

**The Palestinian-Israeli Peace Process in International
Context with a Note on the Consequences for Turkish
Foreign Policy**

by

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ABSTRACT

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This thesis aims to analyze the whole process of peace attempts between Palestinians and Israelis in accordance with the systemic changes in international relations. Here the focal point will be the emergence of the new world order, which has certain positive impact on the parties to the conflict toward accepting a partial solution in the end. Accordingly, the transformation of the nature of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process is firstly analyzed from 1947 until eruption of the 1991 Gulf Crisis. Then, after the evaluation of the political context and the analysis of the 1991-1996 period, it is argued that the impact of new realities in the changing matrix of power politics within the new world order constituted one of the important factors which paved the way to the launching of the last Palestinian-Israeli peace attempt. Meanwhile, in this thesis, an additional chapter is devoted to the relevance of the whole peace process to Turkish Foreign Policy.

The main conclusion of the thesis might be put as follows: Systemic changes in international relations, culminating in the end of the cold war/bi-polarity, have in time clearly affected the progress in Palestinian-Israeli peace process from total refusal by both sides to acceptance of a partial solution, be it willingly or unwillingly, under the imperatives of new realities in the world order, which are of considerable relevance to Middle Eastern affairs.

ÖZET

Uluslararası Çerçevde Filistin-İsrail Barış Süreci ve Türk Dış Politikasına İlişkin Sonuçları

Bülent Aras

Bu çalışmanın amacı, Filistinlilerle İsraililer arasında sürdürülen barış çabalarının oluşturduğu sürecin tamamını uluslararası ilişkilerde meydana gelen sistem değişiklikleriyle ilintili olarak incelemektir. Burada odak noktası, sözkonusu sürecin sonunda kısmi bir çözümün kabulü yönünde, çatışmanın tarafları üzerinde belirgin bir olumlu etkide bulunmuş olan "Yeni Dünya Düzeni" nin doğuşu olacaktır. Buna bağlı olarak ilkin, Filistin-İsrail Barış Sürecindeki nitelik dönüşümü 1947'den 1991'de Körfez Bunalımının patlak verişine kadar uzanan süreçte ele alınacaktır. Devamında ise, 1991-96 döneminin siyasal bağlamda tahlili ve değerlendirilmesiyle birlikte Yeni Dünya Düzeni çerçevesinde değişen güç politikası denkleminde yer alan yeni gerçekliklerin etkisinin Filistinlilerle İsraililer arasındaki son barış anlaşması girişiminin önünü açan önemli etkenlerden birisini oluşturduğu öngörülmektedir. Bu arada da, gene bu çalışmada, ayrı bir bölüm yukarıda belirtilen barış sürecinin bütünü içerisinde Türk Dış Politikasının yerinin incelenmesine ayrılmıştır.

Bu çalışmada bütünüyle seyri incelenen Barış Süreci sonunda temel bir sonuç olarak varılan değerlendirme şöyle belirtilebilir: Uluslararası ilişkilerde gözlenen -Soğuk Savaş ve/veya kutuplu dünya düzeninin çöküşüyle yeni bir eşiğe ulaşan- sistem değişiklikleri Filistin-İsrail Barış Sürecinin gelişimini, zaman içinde sorunun taraflarını toptan red tavrından uzaklaşıp -gönüllü yada gönülsüz- kısmi bir çözümün kabulü çizgisine çekecek surette, açık bir biçimde etkilemiş bulunmaktadır.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|---------------------|---|
| COMCEC (OIC) | Committee for Commercial and Economic Cooperation |
| DFPR (UN): | Division for Palestinian Rights. |
| DOP: | Declaration of Principles |
| EEC: | The European Economic Community |
| HAMAS: | Islamic Resistance Organization, (Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyye) |
| IDF: | Israeli Defence Forces |
| ISGA: | Interim Self Government Agreement. |
| NGO: | Non-Governmental Organization |
| OIC | Organization of the Islamic Conference |
| PFLP: | People's Front for Liberation of Palestine |
| PISGA: | Palestine Interim Self Government Authority. |
| PLF: | Palestine Liberation Front. |
| PLO: | Palestine Liberation Organization. |
| PNC: | Palestinian National Council. |
| TASS: | Soviet News Agency |
| UK: | United Kingdom |
| UN: | United Nations |
| UNRWA: | United Nations Relief and Works Agency. |
| UNSCOP: | United Nations Special Committee on Palestine |
| US: | United States |
| USSR: | Union of Soviet Socialist Republics |

INTRODUCTION

The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is one of the most well-known struggles of the 20th century. It would be an oversimplification to regard the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as a struggle of two nations only. Many elements such as Zionism, anti-Zionism, Semitism, anti-Semitism, Arab countries, Superpowers, Non-Alignment Movement, etc. may be included in this conflict.

The Question of Palestine itself has two dimensions. The first aspect is the Jewish dimension which began with the establishment of the state of Israel. The second aspect is the Palestinian dimension which evolved after the dissolution of the Ottoman State. These two issues constituted the Question of Palestine. The ambivalence of Middle East geography has paved the way for the inclusion of major countries in world politics in the Question. The Question has become extremely sensitive in the atmosphere and evolution of world politics. The rules of *realpolitik* became a part of the evolution of the Question of Palestine from its inception. The establishment of the state of Israel, for example, was a product of the newly risen "pax-Americana" after World War II.

However, it is an exaggeration to attach all transformations in the Question to external developments. The internal and regional dynamics became as influential as global ones. For that reason, the Question is at the core of the regional Arab-Israeli conflict.

Due to its complexity, the Question constitutes a challenge for researchers entering this arena. It is a very dynamic area and the situation is rapidly changing. Besides that, emotions run deep in the Middle East. The complex and melancholic circumstances for dealing with this subject are well known. It should be discerned that the missing element remains to be the political will to undertake the historic compromises necessary to resolve the

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Due to its complexity, the Question constitutes a challenge for researchers entering this arena. It is a very dynamic area and the situation is rapidly changing. Besides that, emotions run deep in the Middle East. The complex and melancholic circumstances for dealing with this subject are well known. It should be discerned that the missing element remains to be the political will to undertake the historic compromises necessary to resolve the

four decade-long conflict. One is also aware that political agreements may not easily resolve decades of distrust and conflict, but they may reduce the suffering and facilitate an accommodating effect on the ongoing peace process. The current situation in the peace process seems to confirm this idea. It is this situation which has been a motivational factor in this research of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process. An analysis of all the peace attempts of not only the Palestinians and the Israelis, but also regional and global ones as mentioned above, in the period between 1947 to 1996, has been undertaken.

This thesis aims to analyze the peace process between Palestinians and Israelis in relation to the systemic changes in international relations. Here the focal point will be the emergence of the new world order. It has had certain positive impact on the parties to the conflict toward accepting a partial solution in the end. Meanwhile, in this thesis, an additional chapter is devoted to the relevance of the peace process to Turkish foreign policy.

This study, more specifically, attempts to analyze the peace process since 1947. Since that time, the Question of Palestine has been dealt with in the international arena within the context of the United Nations. Accordingly, the transformation of the nature of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process is firstly analyzed from 1947 until eruption of the 1991 Gulf Crisis. Then, after the evaluation of the political context and the analysis of the 1991-1996 period, it is argued that the impact of new realities in the changing matrix of power politics within the new world order constituted one of the important factors which paved the way for the launching of the last Palestinian-Israeli peace attempt. Moreover, special emphasis has been put on the peace framework established by the Declaration of Principles which was signed by Israel and the PLO. In order to grasp the realities behind the latest agreements, the historical analysis of developments directly related to the peace process between the PLO and Israel has been the preferred methodology of this study.

In the first chapter, with a view to finding the root causes of the Question and its accompanying peace process, the internationalization of the Question, the partition plan, the emergence of Israel, the 1948 and 1967 wars, and the Security Council Resolution 242 are discussed. The emphasis is on Resolution 242 which is regarded as the basis for all territorial discussions in the peace process.

The second chapter covers the period between 1970-1988 in respect to the main topic. Thus, the Camp David accords, the peace initiatives of the early 1980s, and the Lebanon tragedy constitute the main topics of this chapter.

The third chapter deals with the more recent, vitally important issues and developments in the peace process. In it, firstly, the Intifada will be examined with special respect to its influence over the peace process. The new peace initiatives and transformation in the attitudes of the Palestine Liberation Organization followed the Intifada. Subsequently, in this chapter, the changing priorities upon the impact of the new world (dis)order is emphasized. As a matter of fact, the refractions in the peace process with their global shifts might be taken as proof of the sensitivity of the Question in relation to external dynamics. For that reason, the elements of the Question (as mentioned above) are included not only here, but also throughout the study. In that respect, the Gulf Crisis has also been taken into consideration due to its global effects on the peace process.

Since a critical examination of the latest, post-Cold War developments directly related to the peace process and the ensuing agreements between the PLO and Israel is one of the main focuses of this study, the fourth chapter emphasizes the peace deals which began with the Madrid Framework, at some considerable length. The systemic changes in international relations, at that time, culminating in the end of the Cold War, have clearly affected the progress in Palestinian-Israeli process. Along this

examination line, the Declaration of Principles, the Cairo agreements and other recent developments until the Israeli elections held in May 1996 are also looked at. Meanwhile, not having ignored the international context, in this chapter, the changing American role in the Middle East and foreign policy diversification of the Israel is also dealt with.

The fifth chapter deals with the relevance of the peace process to Turkish Foreign Policy. Under the lights of the facts discussed in previous chapters, this section emphasizes the place of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process in Turkish Foreign Policy.

The concluding chapter, rather than summarizing the study, attempts to provide insight into the problems in the current stage of peace process with special emphasis on the need for democracy and market economy.

THE QUESTION OF PALESTINE WITHIN THE INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK

1.1. INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE PROBLEM

1.1.1. The Emergence of The Question of Palestine in the International Arena.

At the end of World War II, Palestine was a territory being governed by the United Kingdom. Great Britain had had administrative control of Palestine under a League of Nations mandate since 1922. However, the World War II had left the combatant countries with many problems. Great Britain was one of these countries which faced adverse circumstances. The internal problems within the UK limited both the willingness and the ability of its administrators in dealing with matters outside the island kingdom. For that reason, the UK signaled her aim of submitting the Question of Palestine to the two-year-old successor of the League of Nations, the United Nations.

At the close of the World War II, the governmental administration of Palestine had begun to be regarded as an unsolvable question. In addition to increasing migration of Jewish people, rapidly escalating violence reinforced this perception. Therefore, the extremely problematic governmental position, ushered in the internationalization of the question. In 1946, the British government decided to turn over the problem to an Inquiry Committee. After the committee failed to find a solution, the government took a step farther. On 18 February 1947 Great Britain, after thirty years of rule in Palestine, made the following announcement:

His Majesty's Government have... been faced with an irreconcilable conflict of principles. There are in Palestine about 1.200.000 Arabs and 600.000 Jews. For the Jews, the essential point of principle is to

resist ... [until] the establishment of Jews sovereignty in any part of Palestine...

It is in these circumstances that we have decided that we are unable to accept the scheme put forward either by the Arabs or by the Jews, or to impose ourselves a solution of our own. We have, therefore, reached the conclusion that the only course now open to us is to submit the problem to the judgment of the UN... ¹

Since that time, the Question of Palestine has been dealt with in the international arena within the context of the United Nations. In this framework, immediate attention to the problem was decided upon the first special session of the General Assembly in 1947. On 28 April 1947, the General Assembly convened in New York to establish a special committee on Palestine.²

The Arab States were unsuccessful at that time in their efforts to include either the question of independence or the termination of the mandate for Palestine during the special session. On the other side, due to the highly charged Jewish problem in Europe, Jews were very effective and dominant in their demands. The UN, for the first time, gave the right of presentation to non-governmental organizations. Although there was some political jostling, the Assembly took up the request to hear representatives of both sides. With the General Assembly Resolutions 104 and 105, the Jews were represented by the Jewish Agency while the Arab Higher Committee spoke in the name of the Palestinians.³

In the aftermath of World War II, the core element in international relations was power. The Palestinians were faced with the realities of power politics for decades after that time. Thus, as an Arab scholar commented:

¹ UN, *The Question of Palestine*, (New York, 1979), 16.

² UN, *The United Nations and the Question of Palestine*, (New York, 1985), 3.

³ UN, *The Question of...*, 16.

The internationalization of the Palestine problem placed the Palestinian Arab community at a distinct political disadvantage. Lacking adequate organization, inexperienced in the by-ways of mid-twentieth-century diplomacy, wanting the necessary apparatus with which to wage a diplomatic offensive, unskilled in the techniques of propaganda, devoid of the unequivocal support of a Major Power or the staunch advocacy of a powerful constituency therein, the Palestinian Arabs were in no position to mount an effective campaign in international forums.⁴

Israel was, therefore, very successful in achieving her demands, due to the relative weakness of the Palestinians⁵ before the UN and in the international arena for decades. The first and foremost tool of Israel has been its powerful lobbying activities.⁶ The Jewish lobby has also been effective since the meetings of the first Special Committee of the United Nations for the Question of Palestine.

Indeed, the most important event of the Special Committee was the appointment of a United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP). It was made up of 11 member states and was empowered to investigate all the questions and issues related to Palestine by the General Assembly Resolution 106. The establishment of UNSCOP was the result of *de facto* position in international relations and, it was also the hallmark of the partition which later resulted in the formation of Israeli state.⁷ Article 6 of Resolution 106 stated: "The Special Committee shall prepare a report to the

⁴ Samir N. Anabtawi, "The Palestinians as a Political Entity," in *The Arab-Israeli Conflict*, ed. by John Norton, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), 510.

⁵ In this study all future references to "Palestinian" will mean the "Palestinian Arabs."

⁶ For an excellent study on this lobbying, see Paul Findley, *ABD'de İsrail Lobisi*, translated by Mustafa Özcan and N.Ahmet Asrar, (Istanbul: Pınar, 1994).

⁷ M.Lütfullah Karaman, *Uluslararası İlişkiler Çıkmazında Filistin Sorunu*, (Istanbul: İz, 1991),41.

General Assembly and shall submit such proposals as it may consider appropriate for the solution of the problem of Palestine."⁸

In order to fulfill its objectives, the committee visited Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, and Transjordan in the Middle East, and also toured the refugee camps in Europe. During the investigation, the disability of the Palestinians in dealing with the problem became apparent, namely,

While Jewish organization co-operated with UNSCOP in its deliberations, the Palestinian leadership in the Arab Higher Committee decided not to participate, on the grounds that the United Nations had refused to address the question of independence and failed to separate the issue of Jewish refugees of Europe from the question of Palestine.⁹

The Palestinians failed, even, to defend their basic natural rights. They were unable to persuade the international community to consider any investigation concerning their natural rights. The right of self-determination for the Palestinians imposed a *de facto* refusal in the international political environment. A UNSCOP report reflected this refusal with these comments:

With regard to the principle of self-determination, although international recognition was extended to this principle at the end of the WW1 and it was adhered to with regard to the other Arab territories, at the time of the creation of the 'A' mandates, it was not applied to Palestine, obviously because of the intention to make possible the creation of the Jewish National Home there. Actually, it may well be said that the Jewish National Home and the *sui generis* Mandate for Palestine run counter to that principle.¹⁰

⁸ UN, Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People, **Resolutions and Decisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council Relating to the Question of Palestine, 1947-1975**, (New York, 1976), 2. [hereafter **Resolutions and Decisions**].

⁹ UN, **The UN and the ...**, 3.

¹⁰ UN, **The Question of...**, 18.

The right of self-determination implies a unified Palestinian State with total guarantee to the minority. However, the final decision of the committee, which completed its mission in August 1947, was different. UNSCOP reached agreement on the issues of terminating the mandate, the principle of independence, and on the United Nations' role in the solution. However, the committee failed to reach a consensus on the most important problem of the Palestine: a possible settlement of the question of the Palestinians. There was no consensus on this vital issue. The majority of the Committee, consisting of Canada, Czechoslovakia, Guatemala, Netherlands, Peru, Sweden and Uruguay, recommended a partitioned Palestine.¹¹ In other words, the majority recommended that:

Palestine within its present borders, following a transitional period... , shall be constituted into an independent Arab State, and an independent Jewish State, and the (*internationalized*) city of Jerusalem...¹²

They planned a *corpus separatum* for Jerusalem under the administration of the United Nations. Both independent States and Jerusalem were to be linked in an economic union.

On the other hand, the minority plan of the committee was prepared by India, Iran and Yugoslavia, and stated:

The peoples of Palestine are entitled to recognition of their right to independence.

The independent federal... state of Palestine shall comprise an Arab State and a Jewish State...

There shall be a single Palestinian nationality and citizenship (for) Arabs, Jews and others...

Jerusalem... shall be capital...¹³

¹¹ UN, *The UN and...* , 4.

¹² T.G. Fraser, *The Middle East 1914-1979*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980),

1.1.2. The Adoption of the Resolution of the Partition of Palestine

After two months of lengthy debate, the General Assembly approved the partition plan which had been recommended by the majority in the above-mentioned Special Committee, with minor changes, by its Resolution 181(II) on 29 November 1947¹⁴, which reads:

The General Assembly,

Having met in special session at the request of the mandatory Power to constitute and instruct a special committee to prepare for the consideration of the question of the future government of Palestine at the second regular session;

.....

Recommends to the United Kingdom, as the mandatory Power for Palestine, and to all other Members of the United Nations the adoption and implementation, with regard to the future government of Palestine, of the Plan of Partition with Economic Union ;...”¹⁵

This partition plan provided for the termination of the UK mandate with the delineation of borders between the two states and internationalized Jerusalem. According to the plan, the two states would be established not later than 1 October, 1948. Within the four documents attached to the Resolution, the steps to be taken prior to establishment of the two states were set out with details such as citizenship, transportation, boundaries, and the economic union.¹⁶

Though accepted by the Jewish Agency, the plan was dissatisfactory for the Jews in some matters like emigration and territorial limits. For the Arabs, the plan was more problematic. It was totally refused by them, and

¹³ UN, *The International Status of the Palestinian People* (New York: 1979), 13.

¹⁴ Karaman, 42.

¹⁵ *Resolutions and Decisions*, 3.

¹⁶ Kemal Kirişçi, *The PLO and World Politics: A Study of the Mobilization of Support for the Palestinian Cause* (London: Frances Pinter, 1986), 5.

they opposed to be bound by the partition plan. The Palestinians and the Arab States regarded the plan as being in violation of the provisions of the UN Charter.¹⁷

The first development after the Partition Plan was an escalation in violence. Additionally, Britain disclaimed responsibility for the difficulties in Palestine and began to withdraw rapidly. And, when Britain had completed her withdrawal, she had left chaos and conflict behind her.¹⁸

1.2. THE EMERGENCE OF ISRAEL, THE WAR AND INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION

All of these developments opened the way to independence for the Jews. "The plan gave a legitimate base for a possible Israeli state."¹⁹ On the other side, the Palestinian Arabs, although they were a majority in Palestine, fell into the position of being a minority. Interestingly, the favorite of the two groups in the international community was the Jews rather than the Arabs, probably due to events in World War II.

On the same day, the UK mandate was rescinded, that is, on 14 May 1948, the Jewish Agency declared the establishment of the State of Israel, with the announcement of the following declaration:

Eretz-Israel was the birthplace of the Jewish people...
 ...the first Zionist congress... proclaimed the right of the Jewish
 People to national rebirth in their own country...
 ...was recognized in the Balfour Declaration... and reaffirmed in
 the mandate...
 ...the General Assembly required the inhabitants of Eretz-Israel to
 take such steps as were necessary on their part of the implementation of
 that Resolution.

¹⁷ UN, *The UN and...*, 5.

¹⁸ UN, *The International ...*, 13

¹⁹ Alan R. Taylor, *İsrail'in Doğuşu*, translated by Mesut Kardeşhan (İstanbul: Pınar, 1992), 140.

...we members of the People's Council, ...declare the establishment of a Jewish State in Eretz-Israel, to be known as the state of Israel...²⁰

The new Israeli state was immediately recognized by the US and the USSR.²¹ The next day, for the first time, regular troops of neighboring states intervened in the clash between the Jews and the Palestinians, and this pattern continued.²² After this war, the situation concerning the Palestinians became more dramatic. Israel gained control over much of the territory given to the Arabs by the Partition Plan. The Gaza Strip and the West Bank were administered respectively by Egypt and Jordan, and Jordan later annexed the West Bank in 1950.²³

The Question of Palestine became a vital issue on the agenda of the UN after the establishment of the state of Israel. Although still in its infancy, the UN accepted responsibility for the problem, and in time, tried to recognize and guarantee the inalienable rights of the Palestinians through international commitments. The aim of the UN was to bring about a territorial solution to the problem, but its efforts were seriously damaged by the expansionist activities of Israel beyond its previously assigned lands.²⁴

One of the early acts of the UN, as early as the above-mentioned war still continued, was sending Count Bernadotte to Palestine to seek an agreement between the sides of conflict. The Count's mission was

²⁰ Walter Laquer and Barry Rubin (eds), **The Israel-Arab Leader: A Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict**, (New York: Penguin Books, 1987), 125-128.

²¹ T.G.Fraser, **The USA and The Middle East Since World War 2**, (London: Macmillan, 1994), 47-48.

²² UN, **The Question....**, 21

²³ UN, **The UN and...**, 6.

²⁴ UN, **The Question...**, 22

interrupted when he was assassinated by Jewish terrorists.²⁵ Dr. Ralph Bunche was appointed successor to the Count through the "Rhodes Talks." The purpose of these talks was to establish a firm truce agreement. These efforts dealt with the military situation rather than the political one. For this reason, the agreement should not be understood as a recognition of the post-war state of affairs.²⁶

On 11 December 1948, the General Assembly passed its second vitally important Resolution, made with particular attention to Count Bernadotte's recommendation: Resolution 194(III):

The General Assembly
 Having considered further the situation in Palestine
 Establishes a Conciliation Commission consisting of three states
 [France, Turkey, and United States]...
 Requests the Security Council to take further steps to ensure the
 demilitarization of Jerusalem...
 Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live
 at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so...compensation
 should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return...²⁷

Before long, the Commission, referred to in the above Resolution, had separate talks with the two sides at a conference in Lausanne in April 1949. The commission signed a "protocol" with the Arab States of Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria, and separately with Israel. They agreed to use the boundaries provided by the partition plan as a basis for the discussion. However, the commitments made by this Commission ended inconclusively.²⁸ Israel insisted on dealing with the territorial question while the Palestinians gave priority to the return of the refugees. The Palestinians

²⁵ Abdul-Hafez M. Elkordy, **Crises of Diplomacy: The Three Wars and After**, (The Naylor Company, 1971), 75

²⁶ UN, **The Question...**, 22, 22

²⁷ **Resolutions and Decisions**, 27-30.

²⁸ UN, **The UN and...**, 7

expressed an "all or nothing" attitude in the territorial issues. Israel's purpose was to conserve the territories which had been occupied during the war. Israel preferred to leave the West Bank to Jordan, without bringing up the question of the future status of the region to the agenda.²⁹

Israel's declaration regarding the implementation of Resolution 181(III) and 194(II) opened the way for them to become a member of the UN. And, not surprisingly, on 11 May 1949, Israel was voted in as a member of the UN. During the debate the Israeli representative presented assurances, and the General Assembly Resolution admitting Israel into the UN, made specific reference to these assurances as in the following way:

Noting... the declaration by the State of Israel that it unreservedly accepts the obligations of the UN charter...

...taking note of the declarations and explanations made by the representative of the Government of Israel... in respect of the implementation of the said Resolutions. [181(II) and 194(III)]³⁰

Israel's admission to the UN was linked to her assurances concerning Resolutions 181(II) and 194(III). At that time, neither of the Resolutions had been accepted by the Arab States.

Beyond this development, in the 1950s, the issue of Palestine widened the conflict between Arabs and Jews. During this period the UN and both sides moved no closer to any kind of peace deal. Let alone peace, the situation paved the way for the Suez Canal crisis. It had no direct influence on the Palestinian question, and it, " far from refocusing attention on the Palestinians, served only to divert attention from them."³¹

²⁹ UN, *The Question...* , 23

³⁰ *Resolutions and Decisions*, 36

³¹ Anabtawi, 510

With the Suez War, the Middle East instability was taken into the chronicles of the world powers. It was clear that the problems encountered now transcended the region and the question of Palestine constituted the core of the clash in the Middle East. As pointed out by a specialist:

The conflict over the Palestine, once a localized, and subsequently an internationalized dispute, had now become global in its overtones. It now brought the ominous prospect of US and USSR involvement in addition to that of England and France... the peace of the world was deemed at stake.³²

The intervention of the "super powers" was not a new phenomenon, but it gained more significance after these powers perceived there were threats to world peace and order. Also, the Palestinians saw their struggle differently after 1956 Suez War. This paved the way for emergence of the Palestinian identity but they were not so much organized. For example, at that time, their only armed forces was the group of the Mufti of Jerusalem.³³

In 1964 the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) was, in essence, established for political purposes. And, in addition, there were small groups of Palestinians fighting against Israel in mid-1950s. These clan struggles turned into commando raids in the mid-1960s. Another major goal in the establishment of the PLO was to prevent these types of irresponsible deeds. Instead of these local vigilante groups, a trained and well-equipped army was formed and located itself in Egypt, Syria and Iraq.³⁴

As far as the Palestinians are concerned, from 1950 to 1967, the Question of Palestine was also dealt with under particular UN organizations.

³² Anabtawi, 510

³³ Philip Mattar, *Kudüs Müftüsü: Hacı Emin el-Hüseyni*, translated by İsa Ölmez and Ali Soylu, (İstanbul: Akademi, 1991), 169.

³⁴ William B. Quandt, "Political and Military Dimensions of Contemporary Palestinian Nationalism," in *The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism*, William B. Quandt et al. (Berkeley: University of California Press), 50.

The UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) is one of these organizations which is still operating today.

1.3. THE 1967 WAR AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242

The June 1967 War brought about several fundamental changes. The war was a disaster for the Palestinians and for the Arab states involved in the clash. Israel had occupied territories in Syria and Egypt, and what remained of Palestine. This war became one of the most important turning points in the struggle of the Palestinian people.

There were two consequences of the 1967 war which are worth mentioning. Firstly, after the war, the Palestinian people were left in a disastrous position which led to a mass exodus. As a result, the national consciousness of the Palestinians arose to become the prominent issue in the struggle.

...Palestinian nationalism as an idea, and the political organizations based on this sentiment, were presented with the war... the old slogan that Arab unity was the road to the liberation of Palestine was reversed to read that "The liberation of Palestine would be the path to Arab unity."³⁵

In July 1968, the PNC (Palestinian National Council) drew up a new charter and Arafat became the new leader of the PLO in 1969. After this significant change, the PLO, which the Israeli government totally refused to accept, increased armed attacks on the Israeli territories.

The second consequence of the war was the international response to the post-1967 position in Palestine that led to Resolution 242 of the

³⁵ Quandt, 52.

* Arafat was in favor of the inauguration of a war of liberation from within the newly occupied West Bank, assuming that Fatah, under his leadership, could mobilize great support among the million Palestinians suddenly brought under Israeli rule. He entered the West Bank in July 1967 to direct the effort which aimed to arouse mass response.

Security Council. The Council first held seven meetings between 9 and 22 November. Meanwhile the Arabs, with the Non-Aligned and Communist support, insisted that any solution must provide for Israeli withdrawal. Five draft Resolutions were discussed during this time.³⁶ Finally, on 22 November 1967, the UN Security Council passed its fundamental Resolution 242 (1967) based on principles for a peaceful settlement within the Middle East. According to the Resolution, mainly,

The Security Council,
Affirms that the fulfillment of...

- i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;
- ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;...³⁷

Israel was in a very advantageous position after the war and demanded direct negotiation with the Arab states. She insisted on a comprehensive territorial peace as a precondition for withdrawal from occupied territories. On the Arab side, Jordan and Egypt accepted the Security Council Resolution but they demanded Israel's withdrawal from all territories occupied in the recent war as a precondition to negotiation. The PLO and Syria strongly criticized the Resolution because they felt it reduced the whole question to a problem of refugees.

The Resolution has been regarded as a basis for all territorial discussions in the peace process from then on. The Resolution, also led to the assignment of a special representative to the Middle East with the

³⁶ Sydney D. Bailey, **Four Arab-Israeli Wars and the Peace Process**, (London: the Macmillan Press, 1990), 277.

³⁷ **Resolutions and Decisions**, 214

mission of achieving a peaceful settlement. This special representative made a series of attempts between Jordan, Israel, and Egypt on the basis of Resolution 242. As with all other prior commitments, it ended inconclusively in the early 1970s.

Chapter 2

WAR AND THE SEARCH FOR PEACE: 1970 - 1988**2.1. INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION OF THE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN ENTITY**

In the 1970s and 1980s, there were many efforts to reach a solution concerning the Palestinian issue. Since the early 1970s, the Question was perceived as a problem concerning the natural and inalienable rights of the Palestinian people rather than as a refugee problem. These attempts brought the Palestinian problem to a new phase. In November 1970, the General Assembly declared its view on peace in its Resolution 2628(XXV), which reads:

The General Assembly...

Recognizes that the people of Palestine are entitled to equal rights and self determination in accordance with the charter of the United Nations;

Declares that full respect for the inalienable rights of Palestine is an indispensable element in the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.³⁸

As with similar Resolutions passed in the preceding years, the inalienable rights of the Palestinians were expanded to include the right of self-determination, and consequently this right *de jure* was recognized by the International Community.³⁹ The rights of the Palestinian people were established at the core of the issue. The International Community recognized

³⁸ Resolutions and Decisions, 91

³⁹ Kirişçi, 138-139.

that respect for the rights of Palestinians was vitally important in order to initiate a lasting peace negotiation (as mentioned above Resolution).⁴⁰

Also in the early 1970s, a different problem was developing in Jordan. The tensions between the Jordanian authorities and the Palestinian refugees was increasing. The quarrels sometimes turned into armed struggle. Moreover, a civil war in Jordan began on 16 September 1970. At the end of the struggle, there were over three thousand killed and eleven thousand wounded. The victory of Jordan did not come easily due to Syrian and Egyptian intervention in the clash. The ruler of Jordan, King Hussein, was forced to accept the principles of the PLO leadership of the Palestinians, but after the death of the Egypt's leader Nasser, the position changed in favor of Hussein. At the end, all Palestinian organizations were forced to withdraw from Jordan after the fighting in July 1971.⁴¹ "They moved to Lebanon where their appearance in force further destabilized that country's domestic politics while embroiling it ever more directly in the conflict."⁴²

There, before long, the opposition groups along with the PLO accelerated their guerrilla warfare and terrorist attacks on Israeli targets. However, there was no agreement over tactics carried on against Israel. The two main groups, Fatah and the People's Front for liberation of Palestine (PFLP) were in conflict over the tactics to be used. The most extreme group was known as "Black September". They became famous worldwide for their terrorist activities during the Munich Olympic games. The only moderate

⁴⁰ For the life of the Palestinians at that time see Fawaz Turki, *Filistin Sürgünü: Bir Mültecinin Anıları*, translated by Selehattin Erkanlı and Nurettin El-Hüseyni, (Istanbul: Metis, 1986)

⁴¹ Peter Mansfield, *A History of the Middle East*, (London: Penguin Books, 1992), 306 and Cengiz Çandar, *Direnen Filistin*, (Istanbul: May, 1976), 159-163.

⁴² Charles D. Smith, *Palestine and Arab-Israeli Conflict*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 222 and see İrfan Acar, *Lübnan Bunalımı ve Filistin Sorunu*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1989)

group was Fatah, although some elements within that group also embarked on terrorist missions. However, Israel countered these attacks in her own way.

The next crisis in the Middle East region in relation to the question of Palestine was the 1973 war.⁴³ This "October war" caused no immediate direct effect on the Palestinian issue but opened the way to the recognition of the PLO by both the Arab world and the International Community. The immediate response of the UN to the Arab-Israeli war was the adoption of Resolution 338. It called for an immediate truce and cessation of all military activities. It also insisted on the implementation of Resolution 242(1967) without delay after a cease-fire.⁴⁴

In accordance with the provisions of the Resolution 338(1973), a peace conference convened in Geneva on 21 December 1973 under the supervision of the US and the USSR. Participants in the Conference were Israel, Jordan, the USSR, and the US and it was co-chaired by the latter two. Statements were made by all members of the delegation during the meetings. Although the conference did not yield substantive practicable decisions, it underlined the importance of a special international mechanism designed to deal directly with the problem. At the same time, the military sub-committee of the conference played an important role in the negotiations of disengagement of forces between Israel and Egypt and also between Israel and Syria.⁴⁵

Outside the UN, the American Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, was active in the peace process. Both during the war and its aftermath, he

⁴³ For detailed information see, William B.Quandt, **Decade of Decisions: American Policy Toward the Arab-Israeli Conflict**, (London: University of California Press, 1977), 165-207.

⁴⁴ **Resolutions and Decisions**, 233

⁴⁵ UN, **The Need for Convening the International Peace Conference on the Middle East**, (New York: 1989), 11

spent a great deal of effort trying to establish agreement between the Arabs and the Jews. The agreements for the disengagement of forces mentioned above was mostly a product of his renowned shuttle diplomacy.⁴⁶

The events of the year 1974 constituted a major turning point in the problem of the Palestinian People. In September 1974, 56 member states joined to propose that the Palestinian problem should be included in the chronicles of the General Assembly as a separate item. On 14 October 1974, the Assembly passed its Resolution 3210(XXIX), which reads:

The General Assembly,
Considering that the Palestinian People is the principal party to the question of Palestine,
Invites the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people to participate in the deliberations of the General Assembly on the question of Palestine in plenary meetings.⁴⁷

Arab support came later because of Jordanian reservations.⁴⁸ On 29 October 1974, the Arab Heads of States and Governments in the Rabat summit recognized the "PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian People."⁴⁹ Behind this unanimous support for the PLO, Arab leaders affirmed "the right of the Arab Palestinian people to the return of its homeland and its right to self-determination"⁵⁰ At last, the PLO and Arafat received international recognition from the International Community. In November 1974, the PLO chairperson, Arafat spoke before the UN. He made comments on the rights of the Palestinian people, self-determination, sovereignty and national independence in Palestine. He concluded:

⁴⁶ William B. Quandt, **Peace Process: American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Since 1967**, (Washington: Brooking Institution, 1993), 218-220.

