know-how, the architectural theory and practice of the early Republican period fell short of creating a uniquely modern expression and remained only as “representations of an imported modernity without the industrial basis” until late 1940s.³⁹ As a result, the dominant residential typologies were determined by the combination of the official ideology and practical limitations of the period.

Preoccupied with the abundance of modern alternatives in housing design, the architects failed to recognize the spatial relations between the larger scale of the urban fabric and the single building, although the designs had a special interest in providing a visual design for life in the modern dwelling depicted with modern furniture and appliances. Still, the vision for the physical setting of the modern Turkish republic did not go beyond the fragments of proposals for modern housing types and the monumentality of public buildings as the physical self-expression of the new state.⁴⁰ The officially chosen image for the modern cities of the Republic were thus imposed through the regulation of private developers and reinforced by the public housing projects such as *Bahçelievler* (Gardenhouses), *Saraçoğlu Mahalle'si* (Saraçoğlu Housing) and *Yenimahalle* (New Neighborhood).

The city of Ankara had remained almost unchanged in terms of physical size and population from sixteenth century to 1914 despite the great numbers of Turkish refugees who settled in Ankara after the Balkan Wars.⁴¹ After 1923, as the capital of

³⁹ Ibid., p. 187.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 220.

⁴¹ François Georgeon, “Keçi Kılından Kalpağa: Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun Son Yüzyılında Ankara’nın Gelişimi” in *Modernleşme Sürecinde Osmanlı Kentleri*, edited by Paul Dumont and François Georgeon, trans. Ali Berktaş (İstanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı, 1996), pp. 107, 112, 114.

the new Republic, Ankara experienced a significant growth in population. Between 1920 and 1927, the population had almost quadrupled and the housing needs of the new urban dwellers had already become a pressing issue in 1924, when the Municipality of Ankara was founded in order to organize the new constructions and urban development. Despite the strict regulations on private developments in Ankara, the construction of state offices, public buildings and urban infrastructure had primacy in the distribution of public funds for reconstruction. The provision of housing for the government officials and bureaucrats of the new regime –who made up a considerable portion of the upper-middle class in early Republican period– became the second most important policy goal in terms of housing construction in Ankara until the end of the Second World War. The first example of such housing development was the residential quarters of *Yenişehir* (New City), constructed in the newly developed part of Ankara after 1925, in accordance with the first Master Plan of the city, prepared by Hermann Jansen.⁴² The residential quarters of *Yenişehir* were located in *Cebeci* to the east and in the area between *Yenişehir* and *Tandoğan* to the west. The houses were inhabited exclusively by the highest ranking bureaucrats whose offices were located in *Vekaletler Mahallesi*, also in *Yenişehir*.⁴³ The completed part of the project consisted of 198 single-storey houses, situated on land purchased by the government behind the monumental building of the Ministry of Health, designed by Theodor Post.

⁴² The location plans for the old quarters and *Yenişehir* were previously commissioned to Heussler in 1924. Danielson and Keleş, *The Politics of Rapid Urbanization, Government and Growth in Modern Turkey*, p. 60.

⁴³ Özcan Altaban, “Cumhuriyet’in Kent Planlama Politikaları ve Ankara Deneyimi” In *75 Yılda Değişen Kent ve Mimarlık*, edited by Yıldız Sey (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 1998), pp. 44-45.

Due to the increasing material costs of construction and speculative pricing on urban property, cooperatives emerged as a feasible way of gathering the capital required for larger scaled housing schemes. The first example of the housing projects developed by a cooperative was the *Bahçelievler* district in Ankara, the construction of which started in 1934 and was finished in two years' time.⁴⁴ "The Bahçelievler Cooperative Housing Scheme" was initially designed by Jansen as a settlement of small row houses on a lot outside the city's planned limits; however, the project was later changed to provide owner-occupied "single-family villas within gardens" which made the project costlier than originally planned, thus limiting access to ownership only to the advantage of the wealthier families.⁴⁵ The *Bahçelievler* settlement consisted of two-storey single houses scattered around a network of streets; the settlement had its own post office, market place, police headquarters, and a tennis club which shows that in its conception, *Bahçelievler* was definitely designed for a certain elite class of the capital.⁴⁶

The recession caused by economic difficulties of the Second World War was manifest in the construction sector as new building construction almost came to a grinding halt after 1939.⁴⁷ After the Second World War, the problem of housing the

⁴⁴ Sey, "Cumhuriyet Döneminde Konut" In *75 Yılda Değişen Kent ve Mimarlık*, p. 276.

⁴⁵ Bozdoğan, *Modernism and Nation Building, Turkish Architectural Culture in the Early Republic*. pp. 49, 219. According to Sey, the case was not very different in Istanbul; most of the housing development in major cities was geared for the wealthier households, whereas the growing numbers of lower income groups were not provided with any solution to their housing problems. Sey, "Cumhuriyet Döneminde Konut" in *75 Yılda Değişen Kent ve Mimarlık*, p. 276.

⁴⁶ Şevki Vanlı, "Konutun Bilimsel Olmayan Hikayesi" in *Mimarlık*, no. 261 (January, 1995) (Ankara: TMMOB Mimarlar Odası, 1995): p. 15. Refer to Appendix XII, p. 108, for an illustration of the location plan for *Bahçelievler* Housing.

⁴⁷ Sey, "Cumhuriyet Döneminde Konut" In *75 Yılda Değişen Kent ve Mimarlık*, p. 279.

growing mass of government employees in Ankara persisted as the city's population grew 286 percent between 1927 and 1950.⁴⁸ The municipal government responded to this growth in numbers by enlarging the area open to development from twenty square kilometers to 160 square kilometers which made it practically impossible for the government to regulate land-use patterns and new constructions in the new development areas. These developments and the increasing speculation on land prices had a negative impact also on the planned growth of Ankara as was foreseen by Jansen in 1939, the last year before his dismissal from office due to lobbying by speculative builders.⁴⁹

Towards the end of the Second World War, the Civil Servants Housing Construction Law (*Memurin Meskenleri İnşaatı Hakkında Yasa*, no. 4626) was passed by the parliament to remedy the growing problem of providing housing for the government employees in Ankara in 1944. The newly founded *Emlak Yapı Limited Şirketi* (Real Estate Development Limited Corporation) under the Ministry of Finance, was given the contract to develop *Saraçoğlu Memurin Konutları* (Saraçoğlu Civil Servants' Housing), a complete settlement comprised of 450 houses, a primary school, administrative and recreational centers and the whole urban infrastructure which was designed with the assistance of the German architect Paul Bonatz.⁵⁰ The financing for the project was provided by the *Emlak ve Eytam Bankası* (Real Estate Bank), established to finance construction projects with the

⁴⁸ Altaban estimates that thirty-four percent of the population of Ankara was living in squatter houses according to the census of 1950. Altaban, p. 49.

⁴⁹ Danielson and Keleş, *The Politics of Rapid Urbanization, Government and Growth in Modern Turkey*, p. 61.

⁵⁰ See Appendix XII, p. 109, and Appendix XIII, p. 110.

capital required to undertake large scale settlements.⁵¹ Following the construction of Saraçoğlu Housing, a law was passed in 1948 which opened the way for the transfer of publicly owned land for private development by the Municipality of Ankara. A plan was to be prepared by the municipality to prevent squatter development around Ankara by providing urban land, architectural plans, and construction materials to the residents of squatter houses. The settlement project of *Yenimahalle* was started in 1949 on a land plot of 160,419 square meters, half of which had been transferred from the State Treasury to the municipal government. The rest of the land was acquired by expropriation from private landowners. The location plan was prepared by the Ankara Municipality Reconstruction Directorate (*Ankara Belediyesi İmar Müdürlüğü*) as a combination of the better proposals submitted to the competition for the planning of the site.⁵² The municipality prepared plans for five different house types which were single or two-storey dwellings meant to house only one family.⁵³ State subsidies for the construction also included encouragement of the use of locally available building materials by providing support for the transportation of materials. The settlement consisted of 2902 plots of land for housing and fourteen plots reserved for public buildings.⁵⁴ After its completion in 1953, *Yenimahalle* was

⁵¹ Altaban, pp. 49, 50.

