

POLITICS OF TRANSIT IN TURKEY:
ANALYSIS OF BILATERAL ENERGY RELATIONS
WITH RUSSIA AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

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2021

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Thesis submitted to the
Institute for Graduate Studies in Social Sciences
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

in

Political Science and International Relations

by

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2021

ABSTRACT

Politics of Transit in Turkey:

Analysis of Bilateral Energy Relations with Russia and the European Union

Turkey is a strategic transit country located on the routes of energy flow between the leading supplier and the largest market in the region, Russia and the European Union (EU). Taking advantage of this geopolitical virtue, it aims to serve as a hub-and-spoke network that would transfer Russian gas to Europe, which is also vital to meet its domestic energy needs. Being both an aspiring energy hub and an import-dependent country, the long-term stability in bilateral relations with market actors is a must for Turkey. However, ironically, Turkey's bilateral relations with Russia and the EU have been rather chaotic and characterized by political rifts and crises in recent years.

Nevertheless, Turkey has been fairly able to maintain its energy security and develop even more ambitious energy policies in the last two decades. That begs the question: how does Turkey maintain the energy cooperation with regional energy actors even though its bilateral relations are mostly problematic? I argue that Turkey has maintained energy cooperation thanks to the compartmentalization strategy, which allows Turkey to isolate the cooperation areas from conflicts. The case study analysis of Turkey's bilateral relations with Russia and the EU shows that compartmentalization would allow Turkey to 1) secure its long-term economic interests; 2) bypass regional, ideational, and structural conflicts; and 3) conduct quick reconciliation in the aftermath of crises. The comparison of Russia and the EU cases shows that compartmentalization would produce mostly similar outcomes, if not identical.

ÖZET

Türkiye’de Enerji Transit Siyaseti:

Rusya ve Avrupa Birliği’yle İkili İlişkilerin Analizi

Türkiye, bölgesindeki en büyük enerji tedarikçisi Rusya ve en büyük enerji ithalatçısı Avrupa Birliği (AB) arasında yer alan stratejik bir transit ülkedir. Enerji tüketiminde Rusya’ya bağımlı olan Türkiye aynı zamanda jeopolitik konumundan yararlanarak Rus gazını Avrupa’ya aktaran bir enerji dağıtım merkezi olmayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu koşullarda piyasa aktörleri ile ikili ilişkilerde uzun vadeli istikrar Türkiye’nin enerji güvenliği açısından bir zorunluluk olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır. Fakat, Türkiye’nin Rusya ve AB ile olan son yıllardaki ikili ilişkileri, ironik bir şekilde, siyasi anlaşmazlıklar ve krizlerle şekillenmektedir. Buna rağmen, Türkiye’nin enerji güvenliğinin son yirmi yılda kayda değer bir zarara uğramaması, hatta ikili enerji işbirliklerinde büyük gelişmeler kat etmesi ilgi çekici unsurlar olarak ortaya çıkıyor. Türkiye, dışa bağımlı bir transit ülke olarak, ikili ilişkilerinde sorunlar yaşasa da bölgesel aktörlerle enerji işbirliğini nasıl sürdürebiliyor? Bu tez, Türkiye’nin anlaşmazlıklara rağmen ikili enerji işbirliklerini devam ettirebilmesini kompartımanlaştırma stratejisi bağlamında açıklamayı amaçlamaktadır. Rusya ve AB ile ikili ilişkileri nitel durum çalışmalarıyla inceleyen tez, kompartımanlaştırma stratejisinin işbirliği alanlarını çatışma alanlarından izole ederek dış siyasette Türkiye’nin 1) uzun vadeli ekonomik çıkarlarını güvence altına almasına; 2) bölgesel, düşünsel ve yapısal çatışmaları zarar görmeden atlmasına; ve 3) krizlerin ardından uzlaşma süreçlerini hızlandırmasına yardımcı olduğu sonucuna ulaşmaktadır. Tez, kompartımanlaştırma stratejisinin Rusya ve AB ile ikili ilişkiler bağlamlarında çoğunlukla benzer sonuçlar ürettiğini göstermektedir.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank Gün Kut for their valuable guidance making up my mind in writing this thesis. Also, I am grateful to Zühre Aksoy and Akın Ünver, who made insightful comments about my thesis with utmost constructiveness. I valued each and every piece of experience in this process, which rendered my thesis writing period into an elevating – yet fun journey.

My completion of this thesis could not have been accomplished without the doubtless support of my amazing family. I thank my parents, Neriman and Gültekin, who have always been role models in my life, encouraging me in all circumstances. Likewise, I thank my brothers, Serhat and Sabri, for putting their unconditional support for what I am doing.

Salih Tosun deserves special thanks for being my fellow traveler in this journey, provoking and enriching my intellectual processes in thesis writing. Also, I thank Ahmet Utku Akbıyık, who inspired me a lot as a friend and guide, and Mehmet Onur Şahin for accompanying me during my master's years.

I thank Emir, more than a flatmate, for listening to every single detail about my journey with patience, and Samed Bayraktutan for making this process way more fun. A big thanks to Çağrı, my brother, for always having my back whatever it takes, so glad I have you.

Also, I would like to thank Alara, Alperen, Berat, Buse, Cansu, Diler, Emin, Linda, Salih E., Taron, and my friends in MoF and Brotherhood chat groups for being a part of this journey. Moreover, I would like to express my thanks to TÜBİTAK for facilitating my master's study by providing financial support.

Last but not least, a note and thanks to myself: keep up the good work.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AKP	Justice and Development Party (<i>Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi</i>)
BTE	Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum Pipeline
EU	European Union
IEA	International Energy Agency
LNG	Liquefied Natural Gas
MFA	Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
RoC	Republic of Cyprus
UN	United Nations

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Turkey is a strategic transit country located on the routes of energy flow between the leading supplier and the largest market in the region, Russia, and the European Union (EU). Taking advantage of this geopolitical virtue, it aims to serve as a hub-and-spoke network that would transfer Russian gas to Europe, which is also vital to meet its domestic energy needs. Being both an aspiring energy hub and an import-dependent country, the long-term stability in bilateral relations with market actors is a must for Turkey. However, ironically, Turkey's bilateral relations with Russia and the EU have been rather chaotic and characterized by political rifts and crises in recent years.

Apparently, Turkey has been fairly able to maintain its energy security and develop even more ambitious energy policies in the last decade. That begs the question: how does Turkey, as a transit country, maintain the energy cooperation with global energy actors even though its bilateral relations have been mostly problematic? Putting the conflict-ridden characteristics of Turkey's recent foreign policy outlook at the center of the discussion, I will elaborate on Turkey's foreign policy patterns in bilateral relations with Russia and the EU. While doing this, the research will explore how Turkey maintains energy collaboration with Russia, and the EU, despite unstable relations characterized by rifts and crises.

I will elaborate on energy relations by taking it as a key aspect of foreign policymaking. It is one of the most critical elements affecting the bilateral relations because the supply-demand chain between Russia, Turkey, and the EU is subjected to a complex interdependence in which the actors are politically and economically

dependent on each other in terms of energy. The study will try to illuminate energy's role and further investigate how Turkey maintains its bilateral relations under such interconnectedness, which is liable to reciprocal costs in the case of conflict.

To make sense of this complicated picture of diverging interests, geopolitical dynamics, and multiple actors in a complex interdependent setting, I will discuss the energy security concerns of the actors in detail. As a context-specific concept, energy security requires a contextual interpretation according to the dynamics of each country. Hence, the thesis will provide an in-depth analysis of Turkey's bilateral relations to explore the complex geopolitical underpinnings of the energy security framework within the Russia-Turkey-the EU triangle.

Then, what is key to understanding the continuity in Turkey's energy relations in the face of controversies? I argue that compartmentalization would play a critical role in facilitating the stability in energy relations. Here, the term compartmentalization refers to the phenomenon that Turkey is following a foreign policy agenda where energy has been considered as an independent policy area fragmented from other issues in foreign policymaking. I will analyze the compartmentalization strategy in Turkey's politics of transit, which would provide key insights to understand how energy cooperation remained effective even under politically unpleasant circumstances.

As my purpose is to illuminate the interaction between energy compartmentalization and Turkish foreign policymaking in such a complicated web of relations comprised of interwoven interests and reciprocal costs of non-cooperation, I will ground my arguments in the light of the complex interdependence theory. According to the theory, the complex interdependence among actors is tended to be asymmetric mostly. However, because there are reciprocal costs of

conflict under complex interdependence, the vulnerable actors would also influence the outcomes. Highlighting the role of complex interdependences in international relations, the theory suggests that the concept of power needs to be considered through the ability to influence outcomes, rather than a traditional perspective defining the power by military capacity.

Thinking of Turkey's puzzling situation with Russia and the EU as a transit country, I will try to explore its ability to influence stormy bilateral relations while preserving its energy interests thanks to compartmentalization. The study will contribute to the literature on many points. Firstly, the politics of transit is a critical aspect of energy politics, albeit mostly overshadowed by the supply and demand processes. I will argue that transit countries are more than passive passageways whose agency requires attention. Also, compartmentalization is another understudied concept, although it is useful for Turkey to sustain its relations amid conflicts. I will elaborate on compartmentalization in detail and explore its dynamics interacting with the politics of transit. Furthermore, the literature on Turkey's energy relations with the EU is mostly descriptive, often lacks analytical depth and comparative perspective. Rather, I will provide an in-depth articulation of the bilateral relations and their interplay with energy security concerns by suggesting a comparison with the Russian case regarding compartmentalization's outcomes.

1.1 Outline of the thesis

The study is comprised of six chapters. After this brief introduction, the first chapter will provide a detailed historical background of Turkey, Russia, and the EU's energy relations. This chapter will help to acknowledge why energy has vital importance for the interaction among these actors and how puzzling Turkey's foreign policy is. It

will explain the dynamics of complex interdependent setting among the actors, hence do the groundwork for a better understanding of the puzzle that will be analyzed through compartmentalization strategy.

Then, I will provide a literature review in the second chapter. Here, the concept of energy security will be discussed as a key matter to analyze foreign policy dynamics in the region. Moreover, I will cover the literature on Turkey's bilateral relations with Russia, and the EU, which will illuminate the complex interdependence, including energy dependence, that emerged throughout the years.

Given this, the third chapter will offer a detailed elaboration on the theoretical framework forming the basis of the thesis, namely the complex interdependence theory. Along the same line, I will propose the concept of politics of transit as a theoretical tool to direct the focus on Turkey's transit role in the regional energy cooperation. In light of the provided historical and theoretical backgrounds of the study, I will specify my methodology and the limitations of the thesis in the fourth chapter. The chapter will explain the guiding methods of my research that are based on case study analysis conducted through process-tracing and discourse analysis.

Later on, I will conduct my analysis in the sixth chapter comprised of three main parts. First, I will elaborate on foreign policy patterns in Turkish-Russian bilateral relations that will be analyzed under three topics: Russo-Georgian War, the annexation of Crimea, and Russian jet shootdown. In the second part, I will conceptualize the implications drawn from the instrumental case study of Turkish-Russian relations and provide a detailed understanding of compartmentalization.

In the last part, I will analyze Turkey-the EU energy relations in light of the implications derived from the Russian case. There will be three topics discussed to

explore the compartmentalization patterns: Turkey's accession period, Turkey-the EU Positive Agenda on Energy, and lastly, Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean issues. Finally, in the last chapter, I will wrap up my findings about the compartmentalization patterns in Turkey's politics of transit and suggest further research ideas.

1.2 Turkey's role in energy trade

Taking advantage of its unique location in between the importing and exporting countries in the region, the Turkish state embraces the national development goals around the idea that Turkey would serve as an energy hub by which the pipeline routes are being controlled in order to maintain the energy supply of Europe (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MFA], 2019). In line with that purpose, Turkey has dramatically expanded its supply potential through various partnership agreements and facilitated alternative transit routes to gain leverage over both consuming and providing countries. Accordingly, the MFA (2019b) specifies "diversification of supply routes and sources for imported oil and natural gas" as the first objective of its energy strategy.

Considering its remarkable scale and momentum, an illuminating explanation of the recent developments in Turkish energy politics must rely on the fact that Turkey is one of the safest options for natural gas transmission concerning its growing economy and relatively secure political atmosphere where Eurasian energy routes can find a way to Europe. In line with this fact, Turkey's role in the international arena cannot be interpreted without considering its geopolitical importance. Although the global gas trade has been facilitated by the new processing techniques thanks to the recent advancements in technology that allowed liquefied

natural gas (LNG) to be transferable by tankers through the international waterways, two-thirds of the gas trade is dominated by geopolitically bounded pipeline routes (International Energy Agency, 2018). As a result, energy politics and geopolitics remain closely related for both foreign policy elites and the contributors in the literature.

Within this relation, Turkey is positioned between a large market dependent on energy imports, namely the European Union, and Russia, a global energy giant that acquires huge profits from energy exports. Considering the intense interdependence among these actors, Turkey is a critical transit country that operates as an energy corridor facilitating the energy trade. Although the EU has policy moves towards LNG transportation, a viable alternative to land-dependent pipeline trade and renewable energy production to decrease the dependency on energy imports, the current situation and future projections indicate that the EU and Russia's energy interdependence will remain as an agenda-setting dynamic in the near future. EU Reference Scenario shows that the EU's dependency on energy imports will be even higher than 55% in 2017 by reaching up to 58% in 2050 (European Commission, 2016a; Eurostat, 2019b).

1.3 Energy security of Europe and dependency on Russia

According to Eurostat (2019a), due to the declining inland energy production of EU-28 countries and the rise in consumption in recent years, natural gas imports increased dramatically. Twice as much as the 1990 rates, natural gas imports recorded all times high in 2017 by 74.4% - whereas the rate was 70.8% in 2016 - which entails political and economic threats since Russia provides the majority of the natural gas imports (Eurostat, 2019c). Russian share in EU-28's net natural gas

imports constitutes 40.2% of the total imports, which compels the EU to develop its energy strategy by focusing primarily on diversification of the imports to decrease the Russian dependency (Eurostat, 2019d). On the other hand, when we consider the geopolitical conflicts between the EU and Russia, such as the annexation of Crimea and the Georgian War, it would be possible to argue that the EU's energy security does not stand on safe and solid ground.

Although challenged by serious crises, the EU-Russia relations also involve intense cooperation in a complex interdependent bilateral setting. Besides energy resources and raw materials, the EU imports several goods such as vehicles, machinery, manufactured goods, and chemicals from Russia, resulting in the EU trade deficit of 83 billion euros in 2018 (Eurostat, 2019e). According to Eurostat (2019d), Russia's rank is fourth among the EU's export partners, while it ranks the third biggest import partner of the EU goods. Therefore, apart from politically bound energy trade, the total trade volume between the EU and Russia makes them strategically vital partners in terms of economy in general.

Even though the EU-Russia relations are historically troublesome, the overall prospect includes both in-depth cooperation areas as well as political rifts stemming from conflicting geopolitical interests. Thus, the reciprocal economic dependence would tolerate no mistakes in bilateral relations where deliberate policy measures are necessary for solving political problems. In other words, the complex interdependence between the EU and Russia forces both parties to maintain good relations with their counterparts since their commitment to peaceful interaction is a must for their own strategic interests.

In this complex relationship, Russia derives a considerable portion of the benefits from energy exports to the EU. Russia retains almost half of its total

revenues (46% in 2018) from energy resources, while European countries' share in Russian turnover accounts for 44% (Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation, 2019; Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the European Union, 2019). In return, the EU maintains more than half of its energy mix – 55% in 2017 – through net imports from third countries, and the Russian natural gas accounts for 40% of total gas imports (Eurostat, 2019a). At the end of the day, as the abovementioned statistics suggest, energy trade constitutes one of the main pillars of the economic interdependence as well as its politically bounding role that necessitates the involvement of transit countries such as Turkey to assure the uninterrupted availability of gas flow.

1.4 Turkish foreign policy and the EU

Considering the interdependence between the EU and Russia on energy trade, Turkey appears as a significant transit country that deserves attention both politically and economically. In Eurasian geopolitics, Turkey would be considered as a key actor with its remarkable role in regional politics when its claim of being a regional power is taken into consideration (Austvik & Rzayeva, 2017, p. 546).

Geographically located in the midst of Europe, the Caucasus, the Middle East, and East Mediterranean, Turkey's stance on political conflicts can be a decisive factor considered by the global actors who have conflicting interests in the region, especially in energy issues.

Although Turkey has been traditionally involved in the Western alliance, recent developments showed Turkey's commitment towards the EU became a questionable phenomenon (Aydın-Düzgüt & Kaliber, 2016, p. 2). It is possible to argue that Turkish foreign policy follows an oscillating pattern subjected to a certain

contextuality whereby defined according to the changing dynamics in regional politics (Haferlach et al., 2018, p. 53). Therefore, the loose nature of the integration to Western allies provides a certain degree of flexibility to Turkey in foreign policymaking. More importantly, besides having a wide set of foreign policy options, Turkey apparently does not abstain from using the leverages provided by this flexibility while pursuing its interests in regional and global politics, which will be the main quest of this study to be elaborated in the sense of energy politics.

This tumultuous framework of Turkish foreign policy shows that friendly relations with the West, namely the EU, cannot be taken for granted. In the post-Cold War period, Turkey had been positioning itself in the Western block, which continued with the golden era of Europeanization during the early 2000s in the aftermath of the AKP (Justice and Development Party) government's first election success (Aydın-Düzgüt & Kaliber, 2016). This period was the peak point of Turkey-EU relations thanks to the increased cooperation on several issues revolving around the dialogue on Turkey's accession to the Union. In this period, strong dedication to Europeanization was marked by rapid democratization in Turkey that brought optimism to Turkish politics both in domestic and global affairs. Moreover, dedication to the EU conditionalities fueled the economic development through a renovation in market regulations, improvement in monetary and fiscal disciplines, and a rapid rise in foreign direct investments (Öniş & Yılmaz, 2009, p. 8).

However, the relations deteriorated in the next terms of the AKP government (Oğuzlu, 2008, p. 5). The government accused the EU of their lack of motivation in Turkey's accession, although Turkey was allegedly making a great effort to meet Copenhagen's requirements imposed by the EU in this period. In contrast, the EU officials and European leaders blamed Turkey for rising authoritarian tendencies,

downfall in the rule of law, and undemocratic practices endangering the pluralism, which implied that Turkey also lacked commitment to the accession period (Somers, 2016, p. 7). In the 2010s, the equilibrium has been challenged by severe crises such as the Syrian refugee crisis and coup attempt in Turkey, which caused conflicts in Turkey-EU relations, and more importantly, these events eventuated with the Turkish government's disillusionment about the EU. In the current situation, the Turkish government is extremely suspicious of EU relations since Europe's attitude towards Turkey shifted from a candidate member country to a highly functionalized strategic partner.

In many senses, Turkey operates as a corridor between Europe, Caucasus, and the Middle East regions. Cooperating on the Syrian refugee crisis, Europe expected Turkey to close the doors to protect its external borders to secure the Schengen regime against a massive and unwieldy refugee flow coming through Turkish borders. In contrast, in energy trade, Turkey serves as an open corridor where the resource-rich Caucasus and the Middle East regions can transmit the energy to the import-dependent European countries.