⁴⁷ **Resolutions and Decisions**, 112.

⁴⁸ For detailed information see Kirişçi, 64-65.

⁴⁹ **Laquer and Rubin**, 518.

⁵⁰ **Laquer and Rubin**, 518.

Today, I have come bearing an olive branch and freedom fighter's gun. Do not let the olive branch fall from my hand.⁵¹

In the same month, the Assembly also recognized the Palestinian people as a principal party in the establishment of real peace in the Middle East by passing its Resolution 3236(XXIX), which declares that the Assembly:

1. Reaffirms the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people in Palestine, including:
 - a) The right to self-determination without external interference;
 - b) The right to national independence and sovereignty;
2. Reaffirms also the inalienable right of the Palestinians to return to their homes and property from which they have been displaced.
3. Emphasizes that full respect for and the realization of these inalienable rights of the Palestinian people are indispensable for the solution of the question of Palestine.
4. Recognizes that the Palestinian people is a principal party in the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.⁵²

On the same day, the UN General Assembly, by its Resolution 3237(XXIX), gave "observer status" to the PLO. It invited the organization to the sessions and work of the General Assembly and all international conventions under the supervision of the Assembly and the rest of the UN.⁵³

The recognition of the PLO in the world community to some extent transformed the ideology within the PLO. Arafat, at that time, showed his inclination for the idea of a negotiated settlement, and he supported openly the idea of a Geneva conference.⁵⁴ The International Community had come to such a point as to recognize the rights of the Palestinian people as being a core factor in the question of Palestine. Besides external developments,

⁵¹ UN, International..., 18.

⁵² Resolutions and Decisions, 115.

⁵³ UN, The Need For..., 12

⁵⁴ Smith, 13.

the Palestinian National Council (PNC) attained an important level in the peace process in June 1974. The concept of a democratic secular state in all Palestine gave way to the idea of an independent Palestinian state.⁵⁵

The point reached after all these major events was important and constituted a turning point for the Palestinian entity. Consequently, one may argue that the increasing emphasis on the natural and inherent rights of the Palestinians was the early landmark of bi-lateral peace in the territory of Palestine.

2.2. SEARCH FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT: BEFORE AND AFTER CAMP DAVID.

2.2.1. The Camp David Accord and Its Repercussions

From 1974 to 1977, efforts were made at various levels to make progress in peace deals. At the same time, the relations between the Jews and the Arabs had begun deteriorating. The international recognition of the PLO did not have much positive effect on Israeli policy on the Question of Palestine.

The UN General Assembly requested the Security Council to take effective measures for the implementation of the relevant Resolutions by its Resolution 31/61 of 9 December 1976. On the same day, the General Assembly passed Resolution 31/62, related to the peace conference on the Middle East. It called for a convening of the peace conference not later than the end of the March 1977.⁵⁶ The Security Council discussed the situation under the auspices of the investigation of the Secretary General, but it adopted no Resolution. The General Assembly, by adopting Resolution

⁵⁵ Helena Cobban, *The Palestine Liberation Organization: People, Power and Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 78-87, 156-157; Everett Mendelsohn, *A Compassionate Peace: A Future for Israel, Palestine, and the Middle East* (New York: Farrar, Strauss & Giroux, 1989), 83

⁵⁶ UN, *The UN and...*, 27.

32/20, reconsidered the question on 25 November 1977. But, there was no serious conclusion drawn. It affirmed that:

A just and lasting peace in the Middle East, in which all countries and peoples in the region can live in peace and security within recognized and secure boundaries, can not be achieved without Israel's withdrawal from all Arab territories occupied since 5 June 1967 and the attainment by the Palestinian people of its inalienable national rights...

[called a new] for the early convening of the peace conference on the Middle East.⁵⁷

Despite these calls, the tensions between Arabs and Israelis were increasing in terrorist attacks and counter-attacks. Particularly, the Palestinians were on the world chronicles with their terrorist activities carried on against Israeli targets in every corner of the globe. These terrorist acts badly injured the image of the Palestinians and strengthened the pro-Israeli view.

At that time, Egypt emerged as a promising actor in the Palestinian and Middle East peace process. US President Carter's efforts encouraged Arabs in the peace process. He seemed intent on solving the Palestinian issue, and he used the "homeland formulation" for the Palestinian Arabs for the first time.⁵⁸ The reason for Carter's propensity to Egypt was his belief that Egypt could urge the PLO to change its Charter and could force the PLO to accept Resolution 242 which Israel had set as a precondition to introduce the peace negotiation. Israel's objective on Egyptian-Israeli peace may be grasped from the words of the Moshe Dayan of Israel,

The future is with Egypt . If you take one wheel off a car, it won't drive. If Egypt is out of conflict, there will be no more war.⁵⁹

⁵⁷ UN, *The Question of...*,30.

⁵⁸ Quandt, *Peace Process...*, 260.

⁵⁹ Quandt, *Peace Process...*, 260

The most encouraging sign of this early phase of agreement was the eagerness of Sadat, the President of Egypt, to normalize relations. Nonetheless, Sadat could not escape from the dilemma that most of the Arab States fallen into. He tried to achieve recognition of Palestinian rights on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip, not only out of sympathy, but also to protect himself against the charges that he had sold out the Palestinians.⁶⁰

In mid-September 1977, secret diplomacy began between Egypt and Israel in Morocco. Even though Sadat's behavior was shaky during the dealings, the US seemed more pro-Arab. On 19 November, Sadat visited Jerusalem and addressed Knesset the next day. The Camp David talks lasted from 5 to 17 September 1978. Two main agreements were drawn in the talks. One was on the future of the West Bank And Gaza. The other was on the principles of an Egyptian - Israeli peace treaty.

Two central issues, related to the Palestinians, seemed likely to prevent agreement during the negotiations. The first was the autonomy for the West Bank and Gaza Strip. It was the question of what would happen after a five-year transitional period. The second was on the question of Jewish settlements, but Begin delayed this issue until the end of the talks. Finally, the talks about the West Bank and Gaza Strip were obfuscated because of the creation of two tracks: one involving peace treaty negotiations between Israel and Jordan, and the other involving talks between Israel and representatives from the occupied territories.⁶¹ The agreement reached, *a framework for peace in the Middle East*, reads:

1. Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the representatives of the Palestinian people should participate in negotiations on the Resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. To achieve that objective, negotiations relating to the West Bank and Gaza should proceed in three stages:

⁶⁰ Smith, 250.

⁶¹ Bailey, 358.

(a) ...In order to provide full autonomy to the inhabitants, under these arrangements the Israeli military government and its civilian administration will be withdrawn as soon as a self-governing authority has been freely elected by the inhabitants of these areas to replace the existing military government...

(b) Egypt, Israel, and Jordan will agree on the modalities for establishing the elected self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza...

(c) When the self-governing authority (administrative council) in the West Bank and Gaza is established and inaugurated, the transitional period of five years will begin. As soon as possible, but not later than the third year after the beginning of the transitional period, negotiation will take place to determine the final status of the west Bank and Gaza...⁶²

The complex three-stage plan for the West Bank hardly got beyond first phase. Full autonomy was not defined, and "the final status" of territories was left to uncertain future talks.

The peace treaty between Egypt and Israel was signed on 26 March 1979. As a result, Israel undertook a stage-by-stage pullback from the Sinai. Its withdrawal was completed in April 1982. In return, the gains for Prime Minister Begin of Israel and his aides were significant. And because Begin later reneged on his oral statement about Palestinian autonomy, the treaty remained separate from any linkage to autonomy.⁶³

Sadat's early aim was not a separate agreement and, repeatedly, he said he was not prepared for a separate peace. There is one issue clear: both Sadat and Carter overestimated the role of Egypt in the peace of Palestine.⁶⁴ One weakness of the Accord was its exclusion of the Palestinian people, whether inside the occupied territories or outside. Also,

⁶² Bailey, 381

⁶³ Smith, 255-256.

⁶⁴ Quandt, *Peace Process...*, 331.

no other Arab countries were consulted or involved in the process.⁶⁵ Carter's weakness was his failure to recognize the depth of the Begin's attachment to the West Bank and Gaza.⁶⁶

Consequently, within the context of the international and regional circumstances of the time, repercussions of the accord were grave, in particular for the Arabs. The Ninth Arab summit which convened in Baghdad on 31 March 1979 passed a set of Resolutions against the Camp David Accords. The Council decided to withdraw the ambassadors of the Arab States from Egypt.⁶⁷ The General Assembly by its Resolution 34/65 B adopted on November 1979 also stated:

The Camp David Accords and other agreements have no validity in so far as they purport to determine the future of the Palestinian people and of the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967.⁶⁸

Yasser Arafat argued on the accord:

I want to ask: ...Where is the peace hero, the peace hero who is watching the bitter war waged by the Zionist forces against our Lebanese and Palestinian peoples at a time when As-Sadat is shaking hands in Cairo with Zionist War Minister Weizmann, coming from Southern Lebanon, and when he comes to Southern Lebanon from Cairo to intensify the military operations against the Lebanese and the Palestinian people? I say that the events, that took place in the past two years have proved that we have gone beyond the stage of steadfastness and that we have started the stage of the successful confrontation. We have cordoned off the Camp David partners."⁶⁹

⁶⁵ Hazzem Zaki Nusseibeh, *Palestine and the United Nations*, (London: Quartet, 1981), 160.

⁶⁶ Quandt, *Peace Process*..., 332

⁶⁷ Laquer and Rubin, 617

⁶⁸ UN, *The United Nations*..., 26.

⁶⁹ US Foreign Affairs and National Defence Division, *Documents and Statements on Middle East Peace: 1979-1982* (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1982), 47. (Hereafter Documents and Statements)

Syrian President Asad concerning peace in the area stated on 8 March 1980:

Brothers, in the wake of the October war, the campaign to produce despair in the Arab nation escalated and took the form of a large-scale psychological campaign. Following As-Sadat's visit to the occupied land, this campaign assumed new dimensions and intensified with every new concession made by As-Sadat to the enemy and every fresh rapprochement between them.⁷⁰

In sum, the Camp David framework were "far from meeting earlier Arab governmental decisions recognizing the PLO as representing the Palestinians in their aspirations to achieve statehood."⁷¹

2.3. PEACE INITIATIVES IN THE EARLY 1980s

2.3.1. The Venice Declaration

An independent European position on the Palestinian peacemaking was first enunciated in the Venice statement of June 1980. The nine-member European Community called for recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians and the PLO's right to be an equal part in any peace initiative related to Palestinian matters. It also demanded for the dismantling of Israeli settlements since the 1967 war.⁷² It stated :

...the time has come to promote the recognition and implementation of the two principles universally accepted by the international community: the right to existence and the security of all the states in the region, including Israel, and justice for all the peoples, which implies the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people..

A just solution must finally be found to the Palestinian people, which is not simply one of the refugees.⁷³

⁷⁰ Documents and Statements, 200.

⁷¹ Kirişçi, 65.

⁷² The New York Times, 14 June 1980.

⁷³ Documents and Statements, 200.

Efforts of the Nine to take a common joint position regarding the Palestinian issue was meaningful at that conjuncture, because it showed the uneasiness of the Europeans about the Camp David process. In their view, the American initiative had failed. European recognition of the PLO encouraged Arafat to give priority to diplomacy as a major tactic.⁷⁴ Finally, while Israel denounced the declaration, many Arab States and the PLO regarded the declaration as sincere.

2.3.2. The Reagan Plan

A new initiative surfaced with the proposal of US President Reagan on 1 September 1982.⁷⁵ The core of the proposal was Camp David, with substantive additions. Reagan's aim was to apply Resolution 242 to the West Bank and Gaza. This was a position completely at odds with Begin. Reagan offered his plan which consisted of the following points:

1. Autonomy for the Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza to be preceded by a five-year transition period, the purpose of which is to prove that the Palestinians can run their own affairs and that such Palestinian autonomy poses no threat to Israel's security.
2. The United States will not support the use of any additional land for the purpose of settlements during the transition period. Immediate settlement freeze by Israel is needed to create confidence of the Arabs.
3. No independent Palestinian entity should be created. But peace is not achievable on the basis of Israeli sovereignty or permanent control over the West Bank and Gaza.
4. Self-government by the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza in association with Jordan offers the best chance for peace.
5. Arab-Israeli conflict should be resolved on the basis of UN Resolution 242 according to the principle of exchange of territory for peace.
6. It is the United States position that... Resolution 242 applies to all fronts, including the west Bank and Gaza.

⁷⁴ Smith, 263

⁷⁵ Noam Chomsky, **ABD, İsrail ve Filistinliler: Kader Üçgeni**, translated by Bahadır Sina Şener (İstanbul: İletişim, 1993), 406.

7. Jerusalem must remain undivided, but its final status should be decided through negotiations.⁷⁶

Although the Reagan-initiative shifted focus from Egypt to Jordan and the Palestinians, Reagan's remark concerning the Palestinians were ambiguous because of his unwillingness to recognize the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinians. Clearly, his goal was to shift the initiative from the hands of the PLO and the rejectionist front to the moderate Arabs. Also, the plan seemed to be a threat to force Arab States to abandon the PLO if they wished to save the West Bank and Gaza Strip.⁷⁷ Talks between Jordan and the PLO began and continued several months in conformity with the Reagan Plan. However, Hussein declared in April 1983 that his talks with Arafat had failed. In addition to both Israeli and Arab responses and critiques of the plan, the failure of Jordan brought death to the Reagan Plan.⁷⁸

2.3.3. The Fahd and Fez Plans

Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia on 7 August 1981 declared a peace proposal. His statement on Israel was considered a major step in the peace process: he announced that "all states in the region should be able to live in peace."⁷⁹ One may see the point of this proposal as an implicit recognition of the state of Israel but it was only on the initiative of a single state. The plan did not receive very much positive response. However, the following year the Fahd Plan was reinforced with minor changes.

In September 1982, at the Twelfth Arab Summit Conference at Fez, Morocco proclaimed their nine-point "Fez Plan" as a solution to the

⁷⁶ George Lenczowski, *American Presidents and the Middle East*, (London: Duke University Press, 1990), 264.

⁷⁷ Smith, 209.

⁷⁸ Quandt, *Peace Process...*, 347-348.

⁷⁹ Laquer and Rubin, 623; for the full text see 622-623.

conflict.⁸⁰ The Fez Plan was derived from Fahd Plan, and was similar to it, but it had been expanded and clearly deliberated the main requirements for a just peace for the Arab side within the context of regional and international order. The Fez Plan included the following principles:

...1- The withdrawal of Israel from all the Arab territories occupied by it in 1967, including Arab Jerusalem;

2- The dismantling of the settlements established by Israel in the Arab territories since 1967;

3- The guaranteeing of freedom of worship and performance of religious rites for all religions in the Holy Places;

4- The reaffirmation of the right of the Palestinian people to self determination and to the exercise of their inalienable and imprescriptible national rights, under the leadership of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, their sole and legitimate representative, and indemnification of those who do not desire to return;

5- The placing of the West Bank and Gaza Strip under the supervision of the United Nations for a transitional period not exceeding a few months;

6- The establishment of an independent Palestinian State with Jerusalem as its capital;

7- The establishment by the United Nations Security Council of guarantees of peace between all States of the region, including the independent Palestinian State;

8- The guaranteeing by the Security Council of the implementation of these principles;⁸¹

It differed from the Fahd Plan in reinstating the PLO's role of central leadership and in seeking UN warranties for peace. The significance of the plan was twofold. First, it implied the recognition of Israel's right of existence that put an end to the "all or nothing" philosophy of the Palestinians. Secondly, it was based on UN Resolutions, including Security

⁸⁰ Fahir Armaoğlu, *Filistin Meselesi ve Arab-İsrail Savaşları: 1948-1988* (Ankara: T.İş Bankası Yayınları, 1991), 485.

⁸¹ UN, *The Need for...*, 20

Council Resolution 242 of 1967, which resulted positive responses from both the UN and the International Community.

As a proof of the importance of the level reached by the Fez Plan, the PLO recognized the Plan as the " minimum for political moves by the Arab States" in its National Council meetings in Algiers in February 1983.⁸²

2.3.4. The Soviet Peace Plan

Except for the US and USSR joint commitment of 1977, the Soviets had been kept out of Middle East peace deals. This position changed in the early 1980s. In his 26th Party Congress, Chairman Brejnev called for an international conference to reach an honest solution. He criticized the Camp David Accord and he spelt out withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967. On 15 September 1982, the Chairman announced his six-point peace plan, which included:

- The principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of foreign territories by aggression;
- the exercise of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian problem;
- the return of the eastern part of Jerusalem to the Arabs as an integral part of the Palestinian state;
- the termination of the state of war between the Arab States and Israel...
- establishment of international guaranties for the settlement in the region, where the permanent members of the Security Council or the Council as a whole could assume the role of guarantors.⁸³

When compared, almost all the main points in this plan, as will be shown, are closely paralleled to the Fahd-Fez plans.

⁸² Clyde R.Mark, **Middle East Peace Proposals**, (Washington D.C. :CRS Issue Brief, 1990), 8.

⁸³ UN, **The Need For...**, 21

2.3.5. A Comparison of the Peace Proposals

A comparison of the EC, Reagan, Fahd, Fez and Soviet plans may be useful in order to understand both the similarities and the differences of views on peace.

The differences may be centered on three points:

a) The two Arab Plans called for the establishment of an independent Palestinian State while the Reagan Plan advocated only autonomy for Palestinians in association with Jordan. The Soviet Plan fell short of endorsing a Palestinian State and the Venice Declaration did not go beyond insisting on the legitimate rights of the Palestinians.

b) In the Venice Declaration the Nine of EC stated that they would not accept any unilateral initiative on Jerusalem. The Arab and the Soviet plans favored return of East Jerusalem to Arab rule. The Reagan Plan said Jerusalem should remain undivided but was ambivalent on its final status.

c) The Fez Plan (but not Fahd's) and the Venice Declaration made explicit mention of the PLO as the Palestinian's sole representative, while the Reagan Plan did not mention the PLO.

Despite the importance of these differences, there were also certain similarities among them the following deserve to be mentioned:

a) In essence, all the plans subscribed to the formula of exchange of territory for peace, that is, the principle originally prescribed by UN Resolution 242 of 1967.

b) Israel's permanent control over the West Bank and the Gaza Strip was repudiated by all the proposals.

c) All of them were also against any further settlements by Israel in the occupied territories.

d) All proposals recognized (implicitly by the Arab ones) the existence of Israel as state.

2.4. THE TRAGEDY OF LEBANON AND THE NEW INITIATIVES

2.4.1. The Lebanon Crisis

By the mid-1970's the Palestinian population had grown to 8 percent of Lebanon's population or to over 200.000. This situation in Lebanon could best be described as a "state within a state". They lived together in organized communities with a quasi-governmental structure. Towards the end of the 1970's they came closest to having a state and a government which they had ever had since 1947.⁸⁴ Despite these positive conditions for the Palestinians, Lebanon was not a safe haven for them. There were increasing tensions among the different ethnic and religious segments in Lebanon.

In the mid-1970's, the tensions increased between the Maronites and Palestinians, and, also among the Maronites and the leftist forces. The involvement of Syria and Israel and the relatively weak involvement of other Arab States, like Iraq and Libya, added more to the complexity of the problem. Thus broke out a civil war in Lebanon; with the entrance of Syrian troops in 1976, the question acquired international dimension.

As previously seen, the Palestinian commando raids at the Lebanon borders continued, thus intensifying the conflict and deepening the problem. These Palestinian raids had been causing regular reprisals from the Israelis. Particularly, in early 1981 Israeli-PLO armed struggle gained momentum across the Israeli northern border. The clashes often caused civilian and non-Palestinian casualties which increased the opposition to the PLO. On the other hand, the problematic viewpoint of the Syrian government was

⁸⁴ Mendelsohn, 134-135.

the PLO, a multinational force, including American troops, arrived in Lebanon. Finally, on 1 September 1982, Palestinian forces left the country for other Arab States. Immediately after, American troops were withdrawn.

Up to this point, all developments had been in favor of the Israelis, but an unexpected development reversed the situation. While Israeli troops surrounded the refugee regions, Phalangist militias entered into the refugee camps. Two days earlier, because of the assassination of their leader and Israeli encouragement, they had become highly incited. These two events resulted in a massacre in Sabra and Shatila. They killed more than 1000 civilians,⁸⁸ mainly women, children, and elderly.⁸⁹ Subsequently, a report prepared about the massacre by Kahan of the Israeli Supreme Court, criticized the Israeli leadership. The reaction of the Israeli public was extremely interesting:

The largest demonstration in Israel's history- 400.000 people, or almost one-seventh of the entire Jewish population- gathered in Telaviv's Municipality square to condemn the massacres and the war...the massacre became a symbol of Israel's moral failure, which overshadowed any successful aspects of the invasion.⁹⁰

Five months later, Sharon and several other officers were removed from office because of their failure to prevent the massacre.⁹¹ Beside these factors, the PLO was faced with the realities of power politics. Particularly, the Palestinians in the occupied territories became more pragmatic and ready to cope with existing realities.

⁸⁸ In some sources this number is more than 8000. see Smith, 270 and Quandt, *Peace Process...*, 346

⁸⁹ Howard M. Sachar, *A History of Israel*, Vol.2 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 198

⁹⁰ Mendelsohn, 139.

⁹¹ Quandt, *Peace Process...*, 346.

Israel's political, economical, and physical failures, caused by her misadventure in Lebanon increased until the complete withdrawal of troops in September 1988. The results of the war in Lebanon constituted a turning point in the peace process for both Israelis and Palestinians.

2.4.2. The 1983 International Conference and Its Significance

The post-Lebanon war atmosphere created momentum for international peace attempts. The UN General Assembly decided, based on Resolutions from 1980,⁹² to convene an international conference on the Question of Palestine under the supervision of the UN. The conference convened in Geneva from 29 August to 7 September (1983).

According to the Preparatory Committee, the two main objectives of the conference should be:

- a) To increase international awareness of the facts relating to the question of Palestine;
- b) To attain governmental and non-governmental support for effective ways and means to enable the Palestinian people to exercise its inalienable rights in Palestine on the basis of United Nations Resolutions.⁹³

It is clear that the purpose of the Assembly was to ensure universal attention to Palestinian rights. The conference ended with two major documents: the Geneva Declaration on Palestine and the Program for Action for the Achievement of Palestinian Rights. The latter laid down six fundamental guidelines for international commitments to resolve the Question of Palestine. These guidelines were:

- 1-The attainment by the Palestinian people of its legitimate inalienable rights, including the right to return, the right to self-

⁹² The General Assembly decided, by its Resolution 36/120 C of 10 December 1981, to convene conference on the basis of Resolution ES-7/2 of 29 July 1980. These Resolutions were followed by the 36/120C, ES-7/7 of 19 August 1982 and 37/86C of 10 December 1982.

⁹³ UN, The Need For..., 22.

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⁹³ UN, *The Need For...*, 22.

determination and the right to establish its own independent State in Palestine;

2- The right of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people, to participate on an equal footing with other parties in all efforts, deliberations and conferences on the Middle East;

3- The need to put an end to Israel's occupation of the Arab territories, in accordance with the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force, and, consequently the need to secure Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem;

4- The need to oppose and reject such Israeli policies and practices in the occupied territories, including Jerusalem, and any *de facto* situation created by Israel as are contrary to international law and relevant United Nations Resolutions, particularly the establishment of settlements, as these policies and practices constitute major obstacles to the achievement of peace in the Middle East;

5- The need to reaffirm as null and void all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel, the occupying power, which have altered or purported to alter the character and status of the Holy city of Jerusalem, including the expropriation of land and property situated thereon, and in particular the so-called "Basic Law" on Jerusalem and the proclamation of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel;

6- The right of all states in the region to existence within secure and internationally recognized boundaries, with justice and security for all people, the *sine qua non*, of which is the recognition and attainment of the legitimate, inalienable rights of the Palestinian people as stated in paragraph(1) above.⁹⁴

During the course of the conference, a large number of non-governmental organizations participated. The work done there was significant particularly since it consolidated an international consensus with regard to the responsibility and duty of the world community in the effort to solve the Question of Palestine.

⁹⁴ UN, The Need For..., 23-24.

2.4.3. The 1985 Arab Initiative

The year 1984 was seemingly wasted in weak attempts to reach peace. Early in 1984, Egypt was readmitted to the Islamic Conference Organization. In Israel, elections ended with a coalition between the Likud and the Labor parties with a rotating premiership. Peres of the Labor party would be on administration for the first two years. Peres was seemingly moderate and flexible in his decisions. The first sign of this flexibility was his search for cooperation with Hussein.

On July 29, 1984 the Soviet news agency (TASS) announced a Soviet Plan quite similar to the previous peace proposals. Like the previous one, Israel rejected it while Arab states applauded.

On February 11, 1985 King Hussein and Yasser Arafat announced that they had reached an agreement on their terms of dialogue and objectives. The five points that were released by Jordan contained, among other things:

1-land in exchange for peace as cited in UN Resolutions, including Security Council Resolutions;

2-the Palestinian people's right to self-determination exercised within the context of the formation of the confederation proposed between the two states of Palestine and Jordan ;

3-solving the Palestinian refugee problem in accordance with UN Resolutions;

4-solving all aspects of the Palestine question; and

5-peace negotiation within the framework of an international conference attended by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and all parties to the conflict, including the PLO, which is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, within a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation.⁹⁵

⁹⁵ Mark, 9.

The web of relations behind the PLO-Jordan accord was much complex than seen. The aim of Hussein was to regain the West Bank, and for this purpose, he was using the PLO as the legitimizing tool against reactions from the Arab World. Arafat had no love for Hussein but his aim was to gain American support, via Jordan. Also, the possible configuration of the confederation deserves some attention. According to the agreement, the aim was to establish a Palestinian State in confederation with Jordan. If Hussein's West Bank desire was taken into consideration, the concept of the confederation was really much closer to "federation." In order to establish an economically sustainable formation for the occupied territories, that was one of the best possible solutions, but for the purposes of the PLO, it was not.

In any case, on February 20, 1985, the PLO Executive Committee voted in the agreement with a statement that "reaffirmed the PLO commitment to an independent state rejected the Camp David, the Reagan Plan and the 242 approaches, and repeated that only the PLO could represent the Palestinians."⁹⁶ Egyptian leaders took Point 5 as a call for an international conference to be held directly between Israel and the Arabs, and Israel responded positively. The President of Egypt, Mubarek, defended the US delegation by stating there were also Jordan-Palestinian representatives, but this time, terrorism entered into the scene. During the meetings of Reagan and Hussein, the Tunisian headquarters of the PLO was bombed by an Israeli aircraft.⁹⁷ And another delegation in Britain was canceled because of the PLO representatives' refusal to recognize Israel as a state. On February 19, 1986, King Hussein said that he was breaking off

⁹⁶ Mark, 9.

⁹⁷ Smith, 287.

his talks with the PLO since he feared that further delay would jeopardize any chance for the return of the West Bank.⁹⁸

As exemplified and outlined in the above pages of this chapter, the search for peace continued inconclusively between the years 1970 and 1988. There were many negotiations and discussions over establishing a comprehensive peace in the Middle East region. They all failed but some of them, particularly the Fez Plan and the Camp David autonomy talks, constituted a framework for possible peace deals in the future. Moreover, all peace initiatives, at least, showed an inclination toward peace. During that span of time, Israel was continuing its "no land for peace" approach despite the pressures from the world community, and Palestinians were feeling more and more alone at the end of 1987. It was this situation, and this very date, that would engender a "turning point," phenomenon brought about in the occupied territories, to be known world-wide as "Intifada." Due to its importance and its effects and/or impact on new developments within the context of the Question of Palestine and the relevant peace process, now, in the following chapter, first taking up this topic will be in order.

⁹⁸ Adam Garfinkle, *Israel and Jordan in the Shadow of War: Functional Ties and Futile Diplomacy in a Small Place*, (New York: St. Martin Press, 1992), 124.

Chapter 3

THE PEACE PROCESS ON THE THRESHOLD OF THE POST-COLD WAR ERA**3.1. INTIFADA: ITS ROOTS, MEANING AND IMPACT ON THE PEACE PROCESS****3.1.1. The Road to Intifada**

At the close of the 1980's, the world community had witnessed a social revolution in the occupied territories. The Palestinian national identity crystallized during the British mandate and during the clashes against Zionism. After 1967, the Israeli occupation led to deteriorating socio-economic conditions, terrorism and human right violations which increased nationalist tensions in the occupied territories.

Conditions in the Gaza Strip had always been strained due to an extraordinary population density. The economics of the Palestinians living in the occupied territories were severely restricted, owing to the loss of land to the Israelis. An important portion of the labor force in the occupied territories was employed in Israel. There was little industrial development, and there were huge amounts of import from Israel. Jordan, over the years, increased its market share and influence over the economics of the West Bank. She was the principal market for most of the agricultural exports from West Bank. Despite Jordan's assistance, in terms of employment and income, the Palestinians were heavily dependent on Israel.⁹⁹ Through the two-decades of Israeli occupation, the relations among the Palestinians and, their relations with the Israelis became more complex. Important social

⁹⁹ Don Peretz, "Intifadeh: The Palestinian Uprising," *Foreign Affairs*, 66 no.5 (Summer 1988), 971.

transformations occurred and new social groups and classes were generated. It was possible to recognize four social classes:

First was a class of urban entrepreneurs who mediated Israeli control over the economy (labor contractors, subcontracting businessmen, and wholesale distributors of Israeli commodities, especially in the food, textile and building sectors.) Second was a class (constituting about four percent of the Palestinian labor force) of proletarianized peasants and refugee camp dwellers {whose} wholesale (or primary) source of livelihood was employment in the Israeli-Jewish sector. Third was a substantial grouping of unemployed or underemployed university graduates and dropouts... [fourth] was a class of energetic entrepreneurs... who launched a successful campaign in the 1980s to capture the nationalist home market (buy Palestinian) through the loopholes of Israeli control over markets and labor.¹⁰⁰

The first and second classes were the primary beneficiaries of economic integration with Israel. A more substantial portion of the population may be grouped under the third and fourth classes. These two groups were the basis for the revival of Palestinian consciousness and discontent.

At the same time, new generations in the occupied territories had always lived under Israeli rule and their views on the Question of Palestine was not exactly the same as those of the Palestinians in exile. It was also possible to divide Palestinians in terms of their location and experience: those in exile were located mostly around the Middle East, and a small portion in Europe and the US; those who came under Israeli control in 1967, called "insiders"; and the refugees that still lived in the camps.¹⁰¹ A prominent specialist argues that "the bonds between those Palestinians are

¹⁰⁰ Salim Tamari, "Palestinian Movement in Transition: Historical Reversals and the Uprising," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 20 no.2 (Winter 1991), 61.

¹⁰¹ *Pursuing Peace: An American Strategy for the Arab-Israeli Peace Process: Final Report of the Washington Institute's Strategic Study Group*, (Washington: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1992), 22.

as intimate and indestructible as the bonds between Jewish inside and outside Israel."¹⁰² But one may not ignore the fact that insiders were more likely to approve a two-state position while the refugees and outsiders were in favor of holding a territorial claim to pre-1967 Israel.

Beside this, violence had periodically erupted between the Palestinians and the Israelis. The primary cause stemmed from tensions produced by occupation policies;¹⁰³ namely, one of the primary reasons for the Palestinian uprising in the occupied territories was the harassing bureaucracy and the occupation policies of the Israeli administration. In addition, the discontent with deteriorating economic and social conditions further politicized the Palestinians.

The capacity of the Israelis to meet the demand of the insiders and refugees had diminished substantially due to population growth, combined with reduced migration to the outside.¹⁰⁴ The result was a double standard practiced against the Palestinians. The Jewish double standard was apparent in many instances. According to an Israeli journalist:

There is democracy in Israel but none in the territories. A whole generation of Israelis grew up with a non-democratic system next to them, as non-democratic rulers. There is a difference between arrest of Arabs and Jews. When you[a Jew] get arrested, the police or secret service people will say 'we will give you Jewish treatment.' You will be slapped around perhaps but not tortured. Arabs who are arrested are beaten and tortured. It is difficult to convince Israelis that this undemocratic way of ruling and

¹⁰² Walid Khalidi, "Toward Peace in the Holy Lands," *Foreign Affairs*, 66 no.4(Spring 1988), 781.

¹⁰³ Donna Rabinson Divine, "Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip: Contested Domains," in *Local Communities and The Israeli Polity: Conflict of Values and Interests*, ed. by Efraim Ben-Zadak, (Albany: State University of New York Press:1993), 42

¹⁰⁴ Divine, 61

treating Arabs is wrong or evil. Israelis see it as a normal practice. [toward Arabs not themselves].¹⁰⁵

Israeli prisons and detention centers held tens of thousands of Palestinians. According to Israeli estimates some 300,000 arrests have occurred from 1967 to the end of the 1980's. Indoctrination attempts in prisons and detention centers had failed and the ill-treatment received by Palestinians in prison was more likely to create new anti-Israeli activists.¹⁰⁶

The result of these economic, social, and political frustrations became evident. A barrier of fear had been broken and growing awareness of the need for self-reliance became apparent. All Palestinians understood that salvation is self-generated.¹⁰⁷ Four decades after the establishment of Israel, the Palestinian experience had created a sense of national community which is rare in the Middle East and the Third World.¹⁰⁸ The result of this experience, *inter alia* produced the discontents which led to the Palestinian uprising: Intifada.

3.1.2. Intifada, International Responses and Its Impact on the Peace Process

On 8 December 1987, an Israeli truck collided with two vans carrying Palestinian workers in the Gaza Strip. The result was four dead and seven injured. Rumors spread that this was an Israeli attempt as a planned revenge for the murder of a Jew in Gaza two days prior.¹⁰⁹ Beginning in the next day, widespread turmoil disturbed the uneasy tranquillity of the Gaza Strip. Crowds of protesters, mostly young, threw stones and Molotov

¹⁰⁵ quoted in Smith, 297.

¹⁰⁶ Peretz, 966.

¹⁰⁷ Khalidi, 782

¹⁰⁸ Khalidi, 772.

¹⁰⁹ Karaman, 220.

cocktails at Israeli vehicles. It became known as the Arab uprising, Intifada, and soon spread to larger areas.

The immediate Israeli response was deportation and repression against participants in these disturbances. However the Israeli repression had a negative effect and, rather than crushing, led to unification of the Palestinian Arabs. With the extension of Intifada to the West Bank, it attracted youth from the refugees. Commercial boycotts followed the physical struggle of the Palestinians. Intifada was different from the early disturbances in terms of its intensity, its pervasiveness and leadership. Young people and women entered into scene of struggle.

