

THE CHALLENGE AHEAD :

SITUATING EUROPA

Thesis submitted to the

Institute for Graduate Studies in Social Sciences

in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

in

International Relations and Political Science

by

Zeynep Gülşah Çapan

Bogazici University Library



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Boğaziçi University

2004

*To the endless memory of my father and  
to my mother who has always been a north star that has guided me through dark times,*

You must know that I do not love and that I love you,  
because everything alive has its two sides;  
a word is one wing of silence,  
fire has its cold half.

I love you in order to begin to love you,  
to start infinity again  
and never to stop loving you:  
that's why I do not love you yet.

I love you, and I do not love you, as if I held  
keys in my hand: to a future of joy-  
a wretched, muddled fate-

My love has two lives, in order to love you:  
that's why I love you when I do not love you,  
and also why I love you when I do.

Pablo Neruda

To Prof. Kemal Kirişçi for his understanding and guidance in writing of this thesis and his contributions without which I would never have been able to organize my thesis

To Doç Dr. Gün Kut and Prof. Binnaz Toprak for their understanding and comments which have been influential in closing loopholes in my argumentation

To Soli Özel for setting the standards of how to be a great academic to which I will always aim to reach

To Ayhan Kaya for his guidance and understanding during the last two years without which I could never have got around the finishing this thesis

To Gülben Çapan for being as she always is, a nuisance that makes one forget all other engagements

To the family of Gulum and Rahman Khalilov for demonstrating me the value of believing and always being there

To Hasan Çapan who was there when no one would be

To Nazlı Hotic for believing in me long before I ever had the courage to

To Ozge Onursal for our long discussions and ‘arguments’ without which the main contours of my ideas would never have been structured and her consistent ‘battles’ to structure my thoughts and most importantly for putting up with me and being a great friend for they are hard to come along

To Mehmet Ali Tugtan for his comments about the draft of this thesis that enabled me to put my argumentation within a recurring theme and general perspective

To Burç Beşgül for reading the draft of this thesis and his invaluable contributions

To my students who I wish I had enough space to name one by one for teaching me not only the value of being an instructor but also that learning is a never ending process

To Pelin Ünsal for showing me her great personality and accepting me as a friend for I know she does not give that privilege to everyone

To Omer Turan for being an incredibly understanding colleague for working with him has been a true privilege

To all my teachers in the IR department of IBU for not only being great sources of inspiration throughout my years as an undergraduate student but also when I was an assistant in the department, to become an academic would never have been such an attractive choice if I had not had the chance to observe their enthusiasm and love for this occupation

To Francis Clivaz, although it is impossible to express gratitude to you, thank you immensely for making me believe that angels do actually exist. There are times in a lifetime where certain people and events give you the strength to continue and I thank you for being there at that time for without your presence I could never have continued

To my *amigos* for the laughters and life that was like a rollercoaster and the knowledge that time, space and circumstances will never matter for I will always have a home beside each one

To Mrs. Taylor and Mrs. Rowe eventhough I might never have said it to them for giving me the inspiration, belief and skills to continue my education

To my *küçüğüm*, eventhough I will probably never have enough words for you, thank you for demonstrating that hope should never be lost in life for it always has the capacity to surprise you, for making me believe that unconditional love does exist and for giving me the will to go on in live for it is your presence that will make it worth the while,

## ABSTRACT

The aim of this thesis has been to understand the road that European Union identity can take. The thesis argues that 'European' identity is a misnomer because the emerging identity represents a process that emerged out of Europe but is not dependent on every definition of it. European Union has been an undetermined process from its inception which has experienced numerous successes and setbacks. Neither the successes nor the setbacks are in themselves a testament on the future shape of the European Union. The shape of the European Union and its identity will be the result of a process that is still continuing and thus one can not predict the nature of this incipient identity. One can only determine the road that this identity might take. This thesis argues that the road it will take will be through the negotiations and bargainings of the member states, institutions and people. Hence it is an ongoing process that acts in a dialectic fashion of redefinition instead of moving towards a ready made definition and entity. The definition of Europe and the political entity of the European Union will be defined at the end of this process.

**KEYWORDS** : European Union, Projects of Europe, Turkey, European identity, European Union identity

## KISA ÖZET

Bu tezin amacı Avrupa Birliđi kimliđinin gidebileceđi yolu belirlemektir. Ortaya çıkmakta olan kimlik 'Avrupa' kimliđi olarak adlandırılmamalıdır çünkü ortaya çıkmakta olan bu kimlik Avrupa'dan dođmuştur ama her Avrupa tanımına bađımlı deđildir. Avrupa Birliđi ortaya çıktığı andan itibaren bir sürü başarı ve başarısızlık yaşamış olan belirlenmemiş bir süreçtir. Avrupa Birliđinin başarıları da başarısızlıkları da ileride alacağı şekil için tek belirleyici deđillerdir. Avrupa Birliđinin şekli ve kimliđinin özellikleri halen devam eden sürecin sonunda belirlenecektir. Bu neden ile bu kimliđin özellikleri tahmin edilemez. Tek yapılabilecek olan bu kimliđin özelliklerinin belirlenmesi sürecinde izlenecek olan yolu tespit etmektir. Bu tezin temel argumanı kimliđin izleyeceđi yolun üye devletlerin, kurumların ve insanların arasında devam eden muzakereler olduđudur. Bu neden ile kimliđin belirlenmesi halen devam eden bir süreçtir. Avrupa Birliđi kimliđi önceden belirlenmiş bir tanıma ya da bir yapıya dođru ilerlemiyor. Avrupa'nın nasıl tanımlanacağı ve Avrupa Birliđinin yapısının ne olacağı bu süreç sonunda belirlenecektir.

**ANAHTAR KELİMERLER** : Avrupa Birliđi, Avrupa projeleri, Türkiye, Avrupa kimliđi, Avrupa Birliđi kimliđi

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## INTRODUCTION

This thesis is an attempt to understand the past ideas and projects on Europe and the process of European integration in order to conceptualize better the process of the formation of European Union identity. The world and what has become known as the international system is in constant alteration. The international system is acquiring new definitions; new entities are coming into existence and dynamics are altering in the international system. It would be naive not to expect the whole to alter when the parts have long been mutated. There lie a number of challenges along the road that leads to the realization of goals such as making some sense of these shape-shifting concepts. One of the main issues elaborated upon is what political entity will be the heir to the long reign of the king of political institutions: the nation-state. Another issue no less important than the first one is when and how the people of the world will cry 'The king is dead. Long live the new king.' These two issues are basically concerned with whether or not the nation-state will be replaced and if so when, how, and what will replace the nation-state. It has become imperative to ask these questions as a result of societal changes that have been brought about by what is called 'globalization.'

Globalization, to put shortly, is an increase in international trade, investment and finance, and faster flow of information as a result of which a world that is highly interconnected has come into existence. According to McGrew

'globalisation describes the process by which developments in one region rapidly come to have significant consequences for the security and well being of communities in quite distant regions of the globe. It is defined by the widening scope, deepening impact and speeding up of inter-regional flows and networks of interaction within all realms of social activity from the economic to the ecological, the cultural to the criminal'.<sup>1</sup>

This interconnectedness has altered the international system based on nation-states, as the powers of the nation-state are no longer effective in dealing with the consequences of globalization.<sup>2</sup> The main effect of globalization has been to problematize the 'image of society as a bounded and coherent set of structures and practices governed by the sovereign nation-state'.<sup>3</sup>

The established order of clearly delineated concepts of nation-state, territory and identity has been distorted although they have not been extinguished. The present is a process of political, economic, social and cultural forces, which are attempting to re-define and re-conceptualize the world system. The nation-state is not on the verge of extinction but rather it is in a transitory period in which it will have to redefine itself and its functions in order to deal with the problems caused by a globalizing world. The nation-state is increasingly less capable of coping with the effects of transnational economics. It is not only in the realm of economics but also in political, cultural and social areas that the nation-state is challenged by transnational and supranational forces and actors. For example, transnational migration has been pivotal in de-constructing the established concepts of citizenship and national identity, blurring the clear distinctions that were established between the "insiders" and the "outsiders". Thus increased globalization and the problems associated with it have put forward the question of the future of the nation-state, not only with respect to whether or not it will dissolve, but also with respect to how it might re-define itself and the systems of global or regional governance that will be established to accommodate the newly appearing forces and actors in the 'post-modern' era.

The blurring of the division between the inside and the outside, and the attempt to give meaning to the transnational and supranational spaces that are forming is no

where more apparent than in the European Union. European Union has become the litmus test for comprehending the future of the global political structure and how, if at all, a supra-national political entity can be constructed. The birth-place of the nation-state is in process of formulating an un-defined 'post-modern' entity whose identity, borders and character are still elusive. The challenges posed by the existence of the European Union to comprehending issues such as national identities, sovereignty, citizenship and the state is the miniature of a world-wide phenomenon of continuous fluctuation and uncertainty. European Union provides the best analytical tool for comprehending the future of the inter-national system.

The wide array of literature on European governance mainly concentrates upon the shortcomings of the European Union when compared to the nation-state. The European Union is misguidingly analyzed through the spectre of the nation-state. As a result of this there exists what Shaw calls a 'literature of deficits' which discusses how to remedy the Union's 'deficits' whether it be with respect to democracy, accountability or legitimacy. This approach is misguided mainly because the European Union is not a nation-state and its measure of success or failure should not be how much it has achieved statal qualities or not. As Shaw and Wiener state 'the European Union (EU) is simultaneously both 'near-state' and antithetical to stateness'.<sup>4</sup> Although the European Union does have certain qualities that may be considered state-like, it is in essence not a state. The European Union at present is a hybrid political entity that cannot be defined. It is precisely this uncertainty within the character of the EU that frustrates the observers and forces them towards a closed analysis of how the European Union is not what it does not aspire to be. The European Union is not a supra-state that aims at replacing the nation-state, but a political entity that aims to ease the process of globalization on nation-states through a

mechanism of regional governance. European Union would not have existed had the European nation-states been able to solve their regional and global problems within the contours of the nation-state. Furthermore, it is the imprisonment within certain conceptual tools that discloses any attempt to analyze the European Union in comparison to the nation-state.

The comparison of the European Union to the nation-state will block the routes to comprehending the true nature and significance of the European Union. The conceptualization of the nation-state has been possible through 'the enclosure, measurement, and commodification of space' which has been instrumental in 'the production of the modern notion of a national territory bounded by frontiers that sharply distinguish inside from outside'.<sup>5</sup> As Walker states, the inside/outside distinctions have not been existent from time to immemorial. Thus 'patterns of inclusion and exclusion we now take for granted are historical innovations'.<sup>6</sup> Hence there is no reason to assume that the nation-state will be here forever. Furthermore, there is no reason preventing us from conceptualizing beyond the nation-state and the enclosed understanding of space and time that it brings forth. Within this context the European Union might provide the sole material formation of a replacement if that day might come.

The last decade has accelerated the process whereby modernity, and the classifications and the patterns of inclusion and exclusion formed by modernity are being challenged. This confrontation of the classifications that pertain to modernity does not indicate that these classifications will evaporate in an inevitable manner. The outcome can also be a re-organization and re-classification of concepts so that they can endure. The European Union produces a two-fold process as an effect of its being

both 'near-state and antithetical to stateness'.<sup>7</sup> The Union is both a legitimizing force for the nation-state that has lost its power and a means to formulate an alternative political entity as a cause of the legitimization problems of the nation-state.<sup>8</sup> As a consequence of this dual effect the European Union which today can be perceived as posing a challenge to the nation-state was also in the words of Milward 'the mechanism by which the nation-state has been rescued in the post-war Europe'.<sup>9</sup> Accordingly, entrance into the postmodern age does not signify the end of modernity; nor does it imply that its defining characteristics will disappear. As Baumann states postmodernity is not necessarily antithetical to modernity. Rather, 'postmodernity is modernity coming of age: modernity looking at itself at a distance rather than from inside, making a full inventory of its gains and losses, psychoanalyzing itself, discovering the intentions it never before spelled out, finding them mutually cancelling and incongruous'.<sup>10</sup> Hence the entrance into the postmodern age does suggest that the defining characteristics of modernity will be subject to critical analysis as a result of which they might be re-defined and re-conceptualized.

Modernity has served as a lock to a clearly bordered entity with a beginning, clear definitions and boundaries that have made it impracticable to scrutinize beyond the ready-made walls. The definitions and classifications modernity has provided have been based on dualities and on either/or distinctions. 'Classifying consists in the acts of inclusion and exclusion. Each act of naming splits the world into two: entities that answer to the name; all the rest that do not. Certain entities may be included into a class – made a class – only in so far as other entities are *excluded*, left outside'.<sup>11</sup> In contrast, post-modernity should not necessarily be understood as a clear break, contrary to what Marx had said all that is solid does not necessarily have to melt into air<sup>12</sup> for new solids to be forming. The 'postmodern' time or the process of

globalization should not be comprehended within Manichean schematics for 'globalization entails a shift from two-dimensional Euclidian space with its centers and peripheries and sharp boundaries, to a multidimensional global space with unbounded, often discontinuous and interpenetrating sub-spaces'.<sup>13</sup> New entities, definitions and classifications can be – and are – coming into existence without necessarily destroying the previous ones. It is the break-up of the monopoly of conceptual tools that brings uncertainty but it is through this process that one can understand the nature of the post-modern entities that are being formed. Hence 'globalization is a progressive bipolar time stretching between the beginning and the end of history'.<sup>14</sup>

Although, as mentioned above, there exists a 'deficit' literature on the governance of the European Union, there does exist a literature that attempts to conceptualize beyond the nation-state. As will be discussed in the next chapter there is a wide-ranging literature on European identity that does attempt to comprehend how a 'European' identity can be formulated at the supra-national or the post-national level. Even though such attempts do exist in the literature, they are conceptualisations of 'european' identity that has not actually exist a clear definition of what Europe is and which Europe is being discussed. There exists the necessity to comprehend whether that meaning of Europe is congruent with what European Union is and whether a meaning of Europa exists that is independent of what Europe is.

Firstly, the concept of Europa needs to be clarified since this study is directly related to its being situated and analyzed as a political entity. The last few years have been especially confusing for anyone that intends to study the subject of international relations. There does exist, as everyone is aware, a continent called Europe with

borders that have been more or less agreed upon. But Europe itself is divided into sub-categories like Western Europe, Eastern Europe, South East Europe, Central Europe and Nordic Countries and some countries among these sub-categories are part of the non-identified political entity called the European Union and some are not. For example Switzerland is part of the European continent within the sub-category of Western Europe but it is not part of the European Union. Thus Switzerland is a European country. How can one differentiate it from France for example, which is also situated within the European continent under the sub-category of Western Europe but is also part of the European Union? Are they both to be called under the general and non-defined concept of 'European'? This is a confusing similarity that I will attempt to compensate by introducing the concept of Europa.

It needs to be realized that the European Union is both more and less than the geographical entity that is called Europe. Hence any discussion about the emerging, existing, or future European identity is a misnomer. A conception of a 'European' identity already exists and has been evolving and altering in constant relation with the historical, political, economical and social developments that have occurred in the continent as well as in the world; and it will continue to evolve. This European identity is one that encompasses the distinct and at times similar identities of Israel, Switzerland and even Turkey and Russia. But this is the European identity and it is a notion that is separate and that needs to be separated from the emerging 'European Union' identity. The spatial and territorial meaning in addition to the social and cultural as well as geographical boundaries associated with Europe are different from those institutional spatiality and territoriality of the European Union. It also needs to be realized that the spatial and territorial meanings associated with a concept are not fixed but rather are changing and evolving in time. The same spatial or cultural

meaning is not given to Europe today that was given in the 1900s or 1980s, and the meaning given today will not be the same as the one that will be given twenty years from today. Europe may mean a variety of different things to different countries and peoples at different times thus it cannot be considered as a bounded unchanging entity that will remain as it is from here to eternity. As Paasi states 'Europe may be understood as an experience, an institution and a structural body'.<sup>15</sup> Hence the meaning of Europe, with its spatiality and territoriality, is in a constant process of change not least because of the developments within the European Union.

I propose distinguishing Europe from the European Union in order to differentiate between these different levels of spatiality and to rectify the conceptual confusion caused by calling everything by the same name. This will make it easier to locate the real place of the European Union and its identity within these overlapping territorialities. The concepts have been used interchangeably and I think that this conceptual similarity is what creates confusion within the debate of the identity of the European Union. Drawing from historical and even mythical sources I propose to call the European Union in a more practical manner, as 'Europa'<sup>16</sup>, and its identity not as an already conceptualised 'European' identity but one in the process of being formed; the *Europaen* identity. Europe as stated by Bugge has always been defined from a certain perspective and there has always been a political project associated with that certain perspective and definition thus

'one must be keenly aware that Europe is always seen and interpreted from somewhere, from a particular national or political viewpoint. Europe depends on the eye of the beholder and it is not just a problem of, say, competing French, German or Russian versions of the concept or plans for Europe's future. Any thinking about Europe – no matter how much it tries to remain above the level of self-interest – is likely to be so embedded in a specific cultural, political or religious tradition that its outcome may be incompatible with other, equally sincere ideas, even if they are both expressed in seemingly identical terms.

Thus, not only are a Catholic's and socialists projects for Europe likely to be different, but so are their perceptions of Europe itself.<sup>17</sup>

Projects for Europe have portrayed different patterns of inclusion/exclusion because they have had different conceptions of what Europe means as a consequence of what being European means.

## **THE SCOPE OF THE STUDY**

This thesis is neither one of the histories of Europe nor one of the histories of the European Union. This thesis outlines the main conceptions of Europe that have existed throughout history and the main projects for Europe devised in order to demonstrate that the idea of Europe is not a wholesome truth that has always existed or culminated in an inevitable historical process in what is known today as the European Union.

The main objectives of the thesis can be summarized under three objectives. The first aim of this study is to demonstrate that Europe and European Union are not necessarily the same concept nor do they always connote the same meaning. This point will be demonstrated through the analysis of past projects to unite Europe and the different ideas of Europe. Such an analysis will demonstrate that there have been different ideas of Europe which have resulted in different projects of Europe. Not only Europe but also the European Union has had different meanings, and as a consequence competing arrangements have appeared. This will be illustrated through an analysis of the different projects and plans with different conceptions that have appeared within the European Union since its inception.

The second aim of this study is to demonstrate that the present structure of the European Union and the achievement of unity under the banner of democracy, rule of law and human rights was not the product of an inevitable historical process. This point will be demonstrated through the analysis of different identifications and different projects of Europe that did not define Europe as a democratic entity and also through the analysis of the setbacks experienced not only in attempts to unify Europe but even during the integration process that began after the Second World War.

The third objective of this study is a consequence of the first and second aims and intends to demonstrate that the emerging identity will not be a 'European' one but rather a 'European Union' identity. This thesis will argue that attempts to define the contours of any 'European Union' identity is not well-founded for it will be determined through negotiation, bargaining, reactions and positions of the main actors and the international environment. Hence the meaning of the European Union and its identity is as yet undetermined. This point will be demonstrated by presenting an historical analysis of the idea of Europe and projects for Europe. Such an analysis will enable the comprehension that Europe has witnessed many attempts to unify her and all these projects were motivated by different considerations and different conceptions of Europe. Each conception of Europe resulted in a different organization for the unity of Europe where the meaning of being European altered. Thus this historical analysis will make evident that there have been various understandings of European identity over the centuries. This will provide indications that there can be and are different understandings of meanings of the European Union and being part of it. Thus how these definitions merge into one definition will be the result of processes that are to come. Eventually, the identity that comes out of the competing identifications will be a European identity.

## **THE ORGANISATION OF THE STUDY**

The first chapter of the thesis will outline the main works centering on European identity in order to provide a bird's eye view on the discussions about European identity. This chapter will argue that the main deficiency of the present literature is overlooking the difference between 'Europe' and 'European Union' and attempting to locate a 'European identity' when the European identity should be located. The second chapter will present an outline of the competing ideas of Europe that have existed ever since the Greek civilization and the different projects for Europe ranging from Emeric Crucé, Duc De Sully to William Penn. The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate how the ideas of Europe and projects for Europe have differed over the years. The third chapter will begin from the First World War by discussing Friedrich Nauman's, Countentove-Kalergi's and Aristide Briand's calls for a European unity, and outline the different ideas and projects for Europe until the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). This chapter will also attempt to outline the integration process that has culminated in the European Union. The analysis of the integration process will concentrate on the plans that failed and the different plans that emerged even within the project itself. The fourth chapter will be a case-study of the main arguments made in this thesis. This chapter will outline the relations of Europe and Turkey in an attempt to demonstrate through the example of Turkey, how the borders of Europe have altered with different ideas of and projects for Europe. The concluding chapter will aim to summarize the main points made in the thesis and outline why and how the concept of Europa is pivotal in comprehending the emerging identity.

## **CHAPTER I :**

### **FROM NON-EXISTENCE TO MODELS FOR CONSTRUCTION:**

#### **EUROPEAN IDENTITY**

##### **1.1 QUESTIONS OF IDENTITY**

This chapter will give a brief outline of the literature on 'European' identity. The aim of the chapter is to demonstrate the main issues discussed in the literature in order to comprehend the essential contours of the debate on 'European' identity. In doing so, it will demonstrate the important deficiencies within the literature. Moreover, this chapter will emphasize the role of the EU in bringing about a new identity that need not be based on 'Europe'.

