

The Serbo-Croat Relations In Yugoslavia

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ABSTRACT

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by

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The First Yugoslavia was founded as the “Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes” on 1 December 1918, and its name was changed to the “Kingdom of Yugoslavia” by the Royal Coup in 1929. The Kingdom of Yugoslavia was destroyed and occupied by the Axis armies in April 1941. After the communist Partisan victory, the Second Yugoslavia was founded as the “Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia” on 29 November 1945, and its name was altered to the “Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia” by the 1963 Constitution. The Second (Socialist) Yugoslavia collapsed and disintegrated at the beginning of the 1990s.

This study focuses on the Serbo-Croat relations in Yugoslavia with aim of explaining characteristics of the Serbo-Croat relations and their effects in the Yugoslav politics. This study maintains that the Serbo-Croat relations in Yugoslavia had two opposite characteristics: *cooperation* and *conflict*. The *Serbo-Croat cooperation* had *constructive effects*, while the *Serbo-Croat conflict* had *destructive effects* in the Yugoslav politics.

Also, this study shows that the Serbo-Croat War in Croatia and the Bosnian War in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the first half of the 1990s were not “clash of civilizations” or “return of ancestral hatreds” among Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks (Yugoslav Muslims). This study argues and explains that the Serbo-Croat War and the Bosnian War were results of the reconstruction of capitalism in Yugoslavia and of the economic-political contradictions between the Serbian and Croatian bureaucratic-technocratic ruling classes whose ideological basis was nationalist liberalism. For this reason, this study inquires and explains development of bureaucratic-technocratic ruling class whose ideological basis was nationalist liberalism, reconstruction of capitalism in Yugoslavia, and economic-political conflict between Serbian and Croatian bureaucratic-technocratic ruling classes and its destructive effect in the Socialist Yugoslavia.

KISA ÖZET

Yugoslavya'da Sırp-Hırvat İlişkileri

Caner Sancaktar

Birinci Yugoslavya “Sırp, Hırvat ve Sloven Krallığı” adı altında 1 Aralık 1918’de kuruldu. 1929 yılında Kral Aleksandër Karadjordjevic’in düzenlediği darbe devletin ismini “Yugoslavya Krallığı” olarak değiştirdi. Genç Yugoslavya Krallığı 1941 yılının Nisan ayında Almanya, İtalya, Bulgaristan, Macaristan ve Romanya orduları tarafından işgal edildi ve yıkıldı. İşgal altındaki ülke, Yugoslav Komünist Partisi’nin örgütlediği Partizan ordusu tarafından özgürleştirildi. İkinci Yugoslavya, Yugoslav Komünist Partisi liderliğinde 29 Kasım 1945’te “Yugoslavya Federal Halk Cumhuriyeti” olarak kuruldu. 1963 Anayasası ile ismi “Yugoslavya Sosyalist Federal Cumhuriyeti” olarak değiştirilen İkinci Yugoslavya, 1990’ların ilk yarısında kanlı bir biçimde yıkıldı ve parçalandı.

Yugoslavya’da Sırp-Hırvat ilişkilerini inceleyen ve açıklayan bu çalışmaya göre, Sırp-Hırvat ilişkileri birbiriyle çelişen iki zıt özellik gösterir: *işbirliği* ve *çatışma*. Bunlardan ilki (*Sırp-Hırvat işbirliği*) hem birinci hem de ikinci Yugoslavya’yı son derece yapıcı ve olumlu bir biçimde etkilemiştir. İkincisi (*Sırp-Hırvat çatışması*) ise, Yugoslav siyaset hayatında son derece yıkıcı ve olumsuz etki göstermiştir.

Ayrıca bu çalışma, 1990’ların ilk yarısında yaşanmış olan Hırvatistan’daki Sırp-Hırvat Savaşı ile Bosna-Hersek Savaşı’nın bir “medeniyetler, kültürler ve dinler arası çatışma” olmadığını ve bu savaşların “tarihsel-ulusal nefretlerden” kaynaklanmadığını gösteriyor ve açıklıyor. Hırvatistan ve Bosna-Hersek topraklarında yaşanmış olan kanlı çatışmaların asıl nedeni, Yugoslavya’da kapitalist üretim ilişkilerinin yeniden yapılandırılması sürecinde Sırp bürokratik-teknokratik yönetici sınıf ile Hırvat bürokratik-teknokratik yönetici sınıf arasındaki ekonomi-politik çıkar çatışmasıdır. Bu nedenle, bu çalışma, milliyetçi liberalizm ideolojisine dayalı bürokratik-teknokratik bir egemen/yönetici sınıfın gelişmesi, Yugoslavya’da kapitalizmin yeniden yapılandırılması, ve Sırp bürokratik-teknokratik yönetici sınıf ile Hırvat bürokratik-teknokratik yönetici sınıf arasındaki çatışmayı ve bu çatışmanın Sosyalist Yugoslavya üzerindeki yıkıcı etkisini incelemekte ve açıklamaktadır.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

<i>Title Page</i>	<i>i</i>
<i>Approval Page</i>	<i>ii</i>
<i>Abstract</i>	<i>iii</i>
<i>Kısa Özet</i>	<i>iv</i>
Chapter I Introduction	1
Chapter II The First Yugoslavia: The Kingdom Of Yugoslavia	5
II. 1. Foundation of the First Yugoslavia (1915-1921)	5
II. 2. Parliamentary Kingdom (1921-1928)	22
II. 3. Authoritarian Kingdom (1929-1939)	35
II. 4. The Yugoslav Communist Party in the Interwar Period and the the Yugoslav National Question	48
Chapter III The Period Of World War II	63
III. 1. Destruction of the First Yugoslavia	63
III. 2. The Ustasha Movement and the Independent State of Croatia	71
III. 3. Serbian Nationalism in the Second World War	82
III. 3. i. The Serbian Puppet State	83
III. 3. ii. The Serbian Peasantry Uprisings	84
III. 3. iii. The Chetnik Movement	85
III. 3. iv. The Yugoslav Government-In-Exile	91
III. 4. The Yugoslav Communist Party and Partisan Movement	95
Chapter IV The Second Yugoslavia: The Socialist Yugoslavia	112
IV. 1. Foundation of the Socialist Yugoslavia (1946-1950)	112
IV. 1. i. The 1946 Constitution	112
IV. 1. ii. Economic Measures	115
IV. 1. iii. Measures Against the Church	118
IV. 1. iv. The Yugoslav Communist Party	119
IV. 1. v. Expulsion of the Yugoslav Communist Party from the Cominform	120
IV. 2. Foundation of the “System of Socialist Self-management” (1950 - 1960)	126
IV. 2. i. Self-management on the Economic Level	128

IV. 2. ii. Self-management on the Territorial Level	133
IV. 2. iii. Self-management on the Organizational Level	137
IV. 2. iv. Outputs of the Self-management	144
IV. 3. The 1963 Constitution and the Eighth Congress of the LCY: Decentralization and De-etatization	146
IV. 3. i. The 1963 Constitution	146
IV. 3. ii. The Eighth Congress of the LCY	154
IV. 4. The 1965 Economic Reforms: Liberalization of the Yugoslav Economy	155
IV. 5. Growth of Economic Contradiction	160
IV. 6. From the Economic Contradictions to the Political Crisis	168
IV. 6. i. The Fall of Rankovic: The Defeat of the Centralist – Nationalist Serbs	168
IV. 6. ii. The Student Uprising: The Student Opposition against the Bureaucratic-Technocratic Domination	172
IV. 6. iii. The Croatian Spring (1967-1971): The Resurgence of the Croat Nationalist Liberalism	175
IV. 7. The 1971 Constitutional Amendments and Decentralization	182
IV. 8. The 1974 Constitution: Precaution against the Enemies of the Self-management	187
IV. 9. The Associated Labor Law of 1976	194
Chapter V Destruction Of The Second Yugoslavia	198
V. 1. The Yugoslav Economy in the 1980s: Economic Decline and Reconstruction of Capitalism	198
V. 2. Rise of Serbian Nationalism (1980-1990)	207
V. 2. i. Dobrica Cosic and the “Serbian Memorandum”	209
V. 2. ii. Foundation of the Milosevic Regime	211
V. 2. iii. The Serbian Orthodox Church in the 1980s	221
V. 3. Rise of Croatian Nationalism (1980-1990)	223
V. 3. i. The Death of the League of Communists of Croatia ...	225
V. 3. ii. Foundation of Nationalist Liberal Parties in Croatia ..	226
V. 3. iii. The Croatian Catholic Church in the 1980s	229
V. 3. iv. Foundation of the Tudjman Regime	231
V. 3. v. The Serbs of Croatia and the Krajina Issue	235

V. 4. War in Croatia and Foundation of the Independent Croatian State (1991-1995)	239
V. 4. i. Secession of Croatia and Foundation of the Republic of Serb Krajina	239
V. 4. ii. The Serbo-Croat War in Croatia	241
V. 4. iii. The International Intervention and the Cease-fire ...	248
V. 4. iv. After the Cease-fire	252
V. 5. War in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Foundation of the “Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina” (1990-2000)	254
V. 5. i. Foundation of Nationalist Liberal Parties in Bosnia – Herzegovina	255
V. 5. ii. Beginning of the War	258
V. 5. iii. The Bosnian War	261
V. 5. iv. The International Intervention into Bosnia	268
V. 5. v. The Dayton Peace Accords and Foundation of the “Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina”	274
V. 6. Costs and Results of the Wars	279
Chapter VI Conclusion	286
Bibliography	292

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

There were three different Yugoslavia (South Slavia) in the historical path of Yugoslavs (South Slavs):

- 1) The First Yugoslavia: the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.
- 2) The Second Yugoslavia: the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
- 3) The Third Yugoslavia: the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

The Kingdom of Yugoslavia was a triumph of the idea of Yugoslavism that has aimed unification of Yugoslavs (Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Bosniaks-Muslim Yugoslavs, Montenegrins, and Macedonians) within a single country and state: Yugoslavia. This goal was achieved by the consensus of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918 as *the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes*. The name of the Kingdom was changed to *the Kingdom of Yugoslavia* in 1929 as a result of the Serbian nationalist coup under the leadership of King Aleksander Karadjordjevic. The First Yugoslavia was occupied and destroyed by the Axis forces (Germany, Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary and Rumania) in April 1941.

The period of World War II was a very harmful and important era for the Yugoslav peoples and Yugoslavia's future. In this period, the Ustasha Party led by Ante Pavelic founded *the Independent State of Croatia* thanks to the German and Italian support.

During the war, Serbian nationalism was represented by three political and military organization: (1) the Chetnik movement led and organized by Draza Mihailovic; (2) the Yugoslav government-in-exile that was installed in London after the occupation of the country; and (3) the Serbian puppet state which was founded by the Germans and headed by Milan Nedic.

The Ustasha movement aimed to establish a "*Greater Croatia*" and the Serbian nationalism strove for a "*Greater Serbia*". However, the Partisan movement organized and led by the Yugoslav Communist Party fought at first for liberation of the country from the Axis occupation, and then for socialist revolution in Yugoslavia.

This double aim of the Partisan movement was achieved at the end of the war through liberation of the country and foundation of the Second Yugoslavia: Socialist

Yugoslavia. The Second Yugoslavia was established under the name of *Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia* including six federated People's Republics: Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro. It was transformed into the *Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia* by the 1963 Constitution.

The Second Yugoslavia had four distinctive characteristics: First of all, since 1950, the Yugoslav socialist regime has applied *the system of socialist self-management* (or *the system of working people's self-management*) that has been different from the Soviet and Chinese socialist models. Secondly, the Socialist Yugoslavia improved relations with the Third World countries and led *Nonalignment Movement* after his expulsion from the Cominform in 1948. Thirdly, unlike the other pro-Soviet Union socialist states, the Socialist Yugoslavia developed considerable economic and diplomatic relations with the Western Europe and the United States. Finally, the Second Yugoslavia has been the most heterogeneous country of the Balkans, and so, involved very bitter national questions and contradictions.

The Second Yugoslavia collapsed at the beginning of 1990s. The secessions of Croatia and Slovenia on 25 June 1991, Macedonia on 18 September 1991 and Bosnia-Herzegovina on 3 March 1992 declared the death of the Second Yugoslavia. On 27 April 1992, the Third Yugoslavia was formed by the republics of Serbia and Montenegro as the *Federal Republic of Yugoslavia*. The name of the Third Yugoslavia was changed to the *Federal Republic of Serbia and Montenegro* in March 2003.

The collapse of the socialist self-management system and the disintegration of Yugoslavia become very bloody and dramatic political process. The dramatic and bloody death of the Socialist Yugoslavia damaged the Yugoslav peoples as a whole and significantly influenced the Balkan politics. The damages and influences of the Socialist Yugoslavia's collapse and disintegration still continue in the present day.

This study focuses on the relations between Serbs and Croats in Yugoslavia. They were the most important and effective two nations both in the First and Second Yugoslavia due to two main reasons: Firstly, they were the two largest nations of Yugoslavia. Secondly, Serbs and Croats become more effective and dominant in the political, economic and intellectual life of Yugoslavia than the other nations.

Thus, the Serbo-Croat relations affected greatly the foundation of both the first and the second Yugoslavia. Also, they influenced and determined significantly political, economic and intellectual life in Yugoslavia, and the Serbo-Croat contradictions/clashes produced bitter crisis in the Yugoslav politics. It is more important that the Serbo-Croat conflict played very determinative role in the collapse of the socialist self-management system and in the disintegration of Yugoslavia. For this reason, explanation and analysis of the Serbo-Croat relation is very important for explanation and analysis of the Yugoslav politics. Hence, this study aims to explore, explain and analyze characteristic of the Serbo-Croat relations and their effects in the Yugoslav politics.

Chapter Two of the study analyzes and explains political, economic and cultural relations and contradictions between Serbs and Croats on the basis of foundation and evolution of the First Yugoslavia (the Kingdom of Yugoslavia). Also, it covers the foundation and evolution of the Yugoslav Communist Party and the Serbo-Croat relations within the party in the interwar period.

Chapter Three concerns the occupation and destruction of the First Yugoslavia by the Axis forces; the Serbian nationalism and the Chetnik movement; the Croatian nationalism and the Ustasha movement; and the communist Partisan movement in the period of World War II. This chapter also studies and explains why and how the Chetnik and the Ustasha movements produced and deepened national hatreds and contradictions between the Serb and Croat peoples, and why and how the communist Partisans become able to achieve victory and power at the end of the war.

Chapter Four deals with the foundation and evolution of the Second Yugoslavia on the basis of the socialist self-management system; constitutional changes; formation of the bureaucratic-technocratic ruling class and its ideological basis of nationalist liberalism; and rise of economic contradictions. Moreover, the three political crisis (the purge of the Rankovic faction in 1966, the socialist student uprising in 1968, and the Croatian Spring between 1967-1971) were analyzed and explained in this chapter.

Chapter Five focuses on respectively economic decline, collapse of the socialist self-management system and reconstruction of capitalism in the 1980s; rise of the Serbian and Croatian nationalist liberalism in the 1980s; the Serbo-Croat War and foundation of

the 'Republic of Croatia'; the Bosnian War and foundation of the 'Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina'; and finally the severe results of the wars in the 1990s.

Finally, as a conclusion, I assess and define the characteristic and effects of the Serbo-Croat relations in the Yugoslav politics in *Chapter Six*.

CHAPTER II

THE FIRST YUGOSLAVIA: THE KINGDOM OF YUGOSLAVIA

II. 1. Foundation of the First Yugoslavia (1915-1921)

The First World War brought South Slavs (Yugoslavs) together for the first time in history. Dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the West and defeat of the Turks in the South created the conditions for South Slav (Yugoslav) unification. New international conditions, however, did not bring unification alone; instead, it was the internal politics of the South Slavs and possible external threats in the future that produced the unity by both will and necessity.

The assassination of the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand on 28 June 1914 in the capital of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sarajevo, precipitated the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to the Kingdom of Serbia, the first in the series of ultimatum that started World War I. The Archduke's assassin, Gavrilo Princip, and his comrades were members of the revolutionary youth organization *Crna Ruka (Black Hand)* which was led by Dragudin Dimitrijevic and which was committed to the liberation of Bosnia-Herzegovina from Austro-Hungarian rule and its union with Serbia and other South Slav lands.

The Habsburg ultimatum after the assassination was not accepted by Serbia and the Serbian government led by the Serbian Radical Party. On 7 December 1914, Nikola Pasic, the Premier of the Serbian Government and the leader of the Serbian Radical Party, issued the famous *Nis Declaration*, (against which voted only the two Social Democratic deputies) stating that its war aim was the liberation and unification of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Serbian war aim was backed by Russia and France, and Austro-Hungarian Empire was backed by Germany.¹

For almost two years the Serbian army was able to hold in check the superior Austro-Hungarian forces, severely defeating them in several battles on Serbian soil. But the Bulgarian attack on Serbia in 1915 and a joint German-Austro army defeated the Serb army. These joint offensive forced the Serbian government, together with its army, to

¹ See Castellan, Georges, *Balkanların Tarihi*, trans. Ayşegül Yaraman-Başbuğu, Istanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1995, pp. 395-397 ; Schevill, Ferdinand, *A History of the Balkans: From the Earliest Times to the Present Day*, New York: Dorset Press, 1991, pp. 486-487.

withdraw, with heavy losses, through the mounts of Albania to the Adriatic coast and then the Greek island of Corfu.²

Serbian army was trained and equipped by French and English armies. Also, defeating Serb army was reinforced by 30,000 volunteers from Russia and from the United States, and by 30,000 Croat and Slovene defectors from Habsburg forces.³ This reinforced Serb army returned Serbia and defeated the joint force of Germany, Austro-Hungarian Empire and Bulgaria. The joint occupying force was enforced by Serbian army to withdraw Serbia in September 1918.

And finally, the First Yugoslavia was proclaimed as *the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes* on 1 December 1918 by Aleksander Karadjordjevic, acting as regent for his father, King Peter of Serbia. That is, the foremost aim of unification of Yugoslav peoples and lands was realized at the end of the First World War through foundation of the First Yugoslavia. The new State was composed of the following elements:⁴

The Kingdom of Serbia, which involved Macedonia, with a population of 3,350,000; the Kingdom of Montenegro with a population of 250,000; Croatia-Slavonija, a former province of Hungary, that contained 1,638,000 Croats and 645,000 Serbs; the former Austrian province of Dalmatia which had a mixed population of Serbs and Croats amounting to 611,000 in all; the former Austrian province of Carniola (Krain) and parts of Styria (Steiermark), Karinthia (Karnten) and Istria that involved 1,000,000 Slovenes and German-speaking minorities; the former Hungarian districts of Baranja and Backa that had a mixed Magyar, Slovene and Croat population; and finally, Bosnia-Herzegovina with a population of 1,833,000, a former Habsburg province, occupied by the Habsburg Monarchy in 1978 and formally annexed in 1908.

The first Yugoslav census of 1921 records nearly 12 million inhabitants. According to this census, there were 4,665,851 (38,83%) Serbs and Montenegrins; 2,856,551 (23.77%) Croats; 1,024,761 (8.53%) Slovenes; 727,650 (6.05%) Bosniaks; 585,558 (4.87%) Macedonians and Bulgarians; 513,472 (4.27%) Germans; 472,409 (3.93%) Hungarians; 441,740 (3.68%) Albanians; 229,398 (1.91%) Romanians, Vlachs and

² Schevill, op. cit., pp. 492-493.

³ Lampe, John, *Yugoslavia as History*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, p.103.

⁴ See Singleton, Fred, *Twentieth-Century Yugoslavia*, London: Macmillan Press, 1976, pp. 66-67.

Cincars; 168,404 (1.40%) Turks; 115,532 Czechs and Slovaks; 25,615 Rutens, 20,568 Russian; 14,764 Polishes; 12,825 (0.11%) Italians; and others 80, 079 (0.67%) in the First Yugoslavia. Also, the census recorded 5,593,057 Orthodox; 4,708,657 Roman Catholic; 40,338 Greek Catholics ;1,345,271 Muslims including Bosniaks, Turks and most Albanians; 229,517 Protestants and 64,746 Jewish.⁵

Undoubtedly, international conditions and World War I affected the foundation of the First Yugoslavia. However, the foundation of Yugoslavia was not only a simple product of the war and the international conditions of that time. The impact and role of internal history and internal politics of Yugoslavia in the creation of *the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes* was greater and more effective than the war and international politics.

Yugoslavia had the most complex internal history of any Balkan nation at this time, and its problems illustrated many of the basic difficulties and contradictions in the national movement. Since the major steps toward the organization of the state were taken during the war and in the month following the armistice, a closer examination of the events before 1 December 1918, is necessary, with particular attention to the effect and role of the three organizations which were most active in the foundation and organization of the First Yugoslavia: *the Serb government, the Yugoslav Committee and the Yugoslav National Council*. The relations among these three actors during the war shaped and organized the foundation of the First Yugoslavia under affect of international conditions of its time. Therefore, we should study these actors and the relations among them in order to understand foundation of the First Yugoslavia, that is, the unification of the Yugoslav peoples and lands.

After defeat by the German-Austro army and the deadly withdrawal from homeland, a Serbian government-in-exile was established in Corfu under leadership of Prince-Regent Aleksander and prime minister Nikola Pasic who was the leader of the Serbian Radical Party. The Serbian government was in an extremely weak position. The army had been defeated and they had no any assurances about the future from their allies (Russia, France and England).

⁵ See Table 4.2 in Klemencic, Matjaz & Zagar, Mitja, *The Former Yugoslavia's Diverse Peoples*,

In addition, France and England signed *the Secret Treaty of London* on 26 April 1915 with Italy in order to persuade Italy to join the Allies. In return for her entry into the war on the Allied side, Italy was promised, by this secret treaty, Trieste, Gorizia-Gradisca, Istria and part of Dalmatia; with the exception of the city of Trieste, these Austrian lands had a predominantly South Slav population.⁶ This secret treaty damaged and weakened the position and power of the Serbian government-in-exile, and also, decreased the confidence of Serbian government about the Allied side.

Despite the deadly defeat by enemy and the secret treaty, the Serbian aims remained much what they had been before the war. This war was regarded by Serbian nationalism as a perfect opportunity to create the Serbian national unity, in fact, to found *Greater Serbia*. Therefore, the immediate goal of Serbian government was the acquisition of Bosnia-Herzegovina and an outlet on the Adriatic. If possible, they desired to obtain Serbian-inhabited lands under Habsburg rule, in particular the Vojvodina. According to Serbian government, postwar Serbia would thus remain a centralized, Orthodox state under the Karadjordjevic dynasty. So, Serbian government did not aim and desire to found *Yugoslavia* but they aimed and desired to create a *centralized Orthodox Greater Serbian Kingdom*.

However, the Croatian and Slovenian national leaders in the Habsburg Empire were in a different position. There were two different projects among national leaders in Croatia and Slovenia. Some of them aimed the unification of South Slavs (Yugoslav peoples), that is to found *Yugoslavia*. Another group, on the other hand, aimed to gain autonomous sovereignty within the Empire by reorganization of the Empire on the Trialist basis. The autonomist project led by the Slovenian People's Party, that was active in the Austrian parliament under leadership of Anton Korosec.

The national leader who aimed the unification of the Yugoslavs emigrated and organized their effort outside of the Empire. The most important émigré group for the future organization of *Yugoslavia* was the Yugoslav Committee, led by Ante Trumbic and Frano Supilo who were Dalmatian Croats. The Committee was established in Rome

California: ABC-CLIO, 2003, p. 105 and Castellan, op. cit., p.426.

⁶ Auty, Phyllis, *Yugoslavia*, London: Thames and Hudson, 1965, p.70.

in 1915 and largely financed by contributions from the Yugoslavs in America. However, the committee left Rome for Paris and it was constituted at Paris (30 April) after the Secret Treaty of London (26 April). Then the Committee moved to new headquarters in London.⁷

The Committee was entirely unofficial; it represented little more than the opinions and influence of its members. However, it maintained links with individuals in the monarchy and with Croatian and Slovenian politicians. It was also in touch with the large emigrant organizations in Europe and America. Its major task was to carry on a propaganda campaign to inform the Allies about the position of the Yugoslavs within the empire and to agitate for Yugoslav unification. For this aim, the Committee established relations and contact with major political figures such as Woodrow Wilson, Lyold George, French foreign minister Pichon. Also, the Committee accomplished to influence and develop good relations with academicians, journalists and intellectuals of the Allied side.

On the other hand, unlike the Committee, Anton Korosec and his party the Slovenian People's Party, strove for a Slavic state involving Slovenes, Croats and Serbs within the Habsburg Empire on a Trialist basis. That is to say, they did not aim the foundation of Yugoslavia but they aimed the unification of Yugoslavs within the Habsburg Empire. For this purpose, on 30 May 1917, the 33 South Slavic members of the Austrian parliament formed a coalition, and their president, Korosec, made the following declaration:

*"The undersigned national deputies who are banded together in the Yugoslav Caucus declare that, on the basis of the national principle as well as of Croatian state rights, they demand the unification of all the lands of the Monarchy which are inhabited by Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs, into a single, autonomous political body, free from the rule of an alien peoples and founded on a democratic basis, under the scepter of the Habsburg-Lotharingian Dynasty, and that they will bend all their efforts to the realization of this demand by their united people."*⁸

⁷ Graham, Malbone W., *New Governments of Central Europe*, New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1924, p. 339.

⁸ Petrovic, Michael Baro, *A History of Modern Serbia, 1804-1918, volume 2*, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976, p. 642.

We have seen that there were significant contradictions about the future of Yugoslavs. The three actors, the Serbian government-in-exile, the Yugoslav Committee and South Slavic representatives in Austrian parliament, pursued different aims about the future of Yugoslavs. According to Ivo Lederer, Pasic and his government's foremost aim was not the unification of the Yugoslavs on the federal basis but the foundation of *Greater Serbia* on the centralist basis. For this reason, he states that "*the Great Serbian conception did not allow for Serb-Croat-Slovene-Montenegrin partnership, or federative arrangement that was envisaged by Supilo, Trumbic, and the Yugoslav Committee.*"⁹

On the other hand, South Slavic deputies of the Austrian parliament tried for different goal both from the goal of the Serbian government and the goal of the Yugoslav Committee: to gain autonomous sovereignty for Yugoslavs within the Habsburg Empire on the Trialist basis. As a result, there were important conflicts among the three actors and projects. Nevertheless, despite these conflicts, they came to an understanding and established collaboration because of five reasons according to Barbara Jelavich:¹⁰

1) Prince Aleksander and Nikola Pasic had difficulty controlling their military leadership over the Black Hand that was led by Colonel Dragudin Dimitrijevic. That is, the Black Hand threatened the power and leadership of the Serbian government. 2) Montenegrin King Nicholas did not accept Serbian guidance and put forward Montenegrin claims on territory desired by Serbian government. 3) Also, the Macedonian issue between Serbia and Greece frightened the Serb side. 4) Another reason was the fall of the tsarist regime in Russia in March 1917 because the Russian tsarist regime had been the strongest Serbian supporter; without this backing from Russia, the Serbian position in international relations was weakened. 5) We have seen that the Secret Treaty of London had offered some parts of the Yugoslav territory to Italy, and the Italian government aimed to enlarged its territory at the expense of Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia. That is, Italy threatened the three sides.

In addition to these five reasons pointed by Jelavich, there were another three

⁹ Lederer, Ivo J., "Nationalism and the Yugoslavs", in Peter Sugar & Ivo Lederer (eds.), *Nationalism in Eastern Europe*, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1973, p. 430.

¹⁰ See Jelavich, Barbara, *History of the Balkans. Twentieth Century.*, volume 2, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983, pp. 145-147.

reasons for the collaboration:

Firstly, Hungarian nationalists did not welcome the declaration of South Slavic deputies, that was led by Korosec, and their aim for the unification of South Slavs within the Empire on the Trialist basis. That is, Hungarian nationalism threatened the position and presence of South Slavs within the Empire. Militant Hungarian nationalism had attempted in the closing decades of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth to assimilate the non-Hungarians (including Croats and Slovenes) living in the Hungarian half of the Habsburg Monarchy.¹¹ This attitude of Hungarian nationalism forced Korosec and the South Slavic deputies in the Habsburg Empire to establish consensus and collaboration with the Serbian government and the Yugoslav Committee.

Internally the long-term logic of a common market was the second cause of the collaboration for the unification of Yugoslavs. That is, Croatian, Slovene and Serbian landowners and bourgeoisie needed a common extensive market for their products. Hence, the unification of the Yugoslav lands would provide them a profitable common market. This need for the common market incited Serbs, Croats and Slovenes to establish collaboration for the foundation of a single state: Yugoslavia.

Thirdly, there was a cultural and ethnic affinity among Serbs, Croats and Slovenes despite religious and petty linguistic differences. This cultural affinity, also, affected and facilitated the collaboration for the unification.

These total eight reasons stimulated and started negotiations among three sides and elicited collaboration for the future of Yugoslavs. The first product of the negotiations and cooperation was *the Declaration of Corfu* on 20 July 1917. The discussions between the Serbian government and the Yugoslav Committee held between June 15-July 20 in Corfu. Serbian government and the Committee were represented by respectively Pasic and Dalmatian Croat Trumbic.

The results of the negotiation were contained in the Declaration of Corfu. Here it was agreed that the Serbian government and the Committee would cooperate to establish a Yugoslav state; it was to be a constitutional monarchy under the Karadjordjevic dynasty

¹¹ Cviic, Christopher, "Slovene and Croat Perspective", in Alex Danchev & Thomas Halverson (eds.), *International Perspective on the Yugoslav Conflict*, London: Macmillan Press, 1996, p. 123.

The constitution was to be drafted by a constitutional assembly elected on the basis of universal manhood suffrage.¹² The declaration stated that the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes were one people: "*the same by blood, by language, both spoken and written, by the feelings of their unity, by the continuity and integrity of the territory which they inhabit undividedly, and by the common vital interests of their national survival and manifold development of their moral and material life.*"¹³

The declaration, it should be noted, took into account only these three nations (Serbs, Croats and Slovenians) but Bosniaks, Montenegrin, Macedonian and Albanian were not considered separately in the declaration. Also, the declaration was not more than a statement of intent, that is to say, it had no legal force for the sides. Nevertheless, it was a very important declaration since it morally and strategically bound the Serbian government to a Yugoslav solution of some kind. That is, this declaration was the beginning of the cooperation between Serbs and Croats for the unification of Yugoslavs.

The second important outcome of the negotiations and collaboration was the establishment of *the Yugoslav National Council*. The first Yugoslav Congress was held at Prague in May 1918 and then the second in Ljubljana in August. The latter was more important since the Yugoslav National Council (YNC) was founded at the second congress in Ljubljana under leadership of Anton Korosec. In the short time, Regional National Councils were founded in Dalmatia, Bosnia, Slovenia, and other portions of the Yugoslav territories. Foundation of the YNC indicates that, in 1918, the political representatives of the Habsburg Slavs increased their activities toward dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. They followed the example of the Czechs by creating national committees.

These activities culminated on 8 October 1918, when a *National Council of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs* was proclaimed in Zagreb. The National Council declared itself the political representative of all Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs who lived in Croatia-Slavonia, Fiume, Dalmatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Istria, Trieste, Carniola, Gorica, Styria, Carinthia, Backa, Banat, Baranja, Medjmurje, and the other parts of Southwest

¹² Klemencic & Zagar, op.cit., pp. 85-86.

¹³ Petrovic, op.cit., p. 644.

Hungary. The Slovene Korosec was elected President of the Council. The Serb Svetozar Pribicevic and the Croat Ante Pavelic (a different person from the Ustasha leader Pavelic) were elected Vice-Presidents. The Council's only objective was the unification of all Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs and the establishment of an independent state of Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs.¹⁴

In series of events followed establishment of the National Council, the Croatian Sabor (Assembly) within the Habsburg Empire declared independence (October 29); and then, it entered the union that created by the National Council. Also, the Croatian Sabor authorized the Yugoslav Committee, that was led by Supil and Trumbic, to act as its representative in international relations, thus giving that body real authority for the first time. Similar actions were taken in Bosnia, Slovenia, Dalmatia and Vojvodina: the regional national councils declared their adherence to the National Council. These actions by the Croatian, Serbian and Slovenian leaders had the support of national revolutionary organization in Montenegro. In November, a Montenegrin assembly in Cetinje declared the deposition of King Nicholas, who had rejected union with the National Council, and its adherence to the National Council. On the other hand, the National Council empowered the Yugoslav Committee to represent them abroad as the government of the South Slavs of the former Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

There was a division in the National Council. The group which led by Trumbic believed that it would be better first to establish a firm union of the former Habsburg lands and then to enter into negotiations with the Serbian government on what would be an equal basis. Another group, led by Svetozar Pribicevic, the head of the Serbian Independent Party, favored an immediate union as a whole. In spite of the strong opposition of Stjepan Radic, the head of the Croatian Peasant Party, the latter idea was accepted in the National Council. The Council then appointed a delegation to go to Belgrade to negotiate with the Serbian government about the unification of Yugoslavs.

On 28 November 1918, the deputies from the National Council arrived in Belgrade with the Instruction that had been prepared by the National Council and had been approved by most parties associated with the National Council; only the Croatian

¹⁴ See for the National Council *ibid.*, p. 661 and Graham, *op. cit.*, p. 342.

Peasant Party had not approved.

The Instructor emphasized the final organization of the new state would be accepted with a two-thirds majority of votes cast in the Constituent Assembly. It was further emphasized that the Constituent Assembly should decide on the form of the government and whether the new state should be a monarchy or a republic. Until such time, the government of the country was to be conducted by the Council of State. Main duty of the Council of State was to carry out elections for the Constituent Assembly, on the basis of universal (male), equal, proportional, and secret suffrage. Also, the Instructor involved the formation of a Provisional Cabinet that would be responsible to the Council of State.¹⁵

Finally, the representatives of the National Council and the Serbian government came to agreement and, on 1 December 1918, Prince Alexander, who acted as regent for King Peter, proclaimed *the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes* saying:

*"In accepting your (the National Council's) communication, I am convinced that I am thereby fulfilling my duty as a ruler, for thereby I definitely concur with the work which the finest sons of our blood, of all three religions, all three tribes on both sides of the Danube, Sava and Drina already commenced during the reign of my forefathers Prince Alexander I and Prince Mihailo, which corresponds with the wishes and views of my people, so now in the name of his Majesty King Peter I, I proclaim the union of the Serbia with the lands of the independent State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs into a single Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes."*¹⁶

On 16 December 1918, the Provisional Assembly (the Council of the State) was formed which involved 50 representatives from the Kingdom of Serbia, five each from Montenegro and Vojvodina, and all members of the National Council. Four days later, a Provisional Cabinet was formed in Belgrade that consisted of ten members from Serbia, nine from former Habsburg territory and one from Montenegro. The most important task of the transitional regime (the Provisional Assembly and the Provisional Cabinet) was to prepare elections for the Constituent Assembly.

¹⁵ The Instruction consisted of eleven points: see Petrovich, op. cit., p. 677.

¹⁶ Hondius, Frits W., *The Yugoslav Community of Nations*, the Hague: Mouton, 1968, p. 90.

Conflicts emerged in domestic political life before the elections for the Constituent Assembly. The first and loudest opposition came from Croat nationalism. Croatia's small Party of Pure Rights attracted Croats from Slavonia and from Herzegovina against the unification, and favored the foundation of an independent Croat state. Also, the Catholic archbishop of Sarajevo, Josip Stadler, opposed the unification and tried to establish an united opposition against the unification. However, Josip Stadler failed to win power over clerics from the Bosnia-Herzegovina and from Dalmatia, who accepted the unification. Therefore, we can note that, the Catholic hierarchy could not organize a strong and massive opposition against the unification.

Unlike Catholic clerics, the steadfastly anti-clerical Stjepan Radic and his Croatian Peasant Party present a unified opposition. Radic considered the unification the fulfillment of the idea of Greater Serbia of the Serbian government. In February 1919, he dispatched a letter to American President Wilson appealing for the recognition of a Croatian republic, and aimed to attract American aid for foundation of an independent Croat state. Also, he and his party supported the peasant rebellions in the Croat rural areas between 1918-1920. These Croat peasant uprisings were put down by the provisional government. Radic's activities frustrated the Serb side and the Provisional Cabinet. The Provisional Cabinet put Radic in jail because of his separatist activities. He was imprisoned the first time in March 1919, when he spent nearly a year in prison. After his release, he resumed his separatist activities. As a result, he was immediately rearrested in March 1920. In August 1920, Radic was sentenced to two and a half years in prison. Radic was released on the day of the elections for the Constituent Assembly.¹⁷

The election for the Constituent Assembly was hold on 28 November 1920. Forty political organizations were to participate in the election. Here, only the most important parties are discussed:¹⁸

The most influential party in the interwar Yugoslavia was the Serbian Radical Party (SRP) under leadership of Nikola Pasic. Although it had been based on the peasantry, it was led by and representative of the interests of the Serbian middle class,

¹⁷ See Lampe, *op. cit.*, p. 110.

¹⁸ See for political parties in the first Yugoslavia Jelavic, *op. cit.*, pp. 148-150 and Singleton, *op. cit.*, pp. 72-74.

including the businessmen, the merchants, the bureaucrats, the professional men, the military, and the court.

Another important Serbian party was the Serbian Democratic Party (SDP) under leadership of Ljubomir Davidovic and Svetozar Pribicevic. The SDP was formed by a section of the left wing of the SRP in 1919 and played a major role in the political organization of the Serbs of the Habsburg Empire. Like the SRP, the SDP supported a centralized government in Yugoslavia. Its social composition was strongly biased towards the intellectual middle class and its program was for a constitutional monarchy responsible to a democratic parliament, operating within the framework of a unitary Yugoslav state.

The Croatian Peasant Party (CPP) had been formed in 1904 by the brother Ante and Sepjan Radic. The CPP was able to elect only a few representatives to the Sabor because of the extreme narrowness of the franchise in the Habsburg rule. The situation changed radically after the war with the introduction of the universal manhood suffrage and the CPP became a strong party in the Yugoslav parliament. After the death of Ante Radic in February 1919, Stjepan Radic became the leader. Radic and his party, we have seen, were against the proclamation of the unification since they aimed the creation of a Peasant Republic of Croatia. The appeal of the CPP was mainly to the Croat peasants although it had support among Croat workers and intellectuals. Radic and his party flirted with the Communists and in 1924 the CPP entered to the International Peasant Union which was sponsored by the Soviet Union. After the foundation of the Kingdom, the CPP stand in favor of a federal Yugoslavia instead of a centralized Yugoslavia and favored an autonomous organization for Croatia within the Kingdom.

Another important Croat party was the Croatian Party of Rights (CPR) founded in 1919 under leadership of Ante Pavelic. Like the CPP, it opposed a centralized Yugoslavia and supported a federal organization of Yugoslavia.

The Serb Agrarian Party (SAP) under Javon Jovanovic was another peasant party of the new Kingdom. Like the CPP, the SAP opposed centralism and supported federalism. It drew its support from Serb poor peasants in Serbia and Bosnia.

The most important Slovene party was Anton Korosec's the Slovene People's

Party (SPP). This party had been formed by a union of the Austrian and Slovene Catholics in 1905. The SPP, conservative and clerical party, had been very strong and influential party in the Austrian Parliament. This party, also, continued its strong and influential position in the first Yugoslavia. Korosec and his party was in favor of Slovene autonomy within federal Yugoslavia.

Another important and affective party in Yugoslav party-politics was the Yugoslav Communist Party (YCP) that was formed in 1919. The YCP had strong links with the trade unions and youth organizations, and also, it was a member of the Soviet-led Third Communist International. The program agreed at its second congress in 1920 declared that its aim was to gain power and to establish a Soviet Republic in Yugoslavia. The party's greatest strength at this time was in Macedonia, Bosnia and Montenegro. The YCP was another party which opposed centralist organization of the new Kingdom. On 29 December 1920, following Communist-led strikes in Bosnia and Slovenia, the government issued a *Obznana* (Decree) outlawing all activity of the YCP and the Trade Union.

The Yugoslav Muslim Organization (YMO) was the strongest party of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It was formed by Bosniak landowners under leadership of Mehmet Spaho in 1919. Although the YMO was founded in order to protect the interests of Bosniak landowners, it also attracted Bosniak clerics, intellectuals, merchants and peasants; and these social groups supported the YMO. The influence of Bosniak traders and intellectuals in the party increased continuously after the foundation, and this increasing influence led to transformation of the party into a mass party of Bosniaks which contained not only landowners but also intellectuals, merchants, peasants and craftsmen. As a result of this transformation, the party played a major role in the protection and development of Bosniak identity and culture in the First Yugoslavia.¹⁹ Also, Turkish and Albanian Muslims of Macedonia and Kosova established their own party, *the Dzemijet*, and participated in the November 1920 elections for the Constituent Assembly.

The elections for the Constituent Assembly were held on 28 November 1920. Forty political organization participated in the elections and fifteen of them received

¹⁹ See Babuna, Aydın, "Değişen Boşnak Kimliği Üzerine", *Toplum ve Ekonomi*, 9, 1996, pp. 72-74.

representation in the Constituent Assembly. The franchise was open to all except those of German or Hungarian national background on the basis of universal manhood suffrage. 65 percent of those eligible cast their ballots. Of the 419 seats available, the SDP won 92, the SRP 91, the YCP 59, the CPP 50, the SAP 39, the SPP 27, the YMO 24. The remaining places went to representatives of other small parties.²⁰ With these results, a new government was formed by the SDP and the SRP, and Nikola Pasic became the first prime minister of the first Yugoslavia.

After the elections, about 80.000 members of the CPP met in Zagreb on 8 December 1920. They proclaimed the Neutral Peasant Republic of Croatia and took oath to the Croatian homeland and Croatian Republic. The 50 elected representatives who had not presented their credentials to the Constituent Assembly joined the separatist declaration.²¹

Major task of the Constituent Assembly was to form constitution of the new Kingdom. Hence, debates about the feature of the constitution and the form of the state began after the formation of the Constituent Assembly. Some proposals favored centralization while others favored a more or less decentralized federal system. That is, main debate and contradiction occurred between centralists and federalists. There were five main constitutional proposition:²²

- 1) Stojan Protic's draft (the SRP) represented a compromise between the two extremes of centralized vs. decentralized state. Protic's proposal advocated building the national government based on the English parliamentary model. It proposed a creation of nine provinces corresponding to the historical sections into which the Kingdom was divided, within a level of local autonomy.
- 2) The Croatian plan advocated creation of six district provinces: (a) Serbia and Macedonia; (b) Croatia, Slavonija, Dalmatia, Istria and Medjumurje; (c) Montenegro; (d) Bosnia and Herzegovina; (e) Vojvodina; and (f) Slovenia. Each of these provinces was to have an independent government, and the constitution of the Kingdom could never be

²⁰ See for the results of the elections Lampe, op. cit., p. 121.

²¹ Vuckovic, Gojko, *Ethnic Cleavages and Conflict: The Sources of National Cohesion and Dis - integration*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 1997, p. 84.

²² See *ibid.*, pp. 85-86.

changed except with the unanimous consent of the parliaments of the provinces. The Croatian plan stipulated that the central government would have only those powers expressly delegated, that all other powers should be reserved for the local parliaments.

3) Slovene autonomists advocated federalism in politics and strict state interventionism in economics. Their proposal recommended that the country would be divided into six provinces similar to the Croatian plan but slightly different in regard to the boundaries. Their objective was to form three Catholic and three Orthodox autonomous states within the Kingdom.

4) The fourth plan was drafted by Dr Smodlaka and proposed to divide the country into 12 provinces, dismembering even Croatia and Serbia.

5) Fifth proposal was drafted by the Pasic cabinet. It recommended a unitary system of government with a democratically elected unicameral parliament, the ministers being responsible to it and to the King. It was a constitution that assumed the Kingdom was a homogeneous nation rather than a heterogeneous multiethnic nation. The Pasic cabinet draft resembled the Serbian Constitution of 1903. It was supported by the SDP and the SRP whose political platforms advocated a more cohesive centralist state. According to Lenard J. Cohen, these two parties and their leaders believed that a federal system would lead to the disintegration of the Kingdom, and for this reason, they were against federalism.²³

Also, they advocated centralized system of government owing to economic reason. Serbia had been suffered greater human and material losses than Croatia and Slovenia during the war. For example, one-half million civilian died between 1914-18 in Serbia and mines, factories, rail lines and bridges were destroyed and looted by Austrian and German troops. The war also crippled Serbia's capacity to feed itself. The SDP and the SRP aimed to recover and develop Serbian economy immediately. For this purpose, they planed to use and benefit from the resources of Croatia and Slovenia, which had been less damaged by the war, in order to finance the recovery and development of the Serb economy. This plan (to use the Slovenian and Croatian resources for compensation

²³ See Cohen, Lenard J., *Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia's Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1995, p. 16.

of the recovery and development of Serbia) required centralization of the economy of the new Kingdom. That is, the losses of Serb economy could not be recovered and the Serb economy could not be developed without centralization of the state because any decentralization and federalization of the state could hinder the utilization of the Slovenian and Croatian resources for recovery of the Serb economy. For this reason, Serbian side advocated extremely centralization of the political and economic structure of the Kingdom.

In short, there was no another alternative form of the state except centralism for Serbian side since according to them, federal system would (a) disintegrate the Kingdom and (b) prevent the recovery and development of the Serb economy. But it should be noted that Serbs as a whole were not against federal system. There were Serbs who favored federalism such as the SAP and communist Serbs who took place within the YCP.

On the other hand, Croat and Slovene sides were against centralization of the state because of three reasons: (1) They were against the utilization of their wealth for the recovery of Serbian economy. (2) According to them, centralization of the state would be a tool for realization of the *Greater Serbia* which has been the foremost goal of the Serb nationalists. (3) Finally, the centralization of the state was considered as a danger for their freedom. According to Croats and Slovenes, centralized form of the state would destroy their freedom. Hence, they favored federal system in order to protect their freedom against the Serb domination.

There was no political party or ethnic group with an absolute majority in the Constituent Assembly. The coalition parties SDP and the SRP did not have enough votes to pass the constitution (210 votes were needed to pass a constitution). Thus, they entered into negotiations with a number of small parties. Pasic managed to get the support of the YMO, and finally a compromise was reached with the YMO. The YMO came to understanding with the Pasic cabinet and established an alliance with the SRP and the SDP in the vote for the constitution because the Pasic cabinet promised Muslim landlords compensation for holdings taken by the land reform of February 1919.

In the vote on the final Pasic cabinet draft on 28 June 1921, 258 representatives

voted – 223 for, 35 against, while others (161 representatives) abstained, including the representatives of the CPP, the YCP, the SPP. The 223 votes in favor were distributed as follows: 184 Serbs, 18 Muslims, 11 Slovenes, and 10 Croats.²⁴ With these results, the Pasic cabinet draft was accepted as the constitution of the First Yugoslavia. The constitution was proclaimed on the Serbian national holiday Vidovdan (St. Vitus Day), and thereafter came to be known as the *Vidovdan Constitution*.

The Vidovdovan Constitution provided for a Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes under the hereditary, constitutional monarchy of the Karadjordjevic dynasty. There was a single legislative chamber, *the Skupstina*, that was composed of 315 delegates elected for four-year terms by direct, secret ballot.

The Council of Ministers was responsible both to the king and to parliament, and the king had much wider power than is customary in the practice of the constitutional monarchies of western Europe. The rights of free speech, freedom of religion and equality before the law were quarantined by the Constitution.

Local government, according to the Vidovdan Constitution, was under the control of prefects (*zupani*), professional civil servants appointed by the king on the nomination of the minister of the interior. The *zupan*'s chief function was to see that the central government's orders were carried out in his province (*oblast*) and to supervise the work of the sub-prefects (*nacelniki*), who administered the smaller districts (*srezovi*) within his *oblast*. The smallest unit of local government was the commune (*opstina*), headed by a mayor, whose election could be voted by the central government. Although there were elected councils at all levels, their powers were limited, and vital issues of finance were controlled by the central government.²⁵

Under the Vidovdan Constitution, the Kingdom was divided into 33 regions, 393 districts and 7085 communes.²⁶ In general, this division was made with reference to topography, population, former administrative units, economic interests, and old sectional

²⁴ Pavkovic, Alexander, *The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia: Nationalism in a Multinational State*, London: Macmillan Press, 1997, p.28.

²⁵ See for further details about the Vidovdan Constitution Graham, op. cit., pp. 361-381.

²⁶ See Jambreč, Peter, *Development and Social Change in Yugoslavia: Crisis and Perspectives of Building a Nation*, Westmead: Saxon House, 1975, p. 76.

areas such as Croatia, Slovenia and Bosnia. As a rule, the boundaries of the regions did not cross sectional borders, that is, they conformed to the lines of the historic districts composing the kingdom.

In short, it is clear that the Vidovdan Constitution, which largely resembled the Serbian Constitution of 1903, was a highly centralized constitution, headed by a strong Serbian king; and therefore, it was completely contrary to the wishes of the federalists in Croatia and Slovenia.

II. 2. Parliamentary Kingdom (1921-1928)

The Vidovdan Constitution was a triumph of Serbian centralist nationalism against the federalist Croat nationalism. Serbian nationalist centralism achieved triumph with the constitution but at a tremendous cost as a major proportion of the Yugoslav population never accepted this arrangement of the Vidovdan Constitution.

The fiercest opposition came from the Croat side, especially from the CPP, because Croatia in the new state lost the autonomous status that had been enjoyed between 1868 and 1918. In 1868, Croatia signed so-called *Nagodba* (Compromise) with the Habsburg Empire. The *Nagodba* provided Croatia autonomous status and representation in the joint parliament in Budapest. Although, the *Nagodba* left Dalmatia within the Austrian administration, Croatia had its own *Sabor* (Croatian Assembly) and *ban* (Croatian viceroy).²⁷ Thus, Croats opposed bitterly the Vidovdana Constitution that liquidated the autonomous status of Croatia.

In addition to the Croats, many Slovenian, Macedonian, Montenegrin, Albanian and Bosniak groups were unhappy with the centralized structure of the state. On the other side, the Serbian leadership, in defending its position, regarded any the criticism of the constitution as "treason", even when these criticisms aimed the reconstruction but not the destruction of the state. Thus, legal opposition became very difficult in this young parliamentary Kingdom. Belgrade used increasingly force to control the situation. The repressive measures were taken and the general suppression of civil liberties, of course, affected the Serbian population almost as adversely as it did the other nationalities, but Serbs at least had the advantage of belonging to the predominant nationality.

²⁷ Cviic, op. cit., p. 124.

The basic problem of the state was that a Yugoslav nationality did not come into existence. Peoples did not consider themselves one nation: Yugoslav nation. Difficulty of formation of a Yugoslav nation, according to Robert Lee Wolff, was a result of the history of Yugoslav lands because four foreign centers – Istanbul, Vienna, Budapest, and Venice – dominated various parts of the areas at different times from the middle ages until the creation of the unified state in 1918. The effects of the centers led to regional variations under the different political system which introduced varied administrative systems, economic standards, land utilization, and urban patterns.²⁸

That is to say, the process of historical development of the Yugoslav lands and peoples has created some cultural, political and economic differences among them. Therefore, the first Yugoslavia was founded as a state with two alphabets (Latin and Cyrillic), three religions (Orthodox, Roman Catholic and Moslem), three major languages (Serbo-Croatian, Slovenian, and Macedonian), five nationalities (Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Bosniaks, Macedonians, and Montenegrins).²⁹

Furthermore, pre-capitalist traditional relations was very prevailing in the first Yugoslavia, and the traditional social structure could not be destroyed in the first Yugoslavia. As a result, local authorities was highly influential and individual loyalty to local subgroups was very strong. This situation made difficult regional and national integration of the first Yugoslavia.³⁰

Therefore, two factors obstructed the formation of a *Yugoslav nation* in the first Yugoslavia: (1) Cultural, political and economic differences among the regions and the peoples, that has emerged in the historical process. (2) Effectiveness and power of local subgroups and authorities. These two factors prevented formation of a Yugoslav nationality and the peoples did not consider themselves as a single nation. Hence, Jack C.

²⁸ Wolff, Robert Lee, *The Balkans in Our Times*, New York: W. W. Norton, 1967, p. 20.

²⁹ It should be noted that during the interwar period, Macedonians, Montenegrins and Bosniaks (Yugoslav Muslims) did not have a separate administrative unit in the first Yugoslavia, and they were not recognized as separate nations in the Vidovdan Constitution.

³⁰ See Fisher, Jack C., *Yugoslavia – A Multinational State: Regional Difference and Administrative Response*, San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1965, p. 20.

Fisher is highly right when he states that “*between the two World War, Yugoslavia was a state but never really a nation.*”³¹

In this severe condition, the most intense national struggle, which paralyzed the state, broke out between Serbs and Croats. At this time the obstacles involved in bringing together two people with different historical backgrounds became apparent.³²

Previously, most Croats had lived under an autonomous administration, that is, they had their own assembly and local leaders within the Habsburg Empire. Croats was absorbed by Hungary in 1102 and Croatia was an Austro-Hungarian province for eight centuries. That is, Croats had been associated with the Habsburg Empire, which represented a higher civilization level than the level of Serb civilization, a fact they repeatedly impressed upon the Serbs. That is to say, Croats repeatedly asserted that Croat civilization and culture was more advanced than the Serb civilization and culture.

There was also the religious divergence between Serbs and Croats. Serbs received Christianity from Constantinople, becoming Eastern Orthodox; Croats received Christianity from Rome, becoming Catholics. Thus Serbia had an eastern orientation and Croatia had a western orientation. Furthermore, although they are South Slavic peoples and speak the same language, called Serbo-Croatian, there is a difference between Serbian alphabet and Croat alphabet. The Serbian alphabet grew out of Greek; it is called *Cyrillic* and is like the Russian alphabet. The Croatian alphabet was taken from Latin, with extra marks added for the special Slavic sound.

On the other hand, Serbian leaders saw themselves as the liberators of the South Slavs from foreign oppression, both Ottoman and Habsburg; this idea was a part of their national mythology. They also felt that they had suffered more than the other nationality, and therefore, they wished to be repaid at least in part for their heavy losses.³³ Serbian leaders and nationalists were firmly united in their national convictions and in the Orthodox church. Many of them never lost a feeling of distrust for the Croats because of

³¹ Ibid, p. 21.

³² See Roskin, Michael, *Other Governments of Europe*, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1977, pp. 103-104.

³³ During the Balkan Wars, Serbia lost some 30,000 men. The First World War cost it 275,000 men and wartime diseases another 800,000 civilians. These losses amounted to a quarter of the population and two-thirds of its male population between the ages of fifteen and fifty-five. (See Judah, Tim, *The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997, p. 101).

their Catholic faith and their former Habsburg association. Hence, many of them saw Croats as “traitors” and the Serbian nationalist leadership made a determined and successful effort to control the government in order to protect Serbian nation against these “traitors”, that is, to protect the future of Serbs against “Croatian treason”.

The Vidovdan Constitution produced the Serbian domination in Yugoslav political life that annoyed Croat side extremely. The Serbian domination in the state apparatus is well described by Wayne S. Vucinich:

“Only one interwar government was headed by a non-Serb prime minister, and for the most part only Serbs were given the key portfolios in the government (i.e., the ministries of foreign affairs, interior, and army and navy). All seven prime ministers of the twenty-four cabinet holding office between December 1918 and January 1929, the period of parliamentary democracy, were Serbs. In the subsequent period, from January 1929 to March 1941, there were fifteen different cabinets of whose ministers three-fifths (73) of the total of 121 were Serbs. The Slovene Anton Korosec was prime minister from July 27, 1928 until January 6, 1929. Only in the six cabinets immediately after the war (December 20, 1918 to January 1, 1921) did a non-Serb (Croat Ante Trumbic) hold the post of foreign minister. Korosec was the only non-Serb to hold the ministry of interior (on two occasion: July 27, 1928 to January 6, 1929; June 24, 1935 to December 21, 1938). In all thirty-nine cabinets, the minister of army and navy was always a Serb general on the active list. Again, of the 165 generals in 1938 only two were Croats and two Slovenes; all others Serbs . . . By control of patronage and by certain other procedures the government was able to designate Serbs to important banking, credit, and other institution. Political life was marred by extensive corruption in official circles and by the abuse of power. To stay in power, the government employed strong methods against members of the political opposition, especially after 1929, and thereby succeeded in driving some of them into the ranks of the extremists.”³⁴

Also, Stavrianos indicates the Serbian dominance in the Yugoslav politics and describes it with following sentences:

³⁴ Vucinich, Wayne S. “Interwar Yugoslavia”, in Wayne S. Vucinich (eds.), *Contemporary Yugoslavia: Twenty Years of Socialist Experiment*, Berkley: University of California Press, 1969, pp. 10-11.

*“During the parliamentary era from December, 1918, to January, 1929 – a period of 121 months – Serbians held the premiership for 117 months, ministry of the army and navy for 121 months, ministry of interior (which controlled the police) for 111 months, ministry of foreign affairs for 100 months, ministry of finance 118 months, ministry of education for 110 months, and the ministry of justice for 105 months. Likewise in the era of dictatorship, from January, 1929, to March 1941 – a period of 147 months – Serbians held the premiership, the ministry of the army and navy, and the ministry of foreign affairs for 147 months, the ministry of the interior for 129 months, the ministry of finance for 98 months, the ministry of education for 126 months, and the ministry of justice for 132 months.”*³⁵

Like Vuchinich and Stavrianos, G. W. Hoffman and F. W. Neal noted the Serbian dominance in the first Yugoslav and the frustration of Croats. According to them, *“the new state (the first Yugoslavia) amounted to a Serbian hegemony, with not only king and court but also administration, army and police predominantly Serbian, and therefore tending to be anti-Croat. Under a government dominated by Serbs, Croats had less to say about their affairs than before the war. And the Orthodox Church had certain rights denied the Roman Catholics. Croat passion, not unnaturally, began to burn.”*³⁶

The Serbian dominance in the state apparatus and the political life depended upon three power: King Aleksander Karadjordjevic who was a Serbian nationalist, government and army that were dominated and orientated by Serbian nationalist politicians and generals both. This situation, naturally, frustrated and annoyed Croat side and produced a deep political conflict between Serb nationalism and Croat nationalism.

However, the political conflict was not a single conflict between them; this conflict was deepened by economic conflict between Croatia and Serbia:

The position of Croatia changed radically as a result of its incorporation into the new state; instead of being one of the most underdeveloped regions of the Habsburg Empire, it was one of the most developed areas of the first Yugoslavia. While Belgrade gradually concentrated political authority and thus became the center of political power

³⁵ Stavrianos, L. S., *The Balkans since 1453*, New York: Holt, 1958, 624-625.

³⁶ Hoffman, George W. & Neal, Fred Warner, *Yugoslavia and The New Communism*, New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1962, pp. 59-60.

during the interwar period, Zagreb became the center of economic power with its industrial, commercial and financial dominance in the Kingdom. That is, Zagreb became the industrial, commercial and financial center of the first Yugoslavia.

Serbia and Belgrade lost ground in industrialization relative to Croatia and Zagreb. Zagreb's economic development became faster than Belgrade's because of the demand and capital flowing from Austria and Hungary in the immediate postwar period. It became the largest single industrial and import center in the new state. By 1923 the city had accounted for 6 percent of total industrial employment of the Kingdom and 45 percent of Croatia. Zagreb's industrial growth, especially in timber and metal processing, helped relieve the loss of employment and income after the war. Sarajevo and Skopje suffered this same loss after the war, but did not get the industrial growth to compensate for it. New competition from Croatian manufactures also trimmed the artisan sectors of Sarajevo and Skopje.³⁷

Also, Zagreb was the financial center of the state. The capital advance was largely homegrown, but several thousand Czech and Austrian businessmen also arrived in place of the Hungarian officials who departed from the country. They provided valuable business experience, especially in the postwar foreign trade. The Zagreb *općina* (the Zagreb communal assembly) did not wait for the parliament in Belgrade to pass a law for industrial encouragement and granted its own set of exemptions from import duties and taxes for industrial inputs. After the initial postwar boom, they continue to attract foreign capital, especially Austrian and Hungarian capital.

Zagreb's banks did not only finance industrial investments of Croatia, but also financed other regions' industries. For example, the *Prva Hrvatska Stedonica* made more long-term loans to industry of the Kingdom than the National Bank in Belgrade, which was the central bank of the Kingdom and established for commercial lending. The Zagreb banks held larger assets than the Belgrade banks. Croatian banks that depended on Zagreb accounted for 50 percent of the bank assets in Yugoslavia in 1924 and 40 percent in 1929. This means that much of capital came from Croat banks. Also, they refused to participate in the new Kingdom's central bank in Belgrade; that is to say, Croat banks

³⁷ See Lampe, *op. cit.*, p. 148.

could not be controlled and orientated by the National Bank that was dominated and controlled by Serbian politicians.³⁸

While the Serb dominance in the political life and in the state apparatus frustrated Croats, the Croat dominance in the Yugoslav economy frustrated Serbs. The government, that was dominated by Serbs, tried to centralize the economy in order to trim economic power of Croatia and to use Croatian sources for recovery of Serb economy. However, Croats resisted against the centralist economic policy of the government because they believed that centralization of the country's economy would improve the Serb power and curtail the Croat power in the economic life. Therefore, the Croatian side favored decentralization of the economy, while the Serbian side favored centralization of the economy.

These political, economic and cultural differences/contradictions led to the Serbo-Croat conflict which affected the history of the first Yugoslavia significantly. The interwar period in Yugoslavia was dominated by the Serbo-Croat dispute.³⁹

Unlike the Serbo-Croat conflict, there were not a Serbo-Slovene or a Serbo-Bosniak conflict because both Slovenians and Bosniaks came to agreement with Serbian nationalism. Both Slovenes and Bosniaks were able to extract some gains from the central Serbo-Croat dispute. These gains made possible the Serbo-Slovene and the Serbo-Bosniak consensus rather than conflict:⁴⁰

Bosniak landowners and the YMO supported Serbian centralist parties (the SRP and the SDP) because they extracted concessions from them. The coalition government of the SRP-SDP protected the rights of Bosniak landowners. Also, Bosniak tradition and institutions and the historical borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina were protected by the Serb dominated government. That is, the Bosniak leaders supported the Serb-dominated government in order to gain some economic, political and religious privileges.

Similar to the YMO, the SPP under the leadership of Anton Korosec collaborated with the Serbian nationalism because they extracted some gains from the Serb dominated

³⁸ See for further details Lampe, John R. & Jackson, Marvin R., *Balkan Economic History, 1550-1950*, Bloomington: Indian University Press, 1982, pp. 394-398.

³⁹ Zametica, John, *The Yugoslav Conflict*, London: the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1992, p. 7.

⁴⁰ See Judah, op. cit., p. 108.

government. After 1918, the Yugoslav Slovenes benefited from the receiving their own high schools and a Slovenian university. Also, half a million of Slovenes lived under Italian rule in Istria, and the Yugoslavia's Slovenes believed that only a united strong Yugoslavia would be able to free Slovenes in Istria. Furthermore, Slovenia had never been of interest to the partisans of Greater Serbia as there was no native Serb population in Slovenia. Thus, unlike Croats, Slovenes were not threatened by the Serbian nationalism's project for Greater Serbia. Moreover, Slovenes, who were left to administer themselves with little interference from Belgrade, won much local autonomy than Croats in the Kingdom.

Therefore, the strongest opposition against the Serbian nationalism and domination in the political life, and against the centralization of the state came from Croats. The most important representative of the Croat side in the interwar period was the Croat Peasant Party under leadership of Stjepan Radic.

Against the Vidovdan Constitution and the Serbian political hegemony, the CPP and its leader Radic strove for Croatian independence, that, if successful, would led to the dismemberment from the Kingdom. Radic intensified his activity both abroad and in Yugoslavia, and tried to gain the support of the international community. He solicited help from the USA and France. In August 1922, he submitted a memorandum to the League of Nations asking the League to recognize the Neutral Peasant Republic of Croatia, that had been proclaimed by the CPP in Zagrep on 8 December 1920.

However, in March 1923, Radic and his party changed their position within the Kingdom and the CPP took part in the national election. In the elections of March 1923, of the 313 seats available, the CPP won 70 seats, the SRP 108, the SDP 51, the SPP 24 and the YMO 18. Remaining seats were won by other small parties.⁴¹ The YCP could not participated the elections because of the ban of December 1920 which had outlawed activities of the YCP and the Trade Union.

After the elections, Radic negotiated with the SPP, the YMO and the SDP in order to establish a coalition government; but this attempt failed. Pasic and Pribicevic

⁴¹ See for the results of the 1923, 1925 and 1927 elections Lampe, op. cit., p. 135.

came to agreement and formed the coalition government that was called as *P-P Regime* or the *National Bloc* between March 1923-July 1924. In August 1924, new cabinet was formed by Davidovic, the leader of the SDP, including four Slovenes from the SPP and three Bosniaks from the YMO. Although the Davidovic government offered four place for the CPP, Radic did not accept it; and consequently, the CPP did not take place within the Davidovic government. King Aleksander dismissed the Davidovic government and the second P-P Regime (or the second National Bloc) was formed by Pasic and Pribicevic in November 1924.

After the elections of March 1923, the CPP's political strategy involved six main principles: (1) Recognition of the Karadjordjevic dynasty as symbol of the Yugoslav union. (2) A Croatian constitution that would provide for legislative power in the territory of Croatia (Croatia-Slavonia-Dalmatia). (3) Croatian membership in the League of Nations. (4) Foreign affairs, trade and defense to be administered in common, but the organization and use of the national army in Croatia to be decided by the Croatian parliament. (5) Autonomy for Slovenia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Vojvodina – similar to Croatia. (6) All legislative authority in Croatia would belong to the Croatian parliament with executive power to be in the hands of a *Ban* (governor) selected by the Croatian parliament to whom alone he would be responsible.⁴²

In July 1923, Radic, again, left the country in attempt to attract foreign support for his political strategy involving the six principles. During his travels he visited the Soviet Union in the summer of 1924, when the fifth congress of the Comintern was in session. In Moscow, he arranged for affiliation of the CPP with the Communist Peasant International that was connected with the Comintern. Also, Radic and his party struggled for the recognition of the Soviet Union by Yugoslav.

In August 1924, Radic returned the country and started an active policy against the Belgrade regime that was led by the Davidovic government. Mass meetings were held, and the Davidovic government was strongly attacked. When the second P-P Regime was formed, the government decided to enforce firm measures against the CPP. In December, the CPP was outlawed and, Radic and Vladko Macek, the second man of the party, went

⁴² Vuckovic, op. cit., p. 88.

to jail by the Law for the Defense of the State.

Thus, the CPP could not participate the elections of February 1925; however, the members of the CPP could participate the elections, and they won 67 seats of the total 315 seats in the parliament. In this election, the SRP won 143 seats, the SDP 37, the SPP 21 and the YMO 15.

Soon thereafter, in March 1925, Pavle Radic, the nephew of the Radic, announced that his uncle would accept the constitution and work within the political system. Thanks to this announcement, the CPP's leaders, including Radic and Macek, left prison and their delegates took seats in the parliament. In July 1925, Radic and Pasic formed the coalition government that was called as *the R-R (Radic-Radical) Government*. In this coalition government, four representatives of the CPP received places in the ministry, with Radic holding the post of minister of education. So, Radic came to Belgrade as minister of education, the post so long held by Pribicevic. Zagreb University professors who had been dismissed by Pribicevic were reinstated by Radic. Radic placed great emphasis on the importance of primary and vocational education in the rural areas. Also, he struggled for teaching Croatian history, culture and language rather than Yugoslav history, culture and language.

However, this cooperation did not live long time; by April 1926, Radic had withdrawn from the government. Then, prime minister Pasic was forced to resign in February 1926 because of charges of corruption made against his son.⁴³ After the resignation, Radic was able to remain as minister of education in the new Radical - Radic cabinet formed by Nikola Uzunovic, the new president of the SRP. However, by February 1927, the cooperation between the SRP and the CPP had completely broken down. Elections followed in September 1927. Of the 315 seats available, the SRP won 112 seats, the SDP 61, the CPP 61, the SPP 21 and the YMO 17 seats.

At this time, another important political struggle and conflict emerged in the camp of the SDP, when Pribicevic broke with Davidovic and switched to federalist position and began to support a federal rearrangement of the state, while Dovidovic refused a decentralizing revision of the Vidovdan constitution. Hence, the Serbian democrats was

⁴³ Nikola Pasic, who led ten cabinet between January 1921 and April 1926, died in December 1926.

divided into two camps: the centralist Democrats led by Davidovic and the federalist Democrats led by Pribicevic. The federalist Democrats had 22 seats, while the centralist Democrats had 61 seats in the parliament after the 1927 elections.

Thereafter the elections, the SRP formed the government on the support of the centralist Democrats and the YMO. The opposition was composed of the Radic's CPP and the Pribicevic's federalist Democrats. The two leaders agreed to form an opposition coalition, calling it a *Democratic Bloc*, against the SRP government led by Uzunovic. On 10 November 1927, Radic and Pribicevic concluded an agreement establishing *the Peasant-Democratic Coalition*.

The obstructive behavior of the Democratic Bloc led to parliamentary paralysis and resignation of the Uzunovic cabinet in February 1928. For the first time, Radic got a chance to form a cabinet on his own. When King Aleksander offered him this opportunity, he accepted the offer, but his efforts to form a new cabinet were not successful since he was not able to come to an agreement with the SRP, that refused to enter his cabinet.

As a result of parliamentary paralysis, both Radic and Pribicevic, as leaders of the Democratic Bloc, shifted their activity from parliament to streets and public audience with mass meetings. They rose the issue of constitutional revision. In the meeting of Dubrovnik in May 1923, Radic stated that the country would be divided into four or five large regions, each with considerable powers of self-government. He again threatened to pull his representatives out of the Parliament in Belgrade. Also, externally, the Democratic Bloc tried for support in Western Europe on the constitutional revision issue, but they could not attract any support from Western Europe.

In June 1928, it became almost impossible to keep the Parliament in order. Bitter conflicts between the SRP and the Democratic Bloc upset order in the Parliament. Finally, on 20 June 1928, Punisa Racic, a the SRP representative from Montenegro, shot five the CPP representatives, including Stjepan Radic, during a session of the Parliament. Two men, one of whom was Pavle Radic, died at once and Stjepan Radic was wounded. The Croatian leader at first appeared to recover, but finally died in August 8 from the effect of the wound. Punisa Racic was sentenced to 20 years in jail.

After the assassination, the Korosec cabinet was formed on 27 July 1928 and continued until 6 January 1929. Anton Korosec, the leader of the SPP, became the first and only non-Serb prime minister of the first Yugoslavia. As a consequence of the assassination, the Democratic Bloc moved their headquarters from Belgrade to Zagreb and announced that they would no longer participate in the work of the Parliament. They demanded the dissolution of the Parliament and a revision of the Constitution.

In order to overcome the crisis, King Aleksander offered Vladko Macek (Radic's successor) and Pribicevic to form cabinet if they were willing to work with other political parties. They rejected the offer and favored a prior change in the political system that would alter the unitary character of the state. In addition, Macek asked for reestablishment of the old historical regions with their own parliaments and executive power. He favored the formation of seven autonomous units: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Vojvodina.

However, these demands of Macek and Pribicevic did not accept by the King since, according to him, a rearrangement of the state on the federal basis would damaged Serbs severely. King Aleksander believed that it would be better to establish a small but a homogenous Serbian state than a federal rearrangement of the Kingdom because, according to his view, Serbs would be more secure in a small homogenous Serbian state than in a federal Yugoslavia.⁴⁴ For this reason, King Aleksander extremely refused the proposition of the Democratic Bloc which proposed the formation of autonomous units within the Kingdom according to the old historical borders.

On 1 December 1928, on the tenth anniversary of the foundation of the Kingdom, student protests in Zagreb turned into riots. A dozen students were killed when police broke up them. Prime minister Anton Korosec replaced Zagreb's provincial prefect with a Serbian army general without the Parliament's approval. King Aleksander and the Korosec cabinet could not be able to put the country in order. And finally, the King seized full power, abolished parliament and suspended the Vidovdan constitution on 6 January 1929. This royal coup, a few months later, in October 1929, changed the official name of the first Yugoslavia from "*the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes*" to "*the*

⁴⁴ See Judah, op. cit., p. 109-110.

Kingdom of Yugoslavia" and ended the parliamentary regime in Yugoslavia.⁴⁵

The first Yugoslavia was founded as a parliamentary kingdom; however, the parliamentary regime collapsed as a result of the royal coup on 6 January 1929. Parliamentary democracy became failure not only in Yugoslavia but also in the other Balkan countries in the interwar period.

According to Wolfgang Höpken, there were six reasons for the failure of the parliamentary democracy in the interwar Balkan countries, including Yugoslavia: (1) Prevailing "pre-bourgeoisie" social relations and widespread traditional mentality. (2) Insufficient regional and national integration. (3) The problems of economic backwardness. (4) Absence of any social group or strata which could be identified as a representative of democratic culture such as bourgeoisie, working class, liberal democratic political elite or liberal democratic intelligentsia. (5) Dominance of 'personalized social and political relations' and weakness of 'regulated and institutionalized relations'. (6) Finally, the problems of international and regional instability, which derived from the great power interests and from nationalist aspirations and antagonisms among the Balkan states.⁴⁶

In addition to these reasons, two other reasons which were peculiar to Yugoslavia should be taken into account in order to explain and understand the failure of parliamentary democracy in the First Yugoslavia:

1) The foundation of the first Yugoslavia was a unification of Yugoslav peoples (Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Bosniaks, Macedonians, Montenegrins). But this foundation was a product of negotiation among the political leadership rather than of the will of the peoples expressed through some social and political struggles and a plebiscite. In other words, the elitist negotiation and bargaining, but not Yugoslav peoples' negotiations and struggles, between 1914-1918 created the first Yugoslavia. Also, after the foundation, the peoples did not take place and play influential role in the Yugoslav politics; and therefore, the Yugoslav politics was determined by the elite. This political and social condition which excluded the peoples from political sphere both created the legitimacy problem for

⁴⁵ Hoffman & Neal, op. cit., p. 60.

⁴⁶ See Höpken, Wolfgang, "Political Culture in the Balkan States During the Interwar Period", in Günay Göksu Özdoğan & Kemali Saybaşılı (eds.), *Balkans. A Mirror of the New International Order*, Istanbul: İren Yayıncılık, 1994, pp. 86-96.

the regime⁴⁷ and hindered the development of Yugoslav parliamentary democracy in the interwar period.

2) In this condition, the fatal stroke came from the Serbo-Croat conflict which at first paralyzed and then killed the parliamentary democracy. The understanding and cooperation between Serb and Croat sides played a determinative role in the foundation of the first Yugoslavia as a parliamentary Kingdom. But also, the Serbo-Croat conflict, which has determined highly the Yugoslav politics since the foundation, brought an end to parliamentary democracy in the interwar Yugoslavia.

