

AN EXAMINATION OF THE BALKANS IN
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS FROM
PAST TO PRESENT

by

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ABSTRACT

In international politics, the evaluation of a region with multiple actors such as the Balkans is only possible by means of a multi-faceted and detailed study. This work examines important phases of Balkan history from a perspective of international relations and from within a political historical discipline.

This thesis is an examination of a particular story of a geographical region viewed from perspectives which reflect internal and external policies. While considering in turn each point of change in Balkan history, this work sets out from the idea of making a significant conflict-resolution exercise for the creation of a stabilization zone for the Balkans, which even to this day has the characteristic of being a "powder keg." The periods of Ottoman Hegemony, The Development of Modern Balkan States, The Cold War Period, and Contemporary Balkan Developments, each displays its own particular characteristics and reflects the points of disruption during the long span of the period under discussion. However, in all periods which are examined in the course of this work, the truths that are encountered in relation to the Balkans are the influences of demography, geography and external forces on Balkan geopolitics and history. Overall, the outzone of this influence can be evaluated as instability.

ÖZET

Uluslararası politikada, Balkanlar gibi çok aktörlü bir bölgenin değerlendirilmesi, ancak çok yönlü ve detaylı bir çalışma ile mümkün olabilmektedir. Bu çalışmada, Balkan tarihinin önemli evreleri, uluslararası ilişkiler ekseninde ve bir siyasi tarih disiplini içinde incelenmeye çalışılacaktır.

Bu tez, belli bir coğrafyanın öyküsünün iç ve dış politikaya yansıyan yönleriyle, değerlendirilmesidir. Balkan tarihindeki, dönüm noktalarının birer birer ele alınarak incelendiği çalışmamız, günümüzde hâlâ "barut fıçısı" olma özelliğini taşıyan Balkanlar'ı anlama ve hatta bölgede bir istikrar alanı yaratmak için önemli bir ihtilaf çözüm eksersizi yapılması düşüncesinden yola çıkılarak gerçekleştirilmiştir. "Osmanlı Hakimiyeti," "Modern Balkan Devletlerinin Oluşması," "Soğuk Savaş Dönemi," ve "Çağımız Balkan Gelişmeleri," herbiri kendine özgü özellikler taşıyan ve uzun Balkan tarihine kırılma şeklinde yansıyan süreçlerdir. Ancak çalışmanın ardında, incelenen tüm dönemlerde, Balkanlar ekseninde karşılaşılan gerçek, demografi, coğrafya ve dış güçlerin, Balkan jeopolitiği ve tarihi üzerinde ne denli etkili olduğudur. Bu etkinin yansımaları ise genelde "istikrarsızlık" olarak nitelendirilebilir.

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"...The people of the Balkans have
an all-encompassing common history.
If this history has painful memories,
all people of the Balkans share
in having them..."*

M. Kemal Atatürk
October 25, 1931

*Nimet Unan. *Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri, vol. 2 (1906-1938)* (Ankara: Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü Yayınları , 1959), p. 272.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION:

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND BALKAN REALITIES

International Politics and Policies

According to Hans Morgenthau's classic theory, international politics are defined as the "struggle for power and authority."¹ With this point of departure, power is seen as the most important agent or determinant in international politics. Now, as in the past, any group's efforts to protect or advance its interests, for example by defending them within the system provided by international law, as well as when such struggles on occasion exceed sanctioned norms, may be examined in terms of the power differences that define the various positions involved. In the international arena, states have always been responsible for protecting their own interests first and foremost, when no arbitration mechanism existed. That is, no supra-national, organized authority for protecting the international legal order, for establishing rights and obligations and safeguarding the interests of individual states existed. States have always had to form ties with those of greater power than themselves in order to have a place and survive within the international system, and to establish relations of relative power and influence over others. In pursuit of their objectives in this regard, states are obliged to constantly demonstrate their strength in the economic, industrial, political, and military spheres. This rivalry is thus carried beyond the realm of domestic affairs and takes a prominent place in the area of foreign politics.

¹ Hans Morgenthau, *Uluslararası Politika: Güç ve Barış Mücadelesi*, vol. 1, trans. Baskın Oran and Ünsal Oskay (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1970), p. 30.

From the time periods under examination in the introduction up to today, the large number of separate states within the international field has contributed to problems related to the sharing of resources in an environment where those resources are limited and their global distribution is highly uneven. With these givens, states have no choice but to join the competition to obtain new sources of raw materials and new markets for their goods, to secure favorable trade conditions, and to participate in the race to demonstrate their weight and influence within the international political system by acquiring new friends and allies. When we analyze the direction taken by international relations, we may observe that a certain dynamism in international politics has been created from changes in the balance of power among states, which is in turn intimately related to changes in the sources and bases of power and influence among individual states.²

From another perspective, the impression that the old international world order continues to perpetuate itself may be misleading. Nations may occasionally share the same living space, a condition which is only possible when there is a balance of power between them. As Morgenthau explains:

The international balance of power is only a particular manifestation of a general social principle to which all societies composed of a number of autonomous units owe the autonomy of their component parts; that the balance of power and politics aiming at its preservation are not only inevitable but are an essential stabilizing factor in a society of sovereign nations; and that the instability of the international balance of power is due not to the faultiness of the principle but to the particular conditions under which the principle must operate in a society of sovereign nations.³

² A. Suat Bilge, *Milletlerarası Politika* (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1966), p. 22.

³ Hans Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1965), p. 167.

When the dynamics function optimally, the strong and the weak may preserve their independence while co-existing side by side.⁴ Within a world system marked by constant power struggles, it is still possible to encounter periods of relative calm in which a status quo is established, peace is preserved, and a balance is achieved between otherwise opposing powers.⁵

Having introduced the main elements of this framework, we may proceed on to concrete cases to study how the balance of power model actually works. One historical example is that of the Holy Alliance, which may be counted as a first step in Europe's attempts to establish such equilibrium.⁶ Up until the beginning of the nineteenth century, the nations of Europe consistently refused to leave their mutual rivalries aside in order to cooperate for the sake of advancing their common interests. However, with various changes in the map of Europe which took place around that time, these states can be seen to draw together with a common goal, that of forming a new power bloc and "preserving the peace"; and to that end, they met and signed the Treaty of Chaumont, which was followed by the formation of the Quadruple Alliance and the Holy Alliance.⁷

The basic lines of this new system, whose beginnings may be traced back to the Westphalia Congress of 1648, appear with the partial institutionalization of the Concert of Europe, and a new era during which issues began to be seriously dealt with through the methods of diplomacy.⁸ The new model presented by the Concert of Europe, which was concretized by such important steps as the 1856 Paris

⁴ On various methods for arriving at a balance of power, see *ibid.*, pp. 178-194.

⁵ For more on the phenomenon of international equilibrium, see Mehmet Günlübol, *Uluslararası Politika* (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1979), pp. 409-410.

⁶ Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations*, p. 457.

⁷ The Treaty of Chaumont of March 9, 1814, was signed by Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia. The Quadruple Alliance was signed in Paris on November 20, 1815, by the same nations. The Treaty of the Holy Alliance of September 26, 1815 was signed by Austria, Prussia, and Russia. For more details, see *ibid.*, p. 457.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 464; The Treaty of Westphalia marked the birth of modern Europe as a continent of sovereign states. From the Westphalia Congress to the Concert of Europe you can find more details in Kutlu. Sacit Kutlu, *Milliyetçilik ve Emperyalizm Yüzyılında Balkanlar ve Osmanlı Devleti* (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi yayınları, 2007), pp.23-50.

Congress and the 1878 Berlin Congress, was the first phase of a transition to a method of diplomacy which used delegates from international institutions of experts. A more recent example of this system is the United Nations, which replaced the League of Nations.⁹ However, we must not forget that this new system bringing states together within the Holy Alliance of 1815 was hardly universal in conception, but was limited to the borders around what was thought of as Western civilization.

With the above understanding as a point of departure, the Concert of Europe system presented a sufficient degree of conscientiousness to allow its members to allay internal strife and to take common actions and decisions. However, this new method of solving problems or crises through the use of international conferences was generally resorted to when the interests of individual nations were at stake and whenever international conditions made it necessary, in the light of their own needs.¹⁰

The nineteenth century was indeed a period which, by cooperating in the above fashion, Europe managed to maintain a policy of relative tranquility, avoiding major clashes and preserving the existing powers. However, that period was not to last long. Changes in the equilibrium of the world order, as well as the arrival of new powers onto the scene, led to a major disruption in the balance of power. As a result of these changes, the beginnings of which may be traced back into the nineteenth century, the nations whose center was Western Europe began to take on the characteristics of industrial empires, which created the grounds for fundamental transformations in the existing balance of power. Henceforth, the world was to embark on a struggle over the distribution of resources, a struggle which was born among those Western European nations. During the period after the Industrial Revolution began, in particular, the developed nations of European origin began to create colonies and regions of influence throughout the world, whether in pursuit of

⁹ M. Kemal Öke, *Ermeni Sorunu (1914-1923): Devletin Dış Politika Araç Alternatifleri Üzerine Bir İnceleme* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1991), p. 7.

¹⁰ Ibid., p.18.

raw materials or other resources, or in search of new markets. In line with these developments, factors related to this competition began to appear with greater frequency on an international scale, while at the same time, the agents of this competition began to spread beyond Europe's borders.

The principle causes for the changes bringing about the dissolution of the international order were that the parameters which were supposed to assist in bringing about a unified system began to break down. In the struggle between the Great Powers fields, actions beyond Europe's borders became the focus of conflict and the old "gentlemen's agreements" which had prevailed in Europe began to lose their meaning. Competition among the great powers was focused on Africa, the Middle East, and the subject area of this study, the Balkans. At the start of the twentieth century, the Ottoman Empire was beginning to experience difficulty holding onto territories it had ruled for centuries; a general drive to divide up the Empire which coincided with separatist and nationalist movements succeeded in setting the process in motion by which the balance of power and established order in Europe began to unravel.

The Balance of Power Disintegrates

The Eastern Question

The so-called Eastern Question, which may be defined in general terms as an "issue of European diplomacy that was created by the likelihood of the Ottoman Empire's demise," is a phenomenon which cannot be excluded from any study of European and world history of the recent period.¹¹ The Eastern Question owed its

¹¹ On the Eastern Question, see Mark Mazower, *The Balkans. A Short History* (New York: Random House, 2002), pp.79-111; J.R., Marriot, *The Eastern Question: An Historical Study in European Diplomacy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969); Meydan Larousse, "Şark Meselesi," vol. 11 (İstanbul: Meydan Yayınevi, 1980), p. 724. Also see Necdet Kurdakul, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndan Ortadoğu'ya Belgelerle Şark Meselesi* (İstanbul: Dergah Yayınları Tarih Dizisi, 1976).

emergence, in fact, to unsettled scores of long standing, in particular those related to the Empire's having spread over three continents and thus controlling critical geopolitical sites such as the Bosphorus Strait , as well as the Suez Canal, the Middle East, Cyprus, the Balkans, and the Caucasus. This position, when added to the great wealth of the Near East, aroused the interest of certain states in regard to those regions directly, or to the routes leading to them. In the study to follow, it will be observed that the above perception largely informed the policies put forward by those states, whether in the context of relations between the Ottoman Empire and the Western nations or whether in regard to the nationalist movements in the Balkans.

The fundamental issues of the Eastern Question took shape within the framework of Turkish-European relations. According to how these issues have generally been understood in recent years, the full force of the Eastern Question began to be felt in the eighteenth century with the first signs of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, a development which proved to be a turning point in European history. With some modifications over the years, the Eastern Question has been basically understood as the Ottoman Empire's efforts to retain its territories during the first half of the nineteenth century; and, during the second half of that century, the division and distribution of the Ottoman territories in Europe. By the beginning of the twentieth century, the general direction indicated by this definition reached a kind of extreme when the Eastern Question came to mean the division of all the remaining territories of the Empire. From this point on, up until such time as the Ottoman State disappeared entirely from the stage of history, the Eastern Question was one of the most decisive issues affecting the balance of power among the major states.

Approaching this subject from the perspective of competition among the major powers, Sagay explains that the Eastern Question prepared the way for a confrontation between two different systems; that is, it produced the conditions for a

confrontation between Czarist Russia's expansionist policies within the Ottoman territories, and European colonization policies.¹²

Technological Changes

Rapid advances in technology and its applications throughout the nineteenth century had considerable impact on the balance of power of that period. Indeed, as the technological boom began to take on the semblance of a second industrial revolution, and as the rate of industrialization in Europe picked up ever greater speed, new European states emerged to join the old ones, thus tipping the delicate scales of the existing balance of power. At the same time, relations among the influential European powers of the period under examination here, that is, England, France, Czarist Russia, the Austria-Hungarian Empire and the Ottoman Empire, largely determined the global politics of the period. The political as well as economic activities of a majority of those powers had the effect of dividing up the international arena amongst themselves. However, by this time a number of new states began to join into this process as well.

Germany presented the most distinctive example of new developments in this competitive environment. Shortly after consolidating itself as a political entity, Germany began to make rapid strides towards developing itself as a strong continental power and as a new actor on the international political stage, and soon began to be felt as a threat to the existing powers.¹³ Not only did Germany enter the second phase of the industrial revolution as an active participant, but its military strength also gave it a dominant position, and it soon began to put out the first signs of its "world policy" (*Weltpolitik*). In all these ways, Germany soon constituted one

¹² Reşat Sagay, *XIX ve XX. Yüzyıllarda Büyük Devletlerin Yayılma Siyasetleri ve Milletlerarası Önemli Meseleler* (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1972), p. 71.

¹³ Under the leadership of Otto van Bismark, Germany completed its political consolidation as a new state on January 18, 1871. Fahir Armaoğlu, *Siyasi Tarih* (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1975), pp. 168-181.

of the most determining factors on the equilibrium in Europe. With the addition of Italy as yet another influential power, positions within the former European status quo were profoundly disturbed.¹⁴ The period from the nineteenth century until World War I was one in which Asia, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East were divided up as markets among the capitalist nations. Less developed nations, including the Ottoman Empire, which were unable to industrialize for various reasons, became both sources of raw materials for the capitalist nations, as well as guaranteed markets for those nations' manufactured goods.¹⁵

Ideological Transformation

One of the major factors bringing change to the balance of power in Europe was ideology. In this connection, the concept of "nationalism," which was born and spread throughout the world with the French Revolution must certainly be counted as a major development; its impact on Europe's historic balance of power was two-fold.

First of all, nations under the control or protection of various other nations began to move in the direction of "determining their own destiny" and, as the ideal of forming one's own nation-state gathered momentum, they began to bring together under one flag areas that had existed as separate principalities isolated from their own larger ethnic communities. The nationalism characteristic of the first half of the nineteenth century was not a fanatical doctrine which drove states to attack one another in the name of their own national interests, but rather could be described as a widely-accepted realization that the world is made up of many distinct nations; it could also be seen as a philosophy of developing the special characteristics of, or striving for the independence of, one's own national community.¹⁶

¹⁴ The movement for Italian political unification led by Count Cavour achieved completion in 1861. Ibid., pp. 160-166.

¹⁵ Gülten Kazgan, *İktisadi Düşünce, veya Politik İktisadın Evrimi* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınları, 1974), p. 388.

¹⁶ Öke, p. 20.

However, this rather romantic conception of nationalism began to change in the last quarter of the nineteenth century; losing all traces of the liberalism that had once informed it, and nationalism began to exhibit the traits of an oppressive and expansionist ideology.¹⁷ Morgenthau asserts that once the nationalist frame of mind had been firmly implanted within nation-states, it began to develop not as a universalist, humanist ideal but rather as a separatist, individualistic, and self-centered mentality.¹⁸ This transformation was to be the most compelling factor impacting both the European state structure as well as leading to the dissolution of multi-national empires. This was definitely the case for the Balkans, which make up the subject of this study, as it led to the break-up of the multi-ethnic empires which had held sway in the region, leading to the demise of the Austria-Hungarian, the Russian, and the Ottoman empires. Thus the twentieth century was to see the definitive end of the multi-ethnic empire as a historical reality.

The beginnings of participatory government structure coincided with the nationalist concept which played such an important role in dismantling Europe's classic balance of power. Starting in 1789, with the notion of "national sovereignty," the focus of the citizens' loyalty moved from the political regime as such to the new concept of the "national" community. From this point on, citizen populations began to have more say in determining not only domestic, but foreign policy as well.

The weakening of universalistic values and principles brought about by the moral climate of the end of the eighteenth century brought a new harshness and intensification to international level power struggles, which, as they began to take various forms of expansionism, became known as a "new imperialism." From this point on, the balance of power as a common goal was set aside, to be replaced by economic interests, political desires, and an atmosphere of suspicion and insecurity. As a result of all these factors, the global environment became enmeshed in an

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Morgenthau, *Uluslararası Politika*, p. 324.

unrelenting competition for spheres of influence.¹⁹ Of the countries mentioned above, France and England in particular sought to establish their spheres of influence in the name of their prized European values, symbolized by their languages, traditions, flags, and civilizations as a guise for managing the various advantages they held as nations in such a way as to create a margin of security for their activities. Russia did not wish to be left behind in this race, and joined in along with late-comers Germany and Italy; these nations may have expressed their mission with a different vocabulary, but in practice were not substantively different from those of France and England.

The twentieth century witnessed the emergence of the desire for nation-statehood on a global scale. Thus Western Europe's traditional model and conception of statehood, whose history reached back into the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, was being replaced by what we know as the "modern nation" based on the idea of the sovereignty of the people.²⁰ However, in spite of the fact that these concepts were gaining wide acceptance, there was as yet little concrete change in the area of international relations.

In our day, nationalism has become a phenomenon based not on political considerations alone, but on ethnic ones as well; that is, emphasis is placed primarily on the ethnic history of the nation in question. It is for this reason that the nationalist movements of our day have been characterized as a "historical regression."²¹

¹⁹ Öke, p. 22.

²⁰ Kemali Saybaşılı, "Introduction" in Kemali Saybaşılı and Günay Göksu Özdoğan, eds., *The Balkans: A Mirror of the New International Order* (İstanbul: Eren Yayıncılık, 1995), p. 17.

²¹ Kemali Saybaşılı and Gencer Özcan, "Foreward" in Kemali Saybaşılı and Gencer Özcan, eds., *Yeni Balkanlar, Eski Sorunlar* (İstanbul: Bağlam Yayıncılık, 1997), p. 13.

The Balkans within the Balance of Power

The Balkans is a region which throughout history has occupied an extremely sensitive position in international relations.²² From the perspective of geopolitical considerations and struggles there have been few other regions in the world as influential as the Balkans. The Balkans is a region that has historically been characterized by instability and conflict. It has also been the scene of significant developments which have not remained confined within their own regional boundaries, but which have also been able to draw in Europe much of the time, and, from time to time, the world.

On the other hand, in one respect the Balkans has been condemned to remain in the shadow of the Great Powers due to being situated at a very important point in areas of interest and domination for the Great Powers in their own balance of power system. In the evaluation within a process, significant points of disruption have occurred during the history of the Balkans.

Every period has had its own particular characteristics and for this reason they must be examined as independent processes. However the underlying theme which links together these processes is the fact that power policies in the Balkans at various times and in different forms have impacted the present such that has resulted in the creation of instability for the region.

The Balkan problem is seen as having its beginnings particularly in the nineteenth century period of Ottoman hegemony. For this reason, while presenting a general introduction in Chapter Two, the five hundred year period of Ottoman hegemony is examined in light of the process which follows.

The nineteenth century was one in which the countries of the Balkans achieved sovereignty as independent nation-states, while the twentieth century, especially its first quarter, has been a period which has involved the Balkan nations

²² See the discussion of historiography on Balkans in Fikret Adanır and Suraiya Faroqhi; *The Ottomans and The Balkans, A Discussion of Historiography* (Leiden: Brill, 2002).

in efforts to protect and strengthen their new independent status. However, this achievement has been the result of a long, arduous, and painful historical process undergone by the Balkan peoples, reflected in the precariousness of their situation from the second half of the nineteenth century, from which time the Balkan region became known as "The Powder-Keg of Europe."²³

According to the analysis set forth in Chapter Four, perhaps the most important watershed in Balkan history was that period during which the peoples of the region, taking advantage of the weakening of Ottoman supremacy with the decline of the Empire, began to struggle for nation-statehood in line with the new ideological discourses of the period. Although they had been able to retain their distinct cultural identities during the more than five centuries of Ottoman rule, the Balkan communities were far from existing as separate nations, and so with the waning of Ottoman authority, each community began to assert its ethnic identity in the attempt to gain nation-statehood.

The Ottoman system's characteristic overarching identity had ensured a long period of relative stability in the Balkan region, the ethnic complexity of which may have otherwise inclined it to instability. However, this "supra-identity" encompassing separate ethnic groups was not congruent with the realities of the nineteenth century. France's "Unity of State and Nation," for example, assumed the unity of its people within one set of borders. Germany, for its part, put forward the concept of the "Unity of Language and Culture," while Russia under the Czars endorsed the "Unity of Religion" thesis.²⁴ All these ideas would soon be carried to the Balkans and drive the movements for national independence there. Irredentism was another characteristic of this period. When these tendencies first began to show themselves, the Balkan region embarked on a full-scale historical struggle which was to last for two centuries, and from which it emerged without having succeeded in

²³ Orhan Koloğlu, "Osmanlı Döneminde Balkanlar," *Balkanlar* (İstanbul: Ortadoğu ve Balkan İncelemeleri Vakfı Yayınları, 1993), p. 82.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 83.

overcoming all the forces of instability that exist within the very nature of that geographical area. While almost no corner of the Balkan region has not been affected by its own "Dream of Greatness," not to mention expansionist visions, the Balkans is not large enough to realize such desires on its own.

World War I was another major event which had a determining impact on the political geography of the Balkans. Within the new order that the victorious Western nations envisioned, the political map of the Balkan Peninsula was to undergo radical transformation: the three great empires which had to a greater or lesser degree ruled over the region, that is, the Ottoman Empire, the Austria-Hungarian Empire, and Czarist Russia, would be dismantled; and in their place, six small states would be founded: Romania, Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey.

Once these peoples had achieved their independence and the political geography of the region had taken the form of nation-states with World War I, the new nations devoted themselves to the tasks of internal organization and consolidation, to achieve a measure of coherence on the economic and political fronts. When they were first established, these state's borders were drawn by experts from the Great Powers, experts who may have never set foot in the region. The new states that resulted from these "lines on the map" were not of the form or shape that would enable them to survive economically as autonomous nations. Indeed, most of these states entered economic crises not long after completing the process of their founding, and were forced to hand over much of the supervision of their financial affairs to the larger states which protected them. As will be seen, control of financial matters essentially means political control as well. Of course, in a context in which even Europe's industrialized nations with their much higher living standards were negatively impacted by the war, it is not surprising that the Balkan nations found themselves in such difficult straits. Moreover, the economic and social problems of the region following World War I would be reflected in the particular political systems adopted by these nations. During the first ten years after the war (1919-1930), the states in question were taken up with the fundamental issues of

democratization, achieving some degree of economic development; during the next decade (1930-1939), those Balkan states which had not reached those goals were driven to adopt dictatorial regimes in order to counter anarchist tendencies within the political structure, which were fed by poor economic conditions and unresolved minority issues.²⁵

During the 1920s, the international situation caused the nations of the Balkans to form themselves into two main groups. On the one side were the nations who, winners of the war, had the leading hand in designing the order to their liking, and which was institutionalized by post-war peace treaties. On the other side was the group of nations who had lost, and which were unhappy with this new order. This bloc-formation among the major powers of Europe created rivalries which were experienced among the Balkan nations as well and constituted the single most important obstacle to their achieving stability.

As the situation deteriorated internationally during the 1930s, so it did in the Balkans as well. While the nations of the world headed toward a major confrontation, the Balkan nations were unable to distance themselves from these events and, abandoning the objectives they had embraced during the 1920s, were drawn into the gravitational field of the impending war. Because the Balkan nations were unable to form any sort of true unity during the 1930s, they were fated to follow in the footsteps of the European nations, whose political divisions brought them to the point of war.

World War II was a painful experience for the Balkans no less than for the rest of the world. Following the war, the Balkan nations began yet another process of restructuring, elements of which continue even to our day. World War II left the dubious contribution of a polarized political and ideological world order. The main characteristics of this post-war order on the international level were the face-off between the two largest powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, and their

²⁵ Sina Akşin ve Melek Fırat, "İki Savaş Arası Dönemde Balkanlar," *Balkanlar* (İstanbul: Ortadoğu ve Balkan İncelemeleri Vakfı Yayınları, 1993), pp. 98-101.

having both developed nuclear capabilities. These two very different political systems were able to preserve their modes of existence up until the 1990s by largely retaining their respective zones of influence acquired with the end of the war, and also by managing to avoid open confrontation by any means necessary.

As examined in Chapter Five, the order known as the Cold War, based as it was on a precarious balance between two polarized positions, was particularly inadequate to cope with the many issues plaguing the Balkan region religious and ethnic differences, territorial and border disputes. However, the Cold War order did manage to keep those disputes from surfacing as open conflicts through the use of repressive measures that only imposed limitations without resolving root issues. Because these repressive and restrictive measures were removed with the end of the Cold War, those old tensions are most likely to resurface with even greater force; and within the process of restructuring, nationalist feelings and ventures will no doubt appear in intensified form, leading to conflicts and confrontations.²⁶

Finally, starting in 1989, the unique configuration of the Cold War, which had lasted for forty or forty-five years, began to unravel.²⁷ The unexpectedly rapid disintegration of the Communist bloc took with it both the Communist system's leading nation, as well as spreading throughout all of Eastern Europe including the Balkans.

This transformation of the international context which is examined in Chapter Six, came to be known as the "New World Order"; with it a new period began, signaled by the dissolution of the Soviet bloc and the unification of Eastern and Western Germany.²⁸ It was United States President George Bush who first used the

²⁶ İhsan Gürkan, "Balkanlar ve Türkiye," *Balkanlar* (İstanbul: Ortadoğu ve Balkan İncelemeleri Vakfı Yayınları, 1993), p. 268.

²⁷ For a detailed discussion on the end of the Cold War, see Kjell Goldman, "Three Debates about the End of the Cold War," in Pierre Allan and Kjell Goldman, *The End of the Cold War: Evaluating Theories of International Relations* (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1992), pp. 1-11.

²⁸ Adam Robert, "A New Age in International Relations," *International Affairs* 67, no. 3 (1991), pp. 509-525.

term "New World Order" at the start of the Gulf War,²⁹ yet it has not been clarified what sort of order--or disorder and confusion--this term was meant to indicate.

There is one feature of our new age, however, which has garnered consensus, and that is the complex of changes leading to what is called globalization.

This new global order clearly constitutes a turning point in within the history of the international system. This change was quite rapid, unanticipated, and in many ways more impressive than many other developments of international scope recorded in history. World public opinion is thus in accord on the fact of its critical importance for the last years of the twentieth century.³⁰

Turning to the so-called New World Order's impact on the Balkans, we see that this region once again has its own unique story to tell. The dissolution of the Yugoslav Federation has been a primary cause of instability for the region. The disintegration of the Soviet bloc was a major factor aggravating Yugoslavia's economic and political crisis of the 1980s;³¹ that crisis soon grew to irremediable proportions. Yugoslavia had managed to maintain its distance from the polarization brought about by the bi-polar world system, and had played a significant role as a respected and influential champion of the non-aligned movement even while its energies were largely devoted to its own complex internal affairs. Yet Yugoslavia was unable to forestall a rapid and extensive process of fragmentation which soon reached the level of open conflict. When Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence in 1991, the international community's response had the effect of hastening the process of disintegration such that Yugoslavia became a major problem area whose crisis dimensions continue to grow even today.

Inequalities and discrepancies which existed among the republics contributed in significant measure to Yugoslavia's disintegration. That nation's economy

²⁹ Lawrence Freedman, "Order and Disorder in the New World," *Foreign Affairs* 71, no. 2 (Spring 1992), p. 21.

³⁰ Faruk Sönmezoğlu ed, *Yeni Dünya Düzeni ve Türkiye* (İstanbul: Bağlam Yayınları, 1994), p. 10.

³¹ Sabrina Petra Ramet, "War in the Balkans," *Foreign Affairs* 71, no. 4 (Fall 1992), pp. 79-98.

presented a two-tiered structure in which the northern and western republics began to complain of the injustice of their having to "bear the burden of other's poverty," while the south-eastern republics came to see themselves as exploited and colonized.³² This conflict was exacerbated as the north-westerly republics came to see themselves as distinct from the others "wealthy and civilized", and a part of the western world; while in the south-east, the fear of isolation reached panic levels, feeding a destructive anti-western chauvinism.³³ As the example of Yugoslavia shows, the concerns and feelings of hostility that emerge alongside historical developments can bring about rapid disintegration and bloody conflict when the fine line is crossed between republicanism, common aspirations, and national priorities and nationalism as a goal in itself.

This study presents the particular story of a geographical region from internal and external policies point of view, as mentioned above. Each of the breaking points in the Balkan history which are examined in this work has special reasons and effects, related by the conditions. While considering in turn each point of change in the history of the Balkan Peninsula, this work sets out from the idea of making a significant conflict-resolution exercise for the creation of a stabilization zone for the Balkans which even today has the characteristic of being a "powder keg" figuratively and in the region itself.

³² Tanıl Bora, *Yugoslavya Milliyetçiliğın Provokasyonu* (İstanbul: Birikim Yayınları, 1991), pp. 90-91.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 91.

CHAPTER TWO

A GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE BALKANS

Geographic, Economic, Historical and Ethnic Factors

Geography

In general terms, the Balkans may be defined as that group of mountains in southeastern Europe located within the lines drawn from the Iron Gate Pass above the Danube River to the Carpathian Mountains, and from there to the Black Sea.¹ The large peninsula comprised by this group of mountains resulted in this region's being given the name the Balkan Peninsula. Only in 1827, however, was "Balkan" used to refer to the whole peninsula.² In fact, the term *Balkan* is of Turkish derivation, meaning "mountain."³ This characteristically mountainous terrain of the Balkan interior, which extends from the Danube River to the Adriatic, the Aegean, and the Mediterranean seas, has had a determining impact on the area's economic and social history. After the collapse of the USSR in 1990, a new type of definition started to be used for the Balkans: South East Europe. Especially the West Europe started to define this region as "South East Europe". Maybe the main reason for this kind of definition shows that the Balkan region is part of the European continent and

¹ Besim Darkot, "Balkanlar", *İslam Ansiklopedisi* 2 (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1949), p.280; Halil İnalçık, "Türkler ve Balkanlar", *Balkanlar* (İstanbul: Ortadoğu ve Balkan İncelemeleri Vakfı Yayınları, 1993), p.9.

² Derek Hall and Darrick Danta, *Reconstructing the Balkans, A Geography of the New Southeast Europe* (Sussex: John Wiley and sons, 1996), p.4.

³ The *İslam Ansiklopedisi* reports that the word "Balkan" means "mountain" in some Turkish dialects. There is also mention of a mountain range south of the Caspian Sea known by the name "Balkan"; the same source reports in addition that in the first half of the twentieth century, the French geologist Ami Bou gave the name "Balkan Chain" to these mountains. However, it also reports that the same appellation was found in Robert de Vougondy's *Grand Atlas* dating from the previous century. Ibid.

they would possibly integrate with the West. The Balkan region has had many bloody conflicts throughout history. They may want to get rid of this reputation as well. Moreover, the word “Balkan” is a Turkish, as mentioned before.

While the geographical parameters of the Balkan Peninsula are relatively easy to determine, Oral Sander notes that political scientists have been in frequent disagreement over which of the nations of this region should be properly known as “Balkan.”⁴ It is generally accepted that Albania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Romania be counted as Balkan nations, while Turkey and Greece may fall outside this designation since they are defined as Near Eastern and Mediterranean nations, respectively. Some however, consider Greece to be part of the Balkans, while describing former Yugoslavia, and Romania as Central European countries. For the purposes of this study, Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, and the former Yugoslavia, which today’s Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and finally Kosovo, as well as Turkey and Greece, together with their ethnic, historical, geographic, economic, social, and political structures, will be examined as a whole within the framework of issues relating to the Balkans.

Thus the Balkan region presents itself as one of conflict and contrast before it has even been adequately defined. The history of the Balkans is marked by constant mutation and instability. From the beginning of the nineteenth century in particular, transformations taking place in the region set the scene for developments involving the European nations, playing the role of Europe’s “powder keg,” as the classic epithet would have it. Many issues which arose in this region proved to be problematic for Europe and the world as a whole; the two world wars were touched off by conflicts originating in this area. As a result, it would not be unfair to characterize the Balkans as the “theater where the major European powers’ conflicts would be played out,” as Sander states. The reasons for this, he maintains, fall into two main categories: the region’s geography and strategic importance, and the fact

⁴ Oral Sander, *Balkan Gelişmeleri ve Türkiye (1945-1965)* (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1969), pp. 1-2.

that the Balkan nations have been unable to establish cooperation or find sufficient common points of reference.⁵

The Impact of Geography on History

It is well known that geographical considerations can influence the destinies of nations and regions. This is very much true for the Balkans, the history of which has indeed been much affected by its geographical particulars. This peninsula forms a crossroads between Europe, Asia, and even Africa, a fact which has earned the Balkans a critically important geopolitical position. Its geography has, over time, made the Balkans the home of numerous ethnic groups. Specifically, it became an easily accessible place of passage for incursions from the North, the Northeast, and the South. Here the peoples of Europe, Asia, and Africa and their cultures have met and mingled, fought and conquered. The existing indigenous groups occupying this region are proof of the passage of these incursions through the peninsula, which were directed towards Anatolia, Greece, Italy, and Central Europe. As will become clear further on, this history accounts for the diversity of the peoples presently occupying the Balkan Peninsula.

The region's history overall tends to illustrate that, at least considered from the outside, the Balkan Peninsula constitutes a link, a physical bridge, rather than a barrier, between East and West. As pointed out by Robert Wolff, unlike the Iberian Peninsula, cut off from continental Europe by the Pyrenees, and unlike the Italian Peninsula, likewise separated by the Alps, the Balkan Peninsula lies open on the North; in addition, the valleys of the Danube and of its tributaries have always provided easy access from Central Europe.⁶ Likewise, to the West, a mere fifty miles separate the heel of the Italian boot from the coast of Albania. To the South,

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Robert Lee Wolff, *The Balkans in Our Time* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974), p. 19.

the island of Crete serves as a natural stepping stone between the European and African continents. Also, the Aegean Islands have been used as a bridge in both directions by colonists and invaders since the days of Troy. As Stavrianos points out, the special location of the peninsula explains why it has served as a bridge or battleground of empires and cultures from time immemorial.⁷

Among its internal geographical features, the peninsula is cut through by great natural highways formed by its rivers and mountain valleys. Some of these routes have had great importance in the history of the Balkans. One of these routes runs along the north shore of the Black Sea through Romania, then along the Danube River into Central Europe. This was the gateway into the Balkans for the Asiatic tribes which were to deeply impact European, as well as Balkan history. The second major route also runs along the Danube from Vienna to Belgrade and Niš and then further on divides between spurs leading to Thessaloniki and Istanbul. The third route was the major artery between Rome and its eastern provinces, the *Via Egnatia*. This road was particularly important in ancient times and passes through Albania and Northern Greece to reach Istanbul.⁸

In addition, the Balkans were open not only from the land but also from the sea.⁹ They are surrounded by four major seas: the Black Sea, the Aegean, the Mediterranean, and the Adriatic. These seas have played an important role in world politics, falling under the control of this or that great power, and being the scene of battle between them. While in not so clear-cut or obvious a way as in the past, these four seas continue to be involved in the power struggles in the present.

Recent developments show that this region continues to be of considerable strategic and geopolitical importance in the present. In particular, the fact that the Balkan region offers not only a highway link, but also a significant railway, pipe-

⁷ Leften Stavos Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453* (New York: Rinehart, 1961), p. 2.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Charles Jelavich and Barbara Jelavich, *The Balkans* (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1965), pp. 3-4.

line and waterway transport network is of special importance in contemporary changing world conditions.

Economic Factors

It should be emphasized that the influence of geography on history is but one of several determining factors. During the late ancient and the medieval periods, the Balkan area was a thriving center of industry and commerce while Western Europe was relatively primitive agrarian region. The peninsula has also been of unquestionable international importance for economic and commercial reasons as controlling the main trade routes between East and West.¹⁰ It was one of the last major passageways to the West of the so-called “Silk Road,” the commercial route which led from the Far East into the heart of Europe.

Of course, it must be remembered that the Balkans were unable to demonstrate the degree of initiative and energy exerted by the Western European nations in the early industrialization process. Due to this fact, they have served primarily as a source of raw materials for western factories as well as a market for western capital and manufactured goods.¹¹ It is apparent that the Balkan nations have failed to join today’s class of developed nations for other reasons as well. They may have been able to secure greater economic prosperity had there not been ongoing rivalries amongst themselves and differences among their political regimes which prevented them from coming together with the goal of cooperation.

¹⁰ See Wolff, pp. 159-88, for a general presentation of the Balkans’ economic structural features.

¹¹ Stavrianos, p. 14.

The Great Powers

Equally significant in Balkan history has been the influence of the Great Powers. At times this influence has been unconscious or unplanned, as in the impact of French Revolutionary ideology or German Romanticism. However, later changes in the balance of power in Europe began to reveal themselves in the Great Powers' growing involvement in the Balkan region---an involvement which took many forms. There are many cases in which the Great Powers openly manipulated the Balkan peoples for their own purposes, whether through force or persuasion.

The fact that this region was to experience first-hand conflicts of interest among the major powers of Europe throughout its history made it impossible for these nations to cooperate amongst themselves. They were not only incapable of taking a common stance against these foreign powers and their interests but, quite the opposite, became the setting for the playing out of various struggles amongst those powers. The special features presented by the Balkan nations throughout their histories, that is, their many different cultures and forms of life, has tended to separate them one from the other ---when these differences were not used by others to this same end--- with the result that they have tended to turn inward in conforming to narrow nationalist viewpoints, a stance which has led to strife and conflict. This fragmentation process, whether internally or externally driven, has been so striking as to produce the term "Balkanization," which has become common in political writing to denote a process of breaking up, division, or fragmentation.¹²

Thus it was in such an environment of fluctuations, rare and partial union and more general division, that the nations of the Balkans were born; and it was this environment in which those communities had no choice but to adopt and conform to that contemporary model of social and political organization known as the nation-state.

¹² Maria Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 33-37.

Historical Background of the Balkans

As mentioned above, many tribes and cultures and various racial groups have entered the Balkan Peninsula over the course of time, attracted to the region for its economic and geographical features. The result may fairly be characterized as a cultural mosaic. The importance of the variety of ethnic groups currently inhabiting the peninsula cannot be underestimated. Thus it is pertinent to address questions related to who these Balkan peoples are, where they came from, where they currently reside, and how we may interpret the existence and location of the national borders drawn around them. These questions are delicate and difficult indeed. A glance at an ethnographic map of the Balkans shows that its ethnography is very complex; indeed, one is advised not to consult any map of Balkan ethnography without heeding this warning of Sir Charles Elliot: “every ethnographic map of the Balkans gives a different view of the arrangement of the populations.”¹³

From ancient times to our day, the Balkans have sequentially belonged, partially or fully, to various multi-ethnic empires, composed of or including the following peoples: the Ancient Greeks, the Romans, the Venetians, the Germans, the Austrians, the Hungarians, the Russians, and the Ottomans.

Little is known about the ethnic composition of the Balkan communities before written history; at present all that is known has been gleaned from archaeological excavations of buildings and graves which have turned up ornamental items and tools used in daily life. As far back into history as such research has been able to go, it has demonstrated that indigenous peoples of the area included the Illyrians, the Thracians, and the Iskits. In broad terms, these peoples are associated with the following areas: the Illyrians inhabited the Adriatic coast, the Thracians

¹³ Charles Elliot, cited in J. A. R. Marriot, *The Eastern Question, An Historical Study in European Diplomacy*, (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1969), p. v.

were located toward the south of the Danube, and the Iskits were found in the northern regions.¹⁴

Today, the ethnic composition of the Balkans may be described as follows: Serbians, Croatians, Bosniacs, Hungarians, Vlachs, Romanians, Macedonians, Bulgarians, Albanians, Greeks, and Turks. Yet it should be noted that these peoples have mingled with the indigenous populations since before the time of the Ancient Greeks, thus producing a situation of considerable racial and ethnic admixture. Contributing to this diversity has been the impact of various conquests and migrations, as well as various activities involving transience, in addition to those of merchants and missionaries.¹⁵ Yet another factor must be mentioned alongside that of the various civilizations which have contributed to the ethnic diversity of this region, and that is religion. Among the most well-known and widespread religions that have held sway in the region are Christianity, Judaism, and, with the arrival of the Ottoman Empire, Islam.¹⁶

With so many different racial groups and subgroups, religions and religious sects, it is only natural that there should be a great diversity of languages, traditions, and customs. Thus separate national identities would take shape in parallel with a centuries-long dialectical relation between ethnic language groups and religious communities. As may be understood from the above givens, it is obvious that the possibilities for long-term unity or cooperation within the Balkans are remote indeed.

¹⁴ Stavrianos, pp. 8-12.

¹⁵ William M. Sloane, *Bir Tarih Laboratuari, Balkanlar*, trans. Sibel Özbudun (İstanbul: Süreç Yayınları, 1987), p. 10.

¹⁶ Georges Castellan, *Balkanların Tarihi*, trans. Ayşegül Yaraman Başbuğu (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1993), pp. 22-4. in English see Georges Catellan, *History of the Balkans from Mohammed the Conqueror to Stalin*, trans. Nickolas Bradley (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992) pp.4-9.

The Peoples of the Balkans

The Albanians

The Albanians are among the most ancient races of the Balkan Peninsula.¹⁷ In spite of this fact, the Albanians have been able to maintain a considerable degree of racial purity. It is understood that this is mainly the result of geographical features; compared to the rest of the Balkans, the Albanian region is somewhat more isolated by surrounding mountains and the sea, thus ensuring that they were not exposed to the same degree of exposure to foreign incursions. According to Gewehr, despite a considerable admixture of Slav blood, the modern Albanians present certain physical characteristics which identify them with an earlier ethnic substratum.¹⁸

Another trait specific to the Albanians, according to Sloane, is related to the fact that because of internal strife the Albanians have been unable to develop socially and politically in the same fashion as their neighbor nations. As a result of this, they tend to preserve their existing ways of life as a more or less inwardly-turned community, not having assimilated with other cultures to the same degree as other Balkan nations.¹⁹

Opinions are divided on the issue of the Albanian's origins, one group of historians associates them with the Illyrians, another traces them back to the Thracians.²⁰ The Albanians, for their part, call themselves *Shqiptar*, or "Son of an Eagle," further claiming *Shqipëria*, the land they occupy, as their homeland.²¹

While the Albanians consider themselves to have derived from a single origin, with a single language, traditional background, and beliefs, in fact they

¹⁷ Ronald Zickel and Walter R. Iwaskiw, *Albania: A Country Study* (Washington D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1994), p.3.

¹⁸ Wesley M. Gewehr, *The Rise of Nationalism in the Balkans: 1800-1830* (New York: Holt, 1931), p. 5.

¹⁹ Sloane, p. 67.

²⁰ *İslam Ansiklopedisi* vol.1, p. 582.

²¹ Gewehr, p. 5.

constitute two major groups, the Ghegs and the Tosks. Owing primarily to their relatively greater isolation, the Ghegs of the northern areas are relatively less developed than their southern neighbors, the Tosks.²²

Turning to the historical background of the Albanian, their ancestors, the Illyrians, established the Kingdom of Epirus in the fourth century B. C.. That the clans of Illyrians could not made up of a political union made easy the occupation of foreign elements.²³ Later years brought the Albanians under the sovereignty and thus into contact with the Roman Empire (168 B.C.), the Goths in the fifth century A.D., and the Slavs in the sixth century. The Albanians then lived under Byzantine sovereignty before becoming part of the Ottoman Empire, under which they remained until they gained independent statehood (1914).

A brief look at developments related to religion among the Albanians will reveal dynamics which parallel their political development. The main religions practiced by this people are Christianity and Islam. Following the establishment of Ottoman sovereignty in the area, the Albanians appear to have adopted Islam more rapidly than any other subject people. Thus, under Ottoman rule, the Muslim Albanian population increased rapidly in the local population centers, and along with this, so did its influence and authority as a community. Outside of these centers, there was a greater degree of variation of religion, as the Albanians of the southern regions had contact with the Greeks, thus becoming semi-Hellenized and Orthodox, while the Albanians of the northern areas, the Malisors, were Catholic.²⁴

As for the Albanian language, it was an early form of a dialect of Illyrian, and a member of the Indo-European language family; it exhibits many cognates with other Indo-European languages. In addition to this basis, Albanian has been

²² Stavrianos, p. 497.

²³ Nuray Bozbora, *Osmanlı Yönetiminde Arnavutluk ve Arnavut Ulusçuluğunun Gelişimi* (İstanbul: Boyut Matbaacılık, 1997), p.24.

²⁴ Barbara Jelavich, *The Establishment of the Balkan Nation States 1840-1920* (Washington D. C.: University of Washington, 1977), pp. 222-223.

influenced by the civilizations which have occupied its territories, and so it has absorbed much vocabulary from Latin, Greek, and Ottoman Turkish.²⁵

The Greeks

Of all the Balkan peoples, the Greeks are one of the oldest and have left the most significant legacy. Indeed, the Classical Greek civilization forms the point of departure for even the modern world's socio-political structure; it is also considered to be the foundation of Western culture. The modern heirs of this legacy have taken full advantage of these opinions regarding it, and modern Greek foreign relations are in great measure shaped by these philosophical assumptions.

Greek history has been traced back to ancient times. The city-states they founded---Athens, Sparta, Corinth, and their citizens and contemporaries---reached a highly developed level of civilization.²⁶ This civilization had a pioneering influence in commerce, arts and architecture, science, philosophy, and politics, not only in the areas they inhabited, including the coasts of the Aegean, the Mediterranean, and even the Black Sea, but throughout the world. In other words, the Ancient Greeks left a decisive mark on their age.²⁷ They were particularly skilled in sea trade, and thus, alongside their economic dealings, exercised cultural influence on the surrounding areas with which they traded. In this way they left their stamp on the civilizations of the entire Aegean and Western Mediterranean coastal regions.²⁸

In spite of the high level of civilization attained by the Greek city-states, they nonetheless never achieved full unification. While cooperation appeared close or possible from time to time, these initiatives could not be sustained in the face of

²⁵ Henry Noel Brailsford, *Macedonia, Its Races and Their Future* (London: Methuen, 1906), p. 229.

²⁶ For more detail on the cultural and archeological history of Ancient Greece, see Nicholas Geoffrey Hammon, *Studies in Greek History* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1973).

²⁷ Richard Mansfield Haywood, *Ancient Greece and the Near East* (New York: D. Mc.Kay Co., 1964), pp. 266-300.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 207-212.

expansionist tendencies. Due to the disadvantage of its geopolitical position which exposed it to foreign invasions, the Greeks were host to various cultural influences. The Persian Empire was one of these; the Greeks were unable to avoid being drawn under this empire's hegemony in 547 B.C.²⁹ This event would be followed by their being drawn into the Roman Empire, and it could perhaps be said that it was from this period on that the Greeks definitively lost their hegemony up until they achieved independence in 1821 as a new nation state. In spite of this, the Greeks always worked to preserve their cultural identity, whether within the Roman Empire, or during the later period of the Eastern Roman Empire, Byzantium.³⁰ The Greeks had a special place within the Byzantine Empire in particular, and this was due to or complemented by the fact that their mother tongue Greek was the language of the Empire. After adopting the Orthodox sect of the Christian faith, the Greeks were able to earn an influential place for themselves in religious matters as the foremost supporters of the Eastern Church.

The Greeks maintained their influential position even during the era of Ottoman jurisdiction following the Byzantine Empire, brought down with the conquest of İstanbul in 1453 by Sultan Mehmet II, the Conqueror.

The Bulgarians

Today's Bulgaria has been a major transit area for migratory movements since ancient times. Its special strategic importance within the Balkans is owed to its location along the route that stretches between East and the West, into the heart of Europe, in addition to being that piece of land by which Russia might gain access to the warm seas of the Mediterranean. Because of its location, Bulgaria has experienced the passage of numerous ethnic groups; among those who settled in the

²⁹ Ibid., p. 302.

³⁰ Jelavich and Jelavich, p. 16.

area one group was the Bulgarians, who were Asiatic in origin. Jelavich and Jelavich maintain that the Bulgarians were derived from a Finno-Tartar tribe of Central Asia and, settling in the north-eastern lands of the Balkan Peninsula, they mixed with the local peoples and thus acquired Slavic traits and characteristics.³¹

According to Lang, the ethnicon “Bulgar” is of Old Turkic origin, from the word *bulgha*, to mix.³² He adds that this derivation serves to underline the complex racial origins of the proto-Bulgars, who were more of a tribal federation than one specific tribe. The linguistic and archaeological evidence shows that the proto-Bulgars were a hybrid people.³³

The Bulgarians, early place in the complex political tableau of Balkan history was marked by their protracted struggle against the Byzantine Empire. By adopting Orthodox Christianity in 864, the Bulgarians thus took their place within the larger Slav-Byzantine cultural milieu. The Bulgarians experienced a high period of civilization during the rule of Boris’s son Czar Symeon. During that golden age, the Bulgaria Czardom included the entire Moravian Valley, Niş Belgrade, Vardar, and other parts of Macedonia, Thrace, and Albania.³⁴ However, this Bulgarian Czardom was not long-lived; by the eleventh century the Bulgarians were compelled to recognize the supremacy of the Byzantines.

The second major event marking the history of the Bulgarian people was their expansion into central Macedonia, Northern Albania and Thrace.³⁵ Nevertheless, as a final consequence of their rivalry with the Serbian Empire, which was gathering strength and expanding at the same rate during that period, the Bulgarians were eventually obliged to relinquish this newly-won territory.³⁶ This

³¹ Ibid., p. 19.

³² David Marshall Lang, *The Bulgarians from Pagan Times to the Ottoman Conquest* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1976), pp. 31-32.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Stavrianos, p. 26.

³⁵ Lang, pp. 71-92.

³⁶ George W. Hoffman, *The Balkans in Transition* (New York: D. Van Nostrand Co, Inc., 1963), p. 42.

situation continued until the death of the Serbian King Stephan Dushan and with it, the dissolution of the Serbian Empire, thanks to which it became possible for the Bulgarians to seek and achieve independence. This new era was also short-lived, for soon the Bulgarians, along with so many other Balkan peoples, were forced to concede to the hegemony of the rapidly-spreading Ottoman Turks.

