

LIBERTY AS NON-DOMINATION: A CRITICAL DISCUSSION

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Thesis Abstract

Tuğba Sevinç, “Liberty as Non-domination: A Critical Discussion”

This thesis aims at analyzing Philip Pettit’s notion of domination with a view to examining the republican conception of political liberty as non-domination. To do so, the definition and the harms of domination are examined to comprehend political liberty as non-domination and the ways of establishing it. Pettit’s account of political liberty is criticized for being insufficient for two different reasons. First, Pettit’s notion of domination is too narrow to give a comprehensive account of political liberty as non-domination. In order to illustrate a more satisfactory account of domination; Young’s conception of domination and the relation between domination and oppression, Bartky’s view of psychological oppression, and Sen’s theory of “adaptive preference formation” are introduced. Second, Pettit’s notion of equality is criticized for being insufficient. Regarding Pettit’s claim that liberty is a matter of status equality, three forms of status equality are introduced; structural equality, material equality and cultural status equality. Since Pettit argues only for equality before the law, he is criticized for undervaluing the importance of material equality and ignoring the matters regarding cultural status equality. In order to illustrate a more satisfactory account of equality, the dialectic between three forms of equality and their relation to liberty are examined. Considering the critiques about the insufficiency of Pettit’s account of liberty, the scope of state activity is examined with the help of real world examples. When the notions of domination and equality are considered extensively, the scope of state activity must be wider than it is in Pettit’s account of liberty.

Tez Özeti

Tuğba Sevinç, “Tahakkümün Yokluğu Olarak Özgürlük: Eleştirel Bir Tartışma”

Bu tezin yazılış amacı cumhuriyetçilerin tahakkümün-yokluğu olarak kavramsallaştırdıkları politik özgürlüğü kavrayabilmek için Philip Pettit’in tahakküm kavramını incelemektir. Bunun için; tahakkümün tanımı ve zararları, tahakkümün-yokluğu olarak tanımlanan politik özgürlüğü ve onu tesis edebilmenin yollarını kavramak üzere incelenmektedir. Pettit’in tahakküm kavramı iki farklı nedenden dolayı yetersiz olmakla eleştirilmektedir. Öncelikle, Pettit’in tahakküm kavramı, tahakkümün-yokluğu şeklinde tanımlanan politik özgürlüğe kapsamlı bir açıklama verebilmek için çok sınırlıdır. Tahakküm kavramına daha kapsamlı bir açıklama verebilmek üzere, Young’ın tahakküm kavramı ve tahakkümün baskı ile olan ilişkisi, Bartky’nin psikolojik baskı görüşü ve Sen’in “edinilmiş tercih oluşturma” teorisi incelenmektedir. İkinci olarak, Pettit’in eşitlik kavramı yetersiz olmakla eleştirilmektedir. Pettit’in özgürlüğün bir eşitlik meselesi olduğu şeklindeki savı ile ilişkilendirilerek, literatürde etraflıca tartışılmış üç farklı eşitlik biçimi özetlenmekte ve Pettit’in bunlarla ilgili düşünceleri incelenmektedir. Sadece hukuk önündeki eşitliği bir özgürlük problemi olarak görmesi nedeniyle, Pettit, maddi eşitliği hafife alması ve kültürel statü eşitliği ile ilgili konulara ise hiç değinmemesi nedeniyle eleştirilmektedir. Bu bağlamda, eşitlik kavramına daha kapsamlı bir açıklama verebilmek üzere, üç farklı eşitlik biçimi arasındaki dialektik ilişki ve bu eşitlik biçimlerinin politik özgürlük ile ilişkisi incelenmektedir. Pettit’in özgürlük teorisinin yetersizliği ile ilgili bu çalışmada yapılan eleştiriler doğrultusunda, devletin faaliyetlerinin kapsamı ve amacı bazı örnekler verilerek incelenmektedir. Tahakküm ve eşitlik kavramları daha kapsamlı olarak ele alındığında, devletin tahakkümün ortadan kaldırılması için yapacağı çalışmaların kapsamının da Pettit’in savunduğundan daha geniş olması gerektiği sonucu çıkmaktadır.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

There are two camps in the tradition of political philosophy regarding the definition of liberty. Berlin, in his famous work “Two Concepts of Liberty”, argues that there are two distinct conceptions of liberty. These are negative and positive liberty. Berlin defines negative liberty as non-interference.¹ According to the negative conception of liberty, one is free to the degree to which no one interferes with his or her activity; liberty is the *absence* of interference. By contrast, positive liberty is self-mastery. Berlin states that positive liberty is the *presence* of self-mastery.² In this account, I am free to the degree to which my life and decisions depend on myself and not on others. Between these two rival camps, Pettit’s notion of liberty is clearly a negative one as he manifestly states. To him, liberty is the absence of domination.³

Pettit’s conception of liberty as non-domination is inspired by Skinner’s historical analysis of the classical republicans. Skinner argues that there is an alternative/ a third conception of liberty in the history of political thought. In his work *Liberty Before Liberalism*, he argues that this alternative conception of liberty first appears in the thoughts of Machiavelli and afterwards in the thoughts of neo-

¹ Isaac Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty,” *Four Essays on Liberty* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 122.

² *Ibid.*, p. 131.

³ Philip Pettit, *Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 22.

roman republicans.⁴ According to the classical republicans, liberty is something more than non-interference. For them, what threatens liberty is not the exercise of power on an arbitrary basis –interference– but also the existence of that power –mastery. In this respect, Skinner asserts that the republican conception of liberty is an alternative to the conceptions of positive and negative liberty. Then, he clarifies in what respects the republican conception of liberty differs from the other two conceptions of liberty. Skinner claims that the republican conception of liberty is different from the positive conception of liberty as self-mastery. Unlike the positive conception of liberty, the republican conception of liberty does not engage with ideas of self-realization or self-fulfillment. In addition, Skinner claims that the republican conception of liberty also differs from the negative conception of liberty as non-interference because it reconciles liberty with the notions of law, civic virtue and civic duty.⁵ Skinner argues that republican freedom is both non-interference and non-domination.⁶ Pettit asserts

⁴ Neo-roman republicans consist of Machiavelli and his fifteenth-century Italian predecessors; the English republicans Milton, Harrington, Sidney, and others; Montesquieu and Blackstone; the eighteenth-century English commonwealthmen; and many Americans of the founding era such as Jefferson and Madison. Lovett, Frank. 19 June 2006. "Republicanism," In *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Available [online]: "<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/republicanism/> [11 June 2008]. Pettit, *Republicanism*. Quentin Skinner, *Liberty Before Liberalism* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

⁵ See also Quentin Skinner, "The Idea of Negative Liberty: Philosophical and Historical Perspectives," In *Philosophy in History*. Edited by Richard Rorty, J. B. Schneewind and Quentin Skinner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp.193-219. Quentin Skinner, "The Paradoxes of Political Liberty," In *Tanner Lectures on Human Values*. Edited by Sterling M. McMurrin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), pp. 227-235.

⁶ Skinner disagrees with Pettit regarding the definition of republican liberty. According to Pettit, republican liberty is only non-domination. That is the absence of capacity for arbitrary interference by others. By contrast, for Skinner liberty is both non-interference and non-domination. Skinner argues that the classical republican thinkers do not have any problem with the idea of non-interference. Rather, they think that liberty as non-interference is insufficient. In this respect, Skinner says "Pettit imputes to the defenders of 'republican' freedom the view that, since it is only arbitrary domination that limits individual liberty, the act of obeying a law to which you have given your consent is 'entirely consistent with freedom'. The writers I am discussing never deal in such paradoxes. For them the difference between the rule of law and government by personal prerogative is not that the former leaves you in full possession of your liberty while the latter does not; it is rather that the former only coerces you while the latter additionally leaves you in a state of dependence." (Skinner, *Liberty*, p. 83). Replying Skinner, Pettit states that according to the classical republicans, arbitrary interference is worse than non-arbitrary interference. What they mean by republican liberty is only non-domination,

that, according to Skinner, republican liberty is the joint antonym of interference and domination.⁷

Though Pettit disagrees with Skinner about the antonym of liberty, he agrees with Skinner that republican freedom is an alternative to liberty as non-interference and liberty as self-mastery. He states that republican freedom borrows certain insights from positive and negative conceptions of liberty. He claims that republican freedom has one conceptual element in common with the negative conception of freedom: the focus on *absence*, not presence; and one conceptual element in common with the positive conception of freedom: the focus on *mastery*, not interference. He concludes that republican liberty is *the absence of mastery by others*. He states “...the republican tradition is associated with precisely this conception of freedom as non-mastery or, as I prefer to say, non-domination.”⁸ Pettit manifestly claims that republicanism differs from liberalism with respect to its understanding of political liberty.⁹

In addition to the distinction between positive and negative liberty, at the very outset it is necessary to distinguish the versions of contemporary republicanism and

and nothing else. On this account, Pettit argues the antonym of liberty is only domination. For the whole discussion, Skinner, *Liberty*, p. 83. Philip Pettit, “Keeping Republican Freedom Simple: On a Difference with Quentin Skinner,” *Political Theory* 30, no. 3 (June 2002), pp. 339-356.

⁷ He summarizes the disagreement between him and Skinner as follows. “The issue between Skinner and me is whether in giving an account of republican liberty, we should prioritize domination as the antonym of freedom or equate domination and interference as part of joint antonym. See Pettit, “Keeping,” p. 342.

⁸ Pettit, *Republicanism*, p. 22.

⁹ Larmore argues that Pettit’s conception of republican liberty has many attractive features when compared to liberty as non-interference. Yet, his conception of liberalism is overly simplified. Pettit claims that republicanism differs from liberalism in many respects. Larmore argues that if Pettit talks about Hobbes when he says liberals, it is true that republicanism differs from liberalism. But, if we consider Locke, Rawls and Dworkin, the distinction between republicanism and liberalism disappears. Larmore, Charles. (n.d). “A Critique of Philip Pettit’s Republicanism”. Available [online]: “http://www.luiss.it/ricerca/centri/cersdu/attivita_di_ricerca/paperscoll/RepublicanismLiberalism.PDF [25 April 2008].

to figure out to which Pettit belongs. There are two rival camps in contemporary republicanism regarding the meaning of political liberty in the classical republican tradition. Modern republicans disagree about the status of political goods e.g. participation, civic virtues, civic duties and the function of law. Civic humanists – including Arendt, Wood, Pocock, Worden, and Rahe– argue that active political participation, civic virtues, civic duties, the function of law and so on, should be understood in the classical republican tradition as *intrinsically* valuable components of human flourishing and good life. According to civic humanists –especially according to Arendt, these ideas of the good life are rooted in the experience of ancient Greek polis and in the writings of Aristotle. On the other hand, civic republicans –including Skinner, Pettit and Viroli– argue that these goods are *instrumentally* valuable for securing and preserving political liberty.¹⁰ Between these rival camps, Philip Pettit belongs to the civic republican tradition. He considers goods like participation, active citizenship, civic virtues and civic duties as instrumentally valuable to reach the republican ideal of non-domination.

Pettit defines political liberty as non-domination. According to him, domination is the capacity for arbitrary interference. In this account, what generates domination is that someone has a capacity for arbitrary interference. In this respect, he asserts that liberty is the absence of the capacity for arbitrary interference. Pettit endorses the fundamental idea of the republican tradition and claims that not only the exercise but the existence of the capacity for arbitrary interference threatens liberty. In this respect, his contribution to the discussions of political liberty is significant. However, I will claim that his conception of domination is insufficient to give a comprehensive account of domination.

¹⁰ Lovett, “Republicanism”.

In Chapter II, I will analyze Pettit's conception of domination. Pettit asserts the necessity of three conditions to be able to say that one dominates the other. After explaining these conditions, I will present certain characteristics of domination. While comparing the life of domination to the life of non-domination, Pettit asserts that domination harms individuals in certain ways. On the contrary, liberty as non-domination would bring certain benefits, which would emerge as a result of the elimination of domination –the elimination of the harms that domination causes. Even though he considers certain harms of domination, I claim that he disregards some others. I believe that these unconsidered harms of domination have to be examined seriously in their relation to liberty.

In addition, I will briefly discuss the historical origins of the notion of republican freedom. My aim will be that the neo-roman republicans' conception of liberty mirrors their particular complaints under the rule of a powerful king. In this respect, I think their understanding of the harms of slavery is restricted to the particular experience of neo-roman republicans, in which the elected parliament was subject to the arbitrary will of the king. Therefore, I will argue that they disregarded some of the harms of a life of slavery. In my opinion, following the neo-roman republicans, Pettit disregards certain harms such as the underdeveloped capacities for self-expression and self-evaluation, mental conditioning or distorted self-image and material deprivation.

In Chapter III, to give a more comprehensive account of domination and its harms, I will extensively use Young's analysis of domination and oppression¹¹ and

¹¹ Iris M. Young. *Justice and the Politics of Difference*, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1990).

briefly mention Bartky's analysis of psychological oppression.¹² Young is important for the purposes of my thesis for the following reasons. First, Young argues for positive freedom when she argues for the importance of autonomy and the value of participation in maintaining a just society. Second, Young's view comprises the contemporary discussions of slavery, hence domination. She is influenced by Marx's analysis of wage-slavery as well as Foucault's analysis of administrative society. In what follows, drawing on Young's theory: I will argue that a life of domination hinders certain human capacities of evaluation and self-expression, which I find very crucial for liberty. Drawing on Bartky's theory, I will argue that a life of domination forms certain inner constraints to individual freedom.

My position will be based on two basic claims. First, a life of domination results in undeveloped capacities of evaluation and expression of one's needs, interests, and experiences. I think that these capacities are important for participation, whether they are conceived as instrumentally or intrinsically valuable. I believe that these capacities are also important for Pettit who conceives participation as a tool to avoid state domination. He thinks that the more people participate, the less the state will be dominating.¹³ Second, the life of domination forms certain inner constraints to liberty. It damages the way people understand themselves and their belief in what they are capable of. False beliefs about one's self mislead people about their interests and desires. From a different perspective, Elster explains that people form adaptive preferences under certain circumstances. He says that when there is a tension

¹² Sandra Bartky. *Femininity and Domination: Studies in the Phenomenology of Oppression (Thinking Gender)* (New York: Routledge, 1990).

¹³ According to Pettit, for the state to be non-dominating, the citizens should participate in decision mechanisms. Otherwise, state interference will be dominating since it does not track the interests of the citizens. I will discuss these points later in Chapter II.

between people's desires and the possibility of their satisfaction, they either re-forms their desires rationally or prefer certain escape mechanisms that mostly operate at an unconscious level. In what follows, though he desires X be the case, to get rid of the tension "the desires may be changed so that he comes to desire that X not be the case".¹⁴ The dominated people might have adapted preferences and I will claim that liberty requires the reconsideration of these preferences. On this account, I will introduce Sen's notion of "adaptive preference formation" and its relation to liberty.¹⁵ According to Sen, dominated people have a disposition to form adaptive preferences. People who lack security might adapt the preferences of the powerful. I will also introduce his notion of freedom as capabilities –the existence of real alternative functioning sets or people's ability to choose among alternative life styles. As the discussion goes on, I will prefer Sen's account to Bartky's account. It is important to note that Bartky's view of psychologism has some disadvantages as Fraser says.¹⁶ In this respect, after mentioning them briefly, I will state my reasons for preferring Sen's account to Bartky's account.

In Chapter IV, I aim to analyze the relationship between status equality and domination. To this end, first I classify different kinds of "status equality". I group them into three categories. These are *structural status equality*, *material equality* and *cultural status equality*. I will show that Pettit only argues for structural status equality, which no one rejects today. He plainly argues that material equality is not a necessary condition of freedom. He says that it would be good if there were also

¹⁴ Jon Elster, *Alchemies of The Mind: Rationality and Emotions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 21.

¹⁵ Amartya Sen, *Development as Freedom* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).

¹⁶ Nancy Fraser, "Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics: Redistribution, Recognition and Participation", In *Redistribution or Recognition: A Political and Philosophical Exchange* (New York: Verso, 2003).

material equality but it is not necessary for non-domination. In addition, Pettit seems to ignore the whole literature of cultural status equality. I will critically discuss Pettit's attitude of separating structural status equality from the rest. I will claim that it is impossible to eliminate domination without giving them equal weight in policy making. In this account, I will benefit from Fraser's theory of perspectival dualism, in which she claims that recognition and distribution are two equally important aspects of justice. Following Fraser, I will argue the importance of multi-dimensional strategies. I will argue that in eliminating domination we should consider material and cultural inequalities together.

It is important to make a further clarification about my intentions in this work. I do not only want to show that Pettit's conception of domination is insufficient to give a comprehensive account of political liberty. Since Pettit also suggests the ways to eliminate domination, namely the rule of law and the contribution of legal and institutional arrangements, I will evaluate the efficiency of his republican policies. In this respect, I will claim that when we conceive domination as narrowly as Pettit conceives it, the remedies we will suggest to eliminate it will be limited to our narrow conception of domination. I will make my point clearer with the following analogy. Consider that you go to a doctor because you do not feel well. The doctor says that you have a cold that is why you cough that much. He suggests that you take a certain medicine. Provided that your illness is more serious than the doctor says, the medicine will not be enough to remedy your illness. Though giving medicine is the right sort of behavior, it carries the risk of being ineffective if the illness is not diagnosed adequately. Therefore, to cure an illness it is very important to know exactly what the illness is. Otherwise the cure will be insufficient. Throughout his work, *Republicanism*, Pettit argues that the power of "the rule of law" establishes and

secures liberty as non-domination. At this point I agree with Pettit that legal arrangements are the only means that the state can employ.¹⁷ My claim is that since Pettit understands domination in a limited way, his suggestions to eliminate it will be ineffective too. In other words, I will claim that he does not diagnose the illness adequately, so the remedy he suggests will be ineffective.

