

State Planning Organization and Technocracy
A Review of Planning Documents of 1960-1980 Period

Semih Aras Selim

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Abstract

“State Planning Organization and Technocracy: A Review of Planning Documents of 1960-1980 Period”

Semih Aras Selim, Master’s Candidate at the Atatürk Institute for Modern Turkish History at Boğaziçi University, 2019

Associate Professor Z. Umut Türem, Thesis Advisor

In 1960 State Planning Organization was established to plan Turkey’s road to development. Comprehensive five-year developmental plans that covered social and cultural as well as economic aspects were prepared by a small number of young planners. For their lack of previous civil service experience, and their basis of hiring being technical education, these planners were usually called technocrats of Turkey.

Although there has been voluminous work on DPT, especially by the former planners themselves, the institution’s effectiveness in development, its power vis-à-vis the politicians, and the reasons for Turkey’s failed attempt at being a developed country has been the focus. By looking at the planning documents that received less public attention and therefore contained relatively independent analyses, I seek to understand what planning tried to do rather than was it able to do it.

The focus in analysis is how Turkey’s problems were identified and in what manner solutions were offered. To do so, specialization theses written by planners and special expertise commission reports prepared for five-year plans by non-DPT personnel are reviewed. A comparison between two groups involved in the planning process shows that DPT planners not always had a technocratic approach, and that a technocratic mentality was also observed in non-DPT personnel.

42,000 words

Özet

“Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı ve Teknokrasi: 1960-1980 Dönemi Planlama Dokümanlarının Bir İncelemesi”

Semih Aras Selim, Yüksek Lisans Adayı, 2019

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Doçent Z. Umut Türem, Tez Danışmanı

Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı, 1960 yılında Türkiye'nin kalkınmasını planlamak üzere kuruldu. Az sayıda genç plancı tarafından Türkiye'nin gerek iktisadi gerek sosyal ve kültürel yapısını kapsayan bütüncül beş yıllık kalkınma planları hazırlandı. Geçmiş kamu hizmeti tecrübeleri bulunmaması ve teknik bilgilerine göre işe alınmaları nedeniyle bu plancılar zaman zaman Türkiye'nin teknokratları olarak adlandırıldı.

Bir kısmı eski plancılar tarafından yapılan, DPT üzerine çok sayıda araştırma olmasına rağmen, odak genellikle kurumun kalkınmada etkililiği, siyasetçiler karşısındaki gücü ve Türkiye'nin kalkınmış bir ülke haline gelmesindeki başarısızlığının nedenleri oldu. Bu çalışmada, kamuoyunda daha az ilgi çeken ve bu nedenle görece daha bağımsız analizler içeren planlama belgelerinin incelenmesiyle planlamanın ne kadar başarılı olduğundan ziyade neyi amaçladığı anlaşılmaya çalışılmaktadır.

Çalışmanın odağı Türkiye'nin sorunlarının nasıl tanımlandığı ve çözümlerin ne şekilde formüle edildiğidir. Bunun için plancılar tarafından yazılan uzmanlık tezleri ve beş yıllık planlar için hazırlanan özel ihtisas komisyonu raporları incelenmiştir. Planlamada yer alan iki grup arasındaki bir karşılaştırma, DPT plancılarının her zaman teknokratik bir yaklaşıma sahip olmadıklarını ve teknokratik zihniyetin DPT çalışanları dışında da gözlemlenebildiğini göstermektedir.

42.000 kelime

To those who dreamed for a prosperous
people and believed in science to help this

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

DPT	State Planning Organization
EPD	Economic Planning Department
SPD	Social Planning Department
CD	Coordination Department
RPP	Republican People's Party
TMMOB	Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects
ISI	import-substituting industrialization
NUC	National Union Committee
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation & Development
OEEC	Organisation for European Economic Co-operation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
YPK	High Planning Council
SEE	State Economic Enterprise

Preface

The conception of this thesis dates back to a course by my advisor Umut Türem I took in Atatürk Institute. He suggested that a research on Turkey's economic elites, how they acquire their power, and where they come from may be quite interesting. His inspiration, my fascination of the 1960- 1980 period, and lack of any integral documentation that made the initial endeavor impossible led me to my current topic. Early research sparked my interest in the concept of technocracy. I am indebted to Can Armutçu of Directory of Strategy and Budget, which was Ministry of Development when I first made contact to him and State Planning Organization before that. He helped in my struggle for the planning documents, directed me to the library in Beyazıt, and sent the documents as online copies when I could not find them. Lastly, I am forever indebted to my mother Ayper, father Adnan, and brother Arda, who I hope will never suffer reading this thesis.

Introduction

Ever since the reform movements during the late Ottoman period, Turkey's history contains various attempts to become a modern and developed country. Some of these attempts utilized plans, each more comprehensive and complex than the former. These efforts culminated in the creation of a planning agency in September 1960 when a military coup overthrew the first democratically elected government of the Republic of Turkey. Established four months after the coup d'état of May 1960, State Planning Organization (*Devlet Planlama Teşkilatı*, DPT) was tasked with creating and overseeing development plans that would enable Turkey to attain the annual growth rates set by the government. Initially 7 per cent economic growth was the goal and industrialization, urbanization, and efficiency were the main and interconnected means in this process. Planning was also supposed to foster standards of living in various ways, although such 'social' goals were secondary to rapid growth.

A group of young and brilliant economists proficient in at least one foreign language were hired to conduct sectoral research and make fifteen-year, five-year and annual plans. Planning started and carried on under the supervision of Jan Tinbergen, who was one of the first Nobel Laureates on economics for using mathematical models in economics and an important figure in develop-

mental planning. Since their position stemmed from their technical education¹ instead of traditional public office experience, these planners were usually considered ‘technocrats’².

Ever since its establishment, DPT has been subject of profound public interest, ranging from seeing it the solution to Turkey’s political, social, and economic problems to an attempt from the military to limit the elected governments’ power. Academically, DPT is evaluated within a framework of power: which groups or classes were responsible in its emergence, what influence it had on Turkey’s economic policies, and to what extent developmental planning was successful. This thesis, on the other hand, focuses on the perspective of planning, how it formulated Turkey’s problems, and how solutions were created. Since most work on DPT was written by planners or ex-planners from memory, and analyses from outsiders focus on developments in Turkey, documents that were not directly related to the plans are mostly ignored.

The purpose of this thesis is to test whether the planning language in Turkey was indeed technocratic. To do so, planning documents written by planners and non-planners are analyzed. The comparison shows a somewhat blurrier picture where the planners often diverge significantly from a technocrat outlook whereas people outside the DPT sometimes display a better compliance to technocracy. Apart from constituting a proof against the common conception of planners as technocrats, this finding also hints that rather than technical education or other background traits, planning process itself may be a driving factor for a technocratic outlook. However, the limited scope of this thesis and the fact that often the non-DPT personnel who had part in the planning efforts were elected by the planners themselves makes it difficult to prove this argument. What is more easily observed is that planners and non-planners alike were influenced by general political discussions, and the rising left towards the end of 1970s shows itself in some of DPT’s publications.

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- 1 The connection between a ‘technical’ education and technocracy is further explained in the following chapter. Technical education refers here to an education in economics, finance or engineering rather than that of law or public administration.
 - 2 Even the 1971 cabinet formed after a military intervention that included former DPT planners was popularly dubbed the technocratic government.

§ 1.1 Thesis Outline

The first chapter of this thesis deals merely with the concept of technocracy. A historical narrative of various authors and groups is offered with a side discussion on the background in which they emerge. The expectation from this part is to give the reader a wider sense of technocratic thinking and to act as a substance to the argument that technocratic thinking thrives in environments of crises and uncertainty. The first chapter then moves on to contemporary empirical analyses on technocracy. This part offers two dimensions in analyzing technocracy, i.e. as a source of power and as a way of thinking. After relaying some findings on the technocrats' identity, it discusses both sources of technocratic power and the technocratic mentality. The former dimension receives more detail as the power dimension is not the topic of this thesis. The various aspects of a technocratic mentality are reviewed since it will be revisited in the last two chapters.

The second chapter narrates changing state policies in Turkey since the late Ottoman period. Emphasis is attributed to rational and planned actions. An emerging public plan tradition is carried to the new republic with various attempts. The history up until the formation of the DPT is then followed by a parallel narrative of trends, namely Westernization attempts and the rise of engineers, Keynesian macroeconomic demand management, and worldwide acceptance of planning as a necessary tool. Even though the planners were not necessarily engineers, the latter group played an important part in the advance of planning in Turkey within their task of westernization. Similarly, Turkey's dedicated attempt on import substituting industrialization and dominance of Keynesian macroeconomic demand management were at least contributing factors for institutionalized planning of 1960s and 1970s. These two parts are tied with the last part of the chapter that introduces the planning organization itself. Each five-year plan period is narrated with the socio-economic and political developments of the same time.

After the two review chapters, findings of research are offered. The first research chapter relays the planners' own words. Specialization theses of planners and research conducted by the DPT are transferred within certain themes. First, statements are clustered into frequent technocratic themes to

show how the technocratic mentality is observed among the planners. The second part of the chapter involves non-technocratic themes such as Occidentalism, Kemalism, Marxism, and conservatism; some containing severe political criticisms not observed in a technocratic document. This part contains findings against the common conception of planners as technocrats with no connection to ideologies or politics.

Not only planners were involved in planning. Due to the lack quantitative and qualitative information about various parts, sectors, and institutions of Turkey, special expertise commissions were formed with ‘experts’ from relevant institutions. Civil servants, academics, private sector representatives, and members of non-governmental organizations, these actors produced input for the five-year plans with reports. In the last chapter, with analyses of these reports I wish to make a comparison between planners’ and non-planners’ formulation of and offering solutions to Turkey’s problems. While the limited scope of this thesis does not offer enough evidence to prove it, the hinted argument is that technocratic tone does not stem merely from the planners, but the planning process itself. Commissions are formed for various sectors; they are therefore grouped in four sectors in the thesis. Limiting analyses with four sectors and grouping reports by sectors allows making comparisons among the reports. Since the sectors in which they produce knowledge may have influence in the mentality, comparing reports with themselves may enable to check for this influence.

§ 1.2 A Note on Methodology

Even though the five-year plans were supposed to be out of reach from pressures of interest groups, a competitive election system rendered incumbent governments especially vulnerable vis-à-vis the business and electors. This led to frequent and significant intervention to the tools offered in the plans from outside the DPT. Therefore, any analyses on the strategy documents of the plans themselves would fail in capturing the voice of the planners. To overcome this obstacle, specialization theses of the planners and special expertise commission reports are elected to be the subject of research. These documents

are written as part of a career step and as an input for the planners, respectively. Neither directly influence the plans or annual programs, therefore have no redistributive importance.

A period of 20 years from the establishment of DPT is elected. Although it is by no means argued that DPT was crucial in Turkey's socio-economic developments, it still played a greater role until 24 October decisions were accepted by the government in 1980 and planning was bypassed as a medium in major economic decisions. Henceforth, DPT came to receive ever less attention from the general public as well as the governments. Analyses are also limited to social planning as it yields more space for authors to reflect their perspective. Economic planning documents aim at increasing production, efficiency, and foster industrialization. They are usually classified according to sectors and consist of problem-solving efforts based mostly on numbers. Issues on health, housing, education, and labor on the other hand are more politically loaded. Especially towards the end of the period, number of special expertise commissions on social planning sphere increased greatly with more aspects of social life in Turkey being included into the scope of planning. The issues of housing and regional development, health, education, and labor and social services received attention throughout the period. This fact enables a comparison between different periods. Therefore, special expertise commission reports are sampled from these sectors. Specialization theses were elected judged by their abstracts to fit this pattern, again in order to enable comparison without the hindrance of different topics. Content analysis on these documents are conducted in a qualitative manner. Reports and theses do not obey to a certain form and information is relayed in a unique layout. Any count of words or phrases would be misleading since they are often used in different contexts. For instance, 'better living' could have a welfare approach that emphasizes social planning efforts or used in a technocratic manner that sees it simply a byproduct of increased production, requiring no extra effort. Classification of phrases into themes is shown by frequent quotations in order to

enable the reader to object the classification methods with first-hand information³.

3 The full documents used in this thesis are available at the Beyazıt State Library in İstanbul and İstanbul University library.

A History and Theory of Technocracy

If people eat with a spoon that leaks half its contents between bowl and lip, are they not likely to go hungry?

Edward Bellamy, *Looking Backward: 2000-1887*

Administration, in a technocracy, has to do with material factors which are subject to measurement. Therefore, popular voting can be largely dispensed with. It is stupid deciding an issue by vote or opinion when a yardstick can be used.

Harold Loeb, *Life in a Technocracy: What it Might Be Like*

To clarify the concept of technocracy I will first offer a brief history of technocratic thought within the social contexts that give rise to it, from the French Revolution to the post-World War II era. It will be followed by a review of contemporary history of Turkey in the next chapter, focusing on the intellectual precedence of DPT. In the second half of this chapter, I will review contemporary empirical analyses on technocracy. I will argue that analyses on

technocracy may be located on two dimensions: technocratic power and technocratic thinking. By focusing on the latter, I wish to come up with criteria to locate technocratic mentality of planned Turkey in the third and fourth chapters.

Looking at its etymology, technocracy may mean a form of rule based on technical knowledge. As such, it is a political category together with democracy, oligarchy, or monarchy. In fact, Centeno (1993, p. 313) makes a striking comparison, arguing that by “imposing the domination by an instrumental rationale and scientific method, technocracies are similar to theocratic regimes or states that have explicit, dominant political ideologies. In all these cases, legitimacy comes not from the barrel of a gun or from the ballot box, but from adherence to the dictates of a ‘book.’ Whether that document contains the word of god, a theory of history, or the econometric functions that describe equilibria, those best able to interpret its message and implement its laws cannot take opposition or popular participation into account.”

Rather than a clear-cut distinction between types of political orders, technocracy can also be considered a source of power based on technical and scientific expertise. However, for the purpose of this thesis, more significantly technocracy entails a perspective: it rejects conflict of interests as a motor of progress or a way of allocating sources. It aims at collective good and differs from other such utopias as it does not seek to reach it through a particular social arrangement based on a moral value, such as order, equality, or justice. The goal is replacing existing social structures with scientific and technical principles.

Centeno (1993, p. 309) remarks a long tradition of discussing the possible benefits of government as an “administration of things” as opposed to clash of interest starting from “Plato's Philosopher Kings, through Bacon's New Atlantis and the works of Saint-Simon, Comte, Weber, Veblen, and Mannheim.” As such, technocracy often meets objection for being undemocratic. Gunnell (1982, p. 397) cites three main perspectives on technocracy's impact on politics: The first elitist theory warns against political power's tendency “to gravitate toward technological elites” when expert knowledge and technical skills become necessary. Second is the structural view which adds that the very ad-

vance of technology gives it autonomy and politics become suffocated by systemic determinants. Lastly, the Neo-Marxist critical theory draws attention to the role of consciousness, and how technology and science can become a new ideology masking forms of domination. What is constant is a fear of traditional politics being subverted by instrumental rationality.

On the other hand, Savigear (1971, p. 150) argues that technocracy is not the disappearance of politics “but a change in style resulting from the nature of technological knowledge.” Accounting for the welcoming approaches to technocracy is essential as it has been dreamed of by numerous intellectuals and occasionally called for by various groups. Below, I will offer a parallel story of technocratic thinking and social contexts in which they were born. The evolution of technocratic ideals, the social crises which increase their reception by more people, and the rise and fall of technocratic movements will hopefully make this mentality clearer.

§ 2.1 History of Technocracy and Technocratic Thought

2.1.1 *The First Technocratic Movement: Saint-Simon and his Followers*

The first widespread increase in relevance of technical expertise in politics was a result of the Napoleonic Wars and the Napoleonic Code, which reshaped Europe with ideals of progress, development, rationality, and industry. Apart from the partial destruction of traditional order and creation of modern institutions such as the *École Polytechnique*, this transformation can also be observed in the writings of Claude Henri de Rouvroy, Count of Saint-Simon, who was involved in both the American and French revolutions (Collins & Makowsky, 2014, p. 21) (Ionescu, 1976, p. 12) (Manuel, 1971, p. 236)¹. “The cat-

1 An indirect connection between Saint-Simon and the French Revolution is his intellectual debt to Marquis of Condorcet, a devotee and later a victim of the Revolution. It should also be noted that Saint-Simon opposed both the Jacobins and their ‘heir’ Napoleon for undermining the future of industrial society by hijacking the revolution (Ionescu, 1976, p. 47). He explains the revolutions and destruction of his age with the rising mentality and the social

egorical imperative of Saint-Simonian thought” Carlisle (1974, p. 445) remarks, “was the call to apply the scientific knowledge of competent experts to the problems of society.” Gunnell (1982, p. 394) argues that in the writings of Henri de Saint-Simon, there could be found many properties of a technocratic ideal: “an industrial society wherein an elite class of engineers, scientists, industrialists, and planners systematically apply technical knowledge to the solution of social problems and the creation of a rational social order.” Accordingly, while Francis Bacon’s New Atlantis could be considered the first case of a scientific utopia, Saint-Simon’s work constitutes the first example of pure technocracy².

2.1.1.1 Saint-Simonian Thought

Initially a member of the French Aristocracy and a soldier, Saint-Simon renounced his hereditary titles, adopted the ideals of the French Revolution, and received education in physics and later in physiology (Collins & Makowsky, 2014, p. 17) (Ionescu, 1976, p. 13) (Manuel, 1971, p. 206) (Meriç, 2012, p. 29). In his early writings, Saint-Simon wished to replace theology with reason and metaphysical thinking with positive science (Ionescu, 1976, p. 7) (Göle, 1998, p. 41)³. Science was to be so crucial in the social order that Saint-Simon (1964, p. 21) argued “when the new scientific system has been constructed, a reorganization of the religious, political, ethical and educational system will take place”. Yet knowledge in itself is not transformative. Rather than being contingent, different forms of knowledge are created by certain social groups: while

order not corresponding “with the level of enlightenment” (Saint-Simon, 1964, p. 29). What should follow the revolution per Saint-Simon (1964, p. 69) was “the idea of industry; only there shall we find our safety and the end of the revolution.”

- 2 Among other scholars who make similar points are Putnam (1977, p. 384), who considers Saint-Simon “(t)he first theorist of technocracy”, Ridley (1966, p. 43), who regards the technocrat as “the heir of Saint-Simon” and Carlisle (1974, p. 445) who argues that “Saint-Simonianism invented and exemplified the technocrat.”
- 3 Saint-Simon established the bases of both sociology and socialism according to Meriç (2012) and Göle (1998, pp. 36-38) although Ionescu (1976, p. 6) objects by noting that Saint-Simon knew but did not use neither of these concepts; his focus was instead on the appropriate organization accommodative of the industrial society and a positivist ‘political science’ to find it.

in a military regime theology is the dominant force, technical knowledge flourishes in an industrial regime (Collins & Makowsky, 2014, p. 18) (Ionescu, 1976, p. 49) (Meriç, 2012, p. 132).

Each society has a common purpose, and Saint-Simon argues that industrial society is the first society to take production and industry as its goal, thereby differs from previous ones. The path to higher material wealth was paved by science (Manuel, 1971, p. 216) and “a Plan”, based on scientific rationality, which “should embrace all the activities of the society” (Ionescu, 1976, p. 44). Saint-Simon (1964, p. 6) conveys this message to the masses by comparing England where “the workers in towns and even in the country eat meat every day” due to high literacy rate and scientists receiving more respect than the King, with Russia where peasants have very low standards of living and “if a scientist displeases the emperor, they cut off his nose and ears and send him to Siberia.”

Even though Saint-Simon had many revisions in his ideas⁴, opposing idleness, innate privileges and destruction, praising production and work, and seeking out the social arrangement supportive of production has been constant in his thinking (Ionescu, 1976, p. 29) (Meriç, 2012, p. 53). An elite group of scientists and artists were to take power from those who destroy and use this power to increase production (Meriç, 2012, p. 30). Saint-Simon used the metaphor of bees and hornets to explain the division between the producers and the ruling idle class. The former (merchants, industrialists, farmers, bankers, scholars, artists, civil servants and workers) are essential for the wellbeing of all and should be the only class that exists, the complete disappearance of the latter (priests, soldiers, non-working property owners) on the other hand, would not be detrimental, but even helpful to the progress of sciences and fine arts (Ionescu, 1976, p. 52) (Meriç, 2012, p. 61) (Saint-Simon, 1964, p. 74).

4 Ionescu (1976, p. 7) argues that Saint-Simon “genuinely thought” that he was “proposing a neutral, value free, system” which “is why, for instance, he indulged in the otherwise doubtful practice of offering his ‘system’ to everybody who exercised power in France after the fall of the Jacobins and of their heir Napoleon (...) He offered it to the Congress of Vienna; he offered it to Charles X, he offered it to Louis XVIII.” As will be shown later in the chapter, claim to neutrality and the alleged ability to work with various political groups is a prevalent tendency within technocratic thinking.

2.1.1.2 Saint-Simon's Disciples

A common fear towards technocracy stems from the prospect of political institutions' decline vis-à-vis a technical elite. This alert seems to have some merit considering Saint-Simon's (1976, p. 108) definition of politics as "*the science of production*" and his envision of a parliament of technocratic experts replacing political institutions (Gunnel, 1982, p. 394). Pursuit of 'local' or particular interests "which benefit a part of humanity at the expense of the rest" are one of the main problems of his day according to Saint-Simon (1964, p. 9), whereas "there is but one interest common to the whole of humanity, the progress of sciences."

Despise towards politics took a more striking shape after Saint-Simon. His disciples reemphasized the importance of governance, but they envisioned a different style. While Saint-Simon advised the industrial class to promptly unite in a political party and struggle in politics to assert industrialist ideas and transform politics, his follower later renounced this optimism (Ionescu, 1976, p. 44) (Savigear, 1971, p. 155). It became clear to them after their efforts that their movement could not have direct political control. Liberalism and fundamental democratic traditions such as the parliamentary politics were seen divisive, whereas they believed in cooperation rather than competition (Carlisle, 1974, p. 447). Thus, a dictatorship was useful both in uniting the people and giving the technocrats increased importance (Savigear, 1971, p. 156).

As with views on politics, in terms of social conflict and harmony there exist some significant differences between Saint-Simon and his followers, but they also share some core ideas (Ionescu, 1976, p. 21). Both had "the implication that technology would change the work of government by increasing its administrative tasks, and would reduce the extent of political controversy. This confidence was based upon a number of assumptions, the most fundamental being that the improvements and expansion of industry, and corresponding developments in banking and commerce, would benefit all sectors of society and would not take place at the expense of any, unless it were the 'oisifs' (non-producers) who had no claim upon the rest of society. Conflict would thus not result from industrial progress" (Savigear, 1971, p. 150).

2.1.1.3 Legacy of the First Wave

Saint-Simonians continued to work intensively between 1825 and 1832, always attracting public attention and at one point being “the dominant intellectual movement of Paris, consequently of Europe” until being dispersed in 1833 out of internal conflicts, lack of financial resources, and incarceration of some members (Carlisle, 1974, p. 452). Just as how Saint-Simon’s thinking emerged during the intellectual crisis of the French Revolution, Saint-Simonians also influenced the following developments, especially during the Second Empire (Collins & Makowsky, 2014, p. 16) (Ionescu, 1976, p. 12) (Maier, 1970, p. 39) (Manuel, 1971, p. 136). “The possibilities envisaged in the Saint-Simonian writings of the Restoration and the July Monarchy were partly realized during the Second Empire. Many former disciples were associated with the expansion of banking, railways and industry which came with the Empire of the second Napoleon. They were not formally associated together and yet the projects of the period are in the spirit of the *Producteur* of 1825 and 1826” (Savigear, 1971, p. 157).

It is difficult to measure what influence Saint-Simon and his followers had on politics and social relations. Many former Saint-Simonian engineers took part in building railways, the creation of a new European banking system, contributing to the Suez Canal project as well as some social reforms concerning workers, women, and Algerian administration (Carlisle, 1974, p. 464) (Collins & Makowsky, 2014, p. 20) (Manuel, 1971, p. 129). Yet they did not reshape the civilization according to their vision. Nonetheless, this line of thinking was far from being forgotten. In fact, about a century later, another movement was to take place across the Atlantic Ocean.

2.1.2 *Technocracy in the USA*

As in France, the emergence of technocratic ideas followed crises in the USA, albeit economic rather than social ones. Commercial and industrial forces came to enjoy a significant influence on affairs after the Civil War, which provoked wide range of criticism towards the perceived corruption in US politics (Weinstein, 1968, p. 3). The post-war boom left behind a depression in 1870s, the longest in the US history, yet it was milder and decreased investments were

alleviated by rising commerce (Wiebe, 1967, p. 1). After a series of wage cuts, one final cut in July 1877 caused the first national strike in the USA, with migrants and slum dwellers rising up, to be easily suppressed (Weinstein, 1968, p. 4) (Wiebe, 1967, p. 10). However, the railroad industry which caused the crisis in 1870s was still competing in a way undesirable by the business owners. This resulted in another depression in mid-1890s, deepened by hastened decisions. This time, however, it caused rising unemployment and slowing commerce and manufacture.