Seventy-percent of the Palestinian society in the occupied territories were below the age of 24. The Intifada was of the greatest concern to the youth.¹¹⁰ Women also played a key role, sometimes in the leadership positions, in the Intifada. During the strikes, women organized provisions to meet the needs of those unable to shop at designated hours, or for those whose breadwinners had been arrested or killed.¹¹¹ There was a shift in the type of leadership. The shift was from heads of clans to young stone-throwers, and with this shift, the nature of the struggle against Israel differed from previous ones. The new one was a passive resistance with small scale violence.¹¹² Intifada with its peculiar characteristics was a dilemma for Israelis as well as for Arabs. It was a product of the Arab generation of 1988 that would have been unimaginable to their early zealots. Both Israelis and Arabs outside the territories failed to understand the point that "total despair, and the consequent move to open rebellion could jump an entire

¹¹⁰ Jim Lederman, "Dateline West Bank: Interpreting the Intifada," *Foreign Policy*, no.72 (Fall 1988), 230.

¹¹¹ Peretz, 970.

¹¹² Peretz, 967.

generation."¹¹³ That is why both groups failed to recognize what had actually developed after December 1987.

Intifada had a widespread impact on the occupied Palestinian community and unified it as never before. It differed from the early Arab revolt during the British Mandate. The reason for the failure of that revolt had been the struggles among various Palestinian factions. At the same time, the response to Intifada differed from responses to past revolts, such as Syria's measures taken in Hama and the Jordanian action during the 1970 Palestinian upheaval. The Israeli administration recognized the impossibility of taking sterner measures against Intifada.¹¹⁴ Additionally, in spite of her military superiority, Israel was not ready to face such an internal turmoil. The defense minister, Rabin, ordered its soldiers to stop shooting and to resort to merely beating the protesters.¹¹⁵

Despite the new methods of revolt, the mode of coordination in Intifada remained highly traditional. Intifada sustained itself in the West Bank and Gaza with the help of the cooperation of local communities and neighborhood organizations. At its heart, Intifada was a product of the poor and the youth, and the less-advantaged sectors of the population. Shortly after, the PLO initiative emerged in the struggle and sought to direct it. The early leadership of insiders, mostly moderates, such as Faisal Husseini and Sari Nusseibeh, established their own ties with the Fatah, the larger organization within the PLO. The other groups within the PLO sent their own representatives into the territories.¹¹⁶ All collaborated successfully, with only minor problems, in the integration of leadership among different factions.

¹¹³ Lederman, 231

¹¹⁴ Peretz, 973.

¹¹⁵ Myron J. Aranoff, *Power and Ritual in the Israeli Labor Party: A Study in Political Anthropology* (London M.A. Sharpe Inc., 1993), 14

¹¹⁶ Smith, 296.

The uprising succeeded in enlisting the sympathies of the International Community. The struggle between heavily armed troops and unarmed civilians, seen in the Western media, increased the support of Palestinians in wider circles of the West.¹¹⁷ At the least, it drew attention to the Question of Palestine from which it had been diverted by tensions on the other side of the world.¹¹⁸ During March 1988, the EC adopted a Resolution critical of Israeli policies and twelve states voted overwhelmingly against a series of trade agreements with Israel.¹¹⁹ The response of the EC to Intifada was not unique. The UN's attention had also been drawn to the Question of Palestine. On 21 September 1989, in a letter addressed to the Secretary General, the Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People drew most urgent attention to the grave situation. In his letter, *inter alia*, he stressed that:

According to the latest figure published by the Data Base Project on Palestinian Human Rights, the total number of Palestinians killed by Israeli forces since the beginning of the Intifada reached 714 by mid-August. According to daily Yediot Aharonoth of 9 September, the Israeli minister of defense has further liberalized army rules for shooting at suspected Palestinians, and casualties have increased. According to Ha'aretz, 60 Palestinians were shot to death during the months of July and August alone. The same source reported on 27 July that 20 percent of the Palestinians killed during the Intifada, are children under age 16, of them 21 under 12.¹²⁰

In October 1989, the General Assembly condemned the policies and practices of Israel which violated the human rights of the Palestinian people

¹¹⁷ Amos Perlmutter, "Israel's Dilemma," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.68 no.5(Winter 89/90), 119.

¹¹⁸ Such as Gulf War, tensions in Afganistan, and Central America.

¹¹⁹ Aranoff, 215.

¹²⁰ UN, DFPR, Vol.XII, *Bulletin* No. 9 (September 1989), 1.

in the occupied territories, paying special attention to Intifada. The relevant Resolution 44/2 reads as follows:

The General Assembly

Aware of the uprising (Intifada) of the Palestinian people since 9 December 1987 against Israeli occupation, which has received significant attention and sympathy from world public opinion.

...

Condemns those policies and practices of Israel, the occupying Power, which violate the human rights of the Palestinian people in the occupied Palestinian territory, including Jerusalem, and, in particular, such acts as the opening of fire by the Israeli Army and settlers that result in killing and wounding of defenseless Palestinian civilians, the imposition of restrictive economic measures, the demolition of houses and ransacking of real or personal property belonging individually or collectively to private persons, collective punishment and detentions, so forth.¹²¹

Besides drawing international responses, Intifada proved that the *status quo* is unacceptable to all parties.¹²² According to a June 1989 survey conducted by the Israelis, only thirteen percent of the population (sixteen percent Jewish, four percent Arab) regarded the status quo as a solution.¹²³ The Intifada dispelled the notion that a liberal occupation could be sustained. The conclusion of a prominent specialist is meaningful from this perspective. "It would therefore be seen that, just as Israel is a reality which the Palestinians and the PLO must accept, Palestinian nationhood is a reality which Israel must accept. As Israel is here to stay, the Palestinians are here to stay, too."¹²⁴

¹²¹ UN, DFP, Vol. XII, **Bulletin** No.10 (October 1989) 1-2.

¹²² Ellen B. Laipson, **Israeli-American Relations**, (CRS Issue Brief: Foreign Affairs and National Defence Division, 1990), 25.

¹²³ Aranoff, 215.

¹²⁴ Khalidi, 773.

Scenes of the beating of the arrested youths by the Israeli forces in the western media were especially vivid. The public in Western Europe and the US, even with no affinity to Arabs, experienced a wave of sympathy towards the Arabs. The American Jewish Community were disturbed too.¹²⁵ It was clear that the breaking of bones, in particular, was something other than peace, and Israel did not understand or did not want to understand it.

The Intifada which exploded out of the year 1988 resulted in a great degree of polarization in Israeli politics. The doves became more dovish, and the hawks became more hawkish.¹²⁶ The Palestinian Intifada strengthened the doves' determination to find a solution to the Question of Palestine.¹²⁷ Israeli society, on the eve of the 1988 elections, was divided about the peace maneuverings of Shimon Peres, leader of the Labor Party, against the rejectionist bloc represented by Yitzhak Shamir, Prime Minister and leader of the Likud Party.

The diminishing Jordanian influence over the Palestinians and the signs of moderation in the PLO forced the Labor party to change. Their two-decade-old strategies based on "Jordan" and "no political solution" failed. This failure brought the Labor party closer to a dovish position in Israeli politics.

The Israeli Arabs, 17 percent of the population, faced a dilemma with Intifada and divisions in Israeli politics. They felt and showed sympathy to Intifada. In particular, later developments further distanced them from the Jewish majority.¹²⁸ In addition, there was a widely-accepted opinion which argued there was no military means of ending the Intifada. This became the

¹²⁵ Lenczowski, 269.

¹²⁶ Aranoff, 221.

¹²⁷ Efraim Inbar, *War and Peace in Israeli Politics: Labor Party Positions on National Security* (London: Lynne Rienner, 1991), 158.

¹²⁸ Mendelsohn, 40.

hallmark for the decline of the ethical foundation the Israeli state was based on. "The increasing reliance by the main political parties on non-Zionist religious parties to form coalition governments (and the possible future reliance of Labor on non-Zionist Arab parties) is another indicator of the current crisis in Zionism, the dominant motif in Israeli political culture and the main agency of legislation of the Political system."¹²⁹ One other reflection of Intifada on the Israeli society was the escalation of protests. At least 75 peace groups were identified. The largest group was named "Peace Now", organized to support the Camp David Accord. A specialist comments on the peace movement in Israel as follows:

The Israeli peace movement had severe structural limitations, ...Activists of that movements considered it to be part of national unity. The peace movement did not want to act in its own, like a child who did not want to leave home. The view that 'any Jew or Israeli whatever his political position, is my enemy', persisted among activists. There also existed a colonial and patronizing position which led Israeli activists to believe that they know better than the Arab or Palestinian; that whatever the Palestinian did, which did not coincide with the Israeli interests, was wrong. There was a total identification with the Israeli establishment, and the peace movement was elitist, considering the masses of the people as primitive. Until all those limitations were overcome, there was no future for the Israeli peace movement.¹³⁰

Besides the other factors, the role of Islam in the occupied territories had always been significant. The religious activists were dealing the problems of their society through a comprehensive critique of modern life in the Islamic world and argued persuasively that a return to core religious values would bring social justice, good government and a better moral life. And these would put the Muslim in touch with his/her glorious past. The

¹²⁹ Aranoff, 221.

¹³⁰ UN, DFPR, Eighth United Nations North American Regional NGO Symposium on the Question of Palestine, Montreal Canada, 28-30 June 1991, 3.

Islamic groups were providing social and moral alternatives to the alienation imposed by circumstances and these groups were not stood against the PLO. Through out the 1970's the situation gradually changed and Israeli intelligence officials encouraged the Muslim Brotherhood groups. The logic was to undercut loyalty to the PLO and its secular political goals.¹³¹ The most important Palestinian Islamic group was formed in 1988. The new Islamic resistance organization, Hamas (Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyye) was formed by the members of early Muslim brotherhood and began to play a significant role in its formation. Hamas became a reality in the Palestinian Community and it played an important role in Intifada.

All these developments were forcing Israel to an important point. At least, a major Israeli theme, "there is no one to talk to", lost its ground. The Intifada demonstrated the importance of direct negotiation with both sides since Camp David-like agreements were likely to have very little effect on relations between Israel and the Palestinians. Unquestionably, Intifada were responsible for the new situation. The Palestinians returned to a more self-sufficient and local economy, as well as political frustration, in terms of less reliance on the Jewish economy. That economic position forced Israel to pay a higher cost for its occupation.

Considering all factors, there were three choices for Israel: continued repression, mass expulsion of the Palestinians or ceding of the West Bank and Gaza for a demilitarized Palestinian State.¹³² And the third option was the choice of the world community.

In sum, the Intifada created a situation that became a blueprint for the future peace process. It paved the way for the US recognition of Arafat and

¹³¹ Smith, 299.

¹³² Philip Mattar, "The Critical Moment For Peace," *Foreign Policy* no. 76(Fall 1989), 144.

the PLO and also to the establishment of a Palestinian State, within the context of the new developments in the search for peace.

3.2. THE NEW PEACE INITIATIVES

3.2.1. The Mubarek Initiative

The Egyptian President Husni Mubarek had been familiar with the peace process from his earlier experience; during the Camp David talks, he served as vice-president and was in the midst of the negotiation attempts. Shortly after Intifada emerged, Mubarek tried to take initiative as a mediator between the Israelis and the Palestinians. He went to Washington and made an effort to get the attention of American leadership to the new situation in the Middle East.¹³³ Only Mubarek, whose country was already at peace with Israel, openly discussed the situation with Israel as a representative from the Arab world. Finance Minister Peres of Israel openly appealed to Mubarek to exercise his authority. In consultation with Peres, Mubarek presented an official proposal of his own in January 1988. Mubarek called for:

- a six month moratorium on violence in the occupied territories.
- a halt to all Israeli settlement activities.
- respect for the Palestinian people's political rights and basic freedoms. It called for a free election under international supervision to be held in the occupied territories, including east Jerusalem.
- an international force to guarantee Palestinian safety
- efforts to convene an international peace conference.
- Israel to negotiate land for peace and to accept as negotiators two Palestinian activists that Israel had deported from the occupied territories.¹³⁴

¹³³ Quandt, *Peace Process...*, 364-365.

¹³⁴ Perlmutter, 122 and Mark, 10.

The Israeli Labor party was hopeful about the initiative and the US also supported the Egyptian peace initiative. Secretary of State James Baker stated, on October 1989, that the Egyptian ten-points did not represent a competing proposal. They represented a means of getting the dialogue established.¹³⁵ The difference between the Mubarek proposal and the Labor Party peace campaign was negligible. But, the PLO appeared to be upset by the proposal by some references that were absent. If no compromise on the Mubarek plan was eventually reached, the most responsible side would be the rejectionist front in the Likud party, who were dominant in the government.

3.2.2. The Shultz Initiative

At the end of his second trip to the Middle East, Shultz, representing the US, formalized a proposal and described it as a "blend of ideas." The Shultz initiative was launched in January 1988 and was discussed with the Israelis, Jordanians, Egyptians, and unspecified Palestinian leaders after it was spelled out.¹³⁶

The Shultz initiative was the most important US attempt in the Question of Palestine since the Reagan plan. A word about continuity between these two peace proposals needs to be mentioned. The essence of the Shultz initiative was a concept that in exchange for a comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East between Israel and the Arab countries, Israel would be expected to accept a land-for-peace formula in the negotiations. The important points of the initiative were:

The agreed objective is a comprehensive peace providing for the security of all the states in the region and for the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.

¹³⁵ Perlmutter, 123.

¹³⁶ Lenczowski, 271.

Negotiations will start an early date certain between Israel and each of its neighbors which is willing to do so. These negotiations could begin May 1, 1988...will be based on the UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

Seven months after transitional negotiations begin, final status negotiations will begin with the objective of completing them within one year. The transitional period will begin three months after the conclusion of the transitional agreement will last for three years. The United States will participate...[in] negotiations and will promote their rapid conclusion...

Two weeks before the opening negotiations, an international conference will be held. The Secretary General of United Nations will be asked to issue invitations to the parties involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict and the five permanent members of the United Nations Council. All participants in the in the conference must accept UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, and renounce violence and terrorism.

Palestinian representation will be within the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. The Palestinian issue will be addressed in the negotiations between the Jordanian-Palestinian and Israeli delegations.¹³⁷

In his initiative, Shultz' emphasis was mostly on Israel. In his view, in the age of the missiles, the concept of defensible borders would have to be revised for the sake of achieving a stable peace. The Shultz plan also accepted direct Soviet involvement in the peace process. It was an opportunity for the US to legitimize a made-in-USA initiative.¹³⁸ Apart from Peres and Mubarek, no other leader in the Middle East wanted to consider the plan. King Hussein encouraged Shultz but refused to endorse the policy. He went to great lengths not to be put in the position of saying "no" to Shultz. For the PLO, since the plan assigned them to the role of junior partner to Jordan, the Palestinian leaders were unhappy with the Shultz Plan.¹³⁹ And, Syria was also cool to the Shultz initiative.

¹³⁷ Quandt, *Peace Process*..., 486-487.

¹³⁸ Robert E. Hunter, "Seeking Middle East Peace," *Foreign Policy* no.73(Winter 88-89), 11.

¹³⁹ Mattar, "The Critical....," 141.

The chief defect of the initiative was in its ignorance of the major objectives of the Intifada. Those were: immediate termination of Israel's occupation and the Palestinian claim to establish their own government. In addition, the biggest problem Shultz had was Prime Minister Shamir. Shamir's refusal to accept the plan had had a significant impact on Israeli society. A major division occurred between the rejectionists and the peace-seekers which resulted in a demonstration with 50,000 Israelis in Tel Aviv voicing strong support for Shamir's stand.¹⁴⁰

Two dramatic events ultimately overshadowed the Shultz plan: King Hussein's decision to give up his claims on the West Bank in favor of the PLO and PNC (Palestinian National Council) meeting in Algiers in November 1988 which passed a Resolution declaring an independent Palestinian State and giving implicit recognition to Israel under the conditions of UN security council Resolutions 242 and 338.¹⁴¹

3.2.3 The Shamir Initiative

A new initiative was offered by Prime Minister Shamir during his April 1989 visit to Washington. That is, it was a plea to renew the talks on limited self-rule for the Palestinians in the occupied territories, an approach called for in the Camp David Accord. In the words of a 19 June 1989 *Washington Post* report, it was largely a public relations exercise designed to appeal to the sentiments, as related to Israel.¹⁴² The main focus of the peace initiative was a plan for local elections for Palestinian delegates who would negotiate with Israel for some kind of autonomy. Shamir proposed an interim period for final settlement but he did not say how long the interim period would be nor how the elections would be conducted in the occupied territories.¹⁴³ The

¹⁴⁰ Lenczowski, 273.

¹⁴¹ Lenczowski, 275-277.

¹⁴² Mattar, "The Critical...", 144.

¹⁴³ Mark, 13.

Palestinians, in particular, seriously doubted the sincerity of the plan. They feared that an autonomy scheme would block their drive for self-determination. Additionally, Shamir's proposal was a formula that had proved unworkable a decade prior.

In his initiative, Shamir emphasized the role of the US in leading an international effort to solve the Palestinian refugee problem. This was an indication of his total refusal to negotiate for peace with the PLO. Shamir's view of the Question of Palestine was still far away from generally accepted ideas. In Shamir's own words:

The PLO is not a Palestinian creation, nor has its existence anything to do with the so-called occupation of Judea and Samaria (the West Bank). It was organized by Egypt and Syria three years before the 1967 war to conduct terrorist warfare against Israel, and it is dedicated not to liberating this or that territory, but to the annihilation of Israel. That a terrorist organization, established less than twenty years after the holocaust and committed by its constitution to the destruction of Israel, enjoys observer status at the United Nations and diplomatic standing in many capitals is a sad commentary on the state of international morality.¹⁴⁴

As might be expected, no Palestinian, however moderate, accepted Shamir's scheme under such circumstances. A PLO delegate expressed the view of the PLO in 1991 at a Helsinki meeting on the Question of Palestine :

We oppose Shamir's plan by which limited administrative autonomy is given to part of occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip...

He wants to exclude beforehand any talk with Palestinians as a people. He will only talk to natives of the territories, West Bankers and Gazans, to a population not to a people. If he talks with only one

¹⁴⁴ Yitzhak Shamir, "Israel At 40: Looking Back, Looking Ahead," *Foreign Affairs*, 66 no. 3(1987/1988), 578.

Palestinian in exile, then that Palestinian signifies a people. The PLO is the institutional embodiment of the unity of the Palestinian people, beyond the imposed borderlines that divides occupation from exile.¹⁴⁵

According to Shamir, a Palestinian state was impossible since the 2000 square-mile area of land between Israel and Jordan was not appropriate for a politically and economically sustainable state. It became clear that without giving up this approach, a comprehensive peace in the Middle East was only a dream.

The Labor party of Israel was also conscious of this objective. Peres was aware of the changing nature of threat in the world and of the urgent need for efforts to end the conflict. If not, Israel could become more and more a ghetto in the Middle East, far from help with economic and political cooperation with the fear of an imminent outbreak of hostilities.

3.2.4. Swedish Diplomacy

A different initiative was undertaken with a different aim for an Israeli-PLO dialogue. It was carried out by the Swedish government, and in particular by the Swedish Foreign Minister Sten Andersson. Sweden was one of the first European countries to have direct contact with the PLO. The outbreak of Intifada deepened its sense of commitment to the peace process.

In March 1988 Andersson visited both Israel and the occupied Palestinian territories. After his visit, Andersson shifted his focus to US Jews, judging that the road to Jerusalem passed through the

¹⁴⁵ UN, *Prospects for Peace in the Middle East: An Israeli-Palestinian Dialogue*(Helsinki:June 1991), 14.

US.¹⁴⁶ Andersson, after learning of the killing of PLO leader Abu Jihad, wrote Arafat not to carry out acts of revenge. In that letter Andersson wrote:

As many in my generation in Europe, the Nazi persecution and holocaust of millions of Jews during the Second World War made a deep impression on me. In 1964, I sent my then 13-year-old son to Israel to work at a Kibbutz. He became deeply disappointed when he learnt that his Arab fellow workers were treated as second-class citizens. Finally my eyes were opened to the injustices committed against the Palestinians.¹⁴⁷

His aim was to arrange a meeting between Arafat and appropriate Jewish leaders in Stockholm or elsewhere. In late 1988, he intensified his attempts to bring the PLO representatives and American Jews together. His effort was oriented toward initiating an Israeli-PLO dialogue. Shultz initiative and the attributes of Jewish leaders in US and Europe encouraged Andersson to go forward with his plans. With his attempts, a meeting was set up between prominent Jewish leaders in the US and a PLO delegation. Mr. Andersson, rather than Israeli-PLO diplomacy, opened another track of diplomacy to explore US-PLO dialogue.

In December 1988, Shultz sent a letter conveying the long-awaited for American position, along with a text of exactly what Arafat would have to say to meet the American conditions.¹⁴⁸ The next step was an open US-PLO dialogue. Thus, Andersson by his prominent diplomatic activities showed the importance of private diplomacy in the peace process.

¹⁴⁶ Mohamed Rabie, "The US-PLO Dialogue: The Swedish Connection," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 21 no.4(Summer 1992), 56.

¹⁴⁷ Rabie, 56.

¹⁴⁸ Quandt, *Peace Process...*, 372.

3.3. THE CHANGE IN THE VIEW OF THE PLO, THE FOLLOWING STATE FORMATION AND PEACE INITIATIVE

In the second half of the 1980's, the direct negotiation between Israel and PLO became the most favored issue at both the level of the PLO and the Palestinians in the occupied territories. The prerequisite for this direct talk was the acceptance of, specifically, UN Resolutions 242 and 338 which favored land for peace and renounced terrorism. The PLO showed its inclination to meet these minimum requirements in order to start a formal dialogue with both the US and Israel. The driving forces behind the PLO being persuaded were threefold: the first was US toughness which forced the PLO to moderate its position. Secondly, the confident atmosphere of the Palestinians after Intifada gave them the ability to make bold moves toward peace.¹⁴⁹ Thirdly, Arafat's position as *primus inter pares* became apparent after the 18th PNC meeting in 1987.¹⁵⁰

Consequently, at its historic meeting in Algiers on 15 November 1988, the Palestinian National Council (PNC) accepted, specifically, UN Resolution 242 (which included an implied, but not explicit recognition of Israel), renounced terrorism, called for peaceful coexistence in a durable and lasting peace, and declared an independent Palestinian state.¹⁵¹ Another twist in the peace process occurred when, on 31 July 1988, Hussein of Jordan announced his desire to relinquish all Jordanian legal and administrative ties to the West Bank. This decision brought the idea of establishing an independent Palestinian state. The Jordanian government ceased paying the salaries of some 21,000 Arab school teachers and civil servants in the occupied West Bank and left responsibilities to the care of the PLO.¹⁵²

¹⁴⁹ Mattar, "The Critical...", 151.

¹⁵⁰ Khalidi, 786.

¹⁵¹ Aranoff, 211.

¹⁵² Ribhi Halloum, *Palestine Through Documents* (Istanbul: Belge, 1988), 250-251.

Jordan had been conceived as being a necessary gateway and ally by the Palestinians, but they had failed to reach an enduring satisfactory relationship.

At the same time, Jordan had been the preferred partner of the Israelis. But, the withdrawal of Jordan from the West Bank created a shock in Israeli politics. Since Peres and the Labor Party had emphasized a Jordan-oriented scenario for solving the Question of Palestine, Hussein's decision undercut the credibility of Peres and the Labor Party. As we have mentioned earlier, this development forced the Labor party to change its mind on the Question of Palestine. Both Shamir and Peres had missed the point that Jordan was too weak to play the "big brother" role that they both had in mind.¹⁵³

Consequently, the above decision of Hussein paved way for an actual power vacuum in the occupied territories and thus a projection of a Palestinian state which would presumably be established alongside Israel in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The PNC based a separate Palestinian State on UN Partition Resolution 181 of 1947 which had endorsed a two-state solution and abandoned its long professed aim of achieving a unified secular democratic state in the whole of the Palestine.

The events which had happened within the 19th PNC were the signs of radical transformation in Palestinian thinking on the Question of Palestine. The PLO abandoned armed struggle (*al Kifab al-Musallah*) from the core of its strategy and settled on diplomacy instead. At the same time, it reached its limit of concession without reciprocation.¹⁵⁴ The decisions made in the PNC meeting were regarded by the International Community as an important step in reaching a comprehensive and lasting solution to the conflict. The US also

¹⁵³ Pursuing Peace, 28.

¹⁵⁴ Mattar, "The Critical...", 142.

recognized that the Palestinian cause must have some legitimacy, but the US was a bit suspicious of the PLO and Arafat. In order to satisfy the US, Arafat stated his acceptance of Resolutions 242 and 338, and renounced terrorism in Stockholm, but the US dismissed the statement since it was not signed. One way remained for Arafat: to restate his ideas before the UN. But, Shultz denied him a visa to address the UN in New York. The meeting was later convened in Geneva on 13 December 1988 and there Arafat again appealed for peace. Toward the end of the speech, in which he outlined a Palestinian peace initiative, Arafat talked about the issues of 242 and Israel's right to exist, as follows:

The PLO will work to achieve a comprehensive peaceful settlement among the parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict, including the Palestinian state, Israel and other neighboring states, within the framework of the international conference for peace in the Middle East, in order to achieve equality and a balance of interests, especially the right of our people to liberation and national independence, and respect for everyone's right to exist, to peace and to security, according to Resolutions 242 and 338.¹⁵⁵

Some believed that the position of the PLO was close to meeting the US conditions to engage in direct US-PLO talks, but the US still argued that the position of the PLO leader fell short. The next day, 14 December 1988, Arafat clarified his remarks at a peace conference:

Yesterday...I also made a reference to our acceptance of Resolutions 242 and 338 as the basis for negotiations with Israel within the framework of the international conference...In my speech also yesterday, it was clear that we mean...the right of all parties concerned in the Middle East conflict to exist in peace and security and, as I have mentioned,

¹⁵⁵ Quandt, *Peace Process...*, 374.

including the state of Palestine, Israel and other neighbors according to the Resolution 242 and 338.

As for terrorism, I renounced it yesterday in no uncertain terms, and yet, I repeat for the record that we totally and absolutely renounce all forms of terrorism, including individual, group, and state terrorism.¹⁵⁶

And through the diplomatic interventions of Sweden and Egypt on the same day, the US announced that the PLO had met the US conditions for a dialogue.¹⁵⁷

In Israel despite all these developments, the opposition to "land for peace" became vividly clear. There were some disagreements between the current government of Israel and the US regarding the Jewish settlements in the occupied territories and on the meaning of Resolution 242. This was the hallmark of the diminishing credibility of Prime Minister Shamir at the level of both the American public and the administration. Foreign Minister Peres declared his stance firmly saying that "he would negotiate with any Palestinian who recognized Israel's right to exist and renounced terrorism, regardless of his biography."¹⁵⁸

The Arabs' position was confusing at that time. The conflicts among the Arab States prevented them from making an effective initiative during this phase.¹⁵⁹ The differences within the US over the US-PLO dialogue surfaced. In mid-June of 1990, the US administration suspended dialogue after Arafat's refusal to condemn a seaborne attack against Israel.¹⁶⁰ The attack which was planned and directed by the Abu Abbas factions of the PLO placed Arafat in a difficult position in the dialogue and peace process.

¹⁵⁶ Quandt, *Peace Process*, 375.

¹⁵⁷ Laipson, 9.

¹⁵⁸ *New York Times*, September 25, 1988

¹⁵⁹ Stephen C. Pelletiere, *Assad and the Peace Process: The Pivotal Role of Lebanon*, (Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 1995), 10.

¹⁶⁰ Laipson, 9.

In spite of all these developments, the PLO made further attempts to moderate its position. Yasser Arafat declared the PLO Charter articles on Israel null and void on 2 May 1989. The PLO accepted the election proposal of Israel under the guarantee of the superpowers¹⁶¹ In sum, the PLO manifested a constructive attitude and made positive contributions to peace with decisions adopted in Algiers in November 1988 and with the Palestinian peace initiative announced by Arafat at the General Assembly meeting held at Geneva on 13 December 1988¹⁶² Arafat with his own words formalized the Palestinian peace initiative:

That is exactly what we have announced in the Palestinian peace initiative launched by the Palestine National Council in Algiers a year ago. that initiative was reiterated in my statement in Geneva last December. In taking the initiative, we wished to make an effective contribution to advancing the peace process in the region on the basis of the tenets of international legitimacy embodied in the relevant General Assembly and Security Council, including Council Resolutions 242(1967) and 338(1973) as well as the right of our Palestinian people to self-determination.

In our initiative, we concurred with the view of the General Assembly endorsed in its Resolutions, that the best way to attain peace in the region is to convene the international peace conference on the Middle East under the auspices of the United Nations, with the participation of the five permanent members of the Security Council and all parties to the conflict in the region, including the PLO and the Government of the Israel.¹⁶³

The state formation process forced the PLO to change and take further steps to amend its deficiencies. One of its problems was the refugee issue. Arafat had declared "the state of Palestine is the state of all

¹⁶¹ Aranoff, 210.

¹⁶² UN, DFPR, Bulletin 12 no.9(September, 1989), 3.

¹⁶³ UN; DFPR, Special Bulletin on the Commemoration of the International Day of Solidarity with The Palestinian People, 1989, 10.

Palestinians, and presumably also the state of all the Palestinian refugees."¹⁶⁴ Other problems were related to the economical and political sustainability of a new state. The notion of a confederal link between Jordan and the Palestinians on the West Bank was a generally accepted idea. Yasser Arafat was asked in an interview, "Everyone talks about a Palestinian confederation with Jordan ...Would you consider a confederation with Israel?" His answer was, "Why not? Look at the EEC. The youth of Europe are living peacefully together, not killing each other the way their fathers did."¹⁶⁵ Arafat's vision on the political and economic future of the area seemed to be one of association and cooperation, not of partition and separation.

3.4. THE DISCUSSIONS ON THE CONVENING OF AN INTERNATIONAL PEACE CONFERENCE

In the essence of the PLO peace initiative in 1988, as noted above there was a call for the convening of an international conference to be attended by all partners of conflict, including the PLO under the auspices of the five permanent members of the Security Council. It would be held on the basis of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. After official dialogue was established between the US and the PLO, the foreign ministers of the EC put forward a proposal for an international peace conference. The twelve EC members, for the first time, called for an international conference under the supervision of the UN in the Madrid Declaration of 1989. They insisted on the PLO's participation in the peace process and launched an urgent appeal to the Israeli administration to implement the Security Council

¹⁶⁴ Shamir, 124.

¹⁶⁵ Interview by Mike Wallace, "Sixty Minutes," CBS News, February 19 1989 quoted in Gidon Gottlieb, "Israel and Palestinians," *Foreign Affairs*, 68 no.4(Fall 1989), 113.

Resolutions.¹⁶⁶ After such an important change in the attitude of the EEC on the Question of Palestine, a significant joint proposal toward peace appeared during the adoption of General Assembly Resolution 44/42 of 1989. The Resolution was adopted by an overwhelming majority of the members of the General Assembly. It reads:

The General Assembly,

...

1. Reaffirms the urgent need to achieve a just and comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the core of which is the Question of Palestine

2. Calls once again for the convening of the International Peace Conference on the Middle East, under the auspices of the United Nations, with the participation of all parties to the conflict, including the Palestine Liberation Organization, on an equal footing, and the five permanent members of the Security Council, based on Security Council Resolutions 242(1967) of 22 November 1967 and 338(1973) of 22 October 1973 and the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people, primarily the right to self determination,¹⁶⁷

The importance of the consensus of the overwhelming majority of General Assembly concerning the peace conference for the Question of Palestine was clear but the idealistic attempt of the General Assembly did not suffice to bring the opposing sides together to discuss their matters in an international conference. That was the point where *realpolitik* and moral politics were separated from each other.

There were two main problems in the way of any kind of negotiation, which had been inherited from the decade of the 1980s. The first one was to find an appropriate solution for the delegation problem of the Palestinians. The US and Israel had not agreed to start any talks with the PLO. The

¹⁶⁶ UN, DFPR, Third United Nations European Regional NGO Symposium on the Question of Palestine, Austria Center, Vienne 28-29 August 1989, 4-5.

¹⁶⁷ UN, DFPR, Bulletin, 12 no.12, December 1989, 16-18.

second was the growing lack of mutual confidence between the PLO and Israel, and between the PLO and the US. Some may argue that a number of difficulties had, in fact, been overcome in this area, but these two issues continued to remain outstanding. It was apparent that unless they were resolved, it would hardly be possible to convene a regional or international conference, or to start any kind of direct negotiation.

3.4. THE CHANGING PRIORITIES WITH THE IMPACT OF THE NEW WORLD (DIS)ORDER

The history of US-Israeli relations had evolved since the early American policy of sympathy and support for the creation of a Jewish state in 1948. The developments paved the way for an close economic, political and military partnership between these two countries. Particularly, throughout the 1980s, Israel was a strategic asset in helping to defend American interests in the Middle East as a part of Cold War strategy. The dramatic international changes of recent years have truly yielded a "new world order," providing America with a unique opportunity to reassess its global role.¹⁶⁸ Nevertheless, at the end of the 1980s and in 1990s, relations between the US and Israel came under considerable strain. Particularly, two factors contributed to the changes in the nature of their bilateral relations. First, after the end of the Cold War, the strategic environment that led to Israeli priority in the relations between the US and the Middle Eastern countries had changed dramatically. The role of Israel in the Middle East against the Soviet Union was no longer valid. The decline of Soviet influence in the region and the improvement in US-Soviet relations undermined rationale for the US support to Israel. Second, the failure of the US Baker plan and the Likud party position against the plan caused an image erosion of Israel in the

¹⁶⁸ Doug Bandow, "Avoiding War," *Foreign Policy*, no 89 (Winter93), 156.