The last decade has witnessed revolutionary events entailing the breakdown of the Leninist regimes, the end of the Cold War, and the unification of Germany. These events had a profound effect on the integration process of the European Union. The fluctuations in the world and specifically in the political map of Europe have made a redefinition of Europe and the European Union a vital task. The route that the EU may take in terms of integration is correlated with what the identity of the EU will be. Attempts to answer the question on whether an identity at the EU level will be possible, and if so, how this can be realized, is a fundamental ingredient in comprehending the contours of the integration project.

Identity has become one of the main problematiques of the European polity especially because the polity has commenced questioning its nature as an entity and its future significance. The shape and nature of European identity has become a widely

contested issue mainly because a consensus cannot be reached on what the nature of the 'European identity' is and on which basis it can be constituted upon. The issue of identity had not been such a pressing one before because Europeanness had been adopted by most member states as a means to strengthen their state identities, preventing the rise of a possible tension between their national projects and European integration. It is the integration project that has created the necessity to discuss European identity because the integration project has 'by disturbing existing political spaces, created new political arenas'.<sup>18</sup> Even though the European project has always stressed state- and community-building measures it has always remained ambiguous due to its contested aims and goals. There exists an ambiguity because the project of the European identity brings forth 'misgivings about the feasibility of creating a European identity, uncertainty about the historical ingredients that can be used to invent such an identity and doubts about the compatibility of national identities with a European identity'.<sup>19</sup> The aim of this chapter is to provide an understanding on the outline of the debate that has been made on European identity concentrating upon how it can be defined and conceptualised. Following from Laffan's reasons for the enduring ambiguity on European identity this chapter will deal with whether or not a European identity is feasible, whether or not a European identity can compete or co-exist with national identities and what will be its constituting characteristics if one is to be constructed.

## **1.2 EUROPEAN IDENTITY: IS IT FEASIBLE?**

One of the most pivotal issues discussed as regards the European identity is whether or not it can ever come into existence. Those who argue that a European identity cannot become a reality argue so on the grounds that a European nation does not exist. According to this view European identity cannot exist because it does not have the

ingredients that formed the nation. Anthony Smith is a proponent of the view that a European identity is not feasible. He argues that even though there exists traditions that can be considered as common to the nation-states of Europe 'Europe' lacks a secure ethnic base with a clear-cut set of common historical memories, myths, symbols, values and the like'.<sup>20</sup> According to Smith the main deficiency of European identity is that 'it lacks a pre-modern past – a 'pre-history' which can provide it with emotional sustenance and historical depth'.<sup>21</sup> Smith questions whether or not there are characteristics that are unique to Europe and comes to the conclusion that there is 'no European analogue to Bastille or Armistice Day, no European ceremony for the fallen in battle, no European shrine of kings or saints. When it comes to the ritual and ceremony of collective identification, there is no European equivalent of national or religious community'.<sup>22</sup>

A central shortcoming in Smith's perception of European identity is his belief that there should be a European 'equivalent of national or religious community.' According to Smith a European identity cannot exist because it will not have the same ingredients that national identity has, a European identity cannot exist because it cannot be what national identity is. Howe argues that Europe does not need 'the sort of ancient ethnic and cultural history Smith imagines is necessary for any community' to succeed but can formulate its identity 'as a project oriented towards the future'.<sup>23</sup> O'Sullivan<sup>24</sup> and Van Ham<sup>25</sup> make similar criticisms to the approach adopted by Smith. Smith's approach is criticized mainly because of his assumption that European identity formation can only be formulated according to the identity construction process, experienced following the French Revolution.<sup>26</sup> Van Ham argues that following an already set pattern cannot offer a solution to the formulation of a European identity. An alternative cannot be formulated through the construction of a

'European Gemeinschaft with all the traditional paraphernalia of statehood ranging from shared myths and memories to an anthem and European flag will not offer a genuine alternative'.<sup>27</sup>

Howe's<sup>28</sup> stance should be considered apart from the two discussed authors because even though Howe criticizes Smith for his ethno-national approach to comprehending European identity he himself does not move beyond the vocabulary provided by the nation-state but rather argues for its civic aspect instead of the ethno-national one.<sup>29</sup>

Howe asserts that European identity can be formulated upon an understanding of shared destiny but as Kostakopoulo states 'it may be problematic to speak about a shared destiny, bearing in mind that Europe's destination is unknown'.<sup>30</sup> As a reply to Kostakopoulo Howe argues that 'the model of the nation-state weighs heavily on contemporary modes of thinking and behaving and is likely to affect the route taken'.<sup>31</sup> Thus according to Howe even though the EU has not yet become a nation-state it does demonstrate signs that can be considered as steps towards adopting to that model.

The above-discussed analysis presents certain problems concerning the conceptualization of European identity. Whether European identity is conceptualized in the form of Smith's ethno-national approach or Howe's civic approach there exists the problem stated also by Van Ham of not really providing any sort of alternative to the nation-state model but of only copying a model that is itself problematic. One of the main deficiencies of discussing European identity based solely on the concept of identity derived from national identity is overlooking the existence and importance of other identities. Kohli<sup>32</sup> states that utilising solely the political science concept of identity based on the nation-state is a mistaken attitude because the national identity is

not the only social and collective identity that exists; there are other identities like territorial identities ranging from the local, regional, and supranational to the global. Identities should not be considered as fixed concepts but rather as ones that are constantly changing and one that differs from place to place. Thus the only generalization that can be made about European identity 'is that European identity coexists with other identities – state, regional, ethnic, and local – in a way that is not strictly hierarchical. The idea of Europe is not analogous to the idea of state; instead, Europe is one of several cultural territorial constructs to which meaning is attached'.<sup>33</sup>

Smith<sup>34</sup> asks the question about whether or not 'Europe' is only the sum of all the different national communities that reside within it. If so, then he asks, what is the point in summing those identities up to get 'Europe' merely because of their being situated within the same geographical area? Murphy<sup>35</sup> states that globalization and the increase in transnational interactions have brought the interest of peoples living in different regions together and hence the 'functional and perceptual geography of Europe inevitably changed.' Thus the map of Europe is no longer solely composed of states but it is also composed of regions that are not coterminous with state boundaries and ethno-national movements. According to Murphy the existence of Europe as a 'cultural-territorial entity' and the spatial ordering of the map of Europe has altered and this has happened not because 'people are seeing themselves as European above and beyond all else. Rather, it is happening because Europe has come to mean something more than a collection of states'.<sup>36</sup> Thus contrary to Smith, Murphy does not attempt to locate intrinsic traditions and experiences that are common to Europe as a result of which Europe is more than a sum of all its parts. He looks at the present interactions and experiences among and beyond the European states that have created

spaces that are not attributable to the nation-states and national identities as a result of which Europe has become more than its parts.

### **1.3 EUROPEAN IDENTITY: THE OBSTACLES**

At this juncture it needs to be discussed why it is that European identity cannot grow even when new spaces that are conducive to its growth are appearing. Lowenthal attempts to find an answer to the question why: 'is it that European identity remains so embryonic?'<sup>37</sup> He identifies five main reasons for the embryonic status of the European identity; linguistic diversity, disparities of size and resources, cultural differences, the negative connotations of Europeanism and the top-down approach of the European Union. The diversity in language gives rise to problems of communication, which is alleviated by the continuance of historical grievances among the member states. There also exist problems with the differences in size and resources of the member states where France and Germany seem to dominate the route of the polity. Thus there needs to be a European Union that can accommodate and even more so find a common ground among the French, the German, the Irish, the Greek and the Portuguese perspectives on the European Union. This task is further exacerbated by the existence of a negative perception of Europeanness as a consequence of Europe representing not only progress and humanist traditions but also fascism and genocide. This negative perception of Europe is built upon because of the top-down approach adopted by the bureaucratic establishment of the European Union, which provides an obstacle to the participation of citizens.<sup>38</sup>

The future development of the European identity depends on how the above mentioned problems can be solved or circumvented. But even more so one of the pivotal issues with respect to European identity, however embryonic one might

consider it, is the perception of a threat that an identity to replace national identity is in process. How will it be possible for the European and national and even sub-national identities to co-exist with each other? Risse<sup>39</sup> proposes the marble-cake model of identity as a solution to this problem. He argues that one should not conceptualize European identity as 'composed of national, regional or local loyalties in a zero-sum fashion as either/or propositions'.<sup>40</sup> Thus one can identify with Florence, Tuscany, Italy and Europe without there being tensions depending on which identity becomes more important in a given context. He argues that Europeanness exists within all national or sub-national identities whereby to be a German, Italian, English or French cannot be explained without some reference to Europe. The problem is that the references in each national or subnational group may alter depending on its specific experiences. The different identifications with Europe may range from 'Englishness' in Britain whereby 'Europe' still constitutes the 'other', to strong identification with Europe in Italy as a way to overcome the problems of the Italian polity'.<sup>41</sup>

The above explained is the 'marble-cake' identity model as opposed to the 'layer-cake' identity model. The 'layer-cake' identity model claims that there are several layers of identities from the local to the supranational. Each identity comes forth depending on interactions thus 'a Florentine citizen identifies with her local community when confronted with a Milanese, while her Tuscan identity might be involved when dealing with a Sicilian (or even Bavarian)'.<sup>42</sup> The 'marble-cake' identity model claims that identities cannot be distinctly separated from each other. According to this model identities are enmeshed 'since Tuscan history and culture can not be separated from the broader European history and culture, Tuscans would not be able to even describe their distinctiveness without alluding to some European roots'.<sup>43</sup>

The 'marble-cake' model which assumes that a Europeanness exists in each identity has both an advantage and a disadvantage. The advantage is that Europeanness is not non-existent. The disadvantages are that what states comprehended from 'Europeanness' differs thus providing an arena for conflict among the member states if and when their perceptions of Europe conflict with each other.

The imperative question to ask at this point becomes 'whether the different meanings of Europe show some overlap and whether there are common understandings of Europeanness, even though their historical and cultural embeddedness differs profoundly'.<sup>44</sup> If there exists overlaps between different nation-states as to their understanding of Europe and whether there are certain commonalities upon which they can build is the main question at this point in the discussion. Eensaar<sup>45</sup> asks similar questions when discussing whether or not Europe can be considered an amalgam of various national identities or whether or not there exist experiences and traditions that do not belong to a state but are common to all. According to Eensaar there exists a European dilemma between the choice of historical myths and memories and making decisions about fluctuating political will and economic interest. The problem faced by the EU is that the myths, traditions and memories have different significance for the various nation-states because even though certain states have participated in certain European traditions, at certain times they were allies while at other times they were enemies. Thus the question becomes quite similar to the one asked by Smith: 'what experiences are common to all Europeans and in what way do they differ from the experiences of non-Europeans?'.<sup>46</sup>

Although the view that European identity can only exist if it is similar to the model available from the nation-state is mistaken, the view that surpassing the need to re-

create at a higher level what already exists presents certain deficiencies as well. There still appears the need to find some commonality to bring together the people of Europe. There exists a problem with the view of an alternative, supranational identity which is the danger of essentialism at the European level asserting that 'there is concealed a timeless essence, in the form of a core moral identity that is uniquely European'.<sup>47</sup> This tendency to search for an essence is dubbed by Delanty as the 'European Cultural Pluralism' which argues that 'cultural heritage is the basis of European identity'.<sup>48</sup> Thus 'defining European identity as one shaped by the Greek, Roman, (Latin) Christian culminating in the Enlightenment, results in an exclusive Europe, as the western secular heritage'.<sup>49</sup> Hence the search for an essence brings with itself the danger of reconstituting sharp clear-cut boundaries about whom the Europeans are and whom are not. This will result not only in re-creating the nation-state at a larger scale but also re-establishing the main flaws of the nation-state at a larger scale. As presented by the views of Murphy the spaces that open up do not do so because of an everlasting essence but because of globalization and transnational interactions. The commonalities of Europe should not be searched in the same manner as one searches it at the national level, but through other formulations.

As a result there exists a more demanding question as to if it is 'possible to construct a model of political unity, other than the bureaucratic one, which offers a basis for European identity that does not postulate moral, spiritual and cultural uniformity?'<sup>50</sup> Can European identity be conceptualized so that it does not become national identity writ large and so that it does not become an essentialist formulation that eases the creation of a 'Fortress Europe'? Furthermore, the main question that needs to be posed with respect to European identity becomes: does it have to follow from the footsteps of its predecessors or can it create a route that is *sui generis*?

#### 1.4 EUROPEAN IDENTITY: ALTERNATIVES FOR A *SUI GENERIS* IDENTITY

There are various views on how European identity can overcome the problems of being simply a replicate. Wood states that the present problem confronted with in shaping Europe is that there exists a competition to derive the meaning of Europe from national polities which might result in the dominance of the expression given to Europe by one national identity if an acceptable European solution is not found. Thus the 'central dilemma of the European project: resolving unity and (unimpinged) diversity in the same space and time'.<sup>51</sup> The ideal solution would be that Europe would mean more than the sum of its parts but even if it does not mean more it still necessitates a consensus among the different cultures. Wood states that 'multiple loyalties' ranging from 'Munche, Bayern, Germany to Europe might not be the solution even if that adds to 'Europe'' because it might not hold against conflicting allegiances. Thus he proposes a different variation of multiple loyalties that will not divide along the lines of affiliations to place and time but according to political and cultural identifications. This would work through the transfer of 'political allegiances from the 'empty shell' of state sovereignty to a common European level and thereby 'depoliticize' relations between themselves as bearers of differing cultures'.<sup>52</sup> Thus the division between the 'highest political forms of identification' and cultural would be more meaningful than just re-creating another cultural-political identification at the European level. As a result of this model "'Europe' would accommodate the political element with a 'republican' orientation leaving all 'cultures' protected species in their own national and regional habitats'.<sup>53</sup>

The problem encountered in this model is that culture and identity are political issues and as Wood himself states 'culture, identity and politics imbue the gamut of contention within the enigmatic 'European space'.<sup>54</sup> Thus 'deciding upon what is 'Europe's' and what is to remain the competence of the individual members is a political activity'.<sup>55</sup> Habermas's proposition of a constitutional patriotism can be considered as an attempt to achieve what Wood proposes, by asserting that an identity based on politics rather than one based on culture should be formulated at the EU level. This view which Delanty identifies as 'European Postnational Universalism', conceptualizes identity in 'political-judicial norms and institutions'.<sup>56</sup> Thus although it does not divide, as Wood proposes, the political and the cultural, its political and legal character achieves a cultural neutrality. Arguing for a civic conception of European identity, Habermas argues that collective identity 'exists neither independent of nor prior to the democratic process from which it springs'.<sup>57</sup> He concludes that an identity formulated at the European level will be the product of political action instead of any cultural or historical events. Thus it cannot be based on cultural commonality. According to Habermas the only possible basis for European Unity is a common commitment to democracy and the constitution. Grimm rejects such a project because such a constitution 'goes back not to a European people but to the individual Member states, and remains dependent on them even after its entry into force'.<sup>58</sup> Habermas does not find Grimm's criticism to be well-founded because it assumes that a European constitution is not possible since there are no European people. He asserts that 'the ethical-political self-understanding of citizens in a democratic community must not be taken as a historical-cultural a priori that makes democratic will formation possible, but rather as the fluid content of a circulatory process that is generated through the legal institutionalisation of citizens' communication'.<sup>59</sup> The main problem that can be associated with this view is that it is

a minimal identity, which requires stable political structures and the non-existence of tensions over cultural matters. Furthermore, whether or not a constitution can by itself be the basis of a collective identity is questionable.<sup>60</sup>

The attempts to divide up the political and the cultural is a difficult task that is prone to leave fuzzy borders between the two levels that might be the catalyst of further tensions among the nation-states. According to the view presented by Van Ham rather than a division of the cultural which would mean the persistence of the divisions among cultural groups memories of past conflicts and tensions proposes that European identity should be constructed upon a 'collective amnesia'.

Van Ham argues that Europe lacks common principles and experiences that people can identify with because of its diversity and fragmentation. Therefore 'Europeanization is accompanied by a certain sense of dislocation, displacement and puzzlement'.<sup>61</sup> As Ignatieff states, 'Europe does not stand for toleration any more than it stands for ethnic cleansing. The doctrine of toleration is a European invention, but so is the concentration camp.'<sup>62</sup> Following from Ignatieff, Van Ham states that perhaps European identity should not be based upon a collective memory but a collective amnesia that will enable the peoples of Europe to forget the conflicts that divided them for centuries. Delanty who argues that 'culture need not be excluded in favor of a memory-less identity or one that is minimal to the point of being meaningless'<sup>63</sup> presents a view that is opposite to the one proposed by Van Ham.

Delanty proposes defining European identity 'in terms of its conflicts, traumas and fears which have ranged from religious conflict to class and national conflicts to a new era of multicultural conflicts over cultural rights and anti-globalization conflicts

today'.<sup>64</sup> Delanty's argument is different from Kohli's although their starting points are similar. Kohli argues that the most important matter awaiting the European identity is 'whether identity is always an identity 'against''.<sup>65</sup> He proposes that Europe can constitute its other not through a territorial division but rather through a temporal division because 'Europe does not need an external enemy because it has an internal one: its nationalistic past'.<sup>66</sup> Although both views see bringing forth Europe's divisive past as a necessary force that might help to construct a European identity there exists a divergence between the two: whereas Kohli proposes delineating Europe's nationalistic past as an 'other' Delanty proposes utilizing Europe's divisive past as a 'recognition of difference consisting of the ability to see the other within the self and oneself as the other'.<sup>67</sup> He gives the example of the Europeanization of the Holocaust as part of European history and memory rather than one pertaining to one specific nation-state. As a result 'where national identity is about the 'forgetting of history', European identity might be about memory, the remembering of history. It is also a cautious reminder of the dangers of identity'.<sup>68</sup>

The conceptualizations of European identity that aim to base European identity on commonalities other than culture and essence do not just put forward one basis upon which European identity can be constructed. Whether arguing for the division between the cultural and the political within the national and at EU levels respectively, 'constitutional patriotism', 'collective amnesia', constituting the divisive past of Europe as European identity's other or basing European identity on a collective European memory of its divisive pasts, they have also stressed that European identity can flourish within a pluralistic environment that is able to accommodate diversity.

## 1.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS

The literature on European identity is constantly attempting to devise new formulations as to how European identity can be constructed in a manner that can render it *sui generis*. In an attempt to understand the nature of the European identity these formulations fall into the traps of overemphasizing how European identity can be achieved and understating who will achieve it. Even though it is understated, the answer given to the latter question does bring together the different routes proposed. Although all the different alternatives presented conceptualize differently the manner in which to construct a European identity, there does exist an underlying commonality in their assertion for diversity and the dependence of their arguments on the role of the European Union.

For example, Van Ham does not completely put aside the necessity for a sense of *mystique*. He asserts that the *raison d'être* behind the introduction of such symbols as flags and anthems is to increase the European people's consciousness of belonging. Thus 'in order to create such a European mood, 'Europe' has to be 'flagged', symbolized, remembered, heralded, seen, heard, talked about and admired – whatever it takes to keep the idea of 'Europe' relevant or even indispensable.'<sup>69</sup> But he also states that the presence of these symbols and their being flagged will not automatically generate a feeling of belonging simply because 'the notion of Europe has so many competitors that it will be difficult to capture a market-niche in the collective consciousness of European society'.<sup>70</sup> Hence Van Ham does not completely disregard the necessity for symbols that will be produced by the European Union but states that it will be difficult for those symbols to compete with other symbols. Moreover, he states that the statecraft necessary to engineer a community is no longer available to the member states, which do not have any 'ambitions whatsoever to

produce a standardized 'European wo/man'.<sup>71</sup> Thus the significance of EU symbols throughout Europe 'is not a flag which is being consciously waved with fervent passion; it is the flag hanging unnoticed on the public building'.<sup>72</sup>

Delanty also states that 'an important dimension of Europeanization is that of cultural pluralisation and social justice. Given the diversity and contestability of cultural identities, Europeanization is likely to succeed only if it creates an ethos of pluralisation and justice rather than one of cohesion'.<sup>73</sup> Thus according to Delanty since identities are not fixed but altered by social actors, discourses and conflicts, European identity should not be considered as already existing; rather it should be considered 'as a more diffuse and open ended process of cultural and institutional experimentation'.<sup>74</sup> Hence although dissimilar to the Habermassian 'constitutional patriotism', both views pertain to the opinion that the institutions of the European Union, the symbols that they produce and the discourses about the European Union will play an important role in the constant reshaping of the 'European identity'. The main reason is that even though the available statecraft and the will are minimal there will be an attempt to achieve a certain degree of social engineering whether to forget history or to remember history.

As stated by Schlesinger 'if there is a plausible story of emergent Europeanness to be held, it will probably have to be rooted in a gradualist saga of growing together through institutional sedimentation, the patient outcome of the *longue duree* rather than the quick-fine product of technocratic rationalism'.<sup>75</sup> Hence even though a conscious attempt by the European Union is not enough for the construction of such a basis, what is needed is the dialectic relationship between the symbols and discourses and the people of Europe that will grow gradually and with its meaning and base

altering constantly. Thus the identity that will emerge or the one that is emerging is directly linked to the existence, continuance, application and experimentation of the policies of the European Union. This brings forth the necessity of the division that was proposed in the introduction of this thesis for a differentiation between 'European' and 'Europaen'. Even though it might be based upon a history that is called European, its interpretations, representations and comprehension will be Europaen. Thus the identity that is emerging is closely linked to the activities of the European Union and cannot be conceptualized without an understanding of the integration process. Before proceeding into an analysis of the integration process, an outline of the different ideas and perceptions of Europe and the numerous projects for uniting Europe will be given in order to better comprehend the nature of the complexities involved in conceptualizing a European Union identity. Identifying the EU as the main actor in the process of determining an identity is not sufficient since the question of 'how' still remains. The real conundrum emerges here because the term 'EU', similar to that of 'Europe', has disparate meanings, and since there is no clear definition to it, it cannot as yet have a clearly defined identity. The next chapter will demonstrate the multifarious ideas of - and projects for Europe. The existence of such diverse ideas is important in realizing that European Union is itself defined differently depending on the perspectives of the definer. Thus to speak of Europe is always to define Europe and the European Union. The process of defining the European Union identity is still in process, which can be comprehended more clearly once the different ideas of- and projects for Europe and the undetermined and evitable processes are demonstrated.

