

AN INVESTIGATION OF THE RECIPROCAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
ANALYTIC THINKING AND POLITICAL IDEOLOGY

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DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

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ABSTRACT

An Investigation of the Reciprocal Relationship between Cognitive Style and Political Ideology

Although there are studies relating low-effort or intuitive thinking with political conservatism, there are no studies that systematically investigate the reciprocal relation between cognitive style and political ideology. In this research, we first examined the relation of analytic thinking style and political conservatism while controlling for demographic variables, need for cognitive closure, personality traits, religiosity and general cognitive ability (Study 1) and found that reduced analytic thinking predicts social conservatism and political identity but not economic or personal conservatism. In Study 2, we attempted to direct participants toward intuitive thinking by a cognitive load manipulation to see whether they would become more conservative as a result but a manipulation check indicated that the manipulation had failed. In Study 3, we gave a brief analytic thinking training and observed an increase in liberal opinions on a number of issues but no long term change in political attitudes. In Study 4, we attempted to test the reverse causal relation by directing participants toward liberalism or conservatism through passages arguing for the necessity of these political positions and seeing whether this would produce a shift in cognitive style but a manipulation check indicated that participants did not find the passages persuasive. Overall, the results indicate that social conservatives tend to think intuitively while liberals tend to think analytically and that being led to think more analytically increases social liberal (contextualized and less stable) opinions. Furthermore, the results suggest that people's long term political attitudes are resistant to experimental manipulations.

ÖZET

Bilişsel Stil ve Politik İdeoloji Arasındaki Karşılıklı İlişkinin İncelenmesi

Politik muhafazakârlıkla düşük çabalı ya da sezgisel düşünme şeklini ilişkilendiren çalışmalar olmasına rağmen, bilişsel stil ve politik ideoloji arasındaki karşılıklı ilişkiyi sistematik bir şekilde inceleyen bir çalışma yoktur. Bu araştırmada, ilk olarak kişilerin demografik özelliklerini, bilişsel kapanma ihtiyaçlarını, kişilik özelliklerini, dindarlıklarını ve genel bilişsel yeteneklerini kontrol ederek analitik düşünme stiliyle politik muhafazakârlık arasındaki ilişkiyi inceledik (1. Çalışma) ve düşük analitik düşünme eğiliminin sosyal muhafazakârlığı ve politik kimliği yordadığını ancak ekonomik ya da kişisel muhafazakârlığı yordamadığını bulduk. 2. Çalışmada katılımcıların daha muhafazakar hale gelip gelmediğini görmek adına onları bilişsel yük altına sokarak sezgisel düşünmeye yönlendirdik fakat manipülasyon kontrolü yaptığımız manipülasyonun işe yaramadığını gösterdi. 3. Çalışmada katılımcılara kısa bir analitik düşünme eğitimi verdik ve farklı konularda liberal tutumlarının artış gösterdiğini ancak uzun süreli politik tutumlarında bir değişiklik olmadığını gözlemledik. 4. çalışmada politik ideolojilerin bilişsel stiller üzerinde bir etkisi olup olmadığını kişileri liberal ya da muhafazakar ideolojilerin gerekliliğine dair olan metinlerle ikna etmeye çalışarak bu defa ters yönde bir nedensel ilişkiyi test etmeye çalıştık ve bu manipülasyonun bilişsel stiller üzerinde bir değişiklik yaratıp yaratmadığını inceledik ancak manipülasyon kontrolü insanların bu manipülasyondan etkilenmediğini gösterdi. Sonuç olarak, bu sonuçlar, sosyal muhafazakâr insanların eğilimsel olarak daha sezgisel ve sosyal liberal insanların da daha analitik düşünme şekline sahip olduğunu ve kişileri analitik düşündürdüğünüzde sosyal liberal (bağlam içinde kullanılmış ve daha az kalıcı)

düşüncelerde bir artış olduğunu göstermektedir. Ayrıca sonuçlar insanların uzun süreli politik tutumlarının deneysel manipülasyonlara dirençli olduğunu göstermektedir.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Have you ever thought about the processes activated in your mind when you are moving toward the source of a sudden incoming sound? Or when focusing on a specific person's voice in a crowded and noisy room? It is thought that when these processes are at work, two separate systems are activated in our minds according to the dual process model of mind (Evans, 2003; Frederick, 2005; Morewedge & Kahneman, 2010; Stanovich & West, 2000). According to this model, System 1 is an evolutionarily older one which represents our automatic and intuitive responses whereas System 2 corresponds to analytic and controlled processes which developed later in our evolutionary history and is unique to our species.

What is meant by intuitive judgment is the processes which are based on both low effort and automaticity whereas the highlight of the analytic processes is, in contrast, the ability to make a critical judgment based on the reflective and deliberative thought processes through deactivating automatic intuitions. In a sense, then, it can be said that when System 2 is activated, System 1 intuitions are inhibited or overridden, which then leads to less intuitive or counter-intuitive thinking processes (Shenhav, Rand, & Green, 2011).

When we take the dual process model into consideration, religious belief, for example, is thought to be a product of System 1 thinking, whereas religious disbelief is a product of System 2 (Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012; Norenzayan, 2013; Pennycook, Cheyne, Seli, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2012; Shenhav et al., 2011) because disbelieving in religion requires analytic and critical examination. In a similar way, most intuitive thoughts regarding religious belief comes to mind more effortlessly and automatically; much as making moral judgments trigger intuitive and

automatic responses as the social-intuitionist approach suggests (Haidt, 2001, 2007). According to the social intuitionist model, when we judge a moral issue, we first automatically decide whether it is morally plausible or not, and thereafter we can deliberately think on this moral judgment only after making this initial judgment.

Correspondingly, it is thought that there are differences in cognitive styles between theists and non-theists or the ones who base their morality on divine authority and who do not (see Piazza & Landy, 2013; Shariff, Piazza, & Kramer, 2014). For instance, people who are high in belief in God show lower scores on the “Cognitive Reflection Test” (Pennycook et al., 2012); a test used to measure a dispositional tendency to think analytically (Frederick, 2005). More importantly, when people are experimentally manipulated to think analytically, their religious convictions decrease (Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012: Study 2-3-4-5); in contrast, when they are induced to think intuitively, their religious convictions are promoted (Shenhav et al., 2011: Study 3).

Social conservatism, which is positively correlated with religiosity, is a phenomenon that can also vary depending on the cognitive or thinking styles. For example, it is known that the need for cognitive closure is higher in conservative people than in liberals (Kruglanski, 2004). In addition, conservative people have more negativity bias than liberals (Hibbing, Smith, & Alford, 2014). Conservative and liberal people are also different in their level of integrative complexity (Tetlock, 1983). People with high complexity tend to consider multiple perspectives regarding an argument whereas people with low complexity tend to consider only one viewpoint. Liberals show higher levels of integrative complexity than conservatives. In addition to these differences between conservative and liberal people’s cognitive styles, there are also differences in attribution styles. Making a fundamental

attribution error, that is, the tendency to attribute the cause of behaviors to dispositional (e.g., personality) factors while ignoring viable situational explanations, is thought to be an automatic and a quick decision (Gilbert, Pelham, & Krull, 1988; Winter & Uleman, 1984), at least in Western cultures. Correspondingly, conservatives in those cultures are more likely to make a dispositional attribution in different issues such as disasters (Wagstaff & Quirk, 1983), poverty (Zucker & Weiner, 1993) and obesity (Crandall, 1994). Moreover, one of the core elements underlying conservative ideology is the acceptance of hierarchy and the opposition to equality which are also related to cognitive style. For example, Zitek and Tiedens (2011) showed that social hierarchies are remembered and processed easily and liked more than less hierarchical stimuli, thereby showing the intuitive, low-effort nature of the processing and acceptance of hierarchy. These findings from diverse research streams imply that social conservatism is a product of System 1 thinking, much as religious belief is (see also Pacini & Epstein, 1999; Shook & Fazio, 2009; Sidanius, 1985; Van Berkel, Crandall, Eidelman & Blanchar, 2015).

In parallel with this assumption, Eidelman, Crandall, Goodman, and Blanchar (2012) demonstrated that low effort thinking promotes political conservatism (but see Deppe et al., 2015). They specifically showed that when people are under cognitive load or time pressure, they became more conservative, but not less liberal. While these findings are consistent with the emerging literature linking dual process model of the mind to political and religious attitudes, the abovementioned research left some questions unanswered. First, it is not clear whether the effect of low effort thinking is general or specific to social or economic conservatism. In this regard, it is predicted that inducing analytic or intuitive thinking modes should elicit change in social (e.g., death penalty, gay marriage, euthanasia or abortion) but not economic

(e.g. free market, lower taxes, less government spending) attitudes. Second, the effect of low effort thinking on the attitudes of people with politically extreme convictions was not investigated. Correspondingly, they did not control for pre-existing political orientations of the participants. Finally, the causal relations between these variables are not clear. That is, Eidelman et al. (2012) showed one direction of causality (thought to politics), but the other causal direction is also possible (politics to thought: see Talhelm, Haidt, Oishi, Zhang, Miao, & Chen, 2015). In other words, further research is necessary to clarify how liberal and conservative people react to intuitive or analytic mode of thinking respectively.

The aim of the present paper is, thus, fourfold. In Study 1, first, organization of political ideologies in the Turkish political system and various broad psychological tendencies associated with different political orientations were investigated. Then, we examined whether there are systematic differences between people with rightist/conservative and leftist/liberal political ideologies in terms of the dispositional tendency to think analytically or intuitively. In Study 2, we experimentally manipulated cognitive load as a variable that reduces the ability to think analytically and investigated whether being under cognitive load leads participants to endorse more social and economic conservative attitudes, thereby creating a conservative shift. In Study 3, we used a different manipulation technique (training people briefly to think analytically) for priming analytic thinking, and tested whether there is a subsequent liberal shift in political attitudes. In Study 4, we looked at the reverse causal influence by manipulating endorsement of liberal or conservative political policies and investigated whether there is a subsequent shift toward analytic or intuitive mode of thought. We also examined the value of

universalism and the need for cognitive closure for their potential mediating roles in the relation between cognitive style and political ideology in Study 4.

1.1 Dual process model

Since the very beginnings of psychology as a science, many discussions have revolved around two poles of a given concept or issue (see Newell, 1973). For instance, such differences like nature vs. nurture, short term vs. long term memory, innate vs. learned grammar, and conscious vs. unconscious have been important in driving theoretical and empirical advances in the field. Surprisingly, in many of these debates, each side has its own theoretical backing for their positions as well as was supportive empirical data. For instance, there is some empirical support for both a multi-store model (see Baddeley, 1986, 1992; Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Repov & Baddeley, 2006; Shallice & Warrington, 1970) and a unitary-store model of memory (Jonides, Lewis, Nee, Lustig, Berman, & Moore, 2008; Keppel & Underwood, 1962; Postman, 1961).

Similarly, the cognitive miser approach has been the basic building block which forms the general perspective of the behavioral sciences including psychology and cognitive sciences regarding the human mind for the last 50 years (Johnson-Laird, 1983, 1999; Orbell & Dawes, 1992; Simon, 1955, 1956; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). According to the cognitive miser approach, our minds always try to save energy in every possible way mostly by spending less time and effort which then leads our minds to work in an automatic manner. We categorize, for instance, people as men or women, or as Kurds or Turks so as to save energy because we cannot have enough time and energy every time we are faced with a judgment or

decision to make. This energy saving function is, therefore, one of the most important characteristics of the automaticity of human mind.

Although the dual process model, which is also compatible with this cognitive miser approach, has theoretical roots going back to when William James (1890) first proposed the distinction of associative and true reasoning, the empirical support had been rather scarce in psychology until modern times. Especially after Evans, Barston, and Pollard (1983) proposed the modern dual process model of human mind, the field has seen a rise in research and theorizing in support of this view (for reviews, see Evans, 2003; Evans, 2010; Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Kahneman, 2011; Morewedge & Kahneman, 2010; Stanovich, 2009). For example, there is now various mature theoretical accounts and accompanying research built around this theme in the field of social cognition (see Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt & Sibley, 2009; Epstein, 1994; Kruglanski & Orehek, 2007; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Smith & DeCoster, 2000).

According to the dual process model, our mental operations are carried out by two separate but interacting systems which are called System 1 and System 2. System 1 has evolved earlier which corresponds to our automatic and intuitive decision making systems whereas System 2 which is unique to Homo sapiens, has evolved later and represents our analytic and reflective thought processes (Evans, 2003; Frederick, 2005; Morewedge & Kahneman, 2010; Stanovich & West, 2000). Interestingly, Mithen (2002) establishes a connection between the emergence of some higher-level cognitive abilities like art, ability to imagine and tool making ability with the emergence of System 2 thinking in our evolutionary history.

Hence, the primary duty of the mind as a computational system is to save energy while making optimal decisions (Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2014). In doing so, an automatic and intuitive thinking process not involving reflective awareness generally needs to remain active. For instance, when moving toward a sudden incoming voice, when deciding whether the tone of voice or the motions of someone contains hostility, when driving a car in an empty road, when wearing a face of disgust when a disgusting image is shown to us, or when deciding whether one object is closer than the other object, we rely on System 1 processes (Kahneman, 2011). Unlike System 1, the primary duty of System 2 is to inhibit System 1's automatic activations by spending rather than saving energy. That is, System 2 thinking is computationally more expensive compared to System 1 thinking (Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2014). For example, when focusing on a specific person's voice in a crowded room, when searching for a woman who has a white hair with blue eyes, when controlling whether your behavior is socially appropriate, when parking in a narrow place or reasoning a logical argument out, we rely on System 2 processes (Kahneman, 2011).

1.1.1 History of the dual process model

Dual process models of the mind have a long history in psychology, going all the way back to William James (1890). The modern form of this distinction is based on the above-mentioned account of Evans' (1984: see also Evans et al., 1983) dual process model of mind which is formed by two interacting but separate systems: "heuristics processes" and "analytic processes". Two years after Evans proposed the dual process model, Petty and Cacioppo (1986) used this account to propose the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) and claimed that there are two routes that

people can follow when processing a persuasive message --the central route involves highly elaborated processing of the message content whereas the peripheral route involves judging the validity of a message with the help of relatively superficial cues like those signaling that the message source is an expert on the topic. Following the success of the ELM, many dual process models have been proposed in social psychology (see Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Sherman, Gawronski, & Trope, 2014). One of the major theoretical contributions has come from Kahneman (2003) who has provided the further popularization of the dual process approach and integrated the prior different conceptualizations into System 1 and System 2 thinking processes.

Such conceptual work has been accompanied by empirical evidence from both behavioral and neuroscientific research in support of the dual process model as opposed to the unitary process model. This evidence has shown that two separate systems have not only distinct representations but also different functions in our minds accordingly. For example, the first findings come from the belief-bias effect (Evans, 1983), the notion that prior beliefs interfere with our current explicit judgments. In this effect, participants are told that they should ignore their prior beliefs (which is a representation of System 1 automatic activations) and approach the given syllogistic task analytically (which is a function of System 2 controlled processes), but the results show that participants failed to inhibit their automatic activations even when they tried. To be more precise, a valid argument is often judged to be invalid when participants know on the basis of their prior beliefs that its conclusion is false. Conversely, an invalid argument (one whose conclusion does not necessarily follow from its premises) is often judged to be valid when participants know on the basis of their prior beliefs that its conclusion is true.

In a similar vein, the idea that there are two separate systems in the mind has gained support from some neuroimaging studies (Goel, Buchel, Frith, & Dolan, 2000; Goel & Dolan, 2003; Tsujii & Watanabe, 2009; see also De Neys, Vartanian, & Goel, 2008; Goel & Dolan, 2004; Goel, & Vartanian, 2005; Goel, 2007). Goel et al. (2000) showed that content-based activations which are more related to System 1 automatic processes and abstract formal problem reasoning which is more related to System 2 activations are represented in different areas of the brain -- left hemisphere temporal regions and the parietal region, respectively. Correspondingly, in another neuroimaging study (Goel & Dolan, 2003), when people are asked to inhibit their pre-existing beliefs, different brain regions have been activated.

In the present proposal, we aim to rely on dual process model of the mind to shed light on systematic differences in thinking that characterize people of distinct political convictions. Therefore, a review of the literature in political psychology, focusing on the definition and content of ideology as well as psychological tendencies that are prevalent among and differentiate conservatives and liberals is due before we can continue our discussion of dual process model of the mind.

1.2 Political ideology

The word “ideology” is of French origin consisting of the combination of "idée" (idea) and "-ologie" (science) which refers to moral, cultural, and philosophical views or attitudes toward a political issue (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950; Rokeach, 1968; Tedin, 1987; see also Jost, 2006). Although the term has been popularized by Marx and Engels (1846/1970), today its meaning is something different than their usage which focused on false consciousness or an inversion of reality. But today, even by social scientists in fields other than

psychology, ideology is defined with psychological terms. For example, a political scientist, Converse (1964) defines ideology as a relatively stable attitude and belief system. Correspondingly, defining ideology with psychological terms is also prevalent in psychology: it is thought that ideology is represented in our minds much as cognitive schemas (Fiske, Lau, & Smith, 1990; Hamill, Lodge, & Blake, 1985), or is a combination of attitudes and values which are also represented in the mind (see Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003a). Today, political ideology is one of the most important concepts used in order to understand why people do what they do in the political sense (see Jost, 2006).

The most important distinction used to describe the ideological differences is the left-right distinction. This distinction is represented in the American current political system by the liberal-conservative distinction (Jost, 2006), whereas it is represented by the leftist-rightist distinction in the European political system (Feldman & Johnston, 2014; Gerber, Huber, Doherty, Dowling, & Ha, 2010). However, researchers generally do not emphasize the differences between these concepts but also not differentiate the actual meanings of both liberal-conservative and left-right spectrums. Instead, they use these concepts interchangeably (Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009).

Indeed, political ideology has been defined in terms of this kind of a binary distinction since the very beginnings of the usage of this term in the social psychology literature. For example, Eysenck (1954) characterized the political left by radicalism and the political right by conservatism. Other researchers have also adopted a binary distinction as Eysenck did (Alford, Funk, & Hibbing, 2005; Lipset, 1963; Scott, 1960). For instance, left-wing ideologies were matched with defending international peace favoring universalist values whereas right-wing ideologies were

characterized by defending international conflict favoring nationalism (Scott, 1960). In a similar way, Lipset (1963) distinguished conservative versus liberal orientation in American politics in terms of opposition to equality in society. Although the extent to which this conceptualization has explanatory power and whether it is applicable in every political system or not is debated, empirical backing for this position is rather abundant (Benoit & Laver, 2006; Carney, Jost, Gosling, & Potter, 2008; Fuchs & Klingemann, 1990; Jost, 2006; Knight, 1999). Likewise, Jost (2006) argues that opposition to equality and resistance to change are the two culture-free features of conservative political ideology which have also a high predictive power for voting behavior (see also Jost et al., 2003a, 2003b). According to this conceptualization, conservative political ideology is characterized by a tendency to preserve the status quo and hierarchical structure whereas liberal political ideology is characterized by openness to change and endorsement of an equal society (Jost et al., 2003a).

1.2.1 Political ideology in Turkey

In Turkey, political ideology has also been defined as a variable with two poles but a little differently from that of American and European political systems. For instance, sociologist Mardin (1973) defined political ideology as based on the distinction between “center” and “periphery” where the members of the center, who are also the privileged minorities of Turkey, defend their priorities against the periphery who are the majority. The center can be somehow represented by “Republican People’s Party” (CHP) and “Committee of Union and Progress” (İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti) whereas periphery can be represented by Democrat Party and its successors centre-right parties (Motherland Party, ANAP; True Path Party, Doğru-Yol; Justice and

Development Party, AKP). Another sociologist Kongar (1993) also relied on the similar distinction between “western” and “local” where western is similar to the center while local is similar to periphery. More recently, an empirical study suggested that there are three different political ideologies in Turkey: laicistic-leftist, nationalist-conservative, and liberal (Dalmış, 1997; Dalmış & İmamoğlu, 2000). However, laicistic-leftist ideology is not based on conventional leftist opinions emphasizing change and equality; rather this ideology is the founder and safeguard of the Turkish Republic which is represented by the center-left Republican People’s Party (CHP).

