

Positions and oppositions:
Greek foreign policy towards Turkey's accession to the EC/EU
(1987-2002)

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ABSTRACT

Positions and oppositions: Greek foreign policy towards Turkey's accession to the EC/EU (1987-2002) by Aikaterini Kitidi

This thesis concerns the Greek policy towards Turkey's accession to the EC/EU. The instigation for this thesis was the observation of a complete reversion in the Greek policy during that period, from a negative to a very cooperative stance vis-à-vis Turkey's EU prospects. The questions that are treated in the thesis are the following: Under which conditions did this cooperative behaviour occur? Does it reflect a general change in Greek foreign policy towards Turkey? Mainly, why did this shift of policy occur? In order to answer these questions, I proceeded to an historical overview of the Greek foreign policy and I interviewed 14 Greek high-level government officials.

The main argument that is presented in the thesis is the following: The reasons for the change had little to do with the Greek perceptions on Turkey per se. Instead, on the systemic level, the rewards from cooperation were multiplied, with the rapid integration at the EU level. The institutional framework started offering more opportunities and incentives for cooperation, in the way that the neoliberal institutionalists theorized it. However, this cooperation would not have been possible without the rise to power of a new set of actors in the level of political class. These had matured ideologically in the debate concerning the EU at the early '80s; they used the EU as a banner in order to differentiate themselves in their domestic political power struggles and, when in power, they took advantage of the opportunities that the EU offered, in order to pursue their redefined Greek national interest, in which rapprochement with Turkey was included.

KISA ÖZET

Türkiye'nin AET/AB'ye giriş sürecime ilişkin Yunanistan'ın geliştirdiği politikalar

Aikaterini Kitidi

Bu tezin konusu Türkiye'nin AET/AB'ye giriş sürecime ilişkin Yunanistan'ın geliştirdiği politikalarıdır. Bu tezin yazılmasını tetikleyen gözlem, bu 15 yıllık süre içerisinde Yunan politikasının Türkiye'nin adaylığına karşı olumsuz bir tutumdan destekleyici bir konuma doğru yaptığı tam kapsamlı dönüştür. Bu tezde cevabı aranan sorular şunlardır: Bu destekleyici tutum hangi şartlar altında gerçekleşti? Bu durum Yunanistan'ın Türkiye'ye dair dış politikasında genel bir değişiklikten mi kaynaklandı? En önemlisi, bu politika değişikliği neden meydana geldi? Yukarıda sıralanan soruları cevaplamak amacıyla Yunan dış politikasının tarihi bir değerlendirmesine başladım ve 14 Yunan üst düzey hükümet görevlisiyle mülakatlar yaptım.

Tezimin ana argümanı şu şekilde özetlenebilir: Yunanistan'da, komşusunun mevcut imajına dair bir algı değişikliği yoktu. Yunan dış politikasının köklü bir değişikliğe uğratan başlıca etmenler şunlardı: Sistemik düzeyde genel olarak AB düzeyinde hızlanan entegrasyon süreci işbirliğinden kaynaklanan faydaları arttırdı. Kurumsal yapı neo-liberal kurumsallaştırmacıların öngördüğü üzere daha fazla fırsat ve teşvik sunmaya başladı. Bununla beraber bu işbirliği ancak politik sınıf düzleminde yeni aktörlerin iktidara yükselmesiyle mümkün olabildi. Bu aktörler ideolojik olarak 1980'lerin ilk yarısındaki AB tartışması sırasında olgunlaşmışlardı. AB idealini ülke içi iktidar mücadelesinde kendilerini rakiplerinden ayırtmak için kullanan bu aktörler iktidara geldiklerinde Türkiye'yle yakınlaşmayı da içeren yeniden tanımlanmış Yunan milli çıkarlarını savunmak için AB'nin sunduğu fırsatlardan yararlanmasını bildiler.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AKP	Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party)
BSEC	Black Sea Economic Cooperation
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CU	Customs Union
DECA	Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement
EC	Economic Communities
ECOFIN	Economics and Finance Ministers' Council
EEC	European Economic Community
EMU	Economic and Monetary Union
ESDI	European Security and Defense Identity
EU	European Union
FIR	Flight Information Region
FM	Foreign Minister
KKE	<i>Komounistiko Komma Ellados</i> (Communist Party of Greece)
KYSEA	Greek Governmental Council on Foreign Affairs and Defence
MEP	Member of the European Parliament
MP	Member of Parliament
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
ND	<i>Nea Dimocratia</i> (New Democracy: Greek centre-right party)
PASOK	<i>Panhellinio Socialistiko Kinima</i> (Greek centre-left party)
PKK	<i>Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan</i> (Kurdistan Workers Party)
PM	Prime Minister
SYN	<i>Synaspismos</i> (Greek Eurocommunists)
WEU	Western European Union

INTRODUCTION

The aim of this research is to analyze the Greek foreign policy towards Turkey's accession to the EC/EU during the period 1987-2002 and to establish the reasons for its shift from negation to cooperation, which was expressed at the Helsinki Summit in 1999.

1] GENERAL REMARKS

As the businessman Rahmi Koç had once noted, the political problems between Greece and Turkey would become trivial, if their commercial transactions exceeded the 3 billion dollars per year¹. During the course of the 20th century, one never got to see if he is right or wrong; the financial exchanges of the two countries remained minimal and their political relations continued to be tense, with only very short periods of good neighbourliness (detente), usually in the face of a common enemy. However, after the natural disasters that hit both countries in 1999, an impression was created that Greece's relations with Turkey were rapidly changing – from mutual distrust and constant antagonism, to mutual support and intensifying efforts to transfuse the newly developed good bilateral climate from the area of “low politics” to the area of the more important bilateral issues.

One of the fields where this impression of change seemed to assert itself as reality was Turkey's accession efforts to the European Union; efforts to which Greece seemed to pose constant obstacles from the very beginning –since 1959, when Turkey made its application to become an associate member of the European Economic Community. Indeed, on April 14, 1987, when Turkey applied for full EEC membership, the Greek political leadership replied (after an initial hesitance) that the

Turkish membership is out of question, since Turkey does not accept Greece's territorial sovereignty; since it violates the Greek national airspace and illegally occupies a part of the Cypriot territory². Such statements come to a sharp contrast with PM Simitis' declarations after the Helsinki Summit of 1999, when the EU affirmed Turkey's nomination for membership: "It is an historic decision for peace and security in the region, which will help the relations between the two countries, and opens the way for constructive cooperation to the benefit of both Greece and Turkey. Greece had asked right from the start for clear positions and had stressed that Turkey's candidacy would have to be real and not virtual. [...] Our support to the European course of Turkey is given"³.

The observation of this complete reversion of Greece's initial position towards Turkey's EU membership raised in me a series of questions, which I developed into my research questions:

- 1) Under what conditions did this cooperative behaviour from the part of Greece occur?
- 2) Does it reflect a general change in Greek foreign policy⁴ towards Turkey with implications in all the parameters of the bilateral relations or it is just confined to the Greek-Turkish interactions into the institutional framework of the EU?
- 3) And most importantly, why did this change occur: Due to systemic reasons, due to domestic developments or because of changes in the perceptions of the foreign policy decision-makers? Who were the main actors involved and what levels of analysis should be used to locate them? In

general, which factors determine the possibilities and constraints for such a form of regional cooperation⁵?

In brief, my tentative answer to these questions is the following: The seeds of the idea that Turkey's accession can be beneficial for Greece existed since the submission of the Turkish application for EC membership in April 1987. Since that time, the issue was immediately related with the bilateral disputes and the situation in Cyprus. The Greek official reaction was negative, firstly because of the unwillingness of the ruling political class of the era to take advantage of the benefits for cooperation provided by the EC framework; and secondly due to systemic conditions, like the yet incomplete nature of the institutional framework itself.

The shift of the Greek policy towards Turkey's EU path is actually located around 1996, when the replacement of Andreas Papandreou's government by the Simitis administration took place. The reasons for the policy change have little to do with the goals, the strategies and the developments in Turkey *per se*. There was no perception change from the Greek side towards the inner characteristics of its neighbouring country. The main factors that contributed to the change are: 1] On the *systemic level*, the rewards from cooperation (and the sanctions against the defection from it) were multiplied, with the rapid integration at the EU level. The institutional framework started offering more opportunities and incentives for cooperation, in the way that the neoliberal institutionalists had theorized it. 2] However, this cooperation would not have been possible without the rise to power of a *new set of actors in the level of political class*, usually called the "modernizers". These actors had been born from the debate concerning the EU; they used the Union to

differentiate themselves in the domestic political struggle and, when in power, they took advantage of it in order to pursue their redefined Greek national interest.

The time frame that this argument attempts to cover is the period 1987-2002. These fifteen years were selected for the research on the basis of two considerations: Firstly, during that time occurred most of the milestones in Turkey's progress towards further integration in the EC/EU. Indicatively, one can pinpoint at 1995, when Turkey entered into Customs Union with the EU; 1997, when the Commission transiently excluded the country from the enlargement process; 1999, when Turkey was officially recognized as a candidate country; and 2002, when the heads of the EU member-states declared that the reforms in Turkey were satisfying and that the Copenhagen Summit of December 2004 could be an opportunity to set the date for the beginning of Turkey's accession negotiations.

Secondly, this period covers some of the turning points in the history of the Greek-Turkish relations: In 1987, for example, the two countries arrived at the brink of war, when the Turkish vessel *Sismik 1* started a scientific research journey towards an area that is considered Greek continental shelf, after Greece gave licence to a consortium to start research for oil in that place. The next year a major rapprochement effort between Andreas Papandreou and Turgut Özal was set in Davos and was continued in 1992 by Costantinos Mitsotakis and Süleyman Demirel. In 1996 occurred the Imia/ Kardak crisis; after that, the declaration of Madrid; subsequently the S-300 crisis, the Ocalan crisis etc.

My interest in confronting the foregoing research questions augmented when I realized that, in Greece, there is no mention of a relevant scientific paper (a master's or a PhD thesis) in the catalogue of the Greek National Documentation

Centre. There is limited number of related scientific articles and publications (e.g. Marcus Papaconstantis' article, *The European Course of Turkey and Greek-Turkish relations*), but most of them are opinion papers, giving the author's view on whether the Greek support towards Turkey's accession is good or bad for the country; whether the bilateral disputes and the Cyprus issue should be associated with Turkey's EU path etc. Besides, from the rest of the articles and studies, the majority focuses on specific parameters of the EU-Greek-Turkish relationship, like on the economic implications of the Greek support to Turkey.

As far as the bibliography is concerned, the most significant book among the few ones on the issue is Panos Kazakos' collective volume *Greece and the European future of Turkey* (Athens: Sideris, 2001). In Kazakos' volume, Notis Marias engages in an effort to interpret the Greek policy change towards Turkey's accession with the aid of functionalism. In particular, he uses Ernst Haas' theory, in order to explain the Greek decision at the Helsinki Summit as a way of "splitting the difference" with Turkey under the supervision of a third party, which plays the role of the intermediary. However, the fact that the EU cannot be considered exactly as a third party vis-à-vis Greece and Turkey, both because it has to show solidarity to Greece due to the Union's treaties and because it has been rendered an integral part of the problems' solution, opens the way for further researches, in order to find if there is another framework which can better explain the Greek foreign policy shift.

One should note that the lack of related in-depth studies on this subject, does not implicate its lack of importance. On the contrary, the study of the Greek foreign policy towards Turkey's accession can contribute significantly to the wider discussion on foreign policy making; to the debates on conflict and cooperation; as

well as to the issue of the relations between supranational organizations and the policymaking⁶ procedure of their member states.

In this effort to understand and explain the Greek foreign policy shift, I decided to use the following sources:

First of all, I took 14 interviews with Greek politicians and government officials, who were active or still influential during the period under question. I tried to make the selection of the interviewees as representative as possible, approaching people not only from all the major political parties in Greece, but also from all the influential factions in each political party. In particular, I interviewed five members of the Pasok party (centre-left); five members of New Democracy (centre-right); two members of Synaspismos (pro-European left); the head of the international affairs section of the Communist Party; and one former diplomat and secretary general of the foreign ministry. The number of the interviewees from each party corresponds by and large to the party's power in the Greek parliament during the period that I examine –with the exception of the Communist party, whose parliamentary force was larger than Synaspismos' for example, but which allowed me to speak only with one representative.

Secondly, I used Greek, English and French articles and books on the Greek-Turkish relations and the Turkish accession, from the libraries of Boğaziçi and Athens universities.

Thirdly, I had recourse to the archives of *Kathimerini* and *Eleftherotipia* newspapers which are found in the library of the Greek Parliament and on the Internet. I choose these two newspapers because they are widely popular: Both their daily and their Sunday editions rank in the top 5 of the total newspaper sales.

Besides, they are extensively influential, being considered as quality and prestige newspapers. Finally, they are not affiliated with any specific political party, even if the former can be considered as having a centre-right orientation (being closer to New Democracy party), while the latter a centre-left one (being closer to PASOK).

Lastly, another source for my research was the speeches of the Pasok government leaders from 1981 to 2000, which can be found in the press archives of the party. The speeches' study was deemed necessary, since the specific party was in power for the whole period that I examine, except from a 3-year interval of New Democracy administration.

2] THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

In a world which is changing rapidly, where the socio-economic inequalities are increasing on a daily basis, which is dominated by instability and endorses in a continuous soul-searching, theoretical reflection is necessary in order to create an explanatory framework and a guide for the future. The combination of theory with action is the ultimate goal. However, in countries like Greece, which passed the first post-Cold War years ferreting out not only the world around them but also their own identity, it is difficult to find one specific "theory", "model" or "paradigm", which could clearly and fully explain the country's actions in the international system. The reason is that (at least until very recently) many steps in foreign policy were finally decided and implemented at the very last minute, even though they may have been examined, analyzed and prepared since many years.

The Greek "yes" to the Turkish accession constitutes a perfect example for this. As it is explained in the following chapters, domestic political analyses and

academic inducements, as well as systemic exhorting favoring the Greek accord to Turkey's accession existed since the beginning of the '90s. However, even though in 1999 Greece had already since two years declared that it is in fact a *stronger* supporter of Turkey's eventual membership than many other EU member-states, during the Helsinki Summit it kept saying that "it will not make up its mind until it sees exactly what the Helsinki text has to offer" (*International Herald Tribune*, 10/12/1999). Finally, the decision to accept Turkey's candidacy was taken –rejoicing some and disappointing others on both sides of the Aegean. What had happened? Contemplating on the basic theories concerning cooperation is imperative before engaging in an effort to explain these events.

2.1 Overview of the theories on cooperation

The dominant paradigm -as it usually described- in international relations, namely the realist theoretical approach, is rather pessimistic on the outlook of international cooperation. In particular, the realists consider cooperation hard to achieve, difficult to maintain and dependent on state power (Grieco in Baldwin, 1993: 5). Realism argues that the states keep their centrality in an international system which is dominated by anarchy. They constitute unitary actors who act on their self-interest and are obliged to rely on self-help mechanisms. Their basic goal is to augment their power and security and, in order to do that, they engage into a continuous struggle, which is very difficult to substitute by cooperation, even if the states have common interests. All states in the international system try to maximize their own capabilities, while concomitantly undermining the capabilities of the others; and this is how a balance of power can be maintained. The latter is considered

as the only way to manage insecurity and, together with deterrence (namely, the threat of use of force), it is viewed as the only means to prevent war. Realists are sceptical about the prospects of international organizations and they find exaggerated the extent to which they are considered to “mitigate anarchy’s constraining effects on inter-state cooperation” (Grieco in Baldwin, 1993: 8).

These realist views were challenged by the liberal theories, which in general question the centrality of the states and put emphasis on the role of international institutions. The functionalist and neo-functionalist branch of these theories propose to build on and expand the habits of cooperation nurtured by groups of technical experts, outside of formal state channels. Eventually, they believe that those habits will spill over into cooperation in political and military affairs, as the functional experts will lose their close identification with the state and will develop new sets of allegiances to like-minded individuals around the globe. Along the way, the economic disparities will have been eliminated and war will be less likely (Mingst, 2001: 224). In other words, functionalism claims that the integration process between the states can be achieved, if it starts from areas of mutual and overlapping interests in a piecemeal fashion (Cf. Haas 1964; Mitrany 1975).

Another branch of the liberal theory, neoliberal institutionalism, has many similarities with neorealism (as for example on the issues of the nature of the international environment and the place of the states in it) but is a lot more optimistic concerning the ease and the likelihood of cooperation. As Karen Mingst explains (1999:69), for neoliberal institutionalists, the states are not faced with a one-time situation, but they confront each other repeatedly on specific issues. Even though, for these theorists, cooperation is not an innate characteristic of the human species and the established institutions cannot prohibit coercive actions (as the classical liberals

claim), it can emerge because, since actors have continuous interactions with each other, it is in their best interest to cooperate. The established institutions augment the possibilities for cooperation, but they do not guarantee it. Institutions simply provide a framework of interactions and suggest that there will be an expectation of future interactions not only on security issues, but on a whole range of other issues, like human rights, the environment, immigration and economics. It is important to underline that, one of the basic differences between the neoliberal institutionalist theory and the neorealist theory is that the former stresses the absolute gains from international cooperation while the latter have emphasizes the relative gains (Cf. Axelrod 1984; Keohane 1986; the analysis of Baldwin 1993). In short, their difference lies in the issue on whether the states should be primarily concerned with the distribution of gains from cooperation or not.

For interdependence theorists, who continued the debate on international cooperation, the relationships between the states are characterized by complex interactions: there are many forms of connections between societies in addition to the political relations of the governments, including translational links for business cooperation. This situation of interdependence has replaced the crude power politics of the cold war years and appears to create the conditions for a more cooperative and rule-governed world. In our time, violent conflict is not in the agenda, since the international transactions stimulate cooperative behaviours (Jackson and Sorensen, 1999:50). According to these theorists, a higher degree of interdependence leads to greater interstate cooperation and is therefore a force of stability in the international system, especially since it is accompanied with globalisation (Cf. Keohane and Nye 2000).

The “regime” theories of international relations claim that the international regimes can facilitate some form of global governance in the anarchical realm. As Griffiths and O’Callaghan note, they reflect the fact that states often have converging interests and are willing to cooperate in order to achieve certain outcomes. As a consequence, the regime theorists believe that “regimes” play a significant role in reducing the level of international conflict and facilitating cooperation at the international level (2002: 272). (Cf. Krasner 1982; Strange 1982).

A relative theory is the theory of “epistemic communities”, namely of networks comprising specialists with recognized expertise in policy-relevant knowledge areas, who are considered as able to play an important part in decision-making and agenda setting. Since the epistemic communities get involved both in high and in low politics, they can create a broad scientific international consensus, facilitating cooperation (Carkoglu, Eder, Kirisci, 1998). (Cf. Haas 1992).

Finally, the hegemonic stability theories claim that a single dominant state can establish norms and rules for economic cooperation between the states. This cooperation will be secured by the hegemon, since it will superintend its functioning by the enlightened use of its capability to encourage other members to work the regime under its hegemonic power (Evans, 1998: 220). (Cf. Krasner 1976; Strange 1987).

2.2 Levels of analysis

Most of the preceding theories focus on the systemic factors that promote cooperation. However, before engaging in the study of the Greek foreign policy shift towards Turkey’s EU candidacy, one has to examine also the other levels of analysis,

which might have influenced Greece's behavior. As Couloumbis & Wolfe explain, the levels of analysis most often employed in international relations were the individual level, the systemic level and the nation-state level (1978: 125-148). More recently, and with the influx of the behavioral approach in political science and international relations, a mixture of new and intermediate analytical tools and units have been adopted, leading David Singer to offer a guide of five levels of analysis, on which foreign policy can be studied (Roseneau 1971: 95-150). These levels of analysis are the following:

1. The individual (idiosyncratic) level: Here, the foreign policy analyst focuses on the perceptions, the images and the personal characteristics of the decision-makers.
2. The role level: This level can be defined as the job descriptions or the expected rules of behavior of the foreign policy making elites.
3. The bureaucratic level: Here is examined the structure of the government's mechanism and its effects upon foreign policy.
4. The national level: On this level, the analyst focuses on the "environmental" variables, like the size, the geographic location, the type of terrain, the climate and the recourses of the states; in addition, s/he focuses on the population attributes (like the state's size and population and its vital statistics); on the state's economic condition; on the societal cohesiveness and in general the political, economic and social system, together with its various forces, like for example the interest groups or the media; finally, on the national character, the culture, the shared images and the historical memories of each state.
5. Lastly, Roseneau refers to the systemic level, where the analyst concentrates upon the structure and the processes of the whole international system. In other words, on the international dynamics that influence foreign policy making.

To these levels, one has to add one more, which is particularly important for the foreign policymaking in Greece, as it will be explained further down: the level of political class. The term political class, which became popular in the 1980s, describes all those people involved in political influence and political power. Therefore, it encompasses the leaderships of all the political parties and pressure groups and those among the business leaders, church leaders, the military and the academics that political leaders choose to consult. This level is wider than the individual and narrower than the national level. Its separation from the latter is deemed necessary for this research in order to underline its independence from other national factors, as for example the public opinion.

In order to establish the more appropriate levels of analysis for examining the Greek foreign policy towards Turkey, one is obliged to look at some specific characteristics of the Greek state.

First of all, in Greece the bureaucratic level (in foreign policy at least), namely the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the diplomatic service, is not strong and, practically, there is a lack of institutional framework in the foreign policy decision-making mechanism. As Ioakimidis explains, the problem is not that the constitution of the country does not provide for such structures or that there are not legally established institutions for policymaking. The matter is that the official institutional system and the practical procedure of policymaking have very few actual points of contact. The established institutions of collective nature rarely convene, and when they do, they make explanatory, rhetoric pronouncements which have little in common with the real outcomes of foreign policy. The ministry of foreign affairs is by far the better organized part of the Greek administration system. But, while its organizational structure conforms with the European standards, its internal dynamics

and political profile are formed by political considerations of clientelistic nature. Therefore, the ministry's internal organizational structure obstructs it to assume the usual role that the bureaucracy plays in policymaking. As far as the diplomatic service is concerned, its role is more as the implementer of political decisions that are taken from the leadership of the foreign ministry than as a source of political choices (in Stavridis et al, 1999: 140-170).

Secondly, Ioakimidis notes that the absence of effective and legitimized institutional structures leads to the dominance of personalities in foreign policy making. The persons who form and implement foreign policy are very limited and, usually they abate to the minister of foreign affairs or the prime minister. These foreign policy makers act outside of the limits of a collective body or an institutional structure.

Indeed, the history of foreign policy in Greece cannot but prove him right. During the period 1974-1981, Costantinos Karamanlis was the indisputable creator of all the major foreign policy decisions, as was Andreas Papandreou afterwards. The example of his close friend and alternate foreign minister⁷, Kapsis, who wasn't informed about the Davos process in 1988, is more than telling. During the New Democracy government of 1990-1993, when the foreign minister Samaras acted independently on the FYROM issue, his dispute with the prime minister led to his departure from New Democracy and the prime minister reserved for himself the ministry of foreign affairs. Finally, when Papandreou came back to power in 1993, he once again took charge of all the major foreign policy decisions, while (especially after the deterioration of his health) disputes between the foreign minister Papoulias (the current president of the republic) and the alternate foreign minister Pangalos

became all the more apparent –underlining the role of individual personalities in Greek foreign policy.

On first sight, the Simitis administration seemed to follow the same path in policymaking. The rapprochement processes with Turkey for example, which was intensified during his time in government, is often associated only with him and his second foreign minister⁸ Yorgos Papandreou. However, a more penetrating look at the Greek society from the time of his election until his resignation as leader of Pasok, leads to the conclusion that both he and Papandreou acted as representatives and promoted the policies of a wider political class, dubbed as the “modernizers” by scholars and politicians alike. More details on this modernizing political class are given in chapter three. In brief, we can just note here that the division between the modernizers and the traditionalists substituted since the beginning of the ‘90s the division between the “conservative” right and the “progressive” left in Greece. The occurrence of the modernizers is inexorably linked with the increasing integration of the country into the EC/ EU and the consequent need to adjust its economic and political structures to those of the Community (Diamantouros in Clogg, 1993: 17). As Keridis notes, the modernizers’ basic goals are: “the reduction and reconceptualization of the role of the state in the economy and society, the full integration of Greece into the international distribution of labour and European structures, the redefinition of the Greek identity within the framework of an open, multicultural European society and the supplementing of the existing policy of a strong deterrence of the Turkish threat with a new policy of engagement that would promote the European orientation of Turkey” (in Keridis & Triantafillou, 2001: 8). Last but not least, the traditionalist and modernizing poles are not located between, but rather within the political parties.

Simitis himself, before his rise to power, had challenged publicly Papandreou to debate rather than to dictate the important political decisions (cf. chapter 1, section 5.a). And while he was prime minister, he indeed avoided the autocratic conduct of his predecessor. At the time of the expression of the Greek foreign policy change, during the Helsinki Summit, the era of “charismatic leaders” in Greece was over. And even Simitis’ nickname, “the accountant”, shows that he was rather an administration rather a visionary creator of new policy trends. As far as the personalities of Simitis and Yorgos Papandreou are concerned, certainly their low-key, conciliatory image played a role in the rapprochement with Turkey, by reassuring the “other side” more than exuberant profile of their predecessors. But the change of the Greek policy shouldn’t be attributed mainly to their individual characteristics –or their personal ideology:

Simitis could have lost the presidency of Pasok and the leadership of Greece to his main opponent, Akis Tsochatzopoulos, at the 4th Pasok conference which had to elect a new party leader after the death of Andreas Papandreou. Tsochatzopoulos, a close friend and follower of Papandreou’s policy, promoted a more patriotic-realist foreign policy. In the 4th conference of 1996, he declared for example that “the Greek stance towards the Turkish expansionism must reflect stability, power and deterrence. This is why the basic goal of our foreign preparation must be the strengthening of the deterrent capability of the country in every level, because it is the only way to stop the war plans of provocations in Ankara”⁹.

However, the steady rise of the modernizer faction in Pasok; its closer ties and greater “compatibility” with the EU, which was becoming more and more integrated; and mainly its bipartisan character, give substantial reasons to argue than sooner or later, a “modernizer” government would rise to power in Greece, staffed

either by Pasok or New Democracy politicians. Besides, the Greek foreign policy change towards Turkey's EU accession cannot be attributed to changes in the "role variable": one cannot but acknowledge to the Simitis-Papandreou tandem that they stayed put to their pre-electoral declarations...

Connected with the issue of the political classes is the issue of the influence of the public opinion in Greek foreign policy. The FYROM adventure in the beginning of the '90s led some analysts to affirm its strong "comeback" in the political realm. According to Evangelos Kofos¹⁰, for example, "not since the mass demonstrations of the Cypriot anti-colonial struggle of the 1950s, did the Greek society and the Greeks of the diaspora exhibit such awareness and involvement in a foreign policy issue". The anti-Skopje rallies, which gathered more than one million people, were considered by some as the proof that the public opinion has a role to play in foreign policymaking. However, there is substantial reason to question that the public opinion holds a significant and (mainly) independent role in Greek foreign policy.

As Petros Hasapis affirms, "the political elites in Greece don't have the necessary social foothold nor do they keep up with the social dynamics (which would be a far healthier situation), but they move autonomously. It is only natural that these political elites try to hold on everything in order to keep themselves in power. One of the basic means that they use is the state mechanisms, with the help of which they try to keep the society under their control" (in Kanellopoulos and Frangonikolopoulos, 1995: 87).

The relation of the Greek politicians with the Greek society is rather a top-down than a bottom-up connection. The politicians take the decisions; they "sell" them to the public, but trying to touch upon their most sensitive cords, for

augmenting also their personal prestige; and, if they see that their decisions that they finally want or have to take in foreign policy, wouldn't conform with the public feeling that they helped to create, they just stop stirring up the public opinion. Why didn't we witness any mass rallies by the maximalist Greek public opinion after the New York interim accords with FYROM, which harbingered that finally compromising solution would be found in the issue of the name of Greece's neighbouring country? And where was the public opinion, which by 61,5% had declared that it would vote "no" at the Anan plan¹¹, when the heads of the two biggest Greek political parties declared (directly or indirectly) that they support it?

Finally, having commented upon the Greek political classes and the public opinion, one has to examine the place of Greece in the international environment, in order to define the levels of analysis for the Greek foreign policy making. Greece can be considered as a small state, firmly bound in the Western camp since the end of the Second World War (despite the opposing flamboyant declarations of the country's leader during the '80s). It is a member of a large number of international organizations, both with a global and a regional scope. These organizations -political, economic, humanitarian or of a specialized field of competence- constitute both the means and the framework in which the country is striving to achieve its foreign policy goals. It goes without saying that changes in the general structure or the member states of these organizations can create problems, dilemmas for the government or even the need to immediately alter decisions that are taken on a state level.

The most important of these organizations for the foreign-policy mechanism of Greece is, of course, the European Union. As it is affirmed in the foreign ministry's web site, especially since the mid-90s, Greek policy has been

characterized by even further support for the idea and process of European integration, as well as by intensifying integration in every domain, in line with the federal model. It is also characterized by an effort towards greater economic and social convergence, after the fulfilment of the convergence criteria set by the Maastricht Treaty and Greece's participation as a full member in the single currency and the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) since January 1, 2002.

Nonetheless, an understanding of the Greek foreign policymaking cannot be full, without also considering the characteristics of the international system, in which it has to operate. In that system, after the end of the Cold War, the US found itself in the role of the sole superpower. Its vision for the world was “freedom, democracy and market economy” and the axes of its strategy for the 21st century were defined by the former Secretary of Defence, William Cohen, in three words: “shaping, responding and preparing”(Conalis-Kontos in Yiallourides & Tsakonas, 2001: 385-406).

The Greek-American relations, both in the bilateral level and in the level of NATO, improved significantly during the last years and according to the declared wish of all the Greek governments since the early '90s, the latter would like to keep the relations on such a good level also in the future. This postulates that Greece had (and still has) to take into account the “American factor”, when tracing its foreign policy.

