

ERZURUM- PULK OIL CONCESSIONS:
DISCOVERY of OIL in the MINDS and the LANDS of the OTTOMAN EMPIRE

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Thesis Abstract

Behice Tezçakar, “Erzurum-Pülk Oil Concessions: Discovery of Oil in the Minds and the Lands of the Ottoman Empire”

The story of oil in the Ottoman Empire is not limited to the rich oil reserves in Mosul and Bagdad. The administration of the period of Abdulhamid II had to deal not only with great powers that were after rich oil reserves but also with modest entrepreneurs who dreamt of setting up smaller oil wells. This thesis focuses on this other, overlooked aspect of the story of oil, i.e., on the granting of a concession for a small oil field that put in motion the huge apparatus of the State.

The aim of the study is to analyze the impact of the (discovery of) oil in Erzurum Pülk on the actors of the system’s institutions, such as the Sublime Port, the Council of State and the Fourth Army, as well as their perception of the oil concession applicants and their identities. More than to contribute to the history of oil, the main concern of the study is to sound the State mechanisms taking place both from the point of view of the relationship between the different structures within the administration of the era of Abdulhamid II and in terms of its center-periphery relationship. It therefore analyses the role played by institutions like the Sublime Porte, the Council of State and the Fourth Army in the State’s decision-making process. This thesis argues that rather than adopting a protectionist policy in relation to the Pülk oil, Abdulhamid II prefers to use it as a tool for his planned rapprochement between an Ottoman Empire now reduced to the position of a peripheral State, and the German Empire, which is in the position of a Central power.

Instead of the usually mentioned tension between the Sublime Porte (the formal government) and the Yıldız Palace (the Sultan), this case study shows the Sublime Porte and the Yıldız Palace agreeing on a decision that is opposed by a coalition made up of the Council of State, the Fourth Army and the Anatolia General Development Inspector, who, to a certain extent, take on the role of protectors of local interests against the foreign policy objectives of the Yıldız Palace.

Finally, the place occupied by the oil of Pülk in the minds turns out to be much more important than the one it occupies in the actual well. In a word, in its attempt to provide another perspective on the Hamidian era by approaching it through the correspondence concerning the Pülk oil concessions, it has added a few shades to the general picture of the said era.

Key Words: Oil, Erzurum, Pülk, concession, Abdulhamid II, Carl Reiser, the Council of State, the Sublime Port, the Fourth Army, center-periphery.

Tez Özeti

Behice Tezçakar, “Erzurum- Pülk Petrol İmtiyazları: Petrolün Osmanlı Zihninde ve Topraklarında Keşfi”

Osmanlı İmparatorluğu petrolünün hikâyesi sadece Musul ve Bağdat’taki zengin petrol madenleri ile sınırlı değildir. II. Abdülhamid devri yönetim mekanizması zengin petrol kaynaklarının peşinde koşan büyük devletlerin yanı sıra, küçük petrol kuyularının hayalini kuran mütevazî müteşebbislerle de muhatap olmuştur. Bu tez petrol hikâyesinin arka planda kalan diğer yönüne, küçük bir petrol kaynağının büyük devlet aygıtını harekete geçiren imtiyaz sürecine odaklanmaktadır.

Çalışma Erzurum Pülk petrol varlığının Bab-ı Âli , Şura-yı Devlet, Dördüncü.Ordu gibi sistem aktörlerinin zihinlerinde yarattığı etkiyi, petrol imtiyazına talip olan şahısların kimliklerine dair algıyı çözümlemeyi hedeflemektedir.

Tezin asıl amacı petrol tarihine katkıda bulunmaktan ziyade, petrol imtiyaz yazışmalarının analiziyle II. Abdülhamid devri yönetim mekanizmasının gerek kendi merkezi içindeki, gerekse merkez- çevre arasındaki ilişkiye bakmak, Bâb-ı Âli, Şura-yı Devlet, Dördüncü Ordu gibi kurumların devletin karar alma mekanizmasında oynadıkları rolü araştırmaktır.

Tezin iddiası II. Abdulhamid’in Pülk petrolünü korumacı politik tarzıyla ele almak yerine; çevre ülke konumunda bulunan Osmanlı Devletini merkez devlet Alman İmparatorluğuna yaklaştırma aracı olarak kullanmış olduğudur.

Bu çalışmada bilinen Bâb-ı Âli -Yıldız gerginliğinin yerine beraber hareket eden Yıldız – Bâb-ı Âli ikilisinin aldığı karara direnen Şura-yı Devlet -Dördüncü Ordu ittifakı dikkat çekmektedir. Şura-yı Devlet, Dördüncü Ordu ve *Anadolu Islahatı Umumi Müfettişinin*, Yıldız’ın dış politika hedeflerine karşı yerel faydanın görece koruyucusu rolünü üstlenme iddialarından söz edilmektedir.

Sonuç olarak, Pülk petrol varlığının zihinlerdeki yoğunluğunun kuyudakinden çok daha fazla olduğu gözlemlenmiştir.

Genel olarak tez, yeni bir perspektif olarak II. Abdülhamid devrine Pülk petrol imtiyaz yazışmaları noktasından bakmış olmakla beraber devre dair bilinen fotoğrafın tekrar çekilmesini sağlamıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Petrol, Erzurum, Pülk, imtiyaz, II. Abdulhamid, Carl Reiser, *Şurâ-yı Devlet*, *Bâb- Âli*, Dördüncü Ordu, merkez-çevre.

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Abbreviations of Hicri and Rumi Months

B. Receb

BOA. Bařbakanlık Osmanlı Arřivi (The Prime Ministry Ottoman Archives)

C. Cemaziülahir

Ca. Cemaziülevvel

Ka. Kanun-i evvel

K. Kanun-i sani

L. Őevval

M. Muharrem

N. Ramazan

R. Rebiülahir

Ra. Rebiülevvel

S. Safer

Ő. Őaban

T. Teřrin-i sani

Ta. Teřrin-i evvel

Z. Zilkade

Za. Zilhicce

Abbreviations of Archival Documents

A.}MKT.MHM	Sadaret Mektubi Mühime Kalemi Evrakı
DH.EUM.LVZ	Dahiliye Nezareti Emniyet-i Umumiye Levazım Kalemi
DH.EUM.MH	Dahiliye Nezareti Emniyet-i Umûmiye Müdüriyeti Muhasebe Kalemi
DH.EUM.SSM	Dahiliye Nezareti Emniyet-i Umumiye Seyr ü Sefer Müdüriyeti
DH.İD	Dahiliye Nezareti İdare
DH.MKT	Dahiliye Nezareti Mektubi Kalemi
HR.HMŞ.İŞO	Hariciye Nezareti İstişare Odası
HH.THR	Hazine-i Hassa Tahrirat Kalemi
İ.DH	İrade Dâhiliye
İ.HUS	İrade Hususi
İ.PT	İrade Telgraf ve Posta
İ.RSM	İrade Rusumat
İ.ŞD	İrade Şurayı Devlet
İ.TAL	İrade Taltîfât
İ.MMS	İrade Meclis-i Mahsus
MV	Meclis-i Vükela Mazbataları
Y.A.HUS	Yıldız Sadaret Hususî Maruzat Evrakı
Y.A.RES	Yıldız Sadaret Resmi Maruzat Evrakı
Y. MTV	Yıldız Mütenevvi Maruzat
Y.PRK	Yıldız Perakende Evrakı
YPRK.OMZ	Yıldız Perakende Orman Maadin Ziraat Nazareti Maruzatı
Y. PRK.TKM	Yıldız Perakende Tahrirat-ı Ecnebiye Ve Mabeyn Mütercimliği
ZB	Zabtiye

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

“Oilmen are like cats; you can never tell from the sound of them whether they are fighting or making love.”

Calouste Gulbenkian¹

The story of petrol is inseparable from the history of imperialism. “The experience of imperialism is a series of multiple and simultaneous cultural and political contestations and exchanges that transcend binary oppositions such as: modernity/tradition, center/periphery.”²

Subject

Throughout the ages human beings have always needed energy sources for their manufacturing purposes. While man power was the main source that provided energy at first, gradually animal power, water and wind power were also used. Until the Industrial Revolution and its use of steam energy, 85 % of the energy used for production was provided by living creatures.³

The industrialization and mechanization of the western world brought with it a new, mineral, source of power, oil. Since the late nineteenth century, oil has played

¹ Anthony Sampson, *The Seven Sisters: The Great Oil Companies and the World They Shaped*. (New York: Bantam Books, 1976), p. 70.

² Isa Blumi, *Rethinking the late Ottoman empire: a comparative social and political history of Albania and Yemen 1878-1918*. (Istanbul: Isis, 2003), p.16.

³ Charles Issawi, “Technology, Energy, and Civilization: Some Historical Observations,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 23, no. 3 (August 1991), p. 281.

a strategic role as a shaping factor of the world's destiny. The open-ended story of the international struggle to control the vast oil resources of the Middle East finds its roots in the imperial territories of Ottoman Sultan, Abdülhamid II.

One of the most critical moments of world geo-strategic rivalries (in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries) had to do with the taking over of Ottoman oilfields situated in the area ranging from Asia Minor to the Arabian Peninsula. In those days, nobody really knew why the Great Powers turned their attention to the Middle East. In the nineteenth century, technology was not advanced enough to render oil detection possible. Visible evidences for oil, such as seepages, were commonly observed on Ottoman lands. The territories of the Empire accounted for most of the oil reserves in the region at the time. The presence of Ottoman oil intensified imperialist competition. From then on, Ottoman territories became a matrix for the oil industry, and of the struggles related to it.

While the question of energy became a pivotal and determining factor of the international agendas around the world, the Ottoman Empire was undergoing significant political and social changes. Its ruler Abdülhamid II had inherited much instability. In a nutshell, the gradual demise of the empire was caused by a sequence of historical developments, including the great geographic discoveries, the industrial revolution and the rise of modern capitalism in Europe. Following the mercantilist period, the rising capitalist system gradually transformed the Ottoman Empire from a traditional economic center into a periphery of the new world system. As is typically the case of a peripheralized economy, the Ottoman Empire was becoming not only a market for the industrial goods of the center, but also a reserve of raw materials. The latest and most promising raw material, or rather source of energy after coal, oil, was also discovered in the Ottoman territories in 1887. By this time, Sultan Abdülhamid

II, who was well aware of the risks of disintegration of the empire,⁴ was trying to implement a policy which, in some ways, was a reformist one, in the hope of slowing down this process. In actual fact, rather than a reformist, Abdülhamid was an inventive “image maker”⁵ and a pragmatic ruler who knew something about managing the international balance of the time. The Sultan’s greatest efforts however were geared toward the centralization of the Empire.⁶

The Ottoman Empire had a long tradition of centralizing policies, which depended on a complex and elaborate institutional network.⁷ Conflicts often arose and had in fact always existed between the center and the periphery. The autonomy of peripheral social actors was generally limited to *de facto* forms of power. The gap between the center and the periphery perdured also during the Ottoman modernization.⁸ Besides the Sultan’s well known attempts to keep the powers on

⁴ Şerif Mardin says that the frightening realization of their decline by the Ottomans in the eighteenth century provided the driving force behind all of the reforms. Şerif Mardin, *the Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas* (Syracuse NY: Syracuse University Press, 2000), pp. 153-154. The first realization of the decline initially triggered the reflex to reform the old institutions. Reforms were then attempted in almost all areas. Roderic H. Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963), p.19

⁵ For detailed information see: Selim Deringil, *the Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1909* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1998).

⁶ The Ottoman Empire suffered from problems such as the land losses of the nineteenth century, rebellions arising from the effects of accelerating nationalism and the weakening of the central government.⁶ Bernard Lewis, *Emergence of Modern Turkey*, 2nd ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 54-55. The centralization efforts were started in the era of the Mahmut II. The palace and the bureaucracy were of the opinion that the necessary reforms, and thus development, could not be realized before the “*Ulema*” (the educated class of Muslim legal scholars) and “*Society*” pair in the center on the one hand, and the “*Ayan*” (notable) local potentates in the periphery on the other hand were eliminated. The reform movements began with the strengthening the central government.⁶ (*Ibid.*, pp. 77-79). For detailed information see: Kemal Beydilli “Küçük Kaynarca’dan Yıkılışa.” In *Osmanlı Devleti Tarihi*, edited by Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, (İstanbul: Feza Gazetecilik, 1999.), v. 1, pp. 64-135.

⁷ Şerif Mardin, “Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics.” In *Political Participation in Turkey: Historical Background and Present Problems*, edited by Engin D. Akarlı, Gabriel Ben-Dor (İstanbul: Boğaziçi University Publications, 1975), pp. 7- 33.

⁸ *Loc. cit.*

their toes as to his true intentions in terms of international affairs, he had to play the same game within the empire.⁹

In the third quarter of the nineteenth century, the pressure of the periphery on the center of the Empire increased even more.¹⁰ One of the channels through which the relations between center and periphery found their expression was the issue of oil concessions.

Requests for the exploitation and operation of oil concessions were of course submitted from peripheral areas such as Aydın, Erzurum, Tekirdağ, İskenderun, or Fersan to the Ottoman central government. The efforts to obtain oil concessions and the related investigations in this respect constituted an occasion for the reestablishment of relationships and networks between the agents of the center and those of the periphery for the redefinition of their reciprocal role.

The center and periphery relationship created by the oil concessions consisted of two layers. One concerned the interaction of the center and periphery in the Ottoman Empire. But there was also a second type of center-periphery relations, this time between a center formed by some of the European states, especially Germany and Britain, and a periphery consisting of the Ottoman state.

A new world order came into being in Europe with the advent of the age of technology. It was a dynamic process in the sense that centers of hegemony and their relative strength changed over time, while peripheral states, which had remained passive and dependent at one point were able to move towards a position of power

⁹ Stephen Duguid, "The Politics of Unity: Hamidian Policy in Eastern Anatolia," *Middle Eastern Studies* 9, no. 2 (May 1973), p. 153.

¹⁰ Mardin, *art. cit.*, pp. 7-33.

parity with the more active and dominant states.¹¹ The Ottoman Empire, which had moved from the center to the periphery, needed Germany for support. There were many dynamics and instruments behind this kind of partnership. Oil sometimes acted as a reason, sometimes as a point of mediation, and sometimes as the soft underbelly of this type of a partnership.

While trying to throw some light on some significant aspects of oil, I will first simplify the issue by breaking it down to a few basic questions. When was the importance of the world's newest and most powerful energy source realized by the Ottomans? Who were the first fortune seekers? Did the identities of these fortune seekers have an effect on the continuation or rupture of their adventure? Were the Ottomans slow in taking action? Were they late in trying to exercise control over this resource? Who were the real agents of the oil discoveries?

What was the role of the Ottoman government in this story of oil? What were the attitudes of central and local actors towards the presence of oil in Pülk village? How did Abdülhamid and his bureaucrats use their administrative and political power to control oil issues?

Why Late Ottoman History? Why Oil?

G. Barraclough claims that the period that has initiated the problems of today's world corresponds to that of the 1890s.¹² The continuity between the period and the present and its deep relationship with contemporary problems is one of the factors that force us to analyze the critical period of 1875-1910. This is because researchers frequently

¹¹ Engin Deniz Akarlı, "The Problems of External Pressures, Power Struggles, and Budgetary Deficits in Ottoman Politics under Abdülhamid II (1876–1909): Origins and Solutions" (PhD diss., Princeton University, 1976), p. 208.

¹² Geoffrey Barraclough, *an Introduction to Contemporary History* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1967), p. 10.

tend to show a tendency to choose subjects that affect “the present”, which is the period they are living in, and even the future of their “present”.

Many parameters can be used to determine the “importance” of any event in history. However, when the situation is observed from the point of view of general acceptance, events which affect many people in the long term are attributed the adjective “important”. One of the reasons “oil” is chosen as a subject is its importance in terms of such long term effects.

The fact that oil still affects the world we live in today has thus perforce become the driving force of this study. This point, in other words, the fact that oil occupies an important place in today’s minds, constitutes the greatest difficulty of my thesis while it is the driving force behind it. This is because we, as the product of the period, conditions and culture we live in, can never claim to have a groundless unbiased “perception” of past events. The researcher¹³ ultimately is a person of his age and can only analyze the past from the point of view of today.¹⁴ The contiguity of the said “past”, makes it even harder to see the “facts” clearly. The remoteness of the interval however, enables us to see the whole rather than a part of it.

¹³ Although, Carr used the “historian” concept rather than that of researcher we have not found it suitable here to call ourselves historian.

¹⁴ Edward Hallet Carr. *Tarih Nedir*. Translated by Misket Gizem Gürtürk. (Istanbul: Birikim Yayınları, 1980), p. 34.

The Place of the Study in the Research Literature

In the context of the current research literature, this thesis presents the first attempt to analyze the Erzurum Oil Concessions. What happened within the Ottoman Empire concerning oil concessions other than those of Mosul and Baghdad has never been much studied in the literature. No study addressing all of the oil concessions granted in the Ottoman lands or concentrating on the oil concessions in a given area other than Mesopotamia has been done to this date.

The most comprehensive study on this subject is *Osmanlıda Neft ve Petrol* by Volkan Ediger and published in 2006¹⁵. He pursued an effort to draw a general frame for the subject. Idris Bostan had addressed the issue in the context of a case study concerning the first oil well drilled in Ottoman territories. Mining engineers, who have explored possible oil presence on Turkish soil and were thus also involved in the history of oil, approached the subject from a technical perspective. Non-specialist populist writers, who handle the oil topic in a nationalist manner, have written on the basis of assumptions filled with ideological concerns rather than preparing studies that would fill the gaps in the research literature.

The analysis of the oil concessions obtained on Ottoman soil is quite an extensive subject. For this reason, and by way of a start, the subject of this study shall be treated within the framework of the oil concessions of the village of Pülk, in the province of Erzurum. This thesis is the first work that focuses on the Erzurum Pülk oil concession.

Another point that must be specially made is that this study aims to contribute to the literature on the Hamidian era rather than to the literature of the history of oil.

¹⁵ Ş.Volkan Ediger. *Osmanlı'da Neft ve Petrol: Enerji Ekonomi-Politiği Perspektifinden* (Ankara: ODTÜ Geliştirme Vakfı Yayıncılık, 2005).

What is New in this Research?

The presumed existence of oil in the region caused many agents both in the center and the periphery to develop strategies. The process for the obtaining of a concession constitutes a case that reflects - besides their point of view on the subject-the relationship between agents of the central authority, and the agents of the periphery, who have their own self determined agenda. The oil concession, which was a resource sharing process, became an instrument in the determination of authority and rights.

In the literature, the subject is dealt with as if oil exploitation on Ottoman soil was done only in Mosul and Baghdad. As a subject matter, the study refers to the efforts of Sultan Abdülhamid II¹⁶ to try and keep control of rich oil resources despite local difficulties as well as those related to the great powers' policies aimed at benefiting from the rich oil wells exclusively. However, there is another aspect to the oil story. Among the underground resources of the Empire there were not only large oil fields, but also modest, even small ones. Abdülhamid II did not only sit with representatives of the great powers who pursued the rich Mosul oil resources, but also met with the modest entrepreneurs who dreamed of exploiting smaller oil fields.

This study focuses on a small oil field. The Pülk oil field analyzed in this study is not exploited today. Inspection reports state that it is not a rich source. The lands where this well is located have not been snatched away from the Ottoman state. Moreover unlike those in Mosul, the concession of the well was not taken under special protection against the German Empire by Abdülhamid II. On the contrary, it

¹⁶ "The titles of the Mosul and Baghdad oil fields were in the Civil List of Sultan Abdulhamid in the beginning of the twentieth century." Edward Mead Earle, "The Turkish Petroleum Company-A Study in Oleaginous Diplomacy," *Political Science Quarterly* 39, no. 2 (June 1924), p. 266.

was given to a German subject by the Sultan himself. This thesis attempts to conceptualize this issue, which has not been treated before.

The Conceptual and Methodological Framework

As a subject matter of the case study, the Pülk oil concessions are treated on a chronological basis to provide a general picture.¹⁷

The issue of oil concessions, of which we shall attempt to deal with only one case here, is a multi-layered, multifaceted issue that awaits to be researched and interpreted. During the archival research one document follows another. The issue shall remain incomplete even if the research is methodologically classified by areas. Different agents take the stage and different historical dynamics take place, each offering a different story.

Since this study is only a Master's thesis, the issue has been narrowed down as much as possible, so as to focus on a single area, that of the Erzurum-Pülk oil concessions. The method chosen is to proceed with a single story in an effort to maintain the internal consistency of the subject and in order to be able to better analyze the documents at hand. A connection was established between the foreign policy of Abdulhamid II and the political, economic and social conditions of the Erzurum province, in relation with the concession stories. Moreover this connection was drawn from the correspondence that documents the concession establishment process.

¹⁷ Actually applying a research method of analyzing the history backwards starting from today (retrospective method) would have been quite suitable but the limits of the study do not permit this.

The subject will be approached through an examination of the relations between the central government and the Erzurum province, specifically during the 1880s-1910s periods.

The study is divided into two separate sections methodologically. The center and periphery concepts shall assist us in defining the agents. Thus, while in Chapter IV it is mostly the Center's oil perception that is dealt with, in Chapter V, we will look into the periphery's perception of the oil issue.

Literature and Sources

This study heavily relies on unpublished primary source documents obtained from the Ottoman State archives. The material used in the first two chapters was obtained from the following collections:

Yıldız Perakende Arzuhal ve Jurnal (Y.PRK. AZJ), Yıldız Perakende Evrakı Tahrirat-ı Ecnebiye ve Mabeyn Mütercimliği (Y.PRK.TKM), Yıldız Perakende Evrakı Orman Maadin Ziraat Nezareti Maruzatı (Y.PRK.OMZ), Yıldız Perakende Evrakı Arzuhal ve Journaller (Y.PRK.AZJ), Yıldız Mütenevvi Maruzat (Y. MTV), Yıldız Sadaret Hususî Maruzat Evrakı (Y.A.HUS), Yıldız Sadaret Resmi Maruzat Evrakı (Y.A.RES), Dahiliye Nezareti İdare (DH.İD), Dahiliye Nezareti Emniyet-i Umûmiye Müdüriyeti Muhasebe Kalemi (DH.EUM.MH), Dahiliye Emniyet-i Umumiye Seyr ü Sefer Müdüriyeti (DH. EUM. SSM.), Dahiliye Emniyet-i Umumiye Levazım Kalemi (DH. EUM. LVZ), İrade Hususi (İ. HUS), İradeler Meclis-i Mahsus (İ. MMS), İrade Şurayı Devlet (İ.ŞD), İrade Taltîfât (İ.TAL.), Hariciye Nezareti İstişare Odası (HR. HMŞ. İŞO.), Hariciye Nezareti Tercüme Odası (HR. TO).

The forth and fifth chapters, which constitute the main sections of the study, are based on the correspondence that took place between official authorities

concerning the Erzurum Pülk oil concessions. Four of these texts were taken from the Yıldız Archive, and three of them were taken from the Ministry of the Interior. The first three documents were classified in the *Perakende Evrak* section of the Yıldız Collection. The first of these three documents is a technical report which was sent to the Sublime Porte by the Ministry of Forestry, Mines and Agriculture (Y.PRK.OMZ 8 June 1898).

The second document is a text accompanying the files about the concession region, which were sent to the Council of State by the Ministry of Forestry, Mines and Agriculture, and in which an opinion was asked (YPRK. OMZ 19 June 1898).

The third document contains a text written by Rıza Pasha, the commander-in-chief of the 3rd Branch of General Staff Department, (*Erkan-ı Harbiye Dairesi 3. Şubesi Sersakeri*) in response to the Council of State, together with the articles of the oil concession (YPRK. OMZ 5 July 1898).

The fourth document is one of the *Mütenevvi Maruzat Evrakı* which is included in the Yıldız collection. It was sent to the *Mabeyni Hümayun Başkitabeti* (Head Secretariat of the Imperial Palace) by the Fourth Army (Y.MTV 9 October 1905).

The fifth, sixth and seventh documents were taken from the *Dahiliye Nezareti İrade-i Dahiliye* (Directorate of Internal Affairs archives of the Ministry of the Interior). The fifth document was sent to the Ministry of the Interior via the District Head (Kaza Reisi) by artillery major who was on a duty in Erzurum (DH.ID 6 October 1910).

The sixth document was written to the Erzurum Province by Mehmed Nazım, Secretary of the Correspondence Division of the Public Department of the Ministry

of the Interior (*Dahiliye Nezareti Muhaberatı Umumiye Dairesi Şube Müsevvidi*) (DH.İD 8 October 1910).

The seventh document was sent to the Ministry of Interior by the Governor of Erzurum (*Erzuzum Vilayeti Tahrirat Kalemi*) (DH.İD 6 November 1910).

Copies of these seven archival documents, which constitute the basis of the study, can be found in the Appendices. Particular emphasis is put on the official concession negotiations, together with their individual actors, for the sake of the analysis of the case.

It is impossible to say whether these documents, which were taken from the Prime Ministry Ottoman Archives, can fully depict the perceptions developed around the Erzurum Pülk oil field. It is certain that archival documents mostly reflect the viewpoint of the State. However, the reason these documents were intensely used is that they reflect the atmosphere on a certain scale and that no other document is available. The study attempts to use the archival documents in the best possible way in view of improving the awareness of these factors.

The secondary sources about the subject can be examined in three groups. In the first group, there is a large amount of literature written on the Period of Abdulhamid.¹⁸ From memoirs¹⁹ to works by orientalists such as Paul Fesch, Joan

¹⁸ İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Midhat Pasha ve Tâif Mahkûmları* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1992); İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Midhat Pasha ve Yıldız Mahkemesi* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1967); İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Midhat ve Rüştü Pashaların Tevkiplerine Dair Vesikalar* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1946); Selim Deringil, *The Ottomans, the Turks, and World Power Politics: Collected Essays* (Istanbul: The ISIS Press, 2000); Selim Deringil, *The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876–1909* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998); Selim Deringil, "Legitimacy Structures in the Ottoman Empire: Abdülhamid II (1876–1909)," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* XXIII, (1991), pp. 345–359; Selim Deringil, "The Invention of Tradition as Public Image in the Late Otoman Empire, 1808 to 1908," *Comperative Studies in Society and History* XXXV, (1993), pp. 1–27. Engin Deniz Akarlı, "The Problems of External pressures, Power Struggle and Budgetary Deficits in Ottoman Politics under Abdulhamid II (1876–1909): Origins and Solutions" (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1976); Kemal H. Karpat, *Ottoman Population, 1830–1914: Demographic and Social Characteristics* (Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985); Kemal H. Karpat, "The Transformation of the Ottoman State, 1789–1908," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 3/3 (1972): 243–281; Stanford J. Shaw, "The Central Legislative Councils in the Nineteenth Century Ottoman Reform Movement before

Haslip and Michel de Grèce²⁰, it is possible to find many works on the Hamidian period, treating themes ranging from “gender”²¹ to education²². On the other hand, books written about the Hamidian period tend to have conflicting opinions. This some times happens even among different sections of the same book.

Moreover, books written on mines and mining in the Hamidian period generally examine a single region and a single case²³. The most important works we used in the literature of the Hamidian period for our thesis, which remains basically a

1876," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 1/ 1 (1970): 51–84; Carter Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Sublime Porte, 1789–1922* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980); H. S.W. Corrigan, “German Turkish Relations and the Outbreak of War in 1914: a Reassessment,” *Past and Present* 36 (1967):144-52; Chapman, M.K. “Great Britain and Baghdad and the Baghdad Railway 1888-1914,” *History* XXXI (1948); Lucy Mary Jane Garnett, *Turkey of the Ottomans* (New York: Scribner's, 1911); Charles Issawi, *The Economic History of Turkey, 1800–1914* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); M.S. Anderson, *Eastern Question, 1774–1923* (London: MacMillan Press, 1966); Eric Zürcher, “Reactionary Despotism or Culmination of Reform? The Reign of Abdülhamid II,” in *Turkey: A Modern History* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1993); Stanford Shaw, “Sultan Abdülhamid II: Last Man of the Tanzimat.” In *Tanzimat'ın 150. Yıldönümü Uluslararası Sempozyumu Bildirileri* (Ankara: Milli Kütüphane Yayınları, 1989), pp. 179–197.

¹⁹ İsmet Bozdağ, *Abdülhamid'in Hatıra Defteri: Belgeler ve Resimlerle* (İstanbul: Kervan Yayınları, 1975). Some of them were written in Otoman Language: Ahmed Saib, *Abdülhamid'in Evail-i Saltanatı*. (Kahire, 1326); “Hatırat-ı Abdülhamid-i Sani” *Utarid* 1/6 (Kanunisani 1335).

²⁰ Joan Haslip, *The Sultan: the Llife of Abdul Hamid* (London: Cassell, 1958)

²¹ Elizabeth B. Frierson, "Unimagined Communities. State, Press, and Gender in the Hamidian Era" (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1996); Elizabeth B. Frierson, "Mirrors out, Mirrors in, Domestication and Rejection of the Foreign in Late-Ottoman Women's Magazines (1875-1908)." In *Women, Patronage, and Self-Representation in Islamic Societies*, edited by D.Fairchild Ruggles (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000), pp. 177–204.

²² Benjamin Carr Fortna, "Islamic Morality in Late Ottoman 'Secular' Schools," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 32 (2000), pp. 369-393; Benjamin Carr Fortna, “Education for the Empire: Ottoman State Secondary Schools During the Reign of Sultan Abdülhamid II (1876-1909)” (Ph.D. diss., The University of Chicago, 1997); Mehmet Ö. Alkan, "Modernization From Empire to Republic and Education in the Process of Nationalism." In *Ottoman Past and Today's Turkey*, edited by Kemal Karpat (Leiden: Brill, 2000), pp. 47–132; Selçuk Akşin Somel, *The Modernization of Public Education in the Ottoman Empire, 1839–1908: Islamization, Autocracy, and Discipline, The Ottoman Empire and its Heritage*, v. 22. (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2001).

²³ For instance: Donald Quataert, *Miners and the State in the Ottoman Empire: the Zonguldak Coalfield, 1822–1920* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2006); Fahrettin Tızlak, *Osmanlı döneminde Keban-Ergani Yöresinde Madencilik, 1775–1850* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1997); İdris Bostan, "Osmanlı Topraklarında Petrolün Bulunuşu ve İskenderun'da İlk Petrol İşletme Çalışmaları," *Coğrafya Araştırmaları* 1/2 (1990), pp.129–135; M. Bülent Varlık, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Madenlerde Çalışma Koşulları Üzerine Bir Derleme* (Ankara: A.İ.T.İ.A Gazetecilik ve Halkla İlişkiler Yüksek Okulu Basımevi, 1981).

case study, are: *Anadolu Islahâtı ve Ahmet Şakir Pasha*, written by Ali Karaca on Eastern Anatolian policy,²⁴ and *Rethinking the Late Ottoman Empire: a Comparative Social and Political History of Albania and Yemen 1878-1918* by Isa Blumi²⁵, and *Frontiers of State in the Late Ottoman Empire: Transjordan* by Rogan²⁶ and *Fin de siècle Beirut: the Making of an Ottoman Provincial Capital* by Hanssen²⁷, and *Administration of Iraq 1890-1908*,²⁸ by Gökhan Çetinsaya. Çetinsaya makes a general commentary on the late Ottoman provincial administration and draws an overall picture of the nature of its interaction with provincial society, having gathered and analyzed an abundance of complex documents from the Ottoman archives. The clues given by this pioneering work on how the central administration perceived the province, on the relationship between the central administration and the province, as well as on the latter's own dynamics were considerably helpful for us in framing the present thesis.

The case studies mentioned above exhibit different approaches to the center-periphery paradigm as applied to the Ottoman Empire. This paradigm, which constitutes one of the main arguments of the present work, retains its relevance in researches and theoretical works on the Ottoman Empire. It was created in the early

²⁴ Stephen Duguid, "The Politics of Unity: Hamidian Policy in Eastern Anatolia," *Middle Eastern Studies* 9 (1973), pp. 139–155; Ali Karaca, *Anadolu Islahâtı ve Ahmet Şakir Pasha, 1838–1899* (İstanbul: Eren, 1993); Bayram Kodaman, *Sultan II. Abdülhamid Devri Doğu Anadolu Politikası* (Ankara: Türk Kültürü Araştırma Enstitüsü, 1987).

²⁵ Isa Blumi, *Rethinking the Late Ottoman Empire: a Comparative Social and Political History of Albania and Yemen 1878-1918*, (Istanbul: Isis, 2003).

²⁶ Eugene L. Rogan, *Frontiers of State in the Late Ottoman Empire: Transjordan* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

²⁷ Jens Hanssen, *Fin de siècle Beirut : the Making of an Ottoman Provincial Capital* (Oxford: Clarendon Press ; Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2005)

²⁸ Gökhan Çetinsaya, *Ottoman Administration of Iraq, 1890–1908*. (London; New York: Routledge, 2006).

1960s by Edward Shils and picked up and transposed to Ottoman studies by Şerif Mardin, and has influenced historical and social sciences in Turkey ever since.²⁹

Particularly useful for the present thesis was Sherif Mardin's article: "Center-Periphery Relations." In this article, Mardin considers the center as representing the future of the periphery and the periphery as representing the past of the center.³⁰

The second group of the secondary sources related to the subject consists of the literature on oil. A great deal of the material written on oil and its history is based on English sources.³¹ One of the most comprehensive and the most noteworthy of these sources is the study by Marian Kent.³² Kent focuses on German-British oil rivalry in the Ottoman Empire.

This study, where oil plays a major role, focuses on Pre-World War I Ottoman Mesopotamia. Especially the third section called "Early Rivalries for the Mesopotamian Oil Concession" was helpful due to its approach on the oil concessions, the way it reveals Abdülhamid's awareness and in terms of enriching

²⁹ Nadir Özbek, "İmparatorluk Tartışmalarında Radikal Bir Açılım" (A Radical Opening on the Issue of the Empire) *Virgöl* (101) 2006: 14–16

³⁰ Mardin, Şerif. "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics." In *Political Participation in Turkey: Historical Background and Present Problems*, edited by Engin D. Akarlı, Gabriel Ben-Dor. (Istanbul: Boğaziçi University Publications, 1975), pp. 7- 33.

³¹ R.L. Buell, 'Oil Interests in the Fight for Mosul,' *Current History* 17, no. 6 (March 1923), pp. 931–938; J. Carter, 'The Bitter Conflict over Turkish Oilfields,' *Current History* 33 (Jan 1926), pp. 497–497; E.M. Earle "The Turkish Petroleum Company: a Study in Oleaginous Diplomacy," *Political Science Quarterly* XXXIX (1924), pp. 265–79; Zangeneh Azami, *Le Pétrole en Perse*. (Paris, 1933); Alwyn Parker, "The Baghdad Railway Negotiations" *The Quarterly Review* 288 (October 1917), pp. 487–528; H. Woodhouse, 'American Oil Claims in Turkey' in *Current History* 15 (March 1922), pp. 953–954; Daniel Yergin, *The Prize: the Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991); E. Mahmud Sami, *The Quest for Sultan Abdülhamid's Oil Assets: His Heirs' Legal Battle for their Rights* (Istanbul: Isis Press, 2006) V.H. Bérenger, *La Politique du Pétrole*. (Paris, 1920) . D.C. Blaisdell, *European Financial Control of the Ottoman Empire* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1929).

³² Marian Kent, *Oil and Empire: British Policy and Mesopotamian Oil, 1900–1920* (London: Macmillan, 1976)

our understanding on his foreign policy. The book by Longrigg was especially useful in relation to the history of oil and its earliest uses in the Middle East.³³

Although *Maden Tetkik ve Arama Enstitüsü Dergisi* (Mineral Research and Exploration Institute Magazine) approaches the subject from a technical perspective, it has turned out to be one of the important sources this thesis benefited from³⁴. The article by Kemal Lokman³⁵ is a comprehensive work which provides a good summary of the information existent at the time on oil studies related to Anatolia.

The article by Tülay Duran entitled “Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda İmtiyazlar “Zımpara-Kükürt-Petrol (Neft) ve Molibden madenleri İmtiyazları,” (Concessions in the Ottoman Empire: Emery-Sulphide-Oil (Naphtha) and Molybdenum Concessions) published in the *Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi* seems to be directly related with our

³³ Stephen Hemsley Longrigg *Oil in the Middle East: Its Discovery and Development* (London: Oxford U.P, 1968). A financial analysis of Middle Eastern oil concessions in relation to petroleum industry and trade can be found in Zuhayr M. Mikdashi's *A Financial Analysis of Middle Eastern Oil Concessions, 1901–65* (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1966). See also George Lenczowski, *Oil and State in the Middle East* (Ithaca, N.Y. : Cornell University Press, 1960).

³⁴Some of the articles in MTA magazine on the subject are as follows: C.E. Taşman, “Türkiye’de Bitümlü Tezahürlerin Stratigrafik Yayımı,” *Maden Tetkik ve Arama Enstitüsü Dergisi* 40 (1950), pp. 41–50; C.E. Taşman, “Petrol aramaları; 1923’den Evvel ve Sonra,” *Maden Tetkik ve Arama Enstitüsü Dergisi* (1938), pp. 69–76; C.E. Taşman, “Mürefte’de Petrol Aramaları,” *Maden Tetkik ve Arama Enstitüsü Dergisi* 5 (1936), pp.17–22; N. Egeran “Kömürden Petrol,” *Maden Tetkik ve Arama Enstitüsü Dergisi* 12 (1936), pp. 19–26; C.E. Taşman, “Van Gölü Civarında Korzot Petrolü,” *Maden Tetkik ve Arama Enstitüsü Dergisi* 18 (1936), pp. 41–44; MTA Editör, “Yakın Şark’ın Merkez Haline Gelmesi,” *Maden Tetkik ve Arama Enstitüsü Dergisi* 21 (1936), pp. 56–62; MTA Editör, “Dünya Hampetrol Mevcudu,” *Maden Tetkik ve Arama Enstitüsü Dergisi* 7 (1937), p. 51; MTA Editör, “Balkanlar’da Petrol Araştırmaları,” *Maden Tetkik ve Arama Enstitüsü Dergisi* 9 (1937), p. 55–56; C.E. Taşman, “Trakya Jeolojisi Hülasası İle Trakya Petrol Aramaları Durumu,” *Maden Tetkik ve Arama Enstitüsü Dergisi* 12 (Temmuz 1938), pp.14–19; C.E. Taşman, “Cenubi Türkiye’de Petrol İhtimalleri,” *Maden Tetkik ve Arama Enstitüsü Dergisi* 15 (Nisan 1939), pp. 17–20; MTA Editör, “Mısır’da Petrol Aramaları,” *Maden Tetkik ve Arama Enstitüsü Dergisi* 96 (1939), pp. 93–97; C.E. Taşman, “Adana Petrol Sondajı’nın Hususiyeti,” *Maden Tetkik ve Arama Enstitüsü Dergisi* 20 (Nisan 1940), pp. 244–247; MTA Editör, “Irak Petrolü,” *Maden Tetkik ve Arama Enstitüsü Dergisi* 24 (1941), pp. 391–39; C.E. Taşman, “Trakya ve Petrol,” *Maden Tetkik ve Arama Enstitüsü Dergisi* 34 (1945), pp. 336–342; K. Lokman, “Kürzot Petrol Madeni ve Havalisi,” *Maden Tetkik ve Arama Enstitüsü Dergisi* 35 (1946), pp. 95–101; MTA Editör, “Orta Şark Petrolleri,” *Maden Tetkik ve Arama Enstitüsü Dergisi* 38 (1948), pp. 91–102; K. Kurtman and M. Akkuş, “Doğu Anadolu’daki Ara Basenler ve Bunların Petrol Olanakları,” *Maden Tetkik ve Arama Enstitüsü Dergisi* 77 (1971), pp. 1–9; A. Gedik, “Erzurum Havzası’nın Jeolojisi ve Petrol Olanakları,” *Maden Tetkik ve Arama Enstitüsü Dergisi* 103, (1948), pp. 1–24.