The Romanians

While the identity of the original inhabitants of present-day Romania is far from clear, one hypothesis rests on the link between the name “Dacia” with which present-day Romania is associated, and the Dacians, known in history as one of the earliest human groups of the region.³⁷ The borders within which this early people lived were contiguous with those of the Roman Empire. For a certain period, this group was politically associated with the Roman Empire in the form of a state and, under the influence of Latin culture, became assimilated to the Roman Empire.³⁸ Jelavich and Jelavich remark on the consequences of this interaction in the following terms: “The Roman Empire left behind the legacy of the name of the future State of Romania and the basis of the Romanian language.”³⁹

As mentioned above in general reference to the geography of the Balkan Peninsula and its being exposed to the incursions and movements of peoples from various parts of the world throughout history, this was no less true of the Romanian territories. These fertile lands were witness to barbarian invasions, which forced the Romanians to draw together and retreat into the Carpathian Mountains, where they were to remain for an extended period.⁴⁰ As the invasions tapered off, the

³⁷ R. W. Seton-Watson, *A History of the Romanians From Roman Times to the Completion of Unity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1934), pp. 1-16.

³⁸ Nevill Forbes and Arnold J. Toynbee, *The Balkans: A History of Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, Romania, Turkey* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1915), p. 253.

³⁹ Jelavich and Jelavich, p. 18.

⁴⁰ Marriot, p. 286.

Romanians once again moved down into the valleys to the south and west. This expansion resulted in the establishment of two separate and autonomous provinces in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, Wallachia and Moldavia. Wallachia lay between the Danube and the Carpathian mountains, while Moldavia governed the remaining territories between the Danube and the Black Sea.⁴¹ Transylvania was yet another principality which may be added to those of Moldavia and Wallachia. These principalities were able to maintain at least a degree of autonomy until they were finally united in the second half of the nineteenth century during the formation of modern Romania.

The South Slavs

The South Slavs are the largest group of Balkan peoples.⁴² A people without connections to any ancient civilization, they first appeared in the Balkan Peninsula towards the sixth century, having moved southward from their homeland in Russia in the form of individual tribes and clans. As in other cases, the geography of the Balkans contributed to the failure of this people to unite into a single political unit. Because of their failure to unite as one community, the South Slavs were destined to become sub-groups of more than one Balkan nation, those nations being for the most part multi-cultural in any case. This situation is most clearly illustrated in the case of former Yugoslavia. The subsequent history of the South Slavs centers around the development of four major socio-political groupings, Bulgaria, Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia.

⁴¹ Forbes and Toynbee, pp. 256-263.

⁴² Jelavich and Jelavich, pp. 18-19.

The Serbs

The Serbian people have located their origins within the South Slav group. As mentioned above, the Croats and Slovenes may be listed among the groups separating off from the larger South Slav group; alongside these two, however, the Serbs have had considerably more weight and influence. Forbes and Toynbee emphatically assert that the Serbian and the Croatian races and languages derive from a common origin and that their subsequent differences may be attributed entirely to the impact of geography.⁴³ More recently, these two groups have emphasized their separate cultural uniqueness and, on this basis, as will be seen further on, assert their own micro-nationalist ideals.

Turning to the place of the Serbs in Balkan history, these people lived under the sovereignty of the Byzantine Empire before gaining their independence in beginning of the twelfth century. The Serbs experienced their golden age under the leadership of Serbian Czar Stephan Dushan during the fourteenth century.⁴⁴ During this period, the borders of what was known as the greater Serbian Empire included all of Albania, Macedonia, Epirus, and Thessaly.⁴⁵ Having taken Bulgaria, Stephan Dushan's hopes turned to Constantinople; he was unable to realize this dream, however, and with his death the Serbian Empire dissolved into "ban" and "despotisms," which made any later unity a difficult task. Thus these people's fortunes, which rose and fell with the personal authority commanded by its rulers, experienced one of their low points just prior to the regions, conquest by the Ottomans.

⁴³ Forbes and Toynbee, p. 80.

⁴⁴ David McKenzie, *The Serbs and Russian Pan Slavism (1875-1878)* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1967), p. 1.

⁴⁵ The modern-day concept of "Greater Serbia" is based on Stephan Dushan's historical empire. John MacDonald, *Turkey and the Eastern Question* (London: Stokes, 1913), p. 18.

William Sloane drew this comparison between the Serbs and the Bulgarians: “Serbia’s institutions are stronger than those of that community (the Bulgarians) more based on brotherhood; its clan system is more deeply rooted among the people, its religious temperament more developed, and its folklore richer.”⁴⁶ The majority of the Serbs had embraced Orthodox Christianity under the influence of religious leaders Cyril and Methodius. Their national language is Serbian.

The Bosniacs

Located in the northwestern Balkan Peninsula, Bosnia-Herzegovina took its name from the Bosnia River which empties into the Sava, and the Herzog Dukedom which was formed toward the end of the Medieval period.⁴⁷ Of importance for its location as a gateway to Europe, present day Bosnia-Herzegovina has maintained this strategic significance despite its historic experience as one of the most troubled regions of the world owing to problems of close past with the political structures and internal hostility.

It is believed that the first indigenous community of this area was Illyrian. Today the ethnic composition of this area, especially that of Bosniacs, is mostly made up of Bosniacs (*Bosnakça*), Serbs and Croats, the Bosniacs forming the largest of these three groups.⁴⁸ It may be observed that, over the course of time, while living amongst the Orthodox Serbs and the Catholic Croats, this community defined itself in primarily religious, rather than ethnic terms. Among the many religious communities of the region, this group has a special place ; originally, it had separated off from the rest of Christianity into a Christian faction known as the

⁴⁶ Sloane, p. 114.

⁴⁷ Besim Darkot, “Bosna-Hersek,” *İslam Ansiklopedisi* vol. 2 (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1949), pp. 725-729.

⁴⁸ Aydın Babuna, “Değişen Boşnak Kimliği Üzerine,” *Dünü ve Bugünüyle Toplum ve Ekonomi* (İstanbul: Bağlam Yayınları, 1996), p. 78.

Bogomils.⁴⁹ With the coming of Ottoman rule, This Slavic community adopted the new government's political and religious structures *en masse*. While the Bosniacs are generally thought to be of Slavic origin, with the recent breakup of Yugoslavia, the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina have adopted the name “Bosnjak” with the aim of asserting a new national cultural identity.⁵⁰ Until recent times, the majority of this community had designated itself only as “Muslim” and so it was known to the outside world as well.

In respect to Bosnia-Herzegovina’s political history, it may be said that this group has never, to this day, managed to assert an autonomous political organization. Instead, the region it inhabits has been dominated by various powers in turn---the Venetians, the Serbs, the Austria-Hungarian Empire, and the Ottoman Empire. This community was not able to establish its own identity even within the new context that emerged after the long period of Ottoman rule drew to a close. Whether within the Yugoslavian Kingdom created at the end of the World War I, or as part of Socialist Yugoslavia, the Bosniacs, mostly, were not able to articulate a distinctive cultural identity.

⁴⁹ Tayyip Okiç, "Balkanlar'da Bogomilizm Hareketi ve Bunun Bir Araştırmacısı: Aleksandr Vasiljevic-Solovjev," *İslam Tetkikleri Enstitüsü Dergisi* (İstanbul: 1973), vol 1-4, pp 205-215.

⁵⁰ For more on recent transformations of Bosnian identity, see, Babuna , pp.71-78.

CHAPTER THREE

THE BALKANS UNDER THE OTTOMAN RULE

The Establishment of Ottoman Rule in the Balkans

The first time the Turks, that is to say, the Ottomans, set foot in the Balkans was during the course of a short-lived incursion in the fourteenth century.¹ It is widely accepted that Süleyman Paşa's entering Rumeli in 1354 marked the start of the Ottoman conquest of that region.² Following its conquest in 1361, Edirne (Adrianople) was made the capital of the Ottoman State in 1368 with the idea that as the conquest of Thrace proceeded, the Balkans would be the next major target for military operations. In the following years into the fifteenth century, Macedonian, Bulgarian, Southern Romanian, Serbian, and Albanian lands were in large part brought under Ottoman rule.³

By 1521, following the occupation of Belgrade, nearly all of the Balkans except for the coastal areas of Montenegro and Dalmatia had passed into Ottoman hands, thus becoming a region which was to last more than four hundred years. The Ottoman Empire reached its furthest point in Central Europe with the taking of Belgrade and even with the intention of advancing north across the Danube. From this time on, the Ottoman state took its place among the powerful empires of the era. It is true that the Ottoman Empire affected the region in every aspect of life, political, economic, cultural, religious, etc. As a result of this the period of Ottoman Legacy is known as "Pax Ottomanica" in the Balkans.

¹ The Ottomans first entered the Balkan region in 1321.

² İ. Hami Danişmend considers this to be a key moment in Turkish history, pointing out that Ottoman-Turkish rule began to spread into Europe as of this date. İ.Hami Danişmend, *Osmanlı Tarihi Kronolojisi*, vol.3 (İstanbul: Türkiye Yayınları, 1971), p.27; and Münir Aktepe, "Osmanlıların Rumeli'de İlk Fethettikleri Çimpe Kal'ası," *İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Tarih Dergisi*, Sayı.2, İstanbul, p.284.

³ See the Ottoman Conquest in The Balkans, from XIV. Century to XVI. Century, Halil Akman, *Paylaşılamayan Balkanlar* (İstanbul: IQ Kültür, Sanat Yayıncılık, 2006), pp.42-47.

The Ottoman advances into Europe came to an end in the sixteenth century; indeed, they began to suffer territorial losses from that point on. In this chapter, an overall view of the Balkans from the starts of Ottoman hegemony will be presented, including political, social, economic, and cultural aspects. Various positive and negative features of this long-lived regime will be evaluated.

When the Ottomans began their conquest of the Balkan Peninsula they were faced with a region populated by various communities with histories reaching far into the past. As mentioned above, the outstanding feature of the Balkans was an ethnic diversity which had defied any sort of unification. Alongside this unique and fundamental trait, under Ottoman rule this peninsula's various religious, sectarian, linguistic, traditional, and cultural characteristics would over time act as forces for both differentiation and unification.

In fact, one of the reasons for the rapidity of the Ottoman advances into the Balkans was this lack of unification; that is, the absence of an organization of sufficient magnitude to stop the Ottoman armies.⁴ When the Ottomans entered the European continent the Serbian Czar had recently died, leaving the fragments of the state he had created in the hands of local seigniors. The Bulgarian Czarism had also been divided into three parts during this period. And finally, the formerly all-powerful Byzantine Empire lived on in name only. Under these circumstances, the small feudal principalities of the Balkans, were in fierce competition with one another, providing an undeniable opportunity for the Ottomans to penetrate and assume control of the entire region through a combination of force and agreements. Since these small states and feudal structures had been unable to fill the power vacuum left by Eastern Rome, this strong new force was welcomed by these states. Whether through diplomacy or coercion, the politics of equilibrium exercised in the Balkans allowed the Ottoman rule to grow from day to day. To this end they used

⁴ Kemal H. Karpat, *Balkanlar'da Osmanlı Mirası ve Ulusçuluk*, trans. Recep Boztemur (İstanbul: İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, 2004), pp.18-19.

every means at their disposal from vassalage to outright annexation, thus creating a large community of states under the rule of the Ottoman dynasty.

These communities, under the name of the “Ottoman Empire”, were put under a regime which disregarded religious and racial distinctions, gathering all citizens into a political order under the Ottoman umbrella. Given that the ethnic, religious, and linguistic differences between the various groups was a recipe for continual friction, the Ottoman State created an order based on heterogeneity, but at the same time, imposed certain principles of unity. In Koloğlu’s opinion, faced with this diversity, there was one of two choices to be made. The Ottomans could either try to get everyone to conform to their own way of life by the force of the sword, or they could leave each group free to its own practices and particularities within a general administrative framework. The Ottoman rulers chose the latter.⁵

One of the most significant factors contributing to the swift spread of Ottoman hegemony was their recognition of God’s command to protect the lives and property of all citizens of the state without regard to their status as Muslim or non-Muslim. This principle was known in the Kur’an as “*te’lifü’l-kulub*” and in the Ottoman sources as “*istimalet*.”⁶

The Ottoman Empire would work to sustain this structure in which religion, race, language, and cultural differences were disregarded up to the nineteenth century when the Bulgarians, Serbs, and Greeks began to form their own nations in accordance with national consciousness.

Ottoman Administration in the Balkans

Before turning to the topic of Ottoman rule in the Balkans, it must first strongly be emphasized that the Ottoman Empire was a Muslim, not a Turkish

⁵ Orhan Koloğlu, “Osmanlı Döneminde Balkanlar,” *Balkanlar* (İstanbul: Ortadoğu ve Balkan İncelemeleri Vakfı Yayınları, 1993), p. 59.

⁶ Halil İnalçık, “Türkler ve Balkanlar,” *Balkanlar* (İstanbul: Ortadoğu ve Balkan İncelemeleri Vakfı Yayınları, 1993), p. 16.

empire; the Jelaviches have pointed out that its rulers thought of themselves as belonging to a religious group, not a national one.⁷ A brief examination of population figures immediately reveals the significantly higher proportion of Muslims compared to that of other groups in the Empire.⁸ The Empire was constituted on the basis of Islam, that is, it presented the features of a theocracy while its majority of the population was Muslims, or not. The multi-ethnic social order of the Empire was called the *millet* system.⁹ *Millet* was in fact the designation for any religious grouping; it was thus an “Islamic” conception, and the state’s administrators represented the *Millet-i İslamiye* (community or people of Islam).¹⁰

As for the condition of the non-Muslim, minority populations of this Islamic state known as the Ottoman Empire, it is a fact that while these groups were not singled out for special treatment on the grounds of their differences, they were granted certain religious, cultural, and economic privileges.¹¹

From its very beginnings, the Ottoman system did not in any way force any of the populations of its conquered territories to change their religions.¹² The Ottomans invited the occupants of their conquered territories to adopt Islam, but left them entirely free to choose whether or not to do so. Those who accepted this

⁷ Jelavich and Jelavich, p. 26.

⁸ For Ömer Lütfü Barkan’s table indicating the population of the Balkans from 1520-1530, see İnalçık, “Türkler ve Balkanlar,” p. 23.

⁹ The Ottomans transformed the Islamic state system which was based on the concept of *ümmet* into the *millet* system. In this context, the term *millet* has the same meaning as the Ottoman word *cemaat*. The contemporary meaning of the word *millet* is of course quite different; See in Sacit Kutlu, *Milliyetçilik ve Emperyalizm Yüzyılında Balkanlar ve Osmanlı Devleti* (İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2007), pp.6-7.

¹⁰ Mehmet Emin Düzdağ, *Seyhülislam Ebusuud Efendi’nin Işığında XVI. Asır Türk Hayatı* (İstanbul: Enderun Kitabevi, 1972), p. 176.

¹¹ Stanford Shaw has stated that it is not possible to equate specific cases of forced changes of religion with the experience of any particular minority in the Ottoman Empire. Indeed, under the administration of their own religious leaders, the minorities were granted the right to use their own languages and customs in maintaining their own schools, orphanages, and hospitals. Stanford Shaw, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Azınlıklar Sorunu,” *Tanzimat’tan Cumhuriyet’e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, vol.4 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1985), pp. 1002-1003.

¹² Cevdet Küçük, “Osmanlılarda Millet Sistemi ve Tanzimat,” *Tanzimat’tan Cumhuriyet’e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, vol.4 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1985) p. 1007; and Kutlu, pp.4-6.

invitation and converted to Islam were able to enjoy the same rights as other Muslims; those who did not were given the status of *zimmi* and protected as regards the integrity of their lives and property as long as they accepted the supremacy of the Ottoman government. In return, taxes known as the *cizye* (djiza; tax paid by non muslims) and *haraç* (tribute; land paid by non muslims) were imposed on them.¹³ While only Muslim citizens were freed from the burden of this obligation imposed by the Sultan, Christian males' being exempt from military service on the grounds that they paid the *cizye* could be considered a kind of privilege. Still, it must be said that since the *cizye* tax had to be paid in cash it did create difficulties in some cases, especially among villagers in the Balkans.¹⁴ In economically vulnerable areas of the Balkans where the land was not productive, it might be assumed that the Christians would have converted to Islam en masse in order to avoid paying this tax. However, this issue has not been thoroughly researched.

Islamization in the Balkans showed a more significant increase in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. As a rule, the areas where Islam was accepted in greater numbers during the Ottoman period were in the western Balkans, in today's Albania, Kosovo, and Bosnia. Among the first to convert to Islam were those who served in the Ottoman army, especially the Christian *timar* holders. Also, those who served the Ottoman administration in some capacity or lived in border areas, and those who lived among Muslims or had close contact with them were more likely to convert. İnalçık considers the Islamization that took place during this period to be a strictly social phenomenon, brought about by social factors.¹⁵

To return to the tax issue, it was considered reasonable to tax those with similar incomes by similar rates without regard to whether they were Muslim or non-

¹³ For detailed information on the *cizye* and *haraç*, see Mehmet Zeki Pakalın, *Osmanlı Tarih Deyimleri ve Terimleri Sözlüğü* (İstanbul, Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1971), pp. 297 and 734.

¹⁴ See "Cizye," in Halil. İnalçık, *İslam Ansiklopedisi*, 2nd ed. vol. II (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Yayınları), pp. 563-566.

¹⁵ İnalçık, "Türkler ve Balkanlar," p. 20.

Muslim. Special taxes known as *avariz*¹⁶ were generally levied during times of war. They were a considerable burden on both communities and were imposed every year from the end of the sixteenth century on. These conditions are generally considered to be responsible for the Christian community's first signs of protest against the Ottoman government as well as for the phenomena of brigandage and rebellions.

One way in which the non-Muslim groups were treated differently was their being barred from participating in government; in other words, their political rights were limited. However, this very fact also created opportunities for the Christian citizens of the Empire. Under the *devşirme* system Christian children were taken from their families, and, on the condition of converting to Islam, were raised to become soldiers, officers, even reaching the ranks of high level officials or grand viziers.¹⁷ While the idea of removing young children from their families was not democratic and in very many cases distasteful, it could also be seen as an open door to enhanced positions for the children of families with few hopes for otherwise improving their circumstances.¹⁸ Thus, the chance to advance to such high positions created by this system made it seem increasingly desirable to Christian families.

The Ottomans identified themselves with the state structure as an indivisible whole. From its very beginnings the state was developed as a centralized institution whose unity was indisputable. Therefore, although its structure involved strict centralized control, it was able to administer a multi-ethnic community on the principles of order and unity. This was made possible in large part, despite certain failings, by the Ottoman government's refusal to distinguish or discriminate between the *millets*.

¹⁶ On the *avariz*, see Pakalın, vol. I, pp. 112-114.

¹⁷ For a 170-year period following the conquest of Istanbul, only five ethnic Turks took the rank of *Vezir-i Azamlık*; the remainder were Albanian (12), Serb (12), Greek (6), Armenian, Georgian, and even Italian. Jelavich, p. 28

¹⁸ İlber Ortaylı, *Tarihimiz ve Biz* (İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2008), pp.59-60.

This *millet* system, which helped to assure the social order and long duration of the Ottoman Empire, was characterized first and foremost by what could be termed the semi-autonomous administrative status of the Christian minorities. These groups were free to settle their own economic, cultural, religious, social, and even legal matters among themselves. This ethnic heterogeneity was not a problem before, because the individual identities derived not from nationality but from membership in a religious community.¹⁹ Thanks to these favorable conditions, the Ottoman government was able to exert an effective and long-lasting influence on the peoples under its administration.²⁰ The beginning of the end of this regime can be detected in the progressive weakening of the centralized authority and hence the Empire as a whole, after a certain point. The weakening of the state-level mechanisms spread out to affect all institutions, including in particular those of the Balkan peoples which constitute the main topic of this study.

The negative consequences of the refusal of the Ottoman rulers to assimilate the various regions under their control created the conditions for empire's dissolution over time. The fact that the Balkan peoples, in particular, had preserved their culture and uniqueness throughout the of Ottoman rule eventually led them to establish nations on the very basis of these specific traits within a changing world order.

Reasons for the Collapse of Ottoman Hegemony

The world of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was marked by changing social, political, economic, and cultural attitudes and concepts, inevitably

¹⁹ Roderic H. Davison, "The Otoman Diplomacy and Its Legacy" *Imperial Legacy. The Otoman Imprint of the Balkans and The Middle East*, ed. L. Carl Brown (New York: Colombia University Press, 1996), pp.175-176.

²⁰ See the meaning of legacy in Halil İnalcık, "The Meaning of Legacy: The Otoman Case", *The Otoman Imprint of the Balkans and The Middle East*, ed. L. Carl Brown (New York: Colombia University Press, 1996), pp.17-29; and Maria Todorova, "The Otoman Legacy in The Balkans", *The Otoman Imprint of the Balkans and The Middle East*, ed. L. Carl Brown (New York: Colombia University Press, 1996), pp.45-77.

producing new balances of power. While these fundamentally new forms of equilibrium and their many effects were particularly in evidence in Europe, elsewhere, other nations were struggling to prolong their existence. The Ottoman State was affected as well. Having entered a period of rapid dissolution within this changing environment after a long life as a world empire, it merely turned out to be the future homelands of the national states that we will discuss.

As a focal point of the process of the division and dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, the end to nearly five centuries of rule in the Balkans was brought about by both internal and external factors.

The Collapse of the Economic Structure and Balances

The breakdown of the economic structure and balances can be shown to be one of the causes at the heart of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, which has been described as representing the highest form of social order of its time period. Its land policy constituted the foundation of the Ottoman Empire's economic structure. This system, known as the *timar system*,²¹ brought the entire empire's territory under a single administrative order in which the land was divided into *timars*. These were then given over to individuals who had been of service to the state in times of war. These individuals drew benefit from their holdings not directly, but through rents paid by villagers permitted to use the land; in this way the *timar* holders were able to meet their various obligations to the state.²²

²¹ On the *timar* system, see Pakalın, vol. 2, pp. 497-507. Also, see John R. Lampe and Marvin R. Jackson, *Balkan Economic History 1550-1950, From Imperial Borderlands to Developing Nations* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), pp. 33-39.

²² See the economic conditions during 1700-1800's in Michael Palairat, *Balkan Ekonomileri, Kalkınmasız Evrim, 1800-1914*, trans. Ayşe Edirne, (İstanbul: Sabancı University Press, 2000), pp.38-65.

This system worked quite well during the period prior to industrialization, when livelihoods and even prosperity were derived from agriculture. Looking beyond its purely economic effects, the *timar* system also provided a form of organization which brought the entire empire under a single administrative control. This supervision both allowed for the functioning of administrative mechanisms, and also made it possible to monitor various aspects of agricultural production throughout the empire. Indeed, it has been described as a model which compares more than favorably with the feudal system of the European medieval period

In addition to the above features, the *timar* holders, by virtue of their involvement with agricultural production, lost their somewhat undefined social role as war-makers and were transformed into members of the community who shared the concerns of local daily life. Thus one of the system's benefits was in making the army into a productive segment of society.²³

However, the Ottoman Empire was unable to adapt to a changing world; the end of expansion, the beginning of territorial losses, and the failure to secure new areas for the settlement of immigrants all paved the way to breakdowns in the system. On top of this, the central administration made a series of decisions that often made life more difficult for those living off the land.

The weakening of the central authority's ties with the outlying districts made it possible for the *timar* holders to take greater power into their own hands; their increasingly taking on the characteristics of feudal lords contributed to the further degeneration of the system.²⁴ In certain parts of the Empire including in particular our focal area the Balkans, this degeneration affected the local administrators as well.

²³ Emre Kongar, *İmparatorluktan Günümüze Türkiye'nin Toplumsal Yapısı* (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1976), p. 33.

²⁴ Halil İnalcık has established that the village notables who revolted against the central authority in some cases had Janissary origins. Halil İnalcık, *Political Modernisation in Japan and Turkey* Robert E. Ward and Dankward A. Rustow, eds. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), pp. 46-47.

Their transforming the lands of their jurisdiction into commercial properties could be seen as in a sense an assumption of the government's prerogative.²⁵

The administrative cadres' susceptibility to corruption together with the advanced state of dysfunction in the central authority's supervisory mechanisms meant that justice could no longer be expected from the state. This alienated the populations since it was in contradiction with the Ottoman State's own political philosophy. Furthermore, these developments, quite apart from the economic difficulties they imposed, also increasingly undermined the local peoples' sense of connection with and trust in their government.

The outstanding feature of the uprisings of the nineteenth century was the anti-government of the middle class villagers. Ortaylı argues that one of the reasons for the rebellious and nationalist leanings of the small land-holding and landless Christian peasants was the fact that the large farm owners of this period were generally Muslim. All these circumstances help explain why one of the first issues taken up by the Tanzimat bureaucracy (1839) was that of land reform.²⁶

The decay of the Ottoman State was not limited to the economic sphere. During the eighteenth century, elements of dissolution could be found in all institutions. Koloğlu has summed up the Ottoman administrative philosophy in the following formula: "Many soldiers and armies are needed to keep a hold on the nation; large quantities of goods and riches are necessary to feed and maintain the soldiers; the population must be wealthy in order to provide these riches; suitable laws must be established in order for the people to become wealthy."²⁷

The Ottoman State was able to maintain the integrity of its territory to a significant degree throughout this century, yet its overall condition had certainly weakened for reasons listed above.

²⁵ Ömer Lütfi Barkan, *Türkiye'de Toprak Meselesi* (İstanbul: Gözlem Yayınları, 1980), p. 408.

²⁶ İlber Ortaylı, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Millet" *Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 4 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1985), p. 997.

²⁷ Koloğlu, p. 69

One of the mainstays of the Ottoman system was the army. The complete degeneration of the Janissary corps not only made the army incapable of fulfilling its function, it also became a source of violence and repression aimed at the people and the central administration as well.²⁸ On the one hand, during this period of wars one after the other, the army's being under inadequate command created the conditions for Ottomans' loss of standing as a military power. On the other hand, the need to secure moneys for the treasury and support for the military created conditions of dependency on the local notables and chieftains. Thus the government came to favor one class, granting it privileges which it used to establish control over the general population, in this way creating the basis for fundamental transformations in the social structure which were to constitute the greatest danger to Ottoman society. These conditions created a common cause which brought the villagers of the Balkans together with the nationalist intellectuals and underground revolutionaries.

The Empire in this period did experience progress and development in the area of commerce across its entire territory. However, it could not comply with growth and industrialization of Europe and in a way, was only a source of raw materials. This created yet another motivating force behind the separatist movements. One consequence of the protectionist policies of the West, which tended to concentrate commercial activities in the hands of the Empire's minorities, was the increasing influence of those minorities. By virtue of this role, they brought into the Empire western ideas and policies, which became yet another factor leading to its collapse. Thus contact was established with various European countries through the mediation of this class which controlled Ottoman commercial life and capital. This contact was not limited to activities such as importing goods and merchandise, but included bringing forms of thought and ideas into the Empire as well.²⁹

²⁸ See for the collopse of the system, Palairret, pp.40-41.

²⁹ Süleyman Kocabaş, *Avrupa Türkiyesi'nin Kaybı ve Balkanlar'da Panislavizm* (İstanbul: Vatan Yayınları, 1986), p. 47.

Nationalist Movements

One of the most important reasons for the Ottoman Empire's collapse was nationalist movements in the Balkans and their resulting separatism in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The roots of this nationalism that took shape may be found in the Enlightenment period and French revolutionary ideology. This process, which got its start in particular in the Enlightenment Age, was based on the assumption that the introduction of rationalism in the political sphere would bring the idea of freedom to all people by calling on all thinking people to free themselves from narrow-mindedness and to adopt a more open-minded, freer form of thought and analysis.

Starting from this period, various concepts of sovereignty were questioned and dependence on existing absolutist regimes, of which the Ottoman Empire was one example, weakened and was replaced by the concept of the sovereignty of the people.

Thinkers as Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Montesquieu, Diderot, John Locke, and Voltaire began interrogating the existing order from its religious, legal, political, and ethical aspects, thus opening new horizons for their societies. According to a Greek fighter, "The French Revolution opened the eyes of the world. Through this present change it is more difficult to rule the people."³⁰ It was inevitable that such a state as the Ottoman Empire, multicultural, absolutist, and with social and economic problems, would be affected by these developments.

Europe's response to these changing concepts developed swiftly with the result that even its absolutist monarchs, under their influence, inaugurated the age of "enlightened despotism" (*despotisme éclairé*).³¹ However, the Ottoman Empire and

³⁰ Mark Mazower, *The Balkans, A Short History* (New York: Random House, 2002), p.80.

³¹ Fahir Armaoğlu, *Siyasi Tarih (1789-1960)* (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1975), p. 3.

countries like it, characterized by inflexible concepts of administration, were indifferent to these developments, at least in the beginning.

The Eastern Question and the Great Powers

The idea that communities should determine their own futures, which began to penetrate along with the Ottoman administration's contacts with the outside world, was still influenced more by resistance movements against the Empire than by the Empire's own ideas about government. While these new ideas seem to have appeared for the first time during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, in fact they could be thought of as a new shape given to forms of thought that had existed for centuries. However, these ideas may have been thought capable of creating the perfect system for attaining a perfect world, their application was left in the hands of those who were in positions of power. The years following the Industrial Revolution in particular tended to give an ever more leading role to those nations which had already for centuries played determining roles in the balance of power. Thus this order maintained its hold as a competitive center, while spreading out beyond Europe's borders with its imperialist and expansionist policies and its newly-acquired colonies and zones of influence.

The important question from the Ottoman Empire's point of view was what role it would play within this larger arena. The geography of the Ottoman Empire, with its strategically and economically important regions, at the same time imposed a struggle against those powers that wished to obtain or control parts of it.

The so-called "Eastern Question," which arose among European diplomatic circles that wondered whether the Ottoman Empire would survive, was in fact only one part of a larger, multi-faceted game. The eighteenth century, which saw the

beginning of the fragmentation of the Ottoman Empire, has been reckoned as the era when the Eastern Question entered the picture with full force.³²

In fact, the Eastern Question displayed a certain continuity despite its being linked to various events and existing in various forms. At certain points in time it more or less centered on the issue of the Straits (Bosphorus and Dardanelles), at other times on the city of Istanbul, at yet other times it focused on the main theme under examination here, the Balkans.³³

If we can say that the beginning of the period of foreign intervention in Ottoman affairs began with the signing of the 1774 Küçük Kaynarca Accord, then it follows that from this period up until the Ottoman Empire's exit from the historical stage, the Eastern Question was of undeniable interest to all the Great Powers in addition to playing a crucial role insofar as its impact on the balance of power throughout that period.³⁴ The various nations that wished to settle the question of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire according to their own interests, especially during the nineteenth century, changed their approaches in line with varying conditions.³⁵ One nation, for example, which supported the Empire's dissolution in the strongest terms at one point in the hopes of a large territorial acquisition, during another time period proved one of the most outspoken supporters of Ottoman territorial integrity.

As will be seen, in their influence on the process of Balkan nationalization, the nations known as the Great Powers (Russia, France, England and Austria-Hungarian Empire) would profoundly affect not only the Ottoman Empire, but also the shape of the new world in the making. When looked at from this perspective, it

³² For detailed information on the Eastern Question, see Marriott, pp.128-193.; and Mazover, pp. 79-111.

³³ Sagay, pp. 70-71.

³⁴ With the signing of the Küçük Kaynarca Accord, the protection of the rights of Orthodox Christians living in the Ottoman Empire was placed under Russian jurisdiction. Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 37.

³⁵ Hüner Tuncer, *Doğu Sorunu ve Büyük Güçler, Osmanlı'nın Kader Yılları, 1853-1878*, (Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık, 2003), pp.13-14.

would not be wrong to say that the areas in question here would have a determining impact on regional developments in Russia, the Austria-Hungarian Empire, France, and England. In order to create satellites for themselves out of the small countries of the Balkans, these nations' diplomatic undertakings on occasion proved unfruitful, at which points they did not hesitate to resort to military and economic persuasion from their positions of relative strength.³⁶

For Russia, access to the South and the warmer seas, especially the Mediterranean, was at all times perceived as a geopolitical necessity. With this purpose, the Russians would put into motion any number of approaches, from the idea of reviving the Byzantine Empire to making use of their close ties with the Slavic race.³⁷ Thus, in the position of the eternal enemy of the Ottoman Empire, Russia stood to benefit immensely from the loss of integrity and even fragmentation of these countries. Czarist Russia in particular, in pursuit of this goal, supported various uprisings that took place in the Ottoman Empire in any way it could. From Russia's point of view, such kind of movements caused the idea of liberating the Balkan Christians.³⁸

Despite the disadvantages of being another multi-ethnic empire, Austria-Hungary was always involved in developments concerning of the Ottoman Empire. While on the one hand wishing to maintain the status quo on account of the Serbian presence within its borders, Austria also made attempts to take control of the Balkans, even going so far as to set its sights on Thessaloniki.³⁹ To a certain extent it could be said that this equivocation in Austria's foreign policy contributed to its demise. In spite of this, Austria was able to succeed in its goal of protecting the

³⁶ Karpat, p.8.

³⁷ On Turkish-Russian relations, see Ali Kemal Meram, *Türk-Rus İlişkileri Tarihi* (İstanbul: Kitapçılık Yayınları, 1969).

³⁸ On Russia's role in the Eastern Question, see Alexander Bitis, *Russia and the Eastern Question. Army, Government and Society (1815–1833)* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp.15-35; Alan Bodger, "Russia and the End of the Otoman Empire", *The Great Powers and the End of the Otoman Empire*, ed. Marian Kent (London: Frank Cass, 1996), pp.76-102.

³⁹ Sagay, p. 75.

Balkan populations from Russian rule and of drawing them to its side.⁴⁰ However, Austrian President Metternich, aware of the dangers that the new nationalist ideas spreading throughout Europe could represent for absolutist regimes like his own, was able to obtain Austria's participation in agreements protecting the status quo in 1815.⁴¹

France at one time had taken sides with the Ottoman Empire insofar as the latter had acted as a serviceable friend granting France important privileges. In time it began to use those privileges over the Ottomans in a struggle to gain ascendancy within the "balance of power." France not only wielded considerable economic and supervisory influence over the Ottoman State,⁴² it also exercised its might in other regions of the Empire such as North Africa, Syria, and the Balkans.⁴³

As for England, it was natural that its interests, and the policy priorities it set in support of them in the Near and Far East, would incline it to support the Ottoman State.⁴⁴ Russia's efforts to expand toward the South were not in England's interests. Thus, England preferred to keep the Ottoman Empire under its own influence, in this way taking the place that Russia might otherwise have assumed as an economic and political authority in addition to being a large continental power in the East.⁴⁵ Meanwhile, England was also vigilant against the possibility of other European countries capturing a piece of the huge Ottoman commercial market.⁴⁶

⁴⁰ F.R. Bridge, "The Habsburg Monarchy and the Ottoman Empire, 1900-1918, *The Great Powers and the End of the Ottoman Empire*, ed. Marian Kent (London: Frank Cass, 1996), pp.31-49.

⁴¹ Armaoğlu, pp. 45-47.

⁴² On the economic privileges granted to France, see Stefanos Yerasimos, *Az gelişmişlik Sürecinde Türkiye: Tanzimat'tan I.Dünya Savaşı'na*, trans. B. Kuzucu (İstanbul, Gözlem Yayınları, 1975), p. 732.

⁴³ Ann Williams, *Britain and France in the Middle East and North Africa* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1968), p. 58; and L. Bruce Fulton, "France and the End of The Ottoman Empire", *The Great Powers and the End of The Ottoman Empire*, ed. Marian Kent (London: Frank Cass, 1996) , pp.141-166.

⁴⁴ Ali Kemal Meram, *Belgelerle Türk-İngiliz İlişkileri Tarihi* (İstanbul: Kitap Yayıncılık, 1969), p. 131.

⁴⁵ Enver Ziya Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, vol.8 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1983), p.39.

⁴⁶ Orhan Kurmus, *Emperyalizmin Türkiye'ye Girişi* (İstanbul: Bilim Yayınları, 1977), p. 23.

However, changing conditions together with the continuing disintegration of the Empire caused England to alter its positions.⁴⁷ Its decision-making authority over Cyprus and Egypt, dating from the second half of the nineteenth century, gave England a greater measure of security in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Thus it was empowered to change the policies it had followed for a century, bringing to an end its ambition to establish control over the entire Ottoman territory. 1877–1878 Ottoman-Russian War (*93 Harbi*) is the final stage of the Ottoman Legacy in the Balkans as Beydilli pointed out⁴⁸

During the nineteenth century, two more states were added to the list of the so-called Great Powers as referred to above, Germany and Italy. These two states, having consolidated themselves as great power, were occupied with a search for their place in the international arena.

Germany, entering the competition for colonial territories as a late-comer, attempted to rectify this situation with new policies which would play a part in shaking up the international balance of power. That is, Germany was unable to participate in the relatively early expansionism of France and England, since by that time the various nations had long since established their zones of influence. In a world that had already been divided up and shared out, Germany saw potential in the Ottoman Empire alone as the closest region and the one least likely to provoke reaction. Thus, in the second half of the nineteenth century, Germany created a place for itself in the Ottoman context as a major power in international politics.⁴⁹

As a yet not fully unified nation, Italy began to apply an expansionist policy and seek zones of influence to the extent that it was able to overcome the weaknesses of its internal social and economic instability. Having escaped the onslaughts of the

⁴⁷ Gerald Davis Clayton, *Britain and the Eastern Question: Missolonghi to Gallipoli* (London: London University Press, 1971), p. 18 and thereafter.

⁴⁸ Kemal Beydilli, “Balkanlarda Dönüm Noktası: 93 Bozgunu ve Sonrası”, *Berlin Anlaşması’ndan Günümüze Balkanlar*, ed. Mustafa Bereketli (İstanbul: Rumeli Vakfı Kültür Yayınları, 199) pp.25-42.

⁴⁹ See the German influence on the Ottoman Empire in Ulrich Trumpener, “Germany and the End of the Ottoman Empire”, *The Great Powers and the End of the Ottoman Empire*, ed. Marian Kent (London: Frank Cass, 1996), pp.111-133.

major powers and remaining one of the last untouched areas the Eastern Mediterranean eventually became an Italian zone of influence in addition to the Balkans.⁵⁰

The Balkan People Under Ottoman Rule

The Greeks

The Greeks had a unique position among all the other minorities of the Ottoman Empire.⁵¹ Sultan Mehmet the Conqueror, on capturing Istanbul and mounting the throne of the Byzantine emperor in 1453, conferred upon the Greek Orthodox Patriarch of İstanbul the authority to administer the civil as well as the ecclesiastical affairs of the Eastern Orthodox Christians in accordance with their own Greco-Roman law. The Greeks enjoyed advantages that no other nations could claim.

The Ottoman administration satisfied the Greeks in their recognition of the Orthodox Church's rights; in addition, by protecting the Church's autonomy, it saved the Greeks from falling under the influence and authority of the Western church. This calculated policy of the Ottomans forever closed the door to moves to unify the two churches, which had been attempted from time to time, and bound the Orthodox Christians of the region as well as those of Istanbul, Morea, Serbia, Moldavia, and Southern Albania to the Ottoman government.⁵² By conferring authority on the Phanariot Greek Patriarch, the spiritual leader of the Greeks and of all Orthodox

⁵⁰ For further detail on Italy's interest on the Ottoman Empire ; R. J.B. Bosworth, "Italy and the End of the Otoman Empire, *The Great Powers and the End of the Otoman Empire*, ed. Marian Kent (London: Frank Cass, 1996), pp.52-72.

⁵¹ Enver Ziya Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi vol.5* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1976), p. 107.

⁵² İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, vol. 2 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1975), pp. 6-7.

Christians, and with the influence of the Patriarchy in not just religious matters but in temporal matters as well (in the areas of justice and in administrative areas such as education), the Greeks came to occupy the position of second most favored community, after the Muslims, within the Empire.⁵³ The Greeks used their privileges to the utmost, turning the benefits of their position to the pursuit of increasingly clandestine political activities.

Of all the Balkan people, society of the Greeks was one of the oldest and culturally richest. They worked to build a future nation on the foundation of their Ancient Greek inheritance, taking new developments in Europe into consideration and creating a synthesis of those values with those of their own past. In this way they acquired an original new social and political identity within the region.

In the Adriatic, the Greek populations of the Ionian Islands, due to their autonomous status, experienced more rapid exposure to the Renaissance culture that emerged in Italy and Europe. Starting in the sixteenth century, Greek students at colleges opening in Venice and Padua were able to study in an environment of more advanced knowledge and freedom of thought than could be found in Europe's Catholic or even Protestant countries. These educational advantages, together with their cultural inheritance from Ancient Greece, easily ensured the Greek community a privileged place in the Empire.

The Greeks also dominated the economic and commercial life of the Empire. With their aptitude for business and commerce, they were able to dominate in the area of transportation in the Aegean, the Adriatic, and the Black Sea. Starting in the sixteenth century, Venetian and Genoese commerce began to be taken over by Greeks; in the eighteenth century, the most important commercial fleet of the Black Sea and the Mediterranean was owned by Greeks.⁵⁴

⁵³ Johann Strauss, "The Greek Connection in Nineteenth Century Otoman Intellectual History," in *Greece and The Balkans*, ed. Dimitris Tziouvas (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2003), pp.47-67.

⁵⁴ By Karal's reckoning, in 1816, the Greeks had close to 600 commercial ships. Karal, p.111.

They had their commercial houses in various European countries, mostly in Russia, France, Italy, and Great Britain.⁵⁵ Holding the largest share of trade in the Mediterranean carried out under the Ottoman flag, the Greeks were able to form lobbies in the cities in which they established commercial contacts, such as Odessa, Marseilles, Trieste, and London. These lobbies ensured continuity in the Greeks' ties with Europe.⁵⁶

On the other hand, the Greeks of the capital city, Istanbul, belonged to a privileged stratum within the Empire. They penetrated the administrative system of the state, particularly in the eighteenth century. Their familiarity with government affairs as well as with commerce made it possible for the Greeks to obtain high positions in the state. "Phanariot" families living in the Fener district of Istanbul occupied a position that made them most useful to the Sultan. They were the best educated group in the Empire and were also notably adept at languages. Because of their capabilities, Greeks came to hold important posts in the administrative cadres.

Jewish merchants had been employed in the diplomatic field until the seventeenth century. From this point on they were replaced by Greek translators who, in this role, were entrusted with the state secrets of the Ottomans.⁵⁷

Greeks were appointed as ambassadors' assistants for embassies opening in London, Vienna, Berlin, and Madrid starting in 1793.⁵⁸ The Greeks' diplomatic activities were not limited to the above; they became permanent fixtures at the London embassy after the Tanzimat period, offering such examples as a Greek being assigned as chief delegate to the Berlin Congress, a congress of crucial importance to the Ottoman government.⁵⁹

⁵⁵ Gewehr, p. 14.

⁵⁶ Karal, p.111.

⁵⁷ Charles Elliot, *Turkey in Europe* (London: F. Cass, 1965) p. 222.

⁵⁸ Niyazi Berkes, *Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma* (İstanbul: Bilgi Yayınları, 1978), p. 144.

⁵⁹ Taha Toros, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Gayrimüslim Azınlıklar," *Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 4 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1985), p. 1027.

Greeks also took positions within the administrative mechanisms of the Ottoman State. Dimitri Kantemir's assignment to the Hospodarship (governorship) of Moldavia and Wallachia is one illustration of the Phanariot Greek aristocracy's important position.⁶⁰ In sum, historians and thinkers such as Gibbon, Montesquieu, and Von Hammer concluded that the position of Istanbul Greeks in particular within the Empire's state and social structure was one of privilege.⁶¹

Europeans concurred on the principle that the Greeks were the continuation of the ancient Greek civilization. Their close relations with Europe began at the start of the modern age, when Humanist thought and the Renaissance began drawing European scholars' attention to ancient Greek culture and civilization. These cultural ties strengthened throughout the Enlightenment period. With the sympathy felt towards the Greeks which came as a natural outcome of new forms of thought emerging in the nineteenth century French and British intellectuals began to conceive of ancient Greek culture as the very basis of the European cultural awakening; this idea became widely accepted. The Greeks were sensitized by this perception and began to behave more conscientiously towards their own culture, their past, and their future.

Thus, despite of the advantages of the most-privileged minority status that the Greeks held within the Ottoman State system, they soon began to express their own new identity in that evolving world. In particular, the ideas of "freedom and equality" and "national independence" were considered to be incompatible within the conceptual framework of French revolutionary ideology in political and social thought. However, this environment proved suitable for the awakening of Greek national consciousness. That is, as Berkes has indicated, it was assumed that the new political movement would bring together the ideal of human equality with that

⁶⁰ İlber Ortaylı, "Balkanlar'da Milliyetçilik," *Tanzimat'tan Cumhuriyet'e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, vol.4 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1985), p.1027.

⁶¹ Richard Davey, *The Sultan and His Subjects*, vol.2 (London: Chatto and Windus, 1897), p. 110.

of national solipsism.⁶² The clearest example of this may be seen in the careers of two men and their impact on the development of Greek national consciousness. Both Adamantios Korais and Rhigas Pheraios studied in Paris, and both were greatly stirred by the French Revolution. The Greek nation being one of the first to face a language problem of long standing inspired Korais to take particular interest in language questions. It was the first step of a nation state building process. He attempted to create a modern language that was a cross between Classical Greek and the everyday language of the folk. Convinced of the importance of educating the people in political culture, Korais developed and sought to pass on to future generations a notion of national identity based on “Hellenism” as replacement for that of “*Rumluk*,” (*Rum* being the word designating the Greek subjects of the Ottoman Empire.)⁶³ Korais’s most lasting contribution to Greek culture was the publication of a seventeen-volume work on Classic Greek literature entitled, *The Greek Literature Library*.⁶⁴

Rhigas Pheraios, confronting the awakening of Greek national consciousness from a different perspective, is considered to have been a revolutionary writer. A spokesperson for the ideas of freedom, equality, and concurrently nationalism, Rhigas’s most significant effort in this context was his writing the words for the Greek national anthem, entitled, “Sons of the Greeks, Arise!”⁶⁵

The new lines of thought illustrated in the examples given above served as a foundation for the Greek nationalist movement. The political steps taken in this direction began to produce results as early as 1774 (with the Küçük Kaynarca Accord); the Greeks opened consulates where they lobbied on behalf of İstanbulite Orthodox subjects and members of the Greek Church. In pursuing these activities,

⁶² Berkes, p. 150.

⁶³ Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, p. 278.

⁶⁴ Barbara Jelavich, *History of the Balkans: XVIII. and XIX. Centuries* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 176.

⁶⁵ Stavrianos, pp. 278-279.

the Greeks were able to turn to great advantage their privileged positions within the Ottoman State bureaucracy as described above.

In evaluating the Greek nationalist movement we notice that it was the elite class which first spoke on behalf of this awakening. The elites contributed their significant material resources as well as benefited from Western support to further the cause of their own nation's achieving independence.

The first planned revolutionary attempt against the Ottoman Empire was carried out by the Greeks. Just as the Greek effort would constitute a revolutionary example for other nations within the Empire, so it had a special meaning European diplomacy. Because of European nations' attitudes, the "Intervention System" used by Matternich's government was not applied to the Greek uprising, which dealt a major blow to that principle. Europe's approach to this event was no doubt influenced by the fact that the community in question was Christian, revolting against the Muslim Ottoman Empire. Indeed, the issue of the Greek revolution was the one in which the "religious" element was most clearly evident in nineteenth century European diplomatic activities.

Leadership in the Greek nationalist movement was assumed by the *Hetaeria Philike* (Society of Friends), which was founded by the Greeks in the Russian city of Odessa in 1814.⁶⁶ General Alexandr Ypsilanti was chosen as leader of the movement.⁶⁷ It is also thought that the Russian Czar was the society's secret, honorary president.

This society's goals were innocent in appearance. It sought the spread of education and teaching among the Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire; however, their objective was not just the revitalization of the Ancient Greek civilization, but in fact the reestablishment of the Byzantine Empire under the Greek Patriarch in Istanbul.⁶⁸

⁶⁶ Ortaylı, p. 1030.

⁶⁷ Forbes and Toynbee, p. 195.

⁶⁸ Douglas Dakin, *The Unification of Greece: 1770-1923* (London: Been, 1972), p. 29.

In 1821, the first phase of the revolt started near the Russian border, in Moldavia. It soon met with disaster, primarily due to the animosity between Greeks and Romanians which had developed during the years of Phanariot rule, as described above. The Rumanian nationalist movement had gotten underway in the meantime, and led to a revolt which coincided with the Greek uprising. The two movements soon came into conflict. The Ottoman administration was able to contain these outbreaks; however, another revolt was developing in Morea during the same period. It was to continue, ultimately attaining its goal of Greek independence.

The most unfortunate aspect of these revolutionary movements from the Ottoman perspective was their having drawn in and involved the major powers of the period. At the top of the list of those powers stood Russia, as discussed above. In addition to Russia, two other nations showed particular interest in these questions: Great Britain and Austria.

Great Britain supported the territorial integrity of the Ottoman State at first, during Castelreagh's tenure at the Foreign Ministry; later, however, while Canning was Foreign Minister, this position changed. At first, the Greeks' rapprochement with Russia had worried England. If the Greeks were not supported in their movement, which was predicted to end with their independence sooner or later, this would have the result of pushing them into the arms of the Russians. This would be entirely counter to British interests in the region. Thus, they pursued this policy throughout the next century as well.

Austria, while never directly engaged with the issue, sought to buy time for the Ottoman Empire by trying to arrange that the question be dealt with in an international forum. In fact, these efforts did result in the issue being addressed in an international context, thus transforming the nature of the Greek revolt from its earlier status as an internal problem of the Ottoman State.⁶⁹

⁶⁹ Armaoğlu, pp. 101-102.

These developments would constitute the first steps towards the establishment of the Greek nation. In 1825, under England's direction and with Russia's participation, the St. Petersburg Protocol was signed. This agreement stipulated that Greece would be bound to the Ottoman state as a tax-paying, independent minor state, and that all Turks would be removed from Greek territory.⁷⁰

In 1826, Russia and Britain signed an agreement to secure an autonomous Greece. In 1827, France joined these two powers in the Treaty of London, which had a similar aim.⁷¹

From this point on, it seems by all indications that the issue went beyond the control of the Ottoman administration. When the Ottoman state rejected this situation, considering it to be interference in its internal matters, it was confronted by a joining of forces recalling those of the Crusades. Indeed, it is during just this period that the Ottomans cut their diplomatic relations with France, Britain, and Russia. These three countries met on March 22, 1829, and without the Ottoman government's participation, endorsed Greece's independence and drew its borders. It is true that one of the conditions which pressured the Ottomans into accepting this new state of affairs was the Ottoman administration's signing of the Treaty of Adrianople, one of the most compromising of all the accords following that of Küçük Kaynarca.⁷²

The Greeks, not satisfied with what they had obtained, eagerly took advantage of whatever opportunities arose to add to their territory. Among their territorial goals were Crete, Thessaly, and Macedonia. While they were able to

⁷⁰ Karal, p. 117.