US.¹⁶⁹ The countries in conflict in the Middle East wondered whether the US public would continue to support Israel, as it had previously in view of the fact that Israel was a declining strategic asset. In the US the public confidence in Israel had diminished gradually. No one believed Israel would give or offer to the Palestinians equal rights within its existing political order. Some felt Israel ran the risk of a sudden loss of American public support.¹⁷⁰ A specialist argues on this differentiation in relations:

There has been some gradual change in the depth of American support for Israeli policy. Frankly, most Americans do not care very much about the Middle East. We tend to be fairly preoccupied with our internal affairs. But if you ask Americans where their preferences lie, between Israel and any collection of Arab parties, over the years you have seen fairly high levels of support for Israel, although these levels have declined in recent years. We have gone from maybe 60 to 70 percent of American public's instinctively taking a pro-Israeli position down to about 40 to 50 percent. On specific Israeli policies, such as settlements, public opinion offer will be less supportive.¹⁷¹

Another differentiation occurred between Israeli and American views on the American role in the Middle Eastern affairs. However, Israel recognized that the US had begun to see its role in the Middle East peace process as an even-handed broker. The meaning of this "even-handed" position seemed to be pro-Arab in the view of the Israeli public.¹⁷² At the same time, the growing importance of the US-Arab relations was regarded as a threat to the Israeli public. For the Palestinians, the dramatic decline of the Soviet Union was a further remainder that they now stood on their own, with no major power behind them. It is even possible to say that the PLO

¹⁶⁹ Laipson, 1.

¹⁷⁰ Quandt, *Peace Process*, 398.

¹⁷¹ UN, *Prospects for Peace.*, 51.

¹⁷² Laipson, 12.

peace efforts and Israel's Shamir plan were attempts to respond to the new international environment.

The Soviet Union furthermore with the aim of improving her image in the eyes of the western public, signalled its willingness to allow Jews to immigrate to Israel. Israel was ready to accept one million Jews from USSR. This was regarded as a chance to establish a greater Israel in some segments of Israeli society. For the Arabs, it was a cause of fear and a mortal blow to the peace process.¹⁷³ The increasing relations between the SU and Israel further frightened the Palestinians. Under the rule of Gorbachev, the SU changed its classic Soviet policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. He tried to open diplomatic channels to the Jewish state that could lead to a renewal of relations which had been severed during the June 1967 crisis. The SU had publicly distanced herself from the PLO and the Palestinian cause.¹⁷⁴ In the eyes of Jewish hardliners, the situation created a chance to expel Palestinians from the territories under the legitimacy of a stalemate war against Jordan or some other Arab enemy.¹⁷⁵ The Palestinians were apprehensive that the newly elected government was apt to adopt such a strategy increasing the potential impact of the massive immigration from the SU. The massive emigration to Israel could produce a potential growth capability both politically and economically. The Israeli government lost no time in putting forth the effort to meet this highly-skilled labor force with the necessary economic and political policies.¹⁷⁶ The UN and the US were alarmed by the massive Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union. Their panic concerned the implications of such a massive mobilization which had

¹⁷³ "Palestinian Politics after the Gulf War: An Interview with Faisal Husseini," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 20 no.4(Summer 1991), 108.

¹⁷⁴ Hunter, 11.

¹⁷⁵ Ann Mosely Lesch, "Contrasting Reactions To the Persian Gulf Crisis," *The Middle East Journal* 45 no. 1(Winter 1991), 32.

¹⁷⁶ *Pursuing Peace*, 9

the potential to effect the core of controversial issues in such a deteriorating region.

In sum, the declining power of the Soviet Union diminished Arab resistance formed after Camp David and pushed the PLO to accept the solutions offered by the US and Israel. Secondly, the massive immigration of Soviet Jews created a new source of contention.

On the other hand, the Jewish attempt to bring the Soviet Jews to Israel was an attempt to revive the myth of Zionism. The name of this fable was called "ingathering of the exiles."¹⁷⁷ This aim was codified by the Law of Return. It provided any *bona fide* Jew, located anywhere, assurance of gaining entrance to Israel. But as a surprising point, only a limited number of Soviet Jews showed willingness to be gathered into the fold, mostly they wanted to go to the US and other western countries. Israel used every conceivable device to beg, trick, bribe, shame and coerce Soviet Jewish emigrants to come to Israel.

Israel's other great problem was that "Israelis, those who had already been "ingathered", wanted desperately to get out, and almost a million Israel expatriates succeeded, most of whom now live in the US."¹⁷⁸ Most of the Jews from Soviet Union came, not with religious or Zionist ideas, but to live as normal people in Israel. The reasons behind their preferences were a fear of the resurgence of anti-Semitism and chaotic economic conditions within the Soviet Union and its satellites. All these developments landed a second mortal blow on Zionist philosophy and practice, after the first shock had occurred as a result of Intifada.

Some may sympathize with those immigrants coming to Israel due to a fear of anti-Semitism, but one issue became clear: "the solution does not

¹⁷⁷ Andrew J. Hurley, *Israel and the New World Order*, (Santa Barbara: Fithian Press, 1991), 288.

¹⁷⁸ Hurley, 289.

lie in placing the burden upon the long-suffering Palestinians, who are not responsible for any European anti-Semitism, past or present,¹⁷⁹ as the world community placed the whole Jewish question on the burden of the Middle East region.

One other aspect of the migration was the settlement issue. The US strongly opposed any further settlements. The American administration insisted that there would be no loan guarantees without restrictions on settlement.¹⁸⁰ The loan guarantee was at the heart of the Israel-US relations and its impact on Israeli society was significant. At the same time, with the increasing image-erosion of Israel, the differences between the Israeli official position and the American Jewish Community became recognizable publicly. According to a survey of the leaders of US Jews, it indicated that 74 percent of them favored Israeli-PLO talks. Three out of four also opposed Israeli annexation of the territories and deportation of Palestinians.¹⁸¹ In this respect, Jewish opinion in the US became an important factor pushing Israel towards the negotiation table.

One fact goes almost completely unnoticed among the migration and settlement issues of Jews, that is high rate of emigration from the West Bank.¹⁸² At this point, the failure of Palestinians in terms of *realpolitik* was apparent. Israelis, for the sake of national independence, accepted a geography of less than what they regarded as theirs. For that reason, many issues related to the Palestinians did not attract the attention it deserved in comparison to other issues related to the Israelis.

¹⁷⁹ Hurley, 292.

¹⁸⁰ Leon T. Hadar, "The Last Days of Likud: The American-Israeli Big Chill," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 21 no.4(Summer 1992), 80-81.

¹⁸¹ Laipson, 14.

¹⁸² Fred Gottheil, "Demographic and Economic Forces Underlining Likud's Perspective of the West Bank," in *Israeli Politics in the 1990s: Key Domestic and Foreign Policy Factors* (London: Greenwood Press, 1991), 136.

The opposition Labor party of Israel during the late 1980's and early 1990's gained a unique opportunity to analyze the dynamics behind the changing nature of the peace process due to the decline of the Soviet Bloc and changes in world politics. Rabin considered the peace process a very long one, "any attempt... to solve the problem by a single act will lead nowhere"¹⁸³ Peres concluded that warlike tendencies were reinforced by the deteriorating economic conditions in Palestine and in the Arab countries.¹⁸⁴ Another Israeli "dove", Ezer Weizmann, distinguished between a stable peace and a peaceful situation with a potential for war.¹⁸⁵ These three men were the nominees to pursue the peace process, since there were signs that the Labor party might take office in the 1992 election. The shift in the views of "doves" in Israeli politics led to a historical transformation in Jewish mentality. They recognized that in such a globalized world there is no space for a "ghetto mentality" but they were not in consensus on how to escape from this mentality.

Two developments encouraged the "doves" to reach for peace in the 1990's. The first one was the perception of threat. Israeli perception of threat from the past stemmed from the idea that the Arab's goal was the total destruction of Israel. The second one, which also re-enforced first idea, was their evaluation of developments. In their opinion, Israel had become a reality in the Middle East.¹⁸⁶ In order to enhance integration of the Jewish community into the Middle East region, they attached themselves to the concept of peace. According to a poll taken in Israel in late 1990, 30 percent of those polled were willing to give up territories in exchange for peace; 40 percent of those polled, "ideological hawks," opposed exchanging any

¹⁸³ Inbar, 45.

¹⁸⁴ Inbar, 38.

¹⁸⁵ Inbar, 35.

¹⁸⁶ Inbar, 33.

territory for peace; 30 percent, "security hawks", were willing to give up most of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in exchange for security guarantees tied to Washington, DC¹⁸⁷

In the early 1990, James Baker, US Secretary General, called for a third-party talk with Egypt and Israeli colleagues in order to arrange a Cairo meeting between Israelis and selected Palestinians to try to agree on a peace solution for the election.¹⁸⁸ The debate on this issue caused internal friction in Israeli politics. The Labor Party gave up its coalition-partner position and the Likud party formed a new coalition with small religious and right-wing parties.

3.6. THE GULF CRISIS AND ITS IMPACT ON THE PEACE PROCESS

3.6.1. The Gulf Crisis

The diplomacy and subsequent political and military alignments before and after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait are enormously complex.¹⁸⁹ Since this crisis is not directly related to the main focus of this study, only a summary of that crisis will be given. The confrontation between Iraq and Kuwait over oil prices in mid-July 1990 was the first sign of crisis, but no one expected Iraq to take such an extreme action in the region. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait occurred on 2 August 1990. The US immediately responded with military aid to Saudi Arabia. After extensive preparations, coalition forces led by the US recaptured Kuwait at the expense of huge destruction in Iraq. The initiative of this coalition force began on 16 January 1991 and by 28 February, a cease-fire had been imposed. The military triumph over Iraq was unquestionable.

¹⁸⁷ Leon T.Hadar, "The Israeli Labor Party: Peacemaker or Likud II?" *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 21 no.3(Spring 1992), 85.

¹⁸⁸ Laipson,5

¹⁸⁹ For detailed information see Ewan W. Anderson and Khalil H.Rashidian, *Iraq and the Continuing Middle East Crisis*,(New York: St.Martin's Press, 1991)

The Arab and non-Arab nations of the Middle East were caught unprepared for the crisis. Particularly, the Arab countries showed their weakness at solving their own differences among each other. On 3 August 1990, the Arab League foreign ministers had denounced the invasion and called for immediate withdrawal. The vote of condemnation was significant: 14 voted affirmatively (including Egypt and Syria); 5 abstained (Jordan, Mauritania, the PLO, Sudan and Yemen); and Libya voted negatively. In the emergency Arab summit, convened in Cairo on 10 August, differences escalated among the Arab nations.¹⁹⁰ The Arabs recognized their weakness to intervention in the invasion and they also did not reach any consensus on the US-led military presence in the Gulf region. The Arab summit only reinforced and supported international intervention on the question. The PLO was criticized and forced to condemn the invasion and Saddam. The chairman of the PNC's political committee stated. "In no way am I ignoring the rights of the Kuwaiti people to their land, to their legitimacy and to self determination. And in no way would I ignore the principle of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force."¹⁹¹

3.6.2. The PLO, the Arabs and the Gulf War

There were a number of unofficial PLO statements during the first days of the invasion. George Habbash, leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) along with Abu Abbas, leader of the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF) praised Saddam and regarded invasion as a step to provide pan-Arab unity and Arab awakening. No one had expected either the Marxist, Habbash, to worry about the bad conditions of the Amir of Kuwait or Baghdad-based, Abu Abbas, to criticize his boss.¹⁹²

¹⁹⁰ Lesch, 36-37.

¹⁹¹ Philip Mattar, "The PLO and the Gulf Crisis," *The Middle East Journal*, 48 no. 1 (Winter 1994)

¹⁹² Mattar, "The PLO...", 33.

Arafat, on the other hand, after the refusal of all his peace attempts turned to and began to strengthen his ties with Iraq. His hope was to force negotiation with power, rather than by Mubarek's conciliatory forms. Saddam Hussein himself, in early April 1990, at an Arab summit, called for militant criticism of the US and Israel. There, he contended:

So long as Arabs remained economically and militarily weak they would not be able to dislodge Israel from the occupied territories and establish a Palestinian State. An Arab approach to peace ... must be coupled with a pan-Arab military and material build-up. Oil revenues must be invested in the Arab world rather than abroad; wealthy Arab governments must aid poor ones, and special pan-Arab funds should be set up to help the Palestinian Intifada.¹⁹³

In this context, the Iraqi invasion was both a threat and an opportunity for the Palestinians. Arafat began to spend increasing amounts of time in Baghdad. There were also signs that he wanted to move his office to Baghdad from Tunis. The Abu Abbas-faction tried its best to put Arafat under Saddam's influence. Probably the above mentioned Abul Abbas raid was an Iraqi operation to alienate Arafat from the peace camp and to put an end to US-PLO dialogue.¹⁹⁴

There were other reasons to explain Arafat's conduct with Saddam. Like all other dissenting countries, he had to respond to the populist feeling aroused by the Gulf Crisis. The roots and nature of this populism was a bit different. In the years prior to the crisis, Arafat had restrained his relations with radical Arabs and Palestinian groups in order to enter into dialogue with the US, but the US and Israeli attempts did not seem as sincere as

¹⁹³ Quandt, *Peace Process*, 392.

¹⁹⁴ Quandt, *Peace Process*, 392-394.

Arafat's.¹⁹⁵ On 20 June 1990, Bush announced the suspension of the US-PLO dialogue. Arafat assumed concession limits in the eyes of Palestinians, and of course his loss of credibility was apparent. According to a telephone poll conducted in the West Bank (on 12 August 1990 when Saddam linked his invasion with the Palestinian cause), 84 percent of West Bankers considered Saddam to be an Arab hero, 58 percent supported his invasion of Kuwait, and 83 percent supported Arafat's closeness to Saddam.¹⁹⁶ Under the influence of such populist instigation, there remained little space for Arafat to move in.

Iraq gradually became a hospitable base for the PLO. For Saddam, the Question of Palestine was 'the jewel in the crown' of pan-Arab solidarity. His effort was to use the Palestinian cause as legitimate, based on his further aims in the Middle East region.¹⁹⁷ For a more schematic analysis, it is possible to classify the guiding principles of the PLO during the Gulf Crisis under four categories, which will follow:

3.6.2.1. The Linkage issue:

The PLO supported the Iraqi initiative proposed on 12 August 1990. Saddam forwarded an initiative which linked the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait to Israeli's relinquishing the land of the Palestinians. The Palestinians were prone to be propagandized with such an attractive initiative.

According to Israeli polls, conducted in 1988 and 1990 they had found that 49 percent of the Jewish Israelis supported expulsion of Palestinians from occupied territories and that this had increased to 52 percent in 1990.

¹⁹⁵ Walid Khalidi, "The Gulf Crisis: Origins and Consequences," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 20 no.2(Winter 1991), 16.

¹⁹⁶ Mattar, "The PLO...", 41.

¹⁹⁷ George T.Abed, "The Palestinians and the Gulf Crisis," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 20 no.2(Winter 1991), 30.

At that time, 33 months of uprisings and 21 months of PLO diplomacy based on concession, in exchange for nothing had seemed to bring no relief to the Palestinians. In addition, the speed of intervention of the coalition forces led by the US to rescue-occupied Kuwait further frustrated the Palestinians. Most saw a double standard in US-led behavior.¹⁹⁸ There was no apparent claim by PLO officials that the invasion would create an opportunity for the liberation of Palestine. Most of them were far away from thinking of such an idea but there were some points which gained validity in the eyes of Palestinians.

-Iraq's rise as an important military power was to a significant degree (though not solely) motivated by an Arab need to create an Arab military deterrent to Israel in order to influence its politics, particularly on the question of Palestine. Iraq ... [was] the only Arab participant in the 1948 Arab-Israeli war that never signed a permanent armistice agreement with Israel.

-The Palestinians ... [could not] view Israel as an innocent bystander in the Gulf Conflict. The Israeli led crusade calling for Iraq's economic strangulation and military emasculation began long before Iraq marched into Kuwait on 2 August 1990.¹⁹⁹

The second point above is the key to understand why the Palestinians fell into a dilemma in order to defend their national order by either taking sides with Saddam or by taking comfort in international intervention. In sum, Iraq's linkage issue was the only one that tried to keep Palestine at the center of the crisis.

3.6.2.2. The Mediating role

There was no peculiarly PLO position on the Gulf Crisis. The PLO was not a party in the conflict, nor did they take an official side in the conflict.

¹⁹⁸ Mattar, "The PLO...", 39.

¹⁹⁹ Muhammed Hallaj, "Taking Sides: Palestinians and the Gulf Crisis," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 20 no.3(Spring 1991), 44-45.

It proposed a negotiation team at the Arab Summit convened on 10 August 1990. There, it was reminded PLO's earlier role which had been played successfully during a conflict between Iraq and Kuwait in 1973.²⁰⁰ The PLO's mediation attempts were faced with sympathy but later the conflicts among the Arabs did not allow for such a role for the PLO. Despite the strong support for Saddam from some Palestinian groups, the PLO preserved its "official neutrality" and negotiation efforts during the Gulf conflict. One may question Arafat's reluctant behavior at the summit but he later said that he had "accused the Egyptian president of putting to the vote ... the US inspired sets of condemnatory Resolutions that appeared to have been translated from English."²⁰¹

3.6.2.3. Foreign intervention

The PLO's position during the Gulf War stabilized it against foreign intervention. The Palestinian attitude was to see inter-state Arab conflicts as domestic problems, rather than as international conflicts. According to a specialist, the Palestinians "never considered it legitimate for an Arab people to mobilize foreign powers against another Arab people. They make no exception in the present instance. Thus, it is that Palestinians see western military involvement in the gulf as illegitimate foreign intrusion in Arab affairs, not as a legitimate application of the international principle of collective security."²⁰² At the same time, there was a fear on the Palestinian side that foreign intervention might open the door to Israeli expansion.

3.6.2.4. The Arab solution

According to the 6 August 1990 peace plan presented by Libya and the PLO, Kuwait would pay compensation and stop illegal oil-pumping in

²⁰⁰ Mattar, "The PLO...", " 35.

²⁰¹ Mattar, "The PLO...", " 35.

²⁰² Hallaj, 43.

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²⁰² Hallaj, 43.

have happened if the PLO had joined the coalition forces? "Can anyone believe that if the PLO had joined the coalition and fought in front lines against Iraq, Shamir would have sent his congratulations and agreed to withdraw from the occupied territories or granted the Palestinian independence?"²⁰⁶ A prominent Palestinian leader and intellectual, Faissal Hussein argues:

In our eyes, Yizhak Shamir is an evil man whose image among us is not worse than Saddam's among the Israelis. This being the case, how could I as a Palestinian who called upon his people to resolve our conflict with the terrorist Shamir peacefully, ask this same Palestinian people to accept a military solution when it was against Saddam Hussein?

Our official position was pragmatic, but it was also a position of principle. We were demanding international legality for everyone. I don't believe that this position was erroneous, but we did not know how to present it.²⁰⁷

At the same time, that was also the first time the Palestinians had seen Israelis being hit by Scuds. For the Palestinians in the occupied territories, Scuds meant hope, and even more likely, it was a taste of revenge.

In addition to all these explanations of the PLO's position in the Gulf Conflict it is possible to emphasize the lack of institutions in the PLO and the failure of Palestinian intellectuals to recognize the threats of the situation during the crisis. In the PLO, there were some problems of nepotism, inertia, inefficiency, corruption and factionalism. The absence of modern institutions within the PLO decreased its ability to solve questions the most rationally during the crisis.²⁰⁸ And, most of the Palestinian intellectuals neglected their

²⁰⁶ Hurley, 282.

²⁰⁷ "Palestinian Politics after the Gulf War...", 100

²⁰⁸ Mattar, "The PLO...", 38.

responsibilities (with the exception of some, like Walid Khalidi and Edward Said) to openly scrutinize, to discuss, and to acknowledge mistakes.

As we have tried to explain, to describe the Palestinian position as embracing Saddam is thus to distort it by gross oversimplification.

3.6.3. The Gulf Crisis and Israel

It is no question that the Gulf War eliminated Israel's most dangerous military threat at a very small cost to Israel. The position also forced Syria to put the lid on its Israeli initiative. Israel gained the opportunity against Syria that it had seized against Sadat in 1978. Israel reached very close to the Zionist's ultimate goal: a secure Jewish state in its historic homeland.²⁰⁹

The US fear of Israeli intervention in the crisis was maintained until the end of the Gulf Conflict. This fear was increased by the Scuds on the Telaviv-Haifa coastal strip. The Likud party and Israeli military were eager to intervene. There were four reasons for them to get involved.

1. Hunting scuds was harmless sport-SCUDs can't shoot down planes, and the Iraqi air force had already been wiped out of the sky and was in hiding.

2. Iraqi radar and missile sites had already been destroyed. so bombing Baghdad was hardly a 'combat mission.'

3. It was accurately embarrassing for the Likud military to be sitting on the sidelines and not to be invited to participate. After all, they had received and spent tens of billions of American dollars to build up Israel's enormous military machine by convincing the US Congress that Israel was America's key and indispensable ally in the Middle East, necessary for the protection of America's vital interests in the area. Now with the first big war in the Middle East under way, they were being begged-if not ordered-to stay out of it.

4. The principal reason, however, that the Israeli military was so eager to retaliate for the SCUD attacks was to bring Jordan into a war with Israel... The Israeli army would drive the 1.500.000 Palestinians in

²⁰⁹ Pursuing Peace, 28.

the West Bank and Gaza into Jordan where, the Likud says, they belong.²¹⁰

The US government exploited Israeli-backing in mobilizing pro-Israeli politicians, and they also exploited Arab-backing by keeping Israel out of war. One may wonder how, despite the intense desire of the Likud party and the Israeli army, the US managed to keep Israel out. Three reasons are responsible:

1. President Bush begged and pleaded with Shamir not to retaliate for the SCUD attacks, because to do so might destroy the coalition. Israel, of course, cared nothing about the coalition-but George Bush's enmity would be something to be reckoned with.

2. More effective, however, than President Bush's pleas, was his hard-nosed refusal to give the Israel air force the recognition signals it would need if Israeli planes were to enter combat zones and not run the risk of being shot down by allied aircraft. Israel's vaunted 'restraints' in not retaliating for the Scud attacks was not, therefore, exactly voluntary-unless the Israeli air force was willing to take the risk of the Saudi air aces shooting Israeli 'crack pilots' out of the sky.

3. President Bush convinced Shamir that the payoff for staying out would be much greater than for getting in, not only in good will, but also in hard cash.²¹¹

In the region, only Israel had profited economically, politically and militarily.²¹² Israel lost no time to collect the fruits of the post-war era. The US accepted a plan to give 650 million dollars of support to Israel in exchange for her position during the Gulf War.

²¹⁰ Hurley, 282-283.

²¹¹ Hurley, 283-284.

²¹² UN, DFPR, Eight United Nation...2

3.6.4. Concluding Remarks

The impact of the Gulf Crisis on the peace process was very much related to the impact of the Crisis as an important factor pushing both sides of the peace process to the negotiation table, as is explained. The PLO, as official representative of all Palestinian people, was alienated from Western sympathies. The Palestinian rightful image which had been aroused since the beginning of Intifada, lost ground with the Western public. In addition, the Palestinians lost the support of most of the Arab World. Their material and economic losses were noteworthy.²¹³

The Iraqi failure created a disaster for Palestinians: Kuwait expelled about 300.000 Palestinians who had worked there for many years. The meaning of this expulsion meant diminishing worker remittances to the homeland. The Gulf countries found a legitimate opportunity to cease funding the PLO.²¹⁴ They turned their attention to HAMAS, in order to punish the PLO for having supported Iraq. The PLO fell into a rapid decline. It was forced to close many of the PLO offices in the Arab countries and around the world. The Palestinians, particularly insiders and immigrants, began to criticize the PLO and its leader Yasser Arafat. The PLO arrived at the second half of 1991 in such a disastrous position. The resistance capability of Palestinians had diminished sharply and they became vulnerable to all kinds of foreign influences. Under the imperatives of the realities of the post-Gulf war era, Arafat began to realize that he had no option but back to peace camp in order to rehabilitate PLO's relations with the Arab Gulf States and with the rest of the world

²¹³ Ken Matthews, **The Gulf Conflict and International Relations**, (London: Routledge, 1993),214.

²¹⁴ Daniel Williams, "Dateline Tunis: PLO R.I.P.?" **Foreign Policy** no.90(Spring 1993), 161.

On the Israeli side, the Gulf War became a proof that the territories would not necessarily increase Israel's deterrent capability and the risk of retaining the West Bank and Gaza Strip was greater than the security benefits that they estimated. Secondly, the post-Gulf war era put the US in a unique role in world politics and she was in favor of peace. In this respect, if the new developments of the post-cold war order are added to the results of the Gulf War, Israelis' immunity to any kind of US intervention had diminished significantly. In addition, Shamir did not want to lose US political and economic support. These all constituted an important factor pushing Israeli side of the peace process to the negotiation table.

In addition to these explanations, due to its importance and its impact on the progress of the peace process, the international perspective, for both Palestinians and Israelis, will be first taken up in the following chapter.

On the Israeli side, the Gulf War became a proof that the territories would not necessarily increase Israel's deterrent capability and the risk of retaining the West Bank and Gaza Strip was greater than the security benefits that they estimated. Secondly, the post-Gulf war era put the US in a unique role in world politics and she was in favor of peace. In this respect, if the new developments of the post-cold war order are added to the results of the Gulf War, Israelis' immunity to any kind of US intervention had diminished significantly. In addition, Shamir did not want to lose US political and economic support. These all constituted an important factor pushing Israeli side of the peace process to the negotiation table.

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Chapter 4

IN SEARCH OF A PARTIAL SOLUTION AND ITS EMERGENCE**4.1. THE MADRID CONFERENCE****4.1.1 The Road to Madrid**

As we have mentioned in the previous chapter, the post-Gulf War atmosphere created the chance to adopt a peace-negotiation process in the eyes of the Middle East team of the US State Department. The Iraqi failure on the other hand convinced even the most radical Arabs that no military solution to Arab-Israeli conflict was possible. For the Palestinian cause, that situation appeared also to be valid. This was the difference between dream and reality, as realized by the Palestinians dramatically after the Gulf War.

Moreover, the Arabs and Palestinians were faced with the declining importance of the Question of Palestine in the world scene.²¹⁵ The weakness of the Palestinians was so apparent that they were expected to respond positively to any serious diplomatic overtures. The candidate for such diplomatic maneuvers was particularly the US and its representatives.

The post-Gulf war era put the US in a more key diplomatic role than it had ever had in the past.²¹⁶ In the aftermath of the Gulf War, the US had gained a window of opportunity to mobilize support for the peace process from most of the Arab countries, including Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia. This was something that had not happened since 1974.

²¹⁵ Ian J. Bickerton & Carla L. Klausner, **A Concise History of Arab-Israeli Conflict**, (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1995), 257. The dissolution of Yugoslavian Federation and escalation of violence in Bosnia, and troubles in the ex-Soviet Union between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and in other areas removed attention from the Palestinian issue.

²¹⁶ Quandt, **Peace Process**, 396.

That did not make sense so much to the Syrians. It was on the other hand a significant step for Shamir who had earlier indebted most of his fame to his attachment for the territory. Consequently, in mid-July Syria replied to the letter of the US President, spelling out his ideas for convening a peace conference. Syria's decision of acceptance improved prospects for a comprehensive settlement. That opened way to a comprehensive peace solution.²¹⁹

Thus, the second man who remained something of an enigma for the US, was Shamir. He had gained a particular credibility during the Gulf War with his non-interventionist policy. However, his resistance to US demands were very low at that time. US efforts during the war to defend Israel and the aid to offset war losses created a situation such that Shamir's power to say "no" to the US had diminished sharply. In addition to US pressure there were other reasons behind Shamir's agreement to go to Madrid. In his view, the negotiation was a tool that would signify recognition of Israel by the Arab states.²²⁰ Shamir, in the early fall of 1991, initiated a discussion on 10 billion dollars of loan guarantees. The Israeli ambassador in Washington declared that Israel was requesting this money to settle new immigrants. The settlement issue was a controversial one which we have already discussed. In the US, neither Bush nor Baker wanted to be remembered as a sponsor of settlements, since they regarded that cause as a main obstacle to peace.

Indeed, there was nothing to lose for the Israelis in any kind of negotiation with Palestinian inhabitants of the occupied territories. Shamir had already declared his willingness to enter into dialogue with moderates in the occupied territories. Shamir's main problem was on the Syria and Golan Heights debates. Shamir's attachment to the land was still very strong despite the compelling forces to reverse it. On 24 July 1991 he stated:

²¹⁹ Drysdale and Hinnebusch, 200.

²²⁰ Bickerton and Klausner, 258.

I don't believe in territorial compromise. Our country is very tiny. The territory is connected to our entire life-to our security, water, economy. I believe with my entire soul that we are forever connected to this entire homeland. Peace and security go together. Security, territory and homeland are one identity.²²¹

This showed that Shamir had no intention to go to negotiation with any prior commitment to withdrawal. But at last, on August 1991, he announced his conditional acceptance of the US initiative for convening an international peace conference in October.

As for the Palestinian side, the PLO emphasized that the solution must be based on the basic rights, aspirations and wishes of the Palestinians. They were ready to enter a dialogue with Israel. A specialist from the ranks of the PLO argued :

... the question forcing Israeli leaders and the people of Israel is: Do they want to liquidate their Palestinian enemy or to reach a solution, this can be attained only by speaking with our representatives, that is with the PLO, and, at its head, Mr. Yasser Arafat... He is the man who represents the leadership of the Palestinians, and sooner or later they will have to speak with him if they want to reach peace.²²²

The most difficult issue for both Palestinians and Baker was how to find an acceptable formula for Palestinian representation in the peace process. Shamir seemed decisive on his stance not to deal with any PLO representative. The rationale behind his decision was not appropriate to the internal dynamics of the Question of Palestine, since the only legitimate representative was the PLO, as was seen by its recognition of Israel in 1988.

²²¹ Quandt, *Peace Process*, 402.

²²² Faissal Hussein, "The Prospects of Dialogue: Accepting the PLO," in *Israel/Palestine: The Quest for Dialogue*, eds. Haim Gordon and Rivca Gordon, (New York: Orbis, 1991), 34-35.

The representation question was solved in a way to the disfavor of the PLO due to the weakness of Palestinians. Thus, before the conference, a formula was adopted for a joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation. In fact the exclusion of the PLO was not only a demand of Israel's, but also Washington wanted the PLO to decline at that time.²²³ In the view of the US administration the insiders were more moderate and realistic than the Palestinians in exile but they missed some points. A Palestinian "moderate insider" argued that:

At one point during our meeting, James Baker said to us 'you will obtain a little less than a state and more than an autonomy.' We replied: 'We don't want to exchange slogans, but to discuss the substance. This entity you refer to, will be able to apply the right of return for the Palestinians scattered and persecuted around the world? If so, we can talk, because you will have admitted the reality of the ties between the inside and the outside. If on the other hand, you grant us an entity and even if you call this entity a state but if the Palestinians from the outside are deprived of their right of return then we will refuse.'²²⁴

All in all, the US administration missed three points in the representation issue. Firstly, so-called moderates had little mass following. Secondly, some leaders, particularly Islamic and left-oriented, were more radical than the PLO leaders. And lastly, the PLO support was necessary to drive the moderates into the game.

On October 22, Faissal Hussein announced the representation team, including himself with an advisory group. The Israelis re-emphasized that they were not dealing with the PLO and not giving East Jerusalem the same status as the rest of the occupied territories.²²⁵

²²³ Quandt, *Peace Process*, 396.

²²⁴ Palestinian Politics after..., 107.

²²⁵ Quandt, *Peace Process*, 403.

Bush and Baker were the two Americans who carried most of the burden for the international peace conference. President Bush enjoyed unprecedented popularity at home and abroad. His Arab-Israeli peace-making attempts faced no question on the world scene. However, there had been one barrier since the beginning of the attempts in the new peace process. "Why should the United States, especially in the post-cold war era, take another run at the impossible complex dispute between Israel and its Arab neighbors?"²²⁶ The answer to this question must be looked at in the realities of the post-cold war environment. The Soviet Union was on the threshold of dissolution. There was a slight chance for the new leader of Russia, Boris Yeltsin, to play an effective co-chairman role in the peace talk. In the US, after the Gulf War, it became clear that American public opinion would not tolerate American troops staying in the Middle East a day longer than strictly necessary. Since Russia cannot, and America would not play any significant role, the countries in the Middle East moved to a frightening prospect.²²⁷ If the declining economic capability of the US is added to the formula, the necessity of regional order and peace in the Middle East surfaces.

In short, the aim of the US administration was to establish a peaceful regional environment which would require minimum US interference. In order to establish that aim, Baker made several trips to the Middle East region. On March 6, 1991 Bush declared their aim, in a joint session of the US Congress, saying:

We must do all that we can to close the gap between Israel and the Arab states and between Israelis and Palestinians... A comprehensive peace must be grounded in... the principle of territory for peace. This principle must be elaborated to provide for Israel's security and recognition, and at the same time for legitimate Palestinian political rights. Anything else

²²⁶ Quandt, *Peace Process*, 397-398.

²²⁷ Bernard Lewis, "Rethinking The Middle East," *Foreign Affairs*, 71 no.4(Fall 1992), 108-109.

would fail the twin tests of fairness and security. The time has come to put an end to Arab-Israel conflict.²²⁸

In the view of Baker and his top aides, there were three issues that any Middle East initiative must deal with. First, it was necessary to enhance the sense of security of the all the states in the region. Second, long term stability in the Middle East requires significant attempts to provide regional economic balance. Third, there must be a self-sustaining ongoing negotiating process. The US initiative tried its best to take into account the principles outlined above.²²⁹ At this point one may question the difference between the Camp David and Madrid conferences. If there was no difference, why did they last thirteen years? The differences lie in the evolution and transformation of negotiation environment which shaped by the results of Intifada, post-cold war order and Gulf Crisis.

Consequently, after the positive responses of the invited parties- Asad, Shamir, King Hussein, King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, and Mubarak- the peace conference convened on October 30 in Madrid.

4.1.2. The Madrid Conference

The co-sponsors of the Madrid Conference , Bush and Gorbachev had invited Israel, the Arab states, and the Palestinians to this peace conference, for the purpose of directing negotiations. Israel, Jordan, the Palestinians, Syria, and Lebanon decided to attend in response to that invitation. The participation was not restricted to only those mentioned above; the European Community, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, and Mauritania were also engaged in this process.

²²⁸ Quandt, *Peace Process*, 399.

²²⁹ Alfred Leroy Atherton, Jr., "The Shifting Sands of Middle East Peace," *Foreign Policy* no.86(Spring 1992), 122-123.