The above observations on the Greek “particularities” as far as foreign policy is concerned lead to the conclusion that the search for the reasons of the Greek policy change towards Turkey's accession are located on the combination of the political class level and the systemic level of analysis.

2.3 *Towards a linkage between the systemic forces and the political class*

Many international relations theorists have underlined the role of the domestic factor in foreign policy making, from Graham Allison and his work on the Cuban missile crisis, Jack Snyder and his work on imperialism to Helen Milner and her study on tariff policy. Besides, many scholars have tried to provide a model for the linkage between foreign and domestic policy, like Robert Putnam and his work on the “two-level games”. In brief, as Çarkoglu and Kirişci explain¹², Robert Putnam has pointed out that diplomacy can be envisaged as a set of games pursued simultaneously. Level I consists of negotiations between diplomats and decision-makers. Level II consists of negotiations between these decision-makers and their respective national constituencies. In other words, these decision-makers will have to sell the decisions taken at Level I to the actors in Level II, or in general to the public.

The basic impediment for using such work in the present paper is the following: The paper’s main focus is not the diplomatic process between Greece, Turkey and the EU, but the *internal transformation* of the Greek political realm, which resulted to a change in the relations with Turkey. For the explanation of this transformation, a systemic theory on cooperation will be used and its links with the Greek political classes will be established.

The theory that can better explain the workings of the international environment during the time of the Greek foreign policy shift towards Turkey is neoliberal institutionalism. Its basic premises concerning cooperation are presented by Robert Axelrod and Robert Keohane in the article “Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions”, which was published in *World Politics* (Vol. 38, No. 1, October 1985, 226-254). According to the writers, which use the games

like the prisoner's dilemma in order to demonstrate their ideas, cooperation is sometimes attained and it varies among issues and over time. It takes place in situations that *contain a mixture of conflicting and complementary interests* and there are three situational dimensions, which affect the propensity of actors to cooperate: *mutuality of interest, the shadow of the future and the number of actors.*

The first one is related to the payoff structure of the game. As experimental evidence has demonstrated, the greater the conflict of interest between players, the greater the likelihood that the players would choose to defect from cooperation. However, the myopic pursuit of self-interests can be disastrous and both sides can potentially benefit from cooperation, if there is a way to achieve it. An important observation at this point is that the payoff structure that determines the mutuality of interests is not simply based upon objective factors, but is grounded upon the actor's perceptions of their own interests.

What the "shadow of the future" implies is that concern about the future helps to promote cooperation. The more future payoffs are valued relative to current payoffs, the less the incentive to defect today. The length of the shadow of the future, like the character of payoff structures is not necessarily dictated by the objective attribute of the situation. On the contrary, expectations are important. International organizations may therefore be significant, since institutions embody and affect actors' expectations. Thus, institutions can alter the extent to which governments expect their present actions to affect the behavior of others on future issues. The principles and the rules of international regimes make governments concerned about precedents, increasing the likelihood that they will attempt to punish defectors.

As far as the actor's number is concerned, Axelrod has shown that reciprocity is an effective strategy to induce cooperation among self-interest players in the

bilateral relations where the values of each actor's options are clearly specified. However, there are various conditions upon which effective reciprocity depends, like the ability to prevent defection through sanctioning. A way to solve the sanctioning problem is to construct international regimes (or in Greece's case to incorporate the other in the existing regimes), which can provide standards against which actions can be measured and which can assign responsibility for applying sanctions. Regimes provide information about actor's compliance; they facilitate the development and maintenance of reputations; they can be incorporated into actors' rules of thumb for responding to the others' actions; and they may even apportion responsibility for decentralized enforcement of rules.

In brief, for Axelrod and Keohane, an institutionalized system can alter the pay-off structures that the actors are facing; it may lengthen the shadow of the future; and it may solve the sanctioning problem that the possibility of defection poses to cooperation. Institutions give opportunities and incentives which make cooperation more feasible and rewardable. The only thing that is needed is for the actors to perceive these opportunities.

A theory like this implies that a change in the systemic level with the institutionalization of the international environment can promote cooperation even when the other levels, like the political class, remain unaltered. If the situation is even slightly non-zero-sum and the actors realize the benefits of cooperation, then the latter will eventually occur. However, as the case of Greece and other countries (eg. Spain) has proved the actors do not change immediately towards more cooperative behavior, for various reasons: they may not have adequate information,

there may be cognitive gaps, they may be old actors with a maximalist personality resisting the change etc.

In countries like Greece with “relative autonomy” (using Poulantzas’ terminology), even though the institutions provided incentives for cooperation, these were not used by the existing political class. A new set of actors had to arise from the fermentation process created by the debate on the institutional framework.

These actors promoted the new opportunities that could arise from the institutions, first in the political struggle with their competitors, as means to differentiate themselves from the rest of the political elites. In the process, they gathered the support of media, interest groups etc. until they won the electoral game which brought them to power. Having arrived there, they pursued the redefined, now “institutionally-framed” national interest of their country, on the basis of which they were elected. Concomitantly, they also took advantage of the favorable conditions for cooperation that the systemic environment was already offering.

That was the bottom-up contribution to the systemic level, which finally permitted cooperation.

3] ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY

This study is separated into three parts.

The first chapter comprises a general overview of the historical background of the Greek foreign policy towards Turkey’s accession, in order to define the situation in which Greece’s cooperative behavior occurred and explore its basic characteristics. In order to acquire a more complete picture of Greece’s foreign policy, the overview begins six years before the time frame of the study; from 1981,

when the Pasok party, which governed the country almost continuously until 2002, rose to power.

In the second chapter are presented the results of a research which was conducted for the purposes of this paper; namely, the data on the Greek foreign policy gathered from 14 interviewees with Greek policymakers, who influenced the country's external relations during the period 1987-2002.

The empirical data from the interviews contributed in the analysis of the Greek official attitude towards Turkey's accession, which is explained in the framework of the aforementioned theoretical considerations in chapter three.

ENDNOTES

¹ Kazakos Panos, Liargovas Panagiotis *et al.*, *Η Ελλάδα και το Ευρωπαϊκό Μέλλον της Τουρκίας* [Greece and the European future of Turkey], Athens: Sideris, 2001, p. 9.

² Alexandris Alexandros, Veremis Thanos *et al.*, *Οι Ελληνοτουρκικές σχέσεις 1923-1987* [Greek - Turkish relations, 1923-1987], Athens: Gnosi, 1991, 734 p.

³ *Macedonian Press Agency*, 12-12-1999.

⁴ "Foreign policy" refers to actions taken by governments which are directed at the environment external to the state with the objective of sustaining or changing the environment in some way. This formulation captures the centrality of states and of government actors, the boundary-crossing deployment of policy instruments and the purposive nature of the resulting actions (White Brian in Carlsnaes *et al.*, 2004, p. 11).

⁵ "Regional cooperation" refers at "all efforts on the part of (usually) neighbouring countries to address issues of common interest", according to the European Commission, COM (95) 219, p. 3.

⁶ According to Roy Macridis, the term "policymaker" refers to the official empowered with making the relevant decisions in foreign policy. In some political systems, the officials are the effective decision-makers (in stable democratic systems and well-established authoritarian systems). In many countries, no prediction about foreign policy trends can be made without a careful assessment of the relative strength of the students, the trade unions, the military, the church and the business groups (1976: 12).

⁷ The alternate foreign minister replaces the foreign minister when s/he is travelling abroad or s/he is unavailable for decision-making. It is a rank higher than the deputy foreign minister(s) who usually have specific tasks like "deputy foreign minister on European Affairs" or "deputy FM for the Greeks abroad". The alternate foreign minister is a governmental position that does not exist in all cabinets.

⁸ As far as the first foreign minister of Simitis, Theodoros Pangalos, he is considered as oscillating between the "modernizing" and the "traditionalist trend (in Keridis & Triantafyllou, 2001: 9).

⁹ Minutes of the 4th Pasok Convention, 27-30 June, 1996, pp. 148-151. The full text of Tsochatzopoulos' speech can be found at the press archive of the Pasok party, at the electronic address www.pasok.gr.

¹⁰ In Pettifer James, *The New Macedonian Question*, Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, 1999.

¹¹ Poll conducted by the company VPRC for *Sunday Eleftherotipia* newspaper, whose results were presented in the website: www.hellenicnews.com/gr/readnews.html?newsid=1712&lang=GR.

¹² In Carkoglu Ali, Kirisci Kemal, "The view from Turkey: Perceptions of Greeks and the Greek-Turkish rapprochement by the Turkish public", *Turkish Studies*, vol. 5, no 1, spring 2004.

1. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: GREEK FOREIGN POLICY ORIENTATIONS AND ATTITUDES TOWARDS TURKEY

“A page of history is worth a pound of logic”, the American jurist Oliver Wendell Holmes used to say and, at least in the case of the Greek-Turkish dyad, he couldn’t be more right. History can be one of the most useful tools for analyzing and interpreting the bilateral relations: It can unwind the entangled sequence of events which led to the current rapprochement; and it can enlighten the use of the European framework from the moment that Turkey made its application for EU candidacy. But, most importantly, as far as the Greek side is concerned, it can show whether the widely accepted milestone of 1999 indeed constituted a breach in a history of bilateral confrontation, or the culmination of a policy with roots further back in the past.

In the effort to better organize the historical facts, this chapter is divided into five sections, following the turning points of the Greek history of the last two decades. The first section covers the period 1981-1987, namely, from the “short march to power” of Andreas Papandreou and his socialist government, to the Greek-Turkish crisis of March 1987 –which preceded only by a few days Turkey’s application for EU candidacy. The second section, 1987-1990, describes the Greek foreign policy during the soul-searching phase after the March crisis, which ended with the adventurous rise to power of the neoliberal government of ND. The “pro-rapprochement with Turkey” foreign policy of ND’s leader, Mitsotakis, is presented in the third section (1990-1993). The fourth part covers the years 1993-1996; that is from the comeback of Papandreou’s Pasok to the Greek government until his resignation for health reasons. Finally, the last section (1996-2002) concerns the Simitis’ administration, during which the Helsinki Summit took place.

For a deeper understanding of the Greek positions towards Turkey's candidacy during that time, this chapter does not only present the Greek official reactions after each development in the EU-Turkish relations. In addition, it describes the general conceptions of the consecutive Greek governments about the international environment, and their foreign-policy orientations. The reason is that policymakers *don't* rely only on their experience about what is at work in each situation, since they don't have the time to proceed to abstractions in search of theoretical guidance –as it is sometimes advocated. As Roseneau and Durfee affirm:

“Policymakers also proceed from abstract premises as to what is important and trivial in situations. They may not be conscious of these premises and they may think that their experiences and gut feelings underlie their recommendations and decisions, but such self-perceptions do not negate their unrecognized reliance on broad paradigms through which to view the world” (2000: 9-10).

Thereupon, each section is divided into two parts: the Greek conceptions about the international environment and foreign policy orientations; and the Greek policy towards Turkey's EC/ EU accession.

1.1] 1981-1987: PAPANDEOU'S SHORT MARCH TO POWER

Despite Pasok's declamations of total rupture from the previous government's “subservient policy” to NATO and the EC countries, its applied policy, albeit nationalistic, was that of *pragmatism* and *continuity*. This dualistic nature of Pasok's policies, ascribed to it the characterization of “a party with a Western mind and a Third-World heart” (Coulombis in Clogg, 1993: 118-120). As far as Turkey is concerned, Pasok insisted that any form of dialogue could jeopardize Greek security

(especially after the unilateral recognition of Northern Cyprus) and vehemently opposed any idea of Turkey's further association with the EC at the time –unless it took place under the Greek terms.

1.1.1. Greek conceptions about the international environment and foreign policy orientations

When PASOK rose to power in 1981, its views concerning the international system and Greece's place in it seemed to come in sharp contrast with those of the previous governments. Its leader and main ideologue, Andreas Papandreou, endorsed the theories of the neomarxist school of dependency, which he analyzed in his seminal article "Metropolis-Periphery, Dependent Development and Social Change"¹. Dependency theorists claim that the world is separated in metropolises and satellites (according to Gunder Frank's terminology) or core and periphery nations (according to Wallerstein's). The latter are not poor because they are inherently backward or underdeveloped, but because they have been actively kept underdeveloped by the rich countries of the First World, on which they are structurally dependent in the world capitalist system. Accordingly, Papandreou accepted the core/periphery dichotomy and claimed that all major decisions are taken on the international level, based on the interests of the great powers. The financial interests of the core nations correspond to the interests of the world bourgeoisie and they both aim at exploiting the periphery nations, which coincide with the world proletariat. "Class struggle in the international framework everyday takes more and more the form of a conflict between the metropolis and the periphery", Papandreou stated in the aforementioned article.

For Papandreou, Greece is also a dependent country in the periphery of the capitalist world system, exploited by the “US and other imperialist centers”. Greece’s dependency is not only financial, but also military and political², and accounts for all the problems that the country faces. This view is epitomized in the founding document of Pasok, the *Declaration of September the 3rd* (1974): “The root of our sufferings is the dependency of our Homeland [...] from the imperialist establishment of the United States and NATO. Greece has been transformed to a nuclear post of the United States, in order to effectively serve the military and financial interests of the big monopolies”. So, what can Greece, “a country belonging simultaneously to Europe, the Balkans and the Mediterranean”, do in order to escape this situation? “It should follow a dynamic independent foreign policy aiming at guarantying its territorial integrity”³, Papandreou answered, “as we don’t have any commitments except one: the national interest”⁴. This is why the first of the “four arrows” of Papandreou’s policy, which are stated in the *Declaration*, is national independence⁵.

Typical notions of Realism, like the national interest pinpointed above, were common in Papandreou’s analyses, since he combined the dependency approach with some classic Realist principles. For example, just like the Realist theorists, he also believed that states strive to augment their power; that the goal of each country is survival and security, which is always the highest priority because it is necessary for the realization of any other goals; that the national interest is defined as consolidating power to preserve security and sovereignty; that each person expects protection by the state, which is necessary for the welfare of its citizens; and that internationally, nobody will protect one nation from the use of force by another nation, as the other governments and states can never be relied upon completely. As Konstantinidis

notes, this combination of the dependency and the realist school created a climate of confusion. Finally, the name that was established for the prevailing theory during this period of Pasok's government is "Realism with Neomarxist elements" (in Tsakonas, 2003: 178).

The Neomarxist elements had a double influence on Pasok's foreign policy. Firstly, they were the reason that Papandreou adopted his anti-NATO, anti-EC stance. Secondly, based on them he developed a "nationally proud" and "non-subservient" rhetoric, which he used not only against the foreign powers influencing his country, but also against Turkey. The Pasok leader recognized that Turkey was also dependent on the United States, just like Greece⁶. This doesn't mean though that he was willing to pursue cooperation with it (as he did with the Arab, Eastern European and Third-World countries) in order to balance the American power⁷: The reason is that, on one hand, he believed that the Turkish ruling class enjoyed the favor of the American one, and with its help it was slowly becoming "a sub-imperialist station in the area"⁸ –so, it belonged to the enemy camp. Papandreou recognized that the Greek ruling class had the same aspirations. But, there was one fundamental difference between the Turkish and the Greek case: "The ruling class of Greece is dependent on the imperialist centers, but it is not expansionist in any case. On the contrary, because of the dependency, it has the tendency of backfolding, compromising and making concessions. The ruling class of Turkey has a chauvinist-expansionist policy"⁹.

Papandreou's conception of Turkey and its foreign policy goals was very different from the previous (New Democracy) government's conceptions. As Moutsoglou informs us (2000: 127-129), New Democracy attributed Turkish

aggressiveness to the general restructuring of Ankara's policy, which occurred partly because of the Greek political weaknesses during the dictatorship period and the irrational foreign policy decisions that ensued from it. These allowed Turkey to raise new claims, seeking a rearrangement of the control in the Aegean Sea. New Democracy believed that the claims of Turkey concerning the continental shelf, the Greek national airspace etc. are specific and they represent the final objectives of the country. Therefore, dialogue could be fruitful, if it was good-intentioned –a condition which however was not fulfilled during that period. This is why, even though New Democracy kept denouncing “the intransigent policy of Ankara”, it sought dialogue.

On the contrary, Pasok declared that Ankara aims at dichotomizing the Aegean or at least at acquiring a share of its sovereignty. In this effort, Turkey was faced with the tolerance by the US, while the USSR didn't help at its deterrence. Greece's Western allies are unwilling to protect it and constantly advise it to make concessions. They favor Turkey for geopolitical reasons and thus they nurse its expansionism. This conviction is demonstrated by the fact that, each time Papandreou used to “send a message to Turkey” through his speeches, he was also addressing the West. For example, in his inaugural speech at the Greek parliament on 22/11/1981, he noted: “In the issue of the Aegean, it must be made clear *both to our neighbours and to NATO* that the land, sea and air borders, as well as the limits of the Greek continental shelf are not negotiable”.

Pasok claimed that the reasons for the Turkish aggressiveness must be sought in its general will for reshaping its western neighborhood, but also in the *structural* characteristics of the Kemalist Turkish regime¹⁰. Papandreou underlined the threat that Turkey poses on the sovereign rights of Greece, while Greece just wants to retain the status quo. Therefore, he claimed that the country should neither engage in

dialogue nor turn to the International Court of Justice: “If someone breaks the door of your house and says ‘This part of the room is mine, the other is yours’, will you go to court or tell him to get lost?”, we wondered in front of the National Assembly on 12/06/1976, adding that “there cannot be a non-aggression pact with Turkey [negotiated at the time by the New Democracy government], since a part of the Greek nation is under Turkish occupation in Cyprus”. His slogans “we don’t raise any claims, we don’t yield anything” and “Greece asks nothing of Turkey but friendship, but not at the expense of an inch of Greek soil” marked the ‘80s generation.

Nevertheless, Papandreou’s theory on Greece’s position in the world and the nature of its relations with its eastern neighbor *is not completely consistent* with the actual foreign policy decisions that Pasok made concerning Turkey¹¹. The reasons for this have been the topic of many studies and cannot be fully examined here, since the focus of this paper is the Greek attitude towards EC/EU-Turkish relations. However, one should point out the consequences of this inconsistency: Papandreou declared that there is nothing to share –just unilateral pretensions of Turkey, which must be denounced on every occasion. Pasok was labeled “the party of the rejection of dialogue, the intransigent attitude on the Cyprus issue and the offensive response to the revendications of Turkey”. Indeed, the Pasok government refrained from bilateral negotiations. But, after a NATO meeting in Bonn in June 1982 it agreed to announce a common moratorium with Turkey (on July 22, 1982) on provocative actions and statements (which didn’t last); it refrained from actions that could bring the two countries to war after the signing of the Treaty on the Law of the Sea on 30/04/1982; and it didn’t break (as some expected) diplomatic relations with Turkey

after the Turkish recognition of Northern Cyprus as an independent state (Coufoudakis in Clogg, 1993: 170). In general, Pasok's choices towards Turkey, as well as its actual stance towards NATO and the EC, have led many analysts to characterize its foreign policy as "more pragmatic than it sounded" and to talk about "dualism between words and deeds", denouncing however the negative consequences of this dualism on the perceptions of the international community about Greece. "Leaders as Andreas Papandreu have implemented a hybrid form of policy by adopting in words some elements of a dynamic approach but by having the capability of adjustment to the needs of the political feasible", notes for example Couloumbis (1999: 43).

The first occasion in order to test the popular appeal of Pasok's policy would be the European elections of 1984 while the second one would be the national elections shortly afterwards, in October 1985. However, in foreign affairs, Pasok's ideas seemed to change well before they are submitted to the judgment of the public. The change, which gradually became all the more apparent, concerned the usefulness of international organizations, and in particular of the EEC, which was now viewed a lot more positively.

Papandreu underlined that Greece's membership had mainly been a decision of the former, New Democracy, government and that Pasok was asking before 1981 for a special relationship with the EEC, which would acknowledge Greece's financial particularity (namely, the underdeveloped, peripheral character of its economy). The reason is that, initially, the Europe of Six was working as a "Club of the Rich Countries" and membership could further worsen the difficult position of the country. However, when PASOK rose to power, facing the *fait accompli* of

Greece's membership in the EEC, it set as its immediate goal the readjustment of the country's position in it. On March 1982 it presented a memorandum to the Community entitled "Positions of the Greek government on the relations of Greece with the European Communities". The successful negotiation of the Memorandum's positions, as well as the important financial gain from the Community led to the conclusion that the cost of a possible secession of Greece would be a lot higher than the cost of change, while the possibilities to obtain political and financial gains could be maximized after the proper negotiating initiatives (Kranidiotis, 1987: 229). Besides, according to Papandreou, the future of the EEC gradually seemed less bleak: The Southern, less developed countries of the Community were slowly starting to collaborate, in order not only to decrease the distance in the living standards between the "North" and the "East", but also to achieve the gradual *independence* of Western Europe from the American dominion. For Papandreou, this dominion was clearly visible in the political domain, where the EEC was almost always identified with the foreign policy of the United States¹². So, a general effort to change the negative attributes of Europe was taking place –and Greece was willing to participate in it.

This new, conciliatory with Europe orientation of Papandreou's foreign policy was affirmed during the hustings for the European elections, while in his first parliamentary speech after the elections of 1985, the Greek PM announced: "We continue and we intensify our struggle in the framework of the EEC" (cited in Kranidiotis, 1987: 231). However, the governing party had difficulty in abandoning both its dependency-theory approach to world politics and its realist views about the nature of its relations with Turkey, which resulted to and were combined with an extremely patriotic rhetoric. In the same speech where Papandreou declared the

adoption of the EEC framework, he stated that “We have permanently reoriented the country from the policy of *We belong to the West* to *We belong to Greece*; this policy determines, promotes and safeguards our national needs and priorities, our national interests” (cited in Kourvetaris and Dobratz, 1987: 92). A few months earlier he was announcing that:

“We must forge the subconscious of a nation which doesn’t pretend to anything but also doesn’t negotiate its territorial integrity and the national pride [...] We are against armaments and for the promotion and safeguarding of Peace, but we are under a constant and dangerous threat that derives from the expansionist dynamic of Turkey, the chauvinism of its ruling class, which is guided and based on its Allies. Therefore, we are obliged to secure the defense armor of our country and to spend an important amount of our resources, in order to protect our territorial integrity and retain our national independence” (13/3/1984).

Greece still took seriously into account the concepts of power and military balance, as the “revisionist provocations and the threat” of Turkey were considered indubitable. In 1985, it announced a new defense doctrine, stating that the biggest threat towards Greece doesn’t come from the North but from its eastern frontiers; in addition, it announced a “popular defense” program, which provided for the redeployment of the country’s armed forces, so as to protect the islands of the Aegean Sea (Iatrides in Couloumbis *et al*: 2003, 99).

The Pasok government seemed willing to adjust the European framework to its own ideology, not to reconsider its views about the world, taking into account what the membership in the EEC meant for Greece. The political identity of the Pasok government was unclear; consequently, so were the principles that guided its relations with the rest of the world. Besides, this was reflected to its voters, as it is aptly shown in a study made by Tsokou, Shelley and Dobratz (1986): Using

discriminant analysis, the researchers found that it was much easier to classify the supporters of the left and the right parties correctly by knowing their views on foreign (and domestic) issues, than it was to classify the Pasok supporters (Kourvetaris and Dobratz, 1987: 91).

1.1.2. Greek policy towards EEC-Turkish relations

The military dictatorship that controlled Turkey in 1981 underlined the European orientation of the country and stated its goal to implement financial, social and technical measures, in order to become a full member of the EEC. Nonetheless, despite the declaration of good-intentions by the regime, Turkey's relations with the EEC steadily deteriorated until 1983 (Pesmatzoglou, vol. 2, 1993: 41). After the controlled elections of that year, the civilian government of Turgut Özal (which remained in power also after the elections of 1987), reaffirmed Turkey's need for membership in the EEC, under the precondition that its terms would be beneficial to the country. Özal continued the efforts for economic stability and realized a series of reforms for the liberalization of the economy, resulting in the acceleration of the economic growth and the resolution of the foreign currency deficit problem. Furthermore, Turkey's relations with the European countries (which were never really put to a halt on a bilateral level, even after the Cyprus intervention) continued to improve, and so did its relations with the US, partly due to Turkey's policy of neutrality during the Iran-Iraq war and as a compensation for the permission given to Greece to return to the military wing of NATO. The culminant point in the improvement of Turkey's relations with the European countries was April 1986,

when the country assumed the vice-presidency of the Council of Europe, in which for many years it was accused of not respecting human rights.

As Kazakos informs us (in Alexandris *et al*, 1991: 553-660), on January 1986 the Turkish foreign minister Vahit Halefoglu sent a letter to all the member-states of the EEC *except* Greece, in which he proposed the *reactivation of the Association Council*, which had stopped being convened in 1980, with the advent of the Turkish dictatorship. After the Greek complaints, Turkey finally sent the letter to the Greek government too. However, Greece expressed a negative stance towards the Turkish proposals, based on the following arguments:

- a. The reasons that necessitated the suspension of the Council's works in 1980 haven't eclipsed: There are still huge violations of human rights, while the army still indirectly controls the political life of the country;
- b. Turkey continues the illegal occupation of a part of another country, namely Cyprus; and
- c. There is an issue of Community solidarity, concerning the threat that Turkey poses to Greece in the Aegean Sea. In a letter to Halefoglu, the Pasok government "reminded" Turkey that Greece has also a role to play in the warming up of EEC-Turkey relations and that the decisions in the EEC are taken unanimously.

However, the Council of Foreign Ministers announced on February 17, 1986 that the efforts for the gradual normalization of the EEC-Turkey relations must continue and that it is planning to take all the necessary steps towards this direction. As a reaction, on September 1986 the Greek government decided to present the aforementioned arguments to the European Council in Hague. As Papandreou declared: "Turkey continues its revendications and its aggressive policy towards Greece. In this climate,

the capability of the Greek government to show a spirit of collaboration in the issue of EEC-Turkish relations is significantly limited”.

Nonetheless, one should underline that Papandreou also stated: *“We are ready to sign the additional protocol which concerns Turkey, if Ankara complies both with the clauses of the Ankara agreement and with the basic principles of international law”*. This position was repeated at a convention of the Greek Council of Foreign Affairs and Defence (KYSEA) on September 13, 1986. In the convention’s conclusions it is stated that “the European course of Turkey is in the best interest of Greece, but it should be based on such conditions, as to exclude the discussion of issues that concern Greece’s national sovereignty and territorial integrity”¹³. Apparently, Greece was willing to accept the EEC-Turkish dialogue but on *Greek terms* and was awaiting an intensification of the Community’s pressures towards Turkey.

The Greek objections didn’t stop the Association Council from convening on September 16, 1986. On the 22nd of January 1987, the new President of the European Parliament declared that he encourages every effort to resume the works of the Mixed Parliamentary Committee on EEC-Turkish relations and on March 24, 1987, Ali Bozer, who was in charge of Turkey’s relations with the EEC, announced that he is planning to start bilateral negotiations with all the member-states concerning the perspective on Turkish membership in the Community.

1.2] 1987-1990: THE CRISIS OF MARCH 1987 AND ITS AFTERMATH

Even though Papandreou’s power was constantly rising (at least until the scandals which shook the country in 1989) he didn’t move leftwards in accordance

with his ideology, but towards the right, both in the domestic and the foreign policy domains. “Papandreou and Greece had transformed themselves into the Community’s most vocal federalists”, notes Couloumbis. “And in one area where Pasok had tried to differentiate itself from New Democracy, namely Greek-Turkish relations and the Cyprus issue, Papandreou also made a dramatic volte-face” (in Clogg, 1993: 126)¹⁴. However, the efforts for bilateral rapprochement with the Davos Summit of 1989, didn’t result in lifting the Greek negotiations towards Turkey’s EC candidacy.

1.2.1 Greek conceptions about the international environment and foreign policy orientations

The alert of 1987 found the foreign-policy decision making mechanism of Greece in a difficult, soul-searching phase. From the next day of the crisis of March, when the Turkish vessel *Sismik-1* begun to sail in the Aegean for petroleum research in an area which is considered by Greece as Greek continental shelf, the country’s foreign policy had to adjust to the events and not vice-versa. The “negator of dialogue” Papandreou started secret negotiations with the Turkish ambassador in Athens, in order to improve the bilateral climate and to arrange talks between him and the head of the Turkish state during the Davos Summit of January 1988. How did this sudden turn to dialogue occur? Papandreou himself explains it, in a speech to the officer’s club of Janina, on February 21, 1988:

“The first concern of the country, of the people, of the government is the defense of the national integrity of the country. For this we need - irrelevant from the events- strong Armed Forces. And I am really glad that the armament program advances in such a quick pace. The second

concern of our country is the promotion of our national independence [...] and the third one is peace. [As far as Turkey is concerned], indeed, there was a change in orientation. Where is it due? It is due to March 1987 [...] During those days, the armed forces achieved a miracle. In 48 hours, they were ready for combat. Both we and Mr. Ozal, we indeed arrived to the brink of war. Some said that it was a theater. But Turkey didn't interpret it as a theater. And it recognized, as our allies and other people recognized that Greece is ready to defend every inch of its sovereign territory. *Then, I decided, in order not to repeat such encounters that bring us to the verge of war, to make a test, if the climate could change.* And I started with messages concerning the delimitation of the continental shelf of the Aegean [...] I want to underline both for me and for Mr. Ozal, that we didn't go to Davos with any misunderstanding or naivety, thinking that we could solve the big problems that existed [...] But we decided to do one thing: To both take the responsibility of no war. *No war.* You will ask: Why don't you call it peace? We call it peace, but if this peace is to have solid, permanent bases, we must overcome our problems”.

Further down in his speech, Papandreou explains that a bilateral rapprochement “would eliminate the triangular relationship between Greece, the United States and Turkey; and would free his country's defense and foreign policy from dependence on US aid and mediation” (Veremis in Clogg, 1993).