Subjected to this duality, Turkey's national energy policy has been built around the purpose of serving as a central transit country. For this purpose, operating a hub-and-spoke network of energy trade would allow Turkey to gain leverage over both exporter and importer countries' energy security by controlling the energy traffic flowing from East to West. Nonetheless, the management of energy transit involves more than gaining leverage through energy security concerns merely. Energy politics in the Turkish context is an equation with multiple variables, including the dynamics of bilateral and multilateral relations on both regional and global levels.

1.5 Turkish foreign policy and Russia

At this point, a comprehensive analysis of Turkey's energy policy necessitates bringing one of the most important actors to the scene: Russia. As one of the biggest energy producers worldwide, Russia is the biggest energy supplier of the EU by providing more than 30% of the crude oil and 40% of the natural gas need between 2013-2018 (Eurostat, 2019d). Moreover, Russia also supplies the majority of Turkey's energy mix – 54% in 2014, 55% in 2015, 52% in 2016, 51% in 2017, 47% in 2018 – in the last decade until it dropped to 33% in 2019 thanks to recently increased LNG imports (Türkiye Petrolleri Anonim Ortaklığı, 2019). Furthermore, what makes Russia extremely important for global energy politics does not rely solely on its statistical superiority. Russia is a key actor in energy politics, on both regional and global levels, because energy trade has been excessively politicized in Russia's hands. Taking advantage of its leading supplier position thanks to the resource abundance, Russia has been gaining leverage against its counterparts for decades. As a result, Russia has been defined as "the energy superpower" frequently since it is the leading international supplier exploiting this superiority by using the energy as a political commodity in bilateral and multilateral relations (Rutland, 2008, p. 203).

Turkey has a long-lasting relationship with this energy superpower since both countries have centuries-old imperial backgrounds entailing strong regional claims on the Eurasian territory. Although their successors developed friendly relations mostly, the relations between the Russian and the Ottomans were characterized by a historical hostility to dominate the region, which resulted in thirteen wars. As both countries disburdened their imperial backgrounds during the First World War period,

their successors turned a new page in relations, and they laid the foundations of contemporary Turkish-Russian collaboration. To describe today's bilateral relations, rather than a holistic approach, one needs to look at Turkish-Russian relations in the context of geopolitics, which will make a multidimensional approach possible that melts historical, political, and economic aspects in the same pot.

Contemporary Turkey-Russia relations involve a complex series of issues rooted in either structural or contextual causes and are marked by both cooperation and competition. In the First World War's aftermath, the fresh start in the relations was optimistic for both Kemalists and Bolsheviks (Aktürk, 2015). However, at the end of the Second World War, expansionist ambitions of the Soviets and conflicting interests in the region worsened the relations coupled with Turkey's membership to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1952. During the Cold War, Turkey's engagement with the Western block led the relations to continue at a minimum level without any serious interaction (Öniş & Yılmaz, 2016, p. 75). As of 1991, the Soviets fell apart, and the 1990s marked by a warming of the relations between Turkey and Russia as the Cold War ended. During this period, both countries became one of the leading partners of each other in the trade as well as growing cooperation in investment, construction, tourism, and energy. People to people and business to business interaction skyrocketed thanks to governments' efforts, which paved the way for social engagement as well. In this era, energy cooperation had risen, and Russia became the largest energy supplier of Turkey, which deepened the interdependence.

Nonetheless, as mentioned above, Turkey-Russia relations lack a homogenous form where structural discrepancies and political crises can be observed frequently. First and foremost, Turkey's traditional tendency to act together with the

Western alliance, yet being a critical member in NATO with remarkable firepower and geopolitical significance, is a fundamental difference preventing the maintenance of an unquestioned relationship. Ironically, Turkey's commitment to the West has been challenged severely due to conflicting interests of Turkey, the EU, and the US in the recent period. This situation eventually led Turkey-Russia rapprochement. However, it can be argued that Turkey is likely to remain as a NATO member at the end of the day.

Moreover, several unresolved issues are deepening the structural cleavage between Turkey and Russia (Tolay & Linden, 2012). Rooted in regional and historical divergences, conflicting interests on issues such as the Arab Spring, Georgian war, the annexation of Crimea, and the Syrian civil war have punctuated the bilateral relations from time to time. Although the governments adopted different stances on these structural controversies, the complex interdependence in economic and social ties remained mainly untouched in these cases.

In addition to the structural problems, Turkish-Russian relations have been challenged by serious crises stemming from the tumultuous political context in the region. These crises showed how internal and external threats could inflect relations. In November 2015, a Russian SU-24 M fighter jet was shot down by the Turkish Air Force F-16 attack jet on the Syrian border. The incident deteriorated the relations between the two countries and resulted in several sanctions on ongoing economic activities imposed by the presidential decree of Vladimir Putin.

Although asymmetrical, both countries suffered from the reciprocal measures in bilateral trade as Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev pointed out that the crisis would result in negative consequences for the joint projects in addition to the sanctions against financial transactions, import products, custom agreements, and

Turkish construction and tourism sector (Girit, 2016; Walker, 2015). Accordingly, for retaliation, the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant's construction process came under question, and the TurkStream project was suspended. It is important to note that these joint projects are crucial for Turkey's energy security considering that Turkey aims at diversifying the supply sources and serving Europe as an energy hub. Creating more vulnerability, the sanctions implied that Turkey's long-term energy security could be at stake considering that Russia has a bad reputation in using the energy supplies politically and could increase the sanctions' intensity even more by cutting the gas supply.

Nevertheless, the natural gas flow is kept untouched as a vital constituent of Turkish-Russian economic relations. This fact shows that the energy would be treated as a specialized matter in the relations to be maintained in a continuous flow. In other words, although the bilateral relations were at stake for the rest of the transactions, whether political, economic, or social; energy flow has never been affected due to the deterioration in the relations as an independent policy area which is compartmentalized from the other types of cooperation and conflict areas. As an integral part of the complex interdependence between Turkey and Russia, it can be argued that energy cooperation plays a constructive role in relations (Kelkitli, 2012, p. 398) since it is essential for both actors' energy security, directly related to their political and economic interests. Therefore, it is possible to argue a salient interplay between Turkey's energy security concerns and foreign policymaking patterns.

1.6 Compartmentalization in Turkish foreign policy

Putting the energy security concerns at the center of the discussion, how does compartmentalization interact with the energy security concerns in bilateral

relations? In this study, I will focus on the compartmentalization strategy, which could be the key to illuminate important aspects of the Turkish foreign policy mechanism. Here, the term compartmentalization refers to the phenomenon that Turkey is following a foreign policy agenda where energy security has been considered as an independent policy area maintained in a continuum.

In fact, compartmentalization is mostly overlooked despite mentioned by a couple of scholars in Turkish foreign policy literature (Aydın-Düzgit, Balta, & O'Donohue, 2020; Balta, 2019; Çelikpala, 2018; Erşen, 2017; Öniş & Yılmaz, 2016; Sinkaya, 2016). Mitat Çelikpala (2018, p. 117) defines compartmentalization as a foreign policy principle where “geopolitical issues and economic cooperation were segregated as not only separate but distinctive agendas.” Alternatively, Bayram Sinkaya (2016, p. 83) contends that compartmentalization is a foreign policy behavior adopted by international actors trying to segregate the collaboration areas from the disagreements. The actors are tended to compartmentalize issues when they cannot renounce the potential profit in cooperation. Compartmentalization, Sinkaya argues (2016, p. 84), can be based on “common concerns, shared interests and issues of divergence.” Taking this information into consideration, I argue that compartmentalization can be observed regarding the energy security concerns, which would provide further insights about Turkey’s bilateral relations.

In the context of Turkish foreign policy, compartmentalization literature concentrates mostly on Turkey-Russia bilateral relations (Balta, 2019; Çelikpala, 2018; Erşen, 2017). One of the prevailing examples is called *Turkey and Russia in a shifting global order: cooperation, conflict and asymmetric interdependence in a turbulent region* – an article written by Ziya Öniş and Şuhnaz Yılmaz (2016). The authors focus on the increased economic cooperation between BRICS and near-

BRICS countries by using Turkey-Russia relations as a case study in which compartmentalization is suggested as a key aspect of bilateral relations. The authors point out that compartmentalization is a strategy facilitating the improvement of economic cooperation despite geopolitical competition and conflicts.

According to Öniş and Yılmaz (2016, p. 87), Turkey-Russia relations have important implications on compartmentalization. They argue that the economic cooperation may be observed between countries which have diverging political frameworks as it is the case for the Turkey-Russia bilateral relations where the countries have different conduct of politics. Secondly, the authors contend that economic cooperation may exist side-by-side with regional and political conflicts. Accordingly, Turkey seeks to manage the bilateral relations through compartmentalizing economic issues from the geopolitical competition to prevent its possible negative effects on economic interests. Although there are critical rifts in bilateral relations with the actors who constitute the important parts of the supply and demand chain in the energy trade, the continuity in energy security has been maintained to some extent, especially in the case of natural gas flow.

Accordingly, this study will argue that compartmentalization would allow Turkey to secure its energy-related rational interests even though the diplomatically and ideationally driven political conflicts resulted in the deterioration of the bilateral relations. Therefore, the analysis of compartmentalization could be the key to understand how Turkey managed energy cooperation in the midst of conflicts, particularly in the last decade. The extant works on compartmentalization have limited scope in terms of conceptualization and iterability. I aim at an in-depth understanding of compartmentalization that will illuminate the underlying causes and policy outcomes of this strategy across different contexts.

The research will contribute to the literature by evaluating the compartmentalization element in Turkish foreign policy by analyzing the bilateral relations with the EU in addition to the Russian case. Arguing that compartmentalization is not limited to the bilateral energy relations with Russia only, I will contend that Turkey's recent foreign policy would involve compartmentalization as a rational strategy concerning the energy cooperation in EU relations as well. Therefore, I will suggest that compartmentalization would be a common national strategy in Turkish foreign policymaking, allowing Turkey to secure its interests in regional energy cooperation as an import-dependent transit country. I will conduct a comparative analysis on two different cases, including both supply and demand aspects, by hitting the high spots of Turkey's energy security by looking at the energy availability and sustainability during times of crisis.

As the natural consequence of divergent geopolitical interests, Turkey had difficult times in bilateral relations with the EU and Russia in conflict-ridden crisis periods. During the crises, the Turkish economy has suffered from the international sanctions made against several business sectors such as trade, agriculture, and tourism. In these periods, in my opinion, the compartmentalization strategy provided a certain degree of crisis resilience to Turkish foreign policy. Thanks to this strategy's constructive role, Turkey has maintained its energy security in the cases of political rifts, which dominated its bilateral relations with the EU and Russia during the AKP era.

Besides facilitating the pursuit of economic interests and bypassing the conflicts, compartmentalization would work two-sided as it applies to both Turkey and its counterparts since the era of interdependence requires continuity in economic relations whose interruption would entail reciprocal costs. Either on the supply or

demand side, reciprocal costs may force the states to concern about the continuity in their energy cooperation. Furthermore, the prospect of reciprocal costs would also override the asymmetric gains in dependence, which means the stronger actors may suffer from disruptions in energy cooperation, too. Hence, the interdependence among states would motivate the actors to quickly settle the international disputes before their domestic economies get worsened due to the conflicts. To shed light on this argument, I will evaluate the role of compartmentalization in crisis resolution also from the European and Russian perspectives. I will argue that compartmentalization, as a two-sided policy outcome of the complex interdependence, would facilitate the reconciliation processes in the aftermath of crises.

According to the preliminary observation, I suggest three hypotheses regarding the compartmentalization of energy in Turkey's bilateral relations. Firstly, I argue that compartmentalization would produce three main policy outcomes by 1) allowing the actors to pursue their long-term economic interests by promoting stability in relations, 2) helping to bypass the ideational and geopolitical controversies thanks to the provided flexibility in foreign policymaking, and 3) facilitating the reconciliation period by highlighting the importance of mutual gains in the aftermath of crises. Secondly, I argue that compartmentalization could be applied across different contexts rather than being a particular policymaking pattern in Turkish-Russian relations. In that sense, I will try to explore the compartmentalization patterns in Turkey-the EU bilateral relations, which are also characterized by the coexistence of conflict and cooperation as was the case in Turkey-Russia relations. Lastly, I contend that compartmentalizations can be observed in Turkey's energy relations with Europe, albeit it would partly differ from

Russia's context. Russia and the EU diverge in terms of their positions in energy cooperation - the former is supply, the latter is a demand actor – and also their policymaking mechanisms are at odds as the former is centralized whereas the latter is fragmented. Hence, although compartmentalization would produce similar outcomes, there might be dissimilarities to be found in the analysis chapter.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

In this chapter, I will provide a literature review on the subject matter of this study. The chapter will cover three main topics. Firstly, I will present an extensive background of the concept of energy security. Indicating the multidimensional and contextual nature of the concept, this part will also mention the energy security concerns of Turkey, which play a part in foreign policymaking. Then, the next part will scrutinize Turkey-the EU bilateral relations. I will suggest an extensive review of various sources in the literature, which will provide a detailed background of bilateral relations, particularly in the last two decades. Lastly, I will discuss the preexisting studies on Turkey's bilateral relations with Russia. Rooted in a decades-old shared history, Turkish-Russian relations require attention to understand regional energy security dynamics and the underlying causes of compartmentalization patterns.

2.1 Energy security

The extant literature on energy security frequently seeks a common definition of energy security, which has a flexible nature that necessitates a contextual analysis. The universal definition of energy security is suggested by the International Energy Agency (IEA) as "the uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price" (International Energy Agency, 2019). Similarly, the European Commission (2014) defines energy security as "the uninterrupted access to energy sources at an affordable price" for the sake of the European economy's continuity and the modern

way of living. Although the definitions made by IEA and the European Union draw similar boundaries, the literature provides a multifaceted framework. Considering the vague definitions of energy security, Christian Winzer (2012) aggregates different perspectives in the literature as threefold.

According to Winzer (2012, p. 4), the first group focuses on the sustainability of the energy supply as a commodity. Moreover, he argues that the continuity of the energy supply is one of the main pillars of the other perspectives, too. In this sense, the Department of Energy and Climate Change of Great Britain (2009) attributes secure energy to the low-risk condition in the interruption of sufficient supply at an affordable price. In more recent years, this definition has been expanded with a commitment to clean energy as well (Department of Energy & Climate Change, 2018, p. 11). In general, this perspective approaches energy as a physical commodity, a matter of trade, entailing a supply analysis of energy security concerning its affordability through increased focus on sustainable energy resources and environmental concerns.

The second group defines energy security in a relatively more subjective approach that depends on the severity factors used to measure whether the continuity is secure or insecure (Winzer, 2012, p. 5). Among them, price volatility is one of the most common instances of analysis as Jun, Kim, and Chang (2009, p. 1896) argue that "energy security can be defined as a reliable and uninterrupted supply of energy sufficient to meet the needs of the economy at the same time, coming at a reasonable price" (p. 1896). Taking the IEA's definition to the center of their arguments, they find price affordability vital (Andrews, 2005; Costantini, Gracceva, Markandya, & Vicini, 2007; Le Coq & Paltseva, 2009). A bit differently, Mabro (2008) focuses on the scale, speed, and retainment of the price changes above a particular level, thus,

argues that the security will be at stake under specific conditions related to the price. By focusing on either continuity or prices, this approach allows the analysis to be concept-specific for each country, whereas beclouding the international definition of energy security that lacks a global definition (Winzer, 2012, p. 5).

Lastly, the third group of authors asserts a pragmatic approach that measures energy security according to the scale of impact on the energy service continuity, the economy, and the environment in addition to the supply continuity and prices. When it comes to continuity of services, authors suggest a measurement that relies on the potential of service availability in times of supply discontinuity, such as sustainability of heating, transportation, or electricity in everyday life (Findlater & Noël, 2010; Li, 2005; Patterson, 2008). In other words, here, what matters is whether shortcomings in energy supply affect the availability of services or not. Considering the economic aspect of impact measurement, the loss in wealth becomes an instrumental variable that provides a practical calculation of energy insecurity (Bohi & Toman, 1996; Grubb, Butler, & Twomey, 2006; Joode, Kingma, Lijesen, & Shestalova, 2004). In this strategy, the authors look at the impact of change in continuity and prices on the economic welfare in case of energy insecurity. Lastly, relatively novel to former perspectives, environmental sustainability appears as another degree of impact measurement. In recent works, the sustainability of energy resources has been a trending topic among scholars while conceptualizing the impact measurement (Intharak et al., 2007; Kruyt, van Vuuren, de Vries, & Groenenberg, 2009; Verrastro & Ladislav, 2007).

Since the literature suggests that availability and accessibility of energy supply are vital for the wealth of nations, the definition of energy security relies not only on physical security but also on the political security of it. Thus, to

conceptualize energy security, its political implications necessitate an in-depth inquiry. For the first time in realpolitik, energy security has been mentioned by Winston Churchill while the globe was readying itself for the First World War (Yergin, 2006, p. 69). Reportedly from Daniel Yergin, the term energy security was born thanks to Churchill's "Safety and certainty in oil lie in variety and variety alone." statement that has been made after he decided to use oil for British ships, instead of coal, to make them faster than their German rival.

From that day on, energy security had rapidly grown in importance and became an integral part of foreign policy decisions that have a steering effect on domestic affairs as well (Yergin, 2006). Today, Churchill's emphasis on energy security is reshaping global affairs for both demanding and supplying countries. Recently, on energy security, the EU's primary concern is diversifying its energy supply to dilute the Russian share in energy supply. Since the interdependence prevails in today's world, armed options are not the primary matter of conflict resolution anymore (Özpek, 2013, p. 362). Moreover, statistically, the share of imports constitutes more than half of the EU's energy consumption (Eurostat, 2018), which will keep rising until the 2050s (European Commission, 2016a). In this case, the EU is searching for alternative energy routes to diversify its imports, which necessitates new strategies in foreign policy (Yorucu & Mehmet, 2018, p. 3). Accordingly, Turkey moves one step forward when it comes to governing this interdependency, which plays a crucial role in global energy security.

Turkey builds its energy strategy accordingly with Europe's energy policy. As stated in the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources strategy plan, Turkey aims to serve the European market as an energy hub located on the transit routes between energy importing Europe and energy-exporting the Middle East, Caucasus, and

Russia (Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, 2015a, p. 73). Taking advantage of its geopolitical position, Turkey has been enjoying several international energy deals since 2011 and strengthening its hand while using the EU's energy security concerns as a matter of interdependence in international relations (de Mattos Fagundes, Padula, & Padilha, 2016; İpek, 2017). In the context of both economics and international relations, arguably, these attempts are made for two essential aspirations of the Turkish government, which are; firstly, the aim of ensuring energy independence, and secondly, the aim of increased political leverage against its counterparts as a recognized regional hegemon (Triantaphyllou & Fotiou, 2010, p. 60).

