

THE ORIGIN OF SOUTH KOREAN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: KIM DAE-JUNG
GOVERNMENT AND ITS RELATIONS WITH JAPAN

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THE ORIGIN OF SOUTH KOREAN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: KIM DAE-JUNG
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DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

I, Melis Pektaş Kım, certify that

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ABSTRACT

The Origin of South Korean Public Diplomacy: Kim Dae-jung Government and Its Relations with Japan

On August 15, 1945, the Japanese rule in the Korean Peninsula came to an end, and then Korea was liberated. Five years later, however, the Korean War broke out on June 25, 1950. South and North Koreans were tremendously impacted by the Korean War and Japanese colonialism. Especially, “assimilation policies” implemented by the Japanese government in the 1930s and 1940s damaged the consciousness of national and cultural identities among the people. Therefore, since the liberation, Korean governments prioritized the reconsolidating of national identities and pride among the people with anti-Japanese sentiment.

In the post-colonial environment, Korean governments mostly benefited from the concept of “culture” to reconstruct the national and cultural consciousness of Koreans. However, culture would become an industry in Korea because democracy was ensured in South Korea, the struggles against the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis began and the country's administrators realized the importance of globalization. Thus, the Kim Dae-Jung period government further developed the Korean cultural industry, and this situation created the foundations of Korean public diplomacy.

Within this context, to explain the emergence of Korean public diplomacy, the research will focus on the change of cultural policies in the Korean peninsula from the past to the present. Finally, the paper will also discuss the first attempts of the Kim Dae-Jung government to implement public diplomacy in Korea-Japan bilateral relations. The aim is to maintain the historical bond between the two

countries and make it clearer that the foundation of Korean public diplomacy was first laid by Kim Dae-Jung.

ÖZET

Güney Kore Kamu Diplomasinin Kökeni: Kim Dae-jung Hükümeti ve Japonya ile İlişkileri

15 Ağustos 1945'te Kore Yarımadası'ndaki Japon egemenliği sona ermiş ve ardından Kore özgürlüğüne kavuşmuştur. Ancak beş yıl sonra 25 Haziran 1950'de Kore savaşı çıkmıştır. Güney ve Kuzey Koreliler bu süreç boyunca hem Kore Savaşı'ndan hem de Japon sömürgeciliğinden muazzam bir şekilde etkilenmişlerdir. Özellikle 1930'lu ve 1940'lı yıllarda Japon hükümetinin uyguladığı “asimilasyon politikaları” halk arasındaki ulusal ve kültürel kimlik bilincini zedelemiştir. Bu nedenle kurtuluştan bu yana Kore hükümetleri, Japon karşıtı duygulara sahip insanlar arasında ulusal kimliklerin ve gururun yeniden pekiştirilmesine öncelik vermiştir.

Post-kolonyal ortamda Kore hükümetleri, Korelilerin ulusal ve kültürel bilincini yeniden inşa etmek için çoğunlukla “kültür” kavramından yararlanmışlardır. Ancak Güney Kore'de demokrasinin sağlanması, 1997 Asya Mali Kriziyle mücadelenin başlaması ve ülke yöneticilerinin küreselleşmenin önemini kavraması nedeniyle kültür Kore'de bir endüstri haline gelmiştir. Böylece Kim Dae-Jung dönemi hükümeti Kore kültür endüstrisini daha da geliştirmiş ve bu durum Kore kamu diplomasinin temellerini oluşturmuştur.

Bu bağlamda araştırma, Kore kamu diplomasinin ortaya çıkışını açıklamak için geçmişten günümüze Kore Yarımadası'ndaki kültürel politikaların değişimine odaklanacaktır. Son olarak, makale ayrıca Kim Dae-Jung hükümetinin Kore-Japonya ikili ilişkilerinde kamu diplomasini uygulamaya yönelik ilk girişimlerini tartışacaktır. Amaç, iki ülke arasındaki tarihi bağı sürdürmek ve Kore kamu

diplomasisinin temellerinin ilk olarak Kim Dae-Jung tarafından atıldığını daha net bir şekilde ortaya koymaktadır.

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ABBREVIATIONS

- BBC – British Broadcasting Corporation
- CPPL – Cultural Properties Protection
- HCI - Heavy and Chemical Industrialization
- ICT – Information and Communication Technology
- IMF- International Monetary Fund
- IPTV – Internet Protocol Television
- IT – Information Technology
- KBI – Korean Broadcasting Institute
- KCAF – Korean Culture and Art Foundation
- KCIA – Korean Central Intelligence Agency
- KICA – Korea International Cultural Association
- KF- Korean Foundation
- KOCCA- Korea Cultural Content Agency
- KOFACE – Korea Asian Foundation for Cultural Exchange
- MPPL – Motion Picture Promotion Law
- NHK – Nippon Hōsō Kyōkai
- PD – Public Diplomacy
- TEN – Television Enterprises New
- US- United States
- USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Soft power and public diplomacy

The concept of "power" in international relations is defined as the ability to make others do what you want, and there are many ways to apply the concept. You can coerce the other party with threats, encourage them with recompense, or allure them to do what you want through persuasion.¹ In former times, especially in the twentieth century, the First and Second World Wars were an indication that the traditional power in international relations was "military power".² Indeed, in the international relations literature, the effort of a state to persuade the other party by using military and economic force is called "hard power," and this situation corresponds to the first one of the above-mentioned power categories. However, as the sources of power diversified over time, the concept of "soft power" emerged in the twenty first century. Soft power is the ability to lure the other party in line with your expectations and goals.³ This one corresponds to the last category mentioned above. In fact, according to Joseph Nye, both categories of power are interrelated. To exemplify, a country with a strong economy may prefer to apply hard power to the other party by applying sanctions, or it may try to persuade the other party through soft power by making economic contributions.⁴ In Table 1, how the concept of power can be shaped according to the behaviour tendency of states and the types of resources that can be preferred while applying these powers can be examined.

¹ Nye, *Yumuşak Güç*, 20.

² Nye, *Yumuşak Güç*, 22.

³ Karadağ, *Uluslararası İlişkilerde Yeni Bir Boyut Kamu Diplomasisi*, 52.

⁴ Nye, *Yumuşak Güç*, 27.

Table 1. Power

	Hard	Soft
Behavior Range	Issue a Command ← Pressure Incentive	Agenda Setting Appeal Persuasion →
Most Possible Sources	Oppression Sanctions Reciprocity Bribery	Institutions Values Cultural Policies

Source: Yumuşak güç, 2020.

As can be seen in the table, pressure or money are not the only sources to attract other countries. Cultural values, political values, and foreign policy set off the sources of soft power. If a country contains universal values and the values of other countries in its culture, this helps to gain desired results through attraction. While literature, art, and education that appeal to the elite class create "high culture," products based on mass entertainment create "popular culture".⁵ A government's domestic and foreign policies can also serve as soft power. If policies include not only national interests but also universal values such as peace and human rights, they will contribute to soft power.⁶ In addition, when a country is accepted by others, room for manoeuvre will expand for that country in the international arena.⁷ Thus, there will be no need for other methods of coercion (known as the "carrot and stick method" in international relations) to direct the activities of other countries.⁸

In the twenty first century, the worldwide information revolution and economic globalization increased the interest of countries in soft power. With the

⁵ Nye, *Yumuşak Güç*, 32.

⁶ Nye, *Yumuşak Güç*, 36.

⁷ Yaylar, *Karşılaştırmalı Kamu Diplomasisi Analizi: Türkiye, ABD ve Japonya*, 11.

⁸ Karadağ, *Uluslararası İlişkilerde Yeni Bir Boyut Kamu Diplomasisi*, 26.

information revolution, virtual communities and networks that cross national borders increased, and countries had multi-directional communication channels.⁹ Hence, the sharing of information gained speed after technological developments, and there was an information explosion that led to the abundance paradox.¹⁰ The ability to share information became an important factor in the attractiveness of countries, as soft power policies are essentially a kind of marketing method.¹¹

However, the tools and methods of soft power may be diverse from country to country. Since each state determines a target according to its international status and influence, it also determines its soft power resources towards that target.¹² The concept of “Public Diplomacy” (hereinafter referred to as PD) is the most outstanding tool of soft power, but the tools of PD are shaped by countries' purposes, the targeted regions, and the results they want to achieve.¹³ PD can be defined as activities that enable a state to lure the target community and eventuate its interests by diversifying the channels it uses in its foreign policy in the international environment. Shortly, as we can examine in Figure 1, while a state applies PD, they prefer to use the soft power resources of the country for the goals they set in line with the interests of the country.¹⁴

⁹ Nye, *Yumuşak Güç*, 57.

¹⁰ Nye, *Yumuşak Güç*, 151.

¹¹ Karadağ, *Uluslararası İlişkilerde Yeni Bir Boyut Kamu Diplomasisi*, 54.

¹² Lee, “The Theory and Reality of Soft Power: Practical Approaches in East Asia”, 12.

¹³ Yaylar, *Karşılaştırmalı Kamu Diplomasisi Analizi: Türkiye, ABD ve Japonya*, 3.

¹⁴ Karadağ, *Uluslararası İlişkilerde Yeni Bir Boyut Kamu Diplomasisi*, 25.




Figure 1. Formation of public practices

Source: Uluslararası İlişkilerde Yeni Bir Boyut: Kamu Diplomasisi, 2016

As a dominant trend in foreign policy in the twenty first century, a state aims to achieve national interests by influencing the citizens of other nations through PD. The inadequacy of actors, institutions, infrastructure, and traditional diplomacy led countries to prefer PD in their foreign policies. In addition, since globalization shortened distances among countries and the developed-communication methods gathered people closer to each other, countries reviewed their foreign affairs' roles and goals.¹⁵ Lastly, various countries realized the subversiveness of the two great world wars as well as nuclear weapons in the twentieth century, and they ensured democracy during this process. Thus, the preferability of PD increased.¹⁶

As Figure 2 explains, according to Nye, PD has three dimensions: daily communication, strategic communication, and sustainable relations among individuals. To illustrate, in daily communication, when governments take a decision, they contact both the domestic and foreign press to share the decision as a daily communication. This dimension offers one-sided information in terms of interaction.¹⁷ Strategic communication includes political campaigns as well as advertisements. It also creates an image by disseminating information about national

¹⁵Yaylar, *Karşılaştırmalı Kamu Diplomasisi Analizi: Türkiye, ABD ve Japonya*, 38.

¹⁶Yaylar, *Karşılaştırmalı Kamu Diplomasisi Analizi: Türkiye, ABD ve Japonya*, 40.

¹⁷ Nye, *Yumuşak Güç*, 154.

policies.¹⁸ In the third dimension, the most preferred tools are educational scholarships, student exchange programs, seminars, and academic conferences. This dimension aims to maintain communication between the PD producer and the target audience by expanding communication channels.¹⁹




Figure 2. Dimensions of public diplomacy
Source: Karşılaştırmalı Kamu Diplomasisi Analizi, 2020

In the current international order, PD has seven types of tools. These are culture, education, economy and social, technology, military, religious, as well as international organizations.²⁰ Cultural PD tools can be written and visual media. For instance, buying a television channel or opening a new channel in a country where the target audience is located can contribute to the PD of the channel owner country.²¹ The other cultural medium is the film and cinema sector. Since cinema contains visuals, it is able to transmit all kinds of messages more effectively to the other party or messages can be conveyed to the subconscious of target societies

¹⁸ Nye, *Yumuşak Güç*, 155.

¹⁹ Nye, *Yumuşak Güç*, 156.

²⁰ Karadağ, *Uluslararası İlişkilerde Yeni Bir Boyut Kamu Diplomasisi*, 88.

²¹ Karadağ, *Uluslararası İlişkilerde Yeni Bir Boyut Kamu Diplomasisi*, 89.

through movies.²² Popular culture is also one of the tools of cultural PD as it is able to produce a sense of sympathy for a country. Language also has a forceful place in this area. The utilization of the same language is a significant factor, as the purpose of PD is to make the borders among countries invisible and to have an impact on foreign citizens. Therefore, the country that implements PD through language education encourages the target society to learn its own language. At this point, cultural centres are generally institutions that take on the task of language teaching. Town twinning protocols signed between local governments of various countries are also evaluated as cultural tools of PD practices.²³

The second group of PD tools is those linked to education. Owing to educational activities, students can go to universities in other countries with exchange programs or continue their education in other countries thanks to scholarships given by states and private institutions. These opportunities led university students to live in a different country and get to know the culture, people, as well as the lifestyle of that country. Positive experiences in that country also gain students' sympathy.²⁴

Sports events, material and moral aid in natural disasters, and humanitarian aid can be counted as the economic and social tools of PD. For example, hosting the Olympics, world and continental football championships or organizations such as Formula-1 contribute positively to the international recognition and image of a country.²⁵ On the other hand, advancements in information technology (IT) increased the use of technological tools in PD. It became easier for institutions and organizations to make statements on their web pages thanks to developments in the

²² Karadağ, *Uluslararası İlişkilerde Yeni Bir Boyut Kamu Diplomasisi*, 90.

²³ Karadağ, *Uluslararası İlişkilerde Yeni Bir Boyut Kamu Diplomasisi*, 93-94.

²⁴ Karadağ, *Uluslararası İlişkilerde Yeni Bir Boyut Kamu Diplomasisi*, 96.

²⁵ Karadağ, *Uluslararası İlişkilerde Yeni Bir Boyut Kamu Diplomasisi*, 99.

internet field. Hence, the ability of these institutions to shape public opinion also became possible.²⁶

Military and religious activities are two other tools of PD. Today, military personnel exchange programs are a PD practice. Sending people to other countries within the scope of missionary activities may also be within the field of PD since those people serve the interests of their country while trying to promote their own beliefs to other people.²⁷ Finally, international organizations can contribute to the PD of the countries they host, because the activities of these organizations will be shaped in line with the goals and interests of those countries.²⁸

In a nutshell, PD aims to increase interest in a country and promote its soft power in foreign policy by broadcasting, cultural exports, and organizing exchange programs. However, if a country's culture, values, as well as, policies are not attractive, PD cannot produce soft power.²⁹

1.1 Situation of Korean public diplomacy during the post-colonial era

East Asian countries also frequently prefer PD. Numerous of them are striving to build the concept of soft power in their foreign policies via the tools mentioned above. Commonly, East Asian governments invest in PD by establishing cultural centres abroad, promoting their national values as well as goals, and expanding academic or educational exchanges. The main aim is to influence foreign people in such a way as to support their own foreign policy goals.³⁰

²⁶ Karadağ, *Uluslararası İlişkilerde Yeni Bir Boyut Kamu Diplomasisi*, 103.

²⁷ Karadağ, *Uluslararası İlişkilerde Yeni Bir Boyut Kamu Diplomasisi*, 109.

²⁸ Karadağ, *Uluslararası İlişkilerde Yeni Bir Boyut Kamu Diplomasisi*, 112.

²⁹ Nye, *Public Diplomacy and Soft Power*, 95.

³⁰ Sohn, "Regionalization, Regionalism, and Double-Edged Public Diplomacy in East Asia", 11.

South Korea (hereinafter referred to as Korea) is also an East Asian country that prefers to actively utilize PD in its foreign relations. Due to its exposure to colonialism and great powers in the past, it was able to complete economic development between the 1960s and 1970s and its democratization process during the 1980s. On the other hand, globalization and IT were advancing around the world in the 1990s. As technology progressed, the world began to get smaller. Countries and world communities began to integrate with each other. Therefore, governments began to apply PD to influence foreign societies. Thus, the 1990s were a term when PD gained worldwide popularity, and Korea also preferred PD in its foreign policy since the end of the 1990s in order to gain a place in the international order.

I mentioned above that cultural tools are the most preferred tools of PD. However, since the 1950s, all initiatives or policies associated with the culture in Korea served to rebuild the damaged national consciousness of the country during the colonial period and to strengthen the authority of the anti-communist regimes that dominated the country after the Korean War. In other words, after independence, the primary goal of Korean governments was the development of the country, but there should be national unity for this. This national consciousness could be achieved by bringing nationalism to the forefront through cultural values. An intense effort was needed to erase the traces of Japanese domination. Therefore, it was not possible for the cultural policies in Korea to serve as a foreign policy until the end of the 1980s. After Korea began to gain its economic power and solved the problem of democracy, cultural policies could become a source of soft power and a tool of PD.