In the conclusion part, I will argue that to be able to define liberty as non-domination, we have to consider the harms that hinder people's capacity for freedom as non-domination. Non-domination cannot be maintained by the legal and institutional arrangements where their task is only to eliminate capacities for the arbitrary interference of others. Admitting that these additional harms are barrier to liberty as non-domination, the state must also devise policies to deal with them. In what follows, the task of the state in promoting liberty has to be extended beyond the task of eliminating the capacity of arbitrary interference of others. It has to include policies that help people to develop their capacities significant to liberty as non-domination, as well as empower them in the conditions in which they make choices. The State activity should consider material inequalities, the mental conditioning of the dominated people and their underdeveloped capacities as the harms of domination and develop policies to recover them in its fight against domination. On this account, I will argue the importance of affirmative action policies, which aim to remedy the ill-effects of past occurrences of domination and to compensate for the past deprivation of the dominated people. I will give some examples to illustrate how the state could eliminate domination with respect to the remarks made in this work.

To summarize, in my thesis I hope to defend the following claims. Pettit's account of domination is incomplete and a more comprehensive account of

¹⁷ My intention is not to examine the relation between "the rule of law" and liberty, which can be a subject matter of another thesis.

domination is necessary to conceptualize political liberty as non-domination. In this respect, Young's and Bartky's analysis of domination are helpful to complete Pettit's account of domination. However, they fail to describe the means in eliminating domination. In other words, though Young and Bartky diagnose the illness and inform us about the damages of slavery, they do not suggest any remedy to eliminate it. In this manner, Pettit's theory is richer than that of Bartky and Young. He suggests active state policy as a mean to eliminate domination. However, Pettit's republican policies are too abstract and he does not give any concrete examples. This makes it very difficult to understand the republican project and its scope. In addition, since Pettit's account of domination is too narrow, his policy suggestions will be ineffective to eliminate domination completely. I will suggest that legal and institutional arrangements are the only way to eliminate domination. However, their efficiency lies in whether they conceive the additional harms of domination as a threat to liberty as non-domination or not.

CHAPTER II

PETTIT'S NOTION OF DOMINATION

Pettit claims that one dominates another if and only if s/he has a power of interference on an arbitrary basis.¹⁸ In this chapter, I will explicate the notion of domination. I shall examine what Pettit means by power, interference and arbitrariness respectively. Moreover, to illustrate the characteristics of domination, I shall present what I see as the most important features of domination. These include the following ideas: domination is objectively identifiable; admits degrees; might be more or less intense; and might not affect all spheres of existence at all times but may be well limited to a few areas and may not necessarily affect all spheres of existence at all times. I shall also examine Pettit's claim that both domination and non-domination are and must be matters of common knowledge. When there is domination, people know that one is superior and has a power to interfere on an arbitrary basis and the other knows that s/he is subordinate and might be the object of arbitrary power. Likewise, non-domination must be a matter of common knowledge. Everyone must know that they are equals. The previously dominating agent must know that s/he cannot use his or her power on an arbitrary basis any more. The previously dominated person must know that s/he is immune from any interference on an arbitrary basis. According to Pettit, the other important characteristic of domination is that when someone is dominated, it is always with respect to being a

¹⁸ Pettit, *Republicanism*, p. 52.

member of a “certain class or kind”.¹⁹ A person is dominated because s/he is black, or female, or old, or poor. In addition, Pettit claims that domination harms people in certain ways and non-domination has certain benefits, which emerge as a result of the elimination of domination. I shall explain these points and their relevance later in this chapter.

Pettit sets forth the presence of three conditions to be able to say that one dominates the other. He claims that (1) the dominator must “have the capacity to interfere”, (2) interference must be exercised “on an arbitrary basis”²⁰, and (3) it must be exercised “in certain choices that the other is in a position to make”.²¹ In addition, he emphasizes that domination always aims at worsening the agent’s situation.²² Pettit considers a wide range of actions as interference such as the coercion of the body (as in restraint or obstruction), the coercion of the will (as in punishment or the threat of punishment), and manipulation (as in agenda-fixing, the deceptive and non-rational shaping of people’s beliefs or desires).²³ Pettit claims that all acts of interference, whether they are coercive or manipulative, aim to worsen the agent’s choice situation. Interference worsens the agent’s choice situation by changing either the options available to the agent or the cost of certain actions, and makes them less desirable to the agent. Pettit thinks that only intentional actions of the agents are counted as interference. He excludes non-intentional actions as interference. He

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 144.

²⁰ According to Pettit, an action can be both arbitrary and performed systematically. The systematic character of actions does not exclude the fact that they are arbitrary. This point will be clearer when I discuss “arbitrariness” in detail in this chapter.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 52.

²² Actions with good intentions are counted as dominating if they worsen the agent’s choice situation. Unintentional actions are not considered as dominating even though they worsen the agent’s choice situation. Philip Pettit, “The Domination Complaint”, *Nomos* 46, (2005), p. 93.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 53.

asserts that for any act to be counted as interference, it must worsen the agent's choice situation, even if it is for the person's overall good. He says "[a]n act of interference may be done for the good of the victim, and may be successful in achieving that good, and yet be arbitrary."²⁴ He adds that contextual conventions and expectations may be involved in determining whether an act worsens the agent's situation.²⁵ For instance, if you are the only doctor in town, you will have an extreme power on those that might need you. Whereas being a doctor does not produce such an extreme power under normal circumstances, in a context where there is only one doctor available it produces an extreme power for arbitrary interference.

Pettit claims that any act is arbitrary provided that "it is chosen or not chosen at the agent's pleasure" and that it is chosen or rejected "without reference to the interests, or the opinions, of those affected".²⁶ In this sense, in addition to individual actions, a system of law can be arbitrary when it does not take into consideration those who are affected. For instance, a tyranny might have rules and these rules might be perfectly known by those who are governed. They are not arbitrary in the sense that people know what the tyrant could do to them when they do not obey the rules. Yet, they are arbitrary in the sense that the tyrant does not consider the interest of the people he governs and that he has a right to act according to what would please him. According to Pettit, even the laws in the modern systems of democracy might be arbitrary and dominating. In his later works, he formulates what makes an act arbitrary in a different manner. He claims that any act of interference is arbitrary if "in choosing to interfere, the dominating agent is not forced to track the avowed

²⁴ Pettit, "Complaint", p. 93.

²⁵ Pettit, *Republicanism*, pp. 53-54; Pettit "Complaint", p. 93.

²⁶ Pettit, *Republicanism*, p. 55.

interests of the individual interfered with.”²⁷ In addition, Pettit claims that not all acts of interference are arbitrary. There might be interferences that are non-arbitrary. To Pettit, “[a]n act of interference will be non-arbitrary to the extent that it is forced to track the interests and ideas of the person suffering the interference.”²⁸ When the laws consider the interests of people; then though they interfere with people, they are not dominating.²⁹ I will discuss how the agent might be forced to track the interest of the individual affected when I examine the strategies to establish non-domination later in this chapter.

Pettit asserts that there are three respects in which domination admits degrees. First, the dominating agent may have a greater or lesser capacity to interfere on an arbitrary basis. That is, the area of interference might be more or less accessible or uncostly to the agent. Consider the following case. An employer’s capacity for arbitrary interference with workers is greater when there is a high rate of unemployment. The act of interference is accessible and uncostly to the employer. Second, the dominating agent has a capacity to interfere more or less arbitrarily. The dominating agent might be more or less unburdened by constraints designed to force

²⁷ Pettit, “Complaint”, p. 93.

²⁸ Pettit, *Republicanism*, p. 55.

²⁹ The republicans insist on the idea that if the state is forced to track the common good, then it does not dominate its citizens. However, as Pettit points out, the problem is to identify what the common good is. Pettit claims that when common good refers to “people’s common net interests”, it is impossible to find out a single set of common net interests. People’s common net interest is always various. No single set of practices and policies could ever be in the avowable net interest of each, since free-riding will always be a desirable alternative. Imagine that the state imposes a tax on the citizens. Then one of them might claim that his interest is not to pay the tax. He might prefer that others pay the tax so that he will enjoy a free ride. Therefore, benefiting from the analysis of Brian Barry, he claims that common good refers to the people’s common interest as members of the public or as citizens. He introduces the notion of role interest instead of net interest. And he suggests finding the interest of people as citizens rather than their net interest. I will not get into the details of this discussion here. See Philip Pettit, “The Common Good”. In *Justice and Democracy: Essays for Brian Barry*. Edited by Keith Dowding, Robert E. Goodin and Carole Pateman, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 150-159.

him to track the avowable interest of the dominated person. For instance, provided that there is no strong mechanism of monitoring, it is easier for the employer to interfere with the workers arbitrarily. Third, the dominating agent might interfere in a larger or smaller amount of choices on an arbitrary basis. Or the dominating agent interferes arbitrarily in choices that are more or less significant to the dominated person.³⁰ For the first, consider the case of an employer. The employer interferes with the workers only while they are at the work place. His capacity is limited to a certain area. For the second, consider Taylor's example.³¹ Taylor distinguishes acts of interference according to their significance to us. For instance, a restriction on religious practices is more significant to a religious person than the additional red traffic light on our road. Like Taylor, Pettit argues that there are certain areas over which domination is more significant to people.³² It is important to note that it is very hard to make generalizations about what areas of life are significant to all of us. For instance, while for a religious person restriction on religious liberty is more significant than an additional red light on his/ her road, for a non-religious person an additional red light is more significant than restriction of religious liberty. Pettit does not assert the possibility of making generalization about what is significant to all of us. But he leaves the issue aside and does not consider the fact that what is significant to people is value-laden.

Pettit claims that to be able to say that there is domination, the capacity for interference must be an actual capacity.³³ In other words, the capacity for

³⁰ Pettit, "Complaint", p. 94.

³¹ Charles Taylor, "What is Wrong with Negative Liberty?", In *The Idea of Freedom*. Edited by Alan Ryan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 175-193.

³² Pettit, "Complaint", p. 94.

³³ Pettit, *Republicanism*, p. 54.

interference must be ready to use. For Pettit, any complaint of domination is objectively identifiable because the resources that produce the capacity for arbitrary interference are objectively identifiable. For Pettit, these resources are extraordinarily various. He enumerates “physical strength, technical advantage, financial clout, political authority, social connections, communal standing, informational access, ideological position, cultural legitimation, and being someone –e.g. the only doctor in the town, and the like” as the resources whose inequality gives one party an extensive power over others.³⁴ As the republican idea puts forward, not only the exercise of arbitrary power but the mere existence of it restricts individual freedom. The idea indicates that a person does not have to prove the exercise of arbitrary interference. Even if the capacity for interference has never been exercised before, the fact that the capacity for arbitrary interference exists is enough to show that one is subject to domination.³⁵ In other words, it is both necessary and sufficient to show that the agent has actual resources available for interference on an arbitrary basis to claim that a person is subject to domination. It is not necessary to show that the capacity is exercised. I think the requirement is very strong and seems to include cases where we are usually reluctant to say there is domination. Consider the case of a good hearted doctor, who willingly examines all the patients in the town. Also consider that he is the only doctor in the town and he is very hardworking and helpful to the people there. Do we call him dominating due to the fact that he is the only doctor in the town and there is no legal arrangement to restrict his power? Or do

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 59.

³⁵ Historically speaking, the idea appears in the writings of neo-republicans. Skinner states that according to Osborne, “the existence of such a power is in itself destructive to the very essence of liberty” (Skinner, *Liberty*, p. 51). Pettit shares the idea and claims that the existence of the capacity for arbitrary interference itself is a threat to individual freedom.

we call the people of the town dominated due to the fact that the doctor has the capacity for arbitrary interference? It is true that the existence of the capacity for arbitrary interference is a threat to liberty. It is true that the people of the town might try to please the doctor so that one day he would not help. However, in some cases we seem reluctant to refer people as dominated or dominating even though the conditions that Pettit requires are fulfilled. Continuing the previous example, consider that one of the residents of the town dislikes the doctor and reports him to the state authority, claiming that the doctor has a capacity for arbitrary interference, hence he is a dominator. The state cannot punish the doctor since there is no exercise of power on an arbitrary basis. Punishment requires that there must be concrete evidences to show that the doctor exercises his power. However, according to the explanation that Pettit gives, the state has to take the report seriously and make certain arrangements to avoid domination. On the other hand, the man has to show that the doctor has the capacity for arbitrary interference. What the state can do is various and depends on the resources available to the state. The state might provide one more doctor for the town, or the state might impose laws and regulate doctor-patient relations etc. However, when the state considers all the reports seriously, will it become ineffective promoting non-interference? I think Pettit has to consider the existence of regular exercise in order to avoid the problem of ineffectiveness. I think the state should prioritize the cases where there is regular “exercise” of arbitrary power with regard to cases where there is only the “existence” of the capacity of arbitrary power. In other words, existence plus exercise should be conceived worse than existence alone.

In addition, the subjective feeling of being dominated is neither necessary nor sufficient to claim that one is subject to domination. If you claim that you are

dominated because you believe that you are dominated, it will not be sufficient to show that you are dominated. It has to be shown that there exists actual resources that may be exercised upon you on an arbitrary basis. Here, it is important to distinguish two cases in which domination is considered as a “fact” and as a “value”. Pettit thinks that domination as a fact is objectively identifiable. To say that one is subject to domination is enough to show the resources that produce the capacity for arbitrary interference.

Even though domination is salient to both parties as a fact, it might not be so as a value. Consider the case of a couple. The wife knows that her husband is superior to her as a fact, because she knows that he is physically more powerful than her. But, she might not think that her husband dominates her. Pettit asserts that interference does not need to be thought of as wrong. It is not necessary that the parties to the relation of domination “evaluate it negatively”.³⁶ On the other hand, the fact that you are unaware of your dominated status does not mean that you are not dominated. If you do not think that you are dominated, but there are available resources that produce the capacity for arbitrary interference, then you are dominated in the republican sense of the term. For instance, for many years people did not think that women were dominated by men. Yet, women were dominated at those times even when no one claimed so. They were subject to arbitrary interference with respect to being women during those times, too. For Pettit, domination is not a matter of evaluation, but of facts: of whether one has available resources such as physical strength, technical advantage, financial clout, political authority, social connections etc.

³⁶ Pettit, *Republicanism*, p. 54.

However, it seems that claims of domination are not completely value-laden. The examples of domination are stand on a specific culture, a value system and a historical background. Otherwise, it would be too abstract and too difficult to identify what exactly is a form of domination and whose reports about it we should take seriously. For instance, we talk about employers' power over employees but we disregard the cases where employees have the capacity to slow down production. We hesitate to call employees' acts as acts of domination. And we seem to hesitate to refer to the employer as dominated. The reason is that we stand before a historical background, where most of the time employers are the dominator, and employees are the dominated. It boils down to normative principles, common points of consensus and values where we call men, heterosexuals, a religious or cultural majority and employers dominating as opposed to women, homosexuals, religious or cultural minorities and employees are dominated.

Pettit claims that domination must be a matter of common knowledge. The agent that dominates knows that s/he has a power to act arbitrarily on others, and the person that is subject to domination knows that s/he is weak and vulnerable to arbitrary interference. Domination must be salient to both parties involved in any relation of domination as well as to others. "Domination is generally going to involve the awareness of control on the part of the powerful, the awareness of vulnerability on the part of the powerless, and the mutual awareness of this consciousness of each side."³⁷ Pettit requires that non-domination must be a matter of common knowledge just as much as domination: "we may be sure that it will be a matter of nearly common knowledge among parties to the relationship that the conditions for

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 60.

domination fail, and non-domination rules.”³⁸ Non-domination eliminates the subordinate status of people as well as the privileged status of some people and establishes status equality. Pettit asserts that liberty as non-domination is a matter of status equality. I shall examine what Pettit means by “status equality” in the fourth chapter. Pettit requires that the parties to any relation of domination must realize that non-domination rules and they are equals. They should live their lives according to the common awareness that they are equals. However, it is not clear what Pettit means by equality. I shall turn to this point later in the fourth chapter.

Another important characteristic of domination is that domination always happens with respect to being a member of a certain class or kind. Pettit claims that if a person is dominated and if someone is vulnerable to the arbitrary interference of others, then it is always “in virtue being of a certain kind or class, the person is vulnerable insofar as they are black, or female, or old, or poor, or whatever.”³⁹ One is subject to arbitrary interference because s/he occupies a subordinate status and the other has the capacity for arbitrary interference because s/he occupies a privileged status. People are subject to domination qua members of a certain class or kind, not qua individuals. Then, Pettit concludes that in order to advance individual freedom as non-domination, we must advance it for all members of the vulnerable group. In this sense, Pettit argues that non-domination is a communitarian ideal.⁴⁰ For instance, it is impossible for a woman to enjoy a life of non-domination while other women suffer domination in virtue of being woman. The possibility of women’s domination lies on the fact that the status of women is subordinate to the status of men. There is no way

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 71.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 144.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 120-126.

of removing domination on a single woman without altering the conditions under which women in general relate to men.⁴¹ I leave the details of this discussion to the fourth chapter as well.

Concerning the strategies to eliminate domination, Pettit says that the struggle against domination is possible only when there is an efficient group-centered civility in the society. He adds that since one is always dominated qua members of a vulnerable group, the complaint of domination can only be articulated by the group members in the name of the group. He argues that no one can know the interests and needs of people other than themselves. For these reasons, the group or some members of the group must articulate their complaints and needs.⁴² What Pettit has in mind is the active participation of citizens in decision making mechanisms. Having agreed with the claim that modern societies are pluralistic, he thinks that diversity can be represented if and only if each group participates in decisions and articulates their interests through public discussions. For a state to be non-dominating, it has to track the interests of its citizens. And participation from each corner of society is crucial for the state to be able to track the interests of its people. Pettit gives importance to active citizenship. Yet he does not argue for the intrinsic value of participation. According to him, participation is instrumental for pursuing the ideal of non-domination.