II. 3. Authoritarian Kingdom (1929-1939)

Thereafter the coup, King Aleksander disbanded the Korosec cabinet and appointed his closest military advisor General Peter Zivkovic, a extreme Serb nationalist, as prime minister. The only non-Serb of the cabinet was Anton Korosec. King Aleksander and the Zivkovic cabinet took bitter measures and enforced oppressive policies in order to protect the centralizing structure of the state and the Serbian political domination in the state.

The country was governed without constitution by the King decrees between January 1929 – September 1931. Initial decree assigned dictatorial power to the King. In the absence of parliament and constitution, the decrees and King's directives received the force of power. These decrees and directives disbanded all political parties and organizations such as trade union, and their properties were confiscated.

The guarantees on civil liberties disappeared. Nearly one-third of the country's newspapers and journals were closed down, and the others were placed under strict censorship supported by a new press law. Six different Serbian legal codes from the pre-1914 period were adopted. Common textbooks were prepared in order to create a single system of public education.

King Aleksander became command of the army and the state, and chose all the high officials of the state. On 21 January, the King appointed a Supreme Legislative Council, attached to the Ministry of Justice. Every bill had to be reviewed by this body

⁴⁷ Gligorov, Vladimir, *Why Do Countries Break Up? The Case of Yugoslavia*, Göteborg: Graphic System AB, 1994, p. 58.

before it could become law. Also, a Presidency of the Council of Ministers was established, which exercised supervision over the administrative, legislative and financial operations of the government departments. On the other hand, the Municipal Councils were appointed by the prefect (*nacelnik*) of the district who were appointed by the King.⁴⁸

Also, the country's 33 administrative districts were reduced to 9 *Banovinas* (Savska, Dunavska, Vardarska, Drinska, Moravska, Dravska, Vrbaska, Zetska and Primorska) which were governed by *Bans*. The boundaries of Banovinas were drawn with the intention of weakening or destroying traditional loyalties. The boundaries of the Banovinas followed natural boundaries of rivers and mountain ridges rather than traditional historical lines. The Banovinas were given the names of rivers and other geographic features; ethnic, cultural and linguistic differences and features were not taken into account. They were placed under a strong centralized control and were allowed no local autonomous rights. This action was justified as an attempt to create a feeling of supranational, or Yugoslav, unity. In fact, these measures served to enhance Serbian dominance. The boundaries of the Banovinas were gerrymandered so that Serbs formed a majority in six, Croats in two, Slovenes in one, and Bosniaks in none.⁴⁹

Furthermore, the principal offices in the state continued to be held by Serbs from Serbia. From 1929 to 1941, Yugoslavia had 7 prime ministers and 15 cabinets in which 121 ministers served (who all received a ministerial pension after one year's service). Of the 121 ministers, 73 were Serbs, 33 Croats, 10 Slovenes and 5 Bosniaks.⁵⁰ That is, Bosniaks were allotted the lowest position, whereas the Croats remained inadequately represented.

A lot of politicians and intellectuals who were against the royal dictatorship were arrested. Also, in order to escape the repressive regime, many political leader emigrated. For example, Pribicevic, leader of the federalist Democrats, was first imprisoned and then emigrated to Czechoslovakia, where he died in 1936.

⁴⁸ See Hondius, *op. cit.*, p. 105 and Klemencic & Zagar, *op. cit.*, pp. 116-117.

⁴⁹ See Jambreč, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

⁵⁰ Auty, *op. cit.*, pp. 75-76.

Another important political figure, lawyer Ante Pavelic, who was a former leader of the Croatian Party of Rights, left the country for Italy in January 1929. He organized the *Ustasha – Hrvatska Revolucionarna Organizacija* (Insurrection – Croatian Revolutionary Organization) in Italy. According to Ivo Banac, the Ustasha movement was a product of Aleksander's oppressive policies because the royal dictatorship solved nothing, but helped the improvement of radical Croatian nationalism, and therefore, in his words, "*engendered several insurrectionary movements, most notably the Ustasha of Ante Pavelic*".⁵¹

Ante Pavelic and the Ustasha Party aimed to found an independent Croatian state through the aid of Mussolini and then Hitler, if necessary by means of violence. This movement cooperated with IMRO, which was aided by Bulgaria and aimed to overthrow Serbian dominance in Macedonia. Pavelic and his organization were supported by the Mussolini regime, Bulgaria and Hungary. They financed and equipped the Ustasha. Also, the Ustasha was allowed to establish training camps in these countries.⁵² This radical nationalist organization became an affective actor in the Yugoslav politics not only in the interwar period but also in the period of World War II.

Not only in Croatia but also in Serbia fascist political groups emerged in the period of royal dictatorship. The most important one of them was the Yugoslav National Movement, known as *Zbor* (Rally) Party. It was organized under the leadership of Dimitrije Ljotic. It was strongly centralist and Serbian-nationalistic in ideology, and its goal was the establishment of a corporate regime similar to that in Italy. The Zbor Party also had a youth organization known as White Eagle.⁵³

The royal oppressive regime, without constitution and parliament, frustrated public opinion and led to development of opposition against the King. Increasing opposition forced King Aleksander to issue the second constitution of the state in September 1931, that was little more than a cover for the dictatorship.

The new constitution established a bicameral legislature involving the National Assembly (*Skupstina*) and a Senate (*Senat*). According to the very restrictive electoral

⁵¹ Banac, Ivo, "Nationalism In Serbia", in Özdoğan & Saybaşıltı (eds.), op. cit., p.143

⁵² Lampe, op. cit., pp. 171-173.

⁵³ Jelavic, op. cit., p. 202.

law, the National Assembly of 306 (eventually 373) members was to be elected by open ballot from country-wide lists. Candidates needed 60 signatures from more than 300 of the electoral districts plus 200 signatures from their own districts to run in elections. Also, the list winning a plurality would receive two-thirds of the seats. The National Assembly could propose measures and express its opposition to them, but it did not have power to legislate independently.

On the other hand, the Senate of 98 members was to be equally divided between royal appointees and nominees from the banovian councils under indirect control. The king could in any case arbitrate between the National Assembly and the Senate or exercise a preemptive veto. The National Assembly and the Senate together formed the National Representation (*Narodno Predstavništvo*).⁵⁴

Also, the Constitution of 1931, prohibited political associations, societies, and parties which had religious, ethnic, or regional character, or aims which were against national unity, state integrity, and existing social order (Article XII of the Law on Associations, Assemblies, and Agreements). Therefore, only the single government party – the United Radical Peasant Democracy – was officially recognized. Like the Zivkovic government, it stood for a unitary national state. The party also promised to improve the peasant's lot. In 1932 the party's name was changed to the Yugoslav Peasant Radical Democratic Party, and then, in 1933, to the Yugoslav National Party (the YNP). The leadership core of the YNP was made up former the SRP.⁵⁵

The first election after the royal coup held on 8 November 1931. Large numbers in non-Serb areas abstained from the November elections to the regime's restricted National Assembly in order to protest the royal dictatorship and the electoral law. The regime claimed that 65 percent of all those eligible had voted, and 35 percent in Croatia, where the CPP was denied the right to run a lot of candidates because of the 300-district requirement.

In the elections, Serbs won 219 of the 306 seats, Croats 55, Slovenes 25, Bosniaks 3, Macedonian 2, Montenegrin 2, Germans 1 and Hungarians 1. According to

⁵⁴ See Hondius, *op. cit.*, p. 105 and Lampe, *op. cit.*, pp. 166-167.

⁵⁵ Vucinich, *op. cit.*, p. 20, 27.

this results, Serbs won 71 percent of the seats, that was higher than the 49 and 58 percent shares for the 1923 and 1927 elections.⁵⁶

In March 1932, King Aleksander abandoned the Zivkovic government and chose Milan Srskic as prime minister. The Srskic government faced with two important issue: (1)the strong opposition against the royal coup and dictatorship, and (2)the economic problems that had resulted from the 1929 Great Depression.

On November 1932, in Zagreb, the Peasant-Democratic Coalition (PDC), that had been formed by Radic and Pribicevic in 1927, drafted a resolution which proclaimed (a) the people were the sole source of political power; (b) the peasantry should be the foundation of organized public life; (c) Serbian hegemony had been imposed on non-Serb areas and strengthened by the absolutist regime of 6 January 1929; (d) in order to overthrow Serbian hegemony it was necessary to return to the situation of 1918, that is, prior to unification; and (e) a new organization of the state, based on agreement among all of the peoples of the state, was needed.⁵⁷

In December, the SPP followed with a resolution similar to that from Zagreb because Korosec lost his position in government after the fall of the Zivkovic cabinet. Also, the YMO associated with the PDC in January 1933, and adapted a resolution since the royal dictatorship had cut Bosnia-Herzegovina into parts, that is, had not protected its historical borders.

The three resolutions elicited two responses from the regime that was controlled by King Aleksander and the Srskic cabinet: First, it conceded a looser electoral law, requiring only 30 signatures from half of the electoral districts in order to participate in elections for the National Assembly. The winning list would then receive only three-fifths of the total seats. Secondly, the regime invoked the Law for the Protection of the State and ordered the arrest of Macek, Trumbic, Korosec and the three Bosniak leaders in April 1933.

It should be pointed that the opposition against the royal dictatorship did not come from only non-Serb peoples but also some Serbian oppositions were formed. For

⁵⁶ See for the results of the 1931, 1935 and 1938 elections Lampe, *op.cit.*, p. 177.

⁵⁷ Vuckovic, *op. cit.*, p. 94.

example, the students demonstrations of 1931-32 were organized by Belgrade University student. The students protested the royal regime and demanded the freedom of the people and a federal system. Also, in Belgrade University, roughly 75 percent of the students opposed the Serbian conservative and nationalist politicians, parties and the Orthodox Church. Serbian students actively sought a new political direction and moved increasingly toward the YCP.⁵⁸

Also, the Serbian Independent Democrats under Pribicevic, the Serbian Agrarian Party under Javon Jovanovic and the Serbian Republican Party opposed the royal coup and the royal dictatorship. These Serbian parties established a Serbian opposition bloc, known as *Serbia's United Opposition of Democrats, Agrarians and Republicans*, against King Aleksander and the Srskic government. They were against the centralization of the state and favored reorganization of the state on the federal basis.

Another issue of the Srskic government was economic problems that had been created by the 1929 Great Economic Depression. The sharp drop in international agricultural prices and the drying up of Western capital markets hit all the small agricultural economies of the Eastern Europe.

Yugoslavia was one of the countries which were damaged dramatically by the Great Depression. Yugoslav economy deteriorated and life standard of people dropped sharply after the Depression. Especially, peasants impoverished dramatically because of sharp drop in international agricultural prices and in exportation of agricultural products. Purchasing power of peasants declined 44 percent between 1929-1933 because of the 1929 economic crisis.⁵⁹

This economic deterioration of the Yugoslav economy derived from a sharp decrease in agricultural prices and in exportation. The value of the Yugoslav foreign trade fell in 1932 to 38.7 percent of the 1929 value. Exportation dropped to 3,847 million dinars in 1934 from 7,921 million dinars in 1929. Export prices decreased 48.3 percent and domestic prices 37.8 percent between 1929-1934. Especially, the decrease was very sharp in the wholesale price of agricultural products. The wholesale price indices of

⁵⁸ See Lampe, op. cit., pp. 188-189.

⁵⁹ Castellan, op. cit., p. 432.

agricultural products fell from 100.0 in 1926 and 118.6 in 1929 to 89.3 in 1930, 74.3 in 1931, 67.5 in 1932, and 57.2 in 1933. Also, there was a decrease in bank assets: assets of the National Bank dropped to 6,832 million dinars in 1934 from 9.958 million dinars in 1929, and assets of commercial banks to 13,333 million from 18,419 million.⁶⁰ Naturally, this decline in the assets of Yugoslav banks affected negatively Yugoslav industry and agriculture since it became very difficult to finance industrial and agricultural investments between 1929-1934.

This economic crisis influenced the Srskc government negatively and fed opposition because peasants, who constituted 70 percent of the population, accused the government for their impoverishment and supported the opposition. Especially, the YCP benefited from the economic crisis and the impoverishment of the peasants as Yugoslav peasantry began to support the YCP increasingly after the crisis. That is, discontented and poor peasantry fed and contributed the YCP in Yugoslavia where the working class was petty.⁶¹

While the Srskc government was trying to overcome both the opposition and the economic crisis, the assassination of King Aleksander shocked not only the government but also the Yugoslav politics as a whole. The first attempt for assassination was organized in Zagreb when Aleksander visited Zagreb. But the first attempt failed. The second attempt was organized in Marseilles on 9 October 1934 when Aleksander visited the city to meet with French Foreign Minister Louis Barthou. The King and L. Barthou were shot and killed in this assassination. The assassination was arranged by a collaboration of the Ustasha and the VMRO, that was supported by Bulgaria. Also, Italian and Hungarian governments were be involved in the assassination.⁶²

After the assassination, Aleksander was succeeded by his son, Peter II, who was only eleven years old. A regency was thus established by Aleksander's cousin, Prince Paul. Prince Paul was to fulfill royal obligations until Peter II reached his eighteenth birthday and became the King of Yugoslavia in September 1941. Prince Paul disbanded

⁶⁰ See Lampe & Jackson, op. cit., pp. 462, 471-472, 477 and Stavrianos, op. cit., p. 683.

⁶¹ Bertsch, Gary K. & Zaninovich, M. George, "The Yugoslav Setting", in Gary K. Bertsch & Thomas W. Ganschow (eds.), *Comparative Communism: the Soviet, Chinese and Yugoslav Models*, San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Company, 1976, p. 69.

⁶² Hoffman & Neal, op. cit., p. 62.

the Srskić cabinet and chose Bogoljub Jevtić, the former foreign minister, as prime minister in December 1934.

The main task of Prince Paul and the Jevtić cabinet was to keep the state together until Peter's majority to become king. Moreover, criticism of the dictatorial policies had grown to such a degree that some relaxation was necessary. Macek, Trumbić and Korosec were released. There was less police supervision and censorship. The constitution, however, was kept despite the opposition's willingness for revision of the constitution. Within these limitations, the political parties were able to resume some of their activities.⁶³

The new elections were held in May 1935. In the elections, the Jevtić list (the YNP list) won 60.6 percent and the PDC 37.4 percent of the votes. With support from Croatian Serbs and Bosniaks, the PDC list won eighty of every thirteen votes in Croatia and the western districts of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Although the Jevtić list won 303 seats of the 373 seats in the Parliament, he was discredited for Prince Paul. So, Prince Paul assigned Milan Stojadinović, former Finance Minister, as prime minister in June 1935.

According to Stojadinović, the strong opposition and the economic problems caused the fall of Živković, Srskić and Jevtić cabinets. For this reason, the Stojadinović government's main task involved two goals: First, to attract public opinion and to weaken the opposition; and secondly, to overcome the economic crisis and to solve economic problems.

With aim of attracting support from the public opinion, the Stojadinović government relaxed censorship and restrictions on the Parliament, and granted amnesty to over one thousand political prisoners.

Also, in order to appease Croatian opinion, the government signed a concordat with the Vatican in 1937. This concordat defined the privileges of the Catholic church in Yugoslavia and placed it on a footing of equality with the Orthodox church. This agreement welcomed by Catholic Croat clerics, while Orthodox Serb hierarchy opposed extremely the concordat. According to Serb clergy, the concordat provide superior

⁶³ Jelavić, *op. cit.*, p. 202.

privileges and position for Croat Catholic church against the Serbian Orthodox church, and for this reason, they maintained that the concordat would be suspended and such privileges would be withdrawn.

Stojadinovic hoped to attract the Croatian public opinion and political leaders with the concordat. However, many Croatian politician and intellectual interpreted the concordat as an attempt to drive a wedge between the Croat peasants and their Croat clergy, and so, to break the political unity of Croat people. Macek announced that the Croatians were interested in political rather than religious reform; and therefore, the CPP did not welcomed the concordat. The lack of interest in Croatia, together with the furious opposition in Serbia, led Stojadinovic to announce early in 1938 that he would not attempt to pass the concordat through parliament.⁶⁴

On the other hand, Stojadinovic improved relations with Bosniak and Slovene sides in order to divide and weaken the opposition. For this purpose, the government rewarded Bosniaks with restoration of the 1909 autonomy status for the Bosniaks, that had been revoked in 1931. Furthermore, Stojadinovic brought the leaders of Bosniaks and Slovenes, Mehmed Spaho and Anton Korosec, in the government despite the objection of General Zivkovic who took place in the Stojadinovic government.

More important, in August 1935, Stojadinovic proclaimed the creation of a new government party: *Jugoslovensko Radikalna Zajednica* (the Yugoslav Radical Union-YRU). The YRU, which used a slogan as "one state, one people, one king", consisted of the YNP, the SPP, and the YMO. Its slogan promised wide powers for local administration. As a response to this promise, Spaho and Korosec agreed to be vice-presidents of the YRU. This means that, Spaho and Korosec considered the YRU as a unified body rather than a coalition. General Zivkovic and his followers objected this unification and opposed foundation of the YRU. As a response to this opposition, Stojadinovic expelled the Zivkovic faction from the YRU government in March 1936.⁶⁵

In January 1937, Stojadinovic also offered Macek to join the YRU and five cabinet position, but he refused the offer unless the constitution was open to revise. In Spring 1937, the opposition formed a larger bloc against the YRU in order to hinder the

⁶⁴ See Stavrianos, *op. cit.*, p. 630.

Stojadinovic's plan which aimed to divide and weaken the opposition. The CPP, the federalist Democrats, the SAP, the Serb Republican Party formed the *Bloc of National Agreement* (BNA). The formation of the BNA indicated that the Stojadinovic government and the YRU were not only protested by the CPP and Croats but also by some Serbian parties and politicians who favored rearrangement of the country on the federal basis.

On the economic sphere, Stojadinovic aimed to overcome the economic crisis and to get rid of economic problems. According to his economic view, Yugoslav economy needed new and larger markets for its commodities in order to recover the losses that had resulted from the 1929 Depression. That is, the government planned to increase exportation in order to develop Yugoslav economy and to solve economic problems. Secondly, he planned to attract foreign capital as much as possible with aim of financing industrial and agricultural investments. Finally, the Stojadinovic government aimed to increase industrial investments.

For this purpose, the government improved economic relations and foreign trade with Germany, which has ruled by the Hitler's fascist regime since 1933. Germany offered Yugoslavia prices above those of the world market for grain and other agricultural products, and was willing to buy as much as Yugoslav could produce. The German share in Yugoslav exportation jumped to 42 percent in 1938 from 32.4 percent in 1935 when the Stojadinovic government was established. The rate of imports from Germany in the Yugoslav importation climbed to 39.4 percent from 28.1 percent in the same period.⁶⁶

In addition to this, the German share of Yugoslav foreign investment capital has increased sharply since 1935. Both domestic and foreign capital invested in industry rather than agriculture with aim of improving Yugoslav industrial. As a result of the increase in industrial investments, rise in real manufacturing output averaged 10.7 percent a year for 1936-39.⁶⁷

This rise derived more from the newer metallurgical and chemical production of

⁶⁵ See Vuchinich, op. cit., pp. 23, 26-27.

⁶⁶ Lampe & Jackson, op. cit., p. 460.

⁶⁷ See *ibid.*, p. 484.

Serbia and Bosnia than from the older Croatian enterprises since the new industrial investments were concentrated in Serbia and Bosnia, but not in Croatia. This situation, unquestionably, frustrated and annoyed Croat side.

The increasing economic relations with Germany also led to increasing fascist German impact in the Yugoslav politics. In Yugoslavia, the number of politicians who admired Hitler and his fascist regime has increased dramatically since 1935 as a consequence of increasing economic relations. Especially, Stojadinovic was a extreme admirer of Hitler. He expressed admiration for Hitler as a political leader and propagandist. He also appreciated the Nazis' anti-Communist policies. Furthermore, Stojadinovic government and other some Yugoslav politicians were attracted greatly by the rapid development of German economy and Nazis' economic policies. That is, after the formation of the Stojadinovic government, German impact in Yugoslav politics rose sharply.

The third election after the royal coup held in December 1938. In this election, the YRU won 54 percent of the votes and the BNA 45 percent. 650,000 Serbs voted for the the BNA that received over two-thirds of the votes in Croatia. By 1938 the YRU's rate of votes had fallen to 14 percent in Croatian Savska banovina and to 40 percent in all Yugoslavia.⁶⁸

After the elections, in January 1939, the Croatian representatives agreed with Macek to assemble in Zagreb instead of coming to the new Parliament in Belgrade. Also, the Croat representatives and Macek adopted a resolution urging the Great Powers to intervene in Yugoslavia to assure the Croats' liberty.⁶⁹

By January 1939, like public opinion, Prince Paul had lost confidence in Milan Stojadinovic's ability to resolve economic problems and the impasse with Macek and his part: First of all, the Stojadinovic's economic policy could not be successful enough for solution of the severe economic problems of the Yugoslav economy. For example, the Yugoslav exportation increased only to 5,047 million dinars in 1938 from 4,028 million dinars in 1935 in spite of a sharp rise in economic relations with Germany.⁷⁰ In the same

⁶⁸ See Judah, *op. cit.*, p. 111 and Lampe, *op. cit.*, p. 177.

⁶⁹ Vuckovic, *op. cit.*, p. 96.

⁷⁰ Lampe & Jackson, *op. cit.*, p. 462.

year, the per capita national income was estimated at between 60 and 70 dollars.⁷¹

Secondly, the Stojadinovic government could not solve problems with the CPP and the Serbian opposition; and consequently, the firm conflict between the regime, led by Prince Paul and the YRU, and the opposition, led by the BNA, could not be softened.

In addition to these, increasing economic relations with the German fascism and German impact in the Yugoslav political life worried Prince Paul. Stojadinovic's gamble on the greater German market resulted in a German economic domination over the Yugoslav economy. For example, in March 1939, Germany took more than 50 percent of Yugoslav export and supplied about 50 percent of Yugoslav imports.⁷² Yugoslavia came more completely under the German economic domination with the outbreak of World War II in September 1939.

Because of these three reasons, Prince Paul chose Dragisa Cvetkovic, former minister of social welfare and then head of workers' union, as prime minister; and in February 1939, he formed the last cabinet of the first Yugoslavia in the eve of the Second World War.

The Cvetkovic government firstly aimed to solve impasse with the CPP. Both the regime, that was now led by Prince Paul and Cvetkovic, and the CPP led by Macek hurried to reach some agreement. Macek and his party worried about the Ustasha, which flirted with Italian and German fascist regimes, because the support for Ustasha in Croatia has risen since the assassination of Aleksander in 1934. This assassination increased popularity and attractiveness of the Ustasha in Croatia. Also, economic problems of Croatian peasants forced them to sought alternatives in political sphere. The Ustasha was an radical alternative for poor Croatian peasantry.

On the other hand, Prince Paul and the Cvetkovic cabinet worried about Serbian fascist groups such as Zbor Party which flirted with Italy and Germany. These groups improved and strengthened highly on the eve of Word War II. Their improvement frightened and threatened Prince Paul and the Cvetkovic cabinet.

⁷¹ Plestina, Dijana, "From Democratic Centralism to Decentralized Democracy. Trials and Tribulations of Yugoslav's Development", in John B. Allcock, John J. Horton, Marko Millivojevic (eds.), *Yugoslavia in Transition: Choices and Constrains*, New York: Berg Publishers, 1992, p. 128.

⁷² Stavrianos, op. cit., p. 639.

But the fieriest threat for Prince and Cvetkovic came from German and Italian fascism because of their aggressive and imperialist foreign policy. Especially, the occupation of Austria by Germany in March 1938, the occupation of Albania by Italy in April 1939 generated fear and some severe questions about the future of Yugoslavia. Also, in the Munich Conference, which was organized in September 1938, England and France accepted and recognized the German annexation of Czechoslovakia's Sudets Region. Finally, on 14-15 March 1939, Czechoslovakia was absorbed by Hitler's Germany. The Munich Agreement among Germany, England and France, the *appeasement policy* of English government and finally the German occupation of Czechoslovakia demonstrated that the Western allies could not be relied on to prevent Germany and Italy from exploiting the national controversies.⁷³

These fears of the both sides elicited negotiations between Cvetkovic and Macek in April 1939. Finally, Cvetkovic and Macek came to terms on 20 August 1939, less than two weeks before German attack on Poland and the outbreak of World War II on 1 September.

In the *Sporazum* (Understanding) of August 1939, Cvetkovic and Macek came to understanding to give Croatia an autonomous position within the state. Its lands included Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia and some Bosnian territory that was inhabited by Croats. The autonomous region had a population of 4.5 million, of which 866,000 were Serb and 168,000 Bosniaks. It was thus 77 percent of Croatian in nationality. Autonomous Croatia controlled about 30 percent of the population and territory of the entire country. It had its own assembly (*Sabor*) and its chief executive officer (*Ban*), who was appointed by the king but responsible to the Sabor. Croatia was linked to Belgrade for foreign affairs, defense, transportation and communications, but was self-governing in almost all other matters such as budgetary and internal affairs. Also, the CPP joined the government. Macek became vice-premier of Yugoslavia, and three Croats from the CPP entered the ministry. Also, two federalist democrats (Serbian Independent Democrats) entered the Cvetkovic cabinet. Ivan Subasic, a Croat who had served with the Serbian army at the

⁷³ See Sander, Oral, *Siyasi Tarih, 1918-1994*, Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 2001, pp. 49-50.

Salonika Front in the First World War, was appointed as Ban of Croatia.⁷⁴

Opposition to the Sporazum spread from Serbs and Bosniaks who inhabited in the new autonomous Croatia. The YMO protested the agreement which gave some Bosnian territory, where Croats and Bosniaks lived together, to the autonomous Croatia. As a result of the Sporazum, 168,000 Bosniaks were separated from Bosnia-Herzegovina and given to the Croatian control. This figure constituted 13 percent of the Bosniak population in Bosnia-Herzegovina and 3 percent of the population in the autonomous Croatia.

Also, similar complaint came from Serbs and Serbia. 866,000 Serbs were separated from Serbia and given to the Croatian administration by the Sporazum. For this reason, Serbian Orthodox Church, the SDP led by Milan Grol, Zbor (Rally) Party under Dimitrijević Ljotić, and Serbian Cultural Club, founded by respective lawyer and historian Slobodan Jovanović in 1937, opposed extremely the Sporazum.

Another opposition to the Sporazum came from the Ustasha led by Ante Pavelić. Although the Sporazum created an autonomous Croatia and brought Croats in the coalition government, Pavelić and the Ustasha were against this agreement because the main aim of Ustasha was not to obtain autonomous status for Croatia but to create an independent Greater Croatia which would involve Croatia, Dalmatia, Slavonija and Bosnia-Herzegovina. For this reason, the Ustasha did not support the Cvetković-Macek agreement. However, this organization benefited from the Sporazum since this agreement allowed Ustasha members to return from Italy and to recruit new supporters at Zagreb, Mostar, Travnik, Gospić, Vukovar, and Split. The Ustasha had nearly 2,000 members when the Sporazum was signed.⁷⁵

II. 4. The Yugoslav Communist Party in the Interwar Period and the Yugoslav National Question

In the interwar period, working class was petty in the Balkan countries because of the underdeveloped capitalism and prevailing pre-capitalist economic and social relations.

⁷⁴ See Wolff, op. cit. pp. 125-126 and Jelavić, op. cit., pp. 203-204.

⁷⁵ See for the oppositions to the Sporazum Bora, Tanıl, *Bosna-Hersek: Yeni Dünya Düzeninin Av Sahası*, İstanbul: Birikim Yayınları, 1994, pp. 38-39 and Lampe, op. cit., pp. 192-194.

Except for the petroleum industry in Romania, and for railroad workers and printers in all the countries, there was very little class-consciousness among the Balkan workers. In the absence of strong industrial working class, the prevalence of peasant discontent and the widespread popularity of Russia helped the growth of Communist movements in the interwar Balkan countries.⁷⁶

Similar to the other Balkan communist movements, the Yugoslav communist movements and organizations were not organized by proletariat but by communist intellectuals and, in the words of Lenin, by “*professional revolutionaries*”. Also, the Yugoslav communist movement and left parties depended on peasantry rather than proletariat for there was not a strong and large working class.

The ancestors of the Yugoslav Communist Party were the Croatian, Slovenian and Serbian Social Democratic Parties. But also, the Social Democratic Parties of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Vojvodina contributed the foundation of the Yugoslav Communist Party. These social democratic parties assembled on 20-23 April 1919 in Belgrade and established a joint party: *the United Workers' Party*. Resolutions were passed that accepted the Marxist interpretation of socialism and called for extension of the party's activities among the workers and peasants of Yugoslavia. The second congress was held at Vukovar on 20-25 July 1920 and the party's name was changed to *the Yugoslav Communist Party (YCP)*.⁷⁷ At this time, the party had 60,000 members.⁷⁸

So, the YCP was founded in 1919, a year after the foundation of the first Yugoslavia. That is, the new state and the new revolutionary party were born so closely. This revolutionary party became the first real “Yugoslav party” in the history of Yugoslavia, and Josip Broz Tito became the first real Yugoslav national leader.

The YCP played a major role in the struggle for the unification of Yugoslav peoples; and naturally, the Party debated the national question almost as fiercely as the non-Communist parties of Yugoslavia in the interwar period. These debates about the national question of Yugoslavia were also affected by the Comintern which was led by the USSR under the Stalin regime. Furthermore, the debates about national question was

⁷⁶ Wolff, op. cit., p.108.

⁷⁷ Auty, op. cit., p. 81.

⁷⁸ McFarlane, Bruce, *Yugoslavia: Politics, Economics and Society*, London: Pinter Publishers, 1988, p. 8.

the main factor that resulted in division within party. The division within the YCP occurred as a division between the right wing and left wing. That is to say, the national question which shaped the interwar Yugoslav politics also affected greatly the YCP. However, despite the debates about national question and the division within party, the YCP were able to attract successfully discontent peasantry, workers and the university youth.

Before the foundation of the YCP, its ancestors were very sensitive about national questions. Both Slovenian and Croatian Social Democratic Parties⁷⁹ were attracted by Austrian socialist movement and view about national question, and they sought broad autonomy for Slovenes and Croats within the Austro-Hungarian Empire. In 1908, the Croatian Social Democratic Party drafted a solution of the national question within the Empire "*on the basis of a democratic constitution, according to which each nation would be secured full governing, political and educational freedom.*"⁸⁰ Both Croatian and Slovenian Social Democratic Parties also supported enthusiastically the foundation of Yugoslavia in 1918.

The national policy of the Serbian Social Democratic Party (SSDP)⁸¹ consisted of four principles. Firstly, the party was an internationalist party, derived from the revolutionary teachings of Marxism. It opposed Serbian territorial claims in Macedonia and Albania prior to World War I. Also, the Serbian Social Democrats voted against granting war credits to their government in 1914, that is they were against extremely the First World War.

Secondly, the party, which had protested the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Habsburg Empire in 1908, bitterly attacked the colonial policies of the Habsburg government and urged the Austrian socialists to join in a demand for the self-determination. But this attack could not be successful.

The third principle of the national policy of the SSDP was the idea of Balkan

⁷⁹ The Croatian and Slovenian Social Democratic Parties were founded in 1894 and 1896. (Bora, Tanil, *Yugoslavya: Milliyetçiliğin Provokasyonu*, Istanbul: Birikim Yayınları, 1991, pp. 30)

⁸⁰ Shoup, Paul, *Communism and Yugoslav National Question*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1968, p.15.

⁸¹ The Serbian Social Democratic Party was founded by Svetozar Markovic and Dimitrije Tucovic in 1903. (Bora, op. cit., p. 31)

Federation. This idea did not derive from Karl Marx but from Lenin because Karl Marx had not been interested in the Balkan national question, while Lenin had been interested greatly and drafted a solution for the Balkan national question that supported the creation of a Balkan Federation. In the Congress of Socialist International held in 1912, Lenin addressed that the Balkan socialists should develop cooperation among themselves and struggle for foundation a Balkan Socialist Federation.⁸² The Leninist project for the national question in the Balkans was accepted by the SSDP, and it strove for the foundation Balkan Federation.

In January 1910, the SSDP organized *Socialist Balkan Congress*. Delegates from Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey attended the congress. The congress took decision to struggle for establishment of a *Socialist Balkan Federation*.⁸³

However, Serbian social democrats began seeking other solutions to the national question after the Bulgarian attack on Serbia in 1915. The fourth principle was born at this time: Yugoslav Federation. In 1915, Serbian socialists began to debate the foundation of Yugoslav Federation as an alternative plan against Balkan Federation. At the end of World War II, the SSDP abandoned the idea of Balkan Federation and welcomed the foundation of Yugoslavia in 1918. In November 1918, on the eve of foundation of Yugoslavia, the SSDP adopted the proposition that "*the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes are one nation, for they have one language and identical remaining ethnic characteristics. They feel like one people and desire union...Thanks to national union the proletariat gets a broad field for agitation and organization and a more reliable basis for developing class war and, in the last analysis, for a showdown with its national bourgeoisie.*"⁸⁴

A year after the act of union which created the first Yugoslav state, the YCP was founded by Social Democratic Parties of Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Vojvodina. Although the founders of the YCP had been very sensitive and interested

⁸² See Lenin, V. I., *Imperyalizm: Kapitalizmin En Yüksek Aşaması*, trans. Cemal Süreya, Ankara: Sol Yayınları, 1992, pp. 141-142.

⁸³ Bora, op. cit., p. 32.

⁸⁴ Shoup, op. cit., p. 19.

in the national question, the YCP at first was not enough sensitive and interested in the national question owing to two reasons: (1) After the foundation, the YCP firstly focused its attention on the 1920 elections for the Constituent Assembly. (2) After the elections, the regime, which was dominated by King Aleksander and Serbian nationalist politicians, attacked and outlawed the YCP. Thus, after the elections, the YCP struggled to overcome this attack which aimed to destroy communist movement in Yugoslavia.

The elections for the Constituent Assembly was held on 28 November 1920. Of the sixteen parties that won seats in the 1920 Constituent Assembly, the YCP was the third largest, polling 198,643 votes and electing 59 deputies, 12 percent of the total vote and 13 percent of the deputies. In Macedonia and Montenegro, the YCP won almost two fifths of the votes cast.⁸⁵

Also, before the elections, on 12 April 1920, the railway workers organized a strike which lasted for two weeks, and soon they were followed by the miners. These strikes were supported, and according to the Vesnic provisional government, organized by the YCP. Both the strikes and the success of the YCP in the elections frightened the regime. Therefore, the regime attacked the YCP with aim of destroying communist movement in the country.

On 29 December 1920, the Vesnic provisional government issued the *Obznana* (Decree), which prohibited all Communist political organizations, confiscated Communist newspapers and publications, and provided very drastic measures against Communist activity. In the following months, conflicts between the Pasic government and the YCP increased. In March 1921, a group of party conspirators assassinated Milorad Draskovic, former minister of the interior, for issuing the *Obznana*. Among the organizers were Alija Alijagic and Rodoljub Colakovic. Alijagic was hanged for his part in the assassination, while Colakovic, later a leading Tito partisan and Communist writer, was given a long prison sentence. The government used the assassination as a pretext for the enactment of the "Law for the Defense of Realm" on 26 July 1921, which provided severe penalties for the YCP and trade union activities.⁸⁶

⁸⁵ Vucinich, op. cit., p. 12

⁸⁶ Ibid, p. 12.

After the outlawing of the YCP, the party went underground and remained illegal to the outbreak of World War II. These oppressive policies against the communists and the outlawing of the party damaged severely the Yugoslav communist movement. For example, the number of members of the party declined to 3,000 from 60,000 between 1920-1928.⁸⁷

At the beginning, the YCP was not interested in the national question due to these two reasons. For example, at the Second Congress of the Party held at Vukovar on 20-25 July 1920 the Yugoslav national question was not debated. At the congress, the party adopted a program calling a Yugoslav Soviet Republic, with its own people's army, the expropriation and socialization of industry and commerce, protection of the workers' job, socialization of public health facilities, compulsory education, separation of church and state, and centralization of worker's taxes.⁸⁸

That is, in the Vukovar Congress, economic, social and organizational issues were discussed but the national question was not discussed. Looking back in 1948, in the Fifth Congress of the Party, Tito strongly criticized the Vukovar program since, according to him, negligence of the national question in the second congress was a very severe mistake for the YCP and communist movement.

The YCP began to deal with the national question in 1922. Debates about it also caused bitter conflict between right wing led by Sima Markovic, the party secretary between 1921-1923 and 1926-1928, and left wing led by Djuro Cvijic and August Cesarec.

The right wing supported unitary system and opposed "the right of self-determination" and "the right of secession" for nations who constituted Yugoslavia. Sima Markovic strongly attracted all proposals for federalism because, according to him, federal system was tending to weaken the solidarity of the working class in Yugoslavia. Also, he claimed that the rights of self-determination and secession were tending to disintegrate the Yugoslav union. For these reasons, the Markovic faction opposed both federalism and the rights of self-determination and secession.

⁸⁷ Maclean, Fitzroy, *Tito: A Pictorial Biography*, London: McGraw-Hill, 1980, p. 28.

⁸⁸ Wolff, *op. cit.*, p. 109.

Unlike the right wing, the left wing was in favor of federalism, and supported recognition of the rights of self-determination and secession for the Yugoslavia's nations. Djuro Cvijic and August Cesarec, leaders of left wing, argued that federal system which depended on a "workers' and peasants' government" would not weaken the solidarity of the working class and communist movement in Yugoslavia. Also, they maintained that not only Yugoslav nations but also all other nations have the rights of self-determination and secession, and not only the YCP but also all communist parties must support such rights for all nations because, according to them, voluntary (not compulsory) cooperation and unification of nations should be established, and communist parties' duty is to support voluntary unification of nations. Furthermore, they stated that voluntary cooperation and voluntary unification of nations is impossible in the absence of "the rights of self-determination and secession".⁸⁹

The left wing's proposition about the national question depended on Stalin's and the Comintern's principle over the national question. In 1922, Zinoviev, the President of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, acquaint the Balkan communist parties with the Bolshevik interpretation of the national question and urged them to recognize, within each country, the right of self-determination, including the right of separation. Also, in the Fifth Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern on 30 March 1925, Stalin addressed that the YCP should recognize the right of self-determination and secession for Yugoslav nations. He asserted that a solution of the national question in Yugoslavia would not be possible without the fall of the bourgeoisie, and for this reason, according to Stalin, the YCP should struggle to overthrow the existing regime and to realize socialist revolution for a solution of the Yugoslav national question.⁹⁰ However, Markovic claimed that the Yugoslav national question could be solved by constitutional reforms. So, Markovic and his right wing was attacked bitterly by Stalin and the Comintern.

It is clear that there was a consensus and cooperation between left wing of the YCP and the Comintern led by Stalinism against right wing led by Markovic. Left wing

⁸⁹ See Shoup, *op. cit.*, p. 24-25.

⁹⁰ See Hondius, *op. cit.* p. 102.

and the Comintern favored federalism and the right of self-determination including the right of separation, whereas right wing was against these rights and in favor of unitary system in Yugoslavia.

In the meantime, the debate between the left and right factions centered on the issue of collaboration with non-Communist nationalist groups in Yugoslavia. The Comintern urged the YCP to collaborate with other parties in the national question with aim of realizing socialist revolution. IMRO and the CPP formed the core of this debate.

IMRO (the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization) was founded in Salonica in 1893 and struggled against the Ottoman Empire in order to overthrow the Ottoman rule in Macedonia by force. IMRO also struggled against Bulgarian nationalism that aimed to annex Macedonia. The struggle culminated in a mass uprising, organized by IMRO, against the Ottoman rule in 1903. However, the uprising could not be successful; the Ottoman forces were able to suppress this uprising by force. Ten years later, the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 partitioned Macedonia among Serbia, Greece and Bulgaria. According to the Treaty of Bucharest of 30 July 1913, Aegean Macedonia (including 50 percent of the Macedonian territory), Vardar Macedonia (40 percent) and Pirin Macedonia (10 percent) were respectively assigned to Greece, Serbia and Bulgaria. The three sides tried to assimilate Macedonian population. Within Greece, Macedonian Slavs were designed "Slavophone Greeks", while within Serbia, they were officially treated as "South Serbs". On the other hand, Bulgaria described them as "Bulgarian people in Macedonia".⁹¹

After the partition of Macedonia, IMRO continued his struggle for independent Macedonia both in Greece and in Serbia. After foundation of the first Yugoslavia in 1918, IMRO, which was now supported by the Bulgarian government, began to struggle against the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, and aimed to overthrow Serbian sovereignty in Vardar Macedonia, which has been ruled by Serbia since 1913.

The Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) led by Georgi Dimitrov and the Comintern proposed the foundation of an independent Macedonian state within a

⁹¹ See Yasmee, F. A. K., "Nationality in the Balkans: The Case of the Macedonia", in Özdoğan & Saybaşılı (eds.), *op. cit.*, pp. 127-128 and Reuter, Jens, "Policy and Economy in Macedonia", in James Pettifer (ed.), *The New Macedonian Question*, New York: St. Martin Press, 1999, p. 29.

Socialist Balkan Federation. Both the BCP and the Comintern urged the YCP to collaborate with IMRO which struggled against the Kingdom of Yugoslav, led by King Aleksander and the Pasic cabinet, for independence of Macedonia. The left wing of the YCP accepted this will of the BCP and the Comintern, while Markovic and the right wing did not. That is, the right wing was against a secession of Vardar Macedonia from Yugoslavia, whereas the left wing supported Macedonian secession and foundation an autonomous Macedonia within a Balkan Socialist Federation. For this reason, the left wing was in favor of collaboration with IMRO, while right wing was not.

On the other hand, also, the Comintern urged the YCP to develop cooperation with the CPP led by Radic who visit to Moscow in 1924 and made his party a member of the Peasant International led by the Comintern. Markovic, who was against federal rearrangement of the country, rejected any cooperation with Radic because the CPP has striven for federal organization of the sate and an autonomous Croatia since the foundation of Yugoslavia in December 1918. However, the left wing of the party accepted to collaborate with the CPP in the Yugoslav national question because the left wing, as we have seen, was in favor of federal system and the rights of self-determination and secession.

This conflict between left wing, that was supported by the Comintern, and the right wing, that was led by Markovic and dominated by Serbian communists, continued until the fall of Markovic in 1928. In 1928, the Fourth Congress of the Party was held in Dresden. This was the last congress to be held until 1948.

At the congress, the Serb Secretary of the Party, Markovic, was replaced by Bosnian Djuro Djakovic who was supported by the left wing and the Comintern. Also, Josip Broz Tito was elected secretary to the Zagreb Branch of the YCP. The right wing and Markovic was accused of taking a pro-Serbian attitude toward the national question. The congress confirmed the left wing and the Comintern line in the national question. The right of self-determination and the right of secession were accepted, and every nationality, including the Albanian, German and Hungarian minorities, was given the right to secession from the Yugoslavia. The congress recognized the validity of claims for the independence of Croatia, Montenegro, Slovenia and Macedonia. Moreover, in the

Congress, the YCP made a declaration of 'open war' on the Serbian bourgeoisie and the dictatorship. With this aim, the declaration noted that strikes, sabotages and armed insurrections should be organized against the state.⁹²

This means that, the fourth congress was a definite victory of the left wing and the Comintern against the right wing. Also, the left wing and the Comintern described the fourth congress as the victory of real communists against the Serbian nationalists led by Markovic.

The fourth congress was followed by the royal coup of January 1929, that was led by King Aleksander and supported by the Serb nationalism. Royal dictatorship that was formed by the coup took very bitter measures against the YCP and damaged severely the party. The number of members of the party dropped from 3,000 to 200 between 1929-1932.⁹³ Out of 3,000 members, the police arrested a thousand, including Tito, and killed a hundred, including the Party Secretary Djuro Djakovic, between 1929-1932. The report of the Central Committee, which was put in the Fifth Congress of the YCP in 1948, illustrated such condition: "*Party life in country died down in 1930 and 1931. Only scattered groups survived. Almost all the leading Party cadres, at both a high and low level, were in jail, had been killed, or had emigrated.*"⁹⁴

The period of 1929-1932 was the most severe period for the YCP. During this years, the party had not party secretary and the most important figures of the party were arrested or killed by the royal dictatorship. For example, the Party Secretary Djakovic was killed and Tito, Edward Kardelj, Alexander Rankovic and Mosa Pijade were arrested. The YCP was not interested in the national question until 1934 because the coup weakened the party organization, and for this reason, the party tried to reorganize and recovery itself rather than to solve the national question.

The YCP began to recover its losses in 1932. In this year, the Comintern appointed Milan Gorkic as the Secretary General of the YCP, and a new Central Committee was formed in Vienna. Gorkic and the new Central Committee attempted to

⁹² See for the fourth congress Maclean, Fitzroy, *Disputed Barricade: The Life and Times of Josip Broz Tito*, London: Alden Press, 1957, p. 48-51 and McFarlane, op. cit., p. 9.

⁹³ Auty, op. cit., p. 84.

⁹⁴ Fitzroy, *Tito: ...*, op. cit. p. 32.

get local party organization going again. This attempt was finally succeeded in 1934 when some important figures, including Tito, were released from goal. After the release, Tito received membership of the Central Committee and the Politburo of the YCP. By 1934, membership of the party had reached 1,000. After 1934, the party benefited from a slight relaxation of political pressure and their work was made easier. Also, the general lack of political liberty in the country, between 1929-1932, brought angry people to the Communist Party ranks.⁹⁵

Therefore, the YCP, that had been damaged greatly by the royal coup, could be able to reorganize itself in 1934. In this year, also, debates about the Yugoslav national question began again. The party, which had overcome the right wing, continued to take an extreme position on the national question. In the spring of 1934, the Comintern called for the secession of Croatia, Macedonia, and Slovenia from the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, and the YCP signed a pact with Italian and Austrian communist parties to support a united and independent Slovenia.⁹⁶

The Comintern and the YCP planed to weaken and overthrow the royal dictatorship and Serbian bourgeoisie through the secessions of Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia. That is, they aimed to weaken and overthrow the Kingdom of Yugoslavia by exploiting the national question. This means that, the Comintern and the YCP considered the Yugoslav national question as a 'weapon' which would be used to destroy the capitalist regime and to accomplish socialist revolution in Yugoslavia.

However, the efforts to weaken and to revolt the royal regime by exploiting the national question were abandoned, in 1935, by both the Comintern and the YCP because of the rise of Hitler. This change in their policy about the Yugoslav national question was first reflected at the Fourth National Conference of the Party held in December 1934. The portion of the conference statement which dealt with the question of national rights did not make any reference to immediate secession of the national regions from Yugoslavia, that had been previously stated by both the Comintern and the party. Also, in the conference, the demands for self-determination of the minorities in Yugoslavia were

⁹⁵ Auty, op. cit., p. 84.

⁹⁶ Shoup, op. cit., p.39.

dropped and not accepted. However, the earlier militant policy remained and did not change. The conference called for revolutionary workers' and peasants' government in Croatia, Dalmatia, Slovenia, Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia, and Vojvodina. Also, it decided to work to attract students. Gorkic was again elected secretary and Tito was elected to the Central Committee of the YCP at the conference.

This change in the YCP's national policy became very clear in 1935. The Party openly condemned the policy of secession of national regions as advantageous to fascists, and declared that the Yugoslav national question could be solved by enforcing some reforms which would end national oppression. A year later, in 1936, the YCP emphasized need for the Yugoslav unity. Finally, in 1937, the slogan of self-determination disappeared completely from Party policy on national question.⁹⁷

The radical change in the Comintern's and the YCP's policy on the Yugoslav national question was a product of the fascist danger and threat. Fascism has risen in Italy since 1922 when Mussolini became prime minister and in Germany since 1933 when Hitler came to power. Especially, the rise of German fascism has frightened and threatened the USSR and the Balkan countries. Therefore, the Comintern led by Moscow and the YCP has begun to seek measures to protect themselves from fascism since 1935. In 1935, they came to terms to protect unity of Yugoslavia in order to prevent a probable occupation of Yugoslavia by Germany and to repulse a probable German attack on Yugoslavia. For this purpose, they abandoned the effort to weaken the Kingdom of Yugoslavia by exploiting the national question. Also, the YCP has not use the slogan of self-determination including the right of secession since 1935. Furthermore, a Yugoslav delegation headed by Tito attended the Seventh Congress of the Comintern in August 1935, and they took a decision to form a "Popular Front Against Fascism" which would involve non-Communist parties.⁹⁸ Hence, the change in the national policy of the Comintern and the YCP was a consequence of the German and Italian threat.

On the other hand, the strategy of "Popular Front Against Fascism" generated

⁹⁷ See *ibid.*, p. 40.

⁹⁸ Maclean, *Tito: ...*, op. cit., p.36.

another problem for the YCP: the Croat faction within the YCP.⁹⁹ Zagreb had come to replace Belgrade as the center of the party's activity in the late 1920s, following the fall of the Markovic faction. At the end of 1920s, the party membership concentrated in Croatia; over 40 percent of the membership of the party came from Croatia.¹⁰⁰ The Croatian section of the YCP affirmed its leading role at the time of revival of the party at the beginning of 1930s.

Croat section of the YCP was against the creation of "Popular Front" with other parties because it was not willing to form an alliance with non-Communist Serbian parties; however, it did not oppose an alliance with the CPP led by Macek. This indicates that the Zagreb branch of the YCP relied on non-Communist Croatian parties but did not rely on Serbian parties. And also, this means that there was a Serbo-Croat conflict between Serbian and Croatian communists within the YCP.

However, the Party Secretary Gorkic conformed to the Comintern line and accepted to establish a "Popular Front Against Fascism" with non-Communist parties. So although the Zagreb branch looked with suspicion at the effort to create a "Popular Front" with non-Communist Serbian parties, the Party Secretary Milan Gorkic tried vigorously to reach agreement with other parties, including Serbian parties, for creation of Popular Front. This disagreement led to a conflict between the Croat section and secretary Gorkic; and consequently, the Zagreb communists formed a "Croat opposition" against Gorkic within the YCP. Also, Tito, who was appointed by the Comintern as Organizing Secretary of the Party in 1936, did not trust Gorkic, and thus, did not back him in this conflict.¹⁰¹

The Zagreb opposition damaged Gorkic's power within the party and played an

⁹⁹ The Comintern urged the formation of separate Communist Parties among the different nations in Yugoslavia. As a result, the *Communist Party of Croatia* and the *Communist Party of Slovenia* were formed within the YCP in 1937 and 1938. The Communist Parties of Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro were formed after the Second World War. (See Vejvoda, Ivan, "Yugoslavia 1945-1991: From Decentralization Without Democracy to Dissolution", in David. A. Dyker & Ivan Vejvoda (eds.), *Yugoslavia and After: A Study in Fragmentation, Despair and Rebirth*, London: Longman, 1996, pp. 11-12).

¹⁰⁰ Lampe, op. cit., p. 141.

¹⁰¹ Tito, in his memoirs, says that when he traveled to Yugoslavia at this time he refused to use false passports furnished by Gorkic, because, Tito notes that others who had used them often fell into hands of the police, and he suspected Gorkic of using this method of eliminating his opponents in the party. (See Auty, op. cit., p. 85).

important role in the fall of Gorkic. Gorkic was purged from the YCP by the Comintern when he was accused and arrested as a Trotskyite in Moscow in 1937. Then, Tito was appointed by Georgi Dimitrov, the Secretary General of the Comintern, as the Secretary General of the YCP in 1937.¹⁰²

Tito was told by Dimitrov that the party would be liquidated unless order and discipline was restored and maintained, and he was given a fairly free hand in reorganizing and reforming the party. Thus, his first attempt was to restore discipline within the party. For this purpose, a special group, including Slovene Edvard Kardelj, Serbian Aleksander Rankovic, Montenegrin Milovan Djilas, Jew Mosa Pijade and Croat Ivo-Lola Ribar, was formed by Tito.

Tito and his colleagues showed outstanding ability and qualities of leadership; party quarrels at last ended and discipline was enforced. Tito and his staff especially insisted on the primary importance of building up the YCP on a strong national basis and establish a strong "Popular Front Against Fascism". They were in favor of the Yugoslav unity on the socialist federal basis. Furthermore, he planned and supported the foundation of a "Balkan Socialist Front against Fascism" and a "Balkan Socialist Federation". On the other hand, the YCP under the leadership of Tito recognized Macedonian nation as a separate nationality, and Tito tried to convince the Serbs to recognize Macedonian nationality.¹⁰³

Under the leadership of Tito, the membership of the party increased rapidly. The party had 1,500 members when Tito came to power. This figure increased to 6,000 in 1939 and to 12,000 in 1940. Also, the party organized communist youth groups which had 30,000 members in 1940.¹⁰⁴ The rapid increase in the membership and the restoration of the party discipline shows that the YCP strengthened under leadership of Tito on the eve of World War II.

Secretary General Tito and his party faced two important events in August 1939: Less than two weeks before Hitler's attack on Poland and the outbreak of the Second World War, the *Sporazum* and the Soviet-German Pact were respectively signed

¹⁰² See Maclean, *Disputed Barricade: ...*, op. cit. pp. 96-99.

¹⁰³ See Shoup, op. cit., pp. 51-56.

¹⁰⁴ Auty, op. cit., p. 86.

on 20 August and 23 August. The YCP accepted the Soviet-German Pact and conformed to Moscow, while did not accept the Sporazum that was signed between the Cvetkovic government and the CPP led by Macek. However, the Zagreb branch of the YCP did not conform to the party policy, and supported the Sporazum which agreed to Croatian autonomy and formed the Cvetkovic-Macek coalition government.

Hence, a inner conflict emerged within the YCP between the Croatian branch led by Josip Kras and the Central Committee led by Tito on the eve of World War II. This conflict was solved in the favor of the Central Committee. Josip Kras, secretary of the Croatian branch, was replaced by Rade Koncar, a Serb from Croatia, who was a loyal follower of Tito. Rade Koncar guided the Croatian communists under Tito's order; and consequently, the Zagreb branch was ordered and controlled by Tito.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁵ Shoup, *op. cit.*, pp. 44-45.

CHAPTER III

THE PERIOD OF WORLD WAR II

World War II began on 1 September 1939 when the German army invaded Poland. Then, the British and French governments, which had condoned the annexation of Austria and Sudets Region by Germany, declared war against Germany on 3 September. The German army occupied Denmark in April 1940, Norway, Belgium and Holland in May, and a major offensive was commenced against France on 10 May. France could resist only until 22 June when an armistice was signed between Germany and the Pétain government. The armistice brought France under the German domination.

Another fascist power, Italy, that had invaded Albania in April 1939, occupied Somali in August 1940, and following month, in September, entered Egypt. In the meantime, the Tripartite Pact was signed by Germany, Italy and Japan on 27 September 1940. Although Italy launched an offensive against Greece on 28 October, the Italian forces were defeated and repulsed by the Greek army.

On the other hand, the USSR, that had signed a nonaggression agreement with Germany in August 1939, attacked Finland on 30 November 1939, and the Soviet-Fin War ended with victory of Red Army on 12 March 1940. After this victory, the Red Army turned towards Romania, and forced the Romanian government in June 1940 to cede to Bessarabia and Bukovina to Russia.¹⁰⁶

III. 1. Destruction of the First Yugoslavia

As we have seen in *Chapter Second*, the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was influenced by German fascism before the breakup of the war. The German influence in Yugoslavia was initiated by close economic relation between the two countries. Thereafter, the German influence spread over the political and ideological life of Yugoslavia. Especially, the impact of German fascism has increased sharply since 1935 when the Stojadinovic government was established. As a consequence of this effect, fascist-oriented forces' power in Yugoslavia increased on the eve of World War II.

After foundation of the Cvetkovic-Macek coalition government in August 1939,

¹⁰⁶ See Sander, op. cit., pp. 124-143.

Yugoslavia aimed to diminish the German influence. The Cvetkovic-Macek government declared neutrality of Yugoslavia when World War II started on 1 September 1939. Especially, after the breakup of the war, the government tried to increase his economic, diplomatic and military power and independence against Germany, and at the same time, became very careful to not undertake anything that could be interpreted by Hitler as an offense.

The Yugoslav government increased relations with England, France and Greece in order to counterbalance the German pressure in spite of its effort to not frustrate Hitler. Also, after the occupation of France by the German army and the occupation of Bessarabia and Bukovina by the Red Army, the government decided in June 1940 to recognize the Soviet Union and to develop relations with it in order to take support against a probable German offense.

That is to say, the Cvetkovic-Macek government, unlike the Stojadinovic government, inclined toward the Western Powers with aim of diminishing the German impact on Yugoslavia. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that all of Yugoslavia's military plans were developed on the assumption of war against the Axis and of collaboration with the Western Power and Greece. Furthermore, the Cvetkovic-Macek government, especially after the fall of France, regarded the Soviet Union as a additional insurance against a probable Axis attack upon Yugoslavia.

The existing German-Yugoslav relations was workable because the relations were in the German interest as long as Hitler was busy in the West and Yugoslavia performed well as a supplier of strategic materials such as copper, chrome, bauxite and food. For this reason, when in September 1940 Mussolini was ready to attack upon Yugoslavia, Hitler hindered him by insisting that Germany needed peace in Yugoslavia. However, relations between Germany and Yugoslavia changed when Hitler decided (1) to attack Greece in order to help his partner Mussolini and to prevent the British from establishing themselves in the southern Balkans, which could damage the German plans, and (2) to attack the USSR, which required complete security on Germany's flanks in the south, including the protection of the Romanian oil fields.

To achieve these two aims, Germany started to adjust the political and military

situation in southeastern Europe which was economically in the German control. Hitler urged and brought Hungary and Romania in November 1940 into the Tripartite Pact and some German troops moved into these countries. In the same month, the German pressure upon the Cvetkovic-Macek government to join the Tripartite Pact was started by summoning Yugoslav foreign minister Aleksander Cincir-Mirkovic to Berschtesgaden. In the negotiations, the foreign minister could not be persuaded to adhere to the Pact. On 1 March 1941, Bulgaria joined the Pact and the German troops moved into Bulgaria in order to attack upon Greece and to pressurize upon Yugoslavia for joining the Pact.

Thereafter, Germany presented an ultimatum to Yugoslavia to join the Pact. Also, Hitler offered three promises with aim of convincing Yugoslavia: (1) Yugoslavia would not be forced for participation in war against any country. (2) The Axis troops would not moved through Yugoslavia. (3) After the Axis victory, Salonika would be given to Yugoslavia.¹⁰⁷

Finally, Yugoslavia, represented by Prime Minister Cvetkovic and Foreign Minister Markovic in the negotiations, joined the Axis by signing a protocol in Vienna on 25 March 1941 even though great pressure against joining the Pact was brought by Great Britain and the United States.

Although the Cvetkovic-Macek government and Prince Paul were pro-Western Powers, but not pro-German, Yugoslavia adhered to the Axis because of five main reason:

1) The German army had already occupied Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Belgium, Holland, France, Denmark and Norway. That is, Germany had achieved a numerous success against the Western Powers by March 1941.

2) Yugoslavia has not enough military and economic power to protect itself against a probable German offense.

3) Great Britain had not hinder the German army in the Western Europe, and there was no prospect for any speedy assistance from Britain to Yugoslavia. Also, the USA was strong enough but so faraway for a speedy assistance against a probably German attack upon Yugoslavia. This reality was stated by Prince Paul in January 1941, when William

¹⁰⁷ Stavrianos, *op. cit.*, p. 755.

Donovan visited Belgrade as President Roosevelt's representatives to deliver a message involving American support, by saying "*You big nations are hard. You talk of our honor, but you are far away.*"¹⁰⁸

4) Except Greece, Yugoslavia's neighbor states (Albania, Austria, Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria) had already adhered to Italy and Germany, and the German and Italian troops had been installed in these countries. In other words, petty Yugoslavia had already been besieged by the Axis Powers.

5) In this condition, the Cvetkovic-Macek government and Prince Paul regarded the three promises, offered by Hitler to Yugoslavia, as a chance to protect Yugoslavia against a probable occupation and partition.

As soon as news about the agreement arrived to Yugoslavia from Vienna, mass demonstrations started in the Belgrade streets. The Belgrade streets were full of demonstrators who were against the Axis Powers. They shot slogan of "*better war than the pact, better death than slavery*"; and they attacked, damaged and pillaged the German shops and property.¹⁰⁹

The demonstrations against the Axis Powers and the government were supported by politicians and officers who opposed any Yugoslav adherence to the Tripartite Pact. This demonstrations turned into a *coup d'état* against Prince Paul and the government. The dissatisfaction of some officers and politicians with the pro-Axis course of the government resulted in a successful coup on 27 March 1941.

When news of the coup was received by Winston Churchill, prime minister of the British government, he and his cabinet welcomed the coup with a great pleasure. Prime Minister Churchill declared the British support to the coup with his famous statement: "*now Yugoslavia has found its soil.*"¹¹⁰ But, in reality, the British government did not feed and support the "*Yugoslav soil*". The coup also welcomed by Stalin. On April 5, one day before the German attack on Belgrade, a nonaggression pact was signed between Yugoslavia and the USSR.¹¹¹ However, neither Churchill nor Stalin did not protect

¹⁰⁸ Lampe, op. cit., p. 196.

¹⁰⁹ Wolff, op. cit., p. 199.

¹¹⁰ Lampe, op. cit., p. 198.

¹¹¹ Jelavic, op. cit., p. 237.

Yugoslavia against the Axis attack.

The coup of 27 March was led by General Boris Mirkovic. Cvetkovic and a few other politician, including Cincir-Markovic, were arrested. Young Peter, still six months short of legal age of eighteen, was proclaimed King of Yugoslavia, and former Prince Paul was exiled to Greece and then Kenya. The new cabinet was formed under Prime Minister and Chief of General Staff General Simovic. The cabinet included leading members of the SRP, the SDP and the SAP, Macek, the leader of the CPP and the vice premier of the former government, two Slovene clerics, a Bosnian Muslim, two Independent Serb Democrats, and two former premiers of Aleksander's dictatorship, Bogoljub Jefic and Peter Zivkovic.¹¹²

The new government had a broader popular base than any Yugoslav government during the interwar period. Macek and Croats were restless at the beginning of the coup since they were worried about the *Sporazum* and the autonomous status of Croatia. However, General Boris Mirkovic and General Simovic promised to protect the *Sporazum* that had created autonomous Croatia. After obtaining assurance that the *Sporazum* would be continued, Macek and his party, the CPP, entered the government. Thus, the new government took over Croatian support. Yugoslav public opinion welcomed the coup and the Simovic government as he inclined to the Western Powers rather than the Axis. Yugoslav peoples, especially Serbs, have viewed the Germans as the main enemy of Yugoslavia since World War I because, in this war, the German-Austro army invaded Yugoslav lands, and Yugoslavs fought against the German-Austro alliance. Therefore, the public opinion was anti-German and in favor of the coup.

The Simovic government was became very careful to not annoy and provoke Hitler's Germany. For this reason, the government accepted all existing treaties, including the Vienna agreement. He in the same time tried to keep secret his contacts with British and Greek military leaders in Greece and with special British emissaries who came to Belgrade for talks regarding defense problems.

Although the new government accepted the Vienna agreement and Yugoslavia's adherence to the Pact, the coup and formation of the Simovic government were not

¹¹² See Wolff, op. cit., p. 199

welcomed by Hitler and the German public opinion. Especially, the pillage of the German shops and property on 27 March annoyed the German public opinion extremely. The Germans demanded compensation for damage done to the German shops during the riots in Belgrade. Also, they demanded the ratification of the Tripartite Pact by the Yugoslav government. Thirdly, immediate demobilization of the Yugoslav army was demanded by Germany. The first and second demands were accepted, but the third was rejected by the Simovic government.¹¹³

The acceptance of the first two demands by Simovic government was a wasted and vain effort for Hitler since, according to him, the Belgrade demonstrations and the coup demonstrated that Yugoslavs and the Simovic government could not be trusted. An unreliable and hostile Yugoslavia was an intolerable threat for Germany during the forthcoming campaigns against Greece and Russia. Finally, on 29 March 1941, Hitler, after a meeting with his military and politically advisers, issued his Directive No. 25 that prepared the plan for immediate attack upon Yugoslavia. Also, the Directive involved the partition of Yugoslav territory among Germany, Italy, Hungary and Bulgaria:

*“The Fuehrer is determined, without waiting for possible loyalty declarations of the new government, to make all preparations in order to destroy Yugoslavia militarily and as a national unity. No diplomatic inquiries will be made nor ultimatums presented. Assurances of the Yugoslav government, which cannot be trusted anyhow, in the future will be taken note of. The army will attack as soon as the means and troops suitable for it are ready. . . . The war against Yugoslavia should be very popular in Italy, Hungary and Bulgaria, as acquisition of territory can be promised to these states, namely the Adriatic coast to Italy, the Banat to Hungary, and Macedonia to Bulgaria.”*¹¹⁴

The Axis offense began on April 6 with the German air attack on Belgrade and the main Yugoslav airfields. On the same day, a huge German armored and motorized forces moved into Yugoslav Macedonia. Four days later, Hitler struck in great force from Austria and western Hungary against Slovenia and Croatia, and Zagreb was occupied by Germans on April 10. Also, on the same day, German and Romanian forces moved from

¹¹³ Ibid., p. 200.

¹¹⁴ Stavrianos, op. cit., p. 756

Romania through the Banat toward Belgrade. The Italians joined the attack on April 11 with their land force on their Albanian front and in the northwest, and Hungarians on the same day moved against Vojvodina. Furthermore, Bulgarian troops attacked Macedonia on April 11. On April 12, Belgrade was occupied by troops coming from Romania and Bulgaria. Four days later, on April 16, Sarajevo, where was the Yugoslav Supreme Command, was taken by German troops.

King Peter and the Simovic government left the country by air on April 14 and 15 for exile, going first to Greece, then to Palestine, and finally to London. An armistice was signed in Belgrade on April 17. In the armistice, Yugoslavia was represented by Deputy Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command General Jankovic. The armistice provided for an surrender of the Yugoslav Army. Except some Croat officers coming from Croatia, all officers were arrested and the Yugoslav army surrendered with all its armaments and stores. Total 375,000 soldiers and officers fell into Axis hands.¹¹⁵

In the attack, the Axis powers used 52 division involving 870,000 soldiers against Yugoslavia; of these, 24 were German. About 1,500 German and 670 Italian aircraft participated in the operation. Yugoslavia had only 110 light tanks of 5 and 10 tons, of which 60 were of the First World War vintage, and about 600 aircraft, including 150 naval airplanes. Also, the Yugoslav army suffered from the lack of radio equipment. Thus, communications between the Supreme Command and the main units in the field and among the units themselves were extremely poor and largely were severed on the first day of the attack. In the war, German losses were 151 killed, 392 wounded, and 15 missing in action. Yugoslav losses of military personal are not known, but the bombing of Belgrade on April 6 caused 5,000 civilian deaths¹¹⁶

As soon as Yugoslavia was occupied by the Axis Powers in April 1941, the country was dismembered among Germany, Italy, Bulgaria, Hungary and Albania, that has been controlled by Italy since April 1939:¹¹⁷

Slovenia was divided into two parts, the northern two thirds going to Germany

¹¹⁵ Judah, *op. cit.*, p. 117.

¹¹⁶ See Tomasevich, Jozo, "Yugoslavia During the Second World War", in Vucinich (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 71-73.

¹¹⁷ See the map that illustrates the division of Yugoslavia among the occupying states in April 1941 in Klemencic & Zagar, *op. cit.*, p. 155.

and the southern third to Italy. The Germany followed a policy of denationalization in its zone and made a systematic attempt to Germanize the Slovenes. Slovene intellectuals and professionals were deported and German settlers were brought there from Bessarabia, Bosnia, and Austria. Also, Germans proscribed the Slovene language in the schools and the administration. Slovene books in the libraries were burned, and inscriptions in Slovene erased from all monuments, even the tombstones in the churchyards. The Germans spread a systematic propaganda to the effect that Slovenes were in fact of German origin, and urged them to abandon their native language and national culture and became Germans. About 60,000 Slovenes, including children and women, were sent to concentration camps. Their houses and farms were seized by German colonists coming from outside. Moreover, the Slovene young was forced to serve in the German army. As a result of this oppressive policies, a considerable number of Slovenes fled southward, which had been occupied by Italy, as the Italians were not so severe in their zone.¹¹⁸

The Vojvodina was also divided by the Axis, the western part going to Hungary and the eastern (Banat) to Germany. In Banat, the German force established a special administration dominated by the local German minority. The Hungarian army attacked on the Serb population in Vojvodina. At least 10,000 Serbs were massacred by the Hungarian army in Novi Sad.¹¹⁹

Except western part, Macedonia was taken by the Bulgarians and they applied a Bulgarization program. The Bulgarians set up their own schools, library, theater and museum in order to Bulgarize Macedonians. Western Macedonia and the province of Kosovo went to Albania, that has been ruled by Italy since April 1939. In there, Albanians made up a division called as *Skanderbeg Division* which massacred Serbs. According to Serbian sources, in Kosovo, 10,000 Serbs were killed, and 100,000 Serbs were forced by Albanians to left Kosovo. 70,000 of them went to Serbia.¹²⁰

Montenegro was taken by the Italians. Italy formed a Montenegrin army, called *Zelenasi* (Greens), in order to separate Montenegro from Serbia. On 13 July 1941, the Greens proclaimed an independent Montenegro state with aid of Italy. The proclamation

¹¹⁸ Wolff, op. cit., pp. 204-205.

¹¹⁹ Ibid. p. 205.

¹²⁰ Judah, op. cit., p. 131.

and the Greens were opposed by the Chetniks and the Partisans.¹²¹ Italy also annexed large parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Dalmatia which gave Italy full control of the Adriatic Sea.

According to the German records, the population of these various occupying areas was: 775,000 in the part of Slovenia, annexed by Germany; 380,000 in the part of Slovenia, annexed by Italy; 380,000 in Dalmatia and the part of Bosnia-Herzegovina, annexed by Italy; 1,230,000 in Montenegro taken by Italy, Western Macedonia and Kosovo given to Albania; 1,260,000 in the areas annexed by Bulgaria; 3,810,000 in Serbia, occupied by Germany; 640,000 in Banat, occupied by Germany; 1,145,000 in the areas annexed by Hungary; and 6,300,000 in the Independent State of Croatia.¹²²

The occupation and dismembering of Yugoslavia offered a tremendous advantage to Germany:¹²³ (1) Germany secured its southern flank for operations against the Soviet Union. (2) Germany brought Italy, Hungary and Bulgaria into further its control by allowing them to annex or occupation parts of Yugoslavia. (3) Germany took the Yugoslav military stores and supplies for its economy. It acquired strategic materials such as copper, chrome, bauxite, iron, coal and chemicals for German military industry. Also, the German force obtained from Yugoslav territory several hundred thousand workers for German economy. That is, the German economy benefited from Yugoslav manpower. Furthermore, it exploited Yugoslav agriculture. Yugoslav food-surplus areas were used to feed Germany and especially the German army. (4) Germans benefited from Yugoslav transportation opportunities. They secured the navigation of the Danube for vital oil shipments to both Germany and Italy. Also, the German occupying force controlled the Yugoslav railways, which were very important for the connection with Italy and for the connection with German armies in Greece and North Africa. (5) Finally, Germany established a puppet state of Croatia and obliged it to finance and to supply the needs of the German and Italian troops in its zone. Now, we will study this Croatian puppet state: *the Independent State of Croatia*.

III. 2. The Ustasha Movement and "Independent State of Croatia"

¹²¹ Lampe, op. cit., pp. 201-202.

¹²² Tomasevich, op. cit. p. 76.

¹²³ See *ibid.*, pp. 76-77.

As we have seen in the *Second Chapter, the Ustasha – Hrvatska Revolucionarna Organizacija* (Uprising-Croatian Revolutionary Organization) was founded by the Zagreb lawyer Dr. Ante Pavelic, former leader of the Croatian Party of Rights, in Italy in 1929. The Ustasha Party, that was influenced by at first Italian fascism and then German fascism, aimed to create "Greater Croatia" with aid of Italy and Germany. It was at first supported by the Italian, Bulgarian and Hungarian governments, which had territorial claims and aims on Yugoslav lands, and then by Hitler's Germany. Also, the Ustasha collaborated with the IMRO which aimed to overthrow Serbian sovereignty in Vardar Macedonia, that has been dominated by Serbia since 1913.

The Ustasha struggled to achieve its ultimate aim, the creation of Greater Croatia, by destroying the Yugoslav union; and for this purpose, organized several terrorist attacks upon the Yugoslav regime that was dominated by Serbian politicians and officers in the interwar period. This Croatian fascist movement's terrorist attacks culminated in the assassination of King Aleksander and French Foreign Minister in Marseilles in October 1934. The assassination was supported by the IMRO, Italy, Bulgaria and Hungary. The Ustasha's prestige and power has increased continuously since the assassination.

Ustasha ideology was rooted in 19th century concepts of nationalism in which goal was the re-creation of "Greater Croatia" based on the boundaries of King Tomislav's medieval Croatia, which had included Croatia, Dalmatia, Slavonija, and much of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Ustasha ideology, that was affected considerably by the Italian and German fascist regimes and ideologies, was anti-Serbs, anticommunist, antidemocratic, and antimodern in that it focused on peasant forms of socioeconomic organization. Moreover, Roman Catholic identity was central to fascist Ustasha ideology. The Ustasha described Catholic Croatia as a historic bulwark of the Christian West against a series of Eastern invaders, including Slavs and communists. It claimed that Croats were descent of the Goths, but were not Slavs. Hence, Croatian ethnic origin, according to the Ustasha ideology, is different from Slavic ethnic origin of Serbs. Also, the Ustasha ideology considered Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) as the Bosnian Croats who had been converted to Islam by the Ottoman Empire. Some Bosniaks accepted this Ustasha

proposition and took place in the Ustasha and in the Independent State of Croatia. More than 12 percent of the Croatian State officials and the Ustasha members were Bosniaks.¹²⁴

Before the occupation and partition of Yugoslavia, Hitler and Mussolini tried to induce Macek and his party, the CPP, not to have anything to do with the Simovic government and informed them that the foundation of an independent Croatian State was envisaged by Germany and Italy. That is, the Germans and Italians promised Macek a Croatian state after defeat of the Belgrade regime. But, Macek and his party refused to be used as a German and Italian agent in creating an independent Croatia and in destroying Yugoslavia. On the contrary, Macek decided to enter the Simovic government as vice premier and to work for the preservation both peace and Yugoslavia.¹²⁵

For this reason, the Germans and the Italians offered this proposal to Ante Pavelic who welcomed and accepted it. Independent State of Croatia (*Nezavisna Drzava Hrvatske – NDH*) was declared by the Ustasha lieutenant Slavko Kvaternik on 10 April 1941 when German troops entered Zagreb. Mile Budak and Andrija Artukovic became respectively educational and interior minister. When the NDH was founded, the Ustasha Party had 12,000 memberships.¹²⁶

The NDH consisted of Croatia, Slavonija, Dalmatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, but excluding Medimurje, part of Gorski Kotar, the coastal part of Northern Dalmatia between the river Zrmanja and the town of Split, Boka Kotorska and all the islands except Pag, Brac and Hvar. These areas were occupied by Italy. According to the census of 1931, the NDH territory had total population of 6,042,306. Serbs and Bosniaks formed respectively 30.5 and 12 percent of the population in the NDH.¹²⁷ As soon as the NDH was founded, it adhered to the Tripartite Pact, declared war on the Western allies and the USSR, and it was recognized by the Axis states. That is, Croatia became a typical Axis puppet, like Slovakia.

