

STATE-MAKING THROUGH DISASTER MANAGEMENT:
THE CASE OF SOMA

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DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

I, Sumru Tamer, certify that

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ABSTRACT

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This thesis analyzes the functions of the emerging governmental field of disaster management in Turkey. By analyzing the government response after the Eynez mine incident in Soma and comparing it with the government's response after the Van earthquake and to the 'refugees' in Suruç, this thesis maps out the practices and discourses around disaster management. It analyzes Soma, which was turned to be a post-disaster space by state, as a margin of state, in which the state had to be remade through various practices and performances. The representation of state as a compassionate service provider through officials' reference to successful disaster management consolidated the dominant political and economic imagery on which the state is built—neoliberalism. These discourses and performances also designated the borders of 'humanitarian space' and delegitimized some actors' involvement in this space. Representation of this incident as national mourning also stripped off its causes, for which the state was also responsible. The disaster management in Soma functioned for state to perform itself as an actor who knows and is able to provide what is defined as the common good. This thesis explains the way the state's hegemony consolidated in Soma through these performances of state that were built around disaster management. One of the main points of this thesis is that disasters are productive in that they lead to a proliferation of new policies, technologies, actors, discourses and new bodies. It also demonstrates ways in which the state's hegemony is disrupted through people's everyday encounters with it.

ÖZET

Afet Yönetimi Yolu ile Devlet Yapımı: Soma Örneği

Bu tez Türkiye’de son yıllarda ortaya çıkan yönetimsel bir alan olarak afet yönetiminin işlevlerini analiz etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Soma’da Eynez madenindeki olay sonrasında hükümetin müdahalesini analiz ederek ve bu örneği hükümetin Van depremi ve Suruç’ta ‘mülteciler’ in gelişine ettiği müdahale ile karşılaştırarak, bu tez afet yönetimi etrafında oluşturulan pratikler ve söylemleri açıklamaktadır. Bu tez, devlet tarafından afet sonrası alanına dönüştürülen Soma’yı, devletin çeşitli pratik ve performanslar ile tekrardan yapılmak zorunda kalındığı, devletin bir kıyısı olarak analiz etmektedir. Devletin başarılı afet yönetimine referans ile şefkatli ve hizmetkâr olarak temsil edilmesi devletin üzerine kurulduğu egemen politik ve ekonomik tahayyülü olan neoliberalizmi pekiştirdi. Bu söylem ve performanslar aynı zamanda ‘insani yardım mahalli’nin sınırlarını belirleyerek bazı aktörlerin bu alana dahil oluşunu gayri meşru kıldı. Bu olayın milli yas olarak temsil etmesi, devletin de sorumlu olduğu nedenleri görünmez kıldı. Afet yönetiminin belli bir şekilde işleyişi Soma’da devletin kendisini milletin ortak menfaatinin ne olduğunu bilen ve bunu sağlayabilen bir aktör olarak performe etmesini sağladı. Bu tez Soma’da devletin afet yönetimi etrafında kurulan bu performanslarının devletin hegemonyasını nasıl sağlamlaştırdığını araştırmayı amaçlamakta. Bu tezin ana argümanlarından biri afetlerin üretici olduğu ve yeni politikaların, teknolojilerin, aktörlerin, söylemlerin ve bedenlerin ortaya çıkmasına yol açtığıdır. Bu tez aynı zamanda devletin hegemonyasının kişilerin devlet ile gündelik karşılaşmaları sırasında nasıl sarsıldığını göstermektedir.

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For Uğur Çolak

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Lots of food, household appliances, toys coming from everywhere were piled up here. One group is going another is coming. Okay, thanks to them, of course there were lots of people in the villages who needed these. We felt as if all the country was standing next to us. But they must know that what happened here was not an earthquake, not a flood. My husband went down to mine and stayed there. They killed our husbands. Just after that lots of people from both state and company came and asked what we needed. I said, I need my husband. Can you bring him back? Bring, and I won't ask for anything else. (see Appendix, 1, own translation.) (Gülen, 30).

In Eynez Mine, an underground coal mine in Soma, an 'accident' occurred on May 13th, 2014, causing 301 workers lose their lives. This was the severest mine as well as work murder in terms of the number of workplace fatality, in history of Turkey. Cause of the incident in the mine is still under investigation and the penal case against officials and engineers of Soma Kömür İşletmeleri Inc. is still underway since 2015. What is distinctive about this incident, which also motivated me to write this thesis is the unprecedented intensity of public discussion and involvement around a work murder incident.¹ The attention of state after the incident, condensation of state institutions and officials in Soma, technologies and institutions they mobilized in this process, in other words state-making through disaster management constitute one of the main pillars of my thesis. Through focusing on the state's institutions responding to the Eynez incident, I will examine how disasters are productive in the sense that the places managed as disaster areas become sites through which the 'state' is made and the terms of relationship between the state and

¹It would not be wrong to claim that there was no work murder that took that much attention from that many political organizations, media, civil society organizations, NGO's, individuals and state officials and institutions before in Turkey Here I do not want to underestimate the work of organizations, institutions, relatives and also campaigns, demonstrations related to the work murders in Turkey. However, I think the symbolic meaning that 'Soma', the number '301' gained, spread to larger and more diverse masses.

its subjects are reshaped. In other words, I will examine Soma as a post-disaster space where the intervention of news actors, practices and discourses produce the state effect. Although my primary focus will be Soma, Van and Suruç cases will provide a comparative framework for analyzing the particularities of Soma case.²

In the first part of the thesis I will examine the aid institutions, (primarily AFAD (Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency of Turkish Republic), their discourses and practices. The second part focuses on the encounters between the state and the relatives of decedent miners whose lives have been entangled with aid institutions and the legal procedures. In this part I examine the new meanings that the “state” acquires for the relatives of decedent miners.

The questions of this thesis evolve around state’s claim for ‘managing’ the Soma disaster. Disaster management became an important sphere of policy in recent years in Turkey. In this new governmental sphere, new institutions like AFAD, new governmental practices and discourses proliferated. AFAD came to be a prominent actor in disaster management in recent years, which was especially visible in its management of Van earthquake and “migrants”. In Soma, AFAD also appeared as one of the prominent actors during and after the Eynez incident in the media and in the declarations of state officials.

The lives of relatives of 301 miners got filled with the processes and discourses related to aid since the first moment of the incident. When the incident happened in the Eynez mine there was a vast public attention to the issue. Such a vast public attention on this case rendered state’s proliferation of discourses, policies and involvement inevitable in the aftermath of incident. One of the important spheres that

² Two earthquakes hit Van in 2011 on October and November, killing 644 people and creating a big destruction. In 2014 because of the attacks of ISIS to Kobanê, caused a migration through the border city, Suruç. In both cases AFAD became an important actor for organizing aid, registration of migrants, etc.

state involved is the social aid field. Donations varying from cash to food products, toys were flooding to miners' relatives. Lots of civil society organizations, NGO's, state institutions, charity groups and individual benefactors were rushing to the region, charity campaigns began all around the country. One of the most prominent state actors emerged in the arena of social aid was AFAD. First it was represented to be organizing the rescue efforts in the mine. Then it managed the aid distribution processes monopolize the cash flow and charity campaigns for 'Soma' through transferring the total money in to its own account, and then distributing that money to families, making infrastructural investments in Soma, and so on.

But not only AFAD but also the other civil and state actors were flooding to Soma which at the end resulted in state's declaration of state of emergency in Soma. There was an unprecedented attention in the media to the incident starting from the first moment. There were numerous kind of public displays of mourning in civil society and politicians. Demonstrations, press releases, strikes and commemorations was taking place in various cities. Meanwhile Prime Minister of that time, was making his famous declaration about death is in the *fitrat* ("nature") of mining. When Erdoğan went to Soma he was faced with a big demonstration. The demonstrators were attacked by police. One of the prominent image was adviser of the Prime Minister Erdoğan kicking one of the protesters, later he claimed that he was protecting himself from the protestor's attack. Some lawyers and journalists who came for support were attacked by some pro-government groups, taken into custody and tortured by police. After a while Manisa governorate banned any meeting and demonstration in Soma, blocked all the cars coming to city and expelled the lawyers and journalists who came to Soma.

Lives of the relatives of decedent miners also became an entanglement of legal processes and a struggle for justice. Meanwhile the benefactors' visit to Soma was continuing, lawyers of Soma Holding were also visiting the houses as most of my interviewees explained. The topic was about 'blood money', compensation and penal proceeding. While some of my interviewees were already aware of 'blood money', since their relatives already experienced an accident in the mines, ones who never had such an experience or who had it while the mines were not privatized yet, were facing with the lawyers of company and the law itself first time in their lives as they said. Later law became a crucial component of their lives in different forms, especially through the compensation case and the penal case, also with the new legal rights they received after the incident.

For example, a new law called Soma Act was passed in parliament according to which one person from the family of each decedent miner will be given a job in one of the state institutions. Retirement wages and death salaries were assigned in unprecedented speed compared to other mine or work 'accidents'. Miners who survived in Eynez were now unemployed and they were given double of their minimum wage after the accident for six months. This was something that never happened in any mine or work accident, so was again special for Soma disaster. Families had to follow legal procedures carefully to be able to benefit from these new legal rights. Therefore, I will not only analyze the aid process but also legal processes as one of the façades of state that miners' relatives confront with in their daily lives.

In this thesis through focusing on the lives of 301 miners' relatives whose lives became an entanglement of bureaucratic and legal processes and discourses

related to aid and law, I will try to understand how hegemony of AKP works on the ground.

Given these concerns, my thesis lies at the intersection of disaster studies and anthropology of state. Studies on disasters claim that disasters are productive events, in terms of how they lead to arising of new actors, new procedures and discourses (Adams, V., Hattum, T. V., & English, D., 2009), (Bond, D., 2013), (Fassin, D., & Vasquez, P., 2005). On the other hand, anthropology studies on state focus on the ensemble of practices, discourses and performances in daily encounters as constantly reproducing the state (Das & Poole, 2004), (Aretxaga, 2003), (Mitchell, 2006). I argue that in Turkey the incidents formulized as ‘disasters’ and therefore governed as disasters has become productive in the sense that the state is made and remade during the disaster management through proliferating actors, procedures and discourses.

In the second chapter, contrary to what officials claim, I will argue and demonstrate the ways in which the incident in Eynez was not a natural disaster. Transformations in agriculture and energy sector, also new relations between politics and capital with the new organization of labor in Soma were the factors that paved the way for such a mine ‘disaster’ in Soma. Therefore Soma, as other disasters, is not a natural disaster but a humanmade disaster. To explicate this argument, I will be explaining the political, economic and social transformations in Turkey and specific rationality of AKP government which paved the way for such a major work murder. This chapter will both explain the context and will make it possible to understand the rationality behind the response of government to the Eynez incident.

In the third chapter I will be discussing how disasters are productive through focusing on studies on different disasters and disaster responses in various contexts. I will analyze Soma as a post- disaster space. I use the term “post- disaster space”

actually as a reference to the term “humanitarian space” which is conceptualized as a physical and symbolic space discursively created and socially negotiated by different agents like state, humanitarian agents, political groups, media and other stakeholders which deliver services according to the principles they hold for different ends.”

(Hilhorst, D., & Jansen, B. J., 2010). I think ‘humanitarian space’ has become an important sphere for state policy with the end for building legitimacy and hegemony in Turkey in the form of ‘disaster management’. Since in various contexts, like Soma, Suruç and Van where state response takes the form of disaster management, state claimed itself to be an important actor through various state institutions and actors that actively involved in disaster spaces. In the light of the literature on anthropology of state, I will examine the disaster management as a recently emerging arena on which new encounters between state and people take place, eventually (re)constituting 'the state' and its relation to people, subject or citizens in the places where I will call as “margins of the state” (Das, V., & Poole, D., 2004). For this I will examine mechanisms of legibility; epistemological, scientific, discursive practices, theoretical and empirical tools, classificatory schemas or statistics that works for state-making. I will be looking at different contexts than Soma, which are Van and Suruç, since I think comparing the work of state in these places with Soma is necessary to understand the particularities of the ways state-making becomes possible in different contexts.

In the fourth chapter, I will examine how the state-making processes worked in Soma after the incident. By analyzing different sites of state and their technologies, discourses, subject positions they postulate, I will attempt to understand how the state is made and performed through different ways. In Soma, state is made as an affective body whose borders are defined by love and

compassion, that mostly becomes obvious in the discourses on state's capability and power to help. Also, state's borders for inclusion are reestablished by discourses of *hizmet* ("service") and development that proliferated as part of the 'reconstruction' process after the Eynez incident. These particularities in state-making reestablish the state's hegemony in Soma as applier of neoliberal policies.

In the fifth chapter, I study state by focusing on different concepts, spheres, terms, ways, affects through which I could understand miner relatives' encounters with state and the change of meanings they attribute to it. My ethnographic study in this chapter is mostly focused on the daily lives and conversations of relatives of decedent miners. These conversations and daily experiences are mostly shaped by the aid operations and legal procedures. Both processes seem to be intermingled that work to shape the meaning of state. Since I began conducting my fieldwork I joined all the trials, and visited families before and after each trial. Therefore, how they were getting organized among themselves for the legal struggle and their daily life experiences and frustrations after the incident became an important topic for me. For example, going to courtroom for the first time appeared to be a marking experience for all my interviewees without exception. For some it was the place and moment they thought they were right to fight, a moment of realization some said, for some it made them think that justice is a fraud thing and was useless to run after, for some court and law itself became the source of pain rubbing salt into their wounds. These experiences were marking for the relatives of miners for how people are relating to state, their ambiguity and mistrust about institutions. Therefore, this chapter will be analyzing the effects of state-making through focusing on the everyday lives of relatives of miners.

CHAPTER 2

TRANSFORMATION INTO A MINERS' TOWN

Before, I was working in mine, in those times state mines were good, it was hard but good. We were also producing tobacco, but if not, we were going down to mine. Now the tobacco is over, state pulled up its stakes and left.

They just come and check the mine once a while. My son was telling me that they were not even going down to mine, they were coming, just for showing off and in front of the entrance of mine, there would be tables of feast prepared for them. They would sign the paper there on the tables, and they would leave saying that they inspected the mine. That is the way since the privatization, my girl. They obliged us to work in the mines like this, they put us into mines, they made us needy and dependent for the company like that (see Appendix, 2, own translation.) (Yaşar Abi, 60 years old).

Yaşar Abi said he wanted to share his story, after we arrived home at the end of three days long frustrating trial, so I could include it in my research he said. He showed lights of the houses from the balcony, saying most of the people has the same life story. He lost his son in the incident in Eynez mine. He himself was a retired miner who previously worked in the same mine in which his son lost his life. He was telling me the story of a work accident he had in the mine during which he almost died. However, he was remembering the work conditions in state mines as being much better than the recent conditions in private mines like Eynez. Most of the interviewees like Yaşar Abi, who were from the villages of Soma, built the narrative about how this massacre happened by starting to tell about the transformation of their lives through changes in agricultural and mining sector.³

In this chapter I will follow their footsteps. In the following, I will examine the conditions that brought about such a 'work accident' in Turkey through discussing the effects of transformations in agriculture and mining sectors, changing

³ Trajectories, therefore the narratives of people who migrated to Soma after 1950's for working in the mines are different than these.

relations between the government and business people and governmental policies of development and energy sector.

I had been in Soma years ago, before the Eyzek incident. My bus was passing through the fields and olive trees as far as the eye could see. But when the bus entered Soma city center, the scene was occupied with the giant dark shaft of thermal power plant located right in the middle of city, it was spreading clouds of smoke, dust and smell all over the city. As if all the landscape that I admired during my trip was being grinded by this energy plant. Miners who were working for morning shift in the mines were waiting for the shuttle busses that will take them to the underground or open pit mines up the hills.⁴ Soma appeared to me at the first sight as an embodiment of the growing energy and construction sector. This was not only implicated in landscape but also in its soundscape, in the bodies and movements of people. My trip to villages were ripped by roads and infrastructure that links all the components of ‘developing’ energy and construction sector in Soma. Roads were carrying the mine workers, linking the mines, wind energy plants, the thermal plant and the future energy plant projects. Nights were filled with roar of old shuttle buses carrying the workers turning back from night shift, and taking the workers for sundowner’s shift. Sirens of ambulances going up and down the hills could be heard almost each day. Trucks carrying the coal, dozers opening new roads, deep voice of thermal and wind energy plants were constituting the everyday sounds of Soma and around villages. Even these first impressions of mine, were manifesting the violent history of Soma.

My visit to Soma and its villages after years for my thesis, these shallow impressions of mine were magnified as I conducted my research, spending my days

⁴ There are three work shifts in mining sector: *gündüz vardiyası* (“morning shift”) between 08.00-16.00, *paşa vardiyası* (“pasha shift”) that is between 16.00-24.00 and *serseri vardiyası* (“sundowners shift”) between 24.00- 08.00.

and weeks with mine workers and their relatives. The violent history of Soma was sublimated into the real-life experiences of my interviewees. I spent time and conducting interviews mostly with the relatives of miners who died in Eynez incident. They were all emphasizing the inevitability of their children, husbands or brother's death due to the policies that were forcing them to work in the mines with such conditions. But they were still hopeful since their death could be a turning point for the miners, companies and public for changing those conditions. However, during my research, about two years, most of them had already given up that hope.⁵ For them, after 301 people's death, nothing changed in Soma and with little opposition people are still working in the same conditions that 301 miners died, however there is not so much opposition still.

2.1 Transformations in the agriculture sector

Before that, we were in the village making tobacco...Then, when the tobacco ended gradually, the young men of village began to go down to mines (to work). When we got married A., also started going down to mine, and we sometimes go to olive. They are working for subsistence, still both my brothers are working in the mine. Even if he is from your blood and he is your heart, you cannot stop them going down to mine, they are earning their living. Every day they leave home as if it is their final day (see Appendix, 3, own translation.) (Selda, 55 years old).

Yaşar Abi and Selda Abla's accounts are similar in describing the ways in which the state abandoned Soma and how people are left with no option but to work in mines. Selda's story about their lives and how it has changed throughout the course of time, how she cannot say anything to stop her relatives and her husband going to mine even if they know that they can die any time in mine; summarizes the situation in

⁵ This is mostly because they are frustrated with the process of the Penal Case. Also, workers' efforts to organize around new unions and councils was not that much successful due to various reasons which worth discussing in the future. In addition to these they think majority of the miners who are still working, and majority of people in Soma do not show interest or support to the demonstrations or campaigns the relatives organize in order to the remind the conditions that took their loved ones away.

Soma. The desperateness of sending her relatives to the mine despite knowing all the risks and dangers it holds, in other words, 'to be obliged to go down the mine' is the key theme that people used to explain the situation in Soma in my interviews. This common narrative was evolved around the themes of decadence of state and agriculture, eventually rising of privatizations in the mining sector.

Before the proletarianization of the region where the workforce has been condensed around mining sector, most of the local people from Soma were earning their lives from agriculture. Most of the miners who lost their lives in Eynez were originally from farmer background (Genç, 2014). I would like to explain the process leading to proletarianization around energy sector in Soma by analyzing the political and economic transformations in the last decades in Turkey.

Between 1950's and 1980's, the years that are generally called as national developmentalist period, the agricultural sector in Turkey was designed in a way that agricultural producers were not that much affected from the fluctuations in the market regime (Keyder & Yenal, 2015). This was made possible through state policies supporting the agricultural producers. These policies were varying from setting a minimum price for various products, giving buying assurance by state managed cooperatives, subsidies for the agricultural inputs, cheap credits and protectionist trade regime (Keyder & Yenal, 2015). Cooperatives like Toprak Mahsulleri Ofisi, Fiskobirlik, Çaykur, TEKEL, Tariş would give the guarantee to buy the products from the producers for the determined prices. Even when these institutions made loss, this loss would be paid by the government treasury. For Keyder and Yenal (2015), these policies on agriculture were part of general populist approach to agriculture as a method to keep the voters content (p.157). Bargains on input subsidies, supportive prices and promises on buying the products became a

card that could be played any time, in the absence of long-term development projects for the countryside. This was also regarded as a solution for the process where the “development” did not work as what it was expected to be, especially when the informal population in the cities boomed due to not being able to supply employment for those people who had to move from villages to cities. This was a strategy for keeping both the peasants safe from dissolution against the results of market economy and to keep the society in balance. Also for Aydın, the reason for this populist agriculture policies are that, before 1980’s, agriculture was seen as the precondition for economic development, which was necessary for feeding the increasing urban population, and supplying raw materials for the industry (2010, p.161).

End of the 1970’s in Turkey was marked by economic crisis that evolved into political crisis. Also, the pressure of international financial institutions on liberalization of the economies were increased (Boğaziçi Soma Dayanışması, 2015). This period ended with the 12 September coup d’état in 1980 that brought new economic policies along. Introduction of the stabilization and structural adjustment programs in the early 80’s signaled the transition to neoliberal economic policies.

According to Fikret Şenses:

The program was faced with a great deal of opposition from the outset. Opposition parties, trade unions, the mass media and academics were at the forefront of this opposition. Just when the government was about to lose its support in parliament, there was a military takeover, in which the military immediately declared its wholehearted support for the program (Şenses, 2016).

Not only 1980’s but also especially 2001 economic crisis was a turning point for the acceleration of the liberalization of economy in Turkey. Agriculture sector was one of the sectors that was affected most from these neoliberal policies. During 2001 crisis, as part of IMF and World Bank’s neoliberal restructuring policies, reform

package prepared by World Bank, called as Agricultural Reform Implementation Project (ARIP) was accepted (Keyder & Yenal, 2015). This means a transformation that has been resulted with the elimination of “the institutions that represented state intervention including the removal of the price subsidies in products and inputs and the privatization of state marketing and credit cooperatives” (İslamoğlu, 2017, p. 6).

As a result, public expenditures including the ones related to agriculture were decreased and agriculture and food sector began to be liberalized through various structural reforms. Minimum price policy for lots of products were suspended, subsidies and credits given for agricultural products were removed, lots of institutions like TEKEL which were in the role of buyer of the products from producers were restructured. ARIP’s most devastating effect was on the tobacco producers. TEKEL as the sole tobacco buyer that was supporting the tobacco producers through buying all the tobacco products for a price that was determined through political bargaining, was partly privatized (Keyder & Yenal, 2015). Because of the privatization wave of 80’s and also as a result of introduction of multinational companies in the market, small agricultural producers were affected severely (Aydın, 2010) (Keyman, 2010) and, with the neoliberalization of the agriculture market, small producers began to find themselves confronted with the private companies which are mostly the only buyer and sellers in the market, and they had to accept the conditions and prices that those buyers force upon them more (Keyder & Yenal, 2015). The prices were determined in a way that these companies can profit more, rather than protecting the producers. Keyder and Yenal’s research (2015) is mostly focused on the vegetables producers in Aegean and Mediterranean regions of Turkey who are now mostly selling their products to supermarket chains that flooded the market after 80’s. For them, producers were mostly suffering from the asymmetrical

access to knowledge about the market compared to supermarket chains and their inability to adapt quickly to the market conditions that buyers created with their decisions. Consequently, to these transformations as İslamoğlu observes, there has been a drastic decrease of agriculture's share in total employment and total GDP, accompanying with a decline in farmer's income and possible elimination of those who have lands smaller than 100 decares (İslamoğlu, 2017, p. 8).

In the case of Soma, the asymmetrical relation towards the market compared with supermarket chains, industrial companies and their contractors was similar to the situation of agriculture producers that Keyder and Yenil mentioned in their research (Keyder & Yenil, 2015). According to Tütün-Sen President and Çiftçi-Sen Secretary Ali Bülent Erdem, new tobacco law enacted in 2002 was a turning point for the agricultural producers in Soma producer (Yıldırım & Umman, 2017). In the absence of supporting institutions, small producers had to come face to face with multinational companies, which resulted in the inability of the producers to pay even the input costs of the production, because prices of inputs such as fertilizers or seeds that industrial agriculture necessitates were now overwhelmingly high and fluctuating for a small-scale producer (Yıldırım & Umman, 2017). Restructuring in agricultural sector and super marketization brought about contract farming in Soma too. Now the producers must accept the market price for their harvests, that is much lower than before, without any bargaining power against the local contractors who are working for multinational companies (Kaba, 2014). Also, when they produce more than the amount designated in the contract, there is no guarantee that the company will buy these extra products, and when they cannot reach the designated number of products due to various conditions, company does not cover the expenses they made. Without the guarantee and the secure conditions that TEKEL created,

most of the small producers gave up tobacco production. Between 2000 and 2010, tobacco production was cut in half (Keyder & Yenal, 2015). In the competitive conditions of free market, lack of any responsible actor for the fluctuations in the prices of products and inputs, the lack of guarantee of buying farmers' product and any compensation for bad harvest year, farmers were drawn into a cycle of debt. According to the interviews I made with the relatives of miners who were in the Eynez mine, privatization of TEKEL, which symbolized the disappearance of state by some, forced them to give up relying on agriculture for their subsistence:

Since my childhood we were tobacco producers. It was the year of 2003 I was fed up with that. Why. Because I began to earn less and less. I had to accept any price that contractor says to me. So, what happens. What can I do I cannot burn the product, it's a year's labor! So, I decided to go down to mine. Sometimes I go to make olive for my family, or work in some other people's garden for money. Before, when you didn't have money, you would pay with tobacco. Tobacco was like gold. They wouldn't even give you their daughters if you didn't have tobacco. Now young people are going down to mines to be able to get married (see Appendix, 4, own translation.) (Mehmet, 50 years old).