Korea was exposed to cultural activities as well as policies by the Imperial Japanese administration. At that time, the Japanese often imposed their own culture on the Koreans in order to assimilate them. This was an example of the use of culture

as a tool of hard power by the Empire of Japan. To further clarify this, in the previous chapter, I underlined that hard power and soft power can be interconnected by referring to Nye's book. I also stated that countries can choose their economic power through both hard power and soft power methods. Thus, the Japanese Empire preferred to use all the cultural activities and initiatives it implemented in the Korean Peninsula as a source of hard power at that time. For this reason, Korea, as a newly independent country, would try to rebuild its national and cultural consciousness through its own cultural policies. However, also, these cultural policies implemented by the Korean governments during the post-colonial period would mostly serve as hard power until the 1990s. In particular, military governments such as Park Chung-hee and Chun Do-hwan aimed to protect Korean society against the influence of Japan and North Korea and to strengthen their own authority by igniting nationalist sentiments after independence. Therefore, cultural policies would not only create the hard power of these two leaders towards the local people, but also contribute to the rapid recovery of the country. However, the cultural policies of the South Korean governments became a new industrial area after the second half of the 1990s, and with the initiatives of the Kim Dae-jung government, they became the tools of Korea's soft power and PD.

After Japan's defeat in World War II, Korea declared its independence on August 15, 1945. However, the dominance of two different ideologies by the south and north governments on the peninsula and the involvement of powers such as America and Soviet Russia led to the Korean War between 1950-1953, so Korea was divided into two separate parts. In the post-independence period, from 1948 to 1989, authoritarian and military-based South Korean leaders held the administration of the country. The common feature of these leaders was that they adopted an anti-

communist regime and often targeted the Korean people with cultural initiatives and policies. Their aim was to rebuild the national and cultural consciousness damaged by the Japanese, and to consolidate the legitimacy of the anti-communist and authoritarian regimes that prevailed in the country. Therefore, all activities carried out in the field of culture in Korea were tightly controlled by state institutions. The main goal of these activities was to spread the government's ideology among the local population and make Koreans adapt to state policies.³¹

From the 1980s and with the collapse of the USSR in 1991, Korean cultural activities were aimed at attracting the attention of international communities, too. For example, the 1980s was the year of sports activities in Korea. During this period, the Korean government not only preferred to use sports events for the Koreans, but also used them to contribute positively to the country's image in the international arena by hosting the 1988 Olympics. Indeed, the Olympic Games contributed to the recognition of the country and Korean brands as well as establishment of international partnerships.³² After the Kim Young-sam government, Korea adopted globalization policies and endeavoured to develop its cultural activities for this purpose.

In the twenty first century, Korea made PD the basis of its foreign policy, but the factors contributing to this situation were changes in the international environment, advances in technology, the democratization of Korea, and the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. Especially when the country felt the economic crisis deeply, the Korean government of the period reformed the culture industry and its products to contribute more to the country's economy and image. Then, the government

³¹ Hong, "Nation Branding of Korea", 73.

³² Jang, and Paik, "Korean Wave as Tool for Korea's New Cultural Diplomacy", 200.

formed the basis of Korean PD by positioning this new type of industry at the centre of foreign policy.

In sum, the cultural activities implemented by the Korean governments and their aims can be divided into three different periods and expressed with three keywords: modernization (1960s – mid of 1980s), globalization/ *segyehwa*(세계화) (1990s), and developed country/ *seonjinhwa*(선진화) (after 2000s).³³

1.2 Summary of chapters

This thesis examines the development process of the culture industry, which is actively used in today's Korean PD, in the post-colonial period. However, since the cultural activities preferred by the post-independence Korean governments tried to repair the cultural and national destruction created by the Japanese Colonial Administration mentality, this research also examines the Japanese colonial understanding in the Korean peninsula and the cultural policies of the Japanese Empire. Thus, the serious dimension of the assimilation attempts towards the colonized Koreans will be more understandable. The aim of the thesis is to explain the emergence of Korean PD by focusing on the industrialization process of Korean cultural activities and cultural tools over time, which was stem from the memories of the colonial period.

Due to its thirty five year colonial past in history, Korea never had the chance to become a hegemonic power in the international arena through its military or economic hard power capacity.³⁴ Therefore, Korea, which is positioned in the middle power category today, aims to gain a place in the international arena by actively

³³John, "Globalization, National Identity and Foreign Policy: Understanding 'Global Korea'", 42.

³⁴Oh, "Hallyu (Korean Wave) as Korea's Cultural Public Diplomacy in China and Japan", 170.

using PD and its cultural tools in its foreign policy. In the past, making Korea's culture industry a purely PD tool coincided with the term of Kim Dae-jung, who served as president between 1998-2003. Kim's liberal and democratic political views formed the basis of the Korean PD. The Kim government always kept the culture industry at the forefront while creating this foundation. As a result, the thesis focuses on President Kim Dae-jung as a political figure and his period in detail, especially while investigating the emergence of the Korean PD.

In this respect, the thesis aims to answer the following main question and sub-questions:

How did Kim Dae-jung lay the foundation of Korean cultural PD?

- What was the mentality of Japanese Imperialism in the Korean Peninsula, and how did this mentality shape Korean cultural activities and policies in the post-colonial period?
- What did the cultural initiatives and policies of the Korean governments initially aim in the post-colonial era? Then, how did the goals change over time?
- How did Kim Dae-jung add a new dimension to cultural initiatives and policies?
- How did the advanced Korean cultural industry present an example as a tool of Korean PD in twenty first century Korea-Japan relations?

Accordingly, the second chapter of the thesis presents a historical background of Korea-Japan relations by sharing the Japanese Empire's invasion of the Korean peninsula. Then, I explain what kind of mentality the Japanese colonialist structure had. Afterward, I exemplify the Japanese colonial mentality by referring to the cultural policies that the Japanese Empire applied to assimilate the Koreans. The

purpose of this section is to make it understandable why Korean leaders and their policies were under Japanese influence for a long time in the post-colonial era.

The third chapter of the thesis includes the cultural activities and cultural policies of previous governments until the Kim Dae-jung period. The aim of this section is to analyze the characteristics and aims of Korean cultural policies implemented until 1998. Finally, I will talk about two important events that led to the reform of Korean cultural activities and policies. These are Korea's democratization process and the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, and I share them as a subtitle in the second part of the thesis. These two developments needed more detailed investigation, as they also explained the role of Kim Dae-jung in the emergence of the Korean PD.

In the fourth chapter, I mention the cultural industry that Kim Dae-jung further developed with new reforms. The Kim government turned to account this field after the financial crisis, as a new economic resource and a more effective foreign policy tool. In particular, unlike previous Korean governments, the Kim administration gave importance to the products of the culture industry in relations with other countries. This attitude of the government also formed the basis of Korean PD, which became the most preferred diplomatic way in Korean foreign policy for the following periods. In order to make this situation more understandable in my thesis, I examine the cultural policies of the Kim government through Korea-Japan bilateral relations at that time. The aim is to set an example for the application of soft power and PD through Korea-Japan relations and to maintain the historical bond between the two countries.

In the fifth chapter, I concluded that during the colonial period, the activities and policies implemented by Japan in the cultural sphere were Koreanized after

independence. These Koreanized cultural policies were actively used by Korean authoritarian governments to ensure national unity and solidarity. However, developments both within Korea and around the world changed the content and methods of cultural activities in Korea. Thus, firstly, the field of culture was industrialized, and then, thanks to the export of the culture industry, Korean PD emerged. On the other hand, during my research process, I realized that the memories of the Japanese imperial period always kept the concept of culture in Korea at the center during the post-colonial period. Thus, I expressed the PD as “Korean Cultural Public Diplomacy” in my thesis. In short, my aim was to convey to the reader the development process of PD in Korea, which is an important concept in international relations. While carrying out my research, I took care of the history of Korea's cultural policies. Therefore, I hope my research will be useful to young researchers and scholars who want to learn more about the past and future of Korea's cultural public diplomacy.

In my thesis, I used the Diplomatic White Paper published annually by the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kim Dae-jung's autobiography, and Kim's own books. In addition, as a primary source, my thesis includes an interview with President Kim which was done by a television channel in 2007. As a secondary source, I used books and articles prepared by expert researchers. If I were to mention a few of the prominent ones; The book *Japanese Assimilation Policies in Colonial Korea (1910-1945)* by Prof. Mark E. Caprio, the book *Public Diplomacy and Soft Power in East Asia* edited by Dr. Lee Sook Jong and Prof. Jan Melissen, the book *Soft Power* written by Joseph S. Nye Jr., Assist. Prof. Haluk Karadağ's book *A New Dimension in International Relations, Public Diplomacy*, Jeon Sang-sook's article titled as *The Characteristics of Japanese Colonial Rule in Japan*, Prof. Park Sang-

Mi's article *The Paradox of Postcolonial Korean Nationalism: State-Sponsored Cultural Policy in South Korea, 1965-Present*, or *The cultural industry policies of the Korean government and the Korean Wave* written by Kwon Seung-ho and Joseph Kim, Park Mi-sook's article *South Korea Cultural History Between the 1960s and 2012*, and finally the article *Korean Television Dramas in Japan : Imagining 'East Asianness' and Consuming 'Nostalgia'* written by Prof. Lee Soo-bum and Assoc. Prof. Ju Hye-jung. To make more attractive my thesis for readers, I also shared photos from the past, which I found on Korean government websites and other history books.

CHAPTER 2
INVASION OF KOREA AND JAPANESE COLONIAL
ADMINISTRATION

This chapter explains the bilateral relations between South Korea and Japan through the historical past, and it involves anecdotes from the autobiography of South Korean former president Kim Dae-Jung to set examples for the relations. Kim Dae-jung was the president of the period (1998-2003) that I focus on the emergence of Korean PD in this research paper.

Japan designated its relations with the Korean peninsula on the basis of colonialism. Specifically, while Japan met with the Western imperial powers at the beginning of the nineteenth century, it aimed to be a colonialist regional power due to its experiences with Western countries. To further clarify this, in the First Opium War (1839-1842), which took place between China and the United Kingdom, Japan observed how China was completely defeated by the Western powers. During this time, Japan also had the opportunity to observe the combat capabilities of European/American ships and their superiority in naval power.³⁵ Last but not least, as a result of the commercial agreements (unequal treaties) that Japan signed with the Western powers, Japan decided to transform itself into an industrialized power during the Meiji period. The Meiji era emerges as a period when Japan was both Westernized and modernized, and it also laid the foundations of being a colonial power. Hence, the Meiji Restoration was a process that witnessed the transformation of Japan from a feudal, isolationist state to an industrialized power. As a result, Japan displayed an "expansionist" policy towards neighbouring countries by seeking

³⁵ Holcombe, *A History of East Asia from the Origins of Civilization to the Twenty-First Century*, 243.


new markets and cheap labour for its industrializing and developing economy. It intensified its interest in the Korean peninsula from the second half of the 1800s in order to obtain the competitive power and market it needed.

With the arrival of the American ship under the control of Admiral Perry in Tokyo Bay of Japan in 1853 and the signing of the “Kanagawa Treaty” convention between the two countries about a year later, Japan’s almost two hundred years of seclusion policies came to an end. Afterwards, Japan signed “unequal agreements” with Western colonialist powers over time and opened its ports to foreign countries for commercial relations against it. These negative developments dragged the Tokugawa Shogunate into a political stalemate and prepared the process for the Meiji Restoration. In the Meiji period, Japan started its modernization movements by gaining the opportunity to closely observe and examine the Western powers. Then, it sought new markets and cheap labour for its industrializing and developing economy. Thus, for Japan, which became even stronger and modernized during the Meiji era, the Korean peninsula became more important to be able to have a strategic superiority against the Western powers.

Even though the Kanghwa Treaty of 1875 (강화도조약/日朝修好条規) and the military conflict between Japan and Joseon dynasty were Japan’s first attempts to have a right in the Korean peninsula, Japan’s defeat of China and Russia in 1895 and 1905, respectively, were two main events that prepared the annexation of Korea. The Japanese victory in the Sino-Japanese war on October 31, 1895, caused Japanese hegemony on the Korean peninsula. After China and Japan signed the Treaty of Shimonoseki on April 17, 1895, China recognized the independence of Korea and withdrew its troops from the peninsula. Afterwards, Japan began to build railroads to consolidate its position on the peninsula. In addition, Kabo reforms (갑오), between

1894-1896, were implemented to eliminate Chinese influence on the peninsula. To illustrate, the Chinese calendar and the Confucian civil service examination system were abolished.³⁶

However, King Gojong and his wife, Queen Min were aware of this rising of Japan, and they tried to suppress the Japanese influence in the peninsula with the help of the Russians. At that time, Russia was also the other country that coveted the land of Korea. The reason was Russia's desire to find new ways to extend its trade and railroads, since the Russian port Vladivostok was blocked with ice during the winter. Thus, Queen Min supported a pro-Russia policy against Japan's influence on Korea.³⁷



The desire of Russia for a Port in the Corea open at all seasons of the year, is unquestionably the result of the necessity felt for a convenient outlet for its Siberian and Manchurian trade, and although it may be made to cloak political designs, it is so obviously founded on necessity that, it becomes a question of expediency whether it is not wiser to grant the outlet now and confine it to a single Port, which by arrangement should be a free Port and not a fortification, than wait until the desire shall extend, on the opportunity arising, to the absorption of the whole peninsula of the Corea -

Figure 3. In a letter that was written for earls of Rosebery and Kimberley explains foreign powers' position towards China

Source: Gale Primary Sources, Imperial China and the West part II, 1865–1905, <https://go.gale.com/ps/i.do?p=CFER&u=asiademo&id=GALE|HOHQCH607044715&v=2.1&it=r&sid=bookmark-CFER&sPage=89&asid=725c9473>

Being aware of all these events, the Japanese ambassador Miura Goro planned an assassination against Queen Min (을미사변), so the Japanese thugs killed the queen on the night of October 8, 1895.³⁸ After this event, in February 1896, King Gojong

³⁶ Holcombe, *A History of East Asia from the Origins of Civilization to the Twenty-First Century*, 462.

³⁷ Gale, "The Murder of Empress Myeongseong of Korea."

³⁸ Jeong, *Kore Milliyetçiliği Kore'de ve Türkiye'de Milliyetçilik Anlayışlarının Gelişme Süreçleri* (1910-1945), 69.

took refuge in the Russian Legation (*아관파천*) by allowing Russian marines to smuggle him out. Then, he tried to protect his country from Japanese influence throughout 1896. A year later, the Joseon King returned to the court in 1897 and formally assumed the title of "Highest Emperor of East Asia" (*황제* in Korean). This term means "equality" with the rulers of the Great Han Empire and Japan. In the next period, he took initiatives to modernize the country. For instance, he introduced streetcars and electric lights into the capital, and he also organized modern army units.³⁹ However, this situation continued until the Russo-Japanese War of 1905. With Japan's victory in the war, King Gojong's influences in Korea and in the international area began to wane. In 1905, the Portsmouth Treaty was signed between Russia and Japan, it means that Japan gained superiority in the Korean Peninsula against Russia.⁴⁰ The next step was to make a treaty with the Koreans. Although the Koreans preferred to remain neutral at the beginning of the Russo-Japanese war, after the Japanese troops occupied Seoul, the Koreans had to make a treaty with the Japanese. The Japan-Korea Treaty (*을사조약*) in November 1905 strengthened Japan's rule on the peninsula. The General Administration Office was established, and Meiji oligarch Ito Hirobumi was appointed as head of the Japanese Imperial Administration in Korea.⁴¹ This was an indication that Korea was under the protection of Japan. Although King Gojong tried to announce the invalidity of the treaty to the rest of the world by secretly sending his envoys to the "World Peace Conference" held in The Hague, Netherlands in 1907, the delegation was not

³⁹ Holcombe, *A History of East Asia from the Origins of Civilization to the Twenty-First Century*, 240.

