

EDUCATIONAL STRATEGIES OF THE CONSERVATIVE BOURGEOISIE:  
CULTURAL CAPITAL, FAMILY AND SCHOOLING

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## DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

I, Ahenk Anbar, certify that

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## ABSTRACT

### Educational Strategies of the Conservative Bourgeoisie: Cultural Capital, Family and Schooling

Over the past decades, the rise of the conservative bourgeoisie has been discussed in many aspects; however, the relation between such upward social mobility and education has not been problematized. This study is concerned with the conservative bourgeois families' cultural capital formation process and the educational strategies being developed in this respect. The findings of the study are based on a field work composed of twelve semi-structured interviews and participant observation. Plus, to observe these emerging groups' impact on the private education sector, the websites of private schools in Istanbul has been browsed and schools with a conservative identity have been identified. Within this scope, it can be said that AKP has pursued a neo-conservative educational policy in recent years by articulating neoliberal values such as competition, competence and creativity with religious and national ones. Secondly, it is seen that the number of conservative private schools has increased since the second half of 1990s, many of them having affiliations with conservative investment groups, associations and foundations. Thirdly, a significant intergenerational difference has been observed regarding families' engagement with the cultural capital in terms of their rising educational levels and increasing involvement in their children's educational life. This transformation of parenting, or more precisely mothering, can be accepted as an important basis on which the interviewees construct their subjectivities as "good mothers". Finally, it is examined that aesthetics and religion-based morality are two main grounds through which

families distinguish themselves both from lower class conservative families and from the secular bourgeoisie.

## ÖZET

### Muhafazakar Burjuvazinin Eğitim Stratejileri: Kültüre Sermaye, Aile ve Okul

Muhafazakar burjuvazinin yükselişi son yıllarda hem kamuoyunda, hem akademik yazında birçok yönden tartışılmıştır; fakat sınıfsal yükselişin eğitimle olan ilişkisi sorunsallaştırılmamıştır. Bu çalışma, söz konusu gruba ait ailelerin kültürel sermaye üretim süreci ve bu kapsamda geliştirdikleri eğitim stratejilerini konu edinmektedir. Araştırmanın bulguları annelerle gerçekleştirilen on iki yarı yapılandırılmış mülakata ve katılımcı gözleme dayanan bir saha çalışmasına dayandırılmıştır. Ayrıca, söz konusu grubun özel eğitim sektörüne olan etkisini gözlemek adına, İstanbul'daki özel okulların internet siteleri taranmış ve muhafazakar kimliği ile öne çıkan okullar belirlenmiştir. Bu kapsamda, AKP'nin özellikle son beş yılda neo-muhafazakar bir eğitim politikası izlediği, rekabet, yetkinlik, yaratıcılık gibi neoliberal değerlerin yanısıra, dini ve milli değerlerin öne çıkarıldığı söylenebilir. İkinci olarak, özellikle 1990'ların ikinci yarısından itibaren muhafazakar kimlikli özel okulların sayısının hızla arttığı, çoğunun da muhafazakar sermaye grupları, dernek ve vakıflarla ilişkili olduğu belirlenmiştir. Üçüncü olarak, yukarı yönlü toplumsal hareketliliğin, kuşaklar arasında kültürel sermaye bakımından önemli farklar yarattığı, ailelerin eğitim seviyelerinin yükseldiği ve ebeveynlerin çocuklarının eğitim hayatına müdahilliklerinin arttığı görülmüştür. Annelik pratiğinin dönüşümü olarak da yorumlanabilecek bu dönüşümün görüşmecilerin "iyi anne" olarak kendi öznelliklerini kurmalarında önemli bir temel oluşturduğu saptanmıştır. Son olarak, estetik beğenilerin ve din temelli bir ahlak anlayışının, ailelerin kendilerini hem alt sınıf muhafazakar ailelerden hem de seküler burjuvaziden farklılaştırdığı temel iki alan olduğu saptanmıştır.

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## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

Towards the end of 2014, Genç MÜSİAD<sup>1</sup> organized a meeting entitled “Communication Summit” at which three journalists and a deputy from the ruling party, or more specifically the Justice and Development Party, participated. The subject of the summit was the media of “The New Turkey<sup>2</sup>”. It was the early days of my field study. I registered for the summit with the purpose of becoming acquainted with the field and with the hope of meeting people. Because my study is concerned with the educational strategies of well-to-do pious families in raising their future generations, I took the event as an occasion to observe the socialization practices among their younger generation.

The center of MUSİAD, in which also Genç MUSIAD also carries out its activities, was very close to the AKP (Justice and Development Party) Headquarters in Istanbul, conveniently located in the Golden Horn. The Golden Horn constitutes a symbolic part of Istanbul, which the AKP regime heavily invested in within the scope of its regeneration project concerning Istanbul’s Islamic Ottoman heritage (Gunay & Dökmeci, 2012; 104 yıl öncesine dönüyor!, 2012). Haliç Congress Center, Ottoman State Archives, Rami Old Military Barracks Restoration Project were all constructed in the last decade, rendering the area a cultural center of Istanbul.

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<sup>1</sup> It is the youth branch of a pro-government association named “Independent Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association”

<sup>2</sup> The New Turkey is a political discourse embraced by the ruling party since 2010. It was during the presidential election campaigns in 2014 that the discourse started to be stressed and turned into a name for the political project that the AKP envisages for 2023. According to Bora (Bora, 2016), along with the liberal-conservative connotation, this is also a discourse of power marking AKP’s restructuring project of the Republic’s constitutional pillars and reviving the Ottoman past of the state. A non-conciliatory foreign policy, a dominant state in internal policy, and the revitalization of an ethno-religious communitarian vision in society may be considered as the main objectives of this project.

When I entered the building, I saw young women wearing stylish clothing, some covered and some not, going about in a hurry in high-heel shoes. There were also young men wearing fashionable suits who welcomed me and showed me to a seat in the entrance hall. On the coffee table in front of me, there were advertisement booklets of a well-known Turkish auction house in which there were numerous paintings and engravings, mostly of Ottoman sceneries and portraits of sultans. While I was skimming through the booklets, a couple of young men behind me were discussing organizing a big tour to Çanakkale martyrs' cemetery in which members of MUSIAD from all around Turkey could participate and pray for the deceased. A couple of minutes later, we were invited into the big meeting salon, where round tables with their white table clothes were juxtaposed in front of the speech stand. There were biscuits and sandwiches offered on the tables with big flasks of tea. Most of the audience seemed to know each other. There were couples chatting. When the speakers started to take their place at the stand, men and women took their seats separately at most of the tables. I sat behind the women's table, where well dressed women, with their globally known branded bags put on the table, were whispering to one another. I sat down at one of the tables where there were three women, two of whom seemed to be younger than me and one of whom seemed to be in her thirties. They were not as fashionable as the other women. They were in the middle of a conversation when I joined to them. The older woman was a 28 February victim<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> In 28 February 1997, after the meeting of the National Security Council, the Turkish military had declared a memorandum against "the reactionary activities" of the government. It was basically a military intervention, taking side with secularists against the rising influence of political Islam in Turkey. After this postmodern coup, starting with the resignation of the Islamist Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan, a series of interventions had taken place. The field of education had become a focus of these interventions. Religious schools had been closed, the duration of primary school had been extended to 8 years in order to close the secondary level of religious high schools and with the interdiction of *turban* in public institutions, a considerable amount of women students had to leave their university education. 28 February victim is a term embraced by people who had faced diverging difficulties within this process.

who had migrated to Germany to finish her studies in the psychiatry department through a TÜRGEV<sup>4</sup> scholarship. The other two were undergrads in the environmental engineering department of Yıldız Technical University. One of them came from another town and was discussing with the older woman about proper dorms to stay in. The older woman advised her to look for TÜRGEV's dorms, referencing her positive experiences there in the past. Both of the young women seemed ambitious to continue their studies, so the older woman kept sharing her experiences and encouraging them to continue their graduate studies. While I was listening to their conversations, a woman on stage started to introduce speakers with her soft voice and great pronunciation, reminding the presenters of the state's official channel.

How to recognize the New Turkey and its difference from the old one was the main question of the speeches and the following discussions. The common opinion of the speakers was that the establishment process of the new and "democratic" Turkey was almost accomplished and that the time had come to discuss how to give shape to it. However, one of the journalists, also a formerly left wing human rights activist, remarked about a weak spot in the establishment process of the New Turkey and redirected the discussion as follows: "We are already talking about a transformation that took place in politics, in elections. Now, a shift is required in the cultural hegemony. Serious cadres should be positioned in the cultural field."<sup>5</sup>

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Here, as the informants had used the word, it designates the women students who could not continue their studies in the universities of Turkey.

<sup>4</sup> A pro-government foundation named Turkish Youth and Education Service Foundation that gives scholarships, that builds dormitories and guesthouses, etc.

<sup>5</sup> "Zaten siyasette, seçimlerde bir dönüşümden söz ediyoruz. Şimdi, kültürel hegemonyada bir değişim gerekli. Kültür alanına önemli kadrolar getirilmeli."

His comment attracted other speakers' attention and turned into an important axis of discussion for the rest of the summit. During the finishing speeches, it was raised as one of the key subjects to be focused on in their coming activities.

In the following months, the Facebook account of Genç MUSIAD sent me another event organization invite entitled "Entrepreneurship in Education and Culture". The event was introduced with a subtitle "Why is it important to invest in education and culture?" The speaker was a known figure in the communication and publishing sector and one of the primary entrepreneurs touching on the significance of religious values in the private education market. Although I could not attend the event itself, I arranged a meeting with him the week after. He invited me to his workplace in a pro-government news agency at which he was also the general coordinator. It was located in Fatih, the old town of Istanbul, very close to the Süleymaniye Mosque built by the renowned Ottoman architecture Mimar Sinan. His secretary welcomed and accompanied me to his private office, which was filled with books and marble artworks on the walls. Throughout our long conversation, he continually highlighted the importance of education, which he qualifies as a must, in order to incite a significant change in society. He accentuated two important periods in Turkey which enabled considerable opportunities for conservative<sup>6</sup> groups to become aware of such exigency. The first one is the period of Turgut Özal, during which liberal approaches in politics and neoliberal restructuring in the economy enabled different groups to self-actualize in the social field and benefit from the market economy. The second one is the AKP period during which, as he indicated, religion had gained legitimacy in society and gave way to the emergence of pious groups. He also associated the enlargement of religion's sphere of influence among

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<sup>6</sup> Throughout the thesis, the terms conservative and pious will be used interchangeably and the reasons for this usage will be explained in the following section.

society as a reason for pious groups' rising interest in the field of education<sup>7</sup>. In spite of their questionable quality, he underlined the symbolic importance of the increase in the numbers of universities, which opened in nearly every town under the AKP regime. Referring to the process, he exultingly told me that he, and his partners, were pioneers within the field in recognizing this wave of transformation. In his own words:

In the year of 1986, during a conversation among friends, we discussed about the trouble in finding a kindergarten which is not a Qur'an course but which may teach religion and faith. What we thought was that today's child will begin his adult life in five years. The child should learn religious faith. The child should have faith and at the same time be a self-confident, upright individual. That was our goal. (see Appendix D, 1.)

The project was realized the year after and has met with a great deal of demand for the last 29 years with the addition of new branches and study centers, not just in Istanbul, but also in other cities of the country. Regarding such a success story and the rising demand for this type of education, he underlined that he is being praised by his social entourage for teaching them to spend money on education. His contribution was twofold: one, for providing schools that conform to pious groups' values. Two, for showing the significance of education as a legitimate and fertile ground to spend money for their children's future.

The significance of these events for this study lies primarily with the intriguing question on which they put emphasis. The transformation of political Islam in Turkey, pious actors' increasing articulation within the globalized system, their luxurious consumption patterns, and the rising visibility of covered women in public spaces, had already been the main topics discussed in recent years both in

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<sup>7</sup> The term "field of education" is used in its generic meaning throughout this study, rather than its Bourdieusian conception which necessitates one to articulate its structured boundaries, established logic, valorized forms of capital and the exchange rate exclusive to it (Gorski, 2013). These concepts will be elaborated in details in the following pages.

public debates and academic literature. However, up to now, the corresponding changes within the field of education and culture were not on the agenda for such discussions. When the sources of this emphasis are reconsidered- one from an influential pro-government NGO and the other from an opinion leader coming from a pious background and specialized in educative matters, such a point gains further significance. There are several clues discernable from their statements. First, it is possible to see a shift in attitude. It is also possible to see the rising interest of the government towards the educational field. Secondly, it can be seen that such changes do have a remarkable impact on the private educational field, which becomes more worthy of notice when the emerging conservative bourgeoisie is considered. Third, that pious families are also playing an increasingly demanding role in this process as emphasized in the interview.

In the light of these clues, this study will be concerned with the following questions: What kind of an impact did the AKP's rise to power have within the field of education? What role did the emerging conservative bourgeoisie play in this transformation process? To what extent can we talk about the influence of conservative identity among private schools? What are the ways through which these private schools differentiate themselves from other schools? What are the socioeconomic and cultural dynamics that orient families towards these schools? What do families perceive from education, and what kind of educational strategies do they trace in this respect in addition to their school related concerns? How did this embourgeoisement process affect families' parenting roles? Throughout the thesis, satisfactory answers to these questions will be sought after from various sources.

## 1.1 The significance of the study

Among researches concerned with the rising pious bourgeoisie in Turkey, it is possible to classify three groups regarding the focus of their study. The shift in the axis of political Islam from a radical to a more moderate line and the rising compatibility of Islam with liberal ideas, democracy and secularism constitutes the main inquiries of the first group of studies (Çavdar, 2006; Nasr, 2010; Tepe, 2008; Yavuz, 2009). Even if these studies do not suggest in particular class-based analyses, their investigations shed light on the changing character of Islamic actors and their articulation within the global system. The second group of studies focuses on changing class relations and the transformation of pious actors' positioning within the capitalist system (Yankaya, 2014; Madi, 2014, Alpman, 2012, Buğra, 1998). MÜSİAD and İGİAD) are known economic organizations, founded by conservative actors, which are engaged in important fields of research, through which the question of interest in Islam and strategies of capital accumulation and the formation patterns of economic networks were analyzed. The last group of researches, which was generally conducted by anthropologists, turns the focus on ground level interactions between various actors, including institutions and the state. The culture's role in the production of a modern Islamic lifestyle (Saktanber, 2002), the non-confrontational interactions between rising Islamic political actors and the state (Turam, 2007) and the construction of "the political" and "the secularism" in the ever-changing daily encounters of public life (Navarro-Yashin, 2002) constitute the primary matters engaged in these studies.

Apart from a minor emphasis put on the rising interest among conservative groups for qualified education as a way of self-actualizing vis-à-vis secular bourgeois hegemony (Madi, 2014, p.148; Yankaya, 2014, p.190), the question of

how this “quality” is evaluated was left unquestioned among these studies. In Turkey, pious actors’ relation with the field of education has been studied mainly with a focus on three issues: the status of *imam hatip* schools (“religious vocational high schools”) (Ozgun, 2012; Bozan, 2007); contentious relations of covered students with secularist university policies (Nevra Seggie, 2011), and the schools and dormitories of the Gulen community as a places of education with religious influences (Balci, 2003/2005; Agai, 2007).

Balkan and Öncü (2014) stands apart by pointing out the changing concerns among conservative groups within the field of education in relation to their embourgeoisement process. By focusing on the “Islamic” and secular new middle classes of Turkey in a comparative way, authors made a worthy contribution in literature by showing the rising level of education among Islamic groups and their rising interest in sending their children to private schools. However, despite the study’s significance in raising attention concerning such a crucial change, there are several points which mark its boundedness. First, the concept of education is restricted to its schooling aspect, and the out of school educative practices of families was left unquestioned. Two, the quantitative method used in the analysis seems to become a decisive factor as to why the subjective evaluations of families remained untouched, primarily concerning the changing meaning of the term “education” between these two segments of the middle class. Thirdly, all of the practices of the emerging Islamic class have been qualified over the established practices of the secular groups, without questioning how a different approach may be attributed to the same practice, or how a different practice may gain importance among Islamic groups.

Aside from Balkan and Öncü's work, there are not many other researches investigating the role education plays in middle class (re)production strategies in Turkey. David Behar's research (2006) underlines Turkish grand bourgeoisie's rising articulation with global elites by means of globalizing educational networks and how this social networking contributes to the reproduction process of elites in Turkey in return. With a similar concern about the rising impact of neoliberalization, but with a certain focus of Istanbul's urban setting, Rutz and Balkan's encouraging work *Reproducing Class* (2009) raises questions about the rise of new middle classes in Turkey and their changing practices within the field of education. In this respect, authors accentuate the gradually rising neoliberal approach of the Turkish state towards "selective" education, the emergence of new actors in the rising private educative market, such as private tutors and *dershanes* ("private lesson schools preparing children for national entrance exams for high schools and universities"), families' ascending eagerness in appealing to credentials for maintaining their current position in society, and parents' increasing involvement in the process of preparing their children for national examinations.

Although all these studies deserve a good deal of respect regarding their leading role in raising important questions, a considerable amount of time has passed since their field study which were conducted in the late 1990s and early 2000s, necessitating a fresh look within the field. Canan Aratemür Çimen's (2015) dissertation is remarkable on this point on account of the fact that it raises an extended and detailed revision of the field under similar questionings. However, they all remain limited at one point for not considering the transformation taking place within the field of education along with the rising pious bourgeoisie. Yet, to a large

extent, it is this rising segment of the society that inaugurated a significant structural change in the society as a whole throughout the last decade.

There are three main reasons for focusing on the field of education. The first reason is that the educational field constitutes one of the building blocks of the modern state, which needs “legitimate citizens” that can function both economically and ideologically within the state’s prescribed system (Üstel, 2011; Kaplan, 2006; Caymaz, 2007). In this respect, the educational system becomes a fertile ground to study the state and its changing directions, even under neoliberal policies, where the role of the state is constantly being reformulated. Secondly, power relations embedded in the field and masked behind its neutral character, as it was primarily underlined by Bourdieu and Passeron (1970/1990), have come into light more clearly throughout the last decades, especially with respect to rising neoliberal privatization policies and the enhancing role of non-state actors within the field. So, it is also a fertile ground to examine ongoing contentious relations between power groups in the society. Thirdly, the field of education marks a crucial point in middle class studies, especially with the rise of the new middle classes, regarding its significance in families’ social reproduction process. In most of the studies, credentials were emphasized as families’ primary reason for ameliorating or at least for ensuring their current positions in a stratified society (Ball, 2003; Lareau, 2003; Van Zanten, 2005). In Ehrenreich’s words, it is the “fear of falling” that underlies the middle classes’ sense of vulnerability and precariousness (Ehrenreich, 1989). So, it is also a rich ground to examine not just the current class relations in society but also the bourgeoisie’s self-positioning in particular. For the moment, engagement with the current neoliberal educational policies, investing capital in prestigious private educational institutions, and a rise in demand for international prestigious

universities (especially in USA and UK) are the outstanding strategies globally observable among middle class families within the educational field (Ganguly-Scrase & Scrase, 2012; Power & Whitty, 2006).

Regarding the impact of pious groups' embourgeoisement process on the social structure of Turkey and the significance of education for a bourgeois lifestyle, this study will try to explore the educational strategies of the conservative families in Turkey. However, in line with Bourdieu's framework, education will not be embraced only within the scope of schooling. Domestic practices and extracurricular activities will also be analyzed as two other grounds where the cultural capital is being established.

Before moving on to the outlines that will explain how this question will be analyzed in the following chapters, it is necessary to introduce the way the two main concepts, namely conservative and bourgeoisie, will be embraced in this particular study.

## 1.2 Why not Islamist or Islamic, but pious or conservative?

Regarding studies that focus on pious groups in Turkey, it is possible to discern three essential identifications, namely Islamist, Islamic and conservative. Islamist is a widely preferred concept among studies whose field studies were conducted in the 1990s (Çınar, 2005; Güllalp, 2003; Navarro-Yashin, 2002). The formation process of a counter-identity vis-a-vis the secularist one constitutes their common focus. It is the conceptual separation developed by Göle (1997) between Islamist actors, who aim to reformulate the public sphere within the scope of a political project, and the Muslim which describes the individual's personal relation with religion that lies beneath the reason for such identification. Saktanber's study (2002) marks an

exception in the period with its preference to use the term Islamic within the scope of her attempt to surpass the binary constructed between political and cultural Islam.

In his widely known study entitled *Passive Revolution*, Tuğal (2009) marks a shift between Islamist identities of pious groups to an Islamic one regarding their rupture from a religious political project and absorption within the liberal capitalist system. With AKP's rise in power, the term Islamic gains weight among studies concerned with the rising interaction of religious groups with the state, their changing practices in the economic field and their upward mobility in the stratification structure (Madi, 2014; Turam, 2007; Yankaya, 2014). On the contrary, the term Islamic is opposed by another group of scholars (Çavdar, 2013; Durak, 2013; Turam, 2012) for its power in producing binaries around secular-Islamic opposition. Pious Muslims, conservatives or devout groups constitute some of the nomenclatures suggested. Çavdar defended her position by indicating that, while it is not possible to call every Muslim an Islamist, it is also not possible to imagine a devout Muslim's personal relation with religion without making reference to the historical trajectory of Islamist thought in Turkey (Çavdar, 2013).

This final approach will shed light on the identifications in this study. Actors will be defined as conservative throughout the analysis, while the terms pious and devout will also be used interchangeably. Yet, this study is also aware of the fact that identification itself entails a risk of producing an abstract binary peculiar to historical context in Turkey between conservative and secular<sup>8</sup> bourgeoisie. It is basically the

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<sup>8</sup> In his book *A Secular Age*, Charles Taylor (2007) elaborates three types of secularity. According to Taylor, the first conceptualization of secularity is defined in relation to the retrenchment of religion from the public sphere, as also seen in the type of French *laïcité*. The second conceptualization is concerned with the decline of belief and religious practice in society. The third type of secularity may be conceived as a quite liberal and individualized way of characterization where the definition of secularity is exempt from any public references, as a certain condition in which the experience of faith becomes a personal option among others. Throughout this study, the term secular will be used regarding the first conceptualization where the secularity implies the degradation of religious dynamics in configuring public issues.

risk of overlooking the “free play of substitutions” (Derrida, 1967/1978) in real life that exceed the binaries inherent in identifications. Nonetheless, by considering such a trap, I believe that identifications are indispensable as long as they are critically embraced in order to analytically engage with the field of inquiry. As a matter of fact, the choice of the term “conservative” lies at the core of this awareness regarding its flawed character in Turkey capable of articulating with different identities.

Conservatism as a political thought was born in Western countries in the aftermath of the French Revolution, against Enlightenment’s rationalist and progressivist renovation project, which was centered upon a self-appointed human-being (Nisbet, 1986). Rather than being a reactionary stance that resists change, conservatism was an attempt to put a claim on the definition of change, thus the social structure. Against the foundational precepts of liberalism composed of equality, liberty and mankind; conservatist thought had placed loyalty, authority, hierarchy and order as the basis of society (Kukathas, 1987). Hence, it recognized human beings in all their societal bonds. Therefore, history as the builder of the present and the promoter of allegiance, became the core reference of conservative thought (Mannheim, 1991, p.211). Upon such ground, conservatism was transformed into a political ideology in Western history, competing with socialism and liberalism to define what is best for society.

Tanıl Bora (1998) evaluates conservatist thought on two related grounds. On one hand, he remarks that the association between religion, community and tradition in which religion is embraced as a tradition, is like a sense-making kernel that bonds the community. In this respect, religion is exposed to a modernist intervention in conservative thought and undertakes a quite earthly function. On the other hand, as from the second half of the ninetieth century with the rise of modern states, the

association between nation, authority and state has gained strength in conservatism, rendering the nation the new basis of community. By referring to the historical context in Turkey, instead of taking Islamism as the ideology of the former and the nationalism of the latter as political positions distinct from conservatism, he argues to qualify their interrelatedness. Thus, he defines them as the states of matter capable of transforming and articulating to one another where conservatism represents the “cultural and ethical program” (Bora, 1998, p.10) of such intertwined unity.

Among studies concerned with the question of conservatism in Turkey (Bora, 1998; Çiğdem, 1997; Mert, 2003) there arises a shared opinion. It is argued that conservatism did not evolve into a political ideology as in the Western world, capable of staking a claim on established power relations and of triggering socioeconomic transformations. Instead, it has been more of an attitude, a course of conduct and thought integrated in the cultural realm against the secularist reforms of the early Republican period and especially of the one party regime. Revealing the continuity with the Ottoman past and the Islamic roots of the nation may be considered as the essential precepts of such conservative bearing, which Aktay (2003) identified as the Islamist ideology’s legitimate communication channel with the established secular hegemony. On the other hand, the rise of the AKP with its political identity of “conservative democrat” has been widely acknowledged as the party’s rupture from its radical Islamist roots. This new “conservative democrat” identity has the power to render Islam an important component of culture, compatible with secular-liberal social imagery (Bulaç, 2007). Regarding the rise of the bourgeoisie and the shift in politics in the last five years with an increasing stress put on religiosity and nationalism, the question as to whether this cultural

conservatism, weaved around the institution of family, (Yılmaz, 2012) is evolving into a political ideology or not remains to be answered.

### 1.3 Bourgeoisie as a state of formation rather than a state of being

The 1980s mark a turning point in Turkey regarding the restructuring of the economy under neoliberal politics and the changing class structure within the upper segments of the society. It is possible to discern three groups of studies which focus on these advantageous groups. The first group of studies focus on families who could have already benefited from the Kemalist regime reforms and the state led-economy and could have gained an advantageous position in society before the transformation took place. Being an Istanbulite since several generations, a certain emphasis put on a refined cultural taste and the importance given to a Westernized secular lifestyle mark the main characteristics of the group which is defined as the old “elite” (Mağgönül, 2005) or as the “grand bourgeoisie” (Behar, 2006) of Turkey.

After 1980, there emerged two new classes, called the *nouveau riches* (Bali, 2009; Daniş & Perouse, 2005) which play a considerable role in the restructuring process. One of them is the new middle classes, composed of highly educated urban young people, speaking foreign languages fluently, and working in administrative positions of multinational companies within the expanding tertiary sector (Ayata; 2012; Balkan & Rutz, 2009; Doğuç, 2005). Expansive consumption habits, high quality credentials, and segregated life spaces have become the main axis through which this rising class, which Wallerstein (1988/1991) defined as “salaried bourgeoisie”, is characterized by.

On the other hand, there is the rising Anatolian based capital (Madi, 2014; Yankaya, 2014) who had migrated to big cities and benefited from the rising

exportation opportunities of the period. Despite the challenging character of their lifestyles, characterized by their rural character and religious sensitivities, this class segment could benefit highly from the changing social, economic and political waves of the last three decades. It consolidated its class-based identity throughout the 90s. The foundation of economic organizations such as MUSIAD and IGIAD, and the AKP's rise in power have been decisive in this process, which led to their characterizations as the "Islamic bourgeoisie".

Drawing the boundaries of identification between the new middle class, middle class and the bourgeoisie is a compelling endeavor regarding the fractured structure of the upper segments of society and the blurred frontiers in between them. When the studies are examined within the scope of their identifications, three different paths arise.

Firstly, defining new middle classes seem to be much more unequivocal when compared to the other two concepts. It is observed that, one's occupational location, namely her administrative position in corporate firms, becomes the primary determinant for the new middle class category, which also comes along with a variety of lifestyle indicators as underlined above. Living a bourgeois lifestyle under favor of high incomes, but without possessing the means of production, may be considered as the fundamental characteristic recognized in this group's categorization.

As a second approach, ownership of the means of production becomes the method of identifying groups as middle class (Saraçoğlu, 2011) or bourgeoisie (Madi, 2014; Yankaya, 2014). However, none of these studies contend with ownership as the only basis, and they all refer to lifestyle indicators in defining the class location of people, which also constitutes the primary ground of identification

of studies appertaining to the third approach (Çimen, 2015; Öncü, 2005; Saktanber, 2005). Within this scope, bourgeoisie is generally defined as a group capable of differentiating themselves from the lower segments of society, not just in terms of their wealth, but also socially and culturally, through their luxuriously segmented living spaces, higher consumption patterns or their ability to mobilize social networks. On the other hand, the characteristics manifesting a middle-class lifestyle appear as having middle ranged income professions, i.e., officer, tradesman, teacher, journalist, accountant, etc. Plus, it is underlined that the middle class depends on a regular income, takes advantage of the social services provided by the state, and lives neither as well-off as the bourgeoisie nor as disadvantaged as the groups deprived of any of these standards. In this respect, even though it is possible to talk about a similarity between the middle classes and the bourgeoisie in terms of their eagerness to mark their distinction from the lower classes, variations within their level of income are underlined by scholars as their main demarcation line (Ayata; 2012; Öncü, 2005; Saktanber, 2005).

On the other hand, it is also possible to see both classes identified as “groups capable of creating an extended change in society” by playing a significant role in inciting, spreading, and consolidating the new types of practices. While Saktanber refers to such an assumption as an identification of the “middle class ethos” (Saktanber, 2005, p.193; p.198) and of the rising Islamic groups in the 90s, Yankaya (2014) underlines the same point to qualify her informants as bourgeoisie. By referring to both these classes’ ambiguous positions, and “neither peasant, nor noble” character (Wallerstein, 1991, p.136), Wallerstein draws attention to the rising tendency among scholars to use these two terms interchangeably and further defines the bourgeoisie as the central dynamic force of the modern world, regarding on one

hand its protagonist character inciting structural transformations, and on the other hand its regulatory power establishing order and continuity in society.

In today's world, the bourgeoisie's congenital ambiguity manifests itself most clearly in relation to the changing occupational structure in the economic field throughout the twentieth century. The rise of the new middle classes positioned in managerial posts of multinational companies, propertyless but rich in cultural capital and salient with their high-standard consumption patterns, marks the locus of change. In this respect, traditional Marxist class analysis based on the ownership of means of production started to be challenged and noneconomic factors affecting one's social position have since been put on the agenda of stratification theories.

Reconsidering the content of property (Wallerstein, 1991), prioritizing exploitation (Wright, 1985) or defining a sub-class category as new petty bourgeoisie (Poulantzas, 1974/1978) are some of the strategies neo-Marxist scholars have put forth for characterizing middle classes throughout the twentieth century. However, despite the rising emphasis put on cultural and subjective factors in Marxist tradition, these factors' contribution in class formation and process-or stratification structure at large-remained intact, rendering class as an attribute arising solely from actors' structural location in the market. In other words, the Marxist assumption that perceives the subjective realization of class as an output of its objective location was left unproblematized.

Weber, is a prominent name in stratification literature for emphasizing the role of subjective factors in social inequalities. In contrast to the Marxist approach that puts ownership of the means of production at the core of its social theory, Weber (1978) focuses on power as the underlying dimension of social boundaries. In this respect, along with classes determined by the actors' location in the field of

production, he emphasizes status groups arising to a large extent in the field of consumption and parties occurring in political interactions as two different grounds in which power takes form. By virtue of its multidimensional framework capable of capturing the changing class structure, Weberian framework has been celebrated by a variety of scholars (Dahrendorf, 1959; Giddens, 1973; Halbwachs, 1955) and has set their theoretical frameworks. However, in spite of its power in stressing subjective factors, the theory remained insufficient in showing how objective and subjective factors relate with each other in the making of social stratification (Wacquant, 1992).

There are three main reasons that feature Bourdieu's distinctiveness in social stratification analysis. In the first place, Bourdieu does not offer a social class theory that outlines general laws of class structures applicable in every society. Instead, in line with E.P.Thompson (1966), he is concerned with the formation process of stratification, which entails an anthropological regard in order to capture the variabilities of formation peculiar to each society (Bourdieu, 1972/1977). In this respect, he generates an analytical framework in which society is embraced as a social field, where the dynamic positioning of actors, or agents which is the term he uses, becomes the key factor of class formation.

Secondly, the relational and dynamic character of his approach renders his analysis essentially a historical one. Social field is qualified by Bourdieu (1985) as a power field composed of hierarchically ranked autonomous sub-fields, each having their intrinsic principles. In concordance with their positions in multiple fields, agents are defined as strategy producing actors vis-a-vis others in order to preserve or to enhance their position in the stratification structure (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). Along with capital ownership, dominant positions endow actors with the power to determine the legitimate classificatory schemes in society, which renders on

the other hand the boundaries of social classes themselves an axis of struggle between various social groups (Bourdieu, 1979/1996b). In this respect, Bourdieusian framework attaches equal importance to symbolic aspects and to material determinants in the production of social inequalities. Thus, a historical analysis becomes inevitable for two reasons. On one hand, to capture the strategies of agents constantly reformulating in relation to others', and on the other hand to discern the formation process of such symbolic attributes in society.

Thirdly, Bourdieu's approach is essentially an attempt to overcome the objective-subjective dichotomy in social stratification analysis and "practices", which lies at the core of this merger (Ortner, 2006). "Class is defined by its being perceived as by its being" (Bourdieu, 1996b, p.483) is a statement that best explains his approach to social classes. Class is identified on one hand, in relation to the capitals possessed by its adherents according to their position in the social field. On the other hand, the actualization of agents' potential agglomeration into a class takes place in the lifestyles they share. In other words, social classes are realized through their distinctive practices that symbolically differentiate them from others, and it is substantially the cultural realm where such a negative relationship manifests itself (Swartz, 1997). Codes of conduct and judgements of taste are all part of the symbolic struggle that dominant classes rely on to render their arbitrary classificatory schemes aesthetic and legitimate. However, the political implication inherent in these categorizations are misrecognized by agents regarding their naturalization process, i.e. their internalization through practices and reproduction by habits functioning as a "structuring structure" (Bourdieu, 1977, p.170). Even though the role given to agency in this reproduction process engenders important questions, as will be discussed, the significance of Bourdieu's framework in revealing the implicit

presence of structure in the most subjective judgements of a person, and thus positioning objective and subjective factors in a dialectical relation, marks its main distinctive feature.

Relying on these points, it is possible to say that Bourdieu's class analysis offers a much more bedded, dynamic and relational, and thus holistic approach to society in contrast to its Marxist and Weberian counterparts. In his discussion about the supremacy of culture over class-related factors in the social studies of late modernity, Savage (2000) celebrates Bourdieu for offering a theoretical framework capable of capturing the changing form that class takes in our contemporary society. Regarding his account on the "individualization of class", Savage remarks how class is deeply intertwined with culture and its way of being experienced by social actors. Such an emphasis may be considered as the chief reason of the prevalence of Bourdieu's framework in middle class studies of Turkey that contain a special focus on cultural practices (Balkan & Rutz, 2009; Doğuç, 2005; Öncü, 2005; Saktanber, 2002; Yankaya, 2014).

Likewise, this study also entails a Bourdieusian framework, especially regarding the relational<sup>9</sup> character of his theoretical approach. It is possible to underline several reasons for it. In the first place, the embourgeoisement process of conservative groups within the last several decades has taken place in a bidirectional way. On one hand, they differentiated themselves from the lower class conservative camps on a vertical basis. On the other hand, they actualized themselves as a bourgeois faction by distinguishing their cultural practices from those of the secular

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<sup>9</sup> The "relational" in Bourdieu's theoretical framework may be conceived in contrary to the "substantial" or the "categorical". Schinkel describes his relational logic as an approach in which "material goods, but also the positions people occupy in a field, are regarded as arbitrary significations that are not meaningful due to any essential, intrinsic features, but rather as a result of a play of difference" (Schinkel, 2007, p.711)

groups on a horizontal basis. Regarding the intertwined character of these two axes and the position conservative bourgeoisie have taken in the center of it, Bourdieu's strength in fusing the objective and subjective binary renders his approach a favorable one for this particular study. On the other hand, such an interdependent nature positioning in the social field also constitutes the main basis on which both the identifications "conservative" and "bourgeoisie" gains their meaning particular to the Turkish context.

Secondly, as mentioned, Bourdieu offers a model that focuses on the formation process of classes rather than giving us a rigid structure of class. Challenging and reformulating the categories of classification identified by the secular bourgeoisie constitutes the main ground on which conservative groups have formed their bourgeoisness. This is why Bourdieu's emphasis on the struggles concerning the boundaries of social classes makes his framework valuable in the scope of this study. Additionally, the importance given to the dynamism of such formation process is significant regarding its power in considering actors' experiences of social mobility and their contradictory practices that linger from their previous class habitus.

Thirdly, religion constitutes an important ground in the formation process of conservative actors' habitus. As underlined by Mahmood (2005), the religion of Islam is not only about faith, the inner conscience of its believers, but also about their practices. Therefore, by orienting the daily practices of the believers, Islam affects the culture of the community in a considerable way. In this respect, Bourdieu's focus on the role of practices in actors' interiorization process of class habits marks another dimension of his theory's compatibility with the field of this study.

Fourthly, as highlighted by Ortner (2006), practices are not just significant for naturalizing and inculcating the arbitrary categories of structure into agents' world view, but also for reestablishing the world. In this regard, the relationality in Bourdieusian framework generates a productive ground for analyzing the structural transformation taking place in the field of education today in two respects. On one hand, to consider the historical background that shapes the claims raised by the conservative bourgeoisie in the field of education, which had always been a field of contestation between competing power groups. On the other hand, to capture the increasing influence of emerging conservative groups' cultural practices in determining the new position-takings within the field.

#### 1.4 Methodology

Theory of practice marks the core approach of this research. It is a grounded theory suggesting to grasp the dialectical relationship between social and cultural transformations and to focus on practices as a point of articulation in between. It is basically an attempt to analyze the embedded macro structures through micro constructions and also to analyze the power of practices in shaping the structure in return (Bourdieu, 1977; Ortner, 2006). In this respect, along with micro analysis, large-scale frameworks have also been prioritized throughout this analysis. In order to transcend the micro-macro duality, a tripartite methodology has been conducted.

Firstly, with the purpose of taking a macro picture of the educational field, a variety of data has been collected. Within this scope, along with a focus on recent educational policies, related news, public discussions, speeches and declarations of political authorities' and the reactions coming from academics and civil society actors have also been followed and gathered. Furthermore, in order to trace the

emerging conservative class's impact on the educational field, the websites of all the private schools in Istanbul<sup>10</sup> have been scanned, and the private schools presenting their corporate identity with conservative values have been detected. A detailed analysis of these schools will be elaborated on in the second chapter.

Secondly, in order to engage with “the cultural systems, discourses, representations and symbolic systems in the social relations of people ‘on the ground’” (Ortner, 2006, p.3), interviews have been supported with a participant observation method. Participant observation was necessary in the first place in order to build a social network and to have access in the field. In this respect, a wide array of places became ground for meeting informants. These places ranged from malls, NGO and association meetings, fashion shows, expositions, school advertising days etc. Further, with an intent of examining more ordinary conversations between women<sup>11</sup>, I attended a *tezhip* (“ornamentation method”) course for a month and a half and visited various different “luxurious” women coiffeurs in upper middle class districts, which are known as conservative neighborhoods. Advertisements and news accessible through internet pages and forums about these “socially segregated spaces” were also beneficial through the process<sup>12</sup>. Aside from the purpose of meeting new people, these observations were also crucial to have an idea about the symbolic patterns within the field, such as the way of dressing or behaving which

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<sup>10</sup> The list of private schools can be reached from the website of the General Directorate of Private Education Institutions. See <http://ookgm.meb.gov.tr/>

<sup>11</sup> There are three reasons why women rather than men had been chosen as the informants of this study. First, it is a shared opinion among a variety of scholars that despite changes that took place in the social relations of production throughout the last century, which raised the level of womens' education and their entrance in paid labor, the reproductive role of women within the private sphere- both physically and emotionally- remained the same (Chodorow, 1978; Hochschild and Machung, 1990; Sullivan, 2004). Secondly, it is also underlined by scholars (Reay, 1998; Hays, 1996) the issue of education of children becomes a highly gendered process in middle class families. Thirdly, It wouldn't be wrong to forecast Turkey's patriarchally determined structure and the interviewees' conservative character as additional factors reinforcing this statement.

<sup>12</sup> Tesettürlülerin kuaförü: Fark edilmek istiyorlar, 2011

O'Reilly qualifies as “subtle ways to become a part of the field” (O'Reilly, 2005, p.88).

Before the field research, I believed that I would quickly and easily be able to reach a level of intimacy with informants. However, I found that it was nearly impossible to move into the private sphere of the people I had met in public spaces. Our conversations remained generally on a shallow level. Apart from the reasons originating from my personal position in the field, as will be touched upon below, there were two different reasons leading to such a deadlock. On one hand, even though the places I had attended were drawing the interest of the people, women were generally socializing only with their friends around or if they were alone, which was much rarer, they were not spending enough time with me to build up a deep conversation. Coiffeurs were significant in this respect. I thought they would have been the best spots for me with an expectation of taking part in conversations on daily women's issues. However, as distinct from the coiffeurs one may find in humbler neighborhoods, the ones I had attended were much more professional, with loud music and staff providing services personally. So, rather than the women coming in and out swiftly, it was much easier to have a long chat with the staff members. On the other hand, even though there were other places I found through the internet, such as exclusive beauty centers inside luxurious gated communities, or spa or *hamam* (“bath”) centers providing services for families, I was either not allowed through the security doors, or I had to face the financial difficulty of registering for a beauty center annually.

Along with a few preliminary interviews in the beginning, I had tried these various strategies for a long time in order to acquire access in the field. At one point, I realized that a mutual contact would be indispensable in order to get accepted into

informants' confidence zone. The only exceptional experience I had was with a woman from a parent-teacher association of a private school to which I had written via Facebook messenger. After our meeting in a mall, during which I could have gained her trust, she suggested to organize a *gün*<sup>13</sup> ("day") in her house so that I may meet with her friends from the gated community where she resided. Apart from that, I arranged all my interviews either through a person I had already known, or by sampling various informants' social entourages.

In order to enlarge the scope of the field, I tried to meet everyone who I was suggested to get in contact with or to whom I was introduced personally. So, in total, I made 18 semi structured interviews. However, I had to restrict the number of people with whom I engaged throughout my analysis to twelve. Three points were considered in this limitation. First, I limited the scope with mothers whose children were at the secondary school or high school level, which are the periods when students are taking national exams to be able to enter into high schools or universities. From my preliminary observations, I realized that those are the periods during which parents constantly reconsider their educational strategies and take steps in this respect. Second, I considered the class-related practices of informants, as explained above, and tried to limit the analysis with people I may qualify more or less with a bourgeois lifestyle. Thirdly, in terms of conservativeness, besides from informants' self-identification, their practices and values expressed throughout the interview had also been considered. However, even though I restricted the number, all the informants I had met and all the experiences I had gained during the field work contributed a great extent for my observations and developed my insights, as

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<sup>13</sup> It means "day" in English. In daily usage, it identifies the in-house meetings of women, where they gather for diverse reasons, such as meeting, socializing, celebrating or praying all together. It generally takes all day, when the husbands leave for their jobs and children for their schools.

also will be shared throughout the analysis. Pseudonyms are used throughout the study in place of informants' real names.

