THE TRANSFORMATION OF OTTOMAN CRETE: CRETANS, REVOLTS AND DIPLOMATIC POLITICS IN THE LATE OTTOMAN EMPIRE, 1895-1898

Dissertation submitted to the
Graduate Institute of Social Sciences
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy
in
History

by

Pınar Şenışık

Boğaziçi University

2007

ABSTRACT

The Transformation of Ottoman Crete: Cretans, Revolts and Diplomatic Politics in the Late Ottoman Empire, 1895-1898

Pınar Şenışık

This dissertation aims to investigate Ottoman Crete during the late Ottoman Empire (1895-1898). It examines the internal dynamics of Ottoman Crete, the Cretan revolts of 1896 and 1897, massive involvement of Greece and the European states into the internal conflicts of the island, the establishment of the autonomous regime, and the withdrawal of the Ottoman forces from the island within a specific historical framework. This study analyzes the Cretan revolts of 1896 and 1897 as manifestations of nationalist ideology in the island. Particular attention is paid to the transformation of internal dynamics and contribution of the local inhabitants as the crucial driving force shaping the overall transformations within the island. Furthermore, it examines the infiltration of the Greek modern identity into Ottoman Crete and its impact on the Orthodox Christian inhabitants of the island. Contrary to the standard argument which is based on a notion that the main aim of the Cretan Christians was to unite with Greece, this dissertation argues that the Cretan Christians aimed to change the socio-economic and political structure of the Cretan society and to seize of power by overthrowing the Ottoman administration and the evacuation of the Ottoman troops from the island.

The present dissertation is largely based upon the primary material produced during the period under the study. The Ottoman, British and American archives are the main archives that were used in this study. It is the first time that the holdings of the Ottoman Bank Archives and Research Centre on Crete are used in a doctoral dissertation.

ÖZET

Osmanlı Giriti'nin Dönüşümü: Giritliler, İsyanlar ve
Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nun Son Döneminde Diplomasi Politikası, 1895-1898

Pınar Şenışık

Bu tez 1895-1898 tarihleri arasında Osmanlı Giriti'ni incelemeyi hedeflemektedir. Osmanlı Giriti'nin iç dinamikleri, 1896 ve 1897 Girit isyanları, Yunanistan ve Avrupa devletlerinin adanın iç çatışmalarına yaptıkları geniş çaplı müdahaleleri, otonomi rejiminin kurulması ve Osmanlı askerlerinin adadan çekilmesini belirli bir tarihsel çerçevede incelemektedir. Bu çalışma, 1896 ve 1897 Girit isyanlarını adadaki milliyetçi ideolojinin bir düşümü olarak analiz etmektedir. İçsel dinamiklerin değişimi ve adadaki tüm değişimleri belirleyen önemli hareket ettirici bir güç olarak yerel aktörlerin bu değişime olan katkıları üzerinde durulmaktadır. Ayrıca, modern Yunan kimliğinin Osmanlı Giriti'ne nüfuzu ve bunun adanın Ortodoks Hıristiyan nüfusu üzerindeki etkileri incelemektedir. Giritli Hıristiyanların esas amacının Yunanistan ile birleşmek olduğu fikrine dayanan standart argümandan farklı olarak, bu tez Giritli Hıristiyanların Girit toplumunun sosyo-ekonomik ve siyasi yapısını değiştirmeyi ve Osmanlı idaresini düşürmeyi ve Osmanlı askerlerinin adadan çekilmesini sağlayarak iktidarı ele geçirmeyi hedeflediklerini iddia etmektedir.

Bu tez büyük ölçüde incelenen döneme ait birinci el malzemeye dayanmaktadır. Osmanlı, İngiliz ve Amerikan arşivleri bu çalışmada yararlanılan başlıca arşivlerdir. Osmanlı Bankası Arşiv ve Araştırma Merkezi'nin Girit ile ilgili olan arşivi bir doktora tez çalışmasında ilk kez kullanılmıştır.

CURRICULUM VITÆ

NAME: Pınar Şenışık
PLACE & DATE OF BIRTH: İstanbul, 22 September 1971
CURRENT STATUS: Ph.D

GRADUATE AND UNDERGRADUATE SCHOOLS ATTENDED
Boğaziçi University (2000-2007)
İstanbul Bilgi University (1998-2000)
İstanbul University (1988-1992)

DEGREES AWARDED
2007. Doctor of Philosophy, Department of History, Boğaziçi University.
2000. Master of Arts, Department of International Relations, İstanbul Bilgi University.
1992. Bachelor of Arts, Department of Philosophy, İstanbul University.

AREAS OF SPECIAL INTEREST
Late Ottoman History, Nationalist Movements in the Ottoman Empire, Ottoman Balkans, History of Ottoman Crete.

AWARDS
2003-2006. Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Vakfı Zeynep Ayşe Birkan Doctoral Foundation Scholarship.
2004. Winner of the American Research Institute in Turkey (ARIT) Scholarship.
2002. School of Modern Greek Language of Aristotle University Scholarship.

PROFESSIONAL
the present-February 2006. Classification Project of the Ottoman Documents on Crete in the Ottoman Bank Archives and Research Centre.
2001-2003. Teaching Assistant at Boğaziçi University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences, Department of History
HIST 102 "Historical Method and Thought II" Spring 2003
HIST 106 "Making of the Modern World II" Spring 2003
HIST 105 "Making of the Modern World I" Fall 2002
HIST 101 "Historical Method and Thought I" Fall 2002
HIST 106 "Making of the Modern World II" Spring 2002
HIST 102 "Historical Method and Thought II" Spring 2002
HIST 105 "Making of the Modern World I" Fall 2001

PUBLICATIONS
"Boşnakların Ulusal Gelişimi," *Toplumsal Tarih*, Vol. 89, May, 2001.
"Mezar Taşları Dile Gelse," *Tarih ve Toplum*, Vol. 39, No. 233, May, 2003.
"Etniki Eterya Cemiyeti (1894)," *Tarih ve Toplum*, Vol. 44, No. 238, October, 2003.

TRANSLATIONS
"Republican Perceptions: Time ve Gülcemal," *Toplumsal Tarih*, Vol. 92, August, 2001.
"Abdülhamid ve Dönemi," *Tarih ve Toplum*, Vol. 36, No. 216, December, 2001.

SYMPOSIUM PAPERS

"Cretan Uprisings in the Ottoman Empire (1866-1898)," 9th Annual Post-Graduate Seminar of University of Crete, (Rethymno), 19-22 July 2003.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The present study would not have been possible without the support and contributions of a number of individuals and institutions. However, I am responsible for all opinions, mistakes, misunderstandings, and omissions in this dissertation.

I would like to express my gratitude to Assist. Prof. Dr. Yavuz Selim Karakışla, my dissertation advisor, for all his advice and constant encouragement throughout my graduate study. I am grateful to Prof. Dr. Aydın Babuna, Prof. Dr. Selçuk Esenbel and Prof. Dr. Günhan Danışman for providing me insights to construct my intellectual ability. I am greatly indebted to Assoc. Prof. Dr. Mustafa Kaçar for his tolerance and contribution to this study. The encouragement he provided enabled me to overcome certain difficulties I encountered during this study.

I gratefully acknowledge the Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Vakfı Zeynep Ayşe Birkan Doctoral Foundation, which enabled me to research and write this dissertation. Without the sustained and generous support of Zeynep Ayşe Birkan Doctoral Foundation, this study would have been difficult to complete. I would also like to acknowledge the support I received from the American Research Institute in Turkey (ARIT) and the School of Modern Greek Language School of Aristotle University.

I owe a special gratitude to Dr. Chryssi Sidiropoulou for her encouragement and effort. I also owe thanks to Dr. Vangelis Kechriotis for his helpful comments and suggestions he made on during the initial stage of this study.

I owe a debt of gratitude to several professors and friends from the University of Crete. I would like to thank to Assist. Prof. Dr. Socrates Petmezas who invited me to the 9th Annual Post-Graduate Seminar of University of Crete, held at Rethymno in Crete in

2003. I am also grateful to Prof. Dr. Elizabeth Zachariadou for her suggestions and comments during the research process of this study. I owe thanks and gratitude to Irini Renieri for her efforts in supplying me certain documents from Rethymno.

I must express my gratitude to Markos Hristodulopulos, who has sat with me, often for hours on end, for guiding me through difficult *katheravousa*. I am also indebted to Ceyda Eldem for her patience and sense of humor in taking me through tough times with the French language during the initial stage of my doctoral study.

This work is written based on the sources gathered from several libraries and archives. I would like to thank to the staff of the T.C. Başbakanlık Osmanlı Devlet Arşivi for their guidance and help during my archival expedition. I am grateful to all staff of Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Aptullah Kuran Kütüphanesi. I am also indebted to the staff at the Interlibrary Loan Office. I owe thanks to the staff of Taksim Atatürk Kitaplığı, Beyazıt Devlet Kütüphanesi, İstanbul Üniversitesi Merkez Kütüphanesi, İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Kütüphanesi, İslam, Tarih, Sanat ve Kültür Araştırma Merkezi (IRCICA) Kütüphanesi, American Research Institute Library, German Archeology Institute Library, and Aristotle University Library. Thanks are also due to the staff of the British Library and Senate House Library (University of London) who provided me the copies of the certain materials and of the Microfilm Sections of the British Public Record Office in London and United States National Archives in Washington, D.C.

I also owe gratitude to Sima Benaroya, head of the Ottoman Bank Archives and Research Centre, and Lorans Izabel Tanatar Baruh who made my archival research possible in the Ottoman Bank Archives and Research Centre.

On a more personal level, there are friends and colleagues that I would like to acknowledge here. I owe heartfelt thanks to Gaye Şahinbaş Erginöz for her emotional support and friendship. I am indebted to Kaan Ata, who offered technical support. I am

grateful, in particular, to Alexandros Petsas for his support and criticism, but even more grateful to have him as my friend. I wish to express my special gratitude to his family, Thanasis, Sapfo and Anastasia Petsas, for their kindness and wonderful hospitality during my stay in Thesssaloniki. I am particularly grateful to James H. Meyer for the intellectual engagement and incisive criticism he provided with enthusiasm.

Lastly and especially, I would like to express thanks and gratitude to my family for their continuous support, all the sacrifices they have made and their confidence in me. My parents, Mehmet Rıza and Suzan Şenışık, my aunt Sabiha Şenışık, and my sister Deniz have all been patient while I spent time on my dissertation. My nephew Ergiz deserves special thanks for being the source of inspiration during this long process. I dedicate this dissertation to them with my love and most sincere gratitude.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction 1
Theories of Nationalism and Conceptual Framework 4
Available Literature on Nineteenth Century Ottoman Crete 17
A Note on the Primary Sources 28
Outline and Flow Chart 30

Chapter I: The Creation of Modern Greek Identity and Its Impact on Ottoman Crete 33
Pre-revolutionary Era: Korais and Rhigas 41
Ellinismos vs. *Romiossini*: Paradoxes in Greek Nationalism 46
National Historiography 55
National Folklore 61
National Language and Education 66
The Role Played by the Greek Consuls 70
The *Megali Idea* and the Greek Irredentist Aspirations in the "Greek *Irredenta*" 73
Conclusion 84

Chapter II: The Island of Crete: A Historical Background 88
Geography 91
People and Population 92
A Profile from the Socio-Economic Life of the Cretan Muslims: the Council of *Evkaf* and Orphans 102
Rebellious History of the Island 110
The Hamidian Officials' Views Concerning the Cretan Issue 123
Conclusion 145

Chapter III: Violence Revisited: Committee, General Assembly and Cretan Revolt of 1896 150
The Hamidian Era 150
Financial Difficulties and the Reform Committee in Crete 154
Turhan Paşa and the Adjournment of the General Assembly 159
The Outbreak of the Revolt 166
Abdullah Paşa's Arrival 173
Abdullah Paşa's Proclamations 178
The Revival of the Halepa Pact and the Convocation of the General Assembly 180
European Opposition to the Ottoman Military Authority 185
Imperial Commissioners and August Arrangements 193
Conclusion 198

Chapter IV: The Cretan Revolt of 1897 202
The Greek Intrigue 207
Greek Occupation of Ottoman Crete 213
Prince George's Arrival 218
Sublime Porte's Diplomatic Attempts before Europe 219
Europeans' Request and Ottoman Response 221
The Sitia Revolt 228

The Revolts in Sarakina and Candanos and the Muslim Immigration 230
Activities of Greece on the Ottoman-Greek Frontier 237
European Dissidence about the Blockade..... 238
Imperial Expansion: European Blockade and Occupation of Crete 242
Proclamation of Autonomy by the European Admirals 243
Muslim Immigration and Military Cordon 247
On the Eve of War 252
Ethniki Hetairia's Apology 259
Post-war Conditions in Crete..... 260
Resentments of the Cretans 266
Acceptance of Autonomous Government by the General Assembly 272
Life Struggles of the Cretan Muslims..... 274
Memoranda of the Cretan Assembly 281
Conclusion 284

Chapter V: Challenging Authority, Transforming Politics: The End of the Ottoman Rule in Crete 288
Diplomatic Politics and the Candidacy of Prince George 288
Muslim Refugees and Relief Attempts..... 295
Ottoman State Attempts to Cooperate with Russia 297
Local Conditions in Crete..... 307
Provincial Administration and the Cretan Assembly 312
Candia in September 1898..... 315
Admiral Noel's Demand and Ottoman Response..... 318
Collective Note of the European States 322
The Withdrawal of the Ottoman Troops from Crete 326
Conclusion 336

Conclusion 337

Bibliography..... 357

Appendices 380

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Number of murders committed between 1878 and 1889 141

Table 2: Number of murders committed in the five s*ancak*s between 1881 and 1890 141

Table 3a: The incomes of Crete in 1889 144

Table 3b: The expenditures of Crete in 1889 145

Table 4: The amounts of the Ottoman troops stationed in Crete..... 327

Table 5: The major centers to which the Ottoman troops were dispatched 328

LIST OF MAPS

Map 1: Map of Crete, 1307 (1889).

Map 2: The occupation of the major Cretan cities by the European Powers, 1897.

INTRODUCTION

This dissertation is about the transformation of "Ottoman Crete" into "independent Crete," during the late Ottoman Empire (1895-1898); just before it finally became a "province of Greece" in 1908. It examines the Cretan revolts of 1896 and 1897 in detail, and then analyzes the establishment of the autonomous government and the withdrawal of the Ottoman troops from the island. The main purpose of this dissertation is, therefore, to discuss the overall *raison d'être* of these revolts as well as the causes of the unsatisfactory conditions within the Cretan society, and their direct social and political effects on the lives of Cretans. It also aims to demonstrate how the situation was perceived by Ottoman statesmen and what kind of counter-measures were proposed and employed by the Ottoman administration. However, this dissertation is not concerned with explaining all the political and social dynamics concerning the island during this period. In other words, this study does not claim to include and cover everything regarding the Ottoman rule on the island in the late nineteenth century. Rather, it explores one of the most sensitive and turbulent years by focusing on the underlying reasons and determining factors that led the Cretan Christians to rebel against the Ottoman administration in 1896 and 1897. Therefore, the basic aim of this study is to examine the last three years of the real Ottoman rule in Crete by placing special emphasis upon the Cretan revolts of 1896 and 1897 so as to arrive at a more comprehensive understanding. At the same time, this study not only provides a significant picture regarding the power relations, both at the local and imperial levels, but also depicts the relationship of the late Ottoman state to its Cretan subjects.

This study seeks to provide a profile of the so-called "nationalist liberation struggle" of Cretan Christians and attempts to analyze how those people were politicized and nationalized, and why they were engaged in rebellious activities. Furthermore, it

argues that the Cretan revolts of 1896 and 1897 dramatically shook the existing structure and laid the groundwork for the transformation of the local structure and the establishment of the autonomous government in Ottoman Crete, and then for the separation of the island from the Ottoman Empire. In other words, these revolts altered the internal dynamics within the island, the relationship between the island and the Ottoman state, and shaped the post-Ottoman era. To understand the causes behind the conflict and violence at that time, this dissertation seeks to find answers to the following questions: How were the Cretan Christians politicized and nationalized? What did the list of Cretan Christians' grievances include? Why did they include a national context? How did the revolts happen? How were the revolts financed? What kind of government did the insurgents desire? Where did the revolts occur (rural or urban areas)? What was their scope (wide-spread or local and limited)? How long did they last? When did the Cretan Christians rebel? Why did they choose that particular time? Why at that specific time? What were the effects of these revolts on the Cretans?

The present study concentrates primarily on how Ottoman statesmen evaluated the internal conflicts within the island and the kind of measures and policies they proposed. It is my contention that the Ottoman statesmen were aware of the existing dangers that threatened the survival of the Ottoman Empire and the sovereignty of the Ottoman Sultan Abdülhamid II. I argue that they responded in various ways and made great efforts in order to avert the marginalization of the Ottoman power in Crete. Among the most important findings of the Ottoman archives have been materials documenting the long reports and memoranda of Ottoman statesmen that reveal much about how these statesmen perceived the internal conditions and inhabitants of the island. The variety of the material which has been provided goes beyond the information and findings available from the other sources and will exclusively contribute to the literature.

Unlike the existing literature, by seeing that the developments in Ottoman Crete were essentially unique, this dissertation suggests that it is necessary to understand the coexistence and violence in Ottoman Crete within the context of the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire. In other words, the Cretan revolts and inter-communal relations in Ottoman Crete are to be analyzed with an integrative approach in which both local and imperial dynamics have to be considered. As was the case in the imperial setting in the Ottoman Empire and elsewhere, Muslims and non-Muslim communities lived side by side in other multi-ethnic empires, and Muslims and non-Muslims also lived together everywhere in the Ottoman Empire with common and mutual economic, social and political interests and goals. Despite their seemingly irreconcilable differences, they maintained integrated social and economic lives due to their common interests. It should be important to keep in mind that inter-communal relations in Ottoman Crete are both unique and part of a broader world. This approach enables us to understand and comprehend the dynamics of the Cretan society and at the same time to better evaluate broader causes behind the Cretan revolts.

By examining this period, the present dissertation also aims to reveal the extent to which Ottoman Crete was incorporated into the fold of the Greek mainland. It is interesting to point out that after the establishment of the Greek Kingdom (1830), the infiltration of the Greek national ideology into the Cretan society helped shape the trajectories of politics and led to the gradual transformation of the island into the Greek world. The Greek state's irredentist policies and ideological and cultural infiltrations played a vital role in introducing modern Greek identity in Ottoman Crete. In other words, the Cretan Christians were gradually indoctrinated by the idea of belonging to an "imagined community." As was the case in many other modernizing societies of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, schools emerged as an important means for indoctrinating the Christian pupils

with the concept of "Greekness." The circulation of journals, periodicals, and pamphlets contributed *par excellence* to the formation of modern Greek identity among the Christian inhabitants of the island. The following chapters will also demonstrate that *ad hoc* committees, both within the island and Greece, were crucial in this process. The ideological and financial backgrounds of the Cretan revolts were organized by the members of the Cretan and Greek committees in Athens. The aid and assistance of those committees, in certain cases in cooperation with the Greek government, provided the material and financial support to the Cretan insurgents.

Theories of Nationalism and Conceptual Framework

Until the 1960s, primordialism[1] was the dominant ideology in the Balkan nationalist historiography. Accordingly, in this context, conventional writings on Balkan nationalism often considered the Ottoman period as "dark age," and the model applied for the writing of history was the confrontation and conflict between the "ruler" and "ruled," between the "oppressor" and the "oppressed." The sufferings of the Christians were regarded as "tales of martyrdom," "national resistance," and "the heroism of the Christians" against "the infidel Muslim oppressor."[2] Moreover, this conventional view made a few comments and merely generalized the Ottoman rule in the Balkans under the name of *Tourkokratia* (Ottoman rule). On the basis of such stereotypes, the motivations for

[1] The primordialist view of nationalism is the earliest paradigm of nations and nationalism. According to primordialists, "nationality is a 'natural' part of human beings, as natural as speech, sight or smell, and nations have existed since time immemorial." For the details see: Umut Özkırımlı. *Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction*, (New York: Palgrave, 2000), pp. 64-74. After the 1960s, the primordialist view was criticized by Elie Kedourie who traced the origins of nationalism back to German Romantic thought arguing that "nationalism is a doctrine invented in Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century…" Umut Özkırımlı. *Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction*, p. 52. See also: Elie Kedourie. *Nationalism*, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994).

[2] Kemal H. Karpat. "The Social and Political Foundations of Nationalism in South East Europe after 1878: A Reinterpretation," in his: *Studies on Ottoman Social and Political History: Selected Articles and Essays*, (Brill, Leiden, Boston, Köln: Tuta Sub Aegide Pallas, 2002), pp. 373-374.

the rise of nationalism and nationalist, separatist movements in the Balkans have been variously explained by conventional historians. Many books on Balkan nationalism, for instance Seton-Watson's *The Rise of Nationality in the Balkans*, simply demarcated the Ottoman Empire along religious lines, Muslims and non-Muslims, and ethnic and religious factors were seen as the main reasons for the rise of nationalism in the Empire.[3] In other words, ethno-religious factors have typically been viewed as the primary cause of nationalist movements and the events were seen as a confrontation between two religious groups. Those scholars understood and described these movements in ethno-religious terms and interpreted them as reflections of "primordial hatreds" and instituted certain projects that sought to address nationalist movements along these terms.[4] The conflicts that prevailed throughout Ottoman Balkans were analyzed within the context of the "national-awakening" paradigm and nationalist historians attempted to explain the underlying reasons of these conflicts as the reflections of the "awakening" of the "subjugated" peoples.[5] In addition, some contemporary historians claim that the wars which took place in the Balkans in the 1990s were nothing more than "ethnic conflicts." Maria Todorova, for instance, has argued that the so-called "ethnic conflicts" between the Balkan peoples were the result of the Ottoman legacy.[6]

---

[3] Cited in: K. E. Fleming. *The Muslim Bonaparte: Diplomacy and Orientalism in Ali Pasha's Greece*, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 58 n. See also: R. W. Seton-Watson. *The Rise of Nationality in the Balkans*, (New York: Constable, 1966).

[4] According to this approach, the enmities among the various confessional, ethnic and linguistic groups stemmed from the immemorial ill. See: Rifa'at 'Ali Abou-El-Haj. *Formation of the Modern State: The Ottoman Empire, Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries*, (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2005), p. 91.

[5] The well-known representatives of this genre are: Barbara Jelavich. *History of the Balkans, Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries*, 2 vols, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); and, L. S. Stavrianos. *The Balkans since 1453*, (Illinois: Dryden Press, 1958).

[6] Maria Todorova. "The Ottoman Legacy in the Balkans," in: Carl L. Brown (ed.). *Imperial Legacy: The Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 45-77.

In a similar vein, in those years, Greek conventionalist historiography typically depicted the Ottoman rule as a "period of tyranny and slavery" for the Greek nation. It has been a "period of vicious and inhumane slavery, which lasted for four centuries, during which the Greeks lost every sense of civilization, as they were subjected to brutality."[7] All the blame was cast on the shoulders of the Ottoman rule which was referred to as "the Turkish yoke:" "Greece was the first Balkan country to achieve independence … from the Ottoman yoke. This was the product of a long and arduous struggle against the conqueror."[8] And what is more, the word "tyrant" was used to refer to the Ottoman Sultan.[9] In this context, the Ottoman period in the Balkans in general and on the island of Crete in particular has been regarded as a "source of cultural pollution" and the Ottoman Empire has been perceived as non-Western and Islamic. Thus, its domination has been considered to have been of an imitative and derivative nature.

Needless to say, this sort of historiography has been discredited for decades. As aptly remarked by James Gelvin, nationalist studies have been subjected to various alterations in the last two decades. New methodological approaches and comparative analyses have been introduced and essential categories such as "nation," "nationalism," and "national identity" have been studied within the framework of unconventional analytical methods. Contemporary scholars made various attempts in the field of nationalist studies in order to deconstruct teleological approaches of state-sponsored nationalisms and official nationalist histories. In this way, new phrases such as "the invention of tradition," and "peasants into Frenchmen" have become common place in the

---

[7] Sia Anagnostopoulou. "'Tyranny' and 'Despotism' As National and Historical Terms in Greek Historiography," in her: *The Passage from the Ottoman Empire to the Nation-States,* (İstanbul: Isis Press, 2004), pp. 11 and 16.

[8] George Andreopoulos. "State and Irredentism," *The Historical Journal*, Vol. XXIV, No. 4, 1981, p. 950.

[9] *ibid*., p. 950.

scene of academic discourse on nationalism. Today, it is common for historians to argue that identity is not a "fixed,"[10] but rather "… fluid, historically rooted construct; boundaries created between groups and loyalties cultivated to groups frequently shift and change."[11] In addition, the shift from primordialist to constructivist theories of nationalism opened the way for the "belief that nations are created and relatively new phenomenon in world history."[12]

Unlike primordialists, Ernest Gellner has remarked that "nationalism is a very distinctive species of patriotism, and one which becomes pervasive and dominant only under certain conditions, which in fact prevail in the modern world, and nowhere else."[13] He argues that nationalist movements create nations and not vice-a-versa. In other words, nations do not create nationalism. For him, "nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist."[14] It is clear that nationalism is an entirely modern phenomenon and the product of the modern industrial world. The transition from agrarian societies to modern industrial ones is the key factor in understanding the emergence of nationalism. The replacement of "low" by "high" cultures played a crucial role in this transition. Gellner asserts that "high culture" is inculcated through a mass, standardized and academy-supervised education system and defines a nation "as a society with a high culture that is, a specially cultivated, standardized, education-based, literature culture."[15]

---

[10] James L. Gelvin. *Divided Loyalties: Nationalism and Mass Politics in Syria at the Close of Empire*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), pp. 10-12.

[11] Anastasia N. Karakasidou. *Fields of Wheat, Hills of Blood: Passages to Nationhood in Greek Macedonia, 1870-1990*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), p. 20.

[12] James L. Gelvin. *Divided Loyalties: Nationalism and Mass Politics in Syria at the Close of Empire*, p. 12.

[13] Ernest Gellner. *Nationalism*, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1997), p. 138.

[14] Anthony D. Smith. *Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of Recent Theories of Nations and Nationalism*, (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), p. 28.

[15] *ibid*., pp. 30, 32, and 37.

Benedict Anderson has located the origins of the modern nation historically at the junction of three developments in the West European world. These included the decline of religious communities and of dynastic realms, and a fundamental change in the conceptions of time. Finally, the wide scale commercial book-publishing or what Anderson calls 'print-capitalism' made it possible more than anything else "for rapidly growing numbers of people to think about themselves, and to relate themselves to others, in profoundly new ways," that is, in 'national' terms.[16]

What follows, first, is the presentation of the contemporary problematic which is generally related to ethnic and national conflicts or minority and autonomy rights. Then, in order to be able to address the related questions as to whether 'nationalisms' should be understood as "inherited" and "real" or as "invented" and "imagined;" and how we should understand the ways in which nationalisms manipulate history-- Anderson's concept of nation as an 'imagined community' and its 'cultural roots'-- will be explored. At the end, in reference to the actual problematic, some conclusions will be inferred from the presented perspectives.

Benedict Anderson argues that nationalism emerged towards the end of the eighteenth century as a result of the "spontaneous distillation of a complex 'crossing' of discrete historical forces," and once created, they became models which could be used in a great variety of ideologies.[17] However, a persuasive explanation of nationalism should not confine itself to specifying the cultural and political factors that facilitate the growth of nations. The real challenge rather lies in showing why and how these particular cultural artifacts have aroused such deep attachments "that makes it possible, over the past two centuries, for so many millions of people, not so much to kill, as willingly to die for such

[16] Benedict Anderson. *Imagined Communities*, (London: Verso, 1991), p. 36.

[17] *ibid*., p. 4.

limited imaginings."[18] In other words, the crucial question is: "what makes the shrunken imaginings of recent history… generate such colossal sacrifices?"[19]

Before addressing this question, Benedict Anderson tries to offer a workable definition of 'nation' (and therefore nationalism). This is because there is, according to Anderson, a terminological confusion surrounding the concept of nation or nationalism which is partly caused by the tendency to treat it as an ideological construct. Things would be easier if it is seen as belonging to the same family as 'kinship' or 'religion.' Hence, his definition of the nation is "an imagined political community –and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign."[20] It is *imagined*, because "the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion."[21] It is imagined as *limited*, because each nation has finite boundaries beyond which lie other nations. A person ascribes unlimited sovereignty and features to the *de facto* limited community. It is imagined as *sovereign*, because it is born in the age of Enlightenment and Revolution, when the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm was rapidly waning: the nations were dreaming of being free, and this meant possessing a sovereign state. Finally, it is imagined as a *community*, because "regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship."[22]

According to Benedict Anderson, it is ultimately this sense of fraternity that makes it possible for so many millions of people to willingly lay down their lives "for such

---

[18] *ibid*., p. 7.

[19] *ibid*., p. 7.

[20] *ibid*., p. 7.

[21] *ibid*., p. 6. (emphases as in original).

[22] *ibid*., p. 7.

limited imaginings."[23] He accuses Gellner for identifying 'invention' with 'fabrication' and 'falsity,' rather than with 'imagining' and 'creation' with the intention of showing that nationalism masquerades under false pretences. Such a view implies that there are 'real' communities, which can be advantageously compared to nations. However, all communities larger than small villages with "face-to-face contact (and perhaps even these) are imagined."[24] Hence, Anderson concluded, communities should not be distinguished by their falsity or genuineness, "but by the style in which they are imagined."[25]

Emphasizing the political aspect of nationalism, Eric Hobsbawm has contended that nations are the products of nationalism which is a political program aiming to create a nation-state. According to Hobsbawm, the nature of the nations can be understood by analyzing national traditions and those are one kind of "invented traditions,"[26] which are "traditions actually invented, constructed and formally instituted."[27] These are quite recent inventions often deliberately constructed to serve particular ideological ends. The very expression "invention of tradition" is somewhat redundant, since all traditions, as products

---

[23] *ibid*., p. 7.

[24] i*bid*., p. 6.

[25] *ibid.,* p. 6.

It should also be mentioned that the modernist paradigm was criticized by John Armstrong who argued that nations preceded nationalism. See: John Armstrong. *Nations before Nationalism*, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982). Furthermore, Anthony Smith, unlike Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson, stressed the continuity between the "ethnicism" and "nationalism" arguing that "modern nations simply extend, deepen and streamline the ways in which members of *ethnie* associated and communicated. They do not introduce startlingly novel elements, or change the goals of human association and communication." According to Smith, the relationship of the past, especially "ethnic past" is crucial. See: Anthony Smith. *The Nation in History: Historiographical Debates about Ethnicity and Nationalism*, (Hanover: University Press of New England, 2000), pp. 62-63. This indicates that Smith emphasized on ethnicity as being the important category in the construction of nationalism. For him, common myths of descent, shared memories, a common shared culture, an association with a specific territory and a sense of solidarity are the substance of nationalism.

Anthony D. Smith. *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988), pp. 24-29.

[26] Anthony D. Smith. *Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of Recent Theories of Nations and Nationalism*, p. 117.

[27] Eric J. Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds.). *The Invention of Tradition*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 1-4.

of human behavior and human imagination rather than the result of natural forces are invented in one way or another. Hobsbawm alleged that the period of 1870 to 1914 was the apogee of invented traditions. This period, for him, was also important for the incursion of the masses into politics, which created problems for the rulers in maintaining obedience and loyalty from their subjects. At this point, "the invention of tradition" was put into the agenda by the ruling elites to cope with these problems. The development of primary education, the invention of public ceremonies, and the mass production of public monuments were the three main innovations of the period.[28] As a result of this, "nationalism became a substitute social cohesion through a national church, a royal family or other cohesive traditions, or collective group self-presentations, a new secular religion."[29]

These theories emphasize "macro-historical forces"[30] such as the connection between the industrialization and nationalism, the growth of the state, mass education, print capitalism, cultural factors, the role of politics, and power struggles.[31] They argue that nationalism emerged under certain conditions as a result of "discrete historical forces."

To understand the emergence of feelings of nationalism in Ottoman Crete, one should examine the specific conditions which flourished on the island and try to answer the question of when and how the situation became fertile for the emergence of nationalism in an island where certain features and elements of nationalization were not present. In this respect, the politicization and nationalization process of Orthodox Christian community of the island was a very significant point to be examined. Moreover, one should also ask what

---

[28] Umut Özkırımlı. *Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction*, p. 117.

[29] Özkırımlı quoted this part from Eric J. Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds.). *The Invention of Tradition*, p. 303; see also: Umut Özkırımlı. *Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction*, p. 117.

[30] Aviel Roshwald. *Ethnic Nationalism and the Fall of Empires: Central Europe, Russia and the Middle East (1914-1923)*, (London and New York: Routledge, 2001), p. 1.

[31] Umut Özkırımlı. *Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction*, p. 9.

makes the Cretan Christians to decide to sacrifice their lives or "willingly to die"[32] in the so-called "nationalist liberation struggle" for an abstract entity, or an "imagined community." In this sense, it is fair to note that "nationalism is a discourse that constantly shapes our consciousness and the way we constituted the meaning of the world. It determines our collective identity by producing and reproducing us as 'nationals'."[33] And thus, the nationalist discourse became a key element in uniting the Cretan Christians who used this discourse to explain and legitimize their actions.

I argue that the Greek War of Independence (1821-1829) became a model and provided the impetus for the developments on the island in terms of nationalist revolts of the Cretan Christians. In other words, the Greek War of Independence and the infiltration of modern Greek identity into the island manipulated the rebellious history of Crete and became a necessary precondition for the politicization and nationalization of the Orthodox Christian community of the island. Molly Greene's following words illustrate the importance of the creation of a Greek identity and the Greek War of Independence in terms of the change in the vision of the Cretan Christians:[34]

> Daskolyiannēs' uprising [1770] as part of that long-term process, although its vision was not a national one but rather one in which Christian Orthodox Russia would replace the Ottoman Turks in Constantinople and the East in general. … Daskolyiannēs' exclusivist vision, of course, was the one that finally triumphed in Crete and throughout the Greek world. It was in the rural areas that fight against the Ottomans was launched and finally won, and thus to the peasant's traditional enmity toward urban life was added the powerful tonic of a national vision that exalted the authentic country-side over the corrupt Ottoman city.

The available sources focused on the union of Crete with Greece and interpreted it as the *absolute* political and national aim of the Christian insurgents and *the* major reason

---

[32] Benedict Anderson. *Imagined Communities*, (London: Verso, 1991), p. 7.

[33] Umut Özkırımlı. *Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction*, p. 4.

[34] Molly Greene. *A Shared World: Christians and Muslims in the Early Modern Mediterranean*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 208.

for the Cretan revolts. Indeed, Christian insurgents aimed to change the political, economic and social structure of the Cretan society and to seize power by overthrowing the Ottoman administration and forcing the evacuation of the Ottoman troops from the island. In other words, Christian insurgents attempted to transform the existing Cretan society into a new one, in which Christians would be dominant. In this respect, for example, if we use Antonio Gramsci's words, the Cretan Christians' aim can be interpreted as a "hegemonic struggle." Gramsci defined hegemony as "intellectual and moral leadership (*direzione*) whose principal constituting elements are consent and persuasion."[35] According to Gramsci, a social group or class assumed a hegemonic role in order to articulate cultural and ideological belief systems of the society. In this approach, revolutionary party attempts to transform society and "conducts a hegemonic struggle to undermine the legitimating institutions of bourgeois society."[36] This "hegemonic struggle" is relevant to the Cretan case in which the subordinate group (Christian community) endeavored to become the dominant one.

There is no doubt that union with Greece (*enosis*/*ένωσις*) was very often put forward by the Christian insurgents of Crete, but it is important to remember that those insurgents sometimes turned their faces to Russia, their Orthodox co-religionists, to get support for their insurgent activities in order to overthrow the Ottoman administration. Moreover, the following chapters will explain that while certain Cretan Christian insurgents were in favor of the establishment of an autonomous government on the island, the others promoted the unification with Greece.

This dissertation suggests that the Cretan revolts of 1896 and 1897 are to be examined within not only the context of separatist nationalist movements of the nineteenth

---

[35] Benedetto Fontana. *Hegemony and Power: on the Relation between Gramsci and Machiavelli*, (Minneapolis, London: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), p. 140.

[36] *ibid*., p. 148.

century, but also that of the local structure of Ottoman Crete.[37] According to Liah Greenfeld, "every nationalism was an indigenous development," but at the same time "the development of national identities … was essentially an international process, whose sources in every case but the first lay outside the evolving nation."[38] From this perspective, the specific nature of the Cretan society and specific internal conditions and at the same time "international process" became essential in formulating the matrix of these revolts. It should be important to remember that nationalism had been the most powerful ideology in the nineteenth century that shaped the course of world history. The nationalist movements in the Ottoman Empire had their counterparts in other *ancien régime*s like the Habsburg and Russian Empires, and were able to radically alter the multi-ethnic structures of these empires leading to the establishment of nation-states. In this period, the Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire rebelled against the Ottoman administration and succeeded in establishing new independent "quasi-nation-states" in the Balkans. The establishment of the Greek Kingdom became the crucial model for the other Balkan peoples.

However, the establishment of the Greek Kingdom had an outstanding importance for the course of the Cretan history since it diverted the general course of the socio-cultural dynamics by politicizing and nationalizing the Orthodox Christian population of Ottoman Crete, which intensified the conflicts within the island. The indigenous developments also shaped the scope of the Cretan revolts. The local Cretan Christians struggled for their own demands and desires. In other words, these local Cretan Christians mobilized and voiced

---

[37] As the following chapters would demonstrate in detail, the Cretan revolts of 1896 and 1897 were nationalist revolts. According to John Breuilly, "a nationalist opposition can seek to break away from the present state (*separation*), to reform it in a nationalist direction (*reform*), or to unite it with other states (*unification*)." The ultimate goal of the Cretan Christians was to break away from the existing Ottoman administration, since "the overthrow of the existing system … would mean freedom, the end of privilege for the few and a general improvement in everyone's situation." (emphasis is mine). See: John Breuilly. *Nationalism and the State*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), p. 9; and, Peter Alter. *Nationalism*, (London: Edward Arnold, 1989), p. 58.

[38] Liah Greenfeld. *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), p. 14.

their own demands. For that reason, the involvement of local Christian population into the national movements was the decisive element in the Cretan revolts.

Miroslav Hroch examined and defined nationalism among the small states of Europe and divided the national movements into three fundamental phases: Phase A, the period of scholarly interest, Phase B, the period of patriotic agitation, and Phase C, the rise of a mass national movement.[39] Phase A is essential in that it "is marked by a passionate concern on the part of a group of individuals, usually intellectuals, for the study of the language, the culture, the history of the oppressed nationality."[40] Phase B, according to Hroch, is the decisive phase for the small state and "the fermentation process of national consciousness." In this stage, a group of patriots who were discontent with the existing conditions aimed to raise the national consciousness among people. In the last stage, as Hroch considered, "national consciousness has become the concern of the broad masses…"[41] Hobsbawm also divided the history of national movements into three phases: Phase A is "purely cultural, literary and folkloric." In Phase B, militants were active in promoting and campaigning "the national idea." In Phase C, "nationalist programs acquire mass support, or at least some of the mass support that nationalists always claim they represent."[42]

According to Hroch, these three processes are crucial in the transformation of intellectual activity into a movement: a social and/or political crisis of the old order accompanied by new tensions and horizons; the emergence of discontent among significant elements of the population; and a loss of faith in traditional moral systems, above all a

---

[39] Miroslav Hroch. *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe,* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), p. 23.

[40] *ibid*., p. 22.

[41] *ibid*., p. 23.

[42] Eric J. Hobsbawm. *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*, p. 12.

decline in religious legitimacy, even if this only affected small numbers of intellectuals.[43] For Hroch, a successful national movement includes four elements: first, a crisis of legitimacy, linked to social, moral and cultural strains; second, a basic volume of vertical social mobility (some educated people must come from the non-dominant ethnic group); third, a fairly high level of social communication, including literacy, schooling and market relations; fourth, nationally relevant conflicts of interest.[44] In this framework, the patriotic agitation in Ottoman Crete started after the Greek War of Independence, which played a stimulating role for the Cretan Christians. This patriotic agitation gained momentum by the infiltration of Greek national ideology through various means such as education and communication and the discontent of the Cretan Christians with the existing system. In other words, the indoctrination of the Cretan Christians by Greek national ideology increased the pace of ethnic and national consciousness among the Cretan Christians that politicized and nationalized the Orthodox Christian population of the island. In addition, discontent of the Cretan Christians with the existing system played a significant role in the emergence of mass movement on the island. Put another way, when the infiltration of the Greek national ideology was fused with the local discontent, the Cretan Christians found themselves right in the midst of the wave of nationalism and got involved in the nationalist movements.

The shift in the relationships between the Christian and Muslim communities of Ottoman Crete and the politicization and nationalization of the Christian demands are also examined within the theoretical framework of Charles Tilly. According to Tilly, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, conflicts between different social groups are defensive, local and backward. Tilly defines this form of conflicts as "reactive conflicts,"

---

[43] Miroslav Hroch. "From National Movement to the Fully-Formed Nation," *New Left Review*, No. 198, 1993, p. 10.

[44] *ibid*., p. 12.

such as tax rebellion and the food riots. For him, after the victories gained by the state, proactive forms of collective action became the standard settings for collective violence. They are "proactive" rather than "reactive" since "at least one group is making claims for rights, privileges, or resources not previously enjoyed."[45] In the case of Crete, the continuous attempts of the Cretan Christians to destroy the Ottoman rule on the island and their fierce struggles to seize institutions of the state and to gain social, economic and political privileges are "proactive." In other words, they attempted to destroy existing social-structural arrangements and tried to disestablish the value system of the Ottoman administration.

However, it is important to note that although I use certain points of above-mentioned theories in conceptualizing my framework, unlike certain contemporary studies, for example Ussama Makdisi's work on Mount Lebanon,[46] I have not strictly relied on any theoretical perspectives as a guideline of historical analysis. In his study, Makdisi examines the sectarian practices in Mount Lebanon between Maronite Christians and Druze Christians. Makdisi strictly adopted Edward Said's critique of Orientalism as an explanatory framework in his textual analysis of sectarian practices. However, my aim is not to discredit these approaches. Instead, this dissertation is concerned with explaining the Cretan case not only through one theoretical assumption.

Available Literature on Nineteenth Century Ottoman Crete

In spite of its significance for the past and present, Ottoman Crete has not been studied in much depth and scholars have devoted very little attention to the island, partly because it requires a thorough knowledge in different fields and languages, and partly

[45] Charles Tilly, Louise Tilly, and Richard Tilly. *The Rebellious Century (1830-1930)*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1975), pp, 49, 51, and 252-253.

[46] Ussama Makdisi. *The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History, and Violence in Nineteenth-century Ottoman Lebanon*, (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 2000).

because many people have already preconceived ideas about what happened in the past influenced by the present. By interpreting the Cretan revolts simply as reflections of religious tensions, the available literature failed to understand the dynamics of the Cretan society. Partly as a result of this, they produced superficial explanations for the period under study and instituted certain projects that sought to address revolts along these terms.

As one of the oldest and well-structured ancient civilizations of the Eastern Mediterranean, the island of Crete has long attracted attention from Western European travelers. For that reason, travel accounts are one of the most available sources that provide detailed information on history, customs, topography, geography and people of the island. Among these writings, the English traveler Robert Pashley's two-volume book is particularly worthy of mention here. Traveling around the island in 1834, Pashley mainly aimed to discover the ancient sites of Crete and provide information not only on ancient sites, but also on topography, the origin of the Muslim population of the island, the language and the customs of the Cretans.[47] The Austrian physician Sieber, traveling in Crete in the early nineteenth century, focused upon the physical aspect of the island (fauna and flora) and also gave vivid accounts of customs, traditions, costumes and life-style of the Cretan people.[48] Another traveler, William Miller, devoted an intensive part of his book to describe his findings and observations on the internal situation, particularly the European occupation of the major towns of the island in 1898 evaluating the events from the British imperial perspective.[49] He focused on the picturesque and cosmopolitan

[47] Robert Pashley. *Travels in Crete*, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Pitt Press, 1958).

[48] F. W. Sieber. *Travels in the Island of Crete*, (London: Sir Richard Philips & Co, 1823).

[49] William Miller. *Travels and Politics in the Near East*, (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company Publishers, 1899). For further travel accounts written in Western European languages see: Paul Combes. *L'île de Crète: Étude Géographique*, H*istorique, Politique et Economique*, (Paris: J. André, 1897); Charles Edwards. *Letters from Crete*, (London: R. Bentley and son, 1887); G. Perrot. *L'île de Crète: Souvenirs de Voyage*, (Paris: L. Hachette et cie., 1867); Hilary J. Skinner. *Turkish Rule in Crete*, (London, New York: Cassell, Peter & Galpin for the Eastern Question Association, 1877); Thomas Abel Brimage Spratt. *Travels and Research in Crete*, 2 vols., (London: J. van Voorst, 1865); J. M. Tancoigne. *İzmir'e, Ege Adalarına ve*

character of Chania stating that "… all nationalities meet, all tongues are spoken, all currencies pass muster."[50] Miller interpreted the events from the Orientalist point of view. While he was proud of the Western civilization, he considered Crete as an under-developed island where the elements of modernity were absent. He made the following statement:

> At the last picnic our host had given, the guests were forced to eat the various viands in Turkish fashion with their fingers; but our progressive friend had made a great advance since then, and brand-new knives and forks were provided, to our great sorrow, and changes between our course … More *pilaf* next appeared upon the scene, and as at this period of the performance I showed signs of intense thirst, the young progressive desired I should slake it with beer, mixed with beer, mixed with Vichy water -the latter, I mention, being regarded as the operatta is nightly performed by ample Levantine beauties, imported from Smyrna, exhibits to the scornful Mussulmans the amusements of Western civilization. Canea has its *Café Restaurant au Concert Européen*, its *Concert Monte Carlo*, its *Moulin Rouge* and its *Photographie au Souvenir de Crète*. Even … the barbers have discovered that it is the privilege of Englishmen to pay double for a shave.[51]

In addition to travel literature, eye-witness accounts of Western European and Ottoman journalists contributed to the literature. Henri Turot's book entitled "*L'Insurrection Crètoise et la Guerre Greco-Turque*" provides a detailed account of the Cretan revolt of 1897 and especially of the Ottoman-Greek War of 1897.[52] On the other hand, *Devlet-i Âliyye-i Osmânî ve Yunan Muhârebesi 1314* written by Süleyman Tevfik and Abdullah Zühtü, both correspondents for the Ottoman daily *Sabâh*, provides details of the Ottoman-Greek War of 1897 and the Cretan issue and is helpful in understanding how the Ottoman journalists transmitted the events.[53]

Girit'e Seyahat: Bir Fransız Diplomatın Türkiye Gözlemleri (1811-1814), (trl.) Ercan Eyüboğlu, (İstanbul: Büke Yayınları, 2003); Joseph de Tournefort. *Tournefort Seyahatnamesi*, (trl.) Ali Berktay, (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2005).

[50] William Miller. *Travels and Politics in the Near East*, p. 323.

[51] *ibid*., p. 337.

[52] Henri Turot. *L'Insurrection Crètoise et la Guerre Greco-Turque*, (Paris: Librairie Hachett, 1898). See also the book of Stillman, American consul in Crete and correspondent of London Times in Athens and Rome, regarding his observations on the Cretan revolt of 1866-68: William James Stillman. *The Cretan Insurrection of 1866-1868*, (New York: H. Holt and Company, 1874).

[53] Süleyman Tevfik and Abdullah Zühtü. *Devlet-i Âliyye-i Osmânî ve Yunan Muhârebesi 1314,* (İstanbul: Mihran Matbaası, 1315). In addition to the travel and eye-witness accounts, memoirs and biographies were

Western European academic literature has conceptualized the events in Ottoman Crete in terms of the "Cretan Question." From the standpoint of the "Eastern Question" paradigm, for instance, the Ottoman administration in Crete was considered a "corrupt and impecunious Oriental Government,"[54] and the Cretan issue of the nineteenth century was only seen as the "Cretan Question" being an important chain of the "Eastern Question."[55] It is my contention that the term "Cretan Question" is inappropriate in the case of the nineteenth century Ottoman Crete, the term Cretan issue seems more appropriate to refer to the developments that took place on the island, because things were somewhat different from those which were perceived by the European states. In this dissertation, for that reason, I prefer using the term "the Cretan issue."

The "disintegration theory" describes the religious and ethnic groups as active which became "aware of their national consciousness" in time and began to rebel against their "theocratic oppressive ruler." This theory claims that those groups were able to gain their independence through armed struggles. In this context, it was generally argued that the Ottoman Empire had a theocratic system which was not able to control ethnic and religious groups within the empire. Accordingly, these groups found a fertile ground to gain their independence from the Ottoman Empire through armed struggles and rebellious activities. It was often claimed that Ottoman Crete was one of the worst governed provinces in the Ottoman Empire during the nineteenth century: "Crete had for long been

---

also significant in understanding the Cretan issue. See: Prince George's memoir for the post-1898 period: A. A. Pallis (ed.). *The Cretan Drama: The Life and Memoirs of Prince George of Greece, High Commissioner in Crete, (1898-1906)*, (New York: R. Speller, 1959), and the biography of Chester on Venizelos: Samuel Beach Chester. *Life of Venizelos*, (New York: G. H. Doran, 1921).

[54] The following chapters would demonstrate the reasons for this argument and provided further examples. See: Chapter IV in this dissertation.

[55] The best known examples of this approach are the following: Jules Ballot. *Historie de l'insurrection Crètoise*, (Paris: L. Dentu Librarire-Editeur, 1868); Jean Stanislaw Dutkowski. *L'occupation de la Crète (1897-1909): Une Expérience d'administration Internationale d'un Territoire*, (Paris: A. Pedone, 1952); M. Vaillant. *Les Origines de l'Autonomie Crètoise*, (Paris: L. Larose, 1902); Henri Couturier. *La Crète sa Situation au point de vue droit International*, (Paris: A. Pedone, 1900).

one of the most ungovernable parts of the Ottoman Empire."[56] This school of historiography has, explicitly and implicitly, considered the Ottoman administration as passive, static and incapable of establishing order and tranquility on the island and of meeting the demands of the Cretans: "… the revolt which broke out there … was more than a mere protest against misgovernment."[57]

Available Greek nationalist literature in Western European languages viewed the events that occurred in Ottoman Crete in the nineteenth century from their own nationalist perspective. The Cretan revolts were portrayed in this conception as "a matter of religion. [They were] Christians against Turks."[58] A writer of this genre claimed that the Cretan revolts were reflections of "never-ending hostility between the Cretans and Turks." It was also asserted that "to the Cretan, the Turk was a cruel master; he might be checked, temporarily, but could not be associated, in any way, with the code of civilized societies. Between Turk and Greek, particularly the Cretan Greek, there was a deep hostility and enmity; between the despot and the dependent, between Christian and Infidel, between two races so opposite, that fusion was impossible."[59]

Theodore George Tatsios has argued in his book that the Christian peoples of the Balkans had been dominated by the "Turks," and in consequence of entering a new episode of their history, they began to seek political independence from the Ottoman Empire. According to him, "significant racial and cultural differences remained which became the seeds of Balkan nationalism and set the stage for the disintegration of the Turkish Empire." He examined the events and developments in the light of the "Cretan problem" which was

---

[56] M. S. Anderson. *The Eastern Question 1774-1923*, (London: St. Martin's Press, 1966), p. 159.

[57] *ibid*., p. 159.

[58] Emmanuel E. Marcoglou. *The American Interest in the Cretan Revolution, 1866-1869*, (Athens: National Centre of Social Research, 1971), p. 41.

[59] *ibid*., p. 51.

considered an important part of the "Eastern Question." His following statement would best illustrate his approach to the events: "the Cretan problem had become … a new phase of the Eastern Question, the solution of which concerned vitally all the European Powers."[60] He also argued that "unrealistic frontiers" drawn for the independent Greece by the European Powers paved the way for the Greek irredentism and the exclusion of Crete from Greece at that time led to periodic revolts on the island throughout the nineteenth century. According to him, "only one third of the Greek nationals were included in the new Greek state. The remaining two-thirds were still under subjugation." This "subjugation" legitimizes the irredentist policies of the Greek state and the ideology of *Megali Idea* (Μεγάλη Ιδέα). He stressed the "theocratic nature of the Ottoman Empire," which created an unsatisfactory position for its non-Muslim subjects. For him, the reforms granted by the Ottoman government were not fully applied by the Sublime Porte which contributed to the difficulties of the "Cretan problem." In addition to the "maladministration" of the Ottoman government, he made references to "Muslim fanaticism" and their resentment to the reforms:

> … this Arrangement proved to be only another lull in the age-old struggle between the two sects. As the Arrangement was being proclaimed, the Moslems of the island were planning for the next round of massacres and were urging all Moslems to take up arms against their Christian enemy… Moslem propaganda and posters did appear urging the Muslim population not to accept the proposed reforms.[61]

Tatsios further contends that by the implication of the reform programmes "Crete became the most privileged province of the Ottoman Empire; however the Cretan Moslems resented the privileges given to the Christians … like most minorities accustomed to the exercise of power…" He made repeated references to the demographic superiority of the Christian inhabitants of the island over the Muslim ones. Moreover, he exaggerated the

---

[60] Theodore George Tatsios. *The Megali Idea and the Greek-Turkish War of 1897: The Impact of the Cretan Problem on Greek Irredentism, 1866-1897*, (New York: East European Monographs, 1984), p. 142.

[61] *ibid*., p. 80.

term of the Christian governors stating that "the Cretans looked back nostalgically to the days when their island was ruled by the Christian governors." Ironically enough, Tatsios claimed that geographical distance of Crete from the Ottoman government led to the inability to control the island. He wrote that "because of its geographical position and the distance from the Sublime Porte, the Cretan never missed an opportunity to raise the standard of rebellion and to demand union with Greece."[62]

In another book entitled *The Cretan Problem and the Eastern Question: A Study of Greek Irredentism, 1866-1898*, Tatsios also analyzed the "Cretan problem" and its impact on the *Megali Idea* by putting special emphasis on the conflict between Hellenism and Panslavist aspirations in the Balkans. He blamed the European powers for preventing the union of the island with Greece which was considered "inevitable" due to Crete's geographical position, ethnic composition, and the nationalistic fervor of the Cretan peoples. For Tatsios, the Armenian events of 1895 had a considerable impact upon the Cretan revolt of 1896 and the proclamation of the imperial *fermân* of 1889, according to which the Muslim governors ruled the island for five years, played a vital role in the outbreak of the Cretan revolt of 1896. As other Greek nationalist historians, he demarcated the Cretan society along religious lines, as Muslims and Christians, which was regarded as one of the main reasons for the Cretan revolts.[63]

In the same line with Tatsios, another Greek nationalist historian Theocharis Detorakis has regarded the Cretan issue as the "Cretan Question" which was seen as part of the "Eastern Question." Within a similar framework with above-mentioned nationalist historians, Detorakis wrote that "… the clear nationalist character of the Cretan Question … as events developed … began to occupy European diplomacy as an important part of

[62] *ibid*., p. 140.

[63] Theodore George Tatsios. *The Cretan Problem and the Eastern Question: A Study of Greek Irredentism, 1866-1898*, (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1967).

the Eastern Question…"[64] He also claimed that Muslim inhabitants of Crete were not in favor of the reforms and they rather "continuously sought [their] abolition."[65] He remarked the drastic increase in the number of the Christian population after 1821. He emphasized the demographic superiority of the Christians by giving details about the population trends of Crete throughout the nineteenth century arguing that "… the Christians were now able to influence decisively the course of historical events."[66]

On the other hand, Ottoman and modern Turkish national historiography has devoted little attention to Ottoman Crete. While some scholars have paid special attention to Crete's symbolic importance for the Ottoman state as the last conquered territory of the Ottoman Empire, others have portrayed it as a "burden" for the Ottoman state. In his work, for example, Enver Ziya Karal has argued that Sultan Abdülhamid II and the people who shared the same opinion with Sultan Abdülhamid II thought that the island was a "burden" for the Ottoman Empire. According to them, the island did not provide revenues, and the Cretan people often rebelled. The Cretans were not satisfied with the conditions although autonomy was granted to them. Furthermore, Karal notes that the Ottoman government admitted that Crete was a piece of territory to be separated from the Ottoman Empire and that the problem was when and how this separation would be realized.[67] Moreover, Turkish historiography has understood the disturbances that took place on the island simply as the outcome of European states' political intrigue.[68] At this point, it should be noted that, as Karakasidou eloquently remarked, "these are looking-glass histories. They

---

[64] Theocharis E. Detorakis. *History of Crete*, (trl.) John C. Davis, (Iraklion: 1994), p. 330.

[65] *ibid*., p. 347.

[66] *ibid*., p. 370.

[67] Enver Ziya Karal. *Osmanlı Tarihi*, Vol. VIII, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1995), p. 121.

[68] Ussama Makdisi. *The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History, and Violence in Nineteenth-century Ottoman Lebanon*, p. 6.

search backwards over the hills and valleys of historical events to trace the inexorable route of a given (or 'chosen') population to the destiny of their national enlightenment and liberation. They transform *history* into *national history*…"[69]

Contrary to what the Greek and Ottoman nationalist historiographies have portrayed, throughout the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire tried to strengthen its position through reforms to the current needs of the day. When analyzed from a historical perspective, it can be seen that the Ottoman modernization process began to cope with changes going on within the empire and the world. Hence, the reform process began way before the *Tanzîmât* reforms. During the reign of Sultan Mahmud II, fruitful attempts were made to transform the strict structure of the Ottoman Empire to a better functioning and a modern state structure. Many reforms were made in the bureaucracy and army, including the formation of a modern and Western type of army. This was a response to the changes in technology and modern warfare. Similarly, reforms were made to cope with radical external changes.[70] Although these reforms marked a break with the Ottoman tradition, "they did not envisage a fundamental transformation of Ottoman society, or even … of state; rather, they sought to stabilize the existing state and to equip it for survival in a radical altered external environment."[71] This also became evident during the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II, in which the ultimate aim of the reform process was saving the main pillars of the state. The existence and the maintenance of the central Ottoman bureaucratic system were supplemented with various ideological methods so as to facilitate the legitimacy of an empire facing cultural and diplomatic isolation. In its relations with the European states, the Ottoman Empire desperately tried to present itself as a Western

[69] Anastasia N. Karakasidou. *Fields of Wheat, Hills of Blood: Passages to Nationhood in Greek Macedonia, 1870-1990*, p. 17. (emphasis is mine).

[70] İlber Ortaylı. *İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1999), pp. 123-124, and 126.

[71] F. A. K. Yasamee. *Ottoman Diplomacy: Abdülhamid II and the Great Powers 1878-1888*, (İstanbul: Isis Press, 1996), p. 7.

state.[72] But, it should also be important to note that wherever the reforms did not suffice, various levels of "fine-tuning" policies entered into the scene.[73]

An important study on the late nineteenth century Ottoman Crete in Turkish language is Ayşe Nükhet Adıyeke's detailed book which provides valuable insights regarding the history of Ottoman Crete between the years 1896 and 1908. In her noteworthy book, Adıyeke is mainly concerned with the administrative structure of Ottoman and autonomous Crete, focuses on rules and regulations and describes the major events that occurred between 1896 and 1908. However, in her narrative, Ayşe Nükhet Adıyeke has pointed out that Ottoman Crete was somehow *sui generis* and had a very privileged status when compared to the other provinces of the Ottoman Empire. She placed a special emphasis on the privileged status of the island which was put forward throughout her book.[74] In my opinion, this approach not only keeps us away from understanding the socio-political realities of Ottoman Crete, but also prevents us from seeing the broader patterns and similarities that existed across the Ottoman Empire in the same period.

In a series of articles Ayşe Nükhet and Nuri Adıyeke analyzed the island of Crete from its conquest by the Ottoman Empire until its unification with Greece.[75] They wrote interesting articles on various subjects concerning the island such as the inter-communal marriages in Ottoman Crete, the administration of Mehmet Ali Paşa, the population figures, the Ottoman and Greek relationship and the "Cretan Question." In particular in

---

[72] Selim Deringil. *The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1909*, (London: I. B. Tauris Publishers, 1999), p. 165.

[73] *ibid*., p. 10.

[74] Ayşe Nükhet Adıyeke. *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Girit Bunalımı (1896-1908)*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2000). Abou-El-Haj underlined the fact that "Ottoman specialists have emphasized the 'differentness' of their chosen subject to an extent that a dialogue with the neighbouring historical disciplines has become difficult if not impossible." See: Rifa'at 'Ali Abou-El-Haj. *Formation of the Modern State: The Ottoman Empire, Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries*, p. 2.

[75] Ayşe Nükhet and Nuri Adıyeke's collected essays were published as *Fethinden Kaybına Girit*, (İstanbul: Babıali Kültür Yayıncılığı, 2006).

their article called "Girit'te Millet Sisteminin Örnekleri: Kapıda İşaret, Hamamda Çıngırak," they argued that the island's social structure was quite interesting and different, and the Cretan Muslims and Christians were intertwined with various ties and fed from the same source. Most importantly, as they assumed, unlike the other parts of the Ottoman Empire, the demarcation line between the Cretan Muslims and Christians was not so clear-cut in Ottoman Crete.[76] It seems evident that Ayşe Nükhet and Nuri Adıyeke depicted the Cretan society from the standpoint of tolerance and coexistence and considered the Muslim segment of the society, as well as the Christian one, as a homogenous community disregarding the class differences, complex networks, and various webs of interaction which tied the Cretans together.

In this sense, it is interesting to note that, as Çağlar Keyder has pointed out, before the nineteenth century, Muslims and non-Muslims lived in isolated villages or well-defined neighborhoods in the cities, and their material and social differences were not problematic. By the accelerated pace of economic alterations and urbanization, ethnic groups came into contact with each other and the "social schismosis" came onto the scene. Keyder further stated that "not only religious practice, but also schools and community organization, patterns of consumption and levels of Westernization, material culture and life-styles increasingly diverged."[77]

At this point, Ussama Makdisi's words regarding the Mount Lebanon also deserve to be quoted at length here:

> as members of religious communities, Druzes and Maronites did not tolerate as much as fully accept each other with the understating that neither side would encroach on the other's sacred territory; they respected, acknowledged, and often

[76] Ayşe Nükhet and Nuri Adıyeke. "Girit'te Millet Sisteminin Örnekleri: Kapıda İşaret, Hamamda Çıngırak," in their: *Fethinden Kaybına Girit*, pp. 92-100. See also: Ayşe Nükhet Adıyeke, Nuri Adıyeke. "Girit'te Millet Sisteminin Örnekleri: Kapıda İşaret, Hamamda Çıngırak," *Toplumsal Tarih*, No, 136, April 2005, pp. 92-97.

[77] Çağlar Keyder. "The Ottoman Empire," in: Karen Barkey and Mark von Hagen (eds.). *After Empire: Multi-ethnic Societies and Nation-Building*, (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1997), p. 36.

> participated in the various Christian and Muslim feasts, ceremonies, and customs that marked a living multicommunal society.[78]

Here, my aim is neither to deny tolerance and coexistence within the Cretan society nor to draw a picture of violence and hatred. The typologies attributed to Crete as an island of coexistence or violence were not analytically relevant ones. This dissertation suggests that tolerance, coexistence, violence and hatred are to be evaluated within the framework of the empire-wide dynamics in the nineteenth century since as Keyder pointed out inter-communal relations were redefined by the socio-economic and political alterations that took place in the nineteenth century.

I propose that the Cretan revolts of 1896 and 1897 are to be examined within the context of the nineteenth century in time when nationalism was the dominant ideology throughout the Balkans. This dissertation portrays social, political, and ideological currents in Ottoman Crete within the context of local (Ottoman Crete), imperial (Ottoman Empire), nation-state (Greece) and colonial (European Powers) levels, all of which had crucial impacts on the events that took place in Crete at that time. In other words, this study attempts to explain social, political and ideological transformation of Ottoman Crete and the genesis of these revolts within the nationalist context of the nineteenth century.

A Note on the Primary Sources

The present study mainly relies on Ottoman, British, and American archival sources, which are supplemented with the published British Parliamentary documents and various Ottoman, Greek and Western journals. The vast body of Ottoman archival documents related to my subject in the Prime Ministry Archives of İstanbul were used among which the Yıldız Palace Archive and the Girid İrâdeleri are the two vital categories

[78] Ussama Makdisi. "Corrupting the Sublime Sultanate: The Revolt of Tanyus Shahin in Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Lebanon," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, No. 42, 2000, p. 186.

in understanding the late nineteenth century Ottoman Crete and the ways the Ottoman statesmen perceived the Cretan revolts.

The Yıldız Palace Archive contains a large volume of documents including imperial edicts, extensive reports of Ottoman administrators, correspondence of the governors with the centre, memoranda, petitions, complaint letters and grievances of the Cretans, and indicates how the Ottoman state understood the political, diplomatic, economic and social realities of Crete in the last phase of the nineteenth century. The Girid İrâdeleri is a very special collection within the Prime Ministry Archives in which hundreds of documents were housed regarding Ottoman Crete between the years 1839 and 1909. This collection also provided me with a plethora of information and insight on my subject, and its careful examination reveals much about the language of Ottoman governance, the perceptions of the Ottoman statesmen, the realities of Ottoman Crete including social, cultural and economic life, education, trade and immigration, and about the internal workings of the island in the nineteenth century.

The other category of Ottoman archival documents consulted in this study is the holdings of the Ottoman Bank Archives and Research Centre, which includes quite rich records of the Muslim Council of *Evkaf* and Orphans in Ottoman Crete. Those documents offer a different perspective from the Ottoman state documents and are very helpful in capturing the socio-economic life of the Cretan Muslims, the relationships and networks within the Muslim community and they enable us to reconstruct the social history of the island during the late nineteenth century and at the turn of the twentieth century. It should be noted that in these documents we can gain access not only to the local dynamics of the Cretan Muslims in Ottoman Crete but also to the shift and changes in patterns of relations within the Cretan society by the establishment of the autonomous regime and the unification of the island with Greece.

In addition to the Ottoman archival materials, I have also made use of American and British consular reports. The British reports yielded detailed information on daily occurrences in the turbulent periods. The official correspondence between the British consul in Chania and British Minister of Foreign Affairs is useful in understanding the socio-economic and political conditions prevailing on the island during the Cretan revolts and the British imperial perspective regarding the internal and external dynamics of Crete, and it reflects the multiple dimensions of the British involvement in the Cretan affairs. The use of British and American archival sources helped me to balance the Ottoman perspective on the Cretan issue and the hybridization of all these archival sources provides a broader perspective in the reconstruction of the Cretan history.

Outline and Flow Chart

Chapter I examines the establishment of modern Greek identity and the irredentist policies of the Greek Kingdom in order to provide an ideological and historical background for the revolts that took place in Ottoman Crete. The emphasis will be given to the main parameters of Greek nationalism with the aim of discussing the establishment of modern Greek identity. This chapter also deals with two dominant ideologies of the period, which were *Ellinismos* and *Romiossini,* and it attempts to question Greek national identity, its "continuity" and different phases within the context of the nineteenth century. After that debate, this chapter explores the relationship between Greek irredentism and the *Megali Idea* with the aim of illustrating to what extent Ottoman Crete was incorporated into the fold of the Greek mainland.

Chapter II is an attempt to provide an overview of the Cretan history and introduces physical, demographic and socio-political aspects of the island of Crete. It argues that the events of the late nineteenth century were not entirely isolated from the previous ones.

Moreover, this chapter examines the role played by the Council of *Evkaf* and Orphans so as to introduce certain insights in terms of inner and inter-communal relations in the Cretan society. Furthermore, Chapter II explains the rebellious history of the island and illustrates that after the introduction of nationalist ideology into the Cretan society, the Cretan revolts began to have a nationalistic character and the Cretan Christians commemorated their revolts as a "nationalist liberation struggle."

After introducing this historical background, Chapter III begins with the examination of the reappearance of the *Epitropi*'s rebellious activities on the island. This chapter also analyzes the contents of the Cretan Christians' grievances. Then, Turhan Paşa's attempts to prevent the adjournment of the General Assembly are examined. This Chapter also pays special attention to the Cretan revolt of 1896, which provided important insights in the consolidation of the Cretan Christians and the exclusion of the Cretan Muslims. In that way, it illustrates how exclusion and revolt drew certain boundaries between the Christian and Muslim communities of the island. Chapter III elucidates that although the Ottoman state made various attempts to send additional troops to Crete so as to suppress the revolt, the European states limited Ottoman military power.

Chapter IV examines the "nationalist liberation struggle" of the Cretan Christians in 1897 and attempts to indicate that the reasons of the conflict. This Chapter points out that nationalist ideology of the Cretan Christians played the major role in the Cretan revolt of 1897 which represented a hallmark in the history of the island. It also illustrates that the Greek occupation of the island added another dimension to the Cretan revolt of 1897. Chapter IV also analyzes the military intervention of the European Powers, which undermined the Ottoman administration and culminated in the establishment of a new autonomous administration on the island. In this chapter, the devastating impact of the

Cretan revolt on the Cretans, the large-scale Muslim immigration to the coastal towns of the island and the other provinces of the Ottoman Empire are also examined.

Chapter V attempts to elucidate how diplomatic politics challenged the internal dynamics of the island. This Chapter explains that while the European Powers, especially Britain, urged the nomination of a Greek subject to the post of Governor-General of Crete, the Ottoman government opposed it, and insisted on the appointment of an Ottoman subject to that post. Then, the withdrawal of the Ottoman troops from the island is analyzed. As it is identified with violence and seen as the main barrier to deconstructing the existing administration and reconstructing a new one by the Christian insurgents, this Chapter brought the withdrawal of the Ottoman troops to the forefront.

Chapter I

THE CREATION OF MODERN GREEK IDENTITY AND ITS IMPACT ON OTTOMAN CRETE

Greek nationalism stemmed from the interaction between internal and external factors that occurred in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. A variety of factors including changes in the organizational structure of the Ottoman Empire, changing patterns of commerce, diaspora intelligentsia and the revolutionary spirit of the Enlightenment, contributed to the emergence of Greek nationalism and the construction of the modern Greek identity. In order to understand the very origin of Greek nationalism, one should analyze the specific historical reality of the Western Europe and Ottoman Empire in which Greek nationalism emerged, and examine the role and position of the Greek Orthodox peoples within the Ottoman Empire. In this part of the study, I intend to give a very general background and discuss some of the main ideas and developments of the time so as to provide the ideological and historical background for the establishment of the Greek nation-state.

The socio-ethnic structure of the Ottoman Empire and the religious identity determined by the so-called *millet* system had a tremendous impact on the development of Greek nationalism and the process of its nation formation. The *millet* system can be defined as a "socio-cultural and communal framework based firstly on religion and secondly on ethnicity which in turn often reflected linguistic differences."[1] The ethnic

[1] Kemal Karpat. "*Millet*s and Nationality: The Roots of the Incongruity of Nation and State in the Post-Ottoman Era," in: Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis (eds.). *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire*, Vol. I, (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, Inc, 1982), pp. 141-142. However, it is important to note that Benjamin Braude discusses the earlier model of the origins of the *millet* system arguing that the *millet* system arose in the *Tanzîmât* period. See: Benjamin Braude. "Foundations Myths of the Millet System," in:

groups were organized into ethno-religious communities such as the Orthodox, Armenian, Jewish and Muslim. All Orthodox Christians belonged to the Orthodox *Rum milleti* in which the Greeks were the dominant part. The social estates regrouped the subjects according to their occupation and function, and free vertical mobility was prohibited in order to maintain the survival of this organization.[2] In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, profound changes took place in the Ottoman society under the impact of various internal and external social, economic and political factors.[3] The Ottoman social structure of the classical age left the historical scene and new class divisions came into existence that provided a fertile ground for the emergence of the modern Greek identity.[4] The change in commercial patterns between Europe and the Ottoman Empire, the European protection extended to non-Muslim subjects who conducted business with them, and the trade networks established in Europe by the Greek merchants all played significant roles in the development of Greek nationalism. The European demand for reaching rich food and raw materials in the Balkans and the availability of cheap manufactured European goods altered commercial relations within and outside Europe, which affected agricultural trade relations in the Ottoman Empire. From then on, the Ottoman state's control over the production and exchange process started to decrease. As a result of this, the European states' protection over non-Muslim subjects of the Empire became more visible.[5]

Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis (eds.). *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire*, Vol. I, (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, Inc, 1982), pp. 69-89.

[2] Kemal Karpat. *An Inquiry into the Social Foundations of Nationalism in the Ottoman State: From Social Estates to Classes, From Millets to Nations*, (United States of America: Center of International Studies Princeton University, 1973), p. 7.

[3] Kemal Karpat. "*Millet*s and Nationality: The Roots of the Incongruity of Nation and State in the Post-Ottoman Era," p. 152.

[4] Victor Roudometof. *Nationalism, Globalization, and Orthodoxy: The Social Origins of Ethnic Conflict in the Balkans*, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2001), [electronic resource], p. 31.

[5] Fatma Müge Göçek. "The Decline of the Ottoman Empire and the Emergence of Greek, Armenian, Turkish and Arab Nationalism," in: Fatma Müge Göçek (ed.). *Social Construction of Nationalism in the Middle East*, (New York: State University of New York Press, 2002), pp. 22-23. According to Stoianovich, the rising

With the Treaty of Carlowitz, the Ottoman Greeks started to benefit from the trading rights of the Ottoman subjects in the Habsburg domains. After the Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, the Greek ships were allowed to fly Russian flags in the Black Sea which led to a revival in economic conditions and had a significant impact on the emergence of a new middle class in the Greek lands. The Greek merchants began to go to Western Europe to sell their products bringing the new ideas of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution to the Greek mainland.[6] The Greek merchant class facilitated the spread of Greek Enlightenment texts which added a cosmopolitan character to the Greek cultural production that began to develop outside the intellectual sphere of the Orthodox Christian hierarchy.[7] The expansion of the Balkan trade brought these merchants to the Central Europe and reinforced them to interact with the cultural environment of Europe.[8]

Moreover, the diaspora Greek bourgeoisie played an important role in the trade between the Ottoman Empire and Western Europe. The ideas of the Enlightenment and French Revolution flourished in the Greek Orthodox diaspora which became the main centre in the development of Greek nationalism.[9] The diaspora intellectuals were admirers

---

demand of the Europeans for the rural production of the Balkans was very related to the expansion of towns, population, and industry in Western and Central Europe. See: Traian Stoianovich. "The Conquering Balkan Orthodox Merchants," *Journal of Economic History*, No. 20, 1960, p. 255.

[6] *ibid*., p. 23; L. S. Stavrianos. *The Balkans since 1453*, (Illinois: Dryden Press, 1958), p. 274. The Greeks were also indispensable elements to the maritime trade of the Levant. For further information see: Yannis Yannoupoulos. "Greek Society on the Eve of Independence," in: Richard Clogg (ed.). *Balkan Society in the Age of Greek Independence*, (Totowa: Barnes & Noble Books, 1981), pp. 18-33.

[7] Stathis Gourgouris. *Dream Nation: Enlightenment, Colonization, and the Institution of Modern Greece*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), p. 72. In his article, Nicolopoulos attributed a great importance to the first ideological writings, particularly famous *Agathangelos* pamphlet, which had been distributed among the Greek mercantile communities. For the details see: John Nicolopoulos. "From Agathangelos to the Megale Idea: Russia and the Emergence of Modern Greek Nationalism," *Balkan Studies*, Vol. XXVI, No. 1, 1985, pp. 41-56.

[8] Eric J. Hobsbawm. *The Age of Revolution: Europe, 1789-1848*, (London: Sphere Books Ltd., 1977), pp. 173-174.

[9] Nicos P. Mouzelis. *Modern Greece: Facets of Underdevelopment*, (Great Britain: Macmillan Press, 1978), p. 141. Venice, Trieste, Vienna, Amsterdam, Budapest, Bucharest, Naples and Odessa were the main foreign cities where the Greek merchants lived. The intellectual atmospheres of these cities had important effects on the Greek merchants and intellectuals who contributed to the Greek national movement. For the details see:

of liberal Europe and were influenced by the spirit and the beliefs of the Enlightenment and European concepts such as secular education, progress, popular sovereignty, and nation-state. These Greek merchants and diaspora intelligentsia imported and transmitted the ideas and the values of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution that contributed to the ideological preparation for the Greek War of Independence.[10] The transmission of these ideas and values into modern Greek thought contributed to the construction of the modern Greek identity. It can be argued that it was on the above-mentioned dynamics that the seeds of the Greek War of Independence were sown.

L. S. Stavrianos. "Antecedents to the Balkan Revolutions of the Nineteenth Century," *Journal of Modern History*, Vol. XXIX, No. 4, December 1957, p. 343. Geanakoplos noted that the Greek communities of these cities were also important for the preservation of the Greek tradition. For him, especially Venice maintained its significance until the outbreak of the Greek revolution in 1821. The Greek community in Venice was able to establish schools both in Italy and in the Greek mainland, such as in Athens, Patras, Patmos, Thessaly, Macedonia, and Yannina in Epirus in the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. Deno J. Geanakoplos. "The Diaspora Greeks: The Genesis of Modern Greek National Consciousness," in: Nikiforos Diamandouros, John P. Anton, John A. Petropulos, Peter Topping (eds.). *Hellenism and the First Greek War of Liberation (1821-1830): Continuity and Change*, (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1976), pp. 59-77, especially, 61, 77. It should be important to remember that the *Philike Hetaireia* (Friendly Society) established in Odessa in 1814 by the members of the mercantile members of diaspora (Nicholas Skouphas, Emmanuel Xanthos, Athanasius Tsakalof), aiming at liberating "the fatherland" from the Ottoman Empire. For the details of the *Philike Hetaireia* see: George D. Frangos. "The Philiki Etairia: A Premature National Coalition," in: Richard Clogg (ed.). *The Struggle for Greek Independence: Essays to the Mark of the 150th Anniversary of the Greek War of Independence*, (Great Britain: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1973), pp. 87-103; and, C. W. Crawley. "John Capodistrias and the Greeks before 1821," *Cambridge Historical Journal*, Vol. XIII, No. 1, 1957, pp. 175-182. Runciman remarked that at the end of the eighteenth century, several secret societies were established, such as *Athena*, which aimed to liberate Greece with French help, and *Phoenix*, which turned its face to Russia for liberating Greece. One of the members of *Phoenix*, Nicholas Skouphas became the founder of *Philike Hetaireia*. See: Steven Runciman. *The Great Church in Captivity*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), p. 398.

[10] John S. Koliopoulos. *Brigands without a Cause: Brigandage and Irredentism in Modern Greece 1821-1912*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), p. 4. Iosipos Moisiodax was one of the most important diaspora intellectuals who brought the cosmopolitan humanism of Enlightenment to the Greek culture and society. For further information about Moisiodax, see: Paschalis M. Kitromilides. *The Enlightenment as Social Criticism: Iosipos Moisiodax and Greek Culture in the Eighteenth Century*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992). It should be important to note that this new Greek Orthodox Balkan intelligentsia did not only descend from Greeks. The Wallachian Moisiodax was one of the most important examples of a Hellenized non-Greek scholar. For further examples and details, see: Peter Mackridge. "The Greek Intelligentsia 1780-1830: A Balkan Perspective," in: Richard Clogg (ed.). *Balkan Society in the Age of Greek Independence*, pp. 63-84. However, it should be remembered that at that time, Greek was the *lingua franca* of culture and commerce in the central and eastern parts of the Balkans. Traian Stoianovich. "The Conquering Balkan Orthodox Merchants," *Journal of Economic History*, p. 290.

The military contribution of the klephts, literally "thieves," to the cause of Greek independence was also worthy of mention.[11] The klephts were mountaineers, most of them were pastoralists. They were mainly fugitives, outlaws, debtors, misfits and victims of oppression. The Ottomans entrusted the bands of Orthodox Christian irregulars, the *armatole*s ("men at arms") with the control of the mountainous regions, providing security and keeping away the klephts from the villages and mountain passes. According to some scholars, the origins of *armatoloi* can be traced back to the Byzantine and Venetian times while others rejected this view arguing that the *armatoloi* was an Ottoman creation. The *armatole*s were former outlaws who were amnestied by the Ottoman authorities and charged with the maintenance of law and order and control of the mountain passes. The ablest and most dangerous ones became captains who commanded the *armatole*s and were responsible for the maintenance of order in the districts of their jurisdiction, known as *armatolik*s. In this sense, it is important to mention that the boundary between the klephts and *armatole*s was not clear due to the changing economic factors. The klepht became *armatoloi* and vice-a-versa. The following ballad is a clear indication of this fluidity:

> For twelve years long I lived a Cleft on Chasia and Olympos
> At Luros and Xeromeros I served as Armatolos.[12]

At that time, Western intellectuals admired the classical Greek heritage and conceived of the ancient Greece as the birthplace of Western civilization.[13] In other words,

---

[11] Michael Herzfeld. *Ours Once More: Folklore, Ideology, and the Making of Modern Greece*, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982), p. 60.

[12] John S. Koliopoulos. *Brigands without a Cause: Brigandage and Irredentism in Modern Greece 1821-1912*, pp. 26-32; John S. Koliopoulos. "Brigandage and Insurgency in the Greek Domains of the Ottoman Empire, 1853-1908," in: Dimitri Gondicas and Charles Issawi (eds.). *Ottoman Greeks in the Age of Nationalism: Politics, Economy, and Society in the Nineteenth Century*, (Princeton, New Jersey: Darwin Press, Inc., 1999), pp. 143-160, especially, 144; V. J. Parry and M. E. Yapp (eds.). *War, Technology and Society in the Middle East*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), pp. 311, 313-314; Vayne Vucinich. *The Ottoman Empire*, (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1965), pp. 154-155; K. E. Fleming. *The Muslim Bonaparte: Diplomacy and Orientalism in Ali Pasha's Greece*, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 41. Fleming pointed out the fact that at that time klephts were the symbols of the resistance to the "Turks." According to her, "iconic image of klepht versus Turks" shaped "Greek communal identity" to the point that when the Greek children played a popular game, they divided themselves into two groups: the *turkoi* and *klefte*s. p. 62.

Western intellectuals idealized ancient Greeks as their intellectual and spiritual ancestors.[14] Western scholars made available the printed form of the Greek classics with philological and lexicographic adjuncts and dozens of books which recreated the ancient Hellenic civilization. In the last quarter of the eighteenth century, this "past" was accepted by a small number of Greek intellectuals who studied and traveled outside the Ottoman Empire.[15] Infused with the ideas of the Enlightenment, these intellectuals transmitted the culture of the Enlightenment and tried to adopt the achievements of the European civilization to the Greek culture and society.[16] It should be taken into account that the Greek diaspora bourgeoisie and the Western-educated intelligentsia provided the leadership and financial resources for the Greek revolutionary movement.[17] Moreover, the

---

[13] Victor Roudometof. "Nationalism and Identity Politics in the Balkans: Greece and the Macedonian Question," *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, Vol. XIV, No. 2, 1996, p. 290.

[14] Michael Herzfeld. *Anthropology through the Looking-glass: Critical Ethnography in the Margins of Europe,* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 1. According to Clogg, ancient language and culture of the Greeks formed the basis of the Western ruling classes' education that became very advantageous for the Greeks. See: Richard Clogg. "The Greeks and Their Past," in: Dennis Deletant and Harry Hanak (eds.). *Historians as Nation Builders*, (London: Mac Millan Press, 1988), p. 16. Here it should be noted Smith's assertion that "locating the modern Greeks through their cultural heritage of classical antiquity along an East-West axis that stretched from Paris and London to Athens and Constantinople, the 'Hellenic' map differed profoundly from the 'Byzantine' one; for the latter had a North-South axis from Moscow to Constantinople and Egypt, which aligned a re-nascent Byzantine Greece with Orthodox Russia as the protector of Eastern Christianity." Anthony D. Smith. *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988), p. 203.

[15] Benedict Anderson. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of* N*ationalism*, (London: Verso, 1991), p. 72. Throughout the eighteenth century, the number of books printed in Greek increased dramatically, in addition, many books were translated into Greek. The work of translation constituted a planned programme inspired by Iosipos Moisiodax and Dimitrakis Katartzis. See: Catherine Koumarianou. "The Contribution of the Intelligentsia towards the Greek Independence Movement, 1798-1821," in Richard Clogg (ed.). *The Struggle for Greek Independence: Essays to the Mark of the 150th Anniversary of the Greek War of Independence*, pp. 67-86; particularly, 70-71.

[16] Paschalis M. Kitromilides. *Enlightenment, Nationalism, Orthodoxy*, (Great Britain: Variorum, 1994), pp. 6-7. For the details of the influence of the Enlightenment on the Balkans, see: Peter F. Sugar. "The Enlightenment in the Balkans: Some Basic Considerations," *East European Quarterly*, Vol. IX, No. 4, 1975, pp. 499-507.

[17] Nicos P. Mouzelis. *Modern Greece: Facets of Underdevelopment*, p. 141. These merchants played outstanding roles in the publication of improving books, financing the establishment of schools and colleges in their native towns, sponsoring the young Greeks for their education in the West. See: Richard Clogg. "The Greek Mercantile Bourgeoisie: 'Progressive' or 'Reactionary'?" in: Richard Clogg (ed.). *Balkan Society in the Age of Greek Independence*, pp. 85-110. Anthony Smith admitted the role played by the diaspora intelligentsia who "contributed to the resurgence of a Greek sense of common ethnicity, through their university teaching and printing ventures, which led to the revival of a purified Greek language." But,

Philhellenes played a significant part in the construction of the Greek identity.[18] With the impact of the Philhellenism, the Greek intellectuals emphasized the "debarbarizing" of the modern Greeks.[19] As a result of this interaction, Greeks began to conceptualize the Greek identity. As it was pointed out that "…Greek [nationalism] may be considered the first to appear outside Western Christendom, among a community ruled by non-Christians and itself hitherto violently hostile to all Western nations."[20] At this point, it is also important to point out that, as some scholars argued, the Greek Enlightenment did not arise out of conscious and planned actions of political-economic or intellectual elites, but rather it "arose … out of the magma of social and cultural practices in the Balkan and Eastern Mediterranean region of the Ottoman Empire … and as an overall 'project,' it operates at the level of social-imaginary signification."[21]

---

according to him, religious factors were decisive in this process. He wrote: "it was the dream of a restored Byzantine Orthodox empire that most sustained the Greek identity among the poor peasants and shepherds. For it was backed by the dense network of priests in the villages, by the perennial daily ritual of the Church, by its sacred liturgy and texts to which the priests alone had access, and by the long association of the Church hierarchy with political power even under Ottoman rule… The Byzantine identification of religion and politics, its Caesaro-Papist policies and its long wars with Zoroastrian Persians and Muslim Turks, have all coloured and shaped the direction of an emergent Greek nation…" Anthony D. Smith. *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, p. 115.

[18] Philhellenes can be described as "nationally-minded Europeans [who] were excited by the Greek struggle to throw off Ottoman rule in the 1820s." Peter Alter. *Nationalism*, p. 21. For further information on Philhellenes, see: C. M. Woodhouse. *The Philhellenes*, (Rutherford: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1969). For the role played by the European Philhellenic societies (especially the London Greek Committee) see: pp. 74-75, 92. See also: Allan Cunningham. *Anglo-Ottoman Encounters in the Age of Revolution*: *Collected Essays*, Vol. I, (Portland: Frank Cass, 1993), pp. 233-270. David Howarth. *The Greek Adventure: Lord Byron and Other Eccentrics in the War of Independence*, (New York: Atheneum, 1976). For the Phillhellenic enthusiasm in France, Germany and Russia, see: C. W. Crawley. *The Question of Greek Independence: A Study of British Policy in the Near East, 1821-1833*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1930), pp. 15-16. For the British Philhellenes, see: Alexis Dimaras. "The Other British Philhellenes," in: Richard Clogg (ed.). *The Struggle for Greek Independence: Essays to the Mark of the 150th Anniversary of the Greek War of Independence*, pp. 200-223.

[19] Benedict Anderson. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, p. 72.

[20] Peckham quoted this part from Kedourie's book. See: Robert Shannan Peckham. *National Histories, Natural States: Nationalism and the Politics of Place in Greece*, (London: I. B. Tauris, 2001), p. 4; and, Elie Kedourie. *Nationalism in Asia and Africa*, (New York: Meridian Books, 1970), p. 42.

[21] Stathis Gourgouris. *Dream Nation: Enlightenment, Colonization, and the Institution of Modern Greece*, p. 75.

Molly Greene attributed a great significance to the demise of the Venetian power in the eastern Mediterranean in the 1720s. She remarked that after this demise, the Ottoman Empire had no longer struggled against the Venetian threat. Consequently, new cultural choices flourished in the Ottoman Mediterranean and the Orthodox Christians of the Ottoman Empire turned their faces to northern Europe. It is undoubtedly true that the creation of the Greek identity, as Greene put it, resulted from this contact with the Western Europe. The place of Crete in this story has been very important, for Crete's fortunes began to be closely dependent on the developments of Greek nationalism.[22]

In other words, in the context of examining Greek nationalism, we shall attempt to consider the subsequent effect of this upon the social and political conditions of Ottoman Crete as well as the gradual transformation of the Cretan Christians into the Greek world. For that reason, in order to provide the ideological and historical background for the events that took place in Ottoman Crete in the nineteenth century, I intend to give a very general background and briefly discuss the evolution of modern Greek identity in this part of the chapter. In doing so, I wish to examine different and contradictory forms of national identity which were *Ellinismos* (Hellenism) and "*Romiossini.*" While the first ideology represents the classical *Hellas*, the second one idealizes the Byzantine Empire. In order to shed light on how the Greek historians and folklorists contributed to the construction of the Greek identity, this chapter also analyzes the studies made in Greek nationalist historiography and folklore. The issue of identity inculcation and transformation in Ottoman Crete and the mechanisms that were used in the incorporation of the Cretan Christians into the modern Greek identity are also dealt with. The last part of this chapter examines Greek irredentist aspirations which articulated the ideology of the *Megali Idea* (the Great Idea). In the heyday of irredentist aspirations in the Balkans, the Greeks

[22] Molly Greene. *A Shared World: Christians and Muslims in the Early Modern Mediterranean*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 11.

envisioned to enlarge their state to include all the Greek Orthodox population living in the Ottoman lands. As the *Megali Idea* became the dominant ideology throughout the nineteenth century and the Ottoman Crete was one of the main pillars of the "Greek *irredenta*," special emphasis is given to this ideology.

Pre-revolutionary Era: Korais and Rhigas

In the pre-independence period, Rhigas and Korais were the two leading figures in the conceptualization and formation of Greek nationalism. Adamantios Korais (1748-1833) was born in Smyrna and acquired an excellent knowledge of ancient Greek and Latin at an early age. Due to his family's silk business, he was sent to Amsterdam where he continued his education and then returned to his native city in 1788. Four years later, he went to Montpellier to study medicine. After finishing his education, he went to Paris in 1788[23] and began to publish the Greek classics in a series called the Greek Library (*Elliniki Vivliothiki*) and prefaced them with lengthy introductions aiming to give his countrymen an understanding of classical heritage.[24] According to Korais, the Greeks had long been suffering from the cultural and political tyranny since the time of the Byzantine Empire. Sharing the same views with the other intellectuals of the Greek Enlightenment, Korais "transformed the Byzantine state into a medieval version of the Ottoman Empire." In addition to his contempt for the Byzantine state, he did not sympathize with the Ottoman Empire and the *Phanariot*s.[25] The Ottoman Empire, for him, was the most corrupt form of oriental tyranny and the successor of the Byzantine state. Moreover, he placed most of the

[23] Stephen G. Xydis. "Modern Greek Nationalism," in: Peter F. Sugar and Ivo J. Lederer (eds.). *Nationalism in Eastern Europe*, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1971), p. 230.

[24] Gerasimos Augustinous. *Consciousness and History: Nationalist Critics of Greek Society, 1897-1914*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), p. 9.

[25] The *Phanariot*s were Greek merchants, financiers and clergymen who lived in the Fener district of İstanbul. They gradually gained control of the wheat trade in the Black Sea, the Ottoman bureaucracy, and of the church administration. See: L. S. Stavrianos. *The Balkans since 1453*, pp. 270-272.

blame for exploitation of the Greek people on the Byzantine emperors, the Ottoman sultans, and the *Phanariot*s, considering them as a "single corrupt organism," which fed on the Greek people.[26] He suggested a total break with Byzantium, including the monks and the Byzantine aristocracy of the *Phanar*, and the idealization of the ancient ancestors who were the inventors of philosophy.[27]

Korais argued that there was a direct relationship between a nation's language and its moral character. He admired classical Greek and considered it "the language of liberty." He was, however, aware of the fact that the resurrection of the classical Greek was impossible. Accordingly, he aimed to repair the damages that the Greek language had suffered during Greek people's "enslavement."[28] It should be important to remember that the written and spoken forms of the Greek language had differed drastically since 300 B.C. Remaining very close to its ancient classical ancestor, the archaic written form had been used by the educated class. The demotic spoken form had developed along its own way with its easier grammar and syntax,[29] in which Turkish, Slavic, and Albanian words were incorporated throughout the centuries.[30] Until the time of Korais, there were two opposed groups concerning the language: on the one hand, those who were in favor of the written language argued that only the archaic written form would reflect the nation's heritage as it

---

[26] Peter Mackridge. "Byzantium and the Greek Language Question in the Nineteenth Century," in: David Ricks and Paul Magdalino (eds.). *Byzantium and the Modern Greek Identity*, (London: Ashgate, 1998), pp. 49-50.

[27] Cyril Mango. *Byzantium and its Image*, (London: Variorum Reprints, 1984), p. 38. Korais did not sympathize with the clergymen as well. Since, according to him, they opposed any intention which jeopardized their prestige and status. Korais underlined the fact that this opposition was not due to "their zeal for religious matters," but to the fear of losing certain privileges they enjoyed within Church and society. Vasilios N. Makridis. "Science and the Orthodox Church in the 18th and Early 19th Century Greece: Sociological Considerations," *Balkan Studies*, Vol. XXIX, No. 2, 1988, p. 277.

[28] Peter Mackridge. "Byzantium and the Greek Language Question in the Nineteenth Century," p. 51.

[29] David Brewer. *The Flame of Freedom: The Greek War of Independence (1821-1833)*, (London: John Murray, 2001), p. 22.

[30] Thomas W. Gallant. *Modern Greece*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 71.

was very close to ancient Greek. On the other hand, the supporters of the spoken form argued that in order to spread the message, it was necessary to write in the language that people were already using. In addition to these opposing groups, there were advocators of the middle way including Korais. They suggested that spoken language should be adopted, but it should be purified of foreign elements. For them, a language should be based on the structure of the spoken language which retained the features of the ancient Greek, but it should not include foreign elements. What is more striking about Korais' contribution to the language question was the introduction of the pure form of the language, which was called *katheravousa*.[31]

Having being aware of the fact that education provided the basis of the French Revolution, Korais paid special attention to the increase and spread of education among the Greek people asserting that it was the education that provided the basis of the French Revolution and "… gave birth to the love of liberty."[32] He also claimed that the independence of the Greek people would be achieved through education, which would cultivate the republican ethic of spiritedness among the citizens of Greece. For that reason, Korais "urged the Greeks to become educated through Western 'enlightened reason' in order to become worthy of bearing the glorious name of 'Hellene'."[33] In a way, the traditional society of Ottoman Greece would be transformed into a moral republic dedicated to the spirit of Greek classicism and the European Enlightenment.[34] He encouraged the rich merchants to spend their money on the promotion of education by the

---

[31] David Brewer. *The Flame of Freedom: The Greek War of Independence (1821-1833)*, pp. 22-23; Richard Clogg. *Anatolica: Studies in the Greek East in the 18th and 19th Centuries*, (Great Britain: Variorum, 1996), p. 20.

[32] David Brewer. *The Flame of Freedom: The Greek War of Independence (1821-1833)*, p. 23.

[33] Victor Roudometof. "From Rum Millet to Greek Nation: Enlightenment, Secularization, and National Identity in Ottoman Balkan Society, 1453-1821," *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, Vol. XVI, No. 2, 1998, pp. 31-32.

[34] Paschalis M. Kitromilides. *Enlightenment, Nationalism, Orthodoxy*, p. 8.

establishment of schools and libraries throughout Greece and the support of the youth by sending them to Europe,[35] and also emphasized the role of the printed media in the promotion of education. In other words, he believed that the national history was engraved in the minds of the peoples with print-media. His following words are clear indicators of this:

> for the first time the nation surveys the hideous spectacle of its ignorance and trembles in measuring with the eye distance separating it from its ancestors' glory. This painful *discovery*, however, does not precipitate the Greeks into despair: We are the descendants of Greeks, they implicitly told themselves, we must either try to become again worthy of this name, or we must not bear it.[36]

Under the influence of the Western Hellenic ideal, Korais claimed that the ancestors of the modern Greeks were the ancient Greeks. The term *Romioi*, by which the modern Greeks called themselves, represented the national shame, since it included the memory of the Greek's subjection to the Romans. For that reason, he used the "*Hellenes*" for the ancient Greeks and "*Graikoi*" for the modern Greeks.[37] According to Korais, modern Greeks should rediscover their historical origin that "was a reflection of a broader program of political modernization."[38] If the modern Greeks adopted the knowledge of the ancients that was preserved in the West, they could rise and reconstitute themselves in the world. By this program, the continuity between the "ancients" and the "moderns" could be established.[39]

---

[35] David Brewer. *The Flame of Freedom: The Greek War of Independence (1821-1833)*, p. 23.

[36] Quoted in: Benedict Anderson. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, p. 72. According to Benedict Anderson, "print-capitalism" was the principal historical vehicle in the creation of an "imagined community."

[37] Peter Mackridge. "Byzantium and the Greek Language Question in the Nineteenth Century," pp. 49-50.

[38] Victor Roudometof. *Nationalism, Globalization, and Orthodoxy: The Social Origins of Ethnic Conflict in the Balkans*, p. 60.

[39] For further details about Korais see: G. P. Holden. *The Revival of Greek Thought 1620-1830*, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1970), pp. 142-158; and S. G. Chaconas. *Adamantios Korais: A Study of in Greek Nationalism*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1942). In this "archazing process" the people began to name their children ancient names. For instance, the schoolmaster changed the pupils' names from Ioannes and Pavlos to Pericles, Thenistocles, and Xenophon during the ceremony with laurel and olive leaves

Rhigas Velestinlis (1757-1798) was born in the Thessalian village of Velestinon and was educated in his region. Between 1777 and 1780, he lived in İstanbul and engaged in trade, and worked as the secretary of Alexander Hypsilanti. After that, he worked in the service of *hospodar*s for a long time in Wallachia. In 1796, he went to Vienna and got inspired by the French Revolution and the revolutionary atmosphere in France where he developed his revolutionary ideas about the emancipation of the Balkans from the Ottoman rule. He demanded the liberation not only for the Greeks but for all Balkan peoples including Turks believing that only if all oppressed peoples united and fought against the Ottoman Empire, liberation would be inevitable.[40]

In his *Grand Map of Greece of 1797*, Rhigas envisioned the overthrow of the Sultan by the consolidated and coordinated action of all Balkan peoples, and moreover identified *Hellas* with the Ottoman Empire's lands in the Balkans and Anatolia emphasizing the principles of the French Revolution. He favored the French constitution of 1793 as his model. In his federalist model, he underlined the idea of citizenship and individual rights which would provide the coexistence of all Balkan peoples.[41] Rhigas' famous poem "The March" became the slogan of the revolutionaries after 1796. In this poem, he envisioned freedom for all the peoples of the Ottoman Empire who suffered from tyranny. According to him, tyranny should be destroyed through revolution. In other

---

in Athens in 1813. See: William St. Clair. *That Greece Might Still be Free: The Philhellenes in the War of Independence*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 20.

[40] L. S. Stavrianos. *The Balkans since 1453*, p. 274; Varban N. Todorov. *Greek Federalism during the Nineteenth Century (Ideas and Projects)*, (USA: Boulder, 1995), pp. 5-7.