³⁵ Kemal Lokman, “Türkiye’de Petrol Arama Amacıyla Yapılan Jeolojik Etütler,” *Maden Tetkik ve Arama Enstitüsü Dergisi* 72 (1969), pp.219–247.

subject. However, despite its heading's reference to concessions given to the companies and individuals in Ottoman territories between 1887 and 1919, the article unfortunately discusses only the oil concessions given between 1913 and 1917.

The number of books which can be considered of a popular character is greater than that of academic publications. The discourse of the ideological background and intellectual environment which the writers belong to and their perceptions create fertile ground for arguments when it comes to the historiography of the period of Abdülhamid II's reign that has become a center of debate. When this is coupled with concerns like oil, which affects today's world economically, politically and even socially, things gets even more problematic.

Too many people who just believe and insist on believing (without investigation) that "there is oil in these territories", clinging to an illogical and baseless sentimentalist approach, continue to write books which bring no significant contribution to the literature. They should be more critical in their examination of the history of oil, rather than reporting conventional viewpoints.

Almost all researchers, in or outside the academy, who focus on the period of Abdülhamid II or the history of oil do not show the slightest curiosity for what happened regarding oil in Ottoman territories outside Mesopotamia. One of the goals of this thesis is to try to awaken such a curiosity, however slightly.

Overview of the Thesis

The present study is divided into four chapters. The first two chapters are meant to provide the historical background. The first chapter deals with etymology, pre-industrial history and different uses of oil. In addition, it investigates the meaning of oil, its areas of usage in the nineteenth century, and the place it occupies in daily life

and in the political agenda of the Hamidian era. Also covered are respectively the first oil concession in the Ottoman Empire, the most important oil concession in the Ottoman Empire, the other regions for which oil concession were requested, as well as portraits of concession applicants, in order to set the perception of oil in its context. From the first to the last, all applications to obtain oil concessions are classified.

The second chapter draws a picture of the province of Erzurum in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This chapter provides historical background for the understanding of some of the issues and problems of this province. It will briefly describe the historical conditions under which the official and local perceptions of Pülk oil evolved.

Abdülhamid is known to have attempted to establish a total control on the Ottoman State structure as well as the country's natural resources, including oil. In the last two chapters, we will try, to the extent that the official correspondence and papers allow to understand and to bring to light the official and individual attitudes and opinions developed in response to the evidence of the existence of oil reserves in the Pülk village of the Tercan district of the province of Erzurum.

In the third chapter, we will look at the official attitudes the center developed in response to the evidence of the existence of oil reserves in the Pülk region from the perspective of Ottoman governmental agencies and bodies such as the General Staff, the Council of State (*Şurâ-yı Devlet*) and the Sublime Porte (*Bâb- Âlî*) , including their attitudes towards the personal identities of the individuals who applied to obtain a concession for the purposes of exploiting the oil reserves in the Pülk region.

Lastly, we will look at and analyze the issue from the perspective of an artillery major's mental world, in order to determine the peripheral attitudes developed in reaction to the information regarding the evidence of the existence of oil reserves in Erzurum. In this context, we will hold a mirror to the economic and psychological atmosphere of the period together with the major's perception of the situation in relation to the State and the civilization he lived in.

As Blumi has expressed: "ethnicity, the state, faith, social class, geographic location... all are powerfully asserted factors determining the nature of analysis practitioners can make when looking into the past."³⁶ The writings of M. A. enable us to confirm the factors mentioned above in our approach of Erzurum and the oil of Pülk. They tell the story of "history's silenced millions."³⁷

It is certain that this effort to understand the prevailing psychology from the perspectives of individual people, following the impact created in the minds and its development owing to the existence of oil reserves, shall unavoidably remain a relatively modest effort, due to the difficulty in reaching and accessing past documents belonging to ordinary people. Nonetheless, the official correspondence and papers reflect the existence of two different conceptions during the period when the Ottoman center was going through a process of decomposition into competing groups. Based on this fact, we will try to analyze and explain events rather than presenting and narrating them in a story like manner. I have approached this task not as a specialist but as an inquiring M.A. student.

³⁶ Blumi, p.13.

³⁷ Blumi, p.80.

CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

“The Middle East without oil would be a very different region. In addition to changing the face of large parts of the area, oil has helped shape the policies of the Middle East - not only within but also with the world's great powers.”³⁸

This thesis forms a part of a larger project aiming to analyze the history of the oil concessions on all Ottoman territories, including Anatolia and the Balkans, in the light of center-periphery relations. The first intent of the present thesis is to depict the place oil occupied in Ottoman minds and their concept of oil. For this we must first comprehend what exactly “oil” meant in the 1880s-1910s.

Etymology (in Ottoman Language – *Neft- Nafta*)

Liquid and gaseous hydrocarbons are so intimately associated in nature that it has become customary to shorten the expression “oil and natural gas” to “oil” when referring to either of the two. The word oil is used in the English language today, but it was the word petroleum (literally “rock oil” from the Latin “petra”, “rock” or “stone” and oleum, “oil”) that was first used in the West, in 1556, in a treatise published by the German mineralogist Georg Bauer, known as Georgius Agricola.³⁹

The word “*naphta*” which means “inflammable liquid distilled from oil, “has been used since the 1570s and after”.⁴⁰ It is thought to be derived both from Latin and Greek, in which it meant ‘bitumen’. The word “*neft*” means ‘pitch’ in Persian,

³⁸ Peter R. Odell, “The Significance of Oil,” *Journal of Contemporary History* 3, no. 3 (1968), p. 93.

³⁹ *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 2003 ed., s.v. “Oil.”

⁴⁰ Online Etymology Dictionary. 09 November 2007. Available [online]: “<http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?l=n> [09 November 2007]

and the words “*naphtha*”, “*nephta*” in the Aramaic language also mean ‘pitch’.⁴¹ The word “*neft*” was introduced in the Ottoman language from Persian. It was used to describe ‘turpentine’.⁴²

Naphtha oil, in other words, petroleum or oil⁴³ is a complex mixture of hydrocarbons that occurs on the Earth in liquid, gaseous, or solid forms.⁴⁴ The term is often restricted to the liquid form, commonly called “crude oil”, but as a technical term it also includes natural gas and the viscous or solid form known as bitumen. The liquid and gaseous forms of oil constitute the most important of the primary fossil fuels.⁴⁵ As of the twenty-first century, Tatar Turks still use the word “*Neft Oil*” for oil, while some Turkish intellectuals still use “*Neft Yağı*” rather than petrol, the other more common word for oil in modern Turkish.⁴⁶

Pre-Industrial Uses of Oil

Although the development of modern oil industry starts with the first oil well drilled by Drake in the year 1859 in Titusville, Pennsylvania, oil has been especially known in the Near East regions since very ancient times. *Naphtha* can be found in the eye sockets of the sculpture of the Sumerian Emperor Adab. Babylonian king Nebuchadnezzar used it to fix the ends of the 112 meters long bridge that he had built on the Euphrates. The Babylonian queen Samurais also had the tiles of the walls of the 1000 meter long tunnel dug under the Euphrates smeared with bitumen. The

⁴¹ *Loc. cit.*

⁴² Ferit Devellioğlu, *Osmanlıca Türkçe Lügat*. (Ankara: Aydın Kitabevi,1999), p. 818.

⁴³ Petr – oil.

⁴⁴ Encyclopaedia Britannica Online. [2007]. *Petroleum*. Available [online]:“<http://icproxy.sabanciuniv.edu:2092/eb/article-9110438>” [2007].

⁴⁵ *Loc .cit.*

⁴⁶ Oktay Sinanoğlu, *Bir New York Rüyası ‘Bye Bye Türkçe’*. (İstanbul: Alfa Basım, 2007), pp.166 – 168.

ancient Greek historian Herodotus mentions that *naphtha* bubbles together with water naturally from the ground at the site of the Hit, at eight days' distance from Babylon. The Iranian writer Abul Hasan Mesud mentions black oil emerging from the mouth of a stream near Phoenicia, in Anatolia.⁴⁷ Human beings have noticed oil seeping out of the ground and used it since ancient times.

People in the Middle East were already trading in oil long before the Christian era. Passages of the Old Testament mention the usage of oil and the presence of oil and gas seepages in different parts of the Middle East. It is said that Noah's ark was smeared with pitch and bitumen both inside and outside. Sources like cuneiform scripts from kings and tradesmen, texts of ancient historians including Herodotus and recent excavations show us that although the amounts available due to the methods of obtaining it were different, seepages were processed and used in large quantities in many areas. Traders exported oil from Mesopotamia. It was generally used for waterproofing in medicine, and mortar in constructions and sometimes to light lamps.⁴⁸

A Middle East oil industry was already established by the eighth century, when the streets of the newly founded city of Baghdad were covered with tar produced from oil that was easy to obtain from the fields of the region. Persian people distilled oil. In the ninth century chemicals like kerosene were produced by

⁴⁷ For oil formation, surface signs and earliest uses in the Middle East see: Stephen Hemsley Longrigg, *Oil in the Middle East: Its Discovery and Development* (London: Oxford U.P., 1968), p.10 "In Turkey traces of hydrocarbon substances occur of the Bosphorus, inland from the Black Sea coast, in the neighborhood of Alexandretta, Antalya, Van, Diyarbakır, Siirt and elsewhere in widely scattered localities"

⁴⁸ George Roy Leblicher, Rentz and Max Steineke, *Arabian American Oil Company*. Aramco Handbook (New York: Arabian American Oil Company, 1960), p. 97; R. J. Forbes, *Studies Early Petroleum History* (Leiden: E.J.Brill, 1958), pp. 5–13.

the chemist Al-Razi.⁴⁹ Oil fields were exploited in present Baku and other parts of Azerbaijan, as described by the geographer Masudi in the tenth century. The same fields were described by Marco Polo in the thirteenth century as having an output of hundreds of shiploads. Marco Polo also reports that people living north of Persia collected oil from natural seepages and used it as an ointment to cure their camels' skin diseases. He says that oil was "not good to use with food" he noted, but was good to burn.⁵⁰

Oil: Late 1800s - Early 1900s (After the Industrial Revolution)

Until the middle of the nineteenth century, crude oil was gathered from deposits formed where it seeps up naturally from the earth. Since *naphtha* seeped to the sources where the animals drunk or wells dug to obtain salt water, it was often seen as an annoying, undesirable substance. Around 1850, A.C. Ferris followed by S.M. Kier started the first effort to use oil as lamp oil in America. Afterwards George Bissell and Jonathan Eveleth, who were two lawyers in New York, founded an oil exploration company in Pennsylvania and appointed Edwin L. Drake who was a retired railway constructor to drill an oil well near the small town of Titusville, in Pennsylvania. Drake hit upon oil at the depth of 21 meters on 27 August 1859. Soon he was taking out 8 barrels and eventually 20 barrels daily. Since oil was a safer and cheaper lamp oil source than the one obtained through a risky task like whale hunting, it found a ready market. The oil rush era had now begun.⁵¹

⁴⁹ Ajram, Kasem. 11 January 2008. *Alchemy and chemistry in Islam*. Available[online]: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alchemy_\(Islam\)](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alchemy_(Islam)) [11 January 2008].

⁵⁰ David White, "Outstanding Features of Petroleum Development in America," *AAPG Bulletin* 19, no. 4, (1935), pp. 469–502.

⁵¹ J.T. Henry, *History of Petroleum* (Philadelphia: Burt Franklin, 1873), p. 47

Naphta is a very dark colored natural rough mineral oil formed of hydrocarbons with a density ranging between 0.8 and 0.95 g/ml and with a distinctive slight smell. Petroleum, or oil, didn't become important as a power source till the beginning of the twentieth century. At present, various products are obtained from the refining and treating of oil like gas (refined gas, propane, and butane), fuel (gasoline, premium gasoline, reactor fuel, paraffin), dissolvent, diesel oil, fuel oil, diesel fuel, lubricating oils, kerosene, bitumen and oil coke.⁵²

The use of *naphta* went through several stages in connection with developments in science: The first one is the “gas oil (paraffin)”⁵³ period, which lasted from 1860 to 1895. At this stage, in which gas oil was obtained without distillation, gas oil lamps were used. The second one is the “petroleum oil” period, lasting between 1885 and 1890. During this second period, oil began to be used in industry and homes. Gasoline engines were invented in 1890 and diesel engines in 1910. The years 1900 – 1914 correspond to “the gasoline period”. From then on, oil was used in automobiles and the exploration of new oil sources was accelerated.⁵⁴

Commercial oil production began in the 1850s. A million tons of oil was produced in 1892, and ten million tons were produced in 1890. By the year 1913, oil was supplying 6% of the world's energy needs.⁵⁵ In a sense, before the Ottoman

⁵² Tülay Duran, “Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda İmtiyazlar: Zımpara-Kükürt-Petrol (Neft) ve Molibden Madenleri İmtiyazları,” *Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi* 3, no. 57 (Ekim 2001), p. 63.

⁵³ Paraffin (Gas oil): In 1850, Scottish scientist James Young discovered the method of obtaining paraffin from a rock called shale. Young proved that the paraffin could be used in lamps instead of vegetable oil or whale oil. Paraffin which is called kerosene in chemistry has mainly two types. The first is used in oil lamps, gas heaters and heaters; whereas the second type is used as fuel in the engines of some tractors and small fishing boats. The paraffin used in the engines of the jet aircrafts belongs to the second type.

⁵⁴ Duran, p. 63.

⁵⁵ Charler Issawi, *Oil, the Middle East and the World* (New York: The Library Press, 1972), p. 2.

Empire disintegrated, oil had begun to enter seriously into the agenda, especially of those countries which had benefited from the industrial revolution.

Naphta in the Ottoman Empire (Before the Hamidian Era)

“*Aktar*” or “*Attar*”, herb and spice seller, were found in all cities of the Ottoman Empire. These purveyed herbal remedies and products but also dispensed health advice of various kinds⁵⁶. A variety of medical names pertaining to oil and oil products such as “*karabaş yağı*”, which stands for lavender oil from *lavandula stoechas* or “*neft yağı*” spirits of turpentine, were available during the Ottoman era between the sixteenth and the eighteenth centuries.⁵⁷ Presumably these drugs were also provided by the aktars, and their Turkish names suggest that they came from Anatolia or other parts of the Ottoman Empire.

Neft oil was used as a means to produce weaponry, in both the Ottoman and the Byzantine Empire. There are documents that mention the use of *neft* oil during the conquest of Istanbul.

Once the news that ore had been found anywhere in Anatolia or Rumelia reached the palace, a sufficient amount of sample was brought to the centre to identify its type. As soon as it was understood that mining would be advantageous, the inhabitants of one or two populated settlements in the surrounding were exempted from the tax and became *küreci*, that is, miners. Every kind of facility was provided for the miners. Governors or judges couldn't intervene in their work. When

⁵⁶ R. Murphey, “Ottoman medicine and transculturalism from the 16th through the 18th century,” *Bulletin of Historical Medicine* 66, (1992): 376–403.

⁵⁷ Andreas Lardos, "The Botanical Materia Medica of the Latrosophikon: A Collection of Prescriptions from a Monastery in Cyprus," *Journal of Ethnopharmacology* 104, no. 3 (2006): 387–406.

they had court cases, they were tried by *maden eminleri* (mine bailees) so that their work would not be interrupted. It was not permitted to have their trials in Istanbul or any other province. The mines were frequently assaulted by bandits. Strong lords or tribes that inhabited the environs were appointed to ensure the safety and continuity of the works.⁵⁸

The Danish explorer Carsten Niebuhr, who passed by Kirkuk in 1766, mentions in his travel book that there was tar and oil somewhere near Kirkuk. The first concession for Kirkuk oil was given to the Neftcizade family through an imperial edict issued in 1640, during the reign of Sultan Murad IV.⁵⁹ The territorial limits of the field, where oil was found, were also defined on the imperial edict. After the date of 14 June 1748, the *naphtha* use and sale was subjected to *Öşr-i Neft* (Ottoman tax on crude oil).⁶⁰

In a study published in 1854 by the British Geology Association, William Kenneth Loftus, who was a technical advisor on the commission that established the Turkish – Iranian border, mentioned that there were bitumen sources in limestone near the fortress of Van. Before William Kenneth Loftus, Evliya Çelebi had recorded information on the occurrence of oil at the fortress of Van. Evliya Çelebi wrote about *naphtha* (oil) gushing out of rocks and flowing into a big pool near the fortress of Van, which he visited during his travels to Kurdistan: “With God’s order, turpentine mineral comes out of one of the caves, and flows out of the rock and pours into a big pool. When the pool fills up, it is sold to the dealers through the district treasurer of

⁵⁸ Ahmed Refik Altınay, *Osmanlı Devrinde Türkiye Madenleri, 967–1200* (İstanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1931), pp. 5–8

⁵⁹ Nazmi Sezgen, “Kerkük Türkleri I,” *Belgelerle Türk Tarihi Dergisi* 38, (1970), p. 10.

⁶⁰ *Loc. cit.*

Van. This cave is closed day and night. God forbid! When fire falls on naphtha, they dump earth to put it out.”⁶¹

During the Hamidian Era: Oil in Everyday Life - Its Image

People began to use oil to provide oil for lamps, fuel for burners and gasoline for ships. The Standard Oil Company, which was the strongest of the Seven Sisters,⁶² was exporting oil first to Europe, then to the Middle and Far East. Standard Oil made 70% of its exports to Europe, Middle and Far East in the year 1885. It had hired men and spies all over the world. It was sabotaging the efforts of competitor companies or countries, and used every means to prevent others from getting information before they (Standard Oil) did.⁶³ Considering the fact that the Ottoman Empire was one of the customers mentioned above, it must have sent its spies to the Ottoman territories to try and be the first to identify oil sources there, in compliance to this policy.

From the last quarter of the nineteenth century onwards, the increasing popularity of oil began to be felt on the Ottoman lands as well. It is quite interesting to note that the name of the French vessel which was under the ownership of the

⁶¹ Evliya Çelebi, *Seyahatname*. (İstanbul: Üç Dal, 1986), vol. 3-4, p. 542.

⁶² There were 7 large companies which shared the world oil market together until the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the first quarter of the twentieth century. Five of them were established with the cooperation of the Americans; one of them was established with the cooperation of the English; and one of them was established with the cooperation of the English and the Dutch. They take their names after the seven sisters who were sent to the sky as stars by Zeus, a god in the Greek mythology. According to mythology, these sisters would fight to the bone but come together when a stranger attacked them. The name “Seven Sisters” was first mentioned in a New Jersey Joint Stock Companies Law which was enacted in 1913. Enrico Mattei is known to be the person who spread the name “Seven Sisters” to the entire world.

⁶³ Sampson, Antony, *The Seven Sisters: the Great Oil Companies and the World They Shaped*. (New York: Bantam Books, 1976), p. 31.

French Ambassadorship in Istanbul and imported tobacco to the city was named “Pétrole”.⁶⁴

In the fiscal year of 1318 during the reign of Sultan Hamid (1902) ‘prospecting for oil’ was added to the budget program, along with other usual decisions like cutting back expenses, construction of new factories, reducing imports, maintaining salary levels and making new appointments in order to bring down the budget deficit.⁶⁵ From then on, potential oil revenues became a current subject of budget programs.

Areas of Use: Lighting and Heating

During the Hamidian period, oil became a part of the daily life. Lighting was one of the important areas of oil use. Some of the Istanbul streets of that period were lit up with lamps burning with petroleum gas.⁶⁶ Gas oil (paraffin) was also used for the lanterns used by police officers on their train duty.⁶⁷ Efforts were made to purchase agricultural implements that operated not only with steam but also with oil.⁶⁸ A medium size isolator that operated on oil was even imported for the commodity storage of the Post and Telegraph Administration.⁶⁹ There was significant gas oil consumption in police stations. Periodically two hundred gallons of gas oil were purchased and distributed to these police stations.⁷⁰

⁶⁴ BOA, M. 24/47, 7/M/1305, 25 September 1887.

⁶⁵ BOA, ZB. 45/33, 7/T/1318, 20 November 1902.

⁶⁶ BOA, İ.DH. 936/74121, 28/S/1302, 17 December 1884.

⁶⁷ BOA, DH.EUM.MH 149/29, 05/Ca/1325, 27 January 1907.

⁶⁸ BOA, MV 110/26, 22/B/1322, 2 October 1904.

⁶⁹ BOA, İ..PT 21/1324/S-16, 26/S/1324, 21 April 1906.

⁷⁰ BOA, DH.EUM.MH 257/78, 18/C/1333, 3 May 1915.

Oil Storage- Depots

In October 1885, the Grand Vizierate decided to obviate the oil imports because of the competition between Russia and America, and in order to bring order to the oil depots and increase the tax taken from oil.⁷¹ The construction of an oil depot began in Trabzon, in order to be able to store oil coming from Batum.⁷² Masonry buildings suitable for the storage of oil were built because it had become hazardous to keep the oil in dilapidated buildings near settlements in Yemen.⁷³ Oil extracted in Yemen was kept in special buildings constructed in suitable locations in Hudeyde, Luhayya and Muha.⁷⁴

A dispute aroused between the *Hazine-i Hassa* (Pirvy Purse) and the company in charge of the Port of Izmir on the concession for the construction of oil storage facilities in Izmir.⁷⁵

The Şehremaneti (Municipality) of Istanbul had accelerated the construction of oil reserves.⁷⁶ Permission was given to the Trabzon Province authorities for the construction of a depot for the storage of oil that came to Trabzon from Batum and other locations; as well as for the enclosing of a given area for a year with the provision that expenses would be paid by the traders.⁷⁷

⁷¹ BOA, A.}MKT.MHM 487/42; 10/M/1303, 14 October 1885.

⁷² BOA, DH.MKT 1376/75, 09/S/1304, 24 May 1901.

⁷³ BOA, DH.MKT 2530/153, 27/Ca/1319, 11 September 1901.

⁷⁴ BOA, DH.MKT 2563/121, 21/Ş/1319, 3 December 1901.

⁷⁵ BOA, HR.HMŞ.İŞO 191/57, 17/Ra/1323, 22 May 1905.

⁷⁶ BOA, İ.ŞD 31/1521, 09/C/1293, 2 June 1876.

⁷⁷ BOA, DH.MKT 1387/50, 28/Ra/1304, 25 December 1886.

The concession for the construction of oil storage facilities in Izmir was given by Privy Purse.⁷⁸ A representative of the Mantoshoph Russian Trade Company, named Lokka Esayan Efendi, requested a license to construct an oil reserve and depot at the *Hagia Teryade* location in Izmir.⁷⁹

Ottoman Oil Concessions

Oil concessions could only be obtained through official contracts, an Imperial Concession *Firman* (edict) or by a *permis de recherche* (search permit). The first *permis* were given for a one year period, and if by the end of that time the Ministry of Forestry, Mines and Agriculture approved the completed preliminary exploration, the period would be extended for one more year. The concession *firman* might be granted at the end of this additional period, provided that the minister was satisfied with the activities of the concessionaire and the efficiency of his work.⁸⁰

The Ottoman administration was well aware of the importance of oil and of the possibility of the existence of oil reserves in the Empire. As a matter of fact, the course of historical developments reflects this. Some of the oil reserves were granted under contracts and concession licenses to subjects (*tebaa*) of the Ottoman Empire. In 1870, operations at the Baghdad Mendeli oil reserves began. In the same year, samples received from these reserves were sent to Europe for analysis. It turned out that the quality of the Baghdad Mendeli oil was superior to that of the oil of the reserves in Baku and America. During Midhat Pasha's term in office as governor of Baghdad, a refinery that can be described as modern was established in Baghdad

⁷⁸ BOA, İ.HUS 153/1325/Ra-48, 12/Ra/1325, 25 April 1907.

⁷⁹ BOA, DH.MKT 2723/6, 07/M/1327, 29 January 1909.

⁸⁰ Marian Kent, *Oil and Empire: British Policy and Mesopotamian Oil, 1900–1920* (London: Macmillan, 1976), p. 216

Bakuba.⁸¹ In many other places, reserves were exploited, sometimes with very primitive methods. These oil explorations were superficial by today's standards. Oil bubbled out of the cracks formed at surface levels and these cracks were named wells or reserves. Oil reserve contractors would open the mouths of the oil reserves and dig holes and wells into them. Salt water was filled into the drilled or dug wells, and thus the oil accumulated on the surface where it was collected by hand. The crude oil extracted was sold after being filled into leather bags and carried on donkeys and mules.

The First Oil Concession

The region of Çengen in the vicinity of Iskenderun was the first location to be judged promising for oil drilling in Anatolia. In 1887, a foreign firm conducted about ten shallow drillings and only natural gas was found.⁸² Towards the end of the nineteenth century, oil was found in the Çengen village, in the Kabaev district of Iskenderun which was a district of the Province of Aleppo. The find was definitely confirmed by a test done by the chemist Moreau in Istanbul.⁸³ The first concession to drill for the oil discovered in this Çengen village in Iskenderun was given to Ahmed Necati Effendi in 1889. The oil rights for the vicinity of Çengen were delivered to Ahmed Necati Effendi for 75 years with a contract including 11 articles written according to articles, 61, 62, 63 and 65 of the *Maadin Nizamname* (Mines Regulations).⁸⁴ These concessions were passed on to other entities and firms in the

⁸¹ BOA.HH.THR., 248/19, lef. 26

⁸² Filiz Tutar, *Petrolün Bir Enerji Kaynağı Olarak Türkiye Ekonomisinde Önemi* (Eskişehir: Anadolu Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Yayınları, 1992), p. 28.

⁸³ Cevat E. Taşman, "Petrolün Türkiye'de Tarihiçesi," *Maden Tetkik ve Arama Enstitüsü Mecmuası* 39, (1949), p. 14.

⁸⁴ İdris Bostan, "Osmanlı Topraklarında Petrolün Bulunuşu ve İskenderunda ilk Petrol İşletme çalışmaları," *Coğrafya Araştırmaları* 2, (1990), p. 129.

following years. Finally, 26 years after oil was discovered, all the rights were cancelled and operations interrupted by an Imperial edict, during the First World War.⁸⁵

Mesopotamian Oil

The idea that the oil reserves within the territories of the Ottoman Empire could be exploited for commercial purposes could hardly be conceived before the second half of the nineteenth⁸⁶ century, both in countries outside the region and in the Ottoman Empire itself. Important oil reserves were reported in the 1870s by the French and Germans who had been conducting research in Mesopotamia. However, it was not possible to benefit from these sources of oil because of the Ottoman Empire's economical and political condition at the time.⁸⁷ In 1888 and 1889, Sultan Abdulhamid issued two special decrees, which constituted the first concrete claims on Ottoman oil. It was announced that certain lands like those of the oil regions of Mosul and Baghdad were now the Sultan's personal property. Thus, now being a party to the oil struggle, Sultan Abdulhamid had the right to grant oil concessions.⁸⁸

The Deutsche Bank group – an overseas agent of German power - was granted the operative rights of the Haydarpasha–Ismid (Izmit) railway along with its extension line to Ankara as announced at an Imperial summit in October 1888. An

⁸⁵ *art. cit.*. BOA, MV 241/236, 31 Ka 1331/ 13 May 1889.

⁸⁶ By the end of the nineteenth century, the international oil industry was dominated by a single American holding company, the Standard Oil Company. The latter, however, was much less concerned with acquiring foreign oil deposits than with marketing its products overseas; oil resources were believed to be sufficiently abundant in the U.S.A. Henry Longhurst, *Adventure in Oil, the Story of British Petroleum* (London, 1959), pp. 17-18.

⁸⁷ Stephen Hemsley Longrigg, *Oil in the Middle East: Its Discovery and Development* (London: Oxford U.P., 1968), p. 27.

⁸⁸ Benjamin Swandran, *The Middle East, Oil, and the Great Powers* (New York: Wiley, 1973), p. 195

article concerning the extension of the Ankara line up to Baghdad was another significant part of the concession granted to the bank.⁸⁹ The construction of this German railway project was to last from 1904 till the First World War. The railway concession granted to the Germans was not limited to the railway line, but also involved the possession of the lands the railway passed through and the concession to exploit oil, mines and other natural resources falling within a band ranging 20 km on both sides of the railway line. Also granted was the right to construct modern ports in Baghdad, Basra and the Basra gulf, as well as to locate storage facilities.⁹⁰ The railway project had a special importance for Germany because of economical and safety purposes. German Ambassador Marshall von Biebenstein, then posted in Istanbul, declares this openly in one of his reports:

The doctrine claims that the economy and politics are separate has lost its validity today. The nations with developed economies can increase their political impact; on the contrary, economically underdeveloped countries are weak politically... If Germany continues to increase its economical effectiveness in the East, if it constructs the Haydarpasha Port to accelerate the process to transport German goods with German ships, if the Anatolian Railway Project to Baghdad is implemented as a German initiative, only using the German materials, the saying that ‘the Eastern lands are not worth a single Pomeranian soldier’s bones’ will become a historical memory that has lost its actual reality.⁹¹

However, Abdulhamid canceled the concessions on the grounds that the concessionaires had not acted in compliance with the conditions of the agreement.

Oil concessions granted to German companies were not used.⁹²

⁸⁹ Edward Mead Earle, *Turkey, the Great Powers, and the Bagdad Railway: A Study in Imperialism 1894–1954* (New York: Macmillan, 1923), p. 31.

⁹⁰ Leonard Mosley, *Power Play: The Tumultuous Story of Middle East Oil* (Birkenhead: Willmer Brothers Pub., 1973), p.18.

⁹¹ Murat Özyüksel, “AbdulhamidDönemi Dış ilişkileri” In *Türk Dış Politikasının Analiz*, edited by Faruk Sönmezoglu (İstanbul: Der Yay., 1994), p. 21.

⁹² Cecil W. Wood and C. T. Barber, *Petroleum Times Review of Middle East Oil* .(New York: Petroleum Times, 1948), p. 45.

Thus, upon the failure of Deutsche Bank to timely meet its commitments related to the Hicaz railway, the railway concessions granted were terminated by Abdulhamid. This termination caused panic on Germany, as it realized the risk threatening German capital and investments made in Ottoman territories. As a result, the German Ambassador used the words below to explain the reason of the investments made and the risk taken to Abdulhamid II:

“The German Empire is determined to fully comply with all the agreements signed with the Ottoman Empire. However, the German Empire has certain demands to put this decision into effect; and one of these demands is to be granted concessions for the Mosul oil site.”⁹³

There was strong agitation in the Ottoman bureaucracy during the early 1900s, when the competition over oil was even stronger. There was a military and political opposition group, later called the Committee of Union and Progress, who stood against Sultan Abdülhamid, who had reigned for thirty years. In 1908, the Committee of Union and Progress leaders came into power and overthrew Abdulhamid on 27 April 1909 (Sultan Reşad took his place) following a decision made in Parliament. They also transferred all the lands under the ownership of Sultan Reşad to the State Treasury. French and English institutions were admired while the German State was considered as autocratic and anti-democratic by the men behind the Committee of Union and Progress, many of whom had been educated in Europe. Eventually this change was reflected also on the continuing competition regarding oil concessions. In 1909, Grand Vizier Hilmi Pasha granted the Middle East oil concessions to the D’Arcy Group, supported by the English government⁹⁴. The

⁹³ Raif Karadağ, *Petrol Fırtınası* (Ötüken Yayınevi, 1975) p. 98.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 125.

dethroning of the Ottoman Emperor had seemingly invalidated the concessions granted to German capital. All the agreements on oil were declared null and void since Sultan Abdulhamid had transferred all oil sites under his ownership.⁹⁵

Through the Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Co., the “Shell” group was also active in the region between 1906 and 1910, until Abdulhamid’s government was overthrown and the negotiations interrupted.⁹⁶

In 1908, Rear Admiral Colby M. Chester visited Istanbul with the aim of seeking railway and mining concessions. He had the support of President Theodore Roosevelt.⁹⁷ The Turkish National Bank was formed later in the same year. This event brought peace among the British and German parties in 1911, which led to the formation of the African and Eastern Concessions Ltd. Company, which resumed negotiations with the new Turkish Government. In 1912 the name of the company was changed to Turkish Petroleum Co., with Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Co., having a 25% share.⁹⁸

In 1912 the German party to the Anatolian Railway Company strived to have their old Railway concession confirmed. At the same time, the Royal Dutch-Shell group was trying through its subsidiary, the Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Company, to obtain a concession in Mesopotamia with the help of an Armenian, Sarkis Colouste Gulbenkian⁹⁹, while the American group Chester was also seeking a concession.

⁹⁵ Pelletiere, Stephen. *Iraq and the International Oil System: Why America Went to War in the Gulf*. Washington D.C.: Maisonneuve Press, 2004. p. 33.

⁹⁶ Wood, Cecil W., Barber, C. T. *Petroleum times review of Middle East Oil*. London ; New York, N.Y. : Petroleum Times, 1948. 45.

⁹⁷ Henry Woodhouse, “American Oil Claims in Turkey,” *Current History* 15 (1922), pp. 953-954.

⁹⁸ Wood, Cecil W., Barber, C. T., *Petroleum times review of Middle East Oil*. (London ; New York: Petroleum Times, 1948), p. 45.

⁹⁹ Financial adviser to the Ottoman Government, a millionaire. For the biography of Gulbenkian: Hewins, R. *Mr Five per cent: the Story of Calouste Gulbenkian* (New York: Rinehart &

There were four separate groups seeking concessions in Mesopotamia by 1912: 1) German-Deutsche Bank 2) British-D'Arcy (APOC) 3) Dutch –Anglo Saxon Petroleum Company 4) American Chester Group. The preferred means for obtaining the concession was putting combined pressure on the Turks. Therefore the negotiations were not carried on between the Turkish Government and the groups trying to obtain the concessions, but between the Turkish Government and the German and British Governments.¹⁰⁰

In the beginning of the year 1914, D'Arcy Exploration Co., joined in by subscribing new capital equal to the existing capital of the company and the shareholding in Turkish Petroleum Co., D'Arcy Exploration Co.'s participation thus reached 50 per cent, with Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Co., and Deutsche Bank holding 25 per cent of shares each. Mr. C. S. Gulbenkian took an active part in the negotiations, and on the reconstitution of the company in 1914, both Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Co., and D'Arcy Exploration Co., granted 2, ½ percent of the total stock for Mr. Gulbenkian as a 'beneficiary 5 % interest without the right to vote'. The treaty constituting the company on this basis was affixed at the British Foreign Office on 19 March 1914, and included an article to the effect that no one of the signatories would act independently "directly or indirectly in the production or manufacture of crude oil" within the region described as "the Ottoman Empire". In June, 1914, The Grand Vizier of Turkey assured Turkish Petroleum Co. a rental contract for "the oil deposits already discovered or to be discovered in the provinces of Mosul and Baghdad".

Company, 1958); Eldem, Edhem, *In Search of the Gulbenkians* (Istanbul: Sakıp Sabancı Müzesi Yayınları, 2006)

¹⁰⁰Shwadhan, B. *The Middle East, Oil and the Great Powers*. (NewYork: 1959), p.195.

When the First World War broke out, Deutsche Bank's share in Turkish Petroleum Co., was taken over by the British. The company hardly operated during the war. As the war continued, seven fruitless shallow wells were drilled by the Germans in the Qaiyarah region, 37 miles south of Mosul.

With the 24 April 1920 San-Remo Agreement, the German 25 % interest in Turkish Petroleum Co. was given to France. Upon this development, on 12 May 1920, the American State Department issued a Note to the British Foreign Office protesting against the exclusion of American oil interests from the region. Following this, the two Governments had long diplomatic exchanges on the policy named "open door policy" and in 1928; Turkish Petroleum Co. was restructured to include several American companies whose interests were grouped in the Near East Development Corporation.¹⁰¹

Identities of the Fortune Seekers: Who are the Ones Exploiting Oil

While Midhat Pasha was governor of Baghdad, we observe the beginning of the attempts of oil drilling in the present sense. Grounds for Oil conflict, which form an integral part of the present global agenda, were laid during that period, in Mesopotamia. In the 1890s, we observe that Royal Dutch/Shell targeted Middle East as well as Far East oil. English agents and diplomats applied every pressure on the sultan to acquire concessions to pursue searches on the territories of the Ottoman Empire.¹⁰²

¹⁰¹ Wood, Cecil W., Barber, C. T. *Petroleum Times Review of Middle East Oil* . (London; New York: Petroleum Times, 1948), p 45.

¹⁰² Longrigg, Stephen Hemsley. *Oil in the Middle East: Its Discovery and Development*.(London: Oxford U.P, 1968.)