2.2 Turkey-EU relations

According to Öniş and Yılmaz (2009, p. 7), Turkish foreign policy has recorded a significant continuity regarding its multi-dimensional policymaking approaches and political activism in the AKP period. Historically, Turkey has been inclined towards the Western block as a strategical ally of the United States (US) and the European countries during the Cold War. Collaboration with the Western alliance was maintained in the post-Cold War period and the early 2000s with the AKP government as well. As the AKP took power in 2002, although the relations with the US were unpleasant, a strong commitment to Europeanization was adopted through rapid democratization and utilizing soft power in foreign policy (Öniş & Yılmaz, 2009, p. 8).

Taking its roots from the early 1990s, Turkey's Europeanization had reached its peak during the first term of the AKP, which is named as "the golden years," and the accession negotiations were pursued consistently by both Turkey and the EU

(Öniş & Yılmaz, 2009, p. 8). In this period, Turkey acquired several political and economic gains, which are interwoven and mutually promoting. First, Europeanization resulted in a successful economic development thanks to the reforms encouraged by the EU and International Monetary Fund, which allowed Turkey to provide monetary discipline and attract foreign direct investment (Öniş & Bakır, 2007). Secondly, Turkey experienced significant improvements in democratic values through radical reforms such as abolishing the death penalty and democratic opening for the decades-old Kurdish question. Finally, Turkish foreign policy has been renovated in the AKP era.

The then Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu built the new understanding of foreign policymaking in Turkey upon the principle of "zero problems with neighbors" (Aras & Akpınar, 2011; Davutoğlu, 2001; Öniş & Yılmaz, 2009). This principle relies on the premise that Turkey is a central country located on the crossroads of Europe, Asia, and Africa. Accordingly, Turkey presents a melting pot function for multiple diverging identities in the region; thus, it can play a mediating role in the case of conflict and facilitate the cooperation between its neighbors and allies (Kösebalaban, 2011; Öniş & Yılmaz, 2009; Özbay, 2011). At the same time, Turkey was establishing close relations with both the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the EU, as well as frequently interacting with numerous actors in the Middle East, Africa, and Central Asia. Moreover, Turkey was showing intense ambition for membership in the United Nations (UN) Security Council and is motivated to become a critical actor in regional energy security. All these foreign policy maneuvers were reflections of the new strategy that allowed Turkey to keep its historical orientation towards the West while sustaining profound relations with the Middle East and Eurasia (Öniş & Yılmaz, 2009, p. 9).

One of the most important parts of Turkey's integrative role between West and East is its quest that is serving as an energy corridor on the supply and demand routes that connects not only politically but also geographically distinct actors (Bobić, 2015, p. 93). In the case of a successful accession, which includes reconciliation in the Cyprus issue where the Eastern Mediterranean gas would be transported through Turkey along with Azeri gas and Iraqi oil to the European market could contribute to regional energy security for both parties (Tocci, 2014, p. 10). Gas has been considered as one of the main pillars of Turkey-EU relations; both parties are dependent on Russian gas and have a strategy to increase energy security through diversification of the energy mix (Tagliapietra, 2018). Moreover, Simone Tagliapietra (2018) argues that cooperation on energy is not limited to the aim of carrying Caspian and Eastern Mediterranean gas to Europe. A successful accession would bring collaboration in renewables and energy efficiency as well as nuclear energy and fight with climate change through reduction in carbon emission by capacity building, institutional support, and financial mechanisms. Thus, cooperation with the EU has been seen as a package of “moderating and disciplining factors” for the sake of achieving security and stability goals (Alessandri, 2010, p. 88).

To achieve these goals, especially after December 2002, Turkey carried out revolutionary reforms to meet the criteria proposed by the Copenhagen European Council, suggesting that whether and when the accession talks about Turkey's membership will be opened until late 2004 (Tocci, 2014, p. 2). Therefore, when the AKP was elected in November 2002, the road map to Europe was already set, and the AKP government made significant progress. The reformation attempts, which were interpreted positively by the European Council in December 2004, concluded

that the major political criteria were fulfilled sufficiently to open the accession talks, which were planned to start in 2005 (Öniş, 2010, p. 363).

Contradictorily, the accession talks did not go well in the aftermath of 2005. Turkey's EU membership progress was relapsed due to the conflicts and accusations among Turkey, the EU, and its member countries (Saatçioğlu, 2019, p. 2). On the one hand, Turkey accused the EU of showing insufficient commitment to Turkey's membership. Moreover, the Turkish government problematized the questionable political credibility of the conditions imposed by Copenhagen criteria, allegedly reflecting the EU's unfair treatment against Turkey. Consequently, loss of trust and disbelief in the EU's sincerity has undermined the legitimacy of Copenhagen criteria in the eyes of the Turkish government.

On the other hand, for the EU, the opening of accession talks was the peak point of Turkish democracy, which went downhill after this point. Instead of complying with the Copenhagen criteria, European Commission (2005, 2006) stated that there were several critical democratic anomalies, such as restricted freedom of expression, limited access to Kurdish language education, problems in preventing illegal custody, and violent treatment (Kubicek, 2011, p. 918). European Commission (2008, 2009) increased the level of criticism in the ongoing years, and the 2009 report stated that the legal system in Turkey did not satisfy the EU standards. Legal framework and practices fell short in the sense of minority rights (particularly about language), political parties, trade unions, non-discrimination measures in gender issues, Anti-Terror law aiming at Kurdish groups, allegations of corruption and torture, bans on several websites, and the perennial problem of military involvement in politics (Kubicek, 2011, p. 919). Ironically, the Commission

(2008) accused the government of lack of commitment in EU accession as it was the case vice versa.

The third electoral victory with 49.8% in 2011 was a clear indicator that the AKP consolidated its authority, although the Turkish democracy was getting worse in the eyes of Europe since the government was relying on majoritarian democracy, which was decorated with Islamic discourse (Özbudun, 2014, p. 157). Domination of democratic institutions at the expense of pluralism, including legislation, executive, judicial branches, economy, media, and civil society, was interpreted as the Turkish democracy was facing a severe crisis (Freedom House, 2014a, 2014b; Özbudun, 2014). Aydın-Düzgit and Kaliber (2016) argue that the dramatic decline of Turkish democracy cannot be epitomized as slowdown or backsliding in Europeanization but even a de-Europeanization which refers to "the distancing of society and politics in Turkey from the European system of norms, values and policy expectations" (p. 6).

The gradual deterioration continued ceaselessly, and the nature of Turkey-EU relations eventually evolved after the Syrian refugee crisis (Saatçioğlu, 2019). After 2013, the EU's ongoing discontent has been coupled with the rising nationalism in several individual member states and the upgraded authoritarian tendencies in Turkey. Based on a twofold argument, Saatçioğlu (2019) claims that the new form of relations was increasingly built upon functionality (p. 3). Firstly, the crisis in Syria compelled the EU to cooperate with Turkey as a "strategic partner" since the migration flow threatened politically, which could not be prevented by the EU's own instruments (Turhan, 2017, p. 648). Signing Turkey-EU "refugee deal" in March 2016 allowed the EU to benefit from an alternative option that considers Turkey a strategic partner while keeping it out from membership (Karakas, 2013, p. 1070). The strategic role of Turkey helped the EU in the sense of maintenance of the

security of the Schengen regime against a massive refugee flow through the external borders; however, this cooperation highlighted that the asymmetrical nature of the interdependence between the EU and Turkey is in favor of the latter (Krumm, 2016; Saatçioğlu, 2019).

Secondly, Saatçioğlu (2019, p. 3) emphasizes that the EU's foundational normative values were exchanged to guarantee cooperation with Turkey to deal with the refugee crisis. In other words, the cost of a strategic partnership was a retreat from the conditionalities imposed on Turkey for the EU membership (Greenhill, 2016). The collaboration based on both economic profits and normative compromises on the EU's conditionalities was remarkably beneficial for Turkey, whose economy was insecure to deal with a mass refugee flow, and the political regime was supposed to be criticized - although tolerated for the sake of deal - for becoming more undemocratic increasingly (Okuy & Zaragoza-Cristiani, 2016). Overall, these concessions indicated that the EU's approach to Turkey was far from being serious in the case of its EU membership, although pragmatic, meaning that Turkey's perspective became much more functionalized compared to the period before the refugee crisis happened. It is noteworthy that the strategic partnership is a rewarding option for both Turkey and the EU since there have been several cooperation areas, including the fight against global terrorism, human smuggling, drug trafficking as well as economically vital issues such as trade, tourism, and more importantly, energy (Aksu, 2012; Bobić, 2015).

Overall, Turkey-EU relations are in gridlock in Turkey's accession due to the political crises and conflicts. However, thanks to the "strategic partnership" concept, the rational interests of both parties are considered where energy cooperation has been emphasized as one of the most critical collaboration areas that can steer the

direction of the relations in a positive trend (Yorucu & Mehmet, 2018, p. 141). Along with the other producers and transit countries such as Azerbaijan, Algeria, Turkmenistan, and suppliers in the Middle East; Turkey is counted as a strategic partner that requires close attention for the EU to pursue its energy and climate diplomacy (Hafner & Tagliapietra, 2016; Yorucu & Mehmet, 2018). Moreover, Turkey's quest to operate as an energy corridor on the supply and demand routes serves the EU's foreign policy purposes and facilitates its collaboration with not only politically but also geographically distinct actors in the energy-rich remote regions. (Bobić, 2015, p. 93).

2.3 Turkey-Russia relations

In analyzing the Turkish-Russian relations in the global arena, a comprehensive overview of the history of the relations would help understand the nature of the bilateral relations. Ottoman Empire and Tsarist Russia – ancestors of Turkey and Russia – were two dominant actors in the region having diplomatic relations for more than five centuries. However, this perennial history was characterized by reciprocal mistrust, structural conflicts, and endless wars, particularly from the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries (Erşen, 2011, p. 264). Until the early twentieth century, these actors were competing with imperial ambitions in a tumultuous geography for regional dominance (Tolay & Linden, 2012). Surviving through this everlasting competition in the region, both countries have established new political orders as global politics was reshaped in the aftermath of the First World War.

Following the establishment of the Kemalist regime in Turkey and the Bolshevik revolution in Soviet Russia, these historical arch-enemies developed cordial relations based on mutual interests thanks to a non-aggression pact called

1925 Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality (Öniş & Yılmaz, 2016, p. 74; Sadak, 1949, p. 251). The extant literature agrees with the argument that both competition and cooperation characterized this new era in the bilateral relations as the new political formations in both countries needed a rapport rather than a cut-throat rivalry (Öniş & Yılmaz, 2016, p. 87; Özbay, 2011, p. 89; Winrow, 2009). The nature of relations consisted of, on the one hand, emerging economic cooperation between the two newly formed neighboring states in both trade and policymaking, and seemingly friendly but cautious political interaction on the other hand. This dyadic pattern of the Turkey-Russia relations has been the dominant structure of the bilateral interaction throughout the twentieth century and is still valid for present-day politics as the coexistence of competition and cooperation will be one of the focus points discussed in this study (Harris, 1995; Öniş & Yılmaz, 2016).

Nevertheless, friendly relations in the post-World War period did not last long. In 1936, the Montreux Convention appeared as the first crisis, which enabled Turkey to take full control of the Turkish straits¹ through the militarization of the coasts (Coş & Bilgin, 2010, p. 43; Öniş & Yılmaz, 2016, p. 74). Following the dispute over Montreux Convention, as the Second World War ended, the USSR declared that the 1925 non-aggression pact would not be renewed.

In the 1945 Potsdam Conference, Soviets' Premier Stalin's demands further deteriorated the relations as the USSR claimed territories in Turkey's northeastern provinces Kars and Ardahan, requested bases in Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits, and revision of Montreux Convention regarding the status of the straits (Coş &

¹. Here, the term "straits" refers to two straits (Bosphorus and Dardanelles) between the Mediterranean Sea and the Black Sea. Strategically located on the international trade routes, straits were put under the regulation of the Montreux Convention in 1936.

Bilgin, 2010, p. 43). USSR's demands resulted in Turkey's growing suspicion on security prospects, which alerted the US as well. Following this, the 1947 Truman Doctrine was a milestone in Turkey-Russia relations since it has laid the foundations of Turkey's alignment with NATO during the Cold War (McGhee, 2016). The doctrine addressed Soviet expansionism and the rise of communism towards the west by financially supporting the economy and military of Turkey, as well as Greece. Eventually, Turkey joined NATO in 1952, which officially remarked Turkey's position against USSR during the Cold War. Öniş and Yılmaz (2016) describe Turkey-USSR relations during this period as "virtually frozen" although there were rapprochement efforts before the end of the Cold War (p. 75). Among a couple of attempts, the Natural Gas Agreement in 1984 indicated the upcoming interdependence and the growing economic relations between Turkey and Russia.

Turkey recognizes that world politics has a multipolar nature where the Turkish foreign policy is evolving in accordance with patterns of change and continuity in Eurasian energy politics. Relations with Russia is a two-edged sword for Turkey since Russia has been considered the arch-enemy of the western democracies who form the alliance that Turkey is traditionally engaged with as an ally. The analyses on the recent developments in Turkey-Russia relations argue that the rapprochement between Turkey and Russia results from the multifaceted policy of Turkish officials who takes Russia as a balancing actor for Turkey's relations with the West (Umbach, 2017, p. 8). While the tensions are increasing regarding the geopolitical disputes between Russia and the EU, maintaining a strategic balance between these archrivals poses serious threats for Turkey since it is dependent on both parties in several political and economic issues (Erşen & Çelikpala, 2019, p. 590).

According to Erşen (2011, p. 281), rapprochement with Russia implies a "shift of axis" in Turkish foreign policy where Turkey slowly slides from West to East since there are a couple of fundamental changes in terms of both cooperation and conflict with its counterparts. Being not only a strategic alliance change but also occurring rapidly, this rapprochement takes its roots from global, regional, and bilateral dynamics (Erşen, 2011, p. 279). On the global level, the post-September 11 American foreign policy towards Eurasia and the Middle East was posing threats against geopolitical ambitions of both Turkey and Russia (Erşen, 2011, p. 280). Diverging interests of Turkish and American governments led Turkey to increase cooperation with Russia to compensate for the deteriorated relations with the US. On the regional level, Turkey and Russia share a strategical geopolitical area where cooperation, as two prominent regional actors, is less costly than conflict and even highly profitable on several issues. However, the geopolitical ambitions diverge in some cases (Erşen, 2011). To that end, Turkey and Russia are involved in crucial regional cooperation platforms where the dialog between the states is increased. Besides, both countries have a negative outlook on recent bilateral relations with the EU. Turkish-Russian alliance, which also brings about antagonism towards the EU, revolves around the EU's reluctance to Turkey's membership process coupled with Russia's historical and economic rivalry with Europe (Erşen, 2011, p. 280).

As a significant determinant in the bilateral relations, energy interdependence is a major pillar of the Turkish-Russian rapprochement observed from the beginning of the 2000s (Erşen, 2011, p. 279; Lesser, 2008, p. 34). Moreover, this interdependence is not only limited to continuous energy flow from Russia to Turkey but also supported, and even became more asymmetric, through the great projects such as TurkStream and Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant (Warhola & Mitchell, 2006).

Although the interdependence becomes deeper and more asymmetric, these great projects contribute to the future of the relationship by providing a certain degree of clarity and predictability (Erşen, 2011, p. 279). Further, Erşen (2011, p. 281) supports this argument by claiming that the rapprochement has been driven by mainly pragmatic motivations instead of ideological concerns.

Russia's politicization of energy trade is not a novelty in global politics since it has been serving as the main gas provider of Europe for a long time. This asymmetric interdependence, a source of political leverage in Russia's hands against European countries, has been further politicized as Russian President Vladimir Putin came to power (Özpek, 2013, p. 359). Finon and Locatelli (2008, p. 425) argue that in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the state apparatus has been entirely renovated in Putin's period, where Russia was envisioned as an "energy superpower." This energy superpower has been defined as the leading supplier of the energy market in the region, the playmaker in this market through steering the competition by manipulating the needs of importing countries, in the end, urging on its own indispensability and importance (Finon & Locatelli, 2008, p. 425). It is noteworthy that even Putin's dissertation, although accused of plagiarism, is written on possible foreign policy strategies that Russia can adopt concerning the abundant natural resources it holds. To secure Russia's national interests, Putin emphasizes the importance of state guidance on the energy sector in his dissertation (Saivetz, 2007, p. 1). During Putin's presidency, Russia has actively sought benefits by manipulating Europe's energy security concerns through the sovereignty over the energy resources and the pipeline routes that quench the energy thirst of European states (Özpek, 2013, p. 359; Saivetz, 2007, p. 2)

Along the same line, securitization of energy resources plays a significant role in Russian foreign policymaking regarding bilateral and multilateral relations with European countries. As a policymaking tool, energy diplomacy has three main implications in Russian foreign policy. Firstly, the Russian state always protects and supports energy companies, which are crucial actors to realize national interests. Secondly, in energy diplomacy, for success in energy diplomacy, it is key to develop strategic relations with regional actors. Thirdly, in global politics, Russia's comparative advantage relies on its ability to translate its dominant position in the energy sector to political and economic gains (Rosner, 2006, p. 6). Overall, energy constitutes a vital part of Russian diplomatic relations both as means and end through Russian national interests.

Considering the interplay between energy and Russian foreign policy, the future of cooperation between Russia and Turkey through energy projects is mainly linked to the continuation of friendly relations between them (Demiryol, 2015). On the one hand, the analyses on Turkish-Russian rapprochement in the 2000s have summarized the overall relations as "strategic," "deepened," "enlarged," and "multi-dimensional" with respect to the shared incentives in the region against the West and increased potential in several areas such as trade, tourism, investment, and energy sectors (Özbay, 2011, pp. 71–81; Winrow, 2009, p. 4). On the other hand, geopolitical crises such as the Russo-Georgian conflict, the civil war in Syria, the Russian jet shootdown by Turkish military forces, the assassination of the Russian ambassador to Turkey were interpreted as severe threats against the Turkish-Russian cooperation in energy as well as bilateral relations (Siddi, 2018, p. 12). Therefore, although the relations get closer, the geopolitical setting is tended to reproduce political insecurities, which results in long-lasting suspicion in regional cooperation.

Concerning these insecurities, Turkish-Russian relations have always necessitated a fine work that leaves no room for error, especially in sensitive issues (Hill, 2003, p. 69).

CHAPTER 3

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In light of the information above, I will elaborate on the 18-years-long Justice and Development Party (AKP) rule, which witnessed significant developments in foreign policy characterized by ups and downs. Within a complex interdependent setting where energy is a substantial source of both cooperation and conflict, Turkey's foreign policy is shaped through its transit role, allowing the energy flow from Russia to the European market. In this vein, I will employ the complex interdependence theory as the guiding framework.