[41] Victor Roudometof. *Nationalism, Globalization, and Orthodoxy: The Social Origins of Ethnic Conflict in the Balkans*, p. 62. Rhigas translated the 1793 Constitution into Greek. For the details of the adaptation of this text to the political, cultural, and social reality of South-Eastern Europe in the eighteenth century, see: María López Villalba. "Balkanizing the French Revolution: Rhigas's *New Political Constitution*," in: Dimitris Tziovas. *Greece and the Balkans: Identities, Perceptions and Cultural Encounters since the Enlightenment*, (England: Ashgate, 2003), pp. 141-154.

words, for Rhigas, all the peoples of the Ottoman Empire should come together and rebel against the Ottoman tyranny.[42]

Ellinismos vs. *Romiossini*: Paradoxes in Greek Nationalism

After the establishment of the Greek Kingdom in 1830, the Greeks looked to the past as a model for creating their self-image, like most peoples of the southeastern Europe. However, the peculiarity of the Greeks was that they had two different ideal types to trace their origins back to. This point inevitably brings one to the question of 'in what ways did the political elites conceptualize "one nation" out of "two histories"?"[43] The supporters of the Hellenic ideology sought to shape the new Greek state in the Hellenic ideal by negating and excluding the Byzantine and Ottoman past from the Greek history. *Tourkokratia* was seen as a cause of the backwardness of Greece and a period of slavery. Although it was an immediate past and alive in the everyday culture, Greek nationalist historiography negated the *Tourkokratia*.[44] The Hellenic model was "the dominant official version of national identity"[45] in the first century of the statehood, as Herzfeld aptly put it, because "the Greeks were obliged to build their nation-state under the watchful eye of more powerful countries…"[46] Herzfeld criticizes this model for being an "outward directed model"

---

[42] For the details see: Herkül Milas. *Yunan Ulusunun Doğuşu*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1999), pp. 87-112. For "The March" see: pp. 98-101. See also: Herkül Milas. "Osmanlı'da İlk Anayasayı Hazırlayan Aydın ve Eylem Adamı: Velestinli Rigas," *Toplumsal Tarih*, No. 151, July 2006, pp. 16-27.

[43] Michael Herzfeld. *Ours Once More: Folklore, Ideology, and the Making of Modern Greece*, p. 18.

[44] Antonis Liakos. "The Construction of National Time: The Making of the Modern Greek Historical Imagination," *Mediterranean Historical Review*, Vol. XVI, No. 1, June 2001, p. 37.

[45] Michael Herzfeld. *Anthropology through the Looking-glass: Critical Ethnography in the Margins of Europe*, p. 102. Roudometof remarked that "the 'Romeic' identity expressed the local Orthodox and conservative part of the new nation; while the 'Hellenic' expressed the cosmopolitan, modernist and 'Western' part of the nation." Victor Roudometof. "Invented Traditions, Symbolic Boundaries, and National Identity in Southeastern Europe: Greece and Serbia in Comparative Historical Perspective (1830-1880)," *East European Quarterly*, Vol. XXXII, No. 4, Winter 1998, pp. 429-468,

[46] Michael Herzfeld. *Ours Once More: Folklore, Ideology, and the Making of Modern Greece*, p. 23.

dictated by the Europeans. For him, the establishment of a monarchical system, the installation of King Otto, and the main political parties known as the English, French and Russian were all indicators of the European Powers' domination over Greece.[47]

By the nineteenth century, the Greek politicians and intellectuals looked to Western Europe to define Greekness. Accordingly, official nationalism gave priority to the European standard of cultural excellence. It became obvious that in addition to its dominant role in the political sphere of the Greek Kingdom, Europe had also hegemony over the Greek culture. Herzfeld brilliantly questioned the role assigned to Europe as the key actor in the construction of the Greek identity, remarking that since Europe considered ancient Greece as its spiritual ancestor, it dominated the Greek culture deciding on their behalf what was acceptable or not. For the Europeans, Turks symbolized "a monolithic image of oriental barbarism," because "Turks polluted the Hellenic perfection" by bringing elements of shiftiness, double-dealing, and illiteracy to the Greek culture.[48] For that reason, Greece was regarded both as holy and polluted in terms of Eurocentric ideology. As it was the mythic ancestor of all the European culture, it was "holy." On the other hand, as it was polluted during the Ottoman domination, it was "unclean."[49] The contrast between "holy" and "unclean" brought about many further tensions which would pose a real threat to the construction of a stable national identity.

Herzfeld underlined that the Europeans had succeeded in "persuading the Greeks to adopt the Turks as their natural enemies, and to treat Turkish elements in Greek culture as

---

[47] *ibid.,* pp. 18, 20.

[48] Michael Herzfeld. *Anthropology through the Looking-glass: Critical Ethnography in the Margins of Europe*, pp. 28-29.

[49] *ibid.,* pp. 7, 41. Maria Todorova noted that the interest of the Philhellenes was also the product of classicism but she attracted the attentions to the important point by quoting Woodhouse's statements: "They loved Greece of their dreams: the land, the language, the antiquities, but not the people. If only, they thought, the people could be more like the British scholars and gentlemen; or failing that as too much to be hoped, if only they were more like their ancestors; or better still, if only they were not there at all." Maria Todorova. *Imagining the Balkans*, (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 94.

its worth failed as a source of cultural pollution."[50] In this context, the clear manifestation of the European point of view can be observed in the works of the nationalist Greek folklore studies in which oriental elements were interpreted as "evidence of corruption." It became evident that while Europe represented the image of high culture in Greek national historiography, Turks symbolized both illiteracy and fatalism as a consequence of European dictation.[51] Herzfeld furthermore argued that the new Greek state reconstituted itself "… out of an allegedly corrupt, barbaric, and profoundly Oriental morass in which the very rudiments of culture were lacking. The Greeks found themselves cast as citizens of a nation-state that was supposed to represent the 'regeneration' of a Hellas…" created by the German classical philologists.[52]

According to Herzfeld, the idea of returning to the classical past was also a product of the European dictation. For the Greeks, the story was very different from that of the European view. At this point Herzfeld's statements are worth quoting *in extenso*:

> …Unlike their European patrons, the Greeks were not seeking a return to the Classical *past*; they were instead seeking inclusion in the European *present*. The cultural policies of the Greek state appeared to outsiders to represent a sweeping concession to western European sensibilities: the Greeks had meekly submitted to the demand that they act out the role of living ancestors to the European cultural tradition.[53]

---

[50] *ibid.,* p. 29.

[51] *ibid.,* pp. 29, 40.

[52] Michael Herzfeld. "Towards an Ethnographic Phenomenology of the Greek Spirit," in: Jacques Revel and Giovanni Levi (eds.). *Political Uses of the Past: The Recent Mediterranean Experience*, (London: Frank Cass, 2002), pp. 13-26, especially, 14.

[53] Michael Herzfeld. *Anthropology through the Looking-glass: Critical Ethnography in the Margins of Europe*, p. 50. Here, Herzfeld pointed out that the Philhellenes made the Greeks to play the passive role of living ancestors of the ancient Greeks. But at the same time, they criticized the Greeks for not being able to participate in modern Europe. See: p. 109. Moreover, it should be noted that the Greek élites were aware of the fact that without the spread of full Hellenization they could not get foreign support and, as a result of this their own power would be at risk. At this point Herzfeld drew a parallelization between the Greek élites and Indian *brahmi*s arguing that the latter was "resisting the Sanskritization process as a threat to the uniqueness of their prestige, [they] could hardly attack the principles on which it was based except by claiming an essentialist definition of their caste, based wholly on descent." Michael Herzfeld. "Hellenism and Occidentalism: The Permutations of Performance in Greek Bourgeois Identity," in: James G. Carrier (ed.). *Occidentalism: Images of the West*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), p. 219. (emphasis in original).

Herzfeld's statements have been based on certain peculiarities manifested by the Greek elites who might have adopted the neo-classical codes in the Greek cultural environment, but at the same time they might have used these codes in their struggles to obtain the definition of Greek culture from the hands of Europeans,[54] for controlling the construction of national identity. In other words, the Greek elites attempted to seriously challenge the European hegemony over the Greek culture.

This paradox, for Chatterjee, stemmed from the very nature of the 'Eastern' type of nationalism in which "peoples drawn into a civilization hitherto alien to them, and whose ancestral cultures are not adapted to success and excellence by these cosmopolitan and increasingly dominant standards."[55] In the 'Eastern' nationalism, those peoples measured the backwardness of their nations according to certain global standards which were set by Western Europe. Yet, they were aware that these standards belonged to an alien culture and that the inherited culture of their own nation did not provide the necessary appropriate level for progress. For that reason, 'Eastern' nationalism made repeated attempts to "re-equip" and transform the nation culturally.[56]

On the other hand, Liakos argued that it would be an "oversimplification to consider Greek identity as simply a product of post-enlightenment colonialism,"[57] and that the tradition of written texts, Greek, Latin and Hebrew played an outstanding role in the construction of pre-national history. Furthermore, myths of national origins were connected to this written tradition even before the emergence of nation-states. This

---

[54] Michael Herzfeld. *Anthropology through the Looking-glass: Critical Ethnography in the Margins of Europe*, p. 51.

[55] Partha Chatterjee. *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse*, (London: Zed Books, 1993), p. 2.

[56] *ibid*., p. 2.

[57] Antonis Liakos. "The Construction of National Time: The Making of the Modern Greek Historical Imagination," *Mediterranean Historical Review*, Vol. XVI, No. 1, June 2001, p. 30.

tradition was appropriated by the Greeks and then was transformed into a national tradition. For that reason, it can be argued that Hellenism was an intellectual product of the Renaissance.[58]

The tension between the Hellenic and *Romeic* models can be reflected in the distinction between *katharevousa* (purist) and *demotiki* (vernacular) Greek. That is to say, while the linguistic realm of the Hellenic model was *katharevousa*, the linguistic realm of the *Romeic* model was *demotiki*.[59] They have different vocabularies and grammatical rules. *Katharevousa* attempted to artificially recreate past linguistic forms aiming to replace the "vulgar" language with one which would be closer to the "glorious ancient ancestors."[60] In Greek historiography, *katharevousa* was also considered a means of entering into the international arena.[61] Toynbee asserted that classical Greek can be considered a "medium for Modern Greek variety of Western culture," since it would make a connection with the glorious past and impress the West.[62] Here, Herzfeld brilliantly underlined this relationship noting that "the invention and cultivation of *katharevousa* were consistent both with early philhellenic idealism and consequently with the 'outer directedness' of Greek statecraft."[63]

---

[58] *ibid.,* p. 30.

[59] Michael Herzfeld. *Ours Once More: Folklore, Ideology, and the Making of Modern Greece*, p. 20.

[60] Nicos P. Mouzelis. *Modern Greece: Facets of Underdevelopment*, p. 136. It was pointed out that after the establishment of the Greek Kingdom the difference between the *katharevousa* and *demotiki* became a difference of class and divided the Greek population into two. See: Hugh Seton-Watson. *Nations and States*, (Colorado: Westview Press, 1977), p. 114.

[61] Michael Herzfeld. *Anthropology through the Looking-glass: Critical Ethnography in the Margins of Europe*, p. 52.

[62] Arnold J. Toynbee. *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey: A Study in the Contact of Civilisations*, (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1922), p. 21. It was remarked that around the year 1850, the role of the *katheravousa* changed and its use began to symbolize conservatism. Raphael Demos. "The Neo-Hellenic Enlightenment (1750-1821)," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, No. 19, 1958, p. 532. It should be important to keep in mind that the emphasis on language was not a phenomenon unique to Greece. At that time, nationalist movements in Europe, especially in the less developed parts, were associated with the revival of national languages. See: M. S. Anderson. *The Ascendancy of Europe 1815-1914*, (London and New York: Longman, 1985), pp. 214-215.

[63] Michael Herzfeld. *Ours Once More: Folklore, Ideology, and the Making of Modern Greece*, p. 20.

In the course of early statehood, the Eurocentric Greek intelligentsia considered *demotiki* as the representative of cultural incompleteness. It was thought that in the long run the success in the promotion of *katharevousa* would result in the liberation of Greeks both from the corruptions of the *Tourkokratia*, and from their dependent status on the Great Powers of Europe.[64] In other words, for the Greek scholars "*katharevousa* and the several other neo-Classical codes … did not represent a passive acceptance of foreign neo-Classicism; on the contrary, it was an attempt to take internal and external control in a game where the definition of Greek culture was still largely in foreign hands."[65] It seems clear that the language question (*to ghlossiko zitima*) was also a core issue in the development of modern Greek identity.[66]

Given the endless discussions in the cultural and linguistic realms, it seems obvious that the tension between these two mutually opposed forces (*Ellinismos* vs. *Romii*, *katharevousa* vs. *demotiki*) was the essence of Greek identity. However, one has to be aware that these opposed forces had existed in various domains of the Greek society.[67] Kazantzakis referred to this dualism as "they [Greeks] are truly double-born souls."[68] It seems highly likely that this dualism shaped the whole Greek life and it was the key to understanding the nature of the Greeks throughout the nineteenth century.[69] Herzfeld overstressed this tension as "Greek identity is caught between two extreme poles, each

---

[64] Michael Herzfeld. *Anthropology through the Looking-glass: Critical Ethnography in the Margins of Europe*, p. 52. Herzfeld also remarked that among the new European nations only Greece did not use its vernacular in its "*Risorgimento.*" p. 21

[65] *ibid*., p. 53.

[66] *ibid*., p. 101.

[67] Vasilios N. Makrides. "Secularization and the Greek Orthodox Church in the Reign of King George I," in: Philip Carabott (ed.). *Greek Society in the Making, 1863-1913: Realities, Symbols and Visions*, (Great Britain: Variorum, 1997), p. 192.

[68] Cited in: David Holden. *Greece without Columns: The Making of Modern Greeks*, (London: Faber & Faber, 1972), p. 28.

[69] *ibid*., pp. 27-28.

derived from the image of a conquering other. At one end stand law-abiding Europeans… On the other are the no less stereotypical orientals…"[70] He furthermore noted that the tension between these opposing images were not only confined to the cultural and linguistic realms, but could also be observed in the architectural one. There was a tension between neo-classical façade and simple, village style interior in the nineteenth century urban houses.[71] At this point, it is safe to note that

> the modern Greeks … were … corrupt deviants from that pristine state of cultural grace. In their endlessly attributed imperfections, they are still atoning politically for a fall defined as such by the hard hand of occidental power. The uncertainties and ambiguities of Greek identity decorate the reverse face of a coin that bears on its obverse the imperial heads of folklore and anthropology.[72]

During the post-independence period, the Greek state had to formulate and develop a national identity for its nation. In this framework, religious differentiation of the Greeks from the Muslims could no longer cultivate the Greekness of the Greeks adequately.[73] However, as Greek peasants designated themselves as Christians and speakers of Greek, the new nation state had to transform this religious identity into a secular national identity. This can be achieved by two means: first, the Greek nation state should undermine the ecumenical aspect of Orthodoxy and diminish the influence of the Patriarch over the Greeks by the establishment of the national church. The creation of the Greek national church would also increase the influence of the Greek nation state on the Greek Orthodox inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire. Second, an "emotional association" should be

---

[70] Michael Herzfeld. *Anthropology through the Looking-glass: Critical Ethnography in the Margins of Europe*, pp. 111-112.

[71] *ibid*., p. 112.

[72] *ibid*., p. 48.

[73] John S. Koliopoulos. *Brigands without a Cause: Brigandage and Irredentism in Modern Greece 1821-1912*, p. 8; and, John S. Koliopoulos, Thanos M. Veremis. *Greece: The Modern Sequel from 1831 to the Present*, (London: Hurst & Company, 1988), p. 231.

established through various instruments including folklore, history and literature. In a way, the Greeks began to associate themselves with the new Hellenic national identity.[74]

The independence of the Church of Greece from the Patriarch of İstanbul was proclaimed in 1833, which was not recognized by the Patriarchate until 1850.[75] At that time, the Patriarchate had not recognized the Greek national church, since the Patriarchate ideologically had not given its consent to the nationalization of churches[76] that led to the confrontation between the Patriarchate and the Greek national church.[77] The conflict arose from the fact that "Greece decided unilaterally to advocate the cause of Hellenism, not on the basis of religion as practiced in everyday life, but in the light of her own political-historical interpretation of what she considered to be Orthodox Christianity."[78] In other words, by the establishment of the independent Church, as Veremis remarked, the Greek state began to control and associate itself with the nation, or put it in another way,

> … the state incorporated the Church and its martyrs into the pantheon of Greek heroes and made them integral parts of the national myth. Thus the Church became an accomplice of the state in its mission to spread the cohesive nationalist creed and in turn undermined the initial impetus of the enlightened statebuilders.[79]

---

[74] Thomas W. Gallant. *Modern Greece*, p. 69; Victor Roudometof. *Nationalism, Globalization, and Orthodoxy: The Social Origins of Ethnic Conflict in the Balkans*, pp. 124 and 103.

[75] Arnakis interpreted the establishment of the Greek national church as "the most serious challenge to the universalism of the Orthodox Church…" For further information see: G. G. Arnakis. "The Role of Religion in the Development of Balkan Nationalism," in: Charles and Barbara Jelavich. (eds.). *The Balkans in Transition*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963), pp. 133-134.

[76] Anastasia N. Karakasidou. *Fields of Wheat, Hills of Blood: Passages to Nationhood in Greek Macedonia, 1870-1990*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), p. 85.

[77] Paschalis M. Kitromilides. *Enlightenment, Nationalism, Orthodoxy*, p. 166.

[78] Kemal Karpat. *An Inquiry into the Social Foundations of Nationalism in the Ottoman State: From Social Estates to Classes, From Millets to Nations*, p. 78.

[79] Thanos Veremis. "From the National State to the Stateless Nation 1821-1910," in: Martin Blinkhorn and Thanos Veremis (eds.). *Modern Greece: Nationalism and Nationality*, (Athens: Eliamep, 1990), p. 10. Sherrard pointed out that by the establishment of the Church of Greece, the church became "a department of the State and its officers to little more than office boys in the governmental bureaucracy." According to him, apart from the contingent and local reasons, the clash between the Patriarchate and the national church can be explained by the two conflicting perspectives, the traditional Byzantine perspective represented by the Patriarchate and the Protestant perspective represented by the national church. He stated that "… at the end of the eighteenth century and during the first half of the nineteenth century two conceptions of Church-State relationships came face to face. The first, represented by the Patriarchate, was inherited from Byzantium. According to this conception, the Church is a kind of *imperium in imperio* or *imperium iuxta imperium*…

In this regard, it is noteworthy to mention Carras' assertion that the national church "was subordinated to state power and Antiquity provided the legitimation of the new state, but Orthodoxy became the established religion and a fundamental constituent of the new national identity."[80]

The Greek state and the Patriarchate of İstanbul became the two opposing camps and they conflicted with each other so as to who would exercise power over the *Rum*s of the Ottoman Empire and they tried to legitimize themselves in the eyes of this population by the use of different means. As Anagnostopulou remarked, whereas the Greek state tried to legitimize itself by a Greek national legitimacy, the Patriarchate used a Greek or Orthodox ecumenical one. She also pointed out that *Tanzîmât* reforms, the gradual secularization of the *millet* and certain alterations in the social, economic and political functions of the Orthodox population of the Ottoman Empire had considerable effects on the Patriarchate. In this framework, these reforms and changes had redefined the power of the Patriarchate over the Orthodox community since the Ottoman Orthodox *millet* started to define itself in an ethno-religious framework and highlight its ethno-religious character. Thus, the Patriarchate as the head of the Orthodox *millet* had to redefine its position and add new functions to its power.[81] In other words, the above-mentioned reforms,

---

The second conception was that of the Greek reformers. It derived from Western Europe and was originally the product of a reaction against the hierocratic system of the medieval papacy which grew out of a non-Orthodox background and had no parallel in the traditional Church-State relationships in Byzantium or for that matter anywhere in Byzantium… According to this conception, the Church is definitely subordinate to the State…" Philip Sherrard. "Church, State and Greek War of Independence," in: Richard Clogg (ed.). *The Struggle for Greek Independence: Essays to the Mark of the 150th Anniversary of the Greek War of Independence*, pp. 182-199; particularly, 197-198.

[80] Costa Carras. "Greek Identity: A Long View," in: Maria Todorova (ed.). *Balkan Identities: Nation and Memory*, (London: Hurst & Company, 2004), pp. 294-326; especially, p. 320.

[81] Sia Anagnostopoulou. "The Terms *Millet*, *Génos*, *Ethnos*, *Oikoumenikótita*, *Alytrotismos* in Greek Historiography," in her: *The Passage from the Ottoman Empire to the Nation-States,* (İstanbul: Isis Press, 2004), pp. 37-55; especially 39-41. According to Augustinos, with the establishment of the Greek national church, the weakening authority of the Patriarchate over the Orthodox Christian population was increased. After the establishment of the Bulgarian Exarchate, this became more apparent that forced the Ottoman state to reform the Patriarchate of İstanbul. See: Gerasimos Augustinos. *The Greeks of Asia Minor: Confession, Community, and Ethnicity in the Nineteenth Century*, (Kent: Kent State University Press, 1992), p. 114.

secularization, and the emergence of the Bulgarian Exarchate in 1870 delegitimized the Patriarchate's ecumenicity, and for that reason, it redefined and legitimized its power with national terms: the Greek nation.[82] For instance, in Macedonia, together with Greek literary associations and other nationally-oriented organizations, the Patriarchate built churches and schools to create the feeling of common membership in the nation of the *Hellenes*. This meant that the Church became one of the main actors, if not the main, in the preservation of the Greek national identity.[83]

National Historiography

In 1830, Greeks were shocked by the theory of Jakob Philipp Fallmerayer. In this year, his two-volume work *Geschichte der Halbinsen Morea während des Mittelalters* ("The History of the Peloponnesus in the Middle Ages") was published. In this book, he formulated his theory that the present population of Greece was not descendants of the ancient *Hellenes*. He tried to demonstrate his thesis by using a combination of original sources and linguistics, and providing evidence of Slavic toponyms in southern Greece.[84] There was a break between ancient and modern Greeks, since the Greek people disappeared during the Byzantine era due to Slav and Albanian invasions. Accordingly, Fallmerayer made the following assertions:

> not a drop of pure Hellenic blood flows in the veins of the Christian inhabitants of Modern Greece … Scythian Slavs, Illyrian Arnaouts, children of northern lands, blood relations of Serbs and Bulgars, Dalmatians and Muscovites, are the people

[82] Especially during the second term of Joachim III's office (1901-1912), the Orthodox *génos* (Christian Orthodox race) was Hellenized and the role of the Patriarch was nationalized. For the details of the definition of the Greek *ethnos* (nation) and *génos* by the Patriarchate and the Greek state, see: Sia Anagnostopoulou. "The Terms *Millet*, *Génos*, *Ethnos*, *Oikoumenikótita*, *Alytrotismos* in Greek Historiography," pp. 40-48.

[83] Anastasia N. Karakasidou. *Fields of Wheat, Hills of Blood: Passages to Nationhood in Greek Macedonia, 1870-1990*, p. 86.

[84] Victor Roudometof. "Invented Traditions, Symbolic Boundaries, and National Identity in Southeastern Europe: Greece and Serbia in Comparative Historical Perspective (1830-1880)," *East European Quarterly*, Vol. XXXII, No. 4, 1998, p. 6.

> whom we call Greeks at present and whose genealogy, to their own surprise, we have traced back to Pericles and Philopoeman.[85]

Fallmerayer's theory was strongly reacted in Greece, and Greek scholars devoted themselves to refute his theory and to establish a historical continuity throughout Greek history. Moreover, it was understood from his theory that there was an immense time gap between the ancient and modern Greece. Henceforth, it was decided that this gap should be filled by incorporating pieces of Greek history into the puzzle in order to establish continuity.[86] By the middle of the nineteenth century, German romantic ideas spread throughout Europe.[87] The gradual rise of romanticism had a significant impact on Greek scholarship and provided a new system of values. In the post-1850 period, Greek romantic historiography and folklore studies paid special attention to the continuity between ancient and modern Greeks and the historical territory of the Greek nation which was identical with the space occupied by the Byzantine Empire.[88]

Spyridon Zambelios (1813?-1881) was one of the most important Greek nationalist historians who studied the history of the Greek nation. In order to establish a historical continuity, he tried to insulate the Byzantine phase into the narrative of modern Greek history. Accordingly, he considered the Byzantine phase as the connecting link between the classical and modern cultures. In other words, for him, if the Byzantine phase was disregarded, it would be impossible to establish the continuity between the classical and

---

[85] G. G. Arnakis. "Byzantium and Greece," *Balkan Studies*, No. 4, 1963, pp. 289-300. In the contemporary Greek historiography, it was argued that Fallmerayer's theory was the outcome of the international balance of power in Europe. Fallmerayer considered the Ottoman Empire as the counter-balance against the Russian expansionist policy in the Western Europe. For further information see: Michael Herzfeld. *Ours Once More: Folklore, Ideology, and the Making of Modern Greece*, pp. 77-78; and, Stathis Gourgouris. *Dream Nation: Enlightenment, Colonization, and the Institution of Modern Greece*, p. 142.

[86] Antonis Liakos. "The Construction of National Time: The Making of the Modern Greek Historical Imagination," *Mediterranean Historical Review*, p. 32.

[87] Michael Herzfeld. *Ours Once More: Folklore, Ideology, and the Making of Modern Greece*, p. 53.

[88] Victor Roudometof. *Nationalism, Globalization, and Orthodoxy: The Social Origins of Ethnic Conflict in the Balkans*, p. 107.

modern times. For this purpose, Zambelios divided the Greek history into three parts: the modern, the medieval, and the ancient. Although the medieval phase was a time of ethnic regression, the "Hellenic consciousness" was preserved. The tension between the imperial throne of Byzantium and the Orthodox Patriarchate was a conflict between the Roman authoritarianism and the democratic spirit of Classical Greece which was perpetuated in the church.[89] The Byzantium was Hellenic in speech and learning, Christian in doctrine, and Roman in the imperial system of government.[90] Zambelios also paid special attention to the linguistic continuity of the Greek language. According to him, the folksongs provided important evidence which contributed to the historical continuity. For that reason, one should look to the folksongs in order to realize the continuity in the national character.[91] The folksongs of *armatoloi* and klephts provided evidence for historical continuity during the Ottoman domination.[92]

Konstantinos Paparrigopoulos (1815-1891) was regarded as the historian *par excellence* in Greek nationalist historiography for integrating Byzantium into the Greek history and identity. He was born in İstanbul, where his father had been a banker and a representative of Morea. During the Greek Revolution, his father was killed, so he went to Odessa with his mother where he attended the Richelieu Lyceum. He then went to Greece in 1830 and was educated in a school in Aegina. After studying at universities in Germany and France, he returned to Greece and worked at the Ministry of Justice until 1845. As an outsider Greek, he was dismissed from his post and he began to teach in a high school in

---

[89] Michael Herzfeld. *Ours Once More: Folklore, Ideology, and the Making of Modern Greece*, pp. 39-40.

[90] George Huxley. "Aspects of Modern Greek Historiography of Byzantium," in: David Ricks and Paul Magdalino (eds.). *Byzantium and the Modern Greek Identity*, (London: Ashgate, 1998), p. 18.

[91] Michael Herzfeld. *Ours Once More: Folklore, Ideology, and the Making of Modern Greece*, p. 44.

[92] George Huxley. "Aspects of Modern Greek Historiography of Byzantium," p. 17. The folklorists separated the klephts and their tradition from ordinary banditry. The klephts were regarded as national heroes and their songs became part of national treasury. See: Victor Roudometof. *Nationalism, Globalization, and Orthodoxy: The Social Origins of Ethnic Conflict in the Balkans*, p. 108.

Athens. In 1852, he was appointed as professor of History at the University of Athens.[93] In the early years of his career, he devoted himself to respond Fallmerayer's assertions. Paparrigopoulos pointed out the fact that "Hellenic continuity was linguistic and cultural, not racial."[94] Accordingly, in 1843, he wrote an essay *On Slavic Settlements in the Peloponnese* in which he acknowledged the influx of the Slavs into the Pelopponnesos in the early Middle Ages, but made it clear that the Slavs did not come as conquerors, and therefore they were assimilated by the native Greeks.[95]

His main contribution to Greek nationalist historiography was his splendid five-volume book, *History of the Greek Nation*, which was published between 1860 and 1874.[96] According to Kitromilides, this work can be regarded "… as the most important intellectual achievement of nineteenth century Greece…" in which Paparrigopoulos "managed to bring Byzantium and Kolettis' conception of the *Megali Idea* together as components of the political culture of Romantic Hellenism."[97] What is more striking about Paparrigopoulos' work was the appreciation and integration of the Byzantine era into the continuum of Greek history,[98] by putting special emphasis on the particular importance of

---

[93] Stephen G. Xydis. "Modern Greek Nationalism," p. 238.

[94] Costa Carras. "Greek Identity: A Long View," p. 318.

[95] Stephen G. Xydis. "Modern Greek Nationalism," p. 238; Gerasimos Augustinous. *Consciousness and History: Nationalist Critics of Greek Society, 1897-1914*, p. 15.

[96] Robert Shannan Peckham. *National Histories, Natural States: Nationalism and the Politics of Place in Greece*, p. 46. Roudometof pointed out that the gradual publication of this book was partially financed by state agencies and national societies. See: Victor Roudometof. "Invented Traditions, Symbolic Boundaries, and National Identity in Southeastern Europe: Greece and Serbia in Comparative Historical Perspective (1830-1880)," *East European Quarterly*, p. 9.

[97] Paschalis M. Kitromilides. "On the Intellectual Content of Greek Nationalism: Paparrigopoulos, Byzantium and the Great Idea," in: David Ricks and Paul Magdalino (ed.). *Byzantium and the Modern Greek Identity*, (London: Ashgate, 1998), p. 28.

[98] *ibid.,* p. 31. Here, Paparrigopoulos tried to establish a direct continuity between ancient and modern Greece through the Byzantines. It is important to note that "historic continuity" is a clear example of "invented tradition" in the Greek context. Hobsbawm pointed out that "... historic continuity had to be invented, for example by creating an ancient past beyond effective historical continuity, either by semi-fiction … or by forgery…" See: Eric J. Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds.). *The Invention of Tradition*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 7.

Byzantine history for the Greek nation (*to ellinikon ethnos*).[99] In this work, Paparrigopoulos narrated social, economic and cultural issues of the Byzantine Empire, focusing on the political and military events that took place at that time. For Kitromilides, these narratives provided an epic atmosphere which influenced the reader as a story of greatness, high drama and tragedy. Narrating the chronicle of the Byzantine Empire he devoted special attention to the ethnological issues in order to "… depict the survival and continuous existence of that historical actor, the Greek nation…"[100]

Interestingly, while Paparrigopoulos narrated Byzantium, he did not use the third person, rather he used "we" and "us" in describing the Greeks of the past.[101] This means that he did not consider Byzantium as something "foreign" or remote in terms of chronological and cultural time. Accordingly, he used terms such as "Medieval Hellenism," "our Medieval empire," "our Medieval forefathers."[102] By doing this, as Kitromilides noted, Paparrigopoulos incorporated "… the Byzantine past into the frame of reference of his or her identity."[103] In a way, the gap between the ancient world and the modern era was filled by interpreting medieval Byzantium as a manifestation of Hellenism during the Middle Ages.[104] It should be important to note that Paparrigopoulos opposed the European tendency which considered the Greek past as different and discontinuous

---

[99] Stephen G. Xydis. "Modern Greek Nationalism," p. 239.

[100] Paschalis M. Kitromilides. "On the Intellectual Content of Greek Nationalism: Paparrigopoulos, Byzantium and the Great Idea," p. 29.

[101] *ibid.,* p. 29; Antonis Liakos. "The Construction of National Time: The Making of the Modern Greek Historical Imagination," *Mediterranean Historical Review*, p. 33.

[102] Paschalis M. Kitromilides. "On the Intellectual Content of Greek Nationalism: Paparrigopoulos, Byzantium and the Great Idea," p. 29.

[103] *ibid*., p. 29.

[104] Victor Roudometof. "Nationalism and Identity Politics in the Balkans: Greece and the Macedonian Question," *Journal o f Modern Greek Studies*, p. 291.

worlds.[105] Moreover, he rejected the negative claims of Western historians who regarded Byzantium as a degenerate phase of Greek history, stating that "… although foreigners have begun to do justice to certain aspects of Byzantine monarchy, Greeks still sneer at this noble and proud mother of the modern Greek nation; … they owe their existence, their language and their religion to her…"[106]

He admitted that Hellenism underwent certain amount of adulteration in the Middle Ages, but all these stemmed from the Oriental influence and the influx of barbarians.[107] At this point, the paradoxes of Greek nationalist historiography were clearly seen. It was obvious that, on the one hand, Paparrigopulos attempted to obtain control over the construction of national continuity by refuting the negative views of the Western intellectuals concerning the integration of the Byzantine era into a narrative of continuity. On the other hand, he did not refrain from using the oriental image of the West, while he explained the reasons for the "corruptions" in the Middle Ages.[108]

Paparrigopoulos' work not only affected Greek nationalist historiography, but also the historiographies of other Balkan nationalities. The recovery of their medieval past became the main goal in the research of the Balkan historians, especially in those of Nicolae Iorga and Vasil Zlatarski who tried to integrate the medieval past into their linear

---

[105] Gerasimos Augustinos. "Culture and Authenticity in a Small State: Historiography and National Development in Greece," *East European Quarterly*, Vol. XXIII, No. 1, March 1989, p.18.

[106] C. Hatzidimitriou. "From Paparrigopoulos to Vacalopoulos: Modern Greek Historiography on the Ottoman Period," in: A. Lilly Macrakis and P. Nikiforos Diamandouros. *New Trends in Modern Greek Historiography*, (United States of America: Modern Greek Studies Association, 1982), p. 13.

[107] Cyril Mango. *Byzantium and its Image*, p. 41. According to Gourgouris, Paparrigopulos' ability to integrate the Byzantine history into the body of Hellenic history stemmed from Philhellenism's demands. Since Greek modernity, in addition to its link to the West's cultural origins, had to demonstrate its link to the Middle Ages, which considered as "the necessary historical key to modernity and to the formation of Europe's nationalities." See: Stathis Gourgouris. *Dream Nation: Enlightenment, Colonization, and the Institution of Modern Greece*, pp. 259-260.

[108] Paschalis M. Kitromilides. "On the Intellectual Content of Greek Nationalism: Paparrigopoulos, Byzantium and the Great Idea," p. 30.

national histories.[109] Hence, the Balkan historians developed irredentist ideologies which put the Balkan states into conflict with each other. With regard to the impact of the Greek nationalist historiography on other Balkan nationalist historiography, Kedourie pointed out that "… their neighbors found in the nationalism of the Greeks an inspiration and seemed to have attained its goal, successfully mediated and powerfully reinforced the original European message…"[110]

It seems that Greek nationalist scholars gave priority to the studies of history, language and folklore. They not only aim to answer Fallmerayer's theory, but also to prepare a theoretical basis for the new state in the cultivation of the national identity. As the tie between the ancient and modern Greeks blurred, new models were created as a way of establishing continuity. The figures and the events of the Greek history were evaluated according to their contribution to this continuity. On the other hand, Greek nationalist historiography evaluated the classical heritage and incorporated the Byzantine past (excluding the Ottoman past) into the general scheme for constructing a lineage between ancient and modern Greeks.

National Folklore

The folklore studies have accelerated aiming to respond to Fallmerayer's theory and to demonstrate the continuity and unity of Greek culture. Most of them aimed to prove that "the German" was wrong. One of the prominent figures was Michael Lelekos who tried to show the cultural continuity between the classical and modern Greeks by putting special emphasis on the songs.[111] However, the most systematic work was Emmanuel

[109] *ibid*., p. 30.

[110] Elie Kedourie. *Nationalism in Asia and Africa*, p. 48.

[111] Michael Herzfeld. *Ours Once More: Folklore, Ideology, and the Making of Modern Greece*, pp. 79, 83.

Vivilakis' book. In this work, modern customs and practices were described in detail by discussing their ancient parallels.[112]

Nikolaos Politis (1872-1942) was considered to be a landmark in Greek nationalist folklore studies. He was born in Kalamata and studied at the University of Athens and Munich. In 1871, Pandora announced the second philological prize competition, which was sponsored by the wealthy Odessa philanthropist Rodokanakis, to be offered to a collection of Greek manners, customs, and practices from various places and their comparison with what was recorded in the surviving authors.[113] Politis responded to this competition and produced *Study of the Life of the Modern Greeks: Modern Greek Mythology* in which cosmological tales and related materials were brought together with detailed notes on possible contemporary non-Greek as well as Classical Greek parallels.[114]

As for the other nationalist folklorists, the driving force behind Politis' effort was to refute Fallmerayer's theory. The aim of his *Modern Greek Mythology*, as he noted, was to search the kinship between Greek manners, customs and those of the ancient *Hellenes* which would demonstrate the continuity with their ancestors.[115] In other words, it can be safely argued that Politis made a great deal of effort for "demonstrating the continuity and unity of Greek culture back to antiquity by illustrating the essential Greekness of the territory from which the costumes had been collected."[116] His main contribution to the folklore studies was that as its fore-father, he coined the word *laografia* for the first time. In other words, he gave *laografia* its name and implied that the English word "folklore"

---

[112] *ibid*., p. 88.

[113] Robert Shannan Peckham. *National Histories, Natural States: Nationalism and the Politics of Place in Greece*, p. 69.

[114] Michael Herzfeld. *Ours Once More: Folklore, Ideology, and the Making of Modern Greece*, p. 99.

[115] *ibid*., p. 101.

[116] Robert Shannan Peckham. "Internal Colonialism: Nation and Religion in Nineteenth-Century Greece," in: Maria Todorova (ed.). *Balkan Identities: Nation and Memory*, pp. 41-59; especially, 52.

was the equivalent to *laografia*.[117] He was interested in international developments in his own and related fields, since he was aware of the necessity and importance of collecting evidence of folklife and oral traditions in a society where rapid changes took place.[118] Moreover, he was specifically concerned with folksongs and argued that "songs and folktales both as relics and commemorations of the past and as prophecies of future redemption."[119] For him, the songs supported territorial and historical claims of ideological Hellenism. Apparently, he made a connection between the folksongs and the irredentist aspirations of the Greek state by giving its full support to the *Megali Idea*. Herzfeld quotes Politis:

> from the edges of Cappadocia to the Ionian Islands, and from Macedonia and the western regions of the Black Sea down as far as Crete and Cyprus, songs are sung to this day that relate the feats and adventures of Digenes and his struggles against the Apelates and Saracens; and traditions are recounted by word of mouth which recall the places and objects which are associated with Digene's name… To put the matter in its appropriately proud context, in Digenes Akrites the desires and ideals of the Hellenic nation reach their peak, because in this man the long centuries of ceaseless struggle by the Hellenic against the Islamic world are symbolized.[120]

Politis claimed that the prophecies had an outstanding impact upon the popular imagination and provided valuable information on the Greeks' cultural homogeneity. For example, the prophecies about "the recapture of Constantinople" had remained very fresh in the minds of the Greeks and were extensively transformed from one generation to the other.[121] Amongst them, the story of fish was very well known: a monk was frying seven fish; when the Turks arrived in the city they leaped from the pan only half-cooked. The

---

[117] *ibid.,* pp. 110-113.

[118] G. M. Sfikas. "Folklore and History in Modern Greece," in: Jelisaveta Stanojevich Allen, Christos P. Ioannides John S. Langdon, Stephen W. Reinert (eds.). *TO ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΟΝ: Studies in Honor of Speros Vryonis, Jr*, Vol. II, (New Rochelle: Aristide D. Caratzas, 1993), p. 397.

[119] Michael Herzfeld. *Ours Once More: Folklore, Ideology, and the Making of Modern Greece*, p. 117.

[120] Some parts of Herzfeld's quotation were noted here. *ibid.,* p. 119. It should be remarked that Politis had actively involved in the irredentist movement and attempted to enlist as a volunteer to go to Crete for fighting in the 1866 revolt.

[121] *ibid.,* p. 129.

fish would return into the pan to finish getting fried when the city reverted to Christendom. Another prophecy was the *Marmaromenos Vasilias* in which the Emperor turned into marble.[122] However, the Song of Hagia Sophia was the most famous one. Herzfeld noted that the last line of this song became a "rallying cry" for all Greeks:

> Be silent, Lady and Mistress, do not weep so much:
> Again in years and times to come, all will be yours again.[123]

The purpose for the use of the word "*Hellenes*" presented a crucial problem in Greek nationalist historiography that had to be solved. It was argued that as the ancient Greeks shared awareness of their own cultural traditions, they made a categorical distinction between "Hellenes" and "barbarians." In the twelfth century, Bishop of Thessaloniki declared that humanity could be divided into two categories, namely "*Hellene*" and "barbarian." Therefore, being *Hellene* equaled being "civilized." Besides, the term "*Hellenes*" was used by some ecclesiastical writers for exclusion in order to define the people who continued to believe in their ancestral religion and refused to become Christians. Vacalopoulos remarked that after the occupation of İstanbul by the Crusaders in 1204, Byzantine authorities began to call themselves *Hellenes*. He, furthermore, stated that at that time critical circumstances which the Greeks came across played an important role in this usage.[124] For instance, after 1204, Theodore II Lascaris, the successor of the Emperor of Nicaea, called his "empire" "Hellenic."[125] Moreover, for Politis, the term "*Hellenes*" was popularly used during the Byzantine era. Folksongs were the main indicators of this usage in which the last Byzantine ruler was referred to as "the

---

[122] *ibid.,* p. 129; For further examples see: Richard Clogg. *Anatolica: Studies in the Greek East in the 18th and 19th Centuries*, p. 257.

[123] Michael Herzfeld. *Ours Once More: Folklore, Ideology, and the Making of Modern Greece*, p. 131.

[124] A. Vacalopoulos. "Byzantinism and Hellenism: Remarks on the Racial Origin and the Intellectual Continuity of the Greek Nation," *Balkan Studies*, No. 9, 1968, pp. 116-117.

[125] Stephen Xydis. "Medieval Origins of Modern Greek Nationalism," *Balkan Studies*, p. 12.

Hellene Constantine."[126] All these examples show that the term "Hellenes" was used by the high ranks of the society in one way or another. Indeed, the problem is whether its usages corresponded to the populace.[127]

At this point, Herzfeld poses a critical question: was the term "*Hellene*" used for the self-designation by the rural Greeks? For him, although the Greek nationalist scholars tried to demonstrate its survival in the popular memory, they could not demonstrate whether the peasantry used the term "*Hellenes*" for a category of self-designation or the name of a mythical race.[128] In other words, he questioned the popular usage of the term "*Hellene*," claiming that some of these popular usages may be metaphorical in origin, since in the folk narratives the mythical Hellenes were reputed for superhuman strength and size.[129] It is safe to assume that all these attempts to trace the origins of the term "*Hellenes*" back to the Middle Ages were the outcome of the obsession of Greek nationalist historiography, which targeted to establish continuity in the Greek history.

The above-mentioned studies provided the reconciliation of the classical Enlightenment "*Hellenic*" version with the Byzantine Orthodox tradition. In other words, Greek scholars of folklore "transformed the substantive problem of the transition to modernity into a formal problem of historical continuity" and demonstrated that "the modern *Rum milleti* was the inheritor of both classical Greece and the Byzantine past."[130]

---

[126] Michael Herzfeld. *Ours Once More: Folklore, Ideology, and the Making of Modern Greece*, p. 124.

[127] *ibid*., 124. Kakridis argued that after the outbreak of the Greek War of Independence, "the name '*Hellenes*' came into current use in quite *extra-ordinary circumstances*." [emphasis is mine]. See: John Th. Kakridis. "The Ancient Greeks and the Greeks of the War of Independence," *Balkan Studies*, Vol. IV, 1963, pp. 251-264.

[128] Michael Herzfeld. *Ours Once More: Folklore, Ideology, and the Making of Modern Greece*, p. 19.

[129] *ibid*., p. 127.

[130] Victor Roudometof. *Nationalism, Globalization, and Orthodoxy: The Social Origins of Ethnic Conflict in the Balkans*, p. 112.

Along with the Greek nationalist scholars who specifically made use of history, language, and folklore studies in the construction of national Greek identity in the nineteenth century, the state itself also got involved in this process. The cultivation of national identity, within Greece and "*irredenta*," became an important part of its domestic statecraft and foreign policy. In other words, so as to consolidate and legitimize its power, various mechanisms were implemented by the Greek state to cultivate national identity within and outside the Greek Kingdom.[131] As mentioned earlier, the national church and national university became the major centers in the process of transmitting Hellenic culture and nationalistic ideals to the "Greek *irredenta*."[132]

National Language and Education

In the second half of the nineteenth century, by the infiltration of the Romantic ideas in Greece, language as a determining factor relatively lost its importance.[133] It was no longer possible to use language as a criterion of nationality, since the linguistic range of the Orthodox communities became very complicated. For instance, within the Greek Kingdom there were many Albanian and Vlach-speaking peoples. The range was more complicated in Macedonia and Anatolia. Given the circumstances, the criteria became voluntary identification with the 'imagined community' of the Greek nation which was cultivated through various means such as national education.[134]

---

[131] Paschalis M. Kitromilides. *Enlightenment, Nationalism, Orthodoxy*, p. 161.

[132] *ibid.,* p. 20.

[133] John S. Koliopoulos, Thanos M. Veremis, *Greece: The Modern Sequel from 1831 to the Present*, p. 253.

[134] Paschalis M. Kitromilides. *Enlightenment, Nationalism, Orthodoxy*, pp. 169-170.

In this respect, it is important to note that territorial ambitions of the Greek state went hand in hand with "history and myth to form a particular potent combination."[135] After its establishment, the Greek state paid special attention to the creation of an educational network in the Ottoman Empire. Since education was seen as a significant means for the Hellenization of the *Rum milleti* and cultivation of the Greek identity among the Orthodox Christian population of the Ottoman Empire.

In this Hellenization process, the role played by the University of Athens was noteworthy to mention here. From the very beginning of its establishment, the University of Athens not only aimed to train necessary staff for the state apparatus, but also aimed to transmit Western culture to the East. The main idea behind this transmission was the incorporation of the Orthodox Christian population of the Ottoman Empire into the fold of Greek nationalism. As Kitromilides noted, the teachers in high schools were no longer trained in the ecclesiastical centers of the Orthodox Church or in European Universities, rather they were trained in the University of Athens. This meant that the national university became the major supplier of high school teachers for the "Greek *irredenta*" and the main centre for producing the Greek national ideology.[136] Clogg pointed out the fact that the students not only from the Greek Kingdom but also from other parts of the Greek world were educated in the University of Athens and returned to their hometowns "to spread the pure gospel of Hellenism."[137] The emergence of Western-style education undermined the role of the church and then "the church identified more with educational obscurantism and

---

[135] Benjamin C. Fortna. *Imperial Classroom: Islam, the State, and Education in the Late Ottoman Empire*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 61.

[136] Paschalis M. Kitromilides. *Enlightenment, Nationalism, Orthodoxy*, p. 167. Here it suffices to mention Hobsbawm's statements that "the progress of schools and universities measures that of nationalism, just as schools and especially universities became its most conscious champions…" Eric J. Hobsbawm. *The Age of Revolution: Europe, 1789-1848*, p. 166. In this respect, it is safe to argue that the educational network of the Greek state aimed at Hellenizing the *Rum milleti*, as in the case of France, where the peasants turned into Frenchmen. See: Eugen Weber. *Peasants into Frenchmen*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976).

[137] Richard Clogg. *A Concise History of Greece*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 50.

political reaction and conducted heresy trials, the burning of offending books, and opposition to the increasing emphasis on the natural sciences and Greece's classical heritage."[138]

Educational network from the Greek Kingdom to the periphery provided a fertile ground in the cultivation of a national identity and the *Megali Idea* in Ottoman Crete. In the second half of the nineteenth century, the Christian inhabitants of Crete who took refuge in Greece as a result of the 1866-1868 revolts attended the schools of the Greek Kingdom.[139] After the end of the revolt, they came back to the island who added to the number of literate people in the countryside. The graduates of the University of Athens were the first Christian doctors, lawyers, and professors on the island. Moreover, it should be pointed out that most of them became the major figures of Cretan politics.[140] Amongst them, for instance, Venizelos became the leading figure in the Cretan revolts. This illustrated the fact that University of Athens had been the main center in transmitting Greek culture and nationalist ideologies to Ottoman Crete.[141] The leading figures of the Christian population of the island who graduated from the University of Athens became teachers. For instance, the Cretan historian Vasileios Psilakis taught Greek history and philology at the grammar school in Chania, Antony Michelidakis, a politician, taught at the grammar school in Candia.[142]

---

[138] Fatma Müge Göçek. "The Decline of the Ottoman Empire and the Emergence of Greek, Armenian, Turkish and Arab Nationalism," p. 40.

[139] Kallia Kalliataki Merticopoulou. "Literacy and Unredeemed Peasants: Late Nineteenth-century Rural Crete Faces Education," in: Philip Carabott (ed.). *Greek Society in the Making, 1863-1913: Realities, Symbols and Visions*, (Great Britain: Variorum, 1997), p. 117.

[140] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.UM., Dosya: 7, Gömlek: 76, Aded: 1, 1302 N 9.

[141] Paschalis M. Kitromilides. *Enlightenment, Nationalism, Orthodoxy*, p. 15.

[142] Theocharis E. Detorakis. *History of Crete*, (trl.) John C. Davis, (Iraklion: 1994), p. 378. In this sense, it is important to note that the attempt to champion these professionals, including lawyers, doctors, journalists, etc, for their part in the development of nationalism has been discredited for decades.

The new elementary Christian schools formed in the rural Crete were also very crucial to the formation of a concept of "Greekness" in the minds of the pupils and the creation of an imagined Greek identity. After solving the problem of financing education in 1870, the Cretan Christians began to deal with the education of the rural peasants. At that time, the Christian Central Councils of Elders became responsible for the founding of schools in the provinces and invited the Christian children to attend them.[143] In order to disseminate education and to overcome the resistance in the countryside, this council endeavored to promote education "for God and the fatherland" and letters were presented as "heaven-sent and sacred." It was considered that literacy would help people to adopt new ideas and conditions, provide a significant basis for children to acquire a theoretical loyalty to the *Megali Idea*. It was believed that through education, Christians would realize their differences from the Ottomans which made them closer to Greece and "civilized West."[144] In this respect, it should be noted that, according to Strauss, the religious, political, and social differences were important between the two communities in Ottoman Crete, Muslims and Christians, but the "inculcation of hostility" to the "*Rum*" community through history and literature courses from one generation to the other prevented real unity.[145]

Having being aware of the superiority of the Christian education over the Muslim one in Ottoman Crete and the necessity of the expansion of the Muslim education, the Governor-General of Crete sent a memorandum to İstanbul, in which he appealed for help

---

[143] Kallia Kalliataki Merticopoulou. "Literacy and Unredeemed Peasants: Late Nineteenth-century Rural Crete Faces Education," p. 117.

[144] *ibid.,* pp. 127-128. In this sense, it should be important to remind Hobsbawm's assertion that in most of the European countries, the era from 1870 to 1914 was the age of the primary schools. He furthermore stated that the number of children in elementary schools quadrupled and the number of teachers almost tripled in the Balkans. Eric J. Hobsbawm. *The Age of Empire 1875-1914*, (Great Britain: Abacus, 1987), p. 150.

[145] Johann Strauss. "Unutulmuş Bir Cemaat: Girit Müslümanlarının Abdülhamid Devrindeki, İkinci Meşrutiyet Devrindeki ve İlhaktan Sonraki Faaliyetleri," *XI. Türk Tarih Kongresi'nden Ayrıbasım*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1994), p. 2113.

with the funding in order to establish a preparatory school in Chania. In the memorandum, it was stated that "due to the lack of Ottoman educational alternatives on the island, Christian children had no resource but to enroll in schools in Athens... Their minds were thus implanted with 'Greek thoughts' which would eventually afflict the island 'like vermin and locusts'."[146] This memorandum shows that the Governor worried about the increasing threat of Greek education to the Ottoman subjects.

In addition to the emphasis on the study of ancient Greek culture in the schools and in the University of Athens, the choice of Athens as the capital of Greece in 1834 was quite related to the idealization of ancient Greece and illustrated the Greek state's orientation towards the so-called Greek intellectual and spiritual ancestors. It should be important to note that at that time Athens was a small and dusty village which had nothing except the ruins of Parthenon and its associations with the glories of the Periclean age.[147]

The Role Played by the Greek Consuls

The network of Greek consulates and of Greek schools also played vital roles in this process. From 1836 onward, the Greek consulates were established throughout the Ottoman Empire. In the early years of their establishments, in addition to their diplomatic

---

[146] Benjamin C. Fortna. *Imperial Classroom: Islam, the State, and Education in the Late Ottoman Empire*, pp. 61-62.

[147] Richard Clogg. *A Concise History of Greece*, p. 50. In a letter written to his brother, Antonis Kambanis Papadakis, one of the real characters of Rhea Galanaki's novel, narrated the city of Athens as follows: "the vision of a marble city, such as the Europeans had preserved in their imagination over the centuries, was now guiding the architects' hands in giving concrete shape to an ancient dream. The undistinguished Turkish fortress, the barren, ruined village that had survived the revolution, scattered all over with half-buried antiquities, must now rise to the legendary image which had exerted such a lasting influence on the European spirit, while also meeting the requirements of a modern capital." Rhea Galanaki. *The Life of İsmail Ferik Pasha*, (trl.) Kay Cicellis, (London: Peter Owen Publishers, 1996), p. 57. However, after the establishment of the Greek Kingdom, Athens was reestablished in line with the political and cultural aims (modernity, cultural unity and the continuity between the modern and ancient Greece) of the Greek state. Panepistimiou (University), Mitropoleos (Cathedral) and Athinas (Atena) streets in Athens were the main indicators of these aims. See: Eleni Bastéa. "Atina: Sokağa İmgeler Oymak, Planlama ve Ulusal Emeller," in: Zeynep Çelik, Diane Favro, and Richard Ingersoll (eds.). *Şehirler ve Sokaklar*, (trl. Bilgi Altınok), (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2007), pp. 35-53.

and commercial duties, they were engaged in the dispensation of official Greek citizenship to local Greeks who could prove some form of participation in the Greek War of Independence. The consulates also promoted the Greek press to spread news about Greece in the "Greek *irredenta*" and supported educational and cultural activities.[148]

At this point, by giving certain examples from Ottoman Crete, we can better understand and evaluate the role played by the nationalist Greek consuls. Ottoman archival sources provide valuable information on the activities of these consuls in Crete. The Ottoman documents show that the Greek consuls were the main agents of the Greek irredentist policy throughout the second half of the nineteenth century. An Ottoman document gave details on the provocative activities and intrigues of the Greek consul in Crete.

The Greek consul and his vice-consuls secretly called the leading figures of the Christians and Christian deputies in Chania, saying that it would be impossible to unite with Greece if the Christian peoples did not do anything. They, furthermore, attracted the Christians' attention to the fact that as the British Prime Minister Gladstone completed his fifty years at the government service, they should congratulate him by writing a telegram and putting a note at the end of the telegram mentioning their desire for the unification with Greece. The Greek consul added that the Christians' relationship with the Governor should be tense. If not, it would be impossible to unite with Greece. Although the Christian deputies responded to the Greek consul that the governor was Christian and his administration was unproblematic, the Greek consul finally made them to sign the telegram by saying that "let the governors be either Christian or Muslim, but it would not be good for you to get on well with them." It is interesting to note what the Governor-General of Crete, Fotiadi Paşa, told the Greek consul during the dinner party of Mr. Lifons: "… you

[148] *ibid*., pp. 169-170.

are a consul here, not a provocateur of the people….you forced the Christians for dispatching a telegram and deteriorated the relationship between the Governor and the people by forcing them to act in opposition to their Governor. The Europeans, even the Greeks, will not like this…"[149] The next day, the Governor-General called the Greek consul concerning his intrigues. During the firm discussion held between them, the Greek consul tried to defend himself, saying that the aim here was to prevent the island from passing to Germany.[150] Here, it is obvious that the Greek consul promoted the union with Greece and made attempts to provoke the Christians. He also endeavored to get Gladstone's support for his irredentist activities.

Another instance demonstrated the fact that the Greek consul in Crete was not in favor of taking the necessary steps in order to restore order on the island. Mahmud Celaleddin Paşa reported to the Sublime Porte that it was understood from the statements of the Greek consul that he intended that nothing should be done by the Ottoman state in order to reestablish tranquility. What he wanted was that even if an attempt was made, it should be prevented from being successful. When it became certain that necessary precautions would be taken by the Ottoman state, the Greek consul began to fear. Furthermore, it was reported that the consul tried to hinder the taking of necessary precautions.[151] These circumstances showed that the Greek consul, fearing his own plans would fail, endeavored to prevent the necessary steps taken by the Ottoman state even if they were to the advantage and interest of the Cretans.

---

[149] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.AZJ., Dosya: 6, Gömlek: 28, Aded: 2, 1300 M 30.

[150] *ibid*.

[151] T.C. BOA, İradeler Tasnifi, İ.MTZ.GR., Dosya: 26, Gömlek: 944, Aded: 3, 1309 S 21. For further examples about the Greek consuls' activities in Crete, see: T.C. BOA, İradeler Tasnifi, İ.MTZ.GR., Dosya: 4, Gömlek: 60, Aded: 3, 1262 N 29; T.C. BOA, İradeler Tasnifi, İ.MTZ.GR., Dosya: 6, Gömlek: 111, Aded: 7, 1269 L 14; T.C. BOA, Sadaret Mektubi Kalemi Belgeleri, A.MKT.MHM., Dosya: 360, Gömlek: 59, Aded: 3, 1283 Ra 8; and, Chapter III in this dissertation.

The *Megali Idea* and the Greek Irredentist Aspirations in the "Greek *Irredenta*"

Greek nationalist historiography argued that with the establishment of the Greek Kingdom, the majority of the Greeks had been left in the Ottoman Empire, and for that reason, the Greeks who lived in the Ottoman Empire should be "redeemed." In a way, the liberation of these unredeemed Greeks became the major question of the new state. From then on, Greek nationalism with its new irredentist, expansionist policies symbolized in the *Megali Idea*,[152] aimed at liberating all Greeks from the Ottoman rule and to incorporate them into a nation-state with its capital in İstanbul.[153] In spite of all differences and paradoxes that characterized the new state, the *Megali Idea* dominated Greek society until the Greek defeat of 1922.[154]

From the very beginning, the *Megali Idea* was considered as a panacea for internal and external problems. Moreover, it was seen as an ultimate goal and the precondition for legitimacy of the Greek state and elites.[155] Throughout the nineteenth century, although the *Megali Idea* remained the dominant ideology of Greek irredentism, it underwent several changes depending on the domestic affairs within Greece and the international

---

[152] Stephen G. Xydis. "Modern Greek Nationalism," p. 235. In the case of Greek state's irredentist claims, irredentism can be defined as "… the demand made by a government to incorporate its conationalists and the territory they occupy across the border into the parent state, and/or to the demands made by the people involved that they be reunited with their kin across the border." Naomi Chazan (ed.). *Irredentism and International Politics*, (London: Adamantine Press Limited, 1991), p. 2.

[153] John Anthony Petropulos. *Politics and Statecraft in the Kingdom of Greece 1833-1843*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), p. 23. In the same line with the Greek's *Megali Idea*, the Serbs put forward *Nacertanije* with the aim of reviving medieval empire of Stephen Dusan, and the Romanians desired territorial expansion with the union of Wallachia and Moldovia with Transylvania, Bukovina, Bessarabia, Dobruja and the Banat. Thanasis D. Sfikas. "National Movements and Nation Building in the Balkans, 1804-1922: Historic Origins, Contemporary Misunderstandings," in: Thanasis D. Sfikas and Christopher Williams (eds.). *Ethnicity and Nationalism in East Central Europe and the Balkans*, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1995), p. 30.

[154] Thomas W. Gallant. *Modern Greece*, p. 54.

[155] Gerasimos Augustinous. *Consciousness and History: Nationalist Critics of Greek Society, 1897-1914,* p. 14.

conjuncture.[156] At this point it is important to note the statements of Charles K. Tuckerman, the first U.S. Minister to Athens concerning the *Megali Idea*:

> … However divided public opinion in Greece may be as to the proper time and method for attempting the realization of the Hellenic Idea, the [Great] Idea itself never leaves the teeming brain of the Greek. He may, in his impatience, disgust or despair, denounce it as chimerical, and join in the laugh of scorn which its mention evokes among foreign nations; but at heart he still cherishes it -if not as a practical possibility, as a tenet of his political and religious faith.[157]

In Greek historiography, Ioannis Kolettis' speech delivered in the National Assembly in 1844 was considered a landmark in the formulation of the *Megali Idea*:

> But the Greek kingdom is not the whole of Greece, but a part of it, the smallest and the poorest part of Greece. Autocthon [indigenous] then is not only an inhabitant of the kingdom, but also one from Jannina, Thessaly, Serres, Adrianople, Constantinople, Trebizond, Crete, … in general every inhabitant of land which is Greek historically and ethnically… The … struggle did not begin in 1821; it began the day after the fall of Constantinople; fighters were not simply those of 1821; fighters were and are always those continuing the struggle against the crescent for 400 years…
>
> By her geographical location, Greece is the center of Europe; with the East on her right and the West on her left, she has been destined through her downfall to enlighten the West and through her regeneration to enlighten the East. The first task has been fulfilled by our ancestors; the second is assigned to us. In the spirit of our oath and of this great idea, I have seen the delegates of the nation assembling to deliberate not simply on the fate of Greece, but of the entire Greek race… [W]e have been led astray and away from the great idea of the fatherland which was first expressed in the song of Rhigas. At that time all of us who bore the Greek name, united in one spirit, realized a part of the whole goal…[158]

In this speech, Kolettis underlined the fact that Greece had a "civilizing mission" in the East. It was believed that with the rise of the Ottoman Empire in the East, Hellenism

---

[156] Thanos Veremis. "From the National State to the Stateless Nation 1821-1910," p. 13. Mazower draws the attention to the point that the Great Idea spread into the every part of the society that "the toothless baby draws it in the maternal milk, and the toothless mouth of age pledges to it in long drafts of the native resined wine. The shepherd dreams about it in the cold mountain air under his shaggy sheepskin, and the rich proprietor traces in the graceful smoke-cloud of incessant cigarette." Mark Mazower. "The Messiah and the Bourgeoisie: Venizelos and Politics in Greece, 1909-1912," *The Historical Journal*, Vol. XXXV, No. 4, December 1992, pp. 890-891.

[157] Stephen G. Xydis. "Modern Greek Nationalism," p. 236.

[158] Gerasimos Augustinous. *Consciousness and History: Nationalist Critics of Greek Society, 1897-1914*, p. 14; Paschalis M. Kitromilides. *Enlightenment, Nationalism, Orthodoxy*, p. 14.

declined and lost its hegemony which created a strong anti-Turkish sentiment and desire for the rebirth of Hellenism during the *Tourkokratia*. This view was strengthened with the impact of the Enlightenment and passed through the Enlightenment and the Greek Revolution and became the dominant belief of the *Megali Idea*.[159] It seems obvious that Kolettis attributed a great importance to the *Megali Idea* in the "enlightenment" of the East.

Kitromilides argued that Kolettis did not endeavor to resurrect Byzantium, but rather to gain cultural and political hegemony over the "Greek East." Kitromilides, furthermore, underlined that Kolettis did not make a reference to Byzantium during his speech. This might be partly because of the insufficient "evocativeness and psychological potency" of Byzantium in the Greek society and of his Western education and radical political past.[160] What is more striking in his speech is the fact that it involved a very significant message on the debate over the *autochthonous* Greeks, those born within the territory of the Greek Kingdom, between the *heterochthonous* Greeks, those born outside territory of the Greek Kingdom, of the Greek state.[161] At that time, there was a great effort to prevent the *heterochthon* Greeks from holding a post in the Greek state. Accordingly, a political controversy occurred over this issue within the National Assembly. Being a *heterochthon*, Kolettis made a reference to this debate endeavoring to provide the unity of the Greek nation and to give equal rights for all the Greeks regardless of their place of

---

[159] Paschalis M. Kitromilides. *Enlightenment, Nationalism, Orthodoxy*, p. 15.

[160] Paschalis M. Kitromilides. "On the Intellectual Content of Greek Nationalism: Paparrigopoulos, Byzantium and the Great Idea," p. 27.

[161] At that time there had been a great controversy between *autochthon*s and *heterochthon*s for hegemonic control within Greek society. Although the former formed the majority in the Greek kingdom, the latter constituted the leading figures, including intellectuals from the Aegean, İstanbul, and the Ionian Islands, politicians and chieftains of the Greek Revolution. See: Thanos Veremis. "From the National State to the Stateless Nation 1821-1910," p. 11.

birth.[162] This means that Kolettis emphasized the unity of the Greek nation, both inside and outside Greece.[163] In other words, the mission of the *Megali Idea* was not only to "redeem" the Greeks who lived in the Ottoman Empire, but also to consolidate different elements within the Greek Kingdom.

It is crucial to note that the Greek scholars held conflicting views concerning the origins of the *Megali Idea*. While some historians traced the origins of the *Megali Idea* back to the late Byzantine period, others insisted that the *Megali Idea* was a product of the nineteenth century. According to the former, the aim of the *Megali Idea* did not alter; it had aimed to emancipate and unify the enslaved Greeks both during the years of the empire of the Lascarids as well as in the years of the Turkish occupation. Vacalopoulos, a genuine supporter of this traditional view, pointed out "the idea of Hellenism was not a new myth," rather it was "a reality immediately after the capture of Constantinople."[164] Runciman traced its origin back to the days before the Ottoman conquest of İstanbul, arguing that "it was the idea of the imperial destiny of the Greek people. Michael VIII Palaeologus expressed it in the speech that he made when he heard that his troops had captured Constantinople from the Latins…"[165] Bryer also asserted that "since 1453, the Greeks have had to live with the fact of the fall of the city and with the consolidation of the Great Idea … For seven centuries, it [the *Megali Idea*] provided the mainspring of Greek political thinking…"[166] On the contrary, Kitromilides argued that the *Megali Idea* was a nineteenth

---

[162] Paschalis M. Kitromilides. *Enlightenment, Nationalism, Orthodoxy*, p. 165; Gerasimos Augustinous. *Consciousness and History: Nationalist Critics of Greek Society, 1897-1914*, p. 13.

[163] Paschalis M. Kitromilides. "On the Intellectual Content of Greek Nationalism: Paparrigopoulos, Byzantium and the Great Idea," p. 27.

[164] A. Vacalopoulos. "Byzantinism and Hellenism: Remarks on the Racial Origin and the Intellectual Continuity of the Greek Nation," *Balkan Studies*, p. 117, 124.

[165] Steven Runciman. *The Great Church in Captivity*, p. 378.

[166] Anthony Bryer. "The Great Idea: The Greeks and Byzantium," *History Today*, Vol. XV, No. 3, March 1965, p. 159.

century development and an ideological expression of the Greek Kingdom.[167] For Zakythinos, the elements which made up the "Great Idea" had been formed since the first centuries of the Turkish rule. *The Silentium*, written by Nicetas Choniates, was one of the first texts which contained elements of the "Great Idea." However, Zakythinos pointed out that both the expression and the complete theory of the "Great Idea" was not older than the Greek War of Independence.[168]

After the establishment of the Greek Kingdom, the problematic situation did not change much. Exhausted with the civil war and the political powers, the Greek peoples devoted themselves to the task of reconstruction and state-building. However, the situation began to change by 1839. Many Greeks wishfully turned their faces to more exciting and patriotic ways in order to find a solution to their problems. Having seen an important opportunity for the realization of the *Megali Idea*, the Near Eastern Crisis of 1839-1841 intensified Greeks' nationalistic feelings and ignited their irredentist claims in Greece.[169] In December 1839, the Philorthodox plot organized by Colonel Nikitas Stamatelopoulos and George Capodistrias came onto the scene aiming to force King Otto either to convert into Orthodoxy or to abdicate, favoring a war policy and looking to Russia for the realization of the *Megali Idea*.[170] The Cretan revolt of 1841, the revolts in Epirus and Thessaly, the participation of Greek volunteers in the Russian army during the Crimean War were all indicators of the irredentist claims of the Greeks.[171]

---

[167] Paschalis M. Kitromilides. "On the Intellectual Content of Greek Nationalism: Paparrigopoulos, Byzantium and the Great Idea," pp. 26, 33.

[168] D. A. Zakythinos. *The Making of Modern Greece from Byzantium to Independence*, (Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1976), pp. 192-193.

[169] John Anthony Petropulos. *Politics and Statecraft in the Kingdom of Greece 1833-1843*, pp. 346-348.

[170] *ibid.,* pp. 331, 350; Barbara Jelavich. "The Philorthodox Conspiracy of 1839," *Balkan Studies*, Vol. VII, No. 1, 1966, p. 89.

[171] Varban N. Todorov. *Greek Federalism during the Nineteenth Century (Ideas and Projects)*, p. 29.

Greece's humiliation in the Crimean War and the changes that took place after the Crimean War and in the political conditions of Europe made Greek politicians to understand that the *Megali Idea* could not be realized at once; rather it was a gradual process. Accordingly, the military means were put aside for the time being and more attention was paid to the political and diplomatic means. At that time, the Ionian Islands were annexed and Balkan Alliance was signed against the Ottoman Empire.[172] In 1862, King Otto abdicated and King George[173] came to the power. At this point, it should be noted that King George was granted the title of "King of the Hellenes," which meant that he was not only sovereign over Greece, but also over all Greeks still living outside the Greek Kingdom.[174] It is also interesting to mention that King George gave the name "Constantine" to his son, which meant that the new Greek King would be Constantine.[175] It seems likely that the title of the "King of the Hellenes" and "Constantine" symbolized Greece's expansionist plans and became a vivid account of irredentist policies of the Greek state. No doubt as a result of this, irredentist aspirations of the Greeks gained momentum.

The Cretan revolt of 1866 gave a new split to the *Megali Idea* and Greek nationalists claimed that the Cretan revolt started the second phase of 1821.[176] However, the suppression of the Cretan revolt of 1866-69 by the Ottoman Empire, the establishment of the autonomous Bulgarian Church in 1870, and the creation of "Greater Bulgaria" by the Treaty of San Stefano forced the Greek state to alter its priorities in the realization of

---

[172] *ibid.,* p. 29.

[173] He was the son of Denmark's King Christian IX. George's sister, Alexandra, was the Princess of Wales. George's wife Queen Olga, a Russian grand duchess by birth, was a niece of the Russian tsar and a great niece of the German Emperor, William I. See: George J. Marcopoulos. "King George I and the Expansion of Greece 1875-1881," *Balkan Studies*, No. 9, 1968, p. 22.

[174] Robert Shannan Peckham. *National Histories, Natural States: Nationalism and the Politics of Place in Greece*, p. 38.

[175] Elli Skopetea. *Το Πρότυπο Βασίλειο και η Μεγάλη Ιδέα: Όψεις του προβλήματος στην Ελλάδα*, (Athens: Politipo, 1988), p. 284. [The 'Ideal Kingdom' and the Great Idea, Views of the National Question in Greece].

[176] *ibid*., pp. 296-297.

the *Megali Idea*. The Greeks inclined to have peaceful relations with the Ottoman Empire believing that without the help of the Ottomans, the *Megali Idea* could not be realized. The official Greek policy of the early 1870s was in favor of developing an economic, social and cultural prosperity of the Orthodox Greek population of the Ottoman Empire, strengthening their ties with Greece, and reorganizing the Greek state itself.[177] The events of 1876, particularly the İstanbul Conference altered the dynamics of the Greek policy. The Greeks began to realize that the Greek state should be prepared psychologically and militarily. Otherwise, national interests would be jeopardized in the post crisis settlement. The events of 1876 strengthened the positions of the activists (refugees, intelligentsia, university students, and military) and nationalist societies.

Among these societies, the *Etniki Amyna*, *Adelfotis* and *Rigas* were the leading ones. Moreover, regional societies such as Cretans, Thessalians, Macedonians, and Epirotes would suffice to mention here. The national societies began to stir the people for a general rising. At the same time, *Etniki Amyna* and *Adelfotis* established a joint central committee under the leadership of Kalligas which continued to coordinate their activities in line with the government policy, to plan and organize the insurrectionary movement, to raise funds and to expand their secret network in the Ottoman province. The Central Committee had a wide network of local committees and representatives of the Greek Kingdom, the Ottoman Empire and the diaspora. These committees in certain countries raised funds, dealt with the propaganda and public relations, purchased weapons and sent small groups of enthusiastic volunteers to Greece. Those local committees and representatives in border towns and islands near the Ottoman coast both controlled the arms traffic and recruitment and coordinated the preparations on the other side of the

[177] Varban N. Todorov. *Greek Federalism during the Nineteenth Century (Ideas and Projects)*, p. 85.

border. It was pointed out that the Cretan representatives and insurgent chiefs bypassed the Central Committee and acted through their own channels.

As early as 1876, they established their own "Cretan Center;" and in 1878, a special committee was established to coordinate the activities in Greece. The main concern of these committees was to instigate revolts simultaneously in three provinces to the north and in Crete so as to liberate the *Rum*s and unite them with Greece. In July 1877, the Greek government provided the Central Committee with a substantial sum of money, together with arms and munitions from the government stores. The government support added to the funds and weapons obtained by the *Etniki Amyna* and *Adelfotis* which constituted the material basis for starting the insurrectionary process. Furthermore, on the one hand, the Central Committee maintained its close networks with government officials in the border districts, on the other hand, it cooperated with the Greek consuls in Macedonia, Crete, Thrace, and Epirus. January 1878 can be considered a hallmark for the future insurrectionary movements in the Ottoman Empire. On the New Year's Eve, during their speeches on behalf of the Greek cabinet Trikoupis, Zaimis, and Koumoundouros openly gave the committee the go-ahead for preparing the bands to cross the border immediately. On 23 January 1878, Koumoundouros assumed the premiership and decided that the Greek government should take direct action in controlling the insurrectionary movement, because for him the revolts should not be left in the hands of private individuals and nationalist societies. Accordingly, the Central Committee was rearranged for the purpose of directing the revolts.[178]

In this period, Helleno-Ottomanism became very popular among the high strata of *Rum milleti* of İstanbul, who were in favor of the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and the

[178] Evangelos Kofos. "Greek Insurrectionary Preparations, 1876-1878," in: Bela K. Kiraly and Gale Stokes (eds.). *Insurrections, Wars and the Eastern Crisis in the 1870s*, (United States of America: Atlantic Research and Publications, Inc., 1985), pp. 181-195.

cooperation of the Greek Orthodox and Muslim inhabitants of the Empire. According to Skopetea, Helleno-Ottomanism was aimed both to counteract the Pan-Slavic danger that became a serious threat for the irredentist aims of the Greeks and to answer the desires of the *Megali Idea* of the Greek state. Skopetea pointed out that the supporters of this ideology differed in terms of their ideas: While the leading figures of the Greek Ottomans favored the maintenance of the *status quo* so as to ensure their power in the Ottoman Empire, the middle urban class highlighted the superiority of the Greek element of the Ottoman Empire and favored the resurrection of the Byzantine Empire.[179] Among these leading figures of the Greek Ottomans, the *Phanariot*s of İstanbul advocated the doctrine of Helleno-Ottomanism, since they "had acquired strong positions among the governing elite of the Empire" aiming "to preserve their status and privileged position in a new, modern, and multi-national state where the Greeks would secure their natural superiority."[180]

According to decisions made in the Congress of Berlin, Greece was not given any new territories, the fate of Thessaly and Epirus would to be decided between the Ottoman Empire and Greece. Upon this issue, an agreement was reached in 1881 when Thessaly and a small part of Epirus were given to Greece. At that time, irredentist ideologies of the Bulgarians, Romanians, and Serbs rose in tension and became the core issue of the Greek foreign policy. As Macedonia and Southern Thrace were left to the Ottoman Empire in the Berlin Congress, the fate of these regions, especially Macedonia, drew the attention of both

[179] Elli Skopetea. *Το Πρότυπο Βασίλειο και η Μεγάλη Ιδέα: Όψεις του προβλήματος στην Ελλάδα*, pp.309-324; Sia Anagnostopoulou. *Μικρά Ασία, 19ος αιώνας-1919, Οι Ελληνορθόδοξες κοινότητες: από το μιλλέτ των Ρωμιών στο Ελληνικό Έθνος*, (Athens: Ellinika Grammata, 1998). [Asia Minor, 19th century-1919, the Greek Orthodox Communities: from the *Millet-i Rum* to the Greek Nation].

[180] Varban N. Todorov. *Greek Federalism during the Nineteenth Century (Ideas and Projects)*, p. 144.

the Greeks and Bulgarians. The Pan-Slavism became the real threat to the Greek irredentist ambitions in Macedonia and Ottoman Rumelia.[181]

During the 1880s, the old political parties disappeared from the political arena. The "Innovation" party of Harilaos Trikoupis and "National" party of Theodoros Deliyiannis came onto the scene. While the former party had pro-English sentiments, the latter was a mixture of former pro-French and pro-Russian political groups. Trikoupis was in power until the beginning of the 1890s with the exception of three years.[182] He gave priority to the modernization of the state and economic revival, believing that the national unity would be impossible without modernization.[183] At the same time, the political, economic, and cultural infiltration in the Ottoman Empire became very important in the achievement of the irredentist goals. For this purpose, various patriotic and nationalistic organizations (*syllogi*) were created throughout Greece and the Ottoman Empire: the philological *syllogos* (*Ellinikos Filologikos Sillogos Konstantinupoleos*) in İstanbul, the *syllogos* for the dissemination of Greek literature and culture.[184] Moreover, in the early 1880s, a written agreement was concluded between the Trikoupis government and the leaders of the Association for the Advancement of Greek Letters (AAGL), which would be responsible for the supervision of education and national activities in the Greek inhabited provinces of the Ottoman Empire. This association became the main agent of the Greek state in the

---

[181] Evangelos Kofos. "Patriarch Joachim III (1878-1884) and the Irredentist Policy of the Greek State," *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, Vol. IV, No. 2, 1986, pp. 108-109; Varban N. Todorov. *Greek Federalism during the Nineteenth Century (Ideas and Projects)*, p. 30. For the details of the Pan-Slavism, see: Michael Boro Petrovich. *The Emergence of Russian Panslavism 1865-1870*, (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1956).

[182] Varban N. Todorov. *Greek Federalism during the Nineteenth Century (Ideas and Projects)*, pp. 112-113.

[183] Thanos Veremis. "From the National State to the Stateless Nation 1821-1910," p. 14.

[184] Varban N. Todorov. *Greek Federalism during the Nineteenth Century (Ideas and Projects)*, pp. 30, 114. Ellinikos Filologikos Sillogos Konstantinupoleos Ellinikos Filologikos Sillogos Konstantinupoleos was established in 1861 in order to disseminate education in the Orthodox peoples within the Ottoman Empire. See: Athanasia Anagnostopoulou. "Tanzimat ve Rum Milletinin Kuramsal Çerçevesi," in: Pinelopi Stathis. *19. Yüzyıl İstanbul'unda Gayrimüslimler*, (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1999), pp. 1-35; especially, 22-29.

persuasion of its irredentist policy and the cultivation of relations with the Greek consuls, local associations and local leading figures.[185]

By 1890, the Greek debt increased dramatically, and in 1893, the economic crisis reached its peak. As a consequence of this financial situation, the Greek government was forced to declare its bankruptcy. Under these conditions, the Deliyiannis government turned its attention to the irredentist policies. In a way, irredentist aspirations of the Greek state once more gained momentum. Meanwhile, the *Ethnike Hetairia* which became the main actor in the implementation of the irredentist program both in Crete and Macedonia was established. However, various aspects of its activities are discussed more extensively in the chapters that follow. The first expression of the irredentist activities of the Greek state came to the fore on the island of Crete. The Greek government openly supported the Cretan insurgents by sending its troops and ships to the island during February 1897. At the same time, the Greek government began to send its forces to the Ottoman-Greek territory in Thessaly that led to a monthly war between the Ottoman Empire and Greece which ended in the disastrous defeat of the Greek army. At the end of this war, all Greeks including the Greek government, elites, and public realized that the materialization of the *Megali Idea* was almost impossible.[186] However, the Greek state insisted on the articulation of the *Megali Idea* until 1922.

---

[185] The Association for the Advancement of Greek Letters was established in the 1870s for seizing a part from traditional administers to provide the education of the Greeks living in the Empire. It should be important to remember that, at that time the Patriarchate opposed to the policy of Trikoupis government to control the school system of the *Rum*s in the Ottoman Empire. G. G. Arnakis. "The Greek Church of Constantinople and the Ottoman Empire," *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. XXIV, No. 3, 1992, p. 248. To counter the initiatives of the Association for the Advancement of Greek Letters in the education, Patriarch Joachim attempted to establish "Panhellenic Fraternity," but it failed. Later on, for the same purpose, a philanthropic fraternity (*Agapate Allilous*) was established. See: Evangelos Kofos. "Patriarch Joachim III (1878-1884) and the Irredentist Policy of the Greek State," *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, pp. 109, and 112-113.

[186] Thanos Veremis. "From the National State to the Stateless Nation 1821-1910," p. 14; Gerasimos Augustinous. *Consciousness and History: Nationalist Critics of Greek Society, 1897-1914*, pp. 22-23.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have examined the main parameters of Greek nationalism with the aim of discussing the establishment of the modern Greek national identity. It has been argued that the developments of Greek nationalism had been very significant for the politicization and nationalization of the Cretan Christians and their gradual transformation into the Greek world. In other words, the politicization and nationalization of the Cretan Christians can be understood with reference to Greek nationalism and the ideological preoccupations of the intellectual and ruling elites.

The chapter has illustrated that Greek nationalism stemmed from the internal and external factors that occurred in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. We have seen that from the eighteenth century onwards, the intellectual elites invested a great deal of energy in conceptualizing and formulating modern Greek identity. After the establishment of the Greek Kingdom, the Greeks looked to their past in order to create their self-image. As we have seen, the supporters of the Hellenic model tried to shape the new Greek state by excluding the Byzantine and Ottoman past from the Greek history, and looked to Western Europe to define Greekness, since the domination of the European Powers over the Greeks before and after the establishment of the Greek Kingdom was inevitable. Accordingly, the priority given to ancient Greece by the Hellenic model in constructing the modern Greek identity was the reflection of the European impact and domination.

By examining the tension between the two mutually opposed forces in the cultural and linguistic realms such as *Ellinismos* vs. *Romii* and *katharevousa* vs. *demotiki*, this chapter has illustrated how dualism shaped the whole Greek life. In other words, through focusing on this tension, it has shown that dualism was one of the major characteristics of the Greek identity and quite decisive in understanding the nature of the Greek people throughout the nineteenth century.

Particularly after challenging Fallmerayer's theory, Greek nationalist scholars invested an enormous amount of energy in the studies of history, language and folklore, aiming to answer Fallmerayer's theory and to establish continuity between ancient and modern Greeks. In this regard, this chapter has analyzed Greek nationalist historiography by giving special emphasis to Paparrigopoulos' work in which he stressed the importance of Byzantine history for the Greek *ethnos* and attempted to incorporate the Byzantine history into the Greek history so as to construct a national continuity throughout the Greek history. Within the context of examining Greek national folklore, this chapter has also briefly analyzed Nikolaos Politis' contribution to the folklore studies.

Furthermore, the chapter has demonstrated that Greek nationalist scholars' studies went hand in hand with the Greek state's policies in the cultivation of Greek national identity within Greece and "Greek *irredenta*." It has shown that the Greek state used various means and agents, including Greek consuls, schools, and nationalist organizations, to indoctrinate the Orthodox Christian population of Ottoman Empire with the idea of belonging to an "imagined community." Many archival cases reveal that national education networks and the Greek agents, especially Greek consuls, seemed to be significant means for indoctrinating the Cretan Christians with the concept of "Greekness." In other words, the Greek consuls, newspapers and Christian schools created for the Cretan Christians new concepts of self-definition and an "imagined" Greek identity.

We have seen that the Greek state aimed to reach the "unredeemed Greeks" not only through the above-mentioned means, but also through the irredentist, expansionist policies. The aim here was to liberate all Greeks living in the borders of the Ottoman Empire and incorporate them into the Greek mainland. Throughout the nineteenth century, with the powerful ideology of the *Megali Idea*, the Greek state penetrated into the fields of Orthodox Christian population of the Ottoman Empire, and with its important Orthodox

Christian population, Ottoman Crete attracted attention from the Greek state and became the fundamental object of its irredentist policies. The networks between the leaders of the Christian insurgents in Ottoman Crete and various nationalist and revolutionary organizations in Greece, volunteers who came from Greece to participate in the Cretan revolts accelerated the rate of communication between Greece and the island that facilitated the construction of an "imagined Greek" society. National ideology absorbed cultural identity, and altered local economic and social dynamics of the society. In this process, as Anastasia Karakasiadou pointed out "social structure, organization, and identity in local communities were destroyed and replaced by new structures..."[187]

In this context, it is safe to argue that nationalism was absent in the Cretan society before the nineteenth century. This ideology took shape at the end of the eighteenth and at the beginning of the nineteenth century, but it took its final shape after the Greek revolution that marked the beginning of a bloody period on the island of Crete. There was no conception of a national identity, because people's identity was determined in religious terms within the framework of the so-called *millet* system. In other words, historical and political conditions of the nineteenth century within the Ottoman Empire and Western Europe paved the way for the nationalist ideology of the Cretan society. The shift in the definition of identity from a religious to a national one can not be regarded as a special, or unique case for the Cretan society. It should be analyzed within the context of the nineteenth century and Ottoman Balkans. As Sia Anagnostopoulou has eloquently stated "national particularities emerged as a consequence of the process through which problems, which were the same for a whole region, were incorporated and redefined in the reality of

[187] Anastasia N. Karakasidou. *Fields of Wheat, Hills of Blood: Passages to Nationhood in Greek Macedonia, 1870-1990*, p. 25.

each nation."[188] Although different peoples had passed their own passages to nationhood, these passages had similar structures across time and space.[189]

Due to the social, political and economic factors and alterations, the Cretan society underwent internal changes, redefined its character and added to it different dimensions. It is a well-known fact that the infiltration of the Greek national ideology into Cretan society increased the pace of ethnic and national consciousness among the local Orthodox Christian population of the island and politicized and nationalized them, and drastically altered the scenery. As a result of this, the local Christians began to stress the Greek Orthodox part of their identity. In this framework, the existing differences within Cretan society deepened, and they began to rebel. In response, the local Muslims tried to counteract the attacks of the Christians and developed a self-defensive reaction against the Christians.

Constituting the bulk of the present dissertation, the following chapters explore the developments and events that occurred in Ottoman Crete in the late Ottoman Empire. The next chapter provides a quick look at the Cretan history in order to understand the pre-history of the period under study. It introduces geography, population trends of the island, and the characteristics of the Cretans. Then, it focuses on the Council of *Evkaf* and Orphans to provide interesting insights in terms of inner and inter-communal relations within the Cretan society. Finally, it analyzes the island's rebellious history by emphasizing the reports of Ottoman statesmen to see the events from their vantage points.

---

[188] Sia Anagnostopoulou. "The Terms *Millet*, *Génos*, *Ethnos*, *Oikoumenikótita*, *Alytrotismos* in Greek Historiography," p. 38.

[189] Anastasia N. Karakasidou. *Fields of Wheat, Hills of Blood: Passages to Nationhood in Greek Macedonia, 1870-1990*, p. 18.

Chapter II

THE ISLAND OF CRETE: A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

> Here Mother Earth first unfolded the secrets of husbandry. Here the ORPHEUS learned his heavenly notes and here the Pyrrhic dance first weaved its war-like mazes. The Gods of Greece were cradled beneath the sunny skies of Crete. JUPITER was nurtured in a cave among the woody defiles of Mount Ida, and on the snowy peaks of the same mountain was the marriage altar at which he wooed and won the swan-like JUNO. In the rocky vales of the Leuceian hills the Titans originated; and grotto, valley and mountain slope gave birth to a race of gods, goddesses and heroes. Here, the most illustrious of their kingly line, MINOS and RHADAMANTHUS flourished. The one received from the hands of his father JUPITER a perfect code of laws and constructed the wonders of the Labyrinth. The other distinguished by the impartiality of his decrees and the inflexible severity of his punishments, received at death the throne of judgment in the invisible world.[1]

Long before the Venetian times, throughout the Ottoman rule and thereafter, being at the crossroads of the eastern Mediterranean and yet having the basic features of a well-formed and protected point of intersection of different civilizations, the island of Crete had created its own distinct way of life. The more the Cretan social life rooted itself within the Mediterranean history, the firmer bonded the inhabitants of the island with each other. This transformation was not only crucial for the Ottoman Empire, but was also a highly debated and politically charged subject for the Balkans and Europe. With regard to this transformation, Molly Greene makes the following statement:

> By the time the Ottoman navy appeared off the island's northwestern coast in the spring of 1645, Catholic and Orthodox Cretans had lived together for almost five hundred years in a relationship whose complexity had no rival in the Greek East. The Ottoman conquest added another layer to this already complicated past by setting off a process of conversion to Islam that resulted in one of the largest Muslim communities in the Greek world.[2]

---

[1] Stewart L. Woodford. *Crete: An Address*, (Albany: Weed, Parsons and Company Printers, 1868), p. 3.

[2] Molly Greene. A Shared World: Christians and Muslims in the Early Modern Mediterranean, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 4.

She further notes that the incorporation of Crete into the Patriarchate of İstanbul was another important development that was added to the cultural sphere of the island after the Ottoman conquest. According to her, this incorporation and the creation of a large Muslim community were also significant for the nineteenth century, since "the island's fortune would now be closely tied to the fortunes of Greek nationalism."[3]

The Ottoman-dominated Mediterranean that emerged after the Ottoman conquest of the island did not look very different from the Venetian order, especially in the case of Crete. In this regard, it can be argued that religion and culture were not the demarcation line in the Mediterranean basin. Rather, the essential dividing line was the battle between the *ancien régime* and the outside intruders. The European Powers upset the balance of power in the Mediterranean basin and sowed the seeds of confrontation in Crete. The Ottoman conquest, on the other hand, led to the development of an enriched social life and redrew the boundaries of Christendom. The Ottoman rule on the island gave rise to a new spirit and social organization, acted as the catalyzing force and had a significant impact on the future trajectory of Crete.[4]

By the time the last Ottoman soldier finally left Crete in November 1898, the island had been ruled by the Ottoman Empire for two hundred and twenty-nine years. Prior to the Ottomans, the island was ruled by different civilizations and empires throughout its history. In Antiquity, the island of Crete was the main centre of the Minoan civilization, in

---

[3] *ibid*., p. 11. During the Venetian rule, the existence of an Orthodox hierarchy in the island was forbidden and the Orthodox bishoprics were abolished and replaced with Latin ones. Under the Ottoman rule, the Orthodox hierarchy was reestablished in Crete. Neofytos Patelaros, a native of Crete, was appointed by the Ottomans as the first Orthodox metropolitan bishop of Crete in 1647. However, during the first half century of Ottoman rule there was an intense conflict between the Patriarchate, and the local Christian community. For the details of the Cretan Church, see: Molly Greene. *A Shared World: Christians and Muslims in the Early Modern Mediterranean*, pp. 174-205; Theocharis E. Detorakis. *History of Crete*, (trl.) John C. Davis, (Iraklion: 1994), pp. 382-404; and Elif Bayraktar. "The Implementation of Ottoman Religious Policies in Crete 1645-1735: Men of Faith as Actors in the *Kadı* Court," (Ankara: Unpublished M.A. Thesis, Bilkent University), 2005.

[4] *ibid*., p. 5.

nearly 2000 B.C. Thereafter, the Mycenaeans and later the Dorians invaded the island, which became a part of the Hellenic culture until its conquest by the Romans in about 67 B.C. When the Roman Empire split into two in 330 A.D. Crete fell to the Eastern Roman Empire and the first Byzantine period began in 623 A.D. The Arabs took the island from the Byzantine rulers at the first quarter of the ninth century. In 961, Byzantine emperor Nicephorus II Phocas had recaptured the island and Byzantines ruled it until 1204. During the Fourth Crusade, Crete was assigned to Prince Boniface of Montferrat, leader of the crusaders. He sold the island to the Serene Republic of Venice in the very same year.[5]

The Maltese attack on the ship carrying Sünbül Ağa, *Darü's-saâde Ağası*, who was exiled to Egypt; Bursalı Mehmed Efendi, the newly appointed *kadı* of Mecca; and other notables who were on their route to pilgrimage was considered a decisive moment for the Ottoman expansion to Crete. While these people sailed from İstanbul to Mecca in 1644 somewhere in the vicinity of Crete, Maltese pirates attacked their ship and many of its passengers, including Sünbül Ağa and Bursalı Mehmed Efendi were killed and sixty people were captured. After this event, the Ottoman navy was prepared for an expedition. It should be important to note that the Ottomans spent more time and energy during the conquest than they had initially expected. Chania was conquered in 1645, and it was followed by Rethmynon in 1646; and finally, after a long struggle and siege Candia was conquered in 1669.[6]

---

[5] Leland G. Allbaugh. *Crete: A Case Study of an Underdeveloped Area*, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1953), pp. 4-5; Michael Llewellyn Smith. *The Great Island: A Study of Crete*, (London: Longmans, 1965), p. 24; Sally Mc Kee. *Uncommon Dominion: Venetian Crete and the Myth of Ethnic Purity*, (Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia, 2000), p. 1; Cemal Tukin. "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Girit İsyanları ve 1821 Yılına kadar Girit," *Belleten*, Vol. IX, No. 24, 1945, pp. 164-172; V. Vaillant, *Les Origines de l'Autonomie Crètoise*, (Paris: L. Larose, 1902), pp. 4-7; Irene A. Bierman. "The Ottomanization of Crete," in: Irene A. Bierman, Rıfa'at Abou-El-Haj, and Donald Preziosi (eds.). *The Ottoman City and Its Parts: Urban Structure and Social Order*, (New Rochelle, New York: Aristide D. Caratzas, 1991), pp. 55-56; "Ikritish," *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Vol. III, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1960), pp. 1082-1085.

[6] According to Greene, at that time international and internal factors became ripe for the Ottomans to invade Crete as a response to the Maltese attack. See: Molly Greene. *A Shared World: Christians and Muslims in the Early Modern Mediterranean*, pp. 14-15; Elif Bayraktar. "The Implementation of Ottoman Religious Policies in Crete 1645-1735: Men of Faith as Actors in the *Kadı* Court," p. 10.

Geography

The island of Crete was the second biggest in the Eastern Mediterranean. Its proximity to the Asia Minor, Greece and the North Africa gives it a special and strategic character. The particularities of Crete's geography constitutes a distinct stage in its political history.[7] The mountainous character of the island had been a decisive factor in its rebellious history and made it possible for the people to engage in hit-and-run tactics. In other words, the mountains which stretched from the Peloponnese through Crete to Asia Minor give its special character to the island. The western part of the island includes the White Mountains and Mount Idha. Situated on the north-west coast, the Suda Bay is the finest sheltered harbor in the Mediterranean basin. Towards east and south, the landscape has a different character. As far as Lasithi and Mount Dhikti, the hills and deep-cut valleys are gentler in their form where olive trees and vines cover the land. On the northern coast, the Gulf of Candia extends which protects the harbor on the east side. The island of Dhia also protects the harbor from a north and north-east wind, but the harbor was open to winds on the western side. On the south-central part, there lies the Messara plain, which has the best soil on the island. To the east of the Messara plain, Dhikti and Lasithi mountains form a solid barrier across the island. At the eastern edge of Dhikti, the island narrows to a north-south width forming the Isthmus of Ierapetra which separates Dhikti from the Sitia Mountains.[8] The mountain ranges through the center of the island drop on the southern part which makes agricultural cultivation difficult on the south. Unlike the northern coast,

[7]Aglaia Lily Macrakis. "Cretan Rebel: Eleftherios Venizelos in Ottoman Crete, 1864-1898," (USA: Unpublished Ph.D Dissertation, Harvard University, 1983), p. 4.

[8] Elizabeth Clutton and André Kenny. *Crete*, (New Abbot, North Pomfret: David & Charles Inc, 1975), pp. 20-39.

the south does not have any natural harbors, and it is wide open to hot winds coming up from Africa throughout the year, especially in the summer.[9]

People and Population

As Molly Greene has pointed out, after the Ottoman conquest, the creation of a large Muslim community had prime importance for the nineteenth century.[10] In order to understand the origins of the Muslim population on the island, one should analyze the process of conversion to Islam. Unlike other conquered territories of the Ottoman Empire, the traditional policy of colonization was not applied to Crete after its conquest. It was argued that there was no evidence that the Muslims were brought in from the other parts of the Ottoman Empire and were settled on the island.[11] Although it was considered that the state officials, the military personnel and the *vakıf* officials were the first representatives of the Muslim population in Crete,[12] it seems that the origin of the Muslim population can be best explained by the peaceful local conversion to Islam. Greene argues that the conversion rate in Crete was higher than that of the other places in the Greek world. This can be explained by various factors: she made a correlation between the long warfare and the high rate of conversion. According to her, nearly twenty-five-year long warfare had an important impact on the weakening of religious institutions which facilitated conversion to

[9] Molly Greene. *A Shared World: Christians and Muslims in the Early Modern Mediterranean*, pp. 68-69.

[10] *ibid*., p. 11.

[11] Elif Bayraktar. "The Implementation of Ottoman Religious Policies in Crete 1645-1735: Men of Faith as Actors in the *Kadı* Court," p. 76. However, Bierman noted that "on Crete, especially in Qandiye, the Ottomans resettled mainly Muslims from their Albanian, Egyptian, and Anatolian provinces. Even some Christians (mainly Armenians) were settled on Crete. See: Irene A. Bierman. "The Ottomanization of Crete," p. 56.

[12] This argument belongs to Ersin Gülsoy. *Girit'in Fethi ve Osmanlı İdaresinin Kurulması (1645-1670)*, (İstanbul: Tarih ve Tabiat Vakfı Tatav Yayınları, 2004), cited in: Elif Bayraktar. "The Implementation of Ottoman Religious Policies in Crete 1645-1735: Men of Faith as Actors in the *Kadı* Court," p. 76. About conversion in the island see also: Ayşe Nükhet Adıyeke. "XVII. Yüzyıl Girit (Resmo) Sicillerine Göre İhtida Hareketleri ve Girit'te Etnik Dönüşüm," *XIV. Türk Tarih Kongresi*, 9-13 September 2002 (Unpublished paper).

Islam.[13] The other factor that contributed to the attractiveness of conversion to Islam was military career. In order to join the Janissary corps, the local Cretans willingly converted to Islam. The member of the tax-paying class also converted to Islam so as to join the political class.[14] According to Robert Pashley, who was an English classicist who traveled to Crete in 1834, the Muslim population of the island was produced by the conversion of the Christians to Islam, as in Albania, "without any influx of strangers to the soil."[15] In addition, he wrote that Cretan Muslims became a spiritual father of the Christian neighbors' children, they drank wine, and they married Christian women, but raised their children as "the followers of the Muslim Prophet."[16] Moreover, Tournefort, the French botanist who traveled in Crete in 1699, stated that "the Turks throughout the island are mostly renegades or sons of such."[17]

According to Stavro Skendi, the Cretans' hatred for the Venetian rule opened the island for the rapid conversion to Islam. He stated that "thirty years after the conquest … the majority of the Muslims were renegades or the children of the renegades, and by the time of the Greek Revolution (1821) half of the population consisted of the Moslems."[18]

---

[13] Here, Greene mentions the connection between the social upheaval and conversion to Islam in Anatolia between the eleventh and the fifteenth centuries. Unlike Anatolia and Crete, the conversion rate in Cyprus was very low since the latter was conquered by the Ottomans only in a year.
Molly Greene. *A Shared World: Christians and Muslims in the Early Modern Mediterranean*, p. 40.

[14] *ibid*., p. 41.
Greene noted that many of the soldiers in Crete were local converts to Islam. p. 38. It was argued that conversion to Islam was not only means to change status for the Orthodox Christians, but also for the Jews. Yet, it should be noted that compared to the local Christian the conversion rate of the Jews were in a smaller scale.
For more information see: Elif Bayraktar. "The Implementation of Ottoman Religious Policies in Crete 1645-1735: Men of Faith as Actors in the *Kadı* Court," p. 80.

[15] Robert Pashley. *Travels in Crete*, Vol. I, (Cambridge: Pitt Press, 1958), p. 194.

[16] *ibid*., p. 195.

[17] Cited in: Molly Greene. *A Shared World: Christians and Muslims in the Early Modern Mediterranean*, p. 38.

[18] Stavro Skendi. "Crypto-Christianity in the Balkan Area under the Ottomans," *Slavic Review*, Vol. XXVI, No. 2, June 1967, p. 231.