## CHAPTER II:

### THE IDEAS OF AND PROJECTS FOR EUROPE

#### 2.1 INTRODUCTION

Europe has been identified with different concepts during its history whether it is Christianity or liberalism but these were all classifications made to a non-determined geographical entity. All these different identifications and classifications have culminated in different projections for how Europe should be organised and what it should signify. This chapter is an outline of the main ideas of and projects for Europe until the First World War. The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate that Europe is not a concept with clearly defined boundaries or a universally accepted definition. Its definition has always altered and the projects to unify Europe have defined Europe with specific political goals. There have always existed competing ideas of Europe thus the EU is not the culmination of an inevitable process that began with the Greek civilization or Roman Empire. There exists no linear history that has inevitably led to the establishment of the present order in Europe. This chapter will demonstrate that Europe has always been a contested concept. She has always been undetermined, undefined and mutable depending on the perception of actors and how they aimed to employ the concept.

From Homer to Monnet there have been various conceptions of what Europe means ranging from philosophical to geographical and political definitions. These differing perceptions have had one thing in common firstly there were in general terms 'ideas' that were being professed and none actually came close to being a real political project. They all had some conception of what Europe meant but none had devised the

political project that could actually construct that meaning. Thus despite the existence of multifarious meanings no hegemonic definition has actually lasted.

A historical outlook that looks at the idea of and projects for Europe is essential in order to comprehend that there has never been a uniform idea of Europe. Ideas of Europe have always varied culminating in different projects for Europe. This historical analysis is imperative in comprehending the undetermined and evitable process of integration and how Europe and European Union can not connote the same meaning since they themselves have different meanings depending on the perspective defining Europe.

## 2.2 THE ROOTS OF THE CONCEPT

What is Europe? Where is Europe? Who and what does the term 'Europe' connote and how is this connotation meaningful for the organisation of the political space within the continent? As Davies states; 'in the beginning, there was no Europe. All there was, for five million years, was a long, sinuous peninsula with no name, set like the figurehead of a ship on the prow of the world's largest land mass'.<sup>76</sup> How did that landmass assume the name of Europe? Moreover, what was the meaning of the term 'Europe'? There are etymological and mythological roots of the word 'Europe'. There have been various explanations with respect to the etymological roots of the word Europe although none have received wide acceptance. One such explanation was a Celtic one which argued that the word 'Europe' was derived from the Celtic word *wrab* which meant the West. Another, argument states that the word 'Europe' like the word 'Asia' was derived from the Akkadian language. According to this view whereas the word *asu* or *acu* mean 'rising' the word *ereb* or *erih* means 'entering' or 'sunset'. Thus sunset denoted the Orient and sunrise the Occident.<sup>77</sup> The different

explanations that can be given on the roots of the word can become exacerbating and trivialise the real search of situating Europa.

The abundance of explanations increases when one also looks at the mythological explanations for the term 'Europe'. The most widely known was the myth of the rape of Europa. The Cretan god Zeus who disguises in the form of a bull abducts Europa, the daughter of the King of Phoenicians, to the island of Crete. Herodotus questions the etymological roots of the word 'Europe' with references to the myth of the abduction and it seems odd to him to link the name of a native of Asia with Greece or continental Europe.<sup>78</sup> The significance of the myth is that it expresses 'a religious mutation within a civilisation that moved from the Near East to an obscure western land mass, to which it eventually gave the name of its abducted heroine'.<sup>79</sup> Whatever the different myths or etymological explanations there is no consensus on the exact root of why the continent assumed the name 'Europe.' Herodotus himself could neither comprehend why the world was divided into three parts nor could he comprehend why they had assumed the names of three women. He stated that:

'no one has ever determined whether or not there is sea either to the east or to the north of Europe. All we know is that it is equal to Asia and Libya [Africa] combined. Another thing that puzzles me is why three distinct women's names should have been given to what is really a single landmass, and why too the Nile and the Phasis – or according to some, the Maeotic Tanais and the Cimmerian Strait – should have been fixed upon for the boundaries. Nor have I been able to learn who it was that first marked the boundaries or where they got the names from'.<sup>80</sup>

Although Herodotus's statements do not provide a clear explanation and itself is a questioning of the reasons this statement demonstrates that the division into three areas and the identification of the name of 'Europe' with one of the areas existed even in fifth century B.C. During the ancient times the term 'Europe' was used as a geographical concept that was useful in separating itself from Asia or Africa 'thus the

idea of Europe gave to medieval Christendom a sense of territorial unity, though not a specific identity'.<sup>81</sup>

### 2.3 EUROPE AS THE SYNONYM OF CHRISTENDOM

The emergence of the term 'Europe' as something more than a geographical concept accelerated with the decline of the Roman Empire. Mikkeli<sup>82</sup> argues that the Roman Empire can not be considered as a 'European' power. Even though it had under its control most of 'Europe' it was an empire that was also composed of parts of Asia and Africa. Thus at that time Europe only had a geographical connotation and was devoid of any political meaning. As Delanty<sup>83</sup> states because 'Europe' was only a geographical term the term 'Europeans' was not used at all. Even today Europeans are called Franks in Syria or Iran because that had been how they were identified during the crusades of the 12<sup>th</sup> century. It was the split of the Roman Empire in 395 that provided the space conducive to the development of a further meaning for the term 'Europe'. After the Roman Empire split the idea of empire became associated with the Eastern part and 'Europe' was used to describe the western part. As the East and West became associated with the heritages of the imperial Rome the West became associated with Latin Christendom.<sup>84</sup> As a consequence of this division 'little by little Europe and the West became synonymous with Christendom'.<sup>85</sup>

Idea of Europe became increasingly prevalent in the seventh century as it was used to counter the ascendancy of Islam. Hence it was the threat of Islamic invasions and the necessity to stand against a common enemy that 'gave a sense of a European identity to Christendom' but this identity was formed because of a 'siege mentality', thus it was an identity that was 'born in defeat, not in victory'.<sup>86</sup> As the future of Western Europe became threatened and former Roman unity disrupted Christianity's attempts

to revert the decline process and unite Europe (Christianity) appeared. These attempts resulted in the crowning of Charlemagne as emperor of Rome in 800 and Charlemagne is 'referred to as *rex, pater Europae* (king, father of Europe) and he is praised as *Europae Veneranda Apex* (the revered crown of Europe)'.<sup>87</sup> Despite the usage of the term 'Europe seems to be little more than a term indicating territory, with no emotional connotations, suitable for ceremonial occasions but nevertheless an example of literary artifice'.<sup>88</sup>

Even though a power struggle emerged between the Papacy and the Empire for supremacy because they both claimed to be the representatives of Christianity towards the eleventh century there emerged the threat of Islam which was to provide the common ground for Europe.<sup>89</sup> It was the crusades of the eleventh century that enabled the 'collective mobilisation of Christendom and gave a strong sense of territorial identity to medieval Europe'.<sup>90</sup> Despite the instrumentality of the term 'Europe' in achieving a considerable degree of solidarity and unity when faced with a threat 'the idea of Europe was not central to the crusades... Christianity was the principal identity of the crusades'.<sup>91</sup> Christianity being more effective in achieving unification due to its emotional affects the term 'Europe' was used less frequently from twelfth century onwards.<sup>92</sup>

The threat Islam posed to Christianity resulted in plans for the unification of Europe with the aim of recovering the Holy Land. Pierre Du Bois wrote in 1306 'On the Recovery of the Holy Land' where he outlined how Europe should unite under the might of France. Its main aim was to establish peace among the Christian nations so that they could embark upon the crusades. He does propose the organisation of Christians by the pope and devises ways in which arbitration can be achieved between

the sovereign princes.<sup>93</sup> Another plan to end the threat from Turkey came from George von Podebrad, the King of Bohemia, and his counselor Antoine Marini. They proposed the establishment of a tribunal that would deal with the disagreements among the states of Europe enabling them to concentrate on the threat from outside. They aim at establishing an Assembly composed of ambassadors that have been delegated authority and power. This Assembly will be responsible for organizing the Tribunal that will arbitrate the disputes among the states. These ambassadors will stay in a designated city for five years and constitute the College. The city that the Assembly resides in will change every five years. The College shall have 'its own arms, its own seal, and its own common treasure, as well as its official archives, its syndic, its fiscal agent, its officials and all other rights that touch upon and concern in any manner whatsoever a legal and legitimate College'.<sup>94</sup> The plan was unable to receive support mainly because not only did it exclude the Pope from the Alliance but the final article of the proposed treaty demanded that the 'tithes collected by the Church should henceforth be turned over to the Assembly, as the new defender of the Faith'.<sup>95</sup> At a time when unity could be realized only through Christendom a plan that aimed to surpass the powers of the Pope was unrealistic. It should also be noted that neither the plan of Du Bois nor that of Podebrad actually mentions the word Europe that was first mentioned by Pope Pius II after the fall of Constantinople.

The pivotal event for the strengthening of idea of Europe was the fall of Constantinople in 1453. Thus the fall of Constantinople in 1453 is significant both because it was able to unite 'Europe' against the threat from the Turks but also because this threat brought about the first mention of the word Europe.<sup>96</sup> After the fall of Constantinople, Pope Pius II stated that 'We have been beaten in Europe, in our own country, at home'.<sup>97</sup> In contrast to the Crusades that were aimed at invasion the

efforts of Pope Pius II were directed towards defending the *Respublica Christiana* and Europe. The two terms were being used interchangeably by Pius as synonyms and he frequently referred to 'our Europe, our Christian Europe'.<sup>98</sup> Thus within this period the term 'Europe' was used to connote Christendom.

## 2.4 SECULARIZATION OF THE IDEA OF EUROPE

The turning point for the meaning associated with Europe happened in sixteenth century. Although there was no clear break from Christianity the term 'Europe' also came to be associated with different meanings. The root of the change in the meaning of Europe was the secularisation of the concept. Identification with Europe became increasingly difficult as divisions and fragmentations began with the Protestant Reformation among the numerous religious groupings. Even though 'the unifying vision of Christendom had come to an end' its importance had not decreased but Christianity only 'ceased to be the territorial identity of the European system of states and became a purely religious value-system surviving in a rationalized form'.<sup>99</sup> During this period the European states were almost always at war as a result of the divisions that came to the surface after the Reformation. Thus the question of achieving peace and unity became an imperative issue as a result of which several schemes for the establishment of peace and unification of Europe were devised.

In 'Le Nouveau Cynée ou Discours D'estat of 1623' Emeric Crucé argued for a political alliance in Europe that would be capable of maintaining peace and order in the continent. He proposed the establishment of a permanent Assembly or Senate of States in order for decisions to be binding where 'all sovereigns should have perpetually their ambassadors, in order that the differences that might arise should be settled by the judgement of the whole assembly'.<sup>100</sup> The most significant part of his

scheme was that his plan was not restricted to Europe, it included countries such as China, India and Japan. Each country within the Assembly would be assigned a rank. The Pope was the supreme ruler, then came the Sultan of Turkey, the German Emperor, French and Spanish rulers thus he proposed a universal alliance that aimed at achieving universal peace.<sup>101</sup>

The 'Grand Design' of Duc de Sully was aimed at influencing Richelieu and in contrast to Crucé did restrict his plan to Europe not only excluding but also encouraging an attack against Turkey. Sully argued that the three religions; Roman Catholicism, Calvinism and Lutheranism did not have reason to destroy each other since they were all well established thus he was one of the first to devise a formula for European union that recognised these differences.<sup>102</sup> The union that would be established was to be equal in area and resources and in their religious differences.<sup>103</sup> Hence the union that he devised proposed the division of Europe into six hereditary monarchies (France, Spain, England, Denmark, Sweden and Lombardy), five state monarchies (Germany, the Vatican, Poland, Hungary and Bohemia) and four sovereign republics (Venice, Italy, Switzerland and the Netherlands).<sup>104</sup> A senate would be chosen by the states that would solve any disputes that might arise between these states thus 'the Council's decisions must be regarded by all states as binding and final. In relation to the Council the sovereignty of the states will be no more than a conditional sovereignty'.<sup>105</sup> De Sully's scheme had a political mission, which was to establish a common front against the Turkish threat.

The plan that was put forward by William Penn proposed a view that was different from Sully in that respect because according to Penn the wars of the time were not the only problem thus the rulers of Russia and Turkey could be included within the

Parliament that he envisaged. Penn foresaw the establishment of a 'European Parliament' based on a weighed system of votes and the representatives of this Parliament would be determined according to the economic conditions of the country<sup>106</sup>. Another project that did not allow non-European states aiming to establish peace was the one proposed by Abbé de Saint-Pierre in his work entitled Perpetual Peace. He drew on the example of the German Empire as a form of federation of sovereign states that could also be applied in Europe<sup>107</sup>. Abbé de Saint-Pierre concluded that:

If the eighteen Principal Sovereigntes of Europe, in order to maintain the present Government, and to procure the Advantages of an uninterrupted Commerce between Nation and Nation, would make a Treaty of Union, and a Perpetual Congress, much after the Model, either of the seven Sovereignties of Holland, the thirteen Sovereignties of the Swisses, or the Sovereignties of Germany, and form an European Union, from what is best in those Unions, and especially in the Germanic Union, which consists of above two hundred Sovereignties: I found, I say, that the weakest would have a sufficient Security, that the great Power of the strongest could not hurt them; that every one would exactly keep their reciprocal Promises; that Commerce would never be interrupted, and that all future Differences would be terminated without War, by means of Umpires'.<sup>108</sup>

The states that compose the league would each send a delegate to the league council and each state will have one vote. Defending the interests of the Princes and Monarchs and the preservation of the status quo was the main aim of the plan.<sup>109</sup>

The underlying theme of these four projects was to put an end to the wars among the European states by the establishment of a European federation even though which countries were to belong to it and how it would operate differed. Despite these plans none of them actually explained what would replace the unified role of Christendom and make states leave their interests aside for the sake of a higher political authority.

Thus instead of any of these projects being adopted at the political level it was a theory that aimed to balance the interests of states that came forth.

## 2.5 THE BALANCE OF POWER

As the unifying factor had started losing its force 'the theory of the balance of power would come to play an extremely important role in the creation of the political, non-Christian concept of Europe'.<sup>110</sup> Thus 'the end of the Middle Ages and the new view of the infinite universe and the decay of the old idea of Christendom develop together with the new idea of Europe – of the idea of a European political system'.<sup>111</sup> The unity that had been established by Christendom had to be replaced with 'what came to be called the European balance of power, or the European state system, or the equilibrium of Europe, or (later the Concert of Europe)'.<sup>112</sup>

As the balance of power replaced the role once played by Christianity the identification with Christendom also began to be replaced by identification with knowledge and civilisation as characteristics differentiating them from the barbarians.<sup>113</sup> This change was not only a result of the decline of Christendom but also of the age of discovery and the growing influence of the ideas of Enlightenment. Delanty identifies the period from the Renaissance until the American and French Revolutions as the period in which the concept of Europe was 'consolidated as the cultural model of the West and became increasingly important as its political identity' mainly because 'it was when the idea of Christendom had declined and the idea of nation had not yet emerged as an autonomous notion'.<sup>114</sup> Thus the secularised meaning of the term 'Europe' came to be that of civilisation and progress as a consequence of the Protestant Reformation, age of discovery and the ideas of Enlightenment.<sup>115</sup> As a consequence of these developments there developed the idea that the term 'Europe'

could be explained by certain norms and values. This was best put forward by the term 'respublica literaria' which meant that there was a union of elites and scholars. According to Voltaire even though still young Europe had become the continent of enlightenment and even though still encapsulated with destructive wars it is the dominant continent of arts and sciences.<sup>116</sup>

## 2.6 THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

The ordering principles of Europe and the conception of Europe was further transformed after the 1789 French Revolution as the old order came under strain and new concepts began to emerge. Although more or less the same principles had been present in the American Declaration their being present in the Declaration of Rights of Man & Citizen was also significant because France was not the new world, it was a monarchy that was one of the most powerful countries in Europe thus 'as a revolution against the Old Order, it was not merely French but a Europe-wide movement'.<sup>117</sup>

Although the post-revolutionary period gave more credibility to the concept of Europe and it came to be used more consciously it also brought forth competing conceptions of the meaning of Europe and there was 'no question of a version that commanded general agreement'.<sup>118</sup> The differences mainly emerged between the opponents and the supporters of the Revolution although this was not the main dividing line. The revolution was not a complete break with the past but an event that could be the forerunner of further change thus 'at around the beginning of the eighteenth-century -- an interesting tug-of-war was, as regards the European ideal, waged in Europe between the pre-Revolution *Ancien Régime* and the new Europe envisaged by the Revolutionaries'.<sup>119</sup>

The conservatives that wanted to protect the status quo had within themselves two different conceptions of Europe. One was of the Romantics which was based on a return to an idealised 'Europe' that existed in the Middle Ages with Christendom at its centre. A proponent of this view was Novalis who presents a nostalgic vision of Europe. He draws inspiration from an idealised picture of Europe in the Middle Ages stating that 'once there were fine, resplendent times when Europe was a Christian land, when one Christendom occupied this humanly constituted context'.<sup>120</sup> According to Novalis the Reformation had destroyed this Christian community but this destruction 'was an inevitable prerequisite for a new, more lasting and more exalted unity'<sup>121</sup> because it was a 'necessary stage in Europe's dialectical progression'.<sup>122</sup> Novalis argues that a lasting unity can be achieved only through the re-awakening of Christianity because 'it is impossible for secular forces to put themselves into equilibrium; only a third element, which is Christianity, can solve the problem'.<sup>123</sup> Thus Romantics not only wanted to maintain the present order but there existed also a longing for the pre-Reformation period as a result of the idealisation of the Middle Ages.<sup>124</sup>

Second one was a realist conception of Europe based on the balance of power that existed between the sixteenth and eighteenth century. The second view was attempted to be established through the system of Congress of Vienna and the Holy Alliance. The challenge posed by the revolutionary ideals brought the dynastic regimes of Europe together in their decision to protect the status quo. The rise of Napoleon made this unity a necessity in order to avoid the threat of French hegemony within the continent. The European polity came out from this ordeal strengthened as the representatives in peace negotiations with Napoleon at the Congress of Chantillon declared that they were the representatives of Europe and that negotiated with France

in the name of Europe.<sup>125</sup> The meetings in Vienna resulted in the establishment of the Holy Alliance that aimed at maintaining the present order of Europe. This order could not be maintained after the decline of the threat coming from Napoleon to the state system of Europe but also because of the beginning of the era of nationalism.

The liberals also presented a conception of Europe that interwove past and the present. Just like the conservatives the liberals also used history to justify their arguments. One of the most important of these liberals was Guizot who put forward a historical understanding of European civilization.<sup>126</sup> According to Guizot the fall of the Roman Empire designates the beginning of the European civilization. The European civilization is superior to other civilizations because as opposed to other civilizations, which are dominated by one principle leading them to tyranny, Europe is diverse. One principle, one system or one idea does not dominate Europe, as Guizot states:

‘all forms, all principles of social organization co-exist therein; powers spiritual and temporal; elements theocratic, monarchical, aristocratic, democratic; all orders, all social arrangements mingle and press upon one another; there are infinite degrees of liberty, wealth, and influence. These various forces are in a state of continual struggle among themselves, yet no one succeeds in stifling the others, and taking possession of society’.<sup>127</sup>

Guizot’s views on the nature and development of the European civilization were a widely accepted view among the liberals not only because he provided a ‘lucid analysis of the history of Europe’ but also because his analysis could be ‘used to reinforce the political demands of the liberals in the struggle against the alliance of throne and altar’.<sup>128</sup>

The French Revolution had also paved the way for 'progressive romantics'<sup>129</sup> who believed in the liberal ideals of the French Revolution. Mazzini, the leader of the Italian Risorgimento started an International of nationalists in Switzerland named Young Europe who included within itself such groups as Young Germany, Young Poland and Young Italy<sup>130</sup>. Mazzini aimed at a federation of nations and 'strove for union of Italy within a unified Europe' because he believed that "'nationality" was an essential element in any living European union'.<sup>131</sup> Thus Mazzini's aim was not to establish a united European state but rather he aimed to gain support for the nationalist movements and establish the 'basis for a future federal Europe of federal states'.<sup>132</sup>

Along with the liberal and progressive nationalistic ideas, the conception of Europe was also influenced by democratic ideals. Like Guizot had, until the nineteenth century it had been argued that European civilization had begun with the demise of the Roman Empire. George Grote brought forth a new interpretation of the origin of the concept of Europe linking it to Athenian democracy. The idea that the concept of Europe had its roots in Athenian democracy and Greek democracy had been useful 'as the call for political democratisation grew louder and the concept of liberty became radicalized'.<sup>133</sup>

The formation of the above-discussed ideas was a result of the idea of Europe acquiring a historical perspective. The project and the ideal envisioned in the present drew from the past in order to gain legitimacy and justification as a result of which the 'historical vision of Europe was closely connected with contemporary political, social and religious ideals and ideas of what the future should bring'.<sup>134</sup> Thus the Romantics who wanted to re-strengthen Christendom used the Middle Ages, the proponents of

political realist the concept of balance of power and the democrats Athenian democracy. These attempts demonstrated that not only was the concept of Europe historicized but it was also politicized being seen 'more and more in historical terms, with contemporary political debate forming the frame of reference'.<sup>135</sup>

The French Revolution and the different ideas and concepts of Europe that it ignited were important for the future of the concept because it had as stated become historicized and politicized and as a consequence it had become part of a political vocabulary used to advance political ideals. According to Woolf the Revolutionary-Napoleonic period had two other important impacts on the concept of Europe. Firstly, bringing together and transforming earlier concepts into a 'unifying concept of European civilisation and progress' that was instrumental in rationalising the exploitation of the world. Secondly, the conviction that Europe's superiority was based on the nation-state was established.<sup>136</sup> Thus during this period a common understanding among the European elites was forged about the 'national state and of the nation as the primary instruments of their progress'.<sup>137</sup> Although nationalism was at first associated with its resistance to the Old Order and liberalism the romantic nationalism came to an end during the second half of the nineteenth century.