Nonetheless, for many historians, the imminent threat of war and the will for independence are not the only reasons that led to the Davos Summit. According to Veremis, in the pre-election period of 1988, the burden of enormous defense spending on the ailing Greek balance of payments and the long period of obligatory military service which detracted from the government's populist image convinced Papandreou that he should take initiatives towards Turkey. And, if he repeated the emergency appeals to the Greek population, he would eventually blunt its

sensitivities over Greek-Turkish disputes (in Clogg, 1993: 185). Besides, as Pridham underlines, the reduced possibility of conflict with Turkey would leave to the Pasok government the margin to perform more freely an international role on the Balkans, the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean, and it would enlarge Papandreou's room for manoeuvre over the forthcoming issue of the agreement on the US bases (in Conostas, 1991: 80). Papandreou's efforts for rapprochement, which are attributed to domestic and other (apart from the bilateral disputes) foreign policy considerations, were aided by the Turkish determination to gain entry to the European Community, the road to which also passed through Athens.

Davos was going to be the first Greek-Turkish summit in a decade, in the framework of the annual meeting of the World Economic Forum. Starting with a feeling of elation, the bilateral talks ended after few months with a feeling of disappointment, since only vague declarations were made and no tangible decisions were taken concerning the Aegean disputes, the thorny issue of the Turkish military presence in Cyprus and the minority problems. The basic achievement of the process was the Vouliagmeni Memorandum (Athens, 27 May 1988) which contained Confidence-Building, Tension Reduction and Good Neighborliness measures. However, the "Davos spirit proved short-lived"¹⁵ and all hopes for a better bilateral climate stayed unfulfilled: During the springtime of 1988, the Turkish Foreign Minister Yilmaz roused again Greece's discontent by expressing his concern for "the Turkish minority in Western Thrace". The Davos process was finally stalled in late 1988.

It is worth noting that, during the crisis of 1987, Greece didn't turn to its European allies for help. On the contrary, it preferred the logic "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" and sent a delegation to Bulgaria in order to express its

indignation and seek support. The Greek officials considered that the foreign diplomats know very little on the essence of the Greek-Turkish disputes and the continental shelf issue, as well as the reasons which justify the Greek reactions (*Kathimerini*, 30/03/1987). Meanwhile though, Papandreou intensified in his public declarations the messages that Greece wished for further integration of the EEC, which he was already spreading since 1984. The adoption of the European perspective was complete and the use of the EC framework as a constant for the national strategy of the country (at least in the social and financial field) was indisputable. PASOK declared its intention to become the force which will lead the country towards Maastricht, the “aim of 1992” and started placing itself in the framework of the “Third Road to Socialism”. As Clogg explains, for Papandreou, the “Third Road” would forge a new path between social democracy on the Western pattern (which he dismissed as capitalism with a human face) and the totalitarian bankruptcy of “existing socialism”, as it was manifested in the countries of the Eastern block (1993: ix).

Pasok still seemed to have a high regard for the realist values of national security, state survival and military balance. But it made a big turn towards dialogue, which he considered as the best strategy in order to achieve these realist goals. He continued the armaments against Turkey, while he still gave special importance in his rhetoric and his actions to the concept of national interest, which he pursued outside of the transgovernmental organization where his country participated.

1.2.2 Greek policy towards EEC-Turkish relations

The submission of Turkey's application for full EEC membership some weeks after the *Sismik I* crisis (14.04.1987) based on the EEC Treaty's article 237, did not meet the fervent support of Greece. The government spokesman, Yiannis Roubatis, explained that Turkey's accession is a subject that doesn't concern only Greece but the whole of the EEC countries. Nevertheless, he clearly declared that "as long as Turkey continues to threaten Greek territorial integrity and challenge its national sovereignty [...] it would be absurd for Greece to agree to Turkey's admission to the EEC"¹⁶. According to the future alternate Foreign Minister Kranidiotis, the aims of the Greek strategy were: a) to make clear to Ankara that Greece, as a member-state of the EEC, has a decisive role for the evolution of EEC-Turkish relations and b) to make good use of all the negotiating means, which were provided by the effort of reheating EEC-Turkish relations. Greece considered its own membership in the EEC as a restraining mechanism and as an extra weapon, as a lever against its "enemy", given Turkey's will for membership in the same organization. The official Greek arguments were that Turkey cannot be accepted in the EEC because: 1. It has an aggressive policy against a member-state and occupies a part of an associate country. 2. The violation of human rights is continuing and Turkey's political regime doesn't comply with that of the European member-states and 3. The financial situation of Turkey doesn't allow its integration in the EEC (*Kathimerini*, 14/04/1987).

It is worth noting that, in the Greek press, the Turkish application for membership was viewed as Turkey's effort to bring the bilateral disputes into the European framework. As the newspaper *Kathimerini* explained in its articles on the 16 and 18 of April 1987, "With its application, Turkey wants to bring the bilateral disputes to the EEC, because every time that Greece will have an objection on the

Turkish membership, Ankara will portray it as a proof of prejudice and discrimination against an allied country. Consequently, Europe will get tired of the situation and it will push for a solution [...] Even after applying for membership, Turkey is still a “third party” in the EC-Greek-Turkish triangle. However, its case will be treated from now on as that of a possible member of the Community. And the EEC won't be able to take steps which will go against the Turkish ‘effort’ for complying with its membership conditions. Therefore, each time that Greece will pose a veto against measures which are favourable to Ankara it will meet the ‘dissatisfaction’ of the other member-states!” Besides, in the opinion articles of this centre-right and anti-Pasok newspaper, already since 1987 it was stated that “by no means should Greece constitute the frontispiece of objections, the “alibi” which will cover the other member-states [...] the promotion of the bilateral disputes as the reason for the Greek negation is a wrong policy” (*Kathimerini*, 18/4/1987).

In any case, Greece's officially negative stance was underlined by the international media; in Turkey, according to some scholars¹⁷, it had even been calculated by Ozal, who was planning to accuse Greece of blocking Turkey's path to the West in order to disorientate the Turkish public opinion from the real problems of the country during his electoral campaign. However, it is worth noting that the press of the EEC countries did not consider Greece as the only impediment to Turkey's full accession: West Germany, Great Britain, Denmark, Spain and Portugal were presented as equally skeptical, while Turkey's financial, social and political problems were also gathering great attention¹⁸. Trying to surpass these towering obstacles, the Ozal government engaged in intensive diplomatic efforts in order to influence the EEC countries in favor of Turkey's European vocation¹⁹. On the same time, Greece seemed determined to stop the advancement of EEC-Turkish relations,

by denying approval of a common EEC-Turkey statement, if it doesn't include references to a future removal of the Turkish troops from Cyprus (Veremis, 2003: 160).

Nonetheless, it is very important to underline that gradually, even inside the Greek government of Pasok, there started to appear voices which preached a change in the Greek policy towards Turkey's accession. As the alternate foreign minister at the time Yiannis Kapsis, recounted in his interview for this paper:

“Around 1987-1988, I personally submitted to KYSEA a report, which stated that in military tactics, the notion of the full encirclement of the enemy has been abandoned. Because, when you encircle him, he starts desperately to fight back. You must give him a way out. So, gradually, we must start to give to the Turks exchanges, to open their road to Europe. It was at that time that a fiery article was written against me, saying that I was a traitor of the Greek nation”.

Especially after the Davos Summit such voices started multiplying: As *Kathimerini* noted in February 1988, “the issue if Greece wants Turkey into the EEC is a very complex one. However, nowadays the view is starting to prevail that the Europeanization of Turkey, its closer association with the EEC, in accordance with its multiple commitments (economic, social and legal) which will oblige it to respect the laws, the decisions of the United Nations and to abandon gradually the tactic of pursuing its goals through military means, is to the best interest of Athens”²⁰. Meanwhile, the reply concerning the acceptance or negation of the Turkish candidacy, lingered...

Community laws provide that when a state wishes to become member of the Community, it has to apply to the European Council, which will decide unanimously on the matter, based on the opinion of the Commission and with the accordance of the European Parliament²¹. In Turkey's case, these normal procedures were also

followed. However, the Commission's avis, announced on December 18, 1989, was not so favorable as in the case of other candidate states: Albeit Turkey was declared eligible to join the EEC, it was stated that the Turkish candidacy can be examined only after the implementation of the Single Market in 1992; that Turkey's development rate still lacked significantly behind the one of member states; and, that the only thing which could be done for the moment was the completion of the Customs Union, decided in the framework of the Ankara (Association) Agreement of 1963 (Carkoğlu and Rubin, 2003: 5).

Ali Bozer, the Turkish Minister of State, revealed his "slight disappointment"²² at the fact that no specific date was given for the beginning of EC membership talks. In Greece, one would expect the climate to be exactly the opposite; besides, the Commission's report also made specific reference to Turkish-Greek differences and Cyprus, implying that Turkey's membership would be subjected to the resolution of those differences and thus giving Greece important diplomatic leverage²³. Papandreou's policy seemed to work.

However, the Greek interim governments that succeeded him during the period 1989-1990 had so many internal problems to face, that "the country's foreign policy was practically put on ice"²⁴. Moreover, in the midst of the dramatic changes in the international political scene (from Kremlin to Berlin, to Tiananmen, to Bucharest, to Baghdad and to Belgrade), both for the European Community and for the countries themselves, the Greek-Turkish disputes temporarily (and only seemingly) lost their importance.

1.3] 1990-1993: THE MITSOTAKIS ADMINISTRATION

The postponement of Turkey's European prospects coincided with the end of an era for the whole world; with a period of instability for Greece; and the rise to power of a new government with a lot more conciliatory foreign policy –towards the West and the East at least (in contrast with the North). Despite the rise of nationalism in the country due to the FYROM affair, the new PM Mitsotakis sought to build on the heritage of the Davos process and for the first time in a decade, officially supported Turkey's European orientation. However, due to the inability to arrive to a final understanding on the Greek-Turkish disputes and the stagnation on the Cyprus issue, there were no serious bilateral developments on a practical level. Nonetheless, the bases were set for such developments in the future.

1.31 Greek conceptions about the international environment and foreign policy orientations

The international developments that took place until the mid-'90s forced Greece and Turkey to reexamine their foreign policies. According to Eralp, there are three major developments that affected the post-Cold War period: the movement towards unity of Western and Eastern Europe; the disappearance of the dividing line between Europe and Asia; and the changed relationship between the United States and Europe, with the rising need for further cooperation between them (in Martin & Keridis, 2004: 64).

For Turkey, as Şule Kut underlined, “the 1991 Gulf War and the dissolution of two multiethnic socialist federations –the Soviet Union in 1991 and Yugoslavia in 1992–ushered in a new international order, replete with instability and ambiguity. In just two years, the number of states neighboring Turkey increased by 50%. These

newly independent states and ethnic conflicts that emerged in the new era quickly became vital issues for Turkish foreign policy” (in Rubin & Kirişci, 2002: 7). In order to meet the new challenges, one of Turkey’s decisions was to reinforce its orientation towards the West, namely its collaboration with the United States and its Europeanizing efforts. Meanwhile in Greece, the party tracing foreign policy had changed. After a period of great political instability and three legislative elections, on April 1990 New Democracy rose to power, under the leadership of Constantinos Mitsotakis.

The New Democracy party was founded in 1974 by Constantinos Karamanlis, as the “product of *national necessity*”, according to the oft-repeated claim of its founder (Pappas, 1999:143). Consequently, from the outset it exalted the Greek nation, which -for Karamanlis- belongs to the West and should be firmly bound to it, in order to consolidate and preserve democracy. As it happens in Turkey, this center-right party was more integrationist than its more isolationist and nationalist left counterpart. This is why full membership in the European Community became one of Karamanlis’ main goals, laying at the heart of the ideological platform of his party. As Karamanlis stated, “all financial priorities apart, it is political, not to mention national reasons that urge Greece’s prompt integration into the EC. Because it is already clear that Greece, becoming an EC member, both reinforces its national security and safeguards its democratic institutions”²⁵.

The party line which was finally established after the ND congress of 1979 was classified by Karamanlis himself as “radical liberalism”, located between “traditional liberalism and democratic socialism”, where “the prevalence of free market rules is combined with the decisive intervention of the state in favor of social justice”. Karamanlis’ ideology seemed close to John Ruggie’s concept of “embedded

liberalism”²⁶, in which *liberalism* indicates the desirability to maintain open trade and minimize protectionism, while *embedded* refers to the will that higher levels of economic growth are not pursued in ways that hinder the government from fulfilling its role of providing social and economic welfare to the citizens. The liberal profile of ND was reinforced after the rise of Mitsotakis to the presidency of the party on September 1, 1984. As Voulgaris notes, gradually, the party’s line acquired a strong neoliberal tone, as it was also influenced by the international climate, which had granted electoral victories to Thatcher in Great Britain and Reagan in the US (2002, 248-249). This political platform was dubbed “Mitsothatcherism”. However, since in Greece neoliberalism wasn’t successful as a structured system of ideas and values, the party moderated its enthusiasm for it, as well as its political implications.

While in power, Mitsotakis improved the Greek relations with the US, recognized Israel and reinforced the country’s place in NATO. As far as the EEC is concerned, Mitsotakis claimed that Greek membership had permitted the country to face with a lot more ease the Greek-Turkish relations, independently of the fact that the treaties don’t offer a defensive cover for the member-states, since one country of the European Union enjoys moral protection, a lot more than a country which doesn’t belong anywhere. In the issue of the bilateral relations per se, Mitsotakis believed, according to Rizas, that Greeks and Turks don’t hate each other and they both sincerely wish for peace. It was the historical memories and the wounds of the past that allowed “many voices” in both countries to reproduce rivalry and suspicion. Peaceful coexistence and collaboration is possible and would benefit both countries in an unimaginable way. Besides, religion is not a strong divisive element, while, on the cultural level, Greek and Turks have a lot in common. Turkey is not exclusively a revisionist state and it is not Greece’s “given enemy”. However, he acknowledges

that “the Turks are a purely predatory nation. Each time, they try to get the best for themselves”²⁷ –and this happens when Ankara realizes a weakness from the part of Greece (2003: 11-18, 68-72).

The bilateral disputes are not “very important” as far as their essence is concerned, according to Mitsotakis, who characterized as “non-realistic” the PASOK doctrine that Greece has only one issue to discuss with Turkey: the issue of the continental shelf. For the solution of the bilateral problems, there is no need for foreign arbitration –just for political will and bravery. Mitsotakis strongly supported dialogue, with the precondition of the respect for the territorial integrity, the international treaties and the international law. Besides, he believed that the continuous armaments play a very destabilizing role for the economy and the society. In any case, he claimed that the two countries should exclude any kind of armed conflict. However, he underlined that the Cyprus issue and its solution constitute a precondition for the solution of the Greek-Turkish disputes, and without it, the normalization of the Greek-Turkish relations is not possible (Rizas, 2003: 114).

In short, the Mitsotakis government acknowledged that having a Europeanized Turkey with more democratic institutions is better than having a fundamentalist, aggressive, neighbor. The development of Turkey is critical for the development of the whole area, on economic and security terms. The Turks are not necessary good, but they can become good allies. Solving the bilateral disputes will help ameliorate both countries’ international relations especially with the US. A stable, democratic and peaceful Turkey would be the best partner for the joint construction of the new European, Balkan and Near Eastern Order.

On a practical level, Mitsotakis declared that the “bold course that Eleftherios Venizelos and Kemal Ataturk had followed, opening the way for a long period of peaceful and friendly coexistence, only ten years after the end of the bloody war of 1920-1922, was the shining path that I had in front of me during my whole political life” (Rizas, 2003: 11). When he rose to power, the issue of dialogue or no dialogue had lost its practical importance, after the Davos process of 1988. Himself, he decided to follow an even more active policy of negotiations with Ankara, trying to establish a framework for the solution of the bilateral differences and the Cyprus issue. On July 5, 1990 he met the Turkish Prime Minister Yildirim Akbulut in London, while on September 12, 1991 he held talks with the next Turkish PM Mesut Yilmaz in Paris. The announcement of the talks (which was actually made by the US President Bush, according to the *New York Times*²⁸) had raised hopes that a breakthrough would take place, concerning the future of Cyprus and the bilateral disputes. However, Mitsotakis and Yilmaz were unable to find sufficient common ground and, after the breakdown of the negotiations, this effort was put to a halt.

From that point on, until the next legislative elections two years later, the New Democracy government tried more to achieve détente and refrain from a crisis in Greek-Turkish relations than to find a solution for the bilateral disputes. Besides, during that time, the main priority of the Greek foreign policy was the issue of FYROM. Nonetheless, on February 1, 1992 Mitsotakis held a meeting with PM Demirel in Davos, where the two leaders agreed on signing a treaty of friendship while promising to support any initiative concerning the solution of the Cyprus issue. However, none of these plans was realized, while the change of leadership in the Turkish government after the death of Ozal and the rise to premiership of Tansu

Ciller draw backwards even more the efforts for Greek-Turkish negotiations (Veremis, 2003: 165).

It is important to underline, that during Mitsotakis' period in power, Greek-Turkish relations remained fully associated with the Cyprus issue. Greece didn't state that its non solution would lead to war, but it strongly believed that it would acerbate the situation. However, the government couldn't let war happen, because of the developments in the Balkans. Greece's dispute with FYROM concerning the name, the constitution and the flag of the newborn country consumed most of the energy of its foreign ministry, while its veto over European Community's recognition of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia brought it in an uneasy position vis-à-vis its European partners. As *Guardian* reported, the Greek premier was told that Greece is increasingly seen as playing a narrow, nationalistic and obstructive role in Community affairs, not only with Macedonia but also with Turkey. This led one foreign minister from a north European country to declare that "it is disgraceful that the Greeks should conduct themselves as a petty nationalist Balkan state and not a modern member state of the European Community"²⁹. The *Economist* described Greece as "the sick man of Europe" and characterized its relationship with the EEC as in "at an all-time low"³⁰.

1.3.2 Greek policy towards EEC-Turkish relations

In the issue of the Turkish efforts for membership, the New Democracy government declared that it doesn't neglect the problems that could be created in the EEC by the accession a Muslim country with a significant demographic development. However, it stated that Greece should support the rapprochement of

Turkey with Europe and even the Turkish membership and it shouldn't become an obstacle in the development of Euro-Turkish relations. Nonetheless, it connected the progress of Euro-Turkish relations with the solution of the Cyprus issue, considering the disputes on the later as a “bad omen” for the future of Euro-Turkish relations: “If the Cyprus issue is not solved, it will be revealed that the two communities cannot live together; something that will imply that Turkey cannot live with Greece in a united Europe”, announced Mitsotakis on 6/6/1990 (*Kathimerini* newspaper). This policy was stiffened after the collapse of the negotiations between Mitsotakis and Yilmaz. “Greece is not against the European orientation of Turkey. But, as long as the Cyprus issue is not solved, the country will keep obstructing the development of ties between Turkey and the Community. And especially now, after the unfavorable outcome of my meeting with Mr. Yilmaz in Paris and the retreat of Turkey from what we had agreed”, claimed the Greek Prime Minister (Rizas, 2003: 175).

Three months after the electoral victory of Mitsotakis, the European Commission, which had resolved rather disappointingly for Turkey in 1989, adopted a set of proposals, known as the “Matutes Package” (from the name of the EC commissioner responsible for Mediterranean policy), including the completion of the Customs Union, the resumption and intensification of financial cooperation, the promotion of industrial and technological cooperation and the strengthening of political and cultural ties between Turkey and the EEC. This package was not approved by the Council³¹. Nevertheless, after the EEC-Turkey Association Council held in Brussels on the fall of the next year, the Community decided to start again the regular sessions of the Association Committee (which had not convened since 1988, when it stopped its sessions due to disputes concerning Cyprus), aiming at carrying out work on economics and trade with the “eligible for candidate” country. A few

months later (May 1992), the first Steering Committee meeting was held and on November 1992, the Association Council convened again.

Greece didn't pose obstacles to these developments, partly because the name recognition issue for FYROM affected its bargaining power on other issues. Besides, the Common Community Position, which was presented in the EC-Turkey Association Council of 11/1992 and foresaw the continuation of political dialogue between the EC and Turkey, also underlined the need to respect democracy, human rights and international law, on the basis of the UN principles and the treaties in the framework of the CSCE. Amongst the UN principles was the peaceful settlement of disputes with means provided by the international law, and this reference satisfied Greece in the short run. In addition, the Community had characterized the situation in Cyprus "unacceptable" and urged for solution. In any case, on October 1993, together with the rise of Pasok party back in power, it was announced that Turkey has fulfilled the biggest part of its obligations, in order to proceed to the Customs Union.

1.4] 1993-1996: THE SECOND PAPANDREOU PERIOD IN GOVERNMENT

Greece's endeavor to ameliorate its relations with the EU and the efforts to cope with the epoch-making changes in the area didn't alter much in the course of its relations with Turkey. The generally mistrustful position of the second Papandreou government towards Turkey and its efforts to safeguard Cyprus' security, led to the association of Turkey's Customs Union with the accession of Cyprus in the EU.

1.4.1 Greek conceptions about the international environment and foreign policy orientations

Despite a trial for corruption, a serious illness and a scandalizing marriage, and after an electoral campaign that turned violent in many cities, Andreas Papandreou was named once again head of the Greek government in October 1993. This election has been widely viewed as the most significant event since the fall of the military junta in 1974, as instability in the former Yugoslavia and strained relations between Greece and its neighbors, Albania and the FYROM, “have lured the country towards a Balkan quagmire” (*Times*, 11/10/93). In the midst of the Balkan crisis, Papandreou’s campaign was heavily based on nationalism. Such was the case, for example, in his final address to his supporters, when he promised a “great patriotic movement to restore the dignity of Greece: Epirus, Macedonia, Thrace, the Aegean and Cyprus will be united in a non-negotiable line of defense” (*Independent*, 11/10/1993). Both in Greece and in Europe, many believed that this rhetoric was the foretaste of what was going to follow in the next four years. Indeed, in the “national issues” of Greece, namely the disputes with Skopje and Ankara, Pasok’s ensuing policy proved them right. Nonetheless, the ideas of the party’s leader on the international environment and the place of Greece in it had changed already since the end of the ‘80s (as is mentioned above). This change was now more evident and it was widely commented on an international level, for example in articles of American and European newspapers, entitled “Greece sees wily political animal change his spots” and “Old men forget”.

Papandreou neatly summarized his world view in a speech delivered in Athens one year before his electoral victory, on May 21st 1992 at a conference

organized by the Greek-American Chamber and the International Herald Tribune, entitled *Greece and the New Europe*:

“We are in the beginning of a new era. The collapse of bipolarity, the subversion of the post-war balance, the break-up of the Soviet Union and its international web of influence, the overwhelming changes that we have faced during the last few years have literally transform the geostrategic aspect of the planet. It is true that we live in a period of fluidity, uncertainty and great contradictions. In a period of increased dangers but new hopes. We are witnessing the simultaneous development on one hand of cooperation trends and regional integration, in order for the people to face their problems in common, and on the other the revival of centrifugal, destructive forces, nationalistic exaltations and confrontations. We are witnessing constant arrogance by the developed countries; selective enforcement of the international law; technological barbarity; racism; and rising environmental problems, which lead to impasse and desperation the Third World and the people who fight against underdevelopment, social and political oppression [...] However, the breakdown of the regimes of the socialist and communist model cannot be considered as the triumph of western neoliberalism. We must not forget the tragic social impasses and the doubtful financial results of the uncritical implementation of neoliberal programs in Europe, in Latin America and the US. [...] As far as security is concerned, in the political-military field nobody doubts the hegemony of the US. But, in the financial field, the US has serious competitors: The European Community, Japan and of course China. The US doesn't feel comfortable in front of the dynamic course of the EC, its augmenting financial power and the prospect of the creation of a security system in Europe besides NATO. The major question is in what extent all the countries of the Community are willing to go towards a united Europe with common foreign policy and unified European Security System. [...] For Greece, the major question is to be able to participate on an equal basis to this course of economic and political integration of the Community, as it is formed after the Maastricht treaty”.

Papandreou's increasing support for the European integration doesn't imply increasing trust that the EU can safeguard Greece's national security. In an interview to Antenna TV, on June 10, 1994, the Greek PM stated: "Foreign policy [towards the EU] and the national issues are two completely different things. And, I speak honestly: there hasn't been any sign of Community solidarity to our country until now"³². Besides, in an interview at the newspaper *Ethnos* on 10.04.1991, Papandreou declared that the Greek government gave everything to its Western "allies" during the Gulf War and got nothing. On the contrary, the Turkish one gave very few things and got everything. The intention of the Westerners is obviously to "solve" the Cyprus issue according to the will of Ankara, because Turkey is now, not only the new caretaker of US in the area, but also the "spoiled child" of the EC –a mirror image of the one that Turkey has for Greece!

The Greek PM held strongly to the idea that there is only one issue for dialogue between Greece and Turkey: the delimitation of the continental shelf. For Papandreou, the Davos process proved that there is no possibility of negotiations with Turkey. Besides, the Turks take seriously into account only one Greek policy: The firm protection of its national integrity, as it was proved by the crisis of 1987. As he stated in the aforementioned interview, "already, an Islamic arc which is controlled by Ankara and runs through southern Bulgaria, goes through the Muslim inhabitants of Skopje and ends at Tirana, encircles the Greek world in a span of 1 200 km" –another mirror image of the one in Turkey, where an Orthodox arc is considered to be controlled by Greece!

In 1993, Papandreou still viewed the Turks as the "eternal enemy": "We are a patriotic party, because our country is a country under threat. There is a constant and irreversible, at least for the foreseeable future, threat that comes from Turkey. The

developments in the Balkans are carrying new dangers. But I would like to underline that these new dangers are intertwined with the Turkish threat and this is the basic and the most dangerous characteristic of the current state of affairs [...] Turkey is steadily turning into the main regional power. It played a role in the Middle East and it plays a role in the so-called CIS states. Now, Turkey is not only on our East, it is also on our North”³³. So, is there any chance for dialogue, in order to find a solution to the bilateral disputes? The answer was provided by Papandreou in another interview, on Skai radio:

“No, because the last time everything went wrong too quickly. When I went to Davos, we had before that a big crisis on March '87, with the entrance of *Sismik 1* in our territorial waters. As you remember, we said that, if *Sismik 1* indeed enters, we will go to war. So, Turkey retreated. We thought that it would be useful to examine the possibilities for dialogue [...] and, while the initial talks were very positive, very quickly we saw that what Turkey wanted was to sit around the table and sort out our differences. But, with the exception of the delimitation of the continental shelf, these were Turkish revendications against our sovereign rights. So, this phase was closed and there is no reason in coming back to it [...] Now, we have diplomatic relations, we want peace. But we are not going to allow any transgression of our national borders”³⁴.

This conception of Turkey was officially confirmed in the announcement of the government program after the elections of 1993, when Papandreou also added that any violent change of the current situation in Cyprus will be considered as a *casus belli* and that main aim of the Greek government is to encourage the relations of Cyprus with the European Union. Soon after, Papandreou announced the creation of a *Common Defence Area* between Greece and Cyprus. This new, more complex, and

subsequently more costly, defence policy contrasted his efforts to revive the Greek economy.

Indeed the Cyprus issue almost monopolized the Greek-Turkish relations during the period 1993-1996, even though several new bilateral issues emerged, like the Turkish accusations that Greece is nesting PKK terrorists. Greece indulged in intense diplomatic efforts in order to secure Cyprus' accession to the Union, but even though the Summit of Corfu in June 1994 was clear about the acceptance of Cyprus in the EU, it didn't give a date for the beginning of the negotiations. This was realized on March 1995, only after an important concession from the part Athens was made: The quid pro quo that allowed the Union's commitment for the beginning of the negotiations was the Greek consent to a Customs Union with Turkey.

Soon though, the Greek political world had to refrain from the bilateral differences with Turkey, in order to concentrate on a domestic issue: the heavy illness of Premier Papandreou opened a long discussion concerning his succession, which ended in January 1996 with the rise to premiership of Costas Simitis.

1.4.2 Greek policy towards EU-Turkish relations

After intensive negotiations that lasted almost a year, on December 31, 1995 Turkey formally entered in a Customs Union (CU) with the EU, concerning industrial and processed agricultural goods. Except for Malta, the City State of San Marino and Andorra, Turkey was the first and only country to enter into such a form of economic integration with the Union without being a full member³⁵. In the "March 6th package" which contained the agreement for the CU, the EU also provided for financial aid to Turkey, which amounted to 2,22 billion ECU over a five-year period; in addition, it

made a declaration on furthering cooperation with Turkey in the fields of industry, trans-European networks, energy, transport, telecommunications, agriculture, environment, science, statistics, justice and home affairs, consumer protection, cultural cooperation, information etc³⁶. Thus, the EU entered in a period of more advanced institutional cooperation, but also intensified political dialogue with Turkey. At the same time, the Commission determined that accession negotiations with Cyprus were to commence six months after the conclusion of the EU Intergovernmental Conference which was due to start in 1996. Finally, it made a pledge to the Greek government that it will mission a report concerning the effects of the CU on the exposed Greek textile industry³⁷.

The Greek government celebrated the last two developments (on Cyprus and on the textile industry) as victories of the Greek diplomacy, underlining that they had both been presented as necessary terms in order for Greece not to veto the CU. Besides, on the issue of Cyprus, the government spokesman Eleftherios Venizelos had explicitly declared that “it would be inconceivable to have such an upgrading of relations between Europe and Turkey without a specific timetable for Cyprus’ accession to the Community”, underlining that Cyprus’ accession had been decided at both the Corfu and Essen summit meetings³⁸.

