

TURKEY AND GREECE IN THE 21<sup>st</sup> CENTURY:  
A SURVEY OF SOCIO-POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS IN A PERIOD OF  
RAPPROCHEMENT

HAYRİ ERCAN GÜRELLİ

BOĞAZIÇI UNIVERSITY

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Hayri Ercan Gürelli

BOĞAZIÇI UNIVERSITY

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Title: Turkey and Greece in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century:  
A Survey of Socio-Political and Economic Relations in a Period of Rapprochement

This thesis examines Turkish-Greek relations within a historical chronology. The past, present and future of bilateral relations are analyzed thoroughly by employing socio-political as well as economic-financial aspects. The historical background of Turkish-Greek relations from 1821 onwards is characterized by everlasting problem areas between the two states. Cyprus, which requires special attention, is evaluated individually. Taking into consideration the past examples of Turkish-Greek rapprochement efforts, the final, post-earthquake rapprochement process lays the foundation of an on-going détente process. In modern times, economics and finance are increasingly intertwined with the social and political aspects of life. The economic and financial aspects of Turkish-Greek relations are demonstrated as a major example of sustainable rapprochement efforts. The figures and evaluations are further enhanced with the views of an opinion leader. An interview with the President of the Turkish-Greek Business Council Chairman, Mr. Selim Egeli, shows us the evolution of bilateral relations from an economic perspective.

Finally, we come to the conclusion that irrespective of their troubled past, neighbors ought to cooperate and negotiate for a better future. This could be possible and sustainable only with a collective understanding and effort. Economic and financial relations are the simplest and most productive methods for this rapprochement process.

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Başlık: 21. Yüzyılda Türkiye ve Yunanistan  
Yakınlaşma Döneminde Sosyo-politik ve Ekonomik İlişkilere Dair Bir İnceleme

Bu tez Türk-Yunan ilişkilerini tarihsel bir perspektif içinde değerlendirmektedir. İkili ilişkilerin geçmiş, şimdiki zaman ve geleceği, sosyo-politik ve ekonomik-finansal boyutlarıyla incelenmektedir. Türk-Yunan ilişkilerinin 1821'den buy yana gelişimini , iki ülke arasındaki başlıca sorunlu alanları içeren bölüm takip etmektedir. Başlıbaşına önem arzeden Kıbrıs konusu ayrıca değerlendirilmektedir. Geçmiş dönemlerde yaşanan yakınlaşma çabaları ve 1999 depremlerinden sonra başlayan yakınlaşma süreci bir bütün olarak devam etmekte olan yakınlaşma sürecine temel teşkil etmektedir. Modern zamanlarda ekonomik-finansal ilişkilerin sosyal ve politik hayatla içiçe geçtiğın gözlemliyoruz. Türk-Yunan ekonomik ve finansal işbirliğinin kalıcı yumuşama ve yakınlaşma sürecine büyük katkısı olmaktadır. Tez'de bahsi geçen rakam ve tablolar konunun uzmanı kişilerin görüşleriyle daha da anlam kazanmaktadır. Dış Ekonomik İlişkiler Konseyi (DEİK) Türk-Yunan İş Kurulu Başkanı Sn.Selim Egeli ile yapılan röportaj, Türk-Yunan ilişkilerinin bu minvalde kattettiği mesafeyi ve aşamalarını göstermesi açısından önem taşıyor.

Sonuç olarak, komşu ülkelerin geçmişte yaşanan tüm olumsuzluklara rağmen, iletişim içerisinde işbirliği yaparak, daha iyi ve güzel bir geleceğe ulaşmalarının mümkün ve sürdürülebilir olması için başlıca kriterin karşılıklı anlayış ve çaba olduğu açıktır. Ekonomik ve finansal ilişkilerdeki gelişmenin bu süreci başarıya taşıyan en basit ve üretken yöntem olduğu görülmektedir.

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## PREFACE

Turkey and Greece are neighbors in the Balkan Peninsula, which is historically, one of the world's most conflict-ridden areas in terms of race, religion and language. Naturally there exist historical and long-standing problems and disputes which cannot be consolidated in a single category. Accordingly these disputes cannot be evaluated individually and independently. Turkish-Greek relations are actually far more complicated than they are perceived. The legal, technical and political aspects of these problems go hand in hand with the psychological perceptions based on historical rivalry, fear and distrust. Some of the traditional concepts associated with the relationships between nations cannot fully explain the contemporary world issues. So we ought to reorganize our methodology on how nations relate. Apart from solid political and military facts, knowing the countries' histories and political cultures as well as their economic-financial relations is essential in analyzing Turkish-Greek relations. There are motives and anxieties as well as economic realities behind the so-called rights and obligations of states, prestige and dignity of nations, national sovereignty interests and the realpolitik which are the determinants of foreign policy and international relations. In pragmatic terms, the major conflict issues between Turkey and Greece are the Aegean Sea and Cyprus.

The relations between Turkey and Greece also have created problems within the Western Alliance, first in NATO and then in the European Union. Internal politics as well as their relations with other states and international organizations have affected the disputes and bilateral relations between them. The good news is that major world powers

such as the U.S. and the E.U. are keen to support a sustainable resolution to Turkish-Greek disputes.

A unique contribution to the establishment of positive relations has come out of a natural disaster. Since the 1999 earthquakes that hit Turkey and Greece, both countries have experienced a public empathy and diplomatic rapprochement. Although this process, which has had its ups and downs, failed to resolve the Cyprus issue, it requires special attention since it clearly differentiates itself from similar preceding efforts. The warming of public view in both countries has facilitated the process extensively, increasing hopes of sustainability.

So what is the best way for the two nations to live together? The answer, according to Confucius, is simply reciprocity, how one neighbor treats the other and, in turn, how that second neighbor treats the first one. Before negotiating both countries need to establish an atmosphere of dialogue and trust. To establish and sustain peace, friendship and relations based on mutual trust requires both nations to accept this approach.

As a Turkish citizen my lifelong memories are full of aspects related to Turkish-Greek relations. Starting off with our Greek origin neighbors at home, the Cyprus intervention and finally working for Finansbank, the 5th largest private-owned bank in Turkey which has been acquired by the National Bank of Greece, a leading Greek banking group. Being neighbors has shown its effects in many aspects. Since my early adult ages, I have been thinking about what has been going on, what has happened, what will and should happen in the future? This thesis has given me the opportunity to analyze Turkish-Greek relations from a historical as well as a contemporary perspective. I have tried to handle the historical, socio-political, military, economic-financial aspects

of bilateral relations using an academic methodology. I've benefited extensively from this study, intellectually as well as practically. I hope it serves the same purpose for all those who have the same question in their minds.

## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

Turkish-Greek conflict has been one of the long-lasting and seemingly less solvable problems of the international community since the nineteenth century. Apart from its historical roots, it involves many different issues. The historical mistrust is enhanced by the Aegean, Minority and Cyprus issues waiting to be resolved. This survey, which aims to focus on socio-political and economic relations in a period of rapprochement, consists of seven chapters.

This thesis will incorporate a chronological and realistic approach in terms of its theoretical framework. Chapter 1, which is the Introduction, presents an introduction to the topic in general. The main assumption is that apart from historical causes and various conflict issues waiting to be resolved, bilateral relations are widely and positively affected by social and economic-financial developments between the two nations creating a sustainable mechanism of rapprochement.

Chapter 2 elaborates on the historical background as well as the existing problem areas between Turkey and Greece. The origin of Turkish-Greek relations, going back to 1821, when Greece declared its independence from the Ottoman Empire, is analyzed in historical chronology. The Greek invasion of western Anatolia in 1919 which was driven back by the Turks was crucial in terms of creating a climax in terms of hostility and aggression. The Turkish victory in the Turkish War of Independence, followed by the establishment of modern Republic of Turkey, was a total contrast to the Greek defeat. This shows that the rivalry and hostility in bilateral relationships has deep historical roots such

that, as Larrabee writes, “both states link their existence and their identity to experiences that are associated with negative image of the other side.”<sup>1</sup>

On the other hand, the major problem areas are analyzed in two categories, the Aegean Sea issues and the violations of the rights of the Turkish minority of western Thrace. The Aegean Sea issues are detailed as the militarization of the Aegean islands of non-military status, the delimitation of the continental shelf, the territorial waters and the problems of airspace control and command.

Turkey and Greece are a part of the Balkan Peninsula as well as the South-east Mediterranean. They both have been Allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for more than 50 years. Both countries are major actors in political, military and economic terms. These factors bring us to the Cyprus issue, which deserves a separate analysis in Chapter 3. The second time Turkey and Greece went to war in the twentieth century was due to Cyprus. The issue is thoroughly emphasized starting from the London and Berne Agreements to the Annan Plan and finally the admission of Greek-Cypriot side to the EU.

Other than periods of war and tension, Turkish-Greek bilateral relations have also seen periods of détente. The 1930's under the leaderships of Atatürk and Venizelos, the 1950's when both countries joined NATO and the Davos attempt by the Prime Ministers Özal and Papandreou are listed as temporary periods of rapprochement and détente. Chapter 4 examines the post-earthquake process, in other words the final and current rapprochement initiated by the Turkish and Greek governments of Ecevit and Simitis, respectively. Foreign Ministers Cem and Papandreou encouraged and followed

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<sup>1</sup> Stephan Larrabee and Ian Lesser, *Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty*, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003), p. 73.

the concept positively to enhance bilateral relations.<sup>2</sup> The major effect was created when the September 1999 earthquakes hit both countries.<sup>3</sup> Although the détente policy between Turkey and Greece did not lead to an instant solution to their disputes, it suggested a mutually beneficial arrangement of priorities. This period has had an intrinsic importance reflecting local parties' vision that there is no end or benefit to struggle. The effect of globalization, the U.S. and the EU together with the rapprochement process contributed to the positive upheaval of bilateral relations. Nowadays Turkey and Greece share and cooperate far more than before. A common understanding is forming as time passes. Governmental relations have followed inter-communal economic and social relations. Things are getting better and better and it seems that the level of economic-financial integration and cooperation has made a substantially positive contribution to avoiding historical rivalries and hostilities.

To materialize these facts and evaluations, I thought it would be a good and reinforcing contribution to make use of the experiences of an opinion leader in Turkish-Greek relations. Chapter 5 consists of an interview with Selim Egeli, the Chairman of Turkish-Greek Business Council. Mr. Egeli, who has always been deeply involved in Turkish-Greek relations both politically and economically due to his strong personal ties, shared with historical memories. He is an active supporter of Turkish-Greek relations and keenly believes that economic-financial as well as social-cultural interactions are the most important factor in upgrading bilateral relations.

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<sup>2</sup> İsmail Cem , Letter from the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Turkey to Mr. George Papandreou, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Greece, (Ankara: 24-5-1999), available from, <http://www.greekturkishforum.org/docu c1.htm>;

Letter from Foreign Minister of the Republic of Greece, to İsmail Cem, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Turkey, (Athens: 25-6-1999), available from, <http://www.greekturkishforum.org/docu c2.htm>;

<sup>3</sup> <http://www.tumgazeteler.com/?haberleri=1999-marmara-depremi/>

Chapter 6 deals with the economic-financial aspects of Turkish-Greek relations. From this point on the post-earthquake rapprochement will be analyzed in detail with respect to the economic-financial relations and figures. It will give a general outlook on the Greek Economy, Turkey and Greece's bilateral foreign trade and the economic-financial relations between Turkey and Greece. This chapter shows us that economic and financial cooperation between Turkey and Greece has multi-variable positive outcomes. Mutually beneficial, sustainable and growing economic ties also have positive political outcomes. The public opinion in both countries is favorably affected by strengthening economic ties and a common understanding and dialogue levels are achieved incomparable to politics and diplomacy.

The final chapter consists of the Conclusion summing up the past and future of Turkish-Greek relations in a dynamic world with multivariable political and economic dimensions. Past experiences as well as current developments are summarized to reach a conclusion for a better future in terms of increased dialogue and cooperation in light of lessening affect of negative perceptions.

## CHAPTER 2

### HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Turks and Greeks have shared the same geography for a thousand years. This co-existence<sup>4i</sup> has resulted in a negative memory of mutual experience. Numerous differences and problems have existed between Turkey and Greece throughout their common history. They have been deepened and proliferated over time and surely cannot be reconciled in the short term. Turks and Greeks interpret their common history in a widely divergent fashion. It's clear that the major issue between the two countries is the historical distrust created by an acrimonious historical legacy. Controversially both Turkey and Greece achieved their nation-state identities following an armed struggle against each other. So it's obvious that each country occupies an extensive place in each other's history.

Greece emerged as an independent state in 1832, as a result of a military independence struggle against the Ottoman rule which had lasted for nearly four centuries.<sup>5</sup> Greeks call this period as *Tourkokratia*,<sup>6ii</sup> a period of repressive Ottoman dominance over Greece. Greek nationalism has rejected even the possibility of a shared history with Turks. Greeks believe that their culture and national identity were oppressed to a standstill by the Ottomans.<sup>7</sup> The official state doctrine of Greece has tended to alter historical realities. Positive aspects such as serving as members of the Ottoman ruling

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<sup>4</sup> H.R.Trevor-Roper, "A Case of Coexistence", *The New Statesman and Nation*, May 14,1957 In *Greek-Turkish Relations in an Era of Detente*, eds.Ali Çarkoğlu and Barry Rubin,(London: Routledge,2005), p.5

<sup>5</sup> Richard Clogg, *a Concise History of Greece*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992)

<sup>6</sup> Vamik Volkan and Norman Itzkowitz, *Turks and Greeks: Neighbours in Conflict* (Huntington: Eothen, 1994), p, 71.

<sup>7</sup> Clogg, p. 47-99.

classes have been neglected whereas negative aspects such as the Greek Church being kept in captivity in Istanbul by the Sultan have been emphasized.<sup>8</sup> Turkey, leaving behind its imperial Ottoman identity, achieved its independence as a nation-state following its victory at the War of National Liberation. For Turks, starting from their liberation, the Greeks have been perceived as a source of conflict.

The Greeks were the first Ottoman subjects to gain full independence,<sup>9</sup> which had a huge impact on Balkan nationalism.<sup>10</sup> These independence movements led to the dismemberment and finally the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in view of other historical developments, which in turn caused Turkish nationalists to associate their common history with the betrayal and deception of the Greeks. Nearly a century later, the WW I defeat led to the partitioning of Turkey according to the Sevres Treaty of 1923. The WW I defeat was followed by the Greek invasion of western Anatolia in 1919 in order to achieve the “Megali Idea” (The Great Idea).

The Greek phenomenon of the Megali Idea has been a fundamental principle of modern Greece. The goal to unify Greek population throughout the Ottoman Empire’s territories has been viewed as a constant threat by the Turks. These developments have created a “Sevres Syndrome” amongst the Turks which basically summarizes Europe’s territorial ambitions. Although the Turkish War of Liberation was won against big nations such as Britain and France, Greece was the most significant opponent. The physical and psychological devastation created by the Greek invasion has always had a

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<sup>8</sup> Figure 1, *Expansion of Greece, Aegean Sea and Aegean Islands*, (İstanbul, Harp Akademileri Komutanlığı Pub., 1995), pp. 151.

<sup>9</sup> Herkul Millas, *Yunan Ulusunun Doğuşu*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2006)

<sup>10</sup> Nikos Svoronos, *Çağdaş Hellen Tarihine Bakış*, (İstanbul: Belge Yay., 1988)

top position in Turkish historical memory.<sup>11</sup> However, it's clear that there is an unsymmetrical perception<sup>12iii</sup> of threat on the sides of the Aegean. While most Greek people view Turkey as threatening because of its past, population and military power, Turks do not regard Greece in the same manner though it is clear that both countries possess a deep distrust of each other which is the result of living history.<sup>13</sup>

So, the Sevres Syndrome and Megali Idea for Turks and memories of 400 years of Ottoman rule for Greeks have been issues which in turn have shaped bilateral relations. Mistrust, suspicion and especially lack of trust between Turkey and Greece continue to create problems and issues of conflict.<sup>14</sup>

## Past and Current Problem Areas between Turkey and Greece

### The Aegean Problems

The Lausanne Peace Treaty signed in 1923 established a status quo in the Aegean between Turkey and Greece. This status quo has satisfied both states until the 1970's after which time differences turned into interrelated disputes. Apart from the historical distrust between the two countries, the stakes of two countries in the Aegean have created such an outcome. The sovereignty issues concerning maritime and airspace which are of great strategic importance as well as the sharing of rich Aegean resources

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<sup>11</sup> Herkul Millas, *Türk ve Yunan Romanlarında "Öteki" ve Kimlik*, (İstanbul, İletişim Yayınları, 2005)

<sup>12</sup> Vamık Volkan and Norman Itzkowitz, *Turks and Greeks: Neighbours in Conflict* (Huntington: Eothen, 1994)

<sup>13</sup> Fuat Aksu, *Türk-Yunan İlişkileri: İlişkilerin Yönelimini Etkileyen Faktörler Üzerine Bir İnceleme*, (Ankara: SAEMK Yayınları, 2001), p. 27-133.

<sup>14</sup> Rifat Uçarol, *Siyasi Tarih (1789-1999)*, 5.Baskı, (İstanbul: Filiz Kitabevi, 1985), p. 135-143, 152-154, 225-230.

are the two main reasons for the conflict. Turkey believes that according to the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, the Turkish-Greek relations in the Aegean should rest upon three major principles.<sup>15</sup> First, the Aegean is a common sea between the two countries; second the freedom of the high seas and the air space should be analyzed in accordance with the first principle, and last, the extension of territorial waters should be based on mutual consent<sup>16</sup>

According to Tosun Bahçeli, the essence of the Aegean dispute is the overlapping of Greek and Turkish interests in the area. The Greeks view the Aegean as a Greek Sea while Turks, as an Aegean nation, consider that they are entitled to an equitable share of the resources in the Aegean. Over the past 40 years these conflicts have occupied the national as well as international political agenda, but not much has been achieved so far.

#### Militarization of the Aegean Islands of Non-military Status<sup>171819</sup>

The Lausanne Treaty of 1923 as well as the Paris Treaty of 1947 (Article 14) assured that Greece would not militarize three groups of islands under its sovereignty.<sup>20</sup> These group of islands were the Central Aegean islands (İkaria, Khios, Mitylenei, Samos), the Dodecanese (Leros, Khalimnos, Khalki, Khasos, Kos, Meis, Misiros, Patmos, Piskopis, Rhodes, Skarpanto, Sombeki, Stompalya) and the Dardanelles (Lemnos, Samothrace)

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<sup>15</sup> Şule Kut, "Türk Dış Politikasında Ege Sorunu" In *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi*, ed. Faruk Sönmezoğlu, (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 1998), p. 253-270.

<sup>16</sup> Deniz Bölükbaşı, *Turkey&Greece Aegean Disputes A Unique Case in Int'l Law*, (London:Cavendish, 2004)

<sup>17</sup> Table 1, *Greek Islands, Aegean Sea and Aegean Islands*.

<sup>18</sup> Table 2, "Change of Hands" dates of Greek Islands, *Aegean Sea and Aegean Islands*.

<sup>19</sup> Table 3, "Change of Hands" dates of Greek Islands, *Aegean Sea and Aegean Islands*.

<sup>20</sup> Table 4, *Distance of Aegean Islands to Mainland Greece*.

According to the Lausanne and Paris Treaties Greece could only keep security forces the numbers and arms level of which are within an objectively acceptable level, that is helicopters and ACVs (up to 600) in use by paramilitary units do not count under the CFE ceiling. However, Greece began militarizing these islands starting from 1964 following the collapse of the bi-communal government in Cyprus. Of course this was a part of the Greek defense doctrine which encompasses the Aegean and Cyprus as a whole.

Since 1964, Greece has put forward various arguments for militarizing the islands some of which are within swimming range from the Turkish coastline (for example Meis.)<sup>21</sup> These arguments are basically first, since Turkey is not a signatory of the Paris Treaty, Greece is not obliged towards Turkey to keep the Dodecanese demilitarized,<sup>22</sup> second the Montreux Convention of 1936 has lifted the demilitarized status of the Dardanelles,<sup>23</sup> and last, Rebus-sic stantibus: The international and regional conditions necessitating the non-military status of the islands no longer prevail.<sup>24</sup> In addition to these arguments, Greece has been using Article 51 of United Nations to legitimize its militarization activities given that it perceives a Turkish threat against itself.<sup>25</sup> Turkey on the other hand, naturally has its own counter arguments. First, the Paris Treaty has put forward an objective status for the Aegean islands. This status is

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<sup>21</sup> Figure 2, “Demilitarization of Greek Islands”, *Aegean Sea and Aegean Islands*.

<sup>22</sup> Ali Kurumahmut and Sertaç Hami Başeren, *Ege'de Egemenliği Devredilmemiş Adalar*, (Ankara: AÜ Basımevi., 2003)

<sup>23</sup> Ali Kurumahmut, *Ege'de Temel Sorun: Egemenliği Tartışmalı Adalar*, (Ankara:TTK, 1998)

<sup>24</sup> *Encyclopædia Britannica*, 2010, Encyclopædia Britannica Online, 26-7-2010.

<<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/930525/rebus-sic-stantibus>>. The concept meaning “Things standing thus” in Latin, stipulates that, where there has been a fundamental change in circumstances, a party may withdraw from or terminate the treaty in question.

<sup>25</sup> United Nations, *Article 51*.

valid for everyone including non-signatories like Turkey,<sup>26</sup> second the Montreux Convention hasn't lifted the demilitarized status of the Dardanelles,<sup>27</sup> and last there hasn't been any change supporting Greek allegations that require a shift in the governing status of treaties concerning East Aegean islands.<sup>28</sup>

Finally, concerning the Greek alleged Turkish Threat, Turkey has stated that it is itself that has felt the need to take defensive measures taking into account Greek violations. The militarization of the eastern Aegean Greek islands has been a long-lasting unresolved issue between Turkey and Greece. Both countries have tried to stick to their arguments which have kept the issue as an important part of the tension of Turkish-Greek relations.<sup>29</sup>

#### Delimitation of the Continental Shelf

According to many, the delimitation of the continental shelf is the key to the Turkish-Greek problems regarding the Aegean.<sup>30</sup> This issue covers two levels of conflict. The first one is the Delimitation issue itself, while the latter is what sort of a mechanism should be utilized to resolve the conflict.<sup>31</sup>

Turkey suggests that an equitable delimitation solution can only be reached by means of dialogue and negotiation. Turkey's believes that the settlement of the continental shelf issue just like other Aegean issues can be achieved through bi-lateral

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<sup>26</sup> Deniz Bölükbaşı, *Turkey&Greece Aegean Disputes: A Unique Case in Int'l Law*, (London: Cavendish, 2004)

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid.

<sup>30</sup> Şükrü Sina Gürel, "Turkey and Greece: A Difficult Relationship" In *Turkey and Europe*, eds. Canan Balkır and Allan Williams, (London: Pinter Pub., 1993)

<sup>31</sup> Hüseyin Pazarcı, *Doğu Ege Adalarının Askerden Arındırılmış Statüsü*, (Ankara: AÜSBF Yay., 1986)

transactions followed by realistic political decisions. It is obvious that this process must satisfy the security as well as economic interests of Turkey and Greece.

Greece applied to the ICJ in 1976 for the resolution of the Aegean continental shelf conflict. After a two and a half year deliberation, the ICJ took a “non-jurisdiction” decision in December 1978.<sup>32</sup> Four years later, in 1982, another case between Tunisia and Libya was brought to the attention of the ICJ. In its decision, the ICJ stated that,<sup>33</sup> “delimitation is to be affected by agreement in accordance with equitable principles and taking into account all relevant circumstances.”<sup>34</sup> This decision was referred to by both Turkey and Greece. Turkey took this decision as further evidence of legal support for its position. Greece argued that, in the same decision, there were similarities that could be taken into account to reject Turkey’s pleading of special circumstances that prevail in the Aegean and that various Greek islands lay within Turkey’s continental shelf as a natural extension of the Anatolian peninsula.<sup>35</sup>

Turkey and Greece have started negotiations at different periods of time concerning the delimitation of Continental shelf as well as other Aegean issues. Talks which started after the Berne agreement<sup>36, 37, iv</sup> ended with the election of the first PASOK government of Andreas Papandreou in 1981. Greece then started seismic activities and planned drilling activities in the disputed areas of the continental shelf in

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<sup>32</sup> International Court of Justice, *Advisory Opinions and Orders Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Greece vs. Turkey, Request for the Indication of Interim Measures of Protections, Order of September 11, 1978 Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case, 1978* [www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/62/6219.pdf](http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/62/6219.pdf)

<sup>33</sup> International Court of Justice, *1978 Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case Judgement, 1978* [www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/62/6247.pdf](http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/62/6247.pdf)

<sup>34</sup> International Court of Justice, *Case concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia-Libya, 1982*

<sup>35</sup> Deniz Bölükbaşı, *Turkey&Greece Aegean Disputes: A Unique Case in Int'l Law*, (London: Cavendish, 2004)

<sup>36</sup> Fuat Aksu, “AB Üyelik Sürecinde Türkiye’nin Seçenekleri”, *Stratejik Araştırmalar Dergisi* 3, no. 5, (Temmuz 2005), p. 261-286.

<sup>37</sup> Berne Agreement was signed between Turkey and Greece on 11 November 1976. <http://www.turkishgreek.org/bern.htm>

1987. These activities, which led to the March 1987 crisis<sup>v</sup> between Turkey and Greece, were averted and a new process of negotiations started. Turkey's legal arguments are first, that the mainland and the islands cannot be treated on an equal basis. The principle of equality should be assured by taking into consideration the semi-closed nature of the Aegean, transportation routes, security needs and natural resources.<sup>38</sup> Second, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) Agreement,<sup>vi39</sup> of 1982 disallows the consolidation of the islands with mainland Greece. These islands cannot be considered to benefit from the archipelago regime and the mainland Greece. The principle of unconditional equality doesn't originate from national integrity principle. Third, the islands are on the natural prolongation of mainland Greece and don't have a continental shelf.<sup>40</sup>

Greece's legal arguments are that, the delimitation of the continental shelf borders must be based on equidistance principle by taking their closest coast to Turkey into account,<sup>41</sup> That just like the mainland, islands also have continental shelves as confirmed by the LOS Agreement of 1982 which Greece has signed. (Turkey has not

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<sup>38</sup> Deniz Bölükbaşı, *Turkey&Greece Aegean Disputes: A Unique Case in Int'l Law*, (London: Cavendish, 2004)

<sup>39</sup> Law of Seas (LOS): United Nations Convention on the law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 (UNCLOS), UNCLOS III, <http://www.un.org/Depts/los/index.htm>. For the Turkish translation; Özman, Aydoğan, BM III. Deniz Hukuku Sözleşmesi, (İstanbul: IDTO Yayınları, 1984) The UNCLOS III has come in force on 16-11-1994. Turkey is not a signatory. Greece on the other hand has signed it on 21-7-1995. EU has officially ratified the law on 1-4-1998. Article 3 states that, "Each state is entitled to set the breadth of its territorial waters. This breadth cannot exceed 12 nautical in accordance to the basic arguments set forth by the LOS.

<sup>40</sup> Şükrü Sina Gürel, "Turkey and Greece: A Difficult Relationship" In *Turkey and Europe*, eds. Canan Balkır and Allan Williams, (London: Pinter Pub., 1993), p. 169.

<sup>41</sup> Deniz Bölükbaşı, *Turkey&Greece Aegean Disputes: A Unique Case in Int'l Law*, (London: Cavendish, 2004)

signed the agreement),<sup>42</sup> and last that the islands facing Turkey are an integral part of Greece.<sup>43</sup>

At this point we should look at what are the practical implications would be in the Aegean if the Greek arguments were to be accepted by Turkey. If Turkey accepted Greek demands, almost ninety seven percent of the Aegean sea-bed would belong to Greece while Turkey would be left with merely a three percent of Anatolian strip. This surely is unacceptable to Turkey. What if Greece accepted Turkey's proposal? Turkey proposes that based on the equity principle of sharing, a median line be drawn through the Aegean archipelago sharing the continental shelf in two. This has been rejected by Greece.<sup>44</sup>

#### The Territorial Waters<sup>45</sup>

According to the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, the territorial waters of Turkey and Greece were set as three nautical miles according to traditional law of seas clauses.<sup>46</sup> However in 1936 Greece unilaterally increased its territorial waters to six miles.<sup>47</sup> Greece took this decision at a time when Turkey and Greece were coming closer and Italy had begun to be viewed as a threat in the Mediterranean and therefore Turkey did not make a fuss

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<sup>42</sup> Deniz Bölükbaşı, *Turkey&Greece Aegean Disputes: A Unique Case in Int'l Law*, (London: Cavendish, 2004)

<sup>43</sup> Ibid

<sup>44</sup> Şükrü Sina Gürel, "Turkey and Greece: A Difficult Relationship" In *Turkey and Europe*, eds. Canan Balkır and Allan Williams, (London: Pinter Pub., 1993), p. 170.

<sup>45</sup> Figure 3, *Territorial waters – 6 miles, Aegean Sea and Aegean Island*.

<sup>46</sup> Cemil Bilsel, *Lozan*, Birinci Cilt, (Sosyal Yayınlar, Söğüt, 1998)

<sup>47</sup> Ali Kurumahmut, *Ege 'de Temel Sorun Egemenliği Tartışmalı Adalar*, (Ankara: TTK Yayınları, 1998) Ek 23, 13-10-1936 tarihli Resmi Gazete'de yayımlanan Yunanistan Karasuları Hududunun Tespiti hakkında 230/1936 sayılı Mecburi Kanun'a göre "Bazı özel hallerde karasuları bölgesini 6 milden az veya fazla tespit eden yürürlükteki hükümler baki kalmak üzere karasuları bölgesinin genişliği kıyıdan 6 mil olarak tespit olunmaktadır."

about it.<sup>48</sup> Turkey was able to extend its territorial waters to six miles only in 1964. Code 476, ratified in 1964 stated that Turkish territorial waters in the Aegean are six miles together with the principle of reciprocity. According to Code 476, Turkey would implement the same territorial waters limit with respect to countries with limits more than six miles.

In practice this principle was applied as twelve miles in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean.<sup>49</sup> Following 1964, when both Turkey and Greece announced their territorial waters as being six miles, the Aegean Sea was distributed as thirty five percent Greek (with the advantage of possessing more than three thousand islands and islets in the Aegean) and eight percent Turkish. Contemporary Greek possession of the Aegean is almost forty three percent Greek, seven percent Turkish while the rest is accepted as international waters or in other words high seas.<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>48</sup> Mehmet Gönübol and Cem Sar, *Atatürk ve Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası (1919-1938)*, (Ankara: Atatürk Kültür, Dil, Tarih Yüksek Kurumu, 1997)

<sup>49</sup> Republic of Turkey, *T.C. Resmi Gazete*, 20- 5-1982. Law no: 2674 states that Turkish territorial waters extend to 6 miles. Yet the Cabinet is entitled to extend the territorial waters considering special circumstances and according to the concept of reciprocity. So, according to the Cabinet decision # 8/4742 dated 29-5-1982, the territorial waters in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea extend for 12 nautical miles.

<sup>50</sup> Deniz Bölükbaşı, *Turkey&Greece Aegean Dispute:s A Unique Case in Int'l Law*, (London: Cavendish, 2004)

Table 5: The Distribution of Territorial Waters and International Waters According to Different Territorial Waters Limits (%)

Extension	Turkish Territorial Waters (%)	Greek Territorial Waters (%)	International Waters (%)	EDA
6 Nautical Miles	7.47	43.68	48.85	App.% 4.5
12 Nautical Miles	8.76	71.53	19.71	
Source: Bölükbaşı, Deniz, <i>Turkey and Greece: The Aegean Disputes</i> , London: Cavendish Pub., 2004, pp. 125.				

International maritime laws governing territorial seas were modified in 1982.<sup>51</sup> Article 3 of the Law of the Sea<sup>52</sup> empowers countries to establish territorial seas of a maximum breadth of twelve miles from the baselines. While Greece was one the first signatory states, Turkey being greatly disappointed refused to sign the LOS. This article has been the legal basis for Greece's declared intention to extend its territorial waters to 12 miles.<sup>53</sup>

Though often mentioned, Greece has not yet realized its intention. The main reason behind this is the Turkish reaction.<sup>54vii</sup> The Greek Parliament's ratification of the international LOS on 31-5-1995<sup>55</sup> was soon to be followed by the Turkish parliament

<sup>51</sup> United Nations, *UNCLOSIII*, <http://www.un.org/Depts/los/index.htm>. For the Turkish translation; Özman, Aydoğan, *BM III. Deniz Hukuku Sözleşmesi*, (İstanbul: IDTO Yayınları, 1984)

<sup>52</sup> Ibid.

<sup>53</sup> Figure 4, *Territorial waters – 12 miles, Aegean Sea and Aegean Island*

<sup>54</sup> *Milliyet*, 11-2-1996.

[http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/nNmfe\\_x2F\\_BKMTtFZcFhwexhKg\\_x3D\\_x3D\\_](http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/nNmfe_x2F_BKMTtFZcFhwexhKg_x3D_x3D_)

<sup>55</sup> Bölükbaşı, Deniz, *Turkey and Greece: The Aegean Disputes*, (London: Cavendish Pub., 2004), p. 134.

issuing a resolution on 31-5-1995<sup>56viii</sup> authorizing the government to use the necessary measures including military force to protect Turkey's Aegean rights. Resting upon this resolution, Turkey announced that a Greek extension to twelve miles would constitute a "*casus belli*"<sup>57</sup> in other words a justification for war.<sup>58</sup> Apart from a possible war what would be the practical outcome of a bilateral extension of territorial waters to twelve miles?

Naturally the Greek share of the Aegean would go up to seventy two percent, the Turkish share to slightly nine percent while the proportion of high seas would be reduced to nineteen percent.<sup>59</sup> This is unacceptable on the Turkish side since it would place the conflicted continental shelf under Greek sovereignty as well as blocking Turkish transportation lines.

Actually even under the six mile situation Turkey is restricted to only three major ports where ships enter Turkish territorial waters from international waters. Greece has tried to ease Turkey's concerns on limitations to sea-transportation in case of an extension to twelve miles by proposing to offer Turkey the right of innocent passage. This offer has not been acknowledged as a satisfactory tool for Turkey's concerns. The problem has been going on ever since. It has been one of the critical issues on the agenda of all bilateral talks and negotiations.

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<sup>56</sup> Republic of Turkey, *TBMM Genel Kurul Tutanağı, 19. Dönem, 4. Yasama Yılı*, 8 June 1995. [http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/tutanak\\_b\\_sd.birlesim\\_baslangic?P4=692&P5=T&PAGE1=1&PAGE2=2](http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/tutanak_b_sd.birlesim_baslangic?P4=692&P5=T&PAGE1=1&PAGE2=2)

<sup>57</sup> Cem Işıklar, *Casus Belli*, (Ankara: Ümit Yayıncılık, 2005)

<sup>58</sup> T. Couloumbis and L.Klaveras, "Prospects for Greek-Turkish Reconciliation in a Changing International Setting" in Tosun Bahçeli, T.Couloumbis and P.Carley, *Greek-Turkish Relations and U.S.Foreign Policy: Cyprus, The Aegean, and Regional Stability*, Peaceworks No:17, (Washington D.C: United States Institute of Peace) , p.37.