Despite the differences in specialties of products, technology and market configuration, the insecure production conditions, decrease in income and increase in input prices created similar results in Soma with Keyder and Yenal's research on vegetable producers in Antalya area (Keyder & Yenal, 2015). These similar conditions led most of the small agriculture producers to work in a more 'sustainable' sectors as they say, where they expect to have a regular wage, insurance and earlier retirement. Such a sector, available for people in Soma was and is still mining. Therefore, agriculture ceased to be the main subsistence economy, however it did not disappear completely, rather has become a side income (Boğaziçi Soma Dayanışması, 2015) while the primary sector to earn one's living has become mining.

The younger people have chosen working in the mines because it was offering them a job opportunity that they could not find in Soma. While for the ex-mine workers who are old enough were saying that the privatization of TEKEL was the turning point that led them down to mines, the younger ones who are also working seasonally on their own agricultural lands, their families' or for another people's agricultural lands told that they go to mines because it offers them a stable job opportunity that they have been looking for.

My son had a university graduation. He was waiting to be a teacher. He couldn't find a proper job. He worked in a restaurant, also as a taxi driver in Izmir. But couldn't get what he wanted. One night he came and said, father I will go down to mine. I'm also a retired miner myself. He knew how hard it is to work, because he saw me. But I could understand him, he just wanted to have an ordered life, to have a sustainable job, retirement, marriage. So, I didn't stop him (see Appendix, 5, own translation.) (Arif Abi, 60 years old).

Keyder and Yenal's work (2015) explains this change in subsistence living through arguing that process of proletarianization in Turkey has been different than how it happened in other contexts. While, in 18th century England, accumulation by dispossession led people to become wage-laborers in the cities, in Turkey, the way of proletarianization has not been a total dissolution or proletarianization of peasantry. Instead, liberalization of the agricultural sector in Turkey forced people who lived in the countryside towards non-agricultural line of work. This was made possible through development of alternative work choices in the countryside such as in tourism and construction sectors, and through development of energy sector in countryside. Therefore, they are not totally separated from villages and agricultural work for side income. This was also the case in Soma. Mine workers were also involved in agricultural work and their families who were born in the villages of Soma were previously farmers.

During my visits to Soma, both in the city center and in the villages, people were mostly expressing their frustration and sadness about the fact that Eynez incident, public attention and the Penal Case that is going on did not lead to an improvement in the conditions in mines, nor in their own lives. One of the survivors from Eynez incident said while we were in the village of his family:

After the accident, I thought I would never go back down to mine, never. But now I'm begging for mining job. They are not giving job in mines to survivors. They already fired hundreds of us in one night. Now what do we do, some has land some has olive trees. But they don't make money. We are again forced to go down to mines... (see Appendix, 6, own translation.) (Ethem, 30).

Therefore, neoliberal transformation in agricultural sector appears and mentioned commonly to be one of the main reasons that forced local people to go to mines in and around Soma. The fact that people are still going down to mines and work in the similar conditions that once 301 workers worked can be partly explained by their lack of possibilities to work in other sectors like agriculture.

2.2 Transformations in the energy sector

There was TEKEL before, it was a support to producers. Everything began with the privatizations, I mean, privatization of TEKEL. Now what do we have, TKİ (General Directorate of Coal Enterprises of Turkey), it claims that it will supposedly support us, the workers. Supposedly they are inspecting the mines! They never went down into the mine (Eynez). Inspectors would be brought to the restaurants at night, then they were made to glance only from the door of the mine, and then sent off. It's a pity, that not even one of them is judged in the trial (see Appendix, 7, own translation.) (Neşet Abi, 50 years old).

Neşet Abi saying these words was also once a farmer and a retired miner. According to his and other people's accounts, similar to the privatization of TEKEL, privatization in mining sector was also defined to be a turning point for the lives of miners in Soma. In the following I will explain the process that made Soma a town associated with coal and mines.

Establishment of TKİ in 1957 appears to be a turning point for the economy and demography of Soma. The right to run the lignite reserves in Soma was transferred to TKİ and then to Aegean Lignite Enterprises (ELİ) with the nationalization decision of the Turkish Parliament (Karadağ, 2012). In Soma region, until 2004, TKİ was responsible for directing the coal production in mines, through ELİ. According to Karadağ's research (2012), TKİ produced 37 million tons of lignite coal out of national total of 65 million tons. Hence, TKİ was an important actor in coal production in Turkey. As I also explained above, Soma, a town whose inhabitants' economic activities were based on agricultural production previously, was gradually transformed into a miner's city in last 50 years (Karadağ, 2012). Now, coal production and the commercial activities based on coal make up the basis of Soma economy, to the extent that, coal plants in Soma meet 31% of the lignite production in Turkey (Karadağ, 2012).

While in 1927, 27 % of the total population lives in the city center of Soma, in 1935 this rate falls and number of people living in the villages sharply increase due to increase of agricultural subsidies and support by state (Yıldırım & Umman, 2017). In 1960's, especially after the establishment of TKİ in 1957, Soma begins to be populated by migrants from Black Sea and Aegean regions who had prior mining experience. Local people did not have the experience nor the will to work in mines. One of the elders who lost his nephew in Eynez told me that:

While we were young we didn't want to work for coal, we were involved in agriculture. People were brought from outside to work. Mines couldn't even find enough workers. Because we never thought of going to mines, the tobacco was like gold then. Also, we didn't have any knowledge of mines nor working. Later we learned as they did. We had to work in mines, so all of us went to mines at the end (see Appendix, 8, own translation.) (İsmail, 55).

80's saw a sharp increase in the migration towards Soma city center. The ratio of population living in the villages in 1980 fell to 43%, and now it is only 17% (Yıldırım & Umman, 2017). The reason for this sharp increase could be the rising of migration after the construction of Thermal Power Plant in 1976 and weakening of peasantry and process of neoliberalization in agricultural sector (Yıldırım & Umman, 2017) that led local people to go down into mines as I previously explained.

According to Karadağ's research (2012) in 2002, two major dynamics of city economy which are Aegean Lignite Processing Plants and thermal power plant cover 7.4% of the total land in the district, whereas most of the other lands are forestry land or agricultural land. In other words, 10,276 ha area in Soma is left to coal and coal based activities, including thermic power plant. The activities continued in the area provide means of living for some 7,000 families (Karadağ, 2012). Additionally, employment chances created by the activities stimulated migration movement and affected the city center and its neighborhood use decisions and urbanization form as well. Consequently, in socio-economic means, a new kind of urban population profile emerged in Soma (Karadağ, 2012)

With the new regulations in 2004, TKİ give out the coal mines to the private companies through *rödovans* ("royalty tender system") system. Through this system TKİ could transfer the permission that is indicated in the contract for managing the mines to other actors, such as private companies, with an exchange of 'royalty tender price'. After the introduction of *rödovans* system in Soma, the total number of mine workers have increased (Türkiye Barolar Birliği İnsan Hakları Merkezi, 2014). In 2012, number of wage workers in mining sector within the total number of wage workers in Turkey does not constitute a big ratio. However, since the coal production is concentrated in specific number of coal basins, the employment ratio within these

regions of coal basins become much more important for those regions, including Soma. In Soma, coal production appears to be the main employment sector for the considerable part of the population (Buğra, 2015).

Eynez mine was firstly privatized through service procurement tender. Then in 2009 handed over to Soma Kömür İşletmeleri Inc. through *rödovans* agreement with TKİ. One my interviewees who was a miner who had been working for union was saying:

State has left its main responsibilities. TKİ was the engine of energy sector, it opened and built big businesses in Soma. Now it is being partitioned among private companies that only follow their interests of profit. Before, with TKİ, the aim was our people, providing them job, producing energy, but now we are only paying the cost of private companies, mostly with our lives (see Appendix, 9, own translation.) (Erkan, 35).

Coal production, especially in the more dangerous underground mines increases rapidly with the private management each year (Tamzok, 2014). Private companies employ more workers, with less wage, labor-intensive production and less investment in the mine (Ulutaş, 2014). According to Buğra's research (2015), working hours in the mining sector appears to be higher than other sectors according to statistics of ILO. The gross wages of miners who are not part of a collective labor agreement is 2417 TL, while for the ones who are part of a collective agreement it is 3653 TL. Both wages are under poverty limit that is designated by Türk-İş Syndicate as 3926 TL for one family with four members (Buğra, 2015). With privatizations, there is an increase in 'work accidents' industrial diseases and deaths because of work conditions (Tamzok, 2014). The number of workers in Eynez mine increased from 1600 to 6000 in 2009. And the estimated number of 6000 worker before the *rödovans* system, finally increased up to 17.000 after *rödovans* system has been introduced. Correspondingly, during this process, cost for coal production is also reduced. The amount of work accidents increased in recent years (Bütün, 2015).

Before the Eynez incident, in the last two years, there were 11 registered work accidents, where 12 workers lost their lives. Between 2011 and 2014, 38 workers got injured in work accidents in Soma. According to the statistics, most of the work accidents are happening in manufacturing sector, mining, quarrying and construction sectors respectively. Sectors where the accidents result with death is respectively construction, transportation, storage sector and manufacturing. Mining sector is not one of the firsts. For Buğra it is worth to remember that occupational illnesses are much more important in mining sector compared to the other sectors (Buğra, 2015).

Buğra also reminds us the fact that it is not publicly known if the statistics given by SGK includes work accidents, or deaths of those who had been working unregistered (Buğra, 2015). Moreover, there are work accidents and deaths that are not reported because of the private agreements made with the families by the companies, particularly when the incidents are related with unregistered workers. The annual reports of Council of Worker's Health and Work Safety⁶ (2017) who are publishing data gathered by written, visual and digital press, also by the information given by worker families and labor organizations shows a difference between the results of SGK about work accidents in general and death toll in mining sector (Buğra, 2015). According to the statistics that Buğra mentions about, in mining sector, work accidents happen more frequently in private companies compared to the state owned TKİ managements. TMMOB (Union of Chambers of Turkish Engineers and Architects) Coal Report of 2008, shows that the number of work accidents resulted with death is more than twice in private companies (2008). The results of report of TMMOB (2010) named Work Accidents in Mining Sector⁷ shows similar results. The report shows that employment in coal mine sector increased % 94,4

⁶ İşçi Sağlığı ve İş Güvenliği Meclisi

⁷ Madencilikte Yaşanan İş Kazaları

between 1995 and 2008. However, there was no increase in the public sector, and the employment ratio of public sector in 1995 that was % 59,5 falls to % 34, 4 in 2008. Meanwhile the employment ratio in private sector in mining increases from % 40,5 to % 69, 6. Same report indicates that 17 work accidents happened between 1983-2010 where more than 3 workers died in each. Most of these accidents happened in underground coal mines. In total 636 workers lost their lives in these accidents. Between 1992-2010, 11 work accidents occurred in the coal mines managed by private companies, which resulted in death of 231 workers in total. According to the report, the accidents are the result of a lack of inspections and precautions, and this is mostly the case for the mines that are operated by private companies. Additionally, legalization and expansion of sub contractual work made it harder to reinforce the work safety norms within the mining sector (Buğra, 2015).

2.3 The entanglement of politics and capital: The rise of new energy companies

I would like to explain the relations between the politics and capital(ists) which are two components of the “3S triangle” as workers and worker organizations call. This relation enabled the rise of Soma Holding from its ashes becoming a company that was taking lots of procurements, and managing to become a big Holding throughout the 10 years (“Soma Holding, AKP'yle”, 2014). I argue that this was due to the new nature of relations that was built between capital, business people and AKP government during AKP’s rule. Buğra & Savaşkan (2014) analyze the changing relation between the politics, religion and business world in the process of globalization. They examine the changing nature of entanglement between politics and business people, and how the relationship between government and business people changed during AKP government (Buğra & Savaşkan, 2014). When AKP

government came to power, there were fundamental legal reforms operating, so that government intervention into private sector would be prevented. These reforms were implemented after 2001 economic crisis. However, despite the existence of these reforms, AKP's new kind of relations with business people ensured that government could intervene into private sector (Buğra & Savaşkan, 2014). New way of governing and its legislative power brought about new particularistic relations between government and business people. AKP's power was not a break from particularistic relationships that was prominent before AKP, but it just brought about a change in the form and new mechanisms through which government would be able to intervene into the working of economy (Buğra & Savaşkan, 2014). New laws that AKP introduced was not at all limiting but expanding the power of government to influence economic relations. Laws about public procurement and the steps taken for privatizing and commercializing of the off-market spaces have been reinforced by the government (Buğra & Savaşkan, 2014). AKP made numerous changes in the laws regarding the public procurement. Between 2003-2013 AKP changed the procurement act for 29 times, and made changes in the extent and in the various articles of the act more than 100 times (Buğra & Savaşkan, 2014). Eventually procurement laws about energy sector and mining sector were also changed. The result was a considerable advantage for the companies that were relatively small and not yet institutionalized, for them, it was now possible to make use of state's procurements. At the end, new laws and changes in the current laws about the privatizations in mining and energy sector show rather than the decreasing role of governments in market, on the contrary, an increased power of the government in resource allocation (Buğra & Savaşkan, 2014).⁸

⁸ This was also the case in health and housing policies. In both sector, while the private enterprises are increasing public spending is also increasing, there appears private-public partnerships in both sectors.

With these new regulations in public-private sector, new business actors, began to enter the market that exposes the new relations between government and business people. Buğra and Savaşkan highlight the victorious story of ten entrepreneurs during AKP rule. Story of Soma Inc. share some major commonalities with them. That ten entrepreneurs they mention could win huge share of public procurement (like big infrastructure projects), they were able to access the lands easily (construction of big residences, taking the lands for mining, HES etc.), building partnerships with public institutions like TOKİ, and winning municipality procurements. These corporations had invested in various other sectors like construction, energy, media, health and medicine sector etc. (Buğra & Savaşkan, 2014). Likewise, activities, networks, relationships of some prominent business actors under this new regulation can be seen through visual mapping project of Networks of Dispossession: Mapping the relations of capital and power in Turkey⁹ (Mülksüzleştirme, n.d.).

The victorious story of Soma Inc. also follows this path. Soma Inc which had a big amount of debt before 2005, had a great change in its destiny thanks to the procurements it won given by TKİ for coal extraction. Until 2014, the total price of the agreements the company made with TKİ was claimed to be around 60-70 billion (“Soma Holding, AKP'yle”, 2014). Experts in energy foresee that the total value of the fields that Soma Inc. has taken over from the public will surpass 70 million TL. Most of the agreements between the company and the state were made without procurements thanks to the change of law by the Municipality of Energy. That made Soma Inc. as one of the companies that TKİ buys the coal from without any procurements and through royalty tender system, and that TKİ is paying much more

(Özbay, Terzioğlu, & Yasin, 2011) (Buğra & Savaşkan, 2014) (Bora, 2016).

⁹ Mülksüzleştirme Ağları: Sermaye-İktidar ilişkileri üzerine kolektif veri haritalama

than it would do in case of procurement. Until 2010, all the coal that TKİ bought was from a few companies who, as a result, could make enormous profits. Soma Holding is one of the 5 companies from whom the government would buy coal without any procurement. Soma Inc. sold 18 million tons of coal to state between 2005 – 2013 (“Soma'da 101 Yıldır”, 2014).

Also, the particularistic relations between Soma Inc. and the government were effective in the rise of the company. There is a difference between the particularistic relations of AKP and the previous governments. What is different in the particularistic relations during AKP rule than the previous terms are that the fact that kinship relations and overlapping of politicians’ interests with business people regulating the economic relations were not something surprising any more, in fact this became the norm (Buğra & Savaşkan, 2014). Except Democrat Party times, in Turkey, business people chose to have a neutral political position, which was expected and sustainable if one wanted to maintain strength in the market towards government which was a sufficient stance to be able to maintain their position in the market, since 1970’s had gained the power to be able to criticize government’s doings, but during AKP time, this power was deteriorated by the government, pressure of government increased against those business people criticizing the government.¹⁰ Therefore, what is different in the political economy of AKP period is that involving in politics became indispensable if these companies would like to stay in the market. For all these 10 companies that Buğra and Savaşkan mention, getting involved in politics inside the AKP’s organizations is an observable strategy thus, as Buğra and Savaşkan argue, politics gained a new meaning for business people during

¹⁰ An example for this might be the big tax punishment for Doğan Media group (Buğra & Savaşkan, 2014)

AKP rule, in a way that now politics has become a tool to conduct economic relations (Buğra & Savaşkan, 2014).

For example, in the news after the incidents there were lots of details showing the details of clientelist relations between company owners, managers and state. This was also a recurring theme during peoples' conversations about Soma Inc. But as a more concrete example for these kind of clientelist relations they were giving the example of *dayıbaşı*. As they say *dayıbaşıs* are chosen mostly among the ones who are supporting the government. There are lots of cases that miners saying that they were forced to go to pro government demonstrations. These clientelist relations have never been a secret. For example, general director of Soma Inc. declared that he carried 3000 workers to AKP rally because he needed more land for mining (Köseoğlu, 2014). Mehvet Abi was mentioning that his son who died in Eynez had to become a member of AKP when he wanted to work in the mine, lots of workers became members of AKP for finding a job. Also, almost all the workers and families I talked mentioned how the inspectors of the municipalities were entertained by company owners and how they do not even go in to mine or just go for one hour and make their so-called inspection.

“My child also went to meetings, not that he liked them, he would say, do I have another option? He felt obligated, they carried him to the meetings with the flags and everything, he even became a party member.” (Neşe, 40).¹¹

Clientelist relations between state and company owners were also a reason for 'lack' of regulations and inspections, leading authorities to close eyes to private companies' lack of implementing rules about worker's health and safety, hard working conditions, compulsion for overproduction, and companies use of

¹¹ “Bizimki giderdi mitinglere, sevdiğinden değil ne yapıyım ki baba derdi ne yapabilirim. Zorunda hissederdi yani kendini, kaç kere götürdüler bayraklarla falan, parti üyesi de oldu.”

subcontract system. These become the best way for companies like the Soma Inc. to maximize their profit.

Lack of inspections or violations of law by the local governors of Ministry of Labor, and by state institutions like TKİ and MİGEM (General Directorate of Mining Affairs) who are working under the authority of the Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources show a systematized, even institutionalized relations of neglecting.¹² This systematized lack of inspection and legal tricks cannot only be related to clientelist relations between the company and government but also it can be argued that this was a strategy of government related to government's will or 'fetish' of growth in energy sector. Energy sector is one of the key sectors and an important space for analyzing AKP's political economy rationality and hegemony. And the reasons that paved the way for such an incident like in Eynez and also the attitudes of government after the incident is highly related and expressive of the energy policies of government. Adaman and Akbulut (2013) mention the longstanding obsession of Turkish policy makers with economic growth or achieving modernization via economic growth. AKP government also implemented this "modernist/developmentalist fetish" aggressively through construction and energy sectors, mainly thermal and hydroelectrical power plants via expropriation of natural environment and public realms.

JDP has successfully mobilized a spatial politics, for which the idea of modernization/development continues to form an indispensable basis: projects such as the highways, power plants, a third bridge to be built on the Bosphorus and a canal to connect Marmara to Black Sea, do not only reproduce the existence of the state in the most visible way and produce the image that it is indeed working hard for its people, but also materialize the very ideal of modernization/development in the most effective way and receive admiration from different groups in the society. (Akbulut & Adaman, 2013)

¹² The institution that is responsible for inspecting the mines.

‘Growth fetish’ as a hegemonic economic and political imagery of AKP (Akbulut & Adaman, 2013) also shaped and continues to shape Soma fundamentally. For example, again a previous tobacco producer who lost his son said:

They say they will open new mines. They say it as great news after the fire [Eynez incident]. What are we going to do with new mines? Everybody is afraid of it now. But what can we do. Now they are destroying our village, buying the lands in exchange for supplying jobs (see Appendix, 10, own translation.) (Mustafa, 45).

In Soma since long time and also after the Eynez, agricultural landscape and forests are being expropriated by projects like thermal energy plants, which includes big construction projects like open pit mines, ash dam, batch plant, artificial lakes, distribution lines, energy transmission lines, roads and coal conveyor bents, and so on. Lignite processing plants and thermic power station deteriorate the neighborhood of the city and the land where lignite is removed. Following lignite extraction activities, Soma has started to lose population on a large scale in that the excavations and blending areas in villages have limited farming land and even terminated it entirely (Karadağ, 2012).

For example, one of my interviewees who lost his son in the incident explained to me how an energy company was confiscating their lands. This company, Kolin, is one of the biggest companies in energy sector; who previously tried to build a thermal plant in Yırca, a village of Soma. To do this, it illegally cut the olive trees of villagers. Even though it was illegal, government provided the executive orders that would short-circuit the ‘legality’. However, Kolin faced a big resistance by villagers and people all around the Turkey that it had to give up this project.¹³ During my research, Kolin began to build a thermal plant in another village

¹³ The fact that the incident in Eynez-Soma, that happened before the Kolin-Yırca resistance, made the transformation in agricultural sector, dispossession and obligation to work in mines, a public issue probably made the resistance stronger.

of Soma, Kozluören which is the village of my interviewee. This project also included opening of new mines. When I talked to villagers whose lands were in the project sites of Kolin, they said they sold their lands to Kolin because company assured them to give jobs to their sons in one of the facilities they will open. They said agriculture was not sufficient even for the subsistence, and their sons were unemployed or working in low-income jobs in the city, therefore Kolin's job opportunity seemed to be the only way for a better life.

Even though 301 miners died, the insecure conditions of subsistence in the villages lead people to work in the mines and energy sector for securing a job and for a better life. However, considering the working conditions in mines, especially after privatizations, 'better life' they talk about is mostly not about better working conditions or income but having a stable wage, being able to pay their debts, and retirement.

Therefore, the growth fetish of government and the strategies for it like clientelist relations, short-circuiting the laws, changing the procedures or simply confiscating the lands creates a cycle of exploitation for people in Soma. They find themselves inevitably working in the energy sector. In the next chapters I will analyze the way growth fetish does or does not work for establishing the hegemony of AKP in Soma more in depth.

2.4 The organization of labor in Soma

In Soma, subcontracting system works through the actors called *dayıbaşı* ("gang master"). As suggested by the workers and labor organizations *dayıbaşı* system was widespread in the Eynez mine. Rather than being a secret or a unique thing in Eynez mine, *dayıbaşı* system has become normalized and common practice around Soma.

However, the managers of Soma Inc. claim that there was no subcontract system in their mines. But actually '*dayıbaşı*' system is only another name for subcontract system in mining sector in Soma.

The term '*dayıbaşı*' is in fact used commonly in agricultural sector. *Dayıbaşı* is the individual who finds and brings the workers to the seasonal work field and take commission from the employer, or from the wage of the workers. Similarly, in the mining sector their main responsibility is to find some workers by using their local and informal links. Because *dayıbaşı*s find workers for the mines and eventually have a power on the workers, they are also used for ensuring the maximization of production, and keeping the workers under control. They earn premiums from the proportion of the worker's coal production. Since *dayıbaşı*s earn premiums from the work of their subcontract workers on piece basis and since they have more say in the mines than even engineers have, they force workers to work more and more, if not, the subcontracted workers would be insulted, beaten up and fired by *dayıbaşı* (Çırakman, 2014). In addition to these, *dayıbaşı* usually lend money to workers, therefore making the workers indebted to them, ensuring the dependence of the workers to the work conditions along with the threat of getting fired. Considering that mostly *dayıbaşı* choose the workers from their own village or city, when one does not get along with a *dayıbaşı* from his city, it is not possible to find another. *Dayıbaşı* system becomes the instrument of maximizing the labor of workers and therefore the profit which reinforce the exploitative conditions in the mines.

For the working of *dayıbaşı* system, small companies are established in the for *dayıbaşı*s which make agreements with the Soma Inc. As part of this system, *dayıbaşı*s are registered in the main company as workers. On paper, workers are registered as workers in the main company like Soma Inc., but in practice they work

for the companies of *dayıbaşı*s. Because of this system the subcontract system cannot be traced easily on paper.¹⁴

When you want to find a job, you cannot apply like ‘I want to work in your mine’. You must go to find someone and ask him if you can join his team, if not you go to ask someone else. But mostly you have to be a reliable person for him, mostly you can be from the same village, same family maybe. (see Appendix, 11, own translation.) (Ulaş, 25 years old).