¹²⁴ Allcock, John B., Milivojevic, Marko, Horton, John J. (eds.), *Conflict In The Former Yugoslavia*, California: ABC-CLIO, 1998, p. 314.

¹²⁵ Tomasevich, op. cit., p. 69.

¹²⁶ Lampe, op. cit., p. 204.

¹²⁷ See Obrknezevic, Milos, "Development of Orthodoxy in Croatia and the Croatian Orthodox Church", *Croatian Review*, June 1979, p. 17 and Judah, op. cit., p. 124.

There were two strong Croatian political force apart from the Ustasha in Croatia during the War: the CPP led by Macek and Catholic Church led by Archbishop Stepinac. The CPP remained largely passive in this period. Although the CPP refused the German and Italian proposal for creating a Croatian state and entered the Simovic government before the Axis attack upon Yugoslavia, many local organizations of the CPP expressed loyalty to the NDH led by the Ustasha fascist government and many members of the CPP joined the Ustasha Party immediately after the surrender of Yugoslavia on 17 April. Macek, who had refused any collaboration with the Axis powers, was forced by these local organizations and members of the CPP to recognize and to obey the NDH; however, he did not do it and withdrew from politics.¹²⁸

On the other hand, foundation of the NDH was welcomed by the Croatian Catholic Church, and Croatian clerics supported the fascist Ustasha regime. Certain members of the Croat Catholic hierarchy, such as Archbishop Sharich of Sarajevo, endorsed this Ustasha brutality, and some members of the Franciscan order took an active part in the forced conversion of the Serbs and also in the massacres.

The Archbishop of Zagreb, Stepinac, attended the Ustasha ceremonies and took place in the commission for conversion of the Orthodoxy. Although Archbishop Stepinac did not support the massacre of Serbs, Jews and Gypsies, he recognized the Ustasha regime and supported Pavelic's policy about conversion of the Orthodox Serbs to Catholicism.¹²⁹

So, the Croatian Church obeyed the Ustasha Party. Consequently, in this period, the control of Croatian politics and of the NDH fell in the hands of Croatian fascists because the CPP did not resist as a whole against the Ustasha and the Croatian Catholic clerics obeyed the Ustasha regime.

In May 1941, Pavelic visited Italy, and met with Mussolini and Foreign Minister Count Ciano in Rome. Also, he was received by Pope Pius XII. In the negotiations, they decided to nominate Aimone, who was Duke of Spoleto and the second cousin of the Italian King Victor Emmanuel, as the King of the NDH. Duke Aimone assumed the

¹²⁸ Vucinich, Wayne S., "Nationalism and Communism", in Vucinich (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 279.

¹²⁹ See Wolff, *op. cit.*, p. 205.

“Crown of Zvonimir”, and took the name of Tomislav II, both Tomislav and Zvonimir having ruled the mediaeval independent state of Croatia before the Magyar had taken it over in 1102. However, in fact, the Italian “king” never visited his “kingdom”, the NDH. Also, Pavelic was chosen *Poglavnik* (Fuehrer) of the NDH on 15 May, and German Minister Siegfried Kasche was appointed as supervisor of the NDH. Thus, in practice, Pavelic ruled the NDH under control of the German Minister Kasche.¹³⁰

It is clear that, the Ustasha was supported by Germany and Italy, and the NDH was founded by them. Italy has supported the Ustasha since 1929 when it was founded in Rome. Yugoslavia was very frustrated from Italian support to the Ustasha. Therefore, in March 1937, the Stojadinovic government signed Nonaggression and Arbitration Agreement with Italy. According to the agreement, Italy agreed to end aids for the Ustasha and to respect Yugoslavia’s territorial integrity.¹³¹

However, despite the agreement, Mussolini continued to support the Ustasha. Finally, Italy played an important role in the foundation of the NDH on 10 April 1941. But, Italian annexation of Dalmatia and military occupation of some areas of Herzegovina humiliated and thwarted the Ustasha Party which desired such areas. For this reason, a conflict emerged between them. Because of this conflict, the Italians gradually moved into a pro-Serb position to give them a weapon against the Ustasha.

On the other hand, the Germans, who felt that they had been betrayed by the coup of 27 March, became gradually anti-Serbs and pro-Ustasha. As soon as the NDH was founded, Germany aided the Ustasha to strengthen the military arm of the Croatian state. For this purpose, *Domobranici* (Home Guard) was formed as the NDH army that was trained and equipped by the German army. Germany wanted to form a strong and disciplined Croatian army since the main German aim in the occupation was to protect the military communication and to obtain raw materials. For this purpose, the Germans needed a strong and disciplined army to keep order in the country and to put down any resistance to their rule. This need forced the Germans to form, train and equip the Home Guard.

¹³⁰ Ibid., p. 203.

¹³¹ See Vucinich, “Interwar Yugoslavia”, op. cit., p. 49.

The Ustasha army, Home Guard, did not only protect military communications and raw materials for the Germans but also massacred Serbs, Jews and Gypsies who lived within the NDH. Furthermore, the Home Guard served Germany as a “guard of the German army” against the Partisan and the Chetnik insurrections and it was used by the Germans to suppress the Partisan and the Chetnik forces.

Governmental structure of the NDH patterned Hitler’s Germany. Pavelic combined the functions of head of State, prime minister of cabinet and leader of the Ustasha Party. Pavelic formed a “program of action”. His program comprised two points: (1) to clean the NDH from alien elements and (2) conversion of Orthodox population to Catholicism.¹³²

This program used the formula which involved ‘one-third of Serbs will be killed, one-third will be driven out of the NDH, and one-third will be converted to Catholicism’. On 22 June 1941, Budak, in the Krajina, openly announced that “*one-third of the state’s 1.9 million Serbs would be deported to Serbia, one-third converted to the Catholic church, and the other third killed.*”¹³³

On the other hand, both Pavelic and the Minister for Justice and Religion, Mirko Puk, declared that the Ustasha regime was not against the Orthodox religion and people, but against the Serbian Orthodox Church because, according to them, it was an organ and representative of the Serbian statehood and an influential actor of creation of the Serb nation. Thus, they believed that presence of a Serbian Orthodox Church within Croatia meant presence of a Serbian state within Croatia. Hence, they claimed that there was no the question of the Orthodox religion but the question of the Serbian Orthodox Church. This idea was displayed openly by Pavelic in the session of the Croatian Diet on 28 February 1942:

“There is no one in Croatia who has anything against the Orthodox faith. Everyone is praying to God according to his own conscience. . . No one is touching Orthodox but there is no room for a Serbian Orthodox Church in the State of Croatia. I repeat: there can be no Serbian, can be no Greek Orthodox Church. Why? Because

¹³² Hondius, op. cit., p. 115.

¹³³ Lampe, op. cit., p. 205.

everywhere in the world Orthodox Churches are national Churches. The Serbian Orthodox Church is part and parcel of the Serbian State. The hierarchy of the Serbian Orthodox Church was led by the Serbian State. This is dependent on the Serbian establishment. This is in Serbia, and has been in the past in unfortunate Yugoslavia, but it may not and will not be in the Croatian State. . . . We will never permit any Church to become a political tool, particularly not one aimed against the existence of the Croatian nation the Croatian State."¹³⁴

In the light of these quotations, it can be asserted that the Ustasha regime and ideology was against the Serbian Orthodox Church since (a) it was a representative of Serbian State and a actor of establishment of Serbian Nationality, and (b) its presence in Croatia was a strong obstacle for foundation of "Greater Croatia" and "Greater Croatian Nationality" which was the ultimate aim of the Ustasha movement. Therefore, the Ustasha regime abolished and banned the Serbian Orthodox Churches within the NDH, and tried to convert Serbs as much as possible to Catholicism.

On the other hand, the Ustasha regime, which banned the Serbian Orthodox Church and tried to convert Serbs to Catholicism, established the "Croatian Orthodox Church". On 3 March 1942, "Provision of the law about the Croatian Orthodox Church" was published in the gazette "*Narodne Novine*" (National Newspaper) signed by the Minister of Justice and Religions, Mirko Puk, and by Ante Pavelic, according to which the Orthodox Church in Croatia was established. The final organization of the Croat Orthodox Church was determined by the constitution of the Church that came to force on 5 June 1942. Two day later, on 7 June, a Russian Germogen was elected as the Metropolitan of the Croatian Orthodox Church and he took his oath on 8 June. The Constitution of the Croatian Orthodox Church guaranteed wide autonomy and unhindered spiritual activity of the Church. This Church lived until May 1945 when the YCP banned it and arrested, then executed, Metropolitan Germogen.¹³⁵

The Croatian Orthodox Church was founded by the Ustasha regime in order to (a) pacify the Serbian Orthodox Church and to crippled its influence upon the Orthodox

¹³⁴ Obrknezevic, op. cit., p. 19-20.

¹³⁵ See for more details about the Croatian Orthodox Church *ibid.*, pp. 33-43.

people, (b) to calm frustration and opposition of the Orthodox Serbian people who get very angry about the abolition of the Serbian Orthodox Church, and (c) to control the Orthodox population.

In fact, the Ustasha movement tried to destroy Serb nation, culture and identity in order to create "Greater Croatia" of "Greater Croatian Nation" that would be culturally and ethnically pure. Pavelic declared this aim openly, in 1942, by boasting "*Great deeds were done by Germans and Croats together. We can proudly say that we succeeded in breaking the Serb nation, which, after the English, is the most thick-headed, the most stubborn and the most stupid.*"¹³⁶

On April 17, when Yugoslavia surrendered, a decree was issued which established courts empowered to impose the death penalty for any person who spoke against regime and supported the YCP. On April 25, another decree banned the use of the Cyrillic alphabet and designed the Serbian Orthodox church as the "Greek Eastern faith". Also, in the same day, Jews were ordered to wear identifying patches. Furthermore, Jews were identified as "non-Aryans" in the decree of April 30 and, on June 4, they were banned from public facilities. In the same date, the Serbs in the NDH began to be deported by the Ustasha force to Serbia.¹³⁷

The program of action involved massacre of Serbs, Jews and Gypsies who lived within the NDH. The Jews of Zagreb and Sarajevo were killed or sent to concentration camps or deported to Poland for extermination. Fascist Ustasha movement also attacked and slaughtered Serbs. Like Jews, Serbs were sent to concentration camps. The most infamous camp was at Jasenovac on the Sava river, on the border of Bosnia. Today, the name Jasenovac has the same meaning for Serbs as that of Auschwitz has for Jews. Serbs were offered the choice between conversion from Orthodoxy to Catholicism or death. Especially, in the Serb-Croat villages, very brutal violence took place; a lot of Serbs were herded into Orthodox churches and burned alive.

The first massacre carried out on 28 April 1941 in the village of Gudovac, a mixed town of Serbs and Croats, where 187 Serbs were killed by the Ustasha. The Glina

¹³⁶ Stavrianos, op. cit., p. 772.

¹³⁷ Lampe, op. cit., pp. 204-205.

massacre was the second massacre that killed 300 Serbs on 10-11 May. This massacre is described by Svetozar Babic who was a fourteen-year-old Serb from Glina in Croatia when the NDH was proclaimed on 10 April 1941:

“When the war began I remember the German troops passing through. There was no defense, no fighting, they just passed through. Then the Croats nationalized our shop and those of the other Serbs and Jews without any right to compensation. But there was no threat to anyone’s life. Early in May they took away the five or six Jewish families. We thought ‘Okay, they are against the Jews, but we are Christians’. We did not think they were against us. Then came the night of the 10-11 May. Ustasha, not locals, men with guns came knocking on doors at midnight asking who was in the house. They took my father and my brother. My mother lied and said I was twelve which saved my life. They said it was for an investigation, and there was already a line of people outside on the street. On the next day we were allowed to bring food to the prisoners, but on the 13th they told us that they had all been taken away to Germany to work. A few days later we heard that they had all been killed.”¹³⁸

Another witness of the massacre is Professor Milorad Ekmečić, a Serb historian who helped foundation of the Serbian Democratic Party in Bosnia in 1990, explains what happened in his village of Prebilovici in Herzegovina:

“In 1941 when the great massacre started a neighbor killed my father, my uncles and others. Seventy-eight members of my family were killed. The youngest was Andjelina aged four months and the oldest was my seventy-seven-year-old grandfather. Those who remained created the first Partisan unit.”¹³⁹

Also, Croatian Bishop Misić of Mostar wrote the massacre in his letter to Archbishop Stepinac:

“Men are captured like animals, they are slaughtered, murdered, living men are thrown off cliffs. . . . From Mostar and from Capljina a train took six carloads of mothers, young girls, and children to Surmanic. . . . They were led up the mountains and the mothers together with their children were thrown alive off the precipices. . . . In the town of Mostar itself they have been bound by the hundreds, taken in wagons outside the

¹³⁸ Judah, op. cit., p. 125.

town and shot down like animals."¹⁴⁰

There is no a certain number of people who was killed by the Ustasha regime during the World War II but there were some estimates. Estimates of the number of Serbs killed vary from 300,000 to more than a million. According to Serbian Orthodox Church, between 1941 and 1942, about 800,000 Serbs were killed, about 300,000 were driven out, and about 250,000 were converted by force to Catholicism in Croatia. Furthermore, the number of Jews killed was about 50,000 and the number of Gypsies killed was nearly 20,000. However, according to John Lampe, 26,000 Jews and 300,000 Serbs were killed, and around 180,000 Serbs were expelled from the NDH to Serbia. Jozo Tomasevich asserts that 350,000 Serbs were killed and between 200,000 – 300,000 Serbs were converted to Roman Catholicism. Vladimir Zerjavic calculates the number of Serbs killed during the Ustasha regime as 330,000. Also, according to Noel Malcolm 12,000 Bosnian Jews were killed by the Ustasha.¹⁴¹

In this bloody work, the Ustasha had the assistance of many of the Bosniak population. The majority of Bosniaks recognized the NDH dominated by the fascist Ustasha Party, and many enlisted in the service of the state apparatus. For example, *Narodna Uzdanica*, a Bosniak cultural association, led by Felmi Spaho, collaborated with the Ustasha and recognized the NDH. Also, Cafer Kulenovic, leader of the Yugoslav Muslim Organization, was assigned as vice premier of the Ustasha government in November 1941.¹⁴²

Furthermore, Bosniak Huska Miljovic from the Muslim district of Gazin in Croatia formed a military group and joined the Home Guard. But he left the Ustasha and joined the Partisans in 1943. Huska Miljovic was killed by the Ustasha in May 1944.¹⁴³ More important is that, many Bosniaks assisted the Ustasha fascist policy and played active role in the massacre of Serbs, Gypsies and Jews.¹⁴⁴ That is, some Bosniaks joined

¹³⁹ Ibid., p. 127.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 127

¹⁴¹ See for these figures Lampe, op. cit., pp. 206-207 ; Vuckovic, op. cit., pp. 101-102 ; Tomasevich, op. cit., pp. 78-79 ; Klemencic & Zagar, p. 169 and Malcolm, Noel, *Bosna*, trans. Aşkim Karadağlı, Istanbul: Om Yayinevi, 1999, p.281.

¹⁴² Malcolm, op. cit., p. 295.

¹⁴³ Shoup, op. cit., p. 67.

¹⁴⁴ Vucinich, "Nationalism and Communism", op. cit., p. 276.

in the massacres through establishing alliance with the Ustasha regime against both the Orthodox Serbs and the Jews.

Also, some Bosniaks collaborated with the occupying German army against both Chetniks and Partisans. Germany formed a Bosniak military unit, *Hancer*, in April 1941. The *Hancer* was commanded by Himmler, a SS leader. It consisted of 21,000 Bosniak soldiers. The German promise for foundation of an independent Bosnian Muslim state played an influential role in the establishment of Bosniak collaboration with Germany. The *Hancer* was used by Germany and by the NDH in order to suppress Chetnik and Partisan uprisings. Also, in spring 1944, the *Hancer* attacked and massacred Serbs in Tuzla, Gradacac, Brcko, Bijeljina and Zvornic.

But also, some Bosniaks left the *Hancer* and joined Partisan troops. For example, Hafiz Panca at first left the *Hancer* and formed his own military unit, that consisted of poor Bosniak peasants, against the Ustasha and the Chetniks; then joined the Partisan troops led by YCP. In 1944, the number of Bosniak warriors who joined Partisans increased considerably, and military discipline in the *Hancer* was weakened dramatically. Finally, the *Hancer* was disbanded by Germany in the late 1944.¹⁴⁵

There were also Bosniaks who were against the Ustasha and the Germans. They opposed and condemned the massacres of Serbs, Jews and Gypsies. For example, Bosniaks drafted resolutions in Sarajevo, Tuzla, Banja Luka, and Bijeljina and protested the persecution of Serbs. Also, they, in those towns, hidden 2,000 Jews and rescued them from massacre.¹⁴⁶ In return, the Bosniaks who opposed the Ustasha regime became target of the Home Guard. For example, in July-August 1941, 1100 Bosniaks in Bilece and Visegrad were killed by the Ustasha army because of their opposition against the Ustasha regime.¹⁴⁷

On the other hand, the Ustasha brutality and massacre upon the Serb population resulted in a division of opinion among German officials. The commander of the occupation forces, General Edmund von Glaise-Horstenau, wanted to end the Ustasha terrorism and violence upon the Serbs for he believed that the policy of annihilation of the

¹⁴⁵ See for the *Hancer* Malcolm, op. cit., pp. 301-303 and Bora, *Bosna-Hersek: ...*, op. cit., p. 41.

¹⁴⁶ Lampe, op. cit., p. 208.

¹⁴⁷ Malcolm, op. cit., p. 282.

Serbs created anarchy that damaged the Germany military interests. Also, he maintained that, the Ustasha tyranny on the Serbs provoked and sharpened them to rebel against the Germans since Germany supported the foundation of the NDH. For this reason, General Horstenau proposed to hinder the massacre of Serbs by the Ustasha. However, he was opposed by Kasche, who had close connection with Pavelic and who was convinced that the Ustasha was the only Croatian group whom the Axis could rely. Hence, he wanted to support the Ustasha regime and its policies as a whole.¹⁴⁸

This Ustasha savagery upon the Serbs damaged the Yugoslav idea and put it into jeopardy, as indeed, the jeopardy of *Yugoslavism* was aimed and wished by both the Axis and the Ustasha. Serbs were maddened by the horrifying news from Croatia, and they blamed not only the fascist Ustasha men who followed Pavelic and who were supported by the Axis for savagery on Serb population, but also blamed the Croat nation as a whole. In other words, Serbian public opinion and politicians did not only charge the Ustasha Party for the brutality and the massacres upon Serb nation but also charged Croat nation as a whole. Mad Serbs retaliated wherever they could, and they exacted bloody vengeance from Croats. For example, in September 1942, Chetniks under the command of the priest Momcilo Djujic killed 200 Croats in the village of Gata near Split.¹⁴⁹

Unquestionably, these mutual massacres among the Ustasha and the Chetniks affected negatively and deteriorated relations between Serbs and Croats. The Ustasha brutality upon Serbs and Serbian retaliation against Croats feed and sharpen the *Serbo-Croat conflict* and weakened *Yugoslavism* both on ideological and practical levels.

III. 3. Serbian Nationalism in the Second World War

After the occupation of Yugoslavia and the surrender of the Yugoslav army on 17 April 1941, Serbian nationalism had three actors: (1) the Serbian puppet state led by General Milan Nedic, (2) the Yugoslav government-in-exile that was installed in London with aid of the British government, and (3) the Chetnik movement that was organized and led by Colonel Draza Mihalicovic. These actors were the three representatives of the Serbian nationalism in the period of World War II.

¹⁴⁸ Jelavic, op. cit., p. 265.

¹⁴⁹ Judah, op. cit., p. 129.

III. 3. i. The Serbian Puppet State

After the occupation of Belgrade by German and Bulgarian troops, a Serbian puppet state was established by Germany. The territory of the puppet Serb state was about the same as that of the old Kingdom of Serbia before the first Balkan War, with a population of about 4,000,000.¹⁵⁰

This state was governed by the Commissariat between May-August 1941, and by the Milan Nedic government until October 1944 when it was destroyed by the communist Partisans. Nedic, the former Yugoslav Minister of the Army, Navy, and Air Force and the Chief of General Staff, was appointed by the Germans as prime minister of the state. The cabinet of the Serbian puppet state, that was formed and led by Prime Minister Nedic, has competence only in those matters which were "the concern of the Serbs themselves."

Unlike puppet the NDH, puppet Serbian state had no foreign ministry. However, like the NDH, it had a army, the *Serbian State Guard* (SSG), with 30,000 soldiers, of whom 12,000 were contingent on fascist Serbian leader Dimitrije Ljotic, leader of fascist Zbor (Rally) Party¹⁵¹ and 13,400 were contingent on Kosta Pecanac, a White Russian militiaman.¹⁵² Although the Nedic government and army served Germany, the Germans regarded the Serbs as defeated enemies, but the Ustasha government and the Croats as rewarded allies.

Main task of the Nedic government was to maintain order. This means that the Nedic government fought against the resistance that came from Serbian peasants against both the Germans and the NDH. Therefore, the SSG was not used to liberate Serbia and Serbs from the Axis occupation, but used to suppress the Serbian peasantry uprisings although Nedic called his regime the "*Government of National Salvation*". That is, there was a sharp inconsistency between the name of the regime and the policies of the Nedic government.

Nedic and his government, also, was loyal to King Peter who left the country on 14 April for Greece and now dwelled in London. Nedic considered himself the temporary representative of the exile King Peter, and planned to keep order in Serbia in the name of

¹⁵⁰ Wolff, op. cit., pp. 204.

¹⁵¹ Lampe, op. cit., p. 211.

¹⁵² Judah, op. cit., p. 117.

King Peter until his return to country.

In fact, the real rulers of Serbia were the German military authorities, who retained final veto in all political, administrative, and economic matters, and who applied German and martial law. This law divided the country into fourteen districts, and installed a regular central and local military government. Also, in some parts of eastern Serbia, they used Bulgarian troops for garrison duty. That is to say, the Nedic government was used by the Germans to protect military communication routs, to exploit Serbian economy and men power, and also to suppress Serbian peasantry uprisings.

III. 3. ii. The Serb Peasantry Uprisings

After the occupation of Yugoslavia and the collapse of regular Yugoslav government, the Axis forces were unable to control the entire territory effectively and to keep order. Although the Germans established a puppet Serbian state in order to control Serbia, the puppet Nedic government could not keep order in Serbia. On the other hand, the Ustasha regime attacked and massacred Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Therefore, a chaotic and anarchic situation emerged in the country. Thus, the general chaotic situation was most favorable for revolt.

The first uprisings and resistance against the Germans and the Ustasha began in May 1941. These first rebels came from rural Serbs of the Krajina, Dalmatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The rural Serb uprisings were not organized, planned and regular uprisings, and were not led by professional Serbian soldiers and by the Chetnik movement. That is, the first Serbian uprisings came from the Serb peasantry as a reaction to the German and the Ustasha atrocity. The Serb peasant rebels did not only attack on the German and the Ustasha forces but also on Croat peasants.

Also, the Serb peasantry rebels attacked Bosniaks in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Sandzak since, as we have seen, many Bosniaks recognized the Ustasha regime and took active place in the massacre of Serbian peasantry. Thus, the Serb peasantry rebels attacked Bosniaks in order to take revenge. Over one thousand Bosniaks, including women and children, were killed by them in Foca, a town of eastern Bosnia.¹⁵³

The Serbian rural rebels began to attack and damag the German soldiers in May

¹⁵³ Lampe, *op. cit.*, p. 209.

1941. Germany issued a directive on 16 September 1941 as a measure against the Serb peasant uprisings. The Führer's infamous directive of September 1941 stated that all mass uprisings in occupied areas against the Germans must be considered Communist-inspired and Moscow-directed.¹⁵⁴ That is, the uprisings that was not organized by the YCP but by Serb peasants regarded by Germany as communist uprisings. Also, the directive ordered that one hundred hostages were be executed for each German killed and fifty for each wounded. This means that, the Germans decided to take very bitter revenge on Serb peasantry.

This directive was actually applied only in Serbia, and produced bloody results. In October 1941, ten German soldiers were killed and twenty-six were wounded by Serb rebels in Kragujevac, a industrial town of Serbia. In reprisal, the Germans killed 7,000 the town's inhabitants, including school children. Following sentences describes the German massacre at Kragujevac:

*"Workers and shopkeepers, waiters, taxi-cab drivers and newspaper vendors, Jews and gypsies, priest and doctors, the head-master of the secondary school with his teaching staff and all pupils of the fifth to eighth class, the entire personnel of the local law court including the magistrate, lawyers, clerks, jailers, witnesses and prisoners – all were herded off by German troops to the number of seven thousand. The next morning the mass executions began. The victims were mown down by machine gun fire in batches of forty. The massacre was only stayed to keep some six hundred as hostages and release another few hundred to their homes to tell the tale of horror."*¹⁵⁵

III. 3. iii. The Chetnik Movement

The first organized Serbian uprising against both the Germans and the Ustasha regime came from the Chetniks led by the former Yugoslav General Staff Colonel Draza Mihailovic. The Chetnik movement was the most important and influential Serbian nationalist figure in this era. That is, the main representative of the Serb nationalism in the war period was the Chetnik movement under leadership of Colonel Mihailovic.

Chetniks (in the Serbo-Croat language *četnici*) means bands of irregular guerrilla

¹⁵⁴ See for this directive Jelavic, op. cit., p. 268 and Tomasevich, op. cit., p. 90.

¹⁵⁵ Costa, Nicholas J., *Shattered Illusions: Albania, Greece and Yugoslavia*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1998, p. 56.

fighters. So, a *chetnik* is a member of a guerrilla band. The Chetnik tradition originated during the time of the Ottoman Empire, when bands of Chetniks were formed to fight the Ottoman occupation in Serbia. These bands were first organized into recognizable military formations during the Balkan Wars. During World War I, they became an integral part of the Royal Serbian Army, often operating as special forces behind enemy.¹⁵⁶ These nationalist and royalist Chetnik bands in Serbia and Montenegro reemerged under the command of Mihailovic in the Second World War.

When Yugoslav army surrendered, some Serbian commanders did not obey the armistice of 17 April 1941 and took to Serbia mountains in order to organize a resistance against the Axis occupation. Mihailovic was one of those who did not accept the surrender and who withdrew to mountains to start guerilla warfare against the occupying armies. When the armistice was signed between Yugoslavia and Germany, Mihailovic was in the town of Doboj in north Bosnia. He and his 80 men decided to go Ravna Gora, a mountain village in southwestern Serbia. They established a center of their activity in Ravna Gora in May.

Mihailovic's objective was first to establish a center of resistance organization, survey and register potential manpower, and assemble some arms; then at an opportune moment go in action. His group was soon joined by a number of other officers who had avoided capture by the Germans in Serbia and recognized Mihailovic as their chief. He called his force "*Cetnicki Odredi Jugoslovenska Vojske*" (Chetnik Detachment of the Yugoslavia).

In October, contact was established between the Mihailovic's force and the Yugoslav government-in-exile, led by prime minister General Simovic and King Peter, in London. Mihailovic declared his loyalty and adherence to the King and the government, and the government appointed him the Minister of the Army, Navy, and Air Force and the Chief of General Staff in January 1942. After this connection, the name of the Mihailovic's force was changed to "*Jugoslovenska Vojska u Otadžbini*" (Yugoslav Army in the Homeland).¹⁵⁷ This army was popularly called and known as the *Chetniks*.

¹⁵⁶ Allcock, Milivojevic, Horton (eds.), op. cit., p. 41.

¹⁵⁷ See Trew, Simon, *Britain, Mihailovic and the Chetniks, 1941-42*, London: Macmillan Press, 1998, pp. 6-8, 101.

The Chetniks were extreme Serbian nationalists and royalist, and the main aim of Chetnik movement was to found a "Greater Serbia" after the liberation of the country from the occupation. The first major programmatic document of the Chetnik Movement, "Homogeneous Serbia" or "Homogeneous Serbian State", was issued on 30 June 1941. It was written by Stevan Moljevic who was political adviser of Mihailovic. The document stressed that the Serbs must first have hegemony in Yugoslavia and then in the Balkans. For this purpose, Serbs must be separated from neighboring peoples through unification of all Serbs within a single Serb State: Greater Serbia. The document explained that the Greater Serbia must involve all Yugoslav lands except Slovenia and the north-western region of Croatia. Also, it would include some territories to be taken from Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Albania. The document aimed to expel Croats from Greater Serbia and to convert Bosniaks to the Orthodox Christianity.¹⁵⁸

Also, the Chetniks were against the Nedic government as, according to them, Nedic and his government were collaborator and traitor. Furthermore, the Chetnik movement was radically anticommunist, anti-Croat and anti-Bosniak because all of them was obstacle for the foundation a royalist and nationalist Greater Serbia.

The Chetniks considered the YCP and Partisans as enemies of Serb nation and "Greater Serbia" since they supported a socialist and federalist union of the Yugoslavs. Moreover, they blamed Croats for the speedy military collapse of Yugoslavia in April 1941, that is, Croats were accused as traitors. In addition to this, the Chetniks were maddened by the Ustasha atrocity upon Serb population in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and they took oath for revenge.

Finally, according to the Chetnik ideology, Bosniaks were Serbs who had been converted to Islamic religion by the Ottoman Empire. For this reason, they maintained that Bosniaks should be reconverted to the Orthodoxy, and if they refused such conversion, they should be expelled from the country or killed.

"Anti-Croatianism, anti-Mohammedanism, and anti-Yugoslavism – this is the ideology of the Serbian Chetniks" said Dr. Zivko Topalovic, who was an important

¹⁵⁸ Mesic, Stjepan, "The Road to War", in Branka Magas & Ivo Zanic (eds.), *The War In Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina*, London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001, p. 4-5.

member of the Chetnik Central National Committee and a representative of Mihailovic in Italy, *“Experience has shown that in addition to mutual extermination the religious-chauvinistic ideology had one basic consequence – it pushed the Serbs, the Croats, and the Mohammedans (Bosniaks) into dependence upon and submission to the foreign conqueror. It was only in this fashion that one could save his own people and struggle against the members of other denominations. The Communists, however, took another way, the way of cooperation of all South Slavs (Yugoslavs) and the way of religious tolerance. They succeeded in finding understanding for this policy among the younger generation of Serbs, Croats, and Mohammedans, especially in the multinational and multi-religious areas.”*¹⁵⁹

Although the Chetniks planned to overcome the Axis occupation and liberate Serbia, they were reluctant to attack the Germans openly and to organize general popular uprising against the German army. Mihailovic feared about the German reprisal against Serbs which would decrease Serb population, and therefore, weaken the position of the Serbs vis-a-vis the other Yugoslav nations. Especially, the German massacre at Kragujevac of October 1941 frightened Mihailovic and shaped his strategy that refused open war and popular uprising against the German army. Therefore, he decided to remain quiet and to keep his resources and power until the day the Allied powers landed in Yugoslavia.

However, the Allies, especially Great Britain, wanted action against the Germans. Therefore, the British government, that supported both the Chetniks and the Yugoslav government-in-exile in London, forced and ordered the Chetniks to sabotage the German supply and communication lines. Both the Yugoslav government and the Chetniks obeyed the British order, and the sabotage campaign against the German army were launched in 1942. The sabotages, which were planned by British Special Operations Executive (SOE) and carried out by the Chetniks, became successful in damaging the German lines of communication and supply. For example, between September and December 1942, the Belgrade-Nis and the Belgrade-Salonica railways were sabotaged successfully by the Chetniks.

¹⁵⁹ Tomasevich, op. cit., p. 87.

The sabotage campaign damaged greatly the Germans in Serbia. Therefore, in 1942, the Germans were becoming increasingly worried about the sabotages and the Chetniks. On 17 July, Heinrich Himmler wrote this issue in his report:

*“The basis of every success in Serbia and in the entire southeast of Europe lies in the annihilation of Mihailovic. Concentrate all your forces on locating Mihailovic and his headquarters so that he can be destroyed. Any means may be used to achieve this end. I expect the smoothest cooperation between all agencies concerned, from the Security Police and Security Service to all other branches of the SS and police.”*¹⁶⁰

While the Chetniks were cooperating with the SOE in the sabotage campaign against the German army, on the other hand, they also cooperated with the Italians, the Germans, the Nedic government and the Ustasha, which were anticommunist and anti-Partisan, in the fighting against the communist Partisans. As we have noted that the Chetniks regarded the Partisans and the YCP as a bitter enemy of “Great Serbia”, and consequently, they, in fact, more attacked the Partisans rather than the occupying armies.

Although Tito proposed to start negotiations between the YCP and the Chetniks, and to establish an alliance against the Axis occupation, Mihailovic and his men refused Tito’s two invitations of September 1941.¹⁶¹ Finally, the Chetniks with aid of the German army and the SSG led by the Nedic government attacked upon the Partisans in November 1941 in order to destroy the Partisan troops in Herzegovina. The Partisans were defeated by the Chetnik-German-Nedic alliance and they withdrew toward the Sandzak.

Also, in 1942, Mihailovic allowed about 12,000 of his Chetniks to be disarmed by the Germans and 40,000 by the Italians. Then, total 52,000 Chetniks were rearmed by the German and the Italian army for fighting against the Partisans. Furthermore, on 19 June 1942, the Ustasha government was obligated by Germany and Italy to supply and maintain the Italian-organized Chetnik forces against the Partisan. That is, the Ustasha and the Chetniks established a cooperation under the command of the Germans and the Italians against the communist Partisans as they considered the YCP and the Partisans the “common enemy”.

¹⁶⁰ Trew, op. cit., p. 150.

¹⁶¹ Wolff, op. cit., p. 213.

After the collapse of Italy in September 1943, the Chetniks began more actively collaborate with the Germans. Finally, the occupying German forces in Serbia and the various important Chetnik commanders signed a armistice agreement, and came to understanding to cooperate against the communist Partisans. The German-Chetnik understanding was welcomed and obeyed by the Nedic government.¹⁶²

This cooperation against the Partisans was stated in the British reports of 6 June 1943: "*It is clear from information available to the War Office that the Chetniks are hopelessly compromised in the relations with the Axis in Herzegovina and Montenegro. During the recent fighting in the latter area, it has been the well-organized partisans rather the Chetniks who have been holding down the Axis forces.*"¹⁶³

This quotation from the report does not show only such cooperation against the Partisans, but also shows the British frustration about the cooperation between the Chetniks and the Axis. Furthermore, this report indicates that the main power which fought against the occupation was not the Chetniks but the communist Partisans.

Also, the Chetnik movement attacked and massacred Croats and Bosniaks in order to take revenge and to create a "homogenous Greater Serbia" after the war. For example, the Chetniks under the command of Momcilo Djujic killed 200 Croats in Gata near Split in September 1942.¹⁶⁴ Pavle Djuriscic, the Chetnik leader in Sandzak, attacked and massacred the Sandzak Bosniaks, many of them innocent villagers. The most infamous Chetnik massacre upon Bosniaks was carried out in Foca, a town in southeastern Bosnia. 2,000 Bosniaks in August 1942 and 9,000 Bosniaks in February 1943 were killed by the Chetniks in Foca.¹⁶⁵

However, it is very interesting that, although Bosniak population was attacked and massacred by the Chetniks, many Bosniaks collaborated with the Chetniks. For example, *Gajret* (a Bosniak cultural association) collaborated with the Chetniks. Furthermore, in January 1943, there were 4,000 Bosniak militiamen, that formed 8 percent of the army, in Mihailovic's army.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶² See Tomasevich, op. cit., pp. 91-93

¹⁶³ Stavrianos, op. cit., p. 780.

¹⁶⁴ Judah, op. cit., p. 129.

¹⁶⁵ Malcolm, op. cit., p. 298

¹⁶⁶ Ibid., pp. 295, 299.

But also, Bosniak population supported and joined the Partisans with aim of fighting against the occupying forces, the Ustasha and the Chetniks who massacred them. For example, the first Bosniak Partisan unit was formed in August 1941 in Bosnia. Moreover, the Eighth Partisan Brigade was formed by Bosniaks in December 1942 in Bosnia under the command of Bosniak Osman Karabegovic. Furthermore, Nurija Pozderac, a distinguish Bosniak politician, was loyal follower of Tito and supported the Partisan movement although the Bosniak clerics, who had great impact on the Bosniak population, were extremely anticommunist.¹⁶⁷

III. 3. iv. The Yugoslav Government-In-Exile

Another actor of the Serb nationalism during the war was the Yugoslav government-in-exile. As we have seen, the Simovic government and King Peter left the country on 14 and 15 April. They first went to Greece and then Palestine. The Yugoslav government finally settled in London in June 1941. The Yugoslav government-in-exile was led by General Simovic until January 1942, and by Slobodan Jovanovic between January 1942-June 1943. Jovanovic was succeeded by Milos Trifunovic in June 1943, and soon after Bozidar Puric succeed Trifunovic. All of the premiers and their governments were the Serbian nationalists, and supported Mihailovic's Chetniks. Like the Chetniks, they refused any effort to come to terms with the Partisans since they aimed to restore the prewar socio-political order and the Karadjordjevic dynasty.

Also, the Yugoslav government-in-exile was extremely against the NDH. On 3 October 1942, the Yugoslav government claimed that the Ustasha regime killed 340,000 Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina. For this reason, General Simovic proposed the British government to bomb Zagreb in reprisal for the Ustasha action; however, this proposal did not accepted by the British government.¹⁶⁸

The Yugoslav government-in-exile was supported and highly oriented by the British government. The two government backed Mihailovic's Chetniks until 1944. The government-in-exile and Mihailovic came to agreement in creating "Greater Serbia", and for this purpose, the Chetnik offense upon the Partisan, Croats and Bosniaks was

¹⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 297-298.

¹⁶⁸ See Trew, op. cit., pp. 67-68.

approved and supported by the government-in-exile. Also, this collaboration between the Yugoslav government and the Chetniks was supported by the British government until 1944. For example, on 15 November 1942, General Simovic, broadcasting on the BBC, described Mihailovic as “*commander of all Yugoslav armed forces that are fighting in the country*”. In the same day, the British government declared that military aid would be sent to Mihailovic exclusively, but not to Tito.¹⁶⁹ Both the Yugoslav and the British governments used BBC to propagandize the Chetniks.¹⁷⁰

However, in 1943, the British government’s attitude to Mihailovic began to change because of his collaboration with the Germans. In December 1943, the British government asked the Chetniks to undertake some sabotage operations against the Germans in Serbia, however the British demand was refused by Mihailovic. The Mihailovic’s refusal annoyed greatly the British government.¹⁷¹

It was more important that, during these months, pro-Partisan sentiment became more and more manifest among the Yugoslav military and naval forces of the government -in-exile in Egypt and Libya. Some soldiers and officers escaped to Yugoslavia for joining the Partisans because they were discontented with Mihailovic who collaborated with the enemy and admired Tito who fought against the enemy. Furthermore, General Simovic, who had been succeeded by Jovanovic in January 1942, publicly announced his support for Tito.¹⁷²

On the other hand, Mihailovic assembled a meeting in Ba in January 1944. This meeting, the Congress of St. Sava, aimed to liberalize the program of the Chetnik movement in order to attract the British government and wider Yugoslav support. For this purpose, the Congress passed a resolution in favor of federalism, constitutional monarchy, and social and economic reforms. In the congress, Mihailovic did not talk about “Greater Serbia”, but maintained a federal and democratic Yugoslavia.¹⁷³ However, by this time such resolution was too late. The British government already had discounted the Chetniks as a resistance force, while the Partisans were so strong entrenched in so

¹⁶⁹ See Judah, op. cit., p. 119.

¹⁷⁰ See Trew, op. cit., p. 167

¹⁷¹ Tomasevich, op. cit., p. 102.

¹⁷² See Wolff, op. cit., p. 127.

¹⁷³ See Stavrianos, op. cit., p. 780 and Lampe, op. cit., p. 220.

many parts of country, and they already attracted the Yugoslav community greatly.

Finally, the British advised King Peter to oust Prime Minister Puric, and to replace him with a moderate. As a result of the British pressure, the King dismissed Puric and appointed Croat Ivan Subasic, who was a follower of Macek and who had been Ban of the Croatian Banovina created by the Sporazum, prime minister of the government-in-exile on 1 June 1944. So, Subasic became only non-Serb Prime Minister of the Yugoslav government in-exile. Also, King Peter, under the British pressure, expressed his admiration for those who fought against the German invaders and who refused compromise with the enemy, and ordered the Subasic government to establish contact and to develop negotiations with all resistance elements in Yugoslavia, including the Partisans.¹⁷⁴

Thus, the Puric regime, Mihailovic and the followers of Greater Serbia were dismissed together and the King entrusted to Subasic the negotiations with Tito. This radical revision in the Yugoslav government-in-exile was forced and supported by the British government. That is, not only the Yugoslav government-in-exile but also the British government ceased its support to the Chetniks, and the British began to support the Partisans in 1944.

It is certain that Great Britain did not desire a socialist revolution in Yugoslavia and the YCP sovereignty in Yugoslavia after the war. For this reason, the British government, at the beginning, supported the partnership of the Chetniks and Yugoslav government-in-exile against the Partisan movement led by the YCP. However, at the end of the war, the British policy changed and it began to support the communist Partisans.

There were three main reason why the British government ceased to supply the Chetniks and launched support to the Partisans in 1944:

1)The Chetniks fought against the Partisans, Croats and Bosniaks rather than the Germans. However, during the war for the British, the first enemy was Germany, but not the communist Partisans. Therefore, the British government wanted, first of all, an effective and consistent fight against the Germans. But, the Chetniks collaborated with the Axis armies in order to destroy the communists, and this collaboration frustrated the

¹⁷⁴ Wolff, op. cit., p. 128.

British government. In the House of Commons, Prime Minister Churchill declared openly why the British government ended its support to the Chetniks: *"The reason why we have ceased to supply Mihailovic with arms and support is a simple one. He has not been fighting the enemy, and moreover, some of his subordinates have been making accommodations with the enemy."*¹⁷⁵

2) Although the British government was extreme anticommunist and did not want any socialist revolution in the Balkans, it began to support the communist Partisans in 1944 since they became more successful than the Chetniks in fighting and damaging the Germans during the war. That is, for the British, killing the Germans was more important than ideology and politics during the war. *"My task"* said Churchill *"was simply to help find out who was killing the most Germans and suggest means by which we could help them to kill more. Politics must be a secondary consideration."*¹⁷⁶

3) The Soviet Union's pressure upon the British government was the third reason for the change in the British attitude to the communist Partisan. The Soviet Union, which was very important alliance against the Germans for the British, criticized extremely both the British and the Yugoslav government-in-exile why they supported the Mihailovic but not Tito, and forced them to shift their aid from the Chetniks to the Partisans. This Soviet pressure upon the British government played an important role in the change of the British policy.

During the war, the three actors of the Serb nationalism had two aims: (1) to liberate the country from the Axis occupation and (2) to restore the prewar social, political and economic order and to reestablish the Karadjordjevic dynasty on the basis of Greater Serbia. Especially, the Mihailovic's Chetniks regarded the foundation of Greater Serbia as the main task. For this reason, they attacked on the Partisans, Croats and Bosniaks during the war, and these attacks were supported by the Yugoslav government-in-exile and by the puppet Nedic government. Naturally, like the Ustasha savagery upon Serbs, the Chetnik savagery upon Croats and Bosniaks affected negatively and weakened the Yugoslav idea (Yugoslavism), that aimed the foundation of Yugoslav (South Slav)

¹⁷⁵ Maclean, Fitzroy, *Eastern Approaches*, London: Jonathan Cape, 1949, p. 437-438.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 281.

union within a single Yugoslav state. Also, unquestionable, the Chetnik massacre and brutality upon Croat population deteriorated the relations between the two nation, and deepened the Serbo-Croat conflict.

III. 4. The Yugoslav Communist Party and the Partisan Movement

The Yugoslav Communist Party (YCP) was the first real Yugoslav party in the Yugoslav political history because of three reasons:

- 1) The YCP has extremely opposed nationalism that damaged the Yugoslav union. Especially, the party has struggled against the Serbian and the Croatian nationalism that weakened and paralyzed the Yugoslav idea.
- 2) The members of the YCP have come from all Yugoslav nations. That is, it has not depended upon a particular nation but upon all Yugoslav nations.
- 3) The party has struggled to feed the Yugoslav idea, that has been damaged greatly by the Serbo-Croat conflict, and to realize this idea on the basis of a federal and socialist Yugoslavia which must recognize the rights of self-determination and secession for all Yugoslav nations.

On the other hand, during the Second World War, the Partisan movement was the real Yugoslav resistance against the Axis occupation owing to four reasons:

- 1) The Partisan movement, like the YCP, did not base on a single nation but on all Yugoslav nations. In other words, it recruited its warriors from all Yugoslav nations.
- 2) The Partisans fought consistently against the armies of occupation, and they, unlike the Ustasha and the Chetniks, has never collaborated with the occupying forces. The British Prime Minister Churchill wrote in his report of February 22, 1944 that "*the partisans of Marshal Tito are the only people who are doing any fighting the Germans now.*"¹⁷⁷
- 3) The Partisans also fought against the Ustasha movement, that aimed to create a Great Croatia, and against the Chetnik movement, that aimed to create a Great Serbia.
- 4) Finally, unlike the Yugoslav government-in-exile, the Partisan movement under the YCP's leadership did not submit to London.

During the war, this real Yugoslav resistance against the Axis occupation, the Partisan movement led by the YCP, showed enormous effort, will, self-discipline and

¹⁷⁷ Stavrianos, op., cit., p. 782.

sacrifice for (a) liberation of the country from the Axis occupation and for (b) creation of Yugoslav union. This distinguished effort, will, self-discipline and sacrifice was described and admired by Brigadier Fitzroy Maclean, the head of the British Mission to the Partisan headquarters:

“Living as we did amongst the Partisans, we came to know them well, from Tito and the other leaders to dozen or so rank and file who acted as our bodyguard and provided for our daily needs. All had one thing in common: an intense pride in their movement and its achievements. For them the outside world did not seem of immediate interest or importance. What mattered was their War of National Liberation, their struggle against the invader, their victories, their sacrifices. Of this they were proudest of all, that they owed nothing to anyone; that they had got so far without outside help. . . With this pride went a spirit of dedication, hard not to admire. The life of every one of them was ruled by rigid self-discipline, complete austerity; no drinking, no looting, no love-making. It was as though each one of them were bound by a vow, a vow part ideological and part military, for, in the conditions under which they were fighting, any relaxation of discipline would have been disastrous; nor could private desires and feeling be allowed to count for anything.”¹⁷⁸

Also, Milovan Djilas, the commandant of the Partisan troops in Montenegro and the leader of Montenegrin branch of the YCP, describes and commends the communist Partisan in his book:

“History does not have many movements that, like Communism,” writes Djilas by referring to the YCP and the Partisan movement, *“began their climb with such high moral principles and with such devoted, enthusiastic, and clever fighters, attached to each other not only by ideas and suffering, but also by selfless love, comradeship, solidarity, and that warm and direct sincerity that can be produced only by battles in which men are doomed either to win or die. Cooperative efforts, thoughts, and desire; even the most intense effort to attain the same method of thinking and feeling, the finding of personal happiness and the building of individuality through complete devotion to the party and workers’ collective; enthusiastic sacrificing for others; care*

¹⁷⁸ Maclean, *Eastern Approaches*, op. cit., pp. 324-325.

and protection for the young, and tender respect for the old.” Furthermore, Djilas explains us the role of women in the Partisan movement: *“Communist woman too is more than a comrade or co-fighter. It can never be forgotten that she, on entering the movement, decided to sacrifice all – the happiness of both love and of motherhood. Between men and women in the movement, a clean, modest and warm relationship is fostered: a relationship in which comradely care has become sexless passion. Loyalty, mutual aid, frankness about even the most intimate thoughts – these are ideal Communists.”*¹⁷⁹

When the Second World War began in September 1939, the YCP declared that this war was the struggle between the Western imperialist states, such as Great Britain and France, and the Fascist powers. Thus, according to the YCP, Yugoslavia should declared its neutrality in this war; and the party urged the Cvetkovic-Macek government for neutrality. When the government signed the agreement with Germany on 25 March 1941, the YCP opposed the agreement and enforced active policy in the campaign against Yugoslavia’s participation in the Tripartite Pact. Also, the coup of 27 March against the Cvetkovic-Macek government was supported by the party. After the formation of the Simovic government, the party urged the government to recognize and to establish alliance with the Soviet Union.¹⁸⁰

In November 1940, the Fifth Conference of the YCP was held in Zagreb. A new central committee, including Slovene Edvard Kardelj, Serbian Aleksander Rankovic and Montenegrin Milovan Djilas, was elected. The conference described the war as the Second Imperialist War between imperialist rivals groups, and favored the policy of neutrality. Moreover, the conference emphasized that *“everything must be done to stop Yugoslavia from being dragged into the conflict.”*¹⁸¹

After the occupation of Yugoslavia by the Axis armies in April 1941, the YCP organized a meeting in May 1941. The meeting protested the Axis occupation and dismemberment of the country. Also, the party took decision to establish a Popular Front

¹⁷⁹ Djilas, Milovan, *The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System*, London: Thames and Hudson, 1957. p. 153.

¹⁸⁰ See Shoup, op. cit., pp. 47-48.

¹⁸¹ Maclean, *Tito: ...*, op. cit., p. 42.

against the occupation.

At the meeting of the Central Committee of the YCP in June 1941, *Narodno Oslobodilacki Front* (the People's Liberation Front) and *Narodno Oslobodilacki Partizanski Odredi* (People's Liberation Partisan Detachments) were formed, and Tito was elected commander of the Partisan detachments. Furthermore, the meeting of June 1941 ordered to establish *Narodno Oslobodilacki Odbori* (the People's Liberation Committees).

Thus, the first Partisan detachments led by the YCP were formed in the summer of 1941. They aimed firstly to liberate the country, and then to achieve socialist revolution in the country. Therefore, the Partisans fought against both the occupying Axis armies and against the Chetniks, the Ustasha and the puppet Nedic government. That is, the Partisan movement conducted its military operations in order to liberate the country and to achieve socialist revolution. Hence, the Partisan movement involved both military and politically objectives during the war.¹⁸²

At the same time, the first local People's Liberation Committees were established in the Serb villages in the summer of 1941. The Committees had seven main duties and functions during the war: (1) to unite people in the fight against the occupiers and their local accessories; (2) to supply the Partisans with food and other necessities; (3) to supervise rationing and deal with such economic matters; (4) to care for the relatives of the Partisans, for refugees and homeless people; (5) to built up the necessary operational funds and reserves; (6) to conduct local justices; (7) to make appropriations from the wealth citizens for the benefit of the liberation movement and to confiscate the enemy goods.

The People's Liberation Committees were established at the village (*seoski*), municipal (*opstinski*), district (*sreski*) and regional (*zemaljski*) levels. As a rule, each village elected its own committee. Only active followers of the People's Liberation Front would qualify for the election since the committees were not only organs of local power but also organs of the liberation movement. The members of the committees were directly

¹⁸² Klones, N. J., "Tito and the Yugoslav Partisan Movement", in Bertsch & Ganschow (eds.), op. cit., p. 125.

responsible to the people, who had power to convene a voters meeting (*zbor biraca*).¹⁸³

During the war, the Partisans established the People's Liberation Committees in every areas that was captured, and the communists organized their governments in the local areas. The communists called these local committees *narodna vlada* (people's government). The committees continued to function even in areas that Partisans were forced to evacuate before enemy offensives. According to Vladimir Bakarić, these committees involved the some characteristics of the system of Yugoslav socialist self-management, therefore, they formed nucleus of the system of socialist self-management in Yugoslavia. In other words, he indicates that the People's Liberation Committees were the predecessor of the socialist self-management in Yugoslavia.¹⁸⁴

On 26 September 1941, the Conference of the Central Committee of the YCP and of the Chief Headquarters of the People's Liberation Partisan Detachments of Yugoslavia was held in Stolice in western Serbia. The Conference decided to establish a special Chief Headquarters for each national area (province) in Yugoslavia and to transform the existing Partisan Chief Headquarters into Supreme Headquarters of the Partisan Detachments. This decision decentralized the Partisan activity in order to make the Partisans less vulnerable to the enemy offense and to left them free to adapt to local conditions. Also, the conference declared the People's Liberation Committees as the "carriers of the civilian government in liberated territories" and "assistant of the People's Liberation Front". Finally, the conference took decision to establish *Narodno Oslobodilacki Armija Jugoslavije* (People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia). After the conference, the first Partisan brigade was established on 21 December 1941; and the number of the brigades reached to 28 in November 1942, when the People's Liberation Army of Yugoslavia was established.¹⁸⁵

During the war, the Axis High Command organized seven offensives on the Partisans, and all of them was supported by the Ustasha army, the Chetniks, and the army of puppet Nedić government.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸³ Hondius, op. cit., p.125.

¹⁸⁴ See Nobırdalı, Beyto & Selim, Bedri (eds.), *Çağdaş Bir Önder: Tito, Çağdaş Bir Ülke: Yugoslavia*, İstanbul: Koza Yayınları, 1977, p. 26.

¹⁸⁵ Tomasevich, op. cit., pp. 88-89.

¹⁸⁶ See for the seven Axis offensives against the Partisans Maclean, *Tito: ...*, op. cit., pp. 63-82.

The first offense was conducted in November-December 1941, and drove the Partisans out of Serbia and forced them to retreat to Bosnia, Herzegovina and Montenegro. The second was in January 1942, when the Axis power attacked the Partisans in Bosnia. The third was conducted by the Italians in April-June 1942 in Montenegro against the Montenegrin Partisan units, and drove them into Bosnia. The Partisan counter-attacked successfully and liberated the territory along the Bosnia-Croatia border, including the city of Bihac, where the Supreme Headquarters of the Partisan forces was installed. That is, after the third offensive, Bihac became the Partisan political center.

The YCP and the Partisans convened an assembly of fifty-four representatives of the People's Liberation Front at Bihac on 26-27 November 1942. At the meeting, the Front reconstituted itself into Antifascist Council of People's Liberation of Yugoslavia (*Antifasisticko Vece Narodnog Oslobodjenja Jugoslavije - AVNOJ*).

At the end of the meeting Tito issued the famous *Bihac Manifesto*, including six points. The first point declared the main aim of the Partisans: "*the liberation of the country from the invaders and the achievement of independence and true democratic rights for all the people of Yugoslavia.*" The sixth point, on the other hand, emphasized *Bratstvo i Jedinstvo* (Brotherhood and Unity): "*The National Liberation Movement fully recognizes the national rights of Croats, Slovenes, Serbs, Macedonians and all other regions. It is a movement which is as much Croatian as it Slovene and Serbian. It guarantees that the national rights of all the peoples of Yugoslavia will be preserved.*"¹⁸⁷

The first point shows that the Partisan movement involved both military (*the liberation of the country*) and political (*true democratic rights for all the people*) aims. And, the sixth reveals that the Partisan movement included all Yugoslav nations, and also, recognized and guaranteed the national rights of all Yugoslav nations. These aims and ideas of the Partisan movement were also declared by Tito in his famous article, *the National Question in Yugoslavia*, that was issued in December 1942. In the article, Tito openly declared that the YCP did not fight only against the imperialist powers which damaged and threatened the independence and the unity of Yugoslav peoples, but also against the Serbian nationalism and hegemony which aimed to suppress and exploit other

¹⁸⁷ See for the other four points Costa, op. cit., p. 120.

Yugoslav peoples.¹⁸⁸

Also, the YCP and the Partisan movement were in favor of the equality of women; and consequently, they were able, unlike the Chetniks and the Ustasha, to attract the Yugoslav women's support. For purpose of organizing the mass support of women, the YCP gave the initiative for the establishment of "antifascist women's organizations". At the national conference of these organization on 6-8 December 1942 at Bosanski Petrovac, they founded *Antifasisticki Front Zena Jugoslavije* (Antifascist Front of Women). During the war, women became equal to men in political and military activity, and about 100,000 women went through the ranks of the Partisan military forces, of whom about 25,000 lost their lives in the fighting.¹⁸⁹ However, the Chetniks and the Ustasha regime continued to treat women as citizens without rights, and for this reason, they could not attract the Yugoslav women.

The Bihac meeting was followed by the fourth and fifth Axis offensives upon the Partisans. The fourth offensive continued from January to March in 1943. The Partisans were able to break the fourth offensive and especially to damage the Chetnik troops. The Chetniks were eliminated for good as a serious military force. Soon after the fiasco of the fourth offensive, with additional forces in which Bulgarian troops were also included, the Germans and Italians mounted the fifth offensive against the Partisans in May and June 1943. At this time the Partisan force of about 20,000 men under Tito's personal command fought against 120,000 Axis men. The Axis forces aimed to encircle the Partisan in northwestern Bosnia and then to destroy. But the Partisans at first broke the encirclement and then counterattacked into northeastern Bosnia. The Axis objective of annihilation of the Partisans was thwarted again. In the following months, the Partisans moved to back northwestern Bosnia, maintained their the Supreme Headquarters in Bihac.

The surrender of Italy in September 1943 strengthened the position of the Partisans because, after the collapse of Italy, the Partisans disarmed six Italian divisions and captured their weapons and other equipment. By November 1943, the Partisan forces

¹⁸⁸ See Nobirdali & Selim, op. cit., pp. 81-82.

¹⁸⁹ Tomasevic, op. cit., p. 97.

reached to 80,000 men and liberated large parts of Slovenia, the Croatian littoral, Dalmatia, Macedonia, Bosnia, Herzegovina and Montenegro.¹⁹⁰

On 29-30 November 1943, after the Partisan military success against the Axis and the quisling armies, the Partisans and the YCP convened the second session of AVNOJ in Jajce in Bosnia. Briefly, AVNOJ (1) declared itself the supreme legislative and executive organ of Yugoslavia and the supreme representative of Yugoslav sovereignty, (2) established the National Committee of Liberation of Yugoslavia as its executive organ, with all attributes of a national government, (3) declared void all claims of the Yugoslav government-in-exile to being a legitimate government and the claim to the right to represent Yugoslavia abroad, (4) declared all treaties and agreements that had been signed by the government-in-exile to be subject to reexamination for annulment, acceptance or renegotiations, (5) prohibited King Peter from returning to the country until the problem of the monarchy should be solved by the people by their own free will after the liberation of the country, (6) gave approval to all decisions made previously by the Executive Committee of AVNOJ and the Supreme Headquarters of the People's Liberation Army, (7) expressed gratitude to the People's Liberation Army and the Partisan detachments for the struggle against the Axis and the collaborators, (8) declared that Yugoslavia had never accepted the dismemberment of the country in April 1941, and finally, (9) declared that Yugoslavia would be reorganized on democratic federalist principles as a state of equal nations.¹⁹¹ Also, the session bestowed upon Tito the title of Marshal of Yugoslavia.

In the first session of Bihac, AVNOJ did not declare itself a government, but the second session of Jajce did this. Hence, in the light of these points, it is clear that the second session of AVNOJ established a new revolutionary government in Yugoslavia which was dominated by communists and which challenged the government-in-exile.

After the second session of Jajce, Germany launched the sixth offensive in December 1943 in order to destroy the Partisan troops in Bosnia, Croatia and Dalmatia. There were total 360,000 men in the Axis force, including 200,000 Germans and 160,000

¹⁹⁰ Stavrianos, op. cit., p. 781.

¹⁹¹ See for the second session of AVNOJ Maclean, *Disputed Barricade: ...*, op. cit. pp. 254-247 ; Hondius, op. cit., pp. 129-130 and Nobirdali & Selim, op. cit., pp. 83-87.

Bulgarians.¹⁹² Also, the Home Guard, the SSG, and the Chetniks took active role in the sixth offensive.

The strong Axis forces forced the Partisans to abandon most of Dalmatia, the offshore islands, and certain inland regions. But, as in the past, the Partisans were able to counterattack, and in January 1944, they regained much of the lost territory and made advances. The seventh and last offensive against the communists started on 25 May 1944 with a German airborne attack on Tito's headquarters in Drava. But, as in the other offensive, the last offensive could not kill Tito and destroy the Partisan force. That is, the communist Partisans were able to protect and to increase their power continuously during the war despite the seven Axis offensives that were supported by the Ustasha, the Chetniks and the Nedic government.

On the other hand, as we have seen that, King Peter under the British government dismissed the Puric government and replaced him with Subasic on 1 June 1944. It is more important that the King ordered prime minister Subasic to establish contact and to negotiate with the Partisans. The Subasic government obeyed this order; and on 16 June 1944, Marshal Tito and Subasic signed an agreement at the island of Vis off the central Dalmatian coast. Tito and Subasic came to agreement to unify the two government, the National Committee of Liberation of Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav government-in-exile, that is, to establish a unified government.¹⁹³

This agreement was opposed and refused by the Chetniks and pro-Mihailovic politicians. On 12 September 1944, as a response to the opposition, King Peter issued the command over Radio London on ordering the Chetniks to leave Mihailovic and to pass under the command of Marshall Tito.¹⁹⁴ Both the Tito-Subasic agreement and the King's command of 12 September show that the Yugoslav government-in-exile ceased officially its support to Mihailovic.

In the same month, September 1944, Tito visited the USSR, and concluded a agreement with Stalin. This agreement allowed the Red Army to enter Yugoslav territory

¹⁹² Maclean, *Tito: ...*, op. cit., p. 80.

¹⁹³ See for the Tito-Subasic negotiations and agreements *Lanc, Ann, Yugoslavia: When Ideals Collide*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004, p.89-90.

¹⁹⁴ Tomasevich, op. cit., 107.

to pursue the German armies. According to the agreement, Yugoslav civilian authorities would function in areas liberated by the Red Army, and the Red Army would leave Yugoslav territory after the completion of its military operation against the Germans on Yugoslav soil. Thereafter, Tito went to Romania and held talks with a Bulgarian delegation of the Bulgarian Communist Party at the city of Craiova. Tito signed an agreement with the delegation. According to this agreement, Bulgarian forces under the supreme Soviet command would be allowed to operate in Yugoslav territory as Allied forces in the struggle against the retreating Germans.

As a result of these agreements, Red Army, Bulgarian communist army and the Partisans launched a joint operation against the retreating German army. On 20 October 1944, Soviet, Bulgarian and Partisan forces liberated Belgrade. In the military operation, the Partisans had lost 2,953 men and the Soviets lost 1,000 men while the enemy had lost 16,000 dead and 8,000 captured. Some Soviet and Bulgarian troops helped in the liberation of other parts of Serbia, while some other fought in Vojvodina against the Germans. Finally, the Soviet and Bulgarian troops left Yugoslav territory on 12 November and continued the pursuit of Germans into Hungary.¹⁹⁵

Ten days later of the liberation of Belgrade, the second Tito-Subasic agreement was signed on 1 November. According to the second agreement, King Peter should not return to Yugoslavia unless by decision of the people, and that, during his absence, he would be represented by a Regency. A new joint government would be formed including six ministers for the six federative units and would remain in office until the adaptation of a new Constitution.

The second Tito-Subasic agreement was recognized by Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt in the Yalta Conference (4-11 February 1945). Also, King Peter was compelled to conform the Tito-Subasic agreement. On 5 March 1945, the King conferred his powers upon the Regency including Serb Srdjan Budisavljevic, Croat Ante Mandic, Slovene Dusan Sernec who were nominated by Tito. On the same day, both the National Committee and the Yugoslav government-in-exile resigned, and on 7 March, a unified government was formed under Ivan Ribar, member of Presidium of AVNOJ, Subasic and

¹⁹⁵ See Maclean, *Tito: ...*, op. cit., pp. 83-85.

Milan Grol from the SDP. Ribar became prime minister, Subasic foreign minister and Grol vice-premier. Tito was elected by the members of the new government as *President of the Council of Ministers of Yugoslavia*.

Hence, the period of dual government in Yugoslavia ended. There were 28 members in the new government. 23 members of it were followers of Tito, therefore, the Government was dominated by the YCP. On 9 March, the new government announced its program and the name of the state: *Demokratska Federativna Jugoslavija* (Democratic Federal Yugoslavia - DFY).¹⁹⁶

One month later, on 11 April 1945, "*Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Aid, and Postwar Collaboration between the USSR and Yugoslavia*" was signed by the two country. In this treaty, the USSR was represented by Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, and Yugoslavia by Tito, President of the Council of Ministers of Yugoslavia. This treaty involved military, economic and cultural cooperation between the two country and government.¹⁹⁷

In the same month, the Partisans led by AVONJ launched the final attack upon the Chetniks and the Ustasha in April 1945. The Montenegrin Chetnik group under command of Djurisic was destroyed by the Montenegrin Partisan troops in April; and roughly 12,000 Chetniks in Serbia under command Mihailovic was destroyed on 10-13 May. Mihailovic could be able to escape from capture until 13 March 1946. After the capture, he was tried and sentenced to death for treason and war crimes, and executed in July 1946.

The Partisans also attacked the Ustasha regime and army in Croatia. The Partisan offensive forced the members of Ustasha government to left Zagreb on 4 May and Ante Pavelic on May 6. Finally, Zagreb was liberated by Partisan troops on 8 May . The Germans and the Ustasha forces wanted to surrender to the British commanders in Austria; however, their demand was not accepted since according to an agreement between Western Allies and the Soviet Union, all troops of Germany and its allies would have to surrender to troops of countries against which they had fought. Thus, the German

¹⁹⁶ See Hondius, op. cit., pp. 133-134.

¹⁹⁷ See for more details about the treaty Clissold, Stephen (ed.), *Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union (1939-1973): A Documentary Survey*, London: Oxford University Press, 1975, pp. 162-164.

and Ustasha troops surrendered to the Partisans on 15 May 1945.¹⁹⁸

On the other hand, the Partisan troops marched into Trieste, Istria and the Slovenian Littoral. They controlled the large parts of Istria at the end of April 1945, and entered Trieste on 30 April. Hence, the Partisans were able to liberate practically all of Istria, Trieste, and the Slovenian Littoral. However, these areas were occupied by the Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean, Field Marshal Alexander, and put these areas under control of the Allied Military Government on 28 April.

After a series negotiation, an agreement was signed between the Partisans and the Allied Military Government in Belgrade on 9 June 1945. According to the agreement, Istria and the Slovenian Littoral was divided by the so-called Morgan Line. Except for Trieste and the city of Pula, which remained under Western Allied control, all of Istria and the Slovenian Littoral was left under Yugoslav control.¹⁹⁹

The liberation of Istria and the Slovenian Littoral returned to the Yugoslavia between 600,000 Croats and Slovenes. The return of these areas to Yugoslavia was welcomed especially by the Croat and Slovene public opinion. Consequently, this success of the Partisans and the YCP increased the Croat and Slovene support to the communists.

So, the Second World War ended for the Partisan troops and for all Yugoslavia on 15 May 1945 when the last German and the Ustasha troops were surrendered. During the war, 530,000 Serbs, 192,000 Croats and 103,000 Bosniaks died. 8,000 Chetniks escaped to Britain and 12,000 Chetniks went to America, Canada and Australia. Between 20,000 and 40,000 Ustasha men, who were returned by the British commanders in Austria to Yugoslavia, were executed by the Partisans.²⁰⁰ At the end of the war, the Partisan force had 800,000 soldiers. During the war, the Partisans lost 350,000 dead and

¹⁹⁸ See Tomasevic, *op. cit.*, pp. 112-113.

¹⁹⁹ In this agreement, Trieste was not left to Yugoslav control. Until 1947, it was under the occupation of Yugoslav army and the British-American Army. Trieste was handled in the peace treaty with Italy on 10 February 1947. According to the treaty, a "Free Territory of Trieste" was established; Zone A, including the city of Trieste, was under British-American occupation, and Zone B under Yugoslav occupation. The final settlement was signed between the United States, Great Britain, Italy and Yugoslavia on 5 October 1954. This final settlement ended the military occupation of the Free Territory of Trieste and incorporated Zone A into Italy and Zone B into Yugoslavia. Also, according to the agreement, Yugoslavia gained the right to use a free port area in Trieste. (See Hoffman & Neal, *op. cit.*, pp. 76-77, 420-421 and Lampe, *op. cit.*, pp. 137, 172).

suffered more than 400,000 wounded.²⁰¹ On the other hand, the occupying Axis armies lost 447,000 dead and 560,000 Axis soldiers were captured.²⁰²

Naturally, the absolute victory of the Partisans over the Germans, the Chetniks and the Ustasha and the incorporation of Istria and the Slovenian Littoral into Yugoslavia empowered AVNOJ which was established and led by the YCP. Unquestionably, at the end of the war, the most influential and the strongest political figure was AVNOJ dominated by the YCP.

In the third and final session of AVNOJ between 7-10 August 1945, AVNOJ changed itself into the "Provisional People's Assembly of Democratic Federal Yugoslavia", and the non-communist members, including Subasic and Grol, were forced to resign. The state apparatus was organized under control of the communists. The police and other internal security forces were formed by the communists. Militia and State Security Administration was under the control of the YCP and Tito.

Furthermore, on 23 August 1945, the Provisional People's Assembly passed "Law on Agrarian Reform" which nationalized all big estates and limited peasant holdings of arable land to from twenty to thirty-five hectares. This law also liquidated estates belonging to banks, enterprises, land corporations, and other corporate bodies. As a whole, the agrarian reform affected a land area of 1.6 million hectares, half of which was distributed to poor and landless peasants, and half went to the state.²⁰³

The Provisional Assembly that was orientated by the YCP passed the Constituent Assembly Act on 21 August for a bicameral assembly. According to the Act, the Federal Assembly (*Savezna Skupstina*) was to be elected on an all-Yugoslav basis at the ratio of one delegate to every 40,000 inhabitants. The Assembly of Nationalities (*Skupstina Naroda*) was to be elected by the individual federative units (25 delegates each) and autonomous units (15 for the Vojvodina and 10 for Kosovo-Metohija). The draft

²⁰⁰ Judah, op. cit., pp. 124, 130, 134.

²⁰¹ McClellan, Woodford, "Postwar Political Evolution", in Vucinich (ed.), op. cit., p. 120.

²⁰² Hondius, op. cit., p. 117.

²⁰³ McVicker, Charles P., *Titism: Pattern for International Communism*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1957, p. 5 and Madzar, Ljubomir, "The Economy of Yugoslavia: Structure, Growth Record and Institutional Framework", in Allcock, Horton, Milivojevic (eds.), *Yugoslavia in Transition: ...*, op. cit., p. 75.

Constitution required the approval of both assembly with a two-thirds majority. The Electoral Act of 22 August gave voting rights to all citizens aged eighteen years and older, regardless of sex, and to all soldiers and ex-Partisans, regardless of age. But, voting rights were denied to persons who had been members of any of government between 1929 and 1939 as well as to those who had collaborated with the Axis. Hence, about 200,000 people had not voting right. Decree of 1 September 1945 declared the Provisional Assembly dissolved.²⁰⁴

In the election for the Constituent Assembly (*Ustavotvorna Skupstina*), the ballot papers carried only the names of candidates proposed by the People's Front (*Narodni Front*).²⁰⁵ Although the ballot papers were completely dominated by the communists, they also contained some candidates from other parties: the Republican Party, Serbian Peasant Party, National Peasant Party, Independent Serbian Democratic Party, Socialist Party and Croatian Peasant Party. On the election of 11 November 1945, the opposition was represented symbolically by "no candidate" ballot boxes. The People's Front won 6,725,045 votes (90.48%) against 707,422 votes (9.52%).²⁰⁶

The Constituent Assembly dominated by the YCP met on 29 November 1945, the second anniversary of the Jajce session of AVNOJ. In the same day, the Assembly proclaimed the abolition of the monarchy and of the Karadjordjevic dynasty, and the establishment of *Federativna Narodna Republika Jugoslavije* (Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia – FPRY). That is, the second Yugoslavia was founded as a "Federal People's Republic" on 29 November 1945. On 1 December, Tito was appointed head of the government; and also, the Assembly appointed a Presidium consisting a President (Ivan Ribar), six Vice-President, two Secretaries and thirty Members. The new constitution, written by Mosa Pijade, was unanimously accepted by the Assembly on 30 January 1946.

²⁰⁴ Hondius, op. cit. p. 135.

²⁰⁵ The *People's Front* was established by the YCP in 1945. The main duty and function of the People's Front was to work for the reconstruction of the country that had been damaged greatly during the war. In 1953, its name was changed into *Socialist Alliance of Yugoslav Worker People* in the Forth Congress of the People's Front. See Işıklı, Alpaslan, *Kuramlar Boyunca Özyönetim ve Yugoslav Deneyimi*, İstanbul: Alan Yayıncılık, 1983, pp. 169-170.

²⁰⁶ Hondius, op. cit., p. 136.

Taking everything into consideration, it is clear that there were eight basic reasons for the communist Partisans' victory and for failure of the Croatian and Serbian nationalism at the end of the war:

- 1) The old regime could not solve the Yugoslav national question. Furthermore, this question was deepened by the Serbo-Croat conflict that was sharpened by the Ustasha and the Chetnik movements during the war. The YCP promised to solve the national question by creating federative Yugoslavia that would recognize and preserve all rights of Yugoslav nations. Moreover, the communists proposed to recognize the rights of self-determination and secession for all Yugoslav nations. The YCP's policy about the Yugoslav national question revealed itself in the slogan and principle of "*Bratstvo i Jedinstvo* (Brotherhood and Unity)"
- 2) The old regime was dominated by the Karadjorjevic dynasty, big land owners and bourgeoisie. This means that the old regime based upon exploitation of peasants and workers. This exploitation deteriorated economic condition of the Yugoslav people, that is, the Yugoslav people lived in the very severe economic condition between 1918-1939. The YCP promised to solve economic problems and to increase the working people's standard of living through socialist revolution that would involve land reform and expropriation of the property of the old regime's sovereign classes. For this reason, the communist Partisans declared war not only on the foreign occupiers, but also on the old regime. That is to say, their struggle was the "People's Liberation War (*Narodno Oslobodilacka Borba*)" against both the occupying armies and the old regime's upper classes which had exploited the Yugoslav working peoples. So, in the words of Stavrianos, the YCP and the Partisans were supported by "*have-nots*" who desired to destroy exploitative old regime and to create egalitarian society without exploitation, while the Ustasha and the Chetniks were supported by "*haves*" who wanted to restore the old regime based on the exploitation of working people.²⁰⁷ Hence, the Partisan struggle was not only a war between the Partisan forces and the occupying armies, but also a "class struggle" between the Yugoslav upper classes and the lower classes.
- 3) During the war, the Ustasha regime carried out ethnic cleansing upon non-Croats with

²⁰⁷ See Stavrianos, op. cit., pp. 762-764.

aim of creating a Greater Croatia, and the Chetnik movement pursued ethnic-cleansing upon non-Serbs in order to establish a Greater Serbia. Both the Ustasha and Chetnik terror upon innocent people brought about popular rage and opposition against them. The people's rage and opposition against the Ustasha and the Chetniks increased popular support to the Partisans.

