

DISCARD THROUGH A FOUCAULDIAN LENS: THE CASE OF FISHERFOLK
AT KARACHI'S KORANGI COAST

by

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ABSTRACT

DISCARD THROUGH A FOUCAULDIAN LENS: THE CASE OF FISHERFOLK AT KARACHI'S KORANGI COAST

Indigenous Sindhi fisherfolk have used the sea as their means of livelihood since before colonial times in the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent. This thesis studies two fishing villages (Ibrahim Hyderi and Rehri Goth) dating back to the pre-colonial era in Pakistan, located in Karachi's Korangi district—named for the Korangi Creek that runs along it. Over the last decade, Korangi's coastline has deteriorated due to the timber mafia, which cuts down its mangroves to sell for profit. Solid waste dumping by industries and municipal authorities is also routine at the Korangi coast. The land mafia—which includes politicians, police, and, most importantly, land developers—is an active player in the garbage dumping and land grabbing in Karachi, and since 2005 have been reclaiming land from Karachi's seas through the use of compacted, weighted garbage. This thesis aims to answer how the fisherfolk's relationship with the sea has changed due to heavy migration, population changes, and material discard. It analyzes how development and its associated top-down “green” or sanitation-focused discourses are sustained through violence against Karachi's fisherfolk, who are “Othered” through dispossession of their land, narratives of cleanliness, and consistently changing definitions of legality. This thesis uses a Foucauldian discard studies lens to view how power manifests in disposal at the coast, dispossessing fisherfolk of their rights, while a narrative of “greater good” is upheld by the institutions repressing dissenting fisherfolk. It studies how Karachi's marginalized populations are discarded by the central and municipal governance institutions.

ÖZET

FOUCAULD MERCEĞİNDEN ATIK: KARAÇİ'NİN KORANGİ SAHİLİ BALIKÇILARI ÖRNEĞİ

Yerli Sind balıkçıları için Hint-Pakistan alt kıtasındaki denizler sömürge öncesi zamanlardan beri bir geçim kaynağıydı. Bu tez, Pakistan'daki sömürge öncesi döneme kadar uzanan ve Karaçi'nin Korangi kasabasında yer alan, adını kasaba boyunca uzanan Korangi Deresi'nden alan iki balıkçı köyünü (İbrahim Hyderi ve Rehri Goth) incelemektedir. Son on yılda Korangi kıyı şeridi, kar amacıyla satmak için mangrov ağaçlarını kesen kereste mafyası nedeniyle yozlaştı. Endüstri ve belediye yetkilileri tarafından katı atıkların boşaltılmasının Korangi sahilinde rutin bir uygulama oluşu da durumu kötüleştiren bir etken. Politikacıları, polisi ve en önemlisi arazi geliştiricilerini içeren arsa mafyası, Karaçi'deki çöp boşaltma ve arazi gaspında aktif bir oyuncu ve 2005'ten bu yana sıkıştırılmış, ağırlıklı çöpleri kullanarak Karaçi denizlerindeki arazilere el koyuyor. Bu tez, yoğun göç, nüfus değişiklikleri ve atık dökümü nedeniyle balıkçıların denizle olan ilişkisinin nasıl değiştiği sorusunu yanıtlamayı amaçlamaktadır. Bunun için kalkınmanın ve bununla ilişkili tepeden inme "yeşil" veya "temizlik" odaklı söylemlerin; mülksüzleştirme, temizlik söylemi ve sürekli değişen yasallık tanımları vasıtasıyla "ötekileştirilen" Karaçi balıkçılarına karşı şiddet yoluyla nasıl sürdürüldüğünü analiz etmektedir. Bu tez, karşı çıkan balıkçılar ülkenin bekası söylemleri ile çeşitli kurumlar tarafından baskılanırken, gücün kıyıdaki atıklar yoluyla nasıl tezahür ettiğini ve balıkçıların haklarından nasıl mahrum bırakıldıklarını incelemek için, Foucault'cu atık çalışmaları merceğini kullanıyor. Bu yolla tez, Karaçi'nin dışlanmış nüfuslarının merkezi hükümet ve belediye yönetim kurumları tarafından nasıl yok sayıldığını inceliyor.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviation	Explanation
AKUH	Aga Khan University Hospital
CNIC	Computerized National Identity Card
COPHC	China Overseas Port Holding Company
CPEC	China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
FCS	Fisherman Cooperative Society
FC	Frontier Constabulary
KFHA	Karachi Fisheries Harbour Authority
KMC	Karachi Municipal Corporation
NADRA	National Database and Registration Authority
NARA	National Alien Registration Authority
NIC	National Identity Card
PFF	Pakistan Fisherfolk Forum
SWEEP	Solid Waste Emergency and Efficiency Project
TCF	The Citizen's Foundation

1. INTRODUCTION

Indigenous Sindhi fisherfolk have used the sea as their means of livelihood since before colonial times in the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent. Archived documents and news articles display fisherfolk's land rights and use around 400 years ago at the coast and its neighboring islands (Tunio, 2019). Located in Karachi's Korangi district—named for the Korangi Creek that runs along it—Ibrahim Hyderi is a fishing village that dates back to the pre-colonial era in Pakistan. Ibrahim Hyderi comprises 50 *mohallay* (neighborhoods) with a total population of approximately 150,000 people. 10 kilometers further, along Creek Road, is the Korangi Creek's second fishing village, called Rehri Goth. Rehri Goth's 17 *mohallay* house over 100,000 residents, and each *mohalla* contains between 250 and 2000 people (Dehlavi, 2017).



Figure 1.1. Pakistan and Karachi on the world map (American Security Project, 2016).

Fishing is the primary source of economic activity in both these villages. Generations of indigenous, small-scale fisherfolk—mostly of Sindhi ethnicity—ensured that they remained mostly self-sustained until the early 2000s, despite government-prescribed fishing quotas and the

involvement of *beopari* (middlemen) who hire contract fisherfolk to work for sea lords and coastal landowners (Khan et al., 2005).

Over the last decade, the Korangi Creek's coastline and the Arabian sea coast it is attached to have deteriorated due to the timber mafia, which cut down the mangroves at the Korangi Creek to sell for profit as a cheap source of fuel (Dawn News, 24 January 2022). However, the mangroves are essential to sustain marine life at the Korangi coastline, where they harbor the prawn and crab species that are the most lucrative catches and therefore central to the livelihoods of local fisherfolk. Other community members who are not fishing themselves nevertheless are mostly involved in the fisheries sector; women and children in Ibrahim Hyderi and Rehri Goth work as fish cleaners or shrimp peelers, while the non-fishing men often work as processors or transporters. Due to the destruction of mangroves, the subsequent decline in fish catch, and the resultant hike in seafood prices, a vast proportion of Korangi's fisherfolk and fisheries workers cannot afford to make ends meet, or even eat the fish they catch (Idrees, 2021).

Solid waste dumping by industries and municipal authorities is also routine at the Korangi coast—governmental institutions such as the provincial Sindh Solid Waste Management Board and the Karachi Municipal Corporation passively allow or ignore the misuse of low-income districts as dumpsites for Karachi's municipal and industrial solid waste, which is between 18,000 and 20,000 tonnes daily (C40 Cities, January 2020). This is in part due to the fact that Karachi has no proper landfills; Deh Gondal and Jam Chakho, the city's only dedicated solid waste disposal sites, are in reality dump sites that have been choked for the last ten years (Imran, 2019). Informal dump sites are therefore common, with *naalay* (waterways) throughout the city being clogged with solid municipal and industrial waste; examples include the Gujjar and Orangi *naalay* (Hasan, 2021). Karachi is also Pakistan's most densely populated city, with over 24,000 people per square kilometer (World Population Review, 2023)¹. This is due to it being Pakistan's powerhouse for manufacturing employment, and, consequently, the central point for rural-to-urban migration. The overpopulation, solid waste overflow and dumping in public and residential areas, and land and water disputes have rendered Karachi the fifth-most unlivable city in the world as of 2019 (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2019).

¹ [World Population Review website](#)

The land mafia—a mix of politicians, police, and, most importantly, land developers—is an active player in the garbage dumping, land grabbing, and land reclamation in Karachi. These individuals’ campaigns are forceful and hard-hitting, and since 2005 have centered on reclaiming land from Karachi’s seas through the use of compacted, weighted garbage (Guriro, 2017). This reclamation leads to hazardous chemicals in the solid waste leaching into the sand and toxic effluent being dumped into fishing grounds. Marine life has been depleted from the coastline: a combination of the timber mafia’s actions, the water from the Indus Delta running low, and erosion (Aeman et al., 2023; Ali, 2018; Baker, 2022). The aquatic zone’s health has also deteriorated and there are not enough mangroves to remedy this.

These circumstances have forced the fishing communities at Ibrahim Hyderi and Rehri Goth to venture farther and farther offshore to obtain their catch, now more expensive as more fuel is used and more dangerous due to choppy waves and the risk of crossing over into Indian waters and being interrogated or detained on suspicion of being spies by Indian authorities (Imtiaz, 2014).

Against this background, this thesis concentrates on the following main research questions:

1. How has the fishing communities’ relationship with the sea changed on the Korangi coast, as they were exposed to heavy migration and population changes since 1971, and material discard problems since 2007?
2. How are top-down “green” or sanitation-focused discourses sustained through violence against the fisherfolk in Karachi, who are “Othered” through the dispossession of their land and sea, narratives of cleanliness, and consistently changing definitions of legality?
3. How is a narrative of “greater good” upheld by the institutions repressing the dissenting fishing communities, and how are marginalized and dissenting fishing populations discarded by the provincial and municipal governance institutions in Karachi?

I will be answering these questions based on in-depth semi-structured interviews that I have conducted with members of the fisherfolk living in Rehri Goth and Ibrahim Hyderi. These interviews are organized into different sections thematically using open-coding methods. I also studied local newspaper articles pertaining to the Korangi coast’s fisherfolk to construct a historical overview of how the coast has changed over time, including how the fisherfolk’s own relationships with the sea have been affected by the shifts in their space and place.

By applying a Foucauldian lens to discard studies, this thesis will posit that the discard as relates to Korangi is two-fold: there is discard *at* Korangi (of materials) and there is discard *of* Korangi (its ecosystem, people, and traditions). A core part of this thesis's findings is based on how changes in landscape due to garbage dumping and development at the coastline (i.e. shifts in geography) have rippled out and caused physical and socio-economic harm for the fishing communities, including damage to their health and the loss of centuries-old traditional fishing practices and monsoon-time culture. The history of fisherfolk presented within this thesis will explain the content and extent of this harm, while the theoretical frameworks used will highlight the violence involved in this type of economic development at the coast marginalizing and dispossessing fishing communities of their livelihoods, fishing rights and their physical and mental health.

While Ibrahim Hyderi and Rehri Goth fisheries have been studied from a financial perspective (Chandio et al., 2015) and studies are present on the contamination and toxicology concerning groundwater resources at Ibrahim Hyderi and Rehri Goth (such as Waseem et al.'s (2014) important analysis of heavy metal contamination in Korangi), scientific research focusing on different stakeholders including local fishers with respect to the effects of garbage dumping in the region has been very limited. News articles (in local English-language news sources such as Dawn, The Daily Times, The Herald, and The Express Tribune, as well as international news outlets such as Al Jazeera, The New York Times, and The Guardian) have covered how garbage and effluent dumping have made it difficult for the Korangi Creek's fisherfolk to make a living in recent times. There has also been some coverage of enforced disappearances of the fisherfolk by the Pakistani state. While these narratives offer anecdotal evidence for understanding the challenges that Korangi coast's fisherfolk face, they do not construct a historically informed narrative, nor do they speak to the nature of discard wherein the sea is treated as a sewer and dumping ground with unlimited space, or examine the sociocultural causes behind the marginalization of fisherfolk. However, a historical perspective is crucial to understand how the cultural practices and lived realities of the fisherfolk have changed as the coast and sea has changed in their region. This thesis therefore aims to contribute to discard studies and political ecology literatures by providing an in-depth analysis of the wasting and Othering of the indigenous fisherfolk communities in Karachi and how this has changed their centuries-old traditional relationship with the sea.

The following section presents the theoretical background and relevant literature used for this analysis by discussing the three most significant strands of literature for this thesis, namely, discard studies, the Foucauldian lens entailing the concepts of biopower and eco-governmentality, and the concept of ocean grabbing.

2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND LITERATURE REVIEW

All systems produce waste, but the materials, places, and people who are discarded are deeply indicative of a society's values (Leboiron and Lepawsky, 2022). Discard studies literature therefore aims to uncover the value systems behind the discarding of particular things, people, and places, so as to see how this discard enables continued functioning of the governance systems already in practice (ibid). Within the context of this thesis, I will elaborate on how the provincial and municipal governance institutions use discard as a technique of governance using a discard studies lens.

