

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STATE AND CAPITAL:
THE RECONSTRUCTION OF SOCCER STADIUMS
AS AN URBAN TRANSFORMATION PROJECT

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DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

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ABSTRACT

The Relationship Between State and Capital:

The Reconstruction of Soccer Stadiums as an Urban Transformation Project

This study analyzes the relation between state and capital in Turkey to provide an account of the accumulation strategy during the AKP period (between 2002–2015) by focusing on a discernable trend in urban transformation projects, that of the reconstruction of soccer stadiums in Anatolian metropolises. In particular, this work aims to clarify the role of political entrepreneurship in the reconstruction of soccer stadiums through a partnership between state and capital. The term political entrepreneurship refers specifically to a neoliberal form of articulatory practice that serves to reproduce consent for the regeneration of the hegemony of the power-bloc. In this regard, the reproduction of hegemonic project enables the continued generation of economic imaginary in the society in such a manner that the articulation mechanism of hegemonic power and its associated regime of accumulation operate effectively and reproduces themselves.

ÖZET

Devlet-Sermaye İlişkisi:

Kentsel Dönüşüm Projesi Olarak Stat İnşaatlarının Yeniden İnşası

Bu çalışma Türkiye’deki devlet-sermaye arasındaki ilişkiyi 2002-2015 arası AKP dönemindeki stadyum inşaatlarına odaklanarak analiz etmektedir. Anadolu’nun çeşitli anakentlerinde yapılan bu inşaat projelerinin analizi aynı zamanda ilgili dönemin birikim stratejisine de ışık tutmaktadır. Bilhassa, bu çalışma stat inşaatları vasıtasıyla irdelenen devlet ve sermaye arasındaki ilişkide politik girişimcilik kavramının rolünü açıklamayı amaç edinmektedir. Bu kavram spesifik olarak iktidar blokunun hegemonyasının yeniden yaratılmasına yarayan “rıza” mefhumunun tekrar üretilmesi anlamına gelen neoliberal tarzda bir eklemlenme biçimine işaret etmektedir. Bu bağlamda, hegemonya projesinin yeniden üretimi toplum içindeki iktisadi tahayyül olgusunun tekrar oluşumuna olanak vermektedir. Bu vesileyle, hegemonik gücün eklemlenme mekanizması ve onun ilgili birikim stratejisi efektif bir biçimde icra edilmektedir.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER 2: REFORMULATING THE CONCEPT OF STATE	7
2.1 Integral state: The neo-Gramscian analysis of state theories	8
2.2 What is hegemony?	17
2.3 Jessopian understanding of state	19
CHAPTER 3: A NEO-GRAMSCIAN APPROACH TO THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TURKEY	29
3.1 A short summary of political economic history of Turkey	30
3.2 The dance with neoliberal regime of accumulation and Turkey: From post-1980s to the AKP period.....	40
CHAPTER 4: UNDERSTANDING INTEGRAL STATE IN PRACTICE BASED ON RECONSTRUCTION OF SOCCER STADIUMS: THE EXAMPLES OF BAŞAKŞEHİR AND AKHİSAR	58
4.1 Soccer as a field of articulation	61
4.2 Political economy of reconstruction of soccer stadiums	62
4.3 The general framework for the construction of stadiums.....	67
4.4 Akhisar Arena & Başakşehir Fatih Terim Stadium.....	72
4.5 Discussion	87
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION	98
APPENDIX A: SOCCER STADIUMS IN TURKEY	107
APPENDIX B: INTERVIEWEES.....	109
APPENDIX C: A SHORT SUMMARY OF FIELD RESEARCH	110
REFERENCES	114

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This thesis analyzes the role of the state in the process of hegemony construction and its methodology during the AKP period with a focus on the reconstruction of soccer stadiums, taking Akhisar and Başakşehir as its case studies. The main aim of the thesis is to indicate how the economic dimension becomes a tool of the power bloc in its efforts to construct hegemony. In addition, the thesis will sort out the process of hegemony construction at the local level on stadium constructions through field studies in Akhisar and Başakşehir. In this way, this study aims at understanding the role of ideological, political and cultural aspects of society in hegemony construction over the society during the AKP period.

In addition, this study tries to analyze how this new conservative power bloc can become an alternative to the old one by attempting to understand the reaction of political Islam to the neoliberal transformation in Turkey. In this way, the thesis aims at disclosing the specificity of AKP period. More precisely, the thesis tries to find out the points that distinguish this period from other previous conservative governments and that make the AKP-based power bloc a political alternative to the old one.

In this regard, this thesis proposes a neo-Gramscian approach to understand the role of the reconstruction of soccer stadiums in the process of hegemony construction, to scrutinize how AKP seized the political power and how AKP expanded its hegemony, because the neo-Gramscian approach makes possible elaborating economic and extra-economic dimensions of hegemonic practices. That is, rather than focusing only on the

rent creation process by the state, this approach aims to investigate the extra-economic dimensions of state-oriented economic activities by scrutinizing the interwoven relations between political and civil societies.

This study also attempts to interpret Metin Heper's periodization (2013), namely cultural, democratic and economic revolutions, from the viewpoint of the neo-Gramscian notion of state theory. This alternative historiography aims at including historicity in the attempt that tries to explain the period of the main subject of this study.

The thesis consists of three chapters. Following the introduction, in the second chapter, an overview of the theoretical frames (the center-periphery approach and the new institutionalist perspective) that can alternatively be used to study the AKP period will be provided for understanding why this thesis prefers to use the neo-Gramscian theory. Then, the concept of the integral state approach will be introduced and the neo-Gramscian theoretical framework will be delineated via the work of Nicos Poulantzas (1978), Chantal Mouffe (1979), Ernesto Laclau (1985) and Bob Jessop (1990).

In the second part of the first chapter, the main theoretical framework that will be used in the thesis will be introduced and the concepts of "hegemonic project" and "accumulation strategy"—borrowed from Jessop—will be analyzed. These concepts are significant for this study since they enable us to connect the economic and the extra-economic aspects of a social formation. Even if hegemonic project is related to ideological and political dimensions of the construction process of hegemony, its relation to accumulation strategy determines the impact of the hegemonic project on society. Similarly, the harmony of an accumulation strategy with a hegemonic project

facilitates the expansion of the scope of economic field by adding imaginary dimensions. This harmonization is achieved through the construction of an “economic imaginary,” which helps readers to understand in a better way how economic becomes a tool of the power bloc in its construction of hegemony.

Moreover, in this chapter, the concept of hegemony will be discussed following Laclau and Mouffe (1985) understanding of the fields of articulation and articulatory practices. In the last part of the chapter, the methodology of articulatory practices will be analyzed based on David Harvey’s (Neo-liberalism as Creative Destruction) discussion of “creative destruction.” Also, articulatory practices will be identified with the concept of “political entrepreneurship” to clarify the role of the state in the construction of hegemony.

The second chapter (the historical one) will try to put the theoretical framework in work in a historical frame. First, the corner stones of the political economic history of Turkey will be re-interpreted based on the neo-Gramscian understanding against the grain of Heper’s periodization. It will be argued that the power bloc formed during the Republican period tried to articulate different social classes into its hegemonic project by using the coercive apparatus of the integral state. Then, the adaptation of political Islam to the neoliberal transformation will be studied. Also, the political and economic volatility caused by neoliberal structural adjustment programs will be scrutinized to understand how consecutive crises until the beginning of the 2000s created an opportunity to construct a new power bloc. In the last part, the political economy of the AKP period will be sorted out. The question of the specificity of the AKP government will be discussed by focusing on the hegemonic project that is constructed based on the

discourse of “New Turkey” a conservative interpretation of neoliberal regime of accumulation. Also, in this section, it will be construed how the discursive use of the signifier service, “hizmet”, articulated different fractions of social classes into the hegemonic project. The AKP era will be divided into two sub-periods. In the first period, while the conflicts between the new conservative power bloc and the old hegemonic social classes will be introduced, it will be discussed how the AKP-based power bloc obtained and continued to retain its power. In the second period, the aim will be to understand how the power bloc can retain its hegemonic power, even if there are political and economic fluctuations. In this context, the role of articulatory practices will be highlighted. In addition, the building blocks of the accumulation strategy of the AKP period will be discussed. And finally, the methodology of articulatory practices and their dimensions will be discussed specific to the period that is the main subject of this work.

The third chapter (the empirical one) will make an empirical analysis of the political economy of the AKP period that is delineated in the historical chapter based on the Başakşehir and Akhisar soccer stadium construction projects. In this way, it will be discussed how the integral state materializes in practice with the help of the specific public-private business model. The analysis based on public-private partnership does form the economic dimension of the integral state. However, stadium construction projects as articulatory practices expand the scope beyond the economic domain and incorporate in its explanations the extra-economic dimensions of the integral state. In this way, the effects of stadium construction projects on the articulation of society into the hegemonic project, “New Turkey” will be discussed.

In this chapter, I will elaborate on why soccer is chosen as a case study. Hence, the political economy of soccer in Turkey will be discussed. The importance of soccer for society will be evaluated based on the cultural, political, ideological and economic aspects of social formation. Also, this study proposes that the construction sector is one of the main vein of accumulation strategy of the power bloc and the stadium construction projects activate many aspects of AKP's accumulation strategy. For these reasons, these projects are very suitable to study the methodology of the articulatory practices of the power bloc. Also, stadium construction projects as articulatory practices enable us to discuss the extra-economic effects on society. In this vein, the aim will be to understand the role that the stadium construction plays in the creation of economic imaginary and the articulation of the phenomenon of "soccer" into the hegemonic project of "New Turkey".

In the last part of this chapter, the general structure mentioned above will be scrutinized through Akhisar and Başakşehir examples, by focusing on field notes collected from Akhisar, Başakşehir and Ankara visits. In this regard, the methodology of the field study will be summarized. Akhisar and Başakşehir examples will assist this study to understand the success of hegemonic practices at the micro-level. That is, these examples will make possible to elaborate the capability of the power bloc to control local political and economic decision-making process. In this sense, stadium construction projects in Akhisar and Başakşehir will be analyzed to understand how these projects are conducted and to clarify the extra-economic effects of these projects on a local scale. Hence, the questions that will be discussed by comparing these two cases are: Can these projects as articulatory practices be successful economically? Can

these projects articulate local people into the hegemonic project? Can these projects assist the power bloc in its efforts to reach the local level? Then, the conclusion will list possible further studies that would assist the investigation of issues discussed in this thesis.

CHAPTER 2

REFORMULATING THE CONCEPT OF THE STATE

This chapter aims at formulating a theoretical framework based on the neo-Gramscian notion of the integral state to understand the role of the state in the construction of hegemony during the AKP period. In this way, the boundaries of economy and the state are redefined to understand their positions in this construction process. More precisely, mainstream approaches, in particular mainstream economics, perceives the state as an exogenous factor in relation to the economy (which is usually equated with “the market”). Even the phrase “the state intervention” positions the state in a manner that presumes the boundary that separates it from the market is clearly defined. However, the state is always an actor in the market.¹ In other words, such dichotomistic representations of the relation between the state and the market are inadequate if the objective is to study the roles of the economy and the state in the construction of hegemony. Therefore, it is necessary to crystallize the concept of the state in order to proceed.

This study uses the neo-Gramscian notion of integral state with the help of Nicos Poulantzas’s (state) and Bob Jessop’s (capital) understanding; thus, state and capital are defined as social relations. In this way, economic activities are not only related to the issues of rent creation and distribution; economic activities are also read as tools for

¹ Karl Polanyi discusses this point in his book *Great Transformation* by sorting out that modern state triggers the changes in social formation and human nature. These changes lead to form a capitalist economy. This analysis is cogently used by Ayşe Buğra (1994) in the context of the political economy of Turkey.

hegemonizing the society through the creation of economic imaginary. That is to say, this study proposes that in addition to economic dimensions, extra-economic dimensions (political, ideological and cultural) have a role in articulating society into hegemony of the power block.

In this sense, there are two main parts to the theoretical chapter. In the first part, the question as to why this study prefers to use the neo-Gramscian terminology is clarified by comparing this theory with other potential theoretical frames, namely the new institutionalist viewpoint, the center-periphery approach, and Cihan Tuğal's (2009) interpretation of the integral state. After that, this study tries to delineate its interpretation of the neo-Gramscian understanding of the integral state. In this part, the neo-Gramscian concepts, namely hegemony and integral state, are elaborated. In addition, a brief discussion of class analysis based on the Poulantzian notion of social classes is provided. Then, in the last part of this chapter, the main theoretical frame is structured based on the discussions throughout the chapter. That is, the understanding of the relation between economic and extra-economic aspects of society is formed in the context of the concepts hegemonic project and its associated accumulation strategy. In this way, this framework aims to formulate the reconstruction of soccer stadiums theoretically.

2.1 Integral State: The neo-Gramscian analysis of state theories

Even though this study prefers to analyze the AKP period based on the neo-Gramscian understanding, it is also possible to use different theoretical frameworks. The new

institutionalist perspective (Douglas North, John Joseph Wallis, Steven Webb), for instance, proposes a frame that develops an economic view of institutions. That is, this frame, generally, analyzes the interaction between the society and institutions to understand social transformation. Nevertheless, this study does not use this approach as it aims to refrain from methodological individualism that characterize the new institutionalist approach. In other words, rather than assuming that people are rational economic agents, I prefer to focus on the area beyond the economic dimension. In this way, it is possible to understand imaginary economic realities, those make the economy a tool for the construction of hegemony. However, even though I do not prefer to use the general structure of this frame, I use significant insights of this theory based on Adaman, Akarçay-Gürbüz and Karaman's (2014) study.

Another theory is the center-periphery approach. This theory defines center as state elites consist of military bureaucratic elites. Also, it proposes that the social engineering characterized the Ottoman state tradition and the main philosophy of the Kemalist revolution. Thus, to the extent that it resists to integration under the rule of the new Republic, the periphery becomes the center of a counter-official culture (Mardin, 1973, p. 184-187). According to Mardin, this counter-official culture is based on Islam, and its cultural heritage is made possible because the center never became integrated with the periphery culturally (Morsümbül, 2015, p. 689). After Turgut Özal, the periphery could carry out its journey into the center and it has begun to play a major role in the economy and the polity of Turkey (Heper, 2013, p. 141). The Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi-ANAP) attempted to bring together diverse political fractions in Turkey and Özal preferred to implement the rule of export-oriented economic policies instead of the

protectionist and paternalistic policies of the previous decades. As a result of the policy change, the economy of Turkey has been begun to be integrated with the world economy. Heper asserts that social transformations within the economic, political and social environments have begun after economic liberalization. This transformation has assisted “the silent Muslim majority” to become a viable alternative against the Republican elite (Heper, 2013, p. 145-146). In addition, this period is the beginning of the development of a synthesis between the Islamic rules of economic conduct and financialization. Heper attaches a particular importance to the establishment of Islamic banking and argues that it had a trigger effect on the emergence of “Anatolian Tigers”², a group of business people as distinct from the Republican bourgeoisie mainly concentrated in Istanbul. Heper asserts that the former is not dependent on the entitlements and protections traditionally provided by the state for the latter. Also, he argued, “Anatolian Tigers” played a key role in Turkey’s accession to the international market successfully (Heper, 2013, p. 146).

The center-periphery approach interprets the AKP period as a successful culmination of the periphery’s journey to the center. Heper (2013) states that

Özal helped the periphery to move to the center and start to successfully compete in economic terms with the earlier members of the center. Erdoğan in turn has enabled the new members of the center to play a dominant role in the polity. (pp. 147)

That is to say, the AKP period is analyzed as an era in which Jacobinism, with its rationalist utopias and social engineering approach, was rejected (Heper, 2013, p. 154).

² “In reference to either their geographic location or their desire to reflect the strategies of the export-oriented SMEs in EANICs (East Asian Newly Industrializing Countries), they were usually referred to as ‘Anatolian capital’ or ‘Anatolian Tigers’” (Hoşgör, 2011: 345).

Hence, AKP ends to the dominance of the Republican elite as a result of being victorious in a number of consecutive elections.

In this sense, the center-periphery approach proposes that civil society as an area where society that have been historically suppressed by the state elite can survive within its boundaries. Also, this theory defines market as a separate structure from the state where the “authentic bourgeoisie” (Anatolian Tigers) will rise from the periphery without any support from the state—unlike the Istanbul bourgeoisie which had historically benefitted significantly from its relations with the Republican state elite. However, understanding the civil society and the market as separate forms from the state challenged by the central argument of this thesis that the state is always in the business. This conceptualization helps us evade squashing the entire complexity of the political economy of Turkey into a clash between political Islam and Republicans. This narrow-scope analysis hinders a deeper understanding of the backdrop to factors that create an opportunity for AKP to construct its hegemony.

Finally, Cihan Tuğal’s work, “Pasif Devrim: İslami Muhalefetin Düzenle Bütünleşmesi” (Passive Revolution: Absorbing to Islamic Challenge to Capitalism), also analyzes the AKP period. Tuğal reformulates the formulation of integral state as “hegemony= political society + civil society + the state + economic”. This formulation makes hegemony a bounded structure. Also, economic is defined as a superstructure in this formulation. This interpretation diverges from the classical Gramscian formulation. That is, Gramsci defines superstructure as comprised of political and civil societies and uses the economy as the base. He does not, however, depict the economic base as a main determinant of the superstructure because of the dialectical relation between the two. In

this sense, Tuğal's formulation hinders focusing on the extra-economic dimension of hegemonic processes.

As mentioned earlier, this study proposes the neo-Gramscian notion of integral state as an alternative theoretical framework to indicate the interwoven relation between political and civil societies, economic and extra-economic dimensions of hegemony construction. That is, it seeks to explain how nongovernmental organizations affect ideology as in the case of Homo Islamicus. In addition, I attempted to interpret the AKP period by using the term hegemony without using Tuğal's "revision of hegemony". In this way, I attempt to indicate that there is a consent apparatus of the state in addition to coercive and governmental apparatuses. Also, the neo-Gramscian understanding of state theory makes possible investigating how economic becomes a tool of the process of hegemony construction. In this sense, this part focuses on the general characteristic of the Gramscian state theory, so that it will be possible to frame the main theoretical structure of this study.

Integral state is formulated as "integral state= civil society + political society" by Gramsci. This equation deconstructs the dichotomy between the state and the civil society; rather it makes civil society as an aspect of a theory of state. In this way, the state contains not only the governmental apparatus of coercion (political society), but also the hegemonic apparatus (civil society) through which power bloc attempts to obtain consent³ of the masses (Texier, 1979, p. 63). That is to say, "The formulation conceptualizes political society and civil society as being 'co-extensive' rather than two

³ "The 'consent' was made possible by the intellectual and moral hegemony of one group over another and by its capacity to prepare a new historic condition for the future" (Badaloni, 1979: 99).

different ‘regions’” (Nelson, 2012, p. 1). In other words, the idea of integral state refers to a dialectical unity of civil and political societies. They are “two major superstructural levels” and they cannot be fixed in a hierarchical manner in relation to the economic structure within the base-superstructure framework (Thomas, 2009, p. 148). This conceptualization makes possible to confirm the thesis that political, cultural and economic entities of a social formation are integrated with each other and it is impossible to claim that one of them is superior to another. This formulation imposes that political society has a role in shaping and designing civil society. However, not only political society exceeds the state that organizes it but also “civil society exceeds the political society that attempts to impose meaning upon it” (Thomas 2009, p. 190). Thomas interprets this dialectical relationship as an indicator of how hegemonic practices that take place in political society and civil society. In other words, any attempt to organize hegemony in civil society will always have implications for political society (Nelson, 2012, p. 7; Thomas, 2009, p. 194).

The neo-Gramscian analysis should not be oversimplified in the context of class reductionism⁴; hence, this study uses the Poulantzian concept of social classes. The neo-Gramscian understanding of state proposes a broader state definition in the context of the clash within the society rather than interpreting the state as an instrument which is the expression of a clash between two sides (class struggle).

⁴ “Class reductionism: the class criterion began to become the fundamental criterion at all levels and this is how one of the fundamental characteristics of economism originated, that is to say, class reductionism” (Mouffe, 1979, p. 174).