Before the plenary session, the sides came together and tried to understand the views of one another, thus they agreed on procedural matters which were necessary for any international meeting. The parties provided insight into their thinking about a negotiated settlement. They exchanged their visions about living in a mutually satisfying relationship with neighbors. The core issues were land, peace, and security. The parties understood that these issues were inseparable elements in the search for a comprehensive settlement. After that preparatory work, at the Middle East Peace Conference, the Royal Palace, Madrid, 1 November 1991, US Secretary of State Baker stated the following in his opening remarks:

...if you do not seize this historic opportunity, no one will blame anyone outside your region. You now shoulder the destiny and challenge of making peace as you enter direct negotiations with your neighbors. The continuation and success of this process is in your hands. The world still looks to each of you to make the choice for peace.²³⁰

This time Washington seemed to play the part of convener, not that of mediator. During the process, the parties were repeatedly brought together at the table, first in Washington in December 1991, again in January and in March, and once again in April 1992, and those were followed by one more meeting in Rome. In all the meetings despite the Arabs' insistence on more US involvement, Americans did not go beyond the convener role. On the wider Arab front, the reality was that the Arabs were the much less decisive party in the process due to their overall weakness and internal division.²³¹

²³⁰ Secretary Baker Middle East Peace Conference Opening remarks at the Middle East Peace Conference, the Royal Palace, Madrid, November 1, 1991, *Dispatch*, 3 no.4A, Supplement No. 2(February 1992), 10-14.

²³¹ George T. Abed, *The Palestinians in the Peace Process: The Risks and the Opportunities*, *Journal of Palestinian Studies*, 22 no.1(Autumn 1992), 7.

The negotiations contained several breakthrough elements. To begin with, the negotiations were included an extensive framework in which to solve questions between Israel and both the Arab States and Palestine. Secondly, the Palestinians gained the opportunity to sit around the negotiation table as an independent party, even if it came under the umbrella of Jordan's joint delegation.²³² Thirdly, the involvement of many of the Arab States was an important development for Israel since it paved the way for breaking of the Israeli taboo in the eyes of Arabs.²³³ The core issues discussed during the bilateral talks proved the significance of these new negotiations. The bilateral negotiations were meant to resolve the conflicts of the past. The first ever direct talks between Israel and Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Palestinians opened in Madrid on 3 November 1991, immediately following the opening of the Madrid Conference. These talks were, in fact, four separate sets of bilateral negotiation. The first three, the talks between Israel and the three Arab States, were aimed at achieving peace treaties. The negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians were based on more complex issues, like an autonomy scheme for the occupied territories (see Figure 1).

The first two stages, the opening session of the conference and the bilateral talks, were followed by a multilateral track. The third stage, although scheduled to be held in Moscow two weeks after the plenary conference, was delayed until January 28, 1992 due to dramatic events in the ex-Soviet Union. The multilateral track of the peace process was designed to complement the bilaterals by bringing a wider array of regional and extra-regional parties together to develop coordinated approaches to regional

²³² Alfred B. Prados, *Jordan: US Relations and Bilateral Issues*, CRS Report (Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, 1993), 7.

²³³ Herbert C. Kelman, "Acknowledging The Other's Nationhood: How to Create A Momentum for the Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 22 no. 1 (Autumn 1992), 19.

problems. "The multilateral track was meant to be an essential complement to the bilaterals-to tackle those regional problems that are themselves a source of tension and instability. These talks tend to attract less media attention, but they literally have the potential to change the face of the Middle East"²³⁴ (see Figure 1).

The multilateral track included five working groups dealing with key issues affecting the region as a whole: water, the environment, economic development, refugees, and arms control and security. The Palestinians, Israel, 11 Arab countries with the delegations from outside the region- Europeans, Canada, Japan, the UN all participated in the multilaterals.²³⁵ During the negotiations for Palestinians, it became apparent that there was the additional cost of living under occupation and of not being able to exercise their legitimate political rights. But for Israel, too, there were costs of occupation.

During the negotiations, the Palestinian participants were, in effect picked according to Israeli criteria, which restricted what they could act on, and the Israelis resisted demands for a settlements' freeze or for a declaration that they would be willing to trade more land for peace. It was apparent that real progress toward a historic compromise depended on the continued involvement of the United States and the European Community²³⁶ but there was no strong view of how to reach peace in the minds of either Americans or Europeans.

Despite the significance of negotiations, the parties failed to achieve any substantive result. The negotiations produced no progress during the five rounds of bilateral Palestinian-Israeli negotiations before the Rabin victory. On June 23, the Israelis went to the polls and delivered a defeat to

²³⁴ Edward P. Djerejian, *Dispatch*, 4 no. 43(10/25/93), 744-748.

²³⁵ Robert H. Pelletreau, *Dispatch*, 5 no. 16(4/18/94), 219-222.

²³⁶ Morning in Madrid, *Nation*, , 253 no.18(11/25/91), 655-657.

the Likud Party, which had ruled the country since 1977. Rabin's victory increased the hopes of peace-seekers. Rabin named Peres as foreign minister and made clear that he would oversee the peace process. He canceled 6000 housing units planned for the West Bank in order to show his sincerity on peace. The Labor party victory increased both the hopes and fears of Palestinians. A PLO official argued:

The Palestinians had had mixed emotions about Rabin from the start, from the time he was selected as Labor's candidate. Beyond the sweet taste of Shamir's ouster, we feared that Rabin's victory would allow the Americans to abandon their economic sanctions much sooner than needed to achieve real progress at the peace table.²³⁷

As it was seen from the view of an official, the Palestinians were not sure about Rabin. Rabin was conscious of the role of the PLO during the negotiations. The PLO was the leading motivator of the Palestinians, and he was preparing to enter into direct negotiation with the PLO in near future.

To return to negotiations, the multilateral talks also brought no progress. The Palestinians decided that they did not have much interest in tackling a forum designed to unite Israel with its Arab neighbors to discuss regional issues. The source of their frustrations was Israel's opposition in dealing with the refugee issue in a multilateral forum. Their aim was to conduct a bilateral talk with Israel about the refugee matter's final status. Consequently, the Palestinians stayed away from the Moscow session, and Israel boycotted the economic and refugee forums when Palestinians outside the occupied territories returned to attend.²³⁸ After Rabin's victory, both Israelis and Palestinians turned to productive negotiations, but they

²³⁷ "Reflections on the Peace Process: An Interview with Nabil Shaath," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 22 no.1(Autumn 1992), 71.

²³⁸ *Pursuing Peace...*, 33.

were still far from the outcome they were seeking. Arafat argued about the failure of progress in the negotiations:

Yet, despite a year of persistent efforts we have made with all those who are faithful to the peace process and with the co-sponsors, we find that this year has passed without the achievement of any tangible progress on the road leading to peace, especially on the Palestinian track where, according to the letter of invitation, it was supposed that the first stage of negotiations would end, and the interim period would start and would be the transition that would lead to a permanent solution.²³⁹

One main failure of the parties in the negotiations was lack of pragmatism. Probably one of the most important aspects of the negotiations for the Palestinians was the Israeli desire to conclude an agreement on an interim self arrangement.

The autonomy proposal of Israel came during the fourth round of bilateral talks in February-March 1992. Israeli proposal, Interim Self Government Agreement (ISGA), offered Palestinians very limited authority on national, legal, and security matters. In other words, Israel was willing to give up delegation of certain civilian functions rather than a genuine offer of autonomy.²⁴⁰


During the fifth round and afterwards Rabin offered serious proposals, but in substance it was the same. In all proposals, Israel emphasized limited authority for the Palestinians under the umbrella of Israeli occupation. As expected, the proposals were rejected by the Palestinians. Indeed, the

²³⁹ UN, DFP, *Special Bulletin on the Commemoration of the International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People 1992*, 6

²⁴⁰ Raja Shehadeh, "Negotiating Self-Government Arrangement," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 21, no.1(Autumn 1992), 71.

THE MADRID FRAMEWORK

Inaugurated at the
MADRID CONFERENCE
October 30 - November 1, 1991



Source: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Middle East Peace Process: An Overview, (Jerusalem: Information Division: 1994), 6.

Figure 1

PLO's support for an interim agreement first came to surface in January 1992. A detailed plan was submitted to the Israeli delegation during the talks on 3 March 1992 in Washington. The Palestinian proposal, the Palestine Interim Self Government Authority (PISGA) gave them power to exercise jurisdiction, to administrate justice, and to establish police forces. The Palestinian proposal was designed to be implemented in the West Bank and Gaza.²⁴¹ The leaders of the insiders were losing their base, due to worsening economic conditions.²⁴² The interim arrangements of the Palestinians would be described in Baker's words as "more than autonomy and less than a state."* The PISGA offered to supervise an election in order to take initiative in the occupied territories. A specialist emphasized the self-arrangement discussions from the Palestinian negotiation team as follows:

...the differences between the Palestinians and Israelis center on authority, sovereignty, over the land, and legislative powers, with no sovereignty over land and natural resources. They want the present laws to remain in force: the council they want us to have would have no legislative powers. They therefore oppose the formation of an interim government on the basis of general political elections. We, on the other hand, want to have a government that is directly elected by the people not by the occupation authorities. We insist on legislative powers because we don't want these powers to remain in the hands of the Israeli military authorities.²⁴³

²⁴¹ Emile A. Nakhleh, "Palestinians and Israelis: Options for Coexistence," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 22 no.2 (Winter 1993), 15 and Jerome M. Segal, "Strategic Choices facing the Palestinians in the negotiations," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 22 no.2 (Winter 1993), 17-29.

²⁴² Sara Roy, "The Political Economy of Despair: Changing Political and Economic Realities in the Gaza Strip," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 20 no.3 (Spring 1991), 35.

* see, supra, 85.

²⁴³ Reflections on the Peace Process: An Interview with Haydar Abd' Al Shafi, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, XXII no.1 (Autumn 1992), 60-61.

The Israeli delegation rejected the Palestinian proposal on the grounds that it was a subterfuge for an independent state. Both the PISGA and ISGA remained at the table for further negotiations. During the negotiations, the Palestinians only learned more about the art of negotiation and they observed firsthand how the Israelis conducted themselves during the negotiations. The following analogy explains the role of Palestinians and Israelis and the lack of progress during the negotiations.

Efforts are being made to resolve a long-standing feud between the owner of a house and another party who seized the house by force. Many members of the owner's family had either fled or were driven out in the fighting while the house was being seized, but some members remained and are still living in one room.

When after years of fighting, the two parties decide to sit together to negotiate, the usurper is able to impose his conditions. What he is willing to talk about is where the family members still residing in the remaining room can hang their clothes, whether they are permitted to have the sink fixed, whether they can hang photographs on the wall of the family when it was all together, before the house was wrested from them.

As to their access to water and electricity and their right to enter and live the house freely, and as to whether they can prevent the usurper from moving more members of his own family into their room, well, this, the usurper declares, is beyond the scope of the negotiations- to say nothing of the return of the rest of the family and the other parts of the house.²⁴⁴

From such a point of view, the Madrid attempt was something different from a historic opportunity to reach a negotiated peace. In December 1992, Rabin decided to expel 415 Hamas and Islamic Jihad agitators.²⁴⁵ The expulsion, which was provoked by some particularly bold and successful strikes by these militant organizations against the Israeli

²⁴⁴ Shehadeh, 30.

²⁴⁵ Ali Jarbawi and Roger Heacock, "The Deportations and The Palestinian-Israeli Negotiations," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 22 no.3(Spring 1993),36.

army and police, did not have the desired effect. Consequently, the peace process began in Madrid was suspended.

4.2. THE OSLO ACCORD AND AFTER

4.2.1. The Road To Accord

Twenty-two months of negotiations following the Madrid Conference were unquestionably historical since it gave Palestinians a chance to be directly involved with their own issues. That was the first time the Palestinians had put together documents, doctrines, and tactics associated with their interests through legal terms, but the negotiations came to no solution to the question. Unfortunately, it remained only an important educational experience.²⁴⁶ A number of points can be made about the negotiations. First, there was no geographic definition on the negotiation table. How much of the land subject to negotiation was not in certain terms.²⁴⁷ That was the same for the status of Jerusalem, too. Due to this vagueness, the negotiations did not create any prospect for a Palestinian State. Second, there was no agreement and pre-knowledge on the meaning and end of the transition period. Additionally, there was no provision on what would happen if the final-status negotiations did not lead to an agreement.²⁴⁸ The proposals of self government from all the parties fell short of meeting these problems. The lack of parity constituted a major problem. Third, the US did not carry its decisive stance on peace deals until the end of the negotiations. US commitments did not match the promises made in the letter of invitation. The last point may be made on one of the tactical

²⁴⁶ The Oslo Agreement: An Interview with Nabil Shaath, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 22 no.1(Autumn 1993), 9.

²⁴⁷ Camille Mansour, "The Palestinian-Israeli Peace Negotiations: An Overview and Assesment," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 22 no.3(Spring 1993), 29.

²⁴⁸ Eric Rouleau Talks about the Peace Process and Political Islam, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 22 no.4(Summer 1993), 47.

preferences of the Israeli administration during the negotiations. Israeli leaders tried to exploit the distance between the Arab elites and the Arab public. Israelis found certain advantages in dealing with Arab dictators who were not accountable to public opinion.²⁴⁹ Obviously this preference created danger relating to the sincerity of Israel in the eyes of the Arabs and affected the future stability of any new order in the region.

The suspension of negotiations caused an immediate disappointment in the world agenda, but Arafat, in the name of the Palestinians, came onto a peace road where there was no chance of turning back. He made this choice in the mid-1970s. From that time on he saw the light at the end of the tunnel and step-by-step, he approached it. "Movement along this path was slow, tortuously ambiguous, and marked by reversals with respect to both ends and means, but by the late 1980s, Arafat, despite strong opposition, felt able to espouse the objective of peace through partition and to renounce the use of terrorism"²⁵⁰ as has been already mentioned. The Madrid framework had fallen short in the eyes of Arafat since it had not formulated any concrete ideas on an independent Palestinian State. However, the suspension was only a temporary breakthrough for Arafat. The PLO, on the other hand, in Tunis became more moderate. The reasons for that were acute financial weakness, worries over Hamas and internal disputes.²⁵¹

At that time the US was decisive in bringing the parties together again. In early 1993, the new US Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, made a trip in order to resume the peace talks. He told the public after his shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East:

²⁴⁹ William B. Quandt, "The Urge for Democracy," *Foreign Affairs*, 73 no.4(July/August 1994), 2.

²⁵⁰ Mark A. Heller, "The Israeli-Palestinian Accord: An Israeli View," *Global Issues in Transition*, no.8(May 1994), 22

²⁵¹ Jim Lederman, "How to Help the Israelis and Palestinians Reach Peace," *Middle East Quarterly*, 1 no.1 (March 1994), 13

We were informed of this decision directly by the Arab leaders and by the Palestinians... The information to us included a letter this morning from Faisal Husseini, in his capacity as head of the Palestinian peace team... I've had important and productive discussions with them. They have spoken eloquently of the human rights problems in the occupied territories. They have reaffirmed the Palestinian commitment to the peace process and the importance of making early progress, particularly to address the conditions that the Palestinians face in the West Bank and Gaza. They have agreed that it's time to deal with causes, not the symptoms, of the conflict.²⁵²

Rabin, however, decided to repeal the law which prohibited unauthorized contacts with the PLO on 2 December 1992. Rabin's decision, in addition to other factors, became influential in the launching of the talks.²⁵³ After four and a half months, the ninth round of bilateral talks began in Washington. The most obvious development was the Israeli acceptance of Faissal Husseini, who lived in East Jerusalem, as head of the Palestinian negotiation team. Israeli attempts were to reinforce the idea of an interim period agreement while admitting a link between the interim and final phases. They were willing to give some legislative powers to the elected bodies who would govern the Palestinians for the five-year period. In response to the Israeli proposal, the Palestinians prepared another document and presented it to the public. There were three main differences between these two plans:

First, the Palestinian document treated Resolution 242 as a holy writ, valid at all stages and requiring total Israeli withdrawal from the territories captured in 1967, including East Jerusalem and the settlements. Israel on the other hand, saw 242 as relevant only to the negotiations on final status and ruled out any withdrawal during the interim phase. Second, while Israel admitted a link between the first stage of the agreement and the second stage but insisted on keeping all the options open, the

²⁵² Warren Christopher, "Middle East Peace Talks to Resume," *Dispatch*, 4 no.17(4/26/93), 283.

²⁵³ David Bar-Illan, "The Deportations," *Commentary*, no:94(1991), 42.

Palestinians tried to extract a declaration of intent making it clear that, when the time came, Israel would withdraw from all the occupied territories. Third, the two sides could not agree on the powers of the Palestinian authority during the interim stage. The Israeli version envisaged an executive council with limited legislative powers. The Palestinian version envisaged an elected council which would assume all the powers exercised by the Israeli administration.²⁵⁴

After the failure at reconciliation of these two plans, the newly-elected Clinton administration stepped up its involvement. It was based on the rule of insider Palestinians without any territorial base. There was no mention of the PLO and the Palestinians in exile. At that point the proposal was a foreign policy failure for the US. "American draft proposal of statement of principles to guide the Israeli-Palestinian negotiating track seemed a carbon copy of an Israeli version, raising questions about Washington's role as an honest broker."²⁵⁵ In contradiction with the 26-year-old US policy, the proposal accepted the Israeli proposal that East Jerusalem and the rest of the West Bank and Gaza Strip were disputed territories (not occupied).²⁵⁶ The tenth round followed the ninth and lasted from 15 June until 1 July, ending in failure. Rabin was criticized by the Israeli public for his failure to reach a solution. Only two alternatives remained at the hands of Rabin after failure of an official link with the Palestinians. The first was to deal with Asad of Syria which required total withdrawal from Golan Heights with the dismantling of Jewish settlements. The second was to deal directly with the PLO which required no immediate withdrawal, or any dismantling of settlements. Rabin preferred the second.

²⁵⁴ Avi Shlaim, "Prelude to the Accord: Likud, Labor, and the Palestinians," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 23 no.2(Winter 1994), 17.

²⁵⁵ Leon T.Hadar, "The Picture and The Spin," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 23 no.2 (Winter 1994), 90.

²⁵⁶ Hadar, 91.

4.2.2. The Secret Talks.

The secret talks began in late January 1993 with the active encouragement of Deputy Foreign Minister Yossi Beilin. At first, Rabin showed little interest but throughout the mid-1990s considerable steps were taken in the negotiations process which changed his mind. Indeed, Rabin was in favor of peace, but he was not sure on how to reach it. Israeli leaders internalized the point that in the 1990s Zionism had lost both its pseudo-religious nature and its political influence. The reduction of support of International Jewry and the increase in the proportion of Oriental Jews attenuated the philosophical base of Israel.²⁵⁷ Since the early 1990s Jewish academicians and politicians had been discussing Zionism and its future considering its cost-benefit analysis. Israeli leaders were aware of the matter and realized that there was no chance for any "ghetto system" in the world of the 1990s even if it was an Israeli ghetto. The need for integration into the world system was inevitable. The first step towards this end was to provide for Israeli integration into the Middle East region. The new tactical shift changed the three "no's" of Israeli foreign policy: "no" to direct talk with the PLO, "no" to a Palestinian State, "no" to bartering land for peace.²⁵⁸ In mid-1993 it became clear that the only Palestinian body which had the capability of running an interim agreement was the PLO. Additionally, the PLO was the only organization which was capable of controlling the situation in the occupied territories.

On the other hand, the progress in the secret talks was very attractive to Rabin since it was not due any Israeli concession beyond the formal negotiations, but was due to the weakness and bankruptcy within the PLO. The developments mentioned above finally forced Rabin to recognize the

²⁵⁷ Michel Rice, *False Inheritance: Israel in Palestine and the Search for a Solution* (New York: Kegan Paul Int., 1994), 162

²⁵⁸ Shlaim, 7

PLO and Arafat. It became more and more clear that there was no chance to reach a solution to the peace cause without the PLO.²⁵⁹ Obviously, the decision to hold direct talks with the PLO was a revolution, and, was the product of three Israelis: Yithzak Rabin, Shimon Peres and Yossi Beilin.

The secret negotiations were sustained by delegations in direct contact with Rabin and Peres in Jerusalem and with Arafat in Tunis. Scandinavian private diplomacy was on the scene for the second time. Norway hosted the parties during the secret negotiations. The Norwegian head of government and the foreign minister both played an effective and reconciliatory role in the secret talks.²⁶⁰ Initially, the talk began on economic cooperation but later it was extended to establish a framework for a comprehensive agreement. The key players of the negotiations, two Israeli academicians and the treasurer of the PLO Abu Ala, aloof from the public eye and political pressure, established a conceptual framework for the Israel-PLO accord.²⁶¹ The failure of the tenth round of the formal negotiations became the landmark of progress in the secret talks. All together, after fifteen sessions held over an 8-month period, the parties reached a decision on mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO, and provided a limited Palestinian government in the Gaza Strip and Jericho. The Palestinians agreed that there could be no fair settlements in the Question of Palestine.²⁶² Due to the fact that they tried to do their best without insisting on a total transformation, they consented to such an agreement.

²⁵⁹ Avi Shlaim, "The Oslo Accord," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 23 no.3(Spring 1994), 29.

²⁶⁰ Dan O'Neill and Dan Wagner, *Peace or Armageddon: The Unfolding Drama of The Middle East Peace Accord*(London: Harper and Collins, 1993), 25

²⁶¹ Shlaim, "The Oslo..." 3

²⁶² Interview with Eric Rouleau, 52.

4.2.3. The Ceremony and Meaning of the Oslo Agreement.

On 9 September 1993, the parties recognized each other in an exchange of letters and on 13 September 1993, a joint Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles (DOP) was signed by the two parties in a ceremony at the White House in Washington. The US president, after thanking the leaders of the two parties, said:

I pledge the active support of the United States of America to the difficult work that lies ahead. The United States is committed to ensuring that the people who are affected by this agreement will be made more secure by it and to leading the world in marshaling the sources necessary to implement the difficult details that will make real the principles to which you commit yourselves today. (See Annex 2)

The historical handshake between Arafat and Rabin was watched all over the world on TV channels. Israeli and Palestinian leadership established a geo-economic model to change the status quo in the Middle East for the sake of preventing their marginalization in the new global economy and for the sake of joining the winners of the 21st century.

They had reached the accord through Oslo without any help from the US State Department²⁶³. Christopher and his peace processors were skipped over. A specialist argued that the realization of the accord throughout Europe was also connected to the new preferences of Israel, concurrent with the newly emerging realities of international political economy, namely, a strategic shift from the Atlantic region to newly-rising regional blocs.²⁶⁴ Nonetheless, the DOP changed the rule of games entirely.

²⁶³ Shlaim, "The Oslo...", 33

²⁶⁴ Ahmet Davutoğlu, "Yahudi Meselesinin Tarihi Dönüşümü," *Avrasya Dosyası*, 1 no.3(Fall 1994), 91. For detailed information see Bülent Aras, "İsrail'in Yeni Stratejisinde Orta Asya ve Kafkasya'nın Yeri," *Avrasya Dosyası*, 2 no.4(Fall 1995-96), 184-189.

The PLO's recognition of Israel not only constituted an important landmark to Arab recognition of Israel but also opened new alternatives to Israel such as, among others, the opportunity to develop its relations with Asian countries including Japan and India.

Clinton's initial reaction to the secret talks had not been very encouraging because he had regarded it as a hopeless attempt, according to press reports.²⁶⁵ The signing ceremony on the South Lawn of the White House was the landmark of diminishing US influence over the Middle East. If we regard the words of President Clinton during the ceremony we might infer that US involvement would probably continue in the region and the US might help to reach a Syrian peace, but for the coming years "the American unipolar moment is coming to an end."²⁶⁶ That does not mean that the Middle East has lost its significance in the eyes of Americans, but they missed taking the initiative for the region into their hands. As a Jewish intellectual argued:

The 1993 picture resulted from Israeli and Palestinian realization that the US diplomatic position in the region had changed. As the Israelis and Palestinians move along to expand their ties and to create a nucleus for a new regional balance of power, the recognition that the American Century is coming to an end should continue to guide their policies. It was perhaps not surprising that the first official visits outside the Middle East that both Rabin and Arafat made after the ceremony in Washington were to Beijing, one of the focal points of the coming Pacific century."²⁶⁷

Another prominent intellectual from the US argued, in almost the same way:

²⁶⁵ O'Neill and Wagner, 20.

²⁶⁶ Hadar, "The Picture...", 231.

²⁶⁷ Hadar, "The Picture...", 232.

...the Oslo agreement demonstrated that the United States is no longer the only party that can play the role of intermediary. Norwegians showed quite conclusively that other countries, with the necessary skills and discretion, can step in as mediators and help opposing parties to reach at least partial agreements. Now, some could arrive at the conclusion that in this post-cold war era, the United States is no longer needed to move the peace process forward.²⁶⁸

4.2.4. The Letters of Mutual Recognition

The central phrase of Arafat's letter to Rabin reads as follows: "The PLO recognizes the right of the state of Israel to exist in peace and security." It is possible to emphasize four consequences of this recognition. Firstly, it gave an unprecedented legitimacy to the state of Israel, which would not otherwise have been possible without Palestinian recognition. Secondly, the letter failed to define the entity which was being recognized. It was not clear whether they meant the Israel of the 1947 partition plan or the Israel drawn by the 1948-9 armistice agreement. Thirdly, Israeli laws enjoyed legitimacy with the PLO's unconditional recognition. Implicit recognition of Israeli sovereignty entailed recognition of any legislation passed by the Israeli administration. Fourth, the phrase "exist in peace and security" gave Israel a remedy to any situation perceived as a threat.²⁶⁹ Additionally, the meanings of "peace and security" are not clear. Israel might extend the meaning to "economic security", "technological security" and so forth.

Another important phrase in Arafat's letter reads as follows: "...the PLO...will assume responsibility over all PLO elements and personnel in

²⁶⁸ UN, *Prerequisites for Peace in the Middle East: An Israeli-Palestinian Dialogue*, (Elsinore, Denmark, 15-17 June 1994), 25.

*See Annex 2 for all references from letters.

²⁶⁹ Burhan Djani, "The September 1993 Israel-PLO Documents: A Textual Analysis," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 23 no.3(Spring 1994), 6.

order to assure their compliance, prevent violations and discipline violators." Moreover, Arafat emphasized the same subject in his letter to Holst, the Foreign Minister of Norway, which reads as follows: "...the PLO encourages and calls upon the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip to take part in the steps leading to the normalization of life, rejecting violence and terrorism, contributing to peace and stability and participating actively in shaping reconstruction, economic development and cooperation." If we combine these two it is possible to draw two conclusions: Firstly, the PLO undertook the responsibility to discipline violators. This responsibility includes making provisions against any transgression of peace. Secondly, the claim on "normalization of life" means renunciation of the Palestinian struggle in the occupied territories. In fact, the PLO was demanding an end to Intifada.

The other party of the accord relied on a clearly written text. The central phrase in Rabin's letter read as follows: "...the government of Israel has decided to recognize the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and commence negotiations with the PLO within the Middle East peace process."

Thus, at first, Israel recognized no Palestinian right but only an organization representing a people at the negotiation table. Rabin's statement, "commence negotiatons" strengthened Israeli recognition by clearly defining its role in the future. Together with exchanging the above letters, in conclusion:

The PLO, in recognizing the 'state of Israel' recognized a 'territorial' state and a 'sovereign' state, one with executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government but *no fixed borders*. Israel in return recognized 'the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people' and

decided to 'commence negotiations' with it in the context of 'the middle East peace process'.²⁷⁰

4.2.5. The Analysis of the Declaration of Principles

The Declaration of Principles (DOP) contains a set of mutually accepted general principles during five-year interim period. In comparison with the Camp David and Madrid frameworks Palestinians escaped from being under the Jordanian umbrella. There was no representative authority like the PLO at both of these early agreements. The most distinguishing aspect of the DOP, according to a high rank official of the PLO, was its relative superiority in terms of parity.²⁷¹ However, the accord left room for wide interpretation. In order to provide for a deeper understanding, the principal points agreed in the DOP will be classified and emphasized.*

4.2.5.1. The Transfer of Powers

Under the provisions of the DOP, two items related to the "transfer of powers and responsibilities" were theoretically agreed upon. Firstly, the authority will be transferred to the Palestinians on the five spheres according to Article VI.2. These spheres are education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation and tourism. Secondly, the same paragraph of the Article provides that "the Palestinian side will commence in building the Palestinian police force as agreed upon."

4.2.5.2. The Jurisdiction

According to Article IV of the DOP, the jurisdiction of the Palestinian interim self-governing authority will cover the West Bank and Gaza territory, except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status talks. The

²⁷⁰ Dajani, 251.

²⁷¹ Interview with Nabil Shaath, 7.

* See Appendix 1 for all references to the DOP

West Bank and Gaza Strip will be regarded as a single unit. However, Jerusalem was put in a "remaining issue" status under provisions of Article V.3. The DOP also altered the Israeli judicial superiority over the occupied territory.

4.2.5.3. The Elections

Election is another issue to be negotiated during the interim phase. According to Annex I.2, the election agreement, among other things, "should cover the system of elections; the mode of the agreed supervision and international observation and their personal composition; and rules and regulations regarding election campaign, including agreed arrangements for the organizing of mass media, and the possibility of licensing a broadcasting and TV station." Not suprisingly, this last provision implies the intention of controlling the media. Moreover, Annex I.1 of the DOP states that "Palestinians of Jerusalem who live there will have the right to participate in the election process."

4.2.5.4. The Withdrawal of Israeli Forces

The two sides stated in Annex II.1 to sign an agreement within two months on the withdrawal of Israeli military forces from Gaza Strip and the Jericho area. The DOP pays special attention to this matter of withdrawal. It tries to achieve an "accelerated" and "scheduled" withdrawal of Israeli military power within four months.(Annex II.2). But these terms only reflects exaggeration since the withdrawal "involving a few kilometers, could be completed in hours, at most a day."²⁷² Beside these facts, the DOP provides no clear-cut interpretation for those "Palestinian representatives" to whom authority will be transferred upon Israel's withdrawal. According to paragraph 3.b of Annex II the structure, powers and responsibilities of the Palestinian

²⁷² Dajani 15.

authority will be negotiated but these powers are personal rather than territorial. It excludes external security, Israelis and foreign policy. As a significant matter, the Palestinian force constitutes core of the Annex II. Annex II 3.b calls on a body to assume "internal security and public order" after Israeli withdrawal. The same issue was spelled out implicitly in Arafat's letter of recognition to Rabin as was already discussed.

4.2.5.5. Economic Matters

A major economic agreement, among others, is an important matter that must be negotiated during the interim phase. Annex III states that "the two sides agree to establish an Israeli-Palestinian Continuing Committee for Economic Cooperation." It also distinguishes the areas of cooperation to include water, electricity, energy, industry and so forth. The Article VI.2 implicitly emphasizes (as would be expected) on involvement with economic resources, such as water, minerals and land, to promote economic development. Article VII.4 provides more information on promoting the economy as follows:

In order to enable the Council to promote economic growth, upon its inauguration, the Council will establish, among other things, a Palestinian Electricity Authority, a Gaza Sea Port Authority, a Palestinian Development Bank, a Palestinian Export Promotion Board, a Palestinian Environmental Authority, a Palestinian Land Authority and a Palestinian Water Administration Authority, and any other Authorities agreed upon, in accordance with the Interim Agreement that will specify their powers and responsibilities.

Taxation is one of the outstanding issues relating to the future of a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority. It is one of the five spheres called for in Article VI.2. It mentions transfer of the "direct taxation" to the Palestinians. The transformation of this authority does not mean that Israeli administration can not levy taxes. According to Article VI(2).3 of the Agreed

Minutes to the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements:

Each of the spheres described above will continue to enjoy existing budgetary allocations in accordance with arrangements to be mutually agreed upon. These arrangements also will provide for the necessary adjustments required in order to take into account the taxes collected by the direct taxation office.

A specialist on Palestinian Economy argues that Oslo allowed the Palestinians only limited economic decision-making power, and only in five specified sectors. "Powers relating to other areas, especially land and water, are either not provided for or are severely circumscribed by Israel."²⁷³

4.2.5.6. The Joint Committees

The DOP provides for establishment of four joint committees: the first is the *Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee*. The task of this committee is to deal with coordination requirements and to provide for smooth implementation of the DOP (Article X). The second is the *Israeli-Palestinian Continuing Committee for Economic Cooperation*. It has far-reaching jurisdiction over the field of communication, media, electricity-development programs, transport, trade promotion plans, cooperation in industry, social welfare issues and so on. Its wide-range tasks are designated by the provisions of Annex III. The third committee is a *Continuing Committee of Liaison and Cooperation with Jordan and Egypt*. Its task is "establishing further liaison and cooperation arrangements between the government of Israel and the Palestinian representatives, on the one hand, and the governments of Jordan and Egypt, on the other, to promote cooperation between them." The subject of this committee is, mostly, refugees. The fourth committee is *A Joint Palestinian-Israeli Coordination and Cooperation*

²⁷³ Yusuf Sayigh, "Control is the Key," *Worldlink*(November/December 1994), 4.

Committee for Mutual Security Purposes. The task of the committee is to provide for coordination between security institutions.

4.2.6. The Pros and Cons of The Agreement for The Palestinians

Analyzing the positive aspects, it is possible to emphasize four points:

First, the agreement includes the first official Israel recognition of the Palestinian people and their political and legitimate rights, even though there is no explicit mention of 'Palestinian national rights...The agreement gives the Palestinians an opportunity to actualize the concept of a 'Palestinian entity' which has the potential to evolve an independent state.

Second, the agreement stipulates the withdrawal during the interim period of the Israeli army from Gaza and Jericho after a twenty-six-year military occupation that was feared to be permanent.

Third, the agreement indicates that UN security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 will be the basis for the permanent settlement, and that the negotiation on the final status will lead to the implementation of these two Resolutions"

Finally, the agreement stipulates the holding of elections for the Palestinian Council.²⁷⁴

Turning to the negative aspects of the accord, it is also possible to emphasize four major issues, plus a few other problems.

First, the agreement is not a peace treaty but a declaration of principles, and is therefore liable to multiple interpretations.

Second, the agreement does not address Israel's status as an occupying power and indeed implies recognition of the existence of two separate entities in the occupied Palestinian territories, which would seem to lend legitimacy to Israel's having altered the status of the territories it occupied in 1967.