⁵² Murat Küçük, “Yenimahalle Toplu Konut Üretimi İçin Örnek Olabilir miydi?” in *Mimarlık*, no. 260 (January, 1995) (Ankara: TMMOB Mimarlar Odası, 1995): p. 47.

⁵³ See Appendices XV-XVIII, pp. 110-113 for the plans of various types of housing constructed in *Yenimahalle*.

⁵⁴ These fourteen plots were to be occupied by a post office, administrative center, bank, municipal building, recreational and cultural centers including a *halkevi* and a library, market place, mosque, police headquarters, Turkish bath, health center, primary school, playground for children, and a shopping center. Bedriye Kaba, “Yenimahalle, Yenimahalle, Yenimahalle” in *Mimarlık*, no. 260 (January, 1995) (Ankara: TMMOB Mimarlar Odası, 1995): p. 50.

already surrounded by the irregular settlements in *Demetevler*, *Şentepe* and *Karşıyaka*. The pressures for more densely populated urban residential areas led to the increase in the permits for the addition of another storey to the houses in *Yenimahalle* in 1965. Successive permits issued in 1968 and finally in 1994 led to the destruction of most of the original fabric and opened the district to speculative new constructions which were handled by trader developers who replaced the old single family houses with larger apartment blocks, sometimes occupying more than one plot of the original plan.⁵⁵ The fate of *Yenimahalle* after the late 1950s indicated the future trajectory of housing development which would be dominated by two types of housing production: squatters and apartment blocks.⁵⁶

In the second half of 1940s the Municipality of Istanbul was also undertaking a few important projects for housing production. As stated in an official publication by the Municipality, the local government directed by Mayor Lütfi Kırdar had taken steps for the construction of regular settlements in *Mecidiyeköyü*, *Haseki*, and *Levend Çiftliği*. The developments were carried out by a joint venture between the Municipality and *Emlak Kredi Bankası* (Real Estate Bank) founded in 1946 with the name *Istanbul İmar Limited Şirketi* (Istanbul Reconstruction Limited Corporation). According to the founding contract, fifty-five percent of the new housing stock would belong to The Real Estate Bank, whereas the rest would be the property of the Municipality.⁵⁷ The *Mecidiyeköyü* Housing consisted of twenty-eight two-storey, single

⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 51.

⁵⁶ See Appendix XIX, p. 115, for the condition of the surviving original housing stock of *Yenimahalle* after 1990.

⁵⁷ Istanbul Municipality, "Mesken Siyaseti" in *Cumhuriyet Döneminde İstanbul*, (Istanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1949), p. 151.

detached buildings developed on plots of sixty to a hundred square meters, on land owned by the Municipality.⁵⁸ Most of the houses were designed as single family residences in separate gardens and the settlement was obviously targeted at the higher income groups who could afford the labor costs, expensive construction materials and the increasing price of the urban land which was abundantly used for the project. Interestingly, the publication uses the phrase “*orta halli aileler*” (this can be translated as either “middle-class families” or “families with moderate income levels”) to signify the target market of this settlement. The *Haseki* housing was a project for the lower-income families which combined cheaper lands, lower construction costs, and smaller development plots of fifty-six square meters. The houses were single-storey buildings with only three bedrooms and again located in private gardens. According to the Municipality’s estimates, the construction of *Haseki* houses cost about a third of what *Mecidiyeköyü* Housing had cost. The final housing project of the period was the development of a whole new district in *Levend Çiftliği*.⁵⁹ About one million square meters of land was purchased by The Real Estate Bank from the Municipality “at favorable prices” for the development of a large scale residential area. The initial plan aimed to build 1,200 to 1,500 houses of twelve different types including single-storey and two-storey designs; some of the houses would also have commercial spaces at the ground level which would be used by shops, and all of the houses would be situated in private gardens of four-hundred to five-hundred square meters. Probably due to the economies of scale created by the large size of the development and partly due to the lower cost of land, the prices for

⁵⁸ See Appendix XX, p. 116.

⁵⁹ See Appendix XXI, p. 117.

each one of the houses were planned to be set between that of *Mecidiyeköyü* and *Haseki* houses. The purchasing conditions were made even more favorable for civil servants by asking a lower initial payment on the mortgage.⁶⁰

As mentioned in the previous chapter, after 1950, the production of housing has been dominated by apartment buildings of much greater scales compared to the modest *kira evi* of the previous decades. With the diminishing importance of the state's role as the primary agent in urban development, the construction sector has been overtaken by small entrepreneurs whose contributions to the urban housing stock ranged from illegal squatters to modern apartment blocks, catered for the needs of people from different social strata. The productive relations established between small property developers, landowners, informal "communal" networks and municipal institutions have made the production of apartments the most viable way of guaranteeing a certain share from the rent on urban property for all social groups and classes.⁶¹ The new economy of urban housing which emerged out of this social basis meant a departure from the past, reaching far beyond the limited scope of residential space. On both physical and cultural planes, one can observe a clear discontinuity in the production of urban space, between the first twenty-five years of the Republic and the later period. Since a detailed discussion of *gecekondu* (squatter housing) settlements will be presented separately in the third part of this chapter, the following paragraphs will focus on the second most widespread mode of housing production after the 1950s, and that is the practice of a specific kind of small scale

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 152.

⁶¹ İhsan Bilgin, "Modernleşmenin ve Toplumsal Hareketliliğin Yörüngesinde Cumhuriyet'in İmarı" in *75 Yılda Değişen Kent ve Mimarlık*, edited by Yıldız Sey (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 1998), p. 263.

producers referred to as ‘trader developers’. As mentioned previously in the text, Işık defines the trader developer as a certain kind of interclass alliance between different urban social groups each one of whom seeks to exploit its respective share from the rent created by rapid urban development. This kind of production relied mostly on a loose integration between the landowner, developer, and construction undertaker in an economic framework which is reminiscent of precapitalist manufacturing, i.e. an immature mode of production where the capital investment is of relatively minor significance to the whole production process.⁶²

There were two main factors which made this specific kind of housing development feasible in Turkey after 1950. The first factor was the changing material conditions of urban experience which entered an era of radical transformations with the mass migrations of late 1940s. The pressures of an increasing population density in metropolitan areas, scarcity in urban housing stock and the breaches opened in the official modernist planning discourse during the 1950s found their formal expressions in this new method of property development and the network of social relations which made it profitable for large urban masses at the expense of the quality of the built environment. This new urban condition was also echoed in the legislative framework with the *Kat Mülkiyeti Kanunu* (Flat Property Law) of 1965 which constructed the legal framework for fragmented property rights on apartment flats. Thus the apartment had become an anonymous urban property owned by a multitude of occupiers, unlike the *kiraevi* which usually carried the name of its owner as a mark of prestige. This change in the formal perception of the apartments

⁶² Oğuz Işık, “Yapsatçılığın Yazılmamış Tarihi: Türkiye’de Konut Kesiminde Küçük Üreticiliğin Varlık Koşulları ve Gelişimi Üzerine Gözlemler” in *Mimarlık*, no. 261 (January, 1995) (Ankara: TMMOB Mimarlar Odası, 1995): p. 43.

alone also contributed to a transformation of the negative public opinion to a positive one.⁶³ In addition to the changing perception of apartments as an architectural typology, the law also offered a perpetual form of economic relation between the trader developer and the landowner. The trader developers could engage in construction activity almost with no capital investment at the beginning of the development. The land would be purchased from the owner in return for a few flats in the new apartment, whereas such a deal would help the landowner to maximize the rent he or she would get from the land through the sale of the apartment flats.⁶⁴ One obvious problem with this kind of property development was that it had no collective mechanisms of demand forecasting, which meant that it was after all speculative investment by nature. However, the constant demand for new housing where no serious alternatives exist, and the common interests vested in this type of property development has helped the perpetuation of the practice of trader developers.⁶⁵

Towards the end of the 1970s, the sheer volume of speculative housing construction by trader developers had enabled them to increase the scale of their operations until the financial crisis hit at the end of the decade. However, the urban environment created by these apartments of the urban middle classes and the squatter houses of the urban poor have caused a serious deterioration of the urban

⁶³ Balamir, p. 29.