⁷¹ Barbara Jelavich, *Russia's Balkan Entanglements, 1806-1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p.81.

⁷² On the Treaty of Adrianople (Edirne), see Nihat Erim, *Devletlerarası Hukuku ve Siyasi Tarih Metinleri* (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Yayınları, 1953), pp. 279-292. Also see the international consequences of the Treaty of Adrianople in Bitis, pp. 349-377.

secure the first two, the Macedonian question would ultimately lead to a bloody war in the Balkans in the next century.⁷³

In the period 1815-1914 --almost a century-- the Balkans witnessed four major wars. The first of them was the Russian-Turkish War of 1828-1829, as mentioned above, which stemmed from the Greek independence movement. The Crimean War of 1853-56, the Russian-Turkish War of 1877-78, and the Balkan Wars of 1912-13 were to follow. Each of these conflicts caused major changes in the peninsula and produced new national states in the Balkans.

The Romanians

The Romanians were the second most favored minority group after the Greeks under the Ottoman administration.⁷⁴ The Moldavia and Wallachia domains were known to Ottoman annalists as “*Memleketeyn*”; their inclusion into the Ottoman Empire was one phase in the Ottoman conquests of the Balkan Peninsula, a process which began with the taking of Istanbul. The subjugation of these areas was complete by 1512.⁷⁵

Once Moldavia and Wallachia had entered Ottoman rule, they were administered by local princes or *voyvoda* (governors) appointed by the central government. These provinces enjoyed certain privileges stemming from structural features that could only be described as semi-autonomous. They paid a certain amount of taxes to the Ottoman State but were able to regulate their internal affairs with considerable independence. The productive capacity of the land was left in the hands of the Romanian nobility and feudal lords (*boyar*).

Thanks to the privileges they enjoyed under Ottoman rule, the Romanians were able to maintain their political, social, and religious identities and

⁷³ Salahi Ramadan Sonyel, *Türk Yunan Anlaşmazlığı* (Ankara: Kıbrıs Türk Kültür Derneği Yayını., 1985), p.11.

⁷⁴ Jelavich and Jelavich, p. 41.

⁷⁵ Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, pp. 64-65.

organizations. This was perhaps one of the reasons that the Romanians were susceptible to the movements of similar groups during the same century. While Russian support must be counted as one of the principle forces behind the Romanians' first steps toward a nationalist movement, it can also be shown that the local princes were influenced by their contacts with Europe and Russia. Moved to address this last point in particular, the Ottoman central government started by replacing the local princes with Phanariots, as described above, in order to prevent any further developments in this direction. However, this particular choice of governors ultimately produced undesirable consequences. During the "Phanariot period" in Moldavia and Wallachia, the Greek princes showed an extraordinary ability to milk their subjects, as Wolff tells us.⁷⁶ Indeed, during the period that they assumed the administration of Moldavia and Wallachia, the Grek notables mostly saw to their own interests and, in cooperation with highly placed persons of the church hierarchy, began to exploit the local population for economic gain.⁷⁷

The Ottoman central government did not take long-range or effective steps to prevent further development of this kind. The frequent replacement of administrators only created the conditions for similar developments. The negative effects of these frequent administrative changes, which had an impact on all groups, began to appear in the local population. Under the influence of these unfavorable conditions, the Romanians carried out their first revolt in the sixteenth century; the Ottoman government did not respond particularly effectively, and remained silent for a long period following Romanians poor showing.

The growth of the Romanian nationalist movement was also greatly affected by external factors. Russia had begun to take interest in the affairs of these principalities from the days of Peter the Great. That interest stemmed not only from ethnicity, but was also partly geographical and ecclesiastical.⁷⁸ The strategic

⁷⁶ Wolff, p. 63.

⁷⁷ Forbes and Toynbee, p. 264.

⁷⁸ Marriot, p. 289.

significance and geographical situation of the region were very important for Russia. The Russian nation, to whom the local population responded with common religious sentiments, tried to create favorable conditions for itself in anticipation of a possible Russian-Ottoman war in this region, since its location made it a likely springboard for any sort of Russian assault against the Empire. The Russians began to promise the Romanians their independence from the moment they started using them against the Ottoman State.⁷⁹

In the process of preparing this brief examination of developments from the eighteenth century and on, one feature that emerged was the growing interest displayed by Russia. By means of secret agreements, Russia obtained the cooperation of the princes of Moldavia and Wallachia at the very start of that century. This unity resulted in Russian influence on the region's princes throughout the eighteenth century.⁸⁰

With the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca (1774), Russia registered its concern over the affairs of the Romanian Principalities and its right to intervene on their behalf. Another forward step was taken in 1826 with the Convention of Akkerman, concluded between the Czar and the Ottoman government. According to the Convention, native leaders were to be elected by an assembly of nobles. This was yet another event that contributed to hastening the process of Romanian unity.

Russian influence in the affairs of the principalities continued in the years that followed. At the end of the Russian-Turkish War of 1828-9 with the Treaty of Adrianople (Edirne), the region was placed under direct Russian protection. As a result of this agreement, the Romanians' only remaining official connection with the Ottoman State was the payment of a tribute, which continued up until 1878.

According to the general picture which the political developments outlined briefly above attempt to provide, it may be gathered that Russia constituted an important patron and protector of Moldavia and Wallachia. Through its involvement

⁷⁹ Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Tarihi*, vol. 4, p. 74.

⁸⁰ Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, p. 101.

in the Ottoman State and in particular in Balkan government affairs, Russia was able to create a broad field of movement for itself in the region.

Another important phase in the Romanian nationalist movement had to do with developments in the field of culture and education. Pioneers of this phase included students sent to Rome for education. In fact, this situation was related to a sectarian dispute. Thanks to the Uniate Church, itself affiliated with the Catholic Church, students in large part from Transylvania abandoned Orthodoxy (represented by the Fener Greek Patriarch in İstanbul) to be educated in Catholic institutions.⁸¹ Forming what came to be called the Transylvania School, these youth were raised and educated within Western civilization during their stay in Rome and, returning home, began transmitting this knowledge to successive generations.⁸² One member of this “school,” Samuel Klein, perceived the importance of language in the nationalist project, and wrote a Romanian grammar. George Sinkai and Pierre Major were scholars working in the field of history at around this same time. George Lazar founded a school for the positive sciences, which also offered history, philosophy, and political sciences; the question of national identity was dealt with in conjunction with the study of national language, literature, and history.

Still, the influence of France proved to be much greater than that of the shadows of the Roman Empire. These Romanian youths became acquainted with the ideals of the French revolution, and earnestly wished to bring about the realizations of these ideals in their own country. Concurrently, a number of Romanian students attending French universities also contributed to the propagation of French language and culture. As Stavrianos puts it, their proudest boast was that their own Bucharest was the “Paris of the Balkans.”⁸³

The Great Powers of Europe began to take increasing interest in Romania in the second half of the nineteenth century. This interest was stimulated by Russia’s

⁸¹ On the influence of the Uniate Church, see Brailsford, p. 73.

⁸² Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, p. 155.

⁸³ L.S. Stavrianos, *The Balkans: 1815-1914* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966), pp. 51-52.

growing influence in the region. Concerned by Russia's imperialist tendencies, these nations like France and Austria began to conceive of a unified Romania as a possible buffer zone between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, which may serve to impede Russia's advances in the area. France was a strong supporter of this idea, to the point of asserting that Romania could be supervised more easily if it were intelligently organized as a minor state. England, on the other hand, was at this point in time in favor of maintaining the existing balance of power in Europe.

Austria, concerned about its own position and its future, and in light of its own demographic composition, thought the creation of a nation to be ill-advised. The multi-ethnic Austrian Empire was concerned about the Romanians starting a national movement in Bukovina and Transylvania, which were largely under its control. Russia's goal was to make Moldavia and Wallachia part of its own territory or, failing that, to encourage the creation of small, independent nations in the Balkans in order to exert control over them more easily. The Ottomans, presumed rulers of these lands, were opposed to the unification of Wallachia and Moldavia since they feared it would stimulate Romanian nationalism.

The Congress of Paris, which followed the Crimean War, abolished the Russian protectorate and placed Romania under the collective guarantee of the Powers while maintaining the suzerainty of the Ottoman Empire.⁸⁴ As a result of the two elections of 1857 one year later at the Congress of Paris, it was announced that the assemblies of the two principalities would unite under the name "Romania." The Ottoman government did not approve this unification. However, the Romanians were able to circumvent the prohibition on their union by electing the same man, Colonel Alexander Cuza, as governor of both principalities.⁸⁵ After elections had created the single assembly of Wallachia and Moldavia in 1861, the unification of Romania became a reality with the first meeting of the joint congress

⁸⁴ For decisions regarding this region contained in the Paris Agreement, see Karal, pp. 49-50.

⁸⁵ Jelavich and Jelavich, p. 54.

in Bucharest in 1862, although with certain stipulations. The Ottoman State was finally compelled to recognize the union of the two principalities in 1866.⁸⁶

However, the unification of Romania was not a culmination point, but a first step in the process of assuming the status of an independent state. During the Turkish-Russian War of 1877, Russia offered independence to Romania as part of its effort to persuade Romania into joining the war against the Turks. Thus it was that, partly owing to the vulnerability of the Ottomans' position following the war, the Romanians were able to obtain their independence in April of 1877, as stated in the Ayastefanos Pact.⁸⁷ The Berlin Agreement which followed confirmed this decision.

The Serbs

Brought into the Ottoman Empire during the reign of Sultan Mehmet the Conqueror, little appears to have changed in Serbia during its years under Ottoman rule. The Turks' light-handed administration of the region, which consequently enjoyed a semi-autonomous status, gives the impression that there was little tangible change in everyday life, whether in regard to religion, economy, or governance. Having the characteristics of a estates (eyalet; an administrative district) within the Ottoman Empire, Serbia was subject to the central government's land law, according to which the *sipahis* (individuals granted land rights in return for service, usually military, to the Ottoman State) shared the territory amongst themselves, while the villagers had the right to work the land. The villagers paid a certain sum to the *sipahis*, as indicated in legal edicts regarding land use. In general, the circumstances of Serbian villagers under Ottoman administration were comparatively more favorable than those of their European feudal counterparts.

⁸⁶ Danişmend, vol. 4, p. 211.

⁸⁷ Romania ceded Besarabia to Russia and acquired Dobruca, as stipulated in the Ayastefanos Pact. Haluk Gürsel, *Tarih Boyunca Türk-Rus İlişkileri: Bir Siyasi Tarih İncelemesi* (İstanbul: Ak Yayınları, 1968), p. 128.

However, the Serbian villagers had to face certain disadvantages in comparison to their Greeks and Romanian counterparts, as their territory was used as a battlefield for the Ottoman and Austrian armies. The old Serbian ruling class had been eradicated during the years of Ottoman conquest; however, unlike the Greeks and Rumanians, the Serbs were not in a position that might have allowed them to acquire wealth or education.⁸⁸

The Serbs were the first among the Balkan nations to take up arms against the Ottomans. However, the first uprisings were directed not against the central Ottoman government, but at the local government's mistreatment of the Christian and Muslim populations.⁸⁹ The legal edicts regarding Serbia had for years protected and maintained a certain status quo, but this order entered a period of swift decline when the local Janissary leaders began acting arbitrarily and took the law into their own hands. Of course, it is not surprising that the central administration had difficulty maintaining control over such a remote district, especially during this period in which public order and security were not even guaranteed in the capital, Istanbul. However, many measures were taken to remedy the situation. However much much the newly sent administrators struggled to re-establish order and control, the effects of their efforts proved short-lived and insufficient.

From the eighteenth century on, the Serbian movement mobilized against the Ottoman State took on new characteristics in tandem with changing world conditions, especially in its adoption of the national model as seen in other Balkan countries. With internal and external dynamics providing a favorable environment, the Serbian national movement was able to reach its goals within a short period of time.

As indicated above, the weakening of the Ottoman administration over time was one of the principle causes of uprisings in the region. The Ottoman State's

⁸⁸ Jelavich and Jelavich, p. 42.

⁸⁹ Matthew Smith Anderson, *The Eastern Question (1774-1923)* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1966), p. 48.

being forced to address this general disintegration had the effect of creating opportunities to the benefit of power centers both within and outside its borders. For example, Serbia was one of the regions which came under the influence of the Russians' policy of agitation applied in the Balkans from the beginning of Peter the First's reign. Austria exercised a similar policy toward Serbia after the Vienna defeat of 1683, inciting the Serbs against the Ottoman State while promising future independence.⁹⁰ It is important to note that there was a significant Serbian minority population inhabiting southern Austria which was in contact with its ethnic counterparts of Ottoman citizenship. Indeed, their much closer relations with Europe in comparison with those of the Ottoman Serbs, and thus more closely following Europe's religious and cultural life, help explain why the first steps toward an independent Serbia were taken in this geographical area. In addition, the Serbian press was located here, and its first publications were sent across the Danube into Ottoman Serbian territory.⁹¹

Religion emerges as a significant factor in all the nationalist movements of the Balkans. In this regard, the contributions of the Serbian Orthodox Church should be kept in mind when examining the development of Serbian nationalism. The first Serbian Orthodox Church was established in the central Montenegro city of Pech (Ipek) in 1345. It was dissolved following the Ottoman conquest but revitalized in 1557, after which it became an important religious center. After 1739, the Phanariots became more prominent in the Serbian Church, with the result that, in 1766 the Ottoman government abolished the Serbian Patriarchate and put the Serbian Church directly under the authority of the Greek Patriarch at Istanbul.⁹²

⁹⁰ Leften Stavos Stavrianos, *Balkan Federation: A History of the Movement Toward Balkan Unity in Modern Times* (Northampton: Smith College Studies, 1942), pp. 21-22.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

⁹² Wolff, p. 65.

Carole Rogel has studied the important role of itinerant monks in the cultural, economic, and finally national awakening that took place throughout the Balkans.⁹³ Close relations and cooperation with Russian Orthodoxy began in the sixteenth century; from that time on Serbian monks would travel to Russia then return to their own people to transmit the ideas they had absorbed.⁹⁴ During the seventeenth century, the Russians showed special interest in their increasingly frequent visitors from the Balkans. During this period of travel and exchange, strategic information was brought into Russia from the Balkans, while Russia provided assistance both intellectual and material in nature.

When one recalls that the ideas of the French Revolution were also brought in during this preparatory period, it is clear that many factors came into play in transforming the Serbian revolutionary movement into a mass rebellion. The Serbs, who were the first of the Balkan people to rise up against the Turks, lived through many bloody uprisings before finally achieving their independence from the Ottoman State. It was Serbia's destiny to take the leading role in the independence movement, by virtue of its geographical position and ethnic characteristics.

In 1804, the Serbs revolted under the leadership of Kara Yorgi (Black George). These early actions accompanied demands for ameliorating the existing state of disorder and obtaining security of life and property. This initial turbulence was eventually transformed into an independence movement.⁹⁵ The Janissaries, whose behavior to a great extent prepared and triggered these reactions, were dissolved as a counter-measure; however, this did not put an end to the Serbian rebellion. At this point in time, it would appear that in spite of everything, the Ottoman State was still capable of taking charge of the situation. However, it was due less to its own internal organization and more to a favorable international

⁹³ Carole Rogel, "The Wandering Monk and the Balkan National Awakening," *Nationalism in a Non-National State*, ed. William W. Haddad and William Ochsenwald (Columbus: Ohio University Press, 1977), pp. 85-96.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 93.

⁹⁵ Gewehr, p. 18.

environment that the Ottoman State was able to persevere for a while yet to come. Depending on how it furthered their interests, European powers who felt affected by these matters either remained neutral or took positions, however temporary, which had the effect of buying time for the Empire.

France remained indifferent to developments in Serbia since it was interested in the Dalmatian coast during this period. Austria was particularly concerned about Serbia, as noted above, and was in a continual state of tension with Russia over developments in the region. The possibility of an independent Serbia made Austria most uncomfortable. Austrian President Metternich expressed his country's official position in the following terms: "The Serbian nation on the verge of becoming a reality will be no more than a plaything between Russia and Austria. This being the case, it would be wiser for (the Serbs) to stay with the Turks."⁹⁶

The Serbs were determined to carry through with their national struggle even without the assistance they hoped for and needed from Europe. In fact, their greatest support came from Russia, which had emerged as the dominant political and military power in Eastern Europe. The ultimate success of the Serbian liberation movement may be owed in large part to the leadership of the Supreme Prince (Vrhovni Knez), Milos Obrenovic. Fearing Russian intervention, in 1826 the Ottoman Sultan granted Serbia its autonomy, as set forth in the Convention of Akkerman. These rights were reconfirmed in the Treaty of Adrianople in 1829. Thus, the Serbian revolution ended in victory chiefly because Russian interests coincided with those of the Balkan state.⁹⁷

During the Crimean War, the Serbs maintained their neutrality in spite of Russian pressure and agitation. For a certain period of time, the Serbs were taken up with internal conflicts, and, thus busy with their own affairs, temporarily ceased being a sore point for the Ottoman administration. However, in the second half of the nineteenth century, Serbia's political history was more turbulent than that of any

⁹⁶ Karal, vol. 5, pp. 105-106.

⁹⁷ Jelavich and Jelavich, p. 48.

other Balkan country. During this period, the Serbs were irritated at their autonomy being placed under a joint protectorate of European powers, which had been created for the purpose of undermining Russian influence in the region. Under the new leadership of Mihailo Obrenovic, the Serbs' goal of obtaining their independence was modified to include the eradication of all foreign powers from Serbia, as well as the creation of a greater Serbia comprising Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro.⁹⁸ At this point the Serbs had begun seeing themselves as the leaders of a great southern Slavic empire.

In 1876, Serbia suffered a grave military defeat as the outcome of its war with the Ottoman Empire. France and England's intercession in response to this defeat brought a temporary calm to the area. However, an Istanbul conference organized to address these issues produced no real solution. Russia's motive in organizing the meeting had been to push for a general deterioration in the status quo and to isolate the Ottoman Empire from Europe, with the ultimate purpose of creating the environment for a world war.⁹⁹

The 1877-1878 Ottoman-Russian war, known as the War of 93, was touched off under such conditions. The Russians' desire to support Serbia was apparent at the start of the war, but as it proceeded they began to actively support the Bulgarian side, motivated by their interest in the Straits.¹⁰⁰ Indeed, a portion of Serbian land was ceded to Bulgaria at the war's end, becoming one of the reasons for Serbia's eventual turn toward Austria. The most significant outcome of the Ottoman-Russian War from the Serbian perspective was the post-war Ayastefanos Pact, according to which Serbia was granted independence.

⁹⁸ R.W. Seton-Watson, *The Rise of Nationality in the Balkans* (New York: H. Fertig, 1966), p. 105.

⁹⁹ Kocabaş, p. 74.

¹⁰⁰ Michael Boro Petrovich, *A History of Modern Serbia* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976), p. 397.

The Bulgarians

The Bulgarians were in the least favored position of all the Balkan people under Ottoman hegemony. Having been brought completely under Ottoman jurisdiction in the fourteenth century, the Bulgarians were the last of all the Balkan communities to achieve national autonomy. Of course, they enjoyed the rights conferred on all groups within the administrative body of the Empire; this included being allowed to preserve their own culture and religion. Indeed, they experienced less influence and pressure from the Ottomans than they did from the Phanariot Greek Orthodox Patriarchate, which was striving to establish itself as the spiritual leader of the entire Orthodox world. The Bulgarians were the group most oppressed by the Greeks, whose population exceeded that of all other groups in the Empire. Thus, in their struggle for independence, the Bulgarian nationalists fought against both Greek control as well as against Ottoman rule.

The world had been little aware of the Bulgarians' existence up until the nineteenth century. But the Bulgarian nationalist movement took its first steps during the 1800s and by the end of that century Bulgarian nationalist movements surpassed activities found in other Balkan states.

As the centuries-old Ottoman administration began to unravel, one outcome was the granting of privileges to the Bulgarians just as was the case with all other Balkan communities.¹⁰¹ In terms of their economic position and activities, the Bulgarians were mostly villagers who worked on the land. As agricultural workers and *reaya* (non-Muslims), their relations with those who had a right to take profits from the land had been set out in legal decrees by the Ottoman State. In the periods during which this system worked well, the Bulgarian region gives every appearance

¹⁰¹ On the effects that the weakening of the Ottoman administration had on the local population, see Halil İnalcık, "The Ottoman Decline and its Effect upon the Reaya," in *Aspects of the Balkans: Continuity and Change, Contributions to the International Balkan Conference held at UCLA October 23-28, 1969*, eds. Henrik Birnbaum and Speros Vryonis Jr. (Paris: The Hauge, 1972), pp. 338-354. Also see Lampe and Jackson, pp. 133-153.

of having enjoyed the justice and order established by this legal code, in terms of income distribution as well as in administrative and social life. But this region was also affected by the progressive disintegration and misuse of all these institutions. The villagers were particularly afflicted by heavy taxation. The Ottoman administrators became aware of this and, after the first Tanzimat (reform package of 1839) proclamation, they accelerated efforts to remedy the situation. However, their sending Greek-origin administrators into the region, far from bringing about positive results, only made the situation worse. There was no amelioration of conditions; to the contrary, the domination of the Phanariots proved more destructive than that of the prior Ottoman administration. The clergy pursued a systematic policy of obliterating all traces of Bulgarian culture and literature. Thus the Bulgarian case became an example of the Greeks' Hellenization policy in the Empire.

In the most obvious and perhaps most significant illustration of the methods used by the Greeks in pursuit of their objectives, in the eighteenth century the Greek Patriarchate sent a message out to all metropolitans announcing the closure of all Bulgarian Church schools, and decreeing that from then on all liturgical works but those in Greek were banned and that only Greek would be used in the liturgy.¹⁰² Thus it was that the last self-governing Bulgarian church, located in Ohrid, was closed in 1767 by the Phanariot Greek Patriarch, and that all prayer and liturgy services were henceforth conducted by Greek priests in Greek.¹⁰³

Early in the nineteenth century, the invariable prelude to a revival of nationalism began to appear in Bulgaria. From the study of their origins, the Bulgarians worked to discover and define their national identity. There then began a reaction against Hellenic culture and the Greek clergy who maintained it. The first

¹⁰² Halil İnalçık, *Tanzimat ve Bulgar Meselesi* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1964), p. 20.

¹⁰³ David Harris, *Britain and the Bulgarian Horror of 1876* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1939), p. 4.

step towards a national liberation movement was the freeing of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church from Greek influence.¹⁰⁴

Certain areas of the Balkans were put under a joint protectorate made up of the Great Powers as stated in the Paris Agreement of 1856. It is a fact that this new circumstance contributed significantly to weakening the region's ties to the Ottoman State, thus reducing the distance between these proto-nations and their independence. At Berlin, The Ottoman Empire not only lost territory, it was also forced to reconcile itself to foreign intervention, ostensibly to supervise reform on behalf of the Porte's non-Muslim subjects though more usually to further the interests of one power or the other.¹⁰⁵

The Bulgarians would not be slow to take advantage of this new set of givens. Meanwhile, the laws promising freedom of religion and from religious denomination, which were contained in the 1856 Reform Proclamation, prepared the necessary ground for the reconstitution of the Bulgarian Church. In 1870, after a long struggle with the Phanariot clergy and the Ottoman central administration, the Bulgarian Exarchate was established.

Because of the theological nature of Ottoman law, which conceived the religious communities as merely national groups as mentioned earlier, the new Bulgarian Church became a leading agent in the development of Bulgarian nationalism. In fact, all the separatist movements of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were set in motion and then guided and directed by religious centers. The churches of the Greeks, Serbs and Romanians laid the foundations for the nationalist movements examined thus far, and subsequently supervised their progress. While the Ottoman government had the benefit of experience and was able to foresee that Bulgarian nationalism was likely to take a similar course, it was still unable to forestall this eventuality. Thus the Bulgarians' sole aim, once finally freed from the

¹⁰⁴ Mahir Aydın, "Prenslikten Krallığa Bulgaristan," *Berlin Anlaşmasından Günümüze Balkanlar*, ed. Mustafa Bereketli (İstanbul: Rumeli Vakfı Kültür Yayınları, 1999), p.36.

¹⁰⁵ Feroz Ahmad, "The Late Otoman Empire," *The Great Powers and the End of the Otoman Empire*, ed. Marian Kent (London: Frank Cass, 1996), p.5.

authority of the Greek Patriarchate, was to obtain its political freedom in order to constitute itself as an autonomous state, if not a self-governing one.

The Bulgarian nationalist movement also included significant features of cultural and literary awakening. Thus the next phase in the movement was that of a Bulgarian literary and educational revival. The architects of these developments were generally religious leaders.¹⁰⁶ In his history of the Bulgarians, Father Paisii (Athos Paisii) communicated his thoughts and sentiments regarding the national character of the Bulgarian community to his people. Metropolitan Safroni and Venelin the scholar followed the lead of Father Paisii in these efforts.¹⁰⁷

Aside from the existence of these works and studies, there was the question of how they would reach the public for whom they were intended. This entirely new function was assumed by the merchant class. The merchants of Bulgaria had been organized into craft guilds, and it was they who successfully transformed this task into an organized occupation. At the same time, these guilds supported cultural activities by providing generous financial assistance for starting schools and publication houses, and by undertaking the distribution of newspapers, magazines, and books.¹⁰⁸

This new cultural life inspired the Bulgarian bourgeoisie to express their commitment to education by leading efforts to open new schools.¹⁰⁹ The most significant consequence of this activism was in the Bulgarians' being able to create their own educational programs as distinct from the institutions controlled by the Greeks. The Bulgarians quickly concentrated and enhanced their efforts in the area of education through the use of books written in their own language.¹¹⁰

In the mean time, Bulgarian students sent to various European cities and in particular to Russia returned ready to carry out a social revolution under the

¹⁰⁶ Rogel, p. 82.

¹⁰⁷ Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, pp. 370-371.

¹⁰⁸ Stavrianos, *The Balkans: 1815-1914*, p. 59.

¹⁰⁹ Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, p. 371.

¹¹⁰ The first Bulgarian alphabet was created in 1824. Kocabaş, p. 103.

leadership of pan-Slavists.¹¹¹ In addition to the educational and scholarly institutions abroad, the existence of such opportunities within the Ottoman Empire is even more striking. Thus, Bulgarian youths were also sent to foreign institutions that were being opened in various districts of the Empire. In most cases a component of missionary activities, these schools were supervised by liberal and nationalist-minded European groups as well as by the relevant consulates located in the Balkans.¹¹² As an extension of American missionary groups' activities, these schools were opened, especially in Istanbul and Beirut, as well as various other locations, and provided an education that included ideas and attitudes as well as information. According to Jelavich, the colleges founded by American Protestants generally served to disseminate national and political ideals.¹¹³

Incidences of rebellion and revolt against the Ottoman authority in other parts of the Balkans soon began influencing the Bulgarians. The Bulgarian separatist movement made itself heard for the first time when it found itself in a position to benefit from events in other parts of the Empire. The opportunity for revolt came when a rebellion against the Ottoman Empire broke out in Herzegovina in 1875, quickly spreading to Serbia and Montenegro, which declared war against the Ottoman State. News of the revolt of these Orthodox Slavic peoples was received with great sympathy in Russia.

During this period, Russia abandoned the "panorthodoxy" concept and energetically adopted the "pan-Slavist" ideal. It then worked to impose this idea on the Balkan people. Russia paid particular attention to Bulgaria especially from the second half of the nineteenth century and on. This interest stemmed from the fact that Russia's efforts stood to be furthered geopolitically and strategically by the founding of a Bulgarian nation, since it could potentially be used as a stepping stone

¹¹¹ Five hundred Bulgarian students were educated in Russia between 1856 and 1876. Benedict Sumner, *Russia and the Balkans: 1870-1876* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1937), p. 112.

¹¹² Erol Ulubelen, *İngiliz Belgelerinde Türkiye* (İstanbul: Çağdaş Yayınları, 1982), p. 32.

¹¹³ Barbara Jelavich, *The Establishment of the Balkan National States*, p. 136.

to the Aegean and the Mediterranean by way of the Straits. If nothing else, a self-governing Bulgaria could be used as a powerful weapon against the Turks.¹¹⁴

The Bulgarian nationalist movement took shape as a guerrilla war along the panslavist lines advocated by Russia. Its first actions were led by Georgi S. Rakovski, representative of the Bulgarian political liberation movement.¹¹⁵ These initial actions did not draw much attention, mostly because the Bulgarian people as a whole had not been drawn into the uprising. Unlike the Serbian and Romanian nationalist movements, over which the Ottoman State had lost control, the Bulgarian movement was more inclined toward federation as a means of settling differences. However, the Bulgarian separatist leaders felt that the success of such a solution depended on bringing the general population to a state of readiness for revolutionary action. With this goal in mind, clandestine revolutionary groups were formed to serve as command centers working among the people throughout the entire region in order to recruit the masses and bring them to the desired state of readiness.¹¹⁶

In 1870, a secret congress was organized in Bucharest under Karavelov and Levski. As mentioned above, the Russians' contributions to these Bulgarian organizational and insurgency activities were undeniable. This was true to such an extent that it may be said that Russian Ambassador to Istanbul General Ignatief's sole duty was the organization of all Slavic peoples. This individual did not hesitate to use his considerable influence and authority over Ottoman statesmen, when the opportunity arose, to the detriment of the Ottoman State. Even *Sadrizam* (Grand Vizier) Mahmut Nedim Paşa, representing the very highest level in government, fell under the sway of the Russian Ambassador and appears to have been reduced to complete impotency in respect to the Bulgarian separatist question.

In 1876 the necessary ground for a general insurgency movement had been created, and the Bulgarians began to move toward inevitable separation. One

¹¹⁴ Anderson, p. 187.

¹¹⁵ Bilal Şimşir, *Rumeli'den Türk Göçleri*, vol.2 (Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü Yayınları, 1967), pp.72-73.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp.74-75.

important facet of this revolt was the attempt to involve the local Turks. The Pan-Slavists and Bulgarian separatists had decided to bring the Turkish and Bulgarian people into confrontation with one another and push them towards discord in such a way as to make communal life impossible. In so doing they were hoping to create a potential scenario of mutual massacre to present to the West and, benefiting from their status as a minor nation, thus draw international attention to their region.¹¹⁷ As these events unfolded along the lines envisioned by the insurgents, they were noticed by --or brought to the attention of-- the Western nations, who eventually responded with concern.

The campaign against the Ottomans began to produce results. For example, not only did England remain neutral during the inevitable Russian-Ottoman War, but throughout Europe, such events were viewed as legitimizing this neutrality. On this point, Yerasimos has the following comment: "Russia had achieved its concrete objective, and all that remained could be settled with diplomatic legerdemain."¹¹⁸

The 1877-78 Ottoman-Russian War was significant for the Bulgarians in that it was during this time that the Russians abandoned the Serbian cause and began using the Bulgarians to the greatest possible extent. In a striking example, the Bulgarians of Plevne were actively brought into war under the protection of the Russian army.¹¹⁹ Thus the nature and purpose of Bulgarian-Russian cooperation was to eradicate the Muslim Turkish element of the region.

With the signing of the Ayastefanos Pact at the end of the Ottoman-Russian War, Bulgaria was given the status of a minor principate connected to the Ottoman Empire through taxation; however, its new borders made it a sizable country, reaching as far as the Danube to the North, the Aegean to the South, the Black Sea to

¹¹⁷ One example of this is the incidents that took place in the village of Batak which, written up in the British press, took on the shape of a campaign.

¹¹⁸ Yerasimos, p. 864.

¹¹⁹ It has been documented that the Bulgarians far outdid the Russians in the killing of Turks. İbrahim Ethem, *Plevne Hatıraları* (İstanbul: Kervan Kitapçılık, 1979), pp. 78-79.

the East, and Albania to the West.¹²⁰ England, Austria, and other nations with similar viewpoints objected to this new state of affairs, which so clearly advanced Russia's interests. Equilibrium in the Balkans could be significantly upset by such a territorially enlarged Bulgaria. Thus in the hopes that the "Eastern Question" would be addressed in an international setting, Austria successfully lobbied for the calling of an international conference on the issue; however, the Berlin Conference would prove to be of much greater significance for the fates of the Balkan nations.

The 1878, Treaty of Berlin, divided the new Bulgaria into three regions.¹²¹ One of these was Bulgaria, which was given autonomous status. Eastern Rumelia, was given a semi-autonomous status under a Christian governor within the Ottoman Empire. Macedonia was returned to direct Ottoman rule. While the Treaty of Berlin recognized Serbia, Montenegro, and Rumania as independent states, it removed considerable territory from Bulgaria, leaving it the most disappointed nation in the Balkans. While the Ayastefanos Pact had given considerable substance to the pan-Slavist dream, the Treaty of Berlin was, in contrast, considered by many to be the "graveyard of Slavic hopes."¹²² Thus, from the moment the Treaty of Berlin became officially effective there would be attempts to change its contents in line with the above sentiments.

Following the Congress of Berlin, the Great Powers recognized that Russia would be the predominant power in Bulgaria. Uncomfortable with this development in general and, moreover, in the hopes of taking control of the routes and passages through the Balkans, the Great Powers began to hasten their efforts toward establishing their own influence and authority in the region. With the support of the Great Powers, the province of Eastern Rumelia revolted and declared itself a part of Bulgaria in 1885. At a conference held in İstanbul that same year, the Ottoman government was forced to recognize this annexation; it even agreed to guarantee the

¹²⁰ On the Ayastefanos Agreement, see Erim, pp. 387-400.

¹²¹ Aydın, p.37.

¹²² Armaoğlu, p. 279.

region's security vis-à-vis Russia. For its part, Russia was unable to realize its hopes at this conference and was left in an isolated position in respect to the Great Powers. The British government's participation was particularly significant in the decisions that were made at this conference; indeed, while conditions had favored Russia in 1878, by 1885 they had changed to give England the upper hand.¹²³

As may be gathered from the above, nations possessing absolutely no legal standing in the region were nonetheless able to wield considerable influence, directing the course of events in such a way as to further their own interests and create their own zones of influence. From its position of powerlessness, the Ottoman Empire's only options were to remain on the sidelines as a witness to these events or to try to salvage various situations that arose through compromise and conciliatory gestures.

With the annexation of Eastern Rumelia, Bulgaria was able to achieve part of its goal to create a "Greater Bulgaria"; its full realization, however, involved bringing Macedonia into its national borders.

The Macedonian Question

The overarching issue in Balkan politics in the first decade of the twentieth century was the Macedonian Question, as Gewehr has pointed out.¹²⁴ Throughout the history of the region, Macedonia has always been an area of indefinite boundaries. Under Ottoman hegemony, the provinces of Salonica, Kosovo, and Manastir were included within the borders of Macedonia, which was known as the

¹²³ Jelavich, *Russia's Balkan Entanglements*, p.187.

¹²⁴ Gewehr, p. 79.

“*Vilayet-i Selase*” (three Estates) to the *Bab-ı Ali* (Sublime Porte). Otoman administration never called this region as Macedonia ¹²⁵

Macedonia’s geographical location and economic importance have been at the heart of a continual vying for Macedonia’s territory throughout history. Its geopolitical significance stems from the fact that the routes from Central Europe to the Mediterranean pass through these borders. From Serbia and Bulgaria’s perspectives, Macedonia stands as a crucial passageway to the sea. From an economic standpoint, its fertile valleys offer the potential for considerable wealth through agriculture. In short, any state with control over Macedonia acquires significant strategic and economic advantages, thus enhancing its standing in the region.

Moreover, the inhabitants of Macedonia could be as important to the region’s overall value as its strategic and economic qualities. Its population comprised a veritable mosaic of ethnic groups. During the Ottoman period, the majority of the population was Muslim, followed by Bulgarians, Greeks, Serbs, and Vlachs. This variety was further enriched by the presence of Albanians and Jews. It is for this reason that Tarık Zafer Tunaya has dubbed multi-ethnic Macedonia, “Ottoman Europe’s Palestine.”¹²⁶

The political contention over Macedonia has certainly justified this appellation. Having achieved independence and obtained their goals, the Greeks, Serbs, Rumanians, and later, Bulgarians, were ready for new undertakings and thus began to consistently direct their energies toward this area. Lying just outside the boundaries of Greece, Bulgaria, and Serbia, Macedonia’s location predestined it as the battle-ground of those states, which based their claims to Macedonia on historic and racial grounds. However, in fact, their aims in each case were to annex this

¹²⁵ Gül Tokay, “Makedonya Sorunu. Berlin’den Bükreş’e: 1878-1913,” *Berlin Anlaşması’ndan Günümüze Balkanlar*, ed. Mustafa Bereketli, (İstanbul: Rumeli Vakfı Kültür Yayınları, 1999), p.52.

¹²⁶ Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye’de Siyasal Partiler, Meşrutiyet Dönemi* vol. 2 (İstanbul: Hürriyet Vakfı Yayınları, 1984), p. 510.

region as part of their “great empire” ideals. They aspired to break the hold of the Ottoman State over the region as well as the demographic supremacy of its Muslim majority.

Russia and Austria were both keenly interested in the region. They concurred on the desirability of maintaining the status quo, since they feared the possibility of a rapid evolution of events to the benefit of nations they had tried unsuccessfully to dominate.¹²⁷ Austria was in favor of the continuation of the Ottoman, that is, at that time, the weakest state’s, hegemony over the Salonica corridor. Russia wanted to be sure that this “front” would remain stable while it pursued various new objectives in the East. These two nations thus found themselves in agreement on their Macedonian policy, at least until 1908.

On the other hand, a self-conscious movement began developing in Macedonia that, by the twentieth century, began to express itself in terms of “Macedonia for Macedonians.”¹²⁸ An organization for the emancipation of Macedonia known by the initials VMRO, was founded in Salonica in 1893.¹²⁹

Its own internal turbulence, on the one hand, in addition to the above-mentioned interventions of external powers on the other, had turned Macedonia into a hot-bed of conflicting wills by the last ten years of the nineteenth century.

By the twentieth century the situation had escalated to the point that the region appeared to be on the verge of war. In this tense atmosphere, Austria and Russia undertook to solve the Macedonian question, and in 1904 submitted a series of reforms to the Ottoman government known as the Murzteg Programme.¹³⁰ According to these proposals, Macedonia would be policed by a gendarmerie under international command. The country was to be divided into districts and assigned to

¹²⁷ Russia and Austria signed an agreement to maintain the status quo in the area. Marriot, p. 415.

¹²⁸ Gewehr, p. 80.

¹²⁹ *Vitesna Makedonska Odrinska Revolutsianna Organizatsiya*, the full version of the name of this organization, was known by the initials VMRO. Tunaya, p. 511.

¹³⁰ Marriot, p. 417; and Tokay, p. 55.

five of the Powers, with Austria and Russia responsible for the general supervision of the program. The districts were to be assigned as follows: Kosovo would go to Austria-Hungary, Seres to France, Manastir to Italy, Drama to Great Britain, and Salonica to Russia. The remaining Great Power, Germany, refused to participate in the transactions, not wishing to offend the *Bab-ı Ali* (Sublime Porte) and thus imperil her Baghdad Railway plans.¹³¹

During the Sultanate of Abdülhamit the Second, while the Great Powers' pressure tactics succeeded in getting the reform package accepted and the implementation process started, it was nonetheless not carried through, since none were satisfied with a solution that would entail Macedonia's remaining under Ottoman jurisdiction.¹³² By 1905, Macedonia's financial affairs were put into the hands of a European commission. In 1908, at the start of the Second Constitutional Period,¹³³ the Ottoman State's sovereignty over the area continued in name only. Finally, while Macedonia was entirely withdrawn from Ottoman territory after the Balkan wars, the Balkan nations' continued efforts to take it over meant that the Macedonian problem would persist in spite of the new order that had been established throughout the region in the twentieth century.

The Albanians

Albanian nationalism was late in awakening compared to that of the other Balkan nations. But at the end of the Balkan War, Europe witnessed the birth of yet another new nation, Albania. The Albanians had always been the most loyal subjects within the Ottoman Sate; how was it that they decided to cut themselves off from the Empire?

¹³¹ Gewehr, p. 81.

¹³² Ezel Kural and Stanford Shaw, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Modern Türkiye*, vol. 2, trans Mehmet Harmancı (İstanbul: E Yayınları, 1983), p. 261.

¹³³ E. Ramsaur, *The Young Turks to the Revolution 1908* (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1957).

The Albanians had always had a unique position in relation to that of the other communities under Ottoman administration. This was primarily determined by the religious factor. We have stressed the importance of religion in the separatist conceptions and ultimately the national awakening movements of the Balkan nations treated thus far. In the Albanian case, far from being an agent provoking separatism, religion functioned rather to unite. The Albanians' being seventy percent Muslim, and thus enjoying the rights of other Muslim groups such as the Turks and Arabs, meant that they had certain privileges such as being able to obtain positions within the administrative and political mechanisms; these no doubt help explain their close ties to Ottoman authority down through the years.¹³⁴

However, it is important to recognize that the entire Albanian population was not Muslim. Under Ottoman hegemony, there had been a rapid Islamization, reaching the seventy percent figure mentioned above; yet there were always a certain number of Albanians who belonged to different religions or sects. The distribution of religious differences includes, to the South, Albanians influenced by Greek culture, who became partially Hellenized and adopted Greek Orthodoxy. Albanians in the North were Catholic (Malisorlar). Muslim Albanians primarily resided in the central regions, specifically in the cities of Elbasan, Iskodra, and Berat, where there existed a vital and dominant Islamic intellectual culture.¹³⁵

As the Ottoman Empire and its economy developed and expanded together, the Albanians created an important border zone through their trade with neighboring countries. This activity would experience rapid growth, making the region a center for trade in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries especially. Also, the Ottoman administration involved itself very little in the internal affairs of the region, to the point that its authority there could be described as nominal at best.

¹³⁴ Orhan Koloğlu, "Osmanlı Döneminde Balkanlar 1391–1918", *Balkanlar* (İstanbul: Ortadoğu ve Balkan İncelemeleri Vakfı Yayınları, 1993), p.66.

¹³⁵ Ramadan Marmullahu, *Albania and Albanians* (London: C. Hurst, 1975), pp. 16-17.

So privileged in its economic and political position under the Ottomans, this region nonetheless, if comparatively later than its neighbors, underwent the internal and external dynamics leading to separatism, thus serving as the final step in the process of fragmentation taking place in the Ottoman Empire.

The Albanian separatist movement was triggered by the loss of certain of its lands to Montenegro and Serbia as stipulated in the 1878 Ayastefanos and the later Berlin Agreements.¹³⁶ One reason for this was the fact that the Orthodox and Catholic communities of Albania refused to comply with Russian attempts at provocation during the Ottoman-Russian War of 1877-78; in retaliation, Russia pressured the *Bab-ı Ali* into agreeing that some parts of Albania be ceded to Montenegro and Serbia.¹³⁷ The Albanians reacted instinctively to this development to defend the land they occupied, and organized a summit represented by delegates of every group and religious denomination from all corners of Albanian territory. This meeting produced a league for the defense of the Albanian nation known as the League of Prizren, after the town in which it was founded.¹³⁸ The importance of this congress lays in the fact that it presented no signs of differentiation among Muslim, Orthodox, or Catholic Albanians, but instead stressed the primacy of a single Albanian identity. This development indicates that the nationalist concept had already begun to take hold among the Albanians and that religion had begun to exist outside the Ottomans' unifying power.¹³⁹

One of the items in the Prizren document had to do with a plan to form a government. Such actions make it clear that the Albanians were intent on obtaining their political, administrative, and independence from the Empire.

Following the Prizren League, clandestine meeting with political objectives was organized in February of 1881 in Debar and attended by 130 delegates. This secret meeting reached a decision to eventually found an independent Albanian state,

¹³⁶ Armaoğlu, p. 280.

¹³⁷ See entry, "Albania," in *İslam Ansiklopedisi*, p. 588.

¹³⁸ On the League of Prizren, see *ibid.*; and Bozborca, p.71.

¹³⁹ This tract was signed by 43 persons, 38 of whom were Muslims.

and even decided on a capital city: Ohrid. Although the Ottoman government attempted to take measures countering these developments, this moment appears to constitute a point of no return in the Albanian nationalist movement.¹⁴⁰

Parallel to these developments within the body of the Ottoman state, of course, the history of the Balkan region was being shaped and affected in many ways by the interventions of the Great Powers. At this point, we should add Albania to this list of affected countries. In addition, while up to this point Russia, England, France, and Austria-Hungary had been the most active in Balkan affairs, now another European nation began to take interest in the region, Italy. Having completed its unification process, Italy's ambition to make a place for itself among the Great Powers involved assuming the role of guardian of the Albanian nationalist movement. It acted on the belief that having access to and influence over this newly formed and weak nation on the Adriatic would provide Italy with a stepping-stone in the region as well as proof of its new standing. In addition, thousands of Albanians had migrated to and settled in Italy for a variety of reasons. Having earned the loyalty of these immigrants, Italy was ready to act as protector for the new independent state of Albania and in this way strengthen its own position in the Adriatic.

Austria, which closely followed all developments in the Balkans, was worried by Italy's creating a zone of influence for itself in the Western Adriatic, and maintained a policy of rivalry with Italy. However, although their positions were mutually antagonistic, they both acted as champions of Albanian independence, energetically supporting the creation of an autonomous Albania in the hopes that it might act as a buffer zone against possible Slavic incursions from the North.

England's position on Albanian independence may be easily deduced when considering that British-Ottoman relations were not particularly cordial during this period. For its part, Russia's policy in the Balkans had become familiar by now.

¹⁴⁰ Marmullahu, p. 25.

Finally, neighboring countries, such as Serbia, Greece, Montenegro, and Bulgaria were in competition over Albanian territory and thus were keenly interested in the area. Külçe summarizes the situation as follows: “All of these nations’ common goal was to create strife in the region in order to drive the Ottomans out of Rumeli entirely.”¹⁴¹

One of the first steps in the creation of an independent Albania involved, as we have seen in the other Balkan nations, the awakening of intellectual life in the areas of political ideas, literature, and language. Thus it was that the creation of a national Albanian literature got a firm beginning by the end of the nineteenth century. No significant national literature existed before 1878; indeed, up until that period Albanian had been a purely oral language. After the League of Prizren, the Albanians were allowed to open schools and print books in their own language for the first time.¹⁴² Thus, with the contribution of the Albanian alphabet and Albanian books printed in Bucharest, the northern and southern Albanians slowly began to learn reading and writing in their own language. While the first Albanian schools were in the process of being established, intellectuals of the period began to study and explore their own people’s history and folklore.¹⁴³ Such individuals as Mehmet Naim Bey, Koniçalı Faik Bey, Gyerg Fişta, and Fan Noli contributed to this newly-born national literature with their translations as well as original writings.¹⁴⁴

The direction taken by the Albanian separatist movement was influenced by errors in the Ottoman administration’s attitudes and responses. Kocabaş maintains that the Ottomans had earlier treated the region preferentially because of the characteristics that gave it a special place within the Empire, and that the Albanians had been loyal subjects under these conditions. However, this situation began to

¹⁴¹Süleyman Külçe, *Osmanlı Tarihinde Arnavutluk* (İzmir: Zaman Kitabevi, 1944), p. 388.

¹⁴² From Faruk K. Timurtaş’s “Introduction” to Şemsettin Sami, *Kamus-ı Türki* (İstanbul: Çağrı Yayınları, 1978), pp. 6-7.

¹⁴³ Jelavich, *The Establishment of the Balkan Nation States*, pp. 225-227.

¹⁴⁴ See under “Arnavutluk,” in *İslam Ansiklopedisi*, pp. 580-582.

change with the administrative decisions of the Union and Progress Committee following the First Constitutional period.¹⁴⁵

The situation was exacerbated in the Second Constitutional period when, for example, the government began taxing the Albanians and drafting them for military service. As may be expected, the Albanians wanted nothing more than to regain their former privileged status. The first uprisings that took place in the name of these principles had an impact on the foreign powers involved in the region's power struggles, as well as the newly forming Balkan nations, all of which were looking for opportunities to create a front against the Ottomans. Kuran describes the situation in the following, uncompromising terms: "In response to the Committee's aggravating treatment of the Albanians, the Balkan States took advantage of the government's thoughtlessness to push forward with their mutual cooperation initiatives. Istanbul realized the gravity of its errors very late in the game."¹⁴⁶

The Ottoman government's response to the Albanian separatist movement, which consisted of granting small concessions over time, was no doubt reinforced by the threat of a possible Balkan war. In the hopes of achieving some degree of security vis-à-vis the Albanians in anticipation of war, the Ottomans signed an agreement on September 4, 1912 which included various concessions; however, they were not able to obtain the loyalty they were hoping for by this means. By the time the Balkan Wars started, the Albanians were ready to seize their independence.

The Balkan Wars, which resulted in the expulsion of Ottoman hegemony from Europe and the establishment of the last modern Balkan state, began in 1913. While Austria and Italy were the chief supporters of the Albanian nationalist movement, another Great Power's leader, German Prince William of Wied, became the first ruler of Albania; his reign lasted until World War I. In September 1914, the

¹⁴⁵ Kocabaş, pp. 176-177.

¹⁴⁶ Ahmet Bedevi Kuran, *İnkılap Tarihimiz ve Jön Türkler* (İstanbul: Tan Matbaası, 1946), pp. 234-235.

new Albanian state collapsed following the outbreak of World War I and the Prince was stripped of authority and deported from Albania.

Bosnia-Herzegovina

Located in the north-western portion of the Balkan Peninsula, and constituted under the name of the Dukedom Herzog, which was founded in the late middle ages and the name for the Bosnia River, this region constitutes an important passage point to Western Europe whose strategic significance continues to this day. Its geographical position makes it a central point of passage from North to South as well as from East to West. This also made it a land inhabited by many successive ethnic groups.¹⁴⁷

The region's earliest historical settlement reaches as far back as the Illyrians.¹⁴⁸ Then it lived for several centuries under the protection of the Roman Empire. This period was followed by the arrival and settlement of the Serbs and Croats. However, the Bosnia-Herzegovinians were never free from the domination of outsiders, be they Venetians, Serbs, or Hungarians.¹⁴⁹

The Ottoman State's ties with the region began shortly after the conquest of Istanbul, as a result of its expansion into the Balkan Peninsula. Bosnia became Ottoman territory in 1463, and Herzegovina in 1483, at which point the Ottomans began establishing their administration and bringing Turkish-Islamic culture into the region. The region lived in peace under Ottoman rule for many years. This was as much because the Ottoman administration conferred full rights and freedoms on the region because of the local population's cooperative attitude toward the Ottoman social and political order.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁷ Noel Malcolm, *Bosna*, trans Aşkim Karadağlı (İstanbul: Om Yayınevi, 1999), p.29.

¹⁴⁸ For more details, see *ibid.*, pp. 29-44.

¹⁴⁹ Hoffman, p. 44.

¹⁵⁰ Uzunçarşılı, vol. 2, pp. 81-84.