He underlined the fact that among these converts there were many Crypto-Christians. The term "*Linovamvakoi*" (a combination of two Greek words, signifying linen and cotton) used for them as in Cyprus. Among the Crypto-Christians, there were many wealthy and powerful families such as the Kourmouledes family from Khousi in the fertile plain of Messara. In 1821, they renounced Islam and joined the revolt.[19] Pashley wrote that after the Ottoman conquest, this family converted to Islam, but unlike the majority of the new converts, they baptized their children and named them Christian names.[20] It was asserted that these "sword-converts" preserved their mother tongue -Greek- and their national customs and religious superstitions. It was added that

> [they] remained Christian at heart, professing Islam ostensibly only, as a safeguard against oppression. They freely inter-married with avowed Christians, and secretly baptised their children, who answered to a Christian name in the family circle, but owned to a Mahomedan one in public.[21]

Fernand Braudel noted that the whole population of the island in 1525 was 100,000; in 1538, it had 198,844 inhabitants; in 1606, 212,000; in 1608, 220,000; and in 1636, 176, 684.[22] Greene mentions that before the great plague of 1592, the island's population was around 200,000. In 1639, there were 254,040 inhabitants on the island. Depending on Bernard Randolph figures, Greene notes that there were 80,000 "souls."[23] Tatsios estimated that in 1760, the total population of the island amounted to 275,000, out of which

---

[19] *ibid*., pp. 231-233. Hasluck also mentioned that during the Greek Revolution of 1821 many Crypto-Christians declared themselves openly as Christians and for that reason they were "massacred."
See: Margaret M. Hasluck (ed.) *Christianity and Islam under the Sultans*, (New York: Ortagon Books, 1973), p. 474.

[20] Robert Pashley. *Travels in Crete*, Vol. I, p. 105.

[21] Papers of the Greek Committee. *Crete and Greece*, (New Series, 1897), No. 1, pp. 18-19.

[22] Fernand Braudel. *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, Vol. I, (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), pp. 414-415.

[23] Molly Greene. *A Shared World: Christians and Muslims in the Early Modern Mediterranean*, pp. 50-52.

the Christians formed less than one-fourth.[24] According to Dakin, the Muslim population of the island began to shrink partially due to the pressure of the Egyptian rule. He asserts that while the population in 1821 was 289,000, it was reduced by 1840 to 129,000. Furthermore, he points out that the demographic decrease of the Muslims continued after the Egyptian rule, and many Muslims sold their estates and left the island. As a result of this, the demographic proportion of the island changed, whereas the Muslim population was 160,000 and the Christian population was 129,000 in 1821; the ratio became 60,000 Muslims to 200,000 Christians by 1866.[25] Vaillant argues that the total population of Crete in 1858 was 172,000 out of whom 123,000 were Christians and 49,000 were Muslims.[26] Woodford remarks that on the eve of the Cretan revolt of 1866, the island's population was 280,000, out of whom nearly one-fourth were Muslims.[27] According to Ayşe Nükhet Adıyeke, the general population of the island and the number of its Muslim inhabitants had sharply decreased from 1821 onwards.[28] Within a decade, the population of the island decreased from 260,000 to 170,000, of whom about 50,000-60,000 were Muslims. According to the Cretan year book (1293/1876), the total population of the island was 227,871.[29] Depending on the Ottoman yearbook, Kemal Karpat has given the number of total population as 232,834.[30] The census of 1881, conducted under the governorship of Fotiadi Paşa, showed that the total population of the island was 279,192. This meant that

---

[24] T. G. Tatsios, *The Megali Idea and the Greek-Turkish War of 1897: The Impact of the Cretan Problem on Greek Irredentism, 1866-1897*, (New York: East European Monographs, 1984), p. 20.

[25] Dougles Dakin. *The Unification of Greece, 1770-1923*, (London: Benn, 1972), p. 107.

[26] V. Vaillant, *Les Origines de l'Autonomie Crètoise*, p. 70.

[27] Stewart L. Woodford. *Crete: An Address*, p. 14.

[28] Ayşe Nükhet Adıyeke. *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Girit Bunalımı (1896-1908),* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2000), p. 77.

[29] *ibid*., p. 79. See also: *Salnâme-yi Vilâyet-i Girid*, 1293 (1876).

[30] *ibid*., p. 79.

while in Crete the Christians constituted 73 percent of the total population, the Muslims constituted 26 percent and the others were only 1 percent. According to the list provided in the British Parliamentary Papers, the total number of Cretan population in 1881 was 275,280 (202,934 Christians and 72,353 Muslims).[31] Ironically, according to the above-mentioned Cretan yearbook, the proportion of the Christians was 60 percent and the Muslims 40 percent. Depending on the figures shown in Cuinet's book, Ayşe Nükhet Adıyeke states that the total number of the population amounted to 294,192 and that the Muslim population constituted one third of the total population at the beginning of the 1890s. Furthermore, she notes that the Muslim population of the island began to decrease in 1897, the number of Muslims amounted to 70,000 constituting 23 percent of the total population (300,000). During the census of 1900, it was revealed that the decrease in the Muslim population became definite. Out of 303,553 inhabitants, the Muslims were 33,496 (11 percent), the Christians amounted to 269,319 (88 percent), and the Jews were 728 (1 percent). Between the years 1900 and 1908, the dramatic decrease in the Muslim population became slow and amounted to 37,000. According to the census figures of 1911, the number of Muslim population had decreased to 27,852.[32] For Detorakis, the population of the island amounted to 213,000 before the revolt of 1821, and fell to 129,000 in 1832-1833. According to the figures of 1858 census, the population was 278,908 and became

[31] For the details see: British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 3 (1898), *Further Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Crete*, (London: 1898), Enclosure in No. 248.

[32] It seems that a controversy arose over the figures shown by the 1881 census and the year book. This controversy was analyzed by the Sublime Porte. It revealed out that during the census of 1881 while the whole population of the Muslims did not registered, the Christians registered two times, both in the houses and workplaces. Moreover, whereas the Cretan Christians who were living in Greece were registered, the Muslims living outside the island were not registered, and the foreign subjects of the island were registered as the *Rum* Orthodox population. *ibid*., pp. 81-82 and 267-268.

For the population trends in Crete, see also: Kemal Karpat. *Ottoman Population, 1830-1914: Demographic and Social Characteristics*, (Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985); Ayşe Nükhet Adıyeke. "1881 Yılında Girit Vilayetinde Yapılan Nüfus Sayımı ve Tartışmalı Sonuçları," in: Ayşe Nükhet Adıyeke, Nuri Adıyeke. *Fethinden Kaybına Girit*, (İstanbul: Babıali Kültür Yayıncılığı, 2006), pp. 163-170; T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.EE., Dosya: 114, Gömlek: 93, Aded: 3, 1314 L 14; T.C. BOA, Şura-yı Devlet Girid, ŞD., Dosya: 2373, Gömlek: 27, Aded: 8/11, 1299 Ca 8;

276,208 (202,934 Christian Orthodox, 72,353 Muslims, 253 Catholics, 13 Protestants, 8 Armenians and 647 Jews) during the census of 1881.[33]

It is a very difficult task to ascertain the language of the Cretan people. It was argued that the Orthodox Christian population of the island was Grecophone. Due to the local origins of most of Crete's Muslims, scholars and travelers asserted that "the islanders remained Grecophone." Pashley wrote that "… Cretan speaks Greek, as is done by all the inhabitants of the island, both Mohammedans and Christians … the whole rural population of Crete understands *only* Greek. The Aghás, who live in the principal towns, also know Turkish; although even with them, Greek is essentially the mother-tongue."[34] However, according to Pashley, the common language of Crete had undergone certain changes since the poems written in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as a result of the presence of Turkish governors in three big cities and perhaps of Turkish settlers in their neighborhood. He had drawn attention to the point that "many Turkish words are now found in it, and have even got into the mouth of the Spakians, among whom no Turk has ever dwelt, and have had extremely little intercourse with the cities."[35] Depending on the evidence provided by the demographic study of the island made by a Greek member of the local administration in 1890, Greene states that "all of the inhabitants of the island without exception speak the Greek language. Both Ottomans and Christians speak Greek at home as their mother tongue. Very few -some city dwellers only- know Turkish at all."[36] William Miller noted in his book that "… the Mussulmans, no less than the Christians, with few exceptions, speak Greek as their mother tongue and know very little Turkish."[37]

---

[33] Theocharis E. Detorakis. *History of Crete*, pp. 368-370.

[34] Robert Pashley. *Travels in Crete*, Vol. I, p. 8. (emphases in original).

[35] *ibid*., p. 11.

[36] Molly Greene. *A Shared World: Christians and Muslims in the Early Modern Mediterranean*, p. 39.

[37] William Miller. *Travels and Politics in the Near East*, p. 326.

Mazower asserted that "… the Muslim peasants of Crete spoke Greek and enjoyed *Erotokritos*, the island's epic poem, as much as the Christians, from whom after all most of them were descended."[38] According to Herzfeld, communication between the Muslim and Christian communities was easy, since "almost all the Turkish Cretans were native speakers of Greek; indeed very few spoke Turkish well."[39] He further transmitted Stavrakis' words stating that "… knowledge of Turkish was extremely rare among Turkish Cretan women, and I have even encountered in Ayvalik … a West Cretan woman whose Turkish, after seventy years of domicile in Turkey, was still limited to a few conventional greetings." Stavrakis also argues that "most Muslim functionaries, including the *imâm*s of the two Dervish sects, officiated in Greek."[40] The reason for this, according to Herzfeld, is the fact that many "Turkish Cretans" were descendants of Christians who converted to Islam.[41] I do not agree with the scholars who argued that the mother tongue of the Cretan Muslims was Greek. It seems to me that a closer examination is necessary to shed light on the language of the Cretan Muslims.

About the nature and clothing of the Cretans, Sieber wrote that:

> the country people are good-natured and religious… The dress of the Cretans, particularly the country people, is very pleasing to eye. It is entirely of cotton, manufactured by the family. Short wide drawers, which leave the knee bare, a girdle to fasten them, a waistcoat and a short jacket of strong cotton, a bandage round the head, one of end of which hangs down behind, lastly coloured boots, the tops of which reach the ancles as a protection against the thorns…[42]

---

[38] Mark Mazower. *The Balkans: A Short History*, (New York: The Modern Library, 2000), p. 47.

[39] Michael Herzfeld. "Of Language and Land Tenure. The Transmission of Property and Information in Autonomous Crete," *Social Anthropology*, Vol. VII, No. 3, 1999, p. 225.

[40] *ibid*., p. 225.

[41] *ibid*., p. 225.

[42] F. W. Sieber. *Travels in the Island of Crete*, (London: Sir Richard Philips & Co, 1823), pp. 31-32. Tournefort also mentioned the costume of the Cretans writing that the clothes of the *Rum*s were very thin and they were wearing baggy trousers and unlike the European peasants, the Cretans had beautiful shoes. See: Joseph de Tournefort. *Tournefort Seyahatnamesi*, (trl.) Ali Berktay, (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2005), p. 89.

Furthermore, Sieber remarked that while the Christians could not ride at the city gate, the Muslims were free to ride. However, the Greek metropolitan was the only Christian who had the legal right to enter the city gate on his horse or mule.[43]

The surnames of the Cretans are mainly patrigroup or clan names, derived from the nickname of some outstanding ancestor, or from the ordinary given name, such as Mustafakis. The Cretan surnames generally ended with the suffix of *–akis*, marking the patrifiliation which means "son of…" and the female equivalent of *–akis* is *–poula*, which means "daughter of…."[44]

In this aspect, it is noteworthy to mention that the Cretan revolts were always linked to the epic heroism of the Sfakiots within the context of the nationalist rhetoric. Historically, it was believed that "the Cretans are the best fighters of Greece, they have the redoubled love of both highlanders and islanders for independence, their mountainous island is an extremely difficult country to subdue."[45] The Cretans have been the *palikaria* (παλικαριά/brave men, warriors) of Greece, and the Sfakiots were regarded as the *palikaria* of Crete. It was believed that the Sfakiots were lively and diligent people and were the bravest, toughest, most durable mountain warriors and the best sailors of the island. The topography of Sfakia, a natural fortress formed by the southern offshoots of Mount Ida, was combined with the heroism of the Sfakiots claiming that "… remote and inaccessible villages in the White Mountains, the Sfakiots were prominent in the resistance against Venetians, Turk…" The other factor that contributed to the Sfakiots' heroism was

---

[43] F. W. Sieber. *Travels in the Island of Crete,* p. 46. Tancoigne also touched upon to this point in his book. See: J. M. Tancoigne. *İzmir'e, Ege Adalarına ve Girit'e Seyahat: Bir Fransız Diplomatın Türkiye Gözlemleri (1811-1814)*, (trl.) Ercan Eyüboğlu, (İstanbul: Büke Yayınları, 2003), p. 65.

[44] Michael Herzfeld. "Of Language and Land Tenure. The Transmission of property and Information in Autonomous Crete," *Social Anthropology*, p. 225.

[45] William Miller. *A History of the Greek People (1821-1921)*, (New York: E. P. Dutton and Company Publishers, 1922), p. 77.

considered to be "the relative absence of the state from Sfakia."[46] Sieber considered Sfakia as "the Tyrol of Crete" stating that:

> "… [it] is the only part of the island where the inhabitants are free from the direct yoke of the Turks. This province, … is the property of the Sultana Valide, and not under any Pacha, but under the Defterdar or treasurer of Candia. The land produces sufficiency of good wine, corn, honey… Each village has its own captain, who is always a Greek, and not a Turk or Subbaschi. They hate this word, and cannot bear the sight of a Turk. They are tall, well-made, and have a dignified gait… They have a high opinion of their country, and are passionately attached to it."[47]

Another peculiarity of the Sfakiots was their "love of arms." Dapper, the Flemish doctor, remarked that "to be armed at all times was a point of pride with them."[48] Live-stock theft was also a part of their life. The Sfakiots were also fierce towards one another and a quarrel could be pursued for generations and *vendetta* and armed strife between families were very common in that region.[49]

The available documentation is significantly silent about the portrait of the Cretan Christian insurgents. In other words, it is very hard to give a clear portrait of an individual insurgent. Yet, certain documents in the Ottoman Archives reveal that the insurgents were mainly composed of two elements: the first element was the outlaws who had committed very serious crimes on the island. The second one was composed of the local Christians, coming from various segments of the society. Harsh landscape, wild, savage, trackless and waterless mountains made it possible for the Cretans to engage in hit-and-run tactics and guerilla warfare. The insurgents were armed with Martini rifles and most of them carried knives and pistols. During the time of the revolts, the insurgents had established their

---

[46] Sean Damer. "Legless in Sphakiá: Drinking and Social Practice in Western Crete," *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, Vol. VI, No. 2, October 1988, pp. 295-296; Papers of the Greek Committee. *Crete and Greece*. p. 21; J. M. Tancoigne. *İzmir'e, Ege Adalarına ve Girit'e Seyahat: Bir Fransız Diplomatın Türkiye Gözlemleri (1811-1814)*, p. 69.

[47] F. W. Sieber. *Travels in the Island of Crete*, p. 108.

[48] Adam Hopkins. *Crete: Its Past, Present and People*, (London: Faber, 1977), p. 126.

[49] *ibid*., p. 127.

headquarters along the mountains which had long been home to the insurgents. When the heavy snow blanketed the mountains, they returned to their villages to take care of their annual business. Their system of fighting was from the rocks. In addition, they surrounded the blockhouses held by the Ottoman troops and kept up constant fire on strategic points and Muslim villages. They attacked the towns and Muslim villages and sacked, burned, pillaged these villages and houses. Besides, they cut down and destroyed the olive trees, carried off the cattle, cut off the telegraphic lines in order to halt communication, cut down the water supplies, looted whatever valuables and cash they could find and got involved in similar acts of violence.

Prevelakis provided a very heroic narrative about the clothes of the Christian insurgents, which deserve to be quoted at length here:

> … their hair grown grey in the wars, with beards cascading down to their knees; rugged, mature men with steely mustaches and eyes that glowed like coals; and young stalwarts, callow youths, and mere boys with down on their lips –all dressed in warlike finery, tight-belted, high-booted, covered with steel and decorated with silver chains. The old-timers wore the traditional floppy *fez* with a long tassel that rested on their shoulders like a hunting falcon, while the younger men and boys wore kerchiefs tied in various ways, some rolled into rings, other folded over ten times on the top of their heads, and others knotted at the nape of the neck like a pirate's…[50]

When the Cretan Christian insurgents marched from one place to another, they sang songs of heroism, especially *The Eagle*, *Constantine*, *The Conflagrations of Crete*, that revealed their "heroic battle." The first thing to recognize about the sleeping place of the insurgents is that they generally slept in open air. Sleeping in caves was also pervasive. During the Cretan revolt of 1897, Kondilaki observed that sleeping in stables was a luxury for the insurgents.[51] With regard to the revolt that took place in Alikianou in 1897,

---

[50] Pandelis Prevelakis. *The Cretan*, (trl.) Abbott Rick, Peter Mackridge, (Minneapolis: Nostos, 1991), pp. 242-243.

[51] Vasilios Fr. Tomadakis. *Ιωάννου Δ. Κονδυλάκη άγνωστα απομνημονεύματα (1905): από την συμμετοχή του στη Κρητική Επανάσταση του 1897: παράρτημα: οι επώνυμες ανταποκρίσεις του Ιωάννου Δ. Κονδυλάκη από την Μήλο και την Κρήτη κατά την επανάσταση του 1897*, (Athens: Kardamitsas, 2002), p. 66.

Kondilaki stated that the coffee-houses became the sleeping place for the insurgents.[52] The documentation illustrated that the insurgents had very simple and ordinary food. They had eaten bread, onion, cheese, garlic, olive, *peksimet* and *galeta*; they had drunk wine and *tsikodia* (*rakı*).

A Profile from the Socio-Economic Life of Cretan Muslims: the Council of *Evkaf* and Orphans

When the socio-economic life of the Cretans was considered, it reveals that the *dhimoyerondia*[53] and the Council of *Evkaf* and Orphans were the essential elements for the well-being of the Cretan society. While the former was responsible for the Christians, the latter was for the Muslims. These institutions served the economic and social needs of the Cretans, and facilitated the integration of the society. They were not only functional in providing socio-economic needs of the Cretans but also religious ones. The duties of Christian *dhimoyerondia* were determined in the *Dhimoyerondia Nizâmnâmesi* prepared in 1859.[54] In the Provincial Regulation of Crete (*Girid Vilâyet Nizâmnâmesi*) issued in 1866, the responsibilities of the Christian and Muslim *dhimoyerondia*s were also defined.[55]

---

[52] *ibid*., p. 186.

[53] δημογεροντία is a Greek word derives from the combination of δήμος (community) and γέροντας (old man) and means the council of elders.

[54] *dhimoyerondia* will be composed of the three councils of the province, namely Chania, Candia and Rethymnon. The members will be above the age of 35 and will be chosen by the people. They must absolutely be married, should have property at the value of 50,000 *kuruş*, should be literate, should know the religious rules, should be clever enough and should not have been into the prison whatever the reason is, should not have acted against the will of the state, should not have engaged in false witnessing, should not have gone bankruptcy and should be experienced people. And their election will totally be based on the rules applied in the case of the country council's members. After the election, the president of the elders will approve the members of the council and will visit the office of the governor with the members of the council. The governor will inspect to see if these elders (*dhimoyeron*s) have the above-mentioned features and will then endorse and execute their official duties. So, these elders will go to their place of service, will receive the books, accounting documents and goods that were left from their predecessors. These elders will appoint one from amongst them as the treasurer (*sandık emini*), will also appoint a professional clerk and if needed another clerk and the other officers. And the treasurer chosen from amongst them and the other elders will swear before the bishop that they will not disturb the property and goods of the orphans and that they will not use them for other peoples' business. Since the treasurer is responsible from the safety of the property and the goods, he will bring in three guarantors in case some money (*akçe*) is taken into his own personal accounts.

On the economic sphere, it is noteworthy to mention that the Council of *Evkaf* and Orphans played a significant role in the economic activities of the Cretans, especially of the Muslims. It seems that the Muslim people often applied to the council in order to borrow money. Through mortgaging their certain properties and goods, and showing a few people as the guarantors and accepting the terms of interest payment, they could request

---

The president of the Chania *dhimoyerondia* will be headed by the despot of Chania, and the Candia *dhimoyerondia* by the bishop of Crete, the Rethymnon *dhimoyerondia* by the Rethymnon despot. Seven members will be appointed to the Chania *dhimoyerondia*, one person from Chania and one person from its *nahiye*, one from Kissamos, one from Selinos, one person from Apokoron, one from Sfakia, and a priest selected by the despot. *Dhimoyerondia* of the *sancak* of Candia will have one member from each *nahiye* as in the country council (*memleket meclisi*), and will have a priest chosen by the president (totally seven members). If there is no alliance between the chosen ones for the member to be appointed, a lot will be cast from the two *nahiye*s. For the Rethymnon *dhimoyerondia*, there will be a total of six members appointed where there will be one member from Rethymnon and one from its *nahiye*, one from Milopotamos, Ayvasil and Amari and a priest chosen by the president. Since the regulation of the *dhimoyerondia* council of these three *sancak*s will be made for the Cretan bishop those having problems will petition to the bishop and also regarding the cases of inheritance and the subjects related to the orphans which are under the supervision of the related *dhimoyerondia* council administration, they have to petition to the Cretan bishop through their presidents. Hence since the *dhimoyerondia*s are authorized to protect the movable and immovable properties of the orphans they will administer the situation to the level they are authorized to. Meaning that it is their duty to sell a thing when understood that the sale will be beneficial and will deposit orphans' money for an interest and will give liens and will give their lands for farming in a secure manner. It is also their duty to provide a good administration for the orphans and to have a good supervision over them. For the court cases regarding only the Christian inheritors and transferred to them by the government this council will engage in the distribution of such properties. But for those not having the right to inheritance, but who have filed a case against the heirs, their court cases will be carried out in the related courts. *Dhimoyerondia* of each *sancak*, once every three months and with the approval of their president and their supervision will review and finalize their accounts regarding the orphans and the inheritances and will close their books and will keep the books. And the members will be renewed once every two years. When a house of an orphan has to be sold through *dhimoyerondia*, at the end of the auction, for the party given the right to acquire the property and the orphans identity papers and vouchers showing the names of the owner orphans, the client's name and the value of the property and the amount and this voucher will be sent by the presidents to the government. If the thing sold is a property the tax will be determined by the court, if the owner is a *vakıf* a sales note is prepared and if it is a property of the directorate, after getting the tax defined by the cadastre on the basis of the title deed, the title deed prepared by the officer will be given. When a place is rented the contract note will be issued by taking this into consideration.

T.C. BOA, Şura-yı Devlet Girid, ŞD., Dosya: 2373, Gömlek: 2, Aded: 13/46, 1298 Ş 21; T.C. BOA, Şura-yı Devlet Girid, ŞD., Dosya: 2371, Gömlek: 31, Aded: 45/130, 1293 L 24. See also: Nuri Adıyeke. "Rum Cemaat Örgütlenmesi Olarak 'Dimoyerandiya'lar: Girit Örneği," in: Ayşe Nükhet Adıyeke, Nuri Adıyeke. *Fethinden Kaybına Girit*, pp. 199-214.

[55] According to article 67 of this regulation, in each center of the *mutasarrıflık* there will be two *dhimoyerondia*s, one specific to Christianity and the other to Islam. The Christian *dimogerondia* will be chosen from amongst one of the *mutasarrıflık*'s spiritual leader and the *mutasarrıflık*'s trial council, and one from the Christian members of *mutasarrıflık*'s administrative council and two Christians to be chosen from amongst the members of the elderly councils of all the villages existing in the *mutasarrıflık* for a period of three years; and the Muslim *dhimoyerondia* from amongst one of the *naib*s and Muslim member of the mixed trial council of the *mutasarrıflık* and from amongst one of the Muslim members of the administrative council and two Muslims to be chosen from amongst the elderly councils of all the villages existing in the *mutasarrıflık* for a period of three years.

Düstûr, *I. Tertîb*, Vol. I, (Dersaâdet: Matbaa-i Osmâniye, 1330), *Girid Vilâyet Nizâmnâmesi*, p. 668.

loans. Although the majority of the people asking for a loan were Muslims, it was also seen that in certain situations Christians asked for a loan. While some of the people who asked for a loan used the money in their businesses related to their professions, some others requested the loans to fulfill their needs. The requests for loans were generally made for a payment period of one year. However, in certain cases people also borrowed money to pay for their previous loans.[56]

The Muslim inhabitants of Crete complaining of being poor and needy requested aid from the fund for benevolent activities (*şefkat sandıkları*) and asked for appropriate amounts of money. It seems that mothers who married their daughters but were poor and needy and were not able to get things and prepare a dowry for their daughters asked for money and help from the fund for benevolent activities to be able to get the dowry and the things needed. Although generally mothers asked for aid for a dowry and household goods,

[56] Request for a loan of 300 *kuruş* from Chania Orphans Fund by Nazlı Hatun who mortgaged her house at Ağa Camii quarter within the city and who brought in her husband Mehmet Ağa, the boot artisan, as the guarantor. Request for a loan of 2,100 *kuruş* for a year by Demirci Lopaki who mortgaged her shop near the highway outside the castle gate going to Halepa and who brought in Demirci Lopaki Halil Ağa as the guarantor. Meryem bint-i Sotaki Mustafa requested for a loan of 1,500 *kuruş* for a year accepting the legal interests by mortgaging her house which was in Hünkar quarter in Chania. Kalyoncuzade Aziz Efendi asked for a loan of 2,500 *kuruş* for a period of six months to meet his basic needs by accepting the legal interest by mortgaging the shop (half of which he owns) which was in Yorgancılar Street and by bringing in his brother Kalyoncuzade Ali Efendi, the director of the *nahiye* of Chania, as the guarantor. Ahmed Hakkı asked for a loan of 8,000 *kuruş* for his basic needs mortgaging half of his house in İçkale and bringing in his deceased brother Mustafa Hakkı Efendi's wife Esma Hanım and Abdülkadiraki Mehmed Kapudan as guarantors. Abdurrahman Çavuşoğlu Ali requested a loan of 7,000 *kuruş* for a period of one year in order to straighten his business by mortgaging his 5 *kilelik* arable field together with 45 olive trees in the Morkana Suhora region in Mornis village of the district of Cydonia. This field is surrounded by the property of Hacı Kostoyanaki Ağlikozi and Aya Lefteri Monastery property on the one hand, and by Çorbacakalar's *Vakıf* arable field and also his own property on the other hand. Selim Efendi, the guardian of the late Şerbetçi Mustafa Ağa's minor child Osman, requested a loan of 2,000 *kuruş* from the Chania Elders of Orphans (*Hanya Eytâm Heyeti*) so as to cover the debts of Osman towards the merchants and custom houses. Kapudanzade Hasan Fehmi, resident of Chania, asked for a loan from the money of Hacı Yahyazaki Ahmed Efendi which was administered by the Council of Chania *Evkaf* and Orphans for his needs by mortgaging his lands on the way of Halepa on the guarantee of his father. Gamman, one of the orphan children of the late Şerbetçi Mustafa Ağa, asked for a loan of 4,000 *kuruş* from the Council of Chania *Evkaf* and Orphans for purchasing some equipment for shoemaking. Bayrakdaropola Halime Hanım, the widow wife of the late Kortoraki Osman Efendi, asked for a loan of 85 Ottoman gold for a period of one year from the Council of Chania Orphans and *Evkaf* for her needs by mortgaging her house in Hünkar quarter and bringing in broker Ağakaki Süleyman Ağa and her son Kortoraki İbrahim Efendi as guarantors.

OBA, Klasör 1, No 320, 21 Mart 1309; OBA, Klasör 3, No 52, 5 Teşrînisânî 1311; OBA, Klasör 5, No 321, 1 Kanûnıevvel 1304; OBA, Klasör 5, No 91, 11 Nisan 1305; OBA, Klasör 4, No 194, 16 Ağustos 1304; OBA, Klasör 5, No 144, 3 Haziran 1306 ; OBA, Klasör 5, No 466, 17 Kanûnısânî 1303; OBA, Klasör 5, No 40, 16 Ağustos 1305; OBA, Klasör 5, No 106, 14 Haziran 1305; OBA, Klasör 5, No 345, 7 Kanûnısânî 1304.

it is also seen that in certain cases, fathers or the siblings of the marrying girls or even the married poor daughters and siblings would ask the fund for benevolent activities for dowry aid. Although in such requests, the aid was completed by giving the appropriate amount, sometimes requests were made for the supply of the needed household goods. It should also be mentioned that the elderly men of the villages or the neighborhoods demanded aid for a dowry and household goods from the fund for benevolent activities for the poor and the newly married girls of the neighborhood or the village. If the married girl was an underage orphan, aid request from the fund for benevolent activities was made by her guardian.[57]

The Muslims could rent or purchase council's immovable properties like shops, houses, farms and fields through auction. It should be important to note that those real estates were not only rented or sold to the Muslim bidders, but also to the Christians. Yet, the documents do not tell us whether there were certain regulations or restrictions for the Christian bidders. It is clear that Christians were allowed to rent real estates belonging to the Muslim pious foundations. Money obtained from the rents and sales of these properties

[57] The request for aid by Nazife bint-i Mustafa Kalimaki, resident of Cezair Kulu quarter and the mother of Adile, stating that her daughter Adile married Ağakaki İsmail and that being poor they did not have the financial power to buy the dowry and asked for appropriate households. İbrahim Hasan Bölükbaşaki requested aid stating that her daughter Şahine married İbrahimaki Ahmed Ağa, the resident of Chania, and that being poor he did not have power to by her daughter's dowry and he asked for appropriate households to Şahine. Mehvire, the daughter of Bonsaki Hasan Ağa married Hacı Balasaki Ali Bey, but since Mehvire's father was poor and could not buy certain household goods and a dowry for his daughter, the *muhtar* of Daraço village, in Cydonia, asked for help that the needed money or the household goods be given to Mehvire. Fatma bint-i Hüseyin Arnavutalaki, requested aid saying that her daughter Zekiye, the orphan of the late Vopa Mustafa Kapudan, married Hafizaki Ahmed from Suda and that being poor and powerless, appropriate money be given by the above-mentioned fund to Zekiye. Haydaraki İsmail requested aid from the Chania Fund for Benevolent Activities stating that her sister Aliye married İbraki Halil Ağa, the inhabitants of Kirtomazo village of Kidonya *kaza* and that their house in Sifyana village was destroyed by the Christians and that the needed money be given to Aliye for her dowry. Seyide bint-i Mustafa Badaraki, the resident of Musa Paşa quarter, requested aid from the Chania Fund for Benevolent Activities stating that she married Şeyh Alaki Salih and that being poor a dowry be given to her. 68 *kuruş* 30 *para* was paid for the shroud expenses of the poor Zarife Süleyman Ağazopola by the Lasithi Fund for Benevolent Activities.

OBA, Klasör 5, No 424, 28 Mart 1304; OBA, Klasör 5, No 450, 28 Şubat 1304; OBA, Klasör 5, No 53, 7 Temmuz 1305; OBA, Klasör 5, No 54, 3 Temmuz 1305; OBA, Klasör 5, No 64, 9 Eylül 1305; OBA, Klasör 5, No 69, 3 Teşrînievvel 1305; OBA, Klasör 9, No 112, 22 Mart 1298.

were among the major sources of its revenues.[58] Repair and maintenance expenses of the various *vakıf* buildings, houses, shops, schools, mills, fountains, and underground storage depots which were administered by this council and the daily wages of those working at the repair jobs were provided by the council and its funds. It is seen that the payment for such expenses were directly made from the *vakıf*'s funds. However, in some cases it was also seen that payments were made through the fiduciaries.[59]

---

[58] The arable field belonging to the *vakıf* of Hanyevizadegân's School and *Medrese*, which has 100 olive oil trees and which is surrounded by the public high way and by the real estates of Yorgi Ikotaki, Hristo Zaskalaki, Kostandi Hristaki and Aplomi Azboyazaki in Vaho village of Uyanu *kaza* is given to Selim Fahri at the end of the auction for farming with a charge of 2,361 *kuruş* beginning by the September of 1312 for a period of four years. The arable field with its 22 olive trees and three fig trees within Kendre village in Kanbo and the olive yards in Potamus were contracted to Mehmed bin Halil Ayvasaki of Ierapetre with a price of 301 *kuruş*. A store belonging to the *vakıf* of Küçük Hacı İbrahim in Gazi Hüseyin Paşa quarter in Rethymnon was rented to Mustafa Hamidaki, the grocery and a resident of Rethymnon, at a price of 428 *kuruş* for the period beginning by 5 July 1308 till the end of February 1308. In the year 1312, the arable field numbered 8 and the houses and the ruined oil production facility within it, which were a part of the real estates of the *vakıf* of Hanyevizadegân's School and *Medrese* in Yapıncı village in the neighborhood of Kasarazis, were given to Hacı Antuan Kaliva for farming with a charge of 700 *kuruş* beginning by the September of 1312. The store No. 299 in the shopping district of İmaret in Gazi Hüseyin Paşa quarter of Rethymnon *kaza* was rented to the seller of clothing accessories Buhur Arditi, who resided in Rethymnon and who was from the inhabitants of Smyrna, at a price of 725 *kuruş* for a period of one year. Four pear trees, six mulberry trees, 315 olive trees and ten arable fields belonging to the *vakıf* of Albanoğlu Mehmed bin Ali were given to the highest bidder Yorgi Dolkiraki for farming with a charge of 5,710 *kuruş* for four years.

OBA, Klasör 4, No 93, 7 Eylül 1312; OBA, Klasör 4, No 95, 7 Eylül 1312; OBA, Klasör 6, No 14, 3 Temmuz 1892; OBA, Klasör 4, No 89, 7 Eylül 1312; OBA, Klasör 6, No 38, Haziran 1889; OBA, Klasör 3, No 3, 20 Eylül 1309.

[59] The cost of the sand and soil used in the repair of tailor Nakaki's shop which was at Yusuf Paşa quarter in the village of Soğuk Çeşme in Chania and the related labor charges of 90 *kuruş* 10 *para* were paid by the Chania *Evkaf* Fund. 32 *kuruş* 22 *para* which was the charge for the repair of his shop in the wood market to Albotaki Mustafa by the Chania Orphans Fund. 38 *kuruş* which was the charge for the doors opened in two shops belonging to the *vakıf* of Yeni Camii in Ierapetra was paid to the tenant Turkosazaki Hasan by the Lasithi *Evkaf* Fund. 11 *kuruş* 10 *para* which was the cost for the pipes needed for the taps of the fountains in Ierapetra was paid to Hasan, the water distributor (*su yolcu*) of the Hacı Piri Fountain, by the Lasithi *Evkaf* Fund. The total 174 *kuruş* which was the charge for the repair of the water pathway of the Kendre Fountain, for 12 *kıyye* olive oil and for the daily wages of two workers was paid to İbrahim Ağa Ayvasaki, Odabaşaki Ali Efendi, and Merabotaki Hasan Ağa by the Lasithi *Evkaf* Fund. 63 *kuruş* which was the charge for the lime taken for the construction of *İslâm Maârifi* in Leb-i Derya was paid to Kosta Çamarya of Akrotor by the Chania Muslim Educational Fund (*Hanya İslâm Maârifi Sandığı*). The wage charge of 1,180 *kuruş* for the one month seven days' repair work in the water pathway in the neighborhood of Parasiza in Ierapetre town was paid to the repair officer Ali Rıza and water distributor Osman and water distributor Hasan by the Lasithi *Evkaf* Fund. 294 *kuruş* 25 *para* which was the charge for the repair of the field's wall in Papazya and of the water mill of Mehmed and Selime, the minor orphan children of Veliyüddin Bey, in Kaldirus were paid to *mültezim* Hüseyin Behçet by the Lasithi Muslim Orphans Fund. A document dated 24 Temmuz 1300 shows that a decision taken for the collection of 36 *kuruş* fee for the animals employed in the transportation works for the repair of Aşağıkı Sibyan School by the education department to convert it into a girls' school is to be taken from Lasithi Educational Fund (*Laşid Maârif Sandığı*) and fiduciary Salih Berataki Receb Efendi to be appointed for this duty. A signed receipt by Yani Yanakaki stating that 152 *kuruş*, the cost of three units of goods and belongings sold to the supply office of Sibyan School is received from the Lasithi Educational Fund through the fiduciary Salih Berataki.

On the religious sphere, the council was also functional in addressing the religious needs of the Muslims. Restoration and repair of the Muslim worship places, mosques *mevlevihâne*s and *dergâh*s, operating under the *Evkaf*, meeting the expenses of the carpets, mats, oil lamp, candle and other similar materials, appointment of the officials to work in these places and payment of their salaries were among the important activities of the council. The Council of *Evkaf* and Orphans and the *vakıf* accountants were responsible for the protection of the mosques, *mescid*s and other pious foundations (*hayratlar*) and their administration and they had to ensure the repair and the maintenance of the disturbed ones. Besides, they had to look after these places well, to keep them clean and to administer these places in conformity with the *vakıf* laws. Moreover, attention should be paid to strengthen the religious officials like the *imâm*s, preachers *(hatip)* and prayer (*müezzin*) and to increase their religious knowledge. Actions and behavior of these religious officials would be closely followed and it was their duty to dismiss those engaging in actions to create hatred of the people.[60] This council financed the expenditure items of the above-mentioned buildings and their various materials.[61]

OBA, Klasör 7, No 65, 21 Temmuz 1304; OBA, Klasör 3, No 27, 24 Temmuz 1309; OBA, Klasör 7, No 488, 12 Kanûnısânî 1305; OBA, Klasör 7, No 269, 31 Temmuz 1304; OBA, Klasör 7, No 275, 29 Şubat 1304; OBA, Klasör 9, No 208, 27 Teşrînisânî 1314; OBA, Klasör 7, No 438, 2 Kanûnısânî 1308; OBA, Klasör 6, No 42, 25 Teşrînievvel 1308; OBA, No 51, 24 Temmuz 1300; OBA, Klasör 6, No 53, 15 Temmuz 1300.

[60] *Düstûr*, *I. Tertib*, Vol. IV, (Dersaâdet: Matbaa-i Osmâniye, 1330), pp. 603-604.

[61] A document dated 1305 records that 21 *kuruş* 5 *para* which was the cost for the repair of the windows of the Defterdar Ahmed Paşa Mosque and the change of its glasses was paid by the Lasithi *Evkaf* Fund (*Laşid Evkaf Sandığı*) to Ali Rüstem, caretaker (*kayyûm*) and custodian (*ferrâş*). The charge of 16 *kuruş* for the transportation of mats bought for the various mosques on the way going from Spirlanga to Yenişehir was paid to Yorgi by Lasithi *Evkaf* Fund. 75 *kuruş* which was the charge for the olive oil (*revgan-ı zeyt*) used in the Spirlanga Mosque for the year 1290 was paid to Arnavutaki Molla Hüseyin by the Lasithi *Evkaf* Fund. 100 *kuruş* which was the charge for the 20 *kıyye* olive oil used in the olive lamps of the Kendre Mosque between 1304 and 1305 was paid to *imâm* Receb by the Lasithi *Evkaf* Fund. 61 *kuruş* was paid by the Lasithi *Evkaf* Fund for the repair of the Karakaş Mehmed Ağa Mosque's toilets. 261 *kuruş* 30 *para* which was the charge for the illumination of the Uyanu Mosque for one year was paid to *imâm* Akif Hüseyin by the *sancak* of Lasithi *Evkaf* Fund. 226 *kuruş* which was the charge for the illumination and other things of the Yenişehir Karakaş Mehmed Ağa Mosque was paid to *imâm* Şaban by the Lasithi *Evkaf* Fund. 85 *kuruş* which was the charge for the restoration of the Yenişehir Karakaş Mehmed Ağa Mosque was paid to *imâm* Şaban by the Lasithi *Evkaf* Fund. 59 *kuruş* 27 *para* which was the charge for the material used in the restoration of the Defterdar Ahmed Paşa Mosque was paid to Ali Rüstem, caretaker and custodian, by the Lasithi *Evkaf* Fund.

The protection of the movable and immovable properties of the minor orphans, sharing of inheritance, appointment of guardians to the orphans, release of the guardians and selling or renting the properties of the orphans, allocation of maintenance (*nafaka*) for the orphans, meeting their basic needs, provision of their Ramadan needs, needs for clothing, heating and treatment, and the travel expenses were among the important aid activities of this council. Payments of maintenance and aids were directly made by this council or its cash departments of orphans.[62]

For the neighborly disputes and family matters, the Muslim people applied to the council and made their complaints. Recorded cases show that most of the problems between the neighbors emerged due to reasons such as gossip and false accusations. When the couples could not get along with each other, they spelt out their complaints, and asked for "kindly and compassionately" call their husbands or wives. They also demanded that the "religious law be applied" for their husbands or wives or requested divorce.[63]

67,5 *kuruş* which was the charge for the clock purchased for the Defterdar Ahmed Paşa Mosque in Ierapetra was paid to Semercaki Ali Bayram by the Lasithi *Evkaf* Fund. 6 *kuruş* 30 *para* which was the charge for the oil lamps used during the *Kurban Bayramı* in the Küçük Hüseyin Paşa Mosque was paid to Haseki Mahmud Ağa by the Administration of Chania *Evkaf* Fund (*Hanya Evkaf İdâresi Sandığı*). 698 *kuruş* 30 *para* which was the charge for the candles used in the mosques was paid to Marko Markolay by the Chania *Evkaf* Fund.

OBA, Klasör 6, No 14, 31 Kanûnıevvel 1305; OBA, Klasör 7, No 78, 10 Teşrînievvel 1289; OBA, Klasör 7, No 80, 26 Şaban 1290; OBA, Klasör 7, No 273, 15 Temmuz 1304; OBA, Klasör 7, No 75, 13 Teşrînievvel 1289; OBA, Klasör 7, No 88, 30 Şaban 1290; OBA, Klasör 7, No 213, 29 Şubat 1304; OBA, Klasör 7, No 214, 29 Şubat 1304; OBA, Klasör 7, No 286, 20 Teşrînievvel 1304; OBA, Klasör 7, No 268, 12 Mart 1304; OBA, Klasör 4, No 3, 11 Haziran 1311; OBA, Klasör 4, No 78, 15 Kanûnısânî 1311.

[62] The orphan Hüseyin, the minor son of the late Hüseyin Ağa received his August 1309 maintenance of 300 *kuruş* from the Chania Orphans Fund. It was decided that 500 *kuruş* would be paid to the minor child of the late Canım Hocazade Said Efendi as the Ramadan expense which he receives every year. Request by the guardian of the orphan, Mustafa Efendi, that 15 French gold should be given by *Hanya Emvâl-i Eytâm-ı Müslimîn Müdüriyeti*, to be spent in the treatment of Malakaraki Hasan Ağa who was injured and was currently in İstanbul. The orphan Celal, the son of the late Karvonaki İsmail Bey, requested 265 *kuruş* 15 *para* from his money in the fund for his travel expenses to go to Benghazi. Abdüsselamaki Hasan Efendi, the guardian of the late Arnavud Elmas Ağa's orphans, rented orphans's cellar to Mösyö Previ Franko at a price of 12 French *lirâ*s for one year. OBA, Klasör 3, No 35, 28 Temmuz 1309; OBA, Klasör 3, No 55, 18 Kanûnısânî 1312; OBA, Klasör 3, No 16, 4 Nisan 1311; OBA, Klasör 5, No 49, 30 Eylül 1305; OBA, Klasör 5, No 233, 11 Nisan 1306.

[63] Saniye Hanım, the wife of Cabadonaki Mehmet, requested that her husband Mehmed Efendi who has bitterly beaten her and her son Hüseyin without any reason be called in and educated to act in a good manner and be warned not to engage in such a bad treatment again. Of the inhabitants of Hünkar quarter Nakiye Demirçopola requested that her husband shoemaker Dellaki Ali who maltreated and tortured her and continuously cursed at her, almost starved her to death and treated her terribly two days ago be called in,

Another situation in which the *vakıf* administration entered into the scene was the case of paying for the damages that the Muslim people were exposed to due to various reasons. Ledaki Hüseyin, who was a gardener at the small garden in a place called Çukurbostan at Topaltı in Chania and who married Şakire Hanım, the daughter of Mısırlaki Mehmed, was in a bad situation due to being poor and due to burning down of his home in Laşina quarter in Cydonia by the Christians, he requested a certain sum of money from the Fund for Benevolent Activities.[64] Another case dated 21 September 1889 mentioned that Mehmed Kafalaki who was given the properties for farming for a period of two years left by the late Hacı İsmailakiEmin, a resident of Mesa Vukolis village of Kisamo had made profits for the year 1888, but in 1889 his olives were damaged and his house was totally burnt down, and therefore requested that his rent amount be decreased proportionally in line with the damages incurred.[65] Hacı Hüseyinaki Ahmed requested aid by stating that he was the tenant of the properties of the orphans of the late Arnavud Aziz Ağa of Zarpanya,

---

asked that every thing necessary be done to prevent him acting in the same manner again and requested that she be saved from him. Ferdane bint-i Ahmed Avnaki, a resident of Chania, complained of her husband İbrahim Sohora who went to the wine houses everyday and attempted to kill her and requested a divorce. Hamid Arifaki, from the shipping tradesmen and a resident of Chania, came home ten days ago, expelled his wife Osmanapola Aliye Hanım from home by telling bad words and even attempted to kill her with a knife in his hand. Due to safety of her life being in danger, Aliye Hanım requested that her husband be called in and the necessary action be taken. Master Reşidaki İlhami stated that his wife, Melek Hatun, had been leaving home without his consent and wandered around, and although he had firmly told and warned her about it she did not listen to him and continued to act in the same manner, and he requested that his wife be called in and the necessary punishment be given to her. Fatma bint-i Abdullah Zenci, the resident of Kumkapı quarter, complained of her husband stating that he tortured both her and her child (one year old) and requested that her husband be called in and warned him about it. Hamide bint-i Hasan Mısrî Cemal complained of her neighbors Emine, Sıdıka, and Cemile, the residents of Cezair Kulu quarter at Chania, stating that they despised her honor by telling bad words and that she had complained of them before but it did not provide any result and requested that they be called in and warned them and that the necessary action be taken. Complaints of Saliha bint-i Çicaki Mustafa's siblings Hasan, Bekir and Bayram Çicaki to punish Portakalopola Kübra, Melapedri's sister Emine, residents of Kumkapı quarter, who have gossiped that, Saliha bint-i Çiçaki Mustafa, the wife of grocer Melapedri and a resident of Kumkapı quarter, had supposedly a relationship with a person named butcher Mavri and that she acted immorally.

OBA, Klasör 5, No 155, 10 Teşrînisânî 1306; OBA, Klasör 5, No 158, 27 Rebiyyülevvel 1308; OBA, Klasör 5, No 38, 16 Ağustos 1305; OBA, Klasör 5, No 163, 5 Kanûnıevvel 1306; OBA, Klasör 5, No 166, 3 Kanûnıevvel 1306; OBA, Klasör 5, No 175, 25 Ağustos 1306; OBA, Klasör 5, No 392, 3 Temmuz 1304; OBA, Klasör 5, No 104, 13 Temmuz 1305.

[64] OBA, Klasör 5, No 7, 20 Şubat 1305.

[65] OBA, Klasör 5, No 209, 9 Eylül 1305.

and that his crops were demolished and disappeared during the revolt and terror of the Christians and that he incurred losses.[66] Mısırlaki İbrahim who rented for a period of two years the properties of the minor orphans Hasan and Cemile, the children of the late Ömer Ağa from the village of Vukolis in Kisamo, stated that he could not earn anything at all from the orchard crops and cereal grains and that during his immigration the crops were seized by the Christians and that the crops subject to damage be deducted from the rent amount.[67] Request for a new land by the tenant of the flour mill belonging to the orphans of the late Aziz Ağa who was a resident of the Poniye village of the *kaza* of Kisamo stated that the mill was damaged due to a water flood.[68] Cemali Tripaki who rented the properties of the orphans Mustafa Tripaki and Osman Kanberaki in Selene in the August of 1888 for a period of two years at a price of 1,220 *kuruş* from the Chania Orphans Fund stated that he had to desert the mentioned properties due to the revolt taking place in the year 1305, and that he could not get any crops and demanded that 500 *kuruş* be deducted from the lease amount.[69]

Rebellious History of the Island

From a deeper and historical perspective, it can be argued that revolts have been the amalgamation force throughout the Cretan history and the words "Crete" and "revolt" became almost synonymous.[70] During the Venetian rule, the island witnessed many revolts. In the thirteenth century, insurgent Greek *archontes* with their families and

[66] OBA, Klasör 5, No 208, 21 Şubat 1305.

[67] OBA, Klasör 5, No 211, 13 Eylül 1305.

[68] OBA, Klasör 5, No 279, 10 Mart 1307.

[69] OBA, Klasör 5, No 239, 7 Eylül 1306.

[70] Arthur J. May. "Crete and the United States, 1866-1869," *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. XVI, December 1944, p. 287.

followers revolted so as to regain their property and prestige taken by Venice during the conquest of the island. The Hagiostefanites and other Greek noble families fought for social and economic advantages. The revolt of St. Tito occurred in 1363 was different from previous revolts. Allying with the Greeks of the island, the Latin colonists initiated the revolt for political independence.[71] The Cretans of the western Crete revolted in 1502 complaining of the compulsory services which Venice demanded of them.[72]

After the Ottoman conquest, one of the most notable revolts was that of Daskolyiannēs revolt that took place in western Crete in the spring of 1770. John Vlachos, known as Daskolyiannēs, was a Cretan notable and shipowner in Sfakia and his ships traded throughout the Mediterranean and the Black Sea. He often traveled to the Black Sea where he had the opportunity to establish relations with the Russians. It should be important to note that 1770 was also the year of the Orloff uprisings which broke out in Russia as part of the Russo-Ottoman War (1768-1774). Having good relations with the Russians, Daskolyiannēs turned to his coreligionists in the hope that Orthodox Russia would replace the Ottomans in İstanbul and east in general. With this aim in mind, prepared a band of 2,000 armed men out of the mountains down into the plains of western Crete,[73] but a promised Russian fleet did not come to the aid of the insurgents,[74] and then the revolt was harshly suppressed by the Ottomans. Greene pointed out that at the beginning of the revolt, the Ottomans destroyed Sfakiots' merchant ships and then the Sfakiots were forbidden from having any contact with Christian ships. Greene attributed a great importance to these events arguing that "the events of 1770 marked a turning point in

---

[71] Sally Mc Kee. *Uncommon Dominion: Venetian Crete and the Myth of Ethnic Purity*, pp. 134-135.

[72] Michael Llewellyn Smith. *The Great Island: A Study of Crete*, p. 28.

[73] Molly Greene. *A Shared World: Christians and Muslims in the Early Modern Mediterranean*, p. 207; Michael Llewellyn Smith. *The Great Island: A Study of Crete*, p. 82.

[74] Michael Herzfeld. *A Place in History: Social and Monumental Time in a Cretan Town*, (Priceton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), p. 17.

Crete and in the larger world of the Eastern Mediterranean." Henceforth, "… the city of Candia, and the older Mediterranean world of which it was a part, were buried in the events of this day."[75] In addition to its socio-political role, Daskolyiannēs became the archetype of a heroic figure in Greek nationalist historiography.[76] This heroic spirit can be seen in the "Song of Daskolyiannēs."

> Lord, give me thought and mind in the head
> To sit and think of Master John
> Who was the first in Sfakia, the first lord,
> And with all his heart wished Crete to be Greek.
> Every Easter and Sunday he put on his hat
> And said to Protopappa, "The Moscvite I'll bring
> To help Sfakia and chase the Turks
> …
> And Protopappas replied, "Master, what is in your mind?
> The thoughts you think will enslave Sfakia
> And until the ships arrive and the Moscovite come
> No Sfakian will have a home to live in…"
> "Silence, Protopappa, sooner or later
> I will carry the Cross to the gate of Khania
> …
> I will not give tribute or pay the tax
> …
> Let the Sultan bring against us armies and pashas,
> Sfakia has men, castle-wreckers,
> Sfakia has worthy and gallant warriors…[77]

The first revolt in Ottoman Crete in the nineteenth century broke out together with the Greek War of Independence. After the battle of Navarino, in 1827, the Christians attempted a new one, but it failed. In 1830, the island was given to Egyptian rule as compensation for Mehmet Ali Paşa's help to the Ottoman forces in 1821.[78] Mehmet Ali

---

[75] Molly Greene. *A Shared World: Christians and Muslims in the Early Modern Mediterranean*, p. 208.

[76] Michael Llewellyn Smith. *The Great Island: A Study of Crete*, p. 87.

[77] Albert B. Lord. "The Heroic Tradition of Greek Epic and Ballad: Continuity and Change," in: Nikiforos Diamandouros, John P. Anton, John A. Petropulos, and Peter Topping (eds.). *Hellenism and the First Greek War of Liberation (1821-1830): Continuity and Change*, (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1976), pp. 88-89.

[78] Emmanuel E. Marcoglou. *The American Interest in the Cretan Revolution, 1866-1869*, (Athens: National Centre of Social Research, 1971), p. 39.

Paşa ruled the island until 1840. It was asserted that the rule of Mehmet Ali Paşa was not satisfactory for the Cretans. Since he imposed new taxes on agricultural products, increased the *haraç* and gave a chance to certain people to monopolize a number of imported goods through a system of bidding.[79]

In 1840, the rule of Mehmet Ali Paşa was over and Mustafa Paşa was appointed by the Sublime Porte as the governor of Crete. Although Mustafa Paşa offered concessions, he hanged ten people of the Cretan Assembly. The Cretans demanded reduction in taxes and administrative reform. The Cretan Christians desired for the union with the Greek Kingdom and a Central Committee of the Cretans was formed in Greece. In 1841, the Christian inhabitants of the region of Sfakia to the south-west of the island rebelled demanding union with Greece. Yet, the revolt was immediately suppressed.[80] In 1858, 8,000 Cretan Christians gathered at Peribolia saying that if the reforms promised by the *Islahat Fermânı* were not introduced and realized, they would resort to force. At the same time, the Christian peasants complained of the economic policies of the Muslim *bey*s.[81] Regarding the economic situation of Cretans, Miller noted that "the fiscal burdens of the Cretans were not onerous, for besides the tithe of agricultural produce, they paid only one tax, that in communication of military service."[82]

According to Detorakis, the imposition of new taxation and the monastery question were the main reasons of the revolt of 1866. İsmail Paşa's tax policy and his intervention in the monastery question, which stemmed from the requirement of the clerics that the property of the monasteries be placed under the administration of the council of elders for

---

[79] Miranda Stavrinos. "Palmerston and the Cretan Question," *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, Vol. X, No. 2, 1992, p. 253.

[80] William Miller. *Travels and Politics in the Near East*, p. 168.

[81] T. G. Tatsios. *The Megali Idea and the Greek-Turkish War of 1897: The Impact of the Cretan Problem on Greek Irredentism, 1866-1897*, p. 21.

[82] William Miller. *Travels and Politics in the Near East*, p. 306.

founding schools, created discontent among the Christians.[83] It was argued, on the other hand, that the main cause of the discontent was not these grievances, rather it "had its root in feelings of nationality and religion, which the best government could not wholly remove…"[84] Towards the end of April 1866, the insurgent leaders met in Omalos and prepared a petition to the sultan requesting the abolition of the newly-imposed taxation. This petition was also sent to the foreign councils with explanatory notes in which the insurgent leaders demanded autonomy or hegemony granted to Samos. On 28 May 1866, many of the insurgent leaders sent a secret address to the monarchs of the European Powers requesting union with Greece. In July 1866, the Sublime Porte sent its reply in which the Cretan demands were rejected. Immediately afterwards, Christos Zimbrakakis, the minister of war in the Voulgaris government, established a general assembly in Apokorono. On 21 August 1866, the revolutionary assembly gathered the Cretan people to rebel against the Ottoman rule, issuing a declaration from the village of Askyfou near Sfakia.[85]

The insurgents' leaders were divided into two: some of them were in favor of demanding a degree of autonomy and certain privileges, others were determined to unite with Greece. Dakin argues that the insurgents were supported by the Greek and Russian councils in Crete. Central committee, which dispatched ammunitions and volunteers to the island and raised funds, was formed by the Cretan Renieris, a governor of the National Bank in Greece, in 1866. Concerning the Russian help to the insurgents, Dakin states that "… it was clear by September 1866 that the Russians had embarked a forward policy. They

---

[83] Theocharis E. Detorakis. *History of Crete*, p. 330.

[84] Quoted in: Maureen M. Robson. "Lord Clarendon and the Cretan Question, 1868-9," *The Historical Journal*, Vol. III, No. 1, 1960, p. 40.

[85] *ibid*., p. 331; Dougles Dakin. *The Unification of Greece, 1770-1923*, p. 109; Roderic H. Davison. "Ottoman Diplomacy and the Question of the Rebellion in Crete, 1866-1869," *X. Türk Tarih Kongresi, 22-26 IX 1986*, pp. 1193-1194.

certainly sent arms to Crete, and intercepted letters showed that Dendrinos gave the Cretans all the encouragement he could."[86] Lieutenant-General Panos Koroneos and Colonel Ioannis Zimbrakakis left Greece for Crete together with 800 volunteers. Different branches of the central committee, which were established in London, Manchester, Liverpool and İstanbul, not only purchased arms for Crete but also prepared for revolts in Epirus and Thessaly. By the beginning of October, the revolt had spread throughout the island.[87]

The Cretan revolt of 1866 can be divided into three periods: The first stage lasted from September 1866 to 21 November 1866 when the Ottoman soldiers were commanded by Mustafa Naili Paşa and defeated the insurgents and Greek volunteers at Vafe. After that, Ottoman forces descended on the region of Rethymnon where the Cretan revolutionary committee had its centre at the Arkadi Monastery. There were 300 armed insurgents along with 600 women and children[88] in the monastery. Mustafa Paşa's proposal was rejected by Gabriel, the hegumenos of the monastery, and Dimakopoulos, a garrison commander. Then, Mustafa Paşa's forces attacked the monastery on 8 November 1866. The next day,

---

[86] Dougles Dakin. *The Unification of Greece, 1770-1923*, pp. 108-110.

[87] *ibid*., p. 110. In his report dated 21 July 1866, İsmail Paşa stated that the Greek and Russian consuls in Crete provoked the Cretan Christians and that although the Russian consuls expressed that he gave advice to the Cretan Christians to prevent them from engaging in bad things, his attitudes were contrary to his expressions. İsmail Paşa provided certain instances regarding the activities of the Russian consul in the island. See: T.C. BOA, Sadaret Mektubi Kalemi Belgeleri, A.MKT.MHM., Dosya: 360, Gömlek: 59, Aded: 3, 1283 Ra 8. Volunteers flocked to the island by the Greek ships. Among those volunteers there were Greeks, Italians and Montenegrins. For the details see: T.C. BOA, Hariciye Nezareti Tercüme Odası, HR.TO., Dosya: 4, Gömlek: 91, Aded: 2, 1866 11 28. Interestingly, it was asserted that 95 volunteers assembled in İstanbul, then went to Athens, and became 120 and then they left for Crete. *Απομνημονεύματα της Κρητικής Επαναστάσεως κατά τα έτη 1866-67-68 Χρονοέκδοση*, (Athens: Ek tou Typografeiou tou Kallous, 1884). See the introduction. The names of the volunteers who were the officials in the Greek army were mentioned in Nikolaos Psiha's book.

To understand the situation of the western part of Crete during the revolt of 1866-68, see: Nikolaos Psihas. *Επαναστατική Εικών των Δυτικών της Κρήτης Διαμερισμάτων η Ανασκευή Χωριων Τινων της Περιγραφούσης τον Εθνικόν Αγώνα της Κρήτης Διαμερισμάτών η Ανασκευή Χωριων Τινων της Περιγρφουσης τον Εθνικόν* Αγώνα της *Κρήτης κατά των Τούρκων Πραγματείας*, (Athens: Ek tu Typografeiou Nikita Pasari, 1870).

[88] According to Woodford, out of 540 people, 343 were women and children. Stewart L. Woodford. *Crete: An Adress*, p. 17.

the Ottomans smashed down the west gate of the monastery and when the Ottoman soldiers got the monastery to surrender, the powder magazine was blown up by the Christians.[89] Woodford wrote that "…he struck a match and then:

> Spire, vaults, the shrine, the spoil, the slain,
> The turbaned victors, the Christian band,
> All that of living or dead remain,
> Hurled on high with the shivering fane,
> In one wild roar expired.
> The shattered town, the walls thrown dawn,
>
> The hills that shake, although unrent,
> As if an earthquake passed,
> The thousand shapeless things all driven
> In cloud and flame athwart the Heaven,
> By that tremendous blast,
> Proclaimed the desperate conflict o'er
> On that too long afflicted shore.[90]

This event created a great deal of commotion in the European press which "upheld this as a true instance of Greek heroism."[91] The Christians who perished in the Arkadi Monastery were considered national heroes and became the symbol of Cretan bravery and prominent representatives of the national heroism both in the Greek nationalist historiography and Western imagination. The second stage lasted from April to the fall of 1867 when Ömer Paşa ran the campaigns in Sfakia and Lasithi. The third one started in October 1867 with

---

[89] Theocharis E. Detorakis. *History of Crete*, pp. 336-337. According to an Ottoman document, at the end of the warfare at the Arkadi Monastery, 37 Ottoman soldiers, 8 Egyptian soldiers, 7 Albanian soldiers, and 18 local soldiers (totally 71) were killed. 102 Ottoman, 23 Egyptian, 15 Albanian, 24 local soldiers were wounded. For the details of the events at the Arkadi Monastery see: T.C. BOA, İradeler Tasnifi, İ.MTZ.GR., Dosya: 10, Gömlek: 246, Aded: 10, 1283 B 29.

[90] Stewart L. Woodford. *Crete: An Address*, p. 18.

[91] Michael Herzfeld. *The Poetics of Manhood: Contest and Identity in a Cretan Mountain Village*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), p. 7. In this sense, it is interesting to remember that as the events of Souli in Epirus (the resistance of Souliot women against the surrender of Tepedelenli Ali Paşa's forces by throwing themselves and their children into the mountain gorge), the Arkadi Monastery captured an important place in Greek nationalist historiography.
K. E. Fleming. *The Muslim Bonaparte: Diplomacy and Orientalism in Ali Pasha's Greece*, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 63.

the arrival of Ali Paşa and lasted till the spring of 1868.[92] Stillman narrated the effects of the revolt as follows:

> the tragedy which began in the following year (1866), and, lasting three years, left Crete devastated and half depopulated, but was still disastrous to the Turkish Empire, bringing it to the verge of bankruptcy, draining its finances, demoralizing its army, and preparing the road for the successful movement in Herzegovina... The losses of life among the Cretans, … were about 5,000 of the Mussulman men and about 25,000 of the Christians, including women and children, who died from hardships or starvation, or were killed by the troops and irregulars.[93]

In the course of the revolt, many Christians migrated to Greece and it was argued that about 50,000 refugees were maintained there in which:

> … they lived for years, married, gave birth to children, and many of them died. These exiles and their children subsequently returned to their home island with ideas enlarged, their hopes for their country's freedom vivified by intercourse with Athenians, whose patriotic and unselfish interest in the disruption of Crete from Turkey had also become augmented. The bond between the Cretan and the Greek is not therefore one of mere sentiment; it is domestic and personal… Even those Cretans who were hitherto disposed to regard the mainland peninsula rather as a place of sanctuary than as a state with which they ought to regard her as the mother-country; her readiness to shelter them under wing being an earnest of her material affection for them.[94]

It should be important to note that Ali Paşa was sent to Crete with a number of administrative privileges being granted to the Christian inhabitants of the island. These privileges were the essence of the so-called Organic Act by which the island was to be

---

[92] William James Stillman. *The Cretan Insurrection of 1866-1868*, (New York: H. Holt and Company, 1874), pp. 18-19; For the details of the revolt see also: Ali Haydar Emir. *Girit İhtilali, Gamsız Hasan Bey*, (İstanbul: Deniz Matbaası, 1931). For the detailed description of Hüseyin Avni Paşa's operations see: T.C. BOA, İradeler Tasnifi, İ.MTZ.GR., Dosya: 12, Gömlek: 357, Aded: 5, 1285 N 3. In his lengthy report Hüseyin Paşa provided the causes of the revolt alleging that after each revolt people had not handed over their arms to the authorities and as a result of this, people became spoiled and encouraged and inclined to insurgency and began to solve the problems with their arms. For him, the Ottoman authorities had to do their best to disarm the population. The second reason for the revolt, according to him, was the inefficiency to guard the coastline and inland of the island. He argued that the intensive efforts were not spent to build fortifications throughout the island and that the relationship between the Cretan Christians and Greece also provided fertile ground for the revolts, especially the Greek teachers, priests, and the Cretan refugees, who left the island for Greece during the Greek revolution, strengthened the "national cause" (*milliyet davası*) of the Cretan Christians.

T.C. BOA, İradeler Tasnifi, İ.MTZ.GR., Dosya: 12, Gömlek: 370, Aded: 3, 1286 M 14. It is worth to pointing out that Rhea Galanaki made references to the Cretan revolts of 1866-68 in her novel by focusing on the life of İsmail Ferik Paşa and his brother, Antonis Kambanis Papadakis. See: Rhea Galanaki. *The Life of İsmail Ferik Pasha*, (trl.) Kay Cicellis, (London: Peter Owen Publishers, 1996).

[93] Papers of the Greek Committee. *Crete and Greece*, p. 37.

[94] *ibid*., p. 42.

ruled until 1878. According to this arrangement, the island was divided into five provinces (Candia, Chania, Rethymnon, Lasithi, and Sfakia), and subdivided into nineteen districts. The Governor-General and commander-in-chief became the two principal authorities; Turkish and Greek were recognized as official languages.[95]

The Christian representatives of the General Assembly believed that the Organic Act had not granted equal privileges to the members. According to them, the representation in the assembly was highly disproportionate in terms of the demographic ratio. While the Christians had 38 members, the Muslims had 36. They argued that under these conditions they had little chance to get their proposals accepted and that their rights were too limited.[96] Moreover, it was argued that the conditions in the courts were very unsatisfactory for the Christians who were unjustly tried.[97] At that time, a revolt occurred in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1875), after that Russo-Ottoman War (1877-78) broke out in the spring of 1877. All these events had significant impacts on the local conditions of Crete. Various committees were established, the livestock theft and murders increased on the island.[98] In 1878, the insurgents once more rebelled arguing that this was the struggle of the heroic Cretans and the continuation of the spirit of 1821, 1849, and 1866. According to them, the Russian Tsar and Greece would help them and then Crete could unite with Greece. Although the Ottomans offered organic status, their main desire was *enosis*. The insurgents blamed Britain for not supporting them. They also believed that if they had enough munitions of wars, the problem would be solved, since they were the bravest

---

[95] T. G. Tatsios, *The Megali Idea and the Greek-Turkish War of 1897: The Impact of the Cretan Problem on Greek Irredentism, 1866-1897*, p. 39; Theocharis E. Detorakis. *History of Crete*, p. 343. The complete text of the *Girid Vilâyet Nizâmnâmesi* is to be found in *Düstûr*, *I. Tertib*, Vol. I.

[96] Theocharis E. Detorakis. *History of Crete*, p. 347.

[97] Anagnostis Dounakis. *Οι αγώνες της Κρήτης*, (Athens: Ek tou Typografeiou tou Mellontos, 1878), pp. 4-5.

[98] Theocharis E. Detorakis. *History of Crete*, pp. 349, 351; T.C. BOA, Sadaret Mektûbî Kalemi Belgeleri, A.MKT.MHM., Dosya: 482, Gömlek: 14, Aded: 3, 1294 N 2.

people in the world.[99] After the Ottoman Empire's defeat by Russia, the Treaty of San Stefano obliged the Ottoman Empire to comply with the terms of the Organic Act. The Berlin Congress also obliged the Ottoman Empire to implement the Organic Act along with the necessary alterations. In October 1878, the Halepa Pact was signed and ratified by imperial decree. According to this pact, the Governor-General of Crete could be a Christian, the General Assembly had to have 49 Christian deputies, 31 Muslim deputies, a Cretan gendarmerie was to be set up.[100]

The submission of the Halepa Convention in October 1878 marked a new episode in the rebellious history of the island of Crete. Between the years 1878-1889, the island was ruled under the provisions of this convention and became one of the most privileged provinces of the Ottoman Empire. In this period, the island was governed by the Greek Orthodox governors.[101]

The General Assembly was composed of 49 Christians and 31 Muslims. The Christians were divided into two political parties: while the Conservative party (minority party) was largely composed of land-owners, the well-to-do and powerful part of the Christian population such as Hadji-Michalis Yannaris, Professor Antonios Yannaris, N. Stavrakis and I. Sphakianakis, the Liberal party (majority party) represented the poverty stricken crowds and revolutionary part of the Christian population. Konstantin Mitsotakis, the Fumis brothers, A. Michelidakis were the leading members of this party. The animosity

---

[99] Anagnostis Dounakis *Οι αγώνες της Κρήτης*, pp. 5-8. It should be pointed out that in this text there was a great respect for the Russian Tsar and the Greek King.

[100] Theocharis E. Detorakis. *History of Crete*, pp. 353-254. For the details of the Halepa Pact, see: *Düstûr*, *I. Tertib*, Vol. I.

[101] Kostaki Adosides Paşa (February 1878-December 1878), Alexander Karatodori Paşa (December 1878), Kostaki Fotiadi Paşa (December 1878-June 1885), Sava Paşa (June 1885-January 1887), Kostaki Anthopoulo Paşa (January 1887-May 1888), Nikolaki Sartinski Paşa (May 1888-August 1889) governed the island of Crete.
Sinan Kuneralp. *Son Dönem Osmanlı Erkân ve Ricali (1839-1922): Prosopografik Rehber*, (İstanbul: Isis Press, 1999), p. 31.

between the Conservative and Liberal parties was so tense that it split the people and paved the way for the acts of murder and violence on the island. Due to the political fanaticism, the official posts were distributed according to party factions. In consequence of this, the administrative, judicial and security branches of the government became incapable of fulfilling their duties.[102]

From 1888 onwards, the party fanaticism between the two Christian parties of the General Assembly reached its peak and resulted in crucial events. Meanwhile, there was a financial crisis on the island. The salaries of the gendarmerie and the staff of administration had not been paid. While the income of the island was 15,000 *lirâ*s, the expenditure amounted to 95,000 *lirâ*s. For that reason, the budget deficit was 80,000 *lirâ*s which caused a serious financial crisis. Under these conditions, the inhabitants of the island began to urge the Sublime Porte to dismiss Kostaki Anthopoulo Paşa for being incapable of finding solutions to the problems.[103] On 29 April 1888, Kostaki Anthopoulo Paşa sent his resignation to the Sublime Porte, and Nikolaki Paşa Sartinski was appointed as Governor-General.[104] However, after his appointment, the situation on the island did not improve, even got worse. The deputies of the minority party argued that Nikolaki Paşa sided with the majority party and that he should be dismissed from his post.

In the elections of April 1889, the Liberals obtained the majority in the General Assembly, which complicated the matters. The deputies of the minority party reacted to this result. In order to compel the deputies of the majority party to side with them, five deputies from the minority party proclaimed union with Greece in the General Assembly.

---

[102] Theocharis E. Detorakis. *History of Crete*, pp. 356-357. These two parties were also called as *Karavanades* and *Xypoliti*.

[103] For the complaints of the Christian deputies about Sava Paşa and their insistence on his dismissal see the Christian deputies' telegram sent to the Porte: T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.BŞK., Dosya: 9, Gömlek: 52, Aded: 8/11, 1302 Ş 26.

[104] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 2 (1889), *Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Crete*, No. 12, 28, 34.

However, the majority party did not side with them and upon this, these five deputies resigned from the Assembly. After this incident, the partisans of the minority party established committees in various villages so as to disturb peace and order on the island. Since the situation got worse, Mahmud Paşa, accompanied by Ahmed Ratıb Paşa and Galib Efendi, were sent to the island as imperial commissioners. Upon their arrival, the leaders of the minority party, aiming to provoke the population, spread the rumors that Mahmud Paşa, Ahmed Ratıb Paşa and Galib Efendi came to the island in order to accept the requests of their own party and to destroy the majority party. As a result of these rumors, the partisans of the minority party established a committee in Apokorono.[105] At the same time, the leading figures of the minority party offered to meet with Mahmud Paşa. Yet, it was informed that Mahmud Paşa would not make any negotiations with the leaders of that party, unless the committee in Apokorono, threatening the public peace of the island, was abolished.[106] However, the committee was not abolished. Moreover, the delegates were sent from other districts, and as a result, the number of its partisans increased.

In June 1889, the conservative delegates in Apokorono submitted a memorandum of 15 articles to Mahmud Paşa stating that the government and the General Assembly lost their powers. Injustice and insecurity prevailed all over the island. To overcome this situation, it was suggested that Nikolaki Paşa be recalled; that a new governor be an Orthodox Christian of the Greek race; that an Agricultural Bank be established; that a new fiscal system and a term of three years be granted for the payment of tithe farmers; that impartial officials be appointed by the new governor; and that an amnesty be issued to

[105] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.EE., Dosya: 114, Gömlek: 60, Aded: 1/4, 1306 Z 10.

[106] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.KOM., Dosya: 7, Gömlek: 40, Aded: 8, 1306 L 25.

political offenders.[107] According to the ciphered telegram sent by Mahmud Paşa and Ahmed Ratıb Paşa, the main factor behind the current unrest within the island was the opposition of the minority party to the Governor-General of Crete. In this telegram, Mahmud Paşa and Ahmed Ratıb Paşa stated that the minority part insisted on the dismissal of the governor and that if the governor was dismissed, then the majority party would not be satisfied with the new governor. Under these conditions, the members of the majority party would side with the elders and tend to unite with Greece.[108] Furthermore, the requests of the minority party were submitted by Mahmud Paşa to the Sublime Porte and was discussed in the Ottoman Parliament on 22 June 1889. It was stated that the abolition of the committee in Apokorono depended on certain financial supports to be provided. Otherwise, some of the Christian gendarmes, who had not received their salaries for a few months, could leave their jobs and join the committee and the other part of the Christian gendarmes would attempt to initiate a revolt by locating themselves on mountains. It was added that the budget deficit of the island for that year was to be partially balanced. The following points had been decided in view of the financial crisis in Crete: 5,000 *lirâ*s, with respect to 20,000 *lirâ*s demanded for the payment of unpaid salaries, were to be sent to Crete from the Imperial Treasury so as to pay the over-due salaries and the Agricultural Bank was to be established on the island.[109]

After staying for 40 days in Crete, Mahmud Paşa and his entourage left the island. In addition to the outrages between the partisans of the both parties, the Christians began to attack the Muslims, which gave rise to disastrous events between Muslims and Christians.

---

[107] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 2 (1889), No. 87; and see also: T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.AZN., Dosya: 3, Gömlek: 69, Aded: 2/4, 1306 L 25.

[108] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Hus., Dosya: 227, Gömlek: 58, Aded: 5, 1306 Za 18.

[109] T.C. BOA, İradeler Tasnifi, İ.MTZ.GR., Dosya: 21, Gömlek: 760, Aded: 9, 1306 L 29. On 12 July 1889, Mahmud Paşa proclaimed to the Cretans that 20,000 *lirâ*s gradually were to be sent to the island and the Agricultural Bank was to be established. For the full text of this proclamation see: T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Hus, Dosya: 227, Gömlek: 58, Aded: 5, 1306 Za 18.

The disturbances firstly took place in Rethymnon. Three Christians from the committee in the village of Roustica seized the sheep and goats of the Muslims while passing Hagia Yorgi, in the district of Rethymnon, and one of them attempted to seize the Martini rifle from the hands of a Muslim and then they killed each other. The other Christians attacked the Muslim inhabitants of the village of Hagia Yorgi and killed the father of a Muslim and two other Muslims, one was 80 years old and the other one 100 years old. At the same time, they burnt down Muslims' houses. After a while, the Muslim inhabitants of Episcopi were besieged for a few days but were then released. This event caused a panic among Muslims living in other districts of Rethymnon and led them to take refuge in the big cities. This situation also spread to the villages of Amari and Mylopotamu, and the Muslims living there began to migrate to the cities as well. After that, Muslims living in Chania and Candia were also compelled to migrate. The majority of the Muslims living in Kisamo and the Muslim inhabitants of Vukolis and those living in nearby Vukolis left their houses.[110] In order to put down the revolt, the Sublime Porte sent additional troops to Crete and Nikolaki Paşa was recalled and Rıza Paşa was appointed as temporary Governor-General. Following Rıza Paşa, Şakir Paşa was appointed as Governor-General and the island was placed in a state of siege. With this *fermân,* most of the privileges which were given by the Halepa Pact were restricted.[111]

The Hamidian Officials' Views Concerning the Cretan Issue

Given this background, it should be important to note that the Ottoman archive provides valuable information on the reasons of the disturbances that prevailed all over the

[110] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.ASK., Dosya: 57, Gömlek: 1, Aded: 1/2, 1306 Z 11.

[111] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 2 (1889), No. 165, 181; Theodore George Tatsios. *The Megali Idea and the Greek-Turkish War of 1897: The Impact of the Cretan Problem on Greek Irredentism, 1866-1897*, p. 63.

island during this period. In the detailed reports (*layiha*), the causes of the unsatisfactory conditions were discussed. Moreover, counter-measures were proposed in order to remedy the situation. For that reason, in this part of study, the emphasis will be on the question of how the situation was perceived by the Ottoman officials.

According to the Ottoman sources, the administration of the Greek Orthodox governors had a certain effect on the unsatisfactory conditions. The writers of the reports complained of the weakness of these governors and of their partial administrations. Abdülvahab Paşa, in his report dated 1 February 1889, put all the blame for this ongoing trouble on the shoulders of Fotiadi Paşa. The core theme of his report was his complaints about the Greek Orthodox governors. From Abdülvahhab Paşa's point of view, the following misbehaviors were the main causes of the difficulties and of the revolts that took place on the island: first, "*Girid Mehâkim-i Nizâmiyesi Hakkında Nizâmnâme*"[112] was prepared by a Greek who was appointed by Fotiadi Paşa. Although this regulation was not approved by the Muslim deputies of the General Assembly, it was approved by the majority of the Christian deputies and Fotiadi Paşa. Second, Fotiadi Paşa compelled the Sublime Porte to sanction the requests of the Christian deputies concerning the grant of the tithe to the local government. He also informed the Sublime Porte that the Christians were going to establish a non-armed committee in Pocunaria. Third, the Christians were appointed to the most of the posts in the local government. Fourth, the Christian officials were granted permission to continue with their previous positions. Fifth, the officials were appointed according to the suggestions of the notables and the leading figures of the General Assembly. Sixth, the insurgent chiefs and the people who were not loyal to the Ottoman state were appointed as officials to the local posts. Seventh, during the term of Fotiadi Paşa, the regulations which were not in favor of the state were prepared in the

[112] For the details of "*Girid Mehâkim-i Nizâmiyesi Hakkında Nizâmnâme*" see: Ayşe Nükhet Adıyeke. *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Girit Bunalımı (1896-1908)*, p. 74.

Christian schools and churches. Moreover, the Christian newspapers were allowed to issue harmful publications in a heedless way.[113]

Abdülvahab Paşa also remarked that this state of things encouraged Christians to violate and take Muslims' lives, and properties and commit murder. He further complained of the partiality of Nikolaki Paşa arguing that Nikolaki Paşa governed the island in line with the desires of the majority party. Abdülvahab Paşa stated that Nikolaki Paşa took part in the political partisanship and yielded to the requests of the majority party. He stated that Nikolaki Paşa dismissed officials who belonged to the opposition party and that he appointed the adherents of the majority party to replace the previous ones. Moreover, Nikolaki Paşa, as Abdülvahab Paşa claimed, dared to submit the requests to the Sublime Porte again and again without taking into consideration whether they were sanctioned or not. Attitudes which were unfit to the position of Nikolaki Paşa were not just limited to these. During his journey to Arhanes, a village in the Candia province, the Christian inhabitants of this village welcomed him by displaying the photograph of the Greek King and with banners "Long live the Prince of Crete, Sardinski" and discharging thirty-one shoots of cannon ball. In these circumstances, he had remained silent and had not taken effective measures to prevent these unsatisfactory procedures.[114]

During the ceremony of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the coronation of the Greek King in Chania, eight Christian officials of the government had dared to make awful remarks regarding the sovereign rights of the Sultan. Nikolaki Paşa had not dismissed these officials and let them continue their duties. These examples would suffice to illustrate the weakness of Nikolaki Paşa. Furthermore, Abdülvahab Paşa underlined the fact that

---

[113] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.EE., Dosya: 8, Gömlek: 22, Aded: 2/5, 1306 Ca 30.

[114] *ibid*. These statements were also mentioned in a letter which sent by a Cretan, named Mustafa, to the Ottoman journal *Mürüvvet*. See: T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.AZJ., Dosya: 14, Gömlek: 60, Aded: 2, 1306 S 26.

Nikolaki Paşa was quite passive towards the unpleasant events which posed a real threat to the sovereignty of the Ottoman Sultan. For him, Nikolaki Paşa had caused such harmful situations to occur and continue, and caused the deterioration of the dignity of the state in itself.[115]

Mahmud Paşa also complained about the misbehaviors of Nikolaki Paşa. In his letter written to Sultan Abdülhamid II, Mahmud Paşa mentioned when Nikolaki Paşa was appointed as the General-Governor of Crete, he announced that he would be perfectly in favor of preserving the rights and interests of the Ottoman state. Yet, Nikolaki Paşa, for Mahmud Paşa, was in contrary attitudes and actions. Nikolaki Paşa had not made attempts to eliminate the party intrigues, which put the island into a difficult position. Rather, he had disregarded the impartiality principle of the state. Moreover, in order to constitute a majority in the General Assembly, he had favored the lawyers, doctors and journalists who had sided with Greece. Mahmud Paşa added that Nikolaki Paşa had dismissed the officials who were adherents of the opposition party. Mahmud Paşa also criticized him for letting the Christians to openly mention the offer for the annexation of Crete to Greece and stated that if these people were not punished, the insurgents would be encouraged.[116]

In his report dated 15 August 1889, Cevdet Efendi, formerly a member of the Court of Appeal, criticized Nikolaki Paşa pointing out that he dismissed all the Christian gendarmes who belonged to the minority party. And he appointed the partisans of the majority party to the gendarmerie and paid salaries of captain to the untrained gendarmes. Cevdet Efendi further stated that concerning partisanship, Nikolaki Paşa overstepped his

---

[115] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.EE., Dosya: 8, Gömlek: 22, Aded: 2/5, 1306 Ca 30.
It should be noted that Mehmed Salâhî, who was sent to Crete by Sultan Abdülhamid II to examine the situation in 1889, gave the details of the revolt and the state of affairs in the island. About Fotiadi Paşa, he mentioned that "Fotyadi acted as an official appointed by Athens" and governed the island in line with the Greek consul's notifications and appointed the Christian insurgent chiefs to the important posts. For the details of Mehmed Salâhî's accounts see: Mehmed Salâhî. *Girit Meselesi 1866-1889*, (İstanbul: Edebiyat Fakültesi Yayınları, 1967), especially, pp. 31-101.

[116] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.EE., Dosya:114, Gömlek: 67, Aded: 1, 1306 L 13.

limits to the extent that he established a committee composed of members of the majority party so as to ensure the continuity of "his" party. Furthermore, he attributed all the responsibility of the revolt of 1889 to Nikolaki Paşa stating that "this revolution was caused by Sartinski Paşa (*bu ihtilâl Sartinski Paşa'nın yüzünden ileri gelmişdir*)."[117] He claimed that if Nikolaki Paşa had not sided with one part of the population or not regarded the rest as foreigners or had resigned before things went so out of control, the revolt would not have happened.[118]

On the other hand, Nikolaki Paşa wrote in his report that he had not sided with any party and had done his best to eliminate the controversy and misunderstanding between the parties and to establish a balance between the two parties without considering which party had the majority. He argued that he had regarded the interests of the state and country and that remained far from any intervention into the party politics. He further stated that so as not to give way to allegations that the majority party had been supported by the government in the previous year, the opposition party had been protected and most of the official posts had been reoffered to them. For him, this illustrated his impartiality and his kindness towards the minority party. According to Nikolaki Paşa, there were two reasons behind the negative attitudes shown by the minority party against him: on the one hand, due to the animosity between the minority and the majority parties, the former aimed to destroy the latter. On the other hand, some provocations made by the agitators in İstanbul played an important role in the emergence of the negative attitudes. At the end of his

[117] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.ASK., Dosya: 57, Gömlek: 28, Aded: 2, 1306 Z 18.

[118] *ibid*. The Cretan *nevâhî vekil*s also sent telegrams to the Sublime Porte for complaining about Nikolaki Paşa. Upon this, Nikolaki Paşa defended himself by sending two telegrams to the Sublime Porte stating that the majority of those officials were dismissed from their posts due to their negative attitudes and the others were the supporters of the minority party and aimed to destroy order and security within the island. He further noted that those peoples had personal resentment towards him. For the details of these two telegrams see: T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Hus, Dosya: 220, Gömlek: 26, Aded: 4, 1306 R 12.

report, Nikolaki Paşa remarked that "... it was even confessed by the aforementioned party members that [minority] party had no personal resentment towards me."[119]

Cevad Paşa also complained of the Greek Orthodox governors for being one of the important reasons for the ongoing disturbances on the island. He asserted that during the terms of those governors, the Christian inhabitants of the island had been able to do almost everything they wanted to and had even overstepped the limits, like hoisting the Greek flag, praying for the Greek King during the religious days, ascribing the sovereignty of the island to the Greek King, and strolling in the streets with the Greek flags on the enthronement celebrations of the Ottoman Sultan, appointing the Greek citizens to the local official posts, and proclaiming the union of Crete with Greece in the General Assembly. Cevad Paşa stated that "some disagreeable conditions (*birtakım canhıraş hâlat*)" had all occurred during the terms of the Greek Orthodox governors. For him, the most harmful governor was Fotiadi Paşa and ranking after him would be Karatodori and Nikolaki. During his tenure, Fotiadi Paşa had requested the Sublime Porte that the foundation income should be given to the island. When his request was not sanctioned by the Sublime Porte, he implicitly provoked the Christians and established a committee (*Epitropi*). And moreover, he helped the committee by supplying sardines and provisions for it. At the same time, he informed the Sublime Porte that the Christians began to form a committee and were in preparation of a revolution. In a way, it seems clear that he tried to mislead the Sublime Porte in order to compel the Ottoman authorities to sanction his requests.[120] Yanni Papa Aleksaki also accused Fotiadi Paşa of giving so much freedom to

---

[119] "…fırka-ı mezkûrenin (*adıgeçen*) bendelerine bir gûne ağraz-ı şahsîye (*şahsi garezleri*) olmadığı mezkûr fırkaya mensub olanlar tarafından dahi itiraf olunmuşdur."
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.EE., Dosya: 114, Gömlek: 60, Aded: 1/4, 1306 Z 10.

[120] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.EE., Dosya: 86, Gömlek: 76, Aded: 3/6, 1307 R 15. In this sense, it should be noted that according to Namık Kemal, Fotiadi Paşa was responsible for the unsatisfactory conditions of the Cretan Muslims who were not only in a difficult position in Crete but also in the other places. For Namık Kemal, their situation reached to the point that they were used to be *bey* or *ağa* in their own properties, but

the inhabitants. For him, as a result of this, Fotiadi Paşa put the island into a difficult position.[121] Furthermore, Said Paşa reported to the Sublime Porte that during the term of Fotiadi Paşa, harmful people and insurgents who participated in the previous revolts were appointed as officials. For example, the Greek citizens were appointed as inspector of justice and the insurgents were employed as gendarme.[122]

Besides, modifications and regulations made in the executive and judicial procedures of the island were considered to be one of the main reasons for the difficulties. In the report, dated 2 June 1888, Kostaki Anthopoulo Paşa paid special attention to this point stating that while certain regulations were made, the habits and the situation of the inhabitants were not taken into consideration. Rather, these points were ignored and some urgent and superficial regulations were made. Kostaki Anthopoulo Paşa then proceeded to note that when these regulations were made, their negative effects on the local government were discredited and that the rights of the whole government was not granted to the people, but to the mob, in a way the local government was excluded. At the end, the local government lost its power and the Christian and Muslim inhabitants of the island were deeply affected.[123]

Ahmet Cevdet Paşa also stressed the threat posed by the regulations noting that these regulations were not fit for the needs of the people and that the worst of these regulations was that for the *nahiye müdür*s. In this report, Ahmet Cevdet Paşa gave details about the duties of these officials explaining that the *nahiye müdür*s were the officials of the state and were responsible for the preservation and maintenance of order and

---

they became gendarmerie in various places for 120 *kuruş* salary. T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.EE., Dosya: 40, Gömlek: 80, Aded: 1/2, 1301 Ra 13.

[121] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.UM., Dosya: 27, Gömlek: 106, Aded: 1, undated.

[122] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Hus., Dosya: 163, Sıra: 56, Aded: 1, 1297 2 7.

[123] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.BŞK., Dosya: 13, Gömlek: 26, Aded: 4, 1305 N 22.

tranquility in cooperation with the gendarmerie forces and for the discovery and capture of the perpetrators of murders and thefts.[124] Ahmet Cevdet Paşa also pointed out the fact that although the *nahiye müdür*s fulfilled their main tasks in other parts of the Ottoman Empire, the situation was relatively different in Crete. This difference stemmed from the fact that as these officials were elected by the Cretan people, the power of the local government was limited when these officials were concerned. Moreover, the dismissal of the *nahiye müdür*s was made difficult in the regulations. As a result of these factors, they became tools in the hands of Christian insurgents and they refrained from apprehending the perpetrators of murders and thefts hiding in their districts. Ahmet Cevdet Paşa further remarked that during his own term, these officials had been informed that in order to take necessary and effective measures in discovering and apprehending the perpetrators of murders and thefts, additional gendarmerie corps and troops would be sent to their districts. Yet, he noted that he had not obtained any results from his initiatives.[125]

It should be important to remember that most of the local officials, including the deputies of the Assembly, members of the Court of Appeal and the Court of First Instance, were elected by the Cretan people.[126] In the Ottoman reports, this matter was criticized severely on the grounds that these officials should not have been elected by the people, since during the elections of these officials, the Cretans only promoted their interests and disregarded other things. It was also claimed that the election of the Judicial Commission by the people was the main barrier to the execution of the judicial power and the distribution of equal and impartial justice. Kostaki Anthopoulo Paşa stated that since the Judicial Commission was elected by the Cretans and the local power could not interfere in

---

[124] For further information about the *nahiye müdür*s see: Ayşe Nükhet Adıyeke. *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Girit Bunalımı (1896-1908)*, p. 69.

[125] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.EE., Dosya: 86, Gömlek: 93, Aded: 3/9, 1309 M 11.

[126] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.EE., Dosya: 8, Gömlek: 1, Aded: 7, 1306 Ra 22.

judicial affairs, the judicial power could not be executed properly.[127] Sharing the same opinion with Kostaki Paşa, Nikolaki Paşa also complained of the judges stating that they had not carried out their duties. The reason behind this was the fact that the judges were also partisans of the political parties.[128] This was not true only for the Courts of First Instance, but also for the other Courts of Justice. For that reason, as Nikolaki Paşa argued, it became almost impossible to equally distribute justice to the Cretan people. Due to the miscarriage of justice, people began to apply to the government complaining about injustices committed by the Courts of Justice. However, since the judicial power was independent and the government had no right or power to dismiss or change the judges, the government could not take any action on the complaints of the people.[129]

Besides, since the members of tribunals were also partisans of the political parties and were influenced by the partisanship, they divided the community into two opposing camps. For that reason, they could not be just and fair in the trials between the people from their own party and from the opposition party. This made the judicial organs a "centre of oppression (*merkez-i zulm ve taaddî*)."[130] However, the government could not overcome these difficulties, since the judicial power was independent and separate from the executive power. That was the reason why the most important and the most urgent reform to be made on the island was that of the tribunals.[131] Cevad Paşa proposed in his report, dated 9 November 1889, that the most important reform to be made regarding this subject was the appointment of the judges by the Sublime Porte. In other words, unless the judges were

---

[127] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.BŞK., Dosya: 13, Gömlek: 26, Aded: 4, 1305 N 22.

[128] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.EE., Dosya: 8, Gömlek: 1, Aded: 7, 1306 Ra 22; T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Hus., Dosya: 215, Gömlek: 9, Aded: 3, 1305 Za 7.

[129] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.EE., Dosya: 8, Gömlek: 1, Aded: 7, 1306 Ra 22.

[130] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.A., Dosya: 6, Gömlek: 34, Aded: 1/4, 1308 C 7.

[131] *ibid*.

appointed by the Sublime Porte, the condition of the Courts of Justice would not improve to a satisfactory degree.[132]

In another report dated 31 May 1891, Cevad Paşa pointed out that the regulations for the Cretan tribunals and the criminal law should have been modified. He emphasized the fact that the article concerning the election of the judicial officials was not modified in the imperial edict of 1889. He added that if this article was abolished, then the Christians would complain of it. He also noted in another report dated 16 November 1890 that he had already warned the Sublime Porte that the judicial officials should have been appointed by the Cretans, but the government should have the rights to be involved in the elections with special provisos and stipulations and that the Christian officials, who were in the habit of leaving the tribunals, should be replaced with new ones. As the report dated 7 November 1890 was not sanctioned by the Sublime Porte, Cevad Paşa sent another report on the 17 January 1891 suggesting that the regulations enacted in the other provinces of the empire should be adapted to the needs of Crete. For the purpose of the adaptation and the modification of the harmful regulations, a judicial inspector should be sent from İstanbul to Crete.[133]

As mentioned before, the Cretan revolt of 1889 arose out of the differences between the Christian minority and majority parties of the General Assembly. The animosity between these parties divided the Christian inhabitants and gave rise to the disturbances. When the Ottoman documents are examined, it can be clearly seen that the animosity between the Christian parties reached the point of endangering the general peace in Crete. In other words, party fanaticism can be considered one of the leading factors that disturbed order and tranquility within the island. In an extensive memorandum dated 27 March 1893,

---

[132] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.EE., Dosya: 86, Gömlek: 76, Aded: 3/6, 1307 R 15.

[133] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.MTV., Dosya: 50, Gömlek: 71, Aded: 18, 1308 L 23.

Mahmud Paşa paid special attention to partisanship and its adverse effects on the general peace. According to him, the main reason for this was the inefficiency and partiality of the local authorities. While the local authorities were supposed to govern the island impartially and justly providing equal conditions for the Cretan people, they were engaged in party politics. Moreover, they were associated with the majority party and regarded the minority party as their opponent. As a result of this, the officials who were adherents of the minority party were dismissed from their posts by the local authorities. Mahmud Paşa further asserted that the Cretan people were negatively affected by the partisanship which seduced the population and also divided the people who belonged to the same religion and sect. He proceeded to argue that party fanaticism had a certain effect on the loyalty and confidence of the public. The Cretan people lost their confidence towards the government, tribunals and the gendarmerie. As a result, they began to take care of their own problems. In the course of the same memorandum, he also focused on the murders which became a daily occurrence on the island. He drew attention to the act of retaliation stating that the relatives of the murdered would immediately kill a person in retaliation. For example, if a Muslim was murdered by a Christian, the relatives of the murdered, thinking that they had the right to kill anyone from the Christian community, might retaliate on the first Christian they met. In addition to the animosity between Christians and Muslims, Cretan peoples who belonged to the same religion murdered each other due to partisanship. In other words, partisans of the conflicting parties began to kill each other. Mahmud Paşa further remarked that everyday many innocent people were killed by discharging guns from ambushes. As a result of this, the island became a "slaughterhouse."[134] Mahmud Paşa was in the opinion that throughout the revolt the Muslims' houses were burnt; their properties and crops were pillaged; their live-stocks were killed; hundreds of Muslim families immigrated. These

[134] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.EE., Dosya: 114, Gömlek: 52, Aded: 6/6, 1310 N 9.

conditions put Muslims in despair and fear and that as their fear increased and deepened day by day, they tried to find ways to ensure their future. According to Mahmud Paşa, this was a very serious situation, since the emanation of any Muslim complaint pointing out the necessity of a transformation in Crete would alter the attitudes of the other states and endanger the sovereignty of the Sublime Porte on the island.[135]

According to the Ottoman documentation, some elite Christian inhabitants of the island who graduated from the University of Athens or other Greek schools played important roles in the revolts. These people were doctors, teachers and lawyers. Sava Paşa gave a detailed description of the Christian inhabitants of Ottoman Crete dividing the above-mentioned group into two sub-groups: the first group was in favor of the union of Crete with Greece; and the second one, which was the majority, aimed to establish an independent administration on the island. Sava Paşa pointed out that these people tricked the rest of the Cretan population with some absurd promises and they tried to paint their harmful acts in the color of patriotism. Another group, constituting the four-fifth of the Christian population on the island, was in favor of the maintenance of order and tranquility. For Sava Paşa, these people were the ones who rightly deserved to be protected, since they were modest and did not have harmful political ideas. The third group consisted of a few thousand Christians who subsisted on animals and other properties they had stolen. Most of them had moved to Greece during the previous revolt and were scared to come back to the island. However, they benefited from the amnesty. The stolen properties were not taken back from them and they were compelled to make peace with the grieved people in return for a little indemnity. Still, they continued to disturb the security

[135] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.ML., Dosya: 9, Gömlek: 72, Aded: 1, 1307 M 14.

of the island. Ironically, some of them were appointed as gendarmes after the dismissal of the Albanians from the gendarmerie.[136]

At this point, İsmail Paşa's report, although dated at a relatively early period (27 September 1860), is worth repeating here, as it provided a description of the Cretan Christians. According to İsmail Paşa, the Governor-General of Crete, although the Christian community attained privileges, tranquility and security, they were ready to commit disorder, and sometimes they inclined to be under the protection of Britain, France, and Greece due to the foreign intrigues and delusions. However, their primary intention and aim was to release themselves from the Ottoman government. For İsmail Paşa, it should be noted that the notables and the respectable part of the community were not in favor of this. Indeed, the mobs and penniless *mültezim*s dared it.[137]

In the same line with Sava Paşa, Mehmed Esad, formerly *mutasarrıf* of Rethymnon, also divided the Christian inhabitants of Crete into three: the first group was the property owners and the leading farmer figures living in the villages. They were sure that they would not find such prosperous and satisfactory conditions anywhere else. For that reason, they had not been in favor of the protection of Greece or another country. However, they did not dare tell this to the other Christians. The second group aimed to increase the local privileges by the help of the Assembly and to establish a principality and finally realize the union of Crete with Greece. The third group consisted of the Christians who had migrated to Greece at their earlier ages and studied there. And they returned back to the island and endeavored to ignite the revolution through participating in various events such as murder.

[136] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.UM., Dosya: 7, Gömlek: 76, Aded: 1, 1302 N 9.

[137] T.C. BOA, İradeler Tasnifi, İ.MTZ.GR., Dosya: 8, Gömlek: 184, Aded: 3, 1277 Ra 11.

Their main object was to call the attention of the European Powers so as to ensure their intervention in Crete and then to realize the annexation to Greece.[138]

The Ottoman archival sources revealed interesting insights about the mentality of the late Ottoman rulers and indicated their own stereotypes of the Cretans. In his long report, Kostaki Paşa stated that the Cretans had not lived in a state of prosperity and welfare, rather in a state of poverty and despair, and the state of affairs was desolate and devastated. The people had never benefited from the privileges which were granted by the Ottoman state. According to him, although the other provinces of the Ottoman Empire improved day by day, the island gradually became backward. He further stated that the province was ruined, morality of people was corrupt, the order of government was destroyed, and the island was full of murderers and culprits.[139] According to Nikolaki Paşa, since the Cretan peasants were ignorant and deprived of sciences and education, and were simple folk (*ulûm ve maârifden bî-behre ve gâfil ve bir de sâde-dîl bulundukları*), they were easily convinced by the urban people and became instruments for their benefits. The interesting aspect of his detailed report is that Nikolaki Paşa pointed out that the existing roads were insufficient and were even in ruins which made it impossible to go from one place to another, especially in the winter. This put the inhabitants of the villages into a very difficult position. He, therefore, paid special attention to the necessity of the construction of new bridges on the small valleys and rivers, and the restoration and repair of the roads for the improvement of public transport, as was demanded by the people.[140] It is apparent that these governors envisioned the projects as a "civilizing mission" in order to bring the

[138] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.MTV., Dosya: 31, Gömlek: 25, Aded: 2, 1305 C 21.

[139] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.BŞK., Dosya: 13, Gömlek: 26, Aded: 4, 1305 N 22.

[140] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.EE., Dosya: 8, Gömlek: 1, Aded: 7, 1306 Ra 22.