For ethical purposes, informants' awareness of the study and their consent was crucial. Participant observation was challenging in this respect. In order to not needlessly disturb the daily occurrence of events and discourses, I did not declare my purpose to everyone I saw in the field. However, in order to not to be dishonest, I mentioned the reason for my presence to the people which I started a conversation with. Whereas, during the arranged interviews, consent of the informant was the primary thing I had appealed to. I explained the focus and the significance of this study both through the phone and in emails before meeting face-to-face with informants and also once more before starting the interview. Yet, I was also rejected by some after these explanations, either by leaving the email or call unanswered or by an explanation of their lack of free time. In fact, lack of time was a decisive factor during this study regarding women's occupied lives. Some informants were employed. However, time was also a significant factor for non-employed women regarding their occupied schedule by reason of going to courses, attending some foundational activities, *güns* but more importantly for their business related to familial needs, such as carrying children to activities or *dershanes*, studying with them or preparing for the night when their husbands or children come back from work or school. In this respect, except for the employed women with whom I interviewed in their offices, most of the interviews were conducted during the day, around eleven o'clock in the morning, which corresponds to the time when most women relax and drink coffee. The only interview conducted at night was during Ramadan when the informant invited me to her house during hours when her

husband was leaving to go to mosque for *terawih prayer*<sup>14</sup>. Most of the interviews took place in informants' houses, but, in relation to some informants' abstention, several interviews also took place in locations suggested by the informants themselves.

Reflexivity and ethical issues are a concern of every researcher doing ethnographical analysis regarding the embedded, thus indispensable, power relation within each study. Being a researcher with a secular habitus, unavoidably traceable either through my behaviors or the daily language I was using, had been a significant factor throughout the field study. In order to minimize any effects at first appearance, I tried to dress as neutral as I could, as an ordinary student without any symbolic claims. On the other hand, feminist ethnographic methods have also been stimulating in this respect regarding their emphasis put on co-construction of knowledge and the importance of rendering the interviewer's values and opinions explicitly in order to not exploit informants' contribution through a researcher gaze (Heyl, 2007; Skeggs, 2007). So, with the purpose of removing the role of the interviewer role as best as I could, I tried to render each interview as a conversation which I contributed to with a certain sensibility so as to not disturb the flow of conversation. Regardless of my intention, I had been attributed the role of a knowledgeable person in relation to the subject of my study and my educational background. It was interesting to see that while informants were not that much interested in the Galatasaray University, from which I had taken my BA degree, mentioning of my current studies in Boğaziçi University created a significant change in informants' attitudes. The widespread acknowledgement of Boğaziçi University as the best in Turkey and its libertarian attitudes towards religious segments of the society, whereas Galatasaray University's

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<sup>14</sup> It is a praying practice done every night during Ramadan.

historical association with Francophone influences on Turkey's secularist elites, might have played a role in such manners. Mothers' curiosity about my past educational experiences and my share of experiences with them was an important occasion creating a sense of confidence between me and informants, and it was also beneficial in shattering the judgmental manner I could have been attributed as a researcher.

Aside from educational issues, "women's talk" (Devault, 1990) was also another factor rendering the interviews more reciprocal and sincere. Womenhood had become an important ground of experience sharing. Most of the informants had become more talkative around subjects like marriage, having a baby or the possibility of continuing a professional career while founding a family etc. In most of the interviews, this kind of sharing created a joyous ambiance, and in multiple interviews informants offered me another coffee to continue our conversation.

These intimacies also played an important role in my way of conducting the interview. At the beginning of the field study, I had been much more timid and hesitant, trying to find the true and ethical way to address the informants. However, as underlined by Crang and Cook (2007, p.32), aside from the official ethical rules attainable from scholarly literature, the boundaries of what is ethical was also something I had discerned through small encounters during time passed in the field. So, within the process, as I decided the line that will pull me down towards unethical conduct, I had also gained confidence in myself and could put my personality much more in the field.

Honesty was the main axis of ethics that I followed throughout the field study, both during the process of information, taking field notes and within the time I had turned them into academic language. I cannot say that I was 100% ethical in this

process, which I think is impossible, at least within the turn of reality into representations of the study. However, I may say that I tried to be respectful, honest and sincere as much as was possible with the informants. I tried to constantly remind myself of my own position in the study and of the responsibility I had undertaken through all the intimacies I had been a part of during field work.

### 1.5 Organization of the thesis

In the following chapter, the historical background giving rise to the conservative bourgeoisie and the impact of changing structural dynamics on the field of education will be reviewed. Then, the current situation in the field of education will be analyzed with a certain attention paid to the educational politics of the AKP regime. In the final part, the field of private education will be examined through schools that put forward conservative values in their self-presentation.

The self-positioning of conservative groups as a bourgeois class within the social field, and their performance of both their similitudes and differences in relation to secular bourgeoisie, will set the focus of the third chapter. To that end, in the first section, the transformations taking place within the lifestyles of conservative families will be compared to those of the previous generation. In the second section, the impact of social mobility on families' parenting practices, and their changing educational strategies, will be examined by paying attention to the gendered division of labor concerning educational issues.

In the final chapter, the class-based fragmentations taking place among conservative segments of society will be questioned through families' diverging patterns of distinction. In this respect, tastes and aesthetics will set the focal point of the first section. In the second section, conversion of morality into demands within

the field of education and thus conservative families' impact on the transformation taking place within the field will be investigated.

#### 1.6 Time frame of the study

Before moving on into analysis, it is crucial to mark the boundaries and the time frame of this study regarding its significance in relation to sensitive events that took place in the country recently. The field study of this research was started in October 2014 and ended in February 2016. It is a time period during which the controversy between the *Cemaat*<sup>15</sup> (“community”) and the government had been apparent and was subjected to public discussions. Further, serious operations were being conducted by the government against schools and dormitories having connections with the *Cemaat*, especially in the Anatolian cities. The closure of *dershanes* was the most explicit intervention of the government, inciting tangible effects in people's lives. However, even though I got the sense that a certain segregation was taking place among families recently, like pro-government families removing their children from the institutions of *Cemaat*, it was not possible to talk about a clear-cut demarcation line between pro-government and pro-*Cemaat* families in terms of their educational strategies. Moreover, regardless of their affiliations with different communitarian networks, it was obvious that the educational institutions of *Cemaat* were highly favored among conservative groups of society, either to send their children to their schools or to their *dershanes*. In this respect, regarding the weight of the political factors playing a role in this controversy and furthering its restrictive

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<sup>15</sup> *Cemaat* is a politico- religious community established around Fetullah Gulen, a former imam who operated during the 1960s. Within decades, the community had extended throughout the country and had reached an international level. Balkan states and Turkic Republics became the locus of the community's missionary activities, especially through educational institutions.

impact in the field within the framework of this study, the issue of Cemaat-government struggle is considered out of the scope of this thesis.

Additionally, regarding the course of events taking place after 15 July 2016 attempted coup d'état, this study had already become a historical one. Since, on one hand, there is a serious transformation taking place among the conservative bourgeoisie, because the followers of *Cemaat* constituted a considerable part of it. What is more important is that a great number of schools possessed by pro-*Cemaat* actors were closed by the government, which caused a serious change in numbers presented in the second chapter concerning schools with conservative identities. In this respect, considering the time frame of the thesis is crucial for the consistency of the findings discussed in the following chapters.

## CHAPTER 2

### THE RISE OF CONSERVATIVE BOURGEOISIE AND THE CONTESTED FIELD OF EDUCATION

The National Education Council is a consultative committee responsible for examining policies and their function within the field of education and to develop suggestions in this respect for the Ministry. Along with the participation of the Minister of Education and several other state actors, such as vice ministers or secretaries as ordinary members, the General Secretary invites a number of other participants to each Council under minister's confirmation, such as ministry representatives, state institutions and organizations, private sector representatives, press, syndicates, representatives from students and parents, NGOs and specialists. Since the foundation of the republic, there have been nineteen Education Councils, each one giving significant clues about the period's social, political and economic structure and about the formation process of educative policies in this respect.

Within the last Council, which took place in between 2-6 December 2014, there were four main topics discussed: course schedules and weekly course programs, raising the quality of the teacher, raising the quality of the administrator and the school security. However, the presentation of the council in the opening speech made by the president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and the discussions that took place afterwards, were striking in terms of the featured discussions of the council and the prominent topics perceived as worthy to debate on among society.

In his opening speech ("Erdoğan Eğitim Şurası'nda konuştu", 2014), President Erdoğan identified the council as the place where the current problems concerning the field of education would be solved and also as a milestone that will

render the future generation more confident. His following words give further ideas about what he meant by the word confidence:

If you ask “Who is Einstein?” every young person has something to say. If you ask “Who is Ibn-i Sina?” most of them are unaware of him. We have students who can count the names of foreign pop stars by heart, but who feel ashamed to listen to Neşet Ertaş. We have some youngsters who are embarrassed of their ancestors’ words. We have some youngsters who imitate other cultures’ clothes and lifestyles. We cannot question these youngsters. They shall listen to Beethoven, but they should know about İtri or Dede Efendi. We should implement a curriculum that instills self-confidence not frustration. The one that imitates, the one that follows is the one that lags behind. We will be, and stay as ourselves with our own civilization and historical accumulation. (see Appendix D, 2.)

Raising a future generation well-equipped with global scientific, technological and cultural knowledge; but at the same time conscious of its own geography, history and values is what his speech was all about. It is as well the line through which the current government has been putting forth the characteristics of its legitimate citizen, and, in this respect, differentiating it from the one envisaged by the western oriented- secular hegemony. He concluded his speech with a special emphasis put on the power of education in creating a new generation by saying that “These mentioned problems will be defeated by procuring a lifestyle starting from the kindergarten level” (“Erdoğan Eğitim Şurası’nda konuştu”, 2014).

After the Council, despite the fact that there were a lot more topics to be discussed, many of them much more engaged with professional concerns about education such as its quality, productivity and sustainability, it was these following ones which gained wide media attention: Religion courses becoming obligatory starting from the primary grade, the removal of alcoholic drinks and cocktails course given in vocational tourism schools, discussions on segregated schools between girls

and boys etc. Moreover, the debate on *Osmanlıca*<sup>16</sup> as an elective course in high schools and obligatory in *imam-hatip* schools had come to the fore within the period with the opposition party<sup>17</sup> leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu's critique against the decision given in the council. He qualified these attempts as a step towards the "darkness of the medieval world" (Kılıçdaroğlu'ndan Erdoğan'a Hülya Avşar'lı yanıt, 2014), and challenged the purpose of it by asking whether the students will be taught *Osmanlıca* in order to read tombstones. In reply, the prime minister of the period Ahmet Davutoğlu made his statement as (AİHM kararına uygun karar verilmesini bekliyoruz, 2014):

A generation who cannot read its tombstones cannot know its own history. Unfortunately, there was not one another thing left from your one-party period except from these tombstones ... It is not something coming from the darkness of the medieval age as they indicate. I do not understand this allergy against *Osmanlıca*... [By indicating the tombs] They are the deeds of these lands. Yet, not just these lands', they are also deeds of Skopje, of Sarajevo ... These people should go, there are those tombstones next to martyrs in Bagdad, and in Damascus ... A German intellectual, a German or a British Parliamentarian, may read a text from 100 years ago. Well, can you read the texts of the first assembly? You cannot. Is not this a weakness? (see Appendix D, 3.)

It had already been underlined that the field of education is one of the preliminary grounds by which nation states raise their legitimate citizens. On that account, the field had always been politically charged. When the transformation taking place in the society within the last decades is considered, and the rise of a bourgeois class is embraced as the primary trigger of change by "creating a world after its own image" (Marx & Engels, 2004, p.8), this chargedness gains further significance. Since

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<sup>16</sup> A language which also known as Ottoman Turkish. It was in the Ottoman Empire and the related geographies from thirteenth century to twentieth century. It was highly influenced from Arabic and Persian languages.

<sup>17</sup> The Republican People's Party is the name of the opposition party in Turkey, which had been founded by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in the primary years of the Republic and which had carried out the modernization reforms of Turkey. The party had always been the representative organ of the secular segments of the society with western lifestyles and its related values.

the foundation of the republic, the Kemalist, westernized secular hegemony had never been challenged as much as it had been since the rise of the conservative bourgeoisie regarding their transformative claims on the building dynamics of social structure, the cultural ethos in the first place. That is the same point which Bourdieu accentuates in saying that the main purpose of the struggle between dominant groups in the social field is to be able to define the legitimate “visions and divisions” (Bourdieu, 1985, p.726) in this world, and thus to create a world compatible with its own interests.

The turn of the discussion about an elective course into a striking ideological debate among dominant bourgeois segments of the society should be embraced within this frame. The imagined geographical boundaries of the nation, the social construction of the history, the legitimate language of the country and the prized culture and lifestyle to be embraced, all become symbolic aspects in this respect by which these groups struggle to give shape to the field, and hence to the society at large.

This chapter will engage with this prominent role of the field of education as a ground on which the interests of different groups of society continuously clash. In this respect, the chapter is divided into three parts. In the first section, the rise of the conservative bourgeoisie will be elaborated on a historical ground and the impact of these changing dynamics over the field of education will be analyzed respectively. In the second part, AKP’s positioning within the field of education will be examined through an analysis of salient politics developed since the party’s rise in power. Remarkable declarations coming from state authorities will also be considered in this respect. In the last part, as regards to the changing demands coming from the rising bourgeoisie and their increasing articulation with the capitalist market, the transformation taking place within the field of private education will be analyzed.

Within this scope, whether and how a conservative identity is becoming a part of an educational approach will be examined through schools who drive forward their conservative identity in their educational approach.

## 2.1 A historical glance to the rise of conservative bourgeoisie

In Turkey, the definition of the term bourgeoisie itself is also a contested field regarding the intertwinement of cultural and economic features playing role in its identification process. Is it possible to talk about a rising bourgeois class, borne from the contentious relations between social forces, as seen in Western countries? Or, is it produced in a top-down way by force of the Kemalist regime and defined primarily through its cultural attributes? Is it the conservative bourgeoisie who is the real bourgeois class, as it was implied by Erol Yazar- the ex-president of MUSIAD- by making reference to the artificiality of the Republican secular bourgeoisie (Gerçek burjuva sınıfı biziz, 2009)? Within this frame, it is necessary to review the formation of a bourgeois class in Turkey and then the rise of conservative bourgeoisie in this respect.

Going back in time, one encounters that during the Ottoman Empire, a land owning, interest-seeking bourgeois class was missing. Since all the land was the propriety of the Sultan, and since it was given to serfs (*kul*) for the temporary usage without any rights of inheritance, the opportunity of development of a bourgeois class was also very limited. Especially the *devşirme* (“recruitment”) system<sup>18</sup>, established in the fourteenth century and which continued into the eighteenth

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<sup>18</sup> *Devşirme* system is a policy used by the Ottoman Empire to gather the talented non-Muslim young men from the conquered territories to convert them to Islam, to educate them and put them in the top administrative and military offices in order to create a loyal servant group dependent on the Sultan and hence to prevent the rise of a Muslim power group (Ahmad, 2007, p.29)

century, played a considerable role in hindering local authorities' evolution into a bourgeois class (Ahmad, 1993/2007).

From the eighteenth century onwards, a series of reforms took place, especially within the Tanzimat Era to modernize institutions and to cope with the dominance of the military technology of Western countries (Ahmad, 2007, p.39). The military, finance and education were set as the primary fields of reform. With the rising Western influences, two groups arose in the period in terms of the middle class: on one hand, there was the rising western-influenced bureaucratic class dwelling in big cities and educated in modernized institutions (Zürcher, 1993/2000). On the other hand, the commercial demand of European merchants had also created a non-Muslim bourgeois class in central cities, positioning themselves as intermediaries between foreign demand and local producers (Akşin, 2009, p.33). It is the socioeconomic and cultural gap between this double-headed bourgeois-like segment of the society and the Anatolian folk, which Mardin (1973) evaluates through a center-periphery paradigm. He interprets these "modernization" reforms of the late Ottoman period, which appear as centralization, westernization and secularization, as the components which deepened the gap and which also left Islam as the periphery's cement of culture.

In contrast to modernist history writings narrating a linear homogeneous process of modernization in terms of a rising Westernization wave starting from Tanzimat, the period of Sultan Abdulhamid II, known as the *Hamidiye* period, marks a rupture regarding the attempts in that period to reconfigure modernization in coherence with the Islamic values dominant in society. Throughout the period, religion was not taken as something contradictory to emerging modernist ideals within the empire. During the *Hamidiye* period, centralization was an important step

taken intending the articulation of periphery with the center and thus the emergence of an Ottomanist unity. The expansion of schooling within the empire (Akşin, 2009; Lewis, 1968) and the construction of railroads (Zürcher, 2000, p.118) were the two outstanding services of the centralizing regime, which will be elaborated in more detail afterwards. However, the turn of Islamic discourse into Pan-Islamist politics and strict control over the means of communication in order to suppress ideological discussions were evaluated as the motives for the rise of the opposition group named Young Turks (Ahmad, 2007, p.43; Zürcher, 2000, p.119;). This group, which later organized around the Union and Progress Party had taken control of the government in 1908 and reestablished a Constitutional Monarchy.

After the 1908 Young Turk revolution, and the restoration of the Constitutional Monarchy, the empire stepped into a new period where clashing opinions stimulated considerably pluralist public debates. Within this period, three currents of thought, i.e. Pan-Islamism, Pan-Turkism and Ottomanism, had all agreed upon the need for modernization, but it was the way leading to it that separated them apart (Berkes, 2002, p.439; Zürcher, 2000, p.186). In the course of events, with their top down approach to modernization, The Committee of Union and Progress (İTC), gained power within the parliament, and their the pan-Turkism ideology played the leading role in the establishment of the new state based on nation.

The new Republic was founded in 1923 and until 1950s the country was governed by the One Party Regime of Republican People's Party, during which laicism and nationalism constituted the main ideals upon which new power relations of the nation were constructed. The approach of the government to religion may be defined as creating a public sphere deprived of any religious implications and rendering religion an issue of the private realm, hence separating religion and state.

The abolition of the sultanate (1922) and caliphate (1924), adoption of Swiss civil and Italian penal codes and the abolition of sheikh al-Islam may be counted along the same lines. However, this is a definition that seems stuck within the boundaries of the discursive realm when one considers the control-oriented approach of the government in practice toward religion. In the first place, the foundation of the Directorate of Religious Affairs and Directorate General of Pious Foundations in 1924 should be taken into consideration. Friday sermons given by imams (preachers) assigned by Directorate of Religious Affairs was an effective way used in this respect for increasing national consciousness of society through official Islam (Davison, 1998). Moreover, the hat law of 1925, the adoption of the Latin alphabet and western unit of measures, the ban of religious dressing in public sphere, the interdiction of religious monasteries (*tekke, zaviye*) and the shift in language of azan from Arabic to Turkish are some of the examples which marks the regime's attempt to reconfigure the role of Islam, not just in public, but also in the very core aspects of its citizens' private realm.

The question of secularism constitutes a hot debate regarding the positivist orientation of the Kemalist regime that aims to rationalize and dominate the entire social life and create an enlightened form of Islam constrained in the private sphere (Yavuz, 2003a, p. 146). The Turkish secularism influenced by the French *laïcité* is generally described as a form which not just separates the realms of religion and state, but also recognizes a public sphere clarified from any kind of religious symbolism. There are various appellations of this form of French secularism such as “assertive secularism” (Kuru, 2009, p.12) or “strict separation model” (Tepe, 2008, p.66) in opposition to American form of “passive secularism” (Kuru, 2009, p.12) or “accommodationist model” (Tepe, 2008, p.67) that enables the visibility of religion

within the public sphere. However, as underlined by Tepe this kind of prototypic nomenclatures should run the risk of missing out certain aspects of daily social life in which the secular wall of separation of religion and state become highly permeable giving way to creative bargains in between (Tepe, 2008, p.70)

This statist and centralist attitude was also highly vivid in the economic reforms of the regime inspired to a large extent from the Young Turk framework, which is defined by Akşin as a “bourgeois ideology” (Akşin, 2009, p.135). However, according to Çağlar Keyder, the limited degree of bourgeois culture developed in the last years of the Ottoman empire, mostly within the hands of non-Musulman merchants of the period, had relatively disappeared within the first few years of the republic, regarding the decrease in the population of non-Musulman citizens after the wars, the population exchanges, the Armenian genocide and the lack of experience in organizational abilities of Turkish merchants (Keyder, 2011, p.101). Along with such loss, the preliminary goal of the regime was to establish an independent economy of an independent nation. In this respect, organization of İzmir Economic Congress, foundation of a national bank (Türkiye İş Bankası), Industry of Incentive Law may be counted as the prominent steps taken by the government in the economic field (Ahmad, 2007, p.119). However, with the turn of politics to a statist axis after the 1929 Global Crisis, such efforts taken by the regime in order to create a national bourgeoisie as seen in Western countries, turned into a closed system by which a certain group of the society could benefit. Keyder reads such change in policy as an outcome of the lack of contentious relations with pre-capitalist forces, such as landed feudal proprietors, procuring a deficiency in political liberalism in the society at large. In that regard, he implies that the “social class” status of the new bourgeoisie was highly dependent on the state’s tutelage rather than a gain as a consequence of

negotiations with various social forces (Keyder, 2011, p.242). The statist economic policy of the regime and the favoritism towards bureaucrats and industrialists is generally criticized as the center's elitist and monopolist positioning incapable of representing the periphery's worldview nourished by religious principles, as well as their economic interests that advocate for free market policies.

The break of continuity with the past and the control of the role of Islam within society constitute two preliminary aspects of criticisms raised against ongoing top-down reforms in the new republic. Keyder's remark on the disjuncture between the rising bourgeoisie and the peripheral forces in creating a national free market economy is extended by Zürcher to other aspects of the Kemalist project, as its failure to accomplish an efficient socioeconomic revolution in spite of all the reforms realized; and it is mostly the issue of religion in social life that he is making a reference to (Zürcher, 2000, p.253). Such a remark is significant regarding the fact that, religion was the main stake which Democrat Party (DP) had set forth and succeeded in cracking the hegemony of the one party regime.

The 1950s marked a new period in the history of the republic. The post war period's global effects incited changes primarily in the economic realm and the transition to the multi-party system should be underlined as the main triggers of transformation. The Democrat Party was founded in 1946 and gained a considerable support in society in a short period of time. The populist political discourse of DP representatives, rich in religious references, had initiated certain changes in the Republican People's Party's (CHP)<sup>19</sup> orientations as well. In its seventh Congress in 1947, the CHP introduced the necessity of normalization of religious affairs by

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<sup>19</sup> It is the first political party of the Turkish Republic, founded by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. The party had governed the country in between 1923-1950, a period which is also called as One Party Regime. The party has always been known with its modernist and secularist identity and has been generally associated with Kemalist groups of the country.

introduction of voluntary religious courses in school curriculum and by opening a limited number of preacher training schools (White, 2013, p.32). However, despite of the CHP's liberalizing steps, the DP came in power in 1950. Regarding its center-right positioning, and emphasis put on a more liberal social life, the DP has generally been evaluated as the voice of the antagonist groups of the Kemalist state (Turam, 2007, p.54) and the first step that led to the development of Islamist politics. Hakan Yavuz defines the period as the "cultural Islamic movement" phase through which the seeds of Islamist political identities had been planted (Yavuz, 2003a, p.9). The change of the language of azan from Turkish to Arabic, the increase in the numbers of mosques, abolishment of the ban of religious programs in radio and reestablishment of the highly discussed *imam hatip* schools (Ahmad, 1977/2010, p.464; Zürcher, 2000, p. 339) may all be considered as the new party's endeavor in challenging the secularist reforms of the Kemalist regime.

During the DP regime, the circulation of religious publications and broadcasting of religious programs gave rise to an Islamist consciousness and to the expansion of religious groups (Yavuz, 2003a, p.61). In conjunction with these developments in social and cultural life, the Marshall Plan of USA introduced at the end of the Second World War initiated a mechanization in agriculture and gave primacy to highway constructions instead of railways of the Kemalist regime (Keyder, 2011, p. 149). According to Çınar, by prioritizing economic and technological development and thus creating a shift in defining "modernization", the Democrat Party regime shifted the meaning of the West from Europe to USA(Çınar, 2005, p.6), which also means a more liberal attitude. In relation to the economic problems in the second half of the 1950s regarding international conjuncture and the disadvantages of climate change, the DP's liberal economic policy gave way to a

more statist appearance (Ahmad, 2010, p.101). Plus, regarding the rising level of populism, intellectuals and industrialists withdrew their support for the party towards the end of 1950s (Keyder, 2011, p.176). In 27 May 1960, the military-which always had organic connections with Kemalist bureaucrats (Ahmad, 2010, p. 188) - took control of the state by a coup d'état. The ongoing dead-end struggle between opposing parties and the government's antidemocratic applications "betraying Kemalist principles" were underlined as the justification of the militarist intervention (Ahmad, 2010, p.207, own translation).

Even though the 1960s' political atmosphere reemphasized the role of the state, especially in the economic realm by the implementation of import substitution industrialization policy, the bureaucrats lost their central status (Keyder, 2011, p. 177). Together with the deeply libertarian 1961 Constitution in terms of religion and belief, Islamist thoughts had the opportunity to develop into organizational forms (Yankaya, 2013/2014, p 62). As a consequence, the 1970s witnessed the first steps of Islamist thought in the political arena with the foundation of Necmettin Erbakan's Milli Nizamet Partisi (MNP), namely National Order Party. Even though the party had been closed by the 1971 militarist intervention, it reorganized into a new party named National Salvation Party (MSP). Together with MNP, Necmettin Erbakan established the Islamist movement's ideological path known as *Milli Görüş* ("National Outlook"). Influenced by the radical ideological approaches of Hasan El Banna, Ali Şeriati, Said Qutb and Mawdudi (Yankaya, 2014, p.63), this line of thinking designated a framework nourished by nationalism and Islamism that underlined the importance of a non-Western type of development depending upon industry.

Apart from the rise of political Islam gathered around the *Milli Görüş* movement, the 1970s were also marked by the ongoing struggles between rightist and leftist groups. In addition to these ideological confrontations, the oil crisis towards the end of the decade and the implication of harsh IMF programs led to another coup d'état on 12 September 1980 (Yavuz, 2003a, p. 87). Starting from the 1980s, Turkish history experienced a grand transformation period not just in economic, but also in the social and cultural realms of society, giving rise to enormous changes in twenty years of time.

The 1980 coup d'état, the 1982 Constitution and the following center-right Motherland Party (ANAP)'s rise to power turned the course of events in a new direction. The liberalization of the economy, introduction of market forces, and the rise of privatizations under the new neoliberal regime paved the way for a massive reconfiguration of the established power relations, from which small and medium sized enterprises from Anatolian cities benefited in a considerable way. Anatolian Tigers was the popular name used to identify these rising groups, which were also known for their conservative character (Öztürk, 2013, p.196; Yankaya, 2014, p.77). Together with the rise of Islamic financial institutions self-organizing according to Islamic principles, and therefore rejecting the use of interest, not just the economy within the religious segment of society was activated, but also the capital of the Gulf and Arab countries was attracted within the period (Savran, 2013, p.79; Tanyılmaz, 2013, p.156). In conjunction with the liberalizing wave of the period, the public sphere was extended with the increasing visibility of religion. The Prime Minister Turgut Özal was a figure known for his close relations with religious communities and conservative segments of society. The reformulation of national identity under the title of "Turkish-Islamic Synthesis" set religion as the new cement of the nation.

By courtesy of the privatization of mass media enabling Islamist intellectuals channels of self-disclosure, and by the expansion of civil society through associations and NGOs (Göle 1997, p.47), pious segments of society started to gain power and visibility in social and intellectual life. This, on the other hand, promoted the legitimization of religious communities within the national consciousness (Yankaya, 2014, p.85, Yavuz, 2003a, p.34). Regarding this widespread transformation, the rise of a “counter elite” capable of challenging the Kemalist establishment of the existing bourgeoisie started to be discussed (Göle, 1997).

Towards the end of the twentieth century, the rise of Islamic publishers, radio and TV channels, pious schools and dormitories, mosques and Quranic courses (Yavuz, 2003a, p.71) coupled with the activation of solidarist religious networks (Çavdar, 2013, p. 55) expedited the proliferation of Islamist thought within society. The foundation of MUSIAD in 1990 as an alternative to TUSIAD was also symbolic in terms of the materialization of the rising conservative capitalists group’s weight in the economy. Since then, MUSIAD has been presenting itself as the representative organization seeking the interest of mostly Anatolian small and medium sized enterprises in opposition to the big industrialist investment groups of the old elite (Buğra, 1998; Yankaya, 2014).

The victory of political Islam, with Erbakan’s Welfare Party’s (RP) unexpected level of success in the 1994 elections, left its mark on the nineties. Until then, radical Islamist rhetoric could not have gained such an extended base in politics (Turam, 2007, p.59). RP’s party program “Just Order” had an anti-Western and anti-liberal discourse, accompanied by a strong alliance with the urban poor through a social justice platform (Çavdar, 2013, p.9). This, on the other hand, increased left wing support for the party, whose voice had been diminishing since the 1980s

(White, 2003, p.127). Facing this germination, the social field also witnessed the consolidation of an opposing Kemalist identity performed by flags, badges and Atatürk portraits (Navarro-Yashin, 2002; Özyürek, 2006).

According to Çınar (2005), the RP regime created a modernization project as much as the Kemalist regime did in the first half of the century regarding the reconfiguration of bodies, places and time for a “better” future. Praising consciously faithful women, whose image was represented by *tesettür* (“veiling”), reorganizing the urban space according to Islamic principles such as non-alcoholic restaurants or a mosque project in the Taksim square and reformulating the historical thesis of the Kemalist regime as regards the Ottoman past of the nation, may be counted within this modernist project.

Since the public sphere had been identified by the secular state as religion-free, this Islamic upsurge and the rising visibility of Islamic lifestyles within the public sphere brought along a remarkable repositioning process of agents within the social field. Alongside this transformation, which can be explained *grosso modo* as the establishment process of Islamic actors in contrast to Kemalists, a certain fractionation also occurred within the Islamic segment itself. Göle interprets such a shift with the following words: “Islamists are republicans’ contra-elites but at the same time elites of their own followers” (Gole, 2011, p.111). Concerning the profile of this new elite group, it is seen that they mostly originated from migrated conservative families who benefited from the 1980’s social mobility channels thanks to secular mass education opportunities and who developed their intellectual mindset mostly from alternative channels such as religious publications, broadcasts, and social networks. The radical movement’s establishment within the system was underlined by Göle (2011, p.111) as a process of shifting premises. For instance, the

rising appearance of Erbakan with his luxurious high class taste in his vestments and his son's wedding ceremony in Sheraton Hotel (Çınar, 2005, p.88-89) triggered doubts about the party's radical attitude. The *tesettür* fashion shows of the period, rising consumerism marked by Islamic lines and the rising visibility of pious people within concert halls and cultural activities (Navarro-Yashin, 2002, p.78-115) was evaluated as the Islamist movement's embourgeoisement process (Göle, 1997; Tuğal, 2011, p.90). In relation to these concerns, and Erbakan's image as a pragmatist keeping radicals in control and reaping the fruits of power (White, 2003, p.134) the period had been interpreted as the failure of the Islamist movement and the rise of a pious middle class (Tuğal, 2011, p.90; Yankaya, 2014, p.107).

Whether successful in transferring the radical premises in practice or not, Islam had increased its place, or its visibility, in the daily life of society at large throughout the nineties. In return, the empowerment of Islam had been anxiously encountered by the secular segment of society for the reason of radicalism's menace to the pillars of the republic. Media's role in developing this public opinion should not be overlooked since religious sects' secret meetings, their rites and Islamist women's struggle with police to enter in universities without taking off their headscarves were the most frequently viewed scenes and the most heatedly discussed issues of the period (Bali, 2002, p.194-202). Within this context, 28 February decisions, known as a post- modern coup d'état declared by National Security Council, the following "action plan against reactionary forces", Erbakan's resignation and closure of the Welfare Party occurred as a sequence of events devastating the already unsettled balances of the country (Cizre- Sakallıoğlu and Çınar, 2003; Ozgur, 2012). Soon after these decisions, Persuasion Chambers for convincing women to take off their headscarves were created, academics and

military officers known for their Islamist identities were suspended from their jobs, the controls over religious sects rose remarkably. The February decisions had its most efficient effect within the field of education, which had always been the precious ground of the Kemalist regime in raising new citizens of the government. In the course of such contentions, the direction of Islamist movement arrived into a crossroads, either to struggle within the following Virtue Party or to take on a new road. The latter choice guided the way and The Justice and Development Party founded by the once pro-democratic, moderate and neoliberal, reformist young members of the Virtue Party won the elections in 2002 and has been governing the country since.

## 2.2 The field of education: A crucial site of contestation

Social life is relational in its entirety. It is impossible to extract a part of it and focus on its particularity regardless of the countless affiliation it takes part in. In this respect, it is unavoidable to see that every milestone outlined so far also induced significant breakthroughs in the field of education giving way to a certain interplay between related fields.

Within the Ottoman Empire, Islam had played the leading role in the classic education system and the popular education was mostly conducted by local religious institutions (Akşit, 1991; Somel, 2001 /2015.). In general, the education system consisted of three main school types (Kazamias; 1966, p.32; Özdalga, 1999, p.416). The first type was *mektep* (“school”) sponsored by *vakıfs* (“foundation”) in which the education was mainly about Qur’an. The second type was *medrese* (“madrasa”) that offers a wider spectrum of education: an advanced level of religious instruction was accompanied by several other courses such as grammar, logic, rhetoric etc. The main

purpose of these schools was to educate future teachers of the Palace School or of the cadre *ulema* (“the cadre of religious scholars in the Ottoman Empire”). The third type was the merit-based Palace School (*Enderun Mektebi*) founded in 1459 to raise qualified officers in the service of the Sultan and the Empire. It provided a high level of education with a large scale of courses for practical skills such as Arabic, Persian, Turkish, archery, riding, wrestling, etc. In the beginning, the school was founded to raise children coming from *devşirme* system, but afterwards it also recruited Muslim children suitable for the expectations.

The nineteenth century reformist intellectuals who played an important role in the rising modernization waves within the government were aware of the fact that a centralized educational system was one of the stakes used by Western countries to raise “legitimate citizens” and thus to establish a unity in the rising nation states (Üstel, 2011). The foundation of the first modern military schools (also the first modern educational institutions of the empire), the establishment of the Chamber of Translation in 1833 and the Ministry of Education (*Osmanlı Maarif Nezareti*) in 1857 and the preparation of an 1869 Ottoman Education Law may be counted as the outstanding steps of the period's modernization reforms in education. According to Somel, especially the 1869 law, prepared under the influence of the French minister of education Victor Duruy, was a critical reform document not just for systematizing the fragmented structure of educative institutions up to that point, but also for massing and diversifying its content with scientific courses (Somel, 2015). Against modernist Western historiography, which evaluates nineteenth century Ottoman Empire reforms as a linear modernization process leading to a secular state within the hands of the Young Turks, but which also leave out *Hamidiye* period as a religiously reactionist phase in the period, Fortna and Somel emphasizes two main

points that challenge the dichotomies constructed in these interpretations such as state-*ulema*, east-west, Islam-modernity etc. (Fortna, 2002/ 2005; Somel, 2015): On one hand, the educational policies of the modernization period never left religion out. Further, during early Tanzimat, modernization and Islam were perceived as two separate realms without any conflict in between (Somel, 2015). What changed during the *Hamidiye* period, was the attempt of turning this into a synthesis to use as a trump for challenging the rising influence of exterior forces within the empire (Fortna, 2005). To this end, Islamic norms, symbols and morality became the main constituents of the period's modernized educational policy. Rather than a weakened position in contrast to growing modern education, the *ulema* was in fact one of the primary actors in creating a synthesis of Islam and modernity (Fortna, 2005, p.33). In addition to its bonding aspect, religion was also prioritized in the period for its social disciplinization. Somel (2015) describes the character of the period with the words "aiming to arise to the sense of loyalty and submission to a central authority and perceiving education as a means of inculcation of religious and moral values." (p.25, own translation).

It is after the foundation of the Republic that an entire reformation process took place within the field of education. The regime's centralist and authoritarian approach in creating a secular modern nation had important implications within the field of education, since in line with *Hamidiye* period, education was perceived as a redemptive means. However, instead of functioning for an imaginary that amalgamates modernism with an Islamic root; it was operationalized for creating a rupture with the Islamic Ottoman past and to establish a new citizen form, which Tambar names as "institutionalized forgetting" (Tambar, 2013, p.119). Regarding the fact that fourteen ministers of education were changed between the years of 1924-

1938 (Özdalga, 1999, p.418), it goes without saying that the field was under the close scrutiny of the CHP government.

A multiplicity of schools was inherited from the empire such as *mekteps*, *medreses*, minority schools and so forth, and in order to unify and standardize them under the authority of the state, the Law on Unification of Education was enacted in 1924. In place of *medreses*, *imam hatip* schools and a faculty of theology in Istanbul University were founded to raise religious functionaries. However, these *imam hatip* schools were closed in 1930 because of a lack of demand. According to Özgür(2012), this weakness was in fact related to constraints upon these schools. For example, religious functionaries were removed from the officer status, and therefore their salaries were not paid in 1927, and the diploma from the faculty of theology was rendered as equivalent to a general high school diploma of the period. As a result, along with the troubles of the religious families in having religious education and thus raising future religious functionaries, the number of children attending Qur'an courses and illegal *medrese* courses multiplied in a short period of time (Özgür, 2012, p.35-36).

Towards the end of the 1940s, the CHP started to question its own approach to religion regarding the fact that it became one of the preliminary discourses which the DP used as a threat. Reestablishing the *imam hatip* schools was one of their election campaign promises. Founding religious courses was an attempt of the CHP to struggle with the changing atmosphere (Bozan, 2007). However, the DP won the following elections, and reestablishing the *imam hatip* schools was one of the first things realized. Plus, rather than a three year secondary school, they were restored in a long-term system of 4+3 years. In the last year of the DP's power, the High Islamic Institute was founded in addition to Theology departments. The reason for this was

that the theology departments were more prone to teach sociology and philosophy of religion, whereas the main goal of the Institute was to raise teachers for *imam hatip* schools (Ozgur, 2012, p.40).

Despite such reforms, the passage from *imam hatip* schools to university education-except from the theology department and the Institute-was still problematic during the DP regime. Despite its reformist character, the 4+3 reform allowed *imam hatip* school graduates to continue their education only in the High Islamic Institute. In that regard, two choices were possible for *imam hatip* school graduates: either they could continue in general high schools after their first four years of secondary education, or they could pass into a general high school in the last year of their three year high school program and continue their university education in any department they wanted. In fact, this latter non-formal strategy was common in those times, preventing the depreciation of *imam hatip* schools in comparison to general high schools (Özdalga, 1999, p.426)

As mentioned, in between the end of the 50s until the 1980s, two military interventions took place with the justification of conserving the integrity of the secular nation. Such a contentious political atmosphere had its repercussions within the field of education as well. Despite attempts of the provisional government after the 1960 coup d'état to close *imam hatip* schools (Bozan, 2007), the 1970s changed the course of events. For instance, within the first few months of the 1971 military intervention, the first four years of *imam hatip* school programs were closed and pressures rose to prevent graduates' entrance into university. As a result, the number of students decreased in 1972-1973(Özdalga, 1999, p.426). However, with pious MSP's rise in power as a coalition partner of CHP, not just the old program was reinstated, but, also with the 1974 legislation, these schools were equated with

general high schools. Non-religious courses were increased, and their names were changed from *imam hatip* schools to *imam hatip* high schools. Additionally, girls started to be accepted into these schools, which according to Ozgur, marks an important symbolic step, implying schools' rising postgraduate opportunities since girls cannot be imams or preachers in Islam (Ozgur, 2012, p. 46). Such an atmosphere of transformation, and the rise and comprehensiveness of religious schools, is interpreted by Tuğal as a critical point in Islamist politics regarding the schools' alumni's increasing impact on intellectual life, starting to challenge the leftist hegemony in socio-cultural realms (Tuğal, 2013, p.115)

As previously mentioned, the 1980s marked a turning point in the future of society with the emphasis put on the Turkish-Islamic synthesis as the new cement of the nation. Along with the rising legitimization of Islamic practices within the public sphere, the field of education was reshaped respectively. It was during this period when religious courses became compulsory in all educational levels. High Islamic Institutes were transformed into faculties of theology, and their numbers multiplied swiftly in the following two decades. Moreover, after the rise to power of the Motherland Party, Anatolian *imam hatip* high schools were founded in order to educate religious officers competent in foreign languages, which opened to them the gate of working abroad (Ozgur, 2012, p.49). As a result, the already increasing interest of the population towards *imam hatip* schools multiplied in a significant way: the rise of students attending *imam hatip* schools increased at the rate of 45% between 1980 and 1990 (Bozan, 2007, p.19). On the other hand, the liberalization waves of the period also created a field of private education in which pious entrepreneurs started to take place gradually.

Such policy changes, along with the rising Islamist movement during the 1990s in relation to the RP's rise in power, were seen by secularist groups as a threat to the main principle of the republic, laicism in other words. In the aftermath of the post-modern military intervention in 28 February 1997, 15<sup>th</sup> National Education Council marked the turning point in the trajectory of the Islamic movement in Turkey. During the council, the expansion of compulsory education from five to eight years was discussed, which implied in the background the closure of the middle school sections (six to eight grades) of the *imam hatip* high schools. Secondly, by the implementation of the coefficient system, the chance of vocational school graduates' - and hence *imam hatip lisesi* graduates'-entrance in university was obstructed. In fact, 28 February project is a clear sign of education's role in social transformation, thus its political power; since school, as an important field of socialization, was always seen as an inherent threat to the state hegemony throughout the history. By opposing modernist theories, which attribute to the field of education a magical power in producing a uniform type of citizen entirely conformed to the state's ideology, Fortna (2005) accentuates how the field of education has always been the ground that gave rise to its self-destructive forces. In this respect, the 28 February intervention may be interpreted as a strategic move of the secularist forces in order to reestablish the Kemalist-secularist hegemony, which had been quite dominant until the rise of critiques raised by both religious and ethnic groups of the country.

### 2.3 Akp's Positioning Within the field of education

Commercialization and Islamization of education were the two main questions raised in relation to the AKP's education policies since its rise to power. The field of

education has always been a site of contention; however its politically charged character had been in upheaval since the 28 February decisions. Moreover, since the bond connecting the founders of the party had been the *imam hatip* schools, their sensibility on the issue had been raised in their discourses and was perceived by secular groups as the foreshadowing of a religionizing educational field.

Six ministers of education have been changed since the AKP's rise to power, the last one in June 2016. Rather than a well-established politics of education passing from one minister to another, diversified modalities have been observed in between. In an article entitled "What does the AKP's Educational Policy evolve towards?" Aytuğ Şaşmaz (2013) marks a shift in the party's educational policies, taking 2011 as a turning point. Regarding the first period, he concludes that despite the attracting role of religious education in party leaders' discourses, such an attempt at favoring religion in the educative realm could not be read from the policies applied. Rather than religion, it was mostly the international organizations such as OECD and EU; and the suggestions of NGOs' that oriented the policies of the period. Raising disadvantaged groups' access to education, dissemination of preschool education and changes in the curriculum may be thought of as examples within the period.

According to Şaşmaz (Şaşmaz, 2013), the role of religion within the educational field rose after 2011, along with the increasing role of the government in policy making in place of independent organizations. Especially, the ministry of Ömer Dinçer gave way to an enormous change in the established cadres. FATİH PROJECT<sup>20</sup> and 4+4+4 law should be embraced as the preliminary interventions of

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<sup>20</sup> FATİH is the abbreviation of the name "Movement to Increase Opportunities and Technology". It is also a symbolically charged name since it is the name of the Ottoman Sultan who conquered Istanbul and thus played the leading role in the actualization of one of Prophet Mohammed's hadiths. That is also why Fatih Sultan Mehmet has always been a salient name for conservative groups in Turkey.

his period, breeding wide media coverage regarding the discussions taking place.