Complex interdependence theory is brought forward by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye in their book *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition* (1977), which suggests that global affairs are defined by interdependencies in various issues laden with reciprocal costs for all actors. One of the basic premises proposed by the complex interdependence theory highlights the decreasing importance of military-based practices to solve international disputes. On the contrary, the focus on the economy has been rapidly increasing as a crucial dynamic that regulates the international conflicts where energy became an integral part of the global economy and international relations in today's world. Thus, I will interpret the Turkish foreign policy's tumultuous outlook in light of the premises of complex interdependency theory concerning its implications on energy security.

In continuum with the theory of complex interdependence, the thesis will propose the concept of "politics of transit" as a theoretical link to understand the role of transit countries, which play a critical role in the global energy trade. The concept of politics of transit was proposed by Agnia Grigas (2017) in her book called *The*

New Geopolitics of Natural Gas. As a transit country sitting on the main energy routes between Europe, Caucasus, and the Middle East, Turkey's foreign policy has been shaped by regional energy security as well as its energy security concerns. Regarding these energy security concerns, the coexistence of cooperation and conflict in Turkey's politics of transit is a puzzling situation that I will try to explain.

3.1 Complex interdependence theory

Keohane and Nye (1977, p. 3) define the world as a global village with no borders thanks to the growing advancement of technologies that furthered communication and transportation facilities. In the meantime, human relations have been evolved as a matter of new dynamics in the social, economic, and cultural spheres that are rendered into an interwoven global political system. The skyrocketed advancement in technology resulted in a constant and deepened interaction among the nations, which created a new international order. The conventional political tools have been either modified or trivialized (Keohane & Nye, 1977, p. 7). Thus, the very fundamental logic of world politics is changing in this era of interdependence.

Interdependence refers to "mutual dependence" in the most straightforward terms (Keohane & Nye, 1977, p. 7). In international relations, it refers to the circumstances where different states and actors are affected reciprocally. As a result of the rapid increase in interconnectedness through international transactions, this reciprocity emerged, especially in the aftermath of the Second World War (Keohane & Nye, 1977, p. 8). However, interdependency covers a broader set of situations than interconnectedness. Interdependence necessitates costs or limits that are brought along with the interactions among actors. Without costs, the interaction is a mere

interconnectedness. Laden with significant costs subjected to each actor reciprocally, interdependence differs from interconnectedness.

Defining the concept of power is vital to understand interdependence.

Keohane and Nye (1977, p. 9) argue that the traditional view on power is based on military capacity; however, it became challenged as world politics evolved. In complex interdependence, where the military force does not prevail over other power instruments, the concept of power is also complicated. The authors (1977, p. 10) interpret power as “the ability of an actor to get others to do something they otherwise would not do.” Thus, they suggest measuring the power as having “the control over outcomes.” This perspective includes both traditional power resources and the ability to influence the outcomes in interdependence. Keohane and Nye also emphasize the “potential” of influence over outcomes, especially in the case of asymmetric interdependence, where the power relies not only on the initial resources but also the capacity to influence the outcome.

In asymmetrical interdependence, the less dependent actors retain a significant political superiority over the more dependent actor since the changes in relationship status quo would not be as costly as the latter suffers from (Keohane & Nye, 1977, p. 10). However, under complex interdependence, the initial resources may not be effective as they are since the relationships are built upon multilateral and multidimensional ties in general. Therefore, the matter is the ability to translate the potential into gains rather than having significant amounts of power resources. The thesis will consider the conceptualization of power from the perspective of complex interdependence as a theoretical cornerstone while evaluating the role of energy security in Turkish foreign policy. Because Turkey lacks remarkable energy resources, it is almost entirely dependent on energy imports. However, as a transit

country located on important energy routes, its strategic geopolitical advantage allows Turkey to use its potential to influence the political outcomes in complex interdependent settings with Russia and the EU.

Keohane and Nye (1977, p. 10) propose two interdependence levels: sensitivity interdependence and vulnerability interdependence. On the one hand, the former stands for the ability of adaptability in a given policy structure. In other words, sensitivity interdependence is about the speed of a country's responsiveness against a costly change occurring in another country and the effectiveness of that change. Sensitivity is based on the assumption that the policy framework will not be altered in the case of change. Thus, there is no room for a new or alternative policy in sensitivity interdependence. Sensitivity is at stake when there may not be enough time to develop new policies, or there are given policy commitments at the national or international level that cannot be altered easily.

On the other hand, sensitivity does not cover the situations where the change in policy framework is possible in mutual dependence (Keohane & Nye, 1977, p. 11). Assuming that there are available policy options, by making new ones or changing the current framework, what would be the cost of change in an interdependent international arena? In many situations, policy framework change is possible, but what are the costs and benefits of such arrangements? Vulnerability asks these questions to evaluate the costliness of alternatives. Concerning this thesis's subject matter, Keohane and Nye give the example of energy dependence where two countries are equally dependent on energy imports. In this case, both countries may seem to be equally sensitive against a fluctuation in energy prices. However, if it is the case that one country has access to alternative domestic resources at a reasonable price to replace high-priced imported resources while the other country lacks, the

former would be less vulnerable than the latter against a change in status-quo. Consequently, vulnerability interdependence involves contextuality where accessibility and profitability of the alternative policy options come into question.

Keohane and Nye (1977, p. 13) argue that, in comparison with sensitivity, the vulnerability dimension appears as a more important determinant to analyze the political dynamics of complex interdependent structures. Vulnerability is a useful theoretical tool that allows one to understand which actor is the rule-maker in the international arena. The ability to set the rules enables the actor to define the "ceteris paribus conditions" of the game. Furthermore, the authors claim that vulnerability is relatively more effective than sensitivity in analyzing interdependent relations when it comes to energy politics. This is another critical point that the present study will consider, where I will discuss Turkey's foreign policy framework in the context of energy security. A coherent and consistent policy requires an in-depth analysis of current and future vulnerabilities that may affect the policymaking process (1977, p. 14). In this thesis, I will explore how Turkey manages its vulnerabilities against Russia and the EU. Accordingly, I will discuss the patterns of continuity and change in Turkish foreign policy.

Complex interdependency is a theoretical framework proposing a new way of looking at world politics during the times in which the assumptions of realist scholars had dominated the literature. Realism interprets international politics as a "struggle for power" that is characterized by "organized violence" (Keohane & Nye, 1977, p. 19). The realist theory suggests three main assumptions on the nature of global politics. Firstly, the state is the primary actor that dominates international politics. Secondly, the policymaking in international affairs is based on the usage of force where the other instruments remain in the background. Lastly, world politics

has a hierarchical structure where military security is the most prominent affair among nations rather than economic and social relations. In contrast to realism, Keohane and Nye (1977, p. 20) argue that in complex interdependency, the relations function differently, where the states are not the only actors, force is an unfavorable instrument to solve the problems, and an explicit hierarchy among issues does not exist.

In return, complex interdependence has three main pillars (Keohane & Nye, 1977, p. 20). First, multiple channels exist that connect societies in contrast to the political realists who argue that the state is the only actor in global politics. These multiple channels include formal and informal communication methods between government officials, informal relationships between non-governmental actors (either person-to-person or by telecommunication), and transnational bodies operating in the international arena. In short, Keohane and Nye classify these channels as interstate, transgovernmental, and transnational relations.

Second, there is a lack of hierarchy among issues in complex interdependence. Therefore, military security is not the most prevalent issue compared to others. In contrast to the realist tradition, complex interdependence suggests that the line dividing internal and external affairs is no longer clear, which means that issues that were previously considered to be originated from domestic affairs should be investigated on different levels. Political matters are amorphous; thus, they are intermingled. They can be subjected to both domestic and international politics, where different agencies are involved within or between states.

Third, the military is not the only option to solve the international problems between the states in complex interdependence (Keohane & Nye, 1977, p. 21). Especially in the case of the nature of the problem rooted in the economic realm

where the actors form a political or economic alliance, the military does not appear as an optimal solution. Nevertheless, complex interdependence does not suggest a clear-cut classification; the cases in which the military would have resorted are not disregarded.

In light of the main characteristics of complex interdependence, the political processes in international relations are reinterpreted. Keohane and Nye (1977, p. 24) argue that these particular political processes turn the power resources into the ability to control political outcomes. Under complex interdependence, the role of the military is declined as a political instrument to measure power. Hence, power is measured by not military capacity but the controlling capacity over the outcome. The thesis will analyze Turkey's foreign policy towards Russia and the EU in light of the premises of complex interdependence. It will take the energy out of the hierarchy of issues as a significant matter bargained through diplomatic relations rather than military options. Also, I will examine Turkey-the EU relations case, which is an example of relations between state and non-state actors.

3.2 Politics of transit

In accordance with the complex interdependence theory, Agnias Grigas (2017, p. 20) argues that energy politics relies on the concepts of power and influence where the production and trade processes require complex interaction between the actors from different levels. Energy interdependence is a double-edged sword that has consequences for both exporting and importing countries, as is the case for other forms of interdependence areas such as politics, economics, and military. It is noteworthy that this two-sided interdependence forces energy-exporting countries to consider their clients' interests who have a say in the energy market, too. Therefore,

energy interdependence depends on several factors, including both sides' market potential, energy infrastructure, and possible alternative collaborators on energy trade. Because interdependence is a multifaceted issue, it mostly takes an asymmetrical form to the extent that it depends on multiple dynamics, too. Grigas argues (2017, p. 20), the degree of asymmetrical interdependence is not stable. It can be affected by the business dynamics in the market, abundance or scantness of the production, global economic conditions, technological developments, discovery of new resources, and politics at national, bilateral, and global levels.

The study of energy politics entails contextual analysis depending on which side's perspective in the energy relationship will be used while carrying out the research. In other words, each side of the energy interaction has its own particularities, and the analysis takes shape according to the supply or demand perspective. Since the contextuality brings along the complexity as well, to clarify the energy relationships, Agnia Grigas (2017) proposes a multifaceted analysis of current geopolitics of gas where she evaluates the different aspects of global gas trade by employing several conceptual lenses. According to her categorization, the geopolitics of gas requires contextual analysis for each level of the gas transaction. These are politics of supply, politics of dependence, politics of transit, politics of isolated suppliers, and finally, politics of demand.

When it comes to analyzing energy politics, the first two types are the most prominent ones as Grigas (2017) argues: politics of supply and politics of demand. With this, one of the contributions of this thesis is to focus on the politics of transit rather than the supply and demand parts of energy politics. The concept of politics of transit will serve as a conceptual base for analyzing Turkey's role in global gas trade between the major supplier and the greatest market in the world, namely Russia and

the EU. Secondly, Grigas' framework provides another theoretical contribution to this thesis by suggesting an understanding of energy politics that is particularly based on natural gas. Grigas' book, *The New Geopolitics of Natural Gas*, suggests a tailored analysis for the politics of gas by highlighting the peculiar dynamics in different levels of natural gas trade rather than a holistic approach towards energy resources.

Grigas (2017, p. 25) defines the politics of transit as "a phenomenon applicable to states whose territories are instrumental in the flow of energy supplies from producing to importing states." Taking the fundamental transformation in the energy trade into consideration, Grigas argues that the role of transit countries was relatively more effective in the past since the gas market was relying heavily on the interstate pipeline routes that were running through the different states' territories to transport the gas from the producer to importer states. In recent years, LNG shipments through trans-boundary waterways have become easier thanks to the technological and infrastructural investments that allowed natural gas to be transported no longer dependent on state borders. However, she adds, if not a natural gas producer has direct access to the importer through its own territory or has access to the waterways and requisite technical infrastructure for LNG shipment, both exporting and importing countries will stay dependent on the transit countries to access the global gas market. Therefore, transit states will remain strategic actors in the energy market as they take an active part in transporting energy globally.

Grigas (2017, p. 25) points out several political and economic advantages that the politics of transit provides to the transit countries. Firstly, through the politics of transit, transit countries enjoy their geopolitical advantages as strategically important regional actors. This geopolitical advantage empowers transit countries since they

become a key part of the complex interdependent relationships. Secondly, control over supply routes enables transit countries to retain negotiation leverage at different levels depending on the context and geopolitical dynamics. Since they pull the strings of energy supply routes, technically, they can directly interfere in the energy security of both producing and importing states. Lastly, the politics of transit has an economic aspect that allows transit countries to reap the fruits of serving as an important actor in the circulation of the gas since they make money from energy transit fees, operation fees of their energy facilities, and taxes. Alongside the political advantages, transit countries gain significant economic returns, such as cash flow, infrastructural investments, and job opportunities.

Nevertheless, the politics of transit is a complicated phenomenon that involves not only mere geopolitical gains but also particular political or economic risks for the transit countries (Grigas, 2017, p. 25). One of the negative aspects of the politics of transit is its potential to produce a "cycle of rents," which Ukraine already suffers (Grigas, 2017, p. 212). Asymmetric allocation of the transit revenues where the money is distributed among particular interest groups or pro-government corporations may result in a rise in corruption that leads to political insecurities in both internal affairs and reciprocal relationships in the energy market. Secondly, Grigas (2017, p. 25) emphasizes the possible detrimental effects of the geopolitics of transit countries as they are located strategically in their region. Transit countries are vulnerable to political tensions and volatilities occurring in the case of disturbance of the balance of power in their region.

Moreover, this political vulnerability can be intensified if an alteration or crisis happens regarding the political alliance they involve in, which was the case in the aftermath of the dissolution of Soviet Russia, where Russia had to get along with

transit states who gained their independence. Also, the politics of transit becomes further complicated as the transit countries themselves are dependent on the producer countries (Grigas, 2017, p. 25-26). Transit countries like Turkey and Belarus are subjected to both the politics of transit and politics of dependence since they are transmitting Russian gas to the European countries while being dependent on Russia at the same time.

Overall, Grigas (2017, p. 25-26) emphasizes the multifaceted nature of politics of transit as it involves not only political and economic advantages but also certain drawbacks regarding its complexities. In addition to the beforementioned issues, there is a significant gap in the regulation of the politics of transit. Katja Yafimava (2011) from Oxford Institute for Energy Studies defines the situation as a "transit dilemma" since there is no regulatory body that provides comprehensive political, legal, and economic settings where the transactions between exporting and importing countries are arranged as Grigas reports (2017, p. 25). As a result, the politics of transit is vulnerable to the international crises in complicated geopolitical settings like Eurasia.

In light of these complexities of politics of transit, Grigas (2017, p. 16) argues that Eurasia will be the most affected region where fundamental changes occur as the developments in the natural gas sector bring about a new understanding in geopolitics. The fact that Eurasia is a term with more implications than a mere geographic one, the discussions around it address the broader political rivalry between Western democracies, including the EU and the US, and their traditional rival Russia (Grigas, 2017, p. 17). In today's world, this rivalry appears among these actors due to energy resources and supply routes as they are interdependent on the energy trade to pursue their economic interests. This is where Turkey creeps into the

equation as a country subjected to the rules of politics of transit. Although Turkey is not classified as a Eurasian country, its geopolitical position is directly related to Eurasian energy politics since it is located on the very center of the energy routes between the gas giant Russia and energy-hungry European countries.

Gas is the most favorable and politicized source of energy in the recent decades rather than oil that is the primary energy resource that has been widely used in the military, industry, and transportation sectors during the twentieth century through which major political conflicts led to bloody and economically devastating wars. Compared with crude oil, the popularization of natural gas has become a fact as a latter-day phenomenon considering the growing environmental concerns among the global actors as it produces much less carbon dioxide when it burns. Moreover, it has been widely used for electricity production, which led natural gas to be the primary source of energy of the twenty-first century as the blooming global population and ever-growing production levels resulted in the rise in natural gas's popularity.

Indeed, natural gas has always been a strongly politicized energy resource. Since it has been extracted, processed, and sold by the state monopolies in contrast to its counterpart crude oil, which has been open to middlemen and traded freely as a trade commodity, gas has been mainly regulated and traded by state monopolies consequently (Grigas, 2017, p. 8). The fact that the natural gas market is mostly controlled by state monopolies, it has inevitably become a geopolitically strategic energy resource that is dependent on bilateral and multilateral relations between the states. In other words, natural gas has been politicized through interstate relations. Thus, along with oil, natural gas appears as a substantial matter of geopolitics where the global energy market is governed effectively by global politics.

However, the global energy market has been witnessing fundamental transformation through developments across the globe. According to World Energy Council's Issues Monitor Report (2019), on national, regional, and international levels, this transformation occurs in multiple areas: geopolitics, macroeconomics, business environment, energy vision, and technology. The shale gas revolution purports that the US becomes the new gas leader, the oil prices decrease globally, Asian countries appear as strong and competitive markets, digitalization in the energy market proposes new business models, and finally, renewable energy applications become widespread and favored steadily. Considering these changes, the global gas market, which is vulnerable to the political dynamics among the state actors in the international area, recently becomes open to be freely traded like oil as the technological advancement facilitated the production, transportation, and commerce of the gas as a trade commodity.

Grigas (2017, p. 7) argues that although gas was a sparse, locally available, and unwieldy-to-transport energy resource once, the recent developments made it abundant, accessible, and easily transported thanks to the renaissance in the global energy market. The threatening economic and political domination of state monopolies through arbitrary supply cuts and price manipulation appears no longer sustainable. Therefore, the classical relationship between traditional producers and buyer states has been challenged. As the gas becomes an abundant energy resource and globally commercialized product, the tide turned in favor of the buyers instead of state monopolies who were imposing the rules of the game in the classical relationship. According to Grigas, the geopolitics of gas has been changing significantly, where the market becomes the playmaker of *modus operandi* between suppliers and buyers.

CHAPTER 4

METHODOLOGY

In this part, I will define the methodological tools I use to conduct my research. Based on case studies of Turkey's bilateral relations with Russia and the EU, the study will adopt multiple methodologies, including process-tracing and study of discourse. Following this, I will provide brief information about the logic of my case selection and the quantitative data sources used in the study. Lastly, the chapter will highlight the possible shortcomings and limitations of the study.

4.1 Case study analysis, process-tracing, and study of discourse

This thesis will elaborate on Turkish foreign policy by using an interpretive methodology based on two case studies: Turkey's bilateral relations with Russia and the EU. The study will aim for an in-depth analysis of the foreign policymaking processes in the context of energy security. Considering the multidimensional nature of the bilateral relations, I chose the case study method because it can facilitate the incorporation of multiple approaches to collect and evaluate different types of data and information (Hamel, Dufour, & Fortin, 1993). I will analyze the case of Turkey-Russia energy relations as the instrumental case study that "provides insights into the issue," namely the patterns in Turkish foreign policymaking, as suggested by Robert E. Stake (2005, p. 445). The insights and implications derived from the Russian case will facilitate the analysis of the dynamics underlying Turkish energy policy towards the EU, which will be elaborated in the light of complex interdependence theory.

I will conduct the case studies through the process-tracing method, which corresponds to “the examination of intermediate steps in a process to make inferences about hypotheses on how that process took place and whether and how it generated the outcome of interest” (Bennett & Checkel, 2015, p. 6). George and Bennett (2005, p. 206) argue that process-tracing illuminates the intervening causal processes between the independent and dependent variables by identifying the causal mechanisms and causal chains. To this end, the process-tracing method allows the collection of evidence and data from the official and historical documents (Schwandt & Gates, 2018), through which I will investigate the causal dynamics between the energy security concerns and Turkish foreign policy towards Russia and the EU.