<sup>59</sup> Table 5, *Approaches to Turkish and Greek Territorial Waters*.

## Problems in Airspace Control and Command

Definition of Airspace<sup>60</sup>: The Chicago Convention of 1944<sup>61</sup> iterates that a state can exercise sovereignty only over the airspace which corresponds to its territorial seas.

Although Greece has a territorial sea of six miles, it claims to have airspace of ten miles referring to a Royal Decree of 1931. Turkey objects to such a claim and describes it as a limitation to freedom of flight for Turkish military aircraft in international airspace over the Aegean. This objection is also accepted by the US and other NATO countries.<sup>62</sup>

Although Greece claims to have an air space of ten miles, Turkey opposes this claim by flying its military aircraft up to the six mile limit during training flights and exercises. Greece usually responds by sending its own military aircraft to intercept Turkish aircraft considering these as acts of aggression for intimidation purposes and violation of its airspace. These challenges, called dogfights, create high tension in both capitals as well other NATO capitals. Though there have been cases of aircraft casualty on both sides, Turkey and Greece usually kept the tension within limits preventing escalation to more serious confrontations. Greece also asks submission of flight plans by military aircraft which Turkey denies according to the Article 3 of Chicago convention stating that “the Convention is applicable only to civil aircraft and not state (military) aircraft.”

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<sup>60</sup> Figure 5, *Airspace - Territorial waters, Aegean Sea and Aegean Islands*.

<sup>61</sup> *Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation*, December 7, 1944

<sup>62</sup> *Milliyet*, 15 October 1991.

The Six-mile breadth of national airspace is taken as a basis for NATO exercises. The only exception was a joint exercise in October 1991 which Turkey refused to participate although NATO command later on decided not to include the international airspace over the Aegean Sea in the exercise plans.

[http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/FAv3B\\_x2F\\_W2VCz3PjcfbaohRQ\\_x3D\\_\\_x3D\\_](http://gazetearsivi.milliyet.com.tr/GununYayinlari/FAv3B_x2F_W2VCz3PjcfbaohRQ_x3D__x3D_)

Flight Information Region (FIR)<sup>63</sup><sup>64</sup>: In 1952, The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) assigned the FIR (Flight Information Region) responsibilities in the Aegean to Greece.<sup>65</sup> This was accepted by Turkey merely due to the existing positive atmosphere in Turkish-Greek relations at the time. During the early Cold War period of 1947-1955, Turkey and Greece began developing positive relations for the second time since the Atatürk-Venizelos initiated Turkish-Greek reconciliation period in 1930. Later on, Turkey regretted this acceptance because ever since the late 1960's Greece has created disputes concerning the Istanbul-Athens FIR, international flight routes as well as military issues as early warning borders. Turkey has frequently accused Greece of abusing its technical responsibilities.<sup>66</sup>

Greece, which feels confident about its legal position, is continuously trying to "Internationalize" and "Europeanize" the conflicts with Turkey. In order to reach an agreement based on mutual consent Turkey and Greece should and have occasionally come together in bilateral negotiations on Aegean issues. The UN Security Council called upon Turkey and Greece "to resume direct negotiations in order to reach mutually acceptable solutions" in Res. 395 adopted in August 1976. In light of this recommendation upon the continental shelf crisis, Turkey and Greece carried out intermittent talks which brought out the Berne Agreement. The Berne Agreement is noteworthy because Turkey and Greece reached a form of "*modus vivendi*"<sup>67ix</sup> by agreeing to start bilateral negotiations and not to carry out exploration activities outside

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<sup>63</sup> Figure 6, *Flight Information Region*.

<sup>64</sup> Figure 7, *Demilitarization of Greek islands*.

<sup>65</sup> Şükrü Sina Gürel, *Tarihsel Boyut İçerisinde Türk-Yunan İlişkileri*, (Ankara: Ümit Yay., 1993)

<sup>66</sup> Ibid.

<sup>67</sup> Modus vivendi is a Latin phrase signifying an agreement between those whose opinions differ, such that they agree to disagree. [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Modus\\_vivendi](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Modus_vivendi)

their respective territorial waters. The following talks were ended with the election of the first PASOK government under A. Papandreou in 1981.

Yet another crisis concerning the continental shelf broke out in 1987. A second chance was taken following the Davos Process of 1989-89 between PMs Özal and Papandreou. The failure of the Davos Process showed that problems continued. This turned out to be true when Turkey and Greece almost went to war over the sovereignty of the Imia/Kardak rocks.<sup>68</sup> The transition to a moderate climate took more time on this occasion. The earthquakes experienced by both countries led to the revival of talks though again didn't reach a solution.

Nowadays, another start has been given to start bilateral talks between the newly elected PASOK government of Yorgos Papandreou and Turkey's AKP government. Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoğlu met with PM Papandreou in Athens on November 2009 as a sign of positive intention to speed up relations following the 2004 halt. The dialogue was further enhanced by Turkish PM Erdoğan, who visited Athens in May 2010 with half of the Turkish cabinet.

#### Violations of the Rights of Turkish the Minority in Western Thrace<sup>69</sup>

The Turkish minority in western Thrace and the Greeks of Istanbul have been a controversial issue since the 1923 Lausanne Peace Treaty. Turkey and Greece had

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<sup>68</sup> "The Imia/Kardak Rocks Dispute in the Aegean Sea", *Boundary and Security Bulletin* 4, no:1,(April 1996-Jan.1997)

<sup>69</sup> Human Rights Watch, *Destroying Ethnic Identity: The Turks of Greece*, (New York: Helsinki Watch Report, 1990)

signed an agreement on population exchange before the enactment of the Peace treaty.<sup>70</sup> According to this exchange, about 1,250,000 Greek Orthodox Christians were resettled in Greece apart from the Greeks of İstanbul, Imbros (Gökçeada) Tenedos (Bozcaada) and about 500,000 Turks were resettled in Turkey apart from the Turks of western Thrace.<sup>71</sup> Since then both Turkey and Greece have accused each other for mistreating their respective kinsmen.

Turkey argues that the Greek governments has been mistreating the Turkish minority of western Thrace, especially since the mid 1960s after the Cyprus issue turned into a major problem and source of conflict between the two countries. Turkey expects Greece to abide by the international treaties and agreements such as the Treaty of Lausanne, the 1968 Protocol between Turkey and Greece, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the Helsinki Final Act as well as its own Constitution, which guarantees prohibition against discrimination and freedom of religion in Article 5 and Article 13.

A major contribution and a safeguard to the positive development of the Turkish minority's rights and conditions is the Helsinki Watch, which is an international human-rights organization. The Helsinki Human Rights Watch has been monitoring the Turkish minority since 1990. It published its first report called "Destroying Ethnic Identity: The Turks of Greece" in August 1990. Two years later a follow-up report called "Greece: Improvements for Turkish Minority, Problems Remain," was published in April 1992 to cover the developments since the initial report was announced. Finally the third report,

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<sup>70</sup> Ramazan Tosun, *Türk-Rum Nüfus Mübadelesi ve Kayseri'deki Rumla*, (Niğde: Tolunay Yayıncılık, 1998)

<sup>71</sup> Lausanne Treaty, *Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations*, 30-1- 1923 [http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Convention\\_Concerning\\_the\\_Exchange\\_of\\_Greek\\_and\\_Turkish\\_Populations](http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Convention_Concerning_the_Exchange_of_Greek_and_Turkish_Populations)

“Greece: The Turks of Western Thrace,” was released in January 1999. Since then Greece has taken measures to upgrade living conditions taking into consideration the comments of such bodies as Turkey, the Council of Europe, NGOs and local opposition. However there is a far more to do to bring Turkish minority’s conditions to EU norms. Now let us describe long-lasting major problem issues for the Turks of Western Thrace.

### Thrace: Denial of Ethnic Identity

The problem for the Turkish minority in western Thrace lies in the definition of minority. There seems to be a continued Greek state policy of denying the ethnic identity of the Turkish minority in western Thrace. The Greek government views the Turks part of a religious minority, rather than as an ethnic or national minority. It is clear that although the minority consists of Turks, Bulgarian Muslim Slavs called Pomaks<sup>x72</sup> and Muslim Roma, it is mixed on an ethno-linguistic level. The overwhelming majority is of Turkish origin. However, Greece officially recognizes only one minority, which is the “Muslim” minority, as defined in the Lausanne Treaty. According to the government and state officials Turkish refers to citizens of Turkey and they refuse to accept the minority’s Turkish identity. This creates huge problems in everyday life.

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<sup>72</sup>Pomaks are a Bulgarian Muslim population group native to southern Bulgaria, and the adjacent parts of Greece and Turkey. There are about 35,000 Pomaks (acc. Report on the Pomaks, Greek Helsinki Monitor/Minority Rights Group) Pomaks are those whose mother tongue is Pomakika (in Greek) or Pomakci (in their language) Pomakçi belongs to the linguistic family of the Southern Slavic languages, and, within them, to the linguistic group of Bulgaro-Macedonian. Although there is no written tradition, the appropriate alphabet to write the language is the Cyrillic. <http://www.greekhelsinki.gr/english/reports/pomaks.html>

Civil organizations having “Turkish” in their titles are banned. Greek courts even outlawed the use of “Turkish” to describe the Turkish minority.<sup>73xi</sup>

In 1923, the population of Western Thrace was around 192,000 of whom 129,000 were Turks and 34,000 were Greeks while the remaining 29,000 were mostly Bulgarians, Pomaks, Jews and Armenians.<sup>74</sup> Taking into consideration an average birth rate, although their population should have been tripled by now, actually it has not changed much due to a high rate of emigration. The Turks of western Thrace are now estimated to be around 125,000.<sup>75</sup> They form the majority in the Rhodope (Rodop) and Xanthi (İskeçe) prefectures and have a strong presence in Komotini (Gümülcine) and Xanthi (İskeçe). The Thracian Turks and Turkey have long been accusing Greece of neglecting their economic, social, cultural and educational needs. Since economics is the major survival issue in today’s world, it could be clearly stated that western Thrace is and remains to be the poorest region in Greece. As Bahçeli writes, the Turks of western Thrace have always been a rural community with low levels of literacy and lack of skills other than farming.<sup>76</sup>

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<sup>73</sup>Human Rights Watch, *Destroying Ethnic Identity: the Turks of Greece*, (New York: Helsinki Watch Report, 1990), p.16.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid, p. 1

<sup>75</sup> David Levinson, *Ethnic groups worldwide: A Ready Reference Handbook*, (Phoenix, Arizona: Oryx Pub., 1998)

<sup>76</sup> Baskın Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası ve Batı Trakya in Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi*, (Istanbul, Der Yay., 1994)

### Article 19: Deprivation of Citizenship<sup>77</sup>

Usual Practices: The controversial Article 19 of the Greek Citizenship Law has long been a conflict issue for the Turkish minority of western Thrace. This law, which passed in 1965, violates Article 1 and 2 of Greek Constitution as well as Article 40 of the Lausanne Treaty, which guarantee equality of citizens before the law.

Differentiating citizens as ethnic and non-ethnic Greeks, this law states that a non-ethnic Greek citizen leaving Greece, “without the intention of returning” may be declared as having lost Greek nationality. The important clause here is “without the intention of returning.” The law suggests that, if it is proven that a citizen has sold off all resources and holdings in Greece and has not left any members of family behind, then the police would inform the Directorate of Citizenship and that person would be deprived of Greek citizenship. The law allowed citizens deprived of citizenship to appeal to the council within two months of revocation. However this was not practically possible since there is no obligation to inform the citizen and most learned it when everything is over. In many instances although the conditions have not been met (family members still living in Greece, visiting Greece regularly, sending money to Greece on routine basis etc.) still Greek citizenship has been revoked.

This law has certainly been used by Greek authorities to alter the demographic balance in Thrace in favor of Greeks. Between 1955 and 1998, around 60,000 individuals were deprived of their citizenship under Article 19. Of these, more than

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<sup>77</sup> Baskın Oran, *Türk Dış Politikası ve Batı Trakya in Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi*, (Istanbul, Der Yay., 1994)

7,000 lost their citizenship between 1981 and 1997.<sup>78</sup> As a result many people either had to leave Greece or could not come back. An example is the Thracian tobacco industry workers. In the 1960s and 1970s the Thracian tobacco industry was economically affected and many tobacco growers lost their income. This led many Turks to immigrate to Germany. They are estimated to number around 12,000 nowadays.<sup>79</sup>

The Article 19 of the Greek Citizenship Law was repealed on June 11, 1998. The Greek government announced that stateless people who were still residing in Greece would be granted citizenship. This was a major satisfactory development for the Turkish minority. However there was a setback. The repeal did not apply retroactively.<sup>80</sup> In other words, citizens who had been deprived of their citizenship were not able to get back their confiscated rights even though it was said so.<sup>xii</sup> Turkey's efforts in the international arena, especially within the EU generated the required pressure for the Greek government to repeal the act.

Stateless people: As of 2003 there were approximately 4,000 stateless<sup>81</sup> people within Greece who were the victims of Article 19. The stateless individuals are accepted as neither Greek nor foreigner nor refugees. They have great difficulty in proving they exist, put aside receiving social services. Some of them are given temporary residence permits which actually do not grant work permits. Since they are not legally Greek citizens, they can not get identity cards, business licenses, car license plates etc.

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<sup>78</sup> Human Rights Watch, <http://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/greece/Greec991-06.htm>

<sup>79</sup> Richard Clogg, ed. *Minorities in Greece: Aspects of a Plural Society*, (London: C.Hurst & Co., 2002)

<sup>80</sup> Human Rights Watch, *Greece: The Turks of Western Thrace*, 1 January 1999.

<http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/1999/01/01/greece-turks-western-thrace>

<sup>81</sup> Mr. Florentis, an advisor to the Ministry of Public Order, estimated that there were 2,000 stateless individuals. Interview, Athens, September 1997 as in HRW Report, January 1999 (dipnot 85)

Even though they pay taxes and social security compensations they can not get pension payments.<sup>82</sup>

### Education

The biggest and most important problem of the Turkish minority is education. The deficiencies of the education system pose a long-term negative effect on the minority at large. The Articles 40 and 41 of the Lausanne Treaty allow minorities to receive education in their native language as well to manage their own educational institutions. The Cultural Agreements of 1951, which was replaced by the Cultural Cooperation Agreement of 19 July 2001, the Cultural Protocol of 1968 and the EU regulations, bear similar clauses. Critics and Human Watch members note that these social rights usually are violated or their implementation is rejected by Greek authorities.

The Greek authorities systematically undermine the autonomy of the minority education system in different ways. The Greek state has put in around 70 new laws, decrees and governmental decisions regarding minority education.<sup>83</sup> The Greek Ministry of Education and Religious Affairs practically controls all minority schools by deciding itself on building schools, hiring teachers and choosing textbooks.

The education problem is both quantitative as well as qualitative. The basic instruments of the educational system, teachers and schools, are far from the required

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<sup>82</sup> Human Rights Watch, *Destroying Ethnic Identity: The Turks of Greece*, (New York: Helsinki Watch Report, 1990)

<http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/1990/08/01/destroying-ethnic-identity>

<sup>83</sup> Western Thrace Minority University Graduates Association to UN Forum on Minorities, 15-16 December 2008.

[http://www.google.com.tr/search?hl=tr&source=hp&q=Western+Thrace+Minority+University+Graduates+Association%2BUN+Forum+on+Minorities%2B15-16+December+2008&btnG=Google%27da+Ara&meta=&aq=f&aqi=&aql=&oq=&gs\\_rfai=](http://www.google.com.tr/search?hl=tr&source=hp&q=Western+Thrace+Minority+University+Graduates+Association%2BUN+Forum+on+Minorities%2B15-16+December+2008&btnG=Google%27da+Ara&meta=&aq=f&aqi=&aql=&oq=&gs_rfai=)

number and quality. According to Law No: 3518/2006, pre-school education in Greece has become compulsory for children of four and five years since 2007. However there is no minority nursery school in western Thrace.

According to 2008 figures, there are 198 Private Minority Primary schools<sup>84</sup> in Greece providing education to around 9,000 students. Contrary to this figure, there are only two secondary schools, Celal Bayar Minority High School in Komotini and Muzaffer Salihoğlu High School in Xanthi. These schools with a capacity of 1,000 students are far from satisfying the educational needs of the 2,000 students attending secondary schools every year.

There are also two Islamic theological seminaries in Komotini and Echinus (Eşkinöz).<sup>85</sup> It is evident that there is no logic to these numbers. The vast majority of minority children attend minority primary schools where they get a bilingual education. Turkish, mathematics, physics, chemistry, religion, art and physical education are taught in Turkish while Greek, history, geography, civics are thought in Greek. The education level is very low in all minority schools

Mixed Administration: Unlike many Greek primary schools, minority primary schools are all private schools which belong to school boards elected by the parents. However all schools in Greece are under the responsibility in other words control of the Ministry of Education. The state subsidizes schools to a large degree and pays the salaries of Christian teachers and teachers coming from the Thessaloniki Pedagogical Academy. One of the existing high schools is private while the other has a mixed system. In the

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<sup>84</sup> Hellenic Republic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, [www.mfa.gr](http://www.mfa.gr)

<sup>85</sup> Western Thrace Minority University Graduates Association :UN Forum on Minorities, 15-16 December 2008

Celal Bayar High School, which has a mixed system, Christian teachers are paid by the State on automatically renewable contracts while Muslim teachers are paid on private law contract by the Turkish state if they are coming from Turkey or by the school board if they are Greek Muslims. In the case of private schools yet again Christian teachers are paid by the state while Muslim teachers are paid by the school owners. Therefore minority schools are actually semi-state managed schools. This results in state intervening on matters of minority education such as hiring teachers. Usually the minority schools cannot hire qualified teachers. This affects the level of education.

Secondary Schools: There are only two bi-lingual minority secondary schools in Greece, Celal Bayar Minority High School in Komotini (Gümülcine) and Muzaffer Salihoğlu High School in Xanthi (İskeçe).<sup>86</sup> There is a vast difference between their 1000 student capacity and 8,500 students attending Minority primary schools. The State argues that according to the Lausanne Treaty, its sole obligation to provide a bilingual education is through the primary school. So practically, it is the state that decides how many students can attend the minority high schools. Even the two shift (morning/afternoon) attendance to these high-schools which was the case a few decades ago is now restricted by the governments. The shortage of spaces in these minority high schools has caused many students not to complete the mandatory nine years of education. Most students stop their education, very few go Greek high-schools and a few more go to Turkish high-schools. The most crucial part is that girls are the most disproportionately affected part of these students. In many cases, girls drop out of education, since a Muslim minority family rarely allows a female child to attend a non-Muslim school.

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<sup>86</sup> Hellenic Republic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, [www.mfa.gr](http://www.mfa.gr)

The Higher Education and the Minority Quota System: In 1996, a special minority quota system of half percent was introduced which facilitated the entrance of minority students into the Greek universities since they started having the opportunity to compete among themselves.

Teachers: The quality of the minority school teachers is far below than those of standard Greek schools. The main reason for this difference is the lack of standard in hiring school teachers. This in turn permits or leads schools to hire teachers which come from different educational backgrounds. Teachers are basically from five types of educational background. The graduates of educational universities in Turkey, EPATH<sup>87</sup> (Thessaloniki Pedagogical Academy), Muslim religious schools (Medreses), high school graduates and “quota teachers” coming from Turkey on yearly basis.<sup>88</sup>

There are even minority school teachers who are only elementary school graduates. Apart from the differences of educational backgrounds and the compatibility of teachers, the main point of argument seems to be the EPATH.<sup>xiii</sup> This school was founded in 1968 to train members of the minority as teachers in minority schools. In practice there are two conflicting views concerning EPATH.

Contrary to the official statement of purpose, it is argued that most minority members believe the EPATH was founded to control the minority. It is believed that this is a politics-driven assimilation policy of converting the Turkish Muslim minority to Islamized Greeks. There is viable evidence supporting this claim. EPATH and the students of lower class poor families are viewed as tools in implementing this policy.

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<sup>87</sup> EPATH is the Special Pedagogical Academy of Thessaloniki founded in 1968. <http://www.epath.edu.gr/>

<sup>88</sup> Baskın Oran, *Türk-Yunan İlişkilerinde Batı Trakya Sorunu*, (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınları, 1991), p. 143-145.

For instance, the language of instruction at the EPATH is Greek although its graduates provide instruction in Turkish. Most teachers are unqualified to teach in Turkish and are members of a corpse isolated from the mainstream of Turkish culture and civilization.<sup>89</sup>

The state officials, on the other hand, do not share the minority's unwillingness to accept EPATH graduates as satisfactory teachers. They argue that EPATH teachers get 14 years of education before graduating while Greek Muslim teachers have 11 and Turkish academies have 10 years of education. They think that this denial is based on the social discrimination by the minority. State officials think that some minority members view EPATH graduate teachers as traitors assisting a policy of assimilation by the Greek State. The answer to what should be done is already available.

Turkey and Greece signed a Cultural Protocol dating all the way back to 1951. This protocol aimed to magnify educational exchange between Turkey and Greece and also enabled the mutual recognition of diplomas received in each country. Thus, this protocol enabled minority members to study in Turkey and prepared themselves as teachers for the Turkish minority schools in Greece.

Human Rights Watch officials who have visited Greece carrying out intensive field research have come to the conclusion that this protocol should be given further emphasis and its philosophy brought to life. Actually just like a Turkish saying; everything required is available, all there is to be done is to get things running. The numbers of available teachers, as well as the need for them are simultaneously rising.

One point worth interest is the teachers coming from Turkey on a yearly basis. They are called as "quota teachers" since their existence is based on 1951 Education and 1968 Cultural Protocol between Turkey and Greece. Within these protocols Turkey and

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<sup>89</sup> US Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2001, <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2001/>

Greece agreed to interchange 35 teachers to provide education in minority schools. However taking into consideration the number of minority members living in western Thrace and Istanbul, the term of reciprocity should not be anymore the number of teachers but the need for teachers.

Since Greece has limited the number of Turkish quota teachers to 16, which is actually the number required by the relatively small Greek minority in Istanbul, the Turkish minority schools in western Thrace suffer a lack of teachers. To be specific 16 teachers from each side for a population of 2,500 and 125,000,<sup>90</sup> respectively, is beyond objective mathematical calculation. Apart from these insufficient numbers, the restrictions imposed on these teachers complicate the issue even further. Turkish teachers coming from Turkey are usually granted residence and working permits several months after the school year starts. This on-going routine which is beyond objective reasoning is accepted to be based on political preferences.

Textbooks: The production and use of text books in minority schools is regulated by the 1968 Ankara Cultural Protocol and Meetings of Turkish-Greek Cultural Commission which are based on reciprocity. The time-frame in the protocol states that, by September 30, books will be forwarded via diplomatic channels to the respective authorities, the contents shouldn't contain subjects that might cause harm to bilateral relations, the examination of books should be completed by February and that related parties be informed, two copies of books will be sent via diplomatic channels for final approval by July, and by September, the final approval will be announced.

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<sup>90</sup> David Levinson, *Ethnic groups worldwide: A Ready Reference Handbook*, (Phoenix, Arizona: Oryx Pub., 1998)

In practice this protocol is a failure and is not viable. The Turkish-language textbooks used in minority schools are old and out-of-date. They are mainly books approved in the 50's and only a few recent publications are available such as the 1993 edition of a mathematics book. This Protocol was last activated in 1989 when Turkey sent over to Greece 56 books for the Turkish curriculum, none of which have been available up to now.

Greek as a Second Language<sup>91</sup>: A primary minority school graduate, attending a Greek high-school often faces difficulties because of inadequacy in Greek. Many students Turks and even more Pomaks who have to learn both Turkish and Greek , fail or have difficulties because of low standards and language difficulties.<sup>92</sup>

#### Discrimination in Public Employment

There are very few Turkish community members working in the civil service, either at local or state levels due to various reasons. Some are indigenous and objective reasons while most of them are explicitly subjective. The Turkish minority's average level of education and Greek are quite low compared to the rest of Greek population due to various state implemented restrictions. This outcome is of course influential, but examples of outright discrimination also play an important role.

The minority members working in civil services are mostly seasonal workers. This in comparison to the Ottoman rule which the Greek neglect is just the opposite.

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<sup>91</sup> Human Rights Watch, *Greece: The Turks of Western Thrace*, 1 January 1999.

<sup>92</sup> Ümit Kurtuluş, *BatiTrakya'nın Dünü Bugünü*, (Ankara: Sincan Matbaası, 1979)

Let aside low and middle level civil services, during the Ottoman period, many positions were customarily given to non-Muslims especially the Greek. One of the best examples for this was the the Phanariot Greeks.<sup>93</sup> The Phanariot elites were the lay officials and rich Greek families which surrounded the Patriarch of Constantinople. They were entrusted with handling the Empire's foreign relations. The translators of the imperial Divan, who constituted an influential corpse of the Ottoman foreign affairs service, were selected from this group.<sup>94</sup> Actually this translator function became a monopoly of a group of Greek families who retained their hold from the mid-seventeenth century until 1821.

#### Restrictions on Religious Freedom

The Greek governments are accused of violating international guarantees concerning the religious freedom of Turkish minority in three major aspects: the selection of religious leaders "muftis," the restrictions in repairing and building mosques and limiting control over private charitable foundations, "vakıfs." According to the Lausanne Treaty, the Turkish minority is entitled to freedom of religion and the right to control charitable and religious institutions. To be specific, the Treaty of Lausanne states in Article 38, "All inhabitants ...shall be entitled to free exercise, whether in public or private of any creed, religion or belief, the observance of which shall not be incompatible with public order and good morals."

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<sup>93</sup> Hugh Seton-Watson, *Nations and States : An Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press,1977), p.110-117.

<sup>94</sup> Carter V.Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire*, (Princeton,NJ: Princeton University Press,1980), p.77.

Article 40: The Muslim minority in particular, shall have an equal right to establish, manage and control at their own expense , any charitable, religious and social institutions, any schools and other establishments for instruction and education, with the right to use their own language and to exercise their own religion freely therein.

Although the Lausanne treaty grants the Turkish minority the above-mentioned rights, the Greek governments are ultimately defying and preventing the execution of these rights.

Selection of Muftis: The Treaty of Athens of 1913 also allowed muftis<sup>95</sup> to be selected by the Muslim population. The Greek Law No: 2345 of 1920 which regulates issues related exercise of religious freedom was in conformity with the Lausanne Treaty. Article 6 stated that muftis would be selected by the Muslim population from a list of candidates approved by the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the Governor General of the region and the Head Mufti. The Head Mufti was appointed by state after all Greek muftis had elected three candidates. Actually there was a “modus vivendi.”

The Greek government repealed Law No: 2345 on December 1990 following the death of Müftü of Komotini (Gümülcine) in 1985<sup>96</sup> and codified Decree No. 182, which ended the previous system of electing muftis. This was a failure to implement the law according to Cultural Survival<sup>97</sup> and also against the Lausanne Treaty.<sup>98</sup> This decree later became Law No. 1920 in 1991.

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<sup>95</sup> “The mufti fulfills the role both of religious leader and Islamic judge, performing marriages and divorces and overseeing property disputes. Muslim greek citizens also have the right to deal with these matters in civil courts.” As in HRW Report, January 1999

<sup>96</sup> Baskın Oran, *Türk-Yunan İlişkilerinde Batı Takyası Sorunu*, (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınları, 1991), p. 160-172.

<sup>97</sup> Anastasia Karakasidou, “Vestiges of the Ottoman Past: Muslims Under Siege in Contemporary Greek Thrace”, *CSQ* 19.2, (Summer 1995)  
<http://www.culturalsurvival.org/ourpublications/csq/article/vestigis-ottoman-past-muslims-under-siege-contemporary-greek-thrace>

The new law granted the selection of muftis to the state through a committee based on the idea that muftis perform religious as well as civil functions. As a result, muftis began to be appointed rather than selected, which led to the natural result of having two muftis in each region, one appointed by the state and one selected by the community. This created chaos and difficulty especially for selected muftis who were repeatedly prosecuted, convicted, imprisoned and fined by the Greek government according to the Greek Penal Code. However, when the cases were taken to the European Court of Human rights, the Greek government was found to have violated the right to religious freedom as in the case of the elected müftüs Mr.Aga (Xanthi) and Mr.Şerif (Komotini).<sup>99</sup>

Repair of Mosques: Although the Article 40 of the Lausanne Treaty clearly gives them the right to do so, the Turkish minority is having problems in repairing and building mosques. Prior to international organizations' interest to such human rights issues the conditions were even worse. Although positive steps have been taken in the 1990s, the Turkish community still has to deal with bureaucratic difficulties and overcome substantial difficulties to repair and build mosques. In the twenty-first century such acts of intolerance are ealso seen in Central Europe.

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<sup>98</sup> Human Rights Watch, *Greece: The Turks of Western Thrace*, 1 January 1999.

<sup>99</sup> [http://www.mfa.gov.tr/press-release-regarding-the-lawsuit-against-mehmet-emin-aga\\_-the-elected-mufti-of\\_-xanthi\\_br\\_no\\_234--\\_december-2\\_-1999.en.mfa](http://www.mfa.gov.tr/press-release-regarding-the-lawsuit-against-mehmet-emin-aga_-the-elected-mufti-of_-xanthi_br_no_234--_december-2_-1999.en.mfa)

Control over Vakıflar (Charitable Foundations): Vakıfs are private charitable foundations for supporting education and social welfare. The concept of vakıf is an integral part of Islamic tradition. Therefore they have been a significant part of Ottoman social life and deserved preferential treatment by the Ottoman administration throughout its history. Ottoman Sultans were themselves founders of vakıfs and it was a privilege as well as a religious responsibility to take part in founding and supporting vakıfs. According to the Lausanne Treaty, the Turkish minority is entitled to freedom of religion and to the right to control charitable and religious organizations. According to the Turkish community, this right is violated by the Greek government.<sup>100</sup>

Greek Law No. 1091 of 1980 weakened the control of vakıfs by the Turkish minority. This law granted more power to the state for running the vakıfs as well as control over financial matters. However this law was strongly protested by the Turkish minority and was never implemented. Yet the Greek government issued Presidential Decree No. 1 of 1991 which contained most of the fundamental provisions of Law No. 1091 with added loopholes allowing the state to appoint members of the Vakıf managing boards in certain conditions. At present, according to a Presidential Decree, the Vakıfs are run by a committee for three years. The problem is still waiting to be resolved.

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<sup>100</sup>Human Rights Watch, *Destroying Ethnic Identity: the Turks Greece*, (New York: Helsinki Watch Report, 1990), p. 27.

### Police Surveillance

The Turkish minority experiences degrading treatment in the form of continued harassment by the police.<sup>101</sup> Turkish minority community leaders are constantly under surveillance by the the Greek Security Units. From being tailed to tapping of telephones on a regular basis. This is a natural outcome of the Greek state's suspicion and distrust of Turkish minority of western Thrace. This surveillance aims to discover the potential relations of Turkish minority leaders with Turkish state officials forgetting that these people are Greek citizens after all.

### Restrictions on Freedom of Expression

Restrictions on the Freedom of Expression are carried out on two different levels, personal level and social level. Individuals, especially teachers, community leaders and even parliamentarians using the term "Turkish" are prosecuted as in the case of the late Dr. Sadık Ahmet, who was a former Greek parliamentarian. He was convicted for distributing leaflets that mentioned "Turkish Muslim Minority of Western Thrace", "Turkish Muslims" etc. while he was campaigning for the parliament in 1989. He was found guilty of disrupting public order and imprisoned. The Court of Appeals converted the sentence to a fine. Upon Dr. Ahmet's application to the European Commission of Human Rights the issue was forwarded to the European Court of Human Rights, which dismissed the case because Dr. Ahmet had not exhausted all domestic remedies.

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<sup>101</sup> Human Rights Watch, *Destroying Ethnic Identity: the Turks Greece*, (New York: Helsinki Watch Report, 1990), p 22.

Another example for the Greek governments' restrictions on the usage of the terms "Turk" and "Turkish" when describing the minority as a whole is yet another problem. A number of organizations, including the "Turkish Union of Xanti", have been banned for using the term "Turkish" in their title.<sup>102</sup> There have been and still are various individual examples of this sort all of which are causing suffering for innocent individuals basically trying to express themselves.

From a broader perspective, the Greek authorities are targeting their efforts against Turkish media in the region, trying to stop them reaching the minority. A notable businessman, Mr. Dede, who owned a radio station and a newspaper, was put on trial in 1997 for "illegal" operation of the Turkish-language radio station during 1994-1995 in Komotini. Although all private radio stations operated without licenses because of the failure of the local authorities only Mr.Dede's radio-station was prosecuted. Later on, in 1997, Mr.Dede was prosecuted for an article in his newspaper Trakya'nın Sesi (The Voice of Thrace) and was sentenced to six months which was suspended.<sup>103</sup>

These are all efforts on individual and group level to restrict the freedom of expression of the Turkish minority. Turkey as well as international organizations whether they are state organizations or NGOs such as the Helsinki Watch, are working hard to publicize and find remedy such restrictions.

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<sup>102</sup> Greek Helsinki Monitor, *Report about Compliance with the Principles of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities*, 18-9-1999 .  
<http://10.80.3.163:8080/progress?pages&id=648628877&sp2&fileName=Z2htLXNlcDk5LW1pbm9yaXRpZXMucGRm&url=aHR0cDovL3d3dy5ncmVla2h1bHNpbmtpLmdyL3BkZi9naG0tc2VwOTktbWlub3JpdGllcy5wZGY=&referer=aHR0cDovL3d3dy5ncmVla2h1bHNpbmtpLmdyL2VuZ2xpc2gvcmlvbn3J0cy9HSE0tUmVwb3J0cy1HcmVlY2Utbn2xkLmh0bWw=&foo=1>

<sup>103</sup> Mr. Dede, interview with HRW Official, Komotini, Greece, September 1997, Helsinki Human Rights Watch, New York, U.S.A.

## CHAPTER 3

### CYPRUS

Cyprus is not a just a conflict between Turkey and Greece. The issue is basically a conflict between the two peoples of the island.<sup>104</sup> The national affiliations of these peoples with two states of the international community, Turkey and Greece, have brought the issue to the international platform. The involvement of the two Aegean neighbors together with the strategic importance of the island has drawn the attention of extra-regional powers.<sup>105</sup> As a result, the Cyprus conflict has gained a regional as well as international dimension.<sup>106</sup>

The island of Cyprus was under Ottoman rule from 1571 till 1878.<sup>107</sup> Since then, the population has been composed of two national communities which are Orthodox Greeks in majority and Muslim Turks. Following the invasion of the island by Venetians in 1489, the Ottomans pursued a strategy to settle Turkish peasants on the island at large. When the Ottoman Empire began facing political and military difficulties in the nineteenth century, the island was occupied and began to be administered by Britain according to the Convention of 1878. The British rule lasted until 1960, when the Republic of Cyprus was formed. One of the roots of the Cyprus problem lies here. It was never possible for a common Cypriot consciousness to be created. For instance, the two communities on the island never acted together against the British colonial rule

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<sup>104</sup> Sabahattin İsmail, *150 Soruda Kıbrıs Sorunu*, (İstanbul: Kastaş Yay., 1998)

<sup>105</sup> Şükrü Sina Gürel, *Kıbrıs Tarihi 1878-1960*, (Ankara: Kaynak Yay., 1984/2003)

<sup>106</sup> Şükrü Sina Gürel, "Turkey and Greece: A Difficult Relationship" In *Turkey and Europe*, eds. Canan Balkır and Allan Williams, (London: Pinter Pub., 1993), p. 175.