The Ottoman government was receiving around ten requests each year for search permission between 1870 and 1898. Between 1898 and 1900, requests for search permission increased to an average of 139 per year. Between 1870 and 1908, Europeans obtained and used most of the mining concessions given by the Ottoman State. While some foreigners openly applied for these concessions, the rest entered into partnership with partners of Ottoman nationality.¹⁰³

Foreigners

People who had acquired mining concessions could hand them over to others against important sums of money. In order to counter these practices, the Ottoman government produced special regulations, the *Maadin Nizamnamesi*. This document stipulated the conditions under which concessions were to be granted, while specifying that foreigners could participate in mining companies only as shareholders. However, as the right to have access to real property was recognized for foreigners in 1867, the regulations were changed in 1870 and the principle that citizens of foreign countries could exploit mines was accepted.¹⁰⁴

The Banker M.G. Borssevains was requesting that the concession of the oil founded on the area of Mosul, Diyarbakir, Basra and Baghdad would be given to him.¹⁰⁵ Mr. Rosa was requesting the contract of the oil mineral of Baghdad and

¹⁰³ Quataert, Donald, "19. Yüzyılda Osmanlı Devleti'nde Madencilik," In *Tanzimat tan Cumhuriyet' e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 4, (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1985), p. 914.

¹⁰⁴ İrşat İldeniz , "Vilayet Salnamalarına Göre Trabzonun İktisadi ve Ticari Hayatı" (M.A. diss, Ankara University), p.59

¹⁰⁵ BOA, Y.PRK.AZJ 25/8, 29/Z/1310, 14 June 1893.

Mosul.¹⁰⁶ The Oil Engineer Monsieur Pavli was appointed by the Ottoman Bank for the inspection of the naphta mines near Avlonya in Albania and a significant amount of naphta was discovered here. It was decided to operate it on mutual interest bases between the sultan and the Ottoman Bank.¹⁰⁷

Another foreigner who requested concession for searching oil on Ottoman lands was Louis Anmasis and he sent a petition to the Grand vizier which states the concession request.¹⁰⁸

Archaeologists

Intensive searches were made for antiquities in Syria.¹⁰⁹ George Smith was among those who requested and obtained a license to search for antiquities.¹¹⁰ British archeologists were conducting excavations in Aleppo. In fact, one of the researchers, George Saint died during these activities, and an official letter was sent from the British Consulate to the Foreign Affairs Ministry concerning the appointment of Hormuz Rassam in his place.¹¹¹ Meanwhile, the French made a request to search for antiquities in Basra, and a search license *firman* (imperial decree) was given to the Consul of France.¹¹² In 1884, a group of people named Mr. Doro, Mr. Clark and

¹⁰⁶ BOA, YMTV 187/29, 14/L/1316, 25 February 1899; BOA, Y.MTV 184/120, 28/b/1316, 12 December 1898.

¹⁰⁷ BOA, Y.A.HUS 193/36, 13/L/1303, 15 July 1886.

¹⁰⁸ BOA, HR.TO 464/29, 05/Ca/1295, 07 May 1878.

¹⁰⁹ BOA, HR.TO 249/32, 26/b/1291, 08 September 1874.

¹¹⁰ BOA, HR.TO 250/39, 15/Ca/1292, 19 June 1875.

¹¹¹ BOA, HR.TO 251/64, 26/L/1293, 14 November 1876.

¹¹² BOA, HR.TO 205/60, 26/C/1296, 17 June 1879.

Stuart sent by the “The American School of Archaeology” requested a permit for excavations on the Tigris and Euphrates Valley.¹¹³

Another person who came to the Ottoman Empire for excavations was Mr. Kanch.¹¹⁴ An *firman* was given to the French Consul in Baghdad to conduct excavations along the Tigris and Euphrates and in the Persian Gulf for a period of three years.¹¹⁵ The British were also applying for licenses on behalf of museums instead of persons, in order to be able to excavate.¹¹⁶

According to Abdulhamid the Ottoman territories, especially the Mesopotamian region, were full of Europeans who came under the pretext of searching for antiquities. Abdulhamid thought that behind their interest in finding antiquities, the imperialist countries’ real intention was to look for oil. He learned from the information he received that groups in Mosul and Baghdad had stopped archeological field activities and had begun drilling oil wells. For him, it was not broken jars and small sculptures they were looking for, but oil. Hamid had the wells opened in Mosul and Baghdad closed down.¹¹⁷

Concessionaires

Attempts were made concerning oil used for modest and primitive local activities in the villages of the Ottoman Empire, where there were oil seepages; in Anatolia and

¹¹³ BOA, HR.TO 148/35, 27/Z/1301, 18 September 1884.

¹¹⁴ BOA, HR.TO 274/59, 29/B/1303, 03 May 1886.

¹¹⁵ BOA, HR.TO 207/49, 28/R/1306, 01 January 1889.

¹¹⁶ BOA, HR.TO 264/10, 2/M/1307, 29 August 1889.

¹¹⁷ İsmet Bozdağ, *Sultan Abdülhamid'in Hatıra Defteri* (İstanbul: Pınar yayınları, 1985), pp. 76–79

the shale beds of the Marmara region. Shallow wells and galleries were also dug on seepages in Iskenderun.¹¹⁸

Below is a list of concessionaires¹¹⁹:

Karamürsel :

Mihran Şirinyan Efendi, 1893¹²⁰

Ordu - (Dona) :

Lopez Sabuncu Efendi, 1893¹²¹

Adana:

Atnaş Taripani, 1906¹²²

Edirne (Adrianople):

(Şarköy) the Governor of district (*Qaimmakam*) 1893.¹²³

(Şarköy) Grand Vizier Halil Rıfat Pasha attempted to exploit the oil and coal ore discovered in Şarköy within his premises in 1897.¹²⁴ Halil Rıfat Pasha who had obtained oil concessions for Mürefte, Horadere and Şarköy also had a well drilled for a European Petroleum Company.

Stanislaus Mihaniki 1914

American Lucian Thomas 1914

¹¹⁸ Longrigg, p. 25.

¹¹⁹ Concessionaires can be found in Ş.Volkan Ediger. *Osmanlı'da Neft ve Petrol: Enerji Ekonomi-Politiği Perspektifinden* (Ankara: ODTÜ Geliştirme Vakfı Yayıncılık, 2005).

¹²⁰ BOA, DH.MKT 2059/135, 19/Ş/1310, 8 March 1893.

¹²¹ BOA, Y.PRK.TKM 29/26, 10/M/1311, 24 July 1893.

¹²² BOA, DH.MKT 1143/23, 09/Z/1324, 25 December 1906.

¹²³ BOA, Y.PRK.AZJ 33/88, 17 /K/ 1312, 29 March 1896.

¹²⁴ BOA, YPRK. AZJ. 33/88, 25/Ş/1314, 29 January 1897.

(Ferecik) The Hamidiye Hicaz Railway Commission made a concession request in 1905

(Ferecik) Mr. Charlie 1912

Aydın:

(Kuyucak) Alibeyzade Hüseyin Hüsnü, 1913

Alibeyzade Abbas Bey

(Ortakçı) Mehmet Rıfat and Abdülkadir Efendi, ¹²⁵

(Ortakçı) Hacı Emin Efendizade Ahmet Fikri Efendi, ¹²⁶

Fersan Island:

Turhan Pasha, 1902-1903 ¹²⁷

Yusuf Asım Effendi 1909¹²⁸

William Habakkuk Lihye, 1912

Mr. George, 1914

Iskenderun (Alexandretta) - Çengen:

Ahmet Necati Efendi, 1889 ¹²⁹

Hasan Tahsin Efendi, 1890

Monsieur Franz on behalf of the Iskenderun Oil Company, 1891

Kastamonu:

(Ekinviran) Süleyman Reşat Bey, 1911

(Boyabat) Süleyman Reşat Bey

¹²⁵ BOA, MV 217/15 30 Nisan 1333, 26 July 1333.

¹²⁶ BOA, MV 217/16 8 K. 1332, 21 March 1917, MV 217/15 25 June 1335.

¹²⁷ BOA, YPRK. AZJ. 47/35, 29/Z/1320, 27 February 1903. Turhan Pasha demanded that the copper mine concessions for the Karayörük village of Trabzon Görele be granted to him in addition to the petrol concession for the Island of Fersan in the province of Hudayda, in Yemen.

¹²⁸ BOA, DH. MUİ.50/-2 /28, 13/Ca/1328, 26 July 1912.

¹²⁹ BOA, İ.MMS 105/4493, 15/L/1306, 14 June 1889.

Ayşe Feride Hanım, 1914

Van (Kurzon- Beşparmak):

Nikoghos Tokmakyan and Galip Pasha, 1877 -1895

Müşir Fuad Pasha, 1913

Tekfurdağ:

Concession request made by VakımPashazade Tahir Bey and its cancellation, 1905

Tayfur Bey, 1909

Syria Aclun:

Abdülkadir and his partners, 1910

Süleyman Bey and Edward Thomas Buksal, 1913

Erzincan (Mecidiye):

Hurye, Hayık, Artin and Habet, 1911

Erzurum:

In 1887-1889, request made for the granting of a license to Sarıca Osman Bey for the Pülk oil.

On 24 January 1898, Şakir Pasha made a claim concerning the granting of the Pülk oil concession to the Çulhazade family from Trabzon.

In 1898 the attempt made by the Çulhazadeler to obtain the Pülk oil concession resulted in a failure.¹³⁰

1898: request made for the granting the Pülk concession to the German Carl Raiser who was chosen by Ahmed Celaleddin Pasha.¹³¹

1905: Local foundations would have the Pülk oil exploited by the leaseholder.

¹³⁰ BOA, YPRK.OMZ 2/22-1, 19/ M /1316, 9 June 1898.

¹³¹ BOA, YPRK.OMZ 2/22-3, 15/ S /1316, 5 July 1898.

1905: The Fourth Army made an attempt to obtain the exploitation concession for the Erzurum oil.

1905: the request made concerning the exploitation of the Pülk oil of the Fourth Army was refused by the Council of State.¹³²

¹³² BOA. Y.MTV. 279/69, 10/Ş/1323, 9 October 1905.

CHAPTER III

TOWARDS THE PÜLK OIL CONCESSIONS

It is necessary to review relevant contemporary events and conditions in the Erzurum province in order to analyze and interpret the dreams and realities related to the Pülk Oil Concessions.

Erzurum in the Hamidian Era

In the beginning of the Hamidian Era, there were three types of provinces in the Empire: Provinces directly dependent on the centre, autonomous provinces and privileged provinces (provinces benefiting from a special status). Provinces dependent on the centre were reorganized with the new regulations (*kanunname*) introduced in 1864. Erzurum was among those provinces. According to the regulations, provincial governors in such provinces were appointed by the Sultan. The governor represented the absolute executive power, except for military and justice affairs.¹³³ “Watching out that the officers are doing their duties, taking measures concerning prosperity”¹³⁴ was also among the missions of the governor.

The person who was the Erzurum Governor between the years 1895 and 1901 was Şerif Mehmed Rauf Pasha. As for Nazım Bey,¹³⁵ previously governor of Mosul,

¹³³ Gökhan Çetinsaya, *Ottoman Administration of Iraq, 1890–1908*. (London; New York: Routledge, 2006), p. 15.

¹³⁴ İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, Enver Ziya Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi* vol. 8 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1988), p. 310.

¹³⁵ He became grand vizier in 1905.

he was appointed governor of Erzurum in 1901. In April 1906 Mehmed Ata Bey and in October 1906 Mustafa Nuri Bey were appointed Governors of Erzurum.¹³⁶

The vast territory of this region, renowned for its cold (minus 15 degrees R in winter) but healthy climate, was divided into six provinces. In 1878, following the San Stefano and Berlin treaties, the Ottoman Empire had to relinquish the territories of Kars and Çıldır to the Russians, as well as the vast and beautiful forest of Soğanlı, the district of Kağızman and a rich salt mine. Other changes were then made to the administrative division of the remaining territories of the region.¹³⁷ In 1888, there were two Russian Consulates in Erzurum, which stressed even further the pronounced border character the province now had.¹³⁸

A new period started for the eastern provinces in 1878. The *Vilayet-i Sitte* meaning the Six Eastern provinces – an expression which then entered Ottoman administrative terminology were restructured in six favor of the Armenian population, the Ottomans having accepted the protection of the great powers that this community now benefited from.¹³⁹

The omnipresence of European political influence was assured through a series of consuls, founded in almost every significant provincial center all over the Empire. The danger appeared evident to Abdulhamid and his aides: if the issue remained unattended, the European influence would sooner or later destabilize the political power of the Ottoman government which may lead to the establishment of

¹³⁶ Sinan Kunalp, *Son Dönem Osmanlı Erkân ve Ricali, 1839-1922: Prosopografik Rehber* (İstanbul: İsis, 1999) p, 30.

¹³⁷ Vital Cuinet, *La Turquie d'Asie: géographie administrative statistique descriptive et raisonnée de chaque province de l'Asie Mineure* (Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1894) vol.I, p. 105.

¹³⁸ *Ibid.*, p.19.

¹³⁹ Halil İnalçık, "Erzurum," In *İslam Ansiklopedisi vol IV*. (İstanbul, 1977), pp. 340-357.

‘zones of influence’ and ultimately to secession. In the meantime, European political influence could be observed in nearly each and every provincial center of empire.¹⁴⁰

Erzurum, which included the districts of Erzincan and Beyazid, was one of these provinces.¹⁴¹ The Erzurum province covered an area of 76.720 square kilometers and had 635.847 inhabitants. The city of Erzurum was an important trading center between Baghdad and Europe. At this time, very few of the traders were Muslims, the majority being Greek or Armenian.¹⁴² According to the censuses of the years 1881-1882-1893, there were 445.438 Muslims and 107.868 Armenians in Erzurum.¹⁴³ 509.826 inhabitants of the Erzurum province were Muslims, the rest being non-Muslims in 1899.¹⁴⁴ According to the census of 1903; the ethnic distribution of the inhabitants of Erzurum was as follows¹⁴⁵:

¹⁴⁰ Gökhan Çetinsaya, “The Ottoman View of British Presence in Iraq and the Gulf: The Era of Abdulhamid II,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 39, no.2 (April 2003),pp. 194-203.

¹⁴¹ Vilayet-i sitte: Erzurum, Van, Harput, Diyarbakır, Sivas, Bitlis.

¹⁴² Ali Karaca, *Anadolu Islahâtı ve Ahmet Şakir Pasha, 1838-1899* (İstanbul: Eren, 1993), p. 83.

¹⁴³ Kemal Karpat, *Ottoman Population 1830-1914* (USA: Wisconsin University, 1985), pp. 124-148.

¹⁴⁴ *Erzurum Vilayet Salnamaesi 1315* (Erzurum: Vilayet Matbaası, 1315), pp: 89, 290.

¹⁴⁵ French Foreign Ministry Archives, Correspondance Polique et commerciale, Turquie, Politique interieure vol. 79, pp.62-94, 27 October 1903. In Bayram Kodaman, “Fransız Arşiv Belgelerine göre Erzurum-Sivas-Van Vilayetlerinde Ermeni Nüfusu” *A.T.A.D* 3 no.6 (1988), p. 7.

Communities	Population	Percentage
Muslims	663.500	%80
Turks	422.200	
“Qizilbashs” (literally Red Heads in Turkish a term designating an Anatolian Shiite sect, also called Alevi)	107.500	
Lazs	70.000	
Georgians	54.500	
Karapapaks	5500	
Circassians	3800	
Armenians	157.820	%19
Gregorian Armenians	143.950	
Catholic Armenians	8670	
Protestant Armenians	2200	
Anatolian Greeks	3800	%4
Persians	1000	%0,1
Yezidis	2000	%0,2
Total Population	828.120	

The population information given above shows that, Erzurum was varied in terms of its ethnic distribution.

There were 29 villages, including Pülk, within the district of Tercan. Cuinet writes that situated southwest of Erzurum, north of the district of Kiğı and east of the sancak (sub province) center of Erzincan, the district of Tercan has a population of 26.795 inhabitants, including 19.913 Muslims, 6689 Gregorian Armenians, 126 Greek Orthodox and 67 people of other faiths. The village of Pülk, situated in this district of Tercan, has something resembling an oil field, the villagers using the oil as fuel.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁶ Cuinet., p.150.

Russia

Any description of Erzurum at that time must dwell on the neighboring Russian presence. Russia was one of the actors who influenced Abdulhamid's policies regarding Erzurum. Russia was involved in practically every event, every social or political problem that took place in Erzurum at the time, be it secretly or openly, directly or indirectly. Russia's antagonistic policies towards the Ottomans can actually be traced back to Peter the Great. With the war that took place between the two empires between 1821 and 1829 and Russian efforts to use the Armenians to its advantage, Russia became an ever-increasing threat for the Ottomans.¹⁴⁷ Having sent many presents to the Armenian episcopate during the war in their efforts to gain the Armenians of the Ottoman Empire to their cause, following the war, the Russians had many Armenians of the region of Erzurum migrate to territories of the Russian Empire they had recently conquered.¹⁴⁸ Russian policies therefore had an immediate impact on Erzurum.

The Crimean war of 1853-1856 constituted another important turning point, together with the 1877-1878 war, the aftermath of which saw growing political interventions and impositions on the part of Western powers concerning the affairs of the eastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire. Following which Abdulhamid was thus kept quite busy with eastern provinces diplomacy.

¹⁴⁷ Kemal Beydilli, *Osmanlı-Rus Savaşında Doğu Anadolu'dan Rusya'ya Göçürülen Ermeniler* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1988)

¹⁴⁸ Fred Burnaby, *On Horseback through Asia Minor*, vol. II, (London, 1877), pp. 81-82.

Eastern Provinces Diplomacy

Article 16 of the Treaty of San Stefano, signed on 3 March 1878, following the 1877-1878 war, states that:

In order to avoid conflicts that could harm the good relations of the two (Russian and Ottoman) States during the evacuation of the areas of the East Anatolian provinces where Armenians live and which are currently occupied by the Russian Army and to be given back to the Ottoman Empire, the Ottoman Government agrees to take the necessary measures to ensure the interests of the Armenians living in these areas and ensure their security in relation to Kurds and Circassians.¹⁴⁹

With this treaty, the Ottomans accepted to implement reforms in East Anatolia (where Armenians lived).¹⁵⁰ The English however did not accept the said article, which gave the Russians the status of protectors of the Armenians. They managed to gather the conference of Berlin on 13 June 1878 and to have article 16 of the San-Stefanos treaty with the following article:

The Ottoman government agrees to take the measures heeded necessary for the Armenian populated areas without delay and to ensure the security of the Armenians against other elements (Kurds and Circassians). When the time has come to implement afore mentioned measures, it will inform the States concerned and these will monitor the implementation of the said measures.¹⁵¹

With the 1878 Berlin Conference, the Ottoman State accepted to implement reforms relating to the situation of Armenians in its territory and to have Western powers monitor these reforms. Moreover, the Great Powers now shared the right to have their word to say on the preparation, implementation, amendment and

¹⁴⁹ Nihat Erim, *Devletlerarası Hukuki ve Siyasi Tarihi Metinleri: Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Anlaşmaları I* (Ankara, 1953), p. 395.

¹⁵⁰ Justin McCarty, *The Ottoman Peoples and the end of Empire*, (London: Arnold; New York: Oxford: St. Martin's Press, 2001), pp. 66-73.

¹⁵¹ *İbid.*, 66-73.

monitoring of the “Vilayet Nizamnameleri” (Province Regulations). A similar article existed in the San-Stefanos Treaty but it only gave the right of intervention to Russia. With the Berlin Treaty, the Great powers took a step towards solving the “Question d’Orient” by agreeing more or less on sharing this right among them.¹⁵² Thus, the first political developments that drove Abdulhamid to launch the reform process in the eastern provinces – beginning with Erzurum - were these articles of the San-Stefanos and Berlin Treaties.

Following the great Armenian uprising of Sason, in 1894, England, France and Russia issued a common memorandum to the attention of Abdulhamid on 11 May 1895, pressing him to implement the reforms promised for the areas inhabited by Armenians.¹⁵³

In the province itself, some of the Armenian population expressed its satisfaction by ceremoniously receiving the Eastern Provinces Reform Program Committee,¹⁵⁴ while some Armenian committees’ members triggered uprisings coinciding with its arrival. The city of Erzurum itself was quite affected by these protests made against the Reform Committee.¹⁵⁵

At the same time, Abdulhamid’s policies concerning the eastern provinces included the establishment of the Hamidiye Regiments in 1891, in order to restore central authority in the region. Besides the strengthening of central authority, these regiments were also to restore a power balance between the Armenian and Muslim

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, 66-73.

¹⁵³ Richard Hovannisian, “the Historical Dimensions of the Armenian Question 1878-1923”, In *The Armenian Genocide in Perspective*, edited by Richard Hovannisian, (USA: New Jersey, 1987), pp. 19-41.

¹⁵⁴ Erzurum, Van, Diyarbakır, Bitlis Mamuretü’l-aziz ve Sivas.

¹⁵⁵ Ali Karaca, “Tehcire Giden Yolda Ermeni Meselesi’ne Bir Çözüm Projesi ve Reform Müfettişliği 1878–1915.” In *Ermeni Meselesi Üzerine Araştırmalar*, edited by Erhan Afyoncu, (İstanbul: Tatav, 2001),p.120.

populations. The first regiments took position along the Erzurum-Van and the Urfa-Mardin axes.¹⁵⁶

Thus, Abdulhamid created the “Eastern Provinces Reform Inspectorate” in 1894 in response to these policies of the European powers concerning the “Vilayet-i sitte (Six Provinces).”

There were more than 20 Armenian uprisings in Anatolia between September and December 1895. At this period, when the Ottoman Empire attracted international attention, an inspection committee was prepared to inspect the eastern provinces, where the uprisings had occurred, in order to solve the problems and develop the region. The committee reached Erzurum on 9 September 1895. *Müşir* (Field Marshal) Ahmed Şakir Pasha¹⁵⁷ led the inspection committee with the title of *Anadolu Islahatı Umumi Müfettişi* (The Anatolia Reform General Inspector). The Pasha continued to perform this duty till the year 1899.¹⁵⁸

Şakir Pasha made some attempts to improve the existing roads in some of the districts of Erzurum and Anatolia, and to have new roads built where existing roads were unsuitable for access and transportation. Roads were lacking at even the most important spots and the existing ones had gone to ruins. The resulting difficulty of access lead to high transportation costs. Besides, the insufficiency of these roads was limiting the mobility of the Fourth Army. When the need to suppress domestic disturbance or to cross the Russian border occurred, the army couldn't move rapidly.¹⁵⁹ The Committee had even written a plea and sent it to the Petition

¹⁵⁶ Bayram Kodaman, *Şark Meselesi Işığında Sultan II. Abdülhamid'in Doğu Anadolu Politikası* (Istanbul: Orkun Yayınevi, 1983), pp. 29- 31- 38.

¹⁵⁷ Sakir Pasha was appointed to this duty in 27 June 1895.

¹⁵⁸ Karaca, pp, 80-91.

¹⁵⁹ *İbid.*, p.80.

Administration in order to resolve the transportation problems of the province (*vilayet*).¹⁶⁰

The foundation of the *Tezyid-i Servet Komisyonu* established in order to “increase the wealth” and “achieve the civil improvement” of the Erzurum Province was another initiative of the committee. This committee was composed of members chosen among the Agriculture Trade and Forest Bureau officers and people who had capital or owned lands and farms. The exploration and exploitation of underground resources like ores were also within the area of activity of the committee. One of the main purposes of the Committee was to encourage the public participation in the development program and to direct private capital investment.¹⁶¹

The civil administration was under the responsibility of the Governor. It was the Field Marshal who commanded the local troops. The Governor and the Field Marshal reported to different departments at the Porte, the Governor reporting to the Interior Ministry and the Field Marshal to the Ministry of War. Following the legal reforms of 1879, the judiciary was separated from the civil administration. The result was a permanent conflict potential.¹⁶²

In March 1906, a group of local shop owners, traders and artisans encouraged by *İttihadçıs* (members of Union and Progress Party) asked the Sultan for tax reductions. A demonstration took place in which thousands of people participated. The post offices were occupied and an attack was launched on the house of the district governor (*kaymakam*). As for the commander of the Fourth Army, Zeki

¹⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p.85.

¹⁶¹ *İkdam*, issue 538, Şaban 1313 A.H.,(January 1896) ; *Tercüman-ı Hakikat*, 10 R 1315 A.H., (2 February 1898), in *Ibid.*, p. 84

¹⁶² Çetinsaya, *Ottoman Administration*, pp. 15- 19.

Pasha, he refused to obey the Council of Ministers' order to send the army to repress the Erzurum uprising.¹⁶³

Because of chaos stemming from drought, famine and the Armenian uprising that took place in the years 1890, 1891, 1892 a large part of the tax payers had migrated. The rebellions had caused a tax loss of 7 % in the region.¹⁶⁴ Furthermore the presence of the Fourth Army in Erzurum had a negative effect on the budget, which affected the development of the region.

The Fourth Army

The Army of the Ottoman Empire was divided into seven sections. Each army carried the name of the area where it was present. Only the First Army, centered in Istanbul, was called the *Hassa Ordusu* (Imperial Army). The center of the Second Army, the Danube Army, was situated in *Şumnu* (Shumen), the center of the Third Army, the Rumelia Army, in Manastir, the center of the Fourth Army, the Anatolia Army, in Erzurum, the center of the Fifth Army, The Syria Army, in Damascus, the center of the Sixth Army, The Arabian Army, in Baghdad, the center of the Seventh Army, The Yemen Army, in Sana.¹⁶⁵

According to the 1877 state almanac, there were 24 infantry battalions, 4 cavalries, 5 mobile artillery regiments, 12 stronghold artillery companies in the Fourth Army, the Erzurum Army. The soldier strength was 28.596, animal strength was 768, and the cannon number was 670.¹⁶⁶ The Fourth Army had a total strength of

¹⁶³ A. L. Macfie, *The End of the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1923* (New York: Longman, 1998), p. 26.

¹⁶⁴ Karaca, p, 89.

¹⁶⁵ Kemal H. Karpat, "The Transformation of the Ottoman State, 1789–1908," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 3 (Jul., 1972), pp. 243-281

24.000 men. A large part of the Erzurum Province budget was swallowed by the army. For example, the budget of the year 1895 totaled 32.677.000 kuruş, of which 20.440.669 kuruş went to the Fourth Army. With such an amount taken from the budget, there was not enough money left for the other expenses of the province and its improvement.¹⁶⁷

There were tensions between the military and political authorities of Erzurum in the 1890s. The governor of Erzurum, Mehmed Rauf Pasha, was sending reports to the Center in which he complained of activities directed against him by the Commander of the Fourth Army, Zeki Pasha.¹⁶⁸ Conflict between governors and army commanders were quite frequent under the reign of Abdulhamid. One of the reasons for this was the great confidence the sultan had in the men he appointed to military positions. Most of the times he would be better disposed to the ideas of the military than to those of his governors.¹⁶⁹ There was thus a conflict of authority between the Fourth Army commander and the Governor of Erzurum.

Even after his office as Erzurum Governor had ended, Mehmed Rauf Pasha continued to send letters that included warnings concerning the Fourth Army Commander:

His Excellency the Fourth Army Commander Zeki Pasha has been at odds with governors and this has caused them many a problem. During his governorship your servant too had the occasion to witness these kinds of initiatives of his and I know his character only too well. If he is to remain at his post at the head of the Fourth Army, there will be no alternative for reforms to be completed but to appoint him personally as the person in charge of the reform program and send him to Erzurum.”¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁶ İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, Enver Ziya Karal, *Osmanlı Tarihi* vol. 8 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1988), p.356.

¹⁶⁷ Karaca, p. 89.

¹⁶⁹ Abdulhamit Kırmızı, “Rules of the Provincial Empire: Ottoman Governors and the Administration of Provinces, 1895-1908” (Ph.D. diss., Bogazici University, 2005)

¹⁷⁰ Abdülhamit Kırmızı, *Abdülhamid'in Valileri: Osmanlı Viliyet İdaresi: 1895-1908.* (İstanbul : Klasik, 2007), p. 187. “*IV. Ordu-yı Humayun müşiri devletlu Paşa hazretlerinin valilerle*

Despite all these efforts, both Abdulhamid and the State Council continued to give authority to the Fourth Army to launch investigations when deemed necessary and as they continued to trust its opinions, which only goes to show how strong its influence was in the province.

At the same time, we know that many officers, civil servants and gendarmes stationed in the province hadn't received their salaries for ten months, some gendarmes having had to sell their horses to survive. The Inspection Committee proposed the reduction of the military allocation made to the Fourth Army in order to balance the budget. Otherwise unpaid civil servants might adopt unlawful behavior towards the public.¹⁷¹

In summary, Erzurum was a mixed place where people of many different ethnic roots, such as Armenians, Qizilbashs, Greeks, Persians and Yezidis coexisted. War, rebellion, drought and famine had negatively affected the economy, prosperity and stability of the region. The inspection committee sent to the region from the center aimed to "increase the wealth" and "achieve civil improvement" in the province. It had been requested that the share reserved from the budget for the Fourth Army, which had made the region a strategic location, should be reduced, in order to free resources for the province's needs, while ensuring the payment of the civil servants' salaries. "Keeping the officers from fraudulent acts against the public" and "making the region prosperous" were among its main objectives.

The exploitation of the mines and especially the granting of the Pülk oil wells to exploiters for the development of the region were also on the agenda.

geçinemedikçe başlarına gaile çıkarmak mu'tadıdır. Zaman-ı çakeranemde dahi o yolda teşebbüsatta bulunduğundan ahvalini pek iyi bilirim. Müşarunileyh hazretleri IV. Ordu-yu Humayunda kalacak ise icra-yı islahata bizzat kendisi memur edilerek bizzat Erzurum'a , i 'zamından başka çare yokdur."

¹⁷¹ *İbid.*, 90.

The economic situation of Erzurum and the findings concerning the actors in the region have been depicted above. In the next section, these findings shall be put to the test of the analysis of the correspondence and documents related to the Pülk oil concession. The other actors' perceptions of the oil issue, both central and relatively peripheral, shall be studied through the Pülk oil concession cases.

CHAPTER IV

OFFICIAL ATTITUDES REGARDING PÜLK OIL and the CONCESSION

APPLICANTS

Pülk Oil

The existence of an oil reserve in the close vicinity of the village of Pülk, located 30 kilometers west of the Tercan district of the province of Erzincan and 6 kilometers north of the Mans sub-district of the same province had been known for a long time. Two wells drilled on the north side of the village are clear evidences of the existence of an oil reserve. The surface of the water is covered with oil jelly and, in addition to this a strong oil odor comes out of the walls of the wells. Signs of oil in the Pülk basin are found in different layers of the Miocene¹⁷² and in the close vicinity of the east-west fault. Kemal Lokman, 1950¹⁷³

Although it is not mentioned in the sources in connection with this subject, as we noted, the existence of oil in the close vicinity of the Pülk village was known to the Ottomans even before the nineteenth century, and was also used by them. The inscription on the front of the pious foundation of the Caferiye Mosque, located in Erzurum, indicates that the mosque was built in 1645, during the reign of the Sultan Ibrahim I, by Hadji Cafer, the son of the treasury officer Abu-Bakr. More surprisingly, it mentions the existence of oil in the close vicinity of the Pülk. The inscription of the pious foundation of the Caferiye Mosque thus proves that in 1645 the existence of a substance containing oil or an oil derivative in the region was already known, and documents the fact that such material was used to the extent of possibilities of that period. The charter of the Mosque foundation mentions the Pülk

¹⁷² The tertiary is the third geological period and covers roughly the time span between the demise of the non-avian dinosaurs and beginning of the most recent Ice age, approximately 65 million years ago. In this geological age, the Alpine folds were formed and severe crustal movements took place giving rise to volcanic eruptions and, as a result of these movements and eruptions, to the formation of the Atlantic Ocean and the Indian Ocean. The lignite, petroleum, boracite and salt deposits in the territory of Turkey were formed during this period. The Neogene is the period of the tertiary that extends until 26 million years before the present time, and the Miocene epoch is the earliest sub division of the Neogene epoch.

¹⁷³ Cevat Taşman, Türkiye'de Bitümlü Tezahürlerin Stratigrafik Yayımı," *Maden Tetkik ve Arama Enstitüsü Dergisi*, 40 (1950), pp.41-50.

village and its oil in its fifth and sixth articles under the headline “*Vakfiye-i Cami-i el-Hac Cafer*” (Mosque Foundation of Hadji Cafer). We learn from the aforementioned articles that Hadji Cafer Effendi donated the income he obtained from the oil well in the Pülk village to the foundation of the mosque. The aforementioned mosque foundation articles were carved (14 lines) on the qibla wall. Article 5)... and half of the farm under my possession located in the village named Pülk among the villages of the Erzurum sub-district and the products of the lands in the village named Pülk the property rights of which were assigned to me through an official decree of the Sultan Article 6)... and commercial taxes, fees and charges from my properties located on the border and the income of my oil well and revenue of the products derived and extracted from that well and ...¹⁷⁴

Application 1- Sarıca Murad Osman Bey and Mr.Garvişof

The first official application for exploration activities and the obtaining the concession license for the operation of the oil reserve in the Pülk village of the Erzurum province was presented in 1887, by an entrepreneur named Sarıca Murad Osman Bey. A series of inquiries were made to determine whether or not to grant such a concession to him. It was required that it should be scrutinized whether obtaining the license for oil exploration by Sarıca Murad Osman Bey was

¹⁷⁴ İbrahim Hakkı Konyalı, *Abideleri ve Kitabeleri ile Erzurum Tarihi* (İstanbul: Ercan Matbaası, 1960), p.195 “ *Madde 5... ve Erzurum nahiyesi karyelerinden Pülk nam karyede malikanem olan nısıf çiftliği ve nahiye-i Tercanda mülk name-i hümayun ile temlikim olan Pülk nam karyenin mahsulü...Madde 6... ve rüsumatını ve sınırında malim ile harf ve ihraç eylediğim naft (neft) kuyumuz ve mümkün olursa memlihasını...* ” The original text can be seen in the appendix.

inconvenient with respect to the military, since the region was located within the zone of the Fourth Army.¹⁷⁵

According to an official memorandum (*tezkire*) dated 20 Muharrem 1306, A.H. / 2 October 1888 prepared by the Ministry of Forestry, Mines and Agriculture, the Fourth Army was assigned the duty to investigate and inspect the Pülk mining zone.

Beyond the provincial centers, Ottoman authority was more limited. Ottoman rule was tenuous in Eastern Anatolia in the mid-nineteenth century.¹⁷⁶ A real distinction existed between urban centers and more remote rural areas.¹⁷⁷ This must be the reason why the Fourth Army was involved in the Pülk oil concession issue and asked to make its investigation. As an authority, the Fourth Army is closer to the Pülk village and its plight than to the regional center of Erzurum.

The Colonel (*Miralay*) Mahmud Bey, who held the rank of major in the war office, was appointed by the sultan to perform this task. Following the research conducted by Mahmud Bey, the report sent by the Fourth Army to the headquarters, stated that Pülk village, including its oil reserve was a strategic point with respect to military aspects and located within the area of maneuver of the Fourth Army.¹⁷⁸

Following the inspection conducted in the Pülk area, Rıza Pasha, the commander-in chief of the General Staff sent an evaluation letter regarding the inspection to the Council of State. Rıza Pasha reported that the oil was not extracted by Sarıca Murad Osman Bey, who had applied to obtain a concession license but that

¹⁷⁵ BOA, YPRK.OMZ 2/22-3, 15/ S /1316, 5 July 1898.

¹⁷⁶ Eugene L. Rogan, *Frontiers of State in the Late Ottoman Empire: Transjordan* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p.5.

¹⁷⁷ Rogan, p.5.

¹⁷⁸ BOA, YPRK.OMZ 2/22-3, 15/ S /1316, 5 July 1898.

a well had been drilled in the area by an Armenian named Garvişof, who was a Russian subject from Tiflis. He reported also that the costs, amounting to a few hundred *kuruşes*, were incurred by Garvişof.¹⁷⁹

Thus, two different conclusions can be reached from this letter. First, the oil exploration began in the region before a decision was made on whether to grant a concession license or not. Secondly, it seems that Sarıca Osman Bey did not waste his time, despite a clumsy and slow moving bureaucracy that delayed the official decision making process. Osman Bey sold the concession license for drilling wells and exploring oil to the person named Garvişof, on a mutual agreement basis, with Osman Bey thus acting as proxy.

As a matter of fact, an individual who has obtained a concession license by virtue of an exclusive imperial edict (*ferman*) may either exercise the rights and privileges granted by the concession license or otherwise may assign, transfer or sell such rights and privileges to third parties. At the end of the nineteenth century, the number of traders who were solely involved in trading the Sultan's decrees granting concessions significantly increased in Istanbul.¹⁸⁰ Thus, Sarıca Osman Bey may well have applied for the concession license with the sole purpose of selling or transferring this concession license to another person or he may have entered into an agreement with Garvişof on the grounds of his poor financial situation and prospects or for some other reason.

From the letters written by the commander-in- chief Rıza Pasha, it is clear that the General Staff (*Erkan-ı Harbiye Dairesi*) believed that Garvişof sought and created pretexts by purporting to have been involved in walnut lumber trading for

¹⁷⁹ BOA, YPRK.OMZ 2/22-3, 15/ S /1316, 5 July 1898.

¹⁸⁰ BOA, YPRK.OMZ 2/22-3, 15/ S /1316, 5 July 1898.

long years, and relying on the excuse of looking for walnut trees in the region to carry out other type of inquires and exploration activities in the close vicinity of the Fourth Army troupes deployed along the *Çürüksuyu* stream. Furthermore, the population of the Pülk village and its close vicinity almost entirely consisted of “Qizilbashs” (Alevi) and Armenians.¹⁸¹

According to Rıza Pasha, the Qizilbashs and the Armenians indeed constituted the vast majority of the Pülk population and this factor caused the prospect of Garvişof extracting oil in the region to be deemed inadvisable if not unacceptable. Although the required vehicles and instruments for the army could easily be supplied in case of need, these Qizilbashs and Armenians could still raise a commotion in the region (due to the fact that they were in a position where they could act freely and autonomously).¹⁸²

Rıza Pasha also thought that, in addition to the foregoing factors, in the event that Garvişof would have continued his operations in the region for the exploring and extracting of oil, a number of unidentified foreigners would have been encouraged to visit Erzurum, and would have clubbed together in the city and might obtain other concessions. Thus, they would have been informed of any disposition of troops and military operations.¹⁸³

The idea of an Armenian benefiting from the oil reserves in Pülk greatly bothered the army. This gives us an indication of the conception and understanding that had started to become a prevailing phenomenon in that period. As a matter of

¹⁸¹ BOA, YPRK.OMZ 2/22-3, 15/ S /1316, 5 July 1898

¹⁸² BOA, YPRK.OMZ 2/22-3, 15/ S /1316, 5 July 1898.