⁶⁴ Işık, "Yapılaşmanın Yazılmamış Tarihi: Türkiye'de Konut Kesiminde Küçük Üreticiliğin Varlık Koşulları ve Gelişimi Üzerine Gözlemler" in *Mimarlık*, no. 261 (January, 1995), p. 44.

⁶⁵ The cooperative building schemes, which could have posed an alternative for mass housing construction failed to provide satisfactory results even in the early decades of the Republic. Small sizes, profit-seeking interests and the demographic characteristics of building cooperatives in Turkey have rendered this scheme incapable of producing great numbers of affordable houses for the lower income groups. For more details and statistics on building cooperatives founded between 1930 and 1970s, see Ruşen Keleş, *100 Soruda Türkiye'de Şehirleşme, Konut ve Gecekondu*, first edition (Istanbul: Gerçek Yayınevi, 1972), pp. 137-143.

environment because of increasing population densities, irregular –but not always illegal- constructions in land plots without adequate infrastructure.⁶⁶ The spatial layer which was incompletely shaped by state-led development in the first three decades of the Republic had been covered by yet another one through massive demolitions and reconstructions of the housing stock, this time reflecting the short term interests of the urban middle classes and the poor.⁶⁷

After the slump in housing development during the Second World War, recession hit the booming construction sector once again in early 1980s.⁶⁸ In addition to the scarcity of urban land which had been decreasing steadily in the hands of small developers for thirty years, liberal economic policies had introduced new financial investment opportunities which were not available before. As soon as the danger of an enormous shortage loomed in the supply of urban housing, the neo-liberal governments of the 1980s chose to preserve the social and economic status quo in housing production by implementing the most extensive policy package for housing in the history of Turkey, in order to support the existing production relations in the course of their adaptation to the new social and economic climate.⁶⁹

In order to support the construction of mass housing under the new economic imperatives, the military government passed *Toplu Konut Yasası* (Social Housing Law, no. 2487) in 1981, which was based on the experience of the cooperative

⁶⁶ Işık, “Yapsatçılığın Yazılmamış Tarihi: Türkiye’de Konut Kesiminde Küçük Üreticiliğin Varlık Koşulları ve Gelişimi Üzerine Gözlemler” in *Mimarlık*, no. 261 (January, 1995), p. 45.

⁶⁷ Keleş, *100 Soruda Türkiye’de Şehirleşme, Konut ve Gecekondu*, p. 134.

⁶⁸ Sey, “Cumhuriyet Döneminde Konut” in *75 Yılda Değişen Kent ve Mimarlık*, p. 296.

⁶⁹ Bilgin, p. 266.

schemes of pre-1980 era. The law was revised by the Motherland Party in 1984, this time encouraging the participation of large private corporations in housing construction.⁷⁰ However, most developments of the 1980s that served as social housing for the masses were still the settlements planned and initiated by local governments, such as *Egekent-1* and *Egekent-2* in Izmir, *Çukurova Bölge Planlama Projesi* in Adana, *Batıkent* in Ankara, and *Konutbirlik* in Istanbul.⁷¹ Since the municipalities were now encouraged to contribute to housing production by providing publicly owned land in return for a number of the houses to be developed, the new legislation on social housing also integrated the municipalities into the cycle of housing production by trader developers. The opportunity of extracting a certain part of the rent created by urban housing development also attracted the central government and the law of 1984 established a central Social Housing Fund which combined the credits previously extended by the two social security institutions *Sosyal Sigortalar Kurumu* and *Bağ-Kur*.⁷²

The state support for property developers, however, did not alter the basic organization of the market for housing much. The bulk of the houses produced during the 1980s and the early 1990s continued to be developed by small actors including small scale trader developers and middle class cooperatives who exploited the patronage relations established in the previous decades to obtain state support in the form of land or credit at favorable conditions. However, parallel to changing characteristics of urban employment due to a growing service sector in urban areas,

⁷⁰ Ruşen Keleş, "Günümüzde Belediyelerin Konut Girişimleri Üzerine Bir Değerlendirme" in *Kent ve Siyaset Üzerine Yazıları (1975-1992)* (Istanbul: IULA-EMME, 1993), p. 126.

⁷¹ See Appendix XXII, p. 118, for plans of the houses constructed in *Batıkent* Housing, Ankara.

⁷² Keleş, *Kentleşme Politikası*, pp. 445, 448-450.

property development in central urban areas appeared as a new attraction for the larger capitalists. For these groups -who were previously interested in fixed industrial investments in the outskirts of urban areas, where land is cheap- construction of upper-class housing, office buildings, recreational centers and large shopping malls became the new channels for large scale capital investment.⁷³ The new attractiveness of the urban space for capital accumulative interests became an influential dynamic in the transformation of the urban space in Turkey in the 1990s, putting more speculative pressures on urban property, hence also housing.

As a conclusion to the survey presented in this part of the chapter, one could say that the Republic did not seriously approach housing as a problem experienced by larger urban social groups. The class bias in public and private housing construction has consistently favored the middle and upper-middle class urbanites, whereas the urban poor have been offered no large-scale programs for affordable social housing or self-build projects, even though the example of *Yenimahalle* had succeeded at least initially in terms of providing an alternative way for housing the lower income groups in the city. As the state abandoned its role as the provider of housing from very early on, the urban poor and the urban middle classes have drawn up their own strategies for obtaining housing. The development of squatters and irregular settlements, which started by the end of the Second World War will be discussed in the second part of this chapter to gain a deeper sense of how the shortage of regular housing and lack of state involvement has had a wider impact on the physical, social and economic characteristics of the Turkish metropolises.

⁷³ Bilgin, p. 267.

Squatting Practice

Coupled with the global restructuring of the capitalist economies after the Second World War and the emergence of a bipolar world that granted a new significance to the peripheral states neighboring the Soviet Union, rural Turkey experienced two major transformations by the late 1940s.⁷⁴ A steady increase in population growth and rapid mechanization of agricultural production in the countryside caused structural transformations in the villages.⁷⁵ In addition to these, as mentioned in the first chapter, new employment opportunities present in the urban areas have contributed to the motivation for migration to cities.⁷⁶ Before 1950, the first wave of rural migrants had not become permanent residents; the majority was moving to cities only as seasonal workers. These early migrants had not left their villages because of a shortage of rural land; instead, they were seeking to exploit the new opportunities offered in the cities without becoming formal residents. However, the increase in urban construction projects and the need for urban services and industrial sectors prepared the grounds for a reversal of the migration pattern by mid-

⁷⁴ Ibid., p.262.

⁷⁵ Tekeli claims that it is necessary to include an account of the increase in land open to agriculture, patterns of landownership in agricultural production and the structure of the market for agricultural products along with the rate of mechanization and labor demand to understand the totality of the transformation in the countryside after 1948. For details and statistics on each one of these elements, see İlhan Tekeli, *Bağımlı Kentleşme, Kırdan ve Kentte Dönüşüm Süreci* (Ankara: Mimarlar Odası Yayınları, 1977), pp. 11-34.