The events of 1995 constitute a milestone in the relations between Greece, Turkey and the EU. During a press conference after the end of the European Summit at Essen the year before, the Greek government had declared that: “Apart from the German and the French foreign minister, many others underlined the importance of the Customs Union, like the English one, who insisted on this issue. However, our positions are given. So, I repeated to the other foreign ministers our negotiations with great detail and clarity, associating the issue of Turkey’s CU with the development

and the progress in the Cyprus issue, with the course of the democracy and human rights in Turkey, with the general attitude of Turkey against Greece and with a serious of technical affairs. Therefore, the Greek veto remains. [...] We are not against the European Union. We want it to take place under conditions. When these conditions are met, we will be glad to accept the CU”³⁹.

Subsequently, the agreement on the Customs Union was depicted by the government in Greece as the result of a hard negotiation game. Up to the last minute, the alternate foreign minister Yiorgos Magkakis held firmly on the fulfillment of the Greek terms before letting Turkey to sign the Customs Union: He declared that “the Greek side has already made enough retreats and it doesn’t plan to make any more”⁴⁰, trying to renounce suspicions that Greece was ready to revoke its veto without any gains and to promote the possible benefits of Greece from the CU⁴¹. Adding to that, after the signature of the CU agreement, spokesman Venizelos also referred to the possible economic benefits resulting from Turkey’s Customs Union with the EU, saying that “it is obvious that now the field is open for Greek products, as for all Community products, to enter Turkey under better terms”⁴².

In the international press, the CU was celebrated as a “landmark deal which breaks Greece's stranglehold on closer economic and political ties between Ankara and the EU”. The EU’s commitment to Cyprus’ accession was seen not only as the treat which sweetened Greece in order not to veto the decision but also as the “most promising effort from 1974 to end the stalemate over Cyprus”⁴³. Nevertheless, a major part of the Greek public opinion (as expressed from the press and as molded by it) was not convinced. The newspaper headings of the period 04-07/03/1995 (especially of the papers supporting the opposition) were extremely telling: “The veto in shreds. We opened the door of the EU to Turkey” (*Apogevmatini*); “Storm

because of the betrayal. The partnership of Andreas and Samaras bargained away Greece to the Turks” (*Avriani*); “Here is the sell-off. The Turkish invasion in Europe is made with no returns for Greece” (*Eleftheros Tipos*). The opposition parties were attacking the government; the spokesman of New Democracy, Vassilis Manginas, directly accused Pasok of erroneously handling the whole issue: “Turkey’s Customs Union with the European Union is a fact. Our country has missed a good opportunity for the promotion of our national interests through the government’s wrong handling. The government's responsibilities are most heavy”, he said⁴⁴. It was not that Mitsotakis changed his views about Turkey. It was that, after his electoral loss in 1993, he resigned from the leadership of the New Democracy party and was replaced by Miltiadis Evert, a more mistrustful towards Turkey politician, who represented the “patriotic and popular” faction of the party (*To Vima*, 18/05/1997). It is commonly admitted that Evert didn’t have a clear line about Greece’s foreign policy. While on November 1995, he declared that Asia Minor, Constantinople, Northern Epirus [i.e. Southern Albania] should be called ‘unredeemed fatherlands’, implying a continuing claim, and not merely ‘lost fatherlands’⁴⁵, one year later he stated that he is willing to negotiate with Turkey all the bilateral agreements and conventions, even the Lausanne Treaty (*Logos*, 18/09/1996).

In any case, the climate in Greece concerning Turkish Custom’s Union with the EU was further strained by the statements of Turkey's Foreign Minister Murat Karayalcin one hour after the CU agreement, that Turkey will annex the occupied north of Cyprus, if Cyprus talks on becoming a full member of the EU begin before the issue is resolved. The alternate foreign minister Magkakis responded immediately:

“Turkey must realize that its persistence in casting doubt on the legitimacy and international standing of the Republic of Cyprus isolates

it and exposes it internationally. The Republic of Cyprus is part of the European family and will be included in the next round of enlargement on the basis of European Councils. Turkey ought not to be trying to stop this course with threats of developments which the international community will never recognize. On the contrary, it ought to support it if it really wants a just solution to the Cyprus problem and a different quality to Greek-Turkish relations". Magkakis called the Turkish authorities to abandon their "tactics of threats and blackmail" and "to finally come to terms with the demands of international legality"⁴⁶.

1.5] 1996-2002: FROM THE IMIA CRISIS TO THE BILATERAL RAPPROCHEMENT

The eight-year period from 1996 to 2002 contained a lot more positive developments in Greek-Turkish relations than the whole era from 1974 until then. The new Greek Prime Minister Simitis had declared from the beginning his support for Turkey's European vocation and indeed raised the Greek veto to Turkey's EU candidacy. Concomitantly, he pursued a policy of step by step approach with Ankara which led into the signing of several "low politics" bilateral agreements.

1.5.1 Greek conceptions about the international environment and foreign policy orientations

The constant deterioration of Papandreou's health towards the end of 1995 raised the voices that demanded change of leadership in Pasok and the appointment of a new Prime Minister, in order to face the urgent problems of the country. From the beginning of the deliberations concerning the successor of Papandreou, one of the

most prominent candidates was Costas Simitis, who was considered a member of the centrist wing of party. Simitis had the status of a dissident: As economics minister in the mid-1980s, he headed an austerity program for stabilizing the country's finances that got much credit from the EC; but when Papandreou undermined it, announcing a new policy of social benefits, Simitis resigned from his post. Since Pasok returned for a third term in power, in 1993, he emerged as a vocal critic of the party, heading its pro-European faction, which called for a thorough shake-up of its structure and policies. He led a small but vocal opposition to Papandreou from within the party, at one point challenging him publicly to debate rather than dictate important policies. In private, he had denounced the government's handling of foreign affairs, not least the highly charged issue of Macedonia (*Guardian*, 25/01/1996). Simitis quickly pushed aside his opponents, winning both the presidency of PASOK and the prime ministry, at the end of January 1996.

The new Pasok leader endorsed the views that advocates of the interdependency school have voiced, concerning the situation of the international environment. For interdependency theorists (Griffiths and O'Callaghan, 2002: 157), three major changes are taking place in international relations: First, states are becoming more and more interdependent in a variety of issue areas, from consumer goods to security. Second, the decision-making capacity of the states vis-à-vis the world economy is weakening. Third, the more interconnected states are becoming, the more vulnerable they are to disruptions and events in other parts of the world.

Accordingly, two months after he became premier (18/03/1996), Simitis stated in a parliamentary speech entitled *European unification. An opportunity, a challenge, a prospect*: "In the contemporary international system, more and more political authority is moved from the national level to the international. New

decision-making centres and new institutions are created, in order to serve new needs. The traditional centres loose their influence, and established policies are no longer so efficient"; in his inaugural speech at the parliament (29/01/96) he declared that "the globalization of the economy has transformed the terms of national policy. Neither in economy, nor in IR nor in culture we can trace politics without taking into consideration the events that are occurring without our contribution and maybe in contradiction with our wishes", while in another speech on 31/08/1998, he warned that "our participation in the network of the international economy is not a matter of choice. It is a matter of survival"⁴⁷.

Simitis acknowledged that the international environment wasn't yet a cooperative and rule-governed world, admitting that "around us there is a world of instability: Social impasses, religious fanaticisms and competitions about resources are intertwined and threaten peace". However, he also acknowledged that "around us there is a world of promising challenges". So, what can Greece do, in order to face these challenges in a successful way? Simitis was clear about that: The answer is modernization, even on the issue of patriotism: "We must give a *modern content to the word patriotism*, grounded on the values and principles of socialism and on the basis of what can render Greece powerful today" (14/03/1997). Modernization was considered necessary in order to create a "strong Greece". According to Simitis, for a strong Greece "an efficient foreign policy is not enough. It is necessary to have a national strategy, a sum of policies aiming for example at economic stability, self-fed development, efficient public administration, social cohesion and high level of education"⁴⁸.

But, what exactly were his goals as far as foreign policy is concerned? As his predecessor, Simitis declared that the national independence, the territorial integrity

and the armament of the Hellenic world must be the bases of the foreign policy. He urged for a multilateral strategy, which will make Greece an active partner in the European developments and will open the road for a creative role in the Balkans and a renewed presence in the Mediterranean. He declared that "Europe is our space" and this is why European integration is one of the Greek priorities. Besides, "the equal participation in the EU constitutes a major precondition for the democratic modernization of the Greek economy, the maintenance of prosperity that gradually will be enjoyed by the whole of the Greek public, the safeguarding of our national and vital interests. The participation in the EU doesn't necessarily lead to the blind acceptance or imitation of everything foreign, western or European. It doesn't mean that we will lose our national identity. On the contrary, our national identity is in danger from a national isolation or from a financial and political decline" (31/08/1998). Simitis included the negotiations for the membership of Cyprus in the European Union in the first priorities of Greece, as this would amplify the efforts for the solution of the Cyprus issue and declared that the doctrine for a Common Defence Area of Greece and Cyprus also supported the solution process. He wished for the enrichment of Greece's relations with the US. Finally, he stated his intention to help in their Europeanization process of the Balkan states and increase collaboration with them, as he considered this essential for the stabilization of the area.

As far as Turkey is concerned, when Simitis rose to power he affirmed Papandreou's view that Turkey is an expansionist state and declared that Greece's "long-standing position, that the threat for the integrity, the sovereignty and the security of our country comes from the East" is confirmed by the facts (02/02/96). Simitis considered also as the only real issue between Greece and Turkey the

delimitation of the continental shelf and declared that the normalization of the bilateral relations must be escorted by the solution of the Cyprus issue. He stated that his approach to the Greek-Turkish disputes would be two-dimensional. Its first dimension would be an indirect way of facing the Turkish expansionism, through the enhancement of Greece's role in the international environment. The second dimension would be the direct way of treating the Turkish claims: *without negotiations*, as "negotiating with a country that instead of seeking a solution of the problems accumulates new revendications and claims, by definition leads nowhere"; but with a "*step by step peaceful approach*", for the realization of which Turkey should declare that it rejects the use or the threat of force and that it recognizes the International Law as the only basis for the solution of disputes. In order to push for this step by step approach, Simitis would use as a leverage the financing of the Customs Union.

Simitis' diagnosis of the Turkish problem didn't seem so different than that of Papandreou. However, the methods of treating the problem had changed: In contrast with the previous head of Pasok, Simitis recognized from his first day in power the necessity for the European orientation of Turkey and its resulting attachment to the rule of law that holds the Union together. Besides, he declared that the smooth functioning of the CU and the creation right next to it of a huge market has tremendous importance for Greece. He stated that it is very important for the people that live on the border areas to look at the Turkish coast as an area of economic activity and transactions and not as a base for threat. He underlined though that this prospect cannot be fruitful, as long as there is an aggressive strategy from the part of Turkey and a lack of trust.

Simitis remained faithful to his declared positions when he and his staff were tracing policy in the field of Greek-Turkish relations, from the first day of his appointment as Greek PM, in the midst of the Imia/Kardak crisis. In Athens, foreign minister Pangalos regarded the incident as a kind of blackmail from the part of Turkey, in order to change the status quo of a whole array of islets and rocks in the Aegean: "Turkey's aim is to force us to the negotiation table regarding the status of the rocks and the uninhabited islands", he declared⁴⁹, backed by the government spokesman D. Reppas, who said that "Greece maintains its view that there is nothing to discuss between Turkey and Greece except the question of the continental shelf in the Aegean Sea"⁵⁰. Additionally, the hoist of the Turkish flag was considered as the first time that "Turkey is claiming Greek soil". Thus, the spirits in Athens were not appeased when the Greek flag was also taken down –even though the EU acknowledged the rights of the Greek part, with the adoption by the European Parliament of a resolution entitled "On the Provocative Actions and Contestation of Sovereign Rights by Turkey Against a Member State of the Union"⁵¹. Besides, in Ankara, the Imia/ Kardak incident was promoted as a success of the Ciller government⁵². "We have said from the beginning that the Greek troops have to go and the Greek flag had to be removed. We have shown our determination from the very beginning", she declared⁵³.

Therefore, when the Yilmaz government, which succeeded Ciller, backed the Turkish military, which asked for the exemption of the Greek island of Gavdos (south of Crete) from NATO's "Dynamic Mix" exercise on May 1996, Greece replied by vetoing the financial protocol to which Turkey was entitled after the Customs Union, asking for the Imia/ Kardak dispute to be solved at the International Court of Justice (Veremis, 2003). The fall of the Erbakan-Ciller coalition (which

ruled Turkey after Mesut Yilmaz), as well as the diplomatic initiative undertaken by the US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, helped to ameliorate the climate between Greece and Turkey. During the NATO summit in Madrid, on July 9, 1997, the Turkish president Demirel and the Greek premier Simitis signed a deal where they pledged to respect one another's sovereign rights and to settle their differences "by peaceful means, on the basis of mutual consent and without the use of force or the threat of force". Greece acknowledged that both countries should recognize each other's legitimate interests in the Aegean, and Turkey promised to "respect the principles of international law and international conventions"⁵⁴. The bilateral climate quickly became again equally tense, during the first weeks of January 1998, with extensive dogfights between Greek and Turkish military aircrafts over the Aegean. Nevertheless, gradually oil was poured over the troubled waters, with the exception of one thorny issue; the array of S-300 anti-aircraft missiles, which Cyprus intended to buy from Russia, causing the angry reactions of the Turkish government during springtime of 1998. Finally, Cyprus was pressed to deploy the S-300 system in Greece rather than on its soil, while extensive articles on the Turkish press fiercely accuse Greece of harboring PKK militants.

The year 1999 started for Turkey with a new government (under Bulent Ecevit) facing a long-lasting problem: The arrest of the Kurdish leader Abdullah Ocalan. In the search for the head of PPK, Greece played an important role. Ocalan had made an official request to Greece for political asylum; he had visited the country and he had been transferred to its embassy in Kenya, where he was finally arrested. Turkey was furious; it accused Greece for abetting terrorists and threatened with retaliation measures. The Greek foreign minister Pangalos declared that Ocalan himself was the sole responsible for the turnout of the situation, while premier

Simitis initially supported him (*Eleftherotipia*, 17.02.1999). However, the political crisis in Greece was unavoidable. The prime minister demanded the resignation of three ministers (foreign affairs, internal affairs and public order) and appointed George Papandreou as head of diplomacy. The European Union backed Greece up, making a statement that demanded from the Turkish government to abolish the death penalty, to solve the Kurdish issue by political means and to guarantee a fair trial to the Kurdish leader, underlining that its actions will influence the course of Turkey-EU relations (*Eleftherotipia*, 23.02.1999).

Turkey came again to the forefront for Greece and in general of the European Union a few months later, due to the catastrophic earthquake in the Marmara region on August 17, 1999. The European ministers met in Saariselka, Finland and in Brussels, deciding the provision of financial support to country, in the form of humanitarian packages, aid from the European Investment Bank and resources of the MEDA II program for the period 2000-2007. It is worth noting that even though Greece was also providing extensive moral and material support to Turkey after the earthquake, it didn't lift its veto on the financial protocol of the Customs Union⁵⁵. The feeling of empathy, however, created between the Greek and the Turkish people, especially after a second disastrous earthquake that hit Athens on September, permitted the Foreign Ministers of the two countries to publicly present and reinforce a series of bilateral negotiations, that they have been fostering more intensively since the change of the head of the Greek Foreign Ministry on February. On 30.06.1999 in particular, the Foreign Ministers had officially agreed in New York to carry out talks on the level of high-ranking diplomats, in order to examine the possibilities for bilateral cooperation in fields like the economy, trade, tourism, environment, culture, multilateral cooperation and crime-combating.

Despite the opposition voices, the PASOK government in Greece continued its rapprochement with Ankara through the year 2000 -the reasons for which will be explored in the third chapter of this thesis. On January, foreign minister Papandreou paid a visit to the Turkish capital and one month later so did his Turkish counterpart to Athens. During these visits, nine agreements on the so-called low politics issues were signed, enhancing the bilateral cooperation⁵⁶. On the same period, a record number of Greek companies contacted the Turkish embassy on Athens, in search for partners for joint ventures in Turkey (Nachmani in Rubin, Kirişçi, 2002: 115). The new era in Greek-Turkish relations after Helsinki was widely approved by the international opinion, especially since during 1999, there has been one other major destabilizing factor in the “backyard of Europe”: the Kosovo crisis⁵⁷.

The bilateral talks continued through the years 2001 and 2002 with small but important steps, like the installation of a direct telephone line between the defense ministries of the two countries in October 2002. The bilateral *détente* continued after the change of government in Turkey and in Greece, and it is evident until today.

1.5.2 Greek policy towards EU-Turkish relations

After the Common Declaration of Madrid, Mesut Yilmaz sent a personal letter to Simitis and asked for his help in order to promote the Turkish accession to the EU (Moutsoglou, 2000: 271). The Greek government spokesman declared that Greece is willing to help and described once again the conditions concerning the European course of Turkey, which had been formulated in the following way in 1997: 1. Respect for human rights and of the parliamentary institutions, 2. Use of political means in order to solve the Kurdish issue 3. Help from the part of Turkey, in

order to solve the Cyprus issue and 4. Effort to solve the bilateral issues, with a spirit of good neighborliness and on the basis of the international treaties and the international law (*Eleftherotipia*, 16.07.1997).

However, despite the good intentions of the Greek leadership, the EU soon treated Turkey with a big disappointment: On July 16, 1997 the European Commission's "Agenda 2000" which proposed various measures to ensure the accession of ten candidate countries (including Cyprus), excluded Turkey from the enlargement process. In a parallel communiqué, it acknowledged that the Customs Union is working properly and it declared its support to Turkey's eligibility. Nonetheless, it enumerated a series of measures (for political reform and the protection of human rights) that have to be adopted in the country, before the advancement of its relations with the Union. Besides, the "post modern coup" (Candar 1999: 130) which took place in Turkey on February 28, 1997, when the National Security Council exerted severe pressures to the pro-islamist government of Erbakan, in order to protect the secular character of the state, had driven a lot of international observers to the conclusion that there is a "democratic deficit" in the country (see, for example: "Turkish trouble", *Financial Times*, 10.03.1997)⁵⁸. In addition, the EU seemed unsatisfied by the development of the economic reforms in Turkey, which, together with the continuing classes with Kurdish militants in Anatolia, set back Turkey's relations with the EU (Kazakos in Veremis & Dokos, 2002: 351).

The Greek government preferred not to extensively comment on the Turkish "mishap" concerning Agenda 2000: The defense minister Tsochatzopoulos simply stated that "the developments do not meet the expectations of Turkey" and noted that the positive climate concerning Turkey's accession had ceased to exist (*Ta Nea*,

17.07.1997). The deputy foreign minister Papandreou didn't make any direct statements concerning "Agenda 2000" apart from its parameters that affected Cyprus. However, he indirectly expressed his sympathy to Turkey by declaring the Greek willingness to solve the issue of vetoing the financial protocol: "The government doesn't reject the development of financial ties between Turkey and the EU, but this will depend on the satisfaction of the conditions that the EU has posed, and therefore that Greece has posed to Turkey, as these have been expressed in the common European position", he stated (*Eleftherotipia*, 18.07.1997). The new leader of the opposition, Kostas Karamanlis (the current Prime Minister), who had been elected president of the New Democracy party on March 21, 1997, kept a similar stance with the deputy foreign minister⁵⁹.

In their official declarations, the Greek politicians kept an equally careful stance after the Luxembourg European Council, which was nevertheless celebrated as a great Greek victory in Athens. Reflecting the spirit of Agenda 2000, the Council (held on December 12 -13, 1997) confirmed Turkey's eligibility for accession to the European Union, and the European leaders declared that they will draw up a strategy in order to bring closer Turkey to the EU. However, even though at this Summit the EU decided to start the accession process of the other 10 candidate states (Cyprus included), it didn't do the same with Turkey, naming various economic, political and foreign policy conditions for the further evolvement of Turkey-EU relations⁶⁰. These included all of the preconditions that Greece had posed⁶¹, namely 1] that Turkey recognizes the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, 2] that it doesn't obstruct the accession process of Cyprus and 3] that it respects human rights (*Eleftherotipia*, 13.12.1997). The results of the Luxembourg Summit were received with satisfaction also by the opposition parties in Greece, except from the

Communist party, which issued an official declaration characterizing “false” the climate of euphoria. Indeed, black clouds were gathering in the horizon of at least one bilateral issue: the Cyprus question. On the day following the Summit, the Turkish PM Mesut Yilmaz declared that he will end the political dialogue with the EU on the issues concerning Greece and Cyprus and threatens with partial unification of Northern Cyprus with Turkey⁶². As Eralp notes, “the Turkish government believed that the country has been treated unjustly and reacted strongly [...] The Turkish government regarded the decisions as discriminatory and politicized, and made under the influence of Greece [...] Ankara thought that this was a clear sign that the EU was taking the Greek side on the Cyprus issue and acting under Greek influence” (in Martin & Keridis, 2004: 71).

From the beginning of next year, though, the attitude of the EU members towards Turkey’s accession process became more positive, as it was evident at the Cardiff European Council of 15-16 June 1998. In the Conclusions of the Summit, a more favorable language was used concerning Turkey, while during its procedures, the EU leaders endorsed the Commission’s “European Strategy” for Turkey (published on March 4, 1998) and pledged to help find the necessary financial resources in order to implement it. Hard pressures⁶³ were exerted to Greece in order to revoke the veto. However, after the Greek representatives stressed that there is no new reason in order to change the current attitude towards Turkey, their European partners agreed. Nonetheless, the atmosphere in Athens was more skeptical than the previous December. As the parliamentary representative of the main opposition party, New Democracy, declared: “On the issue of the developments in Cardiff and the following statements of the prime minister, the position of New Democracy is evidently for the fixed national interests” (*Ta Nea*, 17.07.2004).

On the 4th of November of the same year, the reserved disposition of the Greeks was proved correct. The Committee of the Permanent Diplomatic Representatives of the EU member states approved –despite the Greek objections– Turkey’s financing with 140m. dollars, by adopting a new regulation, whose endorsement by the Council of Foreign Ministers requested qualified majority and not unanimity⁶⁴. During the European Council of Vienna, on December 1998, all the important issues concerning the financing of the candidate countries and Turkey’s accession were put aside for the consequent German presidency. Subsequently, in Athens, the newspapers reported that the government is gathering its strength; the prevalent impression is that the most serious “give and take” in Greek-EU-Turkish relations was aloof.

In the following European Council of Cologne, on June 3-4, 1999, the German presidency seemed a lot more willing to accept Turkey in the European family (especially after the elections that brought a new Socialist-Green coalition to power), but the Union as a whole refrained from any decision that would include Turkey in the accession process⁶⁵. Besides, as Simitis announces to the press from Germany, “the discussion concerning Turkey’s candidacy is not appropriate for the moment” (*Ta Nea*, 04.02.1999), due to the more pressing issues of the NATO bombings in Kosovo and the forthcoming elections for the European Parliament.

Nonetheless, the Turkish case soon re-emerged, due to the Marmara earthquake of August 1999, while two months later, the European Commission published an very positive Progress Report on Turkey’s accession efforts (on October 13, 1999), stating that the country should be given the status of a regular candidate for EU membership. However, the Greek government wasn’t ready to give unconditionally the green light for Turkey’s accession. Premier Simitis seemed to

adopt the principle: “our support to the European path of Turkey is given –our positive vote in the (forthcoming) Helsinki Summit is not” (*Eleftheri Ora*, 15.10.1997). He was sending the message to Ankara that Greece will agree to the upgrading of Turkey’s status to a candidate state, only if Athens gets what it wants in return: foremost, Cyprus’ accession to the EU, regardless of the evolvement of the Cyprus issue (*Ta Nea*, 14.10.1999). Besides, as the Greek PM declared two days later in Finland, after an extraordinary summit of the EU leaders, “Turkey’s candidacy for EU membership must be genuine, as this implies responsibilities, obligations and not simply rights for the candidate-country” (*Athens News Agency Daily Bulletin*, 16.10.1999).

In an article published in *International Herald Tribune* at the opening of the two-day summit in Helsinki (10.12.1999), the Greek Foreign Minister Papandreou underlined that “Greece has created a window of opportunity for Turkey, but it is up to Ankara to prove that its intentions toward Europe are serious [...] If Turkey is willing to play by EU rules, we in Europe must back Turkey’s candidacy”. And, finally, so he did, as the EU leaders endorsed the three conditions set by Athens for approving Turkey's candidacy: namely, unhindered accession for Cyprus; recourse to the International Court of Justice in the event of bilateral disputes and a timetable with clear prerequisites for Turkey's eventual membership (*Athens News Agency Daily Bulletin*, 18.10.1999). Turkey was officially recognized as a candidate state on equal status with the other candidates, signing an Accession Partnership Document and benefiting from a pre-accession strategy to support its reforms.

The Helsinki decision was adopted with mixed feelings in Turkey. “There might be details we find hard to accept”, Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit said in Ankara (*New York Times*, 11/12/1999). In Greece also, there was a big divergence of

opinions between the government and the opposition. PM Simitis declared that, “It is an historic decision for peace and security in the region, which will help the relations between the two countries [...] It provides that the Council will examine until 2004 at the latest the progress achieved regarding the resolution of bilateral differences”, repeating Greece’s longstanding position that the only bilateral dispute with Turkey concerns the continental shelf. In addition, Simitis noted the particular significance of Turkey’s Partnership Document, since it “creates a mechanism for monitoring Turkey’s behavior”⁶⁶.

The opposition leader Karamanlis, however, criticized the outcome of Helsinki and especially what he called the “recognition of unilateral Turkish claims as Greek-Turkish differences”. Similarly, in its official statement, the Communist Party stated that “the government’s triumphant words are an effort to set up a smoke screen to cover up the fact that the agreement signed in Helsinki is at the expense of Greece’s sovereign rights and the Cyprus issue”⁶⁷.

Meanwhile, cooperation between Turkey and the EU was advancing. On April 11, 2000, the Association Council met in Luxembourg after an interval of three years, establishing eight subcommittees for examining the implementation of the *acquis communautaire*, while the Commission facilitated the process for financial assistance to the country⁶⁸. Turkey’s presence became noticeable during the European meetings –like on the European Council meeting approving Greece’s entry in the eurozone in Santa Maria da Feira of Portugal (June 19-20, 2000), where a letter by Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit concerning the ESDI was also discussed (*Turkish Press Review*, 19.06.2000).

On November 8, 2000, the Commission delivered to the European Council the overall report on the enlargement, which contained an Accession Partnership

proposal for Turkey, enumerating the issues that the country must resolve before starting the accession negotiations. One month later, the procedures concerning Turkey's candidacy were put forth during the European Council in Nice. After this summit, the Greek premier Simitis stated that "the EU-Turkey Accession Partnership text is a framework in which Turkey must move in its effort to make the necessary adjustments for its EU candidacy to be promoted" (*Macedonia Press Agency*, 8.12.2000).

The text of the Accession Partnership was finally adopted by the EU Council on March 8, 2001, after being formally approved on February 26, 2001. Turkey reacted immediately to this development by announcing a National Program for the Adoption of the EU Acquis on March 19, 2001 and submitting it to the European Commission a week later. Among other issues, the Program was also mentioning Greek-Turkish disputes, underlining that "the efforts for the solution of the problems which exist with Greece will continue through dialogue", as well as the Cyprus issue, repeating that "Turkey will continue to endorse the efforts of the Secretary General of the UN aiming at the creation of a new kind of cooperative relation in Cyprus, acceptable by both sides and based on the reality of the island as well as the equality of both sides concerning sovereignty" (*Eleftherotipia*, 19.10.2001).

The Greek support to these Europeanization efforts was expressed at the "Joint Declaration on Turkey-Greece Cooperation in EU Matters", published by the foreign ministers of the two countries during the visit of G. Papandreou in Ankara on March 5, 2001⁶⁹. The support was threatened, though, by the sporadic regressions of the Turkish policy towards Greece and Cyprus –like the one right after the 40th Association Council between Turkey and the EU, convening in Luxembourg on June 26, 2001⁷⁰. During the Council, the Turkish Foreign Minister Cem was rather

reluctant in his statements on Cyprus. Two days later, however, he declared from Brussels that “the unilateral EU accession of Southern Cyprus will lead to an unavoidable conflict, while it will have a negative influence on EU-Turkish financial relationship”, thus raising the anger of the Cypriot and the Greek government (*Eleftherotipia*, 28.06.2001).

Nonetheless, such incidents did not disturb the generally positive course of EU-Turkish relations, which was confirmed at the Laeken European Council of December 15. In Laeken (the first regular European summit after the events of September, 11, 2001), Turkey’s progress towards complying with the accession’s political criteria was acknowledged and the country was invited to participate at the Convention for the future of Europe. Finally, the Council recognized for the first time the possibility of opening accession negotiations with Turkey. One should note though that the positive ambiance prevailing in Ankara after the summit’s conclusion could not be observed in Athens. The British and Belgian efforts to adopt a text upgrading the Turkish military presence in the European Army’s operations had to be countered with great difficulty by Greece, which was afraid that this will turn against her national interests in the Aegean Sea.

Finally the issue was suspended until the next European Council, causing the satisfaction of the Greek foreign ministry, whose spokesman, Beglitis, stressed that “all the EU countries realize and understand Greece’s sensitivity on the objections it has raised concerning Turkey’s involvement in the EU decisions on the Euro-army” (*Macedonian Press Agency*, 17.12.2001). Nonetheless, it also caused the fury of the opposition, whose leader Karamanlis declared that “the government is celebrating a postponement that will not lead to more favorable conditions for resolution of the problem. This is the most worrying thing, because it proves that it has learnt nothing

and is trailing events, while Greece risks failing to safeguard its security” (*Athens News Agency*, 16.12.2001).