As seen in the case of the Albanian independence movement, religion played a determining role in the lives of the local people, whether as a unifying or as a dividing force. Religion had a different sort of function in the Bosnia-Herzegovinian area. The Bogomil Christians, especially those located in Bosnia, converted to Islam quite easily; in fact they appeared to have accepted Islam en masse,¹⁵¹ after which they were able to strengthen their position within the Empire, even taking posts of distinction within the administration.¹⁵²

This region was administered by the governors (*beys*) of its various provinces (*sancaks*) up until 1538, at which point it was transformed into an “estate”, *eyalet*, connected to the Ottoman government, one that served as a kind of military outpost that brought the Ottoman presence up toward the heartland of Europe.

Bosnia developed into a center of commerce since its location made it a point of convergence and a transit zone between Dalmatia and the Balkans; however, its economic life remained closely linked to agriculture. Its economic and social life as well as its land and agricultural system changed little with the arrival of the Ottomans. While there were some complaints and reports of injustices related to taxation and financial demands, these problems did not appear to have significantly troubled the overall picture of harmony that traditionally existed between landlord and renter (or *bey* and *reaya*.)¹⁵³

However, in the nineteenth century, class differences began to create problems as a result of changing outlooks and power balances throughout the world. Starting in this period, friction between the peasants and landlords triggered the first uprisings in the area. However, much the Ottoman government worked to rectify the situation by applying the initiatives contained in the reform packages of 1839 and 1856, these measures were not able to quiet the discontent.

¹⁵¹ About islamization en masse during Otoman rule, see Malcolm, pp.101-127.

¹⁵² In a striking example of the consideration shown to the Bosnian population from the very start of Ottoman hegemony in the region, no fewer than nine individuals were to take the position of Sadrazam. *İslam Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 2, p. 731.

¹⁵³ Ahmet Cevat Eren, *Mahmut II. Zamanında Bosna Hersek* (İstanbul: Nurgök Yayınları, 1965), pp. 27-28.

The majority of the region's population was Muslim, and this was doubtless the sole factor capable of preventing these occasional incidences of rebellion from escalating. Under the Ottoman administration, Bosnia-Herzegovina gave every appearance of being an Islamic community. It could even be said that the Bosnia-Herzegovinians, together with the Albanian Muslims, understood themselves as having guardianship responsibilities and as forming a kind of outpost for the Muslim community of the Empire at its furthest western edge. Indeed, Marriot describes the Bosnian Muslims of this period as being in every way "more Turkish than the Turks."¹⁵⁴

When the Ottoman government experienced problems with its neighbors, as well as during the uprisings in Montenegro and Serbia, the Muslims of the region supported the Ottomans' position to the extent of providing crucial assistance in putting down the rebellions. On the other hand, having shared years of communal life with the Christians, there were no signs of enmity between the Muslim and Christian populations. To the contrary, as Cevdet Paşa has reported, the Christians and Muslims of Bosnia joined forces to go to on military campaigns together as a matter of custom.¹⁵⁵

However, the spark that was lit in the Balkans was soon to leap into this tranquil region, putting an end to the Bosnia-Herzegovinians' traditional cooperation with the Ottoman state. Inevitably reacting to the breakdown of Ottoman governmental order, in conjunction with various forms of incitement from abroad, the Bosnia-Herzegovinians first revolted in 1828-29.¹⁵⁶ The Ottoman government expended great energies to put down this first expression of the region's yearning for independence, which came to light in the aftermath of the Ottoman-Russian War. After the Crimean War, the region experienced both internal tensions as well as pan-

¹⁵⁴ Marriot, p. 319.

¹⁵⁵ Ahmet Cevdet Paşa, "Marûzât," *Türk Tarih Encümeni Mecmuası* no. 2, year 14 (İstanbul: 1340), p. 79. Also see Ahmet Cevdet Paşa, *Maruzat*, ed. Yusuf Halaçoğlu (İstanbul: Çağrı Yayınları, 1980) pp.57-112.

¹⁵⁶ Malcolm, *Bosna*, pp.147-200.

Slavist provocations from outside. The Slavic element of the Bosnia-Herzegovina population contributed to the development of pan-Slavist ideas espoused by Russian missionaries working in the region.¹⁵⁷

The “Great Pan-Slavist Congress” of 1867 held in Moscow directed its attention to the Slavs of the Balkans; Bosnia, as well as Paris, Montenegro, Serbia, and Bulgaria were selected as centers for the movement’s future activities. A distribution network for books, magazines, leaflets, and other forms of propaganda was established in these areas, and young students were drawn in to the movement through personal contact and dialogue.¹⁵⁸

While Russia was applying this policy throughout the Balkans, France, Italy, and Austria also manifested their interest in the region. Working through religious institutions to develop educational possibilities in a similar fashion to that of Russia, these nations worked to create centers of influence with the help of Catholic schools, which were under the protection of their consulates.¹⁵⁹

Of all the Balkan areas, Austria was most particularly interested in Bosnia-Herzegovina; thus it followed policies that were carefully designed and self-interested. France and Italy had a common outlook and similar interests in the region, joining together in support of the idea of a future independent state with the shared assumption that this would enable them to make in-roads into the area.

As indicated above, the region’s separatist tendencies originally manifested themselves as local uprisings. The first organized movement appeared in Herzegovina in 1875. While the burden of taxes on the peasantry and the resistance against paying these taxes lay at the foundation of these first initiatives, the rebellion quickly took on broader political dimensions. The rebellion which originated in

¹⁵⁷ Kocabaş, pp. 87-90.

¹⁵⁸ Marriot, p. 320.

¹⁵⁹ M. Percy Henderson, *A British Officer in the Balkans* (London: Lippincot, 1909), p. 272.

Herzegovina generated excitement in Serbia, Montenegro, and Bulgaria, and soon the Balkans were to present the image of general turbulence and revolt.¹⁶⁰

It is known that the Russian General Consul in İstanbul, Ignatief, whose participation was so influential in the Serbian rebellions, was also actively involved in the Herzegovinian revolts. Ignatief was instrumental in pushing forward the rebellions by exerting his influence over Ottoman administrators in such a way that they were reduced to passivity and procrastination.¹⁶¹

The multi-cultural empire of Austria which was, as has been noted, keenly interested in every phase of these developments in Ottoman territory, was of course concerned about its own Slavic population's being influenced by these rebellions. It is remarkable that Metternich's political advisor Gentz expressed the following opinion as early as 1815: "Austria will not remain viable for long if the Turkish monarchy (sic) is to collapse."¹⁶² Along similar lines in 1875, the Austria-Hungarian Empire's Foreign Minister Andrassy expressed the essence of his government's policy in the following terms: "Turkey...is of incalculable benefit to Austria-Hungary...If Bosnia-Herzegovina were lost to Serbia and Montenegro and we couldn't prevent it, or if a new government were formed there and we couldn't stop it, then our own collapse would become inevitable, putting us in the role of the 'Sick Man.'¹⁶³

Thus Austria, threatened by Russia, Serbia, and Montenegro, was most eager to have the revolts in Bosnia-Herzegovina put down and the status-quo preserved. However, the "Three Empires League" dating from 1872 and made up of Austria, Germany, and Russia, had committed those countries to acting jointly in regard to the Eastern Question; this agreement thus limited Austria's freedom of movement.

¹⁶⁰ Wolff, p. 84.

¹⁶¹ For more information on Ignatief's activities of this period, see David Harris, *A Diplomatic History of the Balkan Crisis of 1875-1878* (Stanford: Archon Books, 1969), pp. 132-169.

¹⁶² Armaoğlu, p. 260.

¹⁶³ Ibid.

Still, Austria took the lead among the three Empires in an initiative known as the Andrassy Note, the content of which was a number of positions which they then addressed to the Ottoman government.¹⁶⁴ In the note, the Ottoman government was requested to take steps to alleviate the tensions in the region, in particular in regard to reducing taxes. Greater freedom of religion and religious practices were also requested.¹⁶⁵ However much the Ottoman administration was put off by this interference in its own domestic affairs, the gravity of the situation nonetheless inclined it to receive the note as friendly, semi-formal advice and to make some of the indicated changes.

It is worth noting that, as may be seen in the above discussion, while Austria and Russia's interests in the Balkans conflicted, the two governments took similar stances in response to the rebellion movements. Of course, the two nations' expectations were very different. Russia had little faith in the potential of reforms to put an end to the revolts. Its policy was thus to act as a catalyst in intensifying the movements, to keep the issue on the international agenda, and to isolate the Ottoman Empire from the flow of events as much as possible.

Austria was kept busy negotiating around Russia's behavior, which was bothersome in the short term and could eventually have negative repercussions on Austria. Thus it worked both to cultivate its influence in Bosnia-Herzegovina by supporting the reform process as a way of expressing its sympathies with the local population, and at the same time it remained determined to block any Russian interference in the area. Danişmend criticizes these policies, writing that "the Russian and Austrian governments' positions in these matters were perhaps not honorable, since on the one hand they assisted the rebels, while on the other they blamed the Sublime Porte (for the rebellions)."¹⁶⁶

¹⁶⁴ Harris, p. 61.

¹⁶⁵ Armaoğlu, p. 261.

¹⁶⁶ Danişmend, vol. 4, p. 251.

Yet the situation in the Balkans was to grow ever more heated as time went on, with the result that the Ottoman government was finally presented a document known as the Berlin Memorandum, which had been formulated by the same nations as those responsible for the Andrassy Note (Russia, Germany, and Austria).¹⁶⁷ Because of serious domestic problems, the Ottoman government was not even able to receive the memorandum. The interfering nations saw this as an opportune moment to increase their pressure tactics, and at the same time prepared themselves to divide up the Balkans according to the existing balance of power.

The cooperation between Russia and Austria regarding Bosnia-Herzegovina, the focal point of their attention in the Balkans during this period, was to help prepare the end of Ottoman domination in the region. With the ultimate goal of gaining full hegemony in the region, Russia willingly left Bosnia-Herzegovina to Austria for a short period on the condition that Austria, which was fully aware of Russia's ambitions in the area, would remain neutral in the event of a Russian-Ottoman war. This arrangement was reinforced by the 1878 Berlin Agreement, and was justified on the grounds that Austria would strive to bring about peace and order in the region. However, the "Sultan's reign of law" was maintained in spite of this new status.¹⁶⁸

While the Muslim community, which constituted almost half the total population, was not happy with the Ottoman administration, they reacted harshly against the Austrians' taking control to this extent. The Austrian government was unable to appease the Muslim community with its promises that the Muslim population could maintain its legal ties with the Caliphate; that Muslims would be free to practice their religion, customs and traditions; and that the security of life and property would be guaranteed.

¹⁶⁷ For in-depth information on the Berlin Memorandum, see Armaoğlu, p. 263.; and Karal, vol. 8, pp. 99-100.

¹⁶⁸ Kocabaş, p. 93, and Malcolm, Bosnia, p.222.

Such was the situation up until the Second Constitutional period. For a period to follow, Austria was intimidated by the Young Turks' ambitions in the area. However, its efforts to officially include Bosnia-Herzegovina into its own borders finally paid off when the Bulgarians declared their own independence; the Austrians seized this opportunity to announce in 1908 that their government had annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina.¹⁶⁹

While the Young Turk administration at first protested this *fait accompli*, Austria's annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina was ultimately approved in the protocol of February 26, 1909 between the Austria-Hungarian and the Ottoman governments. In return for the Ottoman government's obliging stance, the Austrians relinquished Yeni Pazar and promised to help in the removal of the Capitulations.¹⁷⁰

In the period to follow, this arrangement was to cause the most discomfort among the Serbs; they continued to pursue their ambitions in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Indeed, one of the events that led to World War I took place in Bosnia-Herzegovina on June 28, 1914, when a Serbian student shot Archduke Ferdinand, heir apparent to the Austria-Hungarian Emperor's throne, thus touching off a spark whose fire would spread out across the globe.

Montenegro

Montenegro (Crnagora) was yet another region of the Balkans that posed problems for the Ottoman Empire. Surrounded by Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Albania, the original ethnic composition of this mountainous region was very complex.

During the first stages of the Ottoman conquest of the Balkans, Montenegro was in fact part of the Venetian Republic; however, it was unable to resist the swift

¹⁶⁹ Wolff, pp. 89-90.

¹⁷⁰ Armaoğlu, pp. 311-318. (Capitulations were the economic and commercial advantages and privileges given to the Great Powers).

advance of the Ottoman into the area and was soon to fall into their hands. While the status of Montenegro for a certain period was unclear as it struggled for its existence against both these powers, it was soon forced to recognize and submit to Ottoman rule.¹⁷¹

From the beginning of its life under Ottoman rule, local administration was transferred from the *knez* (the local word for *bey*) to the *Vladika*, Christian bishops, who undertook both religious and administrative leadership. The *Vladika*, were given this new position and definition of duties in 1499, meaning that the local power structure was transformed into an essentially theocratic one.¹⁷² The Orthodox community of Montenegro was associated with the Albanian Patriarchate in Ipek. When this Patriarchate was eliminated in 1766, the Montenegrin Orthodox community was brought under the Phanariot Patriarchate in Istanbul.¹⁷³

In the nineteenth century, a change of administration produced the proclamation of Vladika Danilo as prince; he announced that he would not be concerned with spiritual affairs, but would confine his leadership to the secular sphere.¹⁷⁴ Thus the princehood was adopted as a new form of government, replacing the older *Vladika* system. The real importance of this development lay in its producing indicators of an awakening nationalist consciousness.

Montenegro seems to have a unique place in the history of Balkan nationalism. Due to its geographical position, the Montenegrin people were characterized by a rough, hardy temperament and martial qualities; this temperament may have been part of the reason they were so easily drawn into action. From the moment they came under Ottoman authority, they did not hesitate to make common cause against the Ottoman state with their former guardians, the Venetians.

Additionally, the Montenegrins perhaps top the list of those Balkan peoples affected by Russia's policy of inciting the Empire's Orthodox citizens against the

¹⁷¹ The official date of Montenegro's incorporation within the Ottoman Empire is 1482.

¹⁷² Karal, vol. 6, p. 71.

¹⁷³ Ibid.

¹⁷⁴ Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, p. 237.

Ottoman state. The Russians were encouraged in this policy by Montenegro's semi-autonomous status; however, Russia's choice of Montenegro as a point of concentration for these efforts was no doubt also affected by this region's suitability for war, especially guerrilla war, and also by the contentious nature of its people. In this sense Montenegro could be characterized as virtually inaccessible within Ottoman territory to Russia.

Russian involvement in the region began during the Czarism of Peter the First, and these relations persisted down through the years without interruption. Russia provided Montenegro with money, arms, and ammunition in addition to advice and education. Russia was able to develop and expand its assistance to the Balkans through its many consulates located in major cities throughout the area; these forms of assistance were also made available to Montenegro.¹⁷⁵ By these means, Russia managed to turn Montenegro into a sort of base, if not an outpost, for its activities in the Balkans.

But it should not be assumed that the situation was limited to Russia's incitements and ambitions. France entered the scene in the nineteenth century with efforts to influence the Montenegrin people. During the first Napoleonic regime, French government representatives were sent to Montenegro to fark revolutionary ideas. Austria also manipulated the Montenegrins for its own political ends. However, of all these events of the nineteenth century the factor of greatest impact on the Montenegrin people was that of the first Serbian uprisings.

The first rebel action of significance carried out by the Montenegrins took place around the middle of the nineteenth century, since 1850, and it ultimately had a destructive effect on the Ottoman state, involving both financial and human resource costs, as well as because it provoked the intervention of the Great Powers. While the Ottoman government wanted nothing more than to bring this war to an end as soon

¹⁷⁵ In one example, Russian Consul to Montenegro Vlademir Semenovic Ionin, having fervently espoused the panslavist ideal, played a central role in the rebel movements of the Montenegrin people. Sumner, p. 138.

as possible, it was Austria's entering the picture that in fact shortened the process. Austria was anxious about these events taking place so near its borders on the Adriatic Sea, as well as Russia's direct involvement in them; thus it chose to throw all its efforts into peacemaking, and managed to bring the war to an end by negotiating between the rebels and the Ottoman government.

The agreement that resulted preserved the status quo, but its true importance became clear after 1856 when the situation in Montenegro was taken up by the Paris Congress of that year. While Montenegro was declared a self government region connected to the Ottoman state, and this autonomy was to be guaranteed jointly by European nations, the Montenegrin people found this solution far from satisfactory. In fact, the Montenegrins had articulated their objective well before: they wanted complete independence and, moreover, wished to expand their territory.

Thus, Montenegrin Prince Danilo sent a memorandum to the nations participating in the Paris Congress stressing these two desiderata, and also decided to pursue war with the Ottomans. The Ottomans were at war on many fronts during this period; they were thus unable to overpower this remote but intractable force and were eventually forced to accede to some of its demands.

Provocational activity in Montenegro continued unabated throughout the nineteenth century, with the aim of keeping the region's people aroused and ready for action. While the Ottoman government managed to quash an occasional uprising in the hopes of setting an example to Montenegro, the Great Powers prevented the Ottomans from taking more radical action.¹⁷⁶

Such was the general picture which prevailed until Montenegro achieved independence. Montenegro's ambition was realized with the signing of the Ayastefanos Pact at the end of the 1877-78 Russian-Ottoman War. This Pact, while creating many of the nations of the Balkans, also constitutes one of the bitterest pages of Ottoman history. Montenegro's independence was later ratified by the

¹⁷⁶ For information on these responses to the Montenegro rebellions, see Karal, vol. 7, p. 5.

Berlin Pact that followed; however, the Berlin Pact also stipulated that territory granted by the Ayastefanos Pact be relinquished, thus creating new dissatisfaction. Indeed, it was this discontentment, this drive of Montenegro to expand its territory which would create the conditions for making a battlefield out of the entire Balkan region: The first fires of the Balkan Wars were thus lit by Montenegro.¹⁷⁷

¹⁷⁷ Kocabaş, p. 83.

CHAPTER FOUR
THE EMERGENCE OF
THE MODERN BALKAN STATES

The Balkan Nations from their Emergence through
World War I

In the years between 1800 and 1878, a good number of the Balkan peoples---Serbians, Greeks, Romanians, and Bulgarians---were able to establish autonomous or semi-autonomous states. However, while these nation-states came into being one by one, their existence remained precarious for some time. Many factors, especially social, economic, and political, contributed to their not achieving full autonomy and self-sufficiency for almost another century.

Having freed themselves from Ottoman sovereignty, these nations faced many challenges, chief among them being the constitution of ruling and managerial groups and the new political regimes that emerged from them. The ruling classes of these various nations had one common denominator: their goal of gaining freedom from Ottoman sovereignty: Aside from that, these ruling classes each presented their own distinguishing characteristics. The Romanian leadership had been educated abroad, and represented the wealthy landowners, Greece's commercial class exercised influence owing to its business experience and financial resources, while Serbia and Bulgaria's middle class, together with its tradesmen and intellectuals, ruled along with the landowners.¹ More significant than the composition of these apparently dominant groups, however, was the fact that their governments were being shaped in large measure by foreign powers behind the scenes.²

¹ Jelavich and Jelavich, p. 59.

² Branimir M. Jankovic, *The Balkans in International Relations* (Hong Kong: Macmillan, 1988), pp. 111-125.

The new Balkan nations' political systems generally took the form of monarchies which did not seem to place great value on constitutional law or limitations. In spite of various movements and efforts on the behalf of protecting individual rights and freedoms and ensuring political participation, these tenets were not fully applied, and real power remained in the hands of those groups close to the monarch. Jelavich and Jelavich point out, that the very same corrupt structures and practices of the Ottoman State, which were blamed on weaknesses in administration and experience, were relived as national problems faced by the new states.³

Having attained their independence after long struggle and sacrifice, the Balkan nations' first need was peace. However, instead of creating and preserving that much-needed tranquillity, the Balkan governments' more selfish aims were directed at acquiring more land or dividing up the land under their control according to their own interests. This inclination produced some very unfortunate results; however, it may have been justified by reasons put forth at the time. During the Balkan Wars, the young Balkan nations fought first against the Ottoman State, then amongst each other. Such vast resources were devoted to military expenditures that the new states experienced great difficulty with economic recovery and viability. This, in turn, led to political instability.

Indeed, the overall economic condition of these former states of the Ottoman Empire was far from robust, and after years of struggling for their existence they were now in need of creating the structures for their own national economies. However, they were unable to succeed in this task within the conditions and climate that prevailed during that period. Stavrianos describes the period from 1878 to 1914 as the age of imperialism and capitalism in the Balkans.⁴ Castellan, on the other hand, asserts that capitalism entered the region following the Crimean War of 1856, and that the great powers' imperialist tendencies began to impact the Balkans

³ Jelavich and Jelavich, p. 59.

⁴ Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, p. 413.

following the Berlin Pact of 1878.⁵ It seems that whichever version one selects, the important point is that the Balkans and their peoples--knowingly or unknowingly, willingly or not--came to know and experience every negative aspect of the prevailing conditions.

As in the past, so in the final quarter of the nineteenth century, the Balkan nations primarily served as markets for an industrializing Europe.⁶ The internal dynamics of these nations certainly prepared the ground for this phenomenon. Among other changes in the social fabric, new trade and business people had become necessary to the newly forming consumer class, which made the Balkan nations large and small susceptible to European capitalist incursions.⁷ While this situation conflicted with national identity insofar as that identity was conceived as the first priority, the newly formed Balkan nations could hardly avoid being affected by this new value system and its accompanying life-style, which had started in Europe and was spreading to all corners of the world.

The Final Stage in the Fragmentation of the Balkans:

The Balkan Wars (1912–1913)

In addition to sounding the death knell for the Ottoman Empire, the Balkan Wars were also a period of contention over the division and distribution of territories.⁸ As mentioned above, the Balkan region was unstable; indeed, the new status quo installed by the Ayastefanos Pact was far from satisfactory to the new

⁵ Georges Castellan, *Balkanların Tarihi*, p. 354.

⁶ The 1856 Paris Pact declared the Black Sea a neutral zone for the benefit of all commercial vessels, and also placed the Danube under international protection, thus effectively making all the Balkans available to industrializing Europe. Ibid.

⁷Ibid, pp. 355-359.

⁸ For further details, Richard C. Hall, *Balkan Savaşları*, trans. Tanju Akad (İstanbul: Homer Kitabevi, 2003).

nations of the Balkans. This ultimately led to war. Russia was working to unify the Slavs under its patronage in order to counter the Austria-Hungarian Empire's expansionism in the Balkans; at the same time, there were efforts to divide up the last of the Ottoman territories.⁹ The first stage in this process involved the new Balkan nations' establishing unity amongst themselves, in spite of their differences. Russia's pressure on Serbia and Bulgaria eventually took the form of an alliance. This secret alliance of March 13, 1912 was concluded primarily under Russian inducement, and it gave greatest discretionary power to that nation, to the extent that it was Russia that decided when the Ottoman State would go to war.¹⁰

The Greek-Bulgarian Alliance would follow that of Serbia-Bulgaria by two months. These would constitute the first two major phases in the constitution of the Balkan League. The third link in this chain of alliances was formed by Montenegro's participation. Thus by making agreements amongst each other to develop their ties as allies and prepare for war, by the middle of 1912 the nations of what came to be the Balkan Alliance were busy preparing the scene for a final assault on the Ottoman Empire. The nations of the Alliance --Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia-- included Montenegro in forming a front against the Ottoman State. They issued an ultimatum which demanded, in essence, "peace and freedom in Macedonia" and, in October of 1912, declared war.¹¹

While that two-stage conflict known to history as the Balkan Wars gravely sapped the economic and human resources of the warring nations, it nonetheless would not diminish the force of the young states' ambitions. In the first phase of these wars they confronted the Ottoman State head on; in the second phase, they sought to share out the riches that remained from the Empire amongst themselves.

⁹ Armağolu, p. 332.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 335.

¹¹ For more detailed information on the Balkan Wars, see Yusuf Hikmet Bayur, *Türk İnkılâbı Tarihi*, vol. 2, Part 2 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1943).

The Ottoman State lost nearly all its territory in the Balkans by the end of the first phase, thus losing as well any sort of active role in the Balkan region.¹²

The London Conference of May 30, 1913 established that all territory to the West of the Midye-Enez line lay outside of the Ottoman domain, and it gave Crete, which had revolted shortly before, to the Greeks. Finally, it removed the city of Edirne, which had once been capital of the Empire, from Ottoman jurisdiction.¹³

Greece's acquisition of Crete, and Bulgaria's edging closer to gaining a port on the Aegean, per its protector's wishes, went a long way toward satisfying certain of the Balkan nations' desires, if only temporarily. The Great Powers were also present in the distribution of the spoils, as they managed to obtain the right to determine the fates of the Albanian territories and the Aegean Islands.¹⁴

The second stage of the Balkan Wars mostly had to do with distributing what was left of the region's former Ottoman territories. Practically speaking, the Balkan nations finally possessed lands that they had desired for years, by means of the alliances that they had formed with the purpose of ejecting the Ottomans from Europe. They fell into disagreement, however, when it came to deciding how and to whom these lands should be allocated. The territories of Albania and Macedonia, in particular, were the subject of intense controversy.¹⁵

During the Balkan Wars, with circumstances being such as those outlined above, the increasing interventionist role of outside influences proved decisive. St. Petersburg was determined to preserve the union of Balkan nations that it had helped establish, in whatever form and to whatever degree. Vienna, on the other hand, exercised its considerable influence in the region to weaken or dissolve it. Also significant powers of that period, France and England were in favor of the union from its inception, while the Austro-Hungarian Empire had begun forming a bloc in

¹² On the first stage of the Balkan Wars, see Bayur, pp. 19-155.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 299.

¹⁴ Ferdinand Schevill, *The History of the Balkan Peninsula, from the Earliest Times to the Present Day* (New York: Hartcourt, Brace and Co., 1922), pp. 471-475.

¹⁵ Castellan, pp. 388-389.

its aim of countering Germany's imperialistic penchant, which it shared, in any case, as part of its strategy to foil Germany's policy known as "Toward the East" (*Drach Nach Osten*), which the latter had begun to put into effect some time earlier.¹⁶ Yet here again, when evaluating the above scenario, one should not be drawn to the conclusion that Austria and Germany were on the Ottoman side during the Balkan Wars. These two nations stood back and let events unfold however they might. The Austrian ambassador to Bulgaria even declared, "In spite of the desire to preserve the status quo, nothing will be done to slow the progress of the Balkans' historical evolution."¹⁷ Germany, for its part, was of the opinion that "the 'Eastern Question' will be resolved with blood and fire"; and, indeed, it did seem as though the peoples of this region were at each others' throats.¹⁸ Since Italy, another major power, was involved in clashes with the Ottomans on another front (Trablusgarp), it lent its support to any sort of group opposed to the Ottoman State.

During the second phase of the Balkan Wars, two members of the Alliance, Greece and Serbia, formed a union with the common goal of dislodging Bulgaria from the region. In spite of Russia's labors to maintain Serbo-Bulgarian unity, the new bloc was indeed successful in removing Bulgaria from the area. This proved to be the most significant event of the Balkan Wars' second phase. As regards the Ottoman State, this outcome resulted in its being able to repossess Edirne, which naturally excited the Great Powers, which had felt even prior to the war that, however it should end and in whomever's favor, the overall status quo must be maintained. Those who were guided by the principle that "wherever the cross has entered, the crescent may not enter" would have much trouble accepting this result.¹⁹

¹⁶ Kocabaş, p. 262.

¹⁷ Stefanos Yerasimos emphasizes this point, which he cites from E.C. Helmreich's *The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars*. Yerasimos, *Az gelişmişlik Sürecinde Türkiye*, p. 1077.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 1078.

¹⁹ For more information on the military and diplomatic undertakings that followed the Ottoman State's repossession of Edirne, see Bayur, pp. 421-453.

The Bucharest Peace Pact of August 10, 1913, announced the end of the Balkan Wars, and it managed to bring some degree of clarity to the issue of the division of territories, if only provisionally.²⁰

Turning to consider the political ramifications, it may be seen that the Balkan Wars made it possible for a new European nation to come into existence. The Albanian nationalist movement, the very last such movement to emerge in the Balkan region, kindled desires for independence in this society which was already self-governing, in any case. Albania was recognized as an independent state at the Conference of Ambassadors in London. On July 29, 1913, all rights associated with Ottoman sovereignty were removed, and Albania was placed under the administration of a multi-national commission as an “independent” state. However, the tasks of establishing new borders as well as the settling of domestic matters were set aside when World War I broke out, causing the existing situation to remain as it was until the end of the war.²¹

Another important consequence of the Balkan Wars had to do with their bringing serious minority issues to light. Whether during the war or because of decisions and policies that were implemented in its wake, many large groups felt themselves to have been left outside the borders of their homelands. The community most affected by this problem was that of the Muslim-Turks after the Ottoman State had withdrawn from most of the Balkans. Part of this population migrated to Anatolia, and another large part remained within the borders of the newly formed Balkan nations.²²

This new situation meant that populations that had been dispersed, reduced to small groups, or left outside former borders and endured hardships and presented claims which fell under the general term “minority problems.” From this point on,

²⁰ On the Bucharest Pact, see Bayur, pp. 463-472.

²¹ Charles Sudetic, “Historical Setting,” *Albania, A Country Study* (Washington D.C.: U.S. Foreign Office, 1994), pp. 21-23.

²² *Report of the International Commission to Inquire into the Causes and Conduct of the Balkan Wars* (Washington D.C.: n.p., 1914), p. 418.

numerous particular problems would develop into a large one, eventually becoming one of the major issues of recent Balkan history. In the nineteenth century, while each of the Balkan states had its own minorities and, in addition, territorial disputes, the very presence of these minority groups was often denied.²³ The kinds of complaint that were constantly leveled the Ottoman administration seem to have been forgotten while, in almost every case, the ruling group shows great persistence in denying the rights of its minorities. As Koloğlu states, "Each of the Balkan nations failed to realize that the Balkans was not large enough for their 'Greater Dreams' to have realistic chance of succeeding." For this reason the solutions that they have adopted have been incapable of re-establishing a Balkan peace unknown since the times of the "*pax Ottomanica*." ²⁴ After *pax Ottomanica*, in great part because of this unstable situation and conflicts on the Balkan territory, a new war would encompass the entire world.

World War I and the Balkan States

World War I has been one of the most wrenching experiences in both Balkan and world history. This "total war" was not touched off by a sudden or momentary conjuncture, but was the product of a build-up of forces stretching back many years. A new global balance of power that had recently emerged also contributed significantly to the unfolding of events. As we have attempted to show in previous chapters, ideas, currents of thought, political and social institutions that can be traced back to the French Revolution shook the foundations of the status quo of many nations, drawing their societies into a quest for new ways of thinking about and organizing their societies. The Balkans were to be one of the most dramatic settings for these new questions and forms of thought to be played out. At the same time, the

²³ Castellan, p. 12.

²⁴ Koloğlu, p. 92.

region was also a major focal point in European diplomacy. Developments that gathered speed over the course of the second half of the nineteenth century resulted in a war lit by a spark from this region and engulfing the world.

However, if the first fire was set in the Balkans, the sources of World War I go much deeper. The fundamental cause of this war lay in the fact that new power blocs had been forming in Europe and were competing with one another.²⁵ This was particularly the case after Germany entered the international political scene as a major player. The European nations began to form camps amongst themselves primarily as a result of Germany's newly materializing imperialistic intentions as well as because of its eagerness to compete with those nations which had been world political leaders up to that time. Economic interests no doubt lay in the background of this new political rivalry. Industrializing Europe's pace of economic growth, and, as a consequence, the rise and spread of colonialism, caused diplomatic and economic relations to expand beyond Europe's narrow borders into new territories, thus adding even more terrain for the playing out of disputes among Europe's new political blocs. With such givens, it is not surprising that minor disputes between nations quickly escalated into crises.

Relations between Serbia and Austria, which had begun to deteriorate after the 1908 impasse in Bosnia-Herzegovina, were chiefly responsible for quickening the pace of developments. Austria had stayed neutral throughout the Balkan Wars, but Serbia's enhanced strength and expansionist proclivities at the war's end made Austria uneasy, leading it to assume a more rigid stance toward that nation. In addition, Serbia's closer relations with Russia--especially after the Ottoman State's defeat in the Balkans and its subsequent loss of international prestige and effectiveness--nurtured Russian hopes regarding the Straits and the region in general. Russia chose to ally with Austria-Hungary and Germany so as to strengthen its position within its zone of influence. By this means Russia appeared to be pursuing

²⁵ For more information on the issues that led to World War I, see Fahri Belen, *XX. Yüzyılda Osmanlı Devleti* (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1973), pp. 187-189.

the ideal of yet another Balkan League. Meanwhile, Germany and Austria's relations with the Ottoman state, particularly in the military and economic domains, grew and developed as well, thus dividing the powers into two fronts which created increasing tension within the status quo.²⁶

This tension would rise to its culmination in Sarajevo on June 28, 1914, with the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir apparent to the Austro-Hungarian throne, by a Serbian student.²⁷ A shock to the region and to the world at large, this assassination would be remembered as the event triggering World War I, and, in retrospect, the "bullet which was the cause of more than eight million deaths."²⁸

Austria's reaction to the assassination was decisive. Anticipating the possible interference of other nations, it formed an alliance with Germany and officially initiated the war by bombing Belgrade on the 28th of July, 1914. In view of the fact that diplomatic measures were disregarded and ineffectual, it may be surmised that Europe had been more or less in preparation for the war prior to its outbreak.²⁹ It was highly unlikely that Russia would remain neutral under these circumstances. Removing itself from Germany's camp, it declared war on France, attacked Belgium, and mobilized against England. This was sufficient grounds for causing all the European nations, large and small, to be drawn into the conflict.

The Ottoman government took some time to evaluate the situation. It had had good relations with Germany for some time, and since its attempts at allying with France and England had proved fruitless, it found itself in the position of entering the war on the side of the Central Powers.³⁰

²⁶ Armaoğlu, pp. 409-413.

²⁷ The young assassin's name was Gavrilo Princip. Jelavich and Jelavich, p. 77.

²⁸ Castellan, p. 395.

²⁹ England had attempted to prevent the escalation of tensions through diplomatic channels, but was unsuccessful in these efforts. Armaoğlu, p. 415.

³⁰ One event that contributed significantly to eventual hostilities was the secret alliance between the German and Ottoman governments signed on August 2, 1914. For the text of this agreement, see M. Cemil Bilsel, *Lozan*, vol.1 (İstanbul: Ahmet İhsan Matbaası, 1933), p. 154.

The European governments' being in a state of such confusion and even going to war with each other naturally caused the nations of the Far East to mobilize for action, and eventually drew them into the conflict. Finally, the United States joined in as well from across the Atlantic.

Within a short time the war spread to encircle the globe, proving to be nothing short of disastrous for Europe as a whole. Of greatest relevance to our topic area, this major event was the cause of the simultaneous downfall of the three great empires: the Ottoman, Russian, and Habsburg empires, each of which had previously played a dominant role in Balkan history. World War I brought completion to the process of national consolidation of the Balkan nations. However, while to some degree involved, the Balkan region remained a secondary field of military activity; Serbia was the only belligerent among the Balkan states. The others waited and weighed the developments.

World War I held a special significance for the Ottoman state. Bowing to internal and external pressures, the Ottomans went to war on the side of the Central Powers. This would prove to be the single most determining factor in the ultimate collapse of the Empire. This once-powerful empire had joined the camp of the Central Powers, and hence participated in their defeat, but with even more ruinous consequences than was true for other nations of that alliance. It was soon to embark on a fight for its own existence and independence against an array of unified nations, a battle that would in many respects resemble that which the Balkan nations had at one time carried out against the Ottomans themselves. The result of this effort was the formation of a new national entity, the independent Turkish Republic, which was to join the international order at war's end.

Bulgaria, Rumania, and Greece were the other Balkan nations drawn into the war as combatants. The Central Powers were in need of Bulgarian assistance against Serbia, while the Allies had offered Bulgaria parts of Thrace and Macedonia in return for its collaboration against the Central Powers. Bulgaria was thus in a good

position to bargain. Ultimately, Bulgaria became an active ally of the Central Powers in 1915 because of the Bulgarian king's pro-German sympathies.

Romania was another state to join the conflict under the guidance of the Great Powers. Similar to what happened with Bulgaria, Romania was offered Bessarabia by the Central Powers, and Transylvania by the Allies. The second of these two choices was clearly more attractive, and so Romania entered the war on the side of the Allies in 1916. Not only did it back the eventual winner, but in the mean time Romanian troops had entered Bessarabia. By the end of the war, therefore, Romania was at a great advantage. At the peace conference, she was already in possession of one of her unredeemed territories and had been promised others.³¹

Greece was forced into the war on the side of the Allies after Franco-British forces occupied her territory, seized her navy, blockaded her coasts, and deposed her monarch.³² Greece was in a difficult position on the question of participation in the war because of dissenting opinions within the government and public opinion.³³ In 1915, Eleftherios Venizelos (Greek statesman who was supported by Liberal Party) allowed the Allies to land troops in Thessaloniki. Then in October of 1916 Venizelos established a revolutionary government in a full break with the monarchy. With Constantine deposed, Greece entered the war in July of 1917.

At that point in the war, two events took place which greatly influenced the future course of the war. On March 13, 1917, a revolution broke out in Russia; and on April 6, the United States entered the war on the side of the Allies. The Balkan Peninsula was most particularly affected by these developments.

A new power in relation to Europe and the Balkans began to make its appearance from the start of World War I, the United States. The significance of the entrance of the United States into the conflict was related not only to the role which

³¹ Jelavich and Jelavich, p. 79.

³² Gewehr, p. 95.

³³ King Constantine of Greece was the German Emperor's brother-in-law, while Venizelos, its Premier, favored the Allies; this caused a deep split in public opinion.

its wealth and military strength played in the achievement of final victory, but also to the influence of Wilson's ideas³⁴ on foreign relations within the context of the peace settlement.³⁵

The other Great Power of Europe and the Balkans, Russia, was thrown into chaos by war and revolution, and soon was no longer in a position to play a role in European diplomacy.

The Peace Settlement and the Balkan States after the War

The Central Powers were defeated at the end of World War I. The crumbling of the Central Powers' Balkan flank had as disastrous an effect on the Habsburg Empire as on the other empires. The Habsburg Empire literally came apart into its ethnic components, each of which now aimed at gaining complete political independence. With the elimination of some of the Great Powers from European diplomacy, namely Russia, the Ottoman Empire, and Austria-Hungary, peace treaties were drawn up by the four victorious nations, the United States, Great Britain, France, and Italy. The Balkan region would acquire its post-war configuration through the agreements devised by the leaders of these nations. In respect to the Balkans, at least, the new order put into place by these peace agreements may be seen as reflecting a compromise between nationalist impulses on the one hand, and the victorious nations' economic and political interests interpreted in the light of nineteenth-century attitudes, on the other.

The Habsburg Empire, which had once played a deciding role in political developments in Europe and the Balkans, disappeared from the stage of history by the end of the war, and this created the context for new possibilities in the Balkans. New nations such as Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia were born

³⁴ See material on the Fourteen Points of Woodrow Wilson in William Archer's *The Peace President* (New York: H. Holt and Company, 1919), pp. 115-118.

³⁵ Jelavich and Jelavich, p. 80.

and allowed to flourish in the territory left by the expiring Austro-Hungarian Empire. Later developments in Yugoslavia are particularly interesting when examined in light of this history of its founding.

The Serbs and the Yugo-Slavs (Southern Slavs), who had been intent on shoring up their autonomy and making their existence known and accepted internationally from the end of the nineteenth century, adopted the notion of founding their own states. They were aware that this would prove difficult, that there were obstacles to be overcome, and that they could be prevented from making their dream a reality. Religious differences could be especially problematic in forming a unified state.³⁶ Moreover, it could be most difficult to bring all the Slavs together. On the other hand, the demise of the Austria-Hungarian Empire did create the possibility for its former communities to come together and act jointly. On June 20, 1917, when the war had not yet ended, the first steps were taken for the island of Corfu. The Serbs, the Montenegrans, and the Habsburg Empire's Southern Slavs sent delegates in preparation for transforming themselves into future independent states.³⁷ In 1918, the Yugo-Slav National Council (*Narodno Viece*) met in Zagreb and launched a campaign that would lead to its being officially recognized as a national government.³⁸ The Versailles Peace Conference of 1919 gave this new nation its final form.³⁹

In spite of its having been officially recognized, this new state's borders were redrawn by the pacts of Neuilly, St. Germain, and Trianon before at last emerging onto the international stage under the name "Serbo-Croatian and Slovenian Kingdom."⁴⁰ At the end of long exertions, the Southern Slavs had been gathered under one flag. However, economic, social, and political conflicts still remained.

³⁶ The Serbs were Orthodox, the Slovenes and Croats were Catholic, and there was also a large number of Muslims, most of which were also known as, the Bosniacs.

³⁷ Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, p. 618.

³⁸ Castellan, p. 415.

³⁹ Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, p. 619.

⁴⁰ This new nation was known as the Serb-Croat and Sloven Kingdom before becoming officially known as Yugoslavia in 1929.

Religious differences, which had separated the Serbs from the Croats up to that time, created tensions that reemerged immediately after the founding of the new state. The Croats felt that the rights that they had been able to obtain were insufficient and, insisting on total autonomy, turned away from democratic institutions in favor of dictatorship, as was also the case in other Balkan nations. On January 9, 1929, the parliament was dissolved, and a period of rule by the King and his autocracy began.⁴¹

World War I gave birth to some nations and transformed the status and circumstances of others. Romania, which came out of the war on the winning side, appears to have gained the most among Balkan nations in the post-war allotment of territory. Its territory was expanded by acquiring significant portions of Southern Dobrudja from Bulgaria, Bessarabia from Russia, and Transylvania from Hungary.⁴² Although Greece also finished the war on the winning side, it emerged somewhat battered from its venture in Western Anatolia. As mentioned above, Albania's right to independent existence had been recognized before the war, but its borders were not clearly fixed until afterwards.

Bulgaria was perhaps the most hurt by the war among nations on the losing side,⁴³ since it was forced to give up Southern Dobrudja to Romania, parts of Western Trace to Greece, and large parts of Macedonia to Yugoslavia. This situation has remained as thorn on its side, a constant irritant, which Bulgaria has everafter sought to remedy at every possible opportunity.

The Ottoman state had gone into the war as an empire, and, after waging battle on many fronts, emerged from it relegated to a considerably smaller territorial area limited to Anatolia. The war brought to an end the "empire" chapter of its history, a fate it shared with other pre-war empires. The Treaty of Mudros of October 30, 1918 imposed a ceasefire on the Ottoman Empire and removed all rights

⁴¹ Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, pp. 627-629.

⁴² Seton-Watson, *A History of the Roumanians*, pp. 541-550.

⁴³ On the Treaty of Neuilly, which Bulgaria was forced into signing at the end of the First World War, see Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, pp. 578-580.

that defined it as an independent nation. As was the case with other defeated nations, the Turks did not accept the conditions imposed on it.⁴⁴ They decided to fight for their existence, an effort which would ultimately mean bringing an all- new national entity into existence from practically nothing.

Aside from the issue of modifications to borders, which occurred continuously following each successive war in the Balkans, the real problems confronting the region in the aftermath of World War I were those felt in the daily lives of the general population. This was a context in which economies were crippled, ethnic differences had turned into points of conflict or hostility, and national feeling had reached a high pitch of intensity. The Balkan nations had been drawn into a global war before having attained full institutional and political equilibrium as states; thus it was natural that they should face internal weaknesses and instability after the war.

In the new order which followed World War One, most of the Balkan nations were able to attain the objectives that they had desired for almost a century. They had done this by adopting the nation-state model, which implied bringing each state's people together within common borders. Yet in spite of achieving the appearance of this model, they were faced with a certain number of domestic and international problems. There were weaknesses in the economies that these nations would have difficulty remedying: income inequality, a lack of investment capital, unemployment, and inadequacies of supply and demand. In general, the economic principles of nineteenth century Europe continued in force into the twentieth. The demise of the Empires did not mean the end of imperialism; in fact, the imperialist roles in world politics were more than filled by the new actors who took their places.

⁴⁴ Following the Treaty of Mudros of October 30, 1918 and the later Treaty of Sèvres, which was signed by the Ottoman government and the Allies on August 20, 1920, but never ratified by Ankara government, Turkey would embark on its struggle for national existence which was to continue until its independent status was recognized by the Lausanne Treaty in July 24, 1923. See "Treaty of Mudros and Treaty of Sèvres, " in Nihat Erim, *Devletlerarası Hukuku ve Siyasi Tarih Metinleri* (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Yayınları, 1953), pp. 519-691.

After the new order had been established, there was a sort of distribution of nations in respect to which each major power would seek to advance its own interests and enforce its own principles, as well as to serve more or less as patron or guarantor. For example, while France managed to get political leverage over Yugoslavia and Romania, England sought to extend its influence into the Eastern Mediterranean in order to regain some of the position it had held there in the nineteenth century. With this in mind, England increased the tempo of its talks with Greece. Italy turned its attention to the Eastern Mediterranean and the coasts of the Adriatic, while Germany began to investigate various possibilities in Eastern Europe. It could hardly be claimed that this distribution of influence and influence-seeking was a healthy or acceptable practice. In such an atmosphere, multiple interests continually confronted one another and clashed, and changes in infrastructure were accompanied by acts of aggression and imperialism that were no different from those that had been common before the war. With the international economic crash of the 1930s, the new nations that were weak in comparison to industrialized Europe, including Eastern Europe and the Balkans, came under the economic domination of the Great Powers.

At the same time, new political attitudes and systems were emerging during this period in Europe. Likewise, in the Balkans, democratic institutions were pushed aside, replaced by monarchist, military, or authoritarian regimes, which came to power with the claim that “strong administration makes a strong state.” However, they came in with no real ideological authority and thus were unable to garner support from their citizenry. In such conditions they were far from attaining the same level of military or economic performance that the other powers had been able to achieve.⁴⁵

For example, in Yugoslavia, the veering toward nationalist extremism and dictatorship is partially explained by the need to gain control over minority

⁴⁵Oral Sander, *Balkan Gelişmeleri ve Türkiye, 1945-1965* (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1969), p. 6.

problems. Pressure exerted by the Croats, who had been calling for federation since 1929, led the Yugoslav King Alexander to dissolve the parliament and establish a dictatorship. In the years that followed, during the Stoiadinovic period, Yugoslavia would collaborate with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy.⁴⁶

Romania's political scene was dominated by the Peasants' Party and the Liberal Party, yet this country, too, was to feel the effects of Nazism and fascism spreading throughout Europe and beyond. Bulgaria, for its part, had been one of the least favored nations in the recent past, having suffered tremendous losses as a result of finding itself on the losing side at the end of both the Balkan Wars and World War I. This circumstance would form the basis of Bulgaria's foreign policy, and its government would continually seek opportunities to ameliorate its position. Bulgaria's political cadres were also affected by the above developments. While they resorted to some fairly radical tactics during the period of Alexandr Stambuliisky, the monarchist dictatorship style of government soon swept Bulgaria as well with all its harshness.⁴⁷

Greece was ruled by a monarchy from 1924. It took a turn towards republicanism with the ascension and political interventions of Venizelos, but would nonetheless continue to experience military dictatorships in the years to come.⁴⁸

The Ottoman State suffered severe losses in the process of transforming itself into the new Turkish state. Yet this did not prevent the new nation from struggling to conform to the conditions of the new international order. In this process Turkey was assisted by the unity and of her population following her transformation from a multinational empire to a nation-state.

Turkey undoubtedly underwent the most profound changes of all Balkan nations following World War I. This new nation emerged victorious from its war of national liberation, which lasted from 1918 to 1922, and starting in 1923 it embarked

⁴⁶ Stavrianos, *The Balkans Since 1453*, pp. 629-631.

⁴⁷ Gewehr, p. 101.

⁴⁸ On divisiveness in Greece during this period, see Castellan, pp. 439-443.

on a multi-faceted renewal and rebuilding process. With the Lausanne Treaty, signed on July 24, 1923,⁴⁹ Turkey was able to settle most of the unresolved issues left over from World War I as well as to put forth its own political program, having been internationally recognized as a nation state. Turkey's political choices involved adopting a western-style democratic system. Its commitment to this option stands out as a rare example among nations of the region. Both the War of Liberation and the work of rebuilding that followed it to produce the new state both took place under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. The objectives adopted after this period involved preserving and consolidation of the democratic system and maintaining stability within the country and in the region.

The Balkans Between the Two World Wars and the Balkan Entente

While the nineteenth century was the period in which the Balkans found a new place in history by attaining national independence, the first quarter of the twentieth century may be considered a time of their defending and strengthening that new status. Indeed, the Balkan nations worked to consolidate their economic and political stability, and thus to take their place in the new world order whose outlines emerged at Versailles at the end of World War I. The period leading up to World War II could be called one of "temporary peace"; however, it could be said that the essential dynamics of the balance of powers continued along the lines of that which had prevailed in the nineteenth century. While from the Great Powers' point of view various changes had brought new players to be reckoned with during the 1920s, it is clear that there was a tendency to form two major groups. One group, led by Britain

⁴⁹ For more details on the Lausanne Treaty, see Seha Meray, *Lozan Barış Konferansı--Tutanaklar, Belgeler* (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1993); see also M. Cemil Bilsel, *Lozan* (İstanbul: Ahmet İhsan Matbaası, 1933); İsmail Soysal, *Türkiye'nin Siyasal Antlaşmaları* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1989) pp. 85-242.

and France, consisted of nations that had come out of the war as winners and were satisfied with the new order imposed by the peace conditions that ensued. The other group was made up of the vanquished nations, led by Germany, which were dissatisfied with that new order. This bloc formation process began to manifest itself immediately after the War, and the Balkan nations were caught up in that trend, unable to resist being drawn into its polarizing force fields.

Turning to the issue of the Great Powers' activities in the Balkans, the USSR's struggle to establish and protect its communist regime kept it busy with internal problems while Germany, for its part, had not recovered from the sting of defeat. These factors, among others, caused the first of the two groups mentioned above to be the more active in the Balkans. While France was hoping to acquire a position of political patronage over the Serbian-Croatian-Slovenian Kingdom and Latin Romania, Britain strove to carry forward its nineteenth century policies by taking an interest in the affairs of Greece, which was an important military base for England in the Eastern Mediterranean in addition to the fact that it commanded a key position due to its proximity to the Straits. For its part, Italy did not find the Versailles settlement to be particularly attractive, and was concerned about Greece and Yugoslavia's presence in the Adriatic.⁵⁰

After World War I, France's economic and political influence in Europe outweighed that of its neighbors. With its Eastern army stationed in the Balkan region up until 1920, France's position in the new order taking shape in the Balkans appeared to be pre-eminent, a situation that found general acceptance in the region. The scope of political visions could be summarized in the following terms: "to establish close ties with France, which clearly took the lead internationally in the areas of civil life, industrial advancement, and parliamentary regimes, and in making these institutions strong, stable, and effective."⁵¹

⁵⁰ Castellan, p. 452.

⁵¹ Akşin and Fırat, p. 101.