⁷⁶ Gevgili summarizes these transformations as “the elimination of the last remnants of the pre-capitalist mode of agricultural production”. Between the years 1950 and 1973, the number of tractors had increased by 1307 percent, the use of synthetic fertilizers by 1013 percent, and the amount of irrigated land by 273 percent. These technological advancements were financed by credit loans, the amount of which increased by 650 percent from 1948 to 1956. As a result of these agricultural reforms, the labor efficiency in agricultural production had increased by fifty-two percent, significantly decreasing the demand for rural labor. Gevgilili, pp. 70, 71.

1950s. By then, the migrants had started to resettle in urban areas and travel to their villages only as seasonal workers during harvest times.⁷⁷ Such structural changes in the rural and urban societies and economics led to the emergence of a “host of problems relevant to the present purposes, including the increasing density of population in urban centers, the emergence of the phenomenon of squatter housing in massive proportions, and the diversification of the urban population.”⁷⁸

The first significant examples of contemporary squatter housing (commonly called *gecekondu* in Turkish, meaning “landed overnight”) in Turkey appeared in 1945.⁷⁹ These irregular settlements were conceived as “a spontaneous solution” to the common problems of acquiring either cheap urban land or low-cost housing, faced by the newcomers to cities. In her study on the economy of informal housing in Turkey, Buğra argues that the historical development of irregular housing should be analyzed “on a moral basis” implying that the history of these settlements has been shaped by the public perception of squatting on invaded urban land and state responses for the regularization of these illegal and unplanned settlements; the discourse of the “need for shelter” and its “socially recognized legitimacy” is what constitutes the prime elements of the “moral economy” in this case.⁸⁰

⁷⁷ Keyder, *Türkiye’de Devlet ve Sınıflar*, p. 111.

⁷⁸ Heper, “Introduction” in *Local Government in Turkey, Governing Greater Istanbul*, p. 5.

⁷⁹ Sey, “Cumhuriyet Döneminde Türkiye’de Mimarlık ve Yapı Üretimi” in *75 Yılda Değişen Kent ve Mimarlık*, p. 34. Danielson and Keleş claim that “in Istanbul, settlers erected the first *gecekondu* in Zeytinburnu in 1947”. For maps showing the geographical distribution of irregular settlements in Istanbul and Ankara by 1980, see Danielson and Keleş, *The Politics of Rapid Urbanization, Government and Growth in Modern Turkey*, pp. 163, 164.

⁸⁰ Ayşe Buğra, “The Immoral Economy of Housing in Turkey” in *The International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, volume 22 (June 1998) (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1998), p. 306.

The statistical data on the development of irregular housing and the percentage of its inhabitants within the total urban population shows that between the years 1950 and 1960, the number of people living these settlements and their share in the urban population had increased five-fold, a record growth rate which exceeds the figures of the following decades.⁸¹ After decades of steady growth in numbers, the total number of irregular settlements in Turkey had reached 1,585,455 in 1991 with half of them located in Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir.⁸²

A certain kind of social relations is particularly important to make sense out of this growing mass of people who eventually constituted a class of new urban poor in larger cities. Web-type relations based on kinship, locality of origin or other communal links have had an impact on how and where these migrants would settle down once they came to the cities. Communal relations and the creation of a common environment of the likes have helped the newcomers not to get lost –or assimilated- within the urban society⁸³. These relations had their counterpart in the production of irregular settlements and employment opportunities based on the use and constant reproduction of “informal reciprocity networks” in the absence of “formal redistributive measures”, i.e. the state’s efforts to solve the problems of

⁸¹ The number of residents in irregular settlements more than doubled between 1960-1970, reaching 3,000,000 and 23.6 percent of the urban population. By 1980 the same figures had gone up to 5,750,000 people and 26.1 percent of the urban population. Finally, at the beginning of the 1990s, 8,750,000 people were living in these irregular settlements which made up 33.9 percent of the urban population in Turkey. For more statistical data on the development of squatting, see Oktay Ekinçi, “Dünden Bugüne Gecekondu Dosyası, Gecekondulaşmadan Kaçak Kentleşmeye” in *Dünden Bugüne İstanbul Dosyaları* (Istanbul: Anahtar Kitaplar Yayınevi, 1995), p. 17.

⁸² Buğra, p. 307.

⁸³ M. Melih Pınarcıoğlu and Oğuz Işık, *Nöbetleşe Yoksulluk, Sultanbeyli Örneği* (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002), p. 96.

housing, new employment and social integration into the urban life through culture.⁸⁴

Although never perceived as such by the public opinion, *gecekondu* was indeed a threat against both the practice of modern urban planning and private property rights, taken under guarantee by the state.⁸⁵ What would have been seen as a violation of basic property rights in a developed capitalist economy in turn became a substitute for the shortage in low-cost housing and a source for gaining political support through simple populist rhetorics concerning the regularization and legalization of these settlements.

The first generation of rural migrants had enjoyed a considerable increase in their life standards even though they were living in settlements without any urban services or infrastructure. The settlements constructed by these migrants -such as Şentepe and Pamuklar District in Istanbul, which were almost completely swallowed by the “regular” urban development by the late 1990s- were mostly intended for the maximization of the use value, i.e. they were probably conceived as environments to be lived in, and not as some illegal investment opportunities to be exchanged at some point in the future for the extraction of urban rent.⁸⁶ Far from sympathizing with political radicalism, this first generation consistently voted for right wing politicians who offered improvement programs and legalization of the *gecekondu* settlements and appealed to the traditional moral values which the migrants had brought with them from their rural origins and kept reproducing within their communities as a reaction against the isolation and refusal by the urban middle classes. As the

⁸⁴ For a detailed explanation of “reciprocity” and “redistribution” see Buğra, p. 306.

⁸⁵ Şengül, p. 78.

⁸⁶ Pınarcıoğlu and Işık, *Nöbetleşe Yoksulluk, Sultanbeyli-Örneği*, p. 119.

mediator between conflicting interests of the urban capitalists, middle classes and the urban poor, the nature of the state response to *gecekondu* construction has differed widely from legalizing irregular settlements to sanctioning demolition over the years.

The first official reaction to squatting came with Law 5218 of 1948 which aimed at improving the standards of squatter settlements in Ankara. The law also provided land owned by the municipality in order to prevent further construction of irregular housing. Combined with Law 5228, the former dwellers of *gecekondu* were entitled to obtain credit loan extended by The Real Estate Bank (*Emlak Kredi Bankası*) at interest rates as low as five percent. The only condition for the land grant and loan was to build a house within ten years of time on the land provided by the state.⁸⁷ These two laws were the first attempt to prevent irregular housing under the logic of both urban planning and self-help housing construction.⁸⁸ However most of the owners of the houses built under this scheme later chose to sell or rent their property and move back to squatter houses again, thus gaining a considerable profit due to the constant lack of adequate legal housing stock.⁸⁹

⁸⁷ *Yenimahalle* district in Ankara is the first and most successful example for the outcomes of this policy of subsidizing social housing construction by individuals. Keleş, *100 Soruda Türkiye’de Şehirleşme, Konut ve Gecekondu*, p. 203.

⁸⁸ Despite the ambiguity of its ideological background, in its conception, the program bears a resemblance to John F. C. Turner’s planning ideals which he came to apply in Lima, Latin America during 1960s. Turner believed that “when dwellers control the major decisions and are free to make their own contributions in the design, construction or management of their housing, both this process and the environment produced stimulate individual and social well-being.” At the end of the project coordinated by Turner, the residents of *barriadas* (squatter housing in Lima) “managed to build their houses for half the amount that a contractor would charge, while creating an investment worth four or five times their annual incomes: twice the usual maximum for conventionally built housing.” For details on self-build projects and their historical roots in the development of planning practice, see Hall, pp. 10, 252-256.

⁸⁹ Danielson and Keleş, *The Politics of Rapid Urbanization, Government and Growth in Modern Turkey*, p. 182.