<sup>107</sup> Rifat Uçarol, *1878 Kıbrıs Sorunu & Osmanlı-İngiliz Anlaşması*, (İstanbul: Filiz K.Evi, 1998), p.19-25 and 31-36.

though they faced major economic exploitation. Instead of acting jointly they chose to act on their own with different strategies.<sup>108</sup> The Greeks Cypriots sought freedom under the leadership of their church, by aiming to achieve “Enosis” or in other words, union with Greece, whereas Turkey supported the Turkish Cypriots in their resistance to Enosis.

Another historical case distinguishing the attitude difference between the two communities is the labor movement of the late 1940s. AKEL,<sup>xiv</sup> the leftist Greek Cypriot political party could not attract Turkish Cypriots for two reasons. One, AKEL had “Enosis” in its program in order to compete with its major rival the church and secondly due to strong anti-communist feelings of Turkish Cypriots supported by Turkey.<sup>109</sup>

Prior to its independence, Cyprus already had been an important issue on the domestic agendas for both Turkey and Greece. Cyprus was placed on the official agenda of the United Nations for the first time in 1954. The Greek Cypriot leaders were after “Enosis”<sup>xv</sup> while both Ankara and the Turkish community in Cyprus favored the continuation of British rule. If not, the Turkish sentiment was reflected in the division of the island. Cyprus always had been a strategic issue for Turkey. Cyprus, being forty miles from the southern coast of Turkey, has direct access to the ports of Mersin and İskenderun on the Mediterranean coast. So, when the Greeks and Greek Cypriots contested the sovereignty of Cyprus, Turkish leaders began developing strategic concerns vis-à-vis Greece.<sup>110</sup>

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<sup>108</sup> Şükrü Sina Gürel, “Turkey and Greece: A Difficult Relationship” In *Turkey and Europe*, eds. Canan Balkır and Allan Williams, (London: Pinter Pub., 1993), p. 176.

<sup>109</sup> AKEL : The Progressive Party of Working People is a communist party in Cyprus. It supports an independent, demilitarized and non-aligned Cyprus and a federal solution of the internal aspect of the Cyprus problem. [http://www.akel.org.cy/nqcontent.cfm?a\\_id=1&lang=13](http://www.akel.org.cy/nqcontent.cfm?a_id=1&lang=13)

<sup>110</sup> Necati Ertökün, *The Cyprus Dispute*, (Oxford: University Press, 1984)

During late 1950s Greece sponsored Enosis while Turkey backed the Turkish Cypriot struggle against Enosis. Within this turmoil, Ankara's goal of partition of the island was rejected by the Greek Cypriots. Clashes between the two communities broke out during 1955-1958 and hundreds of lives were lost on both sides. The deteriorating level of Turkish-Greek relations was of critical importance for the coming years.<sup>111</sup>

Turkish and Greek diplomacy succeeded in getting over this turmoil and the Republic of Cyprus was established as an independent republic in 1960<sup>112</sup> on the basis of the 1959 Zurich<sup>113</sup> and 1960 London<sup>114xvi</sup> Agreements. This republic was a consociational democracy<sup>115116xvii</sup> also known as a functional federation.<sup>117</sup> Three multilateral treaties were signed by Great Britain, Turkey and Greece and by both communities' representatives of RoC.<sup>118</sup> These were the Treaty of Establishment,<sup>xviii</sup> the Treaty of Guarantee<sup>xix</sup> and the Treaty of Alliance.<sup>xx</sup> The Zurich and London Agreements created a power-sharing constitution for RoC as well as safeguards for the less numerous Turkish population in the island.

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<sup>111</sup> Andreas Mavroyiannis, "Kıbrıs Sorunu'nun Türk-Yunan İlişkilerine Etkisi," *Türk-Yunan Uyuşmazlığı*, ed. Semih Vaner, (İstanbul, Metis Yay., 1989), p. 131

<sup>112</sup> Şükrü Sina Gürel, "Turkey and Greece: A Difficult Relationship" In *Turkey and Europe*, eds. Canan Balkır and Allan Williams, (London: Pinter Pub., 1993), p. 176.

<sup>113</sup> 1959 Zurich-London Agreements for the Constitution of Cyprus started with an intention agreement on 19 February 1959 at Lancaster House London, between Turkey, Greece, the United Kingdom and Cypriot community leaders (Archbishop Makarios III for Greek Cypriots and Dr.Fazıl Küçük for Turkish Cypriots) On that basis, a constitution was drafted and agreed together with two further Treaties of Alliance and Guarantee in Zurich on 11 February 1960.

<sup>114</sup> Ibid.

<sup>115</sup> Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration*, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1977), p. 25-44.

<sup>116</sup> Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1985), p. 568-571.

<sup>117</sup> Zenon Stavrinides, *The Cyprus Conflict: National Identity and Statehood*, (Nicosia: Stavrinides, 1976), p.76.

<sup>118</sup> Sevin Toluner, *Kıbrıs Uyuşmazlığı ve Milletlerarası Hukuk*, (İstanbul: İstanbul Üni. Yay., No.2309, 1977), p.71-89.

In 1960, one-fifth of the population on the island consisted of Turkish Cypriots.<sup>119</sup> Therefore, Turkey as a state was obliged to secure and sustain the rights and well-being of its kinsmen and nationals residing in Cyprus. Taking into consideration the historical as well as strategic importance of Cyprus, securing Turkish and Turkish Cypriot rights were of crucial importance.<sup>xxi</sup>

In Article 181 of the Constitution of Republic of Cyprus<sup>120</sup> which entered into force on 16 August 1960, it is evident that, the Treaties of Guarantee and Alliance would have constitutional force.

Article 181: The Treaty guaranteeing the independence, territorial integrity and Constitution of the Republic concluded between the Republic, the Kingdom of Greece, the Republic of Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Treaty of Military Alliance concluded between the Republic, the Kingdom of Greece and the Republic of Turkey, copies of which are annexed to this Constitution as Annexes I and IÉ, shall have constitutional force.

In Article 182,<sup>xxii</sup> we notice that the Basic Articles which are derived from the Zurich Agreement cannot, in any way, be amended. Article 185 on the other hand prohibits total or partial union with any other state.<sup>121</sup>

Article 185: The territory of the Republic is one and indivisible. 2. The integral or partial union of Cyprus with any other State or the separatist independence is excluded.

In this respect, the Republic of Cyprus Constitution clearly designated two major facts that characterized the structure and the administration format of the new republic.

Turkey was successful in securing Turkish and Turkish Cypriot rights.

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<sup>119</sup> An island-wide census in 1960 indicated the number of Turkish Cypriots as 102,000 and Greek Cypriots as 450,000, Cyprus-SOCIETY, <<http://country-data.com/cgi-bin/query/r-3458.html>

<sup>120</sup> Republic of Cyprus, *the 1960 constitution of RoC*, [http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/cy00000\\_.html](http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/cy00000_.html)

<sup>121</sup> The Constitution of RoC entered into force on August 16, 1960.

First, the equality of the Turkish and Greek communities and their obligation to share sovereignty was designated. According to the constitution, there would be a Greek Cypriot President and a Turkish Cypriot Vice-president was to be elected by their respective communities. Each one of them had individual veto power. The Council of Ministers, the House of Representatives, the civil service, the Military and the Judiciary services were to be divided between the two communities in agreed proportions. Thus, the constitution extended the two communities outstanding checks on each other's authority at the federal level.<sup>122</sup> Secondly were extensive powers of self-government. A Greek Cypriot and a Turkish Cypriot Communal Chamber were to be elected. These Communal Chambers were entitled to full legislative power in educational, municipal, personal and religious issues. In five of the largest towns in the island, separately governed municipalities of the two communities were to be established.

The 1960 London Agreement involved the tutelary rights of Great Britain, Greece and Turkey, which gave powers as guarantors. In political terms, the formation of Republic of Cyprus was the transition of a colony to a Republic. However Republic of Cyprus didn't turn out to be a fully independent and sovereign state because of the special relations between Turkey and Greece with their ethnic constituencies on the island.<sup>123</sup> Finally, things did not work out the way they were expected to. Turkish and Greek Cypriots could not compromise over the application of the constitutional

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<sup>122</sup> Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Monroe Leigh , [www.mfa.gov.tr/the-status-of-the-two-peoples-in-cyprus-edited-by-necati-munir-ertekun.en.mfa](http://www.mfa.gov.tr/the-status-of-the-two-peoples-in-cyprus-edited-by-necati-munir-ertekun.en.mfa)

<sup>123</sup> Ahmet Evin, "Changing Greek Perspectives on Turkey: an Assessment of the post-Earthquake Rapprochement", In Ali Çarkoğlu and Barry Rubin eds., *Greek-Turkish relations in an Era of Detente*, (New York, Routledge, 2005), p.12.

provisions. On November 1963, the Greek Cypriot President, Archbishop Makarios, proposed to the guarantor powers 13 amendments<sup>124</sup> to the Cypriot Constitution.

The main features of these amendments<sup>125</sup> were, first, to have the Greek-Cypriot President and the Turkish-Cypriot Vice-president elected by the Greek-Cypriot dominated House of Representatives as a whole (not by the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot members separately). Second, remove the veto powers of Turkish-Cypriots. Third was to reduce the Turkish-Cypriot component in the civil and military arms of the government and last to unify the municipalities.

The main source of conflict was the issue of thirty percent Turkish Cypriot representation at every level of Civil service. Although this was in the Constitution, Greek Cypriots rejected to materialize this act. Ankara took this as a violation of the independence agreements. According to Ankara, these proposals were intended to shift the delicate balance of power between the two communities to favor Greek-Cypriot (majority) rule.

Disputes concerning the implementation of the constitution finally led to the collapse of the bi-communal government on the island.<sup>126</sup> The Greek Cypriot leader Makarios, supported by Greek governments, unilaterally altered the constitutional order in Cyprus. The Turkish members of the House of Representatives, members of the government and civil servants; in other words the Turkish community was literally

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<sup>124</sup> Makarios argued that these amendments would free many public offices from the ethnic restrictions agreed in London and Zurich. This, he argued, would allow the government to function more efficiently and dissolve rigid inter-ethnic legal boundaries. According to Turkish Cypriots, these amendments threatened constitutional protections against domination by the majority Greek Cypriots.

<sup>125</sup> Makarios, *13 Amendments by Makarios*,  
<http://www.cypnet.co.uk/ncyprus/history/republic/breakdown.html>

<sup>126</sup> Mehmet Hasgüler, *Kıbrıs'ta Enosis ve Taksim Politikalarının Sonu*, (İstanbul:İletişim Yay., 2000)

thrown out of the government and transformed from partnership in government to a harassed community.

The government of Republic of Cyprus, which became a Greek-Cypriot administration, enacted 13 amendments claiming that they acted in legitimate exercise of their offices. Following the enactment, Turkish Cypriots were allowed to be readmitted as partners in the administration if they accepted the amendments passed.<sup>127</sup> The Greek-Cypriot regime, which claimed to be the legitimate government of the Republic of Cyprus, had no legal basis in international law for such a claim. This claim clearly contravened with the Treaty of Guarantee, the Zurich Agreement and the Constitution.

Makarios's proposal was refused by Turkey since it clearly targeted to destroy the existing balance of power between the two communities. While the political arena was in turmoil, the social situation was even worse. Armed violence and civil disorder broke in Cyprus on December 1963. The situation was brought to the UN Security Council.<sup>128</sup> This was the first climax of the alarming events in Cyprus. Turkish Cypriots were severely abused by the far more numerous Greek Cypriots. The guerilla activities of *Ethniki Organosis Kipriakou Agonos* (EOKA-National Organization of Cypriot Struggle)<sup>129</sup> against the Turkish Cypriots caused the loss of hundreds of lives.

Turkey's political discontent was followed by its social and public discontent which peaked when Greek governments started extending their support for Enosis.

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<sup>127</sup> Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Monroe Leigh, [www.mfa.gov.tr/the-status-of-the-two-peoples-in-cyprus-edited-by-necati-munir-ertekun.en.mfa](http://www.mfa.gov.tr/the-status-of-the-two-peoples-in-cyprus-edited-by-necati-munir-ertekun.en.mfa)

<sup>128</sup> United Nations, *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1963, p. 50-52

<sup>129</sup> *Ethniki Organosis Kipriakou Agonos*, National Organization of Cypriot Struggle was a paramilitary force led by General Theodoros Georgios Grivas who was a keen Enosis supporter. It was an underground nationalist movement of Greek Cypriots dedicated to the expulsion of British from Cyprus and the eventual union of Cyprus with Greece. See "EOKA," *Encyclopedia Britannica* <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/189352/EOKA> <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/EOKA>

All of these developments led to the destabilization of political order in the island and the de facto separation of Turkish and Greek communities.

From 1964 onwards,<sup>130</sup> parallel administrations of the Turkish and Greek Cypriots emerged in Cyprus.<sup>xxiii</sup> This was due to the fact that, Turkish Cypriots suffered from the embargo imposed on them by the Greek Cypriot administration. Turkey was discontent with the developments on the island.

The second climax of alarming events in Cyprus was in 1967.<sup>131</sup> In November 1967, General Grivas, the Greek commander of the Cyprus National Guard, deployed a battalion of troops and overran most of the Ayios Theodoros (Boğaziçi) and Kophinou (Köfünye) area where mainly Turkish Cypriots lived. The Turkish government protested to the Secretary General of the UN, who requested the Greek and Cyprus governments to bring about a withdrawal of the National Guard from the areas it had occupied. The withdrawal was carried out on 16 November. On 18 and 19 November armed clashes spread to Kokkina (Erenköy) and Kyrenia (Girne) areas. These events set off a severe political crisis. The Turkish government decided to solve the crisis in diplomatic terms. NATO, the UN and the US were heavily involved in reaching a solution to the crisis. US President Johnson's special envoy to Cyprus, Cyrus Vance, carried out a shuttle diplomacy among the three capitals and an agreement was reached. The political climate slowly calmed down in the following years to come. However this was a temporary process.<sup>132</sup>

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<sup>130</sup> Selahi Sonyel, *Cyprus: the Destruction of a Republic and its Aftermath in British Documents 1960-1974*, (Lefkoşa: Cyrep, 2003), p. 17-22 and 52-64.

<sup>131</sup> November 1967 events set of a political crisis which was settled by UN and US diplomatic intervention. [http://www.unficy.org/nqcontent.cfm?a\\_id=1491&tt=graphic&lang=11](http://www.unficy.org/nqcontent.cfm?a_id=1491&tt=graphic&lang=11)

<sup>132</sup> Faruk Sönmezoglu, *Kıbrıs Sorunu'nda Tarafların Tutum ve Tezleri*, (İstanbul: İ.Ü. Yayınları, 1991)

Finally, in 1974 things got out of hand. A coup d'etat<sup>xxiv</sup> initiated by the Greek military junta in Athens and led by Nicos Sampson<sup>133</sup> against Greek Cypriot President Makarios was carried out with the intention of Enosis. There was an imminent threat to the existence of the Turkish Cypriot community, which had a very limited self defense capability. Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit tried to find a solution with Great Britain to reconstitute the state of affairs on the island. There was no solution. So, Turkey based on humanitarian issues as well as the Zurich and London Agreements' rights accorded to her as a guarantor power intervened militarily to Cyprus. Turkish PM Ecevit dispatched Turkish troops to Cyprus in July 1974 by relying on the rights of intervention as provided by the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee.<sup>134</sup> According to the Treaty of Guarantee;

In the event of any breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, Greece, United Kingdom and Turkey undertake to consult together, with a view to making representations, or taking the necessary steps to ensure observance of those provisions. In so far as common or concerted action may prove impossible, each of the guaranteeing three Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs established by the present Treaty.<sup>135</sup>

The Treaty allowed intervention in order to restore the constitution of 1960. PM Bülent Ecevit for the Turkish side and Rauf Denktaş for the Turkish Cypriot side decided that there was no way that this could be achieved. So they created the basis of a new settlement based on the physical separation of the two communities which were separated mentally long ago.

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<sup>133</sup> Nicos Sampson was a fanatic Greek Cypriot obsessed by Enosis and Megali Idea  
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/obituaries/nicos-sampson-729105.html>

<sup>134</sup> Monteagle Stearns, *Entangled Allies U.S. Policy Toward Greece, Turkey and Cyprus*, (NY: CFR, 1992)

<sup>135</sup> Treaty of Guarantee, Conference on Cyprus: Documents Signed and Initialed at Lancaster House on 19 February 1959, (1964), H.M. Stationary Office, London <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/page1-the-facts.en.mfa>

The 1974 Turkish military intervention<sup>136</sup> led to the de facto partitioning of the island as North and South. This caused nearly one-third of the Greek Cypriot population (160,000) and forty percent of Turkish Cypriots (64,000) to become refugees. There was a bi-lateral movement and this resulted in two homogeneous ethnic entities. In the following years Turkey promoted Turkish citizens to settle in Cyprus to balance the Greek Cypriot population. Nowadays the population ratio is still 4:1 in favor of the Greek Cypriots who are around 800,000 in number<sup>137</sup> and occupy sixty-three percent of the land.

The 1974 Turkish intervention to Cyprus led to major political changes in Cyprus as well as in Greece. Not only did the Sampson regime collapse, but also the colonels' junta that ruled Greece was overthrown and the country returned to democracy.<sup>138</sup> A population movement took place in the island and by 1975, the Turkish and Greek-Cypriot communities were physically regrouped into geographically differentiated zones.

After the 1974 intervention, the Greek-Cypriot regime used its international status to campaign for a return to pre-1974 conditions. This campaign was supported by an economic blockade against the Turkish-Cypriot community and an arms embargo on Turkey. The Turkish-Cypriot administration declared that the problem could only be

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<sup>136</sup> Erol Mütercimler, *Bilinmeyen Yönleriyle Kıbrıs Barış Harekati*, (İstanbul: Arba, 1998)

<sup>137</sup> Republic of Cyprus, *Statistical Service of the Republic of Cyprus*.

[http://www.mof.gov.cy/mof/cystat/statistics.nsf/populationcondition\\_en/populationcondition\\_en?OpenDocument&sub=2&e=](http://www.mof.gov.cy/mof/cystat/statistics.nsf/populationcondition_en/populationcondition_en?OpenDocument&sub=2&e=)

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics\\_of\\_Cyprus](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_Cyprus)

<sup>138</sup> The colonels' junta was overthrown in 1974 following the Turkish military intervention in Cyprus. <http://www.ahistoryofgreece.com/junta.htm>

solved in a new form of partnership government, in other words, a federation and renamed itself as the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus on February 13<sup>th</sup> 1975.<sup>139</sup>

Seven years later in 1981, Greece joined the European Economic Community (EEC) as the European Union (EU) was named at the time.<sup>140</sup> This development was a result of the emphasis on the consolidation of democracy in the context of the EEC's southern enlargement.<sup>141</sup> Greece's admission to the EU effected Turkish-Greek bilateral relations especially those related to Cyprus to a great extent.

Taking into consideration the de facto partitioning of Cyprus as well as Turkey's military superiority, Ankara has not succeeded in convincing the Greek Cypriots to agree on a solution. There are several reasons for this solution less situation. The Turkish community on the Northern side of the island declared its independence in 1983 as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC).<sup>142</sup> In its Declaration of Independence, the Turkish-Cypriots expressed their final aim as to achieve partnership with the Greek Cypriots within a federal framework.

The Turkish-Cypriot Declaration of Independence, 15 November 1983<sup>143, xxv</sup>

Following years of struggle and effort, the patience of Turkish Cypriots was finally exhausted. The establishment of a genuine federation based on two politically equal components' entities seemed to be hopeless. The Greek Cypriots were not ready or

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<sup>139</sup> Kıbrıs Türk Federe Devleti, Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (TFSC), 13 February 1975

<sup>140</sup> Greece has joined the EU in 1981.

<sup>141</sup> *Ibid*, Evin, p.13.

<sup>142</sup> The Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) established in 1983 is not recognized internationally other than Turkey.

<sup>143</sup> Rauf Denктаş, *Letter from President Rauf Denктаş to the UN Secretary-General*, 15 November 1983. <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/data/DISPOLITIKA/KIBRIS/BMGUvenlikKonseyiKarari1983541544.pdf>

willing to share the power in governing a unified Cyprus. Finally, the Turkish Cypriots decided to establish and declare their independence.

President Rauf Denktaş wrote a personal letter<sup>144</sup> to the UN Secretary-General giving the reasons for the Cypriot Turkish Declaration of Independence.<sup>145</sup> This letter was accompanied by the full text of declaration<sup>146</sup> and the unanimous resolution of the Turkish Cypriot legislative assembly.

The declaration of independence stated that, the proclamation of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is not an obstacle to the establishment of a genuine federation but on the contrary a supportive tool raising up the second and politically equal component necessary to the establishment of a true federation.<sup>147</sup>

24. Expressing the legitimate and the irrepressible will of the Turkish Cypriot People, in the light of aforesaid realities, convictions and necessities, we hereby declare before the World and before History the establishment of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus as an independent State.

On this historic date, we reiterate our gratitude to our Martyrs who sacrificed their lives in order that the Turkish Cypriot People may never again be subjected to servitude under foreign domination and may live in dignity and freedom... May God's mercy be upon our Martyrs.

However, the TRNC established in 1983 is still not recognized internationally other than by Turkey,<sup>148</sup> The international community still recognizes the Greek Cypriot Republic of Cyprus as the legitimate government of the whole island. This legitimacy advantage has been used extensively by the Greek Cypriot side to internationalize the issue and to exert pressure on Turkey. Speaking in economic terms, an economic embargo has been

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<sup>144</sup> Rauf Denktaş, *Personal letter to the UN Secretary-General*, 15 November 1983.

<sup>145</sup> Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, *The Cypriot Turkish Declaration of Independence*, 15-11-1983 <http://www.trncinfo.com/index.asp?page=59687&p=2>

<sup>146</sup> Ibid.

<sup>147</sup> Ibid., paragraph 22(b)

<sup>148</sup> Stephan Larrabee and Ian Lesser, *Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty*, (Santa Monica, CA:RAND, 2002), p.78.

imposed on the Turkish Cypriot side since 1974. This embargo has banned all scheduled flights to the TRNC which in turn poses a major threat to its economy. Lack of direct flights to TRNC is a big blow to its tourism sector which is the sole revenue source of the economy other than Turkey's economic assistance in donation terms.

### The Role of the U.S. in Turkish-Greek Relations

The US is a major actor in Turkish-Greek relations. The US has been an important leverage factor for both Turkey and Greece starting in the post-WW2 era and the Cold War. This link has been enhanced by the admission of both countries to NATO. The US was very influential in stabilizing the Turkish-Greek relations during the second half of the 20th century.<sup>149</sup>

The US involvement in Turkish-Greek issues<sup>150</sup> has caused major strains in Washington's relations with both countries such as during the arms embargo and the 7:10 military aid ratio cases. Turkey has a relatively more strategic importance for the US and NATO compared to Greece. Yet most people in Turkey believe that the US is less offensive than the EU in terms of conflicts with Greece. The US has shown support to Turkey on major cases such as EU membership application, the Central Asian/Caucasus energy transportation issues, the US and Turkey being strategic partners, as well as Turkey being a NATO member with a major outstanding military, political power necessitates US intervention in Turkish-Greek dialogue.

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<sup>149</sup> Süha Bölükbaşı, *Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus*, ed. Kenneth Thompson, (Boston: University Press of America, 1998)

<sup>150</sup> Tosun Bahçeli, Theodore Coulombis and Patricia Carley, *Greek-Turkish Relations and US Foreign Policy*, (n.p., US Institute of Peace Publications, Peacework Pub., August 1997)

In the international arena, Greece and Greek Cypriots have been very successful in terms of lobbying. Lobbying especially in the US Congress has created major problems for Turkey in relevance to its relations with the US. In practice, the 1974 intervention had severe political and military implications on Turkey.<sup>xxvi</sup>

The US imposed arms embargo in 1975 on Turkey following the 1974 intervention was the first step. Starting from the early 1980s, lobbying showed its effect even further. Against the wishes of the US administration, the Congress applied a 7:10 ratio to the aid provided to Greece and Turkey respectively.<sup>151</sup> Taking into consideration Turkey's population is six times that of Greece (at the time, nowadays even times) and a relatively larger armed forces, the 7:10 ratio struck deeply at Turkish-US relations for 19 years until it ended in the 1999 fiscal year. However, this still poses a difficulty for Turkey due to the fact that a major portion of Turkey's weapons are of US origin, which requires intensive co-operation.<sup>152</sup>

In general terms the US has been more supportive of Turkey than the EU in terms of Turkish-Greek disputes. The White House seems to lend a helping hand in neutralizing the pro-Greek attitude of the Congress which is affected by the Greek lobby. In various cases such as the airspace issue and the six-mile territorial sea-limit, the US position extends support for Turkey. Finally, the US openly discourages any unilateral move from either side to change the status quo in the Aegean.<sup>153</sup>

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<sup>151</sup> Süha Bölükbaşı, *Turkish-American Relations and Cyprus*, ed. Kenneth Thompson, (Boston: University Press of America, 1998)

<sup>152</sup> Ibid.

<sup>153</sup> Morton Abromowitz, ed. *Turkey's Transformation and American Policy*, (N.Y.: The Century Foundation Press, 2000)

## The European Union

Greece joined the EU in 1981. Naturally, it has used its EU membership as a leverage in its relations with Turkey. Greece has constantly used its veto power to prevent the release of EU aid which was agreed as a part of the 1963 Association Agreement and the 1995 Customs Union Agreement. The biggest success of Greece in international politics and diplomacy has been the admission of the Republic of Cyprus to the EU. Major external factors in Turkish-Greek relations are the US and EU. Since the mid-1990s, the EU has gained more importance in comparison to the US. This importance is mainly due to the EU's attitude towards Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus regarding the terms of admission to the Union.

Turkey attained associate EU membership in 1963. Greece which had applied a year earlier was granted full membership in 1975. Turkey, instead of applying for full membership, acquired assurances that Greece's membership would not effect its interests and membership prospects.<sup>154</sup> However things did not work out as Turkey had expected. Greece constantly use its membership as a tool for setbacks in Turkish-EU relations.

Athens lifted its veto against Turkey joining the EU Customs Union, as a *quid pro quo*<sup>155</sup> for the EU to begin negotiations with the Republic of Cyprus for full membership. The EU Luxembourg summit of December 1997 was a political catastrophe. Turkey's bid to be eligible for membership was rejected. Turkey was

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<sup>154</sup> Haluk Kabaalioglu, *Avrupa Birliđi ve Kıbrıs Sorunu*, (İstanbul, Yeditepe Yay., n.d.)

<sup>155</sup> *Quid pro quo* means "something for something" in Latin and indicates a more-or-less equal exchange or substitution of goods or services. Other similar meanings are "tit for tat", "give and take", "a favor for a favor" and "this for that".

unhappy with the Greek and German stance during the decision process. Ankara's disappointment was elevated when the EU put the Republic of Cyprus on the fast track for accession irrespective of Turkish insistence of a prior settlement between Turkish and Greek Cypriots. Turkey's demand for the settlement of bilateral problems jointly between Ankara and Athens was not taken into consideration and the EU decided to recommend Turkey settle its disputes with Greece in view of international law, namely the ICJ.<sup>156</sup>

At the end of the EU's Helsinki Summit of December 1999, Turkey was accepted as an EU member candidate. Greece once more used its membership status and a trade-off concerning Cyprus and Aegean was attained against lifting its veto against EU's assignment of candidate status to Turkey. The EU statement on Cyprus as well as the EU once more recommending recourse to the ICJ for the settlement of bilateral disputes were Greek achievements. The EU recommendation was ,

“.....to promote their settlement through the International Course of Justice, at the latest by the end of 2004.

The European council underlines that a political settlement will facilitate the accession of Cyprus to the European union. If no settlement has been reached by the completion of accession negotiations, the council's decision on accession will be made without the above being a precondition. In this the Council will take account of all relevant factors.”<sup>157</sup>

This decision secured the pledge given in 1997 Luxembourg Summit. Greek-Cypriot controlled Republic of Cyprus made impressive progress and completed 24 of the 31

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<sup>156</sup> European Union, *Luxembourg European Council, Presidency Conclusions*, 12-13 December 1997, paragraphs 31-36, <http://www.europarl.eu.int/dg7/summits/en/lux1.htm>.

<sup>157</sup> European Union, *Helsinki European Council, Presidency Conclusions*, 10-11 December 1999, paragraphs 31-36, [http://www.europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/dec99/dec99/\\_en.pdf](http://www.europa.eu.int/council/off/conclu/dec99/dec99/_en.pdf).

chapters of the *acquis communautaire*<sup>158</sup> by December 2001. Finally, in spite of Turkish and Turkish Cypriot objections, the Republic of Cyprus was admitted EU membership in the round of EU enlargement.

After 30 years of political dispute and debate, Republic of Cyprus was formally admitted to the EU in May 2004 without a settlement with Turkey or the unification of the island.<sup>159</sup> Turkey had long opposed a unilateral solution to the Cyprus conflict. Based on the 1959 Zurich and 1960 London agreements, Turkey had always insisted on that Cyprus could not become a member of any international organization to which both Turkey and Greece are not members. However politics came in between. Turkey's reaction to the admission of Cyprus to the EU was not as harsh as most had expected. The reason was a pure political trade-off.

In the 1999 Helsinki European Council meeting Turkey was formally granted the long-awaited candidate status with the Greek government pulling back its hidden veto. Greek support for Turkey's EU membership was evidence of a fundamental change in the Greek outlook at the official level on Turkey. This radical change in the Greek policy was certainly a reflection of responsible realism rather than a change of heart. Given the fact that a self-confident and stable Turkey is in its best interests, Greece adopted a rational and credible foreign policy based on its national interests. Instead of keeping Turkey out of the EU, bringing it in would expand Greece's geo-strategic and

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<sup>158</sup> *Acquis communautaire* is used in European Law to refer to the total body of EU law accumulated thus far. [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Acquis\\_communitaire](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Acquis_communitaire)

<sup>159</sup> The EU Accession Treaty was signed by 10 new members at the Athens Summit on April 16, 2003. Cyprus was admitted formally to the EU in May 2004. <http://www.greekembassy.org/embassy/content/en/Article.aspx?office=1&folder=198&article=11660>

economic interests. These developments in turn have turned Turkey to redefine its relations with Greece as “one of close cooperation, alliance and confidence.”<sup>160</sup>

Greece has received outstanding support from the EU concerning its relations with Turkey especially those related to the Republic of Cyprus. Yet it is also clear that in most occasions European governments have tried to stay away from Turkish-Greek disputes. Furthermore they have even resisted Greek pressure and ruled in opposition to Greece’s request. There are namely three major occasions of this sort. First, in 1992, the EU’s security arm, the Western European Union (WEU) declared that “Greek-Turkish differences were beyond its scope.”<sup>161</sup> Second, EU member countries rejected Greek attempts to include an EU commitment for “territorial integrity” in the Amsterdam Treaty of June 1997 which was aimed at weakening the concept of Turkey being geographically a European state,<sup>162</sup> and last, in 2001, EU countries denounced the establishment of a rapid reaction force which was under discussion in relation to the European Security and Defense Policy..<sup>163</sup> This decision satisfied Turkish expectations and enhanced Turkey’s military role and concerns in the Southeastern Europe and East Mediterranean.

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<sup>160</sup> Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Turkish Foreign Policy*, [http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no\\_66--\\_16-nisan-2003\\_-gkry\\_nin\\_-ab\\_je-katilim-andlasmasi\\_-hakkinda.tr.mfa](http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_66--_16-nisan-2003_-gkry_nin_-ab_je-katilim-andlasmasi_-hakkinda.tr.mfa)

<sup>161</sup> İrfan Ülger and Ertan Efeğil, eds. *Avrupa Birliğı Kısacında Kıbrıs Meselesi*, (Ankara, n.p., 2001)

<sup>162</sup> P.H. Gordon, “Storms in the Mediterranean blow towards Europe,” *World Today* 54, No. 2, (February 1998), p.43, [www.nato.int/structur/library/bibref/them0505.pdf](http://www.nato.int/structur/library/bibref/them0505.pdf)

<sup>163</sup> European Union, *European Security and Defense Policy*, [http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/european\\_security\\_defence\\_policy\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/european_security_defence_policy_en.htm)

## The Annan Plan<sup>164</sup>

The Annan Plan<sup>165</sup> has drawn criticism on both sides of the Cyprus conflict. Turkey stated that a just and lasting settlement for the Cyprus issue can be achieved only through negotiations between the Turkish and Greek Cypriot peoples. Therefore, the Turkish objective was a bi-communal and bi-zonal federal settlement based on the sovereign equality of the Turkish and Greek Cypriot states. Greek objective on the other hand was the establishment of a federal, bi-zonal and bi-communal state with a single sovereignty, international personality and citizenship.<sup>166</sup>

The Turkish side's objections rested on the suspicions regarding Greek and European motives for EU enlargement into the eastern Mediterranean, which created a potential threat to Turkey's security interests in the region. In the event of unification, the fear of the dilution of Turkish identity<sup>167</sup> on the island is the main source of suspicion for the Turkish side.

In line with the principles adopted by numerous United Nations (UN) Security Council resolutions and many UN Secretary-General Reports and statements, a permanent solution to the Cyprus conflict was expected to be based on a model of "governance in multi-ethnic societies" where the Turkish and Greek Cypriot

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<sup>164</sup> United Nations, *Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Issue*, 31 March 2004.  
[http://www.cyprus-un-plan.org/Annan\\_Plan\\_Text1.html](http://www.cyprus-un-plan.org/Annan_Plan_Text1.html)

<sup>165</sup> United Nations, *Annan Plan for Cyprus Settlement*.  
<http://www.tcea.org.uk/Annan-Plan-For-Cyprus-Settlement.htm>.

The Annan Plan is U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan's proposal to reunite the Turkish and Greek communities that had been segregated for 30 years by then. The Plan proposed a Swiss-style devolved government with effective and broad power-sharing.

[www.trncinfo.com/\\_images/belgeler/1/Annan\\_Plan\\_1\\_versiyon\\_1.doc](http://www.trncinfo.com/_images/belgeler/1/Annan_Plan_1_versiyon_1.doc)

<sup>166</sup> Hellenic Republic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Greek Foreign Policy, South-Eastern Europe, The Cyprus Issue*.

<http://www.mfa.gr/www.mfa.gr/en-US/Policy/Geographic+Regions/South-Eastern+Europe/Cyprus/>

<sup>167</sup> Osman Metin Öztürk, *Kıbrıs, Annan belgeleri (1., 2., 3.) Üzerine Değerlendirmeler*, (Ankara: Odak Yay., 2004)

communities would operate through a true power-sharing mechanism and resolve their problems through relevant conflict-resolution mechanisms.<sup>168</sup>

Both communities have been negotiating on different platforms to resolve the Cyprus conflict. Although until today they have not been able to succeed there has and always is hope. Both communities have communicated under UN auspices since 1968.<sup>169xxvii</sup> The UN with its organs as well as various UN Secretary-Generals personally has shown extensive effort to reach a lasting solution.

The latest and the most outstanding effort has been a comprehensive overall agreement proposal to both parties by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, known as the “Annan Plan.”<sup>170</sup> The Annan Plan consisted of four parts, the history of the Cyprus conflict, the evolution of the concept of governance in multi-ethnic societies, the fundamental elements of the Annan Plan—A new hybrid model of confederation and federation and a durable solution for the two ethnically distinct communities.