Process-tracing is useful for such inquiry because to discover the causal mechanisms in international politics requires the combination of multiple dynamics related to human agency, individual decision-making, social context, and institutional structure (Bennett & Checkel, 2015, p. 3). Therefore, I will collect and analyze governmental documents, country reports, newspaper articles, statistics, strategy plans published by the ministerial resources, the public statements of the presidents, ministers, and officials, and international agreements in both bilateral and multilateral contexts as documented evidence for the empirical analysis. I will obtain these written documents from public sources such as governmental and international websites and archives (i.e., official gazette, archives of Presidency of the Republic of Turkey, MFA, and official websites of the EU), analyses, and reports published by non-governmental sources, and media agencies.

Milliken (1999) argues that “foreign policy and diplomacy/organization studies are directly concerned with explaining how a discourse articulated by elites produces policy practices” (p. 240). Given this, if not diffusively, I will also refer to

the discursive evidence in my analysis to complement the causal explanations about Turkish foreign policy. Of course, this is thanks to the process-tracing method allowing to work with different types of methodologies and identify the causal mechanisms (Dunning, 2014; Mahoney, 2000). As Jim George (1994) contends, the textual and social processes are closely related to each other, hence the human agency and political decision-making (p. 191). Accordingly, studying discourse would have a facilitating role to make implications on this link. Therefore, I will mention policymakers' statements to enrich the evidential reasoning and justify the implications I make on Turkey's politics of transit.

4.2 Case selection

This study aims to explore the foreign policymaking patterns of Turkey in the context of energy politics. In particular, Turkey-the EU relations will be elaborated considering the case of Turkish-Russian relations where the compartmentalization is the dominant strategy as it has been argued in the literature (Çelikpala, 2018; Öniş & Yılmaz, 2016; Sinkaya, 2016). Moreover, since the quest to explore the compartmentalization patterns in Turkey-EU relations will be the main aim of this thesis, I will analyze the Turkey-Russia case first, then Turkey's foreign policy towards the EU. Since the relations among the actors are complex and interdependent, I will evaluate the analysis of energy relations right along with the course of events that is interconnected to energy cooperation.

In the first case, I will provide an in-depth analysis of Turkey's strategy on Russia, the correlation between energy security concerns and foreign policymaking patterns, and a detailed conceptualization of compartmentalization strategy. The case study will focus on the milestones of cooperation and conflict, which will provide the

critical junctures reshaping the character of the relations. Turkey-Russia relations have been a complicated one characterized by complex interdependence where the ongoing collaboration in particular political issues and economic activity coexist with clashing geopolitical interests in the region. Regarding this information, Turkey-Russia relations will be evaluated in three critical points: the Russo-Georgian war, the annexation of Crimea, and the downing of the Russian fighter jet that raised the questions on energy relations in 2008, 2014, and 2015, respectively.

Secondly, the bilateral relations between Turkey and the EU will be elaborated in light of the analysis of Turkish-Russian energy relations. As is the case for most of the bilateral relations in contemporary world politics, Turkey's relations with the EU offer multiple aspects to take into consideration along with complex interdependence, which have substantial impacts on energy relations. Drawing from the analysis of energy relations between Turkey and Russia, I will elaborate on the interplay between the bilateral and multilateral relations affecting the dynamics of Turkey-the EU energy trade in this case study. Differing from the first part of the analysis chapter, which is based on an in-depth evaluation of critical turning points in the bilateral relations with Russia, the second part will examine Turkey-EU energy relations throughout the AKP period starting from 2002 until 2019, through the lens of the implications derived from the first part of the analysis. As a key issue in bilateral cooperation, I will analyze the energy relations by looking at the oscillating nature of Turkey-the EU relations, which has been challenged by long-lasting crises and political controversies. By doing this, I will illuminate Turkey's role between Russia and the EU, focusing on the practice of compartmentalization strategy.

4.3 Data

Thanks to the methodological flexibility provided by the case study approach, I also support the qualitative analysis with quantitative data (Feagin, Orum, & Sjoberg, 1991). The data will provide further insight into the interplay between developments in bilateral relations and the actors' energy security concerns. Statistical data such as yearly trade volume, energy's share in total trade, amount of natural gas import or export are key to understand the economic dimension of the bilateral interactions among Turkey, Russia, and the EU. When necessary, I will incorporate the statistical data to concretize the material conditions ending up with complex interdependence in the region.

I will derive the data from the Worldbank, OECD, and Eurostat in addition to the governmental sources – such as the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources of the Republic of Turkey and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation – which would allow case-specific statistics and political implications. Supporting the research with quantitative data would increase the robustness of the qualitative analysis, which would involve interpretation fallacies and rigid generalizations.

4.4 Limitations

A matter of concern related to the reliability of the analysis might be about the nationality of the researcher. It is possible to have an implicit influence on the interpretation of the political phenomena because research is held from the perspective of a Turkish national. Of course, the objectivity of the study is considered vital in the context of academic honesty measures, however as Ole Wæver (1996, p. 159) states, "we are all caught by our view of the world, and this

structures our way of importing new information and evaluating it." Given Wæver's argument, there is always a possibility of reflecting a particular perspective or cognitive background, whether implicitly or not, in the analysis.

Using the state as the unit of analysis may be criticized for ignoring the pluralist approaches that explain state behavior in a multi-centric way through accounting for the non-state, sub-state, and transnational actors as well. Moreover, in the second case, I will take the EU as a unitary actor in its relationship with Turkey. For the sake of parsimony, the multilayered structures of Turkey, Russia, and the EU have been analyzed in a holistic approach in the case studies. Besides, despite focusing on the state level analysis, the study will also infer from the statements made by officials. Only when necessary, I will apply the study of discourse as a complementary method to improve the scope of causal explanations with enriched documented evidence. With this, I adopt the methodological opportunism idea proposed by Adam Przeworski, suggesting "doing or using whatever works" (Kohli et al., 1995, p. 16)

An inevitable shortcoming of the study may stem from limited access to information. In other words, in the case if there is backdoor diplomacy that ended up with confidential agreements since it involves classified information and prohibited from being publicized, it may be considered as one of the limitations of this study. Although it is unlikely to happen in the EU relations case, the transparency in Turkish-Russian bilateral relations can be questioned. This concern will be taken into consideration in the analysis chapter.

4.5 Research questions and hypotheses

As mentioned before, I will try to explain the intriguing puzzle of how Turkey can maintain energy cooperation with Russia and the EU, although conflicts frequently challenge bilateral relations. For a detailed analysis of this puzzling coexistence of cooperation and conflict, the study will seek answers to the following research questions:

Research Question 1: How does energy compartmentalization interact with the foreign policymaking mechanism?

Hypothesis 1: In this study, I will discuss Turkey's politics of transit with respect to the compartmentalization of energy as a foreign policy behavior in the context of bilateral relations with Russia and the EU. Having said that, I will argue that the compartmentalization of energy provides three particular advantages in foreign policymaking. Firstly, compartmentalization would allow both parties to pursue their long term economic interests. Secondly, compartmentalization can make it possible to bypass ideational, regional, and structural controversies thanks to the flexibility it would provide in foreign policymaking. Lastly, compartmentalization would yield quick reconciliation in post-crisis periods either as a means or end that create incentives to find common ground in bilateral relations. The analysis will trace the processes underlying bilateral energy relations and explore the politics of transit conducted by Turkey in a complex interdependent setting. The thesis will argue that compartmentalization highlights the facilitating role of energy in bilateral relations as a political and economic commodity.

Research Question 2: How does compartmentalization work with Turkey-the EU relations in terms of energy cooperation?

Hypothesis 2: I will argue that Turkey's foreign policy towards the EU involves the compartmentalization strategy in the context of energy politics. In addition to the energy, with the case study analysis, I will explore the oscillating outlook of the bilateral relations by focusing on various policy issues that affect the state of affairs between two actors. It is essential to include a wide range of issues in the scope of the analysis because the thesis is built upon the theoretical background of complex interdependence, which emphasizes the multiplicity of interactions among international actors (Keohane & Nye, 1977). Accordingly, the energy relations between Turkey and the EU are interconnected to the other policy areas in a bilateral setting. Turkey and the EU have a long history starting from Turkey's application to the European Economic Community in 1987, followed by the involvement in the Customs Union in 1996 that expanded the scope of political, economic, and social interaction (European Commission, 2016b). The relations have been challenged frequently, especially during the AKP's second term in power due to the scale-up in political conflicts that raised question marks over minds in the context of cooperation in energy trade. However, it could be argued that the compartmentalization allowed the energy cooperation to remain intact as a vital issue for both actors considering their dependence on energy imports.

Research Question 3: How does energy compartmentalization diverge in the EU case from the Russian, with respect to its implications on Turkey's bilateral relations?

Hypothesis 3: Further with the second hypothesis, I will argue that compartmentalization is observable in Turkey-the EU energy relations; however, the methods and outcomes of compartmentalization may differ compared to the Russia case. Although Turkey follows the rules of politics of transit in both cases, the

opposite direction of energy flow – natural gas is exported from Russia as the provider and delivered to the EU as the demander – would influence the implementation and after-effects of compartmentalization. In other words, even if Turkey pursues similar foreign policy patterns vis-à-vis Russia and the EU, the distinct characteristics of interdependence may produce diverse outcomes for each case. Also, trajectories of compartmentalization might differ among the two contexts since Russia, and the EU have divergent patterns of policymaking in the international arena as they have a centralized and fragmented decision-making system, respectively. Nevertheless, the outcomes of compartmentalization strategy in the context of Turkey-the EU relations might have significant similarities with the Russian case when it comes to its effects on, firstly, securing long-term economic interests, secondly, sidestepping the regional or ideational controversies, and finally, facilitating quick reconciliation in times of crisis.

CHAPTER 5

ANALYSIS

In this chapter, I will analyze Turkey's foreign policymaking patterns with respect to the energy relations with Russia and the EU in two parts. In the first part, I will discuss the compartmentalization strategy in Turkey-Russia relations, which is designed as an instrumental case study rendering a further analysis for the EU case. I will explain why Turkey adopts a compartmentalized energy policy, how it affects Turkish energy security and bilateral relations in general, and the advantages of employing a compartmentalization strategy in the energy cooperation. The findings I derived from this part will provide an analytical basis for the second part, where I will evaluate Turkey and the EU's energy relations in terms of compartmentalization. Thus, in the second part, I will interpret Turkey's foreign policy towards Europe in line with the first case's claims. As one of the main contributions of this thesis, the implications of the compartmentalization strategy in Turkey's EU relations would be noteworthy.

5.1 Compartmentalization in Turkey-Russia relations

Although Turkey and Russia's bilateral relations go centuries back, the foundations of energy cooperation were laid for the first time by the inauguration of the Western Line that brought Russian gas to Turkey in 1998. In addition to the oil imports from Russia, the share of Russian gas in developing Turkey's domestic consumption incrementally grew since then. The growth continued with the construction of Bluestream in 2003. As of January 2020, the newest pipeline between Turkey and

Russia, namely Turkstream, designed to deliver 31.5 bcm annually, made its first billion cubic meters of gas supply to Turkey (Gazprom, 2020b). Besides Russia has been providing the biggest share in Turkey's energy imports in the last decade, Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant also creates long term dependence (Enerji Piyasası Düzenleme Kurumu, 2019). According to the estimations, Akkuyu will meet 6% of Turkey's energy need in 2030 (Özel & Uçar, 2019, p. 23). Considering that Russian state company Rosatom will hold the ownership of the plant for 25 years, it is possible to argue that asymmetrical interdependence Turkey-Russia relations would remain a persistent dynamic. With this, compartmentalization appears as a strategic dimension in bilateral relations where cooperation needs to continue despite having geopolitical disagreements.

In the case of Turkey-Russia relations, compartmentalization would take its roots from two main reasons, which are interrelated to each other. Firstly, economic concerns are compelling both parties to secure their rational interests to isolate the energy trade from the other issue areas like Syria and Libya, which constitutes conflicting interests. Energy meets the most critical part of Russia's trade volume with Turkey because energy has the biggest share in Turkey's imports from Russia (Turkish Statistical Institute, 2020). Moreover, Turkey is the second-largest customer of Russian gas in the Western market that cannot be disregarded by Russia as an essential customer (Gazprom, 2020a). Thus, I can argue that the Russian account of the two-sided compartmentalization of energy relations is strongly connected to rational interests. On the other side of the coin, for Turkey, Russian gas is one of the most viable alternatives considering price affordability and easy transportation. Furthermore, energy trade between Turkey and Russia does not rely on imports only but also on long-term investments in big projects such as TurkStream and Akkuyu

Nuclear Power Plant that will pay off in the future. With the investments, energy trade underpins the many-sided economic collaboration, which also involves trade in goods and services, and tourism.

Another reason to compartmentalize the energy trade is nested in the definition of energy security. IEA (2019) defines the concept of energy security as "the uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price." Including its long-term economic sustainability, the material accessibility of energy is vital for Turkey's domestic needs for electricity production, heating, and industry, which have been in an increasing trend in the last two decades (Enerji Piyasası Düzenleme Kurumu, 2019). In addition to its economic and material sustainability, the political implications of the energy security highlight the need for a foreign policy that secures the energy trade with Russia considering that the share of Russian gas consisted of 46.95% of the Turkish energy mix in 2018. Thus, compartmentalization appears as a viable solution to ensure Turkey's energy security regarding the complicated bilateral relations characterized by the coexistence of cooperation and conflict. Thinking in terms of IEA's definition of energy security, compartmentalization would allow Turkey to access affordable energy without "interruption" in the case of politically unstable periods and even in times of crisis. In this section, I will evaluate Turkey-Russia energy relations in times of political conflicts, which propose important implications for the main arguments of this thesis. To this end, I will analyze three events: the Russo-Georgian War, the annexation of Crimea, and the Russian jet shot down.

5.1.1 Russo-Georgian war

On Russo-Georgian war, the then Prime Minister Erdoğan said:

Now, they try to push us to one side in the aftermath of the Georgian issue... I will not let Turkey be pushed to one side. We will act according to Turkey's national interests. When it comes to Russia, it is an important energy source for us. Moreover, [Russia is] a country which we have a significant trade volume... Our natural gas demand, need for energy are obvious. Can you ignore these? You cannot... Therefore, Turkey will pursue a balance aligned with its interests. (Bila, 2008) (see Appendix)

The statement provides evidence that would prove Turkey's aim to implement a balancing policy without discrediting any parties involved in the conflict. In line with this balanced mechanism, Erdoğan's statement has substantial implications for the compartmentalization strategy in energy relations towards Russia.

Firstly, the bilateral relations between Turkey and Russia are defined through energy cooperation. To describe Russia as an economic partner, Erdoğan particularly emphasizes energy relations as it is the first and foremost issue to be mentioned apart from the other economic activities. In that sense, energy has also been compartmentalized in discourse. Secondly, he states that the rational interests of Turkey as the main driving force behind Turkey-Russia relations. Turkey needs energy, and it is desirable to have cordial relations with Russia for the sake of economic concerns. This view supports the argument proposed by the complex interdependence theory on prioritizing economic cooperation in international politics. Lastly, Turkey's stance towards the Russo-Georgian war is not determined by the dynamics of the status quo. Erdoğan leaves room for pluralism within Turkish foreign policy, suggesting that the formed political coalitions will not be the determinant factor but Turkey's national interests. Thus, the energy trade is isolated from political, regional, or ideational areas of cooperation and conflicts, as the thesis explains through the concept of compartmentalization.

Taking the then Prime Minister Erdoğan's statement as the departure point to elaborate on the compartmentalization strategy, it is vital to understand the meaning of the dynamics in the context of the Russo-Georgian war. In short, South Ossetia, a separatist territory in which the Georgian authority was lacking, declared independence after a week of regional conflict that ended up with Georgian intervention in the region, followed by Russia's overwhelming involvement against Georgia between August 8 and 16, 2008. The war resulted in Russia's victory and its recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states. However, most of the international public opinion considered it an illegitimate act against Georgia's territorial integrity, a country that was showing interest in aligning and integrating with NATO. In the same vein, Turkey supported Georgia's territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence, as it has been the situation in the aftermath of the Soviet Union's collapse (MFA, 2008c). During the war period, Turkey also provided electricity and humanitarian relief without showing strong opposition to Russia's aggression (MFA, 2008b; Reuters, 2008).

Apart from expressing its concerns, Turkey's moves were worthy to note when analyzing regional politics by considering international dynamics. As a NATO country, in the period before the Russo-Georgian war, Turkey's relations with its Western allies were in a negative trend due to Turkey's reluctance to cooperate with the US in the 2003 military operation in Iraq, and the frustration for the lack of American support against Kurdish terrorist groups in Turkey's southeastern border. The Georgian crisis was the period that the distrustfulness of Turkey towards Western allies has coincided with its willingness to increase the economic cooperation with its Russian counterpart. Because meanwhile, the energy need was

dramatically increasing, coupled with the incrementally growing economy in the mid-2000s.

In this period, Turkey's commitment towards cooperation with the energy giant proved to be strong through some strategic moves. For instance, Turkey denied the US vessels over a particular tonnage to access the straits on the Black Sea route according to the limits set by the 1936 Montreux Convention. Because the US vessels were not only carrying humanitarian aid to Georgia but also their presence in the Black Sea would be intimidating for Russia. In this case, Turkey simply enforced the international law with a strict adherence to the convention – which obliges American vessels to leave the Black Sea in 21 days – at risk of upsetting its closest ally, namely the US, as Erdoğan defines (Bila, 2008; MFA, 2008a). All in all, the war was a test against the delicate balance of Turkish foreign policy and its position amid the rivalry between the west and east.

This delicate balance has been managed fairly successfully in the sense of the future of Turkey-Russia energy relations. The then chief foreign policy advisor Ahmet Davutoğlu's statement gives a brief explanation about how Turkey manages this complex relationship:

Turkey is a candidate for EU [membership] – part of the Western bloc, there is no doubt about it. Any other European country can follow certain isolationist policies against Russia. Can Turkey do this? I ask you to understand the geographical conditions of Turkey. (Council on Foreign Relations, 2008)

In this sense, the effectiveness of Turkey's economic interests outweighs the political concerns of NATO in Turkish foreign policy. He adds:

If you isolate Russia economically, can Turkey afford this? ... Turkey is almost 75-80% dependent on Russia [in energy]. We don't want to see a Russian-American or Russian-NATO confrontation ... We don't want to pay the bill of strategic mistakes or miscalculation by Russia, or by Georgia. (Council on Foreign Relations, 2008)

The statement indicates the centrality of the energy trade when it comes to relations with Russia. To reiterate, the definition of energy security requires affordable and uninterrupted gas flow. Therefore, I would argue that the war eventually forced Turkey to prioritize its energy relations with Russia over a possible political resentment coming from its western allies.