⁴⁰ Holcombe, *Doğu Asya Tarihi: Çin Japonya Kore Medeniyetin Köklerinden 21. Yüzyıla Kadar*, 274.

⁴¹ Jeong, *Kore milliyetçiliği: Kore'de ve Türkiye'de milliyetçilik anlayışlarının gelişme süreçleri (1910-1945)*, 76.

accepted officially by the world since Japan had the authority to establish and manage diplomatic relations in Korea.⁴² After Japan realized this attempt, it forced King Gojong to resign. Hence, the Korean king announced his abdication in 1907, and left the throne to his son Sunjong.⁴³ However, the authority to rule Korea was transferred to the Japanese. The abdication of the king and the increasing Japanese pressure also triggered nationalist feelings in the country, so guerrilla movements against the Japanese began to rise in the peninsula until the official annexation in 1910. In fact, this situation resulted in the assassination of General Administration President Ito Hirobumi by Korean nationalist Chung Gun-An on October 2, 1909.⁴⁴ Nonetheless, this assassination resulted in the complete annexation of Korea as an official colony of the Empire of Japan.

Between 1871 and 1873, Japan gathered 107 people, including statesmen and scholars, to create a delegation. The tasks of the delegation were observing the West, collecting information about developments and innovations from other parts of the world, and renewing the “unequal treaties” signed between Japan and Western colonialist powers. This delegation, assigned to the “Iwakura Mission”, had the opportunity to closely observe the colonial developments in the West. To further clarify this, it can be said that, while the delegation crossed the Pacific, they saw Native Americans assimilated by mainstream American society after the Civil War in the US. The other thing is that the delegation witnessed the French government’s intense campaign to integrate the southern provinces of France. Moreover, instead of military control in Algeria, France revised its Algerian administrative policies to

⁴² Jeong, *Kore milliyetçiliği: Kore’de ve Türkiye’de milliyetçilik anlayışlarının gelişme süreçleri* (1910-1945), 77.

⁴³ Jeong, *Kore milliyetçiliği: Kore’de ve Türkiye’de milliyetçilik anlayışlarının gelişme süreçleri* (1910-1945), 78.

⁴⁴ Jeong, *Kore milliyetçiliği: Kore’de ve Türkiye’de milliyetçilik anlayışlarının gelişme süreçleri* (1910-1945), 79.

ensure direct bureaucratic control.⁴⁵ As mentioned above, the Japanese Empire, which became stronger and more developed, preferred to expand towards the surrounding regions as part of its foreign policy. However, Japan associated the policies it would implement for the conquered regions with the French “Direct Rule Rhetoric”. In the seventeenth century, the colonial policies of France aimed to assimilate the indigenous people into French religion and culture. The first minister of the French state, Jean Baptiste Colbert, encouraged the French people and natives with the slogan “constitute one people and one blood.”⁴⁶ Firstly, the French authorities organized the migration of French people to the St. Lawrence Valley. The aim was that natives could observe the real French people’s lifestyle and imitate them.⁴⁷ Secondly, French authorities used education as another policy tool. They educated the children of the local people in religious schools through the goals of the empire and increased the number of schools. In fact, it was aimed at giving Christian education to girls. Later, these girls would return to their villages and marry infidel men, so Catholic families would emerge.⁴⁸ As a result, just as France imposed its own religion, and culture on the colonial regions and assimilated the local people, Japan would apply similar policies to the Korean people under its protection.

According to Mark E. Caprio, there were two reasons why Japan preferred this colonial policy. As the colonialist powers wished that colonial regions should be close to them in terms of their geographical and ethnic interests and under their control, their interventions towards these regions would be greater. The second

⁴⁵ Caprio, *Japanese Assimilation Policies in Colonial Korea 1910-1945*, 21.

⁴⁶ Belmessous, “Assimilation and Racialism in Seventeenth and Eighteenth-Century French Colonial Policy”, 329.

⁴⁷ Belmessous, “Assimilation and Racialism in Seventeenth and Eighteenth-Century French Colonial Policy”, 331.

⁴⁸ Belmessous, “Assimilation and Racialism in Seventeenth and Eighteenth-Century French Colonial Policy”, 332.

reason was the security concerns of the colonialist powers, for instance, Japan was particularly concerned about a possible Russian intervention in the Korean Peninsula, after cleaned Chinese influence.⁴⁹ Therefore, for the next period, the Japanese began to implement their policies on the peninsula without much consideration of whether the Koreans could be assimilated or not.

Education and media emerged as the two main tools in Japan's efforts to assimilate the Koreans. Even before the complete annexation of Korea, Japan thought that education could increase its influence over Koreans and Korean lands. Thus, the Japanese empire reorganized the education system through edicts and gained control over Joseon education. In 1908, by a decree, Japan increased the control of private schools in Korea and even reduced their numbers. With the revised Joseon Education Law, it was aimed to create the necessary conditions for the unification of Japan and Korea. To suppress Korean national consciousness, in 1910, the Japanese appropriated and burned pieces related to Korean history, geography, and biographies of Korean national heroes. They also destroyed Korean translated books about independence, national birth, and revolution, and anti-Japanese works.⁵⁰

The revision of the Joseon Education Act of 1911 (*Chosunkyoyukryong*) aimed to create a loyal Korean vassal to the Japanese Emperor. Therefore, Koreans were first exposed to an intense Japanese education and culture. If the national language of Joseon was Japanese, the Koreans would be able to obey the emperor's orders and demands more easily.⁵¹ In 1915, it was made compulsory for all school staff to learn Japanese.⁵² During the colonial period, the media also provided support

⁴⁹ Caprio, *Japanese Assimilation Policies in Colonial Korea 1910-1945*, 31.

⁵⁰ Kim, *A History of Korea*, 328.

⁵¹ Song, "The Japanese Imperial Mentality: Cultural Imperialism as Colonial Control – Chosun as Exemplar", 314.

⁵² Song, "The Japanese Imperial Mentality: Cultural Imperialism as Colonial Control – Chosun as Exemplar", 317.

for the education of Koreans. The print media, for example, had a mission to provide an educational environment for Koreans who were unable to attend formal education. It published articles that repeated the information presented in the lectures. Thus, the messages of the Japanese administration were conveyed to the Korean people through the media.

Maeil sinbo which was published firstly in July 1904, was merged with other government media outlets on the peninsula, Keijō nippō and Seoul Press. In the first issue, the translated Korean annexation agreement, the Japanese Imperial Decree, and the Korean administrative law were shared. The newspaper also aimed to reach more readers by publishing articles in the Korean alphabet starting in March 1912. The newspaper claimed that if the Koreans learned Japanese, the two peoples could unionize together. The media also acted as an intermediary to promote Korean participation in events held by the Japanese emperor. For example, it issued instructions on how Koreans should dress and act for imperial birthdays and coronations. Once again, the emperor conveyed his message to the Koreans through the media.⁵³

Apart from education and media, the other area of the Japanese administration's assimilation policies toward Koreans was sports. However, although the Japanese government tried to abolish Joseon's traditional sports activities under the pretext of modernizing and bringing a more controlling system, sports separated from education and media as an area that allowed the conflict between the empire and the colony to emerge. Various sporting events, specifically between Imperial Japan and Joseon, provided the colonists with an opportunity to triumph over the colonial ruler. Thus, sports activities became an area that provided an opportunity for

⁵³ Caprio, *Japanese Assimilation Policies in Colonial Korea 1910-1945*, 101.

the emergence of Korean nationalism and national consciousness. To exemplify, the victory of Joseon teams at a sporting event held in Japan had the potential to stir up a national spirit of resistance to Imperial Japan among Koreans.⁵⁴

In fact, even before the annexation, Koreans were exhibiting nationalist movements to oppose Japanese control of the Korean Peninsula. However, even though the nationalist feelings of the Koreans were triggered more under Japanese rule, the Korean people could not react in their own land due to the oppressive and controlling Japanese policies. Even some of the information I shared above was an indication that the Japanese treated the Koreans as inferior and conquered people. The General Government was passing laws that legalized racial discrimination against Koreans and made them second-class citizens.⁵⁵ Thus, most of the nationalist Koreans preferred to go overseas to look for safe areas, and they decided to be organized there because of this direct rule mentality of the Japanese Imperial. The most influential and largest independence movement under Japanese rule took place on March 1, 1919.⁵⁶ As Korean students studying abroad had a freer political environment, they issued an independent Korea proclamation in February 1919. Later, on March 1, 33 people who signed the declaration gathered in a park in Seoul and mobilized the public. Korean streets were full of people who shouted, “Long live independent Korea!” The unifying force of anti-Japanese sentiment was strong enough to create an anti-colonial coalition, but the Japanese colonial government’s reaction was fierce. Even the colonial government states in its records that many

⁵⁴ Song, “The Japanese Imperial Mentality: Cultural Imperialism as Colonial Control – Chosun as Exemplar”, 313.

⁵⁵ Kim, *A History of Korea*, 323.

⁵⁶ Kim, *A History of Korea*, 329.

people were killed or injured at that time. There was a compromise during the summer months, but Korea's colonial status remained.⁵⁷

The Japanese administration, which suppressed the March 1 nationalist movement in the Korean peninsula, decided to re-examine their policies towards the Koreans in detail. The new regulated system would be shaped according to internal developments in Japan. The Japanese Prime Minister, Hara Takashi, stated that he did not prefer the military-dominated colonial mentality in Korea and announced that he would reshape the Japanese administration in Korea in August 1919. Hence, "Cultural Policy (*Bunka Seiji*)" was declared. On the other hand, Kim Dae-jung wrote about these events and subsequent developments, in his autobiography titled *Conscience in Action, The Autobiography of Kim Dae-Jung*:

Previously, during the emperor Taisho period (1912–1926), Japan actively experimented with a party-based political system called the Taisho Democracy. The first party-based cabinet was launched in 1918. Japan introduced the Cultural Rule policy in Korea after the 1919 Independence Movement. During the ensuing Emperor Showa era (1926–1989), however, this atmosphere changed radically. Although apparently still grounded on party-based governance, the military took power by force and carried out a bloody coup. After that, the military turned its ambitions toward the rest of Asia. (p.4)

According to the new policy, the gendarmerie police system would be mitigated, and ordinary police officers would be active. Reform programs would be launched to allow Koreans to participate more freely in cultural activities and to liberalize press control. The requirement for teachers and government officials to wear uniforms and carry swords would be removed. In education, the Koreans would be provided with equal opportunities as the Japanese, and wider educational opportunities would be created.⁵⁸

⁵⁷ Hwang, *Kore Tarihi*, 131-132.

⁵⁸ Kim, *A History of Korea*, 335.

However, Japan's aim was to increase its control over the Korean Peninsula by displaying a moderate appearance. The Japanese military police in the existing gendarmerie police system were integrated into the new police force, and the system was further strengthened. In addition, police forces were deployed in all local areas in Korea.⁵⁹ Even minor pro-independence activities in Korea were suppressed immediately. In the field of education, a regulation enacted in 1922 ensured that schools did not discriminate against Koreans. However, Keijō Imperial University (today's Seoul National University), which was established by the Japanese in 1924, allocated about one-third of the number of students to Koreans. Moreover, although primary and industrial education were also expanded, only 18% of school-aged Korean children were able to participate.⁶⁰ Moreover, Korean lessons were abolished in schools, and Korean students were only allowed to speak Japanese.⁶¹



Figure 4. Korean children learning how to read in school, 1946, a year after liberation from the Japanese occupation

Source: E-museum, National Hangeul Museum,
<https://emuseum.go.kr/m/detail?relicId=PS0100203400601361300000>

⁵⁹ Kim, *A History of Korea*, 335.

⁶⁰ Kim, *A History of Korea*, 336.

⁶¹ Kim, *Conscience in Action – The Autobiography of Kim Dae-jung*, 12.



Figure 5. "Teacher! Please come back. We know how to read Japanese but not Korean writing."

"Teachers, go back to your school." (Bottom left)

This poster from South Korea in the 1950s is ordering teachers to come back and teach kids who are illiterate in Hangeul (Korean alphabet)

Source: National Museum of Korea, Hangeul Poster, <https://www.museum.go.kr/site/main/relic/search/view?relicId=135949>

In the media area, Japan decided to slacken its broadcasting legislation, thus a space for Koreans will be created to express their views on Japanese administrative practices. Tong'a Ilbo was one of the newspapers which had publication rights within the scope of the reforms brought by cultural policies. It sold more than other Korean newspapers as it criticized the Japanese administration from various perspectives when the cultural nationalist movements were still fresh in the early 1920s. For instance, in April 1924, the newspaper criticized cultural policies as "policies of violence (*mokhaeng chongch'aek*)" applied to Koreans and stated that they were unacceptable. It examined why Koreans would want to be Japanese and stated that wearing Japanese traditional clothes was difficult and uninteresting for Koreans.⁶²

⁶² Caprio, *Japanese Assimilation Policies in Colonial Korea 1910-1945*, 175.

In the 1930s, the Japanese Empire further strengthened its goal to become a regional power and created the “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Area” project. Its aim was to challenge the West, which had begun industrialization earlier.⁶³ In this respect, Japan put into practice its policy called “*Naeseon Ilche*” in Korean and “*Naisen Ittai*” in Japanese on the Korean peninsula. The name of the policy can be translated as “making Japan and Korea into one body.” According to this policy, Japan especially transitioned to a wartime mobilization mentality.⁶⁴ Japan aimed to use Korea as a military base against Manchuria and the rest of China.⁶⁵ Thus, Japan would procure human and material resources from Korea during wartime via the *Naeseon Ilche* policy.



Figure 6. A meeting at which Koreans and Japanese discussed ways to strengthen *Naisen Ittai*

Source: Japanese Assimilation Policies in Colonial Korea 1910-1945, 2009.

⁶³ Jeon, “The Characteristics of Japanese Colonial Rule in Korea”, 52.

⁶⁴ Jeon, “The Characteristics of Japanese Colonial Rule in Korea”, 49.

⁶⁵ Kim, *A History of Korea*, 348.

In the late 1930s, Japan began to orient the Koreans' lifestyle to meet their wartime needs. With the appointment of Imperial Japanese Land Forces General Jirō Minami as governor-general of Joseon in August 1936, assimilation policies began to intensify in line with the plans of the Empire of Japan. For instance, during the imperial palace salutation ceremony in Tokyo, Minami ordered Koreans to pledge their loyalty to the Japanese emperor and to read the "Oath of Imperial Subjects."⁶⁶ Minami also closed schools and newspapers that disobeyed the orders. He banned Korean culture and the Korean language in schools, offices, and workplaces. All government departments and commercial companies should use Japanese when preparing their documents. Teaching materials written in Korean were destroyed, and the Korean History Compilation Committee, established by the Japanese in 1922, published a 35-volume book in 1937 that distorted Korean history.⁶⁷ In the same year, the duration of Japanese broadcasts in the field of radio broadcasting was increased, and broadcast programs promoting Korean culture were abolished. Until 1940, Japan stopped the publication of other newspapers except for the newspaper *Maeil Sinbo*.⁶⁸ On the other hand, Kim Dae-jung wrote about these restrictions on Korean history, culture, and language while telling his childhood:

...Father also occasionally took out his Joseon dynasty chart, which was considered a seditious document, from its secret hiding place and taught his children about it. We learned all about the different kings and the events that occurred during their reign. Father wanted us to know that Korea had its own independent history and kings. (Kim, 2019, pp. 6-7)

As the days passed, the militaristic ambitions of the Japanese government towards the Asian region became clarified. The Japanese administration continued to transform into a thoroughly fascist regime due to the war. Thus, the other most

⁶⁶ Kim, *A History of Korea*, 350-351.

⁶⁷ Kim, *A History of Korea*, 336.