As stated by Ulaş who has been working in the mines for the last three years, in Soma, it is almost impossible to find a job in mines if one is not registered in the company of *dayıbaşı* or if one does not get along with *dayıbaşı*. Moreover, in practice *dayıbaşı*s act as the bosses of subcontract workers. On paper, they are shown as working in the company as foremen but this is only *göstermelik* (“a showing-off”).¹⁵

According to Aykut Akdemir, President of Izmir Branch of Chamber of Mining Engineers, in 1997, when the workers got organized and unionized, *dayıbaşı*s has gained a new role (Yıldırım & Umman, 2017). Main mining companies built new subcontracting companies for the *dayıbaşı*s working at its own mines, and forced the workers to register in these subcontracting companies. However, this procedure worked differently in the case of Soma Inc. Because Soma Inc. signed an agreement with TKİ ensuring that the company will not use subcontract companies. However not on paper but in practice, workers were in practice working under the subcontractor companies even though they were registered to Soma Inc as workers, and eventually their working conditions and production was controlled by those *dayıbaşı*s.

¹⁴ This point is one of the most common arguments that defendant lawyers have been using to evade the accusations about using subcontract workers in the company.

¹⁵ *Göstermelik* is a word that I came across lots during my interviews and it became one of the themes that I used for my analysis in the following chapters.

This system destroyed the previous hierarchy system in mines where *dayıbaşı*s were only the suppliers of the workers, whereas engineers were the ones who were making decisions on production processes and safety measures in mines. The mining engineers and technicians who were employed for ensuring production and safety in workplace have been deprived of any authority regarding these issues, yet they were accountable in case of any incident. Most of the accounts by miners suggest that even though *dayıbaşı*s mostly do not even enter the mines, they have greater authority than the engineers in the mine.

Dayıbaşı is the man of the company. You can't say a word to him. Neither you can nor the engineer. Now they are asking to the engineers in the trial, why didn't you stop the production, well, we couldn't. How can you, when there is a *dayıbaşı* around, when he forces you to produce more and more, how dare you to stop production. In Soma, now there are hundreds of subcontractors who own flats, cars and stuff, and none of them is on trial (see Appendix, 12, own translation.) (Hakan, miner, 29).

At the end in the Soma trial, none of the *dayıbaşı*s are on the trial, neither the actors like TKİ, ELİ and Ministry of Energy and National Resources who initially let this system to continue. Majority of the defendants are engineers. As Sebahat told me in the following lines, none of the *dayıbaşı*s are on the trial, even though *dayıbaşı* system can be detected if one just talks with any person in Soma:

In the court, they cannot prove the subcontract, bosses of Soma Holding are claiming that there was no subcontract in their mine. I tell you, my husband had the insurance from Soma Inc. but in reality, he was the man of Gema Madencilik. It was his subcontractor. They don't ask in the court, how that subcontract was earning that much money, much more money than my husband. Because they were having premiums. If Erdal [her husband] was earning 1500, subcontract was earning 10.500. He was earning premiums by the worker and by the coal (see Appendix, 13, own translation.) (Sebahat, 30).

Dayıbaşı system and the state's policies about it is only a part of larger exploitative system in mining sector in Soma. Some of the miners who were working in Eynez before the incident explains these conditions with an abbreviation of "3S", meaning,

politics, syndicate and the capital(ists) that constitute the corners of "an evil triangle".¹⁶ They visualize themselves to be in the in the middle of this deadly triangle. *Dayıbaşı* system also has played the role of preventing workers from getting organized around syndicates, mostly by threatening them, hence it operated as a tool that ensures the maintenance of this system.

We tried to get organized around a syndicate, I was making meetings, they became member of Dev Maden-Sen, it was going well until a subcontract which is the component of Türk-İş, realized what we are doing. My friends had to cancel their membership one by one, because *dayıbaşı*s were threatening them (see Appendix, 14, own translation.) (Erkin, 25).

There are also other ways that *dayıbaşı* system prevents unionization. Because each *dayıbaşı* is assigned to different part of the mine for different tasks, workers who belong to different teams of *dayıbaşı* has minimum communication with each other. Also, the fact that teams of *dayıbaşı* is divided also through the lines of belonging (to different villages or cities) is also creating a lack of communication between workers (Yıldırım & Umman, 2017). Moreover, the representatives of the syndicate, which is the syndicate that belongs to Turk-Is were mostly chosen among *dayıbaşı*. In this picture, the syndicate itself seems to be the representative of employers rather than the workers. "Most of the workers among 301 were members of syndicate (Maden-İş). Because they had to. It was like it was obligatory. Your *çavuş* (*dayıbaşı*) would ask this. If you don't you wouldn't find job."¹⁷ (Ali, 30)

The Türk- İş syndicate which was also an important part of this death triangle was able to sustain its position through *dayıbaşı*s and therefore threatening the workers through unemployment. This pressure also makes it hard for workers to get organized around their own unions or to have more say in the existing union. Even

¹⁶ Siyaset, Sendika, Sermaye. Here, by "The Syndicate" is generally referred to Maden-İş. Maden-İş is a miners' syndicates established under the Türk-İş (Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions). Maden-İş is the union where majority of the miners working in Eynz are represented by.

¹⁷ 301 arkadaşın çoğu sendikanın (Maden-İş) üyesiydi. Zorunda bırakılıyorlardı. Zorundasın gibiydi. Çünkü çavuşun isterdi. Eğer üye olmazsan işi alamazsın.

though the unionization after 1980's has been falling and this decrease accelerated during AKP rule (Çelik, 2013), it is interesting to see the high ratio of miners who are members of a union. Ayşe Buğra explains the extent of unemployment as one of the reasons for this de-unionization. Unemployment limits the bargaining power of the worker, and also limits any struggle against the employer who does not want unionization. One of the results of this process is emergence of syndicates who are actually following the orders of employers (Buğra, 2015). This was the case in Eynez mine too. Almost all the workers working in Soma A.Ş. and İmbat A.Ş. are members of Turkish Syndicate of Mine Workers. According to my interviews, workers do not have any expectation or hope from syndicate. They believe that Soma Inc. have the power to designate the members of syndicate administration. Workers see the members of the syndicate's administration as they are working like the company's directors (Sarıkaya, 2014), as one of my interviewee told me too:

To be honest, I wouldn't know much about the syndicate before the incident, I would only pay its monthly subscription which was already a big burden for me. This incident showed me what a syndicate is, or what it is supposed to be, the syndicate did nothing for us before, well, not that it did after. They should also be put on trial. They were always on the side of bosses, they should be at the side of them in the court as well (see Appendix, 15, own translation.) (Kazım, 30).

CHAPTER 3

PANORAMA OF POST DISASTER SPACES

In this chapter I will analyze the effects of defining incidents as disasters, and places as post-disaster spaces. In other words, I will analyze disasters as productive events that introduce new actors and relations into a given disaster area, functioning as new spaces for building hegemony for actors like states and companies. Therefore, I will approach to Eynez incident in Soma as a post-disaster space. My reason for this kind of approach is not only because the incident in Soma was defined as a ‘disaster’ by government and different actors; but also, Soma was turned into a post-disaster space by specific interventions by series of actors. I claim that disaster management became an important area for AKP government, who established a new governmentality around disaster management in recent years. The spaces and incidents deemed as ‘disaster and emergency situations’ by the state, has turned into an organizational occupation for state institutions with their legal and bureaucratic procedures. I argue that these practices functioned as a way of reestablishing the state hegemony. During the last years there have been ‘incidents’ that have massive effects with deep social and political repercussions, such as like ‘Van Earthquake’, the coming of Syrian refugees since 2011, and eventually as I mentioned in Soma mine ‘accident’, and all of them were treated and intervened by state as if they were “natural” disasters. In each of these cases AFAD appeared as a salient actor that was prominent in media and in the field. It had claimed to be the sole authority for coordination and intervention into these situations. In this chapter I will firstly discuss the concept of “natural” disasters and highlight some aspects of Soma “disaster” in the light of these discussions. Secondly, I will demonstrate the ways in

which post-disaster spaces and disaster management become productive in reshaping power relations. Although my primary focus is the Soma case, in this chapter I will examine the involvement of the state via AFAD in Van and Suruç post-disaster cases as a way of analyzing the specificity of Soma.

3.1 (Non)Natural disasters and their aftermath

One of the main arguments of the emerging literature on disaster studies is that ‘there is no such a thing as a natural disaster’ (Smith, 2006) (Schäfers & Çelik, 2014). For these studies, every phase of disasters, from their reasons to the phases of response and reconstruction are affected by social, economic and political configurations of society. Deeming disasters as 'natural', masks the social dimensions of such disasters for specific social interests (Schäfers & Çelik, 2014). Therefore, disaster studies analyze disasters as moments that expose the already existing power relations and structures in society.

For example, Hurricane Katrina that mainly destroyed New Orleans with a vast death toll in 2005, invoked many studies to explore the reasons for such a big death toll, and consequently, findings in these studies has escalated the discussions about race and class in United States. For some studies, one of the main reasons for this storm to turn into such a vast disaster was the history of industrialization and neoliberal policies of government in the region (Adams, Hattum, & English, 2009). Before the storm geography and demography of New Orleans is marked by the development of different economic activities in the area, such as shrimp, sugar plantations, timber, petrol extraction in land and offshore (Austin, 2006). These economic activities led to cutting of forests, digging of canals for transporting timber and oil, canal dredging, well building, levee construction, etc. therefore, loss of

coastal and wetlands, eroding New Orleans' natural protection from hurricanes like Katrina (Austin, 2006). Due to lack of political controls in oil industry, these environmental degradations were not accompanied by improvements that would reduce the effects of such a hurricane.¹⁸ Growth of industry led to increase in population causing further draining of wetlands. Conversion of agricultural land, development of industry and the development of housing brought more people within high risk areas. The criteria of being inside or outside the risky areas were determined by one's class and race. People who were living in risky areas were mostly black worker community. They were the ones who made up almost all the victims of Hurricane Katrina. Therefore, the death toll of hurricane Katrina was shaped by social factors like class, race and structure of economy. However, media ignored the links between the death toll and these factors, while companies, industry officials and their government allies and scientists were directly opposed to such criticisms which link the reasons of disaster to the policies of government and its relation to race and class (Austin, 2006). Correspondingly after the storm, the parties that had major role in such destructions walked away from the table without being attributed any responsibility or accountability.

Similarly, the tsunami in 2004 that hit Sri Lanka, India, Indonesia and Thailand which affected mostly the subsistence-working coastal fishermen and their families, was also a result of developments in the region. Many of the natural defenses like coral reefs that could have acted as a barrier and diminish the force of the tsunami had been destroyed due to neoliberal economic policies, sewage, global warming and dynamite fishing (Keys, Masterman-Smith, & Cottle, 2006). Natural

¹⁸ For example, the budget of New Orleans Corps of Engineers which was responsible of improvement of levees was cut by 80% by government. Failure of these levees during the hurricane, led to flooding of New Orleans becoming one of the main reasons for majority of death toll (Smith, 2006).

barriers like sand dunes and mangroves had been bulldozed for tourists to create better views from hotels overlooking the water. Also, mangroves had been cleared for their timber, and to facilitate the US shrimp farming industry, funded by the World Bank (Sharma, 2005, cited in Keys, Masterman-Smith, & Cottle, 2006). In those coastal lands, there was almost nothing in the tsunami's path but the fishing villages and tourist hotels (Keys, Masterman-Smith, & Cottle, 2006). What these studies show is that, 'incidents' that look like and are represented as natural disasters, are in fact a result of social relations, structures, power arrangements. In this regard, disasters can even be the revelation moments of a matrix of relations that remains obscure "otherwise".

After the incident in Soma too, both by declarations of state officials like that accident was in the *fitrat* ("nature") of mining, also through the process of aid where people were sending anything (cloths, furniture, food, etc.) to Soma, the incident was turned into a 'natural disaster', as if there was an earthquake. What happened in Eynez was named as an 'accident' or a 'disaster' which both point out that it was inevitable and there is no specific responsables to detect. But as the disaster studies shows there is no such a thing as natural disaster, but all the disasters are humanmade. Eynez incident was stripped from the conditions and responsables that led such a 'disaster' happen. Therefore, the processes and conditions that paved the way for such an incident, like the processes I mentioned in the previous chapter, was deemed irrelevant and invisible. Moreover, any kind of discourse that exposes these conditions were marginalized by government.

Post-disaster moments become a stage for proliferation of new discourses, technologies and policies which produce new actors and creates new or deepens the already existing power structures in society. As Smith suggests "at all phases, up to

and including reconstruction, disasters do not simply flatten landscapes, washing them smooth. Rather they deepen and erode the ruts of social difference they encounter.” (Smith, 2006). For example, after the 2010 BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill in Gulf Coast the initial aim of official response was to “protect the public and protect the environment” (Bond, 2013). As the deep-water dimensions of oil spill slowly came into focus, there appeared a consensus between scientists, academics and federals suggesting that instead of focusing on coastal effects, it was more important to focus on the effects of the oil in the subsea and on the new technologies for calculating organizational tools for responding to those effects. According to Bond (2013) this was an epistemological shift with social outcomes, in other words, a new ‘epistemic politics’. Federal government, scientists, NGO’s, lawyers and media who were involved in the official response became the facilitators of this epistemic politics. 'Sub-sea' became the new norm of 'environment' and 'environmental protection' for official response and only this consideration of disaster was deemed legitimate by state. This replacement of the problem provided a justification for the state to leave aside the considerations and actions related to the coastal lands and people, like oil pollution in the shores that is threatening the ecology and health of people living there (Bond, 2013). For example, federal officers, municipal leaders, environmental NGO's, industrial lawyers made meetings with the public to learn their thoughts about how to protect the 'environment' after the spill. When they were met with concerns and complaints about health issues of coastal population, they just ignored them, claiming that these were not related to the damages on 'environment'. Therefore, by fixing the term ‘environment’ and multivalent disaster into the standardized terms and grid of subsea chemical conditions, various actors such as state, scientists and media would be able to turn

BP oil spill into a manageable problem. Eventually, this meant to be a drawing of the boundaries of the official recovery where state could leave the policies on public health aside and focus on “subsea operations” (Hewitt, 1983).

The epistemic politics aftermath of the incident of Soma was mostly built through the practices of actors during rescue operations. AFAD was declared to be the sole authority to inform the public about what happened in the mine and what was going on. However, AFAD officials’ declarations about the reason of the incident and the possible number of victims created an ambiguity that I will explain in the next chapter. Later, AFAD officials adopted a policy of not informing the public until the last moment, until the number of victims becomes certain. Epistemic politics afterwards the incident was only focused on a body count of dead bodies- 301-, and organization of the flow of aid to the relatives of 301 miners. Even during the Penal Case of Soma despite the efforts of plaintiff lawyers to link this incident to the underlying relations of exploitation, and their efforts to bring all the responsables (state institutions that are responsible of inspecting the mine, Ministry of Energy and Natural Sources, TKİ, ELİ, MİGEM, etc.) to justice, the essence of the trial necessitates a limited focus that only includes responsables within the Soma Inc. and only victims as 301 workers. Therefore, fixing the disaster to a limited number of victims- 301- and to a limited accountability (officials of Soma Inc.) both through discourses and actions of AFAD and legal process left the other victims and perpetrators within the wider mining sector outside. Deeming Eynez incident as a disaster turned it into as if it is a unique case, as if there are no other victims and perpetrators in mining sector. Soma and other examples I have mentioned show that discourses proliferate after disasters generally operate to naturalize or obscure the

power relations once opened in the course of disaster. Eventually, they contribute to reproduce and reconfigure relations of power.

Disasters are productive in many senses of the term. For one, the discourses around them may turn the mourning into an affective glue, bring about a revival of national unity and a context for declaring state's strength rather than its vulnerability, a context for reinstating the 'common good of nation' and concerns for national security. For example, 1999 floods in Venezuela is generally considered to be the most dramatic event in Venezuela's recent history, and mostly called as "la Tragedia" (Fassin & Vasquez, 2005). The catastrophe affected not only poor but also the rich in wide proportions, therefore it was able to be represented as a 'national tragedy' more easily than the previous small floods and fatalities happened in poor hill neighborhoods. The intensity of the disaster and the equal sharing of the misfortune among everyone combined with a feeling of national communion that fueled solidarity and compassion (Fassin & Vasquez, 2005). Media played a key role by transforming the abstract reality of death tolls and victim statistics into dramatic individual testimonies. Through the media, there was an emotional surge that united the country and transfigured the nation. Media played the role of a gaze that brings people together and through which one feels compassion. Also, the flood happened just in the same day of the voting the new constitution of Chavez who was mostly legitimized by an ideology espousing regeneration of the nation and redemption of people. The disaster was experienced as a trial for the nation and Chavez, making it possible to reconstruct national unity. Theological dimension of politics like religious discourses, like salvation and redemption of the nation by the figure of leader got merged with humanitarianism, and this eventually legitimized declaration of the state of exception. For writers, this was a "humanitarian state of exception" since it was

declared not in the name of a threat to public security but in the name of the emotions like the sympathy for the disaster victims and it was desired by large segments of society, transported by a wave of generosity toward the victims and by a feeling of trust in the president himself (Fassin & Vasquez, 2005). Chavez who was already the moral carrier of Bolivarianism, being the father of nation, acted like the head who decides to assume full powers in a time of danger to save the threatened fatherland which appeared fully legitimate in that context. With the emotion of collective redemption touching all the members of nation; with this humanitarian morality, the exception was seen necessary and the crimes committed by the military during the period were accepted simply as exceptions within the exception (Fassin & Vasquez, 2005).

Disasters and post-disaster responses are also productive in the sense that they may enable series of transformations and may lead to the emergence of new actors and institutions. For example, studies on post-Katrina demonstrate that government response after the hurricane was the ultimate example of how disaster management becomes a tool for neoliberal transformations in New Orleans, how staying in New Orleans was made impossible through policies and procedures, and how the post-Katrina life and the legal procedures people must tackle were perceived to be a worse disaster than the hurricane itself (Austin, 2006). After the hurricane, instead of what was needed such as construction crews, resource centers, social workers, road builders, electricians, and carpenters; government sent military services. State of emergency subsequently led to the authorization of a military response to an “ongoing” disaster that the failure of bureaucratic machinery helped to prolong. One reason for the misplacement of the priorities was that the institution responsible for handling emergency response and recovery (FEMA- Federal

Emergency Management Agency) had become a branch of government, specialized primarily on counter-terrorism and internal security threats before Katrina (Giroux, 2006). Over time the efforts of FEMA seemed to be against the New Orleans residents themselves treating them as threats. The idea of “public security” was displaced, the notion that New Orleansians themselves were a threat to public or national security circulated and became a rationale for the efforts of the government in New Orleans. After the emergency was declared, army blocked the city, literally prisoned people in the flooded city by force, without any aid from outside, stop the people who were trying to run away to other cities. The racist discourses about migration from New Orleans and how the New Orleans people were looters and how they were attacking the private houses spread quickly in the media (Smith, 2006). The National Guard obviously were working under orders to control the city via military and to protect property rather than to bring aid those who needed. The theme of national security was compounded by neoliberal reconstruction of the city. In the aftermath of hurricane nearly a million residents of Louisiana were forced to leave their homes. Upon return they began living in FEMA trailers. Rents skyrocketed putting housing out of reach for many previous low-income renters. Public houses that were not even affected by hurricane were abolished by state, and contracted to private companies for building mix-income units. Perpetuation of 'emergency' in the wake of such disruption enabled government transfer of government funds from institutions of social welfare and public works to private sector contractors. The priority was not actually to rescue or attend to the needs of the poorest but, rather, to invest in profit growth sectors (Klein, 2010). Procedures for getting paid by insurance companies or getting subsidies by government for rebuilding their homes became an entanglement of legal procedures that would take years without any

result. This resulted in deliberate and permanent eviction of the poor from New Orleans (Adams, Hattum, & English, 2009). In this case the victims of hurricane are turned into a threat to national security, and national security is defined in lines what is good for mostly white and upper-class population.

After the incident in Eynez, response of the state was a kind of combination these two seemingly contradictory approaches in Venezuela and New Orleans. Although the mine incident is not considered to be within the commonsense definition of ‘a natural disaster’, it was perceived to be like a great earthquake and flood which led Soma’s marking as a “post-disaster space.” Consequently, the town became a metaphoric meeting point where the “country’s heart beats” as many media agencies used the metaphor. While the town Soma was presented as a humanitarian space that invites everyone to join to the mourning, thus becoming a trial for nation’s togetherness like Venezuela, it was at the same time a place of exclusion. When the grief turned into the protest in Soma, state of emergency was declared and some people were regarded to be dangerous outsiders who should be treated accordingly, and any voice raised to mention that Eynez incident was in fact a workplace murder that calls for accountable, has been regarded as threatening “the security of nation”.

The national unity created by the circulating images, narratives and declarations about a national tragedy can also be compounded by the idea of *ülke menfaati* (“common good of nation”) like it happened in Soma. The reproduction of Eynez incident as a tragedy by declarations of officials and businessman also legitimized the efforts of expanding the neoliberal policies, and delegitimized those actors who are against such policies by rendering them traitors against *ülke menfaati*, as I will explain.

In Soma, aid operations and declarations of state functioned as a way to represent the incident as a national melodrama. It can be the first time that death toll related to a ‘work accident’ received that much attention from state. But certainly, it is the first time that victims were declared as national martyrs. As a result, Eynez incident became a stage where state tried to monopolize mourning through lines of national unity. Melodramatic depictions of stories of miners and their relatives, which rendered the structural factors such as the transformation in the agricultural sector, problems in the mining industry invisible, became a tool for pro-government media to turn this incident as tool for affective glue among the nation. But these efforts of state and strategy of deeming this disaster as a natural and national disaster, legitimized some discourses and actors in post-disaster Soma and delegitimized other actors. Erdoğan’s visit to Soma resulted in big demonstrations that highlighted the government’s responsibility in the incident. Pro-government media claimed that the people in demonstrations were not the relatives of nation’s martyrs but people from ‘outside’, people who are *yabancı* (“strangers”) who aim to create chaos by abusing the mourning of nation. After a while state of emergency was declared in Soma to prevent *yabancı*s. Therefore, any critique of government’s policies on mining sector, any kind of comment on fatality of neoliberal policies were regarded as a threat to national security.

Just after the incident, media began covering the miners who stayed unemployed after the Eynez mine was shut down. The authorities were announcing *müjde* (“good news”) about opening of new mine pits and thermal power plants that will save their miner brothers who stayed unemployed after the shutting down of Eynez mine because of the accident as they said. News were also pointing out to demonstrations or petitions of some miners against shutting down of the Eynez mine

and for opening of it and new mines in Soma (Uyar, 2017). Therefore, the blend of national mourning with the memory of 301 martyrs and national duty for providing employment may have created the conditions for state to reinstate its neoliberal policies and the necessity of expanding the mining sector.

In fact, Soma is the one of the multiple moments that has been translated by the state into a discourse of disaster management. Since the introduction of AFAD, as I will later explain in detail, the state has made a new shift in the perception of the disaster or “humanitarian crisis”. Therefore, state, through the vast resources of AFAD could be able to mark the spaces of disaster as the spaces where it can emphasize its existence. Below I will try to look at different facades of that existence and distinctly changing methods to depending on the geographies and actors.

3.2 Disaster management in Suruç and Van

The examples I have tried to describe show that disasters produce methods that state executes in order to materialize its existence in these spaces, therefore it can be said the state is also made and remade during the course of disaster management.

I argue that what is built by Turkish state in the post-disaster contexts that I mentioned is similar to a humanitarian space, that constantly created the borders, both the borders of who can involve in the space of aid; and also re-created the borders of the Turkish state itself. Humanitarian space is a physical and symbolic space discursively created and socially negotiated by different agents like state, humanitarian agents, political groups, media and other stakeholders which deliver services according to the principles they hold for different ends. These ends may be about legitimizing their respective interests, projects or beliefs, or about political motivations like legitimation of political leaders, control over territory etc., or about

organizational politics — the desire to continue operations and retain staff — or as a form of legitimization politics — showing the public that an agency is doing good work (Hilhorst & Jansen, 2010). Humanitarian space is similar to the aid policies applied by Turkish state and AFAD as the part of disaster management in post-disaster spaces. Because both through regulatory mechanisms and also through the discourses state included or excluded some actors to enter the humanitarian space opened after the incidents like Van earthquake, Eynez mine incident, and also the coming of ‘refugees’ in various contexts including Suri. Production of such spaces, necessitates a certain legal framework that AFAD was endowed with through state regulations. Therefore, I will use the humanitarian space and post-disaster space interchangeably, since management of post-disaster spaces also includes creation of a humanitarian space.