## 2.7 THE ERA OF NATIONALISM

Nationalism began to rise not only as a consequence of the unification of Italy and Germany but also because of the increasing competition among the European states within Europe and abroad. As the idea of nationalism gained ground the idea of Europe faded into the background. Even though the idea of Europe faded this does not mean that nationalism was a negation of Europeanism but on the contrary Europeanism 'was the condition of its very possibility' because ideas associated with

Europe like Reason, Progress and Science coming from the Enlightenment became embodied within the nation-state thus 'Europe, as the embodiment of the Christian humanist ideal of the West, is anchored in the nation-state, which is the agent of European modernity' thus Europeanism does not fade away because the 'nation-state is the carrier of European modernity'.<sup>138</sup>

Even if the idea of Europe was not in opposition to nationalism the era of the rise of nationalism did not produce as many new ideas or ideals about European unity as had been the case in previous decades and centuries. Neither was the concept of Europe used as a political and historical justification. An illustration of this is the remark made by Bismark when confronted by the British Ambassador about his intention to invade Poland and faced with the statement that 'Europe would not allow it' asked 'Who is Europe?'.<sup>139</sup> As the interests and ambitions of individual states began to dominate the political arena in the continent the usage of idea of Europe decreased. Despite the increasing disunity between the states of Europe there existed 'a deep-rooted awareness of one's own nation sharing a vague but common destiny' thus there existed a 'European sous-entendu' (implicit understanding about Europe): the idea that the European nations had in common their superiority over non-European nations'.<sup>140</sup> Notwithstanding this 'sous-entendu' the rising feeling of nationalism and the clashing of the interests of the European states culminated in the First World War, which Nolte<sup>141</sup> dubbed as the 'European Civil War' had a profound effect on the idea and conception of Europe as will be discussed in the next chapter.

## 2.8 CONCLUDING REMARKS

This chapter provided a brief outline of the ideas of and projects for Europe that existed until the First World War. The meaning of Europe has never been static, it has

always altered along with the changing circumstances in Europe, and there have been different perceptions of Europe that have culminated in different projects for Europe. The projects of Europe have been demonstrative of political ideals and the social, cultural and political conditions inherent in Europe. As outlined in this chapter the idea of Europe has moved from having solely a geographical meaning to being used as the synonym of Christendom. With the divisions that appeared in Christendom different projects appeared reunify Europe against Turkey although it was the concept of the balance of power that gained ascendancy. Afterwards the idea of Europe began to be used as a historical concept to justify political ideas and ideals that started to differ after the French Revolution until it became subordinated with the rise of nationalism. It should not be overlooked that the idea of Europe did not change in an evolutionary manner. The history of the perceptions of Europe and the meaning of Europe can not be considered as a linear history because there are no clear breaks with past perceptions or ideas nor is there an unruptured continuity. This chapter has demonstrated that idea of Europe does not have a unitary definition. It is always subject to alteration and thus there can be no linear history with respect to the idea of Europe because it is undetermined. The next chapter will begin with the period starting from the First World War and the effects it had on the ideas of and projects for Europe. After an outline of the ideas of and projects for Europe between 1914 and 1945 an attempt will be made to demonstrate the main dynamics of the integration process that commenced after the Second World War.

## CHAPTER III: TOWARDS THE REALIZATION OF AN UNDEFINED PROJECT FOR EUROPE

### 3.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter outlines the period from the start of First World War until the Convention on the Future of Europe. The chapter consists of three main parts. The first part is an account of ideas and projects for Europe that existed until the end of the Second World War. The alternative conceptions and projects of Europe demonstrate not only the main weaknesses of the projects envisaged but also that the idea of Europe was not always a representative of human rights and democracy. These ideas and projects were also instrumental in preparing an understanding of the necessity of unification after the Second World War.

The second part of this chapter outlines the period from the end of Second World War until the end of the Cold War. This part provides an account of the realization of the European projects by demonstrating the dynamics at work. The main aim of this part is to elucidate that the realized European projects did not develop smoothly. The projects faced serious setbacks, learned from failure and developed step by step. Thus the realization of the project was not a destined event. Furthermore, the project was never one that provided a scheme of the end product to be realized.

The third part of the chapter will outline the period from the end of Cold War until the Convention on the Future of Europe. The aim of this part is to demonstrate the attempts to establish a new architecture by the European Union. The three main projects of enlargement, security and foreign policy and economic union are discussed in order to elucidate upon the

challenges that face the EU in the years to come. This part will be instrumental in comprehending how EU after years of integration can still experience setbacks and challenges demonstrating the undetermined and flexible nature of the process. The setbacks it has experienced and prospects for further challenges through analyzing the process are important in understanding the nature of EU. All the ideas of Europe and projects for Europe in European history are demonstrative of how various dynamics were at work in the realization of the European project. This chapter aims to elucidate upon these different dynamics and also stress the nature of the EU as an undetermined project.

### 3.2 THE FIRST WORLD WAR

*Mittleeuropa* had been a concept that emerged as an opposing 'anti-Europe' to the Europe of Napoleon and has been utilized as a concept ever since the beginning of the 19th century.<sup>142</sup> The concept became widely discussed during the First World War mainly because of the book written by Friedrich Naumann entitled *Mittleeuropa*.

The military alignment of Germany and Austria-Hungary during the First World War could have been extended into economic and political union. According to Naumann, there would be two economic walls established in the post-war order. One would be between Germany and Russia. The other would be between Germany and Austria-Hungary. Naumann did not want another wall to exist between Germany and Austria-Hungary which would end up weakening both states. Thus he proposed a customs union between the two states. Hence Naumann envisaged an 'OBERSTAAT' (OVERSTATE) as a loose confederation primarily concentrated upon economic matters establishing a Central European common market. The main drawback of the plan was the unclarity with respect to whether or not this plan would culminate in Germanization of Central Europe.<sup>143</sup> The plans to create a unified Central Europe with Germany at its core eventually became unrealizable when the Axis powers lost

the war.<sup>144</sup> The plan was envisaged as a way to strengthen Germany and in consequence central Europe to better face the challenges posed by the international environment. The main pillar of the plan was still the state and the means to strengthen the state was through establishing a common market.

Another project that envisaged to unify Europe during the war was put forward by T.G Masaryk in his book entitled 'New Europe'. The main aim of Masaryk was an independent Czechoslovakia but he was aware that such a project would not be supported or taken into account by the great powers unless presented within the parameters of European union. This does not mean that Masaryk approached European unity only instrumentally because he believed 'that only free and independent nations could join any such supranational structure as equal partners and insisted that there could be no conflict between collective (national) and individual democracy'<sup>145</sup>. Thus according to Masaryk the establishment of new small nation-states would not obstruct the European unity but would be the condition for its realization.

It is clear from the above examples that eventhough ideas of Europe and projects for unification were devised they were intertwined within projects that aimed to promote certain national interests. The project of Mittleeuropa became unrealizable with the end of the war and the project envisaged by Masaryk for an independent Czechoslovakia was realized even if the greater project for Europe could not be. Contrary to the beliefs of Masaryk the appearance of nation-states did not constitute a step towards European unity but rather they became catalysis for border problems, national rivalries and rising nationalism in the inter-war years.

The First World War ended having caused great devastation in Europe especially in economic terms. Furthermore, the First World War had ended with the outside intervention of

an external power; the USA. The Russian Revolution had given birth to Soviet Communism. During the inter-war years the idea of European supremacy started to be questioned. The main conundrum for intellectuals and ideologues in the inter-war period was locating the causes of the present crisis in Europe and recommending solution on how to overcome it. Thus the inter-war years can be discerned as a period when Europe attempted to establish the reasons for its divisions and devise solutions on how to overcome them. Depending on the definition of the idea of Europe different causes for the crisis and different solutions to overcome the crisis were presented.

### 3.3 THE CRISIS OF EUROPE IN THE INTER-WAR YEARS

Oswald Spengler in his book entitled 'The Decline of the West' attempted to provide the reasons for the crisis in Europe and his solutions to the crisis. Spengler outlined a theory of history according to which all cultures underwent certain steps like a life cycle from birth to death or like seasons from summer to winter. Hence every culture is born, grows, becomes an adult and grows old and dies as a civilization<sup>146</sup>. As Spengler states:

'Every culture stands in a deeply, symbolized, almost in a mystical relation to the Extended, the space, in which and through which it strives to actualize itself. The aim once attained – the idea, the entire content of inner possibilities, fulfilled and made externally actual – the Culture suddenly hardens, it modifies, its blood congeals, its force breaks down, and it becomes CIVILIZATION, the things which we feel and understand in the words Egypticism, Byzanticism, Mandarinism.<sup>147</sup>

Even though civilization is perceived by Spengler to be the evidence of the death of a culture, the end of a culture can also be discerned through the creation of a new culture. Thus for Spengler the 'Decline of the West' is the harbinger of the birth of a new culture that will be the solution to the existing problems in Europe. Spengler did not just predict the reasons for the 'decline of the West' but also he 'had written off one culture, but only in the hope that a

new one – vital, dynamic, and ruthless in a Nietzschean way – could be born in Western Europe<sup>148</sup>.

The thesis of the decline of the West or decline of Europe was present in different perspectives. A liberal project at unifying Europe came from Coudenhove-Kalergi when he published *PANEUROPA* in 1923. Coudenhove-Kalergi believed that Europe and its supremacy were in decline and his project of *PANEUROPA* was his solution to stop this decline<sup>149</sup>. According to Coudenhove-Kalergi :

The cause of Europe's decline is political, not biological. Europe is not dying out of old age, but because its inhabitants are killing and destroying one another with the instruments of modern science....The peoples of Europe are not senile. As soon as the latter has been radically changed, the complete recovery of ailing Continent can and must ensue<sup>150</sup>.

Coudenhove-Kalergi believed that a new political system would save Europe from decline. He defined his project for European unity as PanEuropean because he wanted to differentiate between a political Europe (Pan-Europa) and a geographical and cultural Europe. This political Europe would not include Britain or Russia. The main aim of PanEuropa was to ensure peace and stability in Europe through supranational arbitration. PanEuropa would be instrumental in defending smaller states from outside powers and would decrease security expenditure and hence promote economic growth.<sup>151</sup> Thus establishment of a political Europe would revitalize Europe politically and economically. Politically, European unification would rejuvenate Europe most importantly by ending the quarrels among themselves and reinstall her in world stage as a great power once again. Economically, a unified Europe would signify ability to focus upon economy after having overcome the problems amongst themselves. Thus a decrease in security concerns within the continent would enable her to concentrate on regenerating herself both economically and politically.

The establishment of a political Europe would also necessitate the promotion of Europeanness in order to achieve an understanding of a common future that needed to be worked towards together. He proposed promoting Europeanness through education that would illuminate the common roots for Europeans. According to Coudenhove-Kalergi, all Europeans were of the same race, they were cousins. He envisaged identity to be evolving in concentric circles from family to village to country and to Europe thus he 'makes Europe – not the nation – the constituent socio-cultural entity'.<sup>152</sup>

The project of Paneuropa gained real political ascendancy after receiving the backing of politicians such as Aristide Briand and Eduard Heriot. Aristide Briand made a speech to the League of Nations in 5 September 1929 where he stated that 'among the peoples constituting geographical groups, like the peoples of Europe, there should be some kind of federal bond'.<sup>153</sup> A 'Memorandum on the Organization of a Regime of European Union' was prepared by May 1930 to be presented to the members of the League. The memorandum was an outline of how the 'Regime of European Union' would function and what its responsibilities would be. According to the Memorandum a European Conference was to be established where all representatives of governments would be represented. Briand aimed to establish a Political Committee functioning as an executive body and a secretariat to function as the legislative body.<sup>154</sup> The European unity envisaged by Briand was an intergovernmental organization. Briand continuously stressed that the union would not challenge the sovereignty of the nation-state or create an alternative to the League of Nations.

Even though a detailed outline of the goals of the union were provided in the Memorandum and the intergovernmental nature of the union was incessantly stressed the memorandum was not supported by the members of the League. Briand was only able to convince the League of

Nations to set up a 'Study Commission for the European Union' under the guidance of the League.<sup>155</sup> There were internal and external factors that caused the rejection of the Memorandum or rather its nonapproval by the members of the League. The internal factor was the idealistic nature of the Memorandum. While it demanded to establish a federal union among states it also stated that states did not have to secede a portion of their responsibilities to the union. There were also external forces that were instrumental in the demise of Briand's plan. As Davies<sup>156</sup> states Briand's 'initial speech on European union had been closely followed by the Wall Street crash. Discussions on his memorandum coincided with the first electoral success of the German Nazis' thus providing an international climate not particularly prone towards federal union. Along with British resistance to the project and national rivalries within Europe the ideal of unifying Europe remained just that, an ideal.

During the 1930s the widely held perception was that the ideals believed to be embodied by Europe like equality, liberalism and democracy were in recession because of the rise of Fascist regimes and the existence of communist Russia. An explanation for the ascendancy of these regimes and how to overcome the crisis was given by Jose Ortega y Gasset in his book entitled 'The Revolt of the Masses'. Ortega y Gasset argued that the entrance of the masses into politics was the main cause of the crisis in Europe because the only means of expression known to the masses was 'direct action' – violence and they were unable to play the political game according to its rules. As Ortega y Gasset states 'the mass-people have decided to consider as bankrupt that system of standards which European civilization implies' thus the system and rules that had been established through centuries was being shattered by the masses. The main drawback was that 'as they were incapable of creating others, they do not know what to do and to pass their time they kick up their heels and stand on their heads'.<sup>157</sup>

The masses were due to their inability to utilize the political means and tendency towards violence attracted to Fascism and Communism both of which for Ortega y Gasset signified decay and crisis. The rise of fascism and existence of Soviet Communism did not signify the end of Europe. Europe according to Ortega y Gasset was in need of a project and a goal because 'the European cannot live unless embarked upon some great unifying enterprise. When this is lacking, he becomes degraded, grows slack, his soul is paralyzed'.<sup>158</sup> Ortega y Gasset aimed to create a 'United States of Europe' and he believed that nations could be and had to be supplanted in order to achieve this project. According to Ortega y Gasset nations had fulfilled their lifetime for nations were not eternal beings, they had 'arrived about a century ago at their highest point of expansion. Nothing more can be done with them except lead them to a higher evolution' and that 'higher evolution' would be the United States of Europe for the nations 'are now mere past, accumulating all around Europe, weighing it down, imprisoning it'.<sup>159</sup> Thus for Ortega y Gasset nations were obstructing the evolution of Europe and the only way to overcome the present crisis and stand against Communism was by establishing a United States of Europe.

The explanation brought forth by Ortega y Gasset was from a liberal perspective and his definition of Europe was of equality and democracy. Other explanations were also given about the crisis in Europe culminating in other projects. One such explanation was given by Christopher Dawson in his book entitled 'The Making of Europe'. According to Dawson the main reason for the crisis in Europe and rise of fascism was spiritual and he stresses the 'need for spiritual or at least moral unity'.<sup>160</sup> Dawson states that the present order is not the only possible order in Europe and argues that the 'unity of our civilization does not rest entirely on the secular culture and the material progress of the last four centuries' so Europeans should need to look behind technological progress to 'discover the fundamental social and spiritual forces that have gone to the making of Europe'.<sup>161</sup>

Europe according to Dawson was synonymous with the 'West' and was restricted to parts that had once been Roman Catholic. Dawson does not support a return to the Middle Ages but 'he does not think that humanism and technology alone will save us' but neither does he state 'that unless we go back to the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas or the Christendom of Gregory the Great, no viable Europe, no European unity is possible'.<sup>162</sup> What Dawson is against is not the modern system but the nationalistic feelings of the modern era and for that reason he is proposing for Europe to remember its moral unity and traditions in order to overcome the perils of world politics. Even though he stresses education of the common traditional past his aim is to overcome the present national rivalries that he perceived to be a cause of the crisis in Europe thus he states that the 'ultimate foundation of our culture is not the national state but the European unity'.<sup>163</sup> Dawson, though arguing for a remembrance of the past and traditions, was arguing for the overcoming of the nation-state as a political organization. He perceived the nation-state and nationalism as modern phenomenon that precluded the unity that had once existed and could still exist.

Even though both Ortega y Gasset and Dawson see fascism as the antithesis of everything Europe represents for them, Europe as an idea was also used by ideologues to justify fascist policies. Alfred Rosenberg was one such ideologue who wrote a book in 1930. According to Rosenberg the main cause of the crisis in Europe was the struggle between the Nordic ABENLAND races and the Catholic Church, the Jews and Marxists. The struggle was over the 'soul of every single European'.<sup>164</sup> The struggle and the crisis in Europe will terminate when the Nordic ABENLAND races commenced to establish order in Europe thus 'if Europe is to be preserved, the first priority must be to revive Nordic sources of Europe's power – these are Germany and Scandinavia, with Finland and England'.<sup>165</sup> Hence Europe did not always mean democracy, human rights and all the ideals of the French Revolution.

Europe was also comprehended by the Fascists as representing an ethnic whole; the superior race. Thus Europe was not always associated with great ideals.

### **3.4 WORLD WAR II AND AIMS OF UNIFYING EUROPE**

The idea and project of Europe propagated by Fascist ideologues became a reality as the Second World War and as Nazis started to gain ground. Even though 'it has been conveniently forgotten today that fascism and anti-semitism were two of the major expressions of the idea of Europe' fascism and idea of Europe are not exclusive concepts, on the contrary the 'unity of Europe was central to fascist ideology' for fascism 'in its classical Italian and Nazi forms was a supra-national ideology' aiming to create 'a new European civilization'.<sup>166</sup> Thus the Nazi project of Europe was also a project to unify Europe and embodied a certain idea of Europe. Nazi Germany did attempt to demonstrate herself as the country defending Europe against communism especially after the attack to Soviet Union in 1940. Hitler in a speech on 30 January 1942 stated that 'it is not a war we are fighting just on behalf of our own German people, but a struggle for the whole of Europe and thus for the whole of civilized humanity'.<sup>167</sup>

The Nazi project for Europe was not the only one present during the Second World War. The events that culminated in the Second World War and the inability of nation-states to obstruct the impending war and the results of nationalism especially the Holocaust caused many to question the viability of the nation-state. A decreasing belief in the viability of the nation-state led many from the Resistance Movements to plan for a European unity. Although there were differences about the details of what kind of a political organization should establish European unity there was one commonality which was for the union to guarantee peace among the European states.<sup>168</sup> Thus Europe had contending meanings during the Second World War. One was the fascist idea of Europe that represented purity of race and the other

was the idea of Europe that represented liberty and equality propagated by the resistance fighters. It is evident from this episode that both sides of a conflict could utilize Europe in their rhetoric embodying Europe with a meaning most appropriate to realize their projects.

A meeting was held by the International Conference of Resistance Fighters where they urged for a European federation. Even though the Resistance was urging for the establishment of a federal Europe it was not going to be the resistance fighters that were to decide on the post-war order. The drive to unify Europe was not supported by the two great powers that emerged from the Second World War. The main reason for the reluctance of US towards a unity of Europe was the negative view of USSR towards such a project. The straining of relations between US and USSR and the start of the Cold War altered the perceptions of US. The dynamics of Cold War and the realization of a divided Europe prompted US to support schemes for unification in order to establish a strong united front. The support of US encouraged the movements who had their origin in the resistance to lobby for the realization of European unification.<sup>169</sup> The support of US especially financially that was so central to the realization of the European project was the result of a political necessity. Thus as Calleo states 'the American presence made it easier for European to integrate'.<sup>170</sup> For the United States the project of European integration was a political necessity in order to establish an economically viable bulwark against the Communist threat.

### 3.5 THE COLD WAR

Two organizations emerged as a result of US support for European unification and the efforts of movements for a federal Europe. The diverse movements lobbying for a European federation whether in Italy, France or Great Britain united and established the Joint International Committee of Movements for European Unity in October 1948. This Committee adopted the name 'European Movement'. The report that was written as a result

of the negotiations culminated in the Treaty of Westminster in May 1949<sup>171</sup> which established the Council of Europe. To the dismay of the federalists the Council of Europe was an intergovernmental organization in which the main decision-making body, the Committee of Ministers was composed of foreign ministers with a right to veto.<sup>172</sup> Although the lobbying efforts were directed towards the establishment of a supra-national organization, the negotiations of nation-states had led to the establishment of an inter-governmental organization. Hence the first attempt to push through a project of European integration had only created an intergovernmental organization that could oversee the Council.