As a first concrete step in the pursuit of the above-mentioned principles, an alliance was formed which confirmed France's authority and leadership in the Balkans. While this alliance, known as the "Little Entente," was enacted primarily with the goal of preserving the status quo in Central Europe, there is no doubt that it gained additional significance by bringing greater unity to the area as well as by promoting regional peace.⁵² When the Czech Foreign Minister E. Benes mentioned the possibility of drawing up such an alliance, France showed the most interest in the idea, and proceeded to play the most active role in bringing it to fruition. The entente was brought into being in 1921, involving Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia. Later, France formed bilateral alliances with Romania (1926), and Yugoslavia (1927), which in effect conferred upon them a supporting role vis-à-vis France's policies in the Balkans.

Throughout these years, France and the nations of the Little Entente would act in concert regarding all developments in the international political arena, thus making the "preservation of the European order" a primary goal.⁵³ This alliance, which encompassed the Balkans and the Danube region, attained permanent status in 1933. However, it could not be said to have secured any concrete success since it was unable to bring about economic cooperation or to mediate disputes between participant states and their neighbors. Still, it might have served as a precedent for a future Balkan alliance.

In spite of all the unfortunate circumstances that separated them, the Balkan nations expended great energies toward the pressing goal of improving mutual cooperation. In fact, the history of such efforts may be traced back prior to this period. In 1912, Balkan statesmen pushed aside the Great Powers themselves in order to form their own Balkan League and unify themselves against the Ottoman state. However, this initiative did not prove long-lasting. It was brought to an end

⁵² Armaoğlu, pp. 502-505.

⁵³ It was in this way that a block which supported the status quo and the anti-revisionist position emerged on its own from the Danube region. *Ibid.*, p. 504.

by misunderstandings and disputes among the Balkan states, as so often had been the case in the history of the region. This episode is an example of how Balkan alliances tended to be created primarily with specific military goals in mind, and is one of the reasons why cooperation among the Balkan states was unlikely to be a durable proposition --a reality that has carried forward to our day.

The 1930s could be characterized as a period in which both domestic and foreign developments led to a drive for alliance-building. Most of the Balkan states decided that it was more productive to put old enmities behind them, form a bloc, and act in concert; thus they were prepared to enter an alliance, suggested or imposed as it were by both foreign and domestic conditions. The importance of international events in bringing the Balkans to the threshold of such alliances cannot be underestimated. The international context in the making was, first and foremost, one that tended toward a polarization of positions. The European states began to gravitate toward one of two groups, revisionist or anti-revisionist. The states of the former group worked constantly to change or modify the global order which had emerged at the end of World War I; this explains why most of the Balkan states came out against this position.

The variability of conditions on the international scene greatly outpaced the rate of change witnessed during the 1920s. One cause of this volatility was the fact that some states that had managed to put their own houses in order began to take more active roles in international politics. In the period under examination the activities of the National Socialist Party resulted in its coming to power in 1933 and, with the ample support of its electorate, began to push Germany into taking a more aggressive posture in its international relations.⁵⁴ In this way, Germany emerged as a potent force in the international arena of the 1930s, and neighboring nations began to design their foreign policies with this new power in mind. German foreign policy began to reflect new goals with Hitler's leadership. Among these goals were the

⁵⁴ Burhan Oğuz *Yüzyıllar Boyunca Alman Gerçeği ve Türkler* (İstanbul: Can Matbaası, 1983).

following: to contest the authority of the Versailles Pact which Germany had been compelled to sign, in order to free itself from the regulations imposed by the Pact; to gather all ethnic Germans living outside of Germany into one nation under the axiom “*Ein Volk, Ein Reich*” (One Nation, One People); and to pursue a policy, under the name “*Lebensraum*” (living zone), of expanding Germany’s borders to include areas upon which it had imperialist designs.⁵⁵ These policies clearly show what a serious threat Germany had become within its own territory, not to mention all of Europe, where its plans to become reality.

It should be noted that the Balkans were feeling the growing impact of Soviet influence alongside that of Germany. The Soviet Union, which had come through the economic crash of 1929 almost entirely unaffected, ignored the dangers posed by criticisms of its political regime and sought to define a decision-making role for itself in the Balkans.

In addition to the above states which exercised their influence in the Balkans, Benito Mussolini came to power in Italy in 1922 and began to practice an imperialist policy from the moment he took office. This was a development of great significance for the Balkans. Mussolini advocated a colonialist movement according to the slogan, “return of the Roman Empire.” He managed to revive this notion, which harkened back to the era before World War I, and elevated it to the level of a national ideal. In line with this ideal, his calling the Mediterranean “*Mare Nostrum*” (Our Sea) was a clear indication of his great interest in the region.⁵⁶

In addition to propagating their political objectives, these nations worked to establish zones of influence in the regions of their choice, zones in which to inject their views and political goals, and even to impose their own regimes as hegemonic. Such behavior was one of the reasons why fascist models were adopted to take the place of the democratic structures abandoned during the 1930s.⁵⁷

⁵⁵ Armaoğlu, pp. 555-556.

⁵⁶ Maxwell H.H., MacCartney and Paul Cremona, *Italy's Foreign and Colonial Policy (1914–1937)* (London: Oxford University Press, 1938), p. 93.

⁵⁷ Akşin and Fırat, p. 101.

The fact that the League of Nations did not have the necessary authority to protect the established order as well as existing borders was one reason why less-powerful nations such as those in the Balkans drew together in order to present a common front. To this new factor one may add the Little Entente, as well as the Locarno Agreement, which dated from this period, the Kellogg Pact and the Litvinov Protocol. These arrangements would serve as paradigms of Balkan unity and cooperation.⁵⁸

The economic Depression of 1929 was felt throughout the world, and the Balkans, as agricultural nations, were particularly hard hit. This was yet another factor which pulled them together. Thus the first link in the chain of causes driving the Balkans toward greater unity occurred in the late 1920s. The spadework in preparation for the actual convening of the Balkan Conferences, which were the first semi-official step toward a possible Balkan Confederation, took place at the Twenty-Seventh Universal Conference of Peace, held in Athens, October 6-10, 1929.⁵⁹ The architect of this movement, whose first goals aimed at economic and cultural cooperation, was the former Greek Prime Minister Alexandros Papanastasiou.

In the opening address, a former President of the Council of Ministers of Greece, Papanastasiou emphasized the necessity of a union between the Balkan states in the following terms: "the destinies of these (Balkan) peoples and their vicissitudes have been similar or common; they have lived for centuries within the framework of the same political organizations; they have similar habits and ideas and sufficiently common interests; in a word, they present numerous common elements which facilitate their union."⁶⁰

With these words, the effort to establish Balkan cooperation was launched in 1930. This undertaking would gain strength as it proceeded within the framework of

⁵⁸ The Locarno Agreement, the Kellogg Pact, and the Litvinov Protocol were all efforts on Europe's behalf to preserve the peace. Armaoğlu, p. 655-656.

⁵⁹ See Robert Joseph Kerner and Harry Nicholas Howard, *The Balkan Conferences and the Balkan Entente (1930-1935)* (Berkeley: California University Press, 1936), p. 25.

⁶⁰ Akşin and Fırat, p.101.

the Balkan Conferences for four consecutive years, up to the articulation of the Balkan Entente in 1934.

In fact, the Balkan nations began to draw together from the second half of the 1920s, during which time they began to seek agreements mostly related to economic matters. These economic cooperation agreements, which began to take concrete form in 1926, continued to be pursued and developed uninterrupted until the Balkan Entente of 1934.⁶¹

The idea of a Balkan union met with general and enthusiastic approval and, at the end of the Peace Congress, the condition of annual Balkan Conferences was stipulated, whose mission it would be to study all questions of common interest to the Balkan peoples. It was also urged that the League of Nations create an Institute of Balkan Cooperation.⁶²

On October 5, 1930, the First Balkan Conference opened in Athens, attended by Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey, Yugoslavia, and Greece. Its purpose was to “contribute to the rapprochement and collaboration of the Balkan Peoples in their economic, social, intellectual and political relations in order to direct this rapprochement ultimately toward the union of the Balkan States.”⁶³ One of the most salient points of this conference was the decision of the Balkan nations in favor of a Balkan Pact, which meant that their cooperation was to extend beyond other domains to the political one as well.⁶⁴ However, conferences among the Balkan states held after this date showed that this political unity would not be easily achieved.

⁶¹ Ibid., p. 22.

⁶² A more detailed project was presented to the First Balkan Conference. This Institute would be composed of six sections: education, ecclesiastical affairs, the press, propaganda, and political and women’s activities. Theodore I. Geshkoff, *Balkan Union: A Road to Peace in Southeastern Europe* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1940), pp. 79-80.

⁶³ Kerner and Howard, p. 31.

⁶⁴ For detailed information on and a list of the decisions made at the First Balkan Conference, see Kerner and Howard in the appendix.

In 1931, the Second Balkan Conference convened in Istanbul. When items related to the fundamental purpose of the conference came up for discussion, the revisionist and anti-revisionist positions separating these nations began to make themselves felt.⁶⁵ During the course of the Second Balkan Conference, the problems that had existed between Turkey and Greece seemed to have been largely resolved.⁶⁶ This made it possible for these two nations, both of which upheld the principle of preserving the status quo in the Balkans, to take leadership positions in furthering the goal of Balkan unity. However, Albania and Bulgaria showed intransigence in their revisionist inclinations during the Conference, which would have the result of making any sort of Balkan federation seem unlikely indeed.

The Third Balkan Conference met in Bucharest on October 22, 1932. This conference was marked by several interesting developments. The conference's agenda had been well prepared and many issues had been studied in detail, particularly those related to the Balkan Pact, economic collaboration, the status of Balkan nationals, and the possibility of some sort of legal unification in the Balkans.⁶⁷ But the Bulgarian group touched off a crisis by withdrawing from the conference because of its minorities problem and also to protest the issue of the juridical equality of the states.⁶⁸ While this attitude of Bulgaria's had, from one day to the next, the power to foreclose the possibility of a Balkan Pact encompassing all the Balkan nations, still Greece and Turkey continued their joint efforts in the cause of Balkan cooperation throughout the conference.

The year 1933 brought new developments to the international scene. The National Socialist Party came to power in Germany, while Italy accelerated its actions in the Mediterranean and its threatening behavior was directed at various

⁶⁵ On the events of the First Balkan Conference, see Geshkoff, pp. 91-99 ; Kerner and Howard, pp. 45-64.

⁶⁶ Baskin Oran, *Türk-Yunan İlişkilerinde Batı Trakya Sorunu* (İstanbul: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1991)

⁶⁷ Geshkoff, pp. 99-103; Kerner and Howard pp. 68-90.

⁶⁸ Kerner and Howard, p. 75.

states of the region. These events left the Balkan nations with no choice but to go into action. Taking yet another step in pursuit of Balkan political unity, Turkey and Greece signed the Greco-Turkish Pact (*Pacte d'Entente Cordiale*) on September 14, 1933.⁶⁹ These two nations, which had been at all-out war with one another in the recent past, succeeded in establishing a mutual accord with the help of an agreement which defined and guaranteed their borders. From that point on they joined forces to play a major role in the process leading to a Balkan alliance. The year 1933 was one in which the Balkan nations continued to draw ever closer by signing various bilateral agreements. Such agreements involving Turkey, Romania, Greece, and Yugoslavia thus constituted a major phase in the process which led up to the Balkan Entente.⁷⁰

At the Fourth Balkan Conference, which convened on November 5-11, 1933 in Thessaloniki, Bulgaria and Albania maintained their revisionist line, advocating modifications of the Neuilly Pact. Nonetheless, all the Balkan states except Albania, which was being pressured by Italy and Bulgaria, supported the concept of the Balkan Pact. They thus moved the process forward, making it a practical reality only a few months later.

The Pact of the Balkan Entente was initiated in Belgrade on February 4, 1934 and solemnly signed at the capital of Greece, Athens, on February 9 by the four Balkan states, Turkey, Greece, Romania, and Yugoslavia. The most important item contained in the pact was that binding all signatory nations to guarantee one

⁶⁹ While this agreement was a significant step in the process leading to the Balkan Entente, Bulgaria interpreted the Entente Cordiale as counter to its interests, particularly as it appeared to block Bulgaria's access to the Aegean. Bulgaria voiced these objections, and in response, the President of the Turkish Republic İsmet İnönü and Foreign Affairs Minister Tevfik Rüştü Aras made a visit to Sofia in hopes of mollifying its concerns. Mehmet Gönlübol and Cem Sar, *Atatürk ve Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası, 1919-1939* (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Basımevi, 1963), pp. 98-99. See also, on the Greco-Turkish Pact of September 14, 1933, Kernerand Howard, "The Balkan Conferences and the Balkan Entente," *Document XII*, p. 231.

⁷⁰ Mehmet Gönlübol and Cem Sar, *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası 1919-1973*, vol.1 (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1982), p. 106.

another's borders,⁷¹ which meant that the various participating nations undertook to protect their neighbors not only against foreign aggression, but also in the event that one Balkan nation should transgress the territorial integrity of another.

Other significant features of the pact included those indicating that where "member states' common interests" were involved, they resolved to inform one another of planned actions and, furthermore, would not take any action against any other Balkan state (for example, Bulgaria or Albania) without first making such plans public; and, finally, that they would not enter into any political obligations.

Although with the Balkan Entente of the mid-1930s a countervailing force which might balance European bloc formation was clearly set on track, no solid mechanism was set in place that might protect the member nations' borders from outside threats; this was, indeed, the weak point of the Pact. In response to the gravity of the situation presented by those revisionist-minded members among them, the remaining nations decided that they should at least form an alliance of as many nations possible, even if it would not include all of them, as a necessary measure to preserve the status quo.

Also, it should be kept in mind that, as another reason for support of the alliance, there was a general fear of a possible Bulgaria-Yugoslav rapprochement at some point, which might lead to the formation of a Slavic bloc.⁷² While the Balkan Conferences were still in progress, Bulgaria attempted to garner Albanian and Yugoslavian support with this end in mind. Greece and Turkey in particular intervened and were able to block this move on Bulgaria's part. But for how long could they succeed in preventing it?

⁷¹ For the text of the Balkan Pact of February 4, 1934, see Turkish Republic *Düstur*, Tertip III, vol.15 (Ankara: Başvekâlet Neşriyat Müdürlüğü, 1934), pp. 195-196. The English text may be found in *The New York Times*, February 18, 1934; the French text may be found in *Les Balkans*, vol. V, Nos. 1-2 (January-February, 1934), pp. 92-93; Resmi Gazete, 12 Mart 1934, no. 2651; İsmail Soysal, *Türkiye'nin Siyasal...* pp. 454-458.

⁷² Sander, p. 10-11. Also see Ali Hikmet Alp, "Balkan Paktı", *Türkiye Dış Politikasında Elli Yıl: Cumhuriyetin İlk On Yılı ve Balkan Paktı (1923-1934)* (Ankara: Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Dışişleri Bakanlığı Araştırma ve Siyaset Planlama Genel Müdürlüğü Yayınları, 1974), pp. 308-368; and Baskın Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası*. vol.1 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002), pp. 350-355.

It was under such conditions that certain weaknesses that emerged during the drafting of the Balkan Entente were present at its inception, preventing a common understanding to be fully realized among all the Balkan states. The major objection to the Pact came from a Balkan nation, Bulgaria, which held that the Entente constituted an association directed against itself. Nor was Italy, whose desires in the Balkans were mentioned above, happy with the pact. While France and England, as supporters of the status quo, were in favor of the pact, they were fearful that Bulgaria's standing alone in the Balkans might drive it closer to Italy or Germany. The Soviet Union did no more than to closely follow developments related to the pact. Germany's interest in the Balkans, however, would lead to its occupying nearly the entire region only a few years later.

When viewed in the light of developments just prior to World War II, the Balkan Entente may be seen as a successful collaboration. Since it was unable to build a powerful security system, this was an indicator of the fact that the region did not have a particularly active political role in events leading up to World War II. However much a common point of view was in evidence within the context of the League of Nations or during the pledges regarding the Straits at Montreux, the input of small nations like the Balkans was destined to remain limited. Starting in 1936, the nations of the Balkan Pact were not in a position to stand up against the larger nations' increasingly frequent acts of political and economic coercion and imperialism. Several forces conspired to drive the Balkan nations, one by one, toward the Italian and German side, starting with Germany's bringing the Balkans and the Middle East under its economic influence. There followed Italy's political maneuvers aimed at driving the Balkan nations apart; and, most importantly, the failure of the League of Nations to form a common defense system capable of blocking the incursions of the imperialist states, while the most powerful of the League nations, France and England, remained silent in the face of these events.

The most important repercussion of this situation was that the Balkan Entente was unable to preserve unity among the member nations. Thus it came as no

surprise when, in 1937, a rapprochement between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria went as far as to produce a friendship agreement, a move which undermined the integrity of the Entente.⁷³ Yugoslavia, desperate in the face of the Berlin-Rome Axis powers, resorted to signing an agreement with Italy and Bulgaria. Greece, for its part, was forced to moderate its position vis-à-vis Italy, which was steadily growing stronger. Although Turkey expended particularly great efforts to advocate the Balkan Entente, events leading to its dissolution unfolded swiftly and, during the last meeting in Belgrade in 1940, the Pact nations had to deal with the partition of a member nation, Romania.⁷⁴

To summarize, the Balkan region was in a rather sensitive position during that period marked by the specter of another world war on the horizon. Indeed, a look at their situation in the period immediately preceding the war suggests that it had become a veritable satellite of Germany. Romania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia were able to defend themselves while viewing Albania, under Italian occupation, as one front. Greece and Turkey, for their part, felt Italy to be a constant and imminent threat, and had reached the point of considering whether they should request that their agreements with England be strengthened into an alliance.

The Balkans during World War II

World War II was to be one of the important pages of human history ever written. This war, which started in 1939 and lasted until 1945, was in essence the outcome of problems, unsettled issues, and conflicts of interest left over from World War I, which had built up to the point of eventually erupting in Europe. New cracks

⁷³ Armaoğlu, pp. 658-659

⁷⁴ On Turkey's relations with the Balkan nations during this period, see Yusuf Sarıınay, "İki Dünya Savaşı Arası Dönemde Türkiye'nin Balkan Ülkeleri ile Münasebetleri, 1919-1939," *19 Mayıs Üniversitesi Eğitim Fakültesi Dergisi*, no.2. (Samsun: 19 Mayıs Üniversitesi Yayınları, 1988), pp. 231-258.

were appearing daily in the world order known as the Versailles system, which had emerged from the peace settlements following World War I. Although that system was able to endure until 1939, by that year it was clear that all hopes for keeping the peace were untenable. During this period, Hitler's Germany, the actions of which affected the foreign policy of not only Europe but the entire world, formed the Axis Group⁷⁵ by acting in concert with Italy. This set into motion the bloc-formation process which confronted the alliance between France and England as they struggled to meet the Axis challenge with their own efforts to preserve the status quo and the balance of power. For its part, the Soviet Union could be said to constitute own a block of its own.

The war broke out with the German assault on Poland on September 1, 1939 within this complex tangle of forces in Europe. Because of the promises they had given to Poland, France and England were forced to enter the war against Germany on September 3.

The war inevitably moved down to involve the Balkans, and lost no time in doing so. Sander summarizes the story of the Balkans in World War II as that of a region in which a battle between fascism and communism was played out, first in favor of the former; second, and finally, in favor of the latter.⁷⁶ Indeed, the German imperialist sweep started in Rumania, then spread to Bulgaria and Greece, and shortly included the entire Balkan region. Yugoslavia and Albania, on the Balkans' southern flank, were in a similar position; shortly, the German-Italian bloc were able to obtain some of its desired goals in those territories as well.

Looking at these developments overall, it may be said that outside of Turkish Thrace, the entire Balkan region had directly succumbed to fascist imperialism, and more specifically to German control. Yet if the Balkan

⁷⁵ Mussolini coined this term in a speech he gave in Milan on November 1, 1936: "The Berlin line is not a line of division but an axis along which all the European nations wishing for peace and cooperation may gather." It was to become the most frequently used word in international relations up until the end of World War II. Armaoğlu, p. 576.

⁷⁶ Sander, p. 15.

cooperation, instigated in the 1930s with such great effort and commitment, had been able to hold, would the German invasion of the Balkans have been as easy as it proved to be? In any case, Turkey, which had played a leadership role in making the Balkan Entente a reality in the beginning, once again took on that role with the hopes of reviving the Entente. In 1940, at the war's very start, the Turkish Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, at a meeting of the Balkan states in Belgrade, attempted to convince their allies of the "necessity to decide and act in concert" against the common threat they faced.⁷⁷ However, Turkey was unable to elicit much of a response; perhaps, under the circumstances, it was also acting with special tact so as not to provoke Germany. Turkey's efforts in this direction only found a positive response among the Allies a year later; England, in particular, supported these efforts of Turkey's from 1941 on.⁷⁸

The Balkan nations, during this period of imperialist occupation, were unable to draw together around a common theme or idea, much less articulate a mutual defense arrangement. Greece was a typical example of this tendency. Even while fighting for survival against the invading Germans, Greece was divided into different camps, the ELAS (National Peoples' Liberation Army) and the EDES (Greek Democratic National League). While the groups gathered under these two names had originally intended to work together, in time tensions arose between them and they split into separate camps.⁷⁹ Yugoslavia suffered a similar fate, separated as it was into two groups of very different political and methodological viewpoints, one known as the *Partisans* under Yugoslav Communist Party leader Josip Broz Tito and the other, known as the *Chetniks*, under Colonel of the General Staff of the Yugoslav Army, Draža Mihailovic. The Partisans' main goal was to start a grassroots movement, while the Chetniks represented an ethnic Serbian movement which used guerrilla tactics to force all of Yugoslavia to a showdown between itself and the

⁷⁷ Sarıay, p. 251.

⁷⁸ Sander, p. 16.

⁷⁹ Armaoğlu, p. 78.

Croats and Slovenes. While the Partisans' organization was communist and republican, the Chetniks were royalist and anti-communist.

An even larger issue separating these two groups had to do with Yugoslavia's future.⁸⁰ While the Chetniks defended the concept of a permanent Serbian majority in government, from which position the Serbs would govern and administer the other ethnic groups, the Partisan movement and its leader, Tito, constantly strove to remain above ethnic differences, promoting instead the principal ideal of a Yugoslavian state in which all the ethnic and religious groups within it would be protected.

The above developments were, on the one hand, examples of resistance to the occupying powers in the Balkans; on the other hand, they also furnished important indications of the shape of the new order to come in the war's aftermath. As for the balance of power in Europe, it seems that developments in the Balkans were to have a great influence in shaping the perceived interests and policies followed by England and the Soviet Union most especially after the war. While the United States took the lead among the Allies following its entry into the war in December of 1941, it did not show any particular interest in the Balkans, leaving the other two major powers, England and the Soviet Union, more room for movement in the region.

The Balkan region's importance to the Soviet Union throughout history has been noted in previous chapters. During specific periods in time, each development in the area has drawn special attention from the Soviets for its possible impact on Soviet interests. While the Soviet Union had for a time lost interest in or given secondary importance to the Balkan region because of its domestic situation especially just after World War I, it began to exercise a more vigorous interest in the area during World War II. While Hitler's Germany was involved in the drive to unite all of Europe against England, the Soviet Union was also urged to participate. In fact, it had earlier responded warmly to this suggestion. By 1939, the war not even

⁸⁰ Barbara Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 267-268.

yet begun, it had signed a non-aggression pact with Germany. Then, because of issues arising from the Balkans, the two sides began to take different positions starting in 1940, and by the summer of 1941 the two nations were at war.

According Armaoğlu, the Soviet Union had two objectives in forming an alliance with Germany. The first was the hope that a Russian-German accord would enable it to achieve its desired imperialist expansion; the second was that by leaving Germany and the West to confront each other, the two sides would wear one another down, thus leaving the Soviet Union robust and capable of spreading its communist order throughout the world more effectively.⁸¹ However, the Western bloc's member state, France, was put out of action almost immediately, and suddenly Germany's unequivocal dominance of Europe seemed imminent. The German threat then directed itself toward Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. In 1941 Germany declared war on the Soviet Union; but this war was to bring an end to Germany's supremacy in Europe. From this point on, the Soviet Union cooperated with the West up until the end of the war.

The first sign of the Soviet Union's more active policies in the Balkans was their taking Bessarabia from Romania. The western nations were not slow to respond to this alarm signal and undertook to counter this move. However, since no common strategy against the Soviet Union had been created in the Balkans, British Prime Minister Churchill had no choice but to sign an agreement with Soviet leader Stalin. With this agreement, the Balkans were to be divided up between the two powers into zones of influence; thus, as in so many cases in the past, the Great Powers would be able to function comfortably in the region. Since they were not even apprised of these decisions, the Balkan nations were left in the role of mere pawns, a status which would be highly determining in the post-war order in the region.

⁸¹ Armaoğlu, p. 694.

On October 9, 1944, as the war drew to a close, the two nations' leaders, Churchill and Stalin, met in Moscow and came to a secret agreement according to which the Balkans would be designated as pertaining to the two nations according to the following formulas: Romania would come under ninety percent Soviet influence, ten percent Allied influence; Greece would go ninety percent to the United States and England; while the nations lying in between them such as Yugoslavia and Hungary would be split fifty-fifty; Bulgaria would have seventy-five percent Soviet, and twenty-five percent British influence. These proportions were British Prime Minister Churchill's suggestion, and Stalin agreed to them without alteration.⁸² While this arrangement was originally intended to be binding only during war time, its substance and consequences continue into the 1990s. Also, whatever the justifications and the ways in which it has been used, the fact remains that this allocation became official over the heads of the Balkan nations and, indeed, without their even being present. The fact that this division was decided on and made official in secret but with the tacit approval of other nations means that competition for influence in the region was in full evidence during World War II as it had been throughout history up until that time, and would continue after the war as well.

The agreement made in 1944 helped the Soviets achieve a great deal of what they had desired in the region, and developments to follow would strengthen their claims all the more. Indeed, the areas over which the Soviet Union had significant influence during the period of this agreement were for the most part either under occupation or shortly about to be. In the period following this one the attitude of the powers in regard to the region was consistent with the arrangement in place.

During World War II, nearly all of the Balkan region came under occupation. All of the Balkan nations were damaged in some way by these occupations, and domestic political developments were very much affected by these conditions following the war. Turkey, the only nation which had succeeded in remaining on the

⁸² For more details on this settlement, see Winston S. Churchill, *The Second World War: Triumph and Tragedy* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1953), p. 227.

sidelines of all of these events, had endured all the political and economic pressures occasioned by the war, but had been able to maintain a consistent and rational foreign policy which preserved it from active engagement.⁸³ In spite of the decision, as part of the British-French-Turkish alliance of October 19, 1939, that the latter nation “must enter the war if it spreads to the Aegean,” Turkey was nonetheless able to maintain its non-participant position.⁸⁴

Greece was occupied by Italy at the very beginning of the war, then later by Germany. Thus it, too, was to experience in full measure the afflictions of war, whether during the war itself or due to internal problems well after its end. Of course, the Western powers’ taking Greece as an ally was of considerable help in rescuing Greece from its woes.

Albania, for its part, remained for a long time under Italian control. Its neighbor, Yugoslavia, quickly came under German occupation following an anti-German coup within its government, and was subsequently entirely shared out among the German allies.

Bulgaria, representative of the revisionist position among the Balkans, entered the war on Germany’s side, but was minimally affected by the war even so. The Bulgarians were thus among the most fortunate beneficiaries of the conditions that existed among the Central Powers. With Germany’s support, Bulgaria occupied certain territories over which it had wanted control; however, this action did not have a positive outcome. Towards the end of the war, Bulgaria fell into the Soviet orbit simultaneously with Germany’s retreat in the face of the Soviet Union.

Romania was another nation which experienced great misfortune in the war. A large part of its territories were occupied by the Soviet Union, Hungary, and Bulgaria.

⁸³ On the efforts to bring Turkey into World War II, see Kamuran Gürün, “Türkiye’yi II. Dünya Savaşına Sokma Çabaları,” *Bellekten*, Atatürk Özel Sayısı, vol. 52, no. 204 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1988).

⁸⁴ Rıfıkı Salim Burçak, “Türk, İngiliz, Fransız İttifakı,” *Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi*, vol. IV (Ankara, 1949), pp. 369-371. For the text of the agreement, see Turkish Republic *Düstur*, II. Tertip, vol. 21 (Ankara: Başvekâlet Neşriyat Müdürlüğü, 1940) pp. 15-18.

In 1945, World War II was nearing its end and, during this period in which the Allies' victory seemed ever more likely, claims and desires regarding the Balkans took on new clarity while negotiation began in earnest. Objectives which had been concealed as much as possible in the complexity and confusion of the war were now articulated even as the light of victory made them all the more obvious. The Yalta Conference of February 4–11, 1945, which was organized to reinforce the new context of peace was, in addition, both a setting in which those objectives took on certain authority, and was also the first official meeting in which the cracks in the alliance began to show. At the Conference, attended by United States President Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Churchill, and Soviet leader Stalin, the broad lines of the new world order were largely defined under the direction of the Allies. Within that framework, the most significant element was signs that the Soviet Union was poised to constitute a new threat for Europe. The US's choice to withdraw from Europe after the war meant that Europe was left alone to face this threat. In fact, the Yalta Conference spelled the end of the "Great Alliance," as well as the end of cooperation and the start of a new era of competition and contestation.

In the days following the Yalta Conference, another meeting to define the new order was held in Potsdam on July 17-August 2, 1945, when Germany had just withdrawn from the war. This meeting was crucial for determining both the immediate fates of the losing nations such as Germany and Italy and the shape of the new Europe. From the perspective of the topic, it is evident that efforts would be made to ensure that the Balkans' new position would be determined according to the above-mentioned "percentage" formulas and, to a great degree, along the lines of the Soviet Union's desiderata. From this point on, the major powers' behavior in regard to the Balkans would reflect this status quo.

Another key item on the Potsdam agenda had to do with certain desires regarding the Straits, the first time this issue was raised in these conferences. One of

the most striking examples of the new Soviet policies following the war was the discussion of this issue going so far as to include the possibility that this route of passage, under Turkish sovereignty, be put under a common defense system.

In the first of several meetings of the Allies following the Potsdam Conference and which took the form of the Council of Foreign Ministers, it became clear that two blocs had been formed, the Western and the Eastern. Because of the Eastern bloc's wish to extend itself to the South, the Balkans became the setting for the West's efforts to prevent this wish from becoming reality. Thus it was that the Cold War infiltrated into the Balkan region which, even after World War II, retained its erstwhile epithet of "powder keg."

CHAPTER FIVE

THE BALKANS DURING THE COLD WAR

The Balkans Within a Newly Polarized World Order

During the period following World War II known as the Cold War the Balkans' situation could be described as being caught between the Eastern (Soviet) and Western Blocks within a bi-polar world order.

As noted in the previous chapter, philosophical and political differences of opinion among the Allies, which had become apparent as World War II in Europe drew to a close, were reflected in the peace treaties and pacts which ended it. The Balkans were among the regions drawn into the power struggle that emerged from these differences of view point. To the extent that the Balkans' place within this struggle was unclear, the occupying armies were in a position to make determinations regarding the political directions to be taken by various areas of Eastern and Central Europe. Soviet leader Joseph Stalin is on record for the following assessment, which he confided to Yugoslav State Premier Josip Broz Tito: "This war is different from past wars. Armies occupying given regions will impose their own social order, and in this way each state will spread its (political) system to such areas as may be controlled by its armies; no other solution seems plausible."¹ And it was within this conceptual and structural context of the postwar period that Winston Churchill spoke of the military and ideological "Iron Curtain" that henceforth divided the Balkan Peninsula.²

¹ Milovan Djilas, *Conversation with Stalin* (New York: Penguin, 1962), p. 114. See also Barbara Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, vol. 2, p. 301.

² Bruce R. Kuniholm, *The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East, Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), pp. 315-316.

Against the backdrop of the highly complex political picture presented by the post-war Balkans, communist parties of the region began to occupy positions in the region's governments over a four year period starting in 1944. In the following interval, from 1949 to 1953, all the communist parties of the region openly declared their allegiance to Moscow; in this way, a multi-block structure was replaced by an essentially bi-polar one.³ Specifically, Greece had been drawn into the Western sphere of influence-one which Turkey was also beginning to sense with increasing intensity-while Bulgaria, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Albania had been drawn under Soviet influence.

It is probably incorrect to assume that pressure from the Soviet Union, or from the Red Army's having occupied the region, was solely responsible for the Balkan nations' increasing inclination toward communist regimes. While this process was no doubt affected by external factors, it also owed much to internal dynamics. For example, the communist parties of Bulgaria and Yugoslavia were viable political agents from the time of these nations' founding in the 1920s; from then on they gathered strength and recognition among ever wider sections of the population within the context of anti-fascist resistance as well as against the backdrop of those nations' war-time and post-war economic and political problems. Sander points out that, World War II was not only a war among nations, but one which for some nations of Eastern Europe and the Balkans involved civil war as well.⁴ As it turned out, not only was the victory or defeat of the nation at stake in these countries; but the losses or gains of various social classes as well. In this regard, rather than siding with their own governments, the bourgeois and large business-industrial classes of these nations tended to cooperate with the enemy, to the point of putting their economic power at Germany's disposal. The peasant and working classes had been the most active groups in the resistance movements during

³ Sander, p. 23.

⁴ Ibid., p. 25.

the war, and would be influential in shaping the radical economic and social ideas that emerged following the war's end.⁵

Another special feature of the political landscape of the post-war period was the widespread fear that fascist elements might reemerge within right-wing political parties. Because of this concern, administrations generally sought to constitute themselves on the basis of agreements among moderate or extreme left-wing parties.⁶ Finally, reaction to the fascist-dominated governments of the years between the two wars was reflected in the post-war period in strong preferences for those which stood as far away from fascism as possible on the political spectrum.

Thus all these factors contributed to the Soviet army's finding the ground in many senses prepared when it moved in to occupy Eastern Europe and the Balkans; and its governments would make the most of these advantageous conditions for years to come. Having chosen the Balkans as a target region for the realization of some of its most pressing interests, the Soviet Union had supported this region's pro-Moscow political parties and leaders from the Occupation period and on, thus helping to ensure the establishment of like-minded regimes. The process of the communist implantation in these nations began with their deliverance from Nazi occupation, and continued as communist parties were given representation within the coalition governments that followed. Finally, Moscow began eliminating the local leaders by replacing them with its own people and/or individuals whom it had approved, thus completing a process which ultimately brought Moscow into direct and active control of these administrations.⁷

The Soviet Union intensified its political authority in the Balkans with the intention of using this region as a buffer zone against any threatening action from the West, especially from Europe. This objective was conceived in part as a response to tactics used by the Western nations during the war. In order to ward off the

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Stoyan Pribichevich, "Yugoslavia in the Balkans and Central Europe," *International Affairs*, vol. 21, no. 4 (London, October 1945), p. 450.

⁷ Sander, pp. 27-28.

possibility of a German attack, France and England had, throughout the war, employed a strategy aimed at directing the German threat eastward; in doing so they permitted the Balkan nations to fall into German hands one by one. The two European nations failed to realize that in this way all of Eastern Europe would either come under Nazi control, or that with a Nazi defeat the region would be occupied by the Soviet Union or be divided up between the two powers by mutual agreement.⁸ Thus it was that the West became incapable of containing the Soviet Union after the war.

The Main Developments of the Cold War Period

New Balkan Policies within the Context of the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan

Starting in 1947, the Western nations (the United States and Europe) began to take an interest in the Balkans as it became clear that the Soviet Union was actively attempting to incorporate Turkey and Greece within the steadily expanding perimeters of its authority and influence. In fact, the Soviet Union's objectives in Turkey and Greece were apparent even during World War II. These objectives were primarily focused on Turkey, and were evident in the Soviet Union's 1945 initiatives involving the Straits and Eastern Anatolia; with these efforts the Soviet Union clearly revealed an attitude that compromised both Turkish national sovereignty and territorial integrity.⁹ As a result of its remaining neutral and a non-combatant throughout the war, Turkey found itself diplomatically isolated at the end of the war

⁸ Frederick L. Schuman, *The Cold War; Retrospect and Prospect* (Louisiana: State University Press, 1962), p. 85.

⁹ For details on the Russian memo of August 7, 1946 requesting changes to the Montreux Straits Agreement, see *Ayin Tarihi*, no. 153 (August 1946), pp. 72-74.

and, suddenly, within the Soviet pincers. Greece was beginning to feel the pressure of Soviet ventures against its regime in the same period.

It could be expected that the regions separating East from West and, in this sense, forming a belt along the Soviet Union's southern flank, would naturally come under threat of expansion into their territories. The nations, like Greece, Turkey and Afghanistan, along this belt, which came to be known as the "Northern Tier,"¹⁰ and which were located either directly along the Russian border or very close to it, had throughout history, much less during the Cold War years, been compelled to take positions and design their foreign policies in response to various messages and intentions issuing from the Soviet Union. Most importantly, the policies directed at these nations were not of concern to themselves alone. As the most salient point of contention between the Soviet Union and the United States of America in the post-war era, these policies unavoidably affected international political developments as well.

As a consequence of all the developments outlined above, England and the United States felt compelled to relinquish their roles as passive bystanders and take action, which they did by creating new policies vis-à-vis the region. The United States played a major role during the development and application phases of this new stance toward the Balkans, such that it may be said the baton of Balkan policy making, which had been in British hands from the nineteenth century, was handed to the United States in the middle of the twentieth century.¹¹ As has been noticed during the course of this analysis, the Eastern Mediterranean and its neighboring areas had been of particular interest and concern to England throughout history, and England constantly sought to maintain strategic control over the region within the

¹⁰ The term "Northern Tier" describes the northernmost Near and Middle Eastern countries on the border of or near the Soviet Union. It gained currency in the 1950s under John Foster Dulles. While historians writing on the subject have various opinions as to exactly which countries comprise the Northern Tier, there is general agreement that it includes Greece, Turkey, and Afghanistan. Kuniholm, pp. xv-xxi.

¹¹ Wolff, p. 23.

broader framework of its foreign policies.¹² However, while England was among the victors of World War II, it had sustained severe economic damage during the war, making it incapable of maintaining its former position of eminence in European politics, much less in this more remote part of the world. England had to recognize that it was unable to single-handedly deal with the new phenomenon of communist regimes in Europe in addition to the new phenomenon of Russian-leaning block formation. Thus it unilaterally broke off agreements it had made with the nations of the region and, starting in February of 1947, relinquished its position to the United States.¹³

For its part, as of this point the United States would put aside its former isolationist position and begin taking an active interest in international affairs, an interest that would continue in full force up to our day.¹⁴ England's compelled retreat from the region, the Soviet policies directed at Turkey and Greece as well as its attempts to gain control of this region, which would result in easier access to the strategic and economic advantages of the Middle East--these initial events opened a new page of history for the United States, to which it responded by articulating the so-called "Policy of Containment" regarding the Soviet Union.¹⁵

The first concrete signs of this new American policy direction came in the form of economic assistance and political support for Turkey and Greece within the framework of the Truman Doctrine.¹⁶ This action of United States President Harry S. Truman contained the first indicators of the new turn in American foreign policy.

¹² Jim Evans, "Britain and the Yugoslav General Elections of November 1945," ed. Andrew Hammond, *The Balkans and the West: Constructing the European Other, 1945-2003* (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2004) pp. 1-15.

¹³ Kuniholm, pp. 212-213.

¹⁴ The April 6, 1946 arrival of the American battleship *Missouri* in Istanbul, with the purpose of conveying the remains of the Turkish Ambassador to the United States Mehmet Ertegün to Turkey, was at that time seen as a symbol of support for the nations of the region. Ibid., p. 335.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ On the Truman Doctrine, see *ibid.*, pp. 434-9. See also *Documents on American Foreign Relations*, vol. 9 (1947), pp. 646-650; and for a summary of the text in Turkish, see *Ayn Tarihi*, no. 160 (May, 1947), pp. 141-142.

With this measure the United States, while confirming its respect for and adherence to the principles put forth by the United Nations, made it clear that it could not remain indifferent to the new world order being shaped by attitudes which contradicted those principles. Within the context of this policy, the American Senate and House of Representatives voted to approve military and economic assistance to nations sensing a threat to their autonomy. They did this by granting the President the authority to request a 400 million dollar appropriation towards furnishing Greece and Turkey with financial assistance along with equipment, services, and informational assistance, as well as for sending of military and technical experts.¹⁷

For Turkey, the assistance provided within the Truman Doctrine held a meaning that far exceeded its economic impact. This action was to be the first entry in a new chapter of Turkish foreign policy, one which involved a rapprochement with the United States beginning in the post-war years and continuing to this day. As Armaoğlu has stated, the military and political objects of this doctrine and its practical application outweighed those of its economic rationale.¹⁸ In this way Turkey obtained the support of the United States, a nation which had emerged from World War II in a strong position and ready to take an active political role internationally while at the same time showing concern for developments in the Balkans and the Soviet Union's intentions regarding Turkey. Moreover, fears about entering into this new relationship were calmed by the fact that the source of this new security was geographically distant, as well as by the fact that the United States did not have a history of colonialism in Europe. Thus the new relationship did not seem to present an obvious contradiction with the principle of "national sovereignty" so much revered in Turkey during that time.¹⁹ In spite of these positive signs, the history of woes stemming from the granting of privileges to foreigners under the regime Capitulations during the Ottoman Empire was still a vivid memory. Thus, in

¹⁷ Mehmet Günlübol, *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası, 1919-1973*, p. 222.

¹⁸ Fahir Armaoğlu, "Sovyet Amerikan Münasebetlerinin Üç Yılı, 1945-1948," *Siyasal Bilgiler Okulu Dergisi*, 4, no. 1-4 (1949), p. 420.

¹⁹ Sander, p. 56.

order to place limits on this large nation's ability to intervene in Turkey's internal affairs, as well as to avoid arousing negative public reactions, it was decided, and agreed on by the Americans that information about the forms and recipients of this aid not be fully divulged.²⁰

Greece, which received the largest share of American aid, was at this time occupied with its struggle to direct this assistance to the repair of the deep wounds it had received as a result of participating in the war. Following World War II, Greece entered a period of civil war the root causes of which were, first, the chronic instability of its political system, and second, the fact that the Soviet Union supported the leftist governments of these years at the same time that the United States, which wished to see Greece move in another political direction, was funneling the greatest part of its aid in support of that opposing political tendency.

The Truman Doctrine was originally conceived as providing relatively limited assistance for military support within specific areas; in time, it would extend to all areas of Europe. The so-called "Marshall Plan," envisioned by United States Foreign Relations Minister George Marshall, from whom it got its name, was essentially a project for rebuilding post-war Europe.²¹ With its primary objective of promoting economic development in Europe through planned mutual cooperation among European nations, this plan presented a model for global development as well. The Marshall Plan detailed the needs for which American assistance was necessary, if not essential, in order to bring this larger project to fruition.²² While the Soviet Union strove to block this plan on the grounds that it amounted to a "United States desire to take economic control of Europe," the Europeans were not about to turn down this offer for cooperation and economic aid. With this in mind, the European nations prepared a "European Economic Development Plan" and in this way were able to realize their hopes for economic improvement through

²⁰ Günlübol, *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası, 1919-1973*, p. 226.

²¹ Armaoğlu, *Siyasi Tarih*, pp. 468-471.

²² Günlübol, *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası, 1919-1973*, pp. 228-230.

cooperation based on rational interests and with the help of American aid. Immediately following American legislation of April 3, 1948, known as the “Foreign Aid Law,” sixteen European nations formed the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) on April 16, 1948.²³

Such developments taking place in the Balkan region were naturally not welcomed by communist regimes in general, and most especially not by that of the Soviet Union. Those regimes interpreted these events as a preliminary step towards the formation of an enemy block in opposition to themselves. It cannot be denied that this new arrangement did, in a sense, confirm in more emphatic tones the separatist tendency at work in the Balkan region following the war, thus reinforcing the internal cohesion of the separate fronts. The first result of the Soviet Union’s reaction to the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan was that nations that had communist parties in government with ties of support to the Soviet Union began to assume the status of “satellite” states in regard to the Soviet Union.²⁴

The second reaction came in a form resembling that already adopted by Western alliances, the formation of the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform), on September 27, 1947. The founding of Cominform constituted a defensive action vis-à-vis the West on the part of the communist movement, and announced that movement’s commitment to consolidating recent advances and to ensuring the participation of all the communist parties in the articulation of common strategies. Cominform moreover expressed the intention that these goals be pursued within a global context. In yet another counter measure, this time resembling the Marshall Plan, the Soviet Bloc moved to implement what it called the “Molotov Plan,” which proposed to cultivate economic cooperation between the Soviet Union and its satellite nations by means of a series of bi-lateral trade agreements.²⁵

²³ Armaoğlu, *Siyasi Tarih*, p. 770.

²⁴ In this way, nations like Rumania and Bulgaria in the Balkans, and Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary in Eastern Europe were brought completely under Soviet influence and control. *Ibid.*, pp. 752-758.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 770.

As is clear from the developments outlined above, the post-war years saw the emergence of a new world order based on a clearly bi-polar structure, a process which took on a greater intensity during the second half of the 1940s. This new reality was, of course, the case for the region under examination here no less than it was for the rest of the world. This period was one in which the nations of the globe were all, in some form or another, seeking places for themselves within the terms set by the Eastern and Western blocks. During the 1940s, separate alliance systems with many points of resemblance gained strength and substance, while as the case of Yugoslavia clearly shows, dynamics within the blocks themselves took various directions. Immediately after the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine, the race to establish mutual cooperation among the communist nations in the Balkans took an unexpectedly adverse turn when Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union found themselves in conflict. This development proved greatly damaging to the communist block. The Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union intensified in response to this new state of affairs, and thus it was that the Eastern and Western blocks were firmly set on the course of cut-throat competition to create new opportunities to turn to their own advantage within the new bi-polar world order.

Yugoslavian Rupture with the Soviet Bloc

Yugoslavia occupied a powerful position among the Balkan nations as World War II drew to a close. With its experienced military corps and its good relations with the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and its revolutionary government nurtured many plans for the future.²⁶ Yugoslavia made no secret of the fact that it sought to play an important role in European affairs during the post-war period; and State Premier Josip Broz Tito was, in addition, clearly intending to play a major role within the

²⁶ İhsan Gürkan, "İkinci Dünya Savaşından Günümüze Değın Balkanlar," *Balkanlar* (İstanbul: Ortadoęu ve Balkan İncelemeleri Vakfı Yayınları, 1993), p. 150.

communist block. As indicated above, the Eastern block had been engaged in efforts to strengthen its own internal ties through various official channels, particularly in the second half of the 1940s. Nonetheless, a power struggle between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union began to emerge at this point, both on the level of state leadership as well as on a national level, and especially from the Yugoslavian side. This tension was to create conflicted relations between the two nations, eventually leading to Yugoslavia's being expelled from Cominform.²⁷

Signs of a parting of the ways between the two states were clearly seen in Yugoslavia's single-mindedly ambitious behavior and the fact that it could not accept being put into the position of a Soviet satellite. In addition, Yugoslavia had put forth the idea of a "Balkan Federation" including Bulgaria and Albania, and possibly extending as far as Romania. This idea was actively resisted by the Soviet Union, which saw it as a potential threat to its own leadership position within Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union was not about to allow a charismatic leader like Tito to pursue the formation of a block among nations it regarded as belonging to its own zone of influence; thus it did not support Yugoslavia in these policies.

Another root cause of Yugoslavia-Soviet Union tension at this time was the fact that Yugoslavia was rapidly industrializing, and did not wish to serve as merely a source of raw materials for Moscow. Thus, even close ideological affinity between the two nations proved incapable of resolving this discord. Also, the Soviet Union, not wishing to aggravate the Western nations nor to offend the communists of Italy and Austria, did not agree with or permit the realization of Yugoslavia's policy proposals involving Albania, Italy, and Austria.²⁸

More could be said about the problems between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union during this interval, but it seems sufficient for the purpose of this study to identify the most fundamental difference of opinion, which had to do with the fact that while Yugoslavia's position was presumably that of acting as an extension of the

²⁷ Sander, pp. 57-60.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 59.

Soviet Union and its policies, it refused to become a satellite of that nation, opting for greater autonomy. This state of tension which had arisen in such a short time soon took new dimensions as the Soviet Union became bent on eliminating its rival. Its being backed in this general position by other nations eventually led to Yugoslavia's expulsion from Cominform on June 28, 1948.²⁹ Following this, positions toward Yugoslavia grew even more rigid, and it was eventually isolated to the point of being effectively under embargo. When Comecom (the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) was created in 1949 as yet another measure to counteract the Marshall Plan, Yugoslavia applied for participation but was refused.³⁰

Yugoslavia's reactions to these events had both regional and international repercussions. Insofar as the regional dimension, this turn of events was to constitute the first step in a consolidation of the Soviet block in the Balkans now that the Yugoslav-Bulgarian friendship had become a dead letter. Another consequence was as important on the global level as it was to the region. From the time that it was distanced from the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia began to draw closer to the West, to the extent that it was now amenable to cooperation in some form or another. At one point, the Soviet Union's decision to surround Yugoslavia with a military presence--to which Yugoslavia's neighbor nations contributed--drew an even more decisive reaction. Yugoslavia moved yet further away from the Soviet model and, for the duration, closer to the West. For a while, at least, Yugoslavia began to take an active role in European politics, thus also being of great benefit to American purposes and ideology.³¹

With regard to ideological dimensions, this discord between two nations within the communist system was taken as an exemplary case and encouraged by the United States, which viewed it with regard to its potential for making the American

²⁹ Jelavich and Jelavich, pp. 121-122.

³⁰ Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, p. 327; see also Wolff, p. 371.

³¹ Sander, pp. 65-66.

side more attractive to other communist states.³² An important consequence for the Soviet Union was that, by losing Yugoslavia, it lost the only other overland access, besides Albania, to the Mediterranean which it had always coveted. It was for this reason as well that Yugoslavia began to acquire so much importance for the West. The addition of Yugoslavia to Greece and Turkey as a third nation proffering itself as a field of potential action was, for the Western states, the first positive sign responding to their hopes for cooperation on a truly regional scale.³³

From this point on, American economic and political assistance to Yugoslavia was to be disbursed in pursuit of American and Western nations' interests in the area over a considerable time period.³⁴ The series of events which including the emergence of American interest in the Balkans, the Greek civil war's coming to a close, and Yugoslavia's separation from the Soviet block, gave the Western world a greater measure of confidence in its desire for greater influence in this area; it was also hoped that they would serve as the foundation for a future regime of cooperation in the region.

A View of the Balkans under the Soviet Umbrella

Concerning Soviet relations with the Balkan nations (excepting Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia), it may be said that its influence on the communist block states extended to the entirety of their institutions and policies. Whether they had been occupied by the Soviet Union at the end of the war or independently formed their own communist regimes, the Eastern European and Balkan nations closely followed the Soviet model, in full conformance with it. However, while these nations openly declared their preference for this system, they gained little from it in

³² Wolff, p. 410.