This first law concerning irregular settlements was followed by another one passed in 1949 (Law 5431), this time banning illegal construction on the grounds that it is a violation of public and private property rights. The law however failed in its implementation when it came to the demolition of *gecekondu* houses. Another law passed in 1953, the Building Encouragement Law (*Bina Yapımını Teşvik Yasası*, no. 6188), legalized the squatter houses built until that time, and made an attempt to remedy the housing shortage by distributing municipality owned urban land to “those in need”.⁹⁰ Despite the passing of complementary Law 7367 of 1959, which transferred urban land owned by the State Treasury to local municipalities to be redistributed to squatters for legal housing construction, these legislative measures constantly failed, over the thirteen years of their implementation, to prevent further squatter development.⁹¹ In addition to its failure in preventing squatting practice, this legislative framework had turned the publicly owned land on the fringes of urban centers into political tools for collecting votes from the urban poor and aided the institutionalization of patronage relations and clientelism geared for the extraction of urban rent over public property.⁹²

Unlike the previous attempts at regularization and prevention of squatter development, the Squatter Law of 1966 (*Gecekondu Kanunu*, no. 775) embarked to

⁹⁰ Law 327, passed just before the local elections in 1963, opened the way for the provision of urban services to “buildings without license”. See, Ekinçi, “Dünden Bugüne Gecekondu Dosyası, Gecekondulaşmadan Kaçak Kentleşmeye” in *Dünden Bugüne İstanbul Dosyaları*, p. 23.

⁹¹ Keleş, *100 Soruda Türkiye’de Şehirleşme, Konut ve Gecekondu*, p. 204.

⁹² Pınarcıoğlu and Işık, *Nöbetleşe Yoksulluk, Sultanbeyli Örneği*, p. 116. Danielson and Keleş argue that “when the ruling Democratic Party sought to win favor among squatters by granting land deeds, all the major political parties promised gecekondu dwellers titles in return for votes... As more and more gecekondu dwellers secured land deeds, squatting became less risky, and more migrants were drawn to the city.” Danielson and Keleş, *The Politics of Rapid Urbanization, Government and Growth in Modern Turkey*, pp. 163, 164.

seek for a solution within the economic and political environment of the 1960s which brought back the emphasis on national and regional planning once again in contrast to the previous decade. This law is also of significance since it was the first time that the term *gecekondu* is used in an official context.⁹³ The law consisted of policies aiming at the improvement of squatter housing stock wherever possible, demolition of the remaining thirty percent of squatter housing, and prevention of further illegal construction activity. The methods for prevention were defined as the demolition of new *gecekondu* constructions and an increase in the production of social housing for the urban poor; however neither one of these turned out to be successful when it came to implementation.⁹⁴ As a result of the failure to prevent squatting, same Law 775 was modified in 1976 with Law 1990 which once again legalized all squatter housing erected in the preceding ten years.⁹⁵

When the 1980s arrived, the practice of squatting had been gradually transformed into an informal and fully commercialized activity, indirectly supported by the state as a way of financing the costs of rapid urbanization without allocating public funds for urban development. Squatting had finally become the normal “strategy” of the new urban poor for survival and upward social mobility in the urban setting against the neglect of state apparatus and private capital.⁹⁶ Through the

⁹³ Buğra, p. 307.

⁹⁴ Keleş, *100 Soruda Türkiye’de Şehirleşme, Konut ve Gecekondu*, pp. 206-210.

⁹⁵ Ekinci, “Dünden Bugüne Gecekondu Dosyası, Gecekondulaşmadan Kaçak Kentleşmeye” in *Dünden Bugüne İstanbul Dosyaları*, p. 26.

⁹⁶ According to Işık and Pınaroğlu, under the regime of import substitution, urbanization was financed by the redistribution of urban rent among different social classes, just as industrialization was financed by the redistribution of “scarcity rents” among the urban industrial bourgeoisie. See, M. Pınarcıoğlu and Işık, *Nöbetleşe Yoksulluk, Sultanbeyli Örneği*, p. 102.

recurring ad-hoc construction licenses and legalization of *gecekondu* settlements, the dominance of use-value in the construction of irregular housing gave way to an awareness about the exchange-value that could be exploited through illegal commercial construction activity on invaded land, an action never seriously sanctioned by the state.⁹⁷

With the state's withdrawal from its role as the mediator between conflicting interests of different urban classes who up to that point had established an alliance for the distribution of urban rent, the extraction and maximization of urban rent became "the only condition of survival" of the urban poor after 1980.⁹⁸ In 1981, the military government passed the "Law on Collective Housing", no. 2487, which established a "Public Housing Fund" and allocated five percent of the national budget for the production of social housing under strong state supervision by the Ministry of Reconstruction and Settlement. However, by 1983 only twenty percent of the budget written in the law was made available by the Ministry of Finance, and the housing produced through the program, which depended on home ownership, proved to be out of the reach of the *gecekondu* dwellers as well as most of the urban middle classes.⁹⁹ After the legislation of 1981, three successive laws were passed by the ruling Motherland Party (ANAP) in 1983 (Law 2895), 1984 (Law 2981), and 1986

⁹⁷ Tekeli claims that "at least some of the norms of modernity were tried to be preserved with the legislations" regarding squatter settlements. However, this argument is questionable in the light of the wider context which has led the political parties to pursue populist policies to gain votes from the urban poor, and the haphazard implementation of the laws. See İlhan Tekeli, "Bir Modernite Projesi Olarak Türkiye'de Kent Planlaması" in *Modernite Aşılırken Kent Planlaması* (Ankara: Imge Kitabevi Yayınları, 2000), p. 29.

⁹⁸ Melih Pınarcıoğlu and Oğuz Işık, *Nöbetleşe Yoksulluk, Sultanbeyli Örneği*, pp. 126, 127.

⁹⁹ Danielson and Keleş, *The Politics of Rapid Urbanization, Government and Growth in Modern Turkey*, pp. 183, 186.

(Law 3290), all legalizing squatter development. The last one of these laws also introduced a new concept, legalizing the construction of high-density housing - through “improvement programs” prepared by the district municipalities- on public land facing the danger of squatting.¹⁰⁰ This law was widely used to open up public urban land for high rise construction by private entrepreneurs, thus depriving the city of its public property and providing a legislative system for the conversion of public land into private property, without incurring the cost of acquiring expensive urban land by private developers.¹⁰¹

As a result of these developments, the construction of *gecekondu* had become a commercial enterprise: By the early 1990s, more than half of the *gecekondu* dwellers in Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir were living on land that was initially invaded by someone else and sold at a profit; one fourth of all *gecekondu* dwellers in these cities were tenants, and the majority of irregular settlements were constructed through informal commercial means.¹⁰² The successive laws passed in the 1980s had made private investment by big construction firms in the urban built environment much more attractive than it was in the previous decades. As a result, the spatial layer created by the squatters over a period of forty five years was haphazardly being transformed into yet another one, this time shaped by the conflict between the rent-seeking behavior of the urban capital appropriating land for the speculative production of residential and office space, the urban middle classes seeking to maximize their share of the urban rent by erecting apartment blocks, and the

¹⁰⁰ Ekinci, “Dünden Bugüne Gecekondu Dosyası, Gecekondulaşmadan Kaçak Kentleşmeye” in *Dünden Bugüne İstanbul Dosyaları*, pp. 27-33.

¹⁰¹ For examples of private sector housing development on previously non-inhabited land and its significance in terms of the creation and distribution of urban rent on peripheral land, see Buğra, p. 307.

gecekondu dwellers –left to their own devices by the formal redistributive mechanisms of market exchange and state control– trying to secure their place in the urban environment through the formation of an informal network of relations.

¹⁰² Ibid., p. 311.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSION

The research presented in this thesis set out with a basic proposition: The forces which shape the urban environment are not impersonal. As a historical process shaped by human action, urbanization is an outcome of the choices, actions and relations of individuals in a society. The main objective of the preceding chapters was to uncover the internal dynamics which shaped the process of urbanization in Turkey in order to present a history of urbanization in Turkey in relation with the development of a modern capitalist economic system. A reassessment of the roles of the urban social classes and the state mechanisms should follow as a conclusion to the work presented so far, since the contradictions and compatibilities between these specific roles gave the process of urbanization in Turkey its unique aspects and made it difficult to conceptualize with reference to an already existing theoretical model.