Up to now, I have examined Pettit's notion of domination. Domination is a matter of common knowledge and individuals are subject to domination always qua members of a certain class or kind. I have noted that elimination of domination requires a change in the status of all members of a group from inferior to equal. In

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 123.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 248.

what follows, I will first explain non-domination and examine the ways to maintain non-domination. Then, I will present the benefits of non-domination. To do so, I will introduce the harms that a life of domination causes.

Pettit claims that a person enjoys non-domination when no one has the capacity to interfere on an arbitrary basis with his/her choices. In other words, when a person lives a life immune to the arbitrary interference of others, s/he lives a non-dominated life.⁴³ Pettit discusses the ways that enable a person to achieve non-domination. He investigates what social design might help advance non-domination. Pettit introduces two strategies to maintain non-domination. He says “[t]here are two broad approaches conceivable. One is the strategy of reciprocal power, as we might describe it, the other the strategy of constitutional provision.”⁴⁴ The strategy of reciprocal power is to make the resources of dominator and dominated more equal so that the powerless persons are able to defend themselves against any interference on an arbitrary basis, or that there would no longer be any one who is too powerless. “The strategy of reciprocal power is to make the resources of dominator and dominated more equal so that, ideally, a previously dominated person can come to defend themselves against any interference on the part of the dominator”.⁴⁵ Pettit neither explains the ways to make people’s resources more equal nor gives any example of it. I think that Pettit considers the cases where there are no rules and everyone protects himself/herself and tries to increase his/her resources, so that no one is able to dominate them. In fact, where it is impossible to equate the resources of the two parties, each party might try to punish or to impose threat of punishment

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 66.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

on the other party. This will generate the capacity of arbitrary interference in the name of eliminating it. For this reason, Pettit thinks that the method of reciprocal power is undesirable. He asserts that it is possible that people are dominating when they try to protect themselves from arbitrary interference. In other words, the strategy of reciprocal authority cannot eliminate domination, but it can only reduce it. On the other hand, the strategy of constitutional provision introduces a constitutional authority to the situation.⁴⁶ Someone else –a third party– other than the dominated agent and the dominating agent has the role of establishing and extending non-domination. The constitutional authority is more likely to eliminate domination at one place without introducing it in another place. Therefore, Pettit argues for the strategy of constitutional authority. Pettit talks about three possible policies to eliminate domination under the title of the strategy of constitutional authority. One way is to redistribute the resources and powers of interference across the population. He calls this strategy a *strategy of armament*. Another way is to remove the extra resources and power from the hands of the dominating agent. He calls the second strategy a *strategy of disarmament*. The third way is to protect the powerless against any arbitrary interference. He calls this last strategy a *strategy of protection*.⁴⁷ Neither is the dominating agent required to consider what s/he has been doing as wrong or unfair; nor is the dominated agent required to consider his situation as unjust or unacceptable. By suggesting only the strategy of constitutional authority, Pettit does not require a change in the way people understand each other as well as they understand themselves. Other than the dominated and the dominating party, a third party will regulate the conditions so that there will be no capacity to interfere on

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

⁴⁷ Pettit, "Complaint", pp. 94-95.

an arbitrary basis. Pettit considers governmental devices as a tool to eliminate domination. It is plain that he does not consider people's beliefs about each other as a cause of domination. My claim is that a different approach to domination can reveal the need for such a change in the self-understanding of the parties of domination to eliminate domination completely. I think when we appreciate the importance of change in people's understanding of each other; we would be looking for policies that try to eliminate people's prejudices and beliefs about each other. However, I am aware of the fact that strategies to keep people from different corners of the society intact might have an inverse effect. For instance, a straight person when motivated to go to a gay bar would react to a gay life style much more strongly than he did before. Yet, what I would like to emphasize is that people's ideas about each other and their ideas about themselves have to be considered as a barrier to non-domination, hence liberty. The state activity must be designed in such a way that it addresses the problem and aims to eliminate them. I will discuss what could be done later.

When Pettit illustrates the benefits of non-domination, he claims that the ideal of non-domination is richer than non-interference. He emphasizes that domination causes certain harms to people. And non-domination brings certain benefits as a result of the elimination of domination.⁴⁸ Pettit claims that liberty as non-interference does not consider these harms.⁴⁹

⁴⁸ Pettit, *Republicanism*, pp. 84-90.

⁴⁹ Pettit thinks that liberty as non-domination provides what liberty as non-interference provides. He claims that liberty as non-interference aims at protecting you from *actual* interference of others. On the other hand, besides protecting you from actual arbitrary interference, liberty as non-domination protects you from the possibility of such an interference. It is important to note that for a republican like Pettit, arbitrary interference is worse than non-arbitrary interference. Not all interference is evil. For instance, laws are necessary to establish liberty which restricts individuals in their choices. To Pettit, to the degree that laws are non-arbitrary –tracks the interests of those who are affected by them– they do not restrict liberty but constitute it.

First, Pettit argues that the expectation of arbitrary interference causes a state of uncertainty and produces a high level of anxiety and wretchedness.⁵⁰ Imagine that your husband is more powerful than you in terms of physical strength, and there is no legal and institutional restriction over his ability to exercise that power over you. He could use his physical strength whenever and wherever he would like to exercise it. In a society where history is full of the examples of men's systematic violence against women such as honor murder, rape, assault, etc., even if he has not exercised it before, the fact that he is able to do so places the woman in a continuous uncertainty and anxiety. Second, not only does it make you experience a continuous uncertainty, but also you have to "keep a weather eye on the powerful, anticipating what they will expect of you, and trying to please them, or anticipating where they will be and trying to stay out of their way."⁵¹ To continue the above example, you always have to watch your husband and try to please him so that he will not think of exercising his power on you. For instance, you make sure you arrive home before he arrives or prepare his meal before he asks for it, etc. Under the continuous fear of arbitrary interference you always need strategy and planning. So, "you can never sail on, unconcerned, in the pursuit of your own affairs", but you always have to consider what would please the powerful.⁵² Moreover, since you are vulnerable to the physical power of your husband you might not say what you think or want directly. You either do not say it or say it with a view to please your husband without making him angry. You have to shape your actions according to this continuous fear. You cannot act the way you would have acted in the absence of such a fear. When domination is

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 86.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 86.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 86.

eliminated, people would get rid of strategy and planning and they would not live in continuous anxiety and uncertainty.

Pettit claims that non-domination is also associated with “subjective and intersubjective benefits”.⁵³ He says that liberty is a matter of status equality.

Therefore, non-domination requires an equal social standing with others. When non-domination is established in a society, the inferior and subordinate status of the dominated will be abolished. The benefit of intersubjective status is based on the knowledge that people are equals and know each other as equals. People act according to the knowledge that they are equals and immune from the arbitrary interference of each other. On the other hand, the benefit of subjective self image is based on the feeling of freedom. Non-domination would provide that you are able to look the other in the eye, “confident with a shared knowledge that it is not by their leave that you pursue your innocent, non-interfering choices; you pursue these choices, as of publicly recognized right.”⁵⁴ And it is possible only when parties share a common awareness that they are equal. As I mentioned before, I would examine what Pettit has in mind when he argues for “equality”, especially “status equality” in the third chapter. This point is of great importance. Pettit underlines the fact that to be able to enjoy liberty people must know each other as equals. Yet, Pettit does not materialize what he means. Would I be free as a woman if I was an equal part of a labor force? Would I be free as a woman if I was independent economically? Would I be free as a woman if I could equally vote and to be voted? Would I be free if the cultural images that subordinate me were abolished? Would I be free when I participated in decision mechanisms? Under what conditions would my subjective

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 87.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 71.

self image change from subordinate to equal? If the task belongs to the state and by imposing laws and punishments the state serves its task, then what rules provide changes in my status? What is the content of these rules? He has no concrete example.

Having examined both domination and non-domination, I will briefly talk about the historical origins of the idea of non-domination. My intention is to show that the neo-roman republicans are guilty of reductionism when they compare their situation with the situation of the slave. Among various harms of domination, neo-roman republicans put forth the evil of living in the presence of a master. They do not consider its affects on people's self-understanding and on the development of human capacities. In addition, in not considering the relation of these ill-effects to individual liberty, neo-roman republicans define liberty as the absence of mastery by others. I will claim that their account of domination is insufficient to explain modern instances of slavery. I will also claim that Pettit's theory is subject to the same criticism.

Historical Origins and the Master-Slave Narrative

In this section, I shall illustrate the historical origins of Pettit's ideas. Here I follow the work of Skinner, especially *Liberty Before Liberalism*, in which he examines neo-roman republicans and their understanding of liberty. As mentioned, the aim is to show that the master-slave analogy and the evil in slavery cannot be reduced to the evil in the existence of the power of arbitrary interference. Domination and its harms must be reconsidered in a wider perspective.

Skinner argues that domination is historically associated with the status of slavery in the writings of neo-roman republicans. The slave analogy is crucial for these writers since they aim to show that freedom is not to be free from interference, but to occupy an equal status with others so that no one can use their power on an arbitrary basis.⁵⁵ According to them, the problem with slavery is not that slaves cannot determine their lives in their own ways, but that there exists a certain power which can be exercised on them without considering their interests. In addition, I will argue that being seen as a slave and subordinate distorts the self-conception of people, which neo-roman republicans completely ignore. For neo-roman republicans, it is possible that the master is benevolent and does not interfere with the life of his slaves. So, the slave can determine where to live, who to marry, how many children to have and how many hours to work, etc. What is wrong with slavery is to live “within the power of someone else”, to “depend on the good will of someone else” and to “be exposed to harm or live at the mercy of others”. For them, the problem is not only the exercise but the very existence of such a power which can be used on an arbitrary basis.⁵⁶ Neo-roman republicans suggest that the way to overcome domination is to change the subordinate status of the slave, to make him immune from any interference on an arbitrary basis. In other words, they require that the powerful must be restricted by laws. According to them, the power of arbitrary interference can be taken under control by maintaining equal subjection of all people to the rule of law.⁵⁷

⁵⁵ They agree that all interference restricts the range of choices that is available to the person. Yet, they do not consider all interferences bad. There must be some sort of interference –Pettit calls it non-arbitrary interference– in order to guarantee liberty. They engage the view that without rules and legal order we cannot talk about freedom meaningfully. They take arbitrary interference as evil.

⁵⁶ Skinner, *Liberty*, p. 51.

⁵⁷ Skinner cites from Livy that the remedy is the equal subjection of all to the rule of law (Skinner, *Liberty*, pp. 44-45).

It is important to understand why neo-roman republicans are so concerned with the notion of servitude – especially why they are concerned with a particular damage of domination among other forms of damage. Quentin Skinner cites neo-roman republican writers and says that in their view, what makes a person a slave is not that he does not determine his life, but that he lives under the good will of someone else. To them, dependency on the master's will is the most important characteristic of slavery among others. No matter whether he has material wealth and is able to determine his life without any interference from the master, the fact that he is open to arbitrary interference makes him a slave. Agreeing with Skinner, Pettit says that he understands domination as the relationship of master to servant, consisting of unequal legal standing and the dependency of one on the good will of the other.⁵⁸ In their distinctive situation, what matters for these thinkers is the existence of the king's power over the decisions of the parliament. Skinner finds this interesting but understandable since neo-roman republicans have a distinct conception of liberty. He says that when we are asked why slaves lack liberty, we would say that it is because they are coerced into acting by physical force or the threat of it. In other words, we would say that they cannot determine their lives. The neo-roman republicans on the other hand claim that slaves are not free because they are “within the power of someone else” and “subject to the jurisdiction of someone else”.⁵⁹

My aim here is to show what is missing in the master-slave narrative. I shall argue that the only evil in domination is not to live under the arbitrary will of someone. Moreover, I argue that both neo-roman republicans and Pettit are right in

⁵⁸ Pettit, *Republicanism*, p. 22.

⁵⁹ Skinner, *Liberty*, pp. 41-42.

asserting the role of law to eliminate domination. However, to eliminate domination, the efficiency of legal and institutional arrangements depends on the scope of the state's goal. I will claim that the goal that Pettit assigns to the state, that is to eliminate capacity of arbitrary interference, is necessary but not sufficient to eliminate domination. Now, I shall try to draw a more concrete picture of the condition of a slave and the possible sufferings and hindrances he might experience.

What might a slave experience in his concrete situation? Slavery is mostly associated with serious material deprivation. In traditional societies, slaves lack material resources even to meet their basic needs. Slavery consists of institutional arrangements that enable the master to appropriate the labor, goods and services of the slaves. The subordinates do not have political or civil rights, and their status is given by birth. For instance, it was argued that slaves are slaves by nature just like masters are masters. The privileged status of the master is given by birth, too. He is a citizen with all his social and political rights. There are always ideologies that justify the subordinate status of some people in comparison to the superiority of other people. They are vulnerable to denigration, insult and assaults. They usually obey the orders of the master and are never in a position to decide, even on matters that are related to their personal affairs. They lack dignity and autonomy. In some cases, they do not have a say even in their personal affairs like family and children. They are usually the property of masters along with their family and children. The things that they produce belong to the master. They are dependent on the will of the master.

Up to this point, what I have said is similar to the claims of Pettit about slavery. However, when we come to analyze the modern instances of domination, we see additional harms and aspects of domination. My opinion is that though Pettit uses the modern terminology and defines liberty as the absence of domination, he

disregards the contemporary discussion related to domination and limits his analysis to that of the neo-roman republicans' analysis of mastery.

Employing modern terminology, we can add the following remarks about the harms of domination. Dominated people and dominant people have a distorted self image of themselves. Dominated people either see themselves as incapable of doing certain things or think that they have no right to do certain things. For many theorists, that is why slavery has persisted for such a long time. Without the agreement and in a sense contribution of the dominated to his life of domination, it is impossible for slavery to exist for centuries. Most of the time slaves think that having a master is good for them, since by birth they are slaves and they do not know any alternative is possible. Many people who live a life of slavery do not think that the life they have is unjust or unfair. Consider women under domination. Many women do not consider their situation as unjust. I do not claim that they are happy with their lives. They certainly experience certain harms, but they do not think that a different life is possible for them. Most of the dominated people are uneducated and never have a chance to enjoy intellectual work. They do manual and unqualified work in agriculture. For this reason, they cannot develop many of the capacities that they potentially have, and could work on, if they were provided with the chance and option to do so. On the other hand, it is important to note that dominant people think that they are superior and have the right to dominate others. We can say that they have a distorted self image too. They conceive themselves as much more perfect than "other" people. They think that they deserve more of everything, have a right to dominate others because they are naturally gifted or follow the true religion or are more intelligent or natural etc.

Throughout his book, Pettit gives some examples to illustrate the modern forms of domination. Pettit groups examples of domination in three basic categories: domination of women, domination of workers and domination of minority groups. I shall examine only domination of women by men to illustrate what is missing in Pettit's account of domination.⁶⁰ Pettit thinks that the goal of feminism is, as feminists put it, "to end men's systematic domination of women". He argues that the main problem for women is that cultural, legal and institutional pressures put them in a position that resembles slavery. Then he concludes that the ideal of freedom is precisely "that of being secured against arbitrary interference".⁶¹ For Pettit, this is accomplished when men's capacities for arbitrary interference of with women are reduced by constitutional arrangements.⁶² Even though many feminists agree with Pettit at this point, they would find his views unsatisfactory. It is true that when women work for the improvement of their situations, they find the institutions against them. Instead of supporting them, the institutions try to silence them.⁶³ Yet, for feminists, the institutional, legal and cultural constraints are not the only restrictions to women's freedom. The mentality of women who have been accustomed to oppression and their undeveloped capacities are as powerful as external constraints to women's freedom. I shall argue and emphasize that these constraints may become so powerful that they may block their struggle against institutions and discriminatory laws. They will need to reeducate themselves and unlearn who they were told to be under patriarchy. Even when we assume that

⁶⁰ In patriarchal environments women can also oppress women, a mother in law or a mother can oppress the bride or her own daughter. Not just men but also women who act as instruments of patriarchy.

⁶¹ Pettit, *Republicanism*, p. 139.

⁶² *Ibid.*, pp. 67-68.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 140.

institutions are willing to support women in a way that Pettit suggests, the above mentioned constraints will still be working against women's liberty. In other words, without considering the inner constraints and undeveloped capacities that the life of domination generates, strategies for establishing liberty as non-domination would not be successful. I think that the two are necessarily linked to one another. If you only develop strategies to get rid of legal and institutional constraints on the path to gender equality, that will be ineffective because the self-images of women will not be changed by that. However, no one can disregard the importance of institutional and legal support. I think that these two strategies are not mutually exclusive. Internal change and external change should go and would necessarily go together. External institutional attempts can have a powerful impact on internal images and self concept, while internal images or consciousness can struggle to institutionalize gender equality rather than reproducing patriarchy.

Imagine that the state regulates the capacity for arbitrary interference of men in the affairs of women. In the life of domination, she has rarely been out of the house and participated in public life as a private citizen or a public figure. She has stayed at home and taken care of the children. She does not know how to manage things outside of the house. Her independent decisions are limited to house work and childcare. Moreover, she does not have any complaint about her husband's treatment of her. She shares the idea that a husband has a right to beat her if she does something wrong. She trusts her husband's judgment on certain matters and thinks that she might have done something wrong if her husband beats her. In addition, she thinks that she is incapable of doing certain things, and agrees with the view that there are kinds of work for men and work for women. She does not question the gendered division of labor. She agrees with her inferior status. Her self-image is

distorted by the male-dominated culture. The way she thinks of her interests is shaped by the ideology of male-dominant culture. Her capacities to articulate her interest and her needs are underdeveloped. Her capacities to survive outside of the house and to take decisions about her affairs are unpracticed. And it is possible that she finds life at home more comfortable and easier than life outside. It is important to note that I do not make generalizations out of this case. There were and are women who discover points of resistance to the patriarchal system. Women resist the impositions on them though it is very costly. I do not want to draw a deterministic picture of the domination of women. Yet, the above case demonstrates the condition of many women under the rule of patriarchal societies.