Discard studies has emerged as a way of understanding “aspects of waste [that] are entirely hidden from common view, including the wider social, economic, political, cultural, and material systems that shape waste and wasting” (Liboiron & Lepawsky, 2022, p. 2). Therefore, discard studies looks beyond the traditional confines of waste studies, which focuses primarily on material waste and the techniques and systems used to manage it. More specifically, it questions “how some materials, practices, regions, and people are valued and devalued, become disposable or dominant” (ibid, p. 3). The emphasis, in discard studies, is on how harm is determined, and by whom (Vogel, 2012), and which materials, peoples, communities, and places are discarded. In order for the dominant system to continue functioning, it rids itself of “people, places, and things that actually or potentially threaten the continuity of [the system]” (Liboiron and Lepawsky, 2022, p. 3). Discard studies conceptualizes wasting as a “technique of power” (ibid), and analyzes the necropolitics² involved in placing value on some places and people above others. The concept of “Othering” within Foucault's theory of governmentality (which will be elaborated on further in this section) aligns with this idea of discard well, and this is why this thesis uses it as the complementary theoretical framework to study Korangi and its fisherfolk.

² The term “necropolitics” was first used by Achille Mbembe (2003), and is often used as an extension to Foucault's concept of biopower (Puar, 2007; Berlant, 2007). It combines Foucauldian theory with a decolonial perspective to define how entire populations are exposed to death by powerful biopower systems that consider them undesirable. Necropolitics creates “death-worlds”, which Mbembe defines as “new and unique forms of social existence in which vast populations are subjected to conditions of life conferring upon them the status of *living dead*” (Mbembe, 2003, p. 40). The key feature of necropolitics is “to produce death on a large scale” (Mbembe, 2019, p. 34) through varied means, including through regulating access to and controlling natural resources (ibid, p. 85).

What is discarded shows who possesses power within the system; as Michel Foucault put it, “power... produces reality [and] domains of objects and rituals of truth” (Foucault, 1991, p. 27). It is not just the waste itself that is discarded; it is also the Other and the places within which the Other typically resides. Foucault defines the “biopower state” as one within which the state is managed and curated by governmental regime, which uses an “explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugation of bodies and the control of populations” (Foucault, 1998, p. 140). Accordingly, the traditional sovereign power of the monarchs entailed decisions about whom to “make die” or to kill the ones threatening its territory and authority, whereas the more recent “biopolitical” governmental disciplinary system revolves around the question of whom to “let die” where the state now does not only use repressive power, but disciplines through new means like regulating and “improving” the well-being of its population to keep them under control (Foucault, 2003; Andreucci and Kallis, 2017). In other words, the biopolitical regime determines which lives have value and which do not, which populations can be subjected to or exposed to death or illness (such as through material discard and toxic waste dumping in predominantly Black neighborhoods in the United States, as Bullard (1990) notes), which populations to reallocate to the outer reaches of the city (such as through the creation of satellite towns for poor and/or racially marginalized communities), and which populations are excluded from the right to possess an identification (such as the Pakistani government’s denial to issue identity documents to “alien” residents or refugees, detailed further in Section 4.3).

Where sovereign power was more territory-oriented, and ruled directly over the population by means of exercising violence (Foucault, 2003), “biopolitical governmentality” (ibid) features a “more diffuse form of power” (Bakker and Bridge, 2008, p. 225). The core concern of the latter is not territory, but population, and the control and power over “the health, productivity, reproduction and well-being of the populations” (Andreucci and Kallis, 2017, p. 96). However, it is essential to note that the traditional sovereign power and the biopolitical power systems are not essentially mutually exclusive and there is no “clear-cut dichotomy” (Andreucci & Kallis, 2017 p. 97); in fact, they can and do coexist, and in fact strengthen and enable one another. As the next section will discuss in more detail, these two modes of power are complementary at the Korangi coast as well. The military’s power over the population in Pakistan is absolute and sovereign in many ways (Daechsel, 2011; Rashid, 2020), and I detail the military’s role in enacting violence against the fisherfolk further in Section 5. For instance, governance institutions such as the National Database and Registration

Authority (NADRA) employ biopolitical power over the fisherfolk, refusing to register Bengali-ethnicity fishers for National Identity Cards (NICs) (Ashfaq et al., 2020). Both sovereign power and biopower (in this case, respectively the military and governance institutions) ensure the repression of Korangi's fisherfolk.

According to Foucault, biopower states do not serve those it systematically discriminates against, defined by Foucault as those individuals who undergo racism. Foucault's concept of racism introduces "the break between what must live and what must die" (2003, p. 254–255) for the biopower and its institutions to continue existing and exerting power. Eco-governmentality studies and socio-ecological literature have defined those on the receiving end of racism as the "Other". Within a biopolitical system, geographical divisions and alterations (such as the making of satellite towns, demolitions of informal housing without due warning, and designation of poor neighborhoods such as Ibrahim Hyderi as a Garbage Transfer Station, according to the Karachi Strategic Development Plan 2020 prepared by the City District Government Office) are made according to statistical information (such as censuses, which provide data on ethnicity, household finances, formal vs. informal housing, etc.), and power is therefore divided along socio-economic lines. In this process, specific races and classes become associated with certain, "undesirable" localities, leading to their marginalization and resulting in their discard. Biopower states control large populations through the use of socially established institutions that enforce discipline and obedience. Biopower practices (such as bureaucracies and policing) reinforce the sovereign power of the state (Andreucci and Kallis, 2017). In a similar vein, Robert Bullard's seminal work *Dumping in Dixie* (1990) and Leboiron and Lepawsky's *Discard Studies* (2022) offer insight on how the discard of marginalized populations can happen through institutionalized practices. All these sources are highly relevant for understanding why Korangi is treated as a waste dump by the provincial government and city municipality, as will be elaborated on in Section 4 and 5.

The concept of governmentality was introduced as a power analytic by Foucault, and has further inspired the term eco-governmentality in the political ecology literature. Eco-governmentality has now become a concept often used by political ecologists to show how environmental concerns can become a "rationality of rule" (McCarthy et al., 2015, p. 389) in neoliberal, governmental systems. Biodiversity conservation efforts, extractive processes, and other environmental concerns have been largely governmentalized, with "new governing apparatuses [producing] new knowledge about

natural and social bodies of proper conduct and rule” (Valdivia, 2015, p. 471). The opinions and decisions of those actually affected by environmental policymaking are not invited, nor are they consulted (Demeritt, 2015). The dispossession of these marginalized communities--and treatment of individuals as subjects to be governed without the right to self-govern or dissent--is a built-in feature of eco-governmentality. Accordingly, a governmental state uses tools to proliferate “techniques and knowledges to manage social life” (Valdivia, 2015, p. 470). It regulates institutions, and uses the complementary technologies of disciplinary power and control mechanisms to remove deviations from behaviors, populations, economic outcomes, etc. that are considered undesirable by the biopower state (Foucault, 2000). Eco-governmentality therefore questions power relations: how power is used, and against whom, within the context of nature-society relations. The term is often utilized to analyze power relations in cases of dispossession and extractivism in the Global South (Ayub et. al, 2022; Andreucci & Kallis, 2017; Goldman, 2001; Himley, 2008).

According to Foucault (1998), disciplinary power and control mechanisms imposed by governments entail implicit ways of individual self-regulation. Foucault’s *Discipline and Punish* (2001) explains disciplinary power--justified by governments as being more humane than outright punishment--through the Panopticon design proposed by Jeremy Bentham. The Panopticon is an architectural design for a prison, with guards stationed within a central tower and maintaining surveillance over the inmates, who would never know for sure whether anyone was watching them. The presence of the paramilitary Rangers forces at the Korangi coastline, or the constant checking of fisherfolk by Sindh police for Pakistani identity cards are examples of disciplinary power, where the subjects being governed do not know when, where, or how they are being surveilled.

Control mechanisms regard certain individual behaviors as better than others and reward certain ways of being for shaping social spheres in a way desirable to those in power. These mechanisms also introduce and reproduce certain ways of knowing. Power systems introduce and sustain a singular “truth,” and the “truth” enables the power system to remain in place and extend. Foucault terms this circular relationship between truth and power a “truth regime” (Foucault, 2000, p. 132). This approach is very relevant for Korangi coast’s fishing communities because of the “truths” that the Karachi municipality, Sindh government, and national authorities propagate: that Bengali residents (or residents without identity cards) in Korangi are “foreign” or “alien,” that the coast belongs to port authorities and whoever else the provincial government decides instead of indigenous

communities with 400 years of history at Korangi, that the power of the law can override the right to exist for marginalized communities. A Foucauldian analysis therefore helps me explain the making and remaking of populations through the use of legality and legal hierarchies in the case of Korangi fisherfolk. These hierarchies form environmental rationality and contribute extensively to the creation of environmental knowledge, which, in turn, is crucial to how power is exercised (Valdivia, 2015).

The analysis in this thesis is further informed by Andreucci and Kallis (2017), who studied governmentality and violence, using the World Bank's involvement in the state of Peru as an example of an international, development-focused economic organization carrying out developmental extractive processes at the cost of the local community's well-being. This text is noteworthy for any extractivist and marginalizing mechanism in the Global South as there are often overwhelming resemblances in developmental processes and the institutions that enable them in these countries due to similarities in the form of informal systems, inadequate protections for indigenous communities, and economies dependent on extractivism.³

Daechsel's (2011) historical ethnography of Karachi with respect to the creation of its satellite town Korangi is particularly relevant to this thesis. His article does not adopt a Foucauldian analysis of developmentalism, yet, it utilizes Foucauldian terms and concepts to unravel the different strands of power that comprised Pakistan's governance institutions. For instance, Daechsel argues that Pakistan's "self-determination" in the form of democracy was constantly hindered by "sovereignty contests in which state sovereignty as such was put into question" (Daechsel, 2011, p. 136) through tribalism, politics based on religiosity, and ethnic conflict, thereby resulting in what Daechsel terms 'raw' sovereignty (ibid). This, combined with weak governmentality--since the Indian sub-continent did not have the same access to controlling populations through biopower due to largely informal systems, as well as a lack of resources, order, and material wealth due to post-colonial poverty and systemic inefficiencies--resulted in "the ultimate source of state sovereignty" (Daechsel, 2011, p. 137)--martial law, which has historically played and continues to play a significant part in "South Asian cultures of power" (ibid). Similarly, Rashid (2020) analyzes the Pakistani army's role in governance, and defines it as the British Indian Army's direct successor in the country, having direct rule over the population for over thirty years. The position of Prime Minister (the most powerful

³ An extractivist model of government is one which is "based on the overexploitation of [...] natural resources, as well as the expansion of cap-ital's frontiers toward territories previously considered nonproductive" (Svampa, 2015, p. 66).

political position in Pakistan) coincided with the Chief of Army Staff position through the enactment of martial law between 1958 and 1971, then between 1977 and 1988, and finally between 1999 and 2008.

Given this context, this thesis aims to examine the Pakistani military's role in eco-governmentality today, and establish how it produces and enforces power over those it governs with respect to the fisherfolk. I also provide a brief history of how Korangi came into being as a satellite town in Section 5.1 as a result of 'raw' sovereignty and weak governmentality.

Complementing these two main theoretical frameworks, namely, discard studies and eco-governmentality, the analysis in the thesis also makes use of ocean-grabbing literature. Similar to its counterpart on terrestrial systems, namely, land grabbing, the ocean grabbing literature attempts to explain what kinds of marine reallocations by governments or the private sector can be considered detrimental to ecosystems and the populations that rely on these ecosystems for survival. According to Barbesgaard (2016), ocean grabbing is a means of accumulation by dispossession. Harvey (2003, 2005) highlights state redistribution as one among the neoliberal mechanisms that enable and uphold accumulation by dispossession. These state redistributions happen routinely at the Korangi coast in the form of ocean grabbing, both implicitly and explicitly, through the auctioning of trawlers (Aamir, 2020; Baloch, 2002; Baloch, 2021; Business Recorder, 2005), repurposing of the fisherfolk's residential coastal land into garbage dumps (Ahmed, 2015; Guriro, 2017; Idrees, 2021; Kaimkhani, 2007), and the consolidation of fishing power into the hands of large companies (Mehmood, 2021). These factors, all combined, have enabled the unraveling of Ibrahim Hyderi and Rehri Goth's communities over the last two decades especially as I will discuss in the next sections.

These reallocations can be considered ocean grabbing if it fulfills one of the following three conditions: it is brought about by inadequate governance, it harms livelihood or human security, or it causes socio-ecological damage (Bennett et al., 2015). Therefore, this strand of literature is mainly relevant for small-scale subsistence fishers, especially those of the Global South. Ocean grabbing "deprive[s] small-scale fishers of resources... and/or undermine[s] historical access to areas of the sea" (ibid, p. 61). In the case of the Korangi coast, the deprivation and undermining of historical access occurs mainly through garbage and effluent dumping, enabled by police violence and inefficient city planning. Although the ocean grabbing lens I present in this paper is secondary, it is

nevertheless a crucial critical lens through which the dispossession of fishing communities in South Asia should be studied. Ocean grabbing studies tend to typically focus on policy making and governance (Bennett et al., 2015) and Blue Growth (Barbesgaard, 2016) from a perspective more centered around the Global North. Perspectives from the Global South are key to understanding how ocean grabbing and the policies and redistributions that enable it are upheld in systems that are more informal in nature, with a variety of stakeholders. The dispossession of indigeneity should be a core part of reporting and researching ocean grabbing, as it is with land grabbing all around the world (Albarenga & i Dalmases, 2022; IDMC, 2013; OHCHR, 2020). The following figure (Figure 2.1) summarizes the three theoretical lenses that I used for discussing the Korangi coast's fisherfolk's case and the main theoretical concepts that are relevant for the present thesis.