The impact of the capitalist economic rationale on urbanization has been studied in the first chapter on a theoretical level by focusing on theories of value, rent, and speculation over urban property with references to the theories of the state, classes and social groups as agents of urbanization, whereas the second and third chapters aimed to provide a historical survey of class dynamics and the impact of state structures in the process.

In all of the chapters, the survey has been carried out by relating urbanization in Turkey to the transformation of a dominantly pre-capitalist rural society into a capitalist urban one. The transformation is also relevant for understanding the transformation of state structures, since in all of the periods studied, the state has preserved its role as an important actor in economic and social spheres. While

implementing policies to restructure the society and the economy, the state itself has gone through transformations as well through the takeover of state power by different social groups in different periods. The methodological task here is not to construct rigid historical structures upon which a determinist history of urbanization can be founded. The conceptions of capital, social classes, and the state as sets of social relations and processes provide the flexibility with which patronage relations, actions of local interest groups and contradictions between local and central governments could be contextualized and integrated into the whole framework. Since one of the objectives of this study is to understand the unique aspects of the Turkish experience with urbanization, a historical survey based on the social and economic dynamics has provided an insight on the specificities of the context in which the Turkish cities have been transformed over time.

The historical context of urbanization in Turkey has been presented in three periods, all of which have been marked by reconfigurations in the cycle of capital accumulation at the urban and national scales. The three periods also display differences in terms of the dominant actors who have shaped the urban built environment. The physical environment created by these actors have been considered as separate historico-spatial layers; the early Republican period between 1923 and 1950 has seen the creation of a layer mostly shaped by public investment, i.e. the urban environment was predominantly shaped by the state either through the construction of ideologically significant public spaces and buildings, or through the development of housing all taking place within an environment of modernist planning. The bureaucracy being the largest social group within the middle class urbanites was the prime agent in the transformation of the urban environment.

Aside from the construction projects which were seen of political significance, such as the construction of Ankara and reorganization of public spaces in Istanbul and Izmir, the state chose to invest in a program for rapid industrialization, instead of the provision of urban services and infrastructure for larger masses. This choice paved the way for the urban crisis which surfaced with mass migrations from rural areas to cities after the Second World War; hence the second period between 1950 and 1980 was marked by the multiplying problems of rapid urbanization. Instead of responding to the situation by employing long term policies based on a concentration of financial sources and administrative powers, the state entered a phase of fragmentation. The result was an inefficient and uncoordinated state structure which failed to develop solutions in regulating urban growth and provision of urban services.

As the state remained reluctant to invest in social housing, urban public transportation and other components of urban infrastructure, the newcomers to cities were led to find their own ways for survival in the urban environment. Thus, the spatial layer created in the first period gave way to a new one, this time created haphazardly by the irregular constructions of the urban middle classes and rural migrants. Both the middle classes and the urban poor exploited the opportunities for extracting their share of the rent created at the urban scale. In this process, apartment blocks and squatters became mass produced commodities which allowed these classes to secure their place in the city. The housing produced in these ways came to be regarded as a substitute for social housing by the governments, and was often indirectly encouraged through laws and official practice at the expense of a planned environment. Numerous amnesty laws issued for squatter housing and *Kat Mülkiyeti Kanunu* were the implications of such a tendency on the side of the state.

After the military intervention of 1980 the urban environment became an attractive location for large-scale capital intensive investments made possible by the neo-liberal economic policies of post-1980s. The domestic capitalists who had been nurtured by the import substitution economy of the previous decades and the small urban trader developers who had accumulated a sizable capital through apartment constructions in the last three decades became the prime actors in the transformation of the urban built environment after 1980. Thus the spatial layer created in the previous periods came to be covered by yet another one of more capital intensive constructions such as office towers, high-rise apartment complexes, expensive suburban settlements, and shopping arcades in the central districts. The urban transformations brought forth by these developments after 1980 also meant the emergence of a new life-style gaining dominance among the upper-class urban dwellers which had its “spatial imprint” on Turkish metropolises through a recomposition of the urban fabric by large private property developments. Such projects were made possible by the neo-liberal economic policies employed after 1980 which facilitated the commodification of urban property and the concentration of large pieces of urban land in the hands of private entrepreneurs.¹

Throughout the Republican period, the state has mostly acted as a formal mechanism of the redistribution of urban rent produced in the informal urban economy. The urban poor received their portion through patronage relations which meant not only legalization of informal housing constructions or the distribution of land deeds for invaded public land. The urban poor also benefited from patronage relations in the provision of urban services such as electricity, running water, and

¹ Nebahat Tokatlı and Yonca Boyacı, “The Changing Morphology of Commercial Activity in Istanbul” in *Cities*, volume 16, no. 3 (1999) (Great Britain: Pergamon, 1999), p. 190.

public transportation between squatter areas and downtown districts.² Increasing participation of the urban poor in the political scene as a powerful interest group made the political parties perceive squatters as a large pool of votes which could be gained in return for these legalization and extension of urban infrastructure, whereas the middle classes maximized their share of the rent through the mechanism of trader developers. By seeking to support class alliances in all periods, the state has preferred to preserve social stability in the face of the problems of rapid urbanization. This means that the state tolerated unplanned urban growth and spontaneous solutions on behalf of the urban social classes in order to escape the financial and political burdens of regulating rapid urbanization. Thus both the central and local governments used non-planning as a tool of planning for urban development with no regard for the long term problems which would be posed by such unregulated urban development.

Within a period of seven decades, the state had changed its position from the planner and leading producer of urban environment to that of a mediator between conflicting and overlapping interests of the urban social classes. However, it would not be correct to see the state structure as a homogenous entity. With regard to the government of urban affairs, one has to distinguish between local and central governments, and the struggle for more authority between these two levels of the state apparatus. The Turkish state's tendency to keep the authority at the central institutions as much as possible has prevented the development of municipal governments as self-sufficient and democratic institutions. The reasons for this political choice can be traced back to the political heritage of the late Ottoman

² For a detailed analysis of municipal policymaking on the provision of infrastructure in squatter areas, see Deniz Baharoğlu and Josef Leitmann, "Reaching Turkey's Spontaneous Settlements: The Institutional Dimension of Infrastructure Provision" in *International Planning Studies*, volume 4, no. 2 (1999) (USA: Taylor & Francis Ltd., 1999), pp. 201-208.

period, but more important than that, one should observe that the struggle for the distribution of state power has sharpened at those times when the center and the metropolitan municipalities were dominated by rival political parties, as was the case in 1970s and after the local elections of 1989. This fact indicates that the political conflicts within the democratic system and among state institutions, rather than a structural heritage, have been influential in the development of local governments.

The spatial and social characteristics of capitalist urbanization can be studied in many other aspects of urban development such as the transformation of central business districts, the emergence of gentrified neighborhoods, social segregation patterns in the urban space, as parts of the discourse of a transition to the “global city”.³ The research presented in this thesis omitted these specific fields for a variety of reasons. First of all, the literature on the transformation of Istanbul under the forces of global finance capital is still far from being adequate in comparison to the volume of works done on New York, London, Tokyo, or other cities which are considered to be the global cities *par excellence*. The evolution of capitalism in Turkey has not fully shifted away from a Fordist configuration of capital accumulation to a Post-Fordist one, where service sector employment clearly outnumbered manufacturing jobs in the city.⁴ Even though the activity of foreign capital started to increase dramatically after 1980, a theoretical framework and comprehensive empirical data is still needed on the transformation of urban space

³ Saskia Sassen, *Cities in a World Economy*, 2nd ed. USA: Pine Forge Press, 2000), pp. 21-28. For a theoretical account on the “model of global cities”, see Saskia Sassen, *The Global City*, 2nd ed. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), pp. 346-355.