2.1.2.1 Edward Bellamy and Early Signs of a New Mentality

Most of the time, reactions to these crises were far from being radical and novelist. Instead, they focused on one specific issue which was, most of the time, trying to strengthen non-partisan and meritocratic civil service to prevent parasitic politics (Wiebe, 1967, p. 61). There were also critics who did not try to fix the one fault in the system but to transform the system itself, among which was the prominent figure Edward Bellamy (Negley & Patrick, 1952, p. 76) (Wiebe, 1967, p. 138).

Bellamy's book, "the most popular utopian tract in American history" according to Wiebe (1967, p. 44) is written from the perspective of a late nineteenth century Boston elite who wakes up from a trance in the year 2000. It yields a comparison between Bellamy's perception of his time and his expectations from the future. "The nation (...) organized as the one great business corporation in which all other corporations were absorbed (...) became the one capitalist in the place of all other capitalists" during "a process which only needed to complete its logical evolution to open a golden future to humanity" (Bellamy, 1917, p. 41). Perhaps as an indicator of inspiration, early on in his book, Bellamy (1917, p. 8) mentions the Panic of 1873, describing the world of his day with constant strikes, high unemployment and turnout rate. The problematization of his day are twofold. The first issue is the socio-economic and moral order:

Selfishness was their only science, and in industrial production selfishness is suicide. Competition, which is the instinct of selfishness, is another word for dissipation of energy, while combination is the secret of efficient production; and not till the idea of increasing the individual

hoard gives place to the idea of increasing the common stock can industrial combination be realized, and the acquisition of wealth really begin (Bellamy, 1917, p. 199).

Another item wherein we save is the disuse of money and the thousand occupations connected with financial operations of all sorts, whereby an army of men was formerly taken away from useful employments. (...) Again, consider that there are no idlers now, rich or poor – no drones.

Our statisticians calculate that one eightieth part of our workers suffices for all the processes of distribution which in your day required one eighth of the population, so much being withdrawn from the force engaged in productive labor (Bellamy, 1917, p. 185).

Quotations above constitute examples against Wiebe's (1967, p. 139) remarks about Bellamy and his contemporaries from various dispositions, which states that after facing the problems of their age, "they gravitated naturally back toward the life of town, and sometimes in strange disguises, they sought to preserve that world in modern America. An abstracted individual, their social atom, was the ultimate object of salvation." On the contrary, sharing Saint-Simon's condemnation of egoism, Bellamy objects the conception of atomic individual, and proposes something beyond village values. The answer was not going back to the traditional isolated farm-town communities but pursuing a new order that ensured wealth for all, which takes us to the second aspect of his analysis. Perhaps due to the influence of Marxism, social order is not enough for him, there also had to be a significant increase in wealth:

Nevertheless, all the waste of all the rich, were it saved, would go but a little way to cure the poverty of the world. There was so little to divide that even if the rich went share and share with the poor, there would be but a common fare of crusts, albeit made very sweet then by brotherly love.

The folly of men, not their hard-heartedness, was the great cause of the world's poverty. It was not the crime of man, nor of any class of

men, that made the race so miserable, but a hideous ghastly mistake, a colossal world-darkening blunder (Bellamy, 1917, p. 269)

Apart from the village values, this utopia could also be likened to socialist ones especially after noting the Marxist influence in its emphasis on degree of material production. To indicate its distinction from socialism, one can look at the role socialists played during this transformation. As Bellamy (1917, p. 205) calls them “the followers of the red flag (...) had nothing to do with” the transformation “except hinder it”, further than that, they are considered to be subsidized by those who were against the reforms as their actions and arguments stood in the way. Similarly, the party that carried out these reforms was not any labor party as “their basis as merely class organizations was too narrow”; there had to emerge a new National Party (Bellamy, 1917, p. 206). Therefore, “a rearrangement of the industrial and social system on a higher ethical basis and for the more efficient production of wealth, was recognized as the interest, not of one class, but equally of all classes (...) Then the national party rose to carry it out by political methods” (Bellamy, 1917, p. 207). Rather than a reactionary dream or a variety of Marxism, what Bellamy proposes seems to be a technocratic ideal, albeit with a strong communitarian tone, in which radical social reform is proposed to ensure the efficient functioning of an industrial army (Negley & Patrick, 1952, p. 78).

Bellamy’s contemporaries appreciated his prophetic ideals and ‘Nationalist Clubs’ emerged across the USA, Bellamy becoming the ideological leader as a journal editor (Negley & Patrick, 1952, p. 76) (Weinstein, 1968, p. 4) (Wiebe, 1967, p. 71). Yet there was no overarching change resulting from these movements: various reform movements of the 1880s faded away, only some cooperative communal experiments with religious or socialist values remained, and for a brief time (Wiebe, 1967, p. 105). Still, challenges were being directed towards the then prevalent classical social theory, which combined the works of Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and Charles Darwin. When the classical social theory was weakened, what Wiebe (1967, p. 145) calls a “bureaucratic” theory emerged around 1900. It tried to make the new urban and industrial world predictable and efficient, and through the education of masses it strived to achieve a uniform, rational mindset. In terms of giving way to the technocratic mentality of the next decades, more importantly it changed the

meaning of science. Now, “science referred to a grand design whose fundamental principles men could comprehend and apply. (...) Science had become a procedure, or an orientation, rather than a body of results” (Wiebe, 1967, p. 147).

2.1.2.2 Taylor, Veblen, and the Engineer

An ardent supporter of the principles of scientific management was Frederick W. Taylor, another frequently mentioned figure in technocratic thinking. Young Taylor forewent his law education out of his doctor’s warning on his deteriorating eyesight and became an industrial worker. As he became fascinated with a talk by Henry Towne in 1886 called *The Engineer as Economist*, his search for efficiency began.

According to Göle (1998, p. 9) the industrial society and the engineering ideology are connected, as engineers propagated development outside of the production process, this led to the idea of social engineering. Taylor shares one of the main purposes of Saint-Simon, that is, replacing arbitrariness with industrial principles. Saint-Simon makes a call to all producers apart from the idle class, rentiers and aristocrats. Seeking the “one best way” of production, Taylor only addresses engineers (Göle, 1998, p. 41), arguing that management is an issue of engineering, and the engineer’s role is first and foremost one of managing, to maximize the employer’s welfare by maximizing each employee’s welfare (Maier, 1970, p. 30); (Köse & Öncü, 2000, p. 29) (Wiebe, 1967, p. 151). For him, engineering is not merely about coming up with technical solutions to physical problems, but also doing this in the most economical way possible (Köse & Öncü, 2000, p. 50). Denying the false idea of a conflict between employers and employees, Taylor sees scientific management to be in the interest of the whole society, and that the task of enlightening the masses against this false perception falls to the engineers and managers. The ideas Taylor was spreading had great appeal in the USA during the Progressive era as well as by Lenin in the aftermath of the October Revolution (Maier, 1970, p. 32;50).

A contrasting view on the role of the engineer comes from Thorstein Veblen, whose *The Engineers and the Price System* published as a book in 1921 “came to be regarded by many as the manifesto of technocracy” (Elsner, 1967,

p. 19). Even though social conflict is not absent in his works, Veblen (1954, 53) argues that when it comes to “material welfare, all the civilized peoples have been drawn together by the state of the industrial arts into a single going concern.”

Veblen inspects various kinds of sabotage, that is hindering production and efficiency, and notes that industry cannot function at full capacity in a society under the price system as it supports the ‘vested interests’ of business by maximizing profits but not efficiency (Gould, 1966, p. 17) (Hobson, 1963, pp. 75-76) (Veblen, 1954, p. 9). Veblen (1954, p. 27) carries his criticism of the price system to its implications of factors of production which have traditionally been considered “land, labor, and capital” simply because sources of income have been “rent, wages, and profit.” This perspective neglects the role of the industrial arts as these do not yield visible income to any particular class. By its nature, this accumulating body of knowledge is collective and rarely claimable by individuals. Rather, it contributes to available resources to and production efficiency of the whole society, as much as the business class allows (Veblen, 1954, p. 30).

Veblen (1954, p. 44) observes an increase in number and position of industrial experts, “because the system will no longer work at all without them.” While the industrial society is capable of increasing welfare and the engineer is the chief actor in this process, they are hampered by “the commercial interests of the absentee owners” (Veblen, 1954, p. 163), who are not interested in material wealth but rather with its monetary equivalent (Greenwald, 1979, p. 631) (Hobson, 1963, p. 134) (Köse & Öncü, 2000, p. 30) (Wiebe, 1967, p. 153). Similar to Saint-Simon’s dichotomy of bees and hornets, there exists a conflict between ‘workmanship’ instinct of producers and ‘predatory’ instinct of pecuniary powers, which is a psychological as well as economic and political division (Hobson, 1963, p. 185) (Layton, Veblen and the Engineers, 1962, p. 65). Veblen’s main focus is on the existence of this ‘leisure class’, a group of people who are able to consume without producing and symbolize success in the society. As the existence of this class is detrimental to welfare of society in general, Veblen seeks to abolish it (Köse & Öncü, 2000, p. 58). Not only should the leisure class be left out of politics, politics itself should stay out of industrial

policy as it “should plainly be left out to the discretion of the general staff of production engineers” (Veblen, 1954, p. 55).

A quick comparison between Taylor and Veblen would highlight their positions vis-à-vis the business class. The former sees no clash of interest between the capitalist, the engineer, and society in general. As such, Köse and Öncü (2000) argue that the engineer serves the capitalist in Taylor’s conception, the primary goal being the highest possible production from each worker. Veblen has a different role for the engineers compared to Taylor: his social engineering requires that the engineers ascend to political power with criteria about industrial efficiency and lay bare their opinions about “facts” (Göle, 1998, p. 44). More than that, as the only group capable of sustaining modern industry “on whose due working depends the material welfare of all civilized peoples” they should collaborate on a shared understanding by forming a ‘Soviet of technicians’ (Veblen, 1954, p. 53). He considers both the price system and the business class standing opposed to the collective good, that is, greater overall wealth, therefore could be considered closer to a Marxist view. Indeed, both Marx and Veblen consider economic systems part of a historical progress, social and political systems as reflecting changes in the organization of material production, and accept a conflict between owners and producers (Hobson, 1963, p. 66). Nonetheless, contradiction results from alienation and exploitation of the workers for Marx whereas for Veblen it is “between a new, scientific rationality (...) and physically irrelevant notions of value, price, and profit derived from obsolete ideas of ownership” (Elsner, 1967, p. 18).

Starting in 1870s, various thinkers and social movements criticized existing disorganized and inefficient administration and piecemeal reforms took place in the USA. After almost half a century, the greatest leap forward towards the new complex organization took place during the final years of the First World War, when numerous parts of the economy in the USA became organized very quickly (Wiebe, 1967, p. 293). The technocratic movement in the USA came about in this context.

2.1.2.3 Engineers Rising: The Technocratic Movement

While some scholars, e.g. Allen (1933, p. 175) and Gunnell (1982, p. 393) contend that the term technocracy was first used in 1919 by William Smyth, a mechanical engineer from the USA, Segal (1996, p. xii) notes that the technocratic movement acknowledged the word dated at least back to 1882. Nonetheless, the term gained popularity in 1930s after the Great Depression, when it was adopted by a movement.

Based on his observations of the revolutionary turn against business groups in American Society of Mechanical Engineers as early as 1919, Veblen (1954, p. 71) noticed the forming of a ‘class consciousness’ among the engineers which focused mostly on the waste and confusion in industry (Layton, 1962, p. 68). Initially called the Technical Alliance, a group of engineers started the *Energy Survey of North America*. The movement gained momentum and fame after the Great Depression which occurred, according to them, because prices have been controlling production and distribution, hence millions were unemployed and machinery stood idle (Allen, 1933, p. 178) (Elsner, 1967, p. 32) (Gould, 1966, p. 13) (The Science News-Letter, 1933, p. 51). Especially in the year 1932 when the depression was most severe, Technocracy drew a lot of public attention and influenced the American imagination (Elsner, 1967, p. 1) (Maier, 1970, p. 60).⁵

The movement was initiated by a group of engineers and technicians with a goal of social reform, influenced from Edward Bellamy’s novel *Looking Backward: 2000-1887* as well as the writings of Veblen, and gained considerable notoriety. While capitalism, the result of the first machines, aimed at personal gain and monetary wealth, “[t]he object of technocracy is to satisfy fully the material needs of each member of the community at a minimum expense of human effort” (Loeb, 1996, pp. 44-45). Their “aim was to abolish corrupt politics and an obsolete economic system and expand administrative and technical rationality” (Gunnell, 1982, p. 393), and sharing Veblen’s despise towards “the superstitious importance attached to money” (Hobson, 1963, p. 82), considered the

5 The same year, Literary Digest (1932, p. 5 as cited in Segal 1996, ix) declared that “Technocracy is all the rage. All over the country it is being talked about, explained, wondered at, praised, damned.”

replacement of the price system by a planned control inevitable (Allen, 1933, p. 182) (Weishaar, 1933, p. 121). Harold Loeb, one of the early members of the technocratic movement, conveys how he “was struck by the logic of treating the production and distribution of wealth as an engineering problem” when Howard Scott first told him about technocracy (Loeb, 1996, p. xliii).

Like Veblen and Marx, the Technocratic Movement also had a materialistic conception of history. Their variable was usage of energy resources: unchanging level of energy usage per capita meant no social change. Domestication of animals had been a key step according to this perspective, yet humanity had been stagnating until the middle of the eighteenth century, since human labor had been predominant whether in slavery or freedom (Allen, 1933, p. 178) (Elsner, 1967, p. 31) (Loeb, 1996, p. 8). Instead of ‘unscientific’ monetary values, the group used physical terms such as ‘man-hours’ and ‘energy hours’ depending how advanced the economy is (Allen, 1933, p. 185) (Loeb, 1996, p. 12) (Segal, 1996, p. xiii) (Weishaar, 1933, p. 126). The movement later was split into two rival organizations: Howard Scott’s Technocracy Inc. which took the lower-class members and focused only on economic issues and the Continental Committee on Technocracy that attracted the more well-to-do members and emphasized social and cultural aspects of the society as well (Elsner, 1967, p. 36).

Apart from the popular accusations of being inhuman and undemocratic (Carleton, 1965-1966, p. 488), there were also many engineers who criticized the group harshly. William Smyth himself being one of them, accused the group of surrounding the concept of technocracy “with false doctrine” (*The Science News-Letter*, 1933, p. 63). It is also important to note that according to Elsner (1967, p. 215), aside from the initial stages, the technocratic movement was not primarily an engineer movement, similar to how Marx was not a proletarian and Veblen not an engineer. More to the point, the movement actually declined during the very moment of history when the type of experts mentioned in the doctrines enjoyed an increase in their numbers as well as importance. Just as with Saint-Simonians, in time the Technocratic movement drifted away from memory, chiefly because as creating employment for those replaced by machines became a more pressing issue than increasing material

wealth, hostility towards advertising, sales and other non-productive sectors started to retain less attention (Gould, 1966, p. 24).

2.1.3 *'The End of Ideology' and Technocracy's Rise in the World*

After the World War II, an 'end of ideology' thesis came to the fore principally in the USA and in the West in general (Kleinberg, 1973, p. 5). Adherents of this theory argued that politics has declined as a consensus was reached between the Left and the Right that state intervention, welfare measures, and collective bargaining was necessary. In the new post-industrial age, extremist parties on both sides almost disappeared and political parties were not representative of class interests. Carleton (Carleton, 1965-1966, p. 489) argues that after the World War II "the chief instrument for improving living standards was machine technology and not any particular ideological system." More than that, ideological conflict was becoming increasingly unlikely due to machine technology. Furthermore, Ionescu (1976, p. 4) highlights a revival in interest towards Saint-Simon's works in early 1970s out of three main reasons: the role of private capital and the capitalist declining due to nationalization and professional management, an increasing gap between technical-managerial elites vis-à-vis the organized labor and modern industrial decision-making being highly participatory and group-based.

The period indeed witnessed a spread of technical methods in state policies and social planning in the developed world. In the USA, the shift of power from traditional politics to a technical elite perceived as heralds of progress and representatives of collective rather than particular interests was also aided by the "military-technocratic sector" containing communism (Kleinberg, 1973, p. 40) in the "post-Sputnik years" when scientists were deified (Greenwald, 1979, p. 639). Gould (1966, p. 89) also contends that World War II and particularly the atomic bomb increased the engineers' position as well as the acceptance of research and development replacing the fear out of monetary concerns towards it. However, Kleinberg (1973, p. 41) argues that traditional institutions merely absorbed technical experts and utilized their knowledge, and that what the end of ideology thesis expresses is a yearning for central administrative mechanisms overriding private interests.

The post-World War II period witnessed a growth in income levels across the world and expanding manufacture output in the North was followed by a decrease in the rate of industrial employment, increasing ratio of tertiary sectors (Carleton, 1965-1966, p. 488)(Kleinberg, 1973, p. 44). From 1930s on, rising importance and prevalence of education among the elites as well as the masses, especially technical education, has been a striking and commonplace feature across the world (Galbraith, 2007, p. 4) (Putnam, 1977, p. 384). There was especially a rise of natural and social sciences, with a relative decline of law degrees. Gould (1966, p. 57) estimates that from mid-eighteenth century onwards, the number of scientific or technical-minded individuals increased exponentially, doubling every decade at around 7 per cent per annum: the twentieth century also witnessed a broadening of scientific base and even higher productivity due to industrial research. The USA exhibited a contrasting picture compared to the past and contemporary European cases as 90 per cent of the top officers in 600 leading companies came from middle or lower-income groups (Gould, 1966, p. 79). Similar trends were observed in socialist countries as well as Western Europe, the USSR having surpassed the USA in terms of technical labor force by 1960 (Gould, 1966, p. 107). Apart from the decreasing importance of social background in University education, a parallel transformation was the spread of a dedication to uniform scientific reason and view of the self as an impartial figure, above specific interests (Maier, 1970, p. 30) (Larson, 1972-1973, p. 8). This led more scholars to consider the possible effects of advances in technology on politics (Carleton, 1965-1966, p. 487) (Manuel, 1971, p. 217) (Laird, 1990, p. 50).

§ 2.2 Contemporary Theories of Technocracy

Notwithstanding minor disagreements, there seems to be two major attitudes towards technocracy in popular usage as well as the literature. “Some have hailed technocracy as the wise and disinterested rule of philosopher-kings, whereas others have fulminated against technocrats as despots of a new and peculiarly inhuman sort”, Putnam (1977, p. 383) summarizes. Attitudes towards the prospective rise of technocracy is often connected with a parallel

view on the advance of science and technology: either heralded for social development and solving centuries old problems or approached with caution or even warning. In the former attitude, technocrats are seen crucial since in their absence the industrial system would not function while for the latter attitude, increasing importance of technical knowledge in social matters means more power “to scientific and technical elites, people unanswerable to the democratic process” (Laird, 1990, p. 50). Although the review in the previous part aids in understanding the historical development of technocracy and the situations in which it thrives, empirical analyses help better in creating nuances and coming up with ways to differentiate a technocratic tone in a text from its rivals.

There is no fundamental variance in the exact definition of technocracy, Ridley (1966, p. 36) simply remarks that it “means government by technicians” and Carleton (1965-1966, p. 494) draws attention to the shift of power: the “trend of the technocratic society is away from vital decision-making by electoral, party, and parliamentary processes and toward decision-making by administrators flanked by specialists and technicians.” Elsner (1967, p. 216) focuses on the ideological aspect and proposes that “technocracy might be conceived as one specific form of technical-managerial ideology.” Gunnell (1982, p. 392) unites the two groups: “technocracy has been taken to mean the government (or control) of society by scientists, technicians, or engineers-or at least the exercise of political authority by virtue of technical competence and expertise in the application of knowledge.” Centeno (1993, p. 314), on the other hand, offers an ideal-typical definition of technocracy: “*The administrative and political domination of a society by a state elite and allied institutions that seek to impose a single, exclusive policy paradigm based on the application of instrumentally rational techniques.*” This perspective differs as it also focuses on the nature of decision-making process rather than only the decision-makers. As I will argue below, technocracy can be analyzed on two dimensions: a source of power based on technical and scientific expertise or a way of formulating social problems and devising solutions to them. In the following sections, I will first review comparative analyses on technocrats themselves, then move on to empirical work on the sources of technocratic power. Moving on to the other dimension of technocracy, I will present studies on technocrats’

attitudes. Lastly, I will offer one final case of ‘technocratization’ of an issue, which introduces dynamisms into the picture and blurs the line between technocratic power and attitude.

2.2.1 *Who Are the Technocrats?*

Even though the focus of this thesis is on the diffusion of a perspective rather than a distinctive group of people associated with it, some attention on technocrats themselves is important in studying technocracy. Ridley (1966, p. 36) argues that “[a] technocrat is a technician with power” and “[a] technician is a person with a specialized skill in an art, science or craft, a person exercising a function by virtue of his specialized qualifications.” In his analysis of the French technocrats, who are the most frequently mentioned example in Europe, he observes that they share (1) a social background, (2) training, (3) a sense of superiority and (4) a spirit of camaraderie, and (5) the link between civil service and the technocratic education institutions strengthen this group’s cohesion. Ridley (1966, p. 37) cites various uses for the word *technician* in France and argues that they all “refer to power elites which are neither ‘political’ in the accepted sense, nor representative of sectional interests.” In France, higher civil servants are commonly divided into two broad groups, based on their perception of the functions of government. First group is the ‘jurists’ who have a ‘negative’ goal of maintaining the state, national unity, and social order (Ridley, 1966, p. 37). Members of the second group are the economic and technical staff, the technocrats, and have a ‘positive’ approach and claim a responsibility for economic development and social progress.

In the Global South, studies on technocracy focus mostly on Latin America, and to some extent Eastern Europe, as they went through neoliberal transformation and establishment of market economies, respectively. In both cases, the conflict between the need to obtain political support and to enforce disruptive economic policies gave rise to technocrats, who usually shared a background in economics mostly with a Ivy League degree. The United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and other research centers where the technocrats had common experience were also sources of unification (Camp, 2000, p. 618) (Centeno, 1993, p. 307) (Larson, 1972-1973, p. 25).

Another debate on technocrats themselves asks whether technocrats constitute a class. In order to constitute a class, Ridley (1966, p. 40) expects the technocrats as a group to be cohesive. Laird (1990, p. 51) also argues that “a technocratic class acquiring power implies a more or less cohesive, self-conscious elite whose claim to power rests purely on their technical knowledge (...) technocracy seems to pose little threat” in that sense as “experts hold a diversity of ideological and policy views.” Putnam (1977, p. 409) also makes similar remarks, a prospect of technocracy requiring cohesive technocrats, whereas no finding in his research “supports the notion that technically trained experts typically concur on the substance of policy.”

2.2.2 *Degree and Sources of Technocratic Power*

The ‘rise of technocrats’ may not take the shape of apolitical experts replacing traditional civil servants and politicians. Ridley (1966, p. 52) criticizes this perspective with the example of French technocrats, who were “committed to active government because they are formed in the French tradition of the public service state”, they “have not obtained power because they are technocrats; they are technocrats because they need expertise to exercise that power.” Often neglected in the literature, this example stresses the fact that the rise of technocrats also indicates a wider transformation in politics and state activity themselves.

Centeno (1993, p. 314) uses three dimensions to measure technocracy: “a) *The penetration of technocratic elites into the upper reaches of the state administration; b) The extent to which institutions where such persons predominate have become the dominant organizations in the regime’s most important policy areas; and c) The degree to which policies produced by these elites and institutions reflect a bias toward technocratic methods and interpretations.*” All three are required for there to be a technocratic state. Centeno (1993) adds that the first implies technocratic power at the expense of politicians, the second criterion narrows down the cases that can be considered technocratic—since most of the time political parties and military rules still have influence and veto power over the technocracy they create— and the third criterion is most difficult to measure, as there is usually yield to populist or democratic pressures.

While these conditions allow one to measure the degree of technocracy, Centeno (1993) emphasizes that the prevalence of static approaches in the literature are problematic, and sources of technocratic rule are highly important. To introduce a more dynamic and historical approach, Centeno (1993, p. 316) offers five factors that strengthen technocracy: “*Complexity of tasks undertaken by the regime; Legitimation of the regime by reference to performance criteria; Institutional autonomy of state organizations associated with experts; Regime stability; and Position within a World System.*” Larson (1972-1973, p. 10) also observes the importance of political stability and the relations with dominant foreign economies, especially in Latin America. Silva (1994, p. 282), on the other hand, emphasizes that the rise of technocracy in Chile around 1930s was not a result of industrial and technological development, instead, it “*preceded* the beginnings of the industrialisation process.” Technocracy had the role of mediating between the government, industrialists, and landed classes in an environment of ‘anti-politics’. With a side quest of eliminating traditional bureaucracy, the technocratic body Chilean Economic Development Agency obtained ‘relative autonomy’ and gave the state an entrepreneurial orientation, utilizing its role as a mediator and the common goal of building Chilean industry (Silva, 1994, p. 294). The incompatibility to these various cases indicate that instead of a common recipe, degree of technocratic power nourishes from various sources depending on the local context.