According to Öniş (2007, 2009), classical left-right distinction is not appropriate for Turkish politics because even right-of-center or Islamist origin parties emphasize issues regarding social justice and the condition of poor people. In addition, there is no European-style social democratic party in Turkey which in turn leads to the process of lop-sided democratization (Öniş, 2009). For instance, the biggest social democratic party (CHP) supported the same candidate with the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), which represents Turkish nationalism, in the 2014 Presidential election. Thus, it can be argued that classical left-right distinction has little explanatory power in Turkish political spectrum. Instead, another binary distinction is suggested: conservative globalists versus defensive nationalists where the initial one represents the conservatives who defend global, capitalist free market economy, in turn pretending to be a reformist whereas the latter one represents the Turkish nationalists who are against the globalism in the sense that they see globalism as a threat to their existing borders and national sovereignty (see Öniş, 2009 for further discussions). Özbudun (2006) also claimed that right-wing ideology in Turkey refers to religious, conservative, and nationalistic values whereas left-wing

ideology refers to secularism. However, the term secularism is not identical with European usage here; rather it is based on Kemalist ideology which emphasizes the nationalistic values without any reference to religious ones on the surface. In addition, liberal ideology, unlike in the American political system, refers to a more rightist political ideology in Turkey (Berzeg, 1996). Although there are different binary distinctions describing the Turkish political spectrum, none of them can include all the ideologies located in Turkey. For instance, leftists or socialists in the European sense have been excluded from these binary distinctions (Öniş, 2009).

On top of this high level of complexity of the Turkish political system and difficulties with conceptualizing political orientation in Turkey, empirical research in this area is rather scarce. There are some studies which showed the availability and utility of the distinctions of liberal-conservative (Olcaşoy & Sarıbay, 2012) and leftist-rightist (Arikan & Şekercioğlu, 2014; Cesur et al, 2014; Yılmaz, 2013, see also “World Values Survey”) in the Turkish political system. Another study suggested that Turkish political structure is composed of at least four different dimensions (socialist, conservatism, liberalism, and nationalism: Küçüker, 2007), but it is unknown for now how these dimensions are related to the liberal-conservative or left-right distinctions.

One must keep in mind that these dimensions (left-right) and categories (nationalist, socialist, etc.) representing political orientations are simplifications of a complex set of values, beliefs, attitudes, and policy preferences that people adopt to navigate the political system. As the organizing dimensions or categories chosen by a researcher decrease in number, the richness of real life politics is inevitably lost to some extent while the efficiency of empirical research and theoretical models built around these dimensions or categories increase. For the present purposes, we will

strive to maintain a reasonable balance between simplicity/efficiency and richness. Regardless of the dimensions or categories we choose to represent political orientations, our most important goal is to expand on the structure and dynamics of the Turkish political system by referring to the psychological differences between different ideologies.

1.3 Political ideology and psychological differences

Political ideology has been previously investigated on an individual basis by comparing individual-level variables such as right-wing authoritarianism (RWA: Altemeyer, 1981) and social dominance orientation (SDO: Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Fortunately, Jost and his colleagues (2003a) systematically analyzed extant psychological variables related to political attitudes in their extensive meta-analysis which included 88 different studies. Their main argument stemming from this effort was that there are two core elements underlying conservative political ideology: resistance to change and opposition to equality (support for hierarchy) in society. More specifically, beforehand, authoritarianism had been measured by RWA and conservatism by C-Scale (Wilson & Patterson, 1968). Jost and his colleagues (2003a), however, demonstrated that these two concepts measure only one dimension of conservative political ideology which is the resistance to change. In addition, they also showed that the fascism scale (F scale: Adorno et al., 1950) and SDO measure another dimension of conservative political ideology which is opposition to equality. These are related (i.e., often seen to be moderately correlated in empirical studies) but distinct dimensions of conservatism.

Jost et al. (2003a) also claim that ideological orientations originate mostly from epistemic and existential needs and motives. Epistemic needs are characterized

by uncertainty avoidance whereas existential needs by situation specific threat avoidance (Jost et al., 2003a; Jost, Napier, Thórisdóttir, Gosling, Palfai, & Ostafin, 2007). It is thought that epistemic needs influence political ideology by way of resistance to change, whereas existential needs influence political ideology through opposition to equality (Jost et al., 2007). For instance, death anxiety and fear of system instability are examples of existential needs, whereas intolerance for ambiguity, openness to experience and need for cognitive closure are examples of epistemic needs (Jost et al. 2003a). Conservatives and liberals are, in general, psychologically different from each other in these respects in the sense that conservatives respond more to the existential threats and system instability (Jost et al., 2003a; Jost, et al., 2007; Landau et al., 2004) whereas liberals are more tolerant and less responsive to them (Jost, 2003a).

There are some other differences characterizing the liberal-conservative ideologies. Personality differences, for example, are often found amongst various political groups in different samples. A study which consisted of 5 different samples for a total of 19,248 participants found that conscientiousness and agreeableness (albeit weakly) are positively correlated with conservatism whereas openness to experience is correlated with liberalism (Carney et al., 2008). These differences are not only replicated in different samples (Gerber et al., 2010; Jost et al., 2003a; Mondak & Halperin, 2008), but also have high predictive power for voting behavior (Caprara, Schwartz, Capanna, Vecchione, & Barbaranelli, 2006; Carney et al., 2008; Jost, et al., 2003a; Mondak ve Halperin, 2008; Rentfrow, Jost, Gosling, & Potter, 2009).

According to conservatism as motivated social cognition approach (see Jost et al., 2003a), all these differences underlying liberal-conservative continuum satisfy

certain psychological needs respectively for liberals and conservatives. Basically and most importantly, psychological needs based on improvement, novelty, creativity and stimulation characterize people endorsing liberal political ideology whereas stability, harmony, cohesiveness, and security needs characterize people endorsing conservative political ideology (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009; Jost et al., 2003a).

Some genetics factors as the main causes of these differences underlying political ideology are proposed and increasingly investigated since the last decade (Amodio, Jost, Master, & Yee, 2007; Hatemi, Eaves, & McDermott, 2012; Kandler, Bleidorn, & Riemann, 2012; Orey & Park, 2012; Hibbing, Smith, Peterson, & Feher, 2014). Identical twins have more similar social and political attitudes than fraternal twins (Alford et al., 2005; Bouchard, Segal, Tellegen, & Krueger, 2003). It is in fact thought that approximately 50% of the differences in political ideology are explained by genetic factors (Alford et al., 2005; Hatemi & McDermott, 2012; Hatemi et al., 2014).

Besides, there are also some neurophysiological differences between the two ideological groups. An fMRI study, for example, measuring the differences between left-wing and right-wing participants in risk taking behavior found that right-wing participants showed more activation in amygdala and insula which are related to emotion regulation and disgust-sensitivity, than left-wing participants (Schreiber, Simmons, Dawes, Flagan, Fowler, & Paulus, 2013). Conservatives are also more sensitive to threatening stimuli than liberals (Vigil, 2010). Another MRI study controlling the potential confounding effects of age and gender found that self-reported conservatism is correlated with increased gray matter activation in right amygdala which is indicative of increased sensitivity to fear processing, whereas self-reported liberalism is associated with increased gray matter activation in anterior

cingulate cortex signifying higher tolerance of uncertainty and ability to resolve conflicts (Kanai, Feilden, Firth, & Rees, 2011). In addition, it is shown that cortisol levels are a better predictor of voting behavior than self-reported political ideology (French, Smith, Alford, Guck, Birnie, & Hibbing, 2014). However, all of these genetic, physiological, and neurological differences do not imply a specific gene causing specific political preferences; instead, some psychological characteristics such as aversion to change and uncertainty have some genetic components which in turn elicit a tendency for a specific ideology.

In a similar vein, in a longitudinal study (Block & Block, 2006), children who are defined as developing close relationships, self-reliant, energetic, somewhat dominating, relatively under-controlled, and resilient by their teacher were more likely to be liberal in young adulthood whereas those who are defined as feeling easily victimized, easily offended, indecisive, fearful, rigid, inhibited, and relatively over-controlled and vulnerable were more likely to be conservative.

In Carney et al.'s (2008) extensive study, they found not only a positive correlation between liberalism and open-mindedness, creativity, and curiosity but also some differences in home and office environment of liberals and conservatives. The rooms of conservatives are in average more regular and tidy than liberals and they have household goods related to order and cleanliness such as calendar, iron and clothes basket whereas liberals have goods related to stimulation and novelty such as CD, book, and map. Conservatives also prefer the familiar foods and music as well as rhymed poems in accordance with higher need for order and structure (Neiman, 2012). All of these findings are therefore compatible with Jost et al.'s (2003a) conservatism as motivated social cognition approach based on the satisfaction of some psychological needs for conservatives and liberals separately.

1.3.1 Political ideology, morality and values

There are also some other differences between liberals and conservatives in basic values and moral judgments. Conservatives give more emphasis on security, conformity, and obedience to authority whereas liberals give more emphasis on self-enhancement and universalism. These differential values are also good predictors of voting behavior (Schwartz, Capcarra, & Vechione, 2010).

Similarly, according to moral foundations theory (Haidt, 2007), liberals define morality with reference to care/harm and fairness/cheating dimensions whereas conservatives give equal emphasis to all five dimensions: care/harm, fairness/justice, loyalty/betrayal, authority/subversion, sanctity/degradation (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; Haidt & Graham, 2007; see also Frimer, Biesanz, Walker, & MacKinlay, 2013; Haidt, 2007; Haidt, 2012).

1.3.2 Political ideology and cognitive style

Although there are many other differences between liberals and conservatives in addition to the above-mentioned ones (e.g., death anxiety, fear of threat, anger, aggression, need for cognition, etc.), the current research will focus on differences in cognitive style. It is important to determine concretely the relevant variables underlying the differences in cognitive style between liberals and conservatives. Therefore, the literature on cognitive style and its potential relation to political ideology will be examined in the following section, keeping in line with the theme of the dual process model where possible.

1.3.2.1 Integrative complexity

Integrative complexity is a concept that highlights the complexity of thought by drawing attention to two processes: cognitive *differentiation* and *integration* of the relevant information. Differentiation implies a realization of availability of different perspectives in a topic whereas integration refers to linking up among priorly differentiated dimensions. Therefore, people with high integrative complexity acknowledge multiple perspectives on a given issue whereas people with low complexity give emphasis to only one perspective or viewpoint. In other words, people with low integrative complexity interpret social and political issues in a more narrow manner and try to reduce uncertainty and find precise and simple answer when thinking about an issue, thereby leaning on intuitive thinking process. People with high integrative complexity, on the other hand, examine the issue in more detail and deliberately by elaborating the issue in several dimensions, thereby behaving in a less intuitive manner (Suedfeld & Tetlock, 1977). For example, according to a survey on political elites people who are affiliated with center-left party demonstrate higher levels of integrative complexity than center-right party members (Tetlock, 1983). Moreover, Brundidge, Reid, Choi, and Mudd (2014) found a significant positive relationship between liberalism and integrative complexity in their extensive qualitative study.

1.3.2.2 Need for cognitive closure

Kruglanski (2004) defines need for cognitive closure as a tendency to seek any answer to a given question regardless of its content as soon as the question, and hence uncertainty, arises. Someone with high need for cognitive closure, for example, tends to prefer order and predictability, to be uncomfortable with

ambiguity, to be rigid-minded, and to prefer to make a stable decision as quickly as possible (Jost et al., 2003a; Kruglanski & Freund, 1983; Thórisdóttir & Jost, 2011). Kruglanski (2004) states that conservative policies which emphasize tradition and opposition to change, have parallels with this need, whereas liberal policies often run contrary to this need. Consistent with this, the need for closure is positively correlated with conservatism and voting for conservative parties (Chirumbolo & Leone, 2008; Jost et al., 2003a; Kimmelmeier, 1997; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). The positive correlation between aging and conservatism is also mediated by being high in need for cognitive closure and low in openness to experience (Cornelis, Van Hiel, Roets, & Kossowska, 2009). As it can be clearly seen that need for cognitive closure is a psychological motive satisfying some psychological needs which also reflects a certain cognitive style. In other words, it is intuitive by nature which in turn elicits a specific ideological orientation by influencing some types of attitude and belief systems.

1.3.2.3 Negativity bias

Negativity bias refers to differential processing of information from the environment whereby negative information is weighed more heavily (i.e., processed faster, with stronger reactions, remembered better, etc.) compared to positive information. It is associated with a physiological reaction which leads to a certain type of cognitive style and it is also thought that negativity bias is the core component underlying some psychological differences between different ideologies (see Hibbing, Smith, & Alford, 2014). Oxley et al. (2008) showed not only that conservatives have higher levels of activation in their sympathetic nervous system when they see a threatening stimulus (a bloody face) than liberals (although there were not such differences in

responding to a non-threatening stimulus), but also that conservatives gave stronger startle-blink reaction to a stimulus which is shown suddenly as well as to encapsulating loud noise. Moreover, Vigil (2010) demonstrated that right-wing participants are more likely to decode an ambiguously negative face with a primary emotion such as threatening or angry whereas liberals tend to perceive a secondary emotion such as surprising in these same faces. Conservatives also spend more time looking at negative images than liberals and gaze more upon these images in an eye-tracking study (Dodd, Balzer, Jacobs, Gruszczynski, Smith, & Hibbing, 2012), and give slower reactions to the negative words in an emotional Stroop test than liberals (Carraro, Castelli, & Macchiella, 2011). All of these differences imply differences between liberals and conservatives in responding to certain negative stimuli. Stronger negativity bias in conservatives might lead them to adopt an intuitive style of thought because negativity bias requires responding to certain stimuli more automatically, quickly, and effortlessly.

1.3.2.4 Preference for status quo

The term “status quo” is of Latin origin and refers to the existing state of affairs. Although preference for status quo generally carries a negative political meaning, we use it in a more neutral way and as a psychological term. Preference for the existing state of affairs represents another core element of political conservatism (Burke, 1790/1999; Eidelman & Crandal, 2009; Jost et al., 2003a; Stone, 1994). Preferring to stick with the status quo, compared to seeking change, requires little effort and awareness (Eidelman & Crandall, 2009). For example, the classic mere exposure effect suggests that familiar stimuli are seen as more favorable (Festinger, Schachter, & Back, 1950; Zajonc, 1968); and not only existing but also long standing states are

seen as good and admirable (Eidelman, Crandall, & Pattershall, 2009; Eidelman, Pattershall, & Crandall, 2010). The effect is enhanced when the stimuli are shown as out of awareness (Bornstein, 1989; Bornstein & D'Agostino, 1992), suggesting the automatic nature of this tendency.

1.3.2.5 Preference for hierarchy

Another core element underlying conservative ideology is the acceptance of hierarchy which is generally operating in parallel with opposition to equality (Berger, Cohen, & Zelditch, 1972; Jost et al., 2003a; Jost & Banaji, 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) as well as bearing on simple, quick, and effortless processing. For example, Zitek and Tiedens (2011) showed that social hierarchies are remembered and processed easily and liked more than social configurations that are less hierarchical. Moors and De Houwer (2005) also showed that the hierarchical distinctions are easily and quickly recognized; and disadvantaged groups accept status differences implicitly (Jost, Pelham, & Carvallo, 2002; Rudman, Feinberg, & Fairchild, 2002) thereby showing the intuitive and effortless nature of acceptance of hierarchy.

1.3.2.6 Preference for dispositional attributions

In addition to the above-mentioned differences between conservative and liberal people's cognitive styles, there are also parallel differences in attribution styles. Making a dispositional attribution signifies preferring a person explanation for explaining the causes of certain behaviors (Heider, 1958). Correspondingly, conservatives are more likely to make a dispositional attribution across a variety of scenarios such as when judging victims of disasters (Wagstaff & Quirk, 1983), origins of homosexuality (Haider-Markel & Joslyn, 2008), poverty (Zucker &

Weiner, 1993), wealth (Bobbio, Canova, & Manganelli, 2010), intelligence (Skitka, Mullen, Griffin, Hutchinson, & Chamberlin, 2002), misfortune (Williams, 1984), and obesity (Crandall, 1994).

1.3.2.7 Mortality salience

According to terror management theory, evolution of the status of self-consciousness led to a (sometimes) maladaptive consequence: awareness of one's own death.

Reminding people of their own mortality makes them more conservative and more prone to vote for George W. Bush (Landau et al., 2004) controlling for pre-existing political orientations, as well as less utilitarian (Tremoliere, De Neys, & Bonnefon, 2012), more religious (Norenzayan & Hansen, 2006), and cognitively impaired (Galliot, Schmeichel, & Baumeister, 2006; Tremoliere, De Neys, & Bonnefon, 2012). Moreover, when people are reminded of their own mortality, liberals start to think like conservatives on some political issues such as capital punishment, abortion, and support for homosexuals (Nail, McGregor, Drinkwater, Steele, & Thompson, 2009). Thus, mortality salience seems to deplete some cognitive resources thereby creating a low-effort and intuitive mode of thought which in turn elicits a conservative shift.

1.4 The present research

In recent years, there has been an increase in the number of studies investigating cognitive style differences between liberals and conservatives (Eidelman et al., 2012; Brandt, Evans, & Crawford, 2014; Talhelm et al., 2015). For example, Brandt et al. (2014) showed that those who have extreme political thoughts, compared to moderates, were less influenced by experimenter-generated anchors, which was

intended for use as a cognitive style measure. In addition, Talhelm et al. (2015) demonstrated that thinking analytically lead both American and Chinese participants to favor more social liberal attitudes whereas thinking holistically lead them to favor more social conservative attitudes. Among such demonstrations of systematic cognitive differences between various political groups, none of them that we know of specifically investigated these differences explicitly within the frame of the dual-process model or the analytic versus intuitive thinking distinction (but see Deppe et al., 2015).

Some studies have found that liberals show higher scores on the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT; Deppe et al., 2015; Pennycook et al., 2012; Iyer, Koleva, Graham, Ditto, & Haidt, 2012), a test used to measure the dispositional tendency to think analytically (Frederick, 2005), whereas some others found no significant difference between conservatives and liberals in a representative sample (Kahan, 2013). Conservatives are in fact slightly (but not significantly) superior to liberals on the CRT in a representative sample of American population according to Kahan (2013). The abovementioned studies which found that liberals show higher scores on the CRT were conducted online and were based on a non-representative sample of Americans (see Kahan, 2013). Thus, it is not clear whether liberals and conservatives are different from each other in a dispositional tendency to think analytically. There is hardly any evidence on this issue outside of Western cultures as well. Therefore, in Study 1, we investigated this relationship in a Turkish sample as an extension of this topic of investigation to non-Western cultures (see Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010) by controlling potential alternative covariate variables such as demographics, personality traits, need for cognitive closure, religiosity and general cognitive ability.

In previous studies (e.g., Eidelman et al., 2012), it is shown that when people are induced to think in a low effort mode, a conservative attitudinal shift occurs. However, the pre-existing political orientations of the participants were not taken into account. Therefore, in Study 2 of the present research, we conducted a conceptual replication of Eidelman et al.'s (2012) study controlling for participants' pre-existing political orientations. In addition, Eidelman et al.'s (2012) seminal study did not differentiate between social and economic conservatism. A more recent study (Talhelm et al., 2015) demonstrated that favoring liberal social attitudes predicts thinking more analytically in a triad task which measures cultural thought style (Chiu, 1972), whereas favoring liberal economic attitudes does not. Moreover, conservative social attitudes predict thinking more holistically in the same task, while economic conservative attitudes do not. More importantly, training people to think analytically versus holistically resulted in more liberal versus more conservative social (but not economic) attitudes. Thus, in the present study, we differentiated social and economic liberalism and conservatism and predicted that inducing people to think analytically or intuitively influences social political attitudes but not economic ones.