Mouffe interprets this broader sense in the following manner “political struggle did not consist in a simple confrontation between antagonistic classes but always involved complex relations of forces” (Mouffe, 1979: 180).

Hence, Mouffe points out this broader perception of the state on the basis of two levels. First, this broader perception means an enlargement of the social base of the state and the complex relations in which the state, the hegemonic class and the society shapes each other. Second, this broader perception means an enlargement of the state’s functions which refer to the incorporation of the apparatuses of hegemony, of civil society and of the state (Mouffe, 1979, p. 182). The reformation process between the state, the hegemonic class and the masses also describes the moment of struggle for hegemony through which social classes try pioneering the foundation of a new type of state. However, complex relations of forces require political, economic and ideological aspects of hegemony as these are critical areas where a system of alliances are to be constructed (Texier, 1979, p. 65). More precisely, this system of alliances gathers the subordinate groups together with dominant group on behalf of the dominant group, therefore, this system constructs the hegemony of ‘dominant’ group on the intellectual and moral plane, and then, subsequently engenders a new civilization under the rule of the ‘dominant’ group (Texier, 1979, p. 65). To summarize, political hegemony should have an economic base, but also, hegemonic exercises in the domain of the economy should have a political base and this bilateral relation incorporates the intellectual and moral planes. However, as Mouffe points out that the hegemony of a social class is not simply a matter of the domination of the antagonistic social groups; in addition, the hegemony requires the leadership of this social class over allied groups. That is to say, it

is also matter of articulation of other social groups (Mouffe, 1979, p. 201). In this sense, it will be useful to clarify the concept of hegemony to understand the issue that how different fractions of social classes are articulated.

In this sense, it is useful to elaborate the Poulantzian concept of social classes and social categories⁵ to understand the political history of Turkey and the AKP period. However, it critical to underline that this brief analysis aims at indicating the ambiguity of relations within the society rather than shaping social relations in a certain form.

Poulantzas (1973) states that

A social class is defined by its place in the ensemble of social practices, i.e. by its place in the ensemble of the division of labor which includes political and ideological relations. This place corresponds to the structural determination of classes, i.e. the manner in which determination by the structure (relations of production, politico-ideological domination/subordination) operates on class practices. (pp. 28)

That is, the concept of social class is not only a matter of economic field; in addition to the economic ones, extra-economic factors need to be taken into account.

Furthermore, Nicos Poulantzas argues that class relations are limited neither to capitalist relations nor to the antagonism between two “fundamental” classes. In this sense,

Poulantzas (1973) points out

If we confine ourselves to modes of production alone, examining them in a pure and abstract fashion, we find that each of them involves two classes—the exploiting class, which is politically and ideologically dominant, and the exploited class, which is politically and ideologically dominated: masters and slaves in the slave mode of production, lords and serfs in the feudal mode of production, bourgeois and workers in the capitalist mode of production. But a concrete society

⁵ Poulantzas defines “social category” as a term which “designates an ensemble of agents whose principal role is its functioning in the state apparatuses and in ideology” (Poulantzas, 1973, p. 40). Nevertheless, it is critical to underscore that social categories belong to classes and they do not form a class on their own (Poulantzas, 1973, p. 40).

(a social formation) involves more than two classes in so far as it is composed of various modes and forms of production. (pp. 33)

This definition enables us to observe how diverse political actors, beyond the two fundamental classes (direct laborers and capitalists), act in relation to the capital accumulation process in its entirety. More precisely, the stratification within capitalist classes refers, in addition to those who appropriate the surplus (e.g., the Board of Directors), to a range of subsumed classes⁶ (e.g., manager, owner, lender of money, or renter of land) (Resnick and Wolff, 1981; Stormes, 1988, p. 86). The stratification among capitalist class positions has also another meaning which discloses layers of capitalist sectors across a range of axes. That is, capitalist classes are decomposed based on ideological and political differences (e.g., Istanbul bourgeoisie vs. Anatolian Tigers; TÜSİAD vs MÜSİAD). Capitalist fractions are also divided into sectorial basis, i.e. financial capital, petty bourgeoisie or small- and medium-scaled capital. These stratifications indicate how the power bloc needs to construct cross-class alliances to articulate them. More non-class positions which define the complex relation of matrix within a social formation overdetermine the class process (Resnick and Wolff, 1981; Stormes, 1988, p. 88). The non-capitalist positions contain figures within non-capitalist sectors like small street vendors acting in an informal economy, free-lancer tutors or household as a different kind of mode of production. In addition, non-capitalist positions refer to government transfers which provide non-class revenues and positions (Resnick and Wolff, 1981; Stormes, 1988, p. 89). These transfers also can be materialized with the help of informal social networks. Kinship and neighbor relations or religious

⁶ Subsumed class positions refers to the possibility that “one may also participate in a class process by disturbing or receiving a payment out of the surplus in return for providing some condition of existence of the future production and appropriation of that surplus” (Resnick and Wolff, 1981; Stormes, 1988: 87).

communities, they contain economic and extra-economic dimensions together, provide childcare, transport, food or shelter. All in all, social class defines a class analysis which comprises economic and extra-economic aspects of a social formation together. In this way, this study aims at understanding the whole dimensions of society while analyzing the political economy of Turkey.

2.2 What is hegemony?

After the analysis of the general characteristics of integral state and a brief discussion of class analysis, this study will clarify the concept of hegemony as an apparatus of integral state. Mouffe's (1979) study underlines that

Hegemony, therefore, becomes, in its typically Gramscian formulation, 'political, intellectual and moral leadership over allied groups. For Gramsci hegemony is a general interpretative category which applies to all forms of the articulation of the interests of a fundamental class to those of other social groups in the creation of a collective will. (pp. 11)

This study uses Mouffe's definition of the concept of hegemony, since this definition contains all aspects (economic and extra-economic) of a social formation. Even though Mouffe's definition looks like attaching importance to ethico-political part of hegemony, she does not ignore its economic dimension as she highlights "all forms of the articulation of the interests". These forms, of course, refer to an economic relation between a fundamental class and other social groups or different capitalist groups. Moreover, Gramsci is aware of the importance of economics. He proposes that in addition to ethico-political structure, hegemony also should have economic characteristics (Gramsci, 1971, p. 248). In this way, he places the economy within the domain of hegemony. Even if economics becomes a subject of hegemonic practices, this

situation does not limit hegemony within boundaries, because hegemony defines a continuous process of articulating heterogenous struggles and demands into a bloc.

Because hegemony is a dynamic process and relation, it needs reproduction and recreation of itself (Demir and Göymen, 2012, p. 101). That is, the dynamic nature of social formation creates unceasing imbalances between social classes that require to be reformulated through hegemonic practices. Understanding such hegemonic practices requires the analysis of two concepts, namely the field of articulation and articulatory practices.⁷ The field of articulation gives us a chance to observe the relation between economic and extra-economic dimensions of the social formation in hegemonic practices. In this way, it is possible to understand the role of economy in the construction of hegemony.

As Laclau and Mouffe argue, the moment of articulation is not enough to realize hegemony, so, antagonisms within the society should also be discussed. That is, it is critical to focus on the battles within political areas to analyze a plurality of various and contradictory positions in any given society. Laclau and Mouffe mention two types of struggles. One of them is democratic struggles which refer to a plurality in the field of politics. The other is popular struggles where a battle establishes a singular political area of certain discourses dividing the field into two opposing camps (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985, p. 137). Hegemonic discourses in political struggle create “others” and imposes on dichotomies by inventing “us” against “others”. This struggle within the political sphere always triggers antagonisms that are used by hegemonic power to marginalize “other”

⁷ The concept of articulatory practices is discussed in the last part of this chapter.

social groups. The marginalization of others aims at generating a political sphere where hegemonic power gives ideological meaning to every economic action. In other words, this marginalization process is a discursive methodology which delineates the ideological structure of their hegemony. In this way, the ideological structure of the hegemonic power forms a reasonable ground for its economic actions.

2.3 Jessopian Understanding of State

In the previous section, the integral state is introduced to indicate the inextricability of civil society and political society. In this way, this study will be able to discuss the role of non-governmental organizations in empowering hegemonic power of the power bloc. In addition, by proposing the neo-Gramscian notion of state that makes the study of complex relations of forces within society possible as its main theoretical structure, it will be possible to avoid falling into class reductionism. Finally, the dynamic nature of the concept of the hegemony is sorted out to clarify how new coalitions are constructed and how new conflicts between social classes are emerges. The framework of integral state enables this study to discuss the concepts, namely accumulation strategy and hegemonic project. These concepts make possible explaining how the power bloc can articulate different fractions of social classes by using economic and extra-economic dimensions of hegemonic practices.

As mentioned above, one of the main purposes of this study is to focus on the closed connection between economic and extra-economic aspects of a social formation. In this manner, hegemonic power must have an ability to change the economic base and

to reconstruct production relations in order to develop new productive forces. Hence, “political hegemony should have an economic base and content” (Texier, 1979, p. 64). This is because this study also attaches importance to the Jessopian analysis of hegemony which crystallizes these two aspects of a social formation by coming up with the concept of the regime of accumulation.

Hegemonic practices provide reproduction of social relations through articulatory practices. The reproduction of social relations has two components: capital accumulation and reproduction of labor as a commodity (Jessop, 2002, p. 46). Capital accumulation means that accepting the term “capital” is not only an economic concept; rather capital is a social relation. There are integrated elements that have a link with different moments to provide the reproduction of the capitalist relations (Jessop, 1999, p. 197). In this way, Jessop discloses extra-economic factors which are as important as the economic ones.

In this regard, Jessop proposes the term accumulation strategy through which researchers can find an opportunity to integrate global economic conjuncture⁸ with national economic dynamics.⁹

An accumulation strategy defines a specific economic “growth model” complete with its various extra-economic preconditions and outlines the general strategy appropriate to its realization. (pp. 198)

In other words, while the growth strategy of a nation cannot be separated from the dynamics of global economic conjunctures, these dynamics are not the only factors that

⁸ “As an analytical tool, the concept of conjuncture can expand the capacity to act politically by helping to examine the conditions of a political intervention in their complexity, that is, to trace the displacements and condensations of different sorts of contradictions, and thus open up possibilities for action” (Koivisto & Lahtinen, 2012:267).

⁹ More precisely, the concept of accumulation strategy is also critical for my analysis of the relation between the state in Turkey, defined as a *sui generis* state form by Heper, and the global economic and political structure in the second chapter.

shape the accumulation strategies of nations. There are extra-economic factors that affect the growth strategies in the national context. That is, even if structural forms of growth strategies on the basis of a regime of accumulation may be the same, there are differences in growth strategies of nations caused by the variations in national political conjunctures. In this regard, capital accumulation is a phenomenon such that it is a result of market and non-market social mechanisms. These institutions are inherent to capital accumulation (Jessop, 1990, p. 198).

Jessop (1990) also proposes two ways to construct accumulation strategy: economic domination and economic hegemony.

Economic domination can be enjoyed by various fractions of capital and occurs when one fraction is able to impose its own particular “economic-corporate” interests on the other fractions regardless of their wishes and/or at their expense. Such domination can derive directly from the position of the relevant fraction in the overall circuit of capital in a specific economic conjuncture and/or indirectly from the use of some form of extra-economic coercion (including the exercise of state power).

Economic hegemony derives from economic leadership through general acceptance of an accumulation strategy. Such a strategy must advance the immediate interests of other fractions by integrating the circuit of capital in which they are implicated at the same time as it secures the long-term interests of the hegemonic fraction in controlling the allocation of money capital to different areas of investment advantageous to itself. (pp. 199)

In addition, an accumulation strategy does not only take into account economically dominant classes and different fractions of capital, but also coordinates the balance of relations between the dominant and subordinate classes. “An accumulation strategy becomes “hegemonic” really, if it is internalized by non-hegemonic fractions and classes within power bloc, as well as, it is internalized by dependent classes” (Jessop, 1990, p. 201).

Thus, the dominant fractions may give up economic-corporate benefits in order to articulate the subordinate classes into their accumulation strategy (Jessop, 1990, p. 201). However, it is critical to point out that providing a balance between different fractions of capital and social classes is not a static process; rather this relation is a dynamic process because of the changing balance of forces and structures. Hence, “it is important to consider not only the value form and directly economic forces but also political and ideological structures, forces, and strategies” (Jessop, 1990, p. 206).

In this respect, the concept of hegemonic projects¹⁰ gains importance. Jessop defines hegemony as “interpellation and organization of different class-relevant (but not necessarily class-conscious) forces under the ‘political, intellectual, and moral leadership’ of a particular class” (Jessop, 1990, p. 207). Holding the leadership depends on a specific hegemonic project which is the solution to possible conflicts between particular interests and the general interests (Jessop, 1990, p. 208). A hegemonic project injects into a society with the help of national-popular program which articulates the social classes into the long-term interests of the power bloc.

The ingredients (consent and force) of hegemonic practices provide social integrity, but, it is hard to claim that hegemonic projects always contain all the parts of society. That is, national-popular program does not always contain the entirety of the society. Jessop conceptualizes this phenomena as two-nations hegemonic projects.¹¹

¹⁰ Hegemonic project refers to the leadership of a class that organizes interest groups. Organizing such a leadership is possible if the clash between self-interest and general interest is dissolved by a hegemonic project (Jessop, 1990, p. 208).

¹¹ There are two types of hegemonic projects that are conceptualized by Jessop. “One nation” hegemonic project is a concept such that it contains all parts of society. Hegemonic fractions can sacrifice economic interests and can give symbolic rewards to provide articulation. On the other hand, two-nations hegemonic

Two-nations projects create “us” and “other” in a manner similar to what Laclau and Mouffe identified as popular struggles. Marginalization and suppression of other social fractions are the main feature of these projects. More precisely, Jessop (1990) states that

Two-nations projects aim at a more limited hegemony concerned to mobilize the support of strategically significant sectors of the population and to pass the costs of the project to other sectors. These projects require containment and even repression of the “other nation” at the same time as they involve selective access and concessions for the more favored ‘nation’. (pp. 212)

According to Jessop, two-nations hegemonic projects increase the importance of the role of the state in rent creation and distribution. Furthermore, the state intervention in two-nations framework entails an economic domination within the economic sphere. In the political sphere, these types of hegemonic projects increases the state oppression and the role of the police force (Jessop, 1990, p. 212).

Moreover, Jessop makes a conceptual distinction between the terms hegemonic project and accumulation strategy. Even if they are not mutually exclusive, these terms are not identical. Put it differently, accumulation strategies are directly related to the economic expansion in the context of national or international scale. In the case of hegemonic project, even though it has an economic aspect, hegemonic projects principally contain non-economic objectives (Jessop, 1990, p. 208). Hegemonic projects are related to military and political power relations, social reforms, political stability or moral regeneration (Jessop, 1990, p. 208). In this regard, hegemonic projects concern broader issues which are contained not only by economic relations but also in the field of civil society and the state (Jessop, 1990, p. 208). However, Jessop underscores the

project aims to acquire supports from the strategic parts of a society and the cost of hegemonic project is reflected to other parts of the society (Jessop, 1990, p. 211).

role that the economic objective plays in assisting to pursuit of a successful hegemonic project, because the economic aspect of hegemonic project enables to articulate different fractions of social classes by providing a flow of material concessions. Also, this economic aspect of hegemonic project empowers the productivity of economy which, in turn, provides political stability (Jessop, 1990, p. 209). That is to say, the harmony between the accumulation strategy and the hegemony project is the key factor to pursue a successful hegemony project. In this respect, the term economic imaginary is critical to understand how to construct a harmony¹² between these two terms. I mean, economic imaginary cannot be accepted to be related only to economic aspects of a social formation; rather it is also and directly related to extra-economic part of social formation since it is a kind of discursive form such that different fractions of social classes are articulated into a common project on the basis of the success of economic imaginary (Jessop, 1990, p. 198). This discursive methodology brings together economic and extra-economic conditions to establish a harmony between the accumulation strategy and hegemony project. In this way, this harmony provides a bilateral regeneration of economic imaginary and hegemonic project.¹³ More precisely, economic imaginary redefine and reshape the economic field by giving ideological, political and cultural meaning to subsets of economic activities. Hence, they have a crucial role in constituting a hegemonic project. Imagined economies articulate social classes by institutions at an

¹² “This harmony assigns an hegemonic project to secure the (integral) economic base of the dominant mode of growth; and that it does this through the direct, active conforming of all social relations to the economic (and extra-economic) needs of the latter.” (Jessop and Sum, 2006: 363).

¹³ This study points out the bilateral generation clearly in chapter three with the help of the term political entrepreneurship which serves as a nodal point between these terms.

international scale, political parties, think tanks, business associations and trade unions, and social movements (Jessop, 2004, p. 163).

2.3.1 Articulatory practices & political entrepreneurship: The methodology of construction of hegemony

The (re)production of economic imaginary requires articulatory practices conducted in the social field. As mentioned above, fields of articulation are areas where implications of accumulation strategies can be transformed into a moment empowering a specific hegemonic project. Articulatory practices, in this regard, are not only economic activities, but also they assist the power bloc to hegemonize different fractions of social classes by affecting the extra-economic aspects of society.

This study proposes that the articulatory practices have four dimensions, namely cultural, political, nature and economic. Cultural dimension of an articulatory practice increases impression of economic activities on society. This effect expands the hegemonic power of the power bloc. This dimension also attaches importance to cultural ties of the power bloc with different social classes. That is to say, a strong connection at a grassroots level of the power bloc may hasten the articulation of subclasses into the hegemonic project. Another dimension of an articulatory practice is political. In this dimension, political representatives of the power bloc try to maintain their political hegemony through elections with the help of articulatory practices. In this way, the power bloc can find a chance to obtain power to use state institutions. This power may make the creation of economic opportunities for capital fractions by using state

apparatus easier. In addition, the types of a hegemonic project (one nation & two-nations) also form the political dimension of articulatory practices. That is, specific to the subject of this study, two-nations hegemonic project is the main structure of the method of hegemonic project. In this regard, articulatory practices in this structure may divide political dimensions into two as “us” versus “other”. This separation assists the power bloc to weaken counter hegemonic projects while articulating different fractions of social classes. The third dimension of an articulatory practice is nature. This dimension is related to ecological cost of implications of accumulation strategies. In general sense, the regime of accumulation after 80s increases the destructive effects of accumulation process on ecology. Articulatory practices revalorize nature without taking into account other species. Hence, climate change becomes an inevitable consequence. Finally, the fourth dimension of articulatory practices is economic. This dimension has a direct relation to the accumulation strategies of the power bloc. In other words, the economic dimension of articulatory practices refers to implications of accumulation strategies. This dimension aims at creating economic opportunities to empower allied capital fractions. However, it is critical to notice that this dimension also articulates subordinated social classes with the help of extra-economic dimensions of articulatory practices.

This study interprets articulatory practices conceptually as political entrepreneurship. In this sense, this work also tries to reformulate the concept of entrepreneurship by adding the state as an important domain of entrepreneurial activities. In this way, political entrepreneurship is conceptualized as a multi-dimensional category. That is to say, this study uses the term to explain how political

power and economic relations are intertwined, how hegemonic consent is constructed on the ground, in the field of economic relations, how economic imaginary and creation and distribution of economic rents are treated as aspects of one single process.

In this regard, political entrepreneurship is formulated as a function rather than accepting it as a personal activity, so, institutions have a significant place in the formulation which contains state institutions, firms and non-governmental organizations. In this way, political entrepreneurship is an instance of integral state in practice. At the same time, political entrepreneurship has a direct relation with the accumulation strategies of the power bloc. More precisely, creativity in political entrepreneurship is bounded by accumulation strategies. For instance, construction and infrastructural investments are the leading economic opportunities in Turkey. In this regard, political entrepreneurial activities cannot be independent from these sectors, since state resources are reutilized for rent creation and distribution on the basis of investments on these leading sectors.