Figure 2.1. Intersections between the three main strands of literature used in this thesis (Figure prepared by Author)

Given this theoretical background, in the following section I present the methodology I used to study and analyze the case of the marginalized small-scale fishing communities on Karachi's Korangi coast, who have been turned into the Other and dispossessed of their right to the sea by several socio-economic actors such as land mafia, municipal government, provincial government, and police and military forces.

3. METHODOLOGY

I carried out in-depth, semi-structured interviews with 12 members of the local indigenous fishing community at the Korangi Creek to study ecological and social damage to fisherfolk at the Creek's coast.




Figure 3.1. Administrative map of Karachi, with the map of the Sindh province at the top left corner indicating where Karachi is located within the province (Urban Resource Center, 2020)

I conducted interviews in May 2021 and July 2022, and kept in contact with my interviewees to ensure this thesis remained up to date on developments as they unfolded on the Korangi coast. The fisherfolk at the coast are mostly of Sindhi ethnicity and speak the Sindhi language among

themselves. The second-greatest ethnic population is Bengali. All of the interviewees, however, spoke Urdu--my mother tongue and Pakistan's primary official language. I got in contact with the Pakistan Fisherfolk Forum's Vice Chairwoman, and initiated my fieldwork in Ibrahim Hyderi and Rehri Goth by interviewing a diverse mix of residents with respect to boat ownership, ethnicity, work status (active or retired), political standing, and age. I received informed consent at the beginning of each interview.

The questions I asked my interviewees were as follows:

- How has the Korangi coast changed from your childhood to now?
- What fishing equipment do you use?
- Is your boat your own or do you work on a commercial boat?
- What is your relationship with the Pakistan Fisherfolk Forum, if any?
- How many individuals do you support through the work that you do?
- How much trust do you have in the government and in governance institutions?
- In your opinion, why does the municipality dump garbage at the Korangi coast?
- What should the government do to rehabilitate the fisherfolk of Korangi?
- Do you feel the presence of paramilitary personnel at the Korangi coast?
- Are there any health issues due to the garbage dumping in your household or immediate neighbors? Which ones?
- Which fish species do you not find anymore on the coast that you used to catch before?
- Which public administration measures do you think should be taken for Korangi's fisherfolk?

These interviews--combined with my literature review and news articles from high-impact English-language local news sources such as Dawn News and The Express Tribune--form the basis of my arguments and allow for a holistic picture of how Ibrahim Hyderi and Rehri Goth have changed over time. The news sources I used are related to:

- violence and dispossession against small-scale, subsistence, or low-income fisherfolk (Ahmed, 2015; Al Hasan, 2021; Imtiaz, 2014)
- violence against the fisherfolk along ethnic lines, or against specific ethnic and/or low-income communities as a whole in Pakistan in order to explain how difference is created and upheld by governmental and military institutions (Aziz, 2016; Hasan, 2021; Kohari, 2021; Mughal & Baloch, 2017)

- the fisherfolk’s protests against dispossession (AHRC, 2011; AHRC, 2011, AHRC, 2016; Down To Earth, 2005)
- the ecological damage that the Korangi coast is undergoing as a result of overfishing, garbage dumping, and the loss of mangrove cover (Ali, 2018; Baker, 2022; Baloch, 2002; Dawn News, 2022; Guriro, 2017; Idrees, 2021; Khaskheli, 2020; Naqi, 2016; Siyal, 2017)
- ocean grabbing by means of auctioning fishing rights away to foreign trawlers (Aamir, 2020; Baloch, 2002; Baloch, 2021; Business Recorder, 2005)
- the direct and indirect violence that small-scale or low-income fisherfolk face (AHRC, 2011; AHRC, 2016; Ashfaq et al., 2020; Down to Earth, 2005; Front Line Defenders, 2016; Guriro, 2017),
- the spiritual and historical connection that the fisherfolk have with the sea (Ayub & Ilyas, 2021; John et al., 2014; Popalzai, 2010; Tunio, 2019)

I believe these additional primary sources are integral to understanding the scale of dispossession that Korangi’s fisherfolk are currently undergoing, and to lay groundwork to understand the history of Karachi and its politics.




Figure 3.2. Map of Karachi’s Korangi district, with Ibrahim Hyderi (left) and Rehri Goth (right) (Google Maps)

Table 3.1. List of interviewees

Interviewee	Description
1	A Sindhi generational fisherman from Rehri Goth, in his thirties, who owns his boat
2	A Sindhi retired fisherman, in his fifties, originally from Ibrahim Hyderi and now

	living in Rehri Goth
3	A Sindhi retired fisherman in his seventies from Ibrahim Hyderi, now working as the head of a fisherfolk welfare center, and previously the Vice Chairman of the Pakistan Fisherfolk Forum (PFF), and a founding member of PFF
4	A Sindhi administrator for Rehri Goth's people who works closely with the fisherfolk themselves and with nonprofits offering services to Rehri's people, in his thirties
5	A Sindhi fisherman from Ibrahim Hyderi, in his thirties, working on a commercial boat
6	A Bengali fisherman from Rehri Goth, in his thirties, working on a commercial boat
7	A Sindhi fisherman from Ibrahim Hyderi, in his fifties, working on his own boat
8	A Sindhi fisherman from Rehri Goth, in his thirties, working on a commercial boat
9	A generational Sindhi fisherman from Ibrahim Hyderi, in his twenties, who owns his own boat
10	A Sindhi woman from Ibrahim Hyderi, in her forties, who cleans and peels shrimp, and whose father was a generational fisherman
11	A Sindhi fisherman from Ibrahim Hyderi, in his twenties, working on a commercial boat
12	A Bengali fisherman from Ibrahim Hyderi, in his thirties, working on a commercial boat

These individuals are key stakeholders for the case analyzed in this thesis, as they are residents of Ibrahim Hyderi and Rehri Goth, and are either fisherfolk, retired fisherfolk, or currently working in the fisheries sector. Their lands, lives, and livelihoods, therefore, are deeply affected by the garbage dumping and development occurring at the Korangi coast.

The number of interviews I conducted was limited due to time constraints and difficulties of carrying out data collection in Karachi. However, each interview I conducted was immensely in-depth, and lasted for well over an hour each. I translated the interviews into English myself, and where an English translation is inadequate, I provide an explanation for the Urdu or Sindhi terms used. I have also used maps to illustrate population changes and development at Korangi wherever I was able to obtain them, since “[m]aps... are political” and in many cases are used to “sanitize and legitimize the violence of development” (Ashfaq et al., 2020, p. 1).

In addition, I used participant-observation techniques. In my capacity as a volunteer and activist against anti-poverty demolitions and dehousing prior to writing this thesis, I have attended workshops and negotiation meetings. These required documentation through writing and photographing without class saviorism or poverty voyeurism, and I hope my thesis uses this same stringency. While writing this thesis, I immersed myself in the fisherfolk’s conversations among themselves and with me I took pictures of the landscape of Ibrahim Hyderi and Rehri Goth that had no identifiable people, so as to help the reader visualize the landscape of the Korangi coast.

The following section (Section 4) gives the socio-ecological and political background for Pakistan and specifically for the Korangi coast from a historical perspective. Later, in Section 5, I present my findings from my interviews as well as news archives.

4. STUDY AREA

In the following section, I provide a brief history of Pakistan (Section 4.1) and the Korangi coast from the 1600s onwards (Section 4.2), then I explain how and why land mafia has emerged on the coastline (Section 4.3). These sections lay the groundwork for the following two sections, Section 5 and 6, which mainly concentrate on how and why “Othering” of the Korangi fisherfolk has happened and which forms of discard this has led to.

4.1. A brief summary of Pakistan’s socio-economic status

Pakistan is a developing country with a population of 241.49 million people (Khan, 2023). Currently, the country is going through a period of deep political and economic unrest. Its unsustainable burden of debt, combined with rising fuel prices due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine and poor governance, has caused inflation to increase unprecedentedly (Brookings, 2023). In addition, the floods of 2023 caused one-third of the country to be submerged in water (UNICEF, 2023), jeopardizing the lives and livelihoods of many Sindhi fisherfolk, in Karachi and neighboring areas (Akbar, 2022).

The Pakistani government has, since 1950, taken loans from the World Bank totaling \$40 billion as of 2022 (World Bank, 2022). Since the 1970s, there has been an ongoing effort to encourage privatization and economic development in Pakistan, which the World Bank has been at the forefront of (World Bank, 2005). The government is greatly obliged to uphold these developmentalist ideals to ensure economic growth in the name of the “greater good.” One of these “greater goods” for the Pakistani government comes in the form of the imminent “Blue Revolution” that aims to maximize profits from the marine sector (Patil et al., 2018, p. 17). This “Blue Revolution” agenda refers to the renewed foreign investment interest in Pakistan’s maritime sector, for which the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is largely responsible (Mehmood, 2021). I discuss both the World Bank’s involvement in Pakistan and the Blue Revolution in detail in Section 6.

The fisheries sector accounts for 0.39% of Pakistan’s GDP (Nusrat, 2021). The minimum wage in Sindh is PKR 25,000 (US\$ 110) as of July 2022 (EFP, 2022). According to a WWF-conducted

socio-economic report for Rehri Goth and Ibrahim Hyderi, the average monthly incomes in these areas are PKR 20,400 and PKR 13,710 respectively (Dehlavi, 2017). Many of my interviewees stated that these figures do not appropriately capture the fisherfolk's poverty. There has been a significant uptick in the deterioration of the coastline, in-migration (of Sindhi fisherfolk from surrounding areas especially due to the floods) and inflation since the WWF survey was published.

4.2 A history of the Korangi coast and its fisherfolk

4.2.1 Fisherfolk culture and tradition from the pre-colonial to colonial era (1600s-1947)

Karachi's industrialization can be traced all the way back to the seventeenth century. The estuary where the Hub River meets the Arabian Sea marked a crucial point of trade between India and Central Asia, with Karak Bunder serving as a port. Due to heavy silting in 1728, Karak Bunder's merchants moved their trade businesses to Karachi, increasing trade until 1839--the year Karachi was conquered by the British, after which the city underwent rapid expansion due to its convenient port. The city originally housed migrant Baloch and Sindhi people who settled there in the eighteenth century (Ashfaq et al., 2020). Karachi's ports also played a significant role in the First World War as the Central Asian headquarters for British interventions. Trade and the British involvement in the subcontinent transformed Karachi from a fishing village to a city of strategic importance with central ship ports, and it became the provincial capital after Sindh separated from Bombay's presidency in 1935, and the national capital upon the creation of Pakistan in 1947 (Hassan & Mohib, 2003).

A generational fisherman from Rehri Goth whose father, grandfather, and great-grandfather were all fishers, that I interviewed in the present study (Interviewee #1), stated that like many other families, his family also used to live on the northwest side of the Indus Delta. In 1833 and before, the delta was the site of 13 active creeks and extended over 13,000 square kilometers of area (Siyal, 2017). When the delta began drying up, the fishers could no longer sustain themselves through the creek waters, and so relocated close by to the fishing village of Rehri Goth along the Korangi coastline. The fishers at both these sites had strong ethnic and cultural ties with each other, and the relocation was made easy by the fact that there were significant fish stocks of 176 species in the Arabian Sea along the Sindh coasts (Khaskheli, 2020), ensuring that all the fisherfolk could sustain themselves and their families at that time.

Interviewee #2--a retired fisherman living in Rehri Goth--explained how this centuries-old relationship meant that both knowledge of fishing skills and fishing vessels were passed down from one generation to the next. The fisherfolk only lived on the Korangi coast for six months every year; the remaining six months were a time of immense activity for them. At the beginning of spring, the fisherfolk and their families would pack up and move to the old port islands, Shah Bunder and Kiti Bunder. They would work to build temporary housing for the time that they would spend on the islands launching fishing expeditions. The women belonging to these fishing villages also took part in fishing-related activities. Many of them weaved nets and dried seafood prior to refrigeration becoming commonplace. A key role of women was in cleaning, brining, and drying shrimp--a catch that has always been lucrative for Indo-Pakistan's fisherfolk. These were paid, seasonal jobs for Korangi's women. The fish caught by the fisherfolk would be packed by them and sold off the coast to traders who would sell it in open bazaars in the city. All through the monsoon, the fisherfolk would carry out expeditions. While it was always a labor-intensive process, Korangi's fisherfolk would set up a *mela* (festival) every year on one of the islands to entertain their children and take time off their expeditions. Once the high tide caused by the monsoon would end, the fisherfolk would move back to the coast and carry out minor expeditions to fish from there to sustain themselves.

Interviewee #7 stated that the women of Ibrahim Hyderi were freer when he was a child than they are now. He states that when it would rain and the women and girls would want to bathe in the creek or the sea, the elder men would band together a few hundred meters from the coast to ensure they remained unbothered as they enjoyed the rain. Now, "outside influences" such as drug addiction, police involvement, and the introduction of many new families to Ibrahim Hyderi--not all of them trustworthy, he adds--prevent the women from feeling safe in their *mohallay*. Interviewee #10 concurred; she fears that the loss of tradition means that her children--especially her daughter--will never be able to witness the spirit of community and feel free due to the deprivation the last two decades have brought for the fisherfolk. She wants her daughter to see a real *mela*.