2.2.3 *Technocratic Attitude*

While some critics consider technocrats “just another ‘ruling class’ with their own interest to pursue”, Ridley (1966, p. 42) contends that “they are probably motivated to a much greater extent by their own views of the ends of society.” Centeno (1993, p. 310) adds that the most important part of studying technocracy is “the identification of a specific and common perspective on policymaking, which is determined by the social, educational, political, and professional background” of technocrats. Since their power comes from production and application of knowledge, without having their own policies and doctrines, technocrats cannot assert power. Even though Centeno (1993, p. 310) sees this as “a link between identity and ideology”, despite technocrats not being devoted to a single ideology, his emphasis on policy suggestions seems well-

placed. This argument is supported by the study of Bockman and Eyal (2002, p. 311), who, by looking at the part economists played in the post-socialist transformation in East Europe, argue that “reformers were converted into adherents of neoliberalism long before 1989 by participating in transnational dialogue and through jurisdiction battles over the role of economists under socialism.”

As the second dimension of technocratic analysis I will now focus on the technocratic mentality. An empirical study on technocratic attitudes which has similar statements is conducted by Putnam (1977, pp. 385-388), who groups prevalent statements about technocracy into six hypotheses: (1) seeing their work as apolitical and above specific interests, technocrats want rational science to replace politics, (2) as such, political institutions like the parliament as well as politicians themselves are seen incompetent and committed to sectional interests, (3) despise towards politics includes pluralist democracy’s processes such as debates, bargains, and pressure groups⁶, (4) their belief that social conflicts are either misplaced or artificial, and that consensus can be reached through rationality leads them to consider any objection to their plans as a result of ignorance or ill-will, (5) emphasizing pragmatist rather than moral or ideological criteria, they ask whether a measure will work rather than whether it is right⁷, and (6) they value technological progress, material wealth, and economic efficiency but do not have much distributional concerns over social justice.⁸

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- 6 Although populism and technocracy are usually considered to be opposites, this is a shared sentiment between them (Bickerton & Accetti, 2017, p. 188).
- 7 “The tendency to reduce all issues to problems of means, under the unquestioned values of efficiency, growth and productivity, is the ideal-typical characteristic of the technical world view” (Larson, 1972-1973, p. 20).
- 8 This tendency should not be confused with attaching more importance to economy rather than politics. As Camp (2000, p. 633) points out, “[i]n 1995-96, more than four-fifths of all Mexicans considered economic issues to be the major problem facing the country. Fewer than one in ten mentioned any form of political concerns.” The same study shows that Mexicans also opposed the neoliberal policies taking place and 78 per cent considered the existing distribution of wealth unjust (2000, p. 634).

Putnam (1977, p. 388) tests these hypotheses with a broader study he conducted on bureaucratic elites in 1970 and 1971. Interviewing around one hundred high-ranking civil servants in the UK, Germany and Italy, he seeks whether any correlation exists between a civil servant's training and his/her political outlook. The results largely confirm his hypotheses; however, a crucial difference emerges between technocrats with natural science backgrounds, who exhibit higher technocratic tendencies and those with social science education who do not differ as much from the general population⁹. Both groups are highly committed in technical progress and sound public policies, but do not agree in avoidance of politics and neglecting social justice. Considering the possible explanations of the divergence between natural and social sciences, Putnam (1977, p. 407) offers socialization and self-selection of fields as only plausible explanations. The nature of work is not a suitable answer, since there is no asymmetry in terms of diplomas in civil service, i.e., a natural science and a social science graduate can both share the same position in office.

A study of similar kind by Greenwald (1979, p. 638) also suggests that "strong integration into organized science" coincides with technocratic thought, but more important is higher aspirations, higher levels of education, economic security and dissatisfaction with occupation choice. "The strongest proponents of technocratic ideology", Greenwald (1979, p. 645) concludes, are those marginal people who have not obtained prominent positions in society even though they consider themselves qualified to do so.

2.2.4 *Technocratization in the Act*

As mentioned above, Centeno (1993) urges the introduction of dynamism to studies on technocracy, however his focus is on the degree of technocratic power. In one final empirical analysis, it is possible to observe how an issue

9 Unfortunately, separation of social sciences into political science, economics, and other sciences is shown only in recruitment patterns. For technocrats' attitudes, they are lumped together, hence it is not possible to see to what extent economists share the same avoidance of politics with natural scientists. However, Putnam (1977, p. 407) does "speculate (...) that the rigor of contemporary economics is creating—and attracting—more hard-headed students, who may subsequently display political attitudes more like those of our natural scientists."

becomes 'technocratized'. Laird (1990) demonstrates this with the energy sector, which he argues is a very suitable area to see the rise of technocracy. The example is a case of a Democratic Policy Review (DPR) for solar energy issued by the Carter Administration in the USA in 1978. Energy issues used to be highly political, especially after the oil price shocks in 1973 and 1979, and various parties started to advocate solar energy, backed up with popular movements in all 50 states. DPRs are supposed to provide the President with various policy options on an issue from different agencies and the process was highly inclusive of public opinion. Not only did the DPR staff inform the citizens about the new policy to be made, but they also gave them voice to state what was to be done. "Closing the DPR to the public would entail substantial political costs", but it still ended up failing to reflect the wishes of the public (Laird, 1990, p. 55). This was not due to indifference of the government officials to the public opinion. Seeing and portraying the core of the problem in highly technical terms, as a targeted percentage of solar energy usage in the United States by 2000, rendered most of the interested parties incompetent in the issue. Since this goal requires very technical analysis, it gave preference to technocrats in having the final say. Even though the DPR was pro-solar as was the popular opinion, Laird (1990, p. 56) contends that "the original technocratic definition of the issue" excluded much of the public concerns from the report without a certain class or group taking over.

Throughout history technocracy sought the one best way to organize society based on science and increase the overall wealth. In the nineteenth century France, this took the shape of reorganizing a nation in chaos by putting scientists and artists in charge. Almost a century later, increasing sophistication of industrial production and the incompetence of traditional business owners led to a call to engineers and formed the basis of the technocratic movement in the USA. After the two World Wars, some circles in the capitalist camp declared the end of ideology in an age when technical education became ever more relevant and frequent. In each age, technocracy targeted the things that were considered to stagnate the pace of improvement; albeit with various actors, different problems of society, and the changing understanding of what should be.

The brief historical review in the first chapter points out to a link between crises and technocracy: the French Revolution and Saint Simon's search of its ending, the depressions in the United States of America echoing in the writings of Bellamy, Taylor, and Veblen, the First World War resulting in the technocratic movement, and the destruction brought about by World War II giving birth to the End of Ideology. This pattern will be followed in the following chapter with a similar narrative of ruptures in the late Ottoman and early Republican periods in Turkey, by concluding that rational and scientific pursuits were partly called for by a society in disorder, finally resulting in the creation of a planning institution in 1960.

The theoretical overview in the first half and empirical analyses in the second imply certain common points in technocratic thinking: a search for harmony that would result in increased production and wealth, wishing to replace other mechanisms of governance with one based on science, focusing on the feasibility of means rather than their ethical implications, denying any real clash of interests, targeting waste, irrational remnants, and narrow, selfish behavior. To test the hypothesis that DPT was the technocratic institution of Turkey in the post 1960 period, in the third and fourth chapters these patterns will be sought in the printed works of Turkish planning. They will also be compared with competing standpoints such as Kemalism and Marxism.

Planning Turkey's Development

Following the concepts of planning and technocracy to a national level, this chapter will first briefly review the history of the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Turkey until 1960, with a focus on changes and continuities in state policies. This narrative portrays a transformation from a tradition of keeping abundant goods in the cities and financing the state structure. At the turn of the nineteenth century, nationalism and interventionism emerge with a side quest of overall social and economic modernization. Similar to the disorder of the French Revolution, the Great Depression and the two World Wars mentioned in the previous chapter, I will argue that in the search of a new order during the downfall of the Empire and the early years of the Republic, a rationalistic and scientific approach emerged among rival mentalities. This trend culminates to the period of 1960-1980 which exhibits an explicitly rationalistic and institutional search for development.

In the second part, I will focus more deeply on some ongoing dynamics that resulted in the rise of a developmentalist agenda and planning in Turkey. Starting with an endeavor to modernize and strengthen a limping military, the Ottoman Empire imported positivist ideas that shaped the following decades. Moving closer in time and extending the scope of analysis, I will track three linked international trends; Keynesian policies, import-substituting industrialization, and planning. Hopefully, the first two parts will shed some light on

the emergence of the State Planning Organization and offer a contrast between previous periods and that of 1960-1980.



Figure 3.1 “The village of today” (DPT, 1963)



Figure 3.2 “The village of tomorrow” (DPT, 1963)

The last part of this chapter consists of a brief history of Turkey’s planned decades and the planning institution. While power relations in macroeconomic and social policy-making are hinted, emphasis will rest on the background of each five-year plan period and the decisions themselves. Hopefully this will inform the reader about the planning institutions as well as Turkey in general between 1960 and 1980, which is the scope of this thesis. By doing so, I wish to allow the following two chapters to make better sense where the printed outcome of the planning efforts is reviewed. The planners’ and other authors’ attention, whose work will be reviewed in the following chapters, is largely occupied by the problems Turkey goes through during this period.

§ 3.1 From Liberalism to National Economy

3.1.1 *Free Trade Treaties and the Rise of the Sublime Port*

Prior to the Westernization efforts of the nineteenth century, state practices in the Ottoman Empire constituted three main principles that clashed with developmentalism according to Ünay (2013, p. 19). Firstly, the Ottoman administration's focus on the provisioning of major cities damaged its international competitiveness and balance of payments. Traditional trade policy had been encouraging imports and restricting exports to increase the available goods. Secondly, exhibiting a case of a fiscal state, the Ottoman rule wished to maximize tax incomes rather than production. Although throughout the nineteenth century increasing fiscal centralization by bypassing intermediaries enabled a slow increase in tax revenues, these were accompanied with debasement and confiscation, and the revenue was used to finance unsuccessful military adventures. Lastly, values such as justice, stability, and order instead of efficiency, freedom or equality were dominant. Rather than pursuing reforms, the Ottoman State tried to preserve traditional institutions and when this failed, it created modern institutions that coexisted with the old ones (Pamuk, 2015) (Zürcher, 1998). However, these policies were to be challenged.

Great Britain's unrivalled position in global trade after the Industrial Revolution provoked protectionist policies in its principal trading partners, Western Europe and the USA. As Great Britain fixed its gaze upon South America and Asia, free trade treaties with these countries ensued. The British Empire and other European powers that followed its path challenged traditional Ottoman trade policy as they considered restrictions on exports to be hindrances towards the Empire's capacity for imports and advocated liberal foreign trade (Keyder, 2003, p. 46). In the long run, this process rendered it increasingly difficult for the Ottoman state to pursue mercantilist trade policies and protectionism as did Mehmed Ali of Egypt, and the state was left with classical liberal policies (Ahmad, 2000, p. 27) (Keyder, 2003) (Zürcher, 1998).

Pamuk (2015) sees the institutional changes occurring throughout the nineteenth century in the Ottoman Empire within a balance of central bureaucracy's efforts to save the small-scale farms, which still constituted the tax base of the Empire, and the European countries' demands for an economy more

open to trade and investment in return for military and financial aid. As such, one can point out two relevant major outcomes, one political and one economic. First was the higher bureaucracy's rise in power. Centralization efforts along with modern schools and administrative institutions saw the gradual increase in the Sublime Porte's power. Initially deriving its power from the palace, the Sublime Port started to gain autonomy and turn into a Weberian bureaucracy (Ünay, 2013, p. 137) (Heper & Bekman, 1980, p. 26) (Hourani, 1993). Secondly, while most of Turkey had historically been self-sustaining, the Empire depended increasingly on foreign trade and finance, becoming a semi-colony (Keyder, Özveren, & Quataert, 1993, p. 527). The emerging bureaucracy's position was challenged by the rise of port cities and their local nascent bourgeoisie. The result was a polarization of military-political power and economic strength that was distributed between two groups, Muslim bureaucratic elite resisting capitalist transformation and the emerging Christian bourgeoisie pushing for it.

3.1.2 *National Economy, National Bourgeoisie*

Three aspects of National Economy stand out for the purpose of this thesis: far-reaching protectionist policies that extended to nationalism, a populism mixed with this nationalism, and the birth of developmentalism. Integration into European markets damaged all merchants; however, the developments were more unfavorable for Muslims (Buğra, 1994, p. 37). The defeat in the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 rendered Turkish nationalism dominant while the First World War both allowed and forced the Empire to pursue protectionism and import substitution. These resulted in an important change in the Ottoman policy makers' goals regarding the economic policies of the Empire, particularly as to who will constitute the bourgeoisie. With the emergence of a new set of policy, namely the National Economy (*Milli İktisat*), there occurred a consensus among the political elite that Muslim-Turks had to join production. Turkish nationalism also meant a redefinition of the imperial (and later republican) subject: non-Muslims were seen almost as how European powers were seen.

Another part of National Economy was the ideas of populism (*halkçılık*) and corporatism, which were to be inherited by the Kemalists (Sunar, 1983).

The Young Turks expressed the need to liberate the peasants, which constituted the majority of the population, from the feudal lords (Ahmad, 2000, p. 42). This aspiration extends to the 1960s and constitutes one of the main themes in agricultural planning as it will be seen in the following chapters. During the Great War, prevalence of profiteering and speculation made the belief that pursuing personal interests would also further common interests less convincing. Even though this sentiment resembles the technocratic des-pise towards individual interests, as part of rising populism an emphasis was put instead on morality and serving the nation. Nascent nationalism accompanied this populism and the people were required to make necessary sacrifices for the national interest (Ahmad, 2000, p. 63).

Toprak (1995) argues that National Economy meant, most importantly, that a significant transformation occurred in the mind of the Ottoman states-people regarding the economy: rather than focusing only on tax revenues and making policies to increase them directly, the Ottoman rulers had started to increase production, steer the economy, and increase state income also indirectly. Programs of Public Works (*Umûru Nafia*) constitute an interesting case. The Ottoman Empire prepared programs that were reminiscent of Jean Bap-tiste Colbert's reforms in the seventeenth century France according to Tekeli and İlkin (Tekeli & İlkin, 2010, p. 475). These programs included building land routes, railroads, ports, watering canals, dams, and draining swamps. Three of these programs were prepared in 1845, 1882, and 1908. Policies of protection-ism and developmentalism of the period are shared in the 1960s and 1970s, although resorting to populism hindered technocratic ideas during late Impe-rial and early Republican years.

3.1.3 *The Republic, the Great Depression and Étatisme*

The establishment of the Public Debt Administration (*Düyunu Umumiye İdaresi*) in 1881 had already created early statist and transformist ideas among the bureaucracy (Keyder, 2003, p. 62). Westernization and modernization came to occupy a wider meaning when the Republic of Turkey was declared in 1923. Some of the reforms of 1920s and 1930s were inherited from the Un-ionist era (Bozarslan, 2008, p. 42). In a situation of global uncertainty, increas-ing protectionism, and lack of financial leadership the new government aimed

at creating a national economy and pursued self-sufficiency. Emerging developmentalist agenda flourished further with the newly found Republic. A public works program reminiscent of the Ottoman Programs of Public Works was prepared as early as 1923, although it was discarded as Ankara became the new capital. In 1929, another twelve-year program was prepared, which was executed with greater capacity despite the outbreak of the Great Depression (Tekeli & İlkin, 2010, p. 478) Cumulating experience rendered each successive plan more complex than the former, yet they were not fulfilled due to external factors.

Across the capitalist world, Keynesian welfare policies became dominant after the Great Depression of 1929, until the oil price shock of 1973. This period is usually dubbed the ‘golden age’ of capitalism with the financial stability of Bretton-Woods system, rising labor productivity thanks to technological improvements and mass education as well as increasing overall demand due to rising incomes and welfare policies. Boratav (2011, p. 60) argues that while from 1908 to 1929 there has been a great amount of continuity in terms of economic policies, 1930s mark a rupture in Turkey. The depression discredited liberal democracy in the eyes of the new political elite and the *Kadro* writers¹, who turned their attention to Italy, Germany, and the USSR (Ahmad, 2000, p. 61). Global agricultural prices plummeted with the Great Depression, decreasing agricultural income especially in exporting coastal regions. The result was a closed economy and pursuit of autarchy (Keyder, 2003, p. 135).

Rather than buying crops from the farmers with higher prices to relieve the peasantry, the government saw the decrease of agricultural products vis-à-vis manufacture following the Great Depression as an opportunity for industrialization (Keyder, 2003, p. 140) (Pamuk, 2015, p. 186). When limits on tariffs enforced by the Treaty of Lausanne expired in 1929, tariffs on sugar rose

1 Starting publication in January 1932, the monthly *Kadro* magazine theorized existing state policies and aimed at rendering them coherent. Being against the anarchy of the market economy, *Kadro* writers – most of whom were ex-Marxists – supported state intervention, rationalization of production and an egalitarian distribution of income. They had a striking tone of corporatism: Turkey’s solution was not reconciliation among potential conflicting classes, but to transcend any such conflict with advance of technology (Ahmad, 2000) (Göle, 1998, p. 92) (Ünay, 2013, p. 167).

by 200 per cent and on final goods such as textiles, by 80 per cent. Tariffs on machinery and raw materials, on the other hand, were kept low. The state supported industrialization also via the Law for the Encouragement of Industry (Buğra, 1994, p. 99). Similarly, majority of state investments were in infrastructure and urban economy.

These show a clear preference of the cities over the villages, and of industry over agriculture. The cost of rapid growth through industrialization was first borne by the farmers, and secondly by the wage workers (Boratav, 2011, p. 80). Prioritizing industry was possible thanks to the one-party system. As the rural population constituted the majority of the voters, any electoral pressure would require acting otherwise (Pamuk, 2015, pp. 197-198). More strikingly, however, these policies entail a rupture from populism in favor of developmentalism, increasing production, and industry. As discussed in the previous chapter, these ends are very much welcome in a technocratic mentality. Although their mere existence is not sufficient to call this period a technocracy or Kemalism a technocratic approach, it constitutes precedence to the technocratic proposals in the planning documents of DPT.

One signatory policy during this period was the Wealth Levy (*Varlık Vergisi*) of 1942. The public statement was that the law was passed to punish war profiteering, which made the state more hostile towards business, and to increase the state revenue (Buğra, 1994, p. 114) (Keyder, 2003, p. 158). However, in a closed-door meeting of the ruling Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*, RPP), Prime Minister Saraçoğlu expressed that the tax would also further economic independence of the Republic (Aktar, 1996, p. 105). Reminiscent of National Economy, there was a goal of delivering the Turkish economy to the Turks, which could be considered very successful, as by 1944, 67.7 per cent of the real estate sold to pay the tax was bought by Muslim Turks (Aktar, 1996, p. 141). More to the point, the tax was also disproportionate to punish luxury consumption: between two individuals with similar income levels, the person who displayed more wealth had to pay much tax (Aktar,

1996, p. 110). This hostility towards luxury consumption is distinct in the writings of Saint-Simon, Veblen, and Bellamy.²

3.1.4 *Planning the New Turkey*

Finally, a distinctive development during the *étatisme* of 1930s was the five-year industrial plans. Planning efforts started relatively early in Turkey, which was one of the several non-socialist countries to pursue industrialization through planning when the First Five-Year Industrial Plan (1934-1938) was prepared. The RPP was very cautious and calculating in the 1930s. The industrial plans were not comprehensive plans that covered a great part of social life and inspected the relations between macroeconomic parameters. Rather, projects for new factories were evaluated and calculations were made for the required labor power, transportation, raw materials etc. (Keyder, 2003, p. 147) (Ünay, 2013, p. 227). The objective of the First Five-Year Industrial Plan was to use domestic raw materials, augment production, prioritize consumer products, and distribute factories equally across regions (Günçe, 1967, p. 14) (Küçük, 1978, p. 248). In quantitative terms, it was only half successful, and mostly failed in regional balance. More importantly, Boratav (2011, p. 65) notes that the plan had an interpretation of the current global order reminiscent of the dependency theory of 1950s.

The Second Five-Year Industrial Plan differed from the first one as it prioritized producers' and capital goods in industry, included various public works, and was based on British rather than Soviet expertise and aid³ (Ahmad, 2000, p. 98) (Günçe, 1967, p. 19) (Küçük, 1978, p. 249). Foreign aid was distinctive in another respect as well: the second plan had a higher need for foreign funds, which according to Küçük (1978, p. 258) can be observed in the increased allocations made to agriculture. Furthermore, while Buğra (1994, p. 112) and many others argue that the second plan had a less *étatist* tone, Günçe (1967, p. 19) adds that it was more advanced in addressing individual problems,

2 It should be noted that despise towards consumption is also shared by populism which is part of both National Economy and Kemalism.

3 Though Turkey had better relations with the USSR for its support in the Turkish War of Independence and later on, the UK and France came to occupy a more significant position in Turkey's foreign policy after 1936 (Ahmad, 2000, p. 67).

was much more voluminous compared to the previous plan, and had an analytical section on the general outlook of the Turkish economy.

The second industrial plan was abandoned with the outbreak of World War II. After the Soviet advance in 1944, Prime Minister Saraçoğlu ordered the preparation of the 1946 Rapid Industrialization Plan (*İvedili Sanayi Planı*) for post-war development. Due to Şevket Süreyya Aydemir's and İsmail Hüsrev Tökin's heavy involvement, it carried the influence of the Kadro magazine, as can be observed in its envision of an independent Turkey between the capitalist and socialist camps as well as preferring the public sector instead of the private sector or foreign investment to prevent social conflict and ensure independence (Tekeli, 1979-1980, p. 306). The plan was more comprehensive compared to earlier industrial plans, which Aydemir criticized for being too narrow (Buğra, 1994, p. 118) (Tekeli, 1979-1980, p. 289). One of the main goals of the plan was mechanization: apart from industrialization, mechanization entailed wider goals such as a cultural revolution and keeping the value added within the country. Change of the government, the 1946 devaluation, and, most importantly, the post-war global conjecture meant that the plan was largely ignored.

3.1.5 *The Cold War, the Expansion of the Market and Agricultural Exports*

After the Second World War, rather than continuing with heavy industry, Turkey accepted the role of agricultural exporter given by the USA and promoted with the Marshall Aid. During a parliamentary discussion regarding a law for distributing land to landless peasants, four members of the RPP objected to the potential punitive power the law gave to the state. With President İnönü's encouragement, they established a new party called the Democrat Party. Apart from military protection and popular discontent, economic aids were also a pressing matter in the post-war Turkish politics. One of the conditions of Marshall Aid was a transition to a free market economy (Buğra, 1994, p. 118). Süleyman Vaner replaced Aydemir and was tasked with the preparation of a new

plan to be presented to the Marshal Plan committee: the 1947 Economic Development Plan of Turkey⁴ (*Türkiye İktisadi Kalkınma Planı*), also dubbed the Vaner Plan (Tekeli, 1979-1980, p. 323). Covering the years 1948-1952, the plan did not have clear main goals, rather it proposed that global economic developments be regarded to obtain foreign credit and therefore it contained preferences between agriculture vs. industry, productive investment vs. infrastructure etc. In that regard, the plan is more supportive of the private sector and agriculture compared to previous plans. It also differs in attempting to trace the effects investments would have on macroeconomic variables, making it more comprehensive (Günçe, 1967, p. 25) (Tekeli & İlkin, 1981, pp. 15-16). Yet Küçük (1981, p. 83) argues that it did not go beyond a letter of intent to the Truman Doctrine of the USA. While Turkey initially failed to obtain Marshall Aid⁵, a fact exploited by the Democrats in opposition, the new direction in policies and the emerging problems in the economy convinced the USA to loan a credit of 10 million USD (Tekeli & İlkin, 1981, p. 14). There was no place for heavy industry under these circumstances. In general, the state's role in the economy continued to be protecting and providing for the emerging private sector.⁶

Support for agriculture and infrastructure projects is distinctive in the post-war period. The DP's accession to power quickened the pace and extended the degree of markets' expansion. Restrictions on imports were lifted which, combined with the accumulated foreign reserves during the 1930s and 1940s as well as the export income during the 1950-1954 boom, skyrocketed imports of consumer goods. When these foreign exchange sources dried up, adverse weather conditions, end of the Korean War and hence the drop in the global prices of agricultural goods decreased Turkey's foreign income, imports

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- 4 The English copy of the 1947 Plan was dubbed the Turkish Recovery Program, which was not a coincidence according to Tekeli and İlkin (1981, p. 24) as the plan principally aimed at obtaining Marshal Aid. Kansu (2004, p. 28) adds that another reason for the plan's preparation was that the United Nations requested such a document.
 - 5 Tekeli and İlkin (1981, p. 12) note that out of the 16 countries in Europe that demanded credit, Turkey was the only one not to obtain it.
 - 6 The difference between the 1947 and 1946 plans symbolize the end of industrialist étatism in Turkey, and blurs the difference between the Democrat Party and the RPP.

came to a halt and troubled years for the new government began (Pamuk, 2015, p. 227). Transition to the multi-party system made its influence felt in the first economic crisis after the Great Depression. Rather than accepting the new conjuncture, the Democrat Party enforced price support for certain crops with no parallel increase in consumer prices (Pamuk, 2015, p. 231).