#### A New Hybrid Model of Confederation and Federation: The Annan Plan

After intensive talks with the leaders of the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot sides, the Annan Plan was proposed to the two sides on November 11, 2002 based on the feedback from the leaders of the two communities. The Plan was later revised and presented to

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<sup>168</sup> Irfan Kalaycı, ed. *Kıbrıs ve Geleceği Ekonomik-Politik Bir Tartışma*, (Ankara: Nobel Yay., 2004)

<sup>169</sup> United Nations, *the Draft Framework Agreement proposed by Secretary General Perez de Cuellar (1985), the Set of Ideas proposed by Secretary General Boutros Ghali (1992).*

[http://www.trncinfo.com/\\_images/belgeler/1/1992%20Gali\\_Fikirler\\_Dizisi.pdf](http://www.trncinfo.com/_images/belgeler/1/1992%20Gali_Fikirler_Dizisi.pdf)

<sup>170</sup> Osman Metin Öztürk, *Kıbrıs, Annan belgeleri (1., 2., 3.) Üzerine Değerlendirmeler*, (Ankara: Odak Yay., 2004)

them twice on December, 10 2002 and February, 26 2003. The third or the last plan is commonly known as the Annan Plan.<sup>171</sup>

The 192-page plan aimed to provide a stable, durable, democratic and multi-ethnic solution to the Cyprus problem with respect to the reality on the island as well as the international law.<sup>172</sup> According to the UN, the Plan offered a balanced solution where the needs and interests of Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot ethnic communities were satisfied in a power-sharing and conflict resolution mechanism. The UN claimed that the Plan was in line with the new idea of governance in multi-ethnic societies.

Article 1 of the Main Articles (MA) of the Annan Plan stated that the Treaty of Guarantee and the treaty of Alliance of the London and Zurich Agreements will remain in force and will apply *mutatis mutandis*<sup>173</sup> to a new “state of affairs.”

In the new state of affairs there would be the United Cyprus Republic, a federal/confederal state and the two constituent states which are the Turkish Cypriot State and the Greek Cypriot State. The status of the relationship between the three actors was modeled on the status of the relationship of Switzerland, its federal government and its Cantons. (MA, Article 2.1 & 2.1.a)<sup>174</sup> According to MA, Article 2.1.a:

Cyprus is a member of the United Nations and has a single international legal personality and sovereignty. The United Cyprus Republic is organized under its Constitution in accordance with the basic principles of law, democracy, representative republican government, political equality, bi-zonality and the equal status of the constituent states.

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<sup>171</sup> United Nations, *the Third Annan Plan*, 26 February 2003.

<sup>172</sup> Ahmet Aydoğdu, *Kıbrıs Sorunu Çözüm Arayışları*, “Annan Planı ve Referandum Süreci”, (Ankara: Ali Yay., 2005), p. 343-375.

<sup>173</sup> *Mutatis mutandis* is a Latin phrase meaning “by changing those things which need to be changed” or simply “the necessary changes having made”. [http://tr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mutatis\\_mutandis](http://tr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mutatis_mutandis)

<sup>174</sup> United Nations, *Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Issue*, 31 March 2004. [http://www.cyprus-un-plan.org/Annan\\_Plan\\_Text1.html](http://www.cyprus-un-plan.org/Annan_Plan_Text1.html)

MA, Article 2.1.c<sup>175</sup> stated that the constituent states of equal status would be able to freely organize themselves under their own constitutions. According to MA, Article 2.2 the external relations was modeled on the Belgian system.<sup>176</sup>

MA, Article 14<sup>177</sup> stated that according to the Constitution of the United Cyprus Republic, the Federal government shall sovereignly exercise legislative and executive functions in twelve topics. These were, the Cypriot citizenship (inc. passports, immigration), external relations (inc. int'l treaties and defense policy), relations with the EU, Central Bank functions (inc. issuance of currency, monetary policy and banking regulations), federal finances (inc. budget, indirect taxation and federal economic-trade policy), natural resources, meteorology, aviation, international navigation and the continental shelf and territorial waters of the United Republic of Cyprus, communications (inc. postal, electronic and telecommunications), combating terrorism, drug trafficking, money laundering and organized crime), pardons and amnesties, intellectual property, weights-measures, antiquities.

The United Cyprus Republic would have a special type of presidential system. A Presidential Council composed of six members with at least one-third from each constituent state would have a President and a Vice President each from a different constituent state who would serve for ten months. The members of the Presidential Council which possessed the executive power would be elected on a single list by a special majority in the Senate and approved by the majority in the Chamber of

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<sup>175</sup> United Nations, *the Annan Plan*.

<sup>176</sup> United Nations, the Third Annan Plan, 26 February 2003.

“The constituent states and the federal government would cooperate and coordinate through Cooperation Agreements and the Constitutional Laws especially in external relations and EU affairs modeled on the Belgian example.” [http://www.trncpresidency.org/press/news/26\\_2\\_2003\\_new\\_plan.doc](http://www.trncpresidency.org/press/news/26_2_2003_new_plan.doc)

<sup>177</sup> Ibid.

Deputies.<sup>178</sup> Although a simple majority would be sufficient in the event of a lack of consensus this majority would require at least one member from each constituent state. Each equal member of the Council would be the head of a department while the heads of the Foreign Affairs and EU Affairs would have to come from different constituent states.<sup>179</sup> A Federal Parliament which would exercise the legislative power would be composed of the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. The Senate would be composed of 24 senators from each side while the Chamber of Deputies from members calculated proportionately according to number of citizens with a minimum twelve from the Turkish Cypriot side.

MA. Article 5.1.b stated that the decisions of the bicameral Parliament would require the approval of both chambers by a simple majority with at least one-quarter of voting senators from each side.

According to MA, Article 6, although each constituent state would have its own courts, the judiciary power of the federal State would be the Supreme Court with three judges from each side as well as three non-Cypriot judges.

MA, Article 30 was one the most crucial topics. According to it, the composition of public service would be proportional to the population of the constituent states but at least one third of the public servants at every level would have to come from each constituent state.

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<sup>178</sup> The Plan states that there will be 24 Senators from the Greek-Cypriot Constituent State and 24 Senators from the Turkish-Cypriot Constituent State. There will be no less than 12 Deputies in the Chamber of Deputies who will come from the Turkish-Cypriot Constituent State.

<sup>179</sup> United Nations, *the Annan Plan*, MA, Article 5.2.b.

MA, Article 8.1.a outlined the Treaty of Guaranty, which would cover independence, territorial integrity, security and constitutional order of both the United Cyprus republic as well as the constituent states.

MA, Article 8.1.b outlined the Treaty of Alliance, which would allow one Turkish and one Greek military contingent not exceeding 6,000 to be stationed on the island.

MA, Article 8.1.f stated that a Monitoring Committee consisting of members from the federal government, the constituent states as well as the guarantor powers chaired by the United Nations would monitor the implementation of the agreement.

The Annan Plan also clearly stated that Cyprus ought to be demilitarized. Each constituent state would have a fixed territory with a clearly defined boundary. There would be one Greek and one Turkish military contingent stationed on the island, which would not exceed 6,000 in number.<sup>180</sup>

The property claims of the displaced persons due to the 1963 and 1974 events would be resolved according to international law, respect for individual rights and the principle of bi-zonality. The requests by displaced people would be administered by a Property Board composed of equal number of members from both sides as well as non-Cypriot members.<sup>181</sup>

Finally, there would be an independent, impartial Reconciliation Commission which would be made of equal number of men and women from each constituent state as well at least one non-Cypriot member. This reconciliation commission would promote tolerance and respect between the two communities on the island.

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<sup>180</sup> United Nations, the Third Annan Plan, MA, Article 8.1.b., 26 February 2003,

<sup>181</sup> United Nations, the Third Annan Plan, MA, Article 10.3: 3, 26 February 2003.

## Annan Plan Referendum, 2004

On April 24, 2004, the two constituent communities in Cyprus held a referendum to settle the longlasting Cyprus dispute.<sup>182</sup> The Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities were asked to choose between ratifying versus rejecting a 5th revision of the Annan Plan. The result was as follows.<sup>183</sup>

Table 6. Voting Results of Annan Referendum

Voting communities	Yes	No	Turnout
Turkish Cypriot Community	64,9%	35,09%	87%
Greek Cypriot Community	24,17%	75,8%	88%

The Greek Cypriot community rejected the plan by a vast majority. The Turkish Cypriot<sup>184</sup> side on the other hand, accepted the plan. Since the implementation of the plan was dependent on its approval by both communities, the Annan Plan became null and void. The Greek Cypriot side of Cyprus or the Republic of Cyprus which is recognized as the legitimate government of the whole island by the international community was admitted and joined the EU. However, if the plan had been ratified by both sides, Cyprus would have entered the EU as a united Cyprus Republic.<sup>185</sup>

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<sup>182</sup> United Nations, *Remarks at the Closing of Cyprus Talks by Secretary-General Kofi Annan*, (Bürgenstock, Switzerland: 31 March 2004)

<sup>183</sup> Claire Palley, *an International Relations Debacle: The UN Secretary-General's Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus 1999-2004*. (Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, 2005), p. 224.

<sup>184</sup> The participation in the referendum of post-1974 Northern Cyprus settlers from mainland Turkey was disputed by many Greek Cypriots, but this was not deemed a matter of relevance to the referendum.

<sup>185</sup> *Ibid.*, Claire Palley.

The European Union states: "In light of Protocol 10 of the Accession Treaty 2003 Cyprus as a whole entered the EU, whereas the *acquis*<sup>186</sup> is suspended in the northern part of the island ("areas not under effective control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus"). This means *inter alia*<sup>187</sup> that these areas are outside the customs and fiscal territory of the EU. The suspension has territorial effect, but does not concern the personal rights of Turkish Cypriots as EU citizens, as they are considered as citizens of the Member State Republic of Cyprus.

#### The Reasons behind the Turkish-Cypriot "Yes" and the Greek-Cypriot "No" Vote

Although the Plan was felt to be pro-Greek on the Turkish Cypriot side, 65 % of the Turkish Cypriot population said "Yes" to the Plan as a means of ending the prolonged international isolation and exclusion from the wider European economy.

The Turkish Cypriot President Rauf Denktaş actively opposed the Plan while the PM Mehmet Ali Talat and the Turkish PM Recep Tayyip Erdoğan favoured the plan's acceptance. Turkey viewed a resolution of the Cyprus issue as being an essential first step to Turkey's EU membership. While there was a great controversy in Turkish political arena, especially MHP, a Turkish centre-right party actively advocated a "no" vote.<sup>188</sup>

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<sup>186</sup> *Acquis* or the term *acquis communautaire*, (EU) is used in European Union law to refer to the total body of EU law accumulated thus far. The term is French: *acquis* means "that which has been acquired", and *communautaire* means "of the community". [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Acquis\\_communautaire](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Acquis_communautaire)

<sup>187</sup> *Inter alia* meaning among other things is a Latin term used in formal extract minutes to indicate that the minute quoted has been taken from a fuller record of other matters, or when alluding to the parent group after quoting a particular example. [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List\\_of\\_Latin\\_phrases:\\_I](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Latin_phrases:_I)

<sup>188</sup> Niyazi Kızılyürek, *Birleşik Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti: Doğmamış Bir Devletin Tarihi*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yay., 2005)

On the other hand, the main reason for the seventy-five percent “No” vote among the Greek Cypriots was their perception that the Annan Plan was unbalanced and excessively pro-Turkish.<sup>189</sup> Many Greek Cypriots opposed the plan considering it as endorsing a confederal state with a weak central government and considerable local autonomy. Any solution other than a return to the status quo ante was deemed unacceptable by many Greek Cypriots. Opinion polls conducted over the entire period of the negotiations had estimated majority of the votes as “No”.

Political leaders in the Republic of Cyprus and Greece influenced the Greek Cypriot vote by a strong opposition to the plan. While the Greek Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis maintained a “neutral” position over the plan, the Greek opposition leader Yorgos Papandreou of the PASOK party urged Cypriots to vote “yes” since the plan had been promoted by his political party while it was still on power. Two days before the referendum, leading Greek-Cypriot party, AKEL, decided to reject the Annan Plan. Although the plan was published on 1 April 2004, it was modified until only 24 hours before the referendum. This brought up allegations that people were being asked to vote on something they had not even seen and whose consequences could not be clearly estimated.

Potential Reasons Cited for the Approval by the Turkish-Cypriots were , reunification due to economic reasons, the Greek Cypriots were no longer perceived as a threat by many Turkish Cypriots, taking into consideration the bi-zonal proposition of the Annan Plan, Turkish Cypriots would receive considerable constitutional power in the United Cyprus Republic that the Annan Plan proposed, over-proportional to their

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<sup>189</sup> Van Coufoudakis, *a Year after the referendum, A year after the EU Accession*, (Washington D.C.: American Hellenic Association, 13-4-2004)  
<http://hellenicnews.com/readnews.html?newsid=3374&lang=US>

percentage of the population, even after territorial cession of some areas to the Greek Cypriot side, the Turkish Cypriot side would still make up about twenty-eight percent of the total area of Cyprus, including large economically important areas that were inhabited exclusively by Greek Cypriots prior to the division of Cyprus in 1974, the possibility of Turkish Cypriots becoming a minority in their respective component state would not exist since the return of Greek Cypriots to their homes in the areas coming under the control of the Turkish Cypriot component state would be strictly limited, Turkey would still have the right to intervene in Cypriot affairs since the guarantor states for the Constitution of Cyprus would retain their powers as such and the Annan Plan did not blame or punish Turkey for the 1974 intervention.

Potential Reasons Cited for the Rejection by the Greek-Cypriots were, Turkey was granted the right of stationing Turkish troops on the island of Cyprus which again threatened full independence.<sup>190</sup>, Turkey obtained bi-zonality provisions, strategic economic benefits, and “security” arrangements, allowing her to intervene militarily which made threatened full independence, the Annan Plan equates the representation of the two major ethnic groups in the proposed Senate and in the Supreme Court giving 50-50 representation to the two communities although the population is divided as % 77 Greek and % 18 Turkish according to 2001 figures,<sup>191</sup> the Supreme Court was to be composed of equal numbers of Greek Cypriot (% 77 of population) and Turkish Cypriot judges (% 18 of population), plus three foreign judges; thus foreign actors would cast deciding votes, the cost of economic reunification which has been estimated as twenty

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<sup>190</sup> Tssos Papadopoulos, *Letter to the U.N. Secretary-General, Kofi Annan*, 7 June 2004.

<sup>191</sup> Republic of Cyprus, *Statistical Service of the Republic of Cyprus*.

[http://www.mof.gov.cy/mof/cystat/statistics.nsf/populationcondition\\_en/populationcondition\\_en?OpenDocument&sub=2&e=](http://www.mof.gov.cy/mof/cystat/statistics.nsf/populationcondition_en/populationcondition_en?OpenDocument&sub=2&e=)

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics\\_of\\_Cyprus](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_Cyprus)

billion dollars would be borne by the Greek Cypriots, Turkey would have constrained United Cyprus Republic's (UCR) economic development by securing provisions in the Law on the Continental Shelf that prevents the UCR from exploring and exploiting maritime resources, the fifth revision of the Annan plan imposed the "Cooperative Agreement on Civil Aviation with Turkey" on Cyprus, the Plan subverted the property rights of the Greek Cypriots of property in the Turkish Cypriot side and by prohibiting recourse to European courts on property issues and withdrawing all pending cases at the European Court of Human Rights and transferring them to local courts.

### Reaction

The Spokesman of the Secretary-General issued a statement on the outcome of the Referanda in Cyprus on April 24, 2004. Following this statement and with the Annan Plan rejected, Rauf Denktaş<sup>192</sup> declared that, his "no" campaign<sup>193</sup> succeeded. He announced that he would not be standing for a 5th presidential term in 2005. Tassos Papadopoulos on the other hand emphasised that Greek Cypriots had rejected the Annan Plan but not all solutions to the Cyprus problem.

There were varied reactions from Cyprus Guarantor Powers, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom. Turkish PM Erdoğan announced that the result spelled an end to Turkish Cypriot isolation and that by rejecting the Annan Plan, Southern Cyprus was the loser. A Greek government spokesman said that efforts to reunite Cyprus should not be halted and that in the EU framework it was in the interest of everyone to continue efforts

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<sup>192</sup> Rauf Denktaş, *Kıbrıs Girit Olmasın*, (İstanbul: Remzi Yayınları, 2004)

<sup>193</sup> Rauf Denktaş, *Yeniden 12'ye 5 Kala*, (İstanbul: Remzi K.Evi, 2005)

to reconcile Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. The British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw responded in pure political terms by saying, “We will respect the choice which Greek Cypriots have expressed today. But I hope that they will continue to reflect on whether this choice is the right one for them.” The international community and particularly those that had worked hard on the Annan Plan and on EU accession arrangements in general were deeply disappointed. Various comments by leading officials can be cited as follows, Annan admitted defeat in Cyprus peacetalks.<sup>194</sup> United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan announced that a unique and historic chance to resolve the Cyprus problem has been missed. The US Congress put the blame on Denktaş for the Collapse of Peace Efforts. Some critics argued that if Annan had been more closely involved in the details, [he] would not have wished his name to be historically associated with such departures from international law and human rights standards.<sup>195</sup> One of the headlines said that a significant opportunity to reach an agreed settlement was lost as a result of the conduct of the UN Secretariat, advised by the USA and the UK.<sup>196</sup> Some others cited that if the Greek-Cypriots say “No” to the Annan Plan, they would take them to a new referendum, until they say “Yes”<sup>197, 198</sup> The European Commission announced that it deeply regrets that the Greek Cypriot community did not approve the comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem, but it respects the democratic decision of the people. The European Commissioner for Enlargement Günter Verheugen announced that,

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<sup>194</sup> United Nations, *Statement issued by the Spokesman of the Secretary-General on the outcome of the referenda in Cyprus*, 24-4-2004.

<sup>195</sup> Claire Palley, *an International Relations Debacle: The UN Secretary-General's Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus 1999-2004*. (Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, 2005),

<sup>196</sup> Ibid.

<sup>197</sup> Lord Hanney, the British architect of the Annan Plan.

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David\\_Hannay,\\_Baron\\_Hannay\\_of\\_Chiswick](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Hannay,_Baron_Hannay_of_Chiswick)

<sup>198</sup> Ibid., Claire Palley.

I feel cheated by the Greek Cypriot government... There is a shadow now over the accession of Cyprus. What we will seriously consider now is finding a way to end the economic isolation of the Turkish Cypriots.

US State Department Spokesman Richard Boucher said that,

We are disappointed that a majority of Greek Cypriots voted against the settlement plan. Failure of the referendum in the Greek Cypriot community is a setback to the hopes of those on the island who voted for the settlement and to the international community.

Finally, Secretary-General Kofi Annan issued his report addressed to the United Nations Security Council on his mission of good offices in Cyprus on May 28, 2004.

This report which analyzed the Annan Plan and the process undergone in detail is of great historical importance<sup>199</sup>

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<sup>199</sup> United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus, 28-5-2004.*

## CHAPTER 4

### POST-EARTHQUAKE RAPPROCHEMENT AND DEVELOPMENTS

#### Historical Background

Greece was the first country that declared its independence, thus opening the gate to the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. After the Empire collapsed, the Turks won their War of Independence against the major powers of the World namely Great Britain, France, Italy and the Greeks. Turks led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk established the modern Turkish Republic. Victory in the Turkish War of Independence is associated with the Asia Minor Catastrophe for the Greeks. Therefore the antagonism and conflict between Turkey and Greece has deep historical roots since both states link their existence and identity to past experiences associated with the negative image of each other.<sup>200</sup>

The present status quo concerning the Turkish-Greek relations was established following WWI, the Turkish War of Independence and WWII. The Treaty of Lausanne signed in 1923 distinguished the borders of the two countries. Turkey and Greece are neighbors in the south-east Mediterranean and the Balkans Peninsula. Turkey and Greece have been Allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) since 1952.<sup>201</sup> They are both major actors in economic, political and military terms in this part of the World geography.

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<sup>200</sup> Stephan Larrabee and Ian Lesser, *Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of Uncertainty*, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002), p.73.

<sup>201</sup> Lord Ismay, *NATO: The First Five Years 1949-1954*, (Paris, n.p., 1954), p. 39-40.  
<http://www.nato.int/cv/secgen/ismay.htm>

Turkey and Greece have engaged in War twice in the twentieth century. Turkish-Greek relations have passed through many controversial phases. Numerous crises in the Aegean and Cyprus, twice every decade since 1955 have brought the two countries close to war and led them to a costly arms race to establish a favorable balance of power. The latest and the most serious crisis of the twentieth century occurred in 1996 over the Imia (Kardak) rocks. Naturally, the tension between the two states is a significant threat to regional stability and security.<sup>202</sup>

Contrary to the general trend, Turkish and Greek bilateral relations have experienced infrequent and relatively short periods of détente and rapprochement. These are Atatürk-Venizelos initiative of early 1930s, the early Cold War attempts of 1949-1952 when the two countries as the beneficiaries of the Truman Doctrine joined NATO and the Özal-Papandreou attempt of late 1980s.

The latest rapprochement was initiated by the Turkish and Greek PMs Ecevit and Simitis. In accordance, Foreign Ministers Cem and Papandreou communicated closely during the Kosovo crisis in 1999. This effort gained momentum following the September 1999 earthquakes that hit both countries. The earthquake diplomacy which was named after the mutual cooperation due to the disasters was accompanied by an unexpected shift in Greek policy towards Turkey's candidacy in the European Union.

In terms of a historical perspective there are three distinct cases of Turkish-Greek rapprochement. These are Atatürk-Venizelos initiative of early 1930s, the early Cold War attempts of 1949-1952 and the Özal-Papandreou attempt of the late 1980s.

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<sup>202</sup> Samuel Huntington, *the Class of Civilization and the Remaking of the World Order*, (New York, Simon&Schuster, 1996), p. 315.

## The Atatürk –Venizelos Initiative: 1930 – 1942

Although the Lausanne Treaty<sup>203</sup> established the status quo and the border arrangement between Turkey and Greece, there were still issues waiting to be resolved. According to Lausanne, a compulsory exchange of populations took place.<sup>204</sup> This population exchange covered 1,250,000 Greeks and 500,000 Turks with the exception of Greek orthodox population of İstanbul, Gökçeada, Bozcaada and the Turks of Western Thrace. This population exchange was reflected to the issue of financial compensation for property losses. A joint committee established by the Article 11 of Lausanne Treaty failed to reach a settlement and by 1928 the dialogue between the two countries was totally cancelled. The Naval arms race in the Aegean started again and the idea of a potential Turkish-Greek war was acclaimed by the international community.

Eleftherios Venizelos, the Greek negotiator in Lausanne took a revolutionary step in bilateral relations during the 1928 electoral campaign. His new foreign policy approach based on 4 pillars was announced in Thessalonica on July 22, 1928.<sup>205</sup> These pillars, were, first, respect for the territorial status quo,<sup>206</sup> and second, the establishment of friendly relations with neighboring countries. Third, reciprocal avoidance of foreign conflicts/disputes, and last reconciliation with Turkey.

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<sup>203</sup>The Lausanne Treaty is accepted as an overall success for Turkey. However there are also views stating that inspite of the victory against the invading Greeks on the battlefield, Turkey made major sacrifices on the diplomacy table by accepting Greek sovereignty over Western Thrace and the Aegean Islands except Gökçeada (Imbros) and Bozcaada (Tenedos). See, Seha L. Meray, *Lozan Barış Konferansı, Tutanaklar-Belgeler*, (İstanbul: YKY, 1993)

<sup>204</sup> Ibid.

<sup>205</sup> Damla Demirözü, *Savaştan Barışa Giden Yol : Atatürk-Venizelos Dönemi Türkiye-Yunanistan İlişkileri*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2007)

<sup>206</sup> This could be analyzed as an end to the Megali Idea which aimed to unite all Greek speaking areas which included Aegean coast of Anatolia, the Black Sea coast and parts of inner Anatolia into a central state called the greater Greece. See, “Dostluk Dönemi (1928-1939”, Baskın Oran (ed.), *Türk Dış*

Following the election victory, Venizelos and his party became the dominant political power in Greece.<sup>207</sup> He sent a letter<sup>xxviii</sup> addressed to Turkish Foreign Minister, Tevfik Rüştü Aras and PM İsmet İnönü noting that it was of mutual benefit for Turkey and Greece to develop friendly and trustworthy relations.<sup>208</sup> His letter was replied to by İnönü, who stated that the Turkish side shared the same ideas.<sup>209</sup> In his letter, İnönü also stated the Turkish demand for economic compensation. Later on, the compensation issue was resolved when the Economic Pact covering other major economic issues between Turkey and Greece as well as the compensations was signed on June 10, 1930.<sup>210</sup>

Despite strong domestic reactions in Greece, Venizelos stood his ground. His famous words were “... public opinion when not favorable, I tend to educate it and not be influenced by it.”<sup>211</sup> Greek PM Venizelos visited Ankara in October 1930 and a number of accords were concluded. These accords included a Pact of Friendship, Arbitration and Reconciliation, a Naval Armaments Protocol and a Commercial and Settlement Pact. In return, Turkish PM İnönü visited Athens in October 1931.

The development of bilateral relations came to life in four Balkan Conferences held between Turkey, Greece and other Balkan countries. These were Athens (1930), İstanbul (1931), Bucharest (1932), Thessalonica (1933). In time these positive developments led to the establishment of “entente cordial” which meant that both

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*Politikası, Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar*, Cilt 1, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2009), p. 344-356.

<sup>207</sup> Venizelos’s liberal party won the majority of votes and the seats in the Parliament as well as the Senate. See, Damla Demiröz, *Savaşın Barışa Giden Yol : Atatürk-Venizelos Dönemi Türkiye-Yunanistan ilişkileri*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2007)

<sup>208</sup> Ibid.

<sup>209</sup> Ibid.

<sup>210</sup> Baskın Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası, Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar*, Cilt 1, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2009), p. 346.

<sup>211</sup> Ibid., Damla Demiröz.

countries guaranteed their common frontier in Thrace.<sup>212</sup> Another positive outcome of these conferences was that they enabled the formation of the Balkan Pact between Turkey, Greece, Romania and Yugoslavia in 1934.

According to the Pact, in case of an attack by a third party, they would collectively guarantee the frontiers of the attacked state. The Pact was influential in 1935 when Greece had problems with Bulgaria.

The Venizelos initiative was followed by his successor Panagis Tsaldaris government after the March 10, 1933 elections. The Ankara Friendship Pact, which aimed at the defense of Greek and Turkish Thrace, was signed in September 1933.<sup>213</sup>

The rapprochement process was the result of both Turkey's and Greece's politics and strategies. The expectations and realities of both states led to a mutual development of relations. According to many scholars, the Venizelos initiative had two main political reasons. According to the Greeks, the first one was to guarantee the status and the rights of the Greek-Orthodox minority and the second was to establish a Greek-Turkish coalition to balance revisionist Bulgaria. Turkey on the other hand also had a strategy.

On the Turkish side, the motives were different. According to Bernard Lewis, Atatürk deliberately limited his actions and aspirations to the national territory of Turkey as defined by the Lausanne Treaty and devoted the rest of his life to the task of Turkey's reconstruction.<sup>214</sup>

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<sup>212</sup> "Balkan Antantı", Baskın Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası, Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar*, Cilt 1, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2009), p. 350-351.

<sup>213</sup> "Türk-Yunan İlişkilerinin Doruğu: 1933 Samimi Anlaşma Belgesi", Baskın Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası, Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar*, Cilt 1, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2009), p. 349-350.

<sup>214</sup> Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, (New York,: Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 250.

In the latter periods, the rapprochement with Greece could also be seen as a part of the general shift in Turkish foreign policy which steered itself into closer ties with the Western World without breaking the links with Moscow. In general terms, Naoum suggests that the Turkish-Greek rapprochement of 1930's had four major reasons to be successful.<sup>215</sup> First, Turkey and Greece had strong governments headed by dominant leaders who could make radical moves free from domestic politics.<sup>216</sup> Second, the international climate was positive and reinforcing for Turkish-Greek peace efforts. Third, the development of bilateral relations was a necessity for common security interests. Last, instead of keeping the tension high, both countries had to concentrate on domestic restructuring.

Following Atatürk's death and the beginning of WW II, Turkish-Greek relations began to decline. The Greek side, insisting that this was mainly due to the change in Turkey's foreign policy,<sup>217</sup> accused Turkey for acting opportunistic in its negotiations with the Allies as well as the Axis Countries.

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<sup>215</sup> Michael Naoum, "*The Greek-Turkish Rapprochement Process, 1999-2004: Paradigm Shift or Epiphenomenon*", (Thesis, Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2004)

<sup>216</sup> Atatürk was a keen supporter of Turkish-Greek rapprochement. See, Damla Demiröz, *Savaştan Barışa Giden Yol : Atatürk-Venizelos Dönemi Türkiye-Yunanistan ilişkileri*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2007)

<sup>217</sup> There are different descriptions for the Turkish Foreign Policy of the era. Some describe it as realistic policy, aimed at preserving the status-quo while some others describe it as opportunistic. See, Faruk Sönmezoğlu, "II. Dünya Savaşı Döneminde Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası," In Faruk Sönmezoğlu, ed. *Türk Dış Politikasının Analizi*, (İstanbul: Der Yayınları, 1994), p. 79-89.

## The Early Cold-War Period: 1947 – 1955

The situation at the end of WW II was turmoil in the Balkans. Turkey was facing a Soviet threat to revise the Status of Turkish Straits<sup>218</sup> while Greece was trying to fight communist territorial demands. The British affected by the financial burden of the WW, cut its Aid Program to Greece and Turkey and made the situation even more fragile.

Soviet policies led the US to develop and implement a set of policies called the Truman Doctrine to fight the Communist spread into Europe.<sup>219</sup> As an outcome of the Truman Doctrine, a joint committee aiming to promote Turkish-Greek cooperation was set up. Military cooperation was followed by economic and cultural agreements. The Turkish-Greek Cooperation was encouraged and supported by the US and Great Britain.

The final and most important phase of this period was signified by the attempts of Turkey and Greece to become NATO members<sup>xxix</sup>. Although the issue had already been under consideration, it got hot in 1951. The admission of both countries would evidently have positive effects for NATO since it would strengthen the Southern part of the alliance as well as the transatlantic Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC). Turkey and Greece renewed their applications in 1951 and furthermore decided to send troops under the UN Flag in Korea. They both believed that in order to balance Communist threat and to receive support to become NATO members, the Korean War was a big opportunity.<sup>220</sup>

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<sup>218</sup> Rifat Uçarol, *Siyasi Tarih: (1789-1999)*, (İstanbul: Filiz Kitabevi, 1985), p. 499-522 and 544.

<sup>219</sup> Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p. 453.

<sup>220</sup> Baskın Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası, Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar*, (İstanbul, İletişim, 2009), p. 545-547.

Turkey and Greece became formal members of the NATO Alliance in February 1952 as a part of the first enlargement process as expressed in Article 10.<sup>xxx221</sup> This led to further improvement of Turkish-Greek relations. Official visits at all military and governmental levels were exchanged. The Greek King visited Ankara in June 1952. Turkish PM, Celal Bayar visited Athens in January 1954 followed by his counterpart Greek PM, Papagos.

Later on regional cooperation as well as encouragement by the US<sup>xxx</sup> led to the signing of an “Agreement on Friendship and Cooperation” between Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia in 1953. This agreement transformed into the 2<sup>nd</sup> Balkan States Defense Pact in 1954. The idea evaporated with the improvement of Russian-Yugoslav relations after 1955.

The positive atmosphere in Turkish-Greek relations was once again abruptly changed in September 1955. Riots erupted against the Greek-Orthodox minority in İstanbul leading to looting, destruction of houses, stores and loss of life.<sup>222</sup> It all was started by a rumour that Atatürk’s birthplace in Thessaloniki had been bombed by Greeks. The riots fueled by Nationalistic Citizen’s Association led by Hürriyet newspaper editor Hikmet Bil expanded rapidly. The September 5-6, 1955 incident has been one of the most controversial catastrophes in Turkish political and social life and it’s still debated whether some Menderes government officials were or not involved in the incident to distract public attention away from the domestic politics.<sup>223</sup>

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<sup>221</sup> NATO, *NATO Basic Texts*, [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official\\_texts\\_17120.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm)  
[http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official\\_texts\\_17245.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17245.htm)

<sup>222</sup> Hasan İzzettin Dinamo, *6-7 Eylül Kasırgası*, (İstanbul: Osmanbey, 1971)

<sup>223</sup> Ibid.

The events of September 1955 had major impacts on the ongoing negotiations on the Cyprus issue. The London Conference on Cyprus, which held discussions among Turkey, Greece and the United Kingdom, was deeply affected by these events. So by and large the Turkish-Greek cooperation after WW II was the result of a set of international developments rather than local necessities. It succeeded to a certain extent due to; first, the will of both Turkey and Greece to join NATO and second, the existence of a Communist Soviet threat. Third, the influence generated by the US and Great Britain motivated to fight Communism. September 1955 events as well as the Cyprus issue put an end to the second Turkish-Greek rapprochement process after the WW II.

#### The Late Cold-War Period: 1988 - 1989

The long-lasting issue of the Aegean Continental Shelf once again was brought to the top of the agenda in January 1987. Turkey and Greece were the counterparts of another crisis over the oil exploitation rights in the Aegean seabed.<sup>224</sup> The important aspect of the crisis was that it took place just before Turkey's official EU membership application on 14 April 1987.

On February 27, 1987 Greek Deputy Foreign Minister Kapsis declared to Turkish Ambassador Akıman that Greece no longer accepted the Berne Treaty and would explore for oil in the Aegean. In response to the Turkish notification of March 1 stating that Turkey held the right to retaliate, Greece announced that a military exercise would be carried out on March 19. The Turkish National Security Council decided to

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<sup>224</sup> Baskın Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası; Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, Cilt: 2(1980-2001)*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2009)

recommend the government send the Turkish exploration ship Sismik 1 to the Aegean. Turkish and Greek Armed Forces were alarmed. Papandreou asked for political support from Bulgaria's Jivkov. NATO members and the U.S.A especially were anxious. This crisis got so severe that the two countries were about to go to war. The U.K. tried to intervene. Turkish PM Özal, who was in England, declared that Turkey would not step back unless Greece stepped back. Upon Özal's solid declaration, Greece made a statement that Turkey had misunderstood. This statement declined the tension and both countries declared that they would keep their ships within their territorial waters.

The usual form of Turkish-Greek relations was the start of a dialogue process following major crises. The March 1987 crisis had a similar outcome. Uncovered written communication between the PM's during the crisis led to the formation of dialogue. Papandreou congratulated Özal upon his November 1987 election victory, stating that he was ready for a meeting without an agenda. This led the way to Davos.<sup>225</sup>

In January 1988 Turkish and Greek PMs met during the Davos meetings of the World Economic Forum. They came together twice and at the end released a joint communiqué which stated that it was of mutual benefit to avoid confrontations that might create hostilities between the two countries. Paragraph 3<sup>226</sup> of the communiqué was especially, important since it revealed the intention of both Turkey and Greece. It stated that, the PM's (...) further elaborated on the recent crisis in the Aegean which brought the two countries at the brink of war, expressed at the same time their optimism introduced as the consequence of exchanged messages between them. They agreed that

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<sup>225</sup> Baskin Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası; Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, Cilt: 2(1980-2001)*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001), p. 113-114.