⁶⁸ Caprio, *Japanese Assimilation Policies in Colonial Korea 1910-1945*, 157.

important Japanese national policy was in the field of sports, as Japan would like to secure the human resources it would need during the war. In 1938, the Sports Bureau was established under the Ministry of Health and Welfare in Japan. After about a year of work, the “National Gymnastics Program for Japan” was implemented, and this program was transferred to the Korean peninsula. Japan's aim was to establish contact with the people in all aspects of daily life during the war period.⁶⁹ In Korea, the imperial government strengthened military power by building Japanese-style sports. For example, Koreans were taught to use the wooden sword through sports such as Kendo (剣道). Japan believed that Japanese nationalism would be supplied as people got up at a certain time in the morning and did national gymnastics. Thus, the national identity targeted by the administration would also emerge, and the Korean people would become loyal subjects of the empire.⁷⁰



Figure 7. Group gymnastics in 1941

Source: A study on Activities and the Prevalence of Tainihonkokumintaiso During Japanese Occupation, 2016.

⁶⁹ Hwang, “A study on Activities and the Prevalence of Tainihonkokumintaiso During Japanese Occupation”, 2.

⁷⁰ Hwang, “A study on Activities and the Prevalence of Tainihonkokumintaiso During Japanese Occupation”, 2.

Perhaps the most compelling event for Koreans at that time was the ban on the use of Korean names. It was stated that there were too many people with surnames Kim and Yi throughout the country. In addition, the differences in Korean and Japanese names caused problems in the family registration system. Thus, the Japanese surname system was introduced in 1939, and Koreans acquired Japanese names as a mandatory requirement.⁷¹ While Kim Dae-jung was describing his life, he mentioned again the harsh impact of this decision on himself and Koreans:

One of the most pivotal experiences of my high school years occurred during my second year, when Koreans were forced to adopt Japanese names. Koreans believe our last names originate in Heaven and are passed down from there through our ancestors; with this in mind, we consider them as precious as our lives. In the Confucian tradition, changing one's last name is considered the greatest betrayal one can commit against his or her ancestors. To express one's dedication to something, a Japanese individual will say he would "sacrifice his life" for it; however, a Korean will say he would 'change his last name.' Therefore, the edict requiring Koreans to adopt Japanese names was truly an act of brutal violence. This order was related to the Japanese Imperialization Policy, under which they also introduced their conscription system. Previously, this system had been compulsory only for Japanese men, but it now included Korean men as well. Throughout the entire country, Koreans lamented the loss of their names. It is very difficult for me to even remember my adopted Japanese name. Occasionally, the Japanese ask me what my Japanese name was out of pure curiosity, but I can never answer that question. (Kim, 2019, p. 14)

The Japanese Imperialization Policies mentioned by Kim Dae-jung were based on the Total National Spirit Movement and included all national movements, including rural development movements. As a result, the Joseon Coalition for Total National Mobilization was formed on July 7, 1938,⁷² and "Patriotic Units" were established as small coalitions to bring small places like villages under a central organization.⁷³ These attempts by the Imperial Japanese government were to make all

⁷¹ Caprio, *Japanese Assimilation Policies in Colonial Korea 1910-1945*, 161.

⁷² Jeon, "The Characteristics of Japanese Colonial Rule in Korea", 59.

⁷³ Jeon, "The Characteristics of Japanese Colonial Rule in Korea", 61.

the resources of the Korean Peninsula available during the Pacific War.⁷⁴ As Korea continued to become an important base for Japan in the Pacific War, Koreans were recruited into the Japanese army by March 1943. Furthermore, due to the “Student Volunteer Ordinance of January 1944,” Japan also included university students in the army. Besides, as a part of the “Comfort Women” practice, which is still a serious issue of tension between Japan and South Korea, Japanese police and local government officials included Korean women in the army. These women were used as sex slaves to raise the morale of the Japanese soldiers.⁷⁵



Figure 8. Korean students had to pay respect to the imperial Japanese flag (Mokdo elementary school in Gyoisan, Chungbuk in 1943)
Source: Institute of Ethnic Studies, Is grenade throwing training at school really?, 2012, <https://www.minjok.or.kr/archives/75121>

If I summarize the relationship between the two countries after sharing it with a historical context, Japan’s meeting with the Western powers made it the most powerful actor in the region until the Second World War. While Japan was trying to

⁷⁴ Jeon, “The Characteristics of Japanese Colonial Rule in Korea”, 65.

⁷⁵ Kim, *A History of Korea*, 349.

defend itself against the Western colonial powers, the Meiji Restoration was realized, and it became a colonial power, especially by adopting a French style of imperialism. It aimed to directly govern the territories it annexed and to create a colonial society integrated into Japanese society. Therefore, Japan's attitude towards the Korean Peninsula was not temporary, but more permanent and long-term. It carried out radical reforms aimed at completely changing Korean society and the country's system.

Understanding the colonial mentality of Japan in the Korean peninsula and the historical past between the two states is significant in making sense of the developments in the peninsula after 1945. The destruction caused by the Japanese due to the radical changes and assimilation policies implemented by Japan on the peninsula penetrated deeply into Korea. Hence, this situation became an important factor in the development process of the South Korean state, especially after the Korean War between 1950-53. When Park Chung-hee took power by military coup, one of his first goals was to re-strengthen and stabilize Korea against communist North Korea. Thus, after the normalization of diplomatic relations with Japan in 1965, Park began to adapt Japanese cultural projects to Korea in order to preserve the legitimacy of his regime. However, the Park regime did not neglect to remember the bitter experiences of the colonial period in its cultural policies. In this regard, he would often try to mobilize nationalist feelings. For example, he would make historical characters like Yi Sun-sin, who steadfastly defended the Korean coast against a far superior Japanese navy during the "Imjin War (임진왜란)", a part of his cultural policy.⁷⁶

⁷⁶ Santos, "South Korean Nationalism and the Legacy of Park Chung Hee: How Nationalism Shaped Park's Agendas and the Future Korean Sociopolitical Landscape", 26.

All kinds of memories from the colonial period were a significant factor in determining Korean policies. Especially, until the 1990s, cultural policies that Korean governments implemented aimed to raise awareness of national unity and solidarity among the local people, so the Koreans would also be protected from the influence of foreign states. However, in the twenty first century, there were changes in the purpose and implementation methods of Korean cultural policy.

CHAPTER 3
CULTURAL POLICIES OF KOREAN GOVERNMENTS IN THE POST-
COLONIAL ERA

3.1 Emergence of Korean cultural policies

In this section, starting from the period of the 1st Republic of Korea, I will examine in detail how the cultural policies and activities of the governments were formed in the post-colonial environment and for what purpose they were used until Kim Dae-jung term. In this part of my thesis, I will reveal how the concept of culture, which is the most crucial tool of PD in Korea, was shaped by the Korean leaders, even political turmoil and economic difficulties. Thus, I will explain how the Kim Dae-jung administration created the culture-based Korean PD as a result of the post-colonial environment.

Mi Sook Park divided cultural politics into three periods in her article titled *South Korea Cultural History Between 1960s and 2012*. Accordingly, the years 1948-1960, namely the First Republic period, was a period when the Syngman Rhee government aimed to reconstruct the Korean national and cultural identity damaged during the Japanese occupation.⁷⁷ Despite not having sufficient financial resources after a long war period, the administration believed that the worn-out national identity and culture needed to be restored for state development. In addition, the Rhee government established the Ministry of Foreign Affairs after a law was enacted on July 17, 1948. The ministry would assume relations with the citizens of other countries and follow international relations and diplomacy in general.⁷⁸ In the same

⁷⁷ Park, "South Korea Cultural History Between 1960s and 2012", 73.

⁷⁸Choi, *The Republic of Korea's Public Diplomacy Strategy: History and Current Status*, 7.

year, he established the “Office of Public Information” and “National Film Production Center” in line with the public and cultural policies of the government.⁷⁹

However, the ideological separation prevailing in the Korean peninsula during the Syngman Rhee period prevented the government from fully focusing on this area. Since the priority of the Rhee administration was to ensure the legitimacy of the Republic of Korea around the world, the duties of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were primarily to establish a foreign policy and increase international economic cooperation and agreements. As the number of countries that have official relations with Korea was limited until the 1960s, the application areas of cultural policies remained limited. By the end of 1959, the Korean government had only nine embassies and eight consulates.⁸⁰ Therefore, in the 1960s, the government determined more robust policies and institutions for the reconstruction of national identity and culture.

The period from Park Chung-hee to Roh Tae-woo is indicated as the second period for Korean cultural policies and activities, and during this period, cultural policies served as regimes to strengthen their authority.⁸¹ Furthermore, the 1960s were the time of Korea's resurgence. In this period, the Park government considered cultural policies as a way to control society and protect the country from foreign influences. In this direction, Park tried to engrain loyalty, patriotism, and nationalism in the people and encourage cooperation via cultural policies.⁸²

First, many academicians and researchers working in the field of Korea have the same opinion that Park Chung-hee aims to strengthen his authority with the

⁷⁹Abduazimov, “Public Diplomacy: Reappraising the South Korean Case through an Evolutionary Approach”, 88.

⁸⁰Choi, *The Republic of Korea's Public Diplomacy Strategy: History and Current Status*, 9.

⁸¹Park, “South Korea Cultural History Between 1960s and 2012”, 74.

⁸²Yim, “Cultural Identity and Cultural Policy in South Korea”, 44.

policies he created during his administration. However, Sang Mi Park, in her article titled *The Paradox of Postcolonial Korean Nationalism: State Sponsored Cultural Policy in South Korea, 1965-Present*, examined Park's policies designed to create a national culture and consciousness from a different perspective. The article highlighted that Park Chung-hee was inspired by cultural initiatives in Japan. As the Korean president had an officer background in the Japanese army during the Second World War, according to the author, Park actively adopted the cultural policies, ideals, and institutions of Japan.⁸³ To illustrate, the Park administration introduced the slogan "Cultural Korea (문화 한국)" in 1971, which was borrowed from the slogan "Cultural Japan (文化 日本)" created by the wartime Japanese state.⁸⁴

Additionally, Park declared October 1972 as "Culture Month" and determined October 20, 1973 as "Culture Day" a year later. In addition, President Park tried to provide feelings of patriotism and nationalism among the people through art and entertainment. His aim was the creation of spiritual mobilization.⁸⁵ As a result, he founded the "Korean Culture and Art Foundation (KCAF)". This institution would convey state propaganda to the public by organizing cultural events in areas such as dance, music, theater, and film. Under the leadership of KCAF, the "New Village Theater Movement (새마을 연극 운동)" was launched to create a spirit of mass

⁸³ Park, "The Paradox of Postcolonial Korean Nationalism: State-Sponsored Cultural Policy in South Korea, 1965-Present", 67.

⁸⁴ Park, "The Paradox of Postcolonial Korean Nationalism: State-Sponsored Cultural Policy in South Korea, 1965-Present", 74.

⁸⁵ Park, "The Paradox of Postcolonial Korean Nationalism: State-Sponsored Cultural Policy in South Korea, 1965-Present", 76.

patriotism in the country. The aim was to enable the people to participate in production movements that would develop the country through entertainment.⁸⁶



Figure 9. Newspaper article on the opening of the Korea Culture and Arts Foundation (Kyunghyang Shinmun, October 11, 1973)
 Source: Mediaus, The unconscious and transformation of the "arts support system" created by the Yushin regime, 2015,
<http://www.mediaus.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=47528>

The "Cultural Properties Protection Law (CPPL)" created by Park's administration in January 1962 was another mark of the Japanese influence on Korean state policies since a law of the same name (文化財保護法, *Bunkazai Hogohō*) was enacted by the Japanese government for the protection of cultural assets on August 29, 1950.⁸⁷ Roald Maliangkay also examined this issue in his article *Colonial Foundations of Korean Cultural Policy* written for the book *Broken Voices: Postcolonial Entanglements and the Preservation of Korea's Central Folksong Traditions*. The

⁸⁶ Park, "The Paradox of Postcolonial Korean Nationalism: State-Sponsored Cultural Policy in South Korea, 1965-Present", 81.

⁸⁷ Maliangkay, "Colonial Foundations of Korean Cultural Policy", 35.

purpose of the Japanese government in creating the law was to protect artistic or historical values that face the risk of being lost, as well as crucial for the public. However, Maliangkay mentioned that Park's goal in creating such a law just 6 months after the military coup could be to gain the support of nationalist Koreans by protecting Korean culture and tradition. In addition, Besides, Korean law carried greater ambitions, emphasizing the importance of cultural heritage not only for the identity of the Korean people but for the whole world.⁸⁸

On the other hand, if we go back to Park's article, she did not neglect to mention the threats Park Chung-hee faces, in that term. These were the communist wind from North Korea and the economic difficulties of the period. Thus, Park also mentioned that Park Chung-hee aimed to create a national consciousness with a sense of nationalism. It means that South Korean leaders perceived the need to invest heavily in cultural projects to strengthen their authority. They believed that creating a strong sense of common identity and culture among the Korean people would unite the nation.⁸⁹

Thus, the Park government aimed to use these cultural policies to protect Korean society from Japanese influence and the communist wind in North Korea. In addition, Park was aware that he needed economic power to bring his country from the "underdeveloped country (후진국)" status to the "developed country (선진국)" status. Thus, in order to gain the support of the people and mobilize them in this regard, the feelings of "patriotism" and "nationalism" should spread among Koreans. Consequently, Park believed that the rebuilding of Korean national and cultural

⁸⁸ Maliangkay, "Colonial Foundations of Korean Cultural Policy", 37.

⁸⁹ Park, "The Paradox of Postcolonial Korean Nationalism: State-Sponsored Cultural Policy in South Korea, 1965-Present", 71.

values that had been worn, suppressed, and blocked by the Japanese administration for 35 years would mobilize these feelings.

With this regard, the other initiative of the Park government, which activated the CPPL, was to highlight national historical places and figures. For example, the government preferred to use the name of King Sejong, the creator of the Korean alphabet, on government projects or institutions. Park also tried to strengthen the sense of patriotism among the people by highlighting military leaders like Yi Sun-sin who had fought against Japan and gained victory.⁹⁰ In addition, television series in the 1960s were often about the Korean War and anti-communism. There was serious state control in the broadcasting field, so intrigue-type serials that would cause moral erosion were not allowed to be broadcast. As of 1973, there were more than 600 programs promoting the Park government.⁹¹ In brief, through all these developments, it can be considered contradictory that Park tried to develop Korean nationalism in the Korean people and consolidate his authority in the country by using similar Japanese cultural policies.

After Park Chung-hee was assassinated in 1979, Choi Kyu-hah who served as the Malaysian ambassador, became president. However, his period lasted less than a year because of a new military coup by Major General Chun Doo-hwan. Just like his former counterpart, Chun Doo-hwan preferred to develop cultural policies to protect the legitimacy of his authority and to strengthen it. In other words, his period was a continuation of the Park term for Korean politics.

In Korean political history, Chun's presidency is remembered as a bloody period since the democratic movement in the country, the Gwangju Uprising, was

⁹⁰ Park, "The Paradox of Postcolonial Korean Nationalism: State-Sponsored Cultural Policy in South Korea, 1965-Present", 75.

⁹¹ Kwon and Kim, "From censorship to active support: The Korean state and Korea's cultural industries", 520.

brutally suppressed. These political conflicts, which frequently stem from the lack of democracy, led the Chun administration to create more controlling policies that would direct the public's attention to other areas. Therefore, entertainment and sports were used to prevent the public from dealing with issues such as economic problems, authoritarian political administration, and the lack of democracy. The Chun government restricted freedom of expression in the media, and he broadcasted adult movies, football, as well as baseball matches by introducing the 3S rule to the media field. The aim was to control over the public via the 3S rule.⁹²



Figure 10. President Chun Doo-hwan throws the ceremonial first pitch at a baseball game between MBC Blue Dragons and Samsung Lions on March 27, 1982
Source: The Korea Times, Three S's in 1980s - a left-wing conspiracy?, 2019, https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2021/05/356_277394.html

In the second chapter of my thesis, I explained how the Japanese government used sports to increase its control over the Korean people and to create a loyal subject to the Japanese empire. Chun administration also preferred the utilization of sports for similar aims, and Sang Mi Park detailed this issue in the same article. Ryūzō Sejima was the originator of this “sports politics” of the Chun administration. Sejima served as an officer in the Imperial Army from 1932 to 1945, and he was president of

⁹²Kwon and Kim, “From censorship to active support: The Korean state and Korea’s cultural industries”, 521.