This study also attempts to use Harvey's term, accumulation by dispossession.¹⁴ One of the practices of accumulation by dispossession is state redistribution. This redistribution process can be materialized by the reproduction of space or opening up new dynamic spaces of capital accumulation (Harvey, 2003, p. 66). In this sense, Harvey (2003) remarks that

¹⁴ Harvey also uses the term creative destruction to explain the cost of neoliberalism on societies. That is, the extreme volatility caused by growth periods of neoliberal era create financial crisis in countries that attempt to adapt their economies into neoliberal form of regime of accumulation (Harvey, 2006: 152). This interpretation, in fact, defines financialization and privatization as practices of accumulation by dispossession.

[the] state reorganizes capitalist social relations and institutional arrangements (rules of contract and private property arrangements) or recommodifies state resources by destroying pre-existing social formations and pre-existing physical landscape for over-accumulation even though this creative destruction has deleterious social and environmental consequences. (pp. 66)

In this way, this study tries to understand the methodology of accumulation strategy of the power bloc. The methodology assists to understand that how power bloc attempts to recommodify urban space through the reconstruction of soccer stadiums.

In conclusion, the aim of this chapter was to further crystallize the theoretical framework of the study in the context of neo-Gramscian understanding. In general terms, the concept of the integral state is interpreted by using Jessopian notions. In this way, economic and extra-economic are taken into account in the state-capital relations. Also, hegemonic apparatus of the state is scrutinized to understand the dynamic nature of social formation and Poulantzas's social classes are used to avoid falling into class reductionism. Then, fields of articulation and articulatory practices are defined to theorize the articulation of different fractions of social classes into a hegemonic project. Finally, this chapter construes the term political entrepreneurship to elaborate the process of (re)generation of economic imaginary that is defined as an intersection set of economic and extra-economic dimensions of the state-capital relation.

In the third chapter, this theoretical structure will be used to attempt to rewrite political history of Modern Turkey and the AKP period specifically. In this way, theoretical structure of this study gains a historical meaning in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 3

A NEO-GRAMSCIAN APPROACH TO THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TURKEY

From modernization theory to class-based analysis, from identity politics to political economy of Islam, from neoliberalism to varieties of capitalisms, there are many different ways of "making sense" of AKP rule. This historical chapter, however, provides an account of the political economy of Turkey by using the theoretical framework introduced in the previous chapter. The main purpose of this chapter is to study the specificity of the AKP period while attempting to rewrite corner points of political economic history of Turkey by critically approaching Heper's (2013) periodization.¹⁵ Nevertheless, this study does not plan to rewrite the entire history of the political economy of Turkey. The main aim is to indicate that there are strong insights to gain from using the Gramscian notion of integral state in making sense of these critical periods, namely the construction of new Republic, the transformation into the multi-party system, the 1980 military coup and the beginning of the neoliberal transformation of Turkey immediately after the coup. This attempt provides a historical structure that forms the basis for understanding the AKP period.

In this regard, there are two main parts to this chapter. In the first part, the history of political economy of Turkey is analyzed in the context of the neo-Gramscian integral state by using Heper's periodization. In the second part of this chapter, growing power of political Islam in society is discussed in relation to the neoliberal transformation in

¹⁵ Heper (2013) defines three revolutions to explain the history of political economy of Turkey. Cultural revolution refers to the construction of the Republic of Turkey. Democratic revolution is the beginning of the transition to multi-party period. Lastly, economic revolution refers to the beginning of economic liberalization.

Turkey. In this way, the general characteristic of neoliberally-oriented conservative ideology is delineated and the historical backdrop of AKP hegemony is re-constructed. The final section of this part focuses on the AKP years beginning with 2002. In this section, I will analyze how AKP became a nodal point¹⁶ that enabled the construction a new power bloc. Moreover, “New Turkey” as a hegemonic project is construed and the accumulation strategy of the power bloc is introduced. In short, the chapter aims at providing an account of the political economy of this specific period from a macro perspective.

3.1 A short summary of political economic history of Turkey

3.1.1 From Kemalist Revolution to economic liberalization

Kemalist revolution required a transformation in a wide spectrum of areas ranging from alphabet to education, from apparel to measurement units in the new Republic. Thus, the Republic of Turkey is formed based on Western-style politics and culture. Based on the lenses of neo-Gramscian notions, this study proposes that the Kemalist revolution has failed to articulate different fractions of social classes into its new hegemonic structure. Put it differently, integral state contains coercion and domination; but this Gramscian state theory also requires a hegemonic apparatus which has a social base that give consent (Dikici-Bilgin, 2009, p. 5). In this sense, the Kemalist Revolution has failed to trigger the consent apparatus of the integral state to work properly. Hence, diverse social

¹⁶ Nodal Point: Nodal point is the node that stays in the center of articulatory relations. Hence, AKP can be a nodal point because it can be positioned on the center on the basis of relational ability with other moments (other social classes).

classes have failed to internalize the republican values (Dikici-Bilgin, 2009, p. 10). However, it does not mean that the power bloc¹⁷ of the Republican period only used force to dictate the republican values. They did try to form a “collective will” in the rubric of secular modernism. Dikici-Bilgin (2009) points out that

Gramscian thinking helps us to understand the establishment and consolidation of the Turkish state tradition not as a mere act of the state imposing a new system on society by force, but rather as a process in which the state goes beyond resorting to force, and tries to form values and a collective will in civil society through the pillars of the constitutive republican ideology. It is a process of transforming a society based on religion to a society in which the citizens, no longer subjects, would define themselves around secular principles and a civic conceptualization of Turkishness. (pp. 10)

Nonetheless, social and political revolution¹⁸ of these classes (the power bloc of the Republican period) have failed to expand the hegemonic power over the society and the hegemonic apparatus of the integral state did not function in full force. More precisely, there were no sufficiently potent political agencies¹⁹ in the early Republican period (the 1920s and 1930s). Thus, its lack of political agencies and entities limited the effectivity of the hegemonic apparatus of the integral state (Dikici-Bilgin, 2009, p. 12). Nevertheless, the power bloc tried to articulate social classes with the help of non-governmental organizations, namely Halkevleri (Yeşilkaya, 2003). This particular institution gave ideological meaning to the new Republic at the grassroots level by attempting to reformulate daily lives of society from education to entertainment.

¹⁸ Öncü (2003) uses these terms to explain the Kemalist revolution. I find these to be more useful concepts in comparison to the Heper’s “cultural revolution,” since they comprehend the Kemalist revolution in a broader sense.

¹⁹ “The early years of the republic, the government has protected itself from any serious opposition on the part of civil society by banning political parties that it perceives to be threatening, or potentially threatening” (Karaman and Aras, 2000, p. 53).

In the case of transition to multi-party system, rather than understanding this transition as a defiance of bourgeoisie against the center, it symbolizes the continuity in the context of the state-society relations (Yalman, 2002, p. 13-14). That is, the interpretation of the transition to the multi-party system²⁰ as a challenge of the emergent bourgeoisie against the state authority has a contradictory structure, since this understanding assumes that the market is a structure independent from the state. In this manner, the state is positioned as an exclusive structure which is out of the boundary of the dynamic nature of social formation. More precisely, the DP's program did not significantly differ from the CHP's program (Öncü, 2003, p. 317). "The DP vowed to remain loyal to the fundamental principles of the secular state while, on the other hand, demanding greater respect for religion and less government intervention in religious affairs" (Öncü, 2003, p. 317). In this sense, the transition to the multi-party system refers to a metamorphosis which does not cause any changes in the power relations among social classes. "It is a new methodology of 'passive revolution'" (Yalman, 2002, p. 14). However, there is a difference between DP and CHP with respect to their discursive methodology. DP developed a new hegemonic discourse to articulate subordinated social classes into the hegemonic project by using Islam as a means of articulatory tool (Öncü, 2003, p. 317). In this way, DP obtained a powerful position in the political arena; it obtained a quasi-monopoly power within the legislative process, the parliament, and the bureaucracy. In addition, the party was controlled by large landowners and people from the countryside. Changes in power balance within the party excluded industrial

²⁰ According to Heper (2013) and Mardin (1978), after transition to multi-party system, Democrat Party (DP) came into power and Republican People's Party (CHP) became the opposition party. This transition in government is interpreted as a democratic revolution, since the periphery to be presented in a political arena through which counter-official culture breaks the tyranny of the center.

bourgeoisie in the decision-making process and in the legislature (Öncü, 2003, p. 317). This antagonism between different social classes within the party resolved by the army which sided with the rising industrial capital. As a result, DP government was subverted by the military coup in May 27th 1960 (Savran, 1992, p. 167-168).

The last period is economic liberalization. Heper uses the term “economic revolution” to refer to the period of post-1980 period in which Turgut Özal triggers the process of economic liberalization. As mentioned above, this study analyses this period based on the neo-Gramscian perspective, since the integral state provides a field to understand the processes of ideological struggle for hegemony (Dikici-Bilgin, 2009, p. 13). The analysis of ideological struggle also assists to delineate a new ideology which combines neoliberal transformation and political Islam. This synthesis also makes it possible to understand the AKP period without reducing it into discussion of democratization.²¹ In this way, it is possible to observe the interaction between political and civil societies. However, this interaction does not only a flow from the political society to civil society; rather civil society has a significant role in forming a new ideology. More precisely, civil society organizations (business associations, foundations or think tanks) have a contact with political society to define the general characteristics of society in Turkey (Dikici-Bilgin, 2009, p. 19).

²¹ I mean, the successful movement of periphery to center understands the AKP period as a development of democratization, but this interpretation has a contradictory structure, since especially the last 8 years of the AKP period indicates that political monopoly of AKP government ruins democratic environment.

In this sense, it is significant to understand the adaptation process of political Islam to neoliberal form of regime of accumulation. Thus, it is possible to picture Turkey-based neoliberal new ideology that has a conservative structure.

3.1.2 The place of political Islam in political economy of Turkey before the AKP period

As mentioned above, this study does not position the political Islam in the periphery. However, it is impossible to reject that the political history of Turkey has been full of struggles between the secular social classes and those who are ideologically close to political Islam. Historically, these struggles have been resolved in favor of Kemalist bureaucratic social categories and its associated capitalist fractions. Nevertheless, throughout this history, the secular power bloc has failed to articulate political Islam into the basic tenets of the Republic of Turkey. In fact, consent mechanism cannot be processed in this struggle to hegemonize such social classes, as the discrepancy among these groups in economic and extra-economic aspects hinders their articulation.

Nevertheless, this does not mean that the subordinate classes and/ or social categories cannot generate alternative hegemonic projects (Jessop, 1990:210). In this vein, social classes close to political Islam may develop alternative economies, politics and culture, but as Jessop (1990) states that

Such hegemonic projects always remain vulnerable to the dissolution of any such hegemony as attempts to implement such projects run up against obstacles grounded in existing economic and political forms. (pp. 210)

That is, counter-hegemony of Islamic social classes cannot obtain state power to activate ideological hegemony over the entire society. However, even if political Islam has been forced to cope with political pressures, Islamic social classes can carry out forming an alternative life. More precisely, “they have a great grassroots mobilization capacity coming from traditional and informal religious and ethnic networks at the local level” (Adaman, Akarçay-Gürbüz and Karaman, 2014, p. 7). Even if these networks are not capable of dominating politics at a national scale, they assisted social classes close to political Islam to shield themselves from the secular hegemonic projects. Already, the dominant coalition (the power bloc) is not capable of processing consent mechanism; instead force becomes the main tool to operate hegemonic projects.

After the beginning of neoliberal transformation of Turkey in the 1980s, excluded groups like small- and medium-sized enterprises in the provinces, traditional industries and informal laborers became an actor in national political economy. More precisely, export-oriented growth model and the influence of neoliberal forms of regulation lead to a change in production relations (Adaman, Akarçay-Gürbüz and Karaman, 2014, p. 11). The exclusion of organized labor and transformation to mass production to flexible production mechanism reshape the organizational structure of production process. In this sense, small- and medium-scale producers found a chance to take active role in the national economy which enabled them to generate a new pattern of capital accumulation. Also, flexible production system created an insecure labor market which pushed to expand informal employment. In this way, counter-hegemonic life-style of Islamic social classes started to become more pre-dominant in production relations.

In this regard, Buğra (1998) remarks that

This new logic of production relations, flexible production, small enterprises in relationships of cooperation as well as competition have become important in an environment characterized by diverse interfirm linkages of suppliers, subcontractors, and end users. (pp. 524)

In this way, feudal connections reformulate production relations. That is, small businesses are mostly conducted by local entrepreneurs who organize their work through feudal relations at which labor is provided on the basis of family connections or community relations.

Informal communitarian networks of political Islam in business became formal by establishing business organizations after the increasing importance of SMEs in national economics. The establishment of the Association of Independent Industrialists and Businessmen (Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği—MÜSİAD) in 1990 is the first instance of the emergence of these conservative formal organizations.²² The establishment of MÜSİAD can be interpreted as a resistance to the economic hegemony of TÜSİAD; nevertheless, even though this study does consider the importance of this point,²³ MÜSİAD also had a role in the integration of political Islam with neoliberalism. From a neo-Gramscian perspective, this civil organization attempts to create ideological structure to make the synergy between neoliberal understanding and the Islamic life-style possible. In this way, a consent mechanism can be activated. More precisely,

²² After MÜSİAD, there are two more conservative business organizations are established, namely ASKON (Anatolian Tigers Businessmen Associations-Anadolu Aslanları İş Adamları Derneği) (1998) and TUSKON (Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Confederation) (2005).

²³ Buğra (1994) states that state-capital relations are structured on particular connections between firms and political actors. In this sense, becoming a member of TÜSİAD or MÜSİAD is not the main determinant of state-capital relations.

political Islam changes its shell after neoliberal transformation. This change helps Islamic social classes to obtain a role in the formation of “the market” as a hegemonic project.

The neoliberal transformation in Islamic groups can be observed in MÜSİAD’s report “İş Hayatında İslam İnsanı” (A Muslim in Business World). This report also indicates the transition of economic understanding in political Islam. That is to say, “Adil Düzen” (Just Economic Order) is an alternative rhetoric of planned economy before the 1980s. In this system, the state was deemed to be the main decision-maker; it was designated to prepare macro development plans, encourage investment projects and render infrastructure services. The system also tries to determine the rules of economic relations (related to credit system, monetary mechanism, tax system etc.) in the context of Islamic rule.²⁴ In this sense, this study understands “Adil Düzen” rhetoric as an Islamic interpretation of the Fordist period.

After the neoliberal transformation, political Islam also reformulated its economic viewpoint. The general idea in MÜSİAD’s report (1994) is that the rules of free market reflect the Islamic economic understanding. The report claims “God determines the prices in the market” by giving reference to the Prophet. In addition, the report asserts that the correct economic organization in a Muslim community can be possible only in free market economy without any regulations. Also, another fundamental assumption in the report is that becoming rich is not a sin, buying luxury goods is a right for Muslims who work hard. These assumptions also enable the devout Muslims to internalize the

²⁴ <http://www.necmettinerbakan.net/haberler/-adil-ekonomik-duzen-ihdiyaci.html>

new pattern of capital accumulation in which SMEs having a strong tie to Islam was beginning to gain increasing economic power in the market. Finally, in the report, the employer – employee relations, unionization (unions are indicated as unnecessary mechanisms), consumer choices and firm theory are re-conceptualized with due reference to Islamic rules. In short, Homo Islamicus²⁵ emerges in this document as a concept which reshapes economic relations in society to carry out integrating political Islam into neoliberal worldview.

In this sense, the transition from “Adil Düzen” to “Homo Islamicus” is an ideological adaptation process of Political Islam into the neoliberal order. This ideological change in Political Islam makes possible to establish “the market” as the hegemonic project on the ground of Sunni-Turkish basis. This ideological basis also assisted AKP government to expedite the process of construction of the hegemonic apparatus of the integral state. In this manner, the power bloc forming by and around AKP was able to articulate different social classes into its hegemonic project.

In addition to the ideological dimension of the adaptation of Political Islam to neoliberal form of regime of accumulation, this Islamic political movement created advantageous position for themselves in political areas by compensating disadvantaged conditions of excluded groups living in peripheries of the urban areas. That is to say, Islamic political parties have appeared since the 1970s, but they were consistently forced to cope with a series of closure cases.²⁶ However, the critical point for Political Islam is

²⁵ Homo Islamicus is a prototype such that it determines the characteristic values of Muslims in working life on the basis of neoliberal orders.

²⁶ These cases have begun with the close of Milli Nizam Partisi (National Regulation Party) and they end with AKP closure case in 30th July, 2008. This is the first case that a political party has a connection with Islam was not closed.

the municipal government elections of March 1994. In this election, Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) won the municipal governments in two metropolises, namely Ankara and Istanbul (Öniş, 1997, p. 743-744). In this way, Political Islam found a chance to represent the poorest and the most marginalized groups living at the outskirts of the metropolis. Municipalities governed by the Welfare Party provided “target-oriented, selective and visible” projects to compensate for the disadvantaged economic conditions of these groups (Öniş, 1997, p. 748). More precisely, after the 1994 elections, political representatives of Political Islam were able to demonstrate themselves in political area as an alternative through which they enabled to contact with sub-classes living in suburban areas of metropolises of Turkey (Karaman, 2013, p. 2). Low income areas of the cities come close to Political Islam thanks to “charitable gift giving technique”. Under the government of AKP, this relation has been maintained at the grassroots level. In this way, subordinated social classes inhabiting metropolises are continuously hegemonized. However, there is a critical difference between the municipalities of Welfare Party in the 1990s and the relation between the subordinated social classes and AKP government. That is, AKP carries out articulating different social classes/categories by using state apparatus additively.

The above analysis introduces a brief summary of ideological transformation of Turkey based on the adaptation process of political Islam to neoliberal regime of accumulation. In addition to ideological dimension, neoliberal transformation in Turkey has an economic dimension.

In the following parts of this chapter, the structure of neoliberal form of regulation is analyzed in the context of political economy of Turkey after the 1980s. In this way,

the general structure of neoliberalism as a new regime of accumulation is conceptualized to help us understand the formation process of hegemonic project in Turkey. Then, this study tries to elaborate the hegemonic project and its associated accumulation strategy of the power bloc during the AKP period.

3.2 The dance with neoliberal regime of accumulation and Turkey: From post-1980s to the AKP period

3.2.1 Turkish neoliberalism and the post-1980s: A period of crises

As mentioned before, neoliberalism promotes a market-led economic and social restructuring. In the public sector, this involves privatization, liberalization, and imposition of commercial criteria in the residual state sector; in the private sector, deregulation is backed by a new juridico-political framework that offers passive support for market solutions (Jessop, 2002, p. 461).

In Turkey, the beginning of the 1980s is a starting point of for restructuring the whole dimension of society. According to Yalman, the 1980 coup d'état is an attempt to carve the market economy into stone. In one sense, the market economy is a solution manual of the hegemonic crisis coming from the 1970s economic and political depressions to reform ideological and political hegemony (Yalman, 2002, p. 19). This reformation process requires a new power bloc which has the ability to articulate subordinated social classes while also effectively creating economic opportunities for different capital fractions. In this sense, this study proposes that multi-class

characteristics of AKP is an important factor in explain how it achieves to construct this new power bloc.

Understanding the AKP period depends on analyzing the post-1980s economic and political environments, since “the market” as a hegemonic project can articulate different social classes in this period. That is, even if neoliberal regime of accumulation forces structural changes in economic policies, these changes create economic and political imbalances in Turkey; thus, the Sunni-Turkish based market hegemony as a new ideology cannot empower its position within the society by supporting this ideology with economic factors.

That is to say, neoliberal transformation for macroeconomic policies in Turkey refers to an export-led growth path which requires outward oriented structural adjustment reforms. For instance, financial liberalization to restore with the help of import liberalization, exchange regime liberalization, depreciation of Turkish Lira (TL), severe depression of wage incomes and declining agricultural support are major changes in economic policies (Boratav and Yeldan, 2001, p. 3-5). This adjustment experience of Turkey after the 1980s is conducted by the state apparatus to provide integration between domestic economy and the world markets (Boratav and Yeldan, 2001, p. 39).