¹⁸³ BOA, YPRK.OMZ 2/22-3, 15/ S /1316, 5 July 1898.

fact, after a short period of time, Armenian separatist and subversive actions began to occur in Erzurum.

Such organizations had been active in Erzurum for a while and their numbers had increased following recent political developments. One of them called “Protectors of the Motherland” appeared in 1881.¹⁸⁴ Its members, who took part in secret activities, were arrested and sent to court for carrying posters bearing the inscription “Independence or Death.” The people of Erzurum were negatively impressed by the fact that the headquarters of this organization were situated in Tiflis, in Georgian territory then under Russian rule, and the fact that the Russian passports of convenience distributed to local Armenians came from the same place did nothing to improve their perception of this city. In other words, these events had caused the city of Tiflis and the people coming from Tiflis to be perceived as the potentially dangerous “other.” The fact that Garvişof was both Armenian and from Tiflis must have done little to improve the disposition of the members of the Fourth Army towards him.

The existence of oil reserves in Pülk appeared on the agenda with an application for a concession license in a period when the oil issue was gaining popularity. However this popularity had not affected the army yet. Indeed, the Fourth Army perceived the oil reserves in the *karye*¹⁸⁵ of Pülk as a potential problem that would prevent and hinder its operations and troupe’s movement rather than as a liberator and saver.

¹⁸⁴ Arthur Beylerian, “Aux Origines de la question armenienne, du traite de San Stefano au Congres de Berlin (1878),” *Revue d’Histoire Diplomatique* (Paris), 1-2, pp. 31-32,’ in Anaide Ter Mınassian, *Ermeni Devrimci Hareketinde Milliyetçilik ve Sosyalizm 1887-1912*. Translation by Mete Yuncay, İletişim Yayınları, Ankara, 1995),p. 17.

¹⁸⁵ “Karye” is the smallest subdivision of the vilayet.

The Army's perception for non-Turkish subjects of the Ottoman Empire was generally marked by suspicion, which led the military to perceive non-Turkish subjects as the "other" as its first and foremost concern was about the security of the military zones.¹⁸⁶ Thus, they perceived the existence of oil reserves in the Pülk village as a problem rather than an opportunity, since they viewed the region as an extremely problematic one, since the Armenians constituted an important minority in Pülk, which happened to be in the close vicinity of the Fourth Army, and since the person who would be profiting from the oil wells was himself an Armenian and moreover a Russian subject.

In the end, a negative reply was given to the request for the concession presented by Sarıca Murad Osman Bey and the transactions were cancelled on 27 November 1889 due to "military inconveniences".

¹⁸⁶ At a time when the perception of "the other" had led to an inextricable situation, to nationalist movements, riots, insurrections, forced emigration and the First World War, the United States President Woodrow Wilson came up with the new principles that he presented to the World Public Opinion. It was declared "*XII. The Turkish portion of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development.*" World War I Document Archive - 1918 Documents - President Wilson's Fourteen Points. Available [online]: http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/President_Wilson%27s_Fourteen_Points [25 May 2008]

The Albayrak Daily published in Erzurum, expressed its expectations from Wilson's Principles based on "self determination", and endeavoured to change the American policy which was thought to be solely for the benefit of Armenians. In articles published in the newspaper under the titles, "To the Attention of the Americans", and "Humanitarian expectations from the United States", the United States was asked to establish a fair balance on earth in terms of social and political aspects. Dursun Ali Akbulut, *Albayrak Olayı: Milli Mücadele Başlarında Halk Hükümeti Kurma Girişimi: Erzurum 1920* (İstanbul: Temel Yayınları. 2006), pp. 40-46.

¹⁸⁶ Dursun Ali Akbulut, *Albayrak Olayı: Milli Mücadele Başlarında Halk Hükümeti Kurma Girişimi: Erzurum 1920* (İstanbul: Temel Yayınları. 2006), pp. 106-108.

Application 2- The Çulhazade Family versus Carl Reiser in other words

The Council of State versus the Sublime Porte

A ten year period of inaction followed Sarıca Osman Bey's unsuccessful attempt to obtain concession rights for the oil reserve in Pülk. Eventually, on 24 January 1898, the Ministry of Forestry, Mines and Agriculture (*Maadin Nezareti*) received a letter related to the oil reserve in Pülk. Its signatory was Ahmed Şakir Pasha (The Anatolia General Reform Inspector). Şakir Pasha expressed the opinion that, to import oil, a commodity which was important for the country, from Russia or the United States, while it was available in Erzurum, would hardly be in the interest of the country.¹⁸⁷

The information given by Vital Cuinet confirms what Şakir Pasha says. The oil reaching the province and the Fourth Army stationed there did indeed originate from Russia and America. It entered the country through the port of Trabzon. In 1888, the year Carl Reiser's concession was debated, 5,051 franks worth of oil was imported from Russia, and 138 franks worth from America.¹⁸⁸

Şakir Pasha's main intention was to signify the wish of the Çulhazade brothers¹⁸⁹ to obtain the concession rights for operating the oil reserve in Erzurum Pülk. That is to say, the new applicant for the mine was the famous Çulhazade family.

Upon the attempt of the Çulhazade family to obtain concession rights, information and permission was requested from the Sublime Porte by the Ministry of Mines via official letter number 42, dated 1 Z 1315 A.H /11 April 1314 / 23 April

¹⁸⁷ BOA, YPRK.OMZ 2/22-1, 19/ M /1316, 9 June 1898.

¹⁸⁸ Cuinet, p.38.

¹⁸⁹ A well known family from the Trabzon province involved in trade.

1898, referring to previous correspondence regarding the concession for the oil reserve in Pülk and asking whether a license could be granted for the reserve and for the actions to be taken¹⁹⁰.

The Office of the Commander-in-Chief notified the Governor's office of Erzurum and the Ministry of Finance that granting the license to the Çulhazade brothers from Trabzon was not deemed inadvisable provided that the said applicants would observe the following conditions: they should establish a company comprising only Ottoman subjects; the license should by no means be assigned or sold to foreigners; foreigners would not be allowed to enter into the military zones for any reason whatsoever.¹⁹¹ This declaration was made on 16 May 1898.¹⁹²

Although the Office of the General Staff had stated that there were no objections to granting concession rights to the Çulhazade family, the transactions for the transfer of the concession license were not initiated.

The Sublime Porte was opposing the granting of the concession rights to the Çulhazade family. The office of the Grand Vizier declared that the concession rights would not be granted to the Çulhazade family and gave an instruction to the Ministry of Mines on 19 May 1898 stating that following an order of the Sultan Abdülhamid II, concession rights for the said oil reserve in the Pülk village would be granted to the person who would be deemed appropriate by Ahmed Celaledin Pasha.

Well known for his authoritarianism, Abdulhamid was particularly sensitive on issues related to internal and external security and finance. On such cases, he

¹⁹⁰ BOA, YPRK.OMZ 2/22-1, 19/ M /1316, 9 June 1898.

¹⁹¹ BOA, YPRK.OMZ 2/22-3, 15/ S /1316, 5 July 1898.

¹⁹² BOA, YPRK.OMZ 2/22-1, 19/ M /1316, 9 June 1898.

would be directly informed and would personally respond.¹⁹³ It is also quite clear that Abdulhamid strove to gather the legislative and executive powers under his control, delegating his competences to others only for matters he considered as unimportant. The Pülk oil concessions could easily be considered as one of these secondary issues. Indeed, at first sight, Abdulhamid was not personally involved in the Pülk transactions. It was his Serhafiye (Head Spy) Ahmed Celaledin Pasha who was appointed to select the Pülk concessionaire. However, in order to understand the importance Abdulhamid gave to the issue, one must first understand who Ahmed Celaledin Pasha was.

Of Circassian origin, Ahmed Celaledin Pasha was raised among the palace attendants and rose to the position of imperial aid.¹⁹⁴ Ahmed, who felt a deep obligation towards his master, who had found him when he was still a little child and saved him from a life of poverty, acted as the Sultan's right arm for years. As Abdulhamid instituted his special intelligence organization, he could think of no person more loyal than Ahmed Celaledin to head it.¹⁹⁵ Ahmed Celaledin Pasha was one of Abdulhamid's personal servants.¹⁹⁶ He was so close to Abdulhamid that the latter would even have him implement decisions that only the Sultan himself was supposed to implement. For example, it was no other than Ahmed Celaledin who,

¹⁹³ Kemal H. Karpat, *The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and Community in the Late Ottoman State* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 168.

¹⁹⁴ "Ahmed Celaledin Paşa" In *Yaşamları ve Yapıtlarıyla Osmanlılar Ansiklopedisi Ekrem Çakıroğlu*. (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Kültür Sanat Yayıncılık, 1999), p.112.

¹⁹⁵ Ziya Şakir Soko, *Yarım Asır Evvel Bizi İdare Edenler*, (İstanbul: Anadolu Türk Kitap, 1943), pp. 163- 165.

¹⁹⁶ *İbid.*,173.

on behalf of Abdulhamid, made secret visits to the Sultan's elder brother, Murad V, who had preceded him on the throne and been deposed due to health problems.¹⁹⁷

The Pasha was also sent to Europe in 1897, with a mission to meet with the Young Turks and convince Mizancı Murat, the leader of the Geneva Group, to return to Istanbul. Ahmed Cellaeddin Pasha did manage to convince Mizancı Murat and a group of Young Turks to return. This only goes to show to what extent Abdulhamid trusted the Pasha.¹⁹⁸ It is quite obvious that Ahmed Cellaeddin Pasha could represent nothing other than the will of Abdulhamid. A year after his trip to convince the Young Turk leaders to return to Turkey, it was Ahmed Cellaeddin who was again appointed to decide on behalf of the Sultan who was to receive the Pülk Oil concession. Such an appointment shows on the one hand the trust Abdulhamid put in his head spy, on the other hand, it serves as evidence that the Sultan did not abandon his cautiousness when dealing with the Pülk concession and that he took the matter seriously. To speak of the Chief Spy Ahmed Cellaeddin Pasha is to speak of Abdulhamid II.

There was another applicant for the Pülk concession apart from the Çulhazade family. It was a German subject named Carl (Şarl) Reiser¹⁹⁹, who was also trying to obtain this concession at that same time. On 29 May, it was declared that Ahmed Cellaeddin Pasha had chosen to grant the oil concession to Carl Reiser.

¹⁹⁷ *İbid.*, 175.

¹⁹⁸ *Osmanlılar*, p. 112.

¹⁹⁹ It can be gathered from the correspondence scrutinized that the concession seeker was a person with German nationality and who was nicknamed "Charles (Sharl)". Why did he feel the need to use a nickname? The second bureaucracy language in the Ottoman State was French. Because of the familiarity of the Ottoman State senior officers with French, Reiser, who was actually German, must have changed his original name, which was "Carl or Karl"¹⁹⁹ to "Charles (Sharl)" in order to facilitate communication. Determining the exact identification of Charles (Sharl) Reiser would certainly clarify the issue.

Ahmed Celaleddin Pasha being a figure who could not have acted independently from the will of the Sultan, the decision to give the concession to Carl Reiser can only be that of Abdulhamid himself.

Despite the fact it knew it was a decision of the Sultan, the Council of State did not immediately ratify the decision to give the concession to Carl Reiser.

In 27 June 1898, the Council of State insisted on asking the General Staff one more time whether there was any military objection.

The correspondence from the Office of the General Staff to the Council of State included all the formal transactions such as the applications placed for concession rights as from 1888 until 1898, the rejection of the applications and their justifications. Among the issues highlighted were the concession application of Sarıca Osman Bey and the reason why this application was rejected of, and the fact that Garıısof was believed to carry out regional mapping activities. It was emphasized that the choice of the identity of the persons who would be granted concession rights should take account of the existence of Armenian and Qizilbash communities in the area, and that - in addition to concerns about the “others” inside the country - if tolerance was shown in this matter it would encourage a lot of foreigners to come to the country.²⁰⁰

It is striking that although ten years had passed, authorities should still insist on the reasons for disapproving the application of Sarıca Osman Bey for concession rights and take the trouble of explaining again the entire story in full detail. At the end of the document, the phrase,

²⁰⁰ BOA, YPRK.OMZ 2/22-1, 19/ M /1316, 9 June 1898.

“...due to these reasons, it was established that granting such concession rights to foreigners was not advisable and this opinion was notified to the relevant ministry.²⁰¹” was included.

It is obvious that the Council of State was trying to resist the order of the Sultan. The Council of State prolonged the decision process by asking the General Staff for its opinion, thereby showing a form of resistance. In other words, it was passively opposing the Sultan’s decision.

With the help of the General Staff, the Council of State was trying to prevent the granting of the concession rights to Carl Reiser despite the Sultan’s decision, whereas it was supposed to ratify it without delay.

In his official letter written on behalf of the General Staff, Commander-in-chief Rıza Pasha emphasized that granting the concession rights to a foreigner would be a mistake and concluded with an admission that the final decision would be made by the sultan:

As the granting of concession rights for the oil and naphta reserve to a person to be selected by Ferik Ahmed Celaleddin Pasha was due to the discretion of the sultan, it was understood from the official letter and its annexes that the initial transactions regarding conferring the contract to the German Carl Reiser, who was pointed out by the pasha, were carried out by the Ministry of Forests, Mining and Agriculture following negotiations with the office of the Grand Vizier. There had been no comment on this issue by the military²⁰².

²⁰¹ BOA, YPRK.OMZ 2/22-1, 19/ M /1316, 9 June 1898.

²⁰² BOA, YPRK.OMZ 2/22-3, 15/ S /1316, 5 July 1898. “.....ma‘den-i mezkûrun Ferik sa‘âdetli Ahmed Celaleddin Pasha Hazretleri'nin irâ'e edeceği nâma imtiyâzının ihâlesi muktezâ-yı irâde-i seniyye-i hazret-i mülûkânenen olduğu gibi müşârûn-ileyhin irâ'e eylediği Almanya Devleti teb'asından Mösyo Carl Reiser uhdesine ihâlesi hakkında da makâm-ı sâmi-i Sadâret-penâhî ile cereyân eden muhâbere üzerine nezâret-i müşârûn-ileyhâca eden mu'âmele-i ibtidâ'iyenin icrâ olunduğu tezkire-i devletleri ve melfûfât mütala'asından anlaşılması olduğundan keyfiyetin cihet-i askeriyece beyân-ı mütâla'âdan vâreste olduğunun taraf-ı âlî-i âsafânelerine izbârî dâ'ire-i mezkûreden ifâde olunarak evrâk-ı mezkûre takımıyla leffen taraf-ı devletlerine i'âde kılınmış olmakla ol bâbda emr u fermân hazret-i men lehül-emrindir. 15 Safer 1316 / 23 Haziran 1314 – Serasker Rıza”

The head of staff's remarks can be interpreted in two ways. First, contrary to their apparent meaning, these expressions of acknowledgement and submission were accompanied by between the lines statements of objection to, and disapproval of the decision.

The second interpretation is that the Council of State is now left alone in its efforts to counter the decision taken by the Sublime Porte in favor of Carl Reiser. The General Staff is indeed declaring that however much it does not agree with the decision taken, it will comply, acknowledging the limits of its competences and its subordinate position. And this is precisely the reason this research considers the case of the Carl Reiser concession as an issue of tension between the Sublime Porte and the Council of State. Indeed, despite the fact that the fourth Army, Şakir Pasha and the General Staff are all of the same opinion as the Council of State, the actor to practically organize the opposition to Carl Reiser and maintain this opposition until the end is the Council of State.

Interestingly enough, this divergence of opinion between the Sublime Porte and the Council of State lasted throughout the official transactions and exchange of documents related to the decision as well as the implementation of the assignment of the concession rights for the Pülk oil reserve to Carl Reiser.

No doubt, interesting developments took place during that period. As it can be seen in the case of the Çulhazades and Carl Reiser, again the strategic location and overall security concerns of the army were also deemed to be the most sensitive issues just as it had been the case with Sarıca Murad Osman Bey and Mr. Garvişof.²⁰³

²⁰³ When we looked at the applicants for the concession rights of the Pülk oil reserve, our attention is first drawn to the diversity of their ethnic origin: Muslim Turkish (Sarıca Osman Bey), Armenian (Garvişof) and German (Carl Reiser). It might be thought that some kind of a strategic conspiracy path was followed step by step against the protectionist policies of the State. However, even if Garvişof had adopted this devious path in order to facilitate the granting of the concession

However, these attempts to prevent the transfer of sources which would yield some benefits to Carl Reiser or at least to delay such transfer met with little success.²⁰⁴

Left with no other choice and despite all its efforts to resist, the Council ratified the granting of a 99 year concession to Carl Reiser. However, the Council managed to include a note in the 17 articles of the concession document, referring to military security concerns.

Text of the special clause: “In the event that the construction of a fort, roads or military buildings is required at the mining site or in the vicinity of the oil reserve, the buildings located on the mentioned site will be demolished. If production partially or completely ceases due to military operations, then the contractor shall not be entitled to claim for any losses and damages. / Council of State”²⁰⁵

The Pülk Oil Concession Contract

The samples from the Pülk mining zone were analyzed and as a result of this analysis and inspection it was concluded that the sample was extremely convenient for production. According to the existing maps²⁰⁶, it is understood that the total area of the land was nine hundred fifty five (955) *cerib*.²⁰⁷ According to the maps available

rights which he was sure would never be granted to him, the German Carl Reiser was completely independent from this train of thoughts.

²⁰⁴ BOA, YPRK.OMZ 2/22-1, 19/ M /1316, 9 June 1898.

²⁰⁵ BOA, Y.PRK. OMZ 2/22-5, 19/ M /1316, 9 June 1898. “Mâdde-i mahsûsa: Mezkûr ma‘denlerin bulunduğu mevki’ ve civarına ve ma‘den yataklarıyla mahrecleri üzerine istihkâm ve turuk ve mevâridât-ı askeriye inşâ olunacak olduğu veyahut istihkâm inşâsı iktizâ edip de mağara ve ebniyelerinin hedmi veya harekât-ı askeriye icrâsıyla ameliyât kısmen veyâ kâmilen tatil ettirildiği hâlde mültezim-i mûmâ-ileyhe hiçbir sûretle muhâlefete hak ve salâhiyeti olamayacağı gibi bir güne zarar ve ziyân ve tazmînât talebine dahi hakkı olamayacaktır. Şurâ-yı Devlet/ 19 Muharrem 1316”

²⁰⁶ The map can be seen in the the appendix.

²⁰⁷ A measurement unit approximately 3600 archines (arşın) carres: 2,633 kilometres carres. (1 archines carres = 0,5745 square metres) (300 archines carres= 172.368 metres carres) (400 archines carres= 229,824 metres carres) F. D.-E. „*Système des mesures, poids et monnaies de l'Empire*

land covered an area delimited in the north from *Vartabet Hill* to the middle section of the *Neftlik Büyük Kızı Hill*, in the west from the same hill (*Neftlik Büyük Kızı Hill*) to the to the top of the *Alkız Mountain*, in the south from the same hill (*Alkız Mountain*) to *Haçka Hill*, and in the east from the same hill (*Haçka Hill*) to *Vartabet Hill*, where the description started having passed through the point of intersection of the *Tolos road* and *Selhane Stream joint*.²⁰⁸

The oil and naphtha mining zones located in the Tercan district were subject to a tax of ten percent. For each cerîb of the land in which mining operations were to be carried out, a tax of the amount of 10 kuruş was to be imposed. From the revenues of the mining operations, five *paras*²⁰⁹ out of each hundred *kuruşes* were to be given to the Poorhouse (*Dâr'ülaceze*). In addition to this, it was also required that fifty Ottoman liras be deposited at the counter of the Ziraat Bank and twenty Ottoman liras be paid to the Sublime Porte Solidarity Fund (*Bâb- Âlî Yardımlaşma Sandığı*). The operator would not be entitled to claim for losses and damages in the event that the mining operations were suspended or ceased due to road or military constructions.²¹⁰

The Council of State

In the political sense, the Ottoman Empire had moved backward after a brief flirtation with European liberalism. Despotism came into being. Most of the

ottoman et des pricipaux états: avec de nombreux exercices et des tables de conversion (Istanbul: Isis Press, 1988), pp. 108.

²⁰⁸ BOA, YPRK.OMZ 2/22-1, 19/ M /1316, 9 June 1898.

²⁰⁹ Currency unit in the Ottoman Empire 1 kuruş= 40 paras

²¹⁰ The issue of the granting the concession license under a contract to be signed by Monsieur Carl Reiser for the exploration, drilling, extracting and operating of petroleum and naphtha reserves - which was mentioned in the petition filed by Ahmed Celaledin Pasha in accordance to the orders of the Sultan - was brought to the Imperial Government of the Ottoman Empire for reconsideration. BOA, YPRK.OMZ 2/22-1, 19/ M /1316, 9 June 1898. For detailed information on the concession articles see the appendix.

trappings of the modern totalitarian state were present. Power was centralized, free thought was forbidden, extreme censorship prevailed, political dissenters were exiled and an efficient spy system operated internally.²¹¹

The above quotation reveals the prevailing description of Abdulhamid II's authoritarian regime. It is interesting to see, in the face of this depiction, that the Council of State should insist on its own opinion, despite the decision of the Sultan to grant the Pülk oil concession to Carl Reiser.

Studies made on the reign of Abdulhamid II mention conflicts between Yıldız Palace and the Sublime Porte, but nowhere are conflicts between the Council of State and The Sublime Porte mentioned. The case of our study offers an example of a conflicting situation between the Council of State and the Sublime Porte. Was this situation related to the authority of the Council of State or the nature of the system? An analysis of the structure of the Council of State and the identification to its presidents shall assist us in the enrichment of our understanding of the situation.

Significant improvements had been made in the administrative organization in the context of the changes required in the political regime by the *Tanzimat* reforms. A movement towards centralization has been developed in the army, the treasury and the judiciary. The emergence of the Council of State was the achievement of the second generation Reformists.²¹² Because there was no legislative organ in the Ottoman Empire until the establishment of the 1876 Constitution,

²¹¹ Merwin Albert Griffiths, "the Reorganization of the Ottoman Army" (Ph.D. diss., Univeristy of California, 1966), p. 8.

²¹² Stanford J Shaw, "The Central Legislative Councils in the Nineteenth Century Ottoman Reform Movement before 1876," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 1, no. 1 (1970), p.71.

issuing laws and order bills and hearing cases of disputes between the government and individuals constituted the priority duties of the Council of State.²¹³

Abdulhamid had first declared the Constitution and a step was taken towards a parliamentary system. However, after a short while, the sultan closed down parliament. As a result, the area of responsibility of the Council of State was extended.

Preparing all kinds of law and regulation drafts; discussing and concluding the administrative disputes relayed by the government; determining the place of resolution for the conflicts between the administration and the legislation; interpreting and explaining the complexities of the laws and regulations; trying the civil servants whom the sultan or the government requested should be tried; reviewing and preparing answers for the questions of the sultan and his ministers were among the duties of the Council of State .²¹⁴

The presidency of the Council of State was a position equivalent to that of a minister. People coming from bureaucratic backgrounds were appointed to this position, which was considered to be a political one. Five of the Council of State Presidents had previously been Grand Viziers. The fact that the presidency should be held by ex- grand viziers must have extended the authority of the Council.²¹⁵ Other members of the Council of State were former cabinet members. Thus, the Council of State was a structure arising from the cabinet, that is the *Bâb-ı Âli*.

²¹³ Ali Pasha, Fuad Pasha, Mithat Pasha, Ahmet Celaleddin Pasha are considered to be the founders of the Council of State. On 10 May 1868, 41 members of whom 28 were Muslim, 13 of other religions took Office under the presidency of Mithat Pasha. The first offices of the Council of State members were the *Hazine-i Hassa* buildings, situated between Dolmabahçe and Beşiktaş. Rıza Göksoy, *Yüz yıl Boyunca Danıştay 1868-1968* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1968), p. 62.

²¹⁴ The council of state was separated into 5 departments in order to conduct these duties. a) Administration/Police/Military, b) Finance/endowments, c) Justice d)Public Works/Trade/Agriculture, e) Education. Shaw, *the Councils*, p.74.

The annulment of the Pülk concession granted to Sarıca Murad Osman Bey following the realization that the reserve was actually exploited by the Garvişof took place in 1888. At this time, the head of the *Şura-yı Devlet* was Ahmet Arifi Pasha. Ahmet Arifi Pasha, had not approved the dethroning of Sultan Abdulaziz and had thus won the appreciation and favor of Abdulhamid and became a Grand vizier, “*Mücerreb olan istikamet ve sadakat ve dirayeti cihetiyle azam tayin olunmuştur.*” The Pasha was cautious (even overcautious) since he had served in the Foreign Affairs Ministry²¹⁶ However, when Abdulhamid forgave and called back Mahmud Nedim Pasha, who was in exile in the Island of Chios (*Sakız*), to appoint him as Minister of Interior Affairs, the description of Nedim Pasha as a person who had “earned the hatred of the general” (*umumun nefretini kazanmış*) by Ahmed Arifi Pasha and his opposition to the appointment, caused his dismissal from the position of Grand Vizier.²¹⁷ According to Yaman, Ahmed Arifi Pasha was dismissed because he was too passive in the way he dealt with problems, and in order to make way for Mehmed Said Pasha.²¹⁸ Thus, Arifi Pasha was appointed as president of the Council of State after he had lost his position as Grand Vizier.

Ahmed Arifi Pasha was the twentieth Council of State president and carried out this duty for three terms. The third and last Council of State presidency of the Pasha took place between 25 September 1885 and 4 September 1895 (29 *Muharrem*

²¹⁶ İnal, İbnülemin Mahmut Kemal, *Osmanlı Devrinde Son Sadrazamlar* (İstanbul: Maarif Matbaası, 1940-1953), pp. 967-968.

²¹⁷ Mehmet Zeki Pakalın, *Son Sadrazamlar ve Başvekilleri* vol.7. (İstanbul: Ahmet Sait Matbaası, 1940-1948), p.389.

²¹⁸ Ahmet Emin Yaman, “Sadr-ı azamlık.” *Türkler v.13*. Ankara: Yeni Türkiye Yayınları, 2002. pp.577-587. Ahmet Emin Yaman, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Sadr-ı azamlık 1876-1922* (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Dil ve Tarih-Cografya Fakültesi, 1999), pp. 43,190.

1309 A.H.), thus coinciding with the annulment of the oil concession of Sarıca Murad Osman Bey²¹⁹.

The date when the actual conflict arises between the Council of State and the Sublime Porte concerning the Çulhazades is 1898. That year, Carl Reiser was found suitable for the Pülk oil concession by the government, while, opposing this, the Council of State supported Çulhazades, the candidate of Şakir Pasha.²²⁰

In 1898, when the conflict arose, the president of the Council of State was Said Pasha²²¹. As the twenty-first president of the Council of State, he served for nearly eight years, between 7 November 1895 and 29 October 1907. This was the longest Presidency of the Council. Said Pasha had previously occupied the Foreign Affairs Ministry chair for 10 years. He was considered to be a conformist. The fact that Said Pasha's years of duty coincide with the reign of Abdulhamid, would rather indicate that there was no disagreement between him and the sultan.

If we are content to consider that the Council of State was formed of former members of the Cabinet, it will be tempting to consider this conflict as a difference of opinion within the cabinet. However, we need to take account of other factors, one of which being the concept of separation of powers in the Ottoman State.

²¹⁹ Pakalın, p. 378-387; İnal, p.961-964; Karal, p.289.

²²⁰ The Council of State valued the opinion of Şakir Pasha who was the Inspector of the Anatolia Provinces. This was not the only case where the Council of State and Şakir Pasha were of the same opinion. In 1896, based on a report prepared by Şakir Pasha, the Council of State had found Governor of Sivas, Reşid Akif Pasha, guilty although Reşid Akif Pasha himself was the claimant. Abdulhamit Kırmızı, "Rules of the Provincial Empire: Ottoman Governors and the Administration of Provinces, 1895-1908" (Ph.D. diss., Bogazici University, 2005), p. 195.

²²¹ Kürd Said.

The Separation of Powers in the Central Ottoman Government and the Independent Stand of the State Council

In the Ottoman concept of sovereignty, the principle of the separation of powers did not exist. Thus, the legislative, administrative and juridical authorities²²² were subjected to the authority of the Sultan.²²³ An important part of the reforms brought to the Ottoman State Administration was accomplished under the reign of Mahmud II (1808-1839). One of the most important contributions to the State organization of the time consisted of the first steps taken towards the separation of the legislative and executive powers, in other words, the move towards the concept of “separation of powers” that characterizes modern States.²²⁴ Through the newly established cabinet of ministers and assemblies, a striking step was indeed taken towards separating the executive and legislative powers. One of Mahmud II’s innovative moves was to have institutions use in his name the competencies he had gathered in his own hands as he attempted to strengthen the Empire’s central authority.

His successors, Abdulmecid (1839-1861) and Abdulaziz (1861-1876), did not interrupt this practice of power sharing with different institutions. Thus the

²²² “The Separation of Powers” defines the distribution of the power of the State between the legislative, executive and judiciary branches. There is another kind of “Separation of the Powers” which defines decentralization. In a clearer sense, it defines the distribution of the authority and power between the federal and the local State or between the central administration and the local administration. (Stockmann, p. 54)

²²³ Robert Devereux, *the First Ottoman Constitutional Period; a Study of the Midhat Constitution and Parliament* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1963), pp.29, 169.

²²⁴ It can be said that in traditional Ottoman State administration, the legislative, judiciary and executive powers were concentrated in the hands of the Sultan, who headed the governmental council called the Divan-ı Humayun, supposed to function on the basis of the concept of unity of powers. It could also be said however that the Ulema (religious authorities) and kadis (judges) benefited from a certain form of autonomy in relation to the Divan and its more executive-like powers. In some cases, Ulemas were able to oppose the Sultan’s edicts, as in the famous example of Selim I, when he tried to abolish the rights of the people of the book (Christians and Jews) to retain their religion. The latter’s religious authorities also enjoyed some form of legal autonomy within the “millet” system.

separation of powers continued uninterrupted from the time of the Tanzimat reforms under Mahmud II to the establishment of the first constitutional monarchy. Indeed between 1839 and 1876, the Sublime Porte was able to use its executive power quite independently under the strong personalities of grand viziers like Mustafa Reşid, Ali and Fuad Pasha. The separation and increased independence of the judiciary can be seen as a result of the separation of these two powers (the legislative and executive). As for the Meclis-i Vala, which constituted the base of the Council of State, it was able to use its legislative and judicial powers separately and relatively independently from the executive. Indeed, the Meclis-i Vala was able to take different initiatives between 1854 and 1861. It even used its judicial powers practically independently.²²⁵ One of the most important steps taken for the separation of powers was the establishment of the Council of State in 1868. The imperial edict read at the opening ceremony of the Council of State clearly states that the purpose of the establishment of the Council is to separate the legislative and the executive powers:

“One of the reforms that needs to be made in priority and urgently relates to the separation of the executive, legal, judiciary affairs...”²²⁶

Abdulhamid’s authoritarian rule aimed to render the Sublime Porte passive and succeeded to do so. It also caused the development of the concept of separation of powers to be interrupted for 33 years. However, during this period of transition, the State Council, as a State institution, would not change overnight and it can be assumed that it probably strove to maintain some of the spirit of the time it was created, in 1868. The attitude exhibited by the central Ottoman government and the

²²⁵ Devereux, p.569.

²²⁶ Mehmet Seyitdanlıoğlu, *Tanzimat Devrinde Meclis-i Valâ, 1838-1868*. (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1999), p. 57. “ ... ziyade lüzumu olan ıslahatın biri dahi mesalih-i hukukiyyenin umur-u mülkiyeye ve hükümet-i icraiyyeden tefriki hususu olup bu madde-i mu'tenabihanın dahi bir an evvel yoluna konulması...”

Council of State in the case of the Pülk concession should therefore not come as a surprise, considering the important steps taken towards the separation of powers until the reign of Abdulhamid. It is thus not so surprising that even under his reign, the State Council, which had previously acted in a relatively independent manner, should adopt what could be considered as an oppositional stand and strive to follow its own independent path in relation to the Pülk concession issue.

Let us now look at the other party of the conflict, Bâb- Âlî during this year of 1898.

The Bâb-ı Âlî

The bureaucrat who occupied the Grand vizier seat on 8 November 1895 and who served this position until 9 November 1901 was Halil Rıfat Pasha. He performed this duty until he died. This is what Abdulhamid would later say of him, during his exile in Salonika:

“The only grand vizier I knew who was intelligent and never caused me any worry was Halil Rifat Pasha.”²²⁷

He did not even mention who murdered Cavid Bey, Halil Rıfat Pasha is son, and escaped from the death sentence thanks to the intervention of the Palace.

It is known that Halil Rıfat Pasha took the Grand vizier position as a “yes-man”. According to the duty concept of the pasha, the sultan would issue a decree and the Grand vizier would execute the decree. If the decision carried out because of the decree produced bad results, the responsibility belonged to the Grand vizier. In the eye of the Rıfat Pasha, the sultan was the shadow of the God.

²²⁷ Karal, p. 299.

Under the light of this information, it can be easily said that a Grand vizier who had such a concept of “service”, could hardly be expected to oppose Abdulhamid II. Halil Rıfat Pasha represents the kind of bureaucrat who is thoroughly submitted to the authority of the Sultan. Considering this, a *Bâb-ı Âli* under the presidency of Halil Rıfat Pasha could not be in a position to oppose any decision of Yıldız Palace.

If a decree was issued from Yıldız Palace granting the Pülk oil concession to Carl Raiser, the *Bâb-ı Âli* of Halil Rıfat Pasha would support it to the end. In this case, the party that would show the opposing spirit predominantly attributed to the Sublime Porte in the literature would be the Council of State, which had originated from the Sublime Porte. The insistence of the Council of State on Çulhazade had caused the Sublime Porte and The Council of State to come head to head.

In addition, it would help to point that both Halil Rıfat Pasha himself and his murdered son Cavid Bey were quite interested in concessions. Indeed, the concessions of the coal and oil ores exploited in the Şarköy district of the *Gelibolu* (Gallipoli) province had been granted to the person of the Grand vizier Halil Rıfat Pasha.²²⁸

The Grand vizier Halil Rıfat Pasha had also requested the issuing of the delayed decree concerning the tax and land rent of the oil mines in the province of Edirne.²²⁹ The concession for the lignite mine was given to the Grand Vizier Halil Rıfat Pasha, along with the concession for the Şarköy oil.²³⁰

²²⁸ BOA, İ.İMT 2/1314/R-1, 21/R 1314, 29 September 1896.

²²⁹ BOA, Y.PRK.A. 11/52, 05/Z/1314, 7 May 1897.

²³⁰ BOA. İ.OM. 4/1314/Z-2, 07/Z/1314, 9 May 1897. BOA, Y.MTV 226/1, 01/Za/1319, 9 Februray 1902.

Halil Rıfat Pasha received the concession for the Şarköy oil wells two years before the conflict arose around the Pülk concession. The oil interests of his Grand vizier, Halil Rıfat Pasha, may have inspired Abdulhamid who may also have wanted to display friendship to the Germans through the choice of Carl Reiser. Another possibility is that this idea could have been suggested to the Sultan by Halil Pasha himself.

In spite of the fact that the Council of State insisted on its view, the concession license was finally granted to the foreigner of German nationality, in accordance with the orders and instructions of the Sultan. No doubt, there were different rationales and dynamics behind this decision

The Rationales

What was the reason for the insistence of the Council of State and Şakir Pasha on granting the concession license for the extracting and operating of the oil reserve in the Pülk village to the Çulhazedes? Was it based on the rationale that the rights to this oil reserve should not to be granted to a foreigner, in other words to Carl Reiser, but that it should be operated and maintained by a person of their kin, who would be reliable, which would ensure the protection of the public interest? Or was it based on totally different reasons and motives such as nepotism and/or favoritism by Şakir Pasha and the pursuit not of the common interest, but of personal benefits?

How could it be? On the one hand, the Council of State and Şakir Pasha deem a candidate who is a Muslim Turk and an influential man is more appropriate than a foreigner of German origin on grounds of State security. In other words, the Council of State, the General Staff and Şakir Pasha were trying to safeguard the security and prosperity of the region's people. On the other hand Sultan Abdulhamid and the

Sublime Porte somehow chose not to protect and safeguard the security and prosperity of the people living in the region. Could such an approach be rational and right?

Why would Sultan Abdulhamid, who possessed sole and exclusive authority over the Imperial Government and accordingly over the Yıldız Palace, and who was known to be a vigilant person, prefer a foreigner of German origin to his own subjects?

To be able to answer these questions, we must consider two different points and the dynamics that affected them. The first point is why Şakir Pasha supported Çulhazades in relation to the Pülk concession, and the second one is why Abdulhamid II did find Carl Reiser suitable.

First, we will look the relationship between the Çulhazades and Şakir Pasha.

The Anatolia General Reform Inspector: Şakir Pasha

Abdulhamid II had founded the Anatolia General Reform Inspectorships (*Anadolu Islahatı Umum Müfettişliği*) and appointed Şakir Pasha to lead it due to external pressures and in order to improve the harsh economic and political conditions of the *Vilayet-i Sitte* and develop the region.²³¹ Reform would be done for the development and improvement of the province and the prosperity of the subjects. The place this restructuring was first applied to, thus the place where Şakir Pasha first took office was Erzurum.²³²

According to Mardin, one of the main causes of the disconnection between the center and the periphery was that the Ottoman government mistrusted the strong

²³¹ Karal, p.143; Tahsin Paşa, *Tahsin Paşa'nın Yıldız Hatıraları* (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Yayınları, 1996), p. 48.

²³² Karaca, p. 83.

families (notables) of the provinces.²³³ Because of the control the state maintained on the economy, Local notables' activities led to the establishment of an increased bond between them and the officials on duty in places where these activities gained importance.²³⁴ Was there such a "bond" between Şakir Pasha and the Çulhazade family?