<sup>226</sup> Greek-Turkish Communique, January 31, 1988 at Davos, Switzerland

from now on such a crisis should never be repeated and both sides must concentrate their efforts vfor establishment of lasting peaceful relations.

This momentum in bilateral relations was thereafter called “the spirit of Davos”. As a result 3 major developments took place. First, a political committee was set up to define the problematic areas and find long-lasting solutions. Second, an economic committee was set up to promote economic cooperation in areas such as tourism and trade. Last, a direct phoneline (redline) was established between Ankara and Athens.

Both countries made positive gestures to emphasize the importance they attributed to the spirit of Davos. Turkey lifted the visa requirement for Greek citizens<sup>227</sup> and abolished a 1964 decree that restricted the property rights of Greek nationals in Turkey. Greece, on the other hand, lifted its objections for the re-activation of the 1964 Association Agreement between Turkey and the European Union.<sup>xxxii</sup>

One major accomplishment of the process took place in May 1988 when an agreement on confidence building measures (CBM's) was concluded, based on a Memorandum of Understanding.<sup>228</sup> This Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), included a pledge by the two parties “... to respect the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of each other and their rights to use the high seas and international airspace of the Aegean.” Later on Foreign Ministers Yılmaz and Papoulias signed a document of “Guidelines for the Prevention of Accidents and Incidents on the High Seas and International Airspace.” The highpoint of the Davos Spirit was Turkish PM Turgut Özal’s visit to Athens in May 1988. Although there are conflicting views whether this visit was successful or not, it was important for being the first visit between two

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<sup>227</sup> Selim EGELİ, Interview by the author, İstanbul, 29 January 2010. Turkish-Greek Business Council, Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEİK), İstanbul, Turkey.

<sup>228</sup> Memorandum of Understanding, May 27, 1988.

neighboring countries in thirty-five years. Although Greek PM Papandreou had scheduled a reciprocal visit to Ankara later that year, he could not come since he got sick and was hospitalized in England.<sup>229</sup>

While this positive atmosphere existed, the public opinion the two countries continued the old routine in various platforms. They both vetoed each other's country chapter at the NATO Defense Committee, Greece objected to the exclusion of Mersin Port in the Conventional Forces in the Europe Treaty in the frame of CSCE<sup>xxxiii</sup> and finally dogfights continued between the Turkish and Greek Air Forces.

The Davos Spirit showed that Greece and PM Papandreou had changed their foreign policies especially those pertaining to relations with Turkey. According to some critics, Papandreou who was elected as PM in 1981 led a rather "independent" foreign policy with a strong anti-west and anti-NATO rhetoric. Later on, this policy seemed to transform into a more pragmatic one. Various reasons seemed to attribute Papandreou, a triumph of personal diplomacy in Davos. First, he realized that Greece had almost got into war which would have had a huge negative effect on the Greek economy. Second, the rapprochement would certainly have a positive effect on the Turkish-Cypriot side in relation with the Cyprus problem. Finally, the rapprochement provided an opportunity to solve regional problems through cooperative initiatives.

Özal, on the other hand, had come to power with forty-five percent of the votes in November 1983 in the first democratic elections which followed the 1980 military coup. He followed a reformist program based on free-trade and a liberal economy. When he was re-elected in November 1987, he made it clear that the final aim of the liberalization program was to become a full-member of the European Union.

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<sup>229</sup>Milliyet, 26-6-1989.

Özal desired to establish good relations with all neighbors especially with Greece. He believed that, if the bureaucracy and the military authority could be overcome in certain ways, it would be possible to re-establish positive relations with Greece.

The Davos process was based on the personal initiatives and conduct of Özal and Papandreou. It was a top-down approach in diplomatic terms where the leadership initiative would be followed by the bureaucracy and the mass media. Papandreou was accused of abandoning the Cyprus issue and taking steps without having any reciprocal answers from the Turkish side.<sup>230</sup> The rapprochement process was only backed by thirty percent of the Greek public.<sup>231</sup> Due to his long-lasting sickness and the financial scandals of 1989, the process could not be sustainable in domestic politics.<sup>232</sup>

The situation was similar in Turkey. Özal, while submitting an olive branch to Greece, made moves which drew reactions in Greece. Turkey supported Denktaş's decision to suspend negotiations with the Greek-Cypriots and the rejection of the Perez de Cuellar Plan. As a result the Davos Spirit did not last for long. Both Turkey and Greece played their role to undermine the rapprochement process and finally it was over by the early 1990s.

The termination of the Davos Spirit shows that, the Turkish-Greek rapprochement and détente attempts have similar characteristics. First of all, a strong, stable government and a strong leadership in both countries is a prerequisite. Strong leaders take the responsibility of diplomatic steps as well as the pressure exerted by the

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<sup>230</sup> Vamık Volkan and Norman Itzkowitz, *Turks and Greeks: Neighbors in Conflict*, (Huntingdon: Eothen Press, 1994), p. 159-160.

<sup>231</sup> Mustafa Aydın and Kostas Ifantis, eds. *Turkish - Greek Relations: The Security Dilemma in The Aegean*, (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), p. 32.

<sup>232</sup> *Milliyet*, 8-3-1989.

public opinion and bureaucracy at such times. Secondly, mutually shared national interests or at least not opposite national interests are important to enhance the likelihood of rapprochement processes.

In the first rapprochement period, Atatürk and Venizelos were both dominant leaders. During the second attempt, the Soviet threat provided a major opportunity for both countries to turn West by joining NATO. This enabled them to modernize their armies and guarantee territorial integrity. Finally, in the Özal-Papandreou event, both Turkey and Greece were facing financial difficulties and it would have resulted in drastic outcomes if the countries were to engage in war which according to critics seemed very close.

The dissolution of the three Turkish-Greek rapprochements also reflects similar reasons. Apart from the leadership, the attitudes of the diplomatic and military bureaucracy in both countries certainly did not contribute as they should have to the extending the initiatives due to longlasting antagonism and rivalry. Conflicting national interests had a negative effect too. To sum up, when the leaders who initiated and took the burdens of such initiatives lost power or disappeared due to natural reasons from the politics, rapprochement efforts could not be sustained, as in the case when Papandreou experienced health problems.

## Post-Earthquake Rapprochement: 1999 - 2004

The earthquakes that hit Turkey and Greece were not the sole reason behind the 1999 initiative. There were a series of events and the efforts of politicians that provided the necessary preconditions for the reconciliation. To understand the political stage we should look at the aftermath of the Kardak (Imia) crisis.<sup>233</sup> During this crisis, Turkey and Greece came to the brink of war and the crisis could only be de-escalated by US efforts that included President Clinton personally.

### The Pre-Earthquake Period: 1999

#### The Madrid Declaration and the 1997 Crete Meeting

Turkish President Demirel and Greek PM Simitis announced the Madrid Declaration during the Madrid NATO Summit in 8 July 1997. This declaration which was highly influenced by the U.S. and its Foreign Minister Albright was a roadmap to reduce the heightened tension in the Aegean following the Imia/Kardak crisis. The three principles of the declaration stated that, first each country is committed to settle their disputes by peaceful means according to mutual consent and without the use or threat of force.<sup>234</sup> Second, in order to avoid conflicts arising from misunderstanding, each country should avoid unilateral acts. Last, each country should respect the other's legitimate and vital interests and concerns in the Aegean.

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<sup>233</sup> Erdem Denk, *Egemenliđi Tartışmalı Adalar: Karşılaştırmalı Bir Çalışma*, (Ankara: Mülkiyeliler Birliđi Vakfı Yay., 1999)

<sup>234</sup> Milliyet, 9-7-1997.

Following the Madrid Declaration, PMs Yılmaz and Simitis met in Crete during the 1997 Balkan Countries Conference. The meeting was not fruitful in terms of reducing the tension between the two countries and mixed messages were conveyed. PM Yılmaz declared in December 1997 that Ankara will intensify integration with the Turkish-Cypriots.<sup>235</sup>

### The Öcalan Case and Kosovo Incident

The capture of PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan<sup>236</sup> and the NATO Kosovo Air Campaign to stop the ethnic cleansing of Albanian population by the Serbs were two major events leading to Turkish-Greek rapprochement. Öcalan was arrested in February 1999 upon leaving the Greek consulate in Kenya. After Turkey had declared its intention to Syria, concerning the hosting of the terrorist leader, he had to leave for a journey covering Russia, Greece, Italy and Kenya. The Greek political and diplomatic authorities were heavily involved in the issue. When nobody accepted Öcalan as a political refugee, Greece too was under Turkish pressure to deport him.

The final solution found by Greek authorities was to send him to Kenya so as to find a destination which would accept him. He was arrested on the way to the airport.<sup>237</sup>

Upon his capture, Turkish PM Demirel declared that,

...Greece is continuing support to PKK terrorist organization represents nothing but a grave violation of international law...Greece has proven that it does not belong to the civilized world. Accordingly, it should be put on the list of the

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<sup>235</sup> Milliyet, 15-12-1997.

<sup>236</sup> Tuncay Özkan, *Operasyon*, (İstanbul, Doğan Kitap, 2000)

<sup>237</sup> Ibid.

countries supporting terrorism and harboring terrorists. Such a country can only be defined as a “rogue state”<sup>238</sup>

Internationally as well as domestically speaking, Greece was influenced heavily by its acts concerning the Öcalan issue. The pressure exerted upon resulted in the resignation of Foreign Minister Theodoros Pangalos from office due to role he acquired in the scandal.<sup>239</sup> Yet this brought along a positive outcome. PM Simitis appointed George Papandreou as the new Foreign Minister. This appointment was a milestone for Turkish-Greek relations since Mr. Papandreou has shown to be sincere in his attempts to initiate a new era in Turkish-Greek relations.

An important aspect of the latest Turkish-Greece rapprochement has been the Kosovo crisis. The Serbian Milosevic government’s campaign against the Albanians of the Serbian province of Kosova created a major international crisis. Albanians constituted a large portion of the population began fleeing Kosova. NATO, taking responsibility, started an air campaign over Kosova and put an end to the crisis. Taking into consideration NATO’s major effect, this was the crucial moment for Turkey and Greece to start a détente since none was willing to cope with the effect of the conflict. Such an outcome would mean a change in the boundaries creating a major destabilization process in the region.<sup>240</sup>

At these stages, the Foreign Ministers of Turkey and Greece, İsmail Cem<sup>241</sup> and George Papandreou<sup>242</sup> exchanged a series of letters in June 1999 stressing the

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<sup>238</sup> Milliyet, 23 February 1999.

<sup>239</sup> Hürriyet, 19-2-1999.

<sup>240</sup> Hürriyet, 24-3-1999.

<sup>241</sup> İsmail Cem, Letter from Foreign Minister of the Republic of Turkey, to Mr. George Papandreou, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Greece, Ankara, 24-5-1999, available from, <http://www.turkishgreek.org/mektupla.htm>

importance of enhancing the relations. The initiative led by Foreign Minister Cem was responded by Foreign Minister Papandreou suggesting that, "...cooperation in several fields such as culture, tourism and economics rather than sensitive issues should be amongst the topics of communications...."

### The Earthquake Diplomacy

In August 1999 a major earthquake hit the Marmara region of Turkey. Thousands of people were killed and huge material loss was realized. Greece was one the countries that responded to this natural disaster and sent search and rescue teams and material support. In September 1999, a less destructive earthquake hit Greece. Turkey acted similarly and assisted Greece in overcoming the aftermath of the disaster.<sup>243</sup> The mutual support of Turkey and Greece during the earthquake disasters had a major psychological impact on the populations of both countries creating a positive atmosphere amongst the communities as well as the politicians.

The diplomatic initiatives of this period have acquired the name of "earthquake" diplomacy. This was a qualitative difference between the last two rapprochement efforts since the previous one of 1980s was merely in the political arena whereas the last one involved the public opinion as well. In parallel to the previous efforts here too, the personal efforts and influences of statesmen surpassed diplomatic and military bureaucracy's difficulties and limitations.

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<sup>242</sup> George Papandreou, Letter from Foreign Minister of the Republic of Greece, to İsmail Cem, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Turkey, Athens, 25-6-1999 available from, <http://www.turkishgreek.org/mektupla.htm>

<sup>243</sup> BBC News Europe, 9-9-1999.

The two Foreign Ministers made reciprocal visits to Ankara and Athens in January and February of 2000, respectively. Nine agreements were signed concerning on issues of low politics. These were Economic Cooperation, Cooperation and mutual Assistance between customs Administrations, Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments, Cooperation in the field of Tourism, Cultural Cooperation Cooperation in Science and Technology, Maritime Transport, Cooperation on Environmental Protection, Combating Terrorism, Organized Crime, Drug Trafficking and illegal Immigration.<sup>244</sup>

### Post-Earthquake Relations

#### Economic Relations

The development of bilateral relations, together with the positive governmental intentions led to a two-track diplomacy.<sup>xxxiv</sup> The main actor of this initiative was the Turkish-Greek Business Partnership Council was re-activated in September 1999. In addition various other social and business groups worked to promote peace between Turkey and Greece. The results have been astonishing. Turkish-Greek Foreign Trade, which was around \$ 400 millions in 1995, reached \$ 1,350 million in 2003 and \$ 3.580 million in 2008. The “Agreement on the Avoidance of double Taxation” signed in Ankara on December 2003<sup>245</sup> is one of the key factors contributing to the increase in trade volume.

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<sup>244</sup> Hellenic Republic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, [www.mfa.gr](http://www.mfa.gr)

<sup>245</sup> Hellenic Republic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, [www.mfa.gr](http://www.mfa.gr)

Table 7. Turkey's Exports-Imports to Greece

(mio USD)

Year	Exports		Imports		Diff.	Foreign Trade	
	Total	Change	Total	Change		Total	Change
1990	139,4		128,6		10,8	268	
1995	209,9	24,5	200,6	90,9	9,3	410,5	50,2
2000	437,7	7,6	430,8	49,8	6,9	868,5	25,1
2005	1126,7	-3,8	727,8	22,5	398,8	1854,5	5
2008	2430,5	7,4	1148,6	20,9	1281,9	3579,2	11,4

Source: Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade

Another area reflecting the improvement of bilateral relations is tourism. The number of tourists visiting both countries has increased significantly following the 1999 rapprochement process. Especially the Greek tourists visiting Turkey increased five times between 2001 and 2005.

Table 8. Number of Turkish and Greek Tourists

YEARS	# GREEK TOURISTS
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2001	197,258
2002	280,033
2003	393,397
2004	458,417
2005	584,952
2006	460,656
2007	447,900
2008	572,212

YEARS	# TURKISH TOURISTS
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2001	114,354
2002	139,018

Source: Republic of Turkey Ministry of Culture and Tourism

## NATO and Strategic Defense Issues

Turkey and Greece had the highest defense budgets within the NATO during the last quarter of twentieth century. This arms race was basically due to the “security dilemma” between the two countries. To slow down the arms race and to reduce arms spending, the 1999 rapprochement was further enhanced when Turkey and Greece agreed on a set of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) on October 2000. These CBM’s were at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Political Directors level as well as within NATO. Political Directors agreed on eight CBM’s.<sup>246</sup>

These were, the establishment of a direct phone line between the two Ministers of Defense, the establishment of direct communication channels at the foreign Ministry, the exchange of visits between General Staff officers, the exchange of invitations to attend large-scale military exercises, the exchange of visits of students of the military academies, the exchange of views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning military matters, the establishment of telemedicine connection between military hospitals and the cooperation in preventing the pollution of River Evros.

Later on, in 2003, further CBM’s were established under NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson’s<sup>247</sup> auspices which included exchange of military personnel, cooperation between mutual Defense Colleges and notification of exercise schedules. These CBM’s were implemented in the natural cause of international relations. For the first time after three decades, Turkey and Greece participated in the “Dynamic Mix”

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<sup>246</sup> Hellenic Republic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, [www.mfa.gr](http://www.mfa.gr)

<sup>247</sup> NATO, *Statement by the Secretary General of NATO*, NATO Press Releases, 23 July 2003.

NATO exercise of 2000.<sup>248</sup> In March 2003, a hijacked THY plane was handed over after it had landed at Athens International Airport following the cooperation of Combined Air Operations Center 6 (in İzmir) and 7 (in Larissa)<sup>249</sup>

Table 9. Turkey's Defense Spending (% to GNP), SIPRI Yearbook

	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989
	4.3	4.9	5.2	4.8	4.4	4.5	4.8	4.2	3.8	3.3
	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
% in GNP	3.5	3.7	3.7	3.8	4.1	3.9	4.1	4.1	4.4	5.6
\$ billions	5.5	5.6	5.9	6.5	6.4	6.6	7.3	7.7	8	9.5

Source: Sipri Yearbook

Once the rapprochement process was initiated, tensions began to ease. On April 2001, Greece terminated by decree the state of war and the mobilization of armed forces dating from 1974. Greece and Turkey reduced major defense procurement programs several times thus leading to a more stable political atmosphere. In 2003, Greece expressed its goal to reduce arms expenditure from four point nine of GDP and stabilize it to an average of two point seven for the period 2010-2015.<sup>250</sup> On May 2004, the Defense Ministers of Turkey and Greece, announced their intention to cut military spending by an average of five percent each year in line with the pre-election consensus between PM Erdoğan and Karamanlis.

<sup>248</sup> "Exercise Dynamic Mix-2000," AFSOUTH

<sup>249</sup> Milliyet, 29-3-2003.

<sup>250</sup> Hellenic Ministry of National Defense, Press Statement, Athens.

Even though the decision to reduce defense spending reflects an effort for mutual confidence building, economic considerations also play an important role. Greek considerations seemed to be mainly due to two reasons. The first is the fear that the high defense budget could undermine economic stability and growth potential and the second being the unexpected cost for the 2004 Summer Olympics. For Turkey, the economic circumstances after the 2001 crisis required tight financial planning.

### The European Union Effect

Turkey and Greece have been associate members to the European Economic Community (EEC) since 1962 and 1963, respectively. Greece became a full member in 1981 whereas Turkey applied for full membership as late as 1987. Greek foreign policy between 1981 and 1990 was distinctive for Greece using EU membership as a tool against Turkey. Greece often tried to force Turkey to change its Cyprus policy by creating difficulties as well as threatening other EU members with using its veto power.<sup>251</sup> In the early 1990s, Greece changed its European policy.<sup>xxxv</sup> Greek politicians argued that the new policy, called the European Option, had more realistic and pragmatic characteristics.<sup>252</sup>

The first move was in March 1995 when Greece lifted its objections to the Customs Union between Turkey and the EU and the associated financial protocol. Turkey became the first country in EU history to establish such a customs union without

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<sup>251</sup> Fuat Aksu, *Türk-Yunan İlişkileri: İlişkilerin Yönelimini Etkileyen Faktörler Üzeriner Bir İnceleme*, (Ankara: SAEMK Yayınları, 2001)

<sup>252</sup> Ian Lesser, Stephan Larrabee, Michele Zanini and Katia Vlachos-Dengler, *Greece's New Geopolitics*, (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001)

becoming a full member first. This was reflected as a huge political victory by PM Çiller. PM Çiller, used it as an internal politics tool to gain votes. However, many have and are still defending that this was actually an EU tool to take advantage of the Turkish market which has a huge potential for European products. Yet more, the financial protocol which covers financial aid for Turkish transformation process has never been fully utilized since Greece has stalled the aid money to Turkey that reached \$ 500 million by 1999. Critics on both sides argue that this agreement also was associated with the EU's decision to begin accession talks with Cyprus in 1998. We also should bear in mind that during this period Turkish-Greek relations were very turbulent. In 1995, when the Greek parliament ratified UNCLOS III, the Turkish answer was prompt including the casus belli clause in 1995. Furthermore, the Imia (Kardak) crisis in 1996<sup>253</sup> nearly brought the two countries to war.

1997 was a year of controversy. The 1997 Luxembourg Summit excluded Turkey from the enlargement process whereas Cyprus was included in the "fast track" of accession talks. According to the Turkish government the Luxembourg decisions were discriminatory and politicized by Greek efforts. The EU had taken the Greek side on the Cyprus issue.<sup>254</sup>

The second Greek move came in December 1999 during the Helsinki Summit. Greece lifted its veto against Turkey's accession talks and the EU granted Turkey EU candidate status together with a \$ 600 million financial protocol.<sup>255</sup> The controversial aspect of the decision was that apart from the political criteria formulated in the 1992

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<sup>253</sup> Baskın Oran, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası; Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, Cilt: 2(1980-2001)*, (İstanbul: İletişim, 2009), p. 464-467.

<sup>254</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 346-348.

<sup>255</sup> European Union, *Helsinki European Council, Presidency Conclusions*, 10-11 December 1999, par. 12 [http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/en/ec/ACFA4C.htm](http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/en/ec/ACFA4C.htm)

Copenhagen Summit,<sup>256xxxxvi</sup> Turkey was expected to, resolve its territorial disputes in peaceful settlements in accordance with the UN or submit them to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) by 2004 and support the process of achieving a solution to the Cyprus conflict.<sup>257</sup>

Following the Helsinki Summit, in March 2001 Turkey adopted its national Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPPA),<sup>258</sup> which materialized in the form of constitutional amendments and harmonization laws in the following period.<sup>259</sup>

The NPPA created a fragile balance in Turkish internal politics between the EU-pros, and the anti-EU. The EU-pros included the Justice and Development Party, Turkish Industrialists and Business Association and various liberal think tanks. The anti-EU, on the other hand, included some bureaucrats, major labor associations, right of center party the Nationalistic Action Party and the leftist Democratic Left Party and though never explicitly announced, some parts of the Turkish military establishment. The main difference between the views of these factions is based on the EU effect on Turkey. Although it seemed to be skeptical, some critics argued that Turkey should preserve its autonomy especially in foreign policy implementation whereas the pro-EU side claims that democratization should cover foreign policy by objecting and demonstrating uncompromising behavior towards foreign policy issues.

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<sup>256</sup> European Union, *Copenhagen European Council, Presidency Conclusions*, 21-22 June 1993, par. 7Aiii, [http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/A72921.pdf](http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/A72921.pdf);

<sup>257</sup> European Union, *Copenhagen European Council, Presidency Conclusions*, 21-22 June 1993, par.4 and 9a.

<sup>258</sup> Republic of Turkey, *Turkish National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPPA)* [http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/turkey/pdf/nppa\\_full.pdf](http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/turkey/pdf/nppa_full.pdf);

<sup>259</sup> *Hürriyet*, 29-12-2001.

Following the 2001 economic crisis and its negative effects, the coalition government collapsed in November 2002.<sup>260</sup> The elections held were won by the Justice and Development Party with a solid majority.<sup>xxxvii</sup> Turkey continued major constitutional, legislative and political reforms. Two examples for these reforms are the appointment of a civilian as the Secretary General of the National Security Council and the abolition of State Security Courts (DGM-Devlet Güvenlik Mahkemeleri). The Commissioner on EU Enlargement released the European Commission's recommendation on the formal accession of Turkey in October 2004.<sup>261</sup> This report explained the progress achieved by Turkey between 2001 and 2004 and indicated that Turkey's foreign policy contributed to regional stability.

In Greece, the Simitis government as well as its successor the new conservative government of Karamanlis,<sup>xxxviii</sup> which came to power in March 2004 both made declarations that they are and will actively support Turkey's EU target.<sup>262</sup>

## Cyprus

The Cyprus issue has been the most debated and complex aspect of Turkish-Greek relations since 1955. Although the issue was disengaged from the rapprochement process it requires special interest concerning the relations between Turkey, Greece, TRNC and the Republic of Cyprus.

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<sup>260</sup> The 57<sup>th</sup> Government of the Republic of Turkey headed by Bülent Ecevit was in office between 28-5-1999 and 18-11-2002. The 58<sup>th</sup> Government of the Republic of Turkey headed by Abdullah Gül btw. 18-11-2002 – 14-3-2003.

<sup>261</sup> Commission of the European Communities, *Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Recommendation of the European Commission on Turkey's Progress towards Accession*, Brussels, 6-10-2004, p. 1-18.

<sup>262</sup> *Hürriyet Daily News*, 8 May 2004.

The Republic of Cyprus applied for EU membership in July 1990 and accession negotiations started in March 1998. Following the 1999 Helsinki Summit, another effort to resolve the Cyprus conflict was initiated in December 1999. The idea was to re-unify the island so that it would join the EU as a single entity. Inter-communal “proximity talks”<sup>263</sup> with no preconditions were held between December 1999 and November 2000 and were followed by direct talks in January 2002 and February 2003. During the process the two sides could not reach an agreement.<sup>264</sup>

The UN Secretary General Kofi Annan proposed a settlement plan on November 2002. The Plan, commonly known as the Annan Plan was called Basis for a Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem. It had to be revised twice in December 2002 and February 2003. According to the Annan Plan, once the negotiations were over, a referendum would take place in March 2003 so that if everything went as planned the re-unified Cyprus would be able to sign the EU Accession Treaty in April 2003. The Plan was rejected by Turkish Cypriot leader Denktaş after he visited Ankara for consultations regarding the issue in contrast to the efforts of Ak Party government.<sup>265</sup> However the Helsinki communiqué stated that “...the EU encourages Turkey, together with all parties, to continue to support the UN Secretary General’s efforts to bring the process, aiming at a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem to a successful solution.”<sup>266</sup>

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<sup>263</sup> United Nations, *UN Security Council, Resolution 1250*, Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus, Meeting: 4018, 29-6-1999.

<http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1999/sc99.htm>

<sup>264</sup> The Greek Cypriot side aimed at a “federation” while the Turkish Cypriot side insisted on a “confederation”

<sup>265</sup> *Hürriyet*, 11-3-2003.

<http://hurasiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/ShowNew.aspx?id=133102>

<sup>266</sup> European Union, *the Council of the European Union, Turkey’s Accession Partnership*, Official Journal of the European Communities, March 2001.

Turkish Foreign Minister Cem declared on March 16<sup>th</sup> 2002 that the solution ought to be based on an agreement on a merger of the basic stances of Turkey and Greece; a new partnership state representing both nations of Cyprus on matters for which is empowered through an agreement between the two constituent states, an agreement on the powers and functions to be given to the partnership state, and an agreement on all matters that the parties consider as vital.<sup>267</sup>

The UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan made a final effort in February 2004 before the concluding date of the negotiations which was 31 March 2004. Vigorous negotiations took place and even the PM's of Turkey and Greece, Erdoğan and Karamanlis, collaborated in the process in Switzerland. Denktaş was not present in this phase of the negotiations. The re-unification plan's text was finalized by the Secretary-General Annan and submitted to the simultaneous referenda in April 2004 by the Turkish and Greek Cypriots. The Annan Plan was accepted by the Turkish Cypriots and rejected by the Greek Cypriots. The Erdoğan government put a great effort into this result. It was clear that both Turkish and Greek expectations had been miscalculated. Turkey showed goodwill and reconciliatory politics towards the EU, but the Greek side fell short of the expectations of a solution. Details of the issue are further elaborated in "Cyprus" section.

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<sup>267</sup>Ismail Cem, [http://www.mfa.gov.tr/16-march-2002-international-herald-tribune--a-common-vision-for-cypriots-by-ismail-cem\\_en.mfa](http://www.mfa.gov.tr/16-march-2002-international-herald-tribune--a-common-vision-for-cypriots-by-ismail-cem_en.mfa)

## Political Cooperation

The rapprochement process excluded the sensitive bilateral issues right from the start. The idea behind this was that it would be hard to establish an appropriate climate when historically fragile issues were in the agenda. Both Turkey and Greece had positive intentions to make a breakthrough. Furthermore, it was in Turkey's interest to solve the Aegean issues on its way EU membership.

During the Davos Meeting of World Economic forum in February 2002, Turkish and Greek Foreign Ministers Cem and Papandreou agreed on a set of meetings to be held by diplomats to evaluate sensitive issues. The Turkish side, led by Undersecretary Uğur Ziyal, and the Greek side, led by Foreign Ministry Secretary General Skopelitis, carried out "exploratory talks" in order to determine the level of importance and negotiability of these issues as well as in bold terms the understanding of each other. In general terms, the official positions of Turkey and Greece were significantly different.

Turkey considers the nature of the disputes as political and argues that the essentials lie in the Lausanne Treaty. According to Turkey, basic issues are;<sup>268</sup> first, the Aegean Problems (The Militarization of the Aegean Islands of Non-military Status, Delimitation of the Continental Shelf, The Territorial Waters), second, the problems in Airspace Control and Command (Definition of Airspace, FIR), and finally, violations of the Rights of Turkish Minority in Western Thrace.

Athens, on the other hand, believes that in terms of International Law, the only unresolved bilateral issue between the two countries is the delimitation of the continental shelf of the Aegean.

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<sup>268</sup> Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Background Note on the Aegean Dispute*, 29-7-2004.

The delimitation of the continental shelf and territorial waters are closely related issues. Greece which is signatory of 1982 UNCLOS III, argues that it can extend its territorial waters up to 12 nautical miles. Turkey, which is not a signatory of UNCLOS, argues that if Greece extends its territorial waters to 12 nautical miles then the Aegean will turn into a Greek Lake. When the Greek Parliament ratified the UNCLOS III in May 1995, the Turkish Grand Assembly responded with a decree including a *casus belli* topic in May 1995.<sup>xxxix</sup> Turkey and Greece held 27 sessions of deliberations between February 2002 and July 2004, which were referred as beneficial and positive in diplomatic terms. Greek PM Karamanlis on September 2004 declared that the talks should not be limited to the deadline in the Helsinki communiqué.

## CHAPTER 5

### ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL RELATIONS

#### A General Outlook on the Greek Economy and Economic-Financial Relations with Turkey

The beginning of the 1980s was a turning point for Turkey and Greece in terms of politics and economy. Turkey replaced its import substitution based development program and adopted an export-oriented growth strategy.<sup>269</sup> Greece, on the hand, joined the EU in 1981 while the signs of military junta were still vivid and began a new era in politics and economy.<sup>270</sup>

Various bilateral negotiations including the Davos meetings have been unsuccessful in resolving the disputes between the two countries and it was only after 1999 that close and friendly relations started to build up. After two decades it is still impossible to say that the existing disputes are settled but it's obviously clear that they are freezed right now.

During the last 10 years substantial development in economic and financial relations had taken place. By the end of 2008, trade volume between Turkey and Greece going over USD 3.5 billion,<sup>271</sup> half a million Greek tourists (almost 5 % of the Greek population) has visited Turkey<sup>272</sup>, Greek investments in Turkey have reached a figure of

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<sup>269</sup> [www.ekutup.dpt.gov.tr](http://www.ekutup.dpt.gov.tr) (24 Ocak Kararları)

<sup>270</sup> [www.europa.eu/abc/european\\_countries/index\\_en.htm](http://www.europa.eu/abc/european_countries/index_en.htm)

<sup>271</sup> [www.dtm.gov.tr](http://www.dtm.gov.tr) (Republic of Turkey, Undersecretariat of The Prime Ministry for Foreign Trade)

<sup>272</sup> [www.kultur.gov.tr](http://www.kultur.gov.tr) (Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Culture and Tourism)

USD 5 billion and the acquisition of the majority share in Finansbank by the National Bank of Greece are all signs showing the level of progress in bilateral relations.<sup>273</sup>

The 2008 world financial crisis, which is assessed as having been the biggest in world history has had its effects in Greece just like the rest of the world.<sup>274</sup> Fluctuation, turbulence and uncertainties gained momentum during this period. At a time when major fluctuations in oil and commodity prices as well as the liquidity crunch have turned many economies to a recession, international competition became even more vicious. Therefore, in order to minimize risks and uncertainty, disclosure policies have gained utmost importance. Although an EU member, Greece has difficulties in providing satisfactory and reliable data to the international world. As cited by Prime Minister Papandreou, Greece will be restructuring its national economic and financial policy rapidly starting with the formation of an independent statistics office.<sup>275</sup>

#### Greece's Economic and Commercial Relations

Greece which has applied for EU membership in 1959 became a member only in 1981<sup>276</sup> when Turkey lifted its blockage. Yet it is worth mentioning that Greece has always been compensated financially in its adventure with the EU. Greece received more than \$150 billion in aid from European funds and financial sources during the 45 years between 1959 and 2004. This has been the biggest amount in comparison to population within the

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<sup>273</sup> [www.yased.org.tr](http://www.yased.org.tr) (International Investors Association)

<sup>274</sup> [www.worldbank.org](http://www.worldbank.org) (The World Bank)

<sup>275</sup> [www.statistics.gr](http://www.statistics.gr) (Hellenic Statistical Authority)

<sup>276</sup> [www.europa.eu/abc/european\\_countries/index\\_en.htm](http://www.europa.eu/abc/european_countries/index_en.htm) (Gateway to the European Union)

EU.<sup>277</sup> Greece is expected to receive further € 21 billion between 2007 and 2013 apart from the extraordinary world economic crisis aid of 2008 amounting to € 19 million. Despite such large figures in financial aid, Greek foreign trade was able to reach \$100 billion only in 2007.<sup>278</sup>

The EU is the biggest trade partner of Greece, with trade constituting 54 % - 59 % of Greek foreign trade between 2003 and 2008.<sup>279</sup> Germany, Italy, Russia, China and the Netherlands are top five business trade partners of Greece whereas Turkey holds the 12<sup>th</sup> place. If you leave the EU countries aside, the ranking changes as Russia, China, the USA and Turkey. Turkey holds the second place in exports from Greece exports following the US and the fourth place in imports to Greece.<sup>280</sup> Greece, somewhat unsuccessful in drawing FDI, has invested heavily in the Balkans and southeastern Europe, reaching a figure of €15 billion.<sup>281</sup> The leading Greek bank, NBG (National Bank of Greece), has issued the largest capital in history to acquire Finansbank of Turkey.<sup>282</sup> Greek efforts in developing economic ties with other countries which rests on the strategies of “economic diplomacy” and “energy diplomacy” started in 2006. Considering that Greek industry is far from supplying local needs and that imports are three times bigger than exports necessitates the strengthening of economic ties especially with its neighbors.