Cretans "into the fold of civilization."[141] According to the Ottoman statesmen, the Cretan society was pre-modern (*gayr-i mütemeddîn*) and the Cretans were savage people who needed to be governed carefully and transformed into modernity through education and other modern means.

In order to understand the causes of the disturbances in Ottoman Crete, one should pay special attention to the murders. In other words, in addition to other factors, the murders that prevailed throughout the island had a certain effect on the general peace in Crete and therefore, this can be considered a crucial point to be examined here. Kostaki Anthopoulo Paşa, in his petition dated 20 November 1887, stressed the spread of murders and pointed out that unless the murders were prevented, they might lead to serious events on the island. Concerning the murders, the most important point to be taken into consideration was revenge.[142]

For instance, if a Christian assassinated a Muslim, the relatives of the murdered would immediately retaliate on a Christian. And as a result of this, a state of chain murders emerged. It is evident that there was a motive of retaliation on the parts of Muslims and Christians. Kostaki Anthopoulo Paşa added that this would endanger the security and trigger serious events between the Muslims and Christians. He further argued that the most significant factor regarding the continuation of such murders was the non-execution of capital punishment on the murderers who had been sentenced to death. Furthermore, he mentioned that had capital punishment been carried out, this could have served as a

[141] Selim Deringil. "They Live in a State of Nomadism and Savagery: The Late Ottoman Empire and the Post-Colonial Debate," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. XLV, No. 2, 2003, pp. 311-342; especially, 329.

[142] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.MTV., Dosya: 29, Gömlek: 10, Aded: 7, 1305 Ra 11.

deterrent factor for the others. In a way, other people would not attempt to kill someone and the persistent continuation of murders could have been prevented.[143]

For Kostaki Anthopoulo Paşa, another important factor in the prevention of murders was the gendarmerie corps. However, it should be important to remember that at that time the gendarmes were not capable of fulfilling their duties. The gendarmerie was composed of the native Cretans and the Christian gendarmes were engaged in party politics. In other words, being natives, the gendarmes had a close relationship with their fellow countrymen and sided with their respective parties. Party fanaticism was very strong among the Christian gendarmes. They did not hesitate to disregard the public security for promoting the interests of their respective parties. Moreover, during the revolts, upon the orders they received from the insurgent chiefs, the Christian gendarmes quit their own duties and joined the insurgents. All these factors illustrated that the gendarmes could not perform their duties in an efficient way. He pointed out the fact that the public security would be in danger as long as the gendarmerie remained in the hands of the natives. For that reason, in order to discover and apprehend the culprits and to establish security within the island, the gendarmerie had to be reorganized. The first necessary step to be taken was the introduction of the foreigners to the gendarmerie.[144] At this point, in order to show the close relationship between the native gendarmes and their fellow country men, the following example will be given: Christo Zolaki, a Mayor of the gendarmerie, seized the revolver of a Muslim gendarme and the horse of the cavalryman for helping one of his relatives who had been sentenced to capital punishment. And, then Christo Zolaki ran

[143] *ibid*.

[144] *ibid*.

away and rebelled. His brother, a member of the Provincial Administrative Council, also pursued the same line of action.[145]

According to Nikolaki Paşa, the gendarmes were not capable of fulfilling their duties, since the gendarmerie forces were composed of incapable people and most of them were illiterate. Moreover, they were not obedient to the state.[146] Nikolaki Paşa mentioned that the Cretan population did not help the gendarmerie for the discovery of the culprits. It should also be stated that while the gendarmes transported the culprits, people attacked the gendarmes to help the culprits escape. Nikolaki Paşa pointed out that these kinds of attacks became common on the island. In some cases, although the people knew the perpetrators of the murders, they would not report them to the gendarmerie.[147]

In the report dated 31 May 1891, Cevad Paşa emphasized the continuity of the murders. Although the revolt of 1889 was suppressed and the martial law was proclaimed, murders were not prevented. He pointed out that murders had been committed for a long time but their number was on the rise after the proclamation of the martial law on the island. In this report, he stated that between the years 1878 and 1889, the following number of people had been murdered in Crete.[148]

---

[145] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.ASK., Dosya: 57, Gömlek: 28, Aded: 2, 1306 Z 18.

[146] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Hus., Dosya: 215, Gömlek: 9, Aded: 3, 1305 Za 7.

[147] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.EE., Dosya: 8, Gömlek: 1, Aded: 7, 1306 Ra 22.

[148] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.MTV., Dosya: 50, Gömlek: 71, Aded: 18, 1308 L 23.

Table 1: Number of murders committed between 1878 and 1889

Year	Murders
1878	30
1879	39
1880	42
1881	54
1882	50
1883	80
1884	98
1885	54
1886	89
1887	81
1888	91
1889	162
Total	**870**

The following table provides the number of murders which had been committed in the five *sancak*s from the beginning of 1881 to the end of 1890.[149]

Table 2: Number of murders committed in the five s*ancak*s between 1881 and 1890

	1881	1882	1883	1884	1885	1886	1887	1888	1889	1890	**Total**
Chania	11	8	14	27	21	27	45	27	15	64	**259**
Candia	6	19	15	15	17	24	25	11	22	31	**185**
Lasithi	6	3	3	0	0	3	4	6	13	7	**45**
Sfakia	1	3	1	1	6	18	12	0	16	45	**103**
Rethmynon	6	6	9	11	6	8	12	10	15	20	**103**
Total	**30**	**39**	**42**	**54**	**50**	**80**	**98**	**54**	**81**	**167**	**695**

For Cevad Paşa, the main reason for the persistent increase in the number of murders was the escape of the perpetrators of murders to Greece. These people were protected by Greece and their number increased day by day and exceeded 500 people. Moreover, the perpetrators of murders were sent to the island from time to time under the guise of political offenders. The pensions given by the Greek government to the Cretan refugees and the perpetrators of murders in Athens were not paid after Deliyanni's cabinet came to the power. As a result of this, these people could no longer stay in Athens and returned to Crete. Cevad Paşa continued his report stating that the fugitives, having

[149] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.EE., Dosya: 47, Gömlek: 12, Aded: 8, 1308 Za 27.

returned to the island, would promote trouble and disturb the Muslims, who were busy with their daily business. For that reason, he proposed that an agreement should be signed with the Greek government for the extradition of the criminals and that the Sublime Porte should initiate diplomatic attempts.[150] He argued that if the perpetrators of murders were punished with life sentence and the condemnation to the galleys for a certain period, no sufficient result would be achieved. For Cevad Paşa, the execution of retaliation and capital punishment were necessary on the island.[151]

The general amnesty granted to the political offenders and the perpetrators of murders was also discussed by Cevad Paşa. The political offenders were condemned by the Court Martial in their presence or absence. However, although the political offenders who were condemned in their presence (*vicâhen*) were imprisoned in the castles of the Ottoman Empire, the others who were condemned in their absence (*gıyâben*) escaped to Athens and were granted amnesty in the previous year during the enthronement celebrations of the Ottoman Sultan. Cevad Paşa proposed that the latter as well as the former had to be granted amnesty. For it would be contrary to the justice of the sultan to grant general amnesty to only one part of the political offenders. In other words, while the political offenders who were the chiefs of the insurgents were granted amnesty, the others were not.[152] On 2 August 1891, Cevad Paşa sent a telegraph to the Sublime Porte informing that if these political offenders were not granted amnesty, the retaliations would extend to a larger scale than hitherto. Therefore, it was necessary to grant amnesty to them. He also

[150] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.MTV., Dosya: 50, Gömlek: 71, Aded: 18, 1308 L 23.

[151] *ibid*.

[152] *ibid*.

complained that in spite of notifying the Sublime Porte before, he had not received an answer.[153]

Cevad Paşa pointed out that the financial situation of the island was not unsatisfactory and figured out that the incomes were 12,198,890 *kuruş* and the expenditures were 15,800, 244 *kuruş*, and that the budget deficit was 3,608,435 *kuruş*. The details of the incomes and expenditures in 1889 were as follows:[154]

[153] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.UM., Dosya: 22, Gömlek: 49, Aded: 8/12, 1308 Z 26.

[154] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.MTV., Dosya: 50, Gömlek: 71, Aded: 18, 1308 L 23.

Table 3a: The incomes of Crete in 1889

kuruş	*para*	*nev'î vâridât*
284,541	30	*akar vergisi*
5,425,094	23	*mahsûlat-ı seyfiyye*
4,789,305	6	*zeytin eşcârı bedel-i a'şârı*
113,775	0	*balık resmi*
446,429	20	*sünger resmi*
1,1059,145	35	*yekûn*
88,530	4	*mahâkim-i umûmîye hâsılatı*
290,058	9	*mukavelât hâsılatı*
51,397	1	*terhînat hâsılatı*
23,450	35	*cezâ-yı nakdi hâsılatı*
18,236	10	*pul bey'iyesi hâsılatı*
15,347	11	*a'şâr ve rüsûmât güzeştesi*
57,056	20	*matbaa-ı vilâyet hâsılatı*
34,088	21	*hâsılat-ı müteferrika*
578,164	31	*yekûn*
33,150	10	*mer'alar hâsılatı*
681	20	*dekâkîn-i mîrîye vesâire icârâtı*
7,651	35	*emlâk-ı mazbûta ve kararı hâsılatı*
41,483	25	*yekûn*
10,473	35	*alçı taşları hâsılatı*
10,473	35	*yekûn*
11,689,268	10	*cümleten yekûn*
		mahsûlât-ı seyfiyye ve zeytin eşçârı a'şârının yüzde beş tahsîldâriye âidâtı
154,940	13	*mahsûlât-ı seyfiyye tahsîldâriyesi*
354,600	18	*zeytin eşcârı tahsildâriyesi*
509,540	1	*yekûn*
12,198,809	1	*icmâl*

Table 3b: The expenditures of Crete in 1889

kuruş	*nev'î masârifât*
1,666,035	*birinci kısım umûr-ı dâhiliye*
320,321	*ikinci kısım umûr-ı mâliye*
2,175,548	*üçüncü kısım umûr-ı adliye*
6,345,280	*dördüncü kısım umûr-ı jandarma*
1,101,332	*beşinci kısım masârif-i mütenevvia*
1,500,000	*altıncı kısım umûr-ı maârif*
1,000,000	*yedinci kısım umûr-ı nâfıa*
47,616	*dâhil-i muvâzene olan zeytin ve seyfiyye a'şârları için müstahdem tahsîldârân âidâtıyla ketebe maâşatı vesâire*
1,281,112	*evvelce istikrâz edilmiş olan 60.000 altının 307 senesindeki bir senelik tekasîti*
15,807,244	*yekûn*

Due to the weakness displayed by the Greek Orthodox governors and the privileges given to the island, the Christian inhabitants of the island suggested the union of Crete with Greece. As a result of this, the island was ready to secede from the Ottoman state. In this sense, Cevad Paşa made a correlation between the Abbasids and the Ottoman state stating that as in the last stage of the Abbasids, when the name of the Caliph was remembered only in the *hutba*s, and the executive powers were in the hands of the oppressors, the state of affairs on the island were so strongly under the control of the Greek officials that it was only a matter of time for the island to fall into their hands.[155]

At this point, he argued that the Ottoman government had lost its prestige in the public eye. Sharing the same opinion with Cevad Paşa, Ahmet Cevdet Paşa also attached a lot of importance to the fact that there were many attempts on the part of the Christians to weaken the power of the Ottoman state on the island. Ahmet Cevdet Paşa asserted that their object was to unite with Greece. Therefore, they were not satisfied with the privileges given by the Ottoman state. Instead of being satisfied with these privileges, and making

[155] "İşte devlet kendi me'mûrlarını en ziyâde kendisine bir düşman-ı kavî bulduğundan imtiyâzât ve sû-i isti'mâlât gittikçe ziyâdeleşüb nüfûz-ı devlet bütün bütün mahv olub Hulefâ'-ı Abbâsîyenin evâhir-i (*son*) devrinde nasıl halîfenin yalnız ismi hutbelerde okunarak sâir icrâât-ı hükûmet mütegallibeler elinde kalmış ise cezîrede dahi nüfûz-u hükûmet öylece Yunan me'mûrları elinde bırakılıb ada ismen devletin ma'nen Yunan me'mûrlarının olmağa bir ramak kalmışdır."
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.EE., Dosya: 86, Gömlek: 76, Aded: 3/6, 1307 R 15.

modifications and regulations for the welfare and security of the island, they disturbed order and tranquility. Hence, they aimed to weaken the power and influence of the Ottoman state before the European Powers. The governors did not protect the rights of the state. Rather, they implemented harmful regulations. Furthermore, the administrative power of the Ottoman state was put in the hands of the governors who were incapable of fulfilling their duties. In a way, the governors lost their powers, and the power of the state was put in the hands of the officials who were elected by the people.[156]

Conclusion

This chapter has provided a general outlook on the Cretan history and introduced physical, demographic and socio-political aspects of Crete to understand the roots of the developments that took place in the late nineteenth century. We have seen that the events of the late nineteenth century were not entirely isolated from the previous ones. In other words, there were no clear-cut distinctions and demarcation lines throughout the Cretan history. The Ottoman conquest, however, marked a turning point in the Cretan history by adding two significant layers to it; the first one was the creation of a larger Muslim community within the island and the other was the incorporation of the Orthodox Christian inhabitants of the island into the Patriarchate of İstanbul.

Analyzing the role played by the Council of *Evkaf* and Orphans in the Cretan society, this chapter has provided interesting insights in terms of inner and inter-communal relations. It seems clear that Ottoman Crete was not simply a province on the periphery full of revolts, conflicts and violence. Rather, the socio-economic relationship between the Cretan Muslims and Christians transcended the boundaries of the religious communities. Each community had not lived in isolation from one another. Rather, there was an intimate

[156] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.EE., Dosya: 86, Gömlek: 93, Aded: 3/9, 1309 M 11.

daily contact between the Cretan Muslims and Christians who often shared the workplaces and living in mixed villages. Therefore, it is meaningless to insist on a clear-cut distinction between the Cretan Muslims and Christians, since they interacted both in economic and social spheres.

This chapter has also illustrated that the island of Crete witnessed many revolts throughout its history. Although the reasons of the revolts differed from one another, after the introduction of nationalist ideology into the Cretan society, the Christian segment of the population began to add a "powerful nationalist tonic" to their insurrectionary activities and commemorated their revolts as a "nationalist liberation struggle." Admittedly, throughout the nineteenth century, revolt and violence were pervasive on the island. After the Greek War of Independence, the nationalist discourse became a fundamental factor in uniting the local Christian population of the island to explain and legitimize their actions.

When the reports of the Ottoman statesmen are closely examined, it is clearly seen that the Ottoman statesmen claimed that difficulties that occurred on the island were mainly due to the "maladministration" of the Greek Orthodox governors, to the inefficiency of the existing laws and regulations, to the illegalities and injustices committed by the Courts of Justice, and to the animosity between the two Christian parties of the General Assembly, namely the Conservatives and the Liberals. From the viewpoint of the writers of status reports, the privileges given by the Halepa Pact had not brought peace or order to the island, rather it had caused various disorders. In these reports, it was asserted that this pact brought an unprecedented freedom to the island and culminated in the revolt of 1889.

The writers of the reports complained of the Greek Orthodox governors, blaming them for disregarding the rights and interests of the Ottoman state and for being partial. For them, the above-mentioned governors were against the primary principals of the state and

were unfit for the post of Governor-General of Crete. The maintenance of those governors in power was considered a big threat to the interests of the Ottoman state. It was repetitively stated that the Christian inhabitants had done whatever they wanted to and even over-stepped the limits during the terms of the Greek Orthodox governors. Moreover, the Cretan Christians were as much encouraged as to openly proclaim the annexation to Greece.

It is my contention that the Christian segment of the Cretan population might have thought that the Greek Orthodox governors served for their benefits and that the Cretan Christians would be able to drive out the Ottoman administration and seize the power under the administration of the Greek Orthodox governors. In other words, it can be argued that the Greek Orthodox governors prepared a fertile ground for the political, economic and psychological needs of the Christian inhabitants. Politically, the Cretan Christians might have thought that they would get ahead farther on their way with the help of these governors. Economically, they might have expected that during the terms of those governors, a suitable ground would be found for compelling the Cretan Muslims to leave the island and as a result of this confiscate the Muslims' properties.

It should be important to remember that after the Berlin Congress, the Ottoman Empire lost a significant portion of its territory on which the Christian population lived. In such an environment, the Greek Orthodox governors were appointed to Crete. From the viewpoint of the Ottoman state, the appointment of these governors not only satisfied the Christian inhabitants, but also remedied the image of the Ottoman state before the eyes of the European Powers.

Nearly all the reports mentioned above emphasized the inefficiency of the judicial power and its impact on the revolt of 1889. In these reports, the writers stressed the injustices displayed by the Courts of Justice. There were repetitive references to the

inefficiency of the Courts of Justice, which were incapable of equally distributing justice. The problems in the Courts of Justice appeared to have originated from the election of the judicial officials by the Cretan people and from the party fanatics among the judges. As the judges based their decisions on party politics, their justice was not impartial. Thus, it can be safely argued that justice was distributed according to factions on the island. Furthermore, it should be important to note that the separation between the executive and judicial powers had a striking effect on the inefficiency of the tribunals. The solution proposed for the difficulties was a reform in the Courts of Justice. The appointment of the Judicial Commission by the Ottoman state and the modifications on the existing regulations and laws were repeatedly proposed in the reports. The animosity between the majority and minority parties among the Christian members of the General Assembly was considered a significant factor that put the island into a very difficult condition. The Christian inhabitants of the island were deeply affected by party fanaticism. The conflicts between the Christian parties seduced the Christian population of the island and culminated in the conflicts between the Cretan Muslims and Christians. Administrative, judicial and security organs of the island carried out their functions according to the party feelings. In other words, they were blinded by party fanaticism and as a result of this, peace and order were disturbed on the island.

Another critical issue discussed in the reports was the murders. Revenge and the act of retaliation were considered two important motives noteworthy of emphasis. It was argued that so long as the gendarmerie was not reorganized, a favorable solution to the murders could not be found. The maintenance of the natives in the gendarmerie was seen as the main barrier to restore order and tranquility on the island. As to the effective reforms, the introduction of foreign elements was repetitively recommended in most of the above-mentioned documents. Moreover, it was proposed that the perpetrators of murder

should be tried and severely punished. It should be important to point out that after the suppression of the revolt, the increase in the murders could not be prevented. Rather they increased sharply. The writers of the reports agreed that the Ottoman state began to lose its power and influence over the island pointing out that the governors' power was put in the hands of the local Christian officials and the regulations and modifications made by them were contrary to the interests of the Ottoman state. The necessity of the modifications in the existing laws and regulations was stressed as well. Apart from this, the writers touched upon the prestige of the Ottoman state arguing that unsatisfactory developments disturbed the confidence of the population in the administrative, judicial and security branches of the state. Thus, the Ottoman state lost its prestige in the eyes of the Cretan people.

Most importantly, while the writers proposed various necessary measures to prevent the disturbances and restore peace and order, they did not propose any military measures. The reason behind this was clearly seen in a report prepared by Said Paşa, dated 6 August 1889, who stated that without any difficulty, the necessary military forces were available in various parts of the empire to be sent to Crete. However, should that be the case, the Christian inhabitants of Crete would complain to the European Powers and as a result of this, those states would interfere in the disturbances. He further stated that so long as the intervention of the European Powers was allowed, the suppression of the revolt by the military forces would be impossible. He went on to claim that the European Powers would probably offer to hold a conference or find a solution by discussing the issue among them. This would be contrary to the interests of the Ottoman state, but be beneficial for the people who were responsible for the disturbances. For Said Paşa, as it was impossible to suppress the revolt through military measures, political ones had to be taken without delay.[157]

[157] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.EE., Dosya: 82, Gömlek: 31, Aded: 1/2, 1306 Z 9.

Chapter III

VIOLENCE REVISITED: COMMITTEE, GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND CRETAN REVOLT OF 1896

Hamidian Period

In the years following the Congress of Berlin, the Ottoman Empire was stuck and it was squeezed under the strict pressure of the foreign states which increasingly involved in intra-Ottoman conflicts and interceded on behalf of the separatist nationalist movements. Although the Ottoman Empire was engaged in efforts to preserve its seemingly equal position of being one of the major actors of world politics, it was dependent on the European Powers in terms of economics and politics.[1] During the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II (1876-1909), various attempts were made to eliminate the foreign intervention in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire and improve the economic strength of the Ottoman administration.[2] Sultan Abdülhamid II's rule began with unsatisfactory conditions, including the profound fiscal crisis of 1876-78, and the devastating Russo-Ottoman War of 1877-78.[3]

In terms of domestic and foreign policies of the Ottoman Empire, the Congress of Berlin (1878) can be considered a hallmark and represents a pivotal shift in the Ottoman state's relations with its subjects, with the European Powers, and moreover, in its inter-

---

[1] Selim Deringil. *The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1909*, (London: I. B. Tauris Publishers, 1999), p. 3.

[2] Engin Deniz Akarlı. *The Problems of External Pressures, Power Struggles, and Budgetary Deficits in the Ottoman Politics under Abdülhamid II (1876-1909): Origins and Solutions*, (USA: Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Princeton University, 1976), p. 50.

[3] Donald Quataert. "Overview of the Nineteenth Century," in: Halil İnalcık with Donald Quataert (eds.). *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire (1600-1914)*, Vol. II, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 766.

communal relations. By the Congress of Berlin, the gap between the religious groups had been widened and mutual tolerance between the various ethnic and religious groups was undermined and destroyed. It should be important to point out that after this congress, the Ottoman Empire became a predominantly Muslim state, the ratio of the Muslim population reached about 75-80 percent of its total population in 1878-79.[4] In other words, the Ottoman Empire "had become more Asiatic in terms of territory and more Muslim in terms of population as a result of the losses of 1878."[5]

From the economic perspective, Sultan Abdülhamid II had inherited a state which was already bankrupt in 1875 due to its defaulted foreign debts.[6] The Public Debt Administration (*Düyûn-u Umûmiyye İdâresi*), by the Decree of *Muharrem*, was established in December 1881. In a way, a large part of the Ottoman revenues, the produce of the salt and tobacco monopolies, the tribute paid by some provinces, and the taxes on stamps and spirits, was to be controlled and used by this council for the service and repayment of the debts.[7]

Sultan Abdülhamid II's foreign policy was based on the differences and rivalries among the European Powers. Unlike the conventional view of the historiography of the Eastern Question, the Ottoman Empire was not a passive state, rather it had enough power to have a preference over the imperialist states.[8] After the Congress of Berlin, the Ottoman state administration lost its confidence in Britain and considered this state a real threat to

---

[4] Kemal H. Karpat. "The Social and Political Foundations of Nationalism in South East Europe after 1878: A Reinterpretation," in his: *Studies on Ottoman Social and Political History: Selected Articles and Essays*, (Brill, Leiden, Boston, Köln: Tuta Sub Aegide Pallas, 2002), pp. 352-354, and 377.

[5] Eric J. Zürcher. *Turkey: A Modern History*, (London: I. B. Tauris, 2004), p. 79.

[6] F. A. K. Yasamee. *Ottoman Diplomacy: Abdülhamid II and the Great Powers 1878-1888*, (İstanbul: Isis Press, 1996), p. 45.

[7] M. S. Anderson. *The Eastern Question 1774-1923*, (London: St. Martin's Press, 1966), p. 224.

[8] İlber Ortaylı. *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Alman Nüfuzu*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1998), p. 49.

its survival since Britain had become very hostile against the Ottoman state and had put heavy pressures on the Ottoman government to undertake reforms within the Ottoman Empire. The decline of British influence in the eyes of the Sublime Porte gained momentum after the British occupation of Egypt in 1882.[9] The relationship with Germany became pivotal in Ottoman foreign policy. For the Ottoman state officials, as Germany did not have a direct interest in disintegrating and partitioning the Ottoman Empire, close relations with it would serve Ottoman interests. Hence, "close but cautious cooperation with Germany" became a crucial element in Ottoman foreign policy. However, it should be noted that the Ottoman state mechanism was well aware that Britain was still the most powerful state in the world, so good relations with Germany did not mean the "total rupture of relations with Britain,"[10] rather it meant a balance in the neo-imperialist aggressiveness of Britain and France.[11] Moreover, Sultan Abdülhamid II diverted the attentions of the European Powers from territorial ambitions into economic rivalries for making investments throughout the Ottoman Empire, including railroads, industry, and trade; in a way he used the rivalries of those states to get investments for the Ottoman Empire.[12]

In this period, the main aim of the Ottoman state was to bring foreign states' intervention and meddling in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire to an end. Although Sultan Abdülhamid II made fruitful diplomatic attempts to eliminate foreign

---

[9] M. S. Anderson. *The Eastern Question 1774-1923*, p. 224.

[10] Engin Deniz Akarlı. *The Problems of External Pressures, Power Struggles, and Budgetary Deficits in the Ottoman Politics under Abdülhamid II (1876-1909): Origins and Solutions*, pp. 44-45.

[11] Hasan Kayalı. *Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918*, (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1997), p. 33.

[12] Stanford Shaw. "Sultan Abdülhamid II: Last Man of the Tanzimat," in: *Tanzimat'ın 150. Yıldönümü Uluslararası Sempozyumu*, (Ankara: Milli Kütüphane, 1989), p. 196.

intervention, he did not manage to annihilate it.[13] The European Powers supported separatist nationalist movements of the Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire and acted on behalf of the Christians. They aimed to destroy the Ottoman Empire through various means, including the establishment of autonomous governments and of exclusive "zones of influence."[14] As the Ottoman Empire lost a large portion of its non-Muslim subjects in the Balkans after the Congress of Berlin, Sultan Abdülhamid II emphasized the role of caliph and Islamic religion so as to provide "a new bid for unity against … an increasingly hostile world."[15] He considered the Caliphate as a crucial element for Muslim solidarity and unity.[16] Indeed, by emphasizing the role of caliph and giving special attention to Muslims around the world and within the Ottoman Empire, Sultan Abdülhamid II hoped to counter-weight the European Powers and to consolidate his power.[17] In other words, "Hamidian Islamism" served to legitimize Sultan Abdülhamid II's autocratic rule (*istibdâd*) and was used in foreign policy objectives, so it can be portrayed as "a pragmatic policy that availed of Islamic symbols and upheld the Ottoman state's Islamic identity and the Muslim subjects' morale following losses in war."[18] It should also be noted that the Ottoman-Russo War of 1877-78 had a devastating effect on the Muslim Ottoman population who began to gradually lose its feeling of superiority to the non-Muslims. For that reason, Sultan

---

[13] *ibid*., pp. 50 and 52.

[14] F. A. K. Yasamee. *Ottoman Diplomacy: Abdülhamid II and the Great Powers 1878-1888*, p. 47.

[15] Selim Deringil. "Legitimacy Structures the Ottoman State: The Reign of Abdülhamid II (1876-1909)," p. 84, in his: *The Ottomans, the Turks, and World Power Politics*, (İstanbul: Isis Press, 2000).

[16] F. A. K. Yasamee. *Ottoman Diplomacy: Abdülhamid II and the Great Powers 1878-1888*, p. 26.

[17] David Kushner. *Expressions of Turkish National Sentiment during the Time of Abdülhamid II, 1876-1908*, (London: 1977), p. 6.

[18] Hasan Kayalı. *Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918*, p. 31.

Abdülhamid II focused on the policies that aimed to dispel this negative feeling and renew the Ottoman Muslims' loyalty to the Ottoman dynasty and government.[19]

The Ottoman Empire entered the last quarter of the nineteenth century with serious issues. This period represents a crucial point in time when the Balkan peoples did succeed in establishing new independent states in the Balkan Peninsula. Like the other non-Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire, the Cretan Christians considered armed struggle as the only way of gaining their independence from the Ottoman rule. After 1895, the Greek government, equipped with its irredentist policies, continued to intervene in the internal matters of Crete and to overtly support and provoke the insurgent activities on the island. The European Powers, on the other hand, evaluating the revolts on the island as being part of the "Eastern Question," acted as the third party mediators to dictate a solution discarding the wishes and interests of the Cretan people. In other words, the Cretan Christians came to be perceived and presented by the European Powers in a similar manner to the other Christian Ottoman subjects living in the Balkans.

Financial Difficulties and the Reform Committee in Crete

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Ottoman government issued a *fermân* to suppress the Cretan revolt of 1889. After its proclamation, the privileges given by the Halepa Convention was restricted, and the number of deputies in the General Assembly was reduced to 35 Christians and 22 Muslims. The Christian deputies had been complaining of this distribution from the very beginning, but as the General Assembly was not convoked since the proclamation of the *fermân* of 1889, they did not find an opportunity to pronounce their complaints. According to the Christian deputies, after the proclamation of the *fermân*, the implementation of certain measures, such as the changes in

[19] Stephen Duguid. "The Politics of Unity: Hamidian Policy in Eastern Anatolia," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. IX , 1973, p. 140.

the collection of tithe, the non-convocation of the General Assembly by the Ottoman government altered the internal dynamics of the island and caused a deep resentment within the society.[20]

This chapter begins with the examination of the reappearance of the *Epitropi*'s rebellious activities on the island. Then it examines the insurgents' demands and Turhan Paşa's attempts to prevent the adjournment of the General Assembly. The chapter also paid special attention to the Cretan revolt of 1896, which provided important insights into the consolidation of the Cretan Christians and the exclusion of the Cretan Muslims. In a way, it illustrates how exclusion and violence drew certain boundaries between the Christian and Muslim communities of the island.[21] In addition, this chapter explores the increasing intervention of the European Powers in the internal conflicts of the island and the limitation of Ottoman military power by those states.

At the beginning of 1895, the Ottoman government decided to convoke the Assembly. After that, the Christian deputies submitted a memorandum to the Governor-General of Crete requesting the redistribution of the seats. In the meantime, Turhan Paşa was recalled by the Sublime Porte and Karatodori Paşa was appointed as Governor-General. Besides, the request of the Christian deputies, an increase of five Christians and three Muslims in the seats of the Assembly was sanctioned by Sultan Abdülhamid II.[22]

The financial conditions of the island were not satisfactory, either. According to the information given by British Consul Biliotti, there was a budget deficit of 120,000 *lirâ*s in

---

[20] In order to express their complaints and proposals, the Christian deputies had sent a petition, bearing 50 signatures, to Sultan Abdülhamid II in June 1894. For the details see: T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.MTV., Dosya: 98, Gömlek: 74, Aded: 2, 1311 Z 26.

[21] In this respect, it is important to remember Fredrick Barth's notion of social boundary mechanisms between different groups. For the details see: Fredrick Barth (ed.). *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference*, (Oslo and London: Allen and Unwin, 1969).

[22] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 7 (1896), *Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Crete*, (London: 1896), No. 4, and 7. It should be important to note that between the years 1889-1895 the administration of Crete were in the hands of the Muslim governors.

the Cretan treasury. Accordingly, the *Vâli* informed the Sublime Porte expressing the necessity of contracting a loan under the guarantee of the Public Debt Administration so as to cover this amount. However, the Sublime Porte believed that there was not a budget deficit of that amount, so it did not sanction the Cretan budget or loan proposal. Instead, it only sent 10,000 *lirâ*s which was mainly used for the payment of the salaries.[23]

The Cretan Committee in Greece began a large scale agitation and sent its agents to Crete organizing the reform committee with the aim of obtaining restitution of the clauses of the Halepa Convention. The Cretan Christian insurgent chiefs, who stayed in Athens at that time, provoked the Cretans to force the local government for the convocation of the General Assembly and the appointment of Christian governors. The journals and pamphlets published by these insurgent chiefs in Athens also contributed to the outbreak of the revolt.[24] At first, the *Epitropi* ("The Reform Committee") commenced its rebellious activities in the province of Apokorono, in the north-western part of the island.[25] At the beginning of September 1895, the Christian chiefs of Chania and Rethymnon had gathered on the Klema plateau where they decided to start a new revolt in Crete and sent a memorandum to the European consulates and the Ottoman Sultan requesting the re-establishment of the Halepa Pact.[26] The followers of the *Epitropi* were mainly composed of two elements: the first element was the outlaws who had committed very serious crimes on the island. The second one was composed of peasants who were deceived with certain promises and participated in the revolts.[27] At that time, the internal conditions of Crete was

---

[23] *ibid*., No. 43 and 49.

[24] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Hus., Dosya: 308, Gömlek: 141, Aded: 5, 1312 3 14.

[25] The greater number of its followers consisted of inhabitants of the village of Campos and southern villages of Apokorono. British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 7 (1896), No. 79.

[26] Pandelis Prevelakis. *The Cretan*, (trl.) Abbott Rick, Peter Mackridge, (Minneapolis: Nostos, 1991), pp. 179-180.

[27] T.C. BOA, İradeler Tasnifi, İ.MTZ.GR., Dosya: 29, Gömlek: 1080, Aded: 4, 1313 N 9.

far from being satisfactory. In a report dated 3 December 1895, the following description was given regarding the internal affairs of Crete: "… an armed band of insurgents has assembled in the mountains, which is reinforced from time to time by volunteers and supported by voluntary contributions … murders and other outrages being rife … the gendarmerie is out of gear, … there is no money to meet the most pressing needs of the Government…"[28] The Christian insurgents rallied on the island and the hawkers sold munitions on the highways. The Muslims loaded their household goods on their backs and left their villages to flee to the major cities.[29]

In a telegram dated 4 February 1896, Karatodori Paşa[30] proposed to the Sublime Porte in order to exclude the first leader group of the *Epitropi*, an amnesty should be issued for the second group. He further stated that in this case, the outlaws would not pose any political threat and would be politically irrelevant. In a way, with the reorganization of the gendarmerie, order and tranquility would be reestablished on the island.[31] This issue was discussed in the Ottoman Cabinet meeting in which the deputies stated that the perpetrators of the murders were bad people who were fugitives and as long as there were fugitives, it

[28] *ibid*., No. 48. At that time murder and violence within the Cretan society was widespread. For the certain instances see: T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Hus., Dosya: 305, Gömlek: 89, Aded: 1, 1312 S 8; T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Hus., Dosya: 311, Gömlek: 54, Aded: 2, 1312 R 24; T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Hus., Dosya: 318, Gömlek: 15, Aded: 1, 1312 Ş 1; T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Hus., Dosya: 323, Gömlek: 70, Aded: 3, 1312 L 8; T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Hus., Dosya: 323, Gömlek: 87, Aded: 3, 1312 L 9; T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Hus., Dosya: 323, Gömlek: 138, Aded: 2, 1312 L 13; T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Hus., Dosya: 330, Gömlek: 157, Aded: 2, 1312 Z 29.

[29] Pandelis Prevelakis. *The Cretan*, p. 180.

[30] Alexandr Karatodori Paşa was born in İstanbul in 1833. After studying Literature and Natural Sciences in Paris, he received his Ph.D. in Law. He began working in the Translation Office of the Sublime Porte at the age of 17. He fulfilled various duties in the Ottoman administration including the duty of being appointed as the ambassador in Rome, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Ottoman Empire, and he was the representative of the Ottoman Empire in the Berlin Congress in 1878. He was also the *Bey* of Samos. In certain periods, he was accused of abusing his administrative powers and was even sued.
T.C. BOA, İradeler Tasnifi, DH.SAİD., Dosya: 18, Gömlek: 257, 1249 Z 29.

[31] Karatodori Paşa arrived at this decision upon an implicit offer he received from the British Consul that the leader of the *Epitropi* could well leave the island.
T.C. BOA, İradeler Tasnifi, İ.MTZ.GR., Dosya: 29, Gömlek: 1080, Aded: 4, 1313 N 9.

would not be possible to maintain order on the island.[32] The deputies claimed that the geographical position of the island made it possible for the outlaws to engage in hit-and-run tactics. Therefore, the criminals ran away to the interior parts when confronted with pressure, and it was difficult to follow and catch them. Taking all of these things into consideration, the Ottoman deputies stated that the general amnesty issued for the villagers and the others should also be issued for the first group (fugitives), but only for their general rights and that they would be treated on the basis of the nature of the event for their personal rights.[33]

After the meeting of the Christian chiefs of Chania and Rethymnon on the Klema plateau, most of the insurgent chiefs had returned to their villages where they waited for the signal to take up arms. During the winter, the Christian women and children had left Askyphou for the lowland pastures, since the weather conditions were very hard in Askyphou where all the houses were buried in the snow and the plateau was cut off from the outside world. During the winter, in the case of women and children, the insurgents stayed in these houses. Captain Manoussos Koundhouros, whose family house was in Petre, also stayed in Askyphou in the winter and prepared for the revolt.[34] Prevelakis depicted the atmosphere of Askyphou stating that the insurgents "fed their fires with holm oak trunks and warmed their wine, which they drank sprinkled with ground pepper." And they sang a song: "When will the skies become clear, oh when will February come?..." or they sang *the Eagle* together:[35]

> On a high crag, on a rooted boulder
> Stands an eagle, stands an eagle,
> Soaked by the rain and frozen by the snow…

[32] *ibid*.

[33] i*bid*.

[34] Pandelis Prevelakis. *The Cretan*, p. 188.

[35] *ibid*., p. 189.

Turhan Paşa and the Adjournment of the General Assembly

From the beginning of 1896, according to the British consul's accounts, murders had increased and become a daily occurrence. The Muslims were murdered by the Christians and vice-a-versa. In various districts, both parties took up arms to defend their co-religionists. The British representative in Chania commented that the commitments of murders frightened the inhabitants and generated panic.[36] It became increasingly difficult for Karatodori Paşa to cope with the state of things on the island. He, therefore, was recalled and Turhan Paşa[37] was appointed as *Vâli* to the island of Crete. According to the British Consul Sir Alfred Biliotti, Turhan Paşa's appointment led to a general resentment both among the Christians and the Muslims. The former, in addition to their general discontent with the Muslim government, expressed their views arguing that his appointment would be the first step towards the appointment of the military government and the proclamation of a state of siege on the island. The latter asserted that Karatodori Paşa had done his best without money. The Muslims added that if Turhan Paşa came without money, the gendarmerie could not be reorganized and so nothing would change in the state of things.[38] Whatever the attitudes of the Christians and the Muslims were, the appointment of Turhan Paşa was a move towards a peaceful settlement of the state of affairs on the island.

---

[36] For the details see: British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 7 (1896), No. 83, 84, 87, 88, 98, and 106.

[37] Turhan Hüsnü Paşa was born in Trikkala in 1846 as the son of Yahya Bey from the Premedi Dynasty. He studied Roman Law and Political Economy in Janina. Turhan Paşa was literate in Turkish and French and could understand Albanian, Greek, Italian and Spanish. For a while he worked in the Translation Office of the Sublime Porte. He also served as the ambassador in Ottoman Embassies at Rome and Madrid and was the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Ottoman Empire between June 1895 and October 1895. Then, he was appointed as the Governor General of Crete. Due to his success he was rewarded by the Spanish government and was also granted the rank of *Vezîr* by the Sublime Porte.
T.C. BOA, İradeler Tasnifi, DH.SAİD., Dosya: 47, Gömlek: 165, 1262 Z 29.

[38] PRO: FO, 195/1939, No. 11, Biliotti to Salisbury, 13 March 1896, pp. 37-39; British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 7 (1896), No. 91.

After his arrival, Turhan Paşa immediately reported to İstanbul that the financial and social situation on the island was not satisfactory. In order to put an end to the prevailing disorder and insecurity, payments of salary to the gendarmerie had to be paid soon.[39] Furthermore, he informed the Sublime Porte that 50,000 *lirâ*s should be sent to the island to find a solution to the present financial crisis, especially to restore order and security through the reorganization of the gendarmerie.[40] In a telegram stamped "important and very urgent," Turhan Paşa reported that some of the Christians have misreflected their ill intentions under the banner of patriotism and established the *Epitropi* and they attempted to significantly increase the privileges they were given until then. He continued that the majority of the Christian people rejected the claims, ideas and activities of the *Epitropi* from the beginning. Yet the people forming this committee had taken some of the unemployed and all of the poor to their side with various promises and they ruined the general peaceful environment and frightened those peace-loving people.[41] To re-establish order and tranquility on the island, Turhan Paşa intended to take the necessary steps. He, therefore, made a plan to arrest the Muslims and Christians who were known by the police in the town. Accordingly, a Commission of Notables of both the Muslims and Christians, in addition, had been appointed so as to urge their co-religionists living on the island to keep quiet and let them know that the government took the necessary measures to restore order and security. New orders were also issued for the troops to co-operate with the gendarmerie in case of need.[42]

---

[39] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.UM., Dosya: 34, Gömlek: 66, Aded: 1, 1313 L 10.

[40] T.C. BOA, İradeler Tasnifi, İ.MTZ.GR., Dosya: 29, Gömlek: 1090, Aded: 6, 1313 Za 16.
It was also mentioned that 50,000 *lirâ*s is to be sent to the island urgently and that the gendarmerie was quitting their duties and delivering their arms to the government.
T.C. BOA, Girid Gelen Giden Defterleri, No. 26, and 35, 10 Nisan 1312, 18 Nisan 1312.

[41] T.C. BOA, İradeler Tasnifi, İ.MTZ.GR., Dosya: 29, Gömlek: 1089, Aded: 5, 1313 Za 16.

[42] PRO: FO, 195/1939, No. 16, Biliotti to Salisbury, 31 March 1896, pp. 52-56; British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 7 (1896), No. 99.

At that time, it was rumored that for the purpose of introducing certain changes in the *Epitropi*, the Greek Consulate General in Crete had called four members of that committee to meet in Halepa. According to an intended program, influential and experienced men were to be placed at the head of the committee and the chiefs and their followers were to form the executive body. On the other hand, after the departure of these four members from Halepa, another group composed of 830 Christians held a meeting at Vrisses, in Apokorono, with the aim of ameliorating the conditions on the island and of recovering the privileges granted by the Halepa Convention. All the Christians at the meeting had reached a *procès verbal* which had been signed by all of them and a copy of this note was submitted to the Greek and British consuls in Crete. According to the British consul, the contents of this note not only coincided with the intended program of the *Epitropi* prepared in Halepa but also with the program adopted by the Greek government. It also seemed clear to Consul Biliotti that the delegation appointed in the above-mentioned meeting was not against the aims of the *Epitropi*. The British consul advised the messenger who submitted this note that the only way to restore order and tranquility was to submit their plan to the *Vâli*; neither to the consuls, nor to the town politicians.[43]

On 19 March 1896, the British consul met with Turhan Paşa to speak about the meeting at Vrisses. Biliotti's aim was to mediate between the *Vâli* and the insurgents. Yet, Turhan Paşa insistently told him that no rebellious activity would be tolerated and that he would not meet with any of them. Furthermore, Consul Biliotti argued that the insurgents who held a meeting at Vrisses could not know that a general amnesty was about to be granted since the meeting took place before this. Turhan Paşa replied that "… he was

[43] Cited in: Theodore George Tatsios. *The Cretan Problem and the Eastern Question: A Study of Greek Irredentism, 1866-1898*, (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1967), p. 162. See also: PRO: FO, 195/1939, No. 13, Biliotti to Salisbury, 21 March 1896, pp. 46-48; British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 7 (1896), No. 97. For the details of the *procès verbal* of elections, see: PRO: FO, 195/1939, p. 49; and, British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 7 (1896), Enclosure in No. 97.

acquainted with all that had taken place in that respect within the last six months…"[44] It appears that in this fruitless meeting, the British consul tried to act as a mediator, but Turhan Paşa made it clear to him that he did not approve of his mediation.

Under these conditions, Turhan Paşa issued a general amnesty to certain individuals who hid on the mountains and to the outlaws who had committed crimes against the common law.[45] A portion of the outlaws had returned to their homes by taking advantage of the amnesty, but the remaining group insisted on being a part of the *Epitropi*, and continued in their rebellious activities. They even attacked the Ottoman troops and the inhabitants. It was almost impossible to control all of these elements due to the mountainous character of the island and the rebellious districts being scattered and broad in scope. The help of the Christians in the rebelling districts was also effective in the difficulty to contain the revolt. That is why, the call for amnesty did not bring the initially expected results.[46] Towards mid- April 1896, in the village of Episcopi, an Ottoman block-house containing 120 soldiers was burned by the Christians. Although the event was reported in different ways, the fire was ordered by the *Epitropi* against the Ottoman troops. Due to this event, authorities in Chania ordered a battalion from Rethymnon and another battalion with mountain guns from Suda Bay. As a result of the events that took place in Episcopi, the Muslim and Christian inhabitants of the surrounding villages began to evacuate their families and movable properties to other places. The fight of Episcopi also urged the outlaws who joined their families to return to the mountains. It had become evident that the amnesty had become meaningless in this instance.[47]

---

[44] PRO: FO, 195/1939, No. 14, Biliotti to Salisbury, 21 March 1896, pp. 50-52.

[45] PRO: FO, 195/1939, No. 12, Biliotti to Salisbury 21 March 1896, pp. 42-43; British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 7 (1896), No. 96.

[46] T.C. BOA, İradeler Tasnifi, İ.MTZ.GR., Dosya: 29, Gömlek: 1089, Aded: 5, 1313 Za 16.

[47] PRO: FO, 195/1939, No. 20, Biliotti to Salisbury, 17 April 1896, pp. 72-75; British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 7 (1896), No. 102.

While the insurgent activities on the island accelerated, the meeting date for the General Assembly also approached. Turhan Paşa, therefore, announced that the presence of *Epitropi* was the main barrier to the immediate convocation of the Cretan Assembly, so it would not be convoked unless the armed bands disbanded.[48] In a detailed telegram sent to the Sublime Porte, Turhan Paşa dealt with this issue and underlined the fact that it would not be appropriate for the General Assembly to convoke until the revolt on the island ended. According to him, it would be quite impossible for the Christian deputies to reject the request of committee. He further claimed that if the Christian deputies did not comply with the demands of *Epitropi*, they would lose their respect in the eyes of the Christians. In order not to loose their respect, the deputies would be compelled to accept the desires of that committee. So, the committee would gain respect, since all of its expressed desires and demands would be accepted and endorsed by all Cretan Christian inhabitants through their representative deputies. However, even if the Christian deputies did not have the inclination to accept the demands of the committee, difficulties would still prevail. And thus, the *Epitropi* would get angry with the General Assembly and then would attempt to trigger a revolt and hinder order. As long as the revolt in one part of the island continued, it would not be appropriate for the General Assembly to convoke in Chania. Turhan Paşa also argued that the overall advantage to be obtained from convoking the General Assembly would be much less than the overall advantage gained by postponing the meeting.[49] It is clear from the evidence that Turhan Paşa believed that the relationship between the Christian chiefs and the Christian deputies of the General Assembly would facilitate the politicization and nationalization of the local Christians' demands. It is likely that those deputies might use their political rights for the purpose of nationalization of the

[48] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 7 (1896), No. 110, and 112.

[49] T.C. BOA, İradeler Tasnifi, İ.MTZ.GR., Dosya: 29, Gömlek: 1089, Aded: 5, 1313 Za 16.

Christians' grievances. Being aware of this relationship, Turhan Paşa made great efforts in order to postpone the convocation of the Assembly in this sensitive period.

This matter was under discussion in the Ottoman Cabinet meeting on 29 April 1896, and the deputies decided that the Assembly should be convoked within the year, but its formation should be postponed as much as possible until a new invitation. They also decided that the provincial office be authorized via telegram regarding the declaration of this situation, provided that the responsibility was borne by the provincial administration.[50] It seems that during Turhan Paşa's term of government, different ways were sought to erode the organized efforts of *Epitropi*. On the other hand, he abstained from making an impression to indirectly accept that this committee was the spokesman of the Christians. With this aim, he postponed the meetings of the Assembly. Turhan Paşa aimed to postpone the negative developments through "interim" solutions. His basic aim was to gain time to lay the ground for the formation of a new policy which could open a new avenue for a peaceful solution.

In a detailed report written to the British government, Consul Biliotti dealt with the adjournment of the General Assembly, and placed the entire blame for the adjournment of the Assembly on the Sublime Porte's shoulder. He argued that as the Sublime Porte did not execute the measures promised with regard to finances and gendarmerie during the last session of the Assembly, the convocation of that body had been adjourned. According to him, this was the real reason for the adjournment. He also admitted that this caused a general dissatisfaction among the Cretan Christians and European consuls in Crete.[51]

In order to insist on the immediate convocation of the General Assembly, the Christian deputies of Chania and Sfakia had invited those of Lasithi, Candia, and

---

[50] *ibid*.

[51] PRO: FO, 195/1939, No. 24, Biliotti to Salisbury, 8 May 1896, pp. 90-93; British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 7 (1896), No. 112.

Rethymnon to meet in Chania. The Christian deputies of Candia refused to leave their districts for Chania, arguing that their attempts would alarm the Muslim inhabitants of the surrounding villages who would insist on going to the town of Candia that would be a great threat for the Christians' lives and property. The deputies of Lasithi were also not in favor of meeting in Chania. Yet, as the state of things got worse in the province of Rethymnon, the deputies of that district went to Chania to find solutions to the present disorder in their district.[52]

Regarding the meeting of the Christian deputies, Turhan Paşa dispatched a ciphered telegram to the Sublime Porte stating that those people who were members of the General Assembly in Chania and who wanted the meeting of the Assembly had sent invitation letters to other places and encouraged the members of other districts to come to Chania. He added that while members of Candia and Rethymnon had hesitated for a while to accept this, upon continuation of the invitations, they too accepted to come to Chania. He further mentioned a telegram received from Candia, in which it was stated that postponing the convocation of the Assembly would lead to annoyance of the people, and therefore the Assembly should meet as soon as possible. Besides, Turhan Paşa also mentioned another telegram sent by the bishop of Candia in which the bishop wrote that there was a need for the convocation of the Assembly to correct the local situation. According to Turhan Paşa, the reason for these members to make a meeting was to issue a protest with the aim of complaining about the postponing of the convocation of the General Assembly. At the end of the telegram, Turhan Paşa stated that since their opinion was not asked, the members of the local administration, the deputies of the Assembly sent their written complaint

[52] PRO: FO, 195/1939, No. 28, Biliotti to Salisbury, 19 May 1896, pp. 118-122; British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 7 (1896), No. 160.

addressed to the office of the Governor-General regarding the postponement of the meeting, but that this was not accepted.[53]

The Outbreak of the Revolt

Towards the end of May 1896, the tension in the western provinces reached its peak. On 13 May 1896, the British consul transmitted his Vice-Consul Trifilli's report to the British government, stating that the state of things was not favorable in the province of Rethymnon and anarchy prevailed. For the purpose of protection, while six Muslim families immigrated from Kordaki-Amari to Merona under the escort of three gendarmes, they were attacked by the *Epitropi*. A 15-year-old lad was shot dead and a gendarme was wounded. These Muslim immigrants were rescued by the Christian inhabitants of the neighboring village of Anomeros. Furthermore, in the district of Aghios Vassilios, four Christians were fired upon while they returned to their villages. The Muslim inhabitants of Amari and Mylopotamo started to transport their movable property to the villages near the town of Rethymnon. In this report, Consul Biliotti also transmitted the murders committed in the province of Cydonia between 5 May and 12 May 1896. In another report dated 17 May 1896, Biliotti reported the ill-treatments of the Muslim officers of gendarmerie and of native gendarmes against the Christians in the province of Rethymnon. He noted that co-operating with their co-religionists, the Muslim gendarmes had committed murders on the Christian inhabitants. According to the Biritish consul, the existing Ottoman troops were quite insufficient to protect the civil people and to control the island. For that reason, he argued, the European war ships should be sent to Chania in order to provide security.[54]

[53] T.C. BOA, İradeler Tasnifi, İ.MTZ.GR., Dosya: 34, Gömlek: 1455, Aded: 11, 1313 Z 4.

[54] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No.7 (1896), No. 133, 135, and 121. Concerning the situation in Amari, it was stated that due the Christian insurgents' attacks on the Muslim inhabitants of the two villages of the *kaza* of Amari, the Muslim families endeavored to leave their houses. Thereafter, those villages were controlled by the Ottoman soldiers.

Here, it is safe to argue that the British consul exaggerated the local conditions and referred to the insufficiency of the Ottoman troops and the native gendarmerie to control the island. His aim was to prepare the ground for the European intervention in the internal conflicts of Crete. It seems that, according to him, the prevailing atmosphere tended toward the inter-communal conflicts. The native Muslim gendarmerie was also identified with murders and violence. For him, the existing Ottoman troops were far from putting an end to these kinds of commitments. No need to say, the statements of the British consul illustrated that he described the events from the perspective of clear-cut distinction and conflict between the Muslims and Christians.

The Ottoman troops were besieged by the *Epitropi* at Vamos, the district of Apokorono. This siege led to the killing of one battalion of Ottoman soldiers and the terrible shock over all the military discipline and order.[55] The Ottoman troops consisted of about 1,000 to 1,200 men and were completely surrounded by 5,000 to 6,000 well-armed Christian insurgents. These troops did not have provisions for more than one or two days.[56] The insurgents also set fire to the tower and the administration building.[57] After the siege, as Prevelakis narrated in his novel, the leader of the insurgents came back to his cave. In the meantime, a courier came to the cave with letters and newspapers from Greece. One of these letters came from the insurgent's family in which his wife urged him to "hurry up and come back as soon as you can. The wheat has ripened and the harvest's beginning any day."[58] After a while, a new courier came to the insurgents' garrison announcing that a ship arrived at Almyros River and unloaded rifles and munitions from the "patriots" in

---

T.C. BOA, Girid Gelen Giden Defterleri, No. 37, 24 Nisan 1312.

[55] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.EE., Dosya: 114, Gömlek: 78, Aded: 2, 1314 B 18.

[56] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 7 (1896), No. 224.

[57] Pandelis Prevelakis. *The Cretan*, p. 205.

[58] *ibid*., pp. 208-209.

Athens. The other boats also anchored the island together with volunteers and munitions. A cordon was formed around the area where the cargo was to be unloaded. The messengers were sent to the nearby villagers in order to announce that the people should come and take their shares. Men and women abandoned their work and set off towards the cargo. Men looked fearsome with their black beards and brandished their sticks. Women were dressed in black and most of them wore boots like the men. The distribution of the cargo was carried out according to plan. The insurgent chiefs wrote down the names of their men on a piece of paper, and then the cargo was distributed to every village accordingly.[59]

Upon deterioration of the state of affairs on the island and upon the Ottoman troops besieged by the insurgents, the Muslims gathered in downtown Chania to protest these developments. On the same day, when the cavass of the Russian Consulate, accompanied by four Christians, was on his way to go to Halepa, he was encountered with the gendarmerie officer who told him that it was not advisable to leave for Halepa with four Christians. After disputes, angry words were exchanged. And the Russian cavass fired his revolver wounding the gendarmerie officer and killing an Arab. Immediately afterwards, the Russian cavass was killed by the Muslims who just happened to be there.[60] This incident caused panic and fear among the people and street-fighting broke out between the Muslims and the Christians at Chania,[61] where many people were killed from both sides within a very short time span. Houses were burnt and plundered, olive gardens and farms were set on fire, mosques and churches were destroyed, fear and bloodshed dramatically

[59] *ibid*., pp. 213-214.

[60] The reports on this incident are so contradictory regarding who fired first. For further information see: British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No.7 (1896), No. 205, and 234, Enclosure 1 in No. 354; T.C. BOA, Y.PRK.MYD., Dosya: 17, Gömlek: 57, Aded: 14, 1313 Z 8.

[61] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.MYD., Dosya: 17, Gömlek: 57, Aded: 14, 1313 Z 28; PRO: FO, 195/1939, No. 30, Biliotti to Salisbury, 2 June 1896, pp. 144-145; Turkey No.7 (1896), No. 269.

prevailed throughout Chania. Every single shop in the bazaar was closed and no one was to be seen on the streets.[62]

Although all parties put the blame for the causes of the Cretan revolts of 1896 on the other side, there were different comments and interpretations of the situation. Regarding the nature and the drastic turn of events that took place in 1896, a letter, written by a Cretan Christian, and published in the Ottoman newspaper *Hakîkât* is noteworthy of mention here:

> … I am also a Christian! I am an honest man and always remember the defective opinions of shameless, unscrupulous Christians with hate. The outlaws wandering around in Sfakia and Apokorono have shown no signs of hesitation to oppress and attack the Muslim inhabitants… Because … the soldiers continuously attack on the Christian churches and the undermining of their rights… Some insurgents are not even ashamed of asking for help from the Great Powers' consuls… Nevertheless, their true aim was to force the Muslims to migrate and to appropriate their real estates and properties at a minimum price…[63]

In those days, the Greek press was full of news on the Cretan revolt. The opposition party leader, Rallis, gave an interview to the Greek daily newspaper *Akropolis*. He analyzed the current situation alleging that the annexation of Crete was very easy and that the Greek navy should have been sent to Crete not only to release the Christian women and children, but also to occupy the island so as to unite it with Greece. He believed that it was not reasonable that the European Powers would drive away the Greek forces from the island, rather Britain and Austria would side with Greece, since their desires were not realized by the Ottoman Empire during the Armenian and Balkan crises. Rallis further said

---

[62] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No.7 (1896), No. 205, 121. It was informed that 23 people were died and 4 were wounded in Chania. T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.ASK., Dosya: 111, Gömlek: 56, Aded: 2, 1313 Z 13.

[63] "Ben de Hıristiyanım! Fakat bizim birtakım ahlâksız, vicdansız, hamiyetsiz olan Hıritiyanların fikr-i sakîmini her zaman nefretle yad eden doğru sözlü bir insanım … İsfakiye ve Apokoron cihetlerinde gezen serseriler ahali-i İslâmiyeye icra-yı zulm ve şekâvetden geri kalmıyorlar. Çünkü … asker ma'bed-i Hıristiyaniyeye, hukûk-ı ahaliye taarruz ediyorlarmış. Hattâ … bazı mefsededler düvel-i muazzama konsoloslarına da mürâcaatdan hayâ' etmiyorlarmış. Halbûki bizim bu serserilerin maksadı Girid İslâmlarını hicrete mecbûr ederek emlâk ve eşyâlarını âdi bir fiyat ile elde etmekden ibaretdir."
"Hakşinâs Bir Hıristiyan İmzâsıyla," *Hakîkât*, No. 32, 25 Şaban 1313, 28 Kanunîsânî 1311, 9 February 1896, Thursday, p. 3.

that the Greek government unfortunately missed the train, and the Greek people would suffer due to the inability of the Greek politicians. He added that at this moment the only thing to be done for the Cretan Christians was to feed the Cretan refugees in Greece.[64] On the same day, the son of Kanaris also gave an interview to *Akropolis* expressing his yearning for the bravery of his descendants who participated in the Greek War of Independence in 1821. According to Kanaris, if the European Powers would prevent Greece from occupying Crete, the Greek government would not be able to declare war against them, since the current generation was not as brave as the generation of the 1820s.[65]

In the European press, like in Austria, there were those who insisted that the events and the revolts on the island were mainly a consequence of the Greek involvement and intervention in the state affairs of Crete. For Greece, due to the government's financial bankruptcy, the only and the best way to have a part in internal affairs of Crete was to get directly involved in the revolts on the island. This would also convince Europe that Crete should be annexed by Greece.[66] An Austrian daily, *Pester Lloyd*, noted that the Greek government could not intervene in the island due to its financial crisis. If order and tranquility were not restored, the revolt would spread to the other provinces of the Ottoman Empire.[67] The Ottoman ambassador in Vienna reported that there were two different views in the Austrian press to put an end to the revolt on the island: On the one hand, it was argued that the Sublime Porte should be warned so as to remove the prevailing difficulties; and, on the other hand, the Greek government should not take part in the delusions of the

---

[64] "Τι φρονείο κος Δ. Ράλλης," *Ακρόπολις*, No. 5128, 19 May 1896.

[65] "Οι υπεύθυνοι," *Ακρόπολις*, No. 5128, 19 May 1896.

[66] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.TKM., Dosya: 37, Gömlek: 44, Aded: 5, 1313 Z 17.

[67] T.C. BOA, Hariciye Nezareti, HR.SYS., Dosya: 191, Gömlek: 40, Aded: 4, 1896 5 27.

Greek revolutionary committees. Another article published in *Pester Lloyd* wrote that the Greek government and the European government could not force the Ottoman Empire not to send Ottoman troops to the island, and that no state could jeopardize the maintenance of peace and order and intervene in the Cretan issue for the benefit of the Cretan Christians. Moreover, it was pointed out that the British government was responsible for the disturbances in the Ottoman Empire which broke out in the previous autumn. The Cretans were urged to remember that the British government supported the Armenians during these disturbances and then left the Armenians in a difficult position. For that reason, the Cretans should trust the European Powers other than Britain.[68] On the other hand, there were those in the European press who stated that to prevent further revolt, the only thing to be done was to separate the island from the Ottoman Empire.[69]

The Greek daily *Akropolis* published an article entitled "And Now?" on 20 May 1896, regarding the Vamos siege. It was argued that the Greek government was in the hands of the irresolute prime minister. The Greek government should decide whether it would be beneficial for its diplomatic affairs to support the "Cretan revolution." Furthermore, it was pointed out that the Greek government should pay special attention to the fact that if the Cretan women and children were "massacred" on the island, then the Greek government would be obliged to send its navy there which might be the ruin of Greece together with Crete. This meant the realization of Trikopous' statements regarding the matter.[70]

In another article published in *Akropolis* on the following day, there was a reference to Trikopous' statements. It was pointed out that the Greek people and Cretans had to

---

[68] T.C. BOA, Hariciye Nezareti, HR.SYS., Dosya: 191, Gömlek: 43, Aded: 7, 1896 6 11.

[69] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.TKM., Dosya: 37, Gömlek: 44, Aded: 5, 1313 Z 17.

[70] "Και τώρα;" *Ακρόπολις,* No. 5128, 20 May 1896.

regard his speech, delivered on 30 October 1889 like the Bible. In that speech, Trikopous had said that it was impossible to maintain a "liberation struggle" against the Ottoman Empire by sending a few shells and munitions of war. It was even impossible by sending ammunitions from state's stores. According to the writer of this article, if the Greek government did not act in line with the wishes of public opinion, then the Greek parliament would be destroyed and the powerful hands would come to power.[71]

The British representative in Crete reported to London that the state of affairs was likewise critical at Rethymnon. The Muslims coming from the villages entered Christian houses in the town by force.[72] In addition, many Muslim villages in the vicinity of Rethymnon were to be pillaged and burnt down by the Christians.[73] These unsatisfactory conditions prevailing on the island laid the groundwork for the European consuls in Chania to request their governments to send war ships to Crete.[74] It is also seen in the reports sent by the *mutasarrıf* and commander of Crete that the situation on the island deteriorated. In his telegram, dated 24 May 1896, Hasan Tahsin Paşa reported that out of three battalions under his command, he took one battalion three days previously and two battalions at the time to Sfakia and Rethymnon. Since the remaining one and a half battalion was in Candia and Lasithi, he did not have any troops left in the centre. For that reason, people were afraid. Moreover, there was a possibility that the revolt could spread to Candia. He also informed the Sublime Porte that the events in Crete spread in two or three days. [75]

As the diffusion of the revolt to other regions increased day by day, the Sublime Porte decided that it was necessary to send additional troops to the island. Accordingly, ten

---

[71] "Untitled," *Ακρόπολις*, No. 5129, 21 May 1896.

[72] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No.7 (1896), No. 121.

[73] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.ASK., Dosya: 111, Gömlek: 56, Aded: 2, 1313 Z 13.

[74] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No.7 (1896), No.125, and 148.

[75] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.UM., Dosya: 34, Gömlek: 106, Aded: 3, 1313 Z 13.

battalions from Salonica and neighborhood garrisons were sent to Crete. At the same time, six battalions were made ready for dispatch in Smyrna. And, the Ottoman battalions in Denizli were kept in reserve to be dispatched to the island in case of need.[76]

Besides, as the Ottoman troops besieged in Vamos were in unsatisfactory condition, it was reported that three battalions would be needed within a short time to relieve the siege.[77] In addition to the forces demanded from the central administration, the need for the enrolment of native Muslims as volunteers in the army was also expressed and a secret meeting was held between the leading Muslim figures and the *Vâli*. During the secret meeting, Turhan Paşa expressed his view that this was the necessary measure to save the future of the island.[78]

Abdullah Paşa's Arrival in Crete

On 29 May 1896, Abdullah Paşa, being the new *Vâli* and the Military Commander, arrived in Chania. 3,200 men from Salonica and Kosova garrisons and 2,400 troops arrived at Crete. In addition, two battalions arrived on 31 May 1896 from Alexandretta.[79] On 3 June 1896, two battalions arrived under Osman Paşa from Smyrna. Alongside the Ottoman troops, the European war ships also began to arrive at Chania to ameliorate the state of things on the island.[80]

---

[76] T.C. BOA, İradeler Tasnifi, İ.MTZ.GR., Dosya: 30, Gömlek: 1104, Aded: 4, 1313 Z 15.

[77] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.ASK., Dosya: 111, Gömlek: 77, Aded: 12, 1313 Z 27.

[78] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.MYD., Dosya: 17, Gömlek: 57, Aded: 14, 1313 Z 28.

[79] PRO: FO, 195/1939, No. 21, Biliotti to Salisbury, 2 June 1896, pp. 132-133; British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No.7 (1896), No. 205.

[80] PRO: FO, 195/1939, No. 22, Biliotti to Salisbury, 4 June 1896, p. 134; British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No.7 (1896), No. 179.
According to the British accounts, the number of the Ottoman troops sent from various points of the Ottoman Empire to Crete were as follows: from Salonica (with Abdullah Paşa) on 29 May 1896: 1,515; Alexandretta: 2,400; Salonica on 2 June 1896: 1,700; and from Smyrna: 4,000. See: British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No.7 (1896), Enclosure 2 in No. 245.

Immediately after Abdullah Paşa's arrival, the Vamos siege had been relieved with the assistance of two battalions of the Salonica garrison, which came to the island with Abdullah Paşa, and with 2,000 men of the troops from Kalives.[81] In a report dated 14 June 1896, Consul Biliotti explained the details of the events which took place in the western parts of the island. When the Ottoman troops began their retreat, a number of Christians had arrived in the neighborhood of Vamos where a severe fight ensued between the Ottoman troops and insurgents for about five hours. At the end, the blockhouse was burned down by the Christians after pillaging everything the Ottoman troops had left. In addition, half of the houses in Vamos were burned down. The Ottoman troops were sent to rescue both Muslims and Christians who were surrounded by the armed individuals of the other creed. Accordingly, 65 Christians were rescued and sent to the monastery of Aghia Trias, in Chania, and the Muslims who were surrounded in Voukolies, Nea Rumata, and Sembrona were also rescued. Furthermore, the British consul reported that the Ottoman gun-boat Heybetnümâ hit the western shores with heavy artillery. Due to the shots heard in Galata, the inhabitants of this village emigrated to Rhodopou. Moreover, the Ottoman troops were forwarded to Nea Rumata and Sembrona to rescue the Muslims who were surrounded by the Christian insurgents. After a while, the Muslim inhabitants of Apopigadi were rescued and in both cases the Muslims were brought to Voukolies.[82] On 17 June 1896, Consul Biliotti visited the village of Galata, in Chania, and reported his observations stating that, "… the village was an identic condition … nearly all the Christian tombs had been violated … the churches had been defiled…"[83] He asserted that although the local authority had enough power to protect Galata, the Ottoman troops were stationed in

[81] PRO: FO, 195/1939, No. 37, Biliotti to Salisbury, 14 June 1896, p. 198; British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No.7 (1896), No. 269.

[82] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No.7 (1896), No. 269.

[83] *ibid*., No. 90.

various points to control the village when the outbreak took place. He also pointed out that at that time there were not any native Muslims in this village. He meant that all depredations, pillage and desecrations were incurred either by the Ottoman soldiers or under their eyes. Hence, he blamed the local government and Ottoman soldiers for not protecting the local Christian inhabitants.[84] Once more, the British consul identified the Ottoman troops with violence and incapability to control the inhabitants of the island.

It should be important to note that while the Muslims left their villages, they had abandoned their crops. For that reason, the insurgents left their camps to harvest the Muslims' wheat. During their marching from Almyros through Piskopi over Roustika to Angouseliana, the insurgents were invited by the local Christian population. With regard to the relationship between the locals and insurgents, Prevelakis made the following statement: a woman wearing a black kerchief sitting outside her home told the insurgents that "as for the dinner all the doors open to you … as for beds, you'll find them wherever there are still men…" Prevelakis further noted that one of the village notables, Adamis Vavourakis, invited the insurgents to his house and they drank *rakı* and chat together. After a while,

> … the villagers gathered there to learn the latest news from the visitors. Everyone who arrived brought rusks, cheese or meat as a welcoming gift for the guests. A table was laid in the middle with the various offerings on it, and lamps were lit… The wine was served by a thick-bearded man with the solemnity of a footman at a royal table. With it they ate olives provided by the mistress of the house…[85]

The movement of Ottoman troops pushed the six representatives of the European Powers in İstanbul to decide upon the measures to be taken for the affairs of Crete. Accordingly, the French Ambassador at İstanbul, M. Paul Cambon, had an interview with Sultan Abdülhamid II who was advised in the following terms: the convocation of the

---

[84] i*bid*., No. 290.

[85] Pandelis Prevelakis. *The Cretan*, p. 222.

Cretan Assembly; the revival of the Halepa Pact; the proclamation of a general amnesty. Finally, the ambassador also suggested that the European Powers should guarantee all these conditions.[86]

On 10 June 1896, Consul Biliotti reported to his respective government that he received a letter from the village Stylos in which it was noted that a paper had been sent to the *Epitropi* requesting that the British occupation was the only way for the settlement of the "Cretan Question." According to the British consul, this letter was written by Portakis[87] who was a member of the Committee of Reform at that time. It seems that there was a sort of hidden agenda behind this action. By asking for an "English occupation" and "English protection," the efforts to directly involve Britain in the matter came to the fore. Involvement of Britain could be the beginning of a new diplomatic maneuver and this action would both benefit the British and the Greek sides.[88]

At this point, it should be noted that *kaymakam* Mehmed Şakir Bey had made a sharp analysis regarding the intention of the European consuls, especially the British and Greek ones and their diplomatic "misconducts." He said that if the insurgents had not been encouraged by them, the revolt would have easily been put down. To make this possible, Mehmed Şakir Bey offered that "… if one of the British or Greek Consuls can be removed from the island and this would discourage the insurgents and would save the government from many difficulties…"[89]

---

[86] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No.7 (1896), No. 204.

[87] He used to be a school master and for a while he embarked on one of the British vessels for exchanging lessons with some British officers who were willing to be taught Greek and he was also willing to learn English. But after a while, he disembarked for being accused of being a British spy by his coreligionists.
PRO: FO, 195/1939, No. 35, Biliotti to Salisbury, 12 June 1896, pp. 177-178.

[88] PRO: FO, 195/1939, No. 35, Biliotti to Salisbury, 12 June 1896, pp. 177-178; British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No.7 (1896), No. 238, and 197.

[89] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.MYD., Dosya: 17, Gömlek: 57, Aded: 14, 1313 Z 28.

In July 1896, the killings between the Muslims and Christians increased in the province of Rethymnon. The Muslims were surrounded and kept hostage by the Christians in Mylopotamu and Amari. For the same purpose, the Muslims surrounded the Christians in Russospiti. As a result of this, the Muslims and Christians began to flee to the town of Rethymnon. As all the troops stationed in Rethymnon were ordered to relieve the Vamos garrison, the local authorities in Rethmynon was unable to prevent this influx. The Muslims' fear increased by the dispatch of volunteers, arms and munitions from Greece and then they gradually emigrated to the town of Rethymnon. On the other hand, some of the Christian families emigrated to Greece; some of them fled to Rethymnon town. As they were without any means, the Greek government gave each of their members 1 *kuruş* per day. [90]

In the Muslim quarters of the Chania town, as the British consul argued, the shops had been gradually reopened and the people were seen in the streets. Unlike the Muslims, the Christian inhabitants were shut up in their houses and hardly opened their shops. According to Consul Biliotti, the Christians tried to demonstrate that it was impossible for them to live with the Muslims anymore under these circumstances, and compelled the European Powers to intervene in the Cretan issue. He further argued that "… the opinion seems to prevail in Greece that the *status quo ante* is a means to restore tranquility by giving satisfaction to the wishes of the Christian population, but if the Cretans are to be taken at their word, the restoration of the Halepa Pact in its fullness is far from being *desideratum*."[91] For the Greek government, the restoration of the Halepa Pact was necessary for the reestablishment of order on the island. Otherwise, it would be difficult to

[90] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No.7 (1896), No. 499.

[91] PRO: FO, 195/1939, No. 31, 10 June 1896, pp. 162-164; British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No.7 (1896), No. 234.

pacify the island.[92] It seems that the British consul in Crete reported to London that the atmosphere on the island became very unsatisfactory and the "hatred" between the Muslims and Christians deepened day by day. In a way, he tried to prepare the ground for the European intervention in order to satisfy the colonial and imperial interests of Britain in the Mediterranean.

Abdullah Paşa's Proclamations

With the aim of restoring order and tranquility on the island, a series of proclamations were sent by the Sublime Porte and proclaimed by Abdullah Paşa.[93] On the other hand, these proclamations were criticized by Mehmed Şakir Bey and Mehmed Sadık Bey in a report dated 19 June 1896:

> … the revolt is limited and is not as bad as the consul especially the British consul reported to his ambassadors and Foreign Ministry. If the Sublime Porte do not act mildly towards the [European] ambassadors and if the Ottoman troops in the island are ordered to act…, it is strongly hoped that the order will be restored within a short time. Since the agricultural produce in the current year will be abundant enough and for that reason the other Christians would not engage in the rebelling activities in order to get their produce. It is clear that if it is acted in a limp manner the revolt would prevail after the harvest. The experience of the past proved that such proclamations and advice do not produce anything but spoil and give hope to them more…[94]

Mehmed Şakir Bey and Mehmed Sadık Bey had insistently argued in a worried tone that the situation on the island was different from how it was reflected by British

---

[92] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No.7 (1896), No. 207.

[93] For the details of the proclamations see: British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No.7 (1896), Enclosure 3 in No. 245, Enclosure 4 in No. 245, and Enclosure 2 in No. 264.

[94] "… şûriş ve isyân bir daire-i mahdûda dâhilinde olub konsolos ve bilhassa İngiliz konsolosunun politika îcâbı bedhâhâne sûretde sefir ve hâriciyelerine iş'âr etdikleri derecede değildir. Bâbıâli süferâya karşı mümâşâtkârâne (*uysallıkla*) davranmayıb ve burada bulunan asâkir-i şâhâneye de hareket emri verilirse … pek az bir zaman zarfında âsâyiş te'mîn olunacağı kaviyyen ümîd olunur. Zîrâ bu sene cezîrede emsâli na-mesbûk feyz ve bereket meşhud (*gözle görülmüş, görülen*) olduğundan mahsûlâtlarından istifâde için ahâlî-i Hıristiyaniye-i sâire şu aralık erbâb-ı fesâda iştirâk edemez bilakis rehâvet gösterilirse vakt-i hasaddan sonra iğtişâşın tevsî' edeceği melhûzdur. İlânât ve nesayihin bunları şımartıb fazla ümîdlere düşürmekden başka bir semere hâsıl etmediği bit-tecrübe sâbit olduğundan…"
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.ASK., Dosya: 112, Gömlek: 23, Aded: 1, 1314 M 8.

Consul Biliotti. They suspected the goodwill of the consul since the Christians were to a great extent busy with their daily agricultural activities and were not engaged in a rebellious activity. Only through various provocations in their off-season period would they be inclined to sympathize with the insurgents. According to Mehmed Şakir Bey and Mehmed Sadık Bey, the consuls were the ones acting as the catalysts in the increasing misconduct.

Yet, in spite of these proclamations, the situation on the island did not improve. In a ciphered telegram sent from Chania, it was stated that the Ottoman Embassy in Athens informed that some Cretans in Greece together with some volunteers were on their way to Crete by small boats and that forty-fifty Cretan Christian insurgents with ammunitions aboard a ship departed from Greece to embark in Sfakia. To prevent the dispatch of munitions and volunteers to the island, Abdullah Paşa asked the Sublime Porte that some rapid vessels should immediately be sent. His telegram was discussed in the Ottoman Cabinet meeting, held on 13 June 1896, stating that as the shores of the island were very suitable for embarkation, even sending rapid vessels would not prevent the transport. For that reason, it was decided that the transport be prevented with the surveillance of the most suitable points of landing on the island.[95]

At that time, the European Powers had been putting pressure on the Sublime Porte to make a decision on convoking the General Assembly and on restoring the Halepa Pact.[96] Accordingly, one copy of the declaration regarding the revival of the pact written in the Ottoman Cabinet had been sent by the Sublime Porte to the *Vâli* of Crete for publication. The copies of this proclamation were sent to the representatives of the Ottoman Empire in Europe and Athens at the same time. The contents of this announcement was submitted to

[95] T.C. BOA, İradeler Tasnifi, İ.MTZ.GR., Dosya: 30, Gömlek: 1107, Aded: 3, 1314 M 17.

[96] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 7 (1896), No. 228.

the British Minister of Foreign Affairs in summary by the Sublime Porte's ambassador to London. During the conversation, which the Ottoman ambassador reported on 17 June 1896, the British Minister of Foreign Affairs told that this was a very happy occasion for him and was of a shared view of Britain that the Ottoman Sultan's sovereign rights be maintained. The British Minister of Foreign Affairs hoped that the Ottoman state would follow a calm policy by taking the friendly warning and advice of the foreign ambassadors in İstanbul into consideration who were of the same opinion as him. This announcement was also welcomed by the French Minister of Foreign Affairs who considered it as a big step towards the reinstatement of peace.[97]

The Revival of the Halepa Pact and the Convocation of the General Assembly

The news that the Halepa Pact would be revived led to resentments among the Cretan Muslims on the island. For that reason, the Muslim deputies presented a petition, bearing 21 signatures, to the consuls of the European Powers in Crete saying that the Halepa Pact had not had the expected results due to defects in the organization of gendarmerie and administration of justice. If these two organs remained as at present, they would not provide equal rights for the Cretan Muslims and Christians, and would not guarantee the moral and material interests of the Muslim population. The writers of the petition begged that their rights and future would not be sacrificed for the radical requests of the Christians, rather it would be cared by the European Powers.[98] Concerning the mediation of the European Powers, the Revolutionary Committee, on the advice of

[97] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.HR., Dosya: 22, Gömlek: 4, Aded: 6, 1314 M 6.

[98] *ibid*.

Koundhouros, replied that: "we are at war with the sultan. Crete is controlled by Christian arms!"[99]

The Ottoman government had requested the assistance of the European Powers so as to restore order and tranquility. To the request of the Ottoman government, the European states had unanimously instructed their representatives in İstanbul to advise the Sublime Porte to adopt the following measures: the nomination of a Christian *Vâli*; the restoration of the Halepa Convention; the convocation of the Cretan Assembly; and finally, a general amnesty for the insurgents.[100] These requests were discussed in the Ottoman Cabinet meeting, in which it was concluded that the convocation of the Cretan Assembly was already decided on,[101] and that the General Assembly would convoke on 17 June 1896. Furthermore, the following points were also decided: First, the general amnesty would be announced for the Christian insurgents in the mountains. Second, the appointment of a Christian *Vâli* was welcomed with the idea that such an appointment would have a positive impact on the Christians. As Corci Paşa was a suitable person for that position, he was to be informed by a telegram to immediately arrive at the island. Third, Abdullah Paşa was to be removed from his post of *Vâli* and appointed as the Military Commander on the island. Fourth, the Halepa Convention was a matter to be decided on by the General Assembly which would convoke in a few days to discuss this

[99] According to Prevelakis, this attitude of the Revolutionary Committee stemmed from the conditions they were living. He wrote that "their clothes were tattered, their boots down-at-the heels and full of holes. Their only food was barley bread, olives and garlic. If anyone got within gunshot of their camps, he was repelled more effectively by their stench than by their bullets." Pandelis Prevelakis. *The Cretan*, p. 219.

[100] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Res., Dosya: 80, Gömlek: 38, Aded: 6, 1314 1 13; British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 7 (1896), No. 243.

[101] It was thought that the adjournment of the meeting would prevent the revolt. But, as no improvement was made, on 21 May 1896 the Ottoman Cabinet decided the convocation of the General Assembly.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Res., Dosya: 79, Gömlek: 52, Aded: 2, 1313 Z 8.

matter in accordance with the local needs. After this discussion, a new *fermân* would be proclaimed.[102]

The Cretan Assembly was convoked on 29 June 1896. Owing to the insufficient number of deputies in Chania, the session did not take place until 13 July 1896.[103] Both the Muslims and the Christians petitioned to the *Vâli* and European consuls in Crete.[104] Unexpected convocation of the Assembly, very shortly after its adjournment, can be considered a sign of weakness. As the Ottoman government unconditionally accepted the application of all the four points,[105] a proclamation was issued on 3 July 1896. The Sublime Porte had accepted the entire proposal of the European Powers and requested the European governments to instruct their ministers at Athens to let the Greek government understand that they should abstain from encouraging rebellious activities in Crete.[106] The Ottoman representatives in Europe were also instructed by the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs to urge the foreign states that there was no way out except exact and enforceable precautions to be taken regarding the Greek government and the Cretans. The European ambassadors to the Sublime Porte unanimously decided to instruct their consuls in Crete to insist on the insurgents that they were no longer in a position to demand anything further from this already accepted requests.[107] Accordingly, the European consuls in Chania reported to the Christian deputies in and out of Chania that the clauses of the

---

[102] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Res., Dosya: 80, Gömlek: 38, Aded: 6, 1314 1 13.

[103] At that time some of the Christian deputies were in Athens. For that reason, the Ottoman Empire requested the prompt and quick return to the island. See: T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Hus., Dosya: 354, Sıra: 32, Aded: 4, 1314 1 23. Some of the Christian deputies were in the mountains with the insurgents. The deputies from the insurgent districts requested armed escorts on their ways while they were going to Chania. British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No.7 (1896), No. 171, Enclosure in No. 406.

[104] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No.7 (1896), No. 340.

[105] *ibid.,,* Enclosure in No. 319, No. 280.

[106] *ibid.,,* No. 285 and 286.

[107] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Hus., Dosya: 354, Sıra: 32, Aded: 4, 1314 1 23.

Halepa Convention were revived by the Sublime Porte.[108] At the same time, the European representatives in Athens urged the Greek government not to encourage the rebellious activities and to stop sending munitions of war and volunteers to the island. In response to the European Powers' warning, the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs asserted that the Greek government would do what was necessary regarding the prevention of dispatch of ammunitions. However, he also stated that the Greek coastline is too long to guard all the dispatch of volunteers, arms and munitions for Crete; and therefore considered that it was now too late to induce the insurgents to lay down their arms since their enthusiasm reached its peak. He added that the responsibility concerning the defense of the Cretan coasts belonged to the Ottoman government, not to the Greek government.[109] What the Greek government meant was that the Ottomans were not in a position to ask deterrence from Greece, while it was not able to take the necessary political and military measures against the insurgents on the island.

On 9 July 1896, Corci Beroviç Paşa[110] was appointed to Crete as Governor-General and Abdullah Paşa continued his role as the Military Commander-in-chief, and has been promoted to the post of *Müşîr*.[111] On 13 July 1896, 39 Christian and 22 Muslim deputies

---

[108] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Hus., Dosya: 354, Sıra: 35, Aded: 2, 1314 1 24.

[109] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Hus., Dosya: 354, Sıra: 68, Aded: 3, 1314 1 28. It should be important to note that it was clearly seen in the following Ottoman records that the munitions and volunteers continuously came from Greece to Crete. The Cretans in Greece and some volunteers came from Greece by small *caique*s, and about 40-50 Cretan Christian insurgents in a small ship laden with 150,000 cartridges were to leave Greece for landing at Sfakia.

T.C. BOA, Girid Gelen Giden Defterleri, Gelen No. 384, No. 100, 1 Haziran 1312; About 50 Cretans arrived in the island and 200 volunteers left Greece for landing at Apokoron. T.C. BOA, Girid Gelen Giden Defterleri, Gelen No. 145, 20 Haziran 1312; by a small ship laden with munitions. 44 people left Pireaus for Selinos. T.C. BOA, Girid Gelen Giden Defterleri, Gelen No. 146, 22 Haziran 1312.

[110] Corci Beroviç Paşa was a descendent of Scutari Dynasty. He was literate in Turkish, French, Italian and Slavic and even understood some Albanian. He was among the guards of the Sultan in the *Mâiyyet-i Seniyye-i Şâhâne Silâhşorânı*. When this organization liquidated after three years, he was released by being given the fourth rank. He worked as a governor in various *sancak*s of the Ottoman Empire. He was also the *Bey* of Sisam. In certain periods he was accused of abusing his administrative powers and was even sued.

T.C. BOA, DH.SAİD., Dosya: 14, Gömlek: 398, 1259 Z 29.

[111] *Müşîr* was the highest rank in the Ottoman military. For the detail information see: Mehmet Zeki Pakalın. *Osmanlı Tarih Deyimleri ve Terimleri Sözlüğü*, Vol. II, (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1993), p.

were present at the opening of the Assembly.[112] Yet, three Muslim deputies and one Christian deputy had not attended. From the very beginning of the session, a number of problems arose. The Christian deputies objected to the delivery of the opening speech in Turkish. Immediately after the Greek opening speech, the Christian deputies asked for a postponement of the session and the Assembly was adjourned.[113] In those days, while such attempts procuring the conditions on the island were made, the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, Skouses, stated that the Christian deputies obeyed the dictates of the European Powers and attended the General Assembly. Yet, they had gained little in turn, since all the concessions given by the Sublime Porte to the Christians were only "illusionary promises," such as the appointment of a Christian *Vâli* to the island but with a military superior.[114]

Although it was announced that the Halepa Convention was revived due to all the diplomatic attempts of the Greek government and the insurgents, the Christian deputies did not hesitate to present a petition to the European consuls in Crete with various demands. The most important demands were the following: first, the Governor-General of the island would be a Christian. He would be appointed by the Ottoman Sultan, with the appropriation of the European Powers. Second, Cretans employed in public service including the members of the General Assembly and the Administrative Council would be proportional to the population of the Christians and the Muslims on the island. Third, in the

---

300. The present *Vâli* of Crete was of lower rank than Abdullah Paşa and the former had no control over the military forces, as by the Halepa Pact no such power was given to the civil governor.
British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No.7 (1896), No. 317, Enclosure 1 in No. 406,

[112] *ibid*., No 123.
Some of the Muslim deputies attended the Assembly were as follows: Edhem Bey, Vecihi Efendi from Rethymnon, Hüsnü Bey and Murad Bey from Candia, and Behçet Paşa, Kavurizade Hasan Bey, Hüseyin Bey, Kandiyeli Fazıl Bey, Sohtezade İbrahim Bey, Dolmazade Ahmed Bey, Bedrizade İbrahim Bey, Petnaki Mehmed Efendi, Nesimi Efendi from Chania.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.ASK., Dosya: 112, Gömlek: 33, Aded: 1, 1314 M 12.

[113] Theodore George Tatsios. *The Megali Idea and the Greek-Turkish War of 1897: The Impact of the Cretan Problem on Greek Irredentism, 1866-1897*, (New York: East European Monographs, 1984), p. 77.

[114] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No.7 (1896), No. 349.

government offices, the use of two languages would be minimized as much as possible. Fourth, maintenance of order on the island and execution of the laws would be carried out by a native gendarmerie including European officers from the rank of colonel to that of captain. Last, for the first five years, president of the Court of Appeal and the Public Prosecutor would be a foreigner. [115]

When the articles of the petition are analyzed in detail and given the fact that the *Vâli* would be a Christian with extensive powers appointed by the Ottoman Sultan with the appropriation of the European Powers, it will be seen that the petition aimed to transfer the administrative status of the island from a privileged status into an autonomous region. Besides, by including the European Powers and their representatives as the guarantors in the application of the articles of this petition, and by giving them various rights and responsibilities in the enforcement of the articles of the petition, the legitimacy of the Sublime Porte as the only power was violated and the Cretan issue became more and more complex with the single power of jurisdiction taken from the Sublime Porte.

European Opposition to the Ottoman Military Authority

The European representatives in İstanbul decided to make a joint representation to the Sublime Porte saying that one of the main reasons of the recent revolt on the island was the preponderance which was given to the military authority over the civil authority. The Ottoman troops, therefore, should be given to an officer who had a lower rank than Abdullah Paşa, and the Ottoman troops stationed on the island should remain on the defensive.[116] Upon this, the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Goluchowski, told

[115] PRO: FO, 195/1939, No. 63, Biliotti to Salisbury, 16 July 1896, pp. 279-281; British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No.7 (1896), Enclosure in No. 385. See also: T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.MTV., Dosya: 143, Sıra: 102, Aded: 2, 1314 M 28.

[116] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No.7 (1896), No. 350; T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Hus., Dosya: 355, Sıra: 66, Aded: 3, 1314 2 11.

the Ottoman ambassador in Vienna that there was a necessity for the Sublime Porte to carry out the above-mentioned recommendations. He claimed that with the initiation of a military operation by the Ottoman troops in Crete and given the disputes between the governor and the military commander, no order deal would emerge. He added that the European Powers should continue their pressures on the Greek government, but the Ottoman Empire should also help them in their endeavors.[117] Goluchowski further mentioned the views of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs in his report stating that the French Minister of Foreign Affairs had said that the recent news from Crete was not good and if the revolt was repeated, he was afraid that some of the states would demand certain things like a reform in Crete and even an autonomy of Crete with the so-called prevention of the Mediterranean to become a source of revolution, and therefore he wanted the Ottoman troops to defend themselves and nothing more.[118]

In the Ottoman Cabinet meeting held on 19 July 1896, the recent developments in Crete were discussed and it was stated that the Christians were not satisfied with the re-establishment of the Halepa Pact. Moreover, the request of the Christian deputies could not be accepted. For that reason, it was pointed out that two problems had emerged while all the things should have been settled: the first one was the problem that the Christian deputies tried to have the foreign ambassadors accept their demands. When the meeting held by the European ambassadors was analyzed, it would be understood that this was not a remote possibility. However, without any notification made by the ambassadors in this matter, it would not legally be correct to begin an initiative. Therefore, it would be appropriate for the time being to temporarily maintain the decision made. The second problem was the problem of deposition of Abdullah Paşa. It was stated that this was

[117] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Res., Dosya: 80, Gömlek: 80, Aded: 16, 1314 2 8.

[118] *ibid*.

especially deemed necessary by the Russian and the Austrian Ministers of Foreign Affairs and that it should be criticized.[119] After that, the Sublime Porte instructed Abdullah Paşa not to take any part in the civil government, and if any military operation became necessary to act in accordance with the *Vâli*.[120]

The first dragoman of the French Embassy in İstanbul also pointed out that in various times the Greek government had been urged not to send munitions of war and volunteers to the island. The Cretan Christians had also been warned to act in tranquility and in obedience through the Greek consul. The first dragoman added that, sharing the views of Russia and Austria, Abdullah Paşa be immediately removed from his post and dictated that another commander be appointed in his place who would act in line with the orders of the governor.[121] Regarding this matter, Lord Salisbury acted in the same line with the other European Powers.[122]

During the interview with the Ottoman ambassador in Paris, Hanatoux, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs told that:

> the advice given by the Great Powers is not properly listened and the commitment regarding the Cretan affairs is not continuously fulfilled by the Sublime Porte... The situation is deteriorating day by day… I have not any hope that this situation, which would cause the states to make certain decisions, is brought to an end. I definitely suggest that a general amnesty should be implemented and the executive power should be entrusted in the hands of the Governor. [123]

In reply, the Ottoman ambassador said the following:

---

[119] *ibid*.

[120] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No.7 (1896), No. 366.

[121] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.BŞK., Dosya: 46, Gömlek: 110, Aded: 2, 1314 S 11.

[122] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Hus., Dosya: 355, Sıra: 66, Aded: 3, 1314 2 11.

[123] "… düvel-i müntehabe tarafından verilen nesayihin ısga' edilmediğini ve cânib-i Bâbıâlî'den Girid işleri hakkında vuku' bulan taahhüdâtın lâyen-kati' (*sürekli olarak*) nezâret edilmemekde olduğunu görmekle müteessifim. Bu ahvâle nazaran günden güne kesb-i vehâmet eden ve şübhesiz devletler tarafından yeniden birtakım mukarrerât ittihâzına sebebiyet verecek olan bir hâl ve mevki'e nihâyet verilebileceğinden kat'-ı ümîd ederim. Afv-ı umûminin tamamî-i icrâ'sı ile muhâsamâtın (*düşmanlığın*) kat'î ve kuvve-i icrâ'iyenin vali-i lâhikin yeddine tevdî'-i husûsîsini ekiden (kati olarak) tavsiye ederim."
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Hus., Dosya: 355, Sıra: 72, Aded: 3, 1314 2 12.

> The Ottoman Empire has no benefit from the deteriorating conditions in Crete. And since the expectation of the Great Powers is to establish peace and tranquility in the island then they have to put pressure on the Greek government not to send any munitions of war, provisions and foods and not to support the rebellious movement. These help encourage the insurgents to act in defense. It is not reasonable to request from [our government] to act in defense.[124]

The requests of the Christian deputies of the General Assembly led to dissatisfaction among the Muslim deputies who accordingly submitted a memorandum to the consuls, expressing their objections to each article of the Christian deputies' petition. Among other objections, two points were noteworthy to be mentioned here: according to the Muslim deputies, the right of appointing the Governor-General, Muslim or Christian, should only be reserved to the Sultan. It seems clear that Muslim deputies' main concern was the sovereign rights of the Sultan. Moreover, for the Muslim deputies, the Muslims should not be excluded from this high function since "… [this] make[s] religion a sufficient reason for exception in the distribution of official posts…"[125] They also stated that the representation of two elements in the General Assembly and the Administrative Council could not be proportional to the number of inhabitants, arguing that although the Muslims were in the minority, property possession should be given a relatively more weight in the determination of the representative powers of the two elements.[126]

Towards the middle of July 1896, the attack of the insurgents from Amari Rethymnon on the south-western districts of Candia alarmed the Muslim inhabitants of those districts where disturbances took place. The embarkation of arms, munitions and volunteers from Greece on the northern coast of the island led to fear in the Muslim

---

[124] "Girid'de hâl ve mevkiîn kesb-i vehâmet etmesinden hükûmet-i seniyyenin bir gûne menfaati yokdur. Ve mademki devletlerin arzusu emn ve âsâyişin iâdesinden ibâretdir her şeyden evvel Yunan hükûmetini mühimmât-ı harbiye ile erzak ve me'kûlat irsâli sûretiyle artık hareket-i isyâniyeyi teşvîk etmemesi husûsuna sevk ve imâle etmek muktezîdir. İşte bu muâvenet eşkıyâ'yı hareket-i tedafüîkâranede bulunmağa teşvîk ediyor. Hareket-i tedafüîde bulunamaklığımızı taleb etmek makûl değildir."
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Hus., Dosya: 355, Sıra: 72, Aded: 3, 1314 2 12.

[125] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No.7 (1896), Enclosure in No. 349.

[126] *ibid.*

inhabitants who began to emigrate.[127] It became evident that, by the middle of July 1896, with the arrival of military supplies in districts like Lasithi and Sitia where there had hitherto been no revolts, the problem diffused to the remote districts.[128] On 22 July 1896, two sailing boats arrived with arms and volunteers at Lasithi and Sitia. These large supplies of arms and volunteers frightened the Muslims and led them to leave their villages for Candia. The *Vâli* had, therefore, sent troops to prevent their move to the town.[129] This clearly indicates the insurrectionary movement had been advancing from the western parts of the island to the east.

These conditions led to the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs to think of taking more effective measures so as to check this importation of arms from Greece.[130] In the first place, the Austrian government had offered to the European Powers to make a collective note pressing the Greek government to prevent the dispatch of arms and munitions from Greece to the Cretan ports. The Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs declared that "… if the present situation continues, the powers will be obliged to restore to the Sultan his liberty of action…"[131] In case this note would be ineffective, the Austrian government would make a second proposal stating that if the Greek government was unable to prevent the dispatch of these proceedings, then, the European Powers should join a blockade of

---

[127] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No.7 (1896), No. 351, 371, and 499.

[128] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No.7 (1896), No. 374, 365, and 213.

[129] *ibid.,,* No. 374, 365, and 213.
It should be noted that the Cretan Christians were supplied with old-fashioned arms from the government stores through the Cretan Committees in Greece and Cretan sympathizers in Salonica also obtained Martini rifles and ammunition from the Ottoman stores for sending Greece.
British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No.7 (1896), No. 398.

[130] Certainly his fear about the possible repercussion of the events upon the developments in Macedonia played the outstanding role in his proposals.
William L. Langer. *The Diplomacy of Imperialism (1890-1902)*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), p. 319.

[131] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No.7 (1896), No. 389.

Crete.[132] However, the British government had refused to join in a blockade arguing that "… such a blockade would place Great Britain in the position of an ally of the Sultan, in the task of repressing the insurrection of his Christian subjects…"[133] Yet, this proposal could never be applied.

The Ottoman Empire, on the other hand, stated its annoyance with the recent developments, and that despite all the precautions and the measures taken, the revolt and munitions dispatch to the island continued. So, the Sublime Porte decided on the execution of these reforms so as to prevent worse incidents and reported this to the foreign representatives in İstanbul and the Ottoman representatives in Europe. Since the Christians did not obey the maintenance of peaceful conditions accepted by the Ottoman state and the other states with the aim of maintaining peace in Europe, and kept on rebelling, the Sublime Porte decided that the foreign states should be invited to execute and maintain the previously made decisions. It was also concluded that this decision should be relegated to the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs.[134]

Upon the deterioration of the situation on the island and no reply coming to the Christian deputies from the Sublime Porte, the Christian deputies sent another petition to the *Vâli* of Crete stating that the previous demands of the Christians be taken into consideration and that the problem be resolved in line with their demands. In this petition, the deputies complained of the local government arguing that due to the deterioration of the local administration, peace and order in many parts of the island disappeared. The Muslim families unnecessarily moved to the castles. In these castles, insurgent teams (*üşerâ takımları*) were established by the Muslim outlaws due to a lack of intervention on

---

[132] *ibid.*

[133] William L. Langer. *The Diplomacy of Imperialism (1890-1902)*, p. 319.

[134] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Res., Dosya: 80, Gömlek: 107, Aded: 2, 1314 2 23.

the part of the local state officials and the soldiers. These Muslim groups had plundered the Christian villages, demolished houses, killed people and animals and in a few days' time, these villages were all torn down. These people were known to the officials, and they were able to do what they wanted and they were not penalized for what they did. So, peoples' confidence in the local administration eroded. The Christians, therefore, felt obliged to run away to the mountains and the Muslims moved on to the sea shores. The daily business activities were all interrupted. The Christian deputies requested an urgent interruption to put an end to this chaotic situation. If it were delayed, future intervention would be of no use.[135] Furthermore, the deputies went on about the notices which were posted in the streets of Rethymnon by the Muslims inviting their co-religionists to awaken and to defend their rights against the Christians' tricks and activities. In those notices, it was written that it was time to act and that the cursing made by the Christians be stopped. The Muslims should stop watching all this like a drama, and this lack of action served the purposes of the Christians, and the Muslims had to overcome this situation as soon as possible.[136]

Pressures of the European Powers regarding the removal of Abdullah Paşa from his post continued. On 18 July 1896, a telegram was written to the Ottoman Embassy at Petersburg regarding the dismissal of Abdullah Paşa. In this telegram, the conversation held between the Russian first dragoman of the Russian Embassy in İstanbul and Sultan Abdülhamid II was reported. It was stated that the first dragoman offered to the Ottoman Sultan that Abdullah Paşa be immediately removed from his office. The military authority was to be given to the military commander who would act with the sanction of the *Vâli*. He further told the Sultan that if Abdullah Paşa was not removed from his post, then a conference would be held to decide on the Cretan independence (*Girid'in istiklâlini taht-ı*

[135] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.MŞ., Dosya: 6, Gömlek: 48, Aded: 5, 1314 S 25.