Nevertheless, this transformation and integration attempts lead to financial instability and additionally banking/ currency crises, i.e. 1994, 1998-99 and 2001. These economic crises also lead to political imbalances. More precisely, “mini boom-and-bust cycles of the volatile characteristics of post-financial liberalization” causes a threat to employment opportunities. This continuous volatility of the economy also leads to

damage business expectations and to the deterioration of real income of working classes.

These frictions, inequalities, uncertainties and discontinuities create politically imbalanced environment (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu and Yeldan, 2000, p. 482-486).

Distributional deterioration also generates social antagonisms caused by the class differentiation experienced in daily urban life. In one part, wealthy people benefit from private health care centers, send their children to colleges or live in the most beautiful districts of metropolis whereas low-waged workers are forced to work to pay for their daily diet.

In addition to the social cost of distribution problems of financially-oriented neoliberal growth strategies, society is also under stress because of unstable political environment in which “human rights violations, public corruption, violence and crime” are basic agendas of daily politics (Cizre-Sakallıoğlu and Yeldan, 2000, p. 494).

Nevertheless, political parties are not capable of fixing these problems which also reveal the fact that a new power bloc cannot be constructed to process a neoliberally-oriented hegemonic project. Thus, imbalanced economic and political environment of Turkey during the 1990s ended up with the 2001 economic crisis. In this sense, 2001 economic and political crises in Turkey are not a discrete case depending on the mismanagement of the then government; instead it is the result of cumulative tension caused by unplanned attempts to liberalize the economy (Cizre and Yeldan, 2005, p. 389).

Such turmoil outcropped in the 2001 crisis. It can be called as crisis of hegemony,²⁷ since the 2001 economic crisis affects not only governments but also all

²⁷ Poulantzas (1978) explains a crisis of hegemony as situations that economic crisis transforms to political crisis at which every element of society is depressed by effects of the crisis (economic & political). Jessop (1990) asserts that a crisis of hegemony is dissolved by hegemonic project which refers

political actors that took stage in the 1990s. The 2002 political election eliminated these parties and gave a chance to AKP that is formed by politicians who departed from Erbakan's Islamic movement (Pamuk, 2014).

In this regard, the period that brings Turkey to hegemonic crisis is not only related to premature macroeconomic adjustment policies. There are also extra-economic factors which occurred not only due to the social cost of such economic policies, i.e. distribution problems., but also due to extra-economic factors related to the ideological and political struggles among different social categories/classes. The complex matrix of relations can be simplified by focusing on the struggle between political Islam and the then power bloc in the 1990s which is ideologically close to the secularist formation of Kemalist Republic. In this manner, it would be beneficial to introduce political Islam in the 1990s to understand AKP period. More precisely, one of the main arguments of this study is that AKP government functioned as an articulatory agent which was capable of forming a new power bloc. Summary of political economy of Political Islam enables to clear the social antagonism among social classes which discloses the extra-economic aspects of hegemonic crisis and which also reveals the multi-class characteristics of the AKP populism.

to the leadership of a class which organizes interest groups. Organizing such a leadership is possible if the clash between self-interest and general interest is dissolved by a hegemonic project.

3.2.2 A new power bloc, a new hegemonic project, a new growth strategy: The political economy of the AKP period

3.2.2.1 A brief analysis of the early AKP period: How the conflict is resolved in favor of the new power bloc

This study proposes that after neoliberal transformation in Turkey, new ideology can find a ground where neoliberal ideals harmonize with political Islam. This idea is elaborated in two ways. First, neoliberal regime of accumulation is introduced and how political and economic areas are reformed by this new regime of accumulation is discussed with a focus on the changes take place in production relations. Second, the political adventure of political Islam is summarized and the ideological transformation based on the concept of Homo Islamicus is interpreted as the adaptation process of political Islam to a neoliberal form of regime of accumulation. Also, this study tries to explain negative effects of neoliberal structural adjustment programs on political and economic environments, which also leads to emerge social inequalities in Turkey. In this sense, after this section, political economy of AKP period is analyzed by accepting 2001 economic crisis as milestones which gives a chance to this neo-conservative power bloc.

The predecessor political parties of AKP had strong ties to subordinated social classes/categories based on the help of informal communitarian networks that it canalizes to compensate socially-disadvantaged position of such groups by using the municipalities. The AKP government diverges from the predecessors with the help of learning process of Islamic political parties in the 1990s in that it has been able to be an alternative not only for subordinated social classes, but also for different capitalist

fractions after the 2001 economic and political crises. That is to say, AKP emerges as an articulatory factor that enables to form a new power bloc by bringing together different fractions of social classes. AKP obtains the political power after an economic crisis and, even if modern Turkish political history is full of stories which indicate imbalances and discontinuity between government programs, the Party did something quite unexpected and adopted and sustained the economic policies that came from previous government (Gürkaynak and Böke, 2013, p. 65). In this way, in addition to business support coming from small and medium-scales business organizations, industrial capital is also articulated by the political power with the help of avoiding costly financial crises, regular growth rates (especially early period of the government) and favorable global economic conditions (Adaman et al, 2014, p. 15; Öniş, 2004, p. 1).

In addition to sustained economic policies which bring economic growth on the basis of maintaining IMF programs, the AKP government went on to undertaking reforms for the integration process to European Union. In this way, even if the AKP government's political heritage has a vexed problem with the secular and hegemonic discourse, political and economic stabilities can carry out compensating the hesitations of such groups in relation to the political power. That is, as Hoşgör (2015) points out

Political stability and economic growth are resulted in a temporary truce within the Turkish capitalist class, while the discursive emphasis on social justice, income equality, and democratization helped this new power bloc to disorganize subordinates social classes, obstructing the formation of a united front against neoliberal reforms. (pp. 202)

EU-led policies were interpreted as a tool to restructure the relation between capitalist class and the new power bloc during the AKP period. In other words, the EU-led reforms which historically had a potential to create political legitimation embodied in the old hegemonic principles created a favorable political ground for AKP government (Hoşgör, 2015, p. 210-211). More precisely, early stages of AKP government were full of conflict with Turkish Army, the Presidency Chair and the Constitutional Court in which antimonies between social classes/categories come out intensively.²⁸ However, this conflict between AKP and the old power bloc (mainly the military and the secular bureaucracy) was resolved in favor of AKP-based power bloc, since secular liberal elite and the EU-sided with the political power as they presented this conflict as one of demilitarization and democratization process. In addition, conservative coalition (the new power bloc) began to control the state apparatus by transforming the formal state organizations with informal network relations. “‘Ergenekon’ and ‘Balyoz’ cases were basic examples of these networks in judiciary and security apparatus resulting mass convictions and purges against coups and covert operations.” (Adaman et al, 2014, p. 15).

On the other hand, the integration process to EU cannot be integrated with the accumulation strategy of AKP in the long run, since there is a strong discrepancy between the accumulation strategy of AKP and the EU-led reforms. Such reforms mostly regulate and rehabilitate economic institutions within the country. Firms must be transformed into formal part of economy. Such a transformation has positive effects on

²⁸ For instance, the President Ahmet Necdet Sezer tried intervening political actions of the government or the court voted whether closing the party or not. Military power also attempted to threaten to the government by e-muhtira (e-memorandum) because of the challenge in the election of the presidency.

firms that have corporate cultures and they empower their positions in industrial capital. However, economic units that act in informal parts of the market cannot benefit enough from these reforms. Quite the contrary, their radius of actions within the market are restricted. Because accumulation strategy of AKP is mostly based on firms that do not have advanced corporate culture, such reforms prevent AKP from gaining economic hegemony. Another significant discrepancy between EU-led reforms and accumulation strategy of AKP is related to public procurement laws. That is to say, EU-led regulations oblige more competitiveness in public bids and competitiveness is challenged with patronage relations that are constructed with the government and capital. More precisely, the role of state within capital allocation process is restricted by such regulations, so, accumulation strategy of AKP is limped.

In this regard, the break-even point for the conflict between classes is July 22th 2007 elections. AKP increased its public support with the help of economic growth and the disadvantageous position in political area began to be solved on the behalf of the new power bloc. Even if there was an attempt to declare outlaw AKP in 2008, the case has resulted in favor of AKP and the constitutional court did not shut down the party. After this case, the action space of AKP enlarged to control and to reorganize economic activities. Even if the government tried to reformulate political and economic fields since 2002, the major lunge has begun after 2007 (Gürkaynak and Böke, 2013). That is to say, the new power bloc obtains political power by winning elections successively. In addition to this political hegemony, the government captures the state apparatus with the help of informal networks which assists the new hegemonic power to eliminate the

military and secularist political hegemony. In this way, the power bloc obtains a field in which the power bloc tries to construct the “New Turkey” harshly.

3.2.2.2 Neo-conservative ideology reforms the society: “New Turkey”

The power bloc may have obtained the hegemonic power unequivocally after 2008. Nevertheless, since then, in comparison to the early years, i.e. 2003-2007, the neoliberally planned economic structure did not exhibit satisfactory growth rates (Boratav, 2016, p. 6). The average growth rate between 2003 and 2007 is 7.3 percent; in the period between 2008 and 2015 this rate becomes 3.4 percent.²⁹ There would be five main reasons of this condition. First, post- 2001 crisis economic expansion came to an end. Second, the growth strategy of the power bloc triggered the expansion of informal economy —this hindered the capacity to evaluate exact economic value at a national scale. Consider this: The political power promotes investments to construction industry. Since construction sector is one of the most significant industries which expands informal economy, the expansion of construction industry may not reflect exact economic value. Third, even though global financial crisis in 2008 does not stop the inflow of global capital, recessions in developed countries also cause of faltering economy. The fourth, political instabilities because of Gezi Protests in 2013 and December 17 and 25 Operations³⁰ have made the Turkish economy highly volatile.

²⁹ <http://www.tuik.gov.tr>

³⁰ Even if these two instances are not within the main scope of this study, both cases indicate the general characteristics of social antagonism within the hegemony of neo-conservative power bloc after 2008. Gezi Protest started in Istanbul and disseminated in different cities in Anatolia is a reaction of the oppressive political understanding of the government. Even if the protest series is not able to form an organized opposition bloc against the neo-conservative type of life-style, this event toughens the discourse of the

Finally, consecutive election periods have led to the disruption of consistent economic policies. In this sense, the conservative dominant coalition empowers its position in the society after 2008; nevertheless, the effects of global economic fluctuations and the domestic political uncertainties lead to fluctuations in growth rates.

AKP government can go on with its electoral hegemony successively for fourteen years despite the fact that the latter half was characterized by imbalanced political and economic environments. In addition, in comparison to other past right-wing governments, AKP follows pretty much the same growth strategy. That is, construction industry (double roads, railroads, dams and other infrastructural investments) is the impetus for economic growth. In this sense, what is the specificity of AKP in the context of hegemonic project and its associated accumulation strategy?

This question can be clarified by analyzing “New Turkey” discourse elaborately. In other words, New Turkey is a rhetorical emphasis which refers to the ideological dimension of the neo-conservative transformation of Turkey starting with the beginning of 2000s. This transformation is an open-ended process that reforms politics and economics (Madra, 2015, p. 15-16). From a neo-Gramscian perspective, in this sense, “New Turkey” represents the idea that aims at forming a collective will. In this way, this rhetoric becomes a project to materialize the fantasy of a common good. The hegemonic project tries to articulate social classes/categories who would like to become a part of this project, gathering around its proposed notion of common good.

political power up. The second case is revenge between Gülen Movement and AKP within the power bloc. As a result, AKP government tries to eliminate Gülen movement from state institutions, economic field and media.

This study proposes that “New Turkey” is a specific hegemonic project of the conservative dominant coalition. The execution of this hegemonic project depends on the ability to protect cross-class position of the AKP government as mentioned several times. That is, the term service “hizmet” is one of the most significant discursive terminologies of AKP through which the political power positions as a nodal point. This term also represents the marriage of neoliberal understanding with Islamic political culture at an ideological dimension (Özselçuk, 2015, p. 82). In other words, “service” is a polysemy. The first meaning is that the party serves the poor through municipalities or other state apparatus. Advance distribution mechanism coming from the communitarian networks and increasing government expenditure in specific areas, particularly health can be counted as a well-designed articulation practices that hegemonize the urban poor (Kuş, 2016, p. 43). Secondly, the party attempts to form rent creation and distribution mechanism for the allied capitalist fractions by continuously changing public procurement laws to fit its needs. In this regard, service presents a structure of hegemonic neo-conservative civilization which is constructed based on AKP-sense of neoliberal development ideals (Özselçuk, 2015, p. 83-91). In one sense, service reformulates the growth strategy of the power bloc by adding imaginary facts into economic activities. This term, hizmet, in this way, becomes the general structure of all articulatory practices.

The fantasy of common good, in this manner, is an attempt to articulate different social classes to a hegemonic project to construct alliances among them. This fantasy forms a synergy among social classes by trying to connect every dimension of social formation. That is, the power bloc generates a politics which brings poverty into

prominence of daily politics by using advanced distribution mechanism that can be conducted formally and informally. In this way, service contains non-capitalist sectors and non-class positions and the imagined economy injects into the daily life of households. In addition, service articulates subsumed and middle classes as a result of expansion in the credit market. More precisely, economic prosperity stems from the expansion in credit market rather than depending on higher productivity. This expansion pushes upward the consumption capacity of subsumed classes. Houses, cars and a variety of products become available for middle class (Kuş, 2016, p. 41-42). Thus, economic dimension of articulatory practices is internalized by subsumed classes (white collars) through which those are also articulated into the specific hegemonic project of the power bloc. That is, the supply side of accumulation strategies (construction of shopping malls and apartments) corresponds to the demand side with the help of credit expansion. Moreover, the power bloc tries to design the horizontal and vertical layers of capitalist sector. The horizontal stratification between capitalist fractions can be observed by analyzing TÜSİAD and MÜSİAD diversification. Even if this study proposes that the diversification between these business organizations is not significant so much because of particular relation between capitalist groups and the state, the power bloc has an ability to change the balance between these two groups (Buğra and Savaşkan, 2014, p. 167). That is, the power bloc can exclude or reward corporations and business groups when they are in the different path on political or other issues. For instance, "Big business groups (Koç and Doğan Holding) were forced to cope with tax inspectors or other authorities and court cases" (Boratav, 2016, p. 7). In addition, in a vertical sense, the power bloc has also a huge effect on sectors by determining the growth strategy. In other words, the political government changes laws, especially the

Public Procurement Laws, several times over. The flexibility of institutional framework that regulates public procurements provides an area for political power to reform capital accumulation process. In this way, quasi-institutionalized small- and medium-scale firms take an advantageous position in these auctions. These revisions and the possibility of the exclusion from the market smooth out the difference between capitalist fractions (Buğra, 1994, p. 129; Boratav, 2016, p. 6). More precisely, the ability of the change the balance in capitalist sectors of the power bloc is coming from the vagueness of neoliberal form of regulation. That is, laws have an indeterminate structure in neoliberalism. This structure makes them changeable infinitely. In this way, the positions of firms in business environment are not clear. They can be illegal and informal immediately while they are legal and formal (Eder, 2015, p. 55). As a result, capitalist fractions are articulated into common good as long as they followed the rules of the power bloc.

In this manner, the fantasy of common good requires enemies that are against “New Turkey”. Being opposite of this hegemonic project means that being opposite of development which refers to construction of highways, railroads, bridges, “crazy” projects or nuclear power plants. “Enemies” want to stop the process of neo-conservative civilization which saves other Muslim societies from the Middle East, Africa or Asia. That is, the hegemony of the power bloc is constructed on the base in which society polarizes consistently by creating new enemies against service which is conducted for the sake of “Turkish nation” (Özselçuk, 2015, p. 82). Polarization in extra-economic dimension of society aims at articulating different forms of social classes by positioning “others” as people that criticize only. In this sense, “us” becomes

people that focus on work and produce³¹ (Özselçuk, 2015, p. 82-87). This rhetoric, Jessop defines it as two-nations hegemonic project and Laclau and Mouffe interpret it as popular struggle, discloses the methodology of articulation practices of the power bloc which keeps alive the class conflicts within the social formation. In this manner, this methodology also indicates extra-economic structure of articulation which forms a cross-class alliance. More precisely, the power bloc articulates different fractions of social classes by bringing ideological structure within social classes into prominence. In this way, politically and ideologically iterated social classes/categories can be articulated into the discourse of “New Turkey”. The polarization between “us” versus “them” uses these ideological and political differences. For instance, popular court cases³² within these 14 years prove that conflicted social classes keep changing and, there is always “other” discursively. That is, defining “others” as the presenters of Kemalist ideology refresh memories by focusing on the social cost of pressure of Kemalist ideology on Political Islam. Headscarf discussion, the party-outlaw cases, February 28 or “e-

³¹ Production, in fact, equals to construction. That is, construction of New Turkey discourse is materialized in construction sector by recommodifying space. This issue is analyzed in detail in further parts.

³² “Ergenekon”, “Balyoz” and “Paralel Yapı” cases are well-known examples of these popular cases. “Ergenekon” and “Balyoz” are cases related to the Turkish counter-guerilla organization places in the state. The accusation asserts that this illegal terrorist organization tries to overthrow the AKP government. However, the two cases were cancelled because of fake evidence. The “Paralel Yapı” case is related to the clash between Gülen movement and the AKP government. After 17th -25th December 2013 corruption operation, illegal economic activities conducted by political actors from AKP were exposed. The government and the president Erdoğan asserted that this operation is related to the Gülen movement that tries to obtain state institutions by defaming the AKP government. Then, a new state-based counter operation has begun to weed out people closed to Gülen from state institutions. The accusation states that people closed to “Gülen Terrorist Organization” do not observe the constitution and they attempted to subvert the state.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2013_corruption_scandal_in_Turkey

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/06/recep-tayyip-erdogan-critic-fethullah-gulen-turkey-police-chiefs-corruption-trial>

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ergenekon_trials

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sledgehammer_\(coup_plan\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sledgehammer_(coup_plan))

memorandum” are fresh examples that create conflicts between social classes. In this way, “memories” based on the recent experiences articulate social classes/categories into the hegemonic project by creating “victimization stories.”

Economic dimension of polarization changes the meaning of economics. In other words, it expands the boundary of economic field by adding it imaginary realities. In this way, construction of “New Turkey” contains the expansion of construction sector. More precisely, even though accumulation strategy is related to economic field, this term is not a mutually exclusive to the specific hegemonic project. In this sense, economic activities that are conducted based on the growth strategy of the power bloc gain a different meaning in the context of “New Turkey”. In the last instance, economic activities become the intersection set of the economic and the extra-economic.

That is to say, the accumulation strategy has two aspects. First, it has a direct relation with the economic field. This aspect indicates the characteristics of accumulation strategy and the methodology of rent creation and distribution. The second aspect of accumulation strategy assigns a new meaning that expands the economic field. In this way, the hegemonic strategy is materialized within the society with the help of its associated accumulation strategy by enlarging the boundary of economic field through adding extra-economic meanings. Hence, even if the growth rates are not satisfactory (especially focusing on the second term of the AKP government), economic activities empower the hegemonic project by creating an imaginary thanks to the reality of monumental projects. In this way, the economic activities are transformed into articulatory practices that affect extra-economic dimension of social formation by creating economic imaginaries.

As mentioned above, the production line which represents the excessive performance of the power bloc for economic well-being of nation is found in the construction sector, because the building blocks of the growth strategy of the hegemonic power are construction-based investments (construction industry, energy and infrastructural investments) (Adaman, Akbulut, Madra and Pamuk, 2014). That is, AKP government focuses on production of intermediate or sub-industrial goods (Adaman, Akarçay-Gürbüz and Karaman, 2014, p. 19). In addition, construction sector helps the AKP government to get consent from a large part of the society by serving middle income classes owning house and consumption opportunities (Adaman and Akbulut, 2015).

More precisely, construction industry becomes the main artery of the state for rent creation and distribution through railroads, bridges, airports. In addition, construction sector is boosted by promoting huge urban transformation projects in metropolitans. Energy investments (Hydroelectric, Thermic and Nuclear Power Plants) positions the construction sector in the center while aiming at supplying for the energy deficit of New Turkey. The energy deficit is seen as one of the most critical hinders of Turkey from becoming a super power. In this sense, the construction sector compensates for the cost of energy deficit by building hydroelectric or nuclear power plants.