The present research therefore aims to reveal the reciprocal influence of cognitive style and political ideology. To be more precise, the core psychological element that creates the basic difference between rightist and leftist ideologies is hypothesized to be people's cognitive styles. In addition, the adoption of rightist or leftist ideology is hypothesized to lead to differences in cognitive styles. For this purpose, Study 1 correlationally investigated the relationship between the tendency to think analytically or intuitively and preference for conservative or liberal attitudes. Study 2 put the participants under cognitive load and investigated whether there is a

change in preference toward social and economic conservatism. More specifically, it is predicted that cognitive load manipulation leads to a conservative shift in social, but not economic, attitudes because cognitive load manipulation leads people to think intuitively. Study 3 replicated the findings of Study 2 in a reverse direction with a new priming methodology. We briefly trained people to think analytically (or not) and investigated whether there is a liberal shift in social attitudes. In other words, we predicted that when the participants are trained to think analytically, they will move toward more liberal social attitudes, but not toward more liberal economic attitudes. In Study 4, we looked at the reverse causal influence of political opinions on cognitive style by manipulating endorsement of liberal and conservative political policies. We predicted that convincing people of liberal versus conservative policies will lead them to think more analytically versus intuitively, respectively. In other words, just as cognitive style predicts political attitudes, political attitudes can also predict cognitive style differences (see Talhelm et al., 2015). In addition, we also examined potential mediators of the relationship between political ideology and cognitive style. In Study 4, we examined that the need for cognitive closure (Kruglanski, 2004) and the value of universalism (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987) mediate the relationship between certain political opinions and cognitive style (see Talhelm et al., 2015).

CHAPTER 2

STUDY 1

2.1 Method

2.1.1 Participants

With an estimated correlation coefficient of .15, a 95% power for detecting an effect required a sample of at least 476 participants. We therefore collected data from 750 participants (mean age = 20.63, $SD = 2.13$, 452 females, 256 males, 2 other, 20 unreported) who were enrolled in an introductory psychology course at Boğaziçi University in return for extra course credit. All students were native Turkish speakers. The sample was a relatively diverse sample in terms of both ethnicity and religiosity (see Table 1 for the demographic characteristics of participants).

Table 1. Demographic characteristics of participants from Study 1 to 4

Demographic Dimension	Study 1	Study 2	Study 3	Study 4
Age				
Minimum (years)	18	18	18	18
Maximum (years)	45	26	25	28
Mean (years)	20.63	20.40	20.31	20.48
Gender				
Male (%)	36.8	23.7	29	54.2
Female (%)	60.3	76.3	71	43.8
Religious affiliation				
Muslim (%)	61.9	71.1	66.7	64.7
Theist without any organized religion (%)	16.4	15.5	18.3	15.0
Atheist (%)	10	4.1	9.7	10.5
Agnostic (%)	4.8	0	2.2	4.8
Christian (%)	0.3	0	1.1	0
Jewish (%)	0.3	0	0	0
Buddhist (%)	0.1	0	0	0
Other (%)	3.6	9	2.2	4.1
Ethnicity				
Turkish (%)	81.5	80.4	78.5	86.3
Kurdish (%)	6.1	7	7.5	4.6
Armenian (%)	0.3	0	1.1	0
Greek (%)	0.1	0	0	0.7
Arab (%)	2	4.1	1.1	0.7
Bosnian (%)	0.4	1	4.3	2.0
Georgian (%)	1.1	1	0	0.7
Caucasian (%)	2.8	1	3.2	0.7
Other (%)	2.9	4.1	4.4	4.8

2.1.2 Measures

2.1.2.1 Analytic cognitive style

We used two different measures of analytic cognitive style. Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) consists of three different questions designed to measure a dispositional tendency to think analytically (Frederick, 2005) and is a widely used measure of cognitive style (Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2011). Each question has one correct, reflective (System 2) and an incorrect, intuitive/spontaneous answer (System 1). The original questions are as follows (see Appendix A for the Turkish version):

- 1) A bat and a ball cost \$1.10 in total. The bat costs \$1.00 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost? Correct answer = 5 cents; Intuitive answer = 10 cents
- 2) If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take 100 machines to make 100 widgets? Correct answer = 5 minutes; Intuitive answer = 100 minutes
- 3) In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half of the lake? Correct answer = 47 days; Intuitive answer = 24 days

As an additional measure of analytic cognitive style, we employed three different base-rate conflict (BRC) problems as used by Penncycok et al. (2012). BRC problems consist of a salient stereotype with analytical probabilistic information. The version we used is as follows (see Appendix B):

In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were 4 kindergarten teachers and 996 executive managers. Lilly is a randomly chosen participant of this study. Lilly is 37 years old. She is married and has 3 kids. Her husband is a veterinarian. She is committed to her family and always watches the daily cartoon shows with her kids.

What is most likely?

- a) Lilly is an executive manager (correct answer)
- b) Lilly is a kindergarten teacher

In this kind of question, people generally ignore the base-rate probability (99.6 % chance that Lilly is an executive manager) and select the intuitive, wrong answer (see De Neys, & Glumicic, 2008). Making this mistake can be overcome by thinking analytically. All the measures of analytic cognitive style were converted to POMP scores (Cohen, Cohen, Aiken, & West, 1999). This technique paves the way for the researcher to standardize all the cognitive variables and converts the original scale into a scale ranging from 0 to 100. We then computed CRT and BRC scores and formed a single analytic cognitive style (ACS) score¹.

2.1.2.2 Cognitive ability questions

The cognitive ability of the participants is supposed to be distinct from analytic cognitive style (see Pennycook et al., 2012). We operationalized the cognitive ability construct by the following measure. We used a total of 4 different questions

¹ We had also used an additional analytic cognitive style measure, two Disjunctive reasoning questions, but did not include them in the main analyses since we encountered a floor effect (%70 of the participants failed at both of the questions). Disjunctive reasoning is a type of analytic thinking style based on deductive reasoning where one should consider all the possible conditions to solve the task correctly. One of the disjunctive reasoning problems was “the married problem” adapted from Levesque (1986, see also Toplak & Stanovich, 2012) as follows (see Appendix C):
Jack is looking at Ann but Ann is looking at George. Jack is married but George is not. Is a married person looking at an unmarried person?

A) Yes B) No C) Cannot be determined

The correct answer to this question can be given only by using disjunctive reasoning strategy thereby considering all the possible issues. For this case, if Ann is married, the answer will be “Yes” because she will be looking at George who is unmarried. If Ann is unmarried, the answer will again be “Yes” because in this case Jack, who is married, will be looking at Ann who is unmarried. Thus, the correct answer is “Yes.” People, however, generally select the option of “cannot be determined.” The second disjunctive reasoning problem called “the five blocks problem” also adapted from Levesque (1986, see also Toplak & Stanovich, 2012) was as follows (see Appendix C):

There are 5 blocks in a stack, where the second one from the top is green, and the fourth is not green. Is there a green block directly on top of a non-green block?

A) Yes B) No C) Cannot be determined

The correct answer to this question as in the married problem can be given only by using disjunctive reasoning strategy where people should consider again all possible conditions. For this case, if the third block is green, the answer will be “Yes” because it will be above the fourth block which is not green. If third block is not green, the answer will be again “Yes” because it will be under the second block which is green. Thus, again, the correct answer is “Yes.” People, however, generally select the option of “cannot be determined” in this question as well.

including some syllogistic problems as well as some basic math problems which measure general cognitive ability (see Appendix D). For examples:

- 1) If all himinids are hobaraks and all hobaraks are gubaraks, therefore are all himinids absolutely gubaraks?
- 2) Ayşe is 16 years old and she is four times older than her brother. When the time Ayşe is two times older than his brother, how old Ayşe will be?

All the questions were again converted to POMP scores (Cohen et al., 1999) and Cognitive Ability (CA) variable was computed separately from ACS variables².

2.1.2.3 Big five personality

We used the Big Five Personality Inventory (BFI; Benet-Martinez & John, 1998) in order to control for personality differences. BFI was translated and adapted to Turkish by Sümer, Lajunen, and Özkan (2005). The inventory has five subscales: Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness. Forty four personality descriptors are presented and the participant is asked to indicate the extent to which each of these is self-descriptive, ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The original Cronbach's alpha reliability of each subscale is satisfactory: ranging from 0.64 to 0.77. In the current study, reliabilities have better Cronbach's alpha values: Neuroticism ($\alpha = .80$), Extraversion ($\alpha = .88$), Openness (α

² We also used base-rate neutral questions. These questions are identical to that of base-rate conflict problems except all the questions are non-stereotypic thereby measuring general cognitive ability rather than a tendency to think analytically. In this sense all the questions are neutral. The following is an example to this type of question used in the literature:

In a study 1000 people were tested. Among the participants there were 995 who live in Los Angeles and 5 who live in New York. Christopher is a randomly chosen participant of this study. Christopher is 28 years old. He has a girlfriend and shares an apartment with a friend. He likes watching basketball.

What is most likely?

- a) Christopher lives in New York
- b) **Christopher lives in Los Angeles**

However, %65 of the participants responded correctly to all of the 3 questions. Since we encountered a ceiling effect in these questions, we did not include them in the main analyses.

= .79), Agreeableness ($\alpha = .69$), and Conscientiousness ($\alpha = .78$) (see Appendix E).

Item 6 was excluded from Extraversion subscale due to low item-total correlation.

2.1.2.4 Social/Political conservatism

We used two different scales to measure social conservatism. The first measure we used --Social/Political Conservatism scale-- was developed by Olcaysoy and Sarıbay (2012, 2014; see also, Olcaysoy, 2012) by compiling items from the Social Dominance Orientation scale (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994), Right-Wing Authoritarianism scale (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992), F-scale (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950), Social and Cultural Attitudes scale (Küçükler, 2007), Egalitarianism-Inegalitarianism scale (Kluegel & Smith, 1983), and items measuring resistance to change used by Jost et al. (2007). The scale measures the two dimensions of conservatism as theorized by Jost et al. (2003a): resistance to change (two different sample's Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.80, 0.83$) and opposition to equality ($\alpha = 0.90, 0.88$). The response format is a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (totally disagree) to 7 (totally agree). Scores on resistance to change ($\alpha = .88$ for this study) and opposition to equality ($\alpha = .75$ for this study) are summed and averaged for each participant in order to form a composite conservatism score in which higher scores indicate more conservative attitudes (one factor solution Cronbach's $\alpha = .88$ for this study; see Appendix F).

The second measure we used ---Revised Version of Scale of Social Conservatism--- was developed by Henningham (1996) over almost two decades in the Australian culture and adapted to the current American political system by Piazza and Landy (2013). In the original scale participants respond dichotomously on each social issue by choosing “opposed to it” or “not opposed to it”. We revised the scale

in accordance with Turkish politics removing some items (e.g. “*Outlawing the buying and selling of firearms*”) and adding new ones (see Appendix G). In addition, we changed the response format to a 7-point Likert type scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Items (item 2 and 12) with low item-total correlations were excluded. The remaining set of 13 items had good reliability ($\alpha = .89$). Scores from this scale were again converted to POMP scores. Although we computed this scale separately from Social/Political Conservatism Scale, we averaged these two scales into a single “Social Conservatism Score.”

2.1.2.5 Personal conservatism scale

This scale was also developed by Olcaysoy and Saribay (2012, 2014) in order to measure personal (as opposed to political) conservatism on the same two dimensions: resistance to change and opposition to equality. The items were devoid of political content and focused instead on the individual’s personal preferences and lifestyle. It was developed by compiling items from Resistance to Change Scale (Oreg, 2003; “The idea of making changes in my life generally evokes negative feelings”), Need for Cognitive Closure Scale (Kruglanski, Webster, & Klem, 1993; “I don’t like unpredictable situations”) and 14 new items (“I prefer dominance or submission, not equality, in my personal relationships”). The response format is again a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (totally disagree) to 7 (totally agree) and two scores on resistance to change ($\alpha = .86$ for this study) and opposition to equality ($\alpha = .80$ for this study) are summed and averaged for each participant in order to form a composite personal conservatism score in which higher scores indicate more personal conservatism (one factor solution Cronbach’s $\alpha = .86$ for this study; see Appendix H).

2.1.2.6 Economic conservatism scale

In Turkish, to the best of our knowledge, there is no scale measuring economic political attitudes. In the U.S., this is generally measured by one self-placement item (see Jost, 2006). Therefore, we composed 16 items to develop a new measure of economic conservatism suitable for Turkish participants³. (“The institution we call the state should evolve towards less taxes and services; “To remedy income inequality, the state should tax the rich more and the poor less”; see Appendix I). Since these 16 items had good reliability (Cronbach $\alpha = .73$), we averaged them into a single score of economic conservatism. These scores were converted to POMP scores as with the other measures.

2.1.2.7 Religiosity

We used the intuitive religious belief scale developed by Gervais and Norenzayan (2012) which is composed of 5 items with responses given on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) (*e.g.*, “When I am troubled, I feel the need to seek help from God”). This scale was adapted into Turkish by Yılmaz (2013) and used in previous studies in Turkish (Yılmaz & Bahçekapılı, 2015; Yılmaz, Karadöller, & Sofuoğlu, 2015; see Appendix J).

2.1.2.8 Need for cognitive closure

Need for cognitive closure scale was developed by Webster and Kruglanski (1994) and revised by Roets and Van Hiel (2007). Subsequently, Roets and Van Hiel (2011) validated an abridged version of the scale. This scale consists of 15-items and the response format is a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly

³ Five items were taken from Küçüker (2007) and the remaining 11 items were developed by the authors.

agree). The scale has five subscales: order, predictability, decisiveness, ambiguity and closed-mindedness. Every subscale is represented by 3 items (e.g., “*I don’t like situations that are uncertain*”). Subscales’ internal reliabilities ranges from .46 to .83 (Order = .83, Predictability = .74, Decisiveness = .56, Ambiguity = .61, Closed-mindedness = .46; see Appendix K). We combined all the subscales into a single need for cognitive closure score ($\alpha = .84$), excluding one item (item 14) with low item-total correlation.

2.1.2.8 Demographic questions

Information about participants’ demographic background including age (in years), sex (Females = 1, Males = 2), SES (1 = very high, 5 = very low), hometown size (1 = metropolis, 5 = village), ethnicity, religious and political affiliations, preference for political party, and identification with political party was obtained (see Appendix L).

2.1.2.9 Procedure

At the beginning of the 2015 Spring term, students taking Introduction to Psychology course at Boğaziçi University received an e-mail invitation to complete an online battery of measures for extra-course credit. Students were given two weeks to complete the battery and they were free to complete it at their own pace but were asked to complete it in one session. The battery contained all the measures listed above and its completion took approximately 40-50 minutes. We counterbalanced the order of the analytic thinking measures and political conservatism measures.

2.2 Results and discussion

Correlations among cognitive, political, and control variables including sex, age, SES, and hometown size are presented in Table 2.

As predicted, Analytic Cognitive Style (ACS) is negatively correlated with one item political orientation score [$r(677) = -.108, p = .005$], social conservatism [$r(676) = -.185, p < .001$], personal conservatism [$r(678) = -.115, p = .003$], and need for cognitive closure [$r(693) = -.213, p < .001$], but did not significantly correlate with economic conservatism [$r(693) = -.023, p = .546$]. In addition, ACS is negatively correlated with Religiosity (IRS) [$r(699) = -.081, p < .001$] replicating previous research (Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012; Pennycook et al., 2012; Shenhav et al., 2011).

Table 2. Correlations among the variables used in this study. Coefficients in bold are significant, $p < .05$.

	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17
1-Political Orientation 1 (left) – 7 (right)	.18	.66	.28	-.11	-.06	.16	-.04	-.02	.09	-.01	-.21	.51	.13	-.03	.08	.01
2-Economic Conservatism	1	.08	.07	-.02	.03	-.09	.07	-.15	-.02	-.12	-.05	.01	.17	-.08	-.10	-.08
3-Social Conservatism		1	.44	-.19	-.12	.26	-.05	-.02	.16	.01	-.20	.59	.12	-.12	.10	.09
4-Personal Conservatism			1	-.12	.01	.62	-.23	-.24	.12	.23	-.29	.20	.14	-.06	-.01	.05
5-Analytic Cognitive Style (ACS)				1	.18	-.21	.04	-.06	-.11	-.16	.05	-.18	.22	.09	-.01	-.10
6-Cognitive Ability (CA)					1	-.10	-.04	-.05	-.11	-.05	.01	-.08	.17	.03	-.02	-.02
7-Need For Closure (NFC)						1	-.14	-.08	.33	.28	-.23	.22	-.09	-.05	-.04	-.06
8-Extraversion							1	.16	.20	-.25	.35	.01	-.02	.03	-.13	-.09
9-Agreeableness								1	.12	-.24	.12	.10	-.12	.06	-.04	.05
10-Conscientiousness									1	-.11	.04	.25	-.10	-.01	-.06	.03
11-Neuroticism										1	-.06	.05	-.23	.01	.01	.06
12-Openness											1	-.09	-.04	.03	-.07	-.07
13-Religiosity (IRS)												1	-.10	-.11	.05	.10
14-Sex													1	.01	.06	-.16
15-Age														1	.07	-.03
16-SES															1	.19
17-Hometown																1

To test the independent effect of ACS on conservatism, four hierarchical multiple regression analyses were carried out predicting Social Conservatism (a total POMP scores of Social/Political Conservatism societal conservatism sub-scale and Scale of Social Conservatism) and a total score of economic conservatism scale (a total POMP scores of Economic Conservatism Scale) and personal conservatism (a total POMP score of Social/Political Conservatism personal conservatism sub-scale) and one-item political orientation score (a total POMP score of Political Orientation question from 1 –left– to 7– right) while controlling for cognitive ability (CA; a total POMP scores for 4 cognitive ability items), sex (Females = 1, Males = 2), age (in years), SES (1 = very high, 5 = very low), hometown (1 = metropolis, 5 = village), need for cognitive closure (NFC), personality traits (Five Big Five dimensions), and intuitive religious belief scale (IRS) (Table 3). In all four analyses, all demographic variables including sex, age, SES and hometown were entered first, followed by NFC, five different Big Five scores and IRS. In the last step, the cognitive measures including CA and ACS were entered simultaneously.

In the first hierarchical multiple regression analysis, we investigated the independent effect of ACS on Social Conservatism, higher scores representing higher level of social conservatism. Sex ($\beta = .164, p = .002$), age ($\beta = -.176, p = .001$) and hometown ($\beta = .113, p = .038$) were significant independent predictors in step 1. In step 2, only sex remained significant ($\beta = .186, p < .001$) while NFC ($\beta = .122, p = .014$), Openness to experience ($\beta = -.106, p = .024$), and IRS ($\beta = .542, p < .001$) made significant independent contributions. In step three, sex ($\beta = .221, p < .001$), NFC ($\beta = .110, p = .024$), Openness to experience ($\beta = -.097, p = .047$), and IRS ($\beta = .524, p < .001$) remained significant, but more importantly, ACS ($\beta = -.149, p = .001$) rather than CA ($\beta = -.056, p = .192$) made a significant independent

contribution. Therefore, as predicted, lower levels of analytic cognitive style predicted social conservatism independently of sex, age, SES, hometown, need for cognitive closure, personality traits, religiosity, and cognitive ability.

Table 3. Hierarchical multiple regression: Standardized regression coefficients predicting Social Conservatism with Analytic Cognitive Style (ACS) controlling for Sex, Age, SES, Hometown, Need for Closure (NFC), Personality (Big Five dimensions), Intuitive Religious Belief (IRS), and Cognitive Ability (CA).

Social Conservatism				
	Step 1	Step 2	Step 3	Adjusted R ²
<i>Demographics</i>				.059 ***
Sex	.164**	.186***	.221***	
Age	-.176**	-.056	-.046	
SES	.040	-.013	-.021	
Hometown	.113*	.055	.056	
<i>Control Variables</i>				.391 ***
NFC		.122*	.110*	
Extraversion		.004	-.010	
Agreeableness		-.066	-.074	
Conscientiousness		.023	.006	
Neuroticism		-.018	-.055	
Openness to experience		-.106*	-.092*	
IRS		.542***	.524***	
<i>Cognitive Measures</i>				.411 ***
CA			-.056	
ACS			-.149**	

+ $p < 0.09$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

We next sought to test whether ACS mediates the relationship between NFC and social conservatism. Therefore, we used a series of bootstrapping analyses (Preacher & Hayes, 2004) to estimate 95% confidence intervals for the indirect effect of NFC via ACS on social conservatism, using 5,000 bootstrap resamples. We

conducted the first analysis with the NFC as the predictor, ACS as the mediator, and social conservatism as the outcome variable. The indirect effect of NFC on social conservatism through ACS was significant (95% CI [.365, 1.30]). However, the direct effect of NFC on social conservatism remained significant when controlling for ACS ($p < .001$; 95% CI [3.93, 7.58]). This shows that ACS partly mediated the relationship between NFC and social conservatism (see Figure 1).




Figure 1. The mediating role of ACS on the relationship between NFC and Social Conservatism. ACS = Analytic Cognitive Style, NFC = Need for Cognitive Closure. Total effect in parentheses. *** $p < .001$.