Instead of the ambience of good Euro-Turkish and “cooled” Greek-Turkish relations, which predominates after the Laeken summit, the year 2002 started rather in an atmosphere of ameliorated relations between Athens and Ankara and an anti-European campaign by the nationalist circles in Turkey. The former was obvious from the decision of the foreign ministers Cem and Papandreou on February 3, 2002 to initiate exploratory talks between their ministries, as well as from their warm-hearted discussions during the EU-OIC Joint Forum held in Istanbul on February 12-13. The latter was evident from the great extent that the Fogg affaire was taking⁷¹; from the statement on March 7 of the Secretary General of the National Security Council, Tuncer Kilinc, that “the European Union adopts a negative stance towards Turkey in a lot of issues [...] It would be useful for Turkey to embark in a quest towards the Russian Federation or Iran”; as well as from the article at the magazine *Savunma ve Havacilik* of the Chief of General Staff Gen. Huseyin Kivrikoglu, stating that “the European countries keep on protecting and supporting the terrorist organizations which work against Turkey” (Abatzis, 2002: 123-124). This anti-European feeling was partly contradicting the emergence of a strong pro-EU trend (mainly in the business world) which was evident in Turkey after the twin economic crisis of November 2000 and February 2001 (see Onis in Carkoğlu and Rubin, 2003: 21).

Nonetheless, Turkey’s European path was cleared a few months later at the Seville European Council of 21-22 June, 2002. The Council welcomed Turkey’s pre-accession progress. It affirmed that “the implementation of the required political and economic reforms will bring forward the country’s prospects of accession in

accordance with the same principles and criteria that are applied to the other candidate states” and proposed the adoption of new decisions concerning the Turkey’s European future in the forthcoming Copenhagen summit.

At the Council, no solution was given on the European army issue and the negotiations were further postponed, creating satisfaction to the Greek government (since Athens believed that its positions had been accepted by the EU), but disappointment to the Greek opposition leaders. “Once more, we have fought a battle for our major national issues, such as the Euroarmy. A battle we have been fighting for a whole year, under dire circumstances, due to the well known carelessness of the government”, states the President of New Democracy, Costas Karamanlis (*Athens News Agency*, 23.06.2002).

During the period after Seville, the meetings between the Greek and the Turkish government officials intensified. Until October 9 and the publication of the 5th annual Progress Report⁷² by the European Commission, six meetings were realized⁷³. Nevertheless, the Progress Report itself did not constitute such a positive development for Turkey. Together with the Strategy Paper which accompanied it, the Report characterized the political reforms realized in the country as a fundamental step towards Europe. Equally satisfactory was judged the alignment with the economic criteria and the *acquis communautaire*. However, the Report concluded that Turkey did not achieve the fulfillment of the EU political criteria and that further reforms need to be adopted in order to arrive to “true democracy”. Finally, the Strategy Paper proceeded to various recommendations concerning the future of Turkey’s candidacy. As far as the other candidate states (like Cyprus) were concerned, the Report included positive comments, affirming that they can conclude accession talks on the following December.

Feelings of disenchantment predominated in Turkey. From Athens, Foreign Minister Papandreou called the Report's references to the country as the most "detailed and substantive evaluation ever conducted by the European Union for Turkey" and cited the "significant steps" of Ankara in its quest to move closer to Europe (*Athens News Agency*, 10.10.1992). In an interview at a Greek radio station he also affirmed the Greek support to Turkey's Europeanization:

"No one expected that Turkey would have been given the green light to enter the European Union in the immediate future or in such a short time [...] what Turkey is requesting is a clearer course to the European Union, something which we consider positive. There should be just such a stance [...] but this is not the responsibility of the European Union alone. It is, first of all, the responsibility of Turkey itself to respond to the criteria, the preconditions posed by the European Union for all states that want membership, for all candidate countries. Greece believes that Turkey's European course, has contributed first beyond all to the decrease of tension between the two countries, it has initiated a new dynamic in the resolution of the Cyprus issue, whether that happens before or after the accession of Cyprus. It has initiated a domestic dialogue in Turkey for its European course; something which we have not witnessed ever before in history and it has given birth to a hope, in any event, for a substantial Europeanization of Turkey. This will be to the benefit of the Turkish people, of democracy - if you so wish - in that country and I would say also to the benefit of stability in the wider region. Thus, we are for the continuation of this course"⁷⁴.

In Ankara, the Report was gradually faced in a more temperate way and the Foreign Minister Gurel stressed that it "doesn't completely block Turkey's path to Europe and doesn't obstruct the arrival at such a political decision, as the one that Turkey deserves" (Abatzis, 2002: 130). Regardless of Gurel's sober approach to the Report, its follow-up, the Copenhagen Summit, was bound to be handled by another

Foreign Minister –Yasar Yakis– appointed by the AKP government which came to power after the elections of November 3, 2002. Despite AKP’s strong Islamist roots, it claimed to be a moderate party, committed to secularism. In addition, it was presented as attached to the goal of EU membership, as well as to the “Annan Plan” on Cyprus, submitted by the UN Secretary General to the Greek and the Turkish-Cypriot side, on November 11, 2000.

Mr. Yakis’ job wasn’t an easy one, as proven at the Summit of December 12-13, 2002, where historic decisions for the future of Europe were made: Ten candidate states would become full members on May 1, 2004; Bulgaria and Romania would probably join on 2007; and Turkey would open negotiations for accession as soon as it fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria. The Commission was “invited to submit a proposal for a revised Accession Partnership [with Turkey] and to intensify the process of legislative scrutiny. In parallel, the EC-Turkey Customs Union should be extended and deepened. The Union will significantly increase its pre-accession financial assistance for Turkey”. This assistance would be financed from 2004 under the budget heading “pre-accession expenditure”⁷⁵.

In Greece, Cyprus’ accession to the EU was celebrated as a national success. The Greek Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Yiannis Magriotis, pointed out that Cyprus’ EU entry, together with the decision on Turkey was a vindication for Greece and Cyprus, which also created the preconditions for security and development in the wider region (*Macedonian Press Agency*, 14.12.2002).

In Turkey, people realized that the country has gotten a date, but not the date that it expected, namely for opening its own accession talks. However, for the new government there was absolutely no question of changing the foreign policy or revoking the reforms. “Turkey has entered a period of more intensive and closer

contacts with EU on the way to full membership” underlined the AKP leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan at Anadolu Agency (13.12.2002), followed by PM Gul who affirmed that “We believe that we should maintain the reform process for our people, not for the EU full membership”.

1.6] CONCLUSIONS:

CONTINUITIES AND CHANGES

This short account of the Greek conceptions about the international environment, the place of Greece in it, and its foreign policy towards its eastern neighbour leads to several observations concerning the changes and the continuities in the official positions of the Greek government from 1981 to 2002.

1.6.1. Changes

i. In the Weltanschauung of the Greek governments and the EU potentials:

During the period 1981-2002 there was a remarkable evolution in the worldview of the Greek governments. This evolution was accelerated by the cataclysmic changes in the end of the ‘80s and it was culminated after the mid-‘90s. The evolution was gradual, concerning firstly the economic and political benefits that could arise from the European Community; secondly Greece’s relations with the rising hegemon in world politics, namely the US; and thirdly the possible security benefits which could result from the EU.

A comparison of the preponderant views in 1981 and 2002 is telling: Andreas Papandreou won the elections in 1981 with anti-American, anti-NATO and anti-EC slogans. He viewed the later as a “club of the rich”, which will rather exploit than

help the Greek people. The world was parted between the “capitalist, imperialist” American camp and the “totalitarian” communist one, and this is why Greece (which “belonged to the Greeks”) should seek independence. According to Papandreou, there was no possibility for dialogue with Turkey, due to the latter’s aggressive and revisionist stance. Its potential entrance in the EEC was not yet an issue, but when it was raised Papandreou stood firmly against it.

On the contrary, Simitis’ Greece in the year 2002 was a Greece which “belonged to the EU and subsequently to the West”. Simitis considered that the EU had substantially aided Greece’s economic and social stability (something that gradually Papandreou himself had accepted), but it could help Greece also in the security field: 1. By the creation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy, which Greece fervently supported 2. Because since it ameliorated Greece’s financial condition it was automatically augmenting Greece’s negotiating power and 3. By providing a framework, governed by specific principles and laws, for the solution of the country’s foreign policy problems. Therefore, it could be (according to Simitis) the ideal field for the solution of the Greek-Turkish disputes, especially since Turkey decided also to apply for membership. As far as the United States are concerned, they were a strong ally of Greece in NATO and the country had no reason for not pursuing a good relationship with them.

ii. In the Greek preconditions concerning Turkey’s accession:

In order to accept Turkey’s membership in the European club, Greece always set out specific preconditions, which were mostly connected to the turbulent relations with its eastern neighbor. As it is noted above, when Turkey made its application for membership in 1987, the Greek preconditions were the removal of the Turkish troops

from Cyprus; an active Turkish effort to solve the bilateral disputes by respecting the international treaties and law; and the amelioration of the human rights conditions in Turkey.

However, the first one of the preconditions (which was the most difficult to achieve) changed during the course of time, after the possibility of Cyprus' full membership in the EEC/EU occurred. The Greek political leaders adopted the view that Cyprus' membership was the best way in order to push and accelerate the procedures for the solution of the political problem of the island. Consequently, they associated Cyprus' accession with the developments towards the Turkish one, abandoning the position that Turkey should withdraw its troops in order for Greece to say "yes" to the Turkish candidacy.

1.6.2 Continuities

i. In the official views concerning the goals of the Turkish establishment in the bilateral relations:

When Simitis rose to power in 1996, only a few days before the Imia/ Kardak crisis, he affirmed the views of his predecessor that Turkey is a revisionist and expansionist country, which poses a threat to Greece. Greece didn't have the opportunity in the following years to change this position. The casus belli if Greece expands its territorial waters, the vividly expressed Turkish anger on an internal Cyprus affair, the purchase of the S-300 defence missile system, and the Turkish threats after the Ocalan affair constituted *real* facts which nourished Greece's feeling for cautiousness towards its eastern neighbour. *Officially* (at least to my knowledge), Greece never retracted from the stance that Turkey is a revisionist country. This view was just downplayed by the Greek government when it decided that rapidly solving

the bilateral disputes and accepting Turkey in the EU is the best policy towards its neighbour.

ii. In the idea that the Turkish membership might be positive for Greece:

As is noted above, the view that Turkey's EU accession might have positive results for Greece was already spreading in some Greek political circles since 1987. Especially after the Davos Summit of 1988, some Greek newspapers were even claiming that it was becoming predominant in the country. A series of proposed policies and accomplished facts had paved the way for the change in the Greek policy from negation to acceptance of the Turkish candidacy, which was finally realized in 1999.

Moving backwards in the past from the Helsinki Summit, one can find a chain of events and expressed opinions favouring Turkey's membership in the EC/EU. Simitis himself had stated that this would be his line of policy since 1996, when he gained the presidency of Pasok and the leadership of Greece. A year before that, Papandreou's government had accepted the Custom's Union with Turkey. Mitsotakis' government before Papandreou approved Turkey's membership and didn't pose obstacles to it. And, before Mitsotakis, the efforts for rapprochement in Davos were accompanied by proposals by high-level government officials (like the alternate foreign minister Kapsis) that Greece should open for Turkey the road towards Europe.

Each proposed policy and accomplished event was always accompanied by conditions that Turkey should fulfil in order for Greece to finally accept its candidacy. The number of these conditions and the possibility for fulfilment vary. The same goes for the reasons that the policymakers presented as supporting their

“pro-Turkish candidacy” views or acts. But one cannot neglect the sense of continuity that s/he gets when reading history more carefully: *The situation that was created after Helsinki is not a result of choices from the recent past, but of a chain of choices; each one of them constitutes a sine qua non and can be traced since the end of the '80s.*

ENDNOTES

¹ «Μητρόπολη-Περιφέρεια, Εξαρτημένη Ανάπτυξη και Σοσιαλιστική Αλλαγή», *Μετάβαση στο Σοσιαλισμό*, Athens: Echmi, 1979, cited in Tsakonias, 2003: 177-181.

² See Papandreou's speech at the Parliament entitled *Εδαφική ακεραιότητα και εθνική εξωτερική πολιτική* (Territorial integrity and national foreign policy), 12/06/1976.

³ From the *Declaration of September the 3rd*, 03/09/1974.

⁴ From Papandreou's inaugural speech at the Parliament after the 1981 elections, 22/11/1981.

⁵ The other three were popular sovereignty, social emancipation and democracy in all aspects of the public life.

⁶ See the speech of 12/06/1976, *op.cit.*

⁷ In fact, as Papandreou had stated, one major reason why he pursued cooperation with the non-Western countries was to balance the *Turkish* power, e.g. during the votes concerning Cyprus at the United Nations.

⁸ Speech of Andreas Papandreou at the 1st conference of the PASOK party, 10/05/1984, p. 20.

⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 23.

¹⁰ See, for example the speech of A. Papandreou at the Parliament, entitled “Territorial Integrity and National Foreign Policy”, 12/06/1976 and his interview in *Vima* newspaper, on 26/02/1978.

¹¹ Even though these decisions are coherent with the previous government's foreign policy.

¹² Speech of Andreas Papandreou at the 1st conference of the PASOK party, 10/05/1984, p. 29.

¹³ This point was mentioned at an interview of the alternate foreign minister at the time, Yiannis Kapsis, with the author on June 2004.

¹⁴ Coulombis makes the following speculations on the reasons for this change: 1. Papandreou felt that a realistic adjustment in foreign policy would help him stay in power 2. In the role of the PM, he realized all the imperatives and limitations of power 3. His beliefs evolved/ changed with new information and new circumstances 4. All the above.

¹⁵ “Thaw pierces the Aegean chill: Greece's premier wants better relations with Turkey”, *Financial Times*, 24/07/1997.

¹⁶ “Greece claims upper hand in Aegean mock air battles”, *Times*, 18/04/1987.

¹⁷ See, for example, Kazakos in Alexandris *et al*, 1987: 633.

¹⁸ See the relevant *Times* and *Sunday Times* articles from 05/04/1987 to 18/04/1987 for an understanding of the British press, as well as *Le Monde* and *Liberation*, for the French reactions.

¹⁹ By publishing, for example, the widely criticized book, *La Turquie en Europe*, Paris: Plon, 1988.

²⁰ Anastasiadis Themis, “Towards Europe via Athens”, *Kathimerini*, February 1988.

²¹ Article 8 of the Single European Act amending the Treaties establishing the Communities.

²² “Brussels rebuffs Turkey; EC membership”, *Times*, 19/12/1989.

²³ “The battle to move into Europe”, *Times*, 23/01/1990.

²⁴ “Ageless rivalry fuels foreign policy moves; Greece; Spectrum”, *Times*, 21/12/1989. See also, Kazakos P., Liargovas P. *et al*, *Η Ελλάδα και το Ευρωπαϊκό μέλλον της Τουρκίας* [Greece and the European future of Turkey], Athens: Sideris, 2001.

²⁵ Cited in Pappas Takis, *Making Party Democracy in Greece*, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999: 143.

²⁶ The concept was analyzed in Ruggie John G., “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order,” in KRASNER, Stephen D. (ed.), *International Regimes*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983, pp. 195-231.

²⁷ Interview of Konstantinos Mitsotakis to Sotiris Rizas, 23/10/2002.

²⁸ "Greece and Turkey Fail to Agree Over Cyprus", *New York Times*, 12/09/1991.

²⁹ "EC fed up with Greek stance on Macedonia and money", *Guardian*, 05.05.1992.

³⁰ "The sick man of Europe", *op.cit.*

³¹ *Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey's progress towards accession*, found in the web site http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_11_98/pdf/en/turkey_en.pdf (visited on 02/11/2004).

³² The transcript of the interview can be found at the archives of Pasok's press office, which are electronically available at the address: www.pasok.gr.

³³ Speech of Papandreou at the National Council of PASOK, Peristeri, 21 March 1992.

³⁴ The transcript of the interview can be found at the archives of Pasok's press office, which are electronically available at the address: www.pasok.gr.

³⁵ See, <http://www.abig.org.tr/en/template.asp?nx=0&id=1474&go=European+Turkey%3ATurkey%27s+European+History>

³⁶ For further information, see the official web sites of the Turkish government: <http://www.euturkey.org.tr> and <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ad/adc/default.htm>, as well as the site concerning EU's enlargement process <http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/turkey/index.htm>.

³⁷ Greece's fears as far as the competition to its textile industry is concerned have proven to be right: Textiles and clothing is the sub-sector with the largest share in Turkey's exports to the EU, accounting for 47 % of total exports in 2002.

³⁸ "Greek demands on customs union 'simple', Venizelos says", *Athens News Agency*, 01/03/1995.

³⁹ Common press conference of PM Papandreou, foreign minister Papoulias, deputy foreign minister Kranidiotis and defence minister Papadoniou, after the end of the European Summit at Essen, 10/12/1994. The text of the press conference can be found in the online press archives of the Pasok party, www.pasok.gr.

⁴⁰ Newspaper *Eleftheros*, 28.02.1995

⁴¹ The aforementioned data result from the study of the press clippings from 28.02.2004-10.03.2003, which are collected by the Athens News Agency and can be found at <http://www.hri.org>.

⁴² <http://www.hri.org/news/greek/ana/1995/95-03-07.ana.txt>.

⁴³ Both quotes are from "EU and Turkey seal customs pact: Treaty intended to strengthen Ankara's role as NATO member", *Financial Times*, 07/03/1995.

⁴⁴ <http://www.hri.org/news/greek/ana/1995/95-03-07.ana.txt>.

⁴⁵ Dimitras P. E., "Writing and rewriting history in the context of Balkan nationalism", *Southeastern European Politics*, October 2000, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 41-59.

⁴⁶ "Turkey threatens EU with annexation of occupied Cyprus", *Athens News Agency*, 07/03/1995.

⁴⁷ The transcripts of the speeches can be found at the archives of Pasok's press office, which are electronically available at the address: www.pasok.gr

⁴⁸ The transcripts of the speeches can be found at the archives of Pasok's press office, which are electronically available at the address: www.pasok.gr

⁴⁹ "Rock-islands cause new tension between Turkey and Greece", *Turkish Daily News*, 29.01.1996.

⁵⁰ "Turkey determined to protect rights on Aegean rocks", *Turkish Daily News*, 30.01.1996.

⁵¹ For the text of the resolution, see: <http://www.hri.org/MFA/foreign/bilateral/europ.htm>.

⁵² See e.g.: "PM Ciller converts her Kardak success into political capital", *Turkish Daily News*, 02.02.1996.

⁵³ "Crisis diffused, Ankara urges Athens to negotiate No flags, no troops: No flags left on the disputed rocks after Greek and Turkish Greek troops' early morning withdrawal", *Turkish Daily News*, 01.01.1996.

⁵⁴ See "Breakthrough in Greek-Turk relations. Backstage US diplomacy brings pledges of respect for sovereignty at NATO summit", *Financial Times*, 09.07.1997.

⁵⁵ *Ibidem*.

⁵⁶ The nine agreements are the following: 1] Agreement on Cooperation in the field of Tourism (came into force on May 4, 2001). 2] Agreement on Economic Cooperation (came into force on November 24, 2001). 3] Agreement on Cooperation in Science and Technology (came into force on May 4, 2001). 4] Agreement on Maritime Transport (came into force on August 19, 2001). 5] Agreement on Cultural Cooperation (came into force on July 19, 2001). 6] Agreement on Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between Customs Administrations (came into force on June 3, 2001). 7] Agreement on reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments (came into force on November 24, 2001). 8] Agreement on Cooperation on Environmental Protection (came into force on June 30, 2001) and 9] Agreement on Combating Crime, especially terrorism, organized crime, illicit drug trafficking and

illegal immigration (came into force on July 17, 2001). From the website of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <http://www.mfa.gr>.

⁵⁷ See, Martin Leonore, Keridis Dimitris (eds), *The Future of Turkish Foreign Policy*, Cambridge (MA): The MIT Press, 2004, p. 78.

⁵⁸ However, as Jung & Piccoli note (2001: 118), “finally the authorities in Europe and the USA silently approved the ‘postmodern coup’ in order to prevent Turkey from falling into the hands of Muslim ‘fundamentalists’”.

⁵⁹ In general, Karamanlis was considered as a moderate politician, trying to reconcile the views of his two interparty “rivals”, namely the consensual policy of Mitsotakis and patriotic policy of his predecessor, Evert. He had declared that he was willing to proceed to dialogue with Turkey, but under conditions which should be closely examined and after an effort to augment the negotiating power of Greece (*Eleftherotipia*, 31/3/1997).

⁶⁰ See, www.abig.org.tr/en/template.asp?nx=0&id=1474&go=European+Turkey%3ATurkey%27s+European+History.

⁶¹ It is worth noting that Greece went to the Luxembourg Summit ready to veto Turkey’s participation in the forthcoming European Conference of March 12, 1998. However, after the Summit’s negative result for Turkey, premier Simitis declared that “there is no more reason for Greece to impose the veto” (*To Vima*, 14.12.1997). Finally, even though Turkey was invited at the Conference, it didn’t attend its inaugural meeting protesting for the Summit’s results.

⁶² *Ta Nea*, 15-12-1997.

⁶³ The pressures were exercised both by the European leaders and by the US President, who called PM Simitis during the Summit, in order to convince him to be more condoning with Turkey, see *Ta Nea*, 17.07.1998.

⁶⁴ http://philippos.mpa.gr/gr/other/anaskopisi_1998/greece/index.html.

⁶⁵ <http://www.euturkey.org.tr>.

⁶⁶ As it is also explained in the website of the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “the policy chosen by Greece aims at examining the [bilateral] issues within a different framework: that of the European Union, based on Turkey’s desire to approach the EU and European structures. Greece supports Turkey’s European orientation. At the same time, she underlines that in order to achieve her goal, Turkey will have to comply with the requirements set for all candidate countries. This procedure, required by EU rules, will contribute to the resolution of all issues currently casting shadows over Greek-Turkish relations. Furthermore, it encourages the Union and the West as a whole, to re-evaluate their position and confront their responsibilities in the region. Within the EU, Greece has made it clear that there is room for all and all countries are welcome, provided that the European Community acquis is respected”. http://www.mfa.gr/english/foreign_policy/eu/eu_relations/enlargement_turkey.html.

⁶⁷ All quotes in this paragraph are taken from *Athens News Agency News*, 13-12-1999.

⁶⁸ See, <http://www.abig.org.tr>.

⁶⁹ The full text of the declaration can be found at: [ww.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ad/ade/ade/greece.joint.dec.1.htm](http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupa/ad/ade/ade/greece.joint.dec.1.htm)

⁷⁰ During the Council, developments concerning Turkey’s pre-accession strategy (as the amendment of 34 articles of the Turkish Constitution), are evaluated and the Turkish participation in the Union’s programs, committees and agencies is regulated.

⁷¹ The Fogg affaire concerns the illegal leakage of electronic correspondence of European Commission’s representative in Ankara, Karen Fogg. The confidential electronic correspondence of Ms Fogg were accessed by unknown persons and sent to the leader of the left wing Worker’s Party (IP) Dogu Perincek, who in turn passed the confidential material to a magazine for immediate release. From *TUSIAD Selected News on Turkey*, February 18-24 2002.

⁷² The full text of the report can be found at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report2002/tu_en.pdf

⁷³ The decision is taken at a discussion between the Foreign Ministers Papandreou and Gurel in New York, where they attended the United Nations General Assembly meeting, on September 13, 2002.

⁷⁴ Cited in *Athens News Agency*, 10.10.1992.

⁷⁵ For further details, see the website of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, www.mfa.gov.tr.

2. RETROSPECTIONS: GREEK POLICY DESCRIBED AND EXPLAINED BY THE POLICYMAKERS

“Politics is more difficult than physics”, Albert Einstein used to say. Nonetheless, sometimes the effort of the aspiring analyst to explain a posteriori the reasons for policy decisions can be even trickier, since the insight-giving tools at his/her disposition are not abundant. An overview of the past, like the one presented in the previous chapter, can help to understand the general framework in which the decisions were made and clearly establish the sequence of events. But, since history alone cannot reveal the exact reasons for which the decisions were taken, a discussion with the policymakers themselves is necessary, in order to get their version of the facts.

It goes without saying that learning how the policymakers explain their own decisions insinuates nothing more than learning *one* interpretation of the facts. The interviews can be a primary source for information on the past, but the interviewees cannot be treated as repositories of data and opinions, which are enough for telling you all there is to know (Holstein & Gubrium, 2002: 17). Firstly, because the respondent constructs *interactionally*, together with the interviewee, his *own version* of reality, which can be *contaminated* by various factors in the process, starting from the interview environment. Secondly, and especially in the case of political elites, because the interview can be considered as a means to *justify* former decisions, even by distorting their reasons or their consequences, for people who care about their ongoing political carrier or their posthumous fame. Keeping this caveat in mind, I proceeded to 14 interviews concerning the Greek policy towards Turkey, which provided me with a rich array of empirical findings.

2.1] DESCRIPTION OF THE INTERVIEWS

In my effort to understand the Greek foreign policy change towards Turkey's EU candidacy, no one could be more helpful than the high-rank officials and the policymakers who were in power or still influential during the period under question (1987-2002). According to Dunbar, Rodriguez and Parker, "interviewing elites calls into question issues of control, power and accessibility" (in Holstein & Gubruim, 2002: 367). Taking into account especially the latter and knowing that many of them would not be available for interviews, I compiled a long list with their names, beginning from the most important (prime ministers and ministers of foreign affairs) to the less influential (simple members of Parliamentary Committees and deputies specializing in IR), and I started contacting them. I decided to limit myself to 10-15 interviews, which I thought it would be both enough for giving me adequate data, and feasible, taking into consideration the strict time-schedule for completing this paper. All the interviews were conducted from June to December 2004 (before the Brussels European Council) in the course of two separate trips to Greece. Most of them lasted 1-1,5 hour, with only one enduring 3,5 hours (in two sessions) and took place at the office or the house of the respondents.

The interviews were delivered to me by 13 politicians of the most popular parties in Greece -namely Pasok (centre-left), New Democracy (centre-right), KKE (communist) and Synaspismos (left)- and a high-rank diplomat, who worked many years as an ambassador to Turkey and as Secretary General of the Greek Foreign Ministry. From the 14 interviews, twelve were oral; in the other two cases, the policymakers responded with written answers to questions that I had sent. The majority of the respondents belong to the two parties that were in government from

1987 to 2002, namely Pasok and New Democracy. However, the opinion of opposition members was also deemed necessary in order to better reflect the synthesis of the parliament that validates all the major governmental decisions, including the foreign policy ones. Therefore, the distribution of the interviewees goes as following: five belong to the Pasok party, five to New Democracy (ND), two to Synaspismos (Syn) and one to the Communist party. Their role in the foreign policy decision-mechanism of Greece is described in the following table.

Table 2.1: The respondents' role in the Greek political life

PARTY	NAME	POSITION
Pasok 1	PANGALOS Theodoros	*Minister of Foreign Affairs: 1996-1999 *Alternate ¹ Minister of Foreign Affairs: 1985-89, 1993-94 *Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs: 1984-1985 *Currently: MP of Attica, Member of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence and Foreign Affairs
Pasok 2	KAPSIS Yiannis	*Alternate Foreign Minister: 1987-1989 *Deputy Foreign Minister: 1982-1987
Pasok 3	MAGKAKIS Yiorgos	*Alternate Foreign Minister: 1995
Pasok 4	VERIVAKIS Eleftherios	*Former President of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence and Foreign Affairs *Former Representative of Greece at the UN/ NATO/ Council of Europe/ EU/ WEU *Currently: MP of Athens
Pasok 5	DROUTSAS Dimitris	* Counsellor of George Papandreou on Greek-Turkish relations and the Cyprus issue in 1999
ND 1	MITSO TAKIS Costantinos	*Prime Minister of Greece: 1990-93 *Minister of Foreign Affairs: 1980-81
ND 2	PAPOULIAS Yorgos	*Minister of Foreign Affairs: 1991 *Former Ambassador to the UN, to Ankara (1979-1983), to London and Washington *Former negotiator for the Cyprus and the Skopje issues at the United Nations
ND 3	POLIDORAS Byron	*Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs: 1992-1993 *Currently: MP of Athens and Member of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence and Foreign Affairs * Received the Ipekçi award for Greek-Turkish friendship in October 1995
ND 4	KASSIMIS Theodoros	*Former Chairman of the Greek delegation to the Parliamentary Convention of BSEC *Currently: MP and Member of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence and Foreign Affairs

ND 5	VOULTEPSI Sofia	*MP of Athens. Member of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence and Foreign Affairs and the Parliamentary Standing Committee on European Affairs *Renown journalist covering Greek-Turkish issues
KKE	AGGOURAKIS Charalampos	*Head of the Foreign Affairs Sector of the Greek Communist Party *Former MP
Syn 1	PAPAGIANNAKIS Michalis	*Member of the political Secretariat of Synaspismos *Former MEP
Syn 2	LAFAZANIS Panagiotis	*Member of the Political Secretariat of Synaspismos *Former MP, 2000-2004,
Diplomatic corps	THEODOROPOULOS Byron	*Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry (1976-1981) *Officer in charge of the Turkish and Cyprus affair in the Foreign Ministry *Former consul at Istanbul and ambassador to Ankara

All the interviewees are male, with the exception of one woman from the centre-right party. Their ages are ranging from 49 to 88 years old, with the majority being in their sixties. All of the respondents have a high level of education and most of them legal training, a high degree of cosmopolitanism and an equally high socio-economic status. Many of them were related to Turkey in a variety of ways, before occupying themselves with it in the course of their political carriers: their descent was from Asia Minor or the Black Sea region; their families had contacts with the Turkish-Cretan population that lived in Greece etc.

The policymakers answered to four groups of questions concerning:

- 1] their personal background and relation to Turkey
- 2] their views on Greek-Turkish relations during the period 1987-2002
- 3] the future of Greek-Turkish relations and
- 4] their opinion on Turkey and its European course.