4) Unlike Chetniks and the Ustasha regime, the Partisans established local organizations, the People's Liberation Committees, which carried out political, economical and military duties. During the war, a network of the committees spread over most parts of the country and formed organizational basis for resistance and administration. It is more important that the committees formed a basis for the establishment of communist government after the war. Thus, in the words of Phyllis Auty, "*it would be incorrect to speak of communists seizing power at the end of the war, for they had gradually taken over authority as areas of the country were liberated in the later stages of the war. They had also created a rudimentary machinery of central and local government before the war ended.*"²⁰⁸ This 'machinery of central and local government' was a product of the People's Liberation Committees.

5) The YCP and the Partisan movement was not a nationalist party and movement. The YCP and the Partisans aimed to found a Yugoslav union on the principle of federalism and socialism. Therefore, the Partisans drew their men from all nationalities of Yugoslavia and operated in all parts of the country. Also, the Partisan movement could be able to attract the minority groups of Yugoslavia. A number of Partisan units were formed from the minority groups. The Partisan force included the Italian Pino Budicin battalion, the Albanian Zejnel Ajdini unit and the Emin Durak brigade; the Hungarian Petöfi Sandor unit, the German Ernst Thalmann unit, the Bulgarian Hristo Betov brigade, and the Czech-Slovak Jan Ziska brigade.²⁰⁹

6) The Partisan movement, unlike the Ustasha and the Chetnik movements, attracted the Yugoslav women for the communists supported equality of women to men continuously. Also, the YCP promised destruction of the traditional social structure which had

²⁰⁸ Auty, op. cit., p. 104.

²⁰⁹ Shoup, op. cit., p. 75.

oppressed the Yugoslav women and implementation of social reforms which would improve their social status. Thus, the Yugoslav women supported the Partisans rather than the others, and their support empowered the Partisans.

7) The Partisans have never collaborated with the enemy, and they fought against the enemy consistently. This consistent fighting against the enemy attracted not only the civil people, but also many soldiers and officers who were contingent to the Yugoslav army-in-exile. Thus, many soldiers and officers left the Yugoslav government-in-exile and joined the Partisans. Furthermore, during the war, many Chetnik and Ustasha militiamen joined the Partisan troops as they were attracted by the Partisan resistance.

8) Finally, unlike the Chetniks and the Ustasha, the YCP and the Partisan movement had great appeal for the Yugoslav intelligentsia. Hence, the Yugoslav intellectuals more backed the Partisans than the Chetniks, the Ustasha and the Yugoslav government-in-exile. The intellectuals' support resulted in intellectual, theoretical and ideological superiority of the YCP and the Partisans over the other sides.

CHAPTER IV

THE SECOND YUGOSLAVIA: THE SOCIALIST YUGOSLAVIA

IV. 1. Foundation of the Socialist Yugoslavia (1946-1950)

The period of 1946-1950, according to Ann Lane, was the period of "Sovietisation"²¹⁰ and, according to Joze Mencinger and Olga Memedovic, the period of "Administrative Socialism".²¹¹ Also, George Macesich describes this period as "Period of Centralization" which based on the Soviet economic model.²¹²

On the other hand, Branko Horvat, a distinguish Yugoslav socialist theorist, divided the *Yugoslav Socialist Revolution* into three stages. The first stage of the revolution was the war period. In this stage, the YCP fought against the occupying Axis armies for national liberation. The second stage began at the end of 1945 and continued until 1950, when started the third stage involving the establishment of self-management.

The second stage, according to Horvat, was consolidation of the first stage. The enemy in the second stage was not the occupying armies but the domestic exploiting classes. Hence, the communists fought against the old regime's exploiting and ruling classes in order to establish socialist society that based on working people's self-management. For this reason, Horvat maintains that, the Yugoslav communists took very radical and bitter measures against the enemy (exploiting classes of the old regime) soon thereafter the war, between 1946-1950.²¹³

IV. 1. i. The 1946 Constitution

The most important and comprehensive measure against the old regime's exploiting classes was the 1946 Constitution. The 1946 Constitution, the first constitution of the Second Yugoslavia, was a copy of the 1936 Stalinist Constitution of the USSR. The first constitution of FPRY received its inspiration from the Stalinist Soviet Union.

²¹⁰ See Lane, op. cit., pp. 95-99.

²¹¹ See Mencinger, Joze, "From a Capitalist to a Capitalist Economy", in James Simmie & Joze Dekleva (eds.), *Yugoslavia In Turmoil: After Self-management*, London: Pinter Publishers, 1991, pp. 71-72 and Memedovic, Olga, *On The Theory and Measurement of Comparative Advantage: An Empirical Analysis of Yugoslav Trade*, Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers, 1994, pp. 108-109, 178-179.

²¹² See Macesich, George, "Major Trends in the Postwar Economy of Yugoslavia", in Vucinich (ed.), op. cit., pp. 203-205.

²¹³ See Horvat, Branko, *An Essay On Yugoslav Society*, New York: International Arts and Sciences Press, 1969, pp. 72-75.

Also, the communist government enforced economic policies that was copied from the Stalinist Soviet economy. That is, between 1946-50, the Yugoslav communist power adapted the state structure and the economy on the Stalinist Soviet socialist model.

According to the 1946 Constitution,²¹⁴ political power based on the working people and belonged to them. The people exercised this power through elected representatives who served in (a)the people's committees at the local level, (b)the republican assemblies on the federated republican level and (c)the National Assembly at the federal level. All citizens of eighteen years of age and over, regardless of sex, nationality, race, religion, had the right to vote. Also, a long list of civil liberties to which all citizens were to be entitled was included within the Constitution.

The Constitution established the Second Yugoslav State as a *federation* that guaranteed 'the rights of self-determination and secession for the constituent peoples' and 'the cultural rights of the national minorities'. Article I of the Constitution declared that the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia (FPRY) was "*a federal people's State, republican in form, a community of peoples equal in rights who, on the basis of the right to self-determination, including the right of separation, have expressed their will to live together in a federative State.*"²¹⁵ And also, Article XIII guaranteed to each of the national minorities "*the right to a protection of its own cultural development and the free use of its own language.*"²¹⁶

FPRY consisted of the six constituent federated republics (People's Republics) which had the explicit right to secede from the federation (FPRY). These 'People's Republics' were Serbia (according to the 1948 census, had the population of 6,527,966); Croatia (3,756,807); Bosnia-Herzegovina (2,565,277); Slovenia (1,391,873); Macedonia (1,152,986) and Montenegro (377,189).²¹⁷ Also, there were the Autonomous Province (*Autonomna Pokrajina*) of Vojvodina and the Autonomous Region (*Autonomna Oblast*) of Kosovo-Metohija. They were contingent the People's Republic of Serbia and didn't have the right of secession.

²¹⁴ See for more details about the 1946 Constitution Hondius, op. cit., pp. 137-167.

²¹⁵ Ibid., p. 138.

²¹⁶ Vucinich, "Nationalism and Communism", op. cit., p. 253.

²¹⁷ See Memedovic, op. cit., p.110. Also, according to nationalities, in 1948, there were 6,547,117 Serbs; 3,784,353 Croats; 1,415,432 Slovenes; 810,126 Macedonians; 808,921 Bosniaks; 750,431 Albanians;

Although the six constituent republics had right of secession, they were forbidden to maintain their own armed force and to deal foreign governments. Also, the 1946 Constitution established a control of the federal state over the republics. For example, most republican ministers were to be supervised by the appropriate federal ministers.

Even though, the federated republics were controlled by the federal state apparatus, they had their own 'Republican Assemblies' that had power of legislation. Unlike the National Assembly of FPRY, the Republican Assemblies were unicameral as, according to the constitution, they had no need to consider the nationalities problem within federated republic. Moreover, each republic had its own 'Republican Presidium' and 'Republican Government'. Republican Presidiums and Governments were elected by their Republican Assemblies.

The National Assembly of FPRY was created by the 1946 Constitution as a bicameral institution involving the 'Federal Council', elected by all of the citizens on the basis of one deputy for each fifty thousand inhabitants; and the 'Council of Nationalities', composed of thirty deputies from each of the six federated republics, twenty from the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina, and fifteen from the Autonomous Region of Kosovo-Metohija, each delegation elected by the voters of their respective areas. Both the two councils were elected simultaneously for a term of four years. Both had equal rights, and no legislation could become law without the full consent of both councils.

The 1946 Constitution created the Presidium of the National Assembly that served as the Assembly's executive organ. It was elected by the two councils in joint session. The federal Presidium was a collective chief of federal state, responsible to the National Assembly for its work, and subject to recall either collectively or individually by the Assembly.

496,492 Magyars; 425,703 Montenegrin; 102,953 Vlachs; 97,954 Turks and the others in Yugoslavia. (Vucinich, "Nationalism and Communism", op. cit. p. 254.)

On the other hand, the 1953 census recorded that, according to religion, Orthodox population constituted 41.5 percent (about 7 million) of the total 16,000,000 population of Yugoslavia; Roman Catholic population 31.8 percent (5.4 million); Muslim population 12.3 percent (2.1 million); Protestants 0.9 percent (150,000); other faiths 1.2 percent (200,000); and 12.3 percent (2.1 million) described themselves as without religion. (Auty, op. cit., p. 196.)

Apart from the federal Presidium, there was also a federal government that was to be the supreme executive and administrative organ of the federal state (FPRY). The federal government was composed of a prime minister, vice-premiers, all heads of federal ministries, and the heads of the Federal Planning Commission and of the Federal Control Commission. The members of the federal government, who were appointed by the National Assembly, were responsible to the Assembly that had power to recall them. In practice, most of the member of the federal government were also members of the Presidium.

Furthermore, the 1946 Constitution determined the structure, duties and powers of the 'People's Committees' which had been established and spread over the country during the war. The People's Committees were regarded by both the Constitution and the YCP as the highest organ of the state authority within its own local territory. That is, according to the communist perspective, they were effective representative bodies of the local population in administering communal affairs.

However, between 1946-50, the committees served in actual practice as the local administrative instruments of the central federal authority. Also, they were under the restrict control of the YCP and dominated by the party members. As Edvard Kardelj declared "*some people's committees had shown a tendency to transform people's self-government into a 'pashalik' of local officialdom*".²¹⁸ That is, between 1946-50, the committees were very weak and ineffective on the level of local self-government.

IV. 1. ii. Economic Measures

During the war, the Yugoslav peoples and economy were damaged severely. Yugoslavia lost 1,014,000 people (5.9 per cent of the total population) in the 1941-1945 period.²¹⁹ Roughly, one-sixth of all prewar housing was either destroyed or heavily damaged. In Belgrade, more than 40 per cent of the housing was rendered unusable. In all, 25 per cent of Yugoslav population was homeless at the end of the war. In December 1945, production was only 30 per cent of prewar in the textile industry, 40 per cent in the

²¹⁸ McVicker, op. cit., p. 147.

²¹⁹ Serb losses were 487,000 (6.9 per cent of the total Serb population), Croat 207,000 (5.4 per cent), Bosniaks 86,000 (6.9 per cent), Jewish 60,000 (77.9 per cent) and Gypsy 27,000 (31.4 per cent). (See Cvlic, Christopher, "Croatia", in Dyker & Vejvoda (eds.), op. cit., p. 203).

food processing industries and 15 per cent in the metal industries. Mines were flooded and machinery was destroyed by the occupying Axis armies. Also, railways and roads were greatly damaged. More than 50 per cent of all rails was either destroyed or badly damaged. The damage was equally heavy in agriculture. Farm machinery, equipment, animals and livestock were destroyed, damaged or looted. The total reduction amounted to between 40 and 60 per cent of total prewar holdings such as 53 per cent of cattle, 67 per cent of horses, 52 per cent of hogs, 80 per cent of harvesting machinery and 40 per cent of peasant carts. About 40 per cent of the area under vineyards and fruit trees was greatly damaged. The damage in forestry amounted to more than 12 per cent of prewar production.²²⁰

It is more important that the war damaged greatly the Yugoslav skilled manpower. 90,000 skilled industrial workers and 40,00 highly trained specialists lost their lives. Yugoslav war economic losses made up 17 per cent of total losses of eighteen Western allied countries.²²¹ The total material damage was \$47 billion. GNP of Yugoslavia in 1945 did not reach one-half of what it was in 1941.²²²

For this reason, after the war, the Yugoslav communist power aimed (a) to recover these damages and losses of the Yugoslav economy and also (b) to destroy economic power of the old regime's ruling and exploiting classes. For these two purposes, the communist government centralized the use of all available human and material resources with the following radical measures:

In the summer of 1946, the Law on Co-operatives was enacted. It provided for collective planning and farming in agricultural areas, established state tractor stations and other centers for heavy farm equipment, and designated the co-operatives as the primary channels of distribution of industrial products in the village. So, the Soviet *kolhoz*-type collective farms were formed in Yugoslavia between 1946-50. But, the YCP did not follow standard Stalinist tactics as a whole in its attempts to collectivize the Yugoslav peasants.²²³

²²⁰ Hoffman & Neal, op. cit., pp. 86-87.

²²¹ Madzar, op. cit., p. 75.

²²² Klemencic & Zagar, op. cit., 194.

²²³ McVicker, op. cit., p. 6.

A comprehensive Nationalization Law, involving 24 Article, was passed in December 1946. Article 1 of the *Law Regarding Nationalization of Private Economic Enterprises* nationalized total 42 branches of economy and passed them into State ownership.²²⁴ Article 19 stated that “Whoever may commit any act with the intention of frustrating or hindering nationalization under this Law, and in particular whoever may destroy, damage, hide, dispose of or in any way whatsoever diminish the value of nationalized property, . . . , shall be punished under the Law against illegal trade, illegal speculation and economic sabotage, or under the Law for the protection of People’s property and property administered by the State.”²²⁵

The Nationalization Law of December 1946 permitted to maintain private ownership in the few branches of commerce and industry. This tolerance of private ownership was restricted by a supplementary Nationalization Law of April 1948, which ordered the nationalization of all private enterprises above the level of artisans and small shopkeepers. By the end of 1948, all industries regardless of its nature and size had become state property. The Nationalization Laws of December 1946 and April 1948 nationalized – with the exception of farming – more than 90 percent of the country’s private property. Private capital in industry, mining, transport, banking, and wholesale and retail trade was nationalized in this period.²²⁶

Also, in spring of 1946, the Law on the State Economic Plan was enacted and new institutions were formed in order to enforce a single working plan for entire economy. And finally, the Five Year Plan for Industrial Development was proclaimed on 28 April 1947. This first plan was prepared by the Yugoslav and the Soviet experts, and based on the Soviet aids. The Plan aimed to improve technological capacity, to raise economic and social level of the country’s less developed republics, to double the national income, to increase industrial output to almost five times the 1939 level, and to modernize agriculture.²²⁷

²²⁴ See for the 42 branches Blagojevic, Borislav T. (ed.), *Collection of Yugoslav Laws, Volume III: Nationalization and Expropriation*, Belgrade: Institute of Comparative Law, 1963, pp. 13-14.

²²⁵ *Ibid.*, 20.

²²⁶ Klemencic & Zagar, *op. cit.*, p. 197.

²²⁷ See for more details Waterston, Albert, *Planning In Yugoslavia: Organization and Implementation*, Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1962, pp. 9-11, 92-95.

IV. 1. iii. Measures Against the Church

Another bitter measure was taken against the Church. The communist power moved against both the Serbian Orthodox and the Croat Catholic churches since they supported nationalism in the interwar period and during the war. Most of Serbian clerics supported the Royal Coup of 1929 led by King Aleksander and the Chetniks led by Mihailovic during the war. On the other hand, the Croat Catholic clerics recognized the NDH and supported the Ustasha regime led by Ante Pavelic during the war. Furthermore, they, including Archbishop Stepinac, supported the Ustasha regime's conversion policy of Orthodox Serbs to Catholicism. That is, most of Serbian and Croat clerics were against the communist Partisan movement led by the YCP although there were some clerics who supported the communist Partisans.

For this reason, the communist government arrested a lot of Serbian and Croatian clerics. The most important trial was the trial of Croat Archbishop Stepinac. He was accused of cooperation with the Germans and the Ustasha regime and supporting the conversion of Orthodox people to Catholicism. Although he was found guilty and sentenced to sixteen years in prison, he was released in December 1952 due to his ill health. On the other hand, soon thereafter the trials, the Vatican formally excommunicated all those directly or indirectly concerned with the trial.²²⁸

Also, the communist government limited land holdings of the Churches. Most of those holdings were confiscated by the state. In addition to these, the regime launched educational reforms which abolished educational functions of the Churches and aimed to eliminate religious influences among young people. Finally, some Churches, but not all, were closed down by the new regime.²²⁹

However, the regime did not close all Churches and Mosques and did not ban worship. The regime provided tolerance to Orthodox, Catholic and Muslim clerics to fulfill their religious mission. But, the clerics were banned from to deal with political, economic and other social issues. On the other hand, it should be emphasized that the Muslim clerics were less attacked by the socialist regime. Also, as a consequence of the

²²⁸ See Hoffman & Neal, *op. cit.*, pp. 94-95.

²²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 93.

communist oppression and restriction upon the Serbian and Croatian churches and nationalism, Islam religion and Muslim Bosniaks were protected by the socialist Yugoslav regime against the Serbian and Croat Churches and nationalism. Thus, the protection and development of the Bosniak identity and nation was supported and facilitated by the socialist regime. It is more important that the socialist regime affected and facilitated greatly the secularization of the Bosniak identity and culture.

IV. 1. iv. The Yugoslav Communist Party

In this period, the most important and effective governmental and political actor of the country was the YCP. The party's upper members controlled the state apparatus. The National Assembly, the Federal Presidium and Government, the Republican Assemblies, Presidiums and Governments, all of them, were dominated by the upper members of the YCP. Also, as Kardelj declared, the Party members dominated local government and political life.

In 1946, the Party had total 258,100 members. 71,000 (27.6) of them were workers; 130,000 (50.4%) were peasants; 30,000 (11.7%) were students, military, pensioners; and 27,000 (10.3%) were employees.²³⁰

In 1968, the workers' share in the membership rose to 31.2 percent of the total 1,146,000, and peasants' share dropped to 7.4 percent. Managers, technocrats and military personal formed 19.0 percent of the membership in 1968. And students' share declined to 3.3 percent.²³¹

Also in 1967, according to national composition of the party, there were 541,526 (51.77% of the membership) Serbs; 189,605 (18.13%) Croats; 70,516 (6.74%) Slovenes; 67,603 (6.46%) Macedonians; 65,986 (6.31%) Montenegrins; 37,433 (3.58%) Bosniaks; 31,780 (3.04%) Albanians; 12,683 (1.21%) Magyars and 28,886 (2.76%) others.²³² These figure shows that the YCP was dominated by the Serbian membership, that was led by the Minister of Interior Affairs and the Chief of Secret Police Aleksandar Rankovic.

After the expulsion of the YCP from the Cominform on 28 June 1948, the Fifth

²³⁰ Horvat, op. cit., p. 199.

²³¹ See Tables 4.7 and 4.8 in Denitch, Bogdan, "Mobility and Recruitment of Yugoslav Leadership: The Role of the League of Communists", in Allen H. Barton (ed.), *Opinion-Making Elites in Yugoslavia*, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973, pp. 113, 116.

²³² Vucinich, "Nationalism and Communism", op. cit., p. 256.

Congress of the YCP was held in Belgrade in July 1948. At the congress six main decisions were taken:

(1) To industrialize the country and modernize its agriculture. (2) To strengthen the Army. (3) To work continuously and consistently to maintain the independence of the country.²³³ (4) To insure national and social equality among all Yugoslav peoples and to recognize the rights of self-determination and secession for all constituent republics. In the Congress, Tito stated openly that "*peoples have a right to self-determination up to the point of secession.*"²³⁴ (5) The Congress, also, came to agreement to fight against the state and party bureaucrats who hindered socialist development of Yugoslavia and political development of workers. (6) Finally, the expulsion of the YCP from the Cominform and the Communist Party of Soviet Union's attack upon the YCP were protested by the congress. The congress supported entirely Tito's policy against the Cominform and the Soviet Union led by the Stalinist regime.²³⁵

IV. 1. v. Expulsion of the YCP from the Cominform

In this period (1946-1950), the most important event for FPRY was the expulsion of the YCP from the Cominform, led by Moscow, on 28 June 1948. In the meeting of the Cominform of June 1948, the Cominform repeated Soviet charges about the YCP and announced the expulsion of Yugoslavia, and called on the YCP to replace its leaders including Tito, Kardelj, Djilas and Rankovic. The Cominform and Communist Party of Soviet Union (the CPSU) declared five main pretexts for Yugoslavia's expulsion:²³⁶

(1) The leadership of the YCP has pursued an incorrect line on the main questions of domestic and foreign policy and departed from Marxism-Leninism, that is, it departed from the Marxist class theory and class struggle. (2) The leadership of the YCP has pursued an unfriendly policy towards the Soviet Union and the CPSU. (3) The YCP leadership has revised the Marxist-Leninist teachings about the party. According to the theory of Marxism-Leninism, the party is the main guiding and leading force in the country. However, in Yugoslavia, according to the Cominform, the People's Front is

²³³ See McClellan, op. cit., pp. 130-131.

²³⁴ Vucinich, "Nationalism and Communism", op. cit., p. 243.

²³⁵ See Nobirdali & Selim, op. cit., pp. 108-109.

²³⁶ See Clissold, op. cit., pp. 202-207.

considered by the YCP leadership to be the main leading force in the country. (4) The leadership of the YCP abolished inner party democracy. That is, the Cominform and the CPSU claimed that there was no elections, no criticism and self-criticism in the YCP. (5) Finally, they claimed that the YCP has broken with the internationalism and has taken the road of 'bourgeois nationalism'.

At the end of the declaration, the Cominform called the members of the YCP to replace the existing leadership, including Tito, Kardelj, Djilas and Rankovic, and to advance a new internationalist and socialist leadership of the party.

However, the Central Committee of the YCP rejected the charges, and declared its solidarity with Tito. Its declaration of 29 June 1948 stated that the Cominform's charges was "*an attempt to destroy the prestige of the YCP both abroad and in the country, to arouse confusion amongst the masses in the country and in the international workers' movement, to weaken the unity within the YCP and its leading role.*"²³⁷ At the end the declaration, the Central Committee of the YCP called upon the Party membership "*to close their ranks in the struggle for the realization of the party line and for even greater strengthening of party unity*", and called upon the working people "*to continue to work even more persistently on the building of our (Yugoslav working people's) socialist homeland.*"²³⁸

One year later, on 28 September 1949, the USSR ended the 'Treaty of Friendship', that had been signed on 11 April 1945 by Molotov and Tito, asserting that "*the Yugoslav government is completely dependent on the foreign imperialist circles.*"²³⁹

Like the Moscow government, the Cominform accused Yugoslavia of collaboration with imperialism:

"The Central Committee of the Party and the Government of Yugoslavia have merged completely with the imperialist circles against the entire camp of socialism and democracy; against the Communist Parties of the world; against the New Democracies and the USSR . . . The Tito clique transformed Belgrade into an American center for

²³⁷ Ibid., p. 209.

²³⁸ Ibid., p. 213.

²³⁹ Ibid., p. 221.

espionage and anti-Communist propaganda."²⁴⁰

These charges of the Cominform and of the USSR were Stalin's pretexts but not real causes of the Yugoslavia's expulsion:

1) The YCP has never pursued unfriendly policy toward the Soviet Union. On the contrary, as we have seen clearly in the *Second* and *Third Chapters*, the YCP obeyed and respected the Soviet Union both in the interwar period and during the Second World War. Furthermore, the YCP and the Partisans regarded the USSR as the 'fatherland of communist revolution'. The faithfulness of the Yugoslav communists to the USSR is described very well by Milovan Djilas:

*"The Yugoslav communists . . . considered themselves to be ideologically bound to Moscow and regarded themselves as Moscow's most consistent followers. . . . For the Yugoslavs, Moscow was not only a political and spiritual center but the realization of an abstract ideal – the classless society. . . . The YCP was not only as ideologically unified as the Soviet, but faithfulness to Soviet leadership was one of the essential elements of its development and its activity. Stalin was not only the undisputed leader of genius, he was the incarnation of the very idea and dream of the new society. . . . Every action of the Soviet Government – for example, the attack on Finland – and every negative feature in the Soviet Union – for example, the trial and the purges – were defended and justified."*²⁴¹

In the war time, Stalin was something more than a political and military leader for the Yugoslav communists. Stalin, writes Djilas, *"was the incarnation of an idea, transfigured in Communist minds into pure idea, and thereby into something infallible and sinless. Stalin was the victorious battle of today and the brotherhood of man tomorrow."*²⁴²

That is, in the interwar period and during the war, both the Soviet Union and Stalin were respected, admired and obeyed extremely by the Yugoslav communists.

2) After the war, the YCP and the Yugoslav government under the leadership of Tito

²⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 225.

²⁴¹ Djilas, Milovan, *Conversations with Stalin*, New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1962, pp. 11-12.

²⁴² Ibid., p. 57.

continued to obey and respect the Soviet Union. For example, they pursued the Stalinist Soviet model of socialism in domestic economic policy. They did not oppose and criticize the Soviet style until the expulsion of Yugoslavia.

3) As we have seen in the *Chapter Two* and *Three*, the YCP and the Partisans consistently fought against fascism, imperialism and domestic exploitative upper classes in the interwar period and especially in the Second World War. This anti-fascist, anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist attitude of the Yugoslav communists continued after the war. Thus, the Belgrade could not be described as 'American center for espionage and anti-Communist propaganda'.

4) Finally, as we have explained, the YCP has struggled against nationalism and nationalist parties, and supported internationalism and equality of peoples since the establishment of the party in 1919. The internationalist and anti-nationalist attitude of the Yugoslav communists continued also after the war. The 1946 Constitution and the decision of the Fifth Congress of the YCP were clear evidences of this attitude.

The main reason for this conflict between the Belgrade and the Moscow, that occurred openly on 28 June 1948, was the Stalin's desire and goal to control Yugoslavia entirely:

The YCP and Tito had very high prestige at the end of the war because of their distinguish struggle for liberation and socialist revolution. The Yugoslav socialist revolution attracted greatly other communist parties of the world and the Third World countries.

Furthermore, Tito aimed to establish a Balkan Socialist Federation. For this purpose, Yugoslavia improved good and close relations with socialist Bulgaria, Albania, Romania.²⁴³

Also, after the war, Tito's Yugoslavia gave military, economic and diplomatic aids to the Greek communists (National Liberation Front/National Popular Liberation Army-EAM/ELAS) who fought against the National Greek Army-EDES and the Royal Greek government-in-exile, which were supported by the British and American governments, in order to achieve socialist revolution in Greece. The Yugoslav

²⁴³ See Işıklı, op. cit., p. 97

government supported the EAM/ELAS because, according to Tito, a "Socialist Greece" should be involved within a "Balkan Socialist Federation."²⁴⁴

All of them frustrated Stalin since the high prestige of Yugoslav socialist revolution and the Tito's project about "Socialist Balkan Federation" would damage the Moscow's undisputed leading position in the socialist world. Thus, Stalin wanted and aimed to control and command the communist party and the government of Yugoslavia. However, the YCP and the Yugoslav government under the leadership of Tito, Kardelj, Rankovic and Djilas opposed the Stalin's plan, that is, they rejected the Soviet domination over Yugoslavia. For this reason, Moscow ordered the Cominform to charge and to expel Yugoslavia. This situation was expressed clearly by Tito:

*"Stalin wanted to subordinate our independence to interests and policies he was following. It was due to the aggressive tendencies of the Soviet Union towards Yugoslavia."*²⁴⁵

The expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform produced eight important results:

1) After the expulsion, the Yugoslav communists, intellectuals, and experts began to criticize the Soviet Stalinist model of socialism. They described the Soviet model as a 'form of state capitalism' which exploited working people in order to sustain its large bureaucracy which dominated the state. Also, they claimed that the Soviet Union utilized other socialist countries as sources of raw materials and markets for its manufactured goods.²⁴⁶ These critics facilitated and supported establishment of self-management (*samoupravlanje*).

2) Undisputed leading role of the Soviet Union and Stalin in the socialist world began to be disputed after the expulsion and the Yugoslav resistance against Moscow.

3) The Yugoslav resistance against the Soviet pressure increased the prestige of the YCP and Tito. Especially, in Yugoslavia, the support of public opinion to the YCP and Tito increased sharply because the Yugoslav public opinion regarded the Soviet pressure as a

²⁴⁴ See Woodhouse, C. M., "Modern Greece", in W. A. Heurtley (ed.), *A Short History of Greece: From Early Times to 1964*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965, pp. 152-160.

²⁴⁵ Auty, Phyllis, "Yugoslavia's International Relations (1945-1965)", in Vucinich (ed.), op. cit., p. 166.

²⁴⁶ Zaninovich, M. George, "The Yugoslav Variation on Marx", in Vucinich (ed.), op. cit., p. 291.

policy that aimed to undermine Yugoslavia's economic progress and independence.

4) After the expulsion, the Titoist government took bitter measures against supporters of the Cominform and Stalinists. For example, about 8,400 Stalinists and followers of the Cominform were arrested between 1948-1951.²⁴⁷

5) The Five Year Plan for Industrial Development, that was launched in 1947, was highly disrupted as a result of the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict since this plan based on the Soviet aids. Termination of the Soviet aids and the boycott imposed by Soviet Union and other pro-Soviet states made fulfillment of the plan impossible. Thus, the break with the Soviet Union and the other Cominform countries led to failure of the first Five Year Plan in Yugoslavia.²⁴⁸ The Soviet economic sanction against Yugoslavia ended in 1955. For the Yugoslav economy, total cost of the sanction was \$400 million. This cost amounted 3.6 percent of the Yugoslav GDP in 1952.²⁴⁹

6) After the expulsion, the Soviet Union and the pro-Soviet states launched economic, military and diplomatic embargo against Yugoslavia. Thus, Yugoslavia developed its economic and diplomatic relations with the West. For example, in 1949, Yugoslavia received \$9 million credits from the IMF, \$20 million from the U.S. Export-Import Bank, 8 million sterling from Britain; and in 1950, 35 million from the U.S. Export-Import Bank.²⁵⁰ In the 1950s, Yugoslavia received more than \$1,157 million of economic aid and \$724 million of military aid from the U.S.A.²⁵¹ Also, amount of Yugoslavia's trade with the West has increased sharply since 1949.²⁵²

7) After the expulsion, the defensive strategy and doctrine of Yugoslavia shifted. The main threat was now coming from the Soviet Union and the pro-Soviet states. Thus, in 1951, Kosa Popovic, Chief of Staff in the wartime and now Minister of Foreign Affairs, went to Washington and signed a "US Military Aid to Yugoslavia Agreement".²⁵³ That is,

²⁴⁷ McClellan, op. cit., p. 130.

²⁴⁸ See Dubey, Vinod (ed.), *Yugoslavia: Development With Decentralization*, Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 1973, pp. 28-29.

²⁴⁹ Bookman, Milica Zarkovic, *Economic Decline and Nationalism In The Balkans*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994, pp. 127-128.

²⁵⁰ Singleton, op. cit., pp. 171-172.

²⁵¹ Plestina, op. cit., p. 133.

²⁵² See Singleton, op. cit., pp. 173-176.

²⁵³ Vasic, Milos, "The Yugoslav Army and the Post-Yugoslav Armies", in Dyker & Vejvoda (eds.), op. cit., p. 120.

after 1948, socialist Yugoslavia improved military relations with the West as a response to the Soviet threat.

8) Finally, the Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Cominform and the Soviet embargo against Yugoslavia was an important cause of Yugoslavia's non-alignment policy. Since 1949, Yugoslav foreign policy increased relations with the Third World in order to (a) decrease its economic dependence on the West and (b) to break the Soviet embargo and encirclement.²⁵⁴

IV. 2. Foundation of the "System of Socialist Self-management" (1950-1960)

In the words of Branko Horvat, the foundation of the system of socialist self-management (*samoupravljanje*) was the third stage of the Yugoslav socialist revolution which aimed to give full economic power to working people and to eliminate the state and party bureaucracy.²⁵⁵

According to Rudolf Bicanic, a member of the YCP and a distinguish Yugoslav socialist theorist, this third stage involved *the four Ds* : *De-centralization, De-etatization, De-politicization* and *De-mocratization*. That is, according to Bicanic, *the four Ds* were four principles of the self-management system. These principles, said Bicanic, "*endeavors to organize production on the basis of workers' self-management, in order to eliminate the roots of exploitation of man by man.*"²⁵⁶

Also, Vladimir Gligorov asserts that the main principle and target of the self-management was the transformation of state-property into social property. So, according to Vladimir Gligorov, the fundamental characteristics of the self-management was social ownership of property.²⁵⁷

On the other hand, in 1951 in Mostar, Tito declared that the ultimate aim of the Yugoslav socialist revolution involving self-management were, at first, to minimize the power of the state and the party bureaucracy, and then, to abolish them by giving full

²⁵⁴ See for more details about the effects of the Soviet pressure in the formation of Yugoslavia's nonalignment policy Rubinstein, Alvin Z., *Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World*, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1970, pp. 3-27.

²⁵⁵ Horvat, op. cit., pp. 75-76.

²⁵⁶ Bicanic, Rudolf, *Turning Points In Economic Development*, the Hague: Mouton, 1972, p.243.

²⁵⁷ Gligorov, op. cit., p. 43.

governmental power to the Yugoslav workers and working masses. “*Real democracy*” said Tito in his famous Mostar speech “*began when the governmental functions of state were abolished.*” Thus, according to Tito, self-management (*samoupravljanje*) was a ‘real democracy’ which abolishes state and party by giving full political and economic power and competence to working masses. That is, the self-management was the self-government of working people in economic, political and social spheres.²⁵⁸

Slovene political leader and theorist Edvard Kardelj described the three basic peculiarities and aims of the socialist self-management in his book: (1) The self-management presupposed social and economic equality among working people.²⁵⁹ (2) “*The alienation of surplus labor is a grave obstacle to the further development of society and to the unity and stability of the economic system.*”²⁶⁰ So, he pointed that the self-management aimed to abolish the alienation of surplus labor (the alienation of workers from their own products) which hinders social development. (3) Finally, according to Kardelj, workers were ‘*self-managers*’ in the system of self-management. In the self-management, the “*worker – self-managers*” said Kardelj “*manage and control income on behalf and in the interest of all working people, that is, in their own name and in that of the whole of society for their personal material and creative interests.*”²⁶¹ In other words, Kardelj stated that the income and social wealth is not controlled by state, party or any ruling class but by the workers who are transformed into the ‘worker – self-managers’ in the system of self-management (*samoupravljanje*).

In the light of these quotations, we can summarize the principles and aims of the self-management in the five points: (1) To give the working people a greater and more direct role in decisions and government affecting socioeconomic development. (2) To transfer the social ownership of the means of production to the working people. (3) To abolish the alienation of producers from product. For this purpose, to put the control of enterprises directly into the hands of producers by abolishing private property and state

²⁵⁸ See Tito, Jozip Broz, *Özyönetimli Sosyalizm*, trans. İlhami Emin, Istanbul: Koza Yayınları, 1978, pp. 8-14 and 18-21.

²⁵⁹ Kardelj, Edvard, *Contradictions of Social Property In A Socialist Society*, Belgrade: Socialist Thought and Practice, 1981, p. 27.

²⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 49.

²⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 95.

bureaucracy. (4) To empower local self-government of society. (5) Finally, to abolish state and party, and to create a classless society.²⁶²

The system of socialist self-management in the second Yugoslavia can be studied on the three levels: (1) economic level, (2) territorial level, and (3) organizational level.

IV. 2. i. Self-management on the Economic Level

Economic level of the Yugoslav self-management based on 'workers' councils'. The worker's councils was established by the 'Basic Law on the Management of State Economic Enterprises and Higher Economic Associations by Working Collectives' that was issued on 27 June 1950. The Basic Law defined the concept of workers' self-management based on workers' councils:

*"Factories, mines, carries, transport, trade, agricultural, forest, public utility and other state economic enterprises, as the general people's property, shall be managed by working collectives on behalf of the social community, within the framework of the state economic plan. . . The working collectives shall exercise this right of management through workers' councils."*²⁶³

By October 1950, 6,319 enterprises, with total working force of 974,932 workers, had established workers' councils. In 1958, there were 135,625 workers' council members in 6,618 enterprises.²⁶⁴ In practice, the worker's councils were given little real power by the 1950 Basic Law. However, the power of the workers' council was strengthened continuously during the 1950s by the reforms of 1952, 1954, 1957, 1958, 1959 and 1961, and by the 1953 Constitutional Law.²⁶⁵

The workers' council was deliberative body, which determined all activities of the undertaking and its general policy. Its main functions and powers were those: (1) To elect and to remove of members of the board of management of the undertaking. (2) To

²⁶² The theory of self-management and its five aims were not a pure innovation of the Yugoslav communists. These idea and aims had deep roots in (a) utopian socialists such as Robert Owen, Charles Fourier, Louis Blanc, (b) Pierre Joseph Proudhon's economic and political thought (c) the Marxian thought, (d) the experience of Paris Commune in 1871, and (e) the Russian revolutions of 1905 and 1917. (See for more details Horvat, op. cit., pp. 27- 31 and İşıklı, op. cit., pp. 30-68).

²⁶³ Singleton, op. cit., p. 126.

²⁶⁴ International Labor Office (I.L.O), *Workers' Management In Yugoslavia*, Geneva: La Tribune De Genève, 1962, p. 75.

²⁶⁵ See İşıklı, op. cit., pp. 123-125.

examine reports of the board of management. (3) To appoint and dismiss the director of undertaking. (4) To prepare financial and production plans of undertaking. (5) To conduct investments of undertaking. (6) To establish new departments or branches within the undertaking. (7) To increase or reduce the undertaking's working capital, net income, sale or purchase. (8) To conduct the undertaking's personal policy. (9) To give the final decision on individual disputes within the undertaking. (10) Finally, The 1961 Reform abolished the power of Federal State to determine the division of net incomes of enterprises. This power was given to the workers' councils. That is, in 1961, the workers' council were given the right to determine autonomously the division of enterprises' net incomes (profit) into personal incomes (wages) and retained funds.²⁶⁶

According to the Basic Law, the 'working collective' included all those employers in an enterprise. In the working collectives with fewer than thirty workers the whole workers constituted the workers' council. In the larger collectives, a workers' council was elected to exercise the function of self-management. The workers' councils were elected at the beginning of each year. Also, elections for the dissolution or recall of the council might be held any time of the year. Voting for the workers' council took place by secret ballot under the supervision of the election committee, that was elected by all workers' votes before the election.

Each undertaking with several workshops or departments could establish 'workers' councils at the department level'. They can be classified in two main categories according to whether they were advisory in character or whether they enjoyed some measures of autonomy in management. Advisory workers' council at the department level did not have actual power of management and responsibility of their own. However, the other had their autonomy power in management. They performed their autonomy function under supervision of the central workers' council.

The workers' council, especially in the large undertakings, established 'committees of the workers' councils'. The status and powers of such committees were defined by the workers' council. The chairman of such committees should be a member of the workers' council, while the other members could be chosen from among other

²⁶⁶ See for the workers' councils ILO, *op. cit.*, pp. 74-88.

workers in the undertaking. Also, a council might set up other standing or special committees whenever there was a need for them. The Labor Relations Act of 1957 entitled the councils to empower committees to take on and discharge individual workers and to set up disciplinary committees.

Every workers' council elected the 'board of management of undertaking (enterprise)' at the first sitting of the council. Before the election, the council appointed an election committee to supervise the election of the board. In the election of the board, the chairman of the workers' council, the director of the undertaking, the chief accountant, the members of the election committee and the persons who had been members of the board of management during the two preceding terms of office were ineligible.

According to the size of undertaking, the board of management involved from three to eleven members. At least three-quarters of the members of the board must be workers directly engaged in the undertaking's essential economic activity. The members of the board could not be re-elected for a third consecutive period of office.

The board of management was the permanent executive organ of the workers' council. The board of management was responsible for the management of the undertaking in accordance with the policy prepared by the council. Also, it bore responsibility for the efficient running of the undertaking. The board had three main duties: (1) To prepare reports and proposals to the council on the management of the undertaking. (2) To execute the general policy prepared by the council and to take the necessary measures to put the decisions of the council into effect. (3) To supervise the director of the undertaking and his subordinates. Also, the board directed the undertaking when the post of director was vacant.

The board of management had right to set up committees. These committees helped the board in preparing draft rules for the undertaking, production plans, and in making some particular studies. Also, workers' councils at department level had right to set up their boards of management at department level.

Furthermore, in order to strengthen the economic self-management, the Yugoslav socialist regime established 'Economic Chambers' and 'Unions of Undertakings'. According to the 1953 Constitutional Law, economic chambers were established by all

undertakings in a particular branch of the economy, either federally or in any one of the territorial units. Each chamber had its own general assembly composed of delegates from undertakings, who elect the committee of management and its chairman together with a secretariat and a number of specialized sections and committees. The executive bodies of the chambers only contained representatives designed by the workers' councils of the member undertakings. The main task of the economic chambers was to promote the interests and operations of their affiliated undertakings. For this purpose, they formulated some plans and proposals.

The 1953 Constitutional Law, also, allowed undertakings to form unions (Unions of Undertakings) for their particular industry or section of the economy. These unions could be formed by not less than a quarter of the undertakings in the following branches: industry and mining, building, agriculture and forestry, and transport. The Constitutional Law banned the chambers and the union to engage directly in any economic activity. However, they could organize meetings to discuss economic problems and to make recommendations for their members. Moreover, they gave great technical help to their members in order to increase productivity. Such chambers and unions were important elements of the Yugoslav self-management at the economic level.²⁶⁷

Finally, it should be emphasized that the Yugoslav socialist self-management system involved two basic principles at the economic sphere: (1) social ownership of the means of production and (2) the comprehensive planning of all economic and social life.

'Social ownership of the means of production' covered the whole of industry, mining, building, wholesale, retailing, transport and communications, hotels and restaurants, municipal services and cultural facilities such as press, cinema, theater etc. Also, banking, insurance, education and health services, that were not regarded as productive activities, were covered by public ownership. However, in agriculture in 1960, social ownership covered only about 12 per cent of the land. Private peasant holdings, according to the 1953 Constitutional Law, were limited to ten hectares and must be farmed by the owner himself or his family without any wage-earning help. Also, there were about 200,000 self-employed handicraft workers in 1960. They were allowed by the

²⁶⁷ See for more details about the economic chambers and the unions of undertakings *ibid.*, pp. 47-50.

1953 Constitutional Law to employ up to five persons.²⁶⁸

The second principle (comprehensive planning of economic and social life) had six functions: (1) To harmonize micro and macro economy. (2) To harmonize industry and agriculture. (3) To abolish inequality between developed regions (Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia) and underdeveloped regions (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia and Kosovo-Metohija). (4) To give an estimate of economic activity, taking into account the resources available, the needs and the investments. (5) To make financial arrangements needed to achieve the targets. (6) To increase productivity of all social figures of economic activities.²⁶⁹

In the light of these six basic functions, the Second Five Year Plan was launched in 1957. The plan depended on the production of consumer goods and finished products with the goal of improving standards of living. It aimed a growth in living standards of nearly 8 per year, and the elimination of shortages and bottlenecks through a faster development of agriculture and industries producing final goods. Thus, investments in agriculture were increased both through the newly-founded Agricultural Bank and through investment funds. The increase in agricultural investments led to a sharp increase in agricultural output. The other targets of the Second Plan were to aid the development of the country's economically underdeveloped areas, to expand and strengthen the system of workers' self-management in economic organizations and in local self-government, to reduce the balance of payments deficit by increasing exports.²⁷⁰

The Second Five Year Plan aimed to reduce regional inequality between developed regions and underdeveloped regions. For this purpose, the plan instituted the 'system of guaranteed investments' under the Federal Government. The Federal Government guaranteed a certain volume of investment to the underdeveloped regions out of the Federal General Investment Fund. During 1957-62, such 'guaranteed investments' amounted to between 46 and 64 percent of total investments in Macedonia, Montenegro and Kosovo.²⁷¹

²⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

²⁶⁹ See Horvat, *op. cit.*, pp. 111-115.

²⁷⁰ See Waterston, *op. cit.*, pp. 98-99.

²⁷¹ Dubey (ed.), *op. cit.* p. 203.

IV. 2. ii. Self-management on the Territorial Level

Self-management on the territorial level was designed by the 1953 Constitutional Law that empowered the people's committees. And then, the 1954 and 1957 reforms reinforced the self-management at the territorial level.²⁷²

As we have seen, the 1946 Constitution gave very weak authority and position to the people's committees in the governmental and political structure of FPRY. The authorities and position of the committees were extremely empowered by the 1953 Constitutional Law. Article 4 of the Law provided that:

*“Social ownership of means of production, the self-management of producers in the economy, and the self-management of working people in the commune, city and district represent the basis for the social and political system of the country.”*²⁷³

According to the 1953 Constitutional Law, the territorial self-management of Yugoslavia based on four types of territorial unit: (a) the federal state; (b) the federated republics; (c) the districts; and (d) the communes. The federal state and the six federated republics were defined as ‘organs of the State’, while the communes and districts were regarded as ‘self-governing groupings of citizens’ to which political and economical functions were entrusted.²⁷⁴

The federal state had a bicameral ‘Federal People’s Assembly (*Skupstina*)’ consisted of the ‘Federal Council (*Savezno Vece*)’ and the ‘Council of Producers (*Vece Proizvodjaca*)’. The Federal Council was elected by direct ballot by all citizens who were eligible for voting, while the other consisted only direct producers who were elected by the district producers’ councils. Both of them also established some specialized committees for some particular issues. In 1958 in the Federal People’s Assembly, there were 254 (44%) Serbian deputies, 130 (22%) Croats, 61 (10%) Slovenes, 41 (7%) Macedonians, 33 (6%) Montenegrins, 18 (3%) Shiptars (Albanians), 12 (2%) Magyars, and 5 others.²⁷⁵

²⁷² See Işıklı, op. cit., pp. 143-144.

²⁷³ Dubey (ed.), op. cit., p. 32.

²⁷⁴ See for the political and administrative organization of Yugoslavia according to the 1953 Constitutional Figure 1 in ILO, op. cit., p. 22.

²⁷⁵ Hondius, op. cit., p 203.

The Federal People's Assembly was entitled exclusive authorities by the 1953 Constitutional Law: amendment of constitution; conduct of general referendums; enactment of the Federal Economic Plan and Budget, basic decisions on foreign and domestic policy, and federal legislation; declaration of war; the conclusion of peace; election and removal of the President of the Republic, members of the Federal Executive Council, and federal judges, etc.

The Federal Executive Council and his Chairman were elected by the Federal People's Assembly. The Executive Council established specialized committees. In 1959, the composition of the Federal Executive Council, by Republic of origin, was as follows: Serbia 10 (29%), Croatia 2 (6%), Slovenia 6 (18%), Bosnia-Herzegovina 4 (12%), Macedonia 3 (9%), and Montenegro 9 (26%). That is, there were an over-representation of Montenegro (which formed only 3% of the population) and an under-representation of Croatia (which formed 22% of the population).²⁷⁶

On the other hand, according to the Law, the President of the Republic was elected from the members of the Federal People's Assembly for the four year term, and served as chief of state, president of the Federal Council and commander of army.

Like the federal state, each federated republic (the People's Republic) had its own People's Assembly, that consisted of 'Republic Council' and 'Council of Producers', and Republic Executive Council elected by Republic People's Assembly. Republic Council was elected by direct ballot by all citizens within the republic, while the other was elected by district producers' councils within the republic. These councils might establish some specialized committees.

According to the Constitutional Law of 1953, the autonomous province of Vojvodina had a 'Representative Assembly' consisting of two council, an executive council, a president of the executive council, and various administrative bodies. However, the autonomous region of Kosovo-Metohija had not a representative assembly, but had a 'Regional People's Committee' and an executive council as its executive political body. While Vojvodina had a 'Secretariat for Judicial Affairs', Kosovo-Metohija didn't has it.²⁷⁷

²⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 204.

²⁷⁷ Macesich, George, *Yugoslavia: The Theory and Practice of Development Planning*, Virginia: the University Press of Virginia, 1964, p. 8.

The third tier of the administrative territorial structure was the District (*Srez*). In 1958, there were 91 Districts. The district was a group of communes. Each district had its own the 'District People's Committee' that involved the 'People's Council' and the 'Council of Producers'. The People's Council was elected by direct ballot by all citizens of the district, while the other was elected by the commune producers' councils of the district. Each District People's Committee established special councils such as economic council, finance council, labor council. Also, District People's Council and District Producers' Council had right to establish some specialized committees.

The last tier was the Commune (*Komuna*). In 1958, there were 1,105 communes. Every commune had its own 'People's Council' elected by all citizens of the commune and the 'Council of Producers' elected by workers of the commune. These two councils, that had right to establish some special committees, formed the 'Commune People's Committee' that established some special councils for some particular issues. Both in the districts and the communes, the People's Committees were representative bodies which had both regulatory and executive powers.²⁷⁸

Edvard Kardelj defined the communes as "*the dictatorship of the proletariat*."²⁷⁹ This means that, the Yugoslav communists under the leadership of Tito-Kardelj regarded the communes as "*the dictatorship of the proletariat*"²⁸⁰ in Yugoslavia.

²⁷⁸ See for the organizational structure of the communes Figure 2 in H.O, op. cit., p. 24.

²⁷⁹ See *ibid.*, pp. 26-27.

²⁸⁰ According to Karl Marx's economic and political thought, communist revolution involves two stages: "*the dictatorship of proletariat*" and "*the foundation of communist society*". The first stage, the dictatorship of the proletariat, will be founded by the proletarians by using force against the capitalist class and the capitalist state. This stage is the period of the transformation of capitalist society into communist society: "*Between capitalist and communist society*" writes Marx "*lies the period of the revolutionary transformation of the one into the other. There corresponds to this also a political transition period in which the state can be nothing but the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat.*" (Marx, Karla & Engels, Friedrich, *Gotha ve Efrut Programlarının Eleştirisi*, trans. M. Kabagil, Ankara: Sol Yayınları, 1989, p. 41.) Also, they, in *Communist Manifesto*, explained the task of the dictatorship of the proletariat: "*The proletariat will use its political supremacy to wrest, by degree, all capital from the bourgeoisie, to centralize all instruments of production in the hand of the State, i.e., of the proletariat organized as the ruling class; and to increase the total of productive forces as rapidly as possible.*" (Marx & Engels, *Communist Manifesto*, London: Penguin Books, 1985, p 104.)

These quotations show that, in the Marxian thought, the dictatorship of the proletariat is the revolutionary proletarian state. Therefore, in the first stage of the communist revolution, the society is not a classless society and there was a ruling class: the proletariat. That is, in this stage, proletarian class transforms himself into the ruling class and establishes his own state and sovereignty against the old society's ruling and exploiting classes.

On the other hand, the 1953 Constitutional Law defined the commune as “*the basic political territorial organization of self-government of the working people and the fundamental social and economic community of the inhabitant of the municipal*”

According to Marx, the proletarian dictatorship (or the revolutionary proletarian state) should take some measures in order to (a) hinder counter-revolution and (b) to prepare the conditions for foundation of communist society. Of course, Marx emphasizes that these measures, functions and duties of the proletarian dictatorship will be different in different countries and in different times. According to the Marxian thought, some of these measures are those: destruction of old ruling and exploiting classes, the capitalist state, and the standing army; foundation of the proletarian guard; abolition of private property and rights of inheritance; centralization of credit in the hand of the state by means of a national bank with state capital and an exclusive monopoly; centralization of the means of communication and transport; enforcement of an exclusive land reform in the interest of poor peasants; to increase industrial and agricultural production; establishment of workers’ management in factories and in process of production; abolition the contradictions between agriculture-industry, town-country, intellectual labor-physical labor; abolition of alienation of labor from its own product; unification of individual power and social power; to decrease the working time and increase free time; distribution of social wealth according to ability and performance of labor; to organize free education and free health care for everybody. (See for these measures, functions and duties of the proletarian dictatorship Marx & Engels, *Communist Manifesto*, op. cit., 104-105 ; Marx & Engels, *Gotha ve Efrut Programlarının Eleştirisi*, op. cit., pp. 29-31 ; Marx & Engels, *Alman İdeolojisi (Feuerbach)*, trans. Sevim Belli, Ankara: Sol Yayınları, 1992, pp. 95, 104-105 ; Marx, *Fransa’da İç Savaş*, trans. Kenan Somer, Ankara: Sol Yayınları, 1991, pp. 57-62 and Miliband, Ralph “Marx and the State”, in D. McQuarrie (ed.), *Marx: Sociology, Social Change, Capitalism*, London: Quarter Book, 1978, pp. 264-270.)

However, Marx emphasized that the aim of the dictatorship of the proletariat is not to continue its dictatorship and sovereignty but to prepare the conditions for the foundation of communist society. Thus, these measures, functions and duties of the first stage aimed to establish communist society. The creation of communist society is also the end of the dictatorship of proletariat. In other words, according to the Marxian thought, the completion of the functions of the proletarian dictatorship will abolish the revolutionary proletarian state and the sovereignty of proletarian class. (See Marx & Engels, *Communist Manifesto*, op. cit., p. 105.)

Thus, in the Marxist political thought, the end of the proletarian dictatorship (the proletarian revolutionary state) is the beginning of the second stage of the communist revolution: *the foundation of communist society*. The communist society according to Marx, is a classless society where there are not state, private property, exploitative economic relations, power relations, hierarchical socio-political relations, and alienation. Furthermore, in the communist society, social wealth will be communal, and thus, distributed according to the needs but not according to the performance and ability of labor. Also, there is not any division between individual and social power; on the contrary, there is unification of them. In addition to these, communism provides free time for the self-realization of human being and freedom through decreasing working time as much as possible. As a result, communist society will provides conditions for the ‘*development of social productive forces*’ and for the ‘*human emancipation*’ because it abolishes the hindrances such as private property, state, alienation, exploitative relations and hierarchical socio-political relations which hinder the human emancipation and the development of social productive forces. (See for more details Marx, *Yahudi Sorunu*, trans. Niyazi Berkes, Ankara, Sol Yayınları, 1997, pp. 41-42, 44-45, 52 ; Marx & Engels, *Efrut ve Gotha Programlarının Eleştirisi*, op. cit., 30-32 ; Marx & Engels, *Alman İdeolojisi*, op. cit., pp. 53-57, 62, 95-96, 105 ; Marx, *1844 Elyazmaları*, trans. Kenan Somer, Ankara: Sol Yayınları, 1993, 168-173, 184.)

In short, according to the Marxian thought, communism is the second stage of the communist revolution coming after the dictatorship of the proletariat (the first stage); and, the communist society is a limitless development of productive forces of society and consummation of human emancipation.

territory.”²⁸¹

Therefore, in the Second Yugoslavia, the commune was the basic unit and socio-political organization of the territorial self-management. The reforms during the 1950s reduced the number and increased the size of communes and districts. In 1960, there were 800 communes with an average population of 22,500 per unit; these were grouped into 75 districts with an average population of 250,000 per district.²⁸²

Unlike the 1946 Constitution, the 1953 Constitutional Law extremely increased powers of the communes. Both administrative and economic power of the communes increased sharply as a result of the 1953 Constitutional Law and the other reforms, especially the 1961 Reform.

The communes' very influential activities were those:²⁸³ (1) The communes had authority to establish their economic plans and budgets. (2) They had power to found undertakings and some communal institutions – cultural, educational, health and social. Also, the communes had right to interfere in the distribution of net incomes within the undertakings.²⁸⁴ (3) They applied directly the laws, rules and regulations that was prepared by higher authorities. (4) They decided on the organization and operation of their organs and institutions. (5) Each commune had its own sources of revenue. The communes had authority to collect taxes in their territory. Also, they might attract funds from the Republic or the Federation. (6) The 1961 Reform entitled the communes to found and to manage communal banks. According to this reform, the communes had right to give credits to enterprises through these communal banks.²⁸⁵ (7) They conducted surveys about economic situation and performance of their territory. These surveys were taken into consideration by the Republic and the Federal governments.

IV. 2. iii. Self-management on the Organizational Level

“The League of Communists of Yugoslavia”, “the Socialist Alliance of the Working People” and “the Confederation of Yugoslav Trade Unions” were three important socio-political organizations in Yugoslavia. These socio-political organizations

²⁸¹ Macesich, *Yugoslavia: ...*, op. cit., p. 9.

²⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 11.

²⁸³ See *ibid.*, pp. 12-15.

²⁸⁴ See H.O., op. cit., pp. 238-239.

²⁸⁵ Singleton, op. cit., p. 152.

formed the *organizational level of the self-management system* in Yugoslavia:

a) The League of Communists of Yugoslavia:

The most important political organization was the Yugoslav Communist Party in socialist Yugoslavia. At the Sixth Congress in November 1952, the YCP changed its name to the 'League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY)'.

At the congress, three main decisions were taken: (1) The party's organs within the State bureaucracy would be abolished. (2) The governmental structure of the party was decentralized. That is, the authorities of the party's local and regional organs and organizations were empowered. (3) The Sixth Congress declared that the main duty and function of the party was not to rule the state, country, and people but to educate politically and ideologically working masses. One year later, Kardelj defined the role of the LCY: "*The League of Communists does not profess to rule in place of the masses, but to inspire and educate the masses so that they themselves might be able to exercise their government, and manage their factories and all their other social bodies and organizations.*"²⁸⁶ Also, in 1953, Tito declared that the LCY had two duties and roles; firstly, to protect the revolution against counter-revolution, and secondly to educate the Yugoslav working people.²⁸⁷

After the expulsion of the YCP from the Cominform, the most important and harmful crisis within the party emerged in 1954 when Milovan Djilas was expelled from the LCY and the government. His expulsion from the party and the government was an important event and crisis for the party since he was a very effective and important figure in the party and in the Yugoslav politics.

Djilas (1911-1995) was a distinguished member of the YCP and a close collaborator of Tito in the interwar years. During the war, he commanded the Montenegrin partisan troops and occupied a position of one of the inner circle of the YCP. After the war, he became vice-president of the FPRY and a member of the Central Committee of the YCP. Also, Djilas was the leader of the Montenegrin branch of the YCP.²⁸⁸

²⁸⁶ McFarlane, *op. cit.*, p 20.

²⁸⁷ See Tito, *op. cit.*, pp. 95-98.

²⁸⁸ See Allcock, Horton, Milivojevic, (eds.), *Conflict in the Former Yugoslavia*, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

Since 1950, Djilas, like Tito and Kardelj, has criticized and defined the Soviet Union as 'system of state capitalism' and supported 'socialist self-management of working people'. However, he began to apply his analysis of the Soviet system to Yugoslavia in 1953. In January 1954, he issued an article in magazine *Nova Misao* and claimed that there were no any differences between the Soviet and the Yugoslav socialist regimes since both of them were ruled and dominated by 'upper state and party bureaucracy'.²⁸⁹

On 16 January 1954, the Central Committee of the LCY met to discuss the attitude of Djilas. In this meeting, Djilas was criticized, protested and reprimanded. Finally, he was expelled from the Central Committee and obliged to resign from his government posts.²⁹⁰

Although Djilas resigned in March 1954, he continued to criticize the Yugoslav regime and the League. In November 1956, he published an article in the American magazine *New Leader* and looked forward to further political revolutions in the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and other socialist countries. Finally, he was judged and sentenced to three years imprisonment.

One year later, Djilas published his famous book *the New Class (Nova Klasa)* in August 1957 in New York. He stated in this book that the most severe dangerous for communist revolution and for Yugoslav socialist regime was *the bureaucratization of the socialist regime* as it created an upper ruling bureaucrats of the State and the League. Djilas defined the upper ruling bureaucracy as the *New Class* or the *Political Bureaucracy*. "The new class" writes Djilas "obtains its power, privileges, ideology and its customs from one specific form of collective ownership which the (new) class administers and distributes in the name of the nation and society."²⁹¹ The New Class was the most dangerous enemy of the Yugoslav socialism because "the selfish interests of the new class and the ideological character of the economy make it impossible to maintain a health and harmonious system."²⁹²

²⁸⁹ McFarlane, op. cit., p. 23.

²⁹⁰ Maclean, *Tito: ...*, op. cit., p. 98.

²⁹¹ Djilas, *the New Class*, op. cit., p. 45.

²⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 113.

In his book, Djilas claimed that the bureaucratization and the New Class produced six results that were incompatible with communism and that were destructive effects for socialist regimes: (1) The party state and the dictatorship of the political bureaucracy, but not the dictatorship of proletariat. (2) Abolition of working people's participation in politics and economy. (3) 'Tyranny over the mind' and intellectual backwardness. (4) Economic dogmatism and awkwardness. (5) Growth of nationalism because of new class's support to nationalism. (6) Finally, according to Djilas, the bureaucratization and the new class resulted in ideological and moral crisis in the socialist countries for the new class used 'the idea of communism and revolution' as an instrument for its economic and political self-interests. That is, he maintained that, in the socialist countries, the 'revolutionary communist ideology' was transformed into a 'special ideological instrument' which was used to legitimize the New Class's political and economic sovereignty.

Finally, Djilas emphasized that until the destruction of the New Class's power "*there can be no indication that important, fundamental changes are taking place in Communist system, at least not in the eyes of men who think seriously about social progress.*"²⁹³ The end of the New Class's power, and so, the fundamental changes in the socialist regimes, according to Djilas, would be fulfilled only by the workers' participation in economy and politics.

That is, he claimed that development of the revolution and creation of communist society is impossible without the workers' participation in political and economic decision-making process. Nevertheless, the New Class at first hindered and then destroyed such participation.

This book and Djilas' critics against the Yugoslav and the other socialist regimes were not welcomed in Yugoslavia. He was found guilty on 5 October 1957 and sentenced to seven years imprisonment.

After the Djilas affair, the Seventh Congress of the LCY was held in Ljubljana in April 1958. This congress warned against two equal dangerous and harmful tendencies: 'anarchist underestimation of the role of the state and party', and the 'tendency to

²⁹³ Ibid., pp. 45-46.

transform the state into an all embracing force'.²⁹⁴

The Congress described Djilas as 'petty-bourgeois anarchist' who underestimate the role of the state and party in the construction of socialist democracy. At the congress, Kardelj supported 'socialist democracy' against 'petty-bourgeois anarchistic democracy'. He asserted that socialist democracy based upon social ownership of the means of production, and the Communist Party and the revolutionary State played an important role in the construction of social ownership. Thus, Kardelj criticized Djilas and 'petty-bourgeois anarchistic democracy' that refused the Communist Party's and State's role. Moreover, he opposed and criticized those who tried to transform the Party and the State into an ultimate force since, according to Kardelj, this transformation would hinder the construction of social ownership and self-management.²⁹⁵ Also, at the congress, Tito reemphasized the educational role of the LCY. Tito restated that the League was not ruler but teacher and assistant of the working people.²⁹⁶

Finally, the Seventh Congress issued a resolution. The resolution declared that there were two negative tendencies (*bureaucratization* and *nationalism*) in Yugoslavia which threatened and hindered the development of the Yugoslav socialist society on the basis of self-management system. Hence, the resolution called the LCY members and all working peoples to fight against 'bureaucratization' and 'nationalism' that were bitter enemies of the Yugoslav socialist self-management.²⁹⁷

b) The Socialist Alliance of Working People: After the LCY the most important socio-political organization was the Socialist Alliance of Working People. In 1945, the YCP and the AVNOJ established People's Front. The main task of the People's Front was to work for reconstruction of the country that had been damaged by the war. In the Fourth Congress of the People's Front in 1953, its name was changed into the Socialist Alliance of Working People (SAWP).

The SAWP's duty was designed by the Fourth Congress to associate all citizens in the working of public life and to support the development of the self-management. It

²⁹⁴ Dubey (ed.), op. cit., p. 31.

²⁹⁵ See McClellan, op. cit., pp. 141-142.

²⁹⁶ See Tito, op. cit. 92-95

²⁹⁷ I.L.O, op. cit., p. 33 and Shoup, op. cit., p. 208.

includes organizations such as the LCY, the Trade Unions, the Youth Organization, the Women's Organization, and the Veterans' Organization. Also, it involved individual memberships. In April 1960, individual membership exceeded 6 million and comprised the majority of the adult population. In 1976, the number of total membership of the SAWP reached 12,555,000.²⁹⁸

The organization of the SAWP was centered on the local communes. The local communes of the SAWP had four basic duties and functions: (1) To encourage its members and other citizens in solving political, economic, social, cultural and other problems facing the local community. (2) To cooperate with the commune people's committees, the organs of workers' management in undertakings and various social management bodies, and to assist them in carrying out their duties. (3) To work in municipal services, school board, health services, housing, etc. in order to strengthen direct democracy and Socialist social relationships. (4) To organize open mass meetings in order to detect and discuss local public affairs.²⁹⁹

When we consider the SAWP according to participation of occupational groups, the most active groups were school teachers, blue-collar workers, civil servants and retired people. On the other hand, farmers, health service employees, housewives and craftsmen formed the least active occupational groups.³⁰⁰

c) The Confederation of Yugoslav Trade Unions: The Yugoslav trade union movement started in the second half of the 19th century. Until 1945 there was no a unified organization of the trade unions. In this year, the Yugoslav trade unions formed a unified organization, *the Unified Trade Unions*, under leadership of the YCP. Then, it was transformed to *the Confederation of Yugoslav Trade Unions* (CYTU) that was involved 14 trade unions.

The structure of the CYTU was both industrial and territorial. At the industrial base, there were trade union branches in all undertakings. In 1958, there were 21,131 trade union branches and nearly 2 million workers (72.7 per cent of the total number of

²⁹⁸ Işıklı, op. cit., p. 170.

²⁹⁹ See H.O, op. cit., pp. 34-35.

³⁰⁰ See Table 4. 1 in Jambreč, op. cit., p. 150.

the workers) belonged to them.³⁰¹

At the territorial base, the federal, republic, district and commune assemblies of the trade unions were formed. Such trade union assemblies were elected by all members of the trade unions. These assemblies also formed the trade union councils at the federal, republic, district and commune levels. The central assembly and the central council of the trade unions were the 'Federal Assembly of Trade Unions' and the 'Federal Council of Trade Unions'.

At the Fourth Congress of the CYTU (April 1959), seven main duties and functions of the trade unions were described: (1) To struggle to expand the productive capacity of the workers. (2) To strengthen socialist democracy and workers' self-management in order to eliminate the last traces of master-servant relationships and to build socialist social relationships. (3) To mobilize the working masses to achieve the economic and social targets of the state plans. (5) To educate and train workers both politically and technically. For this purpose, the CYTU established a number of Workers' Universities. (6) To hold conferences, public discussions, forums, etc. in order to discuss economic and social affairs and to produce recommendations for solutions. (7) Finally, to represent the workers' joint interests within undertakings and also to deal with local and federal authorities.³⁰²

Except these three organization, there were also the League of Socialist Youth (LSY) and the Veterans' Federation (VF); however, they were not as important and influential as the LCY, the SAWP, and the CYTU in the Yugoslav politics.³⁰³

The LSY was established in 1948 at the Fifth Congress of the YCP. It had 1,500,000 members in 1948, 1,700,000 in 1958, and 3,200,000 in 1976.³⁰⁴ Its two basic targets were those: to work for the reconstruction of the country, that had been damaged greatly in the war, and to educate the Yugoslav youth politically and ideologically. On the other hand, the VF was formed in 1947 and aimed to continue tradition and spirit of the Yugoslav liberation struggle. The VF involved 1 million members.³⁰⁵

³⁰¹ I.O, op. cit., p. 44.

³⁰² See *ibid.*, pp. 45-47.

³⁰³ Simmie, James, "Self-management in Yugoslavia", in Simmie & Dekleva (ed.), op. cit., p. 4.

³⁰⁴ Işıklı, op. cit., p. 180.

³⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 183.

IV. 2. iv. Outputs of the Self-management

After World War II, the Yugoslav regime based on self-management did not only facilitate the participation of working people in political and economic life but also achieved rapid and distinguish economic and social development. That is, since the war, Yugoslavia has been rapidly transformed into industrial society thanks to the system of socialist self-management.

A high rate of investment has been a principle feature of the Yugoslav economy since the war. The investment rate averaged 26.3 percent of the national income in 1947-1952, 21.6 percent in 1953-1956 and 20.4 percent in 1956-1958. In 1960, industry and mining accounted for 46 percent of the national income; in 1939 the comparable figure was 27 percent. Agriculture's share in the national income declined from 44 percent in 1939 to under 25 percent in 1960. In 1939, 75 percent of the labor force was employed in agriculture, by 1948, the figure had dropped to 68.3 percent. It then declined to 60.9 percent in 1953 and to nearly 50 percent in 1960. On the other hand, Employment in industry and mining rose from 300,000 in 1939 to 615,000 in 1952 and to 1,100,000 in 1960.³⁰⁶

"The sustained growth of Yugoslav industrial output during the 1950s" emphasizes Zagorka Golubovic *"was faster than that achieved during the same period by any other country in the world, whether in socialist Eastern Europe, capitalist Western Europe or the Third World."*³⁰⁷

Between 1948- 1960, the Yugoslav socialist regime constructed large new plants and expanded existing facilities and these new large investments in industry increased industrial output rapidly. Industrial expansion in 1960 relative to 1939 and 1953 shows that the most notable expansion occurred in the production of electrical equipment, petroleum, metal manufactures, chemicals and iron and steel. For example, production of petroleum increased from 1,000 ton in 1939 to 152,000 ton in 1952 and to 1,341,000 ton in 1961. Also, production of iron increased from 101,000 ton to 2,184,000 ton between

³⁰⁶ Macesich, "Major Trends in the Post War Economy of Yugoslavia", op. cit., p. 208.

³⁰⁷ Golubovic, Zagorka, "Contemporary Yugoslav Society: A Brief Outline of its Genesis and Characteristics", in Allcock, Horton, Milivojevic (eds.), *Yugoslavia in Transition: ...*, op. cit., p. 102.

1939-1961.³⁰⁸

Between 1953-1964, average annual growth rates of GNP, industrial output, agricultural output, employment, labor productivity, personal consumption and gross fixed investment were respectively 8.6, 12.7, 7.2, 6.3, 2.3, 7.3 and 11.4 percent.³⁰⁹

Moreover, the Yugoslav socialist regime based upon self-management of working people did not neglect health care and public education. That is, large economic investments did not restrict the investments in the public health care and education.

After the war, health facilities were improved and the general health level of the population was risen. A steady fall in the death rate was registered. In 1945, it stood at 14.9 per 1,000, in 1947 at 12.7, and 1958 at 9.2.³¹⁰ Between 1939-1961, number of medical schools and physician increased respectively from 3 to 8 and from 4,747 to 12,699. In the same period, population per hospital bed and population per physician fell respectively from 531 to 191 and from 3,242 to 1,461. Also, number of health insurance beneficiaries jumped from 2,616,000 to 9,002,000 between 1939-1961.³¹¹

Furthermore, the Yugoslav socialist revolution based on self-management of working people developed considerably the general educational level of the people in the short time. For example, illiteracy rate slumped from 25.4 percent to 19.7 percent between 1950-1960.³¹²

These figures show that, between 1953-1963, the Yugoslav economy achieved a rapid industrial development and the Second Five Year Plan, launched in 1957, became very successful. This success and rapid industrial development stemmed from five factors: (1) building new factories; (2) raising the productivity of labor; (3) more rational use of the resources; (4) improving organization of production and (5) receiving large foreign loans and aids.

However, despite the rapid industrial development and the success of the Second Plan, between 1953-1963, about 278,000 persons emigrated from Yugoslavia to the

³⁰⁸ See Table 2 in Macesich, "Major Trends in the Post War Economy of Yugoslavia", op. cit., p. 233.

³⁰⁹ Bojicic, Vesna, "The Disintegration of Yugoslavia: Causes and Consequences of Dynamic in Semi-command Economies", in Dyker & Vejvoda (eds.), op. cit., p. 30.

³¹⁰ Macesich, "Major Trends in the Post War Economy of Yugoslavia", op. cit., p. 209.

³¹¹ See Table 10. 1. in Parmelec, Donna E., "Yugoslav Health Care: Is the Cup Half Empty or Half Full?", in Allcock, Horton, Milivojevic, *Yugoslavia in Transition: ...*, op. cit., p. 309.

developed Western European countries in order to achieve higher wages and better standard of living.³¹³ Most of the emigrants were skilled and educated labor. For this reason, this emigration affected negatively the Yugoslav economy. Also, it shows that the rapid economic development and the success of the Second Five Year Plan could not solve all economic problems of the post-war Yugoslavia.

IV. 3. The 1963 Constitution and the Eighth Congress of the LCY: Decentralization and De-etatization

IV. 3. i. The 1963 Constitution

The 1963 Constitution was prepared and implemented in order to (a) decrease power and competence of the federal government and of the federal state, (b) increase power and competence of the republican and local governments, (c) improve the working people's self-management and self-government. That is, in order to develop the system of socialist self-management, the 1963 Constitution based upon two principles: *decentralization* (reduction of power and competence of the federal government) and *de-etatization* (reduction of power and competence of the federal state).

The 1963 Constitution was accepted and proclaimed on 7 April 1963.³¹⁴ The new Constitution was divided into 3 parts, 14 chapters and 259 articles. The Part One, Article 1 described the state: "*The Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia is a federal State of voluntarily united and equal peoples and a socialist democratic community based on the power of working people and on self-government.*"³¹⁵ That is, the new constitution changed the state's name into 'Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (*Socijalistička Federativna Republika Jugoslavije* – SFRY) and declared the period of 'socialist construction' at an end.

The 1963 Constitution described Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians, Montenegrins and Bosniaks (Muslim Yugoslavs) as *the constituent nations* of the SFRY. Bosniaks had not been recorded in the 1946 Constitution and in the 1953 Constitutional

³¹² See Table 2. 1. in Dubey (ed.), op. cit., p. 53.

³¹³ Mesic, Milan, "External Migration in the Context of the Post-War Development of Yugoslavia", in Allcock, Horton, Milivojevic (eds.), *Yugoslavia In Transition: ...*, op. cit., p. 173.

³¹⁴ See for the 1963 Constitution Hondius, op. cit., pp. 244-311.

³¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 246.

Law as constituent nation of Yugoslavia, while the 1963 Constitution elevated the Bosniaks' position to 'constituent nation'. These constituent nations (*nacije*) had the right of self-determination including the right of secession.