Then, given that legal institutions inhibit her husband's arbitrary interference with her affairs, what has changed in her life? How can we say that she enjoys liberty as non-domination in its all aspects? I do not intend to say that it is nothing. It is something. She does not get beaten up, if the man does that he knows he will be punished by law. She has the right to education and she can push the man to let her exercise it, she can work and become financially independent, if he does not let her, she can again count on the law to punish him and help her make a living independently from him, she can get a divorce etc. But the question is whether the woman is aware of these opportunities in front of her. Having been dominated and having lived a life of domination for a long time, the woman must revise her self-image so that she can see herself as equal with others. She must revise her self-understanding and try to find out what she is capable of. In addition, she might need to develop hindered capacities so that she can understand and express herself. She can only do so as she participates in social life, as she works, as she becomes a citizen and as she acquires a public persona. She is not going to change her self-

image at home in isolation from others. Our self image is always bound to the perceptions of others. We develop our social skills only through interaction with other people. It is more likely that there might be resistance to protect the status quo as it always happens. So, not many men will be willing to allow their women to go out and work etc. There must be political strategies to consider these harms seriously and find out ways for people to interact and to be more social.

I leave the whole discussion to the conclusion. Here I will only give a brief outline of my thoughts. I think that the improvement in people's capacity and self-understanding could be achieved through legal and institutional arrangements. At this point, my view is very similar to that of Pettit because I agree with him that legal and institutional arrangements are crucial for securing and establishing liberty. My disagreement with Pettit is the following. Pettit does not consider that lack of capacity for evaluation and expression and critical self-understanding are as important for liberty as non-domination. In what follows, he does not take into consideration how the state policies and legal arrangements must be designed so that they will help overcoming hindrances like underdeveloped capacities and an unquestioned self-image. The state should promote non-domination by pushing women to overcome isolation and being bound to live at home, by making it easy and desirable for them to work outside the home. What Pettit does, instead, is to limit the aim of legal and institutional arrangements to overcome the problem of participation, which he conceives as necessary for a state to be non-dominating. I will argue that though participation in equal terms is of great importance for establishing and securing liberty, it is not the only thing we have to consider. In a society where women are happy with their dominated status, they can vote for a party which is against woman's participation in political decisions. Living under

domination for centuries shapes dominated people in such a way that they view themselves through the eyes of their oppressors. So without considering this fact and developing strategies to struggle with it, I do believe that state activity will fail to establish liberty as non-domination. But the harm of domination to people's subjective self-image can only be reversed in interaction with others, so participation in public life outside of the home is the precondition for changing that self-image.

On the other hand, I think Pettit is right in asserting that the existence of a power capable of domination is enough to threaten our freedom. In reinterpreting the republican idea of liberty as non-domination, he reintroduces a very important concept to the literature: domination and its relation to liberty. Being richer and more comprehensive than the notion of non-interference, his notion of domination adds a new dimension to the discussions of liberty. However, I find his notion of domination insufficient. It is possible to conceive of domination from a different perspective, associated with other ill-effects than Pettit presents, and understand it to be more destructive to individuals than Pettit considers. In the next chapter, I shall present "domination" from a different point of view. In Chapter III, first, I will introduce Young's analysis of domination and oppression. Then, I will introduce Bartky's analysis of psychological oppression.

In the fourth chapter, I will discuss the claim that non-domination is a matter of status equality. To do so, I will examine the resources whose inequality gives one party an extreme power to interfere on an arbitrary basis. I will try to elucidate what Pettit means by "equality".

CHAPTER III

YOUNG'S ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTION OF DOMINATION

Unlike Pettit, Young understands domination and its antinomy self-determination as matters of social justice. Even though she agrees that self-determination is also related to individual freedom, she thinks that to overcome domination is a matter of justice. Young suggests two values that constitute justice and two evils that correspond to injustice.⁶⁴ According to her, by assumption, (i) developing and exercising one's capacities and expressing one's experience; and (ii) participating and determining one's action and conditions of action are the two values. She thinks that not the realizations of these values, but "the degree to which a society contains and supports institutional conditions necessary for the realizations of these values" constitute justice.⁶⁵ On the other hand, the absence of conditions that promote and support these values are what constitutes social injustice. She asserts two kinds of injustice, oppression and domination. Oppression is "the institutional constraint on self-development" and domination is "the institutional constraint on self-determination". The removal of these constraints to one's self-development and self-determination are necessary to establish justice. She thinks that oppression consists of all systematic institutional processes which prevent some people from learning and developing their skills and using them in socially recognized ways. Moreover, she thinks that domination consists of all systematic institutional processes that

⁶⁴ Young, *Justice*, p. 37.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 37.

hinder some people's ability to communicate with others as well as to express their feelings, thoughts and perspectives in an environment where others can listen and pay attention.⁶⁶ My intention is not to evaluate Young's claim that domination and oppression are matters of justice, rather I intend to use her analysis of domination to prove that Pettit's account of domination is too narrow to be able to describe liberty as non-domination. In other words, provided that we want to define liberty as non-domination, then we must have a more comprehensive concept of domination. Before I present her views about domination and oppression, I shall briefly introduce some important aspects of her thoughts. According to Young, justice is not only a matter of the redistribution of material resources. Young criticizes theories of redistributive justice because they assume that a just society is a matter of redistributing material goods among people. In her conception, injustice refers to two forms of constraint: oppression and domination. In addition to redistributive solutions, she claims that justice must also consider issues of decision making procedures, division of labor and culture.⁶⁷

Young claims that though these two notions are distinct and should be considered distinct, most of the time they overlap and are closely interrelated.⁶⁸ In this chapter, I shall try to demonstrate the relationship between oppression and domination, which I derive from Young's accounts. Very briefly for now, I claim that Young has a more inclusive understanding of the notion of domination than Pettit has. The criticism that I raise to Pettit is that domination has various and deeper ill-effects on people which cannot be eliminated in the ways that Pettit suggests to us.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 38.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 38.

In this respect, I shall use Young's analysis of oppression and domination in order to show that Pettit's analysis of domination is insufficient. When domination is considered more widely in terms of its ill-effects, it becomes harder to establish non-domination. In other words, provided that liberty is defined as non-domination, it would be more demanding to establish it. I will argue that what Pettit suggests is necessary for eliminating domination, but not sufficient. I will claim that since all oppressed people "suffer some inhibition of their ability to develop and exercise their capacities and express their needs, thoughts and feelings",⁶⁹ without dealing with policies and activities that are specifically designed to improve these underdeveloped capacities of the oppressed people, elimination of domination and maintaining liberty as non-domination is impossible. However, I think, we should notice that there is a danger of paternalism here. While developing policies and activities that are dedicated to improving these underdeveloped capacities of the oppressed people, the state should be careful about behaving as if it can know better what is good for its people than they do themselves.

Young suggests that democracy is the way to eliminate domination and establish a just society. She says "[d]emocracy is a condition of freedom in the sense of self-determination".⁷⁰ Democracy, in the sense of participation in decision making processes, is a means to express one's own needs and interests to others. She claims that structures of domination can only be eliminated by improving democratic decision making processes and establishing a participatory society. "Participation", in the sense Young uses it, involves having a say in *all* areas of public and private

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

⁷⁰ Iris M. Young, "Self Determination as a Principle of Justice", *The Philosophical Forum* 11, no.1 (1979), p. 30.

life such as home, work and other social institutions like hospitals, schools etc., taking part in processes within the context of political, as well as domestic and professional social space. In this respect, she criticizes the distinction between “private” and “public” or “political” and “non-political”. She states that justice requires that all institutions of social cooperation be democratically organized.⁷¹ At this point, Young agrees with Pettit that for any decision to be non-dominating, agents must have an agreement with the decision or at least have an opportunity to raise their voice against the decision.⁷² In this respect, democracy has an instrumental value. She states “[i]nstrumentally, participatory processes are the best way for citizens to ensure that their own needs and interests will be voiced and will not be dominated by other interests.”⁷³ She argues that democratic participation provides the means for the development and exercise of capacities. In this sense, she says:

[h]aving and exercising the opportunity to participate in making collective decisions that affect one’s actions or the conditions of one’s actions fosters the development of capacities for thinking about one’s own needs in relation to the needs of others, taking an interest in the relation of others to social institutions, reasoning and being articulate and persuasive and so on.⁷⁴

Young claims that participation helps to develop capacities for evaluating one’s own needs and interests, as well as evaluating others’ needs and interests. Participation also helps to develop certain capacities for articulation and persuasion which people have to exercise in making their points to others. Moreover, she argues that only such participation gives people a sense that social relations are subject to change. The exercise of participation will show people that social relations and political

⁷¹ *Ibid.*

⁷² Young, *Justice*, p. 92.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 92.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 92.

institutions are not natural and necessary. They are subject to change and revision according to people's needs and interests. She adds that this feeling also encourages people to participate more and more in decision making mechanisms. She says "[t]he virtues of citizenship are best cultivated through the exercise of citizenship."⁷⁵ She also claims that democracy has an intrinsic value in addition to as instrumental value.⁷⁶ She claims that through democracy and participation a person develops certain skills and capacities and becomes a certain kind of person. In this respect, Young engages with the theory of positive freedom, since she claims participation is a way to gain self mastery. In this respect, she differs from Pettit. Pettit emphasizes many times that republican freedom as non-domination is a version of negative freedom. He says that he can "happily admit the attractions of freedom as personal self-mastery" yet he claims that he does not argue that the state should promote the richer ideal of personal autonomy.⁷⁷

Young also differs from Pettit when she points out the necessity of gaining a different perspective that sees oppression and domination as widely and deeply built in our everyday lives. The marks of oppression are so much built in our every day practices and are taken to be so normal that we consider ourselves neither as agents of oppression nor perceive our acts as oppressive. She says "[t]he conscious actions of many individuals daily contribute to maintaining and reproducing oppression, but those people are usually simply doing their jobs or living their lives, and do not understand themselves as agents of oppression."⁷⁸

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 92.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 92.

⁷⁷ Pettit, *Republicanism*, p. 82.

⁷⁸ Young, *Justice*, pp. 41-42.

I will try to illustrate Young's ideas with an example. For instance, for ages, the transfer of the benefits of housework from women to men was considered normal. Neither did men think that what they did was oppressive, nor did women think that what was done to them was oppression. The benefits of female activities at home and in agriculture are transferred to men without any exchange value. We have never considered female activity at home as an instance of oppression and domination. However, today we are talking about the unjust transfer of female activity to men as oppressive. That is why, for Young, the genuine and effective struggle against domination and forms of oppression requires a change in the perspectives of both the dominated and the dominator. Underlining the importance of gaining a critical perspective, she says "[t]he process by which an oppressed group comes to define and articulate the social conditions of its oppression, and to politicize culture by confronting the cultural imperialism that has denigrated and silenced its specific group experience, is a necessary and crucial step in confronting and reducing oppression."⁷⁹ She suggests consciousness raising for dominated people in order for them to understand existing relations as oppressive. She also suggests a form of consciousness rising for privileged persons to become aware that what they are doing is oppressive. In this respect, she states "[a]nother form of consciousness rising involves making the privileged aware of how their habitual actions, reactions, images and stereotypes contribute to oppression."⁸⁰ For her, these consciousness rising activities are necessary because she thinks that marks of oppression and domination penetrate our seemingly innocent everyday practices. She differs from Pettit, because

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 153-154.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 154.

she emphasizes the importance of perspective change in individuals when understanding themselves and their actions. However, we should notice that consciousness rising activities do not seem to be effective in eliminating domination. The view presupposes that people are aware that what they do is oppressive. Otherwise, they will not attend these activities willingly. And it is clear that no one can force dominating people to attend these activities. The problem here is to make the dominating people to attend consciousness rising activities when they do not think that they are dominators. Young suggests nothing about the ways of making people attend these activities.

Having introduced a brief outline of Young's approach depicting the differences between her understanding and Pettit's, I shall present her conception of power. Young thinks that no matter how many different approaches to the notion of domination are available, it is usually a matter of asymmetry of power between people. This is why, according to Young, the examination of domination and oppression must start with a comprehensive analysis of power. Evaluating distributive solutions to social injustices, Young criticizes a certain conception of power according to which power can be possessed, redistributed and exchanged between agents of any social relation. Given that domination is a matter of resource inequalities, it is not something simply that one party possesses and the other party is deprived of. Young claims that power is always highly correlated with having some resources in excess; yet, it should not be confused with these resources. Following Foucault, she suggests that power is a result of relations in a social network in which many third parties have a part in the use and generation of power. To quote from Young, "[o]ne agent can have institutionalized power over another only if the actions

of many third agents support and execute the will of the powerful.”⁸¹ According to this conception of power, the elimination of domination cannot be accomplished by redistributive solutions, by simply allocating power to agents of a certain relation. Where domination is considered as structural phenomena, and constraints that some people suffer are consequent upon the interplay of all the intended and unintended actions of many third agents, it is impossible to eliminate domination with only redistributive solutions. In other words, unless the function of third parties and the seemingly innocent practices of everyday life are brought to light, it is impossible to eliminate domination and establish justice.⁸²

She illustrates what she means by “the functions of third parties” in an example. For example, a judge’s power over a prisoner is possible only in a network of relations among prison wardens, guards, record keepers, administrators, lawyers etc.⁸³ I will illustrate what Young has in mind with another example. In the context of the domination of women, we usually believe that a father dominates his daughter. The power of the father is supported and generated by the many intended and unintended actions of third parties. In this context, maybe the grandmother in the same house who defends and expands the order of manhood, legal and social institutions, the teacher at school, the shop assistant in the market, friends in the neighborhood and the patriarchal system’s dominant values or ideologies that shape the thoughts of the daughter, contribute to the oppression and domination of women. It is not as simple as the father dominating and oppressing his daughter. The power of the father is an *outcome* of many other things and is constituted by the support of

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

⁸² *Ibid.*, p. 32.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

these third parties. The network is complex and spread out. In such a framework, Young claims, the existing understanding of power as possession does not help us to understand today's instances of oppression and domination. I think that this observation is also important for us when we try to develop concrete strategies to eliminate domination. It will not be sufficient if the state only imposes punishments on the father when he hits his daughter. Rather, the media –which reproduces the ideology of patriarchy–, the school books, advertisements etc. must be watched and punished due to their constitutive role in the domination of women.

Young specifies five faces of oppression, claiming that the occurrence of at least one of them is enough to say that there is oppression. She claims that exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, cultural imperialism and violence are five faces of oppression where people suffer hindrances to their ability to develop and exercise their capacities and express their feelings, needs and experiences. She claims that there might be various combinations of these five categories which might be more or less painful. For instance, working class people are exploited and powerless, but if they are black, they are also subject to marginalization and violence. Similarly, gay people, if they are rich, are not exploited and powerless. But they are still subjected to cultural imperialism and might be subject to violence or a continuous threat of violence.⁸⁴

Even though she believes that most of the time domination and oppression overlap, there is still reason to distinguish them. She underlines that not all instances of domination are associated with oppression. There are some cases in which domination occurs without oppression. For instance, there are highly qualified workers who are subject to domination at work while they do not suffer any

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 64.

constraints on developing and exercising their capacities and expressing their experiences. Their dominated status is due to the fact that they do not have a right to participate in the decisions of the institution they are working for. Another example might be wealthy women. They are pretty well educated. They enjoy social life and improve certain capacities. Yet, they are oppressed in the male dominant society to the extent that they are subject to hindrances to participate in decisions.

Young claims that most of the time domination goes hand in hand with oppression. Young does not exactly explain in what way domination and oppression are related. However, she provides some insights about the nature of this relationship. She says “[o]ppression usually includes or entails domination, that is, constraints upon oppressed people to follow rules set by others”.⁸⁵ I think she refers to the fact that the oppressed will be made to obey the rules they do not consent to and they have not imposed upon themselves. Or the other way around, because they are excluded from the decision making mechanisms, they are not able to live by the rules they impose upon themselves, or obey the rules that they themselves choose to live by. On the other hand, the social institutions hinder the improvement of certain capacities such as expression of one’s experience, capacities for reasoning and criticism which are crucial for the exercise of self-determination. To the extent that people lack these capacities, they are easy victims of domination. Therefore, oppressed people follow the rules set by others and cannot be a part of the decision making process of these rules. Their being oppressed results in their being dominated.

At this point, I argue that the reverse is also possible. Since some people are dominated and they cannot affect the decision processes, they are not able to have their share of the social product and material resources. So, having been dominated

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 38.

for ages, they do not have the resources and suitable environment for them to develop their capacities that are crucial for self-determination. I will try to illustrate the relationship between domination and oppression with an example. In the case of the historical domination of blacks by whites through the ages, domination of blacks resulted in underdeveloped capacities. The institutional design that excludes blacks from participation in decision making processes hinders them from developing certain skills and capacities. The fact that they are dominated results in their being oppressed. They are born in an environment where education is unimportant. The black children observe that their fathers and mothers work for unqualified jobs. So, the environment in which a young black boy grows up determines the degree to which his capacities of self-determination develop. It is important to note that I do not draw a strict deterministic picture. It is true that there is a black movement as well as a women's movement. These people have criticized the white-male society in all its aspects and they are still criticizing it. Yet, we can say that most women and blacks still suffer from the effects of past instances of domination. Otherwise, if there were no such deep effects of domination on the dominated people, everything would have been all right after the legal arrangements had been made. In the U.S.A blacks still work in low qualification jobs. It is still hard to see blacks in the universities. In other words, though I accept that there are exceptions to the above case, most women and blacks still suffer the harms of the past. It is also important to note that I do not argue that these facts are not reversible. In this respect, affirmative action policies are of great importance. Because dominated people are hindered in many respects, and have been under domination for centuries, they now have to be specially treated so that they can enter the fields from which they were excluded in the past.