⁴ As of 1995, jobs in the sectors of communications, financial services and social services made up only about a third of total employment in Istanbul. For detailed statistics on the employment structure, see İstanbul Büyükşehir Belediyesi Planlama ve İmar Daire Başkanlığı Şehir Planlama Müdürlüğü, *1/50.000 Ölçekli İstanbul Metropolen Alan Alt Bölge Nazım Planı Raporu*, (İstanbul: 1995), p. 106.

through internationalization of urban property. However, it shouldn't be surprising to see an increase in the number of studies on the transformation of central business districts after 1980s with relation to global capitalism in the near future.⁵ As more research is made available on the impact of Turkey's economic integration with global capitalism, the newly emerging spatial layer created by these transformations will provide new perspectives for concrete studies on the continuity of the past historico-spatial layers mentioned in this thesis.

As a process triggered by economic and political transformations, urban development in Turkey underwent dramatic changes over the years. A combination of the fragmented ownership pattern of urban land; economic, political and physical remnants of the pre-capitalist Ottoman society, a strong central state and the relations between social classes and groups have been the primary factors in shaping urban development throughout the Republican era. As public agencies responsible for urban planning and government gradually gave up their officially legitimized claims for the regulation of urban physical environment and economy, the production of urban property and thus the redistribution of rent have been taken over by formal and informal market mechanisms. In addition to the markets' inherent deficiencies in "allocating resources, distributing goods, and maximizing individual freedoms and satisfactions", the production of urban space in Turkish metropolises came to be dominated by the informal economy of squatters, irregular apartment blocks, and

⁵ "Is the market really efficient even at the things it claims to do best, i.e. At allocating resources, distributing goods, and maximizing individual freedoms and satisfactions?...That is to say, it does nothing to correct bad distributions of wealth and income. It makes some of them worse; and it rewards plenty of quite unproductive and antisocial behaviour -as when landowners find they can charge monopolist prices for land, or investors find they can get better returns from property and other 'confidence markets' than from productive manufacturing and service industries." Hugh Stretton, *Urban Planning in Rich and Poor Countries* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 36.


patronage relations in the aftermath of the Second World War.⁶ The turbulent history of Turkish metropolitan cities with their coexisting historico-spatial layers of early Republican artifacts, irregular settlements and high technology business towers confirms Tafuri's proposition: "The city of development does not accept 'equilibriums' within it".⁷

⁶ "Is the market really efficient even at the things it claims to do best, i.e. At allocating resources, distributing goods, and maximizing individual freedoms and satisfactions?...That is to say, it does nothing to correct bad distributions of wealth and income. It makes some of them worse; and it rewards plenty of quite unproductive and antisocial behaviour -as when landowners find they can charge monopolist prices for land, or investors find they can get better returns from property and other 'confidence markets' than from productive manufacturing and service industries." Stretton, p. 36.

⁷ Tafuri, p. 120.

APPENDIX I


DISTRICT MAP OF ISTANBUL¹



¹ Feyzan Erkip, "Global Transformations Versus Local Dynamics in Istanbul, Planning in a Fragmented Metropolis" in *Cities*, volume 17, no. 5 (2000) (Great Britain: Pergamon, 2000), p. 373.

APPENDIX II

THE NETWORK OF EXISTING RAILROADS IN ANATOLIA AS OF 1915²



² Reproduced from the map "Railroads in Turkey" in *Bulletin of the American Geographical Society*, volume 47, no. 12 (1915) (American Geographical Society), p. 936.

APPENDIX III


CONSTRUCTION OF RAILROADS IN TURKEY BETWEEN 1860 – 1964³

LINK	DATE	LENGTH (In miles)	LINK	DATE	LENGTH (In Miles)
<i>Under Ottoman Empire</i>			<i>Under Ottoman Empire</i>		
Kizilçullu-Buca	1860	1.2	Konya-Yenice	1918	214.9
Izmir-Aydin	1866	80.7	Fevzipaşa-Nusaybin	1918	258.3
Gaziemir-Seydiköy	1866	0.9	Mardin-Derbesiye	1918	18.6
Izmir-Turgutlu	1866	57.8	Toprakkale-Fevzipaşa	1918	39.1
Istanbul-Izmit	1873	56.5			
Turgutlu-Alaşehir	1875	47.2	<i>Under Turkish Republic</i>		
Aydın-Kuyucak	1881	35.4	Ilica-Balya	1926	18.0
Kuyucak-Sarayköy	1882	27.3	Samsun-Çarşamba	1926	23.6
Torbalı-Tire	1883	29.8	Ankara-Kayseri	1927	236.0
Ödemiş-Çatal	1884	15.5	Kayseri-Sivas	1930	137.9
Mersin-Adana	1886	42.2	Balıkesir-Alayunt	1932	163.3
Istanbul-Edirne	1888	197.7	Sivas-Samsun	1932	249.6
Kırklareli-mainline	1888	28.3	Kayseri-Kardeşgediği	1933	116.1
Sarayköy-Dinar	1889	90.0	Elâzığmainline	1934	14.9
Denizli-mainline	1889	5.8	Fevzipaşa-Diyarbakır	1935	313.0
Söke-mainline	1889	13.7	Afyon-Karakuyu	1936	70.8
Çivril-mainline	1889	19.3	Burdur-mainline	1936	14.9
Manisa-Soma	1890	57.4	Isparta-mainline	1936	8.7
Izmir-Adapazari	1890	30.4	Sivas-Çetinkaya	1936	69.6
Adapazari-Ankara	1892	271.4	Irmak-Hisarönü-Zonguldak	1937	257.7
Mudanya-Bursa	1892	25.5	Malatya-Çetinkaya	1937	86.9
Eskişehir-Alayunt	1894	41.6	Çetinkaya-Erzurum	1939	270.8
Alayunt-Afyon	1895	58.4	Diyarbakır-Kurtulan	1944	98.7
Afyon-Konya	1896	169.2	Tunçbilek-mainline	1944	7.5
Russia-Kars-Sarıkamış	1899	76.4	Maraş-mainline	1948	17.4
Alaşehir-Afyon	1900	157.2	Ereli-Armutcuk	1953	8.1
Eğridir-Dinar	1912	58.6	Narlı-Gaziantep	1953	52.2
Soma-Bandırina	1912	113.6	Gaziantep-Barak	1960	62.7
İskenderun-mainline	1913	36.8	Kütahya-Seydiömer	1962	18.0
Sarıkamış-Erzurum	1916	108.1	Elâzığ-Tatvan	1964	208.0

³ Reproduced from John Kolars and Henry J Malin, "Population and Accessibility: An Analysis of Turkish Railroads" In *Geographical Review*, volume 60, no. 2 (April, 1970) (American Geographical Society, 1970), p. 239.

APPENDIX IV


EXCERPT FROM THE ISTANBUL MASTER PLAN (1943)⁴



⁴ Reproduced from the Istanbul Master Plan of 1943, based on the plan prepared by Henri Prost. "İstanbul Ciheti" in Istanbul Municipality, *Güzelleşen İstanbul, XXİnci Yıl*, prepared and edited by Abidin Daver, Mazhar N. Resmor, Safa Günay (İstanbul: İstanbul Maarif Matbaası, 1943).

APPENDIX V


DETAIL FROM THE ISTANBUL MASTER PLAN OF 1943⁵



⁵ Black arrows added by the author to show the Atatürk Boulevard in Unkapanı, and the new Eminönü motorway to be constructed. Ibid.

APPENDIX VI


PLAN FOR MOTORWAY CONNECTION BETWEEN TAKSIM AND KARAKÖY⁶



⁶ The bold line shows the new road to be constructed according to the Master Plan of 1943 to link Tophane, Karaköy and Taksim. Ibid.