On the other hand, the new constitution enumerated national minorities (*nacionalna manjina*): the Shiptars (Albanians), the Hungarians, the Italians, the Slovaks, the Bulgarians, the Turks, the Romanians, and the Ukrainians. Although the national minorities of socialist Yugoslavia did not have the rights of self-determination and secession, the 1963 Constitution guaranteed the freedom of expression of their nationality and culture, as well as the freedom to use their languages. Also, the individual had the right both to declare, and not to declare, a national allegiance: "*The citizen is not obliged to reveal to which nationality he belongs, nor to opt for one of the nationalities.*" (Article 41).³¹⁶ Furthermore, Article 46 of the Constitution expressed that "*the members of the national minorities shall receive school instruction in their language.*"³¹⁷

That is, the national minorities, that had been deprived of education in their mother tongue in the First Yugoslavia, had right of teaching in their mother tongue and freedom to use their languages in the Second Yugoslavia. Thus, in Socialist Yugoslavia, the national minorities had their own schools that employed the languages of the national minorities. When the number of children of a national minority was not large enough to warrant the establishment of a special school, a separate section in the school was set up for the nationality. In 1964, there were 4,851 Shiptar, 1,565 Hungarian, 261 Slovak, 222 Bulgarian, and 177 Romanian schools or school sections in socialist Yugoslavia.³¹⁸

According to the 1963 Constitution, there were four administrative territorial units: (1) federal state; (2) federated republics; (3) districts; (4) communes. That is, self-management at the territorial level based on these four types of territorial unit in the 1963 Constitution.

The Federal State had two main duties: Firstly, it had to safeguard Yugoslavia's sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, and that effect, to organize its defense, to represent it abroad, to conduct its political, economic and other relations with states

³¹⁶ Ibid., p. 248.

³¹⁷ Ibid., p. 277.

³¹⁸ Ibid., p. 278.

and international organizations, to conclude international agreements and to decide on matters of peace and war. Secondly, the Federal State had duty to protect the internal unity of the Yugoslav federation. For this purpose, it had to protect the sovereign rights and equality of the constituent nations, the constitutional order and constitutionality of the SFRY, and to safeguard the unity of socio-economic and political system, the system of self-management and the fundamental rights and freedoms.

The Federal State, that bore these two main duties, had the Federal Assembly (*Savezna Skupstina*) which was defined by Article 163 as “*the supreme organ of power and social self-government within the framework of the rights and duties of the Federation.*”³¹⁹

It involved five councils: the Federal Council (*Savezno Vece*), the Economic Council (*Privredno Vece*), the Council of Education and Culture (*Prosvetno-kulturno Vece*), the Council of Social Welfare and Health (*Socijalno-zdravstveno Vece*), and the Organizational-Political Council (*Organizaciono-politcko Vece*).

The Federal Council was composed of 120 deputies elected by the assemblies of communes, plus 70 delegates elected by the republican assemblies (ten each) and by the assemblies of the Autonomous Provinces (five each). The republican delegates could be regarded as communal delegates for the republican assemblies were elected by the communal assemblies. According to Article 165, when necessary to resolve questions concerning nationalities, those members of the Federal Council elected by republican assemblies and the assemblies of the autonomous provinces constituted the ‘Council of Nationalities’. That is, the main task of the Council of Nationality involving 70 delegates from the republics and autonomous provinces to discuss and to issue resolution about the Yugoslav national question.

On the other hand, the other four Councils represented working people; therefore, they could at the same time be regarded as ‘the working councils’. Only ‘working man’ could be elected by ‘working man’ for these councils. Delegates of the four Councils were elected by those employed by various institutions such as factories, hospitals, schools, etc.

³¹⁹ Ibid., p. 286

The competence and duties of the Federal Assembly composed of five councils were those: legislation; planning; budgeting; control; accounting; adoption of policy directives and election of the President of the Assembly, the Chairman of Federal Executive Council, the President of the Republic, and the Vice-President of the Republic.³²⁰ Whereas the 1953 Constitutional Law had given power to the Federal Assembly to determine the constitutionality of legislation, the new constitution established a constitutional court which alone was to have the power to determine the constitutionality of all legislation.

The Federal State had its own the Federal Executive Council. The Chairman of the Federal Executive Council was elected by the Federal Assembly, and then he nominated other members of the Executive Council. Also, the chairmen of the republican executive councils were members of the Federal Executive Council. Thus, coordination among the republican executive councils was conducted by the Federal Executive Council. Its other functions were conduct of federal administration; drafting of laws, social plans and other acts; enforcement of federal laws and nominations of high federal functions.

The Federal State was represented at home and abroad by the President of the Republic. He retained most powers granted to his office by the 1953 Constitutional Law such as promulgation of laws, supreme command of the armed forces, etc. He was also the Chairman of the 'Council of the Federation (*Savet Federacije*)'. The Council of Federation was established by the 1963 Constitution, and its main task was to consider matters of state policy and the work of the political-executive and administrative organs. Its members were elected by the Federal Assembly among functionaries of the Federation, Republics, local government and other organization.

The Federal State was constituted by six federated republic: Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and Montenegro. The federated republics were renamed the 'Socialist Republics (*Socijalističke Republike*)' by the 1963

³²⁰ After the adoption of the new Constitution on 7 April 1963, the new elections for the Federal Assembly were held on 3 June. The newly elected Federal Assembly elected Tito as the President of the Republic, Edvard Kardelj as the President of the Assembly, and Aleksandar Rankovic as the Vice-President of the Republic.

Constitution. Article 108 defined the Republics as “*socialist democratic state communities*.”³²¹ These ‘communities’ had rights of self-determination, secession, and sovereignty. Furthermore, republican borders could not be altered without its consent.

Each republic had its own the Republican Assembly involving five councils: Republican Council, Economic Council, Council of Education and Culture, Council of Social Welfare and Health, and Organizational-Political Council. Election procedures resembled those for the Federal Assembly. Delegates of Republican Council were elected by the communal assemblies, and delegates of the four Working Councils were elected by the working people.

The head of state function in the Republics was performed by the President of the Republican Assembly who was elected by the Republican Assembly. Also, the Republican Assembly elected the Chairman of the Republican Executive Council, and than the Chairman nominated the other members of the Republican Executive Council. The number of members of the Republican Assembly and the Republican Executive Council differed from republic to republic.

Each Republican Assembly prepared and adopted the Republican Constitution that had to conform the Federal Constitution. The Republican Assembly could pass laws on matters on which no federal laws had yet been made, and for as long as federal law were lacking.

In the Socialist Republic of Serbia, there were two Autonomous Provinces: Vojvodina and Kosovo-Metohija. In the 1946 Constitution and the 1953 Constitutional Law, the status of Kosovo-Metohija was ‘Autonomous Region’. The 1963 Constitution promoted its status to ‘Autonomous Province’.

Vojvodina and Kosovo-Metohija had their own Provincial Assemblies (*Pokrajinska Skupstina*). The Provincial Assembly was composed of five council; the Provincial Council (90 members in the Vojvodina, 70 in Kosovo-Metohija) and the four other Councils of the same name and function as the four specialized councils of the Federal and the Republican Assemblies. All delegates were elected by the communal assemblies.

³²¹ Ibid., p. 301.

The 1963 Constitution introduced a 'rotation principle' into Yugoslav politics. According to Articles 82 and 83, no person could be twice consecutively a member of the same council of the same assembly or of an executive council nor be at the same time a member of the Federal Assembly and of the assembly of a republic, or a member of two councils of the same assembly. Furthermore, Article 220 ordered that the President of the Republic could be elected for a term of four years and reelected for one further consecutive term. However, this limitation was not applied to Josip Broz Tito.

The third territorial unit of the Yugoslav administrative structure both according to the 1953 Constitutional Law and the 1963 Constitution was the district (*srez*). At the time of enactment of the new Constitution, there were 63 districts.³²² The Republics involved districts and districts involved communes. The number of districts within the republics differed from republic to republic, and the number of communes within districts differed from districts to districts.

After 1955, in the Yugoslav administrative structure, districts were constantly losing their prerogatives and importance while getting larger, until they finally disappeared. They were first abolished in the smallest republic of Montenegro in 1957, and then in Slovenia and Macedonia in 1965. By 1967, districts were abolished throughout Yugoslavia.³²³

In 1963 when the 1963 Constitution was adopted there were 561 communes. According to the 1963 Constitution, a commune was founded for "*a territory of one or more inhabited places which are united by the common interests of their citizens and in which conditions exist for material and social development, for the realization of self-government of citizens.*"³²⁴ Article 73 stated that "*self-government by the citizens in the commune is the political foundation of the uniform social-political system (of the SFRY).*"³²⁵ Also, Article 96 defined the commune as "*the basic socio-political community*" of Yugoslavia. So, according to the 1963 Constitution, the communes were the basic socio - political units of the Yugoslav self-management on the territorial level,

³²² Ibid., p. 308.

³²³ Jambreč, op. cit., 93.

³²⁴ Hondius, op. cit., p. 308.

³²⁵ Fisher, op. cit., p. 151.

and aimed to enhance self-government of the working people and social development.

Each commune had its own the Communal Assembly (*Opstinska Skupstina*) that involved two councils: the Communal Council (*Opstinska Vece*) and the Council of Working Community (*Vece Radnih Zajednica*). The former represented the citizenry and the latter represented the working man of the commune. The Council of Working Community was composed of delegates elected by the economic enterprises as well as in the range of public services and social organizations such as schools and hospitals of the commune.

The main task of the communes was to organize, supervise and provide funds for the social services, to take care of public property and exercise social supervision and to maintain peace and order at the local level. They had competence to enact its own statute, to pass regulation, to prepare its social plans and budges and to determine their funds and revenue.

Article 96 described five functions of the communes: (1) to provide the material and other conditions necessary for the operation and development of the productive forces; (2) to guide and coordinate economic development and the development of the social services; (3) to determine and distribute the means for common communal requirements; (4) to create the conditions required to satisfy the material, social, cultural, and other common needs of the citizens; and (5) to coordinate individual and common interests with the general interests.³²⁶

Except the commune, also, the Local Communities (*Mesna Zajednica*) were established after 1963. They were organized as units in rural or urban communities through which the citizens could directly cater for their daily services or immediate needs. That is, the Local Community was the smallest unit of the territorial self-management in the 1963 Constitution.

On the other hand, at the economic level, the 1963 Constitution supported and protected workers' self-management. The new Constitution extended the concept of workers' self-management to social services such as education, health care and cultural services. The workers' self-management in these social services was defined as 'Social

³²⁶ Ibid., p. 151.

Self-management' by the 1963 Constitution.³²⁷

Article 19 expressed that every enterprise was independent and self-managing, and association of enterprises into chambers, business corporations and joint ventures was voluntary. Also, Article 9 stated that "*any act violating the right of self-management of the working people is unconstitutional.*"³²⁸ In addition to these, Article 6 and 34 ordered that self-management was working people's inviolable right that must be applied in all spheres of economic, social and political life.

According to the new Constitution, the Federal State and the Republican States were responsible for supporting self-management of the enterprises and for creating the most favorable conditions for economic and social development. Also they had the duty to provide unity of the economic system based upon the workers' self-management. That is, in the 1963 Constitution, the Federal State and the Republican States were not managers of the economic life, but the workers and other working masses were the managers. Hence, the 1963 Constitution regarded the working people as the managers of economic life, and the Federal State and Republican States as assistants of the working people in the economic life.

Furthermore, Chapter VII, Article 5 established the 'Fund of the Federation for the Development of the Economically Underdeveloped Regions (FDUR)'. Article 7 defined those areas as underdeveloped: Macedonia, Montenegro, Kosovo-Metohija, South and Southwest Serbia, South and West Bosnia and Herzegovina, and parts of Dalmatia, Lika, Banija and Kordum in Croatia. These underdeveloped areas were financed by the FDUR, and according to Article 8, the resources of this special fund were obtained from the Federal General Investment Fund.

The FDUR aimed to minimize and finally to abolish economic gap between the underdeveloped regions and the developed regions (especially Slovenia and Croatia). For this purpose, large sources were channeled through the FDUR to the underdeveloped region (especially to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo-Metohija, Macedonia and Montenegro). Between 1967-1970, total 8.2 billion dinars were channeled to Bosnia-Herzegovina (2.52 billion), Kosovo-Metohija (2.46 billion), Macedonia (2.15 billion), and Montenegro (1.07

³²⁷ Singleton, op. cit., p. 267.

billion) in order to support their economic development.³²⁹

IV. 3. ii. The Eighth Congress of the LCY

The adoption of the 1963 Constitution was followed by the Eight Congress of the LCY. The LCY convened its Eight Congress in Belgrade in December 1964. At the congress three issues were discussed: Self-management, economic problems, and national question.

At the Congress, Vice-President Rankovic gave political report which discussed problems of party and Yugoslav politics. Also, Kardelj delivered economic report which explained economic condition of Yugoslavia. The major difference and contradiction between the reports was that the Rankovic's report favored more 'centralization' and 'etatization' in order to solve problems, whereas the Kardelj's report favored more 'decentralization' and 'de-etatization' both on the economic and political spheres.³³⁰

At the end of the Congress, a resolution was issued. The resolution involved six main points: (1) the LCY should work for full implementation of self-management. (2) To work for abolition economic gap between the developed and underdeveloped regions. (3) Economic independence and economic self-management of the nations and the republics should be guaranteed by the LCY. (4) To fight against 'nationalism and chauvinism' that was fed by 'etatism and bureaucracism'. For this purpose, the resolution maintained de-centralization and de-etatization in political and economic spheres. (5) To improve power and competence of republican and regional branches of the League. (6) Finally, the Congress argued that creation of the 'Yugoslav nation, identity and culture' could not be achieved by assimilation of the other nations, identities and cultures, but by increasing cooperation among nations, identities and cultures that have lived together in Yugoslavia.³³¹

These six points show that the Eight Congress denied 'centralization' and 'etatization', which hinders improvement of the self-management, and accepted 'decentralization and 'de-etatization', which facilitates improvement of the self-

³²⁸ McClellan, *op. cit.*, p. 146.

³²⁹ Hondius, *op. cit.*, p. 324.

³³⁰ See McClellan, *op. cit.*, pp. 147-148.

³³¹ Hondius., *op. cit.*, pp. 315-316.

management. That is, the Kardelj's report became more influential and dominant than the Rankovic's report in the resolution. Also, the Eighth Congress embarked a course towards confederalization of the LCY through increasing power and competence of republican, regional and local branches of the League.

Both the 1963 Constitution and the Eighth Congress of the LCY prepared condition for implementation of the 1965 Economic Reforms since they based upon two principle: *decentralization* and *de-etatisation*. That is, the 1963 Constitution and the Eighth Congress reduced the role and power of the federal state and government, on the other hand, increased role and power of republics and communes in order to strengthen the working people's self-management and self-government. The decrease in the power of the federal state and government and the increase in the power of republics and municipalities facilitated implementation of the 1965 Economic Reforms.

IV. 4. The 1965 Economic Reforms: Liberalization of the Yugoslav Economy

The 1963 Constitution and the Eight Congress were followed by a series of new economic reforms issued between 1964-1967. These economic reforms that furthered decentralization and de-etatisation at the economic level were frequently called as 'the 1965 Reforms'. These reforms had six goals: (1) to improve the working people's self-management; (2) to give greater autonomy to enterprises and limit the role of state in the economy; (3) to increase economic investments, quality of output, efficiency of enterprises and labor productivity; (4) to increase competitive power of the Yugoslav economy and to integrate it with the world economy; (5) to decrease unemployment; and (6) to remove deficit in the balance of payments by increasing exportation.³³²

The Federal Social Plan for 1961-65 was the forerunner of the 1965 Reforms. This plan proposed to coordinate the Yugoslav economy with the international market. For this purpose, it recommended to concentrate investments on increasing production of commodities which could be made from Yugoslav materials and for which there was a ready profitable market abroad. Also, it planed to decrease economic power and role of

³³² Bicanic, op. cit., p. 234.

the federal government and to increase power and autonomy of enterprises within a competitive economic relations.³³³

The Federal Social Plan, that was adopted in 1961, was followed by a series economic reforms between 1964-67. These reforms, so-called '1965 Reforms', curtailed the influence of economic planners and other government officials at the federal level. The new reforms reduced central planning and control, and placed greater reliance on market as a guide to the allocation of resources. Also, the planning function was decentralized to the republics, communes and enterprises. That is, the influence of market relations was increased at the expense of the federal state officials and planners.³³⁴

In order to integrate the economy with the world economy and to increase the role of market based upon economic competition, the foreign trade of Yugoslavia was liberalized by the 1965 Reforms. In 1964, import duties were reduced from an average of over 23 percent on the value of a commodity to an average of about 11 percent. Also, most raw material imports were removed from import-duty lists. Importation was eased by the new reforms. Moreover, in July 1965, the official exchange rate of the dinar was changed from 750 to 1,250 per dollar with aim of improving export. The new rate brought the dinar closer to the open-market rate.

In order to increase productivity of investments, quality of industrial output and enterprises' autonomy, a series reforms were enacted and enforced. The average rate of interest was reduced from 6 percent to 4 percent. In some industries such as electrical power, transportation, agriculture and fishing the rate was reduced to 2 percent. Moreover, the federal tax on income of enterprises was abolished on 1 August 1965. It was more important that resources at the disposal of economic enterprises, which they were free to employ as they desired, increased from 51 to 71 percent of the income of the enterprise. Also, enterprises were allowed to invest their reserves directly via the banks. This meant that the reforms made enterprises freer in determining the use of their incomes and reserves.

The reforms reduced tax on personal incomes from 17.5 to 10.5 percent. The

³³³ Waterston, op. cit., p. 100.

³³⁴ Knight, Peter T., *Economic Reforms In Socialist Countries: The Experiences of China, Hungary, Romania, and Yugoslavia*, Washington: World Bank Staff Working Press, 1983., p. 86.

federal government's share was 2.5 percent, and the republics and the communes received the remaining 8 percent. This reform aimed to increase purchasing power of persons and to reduce the power of the federal government in collecting taxes.³³⁵

In order to improve workers' productivity in work, workers' councils were urged by the new reforms to reevaluate their criteria for distributing incomes within the enterprise according to the motto 'To each according to his contribution'. That is, no guarantee was given that personal incomes (wages)³³⁶ would increase for everyone by the same amount. Naturally, this economic policy increased inequality among personal incomes.

The 1966 Law allowed to establish private firms in the sectors of transportation and trade. As a result of the reforms, the number of private enterprises increased, and the economic power of private sector improved. For example, The economic contribution of private sector to GNP increased from 9 percent in 1964 to 28 percent in 1970. Also, in the same period, the portion of private sector in total investments climbed to 18,6 percent from 10 percent.³³⁷

The 1965 Reforms increased power and autonomy of banks in the economic life. Banks were permitted to operate more as commercial banks, that is, with a view to making a profit on their loans. In accordance with the Banking and Credit Act of 1965, commercial banks were established by enterprises and state organs ('socio-political communities' at the communes, republican and federal levels) as equal partners who contributed the bank's own capital (credit fund) and became shareholders of the bank. Thus, since 1965, the bank management has been controlled by the founder members in proportion to their share in the bank's capital. That is, the profits made from banking activity belonged to these founder enterprises, and they controlled the credit policy of the

³³⁵ See Macesich, "Major Trends in the Postwar Economy of Yugoslavia", op. cit., pp. 220-221.

³³⁶ According to the Yugoslav socialist regime, 'wage' is a economic category in the capitalist economic relations which bases on exploitation of waged labor. Therefore, 'worker's wage' was described as 'personal income' by the socialist regime in Yugoslavia because there was not capitalist economic relations based on exploitation of labor but socialist economic relations without exploitation of labor.

³³⁷ Vuskovic, Boris, "Yugoslavya'da Toplumsal Eşitsizlik", trans. Sabri Yücesoy, *Birikim*, 42-43-44, August-September-October 1978, p. 134.

bank.³³⁸

Also, the role of banks in housing has increased since 31 December 1965 because all payments into federal housing funds were eliminated and the accumulated resources for housing were transferred to the banks. Moreover, the Law on 1 April 1966 abolished the concept of 'territoriality', which had been the basic principle of the previous banking system. So now, their operation were not limited to the particular geographic area in which they were located, and they could finance projects all over the country. The banks, which were rescued from territorial boundaries, were allowed by the 1966 Law to establish the bank mergers. Naturally, the bank mergers reduced the number of banks from 112 in 1966 to 67 in 1969 and 25 in 1972. These mergers involved banks in all over country.³³⁹

It is more important that, the banks' role in the allocation of investment resources increased at the expense of the federal government's role as a result of the new reforms. The 1965 reforms increased share of banks and enterprises in finance of investments and decreased the financial share of the federal state. The shares of the banks in the finance of investments were 0.9% in 1961, 44.8% in 1966 and 47.2% in 1968. The share of enterprises increased from 29.5% in 1961 to 39.8% in 1966, and then reduced to 31.2 % in 1968. On the other hand the share of the state in finance of investments were 61.7% in 1961, 15.2% in 1966 and 19.9 in 1972.³⁴⁰ These figures reveal that the 1965 Reforms opened the allocation of investment resources to the market mechanism, and the banks "became the paramount vehicle of financial intermediation."³⁴¹

Before the 1965 Reforms, investments in the underdeveloped regions had been guaranteed by the Federal General Investment Fund. The new reforms abolished this policy and ordered that such guarantee must be made by the investor's own resources but not by the Federal Fund. So, after the 1965 Reforms, a smaller amount of the Federal Fund was allotted to the underdeveloped regions, and the importance of investors (economic enterprises and banks) increased.

³³⁸ Bri, Włodzimierz & Lask, Kazimierz, *From Marx to the Market: Socialism in Search of an Economic System*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992, p. 92

³³⁹ Singleton, op. cit., pp. 155-156.

³⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 154.

³⁴¹ Bri & Lask, op. cit., p. 89.

Administrative control of the federal government over prices was restricted by the Law of July 1965. This law aimed to free prices from administrative controls, and to substitute market forces as the main determinant of prices. The 1965 Law was supported by a supplementary law in July 1967, and by August 1967, about 40 percent of all producer prices were free from administrative control, while only 10 percent of prices had been free before 1965.³⁴² However, a direct result of this price policy was a general rise in the price of industrial goods of 39 percent, food price by over 50 percent, rents by 100 percent and the cost of living by 44 percent.³⁴³

The Federal Social Plan for 1961-65 was followed by the Social Development Plan for 1966-1970. The Social Development Plan (1966-1970), adopted in July 1966, had five targets:³⁴⁴

- 1) To redistribute national income in favor of personal incomes, so that, to increase standard of living of persons.
- 2) Intensification of socio-economic activity in order to improve labor productivity.
- 3) Integration of the Yugoslav economy in the international division of labor. For this purpose, production would be reoriented by the world market relations. This meant that, the Social Development Plan ordered to produce goods which were profitable in the world market.
- 4) To permit and encourage foreign investment with aim of attracting modern technology and improving efficiency. For this purpose, in 1967, the country was opened to foreign investors. Yugoslav firms was allowed to set up a type of jointly owned subsidiary with foreign firms if those ventures transferred modern technology to Yugoslavia, or if they resulted in greater productivity in improved products or in increased exports. However, majority control of Yugoslav firms by foreign investors was not permitted. That is, foreign firms were allowed to invest up to 49 percent of the capital in joint enterprises and to repatriate their profits.
- 5) To reduce the federal state's role in finance of investments and to increase the role of banks and enterprises in allocation of investment resources. For this purpose, the various

³⁴² Macesich, "Major Trends in the Postwar Economy of Yugoslavia", *op. cit.*, p. 225.

³⁴³ Singleton, *op. cit.*, p. 160.

³⁴⁴ See Dubey (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 39-40.

federal investment funds were removed and the resources transferred to the banks. For example, the Social Investment Fund, which had been the main instrument of mobilization and allocation of investment resources by the state, were abolished and its accumulated resources were transferred to the banks. However, the FDUR continued to operate in order to decrease the gap between developed and underdeveloped regions.

In short, we can summarize the 1965 Economic Reforms in four points:³⁴⁵

- 1) Transferring a large part of the federal government's responsibility to the republics.
- 2) Integrating the economy with international division of labor by devaluing dinar and by introducing a considerable degree of liberalization of foreign trade.
- 3) Transferring responsibility for resource mobilization and allocation from the federal state to economic enterprises and banks.
- 4) Increasing the autonomy of enterprises in investments, price formation, and in the distribution of enterprise's income to capital accumulation and the personal incomes of workers.

IV. 5. Growth of Economic Contradiction

Both the 1963 Constitution and the 1965 Economic Reforms involved two principles: *decentralization* and *de-etatization*. These principles were also accepted and supported by the Eight Congress of the LCY. Implementation of these principles decreased the power of the federal state and government, and increased the power and independence of republican and local governments, and the autonomy of the banks and enterprises. They also liberalized the Yugoslav economy a considerable degree. Thus, the implementation of the 1963 Constitution and the 1965 Economic Reforms was the decentralization, de-etatization and liberalization of the Yugoslav economy.

On the other hand, the new constitution and reforms aimed to strengthen the socialist self-management, to improve efficiency of the Yugoslav economy, and to integrate the economy with the world economy. However, the 1963 Constitution and the 1965 Economic Reforms (that is, the decentralization, de-etatization and liberalization of the Yugoslav economy) generated undesirable economic contradictions and problems

³⁴⁵ Schrenk, Martin, Ardalan, Cyrus, El Tatawy, Nawal A. (eds.), *Yugoslavia: Self-management Socialism and Challenges of Development*, Baltimore: the Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979, p. 26.

that damaged the regime based upon the working people's self-management. There were eight basic economic contradictions and problems that derived from the 1963 Constitution and the 1965 Economic Reforms:

1) The reforms and the new constitution decreased power of the federal state and government, and increased power and autonomy of the republics. This policy increased political and economical competition among the republics. Especially, the competition among the republics revealed itself as the economic contradiction between the developed rich republics (Slovenia and Croatia) and underdeveloped developed republics (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro). This contradiction focused on the FDUR. The less developed regions were aided through the FDUR, while Croatia and Slovenia opposed the FDUR since they regarded it and aids to underdeveloped regions as exploitation of their resources and wealth. Also, they argued that much aid was wasted in underdeveloped regions, owing to inefficiency and mismanagement, and that these funds would have a much higher output if they were invested in the industrialized republics. However, Serbia and the underdeveloped republics maintained that these funds would facilitate to close the gap between developed and underdeveloped regions, and therefore, help economic integration of the Yugoslav lands.³⁴⁶ So, Slovenia and Croatis favored abolition of the FDUR, whereas Serbia and the underdeveloped republics favored further operation of the fund and aids.

2) Liberalization of the Yugoslav economy in a considerable degree naturally increased the role of market relations and rules. This event differentiated personal incomes (wages), and this differentiation of wages increased socio-economic inequalities among working people. Naturally, this event hardened competition among workers of different sectors and enterprises. More profitable enterprises and sectors were able to increase wages, whereas the less profitable enterprises and sectors could not improve their workers' incomes. Also, the developed republics' working people received higher income than others. It is more serious that the workers of the sectors which were more effective in the political decision making process received higher incomes than the others who were

³⁴⁶ Hoffman & Neal, op. cit., p. 481

employed in the sectors which were not effective in the politics.³⁴⁷

Of course, workers whose wages were lower became discontent with the reforms, while the others with higher wages welcomed the reforms. Thus, a contradiction emerged between 'contented' and 'discontented' workers, and this contradiction weakened "*bratstvo i jedinstvo* (brotherhood and unity)" of the Yugoslav working people due to increasing socio-economic inequalities among working persons.

Furthermore, such liberalization expanded unemployment. Between 1965 and 1967, 160,000 workers lost their job and became unemployed.³⁴⁸ This sharp increase in unemployment promoted emigration of the Yugoslav workers to the industrialized Western European countries. The number of Yugoslav workers abroad increased from 4,288 in 1961 to 20,373 in 1965 and 239,779 in 1970.³⁴⁹ By the end of the 1960s, one-sixth of the adult workforce was employed outside of Yugoslavia.³⁵⁰ This sharp increase in emigration of Yugoslav workers was a result of the 1965 Economic Reforms that liberalized economic relations, and consequently, increased unemployment.

This massive emigration also resulted in a debate and conflict between Croats and Serbs. Croatia, both as a republic and as a nation, more suffered from the migration than Serbia since its contribution to total Yugoslav migrant stocks in the 1960s was higher than Serbian contribution to the migrant stocks. The Croat contribution to the Yugoslav migrant stocks was 56.0 percent in 1960, 36.3 in 1965 and 21.6 in 1970. However, the Serbian contribution was 7.1 percent in 1960, 19.3 in 1965 and 19.5 in 1970.³⁵¹

This meant that the loss of the Croatian population was higher than the loss of the Serbian population. For example, 11 percent of the population of Split emigrated between 1961-1971.³⁵² Also, between 1971-1981, the number of Croats living in Croatia decreased from 3.51 million to 3.45 million. Simultaneously, the number of the Serbs in Croatia was increasing due to immigration of Serbs into the region. The Croat public opinion, intellectuals and politicians claimed that these Serb immigrants took the places

³⁴⁷ See Vuskovic, op. cit., pp. 135-136.

³⁴⁸ Macesich, "Major Trends in the Postwar Economy of Yugoslavia", op. cit., p. 222.

³⁴⁹ Mesic, op. cit., p. 186.

³⁵⁰ Lane, op. cit., p. 133.

³⁵¹ Mesic, op. cit., p. 186.

³⁵² Vuskovic, op. cit., p. 132.

relinquished by the Croat migrants in Western Europe.³⁵³

Croatia was practically affected by massive labor emigration far more because it had proportionately the oldest population (after Slovenia) and a low birth-rate (after 1971 the lowest in Yugoslavia). Therefore, the external labor migration became one of the most important question on which Croatian nationalism rested. The large emigration of Croatian workers to the Western Europe was viewed by Croat nationalists as a *Serbian plot* to move young and skilled Croat manpower out of their homeland.

Finally, the workers who were annoyed because of increasing unemployment and differentiation of wages organized strikes in order to protest the reforms and to solve their economic problems. After the reforms, there were a sharp rise in the number of strikes. The number of strikes topped from 61 in 1960 to 271 in 1964 and then decreased to 148 in 1968.³⁵⁴ This sharp increase in the number of strikes shows that the reforms increased dissatisfaction of workers and sharpened economic contradictions.

3) Autonomy and role of enterprises in the Yugoslav economy expanded as a consequence of the decline of economic role of the federal government and state and liberalization of the economy. This situation sharpened competition and economic contradiction among the enterprises. Competitive market relations increased some enterprises' profits, while reduced some enterprises' profits. Furthermore, financially and technologically unviable enterprises were forced to go bankrupt or to merge with other viable enterprises. Also, some insufficient enterprises were closed down by official decree and their workers became unemployed. This situation was protested and opposed by the trade unions.³⁵⁵

Moreover, a conflict emerged between *large trading enterprise*, particularly those in foreign trade, and *producing enterprises*. As a result of the economic reforms, trading enterprises became profit centers of the Yugoslav economy. They controlled a number of producing enterprises, especially financially unviable producing enterprise. The 1965 Economic Reforms increased the producing enterprises' dependence on the large trading

³⁵³ Klemencic & Zagar, op. cit., p. 229.

³⁵⁴ Jambreč, op. cit., p. 193.

³⁵⁵ Macesich, "Major Trends in the Postwar Economy of Yugoslavia", op. cit., pp. 225, 231.

enterprises.³⁵⁶

4) A bitter dispute and conflict emerged between *centralists* and *de-centralists*. Some politicians and experts supported economic and political centralization, while the others favored further decentralization and liberalization both in political and economical spheres.

Centralist politicians and experts advocated that the 1963 Constitution and the 1965 Reforms endangered the existence of the LCY and the State, and thus, threatened the economic and political integration of Yugoslavia. The advocates of this approach were drawn from Serbia and Montenegro. Also, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia favored centralization rather than decentralization because they benefited from the FDUR and a further decentralization would decrease their benefit from the fund. However, it should be indicated that although most Serb politicians favored centralization, there were some Serb politicians who favored a further decentralization such as the Serbian Prime Minister Petar Stanbolic.³⁵⁷

On the other hand, liberals and de-centralists maintained that more devolution of power to enterprises and a further improvement of autonomy of republican and local government would improve economic efficiency and self-management. The principle supporters of this view were drawn from the prosperous northern republics of Croatia and Slovenia.³⁵⁸ However, in fact, they favored decentralization and liberalization since Croatia and Slovenia wanted to keep a larger proportion of their incomes for themselves rather than yield more to the federal authority in Belgrade to be disbursed to the underdeveloped regions.

That is, almost Croatian and Slovenian politicians and experts favored further economic and political decentralization, however almost Serb politicians and experts supported centralization. Thus, the 1963 Constitution and the 1965 Reforms, which furthered decentralization and liberalization, were regarded by Serbian centralists as a triumph of the de-centralist Croat-Slovene alliance.³⁵⁹

³⁵⁶ Schrenk, Ardalan, El Tataby (eds.), op. cit., p. 29.

³⁵⁷ Judah, op. cit., p. 144.

³⁵⁸ See Lane, op. cit., pp. 130-131.

³⁵⁹ Işıklı, op. cit., p. 141.

5) The economic reforms produced a conflict and competition between *industrial capital* controlled by the prosperous republics of Slovenia and Croatia and *financial/ commercial capital* controlled by Serbia. Serbia dominated and orientated financial and commercial capital, while Slovenia and Croatia dominated industrial capital in the Yugoslav economy. Thus, the conflict and competition between industrial capital and financial/commercial capital revealed itself as an economic conflict and competition between Serbia and the Croat-Slovene alliance.

Serbian commercial firms controlled 70 percent of total Yugoslav foreign trade, and also, 60 percent of the banks was controlled by Belgrade in 1970.³⁶⁰ Serbian superiority and domination in the foreign trade and banking system urged Slovenes and Croats to supported decentralization and liberalization of foreign trade and banking system. They aimed to restrict Serbian domination in the bank system and foreign trade through furthering economic decentralization and liberalization. On the other hand, Serbia favored economic centralization in order to control industrial capital and investments, and so, to limit Slovenian and Croat superiority in industry.

6) Also, a historical conflict between Serbs and Croats continued in the Second (Socialist) Yugoslavia: *the Serbian domination in state apparatus*. Serbs were more effective and determinative than Croats in the Yugoslav bureaucracy and government.

In 1964, 51.5 percent of the members of the LCY was Serbs and 18.6 percent of was Croats. In 1958, Croat members formed 2.8 percent of the membership of the Communist League of Serbia, while Serbian members formed 26.0 percent of the membership of the Communist League of Croatia. In 1963, there were 10 Serbs, 8 Croats, 6 Macedonians, 5 Slovenes and 3 Montenegrins in the Federal Executive Committee; and 44 Serbs, 19 Croats, 19 Slovenes, 14 Montenegrins and 12 Macedonians in the Central Committee of the LCY. In 1963, there were 82 Serbs and only 1 Croat in the Central Committee of the Communist League of Serbia, whereas there were 55 Croats and 13 Serbs in the Central Committee of the Communist League of Croatia. Furthermore, in the same year, there were 52 Serbs and 12 Croats in the Central Committee of the Communist League of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and 7 Serbs and 2 Croats

³⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 142.

in the Party Executive Committee of the Communist League of Bosnia-Herzegovina.³⁶¹ Serbs also were superior and dominant in the Yugoslav People Army (YPA). In 1971, 60.4 percent of the officers in the YPA were Serbs and only 8.4 percent were Croats.³⁶²

These figures show Serbian domination in the Yugoslav bureaucracy and government. This Serbian domination annoyed and frustrated Croat side although the Serbian domination was restricted by federal structure of the Second Yugoslavia and by expansion of power and autonomy of the Socialist Republic of Croatia as a result of the 1963 Constitution and the 1965 Economic Reforms.

7) Radical expansion of autonomy of republics, communes, banks, and enterprises as a result of the 1963 Constitution and the 1965 Economic Reforms caused *regionalism* in the economic investments and production.³⁶³ Consequently, the 1963 Constitution and the 1965 Reforms affected negatively the *political and economical integration of Yugoslavia* and the idea of *Yugoslavism* because "*the shift of economic power away from federal to republican and regional government with the greater role of market forces exacerbated regional and national conflicts*".³⁶⁴

According to Paul Shoup, national conflicts and nationalism in Yugoslavia rose in the mid -1960s on the economic basis. Hence, he describes the nationalism in Yugoslavia in the 1960s as "*economic nationalism*" that strove to develop its own republic's economic power.³⁶⁵ This means that, Serbian "*economic nationalism*" strove for economic development of Serbia, and the Croat "*economic nationalism*" tried to strengthen economic power of the Republic of Croatia.

On the other hand, Milovan Djilas maintained that "*the struggle over the reputation and power of one (bureaucrat)'s own republic does not go much further than a desire to strengthen one (bureaucrat)'s own power.*"³⁶⁶ That is, according to Djilas, every nationalist bureaucrat struggled to increase his own republic's power since any increase in his own republic's power strengthened his self-power. Furthermore, he stated

³⁶¹ See Shoup, op. cit., pp. 270-271 and 274-278.

³⁶² Cohen, op. cit., p. 182.

³⁶³ Singleton, op. cit., p. 156.

³⁶⁴ Bri & Lask, op. cit., p. 92.

³⁶⁵ See Shoup, op. cit., p. 247-248.

³⁶⁶ Djilas, *The New Class*, op. cit., p. 101.

and warned that “*This (Yugoslav nationalism) is not classical (bourgeois) nationalism, but a more dangerous, bureaucratic nationalism built on economic self-interest. This is how the Yugoslav system will begin to collapse.*”³⁶⁷

In the light of these quotations, this means that, Serbian (or Croatian) “*economic nationalist*” bureaucrats endeavored to increase economic power of Serbia (or Croatia) in order to increase their self-power and self-position. Thus, the ultimate goal of Serbian and Croatian nationalist bureaucrats was not to enrich and empower their nations and republics but to strengthen their self-power and self-position in the economic and political spheres.

8) Finally, the new constitution and the reforms decreased the power of federal state and government in the Yugoslav economy. But, on the other hand, they created a “*managerial elite*” or “*technocracy*”, and expanded their managerial power and competence in the economic sphere. Naturally, this increasing economic power and competence of technocracy transformed itself into political power and competence in the Yugoslav politics. That is, the 1963 Constitution and the 1965 Economic Reforms brought about a continuous political and economic rise of technocracy in the Yugoslav economy and politics because, under the conditions of improving market economy, power, instead of going to the working people, passed into hands of a new social stratum: *managerial elite* or *technocracy*. Of course, the rise of technocracy increased social tension and undermined the social position of working class and power of self-management.³⁶⁸

Rise of technocratic oligarchy continuously weakened the Yugoslav workers not only in the economic sphere but also in the political sphere. The workers’ portion in the Republican Assemblies fell from 9 percent in 1958 to 7 percent in 1963 and then 1 percent in 1971. In the same years, this portion was respectively 8 percent, 6 percent and 1 percent in the Federal Assembly. On the other hand, between 1963 and 1969, technocrats’ portion increased from 9 percent to 19 percent in the Republican Assemblies, and from 11 percent to 29 percent in the Federal Assembly. In 1974, technocratic oligarchy occupied 71 percent of the Federal Assembly. Thus, in the 1970s,

³⁶⁷ Bookman, op. cit., p. 23.

the Yugoslav working people called the Federal Assembly as the "*House of Managers*".³⁶⁹

VI. 6. From the Economic Contradictions to the Political Crisis

The economic contradictions, that are explained above, produced three important political crisis in the Yugoslav politics. These political crisis were (1) expulsion of Aleksander Rankovic and his followers from the administration in 1966, (2) the student demonstrations of 1968, and (3) rise of Croatian nationalist liberalism, so-called *Croatian Spring*, between 1967-1972.

IV. 6. i. The Fall of Rankovic: The Defeat of the Centralist-Nationalist Serbs

Aleksander Rankovic fought alongside Tito both before the war and during the war, and was devoted to him. Until 1963, he was minister of the interior and the head of the Secret Police (UDBA). In 1963, he was elected the Vice-President of Tito by the Federal Assembly. He also was the leader of the Serbian branch of the LCY.

Rankovic was viewed as the second man of the Yugoslav politics because since 1963 he has been considered the Tito's natural successor. Rankovic had support of Serb nationalists who favored greater economic and political centralization. He and his faction regarded the liberalizing and decentralizing tendency as a threat to the power of the party. Also, they claimed that a further liberalization and decentralization would give rise the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Thus, Rankovic and his faction were devoted supporters of economic and political centralization. Naturally, a bitter conflict emerged between the centralist Rankovic faction and the de-centralist Croat politicians led by Vladimir Bakaric, the leader of the League of Communists of Croatia.

Furthermore, they pursued a Serbian nationalist-centralist policy in the Autonomous Province of Kosovo-Metohija; and therefore, they were extreme opponents against the increasing power and autonomy of Kosovo-Metohija. They aimed to restrict its autonomy and power through further centralizing the governmental structure of the Socialist Republic of Serbia. Moreover, the UDBA (the Secret Police) that was dominated and orientated by the Rankovic faction used brutal methods against Shiptars

³⁶⁸ See Işıklı, op. cit., pp. 132-135.

³⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 157.

(Albanians) in Kosovo.

The activities of the UDBA was protested and criticized by the Shiptars. Early in 1966, the federal government decided to institute a secret investigation into complaints against the activities of the UDBA, especially the treatment of Shiptars who had long been the focus of the Secret Police brutality in the Kosovo. The federal government's investigation was conducted by the Army Intelligence Service under the leadership the Croat General Ivan Gosnjak. Also, on 16 June 1966, Tito instituted a formal commission of inquiry under the chairman of the Macedonia LCY secretary Krste Crvenkovski in order to inquire the activities of the Serbian Rankovic faction and the UDBA.³⁷⁰

As a consequence of the investigations of the Army Intelligence Service and the Crvenkovski commission, the Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee of the LCY convened on 1 June 1966 in the island of Brioni. The Plenum charged Rankovic and Svetislav Stefanovic, the chief of the UDBA and member of the Federal Executive Council, with to use the UDBA for gathering information about some high functionaries and politicians including Tito and for brutal activity against Shiptars. Also, they were found guilty of opposing democratic development. Furthermore, Rankovic and his followers were charged with to use their positions to take investment funds from individual enterprises and place them in federal investment in Serbia.³⁷¹

The Fourth (Brioni) Plenum was headed by Tito. In the Plenum, Tito expressed that Rankovic and Stefanovic were enemies of the working people's self-management for they supported and led '*etatization*' and '*centralization*' which hindered further development of the self-management. Moreover, Tito asserted that Rankovic and Stefanovic abused their political posts for their self-interests; and consequently, according to Tito, they damaged the development of self-management and the working people's interests.³⁷²

The Brioni Plenum decided to expel Stefanovic from the LCY, and to recommended to the Federal Assembly to dismiss him from the Federal Executive Council and from his post. Thereafter, Stefanovic was dismissed from both the Executive

³⁷⁰ Lane, *op. cit.*, 135.

³⁷¹ McClellan, *op. cit.*, p. 150.

³⁷² Nobirdah & Selim (eds.), *op. cit.*, pp. 136-137.

Council and the Federal Assembly. Also, the Brioni decision involved expulsion of Rankovic from the LCY. As a result of the Brioni decision, Rankovic, the second man of the Yugoslav politics and the leader of centralist-nationalist Serbs, was expelled from the League and dismissed from his post of vice-presidency and from the Federal Assembly.³⁷³

The fall of Rankovic and his faction produced debates in the public opinion. The Croat side welcomed the Brioni decisions and expulsion of the Rankovic faction from the LCY and from other administrative organs, while the Serbian public opinion regarded the fall of the Rankovic faction as a '*Croat lot against Serbs*'. That is, the Brioni decisions were viewed by the Serb side as a '*defeat of Serbs*' and a '*Croatian triumph*'.

Apart from these different interpretations and perceptions of the Serb and Croat sides, the fall of Rankovic generated an economic and political result: a further decentralization and liberalization. Expulsion of the Rankovic faction weakened the opposition against the decentralization and liberalization. Thus, the process of decentralization and liberalization accelerated both on the Party and the State levels.

After the expulsion of Rankovic and his men from the state and party apparatuses, the Fifth Plenum of the Central Committee met on 4 October 1966 in Belgrade. The Fifth Plenum decided to fight against 'Greater Serbian chauvinism' and to improve inter-nation and inter-republican relations. For this purpose, a special commission was established under the chairmanship of the Macedonian Kiro Hadzi Vasilev. Also, the Fifth Plenum established a new organ, the Presidium (*Predsjedništvo*), for systematic examination of problems of social development and general politics, and ordered that one person could not be at the same time a member of the Executive Committee and the Presidium of the LCY.³⁷⁴

On the other hand, on 9 December 1966, the Federal Assembly adopted a new Basic Act on Internal Affairs. This law was based on the presumption of competence of the administrative organs in the Republics and in the local government in all matters of state security, public peace, fire protection, passports, border control, etc., except those matters expressly reserved to the Federation by the Act itself or other federal acts. State

³⁷³ Hondius, op. cit., p. 321-322.

³⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 322.

security was reserved to the competence of the Federation. The UDBA was replaced by the State Security Service (*Sluzba Drzavne Bezbednosti*) in the Federal Secretariat for the Interior, in cooperation with the Republics.³⁷⁵

The decentralization and liberalization was furthered by the 1967 and the 1968 Constitutional Amendments. The Council of Nationalities, involving 70 delegates that came from Republics and two autonomous Provinces, met on 27 January 1967 in order to discuss and prepare new amendments. On 19 April 1967, the Federal Assembly passed 41 amendments to the 1963 Constitution. The 1967 Amendments changed the status of the Council of Nationalities and expanded its authority in several ways. For example, the Council of Nationality became equal partner of the Federal Council in the law-making process. It was also entitled to discuss and participate in decision making about all issues of vital importance of the country. The following year, in December 1968, new amendments were passed by the Federal Assembly. The 1968 Amendments abolished the Federal Council, and the Council of Nationalities became reconstructed as *the Council of Delegates for the Republics and Autonomous Provinces*, therefore serving as the body with basic responsibility for legislation.³⁷⁶

Furthermore, the 1968 Constitutional Amendments elevated the status of the Autonomous Provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo-Metohija, and expanded their political and economic power and autonomy. For example, according to the 1968 Amendments, Vojvodina and Kosovo were represented by their own delegations in the Council of Delegates rather than through wings of the Serbian delegation. Also, Kosovo was allowed to choose its flag as the black eagle on the red background, which was the emblem of the Albanian republic. Moreover, on the educational level, the 1968 amendments increased the educational autonomy of Kosovo. An Albanian university was founded in Pristina to replace the faculties of Belgrade University which had previously provided higher education in Pristina. Visiting professors of Albanian language and literature came from Tirana to the Pristina University in order to develop awareness of

³⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 323.

³⁷⁶ Vuckovic, op. cit., p. 120 and Jambrek, op. cit., pp. 115-116.

national culture of the Albanian people in Yugoslavia.³⁷⁷

On the other hand, the fall of Rankovic faction affected positively the status of Bosniaks. In 1968, the League of Communists of Bosnia-Herzegovina recognized Bosnian Bosniaks as a constituent nation of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Thus, the Bosnian League of Communists accepted that Bosniaks had their own ethnical and cultural identity that was different from the Croat and Serbian identity.³⁷⁸ That is, the Bosnian League ratified the 1963 Constitution that had defined the Bosniaks as a constituent nation of the SFRY.

Finally, one year after, in 1969, the Ninth Congress of the LCY convened. At the Ninth Congress, the demands for more freedom and greater autonomy for republican governments were discussed. At the end of the Congress, a resolution was issued. The resolution accepted the demand for more freedom and greater autonomy to the republics. Also, a new Executive Bureau of the League was established at the congress. The new Executive Bureau composed of two representatives from each of the republics and one from each of the two autonomous provinces.³⁷⁹ Hence, the congress accepted the decentralist approach and supported the 1967 and 1968 amendments.

In short, the defeat of the centralist-nationalist Rankovic faction weakened the position of centralists, and facilitated further decentralization and liberalization that were favored by the Croat-Slovene alliance. Hence, the expulsion of Rankovic faction from the administration was followed by the 1967 and 1968 Constitutional Amendments which loosed the federation through increasing the power and independence of the republics and of the autonomous provinces. These amendments were prepared and supported by centralist and liberal Croat and Slovene delegates. Also, the LCY backed and reinforced such amendments. As a consequence, nationalist and centralist Serbs considered the constitutional amendments a '*Croat and Slovene victory over Serbs*'.

IV. 6. ii. The Student Uprising: The Socialist Student Opposition against the Bureaucratic-Technocratic Domination.

At the beginning of the 1960s, the Yugoslav intelligentsia began to criticize the

³⁷⁷ Lane, op. cit., p. 137.

³⁷⁸ Babuna, op. cit., p. 75.

³⁷⁹ Maclean, *Tito: ...*, op. cit., p. 108.

party and state bureaucracy. The opposing socialist intellectuals defined themselves as 'New Left' and discussed new concepts such as 'creative Marxism', 'Marxist humanism' and 'Humanist Intelligentsia'. Their bible was the Zagreb-based journal *Praxis*. The *Praxis* was founded by the opposing socialist intellectuals in 1964 in Croatia. The *Praxis* also was published in the Western European countries. Thus, it rapidly became the international forum for innovative Marxian critiques of the modern world.³⁸⁰

The New Left and their journal, the *Praxis*, criticized and opposed the 1965 Economic Reforms that liberalized the Yugoslav economy and increased market relations. According to them, the 1965 Reforms did not improve the working people's self-management but improved power of monopolies and technocracy at the expense of the working people. They were not only anti-capitalist but also opposed to the bureaucracy and technocracy. That is, they criticized both 'the fetishism of commodities' and 'the fetishism of party and state apparatuses' because, according to them, both 'capitalism' and 'the party and state bureaucracy' hindered the human emancipation that had been described and supported by Karl Marx.³⁸¹ The New Left and the *Praxis* claimed that the state and party apparatus must be removed in order to establish 'real self-management' since they hindered its establishment and development.³⁸²

The Yugoslav university students were extremely affected and attracted by the New Left and the *Praxis*. Hence, like the New Left and the *Praxis*, the students criticized and protested the bureaucracy, technocracy, and the 1965 Economic Reforms because, according to the students, they deteriorated and weakened the socialist self-management of working people.

Especially, the Belgrade University became the center of the critical university students and played leading role in the student movement in Yugoslavia. The Belgrade students issued a critical socialist paper, *the Student*, which criticized the bureaucracy, technocracy and the 1965 Reforms. Like the *Praxis*, the *Student* discussed the concepts of 'creative Marxism', 'Marxist humanism' and 'Socialist Democracy'. Both the *Praxis*

³⁸⁰ Lane, op. cit., p. 138.

³⁸¹ McFarlane, op. cit., pp. 71-72 and Lampe, op. cit., p. 295.

³⁸² Bora, *Yugoslavya: ...*, op. cit., p. 80.

and the Student described the bureaucracy and technocracy as '*the Red Bourgeoisie*'³⁸³ who was a new ruling class in Yugoslavia and which hindered the development of self-management. The *Student* was also supported by many distinguished academicians of the Belgrade University such as M. Markovic, N. Peculic, L. Tadic, etc. Furthermore, they made links with the '*New Budapest Left*' and the '*Czech Dissidents*',³⁸⁴

Finally, the student opposition and critics against the bureaucracy, technocracy and the 1965 Reforms transformed itself into the student demonstration in Belgrade University on 2 June 1968. The demonstration quickly spread to the universities of the Zagreb, Ljubljana and Sarajevo. During the demonstration, the demonstrators clashed with the police and *the Youth Brigades*, which was controlled and orientated by the LCY and which supported the existing government.³⁸⁵ In the clashes, nearly 169 students were wounded.³⁸⁶

It should be emphasized that such demonstration were not against socialism or the self-management system, but against the bureaucratic-technocratic domination in the Yugoslav politics and economy. Also, the demonstrators protested the 1965 Reforms since, according to them, the new reforms increased the market relations and decreased power of the working people's self-management. During the demonstration, the students shouted slogans of "*Workers, we are with you!*", "*Sack the politicians!*", "*Down with the Red Bourgeoisie!*", "*Fewer cars, more schools!*"³⁸⁷

It is more important that the rebellious students called the workers for general strike against the "*Red Bourgeoisie* (the bureaucratic-technocratic ruling class)". But, the students' calling for a general strike was not fulfilled by the workers. On the other side, the government took measures to isolate student protest from the workers and factories, and to prevent any probable contact and cooperation between the students and the

³⁸³ Barbara Verlic Dekleva described the political and managerial elite as "*the Red Bourgeoisie*". According to Dekleva, the *Red Bourgeoisie*, ruling class of Yugoslavia, consisted of top party leaders, socio-political functionaries, top administrators and professional staff in federal or regional institutions, leading managers in the economy, mass media, public services, army, police, etc. They formed 2-5 percent of the total population and benefited from extensive economic privileges. (See Dekleva, Barbara Verlic, "Implications of Economic Changes to Social Policy", in Simic & Dekleva (eds.), *op. cit.*, p. 112.)

³⁸⁴ McFarlane, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

³⁸⁵ Jambrek, *op. cit.*, p. 200.

³⁸⁶ Işıklı, *op. cit.*, p. 181

workers.³⁸⁸

While the authorities were debating what to do, Tito appeared on television on 9 June, and announced that he was on the side of the students. Tito criticized and accused the government, and supported the students' demands. He addressed that the government was at fault and the ministers must review their policies, get the economy moving and help the lower paid workers. Tito concluded his speech on the television by following words: "*If I am not capable of solving these problems, I have no business to be where I am.*"³⁸⁹

The Tito's speech and promise to the rebellious students calmed down the demonstration in that day, and the students began to play *harmonika* and dance the *kolo* in the streets by displayed portraits of Marx and Tito, and by shouting slogans for Tito and '*Socialist Democracy*'. However, the 'socialist student uprising against the bureaucratic-technocratic domination' was followed by a 'nationalist liberal Croat uprising against the Socialist Yugoslavia'. This nationalist and liberal Croat uprising was generally described as '*the Croatian Spring*'.

IV. 6. iii. The Croatian Spring (1967-1971): The Resurgence of the Croat Nationalist Liberalism

A series of socio-political events conducted by Croatian nationalist politicians, intellectuals and students between 1967-1971 was described by the Croatian nationalists as *maspovni pokret* (*masvoni pokret* or mass movement). On the other hand, the Western terminology described the *maspovni pokret* as "*Croatian Spring*" or "*Croatian Renaissance*".³⁹⁰ This 'Croatian Spring or Renaissance' in fact was a 'resurgence of Croat nationalist liberalism' that challenged the socialist unification of Yugoslavs. This Croatian nationalist-liberal challenge (Croatian Spring) against the Socialist Yugoslavia had roots in the economic contradictions that have been discussed above.

As we have seen above, the Socialist Republic of Croatia was discontent with the FDUR and the Serbian domination in the foreign trade, banking system and bureaucracy.

³⁸⁷ Maclean, *Tito: ...*, op. cit., p. 107.

³⁸⁸ McFarlane, op. cit., p. 26 and Lampe, op. cit., 296.

³⁸⁹ See Maclean, *Tito: ...*, op. cit., p. 107, Işikli, op. cit., p. 181 and Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History*, op. cit., p. 296.

³⁹⁰ Lane, op. cit., p. 139.

Also, most Croat politicians, bureaucrats and intellectuals favored further decentralization and liberalization, that is, further economic and political independence for the Croatian Republic. These Croatian demands generated 'the Croatian Spring' or 'the Croatian Renaissance' which was a 'resurgence of Croatian nationalist liberalism' against the Socialist Yugoslavia.

The Croatian Spring began with '1967 Declaration'. In March 1967, seventeen leading cultural organizations in Croatia, including the literary society '*Matica Hrvatska*', published a manifesto, entitled '*Declaration on the Name and Position of the Croatian Literary Language*', demanding a change of the Constitution to provide better protection for literary languages of Yugoslavia, particularly the Croatian language. The Declaration pointed out that the principle of sovereignty and equality of nations should not only secure economic and political existence of the nations but also their cultural existence. The Declaration considered that a nation was entitled to have a language with a proper name. Also, it alleged that the Serbian literary language threatened to impose itself upon Yugoslavia as a 'state language', due to Serbia's preponderant position as the center of the Federation, while Croatian language was regarded to the position of regional dialect. Finally, the 1967 Declaration proposed that Article 131 of the 1963 Constitution, which mentioned "*the languages of the peoples of Yugoslavs are Serbo-Croatian, Croato-Serbian, Slovenian and Macedonian*", should be changed to "*the four literary languages of Yugoslavia are Serbian, Croatian, Slovenian and Macedonian*".³⁹¹

That is, they demanded to differentiate 'Croatian language' from 'Serbian language', and to use Croatian language in the schools of Croatia. This demand had 130 signatories including the great Croatian writer, intellectual and member of the LCY Miroslav Krleža and the director of Zagreb's Institute for the History of the Worker's Management Dr. Franjo Tuđman. The signatories presented the Declaration to the Sabor (the Republican Assembly of Croatia), the Federal Assembly and to the public opinion.

This proposal for the change of Article 131 was not accepted by the Sabor and the Federal Assembly. Also, Tito and his followers opposed and criticized the Declaration, and accused the Croatian intellectuals and politicians who supported the

³⁹¹ Hlondius, op. cit., p. 326.

Declaration with chauvinism. Moreover, Bakaric, the President of the Croatian League of Communists, rejected and criticized the Declaration. On the other hand, the Serbian intellectual community did not welcome friendly the Croat demands. They, as a response to the Declaration, demanded to use of Cyrillic script for the 700,000 Serbs living in Croatia.³⁹²

The Federal Assembly prepared and adopted the Translation Rules on 11 May 1967 in order to calm nationalist Croats. The Article 229 mentioned that “*every delegate has the right to speak in the sessions of any organs of the Federal Assembly in the language of the people to which belongs.*” Also, according to the Article 230, “*a speech held by a delegate in a session of any organ of the Federal assembly in any of the language of the peoples or national minorities of Yugoslavia shall be translated into the languages of the other peoples of Yugoslavia.*”³⁹³ Hence, after the Parliament of Switzerland, the Yugoslav Federal Assembly became the second multi-lingual parliament in Europe to provide simultaneous translation facilities.

However, the Transitional Rule could not calm down the Croatian nationalist liberalism. In spite of the fierce opposition coming from Tito, Bakaric, the Federal Assembly and the Serbian intellectual community, nationalist-liberal Croat intellectual and politicians continued their nationalist liberal dissent attitudes.

Two years after the 1967 Declaration, Peter Segedin, the president of the Croat Literary Society, wrote the Croatian nationalist liberalism’s proposals and complaints in his article issued in *Kolo* (a Croatian bimonthly journal) in 1969. The chief claims and complaints were: (1) the Croats were treated as illegal residents in their own country; (2) Croat interests were subordinate to the interests of Serbia; (3) to feel Croat under current circumstance was to be worthy of pity; (4) to lose one’s language was to lose one’s separate ethnic identity and the Belgrade regime tried to annihilate the Croat language ; (5) the Croat nation was portrayed as criminal; (6) Croatia was still being equated with the Ustasha; (7) the existing regime dominated by Serbs was attempting to Serbize the Croats; (8) Croat intelligentsia was exterminated in order to exterminate the Croat culture and science; (9) Croatia become a non-man’s land, a land that other groups were

³⁹² Lane, op. cit., p. 137.

claiming as their land.³⁹⁴

The Croatian Spring, that was launched by the Croatian nationalist-liberal intelligentsia, was also supported by the nationalist-liberal politicians such as Miko Tripalo, the Secretary of the Croatian League of Communists, Savka Dapcevic-Kucar, the Prime Minister of Croatia and a former economics lecturer at Zagreb University, and Pero Pirker, a former mayor of Zagreb. They were the political leaders of the Croatian Spring, and in the words of Fitzroy Maclean, they “*inclined to play the nationalist card as a means of gaining popularity*”.³⁹⁵ Another figure of the Croatian Spring was Franjo Tudjman who declared that the Croats could not be satisfied any longer with a federal state and that Serbo-Croat relations could be managed only within a ‘confederal system’.³⁹⁶

This nationalis-liberal approach was also supported by some Croatian journals such as the *Kritika* (Critics) issued by *Matica Hrvatska* and *Hrvatski Tjednik* (Croatian Weekly). A number of nationalistic articles which praised and sublimated the Croatian Peasant Party and the Ustasha Party and their leaders Radic, Macek and Pavalic were issued in these journals. They favored confederal system since, according to the nationalist-liberal journals, the federal structure damaged the national interests of Croats. Also, the *Kritika* focused on discussion of the disadvantageous position of Croat minorities in other republics, particularly Bosnia.³⁹⁷

That is, the conductors of the Croatian Spring favored reconstruction of Yugoslavia on the basis of confederation. For them, a further decentralization of Yugoslavia’s governmental structure meant a ‘confederal reconstruction of Yugoslavia’. They believed and propagandized that a confederal system would enrich the Croatian Republic and strengthen Croatian nations.

The Croatian Spring also included students. Croatian nationalist-liberal students both protested the Serbian domination in bureaucracy and opposed the *New Left* and the 1968 socialist student demonstration. That is, there was a sharp distinction between the

³⁹³ Hondius, op. cit., p. 328.

³⁹⁴ Klemencic & Zagar, op. cit., p. 230.

³⁹⁵ Maclean, *Tito: ...*, op. cit., p. 108.

³⁹⁶ Lane, op. cit., p. 140.

³⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 141 and McFarlane, op. cit., p. 83.

Croatian socialist students, who collaborated with the *New Left* and participated in the 1968 socialist student uprising, and the Croatian nationalist-liberal students, who supported the 1967 Croatian Declaration.

The Croatian nationalist-liberal students, led by Marko Veslica and Dragan Budisa, gloried in Radic, Macek and Pavelic, and viewed themselves as heirs of the Croatian Peasant Party and the Ustasha Party. Also, they highly respected the Croatian Catholic Church and regarded it as a representative of the Croat nation. They demanded a separate national bank, national army and separate representation in the United Nations for the Republic of Croatia.³⁹⁸ It is more important that nationalist-liberal students of Croatia demanded a revision of the Republic of Croatia's boundaries at the expense of Herzegovina and Montenegro. They desired to absorb Herzegovina and coastline of Montenegro.³⁹⁹ That is, the demands of Croatian nationalist-liberal students were more radical and aggressive than the demands of the 1967 Declaration.

In October 1971, the nationalist-liberal students organized a meeting in Zagreb by singing nationalistic songs. On 29 October 1971, a conference of university students of Zagreb University's Philosophy Faculty argued for an autarchic Croatia with its own economic policy and control over its own international economic relations. At the discussion, a leading role was taken by Dr. Hrvoje Susic and student protector Cicak. On 22 November, roughly 30,000 students came out strike in Zagreb and tried to provoke a general strike against the federal government. Also, the Zagreb University's nationalist-liberal students issued a Croatian student paper *Nasi Dani* (Our Days). In this paper, a number of nationalistic articles, that praised the Croatian Peasant Party, the Ustasha Party and the Croatian Catholic Church, were issued by the students of Zagreb University.⁴⁰⁰

Also, the Croatian War Veterans inclined to Croatian nationalist liberalism. A Croatian veterans' representative of Split, Mate Matkovic, said at the Plenum of the Croatian War Veterans in October 1971 that the Belgrade regime damaged the Croatian political and economic interests. Moreover, Ivan Sibal, the President of the Croatian War

³⁹⁸ Lampe, op. cit., p. 301-302 and Jambrek, op. cit., pp. 201-202.

³⁹⁹ Macfarlane, L. J., *Human Rights: Realities and Possibilities. Northern Ireland, the Republic of Ireland, Yugoslavia and Hungary*, London: Macmillan Press, 1990, p. 114.

⁴⁰⁰ Macfarlane, op. cit., pp. 80-81 and Maclean, *Tito: ...*, op. cit., p. 109.

Veterans, delivered a speech accusing the Belgrade media and the Serbian intellectual community. The Plenum demanded further decentralization and autonomy for Croatian Republic.⁴⁰¹

Another actor of the Croatian Spring was the Croatian Catholic Church. Especially, Catholic clergy in Rijeka, Split, Zadar welcomed the Croatian nationalist liberal resurgence. Also, Franciscan priests of Bosnia-Herzegovina became involved in the Croatian Spring.⁴⁰²

On the other hand, the Ustasha remnants at abroad carried out some activities against the socialist Yugoslavia. The Belgrade media and politicians claimed that there was a cooperation between Croatian politicians and the Ustasha remnants abroad. The Ustasha activities abroad culminated in April 1971 when two Croatian terrorists managed to break into the Stockholm Embassy and assassinate Yugoslavia's ambassador to Sweden.⁴⁰³ This assassination stroked the Yugoslav public opinion and increased political tension in the domestic politics.

Of course, the Croatian Spring (resurgence of Croatian nationalist liberalism) and the assassination of Yugoslav ambassador harassed and annoyed greatly Tito. Tito, who was extremely discontent with the rise of nationalist liberalism in Croatia, summoned the leaders of the Croatian League of Communists in Zagreb in July 1971. He told them nationalism was running wild, and the most serious problem was the increasing Croatian nationalism. The Croat leaders, said Tito, had served nationalism and separatism. Also, Tito ordered them to take strict measures in order to prevent the rise of Croatian nationalism.⁴⁰⁴

Also, on 2 December 1971, Tito appeared on the national television and radio to deliver a fierce attack on the nationalism and liberalism. He blamed the nationalist elements and tendency in Croatia, Serbia and Slovenia. Also, he stated that the main cause of nationalistic unrest across society was (a) the bureaucratic-technocratic clique, (b) the backwardness of proper Marxist education in the schools and universities, and (c)

⁴⁰¹ McFarlane, op. cit., p. 82.

⁴⁰² Ramet, Sabrina P., *Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to the War for Kosovo*, Colorado: Westview Press, 1999, p. 91.

⁴⁰³ Lampe, op. cit., p. 302.

⁴⁰⁴ See for the Tito's speech in the meeting Tito, op. cit., pp. 136-140.

the liberal ideas which have improved since the early 1960s. Finally, he called the LCY and the Yugoslav working people to fight against the bureaucratic-technocratic clique, nationalism and liberalism.⁴⁰⁵

Soon thereafter the Tito's fierce critics and attack on nationalists and liberals, the Croat Central Committee met in Zagreb on 12 December 1971. The meeting decided to arrest the leaders of nationalist students. Also, in the meeting, Croatian nationalist-liberal leaders Dapcevic-Kucar, Tripalo and Pirker were forced to resign.⁴⁰⁶ Also, they were declared as 'agents of imperialism' by the LCY that defined the Croatian Spring as 'conspiracy of international imperialism'.⁴⁰⁷

In the same time, Tito ordered the Serbian and Slovenian Leagues to expel nationalist members from the League. This order was implemented under Tito's pressure and control. Action was taken against liberal and nationalist elements in Slovenia. The most notable measure against liberal and nationalist tendency in Slovenia was the removal of the Slovenian Party leader, Stane Kavcic, at the end of 1971. After the purge of Kavcic, the Slovenian League was dominated by those such as France Popit who were loyal to the post-war Yugoslav regime and bitter opponent of liberalism. Also, in October 1972, the chairman and secretary of the Serbian League of Communists and the former Yugoslav foreign minister, Marko Nikezic, was expelled from the League because of his nationalist attitudes.⁴⁰⁸

Apart from Dapcevic-Kucar, Tripalo, Pirker, Nikezic and Kavcic, a number of nationalist-liberal figures were dismissed from the LCY. During 1971-72, nearly 50,000 members of the League of the Communists of Croatia were purged from the League. Furthermore, 12,000 enterprise directors and engineers lost their positions because of their nationalist attitudes, and about 5,000 persons were imprisoned. Among those arrested and sentenced were Marko Veslica and Franjo Tudjman.⁴⁰⁹

Even though the wholesale purge of nationalist-liberal figures from the LCY and the enterprises could not liquidate nationalism and liberalism in Yugoslavia, the Tito's

⁴⁰⁵ Lane, *op. cit.*, p. 141.

⁴⁰⁶ Maclean, *Tito*, *op. cit.*, p. 109.

⁴⁰⁷ Bora, *Yugoslavya: ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 84.

⁴⁰⁸ Lane, *op. cit.*, p. 142.

⁴⁰⁹ Vuckovic, *op. cit.*, p. 119.

measures and attack against nationalist and liberal elements ended the Croatian Spring and delayed the resurgence of nationalist liberalism in Croatia, Serbia and Slovenia. Also, as a result of wholesale purge of nationalist and liberal Croat figures from the League of Communists of Croatia, position and power of the Croatia's Serbs in the Croatian League was promoted.⁴¹⁰

Of course, empowerment of Serbs in the Croatian League annoyed Croatian nationalism. According to Christopher Cviic, the wholesale purge of Croats from the party and the state apparatuses, did not abolish the Croatian nationalism. On the contrary, he indicates that the long-term effects of Tito's 1971-72 purges were the strengthening pro-independence and anti-Yugoslavia sentiments in Croatia and the deepening mistrust between the Croats and the Serbs.⁴¹¹

In conclusion, the 'Croatian Spring' or the 'resurgence of Croatian nationalist liberalism' had two negative impacts in the Yugoslav politics: (1) It damaged development of the socialist self-management system, the unification of Yugoslavs, and the formation of Yugoslav identity. (2) It sharpened the Serbo-Croat contradictions and deteriorated the Serbo-Croat relations.

IV. 7. The 1971 Constitutional Amendments and Decentralization

Even though Croatian nationalist liberalism favored further decentralization and the Croatian Spring, that damaged the regime greatly, depended upon the principle of decentralization and confederalism, Tito and Kardelj did not reverse the trend towards decentralization and did not blame decentralization of economic and political structure because they believed that the development of socialist self-management required decentralization. That is to say, according to Tito and Kardelj, curtailment of economic and political power of the federal state, the federal government and the party was a necessary provision for development of the working people's self-management. For this reason, they continued to support decentralization of the regime in favor of the working

⁴¹⁰ Bennett, Christopher, *Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse: Causes, Course and Consequences*, London: Hurst & Company, 1994, p. 78.

⁴¹¹ Cviic, op. cit., p. 129.

people.⁴¹²

Consequently, the 1971 Constitutional Amendments, that based on the principle of decentralization, were adopted despite the challenge of Croatian nationalist liberalism which aimed to decentralize the state and the country towards confederalism. The 1971 Amendments decreased power of the federal state and government, and expanded power and autonomy of the republican governments, enterprises and the workers' councils with aim of improving the self-management. The ultimate target of the 1971 Amendments was to prevent the corrosion of socialism and self-management by bureaucratic and technocratic encroachment.⁴¹³

The 1971 Amendments can be summarized briefly in eight points:⁴¹⁴

- 1) The Amendment XXXV provided for the establishment of a 'collective presidency', composed of three members from each republic and two from each autonomous provinces. The twenty-two members of the presidency were to be elected by the republican and provincial assemblies to serve for five years. A president and vice-president were to be elected by this body to serve for one year. These officers were to be chosen according to a predetermined order. However, an exception to the principle of annual rotation of office of president was made for Tito. Amendment XXXVI made the exception and referred to Tito's historical role in the national Liberation War, the socialist revolution, the creation and development of the SFRY. That is, both the Amendments and the Yugoslav public opinion viewed Tito as unquestionable leader, figure and symbol of the unification of Yugoslavia and the Yugoslav socialist revolution.
- 2) Kardelj conveyed that the fundamental principle and goal of the 1971 Amendments was to give more power and competence to workers in the management and control of the remaining income of 'basic organization of associated labor', and so, to curtail the state's power in this field.⁴¹⁵

The 1971 Amendments defined a group of workers within a enterprise 'Basic

⁴¹² Dyker, David A., "The Degeneration of the Yugoslav Communist Party as a Managing Elite – a Familiar East European Story?", in Dyker & Vejvoda (eds.), op. cit., pp. 54-55.

⁴¹³ Schrenk, Ardalan, El Tatawy (eds.), op. cit., p.31.

⁴¹⁴ See for the 1971 Constitutional Amendments Singleton, op. cit., pp. 268-274 and Dubey (ed.), op. cit., 41-42.

⁴¹⁵ Kardelj, op. cit., p. 50.

Organization of Associated Labor (BOAL)'. Every BOAL was managed by a workers' council, that was elected by all workers in BOAL, and by a executive board that was elected by the workers' council. According to the new amendments, BOAL was the basic unit of the self-management on economic level.

Amendments XXI and XXII affirmed the right of workers to dispose of the wealth they had created through their 'associated labor'. In other words, workers' councils were given greater powers in deciding how to allocate the surplus funds of their BOAL among personal incomes (wages), investment, social and welfare funds, and other purposes.

3) Also, the 1971 Amendments increased power, competence and autonomy of the enterprises at the expense of banks and federal and republican governments.

The new laws stated that if an enterprise invested money in a bank, the profit made by the bank must eventually return to the investor enterprise. This was intended to prevent the emergence of a capital market which was manipulated by the banks which made a profit at the expense of the investor enterprises. That is, the Amendments aimed to curtail the power of banks which controlled financial capital and gained considerable strength as a result of the 1965 Economic Reforms.

In addition to this, the new laws enhanced the enterprises against the federal and republican governments. The republican governments were not able to erect barriers between enterprises to obstruct the free flow of capital, labor and goods. The federal government was charged with responsibility for national defense and foreign policy and for assisting the economically backward regions, and the new amendments curtailed its power and control over the enterprises and the workers' councils.

4) The republics and autonomous provinces had more economic responsibilities and power, while the authority of the federal government was narrowed as a consequence of the new amendments. Major economic (particularly fiscal) responsibilities were transferred to the republics and autonomous provinces. The federal government retained executive and coordinating functions for foreign trade, monetary policy, the control of prices of basic commodities and services, certain tax and expenditure policies. However, the extent of the federal competence in these fields was limited by the necessity to secure

agreement of the republics and autonomous provinces before new measures could be undertaken by the federation.

5) The Amendments founded five 'Inter-republican Committees' in order to establish an effective cooperation and coordination among the republics whose power and autonomy expanded. These committees dealt with (a) development policy, (b) foreign trade and foreign currency system, (c) the monetary system, (d) internal market matters and (e) financial matters. Each committee was chaired by a member of the federal government. Apart from these five committees, also, 'Federal Coordination Committee' was established by the new amendments. It consisted of the president of federal government, the presidents of republican governments and autonomous provinces, and five members of the federal government.

6) The 1971 Amendments created a system of 'social agreements' and 'self-management agreements' as a major new technique for coordinating the economic behavior of enterprises. The social agreements were acted and conducted between the state, the trade union and the enterprises, while the self-management agreements was acted among enterprises in the same branch of activity. The system of social agreements and self-management agreements was used at first mainly to develop and implement an incomes' policy. The agreements bound the enterprises that entered into them, and according the new laws, the enterprises could not be forced to enter these agreements.