More importantly, in a reverse mediation analysis where NFC was treated as the mediator and ACS as the predictor, the indirect effect of ACS on social conservatism through NFC was also significant (95% CI [-.042, -.016], demonstrating that the mediating role of ACS is not superior to the role of NFC (Figure 2).




Figure 2. The mediating role of NFC on the relationship between ACS and Social Conservatism. ACS = Analytic Cognitive Style, NFC = Need for Cognitive Closure. Total effect in parentheses. *** $p < .001$.

In the second hierarchical multiple regression analysis, we investigated the independent effect of ACS on economic conservatism (a total score of economic conservatism scale), higher scores representing higher level of economic conservatism. In the first step, sex ($\beta = .163, p = .003$) and SES ($\beta = -.110, p = .041$) significantly predicted economic conservatism. In step 2, sex ($\beta = .037, p = .014$) and SES ($\beta = -.115, p = .034$) remained significant while NFC ($\beta = -.118, p = .053$) and Agreeableness ($\beta = -.165, p = .004$) made significant independent contributions. In step three, sex ($\beta = .157, p = .006$), SES ($\beta = -.123, p = .024$), NFC ($\beta = -.124, p = .042$), and Agreeableness ($\beta = -.068, p = .003$) remained significant, but none of the other variables including ACS ($\beta = -.089, p = .115$) and CA ($\beta = -.026, p = .625$) made a significant contribution. Therefore, as predicted, the results show that analytic cognitive style did not predict economic conservatism.

Table 4. Hierarchical multiple regression: Standardized regression coefficients predicting Economic Conservatism

	Economic Conservatism Scale			Adjusted R ²
	Step 1	Step 2	Step 3	
<i>Demographics</i>				.026*
Sex	.163**	.137*	.157**	
Age	.012	.035	.040	
SES	-.110*	-.115*	-.123*	
Hometown	-.011	-.005	-.004	
<i>Control Variables</i>				.056**
NFC		-.118+	-.124*	
Extraversion		.083	.075	
Agreeableness		-.165**	-.168**	
Conscientiousness		.031	.023	
Neuroticism		-.061	-.081	
Openness to experience		-.090	-.082	
IRS		.083	.072	
<i>Cognitive Measures</i>				.059**
CA			-.026	
ACS			-.089	

+ $p < 0.06$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

In the next hierarchical multiple regression analysis, we investigated the independent effect of ACS on Personal Conservatism, higher scores representing higher levels of leaning toward person-level resistance to change and opposition to equality. Only sex ($\beta = .221, p < .001$) was a significant independent predictors in step 1. In step 2, sex remained significant ($\beta = .210, p < .001$) and SES became significant ($\beta = -.083, p = .038$) while NFC ($\beta = .597, p < .001$), Agreeableness ($\beta = -.143, p < .001$), Openness to experience ($\beta = -.100, p = .018$) and IRS ($\beta = .104, p = .014$) made significant independent contributions. In step three, sex ($\beta = .214, p <$

.001), SES ($\beta = -.086, p = .031$), NFC ($\beta = .597, p < .001$), Agreeableness ($\beta = -.145, p < .001$), Openness to experience ($\beta = -.096, p = .023$), and IRS ($\beta = .098, p = .022$) remained significant, but none of the other variables including ACS ($\beta = -.059, p = .156$) and CA ($\beta = .037, p = .343$) made a significant contribution. Therefore, as predicted, the results show that analytic cognitive style did not predict personal conservatism (Table 5).⁴

⁴ We next sought to test an alternative hypothesis that there is an indirect relation between personal conservatism and ACS through the mediating role of NFC. We therefore conducted a bootstrapping analysis (Preacher & Hayes, 2004) to estimate 95% confidence intervals for the indirect effect of ACS via NFC on personal conservatism, using 5,000 bootstrap resamples. We conducted the analysis with the ACS as the predictor, NFC as the mediator, and personal conservatism as the outcome variable. The indirect effect of ACS on personal conservatism through NFC was significant (95% CI [-.080, -.039]). Moreover, the direct effect of ACS on personal conservatism was not significant when controlling for NFC ($p = .666$; 95% CI [-.021, .033]). This shows that NFC fully mediated the relationship between ACS and personal conservatism. More importantly, we conducted a similar bootstrapping analysis with ACS as the mediator and NFC as the predictor in order to test the alternative reverse causal direction and the results indicated that ACS was not a mediator of the relationship between NFC and personal conservatism. The indirect effect of NFC through ACS was not significant (95% CI [-.353, .216]). The direct effect of NFC also remained significant ($p < .001$; 95% CI [11.02, 13.41]) when ACS was treated as a mediator variable, demonstrating that ACS did not mediate the relationship between NFC and personal conservatism.

Table 5. Hierarchical multiple regression: Standardized regression coefficients predicting Personal Conservatism

	Personal Conservatism Score			Adjusted R ²
	Step 1	Step 2	Step 3	
<i>Demographics</i>				.042**
Sex	.221***	.210***	.214***	
Age	-.041	.009	.009	
SES	-.080	-.083*	-.086*	
Hometown	.043	.007	.005	
<i>Control Variables</i>				.501***
NFC		.597***	.597***	
Extraversion		.000	-.004	
Agreeableness		-.143**	-.145***	
Conscientiousness		-.054	-.057	
Neuroticism		.040	.027	
Openness to experience		-.100*	-.096*	
IRS		.105*	.098*	
<i>Cognitive Measures</i>				.502***
CA			.037	
ACS			-.059	

+ $p < 0.09$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Lastly, we investigated the independent effect of ACS on one-item political orientation question (1 = leftists, 7 = rightist), higher scores representing higher levels of political conservatism. Only Sex ($\beta = .175$, $p = .001$) was a significant independent predictor in step 1. In step 2, sex remained significant ($\beta = .191$, $p < .001$) while Openness to experience ($\beta = -.145$, $p = .003$) and IRS ($\beta = .501$, $p < .001$) made significant independent contributions. In step 3, sex ($\beta = .210$, $p < .001$), Openness to experience ($\beta = -.138$, $p = .005$), and IRS ($\beta = .488$, $p < .001$) remained significant, but more importantly, ACS ($\beta = -.115$, $p = .018$) made a significant

independent contribution while CA ($\beta = -.005, p = .914$) did not. Therefore, as predicted, lower levels of analytic cognitive style predicted political conservatism independently of sex, age, SES, hometown, need for cognitive closure, personality traits, religiosity, and cognitive ability (Table 6).

Table 6. Hierarchical multiple regression: Standardized regression coefficients predicting one-item Political Conservatism

	Political Orientation (1 = Leftist, 7 = Rightist)			
	Step 1	Step 2	Step 3	Adjusted R ²
<i>Demographics</i>				.035**
Sex	.175**	.191***	.210***	
Age	-.093	.015	.020	
SES	.061	.011	.002	
Hometown	.071	.008	.006	
<i>Control Variables</i>				.311***
NFC		.037	.033	
Extraversion		-.041	-.049	
Agreeableness		.002	-.001	
Conscientiousness		.024	.016	
Neuroticism		-.019	-.044	
Openness to experience		-.145**	-.138**	
IRS		.501***	.488***	
<i>Cognitive Measures</i>				.344***
CA			.005	
ACS			-.115*	

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Overall, these results demonstrated that ACS is an independent predictor of social conservatism and political conservatism, but not economic conservatism and personal conservatism. Therefore, these set of analyses provided the first systematic

demonstration that lower levels of analytic cognitive style predicts conservatism controlling for sex, age, SES, hometown, need for cognitive closure, personality traits, religiosity, and cognitive ability.

In Study 2 and 3, we aimed to go beyond these promising correlational findings and investigated the causal relation between cognitive style and political ideology. In Study 2, we expected a conservative shift after the participants were induced to think intuitively, and in Study 3, we expected a liberal shift after they were induced to think analytically. In Study 4, we investigated the reverse causal relation by manipulating political ideology and observing its effects on cognitive style.

CHAPTER 3

STUDY 2

3.1 Method

3.1.1 Participants

We estimated a medium effect (f) of .3, which required a total sample of at least 90 with 80% power of detecting any effect. We considered potential attritions and collected data from 104 participants. Participants were selected from those who participated in the online survey (see Study 1). They participated in this study for extra course credit. All students were native Turkish speakers. They were randomly assigned to either the Cognitive load ($n = 56$) or the No-load ($n = 48$) condition. However, in the cognitive load condition, we excluded participants if they responded incorrectly in more than half of the 12 different load trials. This resulted in seven participants being excluded from the analyses (see Table 1 for the characteristics of the participants).

3.1.2 Materials and measures

3.1.2.1 Manipulation

Participants were randomly assigned to either the cognitive load ($n = 49$) or no load ($n = 48$) condition. We used a cognitive load method which includes memorization of a sequence of numbers and letters presented in a random order (for example “ig4j6sf”, see Appendix M). In the cognitive load condition, in each of 12 trials,

participants saw this sequence of numbers and letters, always consisting of a total of 7 characters, before the engaging in the primary task (e.g., responding to an item of the conservatism scale). They were asked to keep this alphanumeric sequence in memory while engaging in the primary task for an uncertain period of time and to report the sequence back when asked. The first sequence appeared at the beginning of the first questionnaire. The remaining 11 sequences were interspersed among items of the various questionnaires used in this study. For each sequence, memory recall was requested after a few items of the questionnaire that the participant was working on, followed by provision of the next load sequence. In the no load conditions, the participants did not see any load items nor were they given any of these instructions. In each trial, if an alphanumeric sequence reported by the participant had more than half of the same characters (at least 4 correct characters out of 7) of the original sequence, it was considered a correct recall.

3.1.2.2 Scale of social conservatism

The same measure as in Study 1 were used (Cronbach's α for this experiment = .90).

3.1.2.3 Economic conservatism scale

The same measure as in Study 1 were used (Cronbach's α for this experiment = .74).

We excluded two items due to low item-total correlations and computed 14 items as an economic conservatism score.

3.1.2.4 Contextualized political opinions

In addition to the Social and Economic Conservatism Scale, the participants were exposed to two semi-fabricated news articles which include a more contextualized

political opinion and also is related to a particular policy (e.g. new internet law). In Talhelm et al.'s (2015) study, training people to think analytically or holistically led to a change in a contextualized political opinion but did not lead to a change in stable political attitudes such as having the opinion that “flag burning should be illegal.” In parallel with this study, we included these contextualized political opinions in this study. We specifically predicted that the manipulation would not influence stable political opinions but would influence political opinions which are actively being processed by the participants, like the news article. Each article presented a dispute between rightist and leftist positions for Turkish political system. One of the disputes was related to a conservative policy—a new internet law enabling the government to completely shut down a website within 4 hours of a complaint—and included a conservative anchor. The other dispute was related to a liberal policy—an argument for making rehabilitation the primary function of prisons—and included a liberal anchor. We selected these disputes because the articles should in fact not include “exact” partisan position. Although, leftists and rightists would of course mostly prefer to support their established views, both of them have also the possibility of shifting their support toward the opposing position (see Appendix N).

Participants were asked to carefully read the article. Once finished, they answered a single question measuring their attitude on the presented issue. The 7-point response scale had conservative (e.g., “I fully support the internet law”) and liberal (e.g., “I’m fully opposed to the internet law”) anchors at the extremes and a neutral (“I have no opinion”) in the middle. Higher scores in the first article (Internet law) represent higher conservative values whereas higher scores in the other article (rehabilitation) represent higher liberal values. We computed separately these two

news articles as two subscales: liberalism (score of rehabilitation article) and conservatism (score of internet law article) scores.

3.1.2.5 Positive and negative affect scale

This scale was developed by Watson, Clark, and Tellegen (1988) and adapted into Turkish by Gençöz (2000). It measures people's current moods on two dimensions separately: positive and negative affect (see Appendix O).

3.1.2.6 Demographic questions

The same measure as in Study 1 were used.

3.1.3 Design and procedure

This study consisted of two sessions which were at least three weeks apart. In the first session, at the start of the semester, all participants filled out an online battery of questionnaires (see Study 1) including a measure of their pre-existing political orientations and some individual variables (one-item religiosity measure, religious affiliation etc.). All items were given in a randomized order for each participant.

In the second session, at least three weeks later, participants were invited to the social psychology lab at Boğaziçi University and were randomly assigned to either the Cognitive load or the No-load condition.

3.2 Results and discussion

3.2.1 Contextualized political opinions

Contrary to our prediction, a one-way ANOVA revealed a significant effect of manipulation on neither the liberal-anchored article, nor the conservative-anchored one (both $F_s < 1$).

In the liberal-anchored article (rehabilitation), participants in the load condition ($M = 5.63$, $SD = 0.96$; 95% CI [5.35, 5.90]) reported more liberal attitudes than no-load condition ($M = 5.44$, $SD = 1.07$; 95% CI [5.13, 5.75]), a non-significant difference, $F(1, 94) = 0.82$, $p = .368$, $\eta p^2 = .009$.

In the conservative-anchored article (Internet law), participants in the load condition ($M = 2.51$, $SD = 1.45$; 95% CI [2.10, 2.93]) reported less conservative attitudes than no-load condition ($M = 2.69$, $SD = 1.43$; 95% CI [2.27, 3.10]), but this difference is also not statistically significant, $F(1, 95) = 0.37$, $p = .545$, $\eta p^2 = .004$.

When we controlled for baseline political orientation, gender, SES, age, and the current mood of the participants, the results remained constant (all $p_s > .05$). In a regression (coded as Cognitive load = 1, No load = 0) controlling for the variables mentioned above, our cognitive load did not significantly predict responses to either news article (all $p_s > .05$).

3.2.2 Stable political attitudes

As expected, we did not find a significant effect of our manipulation on the social and economic conservatism scales (both $F_s < 1$). The results remained constant when controlling for baseline political orientation, gender, SES, age, and the current mood of the participants (all $p_s > .05$).

Overall, in this study, we predicted that cognitive load manipulation will activate intuitive thinking which in turn will lead people to adopt more conservative attitudes on the issues they are actively processing (i.e., the news articles), but will not influence people's stable attitudes. The findings showed that in contrast to the previous finding that low-effort thinking enhances political conservatism (Eidelman et al., 2012), our manipulation did not influence people's long-term stable political attitudes as well as political opinions that they are actively processing.

One potential limitation of this study concerns the manipulation technique being used. We did not do a real manipulation check, therefore we did not really know whether our cognitive load manipulation really influenced people's cognitive styles or not. Moreover, the load conditions may be too difficult for the participants to memorize due to its length and complexity, thus we might encounter a floor effect in this manipulation. The other potential limitation of this study was the number of news article we used in this study. We only used two news articles in order to show the effect of cognitive style on political ideology, however, it would be insufficient to show the effect in question. We, therefore, added two other news articles in Study 3. The manipulation used in Study 2 induced people to think intuitively, but in Study 3, contrary to Study 2, we activated analytic thinking and investigated the effect of cognitive style (but this time analytic cognitive style instead of intuitive) on political ideology.

CHAPTER 4

STUDY 3

4.1 Method

4.1.1 Participants

We estimated a medium effect (f) of .3, which required a total sample of at least 90 with 80% power of detecting any effect. We considered potential attritions and collected data from 106 participants. Participants were excluded from the analyses if they responded incorrectly to the manipulation check questions for the Analytic-prime group ($n = 13$). The remaining sample consisted of 93 participants randomly assigned to the Analytic-prime ($n = 40$) or the Neutral-prime ($n = 53$) conditions. Participants were selected from those enrolled in an introductory psychology course at Boğaziçi University and participated in this study for extra course credit (see Table 1 for demographic characteristics of the participants). All students were native Turkish speakers. Participants were selected from those who participated in the online survey (see Study 1).

4.1.2 Materials and measures

4.1.2.1 Manipulation

Participants were randomly assigned to either the Analytic or the Control (Neutral) prime conditions. We used a new priming methodology to prime analytic thinking based on Talhelm et al. (2015). We briefly trained people to think analytically by teaching them the solutions of standard cognitive reflection test and base-rate problems. In the Analytic-prime condition, participants were first asked to complete

standard 3 CRT problems one by one. At the end of each question, we taught people the correct answer and why it is correct. To check whether they understood or not, we asked them to complete similar questions again with different numbers, and we excluded the participants who failed at any of these check points ($n = 13$). We applied this procedure for 3 base-rate problems as well. In the Control condition, the participants were asked to complete standard 3 CRT and 3 base-rate problems without any training (see Appendix P).

4.1.2.2 Conservatism measures

All the dependent variables are the same with that of Study 2 (Cronbach α for Social Conservatism scale = .89; for Economic Conservatism Scale = .51).

4.1.2.3 Contextualized political opinions

In addition to the semi-fabricated news articles used in Study 2, we used two new articles. Collectively, the articles presented four different disputes between rightist and leftist positions for Turkish political system: Two of the disputes were related to a conservative policy and include a conservative anchor. One of these was related to a new security law which gives more power to police forces. The second one was related to a new internet law which enables government totally banning of internet sites in only 4 hours (also used in Study 2). The other two of the disputes were related to a liberal policy and include a liberal anchor. The first of these concerned whether the first function of the prison system is be rehabilitation of the prisoners or not (also used in Study 2). The second news is related to whether gay marriage should be legal (see Appendix N).

Participants were asked to carefully read the article. Once finished, they answered a single question measuring their attitude on the presented issue. The 7-point response scale had conservative (e.g., “I fully support the internet law”) and liberal (e.g., “I’m fully opposed to the internet law”) anchors at the extremes and a neutral (“I have no opinion”) in the middle. Higher scores in the first two articles represent higher conservative values whereas higher scores in the latter two articles represent higher liberal values. We computed separately responses to these four news articles as two subscales: liberalism (average score of rehabilitation and gay marriage articles) and conservatism (average score of security and internet laws articles) scores.

4.1.2.4 Positive and negative affect scale

The same measure was used as in Study 2.

4.1.3 Design and procedure

The first session is identical to that of Study 1. In the second session, at least five weeks later, participants were invited to the social psychology lab at Boğaziçi University and were randomly assigned to either the Analytic or the Control condition. After the manipulation phase, participants were asked to indicate their opinions regarding the disputes presented in the four semi-fabricated news articles (as in Talhelm et al., 2015). Finally, they completed the social conservatism and economic conservatism scales in individually randomized order.

4.2 Results and discussion

4.2.1 Contextualized political opinions

Figure 3 shows the effect of our manipulation on mean opinion scores in response to the news articles. As predicted, a one-way ANOVA revealed a significant effect of manipulation on liberalism sub-scale of the news article, $F(1, 91) = 4.75, p = .032, \eta p^2 = .050$ (Figure 3). The Analytic-prime group ($M = 5.63, SD = 0.86; 95\% CI [5.35, 5.90]$) reported more liberal attitudes than the Neutral-prime group ($M = 5.15, SD = 1.15; 95\% CI [4.83, 5.47]$). When we controlled for baseline political orientation, gender, SES, age, and the current mood of the participants, the results remained constant (all $ps < .05$).




Figure 3. Analytic-prime and responses to the liberal-anchored news articles

Thus, the effect of analytic training on the contextualized political opinions show that the effect is independent from the baseline political orientation, the current mood and the basic demographic characteristics of the participants. In a regression (with the independent variable coded as Analytic-prime = 1, Neutral-prime = 0) controlling for the variables mentioned above, our analytic training manipulation significantly predicted responses to the liberal-anchored news article ($\beta = .186, p = .042$). Thus, we can conclude that analytic thought training is an independent predictor of liberal political ideology for contextualized opinions (Table 7).

Table 7. Hierarchical multiple regression: Standardized regression coefficients predicting Liberal-anchored news articles with Analytic training manipulation

	Liberal-anchored news articles		Adjusted R ²
	Step 1	Step 2	
<i>Control Variables</i>			.317***
Gender	.052	.072	
Age	.185*	.153	
SES	.139	.133	
Positive mood	-.009	.002	
Negative mood	-.164+	-.188*	
Baseline political orientation	-.589***	-.567***	
<i>Independent Variable</i>			.343***
Analytic training		.186*	

+ $p < 0.08$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

However, there is no significant difference among priming conditions on responses to the conservative news articles, $F(1, 91) = 0.14, p = .711, \eta p^2 = .002$. When we controlled for baseline political orientation, gender, SES, age, and the current mood of the participants, the results remained constant (all $ps > .05$).