APPENDIX VII


PLAN FOR MOTORWAY CONNECTION BETWEEN TOPHANE, KARAKÖY AND EMINÖNÜ⁷



⁷ The bold line shows the road to be constructed in order to connect Tophane with Karaköy and cross Haliç over Atatürk Bridge to reach Eminönü. Ibid.

APPENDIX VIII

CONSTRUCTION OF ATATÜRK BOULEVARD IN UNKAPANI⁸



⁸ The aerial photograph pictures the construction of Atatürk Boulevard in the late 1940s. Notice the traditional urban fabric surrounding the construction site. *75 Yılda Değişen Kent ve Mimarlık*, edited by Yıldız Sey (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 1998), p. 40.

APPENDIX IX

CONSTRUCTION OF VATAN AND MILLET AVENUES⁹



⁹ Aerial view of Vatan and Millet avenues dating from the late 1950s. Photograph reproduced from Mete Tapan, "İstanbul'un Kentsel Planlamasının Tarihsel Gelişimi ve Planlama Eylemleri" in *75 Yılda Değişen Kent ve Mimarlık*, edited by Yıldız Sey (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 1998), p. 84


NEWSARTICLE ON THE BOSPHORUS BRIDGE PROJECT, 1969¹⁰

bir iddia;

□ BOĞAZ KÖPRÜSÜ, İSTANBUL'U BETON ÇÖLÜ HALİNE GETİRECEKTİR!

Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi İskân ve Şehircilik Enstitüsünde «Peyraj Mimarlığı Açısından Boğaz Köprüsü» konusunda bir konferans düzenleyen Dr. Selâmi Sözer, Köprü'nün «Yörenin tarihi atmosferinin aksine, İstanbul'u bir beton çölü haline getireceğini» söylemiştir.

Dr. Sözer, bu inşaatın, «Korkunç tabiat vahimliğini hızlandıracağını» ve daha şimdiden arsa spekülasyonlarına yol açtığını da belirtmiştir.




Çevre yolu boyunca 13 köprülü kavşak Yenı Stadı önünde yol üstündeki 1 kilometre inşa edilecektir. Bunların yerleri şu şekilde belirlenmiştir: 1 — Topkapı, 2 — Vatan Caddesi (yapılacak), 3 — Edirnekapi, 4 — Avcılar, 5 — Halıcıoğlu, 6 — Okmeydanı, 7 — Hacı Ömer, 8 — Mecidiyeköy, 9 — Yıldız, 10 — Ortaköy, 11 — Beylerbeyi, 12 — Altınizade, 13 — Ankara Asfaltı. Otosan fabrikası, Ebediye, 8 — Mecidiyeköy, Ali Sami Kaya.

¹⁰ The article claims that "the Bosphorus Bridge will turn Istanbul into a desert of concrete!". The illustration shows the main ring road as a continuous line and the surrounding network of new roads as hatched lines. "Boğaz Köprüsü, İstanbul'u Beton Çölü Haline Getirecektir!", *Arkitekt*, volume 39, no. 338, October 1969, p. 59.

APPENDIX XI


B. OSMAN RENTAL HOUSE IN ANKARA, YENİŞEHİR¹¹



¹¹ The picture and plan belong to a rental house constructed in the residential quarters of Yenışehir, Ankara. The building dates from the late 1930s; the architect is Bekir Ihsan. Photograph and plan reproduced from Murat Balamir, 'Kira Evi'nden 'Kat Evleri'ne Apartmanlaşma: Bir Zihniyet Dönüşümü Tarihçesinden Kesitler" in *Mimarlık*, no. 260 (November, 1994), p. 30.

APPENDIX XII

THE LOCATION PLAN FOR BAĞÇELİEVLER HOUSING, ANKARA¹²



¹² Plan reproduced from İlhan Tekeli, "Türkiye'de Cumhuriyet Döneminde Kentsel Gelişme ve Kent Planlaması" in *75 Yılda Değişen Kent ve Mimarlık*, edited by Yıldız Sey (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 1998), p. 10.

APPENDIX XIII


SARAÇOĞLU HOUSING¹³



¹³ Photograph reproduced from Sibel Bozdoğan, *Modernism and Nation Building, Turkish Architectural Culture in the Early Republic* (Singapore: University of Washington Press, 2001), p. 273.


APPENDIX XIV

SARAÇOĞLU HOUSING¹⁴



¹⁴ Photograph reproduced from Yıldız Sey, "Cumhuriyet Döneminde Konut" in *75 Yılda Değişen Kent ve Mimarlık*, edited by Yıldız Sey (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, 1998), p. 285.


YENİMAHALLE HOUSING: TWO VARIATIONS OF THE SINGLE STOREY HOUSE PLAN WITH TWO ROOMS¹⁵



¹⁵ Illustrations by Murat Küçük; reproduced from Murat Küçük, "Yenimahalle Toplu Konut Üretimi İçin Örnek Olabilir miydi?" In *Mimarlık*, no. 260 (November, 1994) (Ankara: TMMOB Mimarlar Odası, 1994), pp. 47.

APPENDIX XVI


YENİMAHALLE HOUSING: TWO VARIATIONS OF THE SINGLE STOREY HOUSE PLAN WITH THREE ROOMS¹⁶



¹⁶ Illustrations by Murat Küçük; Ibid., p.47.


APPENDIX XVII

YENİMAHALLE HOUSING: TWO VARIATIONS OF THE TWO STOREY HOUSE PLAN WITH FOUR ROOMS¹⁷



¹⁷ Illustrations by Murat Küçük, Ibid., p.48.


YENİMAHALLE HOUSING: TWO VARIATIONS OF THE TWO STOREY HOUSE PLAN WITH FIVE ROOMS¹⁸



¹⁸ Illustrations by Murat Küçük, Ibid, p.48.

APPENDIX XIX



YENIMAHALLE AFTER 1990¹⁹



¹⁹ Photographs by Murat Küçük. Ibid., p. 48.

APPENDIX XX


MECIDIYEKÖYÜ HOUSING IN ISTANBUL (1949)²⁰



²⁰ Istanbul Municipality, “Mesken Siyaseti” in *Cumhuriyet Döneminde İstanbul*, (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1949), pp. 151, 152.

APPENDIX XXI


LEVEND HOUSING IN ISTANBUL (1948)²¹




²¹ *Cumhuriyet'in Devraldığı İstanbul'dan Bugüne (Istanbul from the Birth of the Republic to the Present Day: The Metamorphosis of a Legacy)*, edited by Çelik Gülersoy (Istanbul: Türkiye Sınai Kalkınma Bankası, 1998)

HOUSING TYPES IN BATIKENT COOPERATIVE HOUSING SCHEME²²

SIRA EVLER




Yerleşim Planı




Zemin - Üst Kat Planları

İKİZ EVLER

Mimar: Recai Ertuğrul - Net 78 m²




Ön Görünüş




Zemin - Üst Kat Planları

GRUP EVLER




Yerleşim Planı




Zemin - Üst Kat Planları

KATLI KONUT

Mimar: Gönül Bırgan - Net 84 m²



Kısmi Yerleşim Planı




Zemin Kat Planı

²² Original illustrations by architects Levin Emiroğlu, Bediz Tuncel. “ ‘Konut Sorunu’ ve Toplu Konut ‘Çözümleri’ ” edited by Semih Eryıldız, in *Mimarlık*, no. 261 (January, 1995) (Ankara: TMMOB Mimarlar Odası, 1995), p. 27.


APPENDIX XXIII

SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF RESIDENTIAL AREAS IN ANKARA (1985)²³



²³ Illustration by Özlem Dündar. Özlem Dündar, "Models of Urban Transformation, Informal Housing in Ankara" in *Cities*, volume 18, no. 6 (2001) (Great Britain: Pergamon, 2001), p. 392.

SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF SQUATTER SETTLEMENTS IN ISTANBUL
(1980)²⁴



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