7) The new amendments established the 'Community of Interest (COI)'. COIs provided a forum of negotiation and bargaining for all suppliers and consumers of the service or commodity. Both groups made decisions on all matters affecting supply and demand (including prices) as well as on investment matters. The COIs were initially introduced for social services such as health, education, science, social insurance, etc. The concept was then extended to public utility services such as electric power generation and distribution, water supply and sewerage, railways and highway construction, etc. Usually, the COIs operated at the communal level for social services and at the republican level for economic services.⁴¹⁶

8) Finally, the peak of the price liberalization was reached in 1971. Producer prices for

⁴¹⁶ Knight, *op. cit.*, p. 96.

about 57 percent of industrial output and 76 percent of commercial turnover were freed by the 1971 Amendments.⁴¹⁷

In 1971, Kardelj supported and praised the 1971 Constitutional Amendment in his speech in the Federal Assembly:

*“Contemporary Yugoslavia is no longer a classic federation, nor can it be a classic confederation but rather a socialist, self-managing community of nations, which to a great extent introduces simultaneously an essentially new category in inter-ethnic relations. The independence of nations in such a community grows greater than in classic federations and confederations, but, at the same time the processes of integration are opened wider in all areas where the common interest of the nations and working people is made manifest and where the conditions for equality are assured.”*⁴¹⁸

The 1971 Amendments were followed by discussions about a new constitution. Some politicians and experts, including Tito and Kardelj, maintained that the 1963 Constitution, that had been reinforced by the 1965, 1967, 1968, and 1971 reforms and amendments, was not enough adequate and appropriate to develop the working people's self-management and to solve some economic and socio-political problems that challenged the regime based upon the working people's self-management. Hence, according to Tito and Kardelj, the socialist Yugoslavia needed a new constitution which should facilitate and help further development of the self-management s and which should fight against bureaucracy, technocracy, nationalism and liberalism.

The Tito's famous letter of September 1972 was a milestone of the debates for a new constitution. In September 1972, Tito sent a letter to the Executive Bureau of the LCY. In the letter, Tito emphasized that there were four bitter enemies of the Yugoslav working people: the bureaucrats, the technocrats, the nationalists and the liberals. He pointed that the bureaucrats were etatist and centralist forces which sought to strengthen the central power of the state apparatus. The technocrats, who often allied with the bureaucrats, sought to undermine the system of self-management by concentrating the power in the hands of managerial elite both in industry and banking. The third group were

⁴¹⁷ Ibid., p. 96

⁴¹⁸ Vuckovic, op. cit., p. 120.

the nationalists, who sought to undermine the brotherhood and unity (*bratstvo i jedinstvo*) of the Yugoslav peoples. Finally, the liberals tried to undermine the role of the LCY under the cloak of spurious democratic slogan. Their democratic slogan was spurious, said Tito, because the liberal democracy involved the dictatorship of capitalist class. According to Tito, all the enemies (the bureaucrats, the technocrats, the nationalists and the liberals) had a common goal: to destroy the system of socialist self-management and to devalue the role and power of the working people in society.⁴¹⁹

Also, on the eve of the adoption of 1974 Constitution, Kardelj expressed in his article that constitutions could not solve all economic, political and social problems. Therefore, “*we don't endeavor*”, wrote Kardelj, “*to create a constitution which will solve all problems*” but a constitution which would protect the self-management socialism against the enemies of self-management.⁴²⁰

IV. 7. The 1974 Constitution: Precaution against the Enemies of the Socialist Self- management

The debates, works and searching for a new constitution, which would protect the socialist self-management against the enemies (bureaucrats, technocrats, nationalists, and liberals), produced the 1974 Constitution that was the last constitution of the Second Yugoslavia. According to Jovan Djordjevic, a distinguished political scientist and authority on constitutional law in Yugoslavia, the 1974 Constitution had six objectives: (1) Strengthening the equality and unity of the Yugoslav nations; (2) developing the social ownership of property and the worker self-management; (3) democratizing political process and the political system as a whole; (4) broadening the rights of the republics and decreasing the federal state's power and competence; (5) increasing the autonomy of Vojvodina and Kosovo; and (6) reforming the Collective Presidency of the Yugoslavia.⁴²¹

The last constitution of the SFRY was accepted in the Federal Assembly in February 1974. The 1974 Constitution guaranteed citizens a number of rights: Citizens' equality regardless of their nationality, race, sex, language, religion, education and social

⁴¹⁹ See Nobirdalı & Selim (eds.), op. cit., pp. 140-142 and Singleton, op. cit., p. 273.

⁴²⁰ See Kardelj, Edvard, “Anayasal Düzenimizin Sürekliliği”, in Nobirdalı & Selim (eds.), op. cit., pp. 266-267.

⁴²¹ Vuckovic, op. cit., p. 122.

status (Article 154); right of petition (Article 157); freedom of opinion (Article 166); freedom of the press, association and assembly (Article 167); freedom of movement and abode (Article 183); inviolability of home (Article 184); confidentiality of mail and other means of communication (Article 185); etc.⁴²²

The new constitution reformed the 'Collective Presidency of the SFRY', that had been introduced in the Yugoslav politics by the 1971 Constitutional Amendments. The 1974 Constitution reduced the number of members of the Collective Presidency from 22 to 9, while expanded its power and competence. The Presidency composed of one representative from each of the republics and the provinces, and the President of the LCY. The president and vice-president were elected by the Presidency. The office of president based on the principle of annual rotation.

Under the 1974 Constitution, the main function of the Presidency was to fulfill and maintain the equality of the nations and to achieve adjustments in the common interests of the republics. For this purpose, it made decisions on the basis of the adjustment views and interests of the republics. Other important duties of the Presidency were those: the nomination of the president of the Federal Executive Council; the appointment of senior judicial, military officials and ambassadors; the representation of the SFRY at home and abroad; and to present proposals to the Federal Assembly on all policy matters. In the Presidency, certain decisions were adopted by a simple majority, while others required a two-third majority.⁴²³

According to the 1974 Constitution, the self-management system on the territorial level had three administrative units: (1) the federal state, (2) the federated republics, and (3) the communes.⁴²⁴

The federal state (the SFRY) had 'Federal Assembly (the SFRY Assembly)' consisted of two councils: the 'Council of Republics and Provinces' and the 'Federal Council'. The former involved 88 members chosen from the federated (republican) assemblies, with 12 members from each of the six republics, and from the provincial

⁴²¹ Vuckovic, *op. cit.*, p. 122.

⁴²² McFarlane, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

⁴²³ Vuckovic, *op. cit.*, p. 123 and Singleton, *op. cit.*, p. 276.

⁴²⁴ See Figure 2 in Singleton, *op. cit.*, p. 266 and Figure 3.1 in Schrenk, Ardalán, El Tatawy (eds.), *op. cit.*, p. 46.

assemblies, with 8 members from each of the autonomous provinces. The 'Federal Council' had 220 delegates chosen from the communal assemblies, with 30 members from each of the six republics and 20 from each of the two autonomous provinces.

The 'Council of Republics and Provinces' was the successor of the 'Council of Nationalities'. That is, it represented the republics and nations on the federation level. Thus, the main task of the 'Council of Republics and Provinces' was to conduct international and inter-republican bargaining. However, the 'Federal Council' represented the working people and the organized socialist consciousness (the socio-political organizations).⁴²⁵

The Federal Assembly, including two council, had extensive and important authorities. The 1974 Constitution defined it as "*the highest expression of the self-management system and the supreme organ of power within the framework of federal rights and duties.*"⁴²⁶ The Federal Assembly, the supreme legislative body of the SFRY, elected the 'Federal Executive Council', the supreme executive body of the federal state (the SFRY). Its president, who was prime minister of the federal state, was proposed by the Presidency and elected by the Federal Assembly.

Moreover, the Federal Assembly had power to elect the President of the SFRY. On 15 May 1974, the Assembly elected Tito the lifetime President of the SFRY. This decision and election based on Article 333 which stated that "*the SFRY Assembly (the Federal Assembly) may, on the proposal of the Assemblies of the Republics and the Assemblies of the Autonomous Provinces, elect Josip Broz Tito President of the Republic for an unlimited term of office.*"⁴²⁷

Apart from the Federal Assembly involving two councils, the 1974 Constitution also established the 'Council of the Federation (Savet Federacija)' involving 105 members who were nominated by the Collective Presidency and elected by the Federal Council. Its members were well paid for their past services and their good behavior. Thus, the 'Council of Federation' was described as a Yugoslav equivalent to the British 'House of Lords'. The first 'Council of Federation' was elected on 26 December 1974,

⁴²⁵ Vuckovic, op. cit., p. 125.

⁴²⁶ Ibid., p. 124.

⁴²⁷ Singleton, op. cit., p. 276.

and included famous writers like Ivo Andric and Oskar Davico, the retired army commander General Gosnjak, the former Slovene president Miha Marinko, the Macedonian scholar Blaze Koneski, and a number of ex-partisans who had retired from active politics.⁴²⁸

The second type of administrative unit was the federated republics. Like the 1946 and 1963 Constitutions, according to the 1974 Constitution, the SFRY was consisted of the six Socialist Republics: Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro and Macedonia. The Socialist Republic of Serbia involved two autonomous provinces: Vojvodina and Kosovo.

Each Republic and Province had its own the 'Republican or Provincial Assembly' consisting of three councils: the 'Council of Associated Labor', the 'Council of Local Community', and the 'Socio-Political Council'.

The Council of Associated Labor's members were elected by the delegations who were elected by (a) workers in the social sector, (b) peasants and farm workers, (c) liberal professions, and (d) the state and the LCY officials and soldiers. The Council of Local Community's members were elected by the delegates who were elected by the all republican or provincial constituency. Finally, the Socio-Political Council was elected by the delegates of the socio-political organizations such as the LCY, the SAWP, the Trade Unions, etc.⁴²⁹

Also, each Republican and Provincial Assembly elected its own 'Republican or Provincial Executive Council' as executive body of the republics or autonomous provinces. The President of the Republican or the Provincial Executive Council, who was the prime minister of the republic or province, was elected by Republican or Provincial Assembly.

According to the 1974 Constitution, like the 1963 Constitution, the 'Commune'

⁴²⁸ Ibid., p. 277.

⁴²⁹ In 1974, there were 4.3 million *workers in the social sector* in 21,000 organizations; 3.9 million *peasants and farm workers*; and 300,000 *liberal professions* such as doctors, dentists, lawyers, etc. 4.3 million workers in the social sector elected 457,810 delegates, 3.9 million peasants and farm workers and 300,000 liberal professions elected total 69,733 delegates. In the same year, 37,847 delegates were elected by the *State and LCY officials and soldiers*, 117,334 delegates by the *socio-political organizations* and 156,837 delegates by the *territorial constituencies*. (Singleton, op. cit., p. 274 and Işıklı, op. cit., 151-152.)

was basic administrative unit of the socialist self-management at the territorial level in Yugoslavia. In 1976, there were 512 communes which involved 21,504,000 people.⁴³⁰

Each Commune had its own the 'Commune Assembly' consisting of three Commune Councils: the 'Council of Associated Labor' elected by delegates of workers in the social sector, peasants and farm workers, liberal professions, and the state and the LCY officials and soldiers; the 'Council of Local Community' elected by delegates of the Commune territorial constituency; and the 'Socio-Political Council' elected by delegates from the socio-political organizations.

According to the 1974 Constitution, each Commune Assembly elected its own 'Commune Executive Council' as executive body of the Commune. The president of the Commune Executive Council, who was elected by the Commune Assembly, was also the prime minister of the Commune.

On the economic level, the 1974 Constitution continued the arrangements of the 1971 Amendments and maintained the principle of economic decentralization. The 1974 Constitution also introduced a new framework for economic and social planning, designed to reconcile decentralized decision making with consistent and coordinated action. The system of planning aimed to establish a national consensus on the most important medium-term goals for the economy. For this purpose, plan formulation was based upon participation on a non hierarchical basis of all economic and social units, including government bodies.⁴³¹

Furthermore, the 1974 Constitution extended the concept of COI, that had been introduced by the 1971 Amendments, to foreign economic relations. It established the 'Community of Interest for Foreign Economic Relations (COIFER)' at the republican and federal levels. They were composed of enterprises representatives organized by industrial branch, and constituted the forum for articulation and coordination of views and plans on matters about foreign economic relations. The COIFERs distributed available foreign exchange among member enterprises in accord with self-management agreements among member enterprises.⁴³²

⁴³⁰ Işıklı, *op. cit.*, p. 151.

⁴³¹ Knight, *op. cit.*, p. 94.

⁴³² *Ibid.*, p. 100.

Adoption of the 1974 Constitution produced debates about it. Tito and Kardelj extremely supported and praised the new constitution. Tito claimed that *“the new Constitution has effected radical changes in the political system – the purpose of these changes is to assure the working class and the working people generally of their dominant position in exercising the functions of power and, in managing social affairs, to develop further the relations between the nation and nationalities of this country. Socialist self-management is exerting itself as a specific form of dictatorship of the proletariat.”*⁴³³

Also, Kardelj asserted that the 1974 Constitution increased the power of workers in the system of income distribution. *“The our new constitution”* stated Kardelj *“assures to the maximum possible extent that income based on greater labor productivity does not flow away from the workers, from the people, but rather towards them.”*⁴³⁴

These quotations show that, according to Tito, the socialist self-management was a specific form of the dictatorship of proletariat. Also, both Tito and Kardelj regarded the adoption of the 1974 Constitution as development of the socialist self-management and reinforcement of the economic and political position of the working people. However, the Croatian and Serbian nationalists became extremely discontent with the new Constitution.

The Croat side of nationalism had three complaints: (1) resources of the Federation continued to be wasted on war pensions, army and non-effective investments in the less developed regions; (2) the federal state was greatly influenced by the Belgrade institution controlled by Serbs; and (3) the federation operated as a system of interest-group in a struggle with the regional interest groups.⁴³⁵

On the other hand, the Serb side of nationalism complained that the 1974 Constitution weakened the unity of Yugoslavia by furthering decentralization towards a ‘Confederation of Republics’. That is, the 1974 Constitution institutionally and formally transformed the Yugoslav Federation into the ‘Confederation of Yugoslav Republics’. This radical decentralization towards a ‘confederal system’ annoyed nationalist-centralist

⁴³³ McFarlane, op. cit., p. 37.

⁴³⁴ Ibid., p. 38.

⁴³⁵ Ibid., p. 55.

Serbs. Especially, they became very discontent with the expansion of the power and autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina at the expense of the Republic of Serbia's power.⁴³⁶

Nationalist-centralist Serbs argued that the 1974 Constitution was a conspiracy of the Croat Tito and the Slovene Kardelj against Serbia and Serb nation. According to them, the constitution divided Serbs among three states – Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia – and made them into a minority in their ancestral land of Kosovo while this province acquired a status equal to that of Serbia.⁴³⁷

Soon thereafter the adoption of the new constitution, the League of Communists of Serbia formed a commission under chairmanship of Dragoslav Markovic. This commission prepared a report, so-called 'Blue Book'. It bitterly criticized the expansion of autonomous status of Kosovo and Vojvodina. The Blue Book regarded the 1974 Constitution as weakening of Serbia and Serb nation since it empowered Kosovo and Vojvodina at the expense of Serbia.⁴³⁸

The adoption of the new constitution was followed by the Tenth Congress of the LCY that met in May-June 1974. At the congress, Tito delivered a report and reasserted that bureaucracy, technocracy, liberalism and nationalism were four enemies of the workers and the socialist self-management. He called the all working people and the LCY to fight against the bureaucrats, the technocrats, the nationalists and the liberals who aimed to minimize economic, political and social power and role of the Yugoslav workers and to destroy the system of socialist self-management.⁴³⁹

At the end of the congress, a resolution was issued. The resolution decided to enhance the party discipline based on the principle of 'democratic centralization' in order to fight against the liberals and nationalists who challenged the system of socialist self-management and the LCY. The expansion of self-management system was accepted and

⁴³⁶ Ibid., p. 57

⁴³⁷ Pavkovic, op. cit., pp. 88-89.

⁴³⁸ Bora, *Yugoslavia: ...*, op. cit., p. 99.

⁴³⁹ See Tito, op. cit., pp. 149-153.

supported in the resolution.⁴⁴⁰ Also, the congress, elected Tito the lifetime President of the League of Communists.⁴⁴¹

IV. 9. The Associated Labor Law of 1976

On 26 November 1976, the Federal Assembly adopted the 'Associated Labor Law (ALL)' consisted of six parts. It was also known as the 'Worker Law' or the '1976 Constitutional Amendments'. The ALL reinforced the 1974 Constitution that maintained and continued the basic principles and arrangements of the 1971 Constitutional Amendments. Like the 1971 Amendments, the ALL aimed to empowered the economic role and position of workers by furthering economic decentralization.⁴⁴²

According to the ALL, there were 10 self-managed organization at the economic level:⁴⁴³

1) Basic Organization of Associated Labor (BOAL): The basic self-managed organization and unit at the economic level was the BOAL. In 1976, there were 16,402,000 BOALs that included all workers who jointed in an 'association of labor'.⁴⁴⁴ The ALL defined the BOAL as "*a component part of an organization of associated labor which makes up a technologically rounded whole, an independent economic and self-managing unit which can have the character of a legal entity.*"⁴⁴⁵ Its main function was to atomizes economic decision making to the smallest technically distinguishable unit producing a marketable output.

Within every BOAL, there were three layers of management: 'workers' councils' elected by secret ballot from within the workers; 'executive organs' elected from among the members of the workers' council; and 'management organs' composed of one or more professional managers. The workers' council, the commune assembly, and the union of organization of work units selected jointly managers from among candidates for the position. The management organ had the right to give directions to workers for

⁴⁴⁰ See Samary, Catherine, *Parçalanın Yugoslavya: Bosna'da Ethnik Savaş*, trans. Bülent Tanatar, Istanbul: Yazın Yayıncılık, 1995, pp. 156-157 and Işıklı, op. cit., p. 168.

⁴⁴¹ Singleton, op. cit., p. 276.

⁴⁴² See Hasan, Velki, *Özyönetim*, Üsküp: Birlik Yayınları, 1984, pp. 111-113.

⁴⁴³ See Table 3.1 in Schrenk, Ardan, El Tatawy (eds.), op. cit., p. 51

⁴⁴⁴ Işıklı, op. cit., p. 128.

⁴⁴⁵ Singleton, op. cit., p. 278.

implementation of the organization's plan and business policy that was adopted by the workers' council. Although it was normally appointed for four years and they might be reappointed, the management organ was subject to recall at any time for negligence, incompetence, legal misconduct or the failure to maintain good relations with other bodies of the enterprise. Dismissal proceeding of professional managers could be initiated by the workers' council, the assembly of the commune, or the trade union.

2) *Enterprises*: They involved BOALs. Their main function was to link associated BOALs that jointly realize income in an 'associated of labor and resources'. They were given extensive authorities and autonomy in policies of income distribution, investment, employment and trade.

3) *Associations*: They involved enterprises in an economic branch. They created forum for discussing common matters, horizontal coordination, and decisions binding consenting member enterprises.

4) *The Economic Chamber*: It included associations and established a forum for discussing common matters and for broad vertical coordination among associations.

5) *Reproduction Entity*: Vertically linked enterprises formed 'reproduction entity' that was not a legal entity.

6) *Composite Organization of Associated Labor*: It was a legal entity formed by vertically or horizontally linked enterprises. Both 'reproduction entities' and 'composite organizations of association labor' integrated enterprises' medium-term plans for output and capacity.

7) *Community of Interest*: Enterprises and other social sectors founded 'communities of interest'. Their basic function was to link suppliers and users of social or productive services for the joint regulation of supply, demand and financing.

8) *Cooperative*: In order to link private individuals for joint productions in agriculture, crafts and productive services, individuals in the private sector established 'cooperatives'. In the cooperatives, private individuals and enterprises retained rights of private ownership over their assets.

Private ownership were important in agriculture where a process of de-collectivization initiated in 1953. The Yugoslav socialist model based on the working

people's self-management permitted private holdings of up to 10 hectares in agricultural sector. In 1970, the private agricultural sector employed 43 percent of the total labor force, and 96 percent of the agricultural workers held 70 percent of the total farmland, and produced 71 percent of the agricultural product and 56 percent of marketed production. Ten years later, in 1980, the private agricultural sector produced 71 percent of the agricultural production and contained 92 percent of the jobs in agriculture.

Outside of agriculture, small-scale activities employing up to five salaried workers were allowed in any area of activity. Private nonagricultural employment rose from 3 percent to 4 percent of the total Yugoslav labor force between 1970 and 1981. On the other hand, social sector employment climbed from 43 percent to 61 percent in the same period. The social sector accounted for 85 percent of GDP in the Yugoslav economy in 1981.⁴⁴⁶

9) *Contractual Organization of Associated Labor (COAL)*: The COALs linked private workers and owner-operators with social resources in hybrid private and social enterprises. So, they bridged the social and private sectors. In the COALs, individuals pooled their financial resources with each other and with social owned resources. That is, the COALs were formed in order to establish a coordination between private and social sectors.

10) *Bank*: Banks involved enterprises as depositors and borrowers. The function of the banks was to work for pooling the resources of enterprises for financing the enterprises' investments. The 1976 ALL regarded the banks as service organizations for enterprises rather than autonomous profit-making entities. Thus, they were owned and managed by their members (enterprises that used the service of the bank as depositors or as borrowers). The banks performed services for their members and had no authority to generate a profit in their own right.

In addition to this, the ALL extended the 'system of social agreements and self-management agreements', that had been introduced by the 1971 Amendments in the area of income policy, to the areas of price, employment, foreign trade, social plans and capital accumulation. That is, according to the ALL, the economic policies about price, income,

⁴⁴⁶ Knight, *op. cit.*, pp. 85-86.

employment, foreign trade, social plan and capital accumulation were determined by the social and self-management agreements.⁴⁴⁷

The 1976 ALL was followed by the Eleventh Congress of the LCY in 1978. The Congress praised and supported the ALL, and described the LCY as the leading force of the Yugoslav working people. Also, Tito explained that the LCY was the helper of the Yugoslav working people but not a manager. Thus, he emphasized that the LCY must be in the struggle against the enemies (bureaucracy, technocracy, nationalism and liberalism) in order to develop the working people's self-management.⁴⁴⁸

So, according to Tito, the working people's self-management could not develop without extermination of the four enemies. He believed that the first necessary provision for the development of self-management was destruction of 'bureaucratic-technocratic oligarchy' whose ideological basis was 'nationalist liberalism'.

⁴⁴⁷ See *ibid.*, op. cit., pp. 92-93

CHAPTER V

DESTRUCTION OF THE SECOND YUGOSLAVIA

V. 1. The Yugoslav Economy in the 1980s: Economic Decline and Reconstruction of Capitalism

Between 1950-1980, the Yugoslav economy was characterized by rapid economic growth and impressive structural transformation. In this period, GDP grew at an average annual rate of about 6 percent in real terms. The share of investment in GDP was about 30 percent in throughout the period. Inasmuch as population grew only 1 percent a year, real per capita income more than doubled during the period.⁴⁴⁹ During the period, the Yugoslav economy achieved a rapid industrialization; and consequently, social structure and characteristic of the Yugoslav society changed extremely. Also, the system of socialist self-management achieved an important development at the educational level. For example, illiterate rate of the Yugoslav population was 44.6 percent on the eve of the World War II. After the war, this rate dropped to 21.0 percent in 1961 and to 9.5 percent in 1981.⁴⁵⁰

However, this economic and social development of the Socialist Yugoslavia was disrupted and stopped in the 1980s. Although the Yugoslav economy was the fastest growing in Europe in the second half of the 1970s, the economy entered a period of economic decline after 1980. The Yugoslav economy deteriorated, and the Yugoslav society suffered severely from the economic decline during 1980s.

Economic indicators of 1980s show a very severe economic decline of Yugoslavia throughout the 1980s:

Annual growth rate of GDP declined from 7 percent in 1979 to 0.5 percentage in 1982 and to -1.6 percent in 1988. Inflation rates were 9 percent in 1976, 30 percent in 1980 and 199 percent in 1988. Also, real wages declined 11.7 percent in 1980, 12.1

⁴⁴⁸ Işıklı, op. cit., p. 169.

⁴⁴⁹ Knight, op. cit., p. 82

⁴⁵⁰ *Yugoslavya'nın Genel Ekonomik Durumu ve Türkiye-Yugoslavya Ticari İlişkileri 1987 Yıllık Raporu*, Belgrade, March 1988, p. 7.

percent in 1983 and 8.0 percent in 1988.⁴⁵¹

The aggregate volume of investment activity in 1987 was 47 percent of its 1979 level. The investment/GDP ratio fell over the same period from 27.3 percent to 18.8 percent. Consumption decreased from 60.5 percent of GDP in 1982 to 58.8 percent in 1987. The average rate of expenditure on education decreased from 5 percent of GDP in the 1970s to 3.5 percent of GDP in the 1980s. Over the period 1978-1989, the absolute number of people living in poverty grew from 3.4 million (17.2 percent of the population) to 5.4 million (23.6 percent).⁴⁵²

By 1985, it was estimated that some 40 percent of social sector workers were living near the poverty line. Real wages (personal incomes) in the social sector fell continuously, from an index of 100 in 1980 to 76 in 1985.⁴⁵³ Also, unemployment increased significantly during the 1980s. Unemployment rate peaked to 37.61 percent in 1988. There were 2,527,000 unemployed people in 1988.⁴⁵⁴ In the same time, the labor productivity declined in the 1980s. Average annual growth rate of labor productivity in the public sector was 4.8 percent between 1956-1964, 4.3 between 1965-1972, 2.7 between 1973-1979, and -2.0 between 1980-1984.⁴⁵⁵

Furthermore, standard of living fell nearly 40 percent between 1982-1989. The country's foreign debt rocketed from under \$3.5 billion in 1973 to \$20.5 billion in 1981 and \$24 billion in 1982.⁴⁵⁶ Finally, GDP per capita declined from US\$ 3,000 to US\$ 2,400 between 1985-1988.⁴⁵⁷

In addition to this, the 1980s was a period of economic scandals and corruption. A series of financial scandals culminated in August 1987: *the Agrokomerc Scandal*. *Agrokomerc* was one of the largest firms in Yugoslavia, located in the towns of Bihac and

⁴⁵¹ See Tables 10.1 and 10.3 in Bole, Velimir & Gaspari, Milja, "The Yugoslav Path to High Inflation", in Michael Bruno (ed.), *Lessons of Economic Stabilization and Its Aftermath*, London: the MIT Press, 1991, pp. 363, 365.

⁴⁵² Radosevic, Slavo, "The Collapse of Yugoslavia – Between Chance and Necessity", in Dyker & Vejvoda (eds.), op. cit., pp. 71-72.

⁴⁵³ Bartlett, Will, "Foreign Trade and Stabilization Policy in a Self-Managed Economy: Yugoslavia in the 1980s", in Allcock, Horton, Milivojevic (eds.), *Yugoslavia in Transition: ...*, op. cit., p. 239.

⁴⁵⁴ Mencinger, op. cit., p. 82.

⁴⁵⁵ See Table 1.2 in Cohen, op. cit., p. 31

⁴⁵⁶ Bennett, op. cit., p. 69 and Plestina, op. cit., p. 151.

⁴⁵⁷ Plestina, op. cit., p. 152.

Velika Kladusa in northwest Bosnia. In August 1987, the investigations disclosed that *Aglokomerc* had issued promissory notes equivalent to 500 million US dollars without collateral. The investigations into scandal revealed a clientele network leading to the top Bosnian communist leader, the Bosniak Hamdija Pozderac, which enabled the firm and local bank to issue a limitless amount of promissory notes. Pozderac was forced to resign, while the director of *Agrokomerc* and a member of the Central Committee of the League of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Bosniak Fikret Abdic was given only a suspended sentence.⁴⁵⁸

The economic scandals, such as the *Agrokomerc Scandal*, received wide publicity in all Yugoslav media and undermined the legitimacy of the official political and economical institutions of the Yugoslav self-management system in the eye of the Yugoslav working people. Also, such scandals show that the bureaucratic-technocratic ruling class damaged and weakened the system of socialist self-management for their self-interests.

According to Janez Smidovnik, the causes of Yugoslavia's economic decline in the 1980s derived from the 'structural characteristics of the system of socialist self-management based on social ownership'. He argues that the self-management of enterprises suffered from four main problems: (1) The performance of Yugoslav enterprises was limited by the fact that they had no real owners of any kind concerned with efficient capital investment. That is, there were not real owners who felt responsibility for efficiency of enterprises. (2) The enterprises were managed by the state, the directors and the workers. All of them had an inclination to use the enterprises for their own ends, but not for the enterprises' ends. (3) Under this system (self-management) it was very difficult to make authoritative decisions in the light of any independent economic or management assessment. (4) Communal system caused regional fragmentation of enterprises and constant state intervention in them.⁴⁵⁹

So, according to Smidovnik, the Yugoslav economy's decline stemmed from

⁴⁵⁸ Pavkovic, op. cit., pp. 78-79

⁴⁵⁹ See for more details Smidovnik, Janez, "Disfunctions of the System of Self-Management in the Economy, in Local Territorial Communities and in Public Administration", in Simmie & Dekleva (eds.), op. cit., pp. 17-32.

these four problems of the self-management system. These problems resulted in at first inefficiency of enterprises, and then economic decline. Smidovnik's explanation and proposals based on liberal economics. According to liberal approach, economic efficiency depends on competition and this 'competition' depends on 'private property', that was described by Smidovnik as '*real ownership*'. Thus, liberals and Smidovnik claim that "the Yugoslav economy based on 'self-management' and 'social ownership' went bankrupt since it prevented 'private property (*real ownership*)' and 'economic competition' which are two necessary provisions for economic efficiency".

Smidovnik's explanation, which based on liberal approach, about the Yugoslav economy's decline is inadequate and simple because of three reasons:

- 1) Yugoslavia under the system of working people's self-management based on social ownership achieved extreme economic, social, cultural and intellectual development in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. So, if it is impossible to increase economic efficiency without 'private property (*real ownership*)' and 'competition', why and how did the Yugoslav socialist self-management based on social ownership achieve rapid development not only on the economic level but also on the social, cultural and intellectual levels? Liberal approach and Smidovnik can not answer and explain this question.
- 2) Liberalism and Smidovnik can not explain why the core and periphery capitalist economies entered a 'period of drastic economic crisis' after the 1974 economic crisis if 'real ownership' and 'competition' are two factor for economic development and efficiency. That is, not only the Yugoslav enterprises, which based on the workers' self-management and social ownership, but also the core and periphery capitalist countries' enterprises, which based on 'real ownership (private property)' and 'competition', entered economic crisis in the 1980s as a result of the 1974 global crisis of capitalism.
- 3) Finally, Smidovnik's explanation, that based on liberal approach, is inadequate and simple because it does not take into account the class relations, contradictions and struggles between the 'Yugoslav working people' and the 'Yugoslav bureaucratic - technocratic ruling class', and the effects of this relations on the economic decline.

If we want to explain the Yugoslavia's economic decline in the 1980s, we must

take into account and explore (a) the 1974 global economic crisis of capitalism, (b) the reaction of the core capitalist states to the 1974 crisis, and (c) the Yugoslav bureaucratic-technocratic ruling class's objectives and attitude.

The Yugoslavia's economic decline coincided with the wave of structural change in the world economy at the beginning of the 1980. The wave involved neo-liberal economic policies and globalization of such policies. The structural change of the world economy on the basis of neo-liberalism was launched by the core capitalist states and supported by the IMF and the World Bank that were controlled and orientated by the core capitalist states. After the 1974 global crisis of capitalism, in order to recover the 1974 crisis' losses, they launched, propagandized and supported the neo-liberal policies that involved (a) comprehensive privatization, (b) establishment of free markets of capital, labor and goods, (c) curtailment of social services and investments, and (d) decreasing wages. The core capitalist states, the IMF and the World Bank especially recommended the neo-liberal policies to the periphery countries in order to (a) create new profitable markets for their capital and goods, and (b) to find and exploit cheaper labor and raw materials for progressive reproduction of surplus-value.⁴⁶⁰

Yugoslavia was one of the countries that were recommended by the core capitalist states to implement the neo-liberal policies. At the beginning of the 1980s, this neo-liberal recommendation was welcomed and accepted by the bureaucratic-technocratic ruling class in Yugoslavia since bureaucrats and technocrats desired to elevate themselves from 'managers of economic means' to 'owners of economic means'. That is, they aimed to transform themselves to a capitalist class or, in the words of Smidovnik, to '*real owners*'. Thus, after the 1974 crisis, the Yugoslavia's economic decline in the 1980s coincided with the implementation of neo-liberal policies in Yugoslavia. As a result, for Yugoslavia, the 1980s was a period of 'economic decline' and 'liberalization'. In other words, this period (1980-1990) for Yugoslavia was a reconstruction of capitalism and integration of the Yugoslav economy into international capitalist relations. Also, this period was a transformation of the 'Yugoslav bureaucratic -

⁴⁶⁰ See for more details Arın, Tülay, "Kapitalist Düzenleme, Birikim Rejimi ve Kriz: Gelişmiş Kapitalizm", *11.Tez*, 1., pp. 122-138 and Arın, Tülay, "Kapitalist Düzenleme, Birikim Rejimi ve Kriz: Azgelişmiş Kapitalizm ve Türkiye", *11.Tez*, 3, pp. 86-105.

technocratic ruling class' to the 'Yugoslav capitalist class'.

The 'reconstruction of capitalism', the 'integration of Yugoslavia to the international capitalist relations' and the 'transformation of the bureaucratic-technocratic ruling class to capitalist class' was a product of 'cooperation between the Yugoslav bureaucratic-technocratic ruling class and the core capitalist states'. That is, the core capitalist states' economic interests and the Yugoslav bureaucratic-technocratic ruling class' economic interests intersected and coincided. Both of the two sides had economic and political interests in 'reconstruction of capitalism in Yugoslavia' and in 'integration of the Yugoslav economy into the international capitalist relations'.

However, this process could not be fulfilled without destruction of the 'system of self-management' and the 'social ownership' because they were incompatible with the neo-liberal policies and the mode of capitalist production. That is, self-management and social ownership were fierce obstacles for implementation of neo-liberal policies and reconstruction of capitalism in Yugoslavia since they were hindering (a) privatization of economic means and (b) establishment of the free markets of labor, capital and goods.⁴⁶¹

For this reason, the 'alliance of the Yugoslav bureaucratic-technocratic ruling class and the core capitalist states' aimed to destroy the 'system of self-management' and the 'social ownership' in order to reconstruct capitalism in Yugoslavia and to integrate it into international capitalist relations. This aim was fulfilled by a series of economic reforms involving neo-liberal policies. Implementation of neo-liberal policies and reconstruction of capitalism in Yugoslavia was openly backed by powerful international institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.⁴⁶²

The first neo-liberal economic reform was adopted in 1980. Yugoslavia agreed with the IMF to a three-year program of economic stabilization. It included exchange-rate adjustment, devaluation of the dinar, strengthening of the market mechanism, liberalizing foreign trade and credit markets, restrictive monetary and fiscal policy that

⁴⁶¹ Kovac, Bogomir, "Entrepreneurship and Privatization of Social Ownership in Economic Reforms", in Simmie & Dekleva (eds.), op. cit., p. 93 and Simmie, James & Dekleva, Joze, "General Lessons from the Yugoslav Experience", in Simmie & Dekleva (eds.), op. cit., p. 152.

⁴⁶² Williams, John, *Legitimacy in International Relations and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia*, London: Macmillan Press, 1998, p. 88.

decreased real personal incomes (wages) and social services.⁴⁶³ In 1983, the 'Krajger Commission' was formed. The commission prepared the 'Report for Economic Stabilization of Yugoslavia' and recommended the liberalization of the economy with full implementation of market principles.⁴⁶⁴ Following year, the 'Long-Term Stabilization Program' was started. Its main targets was to improve market relations and to reduce role of self-management institutions.⁴⁶⁵

The 1980 and 1984 reforms were admired and rewarded by the core capitalist states in 1985. In April 1985, Yugoslavia received a credit of \$300 million from the Western banks.⁴⁶⁶ This reward was followed by the 'Law on Financial Re-Organization of Enterprises' that introduced penalties and withdrawal of subsidies and credits to unsuccessful enterprises. This law allowed and resulted in bankruptcies of some enterprises, and increased unemployment. Also, in 1986, wages were frozen by a decree. Bankruptcies and the wage-freeze annoyed workers and led to strikes in 1986. In March 1987, the government was forced by the strikes to agree to lift the wage-freeze in successful firms, tourism and seasonal industrials.⁴⁶⁷

Federal government in 1988 created a new Commission (Mikulic's Commission) which launched a new 'Program of Economic Reform'. It required the creation of an integral market consisting of product, labor and capital markets. The constitutional conditions for the program were created by a set of Amendments to the 1974 Constitution, adopted in November 1988. The 1988 Amendments aimed to increase the efficiency of the economy by taking decidedly 'pro-market direction'. Thus, the thirty-nine amendments lifted all limitations to private ownership (except that of land, where the limit was set at 60 acres), allowed the formation of joint-stock companies in which decision-making power would be commensurate with the partners' investment. Also the 1988 Amendments decreased government support to failing enterprises.⁴⁶⁸

One month later, in December 1988, the 'Enterprise Act' was passed. It abolished

⁴⁶³ Bartlett, op. cit., p. 242.

⁴⁶⁴ Plestina, op. cit., p. 151.

⁴⁶⁵ Mencinger, op. cit., p. 80.

⁴⁶⁶ Bartlett, op. cit., p. 244.

⁴⁶⁷ McFarlane, op. cit., pp. 143-144.

⁴⁶⁸ Plestina, op. cit., 154.

the work organizations of the 1976 Constitutional Amendments, and re-established enterprises as a legal entity engaged in economic activities and fully responsible for its business operations. Four new types of ownership were introduced: social ownership, co-operative ownership, mixed ownership, and unlimited private ownership.⁴⁶⁹

Economic reforms involving neo-liberal policies culminated in establishment of the Markovic Government that prepared and applied the 1989 Reforms. The new government was formed by Croat Ante Markovic and involved technocrats. So, the Markovic Government was a 'technocratic government'.

When the Markovic Government assumed office on 16 March 1989, Prime Minister Ante Markovic announced three targets: first, the establishment of integrated markets of goods and services, capital and labor; second, the opening of the country to the world, that is, the internationalization of the national economy and culture; and third, the strengthening of the legal system, including the expansion of human right.⁴⁷⁰

The first target indicated reconstruction of capitalism, the second target aimed integration of Yugoslavia to the capitalist world, and the third target involved creation and expansion of liberal ideology under the pretext of 'expansion of human rights'.

Soon thereafter establishment of the Markovic government, President Drnovsek and Prime Minister Markovic traveled to the United States to explain their economic targets to the Bush administration, to the US business representatives and to the IMF. Also, meetings were held with European Free Trade Area representatives and with the General Secretary of the OECD. Furthermore, Jeffery Sachs, a famous liberal economist from Harvard University, became advisor of the Markovic government.⁴⁷¹

During the travel, the newly founded Yugoslav government's economic plans and targets were welcomed, praised and supported by the core capitalist states and their international organizations.

After the negotiations with core capitalist states, Drnovsek and Markovic returned the country and prepared a new economic reforms. On 18 December 1989, Markovic announced his economic program in the Federal Assembly. The Markovic's

⁴⁶⁹ Mencinger, *op. cit.*, p. 81.

⁴⁷⁰ Pregl, Zivko, "Programme of Reforms in Yugoslavia", in Simmie & Dekleva (eds.), *op. cit.*, p. XI.

⁴⁷¹ Plestina, *op. cit.*, p. 162.

Economic Program, that involved radical neo-liberal economic reforms, was voted by the Assembly and accepted by two-thirds majority in the same day. This neo-liberal program was welcomed and supported especially by the Croatian and Slovenian bureaucrats and technocrats.

However, the League of Communists of Serbia under leadership of Slobodan Milosevic refused the Markovic's Program, and Milosevic called workers for a general strike in order to prevent implementation of the program.⁴⁷² Milosevic was a radical opponent of the Markovic's Program because he aimed to centralize at first Serbia and then governmental structure of the federation under Serbian domination. However, the program involved the principle of decentralization and increased economic autonomy of the republics and the two autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo. That is, the Markovic's Program, that was backed by Slovenia and Croatia, conflicted with the Milosevic's plans, and for this reason, he rejected it.

The 1989 Reforms can be summarized in the six points: (1) About 90 percent of imports to Yugoslavia were liberalized. (2) Dinar convertibility was introduced for all external transaction, and the Deutschmark / Dinar ratio of 1:7 and the US Dollar / Dinar ratio of 1:12 were introduced. (3) Money supply, social expenditures, and wages were restricted and decreased. (4) The 'concept of social ownership' was abolished and two new concepts were introduced: *public state ownership* and *private ownership*. That is, social ownership was transformed into 'state ownership' and 'private ownership'. This reform enabled more than 50,000 private firms to be set up in 1990.⁴⁷³ (5) A comprehensive privatization was launched. For this purpose, the big enterprises were segmented into small and medium firms. (6) The same legislation applied to both Yugoslav and foreign investors and enterprises. Both domestic and foreign enterprises were allowed to combine in order to maximize profit.⁴⁷⁴

To conclude, the economic reforms which carried out neo-liberal policies in Yugoslavia in the 1980s produced six basic results:

1) The reforms could not solve economic problems. On the contrary, they affected

⁴⁷² Ibid., p. 165.

⁴⁷³ Pavkovic, op. cit., p. 100.

⁴⁷⁴ See for more details about the 1989 Reforms Pregl, op. cit., pp. XII-XV.

negatively the economy and deepened the economic contradictions. For example, the neo-liberal reforms increased unemployment and decreased real wages.⁴⁷⁵

2) The 'self-management relationships' were replaced with 'capital relationships'; socialism was replaced with capitalism. That is, the reforms based on neo-liberal economic principles destroyed the system of socialist self-management and reconstructed capitalism in Yugoslavia.

3) The Yugoslav economy was integrated into international capitalism and the Yugoslav bureaucratic-technocratic ruling class transformed to the Yugoslav capitalist class which cooperated with the core capitalist states. This means that, the neo-liberal economic reforms in the 1980s strengthened and promoted economic and political position of the bureaucrats and technocrats.

4) The effect of the core capitalist states in the Yugoslav politics increased. Naturally, this circumstance fed and supported rise of nationalism and liberalism in Yugoslavia.

5) Interregional disparities increased in the 1980s inasmuch as the neo-liberal reforms ended federal aids to the underdeveloped regions.⁴⁷⁶

6) Standard of living of workers declined sharply since the neo-liberal reforms decreased real wages, social security, services and investments and increased unemployment. Also, the reforms extremely weakened position of workers in the political and economic decision-making process. That is, the participation of workers in the decision-making process declined as a result of the reforms. Both 'economic regression of workers' and 'expulsion of workers from the decision-making process' annoyed them and abolished their trust on the 'idea of socialism' and the 'idea of Yugoslavism'. This situation facilitated and accelerated expansion of nationalist and liberal ideas. Also, the Yugoslav workers, who were damaged by the reforms, organized a lot of strikes in order to protest and prevent neo-liberal policies. Between 1982-1987, total 1570 strikes involving 360,000 workers were recorded.⁴⁷⁷ However, these strikes could not prevent neo-liberal economic reforms and expansion of nationalist liberal ideas.

V. 2. Rise of Serbian Nationalism (1980-1990)

⁴⁷⁵ Bartlett, *op. cit.*, p. 246 and Dekleva, B., *op. cit.*, p. 115.

⁴⁷⁶ See Mencinger, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

⁴⁷⁷ Pavkovic, *op. cit.*, p. 78.

In Yugoslavia, the period of 1980-1990 was the period of rise of nationalism. That is, economic decline and reconstruction of capitalism based on neo-liberal policies coincided with the rise of nationalistic ideas and spirit in the 1980s. The most important and fierce resurgence of nationalism emerged in Serbia and Croatia. That is, Serbian and Croat nationalism in the 1980s were the most important and influential two nationalist movement in the Yugoslav politics.

In this period, Serbian nationalism based on following propositions:

Serbs were in unjust position in post-Second World War Yugoslavia that threatened existence of Serb nation. Serbs were the victims of economic and political discrimination by Croats and Slovenes. Serbs had made the greatest military contribution and suffered the most casualties over last century and , far from being rewarded, were being punished in peacetime. That is, they had won the war and lost the peace. For the Serbs in Kosovo and Croatia, the situation was even worse. In Croatia, Croatian politicians revived the Ustasha Movement which had murdered and tortured Serbs during the World War II, and in Kosovo, Albanians attacked and oppressed Serbs. Thus, Serbs faced genocide in Kosovo and Croatia.

The system of socialist self-management and the federal structure of the state were invented by the Slovene Kardelj and the Croat Tito in order to weaken economic and political position of Serb nation. Croats, in the person of Tito, and Slovenes, in the person of Kardelj, had deliberately constructed federal Yugoslavia in such a way as to exploit Serbia economically and to divide Serbs between several federal units.⁴⁷⁸ Also, Tito-Kardelj (Croat-Slovene) alliance founded autonomous provinces of Kosovo-Metohija and Vojvodina in order to segment the Serb homeland. So, they established "strong Yugoslavia, weak Serbia".

Moreover, Serbian nationalism argued that Bosniaks were Serbs who had been converted to Islam religion by the Ottoman Empire. Thus, Bosniaks should be reconverted to the Orthodoxy, and those who refuse it should be expelled from Bosnia –

⁴⁷⁸ According to the 1981 census, carried out a year after Tito's death, Serbs made up about 36 percent of Yugoslavia's population. Of these, close to 2 million lived outside the Republic of Serbia while another 1.3 million lived in Serbia's autonomous provinces (Kosovo and Vojvodina) and 4.9 million lived in inner Serbia. (Bennett, *op. cit.*, p. 80.)

Herzegovina.

Serbian nationalists favored and pursued the project of "Greater Serbia" that would unite all Serbs in a single state. They advocated that "Greater Serbia" must be founded in order to protect and promote Serbian nation. According to Serbian nationalism, economic problems can be solved only by "Greater Serbia"; therefore, Serbs must struggle for "Greater Serbia" in order to solve their economic problems.

Finally, Serbian nationalism, on the economic level, was in favor of liberal economy and reconstruction of capitalism within a "Greater Serbia". So, Serbian nationalism was 'nationalist liberalism' which aimed to destroy the system of socialist self-management, reconstruction of capitalism and foundation of "Greater Serbia".

These proposals of Serbian nationalism were led by Dobrica Cosic in the intellectual sphere, by Slobodan Milosevic in the political sphere, and by the Serbian Orthodox Church in the religious sphere.

V. 2. i. Dobrica Cosic and the "Serbian Memorandum"

Dobrica Cosic is one of the most widely known and respected Serbian nationalist writers. He was regarded as spiritual and intellectual father of Serbian nationalism in the 1980s for his ideas played an important role in the resurgence of Serbian nationalism in the 1980s.

Cosic was born in 1921 at Velika Drenova in Serbia, educated at the University of Belgrade and participated in the Partisan Movement during the World War II. After the war, he held many high-ranking position in the LCY, including membership of its central committee. He published a number of literary, linguistic and political books that supported and led Serbian nationalism in the 1950s and the 1960s. Thus, he was expelled from the League in 1968 due to his nationalistic attitude.⁴⁷⁹

After the expulsion, he became an extreme anti-Titoist and opponent of the socialist regime. He argued that the socialist regime damaged and weakened the Serb nation. In order to empower the Serb nation, he proposed and favored establishment of a "Greater Serbia" that would unify all Serbs in a single Serbian state. For this purpose, he stressed insistently that all Serbs should endeavor together. Cosic declared his idea in

⁴⁷⁹ Allcock, Milivojevic, Horton (eds.), *Conflict In The Former Yugoslavia*, op. cit., p. 52-53.

Borba on 13 June 1989:

*“Let us stop once and for all to liberate, save, and safeguard others (Croats, Slovenes and the Kososvo Albanians), to keep convincing them that they would perish without us. If they do not wish to live with us in a democratic federation, let us respect their wish to be alone and happy. It is difficult to understand why the Serbs today reasonably and persistently fail to aspire to a state without national questions, national hatreds, and Serbophobia.”*⁴⁸⁰

Cosic also was one of the most important authors of ‘*Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts*’ on the question of Serbian nationalism. The Memorandum were published on 24 September 1986 in *Vecernje Novosti*. It claimed that Serb nation’s existence was threathened. Especially, it sounded the alarm about the position of Serbs in the other republics:

*“Except during the period of the NDH (the Independent State of Croatia between 1941-1945) Serbs in Croatia have never been as endangered as they are today. The resolution of their national status must be a top priority political question. If a solution is not found, the consequences will be damaging on many levels , not only for relations within Croatia but also far all of Yugoslavia.”*⁴⁸¹

The Serbian Memorandum especially accused Croatia and Slovenia of conspiring against Serbs. Also, it alleged that this campaign against Serbs had been headed by Tito and Kardelj. So, socialist regime based on self-management and federal structure was a product of the Croat-Slovene (Tito-Kardelj) conspiracy against Serb nation. Moreover, it advocated that Serbs were subjected to genocide at the hands of irredentist and separatist Albanians in Kosovo. Finally, the Memorandum proposed to unify all Serbs in a single Serbian state in order to protect Serb nation.

The Memorandum was a manifesto of Serbian nationalism in the 1980s. It involved anti-Croat, anti-Slovene, anti-Albanian, anti-Muslim and anticommunist ideas and sentiments, and served the Serbian nationalist project for “Greater Serbia”. Jacques Julliard describes the Memorandum as *“a real manifesto that bears the idea of Greater*

⁴⁸⁰ Banac, op. cit., p. 149.

Serbia".⁴⁸² Thus, the Memorandum was the intellectual preparation of Serbia and the Serbs for aggression and warfare for "Greater Serbia". In other words, it was a document intended to mobilize and motivate the Serb people for the project of "Greater Serbia".⁴⁸³

Naturally, Croat and Slovene politicians, intellectuals and public opinion bashed the Serbian Memorandum. They regarded it as a document of Serb chauvinism. Also, Dragisa Pavlovic, the President of the Belgrade League of Communists, and Ivan Stambolic, the President of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, roundly denounced the Memorandum. According to them, it was an indication of rising chauvinism and a requiem for Yugoslavia. In an address at Belgrade University on 30 October 1986, Stambolic assessed that:

*"The so called Memorandum is not new. It is the old chauvinist concern for the fate of the Serbian cause with the well-known formula that the Serbs win the wars but lose the peace . . . In short, the so-called Memorandum, more precisely and with an easy conscience, could be entitled 'In Memoriam' for Yugoslavia, Serbs, Socialism, self-management, equality, brotherhood, and unity . . . Essentially, it is diametrically opposed to the interests of the Serbs throughout Yugoslavia."*⁴⁸⁴

V. 2. ii. Foundation of the Milosevic Regime

Milosevic was political leader of Serbian nationalism during 1980s and 1990s. He was born in Pozaverc in 1941 and educated in Law Faculty of Belgrade University. In 1973, Milosevic became director-general of *Technogas*, a Serbian energy enterprise, and in 1978, became president of *Beobank* (Belgrade Bank). Also, he became member of the League of Communist of Serbia (LCS) in 1969. When Ivan Stambolic became president of the Central Committee of the LCS in 1984, Milosevic became president of the Belgrade branch of the LCS. In 1986, when Stambolic was elevated to the president of the Republic of Serbia, Milosevic was elected president of Central Committee of the LCS.⁴⁸⁵

⁴⁸¹ Silber, Laura & Little, Allan, *The Death of Yugoslavia*, London: Penguin Books, 1995, 31-32.

⁴⁸² Julliard, Jacques, *Geliyorum Diyen Faşizm*, Istanbul: AFA Yayınları, 1994, p. 59.

⁴⁸³ Letica, Slaven, "Genesis of the Current Balkan War", in Stjepan G. Mestrovic (ed.), *Genocide After Emotion: The Postemotional Balkan Wars*, London: Routledge, 1996, p. 102.

⁴⁸⁴ Cigar, Norman, "The Serbo-Croatian War, 1991", in Mestrovic (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 55.

⁴⁸⁵ Allcock, Milivojevic, Horton (eds.), *Conflict In The Former Yugoslavia*, *op. cit.*, pp. 175-176.

Milosevic had three goals: The first goal was recentralization of power within Serbia by revoking the autonomy of the republic's two autonomous provinces (Kosovo and Vojvodina). The second goal was recentralization of power within the country at large, from a loose federation to a unitary state, through diminishing the power of the other republics and reinforcing the bureaucracy in Belgrade. That is, he aimed to transform Yugoslavia from federalism to centralism under Serbian domination. It was a political tactic and tool for realization of the ultimate target: unification Serbs in a "Greater Serbia". "Greater Serbia", that was envisaged by Milosevic and Serbian nationalism, included Serbia, Kosovo, Vojvodina, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and half of Croatia (along the Karlobag – Virovitica line) but excluded the ethnically homogeneous Slovenia.⁴⁸⁶ The third goal was reconstruction of capitalism and destruction of the socialist self-management system through implementation of neo-liberal economic policies. For this purpose, in May 1988, the so-called Milosevic Commission consisting of Serbian liberal economists and technocrats prepared and adopted an economic program for the Serbian economy. It involved neo-liberal policies advised by the IMF.⁴⁸⁷ Thus, we can say that Serbian nationalism was a 'nationalist liberalism' which aimed to establish a capitalist "Greater Serbia".

In order to achieve these aims, Milosevic at first tried to take absolute control within the LCS. Thus, he launched operation against the Stambolic faction within the LCS. In order to dismiss the Stambolic faction and to obtain absolute control in the LCS, he tried to attract Serbian public opinion by using nationalistic terminology. Especially, he frequently used the Kosovo crisis for his plan.

In April 1987, more than 60,000 Serbs from Kosovo signed a petition warning they could no longer endure the 'genocide' being inflicted on their community by Albanian irredentist and demanding the purge of Kosovo's Albanian leadership and the imposition of martial law in Kosovo.⁴⁸⁸

On 24 April, Serbs held a meeting in the Kosovo capital Pristina. This meeting was

⁴⁸⁶ Lukic, Reneo & Lynch, Allen, *Europe From The Balkans to the Urals; The Disintegration of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 155-156

⁴⁸⁷ Woodward, Susan L., *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War*, Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1995, p. 107.

⁴⁸⁸ Bennett, op. cit., p. 92.

supported by nationalist politicians and the Belgrade media. Milosevic participated in the meeting and delivered a nationalistic speech to the Serb demonstrators:

*“ You should stay here. This is your land. These are your houses. Your meadows and gardens. Your memories. You shouldn’t abandon your land just because it’s difficult, because you are oppressed by injustice and degradations. It was never part of the Serbian and Montenegrin character to give up in the face of obstacles, to demobilize when it’s time to fighting, to be demoralized when they find it hard going. You should stay here for the sake of your ancestors and descendants. Otherwise your ancestors would be defiled and descendants disappointed. But I don’t suggest that you stay, endure, and tolerate a situation you are not satisfied with. On the contrary, you should change it with the rest of the progressive people here, in Serbia and in Yugoslavia.”*⁴⁸⁹

Three days later, the Kosovo Committee of Serbs and Montenegrins met in the village of Kosovo Polje. Milosevic, in this meeting, launched his assault on Stambolic and Tito’s regime. Also, he endorsed the allegations of genocide against the Serb nation and appealed to Serbs’ warrior, traditions by promising them: *“Nobody will ever beat you again”*. This very nationalistic speech was televised in order to attract Serb public opinion.⁴⁹⁰

On 23-24 September 1987, the Eight Session of the Central Committee of the LCS was held. In the session, a bitter discuss emerged between the Milosevic faction and Stambolic faction. Milosevic called a vote on expelling Dragisa Pavlovic, president of the Belgrade branch of the LCS and Stambolic’s protégé, from the LCS. Eleven voted in favor, five against and four abstained. Expulsion of Pavlovic was followed by a comprehensive purge of the Stambolic faction. Finally, Stambolic resigned on 24 December since his position in the party was weakened sharply as a result of the purge of his followers by Milosevic. Soon thereafter the resignation of Stambolic, Milosevic was elected the President of the Socialist Republic of Serbia.

That is, the Eight Session entitled Milosevic absolute power and he became indisputable political leader of the Serb politics. Surprisingly, the defeat of Stambolic and the radical nationalist Milosevic’s triumph was welcomed by the Croat politicians despite

⁴⁸⁹ Silber & Little, op. cit., 38.

fierce opposition and criticism of Croatian press against Milosevic. Croatian politicians welcomed Stambolic's fall and criticized their own press for objecting to Milosevic regime. Stipe Suvar (the President of the LCY between 1988-89, the President of the League of Communists of Croatia between 1986-90 and Croatia's representative on the Collective Presidency of SFRY between 1989-90) later explained why Croatian political elite defended Milosevic: "*Stambolic was the most feared politician on the Yugoslav scene, so the grey bureaucrat Milosevic made us feel that we could control him.*"⁴⁹¹ Yet, they could not control him.

Soon thereafter the Milosevic's triumph within the LCS, he took control over the Serbian media through dismissing socialist-Titoist and anti-nationalist figures from media. Thus, Milosevic reinforced his victory within the party by victory within the media.

Between 1987-90, the nationalist liberal Serbian media controlled by Milosevic started to write and tell stories regarding the corruption under Tito's socialism as well as injustice and discrimination against the Serbs during and after the World War II. Under the guise secrets of the past, nationalistic liberal press conducted a campaign of delegitimation of Tito's regime and its constitutional foundations. In 1988, open anti-communism and anti-Titoism became the latest intellectual fashion in Serbian media, and this fashion was allowed and supported by the Milosevic government. Also, the principle slogan of the media between 1987-90 was "*united, single Serbia*".⁴⁹²

In this period, Serbian nationalist liberal intellectuals, bureaucrats and technocrats extremely advocated recentralization of Yugoslavia both on the political and economic levels. They advocated that the system of socialist self-management was economically unproductive, and for this reason, 'free market economy' should be introduced. Serbian nationalist liberalism favored gradual abolition of social ownership and gradual transition to privatization.⁴⁹³ These liberal ideas were broadcast by the Belgrade media in order to attract the public opinion.

Moreover, in order to propagandize and spread nationalistic idea and spirit, the

⁴⁹⁰ Bennett, op. cit., 94.

⁴⁹¹ Silber & Little, op. cit., p. 47.

⁴⁹² Pavkovic, op. cit., p. 103.

⁴⁹³ Vejvoda, Ivan, "Serbian Perspectives", in Danchev & Halverson (eds.), op. cit., p. 108.

Milosevic's media every day broadcast a lot of historical myths, fantasies, half-truths and brazen lies. The media offensive was focused against Albanians, Croats and Slovenes. They were regarded as 'enemies of Serb nation'. Especially, in order to feed anti-Croat sentiment, the nationalist media frequently talked and discussed about the Ustasha atrocity upon Serb people during the World War II.

The Serb media repeatedly propagandized that the Serbs in Kosovo and Croatia were victims of social and ethnic discrimination and expulsion. The Serb media claimed continuously that Serb women were raped by the Kosovo Albanians. However, a group of Yugoslav sociologists detected that in Kosovo in the period of 1982-88, 17 Serbian women were raped by the Albanian men and 154 Serbian women were raped by Serbian men.⁴⁹⁴

Letica points that the Serb media "*directly served to create a mass psychosis – involving paranoia and persecution mania – among the Serb population in Kosovo and Croatia*" through nationalistic propaganda and lies.⁴⁹⁵ This situation, of course, helped and facilitated rise of Serbian nationalism and aggression. That is, television, radio, magazines and newspapers were insistently used by the Milosevic regime as "*propaganda tools and weapons*"⁴⁹⁶ with aim of making Serbian people nationalistic, aggressive, anti-Titoist and anticommunist. This condition is described very well by Christopher Bennett:

*"The media offensive of Milosevic's Serbia in the 1980s resembled very closely the propaganda campaign of Nazi Germany in the 1930s. Indeed, the central theme – that all Serbs should be united in a single Serbian state – was identical. The great difference was that by the 1980s the media were infinitely more powerful than in the 1930s and consequently the capacity for disinformation was that much greater. While Hitler had the press, an infant film industry and the radio waves to disseminate his political philosophy, Milosevic was able to beam his new Serb nationalism into every home in Serbia and beyond via saturation television."*⁴⁹⁷

Milosevic, who controlled the LCS and the Serb media, also endeavored to achieve

⁴⁹⁴ Bora, *Yugoslavya: ...*, op. cit., p. 106.

⁴⁹⁵ Letica, op. cit., p. 95.

⁴⁹⁶ Vejvoda, op. cit., p. 107.

⁴⁹⁷ Bennett, op. cit., p. 97.

absolute control over Kosovo, Vojvodina and Montenegro. For this purpose, during 1988-89, he organized mass rallies and demonstrations that protested the existing leadership of Kosovo, Vojvodina and Montenegro and supported the Milosevic regime.

In July 1988, Milosevic sought a constitutional change that would abolish autonomy of Vojvodina. This was denied by the League of Communist of Vojvodina (LCV) under leadership of Bosko Kronic and Milovan Sogorov. The Vojvodina leadership opposed the Milosevic government and tried to defend his province's autonomy. Thus, Milosevic launched campaign against Kronic and Sogorov. On 5 October, Mihalj Kertes, Radovan Pankov and Nedeljko Sipovac, who were Milosevic's most faithful men in the LCV, led a crowd of factory workers by foot, bus and tractor from town of Backa Planka to Novi Sad, forty kilometers away. The crowd of around 15,000 attacked the Vojvodina Assembly by hurling stones and chanting slogans of "*Kosovo is Serbia*", "*Vojvodina is Serbia*", "*Together we are strong*". Sogorov phoned Milosevic appealing for help and Milosevic replayed: "*I will save you, but there is one condition: you must all submit your resignation. If you resign, I will save you.*" Milosevic's condition was accepted; and consequently, the Vojvodina leadership was replaced by Milosevic's men, Kertes, Pankov and Sipovac. That is, on 5 October 1988, Vojvodina fell under Milosevic's control.⁴⁹⁸

Similar operation was conducted in Kosovo against the League of Communist of Kosovo (LCK) led by Titoist Azem Vllasi. In November 1988, pro-Milosevic politicians in LCK organized a mass rally in Pristine. Demonstrators protested and called the Kosovo leadership for resignation by carrying pictures of Milosevic and of Serb national heroes and by singing Serbian nationalistic songs such as "*Who says, who dares to lie that Serbia is little?*". These demonstrations forced the Vllasi leadership to resign. The Vllasi leadership was replaced by Milosevic's appointees. Although Kosovo Albanians supported the Vllasi leadership and organized demonstrations against the Milosevic's coup, Milosevic government suppressed them by using army and police force.⁴⁹⁹

Also, in the same year, the Yugoslav Armed Forces (YAF) was reorganized. According to the reorganization, the Territorial Defense Forces of Kosovo and

⁴⁹⁸ See Silber & Little, op. cit., pp. 58-60.

Vojvodina were abolished. This means that, military power of the autonomous regions was removed. Thus, in 1988, Serbia not only on the political sphere but also on the military sphere achieved control over the provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina as a result of the reorganization of the YAF.⁵⁰⁰

On the other hand, on 8 October 1988, crowds estimated at 10,000 – 20,000 persons gathered in the Montenegro capital of Titograd to demand the resignation of the republic's leaders, shouting slogans in favor of Milosevic and urging strong cooperation with Serbia. Unlike in Vojvodina and Kosovo, the leadership of Montenegro refused to yield power. However, Montenegrin resistance to the Milosevic regime could not last very long. In January 1989, Milosevic's supporters in Montenegro again organized demonstrations against the local communist leadership. Finally, they yielded to the Milosevic regime and Serbian nationalism.⁵⁰¹

It should be stated that these Milosevic's operations in Kosovo, Vojvodina and Montenegro were extremely supported and praised by the nationalist and liberal Serb media. Especially, the media described the nationalistic demonstrations, that were organized by the Milosevic's followers, as 'the Serb struggle and rebellion for freedom'.⁵⁰²

After the fall of Montenegro, the Milosevic government called for amendments to Serbia's constitution that would give Belgrade greater control over the police, judiciary, social and financial planning, defense and foreign policy in Kosovo and Vojvodina. In March 1989, the Serbian Assembly passed the amendments to the constitution of Serbia reintegrating Kosovo and Vojvodina into Serbia and stripping the two provinces of their political and legal autonomy.

⁴⁹⁹ Pavkovic, op. cit., p. 104.

⁵⁰⁰ According to the 1974 Constitution, the YAF composed of two equal components: Yugoslav People's Army (YPA) and Territorial Defense (TD). According to the Law on National Defense, these components were equal as to training and acted as a single operative force in the event of external aggression. The TD forces were trained and run by the leadership of the republics and autonomous provinces, while the YPA's training and operational-strategic use was governed by the Collective Presidency of SFRY. The 1988 Reorganization of the YAF abolished the Kosovo and Vojvodina TD forces, while the TD forces of the six republics continued to work. (See for more details Spegelj, Martin, "The First Phase, 1990-1992: The JNA Prepares for Aggression and Croatia for Defense", in Magas & Zanic (eds.), op. cit., pp. 15-20)

⁵⁰¹ Lukic & Lynch, op. cit., p. 155.

⁵⁰² Bora, *Yugoslavya: ...*, op. cit., p. 108.

Although Kosovo and Vojvodina Assemblies approved the amendments, the Kosovo Albanians rejected them and organized demonstrations in all the major cities in Kosovo. The Milosevic government sent police against the demonstrators. According to Serbian government, 23 demonstrators died during the demonstration. However, Slovenian sources reported the death total at 140 demonstrators. After this event, Slovenia decided to withdraw its contingent from the combined federal police units.⁵⁰³

Three month later, on 28 June 1989, Milosevic organized a meeting in Kosovo. This day is very important for Serbian history and nationalism. On the same day in 1914, Gavrilo Princip, a Bosnian Serb revolutionary student, assassinated Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo. Also, it is more important for Serb nationalism that this day is *St. Vitus's Day*, when Serbian army commanded by Tsar Lazar was defeated and vanquished by the Ottoman army in Kosovo in 1389. 600 years after the defeat and 75 years after the assassination, on the same day, 28 June, around one million Serbs flocked to Kosovo to listen their new nationalist leader and hero, Slobodan Milosevic. He delivered a nationalistic speech that praised Serbs and called the Serb nation to be prepared for 'battle':

*"Serbs in their history have never conquered or exploited others. Through two world wars, they liberated themselves and, when they could, they also helped others to liberate themselves. The Kosovo heroism does not allow us to forget that at one time we were brave and dignified and one of the few who went into battle undefeated. Six centuries later, again we are in battles and quarrels. They are not armed battles though such things should not be excluded yet."*⁵⁰⁴

After the establishment of Milosevic's control over Vojvodina, Kosovo and Montenegro, Milosevic also tried to attract the Macedonian leadership. However, the Macedonian government did not cooperate with the Milosevic regime because of three reasons: First of all, the Serbian nationalist politicians, intellectuals and church considered Macedonia a nation invented by the Tito's regime, and described Macedonian people as 'South Serbs'. Secondly, Macedonian leadership was aware that alliance with Serbia would damage its relations with the prosperous republics of Croatia and Slovenia

⁵⁰³ Lukic & Lynch, op. cit., p. 153.

whose economic aids were needed by the Macedonian economy. Also, any alliance with the Milosevic regime would stimulate uprisings of Albanian minority in Macedonia. These three reasons prevented establishment of Serbo-Macedonian alliance.

In the nationalist Serb meetings organized by the Milosevic regime between 1987- and 1990, those slogans were common: "*Slobodan (Milosevic) send us lettuce; we will already have meat since we will slaughter the Croats*", "*Oh Muslims, you black crows, Tito is not around to protect you*", "*We love you Slobodan because you hate the Muslims*", "*I'll be first, who'll be second to drink some Turkish (Muslim) blood?*" and "*We want arms*".⁵⁰⁵

These slogans openly menaced and extremely frightened not only Kosovo Albanians and Yugoslav Muslims (Bosniaks) but also Slovenes and Croats. For this reason, an alliance and cooperation has emerged among Croats, Slovenes and Albanians against the Milosevic regime since 1989. Both the March 1989 Amendments and the Kosovo meeting of 28 June 1989 were roundly criticized and protested by Croatia, Slovenia and Bosniaks. Croatia and Slovenia have supported Kosovo Albanians against the Milosevic regime since 1989.

On 2 July 1990, although the amendments of March 1989 had been accepted by the Kosovo Provincial Assembly, the Kosovo Assembly, that was supported by Croatia and Slovenia, proclaimed the province an independent unit in the Yugoslav community equal to the other republics. This declaration aimed to nullify the March 1989 Amendments adopted by the Serbian Assembly. Furthermore, on 7 September 1990, a two-thirds majority of Albanian deputies from Kosovo met in secret in Kacanik and declared Kosovo a democratic republic of the Albanian people and of members of other nations and national minorities who are its citizens: Serbs, Bosniaks, Montenegrins, Croats, Turks, Romanics and other living Kosovo. However, on 28 September 1990, Serbian Assembly adopted new constitution. The new constitution revoked the Assemblies of Kosovo and Vojvodina, and thus, abolished completely their autonomies

⁵⁰⁴ Silber & Little, op. cit., p. 72.

⁵⁰⁵ Cigar, op. cit., p. 57.

status.⁵⁰⁶ It also eliminated the word of 'Socialist' from the republic's name. So, 'Socialist Republic of Serbia' was changed to 'Republic of Serbia'.⁵⁰⁷

After the adoption of new constitution, the first multiparty election in Serbia was held in December 1990. Milosevic's party, Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS),⁵⁰⁸ won 77.6 percent of the votes, giving it 194 of the 250 seats in the Serbian Assembly. Also, Milosevic won 65 percent of the votes for the presidency of the republic. The Serbian Renewal Movement (SRM) and the Serbian Democratic Party (SDP) won respectively 19 and 7 seats. The remaining seats went to 14 smaller parties.⁵⁰⁹

The SDP was founded by Belgrade nationalist liberals in 1990. It favored parliamentary liberalism at the political level and neo-liberal economic policies at the economic level. That is, this party supported reconstruction of capitalism and integration of the country into the international capitalist relations. Also, the SDP favored political and economic centralization of the state.⁵¹⁰

The SRM was a nationalistic party that was founded in 1990 under the leadership of Vukasin (Vuk) Draskovic and Vojislav Seselj. Draskovic and his party pursued extreme nationalistic policy and aimed foundation of a "Greater Serbia". The SRM assaulted on Tito's socialist regime and praised Draza Mihailovic and the Chetnik Movement.⁵¹¹

The second man of the SRM was the Bosnian Serb academician Vojislav Seselj who was born in Sarajevo in 1941. He educated in the Universities of Sarajevo and Belgrade, and then became a famous nationalist historian and writer of the Bosnian Serbs. Seselj played an important role in establishment of the SRM, and after the December 1990 elections, established the Serbian Radical Party (SRP). Like SRM, the SRP was a very extreme nationalistic party and desired an "Greater Serbia".⁵¹²

Seselj proposed a territorial division of Yugoslavia by its only three 'true' nations

⁵⁰⁶ Lukic & Lynch, *op. cit.*, pp. 153-154.

⁵⁰⁷ Lane, *Yugoslavia: ...*, *op. cit.*, p. 178.

⁵⁰⁸ On July 1990, the name of 'the League of Communists of Serbia' was changed to 'the Socialist Party of Serbia' under leadership of Milosevic. 111 of the 135 members of the Central Committee of the SPS came from the old bureaucrats and technocrats. So, the SPS was a party of Serbian nationalist bureaucrats and technocrats led by Milosevic. It had a membership of around 400,000-500,000 during the 1990s. (Allcock, Milivojevic, Horton, *Conflict In The Former Yugoslavia*, *op. cit.*, pp. 278-279)

⁵⁰⁹ Pavkovic, *op. cit.*, p. 119

⁵¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 118.

⁵¹¹ Allcock, Milivojevic, Horton, *Conflict In The Former Yugoslavia*, *op. cit.*, pp. 78-79.

– Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. According to him, this division would ensure Serb supremacy over large parts of Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia. Also, he was an extreme anti-Croat. He described Croats as “*degenerate, decayed and cowardly people who has not historical roots*”.⁵¹³

In the elections, the League of Communists – Movement for Yugoslavia (LCMY) supported the SPS. The LCMY was founded on 17 November 1990 by the last Defense Minister of Yugoslavia Veljko Kadijevic, former Defense Ministers Branko Mamula and Nikola Ljubicic, former Chief-of-Staff Stevan Mirkovic and Milosevic’s wife Mirjana Markovic. This party was dominated by nationalist Serbian senior officers and favored unified centralist Yugoslavia. It allied with Milosevic and supported the SPS. On the eve of the December election, Mirkovic had stated that Milosevic’s party was the only party to vote for in the forthcoming Serbian elections.⁵¹⁴ The seniors of the LCMY believed that the most dangerous threat for Yugoslavia was the Croatian and Slovenian nationalist and separatist forces. As a result, they supported Milosevic who has struggled for centralization of Yugoslavia.⁵¹⁵

The December 1990 elections and emergence of new Serbian parties show that, Milosevic and nationalism achieve absolute triumph in Serbia in 1990. Although Milosevic and his party, the SPS, became leader of Serbian nationalism, another influential nationalist figures and parties emerged at the beginning of 1990s. So, Serbian political life was determined by nationalist politicians and parties during the 1990s.

V. 2. iii. The Serbian Orthodox Church in the 1980s

Finally, we should emphasize that during 1980s the Serbian Orthodox Church (SOC) played an important role in the resurgence of Serbian nationalism. According to Slaven Letica, in the 1980s, the SOC functioned in the psychological preparation for the Serbian nationalist aggression and resurgence, by way of sermons and publicity work.⁵¹⁶

In May 1982, *Association of Orthodox Priests of Yugoslavia* declared that the SOC was an inalienable element of national identity, conscience and honor of the Serbian

⁵¹² Ibid., p. 268.

⁵¹³ Bora, *Yugoslavia: ...*, op. cit., p. 152.

⁵¹⁴ Bennett, op. cit., 133-134.

⁵¹⁵ Williams, op. cit., p. 79.

⁵¹⁶ Letica, op. cit., p. 104.

nation, and for this reason, it had a right to express opinion about matters of historic and contemporary importance to the Serbian nation.⁵¹⁷

This declaration was followed by a lot of the SOC's activities that aimed to improve religious and nationalist spirit among Serbian people. Such activities were welcomed by nationalist and liberal Serbian politicians and intellectuals. Between 1980-1990, the Serbian bureaucratic-technocratic ruling class whose ideological basis was nationalist liberalism cooperated with the SOC, and empowered it by granting some permissions that had been not granted by Tito's socialist regime.