At least, we know that there was no parental or other similar link between Ahmed Şakir Pasha and the Çulhazades of Trabzon. The Pasha's relation with Trabzon began during the Anatolian Reform Inspectorate period, when a delegation from the city came to see him during his inspection of the Erzurum province, which was included in the Anatolian Reform Project, and voice some complaints. Following the delegation's request, he went to inspect Trabzon. However, Trabzon was not included in the six eastern provinces mentioned in the Berlin Treaty, and the Sublime Porte actually declared it would not be suitable for him to make an inspection of Trabzon, since he had no competence to do so as an Anatolian Reform Project inspector.²³⁵

The British Consul, Major Bulman, hardly left Şakir Pasha alone during the inspection he made in Erzurum.²³⁶ Moreover, not content to travel throughout Anatolia with the inspection committee, the Consul also asked for a special province to be created, which would include Van, Erzurum and Bitlis.²³⁷ Understandably, this

²³³ Şerif Mardin, "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics," *Political participation in Turkey: historical background and present problems* edited by Engin D. Akarlı , Gabriel Ben-Dor (İstanbul: Boğaziçi University Publications, 1975), pp. 10.

²³⁴ *Ibid.*, p.18.

²³⁵ Filiz Dıġıroġlu, *Memalik-i Osmaniye Duhanları Müşterekü'l-Menfaa Reji Şirketi. Trabzon Reji İdaresi (1883-1914)* . (İstanbul: Osmanlı Bankası Arşiv ve Araştırma Merkezi Yayınları, 2007), p.90.

²³⁶ *Ibid.*, 33.

²³⁷ Muammer Demirel, *Sultan İkinci Abdülhamid ile Erzurum vilayeti arasındaki yazışmalar (1894-1904)*. (İstanbul: Çamlıca Basım Yayın, 2007), pp. 48-49.

kind of direct intrusion in Ottoman interior affairs must have given rise to a defensive psychological reaction on the part of Şakir Pasha. His reaction against foreign capital and his support of the Çulhazades can be seen as a consequence of the circumstances of the time.

Trabzon

After the Crimean War, a new upper class had appeared in Trabzon and it contributed to the city's development. The war had caused a great amount of gold to accumulate in the region. The city's port had become a commercial and supply center between Crimea, the Caucasus and the eastern Ottoman provinces.²³⁸ After the provinces of Batum and Kars came under Russian rule, Russia built a new land transit road through the Caucasus, thus linking Eastern and Central Europe directly to Asia by land, and threatening to eclipse Trabzon, which had until then served as a major stop along the traditional silk route, linking Europe and Asia through Erzurum and Iran. Indeed, this caused a serious drop in Trabzon's transit trade and weakened its economy.²³⁹ However, this change did not take place overnight, and for a time, the most profitable activity in the region remained that of providing back and forth transport for goods going through Trabzon and Erzurum, on their way back and forth between Iran and Europe.

Despite its now Russian controlled competitors, Batum and Poti, Trabzon remained an important stop on the transit route to Asia, be it towards Baghdad or

²³⁸ A. Üner Turgay, "Trabzon", *Doğu Akdeniz'de Liman Kentleri 1800-1914*, (İstanbul,1993), p.45-75.

²³⁹ Cuinet, p.134.

Persia and India.²⁴⁰ Trabzon exports in transit from Iran towards Europe reached an amount of 8,105,225 francs while exports of Anatolian products to Europe reached 7,519,829.²⁴¹ Suffice it to say that goods in transit through Trabzon from and to Iran are estimated at 12 to 16.000 tons, equivalent to some 20-25,000,000 francs.²⁴²

Goods from Europe reached the eastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire through the port of Trabzon,²⁴³ as agricultural goods of the region were exported through the same port. Erzurum and the ten eastern provinces of the Empire constituted Trabzon's hinterland. Moreover, Transport from these same eastern provinces to the Capital, Istanbul, was also conducted through Trabzon. Trabzon was Erzurum's port town.²⁴⁴

Trade along the Trabzon, Erzurum, Iran axis depended on animal transport, in other words, on horses, mules and donkeys.²⁴⁵ The Çulhazade family, which Şakir Pasha had selected for the Pülk oil concession, happened to be one of those rich trading families involved in such transport activities. It possessed caravans of up to 360 horses and mules, and benefiting from trade relations ranging all the way to Iran and even to the Far East.²⁴⁶

²⁴⁰ "Erzeroum" in *Annuaire Oriental (ancien indicateur oriental) du commerce, de l'industrie, de l'administration et de la magistrature: Turquie, Russie, Grèce, Roumanie, Serbie, Bulgarie, 1893–1894* (Constantinople: Cervati Frères & Cie, 1894) , p. 943

²⁴¹ *Anuaire Oriental 1898*, "Trebızonde", p. 1108.

²⁴² *Cuinet*, p. 134.

²⁴³ *Vilayet-i salname-i Trabzon*, Trabzon, 1878, p. 191.

²⁴⁴ *Vilayet-i salname-i Trabzon*, Trabzon, 1902, p. 79.

²⁴⁵ *Cuinet*, p.131.

²⁴⁶ Mehmet Akif Bal, *Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e Trabzonlu Simalar ve Trabzonlu Köklü Aileler* (İstanbul: 2005), p. 552.

The Çulhazades

The Çulhazades were a well established Trabzon family, who belonged to the Çephi Oğuz Turkish branch. Having first settled in the Beşikdüzü district, they then moved to Pazarkapı and Yenicuma. They were also called Saltoğulları. In the 19th century, the family would handle caravans of up to 360 horses and mules, trading and traveling to Iran and deep into Asia. They owned two trade buildings in Trabzon. For a while they acted as trustees (mutemed) for the Nemlizade family's affairs in Trabzon.²⁴⁷

In the years 1906-1907, a donation was raised by officials and the population within the Trabzon province for the repair of the Mekke-i Mükerrerme (*Ayn Zebide*) water works. If we look at the donors, we can see that the highest donation after that of the Governor was made by the Nemlizade family and Kadri Çulhazade, both contributing the same amount.²⁴⁸ This gives us an idea of the economic power the family represented in the region. One can say that the Çulhazades were one of the two most important families in Trabzon.

A letter Governor Mehmed Galip sent to Mustafa Kemal Pasha on 9 June 1919 mentions Kadri Çulhazade as one of the Trabzon notables, evidence that the Çulhazades were one of the prominent families in Trabzon:

“...Trabzon Muhafaza-i Hukuk-ı Milliye Cemiyeti memleketin ileri gelen eşraf ve mütehayyızanı meyanından müntehap ve Murat Hanzade Ziya ve Nemlizade

²⁴⁷ Bal, p. 552.

²⁴⁸ “*Vali-i Vilayet atufetlü Reşad Bey Efendi 1625 kuruş. Nemlizade Saadetlü Cemal Efendi 540 kuruş. Çulhazade Kadri 540 kuruş*”, Hikmet Öksüz, “Hicaz Su Yollarının Tamiri İçin Trabzon ve Havalisinden Toplanan Yardımlar”, *Trabzon Tarihi Sempozyumu 6-8 Kasım 1998*, (Trabzon: Trabzon Kültür Yayınları, 1999). pp. 443-460.

Sabri ve Çulhazade Kadri ve Hacı Ali Hafızzade Mehmet Salih ve Kazazzade

*Hüseyin ve Abanoszade Huseyin ve Hatıpzade Emin Efendilerden mürekkeptir...*²⁴⁹

Rich and dynamic, the members of the Çulhazade family were involved in the lucrative activities of the time. One of them is mentioned as Çulhazade Hüseyin in the 1885 *Annuaire Oriental* and registered as manufacturer and trader.²⁵⁰ In the 1896 commercial yearbook, another family member is registered as “Tchulhazade Frese”, and as being active as a broker.²⁵¹

At that time, metal held quite an important place in the world economy,²⁵² and the Çulhazades also directed their efforts to this field, and were seen to be actively trading in copper, iron and other metals in 1896 and 1898.²⁵³

Considering the large caravans they used to carry goods to Iran and Asia, it is easy to imagine the kind of relation this trading family might have with Erzurum, which acted as one of the important transit points along the route between Trabzon and Tabriz, in Iran. In this sense, there is nothing surprising in the fact that a family from Trabzon should be aware of the presence of oil in the Tercan district of Erzurum.

Why a trader from Trabzon and not from Erzurum?

²⁴⁹ Söylev Belgeler: Vesika 6. Trabzon, 9/6/1919. Available [online]: <http://silifke.meb.gov.tr/Ataturk/SYLBELGE/blghtmtr/blg006.htm> [15 September 2008].

²⁵⁰ “Erzeroum” in *Indicateur oriental: Annuaire du comerce, de la magistrature etc. Turquie, Russie, Grèce, Bulgarie, 1885*. (Constantinople : Raphaël César Cervati, 1885), p.486

²⁵¹ “Trebizonde” in *Annuaire oriental (ancien indicateur oriental) du commerce, de l’industrie, de l’administration et de la magistrature, 1896-97*. (Constantinople : Cervati Frères, 1896), p.1078

²⁵² Cuinet, p. 133.

²⁵³ “Trabizonde” in *Annuaire oriental 1896*, p.1078. Trabizonde” in *Annuaire oriental 1898*, p. 1109.

The provinces of Erzurum and Trabzon shared the same customs.²⁵⁴ Their geographic vicinity also created strong commercial links between the two cities. Erzurum also hosted the region's only trafficable road providing trade communication between Europe and inner Asia. The construction of the road had been difficult and costly and had taken a lot of time. It was open to traffic after the establishment of the Ministry of Public Works in 1856, but was closed in 1865 for repairs, to be reopened only in 1872.²⁵⁵

This road was to the advantage of both Trabzon and Erzurum, but the first city profited more from it than the second, because goods passing through Trabzon had to be stored in the port while waiting to be transited which was an extra source of income, while they only passed through Erzurum, with no need for storage and therefore no extra income.²⁵⁶ This and other similar factors caused the Trabzon traders to be in a much better position than those of Erzurum.

Moreover, the Muslim inhabitants of Erzurum were hardly interested in trade, most of them being busy in agriculture or working as civil servants, trade activities being usually carried out by Armenians.²⁵⁷ This explains why when in search of a local and Muslim investor for the exploitation of the Pülk oil, the chosen entrepreneur should be from Trabzon and not from Erzurum.

Financial Resources for the Reforms

Financial resources were necessary to realize the reforms. At times like those, when the finances of the State were weak, the region would have to rely on its own

²⁵⁴ Cuinet, p. 19.

²⁵⁵ Cuinet, p. 28

²⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 134.

²⁵⁷ *Loc. cit.*

resources for its development to be drawn from.²⁵⁸ It is quite plausible that one of the ways to do this would be to draw upon the mines of the region.

Before long, the Inspection Committee ascertained that there was oil in the Pülk village. The Reform Committee requested the required officers and engineers from the Sublime Porte to come and drill naphtha wells and operate the Pülk oil reserve. This request was discussed and approved at the Council of State, and engineers were appointed to exploit and operate the site.²⁵⁹

Referring to the (Kanunisani 1313) *İkdam*, and (12 Kanunisani 1313 A / 24 January 1898) *Tercüman-ı Hakikat* newspapers issues, *Ali Karaca* writes that gas and oil had been found at the two wells drilled at the "Bölük" village of Tercan District as a result of the work of Abdullah Effendi, who had been sent to Erzurum to explore mines, and that the samples had been sent for analysis.²⁶⁰ The 12 *Kanunisani* issue of *Tercüman-ı Hakikat* dated 1313 corresponds to the date of 27 January 1898. However we know that Sarıca Murat Osman Bey had made a request for the Pülk oil wells in 1888. That is to say the person who discovered oil in Pülk for the first time was not Abdullah Effendi.

Debates concerning the wells in Erzurum and especially the Pülk oil had taken place in the Tezyid-i Servet Commission.²⁶¹

Şakir Pasha was of the opinion that the sources of wealth in Ottoman Empire were monopolize by foreigners and was disturbed by this. He argued that local governments must encourage local people to establish companies. He asserted the

²⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 86.

²⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 81.

²⁶⁰ Ali Karaca, The name "Bölük" is probably a misreading of what must be the original: "Pülk".

²⁶¹ Karaca, 85.

facilitation of the permission for the concession seekers from the public and helping the entrepreneurs who are not foreigners. He thus submitted his opinions to the government on the exploitation of the mines and the need to avoid monopolization as much as possible, as it formed an obstruction to development.²⁶² The memorandum in which Şakir Pasha refers to the name of the Çulhazâdes for the exploitation of the Pülk wells must have been among those presented to the Sublime Porte.

In the final analysis, when all of these aspects are considered, it is quite clear that Şakir Pasha would resort to grant the oil concession as soon as possible to provide income for the budget of the province, in other words, he would approve the granting of the concession to a person from the community who was not a "foreigner". Thus, it is understandable that he should request the granting of the Pülk concession to the Çulhazade family.

In order to understand why Şakir Pasha supported the Çulhazades of Trabzon, we must look at the relation between Trabzon and Erzurum.

The Ottoman-German Alliance

The decision of the Sultan to grant the Pülk oil concession to Carl Reiser would seem to be in contradiction with the protectionist policies of Sultan Abdülhamid, in particular with the protectionist policies in relation to oil reserves in Mosul and Baghdad.

Why did Sultan Abdülhamid prefer a foreigner of German origin to grant the concession license on Pülk oil reserves although he pursued a protectionist policy against imperialist forces? His choice can be seen as an attempt to seek for an ally,

²⁶² *İbid.*, 81.

an attempt to make the Ottoman Empire pleasant and amiable to Germany, since there had been a lot of progress on the whole scheme and plan for them to be allies.

In 1897, England, France and Russia made an alliance against the Ottoman Empire in relation to the Crete island issue; however Germany and Austria took side with the Ottoman Empire and supported the Ottoman Empire.²⁶³

The Sultan made a lot of personal and official attempts in order to strengthen and reinforce his friendship and alliance with the German Empire. Specifically, German officers were employed to oversee the reorganization of the Ottoman army and to train Ottoman officers starting from 1883.²⁶⁴ In the autumn of 1889,²⁶⁵ during his visit to the Well-Protected Domains (*Memalik-i Mahrusa*), Kaiser Wilhelm II, the German Emperor, was hosted in a very friendly manner by Sultan Abdulhamid. This official visit by Wilhelm II increased the influence of the German Empire over the Ottoman Empire²⁶⁶

During his first visit to the Ottoman Empire, the German Emperor perceived that the Ottomans were eager to establish an alliance with the Germans. Wilhelm II was welcomed with overwhelming enthusiastic demonstrations rather than established diplomatic procedures. For a long time, newspapers issued at that time were solely interested in this visit of Wilhelm II to the Ottoman Empire. For instance, the *İkdam* newspaper reported that German people also have the characteristic features of the Ottoman people such as bravery, reliability, manliness and other high attributions and that the people of these two nations reflect each other just like a mirror, and that the Ottomans were always filled with friendship and

²⁶³ İlber Ortaylı, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Alman Nüfuzu* (İstanbul: İletişim, 2004), pp. 52-60.

²⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 52-60.

²⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 53.

affection towards the German people. Furthermore, during his visit the Emperor acquired the concession license for the construction of the railway lines that were to be extended from Konya to Baghdad.²⁶⁷

As a matter of fact, during the visit of the sons of the German Emperor to Istanbul, the macadamized roads of Boğazkesen Avenue and Yeniyol Avenue in Beyoğlu which were on their route were repaired to show respect to them.²⁶⁸

Actually, these welcoming demonstrations were not spontaneous. They were organized in accordance with the instructions and under the personal control of the Sultan. The Ottoman Empire was aware of the importance of creating a positive image in order to survive.²⁶⁹

In 1888, the required concession for the construction of the line that would extend the railroad to Mosul was also granted to the Germans.²⁷⁰ Moreover, an article included in the concession agreement set forth that “the concession rights to operate the mines located on both sides of the said railroad belong to the company that constructs the railroad” clearly showing that the Germans aimed to take advantage of the oil reserves.²⁷¹ Whereupon, Abdulhamid issued an imperial decree on 6 February

²⁶⁷ *Loc. cit.*

²⁶⁸ D.MKT 837/73, 17/M/1322, 03 April 1904.

²⁶⁹ Selim Deringil, *the Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1909* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1998), p. 135.

²⁷⁰ The Anatolian Railway Company (It is an operating company financially organised and controlled by the Deutsche Bank) was the first company to obtain a foreign concession in relation to Mesopotamian oil, in 1888. The company was registered under Turkish law on 4 October 1888 as the Société de Chemin de Fer d'Anatolie. The construction of the line started in 1889 and reached Ankara in 1893. Upon the Sultan's wish that it should be extended to Konya by 1896, the line became the foundation of the future Orient Express railway. This concession constituted the start of Germany's financial concern and economic influence in Turkey. Kent, p. 16.

²⁷¹ Earle, *Turkey, the Great Powers, and the Bagdad Railway*, p. 34.

1889, that transferred the oil reserves in Mosul to his possession and ownership.²⁷²

With this imperial prescript, Abdulhamid tried to counter England and France, and in particular the German Empire, who possessed the railroad concession rights and pursued the goal of taking advantage of the oil reserves in Mosul.²⁷³

When the date and the content of the imperial edict are taken into consideration, we understand that Abdulhamid was aware of the meaning and importance of oil and was already developing strategies concerning the oil reserves ten years before the approval of granting oil concession rights in the Pülk village to the German subject Carl Reiser.

Then, there would be two reasons for granting the concession rights of Pülk oil reserves to a person of German origin. First, the Pülk oil resources were very modest compared to the rich resources of Mosul and Baghdad, and were accordingly deemed of less importance. Secondly, these reserves could thus easily be used in a relatively low cost attempt to please and propitiate the Germans. While Abdulhamid had transferred the Mosul and Baghdad oil reserves to his possession and ownership in order to put them “under his protection”, he chose to grant the concession rights for the oil reserves in Pülk to a foreigner of German origin, most probably, in a symbolic gesture aiming to propitiate the Germans and thus reinforce and strengthen the Ottoman German alliance.²⁷⁴

Finally, when all these historical events and the conjuncture of that period are taken to account, the reason why the Abdulhamid deemed appropriate and

²⁷² Later, on 19 November 1902, Abdulhamid II issued a second Imperial Restrict on this issue.

²⁷³ Cahit Doğan, “Petrol Meselemizin Dünü,” *Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Dergisi* Aralık (1979), p. 110.

²⁷⁴ German- Ottoman friendship had been developing into a solidarity against the alliance of England, France and Russia

advisable to grant the concession rights of the oil reserves in Pülk, contrary to his protectionist policy, and why he ignored all warnings and objections raised by the Council of State becomes very clear. It complies with his foreign policy, which consisted in pursuing balance and acquiring allies.

Carl Reiser²⁷⁵

In 1889 the visit German Emperor Wilhelm had made to Istanbul was important for many other project activities other than the railroad concessions. As the concrete results of this visit, a 'Trade Agreement' signed between the German and Ottoman Empires and the 'Customs Tariff Reduction' is accepted as the important events of 1890. This important agreement later became the main source of the long lasting activity of the German industry in the Ottoman Empire.²⁷⁶ At exactly this point that is at the zenith of the German industry's presence in the Ottoman Empire Carl Reiser appears to be a person who plays a part in Ottoman-German affairs.

Carl Reiser was a German subject who was appointed to the 'Siemens & Halske' company's delegation in Turkey in 1894. But what is the importance of the 'Siemens & Halske' company? The 'Siemens & Halske' Company was founded in Germany in connection with the 1847 Industrial Revolution and had constructed the Ottoman "Istanbul Telegraph Center" in 1855. In 1856, 'Siemens & Halske' sent the first telegraph device to the Ottoman Empire.²⁷⁷ One of the important technological

²⁷⁵ Ibid., 309.

²⁷⁶ Önder Küçükerman, *Siemens'in 150 Yılı (İstanbul: Aksoy Matbaası, 1997)*.

²⁷⁷ The 1856 'İzmir-Aydın Railway' was also started on this date.

breakthroughs of the year 1866 was the invention of 'the Electric Dynamo'. The system developed by 'Siemens & Halske' soon started to be used in Europe.²⁷⁸

Carl Reiser brought this important invention to the Ottoman lands in the following years. Induction devices, electric dynamo and scaling devices start to come to the Izmir Customs in Reiser's name.²⁷⁹ Reiser continues to receive the latest inventions of the era from Vienna and one of these was the telephone.²⁸⁰ The Customs are soon filled up with boxes delivered to the name of Reiser, whom they call "Mösyö Rayzer" (Monsieur Reiser). There were electric light bulbs, switches and cables in the boxes.²⁸¹ Accumulator covers were also sent to the Galata Custom (*Emtia-i Ecnebiye Gümrüğü*) to the name Reiser.²⁸² On 11 October 1906, electric devices and tools reach the Izmir Customs also to be delivered to Reiser.²⁸³ Tools of the latest technology of the era continue to arrive to the Izmir Customs for Carl Reiser on 1 June 1906,²⁸⁴ 11 March 1907,²⁸⁵ 21 April 1907,²⁸⁶ 28 April 1907,²⁸⁷ 2 September 1907,²⁸⁸ 13 November 1907²⁸⁹ and 22 July 1907.²⁹⁰

²⁷⁸ Küçükerman, *Siemens'in 150 Yılı*, p. 25.

²⁷⁹ BOA, İ.HUS 151/ 1325 M-010, 03/M/1325, 16 February 1907.

²⁸⁰ BOA, Y. MTV 201/68, 16/Z/1317, 17 April 1900.

²⁸¹ BOA, Y. MTV 208/47, 08/B/1318 1 November 1900.

²⁸² BOA. İ.RSM 22/ 1323 Z-10, 19/Z/1323, 14 February 1906.

²⁸³ BOA, Y. A.RES 139/27 22/Ş/1324, 11 October 1906.

²⁸⁴ BOA, Y.A.RES 142/12 08/R/1324, 1 June 1906.

²⁸⁵ BOA, İ.RSM. 26/1325 M-22, 26/M/1325, 11 March 1907.

²⁸⁶ BOA. İ.RSM. 27/ 1325-RA-04, 08/Ra/1325, 29 April 1907

²⁸⁷ BOA. İ.RSM. 27/ 1325-Ra-12, 15/Ra/1325, 28 April 1907.

²⁸⁸ BOA. İ.RSM. 29/ 1325-Ş-08 13/Ş/1325, 21 September 1907.

²⁸⁹ BOA. İ.RSM. 29/ 1325-L-07 07/L/1325, 13 November 1907.

²⁹⁰ BOA.İ.HUS 156/1325-C-18 11/C/1325, 22 July 1907.

In 1898, the German Emperor Wilhelm II and the Empress visited the Ottoman Empire on 18 October for the second time, on board the ‘Hohenzollern’ yacht.

It is quite interesting that two months before the Emperor arrives, the electrical armature of the ‘Şale Pavilion’ inside the Yıldız Palace is undertaken by the Siemens firm, that is to say, by Carl Reiser.²⁹¹ On the offer and undertaking letter of the Agency signed by Reiser, it is stated that:

“The lighting equipment and objects used in the palace would be ‘prepared and supplied very rich, very elaborate and soundly gilded’ and the works would be completed by the end of August.”²⁹²

It ought to be because he equipped the Yıldız Palace with the latest inventions of the era that after the second visit of the German Emperor Wilhelm II to the Ottoman capital, his (Carl Reiser’s) wife, a German subject’s wife, was offered a decoration by Sultan Abdulhamid.²⁹³ It is understood that Abdülhamid was not content with offering a decoration²⁹⁴ for the role Carl Reiser played in Ottoman-Germany affairs and the capabilities he had shown. He also found it appropriate to grant him the Erzurum Pülk oil concession.

The identification of Carl Reiser fits in with all of the other pieces of the puzzle. That the dates of the official correspondences and negotiations regarding the granting of the oil concession to Carl Reiser (8 June 1898, 19 June 1899, and 5 July 1899) should correspond to the time just preceding the visit of the German Emperor

²⁹¹ Küçükerman, *Siemens’in 150 Yılı*, pp. 25- 32.

²⁹² BOA. İ.HUS, 75/ 1317 S-063, 25/S/1317, 5 Temmuz 1899.

²⁹³ BOA. İ.TAL. 161/1316Ş-037, 19/Ş/1316, 2 January 1899. The exact name of the Lady who received the Şefkat medal was “Ernestine Carl Reiser,” who must have been (who could hardly have been anyone else but) Carl Reiser’s wife.

²⁹⁴ *Şefkat Nişanı*

gives the impression that the *Memalik-i Şahane* was attempting to catch up with the Emperor's arrival. This evidence supports the thesis that the concession was given to a German with the motivation to reinforce Ottoman- German friendship.

Only one point remains to be dealt with. Was Carl Reiser interested in the oil concession? The answer to this question can also be understood with the aid of the records the kept in Prime Ministry Ottoman Archives.

Records prove that Reiser was indeed interested in mines.²⁹⁵ He had previously requested a tender for the lead, tinsel copper, antimony and lignite mines exploited in the Balıkesir District of the Karesi province, in the Avunya and Balya districts, and in the villages of Mancınık, Alakilise and Sofiler, near the Plain of Gümüşler, in the vicinity of the district of Edremit.²⁹⁶

Abdulhamid had used this interest of Reiser's as a means to affiliate the "*Memalik-i Şahane*," (i.e., the Ottoman Empire) which had fallen to the position of a periphery country, to the more central German Empire.

Applicant 3 - The Fourth Army

The Fourth Army had opposed Garvişof, who came into the agenda through Sarıca Murad Osman Bey, the official applicant for the concession rights to operate oil site in Pülk, on the ground that he was both Armenian and a Russian subject.

Ten years after this event, The Fourth Army was now opposed to Carl Reiser, who had applied for the concession rights, for the reason of his being German. Moreover, there was now an increasing British interest towards the region:

²⁹⁵ Kornrumpf, 309.

²⁹⁶ BOA.MV. 3/85 09/Ş/1302, 24 May 1885.

Two foreigners, Mr. Lih and Mr. Andre, who arrived in Trabzon by sea for the purpose of visiting certain places in the Erzurum and Van provinces, were accompanied by an officer and two sergeants of the mounted gendarmerie.²⁹⁷

The New York Herald Tribune's correspondent Mr. Whiteman also happened to be in Erzurum at that time.²⁹⁸ As two other English subjects, Felix Oswald and Henry Lence were arriving in Erzurum, an instruction was sent to Erzurum stating not to raise any difficulty for them.²⁹⁹

The Fourth Army made an attempt to resolve this sensitive issue in the best possible way from its point of view.

In 1905, the Fourth Army who insisted on not granting the concession rights to foreigners applied itself for the operation of the oil reserve located at the Pülk village.³⁰⁰

This oil reserve site located at the Pülk was at a 13 hours distance from the headquarters of the Fourth Army.³⁰¹ On 10 şaban 1323 A.H. / 10 October 1905, the Field Marshal of the Fourth Army Mehmed Zeki Pasha³⁰² (*Dördüncü Ordu-yu Hümâyûn Müşiri*) wrote that, if the said reserve was well operated, it would meet the requirements of the Ottoman military troops located at Erzurum and Erzincan as well as those of the people living in the close vicinity.³⁰³ He was aware that not only

²⁹⁷ BOA. İ.HUS. 65/1316/M-045, 16/M/1316, 05 June 1898.

²⁹⁸ BOA.Y.MTV.177/261, 16/M/1316, 5 June 1898.

²⁹⁹ BOA. İ.HUS. 65/1316/M-045, 16/M/1316, 05 June 1898.

³⁰⁰ BOA. Y.MTV. 279/69, 10/Ş/1323, 9 October 1905.

³⁰² Sinan Kunalp, *Son Dönem Osmanlı Erkân ve Ricali, 1839-1922: Prosopografik Rehber* (İstanbul: İsis, 1999) p, 16.

³⁰³ "...Mâbeyn-i Hümâyûn-ı cenab-ı mulûkâne Başkitâbet-i Celilesine /Devletli Efendim Hazretleri: Erzurum Vilayeti dâhilinde Tercan Kazası'na mülhak ve merkez-i ordu-yı hümâyûna on üç sa'at bu'd mesafede vâki' Pülk Karyesi'nde bir petrol ma'deni neb'an etmektedir. Bu madenin cinsi hâlis ve oldukça da zengindir. İşletildiği halde Erzurum ve Erzincan mevki'lerinde aramsâz olan

foreign capitalists but also several Ottoman subjects, even the famous Nemlizâde family,³⁰⁴ were doing their best in order to obtain the concession rights of the oil reserve in Erzurum.

The Fourth Army still maintained its opinion of 1898 that acquiring of the concession rights of the oil reserve by the foreigners would be inadvisable in terms of the strategic location of the Tercan district. The establishment of a foreign administration associated with the concession rights of the oil reserve located between Erzurum and Erzincan regions which were of high military importance was considered absolutely disadvantageous and unacceptable.³⁰⁵

According to the Commander of the Fourth Army, if the concession rights were granted to foreigners, the army and the people living in the close vicinity would not benefit from the oil reserve as they deserved. Thus, taking into consideration the advantages the oil reserve presented for the army it was believed that the mining rights of the said reserve should be assigned to it.³⁰⁶

Eventually, a negative reply was given to the application of the army for the concession rights of the Pülk oil reserve. The Fourth Army's application was

asâkir-i şâhâne ve civâr mahaller ahalisinin sarfiyatını te'mîne kâfi idiği tahakkuk kılınmıştır.” BOA.Y.MTV 279/ 69, 10/Ş/1323, 9 October 1905.

³⁰⁴ Nemlizadeler: One of the richest families of the Empire. BOA.Y.MTV 279/ 69

³⁰⁵ “...*Bu madenin imtiyâzını istihsâl etmek üzere ecnebî sermayedârânıyla teb‘a-i şâhâneleri bazıları çalışmakta ve hattâ Nemli Zâdelerden birinin dahi imtiyâz-ı mezkûru ahz ve istihsâle uğraşmakta oldukları işitilmektedir. Erzurumla Erzincan gibi askerlik nokta-i nazarından pek mühim olan iki mevki‘ arasında böyle bir ecnebî idâresinin teşekkülü mahzurdan salim olamayacağına ...”* BOA. Y.MTV. 279/69, 10/Ş/1323 / 09.10.1905

³⁰⁶ “...*ve bunlar tarafından istihsâl olunacak imtiyâz dahi ordu-yı hümayun ve civâr mahaller ahalisini layıkıyla müstefid edemeyeceğine nazaran mezkûr petrol ma‘deninin Dördüncü Ordu-yı Hümayûn tarafından mu‘âvenet-i askeriye icrâsıyla sâye-i hazret-i padişâhîde mevki‘-i istifâdeye vaz‘ı esbâb-ı hasenenin sâha-i fi‘l ve icrâya îsâline çalışmak üzere imtiyâzının ordu-yı hümayûna i‘tâ ve ihsânı hususunun lutfen ve inâyeten meşmûl-i müsâ‘ade-i kerâmet âde-i cenâb-ı zıllullâh-i akdesî buyurulması arz ve estid‘asına mücâseret olunur ol bâbda ve her hâlde emr u ferman hazret-i men lehü'l-emrindir.Fî 10 Şabani'l-mu‘azzam 1323 / 26 Eylül 1321Yaver-i Ekrem-i Hazret-i Şehriyârî Dördüncü Ordu-yı Hümayûn Müşiri [mühür]”* BOA. Y.MTV 279/ 69

rejected. The rationale was quite clear. At that time the lands where the Pülk oil reserve was located were owned by some foundations. Therefore, the Council of State decided that the concession right would only be granted to a person who would be chosen by these foundations.³⁰⁷

Volkan Ediger³⁰⁸ addressed this issue using the expression “Now the sects set their hands on it”. He makes an anachronic assessment that the members of the Fourth Army also followed the ideology of the future Secular, Nationalist Republic, presuming that they perceived the sects, religious orders, and foundations as “dangerous others” just as they perceived the Armenians.

As for the outcome of the Carl Reiser concession case, no document related to it was found during this research. However, considering the (negative) reply to the request for a concession made by the Fourth Army itself in 1905, and the fact that the Pülk oil site then belonged to some religious foundation, it can be gathered that Carl Reiser’s adventure was short-lived.

³⁰⁷ BOA.YPR.A 14/22, 15/ Ra/1314, 24 August 1896.

³⁰⁸ Ş.Volkan Ediger. *Osmanlı'da Neft ve Petrol: Enerji Ekonomi-Politiği Perspektifinden* (Ankara: ODTÜ Geliştirme Vakfı Yayıncılık, 2005), p. 164.

CHAPTER V

ATTITUDES of the PERIPHERY

Local Dynamics

The transition from the nineteenth to the twentieth century had been very difficult for the entire empire. Nevertheless, Erzurum had been one of the provinces that most felt the extreme difficulties of the nineteenth century. The economic situation of Erzurum was weakened due to Russian invasions, frequent rebellions and insurrections.

Three provinces Kars, Ardahan and Batum, also known as “*vilayet-i selase*” remained under Russian occupation as a result of the Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878) also known as “the War of 93.”³⁰⁹ This situation caused a great fear throughout the lands of the Ottoman Empire.³¹⁰ In the last period, Erzurum served the Ottoman Empire as a bastion against the Russian attacks.³¹¹

The region was invaded by the Russians three times, in 1829, 1878 and 1904 respectively. The city center and the surrounding towns and villages suffered great damage, many being almost entirely demolished and burnt down.³¹² It was a frontier region and suffered the consequences of this.³¹³

³⁰⁹ Berlin Treaty (13 July 1878).

³¹⁰ Erzurum, Sivas, Bitlis, Mamüretülaziz and Diyarbekir which were among the eastern provinces would be experiencing this faith at the end of the First World War.

³¹¹ Patrick Balfour Kinross, *Ataturk: the Rebirth of a Nation* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964), p. 218.

³¹² Kamil Erdeha, *Milli Mücadelede Vilayetler ve Valiler* (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1975), p. 47.

³¹³ Ronald C. Jennings, “Urban Population in Anatolia in the Sixteenth Century: A Study of Kayseri, Karaman, Amasya, Trabzon and Erzurum” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 7, no.1 (1976), p. 26.

All this was coupled to naturally severe climate conditions, high altitude and long and cold winter months, which did not only affect agriculture and cattle breeding, but also human life conditions.³¹⁴

We must remember that during the reign of Abdulhamid II, which an “absolute rule” was, military officers who opposed Yıldız Palace were sent into exile to distant provinces. There were many officers in exile in Erzurum since it was a precisely one of these distant provinces.

Moreover, Erzurum could not be closely supervised by the central government due to its remoteness, and this allowed officers in exile to be involved in initiatives and activities against the government.³¹⁵

At that time, the Public officers were suffering and complaining from their low salaries and the inhabitants of Erzurum lived under very severe economic and psychological conditions. Consequently, it had not been difficult to urge and encourage people to rise in insurrection and the insurrection indeed broke out in March 1906.³¹⁶

When the background on the Erzurum insurrection is carefully analyzed, we understand that the lack of minimum standards of living was an important factor.

In 1906, which was the year in which the aforementioned insurrection broke out in Erzurum, a German engineer named Jarmolinski, together with a British

³¹⁴ Hayati Doğan, *Türkiye İktisadi Coğrafyası -Tarım, Hayvancılık ve Ormanlık* (Erzurum: 1986), pp. 17-21.

³¹⁵ Immediately before the insurrection, Hussein Tosun, founding member of the *Adem-i Merkeziyet* (Decentralization Association) Association was sent by Prince Sabahaddin to this Eastern province. His task was to form and develop the organizational structure for an insurrection. Hussein Tosun established a branch of the Adem-i Merkeziyet Association in Erzurum. Tarık Zafer Tunaya, *Türkiye’de Siyasi Partiler: 1859-1952* (İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi, 1952), p. 142.

³¹⁶ Ernest Edmondson Ramsaur, *the Young Turks: Prelude to the Revolution of 1908* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 58. Şerif Mardin, *the Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas* (Syracuse NY: Syracuse University Press, 2000), pp. 153-154

foreman named Tom Corp and skilled workers, whom he had specially brought from Baku and Batumi, investigated and inspected all the oil reserves and facilities located in Mesopotamia (Mosul) and also conducted investigations in the Erzurum province.³¹⁷

The insurrection further weakened the economic situation of Erzurum. However, it was believed and hoped that oil would be a key element for the economic development and enrichment of Erzurum, and this belief and hope motivated attempts to achieve this goal.

Perspective and Motivations of the Artillery Major M. A.³¹⁸

In the last decade of the Ottoman Empire, Erzurum was a place deprived of the fruits of technological developments that could have facilitates the daily life of its inhabitants. In the autumn of 1910, one of the individuals who lived under very severe economical and psychological conditions and who was seeking a way out of this situation was the artillery major M.A, whom we only know from his profession and initials. This artillery major, who was working in Erzurum, wrote a long letter to be sent to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, concealing his name.

The head of district allowed this letter to be sent to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. It was understood that the letter was written in order to draw attention to the

³¹⁷ *M.T.A. Rap.* no. 199. German engineer Jarmolinski produced an inspection report about his investigations and inspections and sent this report to the General Directorate of the Anatolian Railways

³¹⁸ In the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire experienced the process of transformation from its traditional structure into a modern centralist type of State. It is clear that in order to impose new obligations on its subjects and to provide them some benefits, the center had started to get into closer relationship with the periphery, and the subjects at the periphery had gotten into closer relationship with the center. Şerif Mardin, "Center-Periphery Relations: A Key to Turkish Politics." In *Political Participation in Turkey: Historical Background and Present Problems*, edited by Engin D. Akarlı, Gabriel Ben-Dor (İstanbul: Boğaziçi University Publications, 1975), p. 24.

Erzurum Pülk oil reserve and to make it operative. The major, mentioned several issues such as civilization, bribes, State, in his letter.³¹⁹

There were some psychological motivations which encouraged the major to send such a letter, which may be considered as a petition written to the central government.

Motivation 1: Under-development versus (Western) Civilization

“Laziness, an illness which is the leader of all evil has taken root in all levels of the community. There is no progress for us, unless this character laxity changes.”³²⁰ Abdülhamid II

The major thought that the inhabitants of Erzurum were lazy and did not have the ability to improve their lives. Poverty and misery prevented them from taking action. How would it be to live like a human being? A power was needed to guide and allow this miserable community to cope with all these difficulties.