Up to now, I have tried to explicate what Young has in mind when she claims that domination and oppression are closely related concepts. I agree with Young's claim that domination and oppression overlap in most cases. In this respect, I shall argue that patterns of domination and oppression are interwoven with each other, so it is impossible to eliminate domination without struggling simultaneously in certain areas with oppression.

Drawing on Marx's account of exploitation, Young claims that the capitalist system of production is unjust because workers exercise their powers for the benefit and the purposes of capitalists. She says "[t]he injustice of capitalist society consists in the fact that some people exercise their capacities under the control, according to the purposes, and for the benefit of other people."⁸⁶ Exploitation is a form of oppression because in capitalist institutions workers cannot use the outcome of their labor to develop and exercise their capacities. Exploitation is a form of oppression because the institutional structure of the capitalist work place limits self-development. In early capitalism the transfer was so cruel that the benefit received by the workers was not enough even to meet their material needs. Young is of the opinion that the injustice in capitalist society cannot be reduced to material inequality. In this respect, she says "[t]he injustice of class division does not consist only in the distributive fact that some people have great wealth while most people have little."⁸⁷ The transfer of powers from workers to capitalists does not only make the capitalists wealthier but also maintains and augments their power and status. The injustice in exploitation can be overcome through generating new institutional forms that allow workers to develop and exercise their capacities as well as to participate in decisions at the work

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 49.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 49.

place. Justice then requires “eliminating the institutional forms that enable and enforce this process of transference and replacing them with institutional forms that enable all to develop and use their capacities in a way that does not inhibit, but rather can enhance, similar development and use in others.”⁸⁸

Young states that racial and sexual oppressions are also exploitative.⁸⁹ Feminists argue that something similar occurs in the relationship between man and woman. The labor of women makes life easier for men in many ways. The housework, childrearing, care and sexual satisfaction provided are tailored mostly to the interests of men. Women do these tasks for men as well as for themselves. Men enjoy the public world while women spend all their energy at home. Young states “[t]he freedom, power, status and self-realization of men is possible precisely because women work for them.”⁹⁰ Unlike the product of men’s work, the work of women does not bring any exchange value. Childrearing and house work are woman’s duty, so the common belief goes, which she fulfills out of her love for her family. She gains no monetary compensation while men are awarded with various compensations for their public labor. Exploitation of women continues when they become wage laborers. Young claims that women are employed mainly in certain fields and for exercising certain tasks. Typically feminine jobs are sexual labor, nurturing, cleaning, and caring jobs. Female exploitation in work places is an additional form of oppression, because in addition to benefiting capitalists in general, female workers benefit men in the work place. Young says “[women’s] energies and power are expended, often unnoticed and unacknowledged, usually to benefit men by

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 49.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 50-51.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 50.

releasing them for more important and creative work.”⁹¹ The fact that women workers are employed in certain fields means that male workers are able to work for more qualified and prestigious jobs.

Similarly, some manual and unqualified jobs are left to some racial groups. For instance, blacks in the USA usually work in unskilled, low-paid and insecure jobs. Since this work requires no special qualities and capacities, these workers cannot develop and exercise their capacities further. In both cases, it is true that both house work and manual work require certain talents and exercise of certain capacities. However, these jobs do not allow workers to develop themselves in more qualified fields and exercise their capacities fully. What is oppressive here is the classification of tasks with respect to classes or groups of people. Certain jobs are left for certain groups. According to Young, bringing about justice where there is exploitation “requires reorganization of institutions and practices of decision making, alteration of the division of labor, and similar measures of institutional, structural and cultural change.”⁹²

The other form of oppression is marginalization. Young claims that many racial groups, old people, homosexual people and disabled people are marginalized in the sense that they are excluded from the meaningful and useful participation in social life. Marginalization is a form of oppression because it blocks the opportunity to exercise capacities in socially defined and recognized ways. For this reason, Young says “[m]arginalization is perhaps the most dangerous form of oppression.”⁹³ She underlines that marginalization goes in hand in hand with material deprivation.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 51.

⁹² *Ibid.*, p. 53.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, p. 53.

The marginalized are often dependent on the welfare system. However, to the extent that old, disabled and mentally ill people experience material deprivation, they become the subject of arbitrary treatment. In this sense, dependency is a cause of oppression. In meeting the needs, welfare agencies construct the needs themselves. Welfare institutions decide what their needs are and how they should be satisfied. For Young, the treatment of welfare institutions is oppressive, and she says “[d]ependency should not be a reason to be deprived of choice and respect.”⁹⁴ Young argues that to supply material needs and to provide necessary health services do not heal the ill-effects of marginalization. In other words, she does not consider the lack of wealth as the only reason of marginalization. For instance, old people, even though they are wealthy enough to meet their material needs are excluded from participation in society in meaningful and recognized ways. She says “injustices of marginality would remain in the form of uselessness, boredom and lack of self-respect.”⁹⁵

Third, powerlessness is a form of oppression. Nonprofessionals⁹⁶ suffer powerlessness in addition to exploitation. Powerlessness is a distinct face of oppression, because although all workers are exploited in the capitalist system, some of them –working class people and manual workers– are deprived of status and respect while some other workers have status and respect –middle class workers and mental laborers. Nonprofessionals receive orders without giving orders to other people. They have authority neither in their work nor over the work of others. Young

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 55.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 55.

⁹⁶ Young uses the term professional in place of “middle class” or “mental work” and the term non-professional in place of “working class” or “manual work”. She does not use the term professional for people who are successful and good at their jobs (Young, *Justice*, pp. 56-57).

says “the powerless lack the authority, status, and a sense of self that professionals tend to have”.⁹⁷ Nonprofessionals cannot find opportunities to develop and exercise their skills. Moreover, those who are non-professionals suffer from a lack of autonomy and respect in other realms of society, while professional workers receive the benefits of their positions out of the work place. In this respect, professionals occupy a privileged and respected status at work and in other social realms. The distinction between “middle class” and “working class” or “mental labor” and “manual labor” can be seen in nearly all aspects of social life. These groups tend to have different tastes in food, clothes, music, etc. Young claims that whereas the life style of the former is respectable, the latter is not.

Fourth, cultural imperialism is another form of oppression. Young argues that when some groups’ perspectives and ways of life are considered the normal, universal and indeed the only way, other perspectives are stereotyped, seen as deviant and worthless. She argues that after a certain point, even the members of minority groups consider themselves just like the dominant group see them, as deviant, abnormal and the other. Cultural imperialism is oppressive because the members of stereotyped groups cannot talk for themselves, and express their needs and ideas. Young argues that the culturally dominated are subject to a paradoxical oppression. On the one hand, they are marked out as different, deviant and the other. They are stereotyped and inferiorized. On the other hand, they are rendered invisible. They are treated as if they do not exist at all. They are not taken into consideration by authorities. Their experience and interpretation of social life can hardly find expression in the dominant culture. Young points out that “[c]ultural imperialism

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 57.

involves the paradox of experiencing oneself as invisible at the same time that one is marked out as different.”⁹⁸

Young argues that cultural imperialism justifies its practices on the ground that its perspectives, experience and values are neutral and universal. In this respect, she criticizes the ideals of universality and neutrality as oppressive. Furthermore, she claims that nineteenth century scientific classifications of some bodies as deviant, or degenerate also reflect the influence of cultural imperialism. In conclusion, she concludes that justice requires making a political space for a positive sense of group difference.⁹⁹

Fifth, violence or the threat of violence constitutes a form of oppression. Many groups suffer from actual or possible violence. Women, children, racial groups like blacks and Latinos in the U.S.A, religious minority groups e.g. Alevis in Turkey, gays and transgendered individuals are subject to violence or the continuous threat of it. According to Young, what makes violence a form of oppression is its systematic character and it is a message to those that are possible objects of violence. Fear of violence keeps the oppressed group subordinate and establishes the privileged and dominant position of the powerful groups. Young says “[v]iolence is systemic because it is directed at members of a group simply because they are members of that group.”¹⁰⁰ Regardless of what individual victims of violence do, for instance, any woman is an object of rape just because she is woman. Similarly, any gay or transgendered person is subject to violence or the threat of it just because of being gay or transgendered. Like Pettit, Young argues that such a threat of violence deprives

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 60.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 61.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 62.

people of freedom and dignity. “Just living under such a threat of attack on oneself or family or friends deprives the oppressed of freedom and dignity, and needlessly expands their energy.”¹⁰¹

Since Young asserts that “group-directed” violence is institutionalized and systemic, to the degree to which institutions encourage, tolerate or enable the exercise of violence to oppressed groups, those institutions are unjust and should be reformed. She underlines the importance of redistribution and regulation of resources and positions. However, she claims that they are insufficient to prevent these acts of violence. She maintains that it is attainable if and only if there is a change in cultural images, stereotypes and reproduction of relations of domination in everyday gestures and seemingly innocent expressions.¹⁰² She says such a reform in large part can come only “through a change in cultural images, stereotypes, and the mundane reproduction of relations of dominance and aversion in the gestures of everyday life.”¹⁰³

Considering the points that she makes in the above paragraphs, on the one hand I think that Young has a successful analysis of the sources of oppression and domination. In addition, she presents concrete examples about their materialization in our everyday lives. On the other hand, she does not present any concrete strategy to change the existing relations of oppression and domination. Though one agrees that relations of domination and oppression are reproduced by cultural images, stereotypes and everyday gestures, it is not clear how to change them. It is not clear how people will recognize that their acts are acts of oppression and domination. It is

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 62.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, p. 63.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, p. 63.

important to note that Young fails to account by which means such a change will become a reality rather than a dream.

Having summarized what oppression is in Young's theory, I shall now try to illustrate its relation to domination. Here, I shall emphasize the importance of distinguishing two versions of domination in Young.

In the first sense, in contemporary capitalist societies we are all dominated in an administered society. The modern organization of life, when compared to traditional societies, eliminates traditional means of domination but establishes its own means of domination. Introducing rules and procedures that bind everybody, modern society eliminates traditional means of domination where the desires, values and personal ends of a ruler or the sovereign determine people's lives. Yet, Young argues that welfare capitalist society introduces new means of domination. Even though the rule of law and procedures as opposed to the sovereignty of a ruler is seen as a way of eliminating domination, new developments and new understandings in capitalist society generate its own means of domination. Young claims that, no matter whether we are exploited or not, to the extent that we are excluded from contributing to the decisions of any social institution or work place or hospital or school we are dominated.

In the modern world the caprice and particular ends of a ruler is replaced by "the ends of organization and project". Here, the problem is not the absence of order and rules that equally bind every body, but the absence of individuals' participation in making these rules. In other words, the problem in modern society is that our lives are mostly dependent on rules and procedures that we do not take part in making them. In modern societies, we have a limited chance to determine our actions and participate in the decisions of institutions since every thing is arranged to accomplish

the end of organization. According to Young, we are dominated not only as workers, but as consumers or members of any institution in the administrative society. For Young, it is mostly because we are convinced that issues of planning, production and decision making are so difficult that only experts in those fields can decide properly.¹⁰⁴ For this reason, we loose control over our lives, what is best for us and what we want at all. We are reduced to a position in which we do not determine our means according to our ends. Since we lack knowledge, only the expert knows what is best for us. For Young unless this power relation is eliminated, we will not be determining our actions and the conditions of our actions. We are dominated not only in the sense that we cannot participate in the decisions of political institutions but we cannot participate in determining any actions or conditions of actions related to our lives. So, according to her, “[d]emocracy is an element and condition of social justice, not just in government institutions, but in principle in all institutions.”¹⁰⁵

Although these remarks bear truth, it might be undesirable for us to decide about all matters with which we are more or less engaged. It might also be impossible to join in all decisions that are related to us. It is true that our society is based on the power of knowledge. But it is impossible for a single person to know all about banking in order to regulate his/her finances, to know all about health to decide what is good for him/her, to know all about how to educate his/her child etc. For this reason, it seems that we should draw a line in order to be able to decide what domination we are going to deal with and how we can eliminate it. It is desirable that we participate more in decision making mechanisms in all aspects of our lives, yet it is impossible as well as undesirable to decide about everything.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 80.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 81.

In the second sense, oppressed people are dominated. From now on, I shall try to illustrate domination in the second sense. Working class people, unqualified workers, gays, lesbians and travesties, ethnic minorities, religious groups, women, disabled and old people are excluded from participating in decision making processes. Being oppressed, they are marginalized, stereotyped, silenced and their differences are seen as abnormal, deviant, worthless and unhealthy. To the degree to which they are marginalized, stereotyped, silenced and their differences are seen abnormal, deviant, worthless and unhealthy, they are excluded from decision making processes. They are seen as lacking reason, as mad, uneducated and unhealthy. They are seen as subordinate to the majority. So, it is argued that they cannot decide what is good for themselves. When Young argues against the claims of neutrality and impartiality, she mentions how these ideas dominate others. She claims that ideals of neutrality and impartiality often “silence, ignore and render deviant the abilities, needs and norms of others”.¹⁰⁶ Young claims that in modern societies most of the discriminatory practices of everyday life are eliminated. Yet she claims that most of them have not disappeared but “have gone underground, dwelling on everyday habits and cultural meanings of which people are most part unaware.”¹⁰⁷ She claims that unless these marks of discrimination and oppression are brought to light, oppression and domination cannot be eliminated. Justice can only be maintained if dominant groups consider this kind of behavior and everyday practices as oppressive and discriminatory. Young seems to suggest two different strategies to struggle for each type of domination. For the first, she suggests re-politicization of public life. She claims that every aspect of social and political life must be open to discussion and

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 116.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 124.

participation: factories, hospitals, schools, voluntary organizations and political institutions. For the second, in addition to participatory processes, she suggests that there must be processes by which an oppressed group comes to define and articulate the social conditions of its oppression and come to realize that its specific group experience is silenced and devalued. It is a necessary step for reducing domination of oppressed groups.¹⁰⁸ However, Young does not talk about by what means such a change is possible.

After explaining the conception of domination and oppression according to Young, I will briefly explain the ideas of Bartky. As I mentioned, psychological oppression arouses my interest since it emphasizes another harm of domination for the dominated people. Drawing on Fanon's analysis of black people and applying his analysis to the case of women's oppression, Bartky claims that women are subject to psychological oppression. She argues that blacks and women are oppressed in ways that are neither economic nor political. "Blacks and women can be oppressed in ways that need involve neither physical deprivation, legal inequality, nor economic exploitation."¹⁰⁹ She claims that psychological oppression of women is usually in the form of stereotyping, cultural domination and sexual objectification. She explains in what respect psychological oppression differs from economic and political oppression. To quote from her, "[t]o be psychologically oppressed is to be weighed down in your mind; it is to have a harsh dominion exercised over your self-esteem".¹¹⁰ She claims that the most dangerous form of psychological oppression takes place when "the oppressed become to themselves their own oppressors; they

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 152-155.

¹⁰⁹ Bartky, *Femininity*, p. 22.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

come to exercise harsh dominion over their own self-esteem.”¹¹¹ Consider the cases in which most of the time you do not need anyone to tell you that you cannot go out after mid-night. You internalize the idea that when a woman goes out late, she will be the subject of violence. The internalization is so powerful that most of the time when we hear that a woman is attacked on the street after mid-night; we catch ourselves thinking that the victim is guilty too, because she is careless when she goes out late. Bartky calls the internalization of the beliefs, values and judgments of the dominator as “internalization of intimations of inferiority”. In this respect, Bartky claims that women internalize the stereotypes about themselves. It is argued that women are regarded as childlike, more intuitive than rational, more spontaneous than deliberate, and closer to nature.¹¹² According to Bartky, stereotyping gives two forms of damage to the oppressed people. First, when people have stereotyped images of someone, they will not understand his or her needs and show respect to his or her rights. Second, being the victim of a stereotype, stereotyped people will not believe in themselves, their power and their capacities. To Bartky, even when the economic and political oppression are removed, “a depreciated alterego still blocks the way”.¹¹³ She says “[t]he psychologically oppressed come to believe that they lack the capacity to be autonomous.”¹¹⁴ She calls it false consciousness.

Following Bartky, I claim that the life of domination forms certain false beliefs about one’s self as well as what one is capable of. I claim that the life of domination makes the dominated internalize the beliefs and values of the dominator.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 22.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, p. 23.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 30.

I consider these manipulated ideas about one's self as a constraint on individual freedom. I argue that since they are formed as a result of a life of domination, to establish non-domination, we have to consider them.

In this respect, Sen argues that in making choices and taking decisions we adapt to conditions in order to survive in societies where we are disadvantaged. She says "[t]he deprived people tend to come to terms with their deprivation because of the sheer necessity of survival, and they may, as a result, lack the courage to demand any radical change, and may even *adjust their desires and expectations* to what they unambitiously see as feasible."¹¹⁵ She gives examples of oppressed minorities in intolerant communities, routinely overworked employees in exploitative economic arrangements and housewives in sexist cultures. As I explained in the introductory section, Elster also illustrates the point. In environments where it is too costly to make certain choices, people choose what is easy to choose and make themselves believe that they really want that choice. Imagine a housewife who does not want to work outside the home and claims that it is her choice to stay at home and take care of the children. In a society where masculine ideology is dominant, the woman's choice might be an adaptive preference and not a real one.

However, as I mentioned, psychologism carries certain risks. According to Fraser, when we locate the wrong in individual or interpersonal psychology, it will be a short cut to blame either the oppressed or the oppressor, which is nothing to do with eliminating injustices.¹¹⁶ She says:

When misrecognition is identified with internal distortions in the structure of the self consciousness of the oppressed, it is but a short step to blaming the victim, as imputing psychic damage to those subject to racism, for example

¹¹⁵ Sen, *Development*, p. 63. Emphasizes are mine.