Studies on state point out the necessity of studying 'state' in the places where “state law and order continually have to be reestablished”, that is in the margins of state (Das & Poole, 2004) (Asad, 2004). I argue that AFAD functions as a way to rebuild the state through regulations in the newly opening margins, which are the post-disaster spaces. For state, at some point, disaster situations became necessary spaces to reinstate the Turkish state. In other words, I take disasters and post-disaster spaces as margins of state, that needs to be managed, and also as humanitarian spaces in which state constantly reestablish and re-state its borders and itself.

Pierre Clastres (1989) claims that there is a constant struggle between society and state, and statelessness or stateliness is a result of this struggle. Therefore, state is not a de facto thing but an outcome of various processes, struggles and mechanisms. This opens a theoretical space that makes it possible to study state as a process, that constantly re-state itself by performing various tactics. Other anthropological studies

on state also point to the processes and practices for state making. They criticize the approach that takes the state as a coherent source of power that is “distinct, fixed and unitary entity” that stands apart from and above the society (Sharma & Gupta, 2006). Rather state can be studied as an effect of ensemble of discourses and practices, languages, performances, produced in local encounters at the everyday level (Aretxaga, 2003) (Mitchell, 2006). Through these encounters “the state” appears and also mostly functions as a structure that stands apart from, and above society (Trouillot, 2001) (Das & Poole, 2004). So, one can study 'the state' through the places and encounters that it is constantly (re)produced, and through understanding the historical dynamics of this process; and the rationality, the epistemic assumptions behind the concrete workings of its institutions.

State making works by constituting new borders and spaces through discourses, creating representations like statistics making, producing materials like documents, and the phantasy of state that accompany all these. State constantly and continuously declares/states itself through bureaucratic routines, documents and process of documentation, material rituals like identity cards and borders (Nugent, 2010). In terms of material practices, such as ID card controls or signatures, confrontation with any state officer or any procedure (Das & Poole, 2004) materializes the state itself. Through these processes a specific kind of relationship between people, and state's relation to people is consolidated, leaving other alternatives outside.

In relation to these procedures state as a spatiality occurs. Nicholas Blomley explains how law works through building spaces or property (Blomley, 2013). According to Blomley, law regulates the norms of the space and people who can enter or cannot enter to this specified space and what is legitimate and illegitimate in

there. Blomley mentions how mapping, research and statistics ideologically legitimize to claim a space as a property and make it practically possible (Blomley, 2013). Through these practices, places that were accepted as lawless, orderless, alien has mapped and turned into a technical and abstract surface for read by state. This surface becomes readable, familiar, legible, representable and controllable with specific categories. The ones that are not mapped and could not be categorized therefore turn into improper, alien and dangerous. Therefore, law, violence and space is always implicit to each other. Spaces should be constantly fixated, their borders and meanings reestablished and performed. So, for him, state making happens through building of spaces and categories of outside/inside and in relation to it determining the norms of familiar/stranger, proper/improper. The space in question does not need to be considered as private property, as it can be any space that has (even only conceptual) borders, that excludes, that accepts, that has norms about what can or cannot be done within its limits, that mediates a law and normativity. For example, it can be lands of a nation whose borders are determined not only by formal policies but also through constantly evolving narratives related to nation, gender, family.

I argue that AFAD functioned as a way to both building concrete spaces with borders but also conceptual spaces like the nation in the post-disaster periods after Van and Suruç through its legal and regulatory framework for disaster management. Suruç and Van cases are explicit examples showing how disasters and disaster management are productive, reproducing the body of nation and state. I argue that AFAD's role and workings in Soma are different than the contexts of Suruç and Van, therefore the technologies of state-making were also different. In Van and Suruç state made a huge effort to monopolize the response through strict procedures of AFAD

on the ground. In these contexts, AFAD appeared as an actor that excludes any actors from the humanitarian space in practice. While, in Soma, the state tried to represent AFAD as the sole authority for rescue and aid process, in practice, it was not excluding the other actors to join the humanitarian space as much as it did in Van and Suruç. The effort of state was only to ‘expose’ and criticize ‘those who exploit the national mourning in the name of help’ at the representation level. A reason for this can be that while in a context like Soma it is easier for state to produce a discourse around national mourning, national compassion, duty and unity; in the contexts like Suruç and Van any reference to nation must be compounded with mechanisms of state that are similar to colonial mechanisms. Both the people in Van and the refugees in Suruç have an additional identity of being Kurdish, “a constant excess” where the violence of state and nationalism is crafted into their histories and lives, and a strong criticism towards state is enabled through the organization of social life and existence of powerful political actors. This constant excess rendered people in Van and Suruç already “too politicalized” to be solely conceived as victims of a disaster, rather these were the moments that they cannot no longer avoid or escape from the state’s scrutiny. Therefore, the state-making through practices of AFAD and disaster management in these contexts were more strict, violent and slightly different compared to Soma which made them informative examples for me to understand working and meaning of disaster management in Turkey in general.

As I mentioned before, in recent the 'incidents' that have massive effects with deep social and political repercussions like Van Earthquake’, the coming of Syrian refugees since 2011, and finally in Soma mine ‘accident’, AFAD appeared as a salient actor that was prominent in media and in the field. It claimed to be the sole authority for coordination and intervention into these situations. AFAD was

established under the Prime Ministry of Turkey in 2009. It has a vast authority and financial source, thanks to being under Prime Ministry, and according to regulations, it is the sole responsible institution in/during the incidents and places that is defined to be as disasters and emergency situations. According to its official website, AFAD was established as a necessity that was uncontrollable after the lack of coordination of institutions and insufficiency of the government response to the 1999 Marmara earthquake (AFAD, 2017). According to regulations of AFAD, it is the only institution that has the authority to coordinate the intervention to a disaster. It prepares the Disaster Plan of Turkey and puts it into practice. It determines the missions and coordinates ministries, necessary state institutions, civil society organizations, universities, international aid institutions, local municipalities and volunteers. It also has the authority to confiscate in coordination with ministries, pooling national and international donations in its own account. Moreover, AFAD has the authority to “define” a disaster, as it can be seen in the document regarding its regulation. According to this definition, disaster is as an incident that cuts and suspends the living of everyday life and necessitates emergent response. These disasters vary from natural to industrial disasters. Mass population movement in 2011 was also added to this definition due to a high number of Syrians coming to Turkey. One of my interviewees, who studies refugee law and who worked for AFAD for a while, mentions that AFAD has exactly same laws and regulations, categories, management and know how procedures with its international counterparts. In its website, too, it is mentioned to be, compatible with international law standards, and even better than them. Therefore, it is said that it is an institution that turned Turkey into a good example for the world in the sphere of international humanitarian relief. AFAD also sends aid to other countries, that’s why as it is

claimed in its website, it appears as the mighty and compassionate hand of Turkey. The institution is described as scientific, analytic, realistic, innovative and open to learning. By highlighting science, international norms and education it claims to be a competent institution, and only competent institution in Turkey. Even in its reports and statistics a fully technical language is used, the high status AFAD authorities blend this technical language with different discourses on nation. The Strategic Plan of 2013-2017 mentions the strong parts of the institution as following: being the only authority in the country, its great legal authority, financial structure, easiness to reach the sources like vast budget etc. (Afad 2013-2017 Stratejik Planı, 2017). Same document also counts the factors that threatens the workings of institution like: political structure of the municipalities, the conflict of authority between municipality and governor, the fact that NGOs do not want to work with state authority, the fact that some NGOs have secret agendas, the possibility that some professional chambers would become politicized, etc. This blend of organizational technologies and discourse on threat is most explicitly exemplified in Suruç case.

Although I had heard that AFAD was one of the important actors in Van and Soma, my first interaction and field based experiences about AFAD was in Suruç. Since the ISIS attack in Kobanê, lots of people from Kobanê came to Turkey, particularly to border district Suruç.¹⁹ Some of the people began to stay in houses of relatives in Suruç, some of them stayed in warehouses. Kobane Crisis Coordination²⁰ was trying to supply the necessities like health services, distribution of food, building of tents, collecting and distributing aid, etc. I realized in our conversations name of AFAD was always appearing, mostly with frustration. Because AFAD seemed to put

¹⁹ Kobanê was sieged by ISIS in 2014 August.

²⁰ Kobane Crisis Coordination was consisting of Democratic Toplum Kongresi (DTK), Demokratik Bölgeler Partisi (DBP), Halkların Demokratik Partisi (HDP), Halkların Demokratik Kongresi (HDK), Suruç Municipality, Rojava ile Yardımlaşma ve Dayanışma Derneği and various other groups and individual volunteers.

obstacles for any effort by Kobane Crisis Coordination. So, the existence of state was not only apparent in the city as border, patrolling soldiers and police but also through existence of AFAD in the city and its daily interactions with people. Temporary Protective Regulation²¹ that was enacted in 2014 regulates the procedures for temporary protection, right and responsibilities, procedures for entrance of populations who ran away from their country to Turkey and also regulated the measures that state can take against their movement (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Interior Directorate General of Migration Management, 2013). AFAD appeared to be the executer of this regulation of laws. People coming from Kobane did not get the status of 'temporary protection' but instead they were granted with 'temporary guest status'. In order to get this status, people who crossed the border had to register to AFAD camps, give their finger prints and take a temporary ID, in order to get health and education services coordinated by AFAD. The regulations for people from Kobane to live outside of AFAD camps is more strict than other Syrian refugees who came before from different places, mostly making it impossible for them to live outside the camp. People who live outside the camp cannot reach the services like health and education. The physical spaces like tent camps in Suruç built by AFAD is the most obvious example, being inside or outside the camp determines who can receive compassion from state and who could not, also which actors can join the process of providing aid or cannot. Because people who are registered to state should stay in the camp, if they are not in the camp they are not registered therefore not readable by state, nor eligible for help.

For many, what AFAD tried to do, was appeared as an attempt to foreclose any alternatives offered by various other actors and substitute all the possible

²¹ Geçici Koruma Yönetmeliği

relations with its own specific management relation. Therefore, it constituted its own epistemes of aid, through what I previously explained as epistemic politics of aid. It claims its own specific relation to be neutral, non-political/apolitical, scientific, with the best know how in the world, and capable to do what is best for people. The statistics it produces mostly focuses on the amount of aid that should be given, leaving outside the specific cultural, political problems among them, isolated from all social political context that made people from Kobanê to come to Turkey. Stripping the people from these realities reduces them into a statistic of aid, where only the amount of aid given becomes important. All the other possible relations are reduced into a relation of aid provider and receiver.

AFAD consolidates its legal framework on aid or disaster management both through legitimizing it by scientific and nationalist discourse, also through rational disciplinary techniques and direct violence. For example, during first mass population movement from Kobane, people from Kobane were forcefully put into buses by soldiers and sent to AFAD camps, while soldiers attack the people in Suruç who wanted to welcome the people from Kobane, preventing them to build any possible relation with people from Kobane. The ones who once entered the camps could not easily go out from there since the regulations were strict. Only those who stayed in the camps could get ID s and use health and education services. In AFAD's regulation these services are never mentioned as rights that people are entitled to. So, it seems that these are not rights but only services provided by generous state.

Through such procedures and direct force by army, people coming from Kobane got included into the law of AFAD, to refugee or aid law. The ones who rejected to be included in this law, like the ones who managed not to stay in AFAD camps, or stay in municipalities' camps did not have the 'right' to use these services. Any person

coming from Kobane who is not registered and who is not in the statistics of AFAD is treated as part of chaos, and as an unknown object. According to interviews I conducted with state and AFAD authorities, they appear to AFAD authorities as dangerous and potentially having secret agendas with local municipality. Including people into its own law also meant rendering the other alternative efforts for people from Kobane as illegitimate and eventually criminalize them. AFAD tried to prevent Turkish Medical Association²² doctors who were aiming to provide health services also to the ones outside of AFAD camps. The tent-cities built by Solidarity were hindered by the AFAD and its collaboration with governor and gendarme. International aid was monopolized in AFAD accounts and were not distributed equally, especially there was no budget for municipalities. Therefore, DBP²³ municipalities built their own refugee camps with their own budget in solidarity with other civil society organizations. Their electricity and water were constantly cut, the food from Kızılay were not distributed equally between AFAD camps and municipality camps. They were constantly threatened by AFAD officials, gendarme and governor. For example, governor claimed that the land on which Solidarity built a new tent city to be a private land, claimed that what municipality did was illegal and claimed that refugees should go to AFAD camps. Eventually the camp was attacked by police and confiscated.

In my interviews with various AFAD officials they were commonly using a technocratic language mixed with humanitarian language, however they also could not stop touching upon what they call as the ‘secret agenda’ of municipality and how Turkish state, so AFAD, is doing everything just because it is generous and compassionate “not hypocritically as DBP”. They were constantly telling me about

²² Türk Tabipler Birliği

²³ The Democratic Regions Party (Demokratik Bölgeler Partisi) is a pro-Kurdish political party.

the numbers of tents, workers, equipment etc. they have, how clean and great their services are. Thus, for Turkish state, coming of people from Kobane appeared as a new sphere for governmentality. Through new organizational institutions, practices and enforcement of its own disaster rule, state aims to build its hegemony against the Kurdish movement which appears as an alternative power locus deteriorating its authority.

AFAD also was a prominent actor for the aid efforts after Van earthquake in 2011. It built and managed the container camps, selected the NGO's that can and cannot work in the field, it coordinated the national and international aid campaigns, pooled them into its own account and distributing them, coordinated the NGOs, government, governors and municipalities in the field, making the damage assessments of buildings after earthquake, determined who had the right to take aid from state, who had the right to own a container, prepared the official statements about the situation. For example, AFAD was coordinating the damage assessments of buildings effected by the earthquake, according to a damage criteria AFAD determined who has a right to take aid from state and what kind of aid. AFAD's regulations about aid depended upon criteria of ownership and familyhood. Firstly, it was determining if a person was owner of a damaged house or a renter, if s/he was really living in that specific building or not, secondly, they determine if s/he "is" a family. According to this, only owners of any house could get aid, but not the renters. Renters could not even enter the container camps; they did not have any right for state aid. But being an owner is not sufficient for getting a container. Afterwards house owners whose houses were collapsed were offered new apartment flats in newly built TOKİ houses built by collaboration of AFAD and TOKİ. Although this

was presented as a state aid, actually it was a way of indebting people to TOKİ and make them pay back.

On the other hand, in order to be eligible to involve in state's aid process, one also must be part of a family and head of the family, that is the husband, should be present. So, single, divorced and widow women could not get help including being accepted into container camps. In their fieldwork Schäfers and Çelik mention a woman who had to stay with her divorced ex-husband to be able to live in a container. In their fieldwork just after the earthquake, (Schäfers, 2016) (Schäfers & Çelik, 2014) show how VAKAD (Van Women's Association²⁴) which is an association working on domestic violence and against gender inequalities in Van since 2005, pointed out the problems about single women in the container camps ruled by AFAD, and the fact that single women were mostly renters so having no rights for state aid. VAKAD suggested policies to the AFAD administrators but rather than listening, AFAD and governor put obstacles against VAKAD's working. All these criteria for aid, regulated by AFAD can be called as epistemic politics of aid, which was built around the criteria of property ownership and being a family. This epistemology of aid delegitimizes any other epistemologies, that claims aid for other people.

AFAD also had the authority to decide on which actors can join the humanitarian space and who cannot. Thus, some of the NGO's, civil society organizations and municipalities were excluded from the humanitarian space mostly by claim that they were economically or politically supporting PKK.²⁵ VAKAD was sued with the claim that it was making PKK/KCK propaganda during its works after the earthquake (Schäfers & Çelik, 2014). Bank accounts of various associations were

²⁴ Van Kadın Derneği

²⁵Bank accounts of Sarmaşık Derneği were frozen since it is claimed that the money collected was going to terrorist groups.

frozen with this explanation. DBP municipalities were excluded from the aid process due to same allegation. Marlene Schäfers analyses the techno-political governance after the earthquake, especially the mobilization of expertise regarding the assessment of damaged buildings (Schäfers, 2016). What she argues is both the material properties of ruined environment and the political history of region creates a constant distrust and feeling of risk. The fact that, after the first earthquake, government declared some buildings as safe, and they collapsed in the second earthquake, also mistrust of state due to region is crafted by traumatic memories of state led people to define this earthquake not as a natural disaster but a political disaster. Furthermore, the aid process after the disaster strengthened this view, reinforcing the environment of risk and threat for earthquake survivors. It was told that AFAD reports of damage assessment were prepared with bribery and corruption. Through bribery and corruption, some homeowners could get 'highly damaged reports' for their lightly damaged homes in order to have a new TOKI house or they could get an opposite report to be able to rent the home. TOKI houses also made the people indebted established as new relation of dependency, meanwhile it prevented other actors' involvement in the aid process. In addition to that, media coverage of Kurds had many connotations of their hypocrisy as they betray the state yet still ask for the help. It is possible that, with the influence of this discourse of betraying, it was seen that some donation packages sent to Van appeared to be full of stones and Turkish flags. It can be said that Van case always had an excess which could not be encapsulated and contained within a purely humanitarian and a nonpolitical space that the state can govern and manage. On the contrary, post-earthquake region created political subjects in Van who felt themselves to be at the perils of both natural and political disaster.

As it is seen in Suruç and Van cases, post-disaster contexts have become an important governmental sphere for state that was occupied and monopolized by an authoritative institution like AFAD. AFAD and its relation to law, creates a governmental norm in which different technologies like scientific expertise, organizational procedures are producing a legibility grid that defines which actors can enter in or expelled from post-disaster space as aid providers or receiver. Even though this grid, procedures, technologies and language of humanitarian space seems to be a neutral one, it is gendered, racialized, class based and also effected by the political history of the context in which it works. Creation of such an authoritative actor and representation of it as if it is the sole authority points that its struggle in disaster area is not only about rationalizing the practices, but also through rationalizing to create a reality about the state itself as an omnipotent and capable entity. Translation of ‘incident’ into a space of technocratic intervention like disaster management, legitimizes only some actors and some specific relations while delegitimizing the others. Building chic tent camps, or TOKİ houses, frequently declaring the amount of money and aid sent to these places, using a professional language, all these are important to establish the state as a sole and capable aid provider, who knows what is best for people, who does not have any political agenda but only compassion for people.

State establishes its own rule through AFAD in Suruç and Van, this rule is named as disaster management and it functions as a substitute to any other kind of relationship in society, treating these as natural disasters rendering the political histories invisible and irrelevant. This rule of aid is built through an innate violence that suppresses any other kind of way of relations, expelling them from the property of state, declaring them illegitimate. For example, in Suruç this becomes possible

through simultaneous working of spatial practices and discourses. State, and property of state does not have fixed borders, borders of property have to be redrawn constantly, borders has to performed, the ones who can and cannot enter, the things that can and cannot be done inside should be determined constantly (Blomley, 2013). Through this performance, property or nation or state appears both discursively and materially. As I argued practices like giving ID 's to people from Kobane who came to AFAD camps and including them in statistics makes them legible for joining the state's law of order. However, when they are out of this mapping, when they stay in Solidarity's camps they become aliens and dangerous who cannot get any aid from state, and criminalized since they are staying in the camps of so-called organizations with secret agendas. Therefore, the borders of aid law or state's borders are maintained through declaration of who deserves compassion and who can show compassion. For state, only the ones who act 'proper' to brotherhood or familyhood, who shows gratefulness to state, can enter to this post-disaster space. State, through drawing borders, producing documents and setting criteria, becomes powerful enough to decide and regulate who can give aid and who can take it.

Cases of Van and Suruç show us that disasters (earthquake and population movement in these cases) are productive in the sense that a new space is built with new regulations, actors and discourses. State appeared as the authority on deciding and practicing the disaster management in this new humanitarian space through AFAD. With its executive, economical and legal authority, AFAD also functions as a tool for suppressing the political effectiveness of local municipalities and civil society through preventing them to involve, therefore, being the only actor to intervene into 'a disaster situation'. As Bond mentioned in his article on BP oil spill, this intervention of state through AFAD, what he calls as 'epistemic politics of aid'

created specific criteria, and technologies for state to determine who fulfills these criteria (Bond, 2013). In Van, Suruç and Soma as well, through claiming to be the only legal authority to intervene, AFAD tried to intimidate the other interventions regarding organization, social assistance or reporting, in other words, overall involvement of NGOs and other civil organizations, media etc. With these qualities, AFAD might be one of the institutions that represent AKP's will towards major qualitative transitions of state's know-how technologies. One of the reasons and functions of this transition in terrain of 'disaster management' might be related to increasing authoritarianism and centralization during AKP rule, especially through new laws and institutions established. Disaster has become an important agenda and sphere for policy making, subjected to regulations and turning into a sphere of management; coupled with centralization through an institution with vast authority that intimidates local governance and civil society. This exclusion and centralization of disaster management worked as a way of rebuilding the hegemony and stateness in the moments and contexts where the legitimacy of government could be eroded, like after Soma incident.

State's management of this space through these new technologies was also productive in the sense that it created new bodies in society. State's discourse on compassionate and mighty hand of Turkish state created a phantasy of state that is capable of solving any problems like it happened in Chavez state, gaining the symbolical and material power to become sole authority in the country (Fassin & Vasquez, 2005). State's handling of disasters turned some actors into a national threat being obstacles to the state's staging of love and a nationalist phantasy, like the turning the New Orleans people into threats to nation, as obstacles in front of

neoliberal transformation. Most importantly, the disaster management became a surface where Turkish state was made and remade.

CHAPTER 4

STATE MAKING THROUGH DISASTER MANAGEMENT:

THE CASE OF SOMA

In his speech during the ceremony celebrating the 5th year of foundation of AFAD (Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency of Republic of Turkey Prime Ministry) in 2015, Prime Minister Davutoğlu described AFAD with the following words:

AFAD is not just an ordinary institution, it is not a bureaucratic mechanism. The values that AFAD represents have not been built upon political interests. AFAD is the soul of the nation, AFAD is the conscience of the nation. AFAD is the compassion and the power of the state. (see Appendix, 16, own translation.)

He was congratulating AFAD for its successful operations after Van earthquake, for the management of refugees, and along with other cases, its successful operation during and after mine accidents like Ermenek and Soma. Similar to what Davutoğlu had said, I argue that AFAD can not only be analyzed as a bureaucratic mechanism, but the effects of its practices including the discourses and new actors they beget should also be taken into consideration to understand the function of this institution in recent years. In this chapter, firstly I will explain the chain of events that escalated the violence in Soma, also the processes like disaster management and aid distribution, also the declarations of government officials that accompanied those events and processes. Then, in the following parts I will examine how AFAD stands as a reference point for state officials to claim that the state, embodied by AFAD and state officials, actually had been managing the post-disaster Soma in the name of love of nation and with compassion, while ‘the others’ were using the Eynez incident as a pretext for harming the nation. Then I will examine how AFAD also became an

institution that represented the state as an efficient service provider to its citizens.

This representation also served to create categories like “people who are content with the services of state in Soma” and “the ones who are ungrateful to the state”.

Eventually I argue that these affective and discursive byproducts of AFAD’s bureaucratic management in Soma, recreated the conditions for neoliberal restructuring.

In the *Make-Believe Space: Affective Geography in a Postwar Polity*, Yael Navaro- Yashin analyses how "Northern Cyprus," which is an unrecognized state, was crafted as a governmental entity and as a reality using political imagination and through material administrative practices like changing the names of places, putting new signature on roads, writing of history, and declarations of officials (Yashin, 2012). Through introducing the term and analyzing the state as ‘phantasmagoric’ and calling Northern Cyprus as a “make- believe space” Yashin points out not only the material character in the ‘making’ of state’s practices but also the affective potential of these institutional practices that plays role in making the ‘believing’ part to this state (Yashin, 2012). Her analysis depends on conceptualization of institutions not as “disenchanted” but as “enchanted” entities. For her, administrations and their practices have “the potential to generate and exert affective forces in their own right.” And “the tools of administration, such as official handbooks, gazettes, legal forms and documents, filing cabinets, office furniture, buildings, as well as institutional practices such as surveys, audits, censuses, legal practices, and procedures in national assemblies and in court-hearings” cannot only be read as cool, rationalized disciplinary practices of governmentality, but they “have ways of producing affect” (Yashin 2012, p. 31).

Therefore, influenced by Yashin's theoretical framework and methodology in this chapter I would like to explore the 'rationalities of government', that are the state procedures, governmental practices, declarations and performances of state officials, combined with 'the work of imagination' which functioned for 'performing' the state. Through the non-rational potentialities and inclinations of institutions" and affective administration in Soma state is built as a phantasm in Soma.