It is important to underline that the opinions of the respondents don't necessarily coincide with the official policy line of the political party to which they belong. This reflects the democratic character of the parties, with the existence of various policy trends, which is occasionally institutionalized, like in the charter of

Synaspismos. But mainly, it reflects the existence of inter-party opposition, which can be so strong as to contribute to the government's collapse (like in 1993). On these factions, Keridis informs us that, "while Pasok is divided between its modernizing, patriotic and moderate wings [...] New Democracy has been torn apart by a modernizing Euro-liberal minority associated with the former PM Mitsotakis, a conservative Gaullist mainstream with the current Karamanlis leadership and a small but colorful and vocal populist-nationalist extreme" (2001: 15). Synaspismos is also divided in various groups, mainly with a "modernizing" as opposed to a more "traditionally left" character, while the Communist party is the only one which doesn't allow divisions in its line. It goes without saying that while preparing the interviews, I tried to select the respondents in such a way, as to represent in full this wide spectrum of opinions.

2.2] PRESENTATION OF THE INTERVIEWS' RESULTS

The empirical data that I gathered from interviews are hereby presented, divided into three parts: The policymakers' views on: I. the "protagonists" of the Greek-Turkish relations, II. the history of the bilateral relations and the Greek policy towards Turkey's accession, and III. the present situation and the future of the Greek-Turkish-European triangle.

The first part serves mostly as source of guidance, giving the interviewees' definition of "Us" and the "Others", in order to better understand how they perceive the relations between these two actors. The second part includes their description of the Greek policy towards Turkey's accession to the EU before the unanimously asserted "change"; the characteristics and the reasons for the change itself; as well as

its relation with the bilateral disputes. Finally, the third part describes how the respondents perceive the current situation and the prospects of the bilateral disputes, as well as Turkey's future in Europe.

2.2.1 Defining the basic actors: Who are the Greeks, the Turks and the outsiders in their bilateral relations?

1. The Greek position vis-à-vis Turkey

With no exception whatsoever, the interviewees affirmed their good intentions towards Turkey and their personal wish for the normalization of the bilateral relations since this is primarily imposed by the *geographical proximity* of the two nations. As one of the respondents stated: "We are neighbours; we cannot change that; God has thrown us at this place; we must benefit from the neighbourliness and not harm ourselves" (ND 4). Besides, the amelioration of the bilateral climate can benefit both nations in the *economic sector*, too (Pasok 1, ND 4).

With an apparent feeling of nostalgia, some respondents (ND 1, Pasok 3, Dip. Corps) made references to the Greek-Turkish cooperation before the emergence of the Cyprus issue and to the "Venizelos – Atataturk spirit". "Greece and Turkey were moving on hand in hand", noted a former diplomat, claiming that this historical precedent should constitute an example for the future.

Speaking on behalf of the state, many interviewees underlined that Greece doesn't have expansionist views, "it doesn't want to go back to Izmir or Istanbul" (Pasok 2), it is not a dangerous actor (Pasok 3) and that one of the main goals of all

the Greek governments' foreign policy was the amelioration of the bilateral climate (Pasok 5).

Speaking on behalf of the people, most of the respondents seem to endorse the view that "the Greek nation never expressed feelings of hostility against the Turkish one" (Pasok 1), even though two of the policymakers (Pasok 5, Syn 1) underline the difficulties in the rapprochement process between the two people, created by the troubled past of Greece and Turkey. In the words of a deputy of the left: "There were always people who looked positively at a solution like the one that is adopted now and others that were more negative, because of their inherited ideological or experiential history. Some of the refugees or the people whose relatives were killed in Cyprus are still more reserved -and they have every right to be this way- while others are not" (Syn 1).

In general though, *good-intentions* and a *lack of inherent aggressiveness* characterize the Greek people and its government in the minds of the policymakers.

2. The Turkish people and the Turkish elites

In the case of the Turkish people and its government, things become more nuanced. Before proceeding to the presentation of the respondents views, one should underline that, in the flow of the conversation, the interviewees often used the generic name "the Turks", when referring both to the people and the elites (military and bureaucratic) of Turkey. However, a separation of the two categories is necessary for the analysis.

2.i. The Turkish people

Four of the respondents made no specific value judgements on the Turkish people, while the opinions of the rest can be grouped in four categories: 1] positive judgements (four) 2] both positive and negative comments (three) 3] neutral observations (two) and 4] negative judgements (one).

The interviewees of the first category (Pasok 3, Syn 1, Syn 2, KKE) characterized the Turks as “a respectable intellectual and cultural entity”, “worthy of full esteem and respect” and acknowledged the “true will of a major part of them to ameliorate their relations with Greece”. Besides, as a communist deputy underlined, “the majority of Turks, like the majority of Greeks, don’t believe that their problem is Greece and Turkey respectively, as they have a lot of social problems to face in their daily lives” (KKE). One should note that most of the interviewees who made “positive only” comments on the Turks don’t support the accession of Turkey in the European Union.

The three interviewees of the second category also acknowledged the “warmth and sincerity” of the Turkish people (reproducing the stereotype of the “hospitable Turk”, in the specific case) and their will to discuss (Pasok 4), as well as their friendship-seeking disposition (ND 2). However, they recognized in them an “Asian aggressiveness” (Pasok 4) and a “unilateralism” (ND 2), explained in the following manner: “When the Turks put something in their mind they stick to it [...] Turks have always been maximalists. What they believe about their country, they raise it into an axiom. You cannot discuss very easily; with very few people. What they believe in Turkey is raised into a dogma” (ND 2). Finally, for a senior diplomat, the Turks are “a disciplined people, something which can work as an advantage and a

disadvantage and they are a tough people, which is an advantage. Besides, they are really state builders, something that no other Turkic people has done” (Dip. Corps).

The comments characterized above as “neutral” concern various aspects of the Turkish society that don’t have positive or negative connotations. As a New Democracy official noted, the people living in the Aegean coast present significant differences from the Turks of the mainland, but in general the Turkish people “is greatly influenced by religion” (ND 4), while for a Pasok foreign minister, the people doesn’t play any role in tracing both internal and external policies in Turkey (Pasok 1).

Finally, there was only one respondent who didn’t balance his negative opinion on the Turks with any sort of positive comments: a former alternate FM, who recognized “an expansionist syndrome in the Turkish race” (Pasok 2).

2.ii. The Turkish elites

The comments of the policymakers concerning the Turkish elites present greater uniformity, being mostly negative and attributing to them hegemonic and expansionist trends. In only one of the interviews (Pasok 5) there was no value judgement of this part of the Turkish society and also in only one (ND 1) there was a positive comment on the ruling class of Turkey. It is worth noting that these two respondents are considered by some as the “architects” of the Greek-Turkish efforts for rapprochement in different periods in time: the first as prime minister in 1991 and the second as counsellor of the foreign minister in 1999. In addition, in the majority of the interviews no distinction is made between the military and the political establishment. In four of them however, specific opinions are expressed on the army,

in order either to present its augmented role (Pasok 3, Dip. corps) or to underline its specific interests (Pasok 1, ND 4).

In particular, one of the most telling examples of the interviewees' opinion on the Turkish elites is the following comment of a former foreign minister (Pasok 1):

"Turkey is not a common country. And on this issue, the Greeks make a very big mistake. They see the Turks in their poverty and their misery and they think that the Turks are 60 million famished. They are 50 million famished, but the 10 or 5 or 2 millions that rule are the inheritors of an empire. The real inheritors of Byzantium are the Turks; not the Greeks. The real inheritors are the Ottomans. The Turks "took" Istanbul. They have an elite which is the remainder of an empire. I am always surprised, when I go to Turkey, by the finesse, the culture and the wide knowledge of the people that I meet. Most of them have a PhD. They are an elite. And this elite has imperial tendencies. Their relation with Greece is much more complicated than we can imagine. The Greeks are afraid that the Turks will rush to the Aegean and occupy some island, as they did with Cyprus. The Turks don't have such simplistic approaches. They want to rule Greece. That is, they want to have a sphere of influence, sometimes in a comical way. As you know, they deplorably failed in that in Central Asia. [...] They have the idea that they should reign over Greece and this is why, even though they are very careful and very polite, every time they discuss with us, one can see this hegemonic trend rising from a thousand sides. Sometimes, during our quarrels at the end of the '80s, they stated that Greece showed "insolence". But a European country would never say that another European country showed "insolence". This is something that a young man does vis-à-vis an elder, a poor vis-à-vis a rich man, a weak vis-à-vis a strong man. This is how they understood it. They saw Greece as a small country that shouldn't raise its head. They thought that they are the central power in the region and around them are others who should adjust. And since Greece indeed covers geographically a large area at the borders with

Turkey, it is the first area where they try to do this hegemonic expansion”.

Apart from the “expansionist”, “hegemonic”, “revisionist” or at least “nationalist” behaviour, which is attributed to the Turkish elites in many other interviews (Pasok 2, Pasok 3, ND 5, Syn 2, KKE), they are also considered as being “narrow-minded and aggressive”, “believing a lot in raw power, at the naked sword” (Pasok 4); and as “thinking about foreign policy with obsolete categorizations, belonging to the time classical Europe, which are outdated or they starting to be outdated” (ND 2). Besides, they are viewed as having an “Ottoman syndrome”: “Some Turks never accepted the transition of the Ottoman Empire to a modern, big state, but which is not an empire. The military/diplomatic establishment which thinks like that, wants Turkey to play a role which surpasses its capabilities, as well as its interests, by creating problems with the surrounding people” (ND 2). Finally, they are considered as having the role of the “trouble-maker and the hoodlum in the area” (ND 3).

Concentrating on the internal policy of the governing elites, a New Democracy official notes that “for many years, the ruling class in Turkey didn't want the amelioration of the financial situation and the education level of the people because it preferred to have a society which will be tickled from the calls of the political leadership each time”. Finally, one deputy of the left still considers the way of governing in Turkey as “semi-dictatorial” (Syn 1).

It should be mentioned though that four of the respondents (Pasok 4, Pasok 5, Dip. Corps, ND 4) acknowledged that the behaviour of the governing elites towards the Turkish people is slowly starting to change: “What has happened in Turkey since

1999, we call it a small revolution”, notes the most enthusiast between them (Pasok 5).

As is mentioned above, only one of the interviewees doesn't share the negative views about the Turkish elites and makes a positive comment about them. The former PM Mitsotakis repeatedly underlined that the Turks don't have expansionist views. Besides, in comparison with the Greeks, “the Turks always had unity in their foreign policy, which was defined by the National Security Council, under the presidency of the President of Democracy and with the accord of the leaders of the armed forces. Greece didn't have this clear line of policy” (ND 1).

As far as the army is concerned, in the four comments that were made on it, it was either considered as having “the final word” in Turkish affairs (Pasok 3, Dip. corps), or as having specific interests that the Greek-Turkish conflict helps it to protect (Pasok 1, ND 4). The first view is eloquently expressed through an historical anecdote by a senior diplomat:

“I remember that after one of my talks in Turkey with Sukru Elekdag on the Aegean airspace, I took the plane, I went to Sofia and I came back to Greece. The next morning, I see that the Turks have withdrawn their claims. I call Sukru on the phone and I say ‘Sukru Bey, why didn't you inform me? We only separated yesterday afternoon. Why didn't you tell me what you intend to do, so that I can come back and say to my minister that I have achieved this agreement?’ (Laughter) He was perplexed and he said ‘You know, these are decisions that are made in other place’. He meant of course the military. Even the Secretary General of the Foreign Ministry was not aware of the decision!” (Dip. Corps).

The second view is illustrated in the words of a Pasok former minister:

“The army in Turkey functions like a professional group. The officers and the petty officers have advantages that they don't want to lose. Look at the Turkish navy. It is first in line in all the provocative actions against Greece. It is the most extreme. The explanation, according to me, is that it doesn't have a reason to exist without the Greek-Turkish conflict. Because, why does Turkey need a navy? It is a huge continental country; its coastline is guarded by Greece which is an ally in NATO. At the sea they have no problem. So, Turkey doesn't need the navy any more” (Pasok 1).

2.iii. Is Turkey a European country?

Not all of the interviewees answered this question, which would normally be considered as critical for the decision-making on Turkey's accession. Likewise, not all of those who answered expressed clearly their views.

From the nine out of the 14 interviewees that replied, only two (KKE, Syn 1) gave a definite affirmative answer, while three more (Pasok 1, ND 2, ND 4) answered “yes” but with reservations. One should note that the respondents that said definitely “yes” to the European character of Turkey, wouldn't prefer to see it entering the EU.

The people of the second group agree that Turkey's long historical connections with Europe cannot be neglected: “Since the Crimean War, the Europeans themselves recognized a role for Turkey in the European environment. The Europeans until recently considered the Turks equal partners, as far as the European issues in their area are concerned” (ND 2). Therefore history is on Turkey's side. However, its current situation presents two problems, which the country must solve in order to be able to be characterized European: “The first is the issue of the political institutions, free democracy and the submission to the political

authority of all the state mechanisms, including the army. The second, is the financial and social situation; but these issues can be solved after a long transitional period” (Pasok 1). In other words, for the moment Turkey is not exactly a European country, but it has the potential to develop into one.

From the rest of the policymakers, two gave negative answers to the question of Turkey’s European identity (Pasok 3, Pasok 4), underlining that Turkey has different culture, different civilization and different codes from the European countries, while one interviewee replied that the issue doesn’t actually matter for defining if Turkey will constitute a member of the European club: “There are other issues that are more important and of course there are the gains of the European dominant classes” (Syn 2).

To my opinion, the most interesting answer to the question was that of the counsellor that helped George Papandreou trace Greece’s policy at the Helsinki Summit (Pasok 5). When asked if Turkey is European or not, he started enumerating the reasons why the other EU member-states have reservations towards Turkey’s accession to the European Union! This is a perfect example of a general observation: that there is almost no correlation between the respondent’s views on Turkey’s European identity and their views on whether Turkey should actually join the EU.

3. The foreign actors

The bilateral relations between Greece and Turkey are not defined only by the will of their respective governments, as the majority of the interviewees underlined. Foreign powers often support the one of the two, usually impairing the position of the other; they exert pressures for the normalization of the bilateral

relations or actively work in order to undermine them; and they influence the behaviour of the two sides only by their simple presence. According to the respondents, these external actors in the Greek-Turkish relations are the United States, the other European Union member-states and Israel.

3.i. The United States

The augmented presence and role of the United States in South-Eastern Mediterranean was commented upon by 11 of the 14 interviewees. The US is generally considered to have a special relation with Turkey. With only two exceptions (the aforementioned “architects” of the Greek-Turkish rapprochement: ND 1, Pasok 5), it is viewed as influencing the Greek government in order to normalize in the quickest possible way its relations with its neighbouring country and raise its objections for Turkey’s membership in the European Union.

Specifically, the preferential association of the US with Turkey, due to the formers’ interests in the area was stressed in eight of the interviews. As a New Democracy foreign minister explained: “The US sees Turkey as a very important terrain, in order to promote its policy in the Middle East. Especially since Bush decided to democratize the whole Middle East, this cannot be done without the support of the surrounding nations and of course Turkey” (ND 2). Apart from the Middle East, the US is considered as treating Turkey in a favourable way as this can “serve the strategic plans of the US for the future of Europe”, too (Syn 2). The important role that Turkey holds in the American strategic plans is vividly described through an incident that took place at the Bildeberg club: a discussion between the former Greek foreign minister Pangalos, and Henry Kissinger:

“When in a dinner I sat next to Kissinger, I told him who I am and that I’ve read two of his books. He said: ‘I really want to come to Greece, it is my dream, but I am not at ease because I know that you don’t like me’. I answered: ‘Indeed, after ’74, there is a problem with you’. ‘Ah’, he replied, ‘I cannot reveal my cards on Cyprus now, but I will tell you one thing: I came to America, when I was 17 years old. I am a Jew from Austria. My house was non-cleric. I grew up with ancient Greek philosophy and language. And I bet that I speak better ancient Greek than you. For me, Greece is a part of myself. I don’t know the Turks, I haven’t studied them; they don’t mean anything to me on a personal level. If you showed me two buttons and said that if I press one of them, the respective country, Greece or Turkey, will disappear, I would press Turkey and I wouldn’t hesitate for one minute.

But I was Secretary of State for the US. The American way of life is based on the waste of energy. So, we need energy. Energy is oil. Oil is in the Muslim countries. The road to Muslim countries; the way to Muslim countries; the place that controls the Muslim countries, is Turkey. So, nothing is more important than our alliance with Turkey”.

In order to better pursue its interests in the area, the US is treated by eight interviewees as having exerted direct pressures to Greece for the amelioration of its relations with Turkey and for adopting a positive stance vis-à-vis Turkish membership in the EU.

For the deputies of the left (Syn 2, KKE), these American pressures were exerted with the full accord of the Greek political establishment. The phrase “I thank the Americans” of the Greek Prime Minister Simitis after the Imia/ Kardak crisis of 1996 constitutes a perfect example of this consent.

One should note that the policymakers who stated that there are American pressures to Greece generally view them in a negative way –with only one exception: a New Democracy high-rank official who notes the following: “USA has made a lot

of mistakes in our area. Mainly, it overlooked the idiosyncrasy of the people. This is not Greece's problem, even if Greece paid for it sometimes. The US played a role in the bilateral relations. But it was one of the few times that it played a positive role, since it pushed for rapprochement" (ND 4).

Taking this line of thought a little bit further, the former Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis denies the existence of American pressures, at least during his time in power: "When I was a PM, the US only encouraged me. I didn't need the encouragement, but the Americans completely agreed with the policy that I followed" (ND 1). Similarly, the counsellor of the Pasok foreign minister at the time of the Helsinki Summit (Pasok 5), in contrast with the aforementioned leftist deputies, also denies the immediate American pressures, stating that the Greek leadership simply took into account the interest of the foreign actors also, before tracing its policy towards Turkey.

3.ii. The EU member-states

Very few comments on the attitude of the European states towards Greece and Turkey were made outside of the discussion on how these states view the Turkish prospects of accession, which will be analysed later on. In any case, from the four interviewees who engaged in such comments, three (Pasok 1, Pasok 3, Pasok 5) perceive the European countries as having specific interests (financial mainly) in the area which the cooperation with Turkey will help them to pursue and this is why they support it. In other words, they consider the European attitude towards Turkey similar to the American one, namely interest-based. Only one of the interviewees (ND 2), spoke about "feelings of sympathy" from the part of Europe towards Greece,

but he also underlined that these feelings are conditioned, because for many years Greece had a negative stance towards Turkey's accession.

3.iii. Israel

Two of the 14 interviewees (Pasok 1, Pasok 2) made a specific reference to the role of Israel in Greek-Turkish relations, since its security is considered as tied to the one of Turkey and its lobby as very influential in the United States. The first of the interviewees, Mr. Pangalos, exemplified the importance of the Israeli factor through two historical anecdotes:

“While speaking with Holbrooke once, I told him: ‘Look, now Dick, when I discuss about the Greek-Turkish affairs and Cyprus, I speak with the following people: With Albright, who is Secretary of State, with Cohen, who is Secretary of Defense, with Berger, who is the National Security Advisor, with Rubin, the State Department’s spokesman, with you, the assistant Secretary of State, with Grossmann, the assistant Secretary on European issues and with Miller, the Cyprus issue specialist. With seven Jews”. And Holbrooke says: ‘What do you mean by that?’ I replied: “I don’t have any problem with the fact that you are a Jew, but if you wanted to discuss Israel and the Palestinian issue and came up with seven Greeks, wouldn’t that be weird?” He was furious. But I think that it is extremely difficult for seven Israeli Americans to keep such a distance from the Israeli interests in the area, so that they can judge objectively a problem between Greece and Turkey that occurs in the same area”. [...]

“I was once in the United States for a visit, mostly for public relations purposes. I had 32 meetings, saw all the major institutes and newspapers, and delivered speeches in three universities. And I also saw Albright and the American officials. During my 32 meetings, they raised two issues and only two: Why did I say that the alliance between Turkey

and Israel is unethical and dangerous for the area, together with what will happen with the S-300 missiles and how they will not harm Israel's security!" (Pasok 1).

The second respondent who referred to Israel, namely Mr. Kapsis, was more to the point: "Neither the bilateral problems nor the Cyprus issue will be solved, since there is the crisis in Israel. Greece, Turkey and Cyprus are considered as bases for the interventionist policy of the Americans and the Jewish lobby in Palestine" (Pasok 2).

2.2.2 The bilateral relations and the Greek policy towards Turkey's accession

1. The Greek-Turkish disputes

No discussion can be made about the Greek policy towards Turkey's accession to the European Union without referring to the bilateral disputes, since these two issues are interlinked for the majority of the Greek policymakers. The subsequent presentation of the interviewees' views about the Turkish strategy on these problems aims at better understanding the ensuing decisions that the Greeks took concerning their neighboring country. But, before concentrating on that, it is worth examining what the Greek policymakers themselves consider as bilateral problems.

With just one (but very significant) exception (ND 1), all the interviewees adopted the official Greek policy, that the only real problem between Greece and Turkey is the continental shelf of the Aegean islands, whose limits rest to be defined. The Greek former Ambassador Theodoropoulos (Dip. Corps) vividly describes how the continental shelf problem arose for the Greek government:

“From June to September 1974, I was in Caracas, for it was the conference for the Law of the Sea. I remember that my Turkish colleague brought up this argument: “After all, what are the islands? The islands are sitting on Turkish continental shelf”. And thereupon the whole conference started laughing, for it was ridiculous to say that the Greek islands are just sitting over Turkish continental shelf. Actually, he wanted to oppose the article of the Law of the Sea which says that the islands have a continental shelf of their own, since that was the Turkish claim for the Aegean, which had been presented on November ’73 under the pretext that Turkey wanted to exploit the Aegean oil. The Turks wanted and hoped that the final convention of the Law of the Sea wouldn’t say that, but it is very clear at the convention that the islands have a continental shelf of their own, which rests to be delimited”.

The remaining bilateral disputes, concerning the Greek territorial waters and airspace, the Athens FIR, the militarization of the Aegean islands and the existence of so-called grey zones in the Aegean Sea are characterized by the interviewees as unilateral Turkish claims; as Turkish intentions and pretensions that have already been regulated by international treaties; as issues that were constructed for political purposes and that are justified through propaganda. Another comment by Mr. Pangalos is telling:

“Much of the things that are told on the Aegean are myths. For example, the Turkish people believe in their great majority, as Mrs. Ciller herself has told to me, that ‘I cannot go with my boat to Ayvalik without asking the permission of the Greeks’. This of course is stupid because in the so-called territorial waters, the private ships can circulate completely free. [...] Therefore, all these about the territorial waters or the airspace are created problems, meaning that, in the Aegean, only one problem hasn't been solved and this is the continental shelf” (Pasok 1).

Nonetheless, for some of the interviewees who adopt a critical stance to the Helsinki process (Pasok 2, Pasok 4, ND 2, Syn 2, KKE), Greece unfortunately retreated from this position in 1999, since it acknowledged that there were general “border issues” to be discussed with Turkey.

According to the interviewees, adding to the Aegean problems, the international problem of Cyprus is also deeply influencing the Greek decision-making towards Turkey. In fact some of them consider the Cyprus issue as the “mother” of the bilateral disputes (“Cyprus was the reason and the occasion for the expulsion of the Greeks of Istanbul and in general it created a lot of tension in the bilateral relations”, affirms a former Prime Minister), while their majority seems to agree that a full normalization of the bilateral relations is impossible without progress in Cyprus.

As it is stated above, the former Greek PM Mitsotakis negates that the continental shelf is the only real bilateral problem, even though he also accepts the necessity of a quick and viable solution to the Cyprus issue. As he declared in his interview:

“The bilateral problems don’t concern of course only the continental shelf. This is a stupidity of Papandreou which ended up being a slogan even for my party’s people. We have a lot more differences. We have the minority issues: The Turks have a legal interest in the Muslim minority of Western Thrace and we have the same and even greater interest on the Greek community in Istanbul, in Imvros and in Tenedos. Besides, we have differences concerning the air-space, the territorial waters and the 12 miles, which the Turks didn’t recognize and are never going to. Even the delimitation of the sea border north of the Dodecanese hasn’t still been concluded in its final form, and this implies that there can be a dispute on some rocks without meaning that the Turks are disputing

Greek territory or that they have territorial claims against Greece” (ND 1).

One should note that certain interviewees acknowledged that Greece will have to back down from some of its official arguments, in order for the normalization of the bilateral disputes to take place. Mitsotakis (ND 1), for example, considers that Greece will have to retreat from keeping the discrepancy between the 6 n.m. territorial waters and the 10 n.m. airspace –an opinion with which Mr. Pangalos (Pasok 1) also agrees. In addition, the former alternate foreign minister Kapsis (Pasok 2) recognizes that Turkey is partly right on the issue of the militarization of the Aegean islands. However, the policymakers claim that these compromises cannot be made for the moment, either because Greece should keep them for the bilateral negotiations (ND 1, Pasok 1) or because Turkey still constitutes a threat (Pasok 2).

Besides, other interviewees described their effort to momentarily leave aside the Greek official arguments, in order to better comprehend how Turkey views the bilateral disputes, which are its practical problems arising from the existing situation and from which Greek positions it feels threatened (Pasok 5, Syn 1). In the words of a New Democracy official, “The Turkish claims have two parts: The practical one and the ‘Megali Idea’ one. The ‘Megali Idea’ part is rejected, since it consists of claims of Greek national territory. If this is eliminated, we can discuss about the practical one” (ND 4).

2. The Turkish strategy

In the former paragraphs, it is made clear that for the majority of the interviewees Turkey was the main responsible for the bilateral disputes, having

“expansionist”, “aggressive” and “revisionist” views. Besides, in the words of a former alternate foreign minister: “This Turkish aggression is not only confined to the support of positions that are against the Greek interests, but has advanced and disputes the Greek national territory. Turkey proceeded to a military invasion in Cyprus, it proceeds to questioning the Greek air space with military means, it questions the international status quo” (Pasok 3). According to many interviewees, this is a position for which Turkey “doesn’t seem to regret” and, in fact, it keeps escalating its provocations: “The Turks never responded to the Greek retreats with a retreat from their side. They always moved on. [...] I don’t know of any one time that Turkey backed down. I see in front of me a constant escalation” (Pasok 1).

For many interviewees, even though now Turkey seems to pursue rapprochement with Greece, this only constitutes a change of tactics, not a change of strategy. In the words of a Synaspismos official: “Now, Turkey doesn’t seek tensions in the Aegean. Without giving up its goals, it sets them in a second place, in front of its priority of EU membership [...] The Turkish leadership changed for example its policy in the Cyprus issue, marginalizing Denktash and seeking a solution like the Annan plan. However, what I discern is that the Erdogan government hasn’t *really* changed its views on the Aegean issues. Likewise, even though it has readapted its politics and tactics concerning the Cyprus issue, it hasn’t abandoned the goal to play an important, critical, if not decisive role in Cyprus” (Syn 2).

Nonetheless, in this case also, there is one dissenter from these views: Again the former PM Mitsotakis:

“In Turkey, the tradition of Kemal Ataturk for Greek-Turkish friendship still stays alive. [...] The Turks have never questioned the Lausanne Treaty, never. And as long as they don’t do that, they don’t question the Greek soil. [...] It is certain that the Turks many times have followed an

extreme and provocative line, but we have also exaggerated and there is no doubt that we were equally or more extreme some times, that we lacked coolness and a clear line. [...] Turkey is mostly interested about its Eastern frontiers. Once I asked Ozal, "which is your No 1 problem?". And he said: "My eastern frontiers, the Kurdish issue". And then I asked: "Which is your No 2 problem?" He answered: "Finance". So I said: "Why do you keep the Cyprus issue open and you spend all this money?" For the Turks the bilateral disputes are not the No 1 issue in their foreign policy. And their armament, they need it more on the East. They need this military power in that area and not the Aegean. What can they do in the Aegean? They cannot make a landing, because the international situation doesn't allow them. In the Evros region it's the same thing. So, the violations, they arise from their disaccord on the 10 miles. The Turks believe that if they leave us alone, this will mean the de facto recognition of the 10 miles, which they don't want. But of course, on the same time, they use the violations during periods when they think that it is for their best interest" (ND 1).

Between these two extreme positions of the "aggressive" vs the "friendly" Turkey, there is one group of three interviewees (Pasok 5, ND 4, Dip. Corps), which adopts a more moderate attitude: Indeed, Turkey has been aggressive and provocative for many years, but now the situation is slowly starting to change and its government seems more willing to engage into dialogue. The Greek-Turkish disputes and the Cyprus issue may not be solved, but in the second case at least, we were very close to a solution. Besides, the fact that Erdogan has a majority government helps at taking bold decisions, without resorting into populism in order to gather more votes.

3. The Greek policy towards Turkey's accession before the change

So, how did Greece initially react to the Turkish demand for EEC/ EU membership, given this “aggressive behavior” from the Turkish side? The answer was, of course, “negatively”.

As the basic reason for Greece's veto on Turkey's accession before the '90s, most of the interviewees present the “occupation of Cyprus” and the ensuing efforts to solve the Cyprus issue, by exerting pressures to Turkey, directly (by blocking its accession) and indirectly (the EU was considered as the best forum to promote the Cyprus issue. So, Cyprus had to become member before Turkey did). Concomitantly, they underline the bilateral disputes and the rise of the Turkish claims concerning the Aegean Sea. Some other factors that were presented as affecting Greece's stance are the following: The situation of human rights in Turkey; the rights of the Greek minority in Turkey, like the right to reopen the Theological School at Heybeliada; and some other issues of the Rum, like the confiscation of their fortunes.

Many interviewees underline that, even during that period of “cold war relations”, Greece continued the efforts of dialogue with Turkey in order to settle the existing problems. Nonetheless, according to one respondent, these efforts couldn't go very far, because the Greek government at the time had created such internal commitments to the people, that it would have been considered treason, if it initiated negotiations with Turkey (ND 1). Besides, interestingly enough, four politicians (Pasok 3, Syn 2, KKE, Dip Corps) note that until the early '90s, nobody in Greece dealt seriously with the possibility of Turkish accession in the EU; during that period “Greece had to fight with its own problems”, therefore underlying the role that the domestic situation plays when tracing foreign policy. Besides, as a senior diplomat

notes, during the '80s, the issue of Portugal's and Spain's accession was a lot more urgent for the country.