Figure 4.1. Small-scale fishing boats at Rehri Goth docked at the coast during the off-season (Photo by Author)

Each creek connected to the Arabian Sea has its own island, and Interviewee #3 recounted how each island would have 300 homes that housed around 500 families each, all living in harmony. There are four *dargahs* or *mazaars* (shrines of Sufi Muslim saints) located near Korangi and on the islands; visiting these was a core part of the fisherfolk's festival. The Sufi tradition in Islam revolves around spirituality, and Sufi saints are thought to be spiritually alive and able to intercede to God for humanity. The Sindh region is famous for the staggering number of Sufi saints who were born and buried there--one legend says that 125,000 are buried near Thatta, a mere 2 hours' drive from Karachi. Sindhi culture places Sufi thought in high importance, with Sindhis and non-Sindhis alike calling Sindhis "Sufi by nature" (Levesque, 2016, p. 212). The fisherfolk would go to the *dargahs* to pray for protection and prosperity (Interviewee #1). And they did prosper; Interviewee #2, now in his late fifties, recounts that in his childhood, there was such an abundance of fish at the Korangi coast that they could catch fish simply by putting their hands into the water and reaching, so there was no shortage of food. The sea was absolutely clear at the coast. Interviewee #7 describes the Ibrahim

Hyderi of his childhood as a “model fishing community,” mostly harmonious, with any conflicts between the fisherfolk being solved internally.

Interviewee #3, who carried out fishing expeditions over three decades and is one of the founding members of the Pakistan Fisherfolk Forum (PFF)--which was founded in 1998 by the fisherfolk at the Korangi coast to protect their historic right to the sea--recounted how fisherfolk from Korangi, livestock farmers living in the Malir area of Karachi, and agricultural farmers living near the Indus Delta had a system of *lein-dein* (give-and-take, or barter) for products among themselves, thereby ensuring a constant supply of fresh food for all parties involved. According to him, this system took root in pre-colonial times and lasted until the mid-1980s. The Fishermen’s Cooperative Society (FCS) was founded in 1945 by Pakistani fisherfolk to ensure that small-scale fisheries, farms, and other communities involved in sustenance trades could trade products freely and with each other.

However, currently, according to several of my interviewees, the FCS does not represent the interests of the indigenous Sindhi fisherfolk at the Korangi Coast, nor does it work in tandem with the PFF; its interests are more aligned with the Government of Sindh’s plans to modernize and commercialize Pakistani fisheries (FCS, n.d.). In 2015, the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the FCS were indicted with extortion amounting to millions of dollars. They also hired 338 unregistered employees, in addition to 89 ghost employees, during their tenure, in addition to two coordinators, ten advisors, and 57 security guards (Dunya News, 2015). There is therefore now mistrust between the PFF and the FCS. The FCS’s cooperation with the Government of Sindh makes it difficult for the fisherfolk at Korangi to align themselves with the organization, according to my interviewees.

4.2.2 Shifts in population composition as an effect of Independence of Pakistan in 1947: 1947 - present




Figure 4.2. Pre-partition map of the Indian subcontinent, comprising modern-day India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh (Columbia University).

Korangi's demographics have been deeply altered by the British Empire's partition of India and Pakistan in 1947, and by the migrations that took place as an effect of the partition. The religious tensions between the Hindu majority and sizable Muslim minority had heightened, in large part due to the Empire's colonial effects, and the Radcliffe Awards deciding which regions would go to which country. The bureaucratic inefficiencies and shortsightedness of the British colonial system in the subcontinent mean that to this day, accurate data is missing on the number of people moving across provincial, state, and national lines to resettle in either country as a result of the partition. Although Pakistan and India were partitioned into separate geographies on the basis of religion, neither dominion was prepared for the massive volume of population exchange that occurred.

It was expected that ethnic and religious minorities would remain in the same locality (Talbot, 2009). However, due to the strong religious and political sentiment, as well as discrimination on

religious lines, many Pakistani Sindhi Hindus relocated to India over the years. In the ten years between 1941 and 1951, the percentage of Hindu Sindhi people in Karachi declined from 51.1% to 1.7% (Hassan & Mohib, 2003) as they migrated across the border to India, leaving behind mostly Muslim Sindhi people in Pakistan and rendering them an “ethnic and linguistic minority” (Tekchandani, 2005, p. 101). At the Korangi coastline, it was mostly Muslim Sindhi fisherfolk who remained. They would thereafter be joined by Bengali migrants and refugees who would work as fishers.

Karachi’s rapid population expansion--450,000 people in 1947, which became 1.37 million in the decade that followed--caused ethnic tensions among the people of the city. The Urdu-speaking population comprised half of Karachi’s population at this time. These immense shifts in population were marked by turmoil and violence, such as Muslim mobs torching shops belonging to Hindu residents in 1948, which marked the city’s first round of urban disturbance (Ashfaq et al., 2020). The mass migrations to Karachi--first in 1948, and then again in 1951--prompted the creation of cooperative housing societies by migrant groups based on sub-cultural identities so that they could live as a majority within these spaces (Ansari, 2013). At the same time, the partition of India in 1947 resulted in a number of smaller provincial partitions as well; among these was the 1905 partition of the British Indian Bengal Province into East Bengal and West Bengal along the Radcliffe line, decided upon by the British Empire’s Boundary Commission.

Due to its Hindu majority, West Bengal became an Indian state, and East Bengal became a Pakistani province, thereafter named East Pakistan (Mukherjee, 1987, p. 58). Pakistan was, at the time of partition, the only country in the world to be separated from itself by a stretch of land; India lay between West Pakistan (now Pakistan) and East Pakistan, or Bengal (now Bangladesh). The exact numbers are unknown, but the 1947 partition brought a sizable population of Bengali Muslims living in both West Bengal and East Bengal to West Pakistan on the basis of religion or economic opportunity. Between 1947 and 1971, the majority of Bengali people in Pakistan lived in Karachi, forming its second-largest linguistic community. East Pakistan’s fisheries were far more developed and the fisherfolk more skilled than those in Korangi or West Pakistan in general at the time. A possible reason for this could be the immense cultural importance of fish in Bengali culture. The primary form of protein consumed in Bangladesh is fish; it forms the backbone of the country’s diet (FAO, 2014). Since the beginning of the twentieth century, Urdu-speaking merchants and traders

from West Pakistan sought out this skill, and brought back East Pakistan's fisherfolk to Karachi to utilize marine stocks more efficiently, and set up fisherfolk colonies by the sea in the process (Al Hasan, 2021).




Figure 4.3. East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) and West Pakistan, at the time of independence in 1947 (Map created by Julius Paulo).

Despite the religious cohesion, Bengali people faced immense ethnic discrimination in Pakistan, and the whole province of East Pakistan was marginalized by West Pakistan. East Pakistan was home to 55% of Pakistan's total population, but the first Pakistani Governor-General, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, announced in 1948 that Urdu would be the only national language of Pakistan. Ethnic discrimination also governed socioeconomic and political spheres. Numbers kept decreasing as East Pakistan's foremost pro-democracy political leader, Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rahman, was detained multiple times by West Pakistani authorities (Ganguly & Brown, 2003, p. 65). These grievances led to the post-partition population of Bengali people in West Pakistan decreasing as they moved back to East Pakistan. By 1971, there were only between 10,000 and 25,000 Bengali individuals in West Pakistan, almost all of whom worked in Karachi as daily wage earners in textile industries or as part of sea lords' crews on big fishing boats (Kohari, 2021). In 1972, the vote for prime ministership in favor of

Mujib-ur-Rahman was denied through a military junta, and went instead to West Pakistani Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. This turn of events led to the Bangladesh Liberation War, in which Bengal gained independence from Pakistan and became the country of Bangladesh (Ganguly & Brown, 2003, p. 34).

5. RESULTS

This section presents the key findings and analyses based on the in-depth interviews that I conducted with the fisherfolk of the Korangi coast in Karachi. The analysis is complemented by archives on Pakistan's and Karachi's history and news articles on fishing communities living at the Korangi coast. The interviews entailed oral histories of the members of the Korangi fishing communities, as such, they added rich details to historical archives for explaining the marginalization and dispossession the fishing communities have been experiencing for the last several decades.

5.1 Emergence of land mafia and ocean grabbing in Karachi: Physical and socio-economic changes at the coastline

The land mafia came into being due to Karachi's housing crisis, which began in 1947 with the partition and worsened in 1971 due to the separation of Pakistan and Bangladesh, causing two mass migrations into Karachi. At the time of the partition, Karachi's population was approximately 400,000, so housing was not an issue for the city, which is the twelfth-largest in the world. However, refugees and rural-to-urban migrants created new housing challenges, which "land sub-dividers"--what is now referred to as the land mafia, grabbers, or developers--stepped up to control by dividing vacant land in Karachi into plots.

These land sub-dividers were typically government officials, *zamindar* (landowners), bureaucrats, politicians, or members of the Sindh police. They let or sold these plots to migrants for cheap without involving the government or producing proper paperwork. The majority of low-income migrants had left behind their possessions and generational homes before migrating and required this affordable housing, even if it was an impermanent solution. Essentially, the land mafia came into existence due to the lack of affordable housing plans put in place by the national government, and their unwillingness to cater to lower-income individuals and migrants (Ahmed, 2015).

Korangi was among the first districts to be re-settled with migrant groups. The administration of the then-Governor General, Ayub Khan, defined *jhuggis* (informal housing constructed with corrugated iron and mud) as an eyesore where "unhygienic", "unclean" populations lived. Migrants

from India living in Karachi's jhuggis were resettled in Korangi "without any housing or infrastructural support" (Ashfaq et al., 2020, p. 1) as the administration lauded the creation of satellite towns such as Korangi. The purpose of this resettling was to make space for Jinnah's tomb⁴ in 1958. Rajani & Rajani (2016) state that the displacement of these individuals is an example of "colonial patterns," wherein states exert control over subjects, instead of subjects having the power to exercise their rights in how they are governed. The erasure of Korangi's residents is immense; even maps from that time show empty space around central Karachi. Not taking the original dwellers of Korangi into account was a legitimization of the violence that permeated urban and economic development processes and allowed them to happen in the first place (Ashfaq et al., 2020, p. 1).




Figure 5.1. Map of Karachi made by the Army Map Service, 1959. Library of Congress, Geography and Map Division. The yellow area denotes the area of Karachi designated as the capital of Pakistan at that time. The Korangi Creek is mapped far away and indicates a very small population of people.

Land brokers--another category within the land mafia--informally set up displaced vulnerable peoples on the city's outskirts and contracted other brokers to construct homes and set up water supply through Karachi's water tanker mafias.⁵ These areas are populated without possession documents,

⁴ Muhammad Ali Jinnah was the founder of Pakistan, widely referred to as "Quaid-e-Azam," or the great leader (Ahmed, 2005). Jinnah's tomb began being built in 1960, some twelve years after his death, and displaced working-class citizens residing in and near the 3,100 square meters the structure takes up (Rajani & Rajani, 2016).

⁵ Karachi's water supply is not enough to cater to the entire city. The official quota is 650 million gallons per day (MGD), and the nationally acknowledged shortage is 450 MGD, even though a confirmed amount of 520 MGD enters the city.

through political backdoors and bribes. Informal settlements are institutionalized and make up for around half of Karachi's housing needs, and are characterized by the lack of sanitation infrastructure (Hasan, 1996). These units allow individuals without due documentation (National Identity Cards, birth certificates, etc.) to access housing affordably without resorting to "long-drawn, complicated government [housing] schemes" (Ashfaq et al., 2020, p. 13).

Over time, as land became an even more precious commodity due to overpopulation, the land mafia turned to the sea to produce more valuable land at the coast. The aggressive land reclamation campaigns at the Korangi coastline are carried out using solid waste, as a violent form of ocean grabbing. These campaigns use compressed plastic waste (including toxic medicinal waste, since source separated waste is not the norm in Pakistan) to push the coast further into the sea, and the land is rented or sold to illegally operational, environmentally damaging factories. These factories pay a huge one-time cost to the ocean grabbers to carry out operations without the legal paperwork it requires and dump effluent into the sea without the requisite treatment (Guriro, 2017; Ahmed, 2015). Interviewee #9 described how these factories let out unprocessed fumes into the air, stating that "it gets difficult to breathe sometimes". The fishers feel intensely connected to the sea and the coast; the dispossession of their means of livelihood and dismissal of their well-being and core identity is a feature of ocean grabbing (Pedersen et al., 2014).

Interviewee #2 stated that the PFF requested the municipal authorities to set up a sewage and effluent treatment plant multiple times so the water at the coast does not get dirtier with time. They proposed that this be financed by the commercial sea lords--private fishing company owners who have multiple jetties on the Korangi coast and employ fishers to work on commercial boats. However, these sea lords--*sarmaydaar*--are reluctant to finance what they believe is too expensive a project. The gutter water that Korangi's coast receives incorporates the wastewater of 5,000 farmhouses that are located in Bhens Colony--one of the foremost reasons, according to Interviewee #3, that the water at the coast is brown now. He says that the sea is dirty due to a lack of sewage and city planning, and the mangroves dry out as a result of it. This observation is in line with Van Bijsterveldt et al. (2021), who found that mangroves' growth and development is adversely affected by pollution. When the

The remaining amount is stolen by the water tanker mafia, which tampers with flow rates and installs filling points at hydrants. They then supply this water at higher rates to people affected by the city's water shortage--a shortage that the mafia itself creates in large part (Ali & Shah, 2023).

fisherfolk get out of their boats and pull their boats towards the jetties, their feet remain greasy and blackened with residue that does not wash off for days.