Itochu, a Japanese trading company. Despite being Japanese, he had developed close relations with Korean political leaders since the 1980s. Hence, he became President Chun's unofficial consultant by visiting Korea frequently, and he advised Chun on economics, politics, and diplomacy. Furthermore, he was the person who gave recommendations on export growth and a rapid growth strategy for the Korean economy during the Park Chung-hee era. Thanks to Sejima's secret diplomacy, Yasuhiro Nakasone became the first Japanese prime minister to visit Korea after WWII and met Chun in January 1983.⁹³ According to Sejima, there was the same threat to Japan (North Korea) in the region, so he did not neglect to warn the leaders of both sides frequently for the security of the region.⁹⁴

Like the Japanese Empire tried to create Koreans' loyalty to the emperor via sports activities, the Chun administration aimed to gain the endorsement of the public by organizing sports events. In addition, when Sejima visited Korea towards the end of the 1970s, he talked about how Japan gained positive results by hosting the Olympics and other sporting events. Thus, according to him, Korea should host similar events. Thanks to the 1964 Tokyo Olympics and the 1970 Osaka Expo organization, Japan had the opportunity to show how it overcame the difficulties it faced in the post-war period.⁹⁵ Therefore, Sejima claimed that if Korea hosted international sporting events such as the Olympics, the public's positive attitude towards the state would increase, and the Chun regime would gain more supporters.

⁹³ Oh, "The irreversibility of history."

⁹⁴ Park, "The Paradox of Postcolonial Korean Nationalism: State-Sponsored Cultural Policy in South Korea, 1965-Present", 83.

⁹⁵ Park, "The Paradox of Postcolonial Korean Nationalism: State-Sponsored Cultural Policy in South Korea, 1965-Present", 83.

In this direction, the Chun government made intensive efforts for the Asian Games of 1986 and the 1988 Summer Olympics.⁹⁶

After Chun's sports policies, the Korean public's interest increased in sports, and the public participated in various sports events. Thus, the Chun government reactivated the "citizenship gymnastics (국민체조)" that Japan applied to impose state ideologies on the Korean people during the colonial period.⁹⁷ As a result, from the young to the elderly, everyone included sports in their daily lives during the Chun period.

The opening ceremony of the 1988 Seoul (Summer) Olympics coincided with the Roh Tae-woo period, and as Sejima points out, hosting the Olympics gave positive results for South Korea. Major foreign media outlets such as the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC-United Kingdom) and Television Enterprises New (TEN-Australia) broadcasts internationally on Korean traditional culture, history, and socioeconomics during the Olympics. In addition, the number of tourists visiting Korea in 1988 increased by 24.9% compared to the previous year and reached approximately 2.3 million people.⁹⁸

Roh Tae-woo, who came from a military background like his predecessors, was a close friend of Chun, so he would continue Chun's initiatives throughout his term, but he would take them one step further. The cultural policy of the Roh government consisted of the slogan "culture for all the people." In light of this slogan, one of the government's goals was to increase cultural exchange in the

⁹⁶ Park, "The Paradox of Postcolonial Korean Nationalism: State-Sponsored Cultural Policy in South Korea, 1965-Present", 84.

⁹⁷ Park, "The Paradox of Postcolonial Korean Nationalism: State-Sponsored Cultural Policy in South Korea, 1965-Present", 84.

⁹⁸ Abduazimov, "Public Diplomacy: Reappraising the South Korean Case through an Evolutionary Approach", 90.

international arena.⁹⁹ Thus, in 1991, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs established the "Korean Foundation (KF)" to increase Korea's international friendship as well as cooperation, to make the international community more familiar with Korea, and to rise Korea's diplomatic status towards international communities such as the UN and OECD. Finally, during the Roh period, the ministry divided the Cultural Cooperation Bureau into three sections: "Cultural Cooperation 1-2" and "Public Relations".¹⁰⁰

The other target of Roh's cultural policies was the media sphere. The Roh administration abolished the "Basic Media Act", and enacted the "Basic Press Act" in 1987 to end censorship and harsh practices in the media.¹⁰¹ In addition, there was a liberalization in the field of media, and liberal newspapers Kukmin-Ilbo (1988), Segye-Ilbo (1989) and Munwha-Ilbo (1991) were established.¹⁰² However, liberalization in the television industry led to a "drama war" among Korea's three main TV channels, MBC, KBS and SBS. To prevent this situation, in 1994, a "Cultural Industry Bureau" was established under the Ministry of Culture and Sports.¹⁰³ In short, the activities of cultural industries rose towards the end of the 1980s, and with the abolition of censorship, a growth was observed in the number of cultural products criticizing political corruption and social injustice in Korea.¹⁰⁴

Korea, which gradually opened its doors to the outside world with the Roh period, would try to find ways to further improve its relations with other countries in order to increase its competitiveness in the international arena during the Kim Young-sam period. Shortly after the collapse of SSCB, "globalization" in the world

⁹⁹Park, "South Korea Cultural History Between 1960s and 2012," 90.

¹⁰⁰Choi, *The Republic of Korea's Public Diplomacy Strategy: History and Current Status*, 11-12.

¹⁰¹Park, "South Korea cultural History Between 1960s and 2012," 92.

¹⁰² Park, "South Korea cultural History Between 1960s and 2012," 92.

¹⁰³ Kim and Marinescu, "Mapping South Korea's Soft Power," 2.

¹⁰⁴ Kwon and Kim, "From censorship to active support: The Korean state and Korea's cultural industries", 522.

order entered a rapid process. The Soviet Bloc's inability to compete against the increasingly globalized world economy and technology increased the sense of confidence in the liberal market economy. In this context, countries tried to benefit from the opportunities of the free economy, so they increased their cooperation with each other.¹⁰⁵ Indeed, the Kim government coincided with this period. Being aware of the developments and the competitive environment, Kim thought that it was necessary to adapt the rapidly developing era of globalization. Thus, the Kim administration began to adopt the "*Segyehwa (세계화) Policies*", which means globalization in Korean, in all areas. According to Samuel Kim, Korea became the country that gave the most importance to this trend with the initiatives it took in the post-Cold War period. The governments that heightened globalization in their policies were Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae-Jung.¹⁰⁶

In a speech in 1995, President Kim mentioned his country's need for *segryehwa* policies. Although these policies were interpreted by many people as only liberalizing the economy, they would also be put into practice in the political and cultural sphere.¹⁰⁷ This was welcomed by Korean politicians as it would increase global competitiveness, but according to Kim, these policies would also make state stronger and contribute positively to the country's image.

The '*segryehwa*' policy purports to adapt actively ourselves to the changes taking place and to promote development, thus not to repeat the failures of the past. In other words, this is a strategy to reform our consciousness and the institutions [. . .] ultimately to become an central country of the world in the future. (John, 2016, p.43)

¹⁰⁵ Kürkçü, "Küreselleşme Kavramı ve Küreselleşmeye Yönelik Yaklaşımlar", 3.

¹⁰⁶ John, "Globalization, National Identity and Foreign Policy: Understanding 'Global Korea'", 41.

¹⁰⁷ Kim, "Korea and Globalization", 84.

Unlike previous governments, the Kim government was the first which attempt to turn the concept of culture into an industry with the policies it determined on the basis of globalization. The goal of the new cultural policy was to gain the support of the Chaebols and transform the film industry from a service industry to a semi-manufacturing industry. Thus, Chaebol companies such as Daewoo, Samsung, Hyundai, SKC, LG and Chaeil-Jedang invested up to 100% in the cinema sector through the "Motion Picture Promotion Law (MPPL)" issued in 1995.¹⁰⁸ The media and cultural activities of the Chaebols included computer software, music, telecommunications, newspaper publishing, and television programming, too.¹⁰⁹ In fact, after Kim realized that Jurassic Park grossed \$85 million at the Korean box office in 1993, he became interested in the industrialization of culture. Thus, the contribution of the cultural industries to the country's economy was recognized, and Korea provided access to the popular culture sector, where it would gain more success in the future. The budget of the Ministry of Culture and Sports increased by 0.9% in 1997.¹¹⁰ In addition, thanks to the state-sponsored Korean National University of Arts and the Korean Film Academy, the human resources that Korea would need in the media industry began to be trained. The aim of the Kim government was to create a new developmental state model with this new type of cultural policy.¹¹¹

According to Han Sung-joo, the foreign minister of the time, *seguehwa* was crucial for Korea's diplomacy. In Korea, this initiative was aimed to obtain the status of an internationally developed nation and to take part in major international

¹⁰⁸ Park, "South Korea Cultural History Between 1960s and 2012," 99.

¹⁰⁹ Kwon and Kim, "From censorship to active support: The Korean state and Korea's cultural industries", 524.

¹¹⁰ Kwon and Kim, "From censorship to active support: The Korean state and Korea's cultural industries", 523.

¹¹¹ Park, "South Korea Cultural History Between 1960s and 2012", 100.

organizations. Samuel Kim pointed out that since the 1990s, relations with other countries increased in Korean foreign policy. There were developments such as Korea-Russia normalization in 1990, United Nations membership in 1991, Korea-China normalization in 1992, OECD membership in 1996 and UN Security Council Membership in 1997. In addition, while Korea was in diplomatic relations with 126 countries in 1985, the number of these countries reached 186 by the end of the 90s.¹¹²

The globalization movements adopted by South Korea since the mid-90s would continue during the term of President Kim Dae-Jung. However, when Kim was elected president in December 1997, he had economic problems to resolve. These problems stemmed from the Asian Financial Crisis. On the other hand, the resolution of these two issues also allowed for further development and diversification of Korea's cultural industries. Thus, President Kim would lay the foundations of Korean PD.

The next section of the research paper describes President Kim's role in Korea's democratization process and how the 1997 crisis was resolved by the government. In particular, having information about Kim's democracy understanding will also make clear the logic of the Kim government's attempts at foreign policy, because the cultural industries were also developed in line with Kim's democracy logic during this period. These developed and diversified industries also contributed to the country's recovery from the economic crisis. Therefore, before sharing the cultural policies and industries created during the period of President Kim, Korea's democratization process and Korea's experience with the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis will be explained in a subtitle.

¹¹² John, "Globalization, National Identity and Foreign Policy: Understanding 'Global Korea'", 46.

3.2 Democratization process of Korea and 1997 Asian Financial Crisis

Kim Dae-jung was a liberal and opposition party politician, so he defended democracy against authoritarian regimes during his political career. However, due to being an opposition politician, he was exposed to various sanctions and punishments throughout his life. Especially during the Park and Chun period, he was kidnapped on August 8, 1973, by agents of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) in Tokyo, and he was sentenced to the supreme punishment in 1980 for causing riots. On June 1, 1980, the Martial Law Command stated that Kim Dae-jung provoked Choson and Chonnam University students in Gwangju and caused a violent riot (Gwangju Uprising) in the provincial centre. Also, on July 5, 1980, a more comprehensive report was published that Kim Dae Jung was the person who organized and financed the Gwangju Incident.¹¹³ Therefore, despite all obstacles, his struggle for the democratization of Korea made President Kim a crucial figure in Korean political history. Besides this, Kim was a politician who believed in a peaceful existence, so he always preferred a more conciliatory stance toward North Korea. Thus, he elaborated the "Sunshine Policy (햇볕정책)" to make more exchanges between the two Koreas and to develop peaceful relations with Pyongyang, and then, he got the Nobel Peace Prize due to his policy.

Even though Korea achieved the industrialization process as a post-colonial independent state, the conditions for the democratization process were extremely difficult since South Korea is an anti-communist and authoritarian state. In addition, there was a belief that a strong state develops under the control of dictatorial regimes. In the article written by Jung Hae Gu and Kim Ho Ki, "Development of

¹¹³ Tim Warnberg, "The Kwangju Uprising: An Inside View", 47-48.

Democratization Movement in South Korea”, democratization movements under authoritarian rule were divided into three periods: the Syngman Rhee, Park Chung-hee, and Chun Doo Hwan regimes.

There was a strong anti-communist dictatorship in the Syngman Rhee era. However, this dictatorship caused criticism and protest based on liberal democratic values and institutions since Rhee attempted to extend his term in power by amending the law in the constitution, in the early 1950s. Thus, other political parties were established as an opposition group against Rhee. In addition, sudden urbanization led to social changes in Korea. Numerous people came to cities because of the Korean War, and the urban population increased by around two million and reached 5.28 million until 1955. After that, elementary student numbers doubled and reached 3.62 million in 1958, and the number of university students increased from 7,800 to 140,000 for 16 years. As a result, a new social structure and civil society were formed by journalists, intellectuals, and college students during the late 1950s, and this nascent urban civil society and college students were the main actors of the April 19th Revolution. The revolution was against the First Republic, and it was triggered when a high school student was killed by police during demonstrations. However, the April 19th Revolution was an indication of the democratization movement from below in Korea.¹¹⁴

However, the April democracy movement was interrupted when Park Chung-hee captured power in Korea with a military coup on May 16, 1961. Two days before the coup, Kim Dae-jung was elected to the National Assembly in the by-election and became the spokesperson of the opposition party. Kim, who was Park's opponent in the 1971 elections, frequently stated in his speeches that he would establish

¹¹⁴Jung and Kim, “Development of Democratization Movement in South Korea”, 4.

democracy in the country. However, he lost the election by eight points (53-45 percent margin), and Kim continued to be Park's opponent.¹¹⁵

In fact, Park's popularity was adversely affected due to the growing opposition in the 1970s. He also worried that his ultra-anti-communist regime might be undermined because of the official diplomatic relations between the US and China in 1972 as well as the normalized relations between Japan and China. Thus, he formed the new government by declaring the “Yushin Constitution” This constitution led to Park having all the legislative, executive, and judicial powers. He could also appoint members of the national assembly as well as high court judges.¹¹⁶ However, security concerns were behind Park's enactment of the Yushin Constitution. US President Richard Nixon had a foreign policy understanding that would bring East and West closer. Nixon's visit to China in February 1972 and the US' reduction in the number of troops in South Korea made Park uneasy about the North Korean threat. Therefore, these developments led the Park government to create the Military Modernization Program. Thus, Korea would create its own defence system against the aggression of the North, so Park's top priority was the Heavy and Chemical Industrialization (HCI) Plan that was announced on January 12, 1973. In the article *Heavy and Chemical Industrialization, 1973-1979: South Korea's Homeland Security Measures*, Kim Hyung-a stated that the HCI plan and Park's Yushin Constitution were inseparable. With power from the Yushin Constitution, Park had great control over all governmental and non-governmental institutions, such as the army, cheabols, workers, as well as students. Thanks to this control, the Park was able to continue military modernization through the HCI plan against the risk of withdrawing US support. In short, Yushin and HCI formed Park's policy of

¹¹⁵ Baker, “Kim Dae-jung’s Role in the Democratization of South Korea”, 66.

¹¹⁶ Baker, “Kim Dae-jung’s Role in the Democratization of South Korea”, 66-67.

"independent defence".¹¹⁷ However, Park's highly centralized HCI policy and Yushin reforms involved too much pressure, so many Koreans fell victim to Park's developmental power structure. Thus, even after Park's death, debates continued between those who supported rapid industrialization in the country and those who rejected Park's dictatorship.¹¹⁸

When Park declared this constitution, Kim was in Japan, since he preferred to defend democracy in foreign countries. According to him, there was a freer environment abroad.¹¹⁹ On the other hand, this is still a controversial issue, but it is claimed that Park commanded the KCIA to kidnap Kim Dae-jung from the hotel where he was staying in Tokyo, on August 8, 1973.¹²⁰ Indeed, this was an assassination attempt on Kim. However, according to Kim's autobiography, Nippon Hōsō Kyōkai (NHK), a Japanese broadcasting company announced Kim's abduction to the whole world through the US government, especially the note of the CIA. After this incident spread through the media, Park had to share the location of Kim with the Japanese government.¹²¹

A month later, the Japanese government shared the results of the investigation and announced that they had detected the fingerprint of Kim Dong Un, who was the first secretary at the Korean Embassy, in Kim's hotel room.¹²² Nevertheless, the Embassy refused to cooperate with the Japanese government, due to diplomatic immunity. Thus, Kim's abduction negatively affected relations between the two countries. The Japanese government demanded Kim's return to Japan and an apology

¹¹⁷ Kim, "Heavy and Chemical Industrialization, 1973-1979: South Korea's Homeland Security Measures", 20.