To ensure its energy security, Turkey was motivated to take an active diplomatic role to avoid the war's negative spillover effects that have already threatened its long-term national interests to become an energy corridor. On the one hand, energy cooperation with Russia needs to continue without interruption due to growing energy needs. On the other hand, Georgia is a strategic partner located on the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipeline route (BTE) through which Shah Deniz gas from Azerbaijan has been transferred. Also, the war was a direct threat to the desired Nabucco pipeline to transfer Azeri gas to Europe, which was designed to use BTE's route as the predecessor of TANAP. Therefore, the material consequences of the regional conflict would have been extremely disruptive for Turkey's interest in being the energy hub of Europe.

Considering this complexity, Turkey offered Caucasus Cooperation and Stability Pact to the countries in the region, aiming at developing regional cooperation with a particular focus on energy security as a peacebuilding attempt (MFA, 2009). Although the attempt was failed eventually, Turkey's considerable effort to maintain peace in the region was driven by energy security concerns, which appear as one of the most important forces behind foreign policy preferences. Since the politics of transit requires multi-actor engagement with the suppliers, other transit countries, and demanders, Turkey adopted a conciliatory policy between Russia and Georgia that are the two important actors in its energy route. By doing this, Turkey

also bypassed the repercussions of war on Turkey's foreign policy as a NATO member who was expected to take harsher measures against Russia as its allies did. However, the energy security concerns have been compartmentalized as a fragmented issue area shaping the nature of Turkey-Russia bilateral relations. Hence, Turkey avoided disturbing its major energy partner by grounding its foreign policy on their divergent historical positions in international politics. In short, geopolitical and ideational conflicts have been sidestepped through the compartmentalization strategy, which secured energy relations as the main element in Turkey-Russia bilateral relations.

5.1.2 Annexation of Crimea

In early 2014, Russia's aggression against Ukraine that resulted in the annexation of Crimea was another challenge for Turkey and Russia's bilateral relations.

Intrinsically, the conflict's repercussions on the Turkish side were not utterly unprecedented since the Russo-Georgian War had disturbed the relations in similar ways, such as threatening the energy security and creating instability in the region. At the time of the event, the trending rapprochement with Russia in the late 2000s continued through increasing economic cooperation, mainly in energy trade and other economic areas by which the bilateral relations were characterized. The crisis in Crimea was a regional conflict of interests as well as posing a threat to the international power relations alongside other issues such as the Russo-Georgian War. Again, Turkey's strategy aimed at restoring the status quo without disrupting the national interests relied on energy collaboration via trade and pipeline projects that have been questioned during the crisis.

Considering the concerns over rational interests as was the case for the Russo-Georgian war, Turkey similarly adopted a restrained stance towards Crimea's annexation to appease both its energy partner to the north and the allies in the west. Most of the international actors condemned the annexation. The UN (2014) adopted a non-binding resolution on Ukraine's territorial integrity that rejects the validity of the referendum in Crimea. NATO (2014) accused Russia of violating international law and called it to de-escalate the tension in Crimea. Also, G8 suspended the membership of Russia. Moreover, the US and the EU imposed harsh economic measures, which resulted in a recession of the Russian economy.

Although Turkey is a signatory of the UN resolution, there was no significant reaction other than condemning the annexation as illegal and declaring support for Ukraine's territorial integrity that only has limited symbolical meaning. In this sense, the MFA (2014) has made a statement arguing that "it is essential to take as the basis the preservation of the territorial integrity, sovereignty, independence and national unity of Ukraine, a neighbor and strategic partner of Turkey" to resolve the conflict in Crimea.

Turkey's silent response can be understood in terms of asymmetric interdependence as Keohane and Nye (1977, p. 26) argues that asymmetric relations can be used as a source of influence in favor of the relatively powerful actor, which is heavily defined by the energy dependence in the case of Turkey-Russia interdependence. Turkey is both a strategically located transit country and an almost entirely dependent customer of Russia. Thus, the relative cost of a potential deterioration in bilateral relations could upset the Turkish economy seriously, which has already happened in the aftermath of the 2015 Russian jet shot down the crisis. Therefore, it is possible to argue that Turkey needs not only to compartmentalize

energy trade but also prioritize energy security, as one of the most important foreign policy concerns to ensure the nested interests that would get negatively affected due to possible spillover effects.

This argument can be supported by the statement of Minister of Foreign Affairs Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu on the question of whether Turkey will join the EU sanctions against Russia. He states that Turkey will take its own measures but will not sanction Russia, and he suggests everyone to be more "realistic" on their Russia policy since the EU is also dependent on Russian gas in considerable amounts (MFA, 2015). Çavuşoğlu's emphasis on realism is noteworthy to understand Turkish foreign policy that prioritizes the long-term national interests reflected through the compartmentalization of the energy trade.

In general, Turkey's strategy towards the annexation of Crimea represents a clear example of a compartmentalization strategy. Through isolating the energy cooperation from the other issues, Turkey was able to keep its traditional alignment intact with the west while holding the friendly ties tight with its biggest energy supplier without disturbing the ongoing – and future – cooperation for the sake of political conflicts that are not directly related to Turkey's interests. In this sense, Turkey used compartmentalization as a flexible tool whose function is acknowledged by its partners, as can be observed in Turkey's relations with both Russia and Ukraine in the aftermath of the crisis.

Ever since, Turkey continued to support Ukraine's territorial integrity in all circumstances and develop further military cooperation while maintaining energy cooperation with Russia in both trade and projects without interruption. In other words, as was mentioned before, Turkey's energy security, which requires continuity in energy flow, has been ensured in multiple aspects through the resilient foreign

policy provided by the compartmentalization strategy. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that the compartmentalization strategy helped Turkey not only to seek its long-term rational interests but also to bypass the regional and political conflicts without losing its credibility in the international arena.

5.1.3 Russian jet shootdown

The Russian Sukhoi SU-24 fighter's shootdown in June 2015 was one of the most severe challenges Turkish-Russian bilateral relations faced in recent years. In short, the shootdown was caused by the violation of Turkish air space near the Syrian border by an unidentified jet, which has been warned several times before being downed by Turkish F-16, according to Turkey's officials (Nichols & Charbonneau, 2015). Two Russian soldiers were killed by rebel groundfire, including one of the pilots who ejected himself to land in the Syrian border and a Russian marine in the search and rescue team (Weaver, Tran, & Quinn, 2015). Both conflicts and cooperation already characterized the political outlook of the relations, and the former was overweighing the latter in that period since the contrast in conflicting geopolitical interests was saturated in the case of the Syrian crisis where Turkey and Russia have been supporting opposite sides of the war. The shootdown was a critical tipping point that resulted in the deterioration of diplomatic and economic relations.

President Vladimir Putin interpreted the shoot down as an act by "accomplices of terrorists" who "stabbed Russia in the back," and there would be some severe consequences of this hostile move ("Putin Fury after Turkey Downs Warplane," 2015). Accordingly, besides its politically devastating outcomes, the jet's downing resulted in the implementation of harsh economic measures against Turkey, followed by Turkey's reciprocal maneuvers against Russia. Russia applied sanctions

to several economic areas, including banning the agriculture imports from Turkey, canceling chartered flights and visa-free travel to Turkey, and banning tourism firms from selling holidays in Turkey (Roth, 2015). Since the complex interdependence between the countries is asymmetrical in favor of Russia, the sanctions' negative effects were higher for the Turkish economy than its counterpart. Turkish exporters, contractors, agriculture businesses, and the tourism sector suffered deeply from the sanctions. However, the measures on the energy sector were different compared to the other sectors.

The most critical aspects of the energy cooperation threatened by sanctions would be the joint projects, namely the TurkStream pipeline and the construction of the nuclear power plant in Akkuyu. The projects were on different official phases; therefore, the effects of the sanctions on projects were not similar. TurkStream was not officially introduced yet, but only a memorandum of understanding was signed. On the other hand, the agreement on nuclear power plant was already made in 2010, and the project was officially launched by a ceremony in April 2015, shortly before the shutdown happened. Thus, it was more feasible to take strict measures against the former, whereas there was an ongoing legal process for the latter, which includes clauses that oblige big amounts of indemnity to be paid in the case of unilateral cancellation. Moreover, in the case of Russia's unilateral termination of the Akkuyu project, Turkey had the right to collaborate with another stakeholder rather than Russia. Considering these dynamics and Russia's declining economy due to the western sanctions regarding the annexation of Crimea in that period, Russia abstained from terminating the Akkuyu project. Otherwise, it could cost a significant amount of compensation, and Turkey's disfavor, which is one of the most promising partners in the region for long term energy cooperation.

Supporting the argument above, President Putin stated that "The future of this [Akkuyu] project should be decided at the corporate level. This is a strictly commercial issue, and we will not take a single step that would harm our economic interests" in his annual news conference, which shows that the energy cooperation was considered as a prevailing issue embedded in long term economic ambitions and compartmentalized as an independent policy area (Kremlin, 2015). Accordingly, Russia suspended the preparation process of the TurkStream; however, the construction of the nuclear plant continued, albeit its continuation in the aftermath of the crisis was at stake ("Construction of Turkey's First Nuclear Plant Continues as Planned," 2020; Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources, 2015b).

TurkStream was more expendable in that sense; nevertheless, it is worthy to note President Putin's statement on it: "With regard to export routes across the Black Sea, there are certain well-known difficulties of a political nature with Turkey," which shows acknowledged political hardships on energy cooperation but leaves the door open even in the case of a crisis by adding, "however, we have not abandoned any of the projects, neither the South Stream, nor the Turkish Stream..." (Kremlin, 2016a). Considering that TurkStream is actively operating today, I would argue that the suspension of the project was a political decision that has been lifted right away as the parties reconciled in July 2016. One can see the two-sided operationalization of compartmentalization in this case of joint projects. Also, I would argue that energy investments have a significant role in long-term bilateral economic relations and ensuring energy security. Because the economic and security-related energy concerns require long-term stability in bilateral relations, compartmentalization would allow a fragmented policy in favor of energy cooperation.

Apart from the project investments, one of the main questions was whether Russia would cut off Turkey's gas supply. In that period, Russia was the main supplier of Turkey, providing 55% of the Turkish natural gas mix (Enerji Piyasası Düzenleme Kurumu, 2019). Moreover, Russia was notorious for being an energy giant whose national strategy is based on the politicization of the energy trade. Being the global energy hegemon, Russia has been taking advantage of its rich oil and gas resources by using them as political leverages against its customers, who have asymmetrical interdependence with Russia. As a potential policy outcome of the jet shutdown crisis, Russia could consider the instrumentalization of energy interdependence through energy cut-off as was the case in the Ukraine crisis, which had distressed the European market already.

Eventually, the gas cut-off has never happened. It is possible to argue that Russia did not want to alienate Turkey who is not only a prominent customer of Russian gas with the second biggest share in Russian gas export but also a potential collaborator who is eager to serve as an energy hub to deliver Russian gas to Europe (Gazprom, 2020a). Thus, such politically motivated gas cut-off would have resulted in Turkey's loss of trust in Russia, ending up with the failure of Russian ambition to seek alternative routes to pipeline projects bypassing Ukraine. It is safe to argue that Russia isolated the energy trade from political conflicts to ensure long-term interests and keep Turkey in its sphere of cooperation. Therefore, Russia chose to use more secure ways to impose sanctions rather than playing its trump card – energy trade – which constitutes the underpinning of bilateral cooperation.

Finally, besides playing a significant role in securing long-term rational interests, the thesis would argue that compartmentalization of energy helped conduct a quick reconciliation in the Russian jet shutdown case. In other words, the ongoing

and possible future collaboration in energy motivated the parties to take incentives for the normalization of the deteriorated relationship. Although Turkey looked for an alternative option for gas from Qatar, Iraq, and even Israel, eventually Turkey sent a condolences letter (considered as an apology letter for the Russian side) to restore the relations with Russia (Kremlin, 2016b). The letter was sent in July 2016, only after six months of the crisis, which can be considered a respectably short period for resolving such a vexed issue.

Since the day of the crisis, Erdoğan and Putin came together for the first time in August 2016 to restore the bilateral ties with an extended focus on energy cooperation as one of the main concerns of both countries along with trade and tourism. Shortly after the first meeting, during President Putin's visit to Istanbul in October 2016, they signed the intergovernmental agreement to construct the TurkStream natural gas pipeline, and both sides confirmed their commitment to finish the construction of the Akkuyu nuclear power plant. It is important to note that this period coincided with Turkey's isolation in the international arena in the aftermath of the failed coup attempt in July 2016, highlighting Turkey's disappointment towards the western alliance due to their reluctance to show support against the coup plotters. On the other side, Russia immediately showed full support for Turkey on the coup attempt that promised a new phase in Turkish-Russian friendship while western countries were falling into disfavor. Coupled with these variables, strong commitment to energy cooperation was perhaps the most prominent instrument in developing good relations with Russia, which accelerated the pace and expanded the scope of rapprochement progress.

5.2 Understanding the compartmentalization of energy

The case study presents significant implications about the nature of complex interdependence between Turkey and Russia, which is strongly linked to compartmentalization patterns. The analysis shows that compartmentalization would play a critical role in the politics of transit, particularly in crisis times. Turkey is a strategically located transit country on the energy routes between Russia and the EU; hence it is important to note that the complex interdependence connects politics of transit, politics of supply, and politics of demand. Scrutinizing the asymmetric nature of this interdependence would be key to understand the instrumental role of compartmentalization strategy from Turkey's perspective. Eventually, understanding the instrumental role of energy compartmentalization would help us see Turkey's ability to influence foreign policy outcomes, hence its power, following the definition of power in complex interdependence theory.

In the context of interdependence between the two countries, the asymmetrical relationship favors Russia for three reasons. Firstly, Turkey is the more dependent actor by far since it is fully dependent on natural gas imports, and Russia has been providing around half of this need (Enerji Piyasası Düzenleme Kurumu, 2019). Secondly, Turkey has significant amounts of export deficit in bilateral trade with Russia in addition to energy resources (Turkish Statistical Institute, 2020). Lastly, Turkey needs Russia to maintain the geopolitical balance between east and west through strategic cooperation with Russia (Erşen & Çelikpala, 2019, p. 590). Regarding these, Turkey is more vulnerable to negative incidents in bilateral relations, especially in the crisis periods that saturate the asymmetric nature of the interdependence. Thus, isolating energy cooperation as an independent policy area served Turkey as the more vulnerable actor whose loss might be disastrous.

There are three important policy outcomes of compartmentalization strategy according to the analysis of case studies. First and foremost, the compartmentalization strategy allows Turkey to pursue its long term economic interests. Turkey seeks prospective energy cooperation through joint projects to strengthen its position as a transit country and to maintain the growing domestic energy need at low prices as a developing country. To these ends, compartmentalization would provide a certain degree of stability in energy relations with Russia. The analysis of three cases – the Georgian war, the crisis in Crimea, and jet shootdown – shows that the long term economic ambitions were secured when the bilateral relations were strained. Compartmentalization of energy relations can be thought of as a way of protecting rational interests from political challenges, in line with the complex interdependence theory suggesting that the role of economic interests increases incrementally in forming interstate relations.

Secondly, the compartmentalization of energy facilitated bilateral cooperation when regional, ideational, and historical controversies come into question. Turkey and Russia are historical rivals in the Eurasian geography, where their ideational and political differences are highlighted through political crises. Although geopolitical conflicts frequently challenged bilateral relations, compartmentalization allowed both sides to secure energy relations by bypassing the conflicting interests in the other issues. In the Russo-Georgian war and annexation of Crimea, on the one hand, Turkey was extremely cautious in reacting to Russia's aggressive moves. The reaction was confined to calling all parties for calm. On the other hand, Turkey showed full political support for its regional partners aligned with the Western alliance, promoted their territorial integrity, and independence against Russian aggression. That is to say; Turkey simply bypassed the negative spillover effects of

regional conflicts without disturbing its energy security nor its position in global politics. Would Turkey's response to Russia's acts have been harsher if there were no dependence? Most probably, the answer is yes to this counterfactual question.

Lastly, the analysis shows that the compartmentalization strategy would allow quick reconciliation in the aftermath of the crisis as well as crisis resilience for energy relations. Particularly, the reconciliation period in the aftermath of the downing of the Russian fighter jet is a good example to see the positive influence of compartmentalization of energy on rapprochement. Energy is one of the main constituents of Turkey-Russia relations whose trade and projects were continued even during the time of crisis. Therefore, it is safe to argue that energy was a motivating cooperation area to end the breakdown in relations, which promises future reciprocal gains, too. Accordingly, not only the crisis period lasted for a considerably short time, like six months, but also the reconciliation period was very much focused on energy cooperation as a facilitator for mending the disturbed relations. Only a month after the presidential meeting took place for reconciliation, Turkey and Russia signed the agreement on TurkStream as one of the main discussion topics in the first meeting. The positive role of compartmentalization in energy relations facilitated the reconciliation period within which a swift compensation of energy cooperation was observable.

All in all, the first part of the analysis chapter shows that compartmentalization strategy in Turkey-Russia energy relations allowed Turkey 1) to secure its long-term economic interests through ongoing and further energy cooperation, 2) to bypass regional, ideational, and historical conflicts for ensuring energy security, and 3) to reconcile quickly in the aftermath of the crisis by using energy cooperation as a facilitator. Considering these outcomes, I will analyze

Turkey's relations with the EU in the following part of the analysis. The analysis of Turkey-EU relations provides a general overview of cooperation in energy, which will be evaluated through the lens of politics of transit that Turkey employs in the context of complex interdependence. In this sense, I will discuss Turkey's role in the EU's energy security as a transit country by drawing from the first part, which infers three conclusions for compartmentalization strategy. Therefore, I will provide the analysis of Turkey-Russia energy relations as an instrumental case study suggesting a roadmap for the second part of this chapter.

5.3 Turkey-the EU energy relations

In this part, I will analyze Turkey's foreign policy in the context of bilateral energy relations with the EU. Particularly, I will question Turkey-the EU bilateral energy relations from the perspective of politics of transit employed by Turkey.

Compartmentalization of energy in bilateral relations will be discussed, as was the case in relations with Russia. With reference to the complex interdependence highlighting the multilateral interaction among multiple actors, I will provide an understanding of the politics of transit and its interplay with the politics of demand among Turkey, Russia, and the EU. Discussion on the role of energy in Turkey-the EU relations will be followed by the analysis of compartmentalization strategy in energy relations.

I will elaborate on compartmentalization under three topics, which are: energy relations in Turkey's accession period, Turkey-the EU Positive Agenda, and lastly, the Cyprus issue and the Eastern Mediterranean cases. Following this, I will evaluate the implications of compartmentalization on Turkey-EU bilateral relations compared to the Russia case. My analysis will discuss Turkey-the EU energy

relations under three headings derived from the analysis of the Russian case, which suggests that compartmentalization allows Turkey 1) to pursue long-term rational interests; 2) to bypass the geopolitical and ideational controversies; 3) to reconcile quickly in the aftermath of the crises. The analysis will highlight similarities between European and Russian contexts, albeit there would be noteworthy differences as well.