The second effort for European unity was supported by the United States. The main driving force behind the efforts of US was the realization of the unstable economic situation in Europe. There was fear that unless the economic situation normalized there could be a return to the economic conditions of the 1930s causing a shift to the extreme right or extreme left in Europe. As a result, in 1947 Secretary of State Marshall announced the intention to give financial aid to European countries. The aid was tied to the condition that European states themselves agree on the aid programme. This condition was put forward under the assumption that such a process of negotiations would constitute the first step of European economic integration. The Conference held on 12 July by the Committee of European Economic Cooperation was devised to settle the issue of aids. Despite negotiations on the aid to be received, agreement on German economy's pivotal role and the inclusion of the zones occupied by Western powers to the recovery programme, there seemed to be no development towards European economic integration. As a consequence the United States decided to put forward an additional condition stating that the implementation of the aid programme was dependent on the establishment of a permanent institution responsible for the organization of economic cooperation. As a consequence of this condition the 16 countries that were participating in the aid programme set up the Organization for European Economic

Cooperation<sup>173</sup>. The OEEC was in essence like the Council of Europe intergovernmental in its structure whereby the main decision-making body, the Council of Ministers was to work based on unanimity.<sup>174</sup> The second attempt at launching European integration had only resulted in an organization that would coordinate economic aid based on unanimity. Hence it can be viewed from the two above-examples that neither the federalist drive and lobbying nor the support and insistence of USA amounted to the realization of an integration project. These attempts demonstrated that neither non-governmental groupings nor an outside power could by itself cause European integration to commence. There needed to be a further component in the negotiations and that was the will of the governments.

### **3.6 FIRST STEPS TOWARDS REALIZATION**

The main reason behind the turn to inter-governmentalism in both attempts was the resistance of Great Britain. France was reluctant to establish a Customs Union without the support of Great Britain. It was only after 1949 when West German economy boomed that a customs union without Great Britain became conceivable. As a consequence of British absence in leading an integration project the task was assumed by France quite willingly because her economy would greatly benefit from the establishment of a Customs Union.<sup>175</sup> The will necessary for integration was achieved only after such a project became advantageously for the countries concerned especially France and Germany. Plans that could launch such integration were being devised by the leadership of Monnet. The French initiative to establish integration was announced on 9 May 1950 by the French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman. The Schuman Plan was put forward as a solution to the problem of Germany. The plan advocated the establishment of a coal and steel unity among France and Germany that would include any other European state that chose to join.<sup>176</sup> It aimed to become the first step towards establishing peace and enhancing European integration. The Schuman plan was not an overarching project for Europe; it did not have a general view or specific ideals for how

Europe would be in the future. It only had a specific task that it aimed to accomplish which was to establish a common market for coal and steel. Beyond that aim the Plan made no claim to the road that Europe should or could take. On the contrary, the Plan acknowledged its lack of a grand vision for the future as a positive endeavor. As Schuman stated 'Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a *de facto* solidarity'.<sup>177</sup> Thus the plan demonstrated a realistic aim of first establishing solidarity rather than embarking upon a project that would be too ambitious. Starting with small steps rather than great ones would actually ease the process of integration for however small the steps taken it would have established the trust necessary for further integration.

The Schuman Plan was the document that formed the basic premises of the Treaty of Paris that established the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The main body of the institution was the High Authority which was a supranational organization. Although an important step had been taken with the establishment of the ECSC the process of European integration did not embark upon a project that would not encounter any impediment. The Schuman Plan had succeeded and a step had been taken with the ECSC in the process of economic integration. Yet this step did not signify a smooth process in the aftermath whereby no setbacks would be experienced. The first obstacle followed immediately the success of the ECSC. A plan for a European defense structure was put forward by the French premier Rene Pleven. The main aim of the plan was to formulate a system that would ensure that West Germany remained outside NATO structures and its rearmament process restrained.<sup>178</sup> The plan envisaged the appointment of a European Minister of Defense which would supervise the European Army foreseen in the plan. According to the Plan, German army would exist only within the European Army whereas other states would retain their armies while contributing to the European Army.<sup>179</sup> The European Defense Community (EDC) project also

envisaged as a second pillar the establishment of European Political Community (EPC) that would be responsible for supervising the activities of the EDC.<sup>180</sup> The Pleven Plan was in essence a project that aimed to further French national interests thus it was a 'device to stop not create, something'.<sup>181</sup> Hence not only was it an ambitious project but it was also a project that was not launched on trust nor could it have achieved solidarity for its specific aim had been to discriminate towards Germany. The fate of the EDC Treaty supports the view that aim of the plan was never to assist the integration project.

The EDC Treaty which was signed in 1952 was no longer the same as the original Pleven Plan. The Treaty had diverged from its primary aim for those that proposed it. As stated the French aim had been to limit Germany but the Treaty had changed in essence whereby France had ended up accepting a German army independent of the European one. As a consequence the Treaty was not ratified by the French National Assembly on 30 August 1954.<sup>182</sup> The aim of establishing a political and security aspect to the ECSC had failed at the onset. These failures did not signify an end to the project of Europe. Neither the success of the Schuman Plan nor the failure of the EDC and EPC were a signal of the route and nature of European integration. The failures of political and security projects only prompted the realization that the idea of Europe was still to ripe for such projects.

### **3.7 DEEPENING OF INTEGRATION**

Projects designed based upon political and security issues had been discredited with the EDC Treaty. The national idea was still too dominant to devise a scheme that was not to become discriminatory. The failure of these issues to further integration prompted concentration upon areas that were more to the immediate interests of the nation-states. There existed two other manners in which the integration process would develop. One was furthering sectoral integration on areas such as transportation and atomic energy. Second route was establishing

a common market. The Messina Conference that convened the Foreign Ministers of the ECSC countries in 1955 agreed to establish a committee that would report on the two above-mentioned proposals.<sup>183</sup> As a consequence the Spaak Committee was formed. The Spaak Committee produced a report which outlined the process for the establishment of a common market. It stressed the need to bring together national markets.<sup>184</sup> The Treaties of Rome that were signed on 25 March 1957 and ratified on July 1957 established two new organizations. One was the EEC (European Economic Community) which aimed to establish a common market among the member states with respect to manufactured goods. The second one was European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) which was a common market in nuclear minerals like uranium.<sup>185</sup> Thus two new institutions had appeared in the political landscape of Europe in addition to the ECSC. The project of integration that started with coal and steel had extended to atomic energy and manufactured goods even though it had failed in defense and security issues. The approach of small steps had achieved its aim for it had proven the necessity and benefits of continuing economic integration in other areas.

In addition to issues of economic integration there was also the issue of the borders of Europe that started to be important. As stated the country that had resisted integration the most had been Great Britain and the integration process was able to further itself only through the recognition that Great Britain would not be part of it. As the integration process embarked upon deepening through the Treaty negotiations for the EEC and Euratom, Britain established the Maudling Committee to discuss with 'the Six' the subject of launching a free-trade area on manufactured goods with the countries that formed the OEEC.<sup>186</sup> The talks failed and 'the Six' continued deeper economic integration with the establishment of the EEC and Euratom. As a result of the events Britain put 'Plan G' into effect which envisaged the establishment of a European Free Trade Area (EFTA) composed of 'the Seven'. EFTA came into force in 1960.<sup>187</sup> The establishment of the EFTA demonstrated that not only was the project of

integration to experience set backs because of internal dynamics but that it was also to encounter opposition and competition. EFTA was an alternative to the integration project that aimed to thwart the process. Yet within a year after the establishment of EFTA its forerunner Britain was to apply for membership to the EEC.

### 3.8 PROSPECTS OF ENLARGING BORDERS

Britain applied for membership in 1961 and from 1961 until 1963 the negotiations for the entry of Britain, Denmark, Ireland and Norway were held. These negotiations came to an abrupt end in 1963 when De Gaulle announced in a press conference that France rejected Britain's membership to the Community. This was a unilateral action undertaken by De Gaulle that resulted in the straining of relations with the other five members. The relations among France and 'the Five' were to be further stressed after France's reaction to the package proposed by the Commission in 1965. The package was concerned with the method of financing the Common Agricultural Policy in particular and the EEC in general. The package proposed that instead of the direct contributions of the member states financing should be done through funds that are collected from agricultural imports. Had the package been approved it would have resulted in the strengthening of the Commission and the Parliament. De Gaulle who was against any attempt to strengthen Community institutions at the expense of the powers of nation-states started to boycott the EEC on 6 July. The 'empty-chair' policy lasted for six months and paralyzed the EEC.<sup>188</sup> The deadlock ended in January 1966 with the Luxembourg Compromise. The compromise was that when national interests are at stake decisions should only be taken by unanimity.<sup>189</sup> The Luxembourg compromise established unanimity in the informal structure of the workings of the integration project. Although it was a setback in the sense that it stressed an overly intergovernmental tone and demonstrated the problems that could be experienced among member states after 15 years of integration. The projects proposed and the implications of their proposals were capable of

generating results that could jeopardize the integration process. Thus the process was not running smoothly towards a preordained future. These setbacks and positions assumed were influential in the future of the organization as it was not a predestined one but one that formed step by step. Despite the Luxembourg incident neither the attempts to integrate economies nor reform institutions came to a halt on the contrary the end of the 60s was to witness two important reports that dealt with economic integration and institutional reform.

### 3.9 ATTEMPTS TO IMPROVE THE SYSTEM

The Hague Summit of 1969 established two Committees: the Davignon Committee and the Werner Committee. The Davignon Committee dealt with political cooperation and Werner Committee dealt with economic and monetary union. The Davignon Report stated that 'the process of economic and monetary union must accelerate political unification'.<sup>190</sup> The Werner Report outlined the process of economic and monetary union and the necessary institutional arrangements to ease the process. It proposed that the Parliaments' powers be increased and that an independent focus for decisions on economic policy directly responsible to the EP should be set up. The report stressed that two institutions were imperative for the completion of economic union which was 'a centre of decision for economic policy and a community system for the central banks'.<sup>191</sup> Although the first stage was carefully outlined in the report a timetable was not laid out for the following stages in order 'to maintain a measure of flexibility to permit any adaptations that the experience acquired during the first stage may suggest'.<sup>192</sup> The political pillar of integration was not part of EEC's formal institutional structure and was not the first priority of the Community but had slowly become an issue of discussion. The economic and monetary union was an issue that was higher on the agenda of the Community aims and thus the Werner Report received more elaborate consideration. As the Report also demonstrated it did not envisage plans for further stages in integration for that would be determined through experience. This

demonstrated a comprehension that defining every step might not be conducive since unforeseen impediments could obstruct the process causing a failure. Hence designing full fledged plans might only create disappointment but flexibility would provide the possibility of determining the road once embarked upon it rather than designating the end destination and the stops that have to be made at every juncture.

Attempts to reform the Community and achieve greater unity and integration continued. The Paris Summit of 1972 stated that 'the time had come for Europe to recognize clearly the unity of its interests'.<sup>193</sup> The Paris Summit of 1974 declared that 'the time has come for the Nine to agree as soon as possible on an overall concept of European Union'.<sup>194</sup> The summit set up the Tindemans Committee to prepare a report to the community about the prospects of integration. The Tindemans report submitted in 1976 stated that 'to achieve a European Union we must henceforth be able to find in the different European institutions the authority needed to define a policy, the efficiency needed for common action and the legitimacy needed for democratic control'.<sup>195</sup> Thus the main concern of the report was to strengthen the institutions of the Community because according to Tindemans the means to remedy the existing stalemate in the Community would be 'by means of institutions which has been strengthened and improved that the Union will be able to give increasing expression to its own dynamism'.<sup>196</sup> Some of the institutional proposals included the appointment of President of Commission by the European Council. The Report also referred to issues such as foreign policy, defense and social policies as a means to strengthen the community.<sup>197</sup> Another report that dealt with institutional deficiency especially with those of the Commission was the Spierenburg Report. The Spierenburg Report advocated that the appointment process within the Commission should be altered whereby the President should play a greater role in appointing Commissioners which would result in increased coordination and cooperation

achieving a more efficient Commission.<sup>198</sup> Both reports perceived institutional reform to be central to strengthening of the Community and the only route to furthering integration.

Another committee established was the Committee of the Three Wise Men set up in order to evaluate the deficiencies within the Community system. The main concern of the report was cooperation and coordination among the institutions of the Community in order to achieve greater efficiency. The report attempted to put forward recommendations that would reduce the inter-governmental stance of Community institutions.<sup>199</sup> One of the proposals they put forward was changing the composition of the Commission to include one Commissioner per member state and strengthening the powers of the President of the Commission.<sup>200</sup> Even though a detailed proposal for institutional reform had been made according to the Three Wise Men the main reasons for the weakness of the Community was the 'failure of political will' and a lack of a 'clear sense of the Community's goal'.<sup>201</sup> None of the above-mentioned reports had any immediate effect on the developments of the Community. Still they were crucial in outlining the main flaws of the Community and the need to reform if any further integration was to succeed. None of these reports were an all-encompassing grand vision for Europe but specific reforms proposed to ameliorate the internal workings of the Community rather than an all over change in the character of the Community.

### **3.10 ATTEMPTS TO ALTER THE SYSTEM**

The attempts to reform the system had not received great acceptance by member states. Despite the failure of efforts to reform, the 80s also witnessed attempts to alter the character of the Community. Grand initiatives with respect to the character of the Community were put forward by Hans-Dietrich Genscher<sup>202</sup> and Emilio Colombo.<sup>203</sup> It came to be dubbed as the Solemn Declaration on European Union which was agreed upon in the Stuttgart European council of 19 June 1983.<sup>204</sup> The main aims of the Act were to extend the scope of political

cooperation, institutionalize the procedures of political cooperation, and increase coordination among institutions and the resumption of majority voting. The act also envisaged the inclusion of matters such as culture and security into the agenda of the Community.<sup>205</sup> Despite the appearance of a grand scheme the Act was not a revolutionary declaration rather it was a declaration which 'consolidated existing procedures to a large extent, 'reaffirming' certain commitments, modestly expanding the scope, with references to cultural cooperation and approximation of laws as well as to foreign policy'.<sup>206</sup> Along the same time as the Genscher-Colombo initiative another scheme was put forward by Altiero Spinelli. He wrote a letter to all MEP's that outlined his plans for a European Union where the EP would assume the role for European unification. The letter was intended as the basis of a draft treaty that would reformulate the community.<sup>207</sup> The plan envisaged a legislative procedure whereby a bicameral system was to be established involving the EP and the Council. This treaty was approved by the EP on 14 February 1984.<sup>208</sup>

The European Council at Fountainbleu on June 1984 decided to appoint two committees to further discuss possible understandings of the European Union.<sup>209</sup> One of the Committees was the Dooge Committee which dealt with the institutional and political aspects of the necessary change. The report was submitted in 1985.<sup>210</sup> The report stated that the European union will not only 'rest on an economic community alone. The logic of integration had already led Member States to cooperate in fields other than economic ones and will continue to lead them still further'.<sup>211</sup> It put forward certain policy areas that needed development like the environment, social policy, judicial area, external identity and the strengthening of common cultural values.<sup>212</sup> The second Committee was the Adonnino Committee which was to concentrate on establishing a people's Europe. One of its central aims was to propose a route to establish 'the image of a 'people's' Europe, such as a Community flag and anthem designed to give EC citizens a sense of common identity'.<sup>213</sup> These reports were important in

that even a desire to have reports prepared on these subjects were evidence of an acknowledgement that these issues had to be addressed. Whether the recommendations proposed were either realized incrementally or at distant future issues of identity, culture, judicial area had entered the discussions of the Community. These reports are evidence that no decision in the Community was arrived at abruptly or as a result of historical inevitability. Ideas and recommendations of certain issues were put forward years before they were to become part of Treaties.

### 3.11 REALIZATION OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION

The end of the 80s experienced steps in the direction of deeper economic integration. The stimulus to integration was realized through the White Paper prepared by the Commission in June 1985 entitled '*Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from the Commission to the European Council*'.<sup>214</sup> The Milan European Council decided to amend the Treaties and the Single European Act was signed on 17 February 1986. The Single European Act was deemed necessary in order to catch up the economies of Japan through establishing one market for European industries.<sup>215</sup> The Single European Act was an important step specifically for economic integration and in general for integration. It was important for economic integration because Article 13 of the SEA amended Article 8a of the EEC Treaty by stating that steps must be taken 'with the aim of progressively establishing the internal market over a period expiring on 31 December 1992'.<sup>216</sup> Hence the members had committed themselves to establishing the single market 'without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital will be established by 1992'.<sup>217</sup> More generally SEA was important because with respect to issues concerning the internal market unanimity was not necessary on the contrary decisions could be taken by qualified majority.<sup>218</sup> After years of reports on how to improve the system and further integration the Single European Act had achieved a portion of the goals stated. The SEA was important because establishing an

internal market of goods, services and capital was to pave the way for other reforms on social policy and judicial areas.

Delors attempts to further integrate the community did not end with the SEA. After the adoption of SEA, Delors and Commission's efforts concentrated on two areas that were perceived to be crucial for the successful working of the single market. One was the monetary system and the other was social policies.<sup>219</sup> He stated in a speech in 12 May 1988 that there was need to strengthen social dimensions as a supporting policy of the single market. Margaret Thatcher who was displeased with the direction of events made a speech in College of Bruges stating that 'we have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain only to see them reimposed at a European level, with a European super state exercising a new dominance from Brussels'.<sup>220</sup> The Delors Report on Economic and Monetary Union in the European Community was represented in April 1989. The report proposed three stages at the end of which a single currency was to be created on 1 January 1999. The report envisaged stabilizing exchange rates and setting up of a European System of Central Banks. These issues were discussed and adopted in the Madrid Council of June 1989.<sup>221</sup> The process that started with the aim of establishing a single market had spilled over into the monetary system and aiming to establish a central Bank. These events demonstrated that establishing a monetary system brought with it necessities in other areas. The SEA had been agreed to for it was believed to bring considerable economic benefits to the signatory states but as seen from Thatcher's remarks this treaty unfolded a process that required reforms in other areas that had not been conceded to by member states. These reforms were mainly conceded to only in order to realize SEA. These reforms became more of urgency for member states as the structure of the international system altered and defining the Community became a necessity.

The reform process that started in the Soviet Union with the advent of Gorbachev, the proclamation of the Sinatra Doctrine, the 'refolutions' in Central and Eastern Europe, the fall of the Berlin Wall, the end of the Cold War, the unification of Germany and the dissolution of the Soviet Union left the world without the parameters that it had become accustomed to for forty years. These events altered the perception of borders within Europe. Suddenly Eastern and Central European countries were no longer part of the rival bloc for the rival bloc had evaporated and the wall separating Western Europe and Eastern Europe was no longer there. The issue on the agenda before the revolutionary events unfolded was economic integration, after the events other issues came to the agenda like enlargement, the nature of the relations with Central and East European countries and political integration.

### **3.12 FORMULATING A NEW ARCHITECTURE**

As the parameters of the international system were changing the Community embarked upon a process to redefine its parameters and alter its character through formulating a new architecture. The prioritized issue to be dealt with was further integration with the Maastricht Treaty of 1991. The Maastricht Treaty was revolutionary in certain aspects. The Maastricht Treaty established the Community as the European Union. The Treaty divided the Union into three pillars. The first pillar is the Economic Community. The second pillar is the common foreign and security policy. The third pillar is justice and home affairs. These pillars were brought together as the European Union. The last two pillars remain intergovernmental in nature whereas the first pillar moves a step further in integration. The Treaty outlined the timetable necessary to achieve Economic and Monetary Union. Furthermore, the Treaty introduced the concept of European Union citizenship.<sup>222</sup> Even though the Maastricht Treaty was signed after the 'annus mirabilis', it had been conceived off in the pre-1989 world. Thus its aims were designed for a Community of 12 but after the events of 1989 the Community (Union) could no longer remain a Community of 12.

In the post-Maastricht period the European Union set for itself three main projects. The first of these projects was one that had already begun in the Cold War period, namely economic integration. The second project had developed as a result of the end of Cold War envisaging the enlargement of the European Union. The third project was one that had been attempted before only to fail but was resurrected in the post-Cold War environment where the EU felt the need to develop a Common Foreign and Security Policy. Thus the post-Cold War order had enabled the EU to devise projects that it could not have imagined (enlargement) or could not realize (CFSP).