Karachi's sprawling buildings and informal settlements can therefore be viewed as a failure to plan, wherein "illegality becomes part of planning" (Ayub et al., 2022, p. 4). Since the provincial government and municipal urban planning institutions failed to allocate adequate land for housing to migrants and refugees, these individuals had to resort to residing in temporary houses, resulting in various communities that have generationally lived in informal settlements.

5.2 The manifestation of "Othering" in Korangi

5.2.1 The creation of Bengali migrants and refugees at the Korangi coast

The eighties were an especially turbulent time in Bangladesh. Natural disasters, economic hardship, and military coups motivated nearly 1.5 million Bangladeshi individuals to migrate to Pakistan--which was economically faring far better than Bangladesh--by the 1990s (Kohari, 2021). As a new country with deep systemic damages in governance caused by British colonialism and suffering economically due to West Pakistan's control of its economy for 24 years, Bangladesh went through political turmoil and multiple financial crises until the 1980s. After the assassination of Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rahman in 1975 by a military coup, the country had multiple rapid changes in leadership.

Muslim Bengali migrants could get past the Pakistani border relatively easily in the 1980s (Anwar, 2013, p. 419). The Fisherman's Cooperative Society did not require fisherfolk to hold Pakistani National Identity Cards (NICs) to carry out fishing activities, so many new Bangladeshi migrants relocated to the fishermen's colonies along the Korangi coast, where there was already a sizable population of Bengali fisherfolk. Some of them were severely underpaid working on sea lords' commercial fishing boats. The Bengali and Sindhi fisherfolk form the backbone of Sindh's fishing industry, but the majority of Bengali fisherfolk--especially those who entered the country after 1971--still do not have citizenship, even if they have the requisite documents (Al Hasan, 2021; Anwar, 2013). The initial reason for this was the intense ethnic violence between Urdu-speaking and Sindhi peoples in the 1990s (Aziz, 2016); Pakistani authorities were alarmed at the rate of Bengali

individuals entering Pakistan due to the possibility of it worsening Karachi's already tenuous political balance (Kohari, 2021).

5.2.2 Stereotyping and “Othering” of Bengali fisherfolk

The Pakistani Interior Ministry's Frontier Constabulary (FC) works to prevent “illegal” activities. (Anwar, 2013). In 1996, as the FC's Commandant, Afzal Ali Shigri authored a report entitled “Report on Illegal Immigrants and Afghan Refugees in Pakistan,” where he labeled Bangladeshi, Afghan, and Burmese migrants “destitute” and “illiterate”, and claimed that they were involved in a number of “heinous crimes” (Shigri, 1996, p. 13). The report also listed Bengali-majority residential areas, thereby increasing surveillance and popularizing the notion that Bangladeshi migrants were “illegal” and “alien” (Shigri, 1996, p. 15). As a result, Bangladeshi migrants were not given national identity cards (NICs). Instead, their cards were issued by the National Alien Registration Authority (NARA), which was formed in 2000. Most of these migrants found informal employment as fishers, factory workers, or daily wage earners. At the time of writing this thesis, most of the Korangi coast's fisherfolk are of Sindhi ethnicity. Some, as I have detailed earlier, are Bengali. Of the remaining, some residents belong to Seraiki, Pashtun and Baloch minority ethnicities, in addition to displaced Rohingya and Bengali individuals; all of these communities are victims of intense racialized violence within Pakistan.

Many of the Bengali migrants who were given government-issued computerized national identity cards (CNICs) have had them revoked. CNICs are used by the state to police and exclude individuals from national rights and governmental services “along arbitrary lines of citizenship and non-citizenship” (Ashfaq et al., 2020, p. 13). The Bengali and Rohingya members of Korangi are considered “foreign” and therefore ineligible to apply for a CNIC, but even residents who are eligible for citizenship are subject to violent policing if they lack a valid CNIC. Daily wage workers (including fisherfolk) are routinely stopped by the Sindh police and asked to hand over their CNICs for examination. A CNIC--or the lack of a CNIC--becomes a pretext for arrest and extortion for lower-income men or those from marginalized communities (Anwar et al., 2016). Many of the Korangi coast's fisherfolk have been made to pay bribes to the Sindh police on multiple occasions due to their lack of CNICs; those who cannot are sometimes detained and sometimes let off (Mughal & Baloch, 2017). The bribes they are made to pay are “financially crippling” (Anwar et al., 2016, p. 151), with

the police demanding a significant percentage of their daily wages. If they are unable to pay, they are harassed and beaten (Ashfaq et al., 2020). Interviewee #6 explained that customs and maritime officers check CNICs as the boat enters and leaves the harbor, sometimes on the pretext that “Bengali and Afghan fisherfolk are taking money away from Pakistani fisherfolk, on Pakistani waters,” so it is essential for the officers to know who is a “legitimate” Pakistani, and who is not.

Against this background, I argue that the focus on differences regarding ethnicity (and, by extension, class) with respect to the issuing of CNICs by the Pakistani government and as highlighted by the Shigri report is a form of “discard” in line with the “stereotyping” concept discussed in the discard studies literature (Leboiron & Lepawsky, 2022). Labeling Bengali migrants “alien,” “illegal,” or “illegitimate” is used as a deliberate tactic. It is essential to study difference when it comes to power relations or issues of justice. The way that the Shigri report upholds differences between Pakistani and Bengali people, or the way that the Pakistani government discriminates between individuals living in formal vs. informal housing, is another form of discourse around difference, in line with “stereotyping.” Therefore, I posit that “Othering” in the Foucauldian sense is upheld via stereotyping in the case of the Korangi coast. Bhabha (1994) suggests that stereotypes are “complex, ambivalent, contradictory mode[s] of representation, as anxious as [they are] assertive,” and demand of the dominant group that they “change the object of analysis itself” (Bhabha, 1994, p. 138). Dominant groups stabilize knowledge about “aliens” using stereotypes, which are often contradictory (Liboiron & Lepawsky, 2022), as in the case of the Bangladeshi migrants: the Pakistani federal government uses the specific narrative implying they are lazy, immoral thieves, but also that they are taking jobs away from “legitimate” Pakistanis. These two ideas are at odds with each other, and yet both contribute to the idea that Bengali migrants are ‘less than’ the dominant normative group, in the same way that those living in Korangi’s informal housing are Othered through narratives of sanitation and cleanliness, while municipal authorities actively and passively allow garbage and effluent dumping to take place.

In line with this, Interviewee #5 stated that the garbage dumping takes place because the dominant middle class would not care whether a neighborhood was converted into a heap of rubbish as long as it was not within their areas. These attitudes of not-in-my-backyard, and the stereotypes that perpetuate them, are also a production of knowledge about the types of people that it is acceptable for institutions, states, and societies to discard. Essentially, “stereotyping is a foundation of

annihilation” (Liboiron & Lepawsky, 2022, p. 111). The impacts of this stereotyping are damaging across generations; Interviewee #10, for instance, found it immensely difficult to raise her three children in Ibrahim Hyderi, saying that she cannot make herself ask her children to stop playing in the trash, since the trash is everywhere.

Ibrahim Hyderi and Rehri Goth’s residents are low-income, marginalized individuals who are stereotyped on the basis of ethnic or casteist value systems. This grouping together of the residents is based on the “idea that there are fundamental differences between different types of people” (Liboiron & Lepawsky, 2022, p. 100). Governments exercising necropolitics utilize this stereotype by enforcing hierarchies and creating “truths” that protect the “greater good;” in the case of Korangi, the greater good is economic development, which is given value over the human lives of the fisherfolk. However, the valuation of life by the governing system puts the stereotyped Other at substantial risk (Dias & Deluchey, 2020) by exposing them to environments and situations that harm their lives and livelihoods. Therefore, stereotyping is a technique of “discarding through differentiation” (Liboiron & Lepawsky, 2022, p. 100) so as to uphold dominant power structures and dynamics.

The COVID-19 pandemic brought the middle class’s anxieties around disease and uncleanliness to a peak, and engendered a global narrative centered on the importance of living in green, healthy, sustainable cities (Ayub et al., 2022). The Karachi Municipal Corporation (KMC) has used this anxiety as a tool to further neoliberal development agendas (Ayub et al., 2022). For instance, the World Bank’s Solid Waste Emergency and Efficiency Project (Project SWEEP) was meant to clear clogged solid waste from Karachi’s major *nullay*, or waste waterways. The stakeholder document for the project emphasizes that the pandemic has exacerbated citizens’ “concerns that their immediate environment be safe and healthy” (*Stakeholder Engagement Plan: Solid Waste Emergency and Efficiency Project (SWEEP)*, 2020, p. 3). Instead of cleaning up the *nullay*, however, the KMC demolished--with close to no warning--the *katchi abaadiyaan* (informal settlements) built along the *nullay* to make space for real estate commercial projects and wider roads. The KMC capitalized on the fear the pandemic caused, in order to further economic growth by discarding by means of eviction and de-housing 50,000 residents in Gujjar Nullah, roughly half of whom had been living in settlements that had been regularized (and therefore “legalized”) by the municipal corporations themselves. However, the KMC issued a notice to all the relevant authorities to declare the residents’ leases void and labeled the settlements as “encroachments” (Qureshi & Qazi, 2021).

The Korangi coast faces a similar fate; although its residents are not being evicted by the municipal authorities, they are being “forcibly displaced” (Ashfaq et al., 2020, p. 9) further away from the coast due to environmental degradation and ecological shifts in its landscape. Land reclamation using compressed garbage, the formation of sludge at the coast due to wastewater dumping, and the decline of health as a result of residing in Ibrahim Hyderi and Rehri Goth are all external pressures displacing these communities. In addition, land value decides land use in Karachi; this is the reason that many factories and workshops are located in and easily available in Ibrahim Hyderi, Rehri Goth, and other districts that house *katchi abaadiyaan*, thereby causing mass displacement of working-class communities (Ayub et al., 2022).

The mainstream discourse around cleanliness and the pandemic enables the stereotyping of Korangi’s fisherfolk as “dirty” among the middle and upper classes. The district is also subjected to the stigmatization that occurs alongside the waste dumping due to their proximity to the waste. These “inherently classist vocabularies and prejudices” (Ayub et al., 2022, p. 6) enable the state to justify its violent rationale and ensure that the cycle of Othering marginalized communities remains intact.

Further, the heavy policing of residents including the fisherfolk at the Korangi coast is in line with the control mechanisms utilized in political systems reliant on governmentality as theorized by Foucault (1998). The constant surveillance, extortion, and harassment that they undergo can be seen as a control mechanism employed by a governmental state employing “a more diffuse form of power” (Bakker and Bridge, 2008, p. 225) as opposed to older sovereign states that depended on overt forms of punishment to ensure order. Governmental systems rely less on absolutist power, and more on disciplinary and judicial powers (Foucault, 1998). At the Korangi coast, these powers manifest as surveillance, stereotyping, and bureaucratic control. The following figure (Figure 5.2) summarizes these findings under four main types of Othering/Stereotyping, namely, creation of difference (racism), truth-making, enforcement of hierarchy, and “contradictory mode of representation”.




Figure 5.2. A summary of Othering/Stereotyping at the Korangi coast (Figure prepared by Author)

5.2.3 Legality, dissent, and “making/letting die”: Korangi fisherfolk’s deteriorating well-being and mental health

The residents of the Korangi coast, including the fishing communities of Ibrahim Hyderi and Rehri Goth, are subject to discriminatory policies (such as refusal to issue identity cards to Bengali fisherfolk) and state-enabled garbage dumping. This deteriorates their well-being and leads to severe mental and physical health problems (Ahmed, 2015). The groundwater at the Korangi coast is immensely polluted as a result of chemicals leaching into the ground from the dumped solid waste, and can cause stomach infections which may be fatal for infants (Waseem et al., 2014). Allergies and skin diseases are a common complaint for many of the residents, and as summer draws closer, a significant portion of the population suffers from chikungunya, a viral fever borne by mosquitos (Mughal & Baloch, 2017). The “330 million gallons of industrial and domestic effluent” (Guriro, 2017) and resultant decline in fish catch and, by extension, fisherfolks’ livelihood, has taken an enormous emotional toll on Ibrahim Hyderi’s residents, with a sharp rise in mental health issues such as drug addiction, depression, and schizophrenia (Ahmed, 2015). All of these are examples of “making die”; these financial, mental, and physical issues cause the breakdown of the fishing community and render it unable to mobilize effectively due to the imminent threats to its residents’ survival.