[136] *ibid.*

karâra almak üzere bir konferansın in'ikâdı). Since the administration of the island was in the hands of the governor, Abdullah Paşa was warned that if no counter action by the insurgents were taken, no military action would be taken. If a need for a military action rose, then decisions were to be made after discussions were held with the governor.[137]

After this telegram, the Sublime Porte's Ambassador to Petersburg, Hüsnü Bey, reported his interview with the Russian Prince: he stated that Crete should always be under the Ottoman jurisdiction as usual due to its importance in the Mediterranean. This was to the benefit of the Russians as well. When the Russian Prince told that the Greek King did not have any interference in this matter, but that the Greek committees had aided the insurgents, Hüsnü Bey replied that the main aim of these committees were to serve the purpose of Pan-Hellenism which was directly against Russia. Then, the Russian Prince stated that he approved of all this and would immediately communicate it to the emperor. He added that both his and the emperor's aim were to help the Ottoman state in order to reach good results regarding the Cretan affairs.[138] However, other European governments did not share the same opinion. Thinking that Abdullah Paşa was formerly a *Vâli* and would be in a position to consolidate all the power in his hands, they requested his immediate removal from this post. Hence, as a consequence of the different positions taken and the strong pressure by the European Powers, Abdullah Paşa had been removed from his post and he was superseded by İbrahim Paşa.[139] The removal of Abdullah Paşa illustrated the intensifying direct involvement of foreign states in internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire. Here, the European states aimed to marginalize the military authority of

[137] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.EŞA., Dosya: 24, Gömlek: 94, Aded: 11, 1314 S 26.

[138] *ibid*.

[139] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Res., Dosya: 81, Gömlek: 10, Aded: 2/4, 1314 3 5.

the island as a deciding factor in the local government. For the European Powers, a strong military commander would pose a threat to their interests in Crete.

Imperial Commissioners and the August Arrangements

At that time for the purpose of the pacification of the island, the European Powers decided to take initiative and instructed their representatives in İstanbul to prepare an arrangement on the basis of the most essential requests of the Christian deputies. In consequence of the meetings that took place among those representatives, it was agreed that certain modifications would be applied on the original demands of the Christians deputies and that the Sublime Porte might be induced to accept them.[140]

On 26 July 1896, Manousos Koundouros gathered a popular assembly in Tzitzifes where it was decided to transform the *Epitropi* into an insurrectionary assembly. The new representatives of the committee would be elected from each province by popular vote, but the former members would have the privileges of sitting in the assembly without being elected. Kostaros Voloudakis was appointed as provisional chairman.[141] The volunteers who continued to come from Greece reinforced these activities. At the same time, thirty regular officers in the Greek army left Piraeus for Crete, and then a senior officer was sent by the Greek government to intercept them. The elections were held in order to elect the representatives of the committee. On 15 August 1896, the representatives, chiefs and their men, wearing festive costumes, assembled in Kambi, in the province of Cydonia, and celebrated the dormition of the Virgin Mary.[142]

---

[140] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 7 (1896), No. 505.

[141] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.UM., Dosya: 35, Gömlek: 86, Aded: 19/23, 1314 Ra 30. At that time he was at the age of 96 and was the only remaining leader of the revolt of 1821. See: British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No.7 (1896), No. 575.

[142] Pandelis Prevelakis. *The Cretan*, p. 242. These developments were also reported by Corci Paşa to the Sublime Porte. See: T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Hus., Dosya: 357, Gömlek: 63, Aded: 4, 1314 3 8.

Meanwhile, Zihni Paşa, Governor-General of Bursa, and İkiadis Efendi, Counsellor of the Court of Cassation were sent to the island to negotiate with the Christian chiefs to adopt the necessary measures, on the basis of the Halepa Pact, regarding the reestablishment of the tranquility and peace on the island.[143] Zihni Paşa and İkiadis Efendi, after arriving at Chania, dispatched detailed reports in which they explained their impressions from their inspections and the talks they held with the European consuls. In a report, dated 15 August 1896, they wrote that if the renewal of the Halepa Pact was offered to the Christians again and that if the demands announced in their petition were rejected by the Sublime Porte, then the Christian deputies would leave Chania. For that reason, there would be no one left to engage in negotiations with the Sublime Porte. According to them, this would deteriorate the matter and it would be wise to make certain modifications in their demands and accept the appropriate ones. Besides, it was also noted in the report that dispatch of ammunitions and volunteers from Greece continued. And the number of supervisory personnel keeping an eye on the dispatch was inadequate due to the long seashore. According to Zihni Paşa and İkiadis Efendi, this *de facto* situation encouraged the insurgent activity, and then the insurgents attacked the Muslim villages in Candia. To overcome those difficulties, it was offered that in the upcoming meeting, the unacceptable demands be rejected and the acceptable ones be negotiated.[144] Yet, the Christian deputies had refused to discuss the grievances with the Ottoman Commission without the mediation of the European consuls. It was reported to the Sublime Porte by the consuls and was asked whether it would be appropriate for the Sublime Porte to accept the mediation of the consuls or not. Upon this, in the Ottoman Cabinet meeting dated 13 August 1896 it was decided that till then it was customary for the European consuls to engage in mediations

[143] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Res., Dosya: 81, Gömlek: 10, Aded: 2/4, 1314 3 5; PRO: FO, 195/1939, No. 96, Biliotti to Salisbury, 13 August 1896, pp. 369-370.

[144] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.UM., Dosya: 35, Gömlek: 86, Aded: 19/23, 1314 Ra 30.

between the Ottoman government and the people regarding this matter. It was also decided that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs be notified that in order to aid the operation of the commission, mediation of the consuls was permitted and this should be communicated to the related embassies.[145] Once more, the Ottoman state admitted that the European representatives were the "legitimate" and ordinary representatives between the Ottoman government and the Cretan Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire.

However, Zihni Paşa sent a telegram to the Sublime Porte complaining of the Christians' and consuls' attitudes. For him, the attitudes of the Christian deputies were unacceptable, and the most important demands of the Christians were that the governor should always be a Christian and that troops should be dispatched upon demand by the governor. As long as the Greek provocation continued and the Christians did not give up their hopes and expectations from the states, the Christians would not be satisfied with the provisions of the report. Zihni Paşa went on to say that his expectation was that these people would give up the revolt if they were to be really deprived of their hopes by the states and if these articles were removed.[146]

The Ottoman Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tevfik Paşa, continued his initiative with the foreign ambassadors in İstanbul. He visited them with the aim of having the foreign states to fulfill their commitments to stop and to overcome the deteriorating events without delay. During this visit, the ambassadors told him that after the meeting held between the European representatives they would be telling their common decisions to the Ottoman government. If these decisions were also accepted by the Ottoman government, they would be sending their definite order to their consuls. They added that the Christians should not expect anything more than this. They were of the opinion that this problem would be

[145] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Res., Dosya: 81, Gömlek: 10, Aded: 2/4, 1314 3 5.

[146] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.UM., Dosya: 35, Gömlek: 86, Aded: 19/23, 1314 Ra 30.

handled this way. In a special letter sent by the Austrian ambassador to the Ottoman Minister of Foreign Affairs, it was stated that all the European ambassadors had received the long awaited order from their governments regarding the "peaceful settlement" of the Cretan issue.[147] After that, the note prepared by the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs had been discussed in the Ottoman Cabinet meeting and was decided that permission of the sultan be obtained for the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tevfik Paşa to have an interview with the Austrian ambassador.[148]

When the talks came to a halt, on 21 August 1896, with a view to the reestablishment of order on the island and preservation of the European peace, the Sublime Porte accepted the proposal made by the representatives of the European Powers which was prepared on the basis of the requests of the Christian deputies.[149] The Ottoman Sultan requested the help of the European representatives to reach some agreement, which would satisfy the Christian insurgents and safeguard his sovereign rights.[150] Upon this, the European ambassadors stated that they were waiting for the approval of action from their respective governments regarding their proposal to be submitted to the Sublime Porte. They added that the proposal would be submitted for the approval of the Sublime Porte, that if approved, the consuls in Chania would be instructed to tell the Cretan Christians that they would not expect anything beyond this agreement.[151] The creation of the August arrangements was a program decided first by the European representatives on the basis of the Christian deputies' demands, and then the Ottoman government was forced to accept it. In other words, it was a *fait accompli* for the Ottoman government. However, the British

[147] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.HR., Dosya: 22, Gömlek: 21, Aded: 3, 1314 Ra12.

[148] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Res., Dosya: 81, Gömlek: 22, Aded: 3, 1314 3 12.

[149] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.HR., Dosya: 22, Gömlek: 21, Aded: 3, 1314 Ra 12.

[150] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No.7 (1896), No. 538.

[151] *ibid*., Enclosure 1 in No. 603.

consular reports tried to create an atmosphere that this arrangement was not imposed by the European governments on the Ottoman government in order to satisfy the Europeans' colonial and imperial demands. Rather, they argued that the implementation of the so-called reform program would put an end to the "primordial confrontation" and "hatred" between the Muslim and Christian community.

The foreign representatives in İstanbul, upon getting instructions from their respective governments, submitted the proposal to Sultan Abdülhamid II. On 25 August 1896, Sultan Abdülhamid II accepted the document unconditionally; with one or two verbal alterations it was accepted by all sides, and on 27 August 1896, the document called the "August Arrangements" was sanctioned. After that, it was sent to the consuls in Crete for the purpose of submitting it to the Christian deputies. Then both the Christian and Muslim deputies accepted the agreement. The Christian insurgents returned to their villages.

In the fall of 1896, Mehmed Şakir Bey and Mehmed Sadık Bey sent various ciphered telegrams to the Sublime Porte to complain about the ill-treatments of Greek Consul Gennadius in Chania. They stated that as a result of the Greek consul's provocations, the Christians were in preparation for some meetings in Apokorono. According to the writers of the telegrams, the Greek consul provoked agitation in order to increase the Greek influence on the island. They also mentioned the placards inviting the Muslims to "massacre" the Christians. Furthermore, they stated that these placards, written in Greek, were the work of the Greek consul who aimed to demonstrate that there was no security in Chania.[152]

In a later report dated 24 December 1896, Mehmed Saâdeddin Paşa also complained of the Greek consul claiming that the European consuls had interfered in the

[152] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.MYD., Dosya: 18, Gömlek: 3, Aded: 1, 1314 C 2; T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.MYD., Dosya: 18, Gömlek: 8, Aded: 1, 1314 C 8.

affairs of the local administration more than what was permitted by the Sultan, and especially the Greek consul went too far in this matter. He stated that this attitude of the Greek consul was not liked by the other consuls either, and therefore, they had written to their own embassies that the Greek consul be removed from Crete. He further noted that the Ottoman ambassador in Athens began an initiative in this matter before the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but could not get a result. This initiative was reported to the Cretan Christians by the Greek consul that this initiative had no end-result, so there was an effort to increase the Greek influence. Mehmed Saâdeddin Paşa attached to his report one of the labels stuck to some of the cigarettes sold in Crete so as to show how far the Greek consul went. To indicate this point, he also wrote that the name "*Café l'autonomy*" was given to a café house just across the Greek Consulate in Chania.[153] It seems clear that European and Greek consuls involved themselves in the details of everyday politics. These cases provided certain examples indicating that the Greek consuls in Ottoman Crete were the main agents and leading figures of the infiltration of the Greek modern identity into the island and of Greek state's irredentist policy.

Conclusion

As mentioned above, the springing up of the *Epitropi* in Apokorono- a very fertile ground for revolt due to its mountainous geography and intense settlement by the Cretan Christians- literally commenced the events. The provocation of Cretan committees in Athens and the Greek consul in Chania encouraged the Christian insurgents on the island. Owing to these difficulties, the Ottoman administration could no longer be content with simply keeping the population quiet and the conflicts within the island aggravated and led to the Cretan revolt of 1896. This revolt was followed by the repeated Cretan Christian

[153] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.EE., Dosya: 114, Gömlek: 78, Aded: 2, 1314 B 18.

requests for the revival of the Halepa Pact. The European Powers turned their eyes to Crete so as to act on behalf of the Christian insurgents. As a result of the European diplomatic pressure, the Ottoman Empire accepted those requests to satisfy Europe and calm down the tension. However, the Christian deputies did not hesitate to submit another petition to the European consuls for demanding further things, and at the end, the Cretan Christians accepted the August Arrangements.

The European Powers took the most essential points of those requests into consideration, while urging the Ottoman Empire to take the necessary steps to re-establish tranquility and order on the island. The European representatives in İstanbul met several times to prepare a proposal on the basis of the Cretan Christians' demands to be submitted to the Sublime Porte. It is remarkable that the European representatives met and collaborated on the petition of the Christian deputies without any delegation from the Sublime Porte. These meetings clearly indicated the limited power of the Ottoman government regarding the internal affairs of Crete. Although some Ottoman representatives were sent to Crete to negotiate with the Christian deputies, an agreement was never realized. Objecting to the few points of the proposal prepared by the European Powers, the Ottoman state felt itself obliged to sanction it. However, as the following chapter illustrates, the August Arrangements did not provide peace or tranquility within the island, rather it directly contributed to the increase in tension and violence.

The available documentation clearly reveals that the sanction of the August Agreements by the Sublime Porte was not seen as the result of an internal decision, but of European pressure. In other words, the Sublime Porte accepted these conditions in order to satisfy Europe and to prevent the European Powers from holding a conference among themselves to obtain further privileges. From the Ottoman perspective, these conferences would jeopardize the sovereign rights of the Ottoman Sultan and territorial integrity of the

Ottoman Empire. This point can be interpreted as the Ottoman statesmen's sensitivity and fear about the conferences held by the representatives of the European Powers without any Ottoman delegation and it is exemplified by numerous documents.[154]

This chapter has demonstrated that being one of the significant actors for the implementation of Greek national identity in Crete, the Greek consuls reinforced a sense of ethno-religious divisions among the Cretans and instigated the Cretan revolt. In other words, in the course of the Cretan revolt of 1896, the island became a suitable ground for the Greek consul intrigue. The Greek consuls regarded themselves as the principal protectors of the Christian community of the island and made great efforts to divide the Cretan society along the religious lines. It seemed clear that the Greek consuls were the principal conveyors of the Greek state's ideological and cultural policies over Crete and they played crucial roles on the island's incorporation into the Greek Kingdom.

It was seen in the documentation that the European Powers understood the very reason of the revolt as the reflection of ethnic and religious tensions and implemented reforms that sought to end the disturbances along these terms. Those continuing reforms and privileges served as a pretext for greater inequality and exclusion between the Muslim and Christian inhabitants of the island. The privileges given to the Cretan Christians might have caused a considerable annoyance among the Cretan Muslims who thought that their moral and material interests were sacrificed for the requests of the Christians. For that reason, the Cretan Muslims were engaged in efforts to preserve their position of being one of the major elements of the island and demanded to be treated on this basis. They made repeated references to their material possessions so as to counter-balance their weakness in

---

[154] Concerning the Ottoman statesmen's sensitivity about the conferences see: T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Res., Dosya: 80, Gömlek: 51, Aded: 2, 1314 1 20 and the report of Şakir Paşa in T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Hus., Dosya: 235, Gömlek: 102, Aded: 13, 1307 L 22. This illustrated that the humiliation of 1876 was very fresh in the minds of Ottoman statesmen. See: Selim Deringil. *The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1909*, p. 172.

terms of demographic proportions. The Cretan Muslims feared that their power would be gradually absorbed by the Cretan Christians, and at the end, they would become a "tiny minority."[155]

[155] I have borrowed this term from Engin Deniz Akarlı. *The Problems of External Pressures, Power Struggles, and Budgetary Deficits in the Ottoman Politics under Abdülhamid II (1876-1909): Origins and Solutions*, p. 20.

Chapter IV

THE CRETAN REVOLT OF 1897

Previous chapter has examined the Cretan revolt of 1896, the intensifying involvement of the European Powers in intra-Ottoman conflicts, and the August Arrangements. These arrangements aimed a variety of objectives including the reorganization of tribunals and gendarmerie. Accordingly, the European governments appointed their consuls in Chania as a consular commission so as to implement the reform program on the island. First of all, special commissions were constituted and appointed for the valuation of the damages in the houses besides the reorganization of the judicial units and gendarmerie. During the revolt of 1896, the Muslim families emigrated from their villages to the towns. The Christian inhabitants of the towns, at the same time, fled to Greece. According to the statistics given in the *British Parliamentary Papers*, during the revolt of 1896, 5,180 Muslim families were left homeless, 3,099 Christian families were in the same condition, too. The total number, allowing five persons for each family, would be 25,900 Muslims and 15,495 Christians whose houses had been utterly destroyed.[1] Due to the financial difficulties, the damages in the Muslim houses were not fully valued. Yet, afterwards, the special commission valued the damages and then the Muslim families gradually started to return to their villages. On 2 November 1896, the Courts of Justice had suspended work all over the island.[2] This was reported by the *Vâli* to the Sublime Porte for

[1] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 8 (1897), *Further Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Crete*, (London: 1897), Enclosure 1 in No. 77.

[2] *ibid*., No. 2, and 60. It should be noted that in order to repair the Muslims' houses, which were destroyed during the revolt, relief tickets were prepared by the special commission for collecting money. For the relief ticket see: T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.UM., Dosya: 35, Gömlek: 92, Aded: 2, 1314 R 7.

instructions. In reply, the Grand Vizier sent an order stating that the existing Courts of Justice must continue to work until the reorganization of the tribunals. In addition, the execution of the civil and penal cases should not be suspended or postponed.[3] This vizirial order was promulgated by the *Vâli* and the Christian Administrative Councilors protested it arguing that this was contrary to article 16 of the Halepa Pact, and articles 6 and 13 of the August Arrangements. After a while, this order was withdrawn by the Sublime Porte. It was arranged that until the arrival of the Judicial Commission, the *Vâli* would order the existing tribunals provisionally.[4]

A special commission, composed of the military attachés of the European Powers and the representatives of the Christians and Muslims, was also appointed for the reestablishment of the Cretan gendarmerie. This commission prepared the *reglement* suggesting the recruitment of the foreign subjects into the gendarmerie. This *reglement* was presented to the Sublime Porte on 11 January1897 together with a note.[5] On 16 January 1897, the Sublime Porte replied the collective note of the ambassadors stating that "… the Imperial Government has given its approval to the Regulations thereto annexed with the reservation that the foreign gendarmes admitted into the Cretan gendarmerie shall not … be of Greek nationality…"[6] On 21 January 1897, the representatives of the European Powers sent another note to the Sublime Porte. In reply, on 22 January 1897, the Sublime Porte sent a circular note to the ambassadors suggesting a modification in article

[3] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 8 (1897), No. 91. It should be important to remember that during the term of Mahmud Celaleddin Paşa, the Cretan tribunals were reorganized. According to this regulation, the members of the tribunals were appointed by the *Vâli*, being selected from a list prepared by the inhabitants of each community.

[4] *ibid*., No. 88, 99, 100, and Enclosure in No. 113.

[5] *ibid*., No. 28.

[6] *ibid*., Enclosure in No. 29. See also: T.C. BOA, Meclis-i Vükelâ Mazbataları, MV., Dosya: 90, Gömlek: 73, Aded: 1, 1314 B 29. For the proposed proportion of the foreign elements in the Cretan gendarmerie, see: British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 8 (1897), Enclosure 1 in No. 74.

29. Accordingly, the head of the gendarmerie should be appointed by the Ottoman Sultan, not by the ambassadors. At the same time, Cretan Gendarmerie Commission unanimously recommended the nomination of British Major Bor[7] as the commander. The Sublime Porte suggested that Major Poodts, a Belgian officer, should be appointed to that post. On 4 February 1897, in reply to the Sublime Porte's suggestion the representatives of the European Powers wrote that "… their Governments [have] already … approached the Cabinets of Brussels … they must await the result of these steps … Major Bor will proceed to Crete at the request of the Commission … to organize the gendarmerie…"[8] However, the attempts to reorganize the gendarmerie were not realized. While the Cretan Christian gendarmes joined the insurgents, the Muslim gendarmes continued to perform their duties regularly together with 83 Montenegrin soldiers and 9 foreign officers.[9] On 9 March 1897, Philip Currie, the British Ambassador at İstanbul, reported that Major Bor had sent his resignation to the Acting *Vâli* of Crete and that the special commission for the reorganization of the Cretan gendarmerie proposed to leave Crete for İstanbul. On 10 March 1897, the new gendarmerie was disbanded by the commission. The existing "old" gendarmerie, consisting of 49 officers and 518 men, all Muslims, continued to carry out its duties.[10]

During the fall of 1896 and the first months of 1897, various attempts were made to transform the judicial and security units of the island into a better functioning structure. For the August Arrangements were unable to cure all the difficulties. In other words, the efforts to reconstitute new structures of the Cretan tribunals and gendarmerie did not

[7] He was literate both in Greek and Turkish and had served as commander of gendarmerie in Cyprus. British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 8 (1897), No. 18.

[8] *ibid*., No. 107 and its enclosures. It should be noted that the Russian representative in this commission opposed the nomination of Major Bor because of his nationality.

[9] *ibid*., No. 127, and 245; PRO: FO, 195/1983, No. 112, Biliotti to Salisbury, 5 March 1897, p. 253.

[10] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 8 (1897), No. 255, and 256, Enclosure 1, 2 in No. 341.

provide the expected results. It can be argued that the reform process initiated by the various commissions seemed to be concerned with saving the day rather than directly and deeply changing the judicial and security units. This process was followed by the Cretan revolt of 1897, and the final establishment of an autonomous government. The revolt that took place in the early months of 1897 marked a new episode in the rebellious history of Crete. The Greek occupation of the island triggered the next phase and led to the military intervention of the European Powers. Their intervention undermined the Ottoman administration that culminated in the establishment of a new autonomous administration on the island.

From the early days of January 1897, according to the British accounts, murders were reoccurred between the Muslims and Christians in the western districts of the island and became a daily occurrence. On 3 January 1897, two Muslims were wounded by Christians on the road between Chania and Suda Bay, and one Christian was killed in retaliation for these two wounded Muslims. In Tsikalaria, near Suda, a heavy exchange of shots were fired and as a result of this, one Christian died. Another Christian and a Muslim Albanian corporal were murdered in the neighboring villages. About 400 armed Christians were on the surrounding heights, the Christian women and children began to rush towards the mountains and the Muslims ran towards the plain. In the same night, these Christian women and children took refuge in the villages on the mountains. 150 armed Christians came from Campos and Keramia to assist the Christians of Tsikalaria to defend their property. In the meantime, the bells tolled from village to village in order to circulate the rumor about “a massacre of Christians” in Chania which instigated the Sfakians. They joined in the Apokorono armed bands in Kalives and their numbers went up to 600 and 700 Christians. The Ottoman garrison, including 70 soldiers, the seat of the governor of Sfakia and about fifteen Muslim families living there were blockaded by these armed Christians.

In addition, the telegraph wire was cut off and the road was baricaded in order to prevent all kinds of communication between Kalives, İzzeddin Fort and Suda Bay. The situation was not so different in the village of Varipetro. Furthermore, a Muslim was assassinated in Vukolies, and a Christian was killed at Selinos. Due to these continuous murders and lack of security, the Christian inhabitants of Varipetro fled to the mountains, the Muslims rushed to the town of Chania. The Muslim inhabitants of the villages situated in the west part of Chania were surrounded by the Christians, and the movable properties of the Muslims, including olive oil, wearing apparel and cattle, had been robbed by the Christians. It is important to point out that while the local Muslim peasants left their villages, they also abandoned their olive crops and found themselves in destitution in the towns.[11]

Furthermore, on 30 January 1897, concerning the internal state of affairs and causalities on the island, British Consul Biliotti reported to Lord Salisbury noting that:

> …within the few preceding days many robberies had been committed, and that a few olive trees belonging to a Turk having been cut down… a Christian, named Dimitris Zografistos, had murdered a Mussulman in the charge of Kato Arhanes in quarrelling with him … a Mussulman was murdered in the village of Prines Malevisi by a certain Marco Stefanidi, who, some time before, had murdered four Christians, and who was released. Many robberies were taking place in the villages, but there were no gendarmes to arrest the thieves. … the Christians of the neighbouring villages are complaining of being threatened by the Mussulmans…[12]

These accounts reflected the convictions of the British representatives in Crete that described the murders of Muslims and Christians in January 1897. They claimed that the reasons for murders were for revenge between the two communities or the prevailing insecurity that could not be prevented by the local forces.

---

[11] PRO: FO, 195/1983, No. 7, Biliotti to Salisbury, 13 January 1897, p. 10; British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 10 (1897), *Further Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Crete*, (London: 1897), No. 1, 24, 27, and 52.

[12] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 10 (1897), No. 141.

This chapter narrates the "nationalist liberation struggle" of the Cretan Christians in 1897. It argues that nationalist ideology of the Cretan Christians played the major role in the Cretan revolt of 1897, which was a critical milestone in the history of the island. In other words, this revolt represented a fundamental crisis in the local dynamics and challenged the local structure and redefined the boundaries between the Cretan Muslims and Christians. The scope of this revolt was also different from those of the others. It was not confined only to certain districts of the island, and so it spread quickly across the island. Within a short time period, the revolt erupted almost simultaneously in the western and eastern extremities of the island. Moreover, the Greek and European occupations of the island added another dimension to this already turbulent period.

The Greek Intrigue

Towards the end of January 1897, some of the former members of the Reforms and Insurrectionary Committee, the Greek politician Athos Romanos, and many other Cretan Christians left Greece for Crete by an Austrian Lloyd steamer.[13] When they arrived at the island, Romanos had an interview with the ex-president of the *Epitropi* and many other members to get information on the recent situation on the island. On 29 January 1897, Romanos and the leading members of the *Epitropi* held a meeting at Akrotiri, where the friends of Romanos and a few politicians from other districts took an oath to deteriorate the situation in order to provoke the intervention of Greece in the state affairs of Crete.[14] It became evident that Romanos and his friends advised the Insurrectionary Committee that every means should be used to prevent the introduction of the reform program of the

[13] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 11 (1897), *Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Crete and the War Between Turkey and Greece*, (London: 1897), No. 5.

[14] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 10 (1897), No. 36; "Girid Havâdisi," *Servet-i Fünûn*, No. 11, 23 Ramazan 1314, 13 Şubat 1312, 25 February 1897, Thursday, p. 194.

August Arrangements and to deteriorate the existing conditions within the island by provoking the Christian population. According to Koundouros, the time was not ripe for union with Greece and the first thing to be done was to let the Muslims break the agreement. The Greek politicians argued that "to be sure they will break it! The time is ripe for union: when the fighting breaks out in Macedonia, you will have the opportunity you have been waiting for all these years."[15]

Having been aware of this fact, on 7 February 1897, the Sublime Porte sent a circular dispatch to its representatives in Europe stating that the insurgents engaged in certain intrigues so as to prevent the application of the reforms; and that the members of the Cretan Reforms and Insurrectionary Committee in Athens openly provoked the insurgents by sending secret agents and publications to the island. Furthermore, it was stated that most of the Muslim and Christian inhabitants of the island did not take part in the revolt and the *Vâli* would repress the revolt by taking the necessary precautions in cooperation with the European consuls.[16] In this sense, it was argued that the political environment on the island was already ripe for provocation. From the very beginning of February, serious disturbances took place at the province of Chania, where the whole population was armed and they fought with each other. At 3:30 p.m. on 4 February 1897, heavy fighting commenced and the situation became extremely serious. The city was an inferno within hours. Panics succeeded panics, chaos and anarchy prevailed. There had been a great deal of firing and looting.[17]

---

[15] Pandelis Prevelakis. *The Cretan*, (trl.) Abbott Rick, Peter Mackridge, (Minneapolis: Nostos, 1991), p. 249.

[16] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.HR., Dosya: 23, Gömlek: 12, Aded: 1, 1314 N 5.

[17] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 10 (1897), No. 50, and 51.

British Colonel Chermside summarized and reported the disturbances that took place in Crete in the first week of February 1897 to the British Ambassador, Philip Currie, in İstanbul,

> … [on] (1st February) Benghazi Arabs and other Moslems from Canea suburbs lit up Galata, the finest Christian village in the vicinity, … then the villages and farms of the plain and the slops followed suit, and from the gap of Suda Bay on the east, through which one sees the snowy cone of Ida flush with the rising sun, to Platania, 10 miles west along the coast, all the southern prospect under the foothills of the great mass of the snowy "Aspera Vouna" was one chain of smoke and flame. … On Wednesday (3rd February) a rumour reached Halepa that twenty-six or twenty-seven Christians of Akrotori had been murdered by Moslems who had landed from Suda, and so on. It was all a myth. But of a party of soldiers sent to reinforce the cordon beyond Halepa (3rd-4th February), twenty were said by the Vali to have been killed … Thursday morning (4th February), skirmishing to the south and south-east at Tzicalaria and Perivolia, and to west near Daratso. On Thursday afternoon there was the heavy firing in the town of Canea… On Friday and Saturday (5th and 6th February) the outside skirmishing continued, and the Moslem population became very excited and apprehensive, and clamoured to the authorities for arms.[18] On Saturday (6th February) two Turkish companies with one gun, from their position 1½ miles from west of the town, drove the Christians out of Daratso and back to Galata. The Bashi-Bazouks and a small detachment in the centre drove the Christians out of Tsikalaria and relieved Nerokori. The Apokorona and Sphakiot insurgent Christians moved north across the Suda-Canea road, and occupied the rocky southern slopes of the Akrotiri Peninsula. This brings them nearly in contact with a body of armed Christians some 200 strong in Halepa… on … (7th February) distinguished by an outrage which resulted in a headless priest and two dead Christians versus two dead and three wounded Moslems. The Candia and Rethymo districts which had been simmering had, however, caught on, as well as Sitia to the extreme east and Kissamo to the west. … on Sunday there were attacks on the Moslems, which are reported to have left a lot of dead in the streets, including women…[19]

Meanwhile, the European and Greek consuls in Crete had sent various messages to their governments to explain the level of sensitivity in the situation. The Greek Consul-General in Crete blamed the Muslim inhabitants of the island regarding the recent troubles stating that "… a massacre in Canea, and the town is burning. Please cause this to be

[18] It was reported from Candia to İstanbul that when the arms were taken out from the arm storage in Candia, the Muslims looted 1,611 Martini Henry rifles, 1,063 sidearms, 525 bayonets, 4 revolvers, 7 boxes of Martini Henry cartridges, etc. See: T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y. MTV., Dosya: 151, Gömlek: 33, Aded: 2, 1314 N 12.

[19] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 10 (1897), Enclosure in No. 224.

communicated to the other Cabinets…"[20] On the other hand, Colonel Chermside, Military Attaché to the British Embassy in İstanbul, reported to his government that the Christians opposed and sabotaged the reforms, since they only desired the annexation of Crete by Greece.[21]

A series of telegrams were sent to the Sublime Porte from Crete. They informed that the revolt resumed and the Muslims were defenseless. The Muslim villages were attacked, and some of the Muslim inhabitants and gendarmerie were killed. Moreover, there was an urgent need for additional troops to stop the expansion of the incidents to the other parts of the island and to prevent its reoccurrence.[22] Given the emergency of the situation on the island, the Sublime Porte asked the representatives of the related European Powers their opinions on the recent developments on the island. In their replies, the European representatives argued that the revolt taking place in Crete was not a revolt that broke out in the Ottoman Empire, rather it was just a confrontation and manifestation of hatred between the Muslim and Christian community (… *bu şûriş hükûmet-i seniyye-i âlîsinde olmayıb İslâm ve Hıristiyan âhâlîsi miyânında tahaddüs eden bir hareket-i husûmetkârâneden ibâret*…).[23] For the representatives of the European Powers, as it was not an overall revolt, sending troops at that moment would increase the tension and hatred, expand the revolt, and provoke the Muslims. Moreover, it was added that the three representatives of European Powers in Crete went to the spot. For that reason, the results of

---

[20] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 11 (1897), No. 14. According to Tevfik and Zühtü, these statements ignited the nationalist spirits of the Greeks in Athens.
Süleyman Tevfik and Abdullah Zühtü. *Devlet-i Âliyye-i Osmanî ve Yunan Muhârebesi 1314,* (İstanbul: Mihran Matbaası, 1315), p. 103.

[21] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 11 (1897), No. 13.

[22] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Hus., Dosya: 366, Sıra: 7, Aded: 2, 1314 9 2.

[23] *ibid*.

the meeting to be held between the consuls and the insurgents had to be seen.[24] It is clear from the evidence that the British representatives were of the view that the revolt breaking out on the island was due to hostility and hatred between the Muslim and Christian inhabitants of the island. They assumed that the dispatch of the additional Ottoman troops would provoke and reenact Muslim fanaticism towards Christians.

In order to give advice to the insurgents and to put an end to their rebellious activities, the consuls of the European Powers, with the exception of the Russian and the French consuls, left Chania to go to the troubled spot together with the *Vâli*.[25] When they arrived at the neighborhood of Suda, they were under intense fire by the insurgents, so they had to stop there and decided to give advice to the approximately two hundred Christians who had taken refugee in a monastery. In return for their advice, the councils got the following response: "we demand union with Greece, we do not want reforms or anything else."[26] Regarding the replies of the consuls and the *Vâli*, Mehmed Şakir Bey sent a dispatch to the Sublime Porte stating in a very worried tone that the attitude of the *Vâli* regarding this matter could not be understood in advance. According to Mehmed Şakir Bey, in certain matters, the *Vâli* could well be under the influence of the consuls and conceal the truth. It was added that the clashes in Chania continued even more intensely.[27] In his report dated 6 February 1897, the British consul complained of the weakness of the available Ottoman forces in Crete. For his part, the number of Ottoman troops[28] was not

[24] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Hus., Dosya: 366, Sıra: 7, Aded: 2, 2 9 1314; T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.EE., Dosya: 114, Gömlek: 91, Aded: 5/8, 1314 N 17.

[25] It was clearly an unaccustomed and noticeable thing for a *Vâli* to go to the spot of an insurgent activity together with the foreign consuls.

[26] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.ASK., Dosya: 117, Gömlek: 34, Aded: 4, 1314 N 12; British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 10 (1897), No. 48.

[27] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.ASK., Dosya: 117, Gömlek: 34, Aded: 4, 1314 N 12.

[28] According to the telegraphic report sent by the British consul to Lord Salisbury on 25 February 1897, number of Ottoman regular troops stationed in the island of Crete was as follows: infantry, 14,5 battalions

sufficient to control the island, and for that reason, a large force would be necessary to make an effective intervention. Otherwise, he argued, the scope of the disturbances would prevail throughout the island.[29]

In the meantime, both the Greek press and the Greek parliament continued to pressurize the Greek government to take active measures regarding the events on the island. It was argued that the Greek people in Athens wanted a declaration of war against the Ottoman Empire and took revenge of the current killings in Crete.[30] In addition, popular pressure and the propaganda of the *Ethnike Hetairia*[31] and the Cretan Committee in Athens had reached its peak.[32] In order to explain its own activities and draw attention to the importance of military preparation for the Greek state, the *Ethnike Hetairia* sent a memorandum to the Greek King (another memorandum had already been sent to the Greek press on 20 October 1896). In this aspect, the memorandum sent to the Greek press was dealt with. In this memo, three points were underlined: First, there was a need for the union within the small Greek Kingdom. Second, it was necessary to fight in the "enslaved" regions. Third, since it was true that Greece was a weak and poor country, the Greek government was unable to deal with the Macedonian and Cretan issues. It was further stressed that the *Ethnike Hetairia* was above the parties and factionist politics and that its

---

(10,060 men); fortress artillery, 3 battalions (900 men); cavalry, 2 squadrons (220 men); mountain barriers; 4 battalions (415 men); total: 11,600 men. See: British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 10 (1897), No. 201.

[29] *ibid*., No. 63. It should be important to remember that after the settlement of the August Arrangements the number of the Ottoman troops in the island had decreased.

[30] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.TKM., Dosya: 38, Gömlek: 49, Aded: 4/8, 1314 N 25.

[31] *Ethnike Hetairia* was organized in 1894 by a group of lawyers, army officers, patriotic men of business and eminent men of letters with the aim of propagating the *Megali Idea*. But it was also stated that the wide-pullers of the movement aimed at the dynasty's destruction.
William Miller. *Travels and Politics in the Near East*, (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company Publishers, 1899), p. 282; Theodore George Tatsios. *The Megali Idea and the Greek-Turkish War of 1897: The Impact of the Cretan Problem on Greek Irredentism, 1866-1897*, (New York: East European Monographs, 1984), p. 86.

[32] William L. Langer. *The Diplomacy of Imperialism (1890-1902),* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), p. 357; Süleyman Tevfik and Abdullah Zühtü. *Devlet-i Âliyye-i Osmanî ve Yunan Muhârebesi 1314*, p. 103.

main aim was to liberate the enslaved brothers. Moreover, a reference was made to the three Greek national congresses, held between the years 1821 and 1831. It was also argued that these congresses were the basis of the Greek Kingdom and if anyone accepted these congresses, that person would have the Greek national consciousness. Special attention was paid to the military preparation of Greece and military modernization arguing that the committee urged the Greek people to press the Greek government for military preparation. Through this memorandum, the members of the *Ethnike Hetairia* were called to give money for the preparations.[33] In the memorandum sent to the Greek King, the economic weakness of the Greek state and the need for the reorganization of the Greek military forces were emphasized. It was offered that "the king himself assume the responsibility for military preparedness in the future."[34]

Greek Occupation of Ottoman Crete

Having been influenced by the public opinion and the internal pressures, the Greek Prime Minister stated that from the very beginning, the Ottoman Empire had prevented the execution of the reforms. The Sultan's instigation provoked the Muslim inhabitants of the island who took up arms and attacked the Christian population. As the opposition increased its pressure on the Greek government, the Greek Prime Minister Deliyiannis declared that the Greek war ships were to be sent to Crete to protect the lives of the Greek subjects.[35] On 7 February 1897, accordingly, the Greek iron-clad, Hydra, had arrived at Chania.[36] On the same day, interestingly, the insurgents gathering at Akrotiri had hoisted Hellenic flags and

[33] Έκθεσις των Πεπραγμένων υπό της Εθνικής Εταιρίας, (Athens: Ek tou Typografeiou D. Sakellariou, 1897), pp. 14-17, in: USNA, T159/12, No. 29, Rockhill to Sherman, 4 January 1898.

[34] *ibid*., p. 22; Theodore George Tatsios. *The Megali Idea and the Greek-Turkish War of 1897: The Impact of the Cretan Problem on Greek Irredentism, 1866-1897*, p. 89.

[35] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 11 (1897), No. 59.

[36] *ibid.,* No. 69.

proclaimed annexation of Crete to Greece saying that the only solution was to proclaim Cretan union with Greece and the abolition of the Ottoman Sultan's sovereignty.[37] On 8 February 1897, the British consul, in his report to the British government, noted that he was informed by the *Vâli* on the hoisting of the Greek flags and the proclamation of annexation to Greece. He also stated that the Russian consul had informed the *Vâli* that "annexation of Crete to Greece had been decided by all the European Powers except Russia."[38]

The Sublime Porte dispatched a circular to its ambassadors to urge the European governments to impose strong pressure on the Greek government to withdraw its war ships immediately and to stop encouraging the insurgents on the island:

> …With the dispatch of the Greek war ships to the Greek waters and the provocation of the revolutionary committees in Athens, the insurgents increased their courage. When the insurgents came to the island, they showed their courage hoisting the Hellenic flags. With the deceptions of the insurgents, some of the municipalities in the Christian districts began to issue declarations requesting union with Greece… It was also reported from the *şehbender* in Thessaly that even there with the aim of disturbing order and tranquility, arms and munitions were delivered to the people who prepared to attack the frontier…With the hope and expectation that a favorable environment would be created to execute the recent reforms on the island in line with the expectations of the local people and the Great Powers… from the beginning of the provocations the Ottoman state had withdrawn a portion of the military forces and did not even resort to coercive measures relying upon the efforts spent by the consuls of the Great Powers and of the local officials. But, since all positive initiatives towards creating peace and order on the island were rendered useless, in order to preserve the peace, the Great Powers should warn Athens to abstain from any encouragement and to withdraw its war ships which aggravated the revolt or they let Sublime Porte to feel free to act with various means it deemed necessary…[39]

---

[37] PRO: FO, 195/1983, No. 29, Biliotti to Salisbury, 8 February 1897, p. 110; British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 10 (1897), No. 89.

It should be pointed out that on 7 February 1897, the *Ethniki Hetairia* also issued a proclamation to the Cretan people saying that after so much bloodshed and so many sacrifices to the interest of the European Powers, now time was ripe to put an end to the centuries of sufferings. The only way was the proclamation of union of Crete with its "Hellenic motherland."

For the details of the proclamation, see: British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 11 (1897), Enclosure in No. 64.

[38] PRO: FO, 195/1983, No. 29, Biliotti to Salisbury, 8 February 1897, p. 110.

[39] "… Yunan sularına süfun-ı harbiye-i Yunaniye sevki Atina'daki ihtilâl komitelerince mûcib-i teşvîk olarak bunlar bir kat daha cüretlerini arttırdılar. Usat cezîre pîşgâhına vürûdlarında Yunan bayrağı küşad ile

In response to the Sublime Porte's assertion, the British government declared that it was a pity that the event came to such a point, it would determine its attitude and response to the situation after having a meeting with the ambassadors of the other European Powers. The German government had openly objected to the embarkation of the Greek war ships on the island. The Italian and Austrian Ministers of Foreign Affairs had insisted on the view that the current state of things on the island was the outcome of the delay in carrying out the reforms by the Sublime Porte. They also stated the fact that the Greek government had been urged several times regarding the activities of insurrectionary committees on the island. They added that for the warnings made to the Greek government, the Greek government answered as "… the Greek war ships had been dispatched to Crete to protect the lives of the Greek subjects…"[40] Regarding the freedom of action on the part of the Ottoman Empire in this sensitive situation, the Italian and the Austrian ambassadors mentioned that before everyone else, it was up to the Ottoman Empire to decide on what sort of precautions it would take and that it needed no further comment on their part.[41] According to the European Powers, the Sublime Porte could not engage in such reforms which led to the deterioration of the situation on the island and military confrontation with

---

hissiyât-ı serbâzânelerini izhâr eylediler. Başlıca erbâb-ı fesâdın eser-i tesvîlâtıyla (*kötü bir şeyi güzel göstererek aldatma*) mahallât-ı Hıristiyaniye devâir-i belediyelerinden bazıları cezirenin Yunanistan'a ilhâkı talebini hâvî beyânnnâmeler neşr ettiler … Teselya'daki şehbenderlerimiz dahi eyalet-i mütecâvize-i şâhânenin huzûr ve âsâyişini ihlâl maksadıyla hudud-ı tecâvüze hazırlanmakda olan eşhâsa alenen esliha ve mühimmât tevzî' olunmakda olduğunu tarafımıza bildiriyorlar… Islahât-ı ahirenin tatbîk ve icrâ'sı cezireye ahâlî-i mahalliye ile düvel-i muazzamanın âmâline muvâfık bir hâl ve mevki' te'mîn edeceği ümidiyle Girid'deki kuvve-i askeriyyemizin kısm-ı azîmini celb etmiş olduğumuz gibi … tahrîkât-ı hâzıranın bidâyet-i zuhûrundan beri hükûmet-i seniyye me'mûrîn-i mahalliye ile düvel-i muazzama konsolosları tarafından sarf olunan mesâî ve ikdâmata (*devamlı çalışmalar*) i'timâden bu ana değin tedâbîr-i tenkîliyeye (*öldürücü tedbirler*) mürâcaat buyurmak istememişdir. Fakat iş bu mesainin semeresiz kalmasına mebni ya düvel-i muazzamanın sulh ve müsâlemet-i umûmîyeyi muhâfazaten hükûmet-i Yunaniyeyi her gûne tahrîkâtdan ictinâba ve harekât-ı fesâdcuyanenin izdiyâdına (*çoğalmasına*) bâdî olmuş olan sefâin-i harbiyelerini geriye celbe icbâr için Atina'ya ihtârât-ı müessire icrâ' eylemelerinden veyâhûd hükûmet-i seniyyeyi ahvâlin derece-i vahâmetine göre lüzûm göreceği tedâbîre tevessülde serbest bırakmalarından başka yapılacak bir şey yokdur…"

T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK. HR., Dosya: 23, Gömlek: 13, Aded: 1, 1314 N 6; T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK. HR., Dosya: 23, Gömlek: 50, Adet: 1, 1314 N 24.

[40] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.EE., Dosya: 114, Gömlek: 91, Aded: 5/8, 1314 N 17.

[41] *ibid*.

Greece. In other words, describing the events from their typical imperial perspectives, the European Ministers of Foreign Affairs and ambassadors blamed the Ottoman administration for its negligence to carry out the reforms.

After the arrival of the Greek iron-clad Hydra and the intense propaganda applied by the revolutionary organizations, the situation on the island became extremely serious and unbearable.[42] The insurgents, receiving strong encouragement from the revolutionary committee, attacked Chania with the aim of seizing the power on the island.[43] There were 700 armed Christians on the hills of Halepa, and an unknown number to the west.[44] Although figures varied slightly, it was estimated that 12,000 insurgents had gathered in the vicinity of Chania.[45] So many villages and farms were set on fire by the insurgents. Within a few days, flames prevailed throughout the town, and the telegraph wires and the water supplies were cut off. There was also a great deal of food shortage. In the meantime, a number of Christians were sent to the foreign war ships in the harbor. Some of the Christians had embarked on those ships while others had been sent to Milo and Piraeus by Greek ships. The Ottoman authorities objected to this matter arguing that only women and children had taken refuge in those ships, whereas their men joined the insurgents.[46]

In the Ottoman Cabinet meeting dated 11 February 1897, the telegrams by the European states sent in response to the telegrams by the Sublime Porte regarding the recent developments in Crete were discussed. Prince George's heading towards Crete, and

---

[42] *ibid*.

[43] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 10 (1897), No. 119.

[44] PRO: FO, 195/1983, No. 26, Biliotti to Salisbury, 7 February 1897, pp. 106-107; British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 10 (1897), No. 71.

[45] "More Fighting in Canea: The Greeks Ordered by the Powers not to Occupy Crete," *The New York Times*, Vol. XLVI, No. 14195, 16 February 1897, Tuesday, p. 2.

[46] PRO: FO, 195/1983, 6 February 1897, p. 104; Turkey No. 10 (1897), No. 63; "Fierce Fighting in Crete," *The New York Times*, Vol. XLVI, No. 14187, 6 February 1897, Saturday, p. 1.

coming from the Ottoman Embassy in Athens, the dispatches which stated that a decision was made in the Deliyiannis' speech in the Greek parliament telling that the Greek government would object to the Ottoman army to be sent to Crete were also analyzed. Talks made by the Ottoman Minister of Foreign Affairs with the foreign ambassadors regarding this matter was also on the agenda. In the talks made with the European representatives, it was understood that a strict notification would be made to the Greek government by their states so as to prevent the attitude of the Greek government whose actions were contrary to the peace conditions. Their states would not remain passive to the departure of the Prince George to Crete and to Deliyiannis' statement. So, at that moment, what needed to be done was to send a notification to the European states via the Ottoman ambassadors in Europe, to participate in the common action of the states. At the end of the meeting, it was decided that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had to send an urgent circular telegram to the Ottoman representatives in Europe.[47]

In spite of all the diplomatic efforts of the European Powers and the Ottoman Empire, the Greek government, besides sending war ships, ordered extensive military assistance to support the insurrectionary activities on the island. For instance, the man-of-war Laurium had left for the island with 3,000 Gras rifles; 8,000 cartridges; and 6 cannons.[48] In addition to those munitions of war, many volunteers arrived at Akrotiri to give support to the insurgents. Among these volunteers, a group was important to mention here. This group was called "Fallaga" and it was composed of university students, including Greeks and Cypriots.[49]

---

[47] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Res., Dosya: 85, Gömlek: 10, Aded: 2, 1314 N 9.

[48] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 11 (1897), No. 78. It should be noted that the Greek Consul in Chania had taken active part in landing of arms and munitions of war. See: British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 9 (1897), *Reports on the Situation in Crete*, (London: 1897), No. 1.

[49] Vasilios Fr. Tomadakis. Ιωάννου Δ. Κονδυλάκη άγνωστα απομνημονεύματα (1905): από την συμμετοχή του στη Κρητική Επανάσταση του 1897: παράρτημα: οι επώνυμες ανταποκρίσεις του Ιωάννου Δ.

Prince George's Arrival

On 12 February 1897, Prince George, the second son of the Greek King, escorted by six flotilla torpedo-boats, one iron-clad, three war ships, few ships' provisions landed at Chania aggravating the ongoing clashes between the Muslims and Christians.[50] Yet, Prince George left the island the following day. This had been questioned with various assertions as to whether the whole expedition was a demonstration of the dynasty's patriotism, or the assurances given by the Tsar and the Austrian circles to King George of Greece that Crete was to be inherited by his son.[51] Furthermore, the Ottoman ambassador in Athens reported to the Sublime Porte that the Greek government continued to dispatch troops to the Ottoman-Greek frontier. He added that Greece continued to send munitions and volunteers to the island, and that six flotilla torpedo-boats, one iron-clad, three war ships were sent to Crete under the command of Prince George. He further pointed out that the agenda in Greece was very hot, and people were in favor of the war and were all excited about the declaration of war. The King and the Greek government were not in a position to act against the wishes of the public opinion.[52]

When the Ottoman steam-yacht Fuad sailed to carry one company of soldiers and 200 officers[53] from Candia to Sitia, it was fired upon and forced to return by the Greek iron-clad Miaulis.[54] A very urgent telegram was sent to the Ottoman ambassadors from the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs stating that the situation in Crete got gradually worse,

---

Κονδυλάκη από την Μήλο και την Κρήτη κατά την επανάσταση του 1897, (Athens: Kardamitsas, 2002), pp. 26-27.

[50] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 10 (1897), No. 108.

[51] William L. Langer. *The Diplomacy of Imperialism (1890-1902),* p. 358.

[52] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.EŞA., Dosya: 26, Gömlek: 28, Aded: 1, 1314 N 26.

[53] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.EE., Dosya: 114, Gömlek: 91, Aded: 5/8, 1314 N 17.

[54] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 10 (1897), No. 111, and 112; T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.HR., Dosya: 23, Gömlek: 19, Aded: 2, 1314 N 11; PRO: FO, 195/1983, No. 58, Biliotti to Salisbury, 12 February 1897, p. 159.

the Ottoman steam-yacht Fuad was shot at by the Greek war ship. Moreover, the Muslims were blockaded by the insurgents in various parts of the island. It was further stated that depending on the level of the events, they were of the opinion to take the related and necessary measures. Still, before resorting to the last option of force to end the Greek atrocity, the Ottoman state would continue its efforts to get in touch with the European Powers who wished the continuation of the peace as they did and ask for their mediation. However, if the European Powers did not decide on an immediate and effective intervention to prevent bloodshed and to compel Greece to recall its forces from Crete, it was stated that the Ottoman state would be forced to take the necessary precautions leaving all the responsibilities for the consequences on the Greek government which was the real cause of the events.[55] The Ottoman Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tevfik Paşa, also paid visits to the European ambassadors in İstanbul on a daily basis requesting from them again and again that the Cretan revolt be suppressed.[56]

Sublime Porte's Diplomatic Attempts before Europe

Besides that, the Sublime Porte issued a declaration to the European Embassies at İstanbul. As a response to the Ottoman declaration, the German ambassador admitted the importance of the situation and said that he reported the situation to his respective government. He also added that it was understood that certain adverse events were expected in Thessaly and Macedonia, and therefore the Muslims were provided with arms. In case a revolt takes place in these regions, due to lack of adequate Ottoman troops in

[55] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.HR., Dosya: 23, Gömlek: 19, Aded: 2, 1314 N 11.

[56] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.HR., Dosya: 23, Gömlek: 28, Aded: 1, 1314 N 15. The details about murder and violence applied by the Christian insurgents to the Muslim community transmitted to the Ottoman representatives in Europe by the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs in order to attract the Europeans' attention and to put an end to these unsatisfactory conditions. T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.MTV., Dosya: 151, Gömlek: 82, Aded: 3, 1314 N 16. For the details of the replies sent by the Ottoman representatives in Europe to the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs, see: T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.MTV., Dosya: 151, Gömlek: 96, Aded: 6, 1314 N 19.

those regions, the intervention of these Muslim people in the events would result in unwanted consequences. The Russian ambassador also mentioned the importance of the event, and told that the commander of the Russian fleet in the Mediterranean had been ordered to sail to Crete so as to get in contact with the admirals of other European fleets to protect the coastal towns and prevent any attack to be attempted by the Greek war ships. The Austrian ambassador stated that he had no comments to make on the subject. The ambassador added that he had already reported the situation to his government. According to the French ambassador, at that moment it would be inappropriate to send the Ottoman troops to Crete and it would be appropriate to learn the opinion of the Sublime Porte regarding the dispatch of European war ships to the island.[57] The Italian ambassador claimed that the situation would not have become so bad if the Sublime State had applied the reforms. The British ambassador stated that he had forwarded the declaration to the government and that he did not get a reply yet.[58]

It seems clear that the Sublime Porte did its best in diplomatic terms and many times engaged in exchange of views with the ambassadors of Europe for the Cretan issue. Accordingly, it was decided to draw a circular telegram to the Ottoman ambassadors in Europe stating that all the efforts made in Crete were ineffective due to the negative behavior and attitude of Greece. The Greek government did not only cause the revolt but even dispatched its war ships and troops to the island and all of this led to the mix-up of everything and prevented all the efforts for the reinstatement of order and tranquility. In Crete, many local Muslims, including women and children, became victims of the Christians and were still the victims. It was added that everybody wanted to end this

[57] In this reply, Count Goluchowski stated that the Ottoman Empire should act and take the necessary steps to have the Greeks respect its rights and honor, that the Ottoman Empire was totally right in resorting to effective precautions against the Greeks, and that they already did what they could, but that the Ottomans had to do something and leave its steady state aside.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Hus., Dosya: 367, Sıra: 18, Aded: 4, 1314 9 17.

[58] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.EE., Dosya: 114, Gömlek: 91, Aded: 5/8, 1314 N 17.

situation, but without stopping and preventing the Greek attacks, these terrible incidents could not be overcome. Thus, it was decided to notify the Ottoman ambassadors that the first thing to do was to force the Greek government to withdraw its war ships and troops from the island and to withdraw its support from the insurgents in Crete. With that aim in mind, the Ottoman ambassadors had to begin initiatives in their respective countries to insist that the European Powers were to take the effective precautions to direct the Greek cabinet to act in a proper manner.[59]

All these diplomatic efforts of the Ottoman Empire before the European Powers was an indicator that the Sublime Porte wanted to settle the issue through diplomatic and peaceful means, and did not want to engage in military intervention. However, it appears that the Sublime Porte did not think that a military intervention on the island would lead to a positive result on behalf of the Ottoman Empire but would even deteriorate the situation. The Ottoman state saw the military action as the last resort and knew that immature military action could create unwanted results and lead to an irrevocable path. At the same time, Ottoman state officials might have thought that military intervention would attract the attention of European public on Crete and increase the negative image of the Ottomans in the eyes of the Europeans.

Europeans' Request and the Ottoman Response

To prevent the Ottoman reinforcements from being sent to Crete, the consuls in Chania unanimously requested their ambassadors at İstanbul to take the following actions to reestablish tranquility on the island: first, to put pressure on the Greek government to withdraw the Greek naval forces from the Cretan ports. Second, to urge the Sublime Porte not to send new Ottoman troops to the island. Third, to compel the foreign forces stationed

[59] T.C. BOA, İradeler Tasnifi, İ.MTZ.GR., Dosya: 31, Gömlek: 1186, Aded: 3, 1314 N 26.

on the island to occupy Chania, Candia, and Rethymnon. Finally, to complete the reorganization of the Cretan gendarmerie.[60]

In the Ottoman Cabinet meeting held on 13 February 1897, the deputies discussed the recent developments in Crete. The deputies thought that since the Greek King had a meeting with the Austrian Emperor during his European trip and delivered an anti-Ottoman speech to a newspaper correspondent, this increased the probability that Greece engaged in its recent activities with the permission of some foreign states. The deputies also stated that a decision was made to implement reforms in Crete in accordance with the offers made by Europe for the suppression of the last year's revolt. For the execution of these reforms mixed commissions were formed, but the Christians did not find this enough and revolted again. Hence the Greek government had again *de facto* intervened in the matter and the "Cretan Question" had once more turned into a "Greek Question." It was decided that military build-up of the Greeks on the Ottoman-Greek frontier made it necessary for the Ottoman Empire to take precautionary measures to protect its sovereignty. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs had to be notified that these matters had to be told to the European states via the Ottoman ambassadors in Europe and the foreign ambassadors in İstanbul. So, they had to be told that acting in peace requires the Greek government to act in peace both in Crete and on the frontier.[61]

Once again diplomatic efforts of the Ottoman government did not have a deterring impact on the unyielding attitude of the insurgents and the Greek troops which continued their attacks on Chania from the heights of Halepa. Actually, the attacks had been renewed on the followings days. On 13 February 1897, the *Vâli* of Crete, Beroviç Paşa, realizing that the state of affairs on the island was out of his control, took refuge on board the

[60] PRO: FO, 195/1983, No. 48, Biliotti to Salisbury, 11 February 1897, p. 130; British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 10 (1897), No. 96.

[61] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Res., Dosya: 85, Gömlek: 11, Aded: 12, 1314 N 11.

Russian iron-clad with Montenegrins.[62] This was an important turning point on the island, since an Ottoman *Vâli* –in this case a Greek Orthodox Ottoman subject, appointed by the help of the European Powers-gave up his office and left the island on board a foreign ship to Europe without even consulting the Sublime Porte. His departure naturally gave rise to discontinuity in the administrative harmony on the island and could have had a negative impact on the psychology and attitude of the Cretans towards the Ottoman administration. On 15 February 1897, the Greek fleet under the command of Colonel Vassos occupied the island and then Vassos issued a proclamation:

> Proclamation to the Cretan people. The terrible things which have happened during many years, and which still continue from complete anarchy which reigns, the ruin of families and properties which are at the discretion of the unbridled fanaticism and exposed to the plundering of the barbarous mob, have awakened the national feeling, have agitated the whole Greek race. This deplorable condition of a people of the same race, of the same religion, and with a common fortune and history, could no longer be endured. His Majesty the King of the Greeks, my august Master, decided to put an end to this state of things by the military occupation of the island. In the name of his Majesty George I, King of the Greeks, I occupy the island of Crete, and proclaim this to its inhabitants without distinction of sex or nationality. I promise in the name of His Majesty that I will protect the honour, life, and property, and with respect the religious conviction of its inhabitants, bringing them peace and equality rights.[63]

Colonel Vassos's proclamation especially emphasized the continuation of ill-treatment of the Christians on the island, chaos reigning and "awakening national feeling." For him, it was time to end the Ottoman rule and the Greek military occupation of the island was the only means to achieve this. The proclamation of Colonel Vassos aimed "to calm down" the tension by giving assurances to the inhabitants of the island, and especially to the Muslims who would be under his protection. This was an attempt to lay the ground for the acceptance of his authority and the delivery of the message to the Ottoman administration that the system in Crete would prevail.

---

[62] PRO: FO, 195/1983, No. 62, Biliotti to Salisbury, 14 February 1897, p. 163; British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 10 (1897), No. 118.

[63] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 10 (1897), No. 144.

Immediately after Vassos' arrival, the Greek consul in Chania hoisted the Greek flag. In the meantime, embarking the volunteers and munitions of war from Greece had been continuing. At that time, the Christians in Colymbari suffered from starvation and disease, and most of them took up arms. The main aim of the insurgents was to bombard and attack Chania in order to control the city. Yet, the European Powers did not allow them to attack Chania. For that reason, the insurgents asked themselves why the European Powers did not let them take it. In the vicinity of Chania, the Muslims began to leave their villages for the big cities. However, as Kondilaki argued, the Muslim men went to the mountains and took up arms, and then stealthily attacked the Christians at night.[64] According to Kondilaki, the racial hatred (*φυλετικά μίση*) of the Muslims towards the Christians increased after 1889. He argued that before 1889, the Muslims attacked the Christians' houses for the purpose of revenge, but after that they did not respect anything and burned down everything, including animals and even olive trees.[65]

Kondilaki stated in his memoirs that the Christian insurgents welcomed Vassos and his soldiers and presented themselves as law-abiding people towards the Greek soldiers and volunteers. According to insurgents, the Ottoman troops destroyed order and peace on the island, and the Greek soldiers came to the island and put an end to the disturbances. They further said "the idea that enosis takes place, the idea that we are the citizens of King George, and the whole army of the Sultan could not domesticate us."[66] According to the insurgents, the European Powers were unable to establish peace, but the Greek soldiers, though very few in numbers, would bring peace and order to the island.[67]

---

[64] Vasilios Fr. Tomadakis. *Ιωάννου Δ. Κονδυλάκη άγνωστα απομνημονεύματα (1905): από την συμμετοχή του στη Κρητική Επανάσταση του 1897: παράρτημα: οι επώνυμες ανταποκρίσεις του Ιωάννου Δ. Κονδυλάκη από την Μήλο και την Κρήτη κατά την επανάσταση του 1897*, pp. 51-52.

[65] *ibid*., p. 62.

[66] *ibid*., p. 64.

[67] *ibid*., p. 64.

As the Greek government disregarded all the warnings and continued to send war ships and troops, the representatives of the European states declared that it was unanimously decided that in order to remove the Greek war ships and troops from the island, to call the insurgents to obedience and to supervise the reforms, they would take coercive measures. European admirals in Crete unanimously decided to take serious steps in order to prevent the occupation of the island by the Greek troops. Accordingly, on 15 February 1897, the European Powers, composed of 100 men each from the British, French, Russian, and Italian marines, and 50 from the Austrian one, had occupied Chania under the command of the Italian admiral.[68] Yet, this action of the European Powers could not alleviate the situation.[69]

At this point, it is noteworthy to mention the accounts provided by the American representative in İstanbul *in extenso*:

> … The present condition of affairs in Crete is worse than at any former time… The ambassadors of the six powers find when too late that their paper scheme of reforms for Crete, which looked a physical force to restore order, has only produced massacre and worse confusion… This meddling of ambassadors with the internal affairs of Crete, if really intended to pacify, was ill advised; for while they prevented the Sultan from reinforcing his own troops there so as to compel obedience to authority everywhere, they furnished no physical force in their stead and thus left the Mahommedan population in rural district unprotected…[70]

In another report dated 24 February 1897, the American ambassador blamed the European Powers as a whole, for permitting the Greek forces to occupy the island. In his view, "if the concert among the powers to preserve the Ottoman Empire intact was honest and real, then to permit the landing of an armed force in the sight of the allied fleet was

---

[68] "More Fighting in Canea: The Greeks Ordered by the Powers not to Occupy Crete," *The New York Times*, Vol. XLVI, No. 14195, 16 February 1897, Tuesday, p. 2.

[69] William L. Langer. *The Diplomacy of Imperialism (1890-1902),* p. 361. It should be noted that the permission was requested from the Sublime Porte for the occupation of the coastal towns.

[70] USNA, 46/62, No. 1173, Terrell to Olney, 13 February 1897.

idiotic." He further touched upon the bombardment of the European forces considering it "as a part of international comedy" in Crete.[71]

The bombardment of the foreign war ships caused indignation in Europe, especially in Britain and Greece. In Europe, this action was regarded as a clear cooperation between the foreign troops and the Ottomans. In Britain and Greece, the excitement of the public opinion reached its peak with strong protests in the large meetings held in Athens. The protesters asserted that "… the country was now more firmly resolved than ever to spend its blood and treasure for Crete…"[72] The Greek Prime Minister, Deliyiannis, sharing the view of the public opinion, declared that "they are determined to uphold Greek rights and honor, and will persist in helping the Christians in Crete."[73]

It should be noted that public opinion in Italy was also enthusiastically in favor of the Greek action regarding the state of things in Crete. For this purpose, mass meetings were held throughout the country, and many young men had voluntarily left for Crete to take active roles in the revolt.[74] In a special letter from Naples, it was stated that some people in Italy held meetings to support the unification of Crete with Greece. Besides, around five thousand volunteers went to Crete.[75] At the same time, similar meetings were held in Paris. The Greek medical students in Paris together with fifteen Cretan students

---

[71] USNA, 46/62, No. 1185, Terrell to Olney, 24 February 1897.

[72] "Indignation in Athens," *The New York Times*, Vol. XLVI, No. 14201, 23 February 1897, Tuesday, p. 1.

[73] *ibid.,* p. 1.

[74] "Italy Indorses Greece: Her Action Regarded as a Bold Stroke for Humanity," *The New York Times*, Vol. XLVI, No. 14196, 17 February 1897, Wednesday, p. 2.

[75] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.HR., Dosya: 23, Gömlek: 66, Aded: 1, 1314 L 5. The Ottoman Ambassador in Rome stated in his telegram, dated 12 March 1897, that this number did not reflect the truth and that only five volunteers departed from Naples to Crete. See: T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.HR., Dosya: 23, Gömlek: 75, Aded: 3, 1314 L 9.

encouraged and activated the French students to support the insurgents in Crete and held meetings.[76]

To change the negative public opinion against the Ottoman Empire, the Ottoman ambassadors in Europe got into contact with the political leaders, ministers and other leading figures of politics. The Ottoman representative in Paris requested the photographs of the Muslim inhabitants of the island from the Sublime Porte to attach them to the pamphlet which would be delivered throughout France. His aim was to demonstrate the agony of the Muslim women and children and the brutality of the insurgents to the French public.[77] The Ottoman representative in Paris was obviously engaged in efforts to alter the Ottoman Empire's negative image in the eyes of French people and attempted to escape the designation "barbaric" by delivering the photographs of the Cretan Muslim victims. He believed that these photographs would show how the Muslims were subjected to the brutality of the Christian insurgents on the island of Crete.

European admirals warned Colonel Vassos that unless he signed a written declaration to cease marching and hostilities, the admirals would not cease the landing of military assistance for his troops. Colonel Vassos replied that he would not attack the towns which were under the control of the European Powers, unless his forces were not attacked.[78] However, from the beginning of its military action, the Greek side had always thought that the intervention of the European states would be limited to warning and that

---

[76] Ahmed Midhat. "Mertebe-i İrtidâd," *Tercümân-ı Hakîkât*, No. 5690-485, 28 Ramazan 1314, 18 Şubat 1312, 2 Mart 1897, Tuesday, p. 1.

[77] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.BŞK., Dosya: 50, Gömlek: 48, Aded: 2, 1314 L 3. It is important to remember that at that time, the Ottomans were deeply concerned with the image management in Europe. For the details see: Selim Deringil. *The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire 1876-1909*, (London: I. B. Tauris, 1998).

[78] Theodore George Tatsios. *The Megali Idea and the Greek-Turkish War of 1897: The Impact of the Cretan Problem on Greek Irredentism, 1866-1897*, p. 96.

after the Greek "*fait accompli,*" the Ottoman Empire would, too, stay silent.[79] Colonel Vassos continued to march towards the eastern part of the island and landed at Sitia where his forces attacked on the 15 Muslim villages.[80]

The Sitia Revolt

It was asserted that just before the revolt, the agitators sent by the Sultan had done agitative propaganda in Sitia. This agitation had greatly alarmed the Christian population in the villages who called their co-religionists from mountains to protect their lives. Besides, it was claimed that the Muslim inhabitants of Sitia had been agitated by the members of the Muslim committees who came from Candia arguing that the houses of the Muslims would be transferred to the Christians. This also seriously jeopardized the already tense situation. According to Bérard, these conditions in Sitia had brought the town to the brink of a revolt.[81] It seems that Bérard depicted the events in line with the presumption of "Muslim fanaticism" against Christians. He claimed that there was a great Muslim plot in Sitia and the "Muslim fanaticism" aimed to destroy the Christian inhabitants of Sitia.

On the other hand, the account which was transmitted by the British consul was different from that of the above-mentioned one:

> … The massacres appear to have taken place on an order received from some quarter. The Province of Sitia was perfectly quiet; the Mussulmans and Christians were living together in perfect harmony… On the two days preceding the sad tragedy the Christians had advised the Muslims not to leave their villages in order to avoid a disturbance of the peace. They assured them that they had nothing to fear, and neither their lives nor their property were in any danger. Almost on the same day the villages where massacres took place were suddenly surrounded by

[79] "Girid Havâdisi," *Servet-i Fünûn*, No. 11, 23 Ramazan 1314, 13 Şubat 1312, 25 February 1897, Thursday, p. 194.

[80] The province of Sitia was located in the eastern extremity of the island. According to the 1881 census, the population of the province was 16,834 (4,877 Muslim and 11,947 Christian). The Christians and Muslims had close ties and common interests. The mixed marriages were also very common in this town.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.DH., Dosya: 9, Gömlek: 45, Aded: 1/21, 1314 N 10.

[81] Victor Bérard. *Les Affaires de Crète*, (Paris: Armand Colin et Cie Editeurs, 1900), pp. 244-245.

> Christians who had arrived, and fire was opened upon them from some distance. In some places the Muslims, although badly provided with arms, returned the fire. They were, however, hard pressed, and called upon to give up their arms, their lives being promised them. They obeyed and massacre began…[82]

Although the causes given for the outbreak of this revolt may have differed from one source to the other, what is clear here is that the Christian insurgents took the arms of the Muslims and killed them unfairly. The Christian insurgents attacked the Muslim villages; and the Muslim women and children who took refuge in the mosques. Almost in all villages of Sitia, the Muslims were methodically surrounded by the Christians and were massacred. The Muslim men had few arms to defend themselves. After a while, these arms were handed over to the Christian insurgents. Then, the mosques were set on fire by the insurgents and most of the Muslims who gathered in the mosques were killed and some of them took refuge in the caves.[83] The insurgents, moreover, had plundered the Muslim villages and sacked and burnt all their houses and other properties. Certain Muslim girls had also been forcibly converted to Christianity.[84] The example of what happened to certain girls in nearby villages provides important clues about the attitudes of the insurgents to the Muslim population and the Muslim girls.[85] In the village of Ahladiya, for example, the insurgents robbed the cash and jewels of the Muslims, whose numbers amounted to 137 people. Out of these 137 Muslims, the insurgents murdered all the men and eight women. In the village of Molyana, the insurgents Hacı Mihali Fodalbezi, Manoli

---

[82] PRO: FO, 195/1983, No. 12, Biliotti to Salisbury, 17 March 1897, p. 315; British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 10 (1897), No. 339.

[83] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.DH., Dosya: 9, Gömlek: 45, Aded: 1/21, 1314 N 10; Tahmiscizâde Mehmed Mâcid. *Girit Hatıraları*, (İstanbul: Kervan Kitapçılık, 1977), pp. 39-40.

[84] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.UM., Dosya: 36, Gömlek: 109, Aded: 1, 1314 N 21; T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.DH., Dosya: 9, Gömlek: 45, Aded: 1/21, 1314 N 10.

[85] In the case of Emine, the insurgents attacked on her village and killed her uncle and then kidnapped her. In the place where she was taken she saw the other Muslim girls, Hatime and Fadime. While describing how the insurgents treated them she was surprised when she understood that the insurgents were foreigners since they did not speak the Cretan dialect. ("*ceux qui tuaient n'étaient pas du pays: ils étaient de Kritcha, et quelques-uns, tout à fait étrangers, ne parlaient pas le dialecte crétois*…"). At the end, she had been converted to Christianity. See: Victor Bérard. *Les Affaires de Crète*, pp. 247-248.

Zervaki, Anagnosti Maravelaki, and Hacı Yorgi Konomaki, who were the *nahiye müdür*s, took over all the arms that the Muslims possessed. Out of 106 Muslims, 104 Muslim men were murdered by the insurgents. Moreover, they forced two Muslim girls to convert to Christianity. When one of the Muslim girls refused to do so, she was also murdered by the insurgents.[86] On 22 February 1897, it was reported by the Ottoman authorities in Crete that the number of Muslims, including men, women, and children, killed in Sitia amounted to 1,145 and 25 more were wounded.[87] At the end of the revolt, the total number of Muslims killed there amounted to 2,500;[88] while only 25 Muslims managed to escape.[89] In order to put an end to these serious massacres, 100 seamen from British, French, and Italian war ships had landed at Sitia.[90] And finally, the Muslim inhabitants and Ottoman troops in Sitia were relieved by the European naval forces.[91]

The Revolts in Sarakina and Candanos, and the Muslim Immigration

At the same time, the situation in the western districts got worse. The families and Ottoman soldiers were blockaded by Greek troops with cannons in Selinos.[92] The British

[86] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.DH., Dosya: 9, Gömlek: 45, Aded: 1/21, 1314 N 10.

[87] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.ASK., Dosya: 117, Gömlek: 91, Aded: 1, 1314 N 20.

[88] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 10 (1897), No. 134, and 165; Turkey No. 11 (1897), No. 198. At that time, the number of Ottoman soldiers killed at Chania and its vicinity amounted to 16 and 3 soldiers were wounded; at Kisamo-Kastelli 23 Ottoman soldiers were killed and 8 soldiers were wounded; at Selinos 162 Ottoman soldiers were killed and 31 soldiers were wounded; at Candia 25 Ottoman soldiers were killed and 37 soldiers were wounded; at Rethymnon one soldier was killed. See: T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.ASK., Dosya: 117, Gömlek: 90, Aded: 1, 1314 N 19. For the list of the Muslims killed by the Christians in Sitia, see: British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 3 (1898), *Further Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Crete*, (London: 1898), Enclosure in No. 140.

[89] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.TKM., Dosya: 38, Gömlek: 49, Aded: 4/8, 1314 N 24; British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 10 (1897), No. 198;

[90] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 10 (1897), No. 160.

[91] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.HR., Dosya: 23, Gömlek: 51, Aded: 1, 1314 N 24.

[92] Selinos is a district inhabited by 6,000 Christians and 3,000 Muslims.

consul reported to his government that "Mussulman inhabitants of Sarakina[93] were murdered by Christians to the number of 20 Muslim men, 23 women, 61 children…"[94] The admirals decided to send a war ship to Selinos-Kastelli to prevent further outrages. Russian, Italian and British consuls went to Selinos to negotiate with the insurgent chiefs for the release of the Muslims.[95] In a long report dated 22 February 1897, the British consul transmitted the following details given by the Muslims, local authorities and the Christians concerning Sarakina:

> "… in the village of Azoire, Christian gendarmes shot dead a Mussulman, and wounded a lad of 12 or 13 years of age… Thereupon, armed men, of both sects, rushed on the spot and kept up a desultory firing during the whole day… The day following the fight was continued at Cadros …"[96]

In the same report, he pointed out that seeing the situation got worse, the Muslim inhabitants of Sarakina endeavored to emigrate some time before the above-mentioned incidents. He added that the Christians in Pelekano, who had started to abandon their village, induced the Muslims to remain where they were assuring them to prevent further ill-treatment. After few days, the Demarche and notable Christians of their commune told the Muslims that it would be better to emigrate to the sea-shore. They also assured to convey the Muslims with their men. While the Muslim emigrants marched towards the sea-side, fire-arms were shot at them. Consul Biliotti further stated that out of 159 Muslim emigrants, only 44 managed to arrive at Selinos-Castelli; and that the cause of this event

---

[93] Sarakina was situated in Selinos district and isolated from other Muslim villages.

[94] PRO: FO, 195/1983, Biliotti to Salisbury, 19 February 1897, p. 176; British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 10 (1897), No. 158.

[95] PRO: FO, 195/1983, No. 7, Biliotti to Salisbury, 22 February 1897, p. 259; British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 11 (1897), No. 158, and 162.

[96] *ibid*., British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 10 (1897), No. 249.

was the resistance of a Muslim in the rear against the confiscation of his rifle when a scuffle ensued.[97]

The situation in Candanos, located in a circular valley four hours away from the sea-shore, was not favorable. The hills of Candanos were occupied by 1,000 armed Christian insurgents, except a peak where there was a blockhouse with fifty soldiers.[98] On 26 February 1897, the Greek troops and the Cretan Christian insurgents destroyed the blockhouse of Candanos with two cannons.[99] Thereafter, the Muslim inhabitants of Candanos were blockaded by 1,000 insurgents and 50 Greek soldiers who occupied all the hills with the exception of a peak on which 1,700 Muslims with 246 soldiers and 3 mountain guns had been situated. As in the other parts of the island, the Muslims were in a great destitute state and had no bread for eighteen days. The Christian chiefs refused to allow provisions to be sent to the Muslim inhabitants of Candanos arguing that the victuals would not reach the Muslims since the insurgents, who were as hungry as the Muslims, would keep them for their own use. The Muslims had begged for mercy and the necessary measures without delay to be rescued.[100] The representatives of the European Powers came to Candanos so as to negotiate with the insurgents for the purpose of releasing the Muslims. They told the insurgents that if they released the Muslims, they could get inside Candanos with the forces of the European Powers. The insurgent chiefs replied that the

---

[97] *ibid*., İsmail Paşa reported from Crete that the Muslim men, women and children who were killed in Selinos was amounted to 140. T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.UM., Dosya: 36, Gömlek: 109, Aded: 1, 1314 N 21.

[98] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 10 (1897), No. 249.

[99] *ibid*., No. 226.

[100] PRO: FO, 195/1983, No. 8, Biliotti to Salisbury, 1 March 1897, pp. 269-272; British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 10 (1897), No. 304. Kondilaki noted that the Muslim population in Candanos and its vicinity was higher than that of Christians in the past. But, after the disturbances, the Muslims immigrated to Chania.

Vasilios Fr. Tomadakis. *Ιωάννου Δ. Κονδυλάκη άγνωστα απομνημονεύματα (1905): από την συμμετοχή του στη Κρητική Επανάσταση του 1897: παράρτημα: οι επώνυμες ανταποκρίσεις του Ιωάννου Δ. Κονδυλάκη από την Μήλο και την Κρήτη κατά την επανάσταση του 1897*, p. 149.

lawful owner of Crete is the King of Greece and that the whole inhabitants of Crete were his citizens. They added that the only authority and right to negotiate on this subject belonged to the King. The British consul did not accept this reply. The Christian chiefs got angry with the representatives, but after a while, they accepted the offer on the condition that the Muslims had to give up their arms while leaving Candanos.[101]

Towards the middle of March 1897, after reaching an agreement with the Christian chiefs, the British, Italian and Russian consuls in Crete sent the European forces to relieve the besieged Muslim population and garrison of Candanos.[102] On 10 March 1897, Consul Biliotti reported that the release of 340 Ottoman soldiers, 523 men, 1,047 women and children had been successfully achieved by the European forces. Being destitute, the refugees had set off without getting any property which were already plundered by the Christians who came down from the hills. Upon embarkation, in accordance with the agreement, they were disarmed and their arms were given to the Christians. The refugees wished to emigrate to Smyrna.[103] The remaining party was taken to Chania by the European forces. The total number of Muslim inhabitants who took refuge in various places was about 2,500. In addition, there were 600 Ottoman soldiers.[104] After the

---

[101] Vasilios Fr. Tomadakis. *Ιωάννου Δ. Κονδυλάκη άγνωστα απομνημονεύματα (1905): από την συμμετοχή του στη Κρητική Επανάσταση του 1897: παράρτημα: οι επώνυμες ανταποκρίσεις του Ιωάννου Δ. Κονδυλάκη από την Μήλο και την Κρήτη κατά την επανάσταση του 1897*, p. 119.

[102] PRO: FO, 195/1983, No. 8, Biliotti to Salisbury, 1 March 1897, pp. 269-272; British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 10 (1897), No. 304.

[103] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 10 (1897), No. 262.

[104] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 10 (1897), Enclosure 2 in No. 342.
According to the European Powers, the immigration of the country Muslims was the best "solution" for the "Cretan Question." Since Muslims' agglomeration in or around towns in Crete would throw the immigrants into utter destitution.
See: PRO: FO, 195/1983, No. 9, Biliotti to Salisbury, 11 March 1897, pp. 298-299; and British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 10 (1897), No. 304.

Muslims' exodus, the Christians went to the Muslims' houses to pillage and plunder.[105] Upon these developments, the Sublime Porte asked the European ambassadors in İstanbul whether the European forces on the island would engage in the transfer of the Muslim population to the sea-shore from other districts as well. In reply, the European ambassadors had unanimously said that the matter would be negotiated among them and the necessary steps would be taken.[106] In addition, the Christians of the western districts had marched to the hills over Selinos and kept shooting. They killed several horses and mules grazing in the fields and also wounded a Muslim man.[107]

The Russian, Italian and British consuls went to Selinos to negotiate with the insurgent chiefs for the release of Muslims.[108] In these negotiations, British consul underlined the fact that the union with Greece was impossible at that moment, and for that reason the autonomy should be accepted as sufficient by the Christians. If they did not accept it then the foreign states would allow the Ottoman Empire to send its forces to the island so as to make the insurgents lawful people.[109] After this interview, the British consul reported his observations stating the following: "… the cause of the present outbreak of the Christians in that district was not any serious local reason of a serious character, but the encouragement derived from the presence in Crete of Greek soldiers and ships of war, and

[105] Vasilios Fr. Tomadakis. *Ιωάννου Δ. Κονδυλάκη άγνωστα απομνημονεύματα (1905): από την συμμετοχή του στη Κρητική Επανάσταση του 1897: παράρτημα: οι επώνυμες ανταποκρίσεις του Ιωάννου Δ. Κονδυλάκη από την Μήλο και την Κρήτη κατά την επανάσταση του* 1897, p. 149.

[106] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.HR., Dosya: 23, Gömlek: 47, Aded: 1, 1314 N 22.

[107] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 10 (1897), No. 249.

[108] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 11 (1897), No. 158, and 162; PRO: FO, 195/1983, No. 7, Biliotti to Salisbury, 22 February 1897, p. 259.

[109] Vasilios Fr. Tomadakis. *Ιωάννου Δ. Κονδυλάκη άγνωστα απομνημονεύματα (1905): από την συμμετοχή του στη Κρητική Επανάσταση του 1897: παράρτημα: οι επώνυμες ανταποκρίσεις του Ιωάννου Δ. Κονδυλάκη από την Μήλο και την Κρήτη κατά την επανάσταση του* 1897, p. 215.

the belief that terrible massacres had occurred in Canea…"[110] He further added that the Muslim and Christian inhabitants of Selinos were in favor of the extension of the European occupation to their district. In the last paragraph of his report, he put so much emphasis on the role played by the European Powers arguing that "… the solution of the Cretan question depends … exclusively upon the Great Powers…"[111]

It was decided that the Muslim inhabitants of Selinos would be released via the Russian, Italian and British consuls. In various parts of the island, the Muslims were transferred under the protection of the soldiers of the European navy up to the place where they would be settled. This was welcomed by the Ottoman government and application of the same procedure was requested for the transfer of the other Muslim population. This request was notified to the foreign ambassadors by the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In reply, the representatives of the six European Powers stated that they had given the necessary orders to their consuls in Crete and that in the meeting to be held that day, this matter would be on the agenda again.[112]

At that time, there was a great mobility of population within the island. The Muslims living in the interior parts of the island began to flee to the seashores. The number of the Muslim population by the seaside increased, so they began to suffer from hunger and diseases. The demographic map of the towns and different districts began to change; the early signs of social disorder emerged. Various relief campaigns were organized by many commissions within the Ottoman Empire for the Muslim inhabitants of Crete, who lived in terrible conditions, suffering from hunger and threats from the insurgents. The organizations raised funds from the peoples in the Ottoman Empire, placed advertisements

[110] PRO: FO, 195/1983, No. 87, Biliotti to Salisbury, 22 February 1897, p. 185; British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 10 (1897), No. 187.

[111] *ibid*.

[112] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.HR., Dosya: 23 , Gömlek: 47, Aded: 1, 1314 N 22; T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.HR., Dosya: 23 , Gömlek: 48, Aded: 3, 1314 N 23.

and announcements in daily newspapers listing the amounts of aid gathered and the names of the donors.[113]

Attacks of the Christian insurgents and the Greek troops on the Muslims also continued. The Muslim inhabitants of Ierapetra were blockaded by the Greek troops and the insurgents. In the name of King George, the insurgents demanded from the governor and inhabitants to submit the city and the castle to them. The insurgents began to fire artillery at the inhabitants and then there were exchanges of fire and artillery. However, the fighting continued until the early hours of the morning, leading to high casualties on both sides.[114] Yet, with regard to the real cause for the siege of the Muslims by the Christians in different districts of the island, no concrete reason was given. It is important to note what the Muslim governor of Candanos said concerning the siege: "… Muslim quarters had no communication from outside for twenty-five days, and had no idea about the conflagration at Canea, of the presence of Greek ships of war, and of soldiers, and could not understand why they were besieged by the Christians…"[115] This point inevitably brings us to the question of whether the synchronous events in distant parts of the island meant that there was a very good network of communication, or that there was a covert organization and may be provocation in various parts of the island on the part of the insurgents and the Greek troops.

As the revolt could not be prevented, the Sublime Porte instructed its representatives in Europe by a circular dispatch pointing out that the Greek attack was the real reason for the revolt. Therefore, without overcoming this atrocity, the aggravating

---

[113] "Girid İânesi," *İkdâm*, No. 954, 13 Şevval 1314, 5 Mart 1313, 17 March 1897, Wednesday, p. 1. It should be noted that these lists were published on the front pages of the Ottoman newspapers.

[114] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.EŞA., Dosya: 26, Gömlek: 57, Aded: 2, 1314 L 5; T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.ASK., Dosya: 119, Gömlek. 30, Aded: 1, 1314 L 5; T.C. BOA, İradeler Tasnifi, İ.MTZ.GR., Dosya: 31, Gömlek: 1197, Aded: 3, 1314 L 6.

[115] PRO: FO, 195/1983, No. 7, Biliotti to Salisbury, 22 February 1897, p. 259; British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 10 (1897), No. 249.

situation on the island could not be prevented. The first thing to be done was that the foreign states should urge the Greek government to withdraw its forces from the island and to abstain from sending more arms and ammunition.[116]

Activities of Greece on the Ottoman-Greek Frontier

Alongside the revolt in Crete, the Greek government had been sending its troops to the Ottoman-Greek frontier in Thessaly. At the same time, the Greek government continued to form armed bands to make incursions and plunders on the frontier. The *Ethnike Hetairia* also sent volunteers and munitions to the frontier in order to provoke the Ottoman Empire to engage in war with Greece. Moreover, various branches of the committee made preparations to support the insurrectionary movements on the island of Crete and the Balkan Peninsula. The society had external branches in various places in the Balkans and the Aegean islands. A report from the Ottoman representative in Corfu mentioned the branch of the *Ethnike Hetairia* informing the Sublime Porte that this committee had close relationships with the committees in Crete. The *Ethnike Hetairia* sent munitions to Albania to encourage the Christian inhabitants of Albania to start a revolt.[117] Ayşe Nükhet Adıyeke also mentioned its branch on the island of Zante (*Zakynthos*) which raised money and support for the Cretan revolt.[118] A ciphered telegram dated 10 July 1896 provided information about the role played by the Greek consul in Chios. Abidin Paşa, the governor of the Mediterranean, remarked that in order to help the Cretan insurgents, the Greek consul in Chios secretly raised donations from the Greek subjects and some Chiots

[116] T.C. BOA, İradeler Tasnifi, İ.MTZ.GR., Dosya: 31, Gömlek: 1186, Aded: 3, 1314 N 26.

[117] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.EŞA., Dosya: 27, Gömlek: 2, Aded: 4, 1314 Z 8.

[118] Ayşe Nükhet Adıyeke. *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Girit Bunalımı (1896-1908)*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2000), p. 145.

and then sent these donations to the Bank of Athens.[119] These examples were good illustrations of the networks and widening sphere of interaction with the insurgents.

The Ottoman Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tevfik Paşa, had a meeting with the Greek ambassador in İstanbul. Tevfik Paşa told the ambassador that "… since this transgression was against the international law and the benefits of the parties, this *de facto* situation should be ended as soon as possible…" The Greek ambassador replied that "… the Greek government sent its military forces to the border as a reaction to the Ottoman military build-up. And the Greek war ships and soldiers were sent to Crete to prevent the Greek subjects and to restore order and peace…" Upon this, Tevfik Paşa stated that the dispatch of troops was at first initiated, and especially conducted by the Greek government. The military precautions that the Ottoman Empire took were a response to such atrocity in order to prevent its own legal rights. According to Tevfik Paşa, the dispatch of Greek troops to the island had aggravated the situation, let alone maintain tranquility and order.[120]

European Dissidence about the Blockade

According to the German government, the Ottoman side could best protect its interests through military intervention in Greece to deter the Greek government from continuing its military presence in Crete. This had to be done as soon as possible. If the Ottoman government did not do so on time, the Ottoman Empire would lose its impact on the decisions of the European states, and its power and impact on the Balkan states. Otherwise, even the future and the integrity of the Ottoman Empire would be in danger.[121] In this sense, it is important to note what the German Emperor said to the Ottoman

[119] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.UM., Dosya: 35, Gömlek: 20, Aded: 1, 1314 M 29.

[120] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.HR., Dosya: 23, Gömlek: 48, Aded: 3, 1314 N 23.

[121] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.HR., Dosya: 23, Gömlek: 29, Aded: 2, 1314 N 16.

Ambassador, Galib Bey, during the conversation over the banquet at the German Emperor's Palace:

> … I did my best to maintain order. However, the Greeks did not even pay attention. Certain states hesitate to resort to force against the Greeks. For that reason, my hopes regarding the solution of the matter as just between the states are disappearing. For the Sublime State, there is no other option than taking arms. Therefore, in order to preserve his state, the Sultan should immediately send troops and march to Athens and should also declare that the Ottoman troops would not leave Athens until the Greek troops are withdrawn from Crete. This way, it would well be possible for Germany to help with the settlement of the issue, without shedding blood to the advantage of the Ottoman Empire. Otherwise, if the Sublime State does not engage in any action, what Germany can do in that case… [122]

Sharing the German view, the Austrian government was also willing to extend the blockade to the Piraeus and other Greek ports.[123] It was clear that Germany, Austria, and Russia were unanimously in favor of the commencement of the blockade of the Piraeus.[124] The British government, on the contrary, insisted on the commencement of the blockade of Crete rather than the blockade of the Piraeus. Hanotaux, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated that any variation from the decision of the European Powers put them into a difficult position that would be entirely inadmissible.[125] The Greek reply to the European note[126] regarding the immediate withdrawal of the Greek forces from Crete was considered

---

[122] "… muhâfaza-ı âsâyiş için elimden gelen muâveneti dirîğ etdim. Fakat Yunan söz anlamıyor. Bazı düvel ise kendi taraflarından Yunan aleyhinde cebr isti'mâlinde tereddüd gösteriyor. Bu cihetle meselenin yalnız devletler beyninde halli hususundaki ümidlerim gittikçe zâil oluyor. Devlet-i Âliyye tarafından silaha sarılmakdan başka çâre kalmıyor. Binâenaleyh zât-ı akdes-i hümâyûn-ı cenâb-ı pâdişahî devlet ve memleketlerini muhâfaza etmek için derhâl asker sevk ederek Atina üzerine yürümeli ve Yunan askeri Girid'den çıkmadıkça asâkir-i şâhânenin dahi Yunanistan'dan çıkmayacağını ilân etmeli bu sûretle meselenin belki kan dökülmeksizin Devlet-i Âliyye lehinde tesviyesi için Almanya'ya dahi bir vesile-i muâvenet olabilir. Aksi takdirde bazı sahib-i mülk tarafından eser-i hayât gösterilmez ise Almanya ne yapabilir."
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.EŞA., Dosya: 26, Gömlek: 40, Aded: 3, 1314 N 30.

[123] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 11 (1897), No. 298.

[124] "Girid Vakayi' Husûsî Telgrafnamelerimiz," *Sabâh*, No. 2621, 11 Şevval 1314, 3 Mart 1313, 15 March 1897, Monday, p. 1.

[125] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 11 (1897), No. 298, 285, and 299.

[126] It is important to remember that the representatives of the European states sent a note to the Greek and Ottoman governments on 2 March 1897. See: British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 4 (1897): *Notes Addressed by the Representatives of the Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy and Russia*, (London: 1897), No. 1, and British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 11 (1897), Enclosure in No. 271. For the Ottoman reply see: British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No.6 (1897): *Reply of the Turkish Government*

unsatisfactory by the Italian government. In this sense, it should be noted that the Italian government's attitude was considered by Tevfik Paşa as taking the middle-way with regards to the attitude of the European Powers; and being inclined towards the British policy. Even though the Italian government was reluctant towards the request of the Greek government for a joint European intervention, it would act in concert with the British side if it favored such an intervention.[127]

The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Mouravieff, evaluated the Greek reply as a "refusal" and said:

> I considered this response almost as a refusal that includes certain unacceptable ideas. To understand the ideas and considerations of the Great Powers in this matter, I sent telegrams to our Ambassadors in Europe last night… It is my opinion that enforcing precautions will evidently be applied to Greece. Essentially, based on the current alliance between the Great Powers it should be assumed that the Cretan Question is resolved and settled. But I am more afraid of the Thessallian frontier where there is a troop accumulation.[128]

Accordingly, the Russian government expressed its view by conveying a circular dispatch to the Russian representatives stating that there should be a military occupation of Crete by a force numbering 10,000 or 12,000 men on behalf of the European Powers. This force should be furnished by France and Italy and then the European governments should insist on the withdrawal of the Greek and Turkish forces by degrees. In a way, the pretext of the Greek government employing Greek troops to pacify the island would be put aside and under these circumstances, a plebiscite was out of the question. To the Russian

---

to the Note Presented on March, 5, 1897 by the Representatives of the Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy and Russia. (London: 1897), No. 1.

[127] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.HR., Dosya: 23, Gömlek: 85, Aded: 1, 1314 L 11.

[128] "Bu cevabı kabul olunamayacak bazı mülâhazâtı hâvî (*içeren*) âdetâ bir cevab-ı red nazarıyla bakıyorum. Düvel-i muazzamanın bu bâbdaki (*konudaki*) efkâr (*fikirler*) ve mülâhazâtlarını (*düşüncelerini*) dahi anlamak için düvel-i müşarünileyhim nezdindeki süferâmıza (*elçilerimize*) dün akşam telgraflar keşide (*göndermek*) etdim… İ'tikadımca Yunanistan'a karşı tedâbîr-i zecrîye icrâ' olunacağı aşikârdır. Zaten düvel-i muazzama beyninde hâsıl olan i'tilâf-ı efkâra mebni Girid meselesi fasl (*çözme*) ve tesviye (*bir neticeye bağlama*) olunmuş add edilmelidir. Fakat tarafeyn-i asâkirinin tahşîd (*birikme*) etmekde olduğu Teselya hududu cihetinden daha ziyade korkuyorum."
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.HR., Dosya: 23, Gömlek: 69, Aded: 1, 1314 L 6.

proposal, while the British government had given its entire adherence, the French government opposed it. At the end, it was agreed that each European state, except Germany and Austria, should send a further 600 men force to Crete. [129]

In his speech delivered in the French Parliament, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hanotaux, declared the decision made by the European Powers: under the suzerainty of the Sultan, it was decided that Crete would have autonomy; and that the Greek troops would immediately be withdrawn from the island for the establishment of order and tranquility. The soldiers would be gathered in the regions occupied by the European Powers and the Ottoman troops would be withdrawn. He further said that the European states would send 500 to 600 men additional troops to the island and would quickly establish an autonomous administration on the island. He further mentioned that if the Greek government insists on keeping his troops on the island, under the leadership of Colonel Vassos, then related precautionary measures would be taken by the European admirals. He added that the blockade of the island would be proclaimed and transfer of any sort of ammunition and supplies would be prevented if necessary. Besides, the admirals would have the right to decide on a blockade on any part of Greece and enforce it, if deemed necessary.[130] In the same session, upon a question posed to Hanotaux by one of the French deputies in the parliament regarding the use of force for the execution of autonomy on the island, he replied as follows: "the intentions and the decision of the states are as strong and effective against the Sublime State as it is against Greece. The Great Powers has decided to finalize the reform project as decided by their representatives."[131]

---

[129] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 11 (1897), No. 267.

[130] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.HR., Dosya: 23, Gömlek: 83, Aded: 1, 1314 L 11.

[131] "devletlerin azim ve kararları Yunan hükûmetine karşı olduğu gibi Devlet-i Aliyye hakkında dahi kavî (*sağlam*) ve müessirdir (*tesirli*). Düvel-i müşarünileyhim süferâ (*elçiler*) tarafından kararlaştırılan ıslahât lâyıhasını neticelendirmeğe karar vermişlerdir." *ibid*.

Hanotaux's speech was important in various aspects. The European Powers had decided on taking common coercive measures against Greece meaning that they would in no way engage in negotiations with Greece.

Imperial Expansion: European Blockade and Occupation of Crete

Confronted with the inability to reach any agreements regarding these proposals, the European states unanimously decided to blockade the Cretan ports with an international army to prevent the detachments of munitions of war from Greece. It was thought that, in that way, order and tranquility within the island would be reestablished.[132] On 18 March 1897, the European admirals proclaimed the blockade: First, the island of Crete would be blockaded by the admirals of the naval forces of the European Powers on 21 March 1897 at 8 o'clock. Second, no vessel under the Greek flag could come to the Cretan ports in any case. Third, the vessels of the European Powers and those of the neutral powers might come to the ports and land their merchandise there, provided that they are not given to the insurgents and are not intended for dispatch to the interior. Fourth, the Greek vessels which were still in the Cretan waters should be forced to leave the island, if coercive measures were not applied.[133]

In order to announce the contents of the proclamation throughout the island, certain measures would be applied. The European ships, therefore, were to be sailed around the important ports and a copy of the proclamation would be submitted to the municipalities.

"Girid Havâdisi," *Servet-i Fünûn*, No. 12, 14 Şevval 1314, 6 Mart 1313, 18 March 1897, Thursday, p. 12. Meanwhile, the Greek government continued to send troops and warlike preparations to the Ottoman-Greek frontier. In consequence of the serious situation and the imminent risk of a war between the Ottoman Empire and Greece, the Russian government took the initiative by proposing the immediate blockade of Volo. See: British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 11 (1897), Enclosure in No. 362. (In fact, Lord Salisbury was in agreement with the blockade of Volo. However, as some of the deputies in the British Parliament were opposing to the blockade, he changed his mind. See: T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.HR., Dosya: 23, Gömlek: 87, Aded: 3, 1314 L 12.)

[132] It was claimed that at a time when the insurgents were in scarcity of food and were in desperate situation, if the supply of munitions and food to the island were cut off, the insurgents would be compelled to choose to path of peace and tranquility.
"Mukarrerât-ı Düveliye ve Hulâsa-ı Ahvâl-ı Siyâsîye," *Sabâh*, No. 2624, 14 Şevval 1314, 6 Mart 1313, 18 March 1897, Thursday, p. 2.

[133] The limits of the blockade was comprised within 23˚, 24′ and 26˚, 30′ longitude east of Greenwich 35˚, 48′ and 34˚, 45′ north latitude. "Girid Havâdisi," *Servet-i Fünûn*, No. 12, 21 Şevval 1314, 13 Mart 1313, 25 March 1897, Thursday, p. 20; "Husûsî Telgraflarımız, Paris" 18 Mart," *Sabâh*, No. 2626, 16 Şevval 1314, 8 Mart 1313, 20 March 1897, Saturday, p. 1; British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 11 (1897), Enclosure in No. 315.

In the meantime, the admirals of the European naval forces proposed the distribution of the European troops in Crete to their own governments. According to this, 100 British troops and 300 of each of the other powers are to be stationed at Chania; 500 British troops at Candia; 300 Germans at Suda Bay; 300 French at Sitia and Spinalonga; 300 Russians at Rethymnon; 300 Italians at Ierapetra; and 300 Austrians at Selinos and Kissamos.[134] The admirals made known to the inhabitants of the island that the main object to proclaim the blockade was to cut off the communication between Greece and Crete; to hinder the dispatch of munitions of war from Greece; and to pacify the island. With this aim in mind, a copy of the proclamation was to be submitted to the municipalities of the important towns. The admirals also recommended the inhabitants of the island to return to order. The reason for such a measure was that the Greeks published and delivered pamphlets and placards provoking the inhabitants on the island.[135]

Proclamation of Autonomy by the European Admirals

As regards the proclamation of the autonomy, some divergence of views appeared among the European governments on whether it should be issued by the European admirals or consuls at Chania. After reaching an agreement, the admirals issued the proclamation of autonomy on 18 March 1897. Proclamation of autonomy in Crete created fervor among the Cretan Muslims who began to organize themselves into various committees and associations. In order to protest the proclamation of autonomy, for instance, İbrahim Şerif, *müftü* of the municipality sent telegrams signed by 300 Muslims; and Ali Şükrü, *müftü* of Caterina and İbrahim Said sent telegrams containing 1,052 Muslims' signatures to Sir Philip Currie, the British Ambassador in İstanbul, which noted that "… the Christian

[134] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 10 (1897), No. 302.