The FATİH project was presented by the government as a step towards an "information society" and as a way of introducing information technologies within the education system; both for students and teachers. The importance of this project was stated by the president Erdoğan as follows (Emiroğlu, 2012):

By conquering Istanbul, Fatih Sultan Mehmet had put an end to dark ages, to the Middle Ages ... initiated a new era. Likewise today, together with the Fatih Project, we are closing one era and opening a new one altogether, the era of information and technologies, not just in the education system but also in every field in which education takes place. (see Appendix D, 4.)

The 4+4+4 law refers to the reestablishment process of levels in the education system, which have been the most repercussive educational policy within the last years. The reasons necessitating such a transformative legal intervention were explained by the government as extending the time of compulsory education, staging educational levels and democratization/flexibility of the field thanks to the introduction of new elective courses. The proposed law gave way to massive repercussions and protests, especially from scholars, educational specialists and civil society delegates (İstanbul'da "4 4 4" protestosu, 2012) and the critical voices raised by opponent media organs heated up the discussion. The introduced elective courses starting from middle schools were criticized for inculcating religious ideology in children regarding their contents (Qur'an, the life of Prophet Mohammed)(Dindar Nesil 4+4+4 sistemi ile yetiŖecek, 2012). Secondly, the staging of school levels were criticized for forcing children to begin formal education at an earlier age than the age globally recognized (Özkartal, 2012) Plus, the staging intervention was interpreted as a strategy of reestablishing the middle school levels of *imam hatip* high schools, which were closed during 28 February process (4+4+4 gerilimi, 2012). Thirdly, the regulation, which allows distant education in high schools, raised concerns for its

potential in minimalizing girls' attendance in education. Fourthly, reformulation at the beginning of students' orientation in vocational schools at an earlier age was accused of colliding with globally accepted pedagogical needs (Sak, 2012). The last too were also bombarded further for reproducing the present gender inequalities rather than reducing them (Yükseker, Gökşen & Alnaçık, 2012). Soon after the outbreak of these disputes, the president of the period Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's responded to the opposing party leader by saying, "We are going to raise a pious generation. Do you wait from a party with a conservative-democrat identity to raise an atheist generation"<sup>21</sup> scaled up the heat of the ongoing contentions (Dindar gençlik yetiştireceğiz, 2012).

Even though vocational schools at large were central in the changes envisaged by the reform, it was the question of religion that stroked up the discussions. Of course, it is an outcome of the fact that religion has always been a sore spot of Turkish society. However, the persistence of the debate around the issue of religion, and the government's tendency in pursuing the debate, should likewise be thought of as more than a political strategy for animating the religious sensibilities of the voter base. The government's way of building-up the arguments has more to do with analyzing and interpreting the change of politics in the educational field since then.

The law was promoted as a crucial reform with respect to its potential in increasing the rate of schooling, but also in providing a free-diversified field of education with regards to elective demands (Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı, 2012).

Libertarianism and modernism were the two main concepts embraced by the government. In this scope, religiousness was defined by Erdoğan as a culture of

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<sup>21</sup> "Dindar bir nesil yetiştireceğiz. Muhafazakar democrat kimliği olan bir partiden ateist bir gençlik yetiştirmemizi mi bekliyorsunuz?"

libertarianism rendering one both modern and direction-oriented at the same time. (Erdoğan ‘dindar nesil’i savundu, 2012) The question here is not whether religion is compatible with liberal values but rather how religion is embraced with liberal accents and how the content of modernism is reformulated in this respect. What does it mean to be modern and oriented at the same time?

The period following the minister of education Nabi Avcı was more intriguing regarding the government’s attempts towards creating an “oriented generation”. As mentioned above, the national education council which was held in December, 2014 was a clear display of this change in direction (19. Millî Eğitim Şûrası Sona Erdi, 2014). Values education was one of the main topics in the council, covering all educational levels. Plus, during the council, the emphasis put on the conservation of “our culture”, “our civilization “and “our history” was accompanied by various suggestions to introduce "our" classical arts such as miniature, *hat* (“a Turkish decorative art of calligraphy”) , *ebru* (“A Turkish art of water marbling”), *tezhip*, and classical Turkish music in the curriculum. Such references to the Ottoman past in constructing selfhood had always been one of the main axis with which the AKP had questioned Kemalist hegemony; however, the suggestion of articulating the Ottoman past in the cultural capital was new, marking the new orientation of the regime in reformulating the following generations’ habitus configuration.

Regarding values education, the novelty manifested in the council was two-fold. In the first place, up to date, the moral education had always taken place in mass education systems in raising loyal, patriotic citizens to the nation (Kaplan, 2006; Üstel, 2011). However, during the AKP regime the content of values had been reformulated in a significant way. Secondly, rather than being submitted in a separate course, values education had always been imbedded in the curriculum at

large, or within the course of “Religious Culture and moral knowledge”. The AKP regime had initiated the reform in 2010 with a directive sent to schools by the ministry of education and a distinct course of values education had begun in the academic year of 2011-2012. Nonetheless, the carriage of this change in policy into the center of attention was the ninetieth Education Council. One month later to the council, the ministry of education sent a booklet to educational institutions to be taught in schools via seminar organizations. “Patience”, “death and beyond”, “the effect of faith in personal and social life”, “the place of faith and worship in our lives” may be counted from the titles marked in the booklet (MEB’den yeni değerler eğitimi, 2015)

The privatization policy, with the issue of religion in education, took a new road within the last years in relation to the controversy with the *Cemaat*<sup>22</sup>. The field of education has always been one of the prominent building grounds of the *Cemaat*, which Hakan Yavuz identifies as “education oriented Neo-Nur community” (Yavuz, 2003b, p.19). Further, throughout the years, the *Cemaat* had enlarged its zone of influence ranging from private Qur’an courses, *dershanes*, private schools, dormitories to colleges on a global scale<sup>23</sup>. Regarding the considerable place occupied by Gulen institutions within the private educational sector, a

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<sup>22</sup> For several years, *Cemaat* seemed to be a congruent companion to the government regarding their conservative right ideological outlook. However, as Turam(2007) indicated before the controversy, neither their organizational structure nor their activities have ever been common. In contrast to lower class profile of the AKP’s voter base, *Cemaat* was speaking of people aspiring to upward social mobility and a bourgeois lifestyle. Furthermore, according to Ruşen Çakır, it is the alliance which was surprising rather than their opposition and that as a result of the confrontation of their interests a serious conflict occurred(Uçar, 2014). Even though there is a lot more to debate on about such a critical power struggle taking place within society, it will not be discussed here since it is out of the scope of this study.

<sup>23</sup> Religion was not a part of the curriculum thought in *Cemaat* schools or *dershanes*; it is the dormitories, known as light houses, which the community approached as the place of cultivating the ethical/moral integrity of students and hence of consolidating the informal religious bond holding together their adherents(Agai, 2007; Turam, 2007).

confrontational situation with the government meant significant changes to the sector at large.

Before the appearance of the controversy in the media, the government was giving signals about the closure of *dershanes*. At the beginning, the economic power of the *dershane* sector was one of the primary stakes in the hand of the *Cemaat* as a response to such a threat. However, in relation to the rising tension, the government implemented the decision. The solution to the economic threat was the incentive package for both those who wanted to send their kids to private schools and also for investors turning their *dershanes* into private schools. By underlining the rise of privatization in schooling from 2.3 % in 2002 to 5% in 2015 and further emphasizing its nevertheless lower rate compared to OECD average of 15%, the minister of education of the time Nabi Avcı interpreted the outcome of this policy ('Özel okula giden öğrenci sayısı 1 milyonu aştı', 2015) as follows:

Our students in private schools rose 40 % in comparison to last year. That is a huge increase. Last year, there were 777.235 students going to private schools. This year it became 1.095.747. Some are now saying 'you are giving incentive for parents who may already send their children to these schools.' No, numbers are clear. Lots of parents became capable of sending their children to private schools. This is highly beneficial for middle income groups. (see Appendix D, 5.)

In fact, the field of education in Turkey has been increasingly exposed to neoliberal policies since the 1980's liberalization waves, decreasing the budget reserved for public education and rising incentives for private schools (Akkaymak & İnal, 2012; Gök, 2004). This privatization and marketization of the field, met on the other hand with the demands of the rising middle classes, satisfied their eagerness of distinction. In this regard, in place of the decreasing distinctive capacity of general high schools, super high schools and Anatolian high schools which were once the

markers of differentiation; private educational institutions, especially high schools, aroused a remarkable interest among bourgeoisie (Balkan & Rutz, 2009)

As it is seen in Table 1, a rapid privatization process is recognizable during the AKP's regime. Within 14 years, there appears an increase of 92% in the number of primary schools (the statistics were calculated by taking elementary school numbers in 2001-2002 and primary school numbers in 2014-2015 as a reference) and 250% in the number of private high schools.

Table 1. The Number of Private Schools in Turkey since the AKP's Rise in Power

	<i>Elementary School</i>		<i>High School</i>
<i>2001-2002</i>	628		460
<i>2006-2007</i>	758		696
<i>2011-2012</i>	931		885
	<i>Primary School</i>	<i>Middle School</i>	<i>High School</i>
<i>2014-2015</i>	1205	1111	1609

Source: National Education Statistics; Formal Education 2007/2008 and 2014/2015 (Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı [MEB], 2008; MEB, 2015a)

However, it is clear that private education in Turkey has stepped into a new period with the turn of *dershanes* into private schools, a policy which may be interpreted as a democratization of the private school field on the other hand. Under the circumstances, it is possible to expect a decrease in the effectiveness of having a private school diploma regarding the contraction of its rarity in this phase of private “diploma inflation” (Bourdieu, 1996b, p.143), which on the other hand may be perceived as a reason necessitating private schools to offer other dimensions to render their diploma more qualified and thus distinct from those of the others. Then, considering the field study, the significant question to pose turns out to be the ways this distinction is being carried out by schools, the ways in which they mark how they are different from the ordinary.

## 2.4 Building up the distinction through conservative private schools

The significance of the above examined historical perspective for this particular section depends on two things. First, to understand the previous power relations that gave shape to the current structure of the educational field by bearing in mind that the field of education has always been closely related with ongoing power struggles (Bourdieu, 1989/1998; Karabel, 2005; Savage, 2000). Two, for perceiving the relational positioning of actors in the field today and the symbolic aspects of their practices which are historically charged.

According to Bourdieu, a social transformation originates primarily with the failure of the current *doxic* order<sup>24</sup>. *Doxic* order-*doxa*- is the condition which he defines as a second nature within which one's expectations about the social world fits well with the objective structures of the field, creating an arbitrary sense of limits and stability within the social field at large (Bourdieu, 1977, p.164). The break in this *doxic* relation is met with the term structural *hiatus* (Bourdieu, 1984/1990a, p.163) that gives way to a context of awareness among agents (Bourdieu, 1990a, p.190) about the arbitrary character of the current structure and thus to a rising contingency within the field. The above mentioned concept synchronization arises at this point and refers to the conversion process of these field-based contingencies into a general crisis within the entire social structure (Bourdieu, 1990a, p.173).

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<sup>24</sup> The issue of social change in Bourdieu's social theory is a highly discussed topic. On one hand, it is being problematized by scholars regarding the bias given to social reproduction in his theory (Jenkins, 1992; Sewell, 1992; DiMaggio, 1979; Lash, 1993; Frangie, 2009; Willis, 1997). On the other hand, the issue of reflexivity is questioned (Reay, 2004; Crossley, 2003; Peters, 2013; Sayer, 2005) As a third approach, which also sets the approach of this study, Gorski (2013) accentuates the dialectical character of his theory, which envisages change primarily through the transformations taking place in objective structures put together with their subjective parts. In this respect, the objective and subjective parts constitute the two sides of the medallion, best summarized with the epigram "*plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose*".

Synchronization is a process where there appears an overlapping of interests of various agents, positioning homologous positions between different fields, and therefore having similar advantages from a possible detuning within the structure of the entire social field.

When the historical perspective is reconsidered in this respect, it becomes obvious that the liberalization waves of the 1950s and their acceleration throughout the 1980s have been decisive, concerning the shift emerged in the doxic order and the relevant evolution of the structural *hiatus*. Further, it may also be argued that the rise of conservative segments of society have been both the outcome and the reason of the rupture taking place within the established *doxa*. The private sphere and civil society networks seem to be significant in this respect, regarding the contingency originating from them as being a crucial field where religion banned from the public sphere could play a role in the socialization patterns of actors (Mardin, 2006; Saktanber, 2005). In parallel with this, reading the rise of conservative bourgeoisie assert itself *grosso modo* with the rise of neoliberalism in the economic realm, with the conservative-democratic vision in the politic realm and with the imagination of a religico-culturally conservative personality in the sociocultural realm. And it would not be wrong to say that this transformation took place both in relation with changing global and local structural conditions and also with conservative agents' creative projection in articulating religious sensibilities with neoliberal values.

Now, I will try to analyze the effects of these interacting causal spirals on the field of education by tracing the trajectory of private schools whose corporate identity are set forth with conservative tones. These schools will be named as conservative private schools for the rest of this study. Regarding the focus of the study, a certain limitation is made on the schools to be analyzed in order to be able to

center on those that may be on the agenda of conservative bourgeois families' educational strategies. First of all, it is the focus of this study-the bourgeois lifestyle-that requires an analysis of private schools instead of public ones (Ball;2003; Balkan and Rutz, 2009; Power, 2003). Both special education institutions and private vocational schools are excluded from the scope of this research for the same purpose: They do not meet the class-based needs of distinction. Secondly, since I intend to give a broad picture of the field, school websites provide the primary data for analysis and within this frame public schools cause trouble as their websites are featured under the Ministry's website, and shaped according to its format. This creates a problem in examining the conservativeness of public schools without making a field study in each of them separately. Whereas, there are several ways through which the conservativeness of a private school can be analyzed as it will be explained below. Apart from these, the reason for not considering private schools which were transformed from *dershanes* into schools since 2015 is that their ongoing formation process is insufficient to provide enough data for making a conclusion.

In that regard, among the 1109 private schools (primary, secondary, high schools) that were officially listed by the ministry of education last year, 303 schools had been chosen. These are in fact the branches of schools. When one looks at the school as an institution, there were 41 schools chosen, as observable in the Table 2. Within 303 schools, kindergartens are not counted since it is highly difficult to trace their institutional identities since the usage of institutional websites is not that common among kindergartens. However, with the intent of analyzing whether the schools chosen here are also interested in a kindergarten level of education or not, the kindergartens founded under the selected institutions were taken into

consideration, which corresponds to 115 schools in total (According to official statistics, there were 1149 kindergartens registered last year).

Table 2. The List of Conservative Private Schools in Istanbul<sup>25</sup>

	Established	Kindergarten	Affiliated Foundation or Company
Acıbadem Koleji	2012	Yes	Boğaziçi Eğitim Hizmetleri
Altınay Koleji	1995	Yes	N/A
Anafen Koleji	1997	Yes	Kaynak Holding
Asfa Koleji	1991	Yes	Hakyol Eğitim Yardımlaşma ve Dostluk Vakfı
Asır Anadolu Kız Lisesi	1993	No	Hamidiye Eğitim Ve Kültür Vakfı
Bahtiyar Koleji	1998	Yes	Milli Türk Talebe Birliği, Milli Gençlik Vakfı, İskenderun Hizmet Vakfı, Öğretmenler Vakfı ve Anadolu Gençlik Derneği
Başarılı Koleji	1995	Yes	İcmal Yayıncılık
Bayramlar Eğitim Kurumları	1999	Yes	Ulu Çınar Vakfı
Bilge Cihan Koleji	2014	No	N/A
Bilim Medeniyet Koleji	2014	Yes	Akansu İnşaat
Birikim Eğitim Kurumları	1996	Yes	Milli Gençlik Vakfı, Anadolu Gençlik Derneği
Cebir Koleji	1993	No	N/A
Cemre Koleji	2015	Yes	Hayrat Vakfı
Coşkun Koleji	1996	Yes	N/A
Çınar Koleji	1995	Yes	Universal Eğitim Hizmetleri Sanayi ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi
Derya Öncü Koleji	1995	Yes	Öncü Derya Eğitim Hizmetleri ve Ticaret A.Ş.
Efendi Eğitim Kurumları	2014	Yes	Fatih Medreseleri Vakfı
Ensar Koleji / Nev okul	1998	Yes	Ensar Vakfı
Fark Koleji	2014	Yes	N/A
Fatih Koleji	1961	Yes	Çağ Eğitim İşletmeleri
Gökyüzü Koleji	1997	Yes	Türkiye Gönüllü Teşekküllüler Vakfı
İhlas Koleji	1996	Yes	İhlas Holding - İhlas Vakfı
İlim ve Fazilet Vakfı Eğitim Kurumları	1984	No	İlim ve Fazilet Vakfı
İrfan Koleji	1998	Yes	İlim Yayma Vakfı
İsabet Okulları	2008	No	Ümran Eğitim ve Danışmanlık Hizmetleri Ltd. Şti.
İstanbul Bilim Koleji	1997	Yes	Laleli Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği
Kalem Vakfı Okulları	2000	Yes	N/A
Mavi Umut Eğitim Kurumları	2002	Yes	Anadolu Eğitim ve Davet Gönüllüleri Platformu
Medeniyet Koleji	1991	Yes	Vahdet Grup
Mektebim Koleji	2011	Yes	Ümit Kalko- SEDCO - Sancak Grup
Nun Koleji	2014	No	Nun Vakfı
Okyanus Koleji	2004	Yes	Nesil Şirketler Grubu
Özel Bilgi Çağı Koleji	1994	Yes	Ömer Derin Vakfı
Özel Biltek Koleji	2002	Yes	Semerkan Vakfı
Özel Devran Koleji	1998	Yes	Devran Motor Yatakları ve Burçları A.Ş.
Özel Mavigün Eğitim Kurumları	1988	Yes	İnsanlığa Hizmet Vakfı
Özel Sultan Fatih Eğitim Kurumları	1996	Yes	Türkiye İlmî İctimai Hizmet Vakfı
Özel Şefkat Okulları	1997	No	Şefkat Vakfı
Palet Montessori	2011	Yes	TÜRGEV
Tekden Koleji	2006	Yes	Tekden Grup

<sup>25</sup> The conservative character of Mektebim Koleji is taken primarily in relation to the affiliated investment group of the school.

*Vakifs*, associations or companies in relation with the school or with the administrative body of a school constitutes the primary criteria by which the conservativeness of the school was designated. Secondly, the founders' profiles were considered. Thirdly the discourse presented under the "about us" banners on schools' websites was examined. Finally, schools' slogans, activities, projects and clubs were analyzed. Besides from these, news coverage of schools were also considered to support other data.

Websites constituted the essential source for listing the founders of schools. Among 41 schools, 30 of them declared their founders on their websites. Two schools (Fatih and Şefkat Koleji) declared a group of investors as the founder, but the names cannot be found on websites. "Founder, board chairman, founder representative" are the titles accepted for considering the given name as the founder<sup>26</sup>. Among these declared names, only seven founders' biographies were given in detail on school websites, including their academic credentials.

For the purpose of tracing the educational background of founders, newspaper articles, interviews and the *vakif* websites that are related to schools were examined<sup>27</sup>. An analysis made of 22 founders whose information was attainable (there are two schools which declared two and three founders respectively), a heterogeneous map came into sight. Educational sciences and the Faculty of Theology constitute the two departments most preferred by the founders for their undergraduate degrees. Faculty of sciences and literature follow them with three

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<sup>26</sup> The representative capacity was a decisive factor in taking all these titles under the founder category. There were also examples where a person declared as a board chairman was also identified as a founder somewhere else.

<sup>27</sup> In the end it came out that the information about six founders was impossible to reach except on web portals and forums, which are not considered reliable sources. Apart from that, in addition to those two schools that declared their founders as a group of investors, 21 founders' educational background is not-attainable on the internet.

graduates each; and the faculty of economics and management come after with two graduates. The educational situation of two founders was declared as *madrassa* graduates and the list goes on with history, medicine, journalism and international relations with one graduate from each. The interesting point in these educational biographies is that the information about high schools is missing in most of them. Whereas, a certain pattern emerges among the ones that indicated the name of the high school the founders had graduated from. It is observed that they were either graduated from *imam-hatip high school*, or from Vefa High School<sup>28</sup>. The reason for their indication in schools' websites may be considered through their symbolic value, former referring to the religious background of the founder, and the latter to a striking success.

This heterogeneity of choice in the founders' undergraduate studies looks as if it was oriented into other roads later on in their lives. When founders' occupations were examined, it is seen that professions related to education had gained weight with 11 people-leading them to found schools. Five of the founders worked for the Ministry of Education, three others were academics, and three were school teachers. For the rest, six of the founders were interested in commerce, five of them were engaged in the publishing sector, three founders worked in religious posts such as muftis or sermons and four of them had taken a role in politics. It should be kept in mind that, some founders were counted in more than one category here since some of them were or are still active in several other fields at the same time.

Besides these educational-professional backgrounds, engagements in civil society activities came forth as the third topic emphasized in founders' biographies.

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<sup>28</sup> It has always been one of the oldest and most prestigious public high schools in Turkey. It was founded during the Ottoman Empire and became one of the first Anatolian high schools. Even though it is not possible to identify the school with a conservative identity, it was interesting to engage with its name from various informants during the field study.

It is clear that most of the founders take an active role in non-governmental organizations. This outstanding role of civil society in producing and reproducing social capital within the field gets more striking when the relation between schools and *vakifs* are examined.

As indicated in Table 2, conservative private schools are highly engaged with civil society networks. Within these 41 schools, 17 of them, which correspond to nearly half, are interconnected with *vakifs*<sup>29</sup>. Among these *vakifs*, seven of them were founded in between 1960-1980, five of them followed in between 1980-2001; and since 2001 three more *vakifs* have been added to the list<sup>30</sup>.

When the websites of *vakifs* are examined, it becomes evident that working as a charity organization based on Islamic principles is the main objective in most them. *Vakifs* present themselves as solidarity institutions working within the field of education and culture, aiming to support disadvantaged students, to give scholarships, to construct dormitories, libraries, institutes, to raise religious conscience and to promote Islamic science. The ideal of raising new generations devoted to their national and moral values is repeatedly underlined by each of them. However, in place of expressing the prized values with vague terms as do schools on their websites- which will be explained in detail here below- these *vakifs* clearly emphasize their religious character and their goal of supporting various methods for raising faithful pious individuals. For example:

İlim ve Fazilet Vakfı is continuing to raise students who embrace, protect and develop Turkish nations's national, spiritual, moral and cultural values; who loves and always try to aggrandize his family, homeland and nation; who are

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<sup>29</sup>Here, only those *vakifs* which founded these schools or in which the founders of schools take an administrative role have been considered. When the *vakifs* in which the founders take just an active role are considered, the number rises to 23. There are only five schools for whom no information could be found regarding their affiliation with *vakifs*, associations or companies.

<sup>30</sup> The foundation date of two *vakifs* was not attainable.

equipped with the knowledge and capabilities required in the twenty first century. (İlim ve Fazilet Vakfi- İlim ve Fazilet Okulları, see Appendix D, 6.)

Our foundation was founded in 1979, to enrich the moral dynamics of our people and contribute to their scientific, intellectual and moral development ... Within the body of our foundation in which plenty of scientific and academic activities are being carried out concerning religion and values education, a qualified and advanced level of Arabic language education is also being offered and educational seminars in basic Islamic sciences and social sciences are being organized. (Ensar Vakfi–Nev Okul, see Appendix D, 7.)

Şerif Mardin describes *vakifs* as juristically shaped formulas used in the Ottoman Empire which gathered various welfare services within, and which worked as an intermediary institution between the center and the periphery (Mardin, 2006, p. 125-26). This ambiguous character of *vakifs* in between public and private belongings also had important religious roots in doing charity work and participating in social aid as both an obligation (*farz*) and a good deed in the Islamic faith.

As underlined, the glorification of the representation of this Islamic-Ottoman tradition had been on the march since the AKP's rise to power. The party leaders' self-identification with the periphery and the emphasis put on these groups' struggles through civil society channels attracted attention as the party's leading figures' meetings with *vakifs* became more and more mediatized. In an *iftar* ("the evening meal during Ramadan") meeting held by Ensar Vakfi (a *vakif* working within the field of education, especially in the service of religious vocational schools), president Erdoğan gave a speech starting with his wishing for the continuation of this service aiming to raise generations knowing and living their religion ("Vakıf Geleneği, Kardeşliğimizin En Kuvvetli Bağını Oluşturuyor", 2015):

*Vakifs* and foundations, being the most important civil society organizations of ours, are providing highly important services to every part of the nation, in every part of the country ... *Vakif* tradition is an important institution of social solidarity and cooperation. It is our most tenacious fraternal bond since the Seljuks and Ottomans ... The state mechanism which already has a heavy going, bulky structure, especially when it falls into the hands of the wrong mentalities, is causing a huge gap between the state and society and the

individual. In this respect, no matter how strong the state is or how legitimate their administrators are, civil society organizations, such as *vakifs*, will never lose their importance. (see Appendix D, 8.)

Regarding the construction of a linear history in this discourse, linking national identity with preeminent Islamic states of the past and opening a space there for the invention of a *vakif* tradition (Hobsbawn & Ranger, 2002), the project of an alternative modernity (Çınar, 2005), makes itself explicitly apparent. In this respect, it is significant to draw attention to what Zencirci (2015) accentuates about the transformations of meanings and functions which *vakifs* had gained depending on the changing power relations since the foundation of Turkey. *Vakifs* were both exalted as treasures inherited from the Empire, and were deprived of their previous functions under the statist nationalism throughout the primary period of the Republic. They were then reconfigured as private philanthropic foundations to produce the necessary skilled labor force for the mixed economy of the 60-70s, and have become, since the 1980s, the locus of welfare services transferred from the state (Zencirci, 2015). So, I argue that the ambiguous position between public-private demarcations is becoming fertile ground for the neoliberal imagination: neither rendering the state the responsible organ for the qualified educational services, nor detached from its control; neither carrying the weighty ideological backpack of the accumulated state tradition in Turkey that dictates certain actions, nor detached from the current government's positioning by prioritizing certain codes of conduct. In this respect, along with their function in consolidating certain cultural codes in society, *vakifs* also play a considerable role in the functioning of neoliberalism.

In order to reveal the connections of *vakifs* with investment groups, businesspeople and the companies of Turkey, i.e. the economic field, a modest

research was made<sup>31</sup> and a representative table came to the fore, as can be seen in Table 3. (see Appendix B)

Regarding *vakifs*' relation to the economic field, a certain pattern was observed. On one hand, there are those *vakifs* seem much more powerful and institutionalized, such as TÜRGEV, Ensar, İlim Yayma or Nun Vakfi. The government's support for these *vakifs* is a well-known fact. Therefore, it is possible to see patrons of big investment groups, government representatives or relatives of the president taking part within the social network of these "non-governmental" neoliberal institutions, functioning in an enterprise-like manner. On the other hand, there are those *vakifs* which are smaller in extent and which were founded by a "benevolent" businesspeople or a group, such as Ulu Çınar, Fatih Medreseleri and Hamidiye Vakfi. Unlike the big projects, scholarships and events presented on the websites of the former group, the second group of *vakifs* present a more modest image with their old-fashioned websites, and narrower social networks. However, despite their divergences, it was possible through their websites to observe a clear support for the government. When their active role in the field of education was reconsidered, such a point gains further significance.

Within this frame, regarding their weighty position within economic and cultural power relations, it is possible to interpret the presence of *vakifs* within the field of education as a macro-level institutionalized form of "hidden curriculum" functioning within schools. "Hidden curriculum" is a concept used to identify the norms, dispositions, values, aesthetic classifications; so the non-official cultural norms of practice in the broadest sense of the term (Apple, 1971; Lynch, 1989). As

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<sup>31</sup> Only the information of founders or board members of *vakifs* were taken into consideration in this analysis. Regarding the excessive number of people identified as a member of the board, or of the founding group in some *vakifs*, only some of these are put into the table as representative information.

observed from the discourses of *vakifs* about the way they position themselves within the field of education, the religious codes are clearly emphasized as the main guide of their practices. However, when we pass from civil society to the realm of the formal education system, it is seen that the overt emphasis of *vakif* discourses are getting diluted with secular tones. That is why the religiosity of discourse constructs itself in the hidden aspects of curriculum within the boundaries of the secular state order.

This assertion manifests itself most clearly by schools' framing of religious accents with the notion of "morality". When one examines the slogans of schools and their institutional frames of mission and vision announced on their websites, it is seen that, except for the few schools that use the term "faithful" or "religious", they prefer to define their purpose as raising individuals that are "virtuous", "moral" "proper" or "with high spiritual values". Such a shift in discourse is clearly manifested in these following citations one taken from the website of a *vakif*, the other from the school belonging to the same *vakif*:

As I mentioned before, we have only one goal under the roof of Semerkand Vakfi. That is to gain the consent of Allah. In this respect, in all the things we do, we are trying to pay regard to the criterias that will prevent humanity from haram and sin and that will motivate them towards good deeds. On the other hand, to raise generations beneficial for the country and the Ummah is our biggest concern. We did not get on to this road with the intent of enlarging or developing our community and *vakif*. (Semerkand Vakfi, see Appendix D, 9.)

By creating an instruction model together with a team working to aggrandize humanitarian values by taking the advantage of the developments taking place in our country and the world and having the conscience of the value of science and art of their job, our mission is to raise virtuous, knowledgeable, compassionate, successful, cultivated, well-mannered and conscious individuals who can use at its best the potential they are endowed with, and who can show oneself as she is (Biltek Koleji, see Appendix D, 10.)

Usage of the religiously symbolic words like *ilim* ("knowledge") in place of/together with science or *irfan* ("culture") in place of culture is also an observed

tendency in schools' discourses. These concepts are preferred for their umbrella-like character that contains the notion of science and culture without overlooking non-material-spiritual aspects of knowledge. However, it should be kept in mind that the accentuation of word preference here also contains the potential of reproducing the binary meaning vaccinated in these concepts as a result of various socio-political processes. Therefore, it should be considered that the only purpose in articulating these charged words here is to underline the present discourses dominant in the field today. No claim is made about the meanings inherent in these concepts.

Education is described by schools on a holistic basis: making a distinction between education and instruction, and emphasizing the necessity of integrating both for shaping legitimate generations. It is observed that the educational dimension exceeds the limits of instruction and corresponds to a large extent to the children's moral education, and it is presented as a form of responsibility families should consider in order to raise adults both with good personality and beneficial for their own country. Further, it is this ground that is highly open to ideological cultivation that sets the fundamental basis from which these schools put forth their distinction and superiority from other schools.

Intelligence is a gift from Allah; however, you must have seen many intelligent people who have ruined both themselves and those around them by not knowing how to use this intelligence in a good and positive way. In terms of Mevlana's saying "Giving knowledge to a person to whom you did not give a moral education is almost a sword given in the hands of a robber. You will only raise trouble for society." We do believe in this opinion, with which many Western educators also agree. Ultimately, the goal of education is to produce moral and disciplined humans. (Tekden Koleji, see Appendix D, 11.)

Today, the "instruction" is prioritized most of the schools' educational vision, whereas their "education" aspect is being ignored. However, unless the knowledge serves both for the daily life of human beings and their spiritual world, it has no function than putting a strain on the student. Therefore, it is not whether someone knows something good or right which should be urged upon, it is whether they apply them to their lives or not. (Asır Anadolu Kız Lisesi, see Appendix D, 12.)

You give lots of vitamins to your children for their growth, but do you know where to get the vitamin of spirituality and morality for them? For us, school does not mean somewhere merely for instruction. We teach your children about life itself as much as academic life. We give importance to spiritual and moral education so that they become good people together with the school education. (Nev Koleji, see Appendix D, 13.)

Sensitiveness in protecting their own history, being patriotic, watching one's country benefit are other objectives of education which schools lay emphasis on by combining religious codes with nationalist ideals. Except for two schools who did not refer to any nationalist tone while talking about "our civilization", such usage was expressed by the majority of schools as is discernable from the following quotes:

Takes as its mission to raise the outstanding intellectuals and scientists of the new civilization that will be constructed in the world and in our country as individuals who take national and moral values as keystones of her personality, who lays claims on the future, who has a moral and noble soul, who is at peace with herself and with those around her, who is free and carries the conscience of responsibility. (Devran Koleji, see Appendix D, 14.)

Being nourished from our culture and civilization; to raise wise people who can create unique cultural and civilizational elements, and who aspire to gain prosperity, in an educational environment where all needs are satisfied, and to provide a lifelong educational effect. (Birikim Eğitim Kurumları, see Appendix D, 15.)

When the private nature of these schools is reconsidered, it can be said that these schools offer to the parents, their clients, and a chance of taking part in the construction project of a future for the whole country. In other words, unlike public schools, these schools advertise themselves as having an emphasis on this social engineering imaginary composed of nationalist-religionist tones, which constitutes an important part of their presentative discourses. In this respect, besides from an individual oriented quality education discourse, it is also a communitarian ideology that is marketed by positioning parents who choose these schools as the ones capable of shaping the future of the society.

So, along with their distinctive emphasis put on conservative cultural codes in raising proper societies, an analysis of these schools' strategies in positioning within the field of education remains limited if their valorization of bourgeois dispositions is overlooked. In this respect, it is seen that the ideal type emerging from schools' discourse is not just the one that is moral and conscious, but also competitive, risk-bearer, well-equipped, capable of taking important decisions and exhibiting her differences among others. Science, technology and productivity come to the fore as the main concepts underlined in this respect.

To raise individuals who are "sufficient" in terms of science, technical knowledge and experience, "coherent" in terms of emotion, opinion and attitude, "healthy" in terms of mind, spirit and body, "be at peace" with herself and its environment, "faithful" to national and moral values, "respectful" to universal values. In this way, to remove the obstacles in front of the fitrat and to contribute to the aspiration of being a "free person". To reveal unique personalities who are "not the object but the subject" of the information and technology age. ( Derya Öncü College, see Appendix D, 16.)

Our mission is, by placing importance on individual differences in order to raise one's quality of life in an environment that develops creativity and will to research, to rationally prioritize the concepts of responsibility, love, respect and fellowship; to raise young generations who are sensible to environment, who know foreign languages and cultures valid at local and international level, who are academically, socially and athletically successful, who know and develop themselves, who can decide and take responsibility of their decisions, who are analytical, tolerant, productive, entrepreneurial, environmentally and historically conscious and most particularly who faithful and respectful to her national and moral values. (Cebir Koleji, see Appendix D, 17.)

Values education and extracurricular activities provided by schools enlarge the scope of this holistic approach. In the official regulation (MEB, 2015b) regarding values education published by the Ministry of Education, it is again these vague-abstract concepts that are emphasized, which are insufficient to express the content to which it refers. This, on the other hand, provides a compelling opportunity for schools to maneuver in an extremely flexible field of values. Respect, tolerance, self-confidence, solidarity, empathy, responsibility, assiduity, development of aesthetic

senses, optimism are some of the values expressed in the regulation. It would not be wrong to identify them as global values cultivating students with dispositions necessary to survive in the twenty first century world-system. The global inclinations of these values constitute just a part of the value-set favored by most of the schools identified in this study. Familial values, hospitality, patriotism, salutation, self-sacrifice, sensitiveness in cultural heritage and compassion are other values expressed in the regulation which can be grouped as values reinforcing a conservative identity. However, these are the values proposed in the regulation and in order to trace their tangible effects in a school environment, it is important to pay attention to the ways these abstract concepts are being taught. .

Concerning values education, schools seem to take two approaches. Either they prefer to explicitly list those values that are both instructed and experienced through the courses and activities of schools, sometimes adding different values to the ones suggested by the ministry; or they prefer to declare the content of their values education no more than the ones suggested in the regulation but may give a clue about the conservative character of values taught in schools by the activities announced on their websites. With reference to first group, the following statements have been listed:

Values taught in school: Fraternity, love and respect, hard-work and patience, love of books and *ilim*, martyrdom and shahada, responsibility, love of Prophet, respect to ancestors and conscience of history, modesty and propriety (Bahtiyar Koleji, see Appendix D, 18.)

Within the Ministry of education, there are values suggested for schools like responsibility, helping each other, trueness, righteousness, fidelity, tolerance, love and respect. In addition to these values, by deciding a different value each month in accordance with students' levels, related values such as courage, patience, justice, propriety and modesty, salutation, politeness, conviction, speaking and table manners are thought both individually and within groups. Our Values Education Department is also supporting students so that they may gain proper religious knowledge. In this respect, several activities like reading the Qur'an are officially organized after school or

hadith readings about “Life Principles” pursued in values education lessons are organized. So, together with these activities and the course of Religious Culture and Moral Knowledge, a holistic point of view is assured in students. (Özel Bilgi Çağı Koleji, see Appendix D, 19)

We are emphasizing our core values, not just in values education courses, but in all of them, in order to raise students’ consciousness of their responsibilities and to help them be capable of judging for themselves. Together with our 5,6,7 and 8th grades, apart from the course on Religious Education and Moral Culture, Qur’an and *Siyer-i Nebi* [“an epic about the life of Prophet Mohammed”] courses are continued and the minimum catechism knowledge which every Muslim should know, such as performing Salah and Surahs are offered to students in an embedded form in these courses. (Bilim Medeniyet Koleji, see Appendix D, 20)

When these discourses are taught together with the holistic regard schools envision about the function of education, it should not be surprising to see the impact of such values on school activities. In addition to activities detached from any kind of conservative value-context, such as sport tournaments, science fairs, Comenius project, and school trips like to Rahmi Koc Museum, to botanic gardens, to Goethe Institute etc., these schools differentiate themselves with the value set they highlight in other activities. Intelligence game festivals in the name of El- Biruni, hadith and Surah competitions, knowledge contests themed on the Prophet’s life, a poem competition titled “Dream about Palestine, Write a poem about al-masjid al-Aqsa”, reading activity about the lives of women companions of Prophet Mohammed, praying activity, an activity entitled “Students capable of reading our grandparents’ gravestone” organized by Ottoman-Turkish language club, a game named “The ruler of continents” designed by a history teacher to teach Ottoman history are a few of the prominent examples. In addition, some schools also provide activities by including parents in events such as Umrah trip organizations or Qur’an clubs. In effect, it can be said that values education opens the way to a flexible ground, where market forces within the field give primacy to consumer demands to work in correspondence with state in creating a conservatively shaped hidden curriculum within schools.

In a similar fashion, schools also diversify the list of important dates to be celebrated in schools. In addition to the events such as Republic Day, November 10<sup>th</sup> Commemoration, Week of Domestic Goods etc. these schools also take “Holy Birth Week” of the Prophet Mohammed, Commemoration of Mehmet Akif Ersoy and Mevlana, celebration of Mawlid on their agenda. Social clubs that constitute an important space for students’ socialization in schools also strengthens this line of diversification. Coupled with clubs like riding, photography, piano, basketball, jewelry design, ballet, taekwondo, ice- skating, handball, gastronomy, origami, mandala, entrepreneurship, schools also provide and prioritize other clubs such as *tezhip*, janissary band, wrestling, *baglama* (“a string instrument used in Turkish folk music”), *ney* (“a wind instrument often used in Sufi music”), oud, *ebru*, *hat* etc. The intentional prioritization of these clubs is linked both to the schools' positioning strategy within the field and also to the Ministry's urge, repeatedly highlighted in the last National Education Council report as mentioned. In either case, it is the cultural realm which is targeted in order to persuade the following generation to embrace its “cultural heritage” in its entirety.

On the other hand, as regards the foundation dates of schools, these strategies seem to overlap with the expectations of conservative bourgeoisie. It was observed that the number of schools has swiftly increased since the second half of the 1990s<sup>32</sup>. Furthermore, regarding the importance of early childhood in the formation process of habitus, it was also significant to see the rising interest of investment towards

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<sup>32</sup> Among 41 schools, one of them was founded in 1963, another in 1984, 19 schools in between 1990-2000, and 18 others in between 2000-2010. Among those founded in the 1990s, five of them were founded in between 1990-1995 and 14 were founded in between 1995-2000. Among the ones founded in the 2000s, eight of them were founded before 2010 and 10 other schools were founded since then. The foundation dates of two schools were not attainable

kindergarten levels<sup>33</sup>. The lower cost of founding a kindergarten in contrast to a high school and its more flexible context free of an officially recognized curriculum may also be kept in sight as the reasons rendering them more attractive for investors. Apart from all these factors, the rising trend towards campus-like schools should also be emphasized, especially among the schools founded within the last couple of years<sup>34</sup>. Even though they are not yet well-established, it is possible to talk about a similarity between them and private campus schools, which are in high demand by the secular bourgeoisie, such as Robert, Uskudar American etc. Especially, Nun Koleji may be considered in this respect which was founded by an investment group of which, Berat Albayrak, the son in law of the President and the current minister of energy and natural resources, is a member.

Overall I argue that, along with the demands of the conservative bourgeoisie, the state was also a decisive actor in the transition to an alternative modernist project and hence in its reflection in the field of education. It becomes clear when the affinity between educational policies, politicians' discourses and the way private conservative schools present themselves is discerned. In this respect, underneath the state's neoliberal dress is implied its own contraction. We are faced with its efficacious and interventionist existence. This, on the other hand, is more than the basic role of the state recognized in neoliberal ideology; to protect the rights of private property and to provide the favorable ground for well-functioning market

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<sup>33</sup> There are two institutions which only have high schools. Apart from these two and one other middle school recently founded, there are not any institutions that do not have kindergartens. However, there are nine institutions that do not have high schools, and, except for two of them, all the others were founded in the 2000s, which shows the rising interest in kindergartens in latter years

<sup>34</sup> There are fifteen schools that founded all grades from kindergarten to high schools in the same year, and among them six were founded in the second half of the 90s and 9 others were founded after the 2000s, six of them in the last five years particularly..

forces. The state attempts to implement the directions of the good life style, the virtuous practice, the moral personality, and true patriotism.

Neoliberalism, in the most superficial meaning of the term, predicates a belief in market forces and their efficacy in increasing the quality of the product offered regarding the harsh state of competition they find themselves in. In this respect, in addition to the laissez-faire principle of the classical liberalism, the state makes itself apparent in the neoliberal ideology as the regulatory mechanism of a fairly competitive market (Dardot & Laval, 2009/ 2012). According to David Harvey, freedom and the liberty of consumer choice are the two foundational precepts of neoliberalism; which comprises not just products, but also lifestyles, modes of expression and cultural practices (Harvey, 2005, p.42). In this respect, individual shifts in the locus of the whole system. However, as Harvey adds, against the cult of individualism and interest-seeking utilitarianism of neoliberal thought, which may complicate the maintenance of an order in which free market ideology may easily function, neoliberalism produces its own critical approach: neoconservatism. It is values and morality that stand in the core of this restoration project of neoliberalism envisaged as a powerful glue to hold the social body in its integrity. So, in stressing the construction of a worldview that composes these value packages with the fundamental principles of liberalism, Harvey lays emphasis on the legitimizing aspect of values, which works on the other hand as a means of social discipline (Harvey, 2005, p.83).

Regarding the morality which had also been central to neoliberal ideology, Amable underlines how values like being free, fair and self-responsible are being produced and reproduced in neoliberalism (Amable, 2011). As implied by Dardot and Laval, the main divergence between neoliberalism and neoconservatism is that

while neoliberalism aims to inculcate the norms of an enterprise within the individual-and appeals to the moral realm in this respect; neoconservatism heads towards the family as the main site of forming a morally shaped market order (Dardot & Laval, 2012, p.419). Then, systems of values become the ground on which the neoliberal governmentality may easily function. The main argument raised by Dardot and Laval is that, rather than being a political economy or an ideology, neoliberalism is a rationality in the first place, functioning in one's own free space of self-construction; and thus her own "form of existence" (Dardot & Laval, 2012, p.1). By relying on the concept of Foucauldian governmentality, they address the ways in which this relation of domination, the neoliberal governance, is being constructed within the individual oneself.