The Greek state gives utmost importance to this issue. Foreign economic and trade relations are the responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs carried out by a

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<sup>277</sup> [www.europea.eu/competition/state\\_aid/studies\\_reports/expenditure.html#2](http://www.europea.eu/competition/state_aid/studies_reports/expenditure.html#2)

<sup>278</sup> [www.hepo.gr](http://www.hepo.gr) (Hellenic Foreign Trade Board)

<sup>279</sup> <http://www.epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/> (European Commission Statistics – Eurostat)

<sup>280</sup> <http://www.fita.org/countries/greece.html> (The Federation of International Trade Associations)

<sup>281</sup> [www.investingreece.gr](http://www.investingreece.gr) (Greek Investment Agency)

<sup>282</sup> [www.invgr.com/invgt.htm](http://www.invgr.com/invgt.htm) (INVgr is the authority for investment, real estate, franchising and employment opportunities in Greece)

Deputy Ministers whom are also MP. Greece is eager to to develop its economic relations with the Balkan countries. ESOAB (Hellenic Aid Action Plan),<sup>283</sup> the Greek National Plan for the Re-Development of the Balkans, which is financed from the Greek budget, is an important indicator of this understanding and effort. Even the politically conflicted Macedonia, the NATO membership of which was vetoed, gets its share of the effort to develop economic and commercial ties. There are more than 3500 companies operating in the Balkan Peninsula. Greek companies are dominant in the banking and communication sectors in Romania and Bulgaria. Greece is looking forward to developing its ties with Russia in tourism and energy and with Middle East countries in commerce, energy and construction.<sup>284</sup>

As is clearly seen in the Balance of Payments (BOP) figures, tourism and shipping are the two vital sectors for Greek economy.<sup>285</sup> As of 2008 end, tourism and shipping have generated €11.5 billion and €19.2 billion of revenue, respectively, totaling € 30 billion. The net contribution of these two sectors to the BOP was €17 billion in 2008. Despite the huge effects of the World Economic Crisis which started in 2008 and got worse in 2009, the Greek banking sector did not have any casualties. The government extended a € 28 billion aid package to the sector.<sup>286</sup> Although it is another discussion topic it is worth mentioning that the growing Current Deficit has created a major problem for the Greek economy, bringing it to the threshold of bankruptcy. To overcome the diminishing of international markets, Greece has revised its export strategy. HEPO, the export development agency, started giving more emphasis to countries like China

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<sup>283</sup> [www.hellenicaid.gr /Hellenic Aid Action Plan](http://www.hellenicaid.gr/Hellenic%20Aid%20Action%20Plan))

<sup>284</sup> Ibid., ESOAB

<sup>285</sup> [www.bankofgreece.gr](http://www.bankofgreece.gr) (Greek Central Bank)

<sup>286</sup> Ibid.

and the UAE in addition to developing activities in major export markets like Germany, USA, Bulgaria, Romania and Russia.

### Greek Foreign Trade

Greek foreign trade reached €52 billion as of 2003. The 2008 figure was €78 billion. In USD terms total foreign trade exceeded \$ 100 billion level in 2007. During the 2003-2008 period, Greek foreign trade increased 100 % in USD terms and 50 % in € terms. The positive change in favor of the € in the USD/€ cross-rate is the major reason for this difference. Greek exports have increased 10 % and imports 11 % during 2004-2008.<sup>287</sup> Greece got 0.5 % share in world import volume and a 0.2 % share from the world export volume.<sup>288</sup>

Greece Statistical Office has had problems with EUROSTAT at various times regarding the gathering and calculation of data. The same problem is seen in foreign trade figures. There are often differences of up to 10 % between the figures announced by the Greek Central Bank, the Statistical Office, the Exporters Union and the Ministry of Economics-Finance. Greece which had been a typical agricultural country prior to joining the EU, in time started becoming an industrialized country with the contribution of mechanization after its EU accession in 1981. Greece is the biggest beneficiary of EU funds. Starting from its initial application date of 1945 until 2004, Greece received \$154 billion in aid. During the 2007-2013, Greece is expected to get €21 billion more.<sup>289</sup>

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<sup>287</sup> [http://www.hepo.gr/deployedFiles/StaticFiles/Pages/total\\_trade\\_balance\\_2008-1990.pdf](http://www.hepo.gr/deployedFiles/StaticFiles/Pages/total_trade_balance_2008-1990.pdf)

<sup>288</sup> [www.worldbank.org](http://www.worldbank.org)

<sup>289</sup> [www.europea.eu/competition/state\\_aid/studies\\_reports/](http://www.europea.eu/competition/state_aid/studies_reports/)

Greece has become the leading cotton producer with the effect of the EU agricultural support funds.<sup>290</sup> Therefore, textile and ready-wear sectors have developed substantially together with the EU protection walls on the relative sectors. These two sectors achieved 25 % share in Greek export volume at the end of the 1980s. Greece transferred its production facilities to the Eastern block to take advantage of its relatively cheap labor force. With Far Eastern products from China, Korea, India and Pakistan invading all of Europe, Greek industry has begun to have difficult times.<sup>291</sup> This has led many companies to stop production and start importation. Within this respect, when we analyze the foreign trade of Greece, we see that exports are mainly raw materials, semi-finished goods and agricultural products. 20 % of 2008 export was composed of agricultural products. 60 % was industrial products and the rest 20 % was oil and oil products.<sup>292</sup>

Greek imports are mainly composed of industrial products. Apart from a few distinctive sectors, The Greek economy is dependent on importation. The Greek trade deficit has grown starting from its EU accession in 1981. Before 1981, foreign trade was under control due to the 50 % trade barriers. After EU accession all trade barriers were lifted. Half of the imports were from EU countries, whereas a substantial amount of oil and natural gas was imported from Russia and Saudi Arabia. As of 2008, Germany, Italy, Russia, France and China were the leading trade partners. Trade with the top five trade partners makes up 40 % of the total. The first five in exports are Italy, Germany, Bulgaria, Cyprus and USA whereas the first five importers are Germany, Italy, Russia, China and France.

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<sup>290</sup> [www.fas.usda.gov/cotton/circular/2005/11/cotcov1105.pdf](http://www.fas.usda.gov/cotton/circular/2005/11/cotcov1105.pdf)

<sup>291</sup> [www.sev.org.gr](http://www.sev.org.gr) (Hellenic Federation of Enterprises)

<sup>292</sup> [www.hepo.gr](http://www.hepo.gr)

In 2008, 56 % of foreign trade was carried out with EU countries. Exports to EU countries constitute 63 % of the total exports whereas 54 % of total imports were from EU countries. The Exports/Imports ratio has been around 30 % for the last 5 years.<sup>293</sup>

Despite the €11 billion tourism revenue and the €20 billion maritime revenue, the current account deficit has been a growing threat for the Greek economy.<sup>294</sup> Growth in the Greek foreign trade deficit has been 11.3 %. Taking into consideration the exports of goods and services, the export/import ratio fell from 70 % to 60 % between 2006 and 2008. Greece being the weakest link in Europe with respect to its export potential in line with its existing industry and technological infrastructure makes foreign trade a setback in terms of balance of payments. This trend which made economists anxious proved out to be a problem together with public spending in 2009.<sup>295</sup> We can further elaborate Greek Foreign Trade in 3 topics, first, foreign trade legislation, second, non-tariff trade barriers, and last, anti-dumping applications.

#### Foreign Trade Legislation<sup>296</sup>

After becoming a member in 1981 Greece began using EU norms in foreign trade. Greece is obliged by all agreements that the EU has signed with third countries and runs a common Foreign Trade Policy with the EU. Within this respect, Greece has free trade with EFTA countries, Central and East European countries, South Africa, Mediterranean countries, Mexico, Chile which have signed Free Trade Agreements with the EU. Goods

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<sup>293</sup> Ibid.

<sup>294</sup> [www.gnto.gr](http://www.gnto.gr) (Hellenic Ministry of Tourism)

<sup>295</sup> Greek 2009 Deficit revised higher, Euro falls, [www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE63L1G420100422](http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE63L1G420100422)

<sup>296</sup> [www.europea.eu/legislation\\_summaries/external\\_trade/index\\_en.htm](http://www.europea.eu/legislation_summaries/external_trade/index_en.htm) (Summaries of EU Legislation)

and services are exchanged within uniform tax and regulations in Europe whereas a Common Customs Tariff is in force for non-EU countries. Agricultural products as well as anti-dumping rules are determined and utilized according to EU Commission's decisions.

#### Non-tariff Trade Barriers<sup>297</sup>

Greece has a liberal trade based foreign trade regime. Anti-dumping and anti-subsidy precautions are carried in accordance with EU Commission's decisions. Greece acts according to the TARIC which is the joint European tariff regulation.

#### Anti-Dumping Applications<sup>298</sup>

Ongoing European anti-dumping cases and investigations can be followed in the Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade's official web site. As of 2009, the EU has filed two investigations on 8 May 2008 and 13 November 2008 concerning iron-steel products. On the other hand, there has not been an investigation issued against Greece in accordance with the Regulation Concerning the Mal-competition in Imports.

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<sup>297</sup> [www.europa.eu/trade/tackling\\_unfair\\_trade/trade-barriers/](http://www.europa.eu/trade/tackling_unfair_trade/trade-barriers/)

<sup>298</sup> [www.ecipe.org/the-political-economy-of-anti-dumping-reform/PDF](http://www.ecipe.org/the-political-economy-of-anti-dumping-reform/PDF)

## Balance of Payments and Capital Movements: FDI

Greece has been unsuccessful in drawing FDI in the past. Even the countries which have become EU members later on have drawn more FDI as compared to Greece. 2006 was a year of change and a major FDI took place in Greece. According to the Greek Statistics Office figures, \$5.4 billion of FDI, the highest in history, took place. The acquisition of Emporiki and Geniki Bank shares are the major contributors to this figure.<sup>299</sup>

In 2007, the FDI to OECD countries rose by 30 % whereas FDI to Greece decreased by 65 % settling to \$2 billion.<sup>300</sup> As of 2008, the FDI balance in Greece reached \$ 55 billion. As of the same period Greek FDI was \$20 billion. Greek investments were mainly to the banking sector in the Balkans. According to the Greek Central Bank figures the total of FDIs in 2008 was €3.5 billion.<sup>301</sup> In May 2008 Deutsche Telekom acquired 20 % of Greek Telecom OTE for €2.5 billion. The same company paid € 430 million for the 3 % public stake at end of the same year. In other words 85 % of FDI was realized by Deutsche Telekom. Half of the FDI was realized by Luxembourg based companies followed by 10 % Dutch investors. The relatively small size, the geographical remoteness to Central European market, extensive bureaucracy, cost of labor, labour unions and the protective measures in the so-called strategic sectors have resulted in the low level of interest in Greece.<sup>302</sup>

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<sup>299</sup> [www.statistics.gr](http://www.statistics.gr) (National Statistical Service of Greece)

<sup>300</sup> OECD Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs  
[www.oecd.org/statisticsdata/0,3381,en\\_2649\\_34863\\_1\\_119656\\_1\\_1\\_1,00.html](http://www.oecd.org/statisticsdata/0,3381,en_2649_34863_1_119656_1_1_1,00.html)

<sup>301</sup> [www.bankofgreece.gr](http://www.bankofgreece.gr)

<sup>302</sup> [www.investingreece.gov.gr](http://www.investingreece.gov.gr)

Table 10. Major Greek FDI Inflows in 2008

Date	Investor	Investment	Amount
February 2008	Alapis-Cyprus	Alapis-Greece	€50 million
May 2008	Deutsche Telekom	20 % of OTE	€2,548 million
July 2008	Xanatech-Cyprus	Canal 9	€22 million
August 2008	Emirates Int'l Telecommunications	Forthnet	€103 million
September 2008	Southeastern Europe Fund-Cyprus	Chrysi Efkairia Newspaper	€30 million
September 2008	RTL-Germany	Alpha TV	€26 million
November 2008	Deutsche Telekom	3% Public Share of OTE	€431 million
November 2008	Credit agricole	Emporiki Bank	€46 million
December 2008	Dixons	Kotsovolos	€28 million

Source: Greek Investment Agency

According to a declaration made by Greek minister of Economy Mr. Yorgos Alogoskufis as of December 2008, the Greek investments in the Balkans had reached € 14 billion. On the other hand, investments in Turkey are reported to be over € 4 billion in the same time period. This figure is estimated to reach € 7 billion taking into consideration all Greek activities including those in the form of representative offices, partnership etc.<sup>303</sup>

<sup>303</sup> [www.ELKE.gov.gr](http://www.ELKE.gov.gr)

## Turkey and Greece: Economic Relations

The economic and trade relations between Turkey and Greece are carried out in line with the Customs Union agreement between Turkey and the EU. Although the relationship was limited for long years due to historical and political conflicts, the rapprochement process following the joint earthquake disasters of 1999 has contributed more than expected to bilateral relations.<sup>304</sup> There has been a substantial increase in the number and volume of Greek investments lately. According to the May 2009 figures announced by the Turkish Undersecretariat of Treasury, there are 360 Greek origin companies operating in Turkey with an investment exceeding € 6 billions. The number of companies with an investment incentive from the Foreign Capital Agency has reached 42. The investment of 42 companies is almost \$ 200 million. 237 Greek firms (65 % of the total) are located in İstanbul. There are 39 in İzmir, 27 in Bursa and 10 companies operating in Ankara. Greek companies operate in 15 different sectors with 128 in wholesale and retail trade, 81 in production and 37 in real estate.<sup>305</sup>

The National Bank of Greece entered the Turkish financial sector by acquiring the majority stake in Finansbank. For the acquisition NBG has brought a total of \$ 3.7 billions of foreign capital to Turkey which constitutes the biggest FDI outflow Greece has realized. EFG Eurobank which is the third largest bank in Greece has acquired 70 % of Tekfenbank for € 142 million. Intralot is the third largest Greek company in Turkey and operates in Lottery business. The same group is also interested in the National Lottery privatization. Marfin Group which has acquired Olympic Airways invested in

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<sup>304</sup> "Bilateral Relations (The Rapprochement Process)," Hellenic Republic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs [www.mfa.gr](http://www.mfa.gr)

<sup>305</sup> [www.hazine.gov.tr](http://www.hazine.gov.tr) (Republic of Turkey, Prime Ministry Undersecretariat of Treasury)

Şafak Hospitals at the beginning of 2009.<sup>306</sup> On the other hand there are 10 Turkish companies operating in Greece. Taking into consideration that within the same geography there are 15,000 and 5,000 Turkish businessmen operating in Romania and Bulgaria respectively<sup>307</sup>, it's clear that the trouble for Turks doing business in Greece is the difficulties in getting residence permits. It gets easier to obtain a residence permit in Greece if the investment amount exceeds € 300,000. There aren't any similar restrictions in other EU countries concerning the investment amount.<sup>308</sup>

Though it's theoretically possible for a 3<sup>rd</sup> party national to set up a business in Greece, in practice one requirement is the tax number which can only be acquired if you have a residence permit. This vicious cycle is negatively affecting the investment plans of businessmen.<sup>309</sup> Turkey does not require visas from Greek citizens.<sup>310</sup> Greek investors in Turkey are mainly interested in the IT sector as well as agricultural products, packaging, pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, fishing, tourism and construction. Finally leading textile companies of Turkey, namely İpekyol, Koton, İnci and Matchka have opened stores in Athens' "The Mall" on April 2006.<sup>311</sup>

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<sup>306</sup> [www.yased.org.tr](http://www.yased.org.tr)

<sup>307</sup> [www.deik.org.tr](http://www.deik.org.tr) (Foreign Economic Relations Board)

<sup>308</sup> [www.dtm.gov.tr](http://www.dtm.gov.tr)

<sup>309</sup> [www.investingreece.gr](http://www.investingreece.gr)

<sup>310</sup> Republic of Turkey, *Türkiye'nin Vize Uygulamadığı Ülkeler*.

<http://www.egm.gov.tr/hizmet.yabancilar.vize.asp>

<sup>311</sup> [www.dtm.gov.tr](http://www.dtm.gov.tr)

Table 11. Turkish Investments in Greece

Company	Sector	Year	Amount
Ziraat bankası	Banking	2008	18,000,000
Murat metal	Metal	2004	1,800,000
Maçka	Retail	2005	200,000
Gizia	Retail	2005	180,000
HSH Ltd.	Retail	2007	100,000
Koton	Retail	2005	60,000
İpekyol	Retail	2005	40,500
KRT Kuyumculuk	Office-Warehouse	2008	30,000
Inform Electronics	Technology	2007	27,000
Multimedya	Office-Warehouse	2008	21,000
İstikbal mobilya	Retail	2003	Franchise
Güllüoğlu Baklava	Food	2004	Franchise
Çilek mobilya	Retail	2007	Franchise
Sirkeci Restaurant	Food	2007	Franchise

Source: www.dtm.gov.tr

#### General Outlook on Commercial Relations

The rapprochement process following the earthquake disasters was enhanced by Undersecretary of Foreign Trade, Kürşat Tüzmen's export strategy to neighboring countries. This opened a new chapter in Turkish-Greek foreign trade. In line with the strategy Turkish businessmen and state officials have taken part in fairs and exhibitions held in Greece as well as inviting Trade groups to Turkey.<sup>312</sup> Joint Economic Cooperation meetings started to be held on regular basis. They are complemented with Turkish-Greek Business Council meetings organized by businessmen. DEİK and SEV have come together to establish a new Business Council.<sup>313</sup>

<sup>312</sup> www.hepo.gr

<sup>313</sup> www.deik.gov.tr

As a result of these developments, trade which was around \$700 million in 1999 reached \$3.6 billion at the end of 2008. During the same period exports to Greece increased 600 % reaching \$2.4 billion. Bilateral trade has always shown a positive balance in favor of Turkey. 2008 has been a year with the highest import export figures in history. Turkey's trade surplus in 2007 and 2008 has reached \$1 billion. Between 2005 and 2008 Greece was listed as 12<sup>th</sup> in the Turkish exporting countries list.<sup>314</sup>

Table 12. Trade between Turkey and Greece

Year	Exports		Imports		Diff.	Foreign Trade	
	Total	Change	Total	Change		Total	Change
2005	904.3	-3.7	587.8	23.3	316.5	1492.1	5.4
2006	1273.6	40.8	834.1	41.9	439.5	2107.7	41.3
2007	1648.5	29.4	691.5	-17.1	957	2340	11
2008	1645.9	-0.1	783.8	13.3	907.1	2429.7	3.8
*January-June							
2008*	847.4	6	387.3	14.8	478.5	1216.3	19.2
2009*	593.7	-29.9	387.3	4.9	206.4	981	-19.3

Source: [www.dtm.gov.tr](http://www.dtm.gov.tr)

If we put aside EU countries, Turkey's place in Greek foreign trade is; 5<sup>th</sup> in Greek imports and 2<sup>nd</sup> in Greek exports. The details of Turkish-Greek foreign trade with respect to year, product, amount and share are reflected in the following tables. The foreign trade atmosphere has not enabled a uniform investment opportunity in Turkey and Greece. Greek investments in Turkey are far beyond those of Turkey. However it is nice to see that as a result of recent developments the negative sentiments for Turkish products in the Greek market have started to decline.

<sup>314</sup> [www.dtm.gov.tr](http://www.dtm.gov.tr)

Table 13. Trade between Turkey and Greece

(Million\$-%)

Year	Exports		Imports		Diff.	Foreign Trade	
	Total	Change	Total	Change		Total	Change
1990	139.4		128.6		10.8	268	
1995	209.9	24.5	200.6	90.9	9.3	410.5	50.2
1996	236.5	12.7	285	42.1	-48.5	521.4	27
1997	298.2	26.1	430.8	51.2	-132.5	729	39.8
1998	370	24.1	319.8	-25.8	50.3	689.8	-5.4
1999	406.8	9.9	287.6	-10.1	119.2	694.3	0.7
2000	437.7	7.6	430.8	49.8	6.9	868.5	25.1
2001	476.1	8.8	266.3	-38.2	209.8	742.3	-14.5
2002	590.4	24	312.5	17.4	277.9	902.8	21.6
2003	920.4	55.9	427.7	36.9	492.7	1348.1	49.3
2004	1171.2	27.2	594.4	39	576.9	1765.6	31
2005	1126.7	-3.8	727.8	22.5	398.8	1854.5	5
2006	1602.6	42.2	1045.3	43.6	557.3	2647.9	42.8
2007	2262.7	41.2	950.2	-9.1	1,312.5	3212.8	21.3
2008	2430.5	7.4	1148.6	20.9	1,281.9	3579.2	11.4
2008*	1297.9	22	563.1	31.8	734.8	1861	24.9
2009*	793.4	-38.9	516.9	8.2	276.5	1310.3	-29.6

\* January-June




Figure 8. Trade between Turkey and Greece (Graph)

Source: www.dtm.gov.tr

## The Development of Foreign Trade between Turkey and Greece

The Greek industry, which cannot compete with the international market apart from a few sectors such as the petro-chemical goods, plastics and agricultural products, is going through difficult times. Especially due to cheap goods flowing in from Far East markets and the cost disadvantage due to high labor costs, most companies are terminating their production and beginning to import. Greek buyers tend to import from Turkey due to geographical proximity if there are not huge price differences.<sup>315</sup>

### Exports in General and the Increase in Exports to Greece

Between 2000 and 2008, increase in exports to Greece was in parallel to increase in Turkey's total exports. 2003, 2006 and 2007 have been the years with the highest rate of increase. During 1995 to 2008, the increase of exports in 2003 was more than 50 % during the 14-year period. Exports have decreased only in 2005 by 3.8 % as compared to the previous year. According to SNA classification, Turkey's exports were composed of mainly semi-finished and consumption goods whereas the imports were mainly semi-finished goods. As mentioned before, as the Greek industry lost its competitive edge due to increasing costs mainly labor 80 % of its exports are semi-finished goods.<sup>316</sup>

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<sup>315</sup> [www.wto.org](http://www.wto.org) & [www.hepo.gr](http://www.hepo.gr) (World Trade Organization)

<sup>316</sup> [www.dtm.gov.tr](http://www.dtm.gov.tr)

Table 14. Turkey's Export-Import to Greece (Goods)

Exports	2000	2005	2006	2007	2008
Investment Goods	57.3	101.9	160	202.1	217.7
Semi-finished Goods	287.5	564.8	869	1220.8	1341.6
Consumption Goods	93	457.2	571.4	837.6	869

Imports	2000	2005	2006	2007	2008
Investment Goods	15.2	14.1	22.4	30.5	29.6
Semi-finished Goods	294.6	609.6	835.4	737.3	992
Consumption Goods	121	103.8	187.3	182.1	126.8

Source: www.dtm.gov.tr

78 % of Turkish exports to Greece are industrial products. Major items have been; mining products with 13.7 % and agricultural products with 8.3 % share in exports.

Petroleum based oil products are the leading export item with € 180 millions.

Automobiles, iron-steel products, petroleum gases, yachts, are other leading items in Turkish exports to Greece.

Table 15. Foreign Trade Statistics  
Major Exports to Greece  
(Sector)

( 000 \$ )

	2006	2007	2008	July 2008	July 2009
AGRICULTURAL PRO.	135,159	163,387	184,251	106.,15	82,038
Food stuff	126,611	153,352	175,415	100,154	78,237
Agr.Raw Materials	8,548	10,035	8,836	5,960	3,800
MINING PRO.	200,476	404,499	333,055	183,363	101,192
Metal Ores & Scraps	27,717	38,021	30,807	19,642	7,843
Mineral Fuels & Oils	160,935	300,072	242,159	115,639	70,798
Non-iron Metals	11,825	66,406	60,088	48,082	22,552
INDUSTRY	1,264,571	1,691,941	1,909,560	1,229,764	75,317
Iron & Steel	219,725	281,003	343,998	234,691	96,933
Chemicals	70,450	89,048	119,437	77,785	51,913
Other semi-finished goods	139,153	213,315	233,090	151,328	104,433
Machinery & Trans.Veh.	376,132	492,431	570,482	377,881	229,629
Weaved Products	199,252	244,066	248,942	153,154	106,227
Readywear	125,065	193,361	202,584	118,650	81,901
Other Consumption Goods	134,795	178,216	191,028	116,276	81,280
OTHER GOODS	2,384	2,828	3,684	2,302	1,519
TOTAL	1,602.6	2,262.6	2,430.5	1,521.5	937.1

Source: www.dtm.gov.tr

Table 16. Chapters in Exports to Greece

Major Export Items to Greece (million\$-€)

		2007	2007	2008	2008
		USD	EURO	USD	EURO
72	Iron and steel	228.8	167.2	288.9	193.5
27	Mineral fuels and oils	300.1	218.4	242.2	168.3
87	Vehicles other than railway	228.6	165.3	237.4	159.2
84	Machineries, mechanical appliances, boilers,parts therof,	134.6	98.1	154.3	103,8
85	Electrical machinery and equipment	124.2	90.8	136.1	92
73	Articles of Iron & Steel	118.5	86.1	123.4	82.8
39	Plastics and articles therof,	82.3	60	105	70.7
61	Articles of apparel and clothing accessories knitted	80.1	58.3	103.5	70.2
62	Articles of apparel and clothing accessories not knitted	105.6	77.1	92.6	63
48	Paper and paperboard	49.8	36.3	71.1	48.3
94	Furniture	62.2	45.2	70.4	48
76	Aluminium and articles therof,	68.6	49.7	63.1	42.4
60	Knitted or crocheted fabrics	37.1	27.2	53	35.9
3	Fish	46.8	34.1	50.7	34.1
89	Ships, boats, floating structures	14.6	10.7	49.1	31.8
54	Man-made filaments	55.5	40.6	47.8	32.5
52	Cotton, cotton-yarn and cotton-fabric	44.1	32.1	41	27.9
63	Other made-up textile articles	32.8	24	37.1	24.9
69	Ceramic products	37.9	27.8	35.6	24
25	Salt, sulphur, earth, plastering material, lime, cement	30.5	22.3	31.8	21.7
8	Fruit	28.7	20.6	31.8	22.7
57	Carpets and other floor covering	29.9	21.5	30.8	21.4
24	Tobacco and manufactured tobacco substitutes	9	6.4	24.8	17.1
70	glass and glassware	22.2	16.1	24.1	16.3
7	Vegetables	17.9	13.2	22.2	14.9
40	Rubber and articles therof,	20.7	15.1	21.3	14.6
55	Man-made staple fibres	23	16.8	20.2	13.7
29	Organic chemicals	12.7	9.3	17.4	11.6
68	Articles of stone, plaster or similar materials	15.5	11.3	16.6	11.3
64	Footwear and the like	17	12.4	16.3	11
20	preparations of vegetables and fruits	18	13.1	16.1	11.1
58	Special woven-fabrics	15.6	11.4	13.8	9.4
21	Miscellaneous edible preparations	11.1	8.2	11.9	8.2
49	Printed newspapers, books etc.	8.4	6.1	10.3	7.2
28	Inorganic chemicals	6.8	5	10.2	7
44	Wood and articles of wood	18.4	13.,6	8.6	5.8
42	Articles of leather	7.9	5.7	7.1	4.8
83	Miscellaneous articles of base metal	6.2	4.5	7	4.8
56	Wadding, felt and non-wovens	7.5	5.5	5.9	4.1
33	Essentials of oils and resinoids	4.2	3	5.8	4
Source: www.dtm.gov.tr		2,263	1,648	2,430	1,646

Table 17. Major Turkish Exporters to Greece

		(mio\$)	
		2007	2008
1	Tüpraş	273	156
2	Toyoto Otomotiv	89	112
3	Vestel Dış Ticaret	64	60
4	Çolakoğlu Dış Ticaret	48	54
5	Eti Alüminyum	48	43
6	Hyundai-Assan	47	26
7	Man Türkiye	33	23
8	Petkim	18	33
9	Arçelik	24	25
10	Vilmeks	12	36
11	Ereğli Demir Çelik	8	33
12	Astel Kağıtçılık	18	22
13	Ford	16	23
14	Gisad Dış Ticaret	15	17
15	Habaş	20	6
16	Yolbulan Metal	10	15
17	Şişecam	9	16
18	Ufuk Boru	12	11
19	Pergamon-Status	11	12
20	Türk Demir Döküm	11	10
21	Diler Dış Ticaret	13	7
22	Murat Metal	10	10
23	Özşah Örme	9	9
24	Kaptan Metal	17	0
25	Petrol Ofisi	7	10
26	Oyak Renault	7	9
27	Demirsan Haddecilik	6	10
28	Evimteks Dış Ticaret	6	8
29	BSH Ev Aletleri	6	8
30	Güvener İtriyat	13	0
31	Mercedes-Benz	12	0
32	Kent Gıda	6	6
33	Boydak Dış Ticaret	6	6
34	Tosyalı Dış Ticaret	10	0
35	Kılıç Deniz Ürünleri	10	0
36	Grundig	9	0
37	Gediz İç ve Dış Ticaret	8	0
38	Tever Dış Ticaret	8	0
39	TBS Denizcilik	7	0
40	Asaş Alüminyum	7	0
41	Arslantürk Tarım	7	0
42	Ağır Haddecilik	6	0
43	Çebitaş Demir Çelik	6	0
44	Polibak Plastik	6	0

Source: www.dtm.gov.tr

40 % of Turkish imports from Greece are industrial products; mining and agricultural products being 38.7 % and 21.3 % of the total, respectively. Petroleum- based oil products are the leading item group in 2008 imports from Greece. Cotton, polypropylen, semi-finished iron-steel products, copper pipes, wheat, nitrogen, aluminium plates, phosphahate and leather are the following product groups.

Table 18. Foreign Trade Statistics  
Major Imports from Greece (Sector)

(000 \$)

	2006	2007	2008	July 2008	July 2009
AGRICULTURAL PRO.	272,288	188,730	244,090	139,810	185,080
Food stuff	32,415	38,391	69,732	34,204	51,077
Agr.Raw Materials	239,873	150,339	174,357	105,606	134,002
MINING PRO.	446,849	396,116	444,603	240,454	258,058
Metal Ores & Scraps	6502	8480	16,853	7918	4219
Mineral Fuels & Oils	378,912	307,606	355,345	177,139	235,052
Non-iron Metals	61,435	80,029	72,404	55,396	18,788
INDUSTRY	326,106	365,140	459,884	284,205	194,096
Iron & Steel	17,870	25,418	52,065	25,928	1871
Chemicals	167,254	175,019	238,313	150,726	109,936
Other semi-finished goods	41,587	49,237	48,776	32,818	18,953
Machinery & Trans.Veh.	54,771	64,530	67,073	39,354	33,581
Weaved Products	19,641	22,086	22,824	16,389	13,516
Readywear	9522	12,277	11,668	7646	4552
Other Consumption Goods	15,462	16,573	19,166	11,345	11,687
OTHER GOODS	85	172	54	18	97
TOTAL	1045.3	950.2	1148.6	66,487	637,331

Source: www.dtm.gov.tr

Table 19. Chapters in Imports from Greece

Major Import Items from Greece (million \$ and € )

Source : www.dtm.gov.tr

		2007 USD	2007 EURO	2008 USD	2008 EURO
27	Mineral fuels and oils	307.6	221.6	355.3	246.7
39	Plastics and articles thereof,	139.1	102.2	177.2	119
52	Cotton, cotton-yarn and cotton-fabric	129.2	94.7	153.2	104.1
72	Iron and steel	25.3	18.4	52	33.8
74	Copper and articles thereof	49	35.8	40.8	26.9
84	Machineries, mechanical appliances, boilers, parts thereof,	35.3	25.6	40.6	27.8
76	Aluminium and articles thereof,	34	24.8	36.8	24.7
10	Cereals	0.7	0.5	21	15.1
42	Articles of leather	22	16.3	17.5	11.6
31	Fertilizers	3.5	2.5	17	12.1
23	Waste from the food industries, animal fodder	11.8	8.6	16	10.7
85	electrical machinery and equipment	21.6	15.6	14.9	10.1
25	Salt, sulphur, earth, plastering material, lime, cement	9.8	7.1	14	9.6
48	Paper and paperboard	13.3	9.7	12.7	8.6
89	Ships, boats, floating structures	6.7	4.9	11.5	7.7
30	Pharmaceuticals	7.8	5.7	11.4	7.8
32	Tanning and dyeing extracts	8.9	6.4	10.9	7.4
29	Organic chemicals	7.7	5.6	8.3	5.7
15	Animal and vegetable oils	2.7	2	8.1	5.3
47	Pulp of cellulosic material and waste of paper	2.8	2	8	5.4
20	Preparations of vegetables and fruits	8.3	5.9	7.8	5.3
68	Articles of stone, plaster or similar materials	3.4	2.5	7.8	5.3
62	Articles of apparel and clothing accessories not knitted	6.9	5	6.2	4.2
38	Miscellaneous chemical products	3.5	2.6	0.61	4.1
12	Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits	1.8	1.3	5.8	4.2
44	Wood and articles of wood	6.5	4.7	5.6	3.8
26	Ores, slag and ash	4.6	3.4	5.6	3.8
35	Albuminoidal substances	6	4.4	5.6	3.8
49	Printed newspapers, books etc.	2.5	1.8	5.5	3.8
60	Knitted or crocheted fabrics	5.1	3.7	5	3.4
33	Essentials of oils and resinoids	4.6	3.4	4.6	3.1
83	Miscellaneous articles of base metal	4	3	4.3	2.9
28	Inorganic chemicals	2.7	2	4.3	2.9
61	Articles of apparel and clothing accessories not knitted	4.4	3.3	4.2	2.9
56	wadding, felt and non-wovens	5.3	3.8	4.1	2.8
34	Soap	1.4	1	3.8	2.6
22	Beverages, spirits and vinegar	1.7	1.2	3.6	2.4
40	Rubber and articles thereof,	3.7	2.7	3.4	2.3
43	Furskins and artificial fur	2.9	2.1	3.3	2.3
3	Fish	8.1	6	3	2
73	Articles of Iron & Steel	2.3	1.7	2.2	1.5
8	Fruit	2.3	1.7	1.9	1.3
		950	692	1,148	782

Table 20. Major Turkish Importers from Greece

(mio USD)		2007	2008
1	Petrol Ofisi	86	178
2	BP Petrolleri	98	17
3	Shell & Turcas	7	22
4	Nursan Çelik	0	27
5	Altınbaş Petrol	12	12
6	Tüpraş	0	21
7	Dow Türkiye	9	12
8	Gülsan Sentetik	4	16
9	Bossa	0	18
10	Bilkont	4	14
11	BSH Ev Aletleri	7	10
12	Arçelik LG Klima	9	8
13	Kleeman Asansör	6	10
14	Karyer Isı	8	8
15	Eren Tekstil	7	8
16	Petrol Kimya	8	7
17	Topkapı İplik	5	8
18	Opet	0	12
19	Friterm Termik	5	7
20	Merinos Halı	4	7
21	Metalum tüp	5	6
22	Eurodrip	4	6
23	Gisaş Gemi	4	5
24	Beyteks Tekstil	0	8
25	Bandırma Gübre	0	8
26	Sunjüt	0	8
27	Akteks Akrilik	0	8
28	Alp Ateş Gübre	0	8
29	Royal Halı	0	7
30	Süper Film	0	7
31	Silteks Tekstil	0	7
32	Polinas Plastik	0	7
33	Kardemir Haddecilik	0	7
34	Bayteks Tekstil	0	7
35	Fjord Marin	0	6
36	Saykon Deniz	0	6
37	Toprak Mahsulleri	0	6
38	Ada Su Ürünleri	0	6
39	Bağ Yağları	0	6
40	Gülle Entegre Tekstil	0	6

Source: www.dtm.gov.tr

## Developments in 2009

Due to the fact that the €/ \$ cross-rate has fluctuated between 1.25 and 1.4 during the first half of 2009,<sup>317</sup> there might be major differences in analyzing foreign trade figures. It would be more appropriate to analyze commercial relations of Turkey and Greece in € terms in conformity with the Greek Statistical Agency and Eurostat. During the first half of 2009, Turkey's foreign trade declined 37 % in \$ terms and 27 % in € terms. Decline in Turkey's exports was 31 % in \$ basis and 20 % in € terms. The decline in Turkey's imports was 41 % in \$ basis and 32 % in € terms. The decline in Turkey's exports to Greece was declined 29.9 % during the first half of 2009, which is 10 % more than that of the total export figure. It has declined from € 847.5 mio to €593.7. This decline has been around 40 % in \$ terms.<sup>318</sup>

Imports from Greece during the first half of 2009 increased 4.9 % despite the 32.5 % decline in total imports. Imports from Greece increased from € 369 to € 387 when we compare the first halves of 2008 and 2009. On the other hand this 4.9 % increase in € terms equals to 8.2 % decline in \$ terms.<sup>319</sup>

When we analyze foreign trade figures of Turkey and Greece, we see that exports increase in March, April and May whereas imports increase in the months of Q3. Foreign Trade figures of the last 30 years show that December 2008 export figure is the lowest with \$ 103 mio. Export figures of June 2007 (\$260 mio) and April 2008 (\$255 mio) have been the highest figures achieved.<sup>320</sup>

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<sup>317</sup> The European Central Bank, [www.ecb.int/stats/exchange/eurofxref/html/eurofxref-graph-usd.en.html](http://www.ecb.int/stats/exchange/eurofxref/html/eurofxref-graph-usd.en.html)

<sup>318</sup> [www.epp.eurostat.ec](http://www.epp.eurostat.ec)

<sup>319</sup> [www.dtm.gov.tr](http://www.dtm.gov.tr)

<sup>320</sup> Ibid.