That is, the Neo-Ottoman ideology having its origins in an empire which dominates four continents. This ideology, in this way, tries to lean on the Ottoman Heritage in its aspirations towards becoming a super power. Hence, the power bloc tries to establish historical origins of New Turkey by constructing monumental projects as mentioned above. Hereby, construction industry becomes a factor that promotes the role

of Turkey on the international economic and political environment. In other words, construction sector makes real the statement “becoming a playmaking country”. In this way, the accumulation strategy of the power bloc does not only become rent creation and distribution mechanisms, but also this strategy becomes a tool to articulate different fractions of social classes into the New Turkey project, so, economic activities are transformed into articulatory practices. More precisely, as discussed in the theoretical chapter, there are fields of articulation in which hegemonic project of the power bloc and its associated accumulation strategies are conducted with the help of the articulatory practices. Thus, accumulation strategies can be transformed into a moment empowering a specific hegemonic project. Articulatory practices, in this regard, are not only economic activities, but also they assist the power bloc to hegemonize different fractions of social classes by affecting extra-economic aspects of society. In this context, health services, energy sector or urban transformation are fields of articulation in which different fractions of social classes are integrated into the hegemonic project. That is to say, construction of new hospitals, for instance, is a method of rent creation. In addition to its economic return for capitalist fractions, these constructions make visible to public expenditures of the power bloc for society. In this sense, such economic activities create imaginary facts that make easy articulating different social classes into the hegemonic project, namely “New Turkey”.

Nevertheless, there are social and ecological costs of these articulatory practices. These costs indicate the methodology of articulatory practices. More precisely, as mentioned in the theoretical chapter, articulatory practices of this specific period are crystallized in the context of Harvey’s understanding of creative destruction. That is, re-

commodification of state resources and urban space destroys pre-existing social formations and physical landscape. This destructive power of over-accumulation has tremendous cost on society and ecology. In this sense, construction-based articulatory practices of the power bloc during the AKP period have a creative power that destroys ecology and social fabric. In other words, urban transformation projects in metropolises, especially in Istanbul, push urban poor outwards of the city centers to revalorize urban spaces. Also, the ecological cost of energy investments and urban transformation projects are not taken into account while a state-based redistribution process is carried out.

All in all, in the fourth chapter (empirical part), in addition to social and ecological dimensions, political and economic dimensions are also analyzed based on soccer as a field of articulation specifically. In this field of articulation, the reconstruction of soccer stadium as an articulatory practice is scrutinized. In this sense, this study aims at construing the effects of reconstruction of soccer stadiums on the discursive power of New Turkey, while elaborating the main characteristics of these economic activities.

CHAPTER 4

UNDERSTANDING INTEGRAL STATE IN PRACTICE BASED ON RECONSTRUCTION OF SOCCER STADIUMS: THE EXAMPLES OF BAŞAKŞEHİR AND AKHİSAR

This chapter is an empirical (ethnographic) study which assists to understand the role of the state in hegemony construction based on the soccer stadium reconstruction projects by focusing on Başakşehir and Akhisar examples. Previous two chapters focused on competing theories of the state and the political economy of AKP period, respectively. In the first chapter (theoretical chapter), I attempted to formulate a concept of the state based on the neo-Gramscian state theory. In this way, this theoretical frame assists us to understand how continuous changing of balance of forces among social classes affects the state-capital nexus. Hence, rather than focusing only on the economic dimension, this chapter provides an analysis of the two stadium construction projects by taking into consideration cultural, ideological, political, and economic aspects of social formation as an ensemble.

Hegemony, in this relation, enlarges the boundary of capital accumulation by adding extra-economic factors into this process; thus, the transformation of society can be analyzed on the basis of complex relations among social classes. That is, “new coalitions and new blocks among specific social forces are constructed to advance specific interests by pursuing specific strategies in political arena” (Jessop, 1999, p. 197).

This articulation process aims at constructing “collective will” that relates to the economic aspect of social formation through the filter of an economic imaginary. An economic imaginary shapes how the economic relations between different capital fractions and the state are understood by enlarging the economic field where hegemonic bloc does not only create economic opportunities for allied fractions of the capital, but also articulating subordinated social classes into the capital accumulation process. Thus, economic imaginary is materialized as a nexus of both economic and extra-economic aspects of the state-capital relations. More precisely, Economic imaginary as a discursive methodology, in this respect, gives ideological and political meaning to economic relations and forms a connection between the economic and the extra-economic aspects as it articulates diverse social groups into a collective will. In this regard, this chapter does not plan to focus on exact economic return of stadium constructions. Rather than economic return, these economic activities assist us to observe how economic becomes a hegemonic tool for the power bloc.

In this sense, this chapter combines these theoretical perspectives in an empirical context. For this purpose, soccer is a remarkably apt context to understand this connection between the economic and the extra-economic aspects of social formation. Soccer is a field of articulation where integral state materializes, where the political society and the civil society are inextricably interwoven. In particular, the stadium reconstruction projects constitute instances of articulatory practice where the civil society brought together with political society in the economic field. This field can be construed by focusing on the public-private partnership, but this particular business model is only a moment of integral state. The relation between political and the civil

societies exceeds the boundary of economic field. Exceeding the boundary of economic field means that there are imaginary facts in economic fields created by hegemonic power which articulates social groups by the means of articulatory practices. In this regard, the articulatory practice renders consent dimension of integral state through which an economic imaginary is constructed.

In the theoretical chapter, the four dimensions (cultural, economic, political and nature) of an articulatory practice are crystallized. This frame is tried to elaborate in the historical chapter by focusing on the hegemonic project and its associated accumulation strategy of the AKP-based power bloc in macro sense. Reconstruction of soccer stadiums as an articulatory practice, in this chapter, assists to exemplify these four dimensions in micro sense. Also, reconstruction of soccer stadiums enables to materialize the methodology of articulatory practices of the power bloc in AKP period.

In short, this chapter studies the reconstruction of soccer stadiums as an instance of an articulatory practice on the basis of Başakşehir and Akhisar examples while crystallizing integral state practically. In this way, the connection between economic and extra-economic aspects of social formation is elaborated. In addition, soccer is interpreted as a field of articulation; thus, it is tried to be analyzed how the power bloc uses soccer to articulate different fractions of social classes. Moreover, the effect of the reconstruction of soccer on the discursive power on “New Turkey” is scrutinized. At the end, Akhisar and Başakşehir examples are introduced and the differences between them are discussed in the context of theoretical structure introduced above. In this way, it is tried to understand the effects of efficient operation between articulatory mechanism of

hegemonic power and its associated strategy of accumulation on continued generation of economic imaginary.

4.1 Soccer as a field of articulation

As mentioned above, one of the main aims of this study is to understand integral state in practice, so, this study chooses soccer as an instance of integral state, since the institutions of civil and political societies in soccer encounter with each other unceasingly. Municipalities and ministries (the Sport Ministry, the Treasury or the Ministry of Tourism) as institutions of political society and fan groups and soccer clubs as institutions of civil society are interwoven each other on the field of soccer, constituting an instance of integral state in practice.

In addition, soccer has an organic relation with politics in Turkey. That is, in this study, I do not intend to focus on the relation between soccer and politics; however, there are lots of examples which indicate the relation between soccer clubs and politics. For instance, Mehmet Ali Yılmaz was the head of Trabzonspor and he was also the minister of youth and sport from DYP. Also, Melih Gökçek (the mayor of Ankara), Mehmet Özhaseki (the mayor of Kayseri), and Fatma Şahin (the mayor of Gaziantep) are honorary presidents of Osmanlıspor, Kayserispor and Gaziantep Büyükşehir Belediyespor. In the case of Celal Doğan, he carried out the mayor of Gaziantep and the head of Gaziantepspor at the same time. In addition, heads of soccer clubs hope for help to improve positions of their team in soccer leagues. That is, there are many cases which exemplify this condition. The head of Somaspor, for instance, states “we expected a

support from local politicians to play in a league 3”. This cliché, “expecting support from *hemşeri* politicians” is not intrinsic to the head of Somaspor. This sentence can be told by any club managers. In addition, soccer becomes a tool which assists nation states to transform international political problems into a challenge into a game. This situation makes soccer players not only sport people, but also national figures who become a tool of political discourse (Özdağ, Duman and Fişekçioğlu, 2011, p. 8). This organic relation is not limited to political connection between soccer clubs and political power brokers. Also, soccer clubs are financially dependent on state institutions because of tax remission issues or their financially insecure positions.³³ Moreover, soccer teams are counted as representatives of Turkey. The Ministry of Tourism rewards soccer teams for getting successful results from international competitions.³⁴ In this way, soccer clubs are positioned as value-adding services for Turkey’s benefit. To summarize, soccer is a useful industry for political entrepreneurial activities, because the state institutions have a deeply woven relation with soccer through which the state can reshape soccer industry to create articulatory tools which empower the position of the power bloc within society.

4.2 Political economy of reconstruction of soccer stadiums

In this sense, the construction projects are important examples to observe the relation between soccer and politics. Even though soccer clubs do not have property rights for stadiums, the state or municipalities construct stadiums and they serve these stadiums to soccer clubs. This process indicates that the state has supported the clubs economically. Also, this process proves that soccer is not only a node for economic rent, but also the

³³ <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/milyonluk-vergi-borclarina-af-26546702>

³⁴ <http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/MevzuatMetin/3.5.2010956.pdf>

power bloc can use stadium construction projects to articulate different fractions of capital into their hegemonic project using soccer as an intermediary.

More precisely, soccer is not an area where hegemonic power can conduct accumulation strategy effectively; rather this field has a deep connection with hegemonic projects of the power bloc because of its cultural ties with the broader sections of society. Even if this study does not aim at focusing on soccer in the context of cultural studies, it would be useful to mention the popularity of soccer in society. That is, soccer is a product in popular culture. This game can become a part of people's lives easily through the advancement in mass media, so, investments on soccer industry make visible the investors and these investments make them popular. In this way, economic activities in soccer industry transform into hegemonic practices to empower the position of the power bloc in society. To put it differently, soccer is a part of our daily lives, so, investments on stadium construction projects cannot be analyzed by only taking into account economic relations between state institutions and capitalist fractions. These investments can be instrumentalized to promote the leadership of the power bloc in society. Thus, the reconstruction of soccer stadiums articulates different social groups, not only economically, but also ideologically and politically. In this sense, this study also accepts the soccer industry as a field of articulation where an economic imaginary can be produced and reproduced.

That is to say, as mentioned above, in addition to economic dimension, articulatory practices have extra-economic dimensions (cultural, political and natural). Because of the popularity of soccer, stadium construction projects are expected to have significant effects on society in the context of materialization of hegemony of the power bloc. More

precisely, discursive power of hegemonic social classes is embedded in society by stadium projects thanks to cultural dimension of this articulatory practice. That is to say, “Stadiums are spaces that express power, that reflect a concentration of power and give form to the realization of power” (Gaffney and Mascarenhas, 2008, p. 3). However, this materialization of power is not limited to spectators inside the stadiums; rather stadiums make hegemonic discourses a part of daily life by reshaping urban space. Also, the reconstruction of stadiums has significant political effects. Local political actors may improve their political image by carrying out these projects. In addition, because stadiums are arenas where political figures appear in public, the reconstruction of soccer stadiums provides new arenas for politicians to increase visibility. Lastly, stadium projects as an articulatory practice have a natural dimension. Stadium constructions change nature directly. These projects revalorize land. For instance, parking areas in the city centers are destroyed and new ones are constructed at the outskirts of cities. In this way, nature has been re-planned on the basis of economic returns of lands.

After analyzing economic and extra-economic importance of reconstruction of soccer stadiums, it is critical to point out introducing incentives behind the stadium constructions to clarify the new trend in reconstruction of soccer stadiums.

Stadiums constructions are counted as indicators of infrastructural development in sport. These structures are symbols of dreaming of hosting Olympic Games in Turkey. Hence, Atatürk Olympic Stadium that was constructed in 2002 is the beginning of infrastructural investments to become a potential candidate of hosting international tournaments. More precisely, Turkey was one of candidates of 2000 Summer Olympic Games. However, they could not take the organization of this tournament because of

infrastructural incapability. In this sense, Atatürk Stadium project was planned to compensate infrastructural insufficiency by the then Istanbul Mayor of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan (Then, he became the Prime Minister in 2002. Now, he is the President of Turkey.) and the project was started in 1999. After the construction of this stadium was completed, Turkey cooperated with Greece to host UEFA Euro 2008. However, Turkey could not take this tournament because of lack of facilities and political conflicts with its partner.

In addition to dreaming of hosting international tournaments, stadiums are indicators of income sources of soccer clubs in the global competitive soccer industry. That is, Turkish soccer clubs under the leadership of three Istanbul clubs (Galatasaray, Beşiktaş and Fenerbahçe) have started to accord with corporate structure of global soccer clubs. In this regard, rather than becoming amateur organizations, they transformed into incorporated companies and started to create extra income resources like sponsorship agreements, producing official club t-shirts and increasing stadium revenues. At this point, the enlarging stadium capacity became “Megali Idea” of these soccer clubs. The restoration of Fenerbahçe Şükrü Saraçoğlu Stadium between 1999-2006 becomes the trigger point of this trend. After Fenerbahçe, Galatasaray planned to build or restore its own stadium. This project has changed the path of this trend. That is, rather than restoration of the old stadium, Galatasaray preferred to cooperate with the state institutions to build a new stadium. Then, TOKI became the main coordinator of this project and this could be counted as the beginning of stadium construction mobilization in Turkey.

Lastly, this study proposes that soccer stadiums as a kind of urban transformation project are slightly different from other mega projects like “Crazy Istanbul Project”³⁵ (Kanal Istanbul) or “Third Bridge,” because these projects reach a limited number of people within the society and in particular in and around Istanbul. On the other hand, soccer stadiums are publicly in-sight monumental buildings, because, almost, all of the renewed soccer stadiums are constructed in Anatolian cities. In this way, the discursive power of hegemonic force enlarges within the whole Anatolian cities.

The reconstruction of stadiums is also different from other urban transformation projects such as Tarlabası, Ayazma, or Fikirtepe or the construction of hydroelectric plants. That is, in the case of hydroelectric plants, ecology is irreversibly destroyed³⁶ or local people may be forced to evict their home. Also, the examples of urban transformation in Istanbul are stories of deterritorialization of local residents. Contrary to these projects, rather than commodifying the public space for private consumption, stadium projects reshape public space for public consumption. That is to say, the state reconstructs soccer stadiums to give it back to old users while the urban transformation examples in Istanbul force local residents to leave their home.

Consequently, stadium constructions are differentiated from other projects on the basis of technical terms. Ordinary urban transformation projects and construction of

³⁵ “Crazy Istanbul Project (Kanal Istanbul): Kanal Istanbul is the Turkish project name of the artificial sea-level waterway, which is being built by the Republic of Turkey on the European side of Turkey, connecting the Black Sea to the Sea of Marmara, and hence to the Aegean and Mediterranean Seas. Kanal Istanbul would bisect the current European side of Istanbul and thus form an island between the continents of Asia and Europe (the island would have a shoreline with the Black Sea, Sea of Marmara, the new canal and the Bosphorus). The new waterway would bypass the current Bosphorus. Kanal Istanbul aims to minimize shipping traffic in the Istanbul Strait. The project is intended for the 100th anniversary in 2023 of the foundation of the Turkish Republic.” (see also: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kanal_%C4%B0stanbul)

³⁶ In the case of stadium constructions, nature is destroyed, but there are ripple protests comparing to construction of hydroelectric plants.

hydroelectric plants are basic construction projects which can be conducted by an ordinary contractor company. However, stadium constructions are specialized projects in which there are superstructural and infrastructural requirements that necessitate specialized technical knowledge. For example, turf soccer fields, drainage system, position of seats, roof systems and electronic components of stadiums require specialized knowledge, so, stadium constructions are totally different from building an ordinary structure.³⁷

4.3 The general framework for the construction of stadiums

4.3.1 A guideline for stadiums & stadium construction in Turkey

Until this part, the question that why soccer is chosen as a field of articulation was clarified. Its ideological, political, and economic returns for the power bloc were construed and the cultural tie between society and soccer was introduced. Then, this study made political economy of reconstruction of soccer stadiums.

In this part, stadium construction projects that are conducted during the last 10 years in Turkey are summarized based on actors and protocols. In this way, this part attempts to understand the respective roles of public and private actors in these construction projects. Also, the general structure of these projects is delineated on the basis of Galatasaray's stadium project.

³⁷ These technical details are mentioned by many construction engineers like the general secretary of the Union of Turkish Engineers and Architects (TMMOB), a survey engineer from the Ministry of Youth and Sports and the project manager of Akyazı Stadium (Trabzonspor) from TOKI. (Interview with BAŞAKŞEHİR 8 & ANKARA 1&2&3&4)

There are 1944 sport facilities which are used for soccer games. 1,466 of them are soccer fields and 478 of them are stadiums. All stadiums belong to the General Directorate of Sports (Spor Genel Müdürlüğü, henceforth SGM), municipalities, public enterprises and partnership of public enterprises and universities (see Appendix A, Table 1). No soccer club in Turkey owns its own stadium. The rights of usufruct of stadiums are entrusted to these clubs by SGM or other property owners.

There are 29 stadium constructions that have begun in the last 10 years throughout Turkey. 7 of them are completed. 15 of them are under construction and 4 of them are at the design stage. There are also 2 stadium construction projects in Izmir which are cancelled because of judicial process. In the case of Ankara, the stadium project is cancelled and a new one is prepared (see Appendix B, Table 2).

Even if private companies have a significant role on stadium projects, state institutions are the main coordinators of these projects. Firms have responsibilities on construction processes, but state institutions provide lands, find financial resources for projects and manage auction periods. Housing Development Agency (Toplu Konut İdaresi, henceforth TOKI), municipalities, SGM, the General Directorate of National Estate (Milli Emlak Genel Müdürlüğü) and the Ministry of Environment and Urban Planning are state institutions which take part in stadium projects. TOKI is the most important actor in these projects. This institution is responsible for finishing constructions. If a contractor company failed to carry out a stadium project, TOKI can undertake the work and finish it. Because SGM is the owner of stadiums, it takes a part in these projects. It gives up its rights on a stadium project under the condition of building a new stadium. In addition to TOKI, municipalities may take responsible to

conduct construction processes and they may make agreements with SGM. The General Directorate of National Estate, in stadium projects, takes charge in providing a land for TOKI to construct a new stadium. This institution may take public properties with zero cost for building a new stadium. Also, the Ministry of Environment and Urban Planning assists TOKI and SGM to alter master plans for assigned lands. Lastly, the General Directorate of Monuments and Museums sometimes assumes a role in stadium constructions. This institution permits soccer clubs or state institutions to reconstruct old stadiums. In addition to state institutions, private firms become contractor companies in these projects. Sometimes, soccer clubs also take a role by forming an incorporated company which undertakes construction. Lastly, architectural companies also have significant duties in stadium projects. They inspect construction works and draw stadium projects under the control of the state institutions.

There are four types of protocol according to combinations of the partnership of these institutions.

The first one is signed between TOKI, SGM and the General Directorate of National Estate (Milli Emlak Genel Müdürlüğü). According to this type of protocol, SGM gives the property right of old soccer stadiums to TOKI and while TOKI reevaluate the land of old stadiums, they will build a new stadium for SGM. At this point, the General Directorate of National Estate assigns a treasury land to TOKI under the condition of building a new stadium. Also, TOKI and SGM have a right to change master plans of assigned lands with the help of the Ministry of Environment and Urban Planning.

The second type protocol is signed with SGM and municipalities³⁸. This protocol requires that SGM assigns the land of old stadiums to municipalities and they build a new stadium for SGM. Lands of old stadiums are given to municipalities after the completion of the new ones.