The Democrat Party was not a clearly liberal party, and state intervention did not decline in the 1950s (Buğra, 1994, p. 119). Apart from state intervention, there also existed unintended import-substituting industrialization (ISI). After the rapid and unplanned commercialization of agriculture in 1950s, a shortage of foreign exchange forced the Democrat Party to act against its own propaganda and enforce trade controls. These ad hoc protectionist policies resulted in a transfer of capital away from the farmers and merchants to the industrialist and share of manufacture in GDP increased under the rule of a rural populist government (Milor, 1990, p. 6)(Pamuk, 2015, p. 253) (Sunar, 1983). The nature of public intervention was being questioned by the media and the opposition, especially the lack of planning. As the economic conditions worsened, calls were made in the Forum magazine for planning rather than ad hoc bureaucratic interventions. A recurrent Prime Minister and later President Süleyman Demirel (2010, p. 107) had also told Menderes about the necessity of planning., who simply responded by stating that they were already preparing annual budgets.

After the declaration of moratorium in 1958, an IMF stabilization package was accepted. The program was more about satisfying the creditors than an economic necessity (Buğra, 1994, p. 128). Among many shifts of policy that aimed at increasing exports and decreasing inflation and budget deficit, IMF required development planning. OEEC also changed its position for Turkey's economy towards the end of the Democrat Party rule; it started to advocate coordination within a developmental program and asked for a Ministry of Coordination (Kazgan, 2013, p. 63). There has been work on a ten-year development plan even before Jan Tinbergen wrote a letter to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs stating his intention to prepare a development plan for Turkey. The Democrat Party did invite Professor Jan Tinbergen in 1959 but hid this from the public. Instead, the government continued openly denouncing planning and stonewalled Tinbergen's efforts by denying him necessary contacts

and information (Erder, 2010) (Karaosmanoğlu, 2010) (Kazgan, 2013, p. 65) (Milor, 1990, p. 11). IMF stated that due to the political uncertainty in Turkey, there could be no agreement with the Democrat Party (Kansu, 2004, p. 33).

§ 3.2 Shifting Policy Mentalities

After this brief overview of changing economic and social policies of Turkey until 1960, one can observe certain continuities. As Boratav (2011, p. 232) points out, Turkey seems to exhibit an oscillation between economic liberalism and protectionist-interventionist economics. The former mentality was dominant when liberal Young Turks were prominent, during the early years of the Republic as well as the first four years of the Democrat Party period, and later in the post-1980 years. The latter triumphed during World War I, the étatism of 1930s, second half of the 1950s and the ISI period between 1960 and 1980. Contrasting with the “market-augmenting role played by effective state intervention in East Asia” Buğra (1994, p. 23) remarks, “state intervention in Turkey has appeared as a major source of uncertainty affecting business life.” The ambiguity regarding the legitimate sphere of state intervention rendered political connections and short-term rent-seeking behavior more rewarding than striving to achieve global competitiveness and quality (Buğra, 1994, p. 96). Yet the qualitative change in public policy towards social and economic life that had been under progress gained momentum after the 1960 coup. Below I will focus with more detail on the sources of the developmentalism in 1960s and 1970s.

3.2.1 *Westernization and Engineers*

Göle (1998, p. 8) argues that due to the modernization pattern in the ‘non-Western societies’, engineers, champions of the technocratic order in Veblen’s writings, have played a crucial part in social transformation. In Turkey, this can be observed with the leftist social engineering, engineering pragmatism of liberalism and the engineer cadres in the Islamist movement. The pursuit of overcoming backwardness started when the Ottoman Empire sent students of engineering to Europe to modernize the military. The public works plans

starting from the Tanzimat era also gave more significance to engineering education according to Tekeli and İlkin (2010, p. 476). With the influence of positivism emerged the ideology of Ottomanism (Göle, 1998, p. 69). The results of these reforms were the dissolution of peripheral conflicts and relocating future conflicts to the center. The new Republic also preferred a centralist and strong state, therefore the French Jacobin model was preferred over the British market economy, and thinkers such as Comte and Durkheim became influential among reformists (Göle, 1998, p. 11)

With the Democrat Party's incumbency, the emerging market economy and civil society led to the establishment of Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects (*Türk Mühendis ve Mimar Odaları Birliği*, TMMOB) which principally opposed the reliance on foreign technical expertise (Göle, 1998, p. 9) (Köse & Öncü, 2000, p. 106). Buğra (1994, p. 65) points out to the prevalence of having an engineering degree among businesspeople born between 1910 and 1950. The infrastructure investments in the 1950s benefitted the private sector, especially the engineering firms greatly: contracting was a highly lucrative business, more so for the engineers. The arrival of the planned ISI era gave engineers a new position in Turkey (Göle, 1998, p. 115). Engineering education was prioritized in the First Five-Year Development Plan as almost 70 per cent of higher education budget was allocated to higher technical education (DPT, 1963, p. 452). A similar increase was also observed in the number of engineers, which accelerated in the mid-1960s. Furthermore, especially with the Justice Party's (*Adalet Partisi*) ascendance to power in 1965, Göle (1998, p. 9) observes an increase in the proportion of engineers in politics.

While being dependent on the state in the early years, engineers as a socio-economic group came to assert autonomy and moved away from the state according to Göle (1998, p. 115). Due to their so-called neutral position in the employment relations, they claimed to be most fit in technical decisions. This does not mean that engineers displayed highly technocratic attitudes in terms of political orientation and views on conflict during 1960s and 1970s. On the contrary, as opposed to Göle's (1998, p. 117) expectation from them to take the role of rationalist reformers, most engineers in her study conducted in 1980, as well as TMMOB's publications shared the anti-imperialist, leftist, and even

Marxist ideas that were prevalent during this period⁷ (Köse & Öncü, 2000, p. 109). Yet Göle (1998, p. 28) contends that the results of her study show that leftist engineers are closer to being Saint-Simonian modernists than Leninist vanguards: in their eyes development is an alliance of modernists rather than a ‘revolutionary’ opposition to the state.

3.2.2 *Keynesian Macroeconomic Demand Management and Import-Substituting Industrialization*

Arguably, the key factor in Turkey’s (and late Ottoman Empire’s) shift in state policies has been international trends. Following the Great Depression, states of capitalist countries shifted from liberal policies of classical economics to Keynesian intervention. This entailed a focus on macroeconomic stability and stimulating demand through fiscal policies as well as participating in production as a major actor (Milor, 1990, p. 2). In advanced industrial countries, Keynesian policies were accompanied with more inclusive social security schemes and improving distributions of income, usually referred to as the welfare regimes (Kleinberg, 1973, p. 116) (Yenal, 2010, p. 515). In the developing world on the other hand, the post-war context and decolonization movements gave rise import-substituting industrialization (ISI) policies to catch up with the former group of countries (Keyder, 2003, p. 207). Industrialization was seen as a cure for various problems and ISI was the obvious way (Nixson, 1981, p. 56). The developing countries in the post-War context constituted “late-late comers” (Hirschman, 1968, p. 7). Contrary to late industrialisers such as Germany and Japan who could jump-start industrialization by creating new industrial sectors such as chemicals in the nineteenth century, late-late industrializers had to imitate existing industries which made them more dependent on import of capital goods and their production less learning-intensive. A separate effort for global competitiveness and export-orientation in existing industries was necessary.

7 Köse and Öncü (2000) categorize the historical development of TMMOB as follows: Capitalist Developmentalist Technicians (1954-1965), Social Critical Independent Developmentalist Technicians (1965-1973), Social Activist Independent Developmentalist Technicians (1974-1980)

Hirschman (1968, p. 5) cites four motives for ISI: “balance-of-payments difficulties, wars, gradual growth of income, and deliberate development policy.” It can be said that the first and the third motives caused the unintended ISI of Turkey in late 1950s and additionally the last motive caused the planned ISI of 1960s and 1970s. Increasing connections to global markets and rising incomes in the 1950s resulted in higher demand for consumer durables that were not produced in Turkey, whereas Turkey’s industry was still confined mostly to processed food, textile and metal industry (Zürcher, 1998, p. 278). After 1963, import-substitution was encouraged through import restrictions, high tariffs and overvalued lira, as well as incentives such as subsidies and tax breaks, creation of domestic markets through price support for the farmers and high wages for workers (Pamuk, 2015).

3.2.3 *A Planned World*

Keynesian policies and ISI were usually accompanied with central planning. It emerged as a Soviet method of management, which initially was not accepted by the capitalist world (Galbraith, 2007, p. 25) (Küçük, 1978, p. 22) (Yenal, 2010, p. 511). The USSR’s first step was a plan for electrification accepted in 1920. Comprehensive planning began with the First Five-Year Plan starting in 1928 (Porokhovsky, 1981, p. 137) (Tekeli & İlkin, 2010, p. 455). Due to the remarkable success it brought about, the capitalist world soon adopted macroeconomic planning. Loeb (1996, p. 205) notes the prospective influence of publicity given to Soviet planning in the 1930s on the possibility of similar measures in the USA⁸. With the Cold War and arms race, planning received a defensive importance⁹ (Galbraith, 2007, p. 401) (Maier, 1970, p. 46). Planning became a condition for foreign aids to developing countries, which accelerated

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- 8 A former planner Çilingiroğlu (2010, p. 115) emphasizes the international aspect of developmental aids, noting that the USSR did not focus on feasibility reports, but saw aid requests as a matter of global prestige.
- 9 Küçük (1981, p. 93) offers further connections between planning and war: Lenin established the fundamentals of Soviet planning by observing the war economy during the World War I; Dantzig found the solution that made linear programming available while working in the US Air Force during the World War II and the first case of substantial Western planning was that of French post-war reconstruction

its spread across the world. Poorer countries were thought to be in a vicious circle of low income and low savings, which was to be broken through external funds and planned state intervention (Yenal, 2010, p. 516). Planning did not only stem from political or social developments. Technological progress was also a culprit. By focusing on the firms' side, Galbraith (2007, p. 21) argues that modern technology and large-scale production in industry required specialization. Such an intricate and long-term organization of production required knowledge about and manipulation of the market even before designing started. While 1960s constituted the golden age of planning, it became outmoded with globalization and the collapse of the USSR (Kansu, 2004, p. 603).

Galbraith (2007, p. 396) adds that the planning system absorbs class conflict to a great extent, "partly by minimizing the reality of conflict and partly by exploiting the resulting malleability of attitude to win control to belief. The goals of the planning system, in this process, become the goals of all who are associated with it and thus, by slight extension, the goals of the society itself." This emphasis leads to a connection between planning and technocracy. Most definitions of planning have an implicit or explicit claim of neutrality, that is, it does not entail certain goals. Arguing that the modern state is planned notwithstanding its economic system, Tanilli (1981, p. 525) defines planning as "*thinking ahead, calculation and coordination of economic, social and cultural activities within a time frame*" (emphasis original).¹⁰ This view is shared by various former DPT planners: both Kansu (2004, p. 603) and Küçük (1978, p. 15) emphasize that planning is merely a matter of method, sum of tools for choosing the best solution, not establishing a target. Among other planners, Kuruç (2010, p. 358) adds that planning is a fruit of twentieth century reason and a matter of knowledge's superiority over destiny, and Günçe (1967, p. 2) defines planning "as a rational struggle against every natural or social force which impedes development."

In macroeconomic planning, Küçük (1978, pp. 15-16) explains, the first step is to analyze certain indicators such as income, investment, consumption, savings, foreign trade and population movements and the relations between

10 "Plânlama, en geniş anlamıyla, iktisadî, sosyal ve kültürel faaliyetlerin, belli bir zaman çerçevesi içinde, önceden düşünülmesi, hesaplanması ve eşgüdümü demektir."

them. Some of these variables constitute targets and some others become means for macroeconomic policies. The second step is, then, to establish the set of measures for targets set by politicians. These measures include the pace of development, to what extent prices will be allowed to increase, what will the balance of payments be etc. Planners, on the other hand, are entrusted with laying bare the tools to realize these targets, regarding issues of the kind of investment, type and degree of tax, the role of foreign aid and credit etc. Out of several alternatives certain tools are selected and sectoral distributions of these targets are evaluated and planned to prevent bottlenecks. The last step is a process of optimization and involves selection of investment projects.

§ 3.3 Institutionalizing Planned Development, The Birth of State Planning Organization

Having reviewed Turkey's history until 1960 and certain themes that were important in DPT's establishment, this last part will tell the story of DPT until 24 October 1980 when a set of major economic decisions were accepted by bypassing DPT completely. Thus, a controversial but always relevant institution started to enjoy less public attention. The narrative below is grouped into four plan periods since the special expertise commissions whose work is inspected in the second research chapter are formed for five-year plans. This review will hopefully help in making better sense of the discontinuities from one period to another as well as introduce the organization studied in this thesis.

Shortly after the military coup on 27 May 1960, the State Planning Organization was established by the junta rule, the National Unity Committee (*Milli Birlik Komitesi*, NUC) on 30 September 1960¹¹. Behind the creation of DPT there was the alliance of the new military regime¹², the RPP, parts of the bureaucracy, the intelligentsia, and most importantly international organizations

11 DPT was established with Law No. 91, date of issuance 30 September 1960 (The State Planning Organization, 1963, p. 6). The process was delayed due to an internal conflict within NUC.

12 The 1960 coup re-established the military as a political force. Turkey's acceptance to NATO in 1952 was an important factor according to Ahmad (2000) because officers with NATO

such as OECD, OEEC and IMF¹³ (Erder, 2010, p. 235) (Pamuk, 2015) (Sönmez, 1967, p. 32). Due to Turkey's 'geostrategic importance' the USA especially wanted Turkey to develop within a coordinated market economy (Ünay, 2013, p. 217).

Minister of State Şefik İnan intended to talk with a Ford representative to have a group from Harvard College, which was at the time involved in planning in Pakistan, to handle planning. A group of academics including Atilla Karaosmanoğlu, who offered their help in planning, objected stating that Turkish planning should be undertaken by Turks. Being influenced by Tinbergen and Koopman's work, Şefik İnan involved only economic planning in his draft (Akçay, 2007, p. 75) (Kansu, 2004, p. 54). A rival draft was being prepared by Colonel Şinasi Orel, who depended on academics such as Atilla Karaosmanoğlu, Sadun Aren and Ayhan Çilingiroğlu and included social planning as well. During a joint meeting of the NUC and the cabinet on 5 August 1960, the second draft was accepted with some alterations (Akçay, 2007, p. 76) (Türkcan, 2010, p. 252). Şinasi Orel became the head of the new planning organization, and his military background was not found strange in the post-coup environment¹⁴ (Türkcan, 2010, p. 102). The Undersecretary was merely in his forties while heads of departments were in their thirties and most planners were even younger. It is striking that people with relatively young ages came to occupy such positions of strategic power: the office was initially given far reaching responsibilities in social, cultural as well as economic policies. However, there was disagreement regarding the extent of DPT's power. While the hardliner republicans, the military, and the bureaucracy wanted it to have binding decisions on all sectors, other politicians and

training became aware of both their and Turkey's material position compared to other members of the organization.

- 13 The 22 June 1962 issue of Economics stresses the importance of DPT and deems it the only institution in Turkey to ensure that foreign aid would not be wasted due to its position above parties (Forum 15 July 1962, 16 as cited in Akçay 2007, p. 94).
- 14 The notable influence of the armed forces on DPT could be observed in later periods as well. Kuruç (2010, p. 389) narrates how the draft of the fourth plan was first presented to the General Staff, although General Kenan Evren seemed to be interested only in the allotment to military public houses.

the İstanbul bourgeoisie objected and wanted the public sector not to compete with the private sector but to support it. Hence concessions were made from the earlier draft (Erder, 2010) (Karaosmanoğlu, 2010) (Pamuk, 2015) (Zürcher, 1998). Therefore, contrary to the East Asian and some European counterparts that also commanded the private sector, DPT was envisioned as a small elite planning team that was to bypass bureaucracy¹⁵ and advise the government (Ünay, 2013, p. 220).

The High Planning Board (*Yüksek Planlama Kurulu*, YPK) was conceived as a half-technical and half-political body with the Prime Minister and three ministers on the one hand and the DPT Undersecretary, heads of Social Planning, Economic Planning and Coordination Departments on the other (The State Planning Organization, 1963, p. 6). Oktar Türel, the DPT Undersecretary between 1978 and 1979 argues that while number of technical personnel was irrelevant as YPK was not a medium for voting, it allowed free expression of technical opinions as long as there was no open conflict with the Prime Minister (Akçay, 2007, p. 79). Among its functions were “[t]o assist the government in determining economic and social objectives and policies through full - scale collection and evaluation of data on all types of natural, human, and economic resources and potentials in the country, [...] make recommendations to and act in a consultative capacity for the ministries in order to secure coordination of their activities relating to economic policy” and “follow up the implementation of the Plan, evaluate it, and make revisions where necessary” (The State Planning Organization, 1963, p. 6). In article 7 of the Law No. 91, the Economic Planning Department’s (EPD) role was stated as “to make necessary studies and prepare long and short - term plans and programs of a general and/or regional character” while the Social Planning Department (SPD) was supposed “to study the social problems of the country and prepare long and short - term plans to help solve them” (The State Planning Organization, 1963, p. 7). The Coordination Department (CD) was left with finance, legal measures, research, analyses, publications, and public relations.

15 Kansu (2004, p. 66) emphasizes that unlike the eight-level structure of ministries, DPT had only three levels: the undersecretary, a head of department, and finally a branch manager.

Plans were ‘obligatory and binding’ for the public sector and ‘directive and encouraging’ for the private sector. DPT was to start vast structural changes to abolish the merchant and agrarian restrictions on the market and at the same time bypass the markets when they fail to create the capital concentration for capital-intensive and high value-added sectors (Kazgan, 2013, p. 70) (Milor, 1990, p. 2). Although growth was seen almost a panacea, the principal aim was wide-ranging development. A substantial part of the population was seen to be ‘confined’ to subsistence agriculture with weak relations to the market. Plans were to be ‘comprehensive’, that is, including whole social and economic life¹⁶ (Erder, 2010, p. 232).

After the 1961 general election, DPT’s position became increasingly ambiguous as there were clashing opinions regarding the role of the institution among politicians (Milor, 1990, p. 20). Furthermore, politicians competed for the support of industrial conglomerates. Through informal channels or YPK meetings, competing sectors of the bourgeoisie pressured the planners via politicians. DPT was weakened further from 1965 on with the single party government of Justice Party. Rather than guiding the private sector, planning was now to support it and the İstanbul bourgeoisie was to have more voice in the direction of planning.

Even though at first envisioned to be a technocratic institution resistant to political pressures to pursue long-term economic development, DPT soon became a mechanism for politicians to satisfy the industrial conglomerates’ short-term needs and the pressures from the voters (Barbaros & Zürcher, 2013) (Karaosmanoğlu, 2010) (Pamuk, 2015).

3.3.1 *The First Five-Year Development Plan (1963-1967)*

After the working plan of 1962, the First Five-Year Development Plan came into effect as the first part the Fifteen-Year Development plan in 1963. Accord-

16 During the initial years, the planners visited India with AID support to make observations. India received aid from the USA – even though it was non-aligned in the Cold War – simply due to successful planning (Somel, 2010, p. 530). There, the planners took the idea of comprehensive planning (Türkcan, 2010, p. 284).

ing to Tinbergen (1967, p. 72), taking into account the expected 3 per cent annual growth in population, the government accepted a rate of 7 per cent real growth per annum to catch up with Western Europe. In his interview with Türkcan (2010, p. 284), Nejat Erder states that the reason was to double the national income in ten to twelve years. The plan was mainly a projection of investment-production, consumption, project evaluation, and input-output analyses (Türkcan, 2010, p. 262). It was largely successful in meeting goals, although not due to successful implementation but also thanks to worker remittances from Europe which were not included in the calculations but proved important in improving the balance of payments. Planning was learned while doing as there was no comparable precedent experience at that time. Çilingiroğlu (2010, p. 134;147) extends this lack of knowledge about planning methodology to economics in general, and adds that like most planners, he learned about planning by reading Tinbergen's books.

The least discussed target of the plan was raising national wealth as it was accepted to be the single most important aspect of development (Küçük, 1978, p. 275). Connected with this, another target was opening up productive employment opportunities for the rising population. While employment was frequently mentioned as a goal, Küçük (1978) argues that it was not accepted as a real target but rather as a function of national wealth. The third goal was autarchy defined as current account balance. The purpose was to obtain a self-sufficient economy as soon as possible with as little foreign funds as possible. The last goal frequently mentioned in the plan was social justice which mostly meant a just distribution of income. Neither its effect on other targets nor the required measures are discussed in the plan, which makes Küçük (1978, p. 276) conclude that it is mostly a requisite to the real target of increasing wealth. The greatest problem was considered to be the concentration of capital, and attention is focused mostly on increasing it. Out of three possible sources – private, foreign and public funds – the third one is emphasized because the first contradicts with social justice and the second hinders autarchy.

After the preparation of the plan was complete, YPK made major alterations in provisions about reforms in agricultural, SEEs, and taxes (Akçay, 2007, pp. 94-95) (Milor, 1990, pp. 21-24) (Özden, 2004, p. 61) (Sönmez, 1967, p. 41). While the planners proposed a tax and land reform to increase productivity

and savings, the government was unwilling to do so, contending that tax regulation was not the planning's duty and the plan did not need strict statements about taxation. Planners protested taking out a critical means for the targeted 7 per cent growth rate, without lowering the targeted growth rate as well (Karaosmanoğlu, 2010, p. 239) (Sönmez, 1967, p. 43). Due to this damage on the integrity of the plan, the Undersecretary of DPT Osman Nuri Torun, Head of EPD Atilla Karaosmanoğlu, Head of SPD Necat Erder and Head of CD Ayhan Çilingiroğlu resigned¹⁷. The new Undersecretary of DPT, former General Director of Treasury Ziya Müezzinoğlu stated that the changes made by the cabinet were not detrimental to the plan targets (Akçay, 2007, p. 111). However, a second wave of resignation came on 31 October 1963 from the new Head of EPD Atilla Sönmez and a planning specialist Nermin Kırdar on the grounds that rather than adjusting the budget according to the 1963 annual plan, the exact opposite was done (Akçay, 2007, pp. 112-113).

The RPP government was replaced by the Justice Party after the 1965 general election. The emphasis on high growth, social justice and balanced development shifted: Agency for International Development officials advised Prime Minister Demirel that the rate of growth should be decreased, foreign investors should be allowed to utilize underground sources, industry should be based on comparative advantage with Common Market and the economy in general should be shifted towards agriculture (Cumhuriyet, 24 March 1966, 7 as cited in Akçay 2007, p. 120-121). Roughly around the same time, OECD requested that growth rate should be decreased from 7 per cent to 5 or 6 per cent (Cumhuriyet, 26 March 1966, 1 as cited in Akçay 2007, p. 121). Apart from foreign and international organizations, the Justice Party government also wished to make revisions to the plan, bypassing the planners themselves and

17 It is important to emphasize that the reason planners resigned was not declining necessary reforms for development. Rather, the planners objected keeping the same targeted growth rate for public relations while not taking the necessary precautions. The problem was about the discrepancy between means and ends rather than ends alone. Interestingly, troubles with the political power occurred under the RPP rule and international organizations such as the World Bank and OECD supported the DPT, which were deemed institutions of capitalism and imperialism by the planners (Kansu, 2004, p. 122). Türkcan (2010, p. 280) shows, with examples, that the print media in general was also supportive of the planners after resignation and criticized the government harshly.

in the process, frustrating them. Another wave of resignations followed with a list of reasons criticizing the government (Akçay, 2007, p. 123).

3.3.2 *The Second Five-Year Development Plan (1968-1972)*

Preparation of the Second Five-Year Development Plan took place under such turbulent conditions and planning started without the plan objectives and strategy (Akçay, 2007, p. 124). While the models and assumptions of the first plan were inevitably arbitrary, the second plan was prepared with much more sophistication (Tinbergen, 1967, p. 77). It had a more liberal tendency with the single-party government of the Justice Party (Akçay, 2007, p. 126) (Boratav, 2011, p. 127). Limitations to the imports of capital and intermediary goods were considered to stall growth and were lowered and tax breaks were increased. There were still similarities with the first plan, expected growth in agriculture and industry were 4.1 per cent and 12 per cent respectively, and 7 per cent overall (Erder, 2010).

More importantly, this period was marked by the impact of future prime minister Turgut Özal, who was the Undersecretary of DPT incessantly between 1967 and 1971. An engineer himself, Özal lasted longer in his post compared to his predecessors and changed the organization's structure. One crucial change was the establishment of Incentive and Execution Department (*Teşvik ve Uygulama Dairesi*). The private sector had more role in preparation of the second plan according to Özden (2004, p. 86), which had complained about the uncertainty of tax incentive system, and lack of coordination among and slow processes in public offices. The Implementation Law prepared by Özal's entourage was a response to this criticism (Özden, 2004, p. 93). Another major change was about the personnel policy: while hitherto DPT had a small number of qualified planners, during Undersecretary Turgut Özal's period the number of personnel increased greatly. Sometimes new personnel were hired even without a written examination, and the share of planners on contract reached 90 per cent by 1969 while it was initially 0 per cent (Akçay, 2007, p. 129) (Özden, 2004, p. 100). Özal's and his entourage's religious identity was also a source of controversy among the DPT personnel who took pride in their modern outlook. This created a cleavage among the planners based on their hiring conditions and lifestyles. The fact that newcomers were equal to or even

superior to existing cadre in terms of personnel benefits both contradicted bureaucratic traditions and exacerbated the internal hostility (Akçay, 2007, p. 130). The military intervention on 12 March 1971 came almost as a reset in this environment as Özal and new members of DPT left the organization.