In 1984, Serbian authorities allowed the SOC to resume construction of the monumental *Church of St. Sava* that had been started in the period of 1935-1941, but left unfinished. Another permission was granted in 1986 for reconstruction of the historic monastery of *Gradac* in central Serbia. It is more important that the ideological commission of the Serbian Socialist Youth Federation declared that young believers could enjoy full equality in the youth organization, even serving in leadership positions, and proposed to create a postgraduate program in religious studies at the Belgrade University.⁵¹⁸

The rapprochement between the State and the SOC was accelerated and strengthened by the Milosevic regime. It started a comprehensive church construction program including the construction of churches in areas that it had long been barred. Secondly, in December 1989, permission was granted for the *Pravoslavje*, a religious and political newspaper issued by the SOC, to be sold at public newsstands. Thirdly, in January 1990, Orthodox Christmas was publicly celebrated in Belgrade for the first time after the establishment of socialist regime. Also, in June 1990, the Milosevic government removed Marxism classics from school curricula and replaced them with religious instructions prepared by the SOC. In addition to these, Milosevic met with high-ranking the SOC's delegation in July 1990. After the meeting, nationalist liberal press praised the SOC for its service to the Serbian people. *Politika*, a nationalist Serbian newspaper issued in Belgrade, declared that the SOC was the spiritual basis for and the most essential

⁵¹⁷ Macfarlane, L. J., op. cit., p. 144.

⁵¹⁸ Ramet, op. cit., p. 111.

essential component of the national identity of Serbs.⁵¹⁹

As return to Milosevic regime's support, the SOC became a loyal supporter of the Milosevic regime and Serbian nationalism. For example, it participated in the Kosovo rally of Serb nationalism on 28 June 1989 by carried pictures of Serbian historical heroes and Milosevic. That is, the SOC took active place in Milosevic's nationalistic campaign against Kosovo. Secondly, the *Pravoslavje* and high-ranking clerics of the SOC frequently demanded the protection of the Serbs and Orthodox in Kosovo. Thirdly, the SOC denied 'existence of a Macedonian nation' and claimed that Macedonians are 'South Serbs'. Also, according to the SOC, the Macedonian Orthodox Church was established by the socialist regime in order to weaken the Serb nation.⁵²⁰ Moreover, the SOC alleged that the socialist regime cooperated with the Vatican and the Croatian Catholic Church in order to weaken the SOC and Serbian nation.⁵²¹

Finally, in 1989, high-ranking clerics from the SOC prepared and declared a manifesto to the Serbian public opinion. The manifesto called the Serbian state and church to strive for unification of Serbs within a single Serb State:

*"History once again asks the Serbian State and the Serbian Church to gather their people everywhere, both those within the country and those scattered throughout the world. History asks that the cause of this people's future be served by a final overcoming of all of our accursed divisions and migrations, by having us forgive one another and by seeking reconciliation among ourselves over the overplowed ambushes, fratricidal graves, and killing fields. All Serbs must know today: the higher interests of the Fatherland at this moment override all of our political, ideological, regional, and other divisions."*⁵²²

V. 3. Rise of Croatian Nationalism (1980-1990)

Like in Serbia, nationalism rose dramatically in Croatia in the 1980s. Croatian nationalism had two aims: (1) At first to transform the state structure from federalism to loose confederation and then to create an "Greater Croatia" that would involve Croatia,

⁵¹⁹ Ibid., pp. 112-113.

⁵²⁰ Ibid., p. 114.

⁵²¹ Pavkovic, op. cit., p. 89.

⁵²² Banac, op. cit., p. 149.

Bosnia-Herzegovina and coastline of Montenegro. (2) To destroy the system of socialist self-management and to reconstruct capitalism in Croatia through implementation of neo-liberal economic policies and integration into international capitalist relations. So, likewise Serbian nationalism, Croatian nationalism in the 1980s was a 'nationalist liberalism'.

Croatian nationalist liberalism had roots in the first Yugoslavia and the second World War. It advocated tradition of Radic's Croatian Peasant Party and Pavelic's Ustasha Movement, and viewed them as heroes of Croat nation. On the other hand, nationalist liberal Croats described Tito and Kardelj as enemies of Croat nation because according to Croatian nationalist liberalism, Tito and Kardelj founded the socialist self-management system in order to weaken Croatia and Croat nation.

Croatian nationalist liberalism regarded Serbs as the most dangerous enemy of Croat nation because they aimed to establish "Greater Serbia", occupy Croatia and destroy Croat nation. Furthermore, in the Croatian nationalist rhetoric, Serbs were either racially and culturally inferior or lapsed Croats who had betrayed the nation to foreign interests, by converting to Orthodox Christianity.

Croatian nationalist movement in the 1980s referred to the myth of the 'unbroken historical line of Croatian statehood', starting in the tenth century and including both Ustasha's Independent State of Croatia (1941-5) and the Republic of Croatia in the socialist Yugoslavia. The 'argument of the unbroken line of Croatian statehood' was used to support the demands for a sovereign Croatia in a confederal Yugoslavia or for creation of a "Greater Croatia". Also, Croat nationalist liberals viewed creation of a national armed forces as an essential aspect of national sovereignty. Hence, during the 1980s, they strove for creation a Croatian National Army that would not be depended on Yugoslav People's Army.⁵²³

Furthermore, the Croatian nationalist liberalism involved 'Catholicism'. For Croatian nationalist liberalism, Catholicism and the Croatian Catholic Church was unalienable feature and element of the Croat nation. So, Catholic faith and Croatian Church played an important role in Croatian nationalist movement in the 1980s.

⁵²³ Pavkovic, op. cit., p. 92

V. 3. i. The Death of the League of Communists of Croatia

Croatian nationalist liberalism obtained control in the League of Communists of Croatia (LCC) at the end of 1980s and removed it in 1990. There were two wings in the LCC: Titoist wing and nationalist liberal wing. Titoist wing led by Stipe Suvar was anti-nationalist, pro-Yugoslav and federalist. Titoist wing opposed confederalization or centralization of the country and creation of a "Greater Croatia" or "Greater Serbia". Thus, Titoist Croats conflicted with both Croatian and Serbian nationalism. It is more important that, they opposed economic reforms involving neo-liberal policies during the 1980s. That is, Titoist wing of the LCC opposed reconstruction of capitalism and supported the socialist self-management.

Titoist wing and Suvar was defeated by nationalist liberal wing led by Drago Dimitrovic and Ivica Racan at the 11th Congress of the LCC that convened in December 1989. At the end of the congress, the Humanitarian Declaration was accepted and issued. It involved proposals of the nationalist liberal wing. The declaration agreed to abandon the monopoly of the LCC and to introduce a multi-party system. Thus, Croatia became the first Yugoslav republic to abandon the one-party system and move toward multi-party system. Also, the declaration agreed to fight against the Milosevic regime in order to protect Croatian nation. The congress elected Drago Dimitrovic Secretary of the Presidency of the LCC.⁵²⁴ Also, the forty-year-old liberal Ivica Racan was elected President of the LCC.⁵²⁵

11th Congress of the LCC was followed by 14th Congress of the LCY that opened in Belgrade on 20 January 1990. Croatian and Slovenian delegates favored transformation of the LCY into a loose confederation of political parties, introduction of a multi-party system and confederalization of the country. Moreover, they asked that the name of the LCY should be changed and that the army should be depoliticized. However, these proposals were opposed and rejected bitterly by Serbian delegates led by Milosevic. Serbian delegates favored further centralization of both the LCY and the state. Milosevic addressed at the congress that "*a unified party is essential because we are for a unified*

⁵²⁴ Lukic & Lynch, op. cit., pp. 162-163.

⁵²⁵ Lampe, op. cit., p. 346.

Yugoslavia".⁵²⁶ Montenegrin delegates supported Serbian proposals, while Bosnian and Macedonian delegates tried to reconcile the two sides. On 23 January, Croatian and Slovenian delegates left the Congress. And then, the LCC was renamed as the Party of Democratic Change (PDC) under leadership of Ivica Račan.⁵²⁷ That is, in January 1990, Marxist LCC was replaced by liberal and nationalist PDC.

The LCY reconvened its 14th Congress in May 1990, but delegates from Croatia, Slovenia and Macedonia did not attend. Serbian, Montenegrin and Bosnian delegates drafted documents for the next session of the Congress, scheduled for September, but it never took place and the LCY became defunct. That is, in the words of John Williams, "*the Communist party of Yugoslavia, creator and sustainer of the second Yugoslav state, had self-destructed*" in May 1990.⁵²⁸

V. 3. ii. Foundation of Nationalist Liberal Parties in Croatia

In 1989 and 1990, new nationalist and liberal parties emerged in Croatia. The most important and influential party was Franjo Tuđman's Croatian Democratic Union (CDU). It was founded on 28 February 1989 under leadership of Tuđman. Although the greater majority of its founders were university educated, there was a significant number of tradesmen. These strata of self-employed entrepreneurs and tradesmen provided financial and organizational backbone to the party.

The CDU was supported by Croatian diaspora in Western Europe, America, Canada and Australia. These émigrés had fled Yugoslavia in two major waves, one after World War II and the other after Croatian Spring. Nationalist liberal Croat diaspora desired collapse of socialist regime, reconstruction of capitalism and creation of "Greater Croatia". They viewed Tuđman and his party as savior of Croat nation. Thus, Croat émigrés gave ideological and economic support to the CDU. In 1989 and 1990, the Croatian diaspora donated \$8.2 million for the CDU.⁵²⁹ Also, the Herzegovina Croats were strong supporters of the CDU since they saw it as protector of Herzegovina Croats. Thus, close relations were developed between the CDU and the Herzegovina Croats.⁵³⁰

⁵²⁶ Lukic & Lynch, op. cit., p. 165.

⁵²⁷ Allcock, Milivojevic, Horton (eds.), *Conflict In The Former Yugoslavia*, op. cit., p. 233.

⁵²⁸ Williams, op. cit., p. 84.

⁵²⁹ Allcock, Milivojevic, Horton (eds.), *Conflict In The Former Yugoslavia*, op. cit., p. 61.

⁵³⁰ Cviic, op. cit., p. 206.

The CDU's main target was to restructure Yugoslavia on the confederal basis and then to create "Greater Croatia" that would involve Croatia, Herzegovina and the coastline of Montenegro. The nationalist and liberal CDU aimed to destroy socialist self-management and to reconstruct capitalism through implementation of neo-liberal policies and integration of Croatia into international capitalist relation.

The CDU's campaign continuously emphasized the cultural difference between Croats and Serbs, and argued that this was why a unitary Yugoslavia could not work. Also, the CDU viewed Serbs as main danger for Croat nation, and argued that this was why an independent Croatia should be founded. While the party was declared open to Serbs and other nationalities, it emphasized that all other nationalities need to respect their common homeland – Croatia. The party claimed that for the Serbs in Croatia there is only one homeland – Croatia – and thus denied to them any territorial autonomy or the right to consider Yugoslavia as their homeland. So, according to the CDU, the Serbs in Croatia don't have rights of secession and self-determination. Any right of self-determination for Croatia's Serbs was regarded by the CDU as a cover for "Greater Serbian expansionism". The party declared that, in Croatia, only the Croat nation has the right of self-determination and the right to statehood.⁵³¹

Furthermore, propaganda campaign of the CDU based on anti-Serb sentiment that viewed Serbs as devil and despised Serbian nation and culture. According to the CDU, Croats were a European people, while Serbs were a barbarian Balkan people. Furthermore, Tudjman stressed that Croats were ready to struggle against Serbs in order to prevent foundation of "Greater Serbia" and to protect European civilization against barbarian Orthodox Serbs.⁵³² Also, in the 1990 election campaign, Tudjman said that "*I am doubly happy that my wife is neither a Serb nor a Jew*".⁵³³

Tudjman was not only leader of the CDU but also he became leader of Croatian nationalist liberalism during 1980s and 1990s. He was born in 1922 in Veliko Trgovišće in northern Croatia. Tudjman who joined the Partisans during the World War II remained in the YPA after the war, rising to the rank of major general in 1960, the youngest of the

⁵³¹ See Pavkovic, op. cit., p. 93-94, 110.

⁵³² Bora, *Yugoslavya: ...*, op. cit., p. 149.

⁵³³ Bennett, op. cit., p. 140.

generals. After retiring from the army in 1961, he began to work Croatian national history. He argued that the numbers of Serbs, Jews, and Gypsies killed by the Ustasha had been drastically inflated by the Titoist socialist regime. According to his calculation, only 30,000 – 35,000 of them had been killed by Ustasha. This number was only one-tenth of the number given in official estimates.⁵³⁴ According to Tudjman, Serbs inflated this number and exaggerate the Ustasha terror with aim of denigrating the Croat nation.⁵³⁵

Tudjman became involved in the Croatian Spring between 1967-71 and signed the 1967 Croatian Declaration. For this reason, he was expelled from the LCY and sentenced to two years prison in 1972. After his release, he continued to work national history of Croats and to opposed socialist regime. Moreover, during 1970s, he travelled abroad and made links with the Croat émigré communities that were nationalist liberals and anticommunist.

In February 1981, Tudjman was again sentenced to three years in prison and banned from all public activities for five years due to his nationalist attitudes against socialist regime. After his second release, he continued to claim that the Croatian people was politically, economically and culturally oppressed in the socialist Yugoslavia. Thus, he proposed foundation of an independent Croatian state in order to cease such oppression and to protect the Croat nation.

So, in the 1980s, Tudjman emerged as leader of the Croatian nationalist liberal movement for independence and dismemberment of Yugoslavia.⁵³⁶ “*Tudjman*” writes Bennett, “*was proud to call himself a Croat nationalist and . . . nationalism was for him a badge of courage*”.⁵³⁷ Also, Ann Lane emphasized that “*Tudjman’s nationalism was particularly odious because it resonated overtly with the fascism of the interwar period*”.⁵³⁸ The main slogan of this ‘odious nationalism’ was “*a Croatia for Croats only*”.⁵³⁹ So, Tudjman and his party, the CDU, played a very important role in the collapse

⁵³⁴ Allcock, Milivojevic, Horton (eds.), *Conflict In The Former Yugoslavia*, op. cit., p. 295.

⁵³⁵ Pavkovic, op. cit., p. 93.

⁵³⁶ Vuckovic, op. cit., p. 132.

⁵³⁷ Bennett, op. cit., p. 128.

⁵³⁸ Lane, *Yugoslavia: ...*, op. cit., p. 170.

⁵³⁹ Lampe, op. cit., p. 352.

of socialist self-management regime and in the disintegration of Yugoslavia.

Apart from the CDU, another nationalist and liberal parties emerged in 1989 and 1990. Croatian Party of Rights (CPR) was founded under leadership of Dobroslav Paraga in 1990. Paraga was a student leader during the Croatian Spring and jailed in the 1972 for his part in nationalist mass movements. Paraga's CPR drew on the traditions of Ante Starcevic's Party of Rights and Ante Pavelic's Ustasha Party.⁵⁴⁰ The CPR, which was extremely anticommunist and anti-Serb, desired foundation of "Greater Croatia". It insisted on the inclusion of Bosnia-Herzegovina and some parts of Serbia into Croatia.⁵⁴¹

The principle leaders of the Croatian Spring between 1967-71 did not join the Tadjman's CDU but formed their own parties in 1989 and 1990: the Croatian Social Liberal Party, the Croatian Democratic Party, the Croatian Peasants' Party, and the Social Democratic Party of Croatia. On 1 March 1990, together with four other parties, they formed an eight-party Coalition of National Accord (CNA). The CNA was led by Savka Dapcevic-Kucar who had been expelled from the LCY in 1971 owing to his nationalist attitudes and support for the Croatian Spring. On the other hand, the CDU formed the six-party Croatian Democratic Bloc (CDB) led by Tadjman. Also, new Istrian and Dalmatian regional parties were formed.

Except of these Croatian parties, on 17 February 1990, the Croatia's Serbs founded their own party: the Serbian Democratic Party (SDP). The SDP led by Jovan Raskovic become political representative of the Krajina Serbs and improved close relations with Milosevic and Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic.⁵⁴²

V. 3. iii. The Croatian Catholic Church in the 1980s

All of these newly founded parties were highly responsible for rise of nationalism in Croatia. Croatian parties fed Croatian nationalism, while the SDP increased nationalist and militarist sentiment of the Krajina Serbs. Apart from political parties, Croat Catholic Church (CCC) also played a very influential role in resurgence of Croatian nationalism in this period.

During 1980s, the CCC had five main complaints and demands about the Church-

⁵⁴⁰ See Allcock, Milivojevic, Horton (eds.), *Conflict In The Former Yugoslavia*, op. cit., pp. 62, 206-207.

⁵⁴¹ Zametica, op. cit., p. 19.

⁵⁴² See Pavkovic, op. cit., p. 111 and Bennett, op. cit., pp. 123, 126.

State relations: First, the CCC demanded removal of Marxism in the school curricula and introduction of a religious education in the school curriculum. Second, the CCC criticized expulsions of believers from the LCY and official posts. In 1987, Cardinal Kuharic raised this issue in an interview with the Catholic journal *Veritas*, adding that believers were excluded from high posts in various sectors of public life. Third, the CCC repeatedly accused the socialist regime for violating human rights. Catholic clerics repeatedly claimed that the Titoist regime violated civil, national and human rights of Croat believers. Fourth, according to the CCC, the socialist regime tried to annihilate Catholicism and to create an atheist Croat community. Croatian clerics demanded to stop this policy since they declared that Catholicism is unalienable feature of Croatian nation. Fifth, the CCC supported multi-party system and parliamentary democracy and opposed political monopoly of the LCY. In spring 1990, both the Catholic bishops of Zagreb and Ljubljana issued a statement supporting multi-party democracy.⁵⁴³

The CCC on the political sphere supported the Tudjman's CDU. Close relations and cooperation were established between the CCC and the CDU against the Orthodox Serbs. The CDU regarded the CCC and Catholicism as a historical constituent of the Croat nation and culture.⁵⁴⁴

Also, in the 1980s, the Croatian Catholic journals became very effective over Croatian public opinion and backed rise of Croatian nationalism. After the Tito's death, the Croatian Catholic journals began to criticize the Titoist regime and to praise Pavelic's Ustasha Movement, Radic's Croatian Peasant Party and Cardinal Stepinac.

In this period, the most important and influential journal of the Croatian Catholicism was *Glas Koncila*. *Glas Koncila* continuously issued articles which criticized Titoist regime and communism. For example, on June 1987, *Glas Koncila*, which repeatedly sublimated Catholicism and Croatian nationalism, called communism 'one of the most reactionary ideologies of the century'.⁵⁴⁵

Therefore, the CCC fed Croatian nationalism through spreading nationalistic and

⁵⁴³ See Ramet, op. cit., pp. 91-94 and Macfarlane, L. J., op. cit., pp. 143-144.

⁵⁴⁴ See Bora, *Yugoslavya: ...*, op. cit., pp. 148-149.

⁵⁴⁵ Ramet, Sabrina P., "The Role of the Press in Yugoslavia", in Allcock, Horton, Milivojevic (eds.), *Yugoslavia in Transition: ...*, op. cit., p. 436.

religious ideas and sentiments over the Croatian public opinion. Thus, it became an important element of the rise of Croatian nationalism in the 1980s.

V. 3. iv. Foundation of the Tadjman Regime

In Croatia, the first multi-party election were held in April-May 1990. The CDB led by Tadjman's CDU secured 205 of the 386 seats in the Croatian Assembly. Racan's PDC secured 101 seats. The CNA led by Dapcevic-Kucar won 15 per cent of the votes and 4 per cent of the seats. Also, Raskovic's SDP won 5 seats. On 30 May, the CDU-dominated Croatian Diet elected Tadjman Croatia's first post-communist President.⁵⁴⁶

Soon thereafter the elections, great number of supporters and cadres of the PDC and the CNA joined the CDU. So, the CDU become dominant party and minimized all other political forces in Croatia except for the SDP in its Serb-populated Krajina and the regional party in Istria. Furthermore, Tadjman placed supporters and cadres of the CDU in almost all key position in most Croatian institutions including media and university. Especially, he launched a bitter campaign against opponent newspapers, weeklies, journalist and intellectuals. Newspapers and journals which opposed him were closed. Also, anti-nationalist, social democrat and communist academicians were defined as 'suspicious Croats' and dismissed from Zagreb University by the Tadjman regime.⁵⁴⁷ That is, the opposition was purged from the key positions and replaced by Tadjman's men. Hence, the CDU and Tadjman achieved enough power to attract, control and orientate the Croatian public opinion.

The Tadjman government prepared a nationalist liberal program. This program involved five main policies: (1) Reconstruction of capitalism, destruction of the socialist self-management system and integration of the economy into international capitalist relations through implementation of neo-liberal economic policies. (2) Purge of the Croatia's Serbs and opposition from governmental, managerial and media positions. (3) Formation of Croatia's national army. (4) Adoption of a new constitution based on nationalism and liberalism. (5) As a ultimate aim, creation of "Greater Croatia".

In July, the Croatian Assembly dominated by the Tadjman's CDU began to introduce

⁵⁴⁶ See for the elections Pavkovic, *op. cit.*, pp. 111-112 and Bennett, *op. cit.*, pp. 127-128.

⁵⁴⁷ See Woodward, *op. cit.*, pp. 231-232.

a series of constitutional amendments. The amendments enshrined the Croat literary language as the official language in Croatia. Furthermore, the Tudjman regime launched 'Language Purification Program' in order to remove Serbian words from Croatian language and to create a pure Croatian language. Also, the amendments removed the requirement for a two-thirds majority vote in the Croatian Assembly on issues relating to national relations within Croatia. This requirement had been adopted by the 1974 Constitution.

In addition to these, the July 1990 Amendments, in order to abolish communist and Titoist tradition, removed symbols of the socialist regime and the Partisan Movement through adopting new national emblems that resembled the ones used by the Ustasha State between 1941-45. The CDU party flag, which had been based on traditional Croatian designs including the red and white chess board, became the official flag of the Republic of Croatia. Also, street and square names that had been adopted by the socialist regime were changed. For example, Victims of Fascism Square (*Trg Zrtava Fasizma*) was changed to Croat Heroes Square (*Trg Hrvatskih Velikana*).⁵⁴⁸ Also, 'Tito Square' was converted to 'Jelacic Square'. Jelacic had been famous ban of the Croatia in the Habsburg Empire in 19th century.⁵⁴⁹

According to Tudjman, the July amendments made Croatia a politically and economically sovereign state.⁵⁵⁰ These amendments were followed by a new constitution. The new constitution of the Republic of Croatia was accepted in the Croatian Assembly on 22 December 1990. The 1990 Constitution was directed at the establishment of a Croat nation-state. In his speech to the Croatian Assembly at the time of the promulgation of the new constitution, Tudjman explained that the new constitution was a confirmation of the national sovereignty of the Croat nation. Also, he declared that the ultimate aim of the Croat nation was to achieve as soon as possible full and internationally recognized state sovereignty for the Republic of Croatia.⁵⁵¹

The new constitution referred to the historical foundation of Croatian nation and

⁵⁴⁸ Julliard, op. cit., p. 62.

⁵⁴⁹ Bora, *Yugoslavya: ...*, op. cit., p. 148.

⁵⁵⁰ Radan, Peter, *The Break-up of Yugoslavia and International Law*, London: Routledge, 2002, p. 175.

⁵⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 176

statehood emphasizing that the Croatian nation had historical right to full sovereignty. According to the new Constitution, historical foundation of Croatian nation and statehood involves 12 main historical experiences. The Kingdom of Croats in the tenth century, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, the establishment of Banovina of Croatia in 1939, and the Republic of Croatia in the Socialist Yugoslavia were some of the 12 experiences. The new constitution aimed to legalize the 'right of Croat nation for foundation of an independent Croatian State' by referring such historical experiences and turningpoints.⁵⁵²

The first article of the new constitution described the Republic of Croatia as "*a united and indivisible democratic and social state.*"⁵⁵³ It did not offer autonomy to the ethnic groups that have lived within the Republic of Croatia. Also, rights of self-determination and secession for the minorities in Croatia were not recognized: "*The Republic of Croatia is established as the national state of the Croat nation and a state of members of other nations and minorities who are citizens: Serbs, Muslims (Bosniaks), Slovenes, Czechs, Slovaks, Italians, Hungarians, Jews and others.*"⁵⁵⁴

This provision was a significant departure from the 1974 Constitution which stipulated that Croats and the Croatia's Serbs were constituent nations of the Socialist Republic of Croatia and equal in status. The 1990 Croatian Constitution relegated the Serbs of Croatia, who accounted for 12.2 percent of the population of Croatia according to the 1991 census⁵⁵⁵, to the status of a minority from the status of constituent nation in Croatia. The important consequence of this change in status of the Croatia's Serbs was that they as a minority had no right to self-determination and secession. In the 1990 Constitution of Croatia, only the Croat nation had right to self-determination and secession.

On the other hand, Article 6 stated that "*the work of any political party which by its program or activity violently endangers the democratic constitutional order, independence, unity or territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia shall be*

⁵⁵² See for the 12 historical experiences Vuckovic, op. cit., pp. 136-137.

⁵⁵³ Letica, op. cit., p. 110.

⁵⁵⁴ Radan, op. cit., p. 157.

⁵⁵⁵ According to the 1991 census, Croatia had a population of 4,365,000. Croats formed 77,9 percent and Serbs 12,2 percent of the population. (Samary, op. cit., p. 173.)

prohibited'.⁵⁵⁶ So, the 1990 Constitution, which denied rights of self-determination, secession and autonomy for minorities, established a basis for coercion and imprisonment of anyone who dare to challenge this unitary concept.

Also, Article 2 and Article 140 formed constitutional basis for secession of Croatia from Yugoslavia and foundation of an independent Croatian state. Article 2 stated that "*The Republic of Croatia can either enter into, or secede from, union with other states. In this case the republic of Croatia has the sovereign right to decide the amount of power to be relinquished*". And Article 140 emphasized that "*Croatia remains a part of Yugoslavia until a new agreement among the republics, or until the Croatian Parliament decides otherwise*".⁵⁵⁷

On the other hand, Tudjman and his party prepared a 'draft of the Treaty of the Yugoslav Confederation – the Alliance of South Slavic States'. This draft was presented to the Collective Presidency of SFRY on 5 October 1990. The draft consisted of following items: principles and mutual guarantees; membership; jurisdictions; institutions; defense systems; financing; foreign affairs.

The draft proceeded from the premises that the confederation would be an alliance of liberal states and be based on the principle of self-determination of the constituent units, including the right of secession and accession to other political entities. It aimed for the establishment of a single Yugoslav market but provided for separate armed forces for each of the units of the confederation. The draft envisaged a consultative Confederal Parliament, a Council of Ministers, an Executive Commission, and a Confederal Court at the confederal level. Confederal economic bodies would be located throughout the confederation and financing for the confederal budget would be determined by a combination of three factors: per capita national income (40 per cent), the size of state territory (30 per cent) and population (30 per cent). International treaties would be subject to ratification by the member states.

The Croatian draft, that aimed to restructure the country on the confederal basis,

⁵⁵⁶ Vuckovic, op. cit., p. 138.

⁵⁵⁷ Lukic & Lynch, op. cit., p. 168.

was accepted by Slovenia, while it was bitterly criticized and rejected by Serbian and Montenegrin sides. Serbian nationalism led by Milosevic regarded it as destruction of Yugoslavia and Croatian conspiracy against the Serb nation. Milosevic responded the Croatian draft with another draft. The Serbian draft that envisaged centralization of economic and political structure was rejected by Croatian and Slovenian governments. Although Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia tried to reconcile the two drafts, negotiations could not produce any compromise or agreement.⁵⁵⁸

V. 3. v. The Serbs of Croatia and the Krajina Issue

Krajina, meaning 'borderland', refers to the historical *Vojna Krajina*, Austria – Hungary's military border to the Ottoman Empire. These Croatian lands were administered from Vienna. Many Serbs from Serbia settled in *Krajina*, where they were given land by the imperial Austrian Army in return for military border duties. The Krajina Serbs formed an army against the Ottoman Empire. This frontier army involved Serbs who had fled the Ottoman subjugation of Serbia and fought as a permanent defensive barrier against Ottoman expansion. In return, the Krajina Serbs enjoyed economic, political and social autonomy within the Habsburg Empire. This military border was disarmed in 1873 and legally disbanded in 1881.⁵⁵⁹

In the second Yugoslavia, Krajina remained within the Socialist Republic of Croatia. The most important districts of Krajina are Knin, Donji Lapac, Obrovac, Benkovac, Gracac, Titova Koronika, Dvor and Vojnic. According to the 1991 census, the entire population of Krajina was 117,000, of whom 90,000 or 77 percent were Serbs. The biggest district of this region was Kinin with 42,000 population, of whom about 90 percent were Serbs.⁵⁶⁰

The political leader of the Krajina Serbs was the Serbian Democratic Party (SDP) that was founded by Jovan Raskovic, Milan Babic and Jovan Opacic on 17 February 1990. The SDP and the Krajina Serbs regarded Tudjman's CDU as resurgence of the Ustasha Movement and tradition. Also, this idea was common in Serbia. The Milosevic regime, nationalist Belgrade media and nationalist Serbian intellectuals viewed Tudjman

⁵⁵⁸ See *ibid.*, pp. 169-172.

⁵⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 151 and Silber & Little, *op. cit.*, pp. 93-94.

⁵⁶⁰ Bennett, *op. cit.*, pp. 134-135.

and the CDU as the Ustasha remnant. Also, the close relations and cooperation between the CDU and the Croatian nationalist diaspora frightened the Serb side. This fear peaked in May 1990 when the CDU achieved great victory in the elections and established government. Especially, reintroduction of the Croatian flag and the ancient coat of arms, that had been used by the Ustasha State between 1941-45, annoyed and worried the Serbian community in Croatia.⁵⁶¹

On the other hand, for the Croatian nationalist liberalism led by the Tudjman regime, the Krajina Serbs was the most serious problem due the two reasons. Firstly, they believed that the Krajina Serbs were a part of the Serb conspiracy led by the Milosevic regime that aimed to create "Greater Serbia". Therefore, according to the Croatian nationalist liberalism, the Krajina Serbs threatened sovereignty of Croatian nation and Croatian unity. Secondly, Krajina is very important region for the Croat economy since it forms the hinterland of Croatia's prosperous Adriatic coast, with which it had traded and intermarried for centuries. Especially, the Croat economy needed Knin as it was the vital rail and road junction connecting Zagreb to the southern coast. Because of these two reason, in the 1980s, the first issue of Croatian nationalist liberalism was the "Krajina Issue", and the Tudjman government aimed to exterminate this issue.

After the elections of April-May 1990, Croatian President Tudjman and the SDP's President Raskovic met. Tudjman offered jobs in the coalition government to the SDP. Raskovic asked the Serbs to be defined as a constituent nation in the new Croatian, along with the Croats, that is, the Serbs should not be reduced to the status of a national minority. Raskovic's demands were not accepted by Tudjman because he aimed to create a sovereign and unitary Croatian nation-state. Also, Tudjman regarded this demand as a part of Serbian expansionist policy conducted by Belgrade, and saw Raskovic as agent of Milosevic. Consequently, the SDA and the CDU did not come to understanding and the SDP did not enter the new coalition government led by Tudjman.⁵⁶²

In the same month, Babic, the second man in the SDP and Mayor of Knin, established the Association of Serbian Municipalities (ASM) in Krajina. By mid-summer,

⁵⁶¹ Zametica, op. cit., p. 17.

⁵⁶² Silber & Little, op. cit., p. 96.

the ASM had involved the municipalities of Knin, Obrovac, Dvor, Vojnic and Donji Lapac.⁵⁶³

In June 1990, the SDP organized a rally of 10,000 people in Petrinja, a town in south of Zagreb, whose population was half Croat, half Serb. Raskovic, the president of the SDP, addressed to the crowd:

*"The Serbs respected the Croatian people's right to their sovereign state, but they demanded in that state an equal position for the Serbian and other peoples. The Serbs do not want a second state in Croatia, but they demand autonomy... The Serbian people in Croatia should be allowed to speak their language, to write their script, to have their schools, to have their education programs, their publishing houses, and their newspapers."*⁵⁶⁴

One month later, the Assembly of the ASM convened on 25 July. In the Assembly, Babic addressed that *"we wanted the self-governing region which we founded through the association of municipalities to transform itself into an autonomous region to preserve the Serbs' sovereign national rights"*⁵⁶⁵

The Assembly of ASM formed the 'Serb National Council (SNC)' as the representative body of Croatia's Serbs and endorsed a 'Declaration of Sovereignty and Autonomy of the Serb People'. The Declaration asserted the right to Croatia's Serbs to self-determination, including the right of secession, based upon the status of Serbs as a constituent nation within Croatia, with rights to sovereignty equal to that of the Croats. On the basis of this sovereignty, the Declaration demanded autonomy for the Serbs of Croatia.⁵⁶⁶

On the other hand, in the same month, Knin police inspector Milan Martić declared that he and his officers would refuse to wear the uniforms of the Croatian police. Although, Tudjman sent three representatives (the Croatian Interior Minister Josip Boljkovac, his deputy Perica Juric and the Commander of Sibenik Police Ante Bujas) to meet Martić and to solve this issue, the negotiations could not produce any result.⁵⁶⁷

⁵⁶³ Ibid., p. 97

⁵⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 95.

⁵⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 98.

⁵⁶⁶ Radan, op. cit., p. 178.

⁵⁶⁷ See Silber & Little, op. cit., pp. 98-99

On 12 August, in order to discuss the "Krajina Issue", Babic met Borisav Jovic, representative of Serbia on the Collective Presidency, and the Federal Interior Minister Petar Gracanin in Belgrade. Babic asked them four guarantees: first, that the new Croatian flag would never fly above Knin; second that Croatian police should not be allowed into Knin, and third that Serb policemen in Croatia should never be forced to wear Croatian uniforms. These demands were supported by Jovic and Gracanin who collaborated with Milosevic. One day later, on 13 August, Gracanin rebuked Tudjman's Interior Minister Boljkovac and warned him not to try to wrest control of Knin police station and impose a new force.

As a response, Tudjman ordered to impose police forces into Knin. This order was implemented by Boljkovac. On 17 August, Boljkovac sent seven columns of armored police vehicles in order to wrest control of Knin. Also, three helicopters from Zagreb were sent to Knin. However, the Chief of Staff of the YPA sent jets and intercepted the helicopters. Moreover, the Chief of Staff ordered the Croatian police forces to withdraw from Knin. In the same day, the Assembly of ASM declared 'state of war' and the Knin police distributed weapons to the Knin Serbs. The cooperation of the SDP-the Milosevic government-the YPA became successful and forced the Croatian armored columns to withdraw from Knin.⁵⁶⁸

'The 17 August' was described as 'the Serb Rebellion' by the Croatian nationalist liberalism, and as 'the Knin Revolution' by the Serbian nationalist liberalism. However, in fact, 'the 17 August' was a rehearsal for the bloody Yugoslav wars of the 1990s.

After 'the 17 August', the SNC organized a plebiscite which was held between 19 August and 2 September. Of 756,781 votes, 756,549 were in favor of Serb autonomy within Croatia. On 30 September, the SNC issued 'Declaration of Serb Autonomy'. It claimed Serb autonomy over Croatian territory where Serbs lived or which was historically Serb.⁵⁶⁹

Following month, in October, the YPA took decision to disarm the Territorial Defense Forces of Croatia. All Croatian Territorial Defense Forces had been disarmed by

⁵⁶⁸ See *ibid.*, pp. 100-102.

⁵⁶⁹ Radan, *op. cit.*, p. 178.

the end of October 1990. As a response, Tudjman and Martin Spegelj, the Defense Minister of Croatia, launched an armament program in order to establish the 'Croatian National Guards'. Hence, since October 1990, the Tudjman regime began to buy weapons from abroad. This armament program was funded greatly by the Croatian nationalist-liberal diaspora.⁵⁷⁰

On the other hand, the moderate Raskovic was replaced by the more militant Babic in October 1990, and Babic, who aimed the secession of Serb majority areas from Croatia, became the President of the SDP.

The SNC led by Babic's SDP proclaimed the formation of the 'Serb Autonomous District of Krajina (SAD Krajina)' on 22 December 1990, when the Croatian Assembly adopted the new Croatian Constitution that reduced the status of the Croatia's Serbs to minority from the status of constituent nation and that abolished the rights of self-determination and secession for the Serbs. Soon thereafter, the 'Serb Autonomous Districts of Eastern Slavonija, Baranja and Western Srem (SAD Eastern Slavonija)' and the 'Serb Autonomous District of Western Slavonija (SAD Western Slavonija)' were formed.⁵⁷¹

V. 4. War In Croatia and Foundation of the Independent Croatian State (1991-1995)

V. 4. i. Secession of Croatia and Foundation of the Republic of Serb Krajina

Croatian Assembly passed a resolution (Croatian Resolution on Acceptance of the Process of Disunion) on 21 February 1991 endorsing the process of the disassociation of Yugoslavia. This resolution based on the inalienable and inalienable right of the Croat nation to self-determination, including the right of secession and association with other nations and states.

Although the Croatia's disassociation resolution was declared unconstitutional by the Yugoslav Constitutional Court, an independence plebiscite was held on 19 May 1991 in which 93 percent of those voting supported the creation of a sovereign and independent Croatia. This plebiscite was protested by the SADs of Krajina, Eastern Slavonija and

⁵⁷⁰ See Silber & Little, *op. cit.*, pp. 107-109.

⁵⁷¹ Radan, *op. cit.*, p. 179.

Western Slavonija.

On 25 June 1991, the Croatian Assembly passed a Constitutional Decision (Constitutional Decision on the Sovereignty and Independence of the Republic of Croatia) and a Declaration (Declaration on the Establishment of the Sovereign and Independent Republic of Croatia). In the Constitutional Decision, Croatia's independence was based upon the inalienable, unconsumable, indivisible and untransferable right of the Croatian nation to self-determination, including the right of disassociation. The Declaration based upon the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution which granted to the Republic of Croatia the right to self-determination including secession. Both the Constitutional Decision and the Declaration referred to Croatia's international borders being existing republic borders and those parts of Yugoslavia's international borders relevant to Croatia.

The Declaration also emphasized that Croatian claims to independence derived from an unbroken historical process of Croatian statehood. That is, the Croatian Assembly claimed that the declaration of independence and establishment of independent Croatian State was a natural and necessary part and product of the historical process of Croatian statehood.

Both Constitutional Decision and the Declaration of Independence were declared unconstitutional and void by the Yugoslavia's Constitutional Court in October 1991 and November 1991 respectively.⁵⁷²

The declaration of independence of Croatian State was not welcomed friendly by the Croatia's Serbs. They rejected the secession of Croatia and responded it by foundation of the 'Republic of Serb Krajina':

In the wake of the Croatian Assembly resolution of 21 February 1991, endorsing Croatia's disassociation from Yugoslavia, the SAD Krajina passed a resolution on the disassociation of SAD Krajina on 28 February 1991. The Krajina resolution was justified on the basis of the internationally recognized right of people to self-determination as well as provisions in the 1974 Constitution of Yugoslavia granted the equality of all the Yugoslav nations. Also, this resolution stressed that SAD Krajina wished to remain in Yugoslavia and the Croatian Assembly had not right to separate the Krajina Serbs from

⁵⁷² See for more details *ibid.*, pp. 176-177 and Vuckovic, *op. cit.*, pp. 138-140

Yugoslavia.

The resolution was formalized on 18 March 1991 by a decision of the SAD Krajina to separate from Croatia and remain within Yugoslavia. On 12 May 1991, a plebiscite was held and the Krajina Serbs voted in favor of the SAD Krajina remaining in Yugoslavia. On 30 April 1991, the SAD Krajina Assembly was constituted and Babic was elected President of the SAD Krajina.

Finally, on 19 December 1991, the three Serbian autonomous districts in Croatia merged and declared their own independent state under the name of the 'Republic of Serb Krajina (RSK)'. The RSK Constitution adopted by the RSK Assembly described the RSK as a nation-state of the Serb nation and the state of all citizens living in Krajina. The Constitution and the RSK based on the right to self-determination of the Serb nation in Croatia.⁵⁷³

The RSK established its own army: the Serb Army of Krajina (SAK). The SAK, which cooperated with the YPA and the Serb paramilitary groups, played an influential role in the Serbo-Croat War in Croatia and in the Bosnian War between 1991 and 1995. The SAK was commanded by Milan Martić, the Interior Minister between 1991-1994 and the President between 1994-1995 of the RSK.

The SAK consisted of between 40,000 and 50,000 troops which were commanded by six corps headquarters in northern Dalmatia, Lika, Kordun, Banija, Western Slavonija and Baranja. The SAK was subdivided into 27 infantry brigades, 3 mechanized brigades, 1 artillery brigade, 1 antitank regiment and 1 special force brigade. Its equipment consisted of around 240 tanks, 100 armored personnel carriers, 500 pieces of artillery, a number of surface-to-surface missiles, antitank and anti-aircraft missiles, 50 air defense guns, 12 combat aircraft and 5 armed helicopters. The SAK highly depended on Serbia for military materials, fuel, finance and skilled personnel.⁵⁷⁴

V. 4. ii. The Serbo-Croat War in Croatia

The Yugoslav wars of the 1990s did not begin in Croatia but in Slovenia. The Yugoslav People's Army (YPA) attacked on Slovenia on 27 June 1991 soon thereafter

⁵⁷³ See Radan, *op. cit.*, pp. 179-180.

⁵⁷⁴ Allcock, Milivojevic, Horton (eds.), *Conflict In The Former Yugoslavia*, *op. cit.*, p. 262.

the Slovene declaration of independence and secession on 25 June. The Slovene War, that continued only ten days, was terminated by the Brioni Accord on 7 July and the YPA withdrew from Slovenia. In the Brioni Accord, a three-month moratorium on independence was agreed. When this time ran out, Slovenia declared independence on 8 October and adopted its own constitution. On 15 January 1992, the European Community recognized Slovenia, which joined the United Nations in May 1992⁵⁷⁵

The war in Slovenia was short since the homogeneous character of the country made the war that ensued a war between the YPA and Slovenians, rather than a war between different ethnic groups. Also, the Serbian nationalism's project of "Greater Serbia" did not involve Slovenia as there was not an important Serb population.⁵⁷⁶

Because of these two reasons, the Slovene War was short and casualties were relatively light on both sides. Only a dozen members of the Slovenian army were killed and 144 were wounded; the equivalent figure for the YPA were 37 killed and 163 wounded.⁵⁷⁷

However, the Serbo-Croat War in Croatia was longer and more bloody due to fact that Croatia includes a significant Serb population that in 1991 formed 12.2 percent of the Croatia's population and about half of the Croat territory was envisaged by the Serbian nationalism within "Greater Serbia". The war in Croatia began openly in July 1991 when the Serb-dominated YPA⁵⁷⁸ attacked on Croatia although fights between

⁵⁷⁵ See for more details Grizold, Anton, "The Defense of Slovenia", in Danica Fink-Hafner & John R. Robbins (eds.), *Making a New Nation: The Formation of Slovenia*, Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1997, pp. 46-55 ; Bucar, Bojko, "The International Recognition of Slovenia", in Fink-Hafner & Robbins (eds.), op. cit., pp. 31-45 and Bora, *Yugoslavya: ...*, op. cit., pp. 187-197.

⁵⁷⁶ According to the 1991 census, Slovenia had a population of 1,963,000. Slovenes constituted 87,6 percent of the population; Croats 2,7 percent; Serbs 2,5 percent; Bosniaks 1,4 percent and other nationalities 5,9 percent (Samary, op. cit., p. 174).

⁵⁷⁷ Vuckovic, op. cit., p. 140.

⁵⁷⁸ In 1990, 54.3 percent of the YPA officers were Serbs; 12.5 percent were Croats; 7.3 percent were Macedonians; 5.3 percent were Montenegrins; 5.2 percent were Bosniaks; 2.3 percent Slovenes; 1.5 were Albanians ; 1.0 were Hungarians and 1.4 were other nationalities. Also, 9.6 percent of the officers defined themselves as 'Yugoslav' (Cohen, op. cit., p. 182).

Furthermore, in 1990, the command structure of the YPA's north-western theatre whose headquarter was in Zagreb contained no Croats and, except two commanders (Andrija Raseta and Marijan Cad), not one person who was born in Croatia or Slovenia (Spegelj, op. cit., pp. 21-22).

The General Staff of the YPA issued in mid-July a secret order granting volunteers full status as members of the armed forces. Those volunteers were only extreme Serbian nationalists and paramilitaries. Admission of these Serb paramilitaries in the YPA increased power of Serbs within the army (Vasic, op. cit., p. 128). Also, on the eve of the war, many Croat, Slovene and other non-Serb

Croat army, police and the Croatia's Serb militia groups had emerged in March 1991.

The Serbo-Croat War in Croatia involved two sides: Croatia led by the Tudjman regime on the one side and the nationalist Serb Alliance (the Milosevic regime, the YPA, the RSK and the Serb paramilitary groups coming from Serbia and Montenegro⁵⁷⁹) on the other side.

Although Milosevic continuously declared that the Serbian Republic and government was not side in the Croatian war, the Milosevic regime, in fact, was the main actor of the war. On 16 March 1991, Milosevic boasted, as leader of the Serbian nationalist liberalism, that *"If we (Serbs) have to fight, well then we will fight. But I hope they (Croats) are not going to be crazy enough to fight with us. For If we don't know how to work and produce well, at least we will know how to fight well"*.⁵⁸⁰

In order to fight, Milosevic improved close relations and cooperation with the Serb-dominated YPA, the RSK and the Serb militiamen, and established a nationalist Serb Alliance. During the war, the Serb Alliance, in order to justify their military action against Croatia, claimed that they tried to protect the union of Yugoslavia and the Serb minority in Croatia.⁵⁸¹

In January 1991, Federal Defense Minister General Veljko Kadijevic accused Tudjman for rekindling the fires of 1941, fascism and genocide against the Serbs, and launched a blistering attack on the Tudjman regime threatening to use force to disarm Croatia's police and destroy the Tudjman regime:

conscripts of the YPA had been sent to Serbia and Montenegro, and many Serb and Montenegrin conscripts had been sent to Croatia (Cviic, op. cit., p. 208).

On the other hand, between July 1991 and January 1992, more than 80 percent of Croat officers left the YPA for the Croatian Army and fought against the YPA. It is more important that about 9,000 Serbs who were born in Croatia took place within the Croatian Army and defended Croatia against the YPA offense (Tus, Anton, "The War in Slovenia and Croatia up to the Sarajevo Cease-fire", in Magas & Zanic (eds.), op. cit., p. 49)

⁵⁷⁹ The most important Serb paramilitary group in Croatia was Dragan Vasiklovic (known as Captain Dragan)'s forces. Vasiklovic, who was a Serbian émigré in Australia, had served the Australian Army as a legion before the war. Also, there were other paramilitary groups: Vojislav Seselj's *Chetniks* and Zeljko Raznjatovic (known as Captain Arkan)'s *Tigers*, *the Yellow Ants* and *the White Eagles*. These paramilitary groups were trained, equipped and financed by the YPA, the SAK and the Milosevic government. (Bora, *Yugoslavya: ...*, op. cit., pp. 170-171).

⁵⁸⁰ Cohen, Lenard J., "The Disintegration of Yugoslavia", *Current History*, November 1992, p. 370 and Stanicic, Mladen, "Problems and Prospects For Croatia", in Özdoğan & Saybaşılı (eds.), op. cit., p. 171.

⁵⁸¹ Mesic, op. cit., p. 7.

*“The biggest danger for the country’s integrity and security comes from the intensive work towards setting up purely national armies. They (the Tadjman regime) are driving the country further towards the abyss of a fratricidal war. Yugoslavia cannot and will not become another Lebanon. All armed formations set up outside the army (the YPA) will be disarmed. Those responsible for setting them up will be held accountable before the law. Since, under the law and constitution, this come under the competence of the armed forces, there will be no negotiations or compromise. Those who try to oppose the army by force will be thwarted by force”.*⁵⁸²

Also, before the outbreak of the war, commanding officers of the YPA prepared a document, titled *“Information about the Situation in the World and in Yugoslavia and about the Imminent Tasks of the Yugoslav Army”* which was signed by the Central Political Commissariat of the YPA. This document, that was published in *Vjesnik* on 31 January 1991, stressed the USA and the Western Europe tried to destroy communism and the socialist societies including Yugoslavia. The imperialist Western states used the concept of democracy as a demagoguery and ideological tool in order to slander communism and the Socialist Yugoslavia. Also, the document emphasized that there was a close cooperation between the imperialist powers and domestic anticommunist/anti-Yugoslav political elements that aimed to destroy the Socialist Yugoslavia. Hence, according to the document, the main task of the YPA and its commanding officers, as leading political factors of the Socialist Yugoslavia, was to fight against this counter revolution that was planned and conducted by the alliance of imperialism and traitors (the domestic anticommunist and anti-Yugoslav political elements).⁵⁸³

So, during the Yugoslav wars in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia, Milosevic and the YPA’s commanding officers such as Veljko Kadijevic described the Slovene, Croat and Bosniak sides as ‘traitors’ who collaborated with the imperialist powers in order to destroy the socialist Yugoslavia. Also, Milosevic and the YPA claimed that they struggled against ‘the traitors’ in order to ‘protect socialism and Yugoslavia’.

It is true that the imperialist powers aimed to destroy the socialist regimes including

⁵⁸² Silber & Little, op. cit., p. 109.

⁵⁸³ See for this document Letica, op. cit., pp. 105-107.

the Yugoslav socialism with aim of creating new and profitable markets for their capitals, and also it is true that the Slovene, Croat and Bosniak sides of the wars were anticommunist who aimed to destroy the system of socialist self-management and to reconstruct capitalism. However, the Milosevic-YPA alliance's claim was a transparent demagogy and lie since they did not strive for protection of the socialist regime and the Yugoslav union but for foundation of "Greater Serbia". *"The real objective was to create an ethnically pure Greater Serbia"*⁵⁸⁴, and for this purpose, the nationalist Serbian Alliance *"pursued their brutal policy of 'ethnic cleansing' of the non-Serbs"*.⁵⁸⁵

The war plan for the attack on Croatia was prepared and implemented by the YPA high command led by Federal Defense Minister General Kadijevic and Serbian President Milosevic. This plan involved three tactics: (1) The YPA forces were placed in all the garrisons in Croatia in order to form a deep incursion into the Croat rear and to support the SAK and the Serb militiamen. (2) In order to gain enough time for military preparation, the YPA high command and the Milosevic regime continued negotiations with the leadership of Croatia at all levels and encouraged the belief that everything could be resolved by negotiations. (3) Ostentatious movements of tanks and heavy artillery, low-altitude over-flights, and also the use of agents to collect and make public data about individuals and institutions. All of them was organized with aim of discouraging the Croat public opinion and encouraging the Serb public opinion for the war.⁵⁸⁶

Croatia's defense plans, that were produced in June 1991 and against at the end of July 1991, were based on the following:

(1) To carry out the preparation for mobilization in two levies. The first, smaller levy involving 60,000 soldiers, as a first step in the military protection of the republic, was organized in the late autumn of 1990. The second levy, that mobilized about 100,000 officers and men, was prepared in spring 1991. (2) To extend and reconstruct the Croatian police force involving 30,000 men, and to use them to control territory and the movements of the YPA military formations. (3) To use the first mobilized levy and part

⁵⁸⁴ Vasic, op. cit., p. 130.

⁵⁸⁵ Cohen, Philip J., "Ending the War and Securing Peace in Former Yugoslavia", in Mestrovic (ed.), op. cit., p. 31.

⁵⁸⁶ See Spigelj, op. cit., pp. 28-31.

of the police force to keep the garrisons and depots of the YPA under observations, and (4) in the event of attempted military action to surround and occupy them. (5) To hold military and political negotiations in order to gain time for military preparation. (6) Finally, to try to form an alliance of the republics and provinces that have been threatened by the Milosevic regime since 1987.⁵⁸⁷

The YPA attacked on Croatia on 10 July 1991. This attack, that was reinforced by the SAK and the Serb paramilitary groups, damaged the Croat cities and towns greatly. The most severe and dramatic battle occurred in Vukovar and Dubrovnik.

Vukovar, a town in the Eastern Slavonija region of Croatia on the banks of the Danube River and near the border with Serbia, had a population of 84,000, 44 percent of whom were Croat and 37 percent Serb according to the 1991 census. Before the war the mixed population had lived together peacefully. Many of the town's Serbs were against the war and refused to leave their homes when the town came under fierce attack from the combined forces of the YPA, the SAK and the Serb militiamen on 26 August. However, the Serb military forces were anxious to capture the town because it had oil and rich farming land.

The town was put under siege until 18 November when the Croat defenders surrendered and the town was occupied by the Serbian forces. During the siege, Vukovar was bombarded daily with more than 5,000 shells by the Serb tanks, armored cars, heavy artillery, mortars and aircraft. In the Vukovar battle, 89 percent of housing was destroyed, 1,851 soldiers were killed and 2,464 wounded; more than 3,000 civilians were killed and thousands were described as missing. Moreover, 80,000 Croats from Vukovar were forced by the Serbian forces to leave for other parts of Croatia. The Serbian forces which carried out ethnic-cleansing did not withdraw from Vukovar until 1997.⁵⁸⁸

Dubrovnik (Italian name Ragusa) is a medieval walled city that lies on the Adriatic coast in the southern part of Croatia. For 13 centuries, it has functioned as a seaport. Since the arrival of the Slavs in the seventh century, the city has been part of Roman, Byzantine, Venetian, French, Austrian and Ottoman empires, but for much time

⁵⁸⁷ Ibid., pp. 31-33.

⁵⁸⁸ See Taylor, David, *The Wars of Former Yugoslavia*, Austin: Raintree Steck-Vaughn Publishers, 2001, pp. 24-25.

it has remained a virtually free city-republic pursuing independent commercial and cultural activity. In 1918, it became part of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, and from the 1950s, in the Socialist Yugoslavia, it developed a highly successful tourist industry based upon historical, architectural and coastal attraction and attracted millions tourists from abroad. It was known as the 'the pearl of the Adriatic'.⁵⁸⁹

According to the 1991 census, the city had a predominantly Croat population of 50,000. Only 6,000 Serbs lived in the city. Like in Vukovar, before the war there had been no friction between the Croats and their Serb neighbors, and also there was no military garrison. Publicly, the YPA declared that the Croats were harassing the Serbs of Dubrovnik, but in reality its motive for the attack were very different. If the YPA captured Dubrovnik and its port, Gruz, Serbia would have access to the sea via Croatia. In addition, the Serb Alliance believed that capturing this beautiful city would provide them with a powerful bargaining tool in any peace talks that were to arise.⁵⁹⁰ After the war, Kadijevic declared the reason for the Dubrovnik operation: "*It (the Dubrovnik operation) was part of a larger operation designed to take Split and the Dalmatian coast and reach the borders of the future state*".⁵⁹¹ So, like Vukovar, Dubrovnik, 'the pearl of the Adriatic', was a victim of the project of Greater Serbia.

The YPA attack on Dubrovnik began on 1 October 1991, and 'the pearl of the Adriatic' was bombarded from the sea and land. Many housing and historical buildings were destroyed and the ancient city walls were greatly damaged. The Dubrovnik Croats and Serbs retreated into shelters that lacked electricity and water. Boats in the harbor were blown up. It is more important that the Croat towns and villages on the outskirts of Dubrovnik were looted and burned, and the people fled from the YPA and the Serb militiamen coming from Montenegro and Serbia. Like in Vukovar, the Serb forces pursued ethnic-cleansing in Dubrovnik.⁵⁹²

In mid-November 1991, a cease-fire was signed for Dubrovnik. In May 1992, an agreement was reached between the Croat government and the YPA for the withdrawal

⁵⁸⁹ Allcock, Milivojevic, Horton (eds.), *Conflict In The Former Yugoslavia*, op. cit., p. 80.

⁵⁹⁰ Taylor, op. cit., p. 26.

⁵⁹¹ Vasic, op. cit., p. 129.

⁵⁹² See Taylor, op. cit., pp. 27.

of the YPA from the Dubrovnik hinterland.⁵⁹³ The YPA accepted the withdrawal since it focused its forces on the Bosnian War that began in April 1992.

The Croatian Army was in the position of defense until September 1991. In September 1991, the second mobilized levy of the Croatian Army launched an attack upon the YPA garrisons and depots. At the end of September, the Croatian Army occupied the YPA garrisons and depots in Croatia and captured almost 200 tanks, 150 armored personnel carriers and infantry combat vehicles, as well as about 400 artillery pieces, 180,000 rifles and automatics, 18 ships, 2 million tons of ammunition, bombs and mines.⁵⁹⁴

In November 1991, the Croatian Army launched a comprehensive offensive operation against the Serb forces in order to liberate Western Slavonija. This operation, that ended on 26 December, liberated 170 square kilometers of the territory and destroyed the 21 Serb bastions.⁵⁹⁵

Although these operations empowered and encouraged the Croatian Army and damaged the Serb forces, the Croatian Army could not be able to defeat and repulse them. By January 1992, the Serb forces involving the YPA, the SAK and the paramilitary groups had occupied the regions of Krajiina, Eastern Slavonija and Western Slavonija (the RSK's territory) that constitute around one-third of the Croatia's territory. As a consequence of intervention of the Great Powers, the two sides signed a cease-fire in Sarajevo on 2 January 1992.

V. 4. iii. The International Intervention and the Cease-fire

The European Community (EC) issued an ultimatum on 28 August 1991: either the republics (Croatia and Serbia) should comply with a demand for a cease-fire and negotiations by 1 September, or the EC would discuss additional measures including international action. Although a cease-fire was signed in Belgrade on 2 September, the war did not stop and war continued increasingly.⁵⁹⁶ Intensity of the war led to the United Nation (UN) Security Council Resolution 713 on 25 September 1991 which imposed "a

⁵⁹³ Allcock, Milivojević, Horton (eds.), *Conflict In The Former Yugoslavia*, op. cit., p. 81.

⁵⁹⁴ Tus, op. cit., p. 52.

⁵⁹⁵ Ibid., pp. 61-62.

⁵⁹⁶ Osmaņavuşođlu, Emel G., *The Wars of Yugoslav Dissolution and Britain's Role in Shaping Western Policy*, Ankara: SAM Papers, 2000, pp. 48-49.

general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia".⁵⁹⁷

In the same month, the EC appointed Lord Peter Carrington, formerly foreign secretary in the British government in the 1980s, as peacemaker. On 16 October, he prepared 'Arrangement for a General Settlement', so-called Carrington Plan. The Carrington Plan that aimed to restructure Yugoslavia on the basis of confederalism guaranteed a wide range of individual, cultural and political rights to the Serbs outside Serbia. In areas of Croatia and Bosnia where they formed a majority, the Serbs would be entitled to use their national emblems and flags, they would have the right to a second nationalist and an education system that would respect the values and needs of the Serbs. Also, they would be granted the right to their own parliament, their own administrative structure, including a regional police force, and their own judiciary. Serbia was given an ultimatum to accept the Carrington Plan in one week from 28 October or face comprehensive economic sanction.

On 30 October, Serbia and Montenegro sent their amendment to the Carrington Plan, insisting that a clause be inserted in the plan that the SFRY continued to exist for those who did not wish to secede. The Serbo-Montenegrin amendment was refused by the EC and, as a response, the Milosevic regime rejected the Carrington Plan. On 8 November, the EC imposed economic sanctions against Yugoslavia and suspended all trade relations.⁵⁹⁸

The Serb side refused the plan since, according to Lord Carrington, "*it was essential for all Serbs to live in one state (Greater Serbia), not in a number of independent republics bound by little more than interstate relations*"⁵⁹⁹. The failure of the Carrington Plan resulted in appointment of Cyrus Vance, a lawyer and former government official of the United States, by the Javier Perez de Cuellar, the UN Secretary General, as peacemaker in November 1991. So, the center of the international intervention process shifted from the EC to the USA.

After a series negotiations with the Croat and the Serb sides, Cyrus Vance prepared

⁵⁹⁷ Radan, op. cit., p. 180.

⁵⁹⁸ See Osmançavuşoğlu, op. cit., pp. 50-52.

⁵⁹⁹ Silber & Little, op. cit., p. 192.

an agreement plan, so-called the Vance Plan. Cease-fire agreement was signed in Sarajevo on 2 January 1992. Implementation of the Vance Plan began on 21 February 1992. Although Milosevic and the YPA high command accepted the plan, Babic, President of the RSK, opposed the plan. As a result of Milosevic's pressure, Babic was replaced by Goran Hadzic on 26 February 1992.⁶⁰⁰

According to the Vance Plan, the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR)⁶⁰¹ involving 15,000 military personnel, with contributions from 26 countries, deployed in four sectors in Croatia – North (Banija and Kordun), South (Lika and Kninska Krajina), East (Eastern Slavonija) and West (Western Slavonija)⁶⁰² with headquarters in Zagreb. The UNPROFOR's mission was to provide the UN Protected Areas (UNPAs). The UNPAs were defined by the Vance Plan as "*areas in which Serbs constituted the majority or a substantial minority of the population, and in which inter-communal tension led to armed conflict in the recent past*".⁶⁰³

The Vance Plan involved five main tasks:⁶⁰⁴

- 1) Full demilitarization of the UNPAs with full withdrawal of the YPA from Croatia and local irregular units and other military personnel in the UNPAs being disbanded and demobilized. Demobilized meant ceasing to wear any uniform and carry any weapons. The weapons were to be handed over to the UNPROFOR for safekeeping.
- 2) To identify arrangements for local administration and confirm that the composition of these arrangements (including police force) reflected the national composition of the population which lived in the area concerned before the war.
- 3) To monitor the work of local police forces.
- 4) To ensure that the UNPAs remained demilitarized, to protect the indigenous population from 'fear of armed attack', and to help return displaced people to their homes. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees was asked to assume responsibility for designing and

⁶⁰⁰ Radan, op. cit., p. 181.

⁶⁰¹ UNPROFOR was renamed as UNCRO (the UN Conflict Resolution Operation in Croatia) in March 1995.

⁶⁰² See the Map in Glenny, Misha, *The Fall of Yugoslavia*, London: Penguin Books, 1996, pp. V.

⁶⁰³ Gow, James, *Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War*, New York: Colombia University Press, 1997, p. 102.

⁶⁰⁴ Ibid., p. 103.

implementing a practicable plan for achieving the return. (5) Finally, the plan did not permit the UNPROFOR to carry out military operation. The UNPROFOR could use only minimal force for self-defense.

The Milosevic regime, that refused the Carrington Plan, accepted the Vance Plan due to four reasons:

- 1) In December 1991, the USA cut off all trade agreements with Serbia and Montenegro, and the EC lifted economic sanctions in case of Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia and Bosnia.⁶⁰⁵
- 2) Since 25 June 1991, Germany has supported Croatian and Slovenian independence declarations and tried to persuade the EC for recognition of Croatia and Slovenia. The German government has claimed that recognition of Slovenia and Croatia would stop the war and the Serb aggression although the British, French and U.S. governments were against the recognition.⁶⁰⁶ Finally, on 23 December 1991, the German government declared that Germany would recognize Croatia and Slovenia before Christmas but the recognition would be implemented on 15 January 1992.⁶⁰⁷
- 3) By January 1992, about one-third of the Croat territory, that the Serb Alliance desired to occupy, had been accomplished.
- 4) In Serbia, public opinion began to discuss and criticize Milosevic's policies. The increasing opposition forced the Milosevic regime to soften its 'Croatian Policy'. The first important demonstration against the Milosevic regime was organized in Belgrade in March 1991. About 40,000 demonstrators protested the anti-democratic policies of the Milosevic regime and demanded more democracy, free media and resignation of Milosevic. The demonstrators were attacked by the police. Street violence lasted until the late afternoon and the Belgrade police were effectively defeated and dispersed by the

⁶⁰⁵ Osmançavuşoğlu, op. cit., p. 55.

⁶⁰⁶ Unlike the German Government, the British, French and American governments advocated that recognition of Croatia and Slovenia would stimulate, expand and intensify the Yugoslav wars. (See for more details *Unfinished Peace. Report of the International Commission on the Balkans*, 1996, pp. 59-64). In 1993, British Lord Carrington declared that Germany bore an overwhelmingly responsibility for the explosion of Yugoslavia and the escalation of the war, because it forced Europe to recognize Slovenia and Croatia (Finkelkraut, Alain, *Dispatches From the Balkan War and Other Writings*, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1992, p. 142).

⁶⁰⁷ Croatia and Slovenia were recognized by the EC on 15 January 1992 and by the USA in April 1992, and admitted by the UN on 22 May 1992. (See for more details Osmançavuşoğlu, op. cit., pp. 54-62).

demonstrators. Around 18.30 pm YPA tanks and armored personnel carriers rolled into Belgrade and took up key positions.⁶⁰⁸ After the suppression of the demonstration by the YPA, Milosevic agreed to talk to the students and academicians of the Belgrade University. The students told him that he should resign because he was not defending the interests of the Serbian people, which they defined as democracy, pluralism, freedom and peace.⁶⁰⁹

V. 4. iv. After the Cease-fire

Both Croatian and Serbian nationalism focused on the Bosnian War that began in April 1992 after the cease-fire and implementation of the Vance Plan. The YPA and the Serb paramilitary groups withdrew from Croatia and focused their forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Freezing of military activity in Croatia on 2 January 1992, allowed the YPA to prepare itself for war in Bosnia. Also, the SAK participated in the Bosnian War and supported the Serb Army of Bosnia. In the same time, the Tudjman regime, the Croatian Army and the Croat diaspora began to support the Croat forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina in order to wrest Herzegovina. Furthermore, irregular paramilitary groups from Croatia rushed Bosnia-Herzegovina with nationalistic aggressive desires.

On the other hand, after the cease-fire in January 1992, the Tudjman regime launched a military program in order to reinforce and modernize the Croatian Army which would liberate the Croatian territory occupied by the Serbian forces. This military program for reinforcement and modernization of the Croatian Army was supported actively by the American military and financial aids in order to establish a "better" regional (Balkan) balance of power and thus to contain Serb power.⁶¹⁰

The reinforced and modernized Croatian Army organized four offensive operations against the RSK between May 1993 and August 1995:⁶¹¹

1) *Operation Tiger*: The first operation covering 1,925 square kilometers operation area started on 18 May 1992 and lasted until 9 September 1993. This operation liberated the Dubrovnik and Miljevic regions, the Maslenica Bridge, the Zadar hinterland, Rovanjaska

⁶⁰⁸ Vasic, op. cit., p. 125.

⁶⁰⁹ Vejvoda, op. cit., p. 109.

⁶¹⁰ Cviic, op. cit., p. 209.

⁶¹¹ See Table 3, 4 and 6 in Zunec, Ozren, "Operation Flash and Storm", in Magas & Zanic (eds.), op. cit., pp. 69, 78, 80.

and Gospic.

2) *Operation Flash*: Operation Flash, that covered 500 square kilometers and liberated the Western Slavonija, started on 1 May 1995 and ended on 3 May 1995. The SAK responded the Croat offensive with firing shells on Zagreb. The shells killed six people and wounded 175 people.⁶¹²

3) *Operation Summer '95*: This offensive between 25-28 July 1995 covered 1,200 square kilometers and occupied Bosansko Grahovo and Glamoc.

4) *Operation Storm*: The last and most important offensive operation of the Croatian Army was the Storm Operation between 4-10 August 1995. This operation covering 10,500 square kilometers liberated the Krajina region. At the time of Operation Storm, the Croatian Army had 130,000 men, 51 brigades, 320 tanks, 240 armored transporters, 812 cannon, 36 aircraft and 12 helicopters. On the other side, the SAK consisted of 40,000 men, 20 brigades, 385 tanks, 195 armored transporters, 515 cannon, 20 aircraft and 10 helicopters. In the Operation Storm, the Croatian Army seized 60 tanks, 11 aircraft, 1 helicopter, 600 motor vehicles, 300 cannon from the SAK.

The Croatian Army carried out ethnic-cleansing during the operations. It forced around 200,000 Serbs to leave their homes for Bosnia and Serbia, and the regions that was vacated by the Serb population was repopulated by Croats.⁶¹³ The Serb civilians fleeing from Croatia were shelled by the Croatian Army. Also, many Serbs who stayed in their villages, usually the old and infirm, were shot. Especially, in Krajina, many unarmed elderly civilians were killed by the Croat soldiers, and several villages were burned. The UN, after inspecting 389 Serb villages, reported that 17,000 houses out of 22,000 were destroyed or badly damaged by the Croatian forces.⁶¹⁴

The Croat Army's success over the SAK and recapture of Krajina and Western Slavonija revealed weakness and vulnerability of the Serb army. So, the success of the Croat offensive operations and the defeat of the SAK shattered the myth of Serbian military invincibility.⁶¹⁵ Also, the Croat military victory changed the military balance in the

⁶¹² Taylor, op. cit., p. 28.

⁶¹³ Klemencic & Zagar, op. cit., p. 307.

⁶¹⁴ Taylor, op. cit., p. 29.

⁶¹⁵ Ünal, Hasan, "Hrvatlar Krajina'da Hangi Efsaneleri Yıkıyor?", *Milliyet*, 22 August 1995.

region and strengthened the hand of those who favored air strikes against Serb targets in the Bosnian War.⁶¹⁶

These operations could not capture the Eastern Slavonija. After the operations, the SAK forces took up a position in the Eastern Slavonija and repulsed the Croatian Army. So, as a result of the Croatian offensive between 1992-1995, the RSK remained in the Eastern Slavonija and lost the regions of Western Slavonija and Krajina. Because of the Great Powers' pressure and termination of the Milosevic regime's support, the RSK led by President Martić accepted to sign "*the Basic Agreement of the Region of Eastern Slavonija*" with Croatia on 12 November 1995.

Under the terms of the Basic Agreement,⁶¹⁷ the UN set up the UN Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonija (UNTAES) to oversee the process. The new peacekeeping operation was begun by the UN Security Council Resolution 1037 in January 1996. The UNTAES was created for an initial period of one year, and its 5,000 troops were headquartered at Vukovar.

The UNTAES had nine main tasks: (1) supervising the demilitarization of the region; (2) overseeing the return of refugees and displaced persons; (3) establishing and training a transitional police force; (4) monitoring the treatment of prisoners; (5) organizing local elections; (6) monitoring the international borders of the region; (7) monitoring the parties' commitment to human rights; (8) cooperating with the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in investigating and prosecuting war crimes; and (9) ensuring the maintenance of peace and security in the region.

The transitional period officially ended on 16 January 1998, with withdrawal of the UNTAES. Hence, Eastern Slavonija was reintegrated into the Republic of Croatia, and remnant of the RSK and its armed force, the SAK, disappeared altogether in January 1998.

V. 5. War In Bosnia-Herzegovina and Foundation of the "Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina" (1990-2000)

⁶¹⁶ Osmançavuşoğlu, op. cit., p. 217.

⁶¹⁷ See for the Basic Agreement Allcock, Milivojevic, Horton (eds.), *Conflict In The Former Yugoslavia*, op. cit., p. 272.

Bosnia-Herzegovina is surrounded by Serbia in east, by Croatia in north, west and south, and by Montenegro in southeast. It has an area of 51,112 square kilometers and population of 4,760,000 according to the 1991 census. At the beginning of the 1990s, Bosniaks (Yugoslav Muslims), Orthodox Serbs and Catholic Croats formed respectively 43.7, 31.4 and 17.3 percent of the population in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Also, 5.5 percent of the population described themselves as "Yugoslav" in the census.⁶¹⁸

Both Serbian and Croatian nationalism aimed to occupy Bosnia-Herzegovina in order to establish "Greater Serbia" or "Greater Croatia". For Serbian nationalism, Bosnia-Herzegovina was a keystone of "Greater Serbia". In 1993, General Kadijevic asserted that "*Serb people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, by its geographical position and size, one of the keystones for the formation of a common state for all Serb people*".⁶¹⁹

Like the Serbian nationalism, the Croatian nationalism regarded Bosnia-Herzegovina as core of the "Greater Croatia". That is, from the view of Croatian nationalism, it was impossible to found "Greater Croatia" without absorption Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁶²⁰

V. 5. i. Foundation of Nationalist Liberal Parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina

At the beginning of the 1990s, like Serbia and Croatia, new nationalist, anticommunist and liberal parties emerged in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Party of Democratic Action (PDA), the Serbian Democratic Party (SDP), the Croatian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Muslim Bosniak Organization (MBO)⁶²¹ were founded respectively on 27 March, 12 July, 18 August and September 1990. Also, the League of Communists of Bosnia-Herzegovina under leadership of N. Durakovic transformed itself into the Party of Democratic Change (PDC) in September.⁶²²

The PDA was founded by Islamic-nationalist Bosniaks under the leadership of

⁶¹⁸ Samary, op. cit., p 173.

⁶¹⁹ Gow, op. cit., p. 34.

⁶²⁰ Bilandzic, Dusan, "Termination and Aftermath of the War in Croatia", in Magas & Zanic (eds.), op. cit., p. 85.

⁶²¹ After the war, the MBO evolved into the Liberal Bosnian Organization.

⁶²² See Bougarel, Xavier, "Bosnia and Herzegovina: State and Communitarianism", in Dyker & Vejvoda, op. cit., pp. 95-96.

Alija Izetbegovic.⁶²³ The party program described the PDA as “*political alliance of the citizens of Yugoslavia belonging to the historical-cultural sphere of Islam*”.⁶²⁴ Its main aim to protect unity of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Bosniak culture and identity. For this purpose, Izetbegovic called all Bosniaks to support the PDA on the eve of the 1990 elections:

“*Free elections are coming, and with them the day that the Muslim nation (Bosniak nation) has been waiting for more than a hundred years. This is a historical moment, in which there can be no ‘don’t knows’ or neutrals. . . That is why I am asking you to help on that day, by voting for the PDA, for liberty, and for Muslims (Bosniaks). The other Yugoslav nations are going to do it for themselves. Why should the Muslims of Yugoslavia be the exception?*”⁶²⁵

The MBO was another Bosniak party that was founded by Adil Zulfikarpasic and Muhamed Tunjo Filipovic⁶²⁶ who were representatives of the secular Bosniak nationalist trend in the PDA. In September 1990, they denounced the “*fact that the PDA is ruled by eleven people – of conservative and generally religious orientation – and that it is run by a closed and privatized council, held together by family ties*”, and founded the MBO as a secular, liberal and nationalist party of Bosniaks.⁶²⁷

Although both the PDA and the MBO tried to protect unity of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Bosniak culture and identity against the Serbian and the Croatian nationalism, there were some differences between them. Firstly, MBO did not criticize only SDP’s and CDU’s nationalist and militarist policies but also criticized antidemocratic characteristics and policies of the PDA. Unlike the PDA, the MBO emphasized that unity of Bosnia - Herzegovina and Bosnian peace could be protected only through

⁶²³ Izetbegovic had a background of religious activism that earned him two years in prison from 1946 for organizing the Young Muslims and defending the Muslim nationalism. He later graduated in law from Sarajevo University and worked as a legal consultant to Bosnian firms. From 1983 to 1989 he served another jail sentence, his ‘Islamic Declaration’ of 1970 being cited as evidence that he wished to proclaim a Muslim state in Yugoslavia. (See Allcock, Milivojevic, Horton (eds.), *Conflict In The Former Yugoslavia*, op. cit., p. 131).

⁶²⁴ Bougarel, op. cit., p. 96.

⁶²⁵ Ibid., p. 99.