Rather than the word rationality, to which a certain level of reflexivity is attributed within the governmentality approach, Bourdieu proposes to take neoliberalism as a *doxa*, as a pre-reflexive worldview which functions on a global level and which is constantly being reproduced as a self-evident, unquestioned reality (Bourdieu, 1998/2000a). In this respect, he underlines the significance of "labor of symbolic inculcation" conducted both by international actors, experts, academics, think tanks etc., but also by the national actors, states taking the first place. Regarding its shift from welfare to neoliberal form, he underlines how the state, which has always been a part of the dominant power structure, reconsiders the value categories to be implemented and prioritizes production, competition and profit in this respect (Bourdieu, 1998/2000b). Beyond its physical domination, the state is defined by Bourdieu primarily with its symbolic existence, structuring subjects' categories of perception and naturalizing them in the first place (Bourdieu,

2012/2014). In this process of naturalization, he accentuates the role of discourses of state authorities and the education system (Bourdieu, 2014).

When the Turkish state's positioning within the field of education and its endeavor in consolidating a *doxic* order is reconsidered within this frame, a certain attempt in mobilizing a value set composed both of universal neoliberal values and the cultural religious codes becomes apparent. Further, as is also emphasized by other scholars (Çelik & Koray, 2015; İnsel, 2015), in line with a neoconservative approach, it is observable that the moral realm is being actuated by the state as a ground of justification for taking positions within the neoliberal world system, rendering religious values highly compatible with the basic precepts of neoliberalism such as private market, competition, competence and change.

On the other hand, rather than seeing morality as the legitimized ground of neoliberal politics, neoliberal thought itself becomes the ground for religious morality. On a global scale, a similar debate was generated with regards to the spread of "school choice policy", which on one hand, introduces market forces in the public education system by relying on the neoliberal discourse of consumer choice and quality-rise and which on the other hand leads in the long run to the rising communitarization and social segregation along ethnic and religious lines within society (Goldring and Phillips, 2008; Plank & Sykes, 2003). AKP's strategy in emphasizing the freedom of selection for raising the density of Sunni-Islamic religious courses in public education system; or referring to liberty and choice in legitimizing the advocacy of conservative private schools may be set forth in this respect.

To sum up, the key point one may capture from the historical perspective outlined in this chapter is that social life is relational and that there is not a single

event which may be deprived of its effect. Within this scope, it is possible to interpret the rise of conservative bourgeoisie as both the reason and the outcome of various dynamics, including economic, political, social and cultural dimensions that relationally took place for decades within this geography. The field of education also received its share from such a restructuring process and witnessed serious contestations between secular and conservative groups in order to lay claim to the legitimate citizen's formation process. The changing position of *imam hatip* schools, the dynamics leading to 28 February military intervention and the outcomes it procured, the ongoing debates about the place of religious courses in the formal education system, and also the recent discussions about the elective courses may all be taken into consideration in this respect.

The liberalization waves of the 1980s and the AKP's rise to power in the 2000s may be conceived as two decisive turning points in the history of the country, in terms of their impact on the field of education's current situation. It is now clear that there are two bases on which a serious transformation is taking place within the field of education. On one hand, a crucial incentive policy of government for privatization becomes apparent, especially after the transformation of *dershanes* into private schools. On the other hand, it is possible to talk about an explicit encouragement from the state for the enhancement of conservative values in the formal education system, especially through values education. As a result, it is possible to talk about a striking rise in the number of conservative private schools. Extracurricular activities seem to become the main channels through which these schools put forward their identities and consolidate nationalist and conservative values in their educational approach. *Vakifs*, which may be considered as fundamental actors of neoliberal governmentality, and which had always been

supported by the AKP regime, should also be emphasized in this respect regarding their rising interest in the field of private education. Their crucial role stems not just from their function as a networking ground between investors and government authorities, but also in conveying the interest of power groups in the field of education and contributing to the Islamization of the field.

As a result, it is possible to say that conservative values form a supportive ground for the well-functioning of the government's neoliberal policies. Along with the state, schools and *vakifs* should be emphasized within this frame as the primary actors in the field in the reinforcement process of this neoconservative ideology. In this respect, it would not be misleading to claim that in parallel of the Kemalist project's control-oriented approach toward religion, but this time blended with the Abdulhamid II approach, the AKP regime is heading for the religious-moral realm as the primary basis of social disciplinization. So, as underlined by Asef Bayat (1998) Islam has constantly been put into work in the field of education for several decades in order to raise both "modern and direction oriented" generations for the future.

## CHAPTER 3

### RISING CLASS POSITIONS, CHANGING LIFESTYLES AND THE INCREASING INTEREST IN CULTURAL CAPITAL AMONG CONSERVATIVE BOURGEOISIE

Conducting the field work for this study was very trying for me, that is to say, it was filled both with the breakdown of expected possibilities and the appearance of unexpected coincidences. Şeyma was one of the people I had met through a mutual friend, which I coincidentally came across during one of my field research days. I took her number and called her the day after. I was fairly convinced that she was a godsend put in my path after days of struggling to reach people. At the end of the call she invited me to Florya, where she would introduce me to a group of people.

It was interesting to be invited to Florya, a place that I had always imagined as a luxurious residential area historically identified with the Republican elites, but which Şeyma qualified as the “spot to meet the conservative bourgeoisie”. I went there a couple of hours before our appointment. The neighborhood was different from the other ones I had spent time in during the field study, which were also known for their wealthy pious residents. For instance, Beykoz and Başakşehir were hard to define as neighborhoods, regarding the relationship inherent in the meaning of the concept. They were more similar to living spaces composed of huge gated communities with their sumptuous entrances and large roads connecting them to one another and to the center of the city. It was not easy to find a café or a restaurant to sit in. Even though I took my chance with the shopping malls or coiffeurs—generally located within the malls, there were more places where people pass through temporarily with as little interaction as is necessary. On the contrary, along with

malls situated around the district, the central street of Florya was filled with shops, markets, restaurants and cafes juxtaposed to one another. Shisha seemed to be a service in high demand according to notice boards in front of their entrances. I was also able to walk around haute-couture boutiques all along the street where covered mannequins with their inlaid patterned dresses or pantsuits were displayed in most of the showcases. All the cars that I saw in these three districts were highly luxurious. The thing that differentiated them was that, while cars were nearly the only thing that one could see in the boulevards of Başakşehir and Beykoz, people walking and crossing across the streets in Florya were accompanying the cars stuck in the traffic. The long standing past of Florya in the urbanization process of Istanbul may be considered as the reason lying beneath such difference.

While I was waiting, Şeyma picked me up in her smoke-colored jeep and welcomed me with a sincere hug as if we had known each other for a long time. Şeyma is an advertiser who works in an agency. I do not know whether it is related to her job, but I may say that she was one of the most sociable people I have ever met. She was a tall, well-groomed young woman with long, coiffured black hair and polished nails. She seemed to be a person who fit with my concerns about the overlap in the religious-secular dichotomy in Turkey. Neither her outfit nor her gestures gave a sense that she had a conservative identity. On the other hand, regarding the way she addressed the issues we discussed, the discourses of her mother who I had met earlier that day, of her praying group tutor who we came across in the street, or of her social circle, with whom I spent time with, I may say that religion constitutes an important role both in her daily life and her socialization patterns.

Since she had several things to finish up urgently, we spent about half an hour together in the car chatting and moving from one place to another. As we moved into the inner part of the district, the crowded atmosphere gave way to a calm, “neat” middle-class neighborhood. Along with several gated communities, with their relatively old medium height blocks, there were apartments with big windows and balconies. As I was talking about the settlement in the neighborhood, Şeyma added that since it was first popularized as Istanbul’s elite’s summer resort, most of the apartments had their own pools in their backyards. Şeyma’s was one such apartment. She continued her explanation by describing the transformation that she had observed in the district over the years. She said:

Before, Kemalist groups were dominant in the streets, but things have changed so quickly in the last years. Now the Kemalists are spending their time inside their houses, whereas the cafes and restaurants, as you will see, are all filled with pious youth. They are rich. Really rich. The owners of Turkey’s biggest companies are living in here. You can see it from their cars. Here, people know each other from the license plates of their cars. It is the initial of either their surname or of the name of the company they own. (Şeyma, see Appendix D, 21.)

Then, she pointed out the license plate of the car she was parking behind and said that she would introduce me to the daughter of this family who were the owner’s of a gas station as indicated by the initials. As I learned later on, the family was renowned both in the energy and the construction sector. They had close ties with the government. Their house was located on the top of a hill with a great sea view. Just across the street, there was a big, newly built, white mosque with gracious Ottoman style patterns, which I later learned was also paid for by the family.

A well-dressed woman welcomed us with her headscarf swung over her shoulders in a stylish manner. She was young, probably around the same age as me. She was divorced last year and had been raising her two year old son with the support of her family. Within her clean salon, decorated in a plain way,

calligraphically written prayers hung on the walls. We sat in a corner couch, which provided us with a view of the sea. She brought us Turkish coffee, served in inlaid silver coffee cups, and glasses of water with fresh flowers.

As I started to speak of my research, she smiled and responded that this was the right question to ask a mother regarding the process of deciding which school to choose. She spoke about the considerable amount of time she spent with her son in the house, playing and drawing things, since she believed all these shared experiences to be a part of his educational process. Then she underlined the importance of getting the child into a proper school at an early age for both the socialization process of the child and for the development of his muscles. At the moment, she was taking her son to the “playing group” for kids of Palet Montessori schools, which she had heard about from her friends and which she praised for their ability to instill the love of learning in children through games.

The child was barely speaking, but his education was at the heart of his mother’s concerns for the future. It was striking since, as the field clearly gave evidence, such concern is not particular. The field work brought into view that, for bourgeois parents, the question of education starts with the birth of the child, yet before that, regarding all those books and web blogs discussing how to be a good mother. Then, the concern deepens with the school choice discussions and out of school educational strategies as they grow up. I had even met with a mother whose child was going to a kindergarten and the parents’ future plan for sending their son to a foreign university was an important factor, which played a part in their choice of kindergarten. They were also seeing the psychologist of the school and participating in educational seminars in an orderly manner to be able to educate their children properly also within the domestic sphere. I must admit that they were some of the

most engaged parents I had come across during my field research, but it does not affect the fact that, despite its changing levels, education is taken by families as one of the primary stakes to be embraced and to mobilize their capitals for.

In their study on English middle classes, Ball and Vincent (2006) qualified such anxiety for education as a characteristic of middle class and emphasized how education, or “good education” had gone further than just school choice and how it started to substitute what had previously been identified as childrearing. In other words, all the physical and emotional work parents put forth for bringing up their child had started to gain an educational meaning and thus child growth turned into a practice basically of raising an “educational subject” (Ball & Vincent, 2006, p.150). A similar pattern was observable in the field. Regardless of the scene they had narrated, either a game they play together, a question they answer, advice they had given, etc., the discourse of education encompassed most of the parents’ narratives as if an intentional relation had been constructed in every interaction between parents and the child. Moreover, such an accent put on conscious child rearing was also accompanied by a narrative shift in forms of parenting they observed in comparison to their own childhood.

Of all the people I had interviewed, and of all the daily talks I had witnessed, a certain emphasis put on change was perceivable in discourses, either told or mentioned by the informants. As observable from the transformation, Şeyma narrated particular to Florya, Turkish society had been experiencing an extensive transformation within the last several decades. Such a transformation had unfolded in different ways among different segments of society and in particular conservative groups, it seems that the expanding embourgeoisement process had given way to significant intergenerational differences in terms of lifestyles. In this chapter, the first

section will elaborate on this embourgeoisement process by focusing on the differences between economic power, educational status and changing lifestyles between the two generations. Then, these factors' impact on families' changing relation with cultural capital and the transformation in their parenting practices will be elaborated with a certain focus on sexual division of labor within the domestic sphere.

### 3.1 Intergenerational transformation in lifestyles

“Where are you from” is the most common question between strangers in Turkey. If those conversing belong to the same town or region, the power of the question may reach beyond merely imagining a community and establish an instantaneous, unexpected sincerity. If not, it still holds the power of breaking the icy feeling of strangeness and creating a warm air of chitchat. That is why in most cases, the place of origin was the first thing I started to talk about with informants.

The Black Sea Region had a considerable weight among informants' answers. Though the region is widely connected in public opinion with the prevalence of conservative values among locals, the limited fieldwork of this study renders such a finding invalid to make a claim beyond mere coincidence. Nonetheless, questioning informants' about their hometown gave me more to discuss. Regarding twelve women I had interviewed, migration seemed to be at the heart of their families' histories. Among 24 adults, including the husbands' background, nine people were born in Istanbul, among which seven of them had experienced migration in the previous generation (the generation to which belongs the parents of the families I had interviewed is named as the primary generation, and the ones I had met as the second generation). Three people were born in Anatolian cities but moved to Istanbul during

their childhood and eleven people were born in Anatolian cities and moved to Istanbul later on their lives<sup>35</sup>.

The motivating forces of these migrations were composed of highly gendered patterns when they were further analyzed. Among 23 adults, 13 people had an ascribed migration story in relation to the first generations' decisions, which were related to a large extent to the employment issues of their fathers. There was only one family whose decision for migration was oriented towards their daughter's education, so that she could attend a Qur'an course in Istanbul. As to reasons determined by second generation parents-themselves, it is observed that none of the women had employment as a purpose for migrating. In addition to those who migrated with their parents, there were four women who had migrated to Istanbul as a consequence of their marriage. Whereas for men, marriage was not a reason to migrate; instead, education and profession were the two main reasons for which men had migrated.

As it played an important factor in most of the women's departures, marriage does have a significance in women's life trajectories, in terms of earning a valorized identity in society (Dedeoğlu, 2004). Except from the few interviews, it constituted one of the topics women were keen to talk about and give me advice for my future inevitable marriage. I was frequently asked whether I was in a serious relationship, told that my life is passing by and that it is important to have a child as soon as possible. The average of these married women was 22. More than half of them had married by 23. Two of them had divorced and one had got married again afterwards. Regarding the couples' meeting stories, the role of the first generation parents' matchmaking efforts was clearly observed. Seven women had met with their

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<sup>35</sup> One of the interviewed women did not want to talk about her divorced husband, so his information is missing.

husbands through such arrangements. One of the women had married her own cousin. Regarding the rest of the four women, one had known her husband from their workplace and the other three had met in university. It was a suggestive pattern to see that, meeting through matchmaking was lower among working women.

Occupational status is one of the main shifting lines between two generations, not just for women, but also for men. Within the first generation mothers, it seems that except for one person, all the women were identified by their daughters as housewives. The only woman working in paid employment was actually running a local cinema with her husband. Whereas when we pass onto the second generation, it is observed that one quarter of the women were actively employed. One of them owned an haute couture boutique in Florya, another is a director in a municipality, and one another is a gynaecologist who running a clinic and also participating in TV programs. Four other women stated that they had been employed but quit afterwards because of getting married or bearing children. The number of the women self-identifying as housewives had diminished to five people within the second generation. This intergenerational transformation of women's position in employment sector should be considered in relation to several different dynamics such as the rising level of urbanization, the increasing role given to credentials and its diffusion among the rising conservative classes; the rising struggle for women's entrance in public institutions without taking off their turban etc. However, despite the rising share of women in breadwinning, it is observed that men are still the primary source of the family's economic power, thus their class-location.

Among first generation fathers, it is seen that only two people were categorized as non-workers, involved in subsistence farming. Five others were employed as state officials, and only one man was working in a multinational

company as a manager, in other words, as a white collar employee. Ownership of small and medium sized enterprises (SME) was the most common profession in the first generation comprising mostly small enterprises and tradesmen. Whereas among the second generation, it is again the SMEs that constitute the profession for the most part. However, it is seen on one hand that being a tradesman no longer exists in male professions; on the other hand, that the size and the capacity of the enterprises owned had increased. Among those enterprises one may see a construction company which builds projects in central districts of Istanbul, two medium sized factories and one holding company<sup>36</sup>. The number of state officials had diminished to two people; one working as a manager in a municipality together with his wife, the other who worked as a policeman and is now retired (he was included within the bourgeois segment for reasons that will be explained hereinafter). Moreover, the rate of white collar employers had increased significantly between generations as can be seen with the ratio of one-third working as white collar employees in the second generation.

On the other hand, such occupational status of families brings along a corresponding purchasing power. According to the latest statistics published by the Turkish Statistical Institute in September 2015, the average household income for a family in Turkey is around 4000-4800 TL for a four member family (TÜİK, 2015). Among informants, three families had stated that their monthly household income is around 4000-8000 TL. The second group, which constitutes the half of the informants, stated that their income is around 8000-12000 TL; and the last group of three families stated that they have an income of about 12.000-30000 TL.

There was not one person who stated that they were tenants in the house they live in. All the families owned at least the houses they were living in. Except for one

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<sup>36</sup> The father of this family is dead, but since it is a family company, the economic capital transfer to house economy has not changed, so it is taken into consideration.

person<sup>37</sup>, they also stated that they owned other house(s). Eight of the families were living in gated communities and all the rest owned houses in central locations of Istanbul. Two of the latter owned the whole buildings. However, despite these statements, which indicate the informants' considerable economic power, above the average in Turkey, it should not be forgotten that, informants' declaration of their incomes was received in a guarded manner in this study regarding their hesitant air in talking about their wealth.

Most of the informants had identified themselves as members of the middle class or as the ones belonging to the privileged parts of society. However, the blurred boundaries of being a member of the middle class was actually a discursive strategy of informants. Throughout the field study, the ambitious air of talk when informants were talking about their tastes, school preferences or parenting experiences had suddenly gave way to a quite uncomfortable mood when they were asked about their incomes or properties. Of course, the importance of modesty in Islamic faith may be thought of as a factor influencing the informants' drawbacks from talking about their wealth. Such a discourse was highly clear in the informants' narratives about their shopping practices, underlining the importance of shopping in case of a need, otherwise it being a lavishness. However, the meaning behind this hesitation could be considered through the culture embedded in society at large. Above all, talking about one's economic power is generally thought of as bragging and thus a shame. Social memory in Turkey nourishes such a sensibility too. The self-legitimization of the Turkish grand bourgeoisie as the real elites of the country, with the emphasis put on their refined tastes and modesty in contrast to the rising *nouveau-riches*' pretentious attitudes (Bali, 2009), may be considered in this respect.

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<sup>37</sup> They were living in one of the most luxurious neighbourhoods in Istanbul and had a duplex apartment with a Bosphorus view

It is again the post-1980 period that accelerated such a struggle of legitimization due to the rising differentiation within the middle and upper middle classes in consequence of the rising groups. Apart from all these, and probably most importantly, I, being a guest and a stranger in the houses of informants, may have had a huge impact in influencing such an attitude.

Then, regarding the uncertainty of the informants' statements about their wealth and the diversity of their occupational status, how could they be categorized within a single group such as bourgeoisie? As mentioned in the introduction, Bourdieu's framework enables us to look further than statements and search for the clues in the daily lives of people. In this respect, neither income nor occupation were treated as a determinant of one's class position. It is the lifestyle that sets the big picture. For instance, as in the case of the father retired from his job as policeman, the income statement of the informant seems to be in contradiction with his lifestyle. His wife had never worked before, and it seems that now the father has only his pension as a monthly income. Meanwhile, they own another apartment in Istanbul besides the one which I have visited, a duplex apartment in a gated community. All three of their sons were attending private schools, and next year the eldest will be going to Germany for his M.A. studies. Besides, travelling to Paris or passing summer vacations in huge thermal hotels of Turkey, there are other indicators that give one the sense of talking to a family capable of maintaining a well-to-do lifestyle. Likewise, all of the other informants of this study were living more or less similar lifestyles, having similar backgrounds and thus converging opinions and worldviews. Such convergence is what sets the basis of Bourdieu's identification of class composed of people holding similar positions within the field, and therefore

having corresponding habitus. That is also why such personal histories are taken into consideration in identifying the informants as members of the same class fragment.

It is the economic and cultural capital that Bourdieu prioritizes regarding one's positioning within the social field. These two axis' role in rendering one different, thus more prestigious in comparison to the others was extensively analyzed in *Distinction* (1996b). Economic capital is an indicative of one's possessions convertible in money or property rights. On the other hand, again attainable to a large extent in relation to one's financial power, cultural capital may be founded in three-forms: either embodied (dispositions), or objectified (cultural goods) or in its institutionalized form (academic qualifications) (Bourdieu, 1986). However, despite their role in one's social position, social capital and symbolic capital<sup>38</sup> are required regarding their potential in rendering these basic capitals performable within the social field, nurturing a social recognition, and thus rendering power legitimate. In other words, these latter are crucial in transforming the *vis insita* –“a force inscribed in objective and subjective structures”, into *lex insita*- “the principle underlying the immanent regularities of the social world”( Bourdieu, 1986, p.46). In this respect, when Bourdieu says that the prestige of a salon does not only depend on its exclusions, but also on the “quality” of the comers (Bourdieu, 1980/1990b, p.137), it is this natural appearance of quality, a justified classification, which is created by the symbolic power of their practices and its reproduction through social networks.

When the question of being bourgeois is taken in this respect, economic possessions indicated so far are insufficient to label the informants as the members of the bourgeoisie. It is not the ownership of a house, but the indices such as what kind

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<sup>38</sup> Social capital is basically the extent of the social network a person possesses and may mobilize. Even though it is not taken among three basic capital, the symbolic capital has a broader function in providing the capital or the competence a person possesses as recognizable and prestigious. (Bourdieu, 1986)

of a house, which neighborhood is it located in, what kind of a decoration is preferred that are essential in generating the acceptance criteria of the bourgeois salon. In this respect, the traces and patterns of a shared lifestyle generates itself. All the houses I visited were in considerably upper middle class neighborhoods, similar to the districts described above. On my way to interviews, billboards showing the remaining distance to neighboring private hospitals and schools were everywhere, giving a clue about the socio-spatial segregation in which these families maintain their lifestyles. Except from three families, among which one is a single-parent mother and the other two abstain from driving, all the families owned two cars. Most of the women I interviewed seemed to pay considerable attention to appearance. Houses were decorated in a similar fashion, as will be touched upon afterwards in detail. Private school is a widespread choice among parents. Shopping malls and central districts for shopping such as Taksim are the places informants frequently choose to buy their needs and pass time... This list may go on for pages. In brief, these families share a common lifestyle, which enables one to see a class based pattern.

As emphasized, these patterns show a significant shift when compared to the lifestyle of the previous generation as it is described by the informants. However, a deeper look also speaks of variations between families in the level of such a shift. For instance, on one hand there is a family whose parents had maintained themselves by subsistence farming, but the members of the following generation own their own company, live in a gated community with segregated swimming pools and may send their children to the USA for his BA studies. On the other hand, there is another family whose parents were also raised in Fatih, which is a central district in Istanbul and that ran a smaller enterprise. The following generation is now living in a gated

community and sending both their children to private schools etc. When these shifts are considered, it can be observed that some families experienced an embourgeoisement process, primarily through a striking rise in their economic power. Whereas some others already had a certain economic power but shared similar experiences in other respects. What I want to drive at is that the main difference between these two generations is not related essentially to the accumulation of capital, but more to its mobilization. That is what Bourdieu identifies as the transformation of resources into capitals, i.e., potentialities into actives. (Bourdieu, 1986) In my point of view, families' changing relation with the cultural capital and the construction of a relevant lifestyle is what one should focus on in order to read the mobilization process of available wealth.

Zehra was one of the most striking figures I met during field work. She is a single parent, raising her two kids all by herself. As a famous gynecologist, she was hard to reach to arrange a meeting. Apart from the work at her office, she was also making a TV program in Beyaz TV, organizing and attending meetings in different places like women's foundations or municipalities. She was also a member of several different organizations like Turkish Medical Associations, Doctors Worldwide and participated in their organizations as much as she could. Within such an intense working tempo, I could hardly get an appointment after several weeks. I was also warned right off the bat that the interview could not take more than an hour. She requested to do the interview in her office, which was situated in the gated community of Umraniye. It was one of the toughest interviews I did because of her skepticism about me and my study. However, she agreed to answer my questions. Her answers were brief and clear-cut. Regarding her own experiences within the field of education, she conveyed the following:

My family was not very involved in my education. They just provided financial support. I carried out my education on my own. I am the first university graduate in my small and extended family. That is why there was not anyone to guide me. My family was not a benchmark in my school choice. My high school was a local one, Kocamustafapaşa High School. [Why medicine?] I do not know. Since my childhood, I kept telling people that I would be a doctor. I do not know why. And that is what happened in the end. I was not doing anything with my family that would contribute to my education. (Zehra, see Appendix D, 22.)

There are two main points in her answer which speak for the field in general.

First that the educational status between generations is clearly on the rise. Second, the role attributed to parents in their children’s educational life is changing. When the first two generations were contrasted, it is seen that the institutionalized form of cultural capital, namely diplomas (Bourdieu, 1986), seem to have gained a rising importance among families, as shown in Table 4.

Table 4. The Educational Status of Two Generations

	<i>Never Attended School</i>	<i>Primary School</i>	<i>Secondary School</i>	<i>High School</i>	<i>Undergraduate Studies</i>	<i>Post Graduate Studies</i>
<i>1st Generation Women</i>	8	12	3	1		
<i>1st Generation Men</i>	3	13	5	2	1	
<i>2nd Generation Women</i>		1	1	5	5	
<i>2nd Generation Men</i>				2	8	2

As can be observed from Table 3, within the first generation, not attending school is highly common, especially among women. It is also clear that most of the

grandparents are primary school graduates, whereas having an undergraduate degree turns into an exceptional condition. Within the second generation, the educational level increased considerably, mostly high school for women and undergraduate degrees for men. When it is compared to the previous generation, it becomes significant that there is no person who did not attend school and that, instead of having an undergraduate degree, having only a primary school degree turns into being exceptional. When their high schools are examined, it is seen that fourteen among nineteen people had graduated from public high schools; in which four of them later turned into highly sought after Anatolian high schools Kabataş, Beşiktaş Atatürk and Vefa Anatolian high schools. It can be observed that there is only one person who graduated from a private high school.

When the third generation is considered, the tableau takes a new orientation. The question to be addressed is no more about the educational status of future generations regarding the turn of an undergraduate degree into a given requirement. As a consequence of the transference of education from a state-led service to a family concern after 1980 process in Turkey and the rise of private educational sector, new questions arise. The distinction providing boundary is no more about the level of education, but of the school attended, the social network endowed or the foreign languages learned. With similar concerns in mind, private schooling is clearly widespread within the third generation. Among 12 families, eight of them were sending their children to private schools. Among the remaining four families, only two of them indicated that they had chosen public school on purpose, and it was a choice which they made concerning “preferable Anatolian high schools”. One of the other two families that did not choose private schools underlined that they had sent their children to public school because of a temporary economic problem they

had faced and the informant stated that they were planning to send their son to a private university as they were doing for his sister. Even though the other family did their best to convince their son to go to a private school, where they had previously sent their older son, the child insisted on going to an Anatolian high school, which he had already decided on.

Unlike previous generations, a post-graduate plan was considered by most of the families. Some also mentioned their consideration of foreign universities as a choice not to be overlooked. However, a great majority of mothers underlined the drawbacks of sending their children abroad at the beginning of their adolescence, and thus stated that they would prefer for them to leave in the post graduate level. Such a stance's detailed reasoning will be elaborated in the following chapter. Additionally, sending children abroad turned out to be a gendered decision for many families. That is to say, it was observed that families act much more hesitatively when they think about sending their girls abroad to universities as compared to their sons.

Among private school choosers, it was identified that the options offered by the educational market as analyzed in details in the second chapter were highly valid in the decisions of families. Nine families among the twelve described the schools present in Table 2, as the schools most favorable for them to choose. As was clear in the following citations, close attention provided by schools, their safety and hygienic measures and foreign language education were the main reasons mothers mentioned as factors influencing their decisions.

Follow-up is better in private schools, rather than attention... For one thing, I know she is safe. The school has a security staff. I am frightened. Turkey is not the United States, but still one can easily go into the school and harm them. I know where she is. I know she eats healthily, and that she is in a more hygienic place. (Nida, see Appendix D, 23.)

From now on, I think my choice would be a private school because now the state schools cannot provide much. Or maybe that's because we experienced private schools. However, I believe that the situation of state schools have changed since my daughter first went to one of them. Private school is not just different in terms of foreign language. For example, class size is smaller to ensure a comfortable education. The connection with the outside world is cut. The class profile is also different. Those are some factors. (Rümeysa, see Appendix D, 24.)

Both Nida and Rümeysa, and also their husbands are university graduates. Nida was active in the private sector and quit several years before. Her husband is still a director at a multinational company. Whereas both Rumeysa and her husband had always been working in a municipality and got promoted within years, now they are in a management position. When Şeyma's trajectory was considered, a slightly different pattern was observable. She is an elementary school graduate, whereas her husband is an engineer who also pursued his postgraduate studies. Şeyma was never employed. Her husband owned a textile company and thought about transferring his responsibilities to his two sons in the future, "of course after they earn their diplomas."<sup>39</sup>

One thing I know from my friends, not one family that can afford private schools chooses a state school. These schools have everything. Upper level managers, bankers, earning lot of money: They all choose private schools. If parents are not wealthy, it can pose problems in the future, because of differing social circles. For example, my child studied with the grandchildren of very rich men. Those kids were coming to school with bodyguards. (Şeyma, see Appendix D, 26.)

When both the informants' background and their discourses on private schooling are considered together, it supports the argument that faith in "schooling" in the general meaning of the term lost its meritocratic power. Families no longer believe in the idea that a successful student will manage to climb the social ladder. Instead, a certain transition from meritocracy into parentocracy is observed among

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<sup>39</sup> "Elbette diplomalarımı aldıktan sonra"

informants, which Brown identifies as “where a child’s education is increasingly dependent upon the wealth and the wishes of parents rather than the ability and the efforts of the pupils” (Brown, 1990, p.393). It is seen that by underlining several advantages, such as the security, higher level of care from teachers or the networking opportunity provided by schools, families are choosing private schools in order to back up their struggle to maintain their gained position in society. The period through which the informants’ had passed through the educational system, which is mostly the years of the 1980s and 1990s, coincide with the time during which the emphasis put on credentials and the discourse of human capital had risen significantly, both in the international and the national arena (Balkan & Rutz, 2009; Ball, 2003; Kaplan, 2006). The rising level of education among informants when compared to the previous generation should be embraced under the light of these macro level politics. Further, as regards the dynamics analyzed in the previous chapter, the neoliberal policies within the educational field proliferated markedly within the last two decades. So, the intersection of the devalorization of the formal education system and the rising purchasing power of informants was also considered when the massive orientation towards private education within the third generation was analyzed. What is significant is that despite parents’ highly heterogeneous backgrounds, as observed in citations above, the private education had been a common strategy they pursued with similar justifications in order to provide the required equipment for their child, which the market demanded and which the state no longer provided. However, in spite of such a mutual inclination, the space opened for the family in the educational field which Zehra had pointed at as the second main intergenerational difference, seemed to be much more heterogeneous in terms of the strategies conducted by families. In other words, while the guidance of macro

politics towards private education was willingly welcomed by informants on a large scale, the changing patterns of parenting(s) was highly fragmented regarding the particularities of each family. Now, in the following section, firstly the changing ways of parenting, and secondly, their fragmented types capable of influencing the macro politics in return will be explored.

### 3.2 A bourgeois type of parenting on the rise

One of the things I had observed in women's narratives was that they were constantly questioning and reconsidering their own decisions and practices concerning their children. In most cases, such an attitude was identified by informants as a process of self-development. However, what was striking is that it was their own selves or their peers which they had taken as a reference point, or as a role model. An appeal to their own experiences, a certain recourse to the way their parents would have behaved was missing. Nida's following words were noteworthy in this respect, regarding her emphasis on the lack of experience transference between the first and second generations. With reference to her own difficulties in taking a private lesson with a friend and being compared to her during these studies she said:

It seems like some period was skipped. I believe they do not know. Or maybe they did not live it? Sometimes you live that frustration, you feel that feeling and you try to prevent the person you love to feel that way. But you cannot help them if you do not know the feeling at all. That is why I pay utmost attention with my children, because I experienced those feelings. They never have private lessons with a group. They shall have it one-to-one, individually. My parents would not intervene if I told them. (Nida, see Appendix D, 26.)

Such a rhetoric that characterizes one's own educational history as a personal achievement and success was widely common among informants. Furthermore, except from two informants, who had referred to their mothers as influential in their

schooling process, most of the informants emphasized their differences from their parents, which they qualified as bad examples, as did Nida. Yet, even though her mother was an elementary school dropout, her father was a university graduate who had migrated to Austria for both education and working. So, even though she had talked about her past in a similar narration, she was a contradictory example amongst others regarding her opportunities of taking private lessons. In terms of a similar narration, there were three main aspects which informants narrated about their own experiences.

First, parents were not involved in the educational trajectories of their children, sometimes leading to a perception of carelessness by the informants. Even if they were involved, it is more of a restricted role in which parents help their children "in case of a need," but otherwise monitoring their educational life both within the house and outside the house like raising contacts with teacher, etc., was absent among first generation parents. Besides, in terms of involvement, a certain degree of gender related guidance is observable. Two of the informants had stated that their parents wanted them not to pursue their education even if their brothers did. Additionally, without covering things such as favoritism, it is clear from Table 3 that women did not have the same amount of encouragement or need to have diplomas, at least concerning the undergraduate degree.

Secondly, families were bigger in number in the second generation, usually over four people, and it is recognized that a hierarchical relationship between parents and children; and further between siblings was a fundamental value shared by families. The significant point of this issue was that most of the informants mentioned the role that their brothers and sisters had played in their own schooling years, sometimes helping them with homework or giving advice about what to do in

the future, etc. Furthermore, in some cases, bigger brothers also undertook the role of helping their parents in paying for the education of their siblings. Rûmeysa was one of the informants who mentioned her husband's respectable effort in making his siblings continue their education, as did he:

He always backed his siblings. For example he backed his brother a lot. My mother-in-law tells that he took care of his brother's homework. The same happened for the father of my husband too, his father worked but all other siblings after him could graduate from university. (Rûmeysa, see Appendix D, 27.)

The support between siblings is an overlooked issue among studies that question families' role in the educational field (Lareau, 2003; Power, 2003; Reay, Crozier & James, 2011). However, when the dominant values of families are taken into consideration, such a point is worth considering regarding its power in enabling children to benefit from the experiences of elders, which parents cannot or do not offer. Hatice, who was raised with her three sisters and a brother, and a considerable amount of cousins, referred to the role her siblings played in her educational history as a milestone, effectuating her future life:

Of course my elders have some influence, my older brothers and sisters. They told that girls' vocational school would be good for me. And I said ok, but now I understand that I was so young and did not know if I wanted it or not. (Hatice, see Appendix D, 28.)

Thirdly, as underlined by Hatice, informants also talked about the lack of their parents' conscience in orienting their decision making process. Most of the informants attended the closest school or the one suggested by their elders. Vocational schools had been much more common in these decisions regarding their advantage in ensuring a job for the graduates. The informants did not choose the school they attended as do today's students. There are two main reasons for this. The first reason is that, during the time when the informants were students, Turkey did not have an education market like today. Relatedly, families were not offered the

same amount of options, formal schooling was perceived as satisfactory in reaching good positions in social life, and families did not have the necessity to search for better strategies. However, choice is a capital related opportunity, and the families within the primary generation lacked capital both in economic and cultural terms, reducing their options and strategies.

The changing class position of families should also be embraced in relation to the rising anxiety among middle class parents about their children's education in order to maintain or ameliorate their class position (Ball & Vincent, 2006; Lareau, 2003; Nelson, 2010). Within the literature, the changing parenting practices of families was identified in various ways, such as concerted cultivation (Lareau, 2003), parenting out of control (Nelson, 2010), intensive mothering (Hays, 1996) etc. A rising level of monitoring, planning and control may be considered as the prominent traits seen in these new modes of parenting. Parents' willingness to enrich their children with a variety of extracurricular activities and to raise a social and a self-confident person is also underlined. Furthermore, parents also have much more knowledge and extended social networks that allow them to be more familiar with the field of education.

Within this frame, it is possible to talk about a rising convergence among conservative groups' way of parenting towards the "ideal-type" outlined above. Since, in contrast to a narrative filled with impediments, restrictions and personal efforts, which informants constructed regarding their personal histories, their discourses concerning the educational strategies they are developing for their children were presented in a totally different narration. First of all, in place of a lack, parents rising role in the educational field was concentrated around two concepts: caring and choice. Rümeyza was the only women among informants who had

attended an Anatolian high school, which corresponds to a distinctive choice for her generation. Her parents were exceptional regarding their guidance of their daughter to consider one of the “best-known” schools. In spite of such a background, her narrative about the change in the ways of parenting between generations was not different from the others:

We are deeply involved with our children’s education. One of them goes to primary school, fourth grade. Next year fifth grade, secondary school. The other one just started high school. We now take care of them more than before. Both for follow-up of the courses and the choice or change of schools. We take care of every aspect. In our time, there was not a thing like school choice. Now, we choose primary school, we choose secondary school... (Rümeysa, see Appendix D, 29.)

In her well-known book *Unequal Childhoods*, Lareau (2003) categorizes two kinds of childrearing practices with regard to the class condition of families. First one is natural growth, associated with working class children who have to paddle their own canoe in the education system because of being deprived of any kind of capital heritage from the family. On the other hand, there is the middle class child, who grows through a process which Lareau identifies as “concerted cultivation”, in which parents do their best and use the time to their advantage in order to cultivate their children from various aspects; both academic and extracurricular. As is discernible from this last citation of Rümeysa, a shift from natural growth to a concerted cultivation is obvious among informants’ narratives<sup>40</sup>.

By pointing out similar issues, namely class related intergenerational differences in parenting practices among women who had experienced social mobility and had become middle class members, Lawler (2000) adds two different grounds in analysis. Firstly, she focuses on how parenting is being constructed through narrations and how class based factors play a role in this process. In this

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<sup>40</sup> It is seen that a similar finding is also underlined by Canan Aratemür Çimen (2015) concerning the changing ways of parenting in relation to families’ experience of social mobility in neoliberal times.

respect, she emphasizes the differences between women's narratives of their childhood turning around a sense of "lacking" and their narratives about their own mothering, which is identified as the "right way of parenting". On the other hand, she draws attention to the gendered character of parenting and shows how women's "desire to mother unlike her mother" (Lawler, 2000, p.83), becomes the basis of a certain construction of subjectivity through their narration of "good mothering". This second point will set the basis of the following section, which basically questions gendered division of labor among conservative bourgeois families, and how women construct their own subjectivities through a "good way of mothering".

### 3.3 Twenty first century heroes: mothers as educators

Several weeks after my visit to Nida's house, she sent me a WhatsApp message with an explanatory note attached on top saying, "Mothers, please read". It was a kind of social media post narrating an instructive story as follows:

One day, when Edison came home, he gave a paper to his mom and said "My teacher gave me this paper and warned me to give it only to you". The mother read the paper to her son with tears: "Your son is a genius. This school is too small for him, and we do not have a sufficient teacher to educate him. Please educate him by yourself. After many long years, following Edison's mother's death, he was one of the biggest scientists of the century and one day while he was going over his old family stuff, he found a folded paper in a corner of a drawer and opened it. In his paper, it was written: "Your son is a goofy (mentally deranged) boy. We do not authorize any more for him to come to this school. After long hours of crying he wrote in his diary the following words: "Thomas Alva Edison, was a 'goofy' boy turned into a scientist of the century by a heroic mother". (see Appendix D, 30.)

Despite the story's probably fictional character, the heroic definition of mothers regarding all the loving and caring they put into their children seemed to be the main point of the message, which rendered it valuable enough to be shared. Why does it sound so usual for a teacher to write a note directly to the mother? Why does

the absence of the father in the story not make one question whether he had played a part in his child's education and thus deserve a share of the heroic power or not...

Women's identification with the private sphere, domestic roles and reproductive activities and men's belonging to the public sphere, production and power have long been, and still are, the main concerns of feminist literature (Collins, 1994). Trivialization of women's part in these constructed dichotomies and legitimization of such constructions through discourses on nature were accentuated as one of the primary basis on which patriarchal ideology actualized itself. In this respect, womanhood defined through motherhood turned into a core patriarchal argument promoting and rendering this abstraction of sexual division of labor real.

Regarding the permanence of gendered relations within the domestic sphere, despite changes taking place in the organization of production within the last two centuries, Chodorow describes women's mothering as "one of the few universal and enduring elements of the sexual division of labor" (Chodorow, 1978, p.3).

Urbanization, industrialization and the passage from an agricultural society to one producing in factories and consuming in cities is more or less the picture she was talking about, which has not evolved into a new picture since then. However, her argument still prevails: as the productive practices left the house, reproductive practices had gained prominence and turned into the primary criteria through which women were defined (Chodorow, 1978; Hochschild & Machung, 1990; Sullivan, 2004). The rising level of women's education and their entrance into paid labor from the second half of the twentieth century does not seem to mutate this "divine responsibility", but effectuated the ways of childrearing in relation to class-based factors (Hays, 1996).

That said, under the discourse of a continuing mothering, there lies a variety of different types of mothering which should not be overlooked. Ultimately, mothering is a context-specific social construction which takes shape in relation to time, space, culture and thus which transforms according to the society in which it is recognized. In this respect, two essential points emerge. Firstly, as proposed by Ruddick (1980), taking mothering as an identification within the limits of “maternal practice” (p.18) would be beneficial for two reasons. One, for stripping it from its naturalness-attached character and to show its generalizable capacity further than women body. Two, for revealing its structured and transforming character, which Reay asserts as a shift in seeing motherhood from “a state of being” to a “state of doing” (Reay, 1998, p.8).

Secondly, as clearly manifested by Thurer (1995) through her historical engagement into the issue, in relation to the changing expectations of cultures, the definitions of mothering or further “good mothering” had significantly changed throughout history starting from the Stone Ages and leading to a type of scientific mothering with the turn of the twentieth century. In this respect, she speaks of the rising professionalism in mothering with all those experts and specialists which turn mothers primarily into informed trainers and caretakers and later into “servants” (p.258) of children regarding mothers’ increasingly encompassing role on children’s emotional well-being. Mothers, by this means, become stuck between their realities stemming from their womanhood and their mythical presence determined by the patriarchal expectations of society in the guise of expert discourses.

Analyzing mothers’ maternal practices requires one in the first place to understand the legitimate ways of mothering specific to each society, yet more to each group within the society. Therefore, value patterns and their variations between

groups, such as classes, become a prominent arena to be questioned in order to grasp their symbolic worthiness. In Turkey, women's position in society has long been analyzed under two titles: one, in relation to changing social dynamics after the foundation of the new Republic (Arat, 1994; Kandiyoti, 1987) and two, with regards to the changing conditions women experience through their immigration trajectories (Erman, 1998; 2001). The first group of studies focuses on the improvements in the legal basis of women's rights but the continuity of their "emancipated but unliberated" (Kandiyoti, 1987) condition under "modernized" patriarchal constraints. Whereas, the second group center upon women's changing status with regards to the changing organization of labor in the big cities from agriculture to industry. Contraction of women's presence into the private sphere with regards to their loss of control over production is a shared view of scholars. The modernist vision that predicts an ideal with modernization, with rising educational and occupational opportunities for women in an urban setting, decreasing fertility, increasing values of equality among society etc. seem to be challenged by the empirical evidence. As underlined by Gündüz Hoşgör and Smits (2008), even though such a trend has taken a U-curve in the course of time and women's participation in the labor market has risen considerably, the statistics appear quite low in contrast to other developed countries. A sketchy picture of the last three decades shows that the number of university graduated women rose from 1.8 % in 1998 to 5.8 % in 2006, along with the increase in the age of marriage and a decrease in the fertility rates. However, the share of women seeking /having jobs decreased from 34.3 % in 1998 to 22% in 2008 (World Bank, 2009). In 2009, female labor force participation in Turkey was 25%, while it showed an average of 62 % in OECD countries and 64% in EU countries according to the latest numbers from 2007 (World Bank, 2009). The ongoing

sovereignty of a strong patriarchal ideology in the country has been touched on by scholars as the primary ground to search for the explanations of such a striking difference in statistics (Hoşgör & Smits, 2008).