¹¹⁶ Nancy Fraser, "Identity Politics", p. 31.

seems to add insult to injury. Conversely, misrecognition is equated with prejudice in the minds of oppressors, overcoming it seems to require policing their beliefs, an approach that is illiberal and authoritarian.¹¹⁷

Fraser suggests locating the wrong in *social relations*, rather than in individual or interpersonal psychology, which she claims enable us to produce concrete policies that help in eliminating oppression. She suggests reconsidering social relations as manifest and publicly verifiable impediments to some people's standing as full members of society. In what follows, she suggests eliminating these relations as a remedy.

If we agree with Bartky's theory, we will fall in the view which Fraser describes above. In addition, Bartky's analysis of psychological oppression cannot suggest any concrete strategy to deal with the problem of false consciousness. On the contrary, considering the harm as damage in self-consciousness and drawing the situation as irreversible, she makes it impossible to give a solution.

Sen, on the other hand, underlines the importance of social and economic factors such as basic education, elementary health care and secure employment, which give people an opportunity to approach the world with courage and freedom. He considers the development in social and economic conditions as helpful to eliminate the mental conditioning of the dominated people. To him, such security encourages people to make radical choices and enhances freedom.¹¹⁸ For this reason, Sen's account is more optimistic and helpful.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

¹¹⁸ Sen, *Development*, p. 63.

CHAPTER IV

DIALECTICS OF THREE FORMS OF EQUALITY

Pettit defines liberty as non-domination as a matter of status equality. For him, the relationship of master to servant illustrates the true meaning of domination.¹¹⁹ The servant occupies a dominated status against the master. The inequality of their status constitutes the possibility of domination of the slave by the master. The status inequality allows one party to exercise his/her power on an arbitrary basis upon the other while making the other the victim of that arbitrary power. In other words, the master's power of arbitrary interference in the life of his slave has its source in the status inequality between the master and the slave. According to Pettit, domination is not something accidental; rather, it is rooted in the design of society. Put differently, the inequality of status is a matter of social and institutional design. In this respect, Pettit says "if someone is exposed to arbitrary interference by others, then that is always in virtue being of a certain kind or class"¹²⁰ and continues that non-domination must be enjoyed in the company of other people and by virtue of social design.¹²¹ There is power inequality between people because the structure of the society provides its conditions. For this reason, in order to eliminate domination, it is necessary to organize institutions such that no one has the capacity to interfere with others on an arbitrary basis. The relationship between "status" and "domination" can be formulated in comparison to liberty as non-interference. While according to

¹¹⁹ Pettit, *Republicanism*, p. 22.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 144.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 67.

liberty as non-interference individual x –qua individuals– interferes with individual y –qua individuals, it is not the case for liberty as non-domination. For Pettit, people are subject to domination qua members of certain class or kind. In this respect, individual x –qua members of a certain group, class or kind– interferes with individual y – qua members of certain class or kind. Considered in combination with the claim that domination is a matter of status inequality, a reformulation of Pettit’s phrase gives us the possibility of that interference on an arbitrary basis lies in the fact that the class or kind that y is a member of occupies a subordinate status against the class or kind that x is a member of. If liberty is to be immune from domination, and domination is a matter of status inequality, then non-domination requires a change in status.

To put it briefly, liberty is a matter of one’s status in a society rather than whether s/he is able to live according to her/his own will. As mentioned above, it is possible that one occupies a dominated status and at the same time s/he is able to live according to his/her will. Consider the case of a slave under the rule of a benevolent master or the case of a lucky woman married to a good husband. To be able to live according to one’s own will is necessary but not sufficient for liberty as non-domination. Moreover, Pettit states that one’s liberty is dependent on the liberty of others, who are members of the same class or kind. He claims that the liberty of an individual woman depends on the liberty of all women. Unless the condition of all women or how they all relate to men is changed, it is impossible to talk about women’s liberty as non-domination. In other words, since the subjugated or dominated are subject to domination qua members of a certain class or kind; they cannot enjoy liberty as non-domination unless all people like them get rid of their subjugated or dominated status. It is important to notice that this requirement is too

strong and contradicts the idea that freedom admits degree. We tend to believe that a woman can be more free than another woman with respect to a certain criterion. For instance, other things being equal, a rich woman is more free than a poor woman since the former does not experience material deprivation in addition to other hindrances. As I objected in Chapter II –remember the good hearted doctor example– it is impossible to distinguish cases where there is only the existence of the capacity for arbitrary interference from cases where there is both exercise and existence of the capacity for arbitrary interference. Pettit’s insistence on this point lies on the fact that he equates republican notions of freedom with non-domination and excludes the importance of non-interference. Though it is true that not only the exercise but also the existence of arbitrary interference matters for liberty, we still require a basis to distinguish cases of existence from existence plus exercise.

Up to now, I have reiterated certain characteristics of liberty as non-domination, which I have already explained in Chapter II. In order to be able to evaluate the above claims of Pettit and their significance with respect to liberty as non-domination, the notion of “status equality” requires a detailed analysis. In this chapter, first I will try to clarify what Pettit means by the notion of status. Then, I will introduce three types of status equality: structural status equality (formal equality), material status equality and cultural status equality. Then, I will argue that Pettit only engages with structural status equality. I will aim to show that Pettit argues only for the first, subordinates the second to the former without any adequate justification and ignores the third completely. I will criticize Pettit and argue that we cannot distinguish these three types. In what follows, I will show the interaction between these three kinds of status equality and their interrelation. To do so, I will

benefit from Fraser's theory of perspectual dualism and Sen's capability approach for freedom.

Status equality might mean a range of different things. First, a person might occupy a subordinate status with respect to political rights like voting in elections or being elected. An example of this might be women's right to vote. Until the mid-twentieth century, women in many countries did not vote in elections. Feminists struggled for equal voting rights for women. In addition to women, blacks and other indigenous people struggled for equal rights of suffrage. In this sense, equality requires the exercise of equal political rights or, in other words, equal rights of participation in political institutions.

Second, some people occupy a subordinate status, because they are not equal in front of the law and they do not have equal access to justice in the court. In the former case, people are not equal because they are not subject to the same treatment when they commit exactly the same crime. For instance, in the Middle Ages the nobility was privileged over the ordinary people in the courts. And blacks in the USA were discriminated against and they were not subject to equal treatment before the law. For instance, a black man was subject to more serious punishment when he murdered a white man than a white man who murdered a black. In addition, some people are excluded from access to the law when they have complaints or when they are the victims of injustice. For instance, it is a familiar case that complaints from some racial or religious groups are not taken seriously and their access to justice is blocked or slowed down. In this sense, equality requires being subject to the same legal procedures and legal sanctions.

Third, people might also occupy a subordinate status because they are excluded from social services like education, health care, transportation and leisure.

For instance, blacks in the USA and Hindus under the rule of Great Britain could not take the same transportation vehicles as whites. They did not eat at the same restaurants and go to the same hospitals and schools. They were also denied social opportunities that the state provided white citizens. In this sense, equality requires that all people, independently of race, religion and sexual preference, take advantage of social services. For simplification, I shall group these three kinds of status equality under a common title: structural status equality.¹²²

Pettit manifestly argues that what the neo-roman republicans and he has in mind is equality before the law. No one has discriminatory power and everyone should be equal before the law. He argues for equal participation of each individual in decision making processes. He argues for equality in participation so that no one will be dominating.

On the other hand, status equality might also be a matter of material resources. Equality with respect to material resources is called material equality. In this sense, a person might occupy a subordinate status with respect to the material resources he has. Working class people occupy a subordinate status relative to the capitalist class, because they do not have material wealth. There are various versions of material equality. In the strictest sense, material equality requires the redistribution of the total wealth among people in equal terms. It is important to notice that it would be unfair

¹²² The categorization that I draw here is similar to “the principle of formal equality” in Gosepath’s work. (Gosepath, Stephan. 27 June 2007. “Equality”, In *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. Available [online]: “<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/equality/>” [12 June 2008], pp. 10-11). According to the principle of formal equality, all citizens of a society must have equal general rights and duties. In legal matters, legal equality requires that laws are applied to everyone. In the political sphere, all citizens have the same claim to participation in forming public opinion, and in the distribution, control and the exercise of political power. And in social matters, it requires that social institutions have to be designed in such a way that persons who are disadvantaged have an equal chance to make their views known and to participate fully in the democratic process.

Richard Norman makes a similar classification. According to Norman, the components of equality consist of participation in political mechanisms, material goods and educational opportunities. Unlike Norman, I prefer classifying material resources as a form of status equality with purpose. Richard Norman, *Free and Equal* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).

to reduce material equality to its strictest version. So, putting aside the strictest version, material equality is widely discussed in theories of redistribution. To put it briefly, they aim at reducing the gap between rich and poor and try to provide a more equal distribution of goods, services and resources between individuals. Thinkers suggest various criteria for redistribution. Here, I will not get into the details of this discussion. Yet, it would not be wrong to say that material inequality is seen as one of the basic reasons of injustice and domination.

At the very outset, Pettit does not consider material equality as necessary to establishing non-domination. He says “[w]ithout necessarily having to embrace a material egalitarianism, then, republican consequentialism is required to support what we can describe as structural egalitarianism.”¹²³ Yet though he accepts that poverty affects the enjoyment of non-domination and material resources expand the extent of “undominated choice”, he does not consider material equality as necessary for non-domination. For Pettit, material wealth increases the range of “undominated choice” that the agent enjoys, but its importance is secondary to institutional and legal arrangements. For him, the legal arrangements, which guarantee one’s equal status with others, have priority over material wealth, which extends the range of “undominated choice”. Pettit asserts that maximization of non-domination depends on two distinct kinds of policies. There are policies that maximize the “intensity of non-domination” and policies that maximize the extent of it. In this respect, Pettit argues that regulatory mechanisms are the primary goal of the republican state. In his view, while material inequality reduces “the extent of non-domination”, it does not affect the intensity of it. Therefore, material equality is not the primary task of the republican state. But, if we have two states which do equally well in intensifying

¹²³ Pettit, *Republicanism*, p.113.

non-domination, then we should choose the one which also extends the range of undominated choice.¹²⁴

Pettit's giving priority to institutional and legal arrangements is also related to the following republican idea. For republicans, it is conceivable that the range of choices that you enjoy might be wide, and at the same time you might be dominated. Pettit says that in the tradition of republicanism "[t]he equality sought required an equality before the law and before whatever instruments were available for asserting people's freedom as non-domination, it did not entail material equality."¹²⁵ He continues that while the republican project is committed to structural egalitarianism, it is not essentially committed to any sort of material egalitarianism. The only equality he has in mind is the equality before the law. In this respect, he states "While the republican project of promoting overall freedom as non-domination does imply equally intensifying non-domination, it does not necessarily involve equally extending undominated choice."¹²⁶ Pettit admits that in some cases the republican state must deal with instituting certain material equalities if and only if material inequality threatens the "intensity of non-domination".¹²⁷ I will discuss this issue when I examine Pettit's interpretation of Sen's capabilities approach later in this chapter.

However, Pettit seems to disregard cases where *status* is determined by the inequality of material resources. Consider capitalism in which the working class is subordinate to the capitalist class. Workers lack material wealth and that is why they

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 142.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 117.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 119.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 119.

occupy a subordinate status, capitalists hold the capital and that is why they hold the power of arbitrary interference. It seems that material resources not only determine the range of individual choice –e.g. the wealthier you are, the richer your alternatives will be –, but also determine the status of people. So, the way Pettit subordinates material equality to structural equality is an unjustified claim. It is true that legal arrangements can control the capitalist class and reduce their power of arbitrary interference; they cannot eliminate the status inequality between workers and capitalists with respect to material resources. In what follows, since material inequality is a source of domination, reducing it must also be the task of the republican state. In this respect, the role of legal arrangements is not only to protect workers from the power of employers, but also to empower them in terms of material resources. However, Pettit thinks that the status inequality between workers and employers, and employers' capacity for arbitrary interference are the result of lack of legal arrangements. He argues that employers' ability to black list, their capricious way of hiring and firing and the free contract of employment constitutes employers' capacity for arbitrary interference.¹²⁸ He promises that the republican state will prohibit them and maintain status equality. It is true that the above mentioned factors have great influence on worker's domination. There are other reasons for the domination of workers. A high rate of unemployment, absence of unemployment benefits, worker's material deprivation and their inability to bargain on equal terms also determine their dominated status. Without considering the material deprivation they suffer, it would be impossible to eliminate workers' domination. For this reason, I think that any approach which considers material inequality as a source of

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 140-143.

domination as well as a factor that determines the range of individual choice will be better equipped to reduce domination than Pettit's approach.

In addition, there is a very important tie between structural status equality and material equality in securing and enhancing freedom. For instance, the law guarantees freedom of travel to every citizen. However, it is plain that people who lack material resources cannot enjoy that freedom. Similarly, the law states that women and men have an equal right to enter parliament. However, in many countries, the number of women in parliaments is still very low compared to men. There are various reasons. One reason is the economic dependence of women on men; most women are still dependent on their male relatives. Economic dependence has a great influence on women's career plans. I claim that without sufficient material resources, structural arrangements will be insufficient to eliminate domination. The second reason is cultural subordination. Cultural values discourage women from dealing with politics. Politics is always considered the task of men, not of women. In this respect structural equality is inefficient if it is not supported by cultural equality. The law must be associated with other arrangements and also laws that enhance the status of women in the cultural hierarchy. In this respect, there is also a tie between structural equality and cultural equality.

Consider also the following point. People's ability to defend themselves in courts depends on their material resources. Even though there is no discrimination with respect to race, gender and religion in the courts, your ability to defend yourself depends on whether you could hire a good lawyer or not. Similarly, even the rule of law guarantees that you will not be discriminated against when you use public services like health care, education, transportation and leisure; your ability to get a better service depends on your material resources.

Up to now, I have examined material equality and criticized Pettit's approach. On the one hand, Pettit does not consider material equality as crucial as structural status equality, namely equality in front of the law. On the other hand, Pettit maintains that in policy making the state must foster the socioeconomic independence of each individual person for the following reason. He thinks that to the degree to which material inequality has an effect on the "intensity of non-domination," its elimination will be the concern of the republican state. He says "a lack of socioeconomic independence will lessen my prospects for the enjoyment of freedom as non-domination; this relates to the intensity of non-domination I enjoy, not its extent."¹²⁹ In other words, to the degree to which material inequalities produce the capacity of arbitrary interference and make people dependent on others' good will, the state must be concerned with the material inequality in question.

Pettit refers to Sen's "functioning and capabilities".¹³⁰ He concludes that Sen's point has great importance for liberty as non-domination. Today, in many societies, one must be able to read and write, to do basic mathematics, to have a phone number, to have informational access to medical facilities, work opportunities and weather reports. One must also be able to know how to deal with the bank, public officers and how to assert one's rights to the police and legal authorities. In addition, one also needs to be able to provide food, clothing and shelter for himself. What Pettit is interested in is the fact that when trying to provide "functionings" –

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 159.

¹³⁰ Amartya Sen, *Commodities and Capabilities* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).

necessary things to function properly in modern societies¹³¹ –, needy people might become the object of arbitrary interference.

Pettit gives an example of the goodhearted factory owner, who spends all of his annual income on improving the well being of citizens. The example tries to illustrate how social aid systems, if not properly organized, can generate the capacity for arbitrary interference. He provides citizens food, shelter, education and medical care. Pettit claims that though the satisfaction of such needs has great importance for freedom, the fact that they are satisfied in this manner undermines liberty as non-domination. The fact that one is dependent on someone to meet his basic needs makes him vulnerable to arbitrary interference. Even when there is no such interference, the fact that the factory owner might interfere on an arbitrary basis undermines non-domination. People would fear that the factory owner might stop helping people. The needy would be in a position of uncertainty and flattery. Pettit claims that when people cannot have “functioning capabilities”, the state must meet these needs. The state must provide these basic needs in the form of “well established routines and law-like arrangements” so that it will not undermine liberty as non-domination.¹³² When the state secures the supply of these resources under well-established routines and law-like arrangements, it increases the intensity of non-domination. The needy do not have to beg someone to meet their needs. They do not depend on the capricious desire of a certain authority. The support should not be in the form of a gift but rather it must be in the form of a right.¹³³

¹³¹ Pettit thinks that functionings, namely necessary things to function in modern societies, change from culture to culture (Pettit, *Republicanism*, p. 158). One step further, Sen thinks that they also change from person to person. He thinks that things necessary for an abled-bodied person might not be enough for the disabled person (Sen, *Development*, p.74).

¹³² Pettit, *Republicanism*, p. 161.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, p. 162.

Pettit is right when he emphasizes the importance of the form of aid. Whether the aid is provided as in the form of a gift or the form of a right is important for non-domination. It is true that when people try to get their basic needs that are necessary for them to function properly in any society, they might become the object of arbitrary interference. However, there are some points that I would like to emphasize.

First, these goods like food and clothes, services like medical care are different from “functionings” like reading and writing, basic ability in mathematics, knowing how to deal with a bank and public officer etc. Whereas the first two are necessary for surviving in a society, the latter is necessary for competing in a society. The latter includes skills that are important for people to be able to compete with others in modern society. So, we cannot deal with them as if they are a single set. Each of them requires different policies when the state tries to provide them to its citizens. Sen himself makes the point. Some functionings are elementary –e.g. being adequately nourished, being in good health– and some others are complex or secondary.¹³⁴

Second, Pettit only considers them with respect to whether they become a capacity for arbitrary interference. He does not conceive them as tools that help people to develop the capacities that I mention in the third chapter. What seems to be important for him is how to avoid the danger of arbitrariness, when the state provides these goods and services to people. I believe that “functionings” are important not only for avoiding the danger of arbitrary interference, but also for might helping people to develop certain capacities necessary for freedom. In other words, they should be understood as necessary to develop certain capacities.