The third one is signed with sport clubs and state institutions. In this regard, this type of protocol is different from the others because construction companies which are founded by sport clubs (Galatasaray and Beşiktaş) are also included in the protocol. However, in the case of Galatasaray, TOKI and SGM are parts of the agreement, the stadium project of Beşiktaş is planned to rebuild with the agreement between the club and SGM, excluding TOKI.

The last type is belonged to Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality. The municipality does not sign an agreement with either SGM or TOKI. The stadium is constructed on a land which belongs to KIPTAS (an enterprise of Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality), Basaksehir Municipality and Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality.

4.3.2 Stadiums as Monumental Projects: Seyrantepe Stadium and Others

This part of this chapter assists us to understand the methodology of stadium constructions by focusing on Galatasaray Seyrantepe stadium. The construction of this

³⁸ Even though big-scale construction and urban transformation projects are conducted by TOKI (entrusted with extensive authority by central government), some of the stadium projects are conducted by an agreement between municipalities and SGM or by only municipalities. Construction projects as an aspect of accumulation strategy in Turkey is centralized and controlled by the state exclusively. The role of municipalities in stadium constructions destroys this understanding slightly.

stadium presents a prototype which indicates the way of generating economic opportunities by using state resources. This methodology also clears the way of the accumulation strategy of the power bloc. More precisely, the growth strategy of the power bloc follows a Harvey's understanding of creative destruction. That is, reconstruction of soccer stadiums is the result of recommodification of state resources by destroying pre-existing physical landscape and social formations. On the one hand urban and nature are destroyed to utilize public resources, on the other hand, these resources are revalorized by constructing new buildings. That is, the new stadium is built on a different land and the transportation channels are improved (subway etc.). Generally, the old stadium was in the center of the city, so, that land can be transformed into a new profitable investment. In the case of Ali Sami Yen stadium, a skyscraper and a shopping mall is being constructed. In this way, city centers become attractive for construction sector and spaces in city center are reshaped. Even though other stadium projects are not an exact copy of Galatasaray's project, the general idea is to use the project to create a boost for the construction and the infrastructural investments. That is to say, Galatasaray's project is a prototype which induces the construction- and infrastructure-investment led growth model. Also, this prototype is an example of both economic and extra-economic aspects of the integral state. More precisely, the process of deconstruction and reconstruction fits within the general structure of economic field of integral state. In terms of the extra-economic aspects, the destructive power of these articulatory practices reforms the perception of urban space by building giant constructions. As a result, these monumental constructions assist the power bloc to regenerate economic imaginary. This critical point creates a field where accumulation strategy empowers the hegemonic project by articulating different social classes. In this

regard, it would be useful to analyze this point effectively by focusing on Akhisar and Başakşehir examples.

4.4 Akhisar Arena & Başakşehir Fatih Terim Stadium³⁹

After analyzing protocols and actors of stadium construction projects, the methodology of these specific projects was construed based on Harvey's understanding of creative destruction to exemplify the general characteristics of the accumulation strategy of the power bloc. In this way, it was tried to be clarified how an instance of the accumulation strategy empowers the discursive power of the hegemonic project. In other words, the role of reconstruction of soccer stadiums in articulating different fractions of social classes into "New Turkey" was elaborated briefly.

In this part of the ethnographic chapter, construction projects in Akhisar and Başakşehir are summarized to understand the relation between economic and extra-economic factors in detail. Also, how "New Turkey" and an instance of its associated construction-based growth strategy operates to produce economic imaginary in local scale is elaborated based on the two examples.

There are 7 stadium constructions which are conducted by municipalities. Even if every project proposes significant insights, it is impossible to focus on these projects in detail because of time constraint. Also, contacting actors in these projects is a tuff job, so, while choosing examples for this study, the simplicity of connecting with people is

³⁹ The list of interviewees and the detailed information related to field notes, see Appendix B & C.

another criterion. This is because the study chooses Akhisar and Başakşehir examples to focus on soccer stadium reconstruction projects. The other projects are run in Bursa, Çorum, Konya, Malatya and Turgutlu. Because the project in Çorum is at the design stage, it will exclude from this research. In the case of Konya, the stadium has finished 24 months by Konya municipality and The General Directorate of Youths and Sports. Because other liabilities (construction a new sport center etc.) are not carried out by Konya Metropolitan Municipality, transfer of the old stadium to the municipality is not completed yet. Nevertheless, Konya example can be interpreted as a successful story in the context of economic field. In this sense, Konya example is similar to the Başakşehir project. On the other hand, I cannot reach enough people in Konya comparing to Başakşehir. Also, even if there is not a legal connection between Konya Municipality and the soccer club, Başakşehir belonged to Istanbul Municipality until the middle of 2014. This organic connection enables to compare it with Akhisar project and its soccer club. Since the construction process finished in seven years, Bursa case is closed to Akhisar case. However, I can connect people interesting stadium construction from different segments in Akhisar whereas I cannot reach enough data from Bursa case. Also, Bursa case is slightly different from the construction project in Akhisar. That is, the construction of Bursa stadium is completed and soccer games are played. Nevertheless, even if soccer games have been played in this stadium, this project is still incomplete. That is, parking areas have not yet come into service, landscape of the stadium is in a state of completion, toilets within the stadiums are out of use and water fountains are not available yet.⁴⁰ In addition, Bursa case has differences from Başakşehir

⁴⁰ <http://www.tribundergi.com/haber/timsah-arena-da-eziyet>

and Akhisar projects even if municipalities are the main contractors in these three projects. An organic relation between municipality and soccer club in Başakşehir and Akhisar separates them from the stadium project in Bursa. Moreover, people assert that there is a conflict between Bursa municipality and the soccer club because of stadium construction whereas I did not encounter any conflicts between the two soccer club and their associated municipalities. In the case of Malatya, stadium project is under construction, but, Malatya is not a good example, because, there is no soccer club that is in the premier league of Turkey, so, we cannot compare Malatya's soccer club and project with any other projects. However, Akhisar and Başakşehir are good examples, because they are similar on the basis of the success of soccer clubs. That is, Akhisar Belediyespor is a soccer club of Akhisar Municipality. Istanbul Başakşehirspor is the new name of Istanbul Büyükşehir Belediyespor and this soccer team is owned by Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality. Stadium projects of these teams are examples of the worst and the best cases. More precisely, stadium in Başakşehir is completed in 16 months whereas stadium in Akhisar still cannot be completed.

Lastly, in this part, the brief summary of the methodology of field study is introduced.⁴¹ To understand the technical details, legal process and local dynamics of these stadium projects, I visited Ankara, Akhisar and Başakşehir to discuss with the main actors of these specific constructions. In particular, Akhisar and Istanbul Municipalities, the Ministry of Youth and Sport, local politicians and technicians from the contractor company were visited. If I could not take appointments, I talked to people by mobile phone. Also, even though they did not state that I chatted with local people

⁴¹ See also Appendix C.

and fans to understand extra-economic dimension of the reconstruction of soccer stadiums in these towns.

The remainder of this chapter focuses on Akhisar and Başakşehir examples. In this way, the study will analyze the implications of the accumulation strategy of the power bloc at the grassroots levels in local. This analysis enables to understand the level of local articulation to the hegemonic project on the basis of dimensions of articulatory practices as discussed above. In addition, these specific stadium construction projects are scrutinized to understand the success of destructive creativity of these projects which regenerates economic imaginary in society to widen and deepen the hegemonic dispensation of the power bloc over the society. Lastly, these examples help us understand how functions of the integral state in real time, in the field.

4.4.1 Akhisar Arena

4.4.1.1 Akhisar Belediyespor: More than a soccer club

Akhisar is a county of Manisa. As one of the club executives told me, the only feature of Akhisar is its soccer club. Before Akhisar Belediyespor's (henceforth AB) success, the executive says that "people did not even know where Akhisar is, and they confused Akhisar with Akşehir (a town in Konya). Hence, this soccer club is the most valuable thing for Akhisar."⁴² A member of Akhisar Municipal Council claims that "the soccer club is more valuable than Akhisar economically. However, the town cannot benefit

⁴² Interview with AKHİSAR 11

from this valuable institution. Because the stadium in Akhisar does not meet FIFA criteria, they have to play their games in Manisa.”⁴³ Also, the press agent of the club and the deputy mayor of Akhisar (ex-president of AB) assert that “because there are no shopping centers or luxury building complexes in Akhisar, players do not stay in Akhisar. Some of them stay in luxury hotels in Manisa and some players stay in İzmir. In addition, wealthy people from Akhisar do not spend their free time and money in their own city.”⁴⁴ The deputy mayor says “They benefit from economic opportunities of the town, but they do not spend their money in Akhisar instead of İzmir.”⁴⁵ They say that when there is a game in our home, we cannot transform this opportunity into economic rent, because away teams do not stay in town and fans of away teams do not spend time and money in Akhisar. Shopkeepers in Akhisar cannot sell even a bottle of water to visitors.

In this regard, the stadium project in Akhisar is seen as a start to make Akhisar economically attractive. That is to say, there is no construction project or a new building except the municipality building. Hotels which are one of the most critical requirements for soccer clubs to host away team are not capable of satisfying the accommodation of people coming to Akhisar. The deputy mayor believed that stadium project creates an economic chance to Akhisar people, because fans, away teams and journalists will come to and stay and spend in Akhisar. Therefore, the stadium project is not limited to the construction of a new soccer stadium. Because the old stadium located in the center of the city, if the new one is constructed, SGM will transfer the land of the old stadium. On

⁴³ Interview with AKHİSAR 5

⁴⁴ Interview with AKHİSAR 4 &11

⁴⁵ Interview with AKHİSAR 4

the site of the old stadium, the deputy mayor claims, a new living space will be created for Akhisar. When I asked the deputy mayor to clear the meaning of creating a new living space, he told that “Actually, there is no exact project, but we are trying to put across the idea to members of the council of mayor that a shopping mall, residences and a five-star hotel to be built without destroying the texture of Akhisar.”⁴⁶

Akhisar municipality does not prefer to cooperate with TOKI on this stadium construction project. The deputy mayor indicates that “We cannot carry out this work for four years, but if the project was conducted by TOKI, it would have finished at most in two years. Nevertheless, we cannot decide a new building project to be constructed in the place of the old stadium. When TOKI does a project, nobody asks us. The project is coming from Ankara and it is impossible to change the project even a little bit. They prepare a project without knowing the dynamics of our city. Even if the construction of the new stadium is not carried out yet, we will determine the destiny of our city.”⁴⁷

In addition, stadium construction project does not only trigger an urban transformation in Akhisar, but also creates new economic opportunities for Akhisar municipality that is forced to share its income with Manisa Metropolitan Municipality. Put it differently, the municipality positioned as a main controller in this entrepreneurial activity because of narrowing of their economic opportunities. Because 40% of support coming from the ILBANK (A state institution that finance municipalities in Turkey) should be transferred to Manisa Metropolitan Municipality and all profitable works conducted by Akhisar Municipality are performed by Manisa Metropolitan Municipality

⁴⁶ Interview with AKHİSAR 4

⁴⁷ Interview with AKHİSAR 4

due to the law for metropolitan municipality, stadium project in total looks like an attractive opportunity for Akhisar Municipality. The deputy mayor says that “The cost of construction a new stadium is 40 million TL, according to the expert report, the land of old stadium is 90 million TL. The net profit would be 50 million TL. Because the total debt of Akhisar Municipality is 50 million, this profit becomes really attractive for us.”⁴⁸

After AB went to the premier league, the old stadium did not fulfill TFF (Turkish Football Association) and UEFA criteria which determine stadiums’ facilities to be used in national premier leagues and international organizations. In the first phase, the municipality planned to restore the old stadium on the basis of the criteria. However, its total cost was 10 million TL. In addition, a lawyer (MHP parliamentary candidate) asserts that powerful politicians from the government made a pressure not to restore the old stadium and to play games in Manisa. Then, the municipality decided to construct a stadium.

4.4.1.2 Akhisar Arena: A hidden hope within concretes

I ask questions the deputy mayor related to the process of stadium construction to understand the auction period, the reason behind why the project cannot be completed and to clear how to finance the project. He says “We get credit from the ILBANK, as the contractor company completes its work part by part, the municipality pays their money.”⁴⁹ According to former-mayor of Akhisar “ILBANK finances the project and it

⁴⁸ Interview with AKHİSAR 4

⁴⁹ Interview with AKHİSAR 4

gives 30 million TL.” Karaman says “The construction supervisor said to me that 61% of the stadium is completed. Until now, the interim payment is 20 million TL and there is 10 million TL left. As I understand, the contractor company does not want to finish the work with 10 million TL, because the rough construction is completed and the most expensive parts like steel construction works, drainage system and roof are left. Because the auction price is kept low, the agreement between the municipality and the contractor company is cancelled.”⁵⁰ In this regard, a DHA reporter following this process says “The auction price is too low, it should be 50 million TL approximately, but they are afraid of running up a debt because of political costs of the huge amount of debt.”⁵¹

I also scrutinized the firm side to understand the problem clearly. The deputy mayor asserts that the municipality sends the auction requirements to every firm that will enter the auction, thus, the contractor company (Hayranoğulları İnşaat) knows the conditions of the auction. However, the owner of Hayranoğulları does not scrutinize the auction and they do not make a cost benefit analysis. The deputy mayor also claims “When they do want to cancel the agreement, I ask the owner of the company that whether you check the cost of the work or not and he says yes, but only an hour before the auction.”⁵² Reporters say “When we ask the construction supervisor about the auction and its low bid, he said to us that because there is work, we do not think so much about it, just get the auction.”⁵³

⁵⁰ Interview with AKHİSAR 7

⁵¹ Interview with AKHİSAR 3

⁵² Interview with AKHİSAR 4

⁵³ Interview with AKHİSAR 2&3

Moreover, Adnan Kazmacı⁵⁴ who is the architect and designed the concept of the stadium interprets the process of stadium construction in Akhisar. According to Adnan Kazmacı, the stadium construction in Akhisar can be completed by one of the subcontractors of Beşiktaş stadium easily. Stadium construction is a specialized business in construction sector and it requires experience and Hayranoğulları İnşaat does not have this experience. As DHA reporter said that Adnan Kazmacı visited the stadium construction in Akhisar two months ago. He noted that because the contractor company does not have the necessary knowledge to construct the stadium, they could form a reinforced concrete only. This basic structure of the stadium construction corresponds to 65% of the entire work and the rest of the project is the most expensive one. This is because the contractor company should be supervised meticulously, so, the municipality made an agreement with ARKAT that is an architecture company. This company supervises the project and it also elaborates the concept design that is drawn by Adnan Kazmacı. However, Adnan Kazmacı says that “even if the company is capable of carrying out its responsibility in this project, but, because the municipality does not want to give extra money, it tries to exclude this company from this project.”⁵⁵ Also, the contractor company does not follow the advice of ARKAT in practice. In addition, DHA reporter’s interpretation related to supervision process supports Adnan Kazmacı’s arguments. That is, the reporter says that the head of auction committee is a dentist and the chief of department of public works and engineering (Fen İşleri Müdürü)⁵⁶ is a tobacco expert. Hence, people from municipality do not know enough about the

⁵⁴ Adnan Kazmacı is from Akhisar and has a company in Istanbul. Because he is from Akhisar and supports AB, he does not ask any fees for the design.

⁵⁵ Interview with AKHİSAR 9

⁵⁶ This Department is responsible for every construction business of the municipality.

technical aspects of the construction of the stadium, so, municipality cannot supervise the project effectively because of unskilled workers in the municipality. Also, even if they outsource this service from another architectural company, they do not use this opportunity enough because of financial costs. As a result, when the construction supervisor of the stadium project says something related to the project, the chief has to accept his idea without any further analysis.

And finally, I talked to the contractor firm to understand their business philosophy. According to the firm manager, this construction company mostly goes into a partnership with the department of building operations of the ministry of environment and urban planning. They are interested in building superstructure like hospitals, schools and a stadium. The company has 8 projects (3 of them are taken in 2014 and 5 of them are taken in 2015) and does not plan to take a project in 2016. Also, the rate of capacity utilization of Hayranoğulları is 80%. The controller also says that the most expensive projects of the company are Izmir/Bornova Cultural Center and Siirt Provincial Directorate of Security. Their costs are 40 million TL each. The mean of the size of their projects is 4-6 million TL. At the end, when I asked what kind of construction projects are you interested in? He answers this question “Kısmetimizde ne varsa.”⁵⁷ (God helps us to get an auction.)

⁵⁷ Interview with AKHİSAR 10

4.4.2 Başakşehir Fatih Terim Stadium

4.4.2.1 From Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality Sport Club to Istanbul Basaksehir

Soccer Club: A new brand is born in soccer industry

The story of Istanbul Başakşehir (IB) is significantly different. IB is an incorporated company, but, it was a soccer club of Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality with a name Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality Soccer Club (IBB). IBB was found in 1990.⁵⁸ The relation between the soccer club and the municipality are criticized by oppositions after the soccer club has begun to play top leagues in Turkey. Oppositions assert that municipalities should support amateur branches and the youth teams rather than financing professional soccer clubs⁵⁹. Because the three biggest soccer clubs of Turkey are already in Istanbul, the municipality should not finance IBB soccer club. While these criticisms go on intensively, the soccer club of Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality joins the premiere league and it obtains a powerful position in the league. Istanbul Mayor Kadir Topbaş defends the team and the municipality by saying that “We cannot say to our team that you cannot become successful in soccer.”

⁵⁸ IBB was founded to improve sport and sport love by Nurettin Sözen. In addition to soccer, there are 24 branches in this sport club like basketball, volleyball, athleticism and boxing etc.
<http://www.istanbulbbsk.org/>

⁵⁹ Municipalities’ financial support to soccer clubs is a controversial issue. Soccer clubs playing lower leagues do not have enough economic resources; this is because municipalities are always in the business. However, soccer clubs are subject to the law of associations, thus, municipalities cannot make cash transfers. Because of that municipalities make donations which are depended on the success of local soccer clubs. For instance, if the club plays in an amateur league, municipalities donate balls, t-shirts or shorts. When this soccer club gets a right to play upper leagues, the type of donation has been changed. Then, municipalities try to provide cash flow for soccer clubs. Even if I cannot hear any examples related to this topic from any member of the board of Istanbul Municipality, the member of the council of Istanbul municipality from CHP says “Even if there are other sports clubs in Istanbul, the municipality only takes care of IBB soccer club. This is not fair.” (Interview with BAŞAKŞEHİR 6)

IBB soccer club plays their game in Atatürk Olympic Stadium in Istanbul. Even if the stadium is built in 2002 for Olympic Games, this stadium is not capable of being used for soccer games since the location of the stadium is far away from major city centers, in addition, weather conditions affect the quality of the games negatively because of local climate conditions and the stadium is positioned the direction of winds, so, ball control becomes impossible during windy days.

In this sense, the municipality embarks on constructing a new stadium under these circumstances. It breaks off the relation between professional soccer. IBB soccer club becomes an institutional soccer club and it is named as Istanbul Başakşehir Soccer Club⁶⁰ (IB). The critical point in this process is that whereas this soccer club was a municipality enterprise, it is transferred to a firm which carries on a business in Turkish soccer industry. The founders of this incorporated company are business people and politicians from AKP.⁶¹ Also, there are bureaucrats who are closed to AKP from Istanbul Municipality in the administrative body of the soccer club.⁶²

⁶⁰ Even if there is an information pollution related to the name of this new soccer club, according to Istanbul Mayor Kadir Topbaş, “They obtain a powerful position at the top league and we planned to make this soccer club as a professional and independent club. The first aim is to transform the club into Istanbulspor, but, if we cannot do, this club will be Başakşehir because of the stadium in Başakşehir.”⁶⁰ For this reason, the club is nominated as “Başakşehir Futbol Kulübü”.