Of course in a leftist deputy's words, "things started to show a lot greater mobility and to change from the moment that the possibility of a stronger association of Turkey with the EU became more visible" (Syn 2).

Apparently, *none* of the problems that nowadays make other EU members sceptical towards Turkish accession was raised by the interviewees as justifying the Greek "no" at the time. Greece's answer to a question that concerned the whole of the EU was solely based on the country's needs.

4. Period of the change and people responsible for it

On this issue, there is no accord between the interviewees. Most people recognize that the change was gradual and that Helsinki constitutes a landmark, while other important dates are the Davos Summit and the Customs Union. However (understandably enough), the New Democracy politicians give more credit to Mitsotakis' period in government (1990-1993), while the PASOK politicians emphasize Simitis' administration (1996-2002). Likewise, there is no consent on the political actors of the change –some presenting Mitsotakis as the main actor and others saying that he tried but failed to change the Greek policy; therefore, it was Simitis and Papandreou who effectuated the change of the country's attitude towards the Turkish accession. Finally, one interviewee claimed that there is no specific person responsible; it was the interests of the country that imposed the change.

Nonetheless, it is worth noting that four from the fourteen interviewees claim that *they* had prepared the subsequent policy of Greek-Turkish rapprochement – Mr.

Mitsotakis (ND 1), Mr. Kapsis (Pasok 2), Mr. Pangalos (Pasok 1) and Mr. Droutsas (Pasok 5) on behalf of Yorgos Papandreou. Quoting Mr. Pangalos, “with Kranidiotis and Simitis, we had fully prepared Helsinki. [...] The policy of bringing the Greek-Turkish problems and the Cyprus issue into the European framework was a PASOK policy. And it was my policy. I won't be modest about that”.

Quoting Mr. Mitsotakis, “the policy that is followed today by the government, was my policy, not PASOK's. When I was saying such things they called me traitor. As PASOK reigns in the media, it wants to present that this policy belongs to it. But it is a policy that they followed on the last minute, under the pressure of reality”.

5. The reasons for the change of the Greek policy

Looking at the disagreement even on the period of change of Greece's policy towards Turkey's accession, one can imagine how varied the answers of the interviewees were, on the issue of the reasons for that change. Nonetheless, for the purposes of the analysis, they can be categorized in four major groups: a] Self-reflection (domestic reasons) b] International environment (systemic reasons), c] Changes for Turkey and because of its developments (domestic reasons from the Turkish side) and d] Charismatic leaders (the idiosyncratic variable).

5i. Self-reflection

The most common affirmation in the policymakers' interviews (Pasok 1, Pasok 2, Pasok 3, Pasok 5, ND 2, Syn 1) is that the former strategy of Greece had

arrived to an impasse. The Greek veto to Turkish accession “had given all that it could” (Pasok 1); “Greece had consolidated its views, so now it had to give Turkey a margin of movement” (Pasok 2); “We had to try something that would be more beneficial” (Pasok 3) and “as the worsening of the situation in the Aegean did not bear fruit for the Turks, so the effort to hinder Turkey didn't bear fruit for us” (ND 2): This is how the policymakers apprehended the bilateral climate at the time of the policy change.

At that time, Turkey had expressed the wish to become an EU member. So Greece had to “find a way to turn Turkey's wish into Greece's advantage” (Pasok 5, ND 2, ND 4, ND 5). According to the policymakers, four advantages could occur from Greece's “yes” to Turkey's accession:

- 1) Greater safety: As the counsellor of the former FM Papandreou explained (Pasok 5): “The European course of Turkey is a direct interest of Greece, because we believe that the full democratization of Turkey, the stabilization of the democratic institutions, the role of the army etc. only through the European course will enter to a framework that corresponds to the European standard. This is what we wish, which will make us feel safer with our neighbour, Turkey”. And, as a New Democracy deputy affirmed: “If Turkey joins the EU, it will change its attitude and the Turkish political classes will abandon the internal commitments that lead to the violation in the Aegean Sea and to an aggressive behaviour that doesn't fit a European country”.
- 2) Developments in Cyprus: (Pasok 1, Syn 1). In the words of the former FM Pangalos: “we had to find a way to give Turkey what it wants, that is the title of a candidate, which didn't have a substantive content at the time, and from our side to make sure that Cyprus could enter without its political problem

solved. We had already accepted the CU of Turkey with the EU because the latter took the decision to start the accession negotiations of Cyprus with the EU. But the problem that we solved in Helsinki hadn't already been solved. Because we could always arrive at the end of Cyprus' negotiations and have an ill-affected country telling us, "this is great, you've moved on, but we cannot do anything before the political issue of the island is solved"

- 3) Developments in the bilateral disputes: (ND 2, ND 4, Pasok 3, Pasok 5, Syn 1). The European Union could constitute a new framework, where the bilateral problems could be discussed.
- 4) Greater "control" of Turkey: (ND 4). According to a New Democracy official: "It is different to have Turkey inside the game than to have it outside. When it is outside it can be used by anyone. When we are inside and Turkey has benefits from its stay in the EU, then you can more easily control it".

Besides, the policy of negation towards Turkey's membership threatened with the seclusion of Greece in the international scene (Pasok 5, ND 1, ND 2, Syn 2). To his comment about the safety that Turkey's membership will provide, Papandreou's counsellor added the following:

"Our line of thought was that, whether we like it or not, Greece is not the biggest country in the world. On the contrary, whether we like it or not, Turkey is a very big country, which serves the interests of the other international actors. [...] So, when you are facing a problem you have to see: Which is the best way for me to support my interests? Alone, as I saw in the past, it will be difficult, they will corner me and I will suffer from negative consequences. In the international political scene I will be the odd man out, they will avoid me, they will exert pressure on me etc. Therefore, one should have bigger fantasy, take more initiatives. And this is the trick that we did. We said 'how can we get support in the international scene'? Through the European course of Turkey" (Pasok 5).

The same wish for Greece, not to be the odd man out, is expressed by an historical anecdote recited by former PM Mitsotakis:

“Both as a leader of the opposition and as a PM, I had many talks with the leaders of Europe at that time, like Helmut Kohl, who never wanted Turkey in the EU. "Niemals!" he said and he banged his fist on the table! I said, "This is what *you* say. I will say that it can join. Because Greece doesn't have any national reason to be against Turkey's accession. You can say what you want, but I will not make the same stupidity as Papandreou, *to be the bad guy, while you are the good guy*. The Greeks will say yes. We don't have a disagreement as a nation” (ND 1).

Mitsotakis' anecdote reflects the views of other interviewees also (Pasok 2, Pasok 4, Dip. Corps), who stated that it was unjust for Greece to be the only one which openly raises objections to Turkey's membership, while it is very well known that other countries too are against it. “The fact is that the Greek attitude started to change as a means of bringing the West in front of its own responsibilities when talking to Turkey”, stated a high-rank diplomat (Dip. Corps).

5ii. The international environment

It is mainly the interviewees of the left who attribute the change of the Greek policy exclusively to systemic factors. However, in many other interviewees it is acknowledged that the pressures of the international actors couldn't be neglected by the Greek government, when forming its policy vis-à-vis Turkey.

In particular, for the head of the foreign affairs sector of the communist party (KKE), the Greek positive attitude towards Turkey's accession is due to the

following reasons: 1. There was a strong pressure from the EU 2. There was a strong pressure from the US 3. There were some changes in the international environment with which Greece had to adjust, namely a] After the regime subversion and the counter-revolution in the former socialist countries in 1989, international law became permeable; especially, as far as some of its irrevocable principles are concerned, like the infrangibility of the borders, which no state could violate or interpret according to its will and b] The new strategy of NATO, which was adopted in 1999 in Washington, accepted the interventions in the whole world, without always taking into account the Security Council of the United Nations. 4. After the war in Yugoslavia, a new theory was developed, that we must support the Americans, because Greek interests supposedly coincide with the American ones in the Balkans and it is not wise to follow a different policy.

This last point is endorsed by a Synaspismos official too: “For the Greek political establishment, first priority is the American plans in the area. The dominant bourgeois class doesn't want to oppose the American choices, which are very important for our region. It doesn't want to oppose the US choices. Therefore, it follows a policy which it believes that it is the less bad” (Syn 2).

Nonetheless, the role of the external pressures is also underlined by interviewees of the two biggest political parties (Pasok 1, Pasok 3, Pasok 4, ND 1): The former Pasok FM Pangalos clearly states that “before each European council there was American lobbying in favour of Turkey” (Pasok 1), while a New Democracy official affirms: “The changes in the Soviet Union made it imperative to accelerate the developments in Greek-Turkish relations. We couldn't keep on this nagging crawling in history. The geostrategic priorities of the US had changed” (ND 4).

5iii. Changes for Turkey and because of its development

“Turkey itself” as a positive factor contributing to the change in Greek policy is only mentioned in two of the 14 interviews (ND 4, Dip. Corps). For these policymakers, the advent of a strong government in Turkey, with a clear pro-European orientation and a will for discussion made it easier for the Greek government to say “yes” to Turkey’s European course. “With the change of leadership in Turkey, there were interlocutors”, remarks an interviewee (ND 4).

Nonetheless, affirming the Greek will to peacefully solve the bilateral disputes and have friendly relations with all the neighbouring countries, other policymakers stated that, during the decision-making process, Greece tried to trace a policy which would be beneficial both for Greece and for Turkey (Pasok 3, ND 5).

5iv. Charismatic leaders

The role of the personalities in the change of the Greek policy is also underlined only in two of the fourteen interviews. For a New Democracy official (ND 4), it was PM Mitsotakis, “a lot more perceptive person than other short-sighted politicians”, who played a determinant role for the change of the Greek policy. His “understanding” and “special relation” with Ozal proved to be very helpful. For FM Papandreou’s counsellor (Pasok 5), it was Yiorgos Papandreou’s position as the head of the Greek diplomacy that acted as a catalyst for Greece’s “yes”. His special relation with Ismail Cem gave “a real political thrust” to the current Greek positions.

One should note, however, that the idiosyncratic factor not only isn’t mentioned in the rest of the interviews, but also it is highly contested by some

interviewees. A telling example is the viewpoint of a Pasok interviewee, who served as an alternate foreign minister for seven years (Pasok 3):

“In international relations there is no friendship, no sympathy, no recognition. There are interests. The international relations are like the relations with the *bakkal*, a give and take with a sauce of high diplomacy. [...] While little Yiorgos was dancing syrtaki (with Cem), there were violations of the Greek airspace in the Aegean Sea. While Cem was dancing syrtaki with Yiorgos, there were uproars in Western Thrace”.

6. *Opinions on the Turkish accession*

The paragraph above summarizes the interviewees’ explanation of the Greek foreign policy change. But what is their personal opinion about the Turkish accession? The answers of the policymakers can be grouped in three categories: Against the Turkish accession (four interviewees), for Turkey’s membership (five) and for the Turkish membership but under specific conditions (five).

6i. *Negative opinions*

The arguments of the first group, who is against the Turkish accession (Pasok 3, Pasok 4, Syn 2, KKE) are threefold: Turkey’s membership in the EU will be a] harmful for the EU b] harmful for Greece and c] harmful for Turkey.

a] In particular, echoing the theses of many Europeans who are sceptical about Turkey’s membership, a Pasok official supported that: i) The Turkish culture has different roots from the European ones and its adjustment will be very difficult. ii) Turkey has a different institutional structure, lacking the necessary social practices

and historical preconditions in order to adopt a steady democracy, since the two political organisms that define its political reality are Islam and the army. iii) The significant number of the Turkish population will cause the total disruption of the function the EU. iv) The Turkish economy has problems that Greece has also faced in the past, but since it was smaller, Europe was able to surpass them. A member-state with such a financial reality as Turkey will cause many problems, like the issue of the free movement of the workers. v) Turkey is neighbouring the Arab countries and this is why it is forced to face facts from a different point of view from the European states; it must collaborate closely with the US and this might cause trouble in the functioning of the EU (Pasok 3).

Endorsing the arguments about the big population and the key geopolitical condition of Turkey, a Synaspismos official (Syn 2) added that by accepting Turkey, vi) Europe will be opening a way to accept a partner. Turkey will be one of the powers that will define the European developments. Besides, vii) Europe will be in more danger to become just a common market, with different speeds of financial development, while viii) the possibility for a strong European identity will fade away. In addition, ix) an enlargement in order just to expand the European market says nothing about the amelioration of the position of the European people and workers. On the contrary, it will augment the divisions and the gaps in the EU.

b] The same interviewee underlined that Turkey is still an occupying force in Cyprus, which is an EU member, while the bilateral issues are still unsolved. In his own words, if Turkey gets closer to the EU, “it will have extra cards for the role that it wants to play in Cyprus and for the change of the Aegean status quo” (Syn 2). Besides, for a Pasok official “there is no equality between the geopolitical importance of Greece and Turkey. But we must keep a balance, which will also give

security to the Greek side. The membership of Turkey in the EU will influence this balance”.

c] Finally, the communist interviewee based his objection on the negative influence that the European membership will have on the Turkish people and the Turkish institutions: “This process is harmful for the workers and the poor, as far as the education, health and other social issues are concerned [...] Besides, the process is harmful for the foreign policy, since, as long as the European integration moves forward, the foreign policy issues cease to be solved on the basis of international law and are defined on the basis of the competition between the great powers (inside the EU and also between the EU and the United States)” (KKE).

At this point, two observations are necessary. First of all, the view of the Pasok interviewee that the Turkish accession will create many problems for the EU was repeated by all the interviewees *without* exception. But, apparently, for the rest of them, these problems don't constitute sufficient reason in order to oppose the Turkish accession, from which a lot of benefits may rise. Secondly, all the interviewees with negative opinion on Turkey's membership underline that they disagree with the religious barriers that certain people rise against Turkey.

6ii. Positive opinions with pre-conditions

Three are the basic preconditions that the second group of interviewees (Pasok 2, ND 2, ND 3, ND 5, Syn 1) raises, before Turkey gets the final “yes” for its accession to the European Union. Two concern Turkey's development and one the evolution of the EU itself.

As a former alternate foreign minister notes, “Turkey’s European orientation may be in the long term the best thing that has happened to Greece since 1922” (ND 3). But Turkey should avoid the violation of the Greek airspace and recognize the Cyprus Republic before it becomes a full member of the EU (ND 3). The respect of the Greek territorial integrity and national sovereignty (Pasok 2), together with the intensive effort to solve the bilateral disputes (ND 2) are considered as necessary for Turkey’s European course to go further. For another interviewee, Turkey’s accession cannot be concluded if it doesn’t show real respect to the human rights, the religious freedoms and the minority rights (ND 5).

However, as a Synaspismos official underlines, Turkey’s accession will not be meaningful if Europe itself doesn’t evolve to greater political unification. In his own words: If the political integration of the EU moves forward then Turkey and everyone else can enter. [...] But it is a precondition that the political integration of Europe moves forward. If this doesn’t happen, Europe will not stay at the condition that it is now. It will brake down, not tomorrow but in the long run. Because, if a country (Greece, Belgium or Turkey), doesn’t believe that we are obligatory walking forward together, it will try to save itself in every crisis. So, in such a situation there is absolutely no point if Turkey enters or not (Syn 1).

6iii. Positive opinions

Most of the arguments of the five interviewees who answered affirmatively at the question if Turkey should enter to the European Union (Pasok 1, Pasok 5, ND 1, ND 4, Dip. Corps) are cited above, in their justification of the policy change that their parties realized towards Turkey’s accession (see *II.5. The reasons for the*

change of the Greek policy). In brief, these policymakers concede to Turkey's accession because: Greece has no national reason to say no; Turkey's ensuing democratization will increase safety in the area; a new framework for the solution of the bilateral disputes can be created; Turkey will become a more "negotiable" partner; Turkey itself is rapidly evolving and Greece has to stop being the only country that raises objection to Turkey's accession.

7. Opinions on the Helsinki process

The positive or conditionally positive attitude of the majority of the interviewees towards Turkey's accession doesn't necessarily mean that there is a respective acceptance of the Greek policy during the Helsinki Summit of 1999. Apart from three interviewees who didn't specify their views on Helsinki, five disagree with the governing party's handling, while only six of them agree, in comparison with the ten positive and conditional positive answers on Turkey's European course. Interestingly enough, there were *both* disagreements with Helsinki from people who support Turkey's accession, *and* agreements with the conclusions of the Summit from people who don't want to see Turkey inside the EU (but who would prefer a "special relation" between the two).

In particular, the people who view positively the developments of December 1999 (Pasok 1, Pasok 3, Pasok 5, ND 1, ND 4, Syn 1), consider the conclusions of the summit as setting a framework of obligations that Turkey must fulfil before completing its foreign policy goal to enter in the EU. As the counsellor of the Greek Foreign Minister at the time affirms (Pasok 5):

"At Helsinki, the real issue wasn't if Greece would say yes or no to the Turkish candidacy. What we tried and finally achieved was to persuade

all member-states that, if Turkey becomes a candidate country, this will have to be a full candidacy, not a virtual one, as some of our allies wanted. To that, we said no: If Turkey is a candidate, it should be a serious one, with all the rights and all the obligations. From the moment that we approve the candidacy, we will say to Turkey that: ‘we seriously mean that during your accession course we will demand from you to make all the necessary changes’. And this was the great achievement of Helsinki: That we persuaded our allies that Turkey should have a full candidacy”.

As for the text of the conclusions itself, it is approved by this group of candidates since “the EU pledged that Cyprus will be a member, even if the political problem of the island is not solved [...] It talks about the human rights, the Kurds, the bilateral disputes, about things that we must put into practice” (Pasok 1). Especially the paragraphs on Cyprus were regarded as a great victory of the Greek diplomacy (ND 1).

On the other hand, the Helsinki critics (Pasok 2, Pasok 4, ND 2, Syn 2, KKE) consider it as a bad development for the Greek-Turkish relations, mainly because of the infamous phrase that the candidate country will have to regulate all ‘border disputes and other issues’ before its accession. As the interviewee of the Communist party explains, “there are some people who claim that this phrase doesn’t refer to the bilateral disputes. But Turkey doesn’t have serious issues of that kind with any other country. The phrase therefore is a second affirmation (after the Madrid Conference of 1997) that the Greek government accepted that there are other issues with Turkey apart from the continental shelf, which was its fixed position” (KKE).

Therefore, “it actually widens the Greek-Turkish disputes” (ND 2) and “it opens a path that says that we must have an amelioration of the bilateral relations at any cost, even with discounts” (Syn 2).

For the Communist interviewee, the whole thinking of transferring the bilateral problems into the European framework is mistaken: “The Greek government believed that it should exploit the chance that it had to transform the Greek-Turkish issues into European ones; but this means that the basis for their solution will no longer be international law, but a questionable law, which could create further problems” (KKE). For a former alternate minister of foreign affairs, the phrasing of the Helsinki conclusions was wrong because it augments the possibilities of an American interference: “We don’t say ‘border disputes and other issues, because this serves the American fixation for a package deal. This means that the problems will be perpetuated until there is an American intervention in the Mediterranean” (Pasok 2). Besides, “it doesn’t define in which way one can press to the other party to stop the military provocation” (Pasok 4).

2.2.3 The present and the future of the bilateral relations and Turkey’s European course

1. The Greek-Turkish rapprochement

The next logical question after the one concerning the Helsinki Summit would be the interviewees’ opinion about the widely publicized accompanying rapprochement between Greece and Turkey, about the “seismic or people’s diplomacy” and the usefulness of the “low politics” agreements that followed. The degree of uniformity in the opinions of the 11 interviewees that answered is stunning: Apart from two (Pasok 5, ND 1) who gave real credit to this policy, the rest seemed

pretty reserved concerning its tangible results, while three of them (Pasok 1, Pasok 2, KKE) stated that there is no actual rapprochement at all.

Rather expectably, the person who acknowledged the most to the “low politics” agreements is the counsellor of the then FM Papandreou: “Let's not underestimate what some people call ‘low politics’. The bilateral problems and the Cyprus issue might not be resolved. We are still waiting for a solution, but now we can speak clearly about these things. There are still unresolved problems. But, it is important that we can now speak about them; that they are not a taboo; that one can talk openly and without misunderstandings; and that one can see what the other wants and seek a solution” (Pasok 5). Adding to that, the former PM Mitsotakis stated that at least now, with the bilateral rapprochement, the public opinion supports the governmental policy: “Unfortunately there is the populist, nationalistic propaganda that always reopens the old wounds. In any case, at this point, the public opinion won't create any problems. It's on our side” (ND 1).

The latter view, that the government will undoubtedly have the support of the people, is highly contested by other interviewees (Pasok 1, Dip. Corps). As a senior diplomat notes: “At this moment, we could go forward if there was good will on the Turkish side and a little more faith on the Greek side [...] But the public opinion can come and go very easily. All these feelings can flare up just because of some events. ‘Oh! Our Turkish brothers, oh they need help’. I don't give any importance to these things. The main thing is to have a credible government on the one side and an equally credible and politically strong government on the other, so that both governments will develop a policy according to their interests, not according to the impression that it will have on the public opinion” (Dip. Corps).

Besides, as other interviewees added, the policy that followed Helsinki is not efficient enough and Greece should continue to work in order to achieve better results (ND 2), while gradually we are seeing that even the decisions of Helsinki are starting to be threatened (Pasok 3). Finally, for another interviewee, it is no so much a “people’s diplomacy” that we witnessed after Helsinki, but rather a “diplomacy of the Greek capital” and this is why its public support is not secured in the future: “The policy that is exerted towards Turkey is a concessive one, which has the full support of the Greek capital. This is the social backing of this policy. The wider public doesn’t look easily at the other side or at the future” (Syn 2).

An even more reserved line is held by some interviewees who don’t see any tangible results from the policy which was implemented after the Helsinki Summit (Pasok 1, Pasok 2, KKE). The following quote is the most characteristic of their views:

“A picture is created that there is a rapprochement, but this image is completely fake and disorienting. Because it doesn’t touch upon the serious issues and every time these are discussed, it seems that nothing at all is resolved [...] Besides, we cannot consider as normalization the invasion of Greek industrialists in Turkey or some doubtful cultural activities, with a so-called symbolic character” (KKE).

To my opinion however, the comment that was most to the point was the one of a Synaspismos official:

“Now, since the general political direction is given, it will be extremely difficult to move backwards” (Syn 1).

2. *The bilateral disputes: Can they be solved and how?*

“During all these years, the two countries have harmed a lot each other. Firstly, with the defence expenditures. Secondly, with the fact that they were both treated with a feeling of superiority from the other states, who observed that there is antagonism between them and acted either as guardians or as referees”, notes the former FM Pangalos (Pasok 1). His comment seems to be endorsed by all the interviewees: Turkey and Greece must find a way to solve the bilateral disputes and move together peacefully in the future. This view is clearly presented above (see *I.I. The Greek position vis-à-vis Turkey*). But what are the preconditions for this to happen and the ways through which it can be achieved?

Before answering this question, some interviewees point at various external factors that influence the course of the bilateral negotiations. Primarily, the Cyprus issue, whose solution (or at least the effort for it) is viewed as critical for the creation of a concrete base in order to start a serious bargaining (Pasok 1, Pasok 5, ND 1, ND 3, ND 5). Secondly, the will of EU and the will of NATO (KKE), or more specifically of the Americans (Pasok 2), who have particular interests in the South-Eastern Mediterranean region. Thirdly, the priorities, the plans and the strategies of the dominant classes in both countries (Syn 2).

Apart from that, there is a specific psychological climate that should be created between the two states: The words “trust” and “true will to pursue common goals” were repeated in many interviews. In addition, the “clear policies”, the “efforts for understanding the position of the other”, and the feeling that your interlocutor is a “dependable player” that “won’t engage in treachery” are viewed as equally significant. Credibility in particular is deemed as extremely important, since

for certain interviewees this is the basic characteristic that Turkey lacks (Pasok 4, ND 4). Besides, a feeling that the positions of the other side are not dictated or influenced by nationalism would also be of great help (ND 1, ND 4).

The means in order to achieve a final solution to the bilateral disputes is dialogue, for many interviewees. And it is important that this dialogue faces the core of the bilateral problems and not secondary issues (Syn 2). For some policymakers, the dialogue must be carried out only between the two countries, without foreign interventions (Pasok 2), while for others it cannot be fruitful without international support (ND 2). A similar disaccord appears on the issue of resorting to the International Court of Justice: While many interviewees believe that this is the best way to solve the continental shelf problem (officially, the only real bilateral issue), for others, the decisions of the ICJ are not so dependable. As a former alternate foreign policy characteristically notes:

“If someone studies the decisions of the ICJ, none is solely based on international law. The basis for all of them is the principle of equity. Malta has the biggest continental shelf in the world. Do you know why? In order to limit the continental shelf of Kaddafi. This small island has a huge continental shelf. About which international law are we talking, when the judges become millionaires with only one case? And the Turks are going to buy them all” (Pasok 2).

In any case, for many interviewees (e.g. Pasok 2, ND 1, ND 3) the respect for the international treaties and the status quo must accompany any effort for solution. This is a precondition whose enunciation is mainly targeting Turkey, just like the calls to stop the violations of the Greek airspace (ND 3) and abandon the hegemonic mentality (Pasok 1). For other interviewees, a solution to the bilateral problems cannot arise if Turkey itself doesn't change, like its “deep state mentality” which

blocks every effort for solution (ND 2). One should underline, that for some of these policymakers, this is why during the last years there was a “ray of light”: because Turkey slowly started to develop.

But, what about Greece? Are there any extra domains where it should show intensive effort? This issue is not faced by the policymakers, apart from one, an ND deputy who, underling the importance of education and economy for the development of every country, notes that “Greece should help to raise the living standards and the education level of the Turks” (ND 4). However, it would be unjust not to recognize that some interviewees (ND 4, ND 2, Pasok 4) did criticize the Greek policy towards Turkey in the past. The aforementioned Mitsotakis’ comment (ND 1) that “Greece didn’t have a clear line in its foreign policy” is a telling example. Nonetheless, it is difficult to discern when this self-criticism to Greece’s policy arises from self-reflection and when it is based in intra-party rivalries.

3. Can the European framework help in the solution of the bilateral disputes?

If Turkey enters into the EU, will this influence drastically the solution of the bilateral disputes? Not every interviewee is that optimistic. For seven of them (Pasok 1, Pasok 2, Pasok 3, Pasok 4, ND 2, ND 5, Syn 2), the answers range from “no” to “it will be very difficult” and “not enough”.

“Do you know what this idea reminds me of?”, one of the interviewees asked me. “Of two people that are engaged to be married and they fight. Many people say, don’t interfere with them. But, if they attack each other like this now, tomorrow, when they will be one family, will they attack each other less? Now at least, they are supposed to be in love, to pass the period of great love” (Pasok 4). For this

policymaker the complete solution of the bilateral disputes should be a precondition before any more steps are made for Turkey's accession process.

For others, the European framework is judged insufficient to contribute significantly to a solution firstly, because it doesn't have the corresponding mechanisms: "It is not that easy to "erase" the problems through the EU, because it doesn't have a specific policy on these issues. This happens on issues like the agricultural policy, competition etc. There is no communal policy on the issue of border definition, or on the communal relations in the framework of each state (like Cyprus). Of course, a positive atmosphere will be created, but this will be just another organization where the two countries participate, as we have until now commonly participated in NATO, the Council of Europe, OSCE, OECD etc." (Pasok 1). Secondly, because the prospect of Turkey's final membership lays far away in the future, while the bilateral problems need to be faced immediately (Pasok 2). Thirdly, because if Turkey enters in the EU, its relative power will grow and it might become even more aggressive (Syn 2) and finally, because the problems will be solved only if Turkey itself undergoes real changes (and not only complies with the Copenhagen criteria).

Nonetheless, there are some interviewees who have more faith to the effects of the European framework (Pasok 5, ND 1, Syn 1, KKE). Repeating the democratic peace argument, the counsellor of former FM Papandreou (Pasok 5) supports that the whole Europeanization process will democratize Turkey, thus making it more prone to peace. Having a more pragmatic approach, two ND officials (ND 1, ND 4) claim that if Greece helps to avoid crises in EU-Turkish relations then Turkey will contribute to the solution of the bilateral disputes and the Cyprus issue in return. An EU-federalist Synaspismos official states that from the moment that the political

integration of the EU will move forward, the bilateral disputes will be downgraded into non-issues, since for example “the Aegean will become a European sea” (Syn 4).

Finally another interviewee, who also believes that Turkey’s accession will influence the bilateral disputes, notes that this will not necessarily have good consequences, since the issues will not be regulated according to the will of the governments, but according to the will of Brussels (KKE).

4. The European prospects of Turkey

The first observation of the interviewees when asked about Turkey’s European future is that these two entities are very different and that “their osmosis needs time and conditions”, in order not to be dangerous neither for Turkey nor for the EU. The European problems concerning Turkey’s population and economy are not without substance, as even the “architects” of the Greek “yes” to Turkey acknowledge. Besides, if Europe admits the two candidate countries which are next in line, namely Romania and Bulgaria, it will already have a lot of problems to solve (ND 1). Therefore, Europe “isn’t yet ready to pay the bill for the Turks” (Pasok 1).

In addition, even if Turkey satisfies the Copenhagen criteria, it will need many years in order for the reforms to be implemented in the daily life of the people. This observation was illustrated with a joke by a former foreign minister (ND 2):

“It is very difficult for Turkey to change abruptly. Let me tell you a joke from WWII. The Americans had sent to England aircrafts and crews in order to participate in the war against Germany. These were stationed in several airports and there was one near Cambridge. So, the American pilots visited Cambridge and started admiring the grass. When they saw

two English people sitting there, they said: "Can we ask you something? How do you make the grass so nice? We ask because we're also thinking to put some grass back home". So, the Englishmen replied: "We do nothing special, we just plant it and we take care of it for two hundred years"".

Consequently, it was a common estimation in the interviews that a period from 10 to 20 years is imperative, before Turkey could become a full member of the EU, while "the accession will need to be carefully planned step by step" (Pasok 5).