³³ Sander, pp. 88-90.

³⁴ On American aid to Yugoslavia during this period, see Wolff, pp. 410-415.

real terms; indeed, contrary to expectation, the system worked more to the singular benefit of the Soviet Union.³⁵

Within this context, it is evident that the Soviet governments following World War II used their allies to their own advantage, in the sense that their relationship mostly consisted in making use of those nations' resources. This was true to such an extent that the Soviet Union's economic relation to communist regime states may be described as colonialist; the Soviet Union sold them manufactured goods at high prices while paying less than world standard rates for imports from those same states. Whether in the area of commercial transactions or joint economic enterprises, Soviet policies pursued up to the time of Stalin's death in 1953 are said to have come at a total price of \$14 billion to the Eastern European nations, a sum close in value to that transferred from the United States to the economic development projects of Europe within the context of the Marshall Plan.³⁶

It was during these first years of the Cold War that the nations of Eastern Europe and the Balkans struggled to get their industrialization and modernization programs under way. The programs of the states in question were not aimed at economic independence, but rather embraced the general program set by Moscow, one which entailed strong, centralized control, with special priority given to heavy industry such as metallurgy and machinery production.

Agriculture was also intended to bear a good part of the weight of revolutionary economic development, which was the highest ambition of the communist system. The agricultural class, while showing every sign of its potential for serving as a major stimulus to this revolutionary process, in practice did not obtain a sufficiently strong position to do so; instead, that class was encouraged to proletarianize. The first step in line with that objective involved the formation of state farms and the transformation of peasants into workers. A second step was that

³⁵ Gürkan, pp. 154-155.

³⁶ Jelavich, *History of the Balkans*, pp. 336-344.

of founding collectives in which land and animals became common property.³⁷ However, it cannot be said that these general objectives of the communist system met with great success. Indeed, they were not implemented at all in countries such as Poland and Yugoslavia, and, while practiced in Rumania and Bulgaria, they failed to produce significant yields. Dominated by the three major influences of soil, family, and village culture, this class was not open to radical change in its lifestyle, a fact which hindered the system's effective functioning.³⁸

In some states, while the right to employment was secured, the low wages of all groups other than those of the administrative class and state officials presented another detrimental factor of systemic proportions. In addition to its goal of fundamental changes in the economic arena, this new system also resorted to radical measures which sought to integrate the existing social structures and beliefs; such measures were at work in the Eastern block nations of this period. In line with this larger goal, efforts were made to weaken the role of religious belief and religion in every form. Radical new methods based on Marxist theory were also applied in the area of education and instruction with the aim of firmly imprinting this system onto the social fabric. As the mouthpiece for this ideology, educational institutions sought to propagate it to all strata of society.³⁹ Such efforts were aimed at distancing the communist nations of the Balkans from the West and western culture, such that they would be entirely drawn into the communist system.

Thus, within the conditions briefly outlined above, the Communist block, while revealing cracks from time to time, was able to maintain its place in global politics up until the 1990s, a place which ensured uninterrupted support for the Soviet Union as one of the two super powers.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 348.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 349.

³⁹ Gürkan, p. 157.

NATO: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

The Eastern European nations' adoption of communist regimes one by one during the second half of the 1940s impelled the Western nations to search for new ways to counteract Soviet expansionism. At this point in time, one of the goals of Cominform, which had been created at the Soviet Union's behest, was to pursue active resistance against the Western regimes. Clues to the Soviet Union's new expansionist inclinations were gathered from the fact that Cominform did not hesitate to plainly express its hopes for the demise of the Western system.⁴⁰ The United Nations had been founded at the end of the war as a mechanism for preserving the new status quo and for guaranteeing peace and security. However, the use of veto power in this body seriously inhibited its functionality, thus forcing individual states to seek self-protection through ties with other states.⁴¹ As part of this trend, England, France, Belgium, Holland and Luxembourg formed the Western Union Defense Organization as outlined in the Brussels Treaty. Under that treaty, signed on March 17, 1948, these five countries pledged to build up a common defense system and to strengthen their economic and cultural ties.⁴²

The Western Union Defense Organization comprised the first concrete measure aimed at meeting the Soviet challenge militarily on European terrain. However, the nations of this alliance did not appear to present a deterrent of any great consequence to the Soviet Union. At this point the United States, a new member from across the Atlantic, joined the alliance. The United States gave this alliance its unqualified support, thus abandoning the principle of "non-participation in political associations or alliances" that it had faithfully followed since the Monroe presidency, and offering yet more proof of the policy changes taking place in United

⁴⁰ Günlübol, *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası, 1919-1973*, p. 281.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 232.

⁴² *The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Fact and Figures* (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1984), pp. 19-20.

States foreign affairs at this time.⁴³ The US's post-war policy was born of perceived security needs, which led to its contravening the Monroe Doctrine with the formation of a series of alliances. This new approach was put into motion at the suggestion of United States Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, and was made official with the approval of the so-called Vandenberg Resolution of 1948, which was to henceforth determine the direction of American foreign policy.⁴⁴

At this point efforts at bringing nations on both sides of the Atlantic under one organizational umbrella resulted in the nations involved approving, in principle at least, a North Atlantic Treaty. Then, on April 4, 1949, the United States, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway, and Portugal joined the nations of the Western Union Defense Organization in signing the charter of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Washington, DC. Designed primarily for defense purposes, this alliance bound its members to "protect these nations' democratic principles and individual rights, their common heritage and civilization, and the freedoms established by the rule of law; to resolve their differences within the framework of the United Nations; to bring about economic equality and, to this end, cooperate in the task of the evening such disparities; and to strengthen themselves against possible attack by uniting their military forces."⁴⁵ This agreement was also the most important element of the United States' new Containment Policy. It would serve as part of the US's efforts to establish a counterweight to the unofficial but no less real process of block formation pursued by the Soviet Union.⁴⁶

⁴³ For more information on the Monroe Doctrine, see Armaoğlu, *Siyasi Tarih*, pp. 358-364.

⁴⁴ On the Vandenberg Resolution, see Lord Ismay, *NATO: İlk Beş Sene (1949-1954)*, trans. Suat Bilge (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1956), p. 171.

⁴⁵ See section, "The Principles and Scope of the North Atlantic Treaty," in *The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, Facts and Figures*, pp. 22-23. For a Turkish version of the text, see Hamza Eroğlu, "North Atlantic Pact," *İstanbul Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Mecmuası*, 71, no. 1-4 (İstanbul, 1957), pp. 21-47.

⁴⁶ For a comprehensive evaluation of the Containment Policy, see Kamuran Gürün, *Dış İlişkiler ve Türk Politikası, 1939'dan Günümüze Kadar* (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Basın Yayın Yüksekokulu Yayınları, 1983), pp. 267-277.

Since NATO was formed in response to a possible Soviet threat, viewed from the perspective of our topic, its relevance to Greece and Turkey are immediately apparent. Those nations felt themselves exposed to similar dangers and responded to them by siding with the Western block for a certain period of time. Thus their destinies would come to be connected in many ways with that organization. Naturally, these two nations were very much interested in the security zone which was being created by NATO insofar as it offered a defense arrangement; indeed, their interest dated back to NATO's founding. However, this interest was spurred by both the ever-present possibility of renewed Soviet pressure and their fear of being unable to counter it, and also by the promise of American economic aid.⁴⁷ Not wishing to remain outside of this block for both these reasons, Turkey and Greece were finally able to realize their dreams of admission to NATO following a somewhat difficult period of candidacy.

Starting in 1950, Greece and Turkey's efforts to gain admission triggered reactions from both NATO member nations as well as from the opposing block, which was closely following developments within this organization. Throughout the application process, England and the Scandinavian countries did not conceal their displeasure at the prospect of Greece and Turkey's entrance. Their entry conflicted, for example, with certain goals of one of NATO's more powerful members, England, which was working to create a Middle East Alliance among the nations of the Middle East as well as of the Commonwealth countries over which it presided. For this reason England made it clear that it did not wish to see Greece and Turkey become part of Europe's Defense System. The small Scandinavian nations of the alliance, on the other hand, were against Turkey and Greece's inclusion on the assumption that it would add to the system's burden of responsibility. There were economic reasons as well; these small nations were concerned that the inclusion of new nations would bring about a corresponding reduction in American aid via

⁴⁷ Mehmet Günlübol, "Nato and Turkey, an Overall Appraisal," *Milletlerarası Münasebetler Türk Yıllığı*, vol. 11 (Ankara: 1971), p. 13.

NATO. Another objection worthy of note was the fact that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was described as not only a defense alliance but a union of nations which shared an Atlantic- based or affiliated culture and civilization, making it inappropriate to include Turkey and Greece.⁴⁸

Objections to these two nations' participation in NATO also came, of course, from NATO's opposing camp, the Soviet Union. Turkey bore the brunt of these objections, objections from which the assumption was gleaned that, if it became a member of the alliance, Turkey's territory would be used in the event of a NATO attack; naturally, Turkey would face the consequences of its responsibility in such a position.⁴⁹

However, none of these developments were sufficient to dissuade Turkey and Greece as they persisted in pushing for NATO membership. With Turkey's passage to a multi-party system in 1950, the Democrat Party came to power, bringing with it an entirely new line of thought in Turkish foreign relations. At this time, it began to adopt without reservation the approach based on cooperation with the West.⁵⁰ It was in line with this new approach that Turkey's belonging to NATO became not only a desideratum for Ankara, but its most pressing goal.⁵¹

While the year 1950 started out on the note described above, various developments, including the gathering storm clouds on the international political scene, contributed to a softening of the objections to Greece and Turkey's admission to NATO. Events occurring in an entirely different part of the world, one very remote from the NATO nations, would play a role in this turn of events. The Korean War, which began on June 25, 1950, would have a decisive impact on the issue of

⁴⁸ Günlübol, *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası, 1919-1873*, p. 239.

⁴⁹ On the 1951 crisis in Soviet-Turkish foreign relations regarding NATO, see Gürün, *Dış İlişkiler ve Türk Politikası*, pp. 198-199.

⁵⁰ Aptülâhat Akşin, *Türkiye'nin 1945'den sonraki Dış Politika Gelişmeleri, Orta Doğu Meseleri* (İstanbul: Akgün Matbaacılık ve Kitapçılık Müesseseleri, 1959), p. 28.

⁵¹ Gencer Özcan, "Continuity and Change in Turkish Foreign Policy," *The Balkans: A Mirror of the New International Order* eds. Kemali Saybaşılı and Günay Göksu Özdoğan. (İstanbul: Eren Yayınları, 1995), p. 286.

Turkey's joining NATO. Turkey was the second nation after the United States to send forces to Korea following the United Nations directive.⁵² The loyalty shown by Turkey in contributing to this cause at the same level as the other Western nations accelerated the process of its admission to NATO. However, it was most of all due to a change in American attitude towards Turkey's belonging to NATO that turned the tide to its favor.

It had become apparent to American policy makers that Turkey's geopolitical position linking the Balkans, the Middle East, and Asia was of primary importance to American interests, which made its joining NATO a first priority.⁵³ Establishing Western bases in Turkey became essential because of its strategic position vis-à-vis Russia; more generally, NATO needed to provide for the defense of the eastern Mediterranean in order to reinforce its southeastern flank. Indeed, in order to establish bases in its territory NATO had no choice but to admit Turkey, since Turkey permitted the bases only on the condition of its admission.⁵⁴ Another factor affecting this outcome, besides that of Turkey's critical geographical position, was the strength and size of its standing army.

Meanwhile, the civil war in Greece had finally come to an end, thus removing it from the category of areas posing a potential threat to Europe. This was the one of the most important considerations in the decision process leading to Greece's entry into NATO.⁵⁵ Thus NATO admission was deemed appropriate for both nations at the same moment, for geographical, strategic, and historical reasons; and, under the exacerbated conditions of 1951 described above, both were invited to join the organization. The process of admission was brought to completion by the beginning of 1952, with the two nations' gaining full member status under the

⁵² Yusuf Sarımay, *Türkiye'nin Batı İttifakına Yönelişi ve Nato'ya Girişi (1939-1952)* (Ankara: Kültür ve Turizm Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1988), p. 87.

⁵³ Ibid., p. 92.

⁵⁴ Haluk Ülman, "Nato ve Türkiye," *Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi*, 22, no. 4 (Ankara, 1967), p. 150.

⁵⁵ Sarımay, *Türkiye'nin Batı İttifakına Yönelişi ve Nato'ya Girişi*, pp. 92-93.

NATO security umbrella.⁵⁶ Thus this most important phase in the creation of the Western defense system, which had begun with the Truman Doctrine in 1947 and involved determining participation and setting up the security network, was finally accomplished. Both nations thus took a place within the Western world and, with the help of American military and economic inputs, achieved a level of orderly activity in their new roles.

A New Attempt at Alliance-Building in the Balkans:

The Balkan Pact

Turkey and Greece had expressed their inclination to be included in the Western block within the new world configuration that emerged after World War II, with the consequence of their being admitted to NATO in 1952. They then embarked on a course of diplomatic activities regarding the Balkans which reflected American policy objectives in the region. Owing to its recent history of problematic dealings with the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia was ready to join in these initiatives; in sum, this displacement and the events leading to it brought the three nations to the point of forming a new alliance.

This new configuration had some points of resemblance with the Balkan Entente of the 1930s, which had been formed in reaction to Bulgaria's revisionism. Indeed, a striking picture emerges from an examination of the reasons that brought these nations to the point of alliance, aside from the fact that, in both cases, the governments involved represented very dissimilar political systems. It may certainly be said that Soviet claims to supremacy in the Balkans during the 1940s constituted a strong incentive for the creation of this alliance. However, much it had been shaken

⁵⁶ *The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, Facts and Figures*, pp. 30-1. Also for information concerning Turkey's position in NATO, see *Resmi Gazete*, no. 8038. 1. (9 February, 1952).

by the anti-Soviet block actions of 1948, that block's supremacy and the threats it implied appeared to be unchangeable givens. Beyond these factors, the question of Yugoslavia's future direction only added to the tension between the two blocks.⁵⁷

Events occurring in the Balkans in the early 1950s contributed even further to a hardening of the two fronts. In that period, 250,000 ethnic Turks were forced to migrate from Bulgaria,⁵⁸ and this forced expulsion, together with the possibility of an invasion of Yugoslavia by the Eastern block,⁵⁹ conflicts between Greece, on the one hand, and Bulgaria and Albania, on the other;⁶⁰ and Turkey and Greece's entering NATO in 1952--all these events illustrate the hardening of the two fronts mentioned above. Under such circumstances the convergence of these nations also conformed to a principle set forth by the United Nations, according to which regional organization was most appropriate for the purpose of collective security.

During this series of events leading to the new Balkan alliance among Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia, good reasons for doing so were apparent on all sides. Turkey was principally concerned with the potential Soviet menace, as well as that coming from Bulgaria. Having just emerged from a civil war, Greece was struggling to achieve domestic stability on the one hand, while on the other hand parrying various demands from its neighbors, Bulgaria and Albania. While unresolved issues coming in the wake of World War II created sources of tension among these nations, it also left Greece in the position of forming a potentially wider corridor between north and south. From Yugoslavia's vantage point, there was the distinct threat of being exposed to attack by the Soviet block's most fervent defenders, among them Bulgaria, Rumania, and Hungary; their three governments had close mutual ties politically and economically, and, moreover, enjoyed complete military unification with the Soviet Union. All these elements pushed Yugoslavia

⁵⁷ Sander, p. 83.

⁵⁸ Yılmaz Altuğ, "Balkanlar'dan Anayurda Yapılan Göçlerin Mahiyeti," *İstanbul Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi*, 32, no. 2-4 (İstanbul, 1967), pp. 846-857.

⁵⁹ Sander, pp. 85-86.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 86-87.

toward establishing relations with those two nations which had obtained Western backing, Turkey and Greece.⁶¹

As has been seen, the Soviet block policies of the period were decisive in creating an atmosphere that pushed Turkey, Greece, and Yugoslavia toward closer relations, at least until the danger should subside. Finally, the fact that the three nations did not experience any serious clashes of interest during this time made it possible for them to conclude the alliance.

In addition to the causes outlined above, the process leading to this alliance was certainly affected by other factors as well. The newly authoritative role of the United States in world politics, together with the counter-Soviet Union strategies it was in the process of formulating, inspired it to use these three nations as a shield against the common threat.⁶² With Turkey and Greece's joining NATO, a powerful security zone was formed which extended from the Atlantic to the Middle East. Yugoslavia's position was that of closing a major gap within this broad security zone. In fact, Yugoslavia's inclusion in this pact stemmed from this very need. As originally envisioned, the pact had included Italy; later, it was decided that rather than including Italy in a security zone encompassing the Mediterranean, it would rather have Yugoslavia fill that position, thus creating a security zone in Southern Europe and the Balkans.⁶³ Without this goal being stated as such, by creating an alliance structure in which Yugoslavia took a place alongside Greece and Turkey within the larger European system, Europe was creating the conditions for a long-term friendship and ties of mutual support as a way of countering the chronically strained and volatile atmosphere of the region. The United States, which had by this time acquired an important place for itself on the European political scene, was particularly sensitized by the events of 1950. The Korean War, which started in June of 1950 and lasted a year, was clear proof that regional wars between the two blocks

⁶¹ Ibid., pp. 83-90.

⁶² Türkaya Ataöv, *Amerika, NATO ve Türkiye* (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1969), pp.241-242.

⁶³ Sander, p. 92.

were a real and constant possibility. Before this war broke out, however, the United States had operated on the assumption that its clear military advantage in the form of the atomic bomb would ensure the other block's passivity, come what may. The Korean War, however, presented the United States with unexpected challenges, forcing it to consider more comprehensive strategies. The security umbrella created with the founding of NATO was one step in that direction, as seen above; it was followed by new efforts to establish a regional defense system in the Balkans.⁶⁴

As with the Balkan Entente of 1934, Greece and Turkey took the lead in the process of alliance building which was to create new strategic alignments in the Balkans as well as internationally. Relations between the two nations had never been better than during a series of official meetings between Turkish Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and Greek Prime Minister Venizelos which lead to proposals for a new pact.⁶⁵ The West's support for this enterprise was evident in United States Defense Minister Frank Pace's trips to Ankara, Athens, and Belgrade, and British Foreign Minister Anthony Eden's visit to Belgrade, all in 1952.⁶⁶

Turkish Foreign Minister Fuad Köprülü's visit to Belgrade in January of 1953 is considered to have been the first official step in the process leading up to the Bled Agreement.⁶⁷ The second phase of these meetings involved Köprülü's visit to Athens, whereupon the future pact between the three nations was officially announced.⁶⁸ Following this series of meetings between the three governments, the Balkan Pact, officially known as the "Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation" was signed by Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia in Ankara on February 28.⁶⁹ This

⁶⁴ Sarıay, *Türkiye'nin Batı İttifakına Yönelişi ve Nato'ya Girişi*, pp. 91-92.

⁶⁵ On Venizelos's views regarding such a pact, see *Aydın Tarihi*, no. 219 (February, 1952), pp. 3-5. For the text of the joint statement issued at the end of Menderes's visit to Athens, see *Aydın Tarihi*, no. 222 (Nisan, 1952), p. 271.

⁶⁶ Sander, pp. 95-96.

⁶⁷ Günlübol, *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası, 1919-1973*, p. 248.

⁶⁸ For the text of the joint statement issued following Fuad Köprülü's visit to Athens, see *Aydın Tarihi*, no. 230 (Ocak, 1953), p. 110.

⁶⁹ For the text of the Balkan Pact, see Turkish Republic *Düstur*, Tertip.3, vol. 34, (Ankara: Başvekalet Neşriyat Müdürlüğü, 1953) p. 1348. See also İsmail Soysal, *Türkiye'nin Dış*

agreement, while not being an alliance agreement in the strict sense of the word, did pave the way for an alliance with its goal of economic and cultural cooperation among the three nations as well as its provisions for cooperation in the area of joint defense to be pursued at the general staff level.

While the Balkan Pact permitted the participation of other Balkan nations if they so desired, the policy directions taken by Albania, Bulgaria, and Rumania prevented them from engaging in such cooperation. Yugoslavia's using its decision-making prerogatives to join the pact and thus cooperate with the West, independent of Moscow's supervision and consent, was an action the likes of which had not been witnessed within the conditions at work in global politics at the time; it was greeted with amazement. From another point of view, it was also seen as the death blow to Panslavism in the Balkans, obviating as it did the age-old tendency of the Southern Slavs to feel in constant need of Russian protection for fear of being attacked.⁷⁰

Russian reaction to the 1953 Friendship and Cooperation Treaty took the form of working to prevent it from developing into a full-fledged alliance. Followed closely by Soviet leader Stalin's death, these two events were to bring profound changes in Soviet policy. Starting in this period, there was a clear trend toward actively improving relations with Ankara, Athens, and Belgrade. As an example, the expression of desires regarding Turkey heard often between 1939 and 1945 were replaced by affirmations that no territorial claims whatsoever were being entertained.⁷¹ Antagonistic gestures directed at Yugoslavia were tempered to the point of lifting the economic embargo which had been applied in the prior period.

The influence of this transformation in Soviet policy was soon detected in the other Balkan nations as well, resulting in a change of political climate in the region. Even in such a context, attempts at turning the cooperation arrangement between the

Münasebetleriyle İlgili Başlıca Siyasi Anlaşmalar (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1965), pp. 420-423; *Resmi Gazete*, 23 Mayıs, 1953.

⁷⁰ Sander, p. 102.

⁷¹ On the memorandum outlining the Soviet Union's position on this issue, see *Aydın Tarihi*, no. 236 (Temmuz 1953), p. 72.

three nations into a true alliance were not neglected. These attempts finally led to the signing of the three-member Alliance, Political Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance. Agreement the ninth of August, 1954, in Bled, Yugoslavia.⁷² The so-called Bled Alliance, much broader in scope than the Balkan Entente of 1934, was designed to contribute significantly to the Western defense regime. From the Western nations' point of view, Yugoslavia's participation in the pact, and thus the inclusion of such strategic points as the Adriatic coast, Serbia, Vardar, and Morava, made the region more susceptible to outside control, in turn making the creation of security in Southern Europe a more meaningful possibility. Also, hopes were high for the results of cooperation in economic, technical, and cultural areas, as well as for the founding of a Balkan Studies Institute. However, as was the case with the Balkan Entente, these hopes proved unrealistic. In fact, the Balkan Alliance of 1954 was to remain far from accomplishing its mission of creating true cooperation and solidarity. Its point of departure being military necessity, it is a pity that the Balkan Alliance proved short-lived and unable to create the basis for common understanding; for, having satisfied those military exigencies and without achieving much progress in the other areas, its dissolution soon appeared inevitable.

Although it had been drawn up to cover a twenty-year period, the Balkan Alliance was unable to live out this designated life-span. Designed to provide alternatives to the current state of international tensions, this effort at cooperation was claimed to have succumbed to those same pressures, such as they were experienced in the Balkans. While the Soviet Union's attempt to make peace with Yugoslavia in 1954 proved inconclusive, a sudden rapprochement between the two nations was to take place in 1955.⁷³ Having recognized flaws in its policies of the 1940s, the Soviet Union decided to turn over a new leaf in its relations with Yugoslavia. The resulting new balance of relations was a serious blow to the Balkan

⁷² For the text of the pact, see Turkish Republic, *Düstur*, Tertip, 3. vol.36 (Ankara: Başvekalet Neşriyat Müdürlüğü, 1955), p.286. See also Soysal, pp. 428-432; Resmi Gazete, no. 8938 (23 February, 1955).

⁷³ Sander, p. 113.

Alliance, which up to this point had produced no substantial results. Yet the compromises which Yugoslavia extracted from the Soviet Union at this time as well as the resolution of its problems with Italy --notably that of Trieste-- pushed it towards a more realistic foreign policy while at the same time eliminating the need for cooperation with Turkey and Greece, two nations whose foreign policies were in every way bound up with those of the West. While the West showed full support for this three-way alliance, Tito wanted it to remain independent of the major powers; thus when he saw it drifting towards alignment, he began to withdraw from the tripartite bloc. From this point on, Yugoslavia began to follow an independent and autonomous foreign policy, putting forth the principle of "positive" or "active" neutrality.

Acting on the notion that nations of various and different socio-economic orders should be able to live in peace as neighbors, nations such as Yugoslavia, taking advantage of a positive international climate, came together in the Bandung Conference of June, 1955, an event about which it was asserted would have a significant impact on world politics. This group was to occupy a new position and definition as a third bloc in the international political scene, and at this point it became clear that Yugoslavia, which was henceforth vying for a leadership position among non-aligned nations, would no longer be able to honor its commitments to organizations with such limited purposes and effectiveness as those of the Balkan Alliance.⁷⁴

As for the two other nations of the Balkan Alliance, while they had joined in the regional and international alliance system described above, the strain in relations between Greece and Turkey brought about by the Cyprus situation was to have grave consequences for the future of the alliance. Following swiftly on the signing of the Balkan Alliance, the Cyprus issue burst onto the international arena on August 16, 1954. This and the fact that the issue of Greece was given top priority by the

⁷⁴ Ibid., p. 115.

United Nations led to a further deterioration of relations between the two nations resulting in their taking separate paths and, ultimately, in the dissolution of alliance.⁷⁵

The Warsaw Pact

To summarize from the above developments, the Western nations began to openly declare their rapprochement starting with in the 1950s. While they proceeded to back up this new posture with various tangible commitments, the Eastern bloc had also entered into a multi-phased alliance which went much further than unofficial affiliation. In addition, the formation and territorial advances of the Western bloc in the second half of the 1940s pushed the socialist nations into uniting under a pact agreement resembling that of NATO. The West's open support of several regional clusters not only in Europe but in many other parts of the world as well served as a model for the Soviet Union. These support arrangements included the following: ANZUS of 1951, which included Australia, New Zealand, and the United States; SEATO (the South-East Asia Treaty Organization) of 1954 which included Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand, the UK and the United States; and the 1954 Baghdad Pact (later CENTO), which included Britain, Iran, Pakistan, Iraq, and Turkey, with the United States as an associate member.⁷⁶

In addition to the above formations, the process of a newly armed Germany's coming together with Europe to form the West European Union as a first step toward inclusion in NATO was the most important factor in causing the Eastern Bloc to

⁷⁵ On the Cyprus Crisis of the 1950s, see Fahir Armaoğlu, *Kıbrıs Meselesi, 1954-1959, Türk Hükümeti ve Kamu Oyunun Davranışları* (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, 1963); and Faruk Sönmezoğlu, *Türkiye-Yunanistan İlişkileri ve Büyük Güçler, Kıbrıs, Ege ve Diğer Sorunlar* (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 2000).

⁷⁶ Gerard Holden, *The Warsaw Pact: Soviet Security and Bloc Politics* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), p. 7.

unite under an umbrella agreement.⁷⁷ Another point of relevance to these developments was the issue of Germany, that is, the Soviet Union's perception of Germany as a major power and the danger posed by its desire for vengeance. This perception was a key factor contributing to the cohesion among the Soviet Bloc nations.⁷⁸

The Warsaw Pact of May 14, 1954, brought together the Balkan nations of Albania, Bulgaria, and Rumania and the Eastern European nations of Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia with the Soviet Union in the formation of a mutual defense agreement.⁷⁹ These states met in Warsaw on the basis of a common understanding that the Paris Agreement constituted a threat. They formed a pact of friendship, cooperation, and mutual aid based on Article 51 of the United Nations Charter which proclaimed the right to mutual defense. With this pact, Eastern Europe added a military component to the political arrangements which had begun at an earlier stage. In addition, it was anticipated that the member states henceforth would become more active participants within the framework of this pact. Specifically, the treaty commits its signatories to: settle international disputes by peaceful means (Article 2); consult on all international issues affecting their common interest, and to work towards the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction (Article 2); consult immediately in the event that one of the treaty partners was threatened with armed attack so as to "ensure joint defense" (Article 3); establish a joint command (Article 5); not join any alliance with conflicting aims (Article 7); cooperate in economic and cultural relations, while not interfering in one another's international affairs (Article 8); and allow other states to accede irrespective of their social and state systems (Article 9).⁸⁰

⁷⁷ Robin Alison Remington, *The Warsaw Pact: Case Studies in Communist Conflict Resolution* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1971), p. 10.

⁷⁸ On German militarism, see Ataöv, pp. 253-272.

⁷⁹ Holden, p. 6.

⁸⁰ For the full text of the Warsaw Pact (Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance), see Holden, pp. 158-162; see also Remington, pp. 201-206.

As the above clearly implies, the Warsaw Pact was principally a defense agreement within which a framework for mutual cooperation was to be established and maintained. Of course, this latter function had already been in effect in a previous form and time period. At an earlier point, when there was not yet any public mention of a bloc, the only platform around which the regimes of communist states as well as the communist parties of other nations could come together had been Cominform. The official declaration and application of the Warsaw Pact obviated the usefulness and *raison d'être* of the previous arrangement, which was declared annulled on April 18, 1956 and in this way quietly lost to history.⁸¹ In Jonathan Eyal's words, the Warsaw Pact was a product of Stalinization.⁸²

In place of the monolithic voice of the Soviet Union, which was heard in the period from World War II to the 1950s, a shared participation could be seen at this time. However much the Soviet Union favored using this pact as a locomotive, other countries, including those of the Eastern Block, found equal opportunity to express themselves, sometimes even in a way which went against the grain. When one evaluates the effect of the Soviet Union on the Pact, while it may be possible to view this power as a Soviet hegemony, on the other hand the use of these countries by the Soviet Union may be viewed as a weakness.⁸² Whichever approach is correct, it is evident that the existence of Eastern European and Balkan countries in the Pact supported the Soviet Union's role in the world as a second power and a counterweight to the West.

In opposition to the Warsaw Pact and Soviet influence, however, we see that the vanguard countries of the West occasionally interfered. The powers that traditionally played roles in the region, such as the United States and Germany in particular, took advantage of the pliant situation of international politics to take their places as actors during this period of the 1960s. As noted, the United States

⁸¹ Gürün, *Dış İlişkiler ve Türk Politikası*, p. 252.

⁸² Jonathan Eyal, *The Warsaw Pact and the Balkans, Moscow's Southern Flank* (New York: St. Martin Press, 1989), p. 1.

⁸² *Ibid.*, pp. 1-12.

abandoned the policy of partial isolation which it had followed prior to World War I, and while forming a strong security web within the structure of NATO, they sought to attract countries under different systems to their side. The United States and even occasionally Great Britain had policies of breaking relations with the Soviet Union over economic aid and support for human rights in the Warsaw Pact member countries. In contrast, Germany, which was closely interested in the region, took on a far more important role by acting on the advantage, the United States and Great Britain had by virtue of their geographical closeness.⁸³ Ethnic Germans in other countries, Germany's rapidly growing economy, and its cultural ties became decisive in the activeness of the role Germany played. Countries such as Romania, Czechoslovakia and East Germany accepted this role.⁸⁴ The activeness of the role Germany began to play in the region can be evaluated as a starting point for the situation of present developments, and in one way is helpful for understanding the present.

When the Warsaw Pact countries are analyzed from the perspective of their membership within the same system, we are able to see that there were various differences between them despite the fact that they belong to the same system. In the course of evaluating their cultural differences, it was more their religious and ethnic differences that come to light.⁸⁵ For example, in spite of the way the role of religion was cut back in the communist system, it was accepted that Balkan countries such as Bulgaria and Romania were of eastern origins, and from the point of view of religious identity, Orthodox Christian. As for Eastern European countries such as Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, that they were much closer to Western Europe and Roman Catholic dominance was evident in regards to their religious orientation. It is possible to express the same argument in regards to these countries' economic and cultural affinity to the West.

⁸³ Ibid., pp. 2-3.

⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 3.

⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 4.

In short, despite the fact that these countries with homogenous structures participated in the same system, and however much the Soviet Union attempted to fit these countries into a pattern, the task proved impossible. In regard to trade, the same concerns emerged, and nationalist sentiments grew in this area.⁸⁶ Only in military matters and their joint defense agreement, can it be said that the member countries of the Warsaw Pact displayed any shared characteristics. In this regard they moved within a structure completely dependent on the Soviet Union.

In conclusion, it may be said that Balkan countries within the Pact attempted to protect their own identities assumed and from time to time assumed an independent manner and attitude in their relations with the Soviet Union in spite of Moscow. However much Moscow attempted to create ideologies above nationalism, it proved impossible to rid the countries in question of nationalism. In order for leaders to be in a powerful position in the countries they ruled, they used nationalist rhetoric, and the Soviet Union was forced to accept this in the end.⁸⁷ When tensions emerged as a result of ethnic and regional disputes, the Kremlin was forced to change its policies by the 1970s.⁸⁸ In this respect, it abandoned its role and its previous practice of strictly enforcing claims to supremacy, and started to follow a more flexible policy. At the same time, it did not want to lose its position as referee at any cost.

⁸⁶ Sander, pp. 131-132.

⁸⁷ Ibid., pp. 128-129.

⁸⁸ Eyal, p. 10.

CHAPTER SIX

CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE BALKANS

The Beginning of Change after the Collapse of the Soviet Union

During the final decade of the twentieth century, great changes in the world were wrought. The completion of the organized evolution of the two axes, which had come into existence after World War II, and the break-up of one of these axis produced a completely new situation.

Mikhail Gorbachev's becoming leader of the Soviet Union in 1985 can be seen as the initiation of a series of events which at the same time held the world in its clutches and caught the world quite unprepared. The beginning of this period of change was due to the declaration and enactment of Gorbachev's concepts of "*glasnost*", that is, openness, transparency and democratization; and "*perestroika*", economic and political restructuring.¹ This development did not remain solely within the boundaries of the Soviet Union. While it led to the disintegration of the Soviet Empire,² it also laid the foundation for great changes in the existing Balkan countries and for the emergence of people's ethnic awareness, which in turn led to an internal regional civil war and territorial division.

The existing balance during the Cold War period among the Balkan countries was a balance which has been characterized as consisting of Turkey and Greece, which were tied to the directive of Western democratic European Council, NATO, OECD and the European Union and a market economy; Bulgaria and Rumania under

¹ On the disintegration of the Soviet Union, see Michael Mandelbaum, "Coup de Grace: The End of The Soviet Union", *Foreign Affairs* (New York: 1991-1992), pp. 164-183.

² Dimitri Simes, "Gorbachev's Time of Troubles," *Foreign Policy*, no. 82. (Spring 1991), pp. 97-117; and Martha Brill Olcott, "The Soviet (Dis) union," *Foreign Policy* no. 82 (Spring 1991), pp. 118-136.

the directive of the Warsaw Pact and COMECON which were within communist authoritarian system; Yugoslavia and Albania which, while taking pains not to move outside of Moscow's course of action, nevertheless had their own particular models, could not remain unaffected by these influences. The balance that existed among these countries during the Cold War period was quickly pulled into a fast-paced transformation towards the end of 1980s. The "democratic revolution" which developed rapidly within the Soviet Union along with Eastern Europe and the Balkan countries first turned to freeing themselves from Moscow's influence and repression, then followed with the dismantling of the communist party monopoly in socio-political and socio-economic life.³ As for the aftermath of these developments, a tripartite process was carried out in order to embark on the road to liberalism, a form of liberalism which consisted of a multi-party political system, pluralistic democracy, and free market economy.⁴

In considering the concrete repercussions of transformations in the Balkans, it is apparent that this was an attempt to cut ties with the past by means of a change which had its origins in a theoretical orientation of the dismantling of the communist party, that is to say, the transformation of the communist party into a socialist party, which was realized by the large-scale removal of party members.

Those leaders who did not wish to conform to the emergent reform movements in the Soviet Union or who felt that these developments would not suit their own authoritative positions were not able to maintain their positions for long in the process of this transformation. Romania was the first to undergo these changes, and it did so rapidly. Nicolae Ceausescu had not made any concessions in his austere communist dictatorship, which had been continued without interruption since 1965. The deposing of Ceausescu, which occurred within the brief span of one week, was the harbinger of developments that were to occur throughout the Balkans.

³ For new developments in Eastern Europe, see Daniel N. Nelson, "Europe's Unstable East," *Foreign Policy*, no. 82 (Spring 1991), pp. 137-158.

⁴ İhsan Gürkan, "II. Dünya Savaşı'ndan Günümüze Değın Balkanlar," *Balkanlar* (İstanbul: Ortadoğı ve Balkan İncelemeleri Vakfı Yayınları, 1993), pp. 170-171,

This transformation was "realized in a violent revolution"⁵ in comparison to other Eastern European and Balkan nations.⁶ However the processes of change did not continue at the same initial fast pace. The developments in Rumania were marked by a tendency towards securing revitalization and stabilization for itself, rather than radical reforms. Economic and political problems were not solely the result of a confused social transition. It is certain that the reforms of systemic weaknesses has a hindering and retarding effect, and it became apparent in the first half of the 1990s that this was the period for reconstructing the infrastructure.⁷

Bulgaria was another Balkan country that experienced this process at the same time as Romania. Bulgarian leader Todor Zhivkov, who remained in Bulgaria's 35-year long ruling party and who ruled the country in accordance with the Soviet Union, was forced to resign in the face of the winds of reform in Eastern Europe towards the end of the 1980.⁸ After the preparation of a new constitution in the 1990s, Bulgaria began a process of democratization by enacting market competition and free elections. Despite a series of difficulties in this process, Bulgarian leaders attempted to secure democratic necessities and democratization rather than relying on military intervention or taking refuge in ethnic tensions, as would be seen in the case of Yugoslavia.⁹

Among those of the Eastern block Albania was another country the citizens of which took a stand against the communist regime. The fall of Zhivkov in Bulgaria and Ceausescu in Rumania had had a significant impact on Albanians. Between,

⁵ Nicolae Ceausescu, who was seen as single-handedly responsible for the previous period in Romania and his wife were caught and executed by firing squad. Nesto Ratesh, "Romania: Slamming on the Brakes," *Current History* 92, no. 577 (November 1993), p. 390.

⁶ Tom Gallagher, *Outcast Europe. The Balkans 1789-1989, from Ottomans to Milosevic* (London: Routledge, 2001) p. 260.

⁷ Thomas Carothers, "Romania: Projecting the Positive," *Current History* 95, no. 599 (March 1996), pp. 118-119.

⁸ In contrast to other leaders, Zhivkov was excluded by the party in power. Luan Troxel, "Bulgaria: Stable Ground in the Balkans," *Current History* 92, no. 577 (November, 1993) , pp. 386-389.

⁹ Ibid.

1946-1989, Enver Hoxha (Hoja) directed a repressive communist regime, and was followed by Ramiz Alija.¹⁰ Demonstrations began against Alija's leadership, and in 1992, the culmination of these reactions forced him to adopt a more moderate leadership in its place.¹¹

Albania differed from other Balkan countries in that it was led by Enver Hoxha as a sealed-off region far removed from democratic ideals. While many observers expected the country to slide into anarchy or incline towards a dictatorial regime, these processes may have been described as an opportunity for Albania in the economic collapse which followed Enver Hoxha's reign. Under the administration of the first post-communist president, Sali Berisha, rapid action was taken in the prevailing system by changing the communist system and in its place enacting social laws such as human rights, private ownership, constitutional amendments, and accepting the principles of separation of powers, etc.¹² Albania entered the post-communist world in an impoverished and broken state. Although some progress was made under the Democratic Party government after 1992, many underlying problems were not addressed. Despite efforts by the international community to build democratic institutions and assist economic development, the process were hindered by the entrenched and bitter rivalries within Albania's political class as Pettifer and Vickers pointed out.¹³ Towards the end of the twentieth century, in 1998, because of the war in Kosovo, the national question became increasingly important in pan-Albanian politics.¹⁴ In 2000s, Albania's

¹⁰ Miranda Vickers, *The Albanians: A Modern History* (London: I. B. Touris, 1999), p. 210.

¹¹ Elez Biberaj, "Albania's Road to Democracy", *Current History* 92, no. 577 (November 1993), p. 381.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ James Pettifer, and Miranda Vickers, *The Albanian Question, Reshaping the Balkans* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2007) pp.19-20.

¹⁴ Mirela Bogdani and John Laughlin, *Albania and the European Union*. New York: I.B. Tauris, 2007, pp. 87-146.

NATO membership and integrity with EU became the priorities as the other Western Balkan countries.¹⁵

The Disintegration of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia:
A Case Study

The brief examples in the previous section describe the winds of change that swept through the Balkans in the early 1990s. Among the Balkan states, the greatest change and influence of developments in this period was experienced in Yugoslavia, a state which attempted to remain united within a federation framework after World War II.¹⁶ Despite the fact that it was a relatively moderate regime compared to the other Balkan states, with its own unique form of socialism,¹⁷ and that it had begun to adopt a free market economy as early as the 1960s, Yugoslavia, with its federal structuring and multi-cultural ethnic groups, was dragged into partition in this transitional period. As mentioned above, Yugoslavia, which has been established as a mosaic of nations and was under the charismatic leadership of Tito until 1980,¹⁸ was pulled into the search for a new identity.¹⁹ The economic, ethnic, religious and cultural differences finding a fertile environment in the various republics of the Yugoslav Federation (comprised of the republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia), one by one emerged and entered

¹⁵ Ibid., pp. 87-146.

¹⁶ For information concerning changes in Bulgaria, Romania and Albania, see İsmail Soysal, "Günümüzde Balkanlar ve Türkiye'nin Tutumu," *Balkanlar* (İstanbul: Ortadoğu ve Balkan İncelemeleri Vakfı Yayınları, 1993), p. 179.

¹⁷ The power of the federal government was used for foreign policy defense and for a united market. Robin Alison Remington, "The Federal Dilemma in Yugoslavia," *Current History* 89, no. 551 (December 1990), p. 405.

¹⁸ In May 1980 Josip Broz Tito died. See further details: Victor Meier, *Yugoslavia. A History of Its Demise*, trans. Sabrina Petra Ramet (London: Routledge, 1999) pp. 1-34.

¹⁹ See the disintegration of Yugoslavia, Sabrina Petra Ramet, "War in the Balkans," *Foreign Affairs*, 71, no.4 (Fall 1992), pp.79-98.

into a complete state of chaos.²⁰ The end of the repression of a closed regime was the cause of the birth of a new environment. In words to the effect that "the communists removed freedom of thought; at the same time they repressed excessive nationalism," a student of Hungarian origins made an important evaluation and after this outlined the developments that would occur.²¹

In order to discuss the dissolution of the regime in Yugoslavia at the end of the 1980s and the newly-created political dynamism, it is necessary to evaluate the specific conditions of the federation. For these evaluations, we will begin with Serbia, which created the dynamics of these developments.

Serbs, who constituted the most active political and demographic group within the Yugoslav Federal Republic,²² began to give indications of the changes which would emerge within the federation as early as the 1980s. In this period it is possible to see in the line from pragmatic nationalism to chauvinism²³ the path which extended to Slobodan Milosevic, at the rank of party leader.²⁴ Milosevic and his team defended the monolithic and totalitarian political system, while presenting their nationalist rhetoric as official ideology which they wrapped up carefully with socialist dogma.²⁵ Among the people of Serbia, Milosevic began to be known as "the new Tito." With this adjective it is possible to understand that he was believed to be the most charismatic leader to emerge in Yugoslavia after Tito; however, when comparing the approach of Milosevic to Tito that of in the sense of an embodiment

²⁰ Malcolm, p.29.

²¹ Cited in, Tanıl Bora, *Yugoslavya: Milliyetçiliğin Provokasyonu* (İstanbul: Birikim Yayınları, 1991), p. 14.

²² According to the 1981 Yugoslav Census, there were approximately eight million Serbs. This comprised thirty-six percent of the total population of the Yugoslav Federation. If Serbs living in the Serbian Republic constitute eighty-five percent of the majority, their numbers are more diffused in the autonomous republics of Kosovo and Vojvodina and in the republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia. Hugh Poulton, *Balkanlar, Çatışan Azınlıklar, Çatışan Devletler* (İstanbul: Sarmal Yayınları, 1991), p. 23.

²³ Bora, p. 106.

²⁴ For an evaluation of Slobodan Milosevic, see Aleksa Djilas, "A Profile of Slobodan Milosevic," *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993), pp. 81-96.

²⁵ Critical Yugoslav Marxists defined Milosevic's line as "neostalinist." Bora, p. 106.

of a non-nationalistic, multi-national federal Yugoslavia, of course this cannot be considered.²⁶

The 1990 elections demonstrated that the Serb nation was of the same mind as Milosevic and his supporters. While a moderate party won the parliamentary and presidential elections in the majority of other republics, Milosevic and his supporters maintained the upper hand, particularly in Serbia and Montenegro. Later on, the “new” Yugoslavia would consist of only these two republics.

At the beginning of the 1990s, when the federal presidency of Yugoslavia should have rotated to Croatia, which was one of the six republics comprising the federation, as provided for in the Yugoslav constitution,²⁷ Serbia's desire to be the sole possessor of Yugoslavia's legacy constituted the beginning of the break-up process.²⁸

Just as they had made claims to possess all land on which Serbs were found, the Serbs began to demand rights for regions in which they comprised a minority or for which they had only historical claims.²⁹ The political observer Vladimir Gligorov expressed the problem in irony with these words: "Why should I be a minority in your state, when you can be a minority in my state?"³⁰ This expression was a harbinger of excessive nationalism and the ethnic cleansing which followed from it. In that regard, "Minorities have no place in a homogenous society" constitutes a clear declaration of Serbian views.

These developments were followed with alarm by the other peoples of the federation, the Croatians, Slovenes, Macedonians, Bosnians and Kosovo Albanians, and tensions increased. In this process, along with the crumbling of the League of Yugoslav Communists, the leaders of the other republics and their people, seeing the

²⁶ Ibid., p, 109.

²⁷ For the constitutional system, see Poulton, p. 16; and Carole Rogel, *The Breakup of Yugoslavia and the War in Bosnia*, (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1998) pp. 17-27.

²⁸ Rogel, *The Breakup* ... pp. 17-27.

²⁹ Civijeto Job, "Yugoslavia's Ethnic Furies," *Foreign Policy*, no. 92 (Fall 1993), p. 52.

³⁰ Ibid., pp. 52-53.

increase of Serb nationalism, saw that little could be done for their own regional and ethnic interests.³¹ Originally, the constitution of the Yugoslav Federal Republic had limited their field of movement. In the constitution, while mentioning that "with the exception of secession, each country of the Yugoslav nation has the right to determine its own fate," careful language was used and it was stated that these countries would be united in the course of World War II "on the basis of the decree freely expressed."³² This meant that the decisions made by the countries were binding and the right to secession should not be implemented. However, the fast-paced political changes which began in 1989 brought about a complete break from the old constitutional system.

The First Break from the Federation: Slovenia

In 1990-1991 it became apparent that the federation would not be able to maintain its unity in respect to its concomitant republics. An overwhelming support for independence came to light in the referendums that first Slovenia held in August 1990,³³ followed by Croatia in May 1991.³⁴ This situation was a touchstone in the de facto separation of Yugoslavia.

Slovenia was the most developed republic. Although Slovenia's population constituted only 8.7% of all Yugoslavia,³⁵ it produced twenty percent of Yugoslavia's national revenue, in addition to which it exported one-third of the

³¹ Lenard J. Cohen, "The Disintegration of Yugoslavia," *Current History* 92, no. 577 (November, 1993), p. 371.

³² Poulton, p. 16.

³³ In Slovenia on August 28, 1990, independence was ratified by referendum. Soysal, "Günümüzde Balkanlar...", p. 209.

³⁴ Croats voted for independence on May 19, 1991. *Ibid.*, p. 210.

³⁵ Slovenia, which consisted of approximately ninety percent Slovenes, was the most homogeneous of the republics. Poulton, p. 43.

country's goods. As can be deduced from these figures, Slovenia was the richest region among the Yugoslav Federation's republics.³⁶ Differing from the other republics, its industries were not focused in a few centers or sectors, but were diversified in terms of geography and sectors. Parallel to this economic development, Slovenia was the country to enter most quickly into free market economy as well as to adopt political pluralism and democratic processes.³⁷

Finally in contrast to the other republics, Slovenia saw itself as more situated in the realm of economic autonomy and cultural westernism than as a part of Yugoslavia and its orientation was dependent on becoming united with the West in economic development and its historical cultural past. In fact, Slovenia had embarked on intensive economic relations with its neighbors Austria and Italy since the second half of the 1960s.³⁸ In the 1990s, Slovenia displayed these relations to its advantage in the form of uniting with Europe, such that this became the means by which it would secede from the Yugoslav Federation and become independent. In this sense, the first concrete step would be taken in 1990 when Slovenia withdrew from the Yugoslav Federal Parliament, and in 1991 when they realized complete independence.³⁹ On June 25, 1991, Slovenia declared its independence, but the Federal Assembly in Belgrade voted not to recognize Slovenia's independence.

By June 26 Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) troops, were sent to retake control of Slovenia's borders. Only on June 27 were more consequential military operations launched by Belgrade ostensibly in an effort to thwart the wayward republic's quest for independence, but, in reality, to bring home to the Slovenes the cost of ward and

³⁶ Bora, p. 14.

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid., pp. 114-118.

³⁹ For a chronology concerning the process of Slovenia's separation from Yugoslavia, see İsmail Soysal and Şule Kut, *Dağlan Yugoslavya ve Bosna Hersek Sorunu: Olaylar - Belgeler, 1990-1996* (İstanbul: Ortadoğu ve Balkan İncelemeleri Vakfı Yayınları, 1997), p. 3.

ensure their nonparticipation in subsequent operations against Croatia and Bosnia as Ramet points out.⁴⁰

The Process of Croatia Separating from the Yugoslav Federation

Croats comprised the second largest national group within the Yugoslav Federation.⁴¹ The Croats and the Croats living in Bosnia-Herzegovina were some of the most virulent adherents of nationalist tendencies within the Yugoslav federation. The reason for the events that follow lie in Serbian chauvinism and the subconscious fear on the part of the Federal government that the specter of the "*Croatian ustasha* " could rise again from the ashes at any time, which explained the institutionalized repression and surveillance of Croatia.⁴² Despite the fact that Serbs in Croatia constituted only twelve percent of the population, they constituted a significant presence in all of the important positions in the state administrative structure of the Croatian Republic and the police administration. The relationship between these two groups was rendered extremely sensitive.⁴³ Serbian fears of the Croatian ustasha again rising to power, combined with the Croatian anxieties of a foundation being laid for Serbian hegemony, pulled the two groups into a vicious

⁴⁰ Sabrina Petra Ramet, "Democratisation in Slovenia- the Second Stage", *Politics Power and the Struggle for Democracy in South-East Europe*, eds. Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) p. 198.

⁴¹ In the 1981 census the number of Croats was given as 4.5 million, thus comprising twenty percent of Yugoslavia's population. In principle seventy percent of Croats live in Croatia and eighteen percent in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Poulton, p. 37.