These “technologies of control”, in Foucauldian terms, are comparatively diffused and covert. Garbage dumping is heavily protested by the fisherfolk at the coast, who utilize non-violent means of protest including sit-ins, surrounding the garbage trucks so they cannot dump the garbage until the trucks leave. However, it is enabled by the municipal government; in Karachi’s Strategic Development Plan 2020--which was developed in 2007--the City District Office named Ibrahim Hyderi a “Garbage Transfer Station” for its peripheries (Kaimkhani, 2007). Those who dissent actively against the state’s control mechanisms face severe disciplinary and increasingly militarized consequences. For instance, when Interviewee #1, as a young fisherman in his twenties, protested against the garbage dumping in 2007, the Sindh police authorities detained him and falsely accused him of murder. He was an influential part of the protests, and regularly interacted with the media to highlight the extent of disrepair in Rehri Goth as a result of garbage and effluent dumping. He was bailed out by his community and the charges against him were dropped when he was proven innocent, but the detention was an excuse for torture. His right ear was broken by the Sindh police. The means of torture and alienation from community are deliberate; he was not taken to the jail from his own district when he was detained, but rather one much farther away that his community members would have difficulty accessing. His whereabouts were not given to his family. He is only one of many protestors who have been jailed or tortured. In 2011, two members of the PFF were assassinated for fighting against mangrove deforestation and the land mafia (AHRC, 2011).

Muhammad Ali Shah, arguably the most respected among all the Chairmen of the Pakistan Fisherfolk Forum, spent decades resisting the Rangers, a paramilitary unit of the army (i.e. civil armed forces, tasked with maintaining internal security in Pakistan) that was deployed at the Korangi coast in 1977. The Rangers supported the *beopari* (middlemen who work for private fishing companies and sea lords) at the coast who utilized an exploitative contract system, so that Korangi’s fisherfolk (as well as Badin’s, a small city in Sindh near Karachi) could not sell their fish catches at market rates. Instead, they would have to sell it for a twentieth of the price to the *beopari*. Thus began a system wherein the fisherfolk could not afford to eat the fish they caught, or to even take any of the fish they caught home, since the *beopari* would complain to the Rangers, who would then torture the fisherfolk. The relentless nonviolent protests that the PFF held against this restrictive contract system and the public attention gathered through Shah’s arrest helped them, in Shah’s words, “win against an army”

(Down to Earth, 2005) when the Rangers officially withdrew from Badin under the then-Prime Minister Pervez Musharraf's orders.

However, state control against the fisherfolk did not die down. The Karachi Fisheries Harbour Authority (KFHA) is a part of the Sindh government, and announces auctions where private fishing companies outside Pakistan can buy fishing rights. These auctions are the primary means by which foreign corporate trawlers gain access to Pakistani waters (Business Recorder, 2005). The PFF has historically staged sit-ins outside these auction halls. In 2005, after the Rangers withdrew from the coast, Shah was arrested after a sit-in and kept in custody for 22 days. According to Shah, it was all the same whether it was the Rangers, the Sindh government, or politicians--all these factions attempt to profit off the increasingly degraded Korangi coast at the cost of its biodiversity and indigeneity (Down to Earth, 2005).

Pakistan's military and paramilitary forces exercise full control over the population. On the 16th of January 2016, Saeed Baloch, a prominent PFF activist, was "disappeared" by the Rangers after he was taken into custody for protesting against the FCS's corruption (AHRC, 2016). At the time, the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the FCS had extorted millions of dollars, and hired hundreds of unregistered employees (Dunya News, 2015). Pakistan's Anti-Terrorism Act made it entirely legal for the Rangers to detain a person who is deemed suspicious at their discretion even without official charges. Therefore, "legality" is often used by the army and national and municipal governments as a control mechanism against dissenting populations. Baloch was released on bail in August 2016, after international uproar over his arrest (Front Line Defenders, 2016).

The Gujjar Nullah case, too, is a prime example of how the Pakistani state and governmental actors modify their definitions of legality. The municipal corporation could redefine regularized informal housing as "encroachments," label migrants and refugees "illegal," and repurpose their land for any use that furthers their development goals. Ibrahim Hyderi, once a thriving fishing village, became a "Garbage Transfer Station" by law under the City District Government's Karachi Strategic Development Plan 2020 (Kaimkhani, 2007).

These continuously changing definitions of legality target marginalized communities and keep them in a state of flux. Governmentality, in Foucauldian terms, maintains that what is illegal deserves

to be discarded, and those who resist are against the state, and, by extension, against the greater good. Legality is, therefore, used as a means to discard by way of justifying violence against those who protest for their right to reclaim the sea in the case of Korangi. This can be seen in how the PFF's activists have been physically assaulted by the police for a myriad of reasons: campaigning to find members of the timber mafia who have caused mangrove depletion, protesting against the killing of their colleagues by the state, and holding peaceful sit-ins against illegal occupation of their seas and lands by ocean and land grabbers even as the Sindh government protects those who harm the fisherfolk (AHRC, 2011).

In this thesis, therefore, I argue that the shifting of legality to serve the purposes of the biopower state which exercises total control over populations--and, indeed, labeling entire communities of marginalized peoples as "illegal"—can be conceptualized as "Othering" and an example of "making die" (Foucault, 2003). While the state and its agents, namely, the police, military sea lords, municipal officers, etc. may not be physically killing the residents of Ibrahim Hyderi and Rehri Goth, the discriminatory policies and state-enabled garbage dumping steadily worsens their quality of life and causes them deep physical and emotional harm.

5.2.4 Chinese industrial fishing and maritime development threatening Korangi's fisherfolk

In 2017, a 40-year lease brought about by the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) surrendered control of the Gwadar Port to the China Overseas Port Holding Company (COPHC). Gwadar is a coastal region in the province of Balochistan along the coast of the Arabian Sea. In 2020, fisherfolk from Karachi and Gwadar, Balochistan, protested against the arrival of twenty Chinese trawlers, stating that their local fishing equipment did not stand a chance against the trawlers. These grievances are part of local workers' growing resentment against China's growing economic hold over Pakistan as a result of the CPEC. The PFF wrote a letter in protest to the FCS, who had issued the permit to the Fujian Hengli Fishery, which owned the trawlers (Aamir, 2020). These efforts ultimately culminated in the Chinese trawlers being ousted from Pakistani waters. However, China's depletion of fish stocks, and its cultural dependence on seafood, results in Chinese fishing companies looking to sustain their fish catch elsewhere. In 2021, Pakistani authorities detained five Chinese trawlers on suspicion of illegal fishing. Although the boats were full of fish, the president of the COPHC maintained that they were docked to shelter from storms. Despite the then-Prime Minister's

reassurance to the Pakistani fishers that there are not and would not be any licenses granted to Chinese trawlers, reports state that around one hundred trawlers have been licensed to carry out fishing activities in Pakistani waters (Baloch, 2021). Given that bottom trawling is an especially detrimental way of industrial fishing for the marine ecosystems, damaging entire seafloor habitats (Coastal and Marine Hazards and Resources Program, 2016), these licenses are likely to have further negative impacts on the fish stocks and livelihoods of Korangi coast fishers.

Development of maritime infrastructure occurring at Karachi's Arabian Sea coast and Indus Delta also threatens the fisherfolk's survival in Korangi. The Muhammad bin Qasim Port (Port Qasim for short) was opened in 1980, and handles 35% of Pakistan's total cargo. Port Qasim was built on the Indus Delta's northwest edge. Its construction, the sheer volume of cargo it handles, and the dangers associated with the latter have caused the mangrove species surrounding the port to decrease from 8 in 1972 to 4 in 2009 (Dehlavi, 2017). The mangroves are an immense asset to carbon sequestration and a source of protection for Karachi's coast, directing cyclones away from the city. They are also rich ecosystems that are integral to harboring the most lucrative catches for Korangi's fisherfolk, such as prawn and crab species. Although mangrove cover all through Pakistan has increased since 2009, it is unlikely to go back to its 1980 levels (Baker, 2022). The fisherfolk I interviewed also validated that the timber mafia is still active, and cuts down mangrove trees from within the thick of the forest to sell wood for profit. Fuel is an expensive commodity in Pakistan, and with year-to-year inflation at 31.5% as of February 2023--the highest in 50 years (Al Jazeera, 2023)--timber from mangroves is an inexpensive, long-burning source of fuel. It takes between 50 and 100 years for a mangrove tree to mature fully, but Interviewee #1 confirms that the timber mafia takes it for free and sells it for cheap.

Port Qasim's unchecked industrial activity and rapidly increasing shipping volumes threaten the well-being of local bird and fish species. Interviewee #1 stated that when the port was being built, the authorities assured them that there would be minimal pollution and that the indigenous Sindhi population at Korangi would be given lucrative jobs within the newly built port. However, none of Korangi's fisherfolk work there to this day. Interviewee #2 explained how many families living in Rehri Goth and Ibrahim Hyderi have documents proving their family's legal residence at the Korangi Coast from 400 years ago. Interviewee #1 asserted that the Port Qasim authorities are only open to hiring *uttar* (upper-caste) Sindhi people, who mostly come from the neighboring city of Hyderabad

and are better educated than the fisherfolk, whose caste is classified as *laad* (lower-caste), despite the latter having historic right to the sea. He told that the Port Qasim authorities prevent them from going into the sea area that “belongs” to the port. Interviewee #8 stated that the port authorities and governance institutions have ways of making the *laad* fisherfolk feel out of place or inferior. Those who work in state offices are usually *uttar*, and despite the common language they share, the *uttar* officials never speak Sindhi to the *laad* fisherfolk. They use Urdu instead--due to the “hegemonic role of Urdu” (Rahman, 1995, p. 1007) in Pakistan.

Interviewee #4 stated that the Pakistani state has chosen a 50-year old commercial port over a cultural institution of fisherfolk with 400 years of access and right to the sea. He went on to describe how the large boats unloaded at Port Qasim cut through the water so fast that sometimes it upends the fisherfolk’s smaller boats. When the fisherfolk spread their nets out on the water within sight of the authorities, they are told to pack up their nets and leave so the boats headed for Port Qasim can make their way through and unload. Korangi’s fisherfolk are aware that they are not welcome there, or near the coast at Defense, which is an economically privileged neighborhood with a coast just 17 kilometers away from Korangi. The policing means they cannot fish there anymore, at least not comfortably--“our people are not thieves. It’s our sea. We are of and from the water. When we catch a fish, its scales are moist with saltwater. That salt, that water, that fish, is ours. Our lives and our livelihoods are from the sea” (Interviewee #1). Figure 5.3 below summarizes these different forms of making or letting die in the case of Korangi coast.




Figure 5.3. Mechanisms of making and letting die levied by governance and military institutions against the fisherfolk at Korangi (Figure prepared by Author).

5.3. Forms of discard at the Korangi coast

5.3.1 Material discard: Garbage dumping on the Korangi coast

Karachi's land mafia has capitalized off the city's housing issues, which began with the large-scale displacement that the 1947 partition and the 1971 war brought, and were exacerbated by the influx of Afghan refugees in the 1990s and 2000s. Refugees and migrants from different countries or from rural areas created unique housing difficulties for the city. The land mafia divided Karachi's vacant land into plots and set up temporary housing for low-income migrants. The existence of the land mafia is due to municipal carelessness and unwillingness to service lower-income factions of the city (Ahmed, 2015). As land in the central locations became scarcer due to overpopulation, the land mafia began carrying out aggressive land reclamation campaigns at the coast using compressed plastic (Guriro, 2017).



Figure 5.4. The way connecting Ibrahim Hyderi and Rehri Goth is littered with an immense amount of plastic waste. (Photo by Author)

It is not only plastic waste that is dumped at the coast, 330 million gallons of effluent--both domestic and industrial--is dumped directly or indirectly at the coast (Guriro, 2017), further decreasing fish catch and causing declines in small-scale fisherfolk's livelihoods. Waterborne diseases such as chikungunya are immensely common, and Interviewee #4 said that every second or third household has at least one child suffering from some form of skin disease. Organizations such as the Aga Khan University Hospital, HANDS, and Aman Foundation have all operated in Ibrahim Hyderi to provide healthcare to the residents (Ahmed, 2014), but Interviewee #11 stated that no amount of medicine can cure that the water is filthy, the air unbreathable, and the land covered with litter. The fisherfolk community's breakdown is deliberate; the physical, mental, and financial issues they face have caused them immense harm and taken away their resources of mobilization through imminent security- and health-related threats.



Figure 5.5. The Korangi coastline, as seen from Ibrahim Hyderi. (Photo by Author)

In addition, local and international private fishing companies began building jetties for their trawlers at the port that the fisherfolk would have to pay to use in the early 2000s. These deep-sea trawlers run for 24 hours in a go without stopping, and remain the most responsible for overfishing and biodiversity loss (Baloch, 2002). Interviewee #1 emphasized that the fisherfolk would also have to pay the price of rental space to keep their boats at the harbor, which was bought by land developers and sea lords. These rental prices keep on increasing and are paid by the fisherfolk daily for each day they use the jetty space. With regards to discard, Interviewee #6 argued that these jetties have another negative effect. They cut down the natural speed of the water and do not allow the seafloor to be cleaned, since the coast has been replaced by jetty concrete. The water where the jetty starts, therefore, is immensely dirty; there is effluent and sewage water coming from one way, and not enough current to drive it away. Interviewee #9, stated that the water being dirty causes immense harm to the underside of the boats. He was still using his father's old boat, and explained that boats have a much shorter life than they did during his father's time as a result of the gray sludge that gathers at the coast.