As I mentioned previously, what distinguishes Soma case is that there was no work murder that received this much public attention before. As a result, lots of actors joined proliferation of discourses about the incident and actively participated in the processes like aid, law, media representation, demonstrations just after the incident. Since the first moment, innumerable media institutions and journalists were broadcasting the rescue operations. Politicians and political groups were giving their condolences through media. The day after the incident there were public displays of mourning varying from individuals, to football teams' performances like wearing black or people making sounds with the pots in their houses. For a week, all the newspapers covered the incident, in some newspapers even the sport pages were dedicated to Soma (Gürses, 2015; Özkır & Şişman, 2014; Keneş & Taştan, 2016; Özkır, Y. & Başak Ş. 2014).

There were also innumerable demonstrations, strikes and boycotts about Soma in many places in Turkey by parties, syndicates, miners, associations, student groups, other political organizations. Erdoğan, the President at the time visited Soma and faced big demonstrations and reaction by relatives of miners, miners and political organizations etc. Countless numbers of police forces were directed from other cities to Soma, attacking the protestors. One of the workers was caught d by

Special Forces²⁶ and one of the advisors of Erdoğan kicked him. This moment was photographed and circulated in media becoming a viral visual that became emblematic of Soma incident. Pro-government media called this worker a provocateur, and claimed that everybody in that demonstration actually came from outside of Soma, therefore they were not reflecting the real ideas of mine workers or relatives of miners in Soma and just provoking people. Police response to demonstrations all around Turkey was with tear gas canisters, plastic bullets and arrests. One police announcement in a demonstration at ODTU university was as follows: “Be proud of what you did in this sad mourning day!”²⁷ Meanwhile the government authorities were giving declarations similar to that policeman’s at ODTÜ, about how the politicization of this issue is wrong, especially how the death of miners was being abused by some groups coming from outside of Soma and provoking the relatives of miners. AKP İzmir deputy claimed that these groups were necrophiles since “they were politically profiting by abusing the national pains.”²⁸ After a while Manisa governorate banned any meeting and demonstration in Soma, blocked all the cars coming to city and expelled the lawyers and journalists who came to Soma. Some lawyers and journalists were taken under custody, assaulted and tortured.

Just after these demonstrations President Erdoğan was answering the questions of journalists. A journalist asked him about how the Soma Inc. who was running the Eynez mine could keep on its mining operations even when it became obvious after the disaster that company was not prepared against the accidents even

²⁶ Özel Harekat

²⁷ “Yas gününde yaptıklarınızla gurur duyun ODTÜ’lüler!”

²⁸ AKP İzmir Deputy Rifat Sait and AKP İzmir Provincial Head Ömer Cihat Akay both used this term to criticize the demonstrations. Ömer Cihat Akay wrote the following lines on Twitter: “Milli acılar üzerinden bazıları siyasi rant elde etmek istemektedir. Ölü seviciler istismar siyaseti yapmaktadır.” (“AK Partili İki İsimden”, 2014).

though it was operating in such a dangerous sector like mining. As an answer Erdoğan said that Eynez mine was inspected about health and security and determined to be successful about worker's health and workplace security. When the speech goes on, Erdoğan answers the criticisms about high number of casualties by giving examples from other mining accidents that had such big death toll in history, starting from the incidents happened in the 19th century. Then he made his famous declaration that death is in the *fitrat* ("nature") of mining. Government just naturalized the incident as *fitrat*. Responsibilities of company and state in this incident became invisible through these declarations where the company represented as having been inspected by state officials and determined to meet the requirements of work-safety. In other words, state officials ignored and rejected the processes that paved the way for such an incident and such a big death toll in Eynez. The only reason for such an incident could be something that is outside of the limits of controllability. Therefore, this incident was represented as a natural disaster and *fitrat*, both of which implied the uncontrollability and also inevitability of this incident and evaded any sort of accountability. The incident became stripped off from its structural reasons, and the actors like state and company were not held accountable.

Declaration of national mourning and the organization of aid functioned as a way to for avoiding the structural reasons. Generalization of the mourning to all country through the discourses and performances of different actors like state officials represented the pain as shared by everybody in the same manner, as if they were all victims. This representation too worked to push the structural reasons behind this incident to the background. Press was pointing out to a need for conversion of national mourning into a national aid campaign all around the country by all people.

Already there were lots of aid delivered by people from business world, artists, sportsman, government, lawyers, psychologists, celebrities and companies. Aid campaigns functioned as a way to cover the structural reasons. Because aid like food, furniture, clothes began to flood to Soma as if this was a natural disaster like an earthquake. Later state declared that all the aids would be centralized and pooled in the bank account of AFAD and distributed to the families through AFAD. Especially AFAD's new housing projects for the relatives of miners caught big media attention. However, these houses were not made by state or AFAD's budget, but with donations that were pooled into AFAD's accounts. Actually, the only money spent from state's budget was the funeral costs. Also, other than financial aids lots of other kind of aids like foods, clothes, toys, household appliances were flooding to Soma. AFAD also took the responsibility of accumulating those aids and distributing them to families.

However, in contrary to what I observed in Suruç and Van, AFAD or state did not manage nor tried hard to monopolize the aid distribution process. Because according to my interviews various groups managed to distribute aids without the control of AFAD or any other state authority. Although this was the case, AFAD was still being represented as the major institution that had been involved in the rescue and aid processes. Government officials and media were constantly mentioning about the successful operations of AFAD. There was an insistence on the idea that AFAD had everything under control in Soma, not only about the distribution of aid but also during the rescue operations. AFAD became the coordinator of rescue operations, even though it was one of the last arrivers, even though it did not have so much experience in mining disasters. It coordinated the rescue teams, organized the gendarme for closing the area, organized the ambulances, hospitals, warehouses and

process for identification of bodies. It became the sole authority for giving official information about the accident, rescue processes and statistics. Such representation of AFAD was symbolically supported by the fact that all the official press declarations were controlled and transmitted by AFAD Coordination Center to the Minister of Energy and Natural Resources, Taner Yıldız who eventually made the declarations and press releases. In the following parts I would like to examine the effects of such regulations by state and state institutions.

4.1 Performing the state: Love and compassion

As I mentioned before the context of Soma was slightly different from that of Suruç and Van. I argue that in Suruç and Van due to existence of an organized political movement that would undermine the state in moments of disasters, AFAD occupied all the spheres with mechanisms similar to those of colonial mechanisms as much as possible. However, in Soma due to a lack of a strong political organization, AFAD did not monopolize the humanitarian space with its bureaucratic regulations totally. I argue that what it monopolized was the mourning, state had played an affective role to be the official and sole authority to show compassion which happened through giving reference to a national quality of the mourning. In other words, in Soma state-making worked through not monopolization of the all the practices and spaces in post-disaster space, as it happened in Van and Suruç, but through monopolization of compassion through a reference to works AFAD and reference to ‘national mourning’. As I mentioned before, declarations of officials, aid processes and the media coverage of the incident created affective conversion pushing the state’s responsibility into background (Massumi, 2011). Even though structural reasons were mentioned in some newspapers in the beginning, mostly the media played the

role to represent the mourning of miner's relatives in one specific way, that is as a mourning that is shared throughout the nation. Therefore, AFAD's functioning, role and what it tells us about state is different in Soma. Soma case shows that state making not only works through rationalizing practices but also through attributing affective attachments to the space and what is inside/outside, that defines who is acceptable there by establishing affective assemblages through use of love and compassion.

In the beginning of this chapter Davutoğlu's words were pointing out the fact that, the above-mentioned regulations and bureaucratic procedures of AFAD, also have the effect of recreating AFAD, and Turkish state as compassionate and powerful actors that treat everyone equally without a drive of political interest.

In the same talk Davutoğlu continues his words in the following manner:

We want, Turkish Republic, to remain as a state of compassion and power. And we are proud that this compassion and power have been embodied in AFAD... The fundamental principle of humanitarian mission is wherever there is a human and whatever religious, racial background this human has, when someone asks for a mighty hand to help him, being there for him through AFAD, through the representation of mighty hand of the State of Turkish Republic... They will always see Turkey as a hand of compassion, they will see Turkey as a hand raising its hand against the fist of tyrants with compassion. I wish God makes us that strong and compassionate so that we can protect all the sufferers wherever they are, wherever there is a human who got stuck in a difficult situation, we can approach them as human (see Appendix, 17, own translation.)

In this part I claim that representation of AFAD as a neutral actor that is not driven by political interest but by the feeling of compassion for everyone, both recreates the body of nation but also the 'threats' to the nation who can abuse this compassion of Turkish state. In her work *Cultural Politics of Emotions*, (Ahmed, 2004) examines how emotions operate to shape and construct bodies in society. She claims that objects of our emotions are not already there at present in society, but the objects themselves are produced during the course of orientation of our emotions towards

them. For her, emotions produce and shape the individual and collective bodies. Love is one of the emotions she analyzes. Love produces affects, moves people and creates collectivities and bodies. Love produces the body of nation itself, but also produces the individual and collective body of ‘others’ as hateful objects whose proximity is endangering the subjects of nation by for example taking away their jobs, security and wealth; and also, the place of the subject of nation. The proximity of others to the body of loved nation imagined as a threat to the nation, to the object of love (Ahmed, 2004). In Ahmed’s analysis, racist groups become the ‘love groups’ because they suggest that they are acting out of love of nation and their people, not out of hatred for others. They define the people who are criticizing them as ‘hate groups’. Through this conversion hate is identified as belonging to and coming from the people identified as being part of ‘hate groups’ (Ahmed, 2004).

The conversion of hate into love allows the groups to associate themselves with ‘good feeling’ and ‘positive value.’ Indeed, such groups become the ones concerned with the wellbeing of others; their project becomes redemptive, or about saving loved others. These groups come to be defined as positive in the sense of fighting *for* others, and in the name of others. (Ahmed, 2004, p. 182)

In the case of AFAD, in Suruç, Van and Soma state officials represented themselves and the state institutions as compassionate and loving. They claim that what they do was for the love of people. Therefore, these discourses of compassion and love, which were especially built around the ‘successful operations of AFAD and state’, reproduced the body of Turkish state as loving and compassionate. In addition to these qualities, state is also represented as a ‘hand of power’ through references to AFAD. This strength is implying the capability of Turkish state, which can help everyone regardless of their “religious, racial background”. However, strength of state also implies its capability for making legible which actors deserve to be loved, or which actors do not. In addition to this, strength of state also implies that it is the

only actor in authority which can designate who can help, or show love and who cannot. Therefore, state has the capacity to designate the borders of humanitarian space, that is opened in the spaces that state defines as disaster spaces.

Moreover, ‘the hand of power’ implies that state is expecting a recognition from the people who received aid. Therefore, there is an indication that while state is loving, at the same time it is deserving and expecting to be loved, and its power to be recognized. Through the reference to this recognition, the borders of humanitarian space are drawn about between who deserves and who does not deserve the love of nation. The ones who does not deserve the love, therefore prone to the violence of state, are mostly the ones who are critical of state’s discourse of love.

For example, the people, including the miners and relatives of miners who protested the Erdoğan when he came to Soma, was criminalized by state officials and pro-government media. Firstly, it was claimed that they were not actually relatives of decedent miners, and they were coming from outside of Soma. In Soma, families who are protesting the working conditions or joining the commemoration demonstrations are said to be ungrateful to state, or trying to pluck the state for more money. Therefore, the only position reserved for the relatives of miners by state, is to be aid receivers and showing gratefulness to the state. Whenever they criticized the state, they were expelled from the humanitarian space, they lost the statue of being a victim, but at the same time they were not seen as ‘real’ relatives of miners, but abusive actors.

AFAD and state with their aid operations functions as a power hand of state because it regulates the accessibility to this humanitarian space. The designation of actors who can and who cannot enter this space for getting aid or giving aid, also was regulated according to references to love and also neutrality. State was not only

represented as the genuine love provider for the people, but also rational and neutral essence of the aid was emphasized through its institutions like AFAD. State's love was represented to be neutral, so being free of political interests, and being showed to everyone indifferently. AFAD only worked as a representation and creation of phantasy of state which is neutral, which does not have any political interest, therefore as the only actor who had the cure and legitimacy for curing the national pain. Like Chavez did, through a discourse of national mourning that is shared by everyone in the nation, state claimed itself to be the ultimate actor that will handle the situation as a legitimate savior of nation (Fassin & Vasquez, 2005).

This claim for neutrality were contrasted with the other actors who claimed a role in the aid process. Discourses of compassion and love by state officials were always accompanied by a discourse about the 'others' and 'strangers' who are abusing this love, or abusing the mourning created by the disaster situation. As Ahmed mentioned love is always creating bodies of haters, abusers, the bodies that are hurting and abusing the love and the body of lovely nation. These 'others' were mostly defined as hateful ones, who has political interests in getting involved in the aid processes, therefore not aiming to take care of the victims, but use them for their interests. Therefore, they were claimed to be misusing and abusing the situation and even the love of state. They were claimed to be illegitimate for being included in the humanitarian space created after the Eynez incident. In other words, declaration of national mourning converged with the aid campaign around AFAD was managed by government as a way of criminalizing people who were trying to 'politicize' the issue who were so called abusing the national pain. Therefore, the pain and compassion were instrumentalized by state to create two different bodies, one of which is

nation's that is compassionate and neutral embodied by AFAD, and others are abusive and threatening the nation.

For example, civil organizations, parties, municipalities or other actors that were not belonging to the aid mechanism of state, the ones who criticize state's efforts of aid or offering an alternative relation of solidarity was coded as *vefasız* ("ungrateful"), as strangers, or as having secret agendas and political interest in responding these incidents in Soma, Van and Suruç. Actors like lawyers, doctors, researchers, syndicate representatives and journalists coming to Soma were being blocked or had hardships due to the claims by state officials that they had secret agendas, they wanted to provoke people by abusing the pain.

The body of lovely and powerful state and nation is also constituted in gendered terms like 'brotherhood'. State appeared as the head of a family or a brotherhood who has the power to designate the ones from family, and the ones who are not, therefore not deserving love, like *vefasız* or deserving to be treated as threats to the body of family. For example, in the speeches of state officials, decedent miners were mostly called as *kardeşlerimiz* ("our brothers"), *yavrularımız* ("our children"). Meanwhile 'the ones who have political agendas or secret agendas, the ones who are not sincere in showing love and compassion for the victims of 'disasters' were not from the family. Therefore, the state-making worked through creation of a phantasy of family which is based on mutual love and recognition. State appeared as the "loving", objects of aid seemed to be the ones who must be recognizing the love, while 'others' appeared as "ungrateful to the love of family of nation", like *vefasız*. Therefore, they were expelled from the categories of family, they were not the state's miner brothers, but they were strangers coming from outside.

4.2 Performing the state: *hizmet* discourse

In Soma, after the incident AKP had an effort to represent the state as a fast, efficient and ‘heartfelt’ *lütuf* (“favor”) and *hizmet* giver to its citizens. The state was performed as an omnipotent and capable actor. All the institutions of state were claimed to be mobilized after the incident. Firstly, all the aid and social help institutions, primarily AFAD, were represented to have rushed into the region, social help that was given to relatives of miners was in an unprecedented scale and speed that I mentioned in first chapter. Also, successful, efficient and fast management system of AFAD is constantly repeated in different contexts. Its professional operations after Soma and Van, and the greatness of refugee camps that it built, and its successful operations in other countries were always highlighted in media and in its own reports. In this representation, the way AFAD is working seems to be manifesting and creating the phantasmatic quality of Turkish state as a fast and efficient service provider.

One of the main thing that pro-government media was talking about was the fact that Minister of Energy, Taner Yıldız, who came to the mine for coordinating the operations with AFAD, made a declaration that he had been so involved in the situation that he was wearing the same shirt in the last two days. Images of him and his declaration occupied a big place in pro-government media. Although this declaration seems to be absurd for analyzing, I find this sentence and the photos showing him ‘working’ in his two days old shirt, as symblematic of the way government builds its relationship with society and as a micro example of how phantasmatic quality of state is working on the ground. By the images and declarations of Taner Yıldız we witness a displacement of victim. State embodied by Taner Yıldız becomes the victim of the mine ‘disaster’. With the declarations that

this disaster was a disaster for all the nation and for the state, through the rituals of official national mourning, and naming the decedent miners as martyrs, state seems to be the victim of this ‘disaster’. Eventually all these allegories seem to find its best representation in the working and suffering body of Taner Yıldız. He seems to replace the body of miners, with the body of state and all nation. This statesman’s performance was showing as if the state and nation were the victim of what happened. Taner Yıldız, was not at all giving a hint of resigning but rather he was showing the society how he was exerting himself to give *hizmet* to his *millet*, he seemed to become a servant, sacrificing himself in the rescue operations. This image was emblematic in a way how the state performed itself in Soma, it was claiming itself to be the victim in what was conceived as an inevitable disaster, and as a *hizmetkâr* that sacrifices himself for its *millet* whatever it takes.

This image takes another meaning when we juxtapose it with other declarations of government authorities and Yıldız. For example, soon after the rescue operations were over, a ‘good news’ was given to the locals of Soma and miners who became unemployed after the shutting down of Eynez mine, about government’s new plans for opening new mines (“Kolin Soma Termik”, 2014). After the incident, government declared that they were thinking about giving more coal districts to private companies for building more thermal plants and underground mines, that would eventually solve the problem of unemployment in Soma. For example, Ministry of Energy gave Soma Inc. permission to open a new thermal plant in Soma (that includes new mine districts and mine pits). As a response to the critics about how they could give permission to a company which had such an accident with 301 casualties, Taner Yıldız declared:

If I were to reduce my sorrow and nullify the risk, then I should have preferred to import coal. Every decent people whom I asked told me to go this way. However, the issue is not this. What is more important than our personal sorrow, distress or prestige is the interests of the nation (see Appendix, 18, own translation.)

Therefore the ‘personal distress’, by this he probably means his distress about what happened in Eynez, and the risk that is going on in the sector cannot be decisive or more important than the interests of nation. Juxtaposition of this image of Yıldız working for ‘his miner brothers’ in blood, sweat and tears with his declaration about production of coal, his idea that economic development and creating conveniences for companies such as Soma Inc., actually does not contradict with each other but exposes AKP’s political ideology and affective economy it uses for its neoliberal economic and political programme, eventually its populism. For AKP government is not responsible for the ‘accident’, its only responsibility for citizens is making favors, it only makes *lütuf*, like organizing the aid campaigns and creating new job opportunities in the mines, and bringing wealth to everyone in the name of *hizmet*, including his miner brothers through development projects.

For Özselçuk, concept of *hizmet* has a central function for AKP to build a populist sovereignty and a social unity (Özselçuk, 2015). In their article, Özselçuk and Küçük make a discussion of AKP’s use of *hizmet* metaphor, and Erdoğan’s one of the main slogans: “We came to power for being the servant of *millet*, not for being their lord” (Küçük & Özselçuk, 2015).²⁹ For them, here, the empty signifier ‘*hizmet*’ both makes a reference to market that meets the ‘needs’ of people, but also has a fundamental function for building a specific kind of community, conservative *millet*, and legitimating politics of partial recognition. ‘*Hizmet*’ both frames the ideals like development, and AKP’s projects like mega projects, TOKİ’fication etc. as a social necessity and beneficiary, but also refers to a discourse of civilization that aims to

²⁹ “*Milletin* efendisi olmaya değil, *hizmetkârı* olmaya geldik.”

increase its regional power through referring to a *hizmet* to Turkishness and Islam (Özselçuk, 2015). AKP's populist discourse through using the *hizmet* concept, not only aims to please the population but especially please those who were denied by the previous regime for benefiting the fruit of development, especially the poor and the discredited. In order to meet those aims, state works as a "CEO of a company and like a dozer" with its fast development projects (Eder, 2015) (Küçük & Özselçuk, 2015) (Küçük, 2014) and capability of execution through flexing the shape of laws. As I mentioned in the previous chapters, legal tricks like in the energy sector can be understood as an expression of 'growth fetish' of state. 'Growth fetish' is one of the hegemonic economic and political imagery of AKP especially with its growing interest in the energy and construction sector. In Soma case, the declaration of 301 miners as martyrs also creates the feeling that they were the martyrs for a more developed country.

This fetish on development, gets materialized with gigantic energy and construction projects, therefore both reproduce the existence of the state virtually and receive admiration from different groups in the society (Akbulut & Adaman, 2013) Populism of AKP, functions to divide the society into two groups, as the ones that work (AKP), and the ones who do nothing but only talk. Also as the ones who appreciate and who exploit or betray the *hizmet*s of government. As a response for the services of such company-state, citizens who are using these services are expected to show gratitude, loyalty and keep on producing services so that other citizens can consume. So that the company-state builds a phantasy of a society based on reciprocal benefit in which everything that will please everybody is produced and consumed in a harmony. This service is being made for what is claimed to be the common good and desires of *millet* that AKP envisions (Küçük & Özselçuk, 2015).

The ones who do not join this phantasy of *millet*, the ones who expose the contradictions in this harmony are represented as conspirating the *hizmet*s of state and idea of *millet*, they are represented as the ones who are doing nothing but only talking. The voices exposing the contradictions in this phantasy for example those who do not accept that their beloved died for company and state or for what Yıldız called as *ülke menfaati* (“nation’s interest”) were not recognized and were even criminalized since it was a *hıyanet* (“betrayal”) to AKP’s *hizmet*s (aids, development projects) after the incident. In return of its services for people it expected gratitude and loyalty and criminalized who do not join this phantasy of state and *millet*, attacking the protestors by police, or marking them as having secret agendas for building solidarity with miner relatives, preventing the families from following the case.

Moreover, the death of miners was also represented as if they sacrificed themselves for the common good and the development of the nation. Deceased miners were called as martyrs by state officials, and they were buried in a cemetery constructed by state and named as ‘Soma Miner Martyr’s Cemetery’. As if the 301 miners were martyrs, who died not because of the policies by state, but during doing something with an aim, with aim of development, or within the context of producing energy. The meanings attached to their death was also related to fetish of development.

Here in Soma growth fetish of government that builds a community around this ‘common good’, that is development, got combined with compassionate state that is *hizmetkâr* to its citizens, and an efficient state that is capable of fastly executing any order from aid to laws related to aid or coal industry. Therefore, the strategy of government to respond to the incident, that would be expected to create

disruptions in AKP's hegemony, was to combine compassion, efficiency and development fetish into a phantasy of state, that could eventually reinsure its hegemony. AKP only partially recognized the desires of its citizens, relatives of miners or miners in this case, reducing this desire solely into an aid regime or a desire for development and employment; reduced the mourning into a national mourning that was stripped from class conflicts and macro transformations that I explained in previous chapters.

As I mentioned in the first chapter, disasters are productive. In this case too, all the state institutions, projects, and discourse of *hizmet* and speed and efficiency of response like the aids for families, new thermal plant for the ones unemployed after the incident, AFAD houses, images of state authorities and institutions working for help in sweat and blood, with love for their nation, were actually producing a phantasy of state, a story that state seemed to be telling about itself. Because of its various representations, declarations of officials, works of institutions, material arrangement of space (from building a martyred miners cemetery to occupation of police forces) the space opened after the Eynez incident through disaster management became a process of making of the state with phantasmatic qualities.

CHAPTER 5

ENCOUNTERS WITH THE STATE

In the first weeks during my fieldwork, I was trying to explore the state-making in Soma through conceptualizing my object of study, the state, as something that is contained in specific sites. That's why, for my research I tried to find how state institutions controlled the disaster management and aid processes after the Eynez incident by making interviews with relatives of miners about these institutions and interviewing with officials from those institutions. It seemed to me that the easiest way for spotting 'the state' is approaching it as a site, and the discourses, technologies, subject positions etc. produced in this contained site. In a parallel fashion, for the first part of my research to understand the state's magnified existence in post-incident Soma and its effects on political life, I took the 'state' and 'politics' as limited and determined by specific 'sites'. Those sites of state eventually constituted my research field, in my first visits to Soma, I spotted some sites, directly went and made interviews with the officials. Therefore, my field was limited to places and people that I believe to be directly related to what I had in my mind as 'state'. These were the prominent institutions which became active in Soma after the incident, those major ones like AFAD, Kızılay, as well as some minor institutions linked to various ministries and the municipality, or associations working under coordination of AFAD. While they were answering my questions, they were also talking about aids, rights, trial, etc. and building a narrative of what happened in Soma and what is happening right then. During this first part of my research I collected their reports, documents, projects, made research on what they did, what was said about them in media, in parliament meetings, and what they say about

themselves. I wanted to understand how they were functioning to build hegemony, through institutional technologies and discourses.

In this part of my research I have been inspired by Yael Navaro -Yashin's critique of such analysis claiming that anthropological imaginary of the political being mostly about rationalized institutional practices, mostly of state, that is anthropology's own phantasy of 'state' as a contained institution. For her the 'political' is not only produced in what is called as a separate site of public sphere or in state institutions. Public sphere and civil society are also sites for production of political. Therefore, she looks at different spheres, and uses different analytical tools, like phantasy, to understand political life and state, and how the 'state' is reproduced in these spheres (Yashin, 2002).