The decline in Greek foreign trade is similar to the decline in Turkish foreign trade. Greek imports have declined 29.8 % and exports 18.3 %. The decline in imports from EU states and third countries are similar. However, the Greek exports to EU have declined 21 % whereas the decline to third countries has been only 0.8 %. 60 % of Greek foreign trade is with the EU. Turkey has been the 6<sup>th</sup> in exports and 10<sup>th</sup> in imports for Greece. Excluding the EU countries, Turkey is Greece's # 2 exporting country and # 4 importing country.

Declining domestic and international demand, decreasing production, a 30 % decline in construction, increasing competition, tendency to liquidate existing stocks, neighboring countries' interest for Greece have all lead to a decrease in Turkey's exports to Greece.<sup>321</sup>

#### Agreements and Protocols

The Economic Cooperation Agreement signed between Turkey and Greece on 4 February 2000 became operational in 25 November 2001. The Joint Economic Council, which was established, based on this agreement, held its 1<sup>st</sup> term meeting on February 12-13<sup>th</sup> 2002 in Athens, the 2<sup>nd</sup> meeting on March 12-13<sup>th</sup> 2003 in Ankara and the 3<sup>rd</sup> meeting on June 29-30<sup>th</sup> 2005 in Athens.<sup>322</sup>

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<sup>321</sup> [www.hepo.gr](http://www.hepo.gr)

<sup>322</sup> [www.ito.org.tr](http://www.ito.org.tr) (İstanbul Chamber of Commerce, Avrupa Bir.Uluslararası İşbirliği Şb., Yunanistan Ülke Raporu)

Agreement	Date	Off.Gazette
Air Transportation	22.07.1947	-
Commerce and Payments	07.11.1953	08.02.1955
International Land Transportation	16.11.1970	-
Cooperation in Tourism	20.01.2000	10.05.2000
Bi-lateral Promotion and Securitization of Investments	20.01.2000	01.08.2001
Concensus on Protecting the Environment	20.01.2000	16.05.2000
Fighting Terrorism, Org. Crime , Drugs , Smuggling and Illegal immig.	20.01.2000	14.07.2001
Scientific and Technological Cooperation	04.02.2000	10.05.2000
Adm.Ass.& Coop. in Prevention, Follow-up and Fighting Customs Crime	04.02.2000	10.05.2000
Cultural Cooperation	04.02.2000	10.05.2000
Economic Cooperation	04.02.2000	25.01.2001
Sea Transport	04.02.2000	25.07.2001
Technical, Scientific and Economic Cooperation in Agriculture	22.06.2000	18.07.2001
Prevention of double Taxation	02.12.2003	02.03.2004
Cooperation in Standardization, Suitability Evaluation and Testing	30.06.2005	-
Cooperation in Health	28.09.2005	-

There are three border gates between Turkey and Greece. Far south is the İpsala border gate, Uzunköprü in the middle and Pazarkule is in the north. İpsala is the most active border gate in terms of land transport.<sup>323</sup>

Table 22. Land Transport

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
# Transit Docs.	35,000	40,000	42,000	42,000	49,000
TR Vehicles to GR	20,796	22,780	24,956	28,500	?
GR Vehicles to TR	2454	1257	852	1900	?

Source: [www.ubak.gov.tr](http://www.ubak.gov.tr) (Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Transport and Communication)

<sup>323</sup> Republic of Turkey, Undersecretariat of Customs.  
<http://www.gumruk.gov.tr/tr-TR/tanitim/Sayfalar/harita.aspx>

## Other Contacts and Negotiations

- Meetings organized/attended by TOBB and DEIK between 2002 and 2008<sup>324</sup>
  - May 17-18 2002: 4<sup>th</sup> Turkish-Greek tourism Forum held in Kos-Greece
  - June 8-9 2002: 4<sup>th</sup> Turkish Aegean Shores- Greek Aegean Islands Economic Summit
  - September 26-28 2003: 5<sup>th</sup> Turkish Aegean Shores- Greek Aegean Islands Eco. Summit
  - October 21-22 2003: Foreign Minister Abdullah Gül's visit to Athens
  - May 6-8 2004: Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan's visit to Athens
  - December 1-2 2005: ECTAA Athens meeting
  - December 3-5 2007: Foreign Minister Ali Babacan's visit to Athens
- Minister of State H.E. Kürşad Tüzmen, December 8-10th 2006 visit to Rhodes, "Rhodes Turkish Export Goods "The 1<sup>st</sup> Rhodes Turkish Export Goods Fair was started by Ministers Kürşat Tüzmen and Aristotelis Pavlidis with the contribution of Milas, Muğla, Marmaris, Fethiye and Bodrum Maritime Chambers.<sup>325</sup>
- Minister of State H.E. Kürşad Tüzmen, April 5-6th 2006 visit to Greece, Meetings with Minister of Development, Minister of Economy, Minister of Aegean and Island Policies, Attendance to the Conference on Economy held by the Economist weekly, the opening of Turkish stores İpekyol, Machka, Koton ve İnci.<sup>326</sup>
- Minister of State H.E. Kürşad Tüzmen, April 22-24th 2004 visit to Greece as Head of Trade Delegation

<sup>324</sup> TURSAB (Ass.of Turkish Travel Agencies)Tourism News,  
<http://www.turizmhaberleri.com/haberayrinti.asp?ID=12117>

<sup>325</sup> RODOS, Türk İhraç Ürünleri Fuarı, 9-11 December 2006, Milas Ticaret ve Sanayii Odası,  
[www.mitso.org.tr](http://www.mitso.org.tr)

<sup>326</sup> Ibid. TURSAB

- A delegation headed by Undersecretary of Foreign Trade Tuncer Kayalar visited Greece for the 3<sup>rd</sup> term JEC meeting.<sup>327</sup>

### The Turkish-Greek Business Council

The council was established to promote the commercial and economic cooperation opportunities between Turkey and Greece. Yearly meetings are held in Turkey and Greece in turns. During the Foreign Minister Ali Babacan's visit to Athens on December 2007, this new Business council has been established between DEİK (Foreign Economic Relations Council) and SEV (Greek Industrialists' Federation). SEV being the Greek equivalent of Turkish TUSIAD is expected to promote the relations even further ahead.<sup>328</sup>

### Turkey's Aegean Coasts-Greek Aegean Islands Economy Summits

The Greek-Turkish Chamber of Commerce and the İzmir Chamber of Commerce Organize annual meetings in which Foreign Ministers of both countries as well as senior bureaucrats and state officials are guests. The first one was held at Midilli in 1998, followed by İzmir, Samos, Bodrum, Kos, Crete, Athens, Marmaris, Rhodes and Kalamata.<sup>329</sup>

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<sup>327</sup> Dünya Gazetesi, [www.dunyagazetesi.com.tr/haberArsiv.asp?id=165062](http://www.dunyagazetesi.com.tr/haberArsiv.asp?id=165062)

<sup>328</sup> Hellenic Republic.

[www.greekembassy.org/Embassy/content/en/Article.aspx?office=5&folder=361&article=22309](http://www.greekembassy.org/Embassy/content/en/Article.aspx?office=5&folder=361&article=22309)

<sup>329</sup> Ali Osman Eğilmez, Developing Business Ties, *the Bridge*, Q1 2010  
[www.bridge-mag.com/magazine/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=378](http://www.bridge-mag.com/magazine/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=378)

### Free-Zones <sup>330</sup>

According to 2004 figures, a volume of \$ 28.8 million from the free-zones to Greece and \$47.9 million from Greece to the free-zones totaling \$76.7 million of foreign trade were generated between Greece and the free-zones were generated. These figures were \$21.1 million, \$16.7 million, \$37.8 million in 2005; \$27.9 million, \$31 million, \$58.9 million in 2006, respectively.

### Commerce and Economic Cooperation Work Groups <sup>331</sup>

The Commercial and Economic Cooperation Work Groups were established upon the initiation of Foreign Affairs ministers during the rapprochement process. The 11<sup>th</sup> meeting was held in Athens on April 2008.

### Cooperation in 3<sup>rd</sup> Countries

Turkish construction company ENKA and the Greek company ATE 2005 have established a consortium and undertaken the \$ 2 billion part of the \$ 15 billion “Blue City Project” in the Kingdom of Oman.<sup>332</sup>

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<sup>330</sup> [www.dtm.gov.tr](http://www.dtm.gov.tr) and [www.hepo.gr](http://www.hepo.gr)

<sup>331</sup> Regional Cooperation Council, 29 July 2010. [www.rcc.int/index.php?action=news\\_archive](http://www.rcc.int/index.php?action=news_archive)

<sup>332</sup> ENKA Construction Company, The BlueCity Project, Oman. [www.enka.com](http://www.enka.com)  
[www.enka.com/Enka.aspx?MainID=67&ContentID=274&SubID=207&ReferenceID=223](http://www.enka.com/Enka.aspx?MainID=67&ContentID=274&SubID=207&ReferenceID=223)

### Eximbank Credit Facilities<sup>333</sup>

Exports to Greece are supported by Eximbank's short term credit and insurance programs. Within the insurance program, exports of \$91 mio in 2003, \$113 mio in 2004 and \$137 million in 2005 have been insured.

### Guidance Committee Meetings<sup>334</sup>

In accordance with the agreement of the June 1999 meeting of Foreign Ministers in New York, "tourism, environment, commercial and economic cooperation, culture, regional cooperation, fighting vs. organized crime, drugs and terrorism" work group meetings are held regularly. Orientation Committee's 13<sup>th</sup> meeting was held in Ankara on July 2008 and the last in Athens on May 2009.

### Electric Line Interconnection<sup>335</sup>

An agreement was reached between TEİAŞ and PPC on March 2002 to connect Turkey and Greece in order to get Turkish electricity to Greece, Balkan countries and European Electric Union (UCTE). This project covers the 400 kV Filipi-Babaeski transmission lines. The agreement was signed on May 2003. This will be the 3<sup>rd</sup> interconnecting

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<sup>333</sup> [www.turkeximbank.gov.tr](http://www.turkeximbank.gov.tr)

<sup>334</sup> [www.worldbulletin.net](http://www.worldbulletin.net)

<sup>335</sup> MedRing: Building an interconnected system across 3 continents.  
<http://www.globaltransmission.info/archive.php?id=1433>

electricity line out of Turkey other than the two existing lines between Turkey and Bulgaria.

#### Natural Gas Lines Interconnection<sup>336</sup>

The agreement between Turkey and Greece covering the building of a natural gas pipeline was signed on 23 February 2003. The natural gas sales agreement was signed between BOTAŞ and DEPA on 23 December 2003. The fixed start point was 31 December 2006. The 285 km long pipeline's 209 km. part in Turkey cost €80 million, the 76 km part in Greece cost € 115 million. In the 1<sup>st</sup> phase the pipeline is expected to deliver Greece 750 million m<sup>3</sup> of natural gas whereas the expectations lead to 11 billion m<sup>3</sup> in the future.

Apart from the 3 billion m<sup>3</sup> Greek consumption, 8 billion m<sup>3</sup> will be sent to other European countries. The interconnector opening was held in November 2007 by the joint presence of PM's. Another project which Greece is keen about is the Turkish-Greek natural gas pipeline and its second part which is the Greek-Italian pipeline. This 285 km. pipeline was opened in November 2008 and the other is expected to be finished by 2012.

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<sup>336</sup> [www.iea.org/work/2002/seagas/NMCDEPA.PDF](http://www.iea.org/work/2002/seagas/NMCDEPA.PDF)

### The Building of the Second Bridge on the River Meriç<sup>337</sup>

Since the existing old bridge on the İpsala/Kipi border had become insufficient in comparison to the fastly developing commercial relations between Turkey and Greece, it was decided to build a second modern bridge during the Joint Economic council meeting. The agreement was signed on June 2006 by the Foreign Affairs Ministers.

### Tourism<sup>338</sup>

Tourism issues which were analyzed in Tourism Working Groups and Tourism Forums till now will be further elaborated with the signing of a Tourism Cooperation Agreement between Turkey and Greece. The 6<sup>th</sup> Turkish-Greek Tourism Forum was held in Sisam and Kuşadası on June 2005 whereas the 7<sup>th</sup> Tourism Forum and the 2<sup>nd</sup> term Tourism Joint Commission meeting were held in Antalya in November 2006. Every year more than half a million tourists visit Turkey. This is close to 5 % of the Greek population.

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<sup>337</sup> [www.tbmm.gov.tr/d23/7/7-0885c.pdf](http://www.tbmm.gov.tr/d23/7/7-0885c.pdf)

<sup>338</sup> TURSAB (Ass.of Turkish Travel Agencies) [www.tursab.org.tr](http://www.tursab.org.tr) and [www.gnto.gr](http://www.gnto.gr) (Greek National Tourism Org.)

Table 23. Number of Greek Tourists

YEARS	# TOURISTS
2004	458,417
2005	584,952
2006	460,656
2007	447,900
2008	572,212

INTERREG III/A Greece-Turkey Cross-border Cooperation Program<sup>339</sup>

Interreg III is an EU initiative aiming to promote regional cooperation for the program term of 2000-2006.<sup>340</sup> It aims to enable national borders to the integration of European continent and promote regional cooperation. In accordance with Interreg III, to further enhance the existing cooperation between the border cities of Turkey and Greece, “Interreg III/A Greece-Turkey Program” was started. For the 2004-2006 term the program was decided to carry out according to the the strategy, Joint Programming Document and the Programme Complement document. Non-profit organizations in the border cities were chosen to be eligible for the respective EU funds. On the Turkish side, the programme covers Aydın, Balıkesir, Çanakkale, Edirne, İzmir and Muğla cities. The Turkish side’s budget was €19.3 million made up of, €15 million Turkey-EU Pre-Accession Financial Cooperation Fund and €4.3 million Turkish contribution. During the meetings held in 2005, a concensus on the term “Cross Border” could not be reached and so the project was not materialized. The Greek side declared the land borders as “the

<sup>339</sup> [www.invgr.com/invgt.htm](http://www.invgr.com/invgt.htm)

<sup>340</sup> [www.interreg4c.net](http://www.interreg4c.net)

region between”Meriç to Enes” whereas Turkey has asked the Aegean borders to be included.

#### Export of Live Baby Fish to Greece<sup>341</sup>

The import-export transactions which started in 2002 were carried out smoothly till 2005. In 2005, the Greek side banned the importation of baby fish which created problems for Turkish companies. However, the problem has been solved by unofficially and the exports have been going on since then. In line with the Greek customs requirements, baby fish are exported from the Aegean islands of Rhodes, Sakız and Simi.

#### Dual Committee<sup>342</sup>

During the 3<sup>rd</sup> Joint Economic Committee meeting held in Athens on June 2005, the Greek side has proposed the establishment of a “Dual Committee” to abolish the bureaucratic barriers in Turkish-Greek commercial relations and to bring on suggestions to develop bilateral trade relations. This suggested committee was in fact a combination of the Turkish-Greek Joint Economic Commission and the Turkish-Greek Business Council. The Turkish side informed the Greek side that instead of establishing such a committee, Temporary Work Groups functioning under the Joint Economic Council incorporating public and private sector representatives would be more functional.

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<sup>341</sup> [www.igeme.gov.tr](http://www.igeme.gov.tr) (Export Promotion Center of Turkey)

<sup>342</sup> METU, *Turkish-Greek Case Study*, METU Center for Black Sea and Central Asia Studies, Ankara. [www.eudimensions.eu](http://www.eudimensions.eu)

## Damping Investigations<sup>343</sup>

The EU has filed two investigations 8 May 2008 and 13 November 2008 concerning iron-steel products. On the other hand, there hasn't been an investigation issued against Greece in accordance with the "Regulation concerning the mal-competition in Imports"

Table 24. Fairs Attended between 2004-2008

TIF	September-04	GENERAL	Thessaloniki
FINEX FASHION FAIR	February-05	FASHION	Athens
INFACOMA 2005	February-05	HEATING-COOLING	Thessaloniki
SHOETIME	February-05	FOOTWEAR	Athens
DETROP	March-05	FOOD-PACKAGING-MAC.	Thessaloniki
FURNIDEC 2005	March-05	HOME-OFFICE-GARDEN FURNITURE	Thessaloniki
AUTO & SPARE	May-05	AUTOMOTIVE&SPARE	Athens
FINEX FASHION FAIR	September-05	FASHION	Athens
TIF	September-05	COMMERCE	Thessaloniki
HOME TEXTILE	October-05	JOME TEXTILE	Athens
SHOETIME	November-05	FOOTWEAR	Athens
AGROTICA	February-06	AGR.& FOOD PROCESS MACH.	Thessaloniki
INFACOMA	February-06	CONSTRUCTION	Thessaloniki
FINEX FASHION FAIR	February-06	FASHION	Athens
FURNIDEC	March-06	FURNITURE	Thessaloniki
FINEX FASHION FAIR	September-06	FASHION	Athens
TIF	September-06	GENERAL	Thessaloniki
TURKISH EXP GOODS	December-06	GENERAL	Rhodes
INFACOMA	February-07	CONSTRUCTION	Thessaloniki
DETROP	March-07	FOOD	Thessaloniki
FURNIDEC	May-07	FURNITURE-DECORATION	Thessaloniki
TIF	September-07	GENERAL COMMERCE	Thessaloniki
FEDEC	October-07	FACTORY EQ.	Athens
FURNIDEC	January-08	FURNITURE-DECORATION	Thessaloniki
AGROTICA	February-08	AGRICULTURE	Thessaloniki
21sr INT.FOOD&BEV.TECH.	February-08	FOOD&BEVERAGES	Athens
INFACOMA	February-08	CONSTRUCTION	Thessaloniki
TIF	September-08	GENERAL	Thessaloniki

Source: www.hepo.gr (Hellenic Foreign Trade Board)

<sup>343</sup> European Union, European Commission>Trade>Tackling unfair trade>Trade Defence>Anti-dumping, [http://www.ec.europa.eu/trade/tackling-unfair-trade>Trade-defence/anti-dumping/index\\_en.htm](http://www.ec.europa.eu/trade/tackling-unfair-trade>Trade-defence/anti-dumping/index_en.htm)  
<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/tdi/completed.cfm>

## CHAPTER 6

### CONCLUSION

Greek-Turkish relations have always been a controversial issue in international politics. Due to the strategic and geo-political importance of both countries, they have been viewed as key actors in the Western world by constituting the southeastern flank of NATO. Taking positions actively in the Western front since the beginning of the Cold War, problems in bilateral relations between Turkey and Greece have been a source of instability in southeastern Europe, Mediterranean as well as the Middle East. Surely, numerous differences and problems have existed between Turkey and Greece throughout their common history. However, their co-existence<sup>344</sup> has resulted in a negative memory of mutual experience. Antagonism, mistrust and especially a lack of trust between Turkey and Greece have created problems and issues of conflict.<sup>345</sup> Many scholars like Tosun Bahçeli, argue that the essence of the Turkish-Greek conflict lies in the Aegean due to the overlapping of Greek and Turkish interests in the area. On numerous occasions the international community and major actors such as the U.S., the EU and super-powers have participated actively in tension-relieving and solution-oriented efforts whenever required starting from 1821.<sup>346</sup>

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<sup>344</sup> Trevor-Roper, H.R., "A Case of Coexistence", *The New Statesman and Nation*, May 14, 1957, In Ahmet Evin, *Changing Greek Perspectives on Turkey in Greek-Turkish Relations, In an Era of Detente*, ed. Ali Çarkoğlu and Barry Rubin, (Routledge, 2005), p. 5.

<sup>345</sup> Murat Hatipoğlu, *Türk-Yunan İlişkilerinin 101 Yılı (1821-1922)*, (Ankara: Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü, 1988)

<sup>346</sup> Fotios Moustakis, *the Greek-turkish Relationship and NATO*, (London: Frank Cass, 2003)

Every tension and relief process in bilateral relations has shown that cooperative relations are for the benefit of both Greece and Turkey. Both countries should overcome their security dilemma in order to enhance their co-existence.<sup>347</sup>

Yet once this dilemma is overcome bilateral relations have to be enhanced so as to achieve irreversibility. Throughout history, Turkish-Greek cooperative bilateral relations or in other words rapprochement efforts have taken place in instrumental form. Although they had different reasons to start and to end, it is obvious that they share similar characteristics. Although all rapprochement efforts initiated from divergent starting points, they were realized during periods of strong-stable governments and distinctive leaders with common potential interests and goals. The Atatürk-Venizelos era was important due to the aftermath of war.<sup>348</sup> The victorious Turks led by Atatürk were building up a new State whereas Greeks led by Venizelos were trying to recover from a lost war.

Apart from distinctive leadership qualities it was also of mutual benefit to develop war-stricken relations. The second effort<sup>349</sup> of post-WW II, the Soviet Union posed a substantial danger to the Western world. Both countries, eager to take part in the Western world cooperated mutually and achieved their goals by becoming members in NATO. The third rapprochement effort<sup>350</sup> was initiated by Özal and Papandreou in Davos when the countries facing delicate financial situations had just gone through a major confrontation in the Aegean bringing them close to war once again. All three

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<sup>347</sup> Alexis Heraclides, *Yunanistan ve Doğu'dan Gelen Tehlike Türkiye*, trans. Mihalis Vasilyadis and Herkül Millas, (İstanbul: İletişim Yay., 2002)

<sup>348</sup> Oran Baskın, ed. *Türk Dış Politikası; Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar, Cilt: 2(1919-1980)*, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2009), p. 344-356.

<sup>349</sup> *Ibid.*, p.581-588.

<sup>350</sup> *Ibid.*, Cilt 2 (1980-2001), p.113-114.

efforts were affected deeply by the personal views and initiative of state leaders as well as the international and regional security requirements.<sup>351</sup>

The last rapprochement effort of the twentieth century was initiated in a rather different manner. Contrary to the previous ones this time it was a bottom-up process due a reaction to the earth quake disaster that hit both countries in 1999. It started and was developed by the contribution of the local public at large. Turkish and Greek relations have developed significantly since 1999 rapprochement process. A major shift in Greek foreign policy has occurred since 1999<sup>352353</sup> and Greece seems to have abandoned its long-lasting negative attitude towards Turkey's European Union accession. The level of cooperation between the two countries has developed enormously at the social, political and economic levels.<sup>354</sup> Will history repeat itself? Is this rapprochement effort self-sustainable regardless of the internal politics issues, local bureaucracy and state officials? Every set-back for the dissolution of previous rapprochement processes seems to be in-evident this time.

The bureaucracy in both countries has a more positive stance, divergence in national interests tend be resolved positively. Finally, this final rapprochement process is actually moving on relatively more favorable ground as compared to the previous ones since besides politicians and officials, the public in large and the economies-

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<sup>351</sup> Aksu, Fuat, *Türk-Yunan İlişkileri: İlişkilerin Yönelimini Etkileyen Faktörler Üzerine Bir İnceleme*, (Ankara, SAEMK Yay., 2001)

<sup>352</sup> İsmail Cem, Letter from Foreign Minister of the Republic of Turkey, to Mr. George Papandreou, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Greece, Ankara, 24-5-1999, available from, <http://www.greekturkishforum.org/docu c1.htm>;

<sup>353</sup> George Papandreou, Letter from Foreign Minister of the Republic of Greece, to İsmail Cem, Foreign Minister of the Republic of Turkey, Athens, 25-6-1999 available from, <http://www.greekturkishforum.org/docu c2.htm>;

<sup>354</sup> Selim Egeli, interview with the author, İstanbul, 29-1-2010, President of Turkish-Greek Business Council, İstanbul, Turkey.

businessmen are also involved in the process. The economic relations having developed substantially constitute the most important support factor to positive bilateral relations.

Apart from efforts by Turkey and Greece, the international community, the superpowers, mainly the U.S and U.K., NATO and the EU, need to cooperate extensively with both countries to achieve a sustainable and mutually beneficial level of cooperation and understanding. The leading role is of-course with the EU. Turkey's EU membership candidacy, which was decided on December, 17 2004, is of critical importance. It is widely believed that Turkey's admission to the EU will make substantial contribution to the settlement of existing problems and disputes between Greece and Turkey leading to a mutually promising, peaceful and friendly future.

## NOTES

i "Coexistence" is the sharing of a common geography with a minimum degree of cultural integration between separate communities that have, and wish to keep, their distinct, ethnic, confessional and/or cultural characteristics.

ii "Tourkokratia" is a term used to describe a period from 4th.Century to as late as 1922 in Greece. A narrower definition covers a period between the conquering of Constantinople in 1453 to the Greek War of Independence in 1821.

iii A study on Turkish-Greek relations indicates that "more than % 90 of Greeks believe that Turkey threatens Greece", while a survey of public opinion in 1986, indicated that % 63 of Greeks questioned, "didn't trust Turks at all".

iv Berne Agreement between Turkey and Greece of 11 November 1976. Following Turkey's authorization of Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) to drill for oil in the Turkish continental shelf of the Aegean the tension rose between Turkey and Greece. The dispute was brought to the agenda of UN by Greece. Assessing the dispute, the UN Security Council in Resolution 395 adopted August 25 1976, called upon Turkey and Greece to resume direct negotiations in order to reach mutually acceptable solutions. Following the Resolution 395, Greece applied to the ICJ. The ICJ deliberated on the issue between the summer of 1976 and December 1978 but it rejected Greece's argument that Turkey was bound to submit to the jurisdiction of the Court. Within this perspective, Foreign Ministers Çağlayangil and Bitsios met in New York in October 1, 1976 to reach a form of modus vivendi by agreeing to adopt a set of procedures for bilateral negotiations and to refrain from any exploration in areas outside their respective territorial waters. Following the negotiations carried out in Berne, Turkey and Greece signed the Berne Declaration on November 2, 1976. The Berne Declaration is at heart, a text of confidence building measures. It aims to eliminate the mistrust created between the two nations following the 1974 period and to start a new peaceful era of negotiations. According to the declaration;

1. The two parties agree that the negotiations shall be frank, thoroughgoing and pursued in good faith, with a view to reaching an agreement based on their mutual consent with regard to the delimitation of the continental shelf as between themselves.
2. The two parties agree that these negotiations shall by their very nature be strictly confidential.
3. The two parties reserve their respective positions with regard to the delimitation of the continental shelf.
4. The two parties undertake not in any circumstances to make use of the provisions of this document, or such proposals as may be made by either side during these negotiations, outside the context of the negotiations themselves.
5. The two parties agree that there shall be no statements or leaks to the press on the contents of the negotiations, unless they decide otherwise by common accord.
6. The two parties undertake to refrain from any initiative or act concerning the Aegean continental shelf that might trouble the negotiations.
7. The two parties each undertake, so far as their bilateral relations are concerned, to refrain from any initiative or act likely to throw discredit on the other.
8. The two parties have agreed to study the practice of States and the international rules on the subject, with a view to eliciting such principles and practical criteria as might be of use in the case of the delimitation of the continental shelf between the two countries.
9. To that end, a mixed commission will be set up to be composed of national representatives.
10. The two parties agree to adopt a gradual rhythm in the negotiating process to be followed, after mutual consultation.

v On 27-1-1996, a crisis broke out between Turkish and Greek Naval Forces around the islet of Imia/Kardak. Hürriyet, a prominent newspaper in Turkey published the photos of its journalists taking down the Greek flag and raising up the Turkish flag.

vi The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) of 10 December 1982 is the international agreement that resulted from the third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which took place from 1973 through 1982. The Law of the Sea Convention defines the rights and responsibilities of nations in their use of the world's oceans, establishing guidelines for businesses, the environment, and the management of marine natural resources. The Convention, concluded in 1982, replaced four 1958 treaties. UNCLOS came into force in 1994. when Guyana signed the treaty as the 60th state. ("The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (A historical perspective)". United Nations Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea.)

[http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention\\_agreements/convention\\_historical\\_perspective.htm](http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_historical_perspective.htm). retrieved April 30, 2009) To date, 158 countries and the European Community have joined in the Convention. It's now regarded as a codification of the customary international law on the issue. While the UN provides support for meetings of states party to the Convention, it has no direct operational role in the implementation of the Convention. There is, however, a role played by organizations such as the International Maritime Organization, the International Whaling Commission, and the International Seabed Authority (the latter being established by the UN Convention).

### UNCLOS I

In 1956, the United Nations held its first Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I) at Geneva, Switzerland. UNCLOS I resulted in four treaties concluded in 1958:

- Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, entry into force: 10 September 1964
- Convention on the Continental Shelf, entry into force: 10 June 1964
- Convention on the High Seas, entry into force: 30 September 1962
- Convention on Fishing and Conservation of Living Resources of the High Seas, entry into force: 20 March 1966

Although UNCLOS I was considered a success, it left open the important issue of breadth of territorial waters.

### UNCLOS II

In 1960, the United Nations held the second Conference on the Law of the Sea; however, the six-week Geneva conference did not result in any new agreements. Generally speaking, developing nations and third world countries participated only as clients, allies, or dependents of United States or the Soviet Union, with no significant voice of their own.

### UNCLOS III

The issue of varying claims of territorial waters was raised in the UN in 1967 by Arvid Pardo, of Malta, and in 1973 the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea was convened in New York. In an attempt to reduce the possibility of groups of nation-states dominating the negotiations, the conference used a consensus process rather than majority vote. With more than 160 nations participating, the conference lasted until 1982. The resulting convention came into force on November 16, 1994, one year after the sixtieth state, Guyana, ratified the treaty. The convention introduced a number of provisions. The most significant issues covered were setting limits, navigation, archipelagic status and transit regimes, exclusive economic zones (EEZs), continental shelf jurisdiction, deep seabed mining, the exploitation regime, protection of the marine environment, scientific research, and settlement of disputes. The convention set the limit of various areas, measured from a carefully defined baseline. (Normally, a sea baseline follows the low-water line, but when the coastline is deeply indented, has fringing islands or is highly unstable, straight baselines may be used.) The areas are as follows: internal waters, territorial waters, archipelagic waters, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zones (EEZs) and the continental shelf.

vii Türkiye, 1976 yılında konuyla ilgili olarak ortaya kesin bir tavır koymuştur. Türkiye, Yunanistan'ın karasularını altı milin ötesine genişletmesinin "savaş nedeni" (casus belli) sayılacağını kesin bir dille ilan etmiştir. Demirel'in Başbakanlığını yaptığı 1. Milli Cephe Hükümeti'nin bu kararı, zamanın Dışişleri Bakanı İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil tarafından 15 Nisan 1976'da ABD Dışişleri Bakanı Henry Kissinger'a yazılı bir mesajla bildirilmiştir." Şükrü Elekdağ, "Ege'de Kriz Belgeleri", Milliyet, 11 Şubat 1996, s. 19. Mektubun Türkçe metni aşağıdaki gibidir;

15 Nisan 1976  
Ekselans Henry Kissinger  
ABD Dışışleri Bakanı  
Sayın Bakan,

Kabine toplantısında iken, Genel Sekreter Elekdağ, Ekselansları ile Yunanistan Dışışleri Bakanı Mr. Bitsios arasında teati edilen ve metinleri Büyükelçi Macomber tarafından Bay Elekdağ'a tevdi edilen mektuplar hakkında bana bilgi verdi. Mesajınızın aşağıda belirtilen cümlesini çok ciddi telakki ediyorum.

"Bu itibarla, ABD, taraflardan birinin bir askeri çözüm aramasına aktif (actively) olarak ve iltibasa mahal vermeyecek (Hiçbir şüphe ve tereddüt yaratmayacak) bir tarzda karşı koyacak ve böyle bir hareket hattını önlemek amacıyla büyük gayretler sarfedecektir."

Bay Elekdağ'ın da Büyükelçinin dikkatini aynı konuda hemen çekmiş olduğu üzere, bu beyanın, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri hükümetinin konu hakkında yeni bir vaziyet ve tutum aldığı aksettirdiği kanaatine vardım. Şurası açıktır ki, Yunan hükümetinin esas emeli karasularının sınırlarını 12 mile çıkarmak suretiyle, bir oldubitti yaratmak ve bu suretle, Türkiye üzerinde siyasi bir zafer kazanmaktır. Böyle bir hareket Ege Denizi'ni Yunan gölü haline getirebilecek ve netice itibariyle, Türkiye'nin bu denizdeki tabii ve yerleşmiş ananevi (Geleneksel) haklarını fiilen ortadan kaldıracaktır.

Bu durum Türkiye'ye, böyle bir gelişmeyi bir harp sebebi olarak telakki etmekten gayri bir opsiyon imkanı bırakmayacaktır.

Bu itibarla, bu nevi gelişmeleri teşvik edecek nitelikteki pozisyon değişikliklerini, sadece ikili ilişkilerimiz bakımından değil, fakat bölgenin güvenliği bakımından da tehlikeli görüyorum.

Sizden ricam, yukarda işaret ettiğim cümlenin, bizim, tafsile (etraflı bir şekilde izaha) çalıştığımız endişelerimizi hesaba katarak yeni tefsirlere (yorumlara) ve polemiklere meydan vermeyecek bir şekilde düzeltilmesidir, bu mümkün olmadığı takdirde, bahse konu mektupların açıklanmamasının teminidir. Samimiyetle inanıyorum ki, bu Yunanistan'ın da yararına olacaktır.

Saygılarımla  
İhsan Sabri Çağlayangil

viii "Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, 8 Haziran 1995 tarihinde yaptığı 121 inci Birleşiminde, Yunan Parlamentosunun, Birleşmiş Milletler Deniz Hukuku Sözleşmesini onaylayarak, Yunanistan yönünden uygulanabilecek aşamaya getirmesi sonucu ortaya çıkan durumu görüşmüş, aşağıdaki açıklamayı oybirliğiyle kabul etmiştir. Türkiye-Yunanistan arasında ortak deniz olan Ege'deki dengeler, 24 Temmuz 1923 tarihli Lozan Barış Antlaşmasıyla kurulmuştur. O tarihte her iki ülkenin karasuları 3 deniz mili olarak belirlenmişti. Bu durumda, milli hükümler dışındaki açık deniz alanları Ege'nin yüzde 70'ini oluşturmaktaydı. Yunanistan, 8 Ekim 1936 tarihinde karasularını 6 deniz miline çıkararak Ege'nin yüzde 43,68'ini, yani yaklaşık yarısını egemenliği altına almıştır. Ancak, 1964 tarihinde 6 mile çıkarılan Ege'deki Türk karasuları ise, Ege'nin yaklaşık yüzde 7'lik bölümünü kapsamaktadır. Ege'nin yarısı halen açık deniz alanı statüsünde bulunmaktadır. Yunanistan, son olarak, Deniz Hukuku Sözleşmesinin, esas itibariyle açık denizler ve okyanuslar için belirlenmiş bazı hükümlerinden yararlanarak, karasularını 12 mile çıkarmak isteğini ortaya atmıştır. Bu durum gerçekleştiği takdirde, Yunanistan, Ege Denizinin yaklaşık yüzde 72'sini egemenliği altına sokmuş olacaktır. Bir yarımada olan Türkiye'nin, dünya denizlerine ve okyanuslarına Yunan karasularından geçerek ulaşmasına yol açacak böyle bir durumu kabul etmesi asla düşünülemez. Türkiye'nin, Ege'de hayatî menfaatları vardır.

**Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi, Yunanistan Hükümetinin Lozanla kurulmuş dengeyi bozacak biçimde Ege'deki karasularını 6 milin ötesine çıkarma kararı almayacağını ümit etmekle birlikte, böyle bir olasılık durumunda, ülkemizin hayatî menfaatlarını muhafaza ve müdafaa için, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Hükümetine, askerî bakımdan gerekli görülecek olanlar da dahil olmak üzere, tüm yetkilerin verilmesine ve bu durumun Yunan ve dünya kamuoyuna dostane duygularla duyurulmasına karar vermiştir."**

ix Modus vivendi is a Latin phrase meaning way of living. It implies an accommodation between disputing parties to allow life to go on and usually describes informal and temporary arrangements in political affairs. For instance, where two sides reach a modus vivendi regarding disputed territories, despite political, historical or cultural incompatibilities, an accommodation of their respective differences is established for the sake of contingency. This sense of the term has been used as a keystone in the political philosophy of John Gray. Diplomatically, a modus vivendi is an instrument for establishing an international accord of a temporary or provisional nature, intended to be replaced by a more substantial and thorough agreement, such as a treaty. It is usually fashioned informally, and so never requires legislative ratification. Typically armistices and instruments of surrender are modi vivendi.

x Pomaks are a Bulgarian Muslim population group native to some parts of Bulgaria, specifically southern Bulgaria, and the adjacent parts of Greece and Turkey. Historically they are usually considered descendants of native Bulgarians who converted to Islam during the Ottoman rule of the Balkans,[1] although some alternative narratives of their historical identity have been proposed[2] and, according to some authors, their precise origins remain unknown.[3] Today the Pomaks in Greece inhabit the prefectures of Xanthi, Rhodope and Evros.[4] Until Greco-Turkish War (1919–1922) and Population exchange between Greece and Turkey in 1923 Pomaks inhabited a part of the regions of Moglena[5], Kostur[6] and some other parts of Macedonia, Greece. The Pomaks of Thrace were exempted from those exchanges. Pomaks live in the three departments of Western Thrace: they are the main component of the Muslim (in fact today Turkish) minority in Xanthi. There have not been any official statistics since 1951 but the best estimate for the Pomaks today is a figure around 30,000. The Greek state gives an estimate of 35,000 (COMS, 1994); so do authors 'acceptable' to the Greek state: Hidiroglou (1991:45) and Notaras (1994:47). The 30,000 estimate is based on a Greek Helsinki Monitor/Minority Rights Group-Greece detailed estimation, on the basis of the census data and the synthesis of the minority communities as provided by both the Greek authorities and local minority sources. It is also the estimate of Nakratzas (1988:131) and De Jong (1994). Seyppel (1989:42) gives an estimate of 20,000-30,000. The Pomaks together with Muslim Turks and Roma, were granted by the Lausanne Treaty (1923) the right to primary education in Turkish and Greek. Some Pomaks still transmit their dialect (called pomatsko in Greece) to their children and also speak Turkish and Greek, but a large part of them no longer transmit it, having adopted Turkish or Greek as a first language.[7] Pomaks are those whose mother tongue is Pomakika (in Greek) or Pomakci (in their language); most linguists call that language Pomak and, sometimes, Bulgarian. The Pomak language belongs to the linguistic family of the Southern Slavic languages, and, within them, to the linguistic group of Bulgaro-Macedonian. Although there is no written tradition, the appropriate alphabet to write the language is the Cyrillic. It is generally believed that Pomak is one of the various Bulgaro-Macedonian dialects which existed in the Southern Balkans before the emergence of modern nation-states and their corresponding literary languages.

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xi In 1988, the Greek Highcourt affirmed a 1986 decision of the court of Appeals of Thrace in which the Union of Turkish associations of Western Thrace was ordered to be closed. The court decided that the word "Turkish" referred to citizens of Turkey, and couldn't be used to describe the citizens of Greece and the use of the word "Turkish" to describe Greek muslims was held to endanger public order.

xii According to the Greek Helsinki Monitor, the deprivation of citizenship peaked in the period 1976-1979, as many ethnic Turks who had fled to Turkey after the Cyprus crisis had their citizenship revoked, and again in 1986, as an organized civil-rights movement gained speed in the ethnic Turkish community. According to the The State Department on human Rights for 1997, between 1981 and 1991, Article 19 was applied an average 570 times a year.

xiii EPATH, Special Pedagogical Academy of Thessaloniki founded in 1968 trains members of the minority as teachers for the minority schools. The main language of instruction in EPATH is Greek. The duration of education is 3 years. In the preparatory year, the EPATH students are taught Greek, Turkish, Basic Mathematics, History, Psychology, Geometry, Sports, Geography of Greece and Techniques. Although these teachers will educate the minority children in Turkish, all of the courses except Turkish are taught in Greek which affects the level of their teaching capacity in Turkish. All Pedagogical academies in Greece have been replaced by Faculties of Education or Department of Education in 1989 except the EPATH.

xiv AKEL : The Progressive Party of Working People is a communist party in Cyprus. It supports an independent, demilitarized and non-aligned Cyprus and a federal solution of the internal aspect of the Cyprus problem. It places particular emphasis on rapprochement with the Turkish Cypriots. It supported entry into the EU with certain reservations.

xv Enosis refers to the movement of the Greek Cypriot population to incorporate the island of Cyprus into Greece.

xvi 1960 London Agreement: as above...

xvii The term "consociational democracy" is a term used by Lijphart to describe "the politics of accommodation" where different ethnic groups are represented in the government and their rights and interests are protected against the majority. Another scholar, Horowitz, argues that; Belgium, Canada and the Netherlands are successful examples of consociational democracies whereas Cyprus and Lebanon are failures.

xviii The Treaty of Establishment stated that RoC would have sovereignty over the territory of the former colony with the exception of 2 British military bases.

xix The Treaty of Guarantee stated that Great Britain, Turkey and Greece pledged to guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and security of RoC and the state of affairs established by the constitution.

xx The Treaty of Alliance was signed by Turkey and Greece.

xxi A census carried out in the beginning of 2006 by the TRNC, shows a population of 265,100. The majority is composed of indigeneous Turkish Cypriots with the rest including a large number of settlers from Turkey. Of the 178,000 Turkish Cypriot citizens, % 82 are native Cypriots (145,000). Of the 45,000 people born to non-Cypriot parentage, nearly % 40 (17,000) were born in Cyprus. The figure for non-citizens, including students, guest workers and temporary residents stood at 78,000.

xxii Article 182 of the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus (16 August 1960)

1. The Articles or parts of Articles of this Constitution set out in Annex III hereto which have been incorporated from the Zurich Agreement dated 11th February, 1959, are the basic Articles of this Constitution and cannot, in any way, be amended, whether by way of variation, addition or repeal.

2. Subject to paragraph 1 of this Article any provision of this Constitution may be amended, whether by way of variation, addition or repeal, as provided in paragraph 3 of this Article.3. Such amendment shall be made by a law passed by a majority vote comprising at least two-thirds of the total number of the Representatives belonging to the Greek Community and at least two-thirds of the total number of the Representatives belonging to the Turkish Community.

xxiii After the ethnic clashes of 1963, the Turkish Cypriot community established different governing structures to maintain its communal existence: The Provisional Turkish Cypriot Administration (1967), The Autonomous Turkish Cypriot Administration (1974) And the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus.

xxiv Greek Junta leader Brigadier Ioannidis engineered the coup d'etat against Makarios in July 1974.

xxv *The Cypriot Turkish Declaration of Independence, 15 November 1983*

- *Introduction*
- *Destruction of the Partnership State by Greek Cypriots*
- *Usurpation of the Legislature*
- *Usurpation of the Executive*
- *Usurpation of the Judiciary*
- *Monopolization of the Civil Service*
- *Unilateral Foreign Representation*
- *Police and Armed Forces*
- *Budget and Public Services*
- *Economic Warfare Against Turkish Cypriots*
- *Armed Onslaught and Extermination Plans*
- *Inhuman Discrimination*
- *Why We Owe No Allegiance to the Greek Cypriot Administration*
- *A Fully Working Democracy*
- *A People Determined To Live Together in Security and Freedom*
- *Rejection of Re-Colonization by Greece*
- *Turkish Cypriot Efforts for a Bi-Zonal Federal Solution*
- *Destruction of the Negotiating Process by Greek Cypriot Leadership*
- *Inalienable Right to Self-Determination*
- *Not Only a Right but a Duty*
- *Eternal and Universal Principles*
- *Confirmation of An Existing Reality*
- *An Appeal to the Greek Cypriot People For Peace and Friendship*
- *Peaceful Solutions to All Differences*
- *Door Open to Federation*
- *UN Mission of Good Offices*
- *Good Will Measures*
- *Basic Policy*
- *Declaration*

xxvi The U.S. Congress passed in December 1974, a rule of law amendment to the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act against the recommendation of the Administration. An arms embargo was placed on Turkey, effective from February 5, 1975 that lasted for 3 years. In addition, the appropriation of military funds for Greece and Turkey was for many years on a 7 : 10 ratio. This was regarded as un-equitable by Turkey, given Turkey's population was 6 times bigger than Greece and its NATO commitments were comparatively higher.

xxvii The Draft Framework Agreement (1985) proposed by Secretary General Perez de Cuellar, The Set of Ideas (1992) proposed by Secretary General Boutros Ghali were agreement plans that incorporated the creation of a bi-zonal and bi-communal federation between the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities. Each proposal called for a high degree of cooperation, power-sharing and some degree of integration between the two communities.

<sup>1</sup> According to the realist school of thought, the end of the Cold War was supposed to come through a power clash between the East and the West. Happily that didn't happen and instead it was a peaceful collapse. Following the fall of the Soviet Russia, realism would have predicted that NATO would no longer be needed and disintegrate. That too didn't happen. NATO has gained importance in another angle is most likely to remain a dominant actor in international relations.

xxviii *The article "Megali İdea'dan Ankara Antlaşmasına (1930) Eleftherios Venizelos" by Damla DEMİRÖZÜ starts with the presentation of a Greek document that is related directly to Turkish contemporary history. The document is a letter by Venizelos, which he addressed to İsmet İnönü, on 30th of August, 1928. With references to this letter, the article focuses on: (a) acts of Venizelos with Megali idea in Greek policy and (b) changes in Venizelos's attitude concerning the 'Eastern Question' after the foundation of Turkish Republic in 1923. The original letter lies in the Eleftherios Venizelos and His Period Foundation's Archive in Athens. This letter was written by Eleftherios Venizelos in his own*

handwriting on August 30 1928, 11 days after his election victory. It even possesses corections made while it was written.

Bakanlar Kurulu  
Başkanı  
İsmet Paşa 'ya mektup  
Rüştü 'ye mektup  
Atina, 30 Ağustos 1928

Sayın Başkan  
Excellence

Yunan halkının büyük bir çoğunluğu güven göstererek kaderlerini dört yıllığına bana teslim etmiş bulunuyor. Sizi temin etmek isterim ki benim en büyük arzum, iki ülke ilişkilerinin düzenlenmesi ile iki ülke arasında yakın bir dostluğun sağlanması ve bu yakın dostluğu, bu sefer, mümkün olan en geniş şekli ile bir dostluk antlaşması, saldırmazlık ve hakemlik antlaşması ile resmileştirmektir. Türkiye'nin bizim topraklarımızda gözü olmadığını iyibildiğim için seçim süresi boyunca her fırsatta halk önünde Yunanistan'ın da Türk topraklarında hiçbir şekilde gözü olmadığını defalarca tekrarladım. Bu konuda var olan antlaşmalar samimiyetle ve kayıtsız-şartsız kabul edilir. Bugün sayın Rüştü Bey'e yazdığım bu özel mektup ile onun da katkılarını talep ediyorum. Lozan'daki işbirliğimiz her ne kadar benim ülkem için talihsiz şartlar altında gerçekleşti ise de bu işbirliğimizin hoş anısını her zaman muhafaza ediyor ve büyük bir ilgi ile Türkiye 'de4 ülkeyi yeniden kuruluşunu izliyorum. Şundan eminim ki, her iki ülke arasında var olan anlaşmazlığı yeni bir dostluk antlaşması ile bitirirsek sonlandırırız ve bu antlaşma bir taraf için zafer ile sonuçlanan bir savaş ertesinde yapılmaz, tam tersine her iki tarafın da özgür iradeleri sonucu yapılır ise o zaman daha değerli olur, işte o zaman barışın insanların (arzuladığı) susadığı genel barışa büyük bir hizmet etmiş oluruz. Hiçbir şey bu iki devletin [bu barışa/ ulaşmasını engelleyemez... Ekselansları, ilişkilerimizin bu şekilde düzenlenmesinin her iki tarafın da ortak arzusu olduğundan kuşku duymuyorum. Bu ortak arzumuzun gerçekleşmesine, nüfus mübadelesinden kaynaklanan ve daha sonra oluşan, her iki ülke için de hayati öneme sahip olan meselelerden başka hiçbir şey engel olmamaktadır. Karşılıklı bir barış imzalayacak bu iki ülke pek çok menfaatlerini daha yetkin bir biçimde koruyabilir. Bu çok değerli hedefimizin gerçekleşmesi için çok değerli katkılarını esirgemeyeceğini düşündüğüm Rüştü Bey'e de (ona) yazıyorum. Bay Başkan bu teminatıma lütfen inanınız, siz ekselanslarının görüşleri benim için çok önemlidir.Saygılarımla.



xxix President İnönü stated that, Turkey viewed its participation in NATO as being accepted as “ a respected member of the civilized world.”

xxx Article 10 of NATO’s founding treaty states that:

The parties may , by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instruments of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

xxxii Some scholars suggest that the strategy behind the Balkan Pact was to indirectly link Yugoslavia to NATO and therefore to the West. This would set an example to Eastern Europe and Balkan countries.

xxxiii Following the September 12, 1980 military coup in Turkey, the association agreement between Turkey and the European Union was halted.

xxxiiii *Mersin port is of strategic importance for Turkey. Mersin is Turkey’s biggest and most important port in its southern shores and Eastern Mediterranean. Being only 40 nautical miles away from Cyprus, the port has a militarily strategic position and is the major opening of Turkey to international waters of the Mediterranean.*

xxxv Two-track diplomacy is “an informal interaction between the influential members of two opposing groups. It aims to define and examine the psychological barriers to the peace process, to develop strategies in order to influence public opinion and to direct means and sources to resolve conflicts.”

xxxvi In 1996, Costas Simitis succeeded Andreas Papandreuas leader of the socialist party PASOK. His commitment was “modernization” both within PASOK as well as the society. He symbolized European normalcy instead of Greek exceptionalism since Greece was the only Balkan country being a member to both European pillars, the EU (political) and the NATO (defensive).

xxxvii The political criteria formulated in the Copenhagen European Council meeting of 1992 include criterion concerning the adoption of the community Acquis. , the existence of democratic institutions, the rule of law, human rights and protection of minorities (political criterion) and the existence of of a functioning market economy (economic criterion).

xxxviii The Justice and Development Party obtained majority of 336 seats of the Turkish National Assembly thus creating a single party government.

xxxix Kostas Karamanlis’s conservative New Democracy Party was elected with % 45,36 of the votes and 165 out of 300 seats of the parliament in March 2004.

xl The Turkish resolution states that; “...while hoping that the Greek government shall not decide to extent its territorial sea in the Aegean beyond the present 6 miles limits, which in turn would ruin the equilibrium established by the Lausanne Treaty, the Turkish Grand National Assembly, has decided to grant the Turkish government all powers, including those in the military field, for safe guarding and defending the vital interests of Turkey in such eventuality.”

## APPENDIX

INTERVIEW WITH Mr. SELİM EGELİ

(Chairman, Turkish-Greek Business Council, Foreign Economic Relations Board  
(DEİK), 29-1-2010, İstanbul

E.G.: Mr. Egeli, I would like to thank you for giving me the opportunity to interview you in relation to my M.A. thesis concerning Turkish-Greek relations in the twenty-first century.

S.E.: My pleasure.

E.G.: Mr. Egeli, what are your views concerning the role of economic-financial co-operation in the development of Turkish-Greek relations?

S.E.: Economic-financial issues and politics show a direct and bi-lateral correlation. Achievements in economic-financial relations positively effect political relations and vice-versa. Taking into consideration the long-lasting historical legacy of Turkish-Greek relations, only 20 years ago both countries' attitudes reflected signs of suspicion, antagonism and historical enmity. Turkey and Greece have often been at odds over conflicts on the Aegean Sea, Cyprus and various other issues. Competing interests as well as mutual distrust were clearly visible in bi-lateral relations. At the time economic and financial relations amounted to a tragic USD 400,000 whereas today's figure is more than EUR 3 billion.

E.G.: Mr. Egeli, you must have lots of memories related to the evolution of Turkish-Greek relations. Would you be so kind to share a few with us?

S.E.: The most important and historic moment was the day when Haldun Simavi, the owner of prominent Turkish newspaper *Günaydın* and a member of the Simavi press dynasty made an astonishing suggestion to Prime Minister Turgut Özal at an informal occasion. The other members of the group witnessing this historical moment were I and the Minister of State Adnan Kahveci. Mr. Simavi suggested that if Turkey were to abolish the entry visa requirement for Greek citizens visiting Turkey, it would make a dual contribution on the Turkish side. First, it would create a positive effect for Turkey in the international arena and secondly it would create a huge contribution to the economic and financial relations and figures. Prime Minister Özal was a fast thinker and risk-taker. He believed that this was a fantastic opportunity and it was materialized overnight. The results went far beyond expectations. Greece as well as the rest of the world was extremely surprised by this courageous unilateral move to enhance Turkish-Greek relations. Özal was a visionary Prime Minister. This move granted him chronologically the third position in history after Atatürk and Menderes for making a major contribution to Turkish-Greek rapprochement.

E.G.: Who were other formal and informal contributors to this rapprochement process?

S.E.: Mr. Şarık Tara and other colleagues including myself worked extremely hard to develop non-political relations. Mr. Tara used his personal relations with Mr. Schwabb, the organizer of Davos meetings to arrange a meeting between Turkish and Greek PM's

Özal and Papandreou. This was an outstanding and unprecedented occasion and the whole world was at a shock since only months ago the two states had come to the brink of war over the Aegean conflict.

E.G.: Mr. Egeli, what were the substantial achievements of the Davos meeting?

S.E.: Following their meeting in Davos, Switzerland, in early 1998, a MOU covering 10 topics was signed by the two leaders. The leaders agreed that bilateral relations should recover and this should be started by NGO's of both countries. At the time, the internal public opinions were very fragile in both countries and politics wasn't ready yet. The two PM's met again in Davos the next year. The most important achievement of the Davos meeting was the formation of Turkish-Greek Business Councils on both sides. The Turkish organization was established within the Economic Relations Board (DEİK).

E.G.: Could you please give us more information concerning the Turkish-Greek Business Council?

S.E.: The dialogue that was initiated with the Athens Chamber of Commerce and Industry when the Council was first founded has continued with the Union of Hellenic Entrepreneurs (Association of Young Greek Businessmen). Throughout this period, four meetings have been held under the name of Turkish-Greek Forum, and sectoral business opportunities and cooperation possibilities have been discussed in these meetings. Şarik Tara, Rahmi Koç and myself have worked as the President of Turkish-Greek Business Council during the last 20 years. Although there has been lots of volatility, ups and

downs in Turkish-Greek relations, we have never lost contact with each other and never given up cooperation. These non-governmental relations have for sure created a positive atmosphere, which in turn has facilitated recovery during hard times. We have established warm and productive relations with the business sector as well as culture and sports circles. The “Working Groups” formed within the Business Council on banking, stock exchange, environment, shipping, construction, SMEs, trade and industry, insurance and tourism in order to contribute to the development of the relations between the two countries have paved the way for the cooperation of the two countries in these fields.

E.G.: The Davos Spirit has contributed a lot to Turkish-Greek relations. Even though it failed to yield any major political breakthroughs, it laid the foundation of economic and financial relations in terms of NGO's in an organized manner. Now let's jump to late 90's. Turkish Foreign Minister İsmail Cem wrote a letter to his Greek counterpart Yorgo Papandreu on May 24, 1999 proposing cooperation against terrorism. In response to this letter they met in New York on May 30, 1999 and set solid and achievable targets for cooperation in the fields of culture, education, tourism and commerce. What can you say about the Rapprochement of 1999?

S.E.: First of all, it was common understanding which both Ministers shared that both nations suffered extensively from political and social unrest. Co-operation between Turkey and Greece was the fundamental key to solving their problems. Each country had its own competitive advantages. Economically speaking, Greece was strong in the service sector especially in shipping, tourism and finance whereas Turkey displayed a

huge and varied set of industrial output. The two countries have huge mutual interests they can achieve should they co-operate economically and financially. Foreign Ministers Cem and Papandreou decided to lead their governments to a more favorable climate in Turkish-Greek relations. This initiative was keenly acknowledged and further promoted by their relative PM's Ecevit and Simitis. Within the framework of the dialogue that began between the Turkish and Greek Foreign Ministers İsmail Cem and Yorgo Papandreou in June 1999, further steps were taken by businessman and advisors and as a natural outcome of this rapprochement process, the two communities established positive and fruitful relations in business, culture, art and finally politics. Mr. Tara and I traveled on numerous occasions to Athens either individually or in groups. Once the Turkish and Greek governments officially and internationally declared their positive intention to promote the relations, economy and commerce spurred. The economic activity increased from EUR 400,000 to more than EUR 3 billion. In almost ten years, as if a magical hand had touched both countries.


E.G.: Mr. Egeli, what are your predictions for the future? What should be done to resolve historical disputes such as the Cyprus, Aegean, minority issues and further enhance Turkish-Greek relations?

S.E.: There are fanatics and those who benefit from the deadlock state of problems on both sides. The answer is simple. Reform in politics is crucial. We've seen that even a mere plain declaration of empathy has lead to major positive outcomes in bilateral relations. Cyprus which is the key issue should be resolved immediately. Once the Cyprus dispute is over others will surely follow the same path. Politicians and the

bureaucracy should be willing to take the necessary steps to a general solution. This requires will and courage. For a start the Turkish side should put aside the Lausanne syndrome. Actually at top levels this willingness is often more abundant whereas at lower levels things get more difficult and problematic. Even though positive steps are taken to promote bilateral relations by leading politicians and bureaucrats; sometimes a customs officer, a port worker or a laboratory technician may create substantial problems for the other side.

This understanding has to be spread through the communities at large in both nations. Everything's working out fine, there is hope!

E.G.: Thank you very much for your time and hospitality, Mr. Egeli.



HARİTA : 22 YUNANISTAN'IN GENİŞLEMESİ

Figure 1. Expansion of Greece, Aegean sea and Aegean islands

Source: Harp Akademileri Komutanlığı Pub., İstanbul 1995, pp.151.

Table 1. Greek Islands, Aegean Sea and Aegean Islands

**EGE ADALARI**

ADALAR GRUBU		ADANIN İSMİ	
		TÜRKÇE	YUNANCA
I N C İ G R U P A D A L A R I	TRAKYA ve BOĞAZ- ÖNÜ Adaları (TAŞOZ Adası bu grup ile mütalâa edilebilir)	Taşoz Semadirek Gökçeada Bozcaada Limni	Tasos Samotraki İmroz Bozcaada Lemnos Ayios Evstratios
	DOĞU SPORAT Adaları	Midilli Sakız Sisam	Lesvos Hios Psara Samos Ikaria
	ONİKİ ADA veya GÜNEY SPORAT ADALARI	İstanköy İncirli Sümbeki Rodos Meyis	Patmos Lipsos Leros Kalimnos Kos Nisiros Tilos Simi Kalki Rhods Maiste Astipalaia
I I N C İ G R U P A D A L A R	KUZEY SPORAT Adaları	Cura(Şeytan) Eğriboz	Skiatos Skopeles Alonisos Pelagos Yiura Piperi Skiros Evia

B - 1

Source : Harp Akademileri Komutanlığı Pub., İstanbul 1995, pp.205, B-1

Table 2. "Change of Hands" Dates of Greek Islands, Aegean Sea and Aegean Islands

GRUBU	TÜRKÇE ADI	YUNANCA ADI	TÜRKLER TARAFINDAN ZAPTI	İTALYANLARIN İŞGALI	YUNANLILARIN İŞGALI	DOŞUNCULAR
Ege Denizi Kuzeyindeki Adalar	Fasos	12 Temmuz 1456	12 Temmuz 1456		31 Ekim 1912	Hamza Bey tarafından
	Senadirek	Sanoçrakı	12 Temmuz 1456		1 Kasım 1912	"
	Gökçeada	İaroz	12 Temmuz 1456		31 Kasım 1912	"
	Bozcaada	Bozcaada	12 Temmuz 1456		7 Kasım 1912	"
	Linnos	{Fenedos} Leanos	1479		22 Eylül 1912	Y. Sultan Mehmet tarafından
		kylos	1479		31 Ekim 1912	"
		Evstratios				
Ege Sporad Adaları		Skizatos	1470		24 Nisan 1830	
		Skopelos	1470		24 Nisan 1830	
		Alonisos	1470		24 Nisan 1830	
		Pelagos	1470		24 Nisan 1830	
		Yiura	1470		24 Nisan 1830	
		Piperi	1470		24 Nisan 1830	
		Skiros	12 Temmuz 1470		24 Nisan 1830	
	Egriboz	Evvia	1470		24 Nisan 1830	1205'te Lombartlar, 1366'da Venedikliler'in eline geçti. Padiş Sultan Mehmet aldı.
Etilad Adaları (220 Ada)		Andros	Haziran 1538		24 Nisan 1830	
		Tinos	Haziran 1538		24 Nisan 1830	
		Miknos	Haziran 1538		24 Nisan 1830	
		Naksos	Haziran 1538		24 Nisan 1830	
		Iraklia	Haziran 1538		24 Nisan 1830	
		Aeorgos	Haziran 1538		24 Nisan 1830	
		Yiuros	Haziran 1538		24 Nisan 1830	
		Siros	Haziran 1538		24 Nisan 1830	
		Paros	Haziran 1538		24 Nisan 1830	
		Ios	Haziran 1538		24 Nisan 1830	
		Sikinos	Haziran 1538		24 Nisan 1830	
		Tira	Haziran 1538		24 Nisan 1830	
		Anafi	Haziran 1538		24 Nisan 1830	
		Kea	Haziran 1538		24 Nisan 1830	
		Kitnos	Haziran 1538		24 Nisan 1830	
		Serifos	Haziran 1538		24 Nisan 1830	
		Sifnos	Haziran 1538		24 Nisan 1830	
	Kinolos	Haziran 1538		24 Nisan 1830		
	Poliagos	Haziran 1538		24 Nisan 1830		
	Milos	Haziran 1538		24 Nisan 1830		
	Polegandros	Haziran 1538		24 Nisan 1830		

YIKIMLA ÖZEL

C - 1

Source: Harp Akademileri Komutanlığı Pub., İstanbul 1995, pp.207, C-1

Table 2. ....“Change of Hands” Dates of Greek Islands, Aegean Sea and Aegean Islands

YUNAN ADI

İK-C'İN ÖZELİ


GRUBÜ	YORKE ADI	YUNANCA ADI	YORKELER YARAFINDAN YAPTI	İTALYANLARIN İŞGALI	YUNANILARIN İŞGALI	DEĞİŞİMLER
Girit ve Civarı	Girit	Kitira Andikitiira Kriti Gardos	12 Temmuz 1870 12 Temmuz 1870 6 Eylül 1869 6 Eylül 1869		24 Nisan 1830 24 Nisan 1830 10 Ağustos 1913 10 Ağustos 1913	(1)
Doğu Sporatlar	Midilli Sakız Sisran	Lesvos (Mitilini) Niyos Psara Samos Ikaria	1462 14 Nisan 1566 14 Nisan 1566 1479 1479		1 Ocak 1913 1 Ocak 1913 4 Kasım 1912 16 Mart 1913 17 Kasım 1913	(2) (3) (4)
Güney Sporat Adaları (40 Adı)	İstanköy İncirli Şubeki	Patmos Lipsos Leros Kalimnos Kos Nisyros Tilos Sini Kalki	20 Ekim 1522 20 Ekim 1522 20 Ekim 1522 20 Ekim 1522 20 Ekim 1522 20 Ekim 1522 20 Ekim 1522 20 Ekim 1522 20 Ekim 1522	12 Mart 1912 6 Mart 1912 12 Mart 1912 12 Mart 1912 20 Mart 1912 13 Mart 1912 13 Mart 1912 19 Mart 1912 9 Mart 1912	10 Şubat 1947 10 Şubat 1947 10 Şubat 1947 10 Şubat 1947 10 Şubat 1947 10 Şubat 1947 10 Şubat 1947 10 Şubat 1947 10 Şubat 1947	(5)
Güney Sporat Adaları (12 Adı)	Rodos Heyle Kasot Kerpe	Rhodos Kastellerizon Astipalafia Fasos Karpantos	20 Ekim 1522 20 Ekim 1522 20 Ekim 1522 1538 1538	4 Mayıs 1912 14 Mayıs 1912 24 Nisan 1912 13 Mayıs 1912 13 Mayıs 1912	10 Şubat 1947 10 Şubat 1947 10 Şubat 1947 10 Şubat 1947 10 Şubat 1947	(5, 6) (5)

Source: Harp Akademileri Komutanlığı Pub., İstanbul 1995, pp.208, C-1

Table 3. Distance of Aegean Islands to Mainland Greece

Bazı Ege Adaları'nın Türkiye ve Yunanistan'a Olan Mesafeleri			
ADALAR	Türkiye	Yunanistan	
Semadirek (Semothrace)	19,6	20,5	
Gökçeada (Imroz)	19,0	30,7	
Limni (Limnos)	32,4	30,2	
Bozcaada (Tenedos)	27,3	54	
Midilli (Lesvos)	4,9	86,4	Egriboz Adası
İpsara (Psara)	32,4	71,8	84,2
Sakiz (Chios)	3,5	83,7	51,3
Sisami (Samos)	0,8	117	60,5
Ahkeçya (Nicaria-Ikaria)	30,2	90,7	95
Hürşit (Fourni)	22,0	113,4	72,4
Eşek (Agathonisi)	7,8	136	94,5
Nergisçik (Arki)	20,2	126,8	115,5
Batnoz (Patmos)	27,3	118,2	108
Eşekler (Lipso (Lipsos))	19	126,8	101
Bujamac (Farmakonisi)	5	145,2	110
Hacılar (Dhenoussa)	64,3	88	126,3
İleryoz (Leros)	16,2	131,7	77,2
Kalolimnoz (Kalolimnos)	5,6	147,4	Girit Adası
Koçbaba (Levitha)	34,8	118,8	110,7
Ardıçık (Kinaros)	44,3	113	100,4
Kelemez-Kilimli (Kalimnos)	8,6	142,5	99,4
Yağmurgi (Amorgos)	55,6	95,6	102
Keçi (Pserimos)	4,3	151	83,7
Plati	7,8	151	104,8
Istanköy (Kos)	2,7	148,5	104,8
Sakarcılar-Yalı (Yiali)	10,2	158,2	87,5
İncirli (Nisiros)	9	160	88
Sömbeki (Simi)	4	188,4	86,4
Istanbulya (Astipallia)	43,2	124,7	104,2
İleki-İlyaki (Tilos)	11	171,7	71,3
Ardalık (Sirina)	37,8	148	82
Limoniyeye (Alimnia)	20,4	193,3	117
Herke (Kalki)	24,8	186,8	87,5
Rodos (Rhodes)	9,4	195,5	82
Meyis (Megisti - Castellorizo)	1,6	279	77,8
Kerpe (Karpethos)	46	189,5	165,2
Çoban (Kasos)	76,7	189	37,8
			26,5


Source: Casus Belli, H.Cem Işıklar, Ümit Yay., Ankara, 2005, pp.135.



ŞEKİL-2 ADALARIN SİLAHSIZLANDIRILMASI

Figure 2. Demilitarization of Greek islands, Aegean Sea and Aegean Islands

Source: Harp Akademileri Komutanlığı Pub., İstanbul, 1995, pp.155.



HARİTA - 23

Figure 3. Territorial waters – 6 miles, Aegean Sea and Aegean Islands

Source: Harp Akademileri Komutanlığı Pub., İstanbul, 1995, pp.169, Harita: 23



Figure 4. Territorial waters – 12 miles, Aegean Sea and Aegean Islands.

Source: Harp Akademileri Komutanlığı Pub., İstanbul, 1995, pp.173, Harita: 24

Table 4. Approaches to Turkish and Greek Territorial Waters


**Türk-Yunan Karasuları Genişliği Yaklaşımları**

Genişlik	Türk (%)	Türk Km <sup>2</sup>	Yun. (%)	Yun. Km <sup>2</sup>	Uls. (%)	Uls. Km <sup>2</sup>
6 Mil	<b>7,47</b>	14.000	<b>43,68</b>	81.969	<b>48,85</b>	89.469
7 Mil	<b>7,93</b>	14.880	<b>49,73</b>	93.317	<b>42,34</b>	79.450
8 Mil	<b>8,21</b>	15.406	<b>54,74</b>	102.718	<b>37,05</b>	69.523
9 Mil	<b>8,51</b>	15.969	<b>60,70</b>	113.902	<b>30,79</b>	57.776
10 Mil	<b>8,57</b>	16.081	<b>64,10</b>	120.282	<b>27,33</b>	51.284
11 Mil	<b>8,70</b>	16.325	<b>68,63</b>	128.782	<b>22,67</b>	42.540
12 Mil	<b>8,76</b>	16.438	<b>71,53</b>	134.224	<b>19,71</b>	36.985


*Kaynak: Turkey and Greece The Aegean Disputes, Deniz Bölükbaşı.*

Source: Deniz Bölükbaşı, Turkey and Greece: The Aegean Disputes, London:

Cavendish Pub., 2004, pp. 125.



ŞEKİL-5 HAVA SAHASI UYGULAMASI (TÜRKİYE)



ŞEKİL-6 HAVA SAHASI UYGULAMASI (YUNANİSTAN)

Figure 5. Airspace – Territorial waters, Aegean sea and Aegean islands

Source: Harp Akademileri Komutanlığı Pub., İstanbul, 1995, pp.181.





Figure 6. Flight Information Region

Source: Casus Belli, H.Cem Işıklar, Ümit Yayıncılık, Ankara, 2005, pp. 348.



**DOĞU EGE ADALARININ ASKERSİZLEŞTİRİLMİŞ STATÜSÜ**

Figure 7. Demilitarization of Greek islands

Source: Tarihsel Boyut içerisinde Türk-Yunan İlişkileri, Ş. Sina Gürel, Ümit Yay.,

Ankara, 1993, p.79.

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