5.3.2. Discarding the marginalized Other: Marginalization through loss of fishing livelihoods and informal settlements

Small-scale fishing communities on the Korangi coast are especially at risk of losing their livelihoods due to overfishing by foreign trawlers, the increase in the number of individual fishers, and the resultant depletion of marine stocks. This is a vicious cycle: the indigenous fisherfolk have also started utilizing equipment that is harmful to aquatic life; one such example is under-gauge fishing nets that catch fish species before their full maturation period, which ultimately leads to a greater decline in these species (Naqi, 2016). While Pakistan's fisheries sector is not sustainably managed or technologically adept in general, Karachi's fisheries are in worse condition than others. Ibrahim Hyderi suffers from arguably the worst conditions, facing not only the biodiversity loss and overfishing challenges that other fisheries face but also being labeled and utilized as a "Garbage Transfer Station" for its peripheral districts--Ibrahim Hyderi being part of Bin Qasim Town--in 2007 by the City District Government Office in the Karachi Strategic Development Plan 2020 (Kaimkhani, 2007).

Moreover, Ibrahim Hyderi and Rehri Goth's *mohallay* primarily comprise *katchi abadiyaan*--the colloquial Urdu-language term for informal (literally "impermanent") settlements. These *katchi abaadiyaan* were a way for individuals who migrated from India to Karachi in 1947 during and after the partition to have homes in a city with little to no urban planning. While many of these informal settlements are generational houses with leases, the term *katchi abadi* in itself is indicative of marginalization and impermanence (Gazdar & Mallah, 2011, p. 4). The term, like its English equivalent "slum," is associated with dirt, poverty, and other stigma-heavy connotations. The use of this language and these narratives results in *katchi abadiyaan* being widely perceived by judiciary and middle classes alike as encroachments, even though they "are not necessarily illegitimate or unrecognized by the state, having instead resulted from a planning failure and lack of affordable housing in Karachi" (Ayub et al., 2022, p. 6). These two factors, namely, the loss of fishing livelihoods and living in *katchi abaadiyaan*, have further contributed to the marginalization of fishing communities at the Korangi coast. This is a more implicit discard: the discard of the Other, which further adds to material discard through garbage dumping described in the previous section.

5.3.3 Discarding through ocean grabbing and cleanliness ideals

The case study that Andreucci and Kallis (2017) conducted on the violence of development carried out by the World Bank is important to the present thesis, due to the parallels between the World Bank's involvement in Pakistan and Peru. It has been immensely damaging for marginalized, low-income communities because of the immense power the Bank has over them in both countries. Examples of harm include the World Bank's Project SWEEP (Solid Waste Emergency and Efficiency Project), which was meant to clear up Karachi's waste waterways of solid waste in the wake of the panic around COVID-19. The World Bank denied responsibility for the "anti-encroachment" dehousing of low-income communities living in informal settlements along the waterways that the KMC carried out using World Bank funding. However, the World Bank assigned the responsibility for carrying out the project to the KMC, which, in turn, commissioned the NED University of Engineering and Technology in Karachi to carry out the impact assessment of the project. The University used purely aerial means via drones to mark out the impact along Gujjar Nullah, and did not engage with the stakeholders on a meaningful level. Each roof was counted as one house, although it is immensely common for multiple households to exist under one roof in informal settlements. Their report also did not account for the number of members of each household to study impact (Karachi Bachao Tehreek, 2021).

This is just one example of harm that Pakistani local communities have faced as a consequence of the World Bank's involvement. Other damaging projects included The Left Bank Outfall Drain Project, initiated in 1984, which did not account enough for the social impacts of the agricultural drainage facility, leading to the deaths of 56 people and damaging 506 villages and the building of the Tarbela Dam, financed by the World Bank, which decreased water flow to the Indus Delta, forcing communities that prospered due to the delta's waters to migrate elsewhere (Talpur et al., 2013). Similarly, Andreucci and Kallis (2017) focused on extractive practices situated in the Peruvian state enabling unchecked development and the enactment of violence against those who resist natural resource extraction, which is very similar to the case of Korangi. I argue that the nature of governmentality and governance organizations (and their associated structures, permissions, and practices of development) are quite similar across Pakistan and Peru, wherein the well-being of indigenous and/or low-income communities is secondary and discarded as and when it hinders or counters economic growth and "the greater good."

One of these “greater goods” comes in the form of Pakistan’s “Blue Revolution,” which aims to consolidate the fisheries sector into the hands of a few large, hegemonic corporations with well-oiled value and supply chains (Patil et al., 2018), thereby rendering small-scale fisheries obsolete. Pakistan’s lack of dedicated protections for indigenous fisherfolk, as well as this consolidation of power as a result of the CPEC, are forms of ocean grabbing, following Bennett et al.’s (2015) definition of the same: small-scale fishers are deprived of resources, coastal populations are dispossessed of their lands, and their historical access to the sea is restricted and undermined. The fisherfolk’s consent is not taken before their coastline is irreversibly altered by foreign policy, auctioning, overfishing, and garbage dumping. The violence levied by the military against dissenters at the Korangi coast also contributes to ocean grabbing by undermining the fisherfolk’s “historical tenure” (Bennett et al., 2015, p. 63).

The discard at the Korangi is therefore three-fold: Korangi’s coast is *a site of discard* for waste, Korangi fishing communities are *discarded as “Others”* and *the coast is likely to be further discarded* by the neoliberal growth agenda via Blue Revolution to profit from its destruction rather than its rehabilitation. All societies and systems will generate waste to produce value (Gidwani & Reddy, 2011; Liboiron & Lepawsky, 2022, p. 52), but what a society chooses to discard (and who it collectively decides to accept or ignore harm for) is deeply indicative of the societal values around low-income communities: although the Korangi coastline is located only 17 kilometers away from the upper-class ocean-facing neighborhood Defense Housing Authority (DHA) coastline, fisherfolk are banned from fishing in these waters since DHA residents complain about the smell of the fish (Ahmed, 2015). This speaks to the values of a neoliberal capitalist economy focused on economic growth and profit and the societal structuring of these values, wherein an elite neighborhood’s criticism of the way fisherfolk smell has a large enough place to discard the fisherfolk struggling to make a living from these spaces (through exclusionary policies such as banning, fining, and the like).

Discarding, therefore, is a “technique of power” (Liboiron & Lepawsky, 2022, p. 83) at the Korangi coast. All systems utilize resources and discard objects, places, and people that do not fit within their orders, giving rise to various types of unevenness; Liboiron & Lepawsky (2022, p. 83-84) define power as “the maintenance of such unevenness.” Keeping the city’s center and elite spaces relatively cleaner can only be viewed as “good”, if there is a dismissal or erasure of the fact that garbage dumping in low-income areas is the mechanism by means of which this cleanliness is

produced. This erasure is also an act of discarding; it is how Ibrahim Hyderi's fisherfolk are shuttled away to the city's peripheries while also being dispossessed of these peripheries that they built and sustained for generations, which in turn sustained them.

5.3.4. Discard of fishing traditions, culture and enjoyment

Interviewee #3, now in his seventies, recounted the eighties as the time when fishing traditions and tools began to change at the Sindh coast. He was one of the founding members of the Pakistan Fisherfolk Forum in 1998. Prior to the Indus Delta drying up, agriculture and livestock were viable means to make a living. Once the waters dried up, many of the individuals involved in the agricultural and livestock sector near the delta started to become fishers, with a large number of them moving to informal and/or temporary housing along the Korangi Creek. Interviewee #3 believed this to be a key contributor to the initial decline in fish catch, before municipal authorities began dumping garbage and effluent at the coast. The indigenous Sindhi fisherfolk had historically used a *doro jaal*, or hand woven rope nets, to fish in the sea. These nets were woven specifically to ensure that only mature species were caught in them, and that younger fish that were smaller could escape through its eye. In the eighties and nineties, newly-made fisherfolk working on commercial fishing boats popularized the *katla jaal*, or wire net, that held on to younger fish too. These nets quickly became popular among the Korangi coast's indigenous fisherfolk as well due to their lower costs, durability, and the efficiency of catch.

Interviewee #1 stated that the fisherfolk who were born into the practice were well-versed in the knowledge and tools of fishing at the Korangi coast. Fisherfolk who had just moved into the profession did not have the generational knowledge that was indigenous fisherfolk's birthright. They would overfish near the mangroves. The *katla jaal* was threatening biodiversity at the coast; the openings on the machine-made nets got smaller and smaller with time. In the early 2000s, packaging companies began making fishing nets with high-density polyethylene or nylon, which are especially damaging to sea life and make up a significant proportion of plastic in Karachi's sea (WWF Pakistan, 2020). Interviewee #3 demonstrated that the opening of wire nets is so small that even the head of a matchstick cannot pass through it. The use of these plastic nets, combined with the population increase of the fisherfolk, caused a rapid decline in many of the species integral to the fisherfolk's livelihood over the years (Naqi, 2016). He also stated that in his lifetime, he had personally witnessed

the decline of multiple species of shark, including the winghead shark, the whale shark, the blacktip reef shark, and three species of hammerhead sharks: smooth hammerhead, scalloped hammerhead, and great hammerhead. The river shad, barramundi, or pompano fish cannot be found in Karachi's waters anymore, although these used to be a common sight three decades ago. Prawn and crab species flourish at the mangroves, and come back to the same mangrove where they were born to give birth. According to Interviewee #3, there are 32 species of aquatic life that are wholly dependent on the mangroves to thrive. But the young prawns are not allowed to mature due to the usage of machine-made nets. Since the population of mature fish has declined so greatly, using a hand-woven net would yield a lower fish catch for fisherfolk using them. Mass-produced nets are also vastly cheaper than handmade nets, so even indigenous fisherfolk now use them. Most of Korangi's fisherfolk, whether indigenous or not, have now resorted to working on commercial boats. 77.5% of Ibrahim Hyderi and 49.7% of Rehri Goth's populations cannot afford the expense required to carry out boat upkeep, and instead work on commercial fishing boats (Dehlavi, 2017).

Machine-made nets are indicators of an era in disposability and discard. Plastic nets are made to be discarded, but the *doro jaal* was made to be used, repaired, and used again, until it wore out. There were residents--primarily women, but also members of minority ethnicities--at the Korangi coast who used to be hired specifically to weave nets. As machine-made nets were popularized, they had to resort to working elsewhere. Interviewee #3 explained that none of the indigenous fisherfolk trusted disposability; "we lived in an area where we would carry our own *bartan* (pot) to the milkman for milk. Why would we put something as disposable as plastic nets into our sea?" Discard and disposability, therefore, were not normative to Korangi's fisherfolk. They became norms over time due to disruptions in the environment and to the indigenous fisherfolk's way of living. It is quicker, cheaper, and more efficient to buy a machine-made net than to construct a *doro jaal*, and quicker to construct a boat now than ever before. Interviewee #5 told that it would take a year in the seventies and eighties to construct a single boat. Now, it takes maybe a month. Even so, there are too many commercial boats, and fisherfolk cannot afford to keep up with the competition independently. "Too many boats," he says, "and not enough fish."

Interviewee #4 stated, "everyone has the right to make a living, but there is a limit to how much the sea will allow." Previously, the boats used to have a *baadbaan* (sail) that only experienced, skilled fisherfolk would know how to guide. Interviewee #2 said, "we listened to the sea to get our boats

through the water, we heard it talking to us when we sailed on it.” When fishing motor boats were popularized, there was a rapid increase in the number of fishers without prior expertise or knowledge about the Korangi coast and its biodiversity. There is not enough work for the women to move to the islands due to the sharp decline in shrimp catch. The increasing inflation in Pakistan has also made it difficult for fisherfolk to afford fuel, but the pollution at the coastline means they have to venture farther and farther offshore each time to make up their fish catch, thereby running the risk of greater expenses, losing their lives, or being captured by the Indian authorities (Imtiaz, 2014) on suspicion of being spies. Interviewee #12 stated that these suspicions are a smokescreen, and that no one could mistake the fishermen for being anything but fishermen, saying that fisherfolk arrested on either side of the border by the authorities are “only being used to add political pressure. We stand with our Indian fisherfolk brothers in this; they are victims, just as much as we are.” The fisherfolk’s tradition of moving to the islands for the monsoon seasons is now over; there are simply too many fisherfolk and too few fish, thereby increasing competition and internal politics among the fisherfolk themselves. I therefore posit that the fisherfolk at the Korangi coast being forced to let go of their communal forms of enjoyment is another form of discard. Leisure is a core part of both individual and communal well-being (Oncescu & Neufeld, 2019). While detainment, fines, and torture mechanisms are overt forms of breaking up the fisherfolk’s communities, the taking away of spaces and times of leisure is a covert mechanism for the same.

Interviewee #5 explained that the islands along the creeks are all empty now, and they look like they have always been empty, but the fisherfolk still sometimes visit the Sufi saints’ shrines for protection. Karachi’s mangrove forests have proven to save the city on a number of occasions, including from the Cyclone Phet in 2010, Cyclone Nilofar in 2014, and Cyclone Shaheen in 2021 (Ayub & Ilyas, 2021; John et al., 2014; Popalzai, 2010). Many Muslims in Karachi believe that it is solely the shrines that act as protection, but the fisherfolk I interviewed believe that the mangroves are a gift of protection from the Sufi saints. They are well-versed in the science behind the mangroves, but with an added layer of spirituality; to them, the mangroves are holy and their last line of defense against the degradation their geography has gone through.