### 3.12.1- ECONOMIC INTEGRATION

The main issue with respect to economic integration in the post-Maastricht period was the establishment of a common currency. The Maastricht Treaty determined the timetable for the realization of EMU as 1999. The Euro would replace the national currencies after a transitional period between 1999 and 2001.<sup>223</sup> The convergence criteria were established with the Maastricht Treaty. The convergence criteria were set in order to determine which countries were eligible to join the European economic and monetary union. The TEU also established the European Monetary Institute which came into existence in 1994. The chief function of the EMI was to prepare for the establishment of European System of Central Banks and creation of a single currency. Stage three of EMU would start on 1 January 1999 and a transitional period would begin at the end of which Euro would become the common currency of all member states that fulfilled the convergence criteria.<sup>224</sup> Thus the Maastricht Treaty had determined the framework for the realization of economic and monetary union. The Amsterdam European Council (1997) decided on the Stability and Growth Pact which was to ensure budgetary discipline within the Euro area by setting standards on price stability and inflation rates. The Brussels European Council in 1998 decided according to the

convergence criteria which member states were eligible to become part of the EMU and on June 1998 the European Central Bank was established. The third stage began on 1 January 1999 with the fixing of exchange rates and preparation for complete transfer of monetary policy and currencies began. On 1 January 2002 Euro became the common currency of 12 member states. The process of the adoption of Euro was not without its setbacks. Two member states; Britain and Denmark, had decided to remain outside the Euro zone<sup>225</sup> and the structural adjustments necessary to fulfill the convergence criteria had created economic problems like unemployment within the member states.<sup>226</sup> The problems stemming from the economic adjustments caused the main motor and proponent of the Stability and Growth Pact Germany to break the rules of the pact. Thus there remain serious concerns not only with Euro but the whole system of EMU especially the ECB since it has become the epitome of the democratic deficit and accountability problem in the European Union. As Tsoukalis states;

‘The constitution of EMU is incomplete, but it is very much the product of its time in terms of political feasibility and economic ideas. The negotiations leading to the Maastricht Treaty, and subsequent negotiations which added important pieces to the EMU construction, were, of course, conducted by human beings: not entirely rational, at least in the economic sense of the term; each carrying his or her ideological baggage, the contents of which change with economic and political fashion; and taking decisions on the basis of imperfect information, although knowing full well that EMU was part and parcel of a much wider ongoing negotiation on the future of Europe’.<sup>227</sup>

Thus although a common currency has been established there are serious problems that need to be resolved about the economic and monetary union, the functioning of the Euro and the organization of the ECB. These questions are pivotal not only because their resolution will bring a stimulus to the economies of Europe but also because the manner in which they are resolved will give important insights about the nature of the European Union. These problems have become more urgent with the prospect of enlargement.

### 3.12.2 - PROSPECT OF ENLARGEMENT

Every enlargement in the history of European integration process was motivated by different considerations. The post-Cold War order witnessed its first enlargement in 1995 with Austria, Finland and Sweden joining the European Union. The negotiations could be concluded swiftly since the reason for their remaining outside of the EU was never economic or political backwardness but their neutral positions within the Cold War order'.<sup>228</sup> The end of the Cold War had eliminated their rationale for remaining neutral. Neutrality was no longer necessary since there was no longer any Eastern alliance to be appeased by remaining outside the Western Alliance. This enlargement did not necessitate any adjustment thus was settled quickly. It was the prospect of eastern enlargement that posed a great challenge for the EU. Awareness of the economic and political challenges posed by the possibility of eastern enlargement delayed the opening of negotiations to the CEEC's. The end of the Cold War did not directly result in an invitation by the European Union to apply. At first as a means to delay membership the Europe Agreements were signed with the CEEC's. The goal of the Europe Agreements signed in 1991 was the establishment of a free trade area between the CEEC's and the European Union. The Europe Agreements did not envisage membership.<sup>229</sup> The European Union was concerned with the problems of integration, ratification of Maastricht and its priority was to develop a new architecture for the post-Cold War world. Despite these concerns with the pressure from the Commission and Germany and the events in Yugoslavia convinced the EU that the prospect of membership would be a stabilizing force for the CEEC's.

The definitive decision to enlarge was given in the 1992 Copenhagen Council which also determined the conditions necessary for membership. The decisions of the Copenhagen Council were ratified in 1993 as result of which the members had 'agreed that the associated countries in central and Eastern Europe that so desire shall become members of the European

Union. Accession will take place as soon as an associated country is able to assume the obligation of membership by satisfying the economic and political conditions required',<sup>230</sup>

The European Union had brought together certain criteria that were deemed necessary in order to join. These criteria were based on the assumption that fulfilling these criteria would enable these countries to compete on an equal basis with the members of the union. These criteria were as follows:

'Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. Membership presupposes the candidate's ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union',<sup>231</sup>

The Copenhagen Council is significant not only because it declared intention to enlarge but because it determined the conditions necessary to become a member. Thus whatever to be European meant was overridden by the criteria that were necessary to become European.

The first application came in 1994 from Poland and Hungary and was followed by the other central and European states. The Commission prepared a report entitled 'Agenda 2000' which outlined proposals for EU policies. The recommendations centered upon which countries should commence accession negotiations and the criteria others need to fulfill before commencing negotiations. According to the Report, Hungary, Poland, Estonia, Czech Republic, Slovenia and Cyprus had progressed considerably in realizing the Copenhagen criteria and negotiations could be started with them. On the other hand, Slovakia had not fulfilled economic and Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Bulgaria had not fulfilled economic and administrative criteria.<sup>232</sup> The Commission also recommended the establishment of a new framework for regulating negotiations entitled Accession Partnership which aims to 'mobilize all forms of assistance to the applicant countries of Central and Eastern Europe within a

single framework'.<sup>233</sup> The Luxembourg European Council in December decided to open negotiations with the six that had progressed swiftly while the negotiations with the other six would be opened in the Helsinki European Council. On March 1998 accession negotiations began.<sup>234</sup> The Copenhagen European Council in 2002 declared that ten countries would join the European Union in May 2004 by stating that:

'The European Council in Copenhagen in 1993 launched an ambitious process to overcome the legacy of conflict and division in Europe. Today marks an unprecedented and historic milestone in completing this process with the conclusion of accession negotiations with Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the Slovak Republic and Slovenia. The Union now looks forward to welcoming these States as members from 1 May 2004. This achievement testifies to the common determination of the peoples of Europe to come together in a Union that has become the driving force for peace, democracy, stability and prosperity on our continent. As fully fledged members of a Union based on solidarity, these States will play a full role in shaping the further development of the European project'.<sup>235</sup>

The Council also added that they were expecting Bulgaria and Romania to join by 2007. The question of enlargement brought forth the question of institutional reform. The institutional structure of the European Union had been designed to function with six members but with the envisaged enlargement the institutional structure of the Union faced the danger of becoming deadlocked.

The Amsterdam European Council in 1997 that culminated in the signing of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1999 did provide for certain reform of the institutions such as giving more powers to the EP like the necessity for the EP to give its assent to international treaties like enlargement. The Amsterdam Treaty also gave the EP the right to dismiss the Commission. Despite these provisions the institutional reform necessary in order to incorporate new members was not embarked upon until the Nice European Council in 2000. The Nice European Council's main aim was deciding on the institutional reforms necessary to realize enlargement. The applicant countries were not able to participate in the conference even

though the decision was to affect their future status within the European Union.<sup>236</sup> The main issue to be decided with respect to institutional reform was how to rearrange the weights of the votes and the number of Commissioners. The decisions of the Nice European Council reflected the power struggle among the member states. Since more members connoted a less say in the decisions to be taken, every member state negotiated to achieve the optimum where they would not lose their present effect in Community decisions. The important issue of the number of Commissioners was left vaguely since no definitive agreement could be reached. The vague agreement was that it might be limited to 20 commissioners after 2007 but there was no clear explanation of the dynamics of determining the 20. Furthermore, the real tricky issues such as the common agricultural policy were not even discussed at Nice.<sup>237</sup> The Nice Treaty did not receive acknowledgement immediately especially with respect to the ratification problems experienced the enlargement process nearly came to a halt because of the Irish objections.<sup>238</sup> The developments during the Nice European Council and the period until the ratification of the Treaty increased the concerns that enlargement might not be advantageous after all.<sup>239</sup> The enlargement process and the institutional decisions that need to be taken in order to realize it demonstrated once again how there was no linear progression of events with respect to integration. Like the Maastricht Agreement the Nice Treaty was nearly not ratified and the negotiations among the member states nearly caused the whole process to come to a halt.

### 3.12.3 - ESTABLISHING A COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

One of the important projects embarked upon by the EU in the post-Cold War environment was the CFSP that had been established with the Maastricht Treaty. As a consequence of the introduction of CFSP members of the WEU convened in the Petersberg Hotel in Germany where they made a common declaration outlining the issues that European defense would deal with. As it came to be known 'the Petersberg tasks' included 'humanitarian and rescue

tasks, peacekeeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking'.<sup>240</sup> The Petersberg Tasks were incorporated into the TEU with the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997 and the High Representative position was established. Progress in CFSP seemed to be dawdling as it had taken four years to agree on how to rectify it. The main obstacle was the lack of belief in the viability of the CFSP especially after the events in Yugoslavia. Despite the setbacks in Yugoslavia CFSP had not been a complete failure for it had been instrumental in resolving a border dispute in Central Europe and administering the city of Mostar that had been devastated after the war.<sup>241</sup> Although minimal these successes were important in demonstrating that the EU could carry out civilian operations and solve disputes albeit on a small scale. They were important also in demonstrating the main flaw of the CFSP which was the lack of military capability to support the civilian operations.

The Yugoslav crisis provided a stimulus to EU for it had demonstrated their inability to engage in a conflict militarily. Furthermore, the British government which had until then objected to the establishment of a military wing started to look favorably upon such an endeavor. The awareness on the need to establish a military wing prompted the meeting in St. Malo in December 1998 where the two main powers of the EU, Britain and France, made a joint declaration stating that the EU 'must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to use them, and readiness to do so' and such capacities requires the establishment of 'appropriate structures and a capacity for analysis of situations, sources of intelligence, and a capacity for relevant strategic planning'.<sup>242</sup> The underlying theme of the declaration was that this was not an attempt to override NATO or to emulate it. This mechanism would only be operational in crisis situations that NATO was not engaged in.

The Cologne Summit in 1999 initiated the European Security and Defense Policy and stated that the EU aimed to have 'at its disposal the necessary capabilities (including military capabilities) and appropriate structures for effective EU decision making in crisis management, within the scope of the Petersberg tasks'.<sup>243</sup> The Cologne Summit also incorporated 'crisis prevention' and 'crisis management' in the Petersberg tasks. Taking into account the proposals made in the Cologne Summit with respect to the institutional arrangements necessary to implement a defense and security policy, the Helsinki European Council set out to establish a more detailed framework of how the policy would function. The Helsinki European Council in December 1999 declared the goal of establishing a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF). Thus according to the Helsinki European Council the headline goal of the European Security and Defense Policy would be to 'deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least 1 year military forces of up to 50,000 – 60,000 persons capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks'.<sup>244</sup> With respect to institutional arrangements the Helsinki Council decided to establish three institutions two of which were military and one political. The political one was the Political and Security Committee (PSC) which would be responsible for 'the political control and strategic direction of the operation.' The military institutions were the Military Committee that would 'give military advice and make recommendations to the PSC, as well as provide military direction to the Military Staff'. The third institution; the Military Staff would 'provide military expertise and support to the CESDP'.<sup>245</sup> The attempts to establish capabilities demonstrated serious pitfalls especially with respect to deployment of forces on the field. This flaw could be remedied thorough the authorization to use NATO assets and capabilities. The agreement known as the 'Berlin Plus' was delayed due to the objections of Turkey and Greece. The agreement was finalized on March 2003 as a result of which NATO assets and capabilities could be utilized.<sup>246</sup> Although the developments make possible the implementation of ESDP, the issues of how and when it can be implemented is still a thorny issue for the EU especially because of the intergovernmental nature of the process.

The attempts to devise a new architecture with respect to economy, borders and foreign and security policy was not an easy process. The EU faced challenges in diverse areas especially with respect to institutional reform and problem of democratic deficit and accountability. A decade or so had passed since embarking on these projects but they had faced setbacks and increased problems within the EU architecture. The Laeken European Council in 2001 decided to hold a Convention on the Future of Europe to settle the main issues that existed and emerged during the attempts to establish a new architecture.

### **3.13 CONCLUDING REMARKS**

This chapter demonstrated that the EU was an undefined project that came to acquire its present identity through the actions of actors (whether states, individuals or institutions) and the conjecture in the international environment and the relationship between these actions and the reactions given to them. It was a process rather than a well-outlined project with a definite aim. The ideas of Europe and projects for during and in between the two world wars demonstrate how the idea could change its meaning depending on who was utilizing it. Even if the threat perceived was different the solutions for that threat altered among projects for the idea of Europe. The realization of the European projects was not a realization in the real sense for a project had not been realized but a process commenced. This process moved forward or backward depending on the positions of the main actors and the results of the conflicts among different ideas of Europe. Thus the present structure of the EU and the process itself was realized not because it was inevitable but because the events, actions and reactions and positions and ideas held by the main actors in the process. This trend continued after the end of the Cold War whereby the EU embarked upon projects by commencing new processes or continuing old ones. The Convention on the Future of Europe is a grand initiative aimed at establishing the main contours of the EU integration process by solving the

main areas of dispute discussed in this chapter. The concluding chapter will discuss the implications of the process and its ensuing results for the integration. The next chapter will be an attempt to demonstrate through the example of Turkey how the main arguments made in this thesis operate. The process and fluctuations and flexibility within the EU integration process can be best viewed from the example of Turkey and its rocky relations with Europe and the European Union. The next chapter will outline the place of Islam and Turkey in the idea of and projects for Europe in order to better demonstrate the dynamics of the process of integration.

## CHAPTER IV:

### TURKEY:

#### A CASE-STUDY FOR SHIFTING FRONTIERS

##### 4.1 INTRODUCTION

The aim of this chapter is to utilize the example of Islam and Turkey to demonstrate more clearly the observations made in the previous chapters. The example of Turkey is pivotal for Turkey has had a fluctuating relationship with Europe and the European Union. Turkey has sometimes been included in projects for Europe and sometimes excluded from them. The main reason for this inclusion or exclusion has been the idea of Europe held by the architects of these projects. Because there have been diverse ideas of Europe depending on context and positions of actors there have been different manners of situating Turkey. Turkey is also important for comprehending the nature of the European Union. The previous chapter argued that the European Union integration is an undetermined process that was not inevitable. EU's relationship with Turkey is the best example of this process. The relationship has a fluctuating nature because there is no certain border or identity of EU. Borders and identity of EU are undetermined and because of that reason Turkey's position vis-à-vis EU alters depending on the context, events, actions of actors and their perception of borders and identity of EU. Thus EU's relationship with Turkey is the best example to demonstrate how the validity of the points made in this thesis.

The definition of Europe and of its boundaries has always altered throughout the years. At first, the term Europe was not even used as an adjective of self-description. The Greeks had identified themselves as the civilized people and the rest were termed as 'barbarians'. In the Middle Ages the division was between Christianity and non-

Christians. As the term Europe was used more prevalently there emerged the need to define the non-European. As discussed in Chapter 2 every idea of Europe brings with it a different definition of the non-European. The best illustration of how every idea of Europe alters the borders of Europe is the position of the Ottoman Empire and Turkey vis-à-vis the borders of Europe. How Europe is drawn differently can be discerned through observing the place of Turkey in these definitions.

#### 4.2 THE LOCATION OF EUROPE

As stated for the Greeks there was no comprehension of being European. The only differentiation that existed was the one between the 'civilized' Greeks and the barbarians. The Greek lands were not actually composed of the lands that are today perceived to be Europe. Europe as a concept meant the area of Asia Minor and northern Africa and not the Western continent which at the time was largely uninhabited and mainly unknown<sup>247</sup>. Thus in ancient times the concept of Europe was generally unimportant and when it was used it did not encompass the areas that one associates Europe with but rather an area that is today associated as being 'non-European'. The concept of Europe has not only altered as an idea or concept of values but also as a geographical concept. The geographical connotation of Europe has changed dramatically ever since gradually moving westwards. Thus the geographical area that once was Europe no longer is.

Although the differentiation of the Occident and Orient was to come after the division of the Roman Empire, the Greek concept of Europe demonstrates that 'the culture and civilization of the Occident owes its origins to the Orient. The world of antiquity was oriental not western'.<sup>248</sup> The origins of the concept and idea of Europe from the origins of Europa to the geographical concept of Europe were in nature oriental. It

was with the demise of the Greek civilization and rise of Roman Empire that a more general concept of Europe began to emerge. Despite this fact the Roman Empire can not be described as a European Empire. The Roman Empire was geographically turned towards the Orient as well since it did include lands in Asia and Africa. As a result, 'the Roman Empire had provided the continent of Europe with little in the way of unity'.<sup>249</sup> This was because the Roman Empire was not focused on the idea of Europe but on Rome. Thus 'the ancient idea of Europe, then, did not signify the western continent but rather expressed a vaguely defined Occident, the land of darkness, the land of the evening sun'.<sup>250</sup> Even though the Roman Empire was not the provider of unity its lands did encompass Europe as it is presently comprehended except for the northern states. Even if the empire also included lands in Asia and Africa, the geographical location had started to move westwards.

#### **4.3 MATERIALIZATION OF THE EAST/WEST DIVIDE**

An important turning point was the division of the Roman Empire. In 395 the Roman Empire split into East and West. It was this division that was pivotal in determining the contours of understanding the east and west. With time Europe as a term was used to describe the western half while Empire was used to refer to the Eastern part. As Delanty states; 'Occident and Orient evolved to refer to the two halves of the Roman Empire. The term Occident, along with Europe, tended to be used increasingly for the western half of the former Roman Empire, making it possible to speak of the European Occident'.<sup>251</sup> Hence with the division of the Roman Empire into East and West established a permanent division. The division separated from the Empire the parts in Asia and Africa and western Empire came to be referred as Europe. Thus the geographical move towards the west had occurred making the Occident non-European even though it had been the origins of Europe. Despite the geographical delineation of

Europe as the Western Empire corresponding to the boundaries of Europe as one perceives it today, the term Europe had no political or cultural meaning to it.

The rise of Islam and the Muslim conquests increased the mention of Europe as it came to be referred to in opposition to Islam. One of the first mentions of Europe is when the army of Charles Martel defeats Muslims. It was propagated that the army of Martel who fought against the Arabs was a European Army.<sup>252</sup> Europe came to be articulated against Islam during the Middle Ages. As a consequence Europe was actually equated with Christendom. Hence identification against the 'common enemy' was determined according to the main perceived characteristics of the enemy. In the Middle Ages the main characteristic associated with the Arab threat was their religion Islam. Hence the manner to identify oneself against that threat in a unifying way was Christianity.

Unity was achieved through the attempt to defeat an enemy that was perceived to be a threat to the main values of 'Europe'. Christianity was the tool used by monarchs to legitimize their rule since there was no force other than Christianity that could establish unity. As a result of this process 'the notion of Europe as a geographical term became increasingly applied to the Christian parts of the West. Europe became identical with the notion of a Christian commonwealth, with the emphasis being on the north-west'.<sup>253</sup> The rise of Islam provided a value system differentiation to be associated with the East and West. Thus Islam came to represent the East and Christendom the West. The ascendancy of Islam and Arab conquests thus provided the characteristic and nature of the antagonism between the East and West.

#### 4.4 UNITY AGAINST A 'COMMON ENEMY'

The scene of confrontation between the East and West had been established. It would be between Islam and Christendom. The Crusades were an episode where unity was achieved under the guidance of the Pope with the aim of defeating Islam. As Goeffrey Baraclough states 'in the First Crusade Europe, for the first time in its history, undertook a united action'.<sup>254</sup> This unity was established with respect to a specific purpose and it was only for that purpose that a common front could be established. As such, unity against the ascendancy of Islam did not necessarily mean that there was no political turmoil among the countries in Europe. Furthermore, 'the Turkish advance in the East was regarded as a punishment for this dispersion, and many felt that the reestablishment of unity was crucial if the Holy Land was to be recaptured'.<sup>255</sup> Thus the aim of intellectuals and statesmen at the time was to find ways in which to move beyond the disturbances among themselves and face the common threat. Since the main reason for the rise of such a threat had been the lack of unity among the states of Europe then it would disappear once unity was established. This line of thought led to the appearance of plans to unify Europe in order to circumvent the further ascendance of Islam. Hence attempts to unify Europe at this time were devised against Islam. The non-European in these plans was Islam and Asia towards which Europe had to be united:

One of the most important plans that attempted to unify Europe was put forward by Pierre du Bois in his work entitled 'De Rucupatione Terrae Sanctae' (On the Recovery of the Holy Land) written in 1306. According to the plan, the Pope would lead the way in the establishment of a Council that would be given the task of maintaining peace among Christians. The plan envisaged the exile of the populations of states that caused war within Europe to the East where they would fight the real

enemy. This was a mechanism to ensure that peace be established among Christians and those that disrupted the peace would be sent to fight in the East so as to defend Christendom as a result of which they would put their skills into good use.<sup>256</sup> The main aim of the plan was to establish peace among the Christians which was necessary in order to defeat Islam. Thus the plan was devised against Islam and was constructed with the objective of waging war against them.

#### 4.5 ATTEMPTS TO PROTECT THE 'HOME'

Europe had not yet become a political entity but was a cultural entity aiming to unite Christians. But as stressed in previous chapters Europe did not necessarily mean the same to everyone that used the term. Thus its use was 'both arbitrary and varied in the Middle Ages. In referring to the unity of the continent some writers meant political unity, others intellectual or rather spiritual unity. For some, Europe signified a united Christendom, for others, merely a geographical entity'.<sup>257</sup> A milestone in the understanding of Europe and in relation to it of the non-Europe came with the fall of Constantinople to the Ottomans in 1453. As Pope Pius stated the fall of Constantinople meant that they 'had been beaten in Europe, in [their]own country, at home'.<sup>258</sup> The fall of Constantinople created a great sense of defeat and loss within Christendom and Europe. The threat of Islam that had been so dreaded had finally penetrated into their lands. As a consequence, intellectuals and politicians belief in the necessity to unite increased.