3.3.3 *The Third Five-Year Development Plan (1973-1977), the Military Intervention and a Mid-Period Adjustment*

One notable change after the 12 March intervention was in income levels: real wages were constantly increasing prior to the intervention. However, they received a sharp decline after 1971 (Küçük, 1978, p. 364). Industrialists also demanded a shift of resources from agriculture to industry, implying the need of taxing agriculture. Unable to tax the rural population that still constituted the majority of voters, the Justice Party chose the alternative of raising all prices but ensuring that industrial prices exceeded agricultural ones (Küçük, 1978, p. 351). Both trends were reversed thanks to the 1973 election. After the military intervention, Prime Minister Nihat Erim established a so-called 'reform government' and worked with ex-bureaucrats and planners such as Attila Karaosmanoğlu, Şinasi Orel and Ayhan Çilingiroğlu (Akçay, 2007, p. 130). This brief period of a 'technocratic' cabinet helped the restoration from Özal's changes in the organization: principally the purge of his followers and removal of Implementation and Execution Department from DPT (Kansu, 2004, pp. 327-328). Three different governments came to power during the preparation of the third plan, to be completed during Ferit Melen's Prime Ministry. Since the governments were established mostly by the military, they did not have much support in the Grand National Assembly, causing all parties to criticize the plan and demand various alterations in it (Akçay, 2007, p. 134). The legacy of the 1971 intervention on DPT has been harsh, even internal discussions were silenced as planners became increasingly fearful due to stagnating salaries and contracts being cancelled (Akçay, 2007, p. 140).

The period until 1977 constitute what Hirschman (1968) calls 'easy stage of ISI': agricultural exports and worker remittances provided the foreign exchange necessary for the import of capital and intermediary goods of the emerging industry. Signs of failure to move on to next stages of ISI were becoming apparent, exports were stagnating, balance of payments deficit was

rising, and Turkish lira was still overvalued. The share of raw materials in exports was 80 per cent in the first period and manufacture exports were mostly agriculture based, in the second period this share dropped only to 75 per cent and industrial products still constituted the majority of the imports (Kazgan, 2013) (Küçük, 1978, p. 404) (Pamuk, 2015). The 1970 devaluation and increasing remittances from workers decreased the symptoms for a while, but there was still no structural change to initiate the production of intermediary goods and the transition to export-orientation.

3.3.4 *Towards the Crisis: The Fourth Five-Year Developmental Plan (1979-1983)*

After the 1973 oil price shock, slowing world economy decreased exports which were already very low, and gastarbeiter recruitment stopped in Europe. At the same time workers in Europe started to send less money to Turkey and remittances that have been a crucial factor in reducing current account deficits, declined. Getting foreign exchange was still possible under severe long-term costs for the state through loans, which were used to increase domestic consumption rather than investment for future exports (Pamuk, 2015) (Kazgan, 2013) (Keyder, 2003, p. 251).

Despite the fact that the new five-year plan and the 1978 annual plan had to be ready by November 1977, even the plan strategy was absent due to the internal conflict among the Second National Front Government (Akçay, 2007, p. 140) (Kansu, 2004, p. 347). Within fourteen days, without the plan strategy being approved by the government and with various other procedural violations the Fourth Five-Year Development Plan was prepared and accepted by the Grand National Assembly. Shortly after, the government lost vote of confidence and the new RPP government ordered preparation of a new five-year plan with 1978 being a transit year (Akçay, 2007, p. 144). This left-of-center government did not amount to merrier relations between the politicians and the planners (Kansu, 2004, p. 371). Some conflict in domestic policies emerged in issues of transportation, wages, and more importantly regarding how to get out of the crisis. Kansu (2004, p. 308) states that the cadre tasked with the

preparation of the fourth plan was even more leftist and interventionist¹⁸ than before. The fourth plan still took industrialization as the main goal of development, accepted a growth rate of eight per cent per annum to compensate for the slowing pace of growth and obtain foreign credits (Kansu, 2004, p. 386). One significant aspect of the fourth plan is that it entailed substantial reform in public administration, ranging from strengthening of central administration to SEE reforms (Kansu, 2004, p. 387). Due to the political impasse of weak coalitions and social conflict stemming from the clash between the right and the left, planners filled the vacuum and carried out centralist policies¹⁹ in collaboration with the rest of the bureaucracy (Kansu, 2004, p. 399).

The government wished to negotiate a new loan with the IMF while the planners objected, accusing the IMF of being an imperialist organization and supporting the interests of the developed countries (Doğan, 1987, p. 33). In Akçay's (2007, p. 146) interview with Ergun Türkcan, he notes that during the meeting on 27 February 1978 Prime Minister Ecevit realized that foreign relations could not be carried out with DPT. Losing public support, the RPP government resigned and Demirel established the last government of the period (Akçay, 2007, p. 150). After receiving the vote of confidence from the parliament, Prime Minister Demirel appointed Turgut Özal the Undersecretary of Prime Ministry and acting Undersecretary of DPT (Akçay, 2007, p. 152). The greatest purge in DPT's history with 38 leftist planners being fired followed, and 140 new planners were hired (Kansu, 2004, p. 472). The new cadre lifted the obstacles in front of working with the IMF, World Bank and OECD. Under these conditions, 1980 annual plan was revised to be more IMF-friendly and the preparation of the 24 October 1980 decisions started. During the preparations Turgut Özal worked with a closed group consisting almost exclusively of engineers and utilized DPT merely for statistics (Akçay, 2007, p. 157) (Kansu, 2004, p. 472). After the 1980 coup, incentives to the public sector became the

18 Most of the planners in this period consisted of the members of 68 generation leftists according to Kansu (2004, p. 387).

19 One example Kansu (2004, p. 393) gives is when the Municipality of Ankara was unable to import busses for public transport, all public vehicles in the city (except those belonged to the Court of Accounts) were pooled in the hippodrome and redistributed to the municipality and to the public offices to be used as shuttles.

backbone of DPT; number of personnel rose to around 1200, and instead of informal, friendly relations with a three-level administrative structure, DPT had an eight-level complex and bureaucratic structure (Kansu, 2004, p. 509).

The first part of this chapter that goes through the late Ottoman and early Republican history highlights changing state policies, and a trend away from classical state policies of raising taxes to finance conquest endeavors to developmental concerns. Political and economic independence was a major challenge for both states and new institutions were often devised for this purpose. Profiteering in frequent wars led to a despise towards personal interests and cherished communitarian values. This process in turn became the public policy of populism that highlighted harmony and foresaw a social division based only on occupations. A parallel story of planning shows that the disorder and crises faced in these times were tried to be overcome with engineering solutions. Although the narrative above displays a country entangled by nationalism, populism, Occidentalism and various other competing outlooks, there seems to be some technocratic element carried from the Ottoman Empire onwards. This factor arguably catalyzed the formation of DPT and formed the bases of a technocratic mentality.

The second part went through three relevant themes of the period: westernization and the rise of engineers, Keynesian economic policies, and planning. All trends contributed to the establishment of DPT together, but more importantly they shaped the organization itself. The haunting observations of the West contributed to increasing importance of engineers, who were tasked with preparing plans to develop Turkey's economy. It seems that engineers were not always the apolitical technical experts that would mediate between workers and employers, but rather became socialists themselves. This is more striking towards 1980, which coincides with the increasing Marxist tone in planning documents mentioned in the following two chapters.

History of DPT itself shows the organization's susceptibility to outside influence. Each five-year period is marked by different factors influencing the plans themselves. However, sources of and obstacles towards DPT's effectivity has been studied by many authors, some of whom are referenced in this thesis. DPT's history was not summarized to reiterate these studies, but to explain the selection of documents to be studied in the following chapters. In any

event, apart from the outside interventions to planners, since the plans are supposed to obey targets set by the political power, they are hardly reliable sources of information to understand how planners think. Therefore, in the next chapter, documents that are not directly linked to the plans are reviewed to understand the planners' perspective. Although changes can be observed in different periods, these do not seem to stem from changing governments as with the five-year plans. The very political developments narrated in this chapter most likely influenced the planners as well.

Specialization Theses and the Planners' Multifarious Perspective

In this chapter, I will review specialization thesis of DPT planning experts. The next chapter follows this through with an analysis on non-DPT personnel's writings in the special expertise commission reports. Although the five-year plans and the annual programs are subject to pressures from various groups due to their executive implications, neither the specialization theses nor the special expertise commission reports directly go into the plans. Apart from receiving less public attention, this also means that they entail greater freedom from pressure groups for the writers to express their opinions. As the reports and the theses do not follow a strict format, the analysis is completely qualitative.

The texts included in this chapter are specialization theses of assistant planning experts, written in order to become planning experts, and other material by DPT personnel that were not part of the plans themselves but either aided them or were distributed within DPT or outside it to spread an understanding of planning. Published first in 1965, there are 199 specialization theses within the period of this thesis. They were categorized judged by their abstracts, the results were that 140 theses were concerned with economic planning, 4 on European Economic Community, 5 introspective work on how to make plans, and 50 on social planning (DPT, 1986). Out of the 50 theses, a sample was formed with regard to topics and year published. Since there were

no theses in the early years, SPD research that substituted specialization commission reports that were not yet found for the first plan were also included. To compare technocratic mentality with its rivals, review is done by grouping expressions into themes. To show how one text can contain both technocratic and non-technocratic elements¹, some statements that follow each other are relayed as they are without dividing to separate headings.

Analysis is made on values, identification of problems, how they are problematized, and what sort of solutions are offered. As discussed in the first chapter, a technocratic view depends mostly on data, and more importantly there is an implication that the particular problematization and solution offered is dictated by the data. Socio-economic or political conflicts are not dwelled upon due to a belief that with the right order all interests would unite. More specific signs include a call for optimization, efficiency, centralization, integration, harmony, standardization, rationalization, and using scientific methods. Economic growth, industrialization, and development are all collapsed and taken as the goal².

Even though DPT is considered a technocratic institution, this chapter shows that there also exists prevalence of Marxism and criticisms extending to the one-party period. More strikingly, there seems to be a shift from a technocratic monopoly with very little criticism to an increasingly overt Marxist tone and deepening political criticisms towards 1980. Not as often, there is also Kemalism, securitization, and a denial of what is called ‘narrow economism’. What is general to almost all publication is taking the West, i.e. North America and Western Europe, as the role model with seldom mention of the USSR. This shows that planners are not isolated from the general population of Turkey and planning identity does not necessarily determine their perspective, even in the theses written for promotion. Among other alternatives, Marxism is

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- 1 Though the documents in the following chapter are much more internally conflicted due to the high number of authors, specialization theses are not always unilateral in perspective as well.
 - 2 Even though it is very rare to come across a document that does not see economic growth, defined in any way, as the natural goal of planning, there still is a difference how it is connected to other topics of planning and whether aspects not contributing to growth in any way are dwelled upon.

more prevalent and striking, possibly due to increasing social mobility in 1970s.

Studies only on social planning is covered both to limit the scope of analyses and due to their comparative openness to personal opinions compared to economic planning. Economic planning texts target certain sectors, describe their current status in mostly quantitative terms and offer a list of actions to reach plan goals or make general improvements. This line of analysis is not unique to economic planning; in social planning as well seldom the greater part of the text body is description of existing situation, tables, calculation methods, and comparisons with other countries. However, there is still much more room to reflect personal opinions. The division between social and economic planning is somewhat blurry, yet planner Kışmir's (1967, p. 18) definition sums up the approach towards the two pillars: "Social plan develops policies towards realizing basic social principles in issues that need to be handled with social causes before economic causes."³ An alternative simplistic way to distinguish the two is with their relation to production and industrialization. While economic planning wishes to increase them, social planning seeks to render its benefits concrete and distribute to the people in an egalitarian manner. This difference is not very strict, however, since as can be seen below and more in the next chapter, social planning documents also defend certain policies because they would leave more resources to economic investments or improve human factors of production.

§ 4.1 Technocratic Attitude Among the Planners

Since one aim of this chapter is to show that DPT planners were not altogether technocrats, it may be fruitful to first review technocratic approach to matters. Apart from constituting a challenge to the hypothesis in the previous sentence, this would also establish a point of contrast for the rest of the chapter. Furthermore, it may help clarify how technocratic perspective is observed with con-

3 "Sosyal plan, iktisadi nedenlerden önce sosyal nedenlerle ele alınması gereken konularda, temel sosyal ilkeleri gerçekleştireci yönde politikalar geliştirir."

crete examples, Lastly, this endeavor may give an idea what shapes technocracy took in the example of DPT planners. Accordingly, following part in the chapter will extend and detail this technocratic approach and then highlight its exceptions.

4.1.1 *Increasing production and industrialization*

In a booklet first printed in July 1961 and distributed to relevant parties in planning, DPT administrators explain what is planning and why they are making plans, as the name of the document remarks. The ‘Why Planning’ booklet explains the purpose of social planning to be to handle urgent matters now, and leave the rest to the future so as to use scarce resources for rapid growth in order to afford more resources to social problems in the future (DPT, 1962, p. 10). Similarly, an SPD study for the second plan on labor power starts with the problem of inadequate qualified human resource for Turkey in its development attempts. According to the principle of the second plan, in order to use scarce qualified labor, meritocracy is to be established at each level, people will work in a secure working place, and social mobility will be provided in order to render labor power efficient (DPT, 1967, p. 1). Accordingly, modern economy requires a completely different set of skills than traditional agricultural or manual work and developing countries lack the resources to train people with necessary skills (DPT, 1967, pp. 10-12).

In his thesis on economic and social criteria in health planning, Parla Kışmir (1967) mentions economic side of health. Discussions from various economists regarding the economic value of health and human life are reviewed with items such as birth as an investment, child upbringing, period of economic productivity are defined (Kışmir, 1967, pp. 9-13). Ways of measuring savings from both costs, as in death or disease, and waste of human productivity⁴ through health services are mentioned. Connections are also made with education, with the example of loss of a qualified worker or the sickness of a student meaning waste of resources that could have been used for another person (Kışmir, 1967, p. 16). Since planned economies usually wish to use all

4 Kışmir (1967, p. 16) states that all early deaths in full employment, and some in low employment, means the loss of a present and future producer’s loss.

resources in the most rational way to increase production and services with the ultimate goal of increasing living standards as well as social and economic wellbeing, social investments such as education, health, and housing are inevitable.

Birkan's (1969, p. 1) thesis on rationalization of investments in higher education describes the current condition in Turkey as a random total of institutions that were found on various purposes, whereas higher education should be directed towards training highest level of human power that economic and social development requires as well as the personnel for scientific research. Accordingly, apart from the human power needs, rising demands of higher education, systematizing higher education and establishing connections with other levels of education necessitated a planned approach. The mismatch between the rates of targets being reached and the funds allocated to them in annual plans is taken to be a sign of problem in investments and that a planning discipline is lacking with higher education. Although the dominant tone in the thesis seems to be a call for rational reorganization, aside from scientific advancement, the goal of higher education is set to be maximization of human power supply directed towards development.

Where the technocratic language is most striking could be Ertan Ziya Saver's (1972) thesis on comparative wage levels according to characteristics of labor power. Even though the topic of labor is mostly dealt within a social welfare or a Marxist view in planning documents, this thesis is almost completely technical and mostly an evaluation of certain statistics. Wage levels are seen to stem chiefly from quantitative and qualitative productivity of labor power based on education, training, and experience. Since qualified labor power is limited and does not respond quickly to increases in demand as training and education takes time, it has a better bargaining position vis-à-vis employers. Furthermore, higher wage levels leave more room for savings meaning that qualified workers can afford to wait longer for a better job compared to their unqualified counterparts (Saver, 1972, p. 1).

Reviewing two sources of data, studies conducted by Employment Institution (*İş ve İşçi Bulma Kurumu*) and State Statistical Institute (*Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü*), Saver (1972, p. 7) remarks that there exists an incongruity, with Statistics Institute showing much higher numbers for wages, which is explained

by Employment Institution being confined to demanded 8 hours wage by applicants while the former utilizes gross hourly wages of workers from bigger establishments and includes more qualified workers. When discussing wage differences between various workers, the greatest difference in hourly wage is found between highest quality workers that are technicians and unqualified workers, while the experience makes the least difference. Furthermore, another ‘interesting’ finding according to Saver (1972, p. 8) is that women earn less than men, which is not explained or explored further. A comparison between public and private sector show that unqualified workers earn comparatively more in public sector while the opposite is true for public sector. Saver (1972, p. 9) explains this crossness with the social policies of the public sector taking more than work produced into account, and the incentives to create mobility of qualified labor mobility from public sector to private sector. While all of these findings can be attributed to social or political issues, they are instead explained within a narrower outlook confined to economics.

4.1.2 *Urbanization*

Urbanization was not a major topic in which authors dwelled upon in the first chapter. Yet it has been an important topic of social planning in Turkey from 1960 onwards. This partly stemmed from the mounting problem of shanty towns starting in 1950s. Often depicted as unhealthy houses symbolizing being stuck in between the West or the East, or village and city, they are usually abhorred. Its links with industrialization on the other hand whet the technocratic mentality’s appetite. Shanty town settlements are almost defended as a cheap housing alternative.

During the early days of planning when special expertise commissions were still in the making, they covered mostly economic sectors and provided data. To create input for ‘social sectors’ reports were published by the SPD. One such book was a work on housing sector. It begins by depicting houses one of the most important aspects of social life due to its relations with economic power, social interactions and family life. Their role in poorer families’ living standards are emphasized. As with most reports, increasing importance of houses is connected to rapid increase in population and rural-urban migration in Turkey at the time. “The inability to follow a certain regional planning,

urban development; residence, rent and land policy”⁵ being the main culprit, eight problems are listed. Lack of rational planning, integrity, coordination and reliable data constitute four of them, while three other problems relate to luxury housing and speculation rendering housing expensive to the detriment of lower income groups. The remaining problem is the increasing numbers of unhealthy shanty towns. As such, both technocratic tendencies and welfare values are dominant in the analysis while shanty towns constitute merely one category mentioned in the passing.

The identification of problems diverges from mainstream Kemalist narrative that seeks to ‘westernize’ Turkey through mostly cultural reforms therefore has a hostile attitude towards shanty houses. The report evaluates this crucial phenomenon in public health and social integration terms⁶. The stress is not overcoming a type of housing that symbolizes being caught up between the two hemispheres of the world but rather providing cheap and adequate housing for the whole population. This perspective forms the one pillar of the problematization of shanty houses, the other being their illegal nature. Rather than a cultural straddle, they are seen as an almost natural result of rapid population movements coupled with improper legislation, expensive land prices and rents (DPT, 1962, p. 31). The motive of satisfying the basic need of shelter is recognized, however it is also stressed that shanty buildings has become a source of rent and profit.

The solutions proposed are twofold: preventing further construction of shanty houses and renovation of the current ones. The principal method for the first solution is equal distribution of employment opportunities across regions, land reform, and a shift from luxury housing to affordable housing. When improvement of existing houses is discussed, it’s stressed again that the most crucial aspect of shanty houses is their illegal nature, and laws that encourage their construction should be annulled. For houses that are suitable for dwelling, their conditions should be improved and municipal services should

5 “Muayyen bir bölge planlama, şehircilik, mesken, kira ve arsa politikasının takip edilemeyişi mesken bakımından aşağıdaki problemleri ortaya çıkarmıştır.” (DPT, 1962, p. 5)

6 Emphasis is on being far from city centers and the society itself, lack of a waterworks and sewage system, crowded houses and decreasing green areas around the cities.

be provided. As to the remaining, it's emphasized that they should not be evacuated until new houses are built, and the foremost important solution is providing the dwellers with new land and allow them to build their own houses. The report also makes a centralist remark as it adds that since these processes are beyond the resources of municipalities, the state should undertake them (DPT, 1962, p. 39).

4.1.3 *Underdevelopment, Regional development, and Balance*

One expectation from social planning was to 'overcome the Kurdish issue' by reducing inequality (Akçay, 2007, p. 75). Apart from the social, economic, and cultural discrepancies between the Southeast and the rest, there was also the crushing matter of regional imbalance in general. Growth was the purpose, yet it was to be achieved in a balanced manner. This was both a matter of efficiency and social welfare: rationally planned investments would yield more production in underdeveloped regions, and each citizen on Turkey was entitled to the benefits of development.

When mentioning regional development, the 'Why Planning' booklet emphasizes that better living being the main purpose of development, increasing economic resources through better use is not sufficient without an overall development of the society (DPT, 1962, p. 15). Apart from an increase in living conditions, regional balance is also chiefly a matter of efficiency. A Priority Regions for Development Department (*Kalkınmada Öncelikli Yörelere Dairesi*) research proposes a gradual transition from concentration of investments on where the investors reside to a diffusion to various investments centers in order to avoid waste (DPT, 1975, p. 7).

An SPD research on labor reiterates the lack of qualified labor power in Turkey with statistics, however, it is stressed that there also exists an important imbalance, especially across sectors and regions (DPT, 1967, pp. 10-12). Rather than simply increasing qualified workers, they should also be distributed to sectors and cities in a balanced manner. Another study by The Priority Regions for Development Department shows that appointing the 'priority regions' was not sparked completely by the Kurdish problem, since northern provinces such as Artvin, Gümüşhane, and Sivas are also included, and it is advised to make continual scientific study in determining these regions

(Sarıca, 1974). Emphasis being on underdevelopment, planner Sarıca (1974, p. 3) makes references to international standards, geography and economics when discussing the selection of cities. However, when the reasons of underdevelopment are mentioned it is also added that “witnessing wars and insurgencies for centuries”⁷ is also a factor. This statement being an exception, the rest of the study sticks to a technical analysis based on quantitative data, qualitative indicators of development, and a plan of certain goals year by year. The study also conforms to the planning mentality by recognizing that regional balance and the situation of underdeveloped regions are secondary to “the integrity of national plan principles”⁸ (Sarıca, 1974, p. 86).

Aydın Tuğ’s (1972) specialization thesis on unbalanced development between regions of Turkey starts with the definition of development. While the capitalist view sees it as a matter of “increases in the level of urbanization, rate of industrialization, per capita income and the level of education”, that is, being capitalist, the socialistic approach defines it “as the improvement of the human societies, and particular phases in the production powers and relations” which means the dissolution of social classes (Tuğ, 1972, p. 1). Taking the former approach for granted, Tuğ (1972, p. 2) considers article 41 of the constitution the best definition which focuses on each citizen of all regions benefitting from development equally and pursuit of development being a national cause. With improved means of communication, people are becoming more aware of opportunities far away, hence regional inequality brings the danger of mass migration to developed regions and waste of potential resources in undeveloped ones. Which is the case in Turkey according to Tuğ (1972, p. 4) due to lack of coordinated regional development policies and “reluctance of authorities in tackling major development problems of” undeveloped regions. Apart from waste of resources, problems stemming from inequality include consuming what is produced within the region due to non-

7 Geri kalmışlık nedenleri: “Doğal koşullar, sosyal ve fiziksel alt yapının yetersizliği, yüzyıllardan bu yana savaşımlara ve ayaklanmalara sahne oluşu”

8 “Milli plan politika ve tedbirlerinin kalkınmada öncelikli yöreleri özgü, özellikle iktisadi ve sosyal bütünleşmeye dönük sorunların çözümüne yeterli olmadığı durumlarda, milli plan ilkelerinin bütünlüğü ve tutarlılığını bozmayacak biçimde ve milli plan politikalarını tamamlayıcı nitelikte ek politika ve tedbirler yıllık programlarla geliştirilecektir.”

existence of markets, emergence of shanty towns that render urban services difficult to provide.

In his discussions on methodology and numbers from various countries, which occupies the bulk of his thesis on education as an investment, Yurtseven (1974, pp. 45-46) comments about the importance of race in the USA when mentioning equality of opportunities in education. Right after this discussion a table about success levels of high schools in Turkey comes. It is remarkable that numbers showing that Eastern and Southeastern Anatolian high school are last in terms of success in high schools is shared after a discussion about race and opportunities, yet it is portrayed in a manner of socio-economically developed and backwards regions of Turkey rather than a matter of racial inequality. Although (1974) thesis is discussed in more detail below for containing a Marxist tone, regional discrepancy takes a technical approach.

4.1.4 *Rationality, Efficiency, and Data*

It would not be likely to encounter a planning text that goes against rationality and efficiently. However, excerpts below show frequent existence of criteria of rationality and efficiency. The last empirical research mentioned in the first chapter shows how the formulation of an issue could lead to its 'technocratization' (Laird, 1990). Planning by nature often requires numerical calculations. However, analyzing, problematizing and offering solutions to an issue in merely technical terms constitutes a fast track to technocracy. Apart from passing decisions based on data, the way this is usually seen in planning documents is a call for rationalization, clarification of uniformization, and producing data. One example is the SPD research on labor power which sees the main problems as confusion of authority, irrational organization, and inefficient financial control in the public sector (DPT, 1967, p. 90). The severity of these problems being a valid explanation for the emphasis on rationalization, the frequent mention of the latter calls for a closer inspection.