Therefore, the results demonstrate that briefly training people to think analytically led them to adopt more liberal, but not less conservative, values.

4.2.2 Stable political attitudes

As predicted, training participants to think analytically did not significantly influence their long-term political attitudes. A one-way ANOVA revealed no main effect on Social Conservatism, $F(1, 91) = 1.66, p = .200, \eta p^2 = .018$. Although participants in the Analytic training condition ($M = 3.39, SD = 2.37; 95\% CI [2.63, 4.15]$) reported less conservative social attitudes than the control condition ($M = 4.03, SD = 2.55; 95\% CI [3.33, 4.74]$), this difference did not reach statistical significance. Another one-way ANOVA also revealed no main effect on economic conservatism, $F(1, 91) = 1.97, p = .164, \eta p^2 = .021$. Again, participants in the Analytic training condition ($M = 4.29, SD = 0.49; 95\% CI [4.13, 4.44]$) reported less conservative economic attitudes than the control condition ($M = 4.42, SD = 0.40; 95\% CI [4.30, 4.53]$), but this difference did not reach statistical significance. The results remained constant when controlling for baseline political orientation, gender, SES, age, and the current mood of the participants (all $ps > .120$).

Overall, the findings provide evidence for the causal link between analytic thought and liberal political ideology for contextualized political attitudes. However, the manipulation did not lead people to adopt less conservative political opinions on the disputes presented in the news articles. In addition, briefly training people to think analytically did not lead to a change in stable political opinions on social and economic issues.

CHAPTER 5

STUDY 4

5.1 Method

5.1.1 Participants

In Study 4, we estimated a medium effect (f) of .3, which required a total sample of at least 111 with 80% power of detecting any effect. We considered potential attritions and collected data from 153 participants. Participants were selected from those who participated in the online survey (see Study 1). They participated in this study for extra course credit. All students were native Turkish speakers. They were randomly assigned to either the Liberal ideology-prime ($n = 48$), the Conservative ideology-prime ($n = 51$) or the Neutral-prime ($n = 54$) condition.

5.1.2 Materials and measures

5.1.2.1 Manipulation

Participants were randomly assigned to the Liberal ideology, the Conservative ideology or the Neutral prime condition. To manipulate liberal ideology, an essay including arguments favoring the necessities of liberal and leftist values (e.g., “openness to experience”, “peace through universalism,” “technological innovations through the trait of curiosity”) was given to participants. In the conservative ideology condition, another essay including arguments favoring the necessities of conservative and rightist values (e.g., “being responsible”, “discipline,” and “harmony through social order”) was given. In the neutral condition, participants were given no such text (see Appendix R).

5.1.2.2 Manipulation check

We checked the effectiveness of the manipulation in two different ways. First, we asked participants in the liberal and conservative ideology conditions to evaluate the persuasiveness of the argument in the essay on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (completely agree). Second, participants were given the Conservation (Cronbach α for this experiment = .83) subscale of Schwartz's Basic Human Values Survey (Schwartz, Melech, Lehmann, Burgess, Harris, & Owens 2001; see Appendix S) with the prediction that those in the Conservative-prime condition would score higher on this subscale than those in the liberal-prime condition.

5.1.2.3 Analytic thinking

The same measures as in Study 1 were used (CRT, Base-rate Problems).

5.1.2.4 Need for cognitive closure

The same measure as in Study 1 was used in order to test whether epistemic motivation operationalized as the need for cognitive closure will mediate the relationship between political ideology and cognitive style (Cronbach α for this experiment = .85).

5.1.2.5 Universalism value

The universalism (self-transcendence) subscale of Schwartz's Basic Human Values Survey (Schwartz et al., 2001) was used in order to test whether the value of universalism mediates the relationship between political ideology manipulation and cognitive style differences (Cronbach α for this experiment = .76; see Appendix S).

This scale was adapted into Turkish by Demirutku and Sümer (2010). Participants were asked to provide their responses on a scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree).

5.1.2.6 Demographic questions

The same measure as in Study 2 were used.

5.1.2.7 Positive and negative affect scale

The same measure was used as in Studies 2 and 3.

5.1.3 Design and procedure

This study consisted of two sessions which were at least seven weeks apart. In the first session, at the start of the semester, all participants filled out an online battery of questionnaires (see Study 1) including their pre-existing political orientations and some individual variables (one-item religiosity measure, religious affiliation, etc.). All items were given in an individually randomized order.

In the second session, at least seven weeks later, participants were invited to the social psychology lab at Boğaziçi University and were randomly assigned to either the Liberal-prime, the Conservative-prime, or the Neutral condition. After the manipulation phase, the participants were asked to complete the standard 3-item cognitive reflection test, base-rate problems, need for cognitive closure scale, and two subscales of Human Values Survey in a randomized order for each participant.

5.2 Results and discussion

Contrary to our prediction, a one-way ANOVA revealed no significant main effect of our manipulation on analytic thinking tendency, $F(2, 150) = .294, p = .746, \eta p^2 = .004$ (Figure 4). Conservative-prime group ($M = 4.31, SD = 1.33; 95\% CI [3.94, 4.69]$) did not differ from both the Liberal-prime ($M = 4.08, SD = 1.64; 95\% CI [3.61, 4.56]$) and the Neutral groups ($M = 4.24, SD = 1.59; 95\% CI [3.81, 4.67]$). When we controlled for baseline political orientation, need for cognitive closure tendency, gender, SES, age, and the current mood of the participants, the results remained constant (all $ps > .05$).




Figure 4: Political ideology prime and analytic thinking tendency

When we analyzed the persuasiveness ratings of the participants, a total of 38 participants rated less than or equal to the midpoint (3) of the scale. In other words, it is shown that 28 participants (24 in the Conservative-priming condition, 4 in the

Liberal-priming condition) reported they were not persuaded by the argument given in the essay, and 10 participants (5 in the Conservative-priming condition, 5 in the Liberal-priming condition) reported they are undecided. However, when we excluded these participants from the analyses, the results remained constant.

More importantly, our second manipulation check (Schwartz's conservation values) also failed to provide evidence that our manipulation affected participants' ideological views in the desired direction. A one-way ANOVA demonstrated no differences between our priming conditions in terms of conservation values, $F(2, 150) = .257, p = .773, \eta p^2 = .003$ (Figure 5).




Figure 5: Political ideology prime and conservation values

To our knowledge, this study was the first attempt to investigate the reverse causal influence of political ideology on cognitive style. The results, however, showed that especially the Conservative-priming essay (28 participants did not agree

with the argument, and 5 undecided out of 51 participants) did not convince people of the necessities of conservative ideology. Future studies should use more persuasive arguments to prime conservative ideology.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

The present study aimed at revealing the reciprocal relation between cognitive style and political ideology. Study 1 demonstrated—by controlling relevant individual variables such as personality traits, need for cognitive closure, general cognitive ability, and religiosity—that lower levels of analytic thinking tendency is an independent predictor of social conservatism and right-wing political orientation, but not economic conservatism and personal conservatism. In Study 2, we predicted that experimentally inducing intuitive thinking style via cognitive load manipulation enhances conservatism for contextualized political attitudes but we did not find a significant effect of intuitive thinking style on conservatism in the abstract. In Study 3, we predicted that experimentally inducing analytic mode of thought promotes higher levels of political liberalism but not lower levels of political conservatism for contextualized political opinions. Correspondingly, the results showed that, for contextualized attitudes, whereas activating analytic thinking enhances political liberalism, it did not decrease political conservatism. Consistent with the findings of Study 2, there was no support for an effect of analytic training on political attitudes in the abstract. In Study 4, we investigated the reverse causal influence of political ideology on cognitive style but did not find a significant effect on the main dependent variable, nor any additional evidence that this manipulation functions as intended.

6.1 Implications

The original contribution of the current set of studies rests on two conclusions that we can unequivocally draw from these results: (1) When merely measured, analytic

cognitive style and political conservatism are related to each other and this relationship cannot be explained away by sex, age, SES, hometown size, need for closure, personality traits, religiosity and general cognitive ability. (2) There is a causal effect of analytic cognitive style on liberal attitudes. These results are in line with some previous research findings showing the relationship between cognitive style and political ideology (Brandt et al., 2012; Eidelman et al., 2014; Deppe et al., 2015; Iyer et al., 2012; Jost et al., 2003; Pennycook et al., 2012; Talhelm et al., 2015; Van Berkel et al., 2015; but see Kahan, 2014).

Most of the research cited above is based on self-report measures and very few of them are experiments. Two exceptions stand out. In one of them, Talhelm et al. (2015) showed that analytic cultural thought prime leads people to favor more liberal attitudes whereas holistic cultural thought prime leads to more conservative opinions in both American and Chinese samples. In the other one, Eidelman et al. (2012) showed that when people are induced to think intuitively, a conservative shift occurred in their attitudes. However, Eidelman et al. (2012) did not control pre-existing political orientations and also did not differentiate social versus economic attitudes, and stable versus contextualized political opinions. Talhelm et al. (2015) also did not exactly activate analytic or intuitive thinking styles as in the present set of studies. In short, among such demonstrations, none of them that we know of specifically investigated these cognitive style differences within the frame of the dual-process model or investigated the reverse causal relation. Thus, the current set of studies contribute to the emerging literature on the relationship between cognitive style and political ideology by replicating and extending earlier research.

The current results are also compatible with Henrich et al.'s (2010) account of WEIRDness. According to this account, only 15% of people live in Western,

educated, industrialized, rich and democratic societies and the remaining 85% are generally out of the scope of psychological research. Thus, it is important to differentiate the characteristics of the minority (15% of the world population mostly represented by Western people) and the majority (85% of the world population mostly represented by Eastern and Southern people) of humanity. Talhelm et al. (2015) suggested a sixth characteristic of Westerners: their liberal tendency. On this basis, they reveal a new concept: WILDER (Western, industrialized, liberal, democratic, educated and rich). Perhaps, a seventh letter --“A” for the “analytic”-- seems necessary to add to this list in order to define western and liberal people. Like the WEIRD samples that most psychological research draws, our sample was also highly educated (all university students) and all were drawn from a campus with a strongly liberal climate. However, unlike the literature we refer to, our samples were mostly Turkish and Muslim and this fact greatly increases the value of our replications (see Henrich et al., 2010). More specifically, the current research, like other recent findings (Olcaysoy & Sarıbay, 2012; Yılmaz, Sarıbay, & Bahçekapılı, under review), demonstrates the usefulness of the left/liberal - right/conservative dichotomy while also providing the first replication and extension of relevant results (i.e., Eidelman et al., 2012; Talhelm et al., 2015) in a non-Western, non-Christian sample.

6.2 Possible explanations for null findings

Some of our predictions were not supported by the current findings. In Study 2, in contrast to the previous finding that low-effort thinking promotes conservatism (see Eidelman et al., 2012), our manipulation did not influence the political opinions that participants were actively processing. However, because we did not include a real

manipulation check, we cannot be sure whether our findings in Study 2 reflect a correct rejection of our hypothesis or the failure of our manipulation. Thus, we can conclude that the results are inconclusive rather than being a failure to replicate the results of Eidelman et al. (2012). The fact that Study 3, which was conceptually similar, showed significant effect of analytic priming on liberal attitudes suggests that the null findings of Study 2 are due to the weakness of the manipulation. Study 4 is the first attempt to investigate the reverse causal influence of political ideology on cognitive style. This test was suggested by Talhelm et al. (2015). Our results, however, indicated that especially the conservative-priming manipulation failed to influence our participants as intended.

6.3 Limitations and future directions

In Studies 2 and 4, as just mentioned, there appear to be problems with the manipulation. Therefore, future research could replicate both Study 2 and Study 4 with manipulations that are tested in advance to produce sufficiently strong effects in the desired direction. For instance, more persuasive essays for manipulating participants' ideological positions in the conservative direction could be developed. Likewise, when conservative attitudes form the dependent variable, their measurement could be improved to become more sensitive to slight shifts. This is suggested by the fact that both Study 2 and Study 3 failed to show effects on conservative attitudes.

Turkey is also a unique country in terms of the complexity of its political structure. The effect of cognitive style on political ideology and vice versa might reveal stronger or weaker effects in politically less and more complex cultures. Thus, the basic findings revealed in this study should be replicated in politically less

complex places like the U.S. and more complex places like traditional Middle Eastern countries (e.g., Egypt).

One other potential limitation of this study is due to the characteristics of the sample: Boğaziçi University undergraduate students are known both for their liberal tendency and their strong analytical thinking. In Study 1, the mean level of CRT scores of our participants is 1.96 out of 3. According to Frederick's (2005) comparison across top U.S. universities, Massachusetts Institute of Technology is on the first rank with 2.08 mean levels whilst Princeton University comes second with 1.63. This shows that Boğaziçi sample is more analytical than comparable samples from universities such as Princeton, Harvard, and Carnegie Mellon. We think that this characteristic of our sample might influence the effect of relevant primes. For instance, an intuitive prime might be more effective for more conservative people (more intuitive thinkers as we hypothesized) and likewise an analytic prime might be more effective for more liberal people (more analytic thinkers as we hypothesized). The null finding in Study 2 might be therefore due to the especially high levels of liberalism and analytic thinking tendency of our participants. Therefore, future studies should further investigate this relationship in distinct (e.g., more strongly conservative) samples in Turkey and beyond.

6.4 CODA

The current results are in line with the general view of conservatism as motivated social cognition (Jost et al., 2003). Some core characteristics of conservatism such as preference for hierarchy and uncertainty avoidance are seen to be a product of intuitive thinking, whereas being more tolerant and egalitarian may require more effortful thinking. Thus, the main difference between conservative and liberal people

may come from the general cognitive thinking style as characterized in the present research in terms of intuitive and analytic thinking styles. Our results also clarified one more point—pertaining to the general view defining conservatism with pathological terms (Adorno et al., 1950)—that conservatism is a result of natural (intuitive) thinking style arising from certain needs and motivations (see Jost et al., 2003), rather than from a pathology.

Moreover, as lower level of analytic cognitive style was an independent predictor of social conservatism and rightist political orientation (Study 1), to change stable political opinions with contextual primes may not be that easy as shown in this current research and some previous non-significant results investigating the effect of cognitive style on political attitudes (e.g., Deppe et al., 2015). We only found evidence of the effect of our manipulation on the news article measures, that is, on opinions which are being actively processed by the individual. Thus, the priming effect on stable political opinions seems to be resistant to simple manipulations. All in all, the findings are compatible with the view that liberals are dispositionally more analytic and conservatives are more intuitive, but it is experimentally difficult to manipulate these long-term political attitudes. Therefore, in today's culture wars between leftist (liberal) and rightist (conservative) ideological views, being more tolerant rather than persuading the opposite parties using analytic arguments might be a more effective tool for agreement and long-term peace among different ideological groups because convincing people of certain ideologies or manipulating their long-term political attitudes are more difficult than initially assumed.

APPENDIX A

COGNITIVE REFLECTION TEST

1. Bir beyzbol sopası ve bir beyzbol topu 1.10 TL tutuyor. Beyzbol sopası, beyzbol topundan 1.00 TL daha pahalı. Buna göre beyzbol topunun fiyatı nedir? (kuruş cinsinden)

Intuitive Answer: 10 kuruş – Analytic Answer: 5 kuruş

2. 5 makine 5 parçayı 5 dakikada üretiyor. Buna göre 100 makine 100 parçayı kaç dakikada üretir?

Intuitive Answer: 100 dakika - Analytic Answer: 5 dakika

3. Bir gölün belli bir alanı nilüfer yapraklarıyla kaplı. Bu alanın büyüklüğü her gün iki katına çıkmaktadır. 48 günde bu alan gölün tamamını kapladığına göre, kaç günde gölün yarısını kaplar?

Intuitive Answer: 24 gün – Analytic Answer: 47 gün

APPENDIX B

BASE-RATE PROBLEMS/STEREOTYPIC

- 1) Bir çalışmaya 1000 kişi katılmıştır. Katılımcılar arasında 5 mühendis ve 995 tane avukat vardır. Mehmet bu araştırmanın katılımcıları arasından rastgele seçilmiştir.

Mehmet 36 yaşındadır. Evli değildir ve biraz içe dönüktür. Boş zamanlarını bilim kurgu okuyarak ve bilgisayar programları yazarak geçirmekten hoşlanır.

Hangisi daha olasıdır?

- a) Mehmet bir avukattır
- b) Mehmet bir mühendistir

- 2) Bir çalışmaya 1000 kişi katılmıştır. Katılımcılar arasında 4 anaokulu öğretmeni ve 996 tane genel müdür vardır. Ayşe bu araştırmanın katılımcıları arasından rastgele seçilmiştir.

Ayşe 37 yaşındadır. Evlidir ve 3 çocuğu vardır. Kocasını ise veterinerdir. Kendisini ailesini adamıştır ve çocuklarıyla her zaman günlük çizgi film şovlarını izlemektedir.

Hangisi daha olasıdır?

- a) Ayşe genel müdürdür.
- b) Ayşe anaokulu öğretmenidir.

- 3) Bir çalışmaya 1000 kişi katılmıştır. Katılımcılar arasında 996 erkek, 4 tane de kız çocuk vardır. Deniz bu araştırmanın katılımcıları arasından rastgele seçilmiştir.

Deniz 13 yaşındadır. Deniz'in favori konusu sanattır. Deniz'in yapmaktan en çok hoşlandığı şey ise alışveriş yapmak ve okuldaki diğer çocuklarla ilgili dedikodu yapmak için arkadaşlarına yatıya gitmektir.

Hangisi daha olasıdır?

- a) Deniz bir kız çocuğudur.
- b) Deniz bir erkek çocuğudur.

APPENDIX C

DISJUNCTIVE REASONING PROBLEMS

The married problem:

Eray İrem'e bakmakta fakat İrem Oğuz'a bakmaktadır. Eray evlidir fakat Oğuz evli değildir. Bu durumda evli biri evli olmayan birine bakıyor mudur?

A) Evet B) Hayır C) Bu bilgiler ışığında belirlenemez

The five-blocks problem:

Bir kitap rafında üst üste duran 5 kitap vardır. Üstten ikinci kitap yeşildir, üstten dördüncü kitap yeşil değildir. Bu durumda yeşil bir kitap yeşil olmayan bir kitabın hemen üstünde midir?

A) Evet B) Hayır C) Bu bilgiler ışığında belirlenemez

APPENDIX D

BASE-RATE PROBLEMS/NEUTRAL AND GENERAL COGNITIVE

ABILITY QUESTIONS

- 1) Bir çalışmaya 1000 kişi katılmıştır. Katılımcılar arasında saksafon çalan 3 ve bateri çalan 997 kişi vardır. Ahmet bu araştırmanın katılımcıları arasından rastgele seçilmiştir.

Ahmet 20 yaşındadır. Ankara’da okumaktadır ve devamlı bir kız arkadaşı da yoktur. Birikimleriyle daha yeni ikinci el bir araba satın almıştır. Hangisi daha olasıdır?

- a) Ahmet saksafon çalıyor
- b) Ahmet bateri çalıyor

- 2) Bir çalışmaya 1000 kişi katılmıştır. Katılımcılar arasında 997 bilardo oyuncusu ve 3 basketbol oyuncusu vardır. Umut bu araştırmanın katılımcıları arasından rastgele seçilmiştir.

Umut 29 yaşındadır ve tüm hayatını İstanbul’da geçirmiştir. Yeşil renkli gözlükleri ve siyah saçı vardır. Açık gri bir araba kullanmaktadır. Hangisi daha olasıdır?

- a) Umut bir bilardo oyuncusudur.
- b) Umut bir basketbol oyuncusudur.

- 3) Bir çalışmaya 1000 kişi katılmıştır. Katılımcılar arasında 995 kişi İzmir’de, 5 kişi ise İstanbul’da yaşamaktadır. Hasan bu araştırmanın katılımcıları arasından rastgele seçilmiştir. Hasan 28 yaşındadır. Bir kız arkadaşı vardır ve kız arkadaşıyla aynı evde kalmaktadır. Basketbol maçları izlemeyi sevmektedir. Hangisi daha olasıdır?

- a) Hasan İstanbul’da yaşamaktadır
- b) Hasan İzmir’de yaşamaktadır

- 4) “ARMUT”tan “TUMRA” oluyor ise 46.251 ne olur?