One of the plans that followed the fall of Constantinople was devised by George von Podebrad and Antoine Marini in 1464. The treatise written by Marini was entitled 'De Unione Christianorum Contra Turcas'. It was in essence, as can be discerned from the title, a plan to unite Christianity against the 'Turks'. Hence it was not different from

other plans devised during this period with respect to its position towards Islam. A plan that stands out among the others with respect to its position towards Islam is the plan put forward by Cardinal Nicholas of Cusa. His plan was different because he did not envisage the rising of Christendom against the Turks. In his plan entitled 'De Pace Fidei' written in 1453 he argued for the establishment of a system in which Jews, Christians and Muslims would join under a single faith. He based his argument on the fact that all these faiths were monotheistic and since they all worshipped the same God but differed in rituals, ceremonies and rites they could be united. Even though the plan was not based upon exclusion neither was it without a political agenda. Accepting the plan meant that in essence the Muslims and Jews had to convert to Christianity.<sup>259</sup> Thus Cusa did not plan to unite against the Islamic threat but argued for the integration of that threat. His formula for integration was not a scheme to comprehend differences but to make the different 'the same'. Despite Cusa's attempts to unite the different faiths under Christianity, Reformation brought forth the division of Christianity. The banner of Christianity that was used to unite against the Turks had receded. A time had begun when the states of Europe were constantly at war with each other during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. As Europe was constantly at war the question of how to end the ensuing conflict and ensure peace became a common theme both in political and intellectual quarters.

The plans put forward during this period have as their priority the establishment of peace and religious tolerance. One such plan was Emeric Cruce's 'Le Nouveau Cynée ou discours d'estat' written in 1623. His plan was not concerned with defeating the Turks nor was it specifically concerned with establishing peace in Europe. It was a plan that aimed to encompass the whole world where representatives from China, India and Morocco would also be invited to join. In contrast to Cruce, Duke of Sully's

main aim was to bring an end to the conflicts in Europe. He argued that since all religions in Europe had become established there was no reason that they should fight each other. His plan was based on the recognition of religious division in Europe. Another plan that propagated religious tolerance was put forward by William Penn in 1693 in his 'Essay toward the Present and Future Peace of Europe'. According to Penn, the only problem in Europe was not the conflicts within themselves. In order to establish lasting peace Russia and Turkey also needed to be included within the institutions of Europe<sup>260</sup>. A plan that gave no place within its institutions for the Turks was the 'Projet de Traité pour rendre la perpetuelle en Europe' written by Abbé de Saint-Pierre in 1718. This plan also recognized the established order in Europe but as stated Turkey was not included in the plan. Although Turkey was not included in his plan he did concede to forming an agreement with Turkey.<sup>261</sup>

These plans demonstrate that the idea of the 'Turk' as a threat which must be countered by unifying was not as dominant as in previous centuries. Cruce's plan was a universal plan that aimed to establish order not only in Europe but in the world and as such was not a plan devised against 'the Turk'. Sully's plan was concerned with igniting recognition of the religious divergence in Europe instead of fighting because of it. Penn was also aiming to move beyond religious conflict but in addition he also recognized the centrality of Turkey for establishing peace within Europe. Sully's project was also a demonstration for the realization that Turkey was central to the establishment of peace. Although he did not include Turkey within the institutions of his project he did envisage an agreement that would guarantee peaceful relations. Thus even though Turkey was still perceived as a threat it had become one that could be reasoned with and at times one that needed to be included in schemes for unification. From being the reason against which these plans were formulated it had

gradually become a pivotal part of the plans. Towards the end of the eighteenth century as the concept of *raison d'état* gained importance Turkey became an important part of the European state system.

#### 4.6 POLITICAL NECESSITY BUT CULTURAL THREAT

As Turkey became a part of the European state system alliances began to be formed between Turkey and the other European states. A turning point was the Treaty of Carlowitz in 1699 which was the first time that 'the Turk' was invited to a European congress. It signaled the eventual inclusion of 'the Turk' in the European system of states. Moreover, from the Treaty of Carlowitz onwards it had eventually become clear that the Ottoman Empire was no longer the threat it had been and furthermore 'the Ottomans themselves began to realize that their empire could no longer defend without European allies'.<sup>262</sup> The decline of the Ottoman Empire as a political and military threat meant that it could be included within considerations to sustain the European balance of power. The period of the reign of *raison d'état* had come and even though states still perceived the Ottoman Empire to be a cultural threat, they used the declining military and political power of the Empire to their advantage. Thus 'what followed was a century of shifting diplomatic arrangements between European states and the Ottoman Empire, directed at ensuring the empire's survival and at preserving the European balance of power'.<sup>263</sup> Hence the perception of the Ottoman Empire had evolved and it was no longer seen 'as the barbarian other to civilised Europe' but rather it was seen 'as an 'odd man out''.<sup>264</sup> The perception of 'the Turk' had altered at least in political matters. It had become a party that could be included within the state system mainly because it played a pivotal role in the maintenance of balance among the states in Europe.

The Treaty of Paris in 1856 is the date when the Ottoman Empire was accepted into the state system but 'this acceptance was not accompanied by an admission of equality with 'the Turk''.<sup>265</sup> The decline of military and political power made the Ottoman Empire look towards Europe as a superior entity that needed to be emulated. Thus a process of European assistance in military, technology and institutional and administrative matters commenced. These changes were also demanded by European powers in order for the Ottoman Empire to conform to their standards. Hence 'in order to play in the Concert of Europe, 'the Turk' was expected to learn new tunes'.<sup>266</sup> As a consequence the relations between the Ottoman Empire and other states of Europe came to revolve around political interests. As Neumann states 'if the Porte was to be granted European support, it had to tailor its domestic realities to the standards of European civilization. One must acknowledge that the reform demands of the European states were also oriented towards their own economic interests or the interests of non-Muslim communities'.<sup>267</sup> The declining political and military threat of the Ottoman Empire had given it a part in the European state system especially because it was in the interests of the great powers to keep the Ottoman Empire together in order to maintain the balance of power in Europe. Despite these developments the Ottoman Empire and 'the Turk' was still a cultural threat and the perception of that threat was the main reason that the Ottoman Empire was denied equal status with the other states of Europe. The main impetus behind the relations was a mutual necessity and not a unity of purpose.

#### **4.7 ALTERATIONS IN THE 'OTHER'**

The continuing decline and eventual demise of the Ottoman Empire altered the role of 'the Turk' in the plans. Moreover, after the First World War plans to unite Europe were either directed against Russia or the United States. The construction of Russia as

'the other' meant stressing not culture but democracy, human rights and the rule of law as the definition of Europe. The plan put forwards in the inter-war years by Coudenhove-Kalergi was one such plan that aimed to establish a united Europe where Europe represented the ideals of the French Revolution. The main concern of his plan was the rising economic might of the United States and declining influence of Europe in the world. Thus to reclaim their dominance and strengthen ideals of Europe, Europe had to unite. Within this definition of Europe Turkey was not included. But he did include Turkey after the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923.<sup>268</sup> An ambiguous position towards Turkey was also adopted with Briand's plan to establish European unity. Because Briand's plan had originated within the contours of the League of Nations and because Turkey had not yet become a member of the League<sup>269</sup> she had not been included in the plan. Despite its non-inclusion some states argued for Turkey's inclusion in the union if a lasting order in Europe was to be established in their replies to the Memorandum.<sup>270</sup> The considerations of Turkey had increased especially within democratically defined projects of Europe because the newly established republic had set out the goal of Westernization for itself with the aim of eventually becoming part of the Western civilization. This aim demonstrated a willingness to conform to the idea of Europe that was propagated by Kalergi and Briand:

#### **4.8 A TRUSTED ALLY**

The threat of Fascism had been eliminated and a new threat emerged after the Second World War with the Soviet Union. As the rules of the Cold War order were established Europe came to be defined in relation to the SU and areas in her sphere of influence. Accordingly, Europe came to mean only Western Europe leaving out Central and Eastern Europe. The Cold War order gave increasing importance to the

'Western Alliance' as a security framework against the Soviet Union. Situating herself against the Soviet Union which was defined as totalitarian the 'West' began to define herself as democratic. As a consequence Europe came to signify democracy, human rights and rule of law and the 'East' representing totalitarianism became embodied in the Communist Soviet Union.

The end of the Second World War and start of Cold War made Turkey a strategically important state for the Western alliance. As a consequence of her geographically strategic position she was admitted in the Western security alliance, NATO, in 1952. The European integration process during the Cold War years was defined according to the boundaries drawn by Cold War imperatives. Hence the only Europe that could integrate was Western Europe and the Europe beyond the wall was forgotten. As a consequence Europe was not defined in cultural terms but rather in political and economic terms. The 'other' was Communist Soviet Union and the self-identification against that other was one where democracy, human rights and free market reigned rather than religion. As a consequence the relationship of the states within Western Europe and Turkey was no longer cultural but primarily political and economic. Especially with the advent of the Cold War and Turkey's membership to NATO, Turkey also became a pivotal and trusted ally and an important asset for the security framework of Europe.

#### **4.9 THE ROCKY RELATIONSHIP**

The relationship between the European Community and Turkey was not an easy one. It experienced series of setbacks and problems along the years. Turkey applied for full membership on 31 July 1959. The main concern of member states was the role Turkey was playing in ensuring stability, hence strategic considerations were an

important factor in the signing of the Ankara Agreement on 12 September 1963. The Ankara Agreement aimed to regulate the EC-Turkey relationship by establishing stages. The stages were preparatory stage, transitional stage and final stage.<sup>271</sup> An additional protocol was signed on July 1970 which determined a new timetable for the evolution of the association. After the Additional Protocol was adopted relations between Turkey and EC began to be strained. Especially as a consequence of economic difficulties the Ecevit government requested in 1978 the halting of Turkey's commitments. Even though the request was removed by the Demirel government, the 1980 coup caused a five-year freeze in the relations.<sup>272</sup> A proof of the tense relations was the decision by the Commission to delay the Fourth Financial Protocol. In 1982 the president of the EC Council of Ministers Tindemans wrote a report criticizing the human rights record of Turkey. A resolution was also passed by the European Parliament referring the joint Community-Turkey Parliamentary Committee.<sup>273</sup> As can be observed, as relations deteriorated concerns about democracy and human rights became issues of debate between the Community and Turkey. From the onset problems were experienced between Turkey and EC mainly because EC perceived itself to be representing democracy and human rights and wanted Turkey to adhere to that perception. It can be observed that since the European integration project was not a predetermined one its boundaries were not established. It was only the political imperatives of the Cold War order that established the borders. Thus the developments that ensued between Turkey and EC were shaped according to events, actions and reactions of actors and on the perceptions of the meaning of Europe according to those actors.

As Turkey attempted to realize her transition to democracy, the Ozal government also started to normalize relations with the EC and applied for membership to the EC in

1987. The Commission opinion was given in 1989 and the decision that was supported by the Council was the rejection of Turkey's application. The reasons for the rejection were primarily political rather than economic.<sup>274</sup> Turkish application and the Commission's opinion coincided with important events for the future of the EC and the international system. In 1987, as Turkey applied, the Community had embarked on its project to establish a single market and its primary concern was to be integration rather than widening. The EC was also taken by surprise with the events that ensued in the international system with the fall of the Berlin Wall, end of the Cold War and 'refolutions' in Central and Eastern Europe. The political borders established in Europe in alignment with the necessities of the Cold War had evaporated. The borders of Europe could no longer be limited to Western Europe. Furthermore, the 'other' of the European Community and Western Alliance had dissolved. There emerged the need to redefine the European Community and its borders according to the newly emerging political landscape. The situation of Turkey within the Western Alliance also became ambiguous. Turkey had been an important part of the Cold War balance but since that balance no longer needed to be kept the role of Turkey and her relationship with the Western Alliance also needed to be redefined.

Although setbacks had occurred due to the rejection and the fluctuating international environment, the Community and Turkey decided to resume relations by concentrating on the establishment of a customs union. The Customs Union agreement was signed on 6 March 1995. Moreover, the financial aid that had been postponed in the 80s was to become available. There were conflicting views about whether this agreement should be concluded. Most importantly, the European Parliament demanded that Turkey should make improvements on the issue of human

rights. But the French and British governments supported the finalization of the agreement mainly because they perceived it 'as a means both to support Turkey's secular leadership and to link Turkey, a gateway to countries in Central Asia and the Middle East, more closely to Europe'.<sup>275</sup> In an attempt to appease the European Parliament Turkey passed a series of amendments on 23 July 1995. As a result of intense lobbying by member states, the United States and business interest groups, the EP approved the Customs Union on 13 December 1995.<sup>276</sup> Even though Turkey's application had been rejected and Customs Union signed and ratified only after intense lobbying and last minute amendments the relations between the Community and Turkey had improved. Although the end of the Cold War had raised doubts about Turkey's place within the Western Alliance, the Gulf War had reconfirmed her pivotal role for ensuring peace and stability in the Middle East and Central Asia. Moreover, Turkey, a country with a Muslim majority, was a secular state. Thus there was the feeling of a necessity to ensure her internal stability. Hence the conclusion of the Customs Union agreement and the support Turkey received from member states during the process of ratification should be viewed from the general perspective of Turkey's position in the international system.

A turning point in the relations was the Luxembourg Summit which determined the status of the candidates with respect to enlargement. Agenda 2000, a Commission Report published just before the summit had not included Turkey in the enlargement process. The Luxembourg Summit declared that Turkey was eligible for membership but established a divergent strategy for the accession of Turkey. This policy caused a great uproar in Turkey since she was being categorized differently. As a result, Turkey declared on 14 December 1997 that it decided to put on hold political relations with the EU and declined the offer to attend the European Conference on 1998. The

events between the Luxembourg Summit and the Helsinki Summit convinced many that Turkey needed to be connected to the structures of the EU for it not to become a destabilizing force. This period also demonstrated to the member states that without the perspective of membership they were unable to exercise leverage over Turkey. As a result of these considerations the Helsinki European Council in 1999 declared Turkey as a candidate country for EU membership<sup>277</sup>. The events between 1995 and 1999 demonstrated that although the main issues for EU were human rights and democratization with respect to their dealings with Turkey, at times they were able to overlook these concerns in the light of more pressing strategic and political needs.

Although Turkey was not included in the institutional framework agreed in the Nice European Council in 2000, she was invited in the Laeken Summit in December 2001 to participate in the Convention on the Future of Europe. In 2001 the EU also adopted the EU-Turkey Association Partnership which outlined the necessary measures that needed to be undertaken by Turkey in order to fulfill the criteria for membership. In response to this development the Turkish government adopted the National Program for the Adoption of the Acquis. The NPAA provides a list of the reforms that Turkey aims to pass in order to fulfill the criteria for membership<sup>278</sup>. As a result of these events Turkey passed a series of amendments and on August 3, 2002 the Turkish Parliamentarians passed the EU Adaptation Law consisting of 15 Articles in order to adopt the *acquis communitarie* on the issue of human rights. Although a date was expected at the Copenhagen Summit on December 2002 especially after the intense lobbying of the Prime Minister, the leaders of the member states declined to determine a date for the commencement of negotiations. The only agreement reached was to review Turkey's candidacy on December 2004.

The association of Turkey with the EC was within the contours of Cold War politics. The political considerations of Cold War dynamics included Turkey within the Western Alliance and as such dealings with Europe increased. The end of the Cold War destabilized the relationship since the EU was left with important decision with respect to deepening and widening which related to its future institutional character. The end of the Cold War created the necessity for the EU to define itself and decide on her identity which will have a direct bearing upon the position of Turkey within the European Union. European Union herself has been in a state of flux in the last decade because the question of her identity can not be settled either solely within the European Union which is not a monolithic institution or with the member states of the European Union.

As stated there is no one definition of Europe or of the European Union. There are various views with respect to how to define the European Union and consequently about Turkey's position within the European Union. Defining the EU as a secular entity that aims to become a political and even a military power prompts the necessity of including Turkey within the EU. Defining the European Union as an institution that acts according to the rule of law, democracy and respect for human rights encourages Turkey's inclusion within the EU only if and when Turkey fulfills the criteria established by the EU. Defining the EU primarily as a religious association excludes Turkey from EU definitively. These definitions are not exclusionary for an institution, a member state or a party may define the EU in all of these ways but giving each one a different weight and depending on the circumstances. Which definition prevails over the other or rather what kind of an amalgamation of these ideas of European Union becomes more established will be the result of bargaining, negotiations and reactions

of member states, civil society organizations and the circumstances of the international system.

Whether or not Turkey is part of Europe is not especially central for Turkey is aiming not to be part of Europe but of the European Union. As such it is the institutional character of the European Union that will be the determinant factor in this process. Thus as Müftüler-Baç states the main factor 'complicating Turkey's ambiguous relations with the EU is Europe's own identity crisis, which begs the questions 'what is Europe?', Is it 'Atlantic Europe', based on a collective defense, or is there a 'core Europe' with roots in ethnicity and culture? As long as the identities of Europe and Turkey go undefined, Turkey's hopes for accession are dim'.<sup>279</sup> Thus the undetermined nature of the process of integration is the main reason for the undetermined status of Turkey's candidacy. The road that is taken, the choices that are made and the arrangements that become established will be instrumental in determining the status of Turkey. Most important determinant factor will be what kind of a definition of the idea of European Union emerges from the process. There are at present diverse views on the idea of European Union and as a consequence Turkey's place within it. As the EU its identity is also undetermined and will be established as a result of the bargaining and negotiations within the European Union integration process. It is this process that will set the definition of the European and non-European with respect to this specific process.

#### **4.10 CONCLUDING REMARKS**

This chapter aimed to demonstrate through the example of Turkey how the changes in perceptions of Europe had an impact on the project for Europe. This impact was discernible by looking at the position of Turkey within these plans. From being a

cultural, political and military 'other', it at times became a political player in the balance of power games and at times a cultural threat that should not be granted equal status. With the commencement to the European integration process Turkey acquired a different position. Within the parameters of Cold War it was a trusted ally but because the 'other' during the Cold War was the Soviet Union, Turkey could not be part of the perception of the self-identification of Europe with respect to her economic and political development. The end of the Cold War brought forth further challenges to the relationship because the status of Turkey became ambiguous within the new international system where there existed no 'other'. The integration of the EU is a process that has no definite, clear-cut, and strictly established borders thus the EU-Turkey relationship has experienced ups and downs as has the EU herself during this process. In relation to the diverse ideas about the EU there are also diverse ideas about where Turkey should be situated with respect to the EU. Since the integration project is actually a process neither the identity of the EU or Turkey's position are predetermined or the result of an inevitable process. There might still be ups and downs in the relationship in the future for in every attempt of the EU to define herself Turkey will be directly affected whether it is positively or negatively. This, however, does not mean that EU will definitely accept or reject Turkey. This means that the process develop in an undetermined fashion dependent on events and actions and perceptions of actors. It is the result of these processes and which perceptions gain more ground during these processes that will determine not only Turkey's position within the EU but also the nature of the EU. The example of Turkey has clearly demonstrated how different ideas of Europe have materialized in different projects for Europe dependent on context. It has also been pivotal in demonstrating the undetermined nature of the process and the different ideas held about the process. The concluding chapter will attempt to summarize the points made in this chapter along

with previous chapters in order to present an understanding of the process and its future identity.

## QUO VADIS EUROPA?

The starting point of this thesis was the discussions present in the literature about the nature of the EU whereby inquiries with respect to what kind of a political organization the EU is and what its identity can be were discussed. The main issue that needed to be resolved in order to comprehend the EU seemed to be an understanding of 'European' identity. The questions that could be posed were limitless about whether or not did a 'European' identity exist, if it did exist what were its main components and if it did not exist how could it be constructed? These questions were attempted in the literature but their overview demonstrated that before such questions could be answered a preliminary research needed to be made into what Europe was.

The attempt to define "Europe" establishes the main context of this thesis. A questioning of what Europe was led to the realization that there was no determined definition of Europe but rather various definitions. Hence the first aim of this thesis became the demonstration of how there were different ideas of Europe and in relation to them different projects for Europe. This thesis aimed to show that there have been various definitions of Europe during history and different projects to unite Europe have appeared in history depending on how Europe was defined. Like the definition of Europe, European Union does not have a uniform definition either. There are different understandings of the European Union and the aim of the integration process and the end product that should materialize in the end of the process. Since so many different understandings are present the idea of Europe and of the European Union does not represent the same concept. The questioning of what the 'European' identity is becomes invalid at this juncture because Europe represents different meanings and being European can be defined differently. Since Europe and European Union are not

the same, even if a common definition on Europe did exist it still would not be sufficient to define the identity of the European Union. The identity of the European Union and 'European' identity are not the same concepts and the search and questioning should be directed towards what the European Union identity will be and who Europeans are. Even though the inquiry of identity should be directed towards the European Union there is not yet such an identity that can be analyzed.

The second aim of the thesis has been an attempt to comprehend why such an identity is still not apparent. There are two main reasons for the lack of a determined identity. The first is the non-determined nature of the integration process and the second is that this process was not inevitable. The integration process that commenced in the Cold War years was not the result of an inevitable route that inescapably resulted in the European Union. Neither the history of Europe, the idea of Europe or the European Union evolved in a linear process of progression that would no matter what lead to the establishment of unity under the banner of democracy and human rights. The idea of Europe and projects of Europe along with the integration process that resulted in the establishment of the European Union have all experienced successes as well as failures and have been representatives of democracy and totalitarianism. Thus the present structure and perceptions did not occur because of any historical unavoidability but because of the coming together of specific events, actions and perceptions. Another road could have been taken if events had unfolded differently hence the present road was just among many and its route was determined not because of inevitability. This brings the discussion to the second point for in addition to being an evitable process it was also undetermined. The process of integration did not have clearly defined boundaries or aims. It had specific aims that it attempted to accomplish but never did it project for the future a definite description of the end

result. Since the EU was the result of a process rather than a clearly defined project it has no defined definition of the European Union but embodies within it diverse definitions. Consequently, there can be no definite characterization of the European Union identity. It is the result of this process that is not predetermined that will establish the European Union identity.