⁶¹ According to Turkish Trade Registry Gazette (June 10th 2014, No: 8587), Göksel Gümüşdağ (The second chairman of the council of Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality from AKP) becomes the head and the chairman of executive board. Ömer Faruk Ayvaci (Doğa Group of Companies), Mehmet Nuri Ersoy (ETS Tour), Mustafa Saral (Saral Groups of Companies), Mahmut Volkan Sarihan (Aila Real Estate), Mesut Altan (Birleşim Group of Companies) and Kağan Şahin (A member of the council of Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality from AKP) are the other partners of this incorporated company. The shares of capital of these partners are 1 million TL.

⁶² İsmet Yıldırım (the General Director of KİPTAŞ), Çağatay Kalkancı (the General Director of İSFALT) and Ahmet Ketenci (the General Director of BELTUR AŞ)

4.4.2.2 Basakşehir Fatih Terim Stadium: A successful corporate story of a soccer club having no fans

In addition, there is no available stadium for a soccer club playing in the premiere league in Istanbul, hence, this situation creates an opportunity to construct a new stadium.

Başakşehir Fatih Terim Stadium (FTS) is one of the main subjects of this study, because the construction process of this building is an example of a successful project.

Comparing to other projects, (For instance Akhisar stadium project) - many of them cannot be completed yet or finishing a project takes more than five years – this project has been finished in a very short time period (16 months). Moreover, there are no state institutions in this process; rather Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality planned this project alone and made an agreement with a construction firm directly.

This construction project is planned as a sports complex. In addition to stadium, there are camping and training facilities. Therefore, there is a subway construction. Even if this subway construction is not an element in the stadium project, it can be counted as an infrastructure investment which is finished approximately at the same time with the stadium construction. Even though there is no land transfer between the municipality and a state institution⁶³, thus, there is no a new construction project like a skyscraper or a shopping mall, in addition to stadium construction, infrastructure investment (subway) makes this project closer to the prototype of stadium construction projects. However,

⁶³ However, this land transfer process is conducted within Istanbul Municipality. According to an architect from the municipality, KIPTAS, Basakşehir Municipality and Istanbul Municipality have shares in the land. Hence, Istanbul Municipality makes an agreement between these institutions and gives lands from different places.

this subway does not transport people to the stadium directly. People should walk approximately 15 minutes to reach the stadium or to use other public transportation opportunities.

In this regard, I made a visit to Istanbulspor AŞ (a municipality enterprise that is interested in sport organizations in Istanbul). I talked to the director of organization and two other employees that took charge in sport teams of the municipality like (soccer team or basketball team). In general, they said that because Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality governs 15 million people, so, there should be a good organizational schema⁶⁴. The director says “We are the best municipality in Turkey, because Istanbul Municipality is like a corporate firm.”⁶⁵ Therefore, even if Istanbulspor AŞ is not responsible for the stadium construction in Başakşehir, they assert that because of the quality of human capital in the municipality, organizational power of “company” improves and this is the reason why stadium project is finished immediately and successfully.

I also visited to the department of construction affairs of Istanbul Municipality to capture their organizational schema in this stadium project. The municipality employs architects, construction engineers and electric engineers in this project. They think that this project is a prestigious construction, because every possible issue is considered to compensate possible technical problems. For this purpose, they prepare auction for this

⁶⁴ According to the organization schema of the municipality, every business is conducted by an incorporated company. For instance, construction businesses are conducted by KİPTAŞ, ISFALT AŞ is responsible for the quality of roads in the city or BELTUR is an incorporated company that runs a business in the tourism sector.

⁶⁵ Interview with BAŞAKŞEHİR 1&2&3

project by inviting firms which they completed a project that its cost is at least 135 million TL. The importance of this project is also related to the special interest of the president of Turkey. According to a project manager from the municipality, because the President Erdogan follows the process closely, the contractor company does not force the municipality to postpone the due date of the project. He says “Managers from the contractor company complains that this project is not profitable for the firm, but they complete the project as soon as possible, since they know the possible disadvantageous of an unsuccessful result. They never get an auction from Istanbul Municipality again if the stadium cannot be constructed. In addition, they do not want to disappoint the president.”⁶⁶

In addition, it is important to analyze the company that builds FTS to understand the difference between Akhisar project and Başakşehir project. Kalyon, a member of MÜSİAD, is the contractor company of this construction project.⁶⁷ According to the website of the company, even if this stadium project is the first business in this area, they have a large project portfolio.⁶⁸ For instance, KKTC drinking water project, the third airport construction in Istanbul, Istanbul Finanskent project, Mecidiyeköy-Mahmutbey subway construction project, Şile-Ağva Road and Taksim Pedestrianization project.⁶⁹ Another critical point is that this company has a business relation with Istanbul Municipality. Mecidiyeköy-Mahmutbey subway construction project and Taksim

⁶⁶ Interview with BAŞAKŞEHİR 4 &5

⁶⁷ MÜSİAD is a business organization known for its ideological affinity to the political power bloc.

⁶⁸ That is to say, even if the cost of this stadium project is 178 million TL, this project is not the biggest project of the company. For instance, KKTC drinking water project is 1.6 billion TL or Mecidiyeköy-Mahmutbey subway construction project is 850 million TL approximately.

⁶⁹ <https://graphcommons.com/nodes/9d5b35c5-8933-4f6b-8726-f3a5014fcdba>

Pedestrianization project are the examples of this business partnership. In addition, as a construction engineer from the company claims that the firm tries to find a stadium project in Qatar World Cup 2022.

However, IB as a soccer team cannot contact emotional ties with people. The club does not have a specific fan group. Even if this soccer club has an economic value excessively, it does not have a value among local people. When they played in the Olympic Stadium, there were approximately 40-50 people calling themselves as Bozbaykuşlar in the stadium. This group supported IBB soccer club for fun. After this soccer club has begun to play in FTS in Başakşehir, a new fan group is generated called themselves as 1453 Başakşehirliiler⁷⁰, but, as the soccer club, this fan group is too new. This hinders any effort to understand the connection between the club and the fans. Also, IB does not belong to Başakşehir; this is because it is hard to observe an emotional tie between them.

4.5 Discussion

This chapter focuses on soccer to analyze the integral state in practice. The reconstruction of soccer stadiums is an articulatory practice which provides a new research field where political and civil societies are made and re-made in the context of economic relations. Nevertheless, as discussed throughout the chapter, this articulatory practice cannot be bounded by the economic field; rather stadium constructions have gained importance thanks to their extra-economic characteristics which does not only

⁷⁰ 1453 is a specific date for conservatives, because Mehmet the Conqueror took Istanbul in this year.

provide continuity of the accumulation strategy, but also empowers the hegemonic project of the power bloc. In this regard, this chapter interprets Basakşehir and Akhisar examples to understand this articulatory practice in local base empirically.

After summarizing the field notes and explaining the stories, the study tries to compare Akhisar and Başakşehir examples by focusing on the effects of the projects on economic and extra-economic aspects of social formation in local.

In Akhisar case, the stadium construction is expected to trigger local urban transformation depending on destructive power of the accumulation strategy. More precisely, Akhisar municipality tries to enable the creation of new living spaces and to make Akhisar economically attractive by deconstructing and reconstructing the town. This strategy is a reflection of accumulation strategy of the hegemonic power at the local level. Destruction of urban space to reconstruct it is a general framework of this stadium project as an implication of the growth strategy of the hegemonic power. In this way, urban space is revalorized by destroying city architecture and nature to create new opportunities to boost construction and infrastructural industries. However, this construction project as a specific implication of the growth strategy is not successful because of incapability of public and private actors. In other words, the staff of Akhisar municipality is not capable of finishing and supervising this process. Workers from the building operation do not have technical know-how to deal with the possible problems.⁷¹ The firm also does not have a capacity to finish this technically detailed project. Besides,

⁷¹ For instance, TOKI can take responsibility when contract companies quit such projects as in the case of Galatasaray's project.

this company tries to take basic projects from the Ministry of Environment and Urban Planning like school or hospital constructions.

Akhisar municipality also has a strong public financial sponsor (ILBANK) to complete the construction. Nevertheless, because municipality cannot evaluate the total cost and they are afraid of political pressure, this financial sponsor cannot be used sufficiently. That is, political conjuncture in local is not suitable to be managed. Even if opponents in Akhisar do reject assertions of the board of municipality, the deputy mayor and other politicians from AKP claim that because the majority of the council belongs to opposition parties, every decision is criticized intentionally by the council. As the deputy mayor says, “The political conjuncture makes impossible to explain financial burden.”⁷² According to the council members from MHP and CHP, because AB is the most valuable thing for Akhisar, they do not dissent from decisions which improve AB’s economic and sportive positions. In this regard, they would like to support the team personally by participating in the managerial board of the club. Nevertheless, as ex-council member from MHP asserts “The managerial board does not want to include people that are not close to them.”⁷³ This indicates that the soccer club and the municipality would like to be a unique decision-maker for AB and the stadium project. However, the political environment in Akhisar⁷⁴ does not allow the municipality to be a

⁷² Interview with AKHISAR 4

⁷³ Interview with AKHISAR 5

⁷⁴ The state as an entrepreneur in Turkey runs construction business by using TOKI. This institution is entrusted with extensive authority in stadium projects. It can cooperate with the treasury or other state institutions for lands, finance or other factor ownership. Also, because TOKI and other state institutions depend on the same political power, there is no coordination problem politically. On the other hand, Akhisar municipality does not have this political flexibility which creates efficiency problems in this entrepreneurial activity.

unique leader politically. This condition leads to troubles, because the municipality is forced to convince oppositions to pass a decision related to this project. That is to say, components of political society (the council member from MHP and CHP) and civil society (non-governmental organizations and local media) do have a direct effect on decision making process in the municipality. This is because the board of municipality is afraid of taking financial risk in this project.

On the contrary of failures in economic dimension of this articulatory practice, extra-economic dimensions of this practice look like having a power to enable to articulate local people the idea of the construction of a new stadium. More precisely, people in Akhisar adopt the soccer club faithfully, so, every decision of Akhisar Municipality related to the soccer club is supported by notable people of the town. Even if people from opposition parties do not support some policies related to the club, they are afraid of mentioning them loudly. In other words, Akhisar stadium has a powerful effect on the town people because of the cultural connection between the soccer club and local people. Also, the emotional tie between local people and the soccer club has a potential to create an economic return for the soccer club. That is, soccer lovers in Turkey are mostly the fans of three Istanbul clubs, namely Galatasaray, Beşiktaş and Fenerbahçe. Even though these fans follow local soccer teams, they generally spend money for the three Istanbul clubs. Nevertheless, soccer lovers in Akhisar plan to buy seasonal tickets if the new stadium opens. They also buy official products of AB rather than the Istanbul teams.

Moreover, there is no multiplier effect on local economy in Akhisar. That is, there are at most 5-8 local people working in Akhisar stadium project according to a reporter

from AA. Also, workers stay in the worksite and they cook themselves rather than getting service from local catering market. These instances indicate that the multiplier effect of construction is almost zero. However, local people expect that after the stadium opens, this building creates economic opportunities for Akhisar. In other words, even if stadium project in Akhisar have not been completed yet, it contributes to their economic imaginary, because people know that this project will be completed. As deputy mayor says “People should not care about the project so much. It will be finished one way or another.”

Also, even if the perspective of Akhisar municipality on this stadium project is not different from TOKI-centered construction projects, there is a methodological difference which is caused because of the division between center and periphery within the state. However, this division is not related to a cleavage between political and civil societies. The division refers to a stratification within the power bloc. That is to say, Akhisar municipality plans this project as TOKI-based stadium projects like Galatasaray’s stadium. The old stadium is replaced by skyscrapers or shopping malls. However, the municipality does not want to lose economic opportunities coming from this project, so, they do not want to share this opportunity with TOKI. Thus, this methodological difference occurs even if there is no diversion from the growth strategy in macro sense. This methodological difference can be interpreted in the context of the center-periphery approach even though the study does not prefer this theory to interpret AKP period. That is to say, Akhisar municipality refrains from intervention of TOKI because they do want to have a major role in design of stadium project. Also, the municipality wants to revalorize urban spaces without facing a pressure coming from TOKI. In this regard,

both state institutions have closed ties to the political government (Akhisar Municipality have governed by a board from AKP for 12 years), nevertheless, being away from the center by rejecting the authority it positions Akhisar Municipality as periphery. Apart from this methodological difference leading to a center-periphery division, new laws also push Akhisar Municipality away from the center. More precisely, the law for metropolitan municipalities puts town municipalities in a tight financial position. These municipalities have lost their significant income resources. In this sense, Akhisar municipality and other small town municipalities are positioned as periphery by the center. Akhisar example also indicates that AKP hegemony cannot organize in the local effectively. That is to say, the center tries to control local municipalities through the law of metropolitan municipalities. Nevertheless, they do not have power in design stage in the context of stadium construction project. This situation proves that the steady hegemonic power of AKP government does not spread through the Anatolian towns, so, failures occur in hegemonic practices at the local level.

Lastly, this political entrepreneurial activity in Akhisar may also have a potential to create a disarticulation into the hegemonic project of the power bloc because of incompleteness of hegemony construction. That is to say, strong emotional tie between the soccer club and locals, as mentioned above, can articulate people into the idea of constructing a stadium, but, if this project cannot be completed in the long run, local people can complain about the unsuccessful planning of Akhisar municipality. This situation may shake the power of AKP hegemony in local and empower the opposition bloc.

In the case of Başakşehir, there is a perfect corporate story. Even if there is no state support comparing to other stadium projects, Istanbul Municipality carry out this project effectively and it creates a new brand in soccer industry. Istanbul municipality creates its own financial resources. Land belongs to the municipality, KIPTAS (An enterprise of Istanbul Municipality) and Basaksehir Municipality, so, it does not have to cooperate with any state institutions financially. Because the board of the municipality has a majority in the council, the municipality is not forced to cope with political pressure of oppositions intensively. This situation assists the municipality to run decision making process more effectively. That is, there is unique political power in the council of Istanbul Municipality. This political superiority provides an advantageous position for the board of the municipality which is not forced to cope with the opponents. Also, Istanbul municipality is an experienced institution in construction business and it has well-equipped human capital which helps the municipality to supervise construction business and to coordinate well the auction process. The contractor company has also a lot of experience in construction sector and other big budget projects. Even if the firm did not take part in a stadium construction project before, its business portfolio indicates that the firm carried out completing bigger projects. Moreover, its business portfolio proves that it has well-equipped technical workers which assist the firm to solve possible technical problems. Lastly, business relation between the municipality and the contractor company hastens the construction process, because this relation makes a possible asymmetric information problem insignificant. All in all, the construction of FTS is a well-organized business partnership between public and private actors that is conducted by the municipality which coordinates this project like a business corporation.

However, as discussed above, the stadium project as an articulatory practice is not only economic issue; instead, extra-economic dimensions of these practices transform economic activities to imaginary facts which hasten to hegemonize different social groups by positioning accumulation strategies as booster factor of hegemonic projects. In this regard, extra-economic factors in the Basaksehir case should be interpreted. Nevertheless, even if there is a perfect project management in Başakşehir, especially in comparison to the Akhisar case, the soccer club and stadium in Başakşehir do not belong to the town. In the case of Başakşehir, there is no connection between the town and the soccer club. Even if there is a fan group (1453 Başakşehirililer), it is hard to observe a faithful connection between the club and the town. In this sense, political and ideological articulation to hegemonic project through the construction of soccer stadium in Başakşehir is not intense, since stadium as a monumental project which is a symbol of the term “hizmet” is the only indicator of a successful construction project which creates economic rent for a specific business group. That is, articulation of local people into the idea of stadium construction is limited in Basaksehir.

However, it is critical to notice that Başakşehir is a sample that indicates an imagination of neo-conservative hegemonic power in micro level. This stadium in the town hastens cultural and ideological articulations with the help of soccer. In other words, there is a new fan group generated around this new soccer club that has begun to articulate different social classes slowly. In addition, this stadium project is a complementary of the imagined neo conservative life-style⁷⁵ of the power bloc. In this

⁷⁵ This life-style has a deep connection with the concept of *Homo Islamicus*. Neo-conservative understanding advises people not to separate from Islamic rules while becoming a part of neoliberal economy. More precisely, this life-style proposes that becoming rich, consuming luxury goods or

sense, FTS increases the effect of a prototype life-style of neo-conservative ideology on society. Nevertheless, emotional disconnection between Başakşehir and the soccer club limits the level of articulation. That is, local people do not follow Başakşehir's game and they will not spend their money for the soccer team, since the three Istanbul soccer clubs are more attractive than Başakşehir soccer club. In Akhisar, because the soccer club is the most valuable thing for the town, local people back the soccer club. Nevertheless, Başakşehir is not hometown of people living there. Also, the only relation between the Başakşehir and Başakşehir soccer club is their names. Thus, attempts of 1453 Başakşehirli to articulation of local people into the stadium construction may be limited.

On the other hand, as mentioned above, the importance of stadiums is not only related to the point that they can change the consumption pattern of people. Stadiums are significant because the power bloc can articulate people by extra-economic effects of these constructions. I mean, Akhisar arena can host %7 of total population of Akhisar and Başakşehir stadium can host 5% of Başakşehir's population. These stadiums are the largest spaces where people can get together in the towns. In this sense, they can articulate society into the power bloc ideologically and politically with the help of organizations in these stadiums. For instance, in Başakşehir Arena, spectators boo the national anthem of Greece after 1453 Başakşehirli start. Or in Konya, people boo victims of Ankara massacre⁷⁶ in a national soccer game. Or, a political actor watches a game with a boy whose father is a soldier killed by Kurdish warriors. In addition, these

entertainment are opportunities that Muslims can benefit, but no alcohol consumption, having three child or no abortion are essential rules of the hegemonic project.

⁷⁶ Ankara Massacre: It is a bomb attack in October 10th, 2015 in Ankara. 107 people lost their lives.

spaces create areas where municipalities conduct charitable organizations like “toplusünnet töreni”⁷⁷ or wedding ceremonies or “Kuran tilaveti”.⁷⁸ In this way, stadiums create new opportunities for the power bloc to hegemonize society through different ways. Thus, the stadium in Başakşehir can be used to hegemonize society based conservative ideology.

All in all, based on the stadium construction examples in Akhisar and Başakşehir, hegemonic practices are incomplete. That is, the power bloc cannot operate successful articulatory practices that hegemonize society in economic and extra-economic dimensions at all. This incompleteness creates ambiguity of the power of AKP hegemony, since it indicates the disconnection between local and the center. In other words, articulatory practices of the power bloc has potential to create opposition blocs in local because of cost of hegemony construction. More precisely, stadium construction in Akhisar aims at triggering the urban transformation project that may disposes local people. In addition, building a shopping mall may challenge the interest of local shopkeepers. Local people may not obtain expected economic return from the stadium construction sufficiently. In the case of Başakşehir, the stadium may stay just as a successful project which indicates organizational ability of Istanbul municipality and the contractor company. In local, the disconnection between the town and the soccer club may make the stadium a dysfunctional building. That is, this stadium may stay just a concrete construction. This project may be just a rent creation attempt of Istanbul municipality.

⁷⁷ “Sünnet Töreni”: It is a circumcision feast conducted by municipalities for poor people’s children.

⁷⁸ “Kuran Tilaveti”: It is a Quran Concert.

In short, when both examples are taken into consideration, there is no articulatory practice which operates effectively on the basis of all dimensions because of dynamic nature of hegemony. Thus, it is impossible to stabilize this political process. In this sense, this dynamic nature of hegemony creates clashes between social classes continuously, so, this process cannot be optimized. That is, every town has different cultural, political and economic dynamics. This differences create imbalances in hegemony construction and limit the effect of hegemonic power on society in local base.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

This thesis investigated the state-capital relations in AKP period (2002-2015) based on the reconstruction of soccer stadiums in Anatolian metropolis by focusing on Akhisar and Başakşehir examples especially. Nevertheless, this study did not only focus on economic field while analyzing this relation. That is, the analysis of state-capital relations did not only focus on the role of the state in rent creation and distribution. The theoretical framework structured based on the neo-Gramscian understanding focuses on the concept of hegemony to clarify the roles of stadium construction projects. Thus, this study interpreted stadium construction projects as articulatory practices, which assists to indicate extra-economic dimension of this relation. In this way, it was possible to reveal the role of the state in the process of hegemony construction.