⁴² The *ustasha* gang that the Independent Croatian State and Croatian Fascists established which had been created during the period of World War II with Hitler's zeal, carried out a complete genocide of Serbs, Jews and Gypsies. In response to this, Serb nationalist *chetniks* retaliated by treating Croatian and Bosnian Muslims in the same manner. Dusko Doder.

⁴³ Poulton, p. 40.

circle. In Croatia, as had occurred in Serbia, this caused a more powerfully virulent form of nationalism than in the other republics.

Towards the end of the 1980s, the high degree of nationalism that appeared in other regions had begun to be expressed openly in Croatia, and this activated political opposition. In this period, Franjo Tudjman had emerged as the most prominent figure of the nationalist movement in Croatia.⁴⁴ Tudjman declared "From the Baltic to the Adriatic, Eastern Europe will shake with a national democratic revolution," thus giving a great deal of support to the fate of Croatia in the period which leads up to today.⁴⁵ The slogan that Tudjman and his party devised, "Let us be our own masters of the fate of our Croatia," signaled that Croatia was ready to tear itself from the Yugoslav Federation.⁴⁶

In the processes which was concluded with the separation of Slovenia and Croatia from the Yugoslav Federation, religious and sectarian differences played a significant role in regard to nationalistic plots and economic anxieties. As discussed above, "religion" in the Balkan mosaic was an even more significant factor for accentuating differences. One significant factor in the creation of separate camps in Yugoslavia was the conflict of Orthodoxy and Catholicism, which constituted two different branches within Christianity. Despite the fact that religion and state were separated according to the 1974 constitution, the Orthodox Church that was tied to the Serbs was traditionally a "state" church, and most of the time demonstrated its ties to whichever government was in power.⁴⁷ As for the Roman Catholic Church to which the Slovenes and Croatians belonged, if it attempted to remain distant from early political developments, it was seen as a dangerous rival by the communist regime because it was tied to its center in Rome, outside of the country, and was

⁴⁴ Tudjman, who had been a close partisan general with Tito in World War II, carried on his nationalist rhetoric in the post-war period and participated in the political arena. Bora, p. 120.

⁴⁵ Ibid., pp. 120-121.

⁴⁶ Christopher Cviic, "Croatia's Violent Birth," *Current History* 92, no. 577 (November, 1993), p. 374.

⁴⁷ Poulton, p. 17.

therefore subject to attacks.⁴⁸ This development was the reason that the Catholic Church was the first institution to be transformed into one of the Croatian nationalist symbols.⁴⁹ Thus in the process of the dissolution of Yugoslavia, religion was brought to the fore, and according to Bora, "one of the fundamental disagreements that the Croatian-Serb national conflict brought out again was in particular the rivalry between the Catholic and Orthodox churches."⁵⁰ As for Croatian leader Tudjman, while accentuating this distinction, he situated the Catholic-Orthodox and Croatian-Serb conflict on the index of the Eastern-Western opposition, and universalized and Europeanized the matter. According to Tudjman, the fundamental conflict to come in the world will be experienced between the traditional, democratic and humanitarian Western-Christian civilization, and the authoritative and politically-arbitrary Byzantine-Orthodox civilization.⁵¹ According to Ramet, rather than this manifestation being a religious conflict, it was a battle for territory, and that Serbian politicians use religion as a tool to fan the fires of hatred for non-Serbian nations.⁵²

These countries openly stated that they could not longer remain under the umbrella of the Yugoslav Socialist Federal Republic, adding to the aforementioned reasons that the Serb-dominated federal regime did not listen to the Croatian and Slovenian politicians; their desire to continue to direct the federation with a central constitution from Belgrade while not taking into consideration Croatian and Slovenian desires for independence; the introduction of unfair taxation practices which favored Serbs; the number of Serbs in the army and the openly preferential

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 18; Doder, p. 7.

⁴⁹ Lenard J. Cohen, "Embattled Democracy: Post Communist Croatia in Transitio," *Politics Power and the Struggle for Democracy in South-East Europe*. eds. Karen Dawisha and Bruce Parrott (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) p. 74.

⁵⁰ Bora, p. 148.

⁵¹ As for Tudjman's advisor, he advanced the argument that Croatia and Slovenia were countries that would protect Europe from the spread of Islam and Eastern Orthodoxy and economic instability. Bora, p. 149.

⁵² Sabrina Petra Ramet, "Balkan War," *Foreign Affairs* (Fall 1992), p. 81.

treatment accorded to them; and the imposition of the Cyrillic alphabet on the Croatsians. ⁵³

Due to these developments, the Slovenian parliament adopted a resolution to officially begin the process of separation from Yugoslavia on January 31, 1991. On February 20, changes to the constitution were accepted for the process of Slovenia to become an independent state.⁵⁴ In May 1991, Croatia recorded its desire to become independent in a referendum after a similar procedure,⁵⁵ and finally the Slovenian and Croatian parliaments declared their official independence on June 25, 1991.⁵⁶ Yugoslavia's Federal President Ante Markovic's declaration that this motion was illegal and thus invalid, and his sending the Serbian-controlled army to Slovenia and Croatia initiated the war that was to occur in Yugoslavia.

In this process, international public opinion became involved with this matter, attempting to secure reconciliation by bringing the opposing parties together, and at the outset of the events, did not view the breakup of Yugoslavia with favor.⁵⁷ With the involvement of the European Community, the opposing parties that came together at Brioni July 7, 1991 agreed to a cease-fire and a decision was made for a three-month postponement of Slovenia and Croatia's independence.⁵⁸ Finally within a period of time, the Federal army under Serb leadership initiated military action by not returning to their barracks despite the decision for a cease-fire, and with the initiation of an invasion of Croatia, Croatia and Slovenia gave definitive notice of their independence on October 8, 1991, at the end of the three-month

⁵³ Ibid., pp. 81-82.

⁵⁴ Soysal and Kut, p. 5.

⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 7.

⁵⁶ Misha Glenny, *The Balkans. Nationalism, War and the Great Powers 1804 -1999* (New York: Penguin Books, 2001) p. 637.

⁵⁷ At this time, in an announcement broadcast by the European Community, it was stated in the notice regarding non-use of force by the opposing sides, that Yugoslavia in protecting democratic unity would have a better chance of joining with Europe. Soysal and Kut, p. 6.

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 8; Soysal, "*Günümüzde Balkanlar..*," p. 211.

period decided upon in Brioni on July 7.⁵⁹ By the beginning of 1992, it was obvious that the Yugoslav Federation was dead.

Upon the impossibility of the Yugoslav Republic reuniting, international public opinion had to reevaluate the situation anew and on January 15, 1992, the European Community decided to recognize Slovenia and Croatia as independent entities, despite the decision of the reconciliation commission to the contrary.⁶⁰

Europe's View of the Situation of Slovenia and Croatia

The developments in Slovenia and Croatia's process of secession from the Yugoslav Federation were closely followed by Europe in particular. Above all else, the breakup of Yugoslavia, by causing the renewal of historical conflicts with their immediate neighbors, could lead to a hazardous event the results of which would be uncertain, or could incite the advocates of independence, separatist trends and conflict in neighboring countries. As in the case of the Balkans preceding World War I, international league conflicts and disputes could be played out in geographical disputes. A large tempest which influenced not only the immediate region but Europe as well, created a return to the essential meaning of the term "Balkanization," a term which was used to describe overburdened geopolitical regions with these kinds of insoluble conflicts.⁶¹ The influence of these frightening scenarios caused concern, particularly in regard to minorities in European countries. National independence movements could flare up in Corsica for France, among the Basques in Spain, and in Britain's Northern Ireland. The Valoon-Flemish tensions could come to the fore; meanwhile, the regions of Galicia and Catalan in Spain, like

⁵⁹ Ibid., p. 10.

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 14.

⁶¹ Bora, p. 180.

France's Breton, could attempt to claim their rights and separate identity.⁶² Thus these projections by the European parliaments and European Community required at first that action be taken to protect federal unity, due to their concerns that the potential risks of Yugoslavia's problems would be an example that could initiate similar movements. For a long time, practically until the last months before the final collapse of Yugoslavia, Western politicians paid almost no attention to the realities.⁶³

An additional worry for Europe gave rise to concerns that the breakup of Yugoslavia would create divisions in the neighboring regions. The separation of Yugoslavia before Europe would reverberate in the region and would be the cause of re-igniting historical conflicts between Yugoslavia's neighbors (between Macedonia, Greece and Bulgaria, or Serbia, Hungary and Albania), disclosing separatist tendencies (such as the Slovaks in Czechoslovakia, Romanians in Moldavia and Turks in Bulgaria), potentially giving rise to partition in these countries as well, or igniting existing problems among all of the Balkan countries.⁶⁴

As a power that was removed from this region, the United States followed the matter from a distance but with careful attention during this period. Despite the CIA's preliminary study at the beginning of 1991 which revealed the inevitability of Yugoslavia's breakup within one and a half years, the United States also expressed its attitude in support of protecting Yugoslavia's territorial integrity.⁶⁵

It must be remembered that there were materialistic concerns which lay beneath these efforts of the United States and Europe in protecting Yugoslav unity. The question of who would pay the debt of a divided Yugoslavia---a debt which had already reached a high level ---and in what form it would be paid influenced these

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Meier, p.217.

⁶⁴ In all of the Balkan countries there were problems with minorities. For more detailed information, see Poulton, pp. 129-247.

⁶⁵ Bora, p. 180.

countries, as much as the World Bank, the IMF and similar international institutions.⁶⁶

On the other hand, the tendency to approve of the independence of Slovenia and Croatia that was observed in Germany and Italy caused a rupture in the policy that Europe was trying to follow. In addition to the fact that these countries were considered part of Europe and presented a different policy, other factors came into play. On the one hand, Austria and Italy fed aspirations which had their roots in their historical past, on the other hand, Germany took into account future investments.⁶⁷

The Western and North American policy of protecting Yugoslavia's unity, in addition to being a valid concern for the European Security and Cooperation League's protection of law of the new world order, was based on another fear, that this was a danger that was more concrete and short term. Was it possible that this would be an example of scenarios which would lead to the breakup of the Soviet Union? Eduard Severdnazde, as head of the Soviet Union's Foreign Ministry, expressed that the Soviet Union would oppose this country's division when warning the West: "Watch out for Yugoslavia."⁶⁸

As for Slovenia and Croatia, the most important strategic goal of the process of independence which they began together was to join with Europe as soon as possible. These two states which wanted to have Europe on their side in their struggle for independence, stressed that to require the existence of a Yugoslav Federation that would put in danger their people, their republic and goods would be contrary to Western democratic principles, and formally resolved to use their "right to self-determination as a nation" until the end. Consequently, immediately after

⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 181.

⁶⁷ Germany immediately stated its position based on its knowledge of these countries. As for countries such as France, they began to investigate the issue. Beyond the realm of NATO, necessary intervention was not undertaken; if the Western European Union (WEU) and European Community (EC) were to be seen as security divisions, their activities also did not amount to anything. Cohen, p. 373.

⁶⁸ Bora, p. 179.

independence Slovenia and Croatia made clear that they wanted to become part of the European system.⁶⁹

Pandora's Box: Bosnia-Herzegovina

The Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina was one of the most troubled of Yugoslavia's ethnically and religiously-mixed regions. "It was Yugoslavia in miniature" as Carole Rogel pointed out.⁷⁰ During the process of the dissolution of the Federation, the most bloody developments occurred within the boundaries of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Bosnia-Herzegovina was the third largest republic of the Yugoslav Federation. In contrast to the other republics, this region could by no means be considered to be homogenous in respect to the diversity of its population and the concomitant differences in religious and cultural makeup.⁷¹ In the region in which Bosnians comprised a large proportion, there were also Serbs and Croats. In the results of the 1991 census, while the percentage of Bosnians was 43.8 percent, Serbs constituted 31.5 percent and Croats 17.3 percent of the population of Bosnia Herzegovina.⁷² This demographic distribution and the religious differences that it indicates reveals an even more intricate character for this region a character that would lead to an even more troubled process that would be experienced in the period that followed. According to Meier, two questions had a determined impact of the fate of Bosnia: First, whether the consciousness of belonging to a common Bosnia-

⁶⁹ R. J. Crampton, *The Balkans since the Second World War* London: Pearsen Education Ltd, 2002) p.139.

⁷⁰ Carole Rogel, *The Breakup of Yugoslavia and The War in Bosnia*, (London: Greenwood Press, 1998), p.31.

⁷¹ İsmet Görgülü and Veli Yılmaz, *Bosna-Hersek* (İstanbul: Harp Akademileri Komutanlığı Yayınları, 1992), p.3.

⁷² Sabrina Petra Ramet, "The Bosnian War and the Diplomacy of Accommodation," *Current History* 93, no. 586 (November 1994), p. 380.

Herzegovina would be strong enough among all three peoples to guarantee the continued existence of this community after the end of Yugoslavia; and second, whether the Muslims could serve as the principal agents of a (new) state community. As is well known, the first question was answered in a most tragic way with a “no,” while the answer to the second question was a conditional “yes.”⁷³

The developments experienced in Bosnia-Herzegovina began at the same time as those of the other republics and similarly began on the basis of ethnic nationalism. The elections at the end of 1990 illustrated that the political parties were founded on the basis of ethnic differences. As indicated earlier, it was inescapable that the ethnic and religious differences that the political parties---parties which were organized immediately after the dismantling of the communist party monopolies---used as a foundation were a means to incite separatism among the communities which comprised the republic. In the 1990 elections, the Muslim Party for Democratic Action (*Stranka Demokratska Akcija*) won the majority of the vote by thirty-eight percent.⁷⁴ At the same time, as the president of Bosnia-Herzegovina Alija Izzetbegović was elected.⁷⁵

Immediately after the elections, contrary to stressing separatism, Izzetbegović adopted a position of unification. In addition, while noting Bosnian wishes for "not an Islamic state, but a Muslim, Serbian and Croatian republic," he underlined the non-monolithic, non-sectarian and pluralistic foundations. Again it was brought up by this cabinet that they would attempt to solve the problem of the crisis experienced in Bosnia-Herzegovina---particularly in relation to the economic sphere---by entering into a dialogue and improving relations with Croatia and

⁷³ Meier, p. 196.

⁷⁴ For the voter distribution in the 1990 elections, see Robin Allison Remington, "Bosnia: The Tangled Web," *Current History* no. 577 (November 1993), p. 366.

⁷⁵ In 1983 Alija Izzetbegović was sentenced to a seven-year prison term because of his book, *Islamic Manifest*, and was set free in 1989. Bora, p. 137. For Alija Izzetbegović's thoughts on religion, see Alija Izzetbegović, *Doğu ve Batı Arasında İslam*, trans. Salih Şaban (İstanbul: Nehir Yayınları, 1994), pp.9-312.

Slovenia.⁷⁶ Izzetbegović, once more stressing the particularity of the region, noted with emphasis that the boundaries had been determined internationally and went back as far as the 1878 Berlin Congress with the three ethnic groups spread out like spots on a leopard, and that it would be very difficult to divide up the country.⁷⁷

However, Yugoslavia had already come to the stage of partition. In order to prevent the declarations of independence by Slovenia and Croatia, and the Serbian reactions which followed, the war was begun with the army being put into power. It became clear that a region like Bosnia-Herzegovina, which always carried the potential for major conflict, would soon become involved in these developments. While defending the idea since 1991 that "if nothing else, loose federation," the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina was pressured to reduce the feasibility of this formula. While continuing to be left to face Serbia with Slovenia and Croatia's abandonment of the federation, it began to draw back. Gradually the links between the Serbian military bloc and the Bosnia-Herzegovina administration were discarded and the perspective favoring independence for Bosnia-Herzegovina acquired weight. Something not known at the time was that both Serbia and Croatia had express designs on Bosnia. President Milosevic and Tudjman had met in September 1991 and secretly agreed to divide their neighboring republic. Memoirs and interviews with key players in the Yugoslav breakup confirmed this collusion.⁷⁸ The springboard of civil war for Bosnia-Herzegovina in March 1992 was the referendum that was held for independence. In this poll ---despite the boycott of the thirty-one percent of the Serbian population--- the conflicts began when more than fifty percent of the Bosnians and Croats voted for independence.⁷⁹ This was the beginning of the days of chaos that would last for years in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Towards the end of the same year, seventy percent of the country was under Serbian military occupation and the Serbs proclaimed Bosnia-Herzegovina as a Serb republic as well.

⁷⁶ Bora, p. 137.

⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 138.

⁷⁸ Rogel, *The Breakup...*p.31

⁷⁹ Soysal, "*Günümüzde Balkanlar...*p.183.

In this period, 1.2 million Bosniacs and Croats were forced to emigrate from their homeland to other places; populations in numbers reaching hundreds of thousands --- mostly Bosniacs--- lost their lives in conflicts or in concentration camps.⁸⁰ Finally in the circumstances which became a complete war, Serbian military action turned into a genocidal operation which was described first by the Serbs euphemistically as "ethnic cleansing."⁸¹

For close to one hundred years, the Muslim community, which lived with the feeling of being a small island in a Christian sea and, for most of the time, was systematically treated with alienation and repression, the belief prevailed that they were an "unclaimed community which could cross over to the enemy."⁸² Concomitant with this belief, it is a fact that the world did not record the developments in this region, or while not comprehending them adequately enough, led to a long-term bleeding wound.

It is clear that in this investigation into the developments in Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1990 to today will remain limited. However I will briefly attempt to remunerate the period of political transformation and developments in political life to which Bosnia-Herzegovina was subjected in the following section.

As noted before, the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina sought to secure the future of the republic and its people within the Yugoslav Federation. However, with the separation of Slovenia and Croatia from Yugoslavia potentially leaving Bosnia-Herzegovina to face Serbia and Serbian domination, independence was in a sense inevitable for this republic. One starting point for separatist movements in Bosnia-Herzegovina occurred in October 1991. On October 14, 1991, two important steps towards this republic's progress towards independence were taken in a session of the Bosnia-Herzegovina parliament in which Serbian representatives did not participate.

⁸⁰ For numerical information regarding the numbers of those residents of Bosnia-Herzegovina who died or who were forced to abandon their homes, see Remington, "Bosnia: The Tangled Web," p. 364.

⁸¹ Andrew Bell-Fialkoff, "A Brief History of Ethnic Cleansing," *Foreign Affairs* (Summer 1993), pp. 110-121.

⁸² Bora, p. 216.

The parliament decided to bring the issue of Bosnia-Herzegovina's future to a referendum vote, and, in the same manner on the following day, declared the republic's sovereignty with the votes of the Bosnian and Serbian representatives.⁸³ However, it seems that the request during those days of the president of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Alija Izzetbegović, when attempting to make contact for a peace mission to be sent under the auspices of the United Nations⁸⁴ was a harbinger of the developments that were to follow. Immediately after this decision, the Serbian representatives in Bosnia-Herzegovina declared that "Bosnian's parliament was Serb." And in the beginning of 1992, the Bosnian-Serb parliament made the decision that Serbian Bosnia-Herzegovina was tied to a Yugoslavia that was comprised only of Serbia and Montenegro.⁸⁵

The decisions coming from both sides following immediately upon each other obliterated the environment of accord. By means of a referendum inclined towards official registration of the independence process, independence was ratified despite the boycott of the Bosnian Serbs.⁸⁶ This decision ignited the conflicts that were to occur in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The leader of the Bosnian Serbs, Radovan Karadzic caused the conflicts to begin upon saying, "the efforts to separate from a Yugoslav Federation under Serbian control will be the reason for a birth of a hell in which perhaps Muslims will be eliminated."⁸⁷ In this period, in fact, Serbs were aware that it was inevitable that the federation would be dissolved. On the other hand, the Bosnian and Croatian opposition was unable to perceive that Serbs were preparing their operations to arrive at a final solution.⁸⁸ In fact, Serbia would first

⁸³ Soysal and Kut, p. 10.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Brona Marković, *Yugoslav Crisis and the World, Chronology of Events January 1990 - October 1995* (Belgrade: Institute of International Politics and Economics, 1996), p. 31; Soysal and Kut, p. 13.

⁸⁶ The results of the referendum held on February 29, 1992 were announced on March 1, 1992. Soysal and Kut, pp. 15-16.

⁸⁷ Mujeeb R. Khan, *Avrupa'da Yeniden Doğuş, Bosnalı Müslümanların Yaşama ve Tanınma Savaşı* (İstanbul: Dayanışma Vakfı Yayınları, 1996), pp. 19-20.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

provide logistical support to the attacks which the Serbs of Bosnia-Herzegovina began; then later actually participated. Up until the end of 1992, while the country's seventy percent Serbs encountered occupation, Bosnian and Croatian citizens were forced to emigrate.

In 1992 international attention began to turn towards the region as well. Organizations such as the European Parliamentary Council, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), or countries such as the United States and Russia in deciding to recognize Bosnia-Herzegovina, on the one hand, pushed the Serbs, who were now called "Republika Srpska," to declare an independent Bosnia-Herzegovina, and, on the other hand, directed the escalation of the conflict.⁸⁹ Under these conditions, despite the intervention and imposed cease-fire of the United Nations, this did not have a lasting effect.⁹⁰

In the United Nations, a report prepared during the time of Boutros Gali's administration in this period evaluating the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina as "tragic, dangerous, filled with violence and confusing," called attention to the conditions, stating that they were unsuitable for sending a peace mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina.⁹¹ Finally towards the end of 1992, on September 14, the United Nations' UNPROFOR (the United Nations Protection Force) enlarged its field of duty to include Bosnia-Herzegovina and the number of soldiers in the region increased.⁹² On October 9, the decision was made to ban all military flights with the declaration of a no-fly zone in Bosnia-Herzegovina, with the exception of

⁸⁹ Bosnia-Herzegovina was recognized on February 6, 1992 by Turkey; on April 7, 1992 by the United States; and on April 28, 1992 by Russia. On April 6, 1992, the Council of the European Union Ministry in its meeting in Luxembourg decided to recognize Bosnia-Herzegovina. On April 30, 1992 the OSCE accepted Bosnia-Herzegovina as a member. Soysal and Kut, pp. 14-19. As for the United Nations, upon the recommendation of the Security Council, the three former republics of the former Yugoslav Republic were accepted as members.

⁹⁰ With international interference in Bosnia-Herzegovina, a total of sixty-five cease-fires were announced, each time Serbs violating it and returning to intense warfare. Oya Akgönenç Mughisuddin, "Kuvvet Politikasının Yeniden Doğuşu: Bosna-Hersek Uygulaması," *Yeni Türkiye*, no. 2 (January 1995), p. 95.

⁹¹ Soysal and Kut, p. 20.

⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 29.

support flights for UNPROFOR and United Nations operations.⁹³ In November of the same month, the Balkan Conference, which convened in Istanbul at Turkey's request, was unable to reach an agreement on the Balkans.⁹⁴

In 1992 the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina continued with the same rapid speed and the Serbian "ethnic cleansing" operation continued. World opinion could no longer keep silent in the face of these developments to the degree that for the first time on December 18, 1992 the expression, "ethnic cleansing" was transformed to the term "genocide" in the United Nations General Assembly.⁹⁵ Some of the international communities imposed an arms embargo on the Bosnians. Thus faced with Serbs who possessed every kind of heavy weaponry, the Bosnians were rendered impotent and left to their own fate in regard to protecting their lives and the integrity of their country. In fact, Bosniaes had a small (50,000) poorly armed and poorly organized fighting force, as Rogel points out.⁹⁶

At the end of 1992, due to the efforts of Turkey and the Islamic Conference Organization, with a decision made by the United Nations General Assembly held on December 17, 1992, that with the exception of the de facto lifting of the no-fly zone restriction for Bosnia-Herzegovina, they requested that the Bosnia-Herzegovina government be excepted from the arms embargo in accordance with the decision of the United Nations. However the General Assembly did not bring these requests before the Council, due to the fact that the Security Council had begun peace negotiations.⁹⁷

1993 was a year in which formulas for solving the problem of Bosnia-Herzegovina were proposed under the auspices of the international community and

⁹³ *Birleşmiş Milletler Kararlarında Eski Yugoslavya ve Bosna-Hersek. The United States and the Situation in the Former Yugoslavia.* trans. Nejat Özdemiroğlu (İstanbul: Dayanışma Vakfı Yayınları, 1996), pp. 17-18.

⁹⁴ Şule Kut, "Yugoslavya Bunalımı ve Türkiye'nin Bosna-Hersek ve Makedonya Politikası: 1990-1993," *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi.* ed. Faruk Sönmezoğlu (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 1994), p. 169.

⁹⁵ Soysal and Kut, p. 34.

⁹⁶ Rogel, *The Breakup*.p.32.

⁹⁷ Soysal, "Günümüzde Balkanlar..," p. 183.

the United Nations. These plans remained distant from bringing a solution to the problem of Bosnia-Herzegovina, such as in the Vance-Owen Peace Initiative,⁹⁸ due to the presentation of a model based on ethnic division as a solution and because some of the boundaries of Bosnia were not defined clearly. These played an additional role in the breaking out of the Bosniac- Croat war.⁹⁹ During this time, the United Nation Security Council, while deciding in one sense to declare as safety zones those regions under Muslim control ---Sarajevo, Srebrenitza, Tuzla, Zepa, Gorajde and Bihaç--- they secured the isolation of Muslim citizens under the guise of their protection.¹⁰⁰ This situation can be assessed as the United Nations, in its capacity as head of the international community, penalizing Serbian aggression on the one hand, and on the other hand, compensating by assisting in the separation of Bosnia-Herzegovina into ethnically pure regions.¹⁰¹ Thus the Vance-Owen plan, after it was rejected despite the fact that it completely placated the Serbs, the Owen-Stoltenberg plan, which continues to today, can be described as an example of the legalization of claiming land via the international community through the use of force, due to the fact that it was based on a perspective which divided Bosnia-Herzegovina into three ethnic regions, thus can be evaluated as proposing an ethnic federation.¹⁰²

Once these plans were rejected again, despite the fact that they were filled with compromises to the Serbs in response to excessive Serbian requests, the West, with its "Safe Havens" plan, surrendered once more to the incessant invasion of Serbs in Bosnia. In response to this situation, the Croats of Bosnia-Herzegovina, benefiting from this atmosphere, broke with their accord with the Bosniacs, and,

⁹⁸ See the Vance-Owen Plan in Hall and Danta, pp.30-31.

⁹⁹ Nurşin Ateşoğlu Güney, "Bosna-Hersek Sorunu ve Barış Görüşmeleri Süreci," *Yeni Balkanlar, Eski Sorunlar* (İstanbul: Bağlam Yayınları, 1997), pp. 261-262.

¹⁰⁰ Nations Security Council Resolutions. Resolution 824 May 6, 1993 and Resolution 836, June 4, 1993.

¹⁰¹ Kut, pp. 170-171.

¹⁰² See Vance-Owen and Owen-Stoltenberg's Plans in Rogel, *The Breakup*, pp.34-35.

creating an agreement with the Serbs, pushed the developments in the region into a complete impasse.¹⁰³

The years 1993-1994 were divided into a period in which the conflicts among the three sides were quelled and then broke out from time to time.¹⁰⁴ However, the war continued to exist throughout this period. In the situations which had come to the point in which the events could no longer be controlled, the warning of potential active intervention from the West was put into practice for the first time, and in April 1994, Serbian positions were bombed under the auspices of NATO.¹⁰⁵

Westerners paved the way for seeking solutions in the wrong place by perceiving the problem of the Bosnia-Herzegovina war as a "civil war" and basing the peace initiatives that they developed on this perception, and the prevention of war was not possible.¹⁰⁶ In addition to this factor, the elements in the prolongation of the war experienced in Bosnia-Herzegovina were originally the visible policies that Westerners put into practice in response to the Bosnia-Herzegovina crisis and the fact that they did not want to compromise some basic principles in response to this. In this situation, the United States and the European Community were satisfied with securing only humanitarian aid; they were not inclined towards an assortment of military actions, and the United Nations Security Council and the United Nations Secretary General held as well to these lines.¹⁰⁷

After 1994, all of the diplomatic intervention and limited military actions that the Westerners had proposed nourished the goal that the Bosnian Serbs had ensured

¹⁰³ Güney, p. 262.

¹⁰⁴ For the outrage and atrocities experienced in Bosnia-Herzegovina, see *Time*, August 17, 1992, pp. 15-20. In addition, in this period in the assaults carried out on regions where people were gathered, there were developments which resulted in many casualties. For example, the bombing of the marketplace on February 5, 1994 left sixty-eight dead and two hundred injured.

¹⁰⁵ Soysal, "*Günümüzde Balkanlar..*," p. 58. The bombing of Serbs by Western forces implemented by NATO was brought up for consideration a total of twenty-two times, however, outside of a few limited operations, these interventions were abandoned.

¹⁰⁶ Güney, pp. 262-263.

¹⁰⁷ For example, United Nations Secretary General Boutros Gali attempted to show solidarity with the people while visiting Sarajevo, however, he noted that it wasn't certain that military action was necessary. *Cumhuriyet*, December 31, 1992.

towards participation at a later period in the federation. A fact which escaped the notice of the world in this period was that the Serbs, while profiting from certain conditions, stood only to gain what they wanted with power and oppression.

In the final analysis of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the fact that the West did not propose a decisive and clear procedure---or its inability to do so---while also in this period persistently following some fundamental decisions, led to the West being identified with a policy which defended the Serbs. Under these conditions, the reaching of the strategic goal which the Serbs had wanted to bring about since the end of the 1980s was made easier. Since the end of 1995, the fact that Bosnian Serbs were able to hold up to seventy percent of Bosnia-Herzegovina territory under occupation is a clear indicator of this situation.¹⁰⁸

The most bitter tactics among those used by the Serbs in order to reach their political goals was the method of ethnic cleansing, which under the auspices of the Westerners was accepted as a dimension of warfare. Earlier it was seen that the Serbian use of ethnic cleansing in Croatia in order to realize the ideal of a "Greater Serbia" was the most clear practice of genocide.¹⁰⁹ While repudiating historical facts in creating a homogenous Serbian state by means of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbs desired to recreate history. Thus Yugoslavia's integrity would be a result of uniting homogenous Serb regions that they were able to seize. Thus by means of a new Serb Republic, they would realize the cherished ideal of a "Greater Serbia".¹¹⁰

In the final analysis, the first half of the 1990s was a period in which the problem was transformed into a full-scale conflict, and the pace of the war was accelerated. This was due to the fact that peace proposals which were prepared according to set ---but mistaken--- principles were not backed up with military force, and because the Bosnians were limited in their right to defend themselves due to the

¹⁰⁸ Güney, p. 265.

¹⁰⁹ Noel Malcolm, *Bosnia: A Short History* (London: Macmillan Limited, 1994), p. 242.

¹¹⁰ Güney, p. 265.

implementation of the arms embargo. Another fact was that the peace plans which were proposed were not brought to the table in due time and when the decisions were taken, it was too late. In a period of time, the operation of "ethnic cleansing" in the Bosnian war situation was accomplished to a large degree.¹¹¹ Just in Summer 1995 in Srebrenica 6000 or more Muslim men were executed.¹¹² Thus, to create the opportunity for carrying out various peace plans, it was first necessary to eliminate the reasons and circumstances for war. Because of this, it was necessary that the elements used for pressure from the international community avoid influencing the hopes and goals which fed the project of a Greater Serbia, a project which was the main reason for the Bosnian war. The Western world used this as a test case. In this test, once the war was prevented in a short time, this situation in the Balkans was meant to effectively dissuade such a springboard for other areas.

Despite the fact that 1995 was filled with conflicts, another factor that was realized was the seeking of a method for a basis of peace in the region. On October 5, 1995 the United States Deputy Foreign Minister Richard Holbrook sought the transformation of the cease-fire stage ---which he had used his power to obtain--- into a lasting peace agreement. On November 1, 1995, the parties in the presidencies, Alija İzzetbegović, Franjo Tuđman and Slobodan Milošević, realized an important stage in the process towards peace when they met together in the United States city of Dayton, Ohio. In the meeting, which lasted for more than twenty days, the securing of an agreement on various issues was brought to a conclusion with first the initialing of "The General Outline for Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina" and later in Paris with an official signing.¹¹³ On the same day, the

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Rogel, *The Breakup...* p.101; Hüseyin Yorulmaz, *Osmanlı'nın Batı Yakası Bosna*. (İstanbul: 3F Yayınevi, 2007) pp. 67-82; Ali Dikici, "Bosna Savaşının Unutulmayan Trajedisi, Srebrenica Katliamı" *Avrasya Dosyası*, sayı:1, 2004, Ankara pp. 219-239; Antoine Ollivier, "The Judgement of The International of Justice in the "Genocide" case between Bosnia Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro." *ASIL, American Society of International Law, International Legal Materials*, April 13, 2007 cite as 46 ILM185 2007.

¹¹³ For the English version of the Dayton Accord, see Soysal and Kut, pp. 167-297; for the Turkish, see *Birleşmiş Milletler Kararlarında Eski Yugoslavya ve Bosna-Hersek* (İstanbul:

validation of the agreement officially ended the war which had lasted for three and a half years in Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, despite this development, it was obvious that it would not be easy to secure normalization and, above all, stabilization, after this process which was experienced as retaliation in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Richard Holbrook stated that "On paper Dayton was a good agreement. It ended the war and established a single multi ethnic country but countless peace agreements have survived in history books as case studies in failed expectations. The result of the international effort to implement Dayton would determine its true place in history."¹¹⁴ The Dayton Accord may not be as final as a magic wand for the war in Bosnia which lasted three and a half years. This sentiment was expressed by the president of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Alija Izzetbegović, during the signing ceremony of the Dayton Accord, who said, "This may not be a just peace, but it is better than the war which is continuing; with the existing situation and the world as it is today, a better peace is not possible."¹¹⁵ However, it was an important step along the path to peace. Above all else, by stabilizing the problem in the area, the Dayton Accord established Bosnia's statutes, constitution, state model and system.¹¹⁶

A new Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina was proposed as a state structure comprised of the Bosnian-Serbian Republic with the autonomous Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation.¹¹⁷ In Bosnia-Herzegovina, a tripartite state ministry council was created, comprised of members of each of the ethnic groups.¹¹⁸

Dayanışma Vakfı Yayınları, 1996), pp. 271-292. Also see, United Nations. A/50/790-S/1995/999; and United Nations. *Official Records of the Security Council, Fiftieth Year*, Supplement for October, November and December 1995, Document S/1995/999 (New York: United Nations Publications, 1995).

¹¹⁴ Sumantra Bose, *Bosnia After Dayton*, (London: Hurst and Compnay, 2002, p.33.

¹¹⁵ *Birleşmiş Milletler Kararlarında Eski Yugoslavya ve Bosna-Hersek*, p. 271.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 272-292; Soysal and Kut, pp. 167-298.

¹¹⁷ Lenard J. Cohen, "Bosnia and Herzegovina: Fragile Peace in a Segmented State," *Current History* 95, no. 599 (March 1996), p. 108.

¹¹⁸ The state ministry of Bosnia was comprised of members from each of the Bosnian, Croatian, and Serb groups who would be elected every four years (Article 5). Two assemblies were created that consisted of a 42-member House of Representatives and a 15-member House of the People. For both of these assemblies, two-thirds of the delegates

However, the applicability of this statute in the region would only be possible after establishing peace. Thus it was difficult to find a suitable environment for the Dayton Accord. The structure of the agreement did not suppress nationalist sentiment among the opposing sides; to the contrary, it secured those positions to a greater degree. The international climate, the United States, European countries and Russia remained to a degree powerless against these practices which were detrimental to the spirit of accord.¹¹⁹ This situation also illustrated the need for a period of time in order to establish stability.

In addition to this, the problems of implementing the Dayton Accord necessitated utilizing the power of domination and control at the international level such as NATO and the United Nations. To whatever degree international forces such as NATO and the United Nations are organizations of peace, the masses which are able to raise their voices have the potential to be interpreted as the occupying force.¹²⁰ Thus in one sense, the duty of the peace mission, which was comprised of an agreement in which increased coercive force was to be eliminated, was doomed to fail. Nevertheless, some developments which occurred during 1996 demonstrated that it would not be easy to implement the Dayton Accord without use of coercive force.¹²¹

As Kagan and Abramowitz confirm, "To protect a Bosnian state within whose contemporary boundaries there lie more than one ethnic group, does not require the removal of ethnic nationalism in one night or several years. However, it is necessary that in order to implement the Dayton Accord in the most secure and economic means and to rebuild Bosnia anew, the United States' large-scale economic, diplomatic and military force must abandon cooperation, and utilize all the ethnic groups of Bosnia in a persistently demonstrative manner. Those who do

would come from the Federation, and one-third from the Republic of Serbia (Article 4). Ibid., p. 81; Soysal and Kut, pp. 221-226.

¹¹⁹ *The Wall Street Journal: Europe*, September 18, 1996.

¹²⁰ James A. Shear, "Bosnia's Past Dayton Traumas," *Foreign Policy*, no.104.

¹²¹ For developments in 1996, see Soysal and Kut, pp. 99-144.

not conform to the precepts of the accord will be incur economic and diplomatic sanctions, and must risk confrontation by NATO arms. On the other hand, the supporters of Dayton must be protected and rewarded."¹²²

Bosniac, Serb and Croat nationalists were an inescapable reality for Bosnia. In a meeting during the period in which the Dayton Accord was to be carried out, İzzetbegović stated that nationalism was a danger that he did not desire for Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that extremism and chauvinism still constituted a threat. While emphasizing that the Islamic, Catholic and Orthodox religions and Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian people have a point of intersection with the Western and Eastern world, he defended tolerance as a basic condition for Bosnia's survival.¹²³

Although the enactment of the Dayton Accord had been possible from the previous period until the 1996 elections despite the presence of IFOR (Implementation Force), the elections were finally held on September 14, 1996.¹²⁴ In what was considered to be one of the most confusing elections in history, the Bosnia leader Alija İzzetbegović was elected president with the highest vote, and Momčilo Kajisnik and Kresimir Zubak were elected as the Serb and Croat representatives, respectively.¹²⁵

The goals of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina from this period onwards can be summarized as on the one hand to achieve as much stability as possible, and on the other ---with the supervision of such foreign aid sources as the IMF and the World Bank during the process of economic reconstruction--- to be successful and able to stand on its own.

¹²² *The Wall Street Journal*, October 6, 1997.

¹²³ *Cumhuriyet*, September 13, 1998.

¹²⁴ Susan L. Woodward, "Bosnia after Dayton: Year Two," *Current History* 96, no. 608 (March 1997), p. 97.

¹²⁵ *The Economist*, September 21, 1996; Soysal and Kut, p. 139.

Independent Macedonia

Despite the fact that it comprised only six percent of the population of former Yugoslavia, Macedonia possessed an ethnic distribution which could be considered dispersed and mixed for even a complex structure such as Yugoslavia itself. Macedonia was a complete mosaic of nations, with Macedonians, Albanians, Turks, Serbs, Gypsies, Vlachs, Pomaks, Greeks, Bosniacs, and Bulgarians.¹²⁶

In the early 1990s, Macedonia, which joined the strong common current in the Balkans, experienced the emergence of nationalist rhetoric during the process of political reconstruction as in the other republics, and this situation resulted in alterations to the constitution.¹²⁷ Macedonian nationalism, which proposed irredentist aims by following the ideal of a "Greater Macedonia," was yet another log for the conflagration in the Balkans. Known as "Vardar Macedonia", contemporary Macedonia comprised only one of the three portions of "Greater Macedonia"; the others were "Pirin Macedonia" in Western Bulgaria and "Aegean Macedonia" in the Northern Greek region of Thessaloniki.¹²⁸ Hence, while Macedonia faced internal problems, it was also dealing with external issues.

In the same way that Macedonian nationalists under the influence of Bulgaria and Greece brought forth the discourse of an ideal of a "Greater

¹²⁶ Poulton, p. 57.

¹²⁷ Bora, p. 139.

¹²⁸ In hinting that its northern neighbor was making claims on the entire geographical region by using the name of Macedonia, Greece claimed that Macedonia was directly threatening Greece's territorial integrity by means of appropriating the monopoly of the name, that is, having designs on the region of Northern Greece which, since 1988, had carried the name 'Makedhonia' as an administrative district in Greece, Şule Kut "Makedonya-Yunanistan Anlaşmazlığının Boyutları," *Yeni Balkanlar Eski Sorunlar*, eds. Kemali Saybaşı and Gencer Özcan (İstanbul: Bağlam Yayınları, 1997), p. 296.

Macedonia," Bulgarian and Greek nationalists had designs on their own Greater Bulgaria's and Greece's portions within Macedonia.¹²⁹

Regarding the internal developments which Macedonia underwent, it appeared to be in need of a Yugoslav policy due to the fact that it resembled a cooperative like Bosnia-Herzegovina and because Macedonia was in a situation in which it was one of the least economically-developed republics of Yugoslavia. Underlying these conditions, it relied on cooperation with the other Yugoslav republics and even their aid. Additionally, as in the case of Bosnia, Macedonia's fear of being left to face Serbia was another strong reason for the movement towards confederation in Macedonia in the transition period (1990-1991). However, at the point at which the hopes were tied to a "loose" federation---a federation which the administration in turn was dependent upon---weakened, the independence movement which was gaining strength among the Macedonian people and in the heavily nationalist parliament came to fruition. The referendum which was held in the mid-1990s brought about the achievement of the goal of independence for Macedonia by a ninety-five percent majority vote.¹³⁰ However, in spite of the withdrawal shortly thereafter of Yugoslav forces from the region and the recognition granted the newly-established Macedonia by nations such as Turkey, Russia and even Bulgaria, this region is still at present under protection as a crisis center.¹³¹

Everyone is interested in the stability of Macedonia except its neighbours. After the declaration of Macedonian independence in 1991, Bulgaria recognized the new state but not the nation to which its majority belongs nor the language that they speak. The new Yugoslavia refused to ratify the frontier between Macedonia and Serbia while the Serbian Orthodox church denied the status of its Macedonian counterpart. Albania faced its own crises of transformation, but Macedonian citizens self-identified as Albanian were allegedly involved in various armed confrontations

¹²⁹ Bora, p. 142.

¹³⁰ Soysal, "*Günümüzde Balkanlar...*," p. 185.

¹³¹ Soysal and Kut, pp. 14-15.

with Macedonian police over the rights of the Albanian minority in Western Macedonia and in the best known neighbourly stand-off Greece the northern region which is also called Macedonia the republics status by interpreting its constitution.¹³²

An important reason for this is the potential for conflict between Greece and Macedonia. Although Macedonia's independence would seem to be a natural response when the Yugoslav Federation was dispersed and the former republics left the federation one by one, this fact was viewed as unacceptable by Greece.¹³³ With considerable negative reaction, Greece rejected Macedonia's name, flag, and constitution.¹³⁴ While Greece expressed such a reaction against Macedonia, its most important concern was the eternal worry of the Balkans: the question of "minorities." The use of the name, Macedonia, for an independent country, gave birth to the supposition that, above all else, excessively nationalist Macedonians would want to join with the people of Macedonian origin in Greece. As it was, Macedonians of Slavic origins in Greece over the previous eighty year period were largely subjected to systematic assimilation. Greece, on the one hand, declared that there were no Macedonian elements in its own land, and, on the other hand, they were made uncomfortable by the article in the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia concerning the "outside Macedonians." What is of interest is that Greece's demand for a change in the constitution concerning "outside Macedonians" was by implication accepting the existence of this ethnic minority.¹³⁵

¹³² Jane K. Covan and K. S. Brown "Introduction. Macedonian Inflections"; Jane K. Covan ed. *Macedonia. The Politics of Identity and Difference*. (London: Pluto Pres, 2000); James Pettifer, "The New Macedonian Question", James Pettifer, ed. *The New Macedonian Question* (Hampshire: Macmillan Pres, 1999), pp.15-27; Theano S. Terkenli, "Macedonian Cultural and National Identity," Derek Hall and Darrick Danta eds., *Reconstructing the Balkans: A Geography on the New Southeast Europe* (Sussex: John Wiley and Sons, 1996) p.91.

¹³³ Misha Glenny, *The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War* (London: Penguin Boks, 1992) p. 71.

¹³⁴ Duncan Perry, "Macedonia: Balkan Miracle or Balkan Disaster?" *Current History* 95, no. 599 (March, 1996), p. 115; Şule Kut, *Balkanlarda Kimlik ve Egemenlik* (İstanbul: Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2005) pp.17-21.

¹³⁵ Kut , "Makedonya-Yunanistan Anlaşmazlığının..," p. 293.

Greece, in order to prevent the recognition of Macedonia, used the form of pressure employed against other countries (using veto power to prevent Macedonia's membership in international organizations, a nearly two-year trade embargo, and propaganda which Greece ceaselessly propagated for world opinion that "Macedonia is Greek"), thus left a country like Macedonia, which had newly-acquired independence and therefore already had sufficient economic, political and security problems, to face a serious dilemma.¹³⁶

In addition to this, the slogan "Macedonia is Greek" which was used to gain support for Greek's arguments, was transformed over time from its original use into a goal for their own purposes. According to Kut, no matter what changes Macedonia effected, the close relationship between the issues of historical and national identity and contemporary propaganda would remain as a problem between the two countries.¹³⁷

While the problems between the two countries along the lines described above remained unresolved for four years, an accelerated process of resolution by diplomatic means began in the spring of 1995. Shuttle diplomacy carried out from March to June 1995 by means of the participation of nations outside of the two parties, who served as interventionists in the problematic situation, the United Nations' General Secretary Boutros-Gali's special representative, Cyrus Vance, bore fruit due in large part to the resolve of the United States to solve the Bosnian crisis. As a result, Macedonian and Greek delegations came together in New York and, on September 13, 1995, signed the Interim Accord.¹³⁸

Despite the fact that problems continued between the two countries, arriving at such an understanding was extremely important from the perspective of avoiding yet another crisis in the Balkans. The Interim Accord, which was effective for seven years from the date of the signing, committed the parties first and foremost to an

¹³⁶ Ibid., p. 288.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

¹³⁸ Soysal and Kut, p. 88.

obligation to the principles of the Helsinki Final Act regarding the inviolability of national boundaries and unification of land---in particular those principles regarding the obligation of nations to abstain from use of the threat of force against a nation's territorial integrity and political independence---and to upholding the pertinent regulations of all international organizations.¹³⁹ Beyond these however, Macedonia's manner towards the removal of the important objections which Greece had brought forth was interesting. According to the agreement, Macedonia was to change its flag within thirty days and make a constitutional declaration to the effect that it would not make any historical claims to rights and demands for land beyond its existing boundaries. In response to this, Greece was to recognize Macedonia and to end the veto and embargo against this country.¹⁴⁰

By ratifying the Interim Accord on October 15, 1995, the Macedonian parliament changed their national flag and accepted the declaration in the Macedonian constitution that no land claims would be made on the basis of historical assertions. In response to this, Greece officially recognized Macedonia under the name of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM).¹⁴¹

The Turkish Perspective on Contemporary Developments in the Balkans

The obvious dissolution of the communist block and the subsequent emergent process of democratization and reconstruction in the Balkans was met by Turkey with caution on the one hand and approval on the other. However, in the early days of these developments, Turkey could not have predicted that before long

¹³⁹ Kut, "*Makedonya - Yunanistan Anlaşmazlığının...*," pp. 289-290.

¹⁴⁰ Greece implemented a significant economic and trade embargo against the Republic of Macedonia, particularly by not allowing Macedonia to use its Thessaloniki harbor.

¹⁴¹ Evangelos Kofos, "Grek Policy Considerations over FYROM," James Pettifer ed., *The New Macedonian Question* (Hempshire: Macmillan Pres, 1999) pp. 226-256.

territorial division and even a violent civil war would occur, particularly in a such a neutral and respected third world country as Yugoslavia. This oversight was due to the fact that Turkey did not have clear projections for the future as to how the world would enter into the process of change.

From Turkey's perspective as well, the announcements of independence for Slovenia and Croatia (June 1991), Macedonia (September 1991) and Bosnia-Herzegovina (October 1991) and the entrance of Yugoslavia into the middle of a total war created an extremely sensitive situation in regards to Turkey's foreign policy. It was apparent that developments in the region would not be able to escape Turkey's notice, due to the fact that the Balkans, which had remained under Ottoman domination for more than 500 years, could be regarded as the descendent of the Ottoman Empire, and as such possessed historical, cultural and moral ties, along with geopolitical and strategic motives. While attempting to remain neutral as much as possible in the internal structural transformations of Romania and Bulgaria which were connected to developments in the Balkans, Turkey undertook an extremely sensitive policy in regard to the process in Yugoslavia.

Turkey and Yugoslavia, which entered into a close relationship with the 1934 Balkan Agreement and the 1954 Balkan Alliance, did not hesitate to work side by side for Balkan cooperation despite the fact that they took different sides during the Cold War period. At the end of the 1980s, they met together at meetings held among the Balkan ministries of foreign affairs in Belgrade and Tirana.¹⁴² With the entrance of Yugoslavia into the process of dissolution in the 1990s, the position that Turkey took in relation to this situation became important.¹⁴³

¹⁴² Şule Kut, "Türkiye'nin Bosna-Hersek ve Makedonya Politikası," *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi*, ed. Faruk Sönmezoğlu (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 1994), pp. 163-164; Oya Akgönenç Mughisuddin, "Dağılan Yugoslavya: Bosna-Hersek ve Uluslararası Diplomasi," *Dış Politika Bülteni* (Ankara: November, 1992), p. 34.

¹⁴³ At the end of 1990, Turkey wanted to include Yugoslavia in a Black Sea economic cooperative project in which it attempted to bring together nations that border on the Black Sea, despite the fact that Yugoslavia did not share immediate borders with the Black Sea. However, this was unable to be realized due to the dissolution process which began soonafter.

It was evident that Turkey followed a policy of protecting Yugoslav unity at every chance and at every level. Especially Turkish Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel emphasized Yugoslav unity in his speeches.¹⁴⁴ However within the days that followed, Turkey would be faced with a fork in the road when Yugoslavia was being dragged into total dissolution and a state of war. On the one hand, Turkey had witnessed the birth of new nations---nations which expected support from Turkey---on the other hand it did not want to succumb to the problem of a being a country which supported the dissolution of Yugoslavia. In such circumstances, Turkey responded to the requests for political support which came from the former Yugoslav republics while protecting relations on the opposing side and without contradicting international opinion. In this regard, the development which was reassuring from Turkey's perspective was that Bulgaria, one of the other Balkan nations, that has immediately recognized the four republics which declared their separation from Yugoslavia and their independence. In fact it was in such an environment that Turkey also decided at the same time to recognize Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina simultaneously and in October 1992 diplomatic relations with these countries were begun.¹⁴⁵ The Bosnian problem became particularly acute for Turkey between 1992-95, as the Powers failed to take effective measures to protect the Bosnian Muslims.¹⁴⁶

Of course the decision to recognize these countries had a negative impact on the relations between Turkey and Serbia. At the very least because of Turkey's

¹⁴⁴ See Turkish Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel's speech on "Türkiye ve Yeni Dünya Düzeni" (December 11, 1991, Ankara Başbakanlık Basımevi, 1991) p. 12.