[135] "Girid Umûru," *Sabâh*, No. 2631, 21 Şevval 1314, 13 Mart 1313, 25 March 1897, Thursday, p. 3.

inhabitants of Crete, forming the numerical majority of the population, but incapable of properly administering the former privileges they enjoyed…"[136] The Muslims added that in the past, the Christians would abuse these privileges and destroy the Muslim population, therefore, the internal affairs of the island "… may not be removed from the direction of the Sublime Porte. If this be impossible … the internal affairs of the island may be placed under the continual control of the Great Powers in conjunction with the Porte…"[137]

One of the main reasons on the European Powers' insistence on a political "solution" to the Cretan issue was the role to be played by them and the political benefits to be obtained. If the Greek side did not intervene militarily, this would bring in an extra power and opportunity to the European Powers and would be to their interests to be able to have power to decide on the matter. Once they had the power, they would be able to defend and further their interests better. So, rather than the island being in total control of either the Ottomans or the Greeks, they wanted the situation to be under their control, preferably as an autonomous Ottoman province so that they would be able to exert pressure on the Ottomans as well as the Greeks. By this way, they would be able to have the maximum power and the diplomatic control regarding this and other related matters. If the island was given to the single power of either the Ottomans or the Greeks, this would minimize their political interests.

Disarmament process of the native Muslims on the island was commenced by the European admirals. The native Muslims were obliged to lay down their arms and the Benghazi Muslims were warned that if they hesitated to give up their arms, the European forces would open artillery fire on them. The Ottoman Cabinet discussed the issue pointing out that it would be unfair that the Muslims should be deprived of their arms while the Christian insurgents continued their attacks. If the arms of the Muslims had to be

[136] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 10 (1897), Enclosure 1,2 in No. 380.

[137] *ibid*.

confiscated, since these arms were under *mirî* ownership, it would be appropriate to submit them to the *mirî* storages. Moreover, regarding the disarmament of the Muslims, it was also decided to send a circular telegram to the Ottoman ambassadors in Europe and to inform the European representatives at İstanbul through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stating that there was no legitimate reason to confiscate the arms held by the Muslims who were deprived of their belongings and properties due to the continuing revolt. According to the deputies, the Muslims inhabitants of Crete needed these arms for self defense against the Christian insurgents, and if such a measure was taken, it would naturally lead to a situation where one group would dictate to the other side any whim it deemed necessary. This would also violate the international law and justice.[138]

In spite of the blockade and the occupation of the major coastal towns by the European forces,[139] the Christian insurgents, in union with Greek soldiers and volunteers from Greece, had ensued to attack the Muslims in different parts of the island. The Muslim refugees at Chania, Candia, Rethymnon, Sitia, and Ierapetra were constantly attacked by the insurgents. These Muslims were seriously threatened by the danger of starvation and lived in a very desperate condition. Moreover, the insurgents not only attacked the civil Muslim population, but also persisted in attacking the Ottoman military positions and outposts.

Accordingly, during April 1897, an attack was committed by the insurgents upon İzzeddin Fort, at the entrance of the Suda Bay. Although fire was opened by four small ships of different nationalities to stop the insurgents, they resumed their attack on the following day. Yet, the British ship was directed to open fire on their position. After

---

[138] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Res., Dosya: 86, Gömlek: 7, Aded: 2, 1314 11 3; T.C. BOA, İradeler Tasnifi, İ.MTZ.GR., Dosya: 31, Gömlek: 1202, Aded: 2, 1314 Za 4.

[139] The British forces occupied Candia, the French troops occupied Chania and Sitia, and the Russians occupied Rethymnon.

shelling the insurgents' position, the British forces forced to them to retreat, hence the Ottomans took up the outpost.[140] Later on, the insurgents had attacked the Subaşı Fort, where the international and the Ottoman forces jointly returned the attack by putting a few shells on the insurgents that made them to retreat from the fort. It was reported that during the fighting at Subaşı Fort, more than 300 insurgents were killed.[141] Mehmed Şakir Bey reported in his ciphered telegram that the Christians of Apokoron and Krator had submitted to the admirals two notebooks including thousands of signatures stating that they would not accept anything else than annexation; that it was certain the Christians would insist on this idea. It was also mentioned that the total Christian population was uncomfortable with the continuation of the current situation. There were disputes among them due to deprivation, poverty and scarcity.[142]

It is understood from these attacks that the blockade of the island was not efficient enough. Regarding the inefficiency of the blockade, it is noteworthy to mention what the British Admiral Harris had reported to his government: "… the nature of the coast-line and the proximity of Cerigo and Cerigotto islands, always give small vessels and *caique*s, laden with flour or arms, a fair chance of successfully making a run at night, and landing their cargo without being observed by the cruisers."[143] Given the circumstances, the European admirals and the consuls had argued that unless the Greek troops were withdrawn from the island, the insurgents would continue to fight for union with Greece.

---

[140] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 10 (1897), No. 360, 361, 362, and 394; British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 9 (1897), *Reports on the Situation in Crete*, (London: 1897), No. 6; "Greece to be Blockaded," *The New York Times*, Vol. XLVI, No. 14233, 1 April 1897, Thursday, p. 1.

[141] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 9 (1897), No. 7; "Girid Vakayi'i, Husûsî Telgrafnâmelerimiz," *Sabâh*, No. 2639, 29 Şevval 1314, 21 Mart 1313, 2 April 1897, Friday, p. 1.

[142] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.MYD., Dosya: 18, Gömlek: 34, Aded: 1, 1314 L 29.

[143] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 9 (1897), No. 6. During the interview held between Salisbury and Hanotaux it was stated that although there was a full-fledged alliance between the states, tranquility in Crete could not be restored. Even the blockade of the island did not lead to the positive results as envisaged. "Lord Salisbury ile Mösyö Hanoto'un Mülâkatı," *Sabâh*, No. 2638, 28 Şevval 1314, 20 Mart 1313, 1 April 1897, Thursday, p. 2.

In other words, presence of the Greek troops in this sense can be considered the main barrier to the reestablishment of tranquility on the island.[144]

Muslim Immigration and Military Cordon

As the interior parts of the island were occupied by the Christian insurgents, the Muslims in those regions were forced to leave all their houses and properties and had to emigrate to the coastal towns. The majority of these Muslims emigrated to Candia where 25 square miles of military cordon was established by the British forces in order to "prevent" the bloodshed between the Muslims and the Christians. It was estimated that 49,500 Muslim civilians were assembled in Candia and within the cordon area.[145] A majority of these people was peasants and had no purchasing power or work at all. They were without shelter and received only 200 grammes of flour per capita per diem from the Muslim charity. They had only some live-stock which caused skirmishes for grazing between the Muslims and the Christians.[146]

In fact, the establishment of the military cordon and reorganization of the city along communal lines aggravated the tension. In other words, this military cordon demarcated the Christians and Muslims and underlined their differences. By drawing a military line between the two communities, the European forces underlined the exclusion within the Cretan society. With regard to the military cordon, neither the Muslims nor the Christians were satisfied with it. They always blamed each other for surpassing the cordon line. For

---

[144] PRO: FO, 195/1983, No. 159, Biliotti to Salisbury, 5/6 April 1897, pp. 343-344; British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 10 (1897), No. 388.

[145] Out of 49,500 Muslim civilians, 29,000 refugees came from Candia province, 2,900 refugees from Sitia, Spinalonga, Ierapetra, and Mirabello.
PRO: FO, 78/4890, No. 1, Chermside to Salisbury, 17 April 1897, pp. 11-12; British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 9 (1897), No. 8.

[146] PRO: FO, 78/4890, No. 14, Chermside to Salisbury, 13 April 1897, p. 20; British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 10 (1897), No. 406; "Girid," *İkdâm*, No. 1185, 7 Cemâziyyelahir 1315, 22 Teşrînievvel 1313, 3 October 1897, Wednesday, p. 2.

that reason, both sides appealed to the European authorities for extending the cordon area. On the one hand, the Sublime Porte requested that the cordon area should be extended to protect all the Muslims and procure more grazing ground for their live-stock.[147] The Defence Committee at Archanes, in Candia, and the Christian chiefs of Archanes and Monofatsi, on the other hand, had appealed to the European admirals concerning their discontent with the military cordon. They complained of the Muslim violation of military cordon and blamed the European commanders of troops in Candia for not preventing the Muslims' attacks. The Christian chiefs stated the following concerning their discontent with the European protection and the Muslims' attacks: "… under your high protection, the worst shameful things are committed against us by the Mahommedans … if … you are not strong enough to stop the Mussulmans in that case, let us free who have the power … we will attack the Mussulmans and shut them up within the fortress of Candia…"[148] Apart from these difficulties, the water conduit of Candia was intermittently interrupted by the insurgents that led to a water shortage.[149]

Due to the disparate conditions of the Muslim refugees, a rumor was spread that these people endeavored to leave Crete for other provinces of the Ottoman Empire. Yet, the leading figures of the Muslim inhabitants of Candia and Lasithi provinces applied to the *mutasarrıf* of Candia and stated that none of the Muslims had the intention to migrate. They totally rejected this rumor, since the Muslims on the island obtained partial and

---

[147] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 10 (1897), No. 410, and 414.

[148] PRO: FO, 195/1983, No. 258, The Defence Commission in Archanes to Chermside, 10 May 1897, pp. 412-413; PRO: FO, 78/4890, No. 258, The Defence Commission in Archanes to Chermside,10 May 1897, pp. 61-62; British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 3 (1898), Enclosure 1 in No. 24.

[149] On the other hand, various views were expressed by the Christian chiefs arguing that the water supply was interrupted by the Muslims for the purpose of creating hostilities between the Christians and the European garrison.
PRO: FO, 78/4890, No. 5, Chermside to Salisbury, 8 May 1897, p. 42.

continual charity from the Sublime Porte and the Muslims residing in different regions of the Ottoman Empire.[150]

As regards the Muslim immigration, during the meeting held between the Acting Governor of Crete, and the Russian, British and Italian consuls in Chania, the European consuls said that if the problem continued for more than two months, it would be difficult to cope with the basic daily activities of the Muslims who piled up in the cities. Moreover, the representatives of Europe argued that as 20,000 Christians, who migrated from big cities to Greece at the beginning of the revolt, were invited to return to their houses, it would be necessary to reinstate the Christians into their houses by evacuating the Muslim refugees. In that case, it would be very difficult to find new residences for the Muslim refugees. For that reason, the Muslim refugees should leave for Dardanelles and Smyrna on a temporary basis. On the contrary, the Acting Governor of Crete stated that the daily needs of the Muslims were provided for and that there was no reason to leave the island. He pointed out that in order to cope with the problem of accommodation, some of the coming Christians would be accommodated in the damaged Muslim houses in the villages and towns which were outside the military cordon. If it was not enough, these Christian families could also be accommodated in the Christian houses in the villages.[151]

It appears that the migration of the Muslim refugees to the other parts of the Ottoman Empire was seen as the ultimate solution for the unsatisfactory conditions by the representatives of the European Powers. In that sense, it should be important to remember that this compulsory migration of the Muslim inhabitants would be followed by the establishment of Christian political and administrative organization, likewise in Bulgaria,

---

[150] "Girid Ahâlî-i İslâmiyesi ve Bazı Garazkârânın Tasnîâtı," *Sabâh*, No. 2678, 9 Zilhicce 1314, 30 Nisan 1313, 12 May 1897, Wednesday, pp. 1-2.

[151] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.UM., Dosya: 37, Gömlek: 129, Aded: 1, 1314 Za 12.

Dobruja, Serbia, Thessaly, Bosnia and the Caucasus.[152] The reason for this is not difficult to understand. Given the circumstances, the intention of compulsory migration of the Muslim inhabitants of Crete can be seen in a strikingly similar manner to the other efforts that led to the exodus of the Muslims living in the Balkan Peninsula.

The attempts of the European consuls and admirals to get into contact with the Christian chiefs for the purpose of supplying certain food and medical assistance[153] and of advising them to accept the offer of autonomy had continued. Accordingly, the British Vice-Consul Calocherino, captain of British ship of Trafalgar was charged by Colonel Chermside to hand his two letters to the insurgent chiefs in the environs of Candia. In the first letter addressed to captain Antonis Trifitso of Kastelli Pediada province and to Georgi Capetanaki of Arkhanes, Colonel Chermside had advised the Christian chiefs that the insurgents should not provoke or continue fighting. He had also explained how the autonomous administration would be to the advantage of the Christians as the Ottoman Sultan could not interfere in its internal state of things anymore. Most importantly, Europe was in favor of the Cretans. It was further added that "… Europe has decided that Crete is to be no longer governed by the Turks, but to be autonomous and governed by its own people; any aggressive acts by Cretan Christians therefore only prejudice their case before Europe…"[154] In this manner, the Christians, as well as the Muslims, did not believe that order and tranquility would be reestablished by the autonomous government. For the

[152] PRO: FO, 78/4890, No. 1, Chermside to Salisbury, 17 April 1897, pp. 11-12; British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 9 (1897), No. 8.

[153] After the blockade of the Cretan coasts, it became difficult for the Christian insurgents to get food and medicines.

[154] PRO: FO, 78/4890, Chermside to Salisbury, 15 April 1897, p. 28; British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 9 (1897), Enclosure 2 in No. 9.

Christians, therefore, the primary aim and the only "solution" of the "Cretan Question" was annexation to Greece.[155]

The other letter was addressed to the Christian insurgent leaders of Malavisi province to mention that Colonel Chermside was ready to send medical assistance to them if they demanded. Yet, Christian insurgent chiefs replied that "… our province has no need of any medicine, but, even if they had, they would not accept it from a government which, by blockading us, obliges us to die by famine…"[156]

In addition to the other affairs concerning the Cretan issue, discussions proceeded among the foreign states relating to the election of the governor and the form of future government for the island. After having been informed that such discussions took place amongst the European Powers, the Sublime Porte decided to send a circular to its ambassadors in Europe to be delivered to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the respective governments. In this circular dispatch, it was stated that whatever the form of the autonomous administration on the island was, it should abide by the sovereign rights of the Sultan (*hukûk-ı hükümrânî*), and the integrity of the Ottoman Empire (*tamâmiyet-i mülkiyye*). Another important point was it was necessary that an Ottoman subject of the Orthodox faith should be chosen as the Governor-General. The European states should well take this point into consideration in their negotiations. The circular then went on reminding the consequences of the autonomy given to the Eastern Rumelia province, for the Ottoman state, an autonomous government in Crete established in accordance with examples other than the ones applied in Lebanon and Samos would damage its rights and independence. Therefore, accepting such a thing would have drawbacks. It was concluded that since the Greek government had attacked Crete and stationed its forces on the

[155] PRO: FO, 195/1983, No. 17, Calocherino to Salisbury, 16 April 1897, p. 378.

[156] PRO: FO, 78/4890, Christian Insurgents to Chermside, 5 April 1897, p. 39; British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 9 (1897), Enclosure in No. 11.

Ottoman-Greek frontier, the Ottoman Empire had mobilized its army by spending so much money. Under these conditions, the idea of assigning a Greek governor to Crete would damage the independence and territorial integrity very much. This had to be stated in the diplomatic protest note delivered to the European Powers.[157]

On the Eve of War

By that time, the Greek troops had been continuing their provocations and attacks across the Ottoman-Greek frontier which led to tension between the Greeks and Ottomans. Interestingly, the Greek government legitimized these attacks as attacks committed by the irregulars. Throwing all the responsibilities on the irregulars, the Greek government tried to entrap the Ottoman government and then to present itself as the injured party.[158] The attack of the Greek troops, as irregulars, on the Ottoman station in the village of Kranya can be considered the vivid account of the Greek plan.[159] As the situation in Ottoman Crete and Ottoman-Greek frontier was not favorable, the European admirals in Crete thought that the Gulf of Athens should be blockaded to restrain the Greek ships from aggressive action.

---

[157] T.C. BOA, İradeler Tasnifi, İ.MTZ.GR., Dosya: 31, Gömlek: 1203, Aded: 3, 1314 Za 6; T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Res., Dosya: 86, Gömlek: 8, Aded: 4, 1314 11 3.

The Sublime Porte granted autonomy to Samos by decreeing a concession decree in 1832. For the details of the autonomous government of Samos, see: Ali Fuat Örenç. "Yakındönem Tarihimizde Sisam Adası (1821-1923)," İstanbul University, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, (İstanbul: Unpublished M.A Thesis, İstanbul University, 1995), especially, pp. 54-74. The autonomous regime was established in Lebanon in 1861 and in Eastern Rumelia in 1879. For more information, see: Engin Deniz Akarlı. *The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon, 1861-1920*, (London, New York: Centre for Lebanese Studies and I. B. Tauris and Co Ltd., 1993); and Mahir Aydın. *Şarkî Rumeli Vilâyeti*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1992).

[158] "King George's Plans Work Badly," *The New York Times*, Vol. XLVI, No. 14247, 18 April 1897, Sunday, p. 1.

[159] Mehmet Oytun Yılmaz. "*The 1897 Greko-Ottoman War*," (İstanbul: Unpublished M.A Thesis, Boğaziçi University, 2003), p. 77.

Accordingly, they proposed a plan to their governments regarding the details of the blockade.[160]

Before taking active military measures, the Ottoman Cabinet had decided to use diplomatic channels once more and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs prepared a circular telegram to the representatives of the Ottoman Empire in Europe to have the European governments understand that the Greek government did not only station troops on the island, but continued sending troops to the Ottoman-Greek frontier. Therefore, the Ottoman Empire was forced to dispatch troops to the border to defend its rights, and if this situation continued for longer, it would be inappropriate to keep the Ottoman troops under arm for a long time. If the Greek troops continued their invasion of the island and kept sending troops to the frontier, the responsibility of such an action would totally be on the shoulders of the Greek government. Besides, it was added that the Ottoman Empire did not have any intention other than preserving order and its own rights. The foreign states should not doubt this and should take these points into consideration. If the Greek side did not end this atrocity in a few days, the Ottoman Empire would take the necessary precautions.[161]

Owing to the approaching day of the anniversary of Greek independence, which was on 6 April 1897, it was feared that the Greek excitement might reach its peak and lead to fresh conflicts on the Ottoman-Greek frontier.[162] For that reason, the Russian government made a proposal to be declared both in İstanbul and Athens stating that "…the

---

[160] For the full text of admirals' proposal see: British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 11 (1897), Enclosure 3 in No. 412; or T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.MYD., Dosya: 18, Gömlek: 64, Aded: 1, 1314 Za 6.

[161] T.C. BOA, İradeler Tasnifi, İ.MTZ.GR., Dosya: 31, Gömlek: 1204, Aded: , 1314 Za 4; Ayşe Nükhet Adıyeke. *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Girit Bunalımı (1896-1908)*, p. 186.

[162] It was reported that the Greeks were in great enthusiasm when they celebrated the anniversary of Greek independence. While the King attended at the religious ceremonies in the Cathedral, he received a great applause from the public who showered papers written "hurrah for war." At the same day, a mass meeting was held to protest the actions of the European Powers and to present a copy of the resolutions to the King crying "Long live war."
"Ovation to the King," *The New York Times*, Vol. XLVI, No. 14238, 7 April 1897, Wednesday, p. 1.

aggressor will be held responsible for all consequences of the disturbance of the general peace… Moreover whatever the issue of the struggle may be, [the Great Powers] would in no case allow the aggressor to drive the least benefit from it."[163] After the assent of the other European Powers, their representatives in İstanbul and Athens were charged to make a joint declaration to the Ottoman and Greek governments.[164]

On 8 April 1897, the Sublime Porte sent a reply to the collective declaration of the European representatives stating that the peaceful intentions of the European governments were shared by the Ottoman government, but the Greeks were the first to station its armed forces on the Ottoman-Greek frontier that obliged the Ottoman army to send its forces. It was further noted that "… as soon as the Greek troops evacuate Crete and the Greek army on the frontier is disbanded, the reasons which caused the mobilization of the Imperial army will have disappeared."[165]

As regards the impending war, the Sublime Porte refrained from being the aggressor state since it thought that the responsibility for the war would be shifted onto its shoulders. Certainly, the reasons for this hesitation stemmed from the following points: First, the European governments had repetitively warned the Ottoman Empire that until the Greek government began an attack on the frontier it would be inappropriate for the Ottoman Empire to declare war on Greece. And even the French Minister of Foreign Affairs said that first the Greek side had to attack in order for the Ottoman side to have legitimacy to respond. Secondly, the Greek Prime Minister Deliyiannis stated that those attacking the frontier were irregulars and that the Greek government did not approve of their actions and tried to do its best to prevent such actions. Here, it seems clear that Deliyiannis tried to shift the responsibility of the war from their own shoulders onto the

[163] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 10 (1897), No. 414.

[164] "The Powers Want Peace," *The New York Times*, Vol. XLVI, No. 14238, 7 April 1897, Wednesday, p. 1.

[165] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 10 (1897), Enclosure in No. 431.

Ottomans. Moreover, from the very beginning of the Greek issue, he continually acted with such a policy to gain the trust and sympathy of the European governments. Third, the Ottoman side was in the opinion that the Greek side could not engage in such a big plot without being aided and encouraged by a Great Power. In the near future, this problem would get out of control and would well threaten the integrity of the Ottoman Empire by resorting to such measures like calling for an international conference on the Cretan issue. Fourth, the future attitude of the Balkan governments could not be predicted by the Ottomans. For that reason, it was thought that the Ottoman Empire should act with patience, caution and reason regarding the declaration of war. It was to the best interests of the Ottoman Empire to wait till the last minute.[166] However, it was decided that the following should also be attached to the diplomatic note to be delivered to the foreign states: the Ottoman state, in accordance with the peaceful advice of the European states, had not departed from the right attitude till that time, and it did not have any extra demand except protecting its independence and territorial integrity. It was added that it was not an irregular government like the Greek government, and was a responsible and great state that acted in line with its laws and the international law. In order to prove this to the world, the Ottoman government would wait for the Greek government to withdraw its forces from Ottoman Crete and Ottoman-Greek frontier. Furthermore, it was stated that if this is not done, the Ottoman state, based on its legitimate right, would be forced to engage in military action in order to protect its rights, but if the Greek government obeyed this warning and gave up their hostile attitudes, then the Ottoman state would negotiate the terms and conditions of the autonomous government in Crete with the European Powers.[167]

[166] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.BŞK., Dosya: 51, Gömlek: 33, Aded: 5, 1314 Za 11.

[167] *ibid*.

Moreover, Sultan Abdülhamid II was well aware of the fact that even if the Ottoman forces gained territory in Macedonia, the Sublime Porte would not be allowed to keep it and would be forced to restore its rule over to the territory owned by Greece. All these factors played outstanding roles in the unwillingness of the Ottoman Sultan to declare war against Greece.[168] It was also argued that the economic conditions of the Sublime Porte were not favorable for the war. Heavy political blows during the Armenian crisis had a negative impact on the economic situation so that the financial credibility of the Ottoman state was very much damaged. The well known personal hatred of Sultan Abdülhamid II against wars may also be seen as a reason for this unwillingness.[169]

On the other hand, from the other point of view, it was seriously argued that while the Greek state increased its provocations and attacks on the frontier, the expectation was that the Ottoman Empire would have developed counter-measures to deter the attack and to reciprocate it. And even having the provocateurs silenced, there were still hesitations on readying the army for the war. This in turn created a negative impression on the Muslim population and the army in Elassona and Yanya. If these attacks were not prevented, then the final result of such an action should be thought over carefully. Besides that, the Greek side was engaged in all sorts of atrocities in provoking the Serbians and the Montenegrins to attack the frontier. Hence, the Greek side tried to replicate what it had done in Crete and Rumelia. It was added that the European Powers, on the other hand, were reluctant to respond to the actions of the Greek government and even assumed a somewhat affiliate position to the Greek attitudes. Therefore, the "solution" of the Cretan issue and prevention of a joint attack by the Balkan states was only possible by a military measure on the part of the Ottoman Empire. Furthermore, it was argued that the Ottoman Empire had always dealt

---

[168] "What the Sultan Wants," *The New York Times*, Vol. XLVI, No. 14247, 18 April 1897, Sunday, p. 21.

[169] Mehmet Oytun Yılmaz. "The 1897 Greko-Ottoman War," p. 74.

with the Greek side's improper and nationalistic attitudes (*hissiyât-ı milliyesi*) even long after its independence which led the Ottoman Empire to deal with various incidences from time to time. The Greek side now aimed to purge the Ottoman Empire from Europe and even wanted to destabilize the Ottoman Empire in Anatolia.[170]

On 17 April 1897, it was reported that the Ottoman positions situated on the east of Elassona were attacked by the Greek regular troops. On the following day, it was also reported that fourteen Ottoman posts had been taken and Menexe was attacked by the Greek regulars. Upon these events, the Ottoman government sent orders to retain the position taken at all sorts of sacrifices.[171] On 18 April 1897, the following official communiqué appeared in Ottoman newspapers regarding the declaration of war: the Greek side began the war by attacking the Ottoman Greek frontier with its regular army on the night of 1 April 1897. Upon this, in order to protect its rights and integrity, on the basis of reprisal, the Ottoman Empire was forced to engage in war.[172]

Within a few days, the Ottoman forces occupied all the mountain passes and pushed the Greeks forces back from the Meluna Pass. Then, Larissa was abandoned and the Greek army was forced to retreat to Pharsalos. This demoralized the Greek forces and led to dissolution in the Greek army.[173] As the Greek forces were completely defeated, the European governments had attempted to take initiatives to prevent total Greek defeat. The Greek defeat in the Ottoman-Greek War exposed the impotence of Greek military forces and demonstrated the fact that the Greeks could not organize their troops. This put the Greek treasury into a very difficult position.[174] In that sense, it is important to note that

---

[170] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.ŞD., Dosya: 2, Gömlek: 34, Aded: 1, 1314 Za 14.

[171] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 11 (1897), No. 434, and 439.

[172] "İlân-ı Harb," *Sabâh*, No. 2655, 16 Zilkade 1314, 6 Nisan 1313, 18 April 1897, Sunday, p. 1.

[173] William L. Langer. *The Diplomacy of Imperialism (1890-1902)*, pp. 371-372.

[174] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.EŞA., Dosya: 27, Gömlek: 2, Aded: 4, 1314 Z 8.

some Greek newspapers harshly criticized the King for being the real cause of the Greek defeat. On the other hand, the Crown Prince, who was the commander-in-chief of the Greek army during the war, threw all the blame on the shoulders of the Greek Cabinet and various ministries. He believed that those ministries had not given due importance to the reorganization and modernization of the Greek army. According to him, the corrupt system of Greek government was the sole reason for disaster.[175]

On 17 May 1897, the Greek forces were defeated at Domokos which marked the last point in the one-month Ottoman-Greek War of 1897. Immediately after this defeat, at the request of his aunt Olga of Greece, the Russian Tsar sent an urgent message to Sultan Abdülhamid II to end the war. Accordingly, the armistice was signed in Lamia.[176] The peace negotiations between the Ottoman and European representatives in İstanbul commenced on 3 June 1897 at *Tophane Kasr-ı Hümâyûnları*. Among other things, the Ottoman Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tevfik Paşa, insisted on the annexation of Thessaly by the Ottoman Empire, arguing that the annexation of Thessaly by Greece on the basis of the Treaty of Berlin did not alter the Greeks' ill-treatments in Rumelia. However, instead of heeding what was gained from the Berlin Treaty, Greece had gone back on its promise and never stopped the insurgent activities. The European representatives considered that no territory that had been under Christian rule could ever be placed again under the Ottoman rule. Tevfik Paşa, on the other hand, stated that Thessaly was not inhabited by only Christians, but also by Muslims, Jews and others. Even if it were inhabited only by Christians, he continued, it would be natural for a country whose population consisted of mostly the subjects of one certain religion to be ruled by someone belonging to another

[175] USNA, T159/12, No. 34, Rockhill to Sherman 27 January 1898.

[176] *ibid*., p. 119; "Queen Olga to the Tzar," *The New York Times*, Vol. XLVI, No. 14266, 10 May 1897, Monday, p. 7.

religion. According to Tevfik Paşa, the ill-treatments of the Greeks became so apparent by this matter that they should be taught a good lesson.[177]

Ethnike Hetairia's Apology

After the Ottoman-Greek War, the *Ethnike Hetairia* published a pamphlet in order to explain its activities prior to the war and to prove that it was not responsible for the disaster of Greece. In this pamphlet, three arguments were stressed: First, after the Greek War of Independence, few Greeks had been envisaged, and most of the Greeks were enslaved. Second, there was an urgent need for the reorganization of the Greek forces (throughout the text many references were made to this point). Third, enslaved Greeks should be organized by the *Ethnike Hetairia* through infiltration into the Ottoman Empire. This pamphlet disclaimed any connection between the *Ethnike Hetairia* and the Cretan revolt of 1896. It was admitted that in the summer of 1896, the *Ethnike Hetairia* organized a charity for the purpose of collecting money for the Cretans, and beside munitions of war, clothes, food and money were sent to the island. 58,868 *drahmis* was also sent to Crete to help the insurgents and assist orphans and sick people.[178] It was further stated that great efforts were made so as to collect information and organize the enslaved brothers without provoking the Cretans. At this point, the following example was given to demonstrate that the committee had not provoked the Cretan revolts of 1897: a Christian deputy from Crete applied to the *Ethnike Hetairia* for munitions and volunteers, but his request was rejected since the committee was aware that the August Arrangements of 1896 would not succeed on the island. For that reason, they preferred to wait until the failure of the arrangements

[177] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.ZB., Dosya: 19, Gömlek: 8, Aded: 10, 1315 M 17.

[178] Έκθεσις των Πεπραγμένων υπό της Εθνικής Εταιρίας, pp. 10, 12 in: USNA, T159/12, No. 29, Rockhill to Sherman 4 January 1898.

and then the situation would have been ripe for military action.[179] It was also pointed out that the *Ethnike Hetairia* did not influence either the Greek government or the Greek King in sending military forces and war ships to Crete. Rather, it informed the Greek government that if drastic steps were to be taken, the committee would support Deliyiannis' government.[180]

It was further demonstrated that the committee was not responsible for the Ottoman-Greek War. The irregular bands were sent to the Ottoman-Greek frontier by permission of Deliyiannis and munitions belonging to the Greek government were given to the irregulars by his order, since the King and Deliyiannis considered that the war was the only way to save the country from a revolution. It seems clear that this pamphlet tried to illustrate the co-operation between the Greek government and the *Ethnike Hetairia*. In other words, the committee wanted to share the responsibility of the disaster with the Greek authorities and to express its apology.[181]

Post-war Conditions in Crete

Returning to our discussions of conditions in Crete, towards the end of May 1897, the European admirals in Crete had intended to give facilities for trading to the insurgents through the protected coastal towns. For this purpose, the European admirals paid a visit to the Muslim governor of Candia, who opposed this intention: "… with a destitute Muslim population he could not guarantee safe passage of supplies destined for the Christian insurgents without stronger escorts than he could provide…"[182] This proposal was also

[179] *ibid*., p. 21.

[180] *ibid*., pp. 29-30.

[181] USNA, T159/12, No. 29, Rockhill to Sherman 4 January 1898.

[182] PRO: FO, 78/4890, No. 7, Chermside to Salisbury, 11 May 1897, p. 53.

strongly opposed by the Muslim inhabitants and accordingly a representative of the principal Muslims called Colonel Chermside and said the following:

> … The Moslems of Kandia province are industrious and law abiding, they have obeyed the Local Government, it is the Christians not they who are in revolt. They have lost houses, crops, seed, animals, and at present even their lands and olive groves, they are temporarily ruined. How can they, cooped up here as hungry paupers, tolerate the proposed concessions to the armed Christians in insurrection, with no equivalent to themselves, they to remain prisoners here, while the Christians in possession of all the Moslem property as well as their own, are to be free to come and go to buy and sell? -the first thing the latter will do be to sell the crops of the Moslems. -If both sides agree to lay aside their arms and the Moslems can revisit their properties in safety that is a different matter…[183]

On the same day, the European admirals accompanying Colonel Chermside held a meeting with the Christian insurgents. As regards the proposal, the Christian insurgents were also opposed to trading through the protected towns, but would accept trade facilities on the coast for purchasing provisions and clothing. In the course of the meeting, it was seen that the Christian insurgents were unanimously in favor of getting rid of the Muslims by annihilation or expulsion.[184]

The immediate withdrawal of the Greek troops from Crete, which had begun on 9 May 1897, had been carried out until 26 May 1897, when the last part of the Greek troops was withdrawn. It was pointed out that the withdrawal of the Greek troops from Crete and the defeat of the Greek forces in Thessaly paved the way for the new developments that would mark the crucial point in the "Cretan Question." It was argued that the defeat of the Greek troops in Thessaly had an impact on the attitudes of some of the Christian chiefs who did not anymore "cry" for "annexation or death;" rather they tended or pretended to accept autonomy.[185] On the other hand, according to the British consul, the Ottoman success in the Ottoman-Greek War accelerated "the patriotism of the Cretan Muslims,"

---

[183] *ibid.,* p. 54.

[184] *ibid.,* p. 55.

[185] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 3 (1898), Enclosure in No. 7, Enclosure in No. 28.

which was blended with "religious feeling."[186] Sharing the same opinion with Consul Biliotti, British Colonel Chermside argued that the Ottoman victory in Thessaly led to "a considerable effervescence of the Muslim population."[187] The British consul and Colonel Chermside had simply depicted the events that took place on the island from the perspective of an age-old "Islamic fanaticism" and the fanatic religious passions of Muslims against Christianity. Consul Biliotti and Colonel Chermside insisted that the Cretan Muslims desired to kill the Christians and to destroy Christianity on the island of Crete, and vice-a-versa.

Within this framework, Colonel Chermside reported the following commitments that broke out on the island at the end of May 1897 and at the beginning of June 1897:

> During the night of the 28th-29th May, a party of Muslim peasants, said to have numbered forty or fifty, advanced beyond the line of Turkish outpost near Elia, as can at any time be done by small bodies, and penetrated into the country in the hands of the insurgents as far as the village of Ghalifa. The outposts were surprised asleep and killed, and the village attacked –one women and two old men, of whom one was a priest, were killed- one or two more women and a child are reported to have died from wounds received … For forty-eight hours (1st-3rd June), there was some apprehension among the few Christians and European civilians. A Jewish trader, Mr. Sarda, an old man, was knocked down and hustled; one Christian was struck on the head, and several Christians were menaced and hustled.[188]

Furthermore, British Rear-Admiral Harris described the situation in Candia:

> A number of armed Bashi-Bozouks succeeded in carrying out a raid, which had been secretly planned to the authorities … 9 Christian were killed … and about 30 cattle and 100 sheep captured. This raid was probably organized in retaliation for the successful cattle-lifting by insurgents on the 8th May, when eight Moslem shepherds were killed. Two old Muslim shepherds have also been killed by the Christians; one of them was decapitated.[189]

---

[186] *ibid*., No. 22.

[187] *ibid*., No. 49.

[188] *ibid*., No. 49.

[189] *ibid*., Enclosure in No. 63.

The correspondence between M. Hadjidaki, who was a former active partisan of "union with Greece,"[190] and a Christian Deputy for Candia in the Cretan Assembly and the president of the Syllogos, and Hazzi Constantine Ionniadis, who was a Christian notable and one of the insurgents, was an outstanding proof in order to illustrate the definite shift of the Christian insurgents' attitudes after the defeat of the Greeks. In his letter, M. Hadjidaki was suggesting the Christians to be more moderate and wise saying that:

> … the Greek army cannot oppose any serious and continued resistance against the invasion and the progress of the Turkish army in a few days will arrive before Athens… After such a situation, the Cretans should certainly be cautious and reserved, and not provoking… It is the duty and the right of the people who fight in Crete to direct themselves the new negotiations … up to the present with bravery they have fought for union, in the same manner they will, with prudence, bring to an end the more difficult work of the negotiations with Europe. Until peace, or at least armistice, be concluded, you must be reserved, saying to the Consuls and Admirals, with due respect, that reasons of honour oblige you not to abandon the common struggle with Greece till armistice… The most important … is that the Turkish troops should leave Crete, and you must insist on this point, and in order to obtain this you should be yielding to all the others…[191]

The dramatic shift in the attitudes of the Christian chiefs towards the autonomous administration of the island prepared the ground for discussing the details of the Cretan autonomy. With the change in language and tone of the Christian chiefs concerning autonomy, both the European Powers and Christian chiefs commenced to deal with the organization of civil government on the island. The European Powers thought of applying the main features of autonomy, which were the appointment of a European governor, the withdrawal of the Ottoman forces, and the emancipation of Crete from the Sublime Porte under the protection of Europe. Moreover, the European admirals suggested Christian chiefs take steps in line with the Europeans' plan for the settlement of autonomy.[192]

---

[190] *ibid*., No. 49.

[191] PRO: FO, 195/1983, No.19, Biliotti to Salisbury, 10 May 1897, pp. 415-417; FO 78/4890, No. 8, Hadjidaki to Ionniadis, 29 April 1897, pp. 70-71; British Accounts and Papers,Turkey No. 3 (1898), Enclosure 5 in No. 24.

[192] PRO: FO, 195/1983, No. 200, Biliotti to Salisbury, 6 June 1897, p. 402; British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 3 (1898), No. 22, and 23.

Accordingly, the first attempt came from Hadji Mihali Jannaris who issued two proclamations to the Cretans. In the first one, he had underlined the fact that the commons should be invited to elect the delegates for the formation of the General Assembly and that a communal guard should be formed in order to preserve order. In the second proclamation, he put special emphasis on respect for life, honor, and property of the Cretans, irrespective of religion or nationality stating "… our struggle is directed not against our Mussulman countrymen, but against the Turkish misrule of our island … all of us Cretans, without distinction of creed…"[193] It seems clear that Hadji Mihali Jannaris used a very populist language referring to himself as the representative and protector of life, honor and property of all Cretans, not only the Cretan Christians. In other words, it was a very populist narration that claimed to speak for all Cretans.

After a while, another scheme of government for Crete was submitted by Sphakianakia, who was a native Cretan, who was living in Athens at that time, aiming to constitute an autonomous principality under the suzerainty of the Ottoman Sultan.[194] The policy shifts of insurgents that came with the defeat of Greece had various dimensions. It appears that the insurgents abandoned their aim for a while and accepted the establishment of a new autonomous government.

On the other hand, some Christian chiefs of the western districts were still in favor of union with Greece and extremely opposed to the acceptance of autonomy. Their purpose here was to prevent any step that would be taken for the establishment of the autonomous

[193] PRO: FO, 195/1983, 29 May 1897, pp. 435-436; British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 3 (1898), Enclosure in No. 32. It is important to note that this proposal was drawn up by Professor Jannaris.

[194] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 3 (1898), No. 53; Samuel Beach Chester. *Life of Venizelos*, p. 52.

government.[195] It was stated that the Greek intrigues in Crete, supported and financed by the *Ethnike Hetairia*, played an outstanding role in the attitudes of the followers of union.

On the issue of whether accepting or rejecting autonomy, it was decided by the Cretan delegates to hold a meeting. As the conflict between these groups in the Cretan Assembly got more serious, they were unable even to decide where the meeting would be held. While the delegates from eastern and central districts endeavored to hold the meeting in Arkadi Monastery, which was situated in the centre, the delegates from western districts insisted that the meeting should be held in Armenous, arguing that it was far from both European and Ottoman influences. In the end, the meeting was held on 10 July 1897 in Armenous, where Dr. Sphakianaki was appointed as president.[196]

It was argued that most of the delegates of the western districts were "tools" in the hands of *Ethnike Hetairia* which shaped the ideology of those delegates. The role played by the Greek intrigues in the Cretan affairs can be clearly seen in the British consul's lengthy and very confidential report written to London:

> Cretan committee of Athens is very active with cooperation of Greek government which provides supplies and money. M. Gennadius ex-Greek Consul General and subsequently Royal Commissioner in Crete holds an appointment and plays an important part. He corresponds directly with his former tools Benizelo, Foumi etc who are chiefs at Akrotori and have been sent in a ship of war along the coast to collect delegates for the coming general assembly. M. Gennadius urges the Cretans not to come to terms with Europeans by insisting that before entering into negotiations Cretans should demand withdrawal of the Turkish troops to the last soldier. I am told that Christians are given to understand by this measure that they will inherit the lands of Mussulmans who will not dare to return to their villages without the protection of Turkish troops. If Europe should yield to this pretension all settlement will be opposed by procrastination in a word Greece is at present following with more activity than ever her traditional policy of not permitting the Cretans to be satisfied with any form of government autonomy or other…[197]

---

[195] Samuel Beach Chester. *Life of Venizelos*, p. 52; for the full text of this protest see PRO: FO, 195/1983, No. 258, The Defence Commission in Archanes to Chermside, 10 May 1897, pp. 412-413; PRO: FO, 78/4890, No. 258, The Defence Commission in Archanes to Chermside, 10 May 1897, pp. 61-62; British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 3 (1898), Enclosure 1 in No. 24.

[196] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 3 (1898), No. 74.

[197] PRO: FO, 195/1983, No. 211, Biliotti to Salisbury, 10/11 June 1897, pp. 433-434.

In the meantime, the European admirals paid attention to the gradual withdrawal of the Ottoman troops. In other words, they dictated the Sublime Porte what should be done for the future of the island. The purpose here was to minimize the Ottoman control over the island. Although the British admirals were active supporters of this view, they held different opinions on the most appropriate time when the Ottoman troops would be removed from the island. Colonel Chermside was in favor of the gradual withdrawal of the Ottoman troops on the condition that the Christian insurgents agreed to abandon their arms and aggressive attitudes and to disperse to their homes. Agreeing with Colonel Chermside on the same subject, Admiral Harris asserted that unless all the Cretans gave up their arms, it would not be safe to remove the Ottoman troops from the island. It appeared that for Admiral Harris, the timing of the withdrawal of the Ottoman troops was an important matter since as he argued, the present revolt was partly the outcome of the reduction of the Ottoman troops. If the Ottoman troops were withdrawn from the island, the state of things would be turned in the favor of the insurgents again.[198]

Resentments of the Cretans

The relationship between the European forces and the inhabitants of the island was not satisfactory. Since the beginning of the revolt, living conditions in Candia remained unchanged and the number of the Muslim refugees reached 52,000. The city was controlled by 1,500 British and one Italian battalion which were far from being enough to cure the sufferings and distress of the Muslims. The degree of complaints posed by the Christians can be seen in the following statements which were mentioned in the letter written by A. Korakas, who was the chief of the Eastern provinces, to Colonel Chermside: "… the position … of the Christians is insufferable, and their indignation against the

[198] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 3 (1898), Enclosure in No. 28.

British-Italian troops is beyond words…"[199] The Christian chiefs paid a visit to the Italian admiral to complain about the conditions and express their opinions regarding the necessity of reforms. Admiral Canevaro answered that the present unsatisfactory conditions would not come to an end until the peace negotiations between the Ottoman Empire and the European Powers had been finalized.[200]

There was also unsatisfactory feeling among the Muslims against the European forces on the island. In this sense, a petition written by the Muslim inhabitants of Candia to Sultan Abdülhamid II can be regarded as an outstanding proof of the discontent of the Muslims with the local Ottoman administers and the European representatives in Candia. In this petition, the Muslims begged Sultan Abdülhamid II that necessary steps should be taken to remedy this intolerable and unbearable situation. The following petition is worth repeating here as it offers a glimpse into the relations between the Cretan Muslims and local authorities:

> … Major Cemil Efendi and his assistants who were appointed to the command post with the advice of the deputy of the governor and the British consul Mr. Biliotti have drawn us into a totally hopeless situation by depressing us with various matters. Those applying to the government for complaints are looked down, treated badly and are driven away and are intimidated with the excuse of the Europeans. The French and Italian soldiers are beginning to rape our girls. They come to our homes, knock our doors and try to enter in by force. They loot whatever valuables and cash they find. While we walk on the street or while we are engaged in the daily business they loot some of us and hand-cuff them and take them hostage to unknown places in the night without any reason. The local government is oblivious to this unpleasant situation. Although we have applied to the government several times to put an end to this situation and to stop the attack each time we have received a negative answer and we were degraded and driven away. At the end when we found it appropriate to tell this situation with a petition and submitted it to the office of the Acting Governor İsmail Hakkı Bey got the petition in the presence of Şükrü Bey and said the following after reading the petition: "Such things are

[199] *ibid.,* Enclosure 1 in No. 97.

[200] *ibid.,* No. 80, 72, and 70; "Girid Havâdisi," *İkdâm*, No. 1080, 19 Safer 1315, 9 Temmuz 1313, 21 July 1897, Wednesday, p. 2.

> disgraceful, do not you know that the French and Italians can bring two ships and send you exile from the island," and then expelled us…[201]

In addition, the Cretan Christian refugees, who lived in Athens at that moment sent a telegram, signed by Denis, Bishop of Rethmyno; Dr. Sphakianaki Peridi, landowner; Anemogianaki, merchant; Capnisto, manufacturer, noted that unlike the other European occupational forces in Crete, the British troops could not control the deplorable things in Candia. They further argued that "Bashi-Bazouks openly pillage houses and shops, under the eyes of the British commandant, attacking villages, killing the inhabitants, devastating the country, the Christians being hardly able to repel the attacks owing to want of ammunition caused by the blockade…"[202]

According to Chermside, "the two sections of the population," Muslims and Christians, were "bitterly hostile" and "mutually aggressive." For that reason, he argued that the disarmament of the Muslims would not cure the ongoing hostilities and commitments between the Muslims and Christians.[203] The British consul also tried to create an atmosphere in which Muslims and Christians were very hostile with each other. Accordingly, he reported to Lord Salisbury that "[Christians'] losses at Canli Castelli

---

[201] "… Vali vekili saâdetlü İsmail Hakkı Bey ile İngiliz konsolosu Mösyö Biliotti'nin iltimâsıyla jandarma kumandanlığına ta'yîn kılınan Binbaşı rif'atlü Yusuf Cemil Efendi ve a'vaneleri bizim gibi biçareleri güna gün (*türlü*) gardlarla dâğdâr (*yakmak*) ve yeis-i külliye dûçâr etdiriyorlar. Tazallüm-i hâl (*şikâyet etmek*) için hükûmete mürâcaat edenler bed muamele ile tahkîr (*hor görmek*) olunarak tard ve Avrupalılar ile tahvîf (korkutmak) ediyorlar. Fransız ve İtalya askerleri kızlarımıza tecavüz etmeğe tasaddî ediyorlar. Mesken ittihâz etdiğimiz yerlere gelip kapılarımızı dak ile cebren içeriye girmek istiyorlar. Eşyâ-yı (?) bahanesiyle evlerimizin kapılarını kırarak içeriye giriyorlar. Buldukları nukud ile değerli eşyâyı ahz ve gasb ediyorlar. Hiçbir sebeb olmadığı halde sokakda yürürken veyahud tedârik-i maîşet (*hayat*) için bir işle meşgûl iken bazılarımız derdest edilerek ve ellerimize çelepçek geçirilerek zift karanlık deliklere tıkıyorlar. Ahvâl-i maruza-ı na-marziyyeye hükûmet-i mahalliye nazar-ı bi-kayd ile bakıyor. İş bu ahvâlin men-i vukû' ve sailenin istikmâli zımnında defaatle hükûmete mürâcaat eyledik ise de her vakit red ile cevab alarak tard ve tahkîr olunduk. Nihayet ahvâl-i maruzânın ba-arzuhal makam-ı vilayete arzını tensîb (*uygun görmek*) eyleyerek ol vechile arzuhali tanzîm ile takdim etdiğimiz sırada yaver-i hazret-i şehriyarileri Şükrü Bey kulları beraber olduğu halde vali vekili İsmail Hakkı Bey arzuhali eline alarak mütâlaa etdikden sonra "bunlar ayıpdır bilmiyor musunuz ki Fransızla İtalyanlar iki vapur getirib sizi cezireden külliyen teb'id edebilirler" diyerek kullarını tard eylemişdir…"
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.AZJ., Dosya: 34, Gömlek: 63, Aded: 1, 1315 M 25.

[202] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 3 (1898), No. 57.

[203] *ibid*., No. 60.

amounted to twelve killed and twelve wounded. Some of [them] were mutilated and some burnt with petroleum. There were also burnt four wheat floors and two oil factories. The heads of two Muslims had also been brought to town which had been cut off and mutilated by the Christians..."[204] It seems clear that the British representatives in Crete explained the nature of the revolt in terms of hostility between the Christians and Muslims. The tone of their reports to the British government indicated that they understood and described the events in ethno-religious terms. By situating the conflicts within the Cretan society in a primordial context, they argued that there was a great communal separation on the island, and for that reason, even the disarmament of the Muslims would not solve the problems.

The European admirals prohibited the carriage of arms in Candia. According to this regulation, the Muslim inhabitants such as shepherds, rural guards who had permission from the governor would be able to carry arms and were given a license. Besides, a list composed of the names of these licensed people would be given to the British admiralty. Yet, those people would only be able to carry arms outside the town when they performed their jobs.[205]

It was estimated that there were 17,000 armed Muslims in Candia; 5,000 in Rethymnon; and 7,500 in Cydonia. The number of armed Christians was estimated as follows: in Lasithi 18,000; in Candia 21,000; in Rethymnon 13,000; in Chania 17,500.[206] Towards the end of July 1897, Christians began to bring their products and sell them in the major towns of the island. However, the boycotting was made by the Muslims against the Christians' products brought to Chania. The Muslims argued that these products, gathered by the Christians, were actually taken from Muslims' gardens and vineyards. The

---

[204] *ibid*., No. 61.

[205] "Girid Ahvâl-i Hazırası," *İkdâm*, No. 1076, 15 Safer 1315, 5 Temmuz 1313, 16 July 1897, Saturday, p. 3.

[206] PRO: FO, 195/1983, No. 243, Biliotti to Salisbury, 30/31 October 1897, p. 560.

boycotting in Chania lasted three days, and on those days, the Muslims in Rethymnon and Candia also attempted at boycotting. Here, the important thing was that it was the first time that boycotting had been used on the island.[207]

Concerning the state of things on the island, the Sublime Porte had received various messages from different sources. The Acting Governor of Crete dispatched a telegram to the Sublime Porte, telling about his dissatisfaction with the conditions that were provided for the Muslims. He said that the security of the Muslims could not be guaranteed even within the cordon area. Under the pretext of protecting Muslims' properties, the Christians attacked the Muslim houses together with the European forces. As they had many complaints about the commander and his inappropriate deeds, it was required that he be removed from his office. It was also informed that the *Ethnike Hetairia* still sent some Cretan Christians to the island. These issues were discussed in the Ottoman Cabinet meeting, held on 12 July 1897, the deputies decided that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had to begin a new initiative to inform the Ottoman ambassadors to speed up the negotiations agreed on regarding the improvement of the local government. Also, since the Russian government had stated that it would not hesitate to apply to the other parliaments regarding this matter, it was decided that the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs be advised to send a telegram to be addressed to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in which they should be thanked for such a statement.[208]

After a while, in order to protect the Muslim population, it was decided by the Sublime Porte to appoint Cevad Paşa, replacing Tevfik Paşa, as Commander-in-chief of the

---

[207] PRO: FO, 195/1983, No. 22, Biliotti to Salisbury, 21 July 1897, pp. 460-461; British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 3 (1898), No. 141.

[208] Regarding this matter the Russian Vice-Foreign Minister has responded that increase in the level of the Ottoman troops in Crete would not be accepted by the states. The European states, by intervening into Crete, have taken the responsibility to keep order and protect the Muslim people there. Therefore it was the duty of these states to end this sad situation and that the Russian government would not hesitate to apply to the other states.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Res., Dosya: 87, Gömlek: 64, Aded: 3, 1315 2 11.

Ottoman troops on the island to which the European admirals had objected arguing that "…the position of our troops may become very difficult here … [Cevad Paşa] has taken up the effective position of Governor."[209] As in the case of 1896, the European Powers were unanimously opposed to the appointment of a strong personality as commander-in-chief. Moreover, Cevad Paşa's appointment was regarded as the postponement of the removal of the Ottoman troops from the island. At the same time, those states warned the Ottoman authorities that if any attempt was made to land the Ottoman troops on the island, force would be employed to prevent it.[210]

In his ciphered telegram, Cevad Paşa provided detailed information on the matters of grazing area, autonomous government and the dispatch of additional Ottoman troops. At the beginning, he dealt with the administration in Crete stating that the administration had totally been left to the admirals. According to Cevad Paşa, neither the power of attorney of the governor nor the local administrators had any influence. And, therefore, the nature of the duties of the admirals regarding the troops to be dispatched to the island had to be determined. He continued that extension of the cordon and defined boundaries would not lead to a serious solution and would not benefit the Muslims population, since they could not dare to return to their homes within the borders. He added that the Muslim community did not have the might or the means to build and repair their torn and burnt houses. Regarding the matter of the autonomous regime, Cevad Paşa transmitted the views of the French admiral stating that the Christian Assembly which was elected by the people's vote would reject autonomy in order to please the Greek state and would insist on its demand to unite with Greece. If this demand was not accepted by the European states, the Christians would accept autonomy. For Cevad Paşa, if this information did not become true and if the

[209] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 3 (1898), No. 101.

[210] *ibid*., No. 116.

Christians would definitely reject autonomy and insist on its demand to unite with Greece, there would be no other means for the states than resort to force. Namely, Cevad Paşa claimed that the Ottoman troops were to be dispatched to have the Christians accept the autonomy by force. Since it was not known yet whether the Christians would accept this administration or not, if they rejected it, they would be compelled to use force. In this case, their opposition to the dispatch of troops would be void and then they would ask for the dispatch of the Ottoman troops. Therefore, he stated that doors for negotiations with the states regarding the dispatch of troops should be opened and depending on the turn of events postponing the dispatch of troops to a later date would be to the benefit of the state. Towards the end of this long telegram, Cevad Paşa claimed that some of the admirals did not want to "settle" the Cretan issue soon in order not to confront public reaction, and some others had various political aims. The states would hold Crete as a trump card and would use it to force the Ottoman state to sign the Ottoman-Greek agreement. According to him, what needed to be done for the Sublime Porte was to begin a serious initiative on this matter "to settle" the Cretan issue as soon as possible. Otherwise, as the Christians wished, the current situation would continue for a while and that during this time the Muslim people feeling desperate would cause some inappropriate situations. He was afraid that, as a result of this, the Christian states would ruin and subdue the Muslims as it happened in Andalusia.[211]

Acceptance of the Autonomous Government by the General Assembly

The Christian deputies of the General Assembly had moved from Apokorono to the village of Archanes. Venizelos and Foumis, being active members of the Athens Committees, were at the head of these deputies. As the term of office of the President Dr.

[211] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.EE., Dosya: 114, Gömlek: 80, Aded: 3, 1315 Ra 7.

Sfaniaki expired, discussions on a new committee went on. The candidates were Venizelos and Hadjidakis. While the partisans of the *Ethnike Hetairia* supported the former, the followers of autonomy were in favor of the latter. In the end, Venizelos was elected as the president of the Assembly.[212] His election did not satisfy the British representatives on the island, since it was seen as a threat to the establishment of an autonomous government. For this election, Biliotti declared that "… in consequence of this election, it is the Athenian Committee and no longer the Christian patriots who are at the head of the affairs in Crete…"[213] In this matter, sharing Biliotti's view, the election of Venizelos was considered by Admiral Harris "against the Cretans' wishes."[214]

Towards the end of August 1897, the General Assembly sent a petition to the European admirals, declaring their acceptance of the autonomous system for the island proposed by the European Powers.[215] In the meantime, to announce the Christian population that it accepted autonomy, the Assembly issued a proclamation to which a decree was attached and which declared the discharge of Venizelos from his office as president.[216] On 9 September 1897, the Sfakian deputies of the General Assembly addressed a petition to the admirals, stating that under the necessity of the political conditions on the island, they had accepted the autonomy on condition that the Ottoman troops were withdrawn from the island.[217]

---

[212] PRO: FO 195/1983, No. 24, Biliotti to Salisbury, 23 August 1897, pp. 475-476; British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 3 (1898), Enclosure in No. 167, No. 167.

[213] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 3 (1898), No. 159.

[214] *ibid.,* Enclosure in No. 201; Samuel Beach Chester. *Life of Venizelos*, p. 54.

[215] PRO: FO, 195/1983, Biliotti to Salisbury, 31 August 1897, p. 494; British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 3 (1898), No. 179.

[216] PRO: FO, 195/1983, Biliotti to Salisbury, 31 August 1897, p. 494; British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 3 (1898), No. 179; Zorka Parvanova. "Changes in the Political Status of the Island of Crete, 1894-1899," *Études Balkaniques*, No. 4, 1989, p. 81.

[217] PRO: FO 195/1983, No. 29, Biliotti to Salisbury, 7 September 1897, p. 517; British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 3 (1898), No. 187.

Of the European Powers, Britain and Italy and to a certain extent, the French Cabinet were inclined to establish an autonomous government in Ottoman Crete on the basis of the Christian requests and to gradually sever the Muslims' connection with the island. They had a strong desire to prepare a proposal to that effect and to submit to the Sublime Porte. However, it was argued that this was totally contrary to the impartiality policy which the European Powers wanted to adopt towards the inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire. It was even dangerous to dream or wish that the rights and interests of 100,000 Muslims could be sacrificed for the sake of the realization of the unjust intentions of only a few Christians. Yet, not only it was necessary to prevent such requests which would produce destructive results, but it was necessary to prevent the prolongation of the "problem," which would lead to the violation of the rights of the Ottoman Empire. It was also essential that the present trouble be sorted out in order to put an end to the movement aimed at destroying the properties of the Muslims.[218]

Life Struggles of the Cretan Muslims

The Muslim inhabitants of Candia were not satisfied with the grazing area within the military cordon. For the purpose of the enlargement of the grazing area, they appealed to the British admirals and Vice-Admiral Canevaro. A telegram, bearing 22 signatures, was sent to Canevaro by the Muslims in which the following words were stated:

> … we have been as though besieged for the last four or five months in the environs of Candia, and we are suffering from want and adversity. We are waiting for justice, and are careful not to be importunate; but as no grass remains inside the military cordon, we endeavored to feed our cattle by taking them a little way into neutral zone; unfortunately the Commander of the Imperial troops will no longer allow us even to approach the cordon, and our cattle are beginning to die…[219]

[218] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.ŞD., Dosya: 2, Gömlek: 40, Aded: 1, 1315 Ca 10.

[219] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 3 (1898), Sub-Enclosure 1 in No. 144.

Regarding the enlargement of the grazing area, so many dispatches had been exchanged between Chermside and Cevad Paşa. The Christians accepted the request of the Muslims on the condition that the Christian property in the extended boundary should be guaranteed and guarded by the European troops and that the Muslims should be disarmed.[220] The Muslim inhabitants of Candia considered the Christians' conditions as unacceptable arguing that "…We … cannot part with our feeble means of defense so long as our persecutors remain armed; we remember too vividly the massacres of Sitia and Sarakina…"[221] In the middle of August, due to the gathering of the Muslims' crops by the Christians, Cevad Paşa informed the British admirals that the matter of the enlargement of the grazing area was closed.[222]

According to reports received from the Acting Governor-General of Crete, the insurgents continued to attack the Muslim villages. For instance, more than 2,000 insurgents attacked the village of Ipsilia and set fire to the olive trees, carried off about 500 sheep and 60 beasts of burden. They also killed a Muslim shepherd and wounded two others and killed a Muslim named Selim.[223] Concerning the internal state of affairs on the island, British Consul Biliotti reported the following events to his respective government:

> … Christians from Malivisi, laying in ambush near the village of Gournes, carried off 110 sheep and 7 oxen belonging to Mussulmans, after murdering two shepherds, whose bodies, … were mutilated. The Turkish troops stationed at Gournes shot dead two of the Christian aggressors. … In the district of Cydonia, Canea, a Christian shot a Mussulman … near the village of Daraggo, and so seriously wounded him in the thigh that the limb had to be amputated. … two Mussulmans fishing along the islet St. Theodore, situated at 3 miles west of Canea, were fired upon by two Christians who had crossed to that uninhabited island for the purpose of gathering sea salt. … while working in his field at Soubashi, a Mussulman was shot at by a Christian, and died from his wound… During the night … three Christians, one of a mere lad, sleeping in the open air in the village of Tsikalaria, …

[220] *ibid*., No. 147.

[221] *ibid*., Sub-Enclosure 9 in No. 170.

[222] *ibid*., No. 147, and 148.

[223] *ibid*., Enclosure in No. 193.

> were shot dead … early next morning … ten or twelve inhabitants of the Turkish village in Suda were arrested on suspicion, and shortly after an armed band of 100 or 150 Christians from the heights above Tsikalaria, came down for the purpose of avenging their co-religionists … Armed bands came to the rescue even from Sphakia. It is rumoured, … that not to return empty-handed they carried off 300 sheep and goats from the district of Apokorona.[224]

The problems of the Muslim refugees were doubled by the approaching winter. The Ottoman daily *İkdâm* published the petition of the Muslims sent to the Sublime Porte, on 3 October 1897, explaining the living conditions of the Muslim inhabitants of Crete:

> The situation we are in is totally unbearable. Winter is coming and we do not have any place to go… We are continuing our lives with a little bit of flour bought with the money donated… The harvest season begins soon. If we can not return back to our homes how shall we then earn our living till the next harvest season?...[225]

In another article published in *İkdâm* on 23 October 1897, it was stated that:

> While the terrible situation the Cretan Muslims are so bad that it would even affect the most ruthless hearts, the mean Cretan insurgents are taking the goods and properties of the oppressed and innocent Muslims whose numbers reached a hundred thousand and are doing all sorts of wickedness, but still the ruthlessness and wickedness they had did not end and now they are attempting to blame these Islamic people who are deprived of everything with various excuses. These poor Cretan Muslims are now not only deprived of food, but with the coming of winter they are in terrible need of firewood, clothes, places for accommodation and all sorts of other needs … these ruthless Cretan insurgents, for a renewed organization of a different sort of wickedness, are acting quickly and sending telegrams to the Admirals and consulates asking for the protection of the Great Powers against (!...) the Muslims…[226]

---

[224] *ibid.*, No. 204.

[225] "Girid," *İkdâm*, No. 1154, 6 Cemâziyyelevvel 1315, 21 Eylül 1313, 3 October 1897, Sunday, p. 3. In order to complain the outrages committed by the Christians, the *müftü* of the Muslims of Chania and the *nahiye* m*üdürü* sent a telegram to the British Ambassador in İstanbul stating that "… the properties of upwards of 100,000 Muslims … have remained in the possession of the insurgents…The rebels continue to burn the olive trees which belong to the Muslims throughout the island… The object of the insurgents is to compel the Muslims to flee from the island…" British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 3 (1898), Enclosure in No. 199; Concerning the economic conditions of the island the Muslim notables and the Jews prepared a petition to be given to the European admirals in which it was stated that "… while discussing the settlement of the Cretan Question, the losses of the people, which were subjected to the attacks of the insurgents in the course of the revolt, should also be taken into consideration…"
"Girid," *İkdâm*, No. 1172, 24 Cemâziyyelevvel 1315, 9 Teşrînievvel 1313, 21 October 1897, Thursday, p. 2.

[226] "Girid ahâlî-i İslâmiye'nin ahvâl-i felâket iştimâli en katı kalbleri bile dâğdâr-ı hezan edecek derecede iken Girid havane-i usatı mikdarı yüz bine baliğ olan mazlûmîn-i İslâmiye'nin mal ve mülklerini elinden alarak her türlü şenâati (kötülük) irtikâb etdikleri halde zamir-i şekâvet-engizlerinde merkûz olan a'mâl-i habaset (*kötülük emelleri*) ve denâete (*alçaklık*) bir türlü pâyân olamadığı için o bî-çare çıplak bırakdıkları ehl-i İslamı şimdi bir mel'anet-i diğer icrâsıyla ithâma kalkışmışlardır. Zavallı Girid Müslümanları şimdi yalnız yiyecek değil kışın artık yaklaşması hasebiyle yakacak, giyecek, barınacak yer için her türlü

Besides, the Christian insurgents continued to destroy all the Muslims' properties, and to burn houses and olive trees. On the other hand, the Christians telegraphed the European representatives complaining that the Muslims plundered the Christian property and attacked them in Candia.[227] Concerning the telegrams sent by the Christians, British Captain Grenfell was in the opinion that the Christians exaggerated the state of things for political purposes.[228] The British consul also believed that the complaints of the Christians were full of exaggerations. In his report, he explained the reason for this exaggeration stating the following: "It is in the character of the Cretans, whether Christians or Muslims, to greatly exaggerate all their statements, and to speak as of a frequent occurrence of what has taken place once, and of what has happened to an individual as concerning the whole community."[229] Needless to say, the European representatives explained the reasons of the Cretans' complaints and discontents through ascribing them with exaggeration. For the European representatives, the complaints of the Cretans stemmed almost entirely from the nature of the Cretans. In other words, they defined the parameters of the Cretans' complaints through local characteristic terms.

The admirals believed that this would discredit the pacification of the island by the European forces in the eyes of the inhabitants. The council of admirals, for that reason, instructed Colonel Chermside noting that "… if you have not the means at your disposal to put a stop to this state of affairs, you are to inform the Governor energetically, in the name

---

muâvenete (*yardıma)* kalmış… Girid havane-i usatı yeniden diğer bir sûretde tertîb-i mel'anete şitâb (*acele*) ederek amiraller ile konsoloslara bir telgrafnâme düzerek ahâlî-i İslâmiye'ye karşı düvel-i muazzamanın himâyesini taleb etmişler…"

"Usatın Son Tertîb-i Mel'aneti," *İkdâm*, No. 1174, 26 Cemâziyyelevvel 1315, 11 Teşrînievvel 1313, 23 October 1897, Saturday, p. 1.

[227] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 3 (1898), No. 209, and 230.

[228] *ibid*., Enclosure 1 in No. 228.

[229] *ibid*., No. 230.

of the council of admirals, that they hold the Ottoman government responsible for not keeping order…"[230] Here, the admirals tried to blame the local government for being incapable of restoring order on the island. For Colonel Chermside, as mentioned in his report, the repatriation of the rural Muslim refugees and of the Christian urban refugees was the primary requisite for the re-establishment of order in Candia. Moreover, he argued that as long as the police force was inefficient and ill-paid, it would be difficult to prevent robbery and pillage. The absence of tribunals was also a barrier in the re-establishment of favorable conditions in Candia. Above all, he blamed the local government for being "…a corrupt, feeble, and impecunious **Oriental Government**..."[231] For him, the events and disturbances in Crete served as a typical example of the "oriental" type of Ottoman administration. He invariably blamed the inefficiency of the Ottoman administration, which was incapable of restoring peace and tranquility. For the Europeans' part, the Ottoman administration was "corrupt" and "oriental," the troubles on the island were the result of this type of government and the Cretans were its "victims." In other words, the Europeans accused the Ottoman administration of being a backward oriental mechanism and articulated it through an Orientalist discourse.

On the contrary, the articles published in some Ottoman newspapers held the European troops responsible for not keeping order on the island and criticized them harshly. It was stated that even though Europe had intervened, it did not do any good and the Muslims had accumulated in the coastal towns and lived on relief supplies. The Christians in the interior parts established a few parties everywhere and ruined each other. Only in Apokorono, five or six people were killed each day. It was added that even in the revolt of 1866, that much tragedy did not take place before the Europeans. It was also

---

[230] PRO: FO, 78/4890, Enclosure No. 1, Grenfell to Chermside, 20 October 1897, pp. 225-226; *ibid*., Enclosure 1 in No. 228.

[231] *ibid.,* Enclosure No. 4, p. 230; *ibid.,* Enclosure 2 in No. 228. (emphasis is mine).

argued that the Christian people came to a terrible point with the provocation of the Greeks and that there was a need for a strong administration to put them back into track.[232] In the same line, it was stated that although the European forces came to the island to prevent revolt and restore peace, they did nothing except being incapable in the presence of the insurgents; rather the European forces had caused the perpetuation of poverty. It was added that "… as the situation was such, the European troops must be removed from the island. It is now time and right for the Sovereign [of the island] to finalize this matter…"[233]

The Greek government aggravated its intrigues by sending the Cretan Christians and the Cretan insurgents from Athens to Crete. Apart from this, when the Ottomans sailed in the European ships along the Greek coasts, they were subjected to Greek attacks. The Ottoman officers and their families, who were on board an Austrian steamer, were attacked and plundered by the Greeks.[234] After a while, it was reported that 10,000 Gara cartridges were sent from Piraeus to Crete and were detained by the Italian ships.[235]

The plunder of the Ottoman officers and other Muslims caused a great excitement in the Muslim population of the island. In consequence of this, some attacks were committed by the Muslims on the Christians. On 17 September 1897, three Christians were killed by the Muslims in the village of Tsicalaria.[236] The importance of this event is the

---

[232] "Girid," *İkdâm*, No. 1185, 7 Cemâziyyelahir 1315, 22 Teşrînievvel 1313, 3 October 1897, Wednesday, p. 2.

[233] "Girid Meselesi," *Ma'lûmât*, No. 1, 19 Cemâziyyelevvel 1315, 4 Teşrînievvel 1313, 16 October 1897, Saturday, p. 1.

[234] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.ŞD., Dosya: 2, Gömlek: 40, Aded: 1, 1315 Ca 10; "Girid," *İkdâm*, No. 1180, 1 Cemâziyyelahir 1315, 17 Teşrînievvel 1313, 29 October 1897, Friday, p. 2.

[235] Concerning this matter an article was published in Ottoman daily newspaper *İkdâm*. It was pointed out that two points were important in this matter: first, these cartridges were generally used by the Greek regular forces and second, they were sent to the island through Piraeus. For that reason, it was impossible that the Greek government was not aware of the fact.
See: "Mülahaza," *İkdâm*, No. 1181, 3 Cemâziyyelahir 1315, 18 Teşrînievvel 1313, 30 October 1897, Saturday, p. 1.

[236] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 3 (1898), No. 209, and 213.

fact that these accused Muslims were to be tried by the International Police-Court.[237] In order to protest this decision, the Sublime Porte sent a note to the European Powers demanding the dissolution of the International Military Commission and the removal of the accused Muslims to the nearest *vilâyet*, which was Rhodes, for their trials.[238] As this note was not taken into consideration by the admirals, the International Military Tribunal tried the Muslims on 27 October and condemned them to penal servitude for life.[239]

It was reported from Chania that in order to discuss the form of the government of Crete, it was decided to assemble the Cretan Assembly, composed of about 300 Christian chiefs, in Mylopotamou. Most of the people to be present here had earlier gone to Greece, and then they came back to Crete with the permission of the European admirals. These people were assigned by the admirals to discuss the framework and content of the report to be prepared in the envisaged meeting. Moreover, the princedom flag to be prepared by this organization would be revealed out at the end of the negotiation, and that one priest, Kaliyadi who took part in the revolts on the island and also some Greeks came to Chania to attend the meeting. These points were discussed in the Ottoman Cabinet meeting and it was decided that a telegram be sent to the Ottoman ambassadors in Europe. In the telegram prepared it was written that since the events intensified here, the European admirals were appointed with the aim of stopping the revolts. The Ottoman state had already found the offer of the European Powers regarding the application of the autonomous administration

---

[237] It should be important to remember that during the admirals' meeting of 12 August 1897 it was decided to adopt resolution for the administration of justice of Crete. The admirals had substituted themselves for Turkish court and decided to appoint an International Military Judicial Commission in the island.
ibid., No. 149.

[238] *ibid.,* Enclosure 5 in No. 236.

[239] *ibid.,* No. 237. It was reported from the island that due to the present tribunal in Chania, extraordinary measures were put in force in order to prevent any excitement between the Muslims and the Christians. Accordingly British, French, and Italian war ships were stationed in Chania and two artilleries were also stationed. The numbers of police force were aggravated.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.MYD., Dosya: 20, Gömlek: 11, Aded: 1, 1315 C 8.

appropriate, provided that the details would be negotiated. It was underlined that there was no need for asking the ideas of the Christian insurgent chiefs and taking their ideas as a reference point. Such actions may even lead to the increase of the revolt. It was also stated that it was guaranteed by the states that the sovereignty and the property rights of the Ottoman Empire would not be harmed. Confirming to the idea of formation of a princedom and allowing this organization to design a specific flag and reach the level of revealing it out was totally against the guarantees the European states had given to the Ottoman Empire. At the end of the telegram, the Ottoman ambassadors were asked to warn the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the respective states they worked in that the Ottoman Empire would not allow such things and to tell them that the Ottoman state was ready to negotiate the details of the autonomous administration decided between the Ottoman Empire and those states.[240]

Memoranda of the Cretan Assembly

However, the meeting was held in Melidoni, where Sphakianakis became the President and the office-bearers of the Assembly were elected. Also in this meeting, the name of the Assembly, which once used to be "General Insurrectional," was changed to "Cretan Assembly." The flag of the new Cretan state was also designed.[241] It was on 28 October 1897 that the newly-elected Cretan Assembly sent two memoranda to the council of the admirals. In the first one, the question of governor was focused on underlying the fact that the governor of Crete could not be chosen from among the Ottoman subjects. The reasons for this rejection were explained as follows: if an Ottoman subject were chosen for the governor of the island, the Sublime Porte would inevitably interfere in the internal

[240] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Res., Dosya: 89, Gömlek: 23, Aded: 3, 1315 5 17.

[241] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.MYD., Dosya: 20, Gömlek: 9, Aded: 1, 1315 C 7; British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 3 (1898), Enclosure 5, 6 in No. 238. See: Appendix 2.

affairs of the island. As an Ottoman governor would be under the service of the Sublime Porte, he would never have the necessary prestige and confidence of the Cretans. Moreover, if an Ottoman subject were chosen, then he would again govern the island in the Ottoman style that would be the main barrier for "guiding the island into the path of European civilization."[242] Here, the aim was to have absolute administrative control of the island and the complete exclusion of the Ottoman influence.[243]

In the second memorandum, the withdrawal of the Ottoman troops was dealt with and seen as a preliminary measure to the establishment of the new government. It was argued that the justification of the maintenance of the Ottoman troops for the purpose of the protection of the Muslim population became meaningless. Dividing the Muslim population into three classes, the Cretan Assembly tried to explain the reasons for the immediate withdrawal of the Ottoman troops. It was stated that the first class of the Muslims, who were the bulk of the Muslim population and inhabited in the towns, were not subjected to any threat from the Christians, since the Christians were in minority there. As the second class of Muslims lived in the neighborhood of the towns, they were protected from any danger by the powerful administrative centers. The third class lived in distant districts whose number dramatically decreased in consequence of the revolts, emigration, and epidemics. For that reason, the Cretan Assembly stated that, according to former experience, the Ottoman troops would not protect the Muslims of the distant districts.[244]

In the Ottoman Cabinet meeting dated 1 November 1897, it is deemed appropriate to establish a committee composed of Mahmud Celaleddin Paşa, Rauf Paşa, Turhan Paşa

---

[242] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 3 (1898), Enclosure 3 in No. 238.

[243] Samuel Beach Chester. *Life of Venizelos*, p. 52.

[244] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 3 (1898), Enclosure 4 in No. 238; T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.AZJ., Dosya: 35, Gömlek: 25, Aded: 2, 1315 C 1.

and Aleksandr Paşa in order to discuss the matter on the following grounds: First, the reasons of the revolutions that had been taken place hitherto. Second, whether it would be appropriate for the interests of the state to appoint a foreign governor to Crete. Third, whether the withdrawal of the Ottoman troops from Crete would be appropriate; and finally how the Greek government would act now and in the future.[245] Mahmud Paşa thought that the foreign states should be informed via a circular that a committee was constituted for the purpose of determining certain points regarding Crete. He argued that if this was done, any resolution decided by the European Powers would be ineffective.[246]

It was claimed that these memoranda did not reflect the feelings of all the Cretan Christians. It was added that on the contrary, it was the idea of a bunch of 30-40 lawyers who were trained by the *Ethnike Hetairia* and that they were even been fed by them. The removal of the Ottoman troops from Crete and demands in some other matters were not only the idea of the insurgent chiefs and certain European admirals. Especially the Italian admiral had also contributed to these ideas. It was argued that these states did not have any beneficial service for the Cretan case; they had rather spoiled the insurgents. Moreover, these European states did not act in accordance with the interests of the Ottoman Empire, they only thought of their own benefits by "praising the role of force" and by thinking of the strategic importance of Crete in the Mediterranean. These states did not do anything other than struggling with each other. It was further argued that the European states had intervened and sent their war ships and admirals in order to prevent the spread of the revolution to Europe causing a general war. It is undeniable that in certain cases they prevented the bombardment of the towns by the Greek war ships and the Greek soldiers from uniting with the insurgents to attack the centre of the province. However, when the

[245] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Res., Dosya: 89, Gömlek: 58, Aded: 2, 1315 6 5.

[246] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.ŞD., Dosya: 2, Gömlek: 42, Aded: 3, 1315 C 19.

losses and the benefits of such actions were analyzed, it would be seen that the losses incurred and the damage made was much higher than the benefits obtained. Therefore, the European states had to give up Crete.[247]

During the last months of 1897, the governorship of Crete and the sending of fresh Ottoman troops into the island had been discussed by the Ottoman and the European governments.[248] For the governorship of Crete, the Russian government suggested the appointment of Karatodori Paşa, Movroyeni Bey, a former ministry of the Sublime Porte to the United States, or Bojo Petrovich, cousin of the Montenegrin Prince. The first two were rejected by the European states, and the Prince of Montenegro himself refused the appointment of his kinsman to Crete. In December 1897, the Russian government proposed the nomination of Prince George of Greece as governor for the island. At that time, the Sublime Porte intended to dispatch 5,000 recruits to relieve a similar number of time-expired men and informed the European representatives in İstanbul for this purpose. Yet, the European governments strongly opposed the landing of these Ottoman troops on the island and prevented thier dispatch.[249]

Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated the primary motives behind the course of the Cretan revolt of 1897. As Fikret Adanır aptly put it, throughout the nineteenth century, any attempt against the Ottoman sovereignty was enough to cause the intervention of European

[247] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.MYD., Dosya: 20, Gömlek: 43, Aded: 1/3, 1315 C 29.

[248] For the correspondence among the European states on the selection of Governor-General to Crete see: British Accounts and Papers. Vol. CVI, Turkey No. 12 (1897), (London: 1897).

[249] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 3 (1898), No. 261; Samuel Beach Chester. *Life of Venizelos*, pp. 58-59; Theodore George Tatsios. *The Megali Idea and the Greek-Turkish War of 1897: The Impact of the Cretan Problem on Greek Irredentism, 1866*-1897, p. 133.

Powers.[250] Those states, whose colonial and imperial interests in the Mediterranean conflicted, thought that the autonomous government would do little harm to their interests, and therefore they showed willingness for its establishment. As the time was not yet ripe for the partition of the Ottoman Empire, their attitudes were based on a strategy to decrease the sovereign rights of the Empire over Crete and impose a decentralized administrative regime on the island to control the routes in the Mediterranean. What seems certain is that rival claims between these imperial powers regarding their interests in the Mediterranean played a conspicuous role in the submission of autonomous status to the island. It should be underlined that the establishment of the autonomous government was a regime which was decided first by the European Powers, and then the Ottoman government and the local actors were forced to accept it. In other words, it was a *fait accompli* for both the Ottoman government and the local Cretans. According to the European Powers, the Cretan revolt was the expression of the old religious conflicts of the "savage" and "war-like" Cretans. They created an atmosphere in which the Cretan Muslims and Christians would not be able to live in the existing administrative system. They spoke as if the autonomous system was the only "solution" to the "Cretan Question." However, it should be kept in mind that their colonialist and imperialist concerns played a great part in the settlement of the autonomous administrative system on the island of Crete.

The Cretan novelist Nikos Kazantzakis makes the following comments on the subject:

> … from Greece no hope is to be looked for. She is too weak… Crete is a good morsel. And the mighty of the earth are interested in its remaining on the Sultan's plate. If he comes to grief and the heritage has to be divided up, each of the Great Powers hopes that Crete will fall to it. If, on the contrary, Crete became united with Greece, neither God, nor the Devil could separate them again.[251]

---

[250] Fikret Adanır. *Makedonya Sorunu*, (trl.) İhsan Catay, (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1996), p. 150.

[251] Nikos Kazantzakis. *Freedom and Death*, (London: Faber and Faber, 1983), p. 361. It should be noted that Kazantzakis' novel is not on the Cretan revolt of 1897, but the one on 1889.

Regarding the internal dynamics of the island in the course of Cretan revolt of 1897, the flight of the *Vâli* merits attention and represented a fundamental crisis in the local dynamics of the island. It was understood that the highest echelon of the Ottoman government in Crete could not fruitfully cope with difficulties going on within the island. It is certain that the *Vâli*'s flight endangered the sovereign rights of the Ottoman Sultanate; precipitated power vacuums in the administrative power of the local government; and escalated the tensions within the island. From then on, the island was not governed by the Ottoman Governor-General but by the European admirals.

When the Ottoman documents were examined, it became clear that the role of diplomatic actors regarding the intra-Ottoman conflicts increased. It also revealed that the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs continually sent telegrams to its representatives in Europe to instruct them to urge the European governments to take effective measures for the ongoing revolt on the island, and for putting an end to the elaborate "crisis." These dispatches were quite important, because they highlighted the fact that Ottoman statesmen were in favor of suppressing the Cretan revolt through diplomatic means. As European Powers limited the military superiority of the Ottoman troops over the insurgents by preventing the dispatch of additional Ottoman troops to the island, the Ottoman Empire began to exert a great deal of diplomatic efforts to fill the power vacuum. Besides, the Ottoman Minister of Foreign Affairs made efforts before the European representatives in İstanbul so as to reach a policy of reconciliation regarding the Cretan issue. It became clear that multiple levels of communication had been initiated by the Sublime Porte in order to suppress the Cretan revolts and maintain the sovereign rights and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire.

In the British documents cited above, there were repeated references to the necessity of the Muslim migration. These documents created an atmosphere that the

situation came to a point that the Cretan Muslims and Christians could no longer live together on the island. From the British imperial perspective, the Muslim migration would play a great part in the "resolution" of the "Cretan Question." Indeed, the British government was well aware that if the Muslims were forced to emigrate from the island, then Ottoman Crete could become a British dominion. The British consular reports made repeated references to the Muslims' "religious fanaticism" which increased the tension within the island.

Both the Ottoman and British documentation focused on the fear and agony of the Cretan Muslims who had been deeply resented. It should be noted that the Muslims did not welcome the autonomy, largely because they feared that new chains would be added to their numerical disadvantages with unforeseeable consequences. They were quite aware that their powers would be marginalized by the autonomous administration. When the documentation was analyzed in depth, the destructive effects of the revolt were clearly seen. The Cretans suffered from heavy losses during the continuous revolts. The impact of the revolts on Muslims in Sitia and Sarakina was also devastating. Muslim people were forced to migrate to coastal towns where they heavily suffered from starvation. Most of them did not have sufficient food to eat, had nothing to wear and nowhere to sleep. Although various relief organizations attempted to alleviate the agony of the Cretan Muslims, these organizations were unable to provide sufficient food and clothing for the Muslims. The Cretan Christians living in the interior parts of the island also suffered from starvation. This illustrated that the Cretan Muslims and Christians ran into serious hardships due to the revolts. In other words, as a result of these revolts, economic and social balance of the island was altered. Especially, the Muslim inhabitants of the island lost their hopes about the future.

Chapter V

CHALLENGING AUTHORITY, TRANSFORMING POLITICS: THE END OF THE OTTOMAN RULE IN CRETE

Diplomatic Politics and the Candidacy of Prince George

In the early months of 1898, the candidature of Prince George[1] for the governorship of Crete became an acute "problem" between the European Powers and the Ottoman Empire. As it was mentioned in the previous chapter, the Russian government had proposed the nomination of Prince George as the Governor-General of Crete. While the European Powers, with the exception of Germany and Austria, were in favor of the Russian proposal, the Ottoman Empire, strongly opposing the nomination of Prince George, continually insisted that an Ottoman subject should be appointed to this post. According to the Ottoman government, the appointment of Prince George to the post of governor on the island would eventually lead to the annexation of Crete to Greece. Moreover, it was considered very unfair that the sacrifices in men and money the country had made and the victories gained by the Ottoman army in the end of the Ottoman-Greek War would result in the loss of the island.[2]

---

[1] He was born in 1869 as the second son of King George I and Queen Olga of the Hellenes. In 1882, he entered the Military Academy at the Piraeus. He received his naval training in the School of Naval Cadets in Copenhagen and graduated in 1889. In the same year, he returned to Greece and was commissioned in the Greek Royal Navy. Between 1892 and 1898, he was the chairman of the Board of Examiners. During the Cretan crisis of January 1897, he landed at Chania with a flotilla of torpedo-boats. His flotilla was assigned to bombard the Ottoman coast during the Ottoman-Greek War of 1897. He was appointed as High Commissioner of Crete on December 1898. Prince George finally left Crete in 1906.

A. A. Pallis (ed.). *The Cretan Drama: The Life and Memoirs of Prince George of Greece, High Commissioner in Crete, (1898-1906)*, (New York: R. Speller, 1959), pp. xxi-xxv.

[2] British Accounts and Papers, Vol. CXI, Turkey No. 5 (1898), *Further Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Crete*, (London: 1898), No. 45.

It was asserted that as Prince George had a family relationship with the Tsar and saved Nicholas from an assassination during their visit to Japan in 1891, the Russian government was continually insisting on its own proposal, arguing that without the nomination of Prince George it would be very difficult to find a solution to the present Cretan difficulty. See: *ibid*., No. 21. In his article, Marcapoulos attributed so much importance to

This chapter is an attempt to illustrate how diplomatic politics challenged the internal dynamics of the island. It concentrates on countless reports and telegrams exchanged between İstanbul and European capitals. However, they were unable to agree on the nationality of the Governor-General to be appointed to Crete. The European Powers, especially Britain, urged the nomination of a Greek subject to the post of Governor-General of Crete. The Ottoman government opposed, and insisted on the appointment of an Ottoman subject to that post. This chapter also points out the withdrawal of the Ottoman troops from the island which was often identified with violence. It analyzes the conflict between the British troops and Ottoman forces in Candia that led to the withdrawal of the Ottoman troops. This chapter also demonstrates that the Cretan Christians considered the existence of the Ottoman forces on the island as the main barrier to deconstruct the existing administration and to reconstruct a new one and believed that without the evacuation of the Ottoman troops, nothing could be established in Crete.

In the same line with the Ottoman government, the Austrian government strongly opposed the candidature of Prince George. This opposition was clearly seen in the telegram sent by the Ottoman ambassador in Vienna on 20 January 1898. During the interview held between the Ottoman representative and the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Goluchowski, he told the Sublime Porte's ambassador that the candidacy of Prince George was not a definite offer, but a warning to the Imperial Majesty. Count Goluchowski continued that if such a candidacy was accepted by the Sultan, "… what was the reason for sending all these dispatches, declaring war and shouldering so many great difficulties?" According to Count Goluchowski, if this offer was accepted by the Sublime Porte, it would set a dangerous example to the other Balkan states and might incite and encourage the

---

the royal connections arguing that the dynastic connection of the Greek royal family with the Russian and British royal houses was very detrimental in the selection of Prince George.

For the details, see: George J. Marcopoulos. "The Selection of Prince George of Greece as High Commissioner in Crete," *Balkan Studies*, Vo. X, No. 2, 1969, pp. 335-350.

aggressive aspirations of the Balkan governments and might be difficult to forestall these aggressive attitudes.[3] With regard to the Austria's position, the Greek Prime Minister Zaïmis argued that the Austrian government had not accepted the candidature of Prince George, since Count Goluchowski considered Prince's candidature as the ultimate annexation of Crete to Greece. The Austrian government feared the territorial demands of Serbia and Bulgaria in the Balkans. According to Zaïmis, the apprehension of the Austrian government was meaningless, because Bulgaria was satisfied with the recent appointment of the Bulgarian Bishop by the Ottoman Sultan, and Serbia had already declared that the Serbian government would approve of the extension of Greece on the island. Zaïmis further remarked that the real reason of the Austrian government's opposition was its jealousy of Russian influence in the Balkans. For his part, the Austrian government thought that the appointment of Prince George would increase the Russian influence and jeopardize the Austrian interests in the Balkan Peninsula.[4]

The German government had not accepted the candidacy of Prince George, either. For the German government, if Prince George was appointed to Crete, this meant that the island would be annexed by Greece, which would be completely contrary to the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, according to the German government, this appointment would cause many difficulties and lead to Bulgarian, Serbian, Montenegrin, and Albanian provocateurs to commit outrages, which would further endanger the peace and tranquility in the Balkans. Besides, this would destroy order and peace that the European Powers aimed to ensure.[5] During the banquet held in his Emperor Palace, the German Emperor told the Ottoman ambassador that the Ottoman Sultan's insistence on rejecting the

[3] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.HR., Dosya: 25, Gömlek: 16, Aded: 1, 1315 Ş 27.

[4] USNA, T159/12, No. 36, Rockhill to Sherman, 3 February 1898.

[5] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.EŞA., Dosya: 28, Gömlek: 68, Aded: 1, 1315 Ş 19.

appointment of Prince George was considered very appropriate. After so many sacrifices and the victory gained in the Ottoman-Greek War, such a proposal would be unfair and contrary to justice and wisdom. The German Emperor added that if the British government sent Prince George to Crete, the German government would withdraw its navy and forces from the island.[6]

On 9 February 1898, the Sublime Porte sent a telegram to the Ottoman ambassador in St. Petersburg, stating that Russia's proposal about the appointment of Prince George to Crete was contrary to the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. For the Sublime Porte, this would weaken the recent victory gained after so many sacrifices and reduce the importance of this victory. Furthermore, it was noted that this proposal might lead to so many difficulties such as the annexation of Crete to Greece. Therefore, the necessary efforts should be spent for the appointment of an Ottoman subject as governor to the island.[7] Accordingly, on 28 January 1898, the Ottoman Ambassador to St. Petersburg, Hüsnü Bey, had an interview with the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs to induce the Russian government to compromise about the appointment of an Ottoman governor to Crete. In this talk, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs had told Hüsnü Bey that the Russian ambassador in İstanbul dispatched the Russian government's reply, with a long report, to the Sultan. When Hüsnü Bey asked the content of this telegram, the Russian Minister said that it was coincided with the Russian emperor's offer about the appointment of Prince George. Furthermore, Hüsnü Bey pointed out that Sultan Abdülhamid II regarded Russia's approval as vital to the appointment of an Ottoman subject as governor and explained the good effects which would arise out of the appointment of an Ottoman subject and the evil ones of the appointment of Prince George. Yet, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs

[6] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.EŞA., Dosya: 28, Gömlek: 79, Aded: 1, 1315 N 17.

[7] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.EŞA., Dosya: 28, Gömlek: 81, Aded: 3, 1315 N 18.

avoided saying anything and insisted on the previous opinions that the statements of the Ottoman Sultan had been delivered to the Russian Emperor. It should be important to note that in the course of this conversation, the Ottoman ambassador had emphasized to the point that the appointment of a non-Ottoman subject would awaken Pan-Hellenism which would produce certain difficulties and be against the political interests of Russia.[8]

The Russian government's opinion concerning the main events which had been occurring in Crete from the time of the landing of Colonel Vassos on the island up to the final refusal of Sultan Abdülhamid II to accept Prince George of Greece as governor was published in the "Official Messenger" on 9 February 1898. The following was stated:

> … Russia's object in proposing the Prince as Governor was to insure the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and to preserve peace in the East… Owing to the opposition of the Sultan and some of the Powers, Russia has not insisted on her proposal, and she would have had no objection to support any other proposal which would have satisfied the Sultan, the Powers, and the Cretans… Russia does not consider it possible to take upon herself the initiative of making any fresh proposals. [Russia] diverts herself of all responsibility for any disastrous consequences which may ensue from the protracted delay in selecting a Governor. Russia will … in no case allow the Turkish troops on the island to be reinforced…[9]

It was argued that the shift in the Russia's policy was related to the Greek war indemnity and the withdrawal of the Ottoman troops from Thessaly mentioning that when the Russian government had proposed the candidacy of Prince George for the governorship of Crete, the Ottoman Empire had increased its forces in Thessaly. Fearing an indefinite occupation of Thessaly by the Ottoman troops, the Russian government, accepting the suggestion of Britain, had not insisted on the candidacy of Prince George until the payment of indemnity to the Ottoman Empire and the evacuation of Thessaly.[10]

---

[8] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.EŞA., Dosya: 28, Gömlek: 81, Aded: 3, 1315 N 18.

[9] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 5 (1898), No. 56.

[10] USNA, T159/12, No. 38, Rockhill to Sherman, 14 February 1898.

At that time, the Ottoman authorities on the island made various attempts regarding the Cretan issue. In a ciphered telegram sent to the Sublime Porte, Cevad Paşa mentioned his attempts to "resolve" the Cretan issue reporting that in order to negotiate the precautions for the "solution" of "the Cretan matter," a secret messenger was sent to the Archbishop of Candia. The messenger notified the Archbishop that if the necessary precautions were not taken, the problem might be prolonged; moreover, the Muslims and Christians would both be harmed. Therefore, Cevad Paşa offered to have a special interview to understand the opinions and desires of the Christians. However, the Archbishop expressed his gratitude for the confidence shown in his person and maneuvered that he had no authority to make such an interview with Cevad Paşa and had no influence over the Christians. According to Cevad Paşa, the chief reason for the rejection of the Archbishop was the negotiations that the admirals continuously made with the Christian insurgent chiefs and the superiority obtained by the Christians at that moment. He went on that after the candidacy of Prince George to the post of governor, the Archbishop of Chania refrained from making negotiations due to his fear of Greece, Russia, and the Cretan Christians. Cevad Paşa added that both the Archbishop and other Christians continued to believe in the assignment of Prince George to the post of governor. He also remarked that the Greek newspapers, the Greek political circles and the Russian and French consuls on the island encouraged the Christians in this matter. At the end of the telegram, Cevad Paşa expressed his doubts remarking that unless the Christians gave up their hopes on the appointment of Prince George to the island, they would not incline to discuss the necessary measures.[11]

[11] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.ASK., Dosya: 136, Gömlek: 54, Aded: 2, 1315 L 8.

While the Christian inhabitants of the island were in favor of the candidature of Prince George,[12] the Muslims opposed his candidature claiming that it was impossible for them to be ruled by him. In the name of Muslim inhabitants of the provinces of Candia and Lasithi, the Muslim representatives and some Muslim notables petitioned Sultan Abdülhamid II remarking that the Prince's candidature could not be acceptable for them:

> … the rebels have destroyed all our trees and dwellings ... every day our pressing necessities increase and our destitution has reached the maximum … it is clear that the unprecedented barbarities and cruelties of the insurgents in this insurrection, the object of which is complete extirpation of the Mussulmans in the island, are based solely on the instigation and instructions of Greece, the proposal of certain Powers that Prince George should be Governor of Crete is most unjust, and would mean the complete annihilation of the Muslim element… It is impossible for us to live under the hostile influence of Greece … the aforesaid candidature, which is for us deadly poison, may not be accepted…[13]

With regard to the Cretan issue, the German government proposed the following two proposals: a commissioner delegated by the European Powers should be nominated to govern the island of Crete provisionally, or the pacification and reorganization of Crete should be entrusted to two of the European Powers. The German government further declared that if these proposals were not accepted, the German government would withdraw its flag from the island.[14] The Russian government was in the opinion that finding a commissioner was not easier than electing a provisional governor for the island. About the second proposal, the Russian government stated that this would involve many inconveniences and would not meet the requirements of the situation.[15]

---

[12] William Miller. *Travels and Politics in the Near East*, (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company Publishers, 1899), p. 344.

Miller, writing on the opinions of the Christians, alleged that the Christians "… would welcome the Prince with enthusiasm. But like all the Cretans, being intensely insular, they will probably resent in the long run the bestowal of offices upon the little band of continental Greeks…"

[13] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 5 (1898), Enclosure in No. 113.

[14] *ibid*., No. 61, and 75.

[15] *ibid.,* No. 79.

On 22 February 1898, the Sublime Porte instructed its representatives in Europe to urge the European Powers stating that:

> … the uncertain position of Crete … constitutes a danger to the general peace, and causes great injury to the Imperial Government. It is, therefore, important not to allow any further delay in the application and enforcement of the points which we have submitted to the sentiments of equity of the Powers, as regards the conditions which we have attached to our consent to autonomy, relying on the assurances that they had given as to respecting the integrity and sovereignty of the Empire…

It was further insisted that the Ottoman troops in Thessaly should remain there until the settlement of the Cretan issue. The British, French, Russian, Austrian and Italian governments categorically opposed the claims of the Sublime Porte, arguing that "the Cretan Question" and "the evacuation of Thessaly" were not dependent upon each other; and there was no connection between them.[16]

Muslim Refugees and Relief Attempts

In those days, the supply of relief for the Muslim refugees in Candia became very problematic. At the outbreak of Cretan revolt of 1897, the Ottoman government constituted a commission in İstanbul for the purpose of collecting offerings from people for the Muslim refugees on the island. The commissions formed in Candia, Chania, Lasithi, and Rethymnon, composed of the leading figures of the island, prepared lists of the Muslims who required relief. The central commission in İstanbul declared that it could supply flour until the middle of January 1898. The Acting Governor-General, İsmail Paşa, reported to his government that local commissions did not distribute food to the orphans, infirm and old people, but favored their relatives and friends.[17] At the beginning of February 1898, the Muslim committee in Chania had received numerous clothes for women and children, flour and other provisions which would be sufficient for two months. Consul Biliotti reported to

[16] *ibid.,* No. 76, 82, 91, and 101.

[17] *ibid*., Enclosure 13 in No. 31.

his government that the Muslim relief committee in Candia had 8,000 bags of flour, ninety bales of clothes and bed clothing. The Candia British Relief Committee distributed a sum of 11 or 12 *lirâ*s in provisions for the refugees of Paleocastro. The Russian vice-consul of Chania had given 500 *lirâ*s in food to the refugees of Paleocastro and was instructed to distribute a further sum of 1,000 *lirâ*s to the Christian families in Malevizi, Temenos, and Pediada. On 11 March 1898, the British consul reported to London that 280 *lirâ*s given by the British government had already been distributed to the refugees.[18]

As mentioned before, as a result of the revolts, the Muslims had concentrated in the major coastal towns and the Christians were in the interior of the island. It was argued that there was a lack of communication between the Muslims and Christians. In order to bring these two parties together, the European representatives on the island offered to open markets where the Christians and Muslims would meet.[19] Accordingly, on 25 February 1898, the vice-consuls in Candia sent a collective letter to the consular corps in Chania, offering the opening of communications between the town of Candia and some Christian villages situated beyond the military cordon. In this letter, it was stated that the Christian inhabitants of these villages were willing to bring their products to the Candia market for sale and to make contacts with the merchants to get sulphur on credit to use it in their vineyards.[20] The vice-consuls decided to discuss with the Muslim notables for the purpose of starting communications. After some discussion, the Muslim notables agreed with the vice-consuls on the condition that the admirals should take necessary measures to prevent any skirmishes between the Muslims and Christians. The Muslim population refused to attend the bazaars opened on the military cordon around Candia, arguing that they had

[18] *ibid*., No. 72, 77, and 96.

[19] William Miller. *Travels and Politics in the Near East*, pp. 330, 338.

[20] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 5 (1898), No. 87.

nothing to sell and no money to buy anything. According to the Muslims, only the Christians would benefit from the markets. However, the first bazaar in Candia was opened on 16 March 1898.[21] To prevent encounters between Cretan Christians and Muslims, certain precautions were taken by the European forces. William Miller, who visited the island in the spring of 1898, describes the precautions undertaken by these forces in the open market held in Halmyros, about five miles from Candia:

> In one corner of the ramparts the white tents of the Welsh Fusileers stood out against the blue sky, and in the plain a speck of red every few yards marked the spot where a Turkish soldier was posted. The most elaborate precautions had been taken to prevent the encounter at the market. The British gunboat *Hussar* had been anchored off Halmyross, with her guns all ready for action. A detachment of the Welsh Fusileers … guarded the ground on which the market was held, and a thousand Turkish troops were told off along to Candia to protect the Mussulmans…[22]

Some of Candia merchants, M. Stergiades, N. Tzangakis, P. Valiades, Th. Alepoudelis, G. Bournellos and Talianis, sent a petition to consular body to get permission in bringing 200,000 kilograms of sulphur and 150,000 *okka* barley to Candia and conveying them from Candia to Paleocastro, Aghia, Pelagia, and Chersonisos and to sell these quantities to the inhabitants of these districts who had been suffering from starvation. These merchants complained of the high ratio of taxes and offered to transport these sulphur and barley without payment of customs dues and of 3 percent surtax.[23]

Ottoman State Attempts to Cooperate with Russia

In March 1898, Sultan Abdülhamid II made a notification placing the greatest emphasis upon the negative effects of the appointment of a foreigner as Governor-General

---

[21] *ibid.,* No. 94, and 110. It should be noted that the markets were also opened in the other major towns of the island.

[22] William Miller. *Travels and Politics in the Near East*, p. 339.