¹¹⁸ Kim, "Heavy and Chemical Industrialization, 1973-1979: South Korea's Homeland Security Measures", 37.

¹¹⁹ Baker, "Kim Dae-jung's Role in the Democratization of South Korea", 67.

¹²⁰ Kim, *Conscience in Action: The Autobiography of Kim Dae-jung*, 198.

¹²¹ Kim, *Conscience in Action: The Autobiography of Kim Dae-jung*, 198.

¹²² Kim, *Conscience in Action: The Autobiography of Kim Dae-jung*, 200.

from Park. Japan also suspended the ministerial-level conference that was to be held between the two countries in the fall of 1973 indefinitely. This was the first serious problem after the "Normalization Treaty" signed between Korea and Japan in 1965.¹²³ However, "November 1 Measures" were announced by Korean Foreign Minister Kim Yong-shik in order to reduce the tension between the two countries, and the Korean Embassy secretary Kim Dong-un was dismissed first. Furthermore, the Park government would no longer investigate Kim Dae-jung's previous political activities in Japan and America. Finally, the Korean Prime Minister, Kim Jong-pil, visited Japan and delivered President Park's personal letter to Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei. In the letter published in February 2006, Park expressed regret to the Japanese government for this unfavourable event.¹²⁴

The abduction gave a fillip to opposing movements against the Park government and Yushin constitution. In 1974, Park imposed harsh penalties for those who criticized the constitution. On March 1, 1976, a Christian activist group led by Kim issued a statement on democracy and economic justice because of Park's regime. However, the group was also sentenced for attempting to overthrow the government, and Kim was barred from all political and civil rights, and he was also sentenced to five years in prison. The authoritarian rule continued until KCIA Director Kim Jae-kyu killed Park on October 26, 1979.¹²⁵

After the end of the Park administration, Korea entered a new period of military dictatorship. The head of the Army Security Command, Chun Doo-hwan, was investigating the Park assassination, but he made a new military coup on December 12, 1979. I mentioned before that the Chun period is still remembered as a

¹²³ Kim, *Conscience in Action: The Autobiography of Kim Dae-jung*, 202.

¹²⁴ Kim, *Conscience in Action: The Autobiography of Kim Dae-jung*, 203.

¹²⁵ Baker, "Kim Dae-jung's Role in the Democratization of South Korea", 67.

bloody period in Korean political history. Since the pro-democracy movements in Korea increasingly continued during President Chun's term, he counteracted these movements quite harshly. The most popular uprising at that time broke out in the city of Gwangju in May 1980, and as mentioned before, the Gwangju Uprising was a social movement revolted by university students who resisted the military constitution proclaimed by the Chun administration. Chun's intervention in this pro-democratization movement was so rigid. According to official figures released in December 2001, 195 people died, 4782 were injured, and 406 were lost.¹²⁶

On May 19, 1980, one day after the Gwangju movements, the administration launched an investigation against Kim Dae-jung for causing riots, and he got the death penalty, on September 17. However, four months later, his sentence was commuted to life imprisonment, and the government abruptly exiled Kim to the US in 1982. When Kim sustained his political attempts abroad, he published a joint statement with Kim Young-sam, 14th president of Korea, to call for democratization on August 15, the Liberation Day of Korea.¹²⁷ Between 1982 and 1985, the Chun administration gradually lifted the pressure on political activities and released political prisoners. The liberated politicians founded a new party before the February 1985 National Assembly elections, and they requested a constitutional amendment and a direct democratic election for the presidency.¹²⁸

Until 1987, Kim Dae-jung was still politically banned. The opposition group, which won a majority in the National Assembly elections, demanded that Kim's political rights be restored. Due to rising pressure, Chun authorized Roh Tae-woo, who was serving as Defence Security Commander. His tasks were holding a direct

¹²⁶ Lee, "The History of Democratization Movement in Korea", 107.

¹²⁷ Lee, "The History of Democratization Movement in Korea", 115.

¹²⁸ Jung and Kim, "Development of Democratization Movement in South Korea", 14.

presidential election before February 1988, and restoring Kim Dae-jung's civil and political rights. Moreover, there was the June Democratic Uprising in 1987, which was triggered by the death of Park Jong Cheol, and the uprising lasted for 20 days. This situation also led the Chun regime to finally announce a plan, the June 29th Declaration, to resolve the situation.¹²⁹ As a result, this resolution consisted of eight items, including a constitutional amendment for direct election of the president. After this, Kim announced his candidacy for the elections to be held on December 16, 1987, but Roh Tae-woo, who Chun nominated as a candidate, won the elections by obtaining 37% of the votes.¹³⁰

The origin of the newly formed Roh government was based on the Chun regime, but this period was to be Korea's transition period from military rule to civilian rule.¹³¹ The political reforms and democratic elections that Roh carried out in the country helped to lessen the impact of the pro-democracy protests. With the coming to power of Kim Young-sam in 1993, there were attempts to replace the years-long military rule in the country with a civilian government. For instance, Kim Young-sam disbanded a politically connected officer community, Hanahoe, and reduced the powers of the Defence Security Command. Thus, the civilian government gained control over the army. Kim Dae-jung, on the other hand, announced that he left politics after losing the May 1992 elections, but he would be elected as the 15th President of Korea in the 1997 presidential elections, as the country's worst financial crisis in history emerged.¹³²

Until this point, I shared about the struggles of Kim Dae-jung throughout his political life for the establishment of democracy in Korea. In fact, in the country's

¹²⁹ Jung and Kim, "Development of Democratization Movement in South Korea", 13.

¹³⁰ Jung and Kim, "Development of Democratization Movement in South Korea", 14.

¹³¹ Baker, "Kim Dae-jung's Role in the Democratization of South Korea", 69.

¹³² Lee, "The History of Democratization Movement in Korea", 150.

political history, these struggles also reveal the influence of the authoritarian anti-communist regimes that dominated Korea for 43 years. However, the fight for democracy in Korea also makes the perspectives of these former military regimes on the cultural industries understandable. Especially, the regimes of Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan formed the concept of culture to promote their political goals. Songs, TV series, and movies generated at that time advocated the authority of governments by emphasizing the concepts of hard work, sacrifice, and devotion for the rapid development of the country.¹³³

However, in order to understand why Kim Dae-jung developed cultural industries in a different dimension and diversified their usage areas during his presidency, it is necessary to know his understanding of democracy and the history of the country's financial crisis. During his tenure between 1998-2003, Kim preferred to improve the cultural industries in line with his understanding of democracy, and this new type of industry would help Korea cope with the financial crisis. Therefore, in the next part of the research, I will primarily share the logic of Kim Dae-jung's understanding of democracy.

In an interview, Kim stated that since globalization became more popular, and countries became interconnected, future conflicts and international problems had to be solved by a common effort. The basis of this joint effort should be rooted in democracy because Kim believed that peace was the fundamental value of democracy and also the common interest of the international community.¹³⁴ Thus, in the new age, if good governance contributes to the resolution of conflicts through dialogue and communication, the people of the world would be much closer to

¹³³Kwon and Kim, "The cultural industry policies of the Korean government and the Korean Wave", 425.

¹³⁴Han, *Asian Tradition and Cosmopolitan Politics: Dialogue with Kim Dae-Jung*, 85.

accomplish global peace and common prosperity.¹³⁵ On the other hand, Kim believed that democracy had three stages and he explained as “democracy such as today within a nation state, democracy within a (regional) federation, and democracy at the global level practiced by an international organizing body such as the United Nations” (Han, 2018, p.67).

According to his understanding, democracy within a nation-state would be continued, and then, the democratic political structure would be set up at the regional level for democratic rearrangement and cooperation. Finally, a democratic organization depends on an international coalition would be formed at the global level. Thus, freedom and justice could be realized both within a nation-state and in all parts of the world after democracy becomes a universal value, and many countries have a democratic system.¹³⁶ When democracy spread and grew, Kim believed that the world would undergo a huge and rapid change. Furthermore, Kim stated that with globalization, economic borders disappeared, the open market economy spread around the world, and companies of all nations began to cooperate strategically to compete with each other. Hence, Kim mentioned that with global democracy, it would be easier to adapt to this order.¹³⁷

However, the establishment of democracy in Korea and the development of the economy could not occur at the same time. The authoritarian regimes that came to power after the expansion of strength and influence of military power after the Korean War quickly prioritized developing the country's economy against communism and created the "Han River miracle".¹³⁸ Especially Park Chung-hee achieved this by applying interventionist economic policies in the state. Focusing

¹³⁵Han, *Asian Tradition and Cosmopolitan Politics: Dialogue with Kim Dae-Jung*, 245.

¹³⁶Han, *Asian Tradition and Cosmopolitan Politics: Dialogue with Kim Dae-Jung*, 67.

¹³⁷Han, *Asian Tradition and Cosmopolitan Politics: Dialogue with Kim Dae-Jung*, 83.

¹³⁸Lee, “Culture and the State: From a Korean Perspective”, 91.

only on the economic field and ignoring democracy for nearly three decades caused the economic crisis in Korea in the mid-1990s. In this case, when Kim Dae-jung took office as president, ensuring regional democracy became Kim's next goal, as democracy at the nation-state level was just established in the country. Being competitive in an international order where economic borders disappeared owing to globalization was also related to with democratic financial structures.

Korea was in a serious financial crisis, as soon as the government took office, they had to make an agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to determine Korea's ways out of the economic crisis. On the other hand, Kim Dae-jung thought that the main solution was to ensure democracy at the regional level in Asia and to establish good governance for the free market with Asian countries. For Kim, democracy and the free market were like two wheels in a car, so these two concepts had to move forward simultaneously.¹³⁹ Unlike Kim, Park Chung-hee believed that the legitimacy of administration in South Korea depended on quick and sustainable industrialization. Therefore, he thought that economic policies guided by capitalism would be more efficient for this.¹⁴⁰ At that time, Park's idea was also adopted by other authoritarian rulers, and this attitude of military authoritarian regimes caused an economic crisis in the country since 1990. Kim claimed that authoritarian regimes preferred to engage in collusion by offering short-term opportunities rather than encouraging business owners to compete in the domestic and international markets. Hence, the secret relations (정경유착) between the state and private companies increased. Since the middle

¹³⁹ Han, *Asian Tradition and Cosmopolitan Politics: Dialogue with Kim Dae-Jung*, 233.

¹⁴⁰ Kazaz, "Aile ve İşletme: Güney Kore-Türkiye Karşılaştırması (1960-1980)", 21.

of 1997, the foreign debt of many banks reached 24 percent of gross national product,¹⁴¹ as many companies whose financial structure was not transparent went bankrupt.¹⁴² Banks could not collect the repayments of the loans they gave to these companies. In addition, foreign investors lost their trust in the Korean economy due to these secret relations between companies and the state. Then, they began to withdraw their investments from the country quickly. The declining foreign exchange reserves in Korea caused the dollar to appreciate rapidly, as well as a currency crisis.

According to the Korean people, this economic crisis was the most shocking crisis after the Korean War. Therefore, in the first week of December 1997, Korea and the IMF signed a three-year Stand-by Agreement. The IMF asked all candidates in the December 1997 elections to sign the agreement to ensure its the implementation of the agreement.¹⁴³ Kim Dae-jung wrote about those days in his autobiography:

At 10:00 p.m. on November 21, 1997, Deputy Prime Minister for the Economy Lim Chang-ryul announced that the Korean government was requesting a \$20 billion bailout from the IMF. The IMF working group flew to Korea and the negotiation ended on December 3. Afterward, IMF Director Michel Camdessus went directly to the Blue House for an unscheduled visit. He demanded that all presidential candidates sign a memorandum stating that they would carry out the Korean government's agreement with the IMF. Although I found it humiliating, I had no other choice but to sign. (Kim, 2019, p.445)

According to the agreement, a bailout package for Korea would be created by obtaining 58 billion dollars. Funders were the IMF, World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and other countries. However, in remuneration for this

¹⁴¹ Heo U., Jeon, H.C., Kim, H.Y. & Kim, O.J. "The Political Economy of South Korea: Economic Growth, Democratization, and Financial Crisis", 16.

¹⁴² Han, *Asian Tradition and Cosmopolitan Politics: Dialogue with Kim Dae-Jung*, 233.

¹⁴³ Coe and Kim, "Korean Crisis and Recovery."

package, Korea had to regain the trust of foreign investors. Private companies and the financial sector had to be restructured.¹⁴⁴ In addition, the IMF underlined the necessity of high interest rates and tax increases, so the Korean government implemented the prescription given by the IMF and privatized public banks. Rising interest rates made it harder for medium-sized companies to get loans. As a result, as companies went bankrupt, this situation caused unemployment in Korea. Moreover, the financial structure of large family companies, Chaebols, and troubled financial institutions was restructured. To ensure transparency, the government mandated that these companies produce annual financial reports. A trusted international accounting firm controls these family businesses twice a year. To monitor banks' adherence to international standards, the government created two institutions, the Financial Supervisory Commission and the Financial Supervisory Service.¹⁴⁵

Furthermore, Kim emphasized that economic competitiveness and productivity in the twenty first century will be determined by intangible elements such as knowledge and cultural creativity instead of capital, labour, land, and machinery.¹⁴⁶ Therefore, besides the measures of the IMF, Kim focused on the development of cultural industries in the twenty first century as a smokeless industry. In the 1960s and 1970s, the government did not create the cultural industries to meet public needs or consumer demands. The mission of KCAF was to distract people's interest in authoritarian regimes and appease dissident groups with culture and art.¹⁴⁷ On the other hand, the Kim government would make the

¹⁴⁴ Coe and Kim, "Korean Crisis and Recovery."

¹⁴⁵ Heo U., Jeon, H.C., Kim, H.Y. & Kim, O.J. "The Political Economy of South Korea: Economic Growth, Democratization, and Financial Crisis", 17-19.

¹⁴⁶ Han, *Asian Tradition and Cosmopolitan Politics: Dialogue with Kim Dae-Jung*, 236.

¹⁴⁷ Chung, "The Neo-developmental Cultural Industries Policy of Korea: Rationales and Implications of an Eclectic Policy", 65.

culture industry the centre of export-oriented economic development policies. In addition, new initiatives for the cultural industries during the Kim period would contribute to the economy and democracy in the short term. In the long term, this reformed cultural industry would form the development of the Hallyu which is the most preferred tool in today's Korean PD.

The next section of the thesis includes the new reforms that President Kim implemented in the Korean cultural industries, but first, I describe the contributions of these industries to survive from the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. The aim is to make it understandable for the reader, unlike previous authoritarian regimes, how the Kim administration succeeded in turning the cultural industries into an economic resource. Then, the chapter highlights the contributions of the developed and diversified cultural industries not only to the country's economy but also to its foreign policy. This industry also became a tool for Korea's bilateral relations with other countries. The aim here is to make it understandable that the cultural industries serve as a foreign policy tool and for Kim Dae-jung's goal of regional democracy. Last, the chapter explains the preferred application styles of cultural industry in foreign policy by analysing Korea-Japan relations. Hence, it will also be an indication that the Kim Dae-jung administration laid the foundations of Korean cultural PD.