Third, the agreement defers to the final-status talks such major issues as Jerusalem, the settlements and refugees.²⁷⁵

²⁷⁴ Ziad Abu-Amr, "The View from Palestine: In the Wake of The Agreement, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 23 no.2(Winter 1994), 76-77

²⁷⁵ Abu-Amr, 77-78.

Fourth, the agreement left the status of Jerusalem unaddressed while it treats the West Bank and Gaza Strip as a single unit. Moreover, the agreement left out some other problems. For example, it does not give the Palestinians full sovereignty and, it does not define a specific time-frame for the conclusion of the final-status negotiations.

4.2.7. The Implementation of DOP

As is shown in Figure 2 the first phase of the implementation of the DOP was the "Gaza-Jericho" agreement. The details of the Gaza-Jericho aspect of the negotiation was agreed in Cairo on 4 May 1994. The second phase is the "Early Empowerment" in the rest of the territories. Through "Early Empowerment" five specific spheres: education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation and tourism, were to be transferred to Palestinian representatives. On 29 August 1994, at the Erez checkpoint in the Gaza Strip Early Empowerment agreement was signed by the government of Israel and the PLO. The third phase is the "Interim Period and Election" which have already been looked at. And the last phase is the "Permanent Status" talks. This last phase will commence as early as possible, but not later than the beginning of the interim period (May 1996). The final negotiations will cover Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations to and cooperation with neighboring states and other remaining issues. According to the DOP this last phase will take effect in May 1999. The DOP states that "the parties will establish an arbitration through negotiation" if the sides can not reach agreement but there is no mention on the possibility of failure.

4.2.8. The Gaza-Jericho Agreement

Shortly after the signing of the Declaration of Principles, the parties started negotiations in Cairo and Paris, and the negotiations were completed after seven months of hard dealing. The Gaza-Jericho Agreement was signed in Cairo on 4 May 1994. It consists of the agreement itself and four

annexes of almost 300 pages. It addresses four main issues: security arrangements, civil affairs, legal matters, and economic relations.²⁷⁶

4.2.8.1. Security Arrangements and the Withdrawal of Israeli

Forces


Under the Gaza-Jericho agreement, the external security issue is resolved by an Israeli security envelope. Internal security matters are divided between Israelis and Palestinians. The security annex of the agreement contains a number of points. The first is the withdrawal of Israeli forces. As a part of the accord, Israeli military forces have been withdrawn in coordination with the newly established Joint Israeli-Palestinian Security Coordination and Cooperation Committee. The second point is the security of Israelis. The agreement includes security responsibility of Israel for Israelis living in Palestinian territory and settlements. Israel remains responsible for Israelis and settlements. The third is over security on roads. Under the provisions of accord, joint patrols and mobile units will be established for the security of movement on the roads. The fourth is safe passage. Israel will assure safe passage for the Palestinians between the Gaza and Jericho area. The fifth is Palestinian security. According to the accord, Palestinians will be responsible for their internal security and terrorist attacks against Israelis under their control with 9000 policemen, 7000 of whom may come from abroad. The sixth is the Palestinian Prisoners' Release. Some 5000 prisoners would be released but not those associated with anti-peace movements such as Hamas and the Islamic Jihad.

²⁷⁶ For the full text of agreement see UN, DFPR, *Developments Related to the Middle East Peace Process: April-September 1994*, (New York: October 1994), 38-66.

DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES, 13 SEPTEMBER 1993

Stage 1: Interim Self-Government Arrangements

Stage 2: Permanent Status



Source: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Middle East Peace Process: An Overview, (Jerusalem: Information Division: 1994), 6.

Figure 2

4.2.8.2. *The Transfer of Civil Affairs*

The Gaza-Jericho agreement dissolves the Israeli civil administration in Gaza and the Jericho and transfers the responsibilities to the Palestinian Authority.

| The civilian spheres transformed to Palestinians | | |
|--|----------------------------|---------------------|
| - education | - nature reserves | - social welfare |
| - public works | - housing | - postal services |
| - tourism | - parks | - religious affairs |
| - telecommunication | - archaeology | - employee pensions |
| - commerce and industry | - water and sewage | - health |
| - planning and zoning | - transportation | - direct taxation |
| - agriculture | - environmental protection | - employment |
| - population registry and documentation | - electricity | - treasury |
| | - insurance | |

Table 1. The civilian spheres transformed to Palestinians in accordance with the Gaza-Jericho Agreement of 1994.

The Article II.B.6 of Annex II provides that "the Palestinian Authority assures that it shall keep employing the present Palestinian Civil Administration employees in the Gaza Strip and Jericho and shall maintain their rights." In terms of interpretation of a specialist, this unconditional assurance means that "the Palestinian Authority is bound to keep the Israeli appointed civil servants, irrespective of how they perform their tasks"²⁷⁷

4.2.8.3. *The Legal Matters*

The jurisdiction of the Palestinian legal authority extends to all matters falling into its territorial and personal jurisdiction but not to Israeli citizens and settlements. One may note that Palestinian lack of interest and expertise

²⁷⁷ Raja Shehadeh, "Questions of Jurisdiction: A Legal Analysis of the Gaza-Jericho Agreement," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 23 no.4(Summer 1994), 22.

in legal aspects is an important problem for the future of an agreement over legal matters.

4.2.8.4. The Economic Relations

The economic aspects of the accord were agreed on in Paris in May 1994 and included as a separate item. The annex contains the issues related to import policy, local markets and tourism, monetary policy, taxation and labor. According to a prominent specialist, Yusuf Sayigh, the negotiations in Paris and Cairo have imposed further constraint in economic decision-making on the Palestinians when translating the generalities of Oslo into concrete details.²⁷⁸

4.3. THE RESPONSES AND THE RECENT SITUATION IN THE PEACE PROCESS

4.3.1. The Responses

There are a number of responses regarding the positions which parties took after the accord. Moreover, some responses center directly on the DOP itself. To begin with, Edward Said of Columbia University states:

The deal before us smacks of the PLO leadership's exhaustion and isolation and of Israel's shrewdness. Many Palestinians are asking themselves why, after years of concessions, we should be conceding once again to Israel and the United States in return for promises and vague improvements in the occupation that won't all occur until the 'final status' talks some three to five years hence, and perhaps not even then.²⁷⁹

Sari Nusseibeh of Cambridge, as a leading intellectual from Jerusalem reflects his view in the following way:

²⁷⁸ Sayigh, 4.

²⁷⁹ O'Neill and Wagner, 51.

We hope this is a turning point. It opens up a lot of potential for this area and for the two people. But it is a very fragile agreement, fraught with explosives, and one has to nurture it very tenderly to make sure that it grows- on both sides.²⁸⁰

One may object to these responses, arguing that nobody can predict what will happen. But we know that Palestinian intellectuals are a disgruntled and despairing lot. Some describe the accord as no more than an agreement to agree. Another prominent Palestinian intellectual Rashid Khalidi argues:

While the mere fact that any agreement has been reached is unquestionably significant, given the history of profound enmity between Israelis and Palestinians, this agreement has little or no substantive value in and of itself. Since the accord was largely a matter of mood and atmospherics, there is always the danger of disruption of the process it initiated if the public mood changes on either or both sides- a constant danger in a conflict as volatile as this one.²⁸¹

Some criticize Arafat's autocratic, idiosyncratic and secretive style of management and others criticize the substance of the accord. It became widely known that PLO leaders cared a great deal about recognition and security and not too much about the economics and other aspects of the accord. Arafat defends the agreement in an interview with the Egyptian *Al Ahram* as follows:

First of all it is not Gaza-Jericho, Gaza-Jericho is just one of the points. It is something we were able to grab from the Israeli side. When we went to Madrid we went on the basis of self rule for a transition period, but

²⁸⁰ *New York Times*, September 14, 1993.

²⁸¹ Rashid Khalidi, A Palestinian View of the Accord with Israel, *Global Issues in Transition*, no.8(May 1994), 17.

we managed to make a final deal on Gaza and Jericho which is a part of the whole deal, and this is the real gain.²⁸²

However, there were other responses occurred in Gaza. Some saw their leadership reaching an accord they believed to be leading nowhere. There was not very much hope. The expectations were limited to: "Withdrawal of the army from urban areas, release of political prisoners, lifting the nightly curfew, ending the closure, and the return of laborers to their jobs in Israel."²⁸³ In addition the absence of any change disappointed the Palestinian people and they began to scrutinize the accord. With the substantial loss of confidence in the PLO, HAMAS and the PFLP (Popular Front for Liberation of Palestine) in Gaza gained popularity. According to the chief of the HAMAS:

Palestine concerns the entire Arab nation. Arab rulers(including Palestinians) do not have the authority to surrender even a part of Palestine. We oppose peace, reject the Jews, and denounce whoever allies himself with America.²⁸⁴

George Habbash, General Secretary of PFLP, condemned the accord and called for a united national-Islamic front for defeating the deal between Arafat and Rabin.²⁸⁵ He regarded the accord as "a trick to rob Palestinians of their legitimate rights."²⁸⁶ The reasons for this resentment among Gazans are various. If ideological reasons are put aside, it is possible to discern two

²⁸² Andrew Gowers and Tony Walker, *Arafat: The Biography*(London: Virgin Books, 1994), 526.

²⁸³ Sara Roy, "The Seed of Chaos, and of Night: The Gaza Strip after The Agreement," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 23 no.3(Spring 1993), 86.

²⁸⁴ *Ad-Diyar*, September 24 1993

²⁸⁵ Hilal Khasan, "Are the Arabs Ready for Peace with Israel?" *Middle East Quarterly* 1, no.1(March 1994), 26

²⁸⁶ O'Neill and Wagner, 50

other reasons. The first is the absence of local involvement in matters which directly concern the people. The other reason is Arafat's failure to show that he and the PLO are ready to rule.

Other Arab states, as an important component of the question, gave mostly a cool reception to the accord while others opposes. The Libyan leader Qadhafi strongly opposes the accord. With his own words:

...this agreement is with the Fatah movement, which is one of the Palestinian resistance movements no more... This agreement will not solve their problems with the rest of the Palestinian tribes in other areas such as the tribes of the Ahmed Jibril, George Habbash, Nayif Hawatimah, Samir Ghawshah, HAMAS, Abu Musa, Khalid el-Imlah etc...²⁸⁷

King Hussein of Jordan showed respect and support for the PLO concerning the accord. He expressed his thoughts during a speech to the Jordanian Parliament:

The PLO, in full freedom and by its own and free choice, has adopted an independent position, thus bearing its historic responsibility. It concluded a Declaration of Principles with Israel 13 September 1993; and Israel recognized the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people...Old enemies shook hands...since the Rabat summit of 1974, we support the PLO...We shall do everything in our power to extend this support.²⁸⁸

Focusing on the Israeli side, one can see the Likud position is not very different from its earlier times. The new Likud leader, Benjamin Netanyahu, reflects his views:

²⁸⁷ Qadhafi Speaks, *Middle East Quarterly*, 2 no.1(March 1995), 87. This is amusing because, of all the Arab peoples, the Palestinians these days are among those least tightly organized according to tribal affiliation. Perhaps Qadhafi is projecting from what he knows of Libyan society, which is rigidly tribal compared to Palestinian society.

²⁸⁸ Hussein bin Talal, "Address to Jordanian Parliament, Amman, 23 November 1993," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 23 no.3(Spring 1994), 152.

The Plan effectively establishes PLO control over all the territory up to the pre-1967 border- ten miles from Tel Aviv and two miles from down town Jerusalem...What will happen when terrorists attack Israelis in Jerusalem and return to nearby PLO land? Or fire rockets from hills above Tel Aviv? The Israeli army will have no right to enter the territory and root them out. This, believe it or not, is the "internal" responsibility of Yasser Arafat.²⁸⁹

According to a Jewish hardliner, David Bar-Illan, the accord divided Palestinians into two categories- Arafat and his secular forces and evil religious fanatics. And argued the second constitutes a danger for the future of Israel. He emphasized the danger on Arafat's failure to keep commitments he made in Oslo and its aftermath. Those are: "to discipline PLO members who engage in terrorism; to pursue, apprehend, and extradite terrorists to Israel; to refrain from hiring fugitive terrorists as policemen; and to condemn terrorist attacks explicitly."²⁹⁰ Some, still, refuse to accept the PLO as a negotiating partner. Thus, they regard the accord as a violation of Israeli laws by Rabin.²⁹¹ The following future visions reflects the views of the opposers of peace.

[The first] A Lebanon-like civil war for control of the new Palestinian state between the PLO and Hamas; intervention by Syria, which still regards the whole area as its territory; Israel being drawn in to hold Syria back; Iran and Iraq then...joining with the Syrians and the Palestinians and the Palestinians in a *Jihad* against a shrunken Jewish state... [The second] There is also the possibility that the new Palestinian state will become (as has already been happening in Gaza since Arafat took over there) a launching pad for more and bigger terrorist raids against Israel. Retaliation by Israel could then draw the other Arab states into the

²⁸⁹ New York Times, September 12, 1993.

²⁹⁰ David Bar-Illan, "If This Be Peace," *Commentary*, 99, no.2(February 1995), 30-31.

²⁹¹ Norman Podhoretz, "The Peace Process So Far," *Commentary*, 98 no.6(December 1994), 22.

same temporary alliance in the hope of accomplishing the same objective. [The third scenario] is the chance of a fundamentalist takeover in Egypt and Jordan when their present rulers die or are assassinated.²⁹²

The Israeli Prime Minister Rabin defended the DOP in a speech with following comments:

What did we insist on? ... We insisted that Jerusalem would not be included in the framework of the interim arrangement...Jerusalem remains under Israel's sovereignty and is Israel's unified capital. The settlements remain. There is no uprooting of settlements. We will not repeat this, neither in Judea and Samaria, nor in Gaza...Security in everything that relates not only to settlements but also to Israelis wherever they may be in the area is in Israel's hands. Security on the confrontation lines, on Israel's borders, on any crossing line, is in our hands: along the Jordan river, in the Jordan valley...We are prepared to be party to establishing a reality whereby the internal Palestinian security, and let me reemphasize - the security of Israelis both, is in our hands, with the extensive interpretation we will imbue it with. There is no commitment to the nature of the permanent solution.

...Every agreement that concerns an arrangement with the Palestinians on the establishment of the transitional period -the interim arrangement, autonomy - is then subject to change if it is violated significantly. The IDF exists. It is part of the agreement, which could not be the case in an agreement with an Arab country, when a withdrawal is on the line.

...I am telling you, at this stage and in the future, a partial withdrawal in Gaza is better than the evacuation of the Golan Heights.

...It is not like the peace treaty with Egypt, which was linked to the autonomy agreement. This agreement is not linked to Syria, Lebanon, or Jordan and allows us maneuvering room with them.²⁹³

²⁹² Podhoretz, 25.

²⁹³ Dajani, 21.

4.3.2. The Security Matter

It is clear that no agreement is possible between Israel and the Palestinians without establishing a reliable security order. If autonomy does not improve security for Israel, there may be no autonomy for Palestinians. In the Israeli public, peace means, mostly, security. Due to this fact, Israel implicitly demands that the international community must recognize Israel's right to intervene the process established by the DOP if the Israeli security is in danger.

Moreover, Israel regards her high-tech crusader image in the Arab public as a potential danger for her future in the Middle East region. One other threat is Palestinian terrorism. Terrorism is not a genuine threat to Israeli existence but constitutes a security challenge. It injures Israeli manpower and economics, and constitutes a psychological barrier. A survey conducted in January 1993 found that 85 percent of Israelis feared attack by an Arab in their daily lives.²⁹⁴ According to another survey conducted, 53 percent opposed the agreement that is due to be signed regarding the withdrawal of the IDF from the cities of West Bank, and 56 percent think that their personal security will be harmed in the wake of the IDF's withdrawal from cities of West Bank. (See Table 2) And as proof, since the handshake on the White House lawn more than one hundred Israelis have died.

| Opinion Poll over Peace Process in July 1995 | | | |
|---|-----|----|-----------|
| | Yes | No | No Change |
| 1. Do you support the agreement that provides withdrawal of the IDF from the cities of West Bank | 33 | 53 | |
| 2. Will the withdrawal of IDF from the cities of the WB reduce your feelings of personal security | 56 | 21 | 3 |
| 3. Do you support the peace process with the Palestinians from the Oslo Agreement until today | 52 | 39 | |

TABLE 2. Opinion Poll over Peace Process. Source: *Ma'ariv*, 7-7-1995, 1. The results of the opinion poll held about peace process in Israel in July 1995.

²⁹⁴ Joseph Alpher, "Israel's Security Concerns in the Peace Process," *International Affairs* 70 no.2(April 1994), 232.

It is no secret that all these security challenges have paved the way for a new security environment for Israel. Indeed, the beginning occurred with the Gulf crisis as previously mentioned. "Following the Iraqi missile attacks on Israel it became clear that Israel's security could no longer be ensured through the hitherto resolutely pursued concept of strategic depth."²⁹⁵ Secondly, Israeli administration is aware that Israel is not a central component of US military interests in today's Middle East of post-Gulf Crisis. One may object to the idea that Israeli security lost ground in the age of missiles²⁹⁶ and that the peace process has weakened the chances for war in near future, but withdrawal from the West Bank diminishes Israel's ability to defend her heartland- Haifa, Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. And this "strategic vulnerability invites aggression. A redeployment in West Bank would also curtail Israel's ability to deal with terrorist activities."²⁹⁷ Namely, the highest priority has been and continues to be assuring security. Secondly, the traditional approach to Israeli security has lost its validity. And finally, the peace process has weakened Israel's defense posture. All the facts, as seen above, suggest that the changing strategic environment and Israel's ongoing commitments to the peace process will increase her independence with nuclear weapons²⁹⁸ until the entire region is locked in a stable peace. In terms of internal security, Israel may attach the matter to the PLO which is the only organized body that could provide a police force since it has thousands of trained military cadres. In addition, Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) may continue to act in the Palestinian land and if she wants to provide

²⁹⁵ Martin Hoch, "Peace in the Near east After the Gaza-Jericho Accord," *Aussenpolitik*, no.3(1994), 280

²⁹⁶ Harvey Sicherman, *Palestinian Autonomy, Self Government and Peace*(Oxford: Westview Press, 1993), 113.

²⁹⁷ Efraim Inbar, "Israel's Continuing National Security Challenges," *Strategic Review*, 23 no.1(Winter 1995), 52.

²⁹⁸ Louis Rene Beres, "The Peace Process and Israel's Nuclear Strategy," *Strategic Review* 23 no.1(Winter 1995), 43.

security, she must pay attention to the lessons learned during the Intifada and Palestinian resistance years.

4.3.3 The Recent Developments

On 1 July 1994, Arafat arrived in Gaza Strip from PLO headquarters in Tunis to set up the new Palestinian Authority. Arafat's efforts were concentrated on a just and comprehensive peace based on a foundation of equality, free of ambitions for superiority and domination, forward-looking and open to cooperation in all fields, in order to achieve genuine development for both the Palestinian and Israeli peoples.²⁹⁹ In the words of Arafat: "The Palestinian people had begun to set up its own national authority, which was making large-scale efforts despite all political and economic difficulties to build a national economy, reconstruct vital amenities, establish national institutions and achieve overall economic and social developments."³⁰⁰ Palestinians established both a police force, of up to 9,000 officers, and a 24-member authority with legislative and executive powers.³⁰¹

Other developments occurred in Jerusalem. The PLO quickly installed two ministries of the Palestinian Authority (PA) inside Jerusalem itself. At one of them, Faissal Hussein converted his family's property, known as the Orient House into an administrative center at which major foreign dignitaries were received.³⁰² The PA also opened at least five other institutions in Jerusalem.

²⁹⁹ From a personal interview with Fouad Yassin, Palestinian Ambassador in Turkey, on 21 November 1995.

³⁰⁰ UN, DFPR, **United Nations Seminar and NGO Symposium on the Question of Palestine for Latin America and the Caribbean**, (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 20-23 March 1995), 7.

³⁰¹ UN, **The United Nations and the Question of Palestine** (New York: 1995), 23.

³⁰² Dore Gold, "Where is the Peace Process Going?" **Commentary**, 100 no. 2(August 1995), 41.

In 1995, a year after Yasser Arafat moved in, the face of a new Gaza is beginning to emerge. The Palestinian Authority has been building up its tax collection. Additionally, The Health Ministry has extended Palestinian health insurances to almost double the number of Gazans. The Authority also has drafted a new investment law.³⁰³ But Israeli security matters which were instituted by Israel in order to protect her citizens, have adversely affected the Palestinian economy. According to an Israeli official, Israel remains interested in and committed to encouraging economic stability and growth in the Palestinian Authority. To that end, several steps were recently taken in a number of areas such as public transportation, joint industrial parks, water distribution channels, etc.³⁰⁴

The peace process seems to be ongoing with important developments. On 19 September 1995, Israel and the PLO reached agreements on autonomy elections and water-sharing on the West Bank. At this stage, the priorities set by the DOP has changed.³⁰⁵ The parties, for example, began to discuss Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank without completing the transfer of power and other responsibilities in specific areas defined in the accord.

Another important development, on 24 September 1995 Israel and the PLO initiated an accord to expand Palestinian self-rule into the West, occupied by the Jewish state since the 1967 Middle East war. As a part of the Israeli-PLO accord initiated in Taba, Egypt, Israeli troops began to withdraw from seven West Bank cities and 450 villages.³⁰⁶ Israel has insisted on and won a phased troop redeployment so that it can test Arafat's

³⁰³ Isabel Kershner, "Signs of Life in Gaza," *The Jerusalem Report*, (13 July 1995), 22-24.

³⁰⁴ From a personal interview with Israeli vice-Council, Jonathan Peled, in Istanbul on 25 August 1995.

³⁰⁵ *Turkish Daily News*, 19 September 1995.

³⁰⁶ *Turkish Daily News*, 25 September 1995

ability to deliver on security. The logic behind this desire of Rabin was to show voters in next year's general election that Arafat can be trusted to keep the peace. On 28 September the Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and the PLO leader Arafat signed an accord at White House ceremonies establishing Palestinian self-rule in most of the West Bank. According to the Taba agreement:

1. The first phase of redeployment will be followed within 22 days by Palestinian elections.

2. There will be a temporary international presence in Hebron, where Israel will retain power to protect 400 Jews who live among 100.000 Arabs.

3. Israeli troops will continue safeguarding Jewish settlements in the West Bank. They will also control roads traveled by Jewish settlers.

4. The accord also deals with the release beginning upon the signing, of many of the thousands of Palestinian prisoners held in Israel jails.³⁰⁷

The months of September and November of 1995 became a dramatic time period in the peace process. First as an important threat to the peace process, the leader of Islamic Jihad organization has been killed by Mossad. The Mossad's act impaired the peaceful atmosphere both for Palestinians and Israelis, and also there is a fear for revenge. Secondly, the assassination of Rabin by a Jewish fundamentalist in November 1995 has been an astonishing development all over the world. Rabin's death did not make a reverse effect on the peace process but it became clear that Israel will have to deal, more and more, with challenges coming from her own society in the future. As an another important development, Palestinians held elections on 20 January 1996. Arafat became head of the Palestinian National Authority by taking overwhelming majority of votes. The power have

³⁰⁷ Turkish Daily News, 30 September 1995

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gradually shifted to the Palestinian National Authority, now based on an 88-member self rule council, which was elected by Palestinians inside the Gaza Strip and West Bank. The most astonishing development of the 1996 became the suicide bombings carried out by Hamas and the Islamic Jihad in Jerusalem, Ashkelon and Telaviv. This suicide bombings have led to a public reaction in Israel which endangers the continuation of the Oslo peace process and the prospects of Peres winning the coming elections scheduled for 29 May. And the Likud leader Netenyahu won the elections held on 29 May 1996.

Chapter 5

THE CONSEQUENCES FOR TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY

Turkey is a Middle Eastern country as much as she is a member of other bordering regions. Due to this geographical proximity, Turkey has a direct stake in Middle Eastern politics. The events and developments in Palestinian-Israeli conflict which constituted the core of the Arab-Israeli struggle affected Turkey deeply. In that respect, this section will deal with the place of the Palestinian-Israeli peace process in Turkish Foreign policy.

Before examining the historical evolution of Turkish foreign policy behavior towards Palestinian-Israeli peace process, special emphasis will be put on some characteristics of foreign policy inherited from the Ottoman era. After that, Turkish peace process behavior will be examined in conjunction with the changing patterns of Turkish foreign policy in order to provide a broader understanding.

In retrospect, Turkey's foreign policy towards the Middle East has shown many fluctuations. The Ottoman legacy is an important factor that must be kept in mind in order to understand these fluctuations. The features retained from the Ottoman era may be grouped in two categories: First, the limits of Turkish foreign policy are determined by internal and external factors. The latter includes its geographic duality, namely, Turkey's membership in secular and religious organizations such as the Council of Europe and the Organization of Islamic Conference. The internal factors are outcomes of domestic events in Turkey.³⁰⁸ This duality also exists in Turkish political culture and identity as well as in her external environment. Bernard Lewis quotes Field Marshall Slim as saying "Turkey is the only European

³⁰⁸ Hakan Yavuz, "Turkey's Relations with Israel," *Foreign Policy* (Ankara), 15, no.3-4(1991), 42.

country in the Middle East.³⁰⁹ It is also possible to argue that Turkey is the only Muslim country that had a democratic government and a free market economy. Because of this duality, Turkey is considered a Western state while she shares a cultural heritage with Middle Eastern states that is mostly dominated by Islamic values.

The second characteristic inherited from the Ottoman era is the type of foreign policy dominated by elites. As one specialist argues: "That is, since the interest of the nation is equated with the interest of state, foreign policy decisions are made at the state level by this pragmatic elite and do not reflect a grassroots democratic process."³¹⁰ This procedural feature has led to the creation of bureaucratic-pragmatism in the decision making process of Turkish foreign policy.

5.1. SECURITY CONCERNS AND WESTERN-ORIENTED FOREIGN POLICY: 1947-1964

Beside the facts explained above, the fluctuations of Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East, also, have resulted from domestic, regional and global factors more or less related with this region. It is a widely agreed point in all academic studies that changes following World War II have affected certain features of Turkey's attitude towards the Middle East. The Anglo-Turco Treaty in 1939 was an important turning point and a visible hallmark of Turkish Foreign Policy preferences after the war. Turkey followed the policy of "active neutrality" and did not contribute directly to the efforts of the Allies to defeat Germany. Turkey declared war against Germany only at the end of the war, thus became one of the founding members of the United Nations with this symbolic act. Turkey's formal

³⁰⁹ Seyfi Taşhan, "Current Turkish Policy in the Middle East," in *The Middle East in Turkish-American Relations*, ed. George S. Harris (Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 1984), 37.

³¹⁰ Yavuz, 44.

entrance to the Western camp was realized by her acceptance to the Council of Europe in 1949 and later to NATO in 1952. The main rationale of this preference is related to Turkish concerns about Soviet behavior towards Turkey. Upon the expiration of the "Turkish-Soviet Treaty of Neutrality and Non-Aggression" Stalin put forward a set of demands including joint control over the Turkish Straits and readjustments in the Turkish-Soviet border established by the treaty in 1921. For that reason, the main logic behind Turkey's preference to join the Western alliance was to counterbalance the Soviet threat.³¹¹ In sum, throughout the 1950s to 1964, Turkish foreign policy was shaped mainly by security concerns.

Turkey's Middle East policy may be viewed as an extension of her pro-western policy during this era. Turkey was interested in the maintenance of British presence in the Middle East, but Britain seemed militarily unable to defend the region against Soviet threat. The creation of Israel was a real turning point in Turkish and Arab-Israeli relations. Turkey opposed the partition of Palestine and voted against the UN General Assembly resolution on the partition on 30 November 1947.³¹²

At that time the elite-dominated and pragmatic nature of Turkish foreign policy came to light. The negative vote in 1947 was not motivated by popular inspiration or Islamic affiliations but due to fear of the creation of a communist regime in Israel. Indeed, Israel's neutrality was regarded as a camouflage for a deep rooted fear of communism by the Turkish public.³¹³ The role of religion in Turkish foreign policy had diminished sharply. Indeed,

³¹¹ Kemal Kirişçi, "The End of Cold War and Changes in Turkish Foreign Policy Behavior," *Foreign Policy* (Ankara), 17, no:3-4(1993), 5-6.

³¹² Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, "Development of Turkish-Arab Relations: A Historical Appraisal," in *Middle East, Turkey and the Atlantic Alliance*, eds. Ali L.Karaosmanoğlu and Seyfi Taşhan(Ankara: Foreign Policy Institute, 1987), 13-14.

³¹³ Amikam Nachmani, *Israel, Turkey and Greece: Uneasy Relations in the East Mediterranean* (London: Frank Cass, 1987), 6-7.

religion had little impact on Turkey's relations with Israel and Arabs during the 1950s.³¹⁴

Although Turkey opposed the resolution, Turkey voted along with the West in the establishment of a reconciliation commission on Palestine in December 1948. As a second step, Turkey recognized Israel on 28 March 1949. The reason of Turkey's cautious recognition of Israel was the mitigation of above-mentioned suspicion of Israel's being communist. Particularly after American backing of Israel, Turkey did not hesitate to recognize Israel. Israel, during this recognition process, proclaimed herself in favor of the freedom and independence of the democratic regimes.³¹⁵ Arab nations criticized Turkey for playing a role in the creation and legalization of Israel. Although Turkey was the first Muslim country to recognize Israel officially, she was one of the last countries in Europe to do so. Additionally, Turkish recognition of Israel did not matter so much at that time. As Turkish foreign minister Necmettin Sadak stated: "The state of Israel is a fact. More than thirty countries have recognized it. Arab representatives, too, are talking to the Israeli representatives."³¹⁶

As a result of Turkey's official recognition of Israel, Turkish-Arab relations seemed to deteriorate. For example, the Muslim Brotherhood newspaper *al-dawa* labeled Turkey a second Israel and called for her destruction.³¹⁷ This reaction, however, was not solely a result of the Turkey's act. The main reason behind this exaggerated attack on Turkey was the radicalization of Arab countries, particularly of Egypt. Nasser of Egypt, let alone the Arab world was planning to move leadership of Third world. His position became more visible at the Bandung conference in 1954. Thus, the

³¹⁴ Nachmani, 45.

³¹⁵ Nachmani, 48-49.

³¹⁶ Yavuz, 46.

³¹⁷ Kemal Karpat, "Turkish and Arab-Israeli Relations," in *Turkey's Foreign Policy in Transition: 1950-1974*, ed. Kemal Karpat (Leiden: E.J.Brill, 1975), 116.

Israeli issue was the jewel in the crown for providing pan-Arab unity in his eyes. For that reason during 1946-50, as Karpas explains, "Turkish-Arab relations followed a more or less normal course, despite ill feeling caused by Turkish recognition of Israel"³¹⁸ Also, there was not a uniform Arab world at that time; the Arab world had begun to differ within itself. Major Arab states such as Egypt and Syria adopted a policy of non-alignment. They were gradually becoming, in varying degrees, dependent upon the Soviet Union. In such an atmosphere, only the US and other Western countries had the sources available to provide economic and military aid to Turkey. The Arabs could offer nothing concerning the security matters of Turkey.³¹⁹ Turkey's security problems and her political and economic environment were different from that of the Arab states. Arab countries were not under direct threat from the Soviet Union.

The main disagreement arose over and after formation of Baghdad Pact in 1955. The Middle Eastern members of the pact were Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan. In addition to these countries, the US and Britain provided support for the survival of Pact. As Karpas pointed out:

There is hardly any other alliance in the recent history of foreign affairs as unnecessary, ineffectual and harmful to all parties as the Baghdad Pact. Indeed, it caused immense harm to the Western interests in the area, it precipitated the Arab countries' alignment with the Soviet Union, it stimulated the rise of radical ideologies, and cast Turks in the image of docile tool of Western power.³²⁰

³¹⁸ Karpas, 115.

³¹⁹ Oya Akgönenç Müghisuddin, "Turkish Arab Relations: 1945-1975," *Foreign Policy* (Ankara), 17 no.1-2(1993), 125.

³²⁰ Karpas, 116.

Nor did Israel like Baghdad Pact since it carried some implications against Israel. In the midst of all these developments, in a surprising move, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal Company on 26 July 1956. The immediate response to this act was a French, British and Israeli joint attack on Egypt.

Turkish attitude towards the crisis comprised certain contradictions. Although Turkey having no interest in the company, she acted together with the western countries. Paradoxically enough, after the crisis, Turkey, along with the members of the Pact (Britain excluded), condemned the attack on Egypt.³²¹ Turkey recalled her ambassador in Telaviv making clear however that this diplomatic act was made to strengthen the Baghdad Pact and was not a hostile attempt against Israel.³²² Subsequently, a series of events decreased Turkey's credibility in the eyes of Arabs and provoked opposition at home. These events were Turkey's support of the Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957, paradoxical policy toward Syria in 1957 and Iraq in 1958, and granting permission to the US to use the NATO base in Adana during the 1958 Lebanon crisis.³²³

The overthrow of the regime in 1958 in Iraq was added a further destabilizing element. These conditions forced Turkey and Israel closer to each other. The two countries agreed on a secret pact, the so-called Periphery Pact. The Pact came onto the agenda during an unannounced visit of Israeli leader, Ben Gurion, to Turkey. Israel's aim was to establish relations with the countries beyond the Arab zone, namely with Turkey, Iran

³²¹ İsmail Soysal, "70 Years of Turkish-Arab Relations and an Analysis on Turkish-Iraqi Relations," **Studies On Turkish-Arab Relations**, no.6(1991), 58.

³²² Mehmet Gönübol and Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, **Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası** (Ankara: SBF Yayını, 1975), 259.

³²³ Mahmut Bali Aykan, "The Palestinian Question in Turkish Foreign Policy From the 1950s to the 1990s," **International Journal of Middle East Studies**, no.25(1993), 93.

and Ethiopia. But this Pact did not have long and lasting effect.³²⁴ The Turkish elite alienated themselves from the Islamic countries of the Middle East due to both ideological preferences of Turkey made in the 1920s and the current problems with these countries. The reflection of these developments on the elite-dominated character of Turkish foreign policy was surfaced with its cooperation attempts with Israel, particularly at the end of the 1950s. Israel was the only democratic and secular country in the region and its successful development attempts further impressed the Turkish elite.³²⁵ In sum, this era became a favorable period in Turkish-Israeli relations.