Dayıoğlu and Kirdar (State Planning Organization & World Bank, 2010a) emphasize a shift of focus among studies within the last few years from migration based explanations towards more micro factors such as schooling, age, and marriage etc. The rising significance of other factors besides migration, which pertain to a large extent to unskilled women, corresponding to 74% of the population of women in urban settings, may be a reason for such a shift (State Planning Organization & World Bank, 2010b). When the focus is narrowed down to skilled women in the urban area, another striking picture emerges. It is observed that the number of wage-earner women rose in between 1988 to 2006 from 74.8 % to 80.3. However, despite the rising level of education as underlined above, the participation of university graduated women in the labor market decreased from the mid 90s and has stagnated since the 2000s. While the participation rate of university graduate women was around 80% in the 90s, it declined to 70% in the 2000s. Furthermore, while 35% of employed women were single, the rate fell to 19.5% when marriage-status was taken into consideration (State Planning Organization & World Bank, 2010a). Three reasons were underlined by these studies in explaining the current situation. The first was that the drop in wages in the beginning of the 2000s due to economic crisis may be considered as a reason for skilled women's abstention from employment. Second, the rising household income of married women should be recognized. Third, and the one most emphasized, societal norms, and more importantly childrearing, were reasons why women did not work or quit their work. According to Aran et al.'s research (State Planning Organization & World Bank, 2010b), the birth of the first

child was the main reason that high skilled urban women gave as their motivation for leaving the job market and becoming housewives.

Such a motivation played a great role for the informants of this study too. As mentioned, only one quarter of the women were actively employed, whereas four others had been working before but later on quit their jobs. Nida, who graduated from an engineering department and had worked in the private sector for years, explained her contentment in quitting with the following words:

I cannot do it, if I think about my gains and my losses. I did not work, I learned Qur'an; I did not work, I fell in love with the Prophet; I did not work, I loved my daughter. I loved my home. Thank God I do not need it, but I would work if I had the need. Can a mother work and be a mother in the same time, I'm sorry but do not think so. I am not that modern. I believe the mother should stay at home. I will see what I can do, when they grow up a little. Maybe I can have my own job. Something I can do by myself. Let's hope for the best. My mother was a housewife too. My family is very sad, they cannot accept that an engineering graduate woman stays at home. My mother and father-in-law are very happy because they know, they know that if I work, neither of the children would study. Especially my son. He is a boy who needs a lot of support. Until last year, we were always side-by-side studying, but I realized that I get lost and wear myself and him out in the same time. I want to be a mother because I just want to be a mother. (Nida, see Appendix D, 31.)

The emphasis put on the importance of caring for the family and for the children was a well-accepted consensus among informants. Nida's calculation between the losses and gains in making a decision about quitting work was a clear display of it. However, as is clear in her narrative, the motivation behind such a decision is mainly about being capable of spending sufficient time with her children. Hence, when the currently working informants' jobs' flexible character is considered, which gives them the chance of arranging their time and of spending as much time as they want with their children, women's self-identification as the primary party responsible for children, and their qualification of such responsibility as a gain, should be taken as an opinion held among all the informants.

A discourse of task sharing between partners was rare. When I explained that I had been conducting my interviews only with mothers, there seemed to be a certain kind of pride expressed by informants, agreeing with me on such a preference. Most of the interviews took place in the daytime, when the fathers were working. It was the mothers themselves who decided the time of the interviews. There were only a few interviews which we could not schedule during the daytime. The women mentioned that evenings were the busiest time of their days when fathers and children are back in the house. Furthermore, they thanked me for creating an event which allowed them to digress from their daily routine. However, the duration of the evening interviews were much more limited since the women were sitting on thorns, while answering my questions as their husbands and children were “waiting” for them. If the interview was taking place during the day, it was generally at a salon where the women invited me to sit. However, if it was in the evening, we would either choose one of the floors of the house, if it was a duplex, or we would go to the kitchen and create an intimate, woman to woman, environment of conversation. During evening interviews, we got interrupted many times by children asking a particular question or forcing an end to the interview as soon as possible.

There are two essential dimensions that women take responsibility for in order to be a good mother. Firstly, there is the corporeal-material dimension, which involves efforts like going to parent-teacher meetings, taking children to various extracurricular activities, dealing with their transportation issues, preparing the house and creating a proper environment for one to work and concentrate in, looking for the school material a child uses and supplying their needs. Moreover, devoting close attention to children and trying to spend quality time with them should also be

considered in this respect. The following words belong to Feyza, who is the owner of a boutique.

Of course, for example we were reading books at home. Me and his father, we always read books for him in the sleeping hour. His father arrives late, that's why it's generally me. That is how it is. Theater, movies: I keep up with them and then we go all together. (Feyza, see Appendix D, 32.)

As will be analyzed in detail, Feyza is one of the most rigorous parents I met in the field. Even though she was an employed woman, she was highly attentive in scheduling her time firstly with regards to the requirements of her son's education. Besides managing a boutique, she spends a considerable amount of time carrying her son from one activity to another after taking him from school each day. As she underlined, she was also careful to cultivate an atmosphere of ambition within the house, so that her child may take her as a model. Like most of the other informants, she was also trying as much as she could to share opinions with her son and try to understand his emotions about the activities she was orienting him towards. She emphasized the importance of these small talks in attempting to understand the life direction that would make her son most happy in the future. This last point is important, since it constitutes the second essential point women paid attention to in their childrearing practices. "Happiness" was a magical word women made reference to in order to express their role in providing the emotional well-being of their children. Sema, a Qur'an course graduate and a housewife, underlined this second dimension as the primary role she had undertaken in order to ensure a balance between her son and her husband, who urges the children to get better grades and to enter into the best universities. She implied: "My husband is very oppressive; I

perform the duty of a balancer. He should do the job he loves. His occupation and school must be the one that he loves. Otherwise, he would be unhappy<sup>41</sup>”.

Aside from expecting and expressing by words the achievements of their children, a father’s role in childrearing was quite restricted, as is manifested in Sema’s words. Fathers generally got involved in issues either to give directions or to make final decisions among the options submitted by the mother, or to take care of financial issues. Strikingly, such an unequal division of labor between parents was not presented by mothers as a problem to be solved. On the contrary, even by Nida who had quit her job in order to be a better mother, and who had complained about her husband’s indifference in familial issues throughout our conversation, stated that the role undertaken by fathers was as a relieving factor for mothers:

I am the one that always takes care of him. My husband takes care of the financial aspects. All joking aside, I don’t want to be unfair to him. He looks down on the issues. He is more objective. I cannot do something for example, I get stuck. He then suddenly tells me something, and we do what he says. (Nida, see Appendix D, 33.)

Concerning the issue of fathering, women did not have a problem with the gender roles attributed to themselves. On the contrary, most of them adopted a discourse justifying why things should be maintained in this manner. Parenting was also presented as mothering in their discourses, and it was framed as if it should be mothering since it contains affective aspects which necessitate a women to handle. When informants’ changing status within society is considered in contrast to the previous generations regarding their rising educational levels and entrance in the formal economy, etc., the persistence of such mothering discourse should be grasped as something more than the continuation of patriarchy within society. As regards the changing coping mechanisms women adopt in different patriarchal societies,

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<sup>41</sup> “Benim kocam çok baskıcı. Ben dengeleyici görevi görüyorum. Oğlum istediği işi yapmalı. İşi de, okulu da sevdiği olmalı. Diğer türlü mutsuz olur.”

Kandiyoti (1988) lays emphasis on these struggles in the first place in order to understand both the workings of patriarchy specific to each society and to the changing forms of agencies women may adopt. It is these “patriarchal bargains”, as she names them, which should be considered in understanding women’s strategies in building up their agencies. Concerning the Turkish context, she also underlines the significance of childrearing as an important strategy women are adopting in order to be accepted into men’s families (Kandiyoti, 1987). Within this frame, it is possible to say that rather than just being the outcome of patriarchal constraints, it is possible to interpret informants’ intentional embrace of motherhood as a strategy they use to gain a better status and to open up a zone of control for themselves in a highly patriarchal society like Turkey. However, there is also a second ground on which this construction of agency is being built. As mentioned above, there is also a class based demarcation line by which these women legitimize their control over children as being “knowledgeable” and therefore “good mothers” unlike the mothers of the previous generations.

#### 3.4 Mothers as nodes of information and the transformative force in the field

As has been seen up to now, even though their educational and occupational status diverge in relation to the previous generation or among themselves, mothering becomes the primary axis around which women construct their subjectivities. Even though the historical conditions and macro policies do effect shifts in mothering practices, it is ultimately related to these families’ class condition with regards to both their ownership of capital and of the know-how in mobilizing the capital possessed. In this regard, as I observed, education turns into one of the main subjects women discuss in their social network, especially in *güns*.

Regarding the social function of *güins*, as a place to socialize and to create a social network among acquainted women, it is not surprising to see the question of education become a shared concern among women with similar class positions. Aside from daily talks and experience sharing, *güins* turn into private zones where women's research about tutors, schools, experts, i.e. the right people to know and the right strategies to pursue, takes place. In this respect, it is also possible to identify *güins* as a meeting spot where knowledge of the educational field flows horizontally and contributes to the development of new strategies.

Regarding the channels of information middle class families are capable of reaching and using thanks to the different forms of capital they own, Ball and Vincent (1998) make a distinction between the formal and the informal information channels; i.e. cold and hot knowledge respectively. The formal channel is constituted of the institutional knowledge that schools, tutors, courses are publishing through websites, seminars, booklets, brochures etc. It is the kind of knowledge analyzed in the second chapter, a "knowledge of presentation" in other words by which families learn about these service providers and gain information about the course of events and novelties in the field. State publications may also be considered in this respect. The number of women who emphasized their personal effort in reaching rankings and statistics was quite few, whereas women "passively" reaching cold knowledge, like looking through a brochure or an advertisement was much more widespread. Nonetheless, it is observed that none of the channels had been as effective in shaping the field as hot knowledge.

"Hearing through the grapevine" contains a certain power different than formal knowledge, since it is mostly the experience, the subjective dimension that is being transferred rather than a marketed presentation. When it is considered that

these families are closely positioned within the field of power, thus having similar backgrounds, capitals and future prospects, it should not be surprising that they are more convinced by the hot knowledge they gain from other experience, since the possibility of experiencing similar occurrences is pretty high. This also incites similitudes between families' strategies and increasing homogenization within the field under the influence of market rules. Şeyma was a striking example in this respect. She is an elementary school graduate and expressed that she could not have gotten a good grasp of the current field of education if she did not have her friends who also reside in the same gated community. Thanks to her friends and relatives, she gained knowledge about the chance of studying in universities abroad and sent her eldest son to a university in the US, who could not pass the national university entrance exam. Notwithstanding, she even underlined her sense of defeat when she heard about the strategies expressed by the younger generation mothers today, whose children are now the same age as her younger son. She said: "Other parents have an influence because you had to do that. We have a relative here, those parents run against each other. Sometimes I speak to myself and say: 'we were not like that.'" <sup>42</sup>

In fact, schools, as the primary actors of the educational field, are also aware of this knowledge flow among women and their power in shaping the field in return. In this respect, private schools seem to be trying their best to be referred with positive reputation within these hot knowledge channels. Events organized by schools for mothers such as seminars, courses, tours seem to be hot topics discussed in *güns*. Arzu, who is a housewife engaged with charity work with her friends and who repeatedly emphasized her curiosity in self-development, referred to her expectations of the private school, where she was sending her two children:

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<sup>42</sup> "Diğer ailelerin etkisi var çünkü yapman gerekirdi. Bizim burada bir akrabamız var. Bu anneler babalar birbiriyle yarışıyor. Bazen kendi kendime konuşup diyorum ki, 'Biz böyle değildik.'"

They send us a questionnaire at the beginning of the academic year. We filled in this year. Depending on the results, they invite us somewhere. For example, this year we had a trip to Konya. We went there with the mothers. Maybe a Çanakkale trip will be scheduled. They include parents. But I liked one thing in that school on the Anatolian side. They give singing courses to parents. I demanded the same from our school, because I love music. I sing very off key, however. But I can read musical notes. (Arzu, see Appendix D, 34.)

Besides from these activities, it is also observed that schools contribute in various ways by creating a network among mothers. On one hand, informants underlined that schools' eagerness in trying to get in contact with them through various channels and in keeping them informed about their children was one of the reasons they chose these schools. On the other hand, schools' preference in using the application WhatsApp groups for informing parents of the same class on a day to day basis was striking. Because, further than being informed, it is observed that these groups contribute to intimacies among women. In addition to these channels' contributing to the sense of belonging among women, and thus in schools' advertisement in their hot knowledge channels, the same communication channels also function as a place of organization among mothers. The challenging part of this networking is that from time to time these groups may turn into solidarity networks among parents in which they consider their dissatisfaction about schools or teachers and take action in this respect. Several examples that caused the firing of teachers were also mentioned during interviews, pointing out the power mothers hold in their hands within the field of private education.

Before fieldwork, I was expecting to see more mothers interacting with parent-teacher associations. However, there were only two mothers who confirmed that they were involved with such organizations. It was a general opinion among mothers that private schools do not need parents to work for the school, thus the parent-teacher association in these schools were in fact working to organize events so

that parents may get together. The mechanism seemed to take a distinct road from the one that I had imagined. Rather than an organization under the school's control, parents' involvement in this new trend seemed to be much more individualized and parent-oriented. During our conversations, informants stated that it was normal to see parents dispute and group together as a consequence of the discussions taking place in WhatsApp groups. Daily issues, nation-wide matters or opinions about the school or a teacher are some of the topics informants emphasized. As a matter of fact, within such a family- thus consumer-oriented tendency of the educational field in which "conscious" mothers build a considerable amount of agency through their motherhoods, it is an expectable case regarding mothers' differentiating patterns in identifying how to be a good mother and hence trying to participate and transform the field in this respect. In this last section of the chapter, the variations observed among informant's mothering practices will be observed.

### 3.5 Types of mothering

All the points emphasized so far, namely mothers' interest in educational issues, use of their social capital in order to gain knowledge of the field and their converging strategies to head for private schools were more or less common in the narratives of all the informants. It was obvious that mothers were not envisaging a "natural growth" model for their children. However, their way of formulating a type of "concerted cultivation" was differing from one another. The informants' way of framing their opinions or practices was clearly manifesting the fact that a homogeneous class strategy is an abstraction far from reality.

### 3.5.1 Umbrella mothers

Nida, to whom I had referred for various different reasons in this chapter, is a person typical of the group that I defined as umbrella mothers. Umbrella is the term I chose regarding these mother's eagerness in self-developing in a way to become capable of attending to every part of their children's education. Her following words are significant for this identification:

I would like for my son to have more awareness. I would for him to think more about life, about education, about school. The school must give something to the student. It is just about the curriculum; it does not have any differences compared to my own high school. To be honest, my son is not that receptive. Sometimes he says: 'You know too much and you want everyone to know that much', but I say that it is my reason to exist. (Nida, see Appendix D, 35.)

Putting their *raison d'être* primarily for their children's education is an outstanding characteristic of umbrella mothers. Furthermore, self-perceiving as the primary source of education in a manner of rendering schools of secondary importance was also a distinctive tendency observed among them. In this respect, as underlined by Nida, umbrella mothers are trying to acquaint themselves with a sufficient expert knowledge and thus to follow related seminars, workshops and gatherings. These occasions were narrated as the vantage points by which mothers took advantage from and hence were able to perceive schools', yet furthermore policies' functioning in a critical manner. As she conveyed, after quitting her job, Nida could have recognized her son's fear in taking exams. During the times we met, she was taking him to an education specialist each Saturday, to a therapy called "personal alchemy". Aside from her faith in this therapy's usefulness for her son's future life, she also perceived it as an opportunity for herself to act more consciously in role modeling. The conviction in the professional knowledge for mothering was also emphasized by other informants. Ebru, who is a high school graduate, and who

had been a housewife for years, underlined the topic by referring to her enthusiasm in reaching for such occasions in İzmit, a smaller town of Turkey, where she had been living, until her older daughter's entrance in one of the leading universities of Istanbul. She underlined that she had been spending a significant amount of time in those kinds of trainings.

There was some kind of a parent school. It was for just one month. Then you received a certificate afterwards. Here in İzmit, I always went to the seminars of the consultants that the school invited to see if I could learn something and help my children. One thing that a consultant said was: "If you came here today to listen to me, your children will definitely climb the ladder. You care about them, and it doesn't have something to do with me." I also believe that. (Ebru, see Appendix D, 36.)

Sümeyra was another example. She had also graduated from an engineering department and worked in the private sector for many years. Then, several years ago, she quit her job to be able to better take care of her children. She did not seem to be as mobile as Ebru when it came to following different occasions within the city. However, she underlined that she was very talented in using the internet for her own development and turning her private time inside the house into qualified purposes. Aside from articles, videos and discussions, she was engaged with on the internet, she also underlined the importance of making her own analysis based on the cold knowledge she attained from different channels:

I am not oppressive, but I do everything and follow up on everything. I read his booklets before an exam, I follow up on his homework. I follow up with the leaflets of the schools, and I prepare Excel tables. (Sümeyra, see Appendix D, 37.)

Self-perception as a conscious parent having the necessary knowledge to view the school critically, and thus casting a role for themselves in equipping their children with those features that they find missing in a school's education, is observable among umbrella mothers. In place of attributing school a mission to enrich their children from various aspects, these mothers attribute school and

teachers a limited function in the educational project they imagine for their own children. In this respect, mothers' role in orienting their children, especially for extracurricular activities, attracts one's attention. Feyza was striking in this respect. As mentioned above, she was a willing young mother who both managed a boutique and monitored her son's educational matters. Regarding her choice of school, she underlined that the academic success of the school was an important reason for her preference. However, she was aware of the fact that it is not a sufficient criteria to be identified as successful in today's world. Therefore, she was undertaking this role of bridging the gap, which she diagnosed for her son's future.

It is important that they train the children well for the exams. I don't believe that they are socially sufficient. They don't do much. I try to complete that aspect. Because my child should have a good education, but he must not be socially lacking. I attach great importance to this. Aikido, football, basketball, tennis, ice skating. I want it so much. I strive for it. If I let him, he would just sit in front of the television at home. Instead of doing that, or having bad habits, he should do sports. Of course I provide guidance. (Feyza, see Appendix D, 38.)

However, neither their own effort to be "better" moms, nor their exertion to carry their children to extracurricular activities, was perceived as sufficient for educating their children in an ideal manner. Umbrella mothers were keen about making their children internalize these opportunities in their daily lives. Two points were emphasized for this purpose. One, the importance of a well-organized schedule was emphasized both for the children and for the mothers.

Mothers' requirement to synchronize their time primarily with regards to their children and to use the remaining time for themselves was an agreed upon opinion. Furthermore, they also expected from their social group to respect this prioritized schedule. Since, umbrella mothers were highly sensitive about making themselves present for their children, especially during their study hours. "Do yourself, what you expect your child to do" was a shared ideal among them, in a manner of supporting

Bourdieu's insistence on the practices of parents in habitus formation process. Ebru's following words was a clear display of it:

They were studying, even in the summer, every morning for one hour. The day was divided into sections: Turkish, Social Science, or whatever they were studying. For the first hour, you wake up at eight o'clock, read 20 pages until nine o'clock, or solve 100 questions. I did not work in the mornings, and I did not drink coffee with my friends, and they got used to it. I brought my book and read with them. You should read with them. Children will do the same as you do. It is not possible for a child to love to read and study on her own. (Ebru, see Appendix D, 39.)

### 3.5.2 Coordinative mothers

The second group of mothers, which I call coordinative mothers, are highly similar to umbrella mothers regarding their sensibility in educational issues, both in terms of self-development and orientation of the children. However, unlike the first group, coordinative mothers, as the name indicates, are much more open to school administrations' or teachers' involvement in the decision making process about their children's future. For instance, Rümeyşa, a director in municipality as introduced above, was highly interested in the decision making process in her children's education. However, rather than referring to a variety of experts, the specialists provided by the school where she sent her children were taken by her as a sufficient source of knowledge. She was trying to follow all the warnings and advice coming from the school. However, coordinative mothers did not undertake a role more than they were charged for by these significant specialists.

My daughter is very disciplined. She works well at home. We do not interfere very much. For example, when she was preparing for high school, yes, we controlled her progress; because her teachers were giving feedback. But personally, I did not have to control her very much. (Rümeyşa, see Appendix D, 40.)

Additionally, after the end of our conversation, Rümeyşa introduced me to another friend working in the same municipality, since she thought she was an

ideally suited mother, who I needed to meet for my research. The reason was that her friend was a highly oppressive mother, spending all her time after work with her children, studying with them and making them practice foreign languages all night long. It was significant that Rumeysa was qualifying her as kind of an oppressive mother. In fact, coordinative mothers did not care about being together with the children while they worked. The idea of “doing, rather than saying” was also missing in their discourses. In place of it, it was observed that coordinative mothers held themselves as responsible for reminding their children what to do, and to give their attention to what their children ought to do, but no more. Instead of attributing themselves a constitutive role in their children’s future, in terms of education, these mothers gave schools a considerable amount of maneuvering space and expected from them a considerable amount of work. Monitoring and surveillance were presented as responsibilities of the school. A similar opinion was apparent in Arzu’s narratives below about the extracurricular activities her son was trying for:

My children are not inclined to that, but other kids benefit from it. They made playing guitar obligatory. For example, my son plays guitar, but in school not at home. A couple of years ago, they said that my son had a strong diaphragm and lungs, and he should go to conservatory. I really made him go to the conservatory, but normally children are prepared in two years. Still, I did it. They said that normal kids could not blow melodically straight away, but he could do it. He blowed *ney* for example. They said that he has strong lungs. I hope he will start at the university. He also loves the drums and his music teacher said that he has a good ear for music. That teacher provides that kind of guidance. (Arzu, see Appendix D, 41.)

Similar to Rumeysa’s sensibilities concerning the recommendations coming from her daughter’s teachers, but not feeling the necessity of control beyond that, Arzu was also took her son’s teachers’ words as something to be followed. However, her desire in seeing her son play an instrument did not coincide with his interests. At this point, the distinctive point emerges: in place of an umbrella mother’s practice, which would try to take these recommendations as clues and try to incite an

enthusiasm in the child, at least to encourage him to continue playing the instrument at home, Arzu, as a coordinative mother, thought of the university as a new “educational institution” that could build up this passion in children. With regards to that, it was also common among coordinative mothers to schedule their time according to immediate needs, mostly pointed out by the school, rather than a strict schedule envisaging longer-term plans. Thus, even though they were constantly being reminded of the direction of their education, the children of coordinative mothers did not experience the same level of intense working tempo as the children of the umbrella mothers.

### 3.5.3 Remote mothers

A third type of mothering, remote mothers, was discerned. Remote mothers are different from the other mothers described so far, because of their doubtfulness with the competitive culture surrounding both students, parents and teachers. In this respect, an emphasis on their avoidance of hyper-parenting was recognized. However, this does not mean that remote mothers were uninterested. In contrast, they were conveying their attitude through a “conscience” narrative, which they see as missing in other intensive mothers around them. Melek was one of the remote mothers that I met in my field study. She was a housewife who dropped out from Open University. Concerning her leisure time, she implied that she was either passing time in parent-teacher association activities or in house meetings in which they take *tasavvuf* (Sufism) lessons as a group. It was significant that throughout our interview, she underlined that even though she was doing her best to benefit from the association’s activities or to motivate her children to participate in events such as expositions, cultural tours, chess tournaments etc, she was trying to leave them alone in these activities. “Keeping an eye on the

child” was something which she referred to multiple times as a behavior she was trying to avoid, but which she observed as being widespread throughout her social circle. She was so displeased with the recent trends popular among mothers, like trying to be present in every aspect of their children’s lives. According to Melek, this stemmed from mothers’ own competitiveness, which raises children incapable of keeping their feet on the ground. She emphasized the issue as follows:

I do not think that competition is a good thing. Children get exhausted in terms of body and mental health. Every child should be treated according to their capacity. You must not waste the individual. You have a small glass, but you try to fill it till it is overflowing. What I see in the high school is parents trying to intervene with teachers as though it were a primary school. Those children are individuals from now on. In my older son’s school, mothers were putting themselves forward much more than their children. (Melek, see Appendix D, 42.)

Zehra, the gynecologist I referred above, was also a typical remote mother. She was interested in social matters, including educative ones and read as much as she could so as to be informed. As a doctor, and the first university graduate from her family, she was experienced regarding her knowledge about how to strategize within the field. However, she was highly critical of making things easier for her children, even if she had known how to, and was trying to make them struggle as did she. She emphasized her point as:

In the preschool teaching period, I did not make an effort in terms of school preparation. They went to preschool but not as a preschool preparatory class. It was more logical for them to go there, that’s why. I want them to attend the necessary courses, which can contribute to child development. I do not study with them, I would never do that. My daughter takes private lessons. We have never studied together. I did not do any of her activities, projects or homework. I did not do anything. Yes, I intentionally chose this way. It is unnecessary, whether she has difficulties or not. Why should I do her homework? (Zehra, see Appendix D, 43.)

As is obvious from Zehra’s words, even though a certain spirit of natural growth was being praised by remote mothers’ discourses, their practices were giving

evidence of a different pattern. Rather than an uninterested attitude, these mothers were following parent teacher meetings, taking their recommendations or contemplating over their strategies etc., but abstained from showing this to their children. Hulya, a housewife, had even referred to these concerns as the reason why she was critical of private schools for creating an environment for the child as if they will always be supported in one way or another. Instead of support, remote mothers strictly underlined the importance of personality formation process as the first condition in raising adults capable of giving their own decisions. For that matter, extracurricular activities seemed to be the zone remote mothers prioritized for leaving children free to choose whatever they wanted to do. All three mothers underlined the primacy of the child's decision in these activities.

#### 3.5.4 Relieving mothers

The last type of parenting observed was relieving mothers. Their discourses were similar to those of the remote mothers' regarding their criticisms concerning the pressure put on children via education. However, in contrast to a systemic criticism mentioned by remote mothers regarding the disappearance of the child's autonomy in this hyper-parenting and hyper-education age, relieving mothers were more concerned about their personal situation. Both mothers in this group, namely Şeyma and Sema, were respectively primary and secondary school graduates, never employed and self-identified as housewives. They agreed on the point that by sending their children to private schools, which are much more attentive and caring towards students when contrasted with public schools, they were in fact attributing certain responsibilities to institutions such as monitoring and orienting the child in

their educational issues. Yet, these were raised as the main reasons of their private school preference. Şeyma emphasized her position as:

To be honest, to take care of their courses, no I have never done that. I got bored with it. In a state school, you have to care about the courses. A school must have extra study groups. In Gökyüzü Koleji, they have it. These are very necessary. (Şeyma, see Appendix D, 44.)

In comparison to other groups, relieving mothers were not overly anxious about surveilling their children both in their academic orientation or non-academic tendencies. Even if they were aware of certain problems with their children's educational lives, they did not see them as something to act upon and to eliminate immediately. It was more of a relaxed process extended over a period of time that they envisaged for the education of their children. In this respect, in place of self-identifying primarily as the person who should control and direct the child, both Şeyma and Sema perceived mothers' role in these process as emotional in the first place, as a person who should relieve the child from the pressures they are facing in the formal education system.

After seeing such variations between parenting models, one questions whether the differences of mothers' economic and cultural capital effect their way of parenting. The difference in income does not seem to have any impact in parenting practices. On the other hand, despite the fact that it is not likely to see a striking pattern within the first three types of childrearing models in relation to mothers' level of education, it is observed that the mothers pertaining to the last group are the ones who had the lowest level of credentials. Their relatively lower level of experience within the field of education in comparison to other informants may be considered in explaining why relieving mothers prioritize their emotional support for their child in the first place.

When the parenting practices of the conservative bourgeoisie are contrasted with those of the secular bourgeoisie (Balkan & Rutz, 2009; Behar, 2006; Çimen, 2015), it is seen that the hyper-parenting model seems to be much more extended among secular groups. Making longitudinal future plans for their children and mapping a relevant route in this respect is emphasized as a common trait of families. On the one hand, the competitive air among secular families is underlined with a certain reference to their examination-oriented, tutoring-based lifestyle. Their high level of interest in gaining expert knowledge and in appealing to consultancy services should also be considered within this frame. On the other hand, secular families seem to be much more eager not just to encourage their children to have different hobbies, but also to enrich them with a variety of “highbrow” cultural activities such as going to expositions, movie festivals, art galleries, museums. Furthermore, rather than being content with the distinctive capacity of private schools, secular bourgeoisie appear to be much more willing to send their children to the “most prestigious private schools” in Turkey such as Robert College, Uskudar American High School or Koc High School. Even though the conservative bourgeoisie is also keen in gaining knowledge from specialists or in orienting their children to extracurricular activities as outlined in this chapter, neither the national examinations possess a central position in their lives, nor parents are as ambitious as secular groups about the top schools of the country. Besides, it is observed that except for cinema and theatre, which may be thought of as more mainstream activities, it is not possible to see a grand variety of cultural activities frequently practiced by families.

If such divergences were interpreted as the deficiency of cultural capital among conservative groups, such an analysis would remain on a limited ground

regarding its favoring of a certain group of practices as distinctive, while portraying others in this scope. Against approaches that pay attention to highbrow tastes and practices in defining cultural capital, Lamont and Lareau suggest to embrace it as a basis of exclusion (Lamont & Lareau, 1998) that necessitates a certain vision about the legitimate classification patterns in society. In her later study, Lareau takes it further and proposes to define cultural capital as “facts, information, skills, and familiarity with social processes, particularly knowledge about how institutions work” (Lareau, 2015, p.2). On this account, it is important to pay attention to the embourgeoisement process being experienced among conservative groups for several decades, since it is at this crucial point where the importance of relationality arises. In contrast to the long established history of secular bourgeoisie, conservative groups are currently forming their class position within the social field and education seems to be becoming a prioritized target for families in this respect. So, even though families do not participate or encourage their children to participate in “highbrow” kinds of cultural activities, their changing ways of parenting, their willingness – especially of umbrella mothers- to reach expertise knowledge about the field, or their appeal to their own social network in accessing efficient knowledge about the field constitute some of the prominent factors playing a role in the way these families differentiate themselves from not just the previous generation but from the lower conservative groups. Furthermore, as will be elaborated in details in the following chapter, conservative families’ way of embracing culture on a different basis of tastes and aesthetics also plays an important role within this respect. In brief, it is clear that, along with their experience of social mobilization, conservative groups’ engagement with cultural capital has risen significantly, and, despite some

differences, it is possible to talk about a considerable convergence among their practices with those of the secular bourgeoisie.

In conclusion, it is possible to talk about two fundamental findings coming out of the analysis put forth throughout this chapter. First, as a result of their social mobility experience, there is a striking transformation taking place within the lifestyles of conservative bourgeoisie, especially in comparison to previous generations. In relation to this, it is also possible to talk about an apparent change in the way conservative groups are positioning themselves within the field of education and the way they perform parenting. In this respect, a clear relation comes to the fore between social class and the construction of good parenting, i.e., good mothering. Within the scope of this first claim, it is possible to talk about three decisive factors.

Primarily, that the increase of families' economic capital incited, not just a certain purchasing power to live a bourgeois lifestyle, but it also rendered parents capable of making choices within the field of education and of orienting to the private educational market. Secondly, the increasing level of education among second generation parents is evenly significant in making choices, since it is by this experience and knowledge about the field, which parents had gained, that they became capable of considering various choices to make and to head for the right decision most beneficial for the future of their children. Thirdly, along with such a large-scaled embourgeoisement process among conservative groups and the rise of socially segregated places in the city, was observed that the social capital of the families is also changing and that they are becoming socialized to a large extent with the people positioning within similar locations in the social field. In this respect, regarding their similar anxieties about education of their children, it is observed that these social networks are becoming important channels of knowledge-flow regarding

the new changes, information and strategies about the field. So, it is clear that, in relation to the rise in three types of capital-namely economic, cultural and social-these families are performing a bourgeois line of conduct within the field of education and developing their educational strategies in this respect.

The second main finding coming out from this chapter is that, education is a gendered practice and it is the mothers who undertake the responsibility to a large extent<sup>43</sup>. Furthermore, it also becomes the main point through which women build up their subjectivities and gain a powerful agency both in the family and the in the field of education. On one hand, as a consequence of a “patriarchal bargain” informants seem to gain a superior position in society as not just being married women, but further as being mothers. On the other hand, by constantly marking their differences from the previous generation mothers in terms of their higher care, knowledge, and support, thus as being “good mothers” women are reinforcing the agency they had gained from their motherhood.

In this chapter, it was mostly the converging and diverging practices of the conservative groups with those of the secular bourgeoisie that were kept in focus. The following chapter will be concerned mostly with the patterns of distinction by which the conservative bourgeoisie differentiates itself both from the lower classes of the conservative segments and thus position itself vis-à-vis secular bourgeoisie. In this respect, aside from questioning the changing judgements of taste among conservative bourgeoisie, the mobilization of conservative identity into demands within the field of education will be questioned.

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<sup>43</sup> The gendered character of education is not only valid for conservative groups. A similar issue is also observable among secular bourgeoisie (see Çimen, 2015).

## CHAPTER 4

### MORALS AND AESTHETICS IN CREATING AN AUTHENTIC BOURGEOIS LIFESTYLE AND A “TRUE” EDUCATIONAL SUBJECT

One day during field work, I attended to a house gathering organized by Esra to whom I had been introduced by Nur, a kind gatekeeper that I knew before. Esra was living in Maltepe, in a gated community with big walls and security controls in the entrance. After showing an identity card, we were allowed in by the security guard and were accompanied by him to the entrance of the apartment which Esra resides in the upper two floors, in a duplex flat decorated by the help of their interior architect friend. While going up, there were timetables on the walls of the lift indicating the separated hours between men and women for the indoor and outdoor pools, at which Nur pointed with appreciation.

Esra is coming from one of the well-off families of Konya, who lived next to the house of Ahmet Davutoğlu, the ex-prime minister of Turkey. As I could capture from her narratives, her father was a known and influential figure in their social network and was a role model for his children. Aside from being a university graduate- which is rare for his generation- and owning a metal production company, he was also the manager of an athletics team of Konya, taking private *ney* and oud lessons and participating in the political discussion groups, even if he had never taken an active role in politics, as Esra underlined. She also added that, since her family was so sensitive about their children’s education, and especially to make them learn English in a fluent way, they sent Esra to a private secondary and high school and after to a private college for her university education. Further, they sent her

brother to a language camp of Oxford University each summer during his undergraduate studies.

As Esra accentuated, even though she was also employed for a few years, she quit after getting married. Now, she is married to the financial consultant of a multinational company and passes most of her time with her son, who is now in primary school. While he is at school, she is either participating in-house Qur'an reading gatherings between women, in which once she had also met with Hayr nnisa G l<sup>44</sup>, or attending a private course of *tecvid* ("reading Qur'an in a proper way") and *mahreç* ("pronouncing Qur'an in a right way") with her friends. During our conversation, two of her evaluations, one about her vacation preferences and another about the school of choice for her son, were salient for the concern of this study in order to point out the kind of lifestyles valorized among conservative bourgeoisie.

Concerning her vacation preferences, she implied that, except for family visits to Konya, especially during religious holidays, there are two thermal hotels which they prefer for their holidays: One of them is G ral Wellness and Convention Center and the other is Korel Thermal Resort Hotel, both located in Afyon. While she was praising about the refined ornamentations used in the decoration of the hotel, the quality of their spa and massage services and saunas, which she expressed as *fin hamamı*, she conveyed the following words with admiration: "There is always music going on. Really relaxing. However, they are also very decent hotels, you should see, everything is separated between men and women. You can always act easily."<sup>45</sup> Both hotels are highly luxurious, expensive and famous regarding the holiday standard they offer. On one hand, they are similar to the deluxe holiday villages preferred by

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<sup>44</sup> The previous first lady

<sup>45</sup> "S rekli alan bir m zik var. Gerekten ok rahatlatıcı. Fakat bunlar aynı zamanda ok edepli oteller, g rmen lazım, her Őey kadın-erkek arasında ayrılmıŐ. Her daim ok rahat hareket edebiliyorsun."

the secular groups and on the other hand different from them with regards to the possibilities they provide compatible with an Islamic way of living.

A similar pattern was also observable about the way she narrated the decision making process they faced before choosing Gökyüzü Koleji, which is one of the conservative private schools listed in the second chapter. As Esra emphasized, the physical situation of the school and the English instruction level it offered were some of the first criteria they looked at while searching for schools. She also underlined that the Center for Emotional Education established within the school a few years ago to discover the abilities of students and to orient them to the social activities that are “right” for themselves was also an influential factor in their decision making process. However, aside from all these criteria similar to middle class expectations outlined in the second chapter, Esra stressed the following principle that played the primary role in their choice: “We wanted him to have a proper group of friends. We chose this school so that he may gain the values a Muslim child should have.”<sup>46</sup>

Regarding the short profile of Esra and her own evaluations about the priorities she considers in making choices, it is possible to discern close similarities between conservative and secular bourgeoisie in terms of living a well-off lifestyle, as it was also outlined in the previous chapter. However, on the other hand, at the intersection where conservative bourgeoisie differentiate itself from the lower conservative classes and reformulate the content of bourgeoisness along pious values, there arise main lines of divergence between these two groups, which will set the fundamental concern of this chapter. Within this scope, in the first section, the reformulation of the sense of aesthetics will be investigated by questioning the “judgements of taste” (Bourdieu, 1996b) among conservative bourgeoisie. In the

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<sup>46</sup> “Düzgün bir arkadaş grubu olsun istedik. Müslüman bir çocukta olması gereken değerlere sahip olması için bu okulu seçtik.”

second section, the role played by the religion-based morality in shaping a conservative bourgeois lifestyle will be examined. In the last two sections, the impact of these judgements of values and tastes in determining parents' expectations and choices within the field of education will be analyzed.

#### 4.1 Aesthetics and the stylization of life

During my pilot studies, while trying to gain preliminary knowledge about field, I talked to a scholar who had previous experiences in a similar field. Since I was looking for the places where I could take part in the daily conversations and discussions of conservative women, she suggested that I attend one of the courses given by İSMEK located in a high-class neighborhood such as Başakşehir. İSMEK is the abbreviation for Centre for Art and Vocational Training Courses of Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality. Each year, free courses in various fields such as technology, cooking, arts, finance, gardening and such are provided. The principle of the institution is basically to provide education for both men and women to either enrich themselves or to obtain tradable skills in the job market. It is a project initiated in 1996 by the mayor of the period, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, in order to offer a public service within the cultural realm which was embraced by the community in a quite impressive way in the following years. With AKP's rise to power, the project expanded all over İstanbul with the increase in courses offered, and it is clear that they were sought after mainly by non-working women, who wanted not just to develop their skills, but to turn these abilities into informal income channels.

While searching for an available course, I came across the "Turkish-Islamic Art Specialization Center" located in Üsküdar. The center is located very close to public transportation stations. There is a huge entry welcoming you with ornaments

reminiscent of Ottoman architecture. Inside, just about the building of cultural center in which located a big conference salon, there are small rooms lined up one another, their facade all glass, as if they were stores, again creating an ambiance of Ottoman bazaars. In each of these store-like study rooms, there were different groups of women-learning Islamic artisanship such as *ebru*, *tezhip*, *telkari* (“Turkish silverworking art”) etc. While I was looking around, especially at those marvelous works of art produced by women, a man in charge found me, and I mentioned to him my willingness to participate in one of these courses. Then, I learned that it was a center functioning like an academy, accepting those successful graduates of ISMEK courses who could have passed the exam organized by the center.

After several researches, the only course that I could find was again in Üsküdar in which beginners could attend. I participated in the course for a month and a half. From the very beginning of this idea of ISMEK, I always had the discomfort as to whether it was a suitable place to meet bourgeois families. Başakşehir might have been, but Üsküdar was not, regarding the class based configuration of the neighborhood. The women I met mostly came from lower middle class families. Plus, since there were very few people attending in *tezhip*, there was not such an atmosphere of women sharing their daily routines. In other respects, ISMEK provided me not just an insight, but also a considerable knowledge by which I could talk about the Turkish- Islamic traditional art with informants, since similar interests were also apparent among informants of this study.

There was not one single house-or office-in which I did not come across an artwork, a particular genre of traditional art, displayed on the wall. It was generally the *ebru*, or *hat* enframed in fancy gilded frame or inlaid mat. When I talked with women about these art pieces, I realized that, most of them were either inherited or

given as a gift from a family member, or bought as a souvenir. Except for the two informants, none of them had either been to a traditional art course nor were they planning to go in the near future. However, they all indicated their admiration and willingness if they could find time. During our conversations, it was obvious that they all had friends going to those courses, and they all appreciated their existence. One of the informants had showed me a wedding invitation, which was in fact a small artwork of *tezhip* done by the bride herself, who was a graduate of an ISMEK course. She raved about her artworks by underlining how significant it is now that the municipality is providing such a qualified course to the public. This was actually an opinion shared by most of the informants. However, regarding the courses these women had attended such as jewelry design, English, programming etc., it is clear that they were all private courses. The two women, one planning a *tezhip* course and *ney* and the other classical Turkish music course the next year were also confirmed this impression. The *tezhip* teacher in ISMEK also talked about this trend by mentioning that her own teachers were giving private classical Turkish-Islamic art lessons and that they were in high demand.

The question of “conservative art” has been one of the outstanding debates of the last few years, as I also mentioned in the second chapter regarding its impact in the field of education. In 2012, during a speech, the Secretary General of the Presidency of the period, Mustafa İsen, inaugurated a discussion of “conservative art” with the following words: “Just as the conservative segment of society has an understanding of democracy, just as we can talk about a conservative democracy, we are obliged to mention ‘conservative aesthetics’ and ‘conservative arts’ and of

constructing its norms and its structure.”<sup>47</sup> (“Muhafazakar sanatın yapısını oluşturmalıyız”, 2012)

In fact, the discussion dated back to 2009, to one of the articles written by Ekrem Dumanlı in the newspaper Zaman ('Muhafazakâr kesim'de derin boşluk: Kültür-sanat, 2009). In his article, Dumanlı underlined the necessity of orienting the gains obtained within the economic and political realm towards the cultural realm. Cracking the hegemony of leftists within the cultural arena was at the heart of his argumentation. Three years later, the discussion had proliferated with the participation of Mustafa İsen, Beşir Ayvazoğlu (Başaran, 2012), İskender Pala (İskender Pala'dan muhafazakâr sanat manifestosu, 2012) and many other conservative intellectuals. The exigence of a conservative bourgeoisie, in terms of a relevant education, accumulation and sense of art in order to create a holistic transformation in social space and thus to accomplish the journey launched by the AKP government was their common approach. Hasan Bülent Kahraman, a scholar and an art-critic had interpreted this journey as smoothing the way for a more emancipatory and authentic understanding of culture that features synthesis in the first place. Protecting one's own cultural values, improving oneself in every domain of art, being acquainted with Western sources and products but capable of producing and valuing artworks influenced by Turkish Islamic arts under the impact of contemporary look and technology were asserted by writers to identify the characteristics needed to develop within the conservative segments of the society. In this respect, Mustafa İsen underlined the current situation of the cultural realm in Turkey, in which the municipality offers various courses of traditional art such as

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<sup>47</sup> “Muhafazakar kesimin nasıl bir demokrasi anlayışı varsa, 'muhafazakar estetik' ve 'muhafazakar sanat'ın yapısını oluşturmak gibi bir yükümlülük içindeyiz”

ISMEK, which meets with a great deal of demand from people (Gelenekten Geleceğe, n.d.).