According to major M.A, that power was possessed by nobody else but the government. Since the inhabitants of Erzurum were ignorant and did not have the adequate knowledge and skills required for a sustainable self-development of the community, they could not achieve any progress. The major believed that if the inhabitants of Erzurum were not supported and helped by the central authority, they would not be able to understand the “civilization,” consequences of their illiteracy and poverty.³²¹

³¹⁹ BOA.DH.İD 105-1/5, 1/Ş/1328, 6 October 1910.

³²⁰ Karal, p. 253.

³²¹ “...Gerçi ind-i âlilerinde ehemmiyetden müstağni ve ma'lûmu i'lam kabîlinden ise de fakat dıġar olduġum ıstrâb-ı derûnî bendenize Őu varakpareyi nazargâh-ı keremkârilerine arz edilmek üzere takdim ve tisyâra mecbur kıldı lutfen ve tenezzülen mutâla'asını niyaz ederim efendim."Erzurum Vilâyeti" Erzurum kasaba ve tevâbi'i – ma'lûm-ı âlileridir ki bu gün terakkiyât-ı

“.....insanca yaşamak nasıl olur bu yolları o zavallı ahâlîye gösterecek bir mürşid lazımdır. Ki o da hükümetimizdir. Başka kat‘iyyen kimse yokdur ve o ahâlî de kendiliğinden daha bir asır böylece dursalar bir şey yapamayacak ve insanlığı anlamayacaklardır. Çünkü câhildirler çünkü ve hiç bir şeye mâlik değildirlen...”

It seems on the other hand that developments in the West had created a self-depreciation complex not only among the intellectuals³²² but also among the ordinary people of the Ottoman Empire.

No doubt, the major could not explain why western civilization achieved a sustainable development and why the Ottoman Empire could not. The major could not develop a socio-historical perspective that included such development as the renaissance, the great discoveries, and the Industrial Revolution and their consequences.³²³

He would look at the issue with a local perspective that led to the Orient’s orient. The major believed that inhabitants of Erzurum could never achieve “civilization” and related this to the characteristic features and traits of the inhabitants of Erzurum, which he thought would prevent their development.

In his book “Geopolitics and Geoculture”, published in 1991, Immanuel Wallerstein propounds that the concept of “civilization” has not been used in social

ümrâniye ve fenniyeden mahrûm bir yerdir. Ahalisi tenbel olmakla beraber kendiliklerinden bedî‘alar vücuda ve meydana getirebilmek isti‘dadından dahi mahrûmdurlar. Bugün o havâlîde müstevlî olan fakr ve sefâlet hakikaten dilsüzdür. Oradaki ahâlîyi kolundan tutup yapacağı işi gösterecek ne vecihle kesb-i servet edilir nasıl kazanılır insanca yaşamak nasıl olur bu yolları o zavallı ahâlîye gösterecek bir mürşid lazımdır. Ki o da hükümetimizdir. Başka kat‘iyyen kimse yokdur ve o ahâlî de kendiliğinden daha bir asır böylece dursalar bir şey yapamayacak ve insanlığı anlamayacaklardır. Çünkü câhildirler çünkü ve hiç bir şeye mâlik değildirlen.” BOA.DH.İD 105-1/5, 1/Ş/1328, 6 October 1910.

³²² Non-western community doe not have sufficient internal dynamics to follow a Western type development. What must be done is to call for a modernizing *intelligencia* to undertake such a transformation. (*Mardin*, 25) This statement shows how the orientalist paradigm and modernizing approach has been assimilated by the easterner himself.

³²³ Western civilization had lived and experienced stages leading to modernity in a continuous succession involving a series of revolutions: Scientific, Political, Cultural and Industrial, thus reaching a leading position.

sciences literature in a widespread manner. According to him we do not encounter this concept in the majority of sociology textbooks and probably neither in any economy nor political science textbook. The term “civilization” was frequently used as the last stage of an assumptive evolutionary process in anthropology articles pertaining to a period before 1914. In this system, mankind passes from savageness to barbarism and from barbarism to civilization. The term “Civilization” was used by the historians of the nineteenth century from time to time. However, this term was rarely used in the twentieth century, and it can be said that its use is limited to the books and articles of Spengler and Toynbee. Civilization as a term only blossomed and flourished in the field of the Orientalism.³²⁴

Hegel, the father of dialectics, defines “civilized society” as a society that can operate independently and autonomously from the central government and that is based and established on property rights. According to Hegel, the characteristic feature of “Modern Western European Civilization” consists of the people’s capacity to organize themselves on the basis of valid institutions independently from the State.³²⁵ Ottoman society did not have these characteristics.

Thus, we are surprisingly led to accept that the major’s “civilization” concept and perception overlaps with Hegel’s. The major believed that the inhabitants of Erzurum could not achieve civilization on their own since they lacked the sufficient consciousness to extract oil and use of it for their own benefit.

³²⁴ Immanuel Wallerstein, *Geopolitics and Geoculture, Essays on the Changing World-System* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1991)

³²⁵ Mardin, *Genesis*, p. 115.

The periphery is well aware of its secondary status in terms of culture.³²⁶ As a matter of fact, the artillery major expresses this frequently in his petition regarding oil, which he perceives as a means of salvation from destitution.

Motivation 2: Patriotic Consciousness

M.A, the artillery major felt it was his responsibility to furnish information to the government about the Pülk oil reserves. He identified the people whom he thought wished to destroy the Pülk mining zone and deprive its inhabitants from this resource.

According to his allegations, Russian gas traders from Batum, who wished to render the reserve inoperable by pouring mercury into it, had given a bribe of 2000 liras to civil servants. The officers working in the relevant office had accepted the bribe and thus the mining zone in the Pülk village was made inoperable. The artillery major insisted on the reality of the event, and recommending that an instruction be given to the Governor of Erzurum about conducting an investigation in connection with this issue.³²⁷

He wrote, “Dear Sir, would you please give an immediate order to the governor to conduct a confidential investigation concerning this oil reserve.”³²⁸

In addition, the major requested the necessary road construction works to be carried out and an engineer to be sent to the region in order to utilize the oil reserve.³²⁹ It was indeed necessary to use engineers who knew their jobs for the

³²⁶ Şerif Mardin, *Center-Periphery Relations*, p. 13.

³²⁷ BOA.DH.İD 105-1/5, 1/Ş/1328, 6 October 1910.

³²⁸ “*Beyefendi seri’an oradaki vâliye emr buyurunuz bu petrol menba’i hakkında gizlice tahkikât yapılınsın.*”

³²⁹ BOA.DH.İD 105-1/5, 1/Ş/1328, 6 October 1910.

construction of regular roads that would link the mines to the ports and for the maintenance of transportation vehicles in the mines. However, none of these were available to the Ottomans.³³⁰

Throughout the Ottoman Empire, one gallon of gasoline was sold at 15 *quruşes*, and one *kıyye*³³¹ was sold at 60 *paras*. The major thought that now that the place where the ‘black gold’ was buried had been discovered, work should start immediately, and this ‘rich black gold’ reserve would soon bring prosperity to the region.³³² It was obvious that the major saw oil as a salvation. His perception of the State’s mechanism was as follows:

However, now you will say that this mining zone is under the responsibility of the Department of Public Works. Nevertheless, if the Department of Public Works had considered the safety, security and prosperity of the people and homeland in a righteous manner, they would not have been so negligent on the issue. Most probably the civil servants who received the bribe from the Russians were officers who work in the Department of Public Works. I believe that beneficial work should be accomplished. This would help our unfortunate people and bring them some relief.³³³

In his assessment of the situation, the major explains how officers who did not consider the safety and security of their homeland and people and who did not serve and work for their homeland accepted bribes and ganged with the foreign enemy (Russians), thus preventing the prosperity of the people.

The British Consul Graves had made a report on the visit Erzurum Governor Rauf Pasha made to the northern towns of the province on 12 August 1898. He

³³⁰ Karal, p. 198.

³³¹ Kıyye: was one of the weight units used in the Ottoman Empire. 1 kıyye= 1,282 kg.

³³² BOA.DH.İD 105-1/5, 1/Ş/1328, 6 October 1910.

³³³ BOA.DH.İD 105-1/5, 1/Ş/1328, 6 October 1910. “*Ama siz diyeceksiniz ki bu gibi madenlere Nafta Da’iresi karıştır. Nafta Dâ’iresi milletin vatanın selâmet ve saâdetini hakkıyla düşünse idi şimdiye kadar uyumaması lazımdı. İhtimâl ki Ruslardan şu 2000 lirayı çeken oradaki Nafta memurlarıdır.Şu hayırlı işe teşebbüs edilsin biçare millete imdâd!*”

mentions that the governor went to the towns of Bayburt, Tercan and Kiğı. The Tercan visit is of interest to us in so far as it relates to a bribery case as the major did. Graves writes these visits helped determine the public needs of these towns and villages. However, in his visit Rauf Pasha stated that his real priority was to investigate the bribery complaints concerning the registrar officer in the Tercan district. The governor ordered the registrar who had been exiled to another district to be sent to Erzurum to be put on trial following investigation.³³⁴

This example shows that there were some foundations for the artillery major to think that officers in Erzurum accepted bribes to render the oil wells unusable.

Indeed, in the case of the major, his personal happiness depended on preventing the destruction and dissolution of the Empire and on the prosperity and safety of the people of the Ottoman Empire.³³⁵

This kind of patriotic consciousness may be developed under different circumstances: 1) in ancient nations it is a product of the State and monarchy. 2) From time to time it develops following foreign invasions. 3) This is more drastic if the occupier has a different religion. 4) From time to time, the memories and history of a state may contribute to its development into a nation.³³⁶

Whether he was aware of it or not, the major lived under the influence of all these circumstances. Watson considers these factors as the prerequisites for the

³³⁴ Abdulhamit Kırmızı, "Rules of the Provincial Empire: Ottoman Governors and the Administration of Provinces, 1895-1908" (Ph.D. diss., Bogazici University, 2005), p. 158.

³³⁵ Individuals like the major put forth their best efforts in pursuit of goals other than their personal concerns and interest. In their opinion, these goals are of high importance compared to their personal concerns. They believe that their personal beliefs, longings, aspirations can be ignored. Emile Durkheim, *Sosyoloji Dersleri -Leçons de Sociologie* trans: Ali Berkay (İstanbul: İletişim, 2006), pp. 106-107

³³⁶ Hugh Seton-Watson "Nationalism and Multinational Empires." *Nationalism and Communism*. (London, 1964) 5-25 In Baskın Oran, *Az gelişmiş Ülke Milliyetçiliği: Kara Afrika Modeli* (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi, 1977), p. 22.

development of a national consciousness. No doubt, all these factors had contributed to the development of the major's patriotic consciousness.

From the point of view of the major, the Russians represented the element of threat while oil was the element of salvation. Instead of using the available oil for the benefit of the helpless poor inhabitants of Erzurum, some officers had ganged together with the enemy in exchange of bribes. These words reflect the mental world of the major and his patriotic consciousness.

Motivations 3: Severe Climate and Geography

The province of Erzurum (from the expression “Arth-i Rum” i.e., Land of the Romans) is covered with snow most of the year and Cuinet writes that this has been enough to deter many a would-be conqueror.³³⁷ It also acted as a deterrent for many of the civil servants sent to administer the province, who often sent petitions asking their headquarter to have them transferred to another post, on account of the harsh winters and the remoteness of the place. One of the governors of the province, Hakkı Pasha, asked to be transferred for the same reasons.³³⁸ Governor Rauf Pasha referred to the need to treat his rheumatism in his numerous transfer appeals during his office in the province, which did not save him from having to serve there from 1895 to 1903.³³⁹

As for our major, he mentioned in his letter that the inhabitants of the region slept in the stables with their family, together with oxen and cows. An oxen or a cow would be tied on one side, while the husband and wife slept on the other side. They

³³⁷ Cuinet, p. 111.

³³⁸ YEE, Muhabereye Mahsus Defter No.8. 15 December 1894

³³⁹ YEE, Muhabereye Mahsus Defter no.73. 24 march 1904.

had neither a bed nor a quilt. They had neither firewood nor coal. They had no material to keep them warm.³⁴⁰

“Oh my god, what an extreme poverty!”³⁴¹

As we have shown above Erzurum was considered as the Siberia of the Ottoman Empire. This province was temperate only three months of the year. No doubt, the severe continental climate conditions prevailing in the region and the shortage of combustible materials to be used as fuel played an important role in the province's an extreme poverty.

“During winter, in an extremely cold night at minus 28 degrees you are sleeping in a stable with oxen and buffalos lying next to you. You have neither firewood nor coal. What could you do under these circumstances?”³⁴²

Erzurum may have been one of the remote and poverty-stricken provinces of the Empire, but when the profitability performances of the branches of the Ottoman Bank are taken into consideration for period between 1895 and 1914, its Erzurum branch appears among the profitable branches of the bank, together with those of Bandırma, Edirne, Mytilene, Ordu and Uşak, although with a moderate profit ranging between 1.000 and 2.500 liras.³⁴³

On the other hand, the information furnished to the Imperial Government by the major was not based on statistics, but on his observations. The major repeatedly

³⁴⁰ BOA.DH.İD 105-1/5-3, 1/Ş/1328, 6 October 1910.

³⁴¹ BOA.DH.İD 105-1/5-3, 1/Ş/1328, 6 October 1910. “*Bu ne sefâletdir ah!*”

³⁴² BOA.DH.İD 105-1/5-3, 1/Ş/1328, 6 October 1910. “*Beyefendi malumunuzdur ki – Erzurum memalik-i Osmaniye'nin Sibiryası'dır senede üç ay yazı vardır. Kışın tahte's-sıfır derece-i burûdet yirmi sekiz dereceye çıkar. Şimdi siz kendinizi şu 28 derece-i burûdetde bir damın altında öküzlere dahi yamı başınızda yatıyor yakacak odun ve kömür de yok şu halde bulununuz ne yaparsınız.*”

³⁴³ Edhem Eldem, a *History of the Ottoman Bank* (Istanbul: Osmanlı Bankası, 1999), p. 291.

mentioned the necessity to help these people, whom he described as living in “extreme poverty”.

In his letter, the major left no aspect of the issue untouched. Besides providing detailed and comprehensive explanations about the living conditions of the inhabitants of Erzurum, he answers in advance any question that might be raised on the issue.

Oil had just begun to be newly discovered and used as fuel. No doubt, it can be asked why the inhabitants of Erzurum did not use firewood as fuel. There is a clear answer to this:

The major stated that, forests were very rare in Erzurum and its close vicinity. Therefore, it was very expensive to use firewood as fuel. The poor people could not afford to buy it. Previously, they could easily get their firewood from the Soğanlı Mountain, but it was occupied by the Russians as a result of the war of 93. The inhabitants of the region thus had to use dried cow dung as fuel, which heated them barely enough to survive. The inhabitants had to pay to acquire such dried cow dung: 40 *kıyyes* of dried cow dung were sold for 12 *kuruşes*.³⁴⁴

In the 2 or 3 years following the letter of the artillery officer M, the poverty of Erzurum increased. Its population decreased by one tenth compared to the period

³⁴⁴ “...Erzurum kasaba ve tevâbi’inde sâkin ahali bugün ahırda yaşıyorlar beyefendi anların meskenleri ahırlardır. Herkesin öküzü ineği mandası ve kendisi çoluğu çocuğu hep bir damın altındadır. Bir kenarda öküzler bağlı bir tarafta da karı koca yatıyor. Altında yatak yok üstünde dahi yorğan. Yakıp ısıtacak odun kömür ise nam ve nişânı yokdur Bu ne sefâletdir ah!Beyefendi malumunuzdur ki –Erzurum memalik-i Osmaniye'nin Sibiryası'dır senede üç ay yazı vardır. Kışın tahte's-sıfır derece-i burûdet yirmi sekiz dereceye çıkar. Şimdi siz kendinizi şu 28 derece-i burûdetde bir damın altında öküzler dahi yanı başınızda yatıyor yakcak odun ve kömür de yok şu halde bulununuz ne yaparsınız. Şunu tasavvur ediniz işte şu acıklı halde zebun ve nalân ve giryan kalmış olan biçâre ahâlîye serî'an imdâd ediniz bunları şu felâketden kurtarınız.Yalnız şu nokta –odun kömür yokdur- keyfiyeti ihtimal inanmayacaksınız. Malumunuzdur ki Erzurum civarında ormanlar hemen yok gibidir pek az olduğu için odun gayet pahalıdır. Fukarâ-yı ahâlî satın alamaz evvelden elimizde Soğanlı Dağ vardı 93 muhârebesinde Rusların elinde kaldı. Şimdi ise işte biçâre ahali kışın yazdan tedârik ettikleri inek pisliliği yani (tezek) ile anı yakmak ile ancak ölmeyecek derecede ısınabilir bu tezek dahi para iledir kırk kıyyesi on iki kuruşdur.” BOA.DH.İD 105-1/5-3, 1/Ş/1328, 6 October 1910.

prior to the war. The inhabitants of Erzurum were scattered and the entire region was ruined as a result of Russian occupation and because of the conflicts between Armenians and the region's Muslim population. Epidemic diseases also increased during that period, due to lack of hygiene, added to a deteriorating general situation. People could not find anything to eat other than black bread and eggs.³⁴⁵

Motivation 4: Trust in State

The major believed that it was the duty and mission of the government to find a way to remedy the helpless position of the inhabitants of Erzurum. He also believed that there was a very simple way to do this, and set out to explain it. In his letter, he emphasizes that the oil reserves, situated only at a four hour distance from Erzurum, and which he believed constituted a very rich resource, should be operated by the government. As for the labor force, it was cheap in Erzurum. The first thing to do was to construct a macadamized road up to the mining zone as well as barracks on an area adjacent to the mining zone for the accommodation of the workers. Necessary equipments should be supplied and an engineer who would teach how to drill wells and supervise the operations should be sent to the region. According to the major, none of these things were costly. Secondly, oil should be extracted from its reserve and afterwards the inhabitants of Erzurum should be informed about how they could take advantage of this oil, which should be sold at a cheap price to the people who needed it.³⁴⁶

For him, all of these activities should be organized and performed by the government. This oil would revivify both the government and the inhabitants in the

³⁴⁵ Kinross, p.218.

³⁴⁶ BOA.DH.İD 105-1/5-3, 1/Ş/1328, 6 October 1910.

region. Thus the Concession license for this oil should be granted to no one else. It should be used for the benefits of the government through a few reliable and upright government officers and should be operated confidentially.³⁴⁷

The major tried to explain the importance and richness of the oil reserves of the Pülk region in his effort to convince the government authorities. He communicated his point very effectively in his letter, using the words like:

“My sir, please don’t mind what people say, be sure that it is very rich.”³⁴⁸

Major M.A. at least to some extent was aware of what was happening in the world and of the increasing importance of oil, thought and believed that oil was the main factor that could help the Ottoman Empire to overcome the poverty and backwardness that he observed during his official duty. Oil was the only practical source for the development and modernization of the Ottoman Empire.

In his opinion, one of the most important requirements of the Ottoman Empire was oil and oil reserves existed in Mosul, Baghdad, Adana and Erzurum.³⁴⁹

For him, the Government of the Ottoman Empire had the absolute power to do whatever they wanted to. The people constituted a stagnant community that could not achieve civilization and prosperity without the guidance, leading and protection of the central government. They were constituted of ordinary people who did not have the capacity to take their own history in their hands.

Ever since the Tanzimat reforms, there has been a distinct sense of public order instauration- regulatory-civilizing-progress accomplishing mission within the

³⁴⁷ BOA.DH.İD 105-1/5-4, 1/Ş/1328, 6 October 1910.

³⁴⁸ “*Kim ne derse desin emin olunuz gayet güzeldir efendim.*” BOA.DH.İD 105-1/5-4, 1/Ş/1328, 6 October 1910.

³⁴⁹ “*Malum-ı âlileridir ki bugün umûm Memâlik-i Osmaniye'nin en birinci ihtiyâcı petroldur yakacak bundan başka bir şeyimiz yoktur. Bağdad ve Musul vilâyetinde Adana vilâyetinde ve Erzurum'da pek mebzûl petrolmenba'ları mevcuttur.*” BOA. DH.İD 105-1/5-4

Ottoman administration towards the provincial regions. Such a sense of mission is part and parcel of a kind of ‘spirit of the age’ that is particularly apparent in the military-bureaucratic class. It is possible to trace this sense of mission in many a petition or report written at the time.³⁵⁰ The spirit that permeates the letter sent from the province to the metropolitan center by Major M. A. precisely reflects this sense of public order instauration-regulatory-civilizing-progress accomplishing mission.

In his letter the major did not only communicate his solution proposals based on the existence of oil reserves in the Pülk village but also disclosed and complained about government officers who ignored their duties and received bribes from foreign enemies. For this reason he received a prompt reply.

The Defense of the Governor of Erzurum:

The Reply to the Artillery Major

The Secretariat of the Governor of Erzurum Province (*Erzurum Vilayeti Tahrirat Kalemi*) sent a long statement serving as a reply to the Ministry of Internal Affairs bearing the signature of *Erzurum Hisarlısı*”³⁵¹ (Governor) and referring to the letter written by the artillery major, M.A.

In his reply the Governor of Erzurum stating that Erzurum was for sure in need of combustion material. He confessed that the people living in Erzurum had to spend the winter in the cattle stalls. Despite the shortage of combustion materials, unlimited lignite reserves were situated at several locations at a distance of two, twelve and twenty hour distances from the city of Erzurum. When they were informed that people were freezing to death because they could not afford to spend

³⁵⁰ Selçuk Akşin Somel, “Osman Nuri Paşa’nın 17 Temmuz 1885 Tarihli Hicaz Raporu,” *Tarih Araştırmaları Dergisi* 29 (1998), pp. 1-39.

³⁵¹ BOA.DH.İD 105-1/5-5, 4/Za/1328, 7 November 1910.

100 *kuruşes* for 1 *çeki*³⁵² of wood, the municipality made an attempt to operate the sulfurous lignite mine located at a distance of eight hours from Erzurum. To facilitate transportation, permission was obtained from the Ministry of Public Works (*Nafia Nezareti*) to construct a narrow road from the mine to the Erzurum-Trabzon macadamized highway.³⁵³

Undeniably, road construction was a part of Abdülhamid's policy of restructuring of the periphery. As stated in the previous sections, both the governors and the Eastern Provinces Investigation Commission had assigned the duty to monitor the road construction process in the region. However, the transportation problem in the region was not solved. Major M.A. also mentioned in the petition he sent to the center how backwards the region was and that even if the mine was opened, there were no roads to transport its production.

Information that supports the major comes from A.D. Novıçev. Novıçev says that Russia acted as an obstacle to road constructions both in the Eastern Anatolia and the Black Sea regions because of the heavy compensation load it had imposed on the Ottomans after the 1877-1878 Ottoman-Russian War. He records that this hindrance lasted until 1917.³⁵⁴

In its reply, the Secretariat of the Erzurum Province admitted that there was oil in several locations within the boundaries of the province. There were also applicants for the concession rights for the said oil reserves. However, the lands where these reserves were situated belonged to Foundations (*Evkaf*). The estimation

³⁵² 250 kilogram

³⁵³ BOA.DH.İD 105-1/5-5, 4/Za/1328, 7 November 1910.

³⁵⁴ A.D. Novıçev, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunun Yarı-Sömürgeleşmesi* trans. Nabi Dinçer (Ankara: Onur Yayınları, 1979)

surveys for these oil reserves were carried out by an engineer sent by the Foundations for the purpose of putting them on auction.³⁵⁵

According to the Secretariat, the allegations regarding the Russian Gasoline merchant who supposedly wished to make the oil reserve inoperable by poring mercury into it, and who was to have given a bribe of two thousand liras to certain officers, were completely imaginary. Such an oil reserve could not be destroyed even at a cost of two million liras. Moreover, the scientific literature mentions no case where oil was damaged by pouring mercury into it. If the road constructions had been completed as planned, and had the provincial administration been given the promised authorization, it would have then been possible to thoroughly benefit from the mines in Erzurum. Up until that time, that is until the required authorization is granted, they should be content with half measures.³⁵⁶

³⁵⁵ "...Vilâyetin birkaç yerinde petrol menba bulunduđu muhakkak olup bunların imtiyâzına tâlib olanlar da bulunduđu halde yeri vakıf arazisi ma'âdin-i mekşûfeden olduđu için Maden Nezareti tarafından satılığa çıkarılmak için gönderilen mühendis tarafından keşfi yapılmış ve diğerleri için mürâcat edenlere taharrî ruhsatnâmesi verilerek gereken muamelenin tamamlanması Ziraat Nezâreti'ne yazılmışdır. Rusya gaz tüccârı tarafından petrol menâbi'inin taharrîsi için bazı memurlara 2000 lira raddesinde para verildiğine dair olan fikra hayal ürünüdür Bir menba' 2000 lira ile değil 12 milyon lira ile de mahv edilemez. Gaz menba'ına civa dökülmekle gazın yok olacağına dâ'ir fen kitaplarında hiçbir bahis yoktur. İnşâsına teşebbüs olunan yollar tamamlanır ve vilâyetlere verileceği vaad edilen yetki verilirse bu vilâyetdeki maâdinden hakkıyla istifade mümkün olabilir. O zamana kadar tatbîk edilen yarım tedbirlerle yetinme mecbûriyetinde bulunduğumuzu arz ederiz..." DH.İD 105-1/5-5

³⁵⁶.. El-yevm Narman ve Tercan'dan nakl olunan kömürün beher çekisi elli ve Sublişi'den nakl olunan kömürün çekisi otuz quruşfiyatla satılmaktadır. Gerçi bu fiyat gâyet gâli ise de yollar yapılmadıkça çare-i tehvîni de mefkûddur. Petrol menâbi'ine gelince vilâyetin birkaç yerinde petrol menba'ı bulunduđu muhakkak olup bunların imtiyâzına tâlib olanlar da bulunduđu halde yeri evkâfa ait ma'âdin-i mekşûfeden olduđu için nezâret-i müşârün-ileyhâca müzâdeye vaz' edilmek üzere gönderilen mühendis ma'rifetiyle keşfi icrâ ettirilmiş ve diğerleri için ashâb-ı mürâca'ata taharrî ruhsatnâmesi verilerek mu'âmelât-ı lâzimesinin itmâmı Ziraat Nezâreti'ne yazılmışdır. Rusya gaz tüccârı tarafından petrol menâbi'inin taharrîsi için bazı memurlara iki bin lira raddesinde para verildiğine dair olan fikra sırf eser-i hayâlidir. Bir menba' iki bin lira ile değil iki milyon lira ile de mahv edilemez. Gaz menba'ına civa dökülmekle gazın gâib olacağına dâ'ir kütüb-i fenniyece hiçbir bahis yoktur. Yevm-i inşâsına teşebbüs olunan yollar ikmâl edilir ve vilâyetlere verileceği mev'ûd olan salâhiyet i'tâ buyurulur ise bu vilâyetdeki ma'âdinden hakkıyla istifade mümkün olabilir. O zamana kadar tatbîk edilen yarım tedbirlerle iktifâ mecbûriyetinde bulunduğumuz arz ve gönderilen hususî mektub i'âdeten takdîm olunur ol bâbda emr u fermân hazret-i men lehül-emrindir. Fî 4 Zilkade 1328 / 24 Teşrin-i Evvel 1326 / Erzurum Hisarlısı". DH.İD 105-1/5-5.

As can be seen from the above, the Governor of Erzurum (*Erzurum Hisarlısı*) replied to the arguments of the artillery major, M.A in a detailed manner. He confirmed the misery of the inhabitants of Erzurum and the severe condition under which they lived, but he denied the existence of the Russian merchant who supposedly wished to demolish the Pülk oil reserve, as well as the collaboration of officers who were to have received a bribe. He also stated that the Pülk oil reserve could not be operated, because the land it was situated on belonged to the Foundations.

In conclusion, according to the Governor, the Ministry authorized the provincial administration neither to build roads nor to operate the lignite or oil mines. Thus, he held the ministries responsible for this situation, on the grounds that they did not grant the required authority to the governor's office.³⁵⁷

The Pülk Oil Reserve after Artillery Major M.A.

In 1941, thirty years after the petition filed in 1910 by artillery major M.A. in relation to the Pülk oil situated in Erzurum, Vefik Altuğ³⁵⁸ wrote a book on this issue and repeated almost all of the opinions expressed by M.A.

According to Vefik Altuğ, there are oil reserves in Erzurum. However, extracting and operating such oil reserves would be very costly. Substantial amounts of investment and capital would be required in order to extract and operate this oil reserve. Consequently, this could only be performed by the government. Mineral

³⁵⁷ Upon this letter, an official memorandum was sent by the Ministry of Internal Affairs (from the Secretary of the General Correspondence Office of the Ministry of the Internal Affairs, Mehmed Nazım Bey) to the Governor's office in Erzurum stating that the issue regarding the oil reserves in Erzurum would be taken into considerations and the necessary actions would be taken. BOA.DH.İD 105-1/5-5, 4/Za/1328, 7 November 1910.

³⁵⁸ Vefik Altuğ was an official attached to the suite of an official of higher rank in the province of Samsun.

research and exploration activities and operations of the mines should be ensured and the required investments should be made at any cost.³⁵⁹

He argued in his book that there are oil reserves in Eastern Anatolia, because this region is located between the Mosul and Caucasian oil-bearing zones. He mentions the “Paluk (Pülk) oil reserves” located in the close vicinity of the Dumanlı Mountain, north of the Tercan district, which must correspond to the Pulk oil reserves. He also writes that this oil flows like a stream, and that local villagers have learned to take the advantage of this oil source in a primitive way.³⁶⁰

As it is seen, the issue of the existence of oil reserves in the Pülk village has perdured into the republican era. Moreover, many investigations were conducted in the region between 1910 and 1941.

In the period between 1916 and 1917, a Russian subject named Nalivkin examined and investigated the Pülk, Hasankale and Katranlı oil reserves located in the province of Erzurum on behalf of the Southern Caucasian Railways. In 1919, a report on these examinations and investigations was issued in the *Bulletin du Comité Géologique*, published in Moscow.

In Ankara on 30 July 1922, a Russian subject named Kovalevsky produced a report on his examinations, studies and investigations for oil reserves in the Pülk,

³⁵⁹ Vefik Altuğ, *Erzurum ve Civarının Tarihi, Tabii, Beşeri, İktisadi Durumu Uzerinde Tetkikler* (İstanbul, Resimli Ay Matbaası, 1941), p. 65.

³⁶⁰ *İbid.*, p. 64. “Other petroleum reserves in the vicinity of Erzurum: a) The Katranlı gasoline reserve: Leaking from several culverts on the right side of the river Madrak passing through the Katranlı region at the Taşkesen sub-district of the Hınıs district. During the First World War, the Russians spotted this reserve they attempted to install refining drills, but they had to stop when they retreated. People living around this reserve had learned to take advantages of it. b- The Hasankale oil reserves: they are minor reserves and do not constitute a considerable quantity. In another book (Tahsin Akgün, *Erzurum* (İstanbul, 1955), p.18), published in 1955 oil reserves are mentioned in Erzurum Narman, Hasankale and Tekman , and it is stated that the reserves in these districts were utilized in a primitive way, only for the obtaining of combustion materials and that no effective and broad survey has been conducted to determine the richness of the reserves. However, according to MTA reports, several surveys were carried out in the region in the years 1916, 1922, 1926, 1930, 1932, 1933, 1936, and 1936.

Hasankale, Neftlik and Divanhüseyin villages, located in the Erzurum province. This report was published in 1923 in Baku as a brochure. In 1922, Professor Granjean conducted examinations and investigations on the oil reserves in Pülk, Hasankale, Çımağıl (Erzurum), Kürzot (Van), Cizre (Mardin) and Siirt respectively on behalf of the “Société Omnium Internationale de Pétrole”. A copy of his report is kept in the files of the General Directorate of Mining Affairs (*Maden İşleriUmum Müdürlüğü*). In the same year, oil reserves in the Pülk village and its close vicinity were explored and investigated by Engineer M. Leon, on behalf of the Administration of Foundations (*Evkaf İdaresi*) but the report of the aforementioned engineer could not be found in the files of the Administration of Foundations.³⁶¹

In 1926, the Pülk oil zone was examined and investigated by Dr. Lucius. As a result of his studies, he reported that the geologic structure was inconvenient and that it would be costly to carry out the operations required for exploration, extraction and operation of the oil, adding that there was only one solitary leakage of oil in the region. The said zone was located on a very steep land and very far from the coastline. In addition to the foregoing issues, the zone was a heavily forested area and located at very high altitude. Furthermore, it was reported that there was no evidence that would suggest the existence of important oil reserves.³⁶²

The geological structure of the Pülk region was inconvenient. However, a well reaching a depth of 150 meters could be drilled in the Pülk region, at a high cost, thus requiring a heavy investment.³⁶³

³⁶¹ Kemal Lokman, “Türkiye’de Petrol Arama Amacıyla Yapılan Jeolojik Etütler,” *Maden Tetkik ve Arama Enstitüsü Dergisi* 72 (1969), pp.219–247.

³⁶² M. T. A. Rap. no. 205 1926 by Mr. Luis.

³⁶³ M.T. A. Rap. no. 204. 1926 by Mr. Luis.

In 1930, a committee composed of Dr. Lucius, Geologist Cevat Taşman and Kemal Lokman conducted studies and investigations in that region on behalf of and for the government. It was reported that no geological oil structure or oil field existed in Pülk (Tercan). In 1932, Pülk was explored and investigated by an expert engineer named Petenekoff on behalf of Nizamettin Şevki Bey. Engineer Petenekoff examined and investigated the region for the purpose of discovering its geological oil structure. Later, he re-explored the region. We do not know where the report written by him is to be found. The Pülk region was also examined and investigated by geologist Sidney Paige in 1933. In his report, the plicate and fault structure of the region is examined in detail. However, no geological oil structure or oil field justifying the drilling of a well is observed. The report concluded that there was very little hope of discovering oil reserves in the Pülk village and its close vicinity.³⁶⁴

In 1936, the oil reserve in Pülk was studied and investigated by a committee headed by Mr. Baker, Chief Geologist of the Iraq Petroleum Company. The committee conducted surveys and explorations in Pülk. We do not know where the report produced by this committee is kept. In 1937, opinions on the existence of oil reserves in the Pülk area changed. This time it was reported that there were remarkable oil leakages in the Pülk region.³⁶⁵

Oil Engineer Kemal Lokman published a book titled “Oil Possibilities of Turkey”. In his book, Kemal Lokman furnishes detailed and comprehensive information about the geologic studies and examinations that were conducted for the exploring of oil in Turkey during the period between 1925 and 1933, and he

³⁶⁴ *M.T.A. Rap.* no. 203. 1933. by Sindney.

³⁶⁵ *M.T.A. Rap.* no. 692. 1937 by Maxsan.

mentions the results of these studies and examinations and described them in detail region by regions.³⁶⁶

³⁶⁶ Two copies of this book are retained in the library of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey and in the National Library respectively. In addition to this, one copy can be found in the libraries of the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) and one at the General Directorate of Mineral Research and Exploration (MTA).

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

According to some researchers, in this modern world shaped by imperialism, States were divided into two types: “Central States” and “Peripheral States”. One of the most important elements of imperialism born out of the structure of the relationship between the center and the periphery was raw materials.³⁶⁷

According to writers who approach States from the perspective of systems, the fundamental part of the relationship between States consists of economic, strategic and ideological interaction. One of the elements that have caused economic and strategic interaction to take place is also raw materials such as oil.³⁶⁸

The present thesis has tried to assess the Ottoman perception of oil and the meaning and value it gave to it. This perception was approached within the context of the peripheralisation of the Ottoman Empire in terms of its economic and political relationship with a State belonging to “the center”.

In the case studied here, oil is seen as being instrumental in the economic and strategic interaction between the central state of the German Empire and the peripheralized state of the Ottoman Empire. It is also seen as causing divergence of opinion within the Ottoman Empire, be it within its own center or between the same center and its periphery. In other words, the issue of the Pülk oil concessions provides a vital depiction of the nature of the internal and external affairs of the Ottoman Empire during the reign of Abdulhamid II.

³⁶⁷ John Galtung, “A Structural Theory of Imperialism,” *Journal of Peace Research* 8, no.2 (1985), pp. 81- 117.

³⁶⁸ *Loc. cit.*

Summary of the Major Findings

In the fourth chapter, which is the first main chapter of the thesis, six different conclusions have been reached.

Firstly, there is no doubt that Abdulhamid II was well aware of the importance of oil and of its existence in the lands of the Ottoman Empire. In the light of this, we can say that his insistence on granting a concession license to Carl Reiser, contrary to the opinion of the General Staff, did not arise from his lack of awareness of the importance of oil. Abdulhamid tried to keep possession of the Mosul³⁶⁹ and Baghdad oil reserves at a time when they were in high demand by Germans. The oil reserves in the Pülk region were of little importance compared to those in Mosul and Baghdad. Abdulhamid attached secondary importance to the oil reserve in the Pülk region and used it as a means to balance the relations with the Germans.

The study shows that issues of foreign policy, such as German-Ottoman relations, carried more importance than provincial interests. In terms of the economy, the Sultan believed the government's policy should be to establish closer ties with Germany and to take advantage of the skills of efficient and dependable German businessmen.

Natural resources can be used as an economic instrument to achieve foreign policy goal.³⁷⁰ States may use the natural resources they own as a tool to punish or reward other States that need these resources.³⁷¹ The Ottoman Empire of course was

³⁶⁹ For detailed information see: Sarah D. Shields, "An Economic History of Nineteenth-Century Mosul" (P.h.d. diss., The University of Chicago, 1986).

³⁷⁰ Kenneth W. Thompson, Roy C. Macridis, "Comperative Study of Foreign Policy." In *Foreign Policy in World Politics* (New Jersey: 1967), p. 7.

³⁷¹ Joseph Frankel, *International Politics, Conflict and Harmony* (London: Penguin Press, 1969),p. 153.

not in a position to reward or punish Germany. However, in the case being studied here, it can be said that Abdulhamid did reward Carl Reiser with the Pülk concession. This fits in with the Sultan's general policy aiming to get the peripheral State of the Ottoman Empire closer to the central State of the German Empire.