CHAPTER 4

THE EMERGENCE OF KOREAN CULTURAL PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

4.1 Transition of Korean cultural industry into public diplomacy

First, the Kim Dae-jung administration (1998-2003) gave importance to the promotion of cultural industries primarily as they contribute economically to national wealth.¹⁴⁸ Therefore, unlike the traditional developmental state models that consider economy and culture as two different fields, Kim endeavoured to create an economic development model for the export of cultural industries.¹⁴⁹ To achieve this goal, the Kim government initially decided to integrate the cultural industries into the information and communication technologies (ICT) and electronics industries.

The Korea Cultural Content Agency (KOCCA), established by the Kim administration in 2001, would be related to the Korean Broadcasting Institute (KBI), the Korea Culture and Content Agency, the Korea Game Development and Promotion Institute, the Culture & Contents Centre, and the Digital Contents Business Group of the Korea Software Industry Promotion.¹⁵⁰ Kim believed that ICT should be developed in Korea since international information exchange accelerated owing to this field. For instance, people are able to share information with the whole world via a computer. In addition, globalization commenced countries communicating with each other through ICT.¹⁵¹

In this respect, according to the report 1999 prepared by the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Korea embarked on enterprises in the field of ICT to

¹⁴⁸Yim, "Cultural Identity and Cultural Policy in South Korea", 46.

¹⁴⁹Park, "South Korea Cultural History Between 1960s and 2012", 101.

¹⁵⁰ Park, "South Korea Cultural History Between 1960s and 2012", 105.

¹⁵¹ Han, *Asian Tradition and Cosmopolitan Politics: Dialogue with Kim Dae-Jung*, 245.

strengthen the country's national competitiveness in the twenty first century information society. The government created electronic databases and Internet websites for public services, including diplomatic as well as business relations. Hence, the industrialization of cultural elements by integrating them into ICT would also contribute to the national image. In accordance with the government, this situation was directly related to the country's foreign competitiveness.¹⁵² Kim announced "Vision 21" for the cultural industries in 2000. Movies and television series would be integrated into the ICT and electronics industries. The vision increased the 0.60% budget used for the cultural sector in 1998 to 1.15% until 2002.¹⁵³ Prior to this initiative, the government enacted the "Cultural Industry Act" in 1999, and the goal was to encourage the Chaebols to make investments in the domestic film industry. In addition, Korea's cinema service introduced the first e-financing schemes in the film industry, allowing Koreans to invest in film projects via the Internet.¹⁵⁴ The initiative thrived success with the 1999 film "Shiri". The Samsung-funded film broke box office records and was exported to Japan for \$1.3 million.¹⁵⁵ After the achievement of Shiri, the Kim government decided to export of cultural industries to Japan. Telecommunication companies promoted Korean movies, and the government circulated them via smartphones, Internet Protocol Television (IPTV), and digital mobile broadcasting.¹⁵⁶ The other attempt was for the localization of Korean television content. The content of cable television station broadcasts had to include at least 50% local programs.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵² MOFA, "Diplomatic White Paper 1999." https://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_4105/list.do

¹⁵³ Oh, "Hallyu (Korean Wave) as Korea's Cultural Public Diplomacy in China and Japan", 173.

¹⁵⁴ Park, "South Korea Cultural History Between 1960s and 2012", 102.

¹⁵⁵ Ryoo, "Globalization or the logic of cultural hybridization: the case of the Korean wave", 141.

¹⁵⁶ Park, "South Korea Cultural History Between 1960s and 2012", 103.

¹⁵⁷ Kwon and Kim, "From Censorship to Active Support: The Korean State and Korea's Cultural industries", 525.

Moreover, during this period, Korean cultural industries diversified to include online and mobile games, animation.¹⁵⁸ Especially for game developers, the government held seminars on game graphics and 3D game engines. Besides this, the “Video and Game Law” entered into force during the Kim period. The law allowed game developers to work for private game development companies instead of going to the military. Thus, major gaming companies such as Nexon, NHN, NeoWiz, and NC Soft employed developers as military personnel.¹⁵⁹ After these attempts in the game sector, the Korean government promoted events such as the European Computer Trade Show and Tokyo Game Show.¹⁶⁰ To conclude, Korea's new model cultural industries were integrated with IT thanks to developments on the internet and digital media.¹⁶¹ Thus, two different sectors created a growth cycle that was mutually beneficial to each other. The reason for the Kim government’s attempt was the alteration in the international political-economic environment through globalization.¹⁶²

4.2 First practices of Korean cultural public diplomacy: Korea-Japan relations towards twenty first century

The next step for the Kim government was to export its developed cultural industries to other countries. It would set an example for the use of the cultural sector as a soft power in the foreign policy of Korea because the aim was to promote Korea's positive image in the surrounding region. The first overseas

¹⁵⁸Jin, “The Korean Government’s New Cultural Policy in the Age of Social Media”, 7.

¹⁵⁹ Kwon and Kim, “The Cultural Industry Policies of The Korean Government and The Korean Wave”, 432.

¹⁶⁰Kwon and Kim, “The Cultural Industry Policies of The Korean Government and The Korean Wave”, 433.

¹⁶¹ Park, “South Korea Cultural History Between 1960s and 2012”, 104.

¹⁶²Yoon, “The Development and Problems of Soft Power between South Korea and Japan in the Study of International Relations”, 193.

market was Japan for products of the newly improved Korean cultural industry. Kim had a diverse opinion about Japan from previous Korean governments due to his democracy belief. He claimed that cultural exchange with Japan should be encouraged. It even allowed Japanese films, videos, and broadcasts to enter Korea in 1998, before marketing Korean cultural products to Japan. The Japanese show industry would come to Korea in 1999. In 2000, the Korean government imported Japanese animation, pop music, games, and broadcast programs.¹⁶³ Moreover, the Japan Foundation established the Japanese Cultural Centre in Seoul, in the same year. In accordance with Korea's Diplomatic White Paper of 2000, the goal of the Kim administration was to create an environment that would ensure the competitiveness of the cultural industries. Hence, access to Japanese pop culture would provide an occasion for Korean cultural products to enter Japan.¹⁶⁴ In August 2000, the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade as well as the Ministry of Culture organized an event to promote Korean cultural industries such as film, animation, music, and ICT industries. A hundred companies from Korea and Japan participated in the event.¹⁶⁵ In the wake of this initiative, more than 20 billion won (\$15.1 million) in investment contracts were signed for the export of Korean cultural industry products, so Korean companies expanded into Japan.¹⁶⁶ In addition, KOCCA was an institution responsible for the planning, marketing, and distribution of Korean cultural products abroad. Accordingly, in the same year, KOCCA established a marketing centre in Japan to bring Korean content producers together with Japanese marketing managers and Japanese fans.¹⁶⁷ In

¹⁶³Yim, *Cultural Identity and Cultural Policy in South Korea*, 42.

¹⁶⁴ MOFA, "Diplomatic White Paper 2000." https://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_4105/list.do

¹⁶⁵ MOFA, "Diplomatic White Paper 2000." https://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_4105/list.do

¹⁶⁶ MOFA, "Diplomatic White Paper 2001." https://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_4105/list.do

¹⁶⁷ Park, "South Korea Cultural History Between 1960s and 2012", 105.

addition, KOCCA would be responsible for the organization of cultural events to be held by Korea in Japan.¹⁶⁸

Due to Korea-Japan being the host of the World Cup in 2002, Korean dramas had an influence in Japan as a popular cultural product. The first Korean drama broadcast on Japanese television was "Winter Sonata", and with this series, the Japanese perspective on Korea changed. Over time, a huge number of Japanese fans emerged owing to Korean cultural products. The lead actor of the drama, Bae Yong-Joon, had a grand fan group that consisted of a Japanese middle-aged female population. Besides, melodrama Korean series became the most preferred genre in Japan.¹⁶⁹ The other popular Korean drama in Japan was the drama "Dae Jang-geum (Jewel in the palace)". The series was broadcast on Japanese television four times between 2004 and 2007 through intense requests from Japanese fans.¹⁷⁰ By 2008, Japanese satellite television channels were broadcasting a new Korean drama every day. Korean dramas really contributed positively to the image of Korea and Koreans in Japan.¹⁷¹ Before Korean dramas and movies became popular, the country's image in the region reflected negative concepts such as poverty, political instability, as well as the lack of democracy. Nonetheless, the Kim government gathered the favourable results of initiatives.¹⁷² By means of Winter Sonata, it was observed that the Japanese attitude towards Koreans residing in Japan showed an alteration towards friendliness and charm.¹⁷³

¹⁶⁸Park, "South Korea Cultural History Between 1960s and 2012", 106.

¹⁶⁹ Lee and Ju, "Korean Television Dramas in Japan: Imagining 'East Asianness' and Consuming 'Nostalgia'", 78.

¹⁷⁰ Lee and Ju, "Korean Television Dramas in Japan: Imagining 'East Asianness' and Consuming 'Nostalgia'", 79.

¹⁷¹ Lee and Ju, "Korean Television Dramas in Japan: Imagining 'East Asianness' and Consuming 'Nostalgia'", 78.

¹⁷² Ryoo, "Globalization, or The Logic of Cultural Hybridization: The Case of The Korean Wave", 145.

¹⁷³ Lee and Ju, "Korean Television Dramas in Japan: Imagining 'East Asianness' and Consuming 'Nostalgia'", 80.

Furthermore, Japanese fans visited the places where Korean dramas were shot by joining “Korean drama theme tours” and “Hallyu tours”, and it became the most preferred activity by the Japanese.¹⁷⁴ In a study, a Japanese woman in her 50s stated that as a Korean drama watcher, she prefers Korean dramas since they reflect close and respectful human relations.¹⁷⁵ In addition, most of the Japanese surveyed said that there are pieces of Japanese society from the past and present in Korean dramas.¹⁷⁶ With the popularization of Korean dramas, the Japanese audience began to closely follow Korean movies, pop music, and Korean actors or singers. BoA, a K-pop artist, beat records in Japan with hits such as "No.1", "Valenti", and "Listen to my heart". In fact, the last one was the artist's first Japanese studio album, released on March 13, 2002.¹⁷⁷

Indeed, towards the end of the twentieth century, Korea's democratization and economic progress added a distinctive dimension to its foreign policy. In Korea's Diplomatic White Paper of 1998, it was highlighted that the security perspective of countries expanded through political, economic, as well as social dimensions during the post-Cold War period. Thus, the new security perspective brought economic competition to the fore instead of military conflicts. The paper also emphasized the rising interdependence of countries after the end of the bipolar system. These were reasons for globalization diplomacy in Korean foreign policy, so Kim's government believed that cultural diplomacy was the most important part of it.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁴Lee and Ju, “Korean Television Dramas in Japan: Imagining ‘East Asianness’ and Consuming ‘Nostalgia’”, 95.

¹⁷⁵Lee and Ju, “Korean Television Dramas in Japan: Imagining ‘East Asianness’ and Consuming ‘Nostalgia’”, 87.

¹⁷⁶Lee and Ju, “Korean Television Dramas in Japan: Imagining ‘East Asianness’ and Consuming ‘Nostalgia’”, 91.

¹⁷⁷Ryoo, “Globalization, or The Logic of Cultural Hybridization: The Case of The Korean Wave”, 140.

¹⁷⁸ MOFA, “Diplomatic White Paper 1998.” https://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_4105/list.do

From 1993 to 1997, the five years following the end of the Cold War, there were significant changes in the international environment, strengthening South Korea's position in the international community, and the government's pursuit of globalization, which further intensified external cultural exchanges. After the end of the Cold War, global attention shifted from traditional military security concepts to issues that improve the quality of human life, such as peace, human rights, and the environment. As a result, the importance of cultural diplomacy significantly increased. Furthermore, in line with the enhanced international standing of South Korea and the government's pursuit of globalization, there was a strong emphasis on actively promoting cultural diplomacy, focusing on introducing Korean culture externally and enhancing the external image of Korea. As a result, South Korea expanded its cultural exchanges beyond the existing focus on the United States and Western Europe, creating a foundation for expanding cultural exchanges in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. (p.219, own translation)

This fundamental understanding of foreign policy, which was taken during the Kim Young-sam period, was enhanced, and sustained during the Kim Dae-jung period. With the democratization of Korea, the negative effect of the economic crisis went down, and analogy was provided between Korea and Japan in terms of political regime and economy. Kim was a leader who always took a conciliatory stance towards Japan during his incumbency, so he always mentioned that the problems between the two countries should be resolved as the world approaches the twenty first century. For this reason, Kim attached importance to the establishment of more sustainable relations between the two countries. Thus, the frictions originating from the historical past also calmed down with the Kim Dae-jung era. In order to develop bilateral relations with Japan, the twenty first century Korean cultural industry and the new economic understanding of the Kim administration would come to the fore more than in previous periods. Thereby, the developments between Korea and Japan during the Kim period would set a precedent for Korea's cultural PD and the soft power ideology of Korea's foreign policy.

Korea often stated in its diplomatic white papers that the twenty first Century would generally be the “Cultural Century.” In the globalized international order, cultural industries have a high value-added to the economy and a direct impact on the national image. Therefore, Korea saw its cultural industries as an important touchstone for its foreign competitiveness. In the 2000 Diplomatic White Paper, the Kim government made it clear that it views cultural diplomacy as a mission to strengthen cultural competitiveness and secure Korean cultural identity internationally. Thus, the purpose of this mission was to provide mutual cultural exchange with other countries and encourage friendly cooperation between countries.¹⁷⁹

The first attempt at Korea's cultural diplomacy mission was Kim Dae-jung's visit to Japan in October 1998. The summit between President Kim and Japanese Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo was a very significant step for Korea-Japan relations. For the first time, the Japanese Prime Minister apologized for the heavy damage of the past Japanese administration in Korea, and both parties signed this apology in the "Japan-Republic of Korea Joint Declaration" on October 8, in Tokyo.¹⁸⁰ During the post-Cold War order, Obuchi also took trustworthy Japanese diplomacy as a mission in order to straighten Japan's old militaristic image in the Asia region.¹⁸¹ President Kim was also aware of Japan's changing international role. Therefore, Kim noted in the signed diplomatic document that they were aware of Japan's peaceful security policies after the Second World War and the economic aid Japan provided to developing

¹⁷⁹ MOFA, “Diplomatic White Paper 2000.” https://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_4105/list.do

¹⁸⁰ Kim, “Role of Political Leadership in the Formation of Korea-Japan Relations in the Post-Cold War Era”, 123.

¹⁸¹ Yoon, “Structural Change in Korea-Japan Relations during the 1990s and the Korea-Japan Joint Declaration: An Examination of the Transnational Attempts at Cooperation and Institutionalization in the Post-Cold War Era”, 129.

countries.¹⁸² This reciprocal attitude of the two leaders also contributed to Kim Dae-jung's mission of ensuring democracy at the regional level based on peace.

The declaration affirmed the cooperation between Korea and Japan in five fields: Cooperation for the international community's peace and security, expansion of dialogue channels, strengthening economic cooperation, strengthening cooperation on global issues, and increased human and cultural exchange.¹⁸³ However, for the Korean government, the highest level of Korea-Japan relations could be achieved through mutual humanitarian and cultural exchange.¹⁸⁴ Therefore, according to Article 10 of the joint declaration, both leaders mentioned that the relations between the two peoples would be developed, and mutual cultural exchange would be encouraged on the basis of the 2002 Football World Cup event, which was organized jointly by two countries. Primarily for the interaction of Korean and Japanese people, mutual visits by social groups such as researchers, teachers, and journalists would be organized, and visa requirements would be simplified to facilitate visits.¹⁸⁵ Moreover, the two governments promoted student exchange programs with each other.

In this context, there was a "Working Holiday Program" for young people, so in 1999, approximately one thousand Korean and Japanese people from both countries stayed in each other's countries. During the program, these people participated in cultural activities, too. In October 1999, one hundred students from Korea, who were selected to study abroad programs of Japanese science and

¹⁸²Yoon, "Structural Change in Korea-Japan Relations during the 1990s and the Korea-Japan Joint Declaration: An Examination of the Transnational Attempts at Cooperation and Institutionalization in the Post-Cold War Era", 130.

¹⁸³Kim, "Role of Political Leadership in the Formation of Korea-Japan Relations in the Post-Cold War Era", 118.