These two aims are imperative in arriving to the third objective of the thesis. The third objective is to argue that the emerging identity will not be European but Europaen. Since the process is undetermined and in relation to it the identity of EU is undefined there is not as yet a meaning of the identity of European Union. The identity of the European Union will be determined as a consequence of the ensuing process. The identity that will materialize as a consequence of this process will not be European although there will be aspects of Europeanness within it. The identity will not be a completely European Union identity either though the European Union will be its main reference point. The identity that will come out of the process will be Europaen. It will be a *sui generis* identity like the European Union is a *sui generis* political organization. This identity will be formulated as a consequence of the process that is continuing even today and since this process is undetermined and evitable the contours of this identity are also undetermined and its nature can alter depending on events. This identity will come about as a result of events, actions and perceptions of actors and how these actions are received and perceived by other actors. Hence the process is an interactive one where there are various dynamics at work. There are diverse definitions for the European Union and each definition has a different future planned out for the European Union. Which of these futures will be realized and as a consequence what kind of an identity will be formulated is dependent on the outcome of this process. This process not only entails the actions and reactions of actors or

their perceptions but the structure of the international system and changing circumstances in world politics and the position of the member states within that system. Thus there are diverse dynamics that will be at work in determining the nature of the incipient identity and it will be determined only after the process of bargaining, negotiations and agreements can formulate an amalgamation of the diverse ideas, projects and futures for Europe and European Union which will be the European identity. The identity can not be determined presently because the process of determining the identification is still continuing and its results are not only dependent on the policies of European Union even though it will be the main determinant.

The thesis aimed to demonstrate the above-mentioned objectives through a historical analysis of the idea of Europe, projects of Europe and within the European Union. This thesis was not about the history of Europe or the history of European Union nor was it about the history of Turkey or Islam. It was an analysis of the ideas of Europe, the projects of Europe that stemmed from them, the development of European Union in relation to its undetermined and evitable nature. The first chapter aimed to outline the main works in the literature with respect to the prospects of 'European' identity. The aim of the chapter was to demonstrate that although many explanations had been provided about how the nature of the identity might be the process about its creation had been neglected. Despite this neglect there seemed to be a general view that the European Union was to play a central role in its creation. As a consequence, the central role of the European Union and the need to separate it from Europe was stressed.

The second chapter provided an explanation of why there was a need to separate European Union and Europe through a historical analysis of the idea of Europe and

projects of Europe that were a consequence of these ideas. The historical outlook provided a general picture of how ideas of Europe emerged, altered and culminated in different projects to unite Europe. This chapter was instrumental in demonstrating not only that diverse definition of Europe existed but also how different threats and different definitions could be provided in the same period of time and how different projects could be devised even if the perceived threat was the same. This chapter demonstrated that there were many fluctuations in the idea of Europe at times becoming important for intellectuals and statesmen and at times it descended into the background when other concerns were more pivotal.

The third chapter demonstrated how the idea of Europe and projects for Europe could be different in the same period of time with the same perceived threat depending on the political aims of the architects. Europe could represent a purity of race and democracy for different groups in the same time period. This chapter also aims to outline the process of integration that was commenced. The main dynamics of the process, its successes and failures are discussed in order to demonstrate the undetermined nature of the process. The chapter gives an understanding of how different dynamics, events and actors can be influential in the fluctuations in the process. This chapter was important in stressing the undetermined nature of the process and in outlining how different plans and ideas exist even within the European Union demonstrating that the process has always been evitable and undeterminable from the start.

The fourth chapter has been an attempt to demonstrate the points made in this thesis through the example of Turkey. Turkey provides an important example for demonstrating how different ideas of Europe have established different borders.

Turkey's inclusion or exclusion from projects for Europe were outlined in order to demonstrate how every idea of Europe had different priorities and different perceptions on the future of Europe. Turkey is also important because it demonstrates clearly the undetermined nature of the process of integration. It is because the EU has not defined itself and her identity clearly that situating Turkey within it is still problematic.

The most recent event that demonstrates clearly the discussed points was experienced during the Convention on the Future of Europe. The Convention on the Future of Europe was a grand initiative to redefine the architecture of the European Union and settle the ongoing matters of contention once and for all. The fate of the Convention still quite undetermined is a good example for comprehending the integration process. The Convention brought together not only member states, but also institutions of the Union and candidate countries. Thus it was an arena that brought together all aspects of the integration process. The negotiations on the Treaty faced various deadlocks on issues and the final draft was not produced easily. The summit in Thessaloniki was unable to come to a common decision about the Constitutional Treaty. Whether or not the Treaty can be accepted is still a contentious matter. What will follow if and when the treaty is rejected or accepted is an unknown future. The integration process has experienced setbacks and successes. Whether or not the Treaty is accepted is not testament on the failure or success of the integration process. The events that unfold will definitively be a determinant factor in how the integration process continues but it will not signify a complete halt or inevitable continuation. The integration process has demonstrated that there are many dynamics at work that are imperative in determining the road to be taken since there is no predetermined scheme.

A famous legend from the Greek myths states that after the abduction of Europa one of her brothers Cadmus set out to locate her. His attempts to locate her came to no conclusion after having traveled to Rhodes and to Thrace thus he decided to inquire to the Delphic oracles and asked 'Where is Europe?'. The reply he received from Pylhia gave him the task of building a city whereby Cadmus founded Thebes. The interpretation of this mythical event is that 'by pursuing the mythical image of Europe that the Phoenician seamen discovered her geographical reality. But it was also by ceasing to look for Europe as she lay in his memory that Cadmus set about building her'<sup>280</sup>. The main question of this thesis was 'Where to locate Europa?', and the answer can not be an attempt to look for her as she remains in memories or by extracting conceptions of her from the past. No historical definition of her can be located in a mirror-image form in the present. As Rougemont<sup>281</sup> states 'to seek for Europe is to make her. Her existence is in the search for her.' Thus Europa exists not in the shapes that it once had but will exist in a shape that will be determined by the integration process.

## ENDNOTES

- <sup>1</sup> Anthony McGrew, "Between Two Worlds: Europe in a Globalizing Era." *Government and Opposition* 37, no:3 (2002) : 346.
- <sup>2</sup> For a further discussion on globalization look at David Held and Anthony McGrew, *The Global Transformations Reader: an introduction to the globalization debate* (Malden : Mass : Polity Press, 2000).
- <sup>3</sup> Kate Nash, *Contemporary political sociology: globalization, politics and power* (Malden Mass: Blackwell Publishers, 2000), 47.
- <sup>4</sup> Jo Shaw and Antje Wiener, "The Paradox of European Polity." Harvard Jean Monnet Working Paper no: 10/99, <http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/99/991001.rtf>.
- <sup>5</sup> Ana Maria Alonso, "The Politics of Space. Time and Substance: State Formation, Nationalism and Ethnicity," *Annual Review of Anthropology* 23, (1994): 382.
- <sup>6</sup> R.B.J Walker, *Inside/outside: international relations as political theory* (Cambridge: New York : Cambridge University Press, 1993), 179.
- <sup>7</sup> Shaw and Wiener
- <sup>8</sup> J. Huysman, "The European Union and the Securitization of Migration," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 38, no:5
- <sup>9</sup> Alan Milward, *The European rescue of the nation-state* (London : Routledge, 1995)
- <sup>10</sup> Zygmunt Baumann, *Postmodernity and its Discontents* (Cambridge, UK : Polity Press, 1997), 272.
- <sup>11</sup> Zygmunt Baumann, *Modernity and Ambivalence* (Oxford England : Polity Press, 1998), 2.
- <sup>12</sup> Karl Marx, *Communist Manifesto*, with a Introduction by A.J.P Taylor (London; New York : Penguin Books, 1985).
- <sup>13</sup> M. Kearney, "The Local and the Global: Anthropology of Globalization and Transnationalism," *Annual Review of Anthropology* 24, (1995) : 549
- <sup>14</sup> *ibid.*
- <sup>15</sup> Anssi Paasi, "Europe as a Social Process and Discourse : Considerations of Place, Boundaries and Identity," *European Urban and Regional Studies* 8, no:1 (2001) : 9
- <sup>16</sup> Europa is the daughter of a Phoenician king. Zeus abducts her by transforming himself into a bull and takes Europa to Crete. (For further information see Alexander B. Murray, *Manual of mythology: Greek and Roman, Norse and Old German, Hindoo and Egyptian mythology* (New York: Tudor Publishing Company, 1954.)
- <sup>17</sup> Peter Bugge, "The nation supreme : The idea of Europe, 1914-1945," in *The History of the Idea of Europe*, eds. Kevin Wilson and Jan van der Dussen (London and New York : Routledge, 1995), 83.
- <sup>18</sup> Brigid Laffan, "The Politics of Identity and Political Order in Europe," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 34, no:1 (1996) : 90.
- <sup>19</sup> *Ibid.* 98
- <sup>20</sup> Anthony D. Smith, "A Europe of Nations – or the Nation of Europe?," *Journal of Peace Research* 30, no:2 (1993) : 134.
- <sup>21</sup> Anthony D. Smith, "National Identity and the Idea of European Unity," *International Affairs* 68, (1992): 62
- <sup>22</sup> *ibid.* 73
- <sup>23</sup> Paul Howe, "A community of European: the requisite underpinnings." *Journal of Common Market Studies* 33, no:1 (1995): 33.
- <sup>24</sup> Noel O'Sullivan, "European Political Identity and the Problem of Cultural Diversity." *Journal of Applied Philosophy* 17, no:3 (2000) : 237-251.
- <sup>25</sup> Peter Van Ham, "Europe's Postmodern Identity. A Critical Appraisal," *International Politics* 38 (June 2001): 229-252.
- <sup>26</sup> O'Sullivan
- <sup>27</sup> Van Ham
- <sup>28</sup> Howe, "A community of Europeans": Paul Howe, "Insiders and Outsiders in a Community of Europeans : A Reply to Kostakopoulou," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 35, no: 2 (1997) : 309-314.
- <sup>29</sup> Tatiana Kostakopoulo, "Why a 'community of Europeans' could be a community of exclusion," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 35, no:2 (1997): 301-308.
- <sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, 305.
- <sup>31</sup> Howe, "Insiders and Outsiders in a Community of Europeans". 314.

<sup>32</sup> Martin Kohli, "The battlegrounds of European identity," *European Societies* 2, no:2 (2000) : 113-37.

<sup>33</sup> Alexander B. Murphy, *Rethinking the Concept of European Identity*, in *Nested Identities: Nationalism, Territory and Scale*, eds. Gunthram H. Hub and David H. Kaplan. (Lanham : Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1999) , 61.

<sup>34</sup> Anthony D. Smith, "National Identity and the Idea of European Unity," *International Affairs* 68, (1992): 62

<sup>35</sup> Murphy, 62.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*,65.

<sup>37</sup> David Lowenthal, "European identity : an emerging conceot," *Australian Journal of Politics and History* 46, no:3 (2000) : 318.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>39</sup> Thomas Risse, Nationalism and Collective Identities: Europe versus the Nation-State?. in *Developments in West European Politics*, eds. Paul Heywood, Erik Jones and Martin Rhodes. (Palgrave, 2002),

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*,77.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*,77-78.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*,83.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*,84.

<sup>45</sup> Rain Eensar, "Can European Identity Compete with National Identity." *The Bologna Center Journal of International Affairs* 3, no:1 (Spring 2000) [online edition] adresi gir

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*,3.

<sup>47</sup> O'Sulllivan, 239.

<sup>48</sup> Gerard Delanty, "Models of European Identity: Reconciling Universalism and Particularism." *Perspectives on European Politics and Society* 33 no:3 (2002):345-359.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>50</sup> O'Sullivan, 240.

<sup>51</sup> Stephen Wood, "Issues and Agendas: Building 'Europe': Culture, History and Politics." *Journal of Historical Sociology* 11, no:3 (September 1998): 409.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, 410.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*,412.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>56</sup> Delanty, "Models of European Identity: Reconciling Universalism and Particularism." 348.

<sup>57</sup> Jurgen Habermas 2001. 15

<sup>58</sup> Dieter Grimm, "Does Europe Need a Constitution." *European Law Journal* 1 no:3 (November 1995): 290.

<sup>59</sup> Jurgen Habermas, *Does Europe Need a Constitution? Response to Dieter Grimm*, in *The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory*, ed. Ciaran Cronin and Pablo de Greif, (Cambridge, MA : MIT Press, 1998), 158.

<sup>60</sup> Gerard Delanty, "Models of European Identity: Reconciling Universalism and Particularism."

<sup>61</sup> Van Ham, 237.

<sup>62</sup> Ignatieff cited in Van Ham, 239.

<sup>63</sup> Delanty, "Models of European Identity: Reconciling Universalism and Particularism." 354.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*,353-354.

<sup>65</sup> Kohli, 127.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*,128.

<sup>67</sup> Delanty, "Models of European Identity: Reconciling Universalism and Particularism," 354.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*,355.

<sup>69</sup> Van Ham, "Europe's Postmodern Identity. A Critical Appraisal," 243-4.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.*,245.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*,247.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*,244.

<sup>73</sup> Delanty, "Models of European Identity: Reconciling Universalism and Particularism," 356.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid.*, 357.

<sup>75</sup> Schlesinger cited in Van Ham, 243-4.

<sup>76</sup> Norman Davies, *Europe: A History* (London: Pimlico, 1997) , xv.

<sup>77</sup> Heikki Mikkeli, *Europe as an Idea and Identity* (Great Britain: MacMillan Press Ltd, 1998) : Denis de Rougemont, *The Idea of Europe* (New York: Macmilan. 1966).

<sup>78</sup> Mikkeli,5-15

- <sup>79</sup> Rougemont, "The Idea of Europe", 13.
- <sup>80</sup> Herodotus in Pim den Boer, "Europe to 1914: the making of an idea." in *The History of the Idea of Europe*, ed. Kevin Wilson and Jan van der Dussen (London and New York : Routledge. 1995), 14-15.
- <sup>81</sup> Gerard Delanty, *Inventing Europe- Idea, Identity, Reality : an introduction to the history of European unity* (New York: Meridian Books, 1995), 16.
- <sup>82</sup> Mikkeli
- <sup>83</sup> Delanty, "Inventing Europe",
- <sup>84</sup> Delanty, "Inventing Europe", 10-12; Mikkeli, 13-14
- <sup>85</sup> Delanty, "Inventing Europe", 13.
- <sup>86</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>87</sup> Boer, 26-27
- <sup>88</sup> Ibid, 27.
- <sup>89</sup> Mikkeli, 21-25; Rougemont, "The Idea of Europe".
- <sup>90</sup> Delanty, "Inventing Europe", 34.
- <sup>91</sup> Ibid., 35.
- <sup>92</sup> Mikkeli, 24-25
- <sup>93</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>94</sup> Podebrad cited in Rougemont, "The Idea of Europe", 71.
- <sup>95</sup> Rougemont, "The Idea of Europe", 72.
- <sup>96</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>97</sup> Mikkeli, 36.
- <sup>98</sup> Boer, 35
- <sup>99</sup> Delanty, "Inventing Europe", 67.
- <sup>100</sup> Crucé cited in Rougemont, "The Idea of Europe", 95.
- <sup>101</sup> Mikkeli, 46-47.
- <sup>102</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>103</sup> Rougemont, "The Idea of Europe"
- <sup>104</sup> Mikkeli, 48-50.
- <sup>105</sup> Burckhardt cited in Rougemont, "The Idea of Europe", 101.
- <sup>106</sup> Mikkeli, 50-52.
- <sup>107</sup> Ibid, 53-56.
- <sup>108</sup> Abbe de Saint-Pierre cited in Rougemont, "The Idea of Europe", 115.
- <sup>109</sup> Mikkeli, 53-57
- <sup>110</sup> Boer, 39
- <sup>111</sup> Lukacks, 111
- <sup>112</sup> Ibid, 112.
- <sup>113</sup> Mikkeli, 60-80.
- <sup>114</sup> Delanty, "Inventing Europe", 68.
- <sup>115</sup> Delanty, "Inventing Europe"; Mikkeli, 60-80
- <sup>116</sup> Boer, 40-60
- <sup>117</sup> Delanty, "Inventing Europe", 72.
- <sup>118</sup> Boer, 69
- <sup>119</sup> Mikkeli, 61.
- <sup>120</sup> Novalis cited Rougemont, "The Idea of Europe", 232.
- <sup>121</sup> Mikkeli, 64
- <sup>122</sup> Martyn P. Thompson, "Ideas of Europe during the French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 55, no:1 (January 1994): 52.
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- <sup>124</sup> Boer, 65-68
- <sup>125</sup> Andreas Dorphalen, "The European Polity: Biography of an Idea." *The Journal of Politics* 10, no:4 (November 1948), 714-733.
- <sup>126</sup> Boer, 71-73
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- <sup>128</sup> Boer, 72
- <sup>129</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>130</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>131</sup> Mazzini cited in Rougemont, "The Idea of Europe". 272.
- <sup>132</sup> Delanty, "Inventing Europe", 79.
- <sup>133</sup> Boer, 74

- <sup>134</sup> Ibid, 70.
- <sup>135</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>136</sup> Stuart Woolf, "The Construction of a European World-View in the Revolutionary-Napoleonic Years," *Past and Present*, no:137 (November 1992) : 74.
- <sup>137</sup> Ibid.,89.
- <sup>138</sup> Delanty, "Inventing Europe", 75-77.
- <sup>139</sup> Boer, 75-78 ; Mikkeli
- <sup>140</sup> Boer, 77.
- <sup>141</sup> Cited in Bugge, 87
- <sup>142</sup> Delanty, "Inventing Europe", 103-4.
- <sup>143</sup> Bugge, 90-93
- <sup>144</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>145</sup> Ibid, 94.
- <sup>146</sup> Ibid.
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- <sup>148</sup> Bugge, 122.
- <sup>149</sup> Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi. "The Pan-European Outlook," *International Affairs* 10, no:5 (September 1931) : 638-651.
- <sup>150</sup> Coudenhove-Kalergi cited in Wilson van der Dussen. 94.
- <sup>151</sup> Coudenhove-Kalergi
- <sup>152</sup> Bugge, 99.
- <sup>153</sup> Briand cited in Davies, 950.
- <sup>154</sup> Davies,950-1; Heater,132-139
- <sup>155</sup> Bugge,103-105
- <sup>156</sup> Davies,951.
- <sup>157</sup> Ortega y Gasset cited in Rougemont. Idea of Europe, 356.
- <sup>158</sup> Ibid.,357.
- <sup>159</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>160</sup> Ibid.,383
- <sup>161</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>162</sup> Ibid.,
- <sup>163</sup> Ibid, 422.
- <sup>164</sup> Rosenberg cited in Bugge, 126
- <sup>165</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>166</sup> Delanty, Inventing Europe – Idea, Identity, Reality, 111-12.
- <sup>167</sup> Hitler cited in Bugge, 120.
- <sup>168</sup> Stirk,80-90 ; Bugge,111-113.
- <sup>169</sup> Martin Dedman, *The origins and development of the European Union, 1945-1995: a history of European Integration* (London; New York: Routledge. 1996).20-26.
- <sup>170</sup> David Calleo, *Rethinking Europe's Future* (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2001). 136.
- <sup>171</sup> The Treaty of Westminster was signed by ten countries. These countries were Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, Ireland, Italy, Denmark, Norway and Sweden. Today it consists of 45 countries and has granted observant status to five countries. More details of the past and present of the organization can be obtained from its website :  
<http://www.coe.int/defaultEN.asp>
- <sup>172</sup> Dedman,27-30
- <sup>173</sup> The OEEC was transformed into the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in 1960. More information about the workings of the organisation can be reached from its website :  
[www.oecd.org](http://www.oecd.org)
- <sup>174</sup> Robert H. Liestout, *The struggle for the organization of Europe: the foundations of the European Union* (Cheltenham, UK ; Northampton, MA : E. Elgar, 1999),60-63.
- <sup>175</sup> Dedman,43.
- <sup>176</sup> Schuman Plan, The Schuman Declaration (Leiden University, Historical Institute, accessed 10 September 2003) ; available from <http://www.let.leidenuniv.nl/history/rtg/res1/declaration.html>: Internet.
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- <sup>182</sup> Stirk, 132.
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- <sup>187</sup> Dedman, 110-3.
- <sup>188</sup> Dedman, 114-118; McAllister, 31-35.
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- <sup>197</sup> Tindemans Report; Michael Burgess. *Federalism and European Union: the building of Europe, 1950-2000* (New York: Routledge, 2000), 111-115.
- <sup>198</sup> Burgess, 125.
- <sup>199</sup> Stirk, 191-205
- <sup>200</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>201</sup> Stirk, 191.
- <sup>202</sup> German Foreign Minister from 1974 to 1992
- <sup>203</sup> Italian Foreign Minister
- <sup>204</sup> McAllister, 160; Burgess, 134-136.
- <sup>205</sup> Burgess, 134-136.
- <sup>206</sup> McAllister, 160.
- <sup>207</sup> Stirk, 205; Burgess, 139-145.
- <sup>208</sup> Burgess, 139-145.
- <sup>209</sup> McAllister, 168.
- <sup>210</sup> Ibid.
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- <sup>266</sup> Ibid, 57.
- <sup>267</sup> Ibid, 58.
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