5.2. MULTIDIMENSIONAL FOREIGN POLICY: 1964-79

After the 1960 coup in Turkey, the new leaders began to question the unidimensional, Western-dominated foreign policy because of the impact created by two external events. The first was the removal of Jupiter missiles from Turkey for solving the Cuban missile crisis. The second was the June 1964 Johnson letter incident. US president Johnson expressed his reluctance to support Turkey in the crisis over Cyprus and reminded Turkey not to use American weapons in other than NATO related operations. Kirişçi states that Turkish foreign policy makers perceived the developments related to these two events "as an example of how a superpower, when the need arose, could overlook the concerns and interests of a small ally."³²⁶

These events had three consequences for Turkish foreign policy behavior: "First, Turkey broke away from its traditional foreign policy of cool relations with the Soviet Union in favor of a rapprochement. Second, Turkey revised its security policy, especially in respect to weapon procurement

³²⁴ Philip Robin, *Turkey and the Middle East* (London: Pinter, 1991), 77.

³²⁵ Mim Kemal Öke, "Arabic Studies in Modern Turkey: Themes, Approaches and Sources," *Foreign Policy* (Ankara), 12 no.1-2(1985), 49.

³²⁶ Kirişçi, 6.

programs, in a manner that eventually made it possible for Turkey to militarily intervene in Cyprus. Third, Turkey recognized that it had failed to develop relations with the emerging Third World and particularly the Nonaligned movement.³²⁷ Turkish-Arab and Turkish-Israeli relations after 1964 were determined by the combined effect of these events. The new strategy was built on reducing the friction with the Arab states.

The change in Turkish-Western relations, however, was not a radical turning point in Turkey's pro-western foreign and security policies. It paved the way for an effort to generate a rapprochement of relations with the Arab countries but not at the expense of rupturing relations with Israel. Turkish foreign policy makers took a balanced approach towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. Their aim was to adopt a more independent, flexible and diversified approach in determining Turkish Middle Eastern foreign policy in general. In that respect, Turkey tried to avoid appearing as a Western player in the region. In this new foreign policy line, Turkey would not initiate any pact nor join in divisive political pacts.

Along with this new foreign policy line, the most conspicuous approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict came during the 1967 war. Turkey did not allow the US to use the Adana military base in support of Israel in 1967.³²⁸ Turkish foreign minister Çağlayangil made the following statement in order to assure the Arabs: "The military bases in Turkey were not going to be used against the Arabs by way of a *fait accompli*." Later, when the Israeli occupation of large amounts of Arab lands became clear, he announced that "Turkey was against territorial gains [made] by the use of force."³²⁹ Additionally, Turkey

³²⁷ Kirişçi, 7.

³²⁸ Ramazan Gözen, "Patterns in Turkish Foreign Policy Behavior Towards the Middle East," *Foreign Policy* (Ankara), 19 no.1-2(1995), 75.

³²⁹ Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, "The Evolution of Turkish-Arab Relations," in *The Middle East in Turkish-American Relations*, ed. G.S. Harris,(Washington: The Heritage Foundation, 1984), 47.

became actively involved in humanitarian aid projects to the Arab countries. She sent food, clothings and medicine to alleviate the sufferings of war. Turkey's attempts were welcomed by the Arab states and she was exempted from the brief oil embargo following the 1967 war.

Turkey sided with the Arab states in the adoption of Resolution 242. That resolution called for the immediate withdrawal of Israeli troops from the occupied lands during the war. Turkey, however, stressed her respect of the right of all regional states to live within secure boundaries and abstained from voting on the first paragraph of the resolution, which called Israel an aggressor state, for the sake of not injuring her relations with Israel.³³⁰

In 1969, Turkey joined the Islamic Conference Organization as an observer with the hope of mobilizing support for the Cypriot Turks. The Demirel government regarded the conference as a political, not religious, meeting, concerned only with the fire at the Aqsa Mosque and the status of Jerusalem.³³¹ Turkey remained neutral as so was able to act as a balance between opposing camps. For example, at the Rabat Conference in 1969, Turkey opposed a resolution that called for all the participants to break diplomatic relations with Israel.³³²

Turkey pursued similar policies during the 1973 war. The ambassadors of Syria and Egypt asked for political support from Turkey during the crisis. The spokesman of the Turkish Foreign Ministry stated that "Turkey does not approve of Arab lands being forcefully occupied by the Israelis and that it feels a lasting peace settlement is contingent upon the satisfaction of the legitimate demands of the Arab nations on this matter."³³³

³³⁰ Ihsan Gürkan, "Turkish-Israeli Relations and the Middle East Peace Process," *Turkish Review of Middle East Studies*, no.7(1993), 102.

³³¹ Aykan 95.

³³² Gözen, 75.

³³³ Kürkçüoğlu, "Development of Turkish...", 18.

And later Turkey told the US government that "the military bases in Turkey may not be used to aid Israel during the current war in the Middle East."³³⁴ At that time, the US delegation to NATO blamed Turkey for allowing arms transfer from the SU to the Arab states.³³⁵ After the war, Turkey again tried to help those countries that had suffered in the war.

The unprecedented increase in oil prices, worsened Turkish-EC economic and political relations, compounded deterioration of Turkish-American relations (because of Turkey's military intervention in Cyprus) were the important developments related to the Turkish foreign policy in the aftermath of 1973 war.³³⁶ A combination of these factors contributed to the departure from monotrack foreign policy and to further rapprochement with Arab states through growing economic ties with the region. In addition, on 22 October 1973, Turkish Foreign Minister Bayülken put forward a peace plan based on the UN Security Resolution 242.³³⁷

Although Turkey was exempted from the oil embargo of the mid-1970s thanks to her balanced attitude in the 1973 war (had already stated), she was still faced with the indirect effects of the oil crisis which increased the economic burden on the country. At that time, the commercial and economic ties between Israel and Turkey were at a very low level. This situation, however, did not harm the Turkish economy at that time.³³⁸

Meanwhile, two new dimensions were added to Turkey's Middle East policy with developments in the domestic political environment. The first was

³³⁴ Kürkcüoğlu, "The Evolution of...", 47.

³³⁵ *The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations*, XII (Ankara: 1973), 184.

³³⁶ See İsmail Ertürk, "Turkey and the European Community," *International Affairs*, 8 no.2(November 1984).

³³⁷ Kürkcüoğlu, "Development of Turkish...", 19.

³³⁸ Üzeyir Garih, "Turkish-Israeli Business Relations: The View of a Businessman," paper presented at the conference "Actual Situation and Prospects of Turkey's Bilateral Relations with Israel" in Ankara in 1992, 70.

the creation of the religious conservative National Salvation Party which occupied a coalition partner position between 1975 and 1978. Its leader, Necmettin Erbakan, was in favor of developing relations with Islamic countries and abolishing all alliances with the West in order to achieve this objective. The party did not become very influential in the rapprochement with Arab countries except in its minor attempts during the Seventh Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers held in Turkey in 1976.³³⁹ This particular development forced the Turkish government to reconsider and reshape its Middle East policy to conform with the secular constitution of the Republic. The second domestic dimension was the rise of radical leftist movements and their close relations with Palestinian guerrilla organizations.³⁴⁰ This situation was not well regarded in the eyes of Turkish foreign policy makers.

The reevaluation in Turkish foreign policy behavior (in this period) also led to the reformulating of official Turkish attitude towards the PLO. It is possible to argue that Turkey had maintained a decisive stance on the Question of Palestine since the end of the 1940s. The events of the year 1974 constituted a major turning point in the problem of the Palestinian people. The PLO and Arafat received international recognition from the international community and obtained observer status in the UN. Arab Summit also declared the PLO the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Turkey voted in favor of all resolutions that emerged from the UN in 1974. This stance was a shift from the earlier Western attitude towards the Question of Palestine.³⁴¹ The independent Turkish attitude, namely that of support, was first expressed in 1975. Although Turkey had expressed reservations about to the PLO during its early days, she established contact with it through the Turkish embassy in Cairo in

³³⁹ Aykan, 97-99.

³⁴⁰ Karpas, 131.

³⁴¹ Aykan, 97.

January 1975.³⁴² The 1974 Arab summit meeting seems to have influenced this "verbal" recognition of the PLO.

Turkey believed, from the early 1950s onwards, that the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians including their right to establish their own state was the only formula for the solution of the Question of Palestine. Following this recognition, two important figures from the Political Bureau of the PLO arrived in Turkey respectively in 1975 and in 1976 to discuss developing relations and setting up a PLO office in Ankara.³⁴³ The verbal recognition finally formalized by the decision of the Ecevit government to give the PLO diplomatic status. Arafat, the leader of the PLO, came to Turkey to open the office in Ankara in October 1979.³⁴⁴

According to Aykan, there were six reasons for this delay, related closely to the facts discussed above:

The first was that the government was displeased to learn that Turkish militants were receiving armed training in PLO camps in the Middle East. A second was that they believed the PLO supported terrorism and separatist groups- in other words, the Kurds. A third was that some PLO officials had offended and alienated the Turks. A fourth was that the involvement of the PLO in various acts of international terrorism made the Turks cautious. A fifth was that it was not in Turkey's interests to alienate the West, thus foreclosing its chances of receiving economic help. Finally, the PLO had always supported the Greek Cypriot position that Turkish troops had no right to be on Cyprus and should be withdrawn at once, and it did not endorse the resolutions of the Seventh Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers held in Istanbul in May 1976 supporting the Turkish side.³⁴⁵

³⁴² Soysal, 63.

³⁴³ Soysal, 63.

³⁴⁴ Yavuz, 57.

³⁴⁵ Aykan, 98.

Then, one may ask why Turkish government allowed a PLO office in Ankara. The first reason was the PLO help during the rescue operation of Egyptian ambassador from the hands of militants.³⁴⁶ The second was the moral necessity that emerged with the failure of US-Egyptian peace attempts. Third, the Question of Palestine was an important tool for the mobilization of support from the Arabs; Turkey proved its benevolence to the Arabs by permitting the PLO to open an office in Turkey. And finally, the newly emerging "New Security Concept" of Prime Minister Ecevit aimed to strengthen the relations with the countries in the region.³⁴⁷ All these, however, could not bring an end to the traditional Turkish mistrust of the PLO. Turkey, however, recognized the head of the PLO office with the rank of *charge d'affaires* as the Israeli representative in Ankara had in 1979.³⁴⁸

During the 1964-79 period, the Turkish government continued its policy of neutrality despite the rapprochement with the Arab states. One must keep in mind that this rapprochement mostly stemmed from the deteriorating economic conditions of Ankara and the need for support in Cyprus conflict. In this respect, development of economic relations is very important in this period. This situation forced Turkey to act in the midst of opposing lines. "Arabs vis-à-vis Israel and Secularism vis-à-vis Islamic principles."³⁴⁹ It may be concluded that Turkey has succeeded in achieving her foreign policy objectives particularly related with Arab countries and Israel.

³⁴⁶ *Cumhuriyet*, 21 July 1979

³⁴⁷ Gözen, 79.

³⁴⁸ Aykan, 100.

³⁴⁹ Gözen, 75.

5.3. UNEASY RELATIONS IN THE LONG DECADE: 1980-90

The beginning of the 1980s witnessed three important developments which have had lasting impact on the Middle East. These were the emergence of a revisionist regime in Iran, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the Iran-Iraq war. These all increased Turkey's role in the region.³⁵⁰ The 1980s became cooperation years with the US thanks to developments mentioned above. Turkey and the US agreed on a defense and economic cooperation agreement known as the DECA.³⁵¹ Relations reached their highest point since the 1950s. In this respect, the 1980s became a period distinct from previous ones. As stated above, Turkish foreign policy behavior towards the Palestinians and the Israelis was precipitated mostly in association with the Western attitude towards Turkey. "In the 1980s, Turkey's economic, political and trans-societal relations with the Middle East were paralleled by an increase in military, political and economic relations with the US."³⁵²

The most immediate development of this era came on 29 July 1980 from Israel. The Knesset enacted a basic law declaring the annexation of Jerusalem as the immutable capital of the state of Israel.³⁵³ Turkey protested Israeli law declaring that she would not accept this *fait accompli*. Prime Minister Demirel took position along with the Islamic countries and lowered the level of representation to second secretary. Beside this, Turkey closed down and carried her embassy in Jerusalem to Telaviv. This issue also

³⁵⁰ Kirişçi, 8-9.

³⁵¹ Richard Perle, "Turkey and the US Military Assistance," in **The Middle East in Turkish-American Relations**, ed. G.S. Harris, (Washington D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 1985); Daniel Pipes, "Options and Restraints for US Policy in The Middle East: The Turkish Dimension," in **The Middle East in Turkish-American Relations** ed. G.S. Harris, (Washington D.C. : The Heritage Foundation, 1985).

³⁵² Gözen, 79.

³⁵³ Şule Kut, "Filistin Sorunu ve Türkiye," in **Ortadoğu Sorunları ve Türkiye**, ed. Haluk Ülman (İstanbul: TÜSES, 1991), 23.

created friction in Turkey. The left-wing Republican Party and the NSP (National Salvation Party) ousted Foreign Minister Erkmen from office with their votes against his reluctance to sever relations with Israel.³⁵⁴

The domestic dynamics were important as well as external ones in Turkey's involvement in the Middle East as can be seen from the removal of Erkmen from office. The 12 September 1980 Coup initiated a new era in Turkey's internal environment. A prominent Western intellectual described this new era as a liberal revolution.³⁵⁵ In that atmosphere Turkey sought assistance from Arabic countries because of deteriorating relations with the Western countries. Interestingly, the downgrading of relations with Israel took place before the OIC summit in Taif in 1981. Yavuz puts forward the assertion that the Saudi assistance of \$250 million was delivered to Turkey immediately after Turkey's downgrading of diplomatic relations with Israel.³⁵⁶ It was clear that important economic relations with the Arab world would continue during the 1980s. In conformity with this new policy line, President Kenan Evren represented Turkey at the Casablanca Summit of the OIC. Turkey undertook the president position of the economic organ of the OIC, the Committee for Commercial and Economic Cooperation (COMCEC). The following statement made by İlder Türkmen, the Foreign Minister of the military government gives illumination on this new policy line:

Turkey's export to the Western markets [gave] no hope because of the recession in the economy. Therefore, the Middle East look[ed] to be the only alternative for the success of the 24 January Decrees. Furthermore, the Middle East market can be seen as an opportunity for achieving the export-led trade strategy.³⁵⁷

³⁵⁴ Yavuz, 54.

³⁵⁵ Dankward A.Rustow, "Turkey's Liberal Revolution," *Middle East Review*, 17 no.3(Spring 1985).

³⁵⁶ Quoted in Yavuz, 55.

³⁵⁷ Quoted in Gözen, 81.

These conditions forced Turkey to conduct a low-key policy with Israel at a minimum of diplomatic representation. The relations with Israel, however, were never cut completely. The emphasis was shifted to the bridging role of Turkey but this role could not be conceptualized on the policy planning level in order to present an operational significance.³⁵⁸ Nevertheless, Turkey continued her neutral attitude in the Lebanon Crisis in 1982 as had been done in the 1967 and 1973 wars. Turkey made clear that Incirlik base was opened to American forces in Lebanon for humanitarian purposes only; she did not get involved in the Lebanese crisis.³⁵⁹

Meanwhile, the opening of the PLO office in Ankara did not bring a trouble-free period in the relations between Turkey and the PLO. Turkey was aware that Armenian, Kurdish and left-wing terrorists were receiving training in the PLO camps. Israel provided Turkey information on the activities of these groups and Israel destroyed the training center of, the ASALA, killing its leader at the same time.³⁶⁰ The PLO link with the terrorist organizations was the main reason for Turkey's abstention from the UN resolution accusing the Israeli's attempt as genocide in 1982.³⁶¹ The newly elected nationalist-conservative Özal government did not instigate a drastic change in policy formulation towards the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Yasser Arafat, however, was trying into shift their struggle to the diplomatic arena. His visit to Egypt in December 1983 was an important development in this respect. Arafat, on his second visit to Turkey, was welcomed with deep sympathy both at the government and public levels. Ankara's emphasis was on

³⁵⁸ Ali L. Karasmanoğlu, "Turkey's Discreet Foreign Policy Between Western Europe and the Middle East," in *Middle East, Turkey and the Atlantic Alliance*, eds. Ali L. Karasmanoğlu and Seyfi Taşhan (Ankara: Foreign Policy (Ankara) Institute, 1987), 94.

³⁵⁹ Helmut Hubel, " Turkey and the Crisis in the Middle East," in *Middle East, Turkey and the Atlantic Alliance*, eds. Ali L. Karasmanoğlu and Seyfi Taşhan (Ankara: Foreign Policy (Ankara) Institute, 1987), 112.

³⁶⁰ For more information see Nezih Tavlaş, "Türk-İsrail Güvenlik ve İstihbarat İlişkileri," *Avrasya Dosyası*, 1 no.3 (Fall 1995).

³⁶¹ Yavuz, 49.

Palestinian statehood for the solution of the Question of Palestine. Turkish support was aiming to keep the PLO in the moderate camp. In fact, Turkey had long been defending the claims of Palestinians by voting in favor of them in the UN and in other international forums. Turkey, not surprisingly, recognized Palestine as an independent state after its declaration of independence in Algiers on 14 November 1988.³⁶² Turkey became the eleventh state to recognize the Palestinian statehood, and the first from the West.

Turkey, on the other hand, saw the Palestinian-Israeli conflict as a source of instability in the region. She felt obliged to readjust her position in association with the developments in this crisis. The commercial relations between Turkey and Israel started to show good signals in the mid 1980s. Turkey also was likely to upgrade relations with Israel. In September 1986, Ankara made an attempt to upgrade relations with Israel by sending a senior diplomat to Telaviv as *charge d'affairs*.³⁶³ As proof of the vulnerability of relations to the developments in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the emergence of *Intifada* brought a new face to the bilateral relations of Turkey, both with the Israelis and the Palestinians. The uprising succeeded in enlisting the sympathies of the Turkish people. The struggle between heavily armed troops and unarmed civilians, seen in the media, increased the support of Palestinians in Turkey. The improvements in the relations with Israel since the mid-1980s were interrupted by Intifada.

This era also witnessed a set of peace initiatives and proposals put forward for the solution of the Question of Palestine. Turkish perception of the Question of Palestine differed to a considerable extent from the attitude of the US. This period became a delicate era for Turkey in which "to reconcile the security relationship with the United States and its political and

³⁶² Kut, 26.

³⁶³ Karaosmanoğlu, "Turkey's Discreet," 94.

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economic interests vis-à-vis the Islamic world."³⁶⁴ Turkey worked hard to prove that she was not an American satellite in the region. In that respect, she approved the Fez peace plan as being more realistic than the Reagan Plan.³⁶⁵ While there were considerable differences between Turkey and the US over the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, Turkey did not seem to differ substantially from the position of Europeans taken in the Venice Declaration of 1980. Both sides regarded the conflict as a threat to stability in the Middle East and both agreed on the importance of the right of self-determination of the Palestinians, including Palestinian statehood and the Israeli right to exist. In addition, both concerned the PLO as an essential participant of the peace process. Beside these similarities, there were some differences between the Turkish and the West European positions. The most important all, Turkish policy was based on a low profile and non-interventionist approach to the question while the European approach was in favor of an enlarged process to include the USSR and Europeans at an international conference. Turkey was however extremely reluctant to support any initiative which might have increased the Soviet role in the conflict.³⁶⁶ Turkey tried to arrange her "peace-keeping" role so as not to harm her relations with the West. Özal was also aware of the practical necessity of maintaining relations with Israel. He regarded the relations with Israel "as a window ... on future events." For Turkey "to play a role in solving the problems of the Middle East ..." he maintained, "that window must remain open."³⁶⁷

Meanwhile, more favorable circumstances emerged in the peace process in 1989. First a proposal was put forward by Israel known as the Shamir Plan. Turkey welcomed this plan since it favored elections in the

³⁶⁴ Hubel, 109.

³⁶⁵ Hubel, 110.

³⁶⁶ Karaosmanoğlu, "Turkey's Discreet...", 79-80.

³⁶⁷ Quoted in Aykan, 103.

occupied territories. Beside this, Turkey aimed to repair relations with Israel which had been injured by recognition of Palestinian statehood. Turkey also welcomed the peace attempt made by the Egyptian leader Mubarak in Autumn 1989.³⁶⁸ Although these attempts ended inconclusively, Turkey's policy was constructive and interested in keeping up momentum in the peace process.

5.4. THE EMERGENCE OF A PARTIAL SOLUTION AND UNCERTAINTY: 1990-1996

The end of the Cold War has brought drastic changes in international politics. Most important all, pro-Soviet states of the region stepped into a profound transformation process. This process has been accompanied by an unprecedented degree of instability and uncertainty. Turkey has found herself in the midst of this profound transformation process and has faced the instabilities that have emerged during this process. This development had a deep affect on Turkey's place in the international arena as well as on Turkish foreign policy behavior. "One clear manifestation of this is evident in the changed importance attributed to Turkey in the most recent years. There was a brief period at the end of the Cold War during which it seemed to many that Turkey's strategic significance had diminished."³⁶⁹ However, thanks to three important developments, Turkey regained her strategic significance in the region after a short time.³⁷⁰ These developments were the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the peace process started in Madrid. In this section the impact of these developments

³⁶⁸ Gürkan, 106.

³⁶⁹ Kemal Kirişçi, "New Patterns of Turkish Foreign Policy Behavior," in **Turkey: Political, Social and Economic Challenges in the 1990s** Çiğdem Balım et al (eds.) (Leiden: E.J.Brill, 1995), 1.

³⁷⁰ For a general overview on Turkey's growing role in International politics see Graham E.Fuller, "Conclusions: The Growing Role of Turkey in the World," in **Turkey's New Geopolitics From the Balkhans to Western China**, eds. Graham E.Fuller and Ian O.Lesser(Oxford: Westview Press, 1993), 163-183.

on the Turkish foreign policy behavior towards Israel and the Palestinians will be discussed in brief.

The impact of the Gulf Crisis was profound not only on Turkey but also on the whole region. The confrontation between Iraq and Kuwait on oil prices in mid-July 1990 was the first sign of crisis, but no one expected Iraq to take such an extreme action in the region. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait occurred on 2 August 1990. The US immediately responded with military aid to Saudi Arabia. After extensive preparations, coalition forces led by the US recaptured Kuwait at the expense of huge destruction in Iraq. The war situation forced Turkey to abandon her neutrality towards the Middle East which had been, more or less, pursued during the early decades. This meant, more specifically, a change in principle of non-intervention in intra-Arab conflicts and Turkey sided with the Western world. The most important proof of the shift in Turkish foreign policy was the opening of İncirlik air base for the operations of the US during the Gulf Crisis. This new policy line was very similar to the one adopted during the 1950s.

As has been discussed, Turkish-PLO relations could not escape the strain due to a set of questions. Relations came to a critical point after Arafat's recalling of its representative from Ankara. Arafat's purpose was to protest Turkey's delay in upgrading relations with the PLO to ambassadorial level.³⁷¹ The Gulf crisis, on the other hand, created further destabilization in the relations. First of all, seemingly, the PLO backing of Iraq lowered the credibility of that organization in the eyes of the Western and pro-western Arab states since the Iraqi invasion was regarded as a threat to international stability and order. Second, and the most important all, "the statements made by Arafat drawing parallels between the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the 1974 Turkish military operation in Cyprus"³⁷² contributed to the worsening

³⁷¹ Aykan, 105.

³⁷² Aykan, 106.

atmosphere between the two sides. At that time, Turkish foreign policy was under the strong influence of President Özal and he was in support of close cooperation with the US in order to achieve an important objective for Turkey: peace and stability in the region. Özal was even in favor of taking risk to ensure this if necessary.³⁷³

Turkey, Israel (although she was not in the Gulf coalition) and the US sided together against an Arab country; this was more than a simple diplomatic coalition or a joint maneuvering plan. This situation paved the way for the improvement of relations between Turkey and Israel. The increasing strain on Turkish-Arab relations, for several reasons, contributed to this situation. The main problems with some of the Arab countries were Syrian support of Kurdish separatist activities in southeastern Anatolia, the disputed waters of the Euphrates, Turkey's increasing relations with Israel and the West, and the lack of support from the Arab world during the migration of the Turkish minority from Bulgaria.³⁷⁴ All these worsened Arab's image in Turkish public and made a positive contribution to Turkish-Israeli relations.

The second important change that occurred in the early 1990s was the dissolution of the last empire. The end of the SU and the emergence of new Turkish states had a deep impact on Turkish foreign policy behavior. Turkish foreign policy decision makers were caught unprepared for this development. It is possible to argue that "Turkey relegated the place of the Middle East to a secondary level."³⁷⁵ The end of the SU also constituted a window of opportunity for the Israeli administration. Although some argue that American support to Israel is rather a domestic issue, regardless of

³⁷³ Turgut Özal, "Opening Remarks" *Dış Politika Ve Ekonomi Açıklarından Türkiye'nin Stratejik Öncelikleri Sempozyumu*, İstanbul: 5 Kasım 1991; and Mehmet Barlas, *Turgut Özal'ın Anıları* (İstanbul: Gençlik Pub., 1994), 128.

³⁷⁴ Aykan, 104-105.

³⁷⁵ Gözen, 85.

changes in international politics, in the aftermath of the Cold War, the strategic environment that led to Israeli priority in the relations between the US and the Middle Eastern countries changed dramatically. The role of Israel in the Middle East against the Soviet Union was no longer valid. In this respect, Israel hoped to renew the American-Israeli cooperation through the Central Asian and Caucasian states.³⁷⁶ Nevertheless, Turkey and Israel are not the only Middle Eastern actors concerned with the establishment of a sphere of influence in the Central Asian and Caucasian region. Iran and Saudi Arabia are also involved in trying to improve their relations with the countries in this area.³⁷⁷ This situation paved the way for an implicit cooperation between Israel and Turkey.³⁷⁸ In the words of an expert on Israeli foreign policy:

The perception in Washington of an anti-American Islamic threat in the Middle East and Central Asia has produced another marketing formula for Israel. With Turkey, which like Israel appears to have lost its strategic value to the West as a result of the end of the cold war, trying to sell itself as a new pro-American "pillar" against Islamic fundamentalism, the idea of an Israeli-Turkish alliance has been integrated into the Israeli post-cold war strategy vis-à-vis Washington.³⁷⁹

In addition, one may argue that there is a new balance of power game between the pro-American states and the so-called rump states. Turkey has always been well aware of Israel's strong support in the US. Israel has also been sympathetic toward Turkey starting with the highly tolerant attitude of the Ottoman Empire to her Jewish elements.

³⁷⁶ Hadar, 67.

³⁷⁷ Gün Kut, "Yeni Türk Cumhuriyetleri ve Uluslararası Ortam," in *Bağımsızlığın İlk Yılları*, ed. Büşra E. Behar et al. (Ankara: Kültür Bakanlığı, 1994), 17-19; Seyfi Taşhan, "The Caucasus and Central Asia: Strategic Implications," *Foreign Policy* (Ankara), 17 no.3-4(1993); Raphael Israeli, "Return to the Source: The Republics of Central Asia and the Return of the Middle East," *Central Asian Survey*, 13 no.1(1994)

³⁷⁸ Aras, 190-191.

³⁷⁹ Hadar, 68.

The third important development of the early 1990s was the peace process started between Israel and the Palestinians in Madrid in 1991. The Madrid framework led to a historical development in the Middle East. On 9 September 1993, the parties recognized each other in an exchange of letters and on 13 September 1993, a joint Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles was signed by the two parties in a ceremony at the White House in Washington.

This last peace process beginning with the Madrid conference had developed without Turkish involvement but certainly had a deep impact on Turkish foreign policy towards the Palestinians and Israel. The Turkish proposal to host the possible Middle East peace process, which, was put forward during the Moscow visit of President Özal in March 1991, could not be actualized.³⁸⁰ Özal called on the Israeli administration to accept the principle of land for peace and emphasized an even-handed role in the region in his proposal. But Turkey was not included, even in the talks on regional security and water issues. The leader of Democratic Left Party, Ecevit, attributed Turkey's failure in having her historical function in the Middle East, to her foreign policy to chase after the USA.³⁸¹ On the other hand, although Turkey did not need such a peace process with Israel since she had recognized Israel and had continued relations with Israel; she had been in favor of such a peace between the Arabs and Israel for a long time. Prime Minister Çiller's statement on the peace process reflects this preference:

By taking maximum advantage of close historical and traditional ties with brotherly Arabic countries and the people of Palestine, as well as existing good relations with Israel, Turkey shall continue to contribute to the success of the peace process... our government within the framework of

³⁸⁰ Şule Kut, "Ortadoğu Barış Süreci ve Türkiye," *Ortadoğu Barış Süreci ve Türkiye Sempozyumu*, İstanbul, 11-12 April 1995.

³⁸¹ George E.Gruen, "Turkey's Potential Contribution to Arab-Israel Peace," *Turkish Review of Middle East Studies*, no.7(1993), 191.

UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338, sincerely supports a solution that would safeguard all rights of the people of Palestine, including the right to establish their own state, liberate Arab territories under occupation and guarantee the existence of all countries of the region within secure boundaries.³⁸²

There is a long road ahead for the establishment of a just and lasting peace and Turkey may contribute to the peace process in a practical way to reduce tensions and build confidence among the parties. Although Turkey has not an influential role in the present stage of the peace process, she has certain stakes in the consolidation of peace. In an important diplomatic manuevere, Turkey upgraded her diplomatic relations with both Israel and the Palestinians in the atmosphere of the growing consensus, both at home and in the world with the commencement of the Madrid Conference. Most important all, peace process has created new prospects to improve Israeli-Turkish relations.³⁸³

From the Israeli perspective, cooperation with Turkey may accelerate her geo-cultural integration to the region. As a foreign policy analyst pointed out: "Many Israelis know that Turkey has a strategic asset that strikes fear into both Assad and Saddam Hussein: the Greater Anatolia Project, a series of dams that control the flow of water into Syria and Iraq."³⁸⁴ Additionally, cooperation with Turkey may help to avoid some problems in her attempts to penetrate into the markets of the ex-Soviet Union republics. The recent visit of the Israeli president to Turkey in 1995 is evidence of increasing relations.

From the Turkish perspective, close relations with Israel may provide easier access to Israeli technology and know-how. The potential economic

³⁸² Quoted in Gruen, 213. (Official English translation)

³⁸³ Hasan Köni, "Körfez Savaşı Sonrasında Türkiye," *Avrasya Dosyası*, 3 no.1(Spring 1996), 140.

³⁸⁴ William Safire, "Cradle of Terror," *Turkish Daily News*, 27 April 1996. Additionally, the name of the project is South Eastern Anatolian Project.

cooperation areas may emerge related to water, agriculture, and tourism.³⁸⁵ In addition, many Turks believe that friendship with Israel means support from America. The number of Israeli tourists coming Turkey has reached more than a million which equals almost a fifth of Israel's population over the last few years.³⁸⁶ The visits of the Turkish Foreign Minister and Prime Minister to Israel, respectively, in 1993 and 1994, aimed to develop relations between these two countries. A Memorandum on Mutual Understanding was signed during Foreign Minister Çetin's visit in Israel.³⁸⁷ Turkish President Süleyman Demirel's a week long visit to the Middle East in 1996 highlighted the importance of relations with Israel. Demirel began his tour in Israel. He held talks with the Israeli President Weizman and addressed the Knesset. Demirel's visit is the highest level visit by a Turkish official to the Jewish state to date.

(i) Another important cooperation area is related to Turkey's security concerns. Turkey seeks mutual intelligence and strategic cooperation, particularly in association with her struggle against the PKK. The military cooperation agreement concluded between Turkey and Israel on 18 February is a clear sign of mutual understanding in this subject. A Turkish Foreign Ministry spokesman said the accord was for training purposes and such weapons and electronic equipments that could monitor neighboring countries would not be used.³⁸⁸ These facilities, however, could be used in the struggle against the PKK in southeast Anatolia and northern Iraq. This agreement, on the other hand, attracted much criticism. Arab countries and Iran claim the accord will harm their security and the Middle East peace

³⁸⁵ Garih, 81-84.

³⁸⁶ Kirişçi, "Turkey in Search of Security in the Middle East: The Economic Dimension," *Perceptions*, 1no.1(March-May 1996), 157.

³⁸⁷ For the full text of agreement see Gürkan, 133-136.

³⁸⁸ *Cumhuriyet*, 11 April 1996.

process.³⁸⁹ They regard the agreement as a response to the security agreement signed recently between Syria and Greece. They also argue that the "Israeli-Turkish pact could well propel Syria to seek closer military cooperation with Greece, which would be detrimental to Turkey's national security interests and would augment the tensions in the region as a whole."³⁹⁰ This view, however, seems an exaggerated one.³⁹¹ They ignore the fact that Israeli prime minister Peres was received in Oman and Qatar, signaling the end of hostility between the Arabs and Israel. The Arabs seem to forget the lack of understanding and support shown by many Arab countries to Turkey's security concerns. In that respect, Turkey has to take care of her own interests. Apart from external criticism, there is also no internal consensus in Turkey on this matter.³⁹² Students protesting the warming relations with Israel gathered in several times in some big cities of Turkey. Students also protested Israel's attack on Lebanon and called for an "independent Turkey."³⁹³ The Turkish pro-Islamic Welfare Party has strongly opposed the growing Turkish-Israeli relationship.

This situation is, on the other hand, not isolated from the impacts of the developments in world politics. Turkish foreign policy makers have always been well aware of the rising constellations in international politics. It is clear that the 1993 picture resulted from the Israeli and Palestinian realization that the US diplomatic position in the region had changed. That does not mean that the Middle East has lost its significance in the eyes of Americans, but they missed taking the initiative for the region into their

³⁸⁹ Gün Kut, "Arap Birliği Neden Rahatsız," *Yeni Yüzyıl*, 10 April 1996; *Cumhuriyet*, 15 April 1996.

³⁹⁰ *Al-Ahram*, 18-24 April 1996.

³⁹¹ It must be added that the Israeli military operation code named "the Grapes of Wrath", against Lebanon that began on 11 April 1996 has increased the tension in the region.

³⁹² Sedat Sertoğlu, "Hangi Araplar?" *Sabah*, 12 April 1996.