5.3.1 Role of energy on Turkey - EU relations

In the Energy Union Strategy document of the EU, "energy security, solidarity, and trust" are highlighted as the first dimension of the EU's energy policy, aiming at a secure, sustainable, and competitive long-term vision (European Commission, 2015a). To ensure energy security, diversification of supply is stipulated as the most important goal of the Energy Union, which is formulated as threefold: diversifying energy suppliers, energy sources, and energy transit routes to increase the energy security of the member states. In other words, to be more specific, the key point is to maintain a sustainable energy outlook by decreasing dependency on Russia because more than one-third of Europe's imported gas and oil is provided by Russia (Eurostat, 2019b). Therefore, the EU tries to vary its energy mix as much as possible either in the sense of collaborating with different actors other than Russia through different trade routes or differentiating the imported energy in kind to avoid dependency on traditional resources.

In that sense, both Turkey and the EU have mutual interests in energy cooperation. To achieve diversification aims, Europe needs Turkey as a key transit country. Vice versa, Turkey needs to cooperate with the EU to profit from its geopolitical advantages and reach its national interests by becoming an energy hub.

Strictly speaking, Turkey's politics of transit is based on exploiting this reciprocity by f-adopting proactive roles to increase energy cooperation with the EU by taking advantage of geopolitical dynamics. However, these dynamics imply vulnerability to structural and ideational conflicts. Considering the conflict-ridden nature of Turkey and the EU's bilateral relations, it is possible to argue that both actors are tended to isolate energy as a fertile cooperation area with a growing potential for their mutual gains. In the following parts, I will trace the compartmentalization patterns in Turkey's relations with Europe.

5.4 Compartmentalization in Turkey-the EU energy relations

In this part, I will analyze the compartmentalization of energy in Turkey-the EU relations. My analysis will cover three topics to evaluate compartmentalized energy relations. Firstly, I will elaborate on the energy framework within the EU acquis to find out how the EU and Turkey approach energy as a fundamental cooperation area that would be isolated from the rest of the issues. The EU membership requires Turkey's compliance with the EU acquis in 35 different policy areas, namely the chapters, regularly monitored throughout the accession period in which the potential in energy cooperation is highlighted as a matter of mutual gains. Secondly, I will discuss Turkey-the EU Positive Agenda on Energy to reach a further understanding of how both sides are committed to consistent cooperation in energy, although the pace of the accession period was severely hindered after 2010. In the face of potential negative spillover effects of the downturn in the accession period that characterized the bilateral relations, adopting the Positive Agenda can be seen as an embodiment of energy compartmentalization. Lastly, the outlook of energy cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean will be analyzed where a long-lasting

gridlock remains, considering that the Cyprus issue remains unresolved. Although Turkey conflicts with Greece and the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) and is excluded from the EU-supported regional energy cooperation, the ongoing energy cooperation has remained intact as an example of compartmentalization.

5.4.1 Energy in accession period

The positive dynamism of the early 2000s Turkey-the EU relations aiming at full membership is replaced by a pragmatic approach by both sides in the last decade. In December 2004, the European Commission concluded that the accession talks could be opened thanks to Turkey's successful reformation attempts; however, the relations started to deteriorate in the following period. Until the early 2010s, both sides lost their hopes in membership as the EU's desperation for Turkey's democracy gradually increased after 2005 (European Commission, 2006). In return, Turkey's accused the EU of being hypocritical in the membership process, and Euroskepticism has risen by the time of progress (Oğuzlu, 2008, p. 5). Eventually, considering the major crises of Syrian refugee flow, Gezi protests, and coup d'etat attempt in Turkey, which have appeared as areas of conflict with the EU, the recent years have been characterized by the downturn of the relationship that resulted in the European Parliament's resolution on suspending Turkey's membership negotiations in 2019. However, despite the overall situation, energy remains one of the few cooperation areas since it has been isolated from the negative developments in bilateral relations, which have been challenged by political crises.

What would make the energy policy to be compartmentalized? The reasons underlying the compartmentalization of energy are evident in Turkey and the EU's policymaking agendas. As was the case in Turkish-Russian relations, pragmatism

appears as the prevailing characteristic of compartmentalization strategy since politically and economically motivated interests are embedded in energy cooperation. In that sense, energy is not a mere commercial product but a strategically important instrument that provides mutual gains for both Turkey and the EU. It requires long-term policy formulation and the involvement of multiple actors in a complex interdependent setting. Moreover, energy security is the primary concern of both actors' policy agenda, as stated in the EU's official documents such as Energy Union Package and Turkey's ministerial documents on national energy strategy (European Commission, 2015a; MFA, 2019b). Considering these pieces of information, I argue that compartmentalization would help Turkey and the EU to ensure their energy security through facilitating sustainability and stability in energy cooperation.

As a vital element in Turkey-the EU relations, the accession period plays a significant role in understanding the compartmentalization strategy. In the EU *acquis communautaire*, the energy chapter is considered a potential cooperation area for Turkey and the EU. The *acquis* highlights that the EU acknowledges Turkey's strategic geopolitical location as a key country on the crossroads of resource-abundant supply routes whose trans-boundary role can make significant improvements in European energy security (European Commission, 2004).

Moreover, the annual country reports show that the efforts made towards TANAP, formerly Nabucco, have been encouraged by the European Commission throughout the accession period (European Commission, 2004, 2006, 2009, 2011, 2014b, 2015b, 2018). These reports state that the EU officially supports Turkey as a natural energy hub along the same line with its national energy strategy and the developments in energy security are addressed as “very good” in Turkey-the EU

relations. However, the Commission gradually increased the level of criticism against Turkey in the meantime, particularly in value-based areas such as the rule of law, democracy, and human rights. In that sense, the country reports would suggest evidence of compartmentalization in bilateral relations regarding the coexistence of cooperation and conflict. This fragmentation allowed both sides to pursue their rational interests in energy cooperation. In contrast, they have troublesome interaction in other issues characterized by discord between Turkey and the EU *acquis communautaire*.

5.4.2 Turkey - the EU Positive Agenda on Energy

Ironically, the energy chapter has never been opened in Turkey's accession period. Despite the dramatic increase in energy cooperation thanks to the initiatives taken by both sides in the last two decades, RoC unilaterally blocked the opening of the energy chapter as one of six vetoed chapters in 2009. Also, the EU was reluctant on Turkey's membership due to deficiencies in Turkey's democracy – such as the problems in the rule of law, protection of human rights, and freedoms – that are coupled with increasing suspicion of France, Greece, and the RoC who were explicitly opposing to accession. These negative trends endangered the accession period, and there have been no chapter openings after June 2010 until the end of 2013. To facilitate the gridlocked situation, Turkey and the EU agreed on Positive Agenda as a complementary action to the accession efforts in potential cooperation areas, including energy (European Commission, 2012a).

Turkey-the EU Positive Agenda represents the solid bilateral commitment to sustain energy cooperation considering both parties' long-term economic interests. Moreover, including the energy as an exclusive issue with a high potential in a

strengthened collaboration framework would set an example for compartmentalization strategy. As mentioned before, the bilateral relations have a fragmented character as a particularity of the EU's foreign policymaking mechanism; however, the Positive Agenda is a significant evidence of strategic isolation of cooperation areas. In the joint statement of Positive Agenda on Energy, the energy was defined as a "topic of key interest" in Turkey-the EU relations involving common challenges and interests for both parties (European Commission, 2012b). The Agenda states the long term policy coordination in energy security as the first dimension of collaboration. Also, it includes the full commitment to global and regional cooperation that will contribute to the diversification of the energy mix for both. Considering the stalemate in Turkey's accession period, which has been constituting the core of bilateral relations, the Positive Agenda on Energy appears as a joint initiative to bypass the political, regional, and ideational conflicts by isolating the energy cooperation. It presents an example of the bidirectional nature of compartmentalization. The commitments made by this initiative allowed Turkey and the EU to secure their rational interests behind energy cooperation from spillover effects of disruption in other areas.

Following the Positive Agenda, the commitment to energy cooperation is advanced by the high-level policy dialogues between Turkey and Europe. In 2015 and 2016, there were two High Level Energy Dialogues to discuss common challenges and further options in strategic energy cooperation. Turkey and Europe deepened the commitment to strategic energy partnership, and both meetings concluded that Turkey is a key transit country for security and diversification of energy, in continuum with the positive agenda. Although the cooperation in the Syrian refugee crisis appeared as an opportunity to rejuvenate the relations in this

period, the confidence in accession was already exhausted due to Turkey's distancing from Europe's political norms and values that resulted in undergoing distrust starting from the late 2000s. In this context, maintaining the high level dialogue provides significant evidence of isolation efforts in energy collaboration. As was the case in Turkey-Russia relations, it is possible to argue that compartmentalized energy policy allowed both sides to bypass structural and ideational conflicts. At the same time, long term economic interests were pursued continuously.

5.4.3 Cyprus issue and the Eastern Mediterranean energy

Cyprus issue has remained unresolved as a necessary condition to have good relations between Europe and Turkey, which is consistently highlighted in the EU documents, particularly regarding accession (European Commission, 2002, 2004, 2008, 2011, 2014b, 2019). The EU acquis obliges Turkey to apply non-discriminatory rules for all member states for full accession, whereas Turkey does not recognize RoC as the legitimate authority on the island. Besides the bilateral interaction, the Annan Plan was the most concrete international effort to redesign the island as a federational entity, including two states under the United Republic of Cyprus. However, in the April 2004 referendum, only 24% of Greek Cypriots supported the plan, whereas the Turkish side was fairly open to the plan with a 65% approval rate. As a result, the Cyprus issue remained unresolved. Moreover, although the Commission was supporting the reunification of the island, it approved the membership application of the RoC immediately a week after the referendum in May 2004, which eventually irritated Turkey considering its everlasting membership process.

Apart from the political aspect of the Cyprus issue, it is important to note that Turkey's interest in the Eastern Mediterranean energy resources collides with the EU perspective as well. Since Israel's first hydrocarbon exploration in 2009, the Eastern Mediterranean gas has been considered a promising alternative to diversifying the EU energy mix. Moreover, in terms of technical feasibility and economic costs, Turkey appears as one of the possible transit routes to bring the Mediterranean gas to Europe through Anatolia (Tsakiris, Ulgen, & Han, 2018). However, the Eastern Mediterranean gas has been a source of conflict due to the conflict between Turkey, Greece, and RoC on maritime borders. Transmitting the gas via Turkey is only possible by a pipeline designed to pass through the disputed EEZs claimed by both Turkey and RoC. Therefore, prospective cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean energy is subjected to the resolution of vexed relations between Turkey, Greece, and RoC in terms of both the political situation in Cyprus and the controversial geopolitical interests.

Accordingly, Turkey was not invited to the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum, launched by Greece, RoC, Israel, and Egypt in January 2020, upon the idea of building the EastMed pipeline that would transfer the Eastern Mediterranean gas to Europe through RoC and Greece. The EU supports the EastMed project excluding Turkey as a possible stakeholder, albeit almost all regional actors joined the club, directly or indirectly. Furthermore, the EU has been criticizing Turkey's exploration activities in the areas that are claimed as Greek, and Cypriot EEZs, urging Turkey to resolve the Cyprus issue to continue the accession process (European Commission, 2019). In return, Turkey insists on its demands on the Cyprus issue regarding the Cypriot Turks' political rights to be equal with Greek Cypriots. Also, Turkey constantly criticizes the RoC's unilateral hydrocarbon exploitation efforts in the

Eastern Mediterranean that has been considered as one of the main reasons for gridlock in the region by Turkey (MFA, 2014b, 2018, 2019a). Following this, Turkey signed a maritime border delineation agreement with Libya in November 2019 that expands Turkey's maritime zone claims on the Mediterranean by cutting across the planned route of the EastMed pipeline that will transfer the gas to Europe through Cyprus and Greece. As a result, the EU strictly criticized the deal and showed unequivocal support to their fellow member states by stating that Turkey's maritime deal with Libya is an infringement upon the sovereign rights of Greece and RoC (European Council, 2019).

Although the recent developments strained the relations, it is important to note that the Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus cases extend over a longer time period, requiring a wider analysis of energy politics between Turkey and the EU. With this, Eastern Mediterranean energy has become an issue area after the hydrocarbon resources entered the picture with the first exploration in 2009. The following decade witnessed several attempts made to exploit the Mediterranean gas by regional actors; however, the Cyprus conundrum persisted through this period. On the other hand, in the period after 2010, Turkey-the EU energy relations have developed significantly thanks to the SGC project that was one of the "priority corridors" in European energy security as it brings the Caspian gas to the EU in line with the diversification strategy (European Commission, 2017).

Ironically, in addition to TANAP, the EastMed pipeline has been incorporated into the SGC project as a "Project of Common Interest" (PCI) in 2015, which is an EU initiative to support cross-border energy infrastructures that are connected to the European energy system (European Commission, 2015a). The incorporation of EastMed into SGC highlights the duality in the EU's energy policy,

supporting both TANAP and EastMed in the meantime, whereas the Cyprus conflict and Eastern Mediterranean impasse were gridlocked. The coexistence of cooperation and conflict in energy shows that both sides are collaborating wherever it is possible. Thus, it is reasonable to argue that the compartmentalization of energy between Turkey and the EU appears as a complex phenomenon that allows both sides to pursue their economic interests while bypassing the negative spillover effects of conflicting issues.

The Eastern Mediterranean provides noteworthy insights for the compartmentalization of energy in the Turkey-the EU relations. Firstly, the Eastern Mediterranean case suggests that Turkey's politics of transit allows the implementation of proactive policies when necessary. Regarding the context, politics of transit can involve a wide range of policymaking strategies, including active diplomacy and naval operations, rather than relying only on joint agreements on energy investments as was the case in cooperation with Russia in TurkStream and Akkuyu projects. In other words, despite the politics of transit entails relatively passive roles to transit countries in most of the cases compared to countries of supply and demand, it provides more policy options in the Turkish context than a merely reactive and mediating middleman role. Therefore, one can argue that compartmentalization is a foreign policy pattern – rather than an institutionalized strategy defined under the politics of transit – that takes different shapes in the policy implementation phase depending on the context. Accordingly, it is possible to argue that compartmentalization can work as a case-by-base mechanism that necessitates contextual analysis in different settings.

Secondly, coupled with the flexibility provided by the given contextuality, Turkey-the EU energy relations in the Eastern Mediterranean case provides another

implication that compartmentalization leaves the door open to prospective cooperation even though in times of crisis and conflict. The Eastern Mediterranean case, in which the collaboration is possible in alternative scenarios whereas the current situation remains in gridlock due to the exclusion of Turkey, sets the example to this argument that isolating energy policy levels up the crisis resilience in complex relations. Given that the energy cooperation is compartmentalized in Turkey's relations with Europe, both sides consider it as a matter of rational interests necessitating foreseeable stability as the definition of energy security entails a long term political economy vision. Therefore, the reciprocal special treatment to energy renders a complicated relation possible to sustain. Characterized by deepened conflicts, the Eastern Mediterranean case remains gridlock; however, potential cooperation is still conceivable, if not likely, thanks to the reciprocal special treatment on energy.

Energy cooperation is bound to geopolitical dynamics accompanied by multilateral interaction in most cases. In the Eastern Mediterranean case, prospective cooperation between Turkey and Europe is connected directly to the process in the Cyprus issue as well as the regional dynamics between stakeholders. Considering the continuation of the puzzle in the Eastern Mediterranean, it is important to note that ongoing energy cooperation with the EU in other contexts, such as TANAP and Turkey-the EU high-level energy dialogues, remains intact. At this point, it is possible to argue that compartmentalization is observable among energy issues, too. In other words, as well as isolating the energy from the other issue areas, compartmentalization also exists within the realm of energy cooperation. Thus, related to the contextuality implication mentioned above, compartmentalization appears as a multilayered strategy in Turkey's politics of transit that requires different

policies across the settings. Moreover, it is also related to the second finding, on crisis resilience, by the fact that compartmentalization within energy allows Turkey to secure its interests from the negative spillover effects of contested areas in the cases where cooperation is likely.

5.5 Comparison of compartmentalization in Russia and the EU cases

Compartmentalization is a foreign policymaking pattern providing a fragmented framework in bilateral relations by isolating energy cooperation from the political rifts in other areas and applied in different contexts. This begs the question of whether there is a structural difference between Russia and the EU cases in terms of comparing the compartmentalization patterns. It is important to consider the contextual differences while analyzing the compartmentalization in Russia and the EU cases since the conduct of strategy entails different foreign policymaking settings.

Firstly, these actors take roles on opposite sides of the energy supply chain that involve different policy requirements. Russia pursues politics of supply, whereas the EU foreign policy is formulated as politics of demand. Therefore, the definition of energy security alters as the cases require different contextual analyses. Secondly, Russia has a highly centralized decision-making mechanism as a de facto unitary state. In contrast, the EU's foreign policy framework has already been fragmented, particularly in the context of bilateral relations with Turkey, a candidate for EU membership. Hence, the relations are intrinsically compartmentalized for the sake of the accession period based on compliance with chapters in the EU acquis designed under the European Neighbourhood Policy. Briefly, energy compartmentalization is influenced by different structural dynamics depending on the context, whereas

underlying motivations and effects on the overall relations would have similar patterns.

If not identical, both Russia and the EU cases show that energy compartmentalization produces similar outcomes in different contexts. Although its definition would differ as the context changes, the universal definition of energy security is the main reason for this similarity in diverging settings. Simply, the need for energy compartmentalization is drawn from energy security defined by the International Energy Agency (2019) as "the uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price." Concerns on energy security are the motivating cause pushing the politics of supply, transit, and demand to take similar measures for the sake of long term sustainability in energy trade. Moreover, the politics of transit is relatively more vulnerable than the politics of supply and demand since it requires a delicate balance between producers and markets. In particular, Turkey needs to sustain the balance in relations with both Russia and the EU in a highly complicated and interdependent setting that is constantly challenged by geopolitical and ideational conflicts. It is also important to note that this complex interdependence is shaped by the diverging interests of multiple actors that render Turkey's quest to find a sustainable foreign policy framework difficult. Considering this setting's complexity, I argue that compartmentalization helps Turkey secure its interests in energy, whereas its bilateral relations have been challenged frequently. Drawing from the Russian case, I suggest three main outcomes of energy compartmentalization that helped Turkey to 1) pursue its long term economic interests; 2) bypass geopolitical and ideational conflicts; 3) reconcile quickly in the aftermath of crises.

Firstly, it can be argued that compartmentalization serves to pursue long-term economic interests for both Russia and the EU cases. Considering the idea that complex interdependent relations are dominantly shaped by economic interaction, energy appears as the vital element playing a primary role in the Turkey-Russia interdependence. However, energy security requires sustainability and long-reaching commitment in an undisturbed bilateral setting, whereas Turkey-Russia relations are highly conflict-ridden. Therefore, isolation of energy from the conflict areas helped both sides secure their rational interests nested in energy relations.