- 5) Ayşe 16 yaşında bir kızdır ve erkek kardeşinden 4 kat daha yaşlıdır. Kardeşinden 2 kat daha yaşlı olduğunda kaç yaşında olacaktır?

- 6) Eğer tüm himiniler hobaraksa ve tüm hobaraklar gubaraksa o zaman tüm himiniler kesinlikle gubarak mıdır?

- a) Yanlıř
- b) Doğru

7) "Parmak'tan El'e ise Yaprak'tan....? "Bu önermeye göre beř seçenekten hangisi en uygundur? a) Lif b) Ağaç c) Dal d) Kıymık

APPENDIX E

BIG FIVE INVENTORY

Aşağıda sizi kısmen tanımlayan (ya da pek tanımlayamayan) bir takım özellikler sunulmaktadır. Örneğin, başkaları ile zaman geçirmekten hoşlanan birisi olduğunuzu düşünüyor musunuz? Lütfen aşağıda verilen özelliklerin sizi ne oranda yansıttığını ya da yansıtmadığını belirtmek için sizi en iyi tanımlayan rakamı her bir özelliğin yanına yazınız.

1 = Hiç katılmıyorum

2 = Biraz katılmıyorum

3 = Ne katılıyorum ne de katılmıyorum (kararsızım)

4 = Biraz katılıyorum

5 = Tamamen katılıyorum

Kendimi biri olarak görüyorum

- | | |
|---|---|
| ___ 1. Konuşkan | ___ 23. Tembel olma eğiliminde |
| ___ 2. Başkalarında hata arayan | ___ 24. Duygusal olarak dengeli, kolayca keyfi kaçmayan |
| ___ 3. İşini tam yapan | ___ 25. Keşfeden, icat eden |
| ___ 4. Bunalımlı, melankolik | ___ 26. Atılgan bir kişiliğe sahip |
| ___ 5. Orijinal, yeni görüşler ortaya koyan | ___ 27. Soğuk ve mesafeli olabilen |
| ___ 6. Ketum/ağzı sıkı | ___ 28. Görevi tamamlanıncaya kadar sebat edebilen |
| ___ 7. Yardımsever ve çıkarıcı olmayan | ___ 29. Dakikası dakikasına uymayan |
| ___ 8. Biraz umursamaz | ___ 30. Sanata ve estetik değerlere önem veren |
| ___ 9. Rahat, stresle kolay baş eden | ___ 31. Bazen utangaç, çekingen olan |
| ___ 10. Çok değişik konuları merak eden | ___ 32. Hemen hemen herkese karşı düşünceli ve nazik olan |
| ___ 11. Enerji dolu | ___ 33. İşleri verimli yapan |
| ___ 12. Başkalarıyla sürekli didişen | ___ 34. Gergin ortamlarda sakin kalabilen |
| ___ 13. Güvenilir bir çalışan | ___ 35. Rutin ve tekdüze işleri yapmayı tercih eden |
| ___ 14. Gergin olabilen | ___ 36. Sosyal, girişken |
| ___ 15. Derin ve incelikli düşünen | ___ 37. Bazen başkalarına kaba davranabilen |
| ___ 16. Coşku ve şevk yaratabilen | ___ 38. Planlar yapan ve bunları uygulayan |
| ___ 17. Affedici bir yapıya sahip | ___ 39. Kolayca gerilebilen |
| ___ 18. Dağınık olma eğiliminde | ___ 40. Düşünmeyi seven, fikirler geliştirebilen |
| ___ 19. Çok endişelenen | ___ 41. Sanata ilgisi çok az olan |
| ___ 20. Hayal gücü yüksek | ___ 42. Başkalarıyla işbirliği yapmayı seven |
| ___ 21. Sessiz bir yapıda | ___ 43. Kolaylıkla dikkati dağılan |
| ___ 22. Genellikle başkalarına güvenen | ___ 44. Sanat, müzik ve edebiyat bakımından kültürlü |

APPENDIX F

SOCIAL/POLITICAL CONSERVATISM SCALE

Aşağıda, çeşitli toplumsal olaylara dair tepkilerinizle ilgili ifadeler bulunmaktadır. Lütfen dikkatlice okuyunuz ve her ifadeye ne kadar katıldığınızı 1'den 7'ye kadar olan ölçekte işaretleyiniz.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Kesinlikle Kararsızım Kesinlikle
katılmıyorum katılıyorum

Societal Opposition to Equality

1. Gelir dağılımı eşit hale getirilmemelidir çünkü insanların kabiliyetleri eşit değildir.
2. Gelir dağılımı daha eşit olmalıdır çünkü herkesin topluma katkısı eşit derecede önemlidir. (R)
3. İnsanlar iki sınıfa ayrılabilir: güçlü ve zayıf.
4. Eğer insanlara daha eşit bir şekilde davransaydık daha az sorun yaşayan bir toplum olurduk. (R)
5. Aşağı seviyedeki gruplar yerlerini bilmelidirler.
6. Bazı grupların tepede diğerlerinin aşağıda olması muhtemelen iyi bir şeydir.
7. Gelir dağılımı daha eşit olmalıdır çünkü her ailenin yemek, barınak gibi temel ihtiyaçları aynıdır. (R)
8. Eğer gelir dağılımı daha eşit olsaydı insanları daha çok çalışmaya motive eden bir sebep kalmayacaktı.
9. Toplumsal grupların eşit olması iyi bir şey olurdu. (R)
10. Hiçbir grup toplumda baskın olmamalıdır. (R)
11. Toplumsal grupların eşitliği amacımız olmalıdır. (R)
12. Bazı gruplar diğer gruplardan daha fazla yaşam hakkına sahip olabilir.
13. Tüm gruplara hayatta eşit şans tanınmalıdır. (R)
14. Bir sürü insan ekmek bile bulamazken beş yıldızlı otellerde tatil yapmak bir insana yakışmaz. (R)
15. Gelirleri eşitlemek için gayret etmeliyiz. (R)
16. Gelir dağılımının daha eşit hale getirilmesi sosyalizm demektir ve bu kişisel özgürlükleri engeller.
17. Devlet gücü azınlıkta bile olsalar insanların sesini kısmak için kullanılmalıdır. (R)

Societal Resistance to Change

1. Devletin istikrarının korunması için yeni partilerin kurulmasına sınırlandırmalar getirilmelidir.
2. Eğer bazı gruplar yerlerini korusalardı daha az sorunumuz olurdu.
3. Toprak bütünlüğümüzün korunması kişisel çıkarlardan daha önemlidir.
4. Bu belalı zamanlarda kanunların kimsenin gözyaşına bakılmadan uygulanması lazım, özellikle işleri karıştıran devrimci ve provokatörlere karşı.
5. Batılılaşma sevdası kültürümüzün ve kimliğimizin asimile olmasına yol açacak.
6. Ülkemizin ihtiyacı daha çok medeni haktan ziyade daha katı bir hukuk ve düzendir.
7. Toplumsal ahlakımıza ve geleneksel inançlarımıza zarar veren unsurlardan mutlaka kaçınılıyoruz.
8. Toplumda örf ve adetlerimizin korunması değişen dünya düzenine uyum sağlamaktan daha önemlidir.
9. Ülkenin durumu giderek ciddileşmektedir, sorun çıkaranların temizlenmesi bizi yeniden doğru yola ulaştırmak için en güçlü çözüm olacaktır.

APPENDIX G

SCALE OF SOCIAL CONSERVATISM

Lütfen aşağıdaki ifadelere ne kadar karşı olup olmadığımızı belirtiniz.

1) İdam Cezasına

-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5
Hiç karşı değilim					Nötr					Tamamen Karşıyım

2) Daha sert hapis cezalarının uygulanmasına

-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5
Hiç karşı değilim					Nötr					Tamamen Karşıyım

3) Gönüllü Ötenaziye

-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5
Hiç karşı değilim					Nötr					Tamamen Karşıyım

4) Eşcinsel evliliğe

-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5
Hiç karşı değilim					Nötr					Tamamen Karşıyım

5) Kumar oynamanın yasal bir suç haline getirilmesine

-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5
Hiç karşı değilim					Nötr					Tamamen Karşıyım

6) Evlilik öncesi cinsel ilişkiye

-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5
Hiç karşı değilim					Nötr					Tamamen Karşıyım

7) Göçmenlerin ülkeye girişine karşı daha katı kurallar getirilmesine

-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5
Hiç karşı değilim					Nötr					Tamamen Karşıyım

8) Hangi yaş olursa olsun porno izlemenin yasal bir suç haline getirilmesine

-5	-4	-3	-2	-1	0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5
Hiç karşı değilim					Nötr					Tamamen Karşıyım

9) Kürtajı bütünüyle yasaklamaya

-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5
Hiç karşı değilim Nötr Tamamen Karşıyım

10) Esrar içiminin serbest bırakılmasına

-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5
Hiç karşı değilim Nötr Tamamen Karşıyım

11) Genç insanların ebeveynlerinin izni olmadan doğum kontrol konusunda bilgilendirilmelerine

-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5
Hiç karşı değilim Nötr Tamamen Karşıyım

12) Bir kız ve bir erkeğin evlenmeden aynı evde yaşamasına

-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5
Hiç karşı değilim Nötr Tamamen Karşıyım

13) Birisinin bankaya yatırdığı para üzerinden faiz elde etmesine

-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5
Hiç karşı değilim Nötr Tamamen Karşıyım

14) Kız ve erkek çocuklarının karma bir eğitim almasına

-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5
Hiç karşı değilim Nötr Tamamen Karşıyım

15) Osmanlıca dersinin tüm liselerde zorunlu ders olarak okutulmasına

-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5
Hiç karşı değilim Nötr Tamamen Karşıyım

APPENDIX H

PERSONAL CONSERVATISM SCALE

Aşağıda, çeşitli kişisel özelliklerle ilgili ifadeler bulunmaktadır. Lütfen dikkatlice okuyunuz ve her ifadeye ne kadar katıldığınızı 1'den 7'ye kadar olan ölçekte işaretleyiniz.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Kesinlikle Kararsızım Kesinlikle
katılmıyorum katılıyorum

Personal Resistance to Change

1. Şaşırımtansa sıkılmayı tercih ederim.
2. İşlerimin rutin taraflarından hoşlanmam. (R)
3. Spontane olmayı severim. (R)
4. Ne yapacağımı bilmeden yeni bir ortama girmekten kaynaklanan belirsizliği severim. (R)
5. Düzenli saatlerden oluşan, kurallı bir hayatı sıkıcı bulurum. (R)
6. Kuralların açık olmadığı bir durumda huzursuz olurum.
7. Hayatımı muhtemelen geliştirecek değişimler hakkında bile çoğunlukla biraz huzursuz hissederim.
8. Ne zaman hayatım sabit bir rutinlik kazanırsa onu değiştirecek yollar ararım. (R)
9. Tahmin edilemez durumlardan hoşlanmam.
10. Yeni ve farklı şeyler denemektense, aynı eski şeyleri yapmayı tercih ederim.
11. Hayatımda değişim yapma fikri bende genellikle olumsuz duygular uyandırır.
12. Plan değişiklikleri benim için ciddi bir zorluktur.
13. Ne yapacağı belli olmayan insanlarla arkadaşlık etmeyi severim. (R)
14. Bir plan değişiminden haberim olduğunda biraz gerilirim.
15. Bazen kendimi benim için iyi olacak değişimlerden bile kaçınırken bulurum.
16. Tutarlı bir rutin oluşturmak hayattan daha çok zevk almamı sağlıyor.
17. Tanıdığım arkadaşlarımla sosyalleşmeyi tercih ederim çünkü onlardan ne bekleyebileceğimi bilirim.
18. Planlarımı bir kez yaptıktan sonra değiştirmem.

Personal Opposition to Equality

1. Bir grup insanla beraber çalıştığım zaman içimizden birinin ipleri eline almasını tercih ederim.
2. Her insan topluluğunun işlerin düzgün gittiğinden emin olması için diğerlerinden daha fazla güç veya otoriteye sahip olan bir kişiye ihtiyacı vardır.
3. Kişisel ilişkilerimde eşitliği değil ya üstünlük kurmayı ya da boyun eğmeyi yeğlerim.
4. Benden daha üstün birisinin kontrolü eline alıp bana ne yapacağımı söylemesi hoşuma gider.
5. Eğer tanıştırıldığım bir grubun hiyerarşik yapısını bilirsem kendimi daha iyi hissederim.
6. Benden üstün birisi benimle eşitmiş gibi davranırsa rahatsız olurum.
7. Hayatımdaki çoğu kişiyle kendimi eşit hissederim. (R)
8. Görevi bana hizmet etmek olan bir kişinin benimle "senli benli" konuşması beni rahatsız eder.
9. Bir insan topluluğu içinde herkesin eşit sayılması doğaya aykırı bir durumdur.

10. Birisiyle tanıştığım zaman kısa süre içinde benden ne kadar üstün olduğunu tartarım.
11. Sosyal ortamlarda bazı insanların diğerlerine liderlik etmesi işlerin daha iyi yürümesi için gereklidir.

APPENDIX I

ECONOMIC CONSERVATISM SCALE

Lütfen aşağıda yazılanları dikkatlice okuyunuz ve her ifadeye ne kadar katıldığınızı 1'den 7'ye kadar olan ölçekte işaretleyiniz.

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Kesinlikle Kararsızım Kesinlikle
katılmıyorum katılıyorum

Economic Conservatism:

- 1) Hemen her alanda devletten çok daha verimli ve başarılı çalıştığı için özel teşebbüs daha iyidir. (Küçüker, 2007)
- 2) Devlet ekonomiye müdahale etmemelidir. (Küçüker, 2007)
- 3) Devlet küçüldükçe bireylerin özgürlüğü artar. (Küçüker, 2007)
- 4) Özel okullar daha kaliteli eğitim verdiği için devlet okulları özel sektöre devredilmelidir (Küçüker, 2007)
- 5) Devletin ekonomik planlama yetkisi arttıkça rejim diktatörlüğe dönüşür. (Küçüker, 2007)
- 6) Devlet dediğimiz kurum giderek daha az vergi toplamaya ve daha az hizmet vermeye doğru gitmelidir.
- 7) Zengin insanların yatırım yapmaları için teşvikler arttırılmalıdır.
- 8) Hayırseverlik devletin değil, kişilerin sorumluluğudur, dolayısıyla devlet halka yardımseverlikte bulunmamalıdır.
- 9) Devlet gelir eşitsizliğini düzeltmek için zenginlerden daha çok, fakirlerden ise daha az vergi almalıdır.
- 10) Ekonomik geliri düşük olan insanların sağlık harcamaları bütünüyle devlet tarafından karşılanmalıdır.
- 11) Devlet eğer özel teşebbüsleri tamamen serbest bırakırsa, onlar işçilere her türlü zulmü yapabilirler.
- 12) Devletin giderek küçülmesi, gelir eşitsizliğini daha da artırır.
- 13) Devlet sosyal eşitliği sağlamak adına ekonomiye müdahale etmelidir.
- 14) Özelleştirme uygulamaları zenginlerden yanadır ve yasaklanmalıdır.
- 15) Evsiz insanlara ya da sokak çocuklarına bakmak devletin bir numaralı görevidir.
- 16) Devlet insanlara daha iyi bir yaşam standardı vermek için her türlü harcamayı yapmalıdır.

APPENDIX J

INTUITIVE RELIGIOUS BELIEF SCALE

Bu kısımda, dini değerlerinizle ilgili bir dizi ifade bulacaksınız. Lütfen verilen ifadelere ne ölçüde katılıp katılmadığınızı, aşağıdaki sayıları kullanarak değerlendiriniz.

- 1...Kesinlikle katılmıyorum
- 2...Pek katılmıyorum
- 3...Ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum
- 4...Biraz katılıyorum
- 5...Kesinlikle katılıyorum

1) Tanrı'ya inanırım.	1	2	3	4	5
2) Dertli olduğum zamanlar Tanrı'dan yardım isteme ihtiyacı duyarım.	1	2	3	4	5
3) İnsanlar dua ederlerken Tanrı'yla konuştuklarını zannetseler de aslında kendi kendilerine konuşmaktan başka bir şey yapmıyorlar	1	2	3	4	5
4) Din bana anlamsız geliyor.	1	2	3	4	5
5) Günlük yaşantımda dinin hiçbir rolü yoktur.	1	2	3	4	5

APPENDIX K

SHORT FORM OF NEED FOR COGNITIVE CLOSURE

1 = order, 2 = predictability, 3 = decisiveness, 4 = ambiguity, 5 = closed-mindedness.

1. Belirsiz olan durumlardan hoşlanmıyorum. (4)
2. Birden fazla şekilde cevaplanabilen sorulardan hoşlanmam (5)
3. Planlı programlı iyi düzenlenmiş bir hayat benim mizacıma uygundur (1)
4. Hayatımda neden olduğunu anlamadığım bir olay olduğunda kendimi rahatsız hissedirim (4)
5. Birisinin, gruptaki herkesin ortak olarak inandığı bir şeye katılmadığı bir durumda kendimi rahatsız hissedirim (5)
6. Tam olarak ne olacağını bilmeden bir olaya dâhil olmaktan hoşlanmam. (2)
7. Bir karar verdiğim zaman kendimi rahatlamış hissedirim (3)
8. Bir problemle yüzleştiğim zaman çözüme hızlıca ulaşmak için aşırı çaba sarf ederim (3).
9. Bir probleme hemen çözüm bulamazsam birden tahammülsüz ve tedirgin hale gelirim (3).
10. Beklenmedik şeyler yapabilecek kişilerle olmaktan hoşlanmam (2).
11. Birisinin sözlerinin birden fazla anlama gelmesinden hoşlanmam (4).
12. Belirli bir rutinimin olmasının hayatı daha eğlenceli hale getirdiğini düşünüyorum (1)
13. Net ve programlı bir yaşam tarzım olmasından hoşlanırım (1)
14. Genelde kendi görüşümü oluştururken birden fazla bakış açısına başvurmam (5)
15. Sonu önceden kestirilemeyen durumlardan hoşlanmam (2)

APPENDIX L

DEMOGRAPHIC SHEET

1) Cinsiyetiniz: K E Diğer (lütfen belirtiniz): _____

2) Yaşınız: _____

3) Politik görüşünüz aşağıdaki kategorilerden hangisine daha yakındır? (lütfen sadece en yakın olduğunuz “bir” seçeneği işaretleyin)

- Sosyal Demokrat Kemalist Sosyalist
Muhafazakâr Demokrat Liberal İslamcı
Apolitik Ülkücü
Diğer(lütfen belirtiniz)_____

4) Siyasi konularda “sol” dan ve “sağ” dan bahsedildiğini sık sık duyuyoruz. Aşağıda bir sol-sağ cetveli var. Burada “1” en solu, “7” ise en sağ gösteriyor. Sizin kendi görüşleriniz bu cetvelin neresinde yer alır?

1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Sol Orta Sağ

5) Kendinizi diğer partilere kıyasla daha yakın hissettiğiniz bir parti var mı? (lütfen sadece en yakın olduğunuz “bir” seçeneği işaretleyin.

- Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi
Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi
Büyük Birlik Partisi
Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi
İşçi Partisi
Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi
Özgürlük ve Dayanışma Partisi
Saadet Partisi
Türkiye Komünist Partisi
Kendime yakın hissettiğim bir parti yok
Diğer (lütfen belirtiniz) _____

6) Kendinizi yakın hissettiğiniz partiye ne kadar bağlısınız?

0-----1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7-----8-----9-----10
Hiç bağlı değilim Orta Çok bağılım

7) Çocukluğunuzdaki gelir seviyenizi tanımlar mısınız?

- Çok iyi İyi Fena Değil Kötü Çok Kötü

8) Eğitim Seviyeniz:

- Okuryazar İlkokul/ortaokul mezunu Lise Mezunu

- Yüksekokul Mezunu Üniversite Öğrencisi Üniversite mezunu
Lisansüstü Öğrencisi Lisansüstü Mezunu

8) Aşağıdakilerden hangisi sizin dini/inanç sisteminizi en iyi ifade etmektedir?

- Tanrı'ya inanmam (Ateistim)
Tanrı'ya inanıyor ama bir dini tercih etmiyorum
Müslümanım
Diğer _____

10) Etnik kimlik:

- Türk Kürt Ermeni Rum Arap Diğer _____

11) Kendinizi dindar/inanan biri olarak nitelendirir misiniz?