Because firstly in my topic when it comes to make a research on political effects of magnified interventions of state institutions, the research question shifts from 'what are the institutions, discourses, technologies etc.' to 'what these institutions, discourses etc. actually "do"'. This shift necessitates to shift the object from sites to miner relatives' interaction with and narratives about that "those encounters". Moreover, Soma appeared as a context where the state and its institutions only seemed to be monopolizing and managing the post-disaster process, where actually state's presence was much superficial than it was in Suruç and Van. In contrast with AFAD and officials' statement in media, they seemed to be there in Soma only *göstermelik* ("to show off"). In a place where state is mostly mentioned as *göstermelik* by people, researching on state only through its existing institutions misses the big part of the story which actually constitutes an important space in miner's relatives' lives after the incident. Therefore, the designated institutional sites for studying the 'state' or political turns out to be only one of the layers of my study.

The other layers are mostly depending on what the state and politics was and has become for relatives of miners, it depends on changing the field from a ‘site’ to different concepts, spheres, terms, ways, affects in daily lives that are intricately related to the working of state in Soma. Therefore, I shifted my focus from AFAD as a site of state to daily lives of people, trying to capture the ‘ordinary affects’ in their lives. Yashin (Yashin, 2012) proposes that “anthropological practice requires a degree of affective attunement to one’s surroundings (and to those of one’s ethnographic subjects) as a component of the research experience.” She follows the anthropologist Kathleen Stewart for sensing the “ordinary affects” that are what Stewart calls as:

An animate circuit that conducts force and maps connections, routes, and disjunctures. The ordinary registers intensities—regularly, intermittently, urgently, or as a slight shudder...The ordinary is a circuit that’s always tuned in to some little something somewhere. A mode of attending to the possible and the threatening, it amasses the resonance in things” (Stewart, 2007, cited in Yashin, 2012).

As a methodology, Yashin studies the ordinary affects of a space, through taking the metaphors people use to describe the state, or the charges that emanating from the natural and the built environment, as well as from material objects, people’s sensing’s of tension, irritation as different entry points to understand the postwar environment in Cyprus (Yashin, 2012). In Soma, in the second layer of my research, as a method I also tried to catch ‘ordinary affects’ as a methodology to find analytical concepts from my field to explain the working of state in Soma. As I will explain the lives of especially the relatives of decedent miners became an entanglement of institutions, actors, practices and discourses around especially around aid and law. Inspired from Yashin’s research on affect, that she studies through material environment, practices etc. and also inspired by her effort to study state and politics outside the boundaries of institutional sites I will focus on these entanglements in the

lives of people in Soma to analyze state-hood. Therefore, I will be analyzing if the hegemony of AKP works on the ground or not.

My ethnography inevitably took its form around the legal struggle of decedent miners' relatives. For my visit to the field, I decided to join the trial of Penal Case to meet people that my contacts mentioned. During the Soma trial, I also met other people spontaneously, most of them became my interviewees. First trial I joined was in June 2016, there I met some relatives and via them I met all the other relatives of miners that I interviewed through one year of my research. I also went to SHD office (Social Rights Foundation³⁰) which is an association working on social rights and actively involved for organizing the families for going to trials, organizing meetings with the families and lawyers. In SHD office I had the chance to meet some other relatives. I also went to *hayırs* that are special gatherings (dinners or lunches) dedicated to special cases, such as the memory of decedent miners, where everybody is invited, and there I again had the chance to meet with some other decedent miner relatives. One of the families that I was staying with during most of my research was actively involved in the struggle. Their struggle was mainly, but not only, focused on the legal case, they were working on to organize relatives' and public' pursuit of the case. They were calling and visiting the relatives one by one to convince them to attend to the trial. During my research, I joined them to visit the families who were living around the cities and villages of Soma. Therefore, my research was not only based on the families living in Soma center, but also in close cities and villages, I visited not only the families who follow the case, but also the ones who do not.

During my visits, most of the time I traveled with this family, involved and listened their discussions and conversations. Most recurring themes in the

³⁰ Sosyal Haklar Derneği

conversations among them were mostly about aid, trial and working conditions in mines. The topics of conversations would range from who is following the trial and who is not, lawyers' comments, expert reports, threats or bribing by Soma Inc. to some relatives, the amount of aid that relatives got, mining and the conditions of mining. The tone and the atmosphere of the conversation would change from an intense feeling of solidarity and empathy, especially when the relatives would talk about their deceased sons or husbands' last day, or the moment when they saw their dead bodies, to the strict judgments of those who were "selling out the case", or gossiping about the young women who are not acting in a 'dignified way'.

It appeared to me that their highly increased interest knowledge about aid and legal procedures, administrative details of mining companies, and state institutions like TKİ or MİGEM (who had to investigate the mine for safety measures) etc. was itself a research topic. During these conversations, I realized that 'state' appeared as a surface where people constantly interact with one another, while their encounters through its procedures multiple discourses and actors produce affects, different subject positions and new meanings given to politics and the state. Therefore, through focusing on dialogues I inquire the spheres/terms/ways through which the political is constructed and state is appearing and taking meaning in Soma after the incident. Without analyzing these it would be impossible to understand what is happening in Soma and how relatives are relating to politics and state.

In other words, through ethnographic work I tried to understand the political space opened after Eynez incident and how involvement of state in a specific way shaped this space. I will analyze how in the post-disaster Soma, the idea of 'state' was reformulated through people's encounters with it, how the state's involvement became a prism through which new meanings, terms, affects radiated forming new

positions for miner relatives. Therefore, eventually I will examine if the phantasmagoric making of state and its hegemony is working or getting disrupted on the ground through analyzing the of everyday experiences of people in Soma.

5.1 The state as ambiguity and distrust

After the Eynez incident, as I mentioned in previous chapter, state seemed to make a grandiose return to the stage according to the officials and pro-government media.

Although the rescue operation was accepted as it was a big failure that even by some individual AFAD workers themselves as they confessed in some interviews I made, government authorities claim that AFAD handled the situation excellently. AFAD's handling of the situation was chaotic and full of ambiguities for my interviewees.

Survivors and relatives of miners had to navigate among the bureaucratic procedures, places and authorities created by AFAD in order to reach the bodies of their friends, husbands, sons, brothers.

Ayşen had a phone call that day, her friend said that there was an accident in the mine, her husband was working in the shift. Almost every week there was an accident, almost every week she could hear an ambulance passing in front of her house through the road going to one of the mines up there. She did not understand how serious it was until she heard cries of countless ambulances. With her brother, she rushed to the entrance of mine, it was chaotic, crowded with other relatives. AFAD officials blocked their way in front of Eynez mine. Since then only information they could get about their miner relatives were between the lips of AFAD who claimed to be the only coordinator of the rescue operations and only authority for making official statements, since all the information that the company had about the mine and workers inside were shared with AFAD and not with

public.³¹ Survivors and relatives of miners had to navigate among the procedures, authorities and places to reach the bodies of their friends, husbands, sons, brothers. Some could find the bodies soon after the incident, some had to wait in front of hospitals for days, rush to cold storage warehouses or football stadium where the bodies of miners were carried. They had to check the lists, try to talk to doctors, try to hold the number given to bodies in their minds, rush to the new coming ambulances, look at the photos of bodies to identify and take their bodies. One of my interviewee reflected on the chaotic procedures and mood of those days:

I say to myself I wish we didn't wait there at the mine for nothing or wouldn't live that misery in front of hospitals with hope, we should have gone to the cold storage directly, at least we would find him (her husband) earlier, you know we found him six days after accident. (see Appendix, 19, own translation.) (Elçin, 25).

Those frustration was also related to people's distrust in authorities' declarations. Working with Minister of Energy and Natural Resources, AFAD constantly updated the announcements about the situation, numbers and names of workers who died. These official announcements were an effort to monopolize the flow of information, especially about the reasons of incident, number of workers inside the mine and number of people who died. They mainly depended on the information acquired from the meetings made with Soma A.Ş., who, according to the relatives, was probably lying. Also, the fact that a big state institution like AFAD working in coordination with state authorities, gendarme and the company, seemed to take control of everything from declarations, organizing who could enter to the mine area, to assigning doctors and officials to cold storages for counting, identifying and enlisting the bodies, and establishing such procedures helped to reinforce such

³¹ According to official numbers 787 workers were underground when the 'incident' happened and the mine got covered with toxic gas.

mistrust about transparency. Those first days were just a beginning of their lives' immersing into frustrating state's procedures and ambiguity.

Distrust to official declarations of state and AFAD started from very beginning about number casualties. For example, there is still the discussion about the number of 301, none of the people I spoke to told that they believe it was 301. I never ask a question about this topic, but whenever a conversation starts between a relative and someone who knows that s/he is a relative of, or among each other, the dialogue eventually comes to this topic. Everybody seems sure that the real number is not 301. Although most families trust their lawyers, contrary to the lawyers saying that this is the real number, families still do not believe in it.

No, not possible! My friend, I survived the accident by chance, I didn't know him but I was working also in the same mine with your son, now I'm doing another job, since they fired me. The number is absolutely bigger. I worked in that mine for years, I know it like the back of my hand. There were lots of people, working unregistered. When something happens to one of them, they wouldn't even call ambulance to prevent that someone hears, they wouldn't take him to hospital. That's why I totally don't believe (the number 301) (see Appendix, 20, own translation.) (Durmuş, miner, 40).

For me it is not at all 301. It's not possible. They lie in order to prevent people to revolt. I heard that there are some corpses who they didn't register and send them to their hometowns secretly, state send thousands of aids to keep them silent... (see Appendix, 21, own translation.) (Yıldız, 30).

The husband of one of my relatives is doctor. They wanted to go into mine to help during the accident. They applied to AFAD to volunteer in the cold storage...but they didn't take any of them...they brought all the doctors from outside. Because the doctors sign the papers when they take and hand over the bodies...they wrote down 'traffic accident' to some of the dead ones...(see Appendix, 22, own translation.) (Sanem, 30).

The doctor in charge who came from İstanbul, worked in the cold storage. He said someone that he signed 480 bodies. They put some numbers (on the bodies) two or three times, so it would look less. The number is not 301. When we first heard it was lot more than 700. 700 workers scanned their cards (in the entrance of mine). (see Appendix, 23, own translation.) (İsmail 40).

Our lawyers already told how many times, they checked all the reports, they say to me that the number is correct. Anyway, I won't believe even when I

die, I know the officials are lying. I'm so sure that the syndicate is also supporting this lie. AFAD and TKİ too. At the end, we are the ones who work, we see with our own eyes that how many people enters the mine approximately (see Appendix, 24, own translation.) (Burak 25).

The discussions on the number of death toll had been a big discussion since the accident. Especially the fact that the flow of information and people who can access the mine and area during the rescue operation was regulated by a government body, AFAD and in cooperation with the information coming from the company, Soma Inc. reinforced the mistrust. People were always referring to the news about AFAD personnel putting gas masks on the faces of dead miners, and putting them into ambulances as if they were alive and wounded. Such stories became multiplied especially after the aids were distributed, people were talking about state and company giving money to the families of some dead miners to prevent them from talking. Mostly these stories were depending on rumors but also reinforced with the historical mistrust of people to mining companies and state institutions like MİGEM and TKİ.

For the funerals, state built a 'Monument for Martyred Miners'³² that is a cemetery with monuments and flags, for which families had to go through procedures if they (do not) want their burial there. Later, in order to be able to receive the aid from AFAD, they had to do lots of paperwork in state bureaus, like submitting documents about their relationship with the decedent miner, they had to join *çekiliş* ("draw") to get their titles for the houses that AFAD was distributing, in order to benefit from the 'Soma Law' that gave the right to have a job in public sector for one of the relative of decedent miner, they had to get some documents from state institutions and prepare applications for public works. They had to rush

³² Soma Maden Şehitliği Anıtı

between their houses and the court in order to follow the long-lasting legal processes about the penal case and also compensation case. Rapidly, the everyday lives of relatives of miners became immersed into bureaucratic procedures and their worries about these procedures

5.2 *Göstermelik* state

When I ask about state, most of my interviewees were starting to tell their life stories. Their narrative about their life was entangled with and mostly determined by the flow of events that are the results of the political and economical transformations in Soma context. Therefore, meaning of state was inseparable from their life stories, and macro transformations in society. In the narratives of relatives about the incident, the fact that ‘state’ which previously embodied by TEKEL and state-operated mines, left its place to private companies both in agriculture and mining sectors was a recurring story. Regulations and controls of mines made by state institutions like MİGEM and TKİ were seen as fake and ‘*göstermelik*’ by miners and relatives, as if the state itself was absent or ‘*göstermelik*’ now. Giving the state a nostalgic attribute, they mostly give reference to the times that they could earn their living through agriculture, mostly the times TEKEL was still a state institutions. They also refer to those times that mines were operated by state. Their designation about absence of state stems from the transformations in Turkey’s political and economic policies towards neoliberal policies. Conversations on privatizations in the agriculture and mining sectors, appropriation of social help through widespread religious sects, lack of infrastructure, schools and hospitals were pointing out the absence of state in

Soma.³³ Also, when state exists it was again appeared as a showing off. For example, the surveillance of the mines by state officials from TKİ or ELİ were totally fake for all the relatives I talked to. They were mentioning how their miner sons/husbands always talked about those fake assessments of mines by these state institutions.

On the other hand, state existed in different ways in Soma for them. For some of my interviews state was used as a tool by company owners, *dayıbaşı* and syndicates. Because they were using their ties with government for keeping on their exploitative and unsafe system of production. On the other hand, they were seeing the company as a tool for state to sustain its political power. There were lots of accounts of how workers were forced to become members of AKP if they wanted to find a job. *Dayıbaşıs* were also told to be chosen among the AKP supporters who were creating pressure on the workers since they were choosing the workers through clientelist ties. There were also the cases that miners were brought to the AKP demonstrators by *dayıbaşıs*. The ties of company owners and AKP was also a big part of narratives.

Therefore, before the Eynez incident ‘state’ had already acquired attributes like being ‘absent’, ‘fake’ and ‘*göstermelik*’. More than this, even when state’s existence was recognized in Soma, it was attached to its ‘clientelist’ relationships, therefore it was compounded with distrust. It also worth mentioning that I heard the same comments also from the people who are supporting AKP. This distrust or ambiguity of state was also prominent after the incident. The fact that state and public gave that much attention to what happened in Soma was not actually satisfactory for much of my interviewees. Compassionate and *kudretful* image of

³³ There are lots of religious sects in Soma. Lots of families I interviewed with send their children to the dormitories of this schools, since they can have better opportunities for studying and finding a job. Unfortunately, I could not make any research about the role of these sects after the Eynez incident.

state, created by the institutions and declaration of state officials was constantly disrupted by the real-life experiences of relatives of miners.

Now the state is giving us houses, what do I do with the house now, of course there are the ones who need it, the one who became widows in their really young ages. Thanks for the houses but they should know this: what happened here was not an earthquake. We don't need houses but we need justice. I have children, there are lots of young man in Soma, how do we know that in some point they won't go down to mine. We are struggling so that they don't die, that's the that is important, not the house or something else (see Appendix, 25, own translation.) (Gülden, 45).

Whenever I asked about the aids and the houses distributed by AFAD, I felt like people were reacting in similar vein like in this quotation. AFAD houses became one of the symbols through which the deeds of state criticized. As if it was a sign that state was existent there but people were discontent about the way it exists. State became an actor that did not understand what happened in Soma, and did not respond properly, especially it did not bring about the justice. The aid, especially the houses it distributed became a common topic discussed among the parents. Most of the people were thankful but adding that the houses would not bring about justice nor they will fix their wounds.

I didn't give my name nor I went to do the title documents. State gave me a right (house) and I am taking it, that it, there is no need for party. I am ashamed, I cannot accept. People who are not following their own trial is going to the opening ceremonies, going to choose their houses. What want that murderers of their husbands are judged, from the bosses, to ministers. But they are relaxed, they take aid and live their life happy. They love their murderers, they do whatever the authorities say (see Appendix, 26, own translation.) (Hanife, 30).

This was one of the main attitudes of the relatives who are following the trials, getting angry to people who are not following. Aids distributed, and especially the houses distributed by AFAD was always used as a symbol in such critiques through which some people were claiming that they were exposing both state's and also people's hypocrisy.

While I was working in the mine (Eynez) we didn't have any relation with syndicate. Already there was no representative among the workers, we were just paying our fees to syndicate, there is no effort to defend the rights. I survived the accident, by chance. Then one day I checked my phone, a message, I am fired with 2 thousand other friends. Now they know we will ask for our rights, they fired us because we survived. They don't recruit us in other mines, because they know. Especially if you are Alevi they certainly know you will fight for your right, they are sure. They say they will open new mine. I don't care if the conditions didn't get better, if the state doesn't inspect properly. Who goes into the mine without a proper syndicate. Now the state is giving money, aid. The people who will live in that houses, won't they also go down to mines... (see Appendix, 27, own translation.) (Şükrü, 25).

The ambiguity of their lives created by the legal/bureaucratic procedures, the complicity of legal procedures, and their ambiguity about how the state can take back the right it gave after the accident anytime was creating a distrust about state.

5.3 The incompetent state

The law and specifically trials created a different approach about state. After the incident, law, regulations, experiences of going to court, court as a space of encounters became a crucial component of their lives. In the course of my research I joined lots of trials with the families. Most of them was expressing that it was becoming more obvious to them that state was incompetent to bring justice.

After the incident, there are two different cases opened and none of which are resulted yet. One is compensation case, the other is penal proceeding. Penal proceeding that is taking place in Akhisar, a near city to Soma, became a new space of struggle for the families. Almost every two months they are visiting each other's houses to call all the people to follow the case. Then with buses they arrive to Akhisar, make a demonstration, walk together towards the courtroom, building tents and tables in the nearby garden and bring tea and food in order to spend their time together when there is a break in the trial. In my interviews during these breaks in the trial, people were saying trial was the only place that they could feel in solidarity.

Baro of Manisa assigned some lawyers to families but there are also lots of lawyers from Social Rights Association, Contemporary Legal Experts Association³⁴, Halkevleri and individual lawyers. The first penal trial was epitomizing the rest of judicial process and life experiences of relatives of miners. One of my interviewees defined the first day she went to trial as a turning point in her life. First, she said after she lost her husband in the mine, she did not speak or did not do nothing, she was only sitting, looking around, not even able to cry. Then she went to the penal case:

We went there [to the trial in Akhisar] and the police didn't take us to courtroom, I said them our hearts are burning with pain, killers are inside why should we stay outside, one of them shouted at me when that happened I couldn't stop myself, I looked at others [miners' relatives] and they began to shout too we began to push the barricades. They had this TOMA and guns you know. When I looked, I saw some reaching to the court building. I couldn't relax, I couldn't control myself anymore. That was a turning point. I want to speak inside (courtroom) and see if the killers can still lie to our faces. Now I see they can (see Appendix, 28, own translation.) (Büşra, 27).

Going to courtroom appeared to be a marking experience for all my interviewees without exception. For some it was the place and moment they thought they were right to fight, a moment of realization some said, for some it made them think that justice is a fraud thing and was useless to run after, for some court and law itself became the source of pain rubbing salt into their wounds.

Dear what will happen when we go [to the trial], I relegate it to the other side [to the god]. How many times I went to the trial, we sit, they talk, as if they rub salt in our wound. They said the trial would be over soon, when? It never ends, it will never end, why would I follow. They killed the 301 by burning them, not in one day, but for years. What would I expect from such justice that didn't punish them at first sight, that justice who couldn't give decision in the last two years. There is no need that I go there to make myself suffer, no need to see their faces again, my heart cannot stand this anymore (see Appendix, 29, own translation.) (Hafize, 60).

Whenever we went to houses of those people who have not been coming to trial since long time, they were commenting in the same line of this quotation above.

People who were old and living in the villages were already having hardships to

³⁴ Sosyal Haklar Derneği, Çağdaş Hukukçular Derneği

reach to the courtroom since it was far in the city center of Akhisar. They had to first reach Soma center and then take another hour of trip to arrive Akhisar. Also, most of the wives of decadent miners had small children, therefore it was so hard for their wives to find a place to leave their children and come to trial.

Moreover, most of the wives were using their right, given by state after the incident, to get a job in public sector. And they were afraid to be fired if they go to trials. Even though they could get a permission paper from the court, which informs the employers about the fact that she joined the court therefore ask for permission, people were afraid that the fact of following this case itself would create a problem in public job.

I work in a public institution, they know wherever I go, everybody here knows each other. If god permits I will go to trial one day. But frankly speaking it would be a problem at work. Let's say I take permission one day saying that I'm sick, everybody will see I'm fine. Also, the trial is not only one day, it takes at least three days, we will be there for three days. They will hear, and it will be a problem. But I wish from god that I will come to trial one day (see Appendix, 30, own translation.) (Arife, 40).

Therefore, state here appeared as both as a job supplier, support giver but also as a threat that prevents people joining the legal case. State appears to people not as supplier of rights but as an actor making favors, but also an actor that creates an ambiguity in the sense that it can take away the favors it gave anytime it wants. This ambiguity was existing in any kind of rights or any kind of legal/bureaucratic procedure that people involved. These ambiguities were constructing the state as not trustable and unreliable in the long term.

To tell you the truth, I don't trust them. They gave confirmation to such a mine, and now they say we will give aid. A don't believe in the number [301] nor the words of the people in rescue team...I thought about keeping the working right for my daughter lots but then I said to myself what if they take back the right, so let's begin working and not lose this right. (see Appendix, 31, own translation.) (Gülfem, 30)

Other than visiting the houses of people who have not been following the case since a while, I also made in depth interviews with the people who I see in each trial.

Mostly, meeting in Soma and taking the bus to Akhisar, demonstration and the tea breaks during the trial becomes to be the major opportunity to both relatives of miners and other people's, groups, lawyers, journalists to come together and talk.

Dear, I have been looking forward for this trial. What should I do, should I shout at the walls in the home, in the village. These murderers should see how we are, should see the children who are now fatherless, all the brides. They are talking lies in the trial, their lawyers too. As if our beloveds worked so happy. As if they burnt themselves. I think the state also believes them. I wish it also believes us one day. I wish the judge looks at the courtroom one day, I'm shouting for example he hears me (see Appendix, 32, own translation.) (Melek Teyze, 65).

Most of the people who were following the trials were talking in the similar line about their expectations from justice system. They simply did not trust it anymore.

The ones who were hopeful in the beginning became frustrated when they see the decreasing public attention to the trial and the proportionate increase in the lies in the defenses of the lawyers of defendants. Also, the trial was not ending. They expected the defendants to take punishment but the trial was keep going and on since years.

For some this frustrating and dragging process itself had created the mistrust to justice system and state. On the other hand, some of the families were aware that in most of the 'work accident' cases in Turkey there is not even a trial (it is handled with informal agreement between employer and relatives of decedent worker, or if there is a trial, it is mostly short and not so much satisfactory for the workers' side.

One of their reason for some families to come and join the trials was this mistrust on justice system which would for them shelve and cut short this case; and also, their feeling of power that they can expose the calamity of justice system and make it work.

You probably heard what happened in Ermenek. Tens of workers died. The families of the workers couldn't enter to the courtroom, police, the chief judge didn't let them in. What happened at the end, the trial only lasted 2 days, and they took a small punishment then it was over. We don't let this case to happen like that. That's why we are showing that we are following these trials, we are filling up the courtroom since the first days. Our lawyers also told us that, this is the first work trial that lasted that long, longest in Turkey, why because we are struggling. If we wouldn't follow this case it would be over in two days, they would give punishment to two people symbolically. We and our lawyers are here to demand that all the responsible are judged. It is the result of our efforts my dear, of all these families and lawyers, all of these people who worked for Soma. We brought this case to this level (see Appendix, 33, own translation.) (Gülşen, 40).

Through following the trials, and going inside the courtroom, the relatives have indulged in the lexicon of the law. New passing laws, procedures, testimonies, expert's reports, actors like police, judges, lawyers and spaces like court were some of the major sites that miners' relatives encountered the state after the incident. Besides studying the law solely as imposition of rules and punishment, i.e. reproducing the power of state and government, imposing and channeling their force, it is also possible to study it as a discourse and as a form of cultural domination. We can look at law as a set of symbols subjected to interpretation, an area of contest over meanings, field of competing pictures of the way things are, establish own portrayal of what happens and controlling the consequences. Power and domination is inherent in discourse and this imposition of persuasive image of world as it is and renditions of events and relationships (Merry, 1990). Of course, this cultural domination of law is never complete nor static, there is always an interpretive openness which enables people contest and reformulate the meanings. During the trial and also when they talk about the trial in their daily lives, families were seeming like struggling for deconstructing and reformulating meanings. In our house visits, certainly a part of the conversation was about the course of the trial, what the lawyers were saying, which law that defendant's claims were lying on, the procedures in the trials, expert

reports. As if law became one of the important languages in Soma through which what happened to their relatives could be explained and a struggle about this incident could be organized. However, there was always a space between fully assimilating to the language and terms of law, there was a constant struggle about it.