Secondly, it can be said that in nearly all studies on Abdülhamid II, the Sultan's authoritarianism is stressed. Gökhan Çetinsaya stated that:

He (Abdülhamid II) controlled the initiation and implementation of policy in detail, assisted by a staff of personal advisers at the Yıldız Palace, whom he used as counter-weight to his ministers at the Porte. He ignored the rules of bureaucratic hierarchy, conducting personal correspondence with provincial as well as with central officials, and permanently intervened in provincial appointments. Abdulhamid was a strong centralizer determined to curb all tendencies toward provincial autonomy, and to keep a tight rein upon provincial officials.³⁷²

The present study admits these kinds of inferences as part and parcel of the general nature of Abdulhamid's provincial and central rule. The Sultan was not seen explicitly in the decision making process. He did not conduct personal correspondence with provincial and central officials. At the same time, he would have the issue settled via the hand of one of his loyal men who was nothing more than the Sultan's shadow. We can say that the well-known and exaggerated "cautiousness" of Abdulhamid was not explicitly observed in this case. However, the fact that the Sultan gave the duty of determining the concession holder to *Serhafiye* Ahmed Celaleddin Pasha, a faithful subject of his, indicates that Abdulhamid had not given up his cautious approach.

As a third conclusion, it can be said that in the present case, the Fourth Army was acting even more cautiously than Abdulhamid. The problem was security. The importance the Fourth Army attributed to the oil reserves in the Pülk region was

³⁷² Gökhan Çetinsaya, *Ottoman Administration of Iraq, 1890–1908*. (London: New York: Routledge, 2006), p. 11.

strategic rather than economic. From their perspective, the region had a strategic location and importance, so who would obtain the concession rights and who would conduct explorations in the region was more important for them than the richness of the reserves or the quantity of oil to be extracted from this era. Although there were differences and conflicts between Abdulhamid and the Fourth Army, both of them attributed “strategic significance” to the region and never perceived or treated the oil reserve as a “source of wealth and prosperity.”

At this point, the attitudes of the Fourth Army and the Sublime Porte differed. While the Army insisted on the strategic importance of Pülk, Bâb- *Âlî* approached the matter bureaucratically. In other words, the Grand vizier Halil Rıfat Pasha simply carried out the orders of Abdulhamid, without objections.

It is necessary to evaluate the difference in opinion between the Fourth Army and *Bâb- Âlî* within the dynamics that triggered it. According to Gökhan Çetinsaya, “Coming from different backgrounds, and having divergent opinions, outlooks, and life styles, it is not surprising to learn that there were chronic conflicts among civil and military officials. Furthermore, with the expansion of modernized education during Abdulhamid’s reign, there emerged a perceptible “generation gap” in the civil and military administration.”³⁷³

The consensus between the Fourth Army and the Council of State that we witness in this case casts a shadow on this quite logical explanation. The Fourth Army had reached a consensus with the Council of State, a civil institution, concerning not granting concessions to foreigners. However, the Bâb- *Âlî* did not join in this consensus.

³⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 49.

The fourth conclusion is that in the case studied here, we are dealing with an alliance between the Council of State, The General Staff and the Fourth Army against the Yıldız- Bâb- Âlî front, instead of the Bâb- Âlî -Yıldız tension which is frequently mentioned in the literature concerning the Abdulhamid era.

Moreover, it is obvious that the conflict takes place within the center itself³⁷⁴ more than between the center and the periphery. Here, we observe a resistance, be it a passive one, against the Porte by the Council of State, also situated in the center.

The fifth conclusion is that this study has lead us to ask some questions about the position of the Council of State (*Şura-yı Devlet*), which opposed the will of Sultan Abdülhamid and the Bâb-ı Âli. Was the Council of State an adversary or opponent of the Bâb-ı Âli? Did the Council of State attempt to break out of the model imposed by the State? Did the members of the Council of State see themselves as the protectors of local interest?

It cannot be claimed that the study has given concrete and absolute answers to these questions, but we can say that the Council had some kind of passive bargaining power and followed its own policy. In this case, the primary role of the Council of State was to act as the guardian of local interests against the foreign policy of the government.

The sixth conclusion is that, as we know, there was a rivalry between the local notables and the central government. Between 1880 and 1894, the government had been constantly undermining the power of the notables.³⁷⁵ Çetinsaya states that; “The appointment of more powerful *Valis*, the strengthening of the army, and the formation of the Hamidieh had all been attempts to weaken this power of notables or

³⁷⁴ In general, foreign influence comprised a vital dimension of conflicts taking place within the central administration. Akarlı, p.138.

³⁷⁵ Çetinsaya, *Ottoman Administration*, p. 151.

at least control it.”³⁷⁶ In the case of our study, the situation progressed in a way the center wouldn't have preferred,³⁷⁷ insofar as a convergence took place between the local notables and the provincial administration in the periphery (Erzurum).

Both the Governor appointed by the Center and the army, who had a powerful position in the province, but was also an agent of the centre, supported the local notables instead of controlling them, let alone crippling them. The Inspector Şakir Pasha, who represented the center, took the side with the Çulhazade family instead of the German Carl Reiser as recommended by the Center. This can be seen as evidence that the central and peripheral agents were not always static but could show versatility according to the situation.

The second part of our thesis analyzed the meaning given to the Pülk oil by the major who was expected to act as a central agent (at least theoretically) because of his connection with the army, but who saw the oil issue from a provincial perspective in practice. Also analyzed is the direct contact the major established between the “backward periphery” and the “progressive” center, which constitutes in itself a case study of the human and civic dimension that can take place in the center periphery relation. Indeed, one of the points the Pülk oil case reveals has to do with “relational capacities.”³⁷⁸ For both the Anatolian Reform Inspector Şakir Pasha and artillery Major M. A. played a mediating role between the center and the province.³⁷⁹

Jens Hanssen, who develops an innovative approach to the Ottoman province, inevitably refers to the question of “modernity” in his works. He defines it as an

³⁷⁶ *Loc. cit.*

³⁷⁷ Şerif Mardin, *Center-Periphery Relations*, pp. 7-33.

³⁷⁸ Jens Hanssen, *Fin de siècle Beirut : the Making of an Ottoman Provincial Capital* (Oxford: Clarendon Press ; Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2005) p. 20

³⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 20.

urban phenomenon whose origins are ownerless and not nationally bounded.³⁸⁰

Hanssen also says, when writing about nineteenth century Beirut, that, be it the Ottoman center, the Europeans or the local notables, they all endorse a “civilizing mission” towards the region.³⁸¹ In the Pülk case, it is artillery Major M. A. who takes the initiative to endorse this civilizing role and who speaks of “civilizing,” while other actors tend to focus on “security.” As for the reform work launched by the Ottoman center, it is difficult to say whether it is the result of its own volition or of the pressures imposed by the Great Powers.

As the Nobel Prize winner William Golding has said, the twentieth century was the most severe and violent century of human history.³⁸² The Ottoman Empire experienced its share of this violence and turbulence and was dissolved even before the end of the first quarter. The artillery major M. was one of the individuals who sought for and pursued hopes of social and economic revival, and in a survival reflex, attributed more significance to the Pülk oil than it deserved.

It appears that the place of the Pülk oil in the minds of the people who lived in one of the deprived peripheral regions of the Empire was greater than the place of the oil actually lying in the ground.

Finally, following the oil investigations made in Erzurum Pülk enable us to understand local and central attitudes towards this new energy resource, as well as the perceptions the actors had of each other. The study illustrates the nature of the interaction between agents in Ottoman oil history. This case study reflects the different aspects of the Center-Periphery relations in the Ottoman Empire. Tension

³⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p.8

³⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p. 4.


³⁸² Eric Hobsbawm, *Age of Extremes: the Short Twentieth Century, 1914-1991* (London: Abacus, 1995), p. 13.

between competing perception, concerns and interests related to oil determined the role of the actors and shaped their relations.

Agent	Supporter of whom?	Dynamics of attitudes
Şakir Pasha	Supporter of Çulhazades: (Opponents to Abdülhamid's decree)	Serious scarcity of necessary revenues for provincial reforms in Erzurum
Fourth Army	Supporter of Çulhazades: (Opponents to Abdülhamid's decree)	Imaginary security problems: supposedly caused by minorities and prospective foreign entrepreneurs. Military control in the region.
Erkan-ı Harbiye	Supporter of Çulhazades: (Opponents to Abdülhamid's decree)	Security problems: fresh memories of Ottoman-Russian War (93 Harbi)
Bâb- Âlî (Halil Rıfat Pasha)	Supporter of Carl Reiser: Followers of Abdulhamid's decree without questioning	The nature of the Abdulhamid Despotism Regime
Abdülhamid II	Supporter of Carl Reiser:	Attitude was shaped by external factors. Priorities concerned about balance of power and foreign policy.
Major M. A	Supports government economic intervention, as soon as possible.	Attitude was motivated by the local economic factors. Considerable potential for economic and civil development in province

Appendix B: Map of Erzurum

Source: Nasrullah, Mehmet. Osmanlı Atlası. İstanbul: Osmanlı Araştırmaları Vakfı,
2003.



۷۲۲
۱۳۱۵-۱۳۲۹

(۲)

شورای دولتی و ایالتی در خصوص تقسیم اوقاف و وقفات در کربلا

فهرست اوراق	تاریخ تصویب	ردیف
<p>۱- در خصوص ولایتی محفوظه در کربلا در قضاوت بولاک قریه سنخ بیرون وقت معین ۲- بیک قضاوت معین شهریاریه فریبه سادات و محمد الیه بابت حضرت زینب ۳- بدین مویستای ایزره احکامی استیذان دان</p>	<p>۱۳۱۷</p>	<p>۲</p>
<p>شماره فهرستی</p>	<p>۱- در ماده وقفه ۲- در ماده وقفه ۳- در ماده وقفه ۴- در ماده وقفه</p>	<p>عدد اوراق ۱ ۱ ۲ ۴</p>

Appendix D: Transliterations of the Archival Documents

Y.PRK.OMZ 2/22

Umûm Erkân-ı Harbiye Dâ'iresi

Üçüncü Şu'besi

740

Şûrâ-yı Devlet Riyâset-i Celîlesine

Devletli Efendim Hazretleri

Erzurum Vilâyeti mülhakâtından Tercan Kazâsı'nın Pülk Karyesi'nde zâten mekşûf Tüfengci-i Hazret-i Şehriyârî Ferik saadetli Ahmed Celaleddin Paşa Hazretleri'nin irâ'e edeceği nâme imtiyâzının i'tâsı muktezâ-yı irâde-i seniyye-i cenâb-ı padişâhîden bulunan petrol ve neft ma'denleri imtiyâzının müşârün-ileyhe irâ'e eylediği Almanya Devleti teb'asından Mösyö Şarl Rayzer nâmıyla uhdesine ihâlesi istîzânına dâ'ir encümen-i nezâretten tanzîm olunan mazbata ile mukâvele ve şartnâme lâyhalarının takdîmini mutazammın Orman ve Ma'âdin ve Zirâ'at Nezâret-i Celîlesi'nin Şûrâ-yı Devlet'e havâle buyurulan tezkiresiyle melfûfâtının irsâl olduğu beyânıyla bu bâbda cihet-i askeriyece olan mutâla'ânın serî'an bildirilmesi vârid olan 15 Haziran 1314 tarihli ve yirmi altı numaralı tezkire-i aliyye-i âsifânelerinde iş'âr olunmasıyla keyfiyyet erkân-ı harbiye-i umûmiye dâ'iresine lede'l-havâle Sarıca Murad Osman Bey'in bâ-ruhsat-ı resmiye taharrî ve zâhire ihrâc ederek uhdesine ihâlesi derdest-i icrâ bulunan ma'den-i mezkûrun i'mâlinde mevâki'-i askeriyece mahzûr olup olmadığının tahkik ve iş'ârı mukaddemâ Mâliye Nezâret-i Celîlesi'nden vârid olan 20 Eylül 1304 tarihli tezkirede iş'âr olunması üzerine mezkûr ma'den mevki'inin keşf ve mu'âyenesi için dördüncü ordû-yı hümâyun'a memur olup ol vakit erkân-ı harbiye binbaşlarından ve el-yevm Miralay

bulunan Mahmud Bey'in icrâ-yı me'mûriyeti hususuna bi'l-istîzân irâde-i seniyye-i cenâb-ı mülûkâne şeref müte'allik buyurulmasıyla ordû-yı hümâyun-ı mezkûr müşiriyet-i celîlesine sebk eden teblîğât üzerine mûma-ileyh tarafından i'tâ olunup bâ-tahrîrât-ı cevâbiye gönderilen lâyhada ma'den-i mezkûr mevki'inin mevâki'-i müstahkemedden bu'diyetiyle beraber turuk-ı mühimme-i askeriyyenin nokta-i ictimâ'iyeleri civârında bulunmasıyla harekât-ı askeriyece fevka'l-hadd ehemmiyyeti hâ'iz olduğu gibi işbu ma'den Sarıca Murad Osman Bey tarafından zâhire ihrâc olunmayıp Garoyşof nâmında Rusya teb'asından Tiflisli bir Ermeni tarafından birkaç yüz kuruş masrafla bir kuyu hafr ettirildiği ve merkûm Garoyşof'un hayli senelerden beri ceviz kütükçüsü nâmıyla ordû-yı hümâyun mıntıkasında ve keşfiyât bahânesiyle Çürüksuyu üzerinde icrâ-yı keşfiyât ederek harekât-ı askeriyyeye musâ'id olan yolların keşfine muvâfık olduğu ve kendisini setr ederek nâm-ı müste'ârla imtiyâz talebinde bulunduğu ve Pülk Karyesi'nden etrâf ve civârında bulunan kurâ ahâlîsi Kızılbâş ve ermenilerden ibâret olması hasebiyle vesâit-i aksâmiyyenin suhûletle tedârîki kâbil olmasına nazaran bilâhare envâ'-ı mefsedet ikâ'ına bâdî olacakları ve işbu gaz ameliyât bahasıyla bir çok mechûl'l-ahvâl ecânibin ictimâ'larına meydân verilerek anların dahi nâ'il olacakları imtiyâz sâyesinde her türlü tertîbât-ı askeriyyeden haberdâr olabilecekleri gösterilmesinden dolayı ma'den-i mezkûr imtiyâzının verilmesi câ'iz olamayacağı 19 Teşrin-i Sani 1305 tarihinde cevâben nezâret-i müşârün-ileyhâya izbâr olunduğu misillü ahîren mûmâ-ileyh Sarıca Murad Osman Bey tarafından i'tâ edilen istid'ânâme üzerine de ma'den-i mezkûr imtiyâzının verilmesi câ'iz olamayacağı kendisine teblîğ kılındığı ve nihayet Trabzonlu Çulha Zâde birâderlere taharrî ruhsatnâmesi verilmesi hakkında vâki' olacak mutala'anın inbâsına dâ'ir şeref vârid olan tezkire-i sâmiyyeye mûmâ-ileyhim Çulha Zâdeler sırf teb'a-i Devlet-i Aliyye'den şirket teşkil eylemek ve hiçbir nâm ve

bahâne ile ecnebîye ferâğ etmemek ve ecânibin hiçbir vecihle mıntıka-i askeriye sokulmalarına sebebiyet verilmemek şerâ'itini kabûl ve ta'ahhüd eyledikleri hâlde taharrî ruhsatnâmesi i'tâsında ordû-yı hümâyunca bir mahzûr kalmayacağıının vilâyât ve nezâret-i müşârün-ileyhimâya beyân ve iş'âr kılındığı müşârün-ileyhâdan evvelce vârid olan tahrîrâtta iş'âr kılınmış olduğundan ana göre ifâ-yı muktezâsı zımında 4 Mayıs 1314 tarih ve üçyüz seksen beş numarasıyla tezkire-i cevâbiye tastîr kılındığı kayden müstebân olmuş ve ma'den-i mezkûrun Ferik sa'âdetli Ahmed Celaleddin Paşa Hazretleri'nin irâ'e edeceği nâma imtiyâzının ihâlesi muktezâ-yı irâde-i seniyye-i hazret-i mülûkânenen olduğu gibi müşârün-ileyhin irâ'e eylediği Almanya Devleti teb'asından Mösyö Şarl Rayzer uhdesine ihâlesi hakkında da makâm-ı sâmi-i Sadâret-penâhî ile ceryân eden muhâbere üzerine nezâret-i müşârün-ileyhâca iktizâ eden mu'âmele-i ibtidâ'iyenin icrâ olunduğu tezkire-i devletleri ve melfûfât mutala'asından anlaşılmış olduğundan keyfiyetin cihet-i askeriyece beyân-ı mutâla'âdan vâreste olduğunun taraf-ı âlî-i âsifânelerine izbârı dâ'ire-i mezkûreden ifâde olunarak evrâk-ı mezkûre takımıyla leffen taraf-ı devletlerine i'âde kılınmış olmakla ol bâbda emr u fermân hazret-i men lehü'l-emrindir.

15 Safer 1316 / 23 Haziran 1314

Serasker Rıza

Şura-yı Devlet Evrak Odası'na terkim olunan melfûfât müzekkiresidir

Evraka vürûdu tarihi: Fî gurre-i S 1316

DeFTER numarası: Orman 697

Hulâsa-i Evrâk: Erzurum vilayeti mülhakâtından Tercan Kazası'nın Bölük karyesinde petrol ve neft madenleri imtiyâzının Tüfengî-i Hazret-i Şehriyârî'den Ferik saadetli Ahmed Celaleddin Paşa Hazretleri'nin irâ'e eylediği Mösyö Şarl Rabzer'e ihâlesi istîzânına dâ'ir.

Aded-i evrâk:

1 Orman Nezâreti'nin tezkiresi

1 Orman Nezâreti Meclisi'nin mazbatası

2 Şartnâme ve mukâvelenâme

4 Makâm-ı ser'askerinin fî 15 Safer 1316 tarihli tezkire-i cevâbiyesi

Orman ve Maadin ve Ziraat Nezâreti

Mektûbî Kalemi

Aded: 90

Maruz-ı çâker-i kemîneleridir ki

Erzurum Vilâyeti mülhakâtından Tercan Kazâsı'nın Bölük Karyesi'nde hudûd ma'lûm dâhilinde olup zâten mekşûf bulunan petrol ve nefit ma'denleri imtiyâzının Tüfengî-i Hazret-i Şehriyârî Ferik saadetli Ahmed Celaleddin Paşa Hazretleri'nin irâ'e edeceđi nâme tefvîzi muktezâ-yı irâde-i seniyye-i Hazret-i Hilâfet-penâhîden olduđu beyân-ı âlîsiyle ifâ-yı muktezâ-yı şeref vârid ve mevki'-i ta'zîm olan elli iki numaralı ve 26 Zilhicce 1315 tarihli tezkire-i sâmiye-i cenâb-ı vekâlet-penâhîleriyle emr ve iş'âr ve mezkur ma'denlerin Almanya Devleti teb'asından Mösyö Şarl Rayzer nâmıyla uhdesine ihâlesi için ale'l-usûl lâzım gelen mu'âmelenin ifâsı hakkında müşârün-ileyh ile mezkûr imtiyâzın i'tâsı için mûmâ-ileyh Şarl Rayzer tarafından takdim olunan arzuhâllerin leffiyle me'âllerine ve hükm-i celîl-i emr u fermân-ı hümâyûna nazaran iktizâ-yı hâlin ifâsı dahi 9 Muharrem 1316 tarihli tezkire-i sâmiye-i Sadâret-penâhîleriyle irâde ve izbâr buyurulmuş ve mezkûr ma'denlerin mûmâ-ileyh Şarl Rayzer'e de sûret-i ihâlesi hakkında encümen-i nezâret-i âcizîden tanzîm olunan mazbata mukâvele ve şartnâme lâyihalarıyla beraber matviyyen arz ve takdim kılındığı gibi Avrupa'ya imrâr edilecek bi'l-cümle eşyâ resm-i gümrüklerinin lađvı hâlinde mezkur ma'denlerden ihrâc ve imrâr olunacak cevherin gümrüğü ait yüzde bir ihrâcât resminin rusûm-ı nisbiye ve mukarreresinden ve Dârü'l-aceze için i'tâ olunacak yüz kuruşun beş paradan ve Bâbîâlî Teshilât Sandığı harclarından başka

olarak nezâret-i çâkirî veznesine te'diye ve teslim olunacağına dâ'ir mûmâ-ileyh
tarafından verilen 4 Haziran 1313 tarihli bir kıt'a sened muhâsebede hıfz ettirilmiş
olmağın ol bâbda emr u fermân hazret-i veliyyü'l-emrindir.

Selh-i Safer 1316 / 7 Haziran 1314

Orman ve Maadin ve Ziraat Nâzırı Selim

4a

Erzurum vilâyeti mülhakâtından Tercan Kazâsı'na muzâf Bölük Karyesi'nde petrol ve nefit ma'denleri taharrîsi için Sarıca Osman Bey nâmına vaktiyle verilen ruhsatnâme üzerine gönderilen ma'den numûnesi tahlîl ve mu'âmelât-ı sâ'iresi tekmîl edilerek i'lân mu'âmelesi de Mâliye Nezâret-i Celîlesi'nden bildirilmişken mezkûr ma'denlerin ihâle ve i'mâlince bazı mertebe mahzûr-ı askeri olduđu ol bâbda makâm-ı vâlâ-yı seraskeriye yazılan tezkireye müzeyyel cevâbda beyân buyurulmasıyla mu'âmelât-ı vâkı'a ibtâl olunmuş ise de ahîren yâver-i ekrem hazret-i şehriyârî müşîr devletli Şakir Paşa Hazretlerinden mevrûd 12 Kanun-ı Sâni 1313 tarihli tahrîrâtta havâyic-i memleketin birincilerinden olan petrol gazı ordu-yı hümâyûnun kurb ve civarında dururken ta Rusya ve Amerika'dan petrol celb ve istihlâki menâfi'-i memleketle kâbil-i tevfiik olamayacağından ve mu'ahharan bunun için ruhsatnâme talep eden Çulha Zâdeler Trabzon tüccârından olup ve mezkûr ma'deni i'mâl etmek üzere imtiyâz almak arzusunda bulunup binâberin ma'denin ta'mîm fevâ'idi maksadıyla her türlü teshîlât ve müsâ'adât irâ'esi lâzimededen bulunduğundan icrâ-yı icâbı iş'âr kılınmış ve mu'âmele-i sâbıkanın derciyle işbu ma'denler için me'âdin-i mahsûsa misillü yeniden ruhsatnâme verilip verilmemesi ve iktizâsı 2 Zilhicce 1315 ve 11 Nisan 1314 tarihli ve kırk iki numaralı tezkire ile Babıali cânib-i sâmisinden istîzân buyurulmuşdur.

26 Zilhicce 1315 6 Mart 1314 tarih ve elli iki numarasıyla re'sen şeref vârid olan tezkire-i sâmiye-i Sadâret-penâhîde Tercan Kazâsı'na muzâf Bölük Karyesi'nde ve hudûd-ı ma'lûme dâhilinde olup zâten mekşûf bulunan petrol ve nefit ma'denleri imtiyâzının Tüfengî-i Hazret-i Şehriyârî sa'âdetli Ahmed Celaleddin Paşa

Hazretleri'nin irâ'e edeceği nâme tefvîzi muktezâ-yı irâde-i seniyye-i hazret-i hilâfet-penâhîden bulunmasıyla iktizâsını ifâsı ve müte'âkiben şeref vârid olan 28 Zilhicce 1315 ve 7 Mayıs 1314 tarih ve elli beş numaralı tezkire-i sâmiye-i cevâbiyede dahi bu maksadlar için taharrî ruhsatnâmesi istid'â eden Trabzonlu Çulha Zâde biraderlere imtiyâz i'tâsında mahzûr mutasavver olmadığı dördüncü Ordû-yı Hümâyûn Müşiriyet-i Celîlesi'nin iş'ârına mebnî müfettiş Devletli Şakir Paşa Hazretleri'nden izbâr kılındığı taraf-ı âlî-i nezâret-penâhîlerinden mezkûr 2 Zilhicce 1315 tarihli ve kırk iki numaralı tezkire-i mufassala ile bildirilmesi üzerine makâm-ı celîl-i seraskerî ile ceryan eden muhâbere cevâbında bunlar için bazı şerâ'it dâ'iresinde Çulha Zâdeler ruhsatnâme i'tâsında ye's olmadığı dermeyân kılınmış ise de diğer tezkire ile teblîğ eylediği üzere mezkûr petrol ve nefit ma'denleri imtiyâzının müşârün-ileyh Ahmed Paşa hazretlerinin irâ'e edeceği nâme tefvîzi şeref müte'allik buyurulan irâde-i seniyye-i cenâb-ı hilâfet-penâhî iktizâ-yı âlîsinden bulunmasıyla icâb-ı hâlin icrâsı emr ve irâde buyurulmakdan nâşî ma'âdin heyet-i fenniyesinden bi't-takdîm tevdî' buyurulan 16 Mayıs 1314 tarihli mazbatada paşa-yı müşârün-ileyh tarafından mütevârid 12 Mayıs 1314 tarihli takrîrde irâ'e edecekleri nâm-ı müste'âr ile uhdelere ihâles muktezâ-yı irâde-i seniyye-i hazret-i şehriyârîden olan ma'den-i mezkûrun Almanya Devleti teb'asından intihâb ettiklerie Mösyö Şarl Rayzer nâm-ı müste'ârıyla mu'âmele-i tefvîziyenin icrâsı bildirildiğinden ve lede't-tetkîk mezkûr ma'denin vurûd eden numûnesinin bi't-tahlîl tebeyyün eyleyen terkîbâtına nazaran i'mâle elverişli a'lâ bir petrol olduğu ve elde bulunan harîtalarına nazaran arâzîsi şimâlen Vartabet Tepesi'nden bed' ile Neftlik Büyük Kızı Tepesi beynine vasl olunan hatt-ı müstakîm ve garben mezkûr tepeden bed' ile Alkız Dağı Tepesi'nden vasl olunan hatt-ı müstakîm ve cenûben mezkûr tepeden bed' ile Haçka Tepesi'ne vasl olunan hatt-ı müstakîm ve şarkan mezkûr tepe bed' ile Tolos tarîkinin selhâne

deresiyle birleřtiđi noktadan bi'l-murûr bed' hudûd olan Vartabet Tepesi'ne vâsıl
olunan hatt-ı münkesir ile mahdûd ve dokuz yüz elli beř cirisden ibâret bulunduđu
anlařıldıđından

bahisle icrâ-yı icâbı ifâde ve ahiren şeref-vârid olup hey'et-i fenniye'nin müzekkiresiyle me'an tevdî' buyurulan 18 Mayıs 1314 tarih ve altmış beş numaralı tezkire-i sâmiye-i cenâb-ı Sadâret-penâhîde mezkûr ma'denlerin Almanya Devleti teb'asından Mösyö Şarl Rayzer nâmıyla uhdesine ihâlesi için ale'l-usûl lâzım gelen mu'âmelenin icrâsı hakkında paşa-yı müşârün-ileyh cânibinden ve imtiyâzın i'tâsı için Şarl Rayzer tarafından verilen arzuhâllerin irsâl buyurulduğu beyân-ı sâmiyeyle me'âllerine ve hükm-i celîl-i emr u fermân-ı hümâyûna nazaran iktizâ-yı hâlin ifâ ve inbâsı irâde ve iş'âr buyurulmuş ve Mösyö Şarl Rayzer'in 4 Mayıs 314 tarihli olan istid'ânâmesi mekşûf bulunan ve icrâ-yı icâbı nezâret-i celîlelerinden Babıali cânib-i sâmiyine iş'âr kılınan Tercan Kazâsı'ndaki petrol ve petrol ma'denlerinin nizâmnâme-i mahsûs ve usûl-i müttihazesi vecihle kendi uhdesine tefvîzi ve müşârün-ileyh Ahmed Paşa Hazretleri'nin 17 Mayıs 1314 tarihli olan mezkûr arzuhâli dahi imtiyâzın nâm-ı müste'ârla ya'nî mûmâ-ileyh Mösyö Şarl Rayzer nâmıyla uhdelere tefvîzi mûmâ-ileyhin takdim ettiği arzuhâlin tervîci merkezinde bulunmuşdur. İcâbı lede't-tezekkür petrol ve petrol ma'denleri yığın hâlinde olduğuna binâ'en sâlifü'l-arz Tercan Kazâsı'ndaki petrol ve petrol ma'denlerinin yüzde on resm tesmiye tâbi' olmak ve i'mâlât-ı ma'deniyeye inhisâr eyleyecek mezkûr arâzînin beher cerîbi için senevî onar kuruş resm-i mukarrer i'tâ ve ma'denin hâsılât-ı sâfiyesinden yüz kuruşda beş para Dârü'l-aceze'ye ve şeref sâdır olacak fermân-ı âlîden dolayı bir def'aya mahsûs olarak nezâret-i celîleleri veznesine elli ve Babıali Teshîlât Sandığı'na yirmi aded lira-yı Osmânî tesviye ve ifâ kılınmak ve ileride turuk veya inşaat-ı askeriyeden nâşî i'mâlât-ı ma'deniyeye ta'tîl edilecek olur ise bir güne zarar ve

ziyân ve tazmînât da'vâsına hakk ve salâhiyeti olamamak şartıyla ve doksan dokuz sene müddetle ber mûceb-i emr u fermân-ı hümâyûn-ı hazret-i hilâfet-penâhî müşârün-ileyh Ahmed Celaleddin Paşa Hazretlerinin istid'âsı vecihle irâ'e eylediği mûmâ-ileyh Mösyö Şarl Rayzer'e ihâle buyurulması husûsunun muhâsebeci ale'l-usûl tanzîm kılınacak mukâvele ve şartnâmelerin leffiyle bâ-tezkire-i cevâbiye Babıali cânib-i sâmisine arz ve inhâsı tensîb kılındı ol bâbda emr u fermân hazret-i men lehü'l-emrindir.

19 Muharrem 1316 / 27 Mayıs 1314.

Muavin ve Reis-i Encümen-i nezâret Hüseyin

Ma'âdin Hey'et-i Fenniyesi Reisi [mühür]

Orman Heyet-i Fenniyesi Reisi hîn-i tahrîrde bulunmamışdır

Muhâsebeci [mühür]

Zirâ'at Heyet-i Fenniyesi Reisi [mühür]

Sermühendis hîn-i tahrîrde bulunmamışdır.

Mûcebince 29

5a

Şurâ-yı Devlet

Mülkiye Dâ'iresi

Aded

Erzurum Vilâyeti dâhilinde Tercan Kazâsı'na muzâf Bölük Karyesi'nde kâ'in olup ber müceb-i emr u fermân-ı hümâyûn-ı hazret-i hilâfet-penâhî Tüfengî-i Hazret-i Şehriyârî Ferîk saadetli Ahmed Celaleddin Paşa Hazretleri'nin istid'âsı vecihle irâ'e eylediği Almanya Devleti teb'asından Mösyö Şarl Rayzer uhdesine ihâle olunacak mekşûf petrol ve neft ma'denlerinin ihâle fermân-ı âlîsine derc olunacak şartnâmedir.

Birinci madde: Erzurum Vilâyeti dâhilinde Tercan Kazâsı'na tâbi' Bölük Karyesi'nde kâ'in mekşûf petrol ve neft ma'denlerinin şeref sâdır buyurulacak olan fermân-ı âlîsi târîhinden i'tibâren doksan dokuz sene müddetle ve şerâ'it-i âtiye ile mûmâ-ileyha Mösyö Şarl Rayzer uhdesine ihâle ve ilzâm olunacaktır.

İkinci madde: Harîta-i mahsûsasında gösterildiği vecihle ma'den-i mezkûrun hafr ve i'mâli için dokuz yüz elli beş cerib arâzî tahsîs olunmakla işbu arâzînin hudûdu şimâlen Vartabet Tepesi'nden bed' ile Tüfekliğin büyük kaydı Tepesi beynine vasl olunan hatt-ı müstakîm ve garben mezkûr tepeden bed' ile Alkız Dağı Tepesine vasl olunan hatt-ı müstakîm ve cenûben mezkûr tepeden bed' ile Haçfa Tepesi'ne vasl olunan hatt-ı müstakîm ve şarkan mezkûr tepeden bed' ile Tolos tarîkinin selhâne Deresiyle birleştiği noktadan bi'l-murûr mebde' olan Vartabet Tepesi'ne vasl olunan hatt-ı münkesir ile mahdûddur.

Üçüncü madde: İşbu hudûd ile temdîd olunan arâzî dâhilinde mezkûr petrol ve neft ma'denlerinden mâ'adâ zuhûr edecek olan sâ'ir cins ma'denler bu ihâleye dâhil

olmadığından anlar için gümrük mültezim mûmâ-ileyh ve gerek sâ'irleri tarafından talep ve istid'â vukû'bulduğu hâlde ma'âdin nizâmnâmesinin otuzuncu mâddesi hükmüne tatbîken mu'âmele-i mukteziye icrâ kılınacaktır.

Dördüncü madde: İşbu ma'denler için ber vech-i muharrer tahsîs olunan dokuz yüz elli beş cerib arâzînin ma'âdin nizâmnâmesinin kırk ikinci maddesi mûcebince beher çeri için resm mukarrer olmak üzere onar kuruş hesâbıyla Osmanlı altını yüz kuruş olarak dokuzbin beş yüz elli kuruş mültezim-i mûmâ-ileyh tarafından beher sene mart ibtidâsında Orman ve Ma'âdin ve Zirâ'at Nezâreti veznesine te'diye kılınacak ve vakt-i mu'ayyeninde i'tâ olunduğu hâlde eyyâm-ı mûte'ahhire için senevî yüzde dokuz hesâbıyla icab eden fâ'izi dahi ayrıca ifâ olunacaktır.

Beşinci madde: Mezkûr ma'denlerin hudûd-ı imtiyâziyesi dâhilinde bulunan arazî yalnız mezkûr ma'denlerin işledilmesi için i'tibârî olarak tahsîs olunduğundan Ma'âdin Nizâmnâmesinin altmış bir ve altmış iki ve altmış üç ve altmış dördüncü maddeleri hükmünce iktizâ eden mu'âmelât ifâ kılınacaktır.

Altıncı madde: Mezkûr petrol ve nefit ma'denleri yağın hâlinde bulunan mevâdd-ı ma'deniye aksâmından add olunduğu cihetle hâsîlât-ı gayr-i sâfiyesinden yüzde on rusûm-ı nisbiyenin Orman ve Me'âdin ve Zirâ'at Nezâreti'ne i'tâsı mukarrer olmasıyla rusûm-ı mezkûre nezâret-i müşârün-ileyhânın re'y ve karârı üzerine aynen veyahud râyic-i vakte göre bedelen ma'âdin nizâmnâmesinin kırk üçüncü maddesi hükmüne tevfiikan bi'l-hesâb istîfâ kılınacaktır. Ve fakat mültezim-i mûmâ-ileyhe mezkûr petrol ve nefit ma'denlerini tasfiyesi zımında muktezî olan fabrikaları inşâ ve ahvâl-i mevki'iyeye ve icâbât-ı fenniye müsâid olduğu hâlde teshîl-i takayyudât için iskeleye kadar borular ferş edecek ve ihrâc edeceği petrol ve nefitler dâhil-i gümrük rusûmundan mu'âf tutulacaktır.

Yedinci madde: İhâleyi hâvî verilecek fermân-ı âlî tarihinden i'tibâren mezkûr ma'denlerin iki seneye kadar küşâd ve i'mâline mültezim-i mûmâ-ileyh mecbûr olup bu müddet zarfında küşâd olunduğu takdîrde ma'âdin nizâmnâmesinin elli ikinci ve elli üçüncü maddeleri mücebince mu'âmele-i nizâmiye bi'l-icrâ mezkûr ma'denlerin ihâlesi fesh olunacaktır.

Sekizinci madde: Mezkûr ma'denlerin rusûm-ı nisbiyesi Osmanlı altını yüz kuruşa olarak hâsılât-ı ma'deniyenin nakl ve imrâr veya furuht olunduğu anda i'tâ ve te'diye olunmadığı hâlde eyyâm-ı müte'ahhire için senevî yüzde dokuz hesâbıyla icâb eden faizi dahi mültezim-i mûmâ-ileyhe ayrıca i'tâ ve teslîm etmeğe mecbûr olacaktır ve mezkûr ma'denlerin i'mâlât ve ameliyâtı için levâzım-ı ibtidâ'îye olarak bir def'aya mahsûs olmak üzere hâricden getirilecek âlât ve edevât ve makine gümrükden bilâ resm imrâr ettirilecektir.

Dokuzuncu madde: Zikr olunan ma'denlerin i'mâli zımında ihâleyi hâvî tasdîr buyurulacak fermân-ı alînin i'tâsında Maarif Nizâmnâmesinin kırkinci maddesine tevfikân bir def'a olarak ferman harcı olmak üzere mültezim-i mûmâ-ileyh tarafından nezâret-i müşârün-ileyhâ üzerine elli aded Osmânî altını i'tâ kılınacağı gibi Babıali Teshîlât Sandığı için dahi ayrıca yirmi aded lira-yı Osmânî te'diye kılınacaktır.

Tahakkuk eder ise külliyyen men' olunacaktır.

Birinci madde: Ma'den-i mezkûr ameliyâtının su yollarıyla bend ve çeşmelere ve şose tarîki ve demir yollara yüz elli metre uzaklıkta icrâsı lâzimededen olduğundan şayed bu mikdâr mesâfeden noksan olur ise sâbıkda muharrer olan olan mu'âmelât aynıyla bunun dahi hakkında icrâ olunacak ve'l-hâsıl Emniyet-i Umûmiye'nin vikâyesi ve muhâfazasına gâyet i'tinâ ve dikkat kılınacaktır.

Sekizinci madde: Esbâb-ı gayr-i melhûzadan nâşî şayed usûl-i i'mâlâtın ikinci maddeye tevfiķan ta'dîl ve ıslâhı icab eylediği hâlde mültezim-i mûmâ-ileyhin istid'âsı ve mühendisin lâyihası üzerine hükümet-i mahalliye tarafından inhâ olundukda umûr-ı esâsiyesine tatbîken ıslahât-ı icâbiye icrâ olunacaktır.

Dokuzuncu madde: Sath-ı arzda olan kuyu ve mağaraların terk ve ta'fîli icab eylediği suretde Orman ve Ma'âdin ve Zirâ'at Nezâreti'nin göstereceği usûl üzerine masârıfı mültezim-i mûmâ-ileyh tarafından tesviye olunmak üzere mahrecleri setr ve imlâ ettirilecektir.

Onuncu madde: Mültezim-i mûmâ-ileyh cevâhir ihrâcına mahsûs mağara ile su yolu mağarası var ise i'mâlâtın ve suların ihrâcına elverişli sûretde ağızlarına kuvvetli ve emniyetli makineler vaz'ına mecbur olacaktır.