When it comes to the EU case, the bilateral relations are relatively more complexed than Turkey-Russia relations. Turkey's relations with the EU have been shaped by the accession period dominated mostly by political engagement agenda rather than having the energy at the core of relations. However, particularly after 2010, the accession agenda yielded a strategic cooperation approach in which the energy increased in value as a key collaboration area. Moreover, the rise in Europe's energy security concerns regarding the dependence on Russian gas coincided with this gradual change in Turkey-the EU relations. Therefore, in recent years, mutual gains in the energy area are increasingly highlighted as a matter of positive agenda in bilateral relations, which is furthered by joint projects and cooperation. Considering that Turkey and the EU mutually seek diversification of energy to decrease the economic dependence on Russia, compartmentalization addressed the long term economic concerns as a rational approach.

Secondly, in both Russia and the EU cases, compartmentalization of energy allowed Turkey to bypass the conflicts in bilateral relations under complex interdependence. In the Russian case, bilateral relations are characterized by the coexistence of conflict and cooperation. Even during times of crisis, the energy flow

has remained intact without interruption in the cases of downswings in bilateral relations. Compartmentalization appears as a useful concept to understand the continuation of energy collaboration in this context. Again, in terms of energy security, highlighting "the uninterrupted availability" of energy as a key aspect, compartmentalization facilitates the energy politics by isolating it from the conflictual areas, which can overturn the cooperation in energy due to negative spillover effects. Also, thanks to the complex interdependence, present and prospective reciprocal gains pushed both sides to maintain the stability in energy cooperation by preventing the adverse effects of conflicts in relations.

Similarly, I argue that compartmentalization helped Turkey sustain its interests in energy cooperation with the EU as well. Although the relations with Europe were not punctuated by severe crises such as military confrontation or wars like Russia's case, the bilateral relations between Turkey and the EU have also been in a downward trend in parallel with the decay in the accession period in the last decade. In this period, political, social, and economic cleavages between Turkey and Europe were expanded. The bilateral trajectory has shifted from a membership perspective to strategic partnership in a complex interdependent setting. By nature, energy cooperation depends on the stability and predictability in relations since the trade, investments, and joint projects necessitate foreseeability in the long run. Considering the orientation shift in Turkey-the EU relations, arguably, compartmentalization allowed both sides to tolerate the flaws in political and ideational alignments through the aim of long term cooperation in energy. In that sense, completion of TANAP under politically unfriendly conditions and persistent motivation to cooperate in the Eastern Mediterranean while having the Cyprus issue

gridlocked are examples of bypassing the conflicts for the sake of sustainable energy relations.

Lastly, it can be argued that compartmentalization plays a vital role in the aftermath of crisis situations as a reconciliatory tool to turn the impaired relations back to normal conditions. In other words, compartmentalization facilitates the rapprochement period to take a shorter time. As abovementioned, energy cooperation necessitates long-run stability and sustainability in the bilateral relations as an economic, but more importantly, as a political commodity. Therefore, in the case that energy has already been isolated from the conflicts in the other areas, it can serve as a point of exit for the crises since it highlights the mutual gains thus far, as well as the prospective gains in cooperation that would motivate both parties to come to an agreement. This outcome of compartmentalization was easily observable in Turkey-Russia relations. For instance, in the aftermath of the jet shootdown crisis, energy has played a fundamental role in the rapprochement period. Both sides declared their commitment to continue to cooperate in energy trade and projects right after the peace talks started. Accordingly, deterioration in the bilateral relations was fixed quickly – after a six-month-long crisis period – thanks to the willingness in energy cooperation shown by Turkey and Russia that concluded by the TurkStream agreement. It is noteworthy that the energy flow from Russia has continued even in the heydays of crisis thanks to the compartmentalization that also led both actors to sustain ongoing cooperation in energy projects without serious interruption. Thus, maintaining the peace process through fostered collaboration in energy has been easier since it was already preserved throughout the crisis.

The analysis of Turkey-the EU relations differs from the Russian case in the sense of quick reconciliation argument. The nature of relations is similar to the

Turkey-Russia context since there has been the coexistence of cooperation and conflict. However, Turkey's relations with Europe have been controversial due to Turkey's changing political alignment extending over time mostly, rather than sudden and unexpected challenges such as Russia's aggression or jet shootdown. In other words, the disagreements in Turkey-the EU context did not end up with breaking points in relations but gradual deterioration. Thus, there is a lack of evidence to support the quick reconciliation hypothesis in the EU case. Putting the energy cooperation in Turkey-the EU Positive Agenda, and high-level energy dialogues following the disenchantment in the accession period might be considered as examples of compartmentalization's reconciliatory outcome. However, these cases better explain the second argument of this thesis that compartmentalization help bypassing conflicts.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

In this thesis, I tried to answer the puzzle: how does Turkey maintain its energy cooperation with global energy actors even though the bilateral relations have been conflicted mostly. To illuminate this, I analyzed the compartmentalization phenomenon that corresponds to the foreign policymaking pattern in which the energy relations are treated as a separate area, hence isolated from the adverse spillover effects of political challenges. Compartmentalization in foreign policy remains mostly undiscovered in the literature. Given this lacuna, the study would contribute to the literature by exploring the implications of compartmentalization on foreign policymaking.

The thesis covered another overlooked issue in the literature, namely the politics of transit. My analysis focused on Turkish foreign policy to address how transit countries secure their interests in energy relations despite the troublesome regional politics. The research showed that the politics of transit has its own particularities – as well as supply and demand levels dominating the literature – requiring a multi-level understanding. Therefore, I chose to interpret the politics of transit based on complex interdependence theory that emphasizes the complicated nature of international relations. In complex interdependence, the power is not defined through the military but the capacity to influence the outcome (Keohane & Nye, 1977, p. 10). Accordingly, the thesis analyzed Turkey's impact on regional energy trade as a transit country without any remarkable energy production.

In line with theory, my analysis pointed out that the mutual dependence among the politics of supply, transit, and demand is telling. Although the asymmetric

interdependences favor Russia and the EU in most cases, one can argue that Turkey has maintained its vulnerabilities against those actors even in times of crisis. I would say that compartmentalization was key to managing the political hurdles and hedge their negative spillovers to secure Turkey's interests in energy, bound to vulnerable bilateral dynamics. Given this, I designed my research on three research questions to shed light on the compartmentalization process and its implications on foreign policymaking.

The first quest was to conceptualize compartmentalization and its outcomes. To this end, the first part of the analysis has focused on Turkey-Russia energy relations based on three main events that are the Russo-Georgian War, the annexation of Crimea, and the Russian jet shootdown, as they propose insightful findings about the conduct of energy relations. The analysis showed that the compartmentalization strategy would allow Turkey to pursue its long-term economic interests, bypass regional and ideational conflicts, and reconcile quickly in the aftermath of crisis times.

Apart from the first two outcomes of compartmentalization that could be found in the existing literature, I argued that compartmentalization helps the rapprochement happen in a shorter time, which is one of the contributions this study made. The jet shootdown incident would particularly provide evidence for this phenomenon as the prospective gains in energy cooperation motivated Turkey and Russia to resolve the conflict as soon as possible. Laden with ongoing and prospective mutual gains, energy cooperation can play a catalyzer role in the reconciliation progress in the aftermath of crises.

Considering the given outcomes, I found out that compartmentalization is a derivative of strategic thinking. In my opinion, as indicated in the analysis section,

we can understand the underlying causality of compartmentalization by looking at the definition of energy security that highlights the importance of uninterrupted availability of energy (International Energy Agency, 2019). This definition brings long term stability into the question as an obligation for all actors to secure their energy interests. Accordingly, my analysis showed that compartmentalization would appear as a foreign policymaking pattern entailing the pursuit of rational interests with a long term vision.

Regarding this, another finding I propose is the two-sided nature of compartmentalization. The analysis shows that compartmentalizing the energy in bilateral relations is a constructive policymaking pattern adopted by both sides. Energy security might follow different meanings across the contexts; however, it always relies on uninterrupted energy resources availability. Hence, I argue that the compartmentalization strategy is an outcome of this need for continuousness in energy. Whether sitting at different levels – supply, transit, and demand – of energy relations or having asymmetrical interdependence – such as Turkish-Russian relations favoring the latter – all actors would be tended to isolate energy from other issue areas. That means cooperation has to coexist with conflict in a complex interdependent setting where the geopolitical volatility is high, as is the case for Turkey and its partners.

Relating to the coexistence of cooperation and conflict, my second research question sought the traces of compartmentalization in the context of Turkey-the EU energy relations. I hypothesized that compartmentalization would also fit well to the EU case since the overall dynamics of energy relations look similar to the Russian one, where energy cooperation lasts even though the bilateral ties are on the rocks. According to the findings derived from the instrumental case study of Turkey-Russia

relations, I examine Turkey-the EU relations also under three events: the accession period, Turkey-the EU Positive Agenda on Energy, and lastly, Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean issue.

The findings are noteworthy because neither compartmentalization nor transit-demand relationship is well-addressed in the literature, particularly in Turkey-the EU context. Analyzing the last 18 years of Turkey's bilateral relations with Europe, I discovered some remarkable compartmentalization patterns in the conduct of energy relations. Again, the definition of energy security sets the departure point to understand energy compartmentalization's underlying reasons. Turkey and the EU's energy security concerns are strongly linked in terms of aiming at reduced dependence on Russia through diversification. Accordingly, a strategic partnership in energy between two actors is vital, even though they mostly disagree on several other issues rooted in geopolitical and ideational discrepancies. It is possible to argue that compartmentalization would facilitate stability to maintain this strategic partnership.

The complex interdependence among the actors is tended to have negative spillover effects among issues, but compartmentalization would also provide flexibility to mitigate such disadvantages because it is not a clear-cut strategy that has an institutionalized way of conduct. Instead, it allows a contextual approach in foreign policy, significantly while the challenges against relations are growing. This is an important aspect of compartmentalization as a foreign policy pattern considering its backing for stability. In other words, it is safe to argue that compartmentalization can promote cooperation while improving crisis resilience.

Related to its contribution to crisis resilience, the EU case suggests evidence for compartmentalization within a compartmentalized issue. Considering that the current conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean energy cooperation coexists with the

growing collaboration to reduce the dependence on Russia, it is possible to argue that there is compartmentalization among energy issues as well. That means compartmentalization is a multilayered strategy through which not only the collaborative issues are isolated from turbulent ones, but also a case-by-case contextuality is possible within the areas of collaboration.

This contextuality claim is followed by another critical implication about compartmentalization that we would call policy flexibility. Transit countries are often associated with relatively passive roles in energy politics due to their middleman role in energy trade, usually corresponding to making use of geopolitical advantages only. However, the politics of transit in the Turkish case also allows proactive policies, including vigorous diplomatic manoeuvres, increased physical presence through naval operations, and hydrocarbon exploration activities. I argued that such policy flexibility owes to the compartmentalization strategy that helped Turkey to expand its policy set. That is to say, compartmentalization would allow more agency for the politics of transit.

Thus far, I conceptualized the compartmentalization by indicating its relation to foreign policymaking in the case of Turkish-Russian relations and then argued that energy is compartmentalized in Turkey-the EU relations. Then, the last question asks how does the EU case diverge from the Russian one in terms of compartmentalization? In short, I argue that compartmentalization produces similar outcomes, if not identical. However, it is worth noting that the two cases have some different particularities regarding their roles in the energy supply chain and their bilateral relations with Turkey.

First, Turkey's relations with the EU differ from the relations with Russia since the former is a demanding actor as well as Turkey, whereas the latter is a

supplier. Regarding this, Turkey's dependence on Russia is considerably higher than it is on Europe, although complex interdependence among the actors entails reciprocal costs for everyone. Secondly, decision-making mechanisms are different in the EU and Russia cases. Because the former is a sui generis political body in which the foreign policy could be affected by multiple actors in comparison with Russia, a de facto unitary state, whose decision making process is highly centralized. Lastly, one should note that the EU's conduct of foreign policy towards candidates is intrinsically fragmented. Among thirty-five of them, energy has been one of the most critical chapters worthy of special treatment.

Despite all, it is still possible to argue that the outcomes of compartmentalization are considerably similar across different cases. Therefore, once again, I argue that compartmentalization allows high levels of contextuality in foreign policymaking, particularly for the politics of transit. Accordingly, the analysis of compartmentalization requires attention to the contextual dynamics that Turkey has to deal with. This complexity is an expected result of complex interdependence among Turkey, Russia, and the EU. However, one can argue that compartmentalization is a highly functional policy pattern – or an approach – to facilitate Turkey's complicated situation between its colossal partners.

When it comes to the similarity between the EU and Russia cases, my analysis shows that Turkey benefited from compartmentalization as it could facilitate the pursuit of long-term economic interests and help to bypass the geopolitical and ideational conflicts when it comes to energy security concerns. It can be argued that Turkey has been the one actor who benefited the compartmentalization most, in comparison to Russia and the EU. Because Turkey, being the most vulnerable among them, is more fragile against others with its almost fully dependent energy sector,

comparably smaller economy, and need for a delicate balancing policy under conflict-prone geopolitics. In that sense, compartmentalization supports complex interdependence theory, suggesting that interdependence could favor the more vulnerable actor despite the asymmetric relationships. Because the cost of conflict is reciprocal in a complex interdependent relationship in which the asymmetry could be soothed.

Furthermore, the third implication I made about compartmentalization, namely its facilitating role on reconciliation to happen in a shorter time period, would not fit into the EU case for an obvious reason. I found out that energy compartmentalization can serve to end the conflicts in the aftermath of crises, as was the case in the jet shootdown incident. It is necessary to have a severe crisis that might be considered as a valid reason for relationship breakdown to test this argument. However, Turkey-the EU relations lack occasion, but rather have gradual deterioration based on political divergences mostly happened throughout the last decade. If there had been such a case that might challenge Turkey-the EU relations, maybe energy compartmentalization could highlight the mutual gains and work to restore the relations. However, such counterfactuals might be misleading. Therefore, I conclude that compartmentalization would produce mostly similar outcomes in Russia and the EU cases except for the quick reconciliation argument, which is inapplicable to the latter.

Last but not least, one would ask the question: does compartmentalization occur intentionally or compulsorily? The analysis shows that the answer lies somewhere in between. As mentioned before, compartmentalization is not an institutionalized strategy guided by clear-cut planning and implementation processes but a contextual phenomenon that is observed when the actors have to handle issues

of agreement and disagreement in the meantime. In other words, it is possible to argue that compartmentalization is present when the actors are forced to pursue their national interests in a deliberate manner; nevertheless, it may involve a wide range of policymaking strategies taking different shapes and forms in the meantime.

To sum, I would conclude that compartmentalization is an outcome of rational concerns – a derivative of strategic thinking, as the analysis shows that energy security dynamics oblige the actors to secure their long-term interests. It allows the actors to sidestep conflicts to produce win-win situations in the case of conflict is inevitable. In some cases, it can be the strategy – which is not a necessary but sufficient condition to sustain energy relations without interruption. Sometimes compartmentalization would even promote reconciliation when the relations are already disrupted. All in all, compartmentalization might be the key to understand the conduct of politics in conflict-prone geopolitical settings.

All in all, in this thesis, I elaborated on the puzzling situation of Turkish foreign policy where the energy's importance is growing than ever before, even though the outlook of bilateral relations is mostly characterized by negativities. My analysis showed that thanks to energy compartmentalization, Turkey is none the worse for having troubled relations and being located in a risky geopolitical setting. The findings indicate that this strategy would be applicable across different contexts.

Moreover, the puzzle would address not only the recent period. Because, when we consider Turkey's hard-nosed and proactive policies in this period, I guess Turkey will ostensibly keep adopting a hawkish stance in foreign policy. Particularly, the recent developments in the Eastern Mediterranean would support this argument. Considering that Turkey is giving the utmost importance to its national interests in regional energy politics, the tension in the sea has been

increasing gradually, particularly stressing the EU countries as well as the littoral states like Israel and Egypt. Thus, the same puzzle would apply for many instances.

As well, considering that compartmentalization can be observed in the geopolitical settings where cooperation and conflict coexist, the EU-Russia relations might provide interesting implications. In the last five years, the average share of energy imports in the EU's total imports was around 4.5% – of which Russia provides 60% as the leading partner (Eurostat, 2020). Besides this dependence on Russia, on the other hand, the EU raised the level of criticisms against Russia due to the claims of authoritarian and undemocratic policies in recent years. With this, it is possible to argue that the bilateral relations between the EU and Russia are also characterized by agreements and disagreements at the same time. More specifically, Germany's dependence on Russia would be another case where one can make inferences about compartmentalization in the context of the EU-Russia bilateral relations.

On the part of the EU's energy security, the recent developments in Caspian geopolitics would also provide fruitful implications. To date, international expansion of the Caspian energy has been limited due to the disagreements on the Caspian Sea's legal status, resulting in hurdles when sharing the resources. Nevertheless, two prominent suppliers in the region, namely Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, signed a memorandum of understanding for joint energy production in January 2021, which would remark a milestone for Eurasian energy politics (Shaffer, 2021). On the other hand, Azerbaijan also signed an agreement with Kazakhstan for joint drilling activities in Caspian (Abbasova, 2021). Considering that the region holds an estimated 8 trillion cubic meters of natural gas reserves (U.S. Energy Information Administration, 2013), one can argue that these developments in Caspian energy

suggest a promising alternative to Russian gas for European energy security.

Consequently, Turkey's role in the EU's energy security would increase even more as the cooperation in the Caspian region scales up. Therefore, it would be interesting to incorporate the Caspian energy – with greater attention – to the analysis of Turkey-the EU energy relations, despite this study's scope falls short to cover such a comprehensive topic.

Lastly, another issue that would be worthy to note is the changing situation in the US with the 2020 elections. It begs the question of how would the transfer of power in the US affect Turkey's balancing strategy between east and west? The US has been supporting Turkey's opponents in the Eastern Mediterranean in the last couple of years, and the new president Joe Biden would take an even more solid stance against Turkey, which might include harsh sanctions. Would compartmentalization be helpful in such a case again? The time will show us; however, it is worthy to note that compartmentalization would take different forms in different settings. Therefore, upcoming studies can cultivate the compartmentalization patterns in Turkey's energy politics, regarding that Turkey's bilateral relations would not get straightened out overnight.

APPENDIX

LONG TRANSLATED QUOTES

Şimdi Gürcistan olayından sonraki süreçte bizi bir tarafa doğru itmeye çalışıyorlar... Ben Türkiye'nin tümüyle bir tarafa itilmesine müsaade etmem. Türkiye'nin ulusal çıkarları neyi gerektiriyorsa ona göre hareket ederiz. Şimdi Rusya dediğiniz zaman bizim için önemli bir enerji kaynağı. Ayrıca çok önemli seviyede ticaretimizin olduğu bir ülke... Doğalgaz alımımız, enerjiye olan ihtiyacımız belli. Şimdi bunları yok sayabilir misiniz? Sayamazsınız... O halde Türkiye kendi çıkarları doğrultusunda bir denge gözetecektir.

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