5.3.5 Resistance at the Korangi Coast

Although the Korangi Coast's area and ecosystem are significantly degraded, the fisherfolk I interviewed still maintain hope. There have been some positive changes in recent years: an educational non-profit known as The Citizens Foundation (TCF) opened up a school in Ibrahim Hyderi. The fisherfolk I interviewed from both Rehri Goth and Ibrahim Hyderi are pushing authorities and NGOs to fund better healthcare and education. The Aga Khan University Hospital funds a clinic at Ibrahim Hyderi, providing free pediatric care for children under five. Infant mortality rates have drastically dropped to 70 per 1000 births—well below Pakistan's average of 86 per 1000 births. The AKUH also trains local women health workers who have passed their matriculation exams, thereby increasing the literacy rate of women in the area (Ahmed, 2015).

All the interviewees agree that Ibrahim Hyderi is generally better-off than Rehri Goth, since it is an older, more established neighborhood. Interviewee #1 stated that it is their goal to ensure that Rehri Goth becomes a model fishing village for the community. The older members take the younger, Pakistani-born fishers to NADRA to try to get NICs for them “without the fear and shame that officials incite.” Their next goal is to ensure sanitation for all the houses in Rehri Goth.

Currently, Interviewee #4—who has a Bachelor of Arts degree and works as an administrator for Rehri Goth's people—is working on a new curriculum. He stated that children at the Korangi coast should be given the relevant knowledge and training to know their sea and how to sustain it—but they should also have the choice and opportunity to take a different course in life. These efforts are all tied in with the fisherfolk's deep connection to their land at the coast and the sea that “belongs to them, because [we] belong to it” (Interviewee 4).

The slow progression as a result of increased attention with respect to healthcare and education is a small part of the Korangi coast's recovery, brought about due to fisherfolk resistance. Outright rebellion is difficult or impossible for the fisherfolk considering the forces they are up against, much like Scott's explanation of peasant revolts, which “are nearly always crushed unceremoniously” (Scott, 1986, p. 5). Therefore, the everyday forms of peasant resistance also apply in the fisherfolk's case, wherein their “constant struggle” (ibid, p. 6) against the militaristic, developmental, governmental systems that threaten to dispossess them is in itself a defiance. However, the fisherfolk

are not merely limited to the “ordinary weapons of relatively powerless groups,” (ibid); they are also actively resisting the violence at the coast through resistance tactics such as:

- they organize sit-ins when dissenting fisherfolk are killed or disappeared by authorities (AHRC, 2011; AHRC, 2016)
- they hold protests against auctions and when deep-sea trawlers are authorized to fish or are caught fishing near their coasts (Aamir, 2020; Baloch, 2002; Baloch, 2021)
- they organize against ecosystem damage and their greater vulnerability to coastal flooding and storms, for instance, whenever mangroves are cut down (Dawn, 2011; The Express Tribune, 2011)
- they confront authorities when garbage is dumped in their localities (Business Recorder, 2004) as shown by Interviewee #1’s encounter with the police.

It is essential to remember, therefore, that they do not only use “weapons of the weak” (Scott, p. 31)--such as footdragging, false compliance, dissimulation, etc.--which are largely individual, but instead also harness the collective power of their communities for better education, lower infant mortality, and a greater share of the coast’s and sea’s resources. While this transformation is limited and consistently hindered, the importance of these small, everyday revolutions cannot be undermined.

6. DISCUSSION

6.1 Governmental militarization and those it “makes die”

Within the postcolonial context of Pakistan, the state apparatus is controlled and dominated by the army (Akhtar, 2022). The army’s undeniable power in Karachi enables its paramilitary unit of Rangers, as well as increasingly militarized civilian police, to utilize state-sanctioned force against those they consider to be standing against the interests of the state (Waseem, 2022). A governmental system uses militarization as a control mechanism. Therefore, it is not only dissenters who actively threaten violence who are seen to be against the country’s interests. Resisting by means of peaceful protests or advocating against socio-ecologically harmful governmental interests is also criminalized (Andreucci & Kallis, 2017). The disciplinary power and control mechanisms that the governmental system employs mean that fisherfolk standing for their indigenous fishing rights in Karachi are treated as criminals, disciplined through means of restricted mobility and detainment, and in the most severe cases, are subjected to torture and enforced disappearances. Police forces are regularly utilized to keep dissent against development, dehousing, and garbage dumping in check in Pakistan. All these activities reinforce the accumulation and control of capital, wherein “the state stands front and center” (Akhtar, 2022). Security forces have been known to carry out enforced disappearances against dissenters, to the point where there is a Commission of Inquiry on Enforced Disappearances (Gossman, 2022).

In the case of the Korangi coastline, one “truth” consistently propagated by municipal and provincial authorities is the rationale that marginalized communities are “illegal” and living in “illegal” housing. These pervasive narratives can all be conceptualized as racisms: in this context, racism ceases to be purely about race. Instead, the marginalized are collectively the victims of racism. All combined, these institutions enforce Othering through explicit and implicit violence, including perpetually shifting ideas of legality (Ayub et al., 2022). Marginalizations happen along the lines of religion, caste, class, race, ethnicity, gender, and sexuality (Andreucci & Kallis, 2017).

Complementing the sovereign power implemented through repression by military power, eco-governmentality concept (Valdivia, 2015) offers a uniquely suited perspective for the Korangi coast,

where concern for the environment is used as a smokescreen to discriminate against “illegal” or “unclean” residents and to “improve populations”, primarily for the purpose of uninhibited economic development. The Pakistani state decides whom “to ‘let die’ as necessary for the greater good of the population” (Andreucci & Kallis, 2017, p. 97; Foucault, 2003). This is an inevitable consequence of neoliberal economic policies that prioritize economic development above all else.

6.2 Threats to the fisherfolk’s survival as a result of discard

The current culture of discard and disposability poses a very real threat to the fisherfolk at the Korangi coast. Karachi has been facing a persistent garbage dumping problem since the 1990s, but the last ten years in particular have made garbage lifting “a gargantuan task for the solid waste board” (Ibrahim, 2018) . This is due to its rapid increase in population as well as the resources required to maintain this growth. The production of resources necessary to sustain the growing population generates a variety of wastes: sanitary waste, rubble from land development, toxic effluent from industries, and medical waste.

Over the last two decades, waste dumping has increased and worsened across Karachi even in the more affluent areas (Amir, 2017). However, those who suffer the most are daily wage workers living in katchi abadis—especially if these settlements are located across Karachi’s coastline. Korangi’s residents have seen dumping trucks loaded with garbage arrive at their ancestral coastline along with bulldozers to spread it near the coast and into the sea to reclaim land (Guriro, 2017). This garbage dumping has profound impacts on the quality of life for the residents at the coast. Essentially, the well-being of the residents and fishing communities is discarded. Since governance institutions need places to discard Karachi’s garbage as land runs out and becomes increasingly scarce, the district has more use as a dump site than a fishery. The Korangi coast is polluted so that more affluent neighborhoods, that house individuals with greater socio-political standing, can remain relatively clean. In essence, by ascribing to this politics of aesthetics, the discarding of waste also becomes a discarding of indigenous fisherfolk’s mobility, opportunity, and space.

I posit that the reason for the Korangi coast being a convenient alternate route of disposal for industries and municipal authorities is two-fold: first that it is a low-income neighborhood without the financial and organizational resources that privileged districts enjoy, and second that the distance between the city center and the districts in question is 20 kilometers--far enough for the city’s upper-

and middle-class residents to not raise complaints while also being accessible enough for the waste dumping to occur routinely. Robert Bullard's (1990) findings for the black neighborhoods in the US seem to support this argument: Bullard found that the locating of toxic waste dumps in lower-income, predominantly Black neighborhoods in the United States occurs not because these localities are the most suited to house toxins. Instead, it is because residents in these districts do not have the same access to resources as their white counterparts do, or the time, energy, or finances to resist. It is, simply, the path of least resistance, and one that holds up the status quo with respect to ideas of cleanliness and uncleanliness. The discard at the coast and of the fisherfolk ultimately hinders the fisherfolk's survival by extensively limiting their livelihoods, cutting off their access to their historical lands and culture (through the building of Port Qasim and the financial implausibility of constructing temporary housing at the islands due to lower fish stocks), depleting their sense of community (through threat of arrest and violence against dissenting fisherfolk), and overall morale of the population (as can be seen through the mental and physical illnesses commonly seen at the coast).

6.3 Ocean grabbing at the Korangi coast

The series of events at the Korangi coastline can be categorized as ocean grabbing due to it fulfilling the three conditions outlined by Bennett, Govan, and Satterfield (2015):

- **Inadequate governance:** Government authorities in Karachi are unable to stop the timber mafia from cutting down mangrove trees, hence, they are unable to prevent the huge damage on the coastal ecosystems. Ibrahim Hyderi is being utilized as a Garbage Transfer Station and weighted garbage is effectively used to reclaim land from the sea, without any consultation on the side of the fisherfolk. The CPEC's consequences have been severe for the fisherfolk as well; they are not taken into account during auctions and have no protection from external actors such as international trawlers. These all can be seen as examples of inadequate governance at the Korangi coast.
- **Harm to livelihood and human security:** The material discard at Ibrahim Hyderi and Rehri Goth causes physical and mental health issues for the fishing communities living there, and have led to a significant downgrade in their lifestyles and livelihoods (Ahmed, 2014). The control of these populations by the Sindh police--in the forms of suppressing dissent, arrests without bail, fines for the fisherfolk not carrying a CNIC (Anwar, 2013)--harms human security. The foreign

industrial trawlers that Korangi's fisherfolk are forced to share the Arabian Sea with have severely reduced their livelihoods as well.

- Socio-ecological damage: The residents at the Korangi coast suffer from a myriad of waterborne diseases. They are also more susceptible to mental illnesses and drug addiction (Ahmed, 2014). The garbage dumping at the coast and the governance mechanisms employed to ensure the fisherfolk's subservience has caused the fisherfolk to lose centuries-old traditions. They have brought about a lasting cycle of poverty and intergenerational harm to the coast. Garbage dumping and the timber mafia have degraded mangrove forests, which are very rich habitats for many marine species.

As a result, fishing communities in Korangi are dispossessed from their livelihoods, their traditional fishing grounds, their culture as well as their mental and physical well-being, a very common way of ocean grabbing that small-scale subsistence fishers face, as documented by the ocean grabbing literature (Bennett et al., 2015; Pedersen et al., 2014). This mainly happens through garbage dumping, a material discard in physical terms, but this process also discards the Korangi fisherfolks and their traditional way of living by Othering them through neoliberal economic agendas as well as changing definitions of legality, control, cleanliness and hygiene. Hence, the present thesis also contributed to the ocean grabbing literature by demonstrating and analyzing the complex processes behind the dispossession of small-scale fishers and related governance challenges. As such, it bridges the literature on ocean grabbing and discard studies through a Foucauldian lens.

7. CONCLUSION

This thesis focused on small-scale indigenous fishing communities on the Korangi coast of Karachi, Pakistan, by analyzing the socio-ecological context of a coastline that has gone through immense social, ecological and political turmoil. I have tied in the political climate of each period with verbal histories to allow for a well-rounded, holistic picture of the ever-changing relationship that Korangi's fisherfolk have with the sea. Although it is true that the area has changed and become unrecognizable over the last three decades, Korangi's fisherfolk continue to fight for their access to the sea and their right to sanitation, safety and well-being. Small-scale fishing communities are crucial to the culture of the coast, and form the backbone of Pakistan's fisheries sector. Therefore, there is a dire need for the development of policies that protect, center, and rehabilitate the fisherfolk, their rights, and their livelihoods, and legalize those fisherfolk who are considered "alien" by central and municipal governments.

By utilizing a discard studies lens and complementing it with Foucauldian-inspired concepts, the thesis aimed to contribute to the political ecology literature by illustrating how eco-governmentality employs exclusionary narratives to disempower the fisherfolk in Ibrahim Hyderi on the Korangi coast and displace them by way of refusal to access to the sea, their traditional fishing grounds, and even the right to identification documents. The dumping at the Korangi coast--especially during the COVID-19 pandemic--can be conceptualized as a form of violence weaponizing upper- and middle-class citizens' anxieties centered around cleanliness and/or health, and exploiting fishing communities' inability to effectively organize against the state. The thesis also showed that the discarding of waste became a discarding of local indigenous fisherfolk's mobility, well-being, fishing culture and fishing grounds at the same time. The legitimization of this discarding occurred by way of constructed narratives around cleanliness, wherein discarding waste became synonymous with discarding those who live in proximity to the waste. It is therefore imperative to further study widely-accepted rationales and agendas of central and local governments in Pakistan, as well as in other Global South countries, to uncover the increasingly dire impacts of this socio-ecologically unsustainable, anti-poor neoliberal model of discarding of marginalized communities in urban contexts, as well as on coastal zones where small-scale fisheries constitute and sustain coastal communities' food sources, livelihoods and culture.

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