⁶²⁶ Zulfikarpasic lived in Switzerland between 1960-1990 and became a successful businessman. He established the “Bosnian Institute” in Zurich. Filipovic born in Banja Luka in 1929 is a philosopher and academician, as well as professor at Sarajevo University.

⁶²⁷ Bougarel, “Bosnia and Herzegovina: State and Communitarianism”, op. cit., p. 96.

democratization of the political life and development of civil society in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Filipovic maintained that not only the SDP and the CDU but also the PDA endangered the Bosnian unity and peace because they hindered development of civil society and democratization in Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁶²⁸

Another contradiction and difference between the PDA and the MBO was related to 'definition of Bosniak identity'. The PDA emphasized the concept of *Muslimanstvo* (Islamic identity), while the MBO, which was more secular and liberal than the PDA, emphasized the concept of *Bosnjastvo* (Bosniak identity).⁶²⁹ In this discussions, the concept of *Bosnjastvo* was more accepted than the concept of *Muslimanstvo* among the Bosniak intellectuals and in public opinion. In this debate, the most important step was 'People's Assembly of Bosniaks' which was assembled in Sarajevo in October 1993. 349 Bosniak politicians, clerics, academicians and intellectuals discussed the Bosnian War, Bosniak identity and future of Bosnia-Herzegovina at the assembly. In the declaration of assembly, the concept of *Bosnjastvo* was emphasized. In other words, *Bosnjastvo* prevailed over *Muslimanstvo* at the end of the Bosniak Assembly.⁶³⁰

The SDP was founded by nationalist Bosnian Serbs under the leadership of Radovan Karadzic, who is a Serb psychiatrist born in Montenegro in 1945, and functioned as an agent of the Milosevic regime in Bosnia-Herzegovina. So, the SDP improved close relations and cooperation with the Milosevic regime, the SDP of Serbia, the SDP of Krajina and the YPA. The ultimate goal of the Bosnian SDP was to attach Bosnia-Herzegovina to Serbia with aim of creating "Greater Serbia".

The leaders of the SDP viewed Bosniaks as Serbs who had been converted to Islam by the Ottoman Empire. So, according to them, Bosniaks should be reconverted to the Orthodox Christianity, and those who rejected the reconversion should be expelled from Bosnia-Herzegovina. Also, the SDP regarded Bosniaks as 'agents of Turkey'. "*We will never allow the return of Turkey in the Balkans*" said Karadzic on 20 May 1995. Moreover he asserted that "*Serbs, Croats and Muslims (Bosniaks) can no longer live*

⁶²⁸ See Filipovic, Muhamed, "Bosna-Hersek'te Barış Korumanın Yolları", in Samary, op. cit., pp. 185-189.

⁶²⁹ Babuna, Aydın, *Bir Ulusun Doğuşu: Geçmişten Günümüze Boşnaklar*, İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 2000, p. 202.

⁶³⁰ See Babuna, "Değişen Boşnak Kimliği Üzerine", op. cit., pp. 80-81.

together. Just as the Croats and Muslims didn't want to live in an united Yugoslavia, so we don't want to live in their state. You can't keep a dog and a cat in a box together. Either they would always be quarreling and fighting or they would have to stop being what they are".⁶³¹

On the other hand, the CDU in Bosnia-Herzegovina was established as a agent of the Tudjman's CDU in Croatia. The Bosnian CDU involved two wings: the Klujic wing and the Boban wing. Stjepan Klujic, president of the party, favored multi-ethnic and multi-cultural Bosnia-Herzegovina and opposed partition of the territory between Serbia and Croatia. Nevertheless, Mate Boban backed by Tudjman desired unification of Herzegovina and Croatia. With the backing of the Croatian CDU, Boban replaced Klujic in February 1992.⁶³² And in November 1992, both Tudjman's CDU and Boban's CDU forced Klujic to resign from the State Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina in favor of a Croat separatist Miro Lazic.⁶³³ As a consequence, thanks to Tudjman's support, the Boban wing prevailed the Klujic wing and achieved absolute control within the party.

V. 5. ii. Beginning of the War

The first multi-party elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina was held in 18.11.1990 and 02.12.1990. At the 1990 elections there were not any strong federal party but there were strong nationalist and ethnic parties. Among them, the PDA was a relative winner of the elections, since the Muslims comprised the largest part (43.7%) of the Bosnian population. The SDP and the CDU came in second and third after the PDA with 41.25, 35.41 and 20.41 percent of the seats, respectively. In the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the PDA, the SDP and the CDU won 86, 72 and 44 seats of 240 seats, respectively. Another Bosniak party, MBO, won only 2 seats in the elections and Durakovic's PDC won 14 seats. In this elections, nearly 20 percent of the voters did not vote.⁶³⁴

These figures of the 1990 elections shows that nationalist and ethnic parties which won 202 seats prevailed over non-nationalist and ethnic parties which won 38 seats. After

⁶³¹ *Unfinished Peace*, op. cit., 1996, p. 16.

⁶³² Allcock, Milivojevic, Horton (eds.), *Conflict In The Former Yugoslavia*, op. cit., p. 18.

⁶³³ *Ibid.*, p. 143.

⁶³⁴ Agh, Attila, *Emerging Democracies in East Central Europe and the Balkans*, Northampton, MA: E. Elgar, 1998, p. 217 and Babuna, *Bir Ulusun Doguşu: ...*, op. cit., p.198.

the victory of nationalism in the 1990 elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the coalition government was founded by the PDA, the SDP, and the CDU. The Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina involved two Bosniaks, two Serbs, two Croats and one representative of other nationalities. The post of chairmen of the presidency went to Izetbegovic (PDA), and those of prime minister and chairmen of the assembly to J. Pelivan (CDU) and Momcilo Krajisnik (SDP).

Milosevic and Tudjman met in 17 March 1991, before the outbreak of the Croatian War, in Karadjordjevo, one of the Tito's villas, in order to discuss 'the Bosnian Issue'. Stejepan Mesic, who was prime minister of Croatian Republic between 30 April-24 August 1990 and elected president of the Republic of Croatia in February 2000 after the death of Tudjman, explained after the Yugoslav Wars that Milosevic and Tudjman came to understanding to divide up Bosnia-Herzegovina between Serbia and Croatia at the Karadjordjevo meeting. He stated that this agreement "*encouraged Tudjman's passionate desire to extend Croatia's borders*".⁶³⁵ That is, Bosnia-Herzegovina became target of the Croat and Serb nationalism, led by the Tudjman and Milosevic regimes, in the first half of the 1990s.

In June 1991, the MBO leaders Zulfikarpasic and Filipovic met with the Bosnian SDP leaders Karadzic, Krajisnik and Nikola Koljevic for the purpose of reaching an agreement on the status of Bosnia-Herzegovina. An agreement was reached that Bosnia-Herzegovina would remain an integral whole, linked with Yugoslavia in a confederal association, and that the Sandzak⁶³⁶, which had been conjoined with Bosnia-Herzegovina until 1878, would be granted cultural and administrative autonomy, including complete self-administration in schooling, language, and culture; under the agreement, the local Bosniaks would enjoy 60 percent representation in the Serbian portion of the Sandzak and 40 percent representation in the Montenegrin portion. Milosovic agreed this agreement, while Izetbegovic did not agree it. Izetbegovic accused the MBO leaders as 'traitors', while Zulfikarpasic and Filipovic claimed that Izetbegovic killed the last chance

⁶³⁵ See Mesic, op. cit., pp. 11-12.

⁶³⁶ According to the 1991 census, 71 percent of the Sandzak population was Bosniak (Balic, Smail, "Bosnian Muslims: Historical Background and Present Conflict", in Özdoğan & Saybaşılı (eds.), op. cit., p. 155).

for peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁶³⁷

Izetbegovic (President of Bosnia-Herzegovina) and his party, the PDA, did not support separatist policy of Slovenian and Croatian governments. Also, they were against militarist and irredentist policy of Serbian nationalism which was led by the Milosevic regime. The Izetbegovic's PDA favored confederal unity of Yugoslavia, that is, transformation of the political and economic structure into confederation.

Izetbegovic and the PDA opposed 'separation' and favored 'confederation' because of three reasons: (1) Military forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina were weaker than Serbian, Croatian, and Slovenian military forces. (2) Bosnia-Herzegovina had severe economic problems and disintegration of Yugoslavia would affect the petty Bosnian economy negatively. (3) Izetbegovic and the PDA foresaw that any fragmentation of Yugoslavia would lead to a civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and its partition between Serbia and Croatia.

However, after the Croatian and Slovenian independence declarations on 25 June 1991, the PDA changed its policy (confederal association of Yugoslavia), and began to pursue separatist policy. The Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina voted for independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina on 15 October 1991.

The SDP leader Karadzic addressed in the same day in the Bosnian Assembly: *"The road you have chosen is the same road that took Croatia into Hell, except that the war in Bosnia will take you into a worse Hell, and the Muslim nation (Bosniaks) may disappear altogether"*.⁶³⁸ The Karadzic's SDP protested the Bosnian Assembly and established the 'National Assembly of Bosnian Serbs (NABS)' on 24 October.

Referendum for independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina was organized on 29 February - 1 March 1992. The referendum was protested by Serbian voters and the SDP. 99.4 percent of the voters voted in favor of independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and on 3 March 1992, the independent Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina was proclaimed by the Bosnian Assembly. As a response the independence declaration, the NABS proclaimed *Republika Srpska* (Serbian Republic - RS) whose capital was Banja Luka, and on 27

⁶³⁷ See Ramet, *Balkan Babel*, op. cit., p.204.

⁶³⁸ Bougarel, op. cit., p. 100.

March 1992, the RS Assembly proclaimed the unification of the RS with Serbia.⁶³⁹

One month later, on 27 April, Serbian and Montenegrin republics proclaimed the 'Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY)'. Dobrica Cosic, who was called by the Serb nationalist liberals as the spiritual father of the Serb nationalism, became the first President and Milan Panic⁶⁴⁰ became the first Prime Minister of the FRY. So, the second Yugoslavia (SFRY) officially terminated on 27 April 1992, and the third Yugoslavia (FRY) was established by the republics of Serbia and Montenegro. The third Yugoslavia accounted for roughly 40 percent of the territory, 44 percent of the population and 40 percent of the social product of the second Yugoslavia.⁶⁴¹

The Milosevic regime insisted on keeping the name of Yugoslavia in order to gain recognition as successor state to the SFRY, thus inheriting its international legitimacy and assets.⁶⁴² Yet, it could not be achieved as the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) denied successor status to the FRY. The UNSC Resolution 777 on 17 September 1992 declared that the FRY could not continue automatically the membership of the former SFRY in the UN for the other republics (Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia) had seceded.⁶⁴³

V. 5. iii. The Bosnian War

The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina broke out in April 1992 and continued until December 1995 when the Dayton Agreement was signed by the Bosniak, Serb and Croat sides. The Bosnian War was a product of Serbian and Croatian nationalism which aimed to occupy Bosnia-Herzegovina and, it was a struggle for protection of unity of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The second and third meetings between Serb and Croat nationalism were held in

⁶³⁹ See Bora, *Bosna-Hersek: ...*, op. cit., pp. 84-87.

⁶⁴⁰ Panic was born in Belgrade in 1942 but left his country for the America in 1955, later acquiring U.S. citizenship. A professional and champion cyclist at the time of his defection from socialist Yugoslavia, he later became a successful businessman as the director of a pharmaceutical company in California. Panic was invited to the country by Milosevic and Cosic, and returned in 1992. Soon thereafter his return, Panic was allowed by Milosevic to purchase a controlling interest in the leading Serbian pharmaceutical company, *Glenika*. In July, he was appointed to the Premiership of the FRY. (Allcock, Milivojevic, Horton (eds.), *Conflict In The Former Yugoslavia*, op. cit., p. 205).

⁶⁴¹ Vejvoda, op. cit., p. 112.

⁶⁴² Lukic & Lynch, op. cit., p. 156

⁶⁴³ Woodward, op. cit., p. 251.

February and May 1992 in Austria. Tudjman and Boban met with Serbian side (Milosevic and Karadzic) in order to discuss partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In these meetings they agreed to divide up Bosnia-Herzegovina into three parts as 60% for Serbs/Serbia, 30% for Croats/Croatia, and 10% for Bosniaks.⁶⁴⁴ Furthermore, in July 1992, Boban and his party, the Bosnian CDU, proclaimed the 'Croat Republic of Herzeg-Bosna (CRHB)' involving Western Herzegovina, Central Bosnia and Posavina (Northern Bosnia), and Mostar was declared as capital of the CRHB.

Croat military force in the Bosnian War was formed by the Croatian Defense Council (CDC) and the Croatian Defense Force (CDF). The CDC was founded by the Boban's CDU in May 1992, and commanded by headquarters at Mostar, Tomislavgrad, Vitez and Orasje. The CDC had around 50,000 troops, 100 tanks, 50 armored fighting vehicles and 1,200 pieces of artillery, most of which were heavy mortars.⁶⁴⁵

The CDF was founded by the Croatian Party of Rights (the CPR) led by Dobroslav Paraga. According to the CPR, the unification of Bosnia-Herzegovina with Croatia was a 'natural right' of Croats like the unification of Western Germany and Eastern Germany. Also, Paraga stated that the CPR is inheritor of the Ustasha Movement. The aim of the CPR, said Parag, was to recreate the NDH (the Independent State of Croatia between 1941-1945), which had involved Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁶⁴⁶

The CDF involved 10,000 soldiers of which up to 6,000 operated in western Bosnia. The CDF's political aim was the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina that had been absorbed into the NDH. Both the CDC led by Boban and the CDF led by Paraga were supported directly by the Tudjman regime in Zagreb and the Croatian Army.⁶⁴⁷

Also, the nationalist liberal Croatian diaspora gave financial, ideological and military support to the nationalist Croatian forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina during the war. Especially, the Croatian National Council that had been founded by the Ustasha remnants in 1974 in Toronto gave great financial and military aid to the CDC and CDF.⁶⁴⁸

On the other hand, the Serbian nationalism involved five actors in the Bosnian War:

⁶⁴⁴ Bora, *Bosna-Hersek: ...*, op. cit., p. 100

⁶⁴⁵ See Allcock, Milivojevic, Horton (eds.), *Conflict In The Former Yugoslavia*, op. cit., pp. 58-60.

⁶⁴⁶ Bora, *Bosna-Hersek: ...*, op. cit., pp. 210-211.

⁶⁴⁷ O'Ballance, Edgar, *Civil War In Bosnia (1992-1994)*, London: Macmillan Press, 1995, p. 50.

⁶⁴⁸ See for more details Bora, *Bosnia-Hersek: ...*, op. cit., pp. 220-224.

(1) The Army of Republika Srpska (ARS) that was founded by the Bosnian SDP in May 1992 and commanded General Ratko Mladic had about 50,000 men.⁶⁴⁹ (2) The Chetnik paramilitary force involving 5,000 men was founded by the Serbian Radical Party (SRP) led by Vojislav Seselj. The SRP won 73 seats in the December 1992 elections and 42 seats in the December 1993 elections in Serbia. (3) The Serbian Volunteer Guards, co-called *Tigers* or *Arkanovici*, was founded in 1991 and led by Zeljko Raznjatovic (so-called Kapetan Arkan). Kapetan Arkan also founded the Party of Serbian Alliance which won five and then one seat in the December 1992 and the December 1993 elections.⁶⁵⁰ (4) Dragan Vasiklovic (so-called Kapetan Dragan)'s militarist group. (5) The Yugoslav Army (YA). After the declaration of the FRY, the YPA was transformed into the YA that was controlled by the Milosevic regime. The YA involving 90,000 soldiers supported the ARS and the Serb paramilitary groups in the Bosnian War.

These five actors formed Serbian nationalist-militarist alliance during the war. Their political aim was to occupy Bosnia-Herzegovina and to absorb it into "Greater Serbia". For this purpose, like the Croatian forces, they carried out ethnic cleansing against non-Serbs. Especially, the paramilitary groups entered villages and cities after the regular army (the ASR and the YA) units and started killing civilians, raping and looting.⁶⁵¹

However, some groups and politicians opposed to the nationalist-militarist Serb alliance. For example, Dobrica Cosic, President of the FRY, and Milan Panic, Prime Minister of the FRY, formed an opposition against Serbian militarist nationalism which tried to occupy Bosnia-Herzegovina by militarist methods. They favored to carried out political methods instead of militarist methods in Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁶⁵²

Also, in the late 1992, Patriarch Pavle of the Serbian Orthodox Church and Cardinal Kuharic of the Croatian Catholic Church issued a series of three joint statements which criticized Croat and Serbian militarist policies in Bosnia - Herzegovina and called

⁶⁴⁹ O'Ballance, op. cit., p. 50.

⁶⁵⁰ See for the December 1992 and 1993 elections in Serbia Bora, *Bosna-Hersek: ...*, op. cit., pp. 189-190, 196.

⁶⁵¹ Vasic, op. cit., p. 134.

⁶⁵² See for more details Bora, *Bosna-Hersek: ...*, op. cit., pp. 169-172.

peace.⁶⁵³

Moreover, some meetings and demonstrations were organized in Belgrade against the Milosevic regime and protested the Bosnian War. For example, on 28 June 1992, the Belgrade meeting was organized by the opposition. About 100,000 demonstrators protested the war and called Milosevic to resign.⁶⁵⁴

Also, on 5 April 1992 in Sarajevo, between 60,000 and 100,000 demonstrators involving the Sarajevo Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats massed in front of the Bosnian Assembly, booing the parties in power (the PDA, the SDP and the CDU) and demanding that new elections be held. The demonstrators installed a 'committee of national safety'. They were dispersed on the afternoon of 6 April by the SDP snipers deployed on the roof of the Holiday. On 9 April, the 'committee of national safety' was dissolved itself.⁶⁵⁵ However, these demonstrations could not stop rise of nationalism and militarism.

Furthermore, some civil organizations and associations were founded by Bosnian Serbs, Croats and Bosniaks in order to defend the unity of Bosnia-Herzegovina against Serbian and Croatian nationalism. The Serbian Civic Forum⁶⁵⁶, the Red Lilies, the Women Association of Tuzla were some of these associations. The civil associations organized a 'Cultural Festival' in Sarajevo (February-March 1993) and an 'Local Olympiad' in Tuzla (October 1993).⁶⁵⁷ That is, anti-nationalist Bosnian Serbs and Croats formed an alliance with Bosniaks against the Serbian and Croatian nationalism that aimed to occupy and divide up Bosnia-Herzegovina between Serbia and Croatia.

On the other hand, when we look at the Bosniak side, we see the PDA domination. Izetbegovic's PDA formed a 'war government'. The war government headed by Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic involved four Serb ministers. On 5 July 1992, the war

⁶⁵³ Allcock, Milivojevic, Horton (eds.), *Conflict In The Former Yugoslavia*, op. cit., p. 151.

⁶⁵⁴ Bora, *Bosna-Hersek: ...*, p. 178-179.

⁶⁵⁵ Bougarel, op. cit., p. 102.

⁶⁵⁶ The Serbian Civic Forum was formed by an anti-nationalist group of Sarajevo Serbs, who opposed the Karadzic's SDP, when Sarajevo was besieged by the Serb forces in April 1992. The founders of the Serbian Civic Forum wanted to preserve multi-ethnic Sarajevo through cooperation with the Bosniaks and Croats. During the siege, these Serbs, together with the other inhabitants of Sarajevo, were being subjected to constant bombing by Serbian artillery from the surrounding hills. But also, they were subjected to attacks of numerous Bosniak irregular military forces although the Serbian Civic Forum opposed both the Milosevic and Karadzic governments. (Kecmanovic, Dusan, *Ethnic Times: Exploring Ethnonationalism in the Former Yugoslavia*, London: Praeger Publishers, 2002, pp. 96-97).

⁶⁵⁷ See Bora, *Bosna-Hersek*, op. cit., pp. 158-161

government announced the creation of the 'Army of Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina (ARBH)'. The ARBH involving 100,000 men was also supported by police and irregular militia forces such as the Green Berets and the Patriotic League which included some non-Bosniaks.⁶⁵⁸

The ARBH, that was commanded by Sefer Halilovic at first and then Rasim Delic, was the weakest of the armed formation involved in the Bosnian War. It was inferior in firepower to both the ARS, which was aided by the Milosevic regime and the YA, and to the CDC, which was backed by the Tudjman regime and the Croatian Army.

The arms embargo, that has been imposed on Yugoslavia as a whole by the UN since September 1991, hindered the Bosniak government to empower its army through arm importation. Despite the arms embargo, the ARBH could received only illegal and restricted military aid from some Muslim countries such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Sudan, Lebanon, Libya and Turkey.⁶⁵⁹

As a result, the embargo on arms induced the Serbian forces and later the Croatian forces to take advantage of the superiority of their armament to expand to the prejudice of the Bosniak forces.⁶⁶⁰ It is more important that the arms embargo, that froze the military imbalance in favor of Serbian and Croatian military forces, facilitated the Serb and Croat nationalism's ethnic cleansing policy against Bosniaks, and consequently, extended the victims of genocide. According to Philip Cohen, the arms embargo disregarded Article 51 of the UN Charter by denying the Bosniaks the right to defend themselves against aggression.⁶⁶¹

Muhamad Sacirbey, the permanent representative of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the UN, wrote in a letter to the president of the UN Security Council, that if the ARBH had adequate means for defense the war would never have exploded.⁶⁶² But, the UN arm

⁶⁵⁸ O'Ballance, op. cit., p. 49.

⁶⁵⁹ In 1993, up to 4,000 Muslims from over 24 Islamic countries were fighting against the Serb and Croat forces. (Huntington, Samuel P., "The Clash of Civilizations?", *Foreign Affairs*, 3, 1993).

⁶⁶⁰ Anciaux, Robert, "Bosnia-Herzegovina: The Laboratory of the New International Order", in Özdoğan & Saybaşılı (eds.), op. cit., p. 185.

⁶⁶¹ The Article 51 stated that "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security". (Cohen, P. J., op. cit., p. 36)

⁶⁶² Finkelkraut, op. cit., p. 132.

sanction, that prevented empowerment of the ARBH, maintained the military imbalance in favor of Serb army; and consequently, the sanction contributed explosion of the war in Bosnia. However, although the Bosniak government persistently called for the arms embargo to be lifted in their favor, arguing that the Bosnian state and its threatened people should have the right to defend themselves, the UN Security Council did not accept the Bosniak demand.⁶⁶³

During the war, some inner contradictions emerged in the Bosniak side. The most important inner conflict occurred between the Bosniak government and Fikret Abdic, so-called *Babo* (Father). He conflicted with Izetbegovic and formed his own party, the Muslim Democratic Party, in opposition to the PDA. In July 1993, although the Bosniak government led President Izetbegovic and Prime Minister Silajdzic rejected the Geneva Plan, or so-called Owen-Stoltenberg Plan, Abdic advocated to accept the plan addressing “*the prosecution of this bloody war could result in the physical disappearance of our people (Bosniaks)*”⁶⁶⁴.

In September, he accused Izetbegovic for ‘bellicosity’, and called for a referendum on the Geneva Plan. Finally, Abdic proclaimed ‘Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia (APWB)’ on 27 September 1993. A few days later the first armed clashes between Abdic’s armed men and the ARBH occurred in Bihac, that was declared the capital of the APWB.⁶⁶⁵ Furthermore, Abdic signed ‘peace agreements’ with Mate Boban and Milosevic-Karadzic on 20-21 October 1993.⁶⁶⁶ Finally, Abdic’s army was destroyed by the Bosniak-Croat Alliance’s forces in August 1995, and Bihac was overrun by the Bosniak-Croat Alliance. Abdic left Bihac and settled Rijeka, where he enjoys the protection of the Croatian authorities.⁶⁶⁷

Furthermore, there were another inner conflicts in the Bosniak side. Sefer Halilovic (general staff officer of the ARBH until June 1993), Arif Pasalic (the commander of Mostar), Ramiz Drekovic (the commander of Bihac) were three important

⁶⁶³ Gow, op. cit., p. 37.

⁶⁶⁴ Bougarel, op. cit., p. 106.

⁶⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 107.

⁶⁶⁶ Bora, *Bosna-Hersek: ...*, op. cit., pp. 141-142.

⁶⁶⁷ Babuna, *Bir Ulusun Doğuşu*, op. cit., p. 204 and Allcock, Milivojevic, Horton (eds.), *Conflict In The Former Yugoslavia*, op. cit., p. 1.

figures in the ARBH army. When they conflicted with the PDA in 1993, they were purged by Izetbegovic and Silajdzic from the ARBH and the war government. Halilovic, known as the representative of the *Sandzak Lobby* within the ARBH, was replaced by Rasim Delic.⁶⁶⁸

Also, some Bosniak militarist groups and leaders, such as Musam Topolavic, known as Caco, and Ramiz Delalic, known as Celu, emerged during the war. They did not only fight against the Serbian forces but also they formed mafia and committed some serious crimes such as black-marketceering, racketceering, and smuggling. On 24 October 1993, the ARBH took military action against Caco and Celu, and defeated them. In this operation, 194 mafia soldiers were arrested by the ARBH.⁶⁶⁹

During the war, both Serbian and Croatian nationalism described the PDA as a fundamentalist Islamic party which aimed to establish a fundamentalist Islamic Republic in the hearth of Europe. Therefore, the nationalist Serbs and Croats insistently declared that they did not fight only in the interests of Serbs and Croats but also in the interest of the European civilization because they fought against fundamentalist Islam; and therefore, they protected European civilization against fundamentalist Islam.

However, this argument was not true because of three reasons: Firstly, the PDA, which was the most important and strongest representation of Bosniaks during the war, was (and is) not a fundamentalist Islamic party although it emphasized (and emphasizes) the concept of *Muslimanstvo* rather than *Bosnjastvo*.

Secondly, Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) are the most secularized Muslim community in the Muslim World. Only 17 percent of the Bosniaks described themselves as believers in the polls conducted during the 1980s.⁶⁷⁰ Also, the concept of *Bosnjastvo* prevailed the concept *Muslimanstvo* in the Bosniak community. Moreover, the Bosnian Islam has a background of experiences in dealing with the European civilization. This Islam belongs geographically, historically, ethnically and culturally to Europe not to the Asian or African

⁶⁶⁸ Bora, *Bosna-Hersek: ...*, op. cit., p. 139 and Bougarel, op. cit., p. 108.

⁶⁶⁹ O'Ballance, op. cit., p. 222.

⁶⁷⁰ Nation, R. Craig, "The Turcic and Other Muslim Peoples of Central Asia, the Caucasus, and the Balkans" in Vojtech Mastny & Craig R. Nation (eds.), *Turkey Between East And West*, Colorado: Westview Press, 1996, p. 120.

African Muslim World.⁶⁷¹ Hence, there was not any characteristics of Islamic fundamentalism in the Bosnian culture, and Bosnian Muslim people (Bosniaks) were (and are) against Islamic fundamentalism.

Finally, both the PDA and the MBO did not strive for foundation of an 'Islamic Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina' but they struggled against Serbian and Croatian nationalism with aim of preventing a probable occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Serbia and Croatia. However, although Bosniak side did not aim to establish a Islamic state/community in Bosnia-Herzegovina and although Bosniaks are the most secular community of the Muslim World, both the Croat and Serb nationalism, with aim of attracting the European public opinion and taking support from the European governments, claimed insistently that Bosniaks tried to found an Islamic state/community in Bosnia-Herzegovina through the Muslim World's aid against the European civilization.⁶⁷²

V. 5. iv. The International Intervention into Bosnia-Herzegovina

The Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina was recognized by the EU and U.S.A. in April 1992. The Bosnian crisis were held and discussed in the UN Assembly and Security Council during the war. These negotiations in the UN produced some measures and sanctions:⁶⁷³

The UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 755 of 20 May 1992 admitted the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina to membership in the UN. The UNSCR 757 of 30 May 1992 imposed political and economic sanctions on Serbia. The UNSCR 776 of September 1992 extended the UNPROFOR's mandate to Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁶⁷⁴ The UNSCR 781 of October 1992 established no-fly zone in Bosnian airspace. The UNSCRs 819 and 834 of April and May 1993 established Srebrenica, Tuzla, Gorazde, Bihac, Sarajevo, and Zepa as 'safe areas'. The UNSCR 827 of May 1993 established the International War Crime Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. The UNSCR 836 of June

⁶⁷¹ Balic, op. cit., p. 159.

⁶⁷² See Malcolm, op. cit., pp. 342-345.

⁶⁷³ Allcock, Milivojevic, Horton, *Conflict In The Former Yugoslavia*, op. cit., p. 302

⁶⁷⁴ In December 1994, the UNPROFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina involved 22,208 troops from 19 states. Turkey joined in the UNPROFOR with 1,462 troops. (See Table 10.4 in Ramet, *Balkan Babel*, op. cit., p. 226).

1993 authorized the UNPROFOR to protect the six safe areas. The UNSCR 998 of June 1995 authorized the deployment of the Rapid Reaction Force to reinforce the UNPROFOR.

The first significant meeting about the Bosnian War was held in London on 26-27 August 1992. Representatives from over 20 countries attended the London Conference. The conference issued a declaration covering matters such as recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina by all former Yugoslav republics, protection of territorial unity of Bosnia-Herzegovina, guarantees for minorities and rights of return refugees, plus the establishment of an internal peacekeeping force. Also, the conference condemned the Serb military forces' activities in Bosnia-Herzegovina and regarded the new Yugoslavia (FRY) as assailant side. In the London Conference, Izetbegovic, as the representative of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, appealed for military intervention or a lifting of the arm embargo that had been imposed in September 1991 on the whole of the former Yugoslavia by the UN. Yet, the Bosniak side's demands were not accepted by the conference.⁶⁷⁵

In April 1993, the Vance-Owen peace plan was devised by American Cyrus Vance, the UN peace envoy, and British Lord David Owen, the EU mediator. The plan divided up Bosnia-Herzegovina into 10 cantons on the basis of ethnicity and the historical contexts. According to plan, three of these cantons were to be mainly Bosniaks, three mainly Serbs, and three mainly Croat; and Sarajevo was to be governed by the three ethnic groups. Also, Sarajevo was to be seat of a weakened central government for Bosnia-Herzegovina. These plan was accepted by Croat side but Bosniaks and Serbs did not accept the plan.⁶⁷⁶

On 22 May 1993, the Washington Accord (or Program) was prepared and signed by the USA, Russia, Britain, France and Spain in Washington. This accord considered that sanctions against the FRY should continue; the safe areas would be expanded; the no-fly zone was to be retained; war crime tribunal was to be established and international assistance should be sent to monitor Serbia's borders with Bosnia. The Washington

⁶⁷⁵ See for more details Rossanet, Bertrand, *Peacemaking and Peacekeeping In Yugoslavia*, the Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1996, pp. 5-11 and Gow, op. cit., pp. 224-231.

⁶⁷⁶ See for more details Gow, op. cit., pp. 235-247 and O'Ballance, op. cit., pp. 136-139.

Accord was not welcomed and accepted by the three sides of the war. Izetbegovic, complaining that he had not been consulted, said the Washington Accord was unacceptable, and accused the international community of abandoning his country, of rewarding Serb aggression, and consigning the Bosniaks to the UN reservation. Also, Izetbegovic called for Western military intervention.⁶⁷⁷

One month later, the Geneva Conference was held in July 1993 among Izetbegovic, Milosevic and Tudjman. In the negotiations, mediators (Lord Owen and Norwegian Thornvard Stoltenberg) formed a peace plan which was called the Geneva Peace Plan or the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan. These plan divided Bosnia-Herzegovina into three parts on the basis of ethnicity. According to the plan, 53 percent, 30 percent, and 17 percent of the territory was given respectively to Serbs, Bosniaks and Croats. This plan was accepted by the Serb and Croat sides but rejected by the Bosniak government. The Owen-Stoltenberg Plan was modified at the end of 1993 in to 'European Union Action Plan'. The Action Plan gave the Serb side 49 percent of the territory, the Bosniak side 33.5 percent, and the Croat side 17.5 percent. The modified plan was again accepted by the Serbs and the Croats but rejected by the Bosniak side.⁶⁷⁸

The Vance-Owen and Owen-Stoltenberg plans were not accepted by both the PDA and the MBO since they suggested that the disintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina on the basis of ethnicity meant the destruction of Bosniak identity and nation. That is, they regarded the territorial unity of Bosnia-Herzegovina as the basic provision for protection of Bosniak nation and identity.

Also, these peace plans accelerated 'ethnic cleansing policy' and intensified the war because they cut the territory into administrative entities on the basis of ethnic majority. Therefore, the Serbian and Croatian militarist forces accelerated and intensified 'policy of ethnic cleansing' against Bosniaks in order to increase the number of regions where they were majority.⁶⁷⁹

On the other hand, there was a contradiction between the London Conference and the peace plans because although the London Conference supported the protection of

⁶⁷⁷ Gow, op. cit., pp. 167-169

⁶⁷⁸ *Unfinished Peace ...*, op. cit., p. 52.

⁶⁷⁹ Anciaux, op. cit., p. 185.

territorial unity of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the peace plans did not respect the unity of Bosnia-Herzegovina and did not aim to protect its unity. On the contrary, the plans involved partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina on the basis of ethnicity.⁶⁸⁰

At the end of 1993, the UN began to threaten Croatia with economic sanction because of its support to the CDC and CDF. Tudjman, in order to satisfy the UN, forced Boban to resign from his posts of president of the CDU and the CRHB. On 8 February 1994, Kresimir Zubak replaced Boban as president of the CDU and the CRHB.⁶⁸¹

In the same month, the American and German pressures over Tudjman and Izetbegovic resulted in the cease-fire between Croat and Bosniak forces on 23 February 1994. On 18 March, following the Bosniak-Croat cease-fire, the Croat and Bosniak sides signed the 'Washington Agreement' in Washington D. C., at a ceremony hosted by the U.S. President Clinton.

This agreement provided that "*Bosniaks and Croats, as constituent peoples and citizens of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the exercise of their sovereign rights, transform the internal structure of the territories with a majority of Bosniak and Croat population in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina into a Federation, which is composed of federal units with equal rights and responsibilities. The decisions on the constitutional status of the territories of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina with a majority of Serb population shall be made in the course of negotiations toward a peaceful settlement and at the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia*".⁶⁸²

The Washington Agreement was an accord on the creation of a Bosniak-Croat Federation within Bosnia-Herzegovina, with a further preliminary agreement for a confederation of this new federation with Croatia itself. According to the agreement, the Bosniak-Croat Federation's power was to be shared between the two ethnic groups, with provision for the rotation of the posts of president and prime minister between Bosniaks and Croats.

By the end of the month, the agreement had been ratified by the assemblies of

⁶⁸⁰ See Güneş, Nurşin Ateşoğlu, "Bosna-Hersek Sorunu ve Barış Görüşmeleri", in Gencer Özcan & Kemali Saybaşılı (eds.), *Yeni Balkanlar, Eski Sorunlar*, İstanbul: Bağlam Yayınları, 1997, p. 269-273.

⁶⁸¹ Bougarel, op. cit., p. 110.

⁶⁸² Rossanet, op. cit., p. 60.

Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina in Sarajevo and the CRHB in Mostar. Izetbegovic became the first president of the Bosniak-Croat Federation. Croat Kresimir Zubak was elected prime minister and Bosniak Eyup Ganic became deputy of prime minister.⁶⁸³

Also, as a portion of the Washington Agreement, the 'Confederation Agreement' was signed by presidents Tudjman of Croatia and Izetbegovic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It provided for a Confederal Council with rotating chair, as well as for moves toward economic and cultural cooperation and cooperation of defense policies.⁶⁸⁴

After the Washington Agreement, in July 1994, the Contact Group (Britain, France, Germany, Russia and the USA) prepared a plan that called for division of the territory between the newly founded Bosniak-Croat federation and the Bosnian Serbs on the basis of a 51 percent to 49 percent of the territory. The Serb forces at this time controlled some 70 percent of Bosnia. On 20 July 1994, Karadzic rejected the 51-49 percent territorial split; demanded guarantees for the Serbian corridors joining Serbia proper with Krajina; demanded access to the Adriatic Sea; and, most importantly, stressed that any acceptance of the plan must include provision for future review of the plan with the right of secession for the two constituent ethnic states. These demands were rejected by the Bosniak and Croat sides, and so, the Contact Group Plan failed.⁶⁸⁵

The Bosniak-Croat cease-fire and the Washington Agreement was a product of American and German diplomacy that forced the two sides to establish an alliance against the Serb side. Establishment of anti-Serb alliance between Bosniaks and Croats through the cease-fire and the Washington Agreement started the termination of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The Bosniak-Croat alliance has organized joint military operations against the Serb forces since the Washington Agreement, and this operations had damaged and weakened considerably the Serb military force by the 1995. On 22 July 1995, Izetbegovic and Tudjman met in Split and signed an agreement, so-called Split Declaration, that was supported by the US and German government, on military cooperation against the Serb

⁶⁸³ Babuna, *Bir Ulusun Doğuşu*: ..., op. cit., p. 207.

⁶⁸⁴ Allcock, Milivojevic, Horton (eds.), *Conflict In The Former Yugoslavia*, op. cit. p. 327.

⁶⁸⁵ See Economides, Spyros & Taylor, Paul, "Former Yugoslavia", in James Mnyall (ed.), *The New Interventionism, 1991-1994: United Nations Experience in Cambodia, Former Yugoslavia and Somali*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 85-87.

forces.⁶⁸⁶ The Split Declaration was followed by the Croat attack (the Operation Storm) on the RSK and the defeat of the SAK between 4-10 August 1995.

On the other hand, bitter inner conflicts began to emerge in the Serb side in 1994. Serbia, that was damaged greatly by the UN economic sanctions, in order to satisfy the UN, imposed economic sanctions on the Republika Srpska on 4 August 1994. As a reward for this, the UN reopened Belgrade airport for international flights, restarted the ferry from Bar (Montenegro) to Bari (Italy), and lifted sanctions in the spheres of cultural and sport exchange. Of course, this situation broke up cooperation and alliance between the Milosevic regime in Serbia and the Karadzic government in the Republika Srpska.⁶⁸⁷

Furthermore, in August 1995, Karadzic forced Ratko Mladic, commander of the ARS, to resign from his post. But, Mladic, who was fortified by the support of his officers, refused to resign. In the same time, the Serbian Patriotic Front, consisting of a number of opposition parties and supported by the army, demanded the resignation of Karadzic in October 1995.⁶⁸⁸

The overrunning of the safe areas of Srebrenica and Zepa by the Serbian forces in July 1995 brought the issue to a head and paved the way for NATO to take a central role in managing the crisis. The UNPROFOR was strengthened by the deployment of the Rapid Reaction Force and the withdrawal of the UN peacekeepers from vulnerable position; NATO began to plan for more widespread air strikes, and the dual-key arrangement with the UN was abandoned. After a Serb mortar attack on Sarajevo on 28 August 1995, which killed 37 civilians and wounded 88, NATO issued an ultimatum to the Serb forces to remove the artillery from the area surrounding Sarajevo or face reprisals. When the Serb forces did not comply, NATO initiated a three-week campaign of air strikes targeting the Serb military installations, communications centers and ammunition dumps. The Milosevic regime did not react to the attacks.⁶⁸⁹

Finally, (1) establishment of the Bosniak - Croat alliance under the Washington

⁶⁸⁶ See Osmançavuşoğlu, op. cit., pp. 215-216.

⁶⁸⁷ Teokarevic, Jovan, "Neither War nor Peace: Serbia and Montenegro in the First Half of the 1990s", in Dyker & Vejvoda (eds.), op. cit., p. 186.

⁶⁸⁸ Bougarel, op. cit., p. 112.

⁶⁸⁹ Kaufman, Joyce P., *NATO and the Former Yugoslavia: Crisis, Conflict, and the Atlantic Alliance*, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2002, pp. 119-120.

Agreement, (2) the NATO air strikes against the Bosnian Serb forces, (3) the inner conflicts within the nationalist Serb Alliance, and (4) the defeat of the SAK by the Croatian Army resulted in the Serb side agreeing to a cease-fire and eventually led to the Dayton Peace Accords.

V. 5. v. The Dayton Peace Accords and Foundation of the “Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina”

Complex series documents was negotiated at the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base of the U.S. Air Force, near Dayton, Ohio, between 1 and 21 November 1995. The documents were finally signed in Paris on 14 December 1995. The accords were signed by the representatives of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, respectively Izetbegovic, Tudjman and Milosevic.

Izetbegovic in the same day addressed that *“This (the Dayton Peace Accords) may not be a just peace, but it is more just than a continuation of war”*. Also, Tudjman stated that *“the agreement will result in lasting peace and create conditions for the establishment of a new world order in this part of the world”*. And Milosevic emphasized that *“the solutions achieved here include painful concessions by all sides”*.⁶⁹⁰

The Dayton Peace Accords⁶⁹¹ established the “Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina” as a federation, composed of two entities: the “Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (populated predominantly by Bosniaks and Croat ethnicity) and the “Republika Srpska (Serbian Republic)”. Its institution consists of a three-person Presidency (one Bosniak and one Croat elected directly from the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and one Serb from Republika Srpska, chairmanship rotating); a Council of Ministers (6 ministers that are nominated by the Presidency and endorsed by the House of Representatives, chairmanship rotating); a bicameral Parliamentary Assembly (House of Representatives involving 42 members directly elected: 28 from the Federation and 14 from Republika Srpska, and House of People involving 15 delegates: 5 Bosniaks, 5 Croats are delegated

⁶⁹⁰ Taylor, op. cit., p. 41.

⁶⁹¹ See for the Dayton Peace Accords Cousens, Elizabeth M. & Cater, Charles K., *Toward Peace In Bosnia: Implementing the Dayton Accords*, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001, pp. 33-51 ; *Birleşmiş Milletler Kararlarında Eski Yugoslavya ve Bosna-Hersek*, İstanbul: Dayanışma Vakfı Yayınları, 1996, pp. 271-292 and, for the full text of the accord, <http://www.ohr.int/gfa/gfa-home.htm>.

by the Federation House of People and 5 Serbs are delegated by the Republika Srpska National Assembly); a Constitutional Court and a Central Bank. The Constitutional Court is dominated by judge who is appointed by the European Court of Human Rights and who cannot be a citizen of Bosnia or neighboring states, and the Central Bank is run by an IMF appointee who cannot be a Bosnian citizen. According to the Dayton Accord, the constitutional structure of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina cannot be changed by the Parliamentary Assembly.

The Republic is responsible for external representation and affairs, including foreign trade; customs; monetary policy; international and inter-entity law enforcement; international and inter-entity transport and communications; coordination of the actions of the governments of the two entities; and execution of the decisions of the Parliamentary Assembly. It is answerable for its budget to the Parliamentary Assembly.

The Republika Srpska's institution consists of National Assembly (83 members directly elected); the Presidency (President and Vice-President directly elected) and the Government that is nominated by the Presidency and endorsed by the National Assembly. Also, there are Municipal Councils at the municipal level.

The Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina's institution consists of Federation House of Representatives (140 members directly elected); Federation House of People (80 members: 30 Bosniaks, 30 Croats, 20 others, delegated by Cantonal Assemblies); the Federation Presidency (President and Vice-President, 1 Croat and 1 Bosniak, nominated and endorsed by the Federation House of People, chairmanship rotating); the Federation Government that is nominated by the Federation Presidency and endorsed by the Federation House of Representatives. Also, unlike in the Republika Srpska, there are 10 cantons which have their own institutions of cantonal Presidency, Assembly and Government. In addition to these, there are also Municipal Councils at the municipal level.

The Dayton Peace Accords confirmed the central role of NATO in the Bosnia war and in the foundation of new Bosnian state. Under the Dayton Accords, NATO committed itself to deploy the Implementation Force (IFOR) in order to implement the Accords. The IFOR, that replaced the UNPROFOR at the end of December 1995, had a

maximum strength of 60,000 troops and involved 35 country (NATO's 16 members, plus forces from Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, and other countries such as Malaysia and Egypt). In contrast to the UNPROFOR, the IFOR had the mandate, military means, and political backing necessary to maintain the peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina and for the first time included the U.S. ground forces. In 1997, the IFOR was renamed the Stabilization Force (SFOR), and its size was reduced to 36,000 troops. Early in 1998, NATO members agreed to a further extension of the SFOR's mission with no clear time limit.⁶⁹²

Another important product of the Dayton Accords is "the Office of the High Representative (the OHR)".⁶⁹³ The OHR works under leadership of the "High Representative" who is nominated by the "Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council" and endorsed by the UN Security Council. The High Representative has not authority over the NATO-led military SFOR.

According to Article II of Annex 10 of the Dayton Accords, the OHR has seven tasks and authority: (1) To monitor the implementation of the peace settlement. (2) To maintain close contact with the parties to the Agreement and to promote their full compliance with all civilian aspects of the Agreement. (3) To coordinate the activities of the civilian organizations and agencies in Bosnia-Herzegovina and to ensure the efficient implementation of the civilian aspects of the peace settlement. (4) To facilitate, as the High Representative judges necessary, the resolution of any difficulties arising in connection with civilian implementation. (5) To participate in meetings of donor organizations. (6) To report periodically on progress to the UN, the EU, the USA, Russian Federation and other interested governments, parties and organizations. (7) Finally, to provide guidance to the UN International Police Task Force.

The OHR has grown from a small organization, comprising just the High Representative and some 60 staff, into a much larger body. At the end of 2000, the OHR employed 681 staff and 18 office throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina and one representation office in Brussels. The OHR's headquarters are in Sarajevo. The High Representative, his

⁶⁹² Allcock, Milivojevic, Horton (eds.), *Conflict In The Former Yugoslavia*, op. cit., pp. 119-120.

⁶⁹³ See for the Office of High Representative www.ohr.int.

Principal Deputy and his Senior Deputies and their cabinets are based in Sarajevo. In addition, the Sarajevo Office accommodates the Political, Economic and Legal Departments, Rule of Law Pillar, the Return and Reconstruction Task Force, the Military Cell, the Press Office and the Resources Department.

In the economic field, the OHR coordinates the repair and reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina's infrastructure, including its roads, bridges, airports, telephone networks and utilities. The reconstruction is financed under a 5.1 billion dollars World Bank / European Commission program. Apart from economic reform, which aims to integrate Bosnia-Herzegovina's economy into international capitalist relations, the OHR is also focusing on other issues such as refugee return, judicial and legal reform, the protection of human rights, educational reform, media reform, establishment of institutions of the state, establishment of public service broadcasting, and Bosnia-Herzegovina's integration into Europe.

On 8-9 December 1995, The Peace Implementation Council (PIC)⁶⁹⁴ was established by the Peace Implementation Conference in London. The PIC comprises 55 countries and agencies. The PIC has come together at the ministerial level five times to review progress and define the goals of implementation of the Agreement since the London Conference: in June 1996 in Florence; in December 1996 in London; in December 1997 in Bonn; in December 1998 in Madrid, and in May 2000 in Brussels. The PIC funds the OHR. Its budget in 2002 is 25,1 million Euro. Contributions to the OHR budget break down as follows: EU 53%, USA 22%, Japan 10%, Russia 4%, Canada 3%, the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) 2.5%, others 5.47%.

The London Peace Implementation Conference also established the "Steering Board of the PIC" work under the chairmanship of the High Representative as the executive arm of the PIC. The Steering Board members are Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, United Kingdom, United States, the Presidency of the European Union, the European Commission, and the OIC, which is represented by Turkey. The Steering Board, which nominates the High Representative, meets at the level of political directors every four to eight weeks and at the level of Foreign Ministers once a year.

⁶⁹⁴ See for the Peace Implementation Council www.ohr.int.

Among the most important milestones in the process of implementation of the Dayton Agreement was the PIC Conference that was held in December 1997 in Bone. The Bone Conference expanded the OHR's power to deciding the time, location and chairmanship of the government meetings; enacting measures that had not been accepted by the Bosnian official authorities; and dismissing elected officials at every level of government.

After the Dayton Peace Accords, the first general election for BiH House of Representatives was held in September 1996. This election was sponsored and supervised by the international community. This election repeated the results of the previous election in 1990. That is to say, the 1996 election reproduced again ethnic division of Bosnia-Herzegovina because the three nationalistic parties (the PDA, the SDP, the CDU) won 36 seats of the 42 seats in BiH House of Representatives. The SDP and the CDU came in second and third after the PDA with 45.2 (19 seats), 21.4 (9 seats) and 19.0 (8 seats) percent of the seats, respectively. The PDA and the CDU won respectively 54.2 and 25.3 percent of the votes in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the SDP won 54.5 percent of the votes in the Republika Srpska.⁶⁹⁵

The three nationalist leaders of Bosniak, Serb and Croat communities – respectively, Alija Izetbegovic, Momcil Krajisnik and Kresimir Zubak – were elected in the September 1996 elections and they formed a three-member presidency under the chairmanship of Izetbegovic, followed by the establishment of a common government for Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kresimir Zubak became President and Bosniak Eyup Ganic became Vice-President. The first prime minister of the Federation was Haris Silajdzic.⁶⁹⁶

On the other hand, in the Republika Srpska, in June 1996, as a result of the West's pressure, Karadzic stepped down as president of Republika Srpska and relinquished this office to Biljana Plavsic, who was supported by the West. Also, Karadzic stepped down as president of the SDP. Four months later, Plavsic dismissed General Ratko Mladic, the commander of the ARS during the war.⁶⁹⁷

⁶⁹⁵ Agh, op. cit., p. 218.

⁶⁹⁶ Babuna, "Değişen Boşnak Kimliği Üzerine", op. cit., p. 85.

⁶⁹⁷ Ramet, *Balkan Babel*, op. cit., p. 283.

Finally, it should be emphasized that the OHR has great power and authority in the Bosnian politics, and its power has increased since the Dayton Peace Accords at the expense of Bosnian people, elected representatives and the state's institutions. For example, in July 1997, the OHR dissolved the RS Parliamentary Assembly and overruled the RS constitutional court to force new elections. It then organized the selection of a governing coalition that excluded the largest party, the SDP. Furthermore, in March 1999, the High Representative dismissed the newly elected the RS president, Nikola Poplasen, and prevented the vice-president, Mirko Sarovic, from assuming his post. Then, Poplasen's Serb Radical Party was banned from competing in the state, the entity and the municipal elections in 2000. Also, in November 1999, the high representative dismissed nine mayors along with other local officials from the PDA, the SDP and the CDU. Also, neither the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina nor the Republika Srpska can determine their own economic policies. The economic policies of the new Bosnian state are prepared and carried out by IMF and the OHR. That is, the Bosnian state institutions and elected representatives have not power for determination and government of the Bosnian economy.⁶⁹⁸

V. 6. Costs and Results of the Wars

In the Croatian war, according to the Croatian official records, around 20,000 people were killed, 55,000 injured, 3,000 missing and 600,000 displaced.⁶⁹⁹ Before the war, Croatian economy had 1,690,000 people in employment, and in 1995 there were about 1 million; so, 690,000 jobs were lost as a result of the war.⁷⁰⁰ The war destroyed about 30 percent of the Croatia's industrial potential. Total material damage is estimated at between \$22 and \$25 billion. About 7800 miles of roads, or 38 percent of the total road network, was badly damaged. Dozens of important bridges were wrecked, including the bridge at Maslenica near the port of Zadar on the Adriatic coast, which carries the bulk of the tourist traffic to and from Dalmatia, Croatia's most important tourist region. Also, thousands of factories, schools, hospitals and churches were badly damaged or

⁶⁹⁸ See Chandler, David, "Bosnia: The Democracy Paradox", *Current History*, 2001, pp. 14-19.

⁶⁹⁹ Mesic, op. cit., p. 8.

⁷⁰⁰ Bilandzic, op. cit., p. 90.

destroyed by artillery and aerial attacks.⁷⁰¹

The most dramatic and bloody product of the collapse of socialist self-management system and of the disintegration of Yugoslavia was the Bosnian War. This war did not only damage Bosniaks but also the Bosnian Croats and Serbs. However, we should accept that the Bosniak side was more damaged than the Croat and Serb sides. The destructive effects of the Bosnian war are still continuing in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the present day.

According to Vladimir Zerjavic, the distinguished Zagreb demographer, 215,000 persons died in the Bosnian war between April 1992-December 1995 and that among the dead were about 160,000 Bosniaks, 30,000 Croats, and 25,000 Serbs. Moreover, although the bitterness of the Croat-Bosniak battles can not be denied, Zerjavic claims that only 2,000 Bosniaks were killed by Croat forces; the remaining 158,000 died at the hand of Serbian forces. Of the 30,000 Croats who lost their lives in the war, 2,000 were killed by the Bosniak forces and about 28,000 were killed by the Serbian forces, according to Zerjavic's calculations. And of the 25,000 Serbs who lost their lives in the war, Zerjavic estimates that about half of them were killed by the Bosniak forces and half by the Croat forces.⁷⁰²

In addition to these casualties, nearly 30,000-70,000 women were raped during the war.⁷⁰³ Also, about 1,300,000 – 2,000,000 Bosnian people emigrated as a result of the war. These people emigrated to Austria (54,700), Belgium (5,000), Croatia (184,000), Denmark (18,500), Germany (275,000), Macedonia (6,200), Slovenia (29,000), Slovakia (1,800), Sweden (50,000), Switzerland (11,100), Turkey (20,000), the Czech Republic (4,000).⁷⁰⁴ According to Declaration of the Political Directors of the PIC Steering Board on 30 January 2003, 900,000 people of them have returned and resettled in Bosnia-Herzegovina since 1996.⁷⁰⁵

Also, the economic life in Bosnia-Herzegovina was paralyzed by the war and, Bosnian

⁷⁰¹ Cviic, op. cit., p. 196.

⁷⁰² Ramet, *Balkan Babel*, op. cit., p. 239.

⁷⁰³ See for the rape issue in the Bosnian war Alkan, Necmettin, *Dağılan Yugoslavya Mozağinde Bosna*, Istanbul: Beyan Yayınları, 1995, pp. 93-113.

⁷⁰⁴ Kümbetoğlu, Belkıs, "Göçmen Sığınmacı Gruplardan Bir Kesit: Bulgaristan Göçmenleri ve Bosnalı Sığınmacılar", in Saybaşılı & Özcan (eds.), op. cit., pp. 243-244.

Bosnian people still suffer from the economic problems that resulted from the war:

417,000 houses were destroyed during the war and, the war increased number of unemployed people to 700,000.⁷⁰⁶ According to the World Bank, about one-third of Bosnia's health facilities, half of its schools, and about two-thirds of its housing were destroyed during the war. Much of the transportation and telecommunications systems were destroyed, and in 1997, industrial production stood at about 10 percent of prewar levels.⁷⁰⁷ Unemployment pegged at 50 percent in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and at 90 percent in the Republika Srpska in 1996.⁷⁰⁸

In 2003, according to the Institutes of Statistics of the Federation and the Republika Srpska, there were 420,000 unemployed people in the Bosnian economy; and 20 percent of the population was below the poverty line as internationally defined, and another 30 percent of the population was close to it. Also, trade deficit was 4,466 million KM. Mafia, organized crime, smuggling, drug, prostitution, bribe, tax evasion are other important problems of the current Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁷⁰⁹

Even though religion and religious differences played role in the Bosnian War, it is absolutely wrong to describe the Bosnian War as a 'religious and cultural conflict/clash among Muslim Bosniaks-Orthodox Serbs-Catholic Croats'⁷¹⁰ because of three reasons:

⁷⁰⁵ See for this declaration www.ohr.int.

⁷⁰⁶ Karatay, Osman, *Ba'de Harabi'l Bosna*, Istanbul: İz Yayıncılık, 1997, p. 87.

⁷⁰⁷ Ramet, *Balkan Babel*, op. cit., p. 280.

⁷⁰⁸ Cohen, Lenard J., "Whose Bosnia? The Politics of Nation Building", *Current History*, 617, 1998, p. 111.

⁷⁰⁹ See for economic indicators of Bosnia-Herzegovina's economy www.ohr.int.

⁷¹⁰ Samuel Huntington argues that "*fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principle conflict of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future*". (Huntington, op. cit., p. 22).

So, according to this hypothesis, the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia were respectively the Catholic Slovene-Orthodox Serb, the Catholic Croat-Orthodox Serb, and the Muslim Bosniak-Orthodox Serb-Catholic Croat wars. That is, Huntington maintains that these wars resulted from cultural and religious differences and conflicts among such nations. Therefore, according to his assumption, the Slovenian, Croatian and Bosnian wars were cultural and religious clashes among the Serbs, Croat, Slovene and Bosniak nations. (See Huntington, op. cit., pp. 33, 37-38).

Also, like Huntington, the Croat nationalist liberal leader Tudjman viewed the Bosnian War as a 'clash of civilization': "*The Yugoslav experience showed that cultural divides and constraints turned out of be decisive – so strong that the common state proved not viable. The current fault-line overlaps with those of the Roman Empire (Theodosian line) between Rome, Byzantium, and Islam, as well as with the*

First of all, there were bitter inner conflicts and contradictions in the Serb, Bosniak and Croat sides. These inner conflicts and contradictions illustrates the complexity of the war in Bosnia and suggests that it cannot be viewed as a religious and cultural clash alone.

Secondly, during the war, some common civil organizations, associations, cooperation and demonstrations were formed by the Bosnian Bosniaks, Serbs and Croats against the militarist nationalist policies in order to prevent the war. Also, they extremely opposed any partition of Bosnia between Serbia and Croatia.

And finally, some Serb politicians and generals took place in the Bosniak war government and in the ARBH. They supported independence and territorial unity of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and for this purpose, fought against the Serb and Croat nationalist militarist forces that aimed to occupy Bosnia-Herzegovina. For example, a lot of the Sarajevo Serbs defended Sarajevo together with Bosniaks against the Serbian military forces during the siege. Serbs formed 30 percent of the Sarajevo defense force against the Serb siege. Also, the second commander of the Sarajevo defense force was a Bosnian Serb Jovan Divjak.⁷¹¹

All of them shows that the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was not a religious and cultural clash, and did not spring from religious and cultural differences/contradictions. Also, it should be pointed that despite the religious differences, there is close cultural, linguistic and ethnical affinity among the Yugoslav peoples (Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Bosniaks, Macedonians and Montenegrins). And this affinity played an important role in foundation of both the first and second Yugoslavia, and organization of the communist Partisan Movement in the Second World War.

In fact, both the Bosnian and Croatian wars were products of economic and political aims of the Serbian and Croatian nationalist liberal bureaucratic-technocratic ruling classes which aimed to promote their political and economic position through establishing capitalist "Greater Serbia" and capitalist "Greater Croatia". Hence, the

border between the Ottoman and the Habsburg empires. And the region where this divide of civilizations is most palpable, Bosnia-Herzegovina, produced one of the most powerful crisis of today". (Unfinished Peace ..., op. cit., p. 16).

⁷¹¹ Bora, *Bosna-Hersek:...*, op. cit., 158.

Milosevic and Tudjman regimes played more important and determinative role than the religious/cultural differences in the wars. That is to say, the nationalist liberal alliance of Croatian Croats-Bosnian Croats and the nationalist liberal alliance of Serbian Serbs - Bosnian Serbs exploded war in Bosnia-Herzegovina for they aimed to create a capitalist "Greater Croatia" or a capitalist "Greater Serbia".

The Bosnian war was ended by the Dayton Peace Accords that was prepared and imposed by the Great Powers (the EU and the USA). It not only ended the war but also created "Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina" involving two entities, the 'Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina' and the 'Republika Srpska'. The new Bosnian state constructed by the Dayton Accord is an independent state in the accord papers, but in reality, it is a 'mandate state' which is controlled and governed by the Great Powers through the OHR and the SFOR. Also it is a very 'fragile state' since nationalism has not be abolished or minimized in the Bosnian politics.

The Great Powers' intervention⁷¹² in the Bosnia-Herzegovina through the OHR and the SFOR was generally regarded as the essential provision for protection peace and integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In fact, although it stopped the war, the Great Powers' intervention through the OHR and the SFOR affected the Bosnian state and peoples negatively because of four reasons: Firstly, it disempowers the Bosnian people, political parties and elected representatives at the political sphere. Secondly, it hinders improvement of negotiations about internal affairs among Bosniak, Serb and Croat sides. Thirdly, the intervention prevents development of the Bosnian state institutions. Finally, presence of the OHR and the SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina institutionalizes and intensifies political, economic and regional fragmentation in the country.

Although the Serbo-Croat War in Croatia and the Bosnian War did not extend over the Serbian and Montenegrin territories, the Serbian and Montenegrin people suffered severely from the wars as the Serbian and Montenegrin economies were damaged extensively by the UN economic sanctions between May 1992 and 1996. The economic sanctions deepened the economic crisis of the 1980s and deteriorated sharply

⁷¹² Simon Jenkins, a London Times columnist, defined the 'Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina' as "*world capital of interventionism*". (Chandler, op. cit., p. 116).

the standard of living of the Serbian and Montenegrin peoples. In 1992 when economic sanctions were introduced on the FRY, Serbian and Montenegrin social product fell 26 percent in comparison with the previous year, and in 1993 it went down by another 30 percent. While Serbia and Montenegro had a \$3,300 per capita social product in 1990, in 1993 it was only \$700 and in 1994 \$1,100. Also, unemployment grew considerably: out of the 10,500,000 inhabitants of Serbia and Montenegro, 720,000 were unemployed in 1995. In 1994, 2,100,000 people, more than one-third of the Serbian population, were officially below the poverty line. This figure had been 360,000, or 6.23 percent of the Serbian population, in 1990.

Furthermore, the sanctions curtailed the dinar's value and increased inflation sharply. In 1991, 5,000 dinars had a value of \$550, while three weeks after the sanctions, their value dropped to \$2.70. By May 1993, one year after the imposition of sanctions, inflation was at 205 percent monthly. In August, it rose to 1,880 percent monthly. The Serb government calculated that the total damage inflicted by the sanctions amounted to \$45 billion.

It was more serious that, in two pediatric hospitals in Belgrade, 141 patients died in the course of 1993 because of shortage of medicines and surgical materials, which was 80 more than in 1991. The mortality rate of the elderly was five times higher in 1993 than it had been in 1986. Twice as many people died in Serbia from infectious diseases and diabetes between 1991 and 1993 than in the previous two years. Furthermore, as a result of shortage, nearly 50 percent of Belgrade's schoolchildren were anemic and 26 percent of the children in Nis were undernourished.⁷¹³

The economic sanctions, which damaged Serbian economy and impoverished the Serb people, had effect of strengthening the nationalist mood among the people, since sanctions were perceived as unjust and representing persecution of the Serbian people. That is, they felt that the Great Powers was punishing the Serb nation and considered the sanctions as 'international conspiracy' and 'genocide' against the Serbs. This feeling and attitude of the Serb people was especially reinforced by the Serbian media that was

⁷¹³ These figures were quoted from Bookman, *op. cit.*, pp. 78-80, 114-118 and Teokarevic, *op. cit.*, pp. 187-188.

controlled by the Milosevic regime. Thus, the sanctions drew people closer to the Milosevic regime, not further away. The Milosevic regime, in return, capitalized on the sanctions, bolstering public morale by encouraging the people to in history stand up to outside powers that were imposing injustice on the Serb nation. So, the economic sanctions on the FRY fed the Serbian nationalism and aggressiveness.⁷¹⁴

Another result of the economic and arms sanctions was about the power balance in the Balkans. The sanctions damaged and weakened greatly the Serb army and economy, and thus, affected and altered the power structure in the Balkans.⁷¹⁵

Finally, we should emphasize that during the wars in Croatia and Bosnia, the Serbian and Croatian nationalist liberalism carried out ethnic-cleansing as political tool for creation of capitalist "Greater Serbia" and capitalist "Greater Croatia". For this purpose, likewise in the period of World War II, the Serb nationalist military forces attacked on non-Serb peoples and the Croat nationalist military forces on non-Croat peoples. Furthermore, they assaulted cultural and intellectual works such as libraries, museums, archives, mosques and churches. For this reason, the wars resulted in not only deaths and economic destruction, but also destruction of the civilian / social values and degeneration of the intellectual / spiritual life since the Serbian and Croatian nationalist liberalism aimed to destroy everything that might be an obstacle to capitalist "Greater Serbia" and "Greater Croatia". Thus, the wars in Croatia and Bosnia which sprang from the Serbian and Croatian nationalist liberalism generated and increased hatreds among the Serb, Croat and Bosniak peoples.

⁷¹⁴ Bookman, *op. cit.*, p. 122 and Teokarevic, *op. cit.*, p. 186.

⁷¹⁵ Bookman, *op. cit.*, p. 133.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

The Serbo-Croat relations in Yugoslavia had two opposite and contradictory aspects: *cooperation* and *conflict*. The Serbo-Croat cooperation had *constructive*, while the Serbo-Croat conflict had *destructive* effects in the both first and second Yugoslavia.

The first Serbo-Croat cooperation was set up in the period of World War I, 1915-1918, and played a constructive role in the foundation of the First Yugoslavia (the Kingdom of Yugoslavia). However, soon thereafter the foundation of the First Yugoslavia in 1918, the cooperation was transformed into conflict between the Serbian nationalism and the Croatian nationalism.

The Serbian nationalism favored centralization of the state and country, while the Croat side was in favor of federalization of the state and creation a federated Croat Republic within the Kingdom. Also, some nationalist Croat groups such as the Ustasha supported creation an independent "Greater Croatia". Moreover, some nationalist Serb groups such as Nikola Pasic's Serbian Radical Party regarded the foundation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia as a milestone for creation a "Greater Serbia". The Serbo-Croat conflict in the First Yugoslavia culminated in the 1929 royal coup and the assassination of King Aleksander Karadjordjevic by the Ustasha Party in 1934.

This conflict between centralist-nationalist Serbs and federalist-nationalist Croat dominated and paralyzed the Yugoslav politics in the interwar period. Although the 1939 *Sporazum* between the Cvetkovic government and Macek's Croatian Peasant Party softened the conflict and the political life, the fragile First Yugoslavia destroyed by the Axis occupation in April 1941.

During the Second World War, the Chetnik Movement led by Draza Mihailovic and the Serb government-in-exile in London aimed to liberate the country and then to create "Greater Serbia" under the Karadjordjevic dynasty. However, the Ustasha Movement and Croatian nationalism, thanks to the German and Italian support, established the Independent State of Croatia involving Croatia, Dalmatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The Chetniks assaulted the non-Serb population, while the Ustasha on the non-

Croat population. The Chetniks carried out 'policy of ethnic cleansing' in order to found "Greater Serbia", while the Ustasha pursued the same policy for establishment of "Greater Croatia". Of course, the Chetnik and the Ustasha terror deepened the Serbo-Croat conflict and weakened the 'idea of Yugoslavism'.

Both in the interwar period and during the Second World War, the most important, close and effective Serbo-Croat cooperation was achieved within the YCP and the Partisan Movement. Of course, the Yugoslav communist movement did not only include the Serb and Croat communists, but the largest and the most influential actors of the YCP were the Belgrade and Zagreb branches of the party.

Although, in the interwar period, some disagreements emerged between the Belgrade and Zagreb branches of the party, the communist Serbs and Croats struggled together against both the Serbian and Croatian nationalism and the Karadjordjevic dynasty in order to overthrow the existing regime and to achieve 'socialist Yugoslav revolution'. After the Axis occupation in April 1941, the YCP formed the Partisan troops in order to liberate the country and then to realize socialist revolution. During the war, the communist Partisans did not only fight against the occupying Axis armies led by Germany, but also against the Chetnik and the Ustasha armies. They collaborated with the Germans and Italians in order to destroy the Partisan troops and to prevent any probable socialist revolution since the Chetniks and the Ustasha regarded the YCP and the Partisan Movement as the most serious obstacle for creation of "Greater Serbia" and "Greater Croatia". For this reason, both Chetniks and the Ustasha collaborated with occupying German and Italian armies and attacked on the Partisan troops. As a result, the Partisans led by the YCP fought against the occupying armies in order to liberate the country and against the Serbian and Croatian nationalism in order to achieve socialist revolution after the liberation. That is, communist Serbs and Croats established a cooperation within the Partisan Movement and the YCP, and fought together against the occupying armies, the Serb Chetniks and the Croat Ustasha during the war.

After the Partisan victory, the YCP founded the Second Yugoslavia. The Second Yugoslavia was founded as "Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia" on 29 November 1945, and its name was changed into "Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia" by

the 1963 Constitution. So, the Sebo-Croat cooperation within the YCP played a constructive role in the liberation of the country and foundation of the Second (Socialist) Yugoslavia.

Since the Baise Law of 27 June 1950, the socialist regime tried to demolish 'exploitation of man by man' and to construct a 'classless society' in the Yugoslav Federation through the 'system of socialist self-management'. Between 1950-1980, the socialist self-management system achieved a considerable successes and development at the economic, political, cultural and intellectual levels, and established institutions for the working people's participation in the government of the economic, political and social life in order to remove 'exploitative relations' and to create 'classless society'.

For the socialist self-management system, "*the real threat came not from without, but from within*".⁷¹⁶ This 'treat coming from within' was the bureaucracy. The real enemy of the working people's self-management was not imperialism or the old society's ruling classes but 'upper bureaucrats' who controlled the state and party apparatuses.⁷¹⁷ This native enemy was called by Milovan Djilas as the *New Class*.⁷¹⁸

But this upper strata did not consist of only 'upper burcaucrats' but also 'managers of enterprises and banks'. So, James Simmie called this upper strata involving bureaucrats and technocrats as 'political and managerial elite' who controlled decision-making process in the political and economic life.⁷¹⁹ Fred Singleton explained this 'political-managerial elite' as 'red bourgeoisie' in his book in 1976: "*In each republic there began to develop a local 'red bourgeoisie', each with its political power base in the republican League of Communists and its economic base in the local industrial enterprises and banks. This was particularly in evidence in Croatia, but it also affected the other republics*".⁷²⁰

I calls this upper strata (the enemy of the socialist self-management system and working people) as "bureaucratic-technocratic ruling class (btrc)" that controlled political, economic, educational and media means. Benjamin Barber emphasizes that when

⁷¹⁶ Bennett, op. cit., p. 77.

⁷¹⁷ Horvat, op. cit., p. 74.

⁷¹⁸ See for more details Djilas, *the New Class*, op. cit.

⁷¹⁹ Simmie, op. cit., p. 8.

⁷²⁰ Singleton, op. cit., p. 272.

when citizens are expelled from the political sphere and power, it is occupied, controlled and governed by judges, bureaucrats and brigands.⁷²¹ In the case of Socialist Yugoslavia, in order to empower and protect their economic and political position / power, the upper bureaucrats and technocrats expelled the working people from the political, economic, educational and media spheres, and occupied, controlled, and governed these spheres.⁷²² So, especially since 1970, the political and economic position and power of the working people has continuously and dramatically weakened and declined because of the rise of the btrc.

The ideological basis of the btrc was 'nationalist liberalism'. Nationalist upper bureaucrats-technocrats, in order to maximize their self-power and self-interests, tried to empower their own republic's economic and political power at the expense of the others. Unavoidably, this nationalist attitude damaged and weakened sharply the 'idea of Yugoslavism' based on the principle of 'Bratstvo i Jedinstvo (Brotherhood and Unity)'.

But also, the btrc was 'liberal' since the upper bureaucrats-technocrats aimed to destroy the socialist self-management system, to reconstruct capitalism and to integrate the country into international capitalist relations in order to empower their economic and political position, that is, to promote their position from the btrc to the 'capitalist ruling class'. This liberal aim was achieved in the 1980s through implementation of neo-liberal economic policies. Also, the reconstruction of capitalism in Yugoslavia and its integration into international capitalist relation was supported by the capitalist core states. So, in the 1980s, an economic and political cooperation was established between the Yugoslav btrc and the capitalist core states. That is, the capitalist core states played an important role in the collapse of the self-management system and reconstruction of capitalism in Yugoslavia. Although the Yugoslav workers opposed the neo-liberal policies through organizing strikes, the neo-liberal policies and reconstruction of capitalism could not be hindered. In other words, the Yugoslav working people had not enough power to protect and develop the self-management system against the btrc-core capitalist states alliance.

Thus, the rise of Serbian and Croatian nationalist liberalism in the 1980s based on

⁷²¹ Barber, Benjamin R., *Güçlü Demokrasi: Yeni Bir Çağ İçin Katılımcı Siyaset*, trans. Mehmet Beşikçi, İstanbul: Ayrıntı Yayınları, 1995. p. 152.

⁷²² See Vuskovic, op. cit., pp. 142-144.

the Serbian btrc and the Croatian btrc. The Serbian btrc formed the nationalist liberal Milosevic regime in order to create a "Greater Capitalist Serbia", while the Croatian btrc formed the nationalist liberal Tujman regime in order to create a "Greater Capitalist Croatia". So, both the Milosevic and Tujman regimes were representatives of the nationalist liberal btrc in Serbia and Croatia.

The Milosevic and Tujman regimes had a common target: destruction of the self-management system and reconstruction of capitalism. Hence, the Serbian and Croatian btrc cooperated in the destruction of self-management and reconstruction of capitalism, and both of them supported the neo-liberal economic reforms in the 1980s. But also they had extremely opposite and contradictory targets: The Serbian btrc led by the Milosevic regime aimed to found "Greater Serbia", while the Croatian btrc led by the Tujman regime desired a "Greater Croatia". This conflict (the Greater Serbia versus the Greater Croatia) produced at first the Serbo-Croat War in Croatia and then the Bosnian War in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

For this reason, these two wars were not 'the return of ancestral hatreds' or 'clash of civilization' but the conflict/clash between Serbian btrc and Croatian btrc. The Serbian and Croatian btrc fed and spread nationalistic ideas and sentiments among the Serb and Croat peoples through using political, economic educational and media means that were controlled and managed by them. Both the Milosevic and Tujman regimes tried to feed 'nationalistic hatreds' in order to destroy critical thinking⁷²³, the 'Bratstvo i Jedinstvo', the idea of Yugoslavism, and finally to prepare and concentrate the public opinion for war for "Greater Serbia" and "Greater Croatia". That is, national hatreds and hostility between Serb and Croat peoples were provoked by the governments before the wars⁷²⁴ in order to use the peoples for their projects: establishment of "Greater Capitalist Serbia" and "Greater Capitalist Croatia". The Serbian and Croatian btrc led by the Milosevic and Tujman regimes became successful in this work because a ruling/sovereign class which controls and manage economic, political, educational and media means is also able to produce and spread its own ideology, to establish ideological hegemony over people and

⁷²³ Kecmanovic, op. cit., pp. 133-134.

⁷²⁴ Julliard, op. cit., p. 60.

to control and managed public opinion.⁷²⁵

In short, *the Serbo-Croat cooperation* played a *constructive role* in the foundation of both the First and Second Yugoslavia, while *the Serbo-Croat conflict* played a *destructive role* in paralyzing of the First Yugoslavia, collapse of the socialist self-management system in the Second Yugoslavia, and disintegration of the Second Yugoslavia.

⁷²⁵ See Marx & Engels, *Alman Ideolojisi*, op. cit., pp. 70-74 and Uras, Ufuk, *İdeolojilerin Sonu mu?*, İstanbul: Sarmal Yayınevi, 1997, pp. 67-71.

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