According to Çelen Birkan (1969), main problems with Turkey's higher education include insufficient increase in technical education vis-à-vis social

sciences⁹, sacrifices made from quality to increase quantity, and also the lack of coordination among higher education institutions in terms of meeting plan targets. Giving examples from past studies and projects, it is argued that lack of reliable data, coordination, sound analysis, and defined targets limited the success of past investments. Birkan (1969, p. 15) advises various precautions to establish and render functional an interinstitutional body to ensure coordination and carry on plan targets. It is also advised that contacts are made with chambers of commerce and occupational organizations so as to fulfill the needs of the labor market (Birkan, 1969, p. 17).

Seher Savaş's (1977, p. 1) thesis considers health to be a natural right and a duty of the state, as given in the constitution, and an investment to increase production therefore indispensable. Furthermore, since the understanding of development is to uplift as many people as possible to higher living standards and social security, increasing mental and bodily health is a goal as much as increasing wealth is. The topic of the thesis, the Socialization of Health Program¹⁰ was accepted by the National Union Committee in October 1961 with Law No. 224. It prioritized the undeveloped Eastern regions, emphasized protective medicine, dismissed private gains, and aimed at establishing a certain health standard across Turkey by decreasing inequality (Savaş, 1977, p. 12). The plan also aimed at obviating problems in coordination, yet also reducing centralization by opening regional directories, and clarification of duties and authorities.

Savaş's (1977, p. 21) general evaluation of the program is that the initial goal itself was not mistaken with the data at hand, but its application and the authorities were to blame in including more cities too soon, which lead to its limited success. Another deviation from the plan was not assigning all public

9 While ratio of social sciences decreased, the limited decrease is not found satisfactory and the failure is explained by the convenience of increasing social science departments' capacities due to lower costs.

10 More a work of Nusret Fişek, the Undersecretary for the Ministry of Health at the time, than a novelty by the planners, this program was an early attempt at reducing the gap in standards of health services. Indeed, in his thesis Tuğ (1972, p. 23) argues that socialization of health services "can be accepted as the most important and effective step towards overcoming the disparity between the East and West." The program is explained further in the following chapter.

hospitals to the Ministry of Health, which prevented enough physicians being assigned to newly established clinics in rural areas (Savaş, 1977, p. 34). By creating a model that predicts medical needs of a given population, Savaş (1977, p. 40) contends that had the plan been applied without exception, it would have been successful, substantially reducing the need for hospitals, and enough medical personnel would be appointed to the newly establishes facilities rather than serve much fewer people in some state institutions.

4.1.5 *A Harmony of Interests*

As mentioned in the first chapter, one pillar of technocratic thinking is denial of any significant socio-economic, cultural or political cleavage. A major divergence from conservative or socialist ideology, this tendency shows itself in a promise of social harmony. The same SPD research on labor mentioned above which emphasized disorganization in the public sectors envisages that chambers of industry and labor unions will work in harmony for various purposes in the private sector (DPT, 1967, p. 90). To the planners writing the booklet ‘Why Planning’, having successful planning in a democracy requires plans made with democracy’s requirements. Even though preparing the plan is in essence a technical matter, appointing the targets and principle means should be on the political authorities, so that planning and democracy are complementary rather than opposite (DPT, 1962, p. 12). This perspective, prevalent in understanding of planning as mentioned in the previous chapter, helps dislocating political conflicts outside the planning process by dealing only with means to achieve the appointed ends. On the other hand, thanks to scientific methods, it is possible to test whether intended means would lead to the goals and planning enables checks on the authorities and holding them accountable according to early planners (DPT, 1962, p. 12).

§ 4.2 Rival Ideas

Planners without any civil service experience and hired according to their technical expertise may be expected to display technocratic tendencies. However, as analyses below will show, there also exists perspectives that are not compatible with technocracy. Chief exceptions include Occidentalism as part

of Turkey modernization agenda, Socialism, and Kemalism. Although not as frequent, there also exist conservative statements. All of these ideas are also existent in Turkey at the time and by no means innovative. Yet their existence can be seen as a proof against the idea that DPT was the technocratic institution of Turkey and planners were technocrats.

4.2.1 *East vs. West and Occidentalism*

In the *Why Planning* booklet, the 1960 coup is deemed a fortunate start for Turkey's development as was the case for many countries, and the establishment of DPT is explained to be part of the effort of the 'revolution' to put development efforts to an order (DPT, 1962, p. 5). The answer to the question 'why plans' is explained with the existence of a West developed through exploitation on the one side and underdeveloped countries on the other side. Peace of nations and humanity depends on the gap being closed or reduced, hence the international struggle to close it. Since developed countries would not wait for the rest to catch up, it falls to the developing countries' states to intervene to the economic and social life in a systematic, scientific, and planned manner to achieve the crucial rapid growth (DPT, 1962, p. 9).

One particular way East vs. West view surfaces is when statistics and models are discussed: almost always comparisons are made with North American and European countries which are implicitly taken as goals. The SPD research on housing, for instance, compares national statistics with those on global scale, yet the report mentions only European countries by name as do most planning documents (DPT, 1962, p. 11).

Another way the difference is phrased is developing and developed countries. Parla Kışmir's (1967, p. 3) thesis on economic and social criteria in health planning begins with the changing roles of the state throughout history. Until the nineteenth century, states were only expected to provide internal and external security. After the Industrial Revolution and proliferation of popular voting, the notion of 'gendarmerie state' was challenged in France, Great Britain, and the USA where the state became responsible of providing the new needs of changing societies. The idea of providing equal opportunities in various fields to citizens, including healthcare, became ingrained. Three reasons are listed for developing health services: economic reasons such as protecting

the workers' health and extending lifespan to increase production, fear of being infected with diseases such as cholera and the bubonic plague, and out of altruism and mercy towards other people (Kışmir, 1967, p. 20).

Kışmir (1967, p. 5) lists health's threefold relation to social and economic life: being a tool for development, good health being one of the goals of development, and economic development being a tool for reaching good health. Contrary to affluent developed countries, in a developing country there is inadequate medical personnel, hospitals, and medicine. However modern medicine is costly and requires high rates of spending, which means that only in countries where an understanding that takes human wellbeing as the goal of economic development is prevalent, enough resources are allocated to health. In Turkey, that health expenses are considered expenses for developmental shows that a 'progressive' understanding is dominant (Kışmir, 1967, p. 33).

In her thesis on Socialization of Health Program in Turkey, Savaş (1977, p. 10) gives example of a similar program that was applied in Great Britain which appointed a doctor to each citizens and paid doctors regularly based on the number of patients appointed. Patients could only go to regional hospitals when local treatment proved impossible (Savaş, 1977, p. 10). European examples being frequent, it is peculiar that the next case of socialization is from Russia where a similar but less competitive and more statist policy is adopted. It is stressed that apart from the economic system and level of state intervention, there exists similarities between two programs in carrying services to remote areas, preventing waste, and inefficiency. This example seems to constitute an exception to comparisons with North America and Europe, yet the emphasis is on developed countries despite their dominant relation of production.

In Kalyoncuoğlu's (1977) analysis, also within the dichotomy of backwards and developed countries, Turkey is situated among the former group without question. Most of the differences between the two types are explained in numerical qualities such as the share of agriculture in employment, accumulation of capital, propensity to save, ratio of consumer goods within manufactures, and also dependency on developed capitalist countries in terms of aids, foreign capital, and loans which extends to a dependency on local monopolies linked to them (Kalyoncuoğlu, 1977, pp. 9-10). When the social differences are

cited, a duality of modern and traditional relations of production coexisting becomes prominent. While traditional relations are dissolving, it is not at a desirable pace. The coexistence takes shape of women joining in higher rates to labor force where modern relations are prevalent. Another output is inability to attain modern class society, with a limited bourgeoisie that is not politically powerful, and which is mostly dependent to 'outside'. The working class is also few in numbers and unqualified, in that their education levels are very low.

These examples show a common bifurcation of world notwithstanding how the poles are phrased, with Turkey looking towards the developed-Western camp. Prevalence of Occidentalism seems to play its part in this framework for authors from different mindsets. It could be also explained, however, by the usage of different tools in economics for different levels of development. In this regard, planners who follow Jan Tinbergen's writings identify their work as developmental planning and since planning requires finding the means to reach the end, they may apply methods for developing countries. Yet developed economies lay in their horizon at all times, indicating that Occidentalism finds its way into the technocratic thinking.

4.2.2 *Socialism*

In a report specifically about the effect of collective agreements on wages in public sector and SEEs, SPD relays results of a survey¹¹ about collective agreements and wage levels across the years in public sector institutions. In the report, it is stated that collective agreements create the balance between labor and capital, and therefore collective agreements, strikes and lock-outs were among the basic rights in the first plan (DPT, 1966, p. 1). After showing hints of Marxism the report then moves away from it by emphasizing that above-mentioned rights are not the only mechanisms to increase wages. The findings show that during election times the state also increased wage levels by increasing the minimum wage or influencing arbitration courts. Furthermore, as

11 Of the 8 ministries, 15 general directorates, 64 SEEs and 63 state partnerships, 54,7 per cent replied with the results, 25,3 per cent returned empty questionnaire forms and 20 per cent did not reply (DPT, 1966, p. 5).

most negotiations ended with an agreement and rarely with strikes, existence of collective agreements did not make a significant effect, with a minimal support on wages (DPT, 1966, p. 17).

Moving forward in time, specialization theses start to contain a Marxist tone more assertive than above. Yurtseven (1974, p. 1) thesis on education as an economic investment begins with traits that differentiate humans from animals, one of them is borrowed from Marx which states that when humans produce commodities that will sustain their lives they start to differ from animals. Education is as connected to the production process as it is to political and cultural environment. The purpose of analysis is to find out the contribution of education as human capital to economic growth and development (Yurtseven, 1974, p. 3). A review on classical economic literature shows the reasons to abstain from including human capital in forces of production. One is the convenience to neglect a variable difficult to measure, connected to this is the difficulty to separate education as an investment from that of as consumption. Another reason is moral, which causes several authors to refrain from treating humans as capital since capital exists to serve humans (Yurtseven, 1974, p. 6). Human capital occupies an important place in socialist thinking as well, with Marx citing sources of labor power's value as the cost of a worker sustaining his/her life, natural differences between labor power, and the cost to create this power. The third category includes education (Yurtseven, 1974, p. 10).

Problems in Turkey are threefold according to Yurtseven (1974, pp. 60-61): inability to measure demand, not knowing the cost of supply, and the failure to plan demand and supply so as to use scarce resources with an optimum efficiency. Moving on to how to measure education as investment, Yurtseven (1974, pp. 13-28) cites four ways, which are criticized both for not being very accurate and being too technical and neglecting social aspects.

Perspectives that do not comply with that of technocracy often deny approaching matters in a merely economic manner. Soy's (1974, p. 2) thesis for instance, *Entrepreneurship in the Process of Industrialization in Underdeveloped Countries and Turkey*, criticizes the artificial divide between Sociology and Economy, Economy's reliance on models, and exclusion of non-purely economic methods in his methodology. Sociology and Political Science, on

the other hand, are criticized for portraying Western model as the only example of modern or developed one and neglecting the economic aspect of Third World modernization. Similarly, entrepreneurship is treated as a matter of the individual, psychological, or purely economic so far. Soy's (1974, p. 3) solution to these problems is adopting an interdisciplinary approach. Developing countries have different socio-economic factors than developed ones, and the view that once their difficulties in terms of both capital and entrepreneurial spirit are lifted they would develop misses out a mixture of historical, social, economic, and political dynamics. However, Soy (1974, p. 37) argues that until certain national and international problems and contradictions are solved and dependency relations continue, developing countries cannot establish their own industries and develop with their own sources. While the East-West dichotomy is shared in this thesis with the technocratic mentality, including social and political critique creates a divergence in its implication. With a covert Marxist tone, Soy (1974) ends up with an analysis more in line with the dependencia theory.

Soy (1974, p. 8) reviews the neoclassical schools and Schumpeter's views on sources of growth as well as modern psychological and institutional views. All of them are dismissed for being narrow economic perspectives, and Soy (1974, p. 11) continues to challenge the goal of maximizing profit through arranging production and factors of production in a market economy, and states the need to regulate consumption and distribution as well as production, which can be done not through free market but with state intervention and planning. Maximizing resource utilization at the firm level means waste of resources at the society level because capitalism cannot achieve optimum social benefit from production due to its internal conflicts. A complete solution would transfer the role of entrepreneurship to a central and planning state that would arrange key production facilities to maximize societal welfare (Soy, 1974, p. 12).

Even though it seems a socialist solution is offered, diverging from the choices of the political authority, Soy (1974, p. 19) does not completely discard capitalist entrepreneurship. On the contrary lack of it in the Ottoman Empire prevented transition to a capitalist economy and industrialization, which resulted in the richest country in the East until the 16th century to impoverish

vis-à-vis Europe. Accordingly, any effort for national economy started with the Republic. Inheriting very little from the Empire, policies that benefitted landed classes were adopted to develop capitalism, increase production for the market, and diffuse money economy (Soy, 1974, p. 23). Efforts to develop a national industry were far from being effective and incentives to create private entrepreneurship that would create growth failed. Étatism of the 1930s, on the other hand, are explained as an obligation rather than proactive policies independent of private interests. Soy (1974, p. 28) emphasizes that the failure to achieve development during the first decades of the Republic are not to be blamed on private interests but the state, that followed contradictory policies given the dominant relation of production. Not likely to encounter in a technocratic report, this thesis contains political criticisms inspired from Marxism that expand to the early years of the Republic.

The most recent work in this section, Kalyoncuoğlu's (1977) thesis on the economic developments and labor union movements in Turkey contains an undiluted Marxist analysis with criticisms reaching as far as the foundation of the Republic. After citing the three ways for a backwards country to develop, namely the capitalist way, the socialist way, and the non-capitalist way used by newly independent countries at the time, Turkey's choice of capitalism is not questioned and the rest of the thesis takes that as an axiom without touching on alternatives (Kalyoncuoğlu, 1977, p. 28). However, it is added that Turkey's choice of capitalism for development enabled agriculture to retain its dominant position with an industry that is foreign-dependent, small scaled, and consists mostly of assembling (Kalyoncuoğlu, 1977, p. 29).

Within capitalism, the foundation of the republic is narrated with a story of shuttling between laissez-faire and interventionism, symbolized by Celal Bayar and İsmet İnönü respectively, who were the dominant figures in economy (Kalyoncuoğlu, 1977, p. 31). Controversies towards the National Security Law (*Milli Korunma Kanunu*) of the World War II era are relayed by stating the fact that a commission was formed to inspect its compliance with the constitution even during the one-part regime. The law is not considered to be used against the private sector by Kalyoncuoğlu (1977, p. 31), but rather is considered harshest against the workers in order to attain necessary labor power during the war. The Wealth Levy, on the other hand, initially targeted the war

profiteers, namely the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie, but ended up being an anti-minority movement that failed its original purpose. The disillusionment of the bourgeoisie due to the levy combined with the hostility from big land owners caused by a law to give land to peasants broke the coalition of military-civilian bureaucracy, merchants, industrialists, and big land owners according to Kalyoncuoğlu (1977, p. 36).

The thesis emphasizes that economic and social changes such as increases in population, cultivated land, internal and international migration, and international trade, gained pace after 1960, which is the primary reason of Turkey becoming a dynamic society. Among various dynamics, industrialization and labor union movements are singled out as the determinant factors for Turkey's future since 1970 (Kalyoncuoğlu, 1977, p. 3). Ratio of investment goods within manufactures is accepted to be an adequate sign of industrialization. Yet per capita GNP is considered to be a meaningless indicator in itself, and even misleading since it implies equal distribution. While economic improvement is explained as technological improvement of forces of production and the change of relations of production as a result, it is stressed that the term to be used in backwards countries is development, which is using the existing high technologies of developed countries¹². Therefore, industrialization is indispensable in reaching the next level in improvement, that is the next relation of production (Kalyoncuoğlu, 1977, p. 7). And to achieve industrialization, accumulation of capital is necessary according to Kalyoncuoğlu (1977, p. 13), who backs this statement with Marx's money-commodity-money circles without making explicit references to him.

Working class being created by capitalism and industry, Kalyoncuoğlu relays that 1837 is accepted to be the birth of working class in Turkey when a fez factory was opened (1977, p. 56). With an emphasis on organizations, movements, strikes, and their repressions, history of the working class from that point onwards is told with references to historical documents. The republican

12 Kalyoncuoğlu (1977, p. 6) makes a difference between "*kalkınma*" and "*gelişme*", which are translated as development and improvement, respectively, to relay the nuance. While the former is used for backwards countries, implies attaining - or more specifically importing - some qualities new to that country and is derived from standing up, the latter is an improvement and alteration of what is already there, a word borrowed from biology.

period includes criticisms towards the one-part period due to repression of workers movements with the Law on the Maintenance of Peace (*Takriri Sükun Kanunu*), the Labor Law passing as late as 1936, and the first labor union being formed later in 1945 (1977, p. 59). Criticisms extend to the post-war era since the RPP did not support the right to strike and the Democrat Party used it as a campaign slogan but refrained from delivering when it came to power. When collective agreements, strikes, and lock-out became legal in 1963, labor union movement accelerated. However, “with the application of the law, a narrow understanding of unionism became prevalent among workers’ organizations that degraded struggle to narrow molds of economism”¹³. Such an open hostility towards economism, stemming from Marxism, stands out from planning documents prepared by both planners and non-planners alike. Furthermore, it is added that while better wages create a suitable ground for better struggles, rising inflation due to higher consumption would take away any gained benefit. The fact that fifteen years of trade union movement led to a mere 45 per cent increase in real income shows that economic struggle is insufficient (Kalyoncuoğlu, 1977, p. 71). Possible due to the rising inflation, Kalyoncuoğlu contends that unionized workers are realizing that material gains alone do not amount to much since 1971 (Kalyoncuoğlu, 1977, p. 79).

4.2.3 *Kemalism*

Although Kemalism has been the dominant ideology in Turkey for a long period, it is not as common in the specialization theses. The only such thesis in the sampling, Tuğ’s (1972, pp. 7-8) narrative of the Ottoman era and founding of the Republic resembles the Kemalist narrative, with a focus on the inaccessibility of foreign aid due to the War of Independence and the experience of capitulations. While making Ankara the capital was ingenious and helpful at that time, it was still difficult to ensure regional equality. The proliferation of shanty towns after the World War II is blamed on land speculators who first gained experience in Ankara and then extended their methods to all of Turkey

13 “Yasanın uygulamaya başlanması ile birlikte mücadeleyi ekonomizmin dar kalıplarına indirgeyen bir sendikacılık anlayışında [sic] işçi örgütlerine egemen olmuştur.” (Kalyoncuoğlu, 1977, p. 71)

(Tuğ, 1972, p. 14). Attempts were made to combat inequality in Ankara chiefly with cultural activities, and village institutes were created even though they were shut down before bearing fruits (Tuğ, 1972, p. 17). In chapter three of the thesis, titled problems of Eastern Anatolia, Tuğ (1972, p. 24) utters the word Kurdish, which was not a common thing in the planning documents and even at that period:

Eastern Anatolia is an underdeveloped region of Turkey. Shortly before the end of the Ottoman Empire era, while several subject peoples of the empire were gaining their independence, the Kurdish population located in Eastern Anatolia had also appeared as a secessionist power against the new Turkey through the provocations of the imperialist states during the years of struggle for Turkish independence.

Although it is fifty years since then, there still exists a problem of Eastern Anatolia for Turkey. However, this is now a problem of 'inter regional imbalance in development'. After the proclamation of the Republic, although there has been rapid development in some regions of the country, eastern Anatolia has not been able to close the gap.

After identifying Turkey as a capitalist society that is left underdeveloped by imperialism, Eastern Anatolia's being "less improved" is explained by its "particular geographic conditions, historic coincidences, lack of state interference", economic reasons being more important than others (Tuğ, 1972, p. 24). A brief historical description of the land ownership patterns in the region is narrated with frequent emphasis on the Ottoman Empire not using racial discrimination. Nationalistic rebellions started with Armenian rebellions, against which Kurdish soldiers were mobilized to form the Hamidiye Corps. Yet both the Kurds and the Armenians "were provoked by the propaganda of the imperialist states" who "realized their efforts would not succeed" after Mustafa Kemal founded the new Republic (Tuğ, 1972, p. 27).

While his analyses so far comply with official narrative with a mixture of Marxism in definition of development, problems of contemporary Eastern Anatolia contain criticisms towards the state with a hint of corruption as well (Tuğ, 1972, p. 35). Sources of these problems are exploitation, large land estates,

an alliance of village headmen with administrative and legal mechanisms, educational retardation, and religious orders and exploitation. Solutions offered to these problems are “[m]ore wind-power, schools, water, electricity, training and health facilities”, industry and foreign trade (Tuğ, 1972, p. 28). Moreover, to attract investment to the region and have people there benefit equally from development, establishing attraction centers are advised that would bring opportunities to a 100 km radius, and draw technicians and experts studying their needs (Tuğ, 1972, p. 49). The tone is not very optimist, since it is added that 18 governments promised land reform so far in the republican period, none was able to deliver, and it is found doubtful that the incumbent government would hold onto its promise as well.

4.2.4 *Securitization and Conservatism*

Securitization of issues are very rare among the thesis and were not the dominant theme. Rather, certain statements quoted below are observed in theses that were classified as a whole elsewhere in above sections. One such example is the SPD research on housing for the first plan which generally has a technocratic approach on shanty towns. While the report wishes to convert them to adequate houses and emphasize poverty and rent-seeking behavior, as part of the social integration problems it is also mentioned that shanty dwellers become “resentful creatures”, being under suspicion since “suspicious people” also choose to live outside the cities, and the children being lost to addictions¹⁴. Similarly, one of the dangers of regional inequality according to Tuğ (1972, p. 4) is the annoyance and depression of the people of undeveloped regions leading to divergence of political opinions and harm to posing danger to socio-political structure of the country.

Apart from securitization, two conservative statements are worth attention. During the initial years of planning, in a research on existing human power condition and a forecast of its needs in the future, due to lack of any

14 “Burada yaşayanlar [sic] gün geçtikçe cemiyet duygularından uzak küskün birer varlık haline gelmektedirler. Gözden uzak bir muhitlerde şüpheli kimselerin de yerleşmeyi tercih etmeleri buralarda oturanlarında güvenlerini kaybettirmektedir” (DPT, 1962, p. 37).

satisfactory data agricultural labor force is calculated by assuming that a working day is 8 hours, and that women's and children's force is .75 and .5 of that of a man, respectively (DPT, 1961, p. 21). Another example is Yurtseven's (1974) thesis on education as an investment. Although the thesis mostly has a Marxist tone, it is stated that apart from investment, education can be consumption for both the educated, as it provides a satisfaction and pleasure, and for others such as the mothers or neighbors who have a quiet time when the child is at school (Yurtseven, 1974, p. 12). This expression stands out in specialization theses as such mundane values are rarely discussed and taken into account, nonetheless by citing only mother rather than a more general and less value-laden term such as parent.

The first part of this chapter yielded concrete examples from planned epoch of Turkey to a technocratic mentality. Hopefully, it also informed the reader regarding how technocratic mentality showed itself among the planners. Other than what the empirical analyses in the second part of the first chapter puts out such as rationality, efficiency, emphasis on data and harmony, there seems to be a general tendency to divide the world into two. A critical part of Occidentalism in Turkey, which is most visible with Kemalism, interestingly also finds itself a place within technocratic perspectives as well. This constitutes an important exception of technocratic thinking's claim to universality. It could, however, be explained by the prevalence of utilizing different methods and perspectives in social sciences according to the country's level of development, i.e. whether it resides in the East or the West.

One particular issue where the technocratic mentality stands out is housing sector. The issue of shanty towns is usually seen to result from being stuck to village values and lifestyle, or as a matter of being in between during modernization and Westernization. It is therefore the scapegoat for various enemies of the Kemalist agenda. The planners, however, see it as a problem of non-productive housing sector. They seek out ways to utilize it in urbanization, even see it as a potential way to attain cheap housing. This tendency also exists among non-DPT personnel as the following chapter shows.

Non-technocratic themes yield a more interesting picture. An increasing voice of Marxism, which is also visible in the special expertise commission

reports below, rises vis-à-vis early technical analysis. Interestingly enough, despite the prevalence of socialist thought, there does not seem to be a social or even liberal democratic approach that emphasizes welfare without any Marxist tone. The division is not as stark in special expertise commissions in which issues can be handled with mild welfare concerns. Conservative and Kemalist statements are relatively sparse, the former being confined to statements in passing and the latter to one thesis within the sampling. Both themes are more prevalent in the special expertise commissions.

While the way in which these not-technocratic themes emerge are not particular, their existence requires some explanation. Most planners including the first heads of EPD, SPD and CD are graduates from Ankara University Faculty of Political Sciences, where Marxism is prevalent. More importantly until the 1980 military coup, social mobility and leftist tendencies increased in Turkey. The first planners were imported from the academia while later newly graduates were hired as assistant planning experts. In both cases corresponding universities possibly played a part in the planners' perspectives. As noted in the first chapter, Marxism is particularly close to technocratic thinking in some respects. Therefore, one may observe an inclination among Marxists towards planning. Kemalism and Occidentalism, on the other hand, were dominant and rarely challenged. Their occurrence in specialization theses may indicate nothing more than a representation of ideas in Turkey. In that regard, what is critical is that often exceptions to technocratic thinking existed rather than the kind of exceptions.