¹⁸⁴MOFA, "Diplomatic White Paper 1999." https://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_4105/list.do

¹⁸⁵MOFA, "Japan-Republic of Korea Joint Declaration a New Japan-Republic of Korea Partnership towards the Twenty-first Century."

engineering universities, received language training, and they were placed in twenty-five Japanese public universities in April 2001.¹⁸⁶ The other student project organized in 1999 was the exchange program which included 470 Korean middle and high school students as well as 300 Japanese students. The goal was to reach 10,000 students in 10 years.¹⁸⁷ In accordance with the second Korea-Japan Ministerial Meeting, "Korea Super Expo 2000" was held for the first time in Tokyo, and again there were Korean cultural events for Japanese.¹⁸⁸ Furthermore, in 2001, 105 Korean teachers and education administrators and 20 university students visited Japan through the Korea Foundation and International Education Development Institute programs, while 63 Japanese teachers and 100 university students visited Korea.¹⁸⁹ In particular, 2002 was the 'year of public exchange between Korea and Japan', so a Korean and a Japanese female movie star were selected as goodwill ambassadors that year.¹⁹⁰ On the other hand, the Korean government introduced Korean culture to the Japanese people through performance events such as the opera "Chunhyang(춘향)", the musical "Uruwang(우루왕)" and the Korean-Japanese joint play "Birds on the Deck" (갑판위의 새들).¹⁹¹ At the Korea-Japan summit held on July 1, 2002, the leaders of both countries formed the "Korea-Japan Joint Future Project" to expand youth and sports exchanges. Thus, within the scope of the project, exchange programs were carried out between the Korean and Japanese sports groups, consisting of

¹⁸⁶ MOFA, "Diplomatic White Paper 2000." https://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_4105/list.do

¹⁸⁷ MOFA, "Diplomatic White Paper 2000." https://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_4105/list.do

¹⁸⁸ MOFA, "Diplomatic White Paper 2001." https://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_4105/list.do

¹⁸⁹ MOFA, "Diplomatic White Paper 2002." https://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_4105/list.do

¹⁹⁰ MOFA, "Diplomatic White Paper 2003." https://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_4105/list.do

¹⁹¹ MOFA, "Diplomatic White Paper 2003." https://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_4105/list.do

1900 people.¹⁹² Korean government believed that the 2002 World Cup was an opportunity to cooperate with Japan,¹⁹³ so it expanded exchanges in the fields of culture, youth, sports, Expo, tourism, and academia.¹⁹⁴

Although the tools of Korean cultural diplomacy generally provided an opportunity to develop bilateral relations with Japan owing to the World Cup event jointly organized with Japan, the Korean government preferred to utilise cultural diplomacy and cultural industries in its relations with other Asian countries. Especially for Korea, the concept of culture was a vital component of national power. Otherwise, cultural diplomacy encouraged friendly cooperation between countries, and contributed to the further development and spread of cultural industries. Therefore, the products of the culture industry were also important in terms of world economic development. As a result, the Kim government took these points into consideration, and they had three goals in this direction:

- i. Development of cultural exchange, cooperation, and friendly relations with other countries,
- ii. Promotion of Korean culture abroad and increasing the international competitiveness of Korean popular culture,
- iii. To support various cultural exchange activities such as culture, arts, sports, tourism, and youth exchange.

Within the framework of these key objectives, the Kim government supported research on Korean studies abroad. They sent Korean art groups abroad and organized painting exhibitions. The government also promoted Korean culture

¹⁹² MOFA, "Diplomatic White Paper 2003." https://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_4105/list.do

¹⁹³ MOFA, "Diplomatic White Paper 1999." https://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_4105/list.do

¹⁹⁴ MOFA, "Diplomatic White Paper 2001." https://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_4105/list.do

abroad and supported cultural exchanges with other countries by signing cultural agreements and actively participating in cultural-related international organizations.¹⁹⁵ Taking advantage of the 10th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Korea and China, the Korean government designated 2002 as the 'Korea-Chinese National Exchange' and strengthened friendly relations between the two countries by organizing various cultural events.¹⁹⁶ In addition, as part of the 2002 Korea-Japan World Cup as well as the 2002 Busan Asian Games, the Korean government promoted the performances of traditional dance groups in foreign countries such as Italy and Belgium. The aim was to improve Korea's national image, so the National Dance Team also promoted the Busan Asian Games event by organizing an Asia tour.¹⁹⁷ The Korean government particularly attached importance to youth exchange programs, since their purpose was to enable young Koreans to interact with other young people from all over the world. Thus, Korean youth could have an international understanding and perspective. In addition, young people from foreign countries would also experience Korea directly. In 1998, the Korean government exchanged six hundred people with China, Japan, Finland, Chile and Saudi Arabia. In 1999, ten thousand Korean youth took a short 4-night trip to Japan.¹⁹⁸ In addition to the Korean Cultural Centres in Tokyo, New York, Los Angeles, and Paris, the Korean government established cultural public relations departments in major countries, including the US, Japan, Russia, and China. These institutions would undertake overseas promotion of Korea.¹⁹⁹ As of December 31, 1999, Korea held joint cultural

¹⁹⁵ MOFA, "Diplomatic White Paper 2003." https://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_4105/list.do

¹⁹⁶ MOFA, "Diplomatic White Paper 2003." https://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_4105/list.do

¹⁹⁷ MOFA, "Diplomatic White Paper 2003." https://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_4105/list.do

¹⁹⁸ MOFA, "Diplomatic White Paper 1999." https://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_4105/list.do

¹⁹⁹ MOFA, "Diplomatic White Paper 1999." https://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_4105/list.do

meetings in 24 countries, including China, Japan, Russia and England, through the Joint Cultural Committee.²⁰⁰ The Korean government also supported research projects on Korean studies to instil a correct perception of Korea in the international community. The goal was to support systematic academic research activities in various fields, such as Korea's history, politics, economy, and culture. Korea aimed to educate Korean experts and friendly staff in the international community. Hence, the government promoted Korean-related courses, libraries, museums, as well as academic research institutes overseas through the Korea Foundation of the Foreign Affairs and Trade Ministry. It also provided scholarship opportunities to academics from foreign countries interested in Korean studies. The support area expanded from the US to Asia and Europe. Since December 1999, Korean Studies began to be supported by 68 overseas universities and research institutes in 32 countries. Korean language courses were also offered at 307 universities. In addition, “Korean Studies Centres” were established in 26 locations in eight countries to carry out comprehensive academic research activities related to Korea.²⁰¹ Furthermore, through the Korea Foundation, a Korean gallery was established in museums abroad, and contemporary art exhibitions were organized to promote Korean culture regularly.²⁰²

In short, Korea realized the activities of other countries to secure their own cultural identity due to globalization and accepted the twenty first century as the term for culture. The Kim government also noticed that the culture industry is a new branch of the economy that provides high value-added to the national and world economies. Therefore, Korea used the cultural industry both to contribute to

²⁰⁰ MOFA, “Diplomatic White Paper 2000.” https://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_4105/list.do

²⁰¹ MOFA, “Diplomatic White Paper 2000.” https://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_4105/list.do

²⁰² MOFA, “Diplomatic White Paper 2002.” https://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_4105/list.do

the national image and to attract foreign investors by encouraging exports. During the Kim Dae-jung era, Korean cultural diplomacy had four main aspects: strengthening the national image, increasing foreign competitiveness, promoting Korean culture via political and economic diplomacy, and finally organizing cultural exchange activities.²⁰³ All this awareness eventually led to the formation of a Korean Cultural PD.

²⁰³ MOFA, "Diplomatic White Paper 2002." https://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_4105/list.do

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

After the end of Imperial Japanese rule in 1945, Korean cultural activities and politics had the intention of reconstructing of the country. Since the first republic of Korea which was established by Syngman Rhee in 1948, Korean politicians' goals were to build a national identity, preserve Korean traditions and values, and protect Korean culture against Japanese culture. Thus, until the 1990s, the Korean government assumed the role of protecting and defending the national public interest. The administration took measures to prevent the free entry of foreign cultures, especially Japanese culture.²⁰⁴

Japanese colonialism had a profound effect on Koreans. Like Park Chung-hee, most Koreans were brought up under Japan's stern and over-controlling government at the time. However, this life experience led to nationalist feelings of Park, during his regime, Park created his cultural policies under the effect of these nationalist feelings. In my research, I shared that some of the policies I referred to during the Park period were similar to cultural activities in Japan. In addition, I remarked on the existence of a Japanese figure, Sejima, in both the Park period and the Chun period. Frankly, being acquainted with Japan and the Japanese is understandable in terms of these two leaders since they lived their childhood and youth period under Japanese Imperial rule. Although these Korean leaders were also inspired by the Japanese Imperial administration style and assimilation policy, they tried to create national and cultural awareness for the progress of South Korea. Especially, Park's goal was always very clear. It would revive the

²⁰⁴ Yim, "Cultural Identity and Cultural Policy in South Korea", 42.

spirit of nationalism among the Korean people and create a consciousness of unity. Thus, the Korean people would act collectively for the development of the country. In order to realize all these, Park benefited from cultural policies and cultural values. In other words, policies designed to create a national culture were important tools for developing a sense of belonging and loyalty within the nation. In addition, Park believed that the maintenance of cultural values contributed to nationalism and loyalty to the state. In this way, he would be able to strengthen his own authority, too.

On the other hand, Korean governments realized that they could not completely direct the cultural preferences of their citizens, especially as a result of developments both around the world and in Korea. The old, passive diplomacy or closed-door diplomacy became insufficient, so governments gradually changed their policies according to the dynamics of the age. In 1998, Kim Dae-jung allowed the entrance of Japanese culture into Korea. At the same time, he determined that the development of the country's cultural industries was a national goal.²⁰⁵ In an interview of Mokpo MBC News in 2007, President Kim expressed his thoughts on his initiatives as follows:

We must open our doors to Japanese culture. Cultural isolation is a road that trundler the country to destruction. Our culture develops by struggling with other cultures. When I opened the doors to Japanese culture, they criticized it, but if we had such a weak culture, Korean culture should have disappeared immediately. Since our culture is durable, it was not adversely affected by this situation. In fact, Japanese culture encouraged us, and we created "Hallyu", which also influenced Japan. When I see things like this, if Korea continues to improve culture and tourism creatively, I think, there will be a global growth in culture in the 21st century. There is democracy in Korea, there is economic development, there is cultural capacity. Now, Korean cultural products are preferred because they are beautiful, good and solid. If we evaluate these well, I think that it will be a very good resource for cultural development, state power and national development. (Kim Dae-jung, personal communication, 2007, own translation)

²⁰⁵Otmagzin, "A Tail that Wags the Dog? Cultural Industry and Cultural Policy in Japan and South Korea", 316.

After 1970-80, the focus of the government shifted to popular culture and cultural industries. KOCCA and the Korea Asian Foundation for Cultural Exchange (KOFACE) played an important role in setting and implementing the government's policy towards the cultural industries. These two institutions were tasked with increasing the competitiveness of the country's cultural industries abroad. In addition, the Culture Industry Bureau of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism was responsible for implementing Korean cultural policies. The Ministry of Information and Communications provided IT for the country's cultural industry.²⁰⁶ Finally, the Korea International Cultural Association (KICA) was transformed into KF under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1991 owing to globalization policies. In 1994, KF was not only responsible for providing grants to graduate students interested in Korean studies but also for the broadcast of Korean TV programs abroad.²⁰⁷

After democracy was established in Korea in the 1990s, governments began to provide financial support for the growth of the culture industry, and it became a main factor of economic growth, innovation, and employment. Thanks to innovation, Korean cultural products became more diverse, such as movies, television series, animation, video games, and music. Thus, these ones formed the basis of the 1990s Hallyu and Korean cultural PD.²⁰⁸

Exporting popular culture products plays a major role in a country's recognition by the rest of the world. Nye incorporates popular culture into a country's ability to attract and influence international audiences. Therefore, since

²⁰⁶Otmagzin, "A Tail that Wags the Dog? Cultural Industry and Cultural Policy in Japan and South Korea", 316.

²⁰⁷Abduazimov, "Public Diplomacy: Reappraising the South Korean Case through an Evolutionary Approach", 92.

²⁰⁸Kwon and Kim, "From Censorship to Active Support: The Korean State and Korea's Cultural Industries", 517.

the late 1990s, Korea rapidly increased its export of cultural products. If we express the first wave of Hallyu as H1, H1 started to spread to East Asian countries in the early 2000s and reached the whole of Asia in 2007. The cultural products of this period were generally films and series. The H2, the second wave, started in 2007 and expanded its geographical area. Cultural products included K-pop and gaming industry. The new products that emerged were shared more actively through social media and ICT.²⁰⁹ Thus, over time, Hallyu became a cultural PD tool that succeeded in the rise of Korea's popularity abroad.

Nye claims that PD using soft power sources helps a country maintain its power in the international community.²¹⁰ In fact, the reason for the Korean government to include PD in its foreign policy is that the country's hard power is lower than other countries such as China and Japan. Therefore, the Korean government adopted soft power and PD as a resource to rise competitiveness at the regional and global level.²¹¹ The globalization trend as well as the emergence of IT after the Cold War also positively affected Korea's interest in PD. Thus, Korean governments laid the foundations of PD since the 1990s by highlighting the cultural tools within the scope of Nye's concept of soft power. However, factors such as the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis and Kim Dae-jung's realization of cultural exports made it possible to implement Korean PD more seriously during the Kim Dae-jung period.

In particular, the Kim administration believed that thanks to soft power, foreign countries could restore confidence in Korea, which was shaken by the

²⁰⁹Abduazimov, "Public Diplomacy: Reappraising the South Korean Case through an Evolutionary Approach", 96.

²¹⁰Cho, Public Diplomacy and South Korea's Strategies, 281.

²¹¹ Abduazimov, "Public Diplomacy: Reappraising the South Korean Case through an Evolutionary Approach", 101.

1997 crisis. Therefore, he aimed to achieve more positive public opinion and credibility abroad. In fact, in the White Paper of 1998, the Kim government stated that, starting from people's adolescence, Korean PD aims to create a positive perception among people about Koreans and culture.²¹² When I evaluate the main objectives of the concept of PD, I can say that Kim Dae-jung's initiatives and policies in the field of culture serve to the emergence of a culture-centred Korean PD. PD helps to improve a nation's image, and it aims to establish a long-term relationship with other nations. It also contributes to the realization of a country's foreign policy goals. In this direction, especially on the basis of the 2002 World Cup, exchange programs between Korea and Japan, cultural exchanges, or the popularity of Korean TV series and Korean singers in Japan are all examples of PD. Moreover, during the Kim period, the exhibition of Korean cultural shows abroad, the support of Korean Studies in foreign universities, the teaching of the Korean language, and the provision of educational scholarships constitute the cultural tools of PD and the soft power of Korea.

In short, the evolution of Korean cultural activities and products into PD was gradual. Syngman Rhee initiated the creation of cultural heritage and adopted a closed-door attempt against Japanese culture, while Park Chung-hee determined policies that supported the anti-communist authoritarian regime against North Korea and mobilized feelings of nationalism and patriotism in the people. Park's aim was the formation of national consciousness. Chun Doo-hwan applied the 3S rule the most, but Roh Tae-woo liberalized the media industry as he was elected by the people's vote after the Yushin. On the other hand, Kim Young-sam integrated the cultural industry into the globalization trend, and finally, Kim Dae-

²¹² MOFA, "Diplomatic White Paper 1998." https://www.mofa.go.kr/www/brd/m_4105/list.do

jung created both a new export area and a foreign policy tool by integrating the cultural industry with technological developments.²¹³ In a nutshell, the Korean governments first developed the cultural industry by providing the construction of cultural identity and then formed the Korean PD by interplaying with other nations. Thus, cultural policies, which were an example of hard power during the colonial period, changed according to the conditions of the time, and turned into a source of soft power.

²¹³ Abduazimov, “Public Diplomacy: Reappraising the South Korean Case through an Evolutionary Approach”, 96.

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