This emphasis put on the sense of beauty and taste, which takes one to the realm of aesthetics, constitutes one of the preliminary grounds on which Bourdieu constructed his understanding of society. In his opposition against the Kantian aesthetic that places the sense of beauty in a pure form detached from any kind of power relations, Bourdieu underlines the historical, cultural and social processes (Hobart and Kapferer, 2005) in which aesthetics gains a political character. In this respect, by trying to grasp the explainable part of aesthetics (Robbins, 2015), the framework proposed by Bourdieu takes the issue further by asking “What is considered beautiful?” and poses “Why is it considered beautiful?”. By broadening the field of aesthetics from the realm of arts to the ordinary life of individuals, into their tiny daily decisions, such as from the choice of clothing to decoration, Bourdieu proposes to take aesthetics as a sign of one’s position in the social field.

It goes without saying that the social classes are not equally inclined and prepared to enter into this game of refusal and counter refusal; and that the strategies aimed at transforming the basic dispositions of a life-style into a system of aesthetic principles, objective differences into elective distinctions, passive options...into conscious, elective choices are in fact reserved for members of the dominant class, indeed the very top bourgeoisie, and for artists, who as the inventors and professionals of the 'stylization of life' are alone able to make their art of living one of the fine arts (Bourdieu, 1996b, p.57)

In Bourdieu’s theoretical framework (1979/1996a, 1996b) the dominant is the one capable of converting ordinary practices and objects into forms of aesthetical dispositions and by this means into classifying evaluations. This is what is referred to as the stylization of life. By means of prioritization of forms over functions, the banal turns into beautiful, and it is this beauty which comprises in itself a large variety of power relations. That is why the dominant classes are obliged to keep this

aesthetization process alive in order to render the arbitrary character of their evaluations camouflaged, thus legitimate. *Distinction* (1996b) was the book he conferred in showing how cultural resources are operationalized in reproducing established and arbitrary judgements of taste and thus marking the implicit boundaries between classes in order to mask the ongoing struggle in the field to preserve or to ameliorate one's position.

It is clear that, under the influence of the government's incentives, which ISMEK constitutes a good place to analyze, and the transformation taking place in the social structure for several decades, classical Turkish-Islamic arts have gained recognition within society and expanded its field of existence in terms of both production and consumption. However, the story goes further. When the current discussions referred to throughout this thesis, such as the messages given in the Genç MÜSİAD meeting or the above underlined conservative art debate are taken into consideration, it appears that, with the purpose of increasing the influence of traditional Islamic arts among society, the emerging conservative groups are being attributed with a mission to enrich themselves with a considerable amount of cultural capital and to ascribe traditional Islamic arts with symbolic value by means of their refined approach and bourgeois way of consumption. This encouragement of opinion leaders may also be thought within a cultural politics of conservative groups in order to consolidate the conservative values materialized in the traditional cultural goods within a bourgeois lifestyle and by this way to challenge the cultural hegemony of the secular bourgeoisie whose "Westernized" cultural tastes such as classical music or opera have long been recognized as "highbrow" among society. On the other hand, when the rising interest of conservative bourgeoisie in taking private traditional art lessons is considered, it is possible to say that the conservative

bourgeoisie is also appropriating such a mission and taking part in the redefinition process of bourgeois tastes. As mentioned, within Bourdieu's frame, analyzing such a struggle of positioning in the social field which takes place in tastes and sense of aesthetics necessitates one to look at the daily life of individuals, how such a sense of aesthetics is being interiorized by individuals and how they reflect it in their bodily dispositions, clothing or in-house decorations etc.

Appreciation of ornaments, Ottoman-style patterns and designs was apparent in informants' above mentioned artistic tastes, were also observable in their home decoration styles. In most of the interviews, I was invited to have a seat in the salon- even though most of them had other living rooms in the house-where the decoration had more of an exhibition-like character, typical in most of the houses in Turkey. Salons were the places where artworks in fancy frames were displayed. The selection of furniture in these salons also confirming their functionality in welcoming the guest. The central table was considerably big in most of the houses. Even though there was a huge plasma TV was one of the walls of some houses, the sitting group I was directed to sit was generally designed as an isolated part of salon, where sitting groups were placed face to face, creating an ambiance that stimulates conversation.

Purple, silver-grey, ivory-white and dusty rose were the most commonly used colors in the home decoration. The sitting groups, chosen in matching colors with the walls were generally the type of big pillow sofas, in lustrine fabric with inlaid pillows that have huge buttons stitched in the middle. Gem chandeliers were also highly preferred. Rosaries were a common object that was used as a decoration, mostly put in a decorative bowl in the middle of the dining table or the middle table. There were also more modernist cultural pieces with abstract forms and shiny colors mostly used as decorative bibelots and sculptures.

Entrance halls and kitchens were two other parts of the house which I had access to. In contrast to the salons' glossy appearance, kitchens' and entrance halls' halls were generally filled with small nature paintings and souvenirs, mostly taken from other cities. Covered refrigerator door with magnets taken from foreign countries, a contemporary characteristics of a bourgeois house in Turkey, was also something I frequently came across during fieldwork. .

A certain change in decoration when one passes from salon to kitchen, observable in most of the houses, was striking regarding the transition from Ottoman style to the one closer to romantic English decorative style. Most of the kitchen furniture was modern, with their hard edge minimalist style, forming a contrast with the salon's curvy furniture. This coupling should be considered with the fact that most of the families were residing in newly-built gated communities, whose kitchen furniture probably had been decided on by the contractor firm, giving way to an eclecticism in taste. All the kitchen utensils, tableware and decorative objects in the kitchens were highly fashioned, with their pastel tones, flowery patterns and fine materials. During the times I spent time in malls during my field work, especially in Sancaktepe and Başakşehir, I observed that this was the style in demand by conservative families.

Bookshelves also seemed to be commonly used as furniture in the salons of the houses. Instead of a grand book case, it was generally a shelf, or a part of a cupboard that was used to place books. Novels, essays and religious books constituted a large part of the books displayed on the shelves. Among women who indicated that they are a bookish kind of person, books that address social, political and historical issues were raised as the most preferred ones.

I enjoy reading and travelling. I like reading everything, I read novels, and I read science books. I enjoy things that explain other people. I do not enjoy personal development books, they seem meaningless to me. Personal development is only full of catchphrases like “Do this, do that”, it does not make sense to me. So I like books with scientific truth, with social content, that explains people, shows communal structure. (Zehra, see Appendix D, 45.)

Because I have become interested in politics in recent years. What I mean is the politics of the last 15-20 years and contemporary politics. Recently, it became quite dense, so we are lucky. I used to read novels before too. I still read them as something easy after reading difficult books. I read everything (Ebru, see Appendix D, 46.)

It was also observed that religion played an important role in women’s practice of reading and thus “self-cultivation”, a word emphasized by informants themselves. There were informative religious books or Quranic hermeneutics on bookshelves, on table tops or at the edges of sofas, mostly hardcovers with artistically written gilded titles on cover page. In comparison to other kinds of books, religious books were placed much more causally in a manner to be at hand when needed, as a book which is often appealed too. Besides, it should not be forgotten that, as underlined, welcoming guests is important for these women and the salon is the part of the house where they organize their daily meetings of which mostly are prayer gatherings. That may also be the reason why in some houses *rahle* (“Qur’an reading desk”) was placed in a corner of a salon instead of a back room.

Currently I try to read more religious stuff. I try to focus on the Qur’an. But before that, I used to enjoy self cultivation books. Plus after I realized self cultivation is in the Qur’an, I try to work on Qur’an analysis too. I enjoy novels also. (Nida, see Appendix D, 47.)

Whether a *rahle*, a book or the way the salon is organized etc., the room tells one something about the lifestyle, namely the habitus it conserves in its materiality. The object turns into a choice, and thus creates a certain distance from others’ choice of objects and thus marks its own valorization, its own perception in terms of beauty. However, is it only the class position that is being narrated by objects, by the gilded

ornaments; or does it move beyond narrating and form a certain realm of resistance? Or is it more than the class position that is being narrated in such beauty?

Bourdieu's approach to aesthetics is criticized by a group of scholars, among which Ranciere is the best known, for its boundedness in structure and therefore for its restriction of the power embedded in aesthetics. It is the potentiality of resistance embedded in aesthetics and the contingent experiences it may germinate that are seen as deficient in his theory, hence it is the necessity of breaking the reproduction cycle from a more radical line that is at the heart of the issue. In this sense, instead of taking aesthetics as a reflection of a class ethos (Ranciere, 2006), it is the capacity to intervene and to act on the environment that is to be prioritized (Hobart and Kapferer, 2005). Although, agreeing with the idea that Bourdieu exempts radicalism in his approach to aesthetics, I do not share the argument that aesthetics is deprived of a constitutive power in his theoretical framework. Both in *Rules of Art* (1996a) and *Distinction* (1996b) Bourdieu addresses the struggles within the social field for the reconfiguration of already established judgements of taste in order to legitimize a bohemian lifestyle in the former and a new petty bourgeoisie order in the latter. Aesthetics has been referred to in both as a ground of contestation for change.

On the other hand, I see critiques raised against Bourdieu's class related explanation of aesthetic judgement more seriously regarding the theory's boundedness in reading complex forms that these tastes may take. *Distinction* is a word wide open to criticisms in this respect regarding the division put forth between high and low judgements of taste. Despite considering the study's empirical character in reflecting the French society of the time, the critique still holds its significance. In this respect, I think the debate of cultural omnivorousness (Peterson and Kern, 1996) deserves further attention.

By questioning the rigidity of high and low culture segmentation seen in *Distinction*, Peterson and Simkus raised the concept of “cultural omnivorousness” in an early article (1992) that highlighted the possibility of dominants’ eclectic tastes in today’s world. Along with its significance in initiating theoretical discussions about the way cultural appreciation may vary according to time and place dependencies, couple of years later, as a result of a study he had done with Kern (1996), Peterson had taken the issue further and re-questioned whether this eclecticism does solemnly mean a convergence towards popular taste. By turning the focus of the study from the items of consumption to the way these items are perceived, they signal the possibility of a new regulation process in which symbolic boundaries are reconstructed. What is implied is that the same product may turn into a new regime of distinction through its gentrified application. The significant point relies on the fact that an object, a practice, etc., does not establish its cultural or symbolic capital just in regard to its inner qualities; the attributed quality is itself a stake to be embraced, a power to be able to specify the rate of exchange (Karademir Hazır, 2014). In my point of view, rate of exchange is the vital point in Bourdieusian framework for introducing relationality within the theory, and thus marking the point of failure of the reproduction process.

Struggles to determine the rate of exchange constitute the point through which the transformation process takes place. It is then crucial to think of all the objects, practices, discourses, i.e., lifestyles mentioned up to now by considering the social processes that endow them with certain symbolic attributes. In this respect, ongoing debates on conservative art, appropriation of Turkish Islamic artworks by families and appreciation of ornate decoration styles not just in domestic but also in public architecture all play a role in this process of reformulating what is considered

beautiful and marking a shift in patterns of distinction. These judgements of taste, once associated with lower class aesthetics, now go further than marking an eclectic taste, and function as new categories of distinctive and legitimate classifications. Within this scope, the political character of these classifications should not be overlooked, since further than legitimizing a certain lifestyle and rendering it a new bourgeois style of living, these classifications also play a role in introducing different registers such as religious and nationalist sensibilities or morality as legitimate grounds in determining one's preferences and judgement of taste.

We went to Umrah, Mecca, Medina, Finland, La Plant Region, and Northern Europe. We also travel inside Turkey too, we went to Southeast, Marmara region. We travelled Aegean region too. We have done a lot... I enjoyed Finland the most, it was beautiful. We also went to Dubai; but Finland was the most beautiful. Of course in a spiritual sense the most beautiful ones were Mecca and Medina. (Zehra, see Appendix D, 48.)

Generally my husband and I enjoy cultural tours, not so much with our family. We travel cities that we do not know about. We have been to Gaziantep for a day trip, to Urfa, the city of prophets, to Konya, to Cappadocia. Now Sivas is our target. I oppose going to foreign countries, although I have been to them. But I do not want my money to go to them, especially to France. My husband always tell me, "Let me take you to Paris". Instead of going there I will save more, money-even though there is no problem with money- instead of putting effort into it, I would go to Umrah. I have something against them, I do not want my money to go to them (Nida, see Appendix D, 49.)

As can be seen from these quotations, it is possible to talk about different registers than the perception of aesthetics which develop on a class basis and which determine the holiday spot preference for conservative bourgeoisie. On one hand, it can be seen that European cities and some touristic places in Turkey are preferred within the context of a "cultural tour", similar to the secular bourgeoisie. On the other hand, a symbolic value is attributed to Mecca, Madinah or Umrah, different from the secular bourgeoisie. The religious symbolic value of those cities is valorized, and included in some kind of classification of tastes. In the same scope, nationalist values are mobilized in explaining why foreign cities – meaning Western

cities- cannot be a part of legitimate taste. In this regard, it is possible to say that by putting forward conservative values as the basis of one's taste and preferences, and thus marking its difference from the secular bourgeoisie, emerging conservative groups are putting a certain claim on the cultural worldview of a bourgeois lifestyle.

#### 4.2 Morality as a constitutive part of habitus

Michelle Lamont (1992) is a famous scholar, mostly known by her assessment of Bourdieu's class analysis together with moral registers. In her comparative ethnographic study done among upper middle class men in France and the United States, she challenges Bourdieu's approach to cultural capital as being identified as an entrance card to dominant positions which agents trace unquestionably as if the society is a frictionless homogeneous field. In this regard, morality is underlined as the source of friction determining the worth of a certain cultural capital. Similarly, regarding its power in specifying the worthiness of a certain form of practice, it was Sayer (2005) who marked that morals "matter" to people; it matters to the extent that it influences the subjective experience of class and thus contains in itself the possibility of resistance, which social scientists should pay special attention not to overlook.

Morals become the ground by which scholars lay emphasis on regarding its power in cross-cutting class categorizations and in creating an alternative ethos. In fact, considering Savage's remark on the individualization of class identities and the increasing role of cultural identities that play in one's conduct of life, similar stance is significant in reading how contemporary forms of class identities take shape. Touching upon the issue, Mendez (2008) speaks of the role morality plays within the horizontal segmentations taking place among the middle classes of the neoliberal

age. It is mostly the contestation over authenticity which drives middle classes to rely on the moral register and turn them into symbolic boundaries.

In her inspirational ethnographic study *Politics of Piety*, Saba Mahmood proposes to enlarge the boundaries of habitus by including morality as a constitutive element of it, as it was first embraced in its older Aristotelian approach (Mahmood, 2005, p.136). It is the possibility of fracture that morality may engender in habitus configuration that is highlighted as the reason rendering its integration significant. However, since Mahmood valorizes Bourdieu's way of conceptualizing habitus as highly structuralist, she proposes to treat it together with Foucault's positive ethics<sup>48</sup>. The way she embraces positive ethics accentuates primarily the self-constructive ability of the subject; the ethical act of the subject by constructing herself in relation to the norms and injunctions arising from morality (Mahmood, 2005, p.29). On the other hand, Mahmood adheres to Butler's reformulation of the subjectivation process, which emphasizes the importance of practices in addition to discourses become a constitutive realm of the self (Mahmood, 2005, p.163). In this respect, in line with Bourdieu's approach, she takes the issue of morality from its rationalist Kantian frame and places it in the Aristotelian approach, where practices become both the constitutive element of structure and also its reason for failure.

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<sup>48</sup> In fact, Foucauldian subject's capability in self-transforming in a certain truth regime, i.e., one's autopoiesis, is a frequently referred point in showing how a subject may be endowed with an ability to change the given conditions. In Foucault's words, this liberatrice posture does not bring along an unconditional liberty since critique is in fact a virtuous practice within the boundaries of those we are apt to know (Foucault, 1982; 2007). In other words, by naming as limit attitude what Kant previously referred to as critique, Foucault focuses on the relation a subject establishes with the truth regime one finds herself in and the way one may construct herself at the limit where the primary epistemological foundations that founded her integrity fail. At this limit, Judith Butler (2002) underlines the actualization of both the process of desubjugation and self-making in a synchronized manner in endowing the subject with the agency to change. However, in reference to the epistemological limits observable in Foucauldian approach to agency, despite his theoretical framework's nobility in highlighting the interventionability of the subject in structure, I think that there is a significant convergence in between these two French intellectuals, which should not be neglected. It is the emphasis they put on agency-structure axis which characterize their approach in the first place, structure in Bourdieu and agency in Foucault. However, it is clear in both their frameworks to look for structure in the first place in order to grasp the workings of agency.

By hinging upon the experiences I have gained during my field study, I may say that moral registers do form an important ground upon which the habitus is configured by conservative bourgeoisie. Along with good education and a successful career, the importance of conserving the personality and being a good person was underlined by a majority of informants as their primary expectations for the future of their children. As well, in the beginning of interviews, while I was explaining the scope of thesis and that I am taking the concept of “education” in the broader sense of the term including familial educative practices, I came across multiple times with mothers’ supportive responses implying the importance of conveying to the child how to act properly, morally and in a decent way. It is possible to talk about two ways in which informants referred to the way they teach their children how to behave properly. On one hand, in accordance with Mahmood’s emphasis put on the importance of practices in conveying moral codes, informants implied the significance of their own behaviors as a primary factor shaping the moral personality of their children. On the other hand, mothers also underlined the importance of teaching and inculcating the valorized traits to their children in order to render them well-mannered, moral individuals.

Why do people steal? Why do they do bad things? Because no one takes care of them. Because no one gives them a moral education. To make them give place to elders, stand up when someone enters the room, not to cross their legs... I tried to teach them what I have been taught. All my children give place to elders. They help them. (Eslem, see Appendix D, 50.)

[Referring to the religion] I give the necessary to my child, he is going to get what I do at home. Elhamdulillah, my son went to nonsensical schools for years, to ones which didn’t have anything to do with religion. But my pasha, masallah, may Allah make it long lasting insallah, has been fasting in Ramadan last two years, without any reserve. He also wants to do his prayers, with all his heart and soul. (Nida, see Appendix D, 51.)

As seen from these two citations, along with a secular-moral framework, such as respect and politesse among which modesty and assiduity may also be considered

regarding the discourses of other informants, religion plays a crucial role in forming the moral world views of informants, in their way of identifying a certain way of behavior right and ethical. However, these secular and religious moral frameworks should not be taken separately, regarding Islamic faith's essence in organizing the daily conduct of individuals on a holistic basis, as previously mentioned. That is one of the reasons why Saktanber (2002) criticizes those approaches that separate the realm of culture from that of politics. In line with the claim that opposes modernist idea that constrains faith in the scope of the inner life of a human being, she suggests to look towards living Islam in order to grasp the place of religion in the daily life of agents, how it is being performed and how its formative role makes a claim on society at large.

Cliffort Geertz (1973) is one of the primary scholars who approached religion from an anthropological standpoint and suggested perceiving it as a cultural system. Along with the importance such remark opened within social studies of religion, the distinction he set forth between the objective conceptual forms and the social and psychological aspects in reading culture marked the limitation of this approach in reading social workings of religion, which Asad (2009) criticized for its modernist gaze. In contrast to such an approach, Asad suggested perceiving religion within the historical context in which it is positioned, and in this respect with all the other registers of social life that it interacts with. In this regard, he indicates:

My argument, I must stress, is not just that religious symbols are intimately linked to social life (and so change with it), or that they usually support dominant political power (and occasionally oppose it). It is that different kinds of practice and discourse are intrinsic to the field in which religious representations (like any representation) acquire their identity and their truthfulness. From this it does not follow that the meanings of religious utterances are to be sought in social phenomena, but only that their possibility and their authoritative status are to be explained as products of historically distinctive disciplines and forces. The anthropological student of *particular* religions should therefore begin from this point, in a sense

unpacking the comprehensive concept which he or she translates as "religion" into heterogeneous elements according to its historical character. (Asad, 1993, p.129)

In reference to this heterogeneity of social life, Asad (2009) proposes to take religion, Islam in particular, as a “discursive tradition” where the foundational texts of Islam, i.e. Qur’an and Hadith articulates with the nonreligious registers of the moment and shape one’s practices in this respect. Thus, the concept tradition provides the opportunity of moving beyond the treatment of Islam as a distinctive social structure, and hence constructing religion as an anthropological category with all the relationality it conveys in social life.

Even though Bourdieu’s approach to the concept culture contains in itself an anti-Geertzian approach, as emphasized by Strauss and Quinn (as cited in Lizardo, 2010, p.7) , in highlighting the habitus as an embodied state of objective and subjective dimensions of social life, the slippery ground upon which he bases the concept culture renders the theory contradictory. As Edward LiPuma (1993) underlines, even though there is a strong anthropological regard to culture in Bourdieu in qualifying it as a context-specific symbolic system and as a foundation of relationality of his theory, a central theory of culture is required in order to better grasp its linkage to the concept of capital. On one side, we have the culture as a lifestyle, which religious morality may be considered as a part of; on the other side, there is the cultural capital, which is embraced in a variety of forms such as the symbolic mastery of practices, high-culture knowledge, academic skills etc. (Lamont & Lareau, 1998). With an inspiring intervention in order to synthesize these two dimensions and embrace culture in a wider framework, as mentioned before, Lamont and Lareau (1998) propose to perceive the cultural capital as a basis for exclusion. In this respect, the moral frameworks of informants substantially related to the

discursive tradition of Islam may be considered within the cultural realm capable of shaping the basis of exclusion, thus becoming a constitutive aspect of one's strategies for positioning in the field.

This kind of an exclusionist discourse was best traceable from the way women interpreted the importance of morality in the school environment. It was interesting that throughout the field study, as mentioned above, I came across a similar critique from different informants against Doğa College regarding the school's incapability in inculcating moral values in students, thus raising irresponsible children. Many times I had a conversation with a mother sharing an anecdote in which the student they accused of being spoiled was from Doğa College. The college is part of a private school chain opening branches in almost every district of Istanbul, and it is not possible to talk about a concrete identity of school which becomes both the reason why it may have attracted attention of conservative bourgeois families and also its vulnerable point for getting associated with the secular bourgeois habitus.

For instance, there are many differences between a child from Doğa College and a child from Fatih College. The ones that go to Doğa College have a spoiled way of speaking. I know if a child is from Doğa College or not. They have some kind of sauciness. That school doesn't give a moral education. But Fatih College is different. That is to say, both the family and the school are important. They leave the children alone in Doğa College. And also the families give free rein to children there. For example, if they would tell me that "Your child can study for free", I would not send my child there. They just talk about brands there, where should we eat, what should we wear, etc. (Eslem, see Appendix D, 52.)

Of course there is a decline in moral values because of the class difference. This is the situation in private schools. Our son says that everybody smokes, despite being just 16 years old. He also says that they drink. ( Hatice, see Appendix D, 53.)

Considering the presence of families sending their children to Doğa College in informants' social network, and stereotyped narratives about their children, I had

the sense that the school was functioning as a symbolic image of secular educational vision and thus becoming target of critiques in this respect. Yet, as discernable from the statement of Hatice, the sauciness of children seemed to be a result of the families' prosperous lifestyles.

A similar approach in marking the importance of morality in protecting children from bad habits was observable in the discourses of Arzu. Arzu sent her children to one of the conservative private schools. Throughout our conversation, she praised the school's prioritization of moral values in their educational approach and how it affects in a good way the sociability between students, who mostly come from conservative families like themselves. Strikingly, she also stressed that it was also possible to see secular families sending their children to the same school too, so that their children may be educated in an environment sensitive in moral values and by this means be kept away from drug usage, which she indicated as highly expanded in private schools.

It is possible to talk about two significant points regarding these two examples. On one hand, it is clear from the discourses that morality marks a fundamental basis to which conservative bourgeoisie makes reference in marking their difference from secular groups. In this respect, it is seen that secular lifestyle is being identified as incapable of orienting children in a right way of behaving and secular groups' deficiency of morality constitutes the center of this opinion. On the other hand, as seen in the discourse of Arzu, conservative values and morality seemed to be embraced by informants as not just a way of differentiating themselves and thus positioning in the social field, but also as a reference in influencing secular identities.

### 4.3 Symbolic boundaries at work in creating an educational subject

At the end of one of the interviews, with the woman I reached through a previous neighbor of mine, I asked whether she could arrange for me a meeting with another person she knew. She approved and arranged for me a meeting for the next week, with a woman residing in the same gated community. The next week, I bought my bakery products and went to the house of the informant to attend to a breakfast meeting in which her friends from the Qur'an course would also come. She opened the door with an authentic dress and invited me in with a big warm smile of hospitality. After the first phase of the meeting and small talk, I started to introduce my project and my intention in asking for such meeting as I did in the beginning in each of the interviews. The first thing she said was "It is good that you want to talk with us, meaning devout people. We are here too. There is also a part of society."<sup>49</sup> At first, I had taken the notice personally as a boundary between my secular corporeality and hers. Later on in the day, after a couple of hours of conversation, I learned that it was a reaction to a quarrel that had taken place between her and my primary mediator, which had helped me reach my first informant. It turned out to be a discussion about the role religion should play in one's social life, but since the mediator had taken a highly secularist approach, the informant had evaluated me as a party in the dispute in the first place.

As a matter of fact, my own habitus legible from my corporeality, played a considerable role during interviews, especially until the moment the informants were convinced that I was not there for a judgmental purpose. Except for a few informants, who were talkative and easy-going characters, they were not very eager to broach their subjective opinions for quite a while, until the final parts of

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<sup>49</sup> "Bizimle konuşmak istemen güzel bir şey, mütediyyin insanları kastediyorum. Bizler de buradayız. Toplumun böyle bir kısmı da var."

interviews for the majority. Further, it was after I stopped the recorder or stopped taking notes that women felt much more comfortable in talking about their personal judgements. A transition was quite tangible within the way women constructed their narratives and thus their identities which Somers (1992) names as “narrative identities”. In contrast to the abstract, macro level public narratives, women conveyed during interviews, the shift into the sincere air after the interview ended enabled me to face a different narrative nourished from personal experiences and concrete reasoning, which women underlined in justifying the symbolic boundaries they demarcated.

It was common during those off-the record times, that I encountered my informants’ critical attitude towards the hegemonic western-secularist ideology. Rather than being in complete disapproval, it was more about revisiting the official ideology under Kemalist regime and praising those recent attempts that democratized its boundaries in a way that included pious segments of society. In line with the reasons of choosing the nomenclature of conservative instead of Islamist, none of the informants mentioned a foundational reform to disrupt the secularist hegemony. It was in the realm of culture and morality that they took a turn in order to construct a different society. Reformulating present relations with history and reconfiguring the daily lives thereupon was the main idea I came across during interviews, as following:

Alphabet reform perhaps had a negative effect on Turkey. There is a society that is literate to an extent. Suddenly the alphabet reform takes place and the society becomes ignorant. People don’t know anything from then on. Thus, in that period both administrators and families should have placed importance on literacy. We have some habits coming from that period. It is like, when somebody learns to read and write, she learns everything. Of course, the Republic is a very important thing for us, but it has some insufficiencies. My mother showed me those. In my prayers, I first pray for Atatürk and his fellow soldiers. I love them very much, may Allah forgive their sins if they have some. However, there were some inadequacies and subsequent ones didn’t do

anything to overcome the deficiencies. We put the blonde blue eyed man there and we worshipped him. But he says “Take note of my ideas, not me”. We left those ideas, we closed the books. In religious terms, we read Qur’an and we closed it, we never looked at it again. In worldly terms we didn’t say, “Atatürk did those things but why?” We never bothered to read about them. I believe that Nutuk should be a compulsory course book for children in and above secondary school. They should see it; we look to, we believe in, we love this man but why? Why should I love a man that I don’t know? They teach me about his mother, his father. Who cares? I will forget in a couple of days. I need to learn his actions, and why he did those. In my childhood, we studied history in different aspects. Ottoman Empire was always bad, or it was always in its rising period; there is no such thing like that. For 600 years these men ruled these lands, and with a 10 men battalion and Middle East didn’t get any better after Ottoman Empire. It means these men have something. We don’t only consist of the 100 years of republic. May god bless who founded it. They were predestinated for this mission, and thanks to that we live today. But we shouldn’t forget our past. This forgetfulness causes the chaos we live in today. I try to instill this in my children. Yes, I love Atatürk and fortunately the Republic was founded, but there are some other things. Yes, Ottoman Empire made some mistakes, but there are other things. When I was travelling across Europe with my daughters, they have learned how to look at everything with a critical eye. (Ebru, see Appendix D, 54.)

It is this reformulation of the past, and self-positioning as a continuation of Islamic Ottoman heritage that should be taken into consideration to grasp what is referred with the pronoun “us”, which implies here society at large. It is indeed a claim on defining the content of us, its particularities and its historical roots, thus reformulating the foundational basis of the secular hegemonic “us” prevailed up to now. By referring to the state-led birth of secular bourgeoisie and the undemocratic foundations of their bourgeoisness lacking support from different social forces of the geography, the conservative bourgeoisie marks its difference from such an arbitrary character. In this respect, the arbitrary and alienated culture of secular bourgeoisie is being challenged by conservative bourgeoisie’s claim on the authentic, thus legitimate culture of society.

Among studies that engage with the concept (Archer, 2012; Meyer, 2000; Reay, 2002; Schwarz, 2016), it is possible to say that authenticity is being defined from two different levels. On one level, authenticity is embraced as a concept referring

to legitimate codes of practices and tastes within a society. In this respect, authenticity becomes a feature of bourgeois lifestyle, and thus one's reason of eligibility within the boundaries of that dominant lifestyle. Such an approach reads the term as a hegemonic concept veiling the power relations lying behind it. In contrast to this doxic meaning of the term, on the other level, the concept is referred to as addressing those features arising from genuine cultures that fall outside the dominant legitimate circle. In this sense, authenticity is charged with an agency-filled resistant character in this latter approach, with a special emphasis put on its communal ties.

In line with the second approach, Archer (2012) signals the difficulties the minority ethnic middle class groups face in accommodating themselves with a middle class lifestyles without being pretentious on one side and without breaking off their ties with their authenticity, i.e., their social roots, on the other side. As to Reay (2002), such a dilemma stems from one's class position. Emphasizing the experienced aspect in defining authenticity, she argues that while the working class takes authenticity as loyalty to one's background, it is perceived by middle classes as a form of self-actualization. Considering Savage's (2000) main argument that underlines the intertwining of class with identity, giving way to individualized experiences of class under neoliberal regime, Mendez (2008) attracts attention to the ways in which individualized experiences of authenticity may hold in themselves the traces of the social in an implicit manner. In this respect, the two different approaches to authenticity converge, influencing one another: the collective bonding of the genuine culture's authenticity may turn the main line of self-actualization of the individual. At this point, Meyer (2000) marks how authenticity may turn into a legitimate rhetoric of the marginalized to render their "authentic" practices and tastes into becoming the new legitimate patterns of classification. In this respect, it is possible to say that the once

resistant power embedded in claims on authentic practices, morality and tastes now becomes the ground on which authenticity is being identified by emerging conservative groups. In other words, authenticity is now the point of reference by which new categories of classifications are being constructed.

Daily life is full of interacting registers ranging from aesthetic judgements, dispositions and mundane conversations to corporeal outlook that one is exposed to minute-by-minute throughout life. What is right and wrong; true and false; authentic and artificial and so forth are all principles of categorizations being shaped during these daily experiences. In this respect, a daily conversation criticizing the Kemalist regime, working on *ebru* or turning down the sound of music when the azan starts all take part in this configuration process. Faubion (2011) underlines that as is seen in the way cultural capital is being raised in children, the pedagogical dimension within habitus formation should not be overlooked for the moral values either. In line with the argument, Mahmood (2005) also raises the issue regarding the importance of religious practices in raising moral integrity.

Conveyance of children in practicing religion constituted one of the important aspects mothers underlined regarding the education they envisaged for their children. Inculcating the love of Allah and the knowledge of religion in children is accentuated by mothers as their own duty. Family, as the focal point of conservative identity, is also regarded by them as the primary place where the children should learn their religion and how to practice it.

During that breakfast which I attended, the issue of teaching religion was raised, and all three women implied that it is a responsibility of parents, especially mothers, to teach. Despite their agreement on this, the way of teaching turned out to be a discussion, which I had heard from other informants too, that was a subject that

often led to quarrels between parents. In contrast to Nida's slightly repressive manner, her friend implied that parents should primarily make their children love Allah in the first place, and secondly to show them the inner peace they may find in faith. She followed her speech with a personal example and implied that even though she does not have a child, she feels the responsibility to "inculcate the love of Allah" into the hearts of her nephews and therefore that she is performing her prayer in front of the children. She underlined that even though the children take it as a game with all the hunching and rising during the prayer and of climbing to her back, it is a strategy to be used in order to make children learn and love religion. This is in fact a narrative that hinges upon one of the stories I came across in various education blogs, a story about the life of the Prophet Mohammed, in which he advises believers to do their best in order to inculcate faith in children, but not by the means of repression, but by guidance instead. Practice is referred to as an important aspect in this pedagogy.

He knows, he does not miss any Friday prayers. He wants to go to them. I want him to do the regular ones too. We did not have that advantage. It has been 10 years since I practiced praying. I tried and stopped many times before. I want him to continue all the time. My daughter is not like that, since it has been done since she was a child, she says "Let me start next year mother." Without faith it is all for nothing. My son turns to prayer when he is afraid. I see that when he is panicked about something he always goes "Mother let's pray", "Father let's pray". His father says that we should not push him into it, let him do himself. (Nida, see Appendix D, 55.)

In fact, it is not only about children, but society as a whole, where these women feel the responsibility to spread Islamic faith and its exemplary lifestyle. After meeting the informants with the occasion of interview, some wanted to add me to their Facebook account, and some others continued their communication via *whatsapp* messenger. Throughout the field work, I received various messages from my informants, a social media messages that shared stories one should take lessons from, or verses of the Qur'an. None of them were dictating kind of pieces, but more as messages that points to the soothing feeling they experience thanks to their faith.

During my conversations with women about religion and its role in their daily lives, relief had been one of the central concepts which they referred to in constructing their narratives. It is the feel of finding peace and the chance of eluding the gnawing ambitions of our times that women underlined regarding the sense-making role of religion in their lives. During the interview with Melek, while we were talking about my life plans, she gave me a book as a gift, which in fact was a book that she had learned from the private *tasavvuf* course she had been taking for a while. It was interesting that there were multiple other copies of the same book on the shelf. She explained that she was keeping those in order to give as a present to those with whom she wanted to share the experiences she had had after meeting the philosophy of *tasavvuf*. Throughout our conversation, she explained how *tasavvuf* taught her to avoid the daily ambitions of life, to let things flow and to find meaning in spirituality. In fact, she was a highly fateful woman. “Fate” was a word she used in every sentence in response to my questions about what she expected from the future for her son, like “He wants to do his masters in a foreign country. I believe in fate. God has drawn a fate for us. It will appear as it is.” In fact, the idea of fate was central in most of the informants’ discourses concerning their opinions and expectations for their children’s education.

I cannot wish anything. After all, things do not happen by wishing. My spouse always wanted a science high school. He wanted our son to be a doctor. Water finds its way. I always pray but on the inside. I do not tell my children. Water flows. One should not be too ambitious (Sema, see Appendix D, 57.)

As can be seen from the statement of Sema, belief in fate also constitutes a ground from which mothers referred as a reason for their abstention from the reckless competitive spirit ensured in the field of education under the influence of neoliberal politics. However, it was not the idea of competition in the first place that

was being criticized. It was the expectation from children from more than they possess to compete. Since it is the idea of limitation of capacities and a predetermined destiny, contributing in this system of competition was supported in a way by taking cognizance of these capabilities of children. In this respect, as underlined by Mahmood (2005), it is not that these women are deprived of agency to intervene in their life trajectories or incapable of opening new ones; but it is the recognition of intrinsic qualities upon which they support one to struggle for what she wants. The justifications mothers put forth in explaining the reason why their children were not playing a musical instrument or pursuing a hobby may also be thought of in this respect. Instead of qualifying it as their children's indecisiveness, an expression which I frequently came across among secular mothers, most of the informants explained it as the lack of capability in their children that led them to abandon what they were doing. Except from one mother, one of the umbrella mothers, who talked about the pressure she was putting on her son to continue his extracurricular activities, none of the mothers mentioned any such inducement, and none of them expressed a bit of the sense of defeat by reason of such a situation.

Recognition of the limits of one's capacity, which these women had set forth as a resistance ground to the competitive spirit which the field of education was asking from families, was raised on the other hand as a critique of the type of mothers expecting everything from the teacher, for instance to endow children with faculties they are not capable of.

A teacher friend of mine says this: "Do not give us vases and expect pitchers. I mean we sculpt them in elementary school. In middle and high school we continue sculpting and waxing, but in the end we give you a vase back. But do not expect something more. Yes, you should work on this. But if it is a vase, it is a vase, it will not turn to a pitcher." This does not go out of my mind. And an older neighbour of mine says to "Give! You will not regret it, and it will turn back to you." Yes, I try to give my children everything, but I try to give them rules too. Rules not being existant with the current generation

makes the children unhappy too. Parents are not happy too. (Ebru, see Appendix D, 57.)

As explained in detail in the second chapter, in spite of the different levels they partake in, all the informants had close contact with the teachers or school administrators. It was, in fact, one of the reasons why they chose private schools. Nevertheless, with regard to the meetings they conducted with teachers, women accentuated their sensibility in not interfering in the job of the teacher, at least not to act as such. It is clear that in scheduling a meeting with a teacher in order to discuss an issue related to the student would incite a certain form of intervention. However, what they meant was more about the manner they adopted, on the basis of respect, in discussing with a teacher and the way they reflected on such interaction with their children. It was obvious that it was the status attributed to teachers by informants that lay behind that sensibility. In her ethnographic study, Lareau (2003) associates the hesitant manner and respectful tone of informants, while talking with authority figures such as teachers with their inferior class positions. The distance between the habitus of mothers and of teachers was addressed in explaining the presence or not of a hierarchical interaction. From this viewpoint, in relation to my observations in the field, I may argue that class may play an important but a restricted role in explaining parents' attitude. I do not say that the practices of the informants were totally detached from their class position. In contrast, since these are the families who experienced a social mobilization in this same generation, the persistence of practices of the previous class position should be expected, and, in this sense, teachers may be taken as an authority figure among the informants. However, if it was only related to the class position of families, then, these women would show a hesitant attitude in scheduling a meeting or in attending parent-teacher meetings on an orderly basis.

Rather than critique, it is the intervention or disrespect that they hesitate for, which I think is much more related to their values.

In elementary school my daughter came up to me and said "We want to play in the snow. We want to go out to the garden. So, we will have a demonstration at school." I asked her why they are not asking from their teachers. She told me that they already did, but they did not let them out. So I asked why they were doing this. She said they think students would get sick. I told her that their teachers are actually right. She told me okay but that they are still going to make the demonstration. "What are you going to do", I asked. "We will write that we want to play", she said. Okay, they prepared posters. But I warned her to not to disrespect anyone. They made their demonstration in the hall between classes. They made a tour around and the school let them. Did something happen? Maybe their teachers made them tour around the garden, or not. I do not remember. (Ebru, see Appendix D, 58.)

"Discipline" was a word which I frequently heard from informants during our conversations. The way mothers referred to the concept gave clues about the importance of social status and their required values for these parents. On one hand, there were few mothers who used the concept as a synonym for hardworking, and it was a sign of expectation for their children to live their life in a self-organized way. "The school is good and also successful in preparing the students for examinations. The students are disciplined"<sup>50</sup> may be counted as an example of this usage. On the other hand, and this was the way most of the mothers used the word, it was the moral aspect that was underlined. Within this scope, the word discipline comes with the sense of esteem a student should feel for her teachers and the respectful and proper manner in which she conducts herself.

Education is really bad currently. Very much so. There are no good, qualified teachers. They are too young, without experience. One talks to the teachers and the pupils, and it is as if two friends are talking. We used to shake out of fear in front of our teachers. Okay, it is good that they understand, but children should be a little afraid of teachers. There is no discipline. Education is very bad. It will get worse. (Arzu, see Appendix D, 59.)

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<sup>50</sup> "Okul güzel ve öğrencileri sınavlara hazırlamada başarılı. Öğrenciler disiplinli."

Here, the sense of fear is vested with a positive connotation, implying a moral person's valorized properness rather than a state of passivity. The above mentioned opinions of informants regarding the stereotypical perception of students going to Doğa College may also be considered in this respect. The same affirmative remark is also put in the primary approach to discipline as a motive rendering their children hardworking individuals. In either way, congruent with a Foucauldian perspective, whether arising from moral frameworks or meritocratic ideals, discipline sprang as a word that parents validated in order to control and configure their children's subjectivities in concordance with the social and moral norms.

#### 4.4 Choosing the right school

The transformation of the field of education and the rise of conservative private schools was touched upon in multiple aspects throughout the second chapter. On the other hand, the importance of morality in habitus formation and thus in orienting the practices of parents was also widely examined. In this respect, families became an important agent within the social field regarding their role in this changing process through which the legitimate classification patterns are transforming and shifting the lines to which symbolic qualities are attributed.

Throughout our conversations, women were keen in underlining that education did not mean instruction per se. Education was perceived as an issue of personal integrity in the first place, which lays emphasis on a pedagogy of morality and value. In this regard, the discourse put on this holistic approach towards education should be considered as a line of distinction through which mothers differentiate themselves from those mothers who narrow down the term to academic success and who raise children lacking rules and discipline. The emphasis put on the moral aspect of

education moves beyond the private sphere and turns out to be one of the reasons that determine parents' choice of schools.

I am talking about the high school of my older son. The families sending their children to these schools are definite, the social environment is obvious. We had the concern for him not to fall into bad habits. If this was not our choice, he would go to Hüseyin Avni Sözen. We chose education, not instruction. It was always much more important for me. (Sema, see Appendix D, 60.)

How much you invest in education, you should invest in both materially and spiritually. I think like this, and I always try to do it like this. It is not something that can be measured with money. (Ebru, see Appendix D, 61.)

The emphasis put on investment in the second citation was significant regarding the *raison d'être* of conservative private schools. It was not just the instruction that families invest in, but the moral cultivation in a proper way. It seems that the claim of schools in including morality within the scope of education has a strong compliance among conservative families, and thus constitutes the essential justification behind a rising market. Among twelve mothers, there was not one single mother who did not refer to the moral values as a criterion that played a role in their school preferences. Four of them implied reasons other than morality too that determined their school choices such as the school's reputation in preparation for national exams, the closeness of the school or the opportunities it offered such as "special class". Though in the last example, the priority given by families to the quality of education offered coincided with the moral sensitivities of the family, strengthening their persuasiveness in choosing a conservative private school.