Nonplanners in the Planning: Special Expertise Commissions

To offer a comparison with preceding, this chapter reviews special expertise commission reports, which served as a source of data and opinion on various fields by relevant actors for the plans. Küçük (1978, p. 284) relays that they were inspired from a visit to India where such commissions were extremely useful. Members of the commissions were usually from state institutions, along with chambers of commerce, occupational organizations, and universities, who were supposed to be independent experts in their fields. The reports themselves are far from being uniform in terms of content and workings, with some being highly transparent and claim to be democratic, and others simply relaying findings and opinions with no information on from whom it came and how they were decided. In the reports that share the internal processes, it is seen that usually sub-commissions are established for various topics which meet more often than the main commission do and give their reports to the chairmanship. These reports as well as general principles are discussed and voted in the general commission with the final report being written with a DPT planner at present, mostly to consult.

The exact number of commissions are difficult to come up with, since one of the reasons a special series were created for the documents used in the third plan is to be able to track which documents were used. Therefore, sampling of these reports is far from being representative, with apparently very few special

expertise commissions being formed in the first two plan periods while the fourth plan has an abundance of them. Having focused on themes in the previous chapter, four categories are created: (1) housing and regional development, (2) health and physical education, (3) education, and (4) labor and social policies. Reports are analyzed in these four categories to highlight the difference across plan periods. This chapter explores whether technocracy diffuses from planners, or is adapted by non-planners during planning process as well. The analyses below show that special expertise commissions also contain technocratic tendencies. Criticisms towards DPT itself within these documents, of which several examples are given below, refute the possibility of this tone stemming from a pressure from planners alone. More likely, the process of planning also urges the need to make analyses and suggest solutions based on data rather than social values. While their selection by planners means an initial ideological tendency in line with that of DPT, members of the commissions may also develop a particular outlook in their planning experience.

The topic of commissions has potential influence on the dominant theme. A comparison of each topic within their section may allow the reader to notice differences from one plan period to another. The review shows five main perspectives: conservative, Kemalist, social democratic, technocratic, and socialist. Due to the multiplicity of authors, it is possible to notice conflicts within members of commissions that are expressed either in the forewords by the chairmen, or as annexes to the reports.

§ 5.1 Housing and Regional Development

Special expertise commission on housing for the third plan begins with refusing to make any quantitative analyses on future need projections due to lack of data, rather a more general and qualitative approach is adopted (DPT, 1972, p. 2). It is therefore suggested that to make the comparisons the plan necessitates, conducting studies in order to obtain comprehensive data is seen crucial. Furthermore, it is stated that since developed Western statistics are still lacking in Turkey, the report is based on a method used in developing countries

(DPT, 1972, p. 3). Divided into two sub-commissions, one about housing demand and other about supply, the commission stresses the limitations of household incomes on affording the needed supply.

The foremost criterion of house quality is considered to be number of rooms: with “current level of civilization and the conditions of our country”¹ it is estimated that one room for every two household member and a living room is appropriate. Share of housing in disposable income is 15 per cent for each income group according to public statistics, and with increased savings this ration is taken to be twenty per cent with no reference to income distribution inequality. Likewise, income levels are taken as given and costs of houses are estimated accordingly instead of declaring certain minimum standards for a house and suggesting egalitarian measures to make these houses affordable for every citizen (DPT, 1972, p. 20). Yet after technical discussions, the results are evaluated, and it is stated that without state intervention one third of housing demand will take the shape of legal urban buildings of higher income families with the rest being shanty houses despite all the prohibitions. Therefore state intervention is needed so that luxury housing will be restricted and poorer families are supported, no houses should be demolished without safety regards, a credit system should be developed for maintenance and purchasing new houses, and mass housing institutions should be created (DPT, 1972, p. 26). The commission’s report resembles the SPD study in the third chapter in that affordable, yet adequate housing is provided by restricting luxury housing and alleviating shanty houses through both mainstream and legal channels as well as self-help methods. However there is not as much stress on income inequality, but rather criticism towards DPT is addressed for not providing the commission with required data and a macro plan for studies to start from, which is provided for economic sectors but not social ones (DPT, 1972, p. 35). The solution offered requires DPT to take a leading role and using its position to gather data and opinions from various and often conflicting public institutions to ensure coordination, centralization, and uniformity. The dominant perspective in this report seems to be technocracy. Certain remarks

1 “mevcut uygarlık düzeyinde ve ülkemiz koşullarında hanehalkları bireylerinden her ikisine bir oda + bir yaşama yeri (oda) ilavesi şeklinde bir modelle gerekli oranların saptanması lüzumlu görülmektedir.” (DPT, 1972, p. 16)

on the welfare of residents are made though they are not assertive enough to surpass emphasis on rationality.

As many special expertise commission reports, the one on habitation, regional development, urbanization and housing for the fourth plan also expresses the limited scope of analyses due to lack of data, having difficulties receiving information from public institutions (DPT, 1977, p. 8). Relaying the decision-making process as how to proceed, it is explicitly stated that a role of “helping political power in solving social and economic problems with a revisionist attitude would not comply with the role of the commission.”²

Definition of urbanization has been adopted from foreign countries, it is argued in the sub-commission of urbanization, however, that urbanization has been seen as a problem due to a wrong definition. Instead, as it is the biggest vehicle in fostering social change, urbanization is seen as a solution to many of Turkey’s problems and it is healthy in this regard (DPT, 1977, p. 13). Even rural-urban migration and the result of its combination with unemployment and marginalization, is not considered to be a trouble since starting from the second generation, migrants assimilate with the city and obtain the consciousness and knowledge required to be workers. Compared to Turkey, urbanization was not a result of industrialization as was in the West, but rather a tool in creating a suitable atmosphere for it. After a Marxist historical comparison of houses and the social structure they belong to, it is stated that in a capitalist society houses become commodities and reinforce the consumption patterns capitalism imposes. In the first capitalist countries, quantitative housing needs were satisfied shortly. However, in the late industrializing countries the process was crooked and unbalanced. A historical view of land ownership and housing is also narrated of the classic period of the Ottoman Empire, its downfall, and the new republic. Class analysis and dominant economic relations being in the focus, it is argued that global capitalism of post-World War II era attributed an agricultural role to ‘countries like Turkey’ which caused dispossession and unemployment in the rural areas. The cities being unable to create

2 “toplumsal ve ekonomik sorunların çözümünde siyasal iktidarlara revizyonist bir tutumla yardımcı olmakla bağdaşamıyacağı [sic] görüşünde birleşmiştir.” (DPT, 1977, p. 11)

enough employment, dispossessed rural population was not able to obtain urban houses (DPT, 1977, p. 19).

Apart from being a matter of inequal distribution, shanty towns were also permitted and guided by early stages of capitalism and industrialization because it contained surplus labor force, which in turn helped keep wages low. Due to the precarity, poor working conditions, and being unable to organize, even construction workers of legal and bigger constructions suffer from inequality. Instead of references to modernity and legality, emphasis is on social classes when shanty towns and construction is discussed³ (DPT, 1977, p. 80). Class analyses extends to more contemporary examples, such as a change made in the constitution in 1971 about determining the price in compulsory purchases of land. The choice of tax returns rather than market value is interpreted to be a victory of industrialists over land owners. It is also striking that after giving examples of how the law and terms are being interpreted in different ways, possessory rights are advised over ownership rights (DPT, 1977, p. 24).

The sub-commission on infrastructure disputes being confined to technical analyses on urban infrastructure as assigned by DPT and extends its role to a comprehensive social and technical analysis not divided into urban and rural (DPT, 1977, p. 24). Another point of divergence is attributing more importance to local organizations and wishing to give them more autonomy, contrary to the centralist tone prevalent in planning documents (DPT, 1977, p. 26). Criticisms are directed to the government programs firstly because even though they comprise more concrete solutions, they rarely go beyond propaganda and second despite the frequent mention of balanced regional development most of public sector investments are in the already developed Marmara region with Eastern and Southeastern Anatolia getting little share⁴ (DPT, 1977,

3 An exception to making references to the law, references are made to the constitution article that entrusts the state with providing poor citizens with proper houses. State departments and ministries tasked with supervising housing sector and providing cheap houses are seen inadequate in their efforts (DPT, 1977, p. 81).

4 Although there is a more visible difference in terms of economic investments, there does not seem to be such a wide cleavage in terms of new investments in health and education. While

pp. 45,58). Moreover, after showing with references to former five-year plans that economic planning is overtly prioritized over social planning, and matters of regional development are considered to be in the social domain, the bifurcation into economic and social is criticized in spatial planning (DPT, 1977, p. 50). Despite this divergence and overarching changes foreseen in both understanding of planning and DPT's internal organization⁵, the need of coordination among relevant actors is emphasized like in many other reports (DPT, 1977, p. 30).

Limitations on right of property are suggested in a manner of preventing certain rights to dominate others. While underdeveloped countries are seen unable to make such a reform because of vested interests of pressure groups, developed liberal democrat countries devised remarkable limitations while the USSR has an exact solution (DPT, 1977, p. 98). "Successful planning works are possible" it is announced, "with newest technique and methods, knowing the society well, and with scientific planning studies."⁶ Various solutions are cited to the problem of offering social services with prices under their investments costs, with the concluding statement that "what is important is reducing costs [...] elaborating how to minimize national expenditure through a social organization and low-interest resources"⁷. Notwithstanding references to scientific methods such as this, the report in general exhibits any exemplary socialist text, and conforms to the tendency prevalent during the fourth plan period.

the former is explained with the socialization of health program, no explanation is offered for the latter (DPT, 1968, p. 59). It is possible that education investments were used as a mechanism for national integrity.

- 5 Creation of a spatial planning department at the same level with economic and social planning departments is suggested.
- 6 "Başarılı planlama çalışmaları en yeni teknik ve yöntemleri uygulayarak ve toplumu çok iyi tanıyarak, bilimsel planlama çalışmaları yaparak mümkündür." (DPT, 1977, p. 138)
- 7 "Gerçekte önemli olan, maliyeti düşürmektir. Yapım giderini düşürmek, özellikle işletme giderlerini sosyal bir örgütlenme yolu ile azaltmak ve düşük faizli kaynaklar kullanarak milli giderleri en aza indirmek üzerinde durmak gerekir." (DPT, 1977, p. 154)

§ 5.2 Health and Physical Education

The first special expertise commission on health sector was established for the preparation of the second plan. The chairman of commission was the Under-secretary for the Ministry of Health and Social Aid (*Sağlık ve Sosyal Yardım Bakanlığı*) Nusret Fişek. In the foreword, Fişek deems the first plan successful since the same goals were elected by this commission and, unlike most commission reports, explains the working of the commission (DPT, 1968, p. 4). With 22 sub-commissions of 80 people and 20 individual contributors, periodical reports were made to the chairmanship, which in turn made suggestions of alterations and prepared summaries to the commission.

The principle of health program is accepted to improve public health, and improvement of preventive medicine services is prioritized. This meant improving environmental health, providing health education to the people, eradication of infectious diseases, and population planning. Instead of hospitals which is expensive and serve fewer people, a health organization based on ambulatory treatment that can extend to smaller communities is preferred (DPT, 1968, p. 15). Health services in the public sector is to be centralized with the Ministry of Health and Social Aid being in charge or coordination will be established by the High Planning Council⁸. Incentives will be given to the private sector and voluntary associations in a way not to disrupt the public program. The vagueness of division responsibilities and authority among public institutions is considered a chief problem. As long as the legislation is improved, necessary clarification and coordination is ensured and main principles are obeyed with, the report does not require uniformity in policies. It's striking that the wellbeing of health sector employees receives much attention in the report: not only in terms of meritocracy, training, and salary but also with issues such as equality of working conditions in different regions and ensuring that lower ranking personnel can work without weariness (DPT, 1968, pp. 27-28).

8 Special hospitals belonging to the Ministry of Defense is exempt from this rule. In a time of frequent military interventions, avoiding suggestions regarding the affairs of the military and granting exceptions is prevalent in all planning documents, if not legislation in general.

With notice of the heavy burden on the budget entailed by the required improvements in the health sector, it is proposed that the beneficiaries (i.e. ‘the people’) should share in the costs, including the building of the “health houses”⁹. Economics is also taken into consideration when measures for environmental health is proposed. One of the benefits of improving environmental conditions is “increasing the lifespan of people in the working age, preventing the decrease in working hours thanks to decreasing illnesses” combined with reducing infant mortality¹⁰. Sources of legitimizing measures to increase health standards is further mixed: amelioration of environmental conditions is said to “give peace to people”, which in turn “makes social and economic development easier”¹¹, decreases the number of patients therefore provides saving from costs, and reduced the detrimental effect adverse environmental conditions have on tourism.

The members of the sub-commission for family planning are all male and predominantly physicians. Family planning is portrayed as a remedy for problems such as discontent within families, nutritional problems due to pregnancy, maternal injuries and death due to miscarriages, “waste of resources due to infant deaths as value of children’s life decrease due to frequent births”¹², and prevention of work day losses due to frequent pregnancies. Village headmen, civil servants and imams are also to be used for public education regarding family planning (DPT, 1968, p. 41). In yet another sub-commission on mental health, the first precaution is declared accepting that mental illnesses are not individual, being aware that addicts could affect the whole society through accidents and murder, and it is also added that urbanization and industrialization are preparatory reasons for mental diseases (DPT, 1968, p. 52).

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- 9 “Sağlık evleri” are part of the socialization of health program which aims at providing health services to the rural areas with low cost (DPT, 1968, p. 36).
- 10 “Bu da *prodüktif yaşlar grubundaki insanların hayat sürelerinin uzamasını hastalıkların azalması sebebi ile iş saati kaybının önlenmesini sağlar, aynı zamanda çocuk ölümlerinin azaltılmasında en müessir faktörlerden biri çevre sağlık şartlarının ıslahıdır.*” (DPT, 1968, p. 38)
- 11 “Çevre sağlık şartlarının düzelmesi insanda huzur yaratır. Bu da Sosyal ve Ekonomik inkişafı (gelişme) kolaylaştırır.” (DPT, 1968, p. 38)
- 12 “Sık doğan çocukların değer ifade etmemesi dolayısıyla vaki ihmaller sonunda ölen çocukların masraflarının ziyai” (DPT, 1968, p. 41).

The sub-commission for workers' health compares Turkey's high rate work accidents with that of the USA, which is seven times that of the rate in USA in certain sectors. After the statistics on accidents, occupational diseases and deaths are conveyed, the report adds the number of working days lost and the economic value of the waste due to work accidents (DPT, 1968, p. 54). The sub-commission on health education for the people also compares infant mortality rates, infectious diseases, malnutrition, and lifespan in Turkey with 'the West', and adds that the current utilization of health facilities as well as the rate of population increase is "high enough to hamper development"¹³. Health instructors' mission is then to spot the problems, warn and encourage the leaders, organize the society, and mobilize the people by informing them of their needs.

For all sub-commissions, alleviating malfunctioning legislation, coordinating and centralizing public institutions, educating the responsible personnel and the people in general, using the existing resources more efficiently are common solutions. The results of the problems are usually linked with development. To obtain better results with existing scarce resources so as to leave more resources for productive work, economical and effective solutions are preferred over more radical and idealistic changes. Apart from these technocratic tendencies, conservative statements are observed in the sub-commission for family planning and statements on addicts, and welfare regards are noteworthy, not only for the general population but also specifically for the medical personnel.

In the foreword of the special expertise commission for the fourth plan by Chairman Nusret Fişek, the principles accepted by the commission are cited, as they were accepted by various governments in the preceding three plans. First, the progress in socialization of health program and focusing on protective medicine are not satisfactory. Inequal distribution of medical personnel across Turkey and different specialization fields, lack of coordination between different units, and insufficient funds are to blame. Fişek also adds that as personnel of the Ministry of Health and Social Aid comprise the majority of the

13 "Mevcut sağlık tesis ve imkanlardan zamanında faydalanma oranı düşük ve yıllık nüfus artışı ekonomik kalkınmayı güçleştirecek derecede yüksektir." (DPT, 1968, p. 56)

commission, criticisms directed towards this institution in the sub-commission reports were taken out of the main report, but the same did not happen to criticisms towards other state departments (DPT, 1976, p. 4). Indeed, one recurring solution in the report is giving more authority to the ministry. Fişek's personal solution to the uneven distribution of physicians is to abide by the law on socialization of health and pay physicians equally rather than allow market forces work, since it constitutes an incentive to focus on cities and fields that pays more. Another criticism is towards the governments who, according to Fişek, appear to care for health services but prioritize higher care for a certain minority over protective medicinal care and health facilities in the rural areas. Furthermore, contrary to the decision of the sub-commission on socialization of health, Fişek argues that traditional medicinal practices that coexist with modern rational medicine have to be utilized in Turkey since it is impossible to satisfy all the need with modern medicine personnel and facilities (DPT, 1976, p. 5).

In the report itself, progress during the third-plan period is evaluated in numbers and when the purpose of the socialization of health program is explained, reference is made to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights article of access to healthcare (DPT, 1976, p. 14). Despite the members being predominantly physicians, it is stated that since hospitals within faculties of medicine receive an important share from national income, they cannot focus only on education (DPT, 1976, p. 40). For occupational health, the biggest problem is identified as the disorganization, insufficiency, and lack of collaboration among relevant organizations (DPT, 1976, p. 47). Compared to the previous commission, the fourth plan period is inflicted with more critical statements.

For the forth plan, there also was a commission on physical education and sports. Various groups' connection to physical education and sports is cited. Educators see it indispensable in developing and empowering one's spirit and body in a balanced manner. The masses are drawn to the irreplaceable sense of choosing sides in shows and races. And the states see it a tool for international intimacy, mutual understanding and therefore keeping peace, presentation and propaganda as well as its values in education and health (DPT, 1979,

p. VII). The commission defines physical education as “the activities that provide and foster the bodily and spiritual health of human power which is the chief component of economic, social, and cultural development” while sports emerge when “these activities are turned into races”¹⁴. Due to their support towards development, it is found fruitful to give them the necessary importance within a functional and modern education model during the planning efforts. It is argued that physical education and sports should be diffused to the villages that are sources of labor power in urbanization and industrialization as well as where majority of the population dwells so as to increase national income and create resources (DPT, 1979, p. 40). While for primary and secondary education the suggestion is mostly increasing weekly hours of sports lessons, security seems to be a pushing factor for higher education students, who are ‘prone to all sorts of movements’

With references to International Amateur Athletic Federation regulation, problems in legislation are pointed out but at the same time two articles of the constitution about sports are cited verbatim. With reference to another constitutional article stating that the family is the atom of the Turkish society, it is argued that sports should ‘descend to the family’ and observations about sports’ role within families are shared (DPT, 1979, p. 6). The example of the Table Tennis Championship of 1975-1976 being hosted in Van, a city in the Southeastern part of Turkey, is given and connections are made between sports and regional development by arguing how sports could easily be developed in these cities with little fund (DPT, 1979, p. 9). The commission gives the examples from East Bloc countries which are considered the most advanced in sports, when the division between professionalism and amateurship is criticized, and constitutes an exception to the general trend of turning to Europe or the USA when global models are sought (DPT, 1979, p. 21). The exception stays insignificant as when it comes to taking a role model to Turkey, out of the three possibilities of Western European, Eastern Bloc and developing countries models, the first is preferred (DPT, 1979, pp. 21-22).

14 “Yaygın ve genel tanımlanması ile beden eğitimi, ‘ekonomik, sosyal ve kültürel kalkınmanın başlıca unsuru olan insangücünün beden ve ruh sağlığını sağlayıcı ve geliştirici faaliyetler, bu faaliyetlerin yarışmaya dönüşmüş biçimini ise Spor’ olarak tanımlamak mümkündür.” (DPT, 1979, p. 1)

First among the social and political problems caused by the professional sports is the claim that political authorities and leaders of sports clubs join, and cause raises in various services with no accountability on how the revenues are spent. Vague criticisms continue to argue that arbitrary use of ‘state authority’ for personal interests damage public trust towards the state. Later in the report a concrete example is given: “It is against the constitution to build stadiums with taxes levied from the people and renting them to a major sports club for 99 years with ridiculous rents of 200-300 liras”¹⁵. The third article is a concern over the unity over the state threatened by the sectionalism bred by professional football (DPT, 1979, p. 26). Political statements and criticisms come to a halt when physical education in the military is evaluated. Full of praises from the beginning to the end, conditions of physical education are found ‘at the desired level’ and very fruitful since “as a result of their bodily as well as intellectual development during the two-year long service starting from their recruitment, the contribution of youngsters’ from the backwards regions of our country lacking the opportunities for schooling to our country are incomparably higher compared to before”¹⁶. The situation being as perfect as it is, what is needed is more sport facilities built for the Turkish Military, which “drew the world’s attention with the success of the Cyprus Peace Operation”¹⁷. Oscillation between technocratic, social liberal and political statements are all silenced by a military nationalism exclusively for the military posts.

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- 15 “Halktan toplanan vergilerle stadyumlar yaptırıp bir büyük spor kulübüne 99 seneliğine 200-300 liraya varan gülünç rakamlarla kiraya vermek Anayasaya aykırıdır.” (DPT, 1979, p. 34)
- 16 “Ülkemizin geri kalmış yörelerinin okuma olanaklarından yoksun gençlerin silah altına alınmalarıyla başlayan iki yıllık hizmetleri süresince, fikri olduğu kadar beden yapılarında da beliren gelişme gereği, terhislerinden sonra ülke ekonomisine Olan katkıları, öncesiyle kıyaslanmayacak kadar yüksek olmaktadır.” (DPT, 1979, p. 45)
- 17 “Kıbrıs Barış harekâtındaki başarısıyla, Dünya’nın ilgisini çeken Silahlı Kuvvetlerimizin sportif çalışmalarına daha üst düzeye çıkarabilmek için her mevsim ve her bölgede yararlanılacak tesis yapımına önem verilmelidir.” (DPT, 1979, p. 46)

§ 5.3 Education

The special expertise commission for non-formal education for the third plan accepts the education of the people one of the principles of democracy and republic. While Turkey allocated a substantial part of its budget to education, there are still fourteen million people who do not even recognize the alphabet due to rapid increase in the population and the adverse heritage from the past. Apart from being incongruous with values of democracy and republic, this “also hinders the development speed of our developing country that is depended on rapid development”¹⁸ and which is what planning is supposed to alleviate. The solution is non-formal education as a supporting factor to formal education (DPT, 1971, p. 4).

Apart from Kemalist expressions, a conservative stance can also be observed in securitization of publications: “With this situation, it may be a blessing that these people forgot to read. Otherwise, they would read homicidal, lustful or ideologically deviant publications at large, and as a result be harmful people to the society.”¹⁹ Making connections with the distant past, it is argued that although many attempts were made in terms of public education dating back to the Seljuks and Central Asia, yet all were disorganized, discontinuous and inefficient (DPT, 1971, p. 9). The ‘general’ reasons public education is needed is listed with protecting democratic lifestyle on the top. It is then followed with providing the human force for development, protecting, and improving the national culture. Among ‘social, economic, and political reasons’ are the fact that the societies and individuals that do not adapt to science and technology go through crisis, the need for the citizens to fulfil their citizenship roles, and to establish national unity and cultural harmony. The last group of ‘reasons and tasks that render public education mandatory in Turkey’ include also interiorizing Atatürk’s principles, democracy and the republic, providing

18 “kalkınmakta olan, hızlı kalkınmak zorunda bulunan yurdumuzun kalkınma hızına ve süresine de olumsuz tesir etmektedir. İşte bu alandaki planlamanın amacı bu olumsuz etkeni ortadan kaldırmak ve yurdun sür’atle kalkınmasını sağlamaktır.” (DPT, 1971, p. 4)

19 “Bu durumda bu insanların okumayı yazmayı unutmaları belki de bir nimet olmaktadır. Aksi halde ortada bol bol dolaşan cinai, shevi veya ideolojik sapık yayınları okuyacaklar ve bunun sonucunda topluma zararlı kişiler olacaklardır.” (DPT, 1971, p. 5)

women a better place, getting rid of backwards thinking and beliefs as well as individualism, and replacing them with scientific thinking and societal concerns (DPT, 1971, pp. 12-13).

Preparation studies for the third plan also included a special expertise commission on higher education. The report starts with arguing that while traditional methods had worked until now, technological developments necessitate similar changes in all countries. In developing countries, it is observed that education planning attributes more importance to higher education (DPT, 1971, p. 2). The role of higher education is defined as providing the technician cadres, defined in the widest sense, to fulfil determined labor force needs on the one hand, and conducting research as well as importing scientific-technological data and adapting them to local social conditions on the other hand. Higher student participation to administration is praised since it is a welcome feature in democratic countries. Other institutional changes include shortening the length of programs to three years with nine semesters instead of four years with eight semesters in order to cut costs and increase efficiency (DPT, 1971, p. 6). Similarly, different courses having similar topics and students having to repeat a whole year for one course is considered ‘waste’ (DPT, 1971, p. 14). It is stressed not to make compromises from quality while increasing higher education capacities and to be selective in projects since resources dedicated to education are limited. A central institution to supervise higher education is advised, inspired by the British example (DPT, 1971, p. 22). Having less confusion of themes compared to the former report, higher education commission also shares technocratic and welfare values. However, it does not contain securitization tendencies as does the commission on non-formal education.