¹⁴⁵ Turkey recognized these four former republics of Yugoslavia simultaneously on February 6, 1992. The protocols which set forth the foundation of diplomatic relations at the level of ambassadorial functions with these nations were signed on August 27, 1992 in London. Berhan Ekinci, "Yugoslavya'nın Dağılması ve Türkiye," *Balkanlar* (İstanbul: Ortadoğu ve Balkan İncelemeleri Vakfı Yayınları, 1993), p. 255. With the Announcement of the Foreign Ministry dated February 6, 1992, on the one hand, diplomatic relations were put into force with the aid of the Turkish Embassy in Belgrade and on the other, the parliament on October 14, 1992 decided to establish an embassy in each of these countries. Soysal, "Günümüzde Balkanlar..," p. 228.

¹⁴⁶ William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000* (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000) p.261.

forcing of its diplomatic channels, its support of Bosnia-Herzegovina under the auspices of the United Nations, OSCE, the European Council, European Community, NATO, the Islamic Conference Organization, and the announcement of Turkey's support of a potential military operation against the Serbs under the auspices of the United Nations in the war that enveloped the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992 seriously impacted the relations between Ankara and Belgrade.¹⁴⁷ By coincidence, by occupying the position of president in both the European Council and the Islamic Conference Organization, Turkey was an agent which eased and rendered legitimacy for their activities in issues regarding Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Turkey's sensibility and the efforts which it showed towards the developments occurring in Bosnia-Herzegovina were subjected to criticism by the Serbs with the statement that Turkey "was showing its imperialist leanings." Further, the interpretations that it fabricated suggested that Turkey wanted to revive the Ottoman Empire. In fact, since the founding of the Turkish Republic there had been no issue of territorial claims in the Balkans. Turkey's borders in Thrace, which were fixed at the end of the Balkan Wars in 1913, have not been made into a subject of dispute to this day. However, it is also a fact that those Turks and/or Muslims who remain outside of the boundaries of modern Turkey and are at present still dispersed among the various Balkan nations will not be able to remain unnoticed. The one thing that Turkey wants today is that those of its race who remain outside of Turkey's national borders and those masses who have historical ties to Turkey and share a common religion and culture must use their right to live in freedom and to use their sovereignty which has been won.¹⁴⁸

While the developments which emerged with the dissolution of the Yugoslav Federal Republic, a civil war, ethnic cleansing reaching the proportions of genocide brought an international dimension to the issue, Turkey contributed its share to the

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 189.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., pp. 190-191.

international efforts. It was thought that this was a situation in which it could not remain distant, even though Turkey did not want to participate. In this process, the centers which were of interest to Turkey were primarily Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia. Despite the fact that Macedonia achieved its independence without bloodshed, the concrete developments in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which transpired in the world arena and which occurred in the middle of Europe, pushed Turkey in particular into the middle of the Bosnia-Herzegovina issue. The presentation of an "action plan" for Bosnia-Herzegovina was only one of many activities towards these aims, and, more importantly, it was an amalgam of diplomatic and military measures.¹⁴⁹ While underlining the reasons for the impossibility of ending the conflicts, Turkey presented a proposal which called attention to the fact that when at first the United Nations and NATO entered into the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the trustworthiness of international organizations and the international community encountered a serious form of erosion. Turkey believed that the decisions that were made for Bosnia-Herzegovina had the effect of sacrificing the victim (Bosnia), rather than penalizing of the aggressor (Serbia). Thus it intensified all diplomatic initiatives on the issues of dissuading attacks, ending conflicts, reporting on aggressive military action to the international community, and immediate mobilization of humanitarian aid.¹⁵⁰

Although Turkey maintained a position grounded in neutrality on the issue of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the foreign policy which it followed steered it to one side from the emergence of the problem.¹⁵¹ Leaving aside its own natural sympathy, Turkey defended the victim with strength and confidence in the international arena and attempted to be effective with the position that it took in support of the side which was legally within their rights and under attack.¹⁵² Turkey could not forget that the geopolitical and geostrategic issues of today pushed it to follow a position in this

¹⁴⁹ Kut, "Yugoslavya Bunalımı..," p. 167.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., pp. 172-173.

¹⁵¹ *Cumhuriyet*, September 6, 1995.

¹⁵² Gün Kut, "Bosna'da Harekete Geçme Zamanı," *Yeni Yüzyıl*, December 1, 1995.

direction.¹⁵³ In the changing requirements of the world, Turkey found itself in the center of an environment in which new links, new communities, and new nations were forming. It was unavoidable that with the importance of Turkey in the region, it would follow a relevant foreign policy.

Regarding this, some points in Turkey's official evaluations concerning Bosnia are outlined once more as the "preservation of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, independent and sovereign state within its internationally recognized borders is vital for peace and stability in the region." and that the Dayton Peace Accords, which brought about a new era of peace to Bosnia-Herzegovina, must be fully implemented without delay and all parties should respect their commitments.

The effective functioning of the common institutions in Bosnia-Herzegovina is important for the political transition. Unless these institutions function properly, forces of separation will be able to continue their activity against a unified, multi-ethnic state for seen by the Dayton Peace Accords.

Turkey believes that the success of Bosnia-Herzegovina is essential for the unity and multi-ethnic character of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In this framework Turkey, which vigorously supported its establishment, continues its efforts for the consolidation of the federation process.

According to Turkey economic assistance of the international community to Bosnia should be extended parallel to the compliance of the parties to the peace accords. Therefore the principle of "conditionality" should be supported. It is not fair to consider the parties as equally responsible for the insufficient implementation of the peace accords. A distinction should be made between those who cooperate and who do not, also for purposes of encouraging cooperation.¹⁵⁴

¹⁵³ *Bosna Günlüğü*, August 8, 1995.

¹⁵⁴ See *Republic of Turkey. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Website*. Turkish Foreign Office, "Turkish view on the situation in Bosnia," Available (online) at <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/> (December 1997).

Consequently, the Balkans figured prominently on Turkey's foreign policy agenda. Turkey regards the Balkans as its gateway to Europe and has always been a key player in the affairs of the Balkans.¹⁵⁵

International Reaction to the Break-up of the Yugoslav Federal Republic

Vis-a-vis the beginning of the break up of the Yugoslav Federation and the attainment of independence by the Republics one by one most European and world states tried to keep out of this crisis. In November 1990, *The New York Times* reported that "US intelligence is predicting that Federal Yugoslavia will break apart, most probably in the next 18 months, and that civil war in that multinational Balkan country is highly likely."¹⁵⁶ But it was only towards the very end of this period of further escalation that leaders of European Union started to take an interest in the Yugoslav crisis.¹⁵⁷ Germany provided the only exception to this stance and, as explained earlier, supported Slovenia's and Croatia's independence from the very beginning. Germany's support was unwavering in spite of the warnings made by other states against such a stance. Particularly after the reunification of the two Germanys, an idea came into existence that Germany had to take on greater responsibility in international politics. In this respect, this insistence by Germany that Slovenia and Croatia be recognized may be viewed as a test case of united Germany's new role.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁵ *Republic of Turkey*. Turkish Foreign Office, "The Goals and Principles of Turkish Foreign Policy," Available (online) at <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/> (June 1998).

¹⁵⁶ David Binder, "Yugoslavia Seen Breaking Up Soon" *The New York Times*, November 28, 1990, section a, p.7.

¹⁵⁷ More detail for international intervention in the Balkans, especially in Bosnia, see Tom Gallenger, *The Balkans after the Cold War: From Tyranny to Tragedy* (London: Routledge, 2003) pp. 163–192; Tom Gallenger "Milosevic, Serbia and the West," Andrew Hammond (ed) *The Balkans and the West: Constructing the European Other 1945–2003*. (Hampshire: Ashgate, 2004) p.157.

¹⁵⁸ Hüseyin Bağcı, *Güvenlik Politikaları ve Risk Analizi Çerçevesinde Balkanlar (1991-1993)* (Ankara: Dış Politika Enstitüsü Yayınları, 1994), pp.51-58.

From Germany's point of view, this policy toward Slovenia and Croatia can be evaluated as a success. Germany's stance led to the other European Union countries to follow the suit and recognized of these two republics. When it came to Bosnia-Herzegovina, however, Germany openly expressed that it had no intention of acting on its own.¹⁵⁹

At the beginning of the crisis in Yugoslavia, the Western states and the international community were split into two opposing camps. The Western powers' primary concern was to preserve the existing international boundaries.¹⁶⁰ As for the other camp, a completely opposite approach was adopted---one which held that a nation must decide its own future.

When the Yugoslavia crisis took on the dimensions of war, this division in the world community became even deeper. In the international community, decisions were made one after the other to preserve the union of Yugoslavia and the status-quo; while on the other hand, decisions in support of independence were debated.

Various efforts can be evaluated as attempts to preserve the Yugoslav union. These include the decision in support of postponing the declaration of Slovenia and Croatia's independence made in the Brioni Meeting; the appointment of Lord Carrington by the European Union to mediate between the different sides; the decision made at the European Union's Lahey meeting to use force to prevent change in Yugoslavia's borders; the decision by the United Nations Security Council to enforce a weapons embargo on Yugoslavia; the appointment of United Nations Secretary General Cyrus Vance as special representative for the Yugoslavia problem; the European Union decision to impose an economic embargo on

¹⁵⁹ When discussions began on the matter of whether the weapons embargo on Bosnia-Herzegovina would be lifted or not, the German Minister of Foreign Affairs explained that Germany would not act alone on the matter. Ibid., p. 57.

¹⁶⁰ The Helsinki Final Act, August 1, 1975, guaranteed the inviolability of post-war European borders. *Helsinki Avrupa Güvenliği ve İşbirliği Konferansı. Tutanaklar ve Nihai Belge* (İstanbul: Sorun Yayınları, 1976) pp.189-279.

Yugoslavia; and finally, the Security Council's decision to send a peace force (UNPROFOR) to Yugoslavia.¹⁶¹

After the break up of the Soviet Union, the United States which began to be viewed as the only super power in the world, at first played a role in Yugoslav events which was in line by the decisions noted above. At first the United States even abstained from playing a role and followed a policy which preferred to let this question be solved within Europe.¹⁶²

The only reason for the change in international opinion was the clashes in which the Federal Army took part and which immediately followed Slovenian and Croatian independence. Calculations by western countries in particular that these clashes would be halted by international recognition of those republics which broke away from the Yugoslav Federation turned out to be completely wrong.¹⁶³ Following Slovenia and Croatia, it became apparent that Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia would not remain in a Yugoslavia under Serbian domination, and decisions were made in favor of independence which, in combination with diplomatic efforts, trapped the region in a dead end.

The state of international opinion may be discerned from the view of a member of Yugoslavia's Collective Presidency. According to Vasil Tuporkovsky, "even the announcements that stress the territorial integrity and inviolability of borders are put forward in a way that doesn't exclude secession."¹⁶⁴ In these words it may be observed that the world was struggling to create a solution for the

¹⁶¹ For a chronology of this matter, see Soysal and Kut, pp. 5-12. Also for U.N. Secretary General Boutros-Ghali's perspective see Boutros-Ghali, *Confronting New Challenges. Annual Report on the Work of the Organization 1995* (Report on the work of the Organisation from the Forty-Ninth to the Fiftieth Session of the General Assembly) (New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1995), pp. 323-337.

¹⁶² Even if it believed in military intervention, the United State did not want "another Vietnam." Leo, Tindeman, ed. *Unfinished Peace: Report of the International Commission on the Balkans*, (Washington D.C.: Aspen Institute; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996), p. 62. See in Turkish, "Barışa Çağrı," *Uluslararası Komisyon'un Balkanlar Hakkındaki Raporu*, trans. Özden Arıkan (İstanbul: Sabah Kitapları, 1998).

¹⁶³ Bağcı, p. 55.

¹⁶⁴ Vasil Tuporkovsky "The Dissolution of Yugoslavia: An Insider's View," *Mediterranean Quarterly* (Spring 1993), p. 23.

Yugoslav question. In spite of this, the international community struggled to end the serious conflicts, in particular those in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and in order to realize this they chose to follow a path of dissuasiveness and diplomacy. But these attempts would prove to be too little and too late for a region in the midst of war.

In the international arena there was a constant attempt to avoid military intervention in the region. Yet in the first paragraph of the United Nations constitution, there was a statute which actually provided an opportunity for the United Nations to intervene in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This statute may be summarized as "the taking of measures aimed at protecting international security and world peace."¹⁶⁵ In this case, the United Nations or the Security Council, as foreseen in the United Nations constitution, was not meant to be merely a decision-making committee, but rather should be a committee invested with the responsibility to carry into action the decisions it makes. However, on the matter of what the political reasoning for any possible intervention might be, the indecision among the members of the United Nations Security Council appears to be the most important problem blocking military intervention.

The need for the United Nations Security Council to rely on its five permanent members in order to decide on military measures, and the differences of opinion among these five permanent members, which are reflected in the decisions of the Security Council, is the United Nations' weakest point. Especially the Russians resurrected their traditional role as protector of the Serbs.¹⁶⁶

In addition to this, many different opinions involved in the development of international thought and willpower, are some of the important factors which hinder the taking of concrete measures. First of all, the important economic and implied military foundations comprised by European countries, by taking the disagreements

¹⁶⁵ Bağcı, p. 114.

¹⁶⁶ Rogel, *The Breakup...* p. 62.

among themselves to the United Nations, missed the opportunity to take a position in the question.¹⁶⁷

European countries and the U.S. didn't want to put themselves into the whirlpool of the region, even if they were under the umbrella of peace keepers. According to one opinion in this vein, Europe, which lay the foundation for the dismemberment of Yugoslavia, couldn't bring itself to fight for the very moral values which make the West the West.¹⁶⁸ Under these circumstances, the opinion came to the fore that war in the region would not subside until the different sides were exhausted.¹⁶⁹ It was also not desirable that the West help and act as midwife to a Muslim state in the middle of Europe.¹⁷⁰

As a paradox, racist hatred and regional conflicts had never been at such a high level in the New World Order, and it appeared as if there was no international military force capable of stopping the increasing spiral of savagery. In the Cold War era, the enemy had at least been designated. Whereas now, issues such as against whom measures were to be taken and whether or not an international peace force would go into action or not could not be decisively settled. Further, even if such issues were to be settled, disagreement among the different states would not give it a chance. In this process, the Balkans, in a manner never before encountered in their modern history, were left to face their fate and made to feel so acutely alone and neglected for the first time.¹⁷¹

The most important effect of the failure of the policy followed in the region was the Western politicians' and the United Nations' definition of the situation not as that of an unjust aggression, but as that of a human disaster, especially in the case of the crisis in Bosnia. United Nations Secretary of State James Baker described what

¹⁶⁷ Bağcı, pp. 118-120.

¹⁶⁸ Hadi Uluengin, "Bosna ve Din Çelişkisi," *Hürriyet*, December 5, 1994.

¹⁶⁹ *Cumhuriyet*, October 23, 1994.

¹⁷⁰ M. Kemal Öke, "Bosna Dramı'nın Anatomisi," *Yeni Türkiye*, no. 2 (January-February 1995) pp. 107-110.

¹⁷¹ Tindeman, pp. 13-14.

was going on as a "humanitarian nightmare." This illustrates the policy of the United Nations in a roundabout way.¹⁷² The second significant mistake that the organization of the United Nations fell into was the failure to "use force to stop the aggressor" in the middle of an aggressive war. In a more painful description, instead of preventing the ethnic cleansing and massacres in the region, the United Nations contented itself with palliative humanitarian aid such as burying the murdered, treating the wounded, providing shelter for those driven from their homes and supplying food.¹⁷³

The use of force, even in the "safe areas" when faced with heavy Serbian attacks which left thousands dead, was only a defensive measure and was far from dissuasive.

In conclusion, even though the Bosnians were those most hurt by events in Bosnia, the United Nations and the Western countries lost a great deal of prestige in the incident as a result of their erroneous policies.

Serbia and Montenegro after the Breakdown of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

During the closing years of the Cold War, Yugoslavia was one of the few communist states in the world where the political leadership enjoyed increasing popularity. In Serbia, the largest republic in the federation, the communist leadership had been captured by individuals who sought a new lease of life and a fresh political identity by issuing uncompromising ethnic appeals. Under Slobodan Milosevic, Serbia sought to regain the dominant position it had enjoyed under royal Yugoslavia from 1918 to 1941. Socialist Yugoslavism was ditched as a project design to maintain solidarity between the six republics that made up Yugoslavia.¹⁷⁴ During

¹⁷² Ibid., p. 69.

¹⁷³ For more information on mistakes by the United Nations and Western policies, see *ibid.*, pp. 68-73.

¹⁷⁴ Tom Gallagher, "Milosevic, Serbia" p.153.

this time, Milosevic won enormous popularity and when he rose to power in 1989, in Yugoslavia a series of events developed, as mentioned before. That eventually resulted in the secession of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia Herzegovina and Macedonia from Yugoslavia. After the breakdown of Yugoslavia the last two states, Serbia and Montenegro came to a new agreement regarding continued cooperation, which among other changes, promised the end of the name Yugoslavia since they were part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In 2003, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was reconstituted as a State Union Serbia and Montenegro.

On February 4, 2003, The Parliament of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia agreed to a weaker form of cooperation between Serbia and Montenegro within a confederal state called “Serbia and Montenegro”. This new state existed between 2003-2006. In a loose confederation, Serbia and Montenegro were united only in certain political areas (like defence), and the new Constitutional Charter was agreed to provide a framework for the governance of the country. The republics had functioned separately throughout the period of the Federal Republic and had continued to have individual economic policies as well as using separate currencies. Because of the different rapprochments, this unity was not long lasting. On May 21, 2006, Montenegro held a referendum to determine whether or not to and its union with Serbia. The next day, state certified results showed 55.5% of voters in favor of independence. Following the referendum in Montenegro, The National Assembly of Serbia declared the “Republic of Serbia” to be the legal successor to the “State Union of Serbia and Montenegro on June 5, 2006. Serbia and Montenegro became separate states.

The Last Independent State in the Balkans:

Kosovo

“The Yugoslav Crises began in Kosovo and it will end in Kosovo” stated Malcolm.¹⁷⁵ According to him “one can hear this saying repeated almost anywhere in the former Yugoslavia; it is one of the few things on which all parties to the conflicts in the 1990’s seemed to agree.¹⁷⁶ It is difficult to estimate how the story will end in Kosovo. Therefore the issue of Kosovo is quite simply the most intractable of all the political conflicts in the Balkans. The area with the worst human rights abuses in the whole of Europe and certainly the place were, if war does break out, the killing and destruction will be more intense than anything hitherto witnessed in the region”.¹⁷⁷

Throughout history Kosovo has been one of the most controversial issues to occupy the agenda of international politics. It is a small area in the Balkans, but possesses the potential of being a centre of troubles for all the Balkan Peninsula.¹⁷⁸ The territory of present Kosovo was conquered by Rome in the 160 B.C. The Slavic migrations reached the Balkans in the sixth to seventh century whereby autochthonous peoples merged with the northern new comers. Kosovo was absorbed into the Bulgarian Empire in the 850’s where Christianity and Byzantine Slavic culture was cemented in the region. This region is often switched between Serbian Bulgarian on one hand and the Byzantine on the other hand by the end of the eleventh century.

In twelfth century Kosovo was fully absorbed into the Serbian kingdom and became a secular and spiritual center of the Serbian medieval state. The region was

¹⁷⁵ Malcolm, Noel. *Kosovo: A Short History*. (London: Macmillan, 1998), p. xxviii.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

¹⁷⁸ Muhammed Kullashi. “The Kosovo Problem and the Disintegration of Yugoslavia”. *Balkans A Mirror of the New International Order*. Eds. Günay Göksu Özdoğan and Kemali Saybaşılı. (İstanbul: Eren Yayınları, 1995), pp.167-168.

fully conquered by the Ottomans in 1455 and from this time to 1912 Kosovo was a part of the Ottoman Empire. During nineteenth century, there was an awakening of ethnic nationalism throughout the Balkans and the ethnic Albanian nationalist movement was centered in Kosovo.

In 1912, during the Balkan Wars, most of Kosovo was captured by the Kingdom of Serbia and became part and parcel of the Great Serbia ideal. The status of Serbia was finalized at the Treaty of London.¹⁷⁹ In order to change the ethnic composition of Kosovo between, 1912-1941 a large scale Serbian re- colonized by the Belgrade government. After the Second World War Kosovo became a province of Serbia within the Democratic Federal Yugoslavia.¹⁸⁰ In the late 1960s, Kosovo gained limited internal autonomy.¹⁸¹ An ethnic tension continued with violent outbreaks during 1970s and 1980s. On July 1990 after the collapse of communist block an unconstitutional Kosovo parliament declared an independent country namely “the Republic of Kosovo”. It was only recognized by Albania. Only after the Bosnian war drawing considerable international attention was ended with the Dayton Accord in 1995. This agreement wrecked the fragile calm in Kosovo.¹⁸² The Kosovan Albanian received nothing from the settlement. This was a huge disappointment. In fact the Dayton Accord had confirmed that Kosovo was a part of Yugoslavia as well.

By 1996 the Kosovan Albanians had started resistance to Serbian and former Yugoslav security forces resulting in early stages of the Kosovo war. Western interest had increased by 1998, as the violence had worsened and displaced scores of Albanians. On 23 September UNSCR 1199 called for an immediate ceasefire in Kosovo for negotiations between the Serbs and Albanians to end the conflict, but the ceasefire did not hold and fighting resumed during the year. By the end of the year

¹⁷⁹ Malcolm, p.265.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 315.

¹⁸¹ In 1969 Kosovo Albanians were permitted to fly as their own “national” emblem. *ibid.*, p. 325.

¹⁸² R.J. Crampton, *The Balkans Since the Second World War* (London: Pearson Education Limited, 2002), p.273.

tension rised again and exploded on 15 January 1999 when 45 bodies were discovered in the Kosovan Albanian village of Rachak. The Rachak massacre in particular brought new international attention to the conflict. Within weeks, in France, a multilateral international conference was convened and, by March, had prepared a draft agreement, Rambouillet Accords, calling for restoration of Kosovo's autonomy and deployment of NATO peacekeeping forces. NATO intervention between March and June 1999 aimed to force Milosevic to withdraw his forces from Kosovo. During the conflict, roughly a million ethnic Albanians fled or were force fully driven from Kosovo.¹⁸³ Ultimately by June, Milosevic had agreed to a foreign military presence within Kosovo and withdrawal of his troops.

On June 10, 1999, the UN Security Council passed UN Security Council Resolution 1244, which placed Kosovo under transitional UN administration (UNMIK) and authorized KNOR, a NATO peacekeeping force. It provided for the deployment of a force with substantial NATO participation and unified command which was authorized "to establish a safe environment for all people in Kosovo and to facilitate the safe return to their homes of all displaced persons and refugees."¹⁸⁴ Resolution 1244 provided that Kosovo would have "substantial autonomy" within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and affirmed the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, which has been legally succeeded by the Republic of Serbia. UNMIK promulgated a Constitutional Framework for Kosovo, in 2001, that established the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG), including an elected Kosovo Assembly, Presidency and office of Prime Minister. Kosovo held its first free in late 2001.

Intrnational negotiation began in 2006 to determine the final status of Kosovo as envisaged under UN Securitiy Council Resolution 1244.

In February 2007, Matti Ahtisaari (UNs representative) delivered a draft status settlement proposal to leaders in Belgrade and Pristina which proposed

¹⁸³ Ibid., pp. 273-274.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 275.

“Supervised Independence” for the province. This draft resolution backed by the, United States, the United Kingdom and the other European members of the Security Council. Russia, had stated that it would not support any resolution which was not acceptable to both Belgrade and Kosovo Albanians.

After many weeks of discussions at the UN, The United States, The United Kingdom and other European members of security council discarded a draft resolution, having failed to secure Russian backing. A declaration of independence postponed until the end of the Serbian presidential elections. Finally, the Assembly of Kosovo approved a declaration of independence on February 17, 2008.¹⁸⁵ Over the following days, several states (The United States, Turkey, Albania, Austria, Germany, France, The United Kingdom, Republic of China, Australia announced their recognition despite the protests by Russia and others in the UN.

¹⁸⁵ Christopher J. Borgen. “Introductory note to Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence.” ASIL (The American Society of International Law.) International Legal Materials, 2008, vol 47, issue 4. pp. 467-468.

CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION

This work attempts to examine, three of the most sensitive geopolitical areas of the world, the Middle East, the Caucasus and the Balkans, of which the Balkan Peninsula is one of the most sensitive. It occupies an important dimension in the European continent and has been host to many civilizations. From a geographic perspective, these lands which are open to transit from the East and the West constitute also an extremely important passage point due to their proximity to Asia and Africa. This geographic position of the Balkans has been a focus of attention for centers of power through the course of history. Such attention has brought stabilization from time to time, but more frequently it has led to conflict and war, thus bringing about instability to the region.

The lands of the Balkans have been a point of intersection for major civilizations and religions. To create a world empire, Alexander the Great passed through Anatolia to Africa and Asia by setting off from the Balkans. As for the Romans, they transferred their great accumulation of power which they acquired in Europe from the same path to the Asian continent by passing through the Balkans to Anatolia. Since that time, the richness of the East have been transferred to Europe via these lands. For centuries previously it was on these lands through which Christianity passed and then spread to Europe.¹ As for the Ottoman Empire, they created both political domination and introduced these areas to Islam by marching forth on these lands in the fourteenth century.

The Balkans is a region which links the continents of Europe and Asia in which various ethnic groups, cultures and religions are brought together and welded into its structure. On these lands, which we have noted have been a transition point

¹Misha Glenny, *The Balkans: Nationalism War and the Great Powers. 1804-1999* (New York: Penguin Books, 2001), pp.1-120.

for many peoples in the course of history, the traces which they have left is one its most important characteristics. In relation to this, the divisions which echo the Balkans' complex geopolitical situation of today and, parallel to this, the national characteristics and demographic variety, are a reflection of the Balkans having been subjected to countless invasions through the course of history.

As has been examined in the second chapter, the relations among the people of the Balkans have continuously sustained a competitive and conflictive characteristic as a natural result of a divisional and separatist structure, which are the result of Balkan geography as well. In addition to this, the relations of Balkan nations with their allies ---usually Great Powers--- from outside the region in order for these Balkan states to secure the internal instability in the Balkans, to obtain their security and continuity and/or to realize their own irredentist or revanchist goals, has prepared the ground for foreign machinations, thus further complicating the complex structure of the Balkans.

After the events which occurred in the Balkans, the eponym “Balkanization” was given by political science to describe the emergence and sowing of opposition between groups and even the creation of enemy societies in the Balkans, and for the Roman's divide and rule policy (*divide et impera*) which emerges in the strategy of creating power by seizing control in any region with the goal of dividing a community into enemy factions.²

One more point can be added to the geographic causes of regional particularism which are the reasons for continual competition and even war in the Balkans. This has to do with the borders which continue from the past till today. The borders that contain the Catholic and Orthodox Slavs of the Balkans ---that is to say, the Catholic Slovenians and Croatians, and the Orthodox Serbs, Montenegrins, and Macedonians--- is the border between the Western and Eastern Roman Empire which the Emperor Garius Aurelius Valerius Diocletianus devised to sever the

² Maria Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 33-37.

Roman Empire into two separate areas in 286 A.D. In fact, the boundary between the Habsburg Empire and that of the Ottoman Empire maintained the same division. The theory which is spoken of in the proverb, "Man makes history, but geography determines man" attests to a kind of truth of the determinism that man is created by regional geography.³

In addition to many factors ---only a portion of which we have only been able to enumerate above--- the unstable environment created by internal conflicts and foreign intervention has been a dominant characteristic of Balkan policy and strategy. This tableau appears in the Balkans as it has in the past, but with even more facets today. Factors such as the existence of ten independent nations with at least as many languages, three major religions and their concomitant religious sects, and a population over 100 million, has created one of the most complex regions of the world today.

This work has taken as its subject particular major watersheds in the history of the Balkans. In carrying out this investigation, it has been attempted to approach a perspective that takes as its focus point both the individual situations of Balkan societies and their interrelatedness, which we have attempted to briefly describe above.

The study of Balkan history can be taken back to a significantly earlier period. As well as the structure which the native people established, it is seen that external powers such as the Roman Empire, the Habsburgs, the Ottoman Empire and the Soviet Union maintained their field of domination inside the region for long periods. An important part of this work concerns the separation of the Balkans from the period of subjugation under Ottoman domination during the previous 500 year period, one of the most important milestones in Balkan history, and the elucidation of the region's experience of stability under Ottoman domination. As historian Halil

³ İhsan Gürkan, "Türkiye Açısından Balkan Konusunun Çeşitli Boyutları," *Balkanlar* (İstanbul: Ortadoğu ve Balkan İncelemeleri Vakfı Yayınları, 1993), p. 263.

İnalçık states, Balkan history is an inseparable part of Turkish history.⁴ However, it must not be forgotten that the existence of the Ottoman Empire comprises an important portion of Balkan history.

The Ottomans, who in a short period had taken control of the Balkans beginning in the fourteenth century, thereby bringing the Balkans into the fold as a part of the centralist empire, made it possible for the Balkans to be made into a contemporary and somewhat advanced state structure. The situation of the Ottoman Empire's political system which gathered all its citizens without regard to religious and racial difference under the umbrella of the Ottoman state was accepted up until the point that Bulgarians, Serbs and Greeks with their national consciousness in the nineteenth century rebelled in order to establish their own nation states. If there is one thing that can be said for the Ottoman state, it is that for five centuries it created a suitable environment for economic and cultural developments by securing the possibility for the protection of these peoples' own national existence without attempting to eradicate them.⁵ Otherwise, it wouldn't be possible to see such a national veracity in the Balkans.

However, the realities of the nineteenth century did not work well with the fact of multi-national empires. The nineteenth century was a period in which nationalist plots came to the fore, and the facts which supported the truth that "national divisions are a natural feature of humanity, that the ability to be recognized and to determination are characteristics of nations, and lawful state types have their own national will and national determination" emerged in an undeniable form.⁶ The nationalism which emerged in the Balkans again manifested itself in a model which was particular to the region. In place of a realistic nationalist understanding which takes as its basis human rights, the contemporary world and its problems, historical nationalism came to the fore. And this was a nationalism strengthened by longing to

⁴ İnalçık, "Türkler ve Balkanlar," p. 9.

⁵ Ibid., p. 26.

⁶ Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism* (London: Hutchinson, 1960), p. 9.

return to the golden age of the romantic past of the nineteenth century, and an opposition to foreign control.⁷ In this respect, the elements in the Balkans were carried away by a new current with a dynamism which came from within and with influences which came from outside, and one by one they achieved independence beginning in the second half of the nineteenth century. It is thus this unfolding of the process of establishing modern Balkan states which constitutes another important aspect of Balkan history, and as such is a historical development that is impossible to prevent.

The goal of the historical nationalist movement which appeared in the nineteenth and twentieth century Balkans was concentrated on the destruction of foreign control such as that of the Ottomans or the Habsburgs. Xenophobia was one of the most evident characteristics which appeared in this period. It was such that a thought structure emerged which exalted values and characteristics connected to the community which constituted the nation and which remained intolerant towards differences which were to a small degree separate from them. This thought structure was supported by assertions of having superior hereditary qualities and structured on historical ideological perceptions.⁸ Sentiments of intolerance, denigration and antagonism were directed not only in opposition to empires which were characterized as invading forces in the Balkans, but were directed towards neighboring communities as well. These sentiments were affected in a way such that this situation became an indicator that stabilization would not be possible in the Balkans during the course of the development of nation states.

Thus it was that in the wake of the process of becoming a nation, the formation of groups in the Balkans after a short period would begin and the spark of World War I - a war which was one of the most bitter trials of history of this

⁷ Ersin Kalaycıođlu, "Balkanlar'da Milliyetçilik ve Siyasal Yaşam: 1918-1939," *İki Dünya Savaşı Arasında Avrupa ve Balkanlar: İdeolojiler ve Uluslararası Politika* (İstanbul: Aybay Yayınları, 1994), p. 50.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 51.

troubled environment in the Balkans--- ignited in this region and led to a world war. As was stated in the fourth chapter, war was not able to produce the stability which was desired in the Balkans. In this period not one single Balkan state was able to establish complete domination upon a plot of land whose natural boundaries had been recognized. This situation battered the relations among national states in the Balkans since the beginning, and every state showed interest in the minorities to which they felt a closeness or which they saw as a part of their own community.⁹ However, there was a problem of minorities in the Balkans¹⁰ and while this situation created a tendency towards irredentism in that region, it prepared the basis for an international policy always being of a "Balkan" dimension while leading to the birth of an environment which continually threatened national stability.

In the period between the two world wars, it would be overly generous to say that the Balkan nations obtained definite internal stability. The political structure which emerged in the Balkan nations constitutes one of the most important dimensions of this instability. Even if they began with a Western-modeled democratic regime, within a short period of time the Balkan nations favored a more authoritative structure which was closer or more familiar to them.¹¹ It is seen that international dynamics influence the direction taken by Balkan nationalism towards authoritative regimes. As we have seen in all periods of Balkan history, while being influenced by events which originated outside, they themselves were swept up in these winds of change.¹²

The most significant indicator of this is that countries such as Russia, Italy and Germany acquire a large degree of importance for the Balkans. Thus the social systems, totalitarian powers and the concomitant revisionist approaches which emerge in the nations which have seen centuries of power over the region, wield all

⁹ Ibid., p. 63.

¹⁰ Poulton, pp. 9-253.

¹¹ Kalaycıoğlu, p. 65.

¹² Castellan, pp. 452-455.

influence over internal and external instability, cause weakening, and bring a new dimension to irredentism in the Balkans.

However these interpretations must not give us the impression that the entire Balkans sank into a conflict-ridden environment. In the period between the two World Wars, the experience of the process of "de-Balkanization" in the Balkans also constitutes a dimension of this work. The Balkan Entente, realized in 1934, was a result of a search for cooperation and drawing together since 1930. The goal of the entente, which was brought to life with the initiative of Turkey and Greece in particular, was to protect the *status quo* in the Balkans and to make the borders secure. After a lengthy period, although a common current was broached in the region, the experiment proved to be ineffectual. This can be attributed to the concurrence of aspects that had not been instilled with revisionist policies that appeared in the world, such as territorial problems or the situation of minorities.

Due to the fact that the participants in this unification which emerged in the period between the two World Wars came together for a common "negative interest," they were unable to show any sort of unification that was positive.¹³ On the one hand, while there was a dogmatic attempt towards not changing borders, on the other hand there was such a dogmatic insistence for changing borders, particularly emanating from Bulgaria, that both sides exaggerated their national sentiments, which restricted the scope of Balkan cooperation. It is for this reason that since its inception, "national" foreign policies obstructed the movement towards cooperation, even among the Balkan states allied with each other. In this period, dreams of Balkan cooperation were left to politics while in its place everyone took care of his own affairs.¹⁴ Be that as it may for the process of "de-Balkanization," it

¹³Wolfgang Höpken, "National Self-Interest and Multilateral Cooperation: Balkan Cooperation between the Two World Wars," *İki Dünya Savaşı Arasında Avrupa ve Balkanlar: İdeolojiler ve Uluslararası Politika* (İstanbul: Aybay Yayınları, 1994), pp. 99-107.

¹⁴ Ibid.

was a temporary process which intentionally avoided facing up to the main problems in the region and again Balkanization would be inescapable in the future.¹⁵

Moreover, while World War II pulled in the Balkan nations, the concept of Balkanization was foreshadowed, and these nations were split into two different camps in this war. In the aftermath of World War II, all the balances were frozen under the macro balance of a Europe which was divided into capitalist and socialist camps.¹⁶ This was reflected in the Balkans again as being comprised of two poles. In this period since the beginning of the Cold War, which was examined in this work, a large portion of the Balkans was situated within Soviet Russia's power base, and this period continued to a large degree up until the 1990s without losing this characteristic. According to Armaoğlu, as an irony, the fact of this period was that the Soviet system's hegemony in the Balkans created stability.¹⁷

The region, which was part of this order until the 1990s, entered into a period of fast-paced reconstruction or cross examination of the old systems upon the disappearance of balance from above with the Soviet Union's entrance into a quick process of transformation together with the beginning of the dissolution of the union.

It was thought that the Soviet system and the people who lived within this system which was put into practice---over the course of seventy years for the Soviet Union and forty-five years for the Balkans---were created from a single mold and brought to a monolithic state. However, it is now clearly shown with the dissolution that this was wrong. In the regions that had been under Soviet domination or its influence, the communist period's presumed forgotten values such as "national values" or "religion" emerged one by one in a short period with the dissolution of the

¹⁵ Gareth Winrow, "The Balkans in International Politics: An Examination of the Inter-War Period", *İki Dünya Savaşı Arasında Avrupa ve Balkanlar: İdeolojiler ve Uluslararası Politika* (İstanbul: Aybay Yayınları, 1994), pp. 81-96.

¹⁶ Sabahattin Şen, "Yeni Dünya Düzeninde Avrupa ve Türkiye", *Yeni Dünya Düzeni ve Türkiye*, ed. Sabahattin Şen (İstanbul: Bağlam Yayınları, 1992), p. 289.

¹⁷ Fahir Armaoğlu, "Değişen Dünyada Balkanlar ve Türkiye", *Yeni Dünya Düzeni ve Türkiye*, ed. Sabahattin Şen (İstanbul: Bağlam Yayınları, 1992), p. 130.

union. As for the Balkans, this dissolution was the most typical example and in the aftermath of dissolution, constituted the most painful syndrome which the region experienced.

The final section of this work contains the troubled period of the Balkans which it was left to face in this process. Despite the fact that we know that no period of Balkan history has experienced complete stability, we see that the developments which have emerged in recent years in the Balkans are not fitting for the modern world, particularly those events which were experienced in relation to Yugoslavia.

At present, the phenomenon which has emerged as the "New World Order," discussed above, manifested a transformation in the form of a disruption in the developmental process of the international system to the degree that this transformation was reflected as well in the Balkans. Emerging in a manner which was instantaneous and unable to be predicted beforehand, this development was comprised of a significantly more influential and sensational character than that which has been encountered in previous periods, and made its stamp on the final decade of the twentieth century.

The structure of the Balkans has not been homogeneous, neither in the nineteenth century nor in the twentieth century up to the present.¹⁸ The contemporary Balkans have fallen into an extremist and chauvinistic orientation. The conflicts and competition of super-ideologies in our period which enter a seemingly subdued surface begot other polarizations and "-isms" within today's societies. These events in fact are comprised of a repetition of old ideals.¹⁹ The nationalist currents which have been revived in many places in the world have begun to be interpreted in more narrow meanings and appear in micro-nationalist movements.

In this period the example of Yugoslavia appears as a striking development. While seeking the future of the Yugoslavian republics, the leaders of those republics

¹⁸ Ibid, p. 129.

¹⁹ Mughisuddin, "Dağılan Yugoslavya..." p. 39.

remained buried in their own past, thus they proceeded according to pro forma historical relationships, or better, according to pro forma historical enmities. As was noted above, it is not possible to find another country whose past has so adversely affected its present and future.²⁰

In relation to conditions of the past, the 1990s placed proportionately more difficult general conditions on the situation in the Balkans. Thus in this new environment threatening flash points of various dimensions began to develop. The contemporary Balkans gives an example of regional order which is open to rapid change affecting both its surroundings and internal structure. From an external perspective a significant balance has been effectively removed. This balance was both affected by a bi polar system and the stable situation that such a balance supported. It had spanned close to half a century, albeit with different nuances. From an internal perspective, the former members of the Eastern Bloc lived a period of transformation in various forms and dimensions. This was especially true for Yugoslavia, which for many years had its own particular stability in the region and was an element in the balance. The generalized character and speed of the transformation, the border disputes and ethnic conflicts together with economic, social-political and psychological problems opened the path for a generalized instability of increasing dimension in the region.²¹ With this view, the developments in the Balkans brought the potential of threat to an all-encompassing state for not only the region but for Europe and even for the world.

In addition, another fact is that the process which the Balkans has been forced to undergo has disclosed the ongoing existence of former conditions. National borders in the region which were defined at the beginning of the twentieth century are the borders which in 1919 were frozen by the major nations in accordance with their own wishes. These same borders were protected without

²⁰ Ekinçi, p. 251.

²¹ Cengiz Okman, "Teorik Çerçevede Türkiye' nin Dış Politika Seçenekleri", *Yeni Dünya Düzeni ve Türkiye*, ed. Sabahattin Şen (İstanbul: Bağlam Yayınları, 1992).

change in the period between the two world wars and later in the climate of the Cold War. However, the necessity of removing these borders ---borders originally defined by chance with a cease-fire agreement--- as wrought by the changes which were encountered in the 1990s should not be surprising.²²

Within the present-day confusion of the Balkans, it appears very difficult to create a united Balkans. Today, as in yesteryears, there are problems of double or even multiple lands, borders and minorities among all the Balkan nations without exception. The most sensitive aspects are conspicuous in the crisis which was experienced in Macedonia, Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina. At present, if troubled areas are not brought up for discussion, regions such as Cyprus, the Aegean, Western Thrace, Dobrudja, Northern Epirus are filled with elements of risk that are able to bring Balkan nations face to face.

As was generally seen in this work, up until the present many different political groupings have been tried in order to bring this region to the state of a "collective security area." In respect to the present, it is clear that "challenges" of demography and geography have been transformed into elements to be used for power politic conflicts. In fact, history has demonstrated that solutions which are imposed by force tend to be of a temporary nature, no matter how long they last or how many different forms are tried time after time. Today while the Balkans is on the brink of appearing to be incompatible with the modern world, it is clear that the power politics which has been put to use for securing the stability of the region and which have been tried many times are no longer sufficient. With the example of the Balkans, the need is born for grasping a new perspective and appraisal in the relationship between cause and effect in the negative developments which have been experienced to the extreme.

The world of today is no longer the world of yesterday and it is witness to rapid transformations. In one sense in the final years of the twentieth century the

²² Stefanos Yerasimos, *Milliyetler ve Sınırlar: Balkanlar, Kafkasya ve Orta-Doğu*, trans. Şirin Tekeli (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1994), pp. 8-9.

history of man passed through and was transformed at an accelerating point in time. In the words of Alvin Toffler, this transformation has been rapid and inclusive enough to be akin to the expression, "the dimensions of things that happened after I was born are equal to the changes that were experienced in all the time that came before me."²³

The rapid transformation of social events increases the risk in making predictive forecasts. However, while this transformation on the one hand makes foresight and conjectures difficult, on the other hand it is necessary to attempt to perform them. Because contemporary social and intra-social interactions are constituted within a complicated structure influenced by the warp and weave of multiple factors, it is only a multi-faceted work which can produce meaningful conclusions for this subject. Mutual interdependence and responsibilities in a world which is growing smaller has increased to the degree in that the smallest change which emerges at any point in the world is able to effect changes in the balances found in other places and spheres. As a result, new global predictions which are interpreted for all people as if they were in the same boat is the expression of the most basic truth that the New World Order attempts to establish, in putting forth the idea that every country of the world--or at the micro-level, each person---is responsible towards one another and the world system. In the process which emerges with the New World Order, the search continues for the means to prevent the securing of national permanence solely by virtue of possessing military power, to take note of responsibilities in regard to economic and political power and to consider relations with the external world and international opinion. This search has been widely accepted as one of the foundational bases of the New World Order.

As for the powers of motivation which lie behind these, freedom of thought, human rights, freedom and democracy have reached the point of being undeniable

²³ Alvin Toffler, *Future Shock* (London: Random House, 1983), p. 22.

norms for the contemporary world. These sentiments, which are human virtues, absolutely must find their place.

However, along with the manifestation of the New World Order as a concept, it can be seen at present how much the approximations and foresight which are able to be established in order to set this concept into place constitute the most sensitive dimension, that of protecting human life. Thus it is a shame that these goals for the most part are buried under paperwork. In the aftermath of dramatic developments for which in the Balkan example only a profile can be seen, it is not yet clear to what degree revisions and foresight will be accepted by nation-states, the result of which is that it is not immediately clear when and how a long-term system can be established. If the international community is to carefully follow developments in regional disputes especially today, it is seen that neither global institutions nor present security establishments are sufficient for confronting these experiences.

In the international system during the period which followed World War II, we see that the United Nations, which was created with the goal of directing a measure of stability, was not able to manifest a sufficient, decisive and participatory manner of conduct. Whatever the case, even if the end of the Cold War significantly decreased the impediment of the "two-bloc veto," which hampered the movement capability of the organization, from time to time this situation was not able to deploy intervention in time for the developments which occurred, especially for a region such as the Balkans which is filled with complex focus points for interest.

Before all else, in order for this organization to be able to intervene in this kind of situation, it is necessary that the Security Council become involved. As a result, the institutional structure and the form of decision making of the United Nations' establishment carries great importance from the perspective of the organization's situation and future in international politics.²⁴ Because the structure at present reflects the period that followed World War II, the effectiveness of the

²⁴ Faruk Sönmezoğlu, *Yeni Dünya Düzeni ve Türkiye*, "Introduction," ed. Sabahattin Şen (İstanbul: Bağlam Yayınları, 1992), p. 16.

organization as a means for protecting international peace and security is dependent on the structure and composition of the Council being taken charge of anew. It is also possible to think of the renewed coordination of the most influential organ of the organization according to contemporary politics or new agreements in the international system as a solution for achieving stability in the international arena for the short term.

It is possible to place priority on a proposal that the entire membership of the Security Council be reorganized within a power co-efficient system suitable to a totality of political, economic, military, and demographic criteria, that the course of decision-making be defined by this classificatory system and the veto system be removed.²⁵ However, in order for the organization to be able to be an effective arbitrator in the international arena, this type of change is not sufficient, but it serves as a rational and necessary condition which is able to be constituted for the short term. While not leaving issues in international relations solely to the directive of the United Nations, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) can also become involved and have a greater voice in intra-communal relations.

Beyond all of these, contemporary developments render inevitable the examination of new value systems in international relations in the light of a new "political reality." At present, while the traditional state system, outfitted with supra-national authorities, is beginning to be jolted by new global or regional organization on the one hand, on the other hand expressions of ethnicity, cultural or emerging entities supported by marginal societies take the place of the concept of nation. In addition to this, the two basic principles of international law supported by United Nations agreements of national self-determination and the inviolability of national borders entered into a dilemma which brought these principles into conflict, as was seen in the example of Yugoslavia.²⁶ The behavior of Western nations

²⁵ Ibid, p. 17.

²⁶ Haluk Ülman, "Dünya Nereye Gidiyor?" *Yeni Dünya Düzeni ve Türkiye*, ed. Sabahattin Şen (İstanbul: Bağlam Yayınları, 1992), p. 35.

shows that they appraise the principle of self-determination as a political rather than legal principle, particularly in the face of new nationalist movements in Europe.²⁷ Changes in the world map, while linked to changes in state and national terminology, make it difficult to think about world politics with outmoded terminology.

In the short time left before entering the twenty-first century, it is clearly seen that it was not possible to secure or protect peace solely with a "power policy." While it may have been necessary, the establishment of a balance of power was not the final solution for solving all problems and abolishing conflicts. In the long term, moral values such as the tolerance for ethnic differences, secularism, etc. need to be clearly stated and the societies in question to become involved in demonstrating these moral values.

Concerning the periods taken under examination, it is determined that from time to time the theory of a balance of power is insufficient and mistaken. First of all, a theory contains assumptions which are theoretical and not factual. A theory is subject to criticism on the basis of erroneous assumptions. The theory of a balance of power claims to provide an explanatory model for the results of actions taken by a given nation under given conditions, and those results may not be foreshadowed in any of the actors motives or be contained as objectives in their policies. As a general explanatory model, this theory cannot account for particularities.²⁸

In conclusion, it is seen that even the initiation of war, the complete domination of the powerful over the powerless being discussed within balances that are thought to be general and ideal, the removal of national independence, even universal laws which are anticipated to uphold the world system ---all in the name of protecting the Balance of Power-- -are applied or ignored by dominant nations in

²⁷ Şükrü S. Gürel, "Değişmekte Olan Dünyada Türk-Yunan İlişkileri ve Kıbrıs Sorunu," *Yeni Dünya Düzeni ve Türkiye*, ed. Sabahattin Şen (İstanbul: Bağlam Yayınları, 1992), p. 149.

²⁸ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (London: Routledge, 1979), pp. 117-118.

whatever manner they wish. As a result, the balance of power brings about the protection of the Great Powers by developing their *status quo* more than achieving a world order.²⁹

The balance of power demonstrates a transformation parallel to economic and sociological developments of contemporary society. Expressed more directly, the environment in which this theory was put into practice or will be put into practice has changed. It is evident that this concept is not sufficient in it of itself for the resolution of such complicated problems as the Balkans in particular.

Universal human values need to be considered. By this it is meant that universal values are comprised of two distinct concepts. First is the ideal of a universal or common moral code; the second is the ideal of general welfare, and the greatest good for the greatest majority. The United Nations is the only establishment which can set forth a universal standard for the ideals of truth, honor, respect and personal responsibility on an international scale.³⁰ In order to realize this, it is necessary that the United Nations desist from being an extension of power politics, and that the evaluative ideals which are set forth above be constructed anew and re-worked.

In addition to this, we are confronted by concepts which are necessary to bring to the fore in contemporary values. The values of multi-culturalism, ethnic pluralism, human rights and especially public ethics must receive priority in a global civil society and be complimented by domestic policies. In order to accomplish these aims, human rights should be improved at all levels of society. In today's global world, nations should not only apply these values within their own societies,

²⁹ Hedley Bull, "The Balance of Power and International Order," *Perspectives on World Politics*, eds. Richard Little and Michael Smith (London: Macmillan, 1991), pp. 115-124.

³⁰ Terry Nardin, "Moral Renewal: The Lessons of Eastern Europe," *Ethics and International Affairs*, ed. Joel H. Rosenthal (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University, 1995), p. 136.

but, in remaining true to the expression "global neighborhood," they should apply this in such a way as to link themselves to others in the international community.

If it is to be thought that after an 8000 year period of humanity we have merely reached today's level, how much more time will it take in this evolutionary period for individuals and society to arrive at the above-cited values which are foremost? Without a doubt our efforts on this path are to be intensified in the development of these values.³¹

If we do not begin to think from this vantage point, the Balkans will continue to constitute zones comprised of bloody borders the twenty- first century. The longed-for peace and environment of cooperation in relation to geopolitical and historical factors can create systems to be followed while placing priority on the above-mentioned new concepts and values. On this road which is to be extended, the creation of an atmosphere of trust among Balkan nations and their people must be secured before all else. With these requirements, it will be possible for a process which leads towards cooperation to move forward.

³¹ Robert J. Myers, "Speaking Truth to Power: The Quest for Equality in Freedom," *Ethics and International Affairs*, ed. Joel H. Rosenthal (Washington D. C.: Georgetown University, 1995), p. 19.

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