¹³⁴ Amartya Sen, “Capability and Well-Being”, In *The Quality of Life*. Edited by Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen. (Oxford: Clarendon Press), p. 31.

Third, I argue that material equality is important because it enhances people's ability to make radical choices. It would be unfair to reduce the place of material equality in freedom to the increase it makes in the range of choices that the agent enjoys. Material equality is important not only because it improves the *range of choice* –e.g buying the good/service X, Y, Z or W–, but also because it improves *the agent's ability to choose among different life styles*. According to Sen, social and economic factors like basic education, elementary health care and secure employment are important not only on their own but also “for the role they can play in giving people the opportunity to approach the world with courage and freedom.”¹³⁵ We should favor “the creation of conditions in which people have real opportunities of judging the kind of lives they would like to lead.”¹³⁶ Consider the case of the domination of women. Because women lack material resources, many women are subject to the will of their fathers or husbands. Personal independence enables one to choose among alternative life styles. For this reason, the state should provide certain “functionings” to prevent needy people from becoming the victims of arbitrary interference and to enable them to be powerful and secure in choosing among real alternatives and life plans. According to Sen, capability refers to various set of functionings. He says “[c]apability is thus a kind of freedom: the substantive freedom to achieve alternative functioning combinations (or less formally put freedom to achieve various life plans).”¹³⁷

Fourth, we should notice that Pettit's interest in “capabilities” refers only to the conditions of needy people. I agree with Pettit that needy people can meet their

¹³⁵ Sen, *Development*, p. 63.

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 63.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 75.

basic needs through law-like arrangements. It is important for their freedom as non-domination. However, interestingly, he does not say anything about how material deprivation affects the domination of women. He has not considered how material deprivation affects the conditions of women and makes them dependent on the good will of their male relatives. In the case of women, even though material deprivation is not as serious as in the needy people case, lack of material resources makes women dependent. Following Pettit's reasoning, I claim that since women's material deprivation produces a capacity for arbitrary interference, the state must deal with material inequality with respect to the domination of women. However, the policy cannot be the same with the needy people case. In the case of women, eliminating material inequality requires redistributive arrangements. It requires different policies than welfare aid campaigns. I will return to the details of this discussion later.

Now, I will illustrate the third kind of status equality: cultural status equality. I will claim that Pettit ignores the literature about cultural status equality. After that I will show how cultural status equality is interrelated to structural equality and material equality.

According to theories of cultural status equality, a person might occupy a subordinate status because his life and his practices are devalued and ignored by others. There are dominant ideologies according to which certain practices like homosexuality, femininity and the life styles of certain minority, race or religious groups are considered subordinate. They do not receive attention and respect. I have already introduced the claims of these people in Chapter III. Young illustrates the thesis of minority groups under the title of cultural imperialism.¹³⁸ She states that majority practices are considered normal and universal, which engenders the

¹³⁸ Young, *Justice*, pp. 58-61.

discrimination of minority practices. In this account, these groups occupy a subordinate or inferior status due to their practices and life styles.

Likewise, Kymlicka argues that there is a status hierarchy, which says it is better to be English than Irish, better to be white than black or brown or yellow, better to be male than female, better to be heterosexual than homosexual, and better to be able-bodied than disabled.¹³⁹ Equality in this case requires the reconsideration of these formerly devalued and disrespected life practices. Furthermore, it requires the recognition of these practices. I will call this sense of status equality, cultural status equality. Recognition of formerly rejected practices is the subject of an ongoing debate among philosophers. Some argue that recognition of human practices is important for attaining full and undistorted subjectivity. Being recognized by others is a prerequisite of human flourishing. They claim that unless minority practices are recognized and respected like majority practices, we cannot talk about freedom.¹⁴⁰

On the other hand, some argue that recognition is a matter of social status. In this view, what needs to be recognized is not group-specific identity, but rather the status of group members as full partners in social interaction.¹⁴¹ In this respect, Fraser argues that recognition is a matter of justice. Individuals and groups are denied the status of full partners due to the institutional patterns of cultural value.

¹³⁹ Will Kymlicka, *Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 332.

¹⁴⁰ Axel Honneth, "Redistribution as Recognition: A Response to Nancy Fraser", In *Redistribution or Recognition: A Political and Philosophical Exchange* (New York: Verso, 2003), pp. 110-198. Charles Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition", In *Multiculturalism*. Edited by Amy Gutmann. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp.25-75.

¹⁴¹ Nancy Fraser, "Identity Politics", pp. 7-110.

And justice requires deinstitutionalizing these cultural patterns and replacing them with patterns that foster equal participation.¹⁴²

There is an ongoing debate about the possibility, as well as the desirability, of valuing and respecting all practices only because they are cultural and belong to a certain group's life style. In this respect, Barry claims that it is impossible to affirm all cultural practices. He asserts that due to the fact that cultures have propositional content, it is impossible to affirm two conflicting cultural practices at the same time. For instance, he mentions that it is impossible to affirm the views of Southern Baptists, who argue for the sinfulness of homosexuality, and simultaneously for the value of a gay life style. He adds "it is not simply psychologically unattainable but logically impossible".¹⁴³ Some theorists mention the undesirable implications of praising community and cultural membership.¹⁴⁴ I will not engage further in this debate due to the scope of this paper. Yet I would like to mention that even though cultural status equality has some problematic aspects which I have introduced very briefly, it happens to be what today's dominated groups demand. They do not struggle only for legal, political or social rights. They claim that the underlying reason for their dominated status is their inferior status in the cultural hierarchy. In

¹⁴² Fraser, "Identity Politics", pp. 27-30.

¹⁴³ Brian Barry, *Culture and Equality*, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001), pp. 270-271.

¹⁴⁴ Habermas argues that the self-realization view of cultural identity is problematic. He says "The ecological perspective on species conservation cannot be transferred to cultures". Jürgen Habermas, "Struggles for Recognition in The Democratic Constitutional State", In *Multiculturalism*. Edited by Amy Gutmann. Translated by Shierry Weber Nicholsen (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994), p.130. He claims that cultures are always in interaction with other cultures and subject to change. So, it is wrong to attribute stable borders to a culture. Any view that puts the protection of culture over and above the well-being and freedom of its members is problematic. From another perspective, Appiah claims "Between the politics of recognition and politics of compulsion, there is no bright line". K. Anthony Appiah, "Identity, Authenticity, Survival: Multicultural Societies and Social Reproduction" In *Multiculturalism*. Edited by Amy Gutmann (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 163). He argues that the protection of cultural identities results in strict definitions of what it is to be gay or to be black. He asserts that the strict definitions about cultural identities oppress individuals.

most western countries, they have already gained structural status equality, in the sense of the word introduced above. For instance, today feminists struggle to change prejudices and misunderstanding about womanhood. Female practices are considered less valuable when compared to male practices. Women are pictured as emotional, less rational than men, close to nature, weak, etc. Feminists try to change the status of female practices, which for many years were considered as subordinate to men's practices. They do not only struggle for structural status equality, but also for cultural status equality. Similar stories can be told about blacks in their relation to whites, homosexuals in their relation to heterosexuals etc.

Up to now, I have tried to introduce the claims of defenders of cultural status equality and to state the main objections to their arguments. Though the possibility of maintaining cultural status equality is still a subject of ongoing debate, the recognition demands of dominated groups are still valid.

Pettit manifestly states that he advocates the first status equality, namely structural status equality and he does not advocate the second, namely material status equality. However, it is not clear whether he also advocates cultural status equality or not. I will claim that he ignores the contemporary discussion about the relation of domination and cultural hierarchy. I will try to show that Pettit's ignorance constitutes a serious problem for his republican project. I will claim that it is impossible to eliminate structural inequalities without considering cultural status inequality and impossible to eliminate cultural status inequality without considering material inequalities.

Having briefly introduced the forms of status equality, I shall now turn to Pettit and examine his conception of "status equality". For Pettit, as mentioned above, liberty as non-domination is associated with occupying a "status" which is

guaranteed by institutional structure and social design.¹⁴⁵ Unless dominated people occupy an equal “status” with others, it is impossible to talk about liberty as non-domination. As he puts it, “there is a tie between valuing non-domination and valuing equality, in particular equality of status”.¹⁴⁶ He continues with clarifying what valuing equality involves. He says “the ideal (of equality) is going to be equality of non-domination: in effect, equality of the kind that is provided when people equally command attention and the respect of others”.¹⁴⁷ By “equality” he means occupying the same status which enables people to “equally command attention and the respect” of others. Pettit asserts that when the dominated person occupies an equal “status”, he will be a *person* in his own *legal and social right*.¹⁴⁸

Now I will try to clarify Pettit’s notion of “person”. Pettit places “person” in opposition to the subjugated or dominated person. He states that only persons enjoy the life of non-domination. I shall examine what it is to be a “person” in contrast to being a subjugated or dominated person. In this opposition, I shall try to clarify what Pettit has in mind with the term “status equality”.

To do so, I will quote a passage which is of great importance. There Pettit illustrates the conditions of a dominated or subjugated person and “person”. In the passage, while a *person* enjoys non-dominated status and its benefits, the dominated person lacks them.

According to Pettit, to be a *person* is defined as follows:

It means that the enjoyment of non-domination in relation to another agent goes with being able *to look the other in the*

¹⁴⁵ Pettit, *Republicanism*, p. 67.

¹⁴⁶ Pettit, *Complaint*, p. 110.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 108.

¹⁴⁸ Pettit, *Republicanism*, p. 71.

eye, confident in the shared knowledge that it is not by their leave that you pursue your innocent, non-interfering choices; you pursue those choices, as of publicly recognized right... You are a *person* in your own *legal and social right*.¹⁴⁹

He says after a few pages:

To be a *person* is to be a voice that cannot properly be *ignored*, a voice which speaks with a certain authority: enough authority, certainly, for discord with that voice to give others reason to pause and think. To be treated properly as a *person*, then, is to be treated as a voice that cannot be dismissed without independent reason: to be taken as someone *worth listening to*. The condition of domination would reduce the likelihood of being treated as a *person* in this way, so far as it is associated with a need for strategy and a subordinate status.

To be dominated, the strategy bound person is someone with reason to watch what they say, someone who must be assumed always to have an eye to what please their dominators. And equally, the dominated, subordinate person is someone, by common assumption, who has reason to impress their dominators and try to win a higher ranking in their opinion. Such a person will naturally be presumed to lack *an independent voice*, at least in the area where domination is relevant. ...they may happen to receive attention but they will not *command attention*; they may happen to receive respect but they will not *command respect*. It seems reasonable to hold that, no matter what their other commitments; everyone will want to be treated properly as a *person*, as a voice that cannot be generally ignored. But that being so, it follows that every such person has reason to want freedom as non-domination; in the absence of such freedom, they will be strategy bound, subordinate sorts of creature who cannot expect to be treated properly as *persons*.¹⁵⁰

The “person” has certain social and legal rights, which enable him/her to talk and to be heard. S/he is not dependent on others’ will; so s/he has an independent voice.

Accordingly, the “person” is one who does not need to resort to flattery –to please the powerful– and does not need to fear displeasing the powerful. The “person” does

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 71. Emphasizes are mine.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, pp: 91-92. Emphasizes are mine.

not demand respect or attention but commands them.¹⁵¹ It is plain that all dominated groups would find this language attractive. Yet, it is not clear what is meant with “to command respect and attention” or “to look the other in the eye”. The scenario differs according to what you demand the attention and respect for. For instance, in front of a public phone you draw the attention of others to your right to use the phone, and command them to respect your right. Or, you command attention to your right to travel or your right to vote etc. However, what if you command attention to and respect for your life practices, which, you claim, are the reasons of your dominated and subjugated status?

Pettit is right in asserting that people are dominated always qua members of certain classes and kinds. Because you are a woman, you are dominated, and are subject to the arbitrary interference of others. Because of the subordinate status attached to your practices and capacities as a woman, you are dominated. Women’s exclusion from participation in political affairs was the result of the inferior status attached to female experiences and capacities. The exclusion of blacks from participation in political affairs was a result of common beliefs and prejudices about the nature of black people. Modern society has already been regulated in accordance with the ideal of equality so that everyone – no matter of what race and religion s/he is– has a right to participate in political decision mechanisms. At least in theory, legal and institutional arrangements have been made in order to establish structural status equality. Though women can participate equally in political affairs and have comparable social opportunities, they are still discriminated against in their private

¹⁵¹ The idea that everyone deserves the same dignity and respect is a widely held conception of moral equality. Gosepath says “the fundamental idea of equal respect for all persons and the equal worth or equal dignity of all human beings are accepted as a minimum standard by all leading schools of modern Western political and moral culture”. The terminology that Pettit employs here is widely used by many philosophers of different perspectives. Therefore, a close analysis is necessary to examine Pettit’s usage of these words. Gosepath, “Equality”, p. 7.

life on account of being women. There are two cases that correspond to this discussion. It can be said that for a woman to look the other (man) in the eye, she must have equal social and political rights with men. Furthermore, one can argue that it is necessary but not sufficient for a woman “to look the other in the eye”. Unless prejudices and common beliefs attached to female experiences and practices are changed, neither will women consider themselves equal with men –as capable and powerful as men– nor will men consider women as their equal. In this respect, the defenders of cultural status equality argue that unless formerly devalued and disrespected practices of subordinated groups are changed; say as a result of cultural revolution¹⁵², it is impossible to establish status equality in the sense of cultural status equality.

While discussing the modern instances of domination, Pettit claims that the republican ideal of non-domination serves the interests and demands of feminists.¹⁵³ Pettit states that since cultural, legal and institutional arrangements put pressure on women and reduce their status almost to that of slavery, women would agree with the ideal of liberty as non-domination. Pettit mentions the conditions of women at home, in work places and on the streets, and claims that they are vulnerable to the arbitrary interference of men. According to Pettit, the condition of women is deeply associated with a set of assumptions about the role of women and what women are. It is true that women always find that institutions are against them, while they struggle against the conditions they live in. Feminists would certainly find the support of legal and social institutions significant. Yet it is important to notice that Pettit is silent about

¹⁵² See Fraser, “Identity Politics” and Young, *Justice*.

¹⁵³ Pettit, *Republicanism*, p. 139.

the scope of this support. He promises the support of legal and social institutions without talking about the nature of this support.

Pettit recognizes that there are common assumptions about the role of women which turn them into slaves. Although he admits that common assumptions about the role and the nature of women contribute to their subjugated status, he does not say anything about how legal arrangements should be made in order to fight these false images about women. Even though he promises the support of legal and social arrangements, he does not say anything about what these arrangements should contain and what form they should take. Given that cultural status inequality is a cause that produces domination, then reducing it must be the goal of state activity.

I think that ignoring these factors constitutes a failure for his theory because it disregards a very important part of the discussion. Although Pettit examines female subordination, domination of minority groups and the subjugated status of workers, he does not consider non-domination and liberty as matters of cultural status equality, which lies at the heart of the demands of activist groups today. Perhaps he implicitly assumes that when non-domination in the sense of structural status equality is established, cultural status equality will automatically follow. If this is the case, it is the weak point of Pettit's theory because he implicitly assumes something and does not argue it explicitly. Second, if Pettit intentionally does not deal with cultural status equality and intentionally limits his theory to the discussion of structural status equality, he must state his reason for omitting discussions about cultural status equality.

Up to now, I have tried to show how Pettit downplays the place of material equality and disregards the discussion of cultural status equality. I claim that as a result, he does not consider the dialectic between forms of status equality and the

importance of this dialectic for liberty as non-domination. I argue that in eliminating domination, we must have a more comprehensive account of status equality which considers status equality as a dialectic of three distinct dimensions: structural, material and cultural. Considering the fact that status equality is three-dimensional and each dimension has an effect on liberty as non-domination, the state must consider these three dimensions and their relative weight in particular occurrences of domination.

To show the dialectic between different dimensions of status equality, I will benefit from Fraser's theory of perspectival dualism. Fraser argues that overcoming domination requires neither redistribution nor recognition alone. Rather, it requires them both. For instance, when we particularly think about the domination of women, we observe that material inequality is not the only reason. Prejudices about the nature and the role of women go hand in hand with the material deprivation they suffer. And both of these factors together result in the domination of women. Then an effective struggle against the domination of women must consider these two factors together.

Fraser's perspective is important for two different reasons. First, she shows that the subjugated status of dominated people is a result of two distinct inequalities: namely material and cultural status inequality. Therefore, overcoming domination requires the elimination of both inequalities. Second, she shows that each remedy, namely recognition and redistribution, has an effect on the other. This is a very important observation. It highlights the fact that redistribution might have an inverse effect on recognition. Similarly, recognition might have an inverse effect on redistribution. Unlike Fraser, I argue that the effect does not always need to be negative. I claim that recognition or redistribution might have a supportive effect on

each other. I take it as a reason why we should consider them together. Not because they have an inverse effect on each other, but because they might have a supportive effect on each other. I will illustrate each one by one.

Fraser, when she tries to solve the debate between theories of recognition and theories of redistribution, states that we should consider recognition and redistribution as distinct parts of a single theory of justice. She claims that no instance of domination is homogenous; and for this reason, overcoming domination requires a pragmatist approach. She claims that “gender” is an example of two dimensional injustices. From the distributive perspective, gender is a matter of economic inequality. Most women are either excluded from the labor force and reduced to in-home/non-paid activities or hired for lower-paid, non-professional and domestic positions. Then according to Fraser, justice requires an equal contribution of women to labor force for the former illness, and the elimination of gender based division of labor for the second. In this respect, she claims that gender inequality requires redistribution. Without redistribution it is impossible to overcome the domination of women.