Another theme dominating the conversations of families were about the legal procedures. Some of the people I talked to said to me that they never had an issue with law before, they said they did not even know where the courthouse is, what the law says. Some of them said they once had met with the lawyers of mining companies before when their relatives died in a work accident again previously, but that was it, they just bargained, and they did not know about legal cases and procedures.

One of the things that changed was now the legal procedure has been injected in families' lives. Most of my interviewees had a family member who worked in mine, had a work accident that led him have a sort of handicap or to die.

My father also got stuck in the mine when it collapsed, they said his feet wouldn't work again. He was unemployed for months but he got better, now he only has a ruptured disk, he went [to mine] again. But my brother in law stayed (died) in the mine. There was no lawyer, the company paid the blood money, life money then nothing else happened. Now after 301, the people coming from company they toured the houses, they walked in the village, talked, they said we will give this and that, whatever you want from us, we are lawyers. As I know no one from 301 accepted his. They all opened a case (see Appendix, 34, own translation.) (Nermin, 40).

I realized now all of them had a vast knowledge about the technical and legal language and procedures. This was due to the fact that they were following the trial in which what happened to their relatives, miners were discussed in a really technical manner. The trial was mostly 8 hours a day and mostly it was continuing for at least two days. In my first participants in the trial I was writing down almost everything that will shed light to what exactly happened in the mine. These were the trials that

evidences were presented, and it was including evidences and discussions on techniques about mining and Eynez mine, discussions on chemical reactions, engineering rules, lots of mathematics, laws on management like who has the authority of signature etc., technical maps of the mine, autopsy reports, lots of technical information from different disciplines. Also, not only these evidence trials, but also the trials where expert reports were read was also including such dense exposition of the incident. I was writing down all the new words I learn about mining, technology, the argument for explaining what happened in the mine until it became a discussion between the sides with again technical details about the working way of methane recorders, ingredients of the soil etc. After all the time, I spent with the families, this was a really alienating experience for me, where ‘the incident’ was being reduced to a technical language during the trial. But also during my interviews sometimes people were explaining me what happened through using this technical language that they partly received from their own experiences of mining but mostly as I observed from the new terminology they acquired during the technical discussions of lawyers, company owners, and expert reports where they use both technical language on mining but also technical language of law. However, this manner in the court was in some point creating outbursts within the relatives.

My girl, now I am shouting then going out from the courtroom before the judge expel me. I cannot hold myself. The guy [defendant’s lawyer] says the cables were like that, that the mine was so quality, that they made great investments, then our kids exploded themselves. Whatever had happened this mine belonged to them [defendants] they are the responsables. They shouldn’t make me angry by talking about the cables, the signatures of someone, mathematics! They did it, they burnt our sons (see Appendix, 35, own translation.) (Elif Abla, 65).

In the last two years, we are listening and it is not ending. We listened to the expert report, now they ask for other one, now we listened to it, but again now they are asking for one more. We say we want justice. They say, that signature was made by someone else, that he didn't have such authority, the calculations of methane, that the mine joint was three meters, air ventilation was straight or reverse. They say there was no fire, it wouldn't be possible. Thousands of stories. How is it possible it didn't bur. I took my own son totally burnt (see Appendix, 36, own translation.) (Melek Teyze, 65).

These indulgence into technical matters, and law's reliance on scientific and technical discourse in order to bring justice seemed to be one of the reasons creating such outbursts and also distrust to the state's capability for ensuring justice as I will explain below. Soma Penal Case has included numerous expert reports about enlightening the reasons of the incident in the mines. Expert reports were claimed to be not scientific enough and prejudiced by the defenders' side. Therefore, they asked for another expert report, which was accepted by the judge. After rejection of two expert reports and publishing of new expert report there are still discussions on the level of scientificity and prejudice of these reports by defenders' side.³⁵ Defenders side has been asking the judge to let themselves to carry out experiments to find out the reasons of the accident. Meanwhile complainant lawyers are basing their statements on explaining and representing the scientific claims in the expert reports. Their presentations are consisting of the complicated terminology of the mining into a simplified version. During the trials, it seems that the expert reports gains more importance than the testimonies of the survivors.³⁶ A discussion on the changing nature of proof and witnessing, especially about the cases on 'work accidents' in Turkey could be fruitful. However, I will only touch upon this issue shortly. In their book *Mengele's Skull The Advent of the Forensic Aesthetics*, Thomass Keenan and Eyal Weizman discusses the emergence of the 'object' as a proof in trials of human

³⁵ It could be interesting to make a research on use and functions of expert reports especially in the work accident cases.

³⁶ Testimonies of relatives of miners were also taken by the judge. But they do not occupy a place in the courtroom according to my observations.

rights (Keenan & Weizman, 2014). The scientific improvements in osteography, presentation of bones and the scientific findings through new aesthetic Technologies make the bones “speak the truth.” However, they point out the impossibility of reaching the certain “truth” in the sciences. What is decisive about the “truth” is the aesthetic representation and the final judgement of the law:

In forensic matters...the evidentiary value of the thing depends, at least in part, on the authority (probability) of the expert who publicly deciphers it, which is to say that the probability of a fact or an event is also a function of the probity of the expert...In the movement of the concept of probability from subject to object, the predicament that characterizes the witness, for better or worse (faulty memory and ambiguity, for example) now appears as the state of the material object as well. For scientists and equally for lawyers, truth is measured as a position on a scale of probability...Whereas science can simply note the measure of probability or its margin of error, law must render its judgment on the basis of relative uncertainty or fuzziness. Decision in law and in politics, if it is worthy of its name, cannot but be undertaken in excess of calculation; otherwise, judgment is simply a mechanical operation. Decision is necessary precisely because calculation cannot (and should not) provide a definite answer. (Keenan & Weizman, 2014).

As I previously quoted, relatives of miners were getting more and more unsatisfactory and hopeless about the ongoing of trial, when the discussions in the court was only focusing on the contents of expert reports. Whenever there was a discussion on if there was a fire in the mine, if the methane was could burn in that temperature, or if the carbon dioxide could have a chemical reaction with this or that gas etc. it was inevitable that there was an outburst in the salon, a mother screaming in frustration about the fact that his son was burnt. So, what was the discussion about? Defenders side were saying that they were also trying to reach the truth, the truth of what really happened in the mine. However what people were expecting was justice, a term that they link less with the “truth” of scientific reports or discussions. It seemed to be that this term is more linked to ethical and political stance they were

expecting from the judge and therefore state. Therefore, their distrust in justice system and as they also called as their distrust about state increased and increased.

5.4 Soma as a haunted geography

Yashin (2012) argues that phantasmatic state, that is Northern Cyprus is constantly haunted by 'ghosts', ghosts reside in the material surrounding of Cyprus, feelings and memory of the people who were once residing in dwellings around and who are not here anymore disrupts the phantasy. Soma seems to be constantly haunted which is disrupting the phantasy of a capable, helpful and serving state.

During my interviews, I often came across these narratives that are pointing out to the contradiction between the new meaning and emotions that Soma as a place begin to contain through the materials, places or artifacts provided by state, like new houses, aids or martyred miners cemetery. Soma was managed as a post-disaster space by state which created a new geography of meanings and emotions among people living there. Marlene Schäfers in her ethnographic work in Van that was heavily damaged by two earthquakes in 2011, analyses how material environment and artefacts actually act on and shapes the social (Schäfers, 2016). She demonstrates how the specific qualities of ruined environment, like the cracks in the buildings, constantly undermined state's efforts for containing the risk by techno-political governance through mobilization of expert knowledge in damage assessment procedures. These material properties and people's affectual relation with them reshaped people's relation to both their environment and to state, eventually led to formation of political subjects that began to experience the earthquake as a political disaster, in which one cannot trust state, nor its governance. This was due to both people's relation to political history of Van, but also because of the uncertainty

created by the assessment procedures of government. Schäfers' research brings into dialogue an existing scholarship that is "concerning the 'agent like' qualities of material objects arguing that material objects are hardly passive surfaces on which social life is carried out. Rather, they need to be understood as constitutively making up the worlds we live in (Thrift 2008 cited in Schäfers, 2016). "Literature on ruins has focused on how the material qualities of ruined objects shape social and political life through the systematic structures of affordances they create (or forestall), the memories they call forth and the affects they exert" (e.g. Bryant 2014; Dawdy 2010; Navaro-Yashin 2009; cited in Schäfers, 2016, p. 229)

Here in Soma too material artefacts, streets, houses, geography have become agents that put state's role and state into question. Pain's inscription in the wide geography and everyday life contrasted with state's reduction of the incident into a one dimensional 'national mourning' discourse symbolized and limited in martyr's cemetery, and limiting it to aid through distributing aid houses. Issues like state's hypocrisy and justice were always being spoken through referring to these examples of state aids like house and money and cemetery.

They wanted to lock us between four walls, with houses, money. Some of them really got closed at homes. We made the furniture, that's good, it's not wrong. At the end, this is a given right. But I am keeping on struggling because I don't want my child, when she grows up, to ask mother what did you do for my father. At the end, I'm following my trial (see Appendix, 37, own translation.) (Zeynep, 25).

My interviewees daily experiences and their relations to their environment like Soma as a coffin and as a geography filled with bodies of dead miners and relatives of them; and the way they contrast these to new elements in their lives that were given by state, exposes an encounter with the state, which makes them re-evaluate the state. This encounter itself undermined the phantasmatic quality of state as a body in total control of the situation in Soma, that state tried to create in Soma. But also, Soma

and these houses places have become places of resistance. When relatives of decedent miners were meeting with new people they were introducing themselves as ‘relative of 301’.

Relatives of 301 kept visiting each other’s houses, they joined each other’s *hayırs*, and they got organized among themselves to follow the trial, and arrange demonstrations on the 13th of every month. State’s fictionalizing Soma as an ‘humanitarian space’ as if it was just a momentary disaster that could be fixed by state aids, were being disrupted by imagination of space by people. For example, most of my interviewees were using the allegory of graveyard to define Soma, since Soma witnesses lots of work murders which were never heard by public before:

“Soma has lots of dead my dear, there are lots of 301s underground, nobody ever heard about them before.”³⁷ (Gülşen, 45)

According to my interviewees, even though there were lots of ‘work accidents’ in Soma before the Eynez incident this never became a public issue, nor it did not create an identity like being ‘relative of miner martyr’. What happened in mines (state or privately owned) stayed between the family and company, and this topic was mostly communicated in dialogues with family members. But after the incident in Eynez, ‘work accidents’ became a public issue in Soma. Couple of people that I met coincidentally, who lost their relatives in other mine accidents previously and also a mine worker who also had an injury from working in mine was touching upon the fact that they were never given such public attention nor aids or rights by state. However, neither state, nor syndicates looked out for them as they said. They also gave the example of what happened in Ermenek mine ‘accident’ and compared it to Soma:

³⁷ “Soma’nın ölüsü çoktur kızım ne 301’ler var yerin altında haberi olmazdı kimsenin.”

Right after the accident of 301, tens of miners became martyred in Ermenek, no one looked at them, helped them. We didn't see anything on the news. A relative died there, no one visited them for condolences. State never visited them, but to Soma lots of aid were sent. Don't get me wrong, I'm not trying to say something bad about people in Soma, or 301 martyrs. But there are lots of things in mine sector that stays unheard (see Appendix, 38, own translation.) (Yıldız, 50).

Even though Soma was a miner's city, it was not associated with high ratio of 'work accidents' in mines. Yet, the absence of a fully equipped general hospital or medical units specialized in burning related injuries which is common in mining sector, absence of any scientific study on 'work accidents' in Soma, and also the statistics of ISIG's research showing that work casualties in Soma is more than double of the average that Turkish Statistical Institution declares, might be counted as some of the examples to show the extent of how much work accidents are being systematically ignored in Soma (Buğra, 2015). But after the incident in Eynez, Soma began to be associated with this mining 'disaster'. '301' became a public issue for everyone living or visiting Soma. As if all the geography of Soma was shaped according by '301'. Soma became a commemoration place, a monument itself, that is remembered with the numbers 301.

"-My friend, they said there was a relative of mine martyr, the one from 301, do you know which house?

-There is one there, and also there is one in the next house, and there is one more in the back street, you ask everybody would show."³⁸

This was one of the common conversations that we had while visiting the houses of decedent miner's relatives. We were just asking someone in the neighborhood and they were showing couple of houses. And when we visited the houses they were informing us about other families living close. So even being able

³⁸ "-Kardeş bu sokakta bir maden şehidi yakını varmış, 301'in, hangi ev biliyor musun?
-Valla şurada var bir tane, bir de yanındaki evde, bir de arka sokakta da var, onu sor herkes gösterir."

to practice snowball sampling method so easily was a sign of how a ‘work accident’ became crafted in the geography and public life.

Several people defined Soma as a ‘coffin’ and ‘graveyard’, “as if all the houses on the streets has a dead miner inside”: “Here (city center of Soma) is like a cemetery, almost each street had a funeral, prayer didn’t stop for days.”³⁹

These spatial metaphors and explanation of the incident through reference to state, is both helping to explain the magnitude of what happened and also shows how it became visible. What was private before in the sense that the work accidents or death were something between the company and families, became a public issue, the name and geography of Soma is crafted with the traces and memories of this incident.

The state claimed to be able to heal the wounds after the incident, but all the materiality around Soma, as imagined by people was haunted with wounds, non-closures. Esma answered my question about aids in a sarcastic way: “Only thing that state did was to give us graves, 301 graves, and 301 houses.” (Tülay, 25)⁴⁰

Obviously, neither the state’s symbolic spatialization of pain in a martyr’s cemetery, nor state’s endeavor to represent this incident as a disaster, as an exception, nor distributing houses to families could build a stable frame. Everyday conceptualizations of people, the metaphors they are using to explain what they are experiencing, especially Soma being a total graveyard where much more miners than 301 is lying without anyone’s knowledge, was preventing such framing.

In addition to their discursive sides law and aid are also creating conditions for affective encounters that forms different objects and subject positions. When I read the transcripts of the dialogues and my interviews or when I tried to summarize

³⁹ “Burası (Soma merkez) mezarlık gibi, neredeyse her sokaktan bir cenaze çıktı, ezanlar selalar susmadı günlerce.”

⁴⁰ Devletin tek yaptığı şey, bize bir mezar verdi 301 tane, 301 tane de ev.

the impressions of each day in the evenings during my fieldwork trips, one of the first things that come to my mind was, how actually people were falling out with each other by referring to the state aids, legal process, bribery, etc. However, I must warn the reader that there was also a will among the families who are more involved in the political organization of families, not to speak about such things. As they said to me what was more traumatic for them was not the incident but what happened after. The first thing people in Soma explained to me was that state aids and legal case made people fall out with another. Therefore, there is a will not to speak about such topics anymore, however it was inevitable in daily conversations. Firstly, people who have been following the case continuously were referring to the ones who are not coming as ‘people who were bought by state/company and selling out the case’.⁴¹ The conversations were mostly beginning with the people who are not coming to trials anymore and then continuing with the amount of money they received from the state, how they secured a job from state so they were afraid to join the trial, how they were bribed by the authorities to not to give testimony in the trial.

They set people against each other. That much aid, houses, money. No one is able to look at each other’s face. The neighbors are also looking at me with an evil eye. They are interrogating if I am supporting this party or that party. I don’t care, I’m following my trial. They should be ashamed. They didn’t even knock my door to ask about the trial. Look at the people here, she so old, but still she didn’t let it go, she is still following her trial. This is humanity (see Appendix, 39, own translation.) (Selda, 55).

Biggest pressure was on the widowed women. For all the widowed women I spoke, without exception conversations they had and gossip were the main things that magnified the trauma they are living. As one of my interviewee said:

⁴¹ ‘davayı satanlar’ and ‘satın alınmışlar’

Each day, each moment, with each person we are speaking the same things. They are asking even when I ask them to not to do this. They are nagging me like did you buy a house, a car, how much money did you receive, that institution is giving money do you know, that I should go to register my name to get the land title for the house, I had to show my family registers in order to receive the aid in my bank account, nagging and nagging. You go to shopping, and then they are telling hundreds of bad things behind you. Rich widow. That her husband died but she is enjoying her life, travelling. You go to commemoration and demonstration, people are shouting at you: ‘rich widow’. I cannot stand anymore, I don’t want to go out, neither to clove [They put cloves for commemorating the miners and make demonstration] nor to the trial, it’s enough (see Appendix, 40, own translation.) (Elçin, 25).

We are going to demonstration, they are shouting at us “are you still hungry for money rich widows?” We are going on the streets for you, so you don’t die, your children don’t die and work in good conditions. Yes, the state gave us money, but we also know how to call them to account for. Not only the tradesmen, but even the relatives, neighbors are doing the same thing. I am having traumas, believe me these people in Soma is the thing that made me sick (see Appendix, 41, own translation.) (Gülden, 45).

For example, there are some widows, they have a *duruş* (“good stance”). They follow their cases, they are not only taking the money, sharing photos on facebook and travelling around.⁴² (Neşe, 40).

Gender norms especially around the issue of widowed women work in Soma through mediation of aid and legal processes. They are both pressured from the residents around Soma like the people shouting at them at the demonstrators; but also pressured from the relatives who are expecting them to perform a certain behavior of a ‘struggler woman’, a ‘brave woman’ like following the legal case and “not showing themselves off with their aid money on the street”. Here state and its apparatuses like law and aid seemed to be regulating how people were categorizing other people as “traitors / selling out.” Object/subject positions seemed to be mediated mostly by encounters with law, aid and state which appeared as façades of state that miners’ relatives built affective assemblages regarding how they approach and identify other people/other relatives.

⁴² Duruşu olan dullar da var mesela. Her davaya gelir. Parayı alıp da sadece, facebooka fotoğraf koyup etrafta gezinmiyorlar.

In this chapter I tried to understand the effects of encounters with state after the state's intervention to Eynez incident. I examined the function of state and the different themes through which I observed that people give meaning to state. All these accounts are showing how the efforts of state to build an idea on the *hizmet*, love and fetish of development are actually eroded on the ground, through the life experiences of miners, relatives of miners, and people living in Soma. I analyzed the meanings they attribute to state. The ambiguity that state created in their lives, the distrust they have towards state, relating the fakeness and showing off to the state institutions, its incapability to bring justice and fixing the wounds in such a geography haunted by the everyday reality of death in mining sector and everyday realities in the relatives, especially the young widowed women's lives after the death of their loved ones. Through this methodology I analyzed the state-making process in Soma as not only contained in specific sites and bureaucratic mechanisms, but as effect in the lives of people.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

They are calling us rich widows, that we still want more money, that was the reason that we are shouting in the streets. It's true that we received lots of money, they say the government gave us two flats and it silenced us. Are we silenced? We are going to our trial, going to our commemorations, where are the people who are telling these I wonder. (see Appendix, 42, own translation.) (Tülay, 25).

Tülay was complaining to me in frustration about how people were shouting at them when they make the monthly commemoration for the 301 miners on the street. She has lost her husband in the incident and she was one of those miner's relatives who was attending all the trials and commemorations. I heard this complaint from lots of miner's relatives especially from the young women who lost their husbands.

Relatives of 301 miners were accused or humiliated by people because of the aid they received after the incident. After I began my fieldwork in Soma, there were general elections, and AKP became the first party in Soma. The comments about the relatives of decedent miners and people living in Soma increased after the elections. People were even saying that relatives sold out their loved ones for money and houses, by voting for AKP. After the Eynez incident, Tülay found herself within the matrix of being woman, being widowed, being for or against the government, being content of aid or not, calling the responsables for accountability or not giving effort to call for accountability, etc. According to my observations 'Somalılar', as if it is a homogenous group, has been judged and questioned a lot by public. Questions have varied from whether they want more money, to the reason why have they been still supporting AKP after such an incident.

This thesis can also be read as an effort to find answers or reformulate such questions that I heard a lot around me, and also, I myself asked sometimes: How is it

possible that AKP can still take that much vote from Soma, even after such an incident? Does it mean people still support AKP? Did not this incident change something in Soma or in the thoughts of people? Would it be possible to build a direct relation between AKP's rising power, with its practices in Soma after the incident, state's hegemony, and people's approach to state. I cannot suggest a direct answer to such questions, especially the ones about the results of elections that necessitates a much more quantitative research in detail, but throughout this thesis, I tried to analyze the different mechanisms and discourses through which AKP builds its hegemony.

Firstly, in the first chapter I analyzed the transformations in economic policies, relations of politicians with the business people, therefore the relation between state and market and also the underlying vision of government that is fetish of development; that played a big role in shaping Soma. As a result of these processes, locals of Soma became mine workers, Soma turned into a miner city, also witnessed an increasing worker migration from other cities. Both working conditions and also political choices of miners seemed to be effected by these processes, since the relations between state and company worked as a pressure on the workers. Efforts for getting organized around the syndicates for having a word in labor process were hindered by the pro-government actors like yellow syndicate and, *dayıbaşı*s who are working as representatives of government and company, also by the company managers who again had clientelist relations with government. Therefore, when people in Soma became *mecbur* ("obliged") to work in the mines they also stayed *mecbur* to live in these conditions. However, the relations and power mechanisms in the mines, also efforts of unionization among workers in Soma deserves a further study. The growth fetish of government, which substantiated its

hegemony in general, similar to a PR work of a company, with the giant projects in the construction and energy sector also kept effecting the lives of people in Soma. Because in Soma, after the incident, nothing changed on the side of state. The growth fetish, and expansion of energy projects like opening new mines and thermal plants by destroying the agricultural lands, was still the case. Even, the Eynez incident was turned into a pretext to open new mines, for the miners who stayed unemployed after the incident. Therefore, people in Soma are still obligated to go down to mines, with the almost same conditions than before.

After the incident, even the state's response to the incident became part of the success story in the energy sector. With AFAD and its so-called great efforts, fast response, and the speed that it collected aid and distributed, the quality of the houses that AFAD gave the relatives of miners were served as if AFAD was part of the support mechanisms for the greatness in energy sector. Therefore, this appearance of AFAD and state as a fast service and *hizmet* provider seems to be corresponding with the populism created by development projects. So, for the government, even though having disasters is in the nature of mining, which is necessary for the development of energy sector and the country, there is a great state institution that is ready for responding to such disasters. Therefore, the only accountable people in this process are engineers and high statue officials of Soma Inc. for their individual activities. In this context government and state even seemed to appear stronger rather than weakening its legitimacy after this incident. This was both due to the representation of state as capable by AFAD, but also through the discourse of love and compassion, that state used after the incident, as an affective glue that united the nation around mourning. State tried to monopolize mourning and the way people respond to this incident, by criminalizing those who criticized the state itself.

In my research, I tried to examine whether these efforts of state worked or not on the ground. It is possible to interpret Soma as an ‘affective geography’ that is crafted by the practices of state institutions. Aid institutions, especially AFAD as a state institution, and the aid materials like AFAD houses, martyr’s cemetery; and legal processes, including new legal rights for relatives, the penal case and all the workings of actors in relation to this case had initiated new encounters among people which reshaped the political space in Soma. People’s positioning of themselves and other people in this political space, and their positioning vis a vis state were shaped by this affective geography. State’s endeavor via its institution’s rational practices that create affect to build a phantasy of state that is compassionate, favorable, fixing the wounds, omnipotent, efficient, and as servant of its citizens were disrupted both by the experiences of people with law and aid after the incident and also people’s memories and previous experiences with state that were marked by the macro transformations in Turkey.

During our house visits with some of the relatives of 301, for asking the relatives of 301 if they would like to join the next trial, their conversations, their narratives of life, incident, and what they are doing in relation to the incident now included narratives about state, and what state did or meant for them. As I mentioned, state was mostly remembered as something that exists previously in their lives, as TEKEL or as state mines, but now it just exists as ‘*göstermelik*’, like institutions such as MİGEM and TKİ that are state institutions that were responsible to surveil the mine but never did. This experience of ‘*göstermelik*’ state had also affected what people thought about state after the incident. They simply did not trust the rescue operations, nor the information coming from the authorities, nor they trust the law totally. For most of the people the law system was already faulty or it was

not on their sides. Because none of them had been in a legal case even though they experienced ‘work accidents’ before, and they knew that Soma was already a miner’s coffin before the Eynez incident. They had the idea that already company was supported by the state, since state was ‘*göstermelik*’ in its regulations on mining, and this legal case would probably end with a symbolic punishment to the company owners. But with the time and when the political organization around the case became stronger they realized that actual law could be a tool to call the company and state accountable for the incident. State’s creation of job opportunities and opening more mines, in relation to the growth fetish for the neoliberal working of economy also was disrupted by the ideas of some miners and decedent miner relatives who openly criticized the state for what happened in Eynez, and criticize its hypocrisy on making people *muhtaç* (“needy”) and *mahkum* (“obliged to”) to such mine companies. Also, what state gave as rights after the Soma incident seemed as ambiguous rights, that can be taken back anytime. Therefore, for them any decrease in public attention or anything they pose as a threat to the state could be a reason for state to take back what it gave to them. State may have appeared as a compassionate hand but it was a hand that can be pulled back any time. State’s institutional and material practices as well as its discourses around these, and through these its endeavor to create a phantasmatic state that is omnipotent was being disrupted through these experiences. Also, state appeared as an actor that is setting relatives of deceased miners and other people in Soma against each other. Taking state aid, and working in a state institution as a given right after the incident became a tool for marking people and especially the widowed women as ‘proper’ or ‘selling out’ the case. Trial also appeared as another surface that people encounter the state. Their lives were indulged into both legal procedures and also technical language of law.