- 1-----2-----3-----4-----5-----6-----7
Hiç dindar değilim Evet çok dindarım

12) En uzun süreyle yaşadığınız yer:

- Büyükşehir Şehir Kasaba Belde Köy

13) Mesleğiniz: Öğrenci Diğer (lütfen belirtiniz)

APPENDIX M
COGNITIVE LOAD MANIPULATION

- 1) 2hs6ö53
- 2) y8kzp4e
- 3) d2wct7ö
- 4) g7ü2çq
- 5) xa8ö01f
- 6) m2z87i3
- 7) rw79jf4
- 8) dş32sy6
- 9) t1ö7dğ
- 10) y5g1wv
- 11) r6xş4a8
- 12) 5k8b2e4

İnternet yasası ne getiriyor?

Türkiye'deki internet kullanımına yeni düzenlemeler getiren kanun teklifi meclisten geçti. Yasaya özgürlükleri kısıtladığı yönünde eleştiriler gelse de hükümet "yasaklamayı zorlaştırıyoruz" diyor.

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Meclis'ten geçen yeni kanun teklifi 2007'de yürürlüğe giren ve bugüne kadar birçok siteye erişimin engellenmesine sebep olan 5561 sayılı kanuna dayanıyor. Tam adı "İnternet Ortamında Yapılan Yayınların Düzenlenmesi ve Bu Yayınlar Yoluyla İşlenen Suçlarla Mücadele Edilmesi Hakkında Kanun.". Hükümet kanadı yaptığı teklifte Türkiye'de yıllardır sıkıntı olan site engelleme, kapatma ya da benzeri durumlara bir düzenleme getirme amacıyla hazırlandığını söylüyor. Bu birliğin temel görevi Telekomünikasyon İletişim Başkanlığı'ndan (TİB) gelen talimatlarla site engellemek. Yani görünen yapıda artık devlet internet sitesi kapatmayacak ama devletin bir kurumu olan TİB'den gelen talimatlarda bu yeni kurulacak Erişim Sağlayıcılar Birliği siteleri kapatacak.

Özel hayatın gizliliği söz konusu olduğunda mahkeme kararı beklenmeksizin engelleme kararı TİB tarafından verilecek. Burada belirtilen 'özel hayat' ifadesinin nasıl yorumlanacağı ise ucu açık bir konu. Dünyadaki internet kısıtlama uygulamalarına bakıldığında özellikle Batı'da devletin internete özel bir müdahalesi yok. Türkiye ile ilgili en önemli fark bu. Yasayla beraber kişisel bilgiler 2 yıl boyunca saklanacak ve adrese engelleme (yani bir sitenin altındaki tek bir videonun adresinin engellenmesi) yasal hale gelecek. Yasaya karşı olan bazı siyasal parti ve sivil toplum örgütleri ise tasarının bütün olarak özgürlükleri kısıtlayıcı bir yanının olduğundan bahsetmektedirler. Tasarının bazı maddelerinin kulağa hoş gelse de söz konusu içeriklerin yasal olup olmadığının nasıl belirleneceği ve bunun kimin nasıl yapacağını belirsiz olmasının yaratacağı sıkıntılardan şikâyet etmektedirler. En genel olarak kişilerin özel haklarına müdahale edilebileceğinden korkmaktadırlar. Bazı siyasal parti ve sivil toplum örgütlerine göreyse bu bir internet yasağı değil. Yasayı savunan sivil toplum örgütleri, "Bu yasayla beraber İnternet yasaklanmıyor, internetin yasaklanmasının kolay olduğu mekanizma ortadan kaldırılıyor" dedi. Temel amacın kişilik haklarının korunması ve vatandaşların mağduriyetinin giderilmesi olduğunu dile getiren bazı sivil toplum örgütleri ve siyasal partiler, "İnternet yasaklanıyor, internete sansür geliyor, TİB her şeyi engelleyecek" gibi söylemlerin gerçeğe ilgisinin olmadığını belirtti

Hangi tarafı destekliyorsunuz?

1. İnternet yasasına tamamen karşıyım.
2. İnternet yasasına oldukça karşıyım.
3. İnternet yasasına karşıyım.
4. Bir fikrim yok.
5. İnternet yasasını destekliyorum.
6. İnternet yasasını oldukça destekliyorum.
7. İnternet yasasını tamamen destekliyorum.

Yasa tasarısıyla ilgili aşağıdakilerden hangisi yanlıştır?

1. İnternet düzenlemesi Telekomünikasyon İletişim Başkanlığı'ndan (TİB) gelen talimatlarla yapılacaktır.
2. Yasanın bazı maddelerinin özgürlükleri kısıtlayacağından korkuluyor.
3. Hükümet yasanın bazı maddelerinin kısıtlayıcı olduğunu ve değiştirilmesi gerektiğini söylemektedir.
4. Yasayla beraber kişisel bilgiler 2 yıl saklanabilecektir.

'İç Güvenlik Reformu Paketi' neler getiriyor?

Meclis'e sunulan "İç Güvenlik Reformu Paketi" ile polisin gözaltı, dinleme, arama yetkisi genişliyor. Toplumsal eylemlerde molotof atanlara karşı da polis silah kullanabilecek.

16/10/2014 11:01 Güncelleme 18:08 TSİ | Konular Türkiye

Paket ile valilerin ve polislerin toplumsal olaylarda yetkileri arttırılıyor; polise 'makul şüphe' halinde de arama yetkisi veriliyor. Toplantı veya gösteri yürüyüşlerinde, havai fişek, molotof ve benzeri el yapımı patlayıcılar, demir bilye, sapan bulundurulması taşınması yasak olan maddeler kapsamına alınıyor. Eylemlerde göstericilerin kimliklerini gizlemek için yüzlerini kapatması, tek tip kıyafet giymesi da suç kapsamına giriyor. Cezalar arttırılıyor. Jandarma il ve ilçe komutanlarını atama yetkisi İçişleri Bakanlığı'na geçiyor.

Toplumsal muhalefetten de bu yasaya yönelik eleştiri sesleri yükselmeye başladı. Gelen eleştirilerin toplandığı noktalar ise özgürlüklerin alanının daraldığı ve AB normlarının dışına çıkıldığı endişesi.

Meclise sunulan yeni güvenlik paketini bir ileri iki geri demokrasi anlayışının tezahürü olarak niteleyen bazı sivil toplum örgütleri, teklifin keyfiliği getireceği ve ihlallere kapı aralayacağını öne sürüyor.

Paketi savunan bazı sivil toplum örgütlerine göre , hükümet tarafından hazırlanıp Meclis'e sevk edilen İç Güvenlik Paketi'ndeki düzenlemelerin toplantı ve gösteri yürüyüş hakkını kullananlara değil son zamanlarda artış gösteren ve esnafa, iş yerlerine zarar veren yağmacılara karşı getirildiğini belirterek, özgürlük alanının kısıtlanmayacağını savundu. Polise verilen yetkilerle ilgili denetim mekanizmalarının da kurulduğunu ifade eden sivil toplum örgütleri, bu yasayla sıradan vatandaşların hayatlarının hiçbir şekilde etkilenmeyeceğini, aynı zamanda da toplumdaki düzeni ve dirliğini koruyabilmek için yasanın gerekli olduğunu savunmaktadırlar.

Hangi tarafı destekliyorsunuz?

1. Yeni güvenlik paketine tamamen karşıyım.
2. Yeni güvenlik paketine oldukça karşıyım.
3. Yeni güvenlik paketine karşıyım.
4. Bir fikrim yok.
5. Yeni güvenlik paketini destekliyorum.
6. Yeni güvenlik paketini oldukça destekliyorum.
7. Yeni güvenlik paketini tamamen destekliyorum.

Haberin içeriğiyle ilgili aşağıdakilerden hangisini yanlıştır?

1. Yeni güvenlik paketiyle var olan cezalar arttırılmaktadır.
2. Hükümet partisinin içinde de yeni güvenlik paketine karşı olanlar vardır.
3. Bazı sivil toplum örgütleri güvenlik paketinin özgürlükleri kısıtlayacağından endişe etmektedir.
4. Yeni güvenlik paketiyle polislere daha çok yetki verilmektedir.

Mahkumlara Yeni Rehabilitasyon Paketi Geliyor

Üniversitelerle devletin işbirliğine dayanan projede, mahkumların topluma daha kolay adapte olabilmeleri için aktiviteler düzenlenmesine karar verildi.

21/12/2014 15:49 Güncelleme 19:18 TSİ | Konular Türkiye

Ege Üniversitesi Rektörlüğü ile İzmir Aliğa Ceza İnfaz Kurumları Kampüsü bünyesinde yer alan Çocuk ve Gençlik Kapalı Ceza İnfaz ve Kadın Kapalı Ceza İnfaz Kurumları arasında düzenlenen işbirliğinin protokol törenine, Ege Üniversitesi Rektörü Prof. Dr. Candeğer Yılmaz, İzmir Cumhuriyet Başsavcısı Durdu Kavak, öğretim üyeleri ile ceza infaz kurumlarının yetkilileri katıldı. Bu toplantıda konuşan Başsavcı Kavak, "Cezaevi sorunları önemli. Cezaevlerinde kalan tutuklu ve hükümlülerin yeniden topluma kazandırılması çok zor bir konudur ve emek ister. Tutuklu ve hükümlülerin "ne hali varsa görsün, hak ettiği cezayı sonuna kadar çöksinler" tarzı yaklaşımlar yerine, somut adımlarla topluma kazandırılması gerekir. Türkiye'de ilk kez uygulanan proje, bu zorluğu aşmak için ortaya çıkmış bir uygulamadır" diye konuştu.

Rektör Prof. Dr. Candeğer Yılmaz ise "Üniversitenin birikimini ilk defa tutuklu ve hükümlülere uygulayacağız. Bu nedenle onların yeniden topluma kazandırılması için çok heyecanlıyız. Bu projeye yeni bir sayfa açtık. Cezaevlerini de eğitim kampüsü haline getireceğiz. Hükümlü ve tutukluların kendi potansiyellerini arttıracacağız. Yaşama daha farklı bakmalarını sağlayacağız. Protokol kapsamında, genel sağlık, ağız ve diş sağlığı, madde bağımlılığı, psikiyatri, kadın sağlığı ve üreme, personele, tutuklu ve hükümlülere yönelik eğitim faaliyetleri, sosyal kültürel faaliyetler ve proje desteği gibi konularda işbirliğinin sağlanmasını amaçlamaktayız" dedi.

İşbirliğine bazı sivil toplum örgütlerinden ve bazı gazete yazarlarından tepki geldi. Cezaevinin temel görevinin rehabilitasyon olmadığını ve toplumun düzenini ve sağlığını bozan bireylerin, toplumdan dışlanmasına dayalı olduğu vurgulandı. Ayrıca yine içlerinde bazı siyasal partilerin de olduğu bir grup sivil toplum örgütü, rehabilitasyon çalışmasının tecavüz ya da cinayet gibi bazı ağır suçları kapsamaması gerektiğini savunmaktadırlar. Ayrıca düzenlenen protokolle hapishanaları hoş bir yer gibi gösterme durumunun ortaya çıktığı vurgulanmaktadır.

Hangi tarafı destekliyorsunuz?

1. Rehabilitasyon paketine tamamen karşıyım.
2. Rehabilitasyon paketine oldukça karşıyım.
3. Rehabilitasyon paketine karşıyım.
4. Bir fikrim yok.
5. Rehabilitasyon paketini destekliyorum.
6. Rehabilitasyon paketini oldukça destekliyorum.
7. Rehabilitasyon paketini tamamen destekliyorum

Haberin içeriğiyle ilgili aşağıdakilerden hangisini yanııştır?

1. Haberde üniversitelerle devlet kurumlarının bir işbirliği vardır.
2. Bazı sivil toplum örgütleri işbirliğine karşı çıkmaktadırlar.
3. Bazı sivil toplum örgütleri rehabilitasyonun önemine vurgu yapmaktadırlar.
4. Yeni işbirliği paketiyle başsavcılara daha çok yetki verilmektedir.

Eşcinsel Evlilik Yasal Olmalı mı?

11/01/2015 15:36 Güncelleme 13:17 TSİ | Konular Türkiye

Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Başkanı Barack Obama'nın eşcinsel evlilikleri desteklediğini açıklaması akıllara Türkiye'deki eşcinselleri getirdi. Türkiye'de evlenmek için bekleyen eşcinseller var. Hatta bunun için resmi başvuru bile yapıldı.

Bu konuda farklı görüşler var. Örneğin, Kaos GL üyesi Metin Yılmaz, "İlk önce eşcinsellerin varlığının kabul edilmesi gerekiyor, öldürülmememiz ve Anayasa'ya girmemiz gerekiyor. Amerika'daki durum burada da olmalı. Türkiye'de evlenmek isteyen çok eşcinsel var. Kaldı ki, bir kişi bile istese bu bir haktır ve olmalıdır. Demokrasi dediğimiz şey böyledir

Başka bir üye ise "İnsanların cinsel kimliği nedeniyle evlenememesi bir insan hakkı ihlalidir. Ben sevgilimle bir arada yaşıyor olsam, ortak edindiğimiz mülkler söz konusu olduğunda ve de herhangi birimizin vefatı durumunda birimizi mağdur etmeyecek haklarımızın olması lazım. Bırakın vefatı ya da eşcinsel sevgililerden biri cezaevine düşüyor olabilir. Böyle bir durumda devletin akrabalara verdiği hakkı kullanamıyoruz. Cezaevindeki sevgilimizle haftada bir yerine ayda bir görüşebiliyoruz. Çünkü soyadlarımız farklı olduğu için akraba statüsünde olmuyoruz. Bu konuyu tartışırken bizim nelerden yoksun kaldığımızı bakmakta yarar var...

Ancak bu duruma gelen eleştiriler de mevcut. Örneğin, bir sivil toplum temsilcisi "Türkiye'de evliliğe büyük bir kutsiyet atfedilmiş durumda. Bu nedenle aynı cinsler arasında evliliğin Türkiye'de rahat rahat tartışılabileceğini düşünmüyorum. Ülkemizdeki geleneksel ve dini değerlere olan bağlılık hâlâ çok güçlü. Bu sebeple de gay evliliğin tartışılıp, yakın gelecekte de hayata geçebileceğini düşünmüyorum" şeklinde bir yorumda bulunmuştur.

Ayrıca bir gazete yazarı, "Böyle bir hakkın Türkiye'ye gelmemesi lazım. Türk toplumunun örf ve adetlerine göre yasaktır. Ancak azınlıkta da olsa, marjinal olanlar da var bu ülkede. Sistem demokratik olduğu için böyle bir talepte bulunmalarında sıkıntı yok. Ne var ki, dinen böyle bir yasak var, zaten Türk aile yapısı da buna uygun değil. Böyle bir hakkın gelmesi, Türkiye'de toplumsal tepkilere neden olabilir. Bu nedenle böyle bir düzenlemenin olmaması gerektiğini düşünüyorum" şeklinde bir yorum getirmiştir.

Hangi tarafı destekliyorsunuz?

1. Eşcinsel evliliklere tamamen karşıyım.
2. Eşcinsel evliliklere oldukça karşıyım.
3. Eşcinsel evliliklere karşıyım.
4. Bir fikrim yok.
5. Eşcinsel evlilikleri destekliyorum.
6. Eşcinsel evlilikleri oldukça destekliyorum.
7. Eşcinsel evlilikleri tamamen destekliyorum

Haberin içeriğiyle ilgili aşağıdakilerden hangisini yanlışlıştır?

1. Haberde iki tane Kaos GL üyesi görüşlerini bildirmiştir.
2. Bazı gazete yazarları eşcinsel evliliğe karşı çıkmaktadır.
3. Yasa tasarısında eşcinsel evlilik yapanlara teşvik getirilmesi planlanmaktadır.
4. Eşcinsel evliliğin olması gerektiğini savunanlar, devletin akrabalara verdiği haklardan yararlanamadıklarını örnek göstermektedirler.

APPENDIX O

POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE AFFECT SCALE

Bu ölçek farklı duyguları tanımlayan bir takım sözcükler içermektedir. Son iki hafta nasıl hissettiğinizi düşünüp her maddeyi okuyun. Uygun cevabı her maddenin yanında ayrılan yere (puanları daire içine alarak) işaretleyin. Cevaplarınızı verirken aşağıdaki puanları kullanın.

1. Çok az veya hiç
2. Biraz
3. Ortalama
4. Oldukça
5. Çok fazla

1. İlgili _____ 1 2 3 4 5

2. Sıkıntılı _____ 1 2 3 4 5

3. Heyecanlı _____ 1 2 3 4 5

4. Mutsuz _____ 1 2 3 4 5

5. Güçlü _____ 1 2 3 4 5

6. Suçlu _____ 1 2 3 4 5

7. Ürkmüş _____ 1 2 3 4 5

8. Düşmanca _____ 1 2 3 4 5

9. Hevesli _____ 1 2 3 4 5

10. Gururlu _____ 1 2 3 4 5

11. Asabi _____ 1 2 3 4 5

12. Uyanık _____ 1 2 3 4 5

(dikkati açık)

13. Utanmış _____ 1 2 3 4 5

14. İlhamlı _____ 1 2 3 4 5

(yaratıcı düşüncelerle dolu)

15. Sinirli _____ 1 2 3 4 5

16. Kararlı _____ 1 2 3 4 5

17. Dikkatli _____ 1 2 3 4 5

18. Tedirgin _____ 1 2 3 4 5

19. Aktif _____ 1 2 3 4 5

20. Korkmuş _____ 1 2 3 4 5

APPENDIX P

ANALYTIC TRAINING INSTRUCTIONS

Lütfen aşağıdaki soruyu cevaplayınız.

- 1) Bir beyzbol sopası ve bir beyzbol topu 1.10 TL tutuyor. Beyzbol sopası, beyzbol topundan 1.00 TL daha pahalı. Buna göre beyzbol topunun fiyatı nedir? (kuruş cinsinden)

Açıklama: İnsanlar genellikle bu tip sorulara sezgisel cevap verme eğilimindedirler. Çoğunlukla insanlar bu soruya “10 kuruş” cevabını vermektedirler. Halbuki sağlaması yapılırsa aralarında 1.00 TL fark olduğundan dolayı toplamları 1.20 TL olduğu kolaylıkla görülecektir. Dolayısıyla bu cevap yanlıştır. Analitik düşünme eğilimini ölçen bu soruda aklına gelen ilk cevabı vermeyip derinlemesine düşünen insanların çoğu doğru cevap olan “5 kuruş”u vermektedirler. Sağlamasını da yaptığımızda beyzbol topu 5 kuruşa, beyzbol sopasıyla arasında 1.00 TL fark olduğundan dolayı beyzbol sopası da 1.05 TL’dir ve toplamları da 1.10 TL olur. Dolayısıyla bu tip sorularda aklımıza gelen ilk cevabı vermek yerine, durup analitik düşünme süzgecinden geçirmemiz gerekmektedir.

Şimdi lütfen sıradaki soruları bu mantığa göre çözünüz.

- 2) Bir kalem ve bir silgi toplam 2 lira 50 kuruştur. Kalem silgiden 2 lira daha pahalı olduğuna göre silginin fiyatı nedir?
- 3) 5 makine 5 parçayı 5 dakikada üretiyor. Buna göre 100 makine 100 parçayı kaç dakikada üretir?

Açıklama: İnsanlar genellikle bu tip sorulara da sezgisel cevap verme eğilimindedirler. Çoğunlukla insanlar bu soruya “100” cevabını vermektedirler. Halbuki 5 makine 5 parçayı 5 dakikada üretiyorsa, 1 makine 1 parçayı 5 dakikada üretiyordur. Burada aldatıcı olan 5 sayılarının aynı olmasıdır. Örneğin, 5 makine 5 parçayı 8 dakikada üretiyor olsaydı, 1 makinenin 1 parçayı 8 dakikada ürettiğini kolaylıkla görebilirdik. Dolayısıyla soruya dönecek olursak 100 makine 100 parçayı yine 5 dakikada üretir çünkü bir makine bir parçayı 5 dakikada üretmektedir ve 1000 makine de olsa 1000 parçayı yine 5 dakikada üretecektir.

Lütfen sıradaki soruları bu mantığa göre çözünüz.

- 4) 10 makine 10 parçayı 10 dakikada üretiyor. Buna göre 50 makine 50 parçayı kaç dakikada üretir?