Moreover, this study tried to explain how the new conservative power bloc constructed in AKP period becomes an alternative to the old one. In particular, the thesis aimed at forming an alternative interpretation of the AKP period rather than using the center-periphery approach or the new institutionalist perspective. That is, the thesis asserted that 2001 economic and political volatilities created a hegemonic crisis, which was the result of imbalanced transformation process of the political economy of Turkey into the neoliberal form of regime of accumulation. This hegemonic crisis caused of representation crises for the then political actors. Hence, political Islam becomes an alternative political solution to the representation crisis in favor of AKP. Already, the predecessors of AKP achieved connecting subordinated social classes, especially economically, through municipalities. AKP carry out expanding this coalition by

persuading industrial capitalist fractions, so, this party can become an articulatory agent to promulgate the hegemonic project.

Based on the above argument that reconstruction of soccer stadiums, in this sense, is not only economic activities, those promote the allied capitalist fractions through construction investments, but also these projects empower the position of the power bloc within the society by enlarging the effect of hegemonic project. That is to say, these specific construction projects are a kind of urban transformation project that is not only limited to the scope of economic. Therefore, in my research, I defined these projects as articulatory practices and determined four different dimensions of the practices, namely, political, cultural, and economic and nature. These dimensions assisted this study to understand the importance of reconstruction of soccer stadiums in articulation of social classes into the hegemonic project.

After the explanation of my objective and the general hypothesis of this study, it is beneficial to summarize discoveries part by part. In the first chapter (theoretical chapter), a theoretical framework based on the neo-Gramscian integral state was constructed based on the assertion that interwoven relation between political and civil societies provides a functional theoretical base. In this way, the study tried to understand not only coercive and governmental apparatus of the state, but also its hegemonic apparatus.

This hegemonic apparatus of the integral state enables us to understand the nexus of economic and extra-economic. In this regard, this study borrowed two concepts from Jessop, namely accumulation strategy and hegemonic project. Accumulation strategy is

a specific growth model which is mostly related to economic aspect of the society.

Hegemonic project, in case, contains non-economic (ideological, political and cultural) issues generally. However, they are not mutually exclusive concepts; rather the effective operation of the articulation mechanism of hegemonic power and its associated accumulation strategy depends on the harmony between economic (accumulation strategy) and extra-economic (hegemonic project) factors. That is, this study, in this sense, tried to find out the criterions of this effective operation which refers to an articulation of different social classes into a specific hegemonic project on the basis of the whole dimensions of an articulatory practice. More precisely, a successful implication of an accumulation project gains importance by harmonizing this implication with extra-economic aspects of society and hegemonic project empowers the position of the power block by conducting an effective economic operation.

This interpretation enlarges the boundary of the economic field by attaching ethico political dimension to economic. This attachment produces imaginary facts in economic field. That is to say, economic imaginary is an important concept in this study to specify the intersection point of economic and extra-economic aspects of society. This intersection set hastens to articulate different fractions of social classes into the specific hegemonic project.

This study also equalized the concept of articulatory practice with political entrepreneurship. This term refers to every action which produces economic imaginary throughout the study. The thesis tried to formulate political entrepreneurship as a function rather than a person. This function comprises components of civil and political

societies. In this way, political entrepreneurship assisted this study to analyze integral state in practice.

In addition, this thesis tried to sort out the methodology of articulatory practices within the period subjected to the study. The elaboration of methodology of articulatory practices makes possible analyzing the form of construction-based economic activities. Specific to this study, the way of reconstruction of soccer stadiums was clarified with the help of this methodology which elucidates in the context of Harvey's creative destruction. In other words, this study proposed that the state reutilized its own resources for producing new economic opportunities. This political entrepreneurship is disruptive and disequilibrating, since it destroys the former one and regenerates a new one in its stead. In this regard, this study proposed that political entrepreneurial activities have potential to create dispossessions. That is, these activities have huge costs for people and nature; thus, these costs create the incompleteness of hegemony construction which produces oppositions as in the case of Gezi protests. In the second chapter (historical part), the thesis discussed the corner points of the political economy of Turkey based on Gramsci's integral state. Those were chosen to produce an alternative interpretations to Heper's (2013) periodization, namely cultural (the construction of New Republic), democratic (transition to multi-party period) and economic revolutions (economic liberalization after Özal's period). It is proposed that the power bloc could not manage to articulate social classes by creating consent; instead the hegemonic project of the New Republic was tried to hegemonize different social classes by using coercive apparatus of the state. Neoliberal transformation in Turkey was interpreted as a significant turning point in this study. After this new regime of accumulation, a new ideology based on the

harmony between political Islam and economic liberalization was constructed. The thesis interpreted that the harmony produces AKP government.

The thesis, in the second part of the historical chapter, focused on how the AKP-base power bloc carried out producing consent within the society. This question was conceptualized by focusing on discursive analysis of the hegemonic project “New Turkey” and its associated accumulation strategy. Construction industry, energy sector and infrastructural investments were accepted as the decisive branches of the accumulation strategy of AKP period. In the case of hegemonic project, “hizmet” was used to delineate the discursive form of “New Turkey”. Hizmet positions AKP as an articulatory agent. That is, AKP serves capitalist classes by following neoliberal form of economic policies and serves subordinated social classes by improving public expenditures, especially improvements in health services. In this sense, “New Turkey” as a hegemonic project is a rhetorical emphasis which reforms society politically and ideologically while articulating different fractions of social classes through economic policies. Thus, neo-conservative understanding of the power block attempts to reshape every focus of daily life practically. That is, from women’s body to universities, every part of life is redefined within the frame of common good. This fantasy tries to be materialized by accusing some groups of being an obstacle to New Turkey which also refers to economic development and becoming a super power in the world. In this regard, the power block needs to materialize New Turkey to prove the process of becoming super power while articulating different social classes. This materialization process requires imaginary facts.

In this regard, chapter three (the empirical part) analyzed this process. The study chose reconstruction of soccer stadium projects as an articulatory practice, since soccer has an organic relation with politics and it has a deep cultural connection with society. Also, reconstruction of soccer stadium becomes a useful articulatory practice, since these projects are a significant implication of accumulation projects that have a closed tie with the hegemonic project. That is, these specific projects may hasten to articulation of social classes into the hegemonic project by creating imaginary facts. More precisely, soccer is a suitable tool to analyze integral state in practice. The interwoven relation between political and civil societies can be observed in economic field with the help of soccer. However, economic field cannot be enough to explain this interwoven relation; instead there are extra-economic factors. In this regard, the specific construction projects as articulatory practices enable to elaborate these extra-economic aspects. Put it differently, stadium constructions assists to understand the intersection set, namely economic imaginary, between the hegemonic project and its associated accumulation strategy.

In the second part of the empirical chapter, this study analyzed the theoretical structure in Akhisar and Başakşehir cases empirically. While Akhisar case is a good example of unsuccessful implication of the accumulation strategy, Basakşehir case is an example of perfect corporate study. However, the stadium project in Akhisar has a wider effect on local people comparing to Başakşehir case, since local people in Akhisar has a deep connection with local soccer team. Local actors look after Akhisar Belediyespor (AB)'s benefits. Even if local politicians do not agree with decisions of the board of Akhisar Municipality, they are afraid of oppositions when the issue is related to the

soccer team. On the other hand, even though Başakşehir Soccer Club and its stadium are imaginative economic stories, this soccer club does not have a connection with local people in Başakşehir. Even if the stadium project as a monument in Başakşehir has an effect on people in macro sense, this project does not have power to articulate locals.

When both cases were analyzed, it is obvious that there is not an effective operation of the articulatory mechanism of hegemonic project and its associated regime of accumulation project. In the case of the articulatory practice in Akhisar, incapability of management of state and private actors in this project does not impede the articulation of local people. These economic activities can achieve out producing imaginary facts that people plan their future by envisioning the finished stadium. Nevertheless, the project duration and possibility that local people cannot obtain economic yield after stadium construction have potentials to create opposition bloc in Akhisar.

In the case of Başakşehir, the stadium belongs to a soccer club that has no fans. The stadium is in an askew position in the town; nevertheless, it does not mean that this project as a monumental project will not articulate local people, since this stadium project in Başakşehir is a complementary tool of neo-conservative lifestyle. More precisely, Başakşehir is a sample that presents a materialization of New Turkey in micro level. Local people carry out getting into the rules of neo-conservative understanding. Soccer and soccer stadium, in this sense, present a new type of entertainment. This new entertainment activity also has a role to hasten articulation of different social classes thanks to the effect of soccer on society. In this regard, a new fan group that is ideologically integrated to neo conservative understanding (1453 Başakşehirililer) generates and people accustom to go to stadium slowly. In short, this stadium project is a

complementary part of the imagined neo conservative life-style of the power bloc. In this way, the stadium increases the effect of a prototype life-style of neo-conservative ideology on society. On the other hand, the effect of 1453 Başakşehirliiler fan group on local people may be limited because of the top three Istanbul soccer teams. That is to say, people living in Başakşehir does not have a hometown connection to the town. Also, the only relation between the Başakşehir soccer club and Başakşehir is their names. In addition, there are the most popular soccer teams of Turkey in Istanbul. Soccer lovers in Başakşehir probably do not prefer to spend their time and money for Başakşehir soccer club. In this sense, the soccer stadium in Başakşehir just becomes a successful example of public-private partnership. The concrete construction represents a way of rent creation of state institutions.

In this regard, both examples indicate that it is not possible to claim that hegemonic practices in both towns carry out articulating locals into the hegemonic project of the power bloc. Hence, hegemonic practices are incomplete, which makes these practices ambiguous. In addition, two cases indicate that there is no an effective articulation which requires a successful operation of economic and extra-economic dimensions of an articulatory practice, since hegemony has a dynamic nature. This dynamic structure of hegemony hinders optimizing changings in society.

Moreover, when all of these inferences are taken into consideration, there are vital points to profit from this study. Even if implications of the accumulation strategy in local cannot satisfy economic expectations, extra-economic factors may compensate this negative situation. In addition, a spectacular implication of the accumulation strategy cannot be enough to articulate social classes lonely. However, it does not mean that

extra-economic factors can empower the position of the power block. There should be materialization of hegemonic power with the help of economic activities. In this way, imaginary facts are created through which discursive power of the hegemonic project can be generated within local. Hence, rather than focusing on economic success of the power block which empowers allied capitalist fractions, imaginary economic facts are also fabulously significant points to articulate not only capitalist fractions, but also subordinated social classes.

In addition, even if this study did not prefer to use center-periphery approach, there is a division between politically and ideologically closed local actors and the center of the power block in the context of the two cases. However, this division does not mean a cleavage between political and civil societies. This division may have a meaning that the power block may slog away enlarging its power in micro level even if it looks like having a steady position in center. More precisely, even if there is a strong central government, they cannot organize well within the local, so, there are failures in hegemonic practices at the local level. Also, incapability of controlling local creates a stratification between center (AKP government) and periphery (AKP municipality in Akhisar). That is, the stratification is the result of incapacity of AKP. This situation may be an obstacle to constructing an organic unity between the center and periphery in the long run. Even though this question is not the main purpose of the study, this predicament of the power block would be an astonishing issue for further research.

APPENDIX A

SOCCER STADIUMS IN TURKEY

Table 1. Total Number of Stadiums & Soccer Fields in Turkey

	Stadiums	Soccer Field
The General Directorate of Youth and Sports	354	849
Municipalities	22	103
Universities	8	20
Other Public Institutions	15	111
Other	79	366
Private Sector	-	17
Total	478	1466

Source: The Ministry of Youth and Sports

Table 2. List of Stadium Constructions in Turkey (2005-2016)

City	Cost(million TL)	Contractor Company	Property Ownership	Last Status	Protocol*
Adana	140	İlgazlar&Albayraklar	SGM	Under Construction	TOKI-SGM
Afyon	60	Tepe & Ekintaş İnşaat	SGM	Completed	TOKI-SGM
Ankara	200	-	SGM	The project is cancelled	TOKI-SGM
Antalya	103	Akay İnşaat	SGM	Completed	TOKI-SGM
Batman	46	Güneştekin-MBD Ortaklığı	SGM	Under Construction	TOKI-SGM
Bursa	195	Gintaş/Sarıdağlar	SGM	Completed	Municipality-SGM
Çorum	100	Çakır İnşaat Sanayi ve Ticaret AŞ	SGM	In Design Stage	Municipality-SGM
Diyarbakır	150	Yıldızlar Grup	SGM	Under Construction	TOKI-SGM
Edirne	-	-	SGM	In Design Stage	TOKI-SGM
Elazığ	80	-	SGM	In Design Stage	TOKI-SGM

Table 2 (cont.)

Eskişehir	140	Arsel & MD İnşaat	SGM	Under Construction	TOKI-SGM
Gaziantep	93	MAY & Egemen İnşaat	SGM	Under Construction	TOKI-SGM
Giresun	-	-	SGM	In Design Stage	TOKI-SGM
Hatay	306	FY Fer Yapı	SGM	In Design Stage	TOKI-SGM
Istanbul/Başakşehir	178	Kalyon	Municipality	Completed	Municipality
Istanbul/Beşiktaş	225	Çiçekler İnşaat/Suat Altın İnşaat	SGM	Under Construction	BJK-SGM
Istanbul/Seyrantepe	179	Varyap & Uzunlar	SGM	Completed	TOKI-SGM
İzmir/Göztepe	75	Ali Acar İnşaat	SGM	In Judicial Process	TOKI-SGM
İzmir/Karşıyaka	75	Ali Acar İnşaat	SGM	In Judicial Process	TOKI-SGM
Kocaeli	160	Komusoğlu-Tokal İnşaat Ortaklığı	SGM	Under Construction	TOKI-SGM
Konya	160	Gintaş/Sarıdağlar	SGM	Completed	Municipality-SGM
Malatya	78	İlci (İlsan İnşaat)	SGM	Under Construction	Municipality-SGM
Manisa/Akhisar	39	Hayranoğulları İnşaat	SGM	Under Construction	Municipality-SGM
Manisa/Turgutlu	30	Bayburt İnşaat	SGM	Under Construction	Municipality-SGM
Mersin	125	Limak	SGM	Completed	TOKI-SGM
Sakarya	137	Ahes İnşaat	SGM	Under Construction	TOKI-SGM
Samsun	138	Ali Acar İnşaat	SGM	Under Construction	TOKI-SGM
Sivas	106	Tümaş/Can & Kahraman İnşaat	SGM	Under Construction	TOKI-SGM
Trabzon	250	Sarıdağlar	SGM	Under Construction	TOKI-SGM

Source: This table is not prepared based on a specific source. Data is gathered after TOKI and SGM visits, information from the web site of Ministry of Youth and Sports, the web site of local newspaper and the national press.

* All of the protocols signed with TOKI and SGM are also supported by the General Directorate of National Estate legally.

APPENDIX B
INTERVIEWEES

Akhisar	Başakşehir	Ankara
Journalist/Local Newspaper	The Organization Manager of Istanbulspor	A Project Manager from the Ministry of Youth and Sports
Journalist/AA	IBB Basketball Team Manager	A Survey Engineer from the Ministry of Youth and Sports
Journalist/DHA	Ex-Manager from IBB Soccer Club	A Stadium Project Manager from TOKİ
The Deputy Mayor/Ex-head of AB	An architecture from Istanbul Municipality	A Stadium Project Manager from TOKİ
Ex-Council Member from MHP	An engineer from the contractor company	
A Council Member from CHP	A Council from CHP	
The Ex-Mayor of Akhisar	A Worker From the Building Operation of IBB	
The Firm Manager Adnan Kazmacı/Architecture		
A Manager from Hayranoğulları		
Media Coordinator of the soccer club		
Youth Setup Manager of the soccer club		

APPENDIX C

A SHORT SUMMARY OF FIELD RESEARCH

In this study, Başakşehir and Akhisar examples are samples of the empirical part. Also, I visit to Ankara to collect data related to soccer stadium and the specific construction projects. I made interviews with different segments of people who have a relation with this topic. Even if I do not use all of these data, every interview assists me to frame the general structure of these construction projects. Also, I never use the name of interviewees, but there are bureaucrats or soccer club managers that give me a permission to use their names. In addition, I plan to explain how to contact with people. In this way, the methodology of this study may guide researchers for their field research.

1. Ankara

I stay three days in this city to visit the Ministry of Youth and Sports and Housing Development Administration of Turkey (TOKI). In the ministry, I interviewed with bureaucrats and survey engineers to understand the auction process, the role of state institutions and auction specifications. Before the visit to the ministry, I made official arrangements for interviews. However, I can reach limited information after these meetings. Detailed knowledge is obtained during the coffee break.

In Ankara, I also visit to TOKI to talk to people knowing technical details of the construction projects. However, I cannot reach any people to take an appointment on the telephone. Also, when I visited to the TOKI, I spend my time finding an interlocutor to

explain myself. Whereas I find two people, they are the project manager of two stadium projects (Antalya and Trabzon), they do not give enough information. Even if I listen to technical details of stadium projects briefly, they do not give me the tender prices of stadium projects that TOKI is the main coordinator. This visit is the only meeting that people want me to leave as soon as possible. In fact, one of the workers says that “I do not understand why you visit TOKI. If you want to learn tender price, you can go to stadium construction sites. There are boards in the sites indicate tender prices and name of the contractor companies.”

2. Akhisar

I stayed ten days in Akhisar. I visit Akhisar municipality, Akhisar Belediyespor, local newspaper, fan groups' cafeterias and town agencies of opposition parties. I can arrange meetings easily in Akhisar, because I find a connection from Manisa who has business relations and political relations with local actors. He introduces me to two journalists. One of them has a closed relation with the board of Akhisar Municipality and the soccer club. The other journalist follows the stadium construction project closely who has connections with engineers from the contractor company.

Because I arrange meetings with the help of a reliable resource, interviewees explain themselves more than I expected. It is an interesting point that I have to interrupt the meetings, since people almost talk more than two hours sometimes.

In addition, because my grandfather is a close friend of uncle of the head coach of the soccer team, managers from the soccer team talk me sympathetically. Moreover,

they eagerly explain themselves, since they need attention from other institutions. One of the soccer club officials says that “I know. One day, the success of this soccer club becomes a topic of thesis. Universities should analyze Akhisarspor, because we are a sui generis reality in soccer industry.”

Actually, I do not explain my real intention. That is, rather than saying the real topic of this study, I explain the main purpose of this study as the effect of soccer stadium construction on economic growth. Specific to Akhisar case, I introduce this study as an analysis of economic reasons behind Akhisarspor and as the analysis of economic return of Akhisar Arena. I think, this introduction also has a positive impact on interviewees. In this way, they express themselves easily. However, I summarize the real topic of this study exactly during the meeting with a member of an opposition party, but this explanation disturbs him and he hesitates to talk for a while.

3. Istanbul

Because I stay in Istanbul, there is no time constraint. As long as I find time for interviews in Istanbul, I visit Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, related enterprises of the municipality, opposition parties and local people. Because Başakşehir Soccer Club (BS) does not have enough fans, I cannot find any fan to talk. In addition, the board members of this soccer club are potent bureaucrats or business people, I cannot contact them directly. In addition, even if I can reach municipality council members from opposition parties, it is almost impossible to arrange a face to face meeting; so, I talk these people by phone.

Meetings in the municipality are arranged by official appointments. When I go to the scheduled meeting, there are at least three people who are responsible for related topics. In addition, almost every official has a detailed knowledge about the reason of my visit. Officials never reject my demands. However, they always want to take a guarantee from me not to share official documents. Some officials sometimes check my academic personnel card to be sure about my identity.

Even if I cannot reach enough people from the soccer club or top executives from the contractor company and the municipality, there is enough public knowledge in newspaper to follow the construction process and the relation between the municipality and the soccer team.

Lastly, I also try to hide the real intention of this study by explaining the topic as the economic potential of soccer industry in Turkey. Nevertheless, there are interviewees having a PhD degree and they ask the detailed questions for the topic of this study. Thus, I force to study to give detailed information related to the connection between financial markets and economic potential of soccer industry.

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