Onbirinci madde: İ'mâl olunacak mezkûr ma'denlerin hudûdu ittisâlinde diğerk ma'den bulunduğu takdirde iki ma'denin yekdiğerkine iltihâkından neş'et edecek mazarratın men'i için nihâyet hudûdda bulunan mevâdd-ı ma'deniye yataklarından bir mikdar mahall terk ettirilecek ve terk edilecek mahallin vüs'at ve mikdârı dahi Orman ve Ma'âdin ve Zirâ'at Nezâreti'nden tayin kılınacaktır.

On ikinci madde: Bu ma‘denin arâzî-i mahdûdesi dâhilinde petrol ve neft ma‘deninden mâ‘adâ diğerk cins ma‘den zuhûr edip de âhar tâlibine ihâle olduğunu ve mezkûr ma‘denin i‘mâlâtı vaz‘iyyetinin işbu ma‘denlerin i‘mâlât-ı hâzırası derûnundan murûruna lüzum ve ihtiyâc görüldüğü hâlde mültezim-i mûmâ-ileyh hiçbir sûretle mûmâna‘at edemeyecektir ancak andan terettüb edecek tazmînât ashâb-ı imtiyâz beyninde rızâ’en tesviye olunmadığı hâlde ehl-i vukûfun takdîri Orman ve Ma‘âdin ve Zirâ‘at Nezâreti'nin tensîbi ile tayin kılınacaktır.

On üçüncü madde: İşbu ma‘denin ihâlesi dâhilinde vaktten mine'l-evkât demir yolu geçirilecek ve umûma menfa‘atli bir tarîk veyahud ve sâ’ir şey’ inşâ kılınacak olduğu hâlde mültezim-i mûmâ-ileyh hiçbir suretle tazmîn da‘vâsına veyahud muhâlefete istihkâk ve salâhiyeti olamayıp bunlar mezkûr ma‘denin asıl petrol ve neft yatakları mahrecleri üzerinden geçmek lazım gelir ise ol hâlde terettüb edecek zarar ve ziyânı müte‘allik olduğu mahkemenin tetkîk ve hükmü üzerine icâb eden taraftan ifâ kılınacaktır.

On dördüncü madde: İşbu ma‘denin rusûm-ı nisbiyesinin tahsîli Erzurum vilâyetine âid olduğundan mültezim-i mûmâ-ileyh mezkûr ma‘denden ihrâc edeceği cevherin ma‘âdin nizâmnâmesinin kırk dördüncü ve kırk sekizinci maddeleri mücebince mikdârını mübeyyin lazım gelen cedvel ve icmâli takdîm edecektir.

On beşinci madde: Mültezim-i mûmâ-ileyhe mâdde-i sâbıkada muharrer olan hesâb cedvellerini vakt-i mu‘ayyeninde i‘tâ ve teslîm etmediği hâlde ma‘âdin nizâmnâmesinin kırk dokuzuncu maddesi mücebince beş yüzlük Osmanlı altınından yirmibeş yüzlük Osmanlı altınına kadar cezâ-yı nakdî alınacak ve mezkur cetvellerde hakikat-i hâli ketm ederek bi'l-ihtiyâr hâsılâtı mikdâr-ı sahîhinden noksan göstermiş olduğu sâbit olur ve kaçak vukû‘u tebeyyün eder ise devlete aid rusûmâtın noksanı iki kat olarak tazmîn ettirilip hukûk-ı umûmiye ciheti dahi mahkeme-i cezâ’iyede

başkaca fasl ve hükm edilir gerek vergi ve rusûmâtın te'diyesinde ve gerek hükm olunan cezâ-yı nakdînin ifâsında mûmâna'at ve ta'annüd eylediği takdîrde vilâyet-i müşârün-ileyhâ tarafından nihâyetü'n-nihâye iki ayı geçmemek üzere bir müddet tayiniyle resmen ve tahrîren teblîğât icrâsıyla o müddet zarfında tamâmen ifâ olunmaz ise ma'âdin nizâmnâmesinin altıncı mâddesi mucebince istifâ-yı deyn olunacaktır.

On altıncı madde: İşbu ma'denlerin çıkarılıp hârice gönderilecek cevheri Trabzon İskelesi'ne nakl ile ma'âdin nizâmnâmesinin kırk birinci maddesi hükmüne tevfiikan orada vezn olunarak rusûm-ı nisbiye ve resm-i gümrüğünün i'tâ ve murûr tezkiresini ahz eylediğinden sonra istediği mahallere nakl etmeğe mültezim-i mûmâ-ileyhe me'zûn olup şayed ruhsat ve murûr tezkiresi alınmaksızın âhar mahalle hâsılât nakl olduğu tahakkuk edip veyahud nakl eder iken tutulur ise ma'âdin nizâmnâmesinin kırk dokuzuncu mâddesi hükmünce mu'âmele ifâ olunacaktır.

On yedinci mâdde: Mezkûr ma'denlerin fermân-ı âlîsine zeyl olarak tanzîm kılınan ve ma'âdin nizâmnâmesine müteferri' bulunan işbu şartnâmenin ahkâm-ı mündercesi mültezim-i mûmâ-ileyh tarafından kabûl ve tasdîk olduğundan şerâ'it-i muharrerenin hilâfında hâl ve hareket vukû'a getirildiği hâlde mu'âmele-i mukteziye icrâ kılınacağı misillü kavânîn ve nizâmât-ı hâliye ve müstakbele-i Devlet-i Aliyye'ye tamâmıyla tevfiik hareket olunacaktır.

Şûrâ-yı Devlet

Şurâ-yı Devlet

Mülkiye Dâ'iresi

Aded

Erzurum Vilâyeti dâhilinde Tercan Kazâsı'na muzâf Pülk Karyesi'nde kâ'in olup ber müceb-i emr u fermân-ı hümâyûn-ı hazret-i hilâfet-penâhî Tüfengî-i Hazret-i Şehriyârî Ferîk saadetli Ahmed Celaledin Paşa Hazretleri'nin istid'âsı vecihle irâ'e eylediği Almanya Devleti teb'asından Mösyö Şarl Rayzer uhdesine ihâle olunacak mekşûf petrol ve neft ma'adenlerinin ihâle fermân-ı âlîsine zeyl olunacak şartnâmedir. Birinci madde: Erzurum Vilâyeti dâhilinde Tercan Kazâsı'na muzâf Bölük Karyesi'nde kâ'in mekşûf petrol ve neft ma'adenlerinin tersîm edilen üç kıt'a harîta-i mevki'iyyesinni bir kıt'ası Orman ve Ma'âdin ve Zirâ'at Nezâreti fenn odasında hıfz edilerek bir kıt'ası mahalline irsâl ve diğere bir kıt'ası dahi mültezim-i mûmâ-ileyhe i'tâ kılınmışdır ihâle fermân-ı âlîsinin târih-i i'tasından i'tibâren altı mâh müddet zarfında masârıfı mültezim-i mûmâ-ileyhe aid olmak üzere zikr olunan harîtada gösterilen hudûdun mevâki'-i lâzimesine murûr-ı zamân ile bozulmayacak sûretde ma'âdin nizâm-nâmesinin elli birinci maddesine tevfikân hükümet-i mahalliye ve mühendis ma'rifetiyle alâmât-ı mahsûsa rekz ettirilerek keyfiyet-i vilâyet ve ma'âdinin bulunduğu kazânın sicillâtına kayd olunduktan sonra mu'âmelâtı hâvî olarak üç nüsha zabt varakası tanzîm ve zîrleri cânib-i vilâyetden tayin olunan me'mûrlara ve mültezimleri müştereken temhîr ettirilecek ve bundan bir nüshası bâ-mazbata Orman ve Ma'âdin ve Zirâ'at Nezâretine irsâl olunacaktır.

İkinci madde: Mültezim-i mûmâ-ileyhe ma'âdin nizâmnâmesinin elli beş ve elli altı ve elli yedinci maddeleri hükmünce tanzîm ettireceği resm-i musattah ve müsettemlerden mâ'adâ ma'denin icrâsını ihtiyâr edeceği i'lâmâtın usûlünü ve mezkûr resimlere dâ'ir izâhât ve tasavvurâtını bend bend yazıp bir lâyiha tanzîmiyle fermân-ı âlî-i mezkûrun târih-i i'tâsından i'tibâren altı mah zarfında mahallinde hükümet-i mühendese ve mühendis bulunmadığı takdirde doğrudan doğruya Orman ve Ma'âdin ve Zirâ'at Nezâretine irsâl edip nezâret-i müşârün-ileyhâdan dahi tensîb olduğu hâlde icrâsına ruhsat verilecektir şayed sûret-i ma'rûzanın mağdûr ve muhâsarası mutâla'â olunur veyahut i'mâlâtın devâm ve intizâmına ve icrâ olunacak ameliyât-ı âtiye-i nâfi'aya mâni' olacağı tahakkuk eder ise mezkûr lâyiha nezâret-i müşârün-ileyhâdan ta'dîl ve islâh olunacaktır.

Üçüncü madde: İşlemekte olan mağaralara girmek veya hava aldirmek için müceddeden sath-ı arzdan yol ve kuyu ve baca küşâdı lâzım geldiği hâlde evvel emirde mültezim-i mûmâ-ileyhe istid'â ve lâyihasını Orman ve Ma'âdin ve Zirâ'at Nezâreti'ne i'tâ edip ba'dehu ma'den mühendisinin icrâ edeceği keşf üzerine nezâret-i müşârün-ileyhânın re'y ve karârı vecihle mu'âmelesi icrâ olunacak ve ruhsat istihsâl olunmadıkça o makûle ameliyâtı icrâ edemeyecektir.

Dördüncü madde: Mezkûr ma'denin ameliyât-ı esâsiyesinden mâ'adâ müceddeden diğer bir şubenin küşâdı murâd olduğu hâlde işbu şube için ihâlesinin harîta-i mahsûsuna merbût olmak üzere ayrıca bir kıt'a harîta tanzîm olunarak ikinci maddeye tevfiikan tasavvur olunan ameliyât-ı dâ'ime lâyihasıyla beraber mültezim-i mûmâ-ileyh tarafından Orman ve Ma'âdin ve Zirâ'at Nezâreti'ne i'tâ olunacak ve mezkûr lâyihanın nezâret-i müşârün-ileyhâdan kabûl ve ta'dîli veyahud icâbına göre reddi câ'iz olacaktır.

Beşinci madde: Mültezim-i mûmâ-ileyh ma'âdin nizâmnâmesinin otuz altıncı maddesig mûcebince ameliyât-ı vâkı'adan dolayı ashâb-ı emlâke terettüb edecek zarar ve ziyândan mes'ûl olmasıyla bunun için aid olduđu mahkemeden tayin kılınacak tazmînâtı te'diye ve i'tâsına mecbûrdur.

Altıncı madde: İşbu madenlerin civarında bulunan ebniye ve menâzilin altında icrâyı ameliyât olunmak iktizâ eylediđi hâlde mültezim-i mûmâ-ileyh ve ashâb-ı menâzilin ifâdeleri alındıktan ve terettüb edecek zarar ve ziyânın te'diyesi için kefâlete rabt olunduktan sonra hükümet-i mühendesenin lâyihası veyahud mahallî hükümetin iş'ârı üzerine ma'âdin idâresinden ruhsat verilmedikçe o makûle ameliyâta teşebbüs olunacaktır kefâlet ve tazmînât maddelerine da'ir olan münaza'ât aid oldukları mehâkim-i nizâmiyede fasl ve rü'yet olunacak ve şayed ameliyât-ı mezkûre o misillü ebniye ve arâzînin ma'mûriyet ve umûmun emniyyetine muzırrı ve muhill olduđu

Üçüncü madde: Mültezim-i mûmâ-ileyh mezkûr ma‘denlerin i‘mâlâtına müteferri‘ kâffe-i ahvâl ve husûsâtda ma‘âdin nizâm-nâmesinin ahkâm-ı münderecesine teb‘iyyet ve tatbîk hareket eyleyeceği misillü ihâle fermân-ı âlîsinin zeyli olarak te‘âtî olunan şartnâme ve kavânîn ve nizâmât-ı hâliye ve müstakbele-i Devlet-i Aliyye'ye tamâmıyla tevfiik hareket edeceğini ve me‘âdin-i mezkûrenin ihrâc ve i‘mâli için bir şirket teşkîli hâlinde bunun Osmanlı Anonim Şirketi olacağını ta‘ahhüd eder.

On birinci madde: Mültezim-i mûmâ-ileyhe patent nizam-nâmesi mücebince hangi sınıf ve derecede bulunur ise o sınıfa ait patent resmini i‘tâyâ mecburdur.

On ikinci madde: Mültezim-i mûmâ-ileyh rusûm-ı mukarrere ve nisbiye ve sâ‘ireden mâ‘adâ ileride gümrük ihrâcât resminin ifâsı hâlinde mezkur ma‘denlerden Avrupa'ya imrâr ve ihrâc olunacak petrol ve neftin yüzde bir ihrâcât resm-i gümrüğünün dahi ayrıca Orman ve Me‘âdin ve Zirâ‘at Nezâret-i Celîlesi'ne i‘tâsını ve ma‘denin hâsılât-ı sâfiyesinden yüz kuruşda beş parasını dahi Dersaadet'deki Dârü'l-aceze için te‘diye ve ifâsını der‘uhde ve kabul eylemiş olduğundan işbu yüz kuruşda beş para resm-i ma‘denin rusûm-ı nisbiyesiyle me‘an te‘diye olunacaktır.

Mâdde-i mahsûsa: Mezkûr ma‘denlerin bulunduğu mevki‘ ve civarına ve ma‘den yataklarıyla mahrecleri üzerine istihkâm ve turuk ve mevâridât-ı askeriye inşâ olunacak olduğu veyahut istihkâm inşâsı iktizâ edip de mağara ve ebniyelerinin hedmi veya harekât-ı askeriye icrâsıyla ameliyât kısmen veyâ kâmilen tatil ettirildiği hâlde mültezim-i mûmâ-ileyhe hiçbir sûretle muhâlefete hak ve salâhiyeti

olamayacağı gibi bir güne zarar ve ziyân ve tazmînât talebine dahi hakkı
olamayacaktır.

Şurâ-yı Devlet

Huzur-ı sâmilere

Atufetli Beyefendi

Gerçi ind-i âlîlerinde ehemmiyetden müstağnî ve ma‘lûmu ilam kabîlinden ise de fakat düçar olduğum ıstırâb-ı derûnî bendenize şu varakpareyi nazargâh-ı keremkârîlerine arz edilmek üzere takdim ve tisyâra mecbur kıldı lutfen ve tenezzülen mutâla‘asını niyaz ederim efendim.

"Erzurum Vilâyeti"

Erzurum kasaba ve tevâbi‘i – ma‘lûm-ı âlîleridir ki bu gün terakkiyât-ı ümrâniye ve fenniyeden mahrûm bir yerdir. Ahalisi tenbel olmakla beraber kendiliklerinden bedî‘alar vücuda ve meydana getirebilmek isti‘dadından dahi mahrûmdurlar. Bugün o havâlîde müstevlî olan fakr ve sefâlet hakikaten dilsûzdur. Oradaki ahalîyi kolundan tutup yapacağı işi gösterecek ne vecihle kesb-i servet edilir nasıl kazanılır insanca yaşamak nasıl olur bu yolları o zavallı ahalîye gösterecek bir mürşid lazımdır. Ki o da hükümetimizdir. Başka kat‘iyyen kimse yokdur ve o ahâlî de kendiliğinden daha bir asır böylece dursalar bir şey yapamayacak ve insanlığı anlamayacaklardır. Çünkü câhildirler çünkü ve hiç şeye mâlik değildirler.

Erzurum'a gayet yakın olan petrol madeni hakkında size şayan-ı dikkat ma'lûmât vereceğim. Mezkur petrol madenini mahv etmek menba'ini köreltmek için uğraşıyormuşlar hattâ bunun için yani şu petrol menbe'ine civa dökerek gaib ettirmek için Batum Rus Gaz tüccarları bizim hükümet memurlarına iki bin lira kadar bir para vermişler. Orada memûrîn-i aidesi kim ise bu parayı almış mezkur petrol menba'i de mahv ediliyormuş bu keyfiyet sahihdir bey efendi serî'an oradaki vâliye emr buyurunuz işbu petrol menba'i hakkında gizlice tahkikât yapılsın ve aynı zamanda mezkur menba'dan istifâde olunmak için icab eden inşaat ve muhâfaza keyfiyetinin dahi çaresine baktırınız petrol ne vecihle çıkarılıyor bunun suret-i ihrâcını bilir bir mühendis mahalline i'zâm edilsin ve hemen işe başlasın işbu petrol altın deryâsı olan bu menba' bizi ihyâ edecektir. Umûm memâlik-i Osmaniye'de petrole verilen paraları bir kere hesâb ediniz. Bir teneke gaz onbeş kuruş kıyyesi altmış para işte istikrâz edeceğimiz altınlar burada medfûn. Ama siz diyeceksiniz ki bu gibi madenlere Nafia Da'iresi karışır. Nafia Dâ'iresi milletin vatanın selâmet ve sa'âdetini hakkıyla düşünse idi şimdiye kadar uyumaması lazımdı ihtimâl ki orada Ruslardan şu iki bin lirayı çeken oradaki nafia memurlarıdır. Tabi'î hakkıyla tahkikât neticesi tezâhür edecektir yalnız yalnız efendim şu hayırlı işe teşebbüs edilsin biçare millete imdâd!

23 Eylül 1326

Topçu kumandanlarından

M. [imza]

3638

Dahiliye Nezareti Muhâberât-ı Umûmiye Dâ'iresi Şube

Müsevvidi: Mehmed Nazım

Tarih-i tesvîd: 25 Eylül 1326

Erzurum Vilâyet-i Celilesine

Mahrûkât şitâiyeden mahrûm olan vilayetden merkeze dört saat mesâfede bulunan kömür madeninden ve ol havâlîde mevcûd olan petrol ma'deninden ne yolda te'mîn-i fevâ'id edileceğini ve bazı ifâdâtı hâvî oradan vârid olan mektûb leffen gönderilmiş ve mektûb-ı mezkûrun münderecâtı cidden câlib-i dikkat bulunmuş olduğundan mevzu'bahs olan mevâdd hakkında vilayetçe bazı teşebbüsât icra edildiği takdirde mahiyet Erzurum'daki kömür ma'deni ve petrol menba'ı hakkında istîzâha dâ'ir ve derecâtının inbâsı teşebbüsât-ı lâzimenin icrâ ve nezâretten ma'lûmât i'tâsı mütemennâ ve müntazırdır.

Dördüncü Ordu-yı Hümâyûn Müşiriyeti

Mâbeyn-i Hümâyûn-ı cenab-ı mulûkâne Başkitâbet-i Celilesine

Devletli Efendim Hazretleri

Erzurum Vilayeti dâhilinde Tercan Kazası'na mülhak ve merkez-i ordu-yı hümâyûna on üç sa'at bu'd mesafede vâki' Pülk Karyesi'nde bir petrol ma'deni neb'an etmektedir. Bu madenin cinsi hâlis ve oldukça da zengindir. İşletildiği halde Erzurum ve Erzincan mevki'lerinde aramsâz olan asâkir-i şâhâne ve civâr mahaller ahalsinin sarfiyâtını te'mîne kâfi idiği tahakkuk kılınmıştır. Bu madenin imtiyâzını istihsâl etmek üzere ecnebî sermayedârânıyla teb'a-i şâhâneleri bazıları çalışmakta ve hattâ Nemli Zâdelerden birinin dahi imtiyâz-ı mezkûru ahz ve istihsâle uğraşmakta oldukları işitilmektedir. Erzurumla Erzincan gibi askerlik nokta-i nazarından pek mühim olan iki mevki' arasında böyle bir ecnebî idâresinin teşekkülü mahzurdan salim olamayacağına ve bunlar tarafından istihsâl olunacak imtiyâz dahi ordu-yı hümâyûn ve civâr mahaller ahalsini layıkıyla müstefid edemeyeceğine nazaran mezkûr petrol ma'deninin Dördüncü Ordu-yı Hümâyûn tarafından mu'âvenet-i askeriye icrâsıyla sâye-i hazret-i padişâhîde mevki'-i istifâdeye vaz'ı esbâb-ı hasenenin sâha-i fi'l ve icrâya îsâline çalışmak üzere imtiyâzının ordu-yı hümâyûna i'tâ ve ihsânı hususunun lutfen ve inâyeten meşmûl-i müsâ'ade-i kerâmet âde-i cenâb-ı zıllullâh-i akdesî buyurulması arz ve estid'asına mucâseret olunur ol bâbda ve her hâlde emr u ferman hazret-i men lehü'l-emrindir.

Fî 10 Şabani'l-mu'azzam 1327 / 26 Eylül 1321

Yaver-i Ekrem-i Hazret-i Şehriyârî Dördüncü Ordu-yı Hümâyûn Müşiri

[mühür]

Appendix E: The Articles of the Concession Contract (Translation)

1: One of the location maps pertaining to the discovered petroleum and naphtha reservoirs located in the Pülk village of Tercan district of Erzurum province is retained in the Technical department of the Ministry of Forestry, Mining and Agriculture. One of these maps was sent to the relevant office in the region and the last one was delivered to the contractor. Special signs will be erected at the contractor's cost and under the knowledge of the local government and engineer and in accordance with the fifty first article of the codes of rules on Mining and Mining Operations in a manner that would not get ruined or destroyed in the course of time at the points shown in the map within six months after receipt of the firman granting concession license. This should be registered in the records of the province and the district where the aforementioned petroleum and naphtha reservoirs are located and three official documents should be prepared in connection with these procedures and transactions and each of these official documents should be jointly signed and sealed by the officers appointed by the governor's office and the contractor and one copy of such documents accompanied by the official report should be sent to the Ministry of Forestry, Mining and Agriculture.

2: The aforementioned contractor will have maps to be prepared and drawn in accordance with the provisions of the articles 55, 56 and 57 of the codes of rules on Mining and Mining Operations and in addition to these aforementioned maps the contractor will also prepare and produce a report and will indicate the method that will be preferred in carrying out the mining operations and explanations about the aforementioned maps will also be included in the report. This report will be submitted to the engineer of the local authority, if any, if not then to the Ministry of

Forestry, Mining and Agriculture within six months after receipt of the firman granting concession license.

3: The aforementioned contractor will send his report and petition to the Ministry of Forestry, Mining and Agriculture when it is required to construct and open a road, to drill a well or to open a chimney on the surface of the soil in order to enter into the caves and caverns and ventilate such caves and caverns in the mining zone. The contractor shall perform the aforementioned works only after the investigation and exploration of the mining engineer and in accordance with the opinion and resolution of the relevant ministry and such kind works shall not be performed and conducted without obtaining the required permission and license.

4: In the event where it is required to establish and open a new branch for the operation and activities of the aforementioned mining zone a new map shall be prepared and drawn for this new branch to be annexed to the special map prepared in accordance with the firman. This map accompanied by an operation report in accordance with the report contemplated in article 2 above shall be submitted to the Ministry of Forestry, Mining and Agriculture and the Ministry shall be entitled whether to approve and accept such report or to make amendments to this report or otherwise to refuse it.

5: In accordance with the provisions of article thirty-six of the codes of law on mining and mining operations the contractor shall be responsible and liable for the damages and/or losses suffered and incurred by the property holders in the region and shall be obligated to pay and indemnify such amount of compensations that will be determined by the relevant courts that have jurisdiction on the related subject.

6: First it will be taken depositions of the property owners and the contractor in the event when it is required to perform and to carry out works under the buildings and

houses located in the close vicinity of the aforementioned mining zone and the contractor shall set up guarantee and act as surety in order to cover and indemnify the damages and losses that may arise out of or in connection with this works. Without the prior consent of the mining authority upon the report of the government engineer or opinion of the local authority such kind works shall not be performed and/or carried out. Any dispute or conflict arising out of or in connection with amount of compensation and/or in relation with surety and guarantee of the contractor shall be referred to the relevant courts that have jurisdiction on the related subject. The aforementioned works shall be entirely banned and/or restricted in the event if such works found or deemed to be harmful or detrimental or causing damage to the prosperity of the buildings and lands in the close vicinity and to the public safety and security.

7: It is required to carry out and perform the aforementioned works at a distance of at least one hundred fifty meters from the canals, watercourses, dams, fountains, macadamized roads and railways. In the event if it is required to carry out and/or conduct works and operations in a distance closer than specified above the procedures and processes described above shall be applied in the same manner for such works and it shall be placed the required importance, attention and diligence in order to protect and safeguard safety and security of the people.

8: Required amendments and/or alterations shall be made upon the request of the contractor and the report of the engineer and proposal of the local management in the event if it is required to alter or change the production method in accordance with article two above due to unforeseen or unexpected events.

9: In the event if abandonment and cancellation of the caves, caverns and wells situated on the surface of the soil is required then such caves, caverns and wells shall

be closed at the contractor's cost by filling their outlets and/or outflows in accordance with the methods that will be determined by the Ministry of Forestry, Mining and Agriculture.

10: The contractor shall be obliged to install powerful and reliable equipments and machinery operable in a safe manner on the mouths of the caves and watercourse caves dedicated to extract ores and to the mouths convenient and suitable for production and discharging water if any.

11: A part of the land located at the edge of the boundaries in which petroleum and naphtha reservoirs exist shall be abandoned in order to prevent damages and risks that may arise in the event if there other mining zones adjacent and/or neighboring to the boundaries of the aforementioned zoning area. Size and dimensions of the land to be abandoned shall be determined by the Ministry of Forestry, Mining and Agriculture.

12: If another mine apart from the petroleum and naphtha is discovered within the boundaries of the reservoir and another candidate is awarded a contract, then the contractor shall by no means prevent the access to the production site of the new mine. However if the damages and claims that may arise out of this situation can not be settled by the mutual agreement of the concessionaires, it will be resolved by a competent expert and by the approval of the Ministry of Forestry, Mining and Agriculture.

13: If in the future a railway will pass through the location of this mine or any other road or facility will be built for public interest, in such a case the contractor shall not be entitled to bring action for damages or raise any opposition against such decision. In the event if the said roads or public utilities will be required to pass through this

petroleum and naphtha reservoir, then any damages and losses that may occur shall be indemnified by the relevant party according to the decision of the court.

14: As the collection of the proportional taxes associated with this mine is carried with the Provincial administration of Erzurum, the contractor shall submit to the provincial office an accounting statement and abstract indicating the amount of the ore to be extracted from the aforementioned mine according to the articles forty four and forty eight of the mines and the mining regulation.

15: If the Contractor fails to submit the accounting statement set out in the foregoing article within the specified time period, the according to the 49th article of the mines and mining regulation, he shall pay a fine of five hundreds to twenty five hundreds Ottoman gold in cash. If it is established that the contractor declared the amount of the revenue lower than the real figures by falsifying the accounting statement the deficit tax amount due to be paid to the government shall be imposed as the two times of the original tax amount and the public law shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the penal court. If the Contractor fails to pay the due tax amount and the imposed fine then he shall be notified by the Provincial administration of Erzurum with an official letter granting a period of not more than two months. In case the Contractor fails to pay the whole of said amounts during this term, then the due amounts shall be collected in accordance with the provisions of article six of the mines and mining regulation.

16: The contractor shall be allowed to transport the mine ore to anywhere he desires only after he has conveyed the mine to be transported abroad to the Trabzon Wharf and has paid all the necessary customs taxes, duties and levies in accordance with the in compliance with the 41st article of the mine and mining regulation by weighing the said mine ores a the wharf and has obtained the transit document. If the contractor

transports the mine ores without getting the license and the transit document, or the said documents are issued during the transportation then the provisions of the article 49 of the mines and mining regulation shall apply.

17: The contractor hereby agrees and acknowledges the provisions of this specification which is designed in addition to the mandate regarding the mentioned mines and serves as an extension to the mines and mining regulation. If the contractor fails to comply with the written provisions hereof, then the necessary actions will be taken and will be acted in accordance with the applicable and further laws and regulations.

Şura-yı Devlet

Şurâ-yı Devlet

Mülkiye Dâ'iresi

Terms and conditions to be included to the imperial decree of tender for the petroleum and naphtha reservoirs that will be awarded to the German citizen Şarl Rayzer:

1. The contract associated with the petroleum and naphtha reservoirs discovered in the Pülk village of the Tercan District of Erzurum Province will be awarded to Şarl Rayzer, for a period of 99 years as from the date of the relevant imperial decree to be issued and under the following terms and condition.
2. As shorn in its special map, a land of 955 cerib was allocated for the drilling, extraction and processing of the mine. The borders of this land are the straight line from the Vartabet Hill to Büyük Kazı Hill of the Naphtha region at the north, the straight line from the Vartabet Hill to the Akkız Hill on the left, the straight line from

the same hill to the Hfça Hill at the south and the interrupted line from the same hill to the passing through the intersection point of the Tolos road with the Mezbane Stream to the Vertabet Hill at the east.

3. Any other mines apart from petroleum and naphtha that will be discovered in this land within the aforementioned boundaries are not included to this tender and for any claims that may be asserted, arising out of or based on using this site by the contractor or others the provisions of the article 30 of the mines and mining regulation shall apply.

4. The total amount of nine thousand and five hundred and fifty kuruşes as one hundred Ottoman gold hundred kuruşes, calculated under the provisions of the 42nd article of the mines and mining regulation by ten kuruşes for each cerib of the land of 955 ceribs allocated to the mines as mentioned above, shall be paid to the cashier of the Ministry of Forestry, Mines and Agriculture at beginning of March every year. If the contractor fails to pay the due tax amount at the specified time then a default interest of nine percent per annum will be charged.

5. As the land within the concession boundaries of the aforementioned mines is only allocated for mining operations, it will be subject to the provisions of the articles 61, 62, 63 and 64 of the mines and mining regulation.

6. As petroleum and naphtha is considered as conglomerate formations it was decided that proportional tax of ten percent out of its revenues shall be paid to the Ministry of Forestry, Mining and Agriculture. Upon the decision of the said ministry, the foregoing tax shall be collected exactly or shall be calculated in accordance with the provisions of article forty three of the mines and mining regulation. In case of refining of petroleum and naphtha reservoirs, the contractor shall establish the required plants, and shall lay down a pipeline to the wharf to facilitate the

transportation of the minerals in accordance with the location of the site and the requirements of the technology, and the extracted petroleum and naphtha shall be free of customs duties.

7. The contractor shall be obliged to run the mentioned mines and to operate within two years as from the date of the imperial decree for the tender. If the contractor fails to run the mines within this period then the tender shall be terminated according to the articles 52 and 53 of the mines and mining regulation.

8. The proportional taxes related to the said minerals shall be calculated by the Ottoman gold hundred kuruşes and shall be paid at the time of the transportation of the product revenue and at the time of the sales. If the contractor fails to pay the said amount in due time, then a default interest of nine percent per annum for the delayed period shall be charged. All the equipments, tools and the machinery required for the production activities of the mine at the initial stage may be brought in as duty free only for once.

9. According to the 40th article of the mines and mining regulation, the contractor shall pay only for once fifty Ottoman gold liras to the Ministry of Education for the imperial decree for tender that will be inscribed by the sultan for the operation of the said mines and also shall also pay twenty Ottoman liras to the Babiali Provident Fund.

10. The contractor shall comply with the provisions of the mines and mining regulation, the imperial decree for tender and terms and conditions of the mutually agreed specification, and all the applicable Ottoman laws and regulations and all the other laws and regulations that will be enacted in the future, in all aspects related to the operations of the mines. The contractor agrees and acknowledges that if a

company will be established involving the drilling, extraction and the processing of the said mine, this company will be Ottoman Joint Stock Company.

11. The contractor shall be liable to pay patent tax associated with its class and rank according to the patent specifications.

12. Apart from the established taxes, levies, and the proportional taxes, in case customs export tax will be levied in the future, the contractor shall be liable to pay one percent of customs export tax of the said minerals that are extracted and exported to Europe to the Ministry of Forestry, Mining and Agriculture. The contractor also agrees to pay five paras in each hundred kuruşes from net revenues of the mining operation to Darülaceze in Istanbul and this amount shall be paid together with proportional tax.

Special clause: In the event if fortress, roads or military buildings are required to be constructed at the mining site or in the vicinity of the mineral reservoir, then the buildings and the caves located on the said places will be demolished. If the production is completely or partially ceased due to military operations, then the contractor shall not be entitled to claim for any losses and damages.

Council of State

Appendix F: Text of the Caferiye Mosque Foundation Charter

Source: İbrahim Hakkı Konyalı, *Abideleri ve Kitabeleri ile Erzurum Tarihi*. İstanbul:

Ercan Matbaası, 1960.

- 11ye.
- 1 — وقفیة جامع الحاج جعفر
 - 2 — جامع مزبورك قبلینسندہ بنا ایلدوكم رجاله مخصوص همای وتبریز قپوسنك طشرهسندہ اولان دباغ خانه ایله موخخانه
 - 3 — وکوری قپوسندن طشره قلعه دن چیقان صو ایله صواریلان چقورچورمه بوستان وارزنجان قپوسندن طشره حندق کناری ایله آشاغی به
 - 4 — کیدن یوله متصل چورمه بوستان وجامع مزبورك حرمنك شمالاً دیوارنه متصل اوچ قطعه بقال دکانی وقیوخیلر چارشوسندہ اوچ دکان کوشه لری
 - 5 — وارضروم ناحیه سی قریه لرندن ملک نام قریه ده مالکانهم اولان نصف چفتلکی وناحیه ترجاندہ ملک نامه هایون ایله تملیکم اولان پورک نام قریه نك محصولی
 - 6 — ورسوماتی و سنورنده مالم ایله حفر و اخراج ایلدیکم فقط قویومز و ممکن اولورسه مملحه سنی و مجتکرد سنجاغنده حالی و خز ایله قریه لرندن احیا ایلدوكم آلا کلیسا ووززاق نامان قریه لرك سنه ده دیغو سبتت شرطی اوزره یوز استانبولی غلال بیری به ویرلد کدن سوکره ایکی قریه دن حاصل اولان محصولات
 - 7 — ورسوماتی بو مذکورات و متعلقاتی حسبہ لله ته لی و طلباً لمرضاته غریق بحر عصیان و امید وار غفو و غفران کثیر التقصیر اعنی الحاج جعفر بن ابی بکر
 - 8 — عون حق ایله جامع کبیر شریف محله سندہ بناسی میسر اولان جامع شریفه وقف وحبس ایلیوب و بو اوقاف مذکورانه شرط تولیتی اولادمدن و عتقاددن پرهیزکار .
 - 9 — و دیندار اولانه مخصوص ایتدم. هرقتنیسی پرهیزکار اولوب شروطی یرینه کتوررسه متولیلک اعتباری آکا اولوب قرابته اعتبار اولیه و هرکیم اولادمدن وغیردن

- 10 — خلاف شرط وقف نامه تبدیل و تغییر و یا خود ضرر قصدین ایدر اولور ایسه غضب حقه مظهر اولالر واکر و فننامه ده اولان شروطی متولی یرینه کتورمه ده احوال
- 11 — ایدر سه مستحقک نصبی ونا محکم عزلیچون جاممک واعظ و مدرس و خطیب و ائمه ومؤذنین و جملة اهل وظائفنی وعموماً جماعتنی حسبی ناظر وحاکم ولایت وحاکم شرع
- 12 — معین اولنی دخی شرط تقیدلرین امانت ایلدم وجاممک عیاذاً بالله تعالی بریری ییقلهسه تعمیر اولدقجه ووظایق ویرلیوب رقبه اولنه وهرکیم
- 13 — جامعه و اوقافه معین اولوب اجراسنه چالشورسه معینی الله اولوب دنیادن آخرته ایمان ایله کیده جامع و اوقافن و کندوی و اووری
- 14 — وجملة الله حضرتنه امانت ویردم . الواقع فی اواخر شهر جمادی الاولی سنة احدى وستین والف من الهجرة النبویه علیه افضل الصلوة واکمل التحیه .

- 1) **VAKFIYE-İ CAMİ-İL HAC CÂFER**
- 2) Cami-i mezburun, kiblesinde bina eyledüğüm ricale mahsus hamamı ve Tebriz kapusunun karşısında olan debbağhane ile mumhane.
- 3) Ve Gürcü kapusundan taşra kaleden çıkan su ile suvarılan çukur çevirme bostan ve Erzincan kapusundan taşra handek kenarı ile aşşagıya.
- 4) Giden yola muttasıl çevirme bostan ve cami-i mezburun hareminin şimalen divarına muttasıl üç kita bakkal dükkânı ve kuyumcular çarşısında üç dükkân küşeleri
- 5) Ve Erzurum Nahiyesi kariyelerinden Mülk nam kariyede malikânem olan nısıf çiftliği ve nahiyeye Tercanda mülk name-i hümayun ile temlikim olan Pürf nâm kariyenin mahsulü
- 6) Ve Rüsumatını ve sınırında mâlim ile hafr ve ihraç eylediğim naft kuyumuz ve mümkün olursa memlihasını ve Micingirt sancağında hâlî ve harabe kariyelerinden ihya eylediğimiz Zanzak ve Alakilise nâman kariyelerin senede دموستیت şartı üzre yüz İstanbulî gilâl mi-riye verildikten sonra iki kariyeden hâsıl olan mahsulât.
- 7) Ve rusumatını ve bu mezkûrat ve müteallikatını hasbetenillâhi teâlâ ve taleben limerzatihi garik-i bahr-i isyan ve ümid var-i âfv ü gûfran kesir-üt taksir anî el Hâc Cafer ibn-i Ebi Bekr
- 8) Avn-i Hâk ile Cami-i Kebir-i şerif mahallesinde binası müyesser olan cami-i şerife vakf ve haps eyleyüp ve bu evkaf-ı mezkûrata şart-ı tevliyeti evlâdımdan ve ütekâmdan perhizkâr
- 9) Ve dindâr olana mahsus ettim her kangısı perhizkâr olup şûrutu yerine getirürse mütevellilik itibarı ana olup karabete itibar olmaya ve herkim evlâdımdan ve gayrıdan
- 10) Hilâf-ı şart-ı vakıfnâme tebdil ve tagyir veyahut zarar kasdın ider olur ise Gazab-ı Hakka mazhar olalar ve eğer vakıfhânedeki olan şûrutu mütevellî yerine getürmede ihmâl

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