On the other hand, elimination of gender inequality requires recognition. Fraser claims that in male-dominant societies, things that are associated with womanhood are devalued and marked as feminine. She says

[W]omen suffer gender specific forms of status subordination, including sexual assault and domestic violence, trivializing, objectifying, and demeaning stereotypical depictions in the media; harassment and disparagement in everyday life; exclusion and marginalization in public spheres; and denial of the full rights and equal rights of citizenship.¹⁵⁴

She claims that these are the injustices of recognition. They cannot be overcome by redistribution alone because their origin is not the economy. That is

¹⁵⁴ Fraser, “Identity Politics”, p. 21.

why we need additional, independent remedies of recognition to eliminate the domination of women.

In addition, she admits that in each particular case the weight of these two dimensions might change. She says “[t]o be sure, not all axes of subordination are two dimensional in the same way, nor to the same degree.”¹⁵⁵ She suggests two-dimensional political remedies for two dimensional injustices, each particular case requires a different combination of redistribution and recognition. In sum, according to Fraser, real world cases are too complex to overcome injustices by redistribution or recognition alone. She says “[n]one can conceptualize today’s complex relations between cultural ordering and economic ordering, status subordination and class subordination, misrecognition and maldistribution.”¹⁵⁶ For this reason, we should consider recognition and redistribution together.

Fraser also observes the fact that each remedy has an effect on the other, either intended or unintended. She gives the example of welfare programs to illustrate how redistribution has an inverse effect on recognition. Welfare programs target the poor and aim to improve their life conditions. However, in eliminating their deprivation, the poor might become the object of public hostility.¹⁵⁷ Here redistribution has a misrecognition effect. We must take into consideration how we reduce material inequality without increasing cultural inequality. On the other hand, redistributive policies might also be supportive to recognition. Consider the case of gendered division of labor. When the state encourages women’s participation in certain fields, it also helps in deconstructing the gender-based value patterns in

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 25.

¹⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 61.

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 65.

cultural hierarchy. It used to be a common belief that a woman's place is the home. However, as a result of feminists' struggles and affirmative action policies, people believe that women can be successful out of their homes too. In addition, working with women in the same work places, men come to believe that women are as successful as men. Women's participation in the previously forbidden fields has a positive effect on people's beliefs and values, and restores women's place in the cultural hierarchy.

To illustrate how recognition might have an inverse effect on distribution, Fraser gives the example of campaigns that suppress prostitution and pornography for the sake of enhancing women's status. She explains how women lost their jobs and suffered material deprivation when these campaigns were successful. Though these campaigns reestablish women's place in the cultural hierarchy, they have maldistribution effects. On the other hand, recognition might have a supportive effect. Consider women's struggle for day-care centers for children. Feminists question the role of women in child-caring and how it affects their income and career. If there are available day care centers for children, they will not have to give up their jobs and career. They will continue making money and advancing their careers. The campaign which aims to deconstruct the role of women in child-caring will also have a supportive effect on distribution. Similarly, consider the campaign to omit the texts in school books that reproduce gender-based role divisions in society. For instance, the campaign aims to erase pictures in primary school books that depict women cooking and men working outside. The campaign will have a recognition effect but in the long run it might also have a redistributive effect. It will help in changing the image of women from domestic workers to wage earners, and might increase women's participation in employment in the future.

To summarize, in Chapter IV, I have tried to illustrate three forms of status equality: structural, material and cultural equality. Contrary to Pettit, I have argued that the inequality in each form is a cause of domination. I have also argued that these three forms are interrelated in many ways. In various combinations, these three forms are the causes of the domination of women, racial domination, etc. I have only mentioned examples from the domination of women, but similar examples can be given for racial domination too. In this chapter, I have argued that to struggle against domination, we must try to eliminate or reduce all three forms of inequality. The complexity of modern instances of domination requires multi-dimensional strategies.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

My principal endeavor throughout the thesis has been to examine Pettit's notion of domination and his notion of liberty as non-domination. The task required a widespread analysis, since underlying Pettit's framework is a rich history of the republican understanding of political liberty, law and state that allows him to define liberty as the absence of domination. Unfortunately, I had to limit myself to only those ideas that are crucial for the presentation of the main task of this work. Having introduced the notion of domination and the notion of republican liberty as non-domination, I have offered several reasons why Pettit's notion of domination is too limited to give a comprehensive account of liberty. I asserted that in defining domination, the unjustified emphasis on the presence of a master excludes certain aspects and harms of domination to individuals. I averred that these harms are closely related to liberty, because they constitute certain barriers to individual liberty. Pettit's argument goes as follows: given that domination is mastery by others and is defined as the capacity for arbitrary interference, then non-domination can be established through the elimination of the capacity for arbitrary interference of some in the affairs of others. In other words, given that domination is the presence of something—mastery—, then non-domination can be defined as the absence of mastery.

My argument took as its focal point the claim that domination can be understood in a wider context than Pettit understands it. Regarding its other connotations, liberty as non-domination cannot be defined simply as the absence of mastery by others. Asserting that a life of domination causes certain harms to

individuals, I argued that freedom requires the elimination of these harms to be able to give a comprehensive account of individual liberty.

Moreover, I am convinced that though Pettit uses modern terminology and defines liberty as non-domination, his analysis of domination is very similar to that of neo-roman republicans. In other words, I argued that Pettit neither goes beyond the republican analysis of domination nor deals with the contemporary discussion of domination. I argued that he only interprets the republican notion of domination with regard to the modern cases without considering the contemporary content of the notion. In other words, I attempted to illustrate the way in which he disregards contemporary discussions of domination and restricts his framework to domination as the capacity for arbitrary interference.

In what follows, I availed myself of the accounts of Young, Bartky and Sen. Drawing on Young's theory, I argued that a life of domination hinders certain capacities of self-expression and evaluation which are crucial for liberty, no matter whether it is conceived as positive or negative. Having underlined the claim that Pettit does not embrace any view of positive freedom, I restricted my study to its relation to negative freedom, and put forward an argument referring to how the underdevelopment of these capacities may affect negative liberty. In this respect, I argued that the underdeveloped capacities of persons prevent them from participating in decision-making mechanisms to air their grievances before the public. I claimed that these capacities of self-expression and evaluation are crucial in participating in those mechanisms and participation in decision making mechanisms is a condition for the possibility of a domination-free life. I also stated that this point is of great importance for Pettit, since he believes that participation is important for the state to be non-dominating while, in fact, promoting domination. Put briefly, since the

hindrance of the development of certain capacities is the result of a life of domination and these capacities occupy a central place both for positive and negative theories of freedom for different reasons, non-domination requires the development of these capacities.

Then, following Bartky's analysis of psychological oppression, I called attention to the fact that domination damages self-understanding of people. I put forward the claim that just as with the capacities Young underlines, a critical understanding of one's self and projects is crucial for liberty. Given that a life of domination causes false consciousness in the sense that Bartky uses the term, it is necessary to take into account the problem of distorted self-image to be able to give a complete account of liberty. Although I inferred that to act properly in a life of non-domination, former beliefs about one's self and projects have to be reconsidered critically, I claimed that Bartky's analysis carries certain risks. In what follows, I explained Fraser's objections to her psychological view. Although Bartky observes the harms of domination on people's consciousness and mentality, the fact that she understands it as psychological disorder makes the solution impossible. In other words, besides suggesting nothing to eliminate the psychological effects of domination, I have argued that her analysis makes finding a way out impossible.

From a different perspective, Sen argues that dominated people might form adaptive preferences. Since it is the easiest way, the dominated person adopts the preferences of the powerful and believes that it is his or her desire. Sen argues that unless the dominated people are powerful and secure enough to determine their own lives, we cannot talk about freedom. Even the dominated person believes that s/he lives according to his or her desire; it is possible that s/he lives according to the desire of the powerful. I argued that Sen's account is better than Bartky's account

because Sen provides solutions. He thinks that we are free to the degree to which we can choose among various life styles, namely “capabilities”. In this account, enhancing one’s ability to make choices among different alternatives is a way to move towards freedom. By either multiplying the alternatives or enhancing people’s security and power to make choices among existing alternatives, we can increase people’s freedom.

After asserting what is missing in Pettit’s account of domination and its harmful consequences, I approached the issue from a different perspective. I dug deeper into the republican claim that liberty is a matter of status equality. It also helped in improving and deepening my analysis of domination. Having categorized the kinds of status equality as structural status equality, material status equality and cultural status equality, I claimed that that Pettit only argues for structural status equality, which no one rejects today. He subordinates material equality to structural status equality and ignores the claims of cultural status equality. In Chapter IV, I argued that it is impossible to distinguish kinds of status inequalities from each other. They penetrate into each other in many ways and are closely interrelated. For this reason, Pettit’s claim that equality in front of the law is the only one that is crucial for liberty as non-domination is too quick and unjustified.

In what follows, I benefited from Sen’s account to show that material resources are much more important for liberty than Pettit considers them to be; and I benefited from Fraser’s account to show in what ways versions of status equality are interrelated. By giving examples, I tried to illustrate the dialectics between versions of status equality. I argued that it is impossible to maintain status equality, hence non-domination, without considering all these three dimensions together.

Drawing on Sen's analysis, I argued that material resources not only increase one's range of choices – available good/services X, Y, Z and W, instead of just X –, but also one's ability to make choices among different life styles. Sen argues for freedom as capabilities, namely one's ability to choose among various alternative life styles, not just goods. Material resources, in addition to other things such as basic education and health care, provide people with the power and security to choose their life.

Drawing on Fraser's analysis, I argued that in most cases domination has two dimensions, namely misrecognition and maldistribution, which require two dimensional strategies. I argued that it is impossible to eliminate the domination of women without taking into account their material dependence on men. I also argued that it is impossible to eliminate the domination of women, without considering the cultural factors that devalue their practices. I argued that the state should consider both recognition and redistribution. I argued that Fraser's analysis is important because it shows how cultural and material equality are interrelated and penetrate each other.

Up to now, I have briefly summarized what I have done in the previous chapters briefly. I have mentioned the additional harms of slavery and claimed that a life of domination forms certain constraints on freedom. In addition, presenting the dialectic between forms of equality, I underlined the fact that if we are to eliminate domination, we should consider the interrelation between these forms of equality. For the former claim, I suggest affirmative action policies, which considers the past effects of domination and try to eliminate the inequality between people's initial conditions. For instance women's condition is initially disadvantaged in relation to that of men in many jobs. In this respect, affirmative action policies try to fill this

gap. Keeping in mind the interrelation between forms of status equality, I will suggest that in determining the remedy we should take into consideration the dialectic between the forms of equality. From now on, I will try to illustrate my suggestions considering the points that I have made in this work.

Throughout my thesis, I claimed that without eliminating the additional harms of domination it would be impossible to maintain liberty. Having agreed with Pettit that the rule of law and the force of legal arrangements are the only way to eliminate domination, I claimed that his remedies would be insufficient because his conception of domination is too narrow. I underlined the fact that the remedy is always given according to the illness. If we fail to diagnose the illness, we will also fail to cure it. I argued that Pettit fails to give a comprehensive account of domination. Thus, the remedy, namely the scope of legal and institutional arrangements, is limited by his narrow conception of domination. I argued that the scope of state activity must be designed such that it includes strategies to eliminate the additional harms of slavery in addition to the elimination of arbitrary power of interference.

From now on, I will try to investigate the ways the state should act in order to eliminate domination in all its aspects. I would like to repeat that affirmative action policies will be the corner stone of my suggestions since it is important to eliminate the effects of the past instances of domination. Basically I have already emphasized three additional harms of domination.

First, I argued that a life of domination results in underdeveloped capacities of expression and evaluation, which is of great importance in participatory societies. When people make their points in order to be heard by the state, they must be able to articulate their points adequately. This ability is crucial and determines not only how you live but also how much resource you can get from the total share. As long as

people fail to express themselves, their needs and interests, they might not live according to their own life plans and become the easy victims of domination. If it is the case that the more people participate and make their points public the less the republican state is non-dominating, then their capacity to articulate their needs and interests must be a central concern of the republican state. In this respect, I argued that the state has to consider the underdeveloped capacities of the dominated people in policy making. I suggest that the state must engage in affirmative action policies to remedy the harms of past occurrences of domination. The state must encourage dominated people and create desirable environments in which they develop their capacities.

Consider the case of the domination of women. It is plain that the domination of women has many dimensions. They are excluded from participation in politics, the labor force –if they work, they are reduced to gender specific jobs –, their role and nature are shaped by male-dominant ideologies, they are not as educated as men, etc. Consider that the state understands the role of education and imposes compulsory high school education for the young people. The state considers that education is essential to develop the capacities necessary for freedom as non-domination. However, given that there is an inequality between men and women with respect to the rate of high school graduation, the state must also particularly consider the inequality between men and women. Although compulsory education is a step forward to eliminate the domination, to eliminate domination of women requires additional strategies. The state must consider the factors which hinder women from getting on education. The strategies might be various, and change according to the particularity of cases. Punishing parents if they do not allow their daughters to go to school, providing income support to families, providing scholarships to female

students or imposing quotas on the schools might be the alternatives. Besides developing policies to increase the rate of high school graduates among the young, the state has to particularly consider increasing the rate of female high school graduation given the fact that the rate of men is greater than the rate of women in high school education.

Another example of the importance of affirmative action is the freedom of travel. Consider that the state guarantees freedom of travel to all of its citizens. However, given that two people are equal in financial terms, the fact that one is disabled limits him and he cannot enjoy his freedom. So, disadvantaged people require special treatment. What makes a healthy person free would not be enough to make the disabled person free. Because dominated people are hindered in many respects, maintaining non-domination requires special treatment in order to overcome their dominated status.

Second, I argued that a life of domination forms certain inner constraints on freedom. Referring to Bartky, I said that dominated people internalize false beliefs about themselves, their nature and their role. The mentality of the dominated as well as the mentality of the dominator constitutes a problem. Non-domination requires the reconsiderations of these false beliefs and common assumptions. Consider the case of the domination of women again. Many women share the assumptions which work against their dignity and equality. For instance, women still believe that certain jobs are not suitable for them because of their nature and the role assigned to them.

I also said that dominated people might be mentally conditioned and their self image might be distorted. In this respect, I explained “adaptive preference formation”. I summarized Sen’s view and maintained that dominated people might adapt to the desire of the dominator. A housewife might claim that she does not want to work

outside the home, it is easier to work at home and it is her desire to serve her husband and children. However, it might be the case that the housewife adopts her husband's desire because it is the easiest and safest way, and also because she believes that it is her own desire.

Pettit also emphasizes this fact when he talks about strategy and planning among the harms of domination. Yet, "adoptive preference formation" or "distorted self image" theories claim that the situation is much more dangerous than Pettit describes. In the former case, people know their desire or interest but because they fear from the powerful they cannot act according to their desire. In the latter, people are not conscious about their interest and desire. They adapt the preference of the stronger and choose the easiest and most secure way. It is most dangerous because they believe that it is what they desire.¹⁵⁸

Since it is impossible to enter people's mind and change their beliefs, what would be the remedy to eliminate the harms of domination on people's self understanding? In answer to this question, I emphasize the importance of "experience". Since we reshape our beliefs and ideas through experience, the state must aim at creating environments where people experience different life styles and meet people from each corner of the society. They can experience other life styles and will see that something else is also possible for them. Consider the following example. In Turkey, it is almost impossible to see a female bus driver. To most people, it is not a job for women. However, in the U.S.A, there are many women who are bus drivers. The way to overcome prejudices about the place of women in public transportation is to make institutional arrangements, which enable women to enter this field. Women and men should work together. In this way they might revise

¹⁵⁸ Elster, *Alchemies*, p. 21.

their views about the place of women in public transportation. Without female bus drivers, women will not think that women are capable with regard to working in this field. Similarly, men will not revise their belief that public transportation is not a field for women, without working with women and observing women's success in this field. However, it would not be an easy task. Not only men but also women will be unwilling to try it. They both might resist change. So, the state must interfere and should encourage women to take their place in this field. I believe that it requires a package of political action, which includes advertisements in the media and the support of civil institutions. To illustrate my point, I will give another example from Turkey. In Turkey the law against the use of cigarettes in public places was first enacted in 1996. Though it was successful in certain areas, it is hard to say that it was effective in leading the struggle against smoking. On the one hand, it eliminated smoking in planes and buses. On the other hand, people continued smoking in school halls and public offices. On May 19, 2008 the law 4207 was enacted with the end of forbidding smoking in public places.¹⁵⁹ The law is associated with great civil campaigns. People including government and army leaders talked on television and showed their support for the law. As a result, the second law is much more successful than the first one. The authorities, which Turkish citizens respect, and the media, which has a great effect on people's beliefs, support the law and contribute to its success. Continuing the bus driver example, the law that gives support to women's equal standing in certain fields will not be sufficient without the support of the media and other authorities. Without the help of these institutions, it is very hard to influence people through the law alone.

¹⁵⁹ For further information see <<http://www.ssv.org.tr/yasalar.asp>>

To summarize, the distorted mentality of the dominated as well as the dominator constitutes a barrier to people's freedom as non-domination. Creating environments that give people the opportunity to revise their beliefs about themselves and what they are capable of, as well as their beliefs about the others and what the others' are capable of, is crucial to eliminate domination.

In conclusion, in my thesis I examined Pettit's notion of domination and non-domination. I argued that his conception of domination is inadequate. To give a comprehensive account of domination, I introduced Young's account of domination and briefly mentioned Bartky's views. Though their account of domination is much richer than that of Pettit, they fail to suggest concrete strategies to eliminate domination. On the other hand, Pettit is right when he thinks that legal and institutional arrangements are the only ways to eliminate domination. However, because of his narrow conception of domination, he cannot define the scope of state activity adequately. After mentioning other aspects of domination, I benefited from the views of Fraser and Sen and explained the possible state activities. I emphasized the importance of affirmative action policies for recovering the past effects of domination. I suggested multi-dimensional strategies, considering the fact that domination is grounded on three forms of inequality, namely material, structural and cultural. And in the Conclusion, after summarizing the previous chapters, I gave some examples and discussed possible strategies to eliminate domination and its harms.

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