³⁹³ *Turkish Daily News*, 25 April 1996

hands. In the US, after the Gulf War, it became apparent that American public opinion would not tolerate American troops staying in the Middle East a day longer than strictly necessary. If the declining economic capability of the US is added to the formula, the necessity of regional order and peace in the Middle East surfaces. It seems that the most outstanding regional actor for providing this order and peace in cooperation with the US is Israel. But one do not forget that there is a growing unrest in the region and in the world about Israel's military operations both in the Palestine and in Lebanon. The new US-Israeli strategic military cooperation agreement is a clear hallmark of this alliance. Israel, on the other hand, has been systematically widening the scope of her strategic interests to include countries that are geographically distant. Former defense minister Sharon said that "in addition to neighboring Arab states, Israel is extending her strategic interests to include North Africa, Turkey, Pakistan and even Zimbabwe."³⁹⁴ Turkey, in order not to be left out of such a new shaping, regards the cooperation with Israel as fitting to her national interests. The Israeli government also seems willing to have Turkey involved in the Middle East. The question remains open as to whether the Turkish administration will continue its present foreign policy towards Israel without undermining its domestic support and external balances.

One lesson that may be drawn from this low level crisis is that Turkish officials must be sensitive in the policies that project Turkey as subordinate to Israel.³⁹⁵ A prominent Turkish intellectual regards the situation as "giving Israel a check without getting anything in return."³⁹⁶ Instead, Turkey may shift the emphasis to economic cooperation. It is a widely agreed point that economic cooperation may accelerate the consolidation of peace among the

³⁹⁴ **Al Ahram**, 11-17 April 1996.

³⁹⁵ Cengiz Çandar, "Dış Politika Perişan Halde," **Sabah**, 16 April 1996.

³⁹⁶ Cengiz Çandar, **Sabah**, 23 April 1996.

formerly conflicting countries. "This kind of confidence building would help efforts to consolidate the Arab-Israeli peace process."³⁹⁷

As far as the Palestinians are concerned, the visit of Arafat to Turkey in 1995 is a clear sign of importance given to Turkey by the Palestinians. Prime Minister Çiller's visit to Gaza demonstrated the "importance the Turkish government attaches to the peace process and is also a reminder of an evenhanded policy of the Turkish government toward the Israelis and the Palestinians."³⁹⁸ Symbolically, her visit to Orient House was important. Demirel also traveled to Gaza, after Sharm al-Shaykh Summit, and met with Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat. He reaffirmed Turkey's support for the peace process. Meanwhile, Turkey promised about \$50 million for the infrastructure projects of Gaza but it were not delivered yet. Turkey also ignored her role in the Palestinian elections held on 20 January. Turkey sent only four of the sixty monitors that Arafat requested for the elections.³⁹⁹ In that respect, the Palestinian municipal elections to be held at the end of the 1995 is an opportunity for Turkey to show her interests in Palestine's democratization efforts. It must be kept in mind that Turkey -and the rest of the world- has a certain stake in the establishment of a secular-democratic Palestinian state in the Middle East region.

In sum, the peace process created a window of opportunity to Turkey to play a greater role in the Middle East but this is not straight forward.

³⁹⁷ Kirişçi, "Turkey in Search of...", 166.

³⁹⁸ Meltem Müftüler, "Turkey: A New Player in the Middle Eastern Politics," *Mediterranean Quarterly*, 6 no.4(Fall 1995), 116.

³⁹⁹ Kirişçi, "Turkey in Search of...", 168.

CONCLUSION

From 1947 to 1995 peace has been an elusive butterfly in the Question of Palestine. There were hundreds of meetings, negotiations, and discussions. The tensions between the Israelis and the Palestinians have led to terrorism on both sides. Human rights issues pertaining to both ethnic groups became an international topic. There were many countries involved in the effort to assist with the peace process during this 48-year period. At last, at the end of 1993 with the Declaration of Principles, the light at the end of the tunnel became apparent. Main conclusion drawn from the account of the peace process in this thesis is that systemic changes in international relations, culminating in the end of the cold war/bi-polarity, have in time clearly affected the progress in Palestinian-Israeli peace process from total refusal by both sides to acceptance of a partial solution, be it willingly or unwillingly, under the imperatives of new realities in the world order, which are of considerable relevance to Middle Eastern affairs. As far as Turkey is concerned, although she has not a significant role in the present stage of the peace process, she has certain stakes in the consolidation of peace. Most important all, peace process has created new prospects to improve Israeli-Turkish relations.

At this point, in discussing the new situation, three problems will be emphasized related to the peace process. The first one is time. Time must not pass by and be wasted. The second issue is Jerusalem. Any claim on sole sovereignty over all of Jerusalem seems unrealistic. Sari Nusseibeh advises two solutions for the sharing of the Holy City.

[the first solution]...one way of sharing the city and sovereignty is simply and directly by the drawing up or the redrawing of physical tangible borders. ...because of Jerusalem's religious and historical distinctness, special provisions can probably be made to allow for freer cross-border fluidity in the movement of people, goods and services, as well as for extraterritorial administrative authority or authorities over religious sites.

...another way of disturbing rights of sovereignty is by sharing rather than by separating, where shares are not of specific locations but of the aggregate whole...if this principle were to apply to Jerusalem it would require having Jerusalem turned into a *corpus separatum* with a status distinct from that of the two sharing states⁴⁰⁰

The third matter concerns the refugees. Nobody anticipates that a large majority of the Palestinian refugees will return to new Palestinian State but they should be given the right to choose.

Though such matters existed in 1996, the ongoing peace process shows that the future of the process will depend on the future of the new state in Palestine. Thus, as a conclusion it may be more appropriate to take the future of the Palestine state into consideration.

It is a widely agreed point that "a stable and a democratic state in the Palestinian territory is a must for peace and order in the Middle East."⁴⁰¹ Only with the rules of democracy, the sides of peace can continue their life in the newly-shaped Middle East. Otherwise, the reconciliation of Jews and Palestinians in the same stable condition may not be possible. The question of geo-cultural integration is still on the agenda. A prominent philosopher, Azmi Bisharo, noted on this cultural distance:

Israel will never be an integral part of the Middle East, because the compromise it is making with the Arab peoples is diplomatic rather than historic. Hence it will remain suspicious and suspect. Therefore, Israel must not see itself, in the aftermath of the peace agreements, as a part of the Middle East, to hope the benefit from them. Arab culture will not link up with the Israeli culture, not even with the help of bridges built by Jews who came from Morocco and Iraq.⁴⁰²

⁴⁰⁰ UN, **Jerusalem: Visions of Reconciliation**, (Athens, Greece: 27-28 April 1993), 50.

⁴⁰¹ Amos Perlmutter, "Arafat's Police State," **Foreign Affairs**, 73 no.4(July/August 1994), 11

⁴⁰² Ha'ir (Israeli Hebrew weekly), 24 September 1993 quoted in Joseph Alpher, **Israel's Security Concerns in the Peace Process**, **International Affairs**, 70 no.2(April 1994), 241. For more knowledge about this matter of cultural integration see Samuel Yahya

The rules of democracy may help to avoid this problem. At least, it seems to be the best for the situation which occurred after the DOP in the Middle East rather than any other regime exist in today's world. In general, democratic states tend to avoid war as a tool for settling disputes among themselves.

In fact, the Palestinian elite seems to realize that their best chances for an independent state in world system lies in their closeness to democracy. It is not possible to integrate into a western-led world community with low level of political institutionalization and a fractured political structure in an unstable political climate.⁴⁰³ Israelis also should see their stakes in supporting the evolution of a democratic state in the Palestinian lands. It must be an important priority for Israel to ensure democracy in Palestine since that would guarantee the nature of relations as productive and cooperative.⁴⁰⁴ On the other hand, the Palestinians should have an interest in seeing their neighbor Israel remain democratic in order to continue in their way that leads to an independent state. The assassination of Rabin and incidences during the withdrawal from occupied territories has shown that the most obvious enemies of peace in Israel are extremist religious groups, overtly fascist, and racist right-wing activists. On the Palestinian side, many agree that the radical groups such as HAMAS and Islamic Jihad are enemies of peace. The recent bombings proved this fact. The local and international factors behind the Oslo agreements are more powerful than the earlier peace attempts as has been mentioned. The wave of suicide bombings executed by

el-Maghribi, *Yahudiliği Anlamak*, translated by Osman Cilacı(Istanbul: İnsan, 1995), 107-127.

⁴⁰³ Edy Kaufmann and Shukri B.Abed, "The Relevance of Democracy to Israeli Palestinian Peace," in *Democracy, Peace and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, eds. Edy Kaufmann, Shukri B.Abed, and Robert L.Rothstein(London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993), 48.

⁴⁰⁴ Kaufmann and Abed, 44.

Hamas will not change this fact, but they have undoubtedly raised the price Israel will pay.⁴⁰⁵

After all, it is possible to discuss the relevance of democracy in Palestinian society. First of all, Intifada has diminished the authoritarian tendencies of Palestinian politics. Secondly, the influence of Jordan and Israeli politics have increased democratic sentiments.⁴⁰⁶ And, finally the western-educated Palestinian intellectuals admire many aspects of democratic political culture. Furthermore, they may play a major role in formulating a democratic Palestinian State.⁴⁰⁷ According to a recent poll 84 percent of the people in the West Bank and approximately 86 percent in the Gaza Strip opted for democracy for the Palestinian Authority. As an important advantage, there are no ethnic divisions in Palestinian society. The only apparent division seems to be between secular and religious groups. According to a November 1994 poll asking who should be head of the Palestinian Authority Arafat won more than twice as many votes as any other figure. Only in Hebron there might be a strong contest between HAMAS and Arafat's Fatah according to poll.

| | Arafat | Yasin | Habbash | Abd ash-Shafi | Other |
|-------------|--------|-------|---------|---------------|-------|
| Gaza City | 57 | 16 | 5 | 6 | 17 |
| Gaza Middle | 60 | 16 | 7 | 6 | 12 |
| Gaza North | 46 | 16 | 9 | 10 | 19 |
| Gaza South | 58 | 11 | 7 | 7 | 17 |
| Hebron | 28 | 40 | 4 | 11 | 17 |
| Jericho | 55 | 20 | 10 | 5 | 10 |
| Jerusalem | 25 | 21 | 8 | 8 | 38 |
| Nablus | 46 | 13 | 9 | 9 | 24 |
| Ramallah | 30 | 14 | 6 | 13 | 38 |
| Total | 43 | 20 | 7 | 9 | 21 |

Table 3 Election for Head of Palestinian Authority by the area of residence. (Votes in percent and votes may not add up to 100 due to rounding) Source: Lauren G. Ross and Nader Izzat Sa'id, "Palestinians: Yes to Negotiations, Yes to Violence," *Middle East Quarterly*, 2 no.2(June 1995), 19.

⁴⁰⁵ *Al-Ahram*, 14-20 March 1996.

⁴⁰⁶ Quandt, "The Urge...", 3.

⁴⁰⁷ Kaufmann and Abed, 47.

Hamas, unlike the other groups, tries to gain support through social work and it is the only cohesive group in Gaza.⁴⁰⁸ It is the only group trusted by the poor people. Even some senior officials at UNRWA in Gaza trust HAMAS to redistribute UNRWA food donations to the people.⁴⁰⁹ The dynamics, behind the HAMAS, are constituted by the two groups. These are the youth and the merchant classes. This means that HAMAS will remain as a major factor in determining the future of Palestine. Palestinian Authority must provide a multilateral recognition of peace within Palestinian society. Otherwise, governments alone can not provide peace. At first, Palestinian authority must put an end to "good and bad" division in Palestinian society. Peace will only be possible if PLO manages to convince the radical forces of the rationality of peace. Moreover, it requires a reconciliation of hearts. The structure of Palestinian politics has gradually been transforming itself into a multiparty system dominated by two poles- Fatah and HAMAS.⁴¹⁰ Despite its protest of the elections held on 20 January, there are signs that HAMAS would participate in the Palestinian municipal elections to be held in 1996.⁴¹¹ If Palestinians succeed in playing the political game in accordance with democratic rules, this bi-polar situation may constitute the core of the Palestinian democracy in the long run. A democratic Palestine may be considered to be a danger in the eyes of autocratic Arab leaders in different countries, but there is no alternative better than democracy for the Palestinians. As Quandt argued: "A Palestinian democracy would fit more readily into arrangements for regional cooperation and development and have less need for a large armed force."⁴¹² Israeli Foreign Minister Peres believed that Hamas would not win elections but also, before election,

⁴⁰⁸ Perlmutter, "Arafat's Police..." 9.

⁴⁰⁹ Sara M.Roy, "Gaza: New Dynamics of Civic Integration," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 22 no.4(Summer 1993), 29.

⁴¹⁰ Jarbawi and Heacock, 39.

⁴¹¹ *Al-Ahram*, 29 February-6 March 1996.

stated that "whoever is for peace, we shall negotiate with him, if he'll be elected"⁴¹³ After elections, the Palestinians are no longer "just the PLO". The Palestinians are now represented by a national political authority elected by the people within a framework recognized as legitimate both within and outside the region. Voter turn out was extremely high, in spite of calls for a boycott and other impediments. In the West Bank and Gaza respectively, 75 and 85 percent of the registered voters turned out to cast their ballots. Virtually unanimous support, as has been expected (see table 3), -88 percent of the votes- went to Yasser Arafat. For Arafat, the result constitutes a green lights signaling that he should go on in his attempts.⁴¹⁴ The statement made by an international monitor observing elections includes good signs for the future of Palestinian politics:

Not only Fatah but also Hamas and the Popular Front were affected by the elections. At one point the leadership of HAMAS and the PFLP from within the West Bank and the Gaza Strip decided to run for the Council and support the elections. In the end, however, they were forced by their outside leadership to withdraw their candidates. Nevertheless, the inside HAMAS leadership actually did encourage supporters to vote. The fact that there was a 90 percent turnout in some of the HAMAS-dominated areas of Gaza makes it clear that they understood the importance their constituents placed in the entire process and, therefore, the need to establish independence from their outside leadership.⁴¹⁵

Nevertheless, the fact that participation of the Palestinians does not constitute a vote for the Oslo agreement and does not mean that they have accepted all the terms and conditions of the peace. The most can be said that the Palestinians accepted the elections as part of a given reality. For example, Haidar Abdel-Shafi in Gaza and Abdel-Jawed Saleh in Ramallah,

⁴¹² Quandt, "The Urge...", 7.

⁴¹³ Shimon Peres, "Unplugged," *Middle East Quarterly* 2 no.1 (March 1995), 76

⁴¹⁴ *Al-Ahram*, 1-7 February 1996.

⁴¹⁵ *Al-Ahram*, 1-7 February 1996.

in spite of their criticisms of the current political process, won in their districts by large majorities.⁴¹⁶ The radical forces must be convinced that there is no contradiction between the task of confronting the Oslo and the Israeli administration and the need to build a democratic political life for the Palestinians. Palestinians and Israelis, on the other hand, both must prepare themselves to accept the results of the elections to be held in future in Palestine, even if the PLO fails. Otherwise, the result may be Lebanonization of Gaza. In that respect, the Palestinian municipal elections to be held in 1996 is an opportunity for Turkey and the rest of the world to show their interests in Palestine's democratization efforts.

Lastly, if we turn our attention to the economics of Gaza, life conditions are deteriorating. People complain that they saw no fruit of peace., The GNP of the Gaza fell below 30-50 percent in the five years following the emergence of Intifada. The most damaging effect has been coming from the closure of the Israeli market. The combination of severe economic condition with continued political inaction has caused a psychological exhaustion in the Gaza.⁴¹⁷

The need for building prosperity in Palestine is apparent. This may be in a common market with Israel and Jordan. It may even be within a greater coalition to include Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Turkey and so on. If both sides pay heed to the balance of power issue, according to the realities of the region, it will not only be a dream. Some international organizations and developed countries have promised aid to foster the Palestinian economy. Beyond pouring money in, there is a need for technical assistance in all branches of the economy ranging from finance to industry. At the same time, Israel must not turn the situation in Palestine into a new kind of dependency

⁴¹⁶ Al-Ahram, 8-14 February 1996.

⁴¹⁷ Roy, "Gaza: New....," 21-23.

and must not exploit the weaknesses of Palestinians on vital issues such as water and land. Peace itself be a big economic gain for Israel. If the Middle East is politically stable, investment money in the form of equities will come to Israel. The cost of a stable Middle East will build Palestinian prosperity.

In addition to a democratic government, an open-market economy is a must for Palestine to adopt in the world community. It also suits the interests of Israelis. The Israelis must accept a new Palestinian state only with possible few links to Israel. On the Palestinian side, the need is to personalize the results of peace both economically and politically for each individual to include all segments of society.

APPENDICES

1. DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES ON INTERIM SELF-GOVERNMENT ARRANGEMENT

Date: 13 September 1993

The Government of the State of Israel and the PLO team (in the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to the Middle East Peace Conference) (the "Palestinian Delegation"), representing the Palestinian people, agree that it is time to put an end to decades of confrontation and conflict, recognize their mutual legitimate and political rights, and strive to live in peaceful coexistence and mutual dignity and security and achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement and historic reconciliation through the agreed political process. Accordingly, the two sides agree to the following principles:

Article I

AIM OF THE NEGOTIATIONS

The aim of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations within the current Middle East peace process is, among other things, to establish a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, the elected Council (the "Council"), for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, for a transitional period not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

It is understood that the interim arrangements are an integral part of the whole peace process and that the negotiations on the permanent status will lead to the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

Article II

FRAMEWORK FOR THE INTERIM PERIOD

The agreed framework for the interim period is set forth in this Declaration of Principles.

Article III

ELECTIONS

1. In order that the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip may govern themselves according to democratic principles, direct, free and general political elections will be held for the Council under agreed supervision and international observation, while the Palestinian police will ensure public order.

2. An agreement will be concluded on the exact mode and conditions of the elections in accordance with the protocol attached as Annex 1, with the goal of holding the elections not later than nine months after the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles.

3. These elections will constitute a significant interim preparatory step toward the realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements.

Article IV

JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations. The two sides view the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, whose integrity will be preserved during the interim period.

Article V

TRANSITIONAL PERIOD AND PERMANENT STATUS NEGOTIATIONS

1. The five-year transitional period will begin upon the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area.

2. Permanent status negotiations will commence as soon as possible, but not later than the beginning of the third year of the interim period, between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian people representatives.

3. It is understood that these negotiations shall cover remaining issues, including: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with other neighbors, and other issues of common interest.

4. The two parties agree that the outcome of the permanent status negotiations should not be prejudiced or preempted by agreements reached for the interim period.

Article VI

PREPARATORY TRANSFER OF POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

1. Upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles and the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area, a transfer of authority from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the authorized Palestinians for this task, as detailed herein, will commence. This transfer of authority will be of a preparatory nature until the inauguration of the Council.

2. Immediately after the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles and the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, with the view to promoting economic development in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, authority will be transferred to the Palestinians on the following spheres: education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, and tourism. The Palestinian side will commence in building the Palestinian police force, as agreed upon. Pending the inauguration of the Council, the two parties may negotiate the transfer of additional powers and responsibilities, as agreed upon.

Article VII

INTERIM AGREEMENT

1. The Israeli and Palestinian delegations will negotiate an agreement on the interim period (the "Interim Agreement").

2. The Interim Agreement shall specify, among other things, the structure of the Council, the number of its members, and the transfer of powers and responsibilities from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the Council. The Interim Agreement shall also specify the Council's executive authority, legislative authority in accordance with Article IX below, and the independent Palestinian judicial organs.

3. The Interim Agreement shall include arrangements, to be implemented upon the inauguration of the Council, for the assumption by the Council of all of the powers and responsibilities transferred previously in accordance with Article VI above.

4. In order to enable the Council to promote economic growth, upon its inauguration, the Council will establish, among other things, a Palestinian Electricity Authority, a Gaza Sea Port Authority, a Palestinian Development Bank, a Palestinian Export Promotion Board, a Palestinian Environmental Authority, a Palestinian Land Authority and a Palestinian Water Administration Authority, and any other Authorities agreed upon, in accordance with the Interim Agreement that will specify their powers and responsibilities.

5. After the inauguration of the Council, the Civil Administration will be dissolved, and the Israeli military government will be withdrawn.

Article VIII

PUBLIC ORDER AND SECURITY

In order to guarantee public order and internal security for the Palestinians of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the Council will establish a strong police force, while Israel will continue to carry the responsibility for

defending against external threats, as well as the responsibility for overall security of Israelis for the purpose of safeguarding their internal security and public order.

Article IX

LAWS AND MILITARY ORDERS

1. The Council will be empowered to legislate, in accordance with the Interim Agreement, within all authorities transferred to it.
2. Both parties will review jointly laws and military orders presently in force in remaining spheres.

Article X

JOINT ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN LIAISON COMMITTEE

In order to provide for a smooth implementation of this Declaration of Principles and any subsequent agreements pertaining to the interim period, upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, a Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee will be established in order to deal with issues requiring coordination, other issues of common interest, and disputes.

Article XI

ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN COOPERATION IN ECONOMIC FIELDS.

Recognizing the mutual benefit of cooperation in promoting the development of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and Israel, upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, an Israeli-Palestinian Economic Cooperation Committee will be established in order to develop and implement in a cooperative manner the programs identified in the protocols attached as Annex III and Annex IV.

Article XII

LIAISON AND COOPERATION WITH JORDAN AND EGYPT

The two parties will invite the Governments of Jordan and Egypt to participate in establishing further liaison and cooperation arrangements

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between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian representatives, on the one hand, and the Governments of Jordan and Egypt, on the other hand, to promote cooperation between them. These arrangements will include the constitution of a Continuing Committee that will decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder. Other matters of common concern will be dealt with by this Committee.

Article XIII

REDEPLOYMENT OF ISRAELI FORCES

1. After the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, and not later than the eve of elections for the Council, a redeployment of Israeli military forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will take place, in addition to withdrawal of Israeli forces carried out in accordance with Article XIV.

2. In redeploying its military forces, Israel will be guided by the principle that its military forces should be redeployed outside populated areas.

3. Further redeployments to specified locations will be gradually implemented commensurate with the assumption of responsibility for public order and internal security by the Palestinian police force pursuant to Article VIII above.

Article XIV

ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE GAZA STRIP AND JERICHO AREA

Israel will withdraw from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, as detailed in the protocol attached as Annex 11.

Article XV

RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES

1. Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of this Declaration of Principles, or any subsequent agreements pertaining to the interim period, shall be resolved by negotiations through the Joint Liaison Committee to be established pursuant to Article X above.

2. Disputes which cannot be settled by negotiations may be resolved by a mechanism of conciliation to be agreed upon by the parties.

3. The parties may agree to submit to arbitration disputes relating to the interim period, which cannot be settled through conciliation. To this end, upon the agreement of both parties, the parties will establish an Arbitration Committee.

Article XVI

ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN COOPERATION CONCERNING REGIONAL PROGRAMS

Both parties view the multilateral working groups as an appropriate instrument for promoting a "Marshall Plan," the regional programs and other programs, including special programs for the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as indicated in the protocol attached as Annex IV.

Article XVII

MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

1. This Declaration of Principles will enter into force one month after its signing.

2. All protocols annexed to this Declaration of Principles and Agreed Minutes pertaining thereto shall be regarded as an integral part hereof.

DONE at Washington, DC, this thirteenth day of September, 1993.

For the Government of Israel: (SHIMON PERES)

For the PLO: (MAHMOUD ABBAS)

Witnessed By: The United States of America: (WARREN CHRISTOPHER)

The Russian Federation: (ANDREI KOZYREV)

ANNEX I

PROTOCOL ON THE MODE AND CONDITIONS OF ELECTIONS

1. Palestinians of Jerusalem who live there will have the right to participate in the election process, according to an agreement between the two sides.

2. In addition, the election agreement should cover, among other things, the following issues:

a. the system of elections;

b. the mode of the agreed supervision and international observation and their personal composition; and

c. rules and regulations regarding election campaign, including agreed arrangements for the organizing of mass media, and the possibility of licensing a broadcasting and TV station.

3. The future status of displaced Palestinians who were registered on 4th June 1967 will not be prejudiced because they are unable to participate in the election process due to practical reasons.

ANNEX II

PROTOCOL ON WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES FROM THE GAZA STRIP AND JERICHO AREA

1. The two sides will conclude and sign within two months from the date of entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, an agreement on the withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area. This agreement will include comprehensive arrangements to apply in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area subsequent to the Israeli withdrawal.

2. Israel will implement an accelerated and scheduled withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, beginning immediately with the signing of the agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho area and to be completed within a period not exceeding four months after the signing of this agreement.

3. The above agreement will include, among other things:

a. Arrangements for a smooth and peaceful transfer of authority from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the Palestinian representatives.

b. Structure, powers and responsibilities of the Palestinian authority in these areas, except: external security, settlements, Israelis, foreign relations, and other mutually agreed matters.

c. Arrangements for the assumption of internal security and public order by the Palestinian police force consisting of police officers recruited locally and from abroad (holding Jordanian passports and Palestinian documents issued by Egypt). Those who will participate in the Palestinian police force coming from abroad should be trained as police and police officers.

d. A temporary international or foreign presence, as agreed upon.

e. Establishment of a joint Palestinian-Israeli Coordination and Cooperation Committee for mutual security purposes.

f. An economic development and stabilization program, including the establishment of an Emergency Fund, to encourage foreign investment, and financial and economic support. Both sides will coordinate and cooperate jointly and unilaterally with regional and international parties to support these aims.

g. Arrangements for a safe passage for persons and transportation between the Gaza Strip and Jericho area.

4. The above agreement will include arrangements for coordination between both parties regarding passages:

a. Gaza-Egypt; and

b. Jericho-Jordan.

5. The offices responsible for carrying out the powers and responsibilities of the Palestinian authority under this Annex II and Article VI of the Declaration of Principles will be located in the Gaza Strip and in the Jericho area pending the inauguration of the Council.

6. Other than these agreed arrangements, the status of the Gaza Strip and Jericho area will continue to be an integral part of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and will not be changed in the interim period.

ANNEX III

PROTOCOL ON ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN COOPERATION IN ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

The two sides agree to establish an Israeli-Palestinian Continuing Committee for Economic Cooperation, focusing, among other things, on the following:

1. Cooperation in the field of water, including a Water Development Program prepared by experts from both sides, which will also specify the mode of cooperation in the management of water resources in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and will include proposals for studies and plans on water rights of each party, as well as on the equitable utilization of joint water resources for implementation in and beyond the interim period.

2. Cooperation in the field of electricity, including an Electricity Development Program, which will also specify the mode of cooperation for the production, maintenance, purchase and sale of electricity resources.

3. Cooperation in the field of energy, including an Energy Development Program, which will provide for the exploitation of oil and gas for industrial purposes, particularly in the Gaza Strip and in the Negev, and will encourage further joint exploitation of other energy resources. This Program may also provide for the construction of a Petrochemical industrial complex in the Gaza Strip and the construction of oil and gas pipelines.
4. Cooperation in the field of finance, including a Financial Development and Action Program for the encouragement of international investment in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and in Israel, as well as the establishment of a Palestinian Development Bank.
5. Cooperation in the field of transport and communications, including a Program, which will define guidelines for the establishment of a Gaza Sea Port Area, and will provide for the establishing of transport and communications lines to and from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to Israel and to other countries. In addition, this Program will provide for carrying out the necessary construction of roads, railways, communications lines, etc.
6. Cooperation in the field of trade, including studies, and Trade Promotion Programs, which will encourage local, regional and inter-regional trade, as well as a feasibility study of creating free trade zones in the Gaza Strip and in Israel, mutual access to these zones, and cooperation in other areas related to trade and commerce.
7. Cooperation in the field of industry, including Industrial Development Programs, which will provide for the establishment of joint Israeli-Palestinian Industrial Research and Development Centers, will promote Palestinian-Israeli joint ventures, and provide guidelines for cooperation in the textile, food, pharmaceutical, electronics, diamonds, computer and science-based industries.

8. A program for cooperation in, and regulation of, labor relations and cooperation in social welfare issues.

9. A Human Resources Development and Cooperation Plan, providing for joint Israeli-Palestinian workshops and seminars, and for the establishment of joint vocational training centers, research institutes and data banks.

10. An Environmental Protection Plan, providing for joint and/or coordinated measures in this sphere.

11. A program for developing coordination and cooperation in the field of communication and media.

12. Any other programs of mutual interest.

ANNEX IV

PROTOCOL ON ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN COOPERATION CONCERNING REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

1. The two sides will cooperate in the context of the multilateral peace efforts in promoting a Development Program for the region, including the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, to be initiated by the G-7. The parties will request the G-7 to seek the participation in this program of other interested states, such as member,,; of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, regional Arab states and institutions, as well as members of the private sector.

2. The Development Program will consist of two elements:

- a. an Economic Development Program for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
- b. a Regional Economic Development Program.

A. The Economic Development Program for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will consist of the following elements:

(1) A Social Rehabilitation Program, including a Housing and Construction Program.

(2) A Small and Medium Business Development Plan.

(3) An Infrastructure Development Program (water, electricity, transportation and communications, etc.).

(4) A Human Resources Plan.

(5) Other programs.

B. The Regional Economic Development Program may consist of the following elements:

(1) The establishment of a Middle East Development Fund, as a first step, and a Middle East Development Bank, as a second step.

(2) The development of a joint Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian Plan for coordinated exploitation of the Dead Sea area.

(3) The Mediterranean Sea (Gaza)Dead Sea Canal.

(4) Regional Desalinization and other water development projects.

(5) A regional plan for agricultural development, including a coordinated regional effort for the prevention of desertification.

(6) Interconnection of electricity grids.

(7) Regional cooperation for the transfer, distribution and industrial exploitation of gas, oil and other energy resources.

(8) A Regional Tourism, Transportation and Telecommunications Development Plan.

(9) Regional cooperation in other spheres.

3. The two sides will encourage the multilateral working groups, and will coordinate towards their success. The two parties will encourage

intersessional activities, as well as pre-feasibility and feasibility studies, within the various multilateral working groups.

AGREED MINUTES TO THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES ON INTERIM SELF-GOVERNMENT ARRANGEMENTS A. GENERAL UNDERSTANDINGS AND AGREEMENTS

Any powers and responsibilities transferred to the Palestinians pursuant to the Declaration of Principles prior to the inauguration of the Council will be subject to the same principles pertaining to Article IV, as set out in these Agreed Minutes below.

B. SPECIFIC UNDERSTANDINGS AND AGREEMENTS

Article IV

It is understood that:

1. Jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations: Jerusalem, settlements, military locations, and Israelis.

2. The Council's jurisdiction will apply with regard to the agreed powers, responsibilities, spheres and authorities transferred to it.

Article VI(2)

It is agreed that the transfer of authority will be as follows:

1. The Palestinian side will inform the Israeli side of the names of the authorized Palestinians who will assume the powers, authorities and responsibilities that will be transferred to the Palestinians according to the Declaration of Principles in the following fields: education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, tourism, and any other authorities agreed upon.

2. It is understood that the rights and obligations of these offices will not be affected.

3. Each of the spheres described above will continue to enjoy existing budgetary allocations in accordance with arrangements to be

mutually agreed upon. These arrangements also will provide for the necessary adjustments required in order to take into account the taxes collected by the direct taxation office.

4. Upon the execution of the Declaration of Principles, the Israeli and Palestinian delegations will immediately commence negotiations on a detailed plan for the transfer of authority on the above offices in accordance with the above understandings.

Article VII(2)

The Interim Agreement will also include arrangements for coordination and cooperation.

Article VII(5)

The withdrawal of the military government will not prevent Israel from exercising the powers and responsibilities not transferred to the Council.

Article VIII

It is understood that the Interim Agreement will include arrangements for cooperation and coordination between the two parties in this regard. It is also agreed that the transfer of powers and responsibilities to the Palestinian police will be accomplished in a phased manner, as agreed in the Interim Agreement.

Article X

It is agreed that, upon the entry into force of the Declaration of Principles, the Israeli and Palestinian delegations will exchange the names of the individuals designated by them as members of the Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee. It is further agreed that each side will have an equal number of members in the Joint Committee. The Joint Committee will reach decisions by agreement. The Joint Committee may add other technicians and experts, as necessary. The Joint Committee will decide on the frequency and place or places of its meetings.

ANNEX II

It is understood that, subsequent to the Israeli withdrawal, Israel will continue to be responsible for external security, and for internal security and public order of settlements and Israelis. Israeli military forces and civilians may continue to use roads freely within the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area.

DONE at Washington, DC, this thirteenth day of September, 1993.

For the Government of Israel: (SHIMON PERES)

For the PLO: (MAHMOUD ABBAS)

Witnessed By: The United States of America: (WARREN CHRISTOPHER)

The Russian Federation: (ANDREI KOZYREV)

Source: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, **Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements**, (Jerusalem: Information Division, 1993).

2. THE LETTERS OF RECOGNITION

Date: 9 September 1993.

Arafat's letter to Rabin:

Mr. Prime Minister,

The signing of the Declaration of Principles marks a new era in the history of the Middle East. In firm conviction thereof, I would like to confirm the following PLO commitments.

The PLO recognizes the right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security

The PLO accepts United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

The PLO commits itself to the Middle East peace process, and to a peaceful Resolution of the conflict between the two sides and declares that all outstanding issues relating to permanent status will be resolved through negotiations.

The PLO considers that the signing of the Declaration of Principles constitutes a historic event, inaugurating a new epoch of peaceful coexistence, free from violence and all other acts which endanger peace and stability. Accordingly, the PLO renounces the use of terrorism and other acts of violence and will assume responsibility over all PLO elements and personnel in order to assure their compliance, prevent violations and discipline violators.

In view of the promise of a new era and the signing of the Declaration of Principles and based on Palestinian acceptance of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, the PLO affirms that those articles of the Palestinian Covenant which deny Israel's right to exist, and the provisions of

the covenant which are inconsistent with the commitments of this letter are now inoperative and no longer valid. Consequently, the PLO undertakes to submit to the Palestinian National Council for formal approval the necessary changes in regard to the Palestinian Covenant.

Sincerely,
Yasser Arafat
Chairman
The Palestine Liberation Organization

Rabin's letter:

September 9, 1993

Mr. Chairman,

In response to your letter of September 9, 1993, I wish to confirm to you that, in light of the PLO commitments included in your letter, the Government of Israel has decided to recognize the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people and commence negotiations with the PLO within the Middle East process.

Sincerely,
Yitzhak Rabin
Prime Minister of Israel

Source: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, **Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements**, (Jerusalem: Information Division, 1993).

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