The rest of the families announced the moral tendency of the schools as a reason why they took these conservative private schools in consideration in the first place. In their discourses, this moral tendency was narrated in two different aspects. In the first place, the informants underlined the schools' success in teaching religion, starting from younger ages and inculcating values from scratch in the path of raising

future people with good personalities. In this respect, as can be seen from the citations below, even though the religious courses offered were optional- since they should be optional according to law- schools' prioritization of religious courses in their institutional identities and families' emphasis put on religious courses as one of the primary reason in choosing these schools marks the main line of divergence that differentiates the approach of conservative families from the secular bourgeoisie. Besides, since opening these courses was left to the initiative of schools, it is also not possible to see these kinds of courses offered in private schools with secular identities.

Mothers' discourses praising the intensity of religious courses may also be considered as a technical aspect of raising, of cultivating legitimate classification patterns in children. The emphasis put on younger ages should also be considered since it is the period of habitus ossification, which explains on the other hand the rising interest of conservative private school investors in kindergarten levels. A view that dictates "shaping" from the beginning, naturalizing axes of divisions, and thus creating a *doxa* proper to the core, may be read between the lines of mothers' discourses as an attempt to extend their control on the subjectivation process of their children with the choice of proper schools.

They take very good care of guiding children in the right way. But children get a little bored. To be honest, there is no coercion but they provide religious, education to the ones that demand it. Both of my children can read Qur'an better than me. But it is optional, no constraints. In the first years, I did not know about it, they did not tell me. Because some parents have different opinions about it. To tell the truth, there is not any obligation. It was not optional then. It wasn't optional at that time, it has recently become optional. I am talking about 10 years ago. Besides, children were taking those courses in kindergarten because they receive it more easily when they are little, afterwards they don't want it. Can you send them to these courses today? No. They now have all in their minds, they learned before. They know more prayers than me. In high school, they don't want it. All you can give is given when they were little. So that they won't feel themselves inadequate afterwards. (Arzu, see Appendix D, 62.)

About religion classes in school, I think they should be offered. For example, we learnt Surahs in school. It is good. You all learn together. Also, this happens at a very young age. After that, you never forget. Personally, I did not push my son on this subject. But, I think should be taught in school. Children should know their religion. With the aid of audio and visuals, it would be easier to teach. It is like that when you are learning English or Arabic. Actually, in my opinion, someone can start reading the Quran in 20 days. (Sema, see Appendix D, 63.)

In the second place, morality is embraced with regard to its dimension of sociability. In one dimension, sociability is thought of as a structured legitimate power, in creating a social network in which children may socialize with peers coming from similar families. In this respect, it is a horizontal segregation in addition to the vertical one that characterize families' choices, since is not the school that is chosen but the families. In addition to security, here, trust becomes something that is searched for in such a segregated social network.

Both of them went to Coşkun for elementary school. It is a private school. Close to us. The reason we chose that school is that I feel like the families and the ambience is closer to our culture. Not that the school is really great or gives amazing education. Just because we have the same view about the world. (Zehra, see Appendix D, 64.)

On the other dimension, it is the structuring aspect that they search for. It is about creating a social space where the values cared for by the family are being constantly reproduced, either by practice or by discourse. In this regard, it is the hidden curriculum that families search for which is addressed as something that conserve the child in the ideal way possible. It is this aspect which parents perceive that renders the graduates of schools as distinct from others, as having the capacities which others do not, and thus as having a symbolic superiority when compared to other graduates of ordinary schools. From this point on, as will be observed from the next citations, the ordinariness is attributed not just to public school but other private schools rendering these ones distinct.

The reason we should choose private schools is that the public ones have gone bad. They are not like the ones before. In private schools they raise people with quality. I am totally against class difference. He should eat with everyone that matches his values, morals. I expect education from a school, rather than instruction... Humanistic practices should be consolidated. In any private school, education should be more important, rather than instruction. The people they raise have character. Morality is important. (Melek, see Appendix D, 65.)

Our father did not want the children to go to normal schools. Public schools or different colleges... Saying that I know that this school will take care of them in terms of morality and show them their way. (Arzu, see Appendix D, 66)

Despite the fact that conservative private schools are in high demand among conservative families, it was observed that most of the families were also concerned with national examinations in order to see their chances. Most of the mothers talked about a preparation process they had experienced, which included private lessons, *dershanes* for some<sup>51</sup>, and school studies on weekends. There are few schools which they appreciate and implied that they would be happy if their children scored high on the national examination to enter in this few. However, as touched upon, this process was not narrated by informants as something that they went all in as a family, investing both economically and affectively, as it is narrated in other studies with

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<sup>51</sup> As mentioned before, *dershanes* were closed as a result of the controversy between the government and the *Cemaat*. Before the controversy, the *dershanes* were highly demanded by a large segment of the society, both by secular and conservative groups, regarding their success in preparing students for national examinations. Therefore, their closure had created an impact in the society at large. As referred in the introduction, there was not a significant differentiation between the discourses of pro-government or pro-*Cemaat* families in terms of their educational strategies. However, the debate on the closure of *dershanes* had arisen as a main demarcation line revealing informants' positioning with regards to current educational policies. On one hand, adherents of the *Cemaat* had interpreted the intervention of the state as a failure of policy that will lead to the aggravation of educational system in Turkey regarding the impossibility of creating a qualified education with such a rapid transformation process from *dershanes* to private schools. Plus, *Cemaat* members had also underlined the unfairness conveying the policy for orienting families to private schools. Interestingly, pro-government informants had also relied upon the concept of unfairness in explaining their support to the policy. In contrast to followers' backing for *dershanes* by emphasizing their power in preparing students for national examinations and thus providing them the same amount of chance for achieving well in such an unequal contest; AKP followers referred to state incentives in enabling people who may not even pay for *dershanes*, to send their children to private schools and have a good education. In either case, despite their difference in form, it is the neoliberal template that both camps try to shape the concept fairness.

bourgeois families. In this respect, relatively low scores within the national examinations were not considered by families as failure, and thanks to their economic capital they could also use their luxury of choosing and mapping out another ideal route for their children. Nonetheless, the reasons behind idealization of these few schools instead of others also implies important boundaries about the strategizing process of families.

Galatasaray, Kabataş and Beşiktaş Anatolian High School are the names of the schools which mothers had mentioned if they had no limitations to choose. These schools may be identified as the most prestigious public high schools in Turkey with their expectation of overachieved grades to enter and their graduates' high level of success in university entrance exams. Informants also referred to schools' deep rooted history, especially regarding Galatasaray High School. What was significant was that none of the mothers mentioned private schools as an ideal option to choose. Regarding the rising demand of bourgeoisie towards private schools within the last decade, the preference of informants was intriguing. In Turkey, the most prestigious private high schools topmost in the national ranking are mostly known for their foreigner profiles with respect either to their foundation cadres, like Robert College as an American School, or to their education models, like Anglo-Saxon education of Koç High School or French type of education in Notre Dame de Sion High School. Additionally, these schools are generally known for their secular, Western oriented approach and curriculum and the older ones' association with the elites of the new born Republic.

When I asked whether informants would consider sending their children to one of them if they had no limitations (such as exam grades or financial), except for

a few mothers who approved, most of the mothers emphasized their drawbacks from such a selection. The following words are one of these informants:

Why? So that my child can go to Robert College and be a servant of the American system? At those times, she could enter to German College. She could go to prominent schools. I told them that I will not send my daughter to a minority school. Her teachers said that I was blocking her path. So I asked them whether they trusted themselves. I trust myself and my daughter. I told them she will study here and get into a good university. They told me that they trust themselves, but the other schools are really good ones. I told them I do not think that way. Ahmet, Mehmet, Robert. I do not think that way about only Robert. I do not want any names. I want my child to study in a school affiliated with the Turkish government. For the world, for the citizens of the Turkish Republic. I will give belief as well as I can. I want her to have a belief, no matter what religion it is. But I do not enjoy them getting into a religious school and being raised as one of their fans. I told them I do not want it. I lived through the same problems with the *Cemaat*. (Ebru, see Appendix D, 67.)

Among informants, these western oriented private schools were considered as a source of alienation cutting off one's ties with their national and cultural roots. On one hand, an appreciation was clear regarding these schools' competitive power not just national but also in the global arena. However, in contrast to secular bourgeoisie's holding on these schools' promising of undergraduate degree abroad, the conservative identity, laying emphasis on "indigenusness" and "nationalism" (Taşkın, 2015) become the main ground on which informants justified their drawbacks from these schools. The similar vein was also perceivable in informants' reasoning about sending their children to foreign universities.

As mentioned before, studying abroad comprises a certain symbolic memory among conservative families regarding the post 28 February process. A narrative of an exile and the difficulties of living in a foreign culture were quite apparent in the conversations I had with the "victims" of the period. However, things have changed since then and regarding the interviews it is possible to say that rather than an exile, studying abroad turned into a choice for conservative groups. It is possible to read

this orientation from the IB programs taking place in some of the conservative private schools. Nonetheless, regarding the field work, studying abroad seems to constitute a choice which most of the conservative families abstain from. Among informants there was only one family who had sent their son to complete his undergraduate degree in the USA. However, it was, in fact, a strategy the family had developed, since their son could not enter one of the universities of Turkey, and they also had a relative living in the USA, which they could send their children nearby. Besides, except for three families who said they would send their children to schools abroad, all the mothers gave reasons for being hesitant in sending their children. Conservation of the integrity of the family was one of the points mothers expressed as a reason why they would not like to do so. They implied that living closely was important for the continuation of family, which implied in fact the continuation of control. Secondly, mothers expressed the importance of being beneficial for one's own country in order to contribute to its development. Thirdly, it is the fear nurtured in their hesitation that the personality of their children would be damaged and that they may be oriented to wrong paths.

For example she wants to go abroad, but I do not want it. Because she should study university in her own country. Also, life is not just about school. I feel if she leaves to study there, there will be other obstacles. I just think, I do not know if I am wrong or right, but I do not want her to go. If my son wants to go, I would think about it but not my daughter. He wants it a lot. If he finishes school, we will see about his masters. (Zehra, see Appendix D, 68.)

I would be happy if they studied here, but they can study a little here and a little there. Whatever is good for them, it should happen. The thing I am afraid of the most is them losing their personalities. I do not want them to be involved with other things. That is why I leave it to God. Whatever is good, I want that to happen. (Arzu, see Appendix D. 69.)

It was interesting that all my informants' perceived my question of studying abroad as referring to western universities. It is interesting since from the conversations I had during my fieldwork, I had learned that there were various

channels to study abroad, in countries like Morocco, for example. This may be explained from a class-originating reason regarding the latter women's lower middle-class position. Anyway, what was clear in these discourses was that conserving one's personality, one's moral integrity and virtuous life, was a highly important goal in raising a child. It was apprehended as parents' duty, until their children become adults and may continue their lives with their well-established characters. That may be thought of as the reason why even though these families were highly opposing for studying university abroad, they were more tolerant for master's degree. On the other hand, further than mothers' sensitivity in conserving the integrity of the family and in keeping the child in close marking, an exclusionary vein should not be overlooked. Both in abstaining from choosing high school with foreign origins or from sending their children abroad, "Degeneration of one's personality" constitutes an important part of the discourse attributing a dangerous role to the imagined "Other". Either the secular lifestyle or the Western individuality, the Other is charged with depredatory characteristics, rendering the integrity of the personality under threat of its cultural contagiousness. In his study on the educational field in Turkey, Sam Kaplan takes note of how the curriculum was reformulated after the 1980 coup d'état by the state for "immunizing children from wrong knowledge" (Kaplan, 2006, p.61) and formulating the future citizens as such. In a similar vein, in today's neoliberal age, families contribute to this immunizing strategy in order to create a protective zone for their children purged from wrong cultural traits. In this respect, the school choice may be considered as the families' attempt to prolong the time until the child come across with these Others to a moment that the child will be totally immune to these external threats and be able to conserve her well-established personality.

## CHAPTER 5

### CONCLUSION

For several decades, especially after the AKP's rise to power, the emerging conservative bourgeoisie has become a salient subject of discussion in Turkey, regarding its transformative impact on the social structure. Within this scope, it is possible to talk about a variety of researches conducted in recent years. Islam's compatibility with secularism and modernity, the transformation of political Islam in Turkey, religious actors' increasing articulation with the globalized capitalist system, the rising visibility of women with headscarves in public spaces and the changing lifestyles of the emerging conservative groups, regarding their luxurious consumption patterns and segregated living spaces may be counted as the primary concerns of scholars. However, despite scholars' rising interest in such a significant embourgeoisement process among religious groups in Turkey, the question of education, which constitutes one of the main axis of class formation was left unquestioned<sup>52</sup>. On the other hand, even though there are few researches that question the importance of education for middle and upper middle classes' positioning in the social structure of Turkey, the emerging conservative class is not represented in the scope of these studies. In this respect, by questioning the educational strategies of the conservative bourgeoisie in this particular study, I wanted to make a modest attempt in the literature.

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<sup>52</sup> Balkan and Öncü's (2014) study is the only research available in the literature that questions the educational concerns of the rising pious groups. However, the boundedness of the study for taking the concept of education only in terms of formal education and for not questioning how the concept may be perceived by different identities, i.e. secular and pious groups, may be considered regarding the significance of this study.

Throughout this study, the concept of education is taken in the broader sense of the term, including government policies, families' preferences in schooling for their children and also their educative practices in the private sphere. In this respect, by investigating large scale frameworks and micro analysis in a relational manner, I tried to transcend macro-micro dualities in this research.

Pierre Bourdieu's relational analysis set the main theoretical framework of this study which does not just try to examine the changing educational strategies within conservative bourgeoisie along their embourgeoisement process, but also their self-positioning in the social field vis-à-vis the secular bourgeoisie. An attempt to overcome the micro-macro duality and to analyze the relational positioning of agents required this study to look for the dynamic positionings taking place in the field of education at large. In this respect, in line with Balkan and Rutz's suggestion (2009), it is possible to identify three main agents in the field of education, namely state, schools and families. The preliminary function of the state is defined by Bourdieu as follows:

By inculcating common cognitive structures (largely by way of the school system), structures that are tacitly evaluative (you can't say 'white and black' without tacitly saying that white is better than black), by producing and reproducing them, having them deeply recognized and incorporated, the state makes an essential contribution to the reproduction of the symbolic order that has a determining effect on the social order and its reproduction. (Bourdieu, 2014, p. 168)

Primarily, as seen throughout the second chapter, the state has always been an important agent in the field of education in terms of determining objective conditions and symbolic categorizations in the field and hence taking part in the ongoing contestations going on between different dominant groups of society. In this respect, along with the emergence of conservative segments as a power group in society, it is also possible to talk about a rising role of religion in the field. The status of religious

courses and the *imam hatip* schools can be seen as two main grounds by which the change in politics can be analyzed.

Since the AKP's rise to power, especially regarding the last five years, Islamization and privatizations had been the two main pillars that defined the government's positioning in the field. Under the neoconservative policy of the government, on one hand, global neoliberal educational values gained weight within the field such as competitiveness, high competence, free choice etc. On the other hand, regarding the policies, official discourses, and the symbolic names given to projects, it is possible to talk about the glorification of religious-conservative values in the field and a rising reference to the Islamic-Ottoman past of the nation. In this respect, it is possible to talk about the formation of the legitimate citizen as a moral individual, who embraces her own cultural values and who is well-equipped with the capacities compatible with the neoliberal world system.

In relation to the second agent, i.e. schools, it is possible to talk about a considerable transformation process taking place in the field of education in relation to the emergence of the conservative bourgeoisie. When one looks at the private education market, it is possible to see a remarkable rise in private schools that present themselves with conservative identities, especially since the second half of the 1990s. Compatible with the framework put forth by the state, it is observed that these schools built up their distinctive attributes and thus their position in the field of education along two lines: aside from their educational approach, which valorizes bourgeois dispositions such as educating well-equipped, risk bearer competitive individuals, the schools differentiate themselves from other schools especially by putting forward their success in educating moral individuals with religious and nationalist sensibilities.

Another finding revealed through analysis on schools showed that, in addition to three agents, it was also crucial to talk about *vakifs* as an important agent that played a role in the transformation taking place in the field of education. It is observed that half of the conservative private schools are related to *vakifs*, which not just work as Islamic philanthropic organizations, but which also have close connections with prominent investment groups of the country. In this respect, when the function of these *vakifs* in conveying the interests of power groups in the field of education is considered, their role in the Islamization of the field deserves further attention.

Concerning conservative bourgeois families' positioning in the field of education along their embourgeoisement process, a striking intergenerational difference in terms of families' relating with the cultural capital is discerned. It is possible to talk about both an important increase in families' level of education in comparison to the previous generation, and a rising interest in mobilizing their capital, in creating a distinctive educational strategy for their children. In this respect, it is observed that most of the families orient their children towards private education by putting forth bourgeois concerns such as close care, safety and quality education.

Along with such a transformation in families' engagement with the cultural capital, a certain intergenerational change is also observed regarding families' ways of parenting. On one hand, the gendered character of educational practices does not seem to have undergone any change between the two generations. It was always the mothers who took care of the educational issues of the children both physically and emotionally. On the other hand, it was observed that, along with their rising social position in the field, families' parenting practices seem to pass from a "natural growth" model to "concerted cultivation", which implies a rising care among parents

in the educational life of the children (Lareau, 2003). Even though such a class based transformation in parenting practices seemed to show different mothering models among informants, it was seen that a conscious, knowledgeable way of “good mothering” (Lawler, 2000) became the basis on which mothers built up their agencies, both in marking their difference from their own mothers, and also in gaining a higher status in a patriarchal society (Kandiyoti, 1988).

At the intersection where conservative bourgeois families mark their distinction from lower class conservative families and thus differentiate themselves from the secular bourgeoisie, two points come to the fore. Firstly, it was seen that the classical Turkish Islamic arts, which may not be considered as “high-brow” cultural goods among secular bourgeoisie, constituted an important part in the conservative bourgeoisie’s judgement of taste. When the government’s policies and opinion leaders’ encouragement in valorizing these branches of arts-presented as “conservative arts”-is considered, it is possible to say that the emerging conservative bourgeoisie is being endowed with a mission in attributing these arts a symbolic value and in rendering them a basis of distinction. On the other hand, by producing, using and consuming these cultural goods in a luxurious way and by embracing them as part of their stylization of life, it was seen that the conservative bourgeoisie was also taking a role in this cultural politics and making a claim on the rate of exchange these cultural goods hold in the bourgeois lifestyle.

As a second point, it is seen that religious values and religion based moral worldview constitutes the main “basis of exclusion” (Lamont & Lareau, 1988) by which conservative bourgeois families mark the distinction of their lifestyles and educational demands from that of the secular bourgeoisie. A clear separation between instruction and education is observed among informants’ discourses,

affiliating the latter more with the inculcation of moral principles in their children. In this respect, along with ensuring them with a quality education-instruction in other words-, teaching children religious practices and knowledge, rendering them respectful individuals and providing them a social network in which conservative values are valorized seemed to be the main priorities of families regarding their children's education. Within this scope, belief in faith and nationalist sensibilities came to the fore as important registers determining informants' educational strategies, by abstaining from highly competitive structures in the field of education and from the prestigious private schools known for their westernized identities. Within this scope, conservative private schools seemed to be preferred by most of the families primarily for allowing their children to socialize in a moral environment and for instilling them with conservative values. Regarding the common strategy among families in orienting for conservative private schools, it is possible to talk about a rising social segregation in the field of education, a kind of identity and class based enclosure, which may also be perceived as a typical outcome of a neoliberal policy reigning in the field for more than three decades.

In conclusion, when the field of education was analyzed from this relational framework, it came to the fore that the neoconservative educational policy of the government that prioritizes religious, nationalist and moral values seemed to overlap with the demands of the conservative bourgeois families, who are also highly engaged with the neoliberal world system. In this respect, it is possible to talk about a salient convergence in families' educational practices with those of the secular bourgeoisie, as a result of their embourgeoisement process. It is also possible to talk about two main axis by which conservative bourgeois families mobilized their conservative "schemes of thought and perception" (Bourdieu, 1977, p.164) of the

world into demands that play role in the transformation taking place within the field of education. First, it was seen that, compatible with the approach of the government, moral frameworks did not just function as a symbolic boundary of families, which are being mobilized as preliminary registers in evaluating cultural categories, but also as a ground of social disciplinization in raising an ideal individual for the future. Secondly, by putting forward their own legitimate categories of divisions in the social field, in terms of their practices, values and judgements of taste, it is possible to say that the conservative bourgeoisie were making a claim on the established bourgeois habitus, driving forward its own authenticity and thus positioning in the social field in this respect, which sets a crucial ground in inciting a transformation in the society at large.

Overall, I argue that, by positioning in the social field as a bourgeois class, by putting forward their own legitimate categories of classification and thus by inciting an effective change in the society at large, the conservative bourgeoisie are not just triggering a shift in the doxic order of the secular hegemony, but also playing a role in the transformation taking place in the field of education.

However, embracing all these dynamics as unique particularities of the Turkish case, and considering them only with relation to Turkish modernization's defective history, would generate a misleading outcome. Additionally, it would also lead to a contradiction in this study's claim put on its relational approach. In this respect, without abandoning the specificities particular to the Turkish context, it is important to underline the overlapping dimensions of the story told so far with contemporaneous global phenomenon, to underline the current translocal relations and to consider the reciprocal structuring and restructuring process taking place in different parts of the world. In this respect, it is possible to talk about three main

issues: the similarities between Turkey and other late developed countries' history of capitalism; the articulation and the enhancement of moral frameworks with the rise of neoliberalism in other parts of the world; and the culture wars seen in a variety of other societies.

In the first place, it is important to remember that the rise of modernism and Western capitalism inaugurated both institutional and cultural changes also in most of the non-Western geographies such as Middle-East, Africa and Asia since the second half of the nineteenth century (McNeill, 1991). Concerning the Muslim societies such as Persia, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan etc., it is also possible to talk about a pattern similar to the one seen in Turkey, where the compatibility of Islamic fabric of the society with the rising Western values, notably in terms of secularism, has become a crucial axis of contradiction during the establishment process of a modern state (McNeill, 1991). The central role of state in the modernization and nation-building process of non-Western societies has also been significant in terms of forming and consolidating a state-dependent bourgeois class and of establishing industry-based developmentalist strategies. The appearance of Western capitalism as such a state-led project, which supports big business groups that become key actors in the policy making process, and thus in establishing modern capitalism as regards to their own interests, may be taken as a common phenomenon in multiple late industrialized countries such as Turkey, South Korea and India throughout the first half of the twentieth century (Buğra, 1997). On the other hand, concerning the break of national development on a global scale in parallel to the globalization process and neoliberalism's rising sphere of influence in the second half of the century, it is again possible to talk about converging dynamics discernible in the transformation process of these developing countries. In one respect, as an

outcome of Washington Consensus, it is seen that all these countries have been put under pressure by international organizations such as the IMF and World Bank to retrench the state's role and to liberalize their markets. In other respects, by reason of their weak infrastructural bodies, sustainable economic policies and debt-led growth, it is seen that post-1990s witnessed far reaching financial crisis of those neoliberalized economies in Latin America, Eastern Europe, East and Southeast Asia, which led some of them such as India, Vietnam and Chile to shift to hybrid economic policies by increasing the controlling function of the state (Öniş and Şenses, 2003).

Regarding such an interdependent relation of states on a global scale and the occurrence of similar patterns in the world despite the hybrid forms neoliberalism takes with respect to the local particularities of each state, Peck and Tickell propose to read neoliberalism as a form of metalogic (Peck and Tickell, 2002, p.383) actualizing itself diversely through such relations. In this respect, they underline the contradictory and adaptive nature of neoliberalism constantly reformulating itself through new encounters. Within this scope, as an outcome, the neoliberal project had faced globally throughout the 1990s, they emphasize a shift from “roll back” to “roll out” neoliberalisms; i.e. from an aggressive deregulation process coupled with rising privatizations, retrenchment of state and extension of market forces in combatting with every form of Keynesian welfarism and collectivism to a creative form of neoliberalism, where the rising financialization and the increasing impact of international actors such as the IMF and World Bank is being accompanied by the appearance of a socially interventionist state and a re-regulation strategy where non-market registers are being mobilized in the formation of new neoliberal subjectivities.

Within this frame, under the disciplinary and regulatory form of neoliberalism, it is important to underline the rising influence of moral discourse together with the rise of neoliberal governance strategies and political economy. Such a point is significant for capturing the impact of neoliberal dynamics in the consolidation of morality at the center of public policies in Turkey too. In this respect, it is seen that morality has been manifesting itself since for several decades on a global basis both in secular forms and also in communitarian frameworks. In one respect, as is also underlined in the second chapter, it is possible to talk about the mobilization of a moral discourse in generating a competitive, working, self-responsible ethos and thus in creating “ideal” neoliberal subjects (Amable, 2011). It is also seen that morality is not just forming a ground in disciplining subjects, but also in legitimizing a social order as in Serbia (Mikuš, 2015) where the emphasis put on accountability and fairness of neoliberal competitive market and the discourses of clientelism and corruption associated with public sector has been animated in legitimizing the public sector retrenchment policies.

Additionally, with the “revitalization and the assumption of public roles” (Casanova, 1995, p.5) of religions throughout the globe since the 1980s, it is possible to talk about a rising level of influence of religious dynamics in determining moral frameworks. In this respect, it is possible to talk about three main dynamics perceived worldwide, which also detach their perception as particularities belonging to the historical context in Turkey. In the first place, it is seen that, along with the entrenchment of neoliberalism and the consolidation of new media technologies, religion has become a part of the capitalist market to be consumed and to create a religiously fed moral lifestyle. Such a pattern may be seen in the way religious broadcasts have become a part of moral restructuring of the society in Mali (Schulz,

2006), the way Islamic fashion magazines have formulated the relation between Muslim women, sexuality, capitalism and a moral lifestyle in Indonesia (Krier, 2011), or in the way the multiplication of Buddhistic monuments and Chinese shrine festivals in Southern Thailand have become a part of the symbolic economy in which a certain ethno- religious identity is being constructed vis-à-vis the Muslim culture of the region (Marc, 2008). Secondly, it is seen that the transmission of welfare services from government to faith-based organizations, as part of a neoliberal policy and governmentality, is also a worldwide phenomenon observable not just in Middle East (Atia, 2013), South Asia (Salehin, 2016) and Africa (Bornstein, 2005), but also in dominant societies such as USA (Hackworth, 2012), UK (Dinham, 2009) or Finland (Martikainen, 2015). Correspondingly, as a third dimension, it is also observed that with the rise of neoliberalism, religious ethics have been mobilized in other countries such as Indonesia (Rudnycky, 2009), India (Osella & Osella, 2009), Taiwan (Pazderic, 2004), Brasil (Garmany, 2010), Ireland (Kitching, 2013) as a disciplinary ground in producing “ideal” subjects of a neoliberal public order.

In relation to such reciprocal interdependence of neoliberalism and the increasing influence of moral discourses concerning societal issues, it is also possible to think the way conservative bourgeoisie position itself in the social field together with the wave of “culture wars” manifesting itself in different parts of the world, notably since its outbreak in the USA since the 1960s. The culture wars, as underlined by James Hunter, may be conceived as “political and social hostility rooted in different systems of moral understanding” of the society in order to find an answer to the question of ‘how to order our own lives and our lives together in this society’” (Hunter, 1991, p.42). In other words, it may be considered as a certain kind of power struggle, of a symbolic battle, between different social groups in a society

in order to put a claim on the nature of the social fabric, on its defining registers, and also on its past, present and future. In this respect, it is possible to talk about two main grounds on which culture wars occur: First, the culture wars go around a certain assertion of “morality” in terms of defining what is “right” and “good” with respect to one’s values and beliefs. Secondly, it is also seen that these moral judgements take place on a public level, in order to define what is good for the society at large, according to which Iltis underlines the central theme of culture war as “making moral issues matters of public concern” (Iltis, 2011, p.10).

It is possible to talk about several common grounds on which these culture wars take place in different countries of the world: such as, contestations within the educative field in defining the legitimate values to inculcate in future citizens as seen in USA (Deckman and Prud’homme, 2014; Ravitch, 2002) and South Australia (Peppard, 2008), the question of homosexuality becoming a line of contradiction of different groups in Singapore (Chen, 2013) and Canada (Collins, 2006); the struggle between different power groups to determine the substance of national identity in Belarus (Ioffe, 2007); the contestations over the legitimate judgements of aesthetics forming an axis of struggle in Egypt (Mehrez, 2008) or Russia (Anderson, 2013); or the occurrence of the women’s bodies as a combat zone through disputes about abortion manifest itself in Mexico (Maier, 2012) etc...Such a list may be extended broadly. What is crucial to capture is that on one hand, the culture is always a battleground of contestation between competing power groups all over the world in order to define the legitimate content of the social unity. On the other hand, morality, yet further religious morality, becoming a basis of legitimization on which social groups’ construct their claim in their will to power is not unique to the context of

Turkey, but may be seen in most of the above mentioned culture wars around the world.

Having analyzed the educational strategies of the rising conservative bourgeois families, families' way of self positioning in the social field and the relationality of dynamics influencing such position-takings not just in the Turkish case but in the world at large, it is possible to talk about several implications which may set the ground for further research.

The field work of this research was conducted with families in order to understand their positioning in the social field and the educational strategies they developed for their children. Even though the interviews were gathered in a short period of time, they were highly fruitful in revealing the relation between new positions conservative groups have taken within the social stratification and their changing practices in the cultural field, further research is necessary in order to capture the impact of these strategies in the social structure in a more holistic way. In this respect, although it requires an extended amount of work, a longitudinal study may be suggested in order to trace how the cultural traits endowed in children are being mobilized later on in their lives, or whether the social network they gain via their schools will play a distinctive role in their future lives. However, as proposed by Calarco (2014), a study that will be done in a school environment may also be suggested in order to analyze the effects of families' educational strategies in the socialization patterns among students, how they (re)produce inequalities or whether it is possible to talk about a certain agency on the part of students regarding their responses to their parents' cultural transmission. Within this scope, an ethnographic analysis done in conservative private schools would also be highly profitable in analyzing how morality is being constructed in the hidden curriculum of schools, and

how extracurricular activities play a role in inculcating conservative values in children.

Aside from all these factors, with the transformations taking place in the field of education since the July 2016 attempted coup d'état, especially concerning the closure of private schools affiliated with *Cemaat* is considered, further research is required in order to analyze how such a demand will be satisfied by the private education market and what kind of a position the government will take in the close future.

APPENDIX A  
INTERVIEW FORM

- Where are you from? For how long have you lived in Istanbul? Where do your relatives live?

Parents

- Where were you born? (You and your husband)
- How old were you when you got married? How did you meet your husband?
- What are your hobbies? (favorite author if it is literature, favorite branch if it is arts& crafts, favorite genre of music)
- Did you attend any courses when you were young? Are you attending any courses now?
- Educational status. Where have you studied? (and your husband)
- Do you speak any foreign languages? Where did you learn them?
- Are you working? Have you ever worked before?
- Was your family interested in your education?
- What were the criteria laid down by your family regarding the school choice? ( Did you have any influence on high school/university choice? What were the points that you paid attention to?)
- What were the activities you did with your family, to contribute to your education? (like cultural activities)
- What were the professions of your parents? Your husband?
- Are you in the habit of reading newspapers? Which newspapers do you read? Where do you buy them?

- Did you decorate your home on your own? Did you have any help?
- Are you a member of any association, community or work group? Do you attend regular meeting at home or in public space? Which activities do you do?
- Do you travel domestically or abroad with your family? Where have you travelled? Which places were the most influential for you? What do you do on national and religious holidays?
- Do you like shopping? What do you spend the most money on?

#### Students

- Where were your child born?
- Which activities does your child like to do most? Does she/he attend any courses? (dance, sport, language, Qur'an, etc.)
- Did you provide her/him any guidance in choosing the hobby/course? What do her/ his friends prefer as hobbies?
- Did you have any efforts to prepare for school in the preschool period? (sending the child to kindergarten, or spending time with the child doing brain-boosting activities, etc.)
- Which activities do you do with your child that you think would be beneficial for your child's education? (like cultural activities, etc.)
- What do your children do with her/his friends? Where do they go?
- Do you watch television at home? Which programmes do you watch? Which TV channel do you watch most?
- Who takes care of the child's education?
- Have you ever had any help from an educational counsellor?

### Entering the school

- Where did your child study in primary school? Why did you choose that school?
- Which school does your child go to now? Since when?
- The reason why you chose this school
- Where do you get the information about the schools?
- (if prepared to SBS/ TEOG) How was the preparation period before entering the school? (private lessons, private teaching institutions)
- Where did you get the information regarding which schools, which professors and which private teaching institutions were the best ones?
- Do you think there is a competitiveness to enter schools via those exams? Has it been increased recently?

### School- Education

- Why is a certain school preferred? What is the difference from other ones? (investment in the future/ domestic or abroad university opportunities)
- If there were not any limitations, which school would you like the most for your child to enter? Why?
- What are the criteria of successful students for this school? What does the school expect from students?
- (if private school) Why did you choose a private school? What are differences from a state school?
- Did you consider physical facilities of the school when making a decision?

- Did you have any information about the professors of the school before choosing it?
- Is the education provided by the school completely bound to the curricula projected by the state? Does it have different options?
- Does the school have foreign language education? Which languages?
- Regarding the discussions recently taken place ( *Cemaat*-AKP, courses in Ottoman language, obligatory religion courses), have you ever felt that those debates had any reflection on daily life in the school? Did the school make any statements about these subjects?
- Besides the academic framework, how do you evaluate the social and cultural activities provided by the school? Do the parents have any influence on this?
- Could you specify three things you consider the most important that the school can convey to the children?

#### School- Parents

- Does the school have a parent- teacher association? Do you participate in it? Which activities do they do?
- How would you describe the parents sending their children to this school?
- What can you say about the educational level of the parents?
- What are the professions of the parents?
- Have you noticed anything special about the consumption patterns?
- Do you think the other parents do cultural activities? Which cultural activities do they do?

- Have you observed any changes in the parent profile? (if yes, how and since when?)

#### Future

- Where does your child want to go after graduation? What is your dream about it? What is the life you want her/him to have?
- Would you consider a university abroad? Where? Do you have anybody giving you information about it, or anybody talking her/his experiences?
- Do you think your child will be in touch with her/his current friends from the school?
- (if another school is desired) Do you think that school would offer any privileges after graduation?
- Is there an ideal spouse for your child that you have dreamed of? How would you like her/him to be? How sort of wedding would you want to hold?

#### Last Informations

- What is the monthly income level of your family? 0-4000/4000-8000/8000-12000/12000-300000/30000-+
- How old are you?
- What does your husband do for a living? For how long has he been doing this profession? If he owns the workplace, how many employees work there?
- Where do you live? Do you have any other houses?
- Do you own a car? How many cars?

APPENDIX B

VAKIFS' AFFILIATIONS WITH COMPANIES, BUSINESSPEOPLE AND INVESTMENT GROUPS

Table 3. *Vakifs'* Affiliations with Companies, Businessman and Investment Groups

Foundation Name	Affiliated Companies	Company Sector	Board / Founder	Founding Date
Hakyyol Eğitim Yardımlaşma ve Dostluk Vakfı	Server Holding	Asfa Educational Institutions, Server Communications, Akra FM, Necat Construction, Vera Domestic and Foreign Trade and Seyran Tourism are among prominent companies within the body of the holding.	Prof. Dr. Mahmud Es'ad Coşan Hocaefendi is the founder /Muharrem Nurettin Coşan is the son of him and the honorary president.	1980
Hamidiye Eğitim Ve Kültür Vakfı			Dr. Ekrem Gürman is the founder.	
Ulu Çınar Vakfı			Rahmi Çakmak is the chairman of the Executive Board	2011
Hayrat Vakfı			Ahmet Husrev Altınbaşak is the founder.	1974
Fatih Medreseleri Vakfı			Ahmet Binici Hoca is the chairman of the Board of Trustees	1986
Ensar Vakfı	Chairman Dilberoğlu was appointed as an independent member of the board to Turkish Airlines in 2015.		İsmail Cenk Dilberoğlu is the chairman of the Board of Trustees, prominent AKP mayors Ahmet Misbah Demircan and Hilmi Türkmen are members of the board. Also, Kadir Topbaş is among founders.	1979
Türkiye Gönüllü Teşekküller Vakfı	This foundation has any members of the board from foundations such as İlim Yayma Vakfı, MÜSİAD, Ensar Vakfı, Hayrat Vakfı and İHH. It is accepted as a "civil society umbrella organization".		Foundations such as Ensar Vakfı, Hakyyol Vakfı, Hayrat Vakfı, İlim Yayma Vakfı, İnsanlığa Hizmet Vakfı, Şefkat Vakfı are counted as founder institutions. Sabahattin Zaım and the current Turkish Grand National Assembly speaker İsmail Kahraman are among former chairmen.	1994
İhlas Holding – İhlas Vakfı	İhlas Holding	Construction - Real Estate/ Media and Communications / Mining / Manufacturing and Trade / Health and Education	Ahmet Mücahid Ören is the current chairman of the board, whose father is the founder Enver Ören.	1975

Foundation Name	Affiliated Companies	Company Sector	Board / Founder	Founding Date
İlim ve Fazilet Vakfı	Eksioğlu	Construction	Mahmut Eksi is the founder and the chairman of the board.	1972
İlim Yayma Vakfı	Evyap, Kığılı, Ülker		Among the founders, names like Ahmet Fikret Eyyap, Ahmet Yahya Kığılı, Topbaş family Kemal Unaktan, Mehmet Avni Kığılı, Murat Ülker, Numan Kurtulmuş, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Ahmet Davutoğlu can be found.	1973
Kalem Kültür, Eğitim ve Dayanışma Vakfı				
Nun Vakfı	Çalk Holding, Turkuvaz Media Group - Berat Albayrak ve his older brother have been CEOs of these companies.		Bilge Aydın is the chairman while Berat Albayrak is the founder.	2013
Ömer Derin Vakfı	İhlas Holding - İhlas Vakfı			
Semer kand Vakfı			Dr. Mustafa Bahadıröğlu is the current chairman.	2014
İnsanlığa Hizmet Vakfı	Among many donors, philanthropist businessmen Hüseyin Keçiçi of SİLTAS ( sand and casting industry) and Yusuf Ziya Yapar of YAPARLAR A.Ş. ( agricultural tools) come to the fore as	Sand (silica) and agricultural tools	Prof. Dr. Hikmet Özdemir, Şükri Yeşiloğlu, Bayram Akbaşoğlu, Ahmet Erol, Mustafa Osmanoğlu, Ahmet Mert, Refik Yazgan, Eşref İnce	1986
Türkiye İlimi İçtimai Hizmet Vakfı			Prof. Hikmet Özdemir is the chairman of the foundation ( he is also the founder of İnsanlığa Hizmet Vakfı. as seen above ), while Eşref Osmanoğlu is the founder of the foundation and a historical personage.	1973
Şefkat Vakfı	The school's building plot was donated by Meliha Yalçıntaş's ironmonger father Mehmet Üretmen. ( Üretmen Group)		The Board only consists of women, the most significant name is AKP MP Meliha Yalçıntaş. Besides, Bilal Erdoğan's wife is graduated from the school of this foundation.	1986
TÜRGEV			Founded under the guidance of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Arzu Akalın is the current chairwoman. Also, Bilal Erdoğan and Esra Albayrak are among board members.	1996

APPENDIX C

DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF THE PARTICIPANTS

Hatice	Arzu	Nida
<p>Age: 45 Place of birth: Bursa Marital status: Married Education: Vocational high school graduate Husband's education: University graduate Employment status: Employed for a few years before getting married Husband's employment status: Owner of a company that produce mechanical auxiliary equipment Number of children: Two children Residence: Duplex apartment with a Bosphorus view Number of cars owned by the family: Two cars Monthly household income: 4.000-8.000 TL</p>	<p>Age: 40 Place of birth: Rize Marital status: Married Education: High school graduate Husband's education: University graduate Employment status: Never employed Husband's employment status: Owner of a construction company Number of children: Two children Residence: A duplex apartment in a central district of Istanbul Number of cars owned by the family: Two cars Monthly household income: 8.000-12.000 TL</p>	<p>Age: 48 Place of birth: Kars Marital status: Married Education: University graduate Husband's education: University graduate Employment status: She was working in the private sector until the birth of her daughter. She is not employed currently. Husband's employment status: Manager in a private company Number of children: Two children Residence: Gated community Number of cars owned by the family: Two cars Monthly household income: 8.000-12.000 TL</p>
<p>Şeyma</p>	<p>Eslem</p>	<p>Rümeysa</p>
<p>Age: 47 Place of birth: Kastamonu Marital status: Married Education: Primary school graduate Husband's education: University graduate with a master's degree Employment status: Never employed before Husband's employment status: Owner of a textile factory Number of children: Two children Residence: Gated community Number of cars owned by the family: Two cars Monthly household income: 12.000-30.000 TL</p>	<p>Age: 42 Place of birth: Rize Marital status: Married Education: Vocational high school graduate Husband's education: Anatolian high school graduate Employment status: Never employed Husband's employment status: Employed in a private company Number of children: Two children Residence: An apartment in a central district, with a Bosphorus view Number of cars owned by the family: One car Monthly household income: 4.000-8.000 TL</p>	<p>Age: 42 Marital status: Married Place of birth: Istanbul Education: University graduate Husband's education: University graduate Employment status: Director in a municipality Husband's employment status: Director in a municipality Number of children: Two children Residence: Gated community Number of cars owned by the family: Two cars Monthly household income: 8.000-12.000 TL</p>

Melek	Zehra	Sümevra
<p>Age: 48  Place of birth: İzmit  Marital status: Married  Education: High school graduate  Husband's education: University graduate  Employment status: Never employed  Husband's employment status: Manager in a private company  Number of children: Two children  Residence: An apartment in their own building, located in a central district of Istanbul  Number of cars owned by the family: Two cars  Monthly household income: 8.000-12.000 TL</p>	<p>Age: 50  Place of birth: Istanbul  Marital status: Divorced  Education: University graduate  Husband's education: -  Employment status: Gynecologist  Husband's employment status: -  Number of children: Two children  Residence: Gated community  Number of cars owned by the family: One car  Monthly household income: 8.000-12.000 TL</p>	<p>Age: 44  Place of birth: Istanbul  Marital status: Married  Education: 2 year program university graduate  Husband's education: 2 year program university graduate  Employment status: Employed for a few years before getting married  Husband's employment status: Manager in a private company  Number of children: Two children  Residence: Gated community  Number of cars owned by the family: Two cars  Monthly household income: 8.000-12.000 TL</p>
<p>Ebru</p> <p>Age: 48  Place of birth: İzmit  Marital status: Married  Education: High school graduate  Husband's education: Vocational high school graduate  Employment status: Never employed before  Husband's employment status: Shareholder in their family holding  Number of children: Two children  Residence: Gated community  Number of cars owned by the family: Two cars  Monthly household income: 12.000-30.000 TL</p>	<p>Feyza</p> <p>Age: 45  Place of birth: Istanbul  Marital status: Married  Education: Vocational high school graduate  Husband's education: University graduate  Employment status: Owner of a boutique  Husband's employment status: Owner of a private company  Number of children: One children  Residence: Gated community  Number of cars owned by the family: Two cars  Monthly household income: 12.000-30.000 TL</p>	<p>Sema</p> <p>Age: 49  Place of birth: Kastamonu  Marital status: Married  Education: Qur'an course graduate (accepted as a secondary school)  Husband's education: Police academy graduate  Employment status: Never employed  Husband's employment status: Policeman-retired  Number of children: Two children  Residence: Gated community  Number of cars owned by the family: One car  Monthly household income: 4.000-8.000 TL</p>