[23] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 5 (1898), Enclosure 1 in No. 146.

to Crete. According to him, if a foreigner was appointed as governor to the island, this would be contrary to the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire and his sovereign rights. Its effects would spread to the islands of the Ottoman Archipelago and the Bosphorus that might conceivably imperil the rights and interests of the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, the appointment of a high Christian official of the Sublime Porte to the above-mentioned post would be appropriate.[24] Upon Sultan Abdülhamid II's notification, the Ottoman ambassador in St. Petersburg paid a visit to the Russian Emperor and in the course of the interview, the emperor appreciated the Sultan's notification and even said that the Russian government had already offered and suggested the appointment of a high Christian official of the Ottoman Empire as governor to the other European Powers. Yet, the British and French states opposed it, arguing that they would not be able to defend themselves in the parliamentary discussions regarding the appointment of a high Christian official of the Ottoman subject to the island.[25]

The expressions of the Russian Emperor revealed that the election of governor to the island was dependent on the decisions of the British and French states. Accordingly, the Grand Vizierate decided that at that moment what needed to be done was to dispatch a circular to the European Powers and to advise the Ottoman Ministry of Foreign Affairs to send another telegram to the Ottoman ambassadors in Paris and London to commence communications with their respective countries. In the circular, the Sublime Porte once more underlined the fact that the appointment of any foreigner as governor to Crete was contrary to its rights and independence, and the assurances given by the European Powers. The Sublime Porte considered its participation indispensable for the making of any decision on this subject and stated that "… we beg the Cabinets to be so good as to send

[24] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Res., Dosya: 91, Gömlek: 41, Aded: 6, 1315 L 19.

[25] *ibid*.

urgent instructions to their ambassadors at Constantinople to lose no time in commencing negotiations in question with us…"[26] The circular concluded by proposing the selection and appointment of a high Christian official of the Ottoman Empire to the post of governor of the island. In the meantime, as its proposals had not been accepted by the other European Powers, the German government had decided to withdraw its forces from Crete. Accordingly, on 16 March 1898, the German troops were withdrawn from the island.[27]

Towards the end of March 1898, the Sublime Porte made a fresh attempt to call the attention of the European Powers. This was in line with its previous declarations on the subject of the appointment of a high Christian official of the Ottoman Empire as governor to Crete:

> … the appointment of a foreigner as Governor of Crete not being in harmony with the assurances we have received from the Great Powers in regard to respecting the integrity and sovereign rights of the Empire… As the appointment of a foreign Governor would be likely to affect the present condition of the islands of the Ottoman Archipelago, the Imperial fleet would no longer find safe anchorages among these islands, and there would be reason to fear that the effects of this state of things, spreading to the Straits of the Dardanelles and even to the Bosphorus, might also bring about prejudicial changes as regards the Imperial fleet on the Mediterranean coasts of the Empire…[28]

As regards the choice of a candidate among the Christian dignitaries, it was stated that "… we are of opinion that Alexander Caratheodory Pasha … is well fitted for the post…"[29] The European governments did not accept this proposal arguing that the

---

[26] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 5 (1898), No. 102.

[27] *ibid.,* No. 104.

[28] *ibid.,* Enclosure in No. 121; T.C. BOA, İradeler Tasnifi, İ.MTZ.GR., Dosya: 34, Gömlek: 1474, Aded: 1, 1315 L 27; T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Res., Dosya: 91, Gömlek: 57, Aded: 4, 1315 10 27.

[29] In the Ottoman documents, it was mentioned that the Ottoman fleet situating on the coasts of Arabia and Anatolia would also be affected from this. ("… Girid cezîresine ecnebî bir vâlî nasbı adalar denizinde kâin Cezâir-i Osmaniye'nin hâl ve mevki'ini tehlikeye koyacağı cihetle Bahr-i Sefîd'de donanma-ı hümâyûnun barınmasına müsâid mahaller evvelki gibi selâmet ve emniyeti hâiz olamayacağı ve bunun te'sîrâtı Bahr-i Sefîd ve hattâ Bahr-i Siyah Boğazı'na kadar vâsıl olarak Arabistan ve Anadolu sevâhilinin dahi donanma-ı hümâyûna me'men olan mahalleri dûçâr-ı tebeddülât olmak melhûz bulunduğu hasebiyle…") T.C. BOA, İradeler Tasnifi, İ.MTZ.GR., Dosya: 34, Gömlek: 1474, Aded: 1, 1315 L 27; T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Res., Dosya: 91, Gömlek: 57, Aded: 4, 1315 10 27.

appointment of Alexander Karatodori Paşa as governor to Crete was not a satisfactory "solution" to "the Cretan Question." Immediately afterwards, the Russian government suggested that the European admirals in Crete should be temporarily entrusted to introduce the principles of an autonomous administration which had been decided in 1897 by the European representatives in İstanbul.[30]

As a result of the contradictory opinions among the various governments on the Governor-General for Crete and the difficulty in reaching an agreement on the Cretan issue, the Austrian government decided to withdraw its forces from Crete between the period of 24 March to 15 April 1898. Yet, the Austrian government decided to continue its diplomatic cooperation with the other European Powers regarding the island.[31]

After the decision of the Austrian government, in the minutes dated 8 April 1898, the admirals decided to reorganize the superintendence of the island. Accordingly, the British forces would protect the provinces of Malevisi, Candia, Temenos, Monophatsi, Pediada, and Kenurio. The Russians would protect the provinces of Apokorono, Rethymnon, Hagios Vasilis, Mylopotamos, Amari, and Pyrgiotissa. The French forces would protect those of Mirabélo, Lasithi, Viano, Ierapetra, and Sitia. And the Italians would protect those of Chania, Kissamo, Selinos, and Sfakia. The Peninsula of Akrotiri and all part of the island which extends to the south of Suda and Chania Bays would be protected by all European Powers.[32]

At the beginning of April 1898, the Sublime Porte continued its efforts to make the European Powers to accept the appointment of a high Christian official of the Ottoman

---

[30] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 5 (1898), No. 120, and 137.

[31] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 5 (1898), No. 118, 123, and 125; T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.EE., Dosya: 114, Gömlek: 96, Aded: 2/98, 27 Mart 1898, the *Yellow Book* (Sarı Kitap Tercümesi). Certain parts of the *Yellow Book*'s translation are also to be found in T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.HR., Dosya: 25, Gömlek: 19, Aded: 1/11, 1315 N 1.

[32] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 5 (1898), Enclosure 2 in No. 199.

Empire to the post of governor. With this aim in mind, on 1 April 1898, a ciphered telegram was dispatched to the Ottoman ambassador in Paris urging the French government to give its approval to the appointment of a high Orthodox Christian official of the Ottoman Empire. At the first part of the telegram, the conversation made with the French ambassador to the Sublime Porte was mentioned. In the course of this conversation, the Ottoman official told the French representative that there was no way out except the appointment of an Ottoman subject to the post of governor. The appointment of a foreign subject could not be accepted by the Sublime Porte, since it would be contrary to the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and would produce certain difficulties. It was added that since the French government had been paying special attention to the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and had a close friendship with the Ottoman Empire, it had to agree with the Ottoman government on this matter. The French ambassador stated that he would inform the French Minister of Foreign Affairs about these points. In this telegram, the Ottoman ambassador in Paris was instructed to make attempts before the French Minister of Foreign Affairs on the following points: First, if the appointment of an Ottoman subject as governor to the island would be accepted by the European Powers, this would also be accepted by the German and Austrian governments. Second, the Russian government had previously put forward the appointment of an Ottoman subject. Third, since France had crucial interests in the East and was interested in the continuation of integrity of the Ottoman Empire and sovereign rights of the Sultan, it should not give its consent to any act which was contrary to these principles and to the interests of Islam. At the end of the telegram, it was noted that since the island of Crete was geographically close to Tunisia, Tripoli, and, in short, to the coasts of Arabia and Anatolia, the change in the Cretan administration would not be to the benefit of the French government.[33]

[33] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.BŞK., Dosya: 56, Gömlek: 3, Aded: 1, 1315 Za 9.

On the same subject, another telegram was dispatched to the Ottoman Embassy in London noting that in order to preserve the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and sovereign rights of the Sultan and the rights and interests of the Muslims, what needed to be done in Crete was to establish an autonomous government in accordance with the models applied in Lebanon and Samos, and to appoint a high Orthodox Christian official of the Ottoman Empire as governor to the island. In a way, order and tranquility would be restored on the island that was the desire of the British government. [34]

Since the diplomatic efforts of the Sublime Porte before the European Powers were in vain, and it was understood from the confidential statements of the German and Austrian Foreign Ministries that their approvals for the appointment of a high Christian official of the Ottoman Empire were dependent upon the consent of the Russian government. The Ottoman Cabinet, in a meeting held on 3 April 1898, considered the Russian government's position as the key to the matter of governorship and decided to divert its attention to Russia. For this purpose, a telegram was drafted to the Ottoman representative in St. Petersburg during the cabinet meeting in which it was stated that the Cretan affairs became a European question. Therefore, it was natural for the Ottoman state to take the opinions of the other European Powers into consideration. It was added that it was also very decisive for the Ottoman state to collaborate with the Russian government which was a neighbor and friend of the Ottoman Empire (*Devlet-i Âliyye'nin mücâvir ve muhibb-i hâssı olan Rusya devlet-i fehîmmesi*). The cooperative attitude and partnership between the Ottoman Empire and Russia would be beneficial for the elimination of any negative political result which could pose a threat to the sovereign rights of the Ottoman Empire in Crete and the

---

It should be important to note that the Ottoman governments made repeated references to the consolidation of friendship and partnership between the Ottoman and Russian Empires during the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II. As Selim Deringil mentioned that the theme of "natural allies" became a significant "diplomatic charade" at that time. See: Selim Deringil. "The Ottoman Empire and Russian Muslims: Brothers or Rivals?," in his: *The Ottomans, the Turks, and World Power Politics*, (İstanbul: Isis Press, 2000), p. 74.

[34] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.BŞK., Dosya: 56, Gömlek: 2, Aded: 1, 1315 Za 9.

preservation of its rights in the Mediterranean and Bosphorus. If the Ottoman offer was approved by the Russian government, the other European governments would also accept it. In the last part of the telegram, it was pointed out that since the island was in revolt, this put the Muslims' rights and interests into a very difficult position and affected the local trade. For that reason, these unfavorable conditions should be stopped. At the end, the Russian mediation before the other European Powers was asked to negotiate in this matter.[35]

At that time, the Russian government paid special attention to the Far East and its expansionist policy gained momentum in China and Persia; and became very hostile with some countries in the Far East.[36] It was argued that this had an impact on the Russian foreign policy in the Near East, and therefore, Russia could not dare to deteriorate its relations with the Islamic countries. If the Ottoman Sultan should have let the Russian Emperor select an Ottoman subject for the post of Governor-General in Crete, the offer of the Ottoman government would not be so hopeless. And, if the Russian Emperor rejected the Ottoman state's offer and insisted on the appointment of Prince George, the other European states might support Russia. However, the Russian government would not be able to participate in taking coercive measures to urge the Ottoman state to approve of Prince George's appointment, since the Russian Emperor feared that the Sultan could provoke the Muslims in Russia against him.[37]

It should be important to remark that Sultan Abdülhamid II regarded Russia's support and mediation vital to the integrity of the Ottoman Empire and his sovereign rights

---

[35] T.C. BOA, İradeler Tasnifi, İ.MTZ.GR., Dosya: 34, Gömlek: 1475, Aded: 4, 1315 Za 12.

[36] Alan Bodger. "Russia and the End of the Otoman Empire," in: Marian Kent (ed.). *The Great Powers and the End of the Ottoman Empire*, (London: Frank Cass, 1996), pp. 76-77.

[37] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.BŞK., Dosya: 56, Gömlek: 101, Aded: 6, 1315 L 28.

in Crete. In other words, the Ottoman Empire considered that the finalization of the governor issue lay in enlisting the support of Russia, because the Sultan and his ministers were sure that the appointment of Prince George would endanger the unity of the Ottoman Empire; pose a real threat to the Ottoman Empire's security in the Mediterranean; and threaten its survival on the island. For that reason, they repeatedly instructed the Ottoman representative in St. Petersburg to appeal to the Russian emperor to mediate before the other European Powers and induce them to compromise and abandon their insistence on the nomination of Prince George to Crete. In the course of the conversations with the Russian representatives, the Ottoman ambassador made references to the good relations and partnership between the two countries. Yet, the Russian government declined to mediate and urged the Ottoman Empire to approve of Prince George's appointment. The upshot was that the Sublime Porte should make a new diplomatic attempt with the European Powers with an offer to appoint an Ottoman subject as governor.

In his reply, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs stated that the Russian state had previously offered the appointment of a high Christian official of the Ottoman Empire as governor of Crete, but its offer was strongly opposed by the other European Powers that forced the Russian government to abandon its proposal. He added that due to this opposition, the efforts made for the appointment of a Christian Ottoman subject as governor would not produce any results. He further remarked that it was impossible for the Russian government to mediate before the other cabinets so as to reach any solution in accordance with the Ottoman state's demand.[38]

It was clearly understood from the Russian Foreign Minister's reply that the appointment of a high Christian official of the Ottoman Empire as governor of Crete was strongly opposed by Britain, France, and Italy. The Ottoman government needed to do

[38] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.HR., Dosya: 25, Gömlek: 47, Aded: 4, 1315 Za 19.

something to preserve its integrity and rights and to assure the confidence of the Muslim inhabitants of the island. The appointment of Prince George would constitute too serious a violation of territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire and the Sultan's sovereign rights. For that reason, the only thing to be done was to forestall the appointment of Prince George through diplomatic means. The Sublime Porte sent a long telegram to its ambassadors in these countries stating that the opposition of certain European Powers prevented the appointment of a Christian of the Ottoman Empire as governor of Crete and the acceptance of a foreigner as governor would jeopardize the sovereign rights of the Empire. It was further noted that the Sublime Porte would persist in its refusal to consent to a foreigner as governor of the island. The appointment of Alexander Karatodori Paşa or of some other Christian official of the Ottoman Empire would be the best.[39]

The British government replied to the Ottoman government that the decrees declared by the Sultan Abdülhamid II were seriously taken into consideration by the British government. And if the British government accepted the appointment of an Ottoman subject to the governorship of Crete, the Christian population of the island would oppose it. According to the British government, this situation might necessitate the dispatch of European troops. At the moment, for the British government, it was impossible to send the military forces to the island.[40] It was supposed that "… if Prince George of Greece is appointed Governor-General with the consent of the Sultan, and by investiture from His Majesty, the evil effects apprehended by the Ottoman Government would not ensue…"[41] In reply to Lord Salisbury's statements, Sultan Abdülhamid II said that "Lord Salisbury's reply has caused me the deepest sorrow… The appointment of Prince George

[39] T.C. BOA, İradeler Tasnifi, İ.MTZ.GR., Dosya: 34, Gömlek: 1476, Aded: 4, 1315 Za 17; British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 5 (1898), No. 165.

[40] T.C. BOA, İradeler Tasnifi, İ.MTZ.GR., Dosya: 34, Gömlek: 1477, Aded: 3/4, 1315 Za 22; T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.A., Dosya: 11, Gömlek: 83, Aded: 5, 1315 Za 21.

[41] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 5 (1898), No. 152.

would cause much danger to the State, and it is impossible for me to accept any such proposal…"[42]

In addition to the governorship issue, the withdrawal of the Ottoman troops in Crete came to fore. On 2 April 1898, the European admirals in Crete sent the following identic note to their governments:

> … the departure of the Austro-Hungarian troops obliges the Admirals to demand an augmentation of the international troops … as all the actual difficulties come from the presence of Turkish troops, the Admirals beg their Governments to insist to the Porte for the immediate recall of one-half of the garrison, and the concentration of the other half on one or two points till its definite departure…[43]

The Sublime Porte opposed the immediate recall of half of the Ottoman troops from the island and their concentration on fixed points until their departure. It was considered that these troops were the material evidence of the territorial and sovereign rights of the Ottoman government. It was also contrary to the assurances which were given by the European Powers concerning the territorial integrity and sovereign rights of the Ottoman Empire.[44]

The Ottoman Empire was left powerless to do anything by the replies of the European governments. It feared that the foreign states might appoint Prince George to Crete which would upset the interests of the Ottoman Empire and jeopardize its sovereign rights and unity on the island. On 13 April 1898, the Ottoman ministers met in the Ottoman Cabinet to examine the Cretan affairs in depth. According to the ministers, the appointment of a foreign subject as governor to Crete would not be appropriate to the principle of the territorial integrity of the Ottoman state, and the appointment of Prince George to the post of governor would be a *fait accompli*. They further considered that the Ottoman-Greek

---

[42] *ibid.,* No. 156.

[43] *ibid.,* No. 142.

[44] *ibid.,* No. 155.

War of 1897 and the Cretan issue were not separate things, since the arrival of Prince George, with the Greek forces on the island deteriorated the relationship between the Ottoman and Greek governments. Moreover, the Greek government had dared to attack the Ottoman-Greek frontier disregarding the European Powers' peaceful notifications. The European Powers attempted to appoint Prince George to the governor post of Crete even after the Ottoman victory. It was added that during the peace negotiations between the Ottoman and European delegations, although the former wanted to settle the Cretan issue in accordance with the desires and rights of the Sublime Porte, the latter argued that the Cretan issue was not dependent on the Ottoman-Greek War, and the assurances given for the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire and the sovereign rights of the Ottoman Sultan would not be violated. The ministers feared that the European Powers could appoint Prince George as governor to the Crete and obliged the Ottoman state to approve of his appointment. For that reason, they contemplated further policies.[45]

Local Conditions in Crete

The living conditions on the island were similar to that of the previous year. Both Muslims and Christians sufferied from the unsettled state of things. According to the British consul reports, some Christian inhabitants of the interior part were in need of food. These families lived on herbs which they ate without oil or bread. While some of them began to go to Greece, others were dependent on the relief. The Russian government and the English Relief Committee of Westminster Fund aided those poor people. Moreover, rural Christian population, the Muslim refugees and poor Muslims in the towns received

[45] T.C. BOA, İradeler Tasnifi, İ.MTZ.GR., Dosya: 34, Gömlek: 1477, Aded: 3/4, 1315 Za 22; T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.A., Dosya: 11, Gömlek: 83, Aded: 5, 1315 Za 21.

relief from the Russian government and the English Relief Committee.[46] The Duke of Westminster's Fund had also distributed food and sulphur to the Christians to use in their vineyards.[47] The Muslim refugees were still in great difficulty and largely dependent on the Ottoman government's relief sources. It was estimated that 12,124 Muslims in Chania; 10,712 in Rethymnon; 29,740 in Candia; and 7,534 in Lasithi received relief from the Ottoman government.[48]

In Chania, a collision between an Ottoman soldier and two French soldiers occurred. According to the French accounts, they had quarreled for the "right of way" and the French soldiers seized the Ottoman soldier. Two Montenegrin gendarmes intervened to separate them, and succeeded in doing so. They let the Ottoman soldier, Yakub go; but he returned and fired two shots at the French soldier. Then, on his way to the Ottoman guard-house, he fired again in the air and entered the house. The French guard closed the gate. Yakub was disarmed, but he jumped out of a window and rushed into the street with his dagger, and then the Montenegrins arrested him and took his dagger away. From one of the windows of the guard-house a shot was fired. In the end, two Muslims and one Christian were wounded.[49]

According to the Ottoman accounts, however, on his way to Soğukçeşme, several drunken French soldiers assaulted Yakub, and tried to take away his rifle. As Yakub tried to defend himself, one of the French soldiers hit him with his bayonet. At that moment, the Montenegrin gendarmes rushed to the scene and wounded Yakub, who could afterwards not continue his journey. The Montenegrins followed him and fired at him. As a result of

---

[46] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 5 (1898), No. 248, Enclosure 2 No. 206; British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 6 (1898), *Further Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Crete*, (London: 1898), No. 33; PRO: FO, 78/4969, "British Relief Work in Crete," 27 June 1898, p. 163.

[47] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 5 (1898), Enclosure 1 in No. 225.

[48] *ibid*., Enclosure 1 in No. 199.

[49] *ibid.,* No. 204.

the Montenegrins' shots, two Muslims and one Christian were wounded.[50] Immediately after the collision, the admirals in Crete had proposed to Cevad Paşa that the forts of the island should be evacuated by the Ottoman troops.[51]

Concerning the question of the Ottoman garrison on the island, the British Foreign Minister thought that the Sublime Porte would not be induced to reduce its forces by mere representations. Rather a definite proposal on the part of the admirals would be taken into consideration. He further stated that if the Sublime Porte did not follow the European Power's advice on this subject, it must bear the whole responsibility for any consequences.[52]

With regard to the Russian proposal on the subject of instructing the admirals to establish a temporary government on the island, Lord Salisbury declared that the admirals could not control the whole island with their inadequate forces. According to Lord Salisbury, if they had attempted this, they would not be able to succeed. The disposal of adequate forces would not possible without money. He added that the money would be obtained by loan, and it was very doubtful whether that would be approved by the British Cabinet.[53] After these reservations, Lord Salisbury proposed that the Cretan Assembly should be invited to appoint an executive committee in charge of provisional administration of the interior parts of the island which were occupied neither by the international forces nor by the Ottomans. This committee should act in accordance with the admirals' advice.[54] In this sense, the Russian Foreign Minister Count Mouravieff said that

---

[50] *ibid.,* Enclosure in No. 197.

[51] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.MYD., Dosya: 21, Gömlek: 73, Aded: 1, 1316 Ca 17; British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 5 (1898), No. 187.

[52] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 5 (1898), No. 192.

[53] *ibid.,* No. 193; T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.EE., Dosya: 114, Gömlek: 96, Aded: 2/98, 22 Nisan 1898.

[54] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 5 (1898), No. 193.

there were no fundamental differences between the Russian and British views[55] and proposed the following: "an Executive Council in Crete should be nominated by the Assembly, in accordance with your Lordship's wish, conditional, however, on the right of veto being reserved to the admirals."[56] This proposal was accepted by the British government. In a way, the admirals would directly be responsible for the administration of the interior of the island.[57]

On 16 June 1898, the British consul reported to his government complaining "that the island is governed by no one."[58] For him, there was a lack of authority on the island. As the authority of the European admirals had not extended beyond the towns, the interior part of the island was controlled by the Christians and conflicting jurisdictions of the various European officials caused some difficulties in the towns. The European naval authorities had conflicted with the military, and in some cases the advice of the consuls had been neglected by the admirals. The Ottoman authorities were not in harmony either. This can be seen in Mehmed Şakir Bey's report in which he criticized Cevad Paşa for attaching too much importance on the British consul's statements regarding the Ottoman troops. He argued that Cevad Paşa's fears and suspicions on this subject were the result of his wishful thinking and were out of place. And Cevad Paşa's flurry created an unpleasant atmosphere, which was contrary to his post, and caused the sarcastic laugh of the enemies. According to

[55] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.EE., Dosya: 114, Gömlek: 96, Aded: 2/98, 1 Mayıs 1898.

[56] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 5 (1898), No. 215.

[57] *ibid*., No. 216.

[58] Cited in: Robert Holland. "Nationalism, Ethnicity and the Concert of Europe: The Case of the High Commissionership of Prince George of Greece in Crete, 1898-1906," *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, Vol. XVII, No. 2, October 1999, p. 255; He quoted this part from British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 5 (1898), No. 248.

Mehmed Şakir Bey, the British consul and the commander of Candia were two sly Britons, who made use of Cevad Paşa's weaknesses.[59]

Since the question of the future administration of the island had not been solved, the European Powers thought of applying the principles settled the previous year by the European representatives in İstanbul. Accordingly, an Executive Committee (*İcrâ Komitesi*) was constituted on the basis of the following points: the Cretan Assembly would nominate the Executive Committee, which would be of a temporary character and would be in constant communication with the admirals. If the Executive Committee exceeded its powers, the admirals would suspend it. While the Executive Committee would administer the portions of the island which obeyed the Cretan Assembly, the districts occupied by the Ottoman and European troops would be under the control of the admirals as hitherto exercised.[60] Furthermore, the four European Powers considered the formation of an international syndicate of bankers which would be authorized to collect the whole or part of the 3 per cent customs surtax.[61] The Russian government thought that the Sublime Porte should be informed about the establishment of the temporary administration on the island. The French government agreed with the Russian government, but the British Foreign Minister Lord Salisbury considered it unnecessary. The Russian government insisted on its suggestion and at the beginning of July 1898, the First Dragomans of four European states informed the Sublime Porte that the Cretan Assembly was to be given the power to appoint an Executive Committee on the basis of the above mentioned points.[62]

---

[59] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.MYD., Dosya: 21, Gömlek: 73, Aded: 1, 1316 Ca 17.

[60] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 5 (1898), Enclosure in No. 238.

[61] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 6 (1898), No. 46.

[62] *ibid.,* No. 3; Samuel Beach Chester. *Life of Venizelos*, (New York: G.H. Doran, 1921), p. 62; T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.EE., Dosya: 114, Gömlek: 96, Aded: 2/98, 20 Haziran 1898 and 29 Haziran 1898.

Provincial Administration and the Cretan Assembly

The consular body in Crete was ordered by the admirals' council to prepare the basis of a provisional government and to decide the mode of election of the Executive Council. The European consuls in Crete had embodied a detailed scheme, according to which, the Executive Committee should be elected by the Cretan Assembly and be represented by an Administrator-General in each of the four international sections. The trials would be executed according to the Cretan Law, a provisional gendarmerie composed of native and European elements commanded by foreign officers; that is, under the orders of the commander of the section, would also be established. The scheme also involved the settlement of a provisional budget in which the taxes would be levied under the assistance of the gendarmerie. In this scheme, the admirals had only objected to the statement of justice. For the admirals, all criminal acts had to be referred to the Military Tribunal. In the end, the note drawn up by the consuls was submitted to the members of the Cretan Assembly.[63]

The Sublime Porte strongly opposed the recognition of the Cretan Assembly, which was regarded by the Sublime Porte as the representative of only the insurgent portion of the population,[64] and accordingly, the Sublime Porte sent the following memorandum to the European states, protesting the scheme of a provisional government for Crete:

> … [the Cretan Assembly] will be requested by the Admirals to appoint an Executive Committee for the provisional administration of certain parts of the island is merely an assembly of the leaders of the insurgents, who have upset property, commerce, and industry in Crete, compromised order and tranquility, and committed all sorts of exactions to the prejudice of their fellow-countrymen. To propose to intrust to them the administration, even provisionally, of a part of the island, is to legalize their position at the expense of the Mussulmans who have various interests there…[65]

---

[63] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 6 (1898), No. 35, Enclosure 2,3 in No. 35.

[64] *ibid.,* No. 4.

[65] *ibid.,* Enclosure in No. 21.

Yet, the European Powers defended themselves that the arrangement was entirely provisional and was formed in order to restore the order on the island.[66]

As the Muslims' interests and rights were not taken into consideration during the preparation of the form of provisional administration of the island, the leading Muslim figures of Chania, in the name of the Muslim population of the town, had appealed to Salisbury requesting security for their lives, properties, and interests:

> … those of our properties in the country which have not been destroyed are in the usurping hands of the insurgents, who have no fear of being punished in accordance with the laws, while 25,000 families, naked, famished, and deprived of everything, have for the last eighteen months been leading a wretched life in the towns and cooped up within the narrow limits of the military cordons, a prey to fearful destitution … no mention has been made of us, no measures has been adopted for securing our interests and our civil and political rights, in the recent Memorandum concerning the provisional administration of the island…we implore the Powers … to secure to us now, and for the future, our lives, our honour, our property, our interests, and our rights…[67]

On 12 July 1898, the Ottoman Commander-in-chief Cevad Paşa visited Admiral Pottier to ask permission to replace the 5,000 time-expired Ottoman soldiers with the other Ottoman troops. Admiral Pottier replied that the Ottoman troops might leave the island, but the fresh troops could not be allowed to disembark to Crete.[68] To express its intention for the replacement of the time-expired troops in Crete by fresh ones, the Sublime Porte sent a verbal note to its representatives stating that "…the Imperial Government….[is] not seeking to increase the strength of the Ottoman contingent in the island … it is inadmissible that the liberty allowed to the other Powers of changing the soldiers they keep in Crete should be refused to the Imperial Government, the territorial Sovereign of the

---

[66] *ibid.,* No. 27.

[67] *ibid.,* No. 42.

[68] *ibid.,* No. 23, and 24; T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.EE., Dosya: 114, Gömlek: 96, Aded: 2/98, 15 Temmuz 1898.

island…"[69] The Sublime Porte had further communicated with the Russian government through its ambassador for the purpose of getting permission to replace the time-expired Ottoman troops by new ones. The Russian Foreign Minister Count Mouravieff noted that the request of the Sublime Porte could not be accepted since the presence of Ottoman troops was seen as the main obstacle to the pacification of the island. He further mentioned that the present policy of the Sublime Porte undermined the efforts of the four European Powers concerning the island. He added that if the Sublime Porte kept on insisting on its policy on Crete, the result could be either the annexation of Crete to Greece or its complete independence.[70]

On 19 July 1898, 300 Christian deputies and electors from various parts of the island held a meeting in Akrotiri-Plakoures, where they had elected six new deputies for each of the twenty districts and for the three towns. These deputies requested some modifications in the scheme for a provisional government prepared by the consuls at the requests of the admirals. Finding the provisional government improbable, they had requested some modifications in the way it would be formed. The Cretan Assembly considered the existence of the Ottoman troops on the island as the main barrier to the reestablishment of order and without the withdrawal of these troops nothing could be established in Crete. The Cretan Assembly further stated that it would be impossible for them to allow the Muslims to return to their villages if the Ottoman troops were not withdrawn from the island. The consuls had submitted these requests to the council of admirals and after the sitting held on board on 25 July 1898, the admirals declared the final decision concerning the basis of the provisional government. It is important to note that the

[69] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 6 (1898), Enclosure in No. 60.

[70] *ibid.,* No. 62.

final decision of the admirals was almost "word by word" drawn from the scheme prepared by the consuls.[71]

It was considered by the Ottoman government that sovereign rights of the Sultan and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire would be guaranteed by the appointment of an Orthodox Ottoman subject as governor of Crete and the continued presence of Ottoman troops on the island. Moreover, the autonomous government that was promised by the European Powers could not be contrary to those principles. For that reason, it was deemed necessary to maintain the same action and discuss the matter in the parliamentary meeting and then submit the decision to the Ottoman Sultan.[72]

At the end of the July 1898, the Cretan Assembly had unanimously accepted the final scheme of the provisional administration with the reservation that the Ottoman troops should be withdrawn from the island.[73] In the meanwhile, the admirals had begun to deal with finding financial resources for the expenses of the provisional government. For that reason, they had asked their governments to undertake the authority for the management and collection of the Cretan *a'şâr*.[74]

Candia in September 1898

The council of admirals had decided to undertake the management and collection of the tithe revenue for the purpose of using it for the needs of the provisional government.

---

[71] *ibid.,* Enclosure 1 in No. 54.

[72] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.BŞK., Dosya: 57, Gömlek: 50, Aded: 1, 1316 Ra 10.

[73] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 6 (1898), No. 50.

[74] *ibid.,* No. 48.
At that time, there were three main revenues in the island. The first was the customs revenues divided into two: import duty of 8 percent that was imposed on the products introduced into the island, and export duty of 1 percent imposed on the products exported for a foreign port, and of 8 percent on the products sent to another port of the Ottoman Empire. The second revenue was the custom surtax of 3 percent that imposed on all merchandize imported into the island. The third one was the *a'şâr* which represented an export duty and varies according to the products between 10 and 13 percents.
ibid., Enclosure 3 in No. 65.

According to the new arrangements, to each of the major ports, a director, a controller and a secretary of the Christian sect were to be appointed. The receipts were to be handed to the commander daily and would be remitted to the head office in Chania periodically. At the minor ports, outside the military cordon, the Executive Committee would be responsible for the collection of the *a'şâr* which would remit monthly.[75] According to the British consul, the management and collection of the *a'şâr* were conducted without any difficulty, except in Candia. In this sense, it is important to note the statements of British Consul Biliotti: "…what is an easy task in Canea becomes a very dangerous one in Candia, owing to the far superior number of Muslims, their heavier sufferings and distress, and especially the animosity of the Sitia Muslims who are in Candia, as a result of the massacre of their relatives."[76]

On 3 September 1898, Edhem Paşa was officially called by Colonel Reid and Consul Biliotti, who required that the *a'şâr* office should be handed over to them and the clerks should be withdrawn, which Edhem Paşa refused to do. After that, a letter was written by the British representatives stating that the Ottoman officials should continue to retain possession of the office, but a clerk paid by these representatives should be kept in the office to keep accounts of receipts, and the money should be reserved until some final instructions arrived. This was not accepted by Edhem Paşa, either. İsmail Hakkı Bey agreed to allow the collection and instructed Edhem Paşa. In the end, the British suggestion was accepted. The admirals also declared that they carried out this task by conciliatory means or by compulsion.[77]

---

[75] *ibid.,* Enclosure 1 in No. 60.

[76] *ibid.,* No. 5.

[77] *ibid*., No. 1, 5; see also: Jean Stanislaw Dutkowski. *L'occupation de la Crète (1897-1909): Une Expérience d'administration Internationale d'un Territoire*, (Paris: A. Pedone, 1952), especially, 66-67.

According to the British accounts, the Muslims in Candia were in a great excitement on 7 September 1898. They had prevented the opening of the market in Gazi. As their excitement increased, a British common picket was sent to the town. On the same day, Colonel Reid had gone to the *a'şâr* office, which was situated near the quay, in order to take possession of it. When he arrived at the *a'şâr* office, the doors were locked. The key was obtained from one of the office guards. Within a minute, one of the pickets was stabbed from behind, and then he fell down and his rifle went off and killed a Muslim. In the meanwhile, firing commenced in the town. From the surrounding houses, windows, and the ramparts heavy firing had begun. Candia became an inferno. Then, the British gun-boat began to bombard Candia. As a result, 150 Muslims and 200 Christians were killed. The British Vice-Consul Calocherino was also burnt.[78] According to the French accounts, 13 British soldiers and one British officer were killed, 40 British soldiers and two British officers were wounded during the disturbances. In order to help the British forces in Candia, one company of French and Italian forces were sent there.[79]

On the other hand, the Ottoman authorities on the island reported the following to the Sublime Porte: when the British forces had gone to the *a'şâr* office, a Muslim mob, who gathered in the quay, was scattered by the British detachment. Afterwards, as the Muslim mob came back to the quay, the leading figures of the town were sent to the quay. In the meanwhile, in the Vezir Street, which was in the interior of the town, the Christians opened fire on the Muslims. Immediately afterwards, in the gate of harbor, the British infantry soldiers hit the Muslim mob with their bayonets and two Muslims were wounded. Fire was also opened in the air and a few more Muslims were wounded. At that moment,

[78] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 7 (1898), *Further Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Crete*, (London: 1898), No. 11, 20, 27, and 64; According to the *Yellow Book*, 600 Christians were killed during the disturbances. T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.EE., Dosya: 114, Gömlek: 96, Aded: 2/98, 10 Eylül 1898. According to the Ottoman records, 153 Christians were killed in Candia. For the details see: Appendix.1.

[79] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.EE., Dosya: 114, Gömlek: 96, Aded: 2/98, 7 Eylül 1898, 8 Eylül 1898.

the Muslims took up arms and a collision between the Muslims and Christians occurred. All the shops in the Vezir Street were burned down and the fire spread into the harbor. A company of Ottoman troops were sent there to prevent the disturbances.[80]

Due to this outbreak in Candia, the British government demanded the withdrawal of the Ottoman troops from the island. It was argued that the real cause of this event was the Ottoman officers and the Ottoman forces had not done anything to prevent the outbreak. For that reason, the withdrawal of the Ottoman troops and authorities was requested by the admirals.[81] The Sublime Porte opposed this request arguing that the order on the island had been maintained by the Ottoman troops and that the rights of the Muslims had been preserved by the Ottoman troops. It was decided to inform the European governments that the Ottoman state, as the sole owner of the island, would never agree with the efforts concerning the withdrawal of the Ottoman troops.[82]

Admiral Noel's Demands and Ottoman Response

On September 1898, the admirals issued a memorandum.[83] Upon this, the Sublime Porte sent a long circular to its ambassadors in Europe requesting them to communicate with the European Minister of Foreign Affairs:

> … the Governor of Candia made the most strenuous efforts to allay the excitement, and that the Imperial troops did their best to protect the foreign officers and soldiers and to restore order … the Imperial Government considers that the action of the Admirals … is absolutely contrary to the assurances given by the Powers in regard

[80] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.ASK., Dosya: 143, Gömlek: 103, Aded: 10, 1316 R 23; T.C. BOA, İradeler Tasnifi, İ.MTZ.GR., Dosya: 32, Gömlek: 1307, Aded: 18,1316 R 20.

[81] T.C. BOA**,** Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.EŞA., Dosya: 31, Gömlek: 21, Aded: 1, 1316 R 6; T.C. BOA, Y.EE., Dosya: 114, Gömlek: 96, Aded: 2/98, 10 September 1898; British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 7 (1898), No. 34, and 49.

[82] T.C. BOA, İradeler Tasnifi, İ.MTZ.GR., Dosya: 32, Gömlek: 1302, Aded: 1, 1316 R 23.

[83] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 7 (1898), No. 66. For the details of the memorandum see the demands of Admiral Noel.

> to its sovereign rights, and is calculated to expose Crete to still greater misfortunes…[84]

Admiral Noel demanded the following from Edhem Paşa: First, the ring-leaders of the late disturbance in Candia should be given up and the entire Muslim population of the town should be disarmed within the next forty-eight hours. Second, the buildings which were across the barracks of the international troops should be destroyed within the next twenty four hours. Third, the fire should not be opened to the British forces again. Fourth, the Ottoman troops should occupy certain positions so as to able to help the British soldiers should a new occasion arise. Admiral Noel also pointed out that if the measures were not adopted within the time specified, coercive measures would be taken. After being informed of these demands, the Ottoman Foreign Minister paid a visit to the British Embassy to convey a verbal message of the Sultan. It was suggested that a mixed commission should be appointed in order to find the ring-leaders who were not still in the hands of Edhem Paşa. According to Sultan Abdülhamid II, the entire population of Candia should be disarmed, not only the Muslim inhabitants, as it was stated by Admiral Noel. If the Christians were permitted to carry their arms while the Muslims were not, this would lead to resentment among the Muslims.[85] Accordingly, a circular was sent to the Ottoman representatives consisting of the "counter-propositions" of the Sublime Porte against Admiral Noel's demands. It was stated that:

> … In accordance with the proposals of the Admiral, the Imperial troops are to guard the ramparts and maintain public order and tranquility; in order to secure the building occupied by the international troops against any attack, the houses opposite to it, instead of being demolished, are to be evacuated and guarded by Ottoman soldiers; and the international troops in Crete, whom the Imperial Government looks upon as a force intended to assist it, are to be respected as they have been hitherto. As regards the discovery and arrest the persons whose incitements caused the disturbances and the disarming of the Muslim population, we are of opinion that the requirements of the case will be better met by appointing

[84] *ibid.,* No. 61.

[85] *ibid.,* No. 74; T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.ASK., Dosya: 144, Gömlek: 13, Aded: 2, 1316 R 27.

> without delay a Commission, presided over by his Highness Cevad Paşa. Each of the Great Powers would be represented by a Delegate, and the Commission would be instructed to make a minute and equitable inquiry, with a view to discover the guilty parties and punish them in accordance with the law, and to decide on the best manner of proceeding; with all possible precautions, to disarm both the Muslims and Christians…[86]

Yet, these "counter-propositions" were not taken into consideration by the four European Powers. The culprits were arrested and handed over to Admiral Noel by Edhem Paşa. Moreover, their houses were destroyed.[87] By 15 September 1898, thirty-nine houses were destroyed, and on 26 September 1898 ninety-eight prisoners were handed over to Admiral Noel.[88] With regard to the punishment of the ring-leaders who had been handed over to Admiral Noel, Sultan Abdülhamid II thought that they should be banished to the distant parts of the Ottoman Empire, such as Tripoli, Yemen, Taif, and prevented from coming back to the island forever.[89]

On 16 September 1898, Admiral Noel sent a letter to Edhem Paşa informing that all the arms should be collected in Candia and delivered them to the harbor for conveyance to British ships not later than sunset on 20 September 1898, and that the safety of the disarmed Muslims were guaranteed by the British forces.[90] An imperial *irâde* was issued specifying that the arms of the Muslims in Candia should be collected by the Ottoman officials and those arms should be sent to İstanbul.[91] Admiral Noel consented that the arms

---

[86] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 7 (1898), No. 83.

[87] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 7 (1898), No. 82, and 100; T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.ASK., Dosya: 144, Gömlek: 8, Aded: 6, 1316 R 27.

[88] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 7 (1898), No. 82; Samuel Beach Chester. *Life of Venizelos*, p. 68.

[89] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 7 (1898), No. 90, and 100; T.C. BOA, İradeler Tasnifi, İ.MTZ.GR., Dosya: 32, Gömlek: 1297, Aded: 1, 1316 Ra 28; Ayşe Nükhet Adıyeke. *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Girit Bunalımı (1896-1908)*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 2000), p. 204.

[90] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 7 (1898), Encloure 2 in No. 148.

[91] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.MYD., Dosya: 21, Gömlek: 71, Aded: 2, 1316 Ca 17; T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.ASK., Dosya: 144, Gömlek: 47, Aded: 1, 1316 Ca 2.

which belonged to the Ottoman government would be sent to İstanbul.[92] After that, Edhem Paşa's orders were announced by notices and public criers in the town of Candia. In the evening of 19 September 1898, the Muslims began to hand over their arms. Moreover, a special commission was sent to the countryside to collect the arms of the whole Muslim inhabitants of the island.[93]

The Italian government proposed that a joint representation should be made by the representatives of the four European states to the Sublime Porte with a view to the withdrawal of the Ottoman troops and officials from the island. On the other hand, French Foreign Minister Delcassé thought that this collective note would be more effective and successful, if the European Powers joined it.[94] However, Germany and Austria-Hungary refused to take part in the collective representation to be submitted to the Sublime Porte. On 22 September 1898, the remaining four European Powers had decided to submit the collective note demanding that the Sublime Porte commence the withdrawal of Ottoman troops and authorities from the island by 5 October 1898.[95] In this sense, it should be pointed out that a turning point concerning the withdrawal of the Ottoman troops came with the disturbances in Candia. The European Powers' opinion solidified under the influence of this event and the European admirals "… turned definitely in [Christians'] favor…"[96]

---

[92] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.MYD., Dosya: 21, Gömlek: 71, Aded: 2, 1316 Ca 17.

[93] *ibid*. It was reported that 4,702 arms were collected from the Muslim inhabitants of Candia until 25 September 1898.

[94] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 7 (1898), No. 81, and 98; T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi., Y.EE., Dosya: 114, Gömlek: 96, Aded: 2/98, 17 Eylül 1898.

[95] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 7 (1898), No. 136.

[96] Samuel Beach Chester. *Life of Venizelos*, p. 66.

Collective Note of the European States

Towards the end of September 1898, the draft of the joint collective note to the Sublime Porte was approved by the four foreign states. The Russian government suggested that before the note was submitted to the Sublime Porte, the European Powers should come to an agreement on the necessary coercive measures to be taken in case the Sublime Porte refused to act in compliance with the note. However, Lord Salisbury opposed this suggestion in that any delay in the presentation of this collective note would increase the already present difficulties.[97]

The Ottoman government was well aware of the fact that the present state of affairs became very unsatisfactory. The four European Powers had already decided to send a collective note to the Ottoman government to withdraw its forces and officers from the island. In order to prevent the negative results of the European note, in the Ottoman Cabinet meeting of 27 September 1898, the ministers decided to request European cabinets that the Cretan issue should be settled on the basis of international treaties. Accordingly, the Ottoman representatives in Europe made hopeless attempts to urge the European governments.[98]

The Ottoman ambassador in St. Petersburg visited the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs to enumerate the dangers which would arise out of the European representatives' note regarding the withdrawal of the Ottoman troops from Crete. The Ottoman ambassador made an appeal to the Russian government, expressing the Ottoman Sultan's wish for friendly support of the Russian emperor to preserve the rights and interests of the Sublime Porte. The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs replied that the Ottoman notification would be delivered to the Russian emperor. The Russian ambassador in İstanbul was instructed to

[97] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 7 (1898), No. 147.

[98] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Res., Dosya: 95, Gömlek: 18, Aded: 4, 1316 5 11.

make efforts to preserve the rights of the Sultan, but not separate the Russian state from the three governments' alliance. According to the Ottoman representative in St. Petersburg, the other three states insisted on the evacuation of the Ottoman forces from the island, and it was very difficult for the Russian state to separate itself from the alliance.[99]

On 4 October 1898, the collective note concerning the withdrawal of the Ottoman troops from Crete was submitted to the Sublime Porte:

> … the presence of the Turkish troops is a permanent source of agitation and constitute the principal cause of disorder, and the sanguinary events which have recently taken place at Candia demonstrate their complete inability to insure tranquility at the places occupied by them. Their retention is an obstacle to the disarmament of the Christian population and the re-establishment of a regular state of affairs…

It was further added that the four Powers instructed their representatives in İstanbul to invite the Sublime Porte "… to recall all the troops in garrison in Crete within a period of one month, the evacuation to commence fifteen days after the delivery of the present note … [the four European Powers] will also take all the necessary steps to insure the security of the Muslim population…"[100] It was also pointed out that "in the event of the four Powers meeting with a refusal, they will be compelled to have recourse immediately to active measures for effecting the evacuation of Crete by the Turkish troops."[101] This note can be considered the turning point for the sovereign rights of the Ottoman Empire. From then on, according to the Ottoman state, the "material evidence" of the territorial and sovereign rights of the Ottoman Empire would be destroyed.

The following table provides details of the numbers of Ottoman troops stationed in Crete:[102]

---

[99] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.EŞA., Dosya: 31, Gömlek: 76, Aded: 1, 1316 Ca 20.

[100] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 7 (1898), Enclosure in No. 165.

[101] *ibid*.

[102] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.ASK., Dosya: 145, Gömlek: 9, Aded: 2, 1316 Ca 27.

Table 4: The amount of the Ottoman troops stationed in Crete

places where the Ottoman troops were stationed	**total numbers of soldiers**	**rank**
Candia	651	infantry
Chania	539	infantry
Candia	622	infantry
Chania	698	infantry
Chania	561	infantry
Chania	756	infantry
Chania	671	infantry
Chania	49	infantry
Candia	810	infantry
Candia	608	infantry
Candia	764	infantry
Candia	754	infantry
Candia	38	infantry
Rethmynon	700	infantry
Rethmynon	669	infantry
Rethmynon	672	infantry
Chania	466	infantry
Total	**10,248**	

The major centers (Smyrna, Salonica and Beirut) to which the Ottoman soldiers were dispatched, and the provinces to which those soldiers belonged are listed as follows:[103]

Table 5: The major centers to which the Ottoman soldiers were dispatched

Smyrna		**Salonica**		**Beirut**	
Ankara	462	Selanik	544	Suriye	552
İzmit	49	Kosova	288	Beyrut	192
Bursa	369	Manastır	104	Kudüs	123
Biga	90	Yanya	180	Halep	346
Dersaadet	181	İşkodra	97	**Total**	**1,213**
Kayseri	8	Edirne	473		
Kastamonu	832	**Total**	**1,686**		
Sivas	158				
Trabzon	930				
Erzurum	72				
Diyarbakır	11				
Mamüratül-aziz	336				
Van	1				
Aydın	855				
Konya	769				
Total	**5,123**				

Meanwhile, in order to prepare a welcome ceremony for Prince George, a commission, composed of the Cretan Muslims and Christians, was constituted by the Municipality of Chania. The Christian members of this commission offered to make triumphal arches with flowers and fresh leaves from Barbaros to the gate of the castle and to adorn them with the flags of European Powers and Greece. On the contrary, the Muslims offered that the Ottoman flag should be hoisted together with the other flags, which in turn caused a dispute between the Muslim and Christian members of the commission. At the end of the discussion, it was decided that both the Greek and Ottoman flags were not to be hoisted on the triumphal arches. In addition to the preparations for the welcome ceremony, the imperial monogram was removed from the Custom House and

[103] T.C. BOA, İradeler Tasnifi, İ.MTZ.GR., Dosya: 32, Gömlek: 1309, Aded: 4, 1316 Ca 30.

Court House. The latter was assigned for Prince George and was painted and decorated. Whereas the Russians made preparations in Rethymnon, the Municipality of Candia did not make any preparation for the welcome ceremony of the Prince. In Candia, the Muslims dispatched telegrams to the British government and the Queen, complaining that they were not in favor of Prince George and they sheltered under the British protection. The municipalities of Chania and Rethymnon dispatched congratulatory telegrams to Prince George for his appointment as governor to Crete.[104]

According to the ciphered telegram received from İsmail Hakkı Bey, the French admiral in Crete ordered that the documents stored in the Court House were to be handed over to the European Commander in Chania and then accordingly, these documents were counted and handed over to the French commander. İsmail Hakkı Bey stated that it was clearly understood from the admiral's statements that when the evacuation of the Ottoman troops commenced, the European forces would leave the city and the local gendarmerie would be placed under the authority of the new government. İsmail Hakkı Bey added that due to the insufficiency of the new government, the disturbances were likely to take place in Chania. Therefore, the reason for these precautions was to prevent these documents from getting damaged.[105]

The Withdrawal of the Ottoman Troops from Crete

The Ottoman state finally realized that it was no longer possible for the Ottoman troops to remain on the island. Therefore, it directed its attention to the retention of a small contingent in the forts of the island. Accordingly, the Ottoman Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tevfik Paşa, made a desperate attempt before the European representatives in İstanbul to

[104] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.AZJ., Dosya: 37, Gömlek: 90, Aded: 2, 1316 Ca 23.

[105] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.UM., Dosya: 43, Gömlek: 117, Aded: 3, 1316 Ca 30.

urge them to communicate with their respective governments on the subject of the retention of a small contingent in the forts of the island to be the emblem of the sovereign rights of the Ottoman Sultan. He also demanded the protection of the rights and interests of the Muslim population after the withdrawal of the Ottoman troops.[106]

On 10 October 1898, the Sublime Porte replied the collective note of the European Powers:

> … it desires to inform the Powers that as a proof of its acceptance of the contents of the identic note and the pro-memorial addressed to it by the Embassies of the Great Powers on the 2nd and 4th March, 1897, relative to the bases of an autonomous Government to be established in Crete, and especially in proof of its desire to act in concert with them, it has just given the necessary order for the withdrawal, within the period indicated in the [collective] note, of the Imperial troops now in the island, a sufficient contingent being left in the forts (fortified towns) to safeguard its sovereign rights and its flag…[107]

The four European Powers considered Sublime Porte's reply as conditional and unacceptable. For the admirals, the request of the Sublime Porte was very dangerous, since it would in the future be a pretext for the Sublime Porte by which to interfere in the internal affairs of the island in case its troops were attacked. Therefore, the complete evacuation of the Ottoman troops had to be agreed upon by the Ottoman government.[108] The British consul visited Cevad Paşa and told him that although the European Powers considered the Ottoman forces on the island as a main barrier to the "resolution" of the Cretan issue, they accepted the retention of a small Ottoman contingent so as to preserve the Ottoman flag. He also said that the sovereign rights of the Ottoman state over the island and lives and properties of the Muslims would be preserved by the European Powers. Yet, if the Ottoman state did not accept to withdraw its forces, this commitment would be avoided. The consul further warned him that the establishment of an administration, which had been

---

[106] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.HR., Dosya: 26, Gömlek: 42, Aded: 4, 1316 Ca 30.

[107] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 7 (1898), Enclosure in No. 193.

[108] *ibid.,* No. 186, and 188.

long desired by the majority of the Cretan population, could not be prevented. He added that certain coercive measures would be applied, the transportation of arms and provisions to the Ottoman forces would be hindered. Even two British artillery battery and two battalions would be sent to Candia.[109] In the same manner, Consul Biliotti paid a visit to the Acting Governor of Crete, İsmail Hakkı Bey, and warned him that if the withdrawal of the Ottoman forces would not commence within the proposed evacuation date, they could be evacuated by force as it had been decided by the foreign states. Consul Biliotti continued that if the Ottoman soldiers opposed this act, then a clash would occur between the Ottoman and foreign troops. This might lead to additional complications which could put the country into a difficult position. The Sublime Porte would be responsible for all these clashes and difficulties and the European Powers could demand indemnity for the damages and even the Ottoman state would be condemned to pay the money that had been spent hitherto.[110]

The representatives of four European Powers in İstanbul decided to send another collective note in reply to the Ottoman note of 10 October 1898. Accordingly, a note, dated 14 October 1898, was sent to the Sublime Porte underlying the fact that the four European Powers had requested a reply from the Sublime Porte without any reservation, but the Sublime Porte's answer had reservations. This was certainly not acceptable to the European Powers. It was added that the representatives of the four Powers begged the Sublime Porte a pure assent to their demand of 4 October 1898. In the last paragraph, the representatives had attracted the attention of the Sublime Porte stating "… [four] Governments will not refuse to consider afterwards the best means of satisfying the

[109] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.ASK., Dosya: 144, Gömlek: 103, Aded: 1, 1316 Ca 17.

[110] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.UM., Dosya: 43, Gömlek: 117, Aded: 3, 1316 Ca 30.

legitimate wishes which may be expressed to them in the name of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan."[111]

In the meanwhile, the European authorities on the island warned the Ottoman authorities that if the complete evacuation of the fortified places by the Ottoman troops were not agreed by the Sultan, the international forces in Chania would be obliged to withdraw from the town at any time between 18 and 19 October 1898. It was argued that the population was in great dread, and many Muslim notables begged the British consul that the consent of the Ottoman Sultan to this subject was the only means to save the Muslims' property.[112]

On 19 October 1898, the Sublime Porte sent its reply to the representatives of the four European Powers, informing them that their request had been accepted by the Sublime Porte. In this reply, a reference was made to the last paragraph of the four European Powers' note on 14 October 1898 and it was noted that "… the Imperial Government … is confident that the four Great Powers will satisfy its legitimate desire for the maintenance of the sacred rights of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan over the island and the protection of the rights and interests of the Mussulmans."[113]

On the last day of October 1898, the Sublime Porte sent a verbal note to the four Powers' Embassies in İstanbul for the purpose of securing its sovereign rights over Crete. It was stated that the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire in Crete should be maintained. The Ottoman flag should be used both on the island and by the merchant vessels. The judicial authority should be exercised in the name of the Ottoman Sultan and the retention of sufficient number of Ottoman troops in the fortified places being the

---

[111] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 7 (1898), Enclosure in No. 194.

[112] *ibid.,* No. 180; T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.BŞK., Dosya: 57, Gömlek: 110, Aded: 3, 1316 Ca 30.

[113] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 7 (1898), Enclosure in No. 216.

symbol of the sovereign rights of the Sultan. A fixed sum should be paid by the administration of Crete to the Ottoman Treasury, civil rights, lives and property of the Muslims should be guaranteed. The person who was to be placed at the head of the administration of the island should be appointed in agreement with the four European Powers, and the present official of the island should continue to perform their duties until the establishment of a legal autonomous administration.[114]

The Ottoman Foreign Minister Tevfik Paşa paid a visit to the European Powers' representatives in İstanbul to emphasize the points of the Sublime Porte's last verbal note. Tevfik Paşa told them that the retention of a sufficient number of Ottoman troops in the fortified places of the island as a symbol of the sovereign rights of the Sultan was the most important point. Furthermore, he pointed out that there were a sufficient number of Ottoman troops in other autonomous provinces of the Ottoman Empire. The proposal made by the admirals concerning the withdrawal of the Ottoman officials would lead to so many difficulties. In reply, the French ambassador said that the Sublime Porte's note had already been delivered to the French government and considered that the complete implementation of this note was difficult. According to the French representative, the European admirals were unable to restore order so long as the Ottoman troops remained on the island. Since the security of the island was entrusted to the admirals by their respective governments, the admirals could do whatever they like. He proceeded to say that he was not surprised by the proposal agreed upon the evacuation of the Ottoman officials. If the present administration was to be ended, the admirals could appoint whoever they like. The British ambassador in İstanbul followed suit. The Russian representative considered that the Sublime Porte's note was quite important, but had some unacceptable points and pointed out that he had no hope regarding the approval of the retention of Ottoman troops. He added that the Russian

[114] *ibid.,* Enclosure in No. 238.

government agreed upon this point, since the admirals had argued that order and tranquility could not be restored so long as one single Ottoman solider remained on the island. If the Ottoman forces were attacked by the Christians, the admirals would be unable to resist these attacks and to punish the aggressors. The Russian ambassador added that due to these reasons, the Russian government agreed with other governments and the fulfillment of all the promises by the Ottoman state was the best course to follow. In other words, for him, this was the only way to eliminate what he called "the Cretan trouble."[115] Tevfik Paşa continued to make efforts before the European ambassadors to abdicate them from insisting on the withdrawal of all the Ottoman troops from Crete. For the Sublime Porte, this was contrary to the assurances given by the European Powers that the rights of the Sultan on the island would be preserved. The ambassadors told Tevfik Paşa that it was impossible for them to agree with the Sublime Porte on this subject.[116]

On 10 November 1898, the Sublime Porte sent a circular note to its representatives categorically declaring that the Sublime Porte would never admit it if Prince George was nominated to Crete, since his arrival with the Greek forces to the island had deteriorated the conditions and as a result of this, the revolt prevailed. Furthermore, it was remarked that the Greek government, disregarding the European Powers' advice, had made repeated attacks on the Ottoman-Greek frontier which forced the Ottoman Empire to declare a war against Greece. During the peace negotiations held between the Ottoman and European delegations, the Ottoman representatives requested the "resolution" of the Cretan issue, but Greek the representatives had not accepted it arguing that the condition was not ripe for the discussion of the Cretan matter and assured that this problem would be solved later. In accordance with the assurances given by the European cabinets, the Sublime Porte

[115] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.EE., Dosya: 114, Gömlek: 66, Aded: 2/5, 1316 C 15.

[116] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.HR., Dosya: 26, Gömlek: 49, Aded: 2, 1316 C 22.

accepted the terms and conditions regarding the peace negotiations and the establishment of an autonomous administration on the island, and the withdrawal of the Ottoman troops from Crete. For that reason, the Sublime Porte could not trust the decision of assigning Prince George to Crete. Moreover, if such a thing happened, the Ottoman Empire would never approve of it, since the Ottoman Empire accepted the offer of the European states regarding the establishment of an autonomous regime on the condition that this regime should model the examples applied on Samos and in Lebanon; and another person was to be appointed as governor to the island.[117]

Besides, the Sublime Porte endeavored to attract the attention of the Russian government once more saying that it was impossible for the Ottoman government to approve of the nomination of Prince George. It was further stated that the nomination of a high Orthodox official had already been proposed by the Sublime Porte, but at that time, this candidate was eliminated. It was added that a person who was a foreign subject and well aware of our country's affairs, such as Von der Goltz, would be more appropriate for the nomination to Crete as governor. However, it was pointed out that if the Russian Emperor preferred to nominate another person who was not a Greek subject, this person would be approved and then he would be proposed to the other states as Governor-General of Crete.[118]

By 28 October 1898, nearly eight thousand Ottoman troops left the island. On 15 November 1898, the last Ottoman troops left the island.[119] It was reported that in all

---

[117] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.HR., Dosya: 26, Gömlek: 53, Aded: 2, 1316 C 25.

[118] *ibid*.

[119] Theodore George Tatsios. *The Megali Idea and the Greek-Turkish War of 1897: The Impact of the Cretan Problem on Greek Irredentism, 1866*-1897, p. 135. Regarding the "solution" of the "Cretan problem" Dakin stated that "… despite her [Greece] defeat in 1897, [it] had gained considerably on balance. For this Greece was chiefly indebted to England and Russia, who despite their rivalries, had combined against Germany in south-eastern Europe."
Douglas Dakin. *The Greek Struggle in Macedonia 1897-1913*, (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1993), p. 43.

churches in the province of Candia *Te Deums* were chanted for the departure of the Ottoman troops and a special service was held in memory of the Christians who died during the disturbances of Candia. The Ottoman flag was hauled down everywhere, except the government house in Chania.[120] The European admirals in Crete issued a proclamation in which they requested to the Christians to be nice to the Muslims whose lives and property would be under the protection of the European forces. The admirals requested to the Muslims to return to their own villages, and warned all the Cretans to give up their arms.[121]

In his special letter, the Russian Emperor Nicholas informed Sultan Abdülhamid II that Prince George was nominated as high commissioner to Crete. The European Powers, which undertook the responsibility for restoring peace and security in Crete, had no any aim other than to place the rights and influences of the admirals in the hands of Prince George and to hasten the introduction of a definite administrative system. The object of the European Powers was not to violate the sovereign rights of the Sultan, they considered the nomination of Prince George to Crete as the only means for reestablishing tranquility on the island, which had been the desires of the Cretans. The Russian Emperor stated that the Russian government could not oppose this appointment, and appealed to the Sultan not to make any comments regarding this nomination. He concluded by expressing the hope that the definite settlement of the Cretan affairs would consolidate the good relations between the Ottoman Empire and Russia.[122]

In order to prevent the nomination of Prince George as high commissioner to the island, the Sublime Porte sent a circular to its representatives stating that it was informed

---

[120] PRO: FO, 78/4969, No. 1, Biliotti to Salisbury, 16 November 1898, p. 212.

[121] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.BŞK., Dosya: 58, Gömlek: 5, Aded: 2, 1316 B 10.

[122] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.EE., Dosya: 114, Gömlek: 58, Aded: 1, 1316 B 10.

that Prince George was going to be appointed to the island as a high commissioner. This would be contrary to the assurances given by the states regarding the Ottoman state's legitimate desire for the preservation of the sovereign rights of the Sultan. Because of these assurances, it was believed that a Greek subject could not be appointed to Crete, and so the Ottoman ambassadors should inform the Ministers of Foreign Affairs in their respective countries that the appointment of Prince George would not be accepted by any subject of the Ottoman Empire. Moreover, their hopes would be dashed. It was added that any commissioner or governor proposed by the European Powers would be accepted by the Sublime Porte, except a Greek subject.[123]

In spite of all the diplomatic efforts of the Sublime Porte, the European Powers nominated Prince George as High Commissioner. For the British government, he should be appointed for a term of one year. The Russian and Italian governments stated that the appointment should be for an indefinite period since the pacification of the island would be reached in a lesser period.[124] On 26 November 1898, the representatives of the four Powers in Athens submitted a memorandum to King George I, offering the post of High Commissioner of Crete to Prince George.[125] The following was stated in the memorandum: Three years were to be given to the High Commissioner by the mandate of the Powers for the pacification of the island and the establishment of a regular administration. The High Commissioner should recognize the sovereignty of the Sultan. The Ottoman flag should be flown upon one of the fortified places on the island. The High Commissioner should secure in an equal degree the safety of the Muslim and Christian inhabitants. King George I willingly accepted the nomination of Prince George as High Commissioner of Crete. Then

[123] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.HR., Dosya: 26, Gömlek: 66, Aded: 2, 1316 B 17.

[124] USNA, T159/12, No. 14, Rockhill to Hay, 2 November 1898.

[125] Samuel Beach Chester. *Life of Venizelos*, p. 70; Theodore George Tatsios. *The Megali Idea and the Greek-Turkish War of 1897: The Impact of the Cretan Problem on Greek Irredentism, 1866*-1897, p. 136.

the memorandum was handed to Prince George who expressed his thanks to the European states.[126] On 30 November 1898, the representatives of Europe in İstanbul officially notified the Sublime Porte that Prince George was appointed as the High Commissioner of the European Powers to Ottoman Crete.[127]

Prince George arrived at Suda Bay on 9 December 1898. In the government house the French admiral handed to Prince George officially the control of the island. The Cretan flag was raised and the Ottoman flag was left only on the castle of Suda as a last symbol of Ottoman suzerainty in Crete. After a while, Prince George appointed a committee (12 Christians and 4 Muslims) under the chairmanship of Ioannis Sphakianakis in order to draft a new constitution for Crete. On 24 January 1899, a new Cretan Assembly was elected consisting of 138 Christians and 50 Muslims. During the first session of the Cretan Assembly, on 8 February 1899, the new constitution was approved. On 27 April 1899, Prince George appointed the first government and Eleftherios Venizelos became the minister of justice, Konstantinos Foumis minister of economic affairs, Manousos Koundouros minister of foreign affairs, Nikolaos Yamalakis minister of education and religion, and Hüseyin Yenitsarakis minister of public order. Due to the different views between the High Commissioner and Venizelos, the latter was removed from his post and formed a strong opposition force against Prince George. On 26 February 1905, the opposition members demanded a change in the Cretan Constitution. A few days later, the Therisos revolt broke out under the leadership of Venizelos, Foumis and Manos. After this revolt, Prince George submitted his resignation on 12 September 1906 and Alexander

---

[126] A. A. Pallis (ed.). *The Cretan Drama: The Life and Memoirs of Prince George of Greece, High Commissioner in Crete, (1898-1906)*, pp. 17-18; Samuel Beach Chester. *Life of Venizelos*, p. 70; Theodore George Tatsios. *The Megali Idea and the Greek-Turkish War of 1897: The Impact of the Cretan Problem on Greek Irredentism, 1866*-1897, p. 136, T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Hus., Dosya: 391, Gömlek: 45, Aded: 3, 1316 7 13; USNA, T159/12, No. 20, Rockhill to Hay, 26 November 1898.

[127] Theodore George Tatsios. *The Megali Idea and the Greek-Turkish War of 1897: The Impact of the Cretan Problem on Greek Irredentism, 1866*-1897, p. 136.

Zaïmis was appointed by King George I as the new High Commissioner of Crete. In September 1908, meetings held on the island and declared the immediate union with Greece. On 25 September 1908, the members of the government of Crete ratified the resolution for union. However, the island was united to Greece in 1913.[128]

Conclusion

An attempt was made in this chapter to illustrate the efforts spent by the European Powers to nominate a Greek subject, Prince George, as Governor-General for Crete. The project of those states was to undermine the Ottoman administration on the island, since the presence of Ottoman authorities and forces would no longer satisfy their imperial interests in this region. It seems clear that the European Powers became primary actors in the events of the island and imposed a Greek subject to the post of governor and forced the Ottoman Empire to evacuate its troops from the island that culminated the union of Crete with Greece at the very end. The European Powers considered the "governorship problem" as one in a whole series of the so-called "Cretan Question," and provided a "solution" on this basis.

[128] For the details see: Theocharis E. Detorakis. *History of Crete*, (trl.) John C. Davis, (Iraklion: 1994).

CONCLUSION

This dissertation has analyzed how revolt and diplomatic politics altered the internal dynamics of Ottoman Crete and impacted the lives of the Cretans. I have argued that the Cretan revolts of 1896 and 1897 had shaken the existing local structure and laid the ground for the establishment of the autonomous government on the island; and then the separation of Crete from the Ottoman Empire. Although the transition from the Ottoman administration to an autonomous regime was a long process, the revolts of 1896, and especially of 1897 marked a turning point in the alteration of the local dynamics within Ottoman Crete. These revolts not only threatened the survival of the Ottoman administration, but also the lives of the Cretans. Thousands of people were forced to leave their homes, inter-communal relations had shifted, mutual tolerance was destroyed, and heterogeneity replaced homogeneity. These factors all coincided with the occupation of the major cities of the island by the European Powers that had a considerable effect in marginalizing Ottoman power. Furthermore, the conflict between the British forces and Ottoman troops in Candia in 1898 culminated in the withdrawal of the Ottoman forces from the island.

The history of the Cretan revolts of 1896 and 1897 presented an opportunity to study and investigate certain questions about the nationalist revolts in the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire, a time when nationalism not only prevailed throughout Ottoman Balkans, but also determined the course of the Ottoman history. Thus, Ottoman Crete provided an interesting case for the study of nationalist and separatist movements. It also enabled me to study the "nationalist liberation struggle" of the Cretan Christians, who constituted an important segment of the Cretan population from the perspective of political history. Although the other provinces of the Ottoman Empire shared the same experience

in terms of the shift in inter-communal relations, what makes its case unique is the periodic revolts. In other words, a remarkable feature of the nineteenth century Ottoman Crete, distinguishing it from the other provinces of the Ottoman Empire, was the high frequency of its revolts.

This dissertation has problematized the politicization and nationalization process of the Cretan Christians in which they decided to sacrifice their lives in the so-called "nationalist liberation struggle." It has argued that the Cretan Christians aimed at changing the socio-economic and political structure of the Cretan society and conquering power by driving out the Ottoman administration and the Ottoman troops from the island. In other words, contrary to common belief, the revolts' primary aim was not to unite with the Greek Kingdom. The present study has demonstrated that while certain Cretan Christian insurgents were in favor of the union with Greece, the others were not. The Cretan Christians considered the existence of the Ottoman forces on the island as the main barrier to deconstruct the existing administration and to reconstruct a new one. They believed that without the evacuation of the Ottoman troops, nothing could be established in Crete. The Ottoman soldiers were often identified with murder and violence. It seems clear that the presence of those forces on the island was regarded as the main threat for the alteration of existing structure and the seizure of power.

Unlike the standard historiography, failing to examine certain Cretan revolts in detail, the present study has not incorporated all Cretan revolts that took place in Ottoman Crete throughout the nineteenth century as a single narrative. In other words, by examining the Cretan revolts of 1896 and 1897 in detail, it has avoided piecing the Cretan revolts together into a basic narrative. This dissertation has also avoided examining the developments and conflicts of the nineteenth century Ottoman Crete with those of the autonomous regime, since it has argued that the overthrow of the Ottoman rule and the

constitution of the autonomous government did not just mean a transition from the Ottoman administration to the autonomous one. With autonomy, large-scale institutional, social and political changes occurred; and a different system of politics had been established on the island. Through a closer examination of the years between 1895 and 1898, this study has attempted to make a contribution to the literature in the following respects: first of all, it has narrated one of the most turbulent and sensitive periods of the nineteenth century Ottoman Crete from a different perspective, which has so far been neglected by historians. Second, it introduced a different and detailed interpretation of the "nationalist liberation struggles" of the local Cretan Christians. It has argued that the participation of the local Cretan Christians in the "national project" played a conspicuous role in changing the internal dynamics of Ottoman Crete. Third, by using a wide variety of archival sources, it has attempted to provide an integrative approach in order to understand the Cretan experience. This means that the Cretan revolts of 1896 and 1897 had both internal and external dimensions.

Constituting the backbone of this process, the rebellious activities of the local Cretan Christians played an important role in the "popularization" of the political and national ideology. These local people voiced their own grievances, such as the nomination of a Christian *Vâli*, the restoration of the Halepa Convention, the convocation of the Cretan Assembly, the proclamation of the General Amnesty, and finally the withdrawal of the Ottoman forces from the island. This dissertation also illustrated that the Cretan revolts also consolidated the Cretan Christians and acted as important means to integrate most of the Christian inhabitants of Ottoman Crete and created the sense of "differences" (*dhiafores*) between the Muslim and Christian communities. These insurgents legitimized their rebellious activities as "national resistance against the infidel Turkish oppressor."

This dissertation has also paid attention to the murder and violence that bloodied the island before, during, and after the revolts. The available documentation illustrates that murders had a certain effect on the general peace in Ottoman Crete. According to the Ottoman and British sources, during the period under study, murders became a "daily occurrence," and prevailed throughout the island. Concerning the murders, the most important point to be taken into consideration was "revenge." It is evident from the documentation that there was a motive of retaliation on the parts of Muslims and Christians. If a Christian assassinated a Muslim, for instance, the relatives of the murdered would immediately retaliate on a Christian, any Christian that they could get or vice-a-versa. The available documentation also provided certain cases that everyday, many innocent people were killed by discharging guns from the ambushes.

However, it is important to point out that while the standard view considered that murder and violence were results of the "primordial religious hatred" between the two different communities, Christians and Muslims, this study has demonstrated that conflict and violence were not simply the outcome of the "primordial hatreds." This study has tried to tell a different story and to free itself from the clichés of the nation-state approach which polarizes society as Muslims *versus* Christians, or vice-a-versa. In this regard, this dissertation has argued that the Cretan experience can not be understood by overemphasizing the 'differentness' of the Cretan history and describing the events from the standpoint of a clear-cut distinction and mutual conflict between the Muslims and non-Muslims, or exaggerating tolerance and co-existence between the various communities. Indeed, while having its peculiar local dynamics, the developments and conflicts in Ottoman Crete seem to be part of broader patterns.

With regard to the occurrence of the Cretan revolts of 1896 and 1897, factors of time and place must also be taken into account. The available documentation indicates that

the Cretan Christians were more likely to rebel in times when they did not deal with gathering their olive crops. It is interesting to note that they gathered olive crops in October and November, and after that they engaged in rebellious activities. Unlike the Cretan revolt of 1896, the revolt of 1897 was not only confined to certain districts of the island, it spread quickly across the island. Within a short time period, the revolt had crossed from western to the eastern districts. In other words, the revolt appeared almost simultaneously in Sitia, situated on the eastern part, and Candanos, situated in the western extremity of the island. The co-existence of similar events in distinct parts of the island meant that there was a very good web of communication throughout the island. The whole Crete might have been covered with a network of insurgents and their confidants. Every piece of news was carried by the couriers from one end to the other.

Throughout the text, I have touched upon the activities of the revolutionary committees, whose members both in Greece, exclusively in Athens, and Crete, prepared the national and financial background of the Cretan revolts. These revolutionary committees raised funds from various branches, dealt with the propaganda and public relations purchased weapons; and sent small groups of enthusiastic volunteers, insurgents and munitions of war to Crete. Those committees and their representatives had both controlled the arms traffic between the island and mainland Greece and coordinated all kinds of preparations for the Cretan Christian insurgents. Moreover, they maintained close networks with the Greek government officials and cooperated with the Greek consuls in Crete. In addition to these revolutionary committees, archival documentation shows that the masonic organizations also contributed *par excellence* to the Cretan revolts. It is remarkable to note that the close relationship between the Cretan Christian refugees in Greece and the local Christians in Crete had a profound impact on the Cretan revolts. Those refugees often held meetings in Greece and Europe; and took oath to unanimously

sacrifice their lives for their motherland (*vatan uğruna müttehiden fedâ'-yı cân etmeğe ahd ve mîsâk etmişler*); and then they made preparations for penetrating into the island with munitions and arms.[1]

On the eve of the Cretan revolt of 1896, the presence of the *Epitropi* seemed to be one of the major threats that had shaken the local dynamics of the island. Beginning its rebellious activities from Apokorono, they claimed to significantly increase the privileges they were hitherto given, especially the privileges given by the Halepa Pact. It is important to point out that this committee had taken some of the unemployed and the local poor to their side by concealing its aims under the banner of dealing with the "national question." Also, the activities of the *Ethnike Hetairia* became the main actor in the implementation of the Greek irredentist program in Ottoman Crete throughout the Cretan revolt of 1897. The *Ethnike Hetairia* also sent volunteers and munitions to the Ottoman-Greek frontier in Thessaly so as to stir the Ottoman Empire for engaging in war with Greece. Moreover, various branches of the committee made preparations to support the insurrectionary movements in Crete and the Balkans. This society had external branches in various places in the Balkans and the Aegean islands. The Cretan Defense Commission and the Central Committee also provided important support to the Cretan Christian insurgents in order to save the "motherland" from the hands of the "barbarian Turks."

The present study has tried to show the devastating effects of the Cretan revolts of 1896 and 1897 on Cretan society as a whole. Many Cretans lost their lives or were injured during the period between 1896 and 1898. They had suffered from heavy losses both in human and material resources. However, I do not mean to paint a picture of chaos or to deny that certain things went back to normal after the revolts. At least, it is possible to follow the stories of pillage, poverty and migration. What is clear is that, as my findings

[1] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Hus., Dosya: 237, Gömlek: 41, Aded: 3, 1307 Z 9.

indicate, the population of the island almost reached a level of poverty during the revolts, and in certain parts of the island, most of the people were left homeless due to the devastating impact of the revolts.

Meanwhile, since the interior parts of the island were occupied by the Christian insurgents, the Cretan Muslims in those regions were forced to leave their houses and properties and had to flee to the major coastal towns. During the Cretan revolt of 1897, the majority of these Muslims immigrated to Candia, where 25 square miles military cordon was established by the British forces so as to "prevent" clashes between the Cretan Muslims and Christians. However, the establishment of the military cordon and reorganization of the city along communal lines divided the island into compartments. In other words, this military cordon demarcated the Christians and Muslims and divided the population into exclusive ethno-religious categories. It was estimated that more than 50,000 Cretan Muslims were gathered in Candia. Needless to say, this was a remarkably high number when the total population of the local Muslims was taken into account. Most of those Muslim refugees were peasants and had no purchasing power or work. They were left in this concentration camp without shelter and received only some food from the Muslim charity. The refugees were caught in a life-struggle with their live-stocks and they lost all their hopes about the future. In addition, various diseases, especially small-pox and diphtheria, appeared within in the cordon area. It is noteworthy to mention that the Muslim relief organizations attempted to cure the agony of the Cretan Muslims, but it seemed that they were unable to provide sufficient food and clothing to the Cretan Muslims. Moreover, various European relief committees, especially British and Russian ones, distributed food and clothes to the Cretan refugees, especially orphans and the poor.

The revolts had also a devastating effect on the material resources of the island. The indicative example is the fact that two million olive trees, then valued at one pound a piece,

had been destroyed throughout the island.[2] Things were somewhat different in the interior parts of the island. Unlike the major coastal towns, which were open to various influences from the outside world, in the interior part of the island, the Cretan Christians were far superior to the Muslims in number. The Cretan Christian insurgents divided the interior part of the island into districts and each district was controlled by one of the insurgent chiefs. Archival documentation illustrates that some of the Cretan Christians too encountered extremely tough living conditions there.

It needs to be highlighted that the financial difficulties were among the most important problems that the Ottoman administration faced in Crete at that period. It is important to point out that the continuous revolts and general state of anarchy affected the financial situation and placed a major burden on the financial resources of the island. There was a lack of money on the island and non-payment of the salaries of the state officials had become a serious problem. The local administration was even unable to provide salaries to the gendarmerie forces. It is certain that continuous revolts had inflicted such an economic situation, and the financial problems became too complex to be solved by the Ottoman state. As a solution to the financial difficulties, the governors made repeated attempts before the Sublime Porte, informing that a certain amount of money was to be sent to the island to find a solution to the financial crisis and to cover the budget deficit. Due to the non-payment of their salaries, for instance, the Cretan gendarmerie could not perform their duties in an efficient way. In order to provide the security of the island, various attempts were made to reorganize the gendarmerie forces. However, the authorities had accomplished little in the way of reorganizing the gendarmerie and of ensuring the safety of the Cretans.

---

[2] William Miller. *Travels and Politics in the Near East*, (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company Publishers, 1899), p. 332.

In this framework, interests and irredentist policies of the Greek state ultimately lay in Hellenizing the Orthodox Christian inhabitants of the island and marginalizing the Muslim ones; and in the end, uniting the island with Greece. The Orthodox Christian population of the island felt entitled to Greek support by virtue of sharing common religion and language, which must have been the deterrent factors in the organic relationship between the Greeks and Cretan Christians. This dissertation has argued that the Greek War of Independence became a model and provided the impetus for the developments on the island. In other words, the creation of modern Greek identity and its infiltration into the island throughout the nineteenth century manipulated the rebellious history of Crete and became a necessary precondition for the politicization and nationalization of the Orthodox Christian community of the island.

Needless to say, in this narrative, the role of the Greek state was essentially visible and indispensable. In the course of the Cretan revolts of 1897, the Greek state openly intervened in the revolts by sending its war ships into the Cretan waters and occupied the island under the pretext of protecting the lives of the Cretan Christians. The forces of the Greek state accompanied the Cretan Christian insurgents and attacked the Muslim villages and killed thousands of Cretan Muslims.

In addition, the Greek government had dispatched its troops to the Ottoman-Greek frontier in Thessaly and set up armed bands to make incursions and acts of pillage on the frontier. The Greek government legitimized these attacks as attacks committed by irregulars. Throwing all the responsibilities on the irregulars, the Greek government tried to entrap the Ottoman government and to present itself as the injured party. Under these conditions, the Ottoman Empire used diplomatic channels before the European Powers to have them understand that if the Greek government continued sending troops to the Ottoman-Greek frontier, the Ottomans were forced to dispatch troops to the border to

defend its rights. Despite these diplomatic attempts of the Ottoman state, the war broke out and it ended up in the Greek defeat within a short time.

As mentioned in the introduction, this dissertation focused primarily on how Ottoman statesmen evaluated the internal conflicts within the island and what kind of measures and policies they proposed. The present dissertation has demonstrated that the accusations of the European Powers, which argued that the Ottoman Empire prevented the execution of the reforms in Ottoman Crete, were simply false. The Ottoman Sultan and statesmen had their own visions and projected administrative, economic, social, political, and judicial reforms and adopted those reforms and certain measures from what they saw to be successful on the island.

In response to the Cretan Christians' grievances and revolts, Ottoman authorities pursued various reforms and granted certain privileges to the Cretans. The Ottoman documentation made repeated references to the fact that the main aim of Ottoman statesmen was not only to suppress the revolts (*şûriş ve iğtişâşâtın indifâ'ı*) so as to reestablish peace and order within Crete (*Girid'in iâde-i huzûr ve âsâyişi*), not only to satisfy the Cretan Christians, it was for all of these reasons, but they also aimed to maintain the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire (*tamâmiyet-i mülkiyye*) and the sovereign rights of the Sultan (*hukûk-ı hükümrânî*) and to increase the legitimacy of the Empire in the eyes of the local population. In other words, by granting privileges to the Cretan Christians and implementing necessary reforms within the island, the Ottoman Empire endeavored to stave off the threats that jeopardized its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Throughout the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire sought to reshape and improve the island in order to reestablish peace and tranquility. Moreover, many reforms were made in the internal structure of the island so as to cope with the difficulties. However, all of these reforms and measures proved insufficient at the end.

The present study, thus, provided a different interpretation in terms of state-society relations in Ottoman Crete. As mentioned in the preceding pages, the Ottoman government was always conceptualized as "…a corrupt, feeble, and impecunious Oriental Government…" and the state-society relations were seen from the perspective of isolation and dichotomy, insisting on the clear-cut distinction between the Ottoman state and the Cretan society as a whole. The privileges and reforms granted to the Cretans revealed the Ottoman state's concerns about the internal dynamics of the island. By understanding the state-society relations beyond this Orientalist approach, this dissertation suggested a dynamic relationship between the state and society in the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century.

During the period examined in the present dissertation, the Ottoman state invested an enormous amount of energy in appointing "strong" governors to the island. On the eve of the Cretan revolts of 1896, Karatodori Paşa was recalled and Turhan Paşa was appointed. During the Cretan revolts of 1896, Abdullah Paşa was appointed as the Governor-General and the military commander to investigate the events and suppress the revolt. It seemed that according to the Sublime Porte, a strong governor who held the administrative and military powers in his hands would be able to cope with the extra-ordinary conditions and suppress the revolt. After the appointment of Corci Beroviç Paşa as Governor-General in July 1896, Abdullah Paşa continued to be the Military Commander-in-chief and had been promoted to the post of *Müşîr*. However, the European Powers forced the Ottoman Empire to dismiss Abdullah Paşa from his post, arguing that the Ottoman government gave priority to the military authority over the civil one. On 13 February 1897, a most tragic event, if not *the* most, took place in Crete. Corci Beroviç Paşa, a Greek Orthodox Ottoman subject, appointed *Vâli* by the help of the European

Powers, took refuge on board the Russian iron-clad with some Montenegrins and left the island.

The Ottoman archival sources revealed that the Ottoman governors had sent long reports to the Sublime Porte regarding the local state of things, including the socio-economic and political conditions, and necessary measures to be taken to ensure the future of the island. These reports provided interesting insights about the mentality of the late Ottoman rulers and indicated their own stereotypes of the Cretans. Although there were various opinions, the common belief was always the same. They considered the island as a place of danger and anxiety that threatened to restore peace and order. It was believed that the island had long been famous with its revolutions and the people were rebellious and inclined to the insurgency and for that reason, the Cretans had to be treated and governed carefully.[3]

This dissertation has also illustrated that the involvement of the European Powers in the Cretan issue had crucial consequences for the Cretan history. The European Powers played an increasingly outstanding role in the internal affairs of the island by reducing their duty to protect only the Christian inhabitants of the island. The so-called "Cretan Question" became a center of the "Eastern Question," in which the European Powers tried to legitimize their intervention as being protectors of their co-religionists and halting the inter-religious tension and reestablishing order and peace on the island. Needless to say, this was not true, but this was only reflected in their political preferences. They created an atmosphere where the "solution" of the "Cretan Question" depended upon the European governments. At this point, Italian admiral Canevaro's statement is worth citing:

> It is notorious that, if the massacres of Sitia and Sarakina added a dark page to the history of the recent events in Crete, a history already crowded with excesses of all kinds committed by both sections of the population, those massacres occurred at a time when not the smallest trace of government remained in the country, when the

[3] T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.UM., Dosya: 7, Gömlek: 76, Aded: 1, 1302 N 9.

> most complete anarchy reigned throughout the island, and when the European military forces had not yet arrived to put an end to the odious and barbarous scenes which were being enacted in Crete. Nor should it be forgotten how the sailors of the foreign squadrons, regardless of the dangers to which they exposed themselves, went to mountains of Selino and the plateaus of Sitia to rescue the Mussulman families and Ottoman soldiers who were in distress there, and who otherwise would not have escaped.[4]

Ironically, at the very beginning of the Cretan revolt of 1896, the European Powers' representatives argued that the ongoing clash was not an overall revolt, but was a conflict between the two elements, Muslims and Christians. So, they forced the Ottoman state to grant privileges to the Cretan Christians and limited the Ottoman military measures by hindering the Ottoman state from sending additional troops to the island. Later on, they often insisted on the point that the Cretan Muslims and Christians could no longer live together. For precisely that reason, the Muslims had to be forced to flee from the island since they claimed that ethno-religious factor was the primary cause of the late nineteenth century Cretan revolts. The European Powers' representatives on the island of Crete understood and described these revolts in ethno-religious terms and instituted and dictated certain projects along these terms. In other words, according to the European Powers, the Cretan revolts were the expression of the "old religious conflicts" of the "savage" and "war-like" Cretans. The Cretan Muslims had also been perceived as the representatives of "Islamic fanaticism." Accordingly, the island of Crete has long been regarded as a region of endemic violence and the Cretans were stereotyped as "war-like" people. In this way, these kinds of typologies otherize the island of Crete as a place of violence.

Moreover, the European representatives had made various attempts to create an atmosphere where the Ottoman troops were quite insufficient to protect the people and control the island. For that reason, the European war ships were sent to Crete in order to "provide the security." As the European Powers successfully limited the military power of

[4] British Accounts and Papers, Turkey No. 3 (1898), Sub-Enclosure in No. 201.

the Ottoman Empire in suppressing the Cretan revolts, the Ottoman state began to invest enormous diplomatic efforts in filling in the power vacuum. In this sense, it was seen that the role of diplomacy in Ottoman governance extremely increased, the role of the Ottoman military power in internal disputes of certain provinces was marginalized. Before the outbreak of the Ottoman-Greek War of 1897, for example, the Ottoman state had made multiple levels of diplomatic attempts to prevent the war.

In this context, the rivalries and differences among the European Powers were also used by Ottoman statesmen. During the crisis regarding the appointment of the new governor to Crete, for instance, the Ottoman state considered cooperation with the Russian government as a crucial element to eliminate the pressures of the other European states, particularly Britain, and maintain the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire and the sovereign rights of the Ottoman Sultan. By making diplomatic attempts before the Russian government, Sultan Abdülhamid II aimed to counter-weight the European Powers' pressures, and abandon their insistence on the nomination of a Greek subject to the post of Governor-General of Crete and maintain his authority on the island. Despite the countless telegrams and diplomatic work devoted to avert the nomination of a Greek subject, Prince George, the Ottoman government was not successful in the way of nominating an Ottoman subject as Governor-General to Crete. Moreover, the Ottoman Empire spent great efforts to prevent the European Powers from holding a conference among themselves regarding the Cretan issue. According to the Ottoman statesmen, these conferences would jeopardize the future of the island (*cezîrenin istikbâline sû-i te'sîr edeceği*) in particular, and the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire in general. Therefore, for the Ottoman statesmen, the Ottoman state had to try to prevent the intervention of the European Powers in the Cretan issue through diplomatic means. After the occupation of the major towns of the island by the European forces, the admirals of those states issued a proclamation of autonomy. The

European Powers thought that the autonomous regime would do little harm to their interests. Therefore, they showed willingness for its establishment. In other words, rather than the island being in total control of either the Ottomans or the Greeks, they wanted the situation to be under their control, preferably as an "autonomous" Ottoman province. The European admirals suggested the Cretan Christian insurgent chiefs to take steps in line with the Europeans' plan for the settlement of autonomy.

After the Greek defeat in the Ottoman-Greek War, a remarkable shift was observed in the Christian insurgents' attitudes. The Christian deputies of the General Assembly accepted the autonomous system for the island proposed by the European Powers. After a while, the Cretan Assembly sent two memoranda to the council of the European admirals. In the first memorandum, the Cretan Christian deputies emphasized the question of governor stating that the governor of Crete could not be chosen from among the Ottoman subjects. Since they believed that if an Ottoman subject were chosen as governor, the Ottoman state would inevitably interfere in the internal affairs of the island. In the second one, the main concern of the deputies was the withdrawal of the Ottoman troops from the island, since they argued that the evacuation of the Ottoman forces was the primary measure in setting up the autonomous government. A scheme for a provisional government was prepared by the European consular body at the requests of the European admirals. At the end of July 1898, the Cretan Assembly had unanimously accepted the final scheme of the provisional administration with the reservation that the Ottoman troops should be withdrawn from the island. In a way, the autonomous status was granted to Crete and the Ottoman forces left the island in November 1898.

At the very basis, this dissertation has argued that the Cretan Christian insurgents aimed to change the political, economic and the social structure of the Cretan society and seize power by overthrowing the Ottoman administration and the evacuation of the

Ottoman troops from the island. This study has illustrated that at the end of the rebellious period, with the help of the European Powers, the Ottoman troops were forced to leave the island by the Cretan Christians. However, the Cretan Christians could not seize power on the island. Rather, the European Powers put the administrative power in the hands of High Commissioner Prince George, a Greek subject.

Here, it also needs to be highlighted that the administrative power of the island could not be seized by the Cretan Christians, who had struggled to capture the power through rebellious activities. At this point, it makes sense to mention what Hacı Michalis, a Cretan Christian insurgent chief, said. According to him, there was not a big difference between the Ottoman and the Greek rules. While in the rule of the Ottoman Empire, everything was sacrificed for the personal interests of the Ottoman Sultan, in the rule of Greece, the palace made decisions for itself, not for the people. Yet, for Hacı Michalis, Crete was important. He stated that "… Crete has to think of itself first, before anything else we must be Cretan…"[5] It is not so clear that whether the Cretan Christians were totally satisfied with the appointment of Prince George, as a High Commissioner to Crete. What is clear is that the Cretan Christians, under the leadership of Venizelos, rebelled once more, this time against the rule of Prince George in 1905, and forced him to leave Crete in 1906 for good.

The present study has argued that the establishment of the autonomous regime did not simply mean a transition from the Ottoman regime to an autonomous one. This caused a considerable annoyance among the Cretan Muslims and had a demoralizing effect on the local Muslims who thought that they lost their superiority over the Cretan Christians. The Cretan Muslims believed that their moral and material interests were in danger. In other words, the establishment of the autonomous government on the basis of the Cretan

[5] Victor Bérard. *Les Affaires de Crète*, (Paris: Armand Colin et Cie Editeurs, 1900), p. 161.

Christians' projects in cooperation with the European Powers alienated the Cretan Muslims and deepened their anxiety regarding their survival in Crete.

The tone of the Muslim petitions sent to the Sublime Porte indicated that they became hopeless about the future of the island. The Ottoman Bank Archive provided considerable material evidence about the marginalization of the Cretan Muslims under the autonomous status and demonstrated that local structure and the relationship between the Cretan Christians and Cretan Muslims shifted. By the establishment of the autonomous regime in 1898, the power and the initiative of the Ottoman state were marginalized, and as a result of this, the Cretan Muslims became subordinate to the Cretan Christians, or started to leave for other parts of the Ottoman Empire, particularly Çanakkale, İzmir, Adana and İstanbul. The sale contracts of the real-estates, including houses, farms, olive trees, fields, and shops present the vivid account of the marginalization of the Cretan Muslims and the transmission in property ownership. These documents indicate that there was a profound change in the ownership of properties, which means that many Muslim properties rapidly became Christian. In other words, the large-scale Muslim flight not only changed the demographic picture of the island, but also its socio-economic structure. It is remarkable to note that, at that period, certain Muslim properties were sold to the Christian highest bidders through auction. In addition, the immovable properties of Muslim minor orphans which were inherited from their late fathers or mothers were sold to the Christian inhabitants of the island.

The other point to be mentioned here is the language of the *vakıf* documents existing in the Ottoman Bank Archives. The new regime was deeply concerned with the language of the documents. In the autonomous regime, Greek became the sole official language. It was seen that if the documents were written in Ottoman Turkish, some of them

were translated into Greek by the official translators. Michael Herzfeld explained the reason for the Greek translations stating that:

> Much of the existing documentation at the time of autonomy was in Turkish. Greek law, however, required a much deeper analysis of a property's ownership history, so that it now became necessary to translate all documents pertaining to properties in process of transfer. Such translations had to be certified as genuine by the official translator, which makes it all the more surprising that the phraseology of the translations should correspond so perfectly to that of Greek legal jargon- a point that should be borne in mind lest we too easily succumb to the temptation of assuming two radically different systems of bureaucratic practice.[6]

As pointed out by Herzfeld in his article, it is also clearly seen in the documents of the Ottoman Bank Archive that before the establishment of the autonomous regime, the locations of the properties were determined with the neighborhoods which bore Ottoman names. Moreover, there were no street names. However, with the arrival of autonomy, these Ottoman names began to disappear and the new street names appeared. Most of the names given to those streets were no longer Ottoman names. They became, for instance, Constantine Street, Canevaro Street, Czar Street. While during the Ottoman administration, a certain property was defined by the specific neighbors whose properties bordered it, under the autonomous government, a street or a number was assigned to each property in order to determine the location.

During the autonomous government, the Cretan Christians continued their attempts to homogenize the Cretan society. A document dated 27 July 1899 provided interesting insights into the aims and projects of the Cretan Christians regarding the homogenization of the island. This document revealed that the Cretan Christians attempted to settle the Christian "*Rum*" inhabitants of Caucasus in the houses of the Cretan Muslims, especially in the villages. It is striking that about 5,000 Christian "*Rum*s" were to be brought in so as to

[6] Michael Herzfeld. "Of Language and Land Tenure. The Transmission of Property and Information in Autonomous Crete," *Social Anthropology*, Vol. VII, No. 3, 1999, p. 229. By the arrival of autonomy, the *vakıf* documents were not anymore stamped by the Ottoman stamps, but by the stamps of "*ΚΡΗΤΗ*" (Crete). It is interesting to note that after the proclamation of the union with Greece by the Cretan Assembly in 1908, those stamps were sealed by the term of "*ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΟΝ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΙΟΝ*" (the Greek Kingdom).

settle in the Muslim houses. A Muslim commission attempted to give some lumber and 25 French gold to each Muslim family who took refuge in Candia in order to encourage the Muslims to return to their villages.[7] In this case, it becomes clear that while the Christians forced the Muslims to emigrate from the island, they provided opportunities to the "*Rum*" inhabitants of Caucasus to settle in Crete.

As argued in the introduction of this dissertation, after the establishment of the Greek Kingdom, the Greek state invested a great amount of energy in cultivating the modern Greek identity in Ottoman Crete and the formation of an "imagined" Greek identity in the minds of the Cretan Christians. Throughout the nineteenth century, the Cretan Christians were gradually indoctrinated by the idea of belonging to an "imagined community." The participation of the Cretan Christians in the Macedonian events that took place in Macedonia at the turn of the twentieth century seemed to be a clear indicator of Greek state's success in terms of the Hellenization of the Cretan Christians and revealed much about the transformation of the Cretan Christians into the Greek world. In this framework, it can be safely said that the Cretan Christians became the torch-bearers and active elements of Greek nationalism. In this sense, the Cretan Christians decided to sacrifice their lives or "willingly to die" in the so-called "nationalist liberation struggle" in Macedonia.

Regarding their involvement in the Macedonian events, Detorakis stated that "many Cretan leaders and rebel fighters, still fired by the enthusiasm of new-founded freedom and national ideals, formed their own voluntary bands and joined up with the front ranks of the Greek forces in the struggle for the liberation of Macedonian Hellenism."[8] Dakin remarked that most of the Greek bands were largely recruited from the Cretan Christians. No one

[7] OBA, Klasör 26, No. 6, 15 Temmuz 1315.

[8] Theocharis E. Detorakis. *History of Crete*, (trl.) John C. Davis, (Iraklion: 1994), p. 423.

minimizes the role played by the Cretan Christians and their contribution to Hellenism. He further pointed out that "[the Cretan Christians] carried with them from their homeland a great bitterness towards the Turks…"[9] Karakasidou also mentioned that the "Cretans played an important role in the turn-of-the-century Macedonian Struggle, as well as in the subsequent integration of Macedonia into Greece."[10] It became apparent that the Greek state could accomplish its goals and irredentist claims at the end of the long Hellenization process of the Cretan Christians.

[9] Douglas Dakin. *The Greek Struggle in Macedonia 1897-1913*, (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1993), p. 179.

[10] Anastasia N. Karakasidou. *Fields of Wheat, Hills of Blood: Passages to Nationhood in Greek Macedonia, 1870-1990*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), p. 176.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. *Unpublished Archival Sources*

A. Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, İstanbul (İstanbul Prime Ministry Archive) (T.C. BOA).

a) Yıldız Tasnifi

i) Yıldız Esas Evrakı (Y.EE)

T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.EE., Dosya: 8, Gömlek: 1, Aded: 7, 1306 Ra 22.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.EE., Dosya: 8, Gömlek: 22, Aded: 2/5, 1306 Ca 30.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.EE., Dosya: 40, Gömlek: 80, Aded: 1/2, 1301 Ra 13.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.EE., Dosya: 47, Gömlek: 12, Aded: 8, 1308 Za 27.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.EE., Dosya: 82, Gömlek: 31, Aded: 1/2, 1306 Z 9.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.EE., Dosya: 86, Gömlek: 76, Aded: 3/6, 1307 R 15.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.EE., Dosya: 86, Gömlek: 93, Aded: 3/9, 1309 M 11.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.EE., Dosya: 114, Gömlek: 52, Aded: 6/6, 1310 N 9.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.EE., Dosya: 114, Gömlek: 58, Aded: 1, 1316 B 10.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.EE., Dosya: 114, Gömlek: 60, Aded: 1/4, 1306 Z 10.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.EE., Dosya: 114, Gömlek: 66, Aded: 2/5, 1316 C 15.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.EE., Dosya: 114, Gömlek: 67, Aded: 1, 1306 L 13.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.EE., Dosya: 114, Gömlek: 78, Aded: 2, 1314 B 18.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.EE., Dosya: 114, Gömlek: 80, Aded: 3, 1315 Ra 7.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.EE., Dosya: 114, Gömlek: 91, Aded: 5/8, 1314 N 17.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.EE., Dosya: 114, Gömlek: 93, Aded: 3, 1314 L 14.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.EE., Dosya: 114, Gömlek: 96, Aded: 2/98, 27 03 1898.

ii) Yıldız Sadaret Resmî Maruzat Evrakı (Y.A.Res)

T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Res., Dosya: 79, Gömlek: 52, Aded: 2, 1313 Z 8.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Res., Dosya: 80, Gömlek: 38, Aded: 6, 1314 1 13.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Res., Dosya: 80, Gömlek: 51, Aded: 2, 1314 1 20;
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Res., Dosya: 80, Gömlek: 80, Aded: 16, 1314 2 8.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Res., Dosya: 80, Gömlek: 107, Aded: 2, 1314 2 23.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Res., Dosya: 81, Gömlek: 10, Aded: 2/4, 1314 3 5.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Res., Dosya: 81, Gömlek: 22, Aded: 3, 1314 3 12.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Res., Dosya: 85, Gömlek: 10, Aded: 2, 1314 N 9.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Res., Dosya: 85, Gömlek: 11, Aded: 12, 1314 N 11.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Res., Dosya: 85, Gömlek: 31, Aded: 2, 1314 9 28.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Res., Dosya: 85, Gömlek: 56, Aded: 2, 1314 10 19.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Res., Dosya: 86, Gömlek: 7, Aded: 2, 1314 11 3.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Res., Dosya: 86, Gömlek: 8, Aded: 4, 1314 11 3.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Res., Dosya: 87, Gömlek: 64, Aded: 3, 1315 2 11.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Res., Dosya: 89, Gömlek: 23, Aded: 3, 1315 5 17.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Res., Dosya: 89, Gömlek: 58, Aded: 2, 1315 6 5.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Res., Dosya: 91, Gömlek: 41, Aded: 6, 1315 L 19.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Res., Dosya: 91, Gömlek: 57, Aded: 4, 1315 10 27
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Res., Dosya: 95, Gömlek: 18, Aded: 4, 1316 5 11.

iii) Yıldız Sadaret Hususî Maruzat Evrakı (Y.A.Hus)

T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Hus., Dosya: 163, Gömlek: 56, Aded: 1, 1297 2 7.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Hus., Dosya: 215, Gömlek: 9, Aded: 3, 1305 Za 7.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Hus., Dosya: 220, Gömlek: 26, Aded: 4, 1306 R 12.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Hus., Dosya: 227, Gömlek: 58, Aded: 5, 1306 Za 18.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Hus., Dosya: 235, Gömlek: 102, Aded: 13, 1307 L 22.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Hus., Dosya: 237, Gömlek: 41, Aded: 3, 1307 Z 9.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Hus., Dosya: 305, Gömlek: 89, Aded: 1, 1312 S 8.