- 5) Bir gölün belli bir alanı nilüfer yapraklarıyla kaplı. Bu alanın büyüklüğü her gün iki katına çıkmaktadır. 48 günde bu alan gölün tamamını kapladığına göre, kaç günde gölün yarısını kaplar?

Açıklama: İnsanlar genellikle bu tip sorulara da sezgisel cevap verme eğilimindedirler. Çoğunlukla insanlar bu soruya “24” cevabını vermektedirler. Halbuki burada da mantık basittir. Eğer bir bardağın içindeki su miktarı her gün iki katına çıkıyorsa, kaç günde tamamen doluyorsa, ondan bir gün öncesinde bardağın yarısı doludur. Yani soruya dönecek olursak, eğer bardak 48 günde doluyorsa 47 günde yarısı doludur. Çünkü her gün iki katı dolduğundan 48 günde tamamının dolması için 47. günde yarısının dolu olması gerekmektedir.

Lütfen sıradaki soruları bu mantığa göre çözünüz.

- 6) Bir gölün belli bir alanı nilüfer yapraklarıyla doludur. Bu alanın büyüklüğü her gün 2 katına çıkmaktadır. Gölün tamamı 64 günde kaplandığına göre gölün yarısı kaç günde kaplanmıştır?
- 7) Bir çalışmaya 1000 kişi katılmıştır. Katılımcılar arasında 5 mühendis ve 995 tane avukat vardır. Mehmet bu araştırmanın katılımcıları arasından rastgele seçilmiştir.

Mehmet 36 yaşındadır. Evli değildir ve biraz içe dönüktür. Boş zamanlarını bilim kurgu okuyarak ve bilgisayar programları yazarak geçirmekten hoşlanır.

Hangisi daha olasıdır?

- a) Mehmet bir avukattır
b) Mehmet bir mühendistir

Açıklama: İnsanlar genellikle bu tip sorulara da sezgisel cevap verme eğilimindedirler. Çoğunlukla insanlar bu soruya “b” cevabını vermektedirler. Çünkü tarifi yapılan kişi kafamızdaki mühendis şemasına uymaktadır. Oysa verilen istatistiki bilgiye dikkat ettiğimizde kolaylıkla görebiliriz ki, kişinin özelliklerinin ne olduğundan bağımsız olarak rastgele seçtiğimiz bir kişinin avukat çıkma olasılığı %99.5’ken mühendis çıkma olasılığı %0.5’tir. Çünkü torbada 995 avukat varken, yalnızca 5 mühendis vardır. Dolayısıyla burada aldatıcı olan kişinin tarif edilirken sezgisel cevaba doğru yönlendirilmesidir. Analitik düşüncesi gelişmiş olan insanlar bu kalıpyargısal tarifi göz ardı ederek verilen temel istatistiksel orana göre seçimlerini yapmaktadırlar. Dolayısıyla burada rastgele seçilen bir kişinin avukat olma olasılığı mühendis olma olasılığından kat ve kat kere daha fazladır. Dolayısıyla doğru cevap “a” seçeneğidir.

Lütfen sıradaki soruları bu mantığa göre çözünüz.

8) Bir alıřmaya 1000 kiři katılmıřtır. Katılımcılar arasında 4 anaokulu ğretmeni ve 996 tane genel mdr vardır. Ayře bu arařtırmanın katılımcıları arasından rastgele seilmiřtir.

Ayře 37 yařındadır. Evlidir ve 3 ocuęu vardır. Kocası ise veterinerdir. Kendisini ailesini adamıřtır ve ocuklarıyla her zaman gnlk izgi film řovlarını izlemektedir.

Hangisi daha olasıdır?

- c) Ayře genel mdrdr.
- d) Ayře anaokulu ğretmenidir.

9) Bir alıřmaya 1000 kiři katılmıřtır. Katılımcılar arasında 996 erkek, 4 tane de kız ocuk vardır. Deniz bu arařtırmanın katılımcıları arasından rastgele seilmiřtir.

Deniz 13 yařındadır. Deniz'in favori konusu sanattır. Deniz'in yapmaktan en ok hořlandığı řey ise alışveriş yapmak ve okuldaki dięer ocuklarla ilgili dedikodu yapmak iin arkadařlarına yatıya gitmektir.

Hangisi daha olasıdır?

- c) Deniz bir kız ocuęudur.
- d) Deniz bir erkek ocuęudur.

APPENDIX R

IDEOLOGY MANIPULATIONS

Liberal Ideology Condition

New York Üniversitesi'nden Prof. Trevor Mountcastle klasik makalesinde sol-kanat politik ideolojilere olan ihtiyacımız hakkında aşağıda özetlenen fikirleri savunmaktadır.

Sol-kanat Politik İdeolojiler ve Geleceğimiz

Sol ve sağ kavramlarını hep duymaktayızdır ancak her birinin ne anlama geldiğine genellikle dikkat etmeyiz. Bunun yerine kendi ideolojik duruşumuz dışında bir şeyle karşılaştığımızda otomatik bir şekilde karşı çıkma eğiliminde oluruz. Örneğin gençliğimde ateşli bir sağ-kanat, muhafazakâr politikalar savunucusu olan ben, geldiğim noktada sol-kanat, evrenselci değerlere olan ihtiyacımızın farkına varmış bulunmaktayım. Örneğin, milliyetçilik ya da kendi grubundan olan birisini kayırmak ve dış-gruptan olan insanlara karşı bilerek ya da bilmeyerek önyargılı olmak evrensel barış açısından büyük bir sorun teşkil etmektedir. Çünkü eğer her milletin vatandaşları kendi ülkesini ve milliyetini kayırırsa, evrensel bir barıştan söz etmeyi geçtim, uzun vadede savaşı engellememiz bile mümkün gözükmemektedir. Örneğin, tarih kendi milliyetini ve dinini üstün kılmaya çalışan ülkelerin ve insanların savaş hikâyeleriyle doludur.

Bunun dışında, sol-kanat ideolojilere sahip olan insanlarla sağ-kanat ideolojilere sahip olan insanları birbirinden ayıran en önemli özellik solcuların yeni tecrübeler ve deneyime açık olmalarıdır. Sağcılar ise var olan durumu ve statükoyu (mevcut durumu) korumayı ve muhafaza etmeyi tercih etmektedirler. Ancak yeni deneyimlere açık olmak ve beraberinde gelişen merak duygusu bugün geldiğimiz noktada insanlık olarak bizi geliştiren ve belki de günün birinde evrene yayılmamızı sağlayacak motivasyona karşılık gelmektedir. Başka bir ifadeyle, insanlık olarak ilerlememiz için değişime ve tecrübeye açık olmaya ve teknolojik gelişmelere yol açacak meraka ihtiyacımız vardır.

Tüm bunlara ek olarak, insanlar arası eşitsizliğin ve toplumda evi olmayan ve sokakta yaşayan insanların varlığı, daha eşitlikçi bir toplumsal düzen kurmamızın zorunluluğunu bize göstermektedir. Her ne kadar tarihte bu ideallerin radikal versiyonlarını görsük de (Sovyetler), sol kanat değerler aslında insan olmamızın gereği olan eşit doğmak ve eşit bir şekilde yaşamak ideallerinin temsilini oluşturmaktadır.

Bu yüzden, her ne kadar kendi ideolojik duruşlarımız olsa da, sol-kanat ideolojilerin ortaya koyduğu değerlerin önemine dikkat etmemiz gerekmektedir. Çünkü insan ırkının geleceğini barış içinde garanti altına almak istiyorsak, sol-kanat ideolojilere mensup olan kişilerin özellikleri olan “merak”, “yaratıcılık”, “toleranslı olma”, “çeşitliliklere saygı” ve “açık fikirli olma” gibi özelliklere ihtiyacımız olduğunun farkına varmamız gerekmektedir.

Özeti verilen bu makaledeki görüşü ne ölçüde benimsiyorsunuz?

- 1...Kesinlikle katılmıyorum
- 2...Pek katılmıyorum
- 3...Ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum
- 4...Biraz katılıyorum
- 5...Kesinlikle katılıyorum

Conservative Ideology Condition

New York Üniversitesi'nden Prof. Trevor Mountcastle klasik makalesinde sağ-kanat politik ideolojilere olan ihtiyacımız hakkında aşağıda özetlenen fikirleri savunmaktadır.

Sağ-kanat Politik İdeolojiler ve Geleceğimiz

Sağ ve sol kavramlarını hep duymaktayızdır ancak her birinin ne anlama geldiğine genellikle dikkat etmeyiz. Bunun yerine kendi ideolojik duruşumuz dışında bir şeyle karşılaştığımızda otomatik bir şekilde karşı çıkma eğiliminde oluruz. Örneğin gençliğimde ateşli bir sol-kanat, ilerici politikalar savunucusu olan ben, geldiğim noktada sağ-kanat, düzeni sağlayıcı değerlere olan ihtiyacımızın farkına varmış bulunmaktayım. Örneğin, deneyime açık olmak ve her türlü farklılığa toleranslı olmak toplumsal düzen ve uyum açısından büyük tehlikeler oluşturabilir. Çünkü eğer dışarıdan gelen her yabancı uyarana karşı güvenli bakar ve gerekli önlemleri almadan etkileşime girersek, gelebilecek potansiyel tehlikelere karşı da savunmamız kalmış olabiliriz. Örneğin tarih, farklı kültürlerin üyeleriyle ilk iletişime geçtiğinde yerliler tarafından umduğu misafirperver karşılığı bulamayan insanların kötü hikâyeleriyle doludur.

Bunun dışında, sağ-kanat ideolojilere sahip olan insanlarla sol-kanat ideolojilere sahip olan insanları birbirinden ayıran en önemli özellik sağcıların sosyal düzene olan ihtiyaçları ve mevdut durumu devam ettirme güdüleridir. Solcular ise var olan durumu ve statükoyu (mevcut durumu) değiştirmeyi ve yerine her seferinde farklı bir toplumsal düzen kurmayı istemektedirler. Ancak uygarlık olarak bugün geldiğimiz noktada sosyal düzene olan ihtiyacımız, insanlık olarak bizi geliştiren ve belki de günün birinde mükemmel bir sosyal düzen içerisinde yaşamamızı sağlayacak motivasyona karşılık gelmektedir. Başka bir ifadeyle, insanlık olarak ilerlememiz için kargaşa ve kaos oluşmasını engellememiz ve toplumsal düzeni ve uyumu savunmamız gerekmektedir.

Tüm bunlara ek olarak, toplumdaki suç oranının giderek artması toplumsal düzeni sağlamak açısından daha sert politikalar içeren daha muhafazakâr tedbirlere olan ihtiyacımızı bize göstermektedir. Her ne kadar tarihte bu ideallerin radikal versiyonlarını görsek de (Naziler), sağ kanat değerler aslında insan olmamızın gereği olan düzenli bir toplumda huzur içinde yaşamak ideallerinin temsilini oluşturmaktadır.

Bu yüzden, her ne kadar kendi ideolojik duruşlarımız olsa da, sağ-kanat ideolojilerin ortaya koyduğu değerlerin önemine dikkat etmemiz gerekmektedir. Çünkü insan ırkının geleceğini huzur içinde garanti altına almak istiyorsak, sağ-kanat ideolojilere mensup olan kişilerin özellikleri olan “geleneksellik”, “düzene olan ihtiyaç”, tehlikelerin farkına varmak için “kapalı olma”, “disiplin” ve “sorumluluk duygusu ile hareket etme” gibi özelliklere ihtiyacımız olduğunun farkına varmamız gerekmektedir.

Özeti verilen bu makaledeki görüşü ne ölçüde benimsiyorsunuz?

- 1...Kesinlikle katılmıyorum
- 2...Pek katılmıyorum
- 3...Ne katılıyorum ne katılmıyorum
- 4...Biraz katılıyorum
- 5...Kesinlikle katılıyorum

APPENDIX S

UNIVERSALISM AND TRADITIONALISM

Aşağıda bazı kişiler kısaca betimlenmiştir. Lütfen her betimi okuyun ve bu kişilerin size ne kadar benzediğini ya da benzemediğini düşünün. Betimde verilen kişinin size ne kadar benzediğini göstermek için sağdaki kutucuklardan sizce uygun olanı işaretleyiniz. Rakamların anlamları aşağıdaki gibidir.

- 1-Bana hiç benzemiyor 2-Bana benzemiyor 3-Bana çok az benziyor
4-Bana az benziyor 5-Bana benziyor 6-Bana çok benziyor

1- Dünyada herkesin eşit muamele görmesinin önemli olduğunu düşünür. Hayatta herkesin eşit fırsatlara sahip olması gerektiğine inanır.	1	2	3	4	5	6
2- Kendisinden farklı olan insanları dinlemek onun için önemlidir. Onlarla aynı fikirde olmadığında bile onları anlamak ister.	1	2	3	4	5	6
3- İnsanların doğayı korumaları gerektiğine gönülden inanır. Çevreye bakıp güzelleştirmek onun için önemlidir.	1	2	3	4	5	6
4- Dünyadaki bütün insanların uyum içinde yaşaması gerektiğine inanır. Dünyadaki bütün gruplar arasında barışın güçlenmesi onun için önemlidir.	1	2	3	4	5	6
5- Herkese, hatta hiç tanımadığı insanlara bile adil muamele yapılmasını ister. Toplumdaki zayıfları korumak onun için önemlidir.	1	2	3	4	5	6
6- Doğaya uyum sağlamak ve onla kaynaşmak onun için önemlidir. İnsanların doğayı değiştirmemesi gerektiğine inanır.	1	2	3	4	5	6
7- Sahip olduğundan daha fazlasını istememenin önemli olduğunu düşünür. İnsanların sahip olduklarıyla yetinmeleri gerektiğine inanır.	1	2	3	4	5	6
8- Dini inanç onun için önemlidir. Dininin gereklerini yerine getirmek için çok çaba harcar.	1	2	3	4	5	6
9- İşleri geleneksel yollarla yapmanın en iyisi olduğunu düşünür. Öğrendiği gelenek ve görenekleri devam ettirmek onun için önemlidir.	1	2	3	4	5	6

10- Alçakgönüllü ve kibirsiz olmak onun için önemlidir. Dikkatleri üzerine çekmemeye çalışır.	1	2	3	4	5	6
11- İnsanların kendilerine söylenenleri yapmaları gerektiğine inanır. İnsanların her zaman, hatta başkaları izlemiyorken bile kurallara uymaları gerektiğini düşünür.	1	2	3	4	5	6
12- Her zaman uygun şekilde davranmak onun için önemlidir. İnsanların yanlış diyeceği şeylerden kaçınmak ister.	1	2	3	4	5	6
13- Ana-babasına ve yaşlı insanlara her zaman saygı göstermesi gerektiğine inanır. Onun için itaatkâr olmak önemlidir.	1	2	3	4	5	6
14- Başkalarına karşı her zaman nazik olmak onun için önemlidir. Başkalarını hiçbir zaman rahatsız ve huzursuz etmemeye çalışır.	1	2	3	4	5	6
15- Onun için güvenli bir çevrede yaşamak önemlidir. Güvenliliği tehlikeye sokabilecek her şeyden kaçınır.	1	2	3	4	5	6
16- Ülkesinin güvende olması onun için çok önemlidir. Devletin içeriden ve dışarıdan gelebilecek tehditlere karşı uyanık olması gerektiğini düşünür.	1	2	3	4	5	6
17- Eşyaların düzenli ve temiz olması onun için önemlidir. Ortalığın dağınık ve kirli olmasından hiç hoşlanmaz.	1	2	3	4	5	6
18- Hastalanmaktan kaçınmak için çok çaba gösterir. Sağlıklı olmak onun için önemlidir.	1	2	3	4	5	6
19- İstikrarlı bir hükümetin olması onun için önemlidir. Sosyal düzenin korunması konusunda endişelenir.	1	2	3	4	5	6

APPENDIX T

CONSENT FORM

Katılımcı Bilgi Ve Onam Formu

Araştırmayı destekleyen kurum: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Psikoloji Bölümü
Araştırmanın konusu: Sosyal Tutumlar Araştırması
Araştırmacının adı: Onurcan Yılmaz ve Doç. Dr. Adil Sarıbay
Adres: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, Psikoloji Bölümü, 34342 Bebek-İstanbul
E-posta: onurcanyilmazz@gmail.com (Onurcan Yılmaz)
Telefonu: 444 79 97 /1455

Proje konusu: Bu araştırmada kişilerin sosyal olgulara karşı tutumuyla bir takım bilişsel değişkenlerin ilişkisi incelenmektedir. Çalışmada doğru veya yanlış cevap yoktur. Sizden istediğimiz kendinize en yakın hissettiğiniz cevapları işaretlemenizdir.

Onam: Bu çalışma bilimsel amaçlarla yapılmaktadır. Çalışma süresince toplanan veriler anonim olarak değerlendirilecek ve araştırmanın hiçbir aşamasında isimler kullanılmayacaktır. Sonuçlar kişisel bilgileriniz ile eşleştirilmeyecek, araştırma sonucunda herhangi bir kişisel değerlendirme yapılmayacaktır.

Çalışma yaklaşık 35 dakika sürecektir. Bu araştırmaya katılımınız karşılığında size PSY 101 dersinden 1 kredi verilecektir. Çalışmaya katılmanız tamamen isteğe bağlıdır. Bu formu imzalamama ve çalışmaya katılmama hakkınız her zaman geçerlidir. Formu imzalasanız dahi kendinizi rahat hissetmediğiniz an çalışmayı bırakabilirsiniz. Bu durumda, kredi alma hakkınızı kaybetmeyeceksiniz ve sizden almış olduğumuz veri yok edilecektir.

Veriler isimler veya okul numaralarıyla eşleştirilmeden bilgisayar ortamında saklanacak ve ham veriler araştırmacılar dışında kimsenin ulaşamayacağı bir dolapta saklanacaktır.

Yapmak istediğimiz araştırmanın size risk getirmesi beklenmemektedir. Araştırmanın ileride diğer araştırmacılara ve bu alanda çalışan bireylere yarar sağlaması muhtemeldir.

Bu formu imzalamadan önce sormak istediğiniz bir soru varsa lütfen deneyi yapan kişiye sorunuz. Daha sonra sorunuz olursa, Onurcan Yılmaz'a (E-mail: onurcanyilmazz@gmail.com) sorabilirsiniz. Araştırmayla ilgili haklarınız konusunda INAREK'e danışabilirsiniz.

Bana anlatılanları ve yukarıda yazılanları anladım. Bu formun bir kopyasını aldım. Çalışmaya katılmayı kabul ediyorum.

Adı Soyadı:.....

Öğrenci Numarası:

İmzası:.....

Tarih (gün/ay/yıl):...../...../.....

APPENDIX U

DEBRIEFING FORM

Katılım Sonrası Bilgi Formu

Bu çalışma Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Psikoloji Bölümü Yüksek Lisans öğrencisi Onurcan Yılmaz'ın Doç. Dr. Adil Sarıbay danışmanlığında yürüttüğü bir çalışmadır. Bu çalışmada, katılımcıların, politik görüşleriyle düşünme tarzları arasındaki bağlantı incelenmektedir.

Yapılan araştırmalar, kendini muhafazakar ve liberal olarak tanımlayan katılımcıların farklı tarzda ve farklı hızda düşünme stillerine sahip olduklarını göstermektedir (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, Sulloway, 2003). Fakat bu araştırmaların çoğunluğu korelasyonlara dayanmaktadır ve dolayısıyla bize politik görüşle düşünme stilleri arasında doğrudan bir nedensel ilişki olup olmadığı ve varsa bu ilişkinin ne yönde olduğu hakkında bilgi vermemektedir. Biz bu projede deneysel olarak ideolojinin mi bilişsel tarzları yoksa bilişsel düşünme tarzlarının mı ideolojik tercihlerini etkilediğini inceliyoruz.

Bu çalışma kapsamında sizden toplanan veri ile isminiz asla eşleştirilmeyecek; elde edilen veriler ve bilimsel bilgiler kimseyle paylaşılmayacak, yalnızca akademik ve bilimsel sunum ve yazılarda kullanılacaktır.

Çalışmanın sonuçlarını öğrenmek ya da bu araştırma hakkında daha fazla bilgi almak için aşağıdaki isime başvurabilirsiniz. Bu çalışmaya katıldığınız için teşekkür ederiz.

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