## APPENDIX D

### NARRATIVES IN TURKISH

1. 1986 yılında, arkadaşlarla konuşurken Kur'an kursu olmayan, fakat din ve imanı öğretebilecek olan bir anaokulu bulmanın zorluğundan konuşuyorduk. Düşündüğümüz şey, bugünün çocuğunun beş yıl içinde yetişkin hayatına başlayacağıydı. Çocuk dini inancını öğrenmeli. Çocuğun inancı olmalı, aynı zamanda da kendine güvenli, dik olmalı. Amacımız buydu.
2. Einstein kimdir deseniz? Her gencin diyecek bir sözü vardır. İbn'i Sina kimdir deseniz? Çoğu bundan habersiz. Yabancı popçuları ezbere sayan, Neşet Ertaş'ı hiç dinlemeyen utanan öğrencilerimiz var. Atalarının kelimelerinde mahcubiyet duyan gençlerimiz var. Başka kültürleri ait giyim kuşama, yaşantıya özenen gençlerimiz var. Bu gençleri de sorgulayamayız. Beethoven'ı dinlesinler ama İtri'yi, Dede Efendi'yi de bilmeliler. Öğrencilerimizde eziklik değil, özgüven aşıl原因an bir müfredatı eğitim sistemine kazandırmamız gerekiyor. Bizim gençlerimizi ırkçılık hastalığından koruyacak olan eğitim - öğretimdir. Demokrasi ve milli iradeyi hayat tarzı haline dönüştürecek olan öğretmenlerimizdir.
3. Mezar taşlarını okuyamayan bir nesil, tarihini bilemez. Maalesef sizin tek parti döneminizde bu mezar taşlarından başka bir şey bırakılmadı ... Bahsedildiği gibi Ortaçağ karanlığında gelen bir dil falan da değildir... Nedir bu Osmanlı alerjisi anlamıyorum ... Onlar bu toprakların tapusudur. Sadece bu toprakların değil, Üsküp'te de, Saraybosna'da da tapudur. Gitsinler Şam'da da Bağdat'ta da şehitlerimizin yattığı yerlerde o mezar taşları var... Bir Alman aydını, bir Alman Parlamenti, bir İngiliz Parlamenti 100 yıl önceki metni okuyor. Peki, siz birinci Meclis'in metinlerini okuyabilir misiniz? Okuyamazsınız. Bu bir zaaf değil mi?
4. Fatih Sultan Mehmet, İstanbul'u fethederek, karanlık bir çağa, Orta Çağ'a son vermiş ... yeni bir çağı başlatmıştı. İşte biz de bugün Fatih Projesi ile sadece eğitim sisteminde değil, eğitimin etkilediği her alanda bir çağı kapatıyor, yeni bir çağı, bilgi çağını, bilgi teknolojileri çağını hep birlikte buradan açıyoruz.
5. Geçen yıla göre bu yıl özel okullarda öğrenci sayımız yüzde 40 arttı. Çok büyük bir yükseliş var. Geçen yıl 778 bin 235 öğrencimiz özel okulda okuyordu. Bu yıl 1 milyon 95 bin 747. Şimdi bazıları 'Siz, zaten özel okullara gönderecek velilere ayrıca destek veriyorsunuz' diyor. Hayır. Rakamlar ortada. Birçok veli destekle çocuğunu özel okula gönderebilir hale geldi. Bu orta gelir grubundaki insanlarımız için çok yararlı. Ayrıca her özel okulun yasa gereği yüzde 3 oranında burslu öğrenci okutma zorunluluğu var.
6. İlim ve Fazilet Vakfı, Türk milletinin millî, ahlakî, manevî ve kültürel değerlerini benimseyen, koruyan ve geliştiren; ailesini, vatanını, milletini seven ve daima yüceltmeye çalışan, 21. yüzyılın gerektirdiği bilgi ve beceri

donanımına sahip öğrenciler yetiştirmeye devam ediyor. (İlim ve Fazilet Vakfı)

7. Vakfımız; ülkemiz insanının manevî dinamiklerini zenginleştirmek, ilmi, fikri ve ahlaki yönden gelişmesine katkıda bulunmak amacıyla 1979 yılında kurulmuştur... Din ve Değerler eğitimi alanında ilmi ve akademik pek çok faaliyetin yürütüldüğü vakfımız bünyesinde öğrencilerimize aynı zamanda, nitelikli ve ileri seviyede Arapça dil eğitimi verilmekte, temel İslami ilimler ve sosyal bilimler alanlarında da eğitim seminerleri düzenlenmektedir (Ensar Vakfı)
8. Vakıflarımız ve derneklerimiz, bizim en güçlü sivil toplum örgütlerimiz olarak, ülkemizin her köşesinde, milletimizin her kesimine çok önemli, çok hayırlı hizmetler veriyor ... Selçuklu ve Osmanlı'dan beri bizim çok önemli sosyal dayanışma ve yardımlaşma kurumumuz olarak kardeşliğimizin en kuvvetli bağına oluşturuyor ... Zaten ağır işleyen, hantal bir yapıya sahip devlet mekanizması, zaten bir de yanlış zihniyetlerin eline düştüğünde, devletle toplum ve birey arasında devasa bir uçurum ortaya çıkmasına neden oluyor. Bu bakımdan devlet ne kadar güçlü, devleti yönetenler ne kadar makbul olursa, vakıflar başta olmak üzere sivil toplum kuruluşlarının önemi hiçbir zaman azalmayacaktır.
9. Semerkand Vakfı çatısı altında daha önce de ifade ettiğim gibi tek bir amacımız var. O da rıza-i ilahiyi kazanmaktır. Bu kapsamda yaptığımız tüm çalışmalarda insanlığı haramdan, günahattan alıkoyacak, sevaba sevk edecek kriterleri gözeterek yol alıyoruz. Öte yandan ülkeye ve Ümmete faydalı olan nesiller yetiştirmek en büyük derdimiz. Camiamız, vakfımız büyüsün, gelişsin gibi bir amaçla bu kutlu yola çıkmadık." (Semerkand Vakfı)
10. Yurdumuz ve dünyamızdaki gelişmelerden yararlanarak, insanî değerleri yüceltmeye çalışan, yaptığı işin bilim ve sanat değeri taşıdığı farkında olan bir ekiple; öğretim modeli oluşturarak, doğuştan sahip olduğu potansiyelini en yüksek düzeyde kullanabilen, tutum ve davranışları bakımından erdemli, bilgili, şefkatli, başarılı, kültürlü, görgülü, bilinçli ve "kendisi" olarak ortaya çıkabilen bireyler yetiştirmektir. (Biltek Koleji)
11. Zekâ, Allah vergisidir, ama zeki birçok insanın, bu zekâsını, iyi ve olumlu yönde (akıllı) kullanmayı bilmeyip, hem kendisini hem de çevresini mahvettiğinin örneklerini görmüşsünüzdür. Mevlana'nın deyişiyle "ahlaki eğitim veremediğiniz kişiye öğretilen bilgi, adeta haramini eline verilmiş kılıç gibidir, topluma ancak bela yetiştirirsiniz." Birçok batılı eğitimcinin de katıldığı bu fikre biz de inanıyoruz. Sonuçta, eğitimin gayesi de, ahlak ve disiplin sahibi akıllı insanlara sahip olmaktır (Tekden Koleji)
12. Günümüzde pek çok kurumun eğitim-öğretim anlayışında, "öğretim" ön planda tutulmakta, "eğitim" boyutu ihmal edilmektedir. Oysa bilgi, insanın hem günlük hayatına, hem de ruh dünyasına hizmet etmedikçe insana yük olmaktan başka bir işe yaramamaktadır. Bu yüzden insanların iyi ya da doğruyu bilmelerinden daha çok, bu doğruları uygulayıp uygulamadıkları üzerinde durulmalıdır. (Asır Anadolu Kız Lisesi)

13. Çocuğunuza büyümesi ve gelişmesi için birçok vitaminli şeyler veriyorsunuz. Peki, onlara ahlaki ve manevi vitaminlerinin nerden alınacağını biliyor musunuz? Okul demek sadece derslerle ilgilenmek değil bizim için, çocuklarınıza okul hayatı kadar hayatın kendisini de öğretiyoruz. Biz çocuklarımıza okul eğitimiyle beraber iyi birer birey olarak yetişmesi için ahlaki ve manevi eğitime önem veriyoruz. (Nev Koleji)
14. Bu inançla dünyada ve ülkemizde kurulacak yeni bir medeniyetin seçkin fikir ve bilim adamlarını, milli ve manevî değerleri bireysel kimliğinin temel taşı olarak gören, geleceği sahiplenen, ahlâklı, asil bir ruha sahip, kendisi ve çevresi ile barışık, özgür ve sorumluluk bilinci taşıyan kişilik sahibi bireyler olarak yetiştirmeyi kendine misyon olarak benimser. (Devran Koleji)
15. Kültür ve medeniyetimizden beslenerek, ihtiyaç duyduğu anda özgün kültür ve medeniyet unsurlarını üretebilen ve umrana ulaşmayı gaye edinmiş bilge insanları, tüm ihtiyaçları giderilmiş eğitim ortamlarında yetiştirmiş olma, hayat boyu eğitim etkisi sağlama (Birikim Eğitim Kurumları)
16. İlim, teknik, tecrübe bakımından “yeterli”; duygu, düşünce, davranış bakımından “tutarlı”; akıl, ruh, beden bakımından “sağlıklı”; kendisiyle ve çevresiyle “barışık”; millî ve manevi değerlere “bağlı”; evrensel değerlere “saygılı” fertler yetiştirmek. Böylece; fitratın önündeki engelleri kaldırarak “özgür insan olma” niyetine gayretine katkıda bulunmak. Bilgi ve teknoloji çağının “nesnesi değil öznesi olan” özgün şahsiyetleri ortaya çıkarmak. (Derya Öncü Koleji)
17. Misyonumuz ise; kişinin yaşam kalitesini yükseltmek için bireysel farklılıklara önem vererek, yaratıcı ve araştırmacılığı geliştiren bir ortamda, akılcı bir yaklaşımla sorumluluk, sevgi, saygı ve kardeşlik kavramlarını ön planda tutmak, çevreye duyarlı, ulusal ve uluslararası düzeyde geçerli yabancı dilleri ve kültürleri bilen, akademik, sosyal ve sportif başarılarla imza atan, kendini tanıyıp geliştiren, kararlar verip, verdiği kararların sorumluluğunu üstlenebilen, çok yönlü düşünebilen, hoşgörülü, üretken, girişimci, çevre, tarih bilinci gelişmiş ve özellikle de milli ve manevi değerlerine sahip ve saygılı, gönülden bağlı genç nesiller yetiştirmektir. (Cebir Koleji)
18. Okulda işlenen değerler: Kardeşlik, sevgi ve saygı, çalışmak ve sabır, kitap ve ilim sevgisi, şehitlik ve şehadet, sorumluluk, peygamber sevgisi, ecdada saygı ve tarih bilinci, haya ve edep. (Bahtiyar Koleji)
19. Milli Eğitimin Bakanlığının eğitim programında okullara tavsiye edilen sorumluluk, yardımlaşma, doğruluk, dürüstlük, vefa, hoşgörü, sevgi, saygı vb. değerler bulunmaktadır... Bu değerlerin yanı sıra öğrencilerimizin seviyelerine uygun olarak, her ay bir değer belirlenerek, o değerle bağdaştırılabilecek cesaret, sabır, adalet, edep, hayâ, selamlaşma, nezaket, kanaat, konuşma ve sofrada adabı gibi tamamlayıcı değerler grup ve bireysel olarak işlenmektedir. Değerler Eğitimi Birimi öğrencilerimizi dini ilimleri doğru bir şekilde öğrenmeleri konusunda da desteklemektedir. Ders

çıkışlarında yapılan Kur'an-ı Kerim'i güzel okuma çalışmaları, değerler eğitimi dersinde Hayat Ölçülerimiz konulu hadis okumaları yapılmaktadır. Böylece Din Kültürü ve Ahlak bilgisi dersi ve diğer çalışmalar öğrencide bütüncül bir bakış açısının oluşmasını sağlamaktadır. (Özel Bilgi Çağı Koleji)

20. Sorumluluklarının farkında olan ve kendi kendisini yargılayabilecek öğrenciler yetiştirmek adına sadece değerler eğitiminde değil tüm derslerimizde temel değerlerimize vurgu yapıyoruz. 5. 6. 7. ve 8. Sınıf öğrencilerimiz ile birlikte temel din kültürü ve ahlak bilgisi dersi dışında Kur'an-ı Kerim ve Sıyer-i Nebi dersleri işlenmekte ve Namazın kılınışı, Sureler, Her Müslümanın bilmesi gereken asgari ilmihal bilgileri vb. bilgiler bu derslerin içlerine meczedilmiş bir şekilde öğrencilerimize sunulmaktadır. (Bilim Medeniyet Koleji)
21. Önceden, Kemalist gruplar sokaklarda daha fazlaydı, fakat son yıllarda her şey çok hızlı değişti. Şimdi Kemalistler zamanlarını evlerinde geçiriyor, göreceksin, kafeler ve restoranlar muhafazakar gençlik ile dolu. Zenginler. Gerçekten zenginler. Türkiye'nin en büyük şirketlerinin sahipleri burada yaşıyor. Arabalarından anlayabilirsin... Burada insanlar birbirlerini arabalarının plakasından tanıyor. Ya soyadının ya da şirketinin baş harfleri oluyor. (Şeyma)
22. Ailemin benim eğitim sürecimle çok alakası olmazdı. Sadece maddi destek sağlardı. Kendim yürütürdüm. Ailede geniş aile, küçük aile ve büyük ailede ilk üniversite okuyan benim. O yüzden bana önder olacak kimse yoktu. Okul seçimimde ailem kıstas olmadı. Lise seçimimde zaten mahalle mektebiydi, mahallemizdeki liseye gittim. Kocamustafapaşa lisesine gittim. [Neden tıp] Bilmiyorum yani. Doktor olacağım diyordum çocukluğumdan beri. Nedenini bilmiyorum ama. Sonuçta da öyle oldu. Ailemle birlikte eğitimime katkı sağlayacak hiçbir şey yapmazdım. (Zehra)
23. Özel okulda takip daha iyi, ilgiden ziyade... Bir kere güvende olduğunu biliyorum. Güvenlik görevlisi var. Korkuyorum, Türkiye Amerika değil ama okula elini kolunu sallayarak gidebilir zarar verebilir. Nerede olduğunu biliyorum. Düzgün beslendiğini biliyorum, bir şekilde daha temiz ortamda olduğunu. (Nida)
24. Artık özele gideriz herhalde çünkü devlet okulları şu anda çok fazla şeyi veremiyor. Ya da özeli gördüğümüz için mi ama şimdi düşünüyorum kızımı devlete ilk verdiğim seneki durumla şu andaki durum birbirinden biraz daha farklı okulların durumu. Sadece dil değil özel okul. Çocuklar daha rahat bir ortamda okumaları için de sınıf mevcutları mesela çok düşük, buldukları dışarıdan irtibat kesik öğrenci profili belli. Biraz onlar da etken oluyor okulda. (Rümeysa)
25. Benim çevremden gördüğüm bir kere özel okul parasını ödeyebilen hiçbir aile devlet okuluna göndermiyor yani. Özel okul hem eğitim hem de işte çocuklarını güvenerek gönderiyorlar. Her türlü şey var. Üst düzey çalışan para kazananlar bankacı vs. hep özel okul görüyoruz. Zengin olmayan

insanların o şeye göndermesi ileride sıkıntı yaşayabilir. Çünkü arkadaşlık grubu falan çok farklı oluyor. Mesela benim çocuğum çok zengin adamların torunuyla beraber okudu yani. Çocuk özel okul vs. harala gürele korumalarla eve gelip gidiyordu yani...(Şeyma)

26. Birkaç dönem atlanmış gibi. Bilmiyorlar bence. Ya da yaşamadıkları için mi? Bazen o ezikliği yaşıyorsun ki o duyguyu tadıyorsun ki sevdiğin kişi tatmasını diye çabalıyorsun. Ama hiç bilmediğin bir duygu karşısında yardımcı olamıyorsun karşıdaki kişiye. Hani ben onları yaşadığım için çocuklara da en çok dikkat ettiğim şey o. Asla toplu ders alamazlar. Başkasının öğretmeninden almasın, tek başına alsın. Bireysel alsın. Ben anneme babama da anlatsam müdahale etmezlerdi. (Nida)
27. Kardeşlerini hep o takviye etmiş. Erkek kardeşini çok takviye etmiş mesela. Ödevleriyle birebir ilgilenmiş, kayınvalidem anlatıyor. Eşim mesela babasına da öyle olmuş babası çalışmış ama sonraki tüm kardeşler üniversite bitirmiş. (Rümeysa)
28. Büyüklerimin etkisi vardı tabii, ablalarımın abilerimin. Kız meslek lisesinin iyi olacağını söylediler. Ben de, iyi dedim, ama hani geri dönüp baktığımızda çok çocuk olduğumu neyi isteyip istemediğimi bilmediğimi anlıyorum. (Hatice)
29. Çocukların eğitimi ile biz birebir ilgileniyoruz. Biri ilkokul seneye ortaokul olacağız, yani dörtte, seneye beş olacağız. Öteki de lise birde, yeni başladı. Biz şimdi biraz daha fazla ilgileniyoruz. Hem ders takibi noktasında, hem ne yapacaklar ne edecekler, hangi okula gidecekler okul değişimleri. Her türlü şeylerinde ilgileniyoruz. Bizim zamanımızda çok okul seçme şeyi de yoktu. Yani şey için diyorum, ilkokul da seçiyoruz, ortaokul da seçiyoruz. (Rümeysa)
30. Bir gün Edison eve gelir ve annesine bir kağıt vererek şunu der: “ Öğretmenim bana bu kağıdı verdi ve sadece sana vermem konusunda uyardı”. Annesi gözyaşları içinde kağıdı oğluna okur: “ Oğlunuz bir dahi. Bu okul onun için küçük, ve onu eğitecek yeterlikte bir öğretmen yok. Lütfen onu kendiniz eğitin”. Uzun yıllar sonra, annesinin ölümünü takiben, Edison yüzyılın en büyük bilim insanları arasına girmiştir. Bir gün ailesinden kalan eski kağıtları incelerken çekmecenin kenarında katlanmış bir kağıt bulur ve okumaya başlar. Kağıtta şunlar yazılıdır: “Oğlunuz zihinsel olarak engellidir. Bu okula daha fazla devam etmesine izin verememekteyiz.” Uzun saatler ağladıktan sonra günlüğüne şu kelimeleri yazar: “Thomas Alva Edison, kahraman bir anne tarafından zihinsel engelli bir çocuktan yüzyılın bilim insanına dönüştürüldü”.
31. Yapamam... Yani ben kazandığım kaybettiğimi düşününce... Çalışmadım kuranı öğrendim, çalışmadım peygambere âşık oldum, çalışmadım kızımı sevdim. Evimi sevdim. Çok şükür ihtiyacım da yok yani hani ihtiyaç halinde

olabilir. Ha bir anne hem çalışıp hem yapabilir mi kısmında ben üzgünüm ama şey değilim modern düşünmüyorum. Ben annenin evde olması gerektiğini düşünüyorum. Biraz daha büyüsünler bakalım ne yapabilirim. Belki kendi işim olabilir. Kendi yapabileceğim bir şey. Hayırlısı olsun yani. Annem de ev hanımıydı. Ailem çok üzgün, mühendis kadının evde oturması onların çok ağrına gidiyor. Kayınvalidem ve kayınbabam çok mutlular. Onlar zaten biliyorlar. Onlar biliyor ki ben çalışırsam çocukların ikisi de okumayacak. Özellikle oğlum benim. Çok destek isteyen bir çocuk... Geçen seneye kadar dip dibeydik hep beraber çalışıyorduk ama ben baktım kayboluyorum gidiyorum yani hem onu hem kendimi yıpratıyorum. Ben anne olmak istiyorum çünkü yani sadece anne olmak istiyorum. (Nida)

32. Tabi yani evde mesela kitap okuduk. Uyuma saatinde babası veya ben ona hep kitap okurduk. Baba geç geliyor o çok değil de beni görüyor mesela kitap okurken. O şekilde oluyor yani. Tiyatro sinema ben takip ederim gideriz yani beraber. (Feyza)
33. Daha çok değil, hep ben ilgilenirim. Para kısmıyla baba ilgileniyor. Şakası bir yana haksızlık etmeyeyim eşime. O daha yukarıdan bakar daha objektiftir. Bayılırım mesela, bazı şeyleri yapamam kalırım. O hemen pat diye bir şey söyler, onun söylediğini yaparız biz de. (Nida)
34. They send us a questionnaire at the beginning of the academic year. We filled in this year. Depending on the results, they invite us somewhere. For example, this year we had a trip to Konya. We went there with the mothers. Maybe a Çanakkale trip will be scheduled. They include parents. But I liked one thing in that school on the Anatolian side. They give singing courses to parents. I demanded the same from our school, because I love music. I sing very off key, however. But I can read musical notes. (Arzu)
35. Oğlumun daha çok farkında olmasını, daha çok düşünmesini isterdim ben mesela: Hayatla ilgili, eğitimle ilgili, okulla ilgili. Okul bir şey kazandırmalı. Sadece müfredat yani hani benim gittiğim liseden hiçbir farkı yok. Oğlum da çok açık değil açıkçası. Bazen diyor ki, “Sen çok şey bildiğin için herkesin de aynı şekilde bilmesini istiyorsun”; ama ben de diyorum ki benim bulunma sebebim o olsun. (Nida)
36. Bir ana baba okulu vardı. Bir aylık bir şeydi ona gitmiştik işte sertifika falan alıyorsun sonuçta. Burada da İzmit’te de okulların getirdiği danışmanların mutlaka programlarına giderdim. Bir şey öğrenirim çocuklarıma faydam olur diye. Bunlardan danışmanımın söylediği bir şey: “Siz eğer buraya gelip beni dinlemeye buraya geldinizse. Mutlaka çocuklarını iyi bir yere gelecek. Demek ki siz onlara önem veriyorsunuz bunun benimle alakası yok demişti. Evet, buna da inanıyorum. (Ebru)
37. Ben baskıcı değilim; ama her şeyini yapıyorum takip ediyorum. Kitapçıklarını okuyorum sınava girerken, ödevlerini takip ediyorum,

okulların kitapçıklarını broşürlerini takip ediyorum. Excel tabloları hazırlıyorum. (Sümeysa)

38. Çocukları sınavlara iyi hazırlıyorlar, bu önemli. Sosyal anlamda çok yeterli olduklarını düşünmüyorum. Çok fazla bir şey yapmıyorlar. O kısmını ben tamamlamaya çalışıyorum. Çünkü çocuğum iyi eğitim alsın ama sosyal açıdan da eksik olmasın. Buna çok önem veriyorum. Aikido, futbol, basketbol teniz, buz pateni. Ben çok istiyorum, çok uğraşıyorum bunun için. Yani ben bıraksam evde öyle TV karşısında oturacak. Onu yapacağına, kötü alışkanlıklar edineceğine spor yapsın. Yönlendirmem oluyor tabii. (Feyza)
39. Bizim yazın bile her sabah bir saat ders çalışırlardı. Gün bölünmüştü işte: Türkçe, Sosyal, hangi sınıfta okuyorlarsa. Bir saat, sekizde uyanıyorsun. Dokuzaya kadar dersten 20 sayfa oku, yoksa 100 sayfa soru çöz. Ama buna alışana kadar ben sabah işi yapmadım ya da sabah arkadaşlarımla kahve içebilirdim içmedim. Onlarla beraber ben de kitabımı aldım onların yanında okudum. Siz de alıp okuyacaksınız. Sen ne yapıyorsan o çocuk da onu yapacak. Çocuk kendi kendine okumayı da sevsin, ders de çalışsın, yok öyle bir şey. (Ebru)
40. Kızım çok disiplinlidir. Evde güzelce çalışır. Çok müdahale etmeyiz. Mesela, liseye hazırlanırken, evet, gidişatını kontrol etmiştik. Çünkü hocaları bize geri dönüş yapıyordu. Ama aslına bakarsanız, çok da kontrol etmem gerekmedi. (Rümeysa)
41. Benim çocuklarım o yönde şey değil de, vallahi başka çocuklar yararlanıyor. Gitarı zorunlu yaptılar. Mesela benim oğlum gitar çalıyor okulda, ama evde çalmıyor. Birkaç sene önce oğlum için şey dediler diyaframı çok kuvvetli, konservatuvara sokun dediler. Ben de hakikaten gittim soktum ama konservatuvara iki senede falan insanlar hazırlıyorlar çocuklarını. Yine de soktum yani. Dediler melodikayı normal çocuklar hemen üfleyemiyor, oğlunuz üflüyor. Ney çaldı mesela, hemen üfledi. Nefesi kuvvetli dediler. Böyle yani. İnşallah üniversitede başlar. Şeyi de çok seviyor, trampet de çok seviyor. Kulağı da iyi dedi müzik öğretmeni. Yani öyle yönlendirmeler yapıyor öğretmeni. (Arzu)
42. Ben rekabeti iyi görmüyorum. Çocuklar çok yıpranıyor. Beden-ruh sağlığı açısından... Çocuğun kapasitesine göre davranılmalı. Bireyi harcamamak lazım... Bardağınız bu kadar, siz yine su doldurmaya çalışıyorsunuz. Lisede gördüğüm şey, hala anne babanın ilkökul çocuğu gibi öğretmenlere müdahale etmeye kalkması. Bunlar artık birey. Büyük oğlumun döneminde anneler kendilerini çocuktan öne çıkarıyorlardı (Melek)
43. Okul öncesi dönemde, okula hazırlık anlamında, herhangi bir çabam olmadı. Anaokuluna gittiler ama okul öncesi hazırlık diye değil. Gitmeleri daha mantıklıydı ondan. Çocuk eğitimine katkı olan gerekli kurslara gitmelerini isterim. Beraber ders çalışmam, asla öyle bir şey yapmam. Özel ders alıyor

- kızım. Beraber ders hiç çalışmadık, hiçbir faaliyetini ben yapmadım. Hiçbir proje ödevine parmağımı kimıldatmadım. Evet, özellikle bunu seçtim, çok gereksiz. İster zorlansın ister zorlanmasın. Ben neden yapayım onun ödevini? (Zehra)
44. Vallahi oturup onlarla, dersleriyle birebir ilgilenme, ben hiç yapmadım. Sıkılıyordum. Devlet okulunda, senin derslerle ilgilenmen gerekir. Okulda etüt olmalı. Gökyüzü'nde var şimdi. E bunlar gerekli şeyler. (Şeyma)
45. Kitap okumaktan ve gezmekten hoşlanırım. Her şeyi okumayı severim. Roman da okurum, bilimsel kitap okumayı da severim. İnsanı anlatan şeyleri severim. Kişisel gelişim tabirini sevmiyorum, anlamsız geliyor bana. Kişisel gelişim “Şunu yap, bunu yap” sadece sloganvari cümleler, anlamlı gelmiyor bana. Yani bilimsel gerçekliği olan kitaplar, sosyal içerikli, insanı anlatan, toplumsal yapıyı gösteren kitapları severim. (Zehra)
46. Son yıllarda özellikle siyasete taktığım için. Yani son yıllarda dediğim, belki bir 15-20 yıldır; siyasi, hem tarih, hem günümüz siyaseti. İyice yoğunlaştı son dönem, o konuda da şanslıyız. Daha önce romanlar da okuyordum. Hala da okurum yani, çok ağır kitaplar okuduktan sonra bazen çerez olsun diye. Her şeyi okurum. (Ebru)
47. Şu sıralar daha çok dini şeyler okumaya çalışıyorum. Kuran'ı Kerim'le ilgilenmeye çalışıyorum. Ama ondan öncesinde de kişisel gelişim kitaplarını çok seviyordum. Artık kişisel gelişimin Kuran'da olduğunu fark ettiğim için daha çok Kuran çözümlemesine yönelik bir şeyler yapmaya çalışıyorum. Romanları da çok severim. (Nida)
48. Umre'ye gittik; Mekke Medine, Finlandiya'ya gittik; La Plant bölgesi, kuzey Avrupa'ya. Türkiye içi de yaparız tabi, Güneydoğuya, doğuya gittik; Marmara'yı gezdik. Egeyi gezdik. Çok yapmışız... En çok Finlandiya hoşuma gitti, çok güzeldi. Bir de Dubai'ye gittik, ama en güzeli Finlandiya'ydı. Tabi manevi olarak Mekke Medine idi, en güzeli tabi ki oydu. (Zehra)
49. Genelde ailecek değil de eşimle çok severiz kültür turları. Bilmediğimiz şehirleri dolaşırız. Gaziantep'e gittik günöbirlik, Urfa'ya gittik, Peygamberler şehri. Konya'ya gittik, Kapadokya'ya gittik. Şimdi Sivas var hedefimizde. Yurtdışına ben karşıyım, gitmişliğim var. Ama paramın onlara verilmesini istemiyorum, hele Fransa. Eşim sürekli diyor; “Paris'e götüreyim seni.” Oraya gideceğime para biriktireyim, para sıkıntısı yok da, ona efor sarf edeceğime, Umre 'ye giderim. Bir düşmanlığım var param gitmesin onlara şeklinde. (Nida)
50. Niye bu kadar insanlar hırsızlık yapıyor, kötölük yapıyor? İlgilenilmediği için, ahlaki dersler verilmediği için. Hep büyüklerine yer vermesini, biri

odaya girdiğinde ayağa kalk, bacak bacak üstüne atma... Biz ne öğrendiysek onu öğretmeye çalıştım. Benimkilerin hepsi yer verir. Yardım eder. (Eslem)

51. [Dini kastederek] Ben veririm çocuğuma, ben evde neysem benden alacak. Elhamdülillah benim oğlum senelerce abuk sabuk okullara gitti, dinle alakası olmayan. Paşam maşallah, Allah daim etsin inşallah, iki senedir hasarsız orucunu tutuyor. Namazını da gönülden yapmak istiyor. (Nida)
52. Mesela Doğa Koleji'nden çıkan çocukla, Fatih Koleji'nden çıkan çocuk arasında çok fark var. Doğa'ya gidenlerin şımarık konuşma tarzları var. Ben anlarım o çocuğun Doğa Koleji'ne gittiğini. Bir şımarıklık var onlarda. Ahlakı vermiyor onlar. Ama Fatih'te daha farklı... Yani, hem biraz aile biraz da okul önemli. Rahat bırakıyorlar Doğa'da. Çocukları başıboş bırakmışlar orada aileler de. Bana mesela deseler, "Çocuğunu bedava okutacağız", ben vermem. Onlar sadece marka var, nereye gidelim ne yiyelim, ne giyelim falan konuşuyorlar. (Emine)
53. Sınıf farkından dolayı tabi, ahlaki değerlerde biraz düşüş var. Özel okullarda durum öyle. Oğlumuz anlatıyor bize, herkesin sigara içtiğini, daha 16 yaşında. İçki filan da içtiklerini söylüyor. (Hatice)
54. Alfabe reformunun belki Türkiye üzerinde olumsuz etkisi oldu. Belli bir ölçüde okuyan bir toplum var. Birden bire harf devrimi oluyor ve toplum sıfır cahil. Hiçbir şey bilmiyor. Dolayısıyla, o dönem okuma yazmaya önem vermek zorunda, yöneticiler de, aileler de. Oradan kalma birtakım alışkanlıklarımız var. Sanki okuma öğrendiği zaman her şeyi öğreniyor. Şimdi Cumhuriyet bizim için çok önemli bir şey ama elbette ki eksik tarafları var. Bu benim annemden gördüğüm bir şey. Namazlarımda da önce Atatürk ve silah arkadaşları için dua ederim. Çok seviyorum, Allah varsa günahlarını affetsin. Ama birtakım eksiklikler yapıldı, sonradan gelenler bu eksiklikleri gidermek için uğraşmadı. Sarışın mavi gözlü adamı koyduk oraya ve taptık. Ama adam diyor ki, "Beni bırakın benim düşüncelerime önem verin." Biz o düşünceleri bıraktık, kitapları kapattık. Dini anlamda Kuran'ı Kerim'i okuduk, kapattık, koyduk, geçtik. Dünyevi anlamda da, "Atatürk bunları yapmış da neden yapmış?" Şunu tutup açıp bir okuyalım demedik. Ben şuna inanıyorum, Nutuk ortaokul itibarıyla çocuklara ders kitabı olarak okutulmalı. Çocuklar görmeli. Biz bu adama bakıyoruz, inanıyoruz, görüyoruz ama neden seviyoruz bu adamı? Tanımadığım bir adamı ben neden seveyim? Bana anasını, babasını öğretiyorlar. Ya bana ne, ben unutacağım üç gün sonra. Bana yaptıkları lazım, niçin yaptıkları lazım. Benim çocukluğum döneminde tarihi farklı yönlerden işledik biz. İşte Osmanlı hep kötüydü. Hep yükseliş dönemindeydi yok öyle bir şey yani. 600 yıl bu adam bu topraklara hükmettiyse ve 10 kişilik bir taburla hükmettiyse, Osmanlı Ortadoğu'dan çıktıktan sonra Ortadoğu hiç düzelmediyse, var bu adamların bir hikmeti. Biz bir tek 100 yıllık Cumhuriyet'ten ibaret değiliz. Allah bin kere razı olsun kuranlardan, sebep olanlardan. Allah o görevi onlara nasip etti ki biz bugünü yaşıyoruz. Ama geçmişimizi de unutmamalıyız. İşte o geçmişi unutmuşluk bize şu andaki kaosu yaşıyor. Ben çocuklarıma bunu aşılamaaya çalışıyorum. Evet,

Atatürk'ü seviyorum evet iyi ki cumhuriyet kuruldu ama şu şu şunlar da var. Evet, Osmanlının hataları var ama şunlar şunlar da var. Ben çocuklarla Avrupa'da gezerken de gördüğümüz her şeyi eleştirel gözle bakmayı öğrendiler. (Ebru)

55. Biliyor, Cuma namazı kaçırmaz. Onlara gitmek istiyor. Ben vakit namazlarını da istiyorum kılsın. Bizim öyle bir avantajımız olmadı. Ben 10 sene oldu namaz kılalı, üzgünüm. Önceden çok denedim, bıraktım. İstiyorum ki o sürekli devam etsin. Kızım öyle değil, onun bebekliğinden beri bu iş yapıldığı için kendi diyor, “Seneye ben başlayayım anne” diye. İnanç olmadıktan sonra hepsi boş. Oğlum korktuğu zaman namaz kılmaya sarılıyor. Bakıyorum bir şeyden panikledi, korktu, hemen diyor “Anne namaz kılalım”, “Baba namaz kılalım.” Babamız da baskı yapmayalım, o kendi yapsın diyor.” (Nida)
56. Ben bir şey dileyemem. Ondan ötesi dilemekle olmuyor. Eşim hep Fen Lisesi istedi. Oğlumuzun doktor olmasını hayal ediyordu. Su yolunu buluyor. Ben hep dua ederim ama içimden, çocuklara söylemem yani. Su akıyor yani. Çok hırslı bir şeye gelmemek lazım. (Sema)
57. Benim bir öğretmen arkadaşım şunu söylemişti: “Siz bize vazo verip, sürahi istemeyin. Yani biz onu işte ilkokulda biraz törpülüyoruz. Ortaokul ve lisede de biraz daha törpüleyip cilalıyoruz ve yine size biz vazo veriyoruz. Ama böyle bir beklentiye girmeyin. Evet, siz de bunun için uğraşın. Yani vazoya vazodur, yani sürahi olmaz bu.” Hiç aklımdan çıkmaz bu benim. Bir de bir komşu ablam da şey der, “Ver! Pişman olmazsın, sonra sana döner” diye. Evet, ben de elimden geldiğince çocuklarıma her anlamda vermeye çalışıyorum ama kural da vermeye çalışıyorum. Şu andaki nesilde benim gördüğüm kuralsızlık çocukların da mutsuz olmasına sebep. Anne babalar da mutsuz. (Ebru)
58. Kızım daha ilkokulda bana gelip “Anne biz kar tatili istiyoruz, bahçeye çıkmak istiyoruz. Bunun için gösteri yapacağız okulda” dedi. Niye dedim öğretmenlerinize söylemiyorsunuz. Söylediklerini ama izin vermediklerini söyledi. Neden izin vermiyorlarmış, dedim. Hasta olacaklarını düşündüklerini söyledi. “Aslında haklılar” dedim. Bana tamam dedi ama yine de gösteri yapacaklarını söyledi. “Yani ne yapacaksınız?” diye sordum. “Yazacağız işte, biz oynamak istiyoruz” dedi. Tamam, dövizler hazırladılar. Hiçbir saygısızlık olmaması gerektiği konusunda uyardım. Sınıfların oradaki boşlukta yaptılar gösterilerini. İşte böyle tur atıp gezmişler okul da buna izin vermişti. Bir şey mi oldu, olmadı. Belki öğretmenleri aldı bir tur attırdı bahçede veya olmadı. Şu anda hatırlamıyorum. (Ebru)
59. Eğitim şu anda çok kötü. Çok çok. İyi kaliteli öğretmen de yok. Çok genç öğretmenler, deneyimsiz. Bir iki konuşuyorsunuz öğretmenle, çocuklara falan. Sanki iki arkadaş konuşuyor. Eskiden biz titredik öğretmenlerin karşısında. Tamam, iyi güzel iyi anlaşılmalı ama biraz da korkmalı çocuklar

öğretmenlerden. Disiplin yok yani. Eğitim çok kötü. Daha kötü olacak.  
(Arzu)

60. Büyük oğlumun lisesinden bahsediyorum. Bu okullara çocuklarını gönderen aileler belli, sosyal çevre belli. Oğlumuz kötü alışkanlıklar edinmesin diye endişemiz vardı. Seçimimiz bu olmasa, Hüseyin Avni Sözen'e giderdi. Eğitimi seçtik, öğretimi değil. Bu benim için her zaman daha önemli oldu.  
(Sema)

61. Eğitime ne kadar yatırım yaparsan yap, hem maddi, hem manevi yapmalısın. Ben böyle düşünüyorum ve hep böyle düşünmeye çalışıyorum. Parayla ölçülebilecek bir şey değil. (Ebru)

62. Çocukları doğru yola yönlendirmede birebir çok ilgileniyorlar. Çocuklar biraz fazla sıkılıyorlar ama. Açıkçası hiç zorlama yok ama, dini eğitim isteyenlere de dini eğitim veriyorlar. Benim çocuklarımın ikisi de Kuran'ı Kerim'i benden iyi okuyorlar. Ama isteğe bağlı, hiç zorlama yok. Benim ilk seneler hiç haberim olmadı, söylemediler. Şey yapmadılar çünkü bazı veliler farklı bakabiliyor. Açıkçası böyle, hiç zorlama yok. O zaman seçmeli değildi, daha yeni oldu. 10 sene öncesinden bahsediyorum. Bir de yuvada da alıyordu çocuklar; çünkü çocuklara küçükken verirsiniz alıyorlar, sonra zaten istemiyorlar. Şimdi istesenez yollayabilir misiniz? Yok. Aldıklarıyla, akıllarında yani. Benden çok dua biliyorlar. Lisede istemiyor çocuklar yani. Küçükken ne verebilirsiniz çocuklara onu veriyorsunuz. Yarın öbür gün eksikliklerini görmesinler diye. (Arzu)

63. Okulda din dersi konusunda ise ben verilmesi gerektiğini düşünüyorum. Biz mesela namaz Surelerini okulda ezberlerdik. E ne güzel. Hep birlikte de öğreniyorsun. Bir de bunlar erken yaşta oluyor. Sonra da aklından çıkmıyor. Ben oğluma hani kendim o konuda hiç baskı yapmadım. Bence okulda öğrenmeli yani. Dinlerini bilsinler çocuklar. Ses, görüntü aynı anda olunca öğrenmesi de kolay olur. E, İngilizce öğrenirken de öyle Arapçada da. Aslında bence 20 günde Kuran okur hale gelebiliyor insan. (Sema)

64. İlkokulu ikisi de Coşkun'da okudu. Özel bir okul. Yakın. Neden orayı seçtik, ortamın ve ailelerin daha bizim kültürümüze yakın olduğunu düşündüğüm için seçtim. Yoksa okul çok kaliteli, çok iyi eğitim veriyor falan diye değil. Aynı dünya görüşünde olduğumuzu düşündüğüm için. (Zehra)

65. Özel okul neden tercih edilmeli, çünkü devlet bozuldu. Eskisi gibi değil. Özel okulda kaliteli insan, birey yetişiyor. Sınıf ayrımına kesinlikle karşıyım. Değerleri, ahlakı tutan herkesle yemek yiyebilirsin. Ben bir okuldan öğretimden çok eğitim beklerim. İnsani davranışlar yerleşmeli. Herhangi bir özel okulda, öğretimden çok eğitim olmalı. Yetiştirdikleri birey karakterli oluyor. Ahlaki yapı önemli. (Melek)

66. Bizim babamız normal okullara yollamak istemedi çocuklarını. Devlet okulları veya farklı kolejlere. Bu okulun çocukları ahlak konusunda onlara sahip çıkacağını ve onları yönlendirebileceğini biliyorum diyerek. (Arzu)
67. Neden? Robert Kolej'e girsin de Amerikan uşağı olsun diye mi? Kızım Alman Lisesi falan kazanmıştı o zaman. Ciddi okullar kazanmıştı. Ben dedim azınlık okuluna çocuğumu göndermem. Geleceğine engel olduğumu söyledi öğretmenleri. Kendilerine gücenip güvenmediklerini sordum. Ben kendime de kızıma da güveniyorum. Burada okuyacağını ve iyi bir üniversite kazanacağını söyledim. Kendilerine güvendiklerini ama diğer okulların çok iyi olduğunu söylediler. Ben öyle düşünmüyorum, dedim. Ahmet, Mehmet, Robert. Ben yalnız Robert için düşünmüyorum. Herhangi bir ismi istemiyorum. Benim çocuğum Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'ne bağlı bir okulda okusun. Dünya için, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti vatandaşı için. İnancımı ben elimden geldiğince vermeye çalışırım. Bir inancı mutlaka olsun, hangi dine inanırsa inansın. Mutlaka bir dini inancı olsun isterim. Ama onun bunun okuluna giderek birinin sempatzanı olarak büyümesinden hoşlanmıyorum. İstemiyorum dedim. Cemaatlerle alakalı da aynı sıkıntıyı ben yaşadım. (Ebru)
68. Mesela o yurtdışı istiyor ama ben yurtdışı istemiyorum. Çünkü yani, üniversiteyi kendi ülkesinde okusun. Bir de yani hayat okul okumak değil, sonuçta ailesinden koparak gidip orada okumanın başka zorlukları olacağını düşünüyorum. Düşünüyorum, öyle doğru yanlış bilmiyorum, o yüzden gitmesini istemiyorum. Oğlum yurtdışına gitse düşünürüm ama kızım için istemiyorum. O çok istiyor da. Okulu bitirirse oğlum master için bakalım. (Zehra)
69. Burada okurlarsa çok memnun olurum ama biraz burada, biraz orada da okuyabilirler yani. Hayırlısı neyse o olsun. Benim en çok korktuğum olay, çocuklarımın kişiliklerinin bozulması. Başka şeylere bulaşmalarını istiyorum. O yüzden biraz tevekkül yapıyorum. Nasıl iyiyse, öyle olmalarını istiyorum. (Arzu)

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