The non-ending trial process and the technical discussions created more uncertainty and distrust in the legal system and state. Therefore, the meaning of state was reconstructed and the phantasmagoric state was constantly reshaped by disrupting the endeavor to build an image of omnipotent state, through the everyday experiences and struggles of relative of miners.

While analyzing the building of hegemony and questioning whether this hegemony is disrupted on the ground, it was inevitable to fall into a phantasy about state itself as a research object, but also to fall into a phantasy of subjects who are fully supporting or resisting to the state. But the question that ‘why people are voting for AKP’ necessitates a research for understanding the spheres, way, technologies, actors through which hegemony of AKP, hegemony and consent are produced in local contexts, that I tried to explore in this thesis.

With the new institutional actors, technologies and discourses in Soma new subject positions opened. People did not only lose their loved ones but also became subjects in the aid and law processes, and all the discourses, rumor, speculations, expectations proliferated around these processes. In the ethnographic part, I tried to understand how the miners’ relatives relates and fill those positions, like criticizing the aid by not taking the keys of AFAD houses, by accepting the aids but criticizing those people who are not following the legal case, taking up the position of struggle by following the case, giving up following the case because not believing the state for bringing justice. Therefore, more than being a theoretical question for a research, this question of who is supporting the state, who is not, was constantly appearing and actually as my interviewees said creating the biggest trauma in Soma. Everyone was judging each other as ‘selling out’, ‘as betraying the dead bodies’, who is selling out, who is a *duruşu olan* woman, who is a rich widow selling out the honor of 301 for

money, who is spoiled etc. by different reasons related to aids and legal case. But I think these daily discussions also contributes to anthropological studies about questioning how to study or ontologize ‘resisting’, ‘submitting’, ‘consenting’ and even ‘voting’ subjects, and an appeal to studies on social movements. In other words, I had to problematize the ways I study or ontologize the resisting or submissive subjects, the possibility of doing this when there is no such contained subject position in the field, and how it is possible to study when strugglers, struggle or submission appears as fragmented, when it is not possible to categorize people as totally supporting or totally against the state.

Through ethnography of everyday encounters with the state and its institutions, procedures, discourses, I tried to demonstrate the ways in which both consent and dissent to the state can be fragmented.

APPENDIX

INTERVIEWEE QUOTATIONS IN ORIGINAL TURKISH

1. Her taraftan yemekler, ev aletleri, oyuncaklar yığıldı kamyonlarla. Bir grup gidiyor bir grup geliyor. Tamam sağ olsunlar var olsunlar, mutlaka köylerde ihtiyacı olanlar da çoktu, tüm Türkiye'yi yanımızda hissettik gibi sanki. Ama bilsinler burada bir deprem olmadı, sel olmadı, madene indi benimki, kaldı. Bizimkileri öldürdüler. Hemen sonrasında devletten de şirketten de çok kişi geldi soruyor neye ihtiyacınız var, dedim oğluma. Geri getirebilecek misin? Getir başka şey istemeyeceğim.
2. Eskiden ben madene giriktim, o zamanlar devlet madeniydi iyiydi, zordu ama iyiydi, tütün de yapardık, olmadı madene de girerdik. Artık tütün bitti, devlet de topladı tası tarağı. Anca arada bir madene bakarlar, onu da göstermelik, madene bile inmezlermiş öyle derdi oğlum, gelirler madenin kapısında sofralar kurulmuş, imzayı da orda atarmış denetledim der gidermiş. Özelleşmeden beri böyle kızım, bizi böyle böyle mecbur etti madenlere soktular, işletmeye (özel) muhtaç ettiler.
3. “Önceleri köydeydik biz tütün kırardık...Sonra yavaş yavaş tütün bitince, köyün gençleri madene girmeye başladılar, evlenince A. abin (eşi) de girdi, biz de şimdi bazen zeytine gidiyoruz, Ekmek parası için çalışıyorlar benim iki abim de hala çalışıyo madende. Canın kanın da olsa herkes ekmeğinin derdinde, gitme diyemiyorsun ki. Evden helalleşip çıkıyorlar...”
4. Çocukluğumdan beridir tütün üretirdik. 2003 senesiydi, artık bıktım. Neden. Çünkü giderek daha az kazandım. Aracı ne fiyat verse kabul ediyoruz, çare yok. E ne oldu ne yapayım elimdeki malı yakamam ki bütün yılın emeği! E

dedim ben madene gitmeye karar verdim. Bazen akrabaların zeytinine gidiyorum, ya da başkasının bahçesinde çalışıyorum yevmiyeyle. Eskiden paran olmadığıda Tütün'le öderdin. Tütün altın değerindeydi. Tütünün yoksa sana kız vermezlerdi. Şimdi gençler evlenebilmek için madene giriyorlar.

5. Benim oğlum üniversite mezunuydu. Atama bekliyordu. İstedığı gibi iyi bir iş bulamadı. Lokantada çalıştı, İzmir de taksicilik yaptı. Ama istediği olmadı. Bi gece geldi yanıma dedi baba ben madene giricem. Ben kendim de madenciyim emekli. Benden biliyor çalışmanın ne kadar zorlu olduğunu. Ama yine onu da anlıyordum ben, düzgün bir hayat istedi, düzenli bir işi olsun, emekliliği olsun, eşi olsun. Ben de yapma demedim.
6. Kazadan sonra bir daha öldürseler madene girmem diyordum, asla. Ama şimdi madenlerin kapısını aşındırıyorum iş için. Zaten yüzlercemizi bir gecede kovdular. Ben ne yapayım ki şimdi, bazılarının bahçesi var bazılarının zeytini. Para mı ediyor ki? Yine madene mecbur...
7. TEKEL vardı mesela eskiden, dayanak olurdu üreticiye. Her şey TEKEL'le başladı, özelleştirilmesiyle. Şimdi ne var TKİ sözde, bize işçiye destek olacakmış, denetliyorlarmış sözde! Bir kere bile inmemişler madene, şöyle bir kapıdan içeri baktırılıp akşamları lokantaya götürülüp yolcu edilmiş denetçiler. Tek biri bile yargılanmıyor mahkemede insaf.
8. Biz gençken Kömür işi yapmak istemezdik, tarımdı işimiz. Çalışmak için dışarıdan geliyorlardı. Madenler yeterince çalışacak adam bulamazdı. Çünkü biz düşünmedik ki o zaman madene inmeyi, e tütün zaten altın gibiydi. E zaten ne madende çalışmayı biliriz. Sonraları biz de öğrendik onlar gibi. Zorunda kaldık madende çalışmaya, sonunda hepimiz de girdik madene.

9. Devlet bütün sorumluluklarını bıraktı. TKİ enerji sektörünün motoruydu. Somada önemli büyük işler açtı yürüttü. Ama şimdi kendi kazançlarının peşinde özel şirketlere peşkeş çekiliyor. Önceleri TKİ'nin amacı insanlarımızı, onlara iş vermek, enerji üretmekken, şimdi biz özel şirketlerin bedellerini ödüyoruz, genelde de canlarımızla ödüyoruz.
10. Yeni madenler açacaklarmış. Bunu bir de müjde gibi söylemiyorlar mı yangından sonra. Herkes korkuyor madenden artık. Ama ne yaparsın. İş karşılığı arazileri satın alıyorlar, köyleri boşalttırıyorlar.
11. İşe girmek istediğinde mesela gidip de madene ben sizin madende çalışmak istiyorum diye başvuramazsın. Önce birini bulup, onun ekibine katılabilir misin onu sorman lazım, o yoksa başkasına soracan. Ama genelde güvendiği biri, hatta belki aynı köyden, akrabalardan olmalısın.
12. Dayıbaşı şirketin adamıdır. Sesini çıkaramazsın. Sen de çıkaramazsın, mühendis de. Duruşmada soruyorlar şimdi mühendisler, neden üretimi durdurmadınız, e çünkü durduramadık. Orada çavuş [dayıbaşı] varken, üretime zorlarken, nasıl durduracaksın ki. Soma'da evi arabası olan yüzlerce taşeron var, bunların hiçbiri şu an yargılanmıyor.
13. Mahkemede taşeronu kanıtlayamıyorlar, Soma Holding'in patronları madende taşeron olmadığını söylüyorlar. Ben sana söylüyüm, benim kocamın sigortası Soma Holding'dendi ama pratikte Gema Madencilik'in çalışanıydı. Benimkinin taşeronu buydu. Mahkemede sormuyorlar ki nasıl oluyor da o taşeron o kadar para kazanıyor, kocamda çok daha fazla kazanıyordu. Üzerlerinde prim alıyorlardı çünkü. Erdal 1500 kazanıyorsa o 10.500 kazanıyordu. Kömürle kelle başına prim alırlardı.

14. Sendikada örgütlenmeye çalıştık. Toplantılara falan gittim ben de, Devrimci Maden Sendikasına kaydoldum. Fena gitmiyordu. Ta ki taşeron bu işin farkına varana kadar. Türk-iş tendi o. Bir sürü arkadaşım teker teker sendika üyeliğinden çıkmak zorunda kaldılar. Ne yapsınlar dayıbaşılar tehdit ediyor.
15. Benim açıkçası bu olaydan önce sendikayla mendikayla pek işim olmazdı, (sendikaya) aidatımı vermek durumundaydım o kadar, onu da istemiyordum. Bu olaydan sonra anladım sendika neymiş ne olmalıymış, sendika olaydan önce hiçbir şey yapmadı bizim için, sonrasında da yapmadı ya. Onlar da yargılanmalı ya aslında. Patronlarla yan yanaydılar hep, mahkemede de yan yana dursunlar.
16. AFAD herhangi bir kurum değildir, bürokratik mekanizma değildir, AFAD'ın temsil ettiği değerler, siyasi hesap üzerine kurulan değerler değildir. AFAD bir milletin ruhudur, AFAD bir milletin vicdanıdır, AFAD bir devletin şefkat ve kudretidir
17. Biz Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Devleti'nin, ilerde de şefkat ve kudret devleti olarak kalmasını istiyoruz. Bu şefkat, kudret, AFAD eliyle tecelli etmesinden de büyük gurur duyuyoruz... İnsani misyonun esası nerede bir insan varsa ve o insan hangi dini, ırkı, arka plana sahip olursa olsun 'bana yardım edecek kudretli el yok mu' diye sorduğunda Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Devleti'nin kudret elinin timsali olan AFAD'ın orada olmasıdır... Onlar zihinlerinde Türkiye'yi hep şefkat eli olarak görececek, zorbaların yumruğuna karşı şefkatle uzanan el olarak görececek. Allah bize öylesine kudretli, öylesine şefkatli eylesin ki nerede mazlum varsa ona sahip çıkabilelim, nerede zor durumda kalmış eşrefi mahlûkat varsa ona eşrefi mahlûkat olarak yaklaşabilelim.

18. Ben eğer riski sıfırlamak yönünde bir tercih kullansaydım, kendi üzüntümü azaltmak üzere bir tercih kullansaydım, ithal kömürü tercih etmem gerekirdi. Bütün sorduğum akıllı insanlar bana ‘bunu tercih et’ diyorlar. Ama konu öyle öyle değil arkadaşlar! Bizim şahsi üzüntümüz, sıkıntımız, prestijimizden ziyade burada ülke menfaatleri önemli.
19. Kendime diyorum ki, keşke madende beklemeseymişiz hiç yere, hastanelerin önlerinde bir umutla sürünmeseymişiz de direkt soğuk hava deposuna gideymişiz, en azından erken bulurduk, onu kazadan anca altı gün sonra bulabildik biliyor musun?
20. Yok yaa! kardeşim ben tesadüfen kurtuldum kazadan, tanıımıyordum ama oğlunla aynı madendeydim, şimdi başka iş yapıyorum, çıkarttılar işten. Kesinlikle sayı o kadar az değil. Ben yıllarca o madende çalıştım, neyi var neyi yoksa bilirim. Bir sürü kişi vardı orada, kayıtsız. Birine bir şey olsa duyulmasın diye ambulans bile çağrılmazdı, hastaneye götürülmezdi. Asla inanmıyorum ben yani [sayının 301 olduğuna].
21. Bence asla 301 değil. Mümkün değil. Gale yana gelmesin insanlar diye yanlış söylüyorlar. Hiç kayıt altına alınmayıp sessiz sedasız memleketine gönderilen cenazeler varmış, sessiz kalsınlar diye devlet tonla yardım yapmış...
22. Benim akrabamın eşi aile hekimi, madene gidip görev almak istemişler maden kazasında AFAD a başvurmuşlar soğuk havada falan gönüllü olmak için...ama hiçbirini almamışlar...Hep doktorları dışardan getirdiler. Doktorlar imza atarak teslim edecek ya...Bazı çıkan ölenlere trafik kazası falan yazmışlar

23. İstanbul'dan görevli gelen doktor soğuk hava deposunda çalışmış, ben 480'e imza attım demiş. Bazı numaraları ikişer üçer kere koymuşlar ki az görünsün. Sayı 301 değil. İlk duyduğumuz 700 küsürdü. 700 küsür kişi kart basmış.
24. Bizim avukatlar da kaç kere söylediler, bütün kayıtları incelemişler, abla sayı doğru diyorlar. Olsun ben ölsem de inanmam, biliyorum yetkililer yalan söylüyor, adım gibi eminim sendika da çanak tutuyor, AFAD da TKİ de. Sonuçta çalışan biziz az çok madene kaç kişi girdiğini gözlerimizle görüyoruz.
25. Devlet ev veriyor şimdi bize, ben ne yapayım şimdi evi, ihtiyacı olanlar da var evet tabii, çok genç yaşta dul kalanlar. Ev için sağ olsunlar ama şunu da bilsinler. Burada deprem olmadı, bize ev değil adalet lazım. Benim çocuklarım var, Soma'da bir sürü genç var, elbet madene girmeyecekleri ne malum, onlar ölmesin diye uğraşıyoruz, önemli olan o, yoksa ev mev değil.
26. Ben ne adımımı verdim ne imzaya ne de tapu işlerine gittim. Devlet bana bir hak tanımış, hakkımı alıyorum ben bu kadar, şamataya gerek mi var. Utanıyorum, kabul edemiyorum. Daha davasını takip etmeyenler gidip evlerini seçiyorlar, açılışlara gidiyorlar. Biz istiyoruz ki kocalarının katilleri yargılsın, patronundan bakanına kadar, onlar oh yardımları aldık yat otur hayatını yaşa. Katilini seviyorlar bunlar, baştakiler ne deseler yaparlar.
27. Ben madende çalışırken [Eynez] sendikayla pek işim olmadı kardeşim, zaten işçilerden temsilci falan da yoktu, sadece aidat, hakkımızı savunmak falan, yok. Kazadan kurtuldum, şans eseri. Sonra bir gün telefonuma bi baktım, bir mesaj, işten çıkarmışlar beni iki bin arkadaşla beraber. Şimdi bizim artık hakkımızı arayacağımızı biliyorlar, sağ kaldık ya ondan çıkardılar. Diğer madenlerde de almıyorlar işe, biliyorlar çünkü. Hele Alevi'ysen kesin hakkını

arayacaksın eminler. Yeni maden açacaklarmış, bana ne koşulları düzeltmedikçe, devlet doğru düzgün denetlemedikçe, sendika olmadıkça kim girsin madene. Şimdi ev, para dağıtıyor devlet. Orda oturanların çocukları da girmeyecek mi madene...

28. Gittik [Akhisar'daki duruşmaya] polis bizi salona almıyor. Ben dedim bizim içimiz yanıyor, katiller içeride biz niye içeri alınmıyoruz. Bir tanesi bana bağırınca, kendimi tutamadım artık, diğerlerine baktım [madenci aileleri], bu sefer onlar da bağırmaya başladılar, engeller vardı onları itmeye başladık. TOMA var silahları var işte. Bi baktım bazıları salonun girişine varmışlar bile. Artık rahatlatamadım kendimi, artık kontrol edemedim. Bu benim için bir dönüm noktasıydı. İçeride konuşmak benim için kaçınılma gibiydi bakalım katiller bizim yüzümüze de yalan söyleyebiliyorlar mı diye görmek için. Söyleyebiliyorlarmış zaten.

29. Kızım gidicez de ne olacak ben artık diğer tarafa havale ettim. Orada bulsunlar hak ettiklerini. Kaç kere gittim ben davaya, biz oturuyoruz onlar konuşuyorlar, yaramıza tuz basar gibi. Hani bitecek diyorlardı dava, hiç bitmez, bitmeyecek, neden takip edeyim ki, 301'i yaka yaka öldürdüler bir günde değil ha yıllarca, bunları ilk görüşte cezalandırmayan adalet, iki senedir bir karar veremeyen adaletten ben ne bekleyeyim. Hiç gerek yok gidip kendimi yıpratcam ben orada yine, yüzlerini göreceğim yine, artık kalbim dayanmıyor.

30. ...'de [bir devlet kurumunda] çalışıyorum, nereye gitsem bilirler, herkes birbirini tanıyor burada. Ben de inşallah bir gün gelicem davaya. Ama açıkçası işte problem olur. Hadi bir günlük hastayım diye izin alsam, herkes

görecek sağlamım, zaten bir gün sürmüyor ki dava en az üç gün oradayız.

Duyarlar, sıkıntı olur. Ama inşallah bir gün gelicem.

31. Açıkçası ben güvenmiyorum, bu madene onay vermişler, şimdi de yardım vereceğiz diyorlar. Ben ne sayıya inanıyorum [301 sayısına], ne orda kurtarmadaki görevlilerin sözüne... İş hakkımı kızıma saklasam mı diye çok düşündüm ama sonradan dedim hakkı alırlar ederler ben başlıyım da işe kaybetmeyelim hakkı.
32. Kızım ben dört gözle bu davayı bekliyorum. Ne yapayım köyde, dört duvar, duvara mı söveyim. Görsünler o katiller bizim halimizi, babasız bıraktıkları çocukları, gelinleri. Çıkıp orada yalan dolan konuşuyorlar, avukatları da, sanki sorsan çok mutlu mutlu çalışırlardı bizimkiler. Sanki kendileri kendilerini yaktılar. Devlet de bunlara inanıyor kızım herhalde baksana. Bir de bize inansın bakalım, salona bir baksın, ben bağırıp çıkıyorum mesela, duyuyor hâkim beni.
33. Ermenek'te olanı duymuşsundur. Onlarca işçi öldü. İşçilerin aileleri salona girememişler, polis, mahkeme başkanı sokmamış. Sonunda ne oldu, iki gün sürdü dava azıcık ceza aldılar bitti. Biz bu davanın böyle olmasına izin vermeyeceğiz. Bu yüzden ilk günden beri davamızın peşinde olduğumuzu gösteriyoruz, salonu ilk günden beri dolduruyoruz. Avukatlarımız da bize söyledi, bu şu ana kadar Türkiye'de en uzun süren ilk iş davası imiş, neden çünkü bizim mücadelemiz var. Biz bu davaya sahip çıkmamış olsak, iki günde biterdi, sembolik bir iki kişiye ceza verilir biterdi. Biz ve avukatlarımız bütün sorumluların yargılanmasını talep ettiği için burada. Bizim sayemizde yani kızım, burada gördüğün bütün bu aileler ve sağ olsun avukatlarımız,

buraya Soma'ya emek vermiş insanların sayesinde, bu davayı bu aşamaya kadar getiren bizleriz.

34. Benim babam da maden çöküyor içinde kalıyor, belden aşağısı tutmaz demişler, neyse ki aylarca işsiz kaldı, iyileşti fitik kaldı yalnız, tekrar girdi [madene]. Eniştem ama madende kalık [öldü]. Avukat falan değil, o zaman şirket verdi kan parası can parası başka da bir şey olmadı. Şimdi 301'den sonra da şirketten gelenler evleri dolaştılar, şöyle gezdiler köyü, konuştular, şunu veririz bunu veririz, ne istersiniz bizden, avukatız dediler. Benim bildiğim 301'den olmadı kabul eden. Hepsi açtı dava.
35. Kızım ben artık bağıryorum çıkıyorum salondan hâkim atmadan. Tutamıyorum kendimi. Adam [sanık avukatı] diyor, yok kablolar şöyle iyiymiş, çok iyiymiş maden, çok güzel yatırımlar yapmışlar, e tabii bizim çocuklar kendi kendilerini patlattılar o zaman. Ne olursa olsun, o maden onların [sanıklar] sorumlusu onlar. Kabloyu mabloyu, bilmem ne kaplamasıymış, şunun matematiğiymiş, yok onun değil bunun imzasıymış karıştırmaları, beni çileden çıkarmasınlar. Yaptılar mı yaptılar, yaktılar oğullarımızı.
36. İki senedir dinle dinle bitmedi, bilirkişi raporunu dinledik, başka bi tane istediler, şimdi onu dinledik, e şimdi de yeni bir tane istiyorlar. Biz adalet diyoruz onlar, onlar yok o imzayı başkası atmış, yok onun yetkisinde değilmiş, yok şu metan değeri böyleymiş, yok dirsek 3 metreymiş, havalandırması tersmiş düzmüş. Yangın yok, olmazmış diyorlar bin bir türlü hikâye. Nasıl yanmadı. Ben kendim aldım oğlumu tamamen yanık.
37. Bizi dört duvar arasına kapatmak istediler, evmiş paraymış. Bazıları kapandı da. Mobilyaları döşedik, evi döşedik, güzel, tabii ki yanlış değil, sonuçta bize

verilmiş hak bu. Ama çocuğum büyüyünce kalkıp bana anne sen babam için ne yaptın ki demesin diye mücadeleyi sürdürüyoruz. Davamızı takip ediyoruz biz sonuçta.

38. 301'in kazasından hemen sonra Ermenek'te onlarca madenci şehit oldu, kimse onlara baktı mı, yardım etti mi, tek bir haber görmedik, benim akrabasının bir yakını vefat etmiş, tek bir başsağılığına giden olmamış. Devletin hiç gelip gittiği yok bunlara halbuki Soma'ya yardım yağdırdı. Yanlış anlama kötümeye çalışmıyorum Soma'dakileri haşa, 301 tane şehidi ama duyulmayan o kadar şey var ki maden işinde.
39. Ya insanları birbirine düşürdüler burada. O yardım bu yardım, şu para, bu ev. Kimse kimsenin yüzüne bakamaz oldu. Komşular da bana o gözle bakıyor. Yok şu partiyi destekliyordum yok onu. Umurumda değil ben davamın takipçisiyim, onlar utansınlar tek bir gün kapımı çalıp da davayı sormadılar, bak bu insanlara buradaki, kaç yaşında kadın hala bırakmadı geliyor, davasını takip ediyor. İnsanlık budur.
40. Her gün, her an, her kişi ile bunları konuşuyoruz. İstemesem bile soruyorlar, komşular, akrabalar, daraldım. Kafamı ütülüyorlar. Ev aldın mı, araba aldın mı, kaç para aldın, şu kurum yardım dağıtıyormuş haberin var mı, yok ismini yazdırman gerekiyormuş da tapunu alabilmek için, yok kütüğünü göstermen gerekiyormuş paranın yatması için, vır vır vır. Çarşıya çıkıyorsun, sonra arkandan bin bir türlü laf söylüyorlar, yok zengin dul, yok kocası ölmüş o hayatını yaşıyormuş, geziyormuş. Anmaya eyleme gidiyorsun, yine soktakiler laf atıyor 'zengin dul'. Ben artık dayanamıyorum, istemiyorum çıkmak, ne karanfile [anma ve eylem sırasında karanfil koyuluyor], ne davaya, yetti artık.

41. Eyleme gidiyoruz, arkamızdan bağıyorlar “paraya doymadınız mı zengin dullar”. Halbuki biz senin için çıkıyoruz sokağa, sen ölme senin çocuğun ölmesin iyi koşullarda çalışsın diye. Devlet bize para vermedi mi verdi, ama biz ondan hesap sormasını da biliyoruz. Sırf esnaf değil, akrabalar, komşular bile aynı şeyi yapıyor. Travma yaşıyormuşum ben, inan asıl bunlar beni hasta etti Soma’da.

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