The special expertise commission on education for the fourth plan defines education as a process with which humankind develops its ability to think, knowledge, and understanding through learning and adds that societies transfer their beliefs and practical skills to new generations through it. This last aspect gives education economic goals as it has cultural and social ones. It is seen education’s “indispensable function to help bring about illuminated persons who are honest, can think freely, carrying a sense of responsibility, not falling into bigotry, tolerant, unprejudiced, open to criticism, temperate, able

to perceive beauty, free, and appreciating the virtues of a democratic and secular social order”²⁰. When the principles that Turkey’s educational system will be based on are discussed, revolutions of Atatürk, his rationality and the constitution occupy the first article, followed by consistency, efficiency, modernity, and well planned reforms (DPT, 1977, p. 2). Regional balance and equality of opportunities, being universal and based on scientific research and methods, having minimum educational backgrounds for teachers at each level to ensure a dynamic educational system, and having planned, autonomous and funded supervisory state institutions constitute the remaining principles. (DPT, 1977, pp. 3-4). Ordinary high schools are seen redundant as they produce surplus candidates for bureaucracy and higher education while people “who can work with their hands, can coordinate his/her head and produce work and who like and respect work”²¹ are needed. Emphasis on practicality reemerges with experiment in schools, which according to the report are done with unnecessarily expensive tools that are too complex for the students and can be replaced with more cost-efficient alternatives (DPT, 1977, p. 40). Problematicization of current status in technical education takes the shape of not being oriented towards the market and satisfying the needs of industries.

However, while throughout the sub-commission report on secondary education cutting costs, using resources more efficiently, and redirecting education towards the needs of the market is emphasized, in medicinal schools the focus is entirely on regional inequality in terms of opportunities (DPT, 1977, p. 53). The sub-commission on mass education, on the other hand, identifies Turkey as a pre-industrial country and sets education’s goals as “moving the society in the direction foreseen in the constitution, having it reach the level of modern civilization, bringing up the citizens so that they can adapt to the

20 “Başka bir deyimle dürüst, özgürce düşünebilen sorumluluk duygusu taşıyan, bağınazlığa kapılmayan, hoşgörülü, önyargısız, eleştiriye açık, ölçülü, güzelliği duyabilen, özgür, demokratik ve laik toplumsal düzenin erdemlerini değerlendirebilen aydın kişiler yetişmesini sağlamak eğitimin vazgeçilemez işlevidir.” (DPT, 1977, p. 1)

21 “Bunun yerine ‘liselerimizi’ de daha çok elini kullanabilen, eli ile kafasının bir yere getirerek ‘iş’ üretebilen ‘iş seven ve sayan insanlar’ yetiştirmeğe katkıda bulunacak ‘pratik ve beceri ‘dersleri ile donatmak gerektiğini vurgulamak zorundayız.’” (DPT, 1966, p. 5)

changing social conditions”²² with an overtly Kemalist tone. Equality of opportunities, between women and men, rural and urban areas, developed and backwards regions, people with low and high-income levels as well as reducing the high illiteracy rate with mass education is identified as the way to alleviate current problems.

The sub-commission on higher education cites the purpose of higher education as providing higher occupation education, contributing to scientific research, and spreading science. The first problem with higher education is the high demand that cannot be met with existing facilities (DPT, 1977, p. 243). The second problem is about social inequality in terms of the students’ social backgrounds and the inability to break through parental occupational constraints. Third problem is also about inequality in access to higher education, but on regional terms that are addressed only in quantitative statements (DPT, 1977, p. 247). The European model for higher education is accepted as a role model for Turkey after a brief review of universities’ history in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey (DPT, 1977, p. 250). Alongside the new model, it is also advised to make a realistic analysis and shape higher education to fulfill human power needs in quantitative and qualitative terms (DPT, 1977, p. 253). Further policies are considered including switching to three semesters from two and devising ways to reduce times needed to graduate so as to decrease costs, speed up the process of joining the working force, and utilize existing physical capacities better (DPT, 1977, pp. 255-261).

Confederation of Progressive Trade Unions of Turkey’s (*Türkiye Devrimci İşçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu*) criticisms of the report is added as an annex which views the problem in education chiefly as a matter of productive forces satisfying material needs of the society (DPT, 1977, pp. 274-288). As long as production does not increase, there can be no progress both materially and culturally. To increase production, mental labor force should be increased through education as manual power cannot be increased. Another purpose of education is to uplift humans and provide individual prosperity since humans

22 Toplumun Anayasanın öngördüğü doğrultuda ilerlemesi, çağdaş uygarlık düzeyine ulaşması, değişen toplum koşullarına uyum sağlanması için yurddaşların [sic] yetiştirilmesi konusunda eğitim düzenine önemli görevler düşmektedir. (DPT, 1977, p. 114)

are not only the source of production but also its purpose. Matters of the organization of education curriculum are intentionally not touched upon since they are technical matters. Instead, statistics are provided showing number of male and female students at each level of education, and schooling rates compared to Western European countries. With the analyses of these data, Turkey's schooling rate is found very low and inequality between rural and urban dwellings, Western and Eastern regions of the country as well as social classes are said to contribute to existing inequalities rather than overcome them. This is explained by stating that as a superstructure institution, education is a means for the ruling classes to raise its own members, prevent others from reaching higher echelons within the society, and infuse its own ideology to other classes. As such, the main problem with education is capitalism itself, while the regional inequality stems from the undeveloped nature of Turkey's capitalism. Within capitalism, there can be no radical changes in education but only minor improvements. First among which is reducing inequality in opportunities in terms of access to education, and secondly lifting the fascistic oppression on students and teachers, both of which are accepted to be part of the report's purposes of democratizing education.

§ 5.4 Labor and Social Services

Special expertise commission on social services for the second plan constituted 8 sub-commissions on children, families, convicts, the handicapped, ailing, and elderly as well as a commission for their coordination and one for social work education. The report starts with discussing the old and modern social democratic understandings of social services: the former deeming the individual responsible for his or her wellbeing and offering aid as charity and the latter considering all individuals as equal, certain needs as common and social work as an obligation. While they are both existing at that day, it is stressed that with a developed industry an institutionalized social democratic approach is preferred (DPT, 1966, pp. 4-7).

When the purposes are discussed, it is accepted that “in a democratic society, the state’s principle goal is the wellbeing of the people”²³ and that the real purpose is not to increase the national income but to establish social welfare. It is soon added that the people are not merely the beneficiaries of national development but also a substantial resource for it, and input-output analyses with long-term investment plans follow (DPT, 1966, p. 11). Sticking back to developmentalism follows when justifications are made for prioritizing social welfare. It is conveyed that “in a democratic society, social development depends on the rational and equal distribution of national resources at hand. Accordingly, expressions of minimum wage, land reform and labor sources are indispensable aspects for the realization of social welfare goals²⁴”. Coming up with economical solutions via self-help mechanisms resurface when it comes to education. Instead of dormitories, it is suggested that students accommodate with their parents and get incentives to do so. This way it would be both cheaper and the family would attain the capacity to solve its own problems (DPT, 1966, p. 14).

When priorities within groups are evaluated, young people are chosen principally because they constitute the majority of the population, and also due to their future contribution to the country’s development and their fragility vis-à-vis the rapid social changes. Next in line would be the disabled people since “it is both an economic and humanitarian necessity to render them functional.”²⁵ Moving to general advises, first article in the report is extending social welfare to ever more citizens with new programs. Reevaluating legislature according to international standards and social work principles, establishing an institute for social welfare research, providing on-the-job training for family and children’s welfare, replacing institutions with applications such as parole and probation, contributing to national development by reinforcing current youth programs with trainings in leadership, voluntary community

23 “Demokratik bir toplumda devletin temel amacı halkın refahıdır.” (DPT, 1966, p. 10)

24 “Demokratik bir toplumda sosyal gelişme aynı zamanda eldeki milli imkanların (kaynakların) rasyonel ve eşit bir dağıtımına bağlıdır. Buna göre, asgari ücret tabirleri, toprak reformu ve iş kaynakları sosyal refah hedeflerinin gerçekleşmesi için mevcut olmaları şart olan unsurlardır.” (DPT, 1966, p. 13)

25 “[İ]şe yarar hale getirilmeleri hem ekonomik hem de insani bir zorundur.” (DPT, 1966, p. 16)

services and self-help, integrating social welfare planning with national development by creating a 'Social Planning National Consultation Committee', and taking precautions to increase the number of qualified personnel.

For the third plan, a specific commission was created for labor and human resources. The report criticizes the first two plans for waiting increased value added to create employment while it clearly required separate attention as seen from examples such as Italy and France (DPT, 1971, p. 1). More specifically, former plans and policies could not govern qualified labor force efficiently and its distribution to various occupations was uneven. Accordingly, past education policies and both past and current wage policies were to blame (DPT, 1971, p. 5). Furthermore, the report moves on to evaluate and criticize DPT statistics on labor and makes suggestions to make estimates more accurate and gather more reliable data.

The main purpose of developmental plans is accepted to be human happiness, yet employment is linked to this by arguing that "preventing social unrest is mostly depended on creating employment"²⁶ and that "employment should be productive to the person and the society"²⁷. Although early in the report human happiness was considered to be the main purpose, it is also suggested that as an economic value, if it is used properly it would foster growth, if not it would disrupt the social body. The discourse moves further away from social priorities when full employment is discussed: while it is noted that all economies target it, achieving full employment should not mean compromise from industrialization (DPT, 1971, p. 18). Similarly, with heavy industry being exception and as long as development is not affected, labor-intensive technologies should be preferred in imports (DPT, 1971, p. 32). Land reform is seen crucial to "rescue agriculture from traditional structure"²⁸ so that agriculture could yield finances for industry. Another limit is the mostly unqualified labor force, which renders all backward countries like Turkey unable to produce technology rather than import it (DPT, 1971, p. 24). With references to the

26 "Toplumsal huzursuzlukların önlenmesi geniş ölçüde istihdam yaratmaya bağlıdır." (DPT, 1971, p. 2)

27 "İstihdam kişi ve toplum için verimli olmalıdır." (DPT, 1971, p. 2)

28 "Tarımın geleneksel yapısından kurtarılması gerekir. (DPT, 1971, p. 24)"

need of qualified labor force for development, it is also seen fruitful that “some of the existing high schools and all Islamic vocational schools should be turned into technical and vocational schools”²⁹. Furthermore, the sub-commission on technology choices criticizes the Ministry of Labor for striving to harmonize labor-capital relations but not making the same effort to increase employment or producing and using sound data (DPT, 1971, pp. 44-45). The General Directorate of Veterinary Affairs argues that scales of production are too small and production for markets are too rare in Turkey for agriculture to be rational and efficient whereas the planners preferred smaller family businesses (DPT, 1971, p. 86).

While the commission on social services for the second plan had a striking social-democratic tone, this report prefers a technocratic mentality with mention of the threats to social order if unemployment is not dealt with. The report also includes opposing views as well as additions from various occupational and social groups as annexes. The employer associations draw attention to increased costs implied by policies to increase employment and argue that wage increases surpassed increases in production (DPT, 1971, p. 34). Agricultural Engineers Association stresses that development and ‘reaching the developed nations’ level³⁰ are depended upon science (DPT, 1971, p. 62). Representative of Mechanical Engineers’ Association Cevat Ayhan starts with global comparisons in terms of social security and labor policies. While all kinds of social security measures, employment being the principle one, are considered to be a duty of the state, regional balance is as important as the general condition of the country. Drawing attention to the law and order side of the issue, he argues that while almost all countries suffer unemployment problems, the developed and developing countries experience it differently. In the former where most of the population is in the cities, a recession increases unemployment which then causes problems to the society and the government while in the latter it

29 “Ekonominin ihtiyacı olan insangücünün yetiştirilmesinde, mevcut genel liselerin bir kısmı ile imam hatip okullarının; teknik ve meslek okulları haline dönüştürülmesi faydalı görülmektedir.” (DPT, 1971, p. 32). This issue is repeated in the special expertise commission report on education for the fourth plan (DPT, 1977, p. 37).

30 Catching up with and surpassing developed or modern nations is a canonical Kemalist goal.

merely changes the rate of hidden unemployment (DPT, 1971, p. 99). After focusing on the political aspect of employment policies, Ayhan still complies with the priority of industrialization and development over full employment value by noting that labor intensive production increases employment but renders labor expensive and hence is detrimental to rapid industrialization.

The commission on social security for the fourth plan seeks to transcend an understanding of social security that confines with disease, old age, disability, and death (DPT, 1977, p. 5). Instead, with references to the constitution social security is defined as “securing everybody’s condition and future including social and economic needs without any exception”.³¹ While most of the annexes are additions to the report rather than oppositions, Şefik Çakmak, a representative of the Ministry of Finance, considers the third sub-commissions’ proposals to increase revenues for social security system an excess of power. Furthermore, criticisms towards tax refund and incentive pay for being non-efficient are denied by pointing out that the sub-committee does not have required expertise. These statements are requested to be taken out of the report as they imply that the current tax system is not balanced (DPT, 1977, pp. 296-297).

According to the special expertise commission report on labor problems for the fourth plan, in terms of human resources development plans aim at “providing and using each person trained in all layers of economy within their appropriate places, ensuring social mobility, eradicating the imbalances in the division of the working population into productive occupational groups, and providing a balanced distribution within the nation”³². While the first two plans did not address the employment problem in itself, but rather with connection to industrialization, increases in income or efficiency, the third plan saw employment as a separate problem to be addressed, and did not depend

31 “Sosyal güvenlik, hiç bir ayırım gözetilmeksizin, herkesin, sosyal ve ekonomik gereksinmelerini de kapsayacak biçimde hal ve geleceklerinin güvence altına alınması alınmasıdır.” (DPT, 1977, p. 11)

32 “Kalkınma planlarında insangücünün yeri, ekonominin her kademesinde yetişenleri yerinde kullanmak ve sağlamak, sosyal hareketliliği yaratmak, çalışan nüfusun verimli meslek gruplarına bölünüşündeki dengesizlikleri ortadan kaldırmak ve yurt içinde daha dengeli bir dağılışı sağlamaktır.” (DPT, 1977, p. 1)

on growth or industrialization to solve it (DPT, 1977, p. 3). Yet the fact that solving income inequality and unemployment in the near future comes against developmental goals, they were addressed as long-term problems.

With references to data provided by DPT and State Statistical Institute, it is emphasized that wage increases have been behind increases in productivity of labor in a period where collective contracts are prevalent and employers have been complaining about the wage increases bargaining entailed (DPT, 1977, p. 10). With further references to the little share wages have in costs of production the claim above by employers is refuted (DPT, 1977, p. 23), however no statement is passed about salaries due to the lack of data. Instead, determining minimum wage is said to be a matter of preventing the average payment to an unqualified worker go beneath socially acceptable levels, and that collective agreements and determining the minimum wage have been reinforcing each other. The primary problem with minimum wage is that while it is used in the public sector, its application is very limited in the private sector (DPT, 1977, p. 11).

The problem of unemployment is sought back to the discrepancy between demographic condition and the inadequate labor demand created by economic activities. Aside from being a pushing factor, increasing employment is also a condition for other social goals, a requirement for increasing production and national income, and improving living standards. The means of achieving full employment is a matter of technology choice and the best utilization of land and capital (DPT, 1977, p. 13). After providing statistics about capacity usage, it is also suggested that employment could easily be increased without extra investments. Yet optimal profit motives, using latest imported technology unnecessarily, and preferring capital-intensive production hinders employment increases. A Marxist tone hidden beneath developmentalism becomes more visible when the commission contends that as long as unemployment exists income equality cannot be achieved, without making references to unemployment as a leverage for employers. Remarkably, it is added that “modernization and attaining the balance between labor demand and supply

is within possibility only by increasing the share labor receives from production”³³. With comparisons to Western countries, prioritizing worker safety as well as distributing more to the working class from production by state intervention is portrayed as a novel and widely accepted method for the necessities of every economy (DPT, 1977, pp. 15, 38). Further into the report, low employment is dubbed an unused factor of production which is foremost a technology policy problem (DPT, 1977, p. 36). The problems with legislation are portrayed in a technocratic matter as well. The legislation about severance pay and the blurry legal difference between civil servants and workers are problematized as causing hostility and tension among different groups (DPT, 1977, p. 44). When the relation between employer and employee is concerned, the legal system is praised to be focused on fostering dialogue (DPT, 1977, p. 53). As such, the main goal of the suggestions seems to be creating harmony. The journey from a social democratic approach in the second plan period to a technocratic and security perspective is concluded by a report marked by socialism.

As an annex, this report also contains a dissenting vote text, one from ‘employers’ (DPT, 1977, pp. 66-71). Criticizing the report for containing expressions and analyses that are not objective, the text explains the low capacity usage not as a result of cutting production for optimal profit, but rather of power outages, formalities in importing necessary material, lack of qualified labor power, slowdown strikes, and the SEEs failing to provide raw material that are fit for usage. Even with higher capacity usage, new investments and therefore incentives for investments are seen necessary. Another point of objection is with labor productivity. It is argued that the high and fluctuating numbers of rising labor productivity does not have any example in the world, and that a comparison with numbers in a 1975 ILO report shows that the ones used in the report are completely false. While the ‘true numbers’ are much lower, they cannot be said to stem from workers alone since modern management and methods are also effective. The productivity increase being lower

33 “Gelir dağılımında işsizlik devam ettiği sürece bir düzeltmenin sağlanması olanaksızdır. Başka bir anlatımla, modernleşme ve işgücü talep ve arzından dengenin sağlanması, emeğin üretimden aldığı payın artırılması ile olanak içindedir.” (DPT, 1977, p. 15)

than what is reflected, increases in wages are also much higher with “the organized labor becoming the happy minority with astronomical raises in collective bargains”³⁴.

A comparison between planners’ and non-planners’ outlooks renders difficult making any statement about one group having a technocratic mind set while the other does not. Possibly due to the selection of commission members and technocratic impulses of the planning process itself, same technocratic statements can be observed among non-planners that the DPT personnel exhibit in the previous chapter. If anything, emphasis on lack of resources and wishing to optimize existing facilities to attain higher growth for a more industrious Turkey is more prevalent, and DPT is criticized for not conducted sound research, offering necessary data, and even misinterpreting numbers. While texts in the previous chapter are more monolithic, hence it is possible to come up with an outlook that is almost completely technocratic, reports are too colorful to observe such a consistency. Attributable to the vast number of members in commissions, reports contain higher internal diversity than the theses. More importantly, they contain internal clashes which can be observed in some annexes by members who have opposing thoughts.

This trend increases together with Marxist statements and opposition in general towards the end of the period. Turkey’s political turmoil towards late 1970s which was violently disrupted by a military coup in September 1980 can be observed in the reports as well. An internal comparison of each social planning topic shows changes in dominant perspectives which usually ends with increasing oppositional tone, mostly with a socialist agenda. Although technocratic tone is more visible in the earlier reports, prevalence of political criticism and socialist values leave little room for it in the fourth plan period.

34 Hele son iki yılda toplu sözleşmelerle elde edilen astronomik ücret zamları ile sendikalı işçiler mutlu azınlık haline gelmişlerdir. (DPT, 1977, p. 69)

Concluding Remarks

*The philosophy of the last century was revolutionary;
that of the nineteenth century must be constructive.*

Saint-Simon, *Social Organization, the Science of
Man and Other Writings*

So far I argued that technocracy can be analyzed as a source of power or as a way of seeing social problems and devising solutions. A study on the case of State Planning Organization in Turkey hints that planning process itself causes a diffusion of technocratic thinking among relevant actors. This seems to be the case for members of the special expertise commissions who at times exceed DPT planners in using the language of efficiency, productivity, and economism. However, the limited scope of this thesis does not suffice to test this hypothesis. The greatest limit to this finding is that during the initial months, planners conducted meetings with various candidates to come up with like-wise minded people they could work with in the future. Any resemblance in language therefore could easily be explained by this selection.

Inspecting documents outside DPT could yield more reliable data. If from 1960 onwards a general inclination towards a technocratic language is observed in publications of ministries, academics, or non-governmental institu-

tions, it could be argued that establishment of DPT had such an effect in problematization of issues and offering solutions in Turkey. The socialization of health program, for instance, is mostly the work of Undersecretary for the Ministry of Health Nusret Fişek, a close figure to the planners. A comparison of health programs prior to and after the establishment of DPT may prove a good starting point to test this hypothesis.

Another argument about technocracy I offered was its link to crises and uncertainty. Saint-Simon was as troubled with the chaos after the revolution as he disdained non-productive elements of pre-revolutionary France. The fact that both the fields and the factories stood idle while millions were unemployed and hungry most likely contributed to a technocratic movement in the USA in 1930s. The new Republic saw most visible increase in wealth in early 1950s. The fact that it was followed by a depression in the second half of the decade was explained by lack of planning and irrational investments, possibly inspiring OECD to advise planning and the military junta to obey that advise in 1960. Ünay's (2013) book on planning was based on his dissertation completed in 2005 and Akçay's (2007) book on DPT's transformation was based on his MA thesis completed in 2004. The only two books on DPT referenced in this thesis that are not written by former planners both come after the 2001 depression in Turkey. Similarly, the conception of this thesis took place when the 2008 crisis was not far from memory and its causes and effects were still widely discussed in the social sciences literature. Stalling effects of the 2008 depression combined with new fears of trade wars, discussions on post-truth, and decreasing role of rationality in politics may bring about yet another utopian search for a scientific order that would solve all our ills.

In the first chapter it was also stated that technocracy was at times greeted with hostility out of a fear of its threat to democracy. As cited in the beginning of that chapter, some adherents to technocracy find it futile to discuss matters when scientific principles and calculations could be used. The idea of false clashes of interest can be carried on to such an extent that any objection to a particular interpretation of scientific finding is deemed premodern and hostile to the humankind's overall improvement. Although this trend was not observed among planning documents reviewed in this thesis - where democracy is praised - it is still curious that throughout the period elected power holders

often watched DPT with suspicion. This was most visible with right wing political parties which traditionally obtain the majority of votes in Turkey. Even though this could be easily explained by the initial *raison d'être* of DPT, a tool of the military to curb political parties' power, a comparative study on the relation between democracy and technocracy may yield interesting findings in this regard.

In the chapter on special expertise commissions it is implied that planning process may be one culprit for the technocratic tone among non-planning personnel. This may be true for planners as well. As discussed in the first chapter, among common points of technocratic thinking are rationality, efficiency, decisions based on scientific criteria, and seeking harmony. All of these can be applied to planning. In fact, it may be difficult to come with an alternative way of planning a whole country's next five years and facilitate radical and overarching changes at the same time. Perhaps other themes than technocracy were transitory to technocratic mentality. As mentioned in the first chapter, figures such as Saint-Simon, Edward Bellamy, and Veblen had important ties to socialism. Similarly, it was stated in the second chapter that members of the *Kadro* magazine were Kemalists who propagated ideas close to technocracy. Kemalism itself emerged partly from the populism of late Ottoman elite. Although socialism and populism are incompatible with technocratic thinking, they come close in many regards and can be considered rivals in this sense.

To test whether there exists such a strong link between planning and technocracy requires a much more comprehensive study that includes more than one example of planning. There could be another school of planning that does not necessitate a technocratic outlook. For instance, Küçük (1978, p. 104) notes that due to the vast structural changes needed, Soviet planning did not use mathematics in the beginning even though some mathematical methods for planning were developed by the USSR.

Other than comparisons between various planning schools, it may be possible to conduct studies on individuals in planning institutions where technocratic perspectives exist. If the current political, social, and economic uncertainty were to be spark an apolitical search for harmony or polarization were to decline, room for such a study may appear. Socialist thinking is much rarer

in public offices and Kemalism does not enjoy the hegemony it did six centuries ago, therefore it may be difficult to test the link between these three ways of thinking. In dept interviews with new age technocrats could still inform us about this possible transition and to what extent other perspectives are conducive to technocracy.

One final topic for further research could be the heterodox statements and opposition in the planning documents. Especially towards late 1970s, there seems to be increasing frequency of internal conflict within special expertise commissions and criticisms towards both incumbent and past governments' policies. Within this thesis, these were evaluated merely in terms of being beyond technocratic thinking. Yet a wider research on this may show that planning also served as an alternative medium for antagonistic politics, and that the pluralistic tone in the commissions increased and decreased across time and depending on sectors. Rather than being a study in itself, this could prove a helpful contribution to a study on democracy. Any finding that indicates plans becoming new means of political dissent would also debunk the argument that there exists a strong link between technocracy and planning.

Appendix A Provisions of the Turkish Constitution relating to Planning

ARTICLE 41 THE REGULATION OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL LIFE

Economic and social life shall be regulated in a manner consistent with justice, and the principle of full employment, with the objective of assuring for everyone a standard of living befitting human dignity.

It is the duty of the State to encourage economic, social and cultural development by democratic processes and for this purpose to enhance national savings, to give priority to these investments which promote public welfare, and to draw up development projects.

ARTICLE 129 DEVELOPMENT

Development Projects and the State Planning Organization

Economic, social and cultural development is based on a plan. Development is carried out according to this plan.

The organization and functions of the State Planning Organization, the principles to be observed in the preparation and execution, and application and revision of the plan, and the measures designed to prevent changes tending to impair the unity of the plan, shall be regulated by special legislation. (The State Planning Organization, 1963, p. 5)

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