T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Hus., Dosya: 308, Gömlek: 141, Aded: 5, 1312 3 14.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Hus., Dosya: 311, Gömlek: 54, Aded: 2, 1312 R 24.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Hus., Dosya: 318, Gömlek: 15, Aded: 1, 1312 Ş 1.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Hus., Dosya: 323, Gömlek: 70, Aded: 3, 1312 L 8.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Hus., Dosya: 323, Gömlek: 87, Aded: 3, 1312 L 9.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Hus., Dosya: 323, Gömlek: 138, Aded: 2, 1312 L 13.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Hus., Dosya: 330, Gömlek: 157, Aded: 2, 1312 Z 29.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Hus., Dosya: 354, Gömlek: 32, Aded: 4, 1314 1 23.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Hus., Dosya: 354, Gömlek: 35, Aded: 2, 1314 1 24.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Hus., Dosya: 354, Gömlek: 68, Aded: 3, 1314 1 28.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Hus., Dosya: 355, Gömlek: 66, Aded: 3, 1314 2 11.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Hus., Dosya: 355, Gömlek: 72, Aded: 3, 1314 2 12.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Hus., Dosya: 366, Gömlek: 7, Aded: 2, 1314 9 2.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Hus., Dosya: 367, Gömlek: 18, Aded: 4, 1314 9 17.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Hus., Dosya: 367, Gömlek: 129, Aded: 3, 1314 9 28.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.A.Hus., Dosya: 391, Gömlek: 45, Aded: 3, 1316 7 13.

iv) Yıldız Mütenevvî Maruzat Evrakı (Y.MTV)

T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.MTV., Dosya: 29, Gömlek: 10, Aded: 7, 1305 Ra 11.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.MTV., Dosya: 31, Gömlek: 25, Aded: 2, 1305 C 21.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.MTV., Dosya: 50, Gömlek: 71, Aded: 18, 1308 L 23.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.MTV., Dosya: 98, Gömlek: 74, Aded: 2, 1311 Z 26.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.MTV., Dosya: 143, Gömlek: 102, Aded: 2, 1314 M 28.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.MTV., Dosya: 151, Gömlek: 33, Aded: 2, 1314 N 12.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.MTV., Dosya: 151, Gömlek: 82, Aded: 3, 1314 N 16.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.MTV., Dosya: 151, Gömlek: 96, Aded: 6, 1314 N 19.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.MTV., Dosya: 182, Gömlek: 153, Aded: 4, 1316 Ca 10.

v) Yıldız Perâkende Evrakı (Y.PRK.)

Yıldız Perâkende Askerî Maruzat (Y.PRK.ASK)

T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.ASK., Dosya: 57, Gömlek: 1, Aded: 1/2, 1306 Z 11.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.ASK., Dosya: 57, Gömlek: 28, Aded: 2, 1306 Z 18.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.ASK., Dosya: 111, Gömlek: 56, Aded: 2, 1313 Z 13.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.ASK., Dosya: 111, Gömlek: 77, Aded: 12, 1313 Z 27.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.ASK., Dosya: 112, Gömlek: 23, Aded: 1, 1314 M 8.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.ASK., Dosya: 112, Gömlek: 33, Aded: 1, 1314 M 12.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.ASK., Dosya: 117, Gömlek: 34, Aded: 4, 1314 N 12.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.ASK., Dosya: 117, Gömlek: 91, Aded: 1, 1314 N 20.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.ASK., Dosya: 117, Gömlek: 90, Aded: 1, 1314 N 19.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.ASK., Dosya: 119, Gömlek. 30, Aded: 1, 1314 L 5
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.ASK., Dosya: 136, Gömlek: 54, Aded: 2, 1315 L 8.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.ASK., Dosya: 143, Gömlek: 103, Aded: 10, 1316 R 23.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.ASK., Dosya: 144, Gömlek: 8, Aded: 6, 1316 R 27.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.ASK., Dosya: 144, Gömlek: 13, Aded: 2, 1316 R 27.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.ASK., Dosya: 144, Gömlek: 47, Aded: 1, 1316 Ca 2.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.ASK., Dosya: 144, Gömlek: 103, Aded: 1, 1316 Ca 17.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.ASK., Dosya: 145, Gömlek: 9, Aded: 2, 1316 Ca 27.

Yıldız Perâkende Arzuhal ve Jurnaller (Y.PRK.AZJ)

T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.AZJ., Dosya: 6, Gömlek: 28, Aded: 2, 1300 M 30.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.AZJ., Dosya: 14, Gömlek: 60, Aded: 2, 1306 S 26.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.AZJ., Dosya: 34, Gömlek: 63, Aded: 1, 1315 M 25.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.AZJ., Dosya: 35, Gömlek: 25, Aded: 2, 1315 C 1.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.AZJ., Dosya: 37, Gömlek: 90, Aded: 2, 1316 Ca 23.

Yıldız Perâkende Adliye ve Mezahib Nezareti (Y.PRK.AZN)

T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.AZN., Dosya: 3, Gömlek: 69, Aded: 2/4, 1306 L 25.

Yıldız Perâkende Sadaret Maruzatı (Y.PRK.A)

T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.A., Dosya: 6, Gömlek: 34, Aded: 1/4, 1308 C 7.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.A., Dosya: 11, Gömlek: 83, Aded: 5, 1315 Za 21.

Yıldız Perâkende Mâbeyn Başkitâbeti (Y.PRK.BŞK)

T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.BŞK., Dosya: 9, Gömlek: 52, Aded: 8/11, 1302 Ş 26.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.BŞK., Dosya: 13, Gömlek: 26, Aded: 4, 1305 N 22.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.BŞK., Dosya: 46, Gömlek: 110, Aded: 2, 1314 S 11.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.BŞK., Dosya: 49, Gömlek: 95, Aded: 4, 1314 N 16.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.BŞK., Dosya: 50, Gömlek: 48, Aded: 2, 1314 L 3.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.BŞK., Dosya: 51, Gömlek: 33, Aded: 5, 1314 Za 11.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.BŞK., Dosya: 56, Gömlek: 2, Aded: 1, 1315 Za 9.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.BŞK., Dosya: 56, Gömlek: 3, Aded: 1, 1315 Za 9.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.BŞK., Dosya: 56, Gömlek: 101, Aded: 6, 1315 L 28.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.BŞK., Dosya: 57, Gömlek: 50, Aded: 1, 1316 Ra 10.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.BŞK., Dosya: 57, Gömlek: 110, Aded: 3, 1316 Ca 30.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.BŞK., Dosya: 58, Gömlek: 5, Aded: 2, 1316 B 10.

Yıldız Perâkende Dahiliye Nezareti Maruzatı (Y.PRK.DH)

T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.DH., Dosya: 9, Gömlek: 45, Aded: 1/21, 1314 N 10.

Yıldız Perâkende Elçilik ve Şehbenderlik Tahriratı (Y.PRK.EŞA)

T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.EŞA., Dosya: 24, Gömlek: 94, Aded: 11, 1314 S 26.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.EŞA., Dosya: 26, Gömlek: 28, Aded: 1, 1314 N 26.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.EŞA., Dosya: 26, Gömlek: 40, Aded: 3, 1314 N 30.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.EŞA., Dosya: 26, Gömlek: 57, Aded: 2, 1314 L 5.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.EŞA., Dosya: 27, Gömlek: 2, Aded: 4, 1314 Z 8.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.EŞA., Dosya: 28, Gömlek: 68, Aded: 1, 1315 Ş 19.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.EŞA., Dosya: 28, Gömlek: 79, Aded: 1, 1315 N 17.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.EŞA., Dosya: 28, Gömlek: 81, Aded: 3, 1315 N 18.
T.C. BOA**,** Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.EŞA., Dosya: 31, Gömlek: 21, Aded: 1, 1316 R 6.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.EŞA., Dosya: 31, Gömlek: 76, Aded: 1, 1316 Ca 20.

Yıldız Perâkende Hariciye Nezareti Maruzatı (Y.PRK.HR)

T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.HR., Dosya: 22, Gömlek: 4, Aded: 6, 1314 M 6.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.HR., Dosya: 22, Gömlek: 21, Aded: 3, 1314 Ra12.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.HR., Dosya: 23, Gömlek: 12, Aded: 1, 1314 N 5.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.HR., Dosya: 23, Gömlek: 13, Aded: 1, 1314 N 6.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.HR., Dosya: 23, Gömlek: 19, Aded: 2, 1314 N 11.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.HR., Dosya: 23, Gömlek: 28, Aded: 1, 1314 N 15.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.HR., Dosya: 23, Gömlek: 29, Aded: 2, 1314 N 16.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.HR., Dosya: 23, Gömlek: 47, Aded: 1, 1314 N 22.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.HR., Dosya: 23, Gömlek: 48, Aded: 3, 1314 N 23.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.HR., Dosya: 23, Gömlek: 50, Adet: 1, 1314 N 24.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.HR., Dosya: 23, Gömlek: 51, Aded: 1, 1314 N 24.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.HR., Dosya: 23, Gömlek: 69, Aded: 1, 1314 L 6.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.HR., Dosya: 23, Gömlek: 75, Aded: 3, 1314 L 9.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.HR., Dosya: 23, Gömlek: 77, Aded: 2, 1314 L 9.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.HR., Dosya: 23, Gömlek: 83, Aded: 1, 1314 L 11.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.HR., Dosya: 23, Gömlek: 85, Aded: 1, 1314 L 11.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.HR., Dosya: 23, Gömlek: 87, Aded: 3, 1314 L 12.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.HR., Dosya: 25, Gömlek: 16, Aded: 1, 1315 Ş 27.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.HR., Dosya: 25, Gömlek: 19, Aded: 1/11, 1315 N 1.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.HR., Dosya: 25, Gömlek: 47, Aded: 4, 1315 Za 19.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.HR., Dosya: 26, Gömlek: 42, Aded: 4, 1316 Ca 30.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.HR., Dosya: 26, Gömlek: 49, Aded: 2, 1316 C 22.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.HR., Dosya: 26, Gömlek: 53, Aded: 2, 1316 C 25.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.HR., Dosya: 26, Gömlek: 66, Aded: 2, 1316 B 17.

Yıldız Perâkende Komisyonlar Maruzatı (Y.PRK.KOM)

T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.KOM., Dosya: 7, Gömlek: 40, Aded: 8, 1306 L 25.

Yıldız Perâkende Maliye Nezareti Maruzatı (Y.PRK.ML)

T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.ML., Dosya: 9, Gömlek: 72, Aded: 1, 1307 M 14.

Yıldız Perâkende Meşihat Dairesi Maruzatı (Y.PRK.MŞ)

T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.MŞ., Dosya: 6, Gömlek: 48, Aded: 5, 1314 S 25.

Yıldız Perâkende Yâveran ve Maiyet-i Seniyye Erkân-ı Harbiye Dairesi (Y.PRK.MYD)

T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.MYD., Dosya: 17, Gömlek: 57, Aded: 14, 1313 Z 28.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.MYD., Dosya: 18, Gömlek: 3, Aded: 1, 1314 C 2.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.MYD., Dosya: 18, Gömlek: 8, Aded: 1, 1314 C 8.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.MYD., Dosya: 18, Gömlek: 34, Aded: 1, 1314 L 29.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.MYD., Dosya: 18, Gömlek: 64, Aded: 1, 1314 Za 6.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.MYD., Dosya: 20, Gömlek: 9, Aded: 1, 1315 C 7.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.MYD., Dosya: 20, Gömlek: 11, Aded: 1, 1315 C 8.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.MYD., Dosya: 20, Gömlek: 43, Aded: 1/3, 1315 C 29.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.MYD., Dosya: 21, Gömlek: 71, Aded: 2, 1316 Ca 17.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.MYD., Dosya: 21, Gömlek: 73, Aded: 1, 1316 Ca17.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.MYD., Dosya: 43, Gömlek: 129, Aded: 2, 1316 C 10.

Yıldız Perâkende Şûra-yı Devlet Maruzatı (Y.PRK.ŞD)

T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.ŞD., Dosya: 2, Gömlek: 34, Aded: 1, 1314 Za 14.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.ŞD., Dosya: 2, Gömlek: 40, Aded: 1, 1315 Ca 10.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.ŞD., Dosya: 2, Gömlek: 42, Aded: 3, 1315 C 19.

Yıldız Perâkende Tahrirat-ı Ecnebiye ve Mâbeyn Mütercimliği (Y.PRK.TKM)

T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.TKM., Dosya: 37, Gömlek: 44, Aded: 5, 1313 Z 17.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.TKM., Dosya: 38, Gömlek: 49, Aded: 4/8, 1314 N 25.

Yıldız Perâkende Umum Vilayetler Tahriratı (Y.PRK.UM)

T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.UM., Dosya: 7, Gömlek: 76, Aded: 1, 1302 N 9.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.UM., Dosya: 22, Gömlek: 49, Aded: 8/12, 1308 Z 26.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.UM., Dosya: 27, Gömlek: 106, Aded: 1, undated.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.UM., Dosya: 34, Gömlek: 66, Aded: 1, 1313 L 10.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.UM., Dosya: 34, Gömlek: 106, Aded: 3, 1313 Z 13.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.UM., Dosya: 35, Gömlek: 20, Aded: 1, 1314 M 29.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.UM., Dosya: 35, Gömlek: 92, Aded: 2, 1314 R 7.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.UM., Dosya: 36, Gömlek: 109, Aded: 1, 1314 N 21.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.UM., Dosya: 37, Gömlek: 129, Aded: 1, 1314 Za 12.
T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.UM., Dosya: 43, Gömlek: 117, Aded: 3, 1316 Ca 30.

Yıldız Perâkende Zaptiye Nezareti Maruzatı (Y.PRK.ZB)

T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.PRK.ZB., Dosya: 19, Gömlek: 8, Aded: 10, 1315 M 17.

b) İradeler Tasnifi:

İrade Eyalet-i Mümtaze Girid (İ.MTZ.GR)

T.C. BOA, İradeler Tasnifi, İ.MTZ.GR., Dosya: 4, Gömlek: 60, Aded: 3, 1262 N 29.
T.C. BOA, İradeler Tasnifi, İ.MTZ.GR., Dosya: 6, Gömlek: 111, Aded: 7, 1269 L 14.
T.C. BOA, İradeler Tasnifi, İ.MTZ.GR., Dosya: 8, Gömlek: 184, Aded: 3, 1277 Ra 11.
T.C. BOA, İradeler Tasnifi, İ.MTZ.GR., Dosya: 12, Gömlek: 357, Aded: 5, 1285 N 3.
T.C. BOA, İradeler Tasnifi, İ.MTZ.GR., Dosya: 12, Gömlek: 370, Aded: 3, 1286 M 14.
T.C. BOA, İradeler Tasnifi, İ.MTZ.GR., Dosya: 21, Gömlek: 760, Aded: 9, 1306 L 29.
T.C. BOA, İradeler Tasnifi, İ.MTZ.GR., Dosya: 26, Gömlek: 944, Aded: 3, 1309 S 21.
T.C. BOA, İradeler Tasnifi, İ.MTZ.GR., Dosya: 29, Gömlek: 1080, Aded: 4, 1313 N 9.
T.C. BOA, İradeler Tasnifi, İ.MTZ.GR., Dosya: 29, Gömlek: 1089, Aded: 5, 1313 Za 16.
T.C. BOA, İradeler Tasnifi, İ.MTZ.GR., Dosya: 29, Gömlek: 1090, Aded: 6, 1313 Za 16.
T.C. BOA, İradeler Tasnifi, İ.MTZ.GR., Dosya: 30, Gömlek: 1104, Aded: 4, 1313 Z 15.
T.C. BOA, İradeler Tasnifi, İ.MTZ.GR., Dosya: 30, Gömlek: 1107, Aded: 3, 1314 M 17.

T.C. BOA, İradeler Tasnifi, İ.MTZ.GR., Dosya: 31, Gömlek: 1186, Aded: 3, 1314 N 26.
T.C. BOA, İradeler Tasnifi, İ.MTZ.GR., Dosya: 31, Gömlek: 1197, Aded: 3, 1314 L 6.
T.C. BOA, İradeler Tasnifi, İ.MTZ.GR., Dosya: 31, Gömlek: 1199, Aded: 2, 1314 L 19.
T.C. BOA, İradeler Tasnifi, İ.MTZ.GR., Dosya: 31, Gömlek: 1200, Aded: 4, 1314 L 11.
T.C. BOA, İradeler Tasnifi, İ.MTZ.GR., Dosya: 31, Gömlek: 1202, Aded: 2, 1314 Za 4.
T.C. BOA, İradeler Tasnifi, İ.MTZ.GR., Dosya: 31, Gömlek: 1203, Aded: 3, 1314 Za 6.
T.C. BOA, İradeler Tasnifi, İ.MTZ.GR., Dosya: 31, Gömlek: 1204, Aded: , 1314 Za 4.
T.C. BOA, İradeler Tasnifi, İ.MTZ.GR., Dosya: 32, Gömlek: 1297, Aded: 1, 1316 Ra 28.
T.C. BOA, İradeler Tasnifi, İ.MTZ.GR., Dosya: 32, Gömlek: 1302, Aded: 1, 1316 R 23.
T.C. BOA, İradeler Tasnifi, İ.MTZ.GR., Dosya: 32, Gömlek: 1307, Aded: 18, 1316 R 20.
T.C. BOA, İradeler Tasnifi, İ.MTZ.GR., Dosya: 32, Gömlek: 1309, Aded: 4, 1316 Ca 30.
T.C. BOA, İradeler Tasnifi, İ.MTZ.GR., Dosya: 34, Gömlek: 1455, Aded: 11, 1313 Z 4.
T.C. BOA, İradeler Tasnifi, İ.MTZ.GR., Dosya: 34, Gömlek: 1474, Aded: 1, 1315 L 27.
T.C. BOA, İradeler Tasnifi, İ.MTZ.GR., Dosya: 34, Gömlek: 1475, Aded: 4, 1315 Za 12.
T.C. BOA, İradeler Tasnifi, İ.MTZ.GR., Dosya: 34, Gömlek: 1476, Aded: 4, 1315 Za 17.
T.C. BOA, İradeler Tasnifi, İ.MTZ.GR., Dosya: 34, Gömlek: 1477, Aded: 3/4, 1315 Za 22.

Dahiliye Nezareti Sicill-i Ahval Defterleri (DH.SAİD)

T.C. BOA, İradeler Tasnifi, DH.SAİD., Dosya: 14, Gömlek: 398, 1259 Z 29.
T.C. BOA, İradeler Tasnifi, DH.SAİD., Dosya: 18, Gömlek: 257, 1249 Z 29.
T.C. BOA, İradeler Tasnifi, DH.SAİD., Dosya: 47, Gömlek: 165, 1262 Z 29.

c) Sadaret Mektûbî Kalemi Mühimme Kalemi (Odası) Belgeleri (A.MKT.MHM)

T.C. BOA, Sadaret Mektubi Kalemi, A.MKT.MHM., Dosya: 360, Gömlek: 59, Aded: 3, 1283 Ra 8.
T.C. BOA, Sadaret Mektubi Kalemi, A.MKT.MHM., Dosya: 482, Gömlek: 14, Aded: 3, 1294 N 2.

d) Meclis-i Vükelâ Mazbataları (MV)

T.C. BOA, Meclis-i Vükelâ Mazbataları, MV., Dosya: 90, Gömlek: 73, Aded: 1, 1314 B 29.

e) Şura-yı Devlet Girid (ŞD-Girid)

T.C. BOA, Şura-yı Devlet Girid, ŞD., Dosya: 2371, Gömlek: 31, Aded: 45/130, 1293 L 24.
T.C. BOA, Şura-yı Devlet Girid, ŞD., Dosya: 2373, Gömlek: 2, Aded: 13/46, 1298 Ş 21.
T.C. BOA, Şura-yı Devlet Girid, ŞD., Dosya: 2373, Gömlek: 27, Aded: 8/11, 1299 Ca 8.

f) Hariciye Nezareti Tasnifi

Hariciye Siyasi (HR.SYS)

T.C. BOA, Hariciye Nezareti, HR.SYS., Dosya: 191, Gömlek: 40, Aded: 4, 1896 05 27.
T.C. BOA, Hariciye Nezareti, HR.SYS., Dosya: 191, Gömlek: 43, Aded: 7, 1896 06 11.

Hariciye Tercüme Odası (HR.TO)

T.C. BOA, Hariciye Nezareti Tercüme Odası, HR.TO., Dosya: 4, Gömlek: 91, Aded: 2, 1866 11 28.

g) Girid Gelen-Giden Defteri (384-385)

h) Haritalar

T.C. BOA, Girit Vilayeti, Sıra No. 283.

B. Osmanlı Bankası Arşivi, İstanbul (OBA)

OBA, Klasör 1, No 320, 21 Mart 1309.
OBA, Klasör 3, No 52, 5 Teşrînisânî 1311.
OBA, Klasör 3, No 3, 20 Eylül 1309.
OBA, Klasör 3, No 27, 24 Temmuz 1309.
OBA, Klasör 3, No 35, 28 Temmuz 1309.
OBA, Klasör 3, No 55, 18 Kanûnısânî 1312.
OBA, Klasör 3, No 16, 4 Nisan 1311.
OBA, Klasör 4, No 3, 11 Haziran 1311.
OBA, Klasör 4, No 46, 28 Mart 1304.
OBA, Klasör 4, No 78, 15 Kanûnısânî 1311.
OBA, Klasör 4, No 89, 7 Eylül 1312.
OBA, Klasör 4, No 90, 7 Eylül 1312.

OBA, Klasör 4, No 95, 7 Eylül 1312.
OBA, Klasör 4, No 194, 16 Ağustos 1304.
OBA, Klasör 5, No 7, 20 Şubat 1305.
OBA, Klasör 5, No 38, 16 Ağustos 1305
OBA, Klasör 5, No 53, 7 Temmuz 1305.
OBA, Klasör 5, No 54, 3 Temmuz 1305.
OBA, Klasör 5, No 64, 9 Eylül 1305.
OBA, Klasör 5, No 69, 3 Teşrînievvel 1305.
OBA, Klasör 5, No 40, 16 Ağustos 1305.
OBA, Klasör 5, No 49, 30 Eylül 1305.
OBA, Klasör 5, No 91, 11 Nisan 1305.
OBA, Klasör 5, No 104, 13 Temmuz 1305.
OBA, Klasör 5, No 106, 14 Haziran 1305.
OBA, Klasör 5, No 144, 3 Haziran 1306.
OBA, Klasör 5, No 155, 10 Teşrînisânî 1306.
OBA, Klasör 5, No 158, 27 Rebiyyülevvel 1308.
OBA, Klasör 5, No 163, 5 Kanûnıevvel 1306.
OBA, Klasör 5, No 166, 3 Kanûnıevvel 1306.
OBA, Klasör 5, No 175, 25 Ağustos 1306.
OBA, Klasör 5, No 208, 21 Şubat 1305.
OBA, Klasör 5, No 209, 9 Eylül 1305.
OBA, Klasör 5, No 211, 13 Eylül 1305.
OBA, Klasör 5, No 233, 11 Nisan 1306.
OBA, Klasör 5, No 239, 7 Eylül 1306.
OBA, Klasör 5, No 279, 10 Mart 1307.
OBA, Klasör 5, No 321, 1 Kanûnıevvel 1304.
OBA, Klasör 5, No 345, 7 Kanûnısânî 1304.
OBA, Klasör 5, No 392, 3 Temmuz 1304.
OBA, Klasör 5, No 424, 28 Mart 1304.
OBA, Klasör 5, No 450, 28 Şubat 1304.
OBA, Klasör 5, No 466, 17 Kanûnısânî 1303.
OBA, Klasör 6, No 38, Haziran 1889.
OBA, Klasör 6, No 42, 25 Teşrînievvel 1308.
OBA, Klasör 6, No 51, 24 Temmuz 1300.
OBA, Klasör 6, No 53, 15 Temmuz 1300.
OBA, Klasör 6, No 14, 31 Kanûnıevvel 1305.
OBA, Klasör 6, No 14, 3 Temmuz 1892.
OBA, Klasör 7, No 65, 21 Temmuz 1304.
OBA, Klasör 7, No 75, 13 Teşrînievvel 1289.
OBA, Klasör 7, No 78, 10 Teşrînievvel 1289.
OBA, Klasör 7, No 80, 26 Şaban 1290.
OBA, Klasör 7, No 88, 30 Şaban 1290.
OBA, Klasör 7, No 213, 29 Şubat 1304.
OBA, Klasör 7, No 214, 29 Şubat 1304.
OBA, Klasör 7, No 268, 12 Mart 1304.
OBA, Klasör 7, No 269, 31 Temmuz1304.
OBA, Klasör 7, No 273, 15 Temmuz 1304.
OBA, Klasör 7, No 275, 29 Şubat 1304.
OBA, Klasör 7, No 286, 20 Teşrînievvel 1304.
OBA, Klasör 7, No 438, 2 Kanûnısânî 1308.
OBA, Klasör 7, No 488, 12 Kanûnısânî 1305.
OBA, Klasör 9, No 112, 22 Mart 1298.
OBA, Klasör 9, No 208, 27 Teşrînisânî 1314.
OBA, Klasör 26, No 6, 15 Temmuz 1315.

C. Great Britain Public Records Office; Foreign Office, London (PRO: FO)

PRO: FO 78/4890.
PRO: FO 78/4969.
PRO: FO 78/4970.
PRO: FO 195/1939.

PRO: FO 195/1983.

D. United States of America Archives (National Archives, Washington, D.C.)

USNA, T159/12.
USNA, M46/62.
USNA, M46/63.

II. *Published Documents*

a) British Parliamentary Papers

Accounts and Papers. Turkey No. 2 (1889), *Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Crete*, (London: 1889).

Accounts and Papers. Turkey No. 3 (1898), *Further Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Crete*, (London: 1898).

Accounts and Papers. Turkey No. 4 (1897), *Notes Addressed by the Representatives of the Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy and Russia*, (London: 1897).

Accounts and Papers. Turkey No. 5 (1898), *Further Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Crete*, (London: 1898).

Accounts and Papers. Turkey No. 6 (1897), *Reply of the Turkish Government to the Note Presented on March, 5, 1897 by the Representatives of the Great Britain, Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy and Russia*, (London: 1897).

Accounts and Papers. Turkey No. 6 (1898), *Further Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Crete*, (London: 1898).

Accounts and Papers. Turkey No. 7 (1896), *Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Crete*, (London: 1896).

Accounts and Papers. Turkey No. 7 (1898), *Further Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Crete*, (London: 1898).

Accounts and Papers. Turkey No. 8 (1897), *Further Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Crete*, (London: 1897).

Accounts and Papers. Turkey No. 9 (1897), *Reports on the Situation in Crete*, (London: 1897).

Accounts and Papers. Turkey No. 10 (1897), *Further Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Crete*, (London: 1897).

Accounts and Papers. Turkey No. 11 (1897), *Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Crete and the War between Turkey and Greece*, (London: 1897).

Accounts and Papers. Turkey No. 12 (1897), *Further Correspondence Respecting the Affairs of Crete*, (London: 1897).

III. *Journals*

Akropolis
Hakîkât
İkdâm
Ma'lûmât
Sabâh
Servet-i Fünûn
Tercümân-ı Hakîkât
The New York Times

IV. *General Sources*

Abou-El-Haj, Rifa'at 'Ali. *Formation of the Modern State: the Ottoman Empire, Sixteenth to Eighteenth Centuries*, (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2005).

Adanır, Fikret. *Makedonya Sorunu*, (trl.) İhsan Catay, (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1996).

Adıyeke, Ayşe Nükhet. *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu ve Girit Bunalımı (1896-1908),* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 2000).

Adıyeke, Ayşe Nükhet. "XVII. Yüzyıl Girit (Resmo) Sicillerine Göre İhtida Hareketleri ve Girit'te Etnik Dönüşüm," *XIV. Türk Tarih Kongresi*, 9-13 September 2002, (unpublished paper).

Adıyeke, Ayşe Nükhet and Adıyeke, Nuri. "Girit'te Millet Sisteminin Örnekleri: Kapıda İşaret, Hamamda Çıngırak," *Toplumsal Tarih*, No. 136, April 2005, pp. 92-97.

Adıyeke, Nuri. "Rum Cemaat Örgütlenmesi Olarak 'Dimoyerandiya'lar: Girit Örneği," in: Ayşe Nükhet Adıyeke, Nuri Adıyeke. *Fethinden Kaybına Girit*, (İstanbul: Babıali Kültür Yayıncılığı, 2006), pp. 199-214.

Adıyeke, Ayşe Nükhet. "1881 Yılında Girit Vilayetinde Yapılan Nüfus Sayımı ve Tartışmalı Sonuçları," in: Ayşe Nükhet Adıyeke, Nuri Adıyeke. *Fethinden Kaybına Girit*, (İstanbul: Babıali Kültür Yayıncılığı, 2006), pp. 163-170.

Akarlı, Engin Deniz. *The Problems of External Pressures, Power Struggles, and Budgetary Deficits in the Ottoman Politics under Abdülhamid II (1876-1909): Origins and Solutions*, (USA: Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Princeton University, 1976).

Akarlı, Engin Deniz. *The Long Peace: Ottoman Lebanon, 1861-1920*, (London, New York: Centre for Lebanese Studies and I. B. Tauris and Co. Ltd., 1993).

Allbaugh, Leland G. *Crete: A Case Study of Underdeveloped Area*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953).

Alter, Peter. *Nationalism*, (London: Edward Arnold, 1989).

Anagnostopoulou, Athanasia. "Tanzimat ve Rum Milletinin Kuramsal Çerçevesi," in:

Pinelopi Stathis. *19. Yüzyıl İstanbul'unda Gayrimüslimler*, (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1999), pp. 1-35.

Anagnostopoulou, Sia. "'Tyranny' and 'Despotism' As National and Historical Terms in Greek Historiography," in her: *The Passage from the Ottoman Empire to the Nation-States,* (İstanbul: Isis Press, 2004), pp. 11-19.

Anagnostopoulou, Sia. "The Terms *Millet*, *Génos*, *Ethnos*, *Oikoumenikótita*, *Alytrotismos* in Greek Historiography," in her: *The Passage from the Ottoman Empire to the Nation-States*, (İstanbul: Isis Press, 2004), pp. 37-55.

Anagnostopoulou, Sia. *Μικρά Ασία, 19ος αιώνας-1919, Οι Ελληνορθόδοξες κοινότητες: από το μιλλέτ των Ρωμιών στο Ελληνικό Έθνος*, . (Athens: Ellinika Grammata, 1998). [Asia Minor, 19th century-1919, the Greek Orthodox Communities: from the *Millet-i Rum* to the Greek Nation].

Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, (New York: Verso, 1991).

Anderson, M. S. *The Eastern Question 1774-1923*, (London: St. Martin's Press, 1966).

Anderson, M. S. *The Ascendancy of Europe 1815-1914*, (London and New York: Longman, 1985).

Andreopoulos, George. "State and Irredentism," *The Historical Journal*, Vol. XXIV, No. 4, 1981, pp. 949-959.

Απομνημονεύματα της Κρητικής Επαναστάσεως κατά τα έτη 1866-1868 Χρονοέκδοση, (Athens: Ek tou Typografeiou tou Kallous, 1884).

Armstrong, John. *Nations before Nationalism*, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982).

Arnakis, G. G. "The Role of Religion in the Development of Balkan Nationalism," in: Charles and Barbara Jelavich (eds.). *The Balkans in Transition*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963), pp. 115-144.

Arnakis, G. G. "Byzantium and Greece," *Balkan Studies*, No. IV, 1963, pp. 379-400.

Arnakis, G. G. "The Greek Church of Constantinople and the Ottoman Empire," *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. XXIV, No. 3, 1992, pp. 235-250.

Augustinos, Gerasimos. *Consciousness and History: Nationalist Critics of Greek Society, 1897-1914*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977).

Augustinos, Gerasimos. *The Greeks of Asia Minor: Confession, Community, and Ethnicity in the Nineteenth Century*, (Kent: Kent State University Press, 1992).

Aydın, Mahir. *Şarkî Rumeli Vilâyeti*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1992).

Barth, Fredrick (ed.). *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference*, (Oslo and London: Allen and Unwin, 1969).

Bastéa, Eleni. "Atina: Sokağa İmgeler Oymak, Planlama ve Ulusal Emeller," in: Zeynep Çelik, Diane Favro, and Richard Ingersoll (eds.). *Şehirler ve Sokaklar*, (trl.Bilgi Altınok), (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2007), pp. 35-53.

Bayraktar, Elif. "The Implementation of Ottoman Religious Policies in Klasör1645-1735: Men of Faith as Actors in the *Kadı* Court," (Ankara: Unpublished M.A. Thesis, Bilkent University, 2005).

Bérard, Victor. *Les Affairs de Crète*, (Paris: Colmann Levy, 1898).

Bierman, Irene A. "The Ottomanization of Crete," in: Irene A. Bierman, Rıfa'at Abou-El-Haj, and Donald Preziosi (eds.). *The Ottoman City and Its Parts: Urban Structure and Social Order*, (New Rochelle, New York: Aristide D. Caratzas, 1991), pp. 53-75.

Bodger, Alan. "Russia and the End of the Otoman Empire," in: Marian Kent (ed.). *The Great Powers and the End of the Ottoman Empire*, (London: Frank Cass, 1996).

Braude, Benjamin. "Foundations Myths of the Millet System," in: Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis (eds.). *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire*, Vol. I, (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, Inc, 1982), pp. 69-89.

Braudel, Fernand. *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II*, 2 vols., (New York: Harper and Row, 1973).

Breuilly, John. *Nationalism and the State*, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994).

Brewer, David. *The Flame of Freedom: The Greek War of Independence (1821-1833)*, (London: John Murray, 2001).

Bryer, A. "The Great Idea," *History Today*, March 1965, pp. 13-23.

Carras, Costa. "Greek Identity: A Long View," in: Maria Todorova (ed.). *Balkan Identities: Nation and Memory*, (London: Hurst & Company, 2004), pp. 294-326.

Chaconas, S. G. *Adamantios Korais: A Study of in Greek Nationalism*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1942).

Chatterjee, Partha. *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World*, (London: Zed Books, 1986).

Chazan, Naomi (ed.). *Irredentism and International Politics*, (London: Adamantine Press Limited, 1991).

Chester, Samuel Beach. *Life of Venizelos*, (New York: G. H. Doran, 1921).

Clogg, Richard. "The Greek Mercantile Bourgeoisie: 'Progressive' or 'Reactionary'?" in his: *Balkan Society in the Age of Greek Independence*, (Totowa: Barnes & Noble Books, 1981), pp. 85-110.

Clogg, Richard. *A Concise History of Greece*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

Clogg, Richard. *Anatolica: Studies in the Greek East in the 18th and 19th Centuries*, (Great Britain: Variorum, 1996).

Clutton, Elizabeth and Kenny, André. *Crete*, (New Abbot, North Pomfret: David & Charles Inc, 1975).

Combes, Paul. *L'île de Crète: Étude Géographique*, H*istorique, Politique et Economique*, (Paris: J. André, 1897).

Crawley, C. W. "John Capodistrias and the Greeks before 1821," *Cambridge Historical Journal*, Vol. XIII, No. 1, 1957, pp. 162-182.

Crawley, C. W. *The Question of Greek Independence: A Study of British Policy in the Near East, 1821-1833*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1930).

Cunningham, Allan. *Anglo-Ottoman Encounters in the Age of Revolution*: *Collected Essays*, Vol. I, (Portland: Frank Cass, 1993).

Dakin, Dougles. *The Greek Struggle in Macedonia, 1897-1913*, (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1964).

Dakin, Dougles. *The Unification of Greece, 1770-1923*, (London: Benn, 1972).

Damer, Sean. "Legless in Sphakiá: Drinking and Social Practice in Western Crete," *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, Vol. VI, No. 2, October 1988, pp. 291-310.

Davison, Roderic H. "Ottoman Diplomacy and the Question of the Rebellion in Crete, 1866-1869," *X. Türk Tarih Kongresi, 22-26 IX 1986*, pp. 1193-1203.

Demos, Raphael. "The Neo-Hellenic Enlightenment (1750-1821)," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, No. 19, 1958, pp. 523-541.

Deringil, Selim. *The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire 1876-1909*, (London: I. B. Tauris, 1998).

Deringil, Selim. "Legitimacy Structures in the Ottoman State: The Reign of Abdülhamid II (1876-1909)," in his: *The Ottomans, the Turks, and World Power Politics*, (İstanbul: Isis Press, 2000), pp. 83-99.

Deringil, Selim. "The Ottoman Empire and Russian Muslims: Brothers or Rivals?," in his: *The Ottomans, the Turks, and World Power Politics*, (İstanbul: Isis Press, 2000), pp. 73-81.

Deringil, Selim. ""They Live in a State of Nomadism and Savagery:" The Late Ottoman Empire and the Post-Colonial Debate," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. XLV, No. 2, 2003, pp. 311-342.

Detorakis, Theocharis E. *History of Crete*, (trl.) John C. Davis, (Iraklion: 1994).

Dimaras, Alexis. "The Other British Philhellenes," in: Richard Clogg (ed.). *The Struggle for Greek Independence: Essays to the Mark of the 150th Anniversary of the Greek War of Independence*, (Great Britain: The Macmillan Press Ltd, 1973), pp. 200-223.

Dounakis, Anagnostis. Αναγνώστης Δουνάκης, Οι αγώνες της Κρήτης, (Athens: Ek tou Typografeiou tou Mellontos, 1878).

Duguid, Stephen. "The Politics of Unity: Hamidian Policy in Eastern Anatolia," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. IX, 1973, pp. 130-155.

Dutkowski, Jean Stanislaw. *L'occupation de la Crète (1897-1909): Une Expérience d'administration Internationale d'un Territoire*, (Paris, A. Pedone, 1952).

Düstûr, I. Tertib, Vol. I, (Dersaâdet: Matbaa-i Osmâniye, 1330).

Düstûr, I. Tertib, Vol. IV, (Dersaâdet: Matbaa-i Osmâniye, 1330).

Edwards, Charles. *Letters from Crete*, (London: R. Bentley and son, 1887).

Emir, Ali Haydar. *Girit İhtilali, Gamsız Hasan Bey*, (İstanbul: Deniz Matbaası, 1931).

Encyclopaedia of Islam, Vol. III. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1960).

Fleming, K. E. *The Muslim Bonaparte: Diplomacy and Orientalism in Ali Pasha's Greece*, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1999).

Fontana, Benedetto. *Hegemony and Power: on the Relation between Gramsci and Machiavelli*, (Minneapolis, London: University of Minnesota Press, 1993).

Fortna, Benjamin C. *Imperial Classroom: Islam, the State, and Education in the Late Ottoman Empire*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

Frangos, George D. "The Philiki Etairia: A Premature National Coalition," in: Richard Clogg (ed.). *The Struggle for Greek Independence: Essays to the Mark of the 150th Anniversary of the Greek War of Independence*, (Great Britain: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1973), pp. 87-103.

Galanaki, Rhea. *The Life of İsmail Ferik Pasha*, (trl.) Kay Cicellis, (London: Peter Owen Publishers, 1996).

Gallant, Thomas W. *Modern Greece*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).

Geanakoplos, Deno J. "The Diaspora Greeks: The Genesis of Modern Greek National

Consciousness," in: Nikiforos Diamandouros, John P. Anton, John A. Petropulos, Peter Topping (eds.). *Hellenism and the First Greek War of Liberation (1821-1830): Continuity and Change*, (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1976), pp. 59-77.

Gellner, Ernest. *Nationalism*, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1997).

Gelvin, James L. *Divided Loyalties: Nationalism and Mass Politics in Syria at the Close of Empire*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).

Gourgouris, Stathis. *Dream Nation: Enlightenment, Colonization, and the Institution of Modern Greece*, (California: Stanford University Press, 1996).

Göçek, Fatma Müge. "The Decline of the Ottoman Empire and the Emergence of Greek, Armenian, Turkish and Arab Nationalism," in: Fatma Müge Göçek (ed.). *Social Construction of Nationalism in the Middle East*, (New York: State University of New York Press, 2002), pp. 15-83.

Greene, Molly. *A Shared World: Christians and Muslims in the Early Modern Mediterranean*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).

Greenfeld, Liah. *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993).

Gülsoy, Ersin. *Girit'in Fethi ve Osmanlı İdaresinin Kurulması (1645-1670)*, (İstanbul: Tarih ve Tabiat Vakfı Tatav Yayınları, 2004).

Hasluck, F. W. *Christianity and Islam under the Sultans*, (New York: Ortagon Books, 1973).

Hatzidimitriou, C. "From Paparrigopoulos to Vacalopoulos: Modern Greek Historiography on the Ottoman Period," in: A. Lilly Macrakis and P. Nikiforos Diamandouros. *New Trends in Modern Greek Historiography*, (United States of America: Modern Greek Studies Association, 1982), pp. 13-23.

Herzfeld, Michael. *Ours Once More: Folklore, Ideology, and the Making of Modern Greece*, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982).

Herzfeld, Michael. *The Poetics of Manhood: Contest and Identity in a Cretan Mountain Village*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985).

Herzfeld, Michael. *Anthropology through the Looking-glass: Critical Ethnography in the Margins of Europe*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

Herzfeld, Michael. *A Place in History: Social and Monumental Time in a Cretan Town*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991).

Herzfeld, Michael. "Hellenism and Occidentalism: The Permutations of Performance in Greek Bourgeois Identity," in: James G. Carrier (ed.). *Occidentalism: Images of the West*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 218-233.

Herzfeld, Michael. "Of Language and Land Tenure. The Transmission of Property and Information in Autonomous Crete," *Social Anthropology*, Vol. VII, No. 3, 1999, pp. 223-237.

Herzfeld, Michael. "Towards an Ethnographic Phenomenology of the Greek Spirit," in: Jacques Revel and Giovanni Levi (eds.). *Political Uses of the Past: The Recent Mediterranean Experience*, (London: Frank Cass, 2002), pp. 13-26.

Hobsbawm, Eric J. *The Age of Revolution: Europe, 1789-1848*, (London: Sphere Books Ltd., 1977).

Hobsbawm, Eric J. and Ranger, Terence (eds.). *The Invention of Tradition*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).

Hobsbawm, Eric J. *The Age of Empire 1875-1914*, (Great Britain: Abacus, 1987).

Hobsbawm, Eric J. *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

Holden, David. *Greece without Columns: The Making of Modern Greeks*, (London: Faber & Faber, 1972).

Holden, G. P. *The Revival of Greek Thought 1620-1830*, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1970).

Holland, Robert. "Nationalism, Ethnicity and the Concert of Europe: The Case of the High Commissionership of Prince George of Greece in Crete, 1898-1906," *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, Vol. XVII, No. 2, October 1999, pp. 253-276.

Hopkins, Adam. *Crete: Its Past, Present and People*, (London: Faber, 1977).

Howarth, David. *The Greek Adventure: Lord Byron and Other Eccentrics in the War of Independence*, (New York: Atheneum, 1976).

Hroch, Miroslav. "From National Movement to the Fully-Formed Nation," *New Left Review*, No. 198, 1993, pp. 3-20.

Hroch, Miroslav. *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe,* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000).

Huxley, George. "Aspects of Modern Greek Historiography of Byzantium," in: David Ricks and Paul Magdalino (eds.). *Byzantium and the Modern Greek Identity*, (London: Ashgate, 1998), pp. 15-23.

Jelavich, Barbara. "The Philorthodox Conspiracy of 1839," *Balkan Studies*, Vol. VII, No. 1, 1966, pp. 89-95.

Jelavich, Barbara. *History of the Balkans, Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries*, 2 vols, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

Kakridis, John. "The Ancient Greeks and the Greek War of Independence," *Balkan Studies*, Vol. IV, 1963, pp. 251-264.

Karakasidou, Anastasia N. *Fields of Wheat, Hills of Blood: Passages to Nationhood in Greek Macedonia, 1870-1990*, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1997).

Karal, Enver Ziya. *Osmanlı Tarihi*, Vol. VIII, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1995).

Karpat, Kemal. *An Inquiry into the Social Foundations of Nationalism in the Ottoman State: From Social Estates to Classes, From Millets to Nations*, (United States of America: Center of International Studies Princeton University, 1973).

Karpat, Kemal. "*Millet*s and Nationality: The Roots of the Incongruity of Nation and State in the Post-Ottoman Era," in: Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis (eds.). *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire*, Vol. I, (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers, Inc, 1982), pp. 141-169.

Karpat, Kemal. *Ottoman Population, 1830-1914: Demographic and Social Characteristics*, (Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985).

Karpat, Kemal. "The Social and Political Foundations of Nationalism in South East Europe after 1878: A Reinterpretation," in his: *Studies on Ottoman Social and Political History: Selected Articles and Essays*, (Brill, Leiden, Boston, Köln: Tuta Sub Aegide Pallas, 2002), pp. 352-384.

Kayalı, Hasan. *Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918*, (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1997).

Kazantzakis, Nikos. *Freedom and Death*, (London: Faber and Faber, 1983).

Kedourie, Elie. *Nationalism in Asia and Africa*, (New York: Meridian Books, 1970).

Kedourie, Elie. *Nationalism*, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994).

Keyder, Çağlar. "The Ottoman Empire," in: Karen Barkey and Mark von Hagen (eds.). *After Empire: Multi-ethnic Societies and Nation-Building*, (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1997), pp. 30-44.

Kitromilides, Paschalis M. *The Enlightenment as Social Criticism: Iosipos Moisiodax and Greek Culture in the Eighteenth Century*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992).

Kitromilides, Paschalis M. *Enlightenment, Nationalism, Orthodoxy*, (Great Britain: Variorum, 1994).

Kitromilides, Paschalis M. "On the Intellectual Content of Greek Nationalism: Paparrigopoulos, Byzantium and the Great Idea," in: David Ricks and Paul Magdalino (eds.). *Byzantium and the Modern Greek Identity*, (London: Ashgate,

1998), pp. 25-33.

Kofos, Evangelos. "Greek Insurrectionary Preparations, 1876-1878," in: Bela K. Kiraly and Gale Stokes (eds.). *Insurrections, Wars and the Eastern Crisis in the 1870s*, (United States of America: Atlantic Research and Publications, Inc., 1985), pp. 181-195.

Kofos, Evangelos. "Patriarch Joachim III (1878-1884) and the Irredentist Policy of the Greek State," *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, Vol. IV, No. 2, 1986, pp. 107-120.

Koliopoulos, John S. *Brigands without a Cause: Brigandage and Irredentism in Modern Greece 1821-1912*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987).

Koliopoulos, John S. "Brigandage and Insurgency in the Greek Domains of the Ottoman Empire, 1853-1908," in: Dimitri Gondicas and Charles Issawi (eds.). *Ottoman Greeks in the Age of Nationalism: Politics, Economy, and Society in the Nineteenth Century*, (Princeton, New Jersey: Darwin Press, Inc., 1999), pp. 143-160.

Koliopoulos, John S, Veremis, Thanos M. *Greece: The Modern Sequel from 1831 to the Present*, (London: Hurst & Company, 1988).

Koumarianou, Catherine. "The Contribution of the Intelligentsia towards the Greek Independence Movement, 1798-1821," in Richard Clogg (ed.). *The Struggle for Greek Independence: Essays to the Mark of the 150th Anniversary of the Greek War of Independence*, (Great Britain: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1973), pp. 67-86.

Kuneralp, Sinan. *Son Dönem Osmanlı Erkân ve Ricali (1839-1922): Prosopografik Rehber*, (İstanbul: Isis Press, 1999).

Kushner, David. *Expressions of Turkish National Sentiment during the Time of Abdülhamid II, 1876-1908*, (London: 1977).

Langer, William L. *The Diplomacy of Imperialism (1890-1902)*, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956).

Liakos, Antonis. "The Construction of National Time: The Making of the Modern Greek Historical Imagination," *Mediterranean Historical Review*, Vol. XVI, No. 1, June 2001, pp. 27-42.

Lord, Albert B. "The Heroic Tradition of Greek Epic and Ballad: Continuity and Change," in: Nikiforos Diamandouros, John P. Anton, John A. Petropulos, Peter Topping (eds.). *Hellenism and the First Greek War of Liberation (1821-1830): Continuity and Change*, (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1976), pp. 79-94.

Mackridge, Peter. "Byzantium and the Greek Language Question in the Nineteenth Century," in: David Ricks and Paul Magdalino (eds.). *Byzantium and the Modern Greek Identity*, (London: Ashgate, 1998), pp. 49-61.

Mackridge, Peter. "The Greek Intelligentsia 1780-1830: A Balkan Perspective," in:

Richard Clogg (ed.). *Balkan Society in the Age of Greek Independence*, (Totowa: Barnes & Noble Books, 1981), pp. 63-84.

Macrakis, Aglaia Lily. "Cretan Rebel: Eleftherios Venizelos in Ottoman Crete, 1864-1898," (USA: Unpublished Ph.D Dissertation, Harvard University, 1983).

Makdisi, Ussama. "Corrupting the Sublime Sultanate: The Revolt of Tanyus Shahin in Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Lebanon," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, No. 42, 2000, pp. 180-208.

Makdisi, Ussama. *The Culture of Sectarianism: Community, History, and Violence in Nineteenth-century Ottoman Lebanon*, (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 2000).

Makrides, Vasilios N. "Secularization and the Greek Orthodox Church in the Reign of King George I," in: Philip Carabott (ed.). *Greek Society in the Making, 1863-1913: Realities, Symbols and Visions*, (Great Britain: Variorum, 1997), pp. 179-196.

Mango, Cyril. *Byzantium and its Image*, (London: Variorum Reprints, 1984).

Marcoglou, Emmanuel E. *The American Interest in the Cretan Revolution, 1866-1869*, (Athens: National Centre of Social Research, 1971).

Marcopoulos, George J. "King George and the Expansion of Greece, 1875-1881," *Balkan Studies*, No. 9, 1968, pp. 21-40.

Marcopoulos, George J. "The Selection of Prince George as High Commissioner in Crete," *Balkan Studies*, Vol. X, No. 2, 1969, pp. 335-350.

May, Arthur J. "Crete and the United States, 1866-1869," *The Journal of Modern History*, Vol. XVI, Dec. 1944, pp. 286-293.

Mazower, Mark. *The Balkans: A Short History*, (New York: Modern Library, 2000).

Mazower, Mark. "The Messiah and the Bourgeoisie: Venizelos and Politics in Greece, 1909-1912," *The Historical Journal*, Vol. XXXV, No. 4, 1992, pp. 885-904.

Mc Kee, Sally. *Uncommon Dominion: Venetian Crete and the Myth of Ethnic Purity*, (Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia, 2000).

Mehmed Salâhî. *Girit Meselesi 1866-1889*, (İstanbul: Edebiyat Fakültesi Yayınları, 1967).

Merticopoulou, Kallia Kalliataki. "Literacy and Unredeemed Peasants: Late Nineteenth-Century Rural Crete Faces Education," in: Philip Carabott (ed.). *Greek Society in the Making, 1863-1913: Realities, Symbols and Visions*, (Great Britain: Variorum, 1997), pp. 115-130.

Milas, Herkül. *Yunan Ulusunun Doğuşu*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1999).

Milas, Herkül. "Osmanlı'da İlk Anayasayı Hazırlayan Aydın ve Eylem Adamı: Velestinli

Rigas," *Toplumsal Tarih*, No. 151, July 2006, pp. 16-27.

Miller, William. *Travels and Politics in the Near East*, (New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company Publishers, 1899).

Miller, William. *A History of the Greek People (1821-1921)*, (New York: E. P. Dutton and Company Publishers, 1922).

Miller, William. *The Ottoman Empire and Its Successors, 1801-1927*, (London: Cambridge University Press, 1927).

Mouzelis, Nicos P. *Modern Greece: Facets of Underdevelopment*, (London: Macmillan, 1978).

Nicolopoulos, John. "From Agathangelos to Megali Idea: Russia and the Emergence of Greek Nationalism," *Balkan Studies*, Vol. XXVI, No. 1, 1985, pp. 41-56.

Ortaylı, İlber. *İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1999).

Ortaylı, İlber. *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Alman Nüfuzu*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1998).

Örenç, Ali Fuat. "Yakındönem Tarihimizde Sisam Adası (1821-1923)," İstanbul University, Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, (İstanbul: Unpublished M.A Thesis, 1995).

Özkırımlı, Umut. *Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction*, (New York: Palgrave, 2000).

Pakalın, Mehmet Zeki. *Osmanlı Tarih Deyimleri ve Terimleri Sözlüğü*, Vol. II, (İstanbul: Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Yayınları, 1993).

Pallis, A. A. (ed.). *The Cretan Drama: The Life and Memoirs of Prince George of Greece, High Commissioner in Crete, (1898-1906)*, (New York: R. Speller, 1959).

Papers of the Greek Committee. *Crete and Greece*, (New Series, 1897), No. 1.

Parvanova, Zorka. "Changes in the Political Status of the Island of Crete, 1894-1899, *Études Balkaniques*, No. 4, 1989, pp. 64-84.

Parry, V. J. and Yapp, M. E. (eds.). *War, Technology and Society in the Middle East*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), pp. 308-329.

Pashley, Robert. *Travels in Crete*, Vol. I, (Cambridge: Pitt Press, 1958).

Peckham, Robert Shannan. *National Histories, Natural States: Nationalism and the Politics of Place in Greece*, (London: I. B. Tauris, 2001).

Peckham, Robert Shannan. "Internal Colonialism: Nation and Religion in Nineteenth-Century Greece," in: Maria Todorova (ed.). *Balkan Identities: Nation and Memory*, (London: Hurst & Company, 2004), pp. 41-59.

Perrot, G. *L'île de Crète: Souvenirs de Voyage*, (Paris: L. Hachette et cie., 1867).

Petropulos, John Anthony. *Politics and Statecraft in the Kingdom of Greece 1833-1843*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968).

Petrovich, Michael B. *The Emergence of Russian Panslavism 1856-1870*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956).

Prevelakis, Pandelis. *The Cretan*, (trl.) Abbott Rick, Peter Mackridge, (Minneapolis: Nostos, 1991).

Psihas, Nikolaos. *Επαναστατική Εικών των Δυτικών της Κρήτης Διαμερισμάτων η Ανασκευή Χωριων Τινων της Περιγραφούσης τον Εθνικόν Αγώνα της Κρήτης Διαμερισμάτών η Ανασκευή Χωριων Τινων της Περιγρφουσης τον Εθνικόν Αγώνα της Κρήτης κατά των Τούρκων Πραγματείας*, (Athens: Ek tu Typografeiou Nikita Pasari, 1870).

Quataert, Donald. "Overview of the Nineteenth Century," in: Halil İnalcık with Donald Quataert (eds.). *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire (1600-1914)*, Vol. II, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 761-994.

Robson, Maureen M. "Lord Clarendon and the Cretan Question, 1868-9," *The Historical Journal*, Vol. III, Issue 1, 1960, pp. 78-88.

Roshwald, Aviel. *Ethnic Nationalism and the Fall of Empires: Central Europe, Russia and the Middle East (1914-1923)*, (London and New York: Routledge, 2001).

Roudometof, Victor. *Nationalism, Globalization, and Orthodoxy: The Social Origins of Ethnic Conflict in the Balkans*, (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2001), [electronic resource].

Roudometof, Victor. "Nationalism and Identity Politics in the Balkans: Greece and the Macedonian Question," *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, Vol. XIV, No. 2, 1996, pp. 253-301.

Roudometof, Victor. "From Rum Millet to Greek Nation: Enlightenment, Secularization, and National Identity in Ottoman Balkan Society, 1453-1821," *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, Vol. XVI, No. 2, 1998, pp. 11-48.

Roudometof, Victor. "Invented Traditions, Symbolic Boundaries, and National Identity in Southeastern Europe: Greece and Serbia in Comparative Historical Perspective (1830-1880)," *East European Quarterly*, Vol. XXXII, No. 4, 1998, pp. 429-468.

Runciman, Steven. *The Great Church in Captivity, A Study of the Patriarchate of Constantinople from the Eve of the Turkish Conquest to the Greek War of Independence*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968).

Salnâme-yi Vilâyet-i Girid, 1293 (1876).

Seton-Watson, Hugh. *Nations and States*, (Colorado: Westview Press, 1977).

Seton-Watson, R. W. *The Rise of Nationality in the Balkans*, (London: Constable, 1966).

Sfikas, G. M. "Folklore and History in Modern Greece," in: Jelisaveta Stanojevich Allen, Christos P. Ioannides John S. Langdon, Stephen W. Reinert (eds.). *TO ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΟΝ: Studies in Honor of Speros Vryonis, Jr*, Vol. II, (New Rochelle: Aristide D. Caratzas, 1993), pp. 393-406.

Sfikas, Thanasis D. and Williams, Christopher. *Ethnicity and Nationalism in East Central Europe and the Balkans*, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1995).

Shaw, Stanford. "Sultan Abdülhamid II: Last Men of the Tanzimat," *Tanzimat'ın 150. Yıldönümü Uluslararası Sempozyumu Bildiriler,* (Ankara: Milli Kütüphane, 1989), pp. 179-197.

Sherrard, Philip. "Church, State and Greek War of Independence," in: Richard Clogg (ed.). *The Struggle for Greek Independence: Essays to the Mark of the 150th Anniversary of the Greek War of Independence*, (Great Britain: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1973), pp. 182-199.

Sieber, F.W. *Travels in the Island of Crete*, (London: Sir Richard Philips & Co, 1823).

Skendi, Stavro. "Crypto-Christianity in the Balkan Area under the Ottomans," *Slavic Review*, Vol. XXVI, No. 2, June 1967, pp. 227-246.

Skopetea, Elli. *Το Πρότυπο Βασίλειο και η Μεγάλη Ιδέα: Όψεις του προβλήματος στην Ελλάδα*, (Athens: Politipo, 1988). [The 'Ideal Kingdom' and the Great Idea, Views of the National Question in Greece].

Smith, Anthony D. *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988).

Smith, Anthony D. *Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of Recent Theories of Nations and Nationalism*, (London and New York: Routledge, 1998).

Smith, Anthony D. *The Nation in History: Historiographical Debates about Ethnicity and Nationalism*, (Hanover: University Press of New England, 2000).

Smith, Michael Llewellyn. *The Great Island: A Study of Crete*, (London: Longmans, 1965).

Spratt, Thomas Abel Brimage. *Travels and Research in Crete*, 2 vols., (London: J. van Voorst, 1865).

St. Clair, William. *That Greece Might Still Be Free: The Philhellenes in the War of Independence*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1972).

Stavrianos, L. S. *The Balkans since 1453*, (Illinois: Dryden Press, 1958).

Stavrianos, L. S. "Antecedents to the Balkan Revolutions of the Nineteenth Century," *Journal of Modern History*, Vol. XXIX, No. 4, December 1957, pp. 335-348.

Stavrinos, Miranda. "Palmerston and the Cretan Question," *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, Vol. X, No. 2, 1992, pp. 249-269.

Stillman, William James. *The Cretan Insurrection of 1866-1868*, (New York: H. Holt and Company, 1874).

Stoianovich, Traian. "The Conquering Balkan Orthodox Merchants," *Journal of Economic History*, No. 20, 1960, pp. 243-313.

Strauss, Johann. "Unutulmuş Bir Cemaat: Girit Müslümanlarının Abdülhamid Devrindeki, İkinci Meşrutiyet Devrindeki ve İlhaktan Sonraki Faaliyetleri," *XI. Türk Tarih Kongresi'nden Ayrıbasım*, (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1994), pp. 2105-2114.

Sugar, Peter F. "The Enlightenment in the Balkans: Some Basic Considerations," *East European Quarterly*, Vol. IX, No. 4, 1975, pp. 499-507.

Süleyman Tevfik ve Abdullah Zühtü. *Devlet-i Âliyye-i Osmânî ve Yunan Muhârebesi 1314*, (İstanbul: Mihran Matbaası, 1315).

Tahmiscizâde Mehmed Mâcid. *Girit Hatıraları*, (İstanbul: Kervan Kitapçılık, 1977).

Tancoigne, J. M. *İzmir'e, Ege Adalarına ve Girit'e Seyahat: Bir Fransız Diplomatın Türkiye Gözlemleri (1811-1814)*, (trl.) Ercan Eyüboğlu, (İstanbul: Büke Yayınları, 2003).

Tatsios, T. G. *The Megali Idea and the Greek-Turkish War of 1897: The Impact of the Cretan Problem on Greek Irredentism, 1866-1897*, (New York: East European Monographs, 1984).

Tatsios, T. G. *The Cretan Problem and the Eastern Question: A Study of Greek Irredentism, 1866-1898*, (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1967).

Tilly, Charles, Tilly, Louise; and Tilly, Richard. *The Rebellious Century (1830-1930)*, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1975),

Todorov, Varban N. *Greek Federalism during the Nineteenth Century (Ideas and Projects)*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995).

Todorova, Maria. *Imagining the Balkans*, (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).

Todorova, Maria. "The Ottoman Legacy in the Balkans," in: Carl L. Brown (ed.). *Imperial Legacy: The Ottoman Imprint on the Balkans and the Middle East*, (New York: Columbia University Pres, 1996), pp. 45-77.

Tomadakis, Vasilios Fr. *Ιωάννου Δ. Κονδυλάκη άγνωστα απομνημονεύματα (1905): από την συμμετοχή του στη Κρητική Επανάσταση του 1897: παράρτημα: οι επώνυμες ανταποκρίσεις του Ιωάννου Δ. Κονδυλάκη από τη Μήλο και την Κρήτη κατά την*

επανάσταση του 1897, (Athens: Kardamitsas, 2002).

Tournefort, Joseph de. *Tournefort Seyahatnamesi*, (trl.) Ali Berktay, (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2005).

Toynbee, Arnold J. *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey: A Study in the Contact of Civilisations*, (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1922).

Tukin, Cemal. "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Girit İsyanları ve 1821 Yılına kadar Girit," *Belleten*, Vol. IX, No. 24, 1945, pp. 136-206.

Vacalopoulos, A. "Byzantinism and Hellenism : Remarks on the Racial Origin and the Intellectual Continuity of the Greek Nation," *Balkan Studies*, No. 9, 1968, pp. 101-126.

Vaillant, M. *Les Origines de l'Autonomie Crètoise*, (Paris: L. Larose, 1902).

Veremis, Thanos. "From the National State to the Stateless Nation 1821-1910," in: Martin Blinkhorn and Thanos Veremis (eds.). *Modern Greece: Nationalism and Nationality*, (Athens: Eliamep, 1990), pp. 9-22.

Villalba, María López. "Balkanizing the French Revolution: Rhigas's *New Political Constitution*," in: Dimitris Tziovas. *Greece and the Balkans: Identities, Perceptions and Cultural Encounters since the Enlightenment*, (England: Ashgate, 2003), pp. 141-154.

Vucinich, Wayne. *The Ottoman Empire*, (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1965).

Weber, Eugen. *Peasants into Frenchmen*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976).

Woodford, Stewart L. *Crete: An Address*, (Albany: Weed, Parsons and Company, 1868).

Woodhouse, C. M. *The Philhellenes*, (Rutherford: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1969).

Xydis, Stephen G. "Modern Greek Nationalism," in: Peter F. Sugar and Ivo J. Lederer (eds.). *Nationalism in Eastern Europe*, (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1971), pp. 207-258.

Xydis, Stephen G. "Modern Greek Nationalism," *Balkan Studies*, No. IX, 1968, pp. 1-20.

Yannoupoulos, Yannis. "Greek Society on the Eve of Independence," in: Richard Clogg (ed.). *Balkan Society in the Age of Greek Independence*, (Totowa: Barnes & Noble Books, 1981), pp. 18-33.

Yasamee, F. A. K. *Ottoman Diplomacy: Abdülhamid II and the Great Powers 1878-1888*, (İstanbul: Isis Press, 1996).

Yılmaz, Mehmet Oytun. "The 1897 Greko-Ottoman War," (İstanbul: Unpublished M.A Thesis, Boğaziçi University, 2003).

Zakythinos, D. A. *The Making of Modern Greece from Byzantium to Independence*, (Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1976).

Zürcher, Eric J. *Turkey: A Modern History*, (London: I. B. Tauris, 2004).

APPENDICES

The Records of the Cretan Christians during the Disturbances of Candia in 1898



Kandiye kazasında mütemekkin iken vak'a-ı müellime esnasında ber-hayat kalıp hükûmet-i mahalliyenin taht-ı muhâfazasında kalan Hıristiyanların mikdârını mübeyyin defterdir*				
icmâl	**zükûr**	**inâs**	**esâmî**	**mülahazât**
2	2		fırıncı Nikola Bako ve oğlu	
1	1		Yorgi Steryazi	
2	2		Manoli Kavalaki ve biraderi	
1	1		Iraklı Aryiraki	
1	1		Dimitri Senkelaki	
1	1		Yanko Sabuncaki	
1	1		Vangeli Vasiyazi	
1	1		Manoli Haritaki	
1	1		Yorgi Kasatiripi	
1	1		Yorgi Pavlizi	
1	1		Aritonalı Pavlizi	
1	1		Nikola Pavlizi	
1	1		Dimitri Sakonalı	
1		1	Mariya Papazaki	
1		1	Mariya Apostolizaki	
1		1	Vasiliki Katoti	
1	1		Yanni Katoti	
1	1		Yorgi Vasalaki	
1	1		Kosta Kasteryanaki	
3	3		Yorgi Bayraki ve evladları	
1	1		Andoni Melesanu	
1	1		Yorgi Kokinaki	
1	1		Yorgi Masiyozaki	
1	1		Mihail Masiyozaki	
1		1	Eleni Vasiliyazu	
1		1	Harikala Vasiliyazu	
1		1	Vasiliki Vasiliyazu	
1		1	Mariya Vasiliyazu	
1	1		Manoli Vasiliyazu	
1		1	İrini Skalagotaki	
1	1		Yanni Vasiliyazi	
1	1		Mihail Mavroyanaki	
1		1	Aspasya Marizaki	
1	1		Steryo Zaharyozaki	
38	**29**	**9**		

* T.C. BOA, Yıldız Tasnifi, Y.MTV., Dosya: 182, Gömlek: 153, Aded: 4, 1316 Ca 10.

جواب	زید	بکر	شرح	صد فعلت
۲۸	۷۹	۹	نقاشباشی	
۱	۰	۱	صوفیا ناظر برزو	
۱	۱	۰	عکس ء	
۱	۰	۱	قانقچی صابونچاک	
۱	۰	۱	آنقا ء	
۱	۰	۱	اریه قاراویناک	
۱	۰	۱	ماه یار صابونچاک	
۱	۰	۱	آغایی آخانوناک	
۱	۱	۰	کیرباقی ء	
۱	۱	۰	پورک بیشقاناک	
۱	۱	۰	پورک قالوجری	
۱	۱	۰	منول دوزی	
۱	۱	۰	منول ساقا	
۱	۱	۰	بقچوق آرپاناک	
۱	۱	۰	دانکرارای	
۱	۱	۰	منولی ساچاقناک	
۷	۷	۰	پورک و منول قاراویناک	
۱	۱	۰	قسطه ساقاک	
۱	۱	۰	آزوق قوکیسی	
۱	۱	۰	بقچوق قپاناک	
۱	۱	۰	پورک قاستانای	
۱	۱	۰	منجاق ستمانای	
۱	۱	۰	آزوق خرسوزوری	
۱	۱	۰	یای آلتیر	
۱	۱	۰	راسلی بایاوسی	
۱	۱	۰	قطن آوغرستاک	
۱	۱	۰	زنجری لوغاریاستاک	
۱	۱	۰	پورک سالوستاک	
۱	۱	۰	بقچولی ساقا	
۱	۱	۰	آپرسلوک جانقاک	
۱	۱	۰	منجاق ساتیوزاک	
۱	۱	۰	قطن زنجر بیاوزاک	
۱	۱	۰	یای ساستوزاک	
۷۸	۵۶	۱۵		

icmâl	zükûr	inâs	esâmî	mülahazât
38	29	9	nakl-i yekûn	
1		1	Sofia Zaharyozu	
1	1		Aleksi Zaharyozu	
1		1	Kantiko Sabuncaki	
1		1	Anika Sabuncaki	
1		1	İrini Karavitaki	
1		1	Mariya Sabuncaki	
1		1	Agapi Arhanotaki	
1	1		Kiryako Arhanotaki	
1	1		Yorgi Şitanaki	
1	1		Yorgi Kalomiri	
1	1		Manoli Veneri	
1	1		Manoli Mataksa	
1	1		Nikola Ariyanaki	
1	1		Vangeli Peraki	
1	1		Manoli Stavrakaki	
2	2		Yorgi ve Manoli Karavitaka	
1	1		Kosta Yanakaki	
1	1		Andoni Kokizi	
1	1		Nikola Kebabaki	
1	1		Yorgi Kastanaki	
1	1		Mihail Stefanaki	
1	1		Andoni Hristozolaki	
1	1		Yanni Alkisyo	
1	1		Vasili Papavasili	
1	1		Kosta Avgostaki	
1	1		Dimitri Logaryastaki	
1	1		Yorgi Salostraki	
1	1		Nikola Metaksa	
1	1		Apostolus Cankaki	
1	1		Mihail Masyozaki	
1	1		Kosta Dimitriyazaki	
1	1		Yanni Mastoraki	
71	**56**	**15**		

جمع	زنانه	مردانه	اسامی	ملاحظات
۷۱	۵۶	۱۵	نقاشیکوف	
۱	۱		نوذوری آرخانگوتاک	
۱	۱		میخائل سپاره	
۱	۱		آنه ریقو	
۱	۱		وسیلی باستف	
۱	۱		علک نه رو باشقیرلاک ویایلاقاک	
۱	۱		ذمیتری مارقاک	
۱	۱		موسیو برینه	آوستریا قونسلاری
۱	۱		خاریوف قفقازیلی	
۱	۱		میخائل تاقا	
۸	۲	۶	موسیو قره بغدعاکی	
۱	۱		یاغ باباداک	
۸	۲	۶	منوخ باباداک عاکری وولده وحشره سی	
۲	۱	۱	آپوستولو وسیلیادی	
۱	۱	۰	یورکی باباداک	
۱	۱		آناستاسی ازمیرلی	
۱	۱		آلیوزه ف زاسیوولسو	
۱	۱		آرتمی پاتراک	
۱	۱		یاغ خاجیداک	
۱	۱		میخائل جاجیاک	
۱		۱	افروبیا داوی	
۱		۱	الغ بلیناک	
۱		۱	مارینا ایقونومویولو	
۲	۱	۱	مارینا ملیندی وارواردلی	
۱	۱		منوخ	
۱		۱	خاریقلیا ایقونومویولو	
۱		۱	آنه ریاغ مباشره ونلاک	
۱	۱		یورکی یورکیلیادی	
۱	۱		میخائل قسطرینیاک	
۱		۱	قاترین لیلاه داک	
۱	۱		ذمیتری	
۱	۱		یاغ قاسیماک	
۱۱۹	۸۲	۳۷		

icmâl	zükûr	inâs	esâmî	mülahazât
71	56	15	nakl-i yekûn	
1	1		Suzuri Arhagotaki	
1	1		Mihail Sparta	
1	1		Mihail Andriako	
1	1		Vasili Basko	
1	1		Aleksandro Baskolaki veya Polakaki	
1	1		Dimitri Markaki	
1	1		Mösyö Berinda	Avusturya Konsolosu
1	1		Harilau Kostandingizi	
1	1		Mihail Metaksa	
8	2	6	Mösyö Karabet'in ailesi	
1	1		Yanni Papazaki	
8	2	6	Manoli Papazaki ailesi ve valide ve hemşiresi	
3	1	2	Apostolu Vasiliyazi	
1	1		Yorgi Papazaki	
1	1		Anastas İzmirli	
1	1		Alepozeli Jasimovelo	
1	1		Artemi Pataraki	
1	1		Yanni Hacızaki	
1	1		Mihail Çaçaki	
1		1	Efseviya Davi	
1		1	Eleni Palayanaki	
1		1	Mariya İkonomopola	
2	1	1	Mariya Melsizi ve evladları	
1	1		Manoli Melsizi	
1		1	Harikala İkonomopola	
1		1	Andiryani Mastrandonaki	
1	1		Yorgi Yorgiyazi	
1	1		Mihail Kasterinoyanaki	
1		1	Katerini Linarzaki	
1	1		Dimitri Linarzaki	
1	1		Yanni Kasimati	
119	**83**	**36**		



icmâl	zükûr	inâs	esâmî	mülahazât
119	83	36	nakl-i yekûn	
9	4	5	Kapudan Bastiyanu ma familyası	
16	5	11	Mösyö Korpi ma familyası	
4	2	2	Mösyö Piyer ma familyası	
2	1	1	Seyfi Milaraki ve zevcesi	
1	1		Minerbo fotoğrafçı	
1	1		Nikola Daksa fırıncı	
1	1		Kosta Darmi fırıncı	
1	1		Mihail Setrahaki fırıncı	
1	1		Petro Veraka fırıncı	
1	1		Kosta Papazaki fırıncı	
1	1		Dimitri fırıncı	
1		1	Eftimiya Setyakaki fırıncı	
2		2	tercümanın validesi Klara ve validesi	
2		2	Yorgi Stamataki'nin beslemesi ve kerimesi Kalyopi	
1		1	Ana Nikolozaki	
1		1	Yanni Perizi'nin dul karısı	
2	2		Yanni Velasto'nun evladları	
1	1		Mösyö Amabile'nın eczacısı Badestino	
1	1		Dimitri Mavri	
7		7	Anderiya Kalokerino'nun zevcesi, Mariya beslemesi Ana, Katerini, Eleni, Zabya ve validesi Arpiro	
4	3	1	Patakaki zevcesi Ana ve evladları	
11		11	Pirine'nin üç kızı, teyzesi, Anastasia Arazmiya Ana Elena Ziyamanti Ayisinya ve Eleni	
2	1	1	Eleni Ziyamantizi ve oğlu Miya	
2		2	Cankaki'nin beslemesi	
7	2	5	Pirizo Magozaki ve zevcesi Pinelopi ve evladları	Aya Mina Kilisesindedirler
2	1	1	Manoli Terzaki ve zevcesi Zabya	Aya Mina Kilisesindedirler
2	1	1	Hacı Manoli Furneli ve zevcesi Kiryaki	Aya Mina Kilisesindedirler
1		1	Eleni Zafirakena dul	Aya Mina Kilisesindedirler
2	1	1	Manoli Bakkalbaşı ve kerimesi İrini	Aya Mina Kilisesindedirler
2		2	Hacı Ana ve kerimesi Kalyopi	Aya Mina Kilisesindedirler
1		1	Eleni Marinopola	Aya Mina Kilisesindedirler
1	1		Stavro Pelakoti	Aya Mina Kilisesindedirler
1		1	Mariya Birişimçiyana	Aya Mina Kilisesindedirler
3	1	2	Yorgi Koziri zevcesi Mariya ve kerimesi	Rum Hastahanesinde
216	**117**	**99**		



مجلد	جزء	باب	اسامی	ملاحظات
۶۱۶	۱۱۷	۹۹	نقدیکوف	
۷	۱	۱	باغی سیاوکی فدوجی اوغلی	روم خط خانه سنده
۷	۱	۱	یقوله یقولاتاکی وواسیلی	ء ء
۷	۱	۱	یورکی مونسانلو وواسیلی قرتی	ء ء
۷	۷	۱	باغی یقولاتاکی وواسیلی وقتری	ء ء
۷	۱	۱	ماریا حوستاقوپولو ء یورکی	ء ء
۱	۱	۱	زیکا سوماروپولو خولی	ء ء
۱	۱	۱	قالیوپ باکی	ء ء
۷	۷	۱	قالیوپ ماناتاپوپولو وکریوی ماریا	ء ء
۱	۱	۱	ستیانی دیاقوپولو	ء ء
۱	۱	۱	ایرینی ستاماتوپولو	ء ء
۱	۱	۱	ستفانا ستاورونی	ء ء
۱	۱	۱	ماریا ترانجوپولو	ء ء
۱	۱	۱	قالیوپ روزوپولو	ء ء
۷	۷	۱	ماریا آلیوراتوپولو وقتری	ء ء
۱	۱	۱	کیریاکی کرانیاف	ء ء
۱	۱	۱	ماریا ترخیلیا	ء ء
۱	۱	۱	صوفیا ایاپاپاکیا	ء ء
۱	۱	۱	زیکا مارالیا	ء ء
۱	۱	۱	ایقدانوموس راهب	طوسیا فاستنده
۱	۱	۱	باغی قلاوکاک	ء ء
۱	۱	۱	ماریا قردولاکا	ء ء
۱	۱	۱	ماریا چیلنکرونا	ء ء
۱	۱	۱	ایمن یاپدس مونس افندی	اسمنیلی
۱	۱	۱	سعیق ماتوس	ء
۱	۱	۱	قهوه جی آوشاقی	ء
۱	۱	۱	اوهانس	ء
۱	۱	۱	سیباط	ء
۱	۱	۱	یوانکو	ء
۱	۱	۱	دوسکیادی	ء
۱	۱	۱	آغدیاپ	ء
۱	۱	۱	سنکدیم	ء
۱	۱	۱	ستفاکا قدیانوپولو	ء
۱	۱	۱	فروین برنجیاک	ء
۱۷۷	۱۸۶	۷۵۶		

icmâl	zükûr	inâs	esâmî	mülahazât
216	117	99	nakl-i yekûn	
2	1	1	Yanni Sinazaki ve zevcesi Eleni	Rum Hastahanesinde
2	1	1	Nikolataki ve validesi	Rum Hastahanesinde
2	1	1	Yorgi Metoşano ve validesi Fotini	Rum Hastahanesinde
2	2		Yanni Nikolataki ve oğlu Dimitri	Rum Hastahanesinde
2	1	1	Mariya Mostakopola ve oğlu Yorgi	Rum Hastahanesinde
1		1	Zispiga Sumaropola dul	Rum Hastahanesinde
1		1	Kalyopi Peraki	Rum Hastahanesinde
2		2	Kalyopi Martalamopola ve kerimesi Mariya	Rum Hastahanesinde
1		1	Stelyani Dabakopola	Rum Hastahanesinde
1		1	İrini Stamatopola	Rum Hastahanesinde
1		1	Stefana Stavroti	Rum Hastahanesinde
1		1	Mariya Tütüncüpola	Rum Hastahanesinde
1		1	Kalyopi Ruzopola	Rum Hastahanesinde
2		2	Mariya Alyoratopola ve kızı	Rum Hastahanesinde
1		1	Kiryaki Kirazyani	Rum Hastahanesinde
1		1	Mariya Sufilya	Rum Hastahanesinde
1		1	Sofia Ayaparaksia	Rum Hastahanesinde
1		1	Zespika Merabeloniya	Rum Hastahanesinde
1	1		İkonomus rahib	Tursinya Manastırında
1	1		Yanni Kalaycaki	Tursinya Manastırında
1		1	Mariya Kodolenga	Tursinya Manastırında
1		1	Mariya Çilengerena	Tursinya Manastırında
1	1		Ermeni Papazı Manuel Efendi	Ermeniler
1	1		Saatçi Mateus	Ermeniler
1	1		Kahveci Aruşak	Ermeniler
1	1		Kahveci Ohanis	Ermeniler
1	1		Kahveci Simbat	Ermeniler
1	1		Kahveci Yuakim	Ermeniler
1	1		Kahveci Doskimak	Ermeniler
1	1		Kahveci Ağayab	Ermeniler
1	1		Kahveci Sengerim	Ermeniler
1		1	Stefana Karayanopola	
1		1	Fırıncı Birişimcaki	
256	**134**	**122**		



icmâl	zükûr	inâs	esâmî	mülahazât
289	154	135	nakl-i yekûn	
1		1	Kostina Azamizi	
1		1	Katerini Masyozopola	
1		1	Asina Yanakaki	
1	1		Taryovizo Yanaki	
1		1	Mariya Siyakaki	
1	1		Yanni Siyakaki	
1		1	Aryidi Stamataki	
1		1	Ana Stamataki	
1		1	Elisavet Buma	
1		1	Lara Sodkad	
1		1	Haris Surovopola	
1	1		Seozoro Sfakanaki	
1		1	Evangeliya Sfakanaki	
1		1	Elisavet Aya	
1		1	Mariya Servopola	
1	1		Yanni Volis	
1		1	Eleni Hacı Sibrino	
1	1		Nikola Sibrino	
1	1		Vangeli Sibrino	
1		1	Katerini Makrizi	
1		1	Aryiri Kopozaki	
1		1	Mariko Kalafati	
1		1	Eleni Stamataki	
1		1	Asina Velonaki	
1		1	Mariya hidmetkâre	
1		1	Margarita Laşyoti	
1		1	Leonizona Soryazaki	
1		1	Ana hidmetkâre	
1		1	Aspasya Steryazi	
1		1	Aspasya Pavlizi	
1		1	Eleni Zarifaki	
1		1	Ana Klazo	
1		1	İrini Kipriyotaki	
1		1	Eleni hidmetkâre	
2		2	Anastasya Nikiforaki ve Asina Nikiforaki	
1		1	Olambiya Zarifaki	
1		1	Kırostalı Malerini Mesopola	
327	**160**	**167**		



icmâl	zükûr	inâs	esâmî	mülahazât
327	160	167	nakl-i yekûn	
1		1	Angeliko Vangelopola	
1		1	Mariko Vangelopola	
1	1		Petro Vangelaki	
1		1	Sofiya Kokizaki	
1		1	Aryiro Kokizaki	
1		1	Tripi Hori dört yaşında	
1	1		Manoli Hristoforu	
1		1	Mariya Sityakaki	
1	1		Kosta Sityakaki	
1	1		Manoli Sityakaki	
1		1	Elozinya Sinalaki	
1		1	Viktorya Kamilaki	
1	1		Yorgi Velaha	
1	1		Manoli Zazazaki	
1	1		Luiniza Sananaki	
1	1		Mihail Karpi	
1	1		Suma Handaloni	
1	1		Kosta Yakodidi	
1	1		Mina Steryazi	
1	1		Luiniza Yamalaki	
1	1		Yorgi Hıristaki	
1	1		Sutir Makrizi	
1	1		Anastas Peneraki	
1	1		Manoli Zemaraki	
1	1		Kosta Hrisos	
1	1		Manoli Magozaki	
1	1		Yorgi Perolaraki	
1	1		Kosta Karamenolaki	
1	1		Nikola Nerolizaki	
1	1		Penayota Cakaraki	
1	1		Yorgi Valyazi	
358	**183**	**175**		

ملاحظات	اسامی	بنا	جمع	جمع
	تقدیمی	۱۷۵	۱۸۴	۴۵۸
	ستیانر آذامنی		۱	۱
	واسیلی نیاقاک		۱	۱
	نیقولا قره یاخ		۱	۱
	قطن میشه لیناک		۱	۱
	یورکی قره ناناک		۱	۱
	نیقولی برونیاک		۱	۱
	یورکی قاپیجی		۱	۱
	تحستوقلی بانده لیک		۱	۱
	ذیحوستف ناغاریو		۱	۱
	منیا صحاناک		۱	۱
	قطن سرچینه اک		۱	۱
	ذیمتری لولو		۱	۱
	میخائل سیحاک		۱	۱
	بابا ستاماطری		۱	۱
	آدیستیزی ستاولیناک		۱	۱
	نیقولا جاقاریاک		۱	۱
	کرمایلکلو اتجیلرجی وقایلس	۱	۱	۲
	اوغلی ساده وهنجی قایلس	۱	۱	۲
	ستیانر سیانوناک		۱	۱
	قطن آندونیق		۱	۱
	یاغی هرقیانناک		۱	۱
	ذیکقا آندونیق	۱		۱
باجی کبره ایدیلر	ماریا ء	۱		۱
	ذاناماری میخائل اغا		۱	۱
	زوجه سی ناصالیا	۱		۱
	کریکی قاترنی	۱		۱
	بسلری ء	۱		۱
	آدیستیزی رومانناک		۱	۱
	زوجه سی قالیوپی	۱		۱
	ماریا قاوقاتی	۱		۱
	آدیستیزی رومانناک کریکی افروپیا	۱		۱
		۱۸۵	۲۰۶	۴۹۱

icmâl	zükûr	inâs	esâmî	mülahazât
358	183	175	nakl-i yekûn	
1	1		Stelyano Azamizi	
1	1		Vasili Yanakaki	
1	1		Nikola Karayani	
1	1		Kosta Mişelizaki	
1	1		Yorgi Karanaraki	
1	1		Nikola Yuronimaki	
1	1		Yorgi Kapnisto	
1	1		Temistoklu Bandelizi	
1	1		Zimosteni Zahariyo	
1	1		Mina Maharaki	
1	1		Kosta Serçizaki	
1	1		Dimitri Lala	
1	1		Mihail Sepeçaki	
1	1		Papa Stamatos	
1	1		Aritizi Stavelizaki	
1	1		Nikola Çakaraki	
2	1	1	Kermasid Bey'in aşçısı uncu ve karısı	
2	1	1	oğlu Sara ve hidmetçi karısı	
1	1		Stelyano Sepanozaki	
1	1		Kosta Andonio	
1	1		Yanni Avziyanaki	
1		1	Zispiga Andonio	{ Raci Bey'de idiler
1		1	Mariya Andonio	
1	1		jandarma mülâzımı Mihail Ağa	
1		1	zevcesi Ameliya	
1		1	kerimesi Katerini	
1		1	beslemesi Katerini	
1	1		Aristizi Romanaki	
1		1	zevcesi Kalyopi	
1		1	Mariya Kalafati	
1		1	Aristizi Romanaki'nin kerimesi Efseviya	
391	**206**	**185**		



icmâl	zükûr	inâs	esâmî	mülahazât
391	206	185	nakl-i yekun	
1	1		Manoli Amaryoti	
1		1	zevcesi Angeliki	
1	1		oğlu Petro	
1		1	baldızı Mariya	
1	1		Vasili veled-i Yorgi onbaşı	
1	1		Nikola Kozma Yanyalı	
1	1		Rahib Andonio	Frenk Kilisesinde
1	1		Rahib Rotarino	Frenk Kilisesinde
1	1		Rahib Ferekas	Frenk Kilisesinde
1	1		mahpus Dimitri Kasnitaki	Rum Habishanesinde
1	1		mahpus Yanni Kolazaki	Rum Habishanesinde
1	1		mahpus Mihail Linarzo	Rum Habishanesinde
1	1		mahpus Nikola Kazamiya	Rum Habishanesinde
1	1		mahpus Aristizi Setratarizaki	Rum Habishanesinde
1	1		mahpus Nikola Haritaki	Rum Habishanesinde
1	1		mahpus Spirizo Harkazaki	Rum Habishanesinde
1	1		karantina me'mûru Avzil	
1	1		telgrafçı Darman	
1	1		telgrafçı Kalçenopolus	
1	1		telgrafçı Davi	
1	1		telgrafçı Vasilyazi	
6	4	2	telgrafçı Feliç Asbar	
3	1	2	Mösyö Amabilo ve ailesi	
2	2		Manoli Miçotaki ve Hacı Yasakçı	
1	1		Minova Kalokerinos	yevm-i vak'ada su vapuruna iltica etmişdir
1	1		Stelyano Alkisyo	yevm-i vak'ada su vapuruna iltica etmişdir
1	1		Yorgi Bulanaki	yevm-i vak'ada su vapuruna iltica etmişdir
1	1		Petro Marizaki	yevm-i vak'ada su vapuruna iltica etmişdir
1	1		Meltiyazi Kabnanari	yevm-i vak'ada su vapuruna iltica etmişdir
1	1		Anderiya Kalokerinos	yevm-i vak'ada su vapuruna iltica etmişdir
1	1		Dimitri Nubaçaki	yevm-i vak'ada su vapuruna iltica etmişdir
3	3		Bako'nun iki evladı ve hidmetçisi	yevm-i vak'ada su vapuruna iltica etmişdir
1	1		a'şâr me'mûru Yorgi İkonomopolo	yevm-i vak'ada su vapuruna iltica etmişdir
434	**243**	**191**		



icmâl	**zükûr**	**inâs**	**esâmî**	mülahazât
434	243	191	nakl-i yekûn	
2	1	1	Yorgi Kuzunari ma bir karı	yevm-i vak'ada su vapuruna iltica etmişdir
3	2	1	manifesto me'mûru Mercan Efendi	yevm-i vak'ada su vapuruna iltica etmişdir
7	7		Meskenlik'te bulunan cüzzam	
1	1		Kasteryano Yanaki'nin hidmetçisi Mihail	{ İngilizlerin yanındadır
1	1		hidmetçi Kosta	
1	1		Rugazyalı	
1	1		İngiliz telgrafhane kavası	
2	1	1	Stelyani Siryani ma erkek evladı	
452	258	194		
icmâl-i nüfûs-ı muharrerenin hüviyyetleri				
Mösyö Biliotti'nin pusulası mündericâtınca vapurlara irkâben azîmet edenler				
		nüfûs		
		231	Nemçe posta vapuruna irkâb edilen	
		25	Teriton vapuruna irkâb edilen	
		4	Raguzyaya çıkarılan	
		22	İngiliz harb gemisinde kalan	
		43	İtalya harb gemisinde kalan	
		13	Nemçe harb gemisinde kalan	
		338		
338				
		âhiren vapura gidenlerin nüfûsu fi 30 Ağustos'da		
		9	ma-rahib Ermeniler	
		2	Estilyani Siryani ma erkek oğlu	
		11		
11				
		31 Ağustos'da gidenler		
		nüfûs		
		1	Estilyani Kolokotoronana	
		1	Eleni Zafirakena dul Marinopola	
		1	Kalyopi Peraki	
		1	Cankaki'nin hidmetkâresi Anika Malasyanaki	
		1	rahib İkonomus	
		5		
5				
354				
		el'ân Kandiye'de bulunanlar		
		nüfûs		
		48	memhûr pusula mucibince Aya Mina ve Tursina manastırında ve Rum hastahanesinde	
		13	jandarma efradıyla aileleri	
		3	Frenk kilisesinde rahib	
		7	hapishanede mahpus	
		7	Meskenlik'te cüzzam	
		5	ma kavas telgrafçılar	
		3	Mösyö Amabilo ailesi	
		4	İngilizler yanında	
		2	Arpacaki Raci Beyler yanında	
		2	karantina me'mûru	
		4	rüsûmat me'mûrları ve Mercan Efendi'nin ailesi	
98		98		
452		cümle-i yekûn		



Kandiye'de mütemekkin iken vak'a-ı müellime esnâ'sında telef olunanlar ile harîkde yanmış ve zâyi'de olan Hıristiyanların mikdârını mübeyyin defterdir				
icmâl	**zükûr**	**inâs**	**esâmî**	**mülahazât**
5	3	2	Yorgi İstamataki ailesi	
6	2	4	varilci Minova ma müteehhil oğlu Mihail ailesi	
3	1	2	Yuanni Velasto ailesi	
3	2	1	Yorgi İsfakanaki ailesi	
3		3	Yorgi Kozonari ailesi	
3	1	2	aşçı İstavro ailesi	
10	2	8	Yorgi Cankaki ailesi	
3	2	1	Yorgi İsteryazi ailesi	
2	2		berber Paraskeva ailesi	
2	2		Andoni Perizi ailesi	
5	2	3	meyhaneci Nikola Papazaki	
2	2		Yorgi Loruncu ailesi	
1	1		Bandeli İstiyakaki	
1		1	Karaeko zevcesi	
3	2	1	Zahariya Siyakaki ailesi	
1		1	Marigola Zarena	
3	1	2	Korpi'nin hidmetçisi Nikola ve zevcesi ve kerimesi	
2	2		Aristizi Kasterinoyanaki ve Bonderlo'nun hidmetçisi	
3	2	1	Mirambelalı Dimitri Stefanaki ve refikası	
4	1	3	Lisimasu Kalokerino ailesi	
1	1		Stefano Saatçaki	
1	1		Luiniza Aksansaki çırağı Marzelaki	
4	4		Kostandi Evraka	
1	1		Yorgi Vetolaki	
1	1		Andone İprisimcaki	
1	1		Andoni Vego	
1	1		Kostandi Harizimaki	
1	1		Nikola Larecu	
1	1		Mihail Kapnistus	
2	2		aşçı Yorgi ve meyhaneci çocuğu Yorgi Anoyanaki	
1	1		Espirizo Sakalaki	
3	3		Sokoklu ve fotoğrafçı ve hidmetçisi	
1	1		Estilyano Marizaki	
1	1		fesçi Dimitri	
1	1		kuyumcu Kostandi	
86	**51**	**35**		



icmâl	zükûr	inâs	esâmî	mülahazât
86	51	35	nakl-i yekûn	
1	1		kuyumcu Aleksandro Kaçotaki	
2	2		Manoli Arhondaki ve enişte si İspirizo	
1	1		meyhaneci Yuanni Galaganos	
1	1		Yorgi Papazaki yahud Dalokos	
2	1	1	Manoli Eplati ma zevcesi	
1	1		Yanni Azostas veyahud Çirifoti	
1		1	meczub Vasiliko	
2	2		boyacı Kozmazaka	
1	1		Dimitri Kalakati	
3	3		kahveci Hacı Kipriboti ve hidmetçileri	
1	1		Vasiliki karyesinden Kosta	
1	1		meyhaneci Yorgi İngelzo	
1	1		meyhaneci Yanni Zaharyozaki	
1	1		Mina Kondulaki meyhaneci	
1	1		aşçı Yorgi Kasizi	
1	1		terzi Yanni Lefteraki	
1	1		Angenosti Orfanozaki	
1	1		meyhaneci Yorgi Karalaki	
1	1		Kostandi Kazo'nun kâtibi	
1	1		Nikola Şereti	
1	1		Manoli Kokinaki	
1	1		Kosta Olahaki	
1	1		Kalokerino'nun kâtibi Nikola Mamaraki	
3	3		Andoni Perizi'nin hidmetçileri	
2	2		fırıncı Kosta ve Vasili	
2	2		fırıncı Manoli Karayanaki ve Zahari	
2	2		fırıncı Aristizi Kasterinoyanaki'nin oğlu ve hidmetçisi Bandeli	
2	2		Andriya veled-i Minokalokerino ve Fanuryo	kâtibi
3	3		terzi Manoli ma toprağı ve meyhaneci Yorgi	
1	1		Manoli Kasansaki	
2	2		meyhaneci Yorgi Sifaki ma hizmetçisi	
1	1		berber Manoli	
1	1		meyhaneci Yorgi Vasilanus	
1	1		Dimitri Midilliyonus	
4	4		Bako fırınhanesinde Lambro (oğlu Koçu) Vasili Dalma, Kogus	
3	2	1	Pataropolo ailesi	
1		1	Mina Esteryazi'nin kapatması Hrisnati	
2	2		Yorgi Tahataki ve enişte si Nikola	
144	**105**	**39**		

مجلد	نمره	زیاده	اسامی	ملاحظات
۱۵۷	۱۱۴	۶۰	یکون	
			نقد پکون	
۱	۱		مبلغ آریستی ناضاریو	
۱	۱		یورکی پستوپیاناکی مریورکی وایلجی	
۱	۱		تلغراف خرجی پولنیغ بابکی اضیاء قره بوط	
۱	۱		ضبطیه ده کی الن قرالوپولو	
۱	۱		قالوکرینو آنده ریاغ کاتبی آندوخ	
۱	۱		بزاز قسطنینو ذه قاکیغ ضبطیه یورکی	
۱	۱		وایلجی ماستروپاغ	
۱	۱		قالوکرینو قپاتمه سنه اوغلی ضبط میناکی	

قضیه رده ۱۲۷۵ تاریخ مصادف حسابا کونده ظهور ایده غائز مولد انسانه تلفظ ایدلدیکی وقوعبولده حرکوله انسانه محرره وضایع بولنمه اولدیغندن خرستاکی اسمیله مقدمای بروجه مبسوط یکدیگر یوزلرینه نظرا اوچ نفوسه عایدیه بولنیغی عریضه وجهه اجراولنان تحقیقات نده اکملا شمراولدیغی مبنیه تنظیم قلنمه اشبو دفتر بالتحریر تقدیم قلنمشدر اولباده فقط

مخبر	مخبر	اعضا	اعضا	رئیس
آریستی یفندی	معاون فطی	احمد بسیم	ابراهیم ادهم	محمد

قومیسیون ماظری
فائق مقام
محمد سوفی

اشبو دفتر بزیده موضوع مهر ایله وقیمه مولد مسطور حررک قضیه یه مرابوط تحقیقات وتلفظ اولنان نفوس حرستیانی تحقیقیه ایچون اوزره تسلیم اعضا قومیسیونه تسلیم مهر دائری اولدیغی قضیه یه مرابوط اولمغله

قضیه معارف وقفه ماذنه
مرلوا
ابراهیم ادهم

اشبو دفتر مهر ایله مطابقدر

۱۲۷۵ صفر ۲۱۴

icmâl	zükûr	inâs	esâmî	mülahazât
144	105	39	nakl-i yekûn	
1	1		mübaşir Aristizi Zahariyu	
2	2		Yorgi Piskopiyanaki ve Yorgi varilci	
1	1		telgrafçı Karapoti'nin babası ihtiyar Karabot	
1		1	telgrafçı Karapoti'nin hizmetkâresi Eleni Karalopola	
1	1		Kalokerino Andreya'nın kâtibi Andoni	
1	1		Bizaz Kostandino Zarakaki'nin hizmetçisi Yorgi	
1	1		varilci Mastroyani	
1	1		Kalokerino kapatmasının oğlu Manoli Misaki	
153	113	40	yekûn	

Kandiye'de 25 Ağustos 1314 tarihine müsâdif Salı gününde zuhûr eden gaile-i müellime esnasında telef olanlar ile vuku' bulan harîk esnasında muhterik ve zayi' bulunmuş olan Hıristiyanların esâmesiyle mikdârı ber vech-i mebsût yalnız yüz elli üç nüfûstan ibâret bulunduğu arîz ve amîk icrâ' olunan tahkikatden anlaşılmış olduğunu mübeyyin tanzîm kılınan iş bu defter bit-temhîr takdîm kılınmışdır. Ol babda fermân. fi 4 Eylül 1314 Komisyon Nazırı Kaymakam Mehmed Şevki, Reis Mehmed, Aza İbrahim Edhem, Aza Ahmed Besim, Muhbir Mihail Kosta, Muhbir Aristizi Nikola

İş bu defterin zirinde mevzu mühürler vaka'-ı müellime-i malûme sırasında Kandiye'de bulunup tahlîs ve telef nüfûs-ı Hıristiyaniyi tahkik etmek üzere teşkil olunan komisyon hey'etinin mühr-i zâtîleri olduğu tasdik olunur. 5 Eylül 1314 Kandiye Mutasarrıf ve Kumandanı Mirliva İbrahim Edhem
iş bu defter suret-i aslına mutabıkdır. Müdür-i Vilâyet-i Girid Evkaf 14 Eylül 1314

The Flag of the Cretan Republic

Retrieved April 2007, from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Crete

Map 1: Map of Crete, 1307

Source: T.C. BOA, Girit Vilayeti, Sıra No. 283.

Map 2: The Occupation of the Major Cretan Cities by the European Powers, 1897



Source: PRO:FO 78/4969