The Greek policymakers perceive the European governments as much more willing to accept Turkey into the European Union than the people of the European states (ND 1, Pasok 4). But they discern great differences in the reactions towards Turkey's accession also between the European leaders: "There are many different views on Turkey's accession even between people from the same country. Fischer for example says that Germany needs Turkey in, because of geostrategic reasons, but Schmidt says that it is megalomania for Europe to want to become a part of Asia" (Pasok 4). This division of opinions on Turkey's accession is considered as another potential danger for the future of Europe, which must be faced before the negotiations move any further.

However, for certain interviewees, Turkey doesn't have many choices rather than banging at the European door (Pasok 3, ND 4, Syn 2), since its geopolitical position which for the moment guarantees her a privileged relation with the United States, won't always be so important.

This is the reason why, before being a full EU member, Turkey should learn to live with the rest of the Europeans breathing down its neck –which is extremely difficult, as the case of Greece has proven: "This is a shock and someone has to live it in order to understand it. It is shock to have everyday questions by the Finish: 'In

that village, why did the parents beat their children?' One cannot say: 'Why do you interfere?' He is obliged to give an answer. And if there is a legal issue, to pay the price", remembers a former Synaspismos MEP (Syn 1), who concludes: "The European course of Turkey depends on Turkey itself" –a conclusion with which almost everybody agrees.

2.3] CONCLUSIONS AND ADDITIONAL REMARKS

The wide array of opinions which are presented above allows a first insight into the Greek policymakers' views on Turkey, Greek-Turkish relations and Turkey's EU candidacy. Nonetheless, a summary of the interviewees' major remarks and of their significance for this research is necessary before proceeding to a more detailed analysis of Greece's policy towards Turkey's accession.

2.3.1 Greece and Turkey: the two faces of Janus

As it is underlined above, the lack of aggressiveness and the good intentions are the two major qualities that the policymakers attribute to their country in its bilateral relations with Turkey. This perception is fully in line with the official image that their four parties propagate for Greece –namely, as a country with a "dynamic foreign policy of cooperation" (ND), "which contributes and safeguards peace" (Pasok), "seeking a just and viable solution of the Cyprus issue, together with the normalization of the bilateral disputes" (Syn), because "the two people must come together, in the closest possible way" (KKE). Besides, the policymakers' perception of Greece as a benevolent country towards Turkey reflects the attitude of the people,

who declared that they opted for a rapprochement with their neighbouring country by 63% in a survey following the Helsinki Summit².

This positive opinion on Greece is not accompanied with an equally positive opinion concerning Turkey. The paragraphs 2.1.2.i, 2.1.2.ii and 2.2.2 summarize the policymakers' nuanced views on the Turkish people, which became a lot more uniform -and negative- on the issue of the Turkish military/bureaucratic elites and the Turkish strategy towards Greece. Turkey's intentions were generally judged as "expansionist", "revisionist" and "aggressive". The very few exceptions to this ruling perception, which either negate the idea of "the bad Turk" or recognize a gradual change in Turkey, transgress party lines, coming mainly from people with either a strong neoliberal (Mitsotakis) or a strong leftist (the interviewees of KKE and Syn) background. In addition, they transgress age groups and cannot be attributed only to the "New Guard"³ of Greece.

A characteristic example from the New Democracy party is that, while the 88-year-old Mitsotakis stated that Turkey doesn't have expansionist views and that the Venizelos - Atatürk spirit is still alive, the 49-year-old Voultepsi affirmed that Turkey has internal commitments which lead to violations of the Greek airspace and to an aggressive behaviour.

The ensuing result cannot be other than the following: For many of the policymakers of the period 1987-2002 that were interviewed for this research, the manichaeistic distinction between the "good Greece" and the "bad Turkey" still lived on. For the majority of the respondents, the image of a "danger from the East" hadn't eclipsed, in accordance with the Greek defence doctrine, which stopped considering Turkey as the country's main military threat only in the year 2005⁴. Therefore, there was no perception change in the minds of the policy-makers as far as the

characteristics and the goals of Turkey are concerned, that could explain the Greek foreign policy change towards Turkey's accession. There were other considerations that led Greece to agree to the unobstructed conduct of Turkey's accession negotiations. The respondents' own version for the reasons of that change is stated underneath.

2.3.2 European identity: acquired not inherent

On the question of whether Turkey is a European country or not, there was no agreement between the respondents. Nonetheless, a careful observation of their answers reveals an interesting point on how they perceive the European identity itself.

As it is noted in section 2.2.2.iii, there were only two definitely negative answers to the question of Turkey's European identity (belonging to the "Old Guard"³ of Pasok) and only in these two there was reference on the issue of the Turkish culture, which was conceived as different from the European one. The respondents that answered affirmatively to whether Turkey is European, based their views on other considerations, namely the membership of Turkey in the Council of Europe (which meant that its European character is already acknowledged), and the cultural (among others) interdependence between the nations, which renders issues like identity rather irrelevant. These positions, together with the fact that many interviewees stated that Turkey has the potential to *develop* into a European state, lead to the assumption that, for most of the policymakers, the European identity is not something inherent, but something acquired or dependent on the circumstances.

One should note that this seems to be in contrast with the opinion of the Greek public, which together with the Portuguese one is the most likely in the EU to believe in an established shared European cultural identity, by 49%^o.

2.3.3. The reasons for the Greek veto in the past

In paragraph 2.2.3, the policymakers present mainly four reasons in order to explain the Greek veto towards Turkey's accession: 1] The aggravated situation of the bilateral disputes, 2] The will for the solution of the Cyprus issue, 3] The internal commitments of the Pasok government, which didn't allow dialogue or cooperation at any level and 4] The fact that the issue of Turkey's accession was not considered as imminent, while there were other problems (like the accession of Portugal and Spain or Greece's own position in the European Community) that troubled more the Greek government.

From these arguments, the first two are the most popular among the policymakers. However, these two are the ones who can least explain the foreign policy change itself. Neither the bilateral disputes nor the Cyprus issue were solved at the time of the Helsinki Summit. Which means that: 1] either the policymakers perceive Helsinki as a defeat of the Greek government, since it accepted the Turkish candidacy without having satisfied the reasons for which it vetoed it in the past (which is not the case, as it is revealed later on in the interviews, by the support that many declared to the governmental policy of 1999), 2] either the Greek government had other reasons to accept Helsinki, which were stronger than its persistence on its declared goals (eg. foreign pressures), 3] or that it decided to escape the trade-off logic of the past.

2.3.4 *The respondents' outlook on the reasons of the Greek foreign policy change*

The majority of the interviewees promote (or at least strongly indicate) the domestic situation for understanding the Greek “yes” to Turkey’s candidacy: The government’s feeling of impasse in the bilateral relations was combined with the wish of the Greek politicians to better take into advantage Turkey’s intensively expressed desire to become a member of the EU. As many of them noted, the advantages that could arise from Turkey’s accession process would be greater safety for Greece and easier control on its neighbouring country, as well as developments in Cyprus and in the solution for bilateral disputes. In parallel, the interviewees stated that the Greek government promoted Turkey’s accession, hoping that this will end the perceived seclusion of Greece in the international scene, too.

All of the interviewees *except two* also pointed at the role of foreign actors in tracing the Greek policy towards Turkey. The “American hegemon” and, in lesser degree, the EU are believed to have exerted to Greece both direct pressures and indirect influence, since the Greek establishment didn’t want to oppose their interests in the area (as it perceives them). These interests are generally conceived as favouring Turkey, due to its geopolitically and (potentially) economically important role. The foreign, and especially the American, influences to the Greek foreign policy decision mechanism are viewed in a negative way from all (but one) of the interviewees who made reference to them. This feeling of distrust towards the US plans in the area, which one can get from the interviews, conforms to the views of the Greek public, which in a recent Eurobarometer study declared that they trust the American foreign policy only by 5%. In any case, it is important to underline that all the policymakers seemed to base their opinions on the American plans on their

personal experience and on their “rational” holistic interpretations of the international environment –and not to an inherent unjustified anti-Americanism for which the Greeks are sometimes accused⁸.

In the interviews, no reference is made to Turkey’s internal situation and change as a factor influencing the Greek policy towards it, except in the case of two interviewees. Even the respondents who supported that Turkey’s evolution played a role in tracing Greece’s policy, they describe this evolution as “internal democratization” and “more proneness to dialogue” –not as a change in the strategic goals of Turkey towards Greece. Equally limited reference is made on the role of the individuals in the Greek foreign policy change, which is strongly contested by some of the interviewees.

It is worth noting that the Pasok and the New Democracy interviewees show remarkable similarities in their reading of the reasons for the Greek foreign policy change. More differentiated are the leftist respondents, who pointed more at the systemic level for explaining Greece’s attitude towards Turkey’s accession.

From all these complementing opinions on the reasons for the change of the Greek policy towards Turkey’s EU candidacy, it is worth focusing a little bit more on the three most influential leaders of the Greek diplomacy during the ‘90s: Prime Minister Mitsotakis for the period 1990-1993, Foreign Minister Pangalos for the period 1996-1999 and Mr. Droutsas, speaking in the name of Yorgos Papandreou, who was Foreign Minister from 1999 to 2002.

According to PM Mitsotakis, Greece had to say “yes” to Turkey’s accession efforts because it had no national reason to contend it and because it didn’t want to be “the bad guy” in Europe, as had happened during the government of his

predecessor, Andreas Papandreou. Besides, Greece had to solve in the quickest possible way the bilateral disputes and take steps towards the solution of the Cyprus issue; and supporting Turkey's accession could constitute a good first step towards dialogue. For FM Pangalos, Greece's veto to Turkey's accession had offered all that it could offer, namely a secured accession of Cyprus in the EU and a discussion of the Greek-Turkish disputes on a European level. Therefore Greece had to find a new way to face its bilateral problems with Turkey and it decided to do so, but letting Turkey to participate into the European framework. Finally, as Mr. Droutsas affirms, when Yorgos Papandreou became Foreign Minister, he also believed that Greece should try a new way to face Turkey, without retreating from its interests. He saw that, if Greece proceeded alone, it would be difficult to solve the bilateral disputes, due to the huge defence expenditures and because the other international actors (who support Turkey) will treat Greece as an odd man out and will exert pressures on it. So Greece had to find international support and the best way to do that would be the European course of Turkey. Besides, Turkey's Europeanization would bring its democratization, and this way Turkey might present a lower danger for Greece.

As it is apparent, the three policymakers are slightly differentiated in their reasons to choose the foreign policy option of a positive stance towards Turkey's accession. However, it was a common wish of all to change policy, in order to solve the bilateral disputes and assure international support –and the safer and most promising field in which this change could take place was Turkey's accession efforts to the European Union. The ensuing result is that the Greek support to Turkey's accession could be characterized as the most important tactical move of the programmatic decision of the Greek government to pursue rapprochement with Turkey. As “programmatic”, are characterised the major decisions with long-range

consequences, made following detailed study, deliberation and evaluation of a whole range of available options (Couloumbis & Wolfe, 1978: 128).

2.3.5 Opinions on the Greek support towards Turkey's accession

The arguments which the three aforementioned politicians used in order to explain their policy change towards Turkey's accession were endorsed by the most "modernizing" factions of Pasok, who were in power during the end of the '90s, as well as by the "modernizing Euro-liberal" faction of New Democracy, still gathered around the former PM Mitsotakis. This way, the necessary bipartisan consensus was created in order to fully implement the new policy towards Turkey's accession and "pass" it to the Greek public which usually shows an augmented sensitivity in the Greek-Turkish affairs.

However, as it is apparent also in the interviews, it was not easy for all the Pasok and New Democracy politicians to accept the new policy line. The more conservative faction of New Democracy (represented in this paper by three interviewees), together with a part of Pasok's "Old Guard" (one interviewee) hurried to underline that Turkey's accession cannot be completed if it doesn't take concrete step in order to normalize its relations with Greece (stop the violations of the Greek airspace, respect the Greek national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and recognize the Republic of Cyprus). To these conditions, a Synaspismos official added the need for further integration of the EU, in order for Turkey's membership to have a true meaning. The rest of Pasok's "Old Guard" and the majority of the leftist respondents disagree completely with Turkey's accession to the EU, for different reasons in each case.

Statistically, these opinions can be expressed as following: 35% of the interviewees were for Turkey's accession, 35% for but with pre-conditions and 30% against the Turkish membership in the EU. Compared to the public opinion, in a poll that took place on November 2002, 44% declared that Turkey's accession is beneficial for Greece, 37% that it's not beneficial and 19% didn't express an opinion on that⁹.

2.3.6. The support for the Helsinki Summit

The Pasok government of the year 2000 presented the Helsinki Summit as a great victory for the Greek diplomacy and as the beginning of a new era in the bilateral relations. The euphoric climate that was transmitted by a part of the Greek media had a deep impact on the public opinion: On March 2000, only a minuscule 6.6% of the Greeks classified the Greek-Turkish relations as one of the country's problems, compared with the 24,9% who did that on December 1997, even though that year there were also efforts for rapprochement after the Declaration of Madrid¹⁰.

However, as it is noted in paragraph 2.2.7, amongst the politicians there was a big divergence of opinions concerning Helsinki's benefits for Greece. 55% of the respondents agree with the conclusions of the Summit, while 45% disagree. The 45% comprises two of the three leftist interviewees, two members of Pasok's Old Guard and a pro-accession ND respondent, who wished for better negotiation of the Summit's conclusion. If one compares the support for Helsinki to the support for Turkey's membership, s/he will come to the following conclusion: There were both disagreements with Helsinki from people who support Turkey's accession and

agreements with the conclusions of the Summit from people who don't want to see Turkey inside the EU.

More than any other issue, the interviewee's opinions on Helsinki show the thriving existence of factions in the Greek political parties. The official New Democracy line at the time was that Helsinki constituted a good development for Cyprus, but as far as the bilateral issues are concerned, it should have been better negotiated. Nonetheless, two ND interviewees belonging to the more "liberal" faction of the party were ready to accept it without reservations. Accordingly, the Synaspismos official line was satisfaction for the decision of the Summit; however, in this research (and not only here), its respondents were divided, being one pro and one against the Summit's results. Finally, the Old Guard of Pasok, staying put to the "patriotic" policy of its founder, Andreas Papandreou, didn't hesitate to exert interparty opposition to Pasok's new leader Simitis, by criticising the Helsinki process, despite its occurrence in a critical for the party, pre-election period, when unity would be the norm.

2.3.7 Bilateral disputes: the means to an end

In a recent opinion poll¹¹, 76% of the Greeks underlined the necessity of immediate negotiations with Turkey for the solution of the bilateral disputes. The latter are understood by the majority exactly like they are understood by the interviewees of this research (with the exception of Mr. Mitsotakis): as the delimitation of the continental shelf, plus the Turkish claims. So, how can the efforts for rapprochement help to the solution of the bilateral differences? Have they already contributed

towards this direction? Which is the best way to achieve this solution? And can the EU framework help?

As far as the rapprochement is concerned, after the earthquakes of 1999, half of the Greeks declared that they have trust in it: In an opinion poll before the Helsinki Summit, 51,1% said that, since this process is initiated, there will be an amelioration in the bilateral relations and only 44,2% declared that nothing will change¹⁴. Five years later, the Greek politicians, whose views are presented in section 2.III.1, seem a lot more reluctant towards the rapprochement's prospects. Only two acknowledge this policy's benefits, while for the others, the rapprochement is considered either as not enough or as... inexistent. Then, what about Turkey's EU membership? Couldn't this help towards a solution? 53% of the interviewees is not that optimistic, arguing that 1] the EU doesn't have the necessary mechanisms for handling such issue and 2] Turkey's membership is still a distant process.

Therefore, what can be done in order to end the current situation? In paragraph 2.3.2, the politicians propose, first of all, to face the external factors that influence the bilateral climate; for example, work for the solution of the Cyprus issue and for moderating the foreign involvement in the bilateral affairs. Many underline the importance of creating a climate of trust and credibility from both parties, while others insist on the acceptance of the international law from the part of Turkey and on its development for progress to occur.

Postscript

One of the most interesting observations which originated from the interviews concerning the Greek political scene is the great convergence of opinions between

Yorgos Papandreou's counsellor and representative, Mr. Droutsas, and the former Prime Minister, Costantinos Mitsotakis, who is the honorary president of New Democracy and (unofficial) leader of its more Euro-liberal faction. Even in questions where everybody else disagreed, like the benefits from the rapprochement, these two men showed a similar line of thought which could be explained by three speculations:

1. Pasok's views in foreign policy have significantly moved towards the right, approaching those of the New Democracy government of 1990-1993,
2. Mr. Mitsotakis is endorsing into interparty opposition, by supporting Pasok's policies against the general New Democracy line, for his own, personal reasons or
3. The opinions of both are dictated by the same external interest groups.

Our effort for explanation of this coincidence, together with the other conclusions will be presented at the following chapter.

ENDNOTES

¹ The alternate foreign minister replaces the foreign minister when s/he is traveling abroad or s/he is unavailable for decision-making.

² Gallup poll conducted by the company *Kapa Research* for the newspaper *To Vima*, published on September 3, 2000.

³ The phrase "New Guard" describes the younger, more dynamic officials of each Greek political party, who have the most promising future and their image hasn't been spoiled by political feuds or wrong decisions in the past.

⁴ As it was announced by the press, the Greek Governmental Council for Foreign Affairs and Defence altered the "National Defence Policy" or "Defence doctrine" on March 2, 2005, naming terrorism as the most important threat for the security of Greece. According to the newspaper *Ta Nea* (2/3/2005), this change occurred after taking into account the following developments: 1. Ankara's decision not to include Greece in the "military threats" against Turkey 2. The US/NATO (and partly EU) position, that there is an augmented danger for an outbreak in the Balkans and especially in Kosovo 3. The American estimation that Greece faces "an augmented danger from international Islamic terrorism" and 4. The further adjustment of the Greek Armed Forces to the new model of NATO.

⁵ With the phrase "Old Guard" are described the officials of a party who participated in its creation or have a long, distinguished history in its lines. When the phrase is used for the Pasok party, it usually connotes its members that had a close relationship with Andreas Papandreou and who stay faithfully committed to his ideas.

⁶ How Europeans see themselves: looking through the mirror with public opinion surveys, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2001.

⁷ The results of the Eurobarometer were published in the Sunday edition of *Eleftherotypia* newspaper on January 1st, 2005.

⁸ See Stutton David, "Poked by the 'Foreign Finger' in Greece: Conspiracy Theory or the Hermeneutics of Suspicion?" in Brown K.S., Hamilakis Yiannis (eds), *The Usable Past. Greek Metahistories*, Boston: Lexington Books 2003.

⁹ Poll conducted by VPRC institute on behalf of the Greek radio station “Sky”, on November 1-2, 2004.

¹⁰ Poll conducted by MRB company, on behalf of the Greek TV channel “Mega”, whose results were published in the newspaper *Ta Nea*, 7/3/2000.

¹¹ Poll conducted by VPRC institute on behalf of the Greek radio station “Sky”, on November 1-2, 2004.

¹² In Papanicolatou Nafsika, “Greek-Turkish friendship: zero hour”, *Dikaiomatika*, v. 7, October 2000.

3. GREEK FOREIGN POLICY: AN EFFORT FOR INTERPRETATION

In the quest for the reasons that led to the Greek foreign policy shift towards Turkey's EC/EU accession, the historical overview and the interviews that were presented in the previous chapters, provide valuable information.

The examination of the historical facts has shown that, in contrast with the Papandreou government of the '80s, the Pasok administration which ruled the country around the mid-90s, placed Greece firmly into the Western camp, desired to complete the country's Europeanization process and foresaw a lot more benefits from the European framework –not only economic and political, but also in the security domain. It still considered Turkey as the more important threat towards Greece's security, but it believed that the best way to face it was actually by accepting it into the European family.

The prime minister of the time, Simitis, by declaring himself ready to open Turkey's European path, was *realizing an idea which had been expressed already since the end of the '80s and which had been gradually prepared by a chain of choices and events which could be traced back to the previous decade*. The Greek government still linked the Cyprus issue to Turkey's accession negotiations, but now it didn't ask for the removal of the Turkish troops from Cyprus, before it could say "yes" to the Turkish membership. Instead, it asked for Cyprus' own unconditional accession –which was a lot more feasible to attain and acceptable by the neighbouring country.

Some of the rich empirical findings from the interviews, which could also help cut the knot of the Greek foreign policy shift, are the following: Indeed, *there was no change in the policymakers' perception as far as the characteristics and the*

goals of Turkey are concerned, which could explain the Greek foreign policy change towards Turkey's accession. Besides, the Greek policy towards Turkey's Europeanization was not influenced by considerations concerning its European identity. Among the policymakers there is no accord about the date, the people responsible and the reasons for the Greek policy shift. This was rather expectable, given the fact that everyone would like to stress his own contribution to the current, judged positive, situation. Nonetheless, the various complementing explanations for the Greek policy change, pinpoint at two levels of analysis: *the systemic and the domestic ones.*

Looking at the opinions on the Helsinki process and the decision to accept Turkey in the European framework, *one can easier find a pattern of similarities between the more "liberal" (as they are characterized by others) factions of the two main parties, than between government and opposition.* It was not easy for all the Pasok and New Democracy politicians to accept the new policy line, and the same goes with the smaller parties of the left: Synaspismos was torn in two, while the Communists were negative. As for the responses of the interviewee coming from the diplomatic corps which reflected exactly the governmental views, they rather confirm the widely accepted hypothesis that the diplomatic mechanism doesn't act as a policymaker, but as a policy-implementator.

Finally, the rather reserved stance of the respondents on the consequences of the rapprochement for the bilateral disputes could be explained from the fact that during the years from the end of period under study and the time of the interviews, no significant steps were taken for the dispute's solution.

How could one combine these findings in a solid explanatory framework? My proposition is the following: During the early '90s, the international environment in

which Greece was trying to trace its foreign policy witnessed some storming changes. The new conditions favoured a rapprochement between Greece and Turkey, in order to assure stability in the area; and they favoured Turkey, in its efforts for accession to the EU. But most importantly, they *favoured Greece*, if it decided to pursue its full Europeanization, for which cooperation with its “perennial enemy” would be *both a precondition* and an important *asset*. On the other hand, the Greek Europeanization on its own could function as an asset, if the Greek government decided to finally work towards a friendlier relationship with its eastern neighbour and a solution for the bilateral disputes, according to its declared wish.

However, the existence of these incentives and opportunities alone wasn't enough to make the Greek political classes pursue cooperation in a world of bounded rationality, as the case of the 1990-1993 and the 1993-1996 Greek administrations has proved. A new set of actors, the so-called “modernizers” had to arrive to power. These actors had matured ideologically in the early years of Greece's EC membership and they could better grasp what the membership meant for the country itself and for its external relations. They used the European framework as a banner in their internal political struggle against their “traditionalist” adversaries, gathering the support first of the business groups, then the media and then the wider public, until they won the electoral game which brought them to the government. Once there, they pursued the redefined (according to their views) national interest of their country, on the basis of their pre-electoral declarations -that is seeking its full Europeanization. Concomitantly, they also took advantage of the favorable conditions for cooperation that the systemic environment was already offering.

This is the argument that will be developed in the following pages.

3. 1] THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

In this section will be analyzed the consequences of the changes in the systemic environment to the Greek-Turkish-EU triangle. In addition, will be examined the role in the Greek foreign policy shift of the direct pressures that this environment seemed to exert towards a Greek-Turkish rapprochement.

3.1.1 The American hegemony and the Greek-Turkish-EU triangle

After the end of the Cold War, the US found itself alone in the steering wheel of international developments. Together with its Western allies, it had spent the last fifty years containing the Soviet Union and engaging in a constant fight to match power with power. Finally, as Conalis-Kontos explains, the US was now feeling free to concentrate on its declared goal to help create a new world order, where “freedom, democracy and market economy would be available for all”; also it could start fighting global and translational threats like crime, narcotics, ecological devastation, nuclear proliferation and terrorism. Nonetheless, the expressed American euphoria for the good years to come didn’t last long: Firstly, because of the pressing domestic debate on the new role that the US should acquire, between the neo-isolationists and the proponents of its role as a global policeman. Secondly, because of the new challenges in Asia, Middle East and Europe, where new identities were being re-established and the American economic primacy was questioned (in Yiallourides & Tsakonas, 2001). Between the two roles, the American administration chose the second and so it engaged in its first mission, to save a small Gulf War state from the aggressiveness of its neighbour.

As the US was feeling more and more comfortable in the role of the hyper-power, it cleared its goals and defined its strategy. To this strategy, the instability in the eastern Mediterranean region that persisted after the end of the Cold War created a big security challenge. A major cause of this instability was of course the Greek-Turkish disputes, which seemed rather to worsen than to improve since the beginning of the '90s. Incidents like the Imia/Kardak crisis, which are presented in the first chapter of this thesis, are particularly telling. Besides, the Cyprus question still lingered unsolved, despite the efforts both of the Bush senior and the Clinton administration to help towards a solution.

This situation contravened the American interests in the area, which are summarized as follows by Monteagle Stearns: Secure access to the Middle Eastern oil supplies; unimpeded rights of navigation in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean; implementation of the Dayton accords on Bosnia and Kosovo; and promotion of the Arab-Israeli peace process. In addition, interest in containing Islamic fundamentalism, which was expressed more intensively in the lands bordering the eastern and the southern Mediterranean (in Keridis & Triantafyllou 2004). To these interests one can add the growing disaffection inside NATO for the troubled relationship in its southern flank, which was difficult to neglect any more (or to exploit, according to some analysts who pinpoint at the huge purchases of American weapons by Greece and Turkey), in front of the plans for restructuring, as well as enlargement towards Central and Eastern Europe. Simply put, it would be very awkward to try to convince the candidate countries that they would benefit from accession to NATO, if the latter couldn't resolve a lingering internal dispute. The stabilization of the region had to come at all costs but, officially, equal distances had to be kept on the issues of contention between Greece and Turkey.

Besides, both had contributed significantly to the promotion of the American plans in the Middle East region. As far as the Greek side is concerned, Coufoudakis explains that the ND government of 1990 signed an eight-year DECA agreement which provided for the retention of two American bases in Crete. Despite strong domestic opposition, it supported the UN-mandated war against Iraq and, after much debate in the parliament, a Greek frigate joined the multi-national naval force in the Red Sea. When the war in Bosnia broke out, the Americans started considering Greece as a good means to conduct their plans for economic exploitation and geostrategic control in the Balkans. And indeed their bilateral relations developed a lot -with exchanges and visits in both sides of the Atlantic and even with an official recognition from the US ambassador of the negative role that the Americans played during the Greek junta. During the Kosovo crisis, Athens again declared immediately its support to NATO's bombings, despite the opposition of a major part of the Greek public opinion. The situation became particularly sensitive when, with the consent of the government, NATO troops and equipment disembarked at Thessaloniki (in Couloumbis, Kariotis & Bellou , 2003).

The role of Turkey in the American strategic planning in the area is described by Stephen Larrabee¹: While during the Cold War, Turkey was crucial in stemming Soviet military expansion, since it tied down 24 Soviet divisions and provided useful communications and intelligence assets, after the fall of the Iron Curtain its importance was based on different reasons. Basically, on its position between three areas, for which the Americans presented augmented interest; namely the Middle East, the Caspian and (as in the case of Greece) the Balkans. Ankara also was a strong supporter of the US policy in Bosnia and played an important role in implementing the US efforts to train and equip the Bosnian army, while it gave

assistance to the modernization effort of the Macedonian and the Albanian armed forces. Besides, Turkey was considered as an important stabilizing factor in the Caspian region and in the Caucasus, especially after the decision for the creation of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, which would help reduce the Georgian and Azeri dependence from Russia. Turkey proved more than willing to allow the US to use the Turkish facilities for launching air raids on Iraq in the Gulf War. Finally, Turkey's growing strategic relationship with Israel was seen by Washington as an important counterweight to radical Muslim regimes in the region, such as those in Iran, Iraq and Syria.

The importance that Turkey held in the American plans for the aforementioned reasons, resulted in an augmented American concern to secure Turkey's stability. One way to do that would be through Turkey's EU candidacy, which was often promoted by the US, with "discreet pressures" to the European member-states. One of the arguments that the Americans repeated in order to justify their support to Turkey's EU candidacy was that "Turkey must be rescued from the hands of Islamic fundamentalism". A characteristic example of the US "discrete pressures" is the intervention of the American president Clinton during the Cardiff Summit on June 16, 1998, when he called the Greek prime minister Simitis at 1.30' a.m., in order to convince him to change his attitude towards Turkey's candidacy, since "this might create tensions in the area" (*Eleftherotipia* newspaper, 16-06-1998). Besides, another explanation for the American support to the European orientation of Turkey was that the US government tried this way to "diminish the power of its traditional adversaries, like France and Germany" inside the EU. This argument, which appeared in the American newspaper *Wall Street Journal* was also adopted by the British magazine *Economist*, where it was stated that: "Like the ten countries

from central-eastern Europe that just joined the EU, Turkey would promote the pro-American feelings inside the EU, acting against the older countries, like France, which flirted with the idea of creating a counterweight to the United States”². In addition, Washington was considered willing to anchor Ankara to Europe so as to avoid any European defence mechanism that is not “exactly coextensive and subordinated to NATO”³.

Finally, one should underline that after the end of the Cold War, the relations of Europe with Turkey started presenting a lot more problems than the Turkish-American ones. As long as the Soviet Union was perceived as the main threat, Europe gave high priority in its relations with Turkey due to strategic considerations. However, when after the early ‘90s, the economic and social issues, not the military and strategic concerns started dominating the Turkish-EU agenda, this underlined Turkey’s “distinctiveness” and raised questions about whether Turkey fits in the new, emerging Europe. The result, since the US was backing Turkey up, was that the country had emerged as an increasingly divisive issue in the transatlantic relations. Only after the Helsinki Summit in December 1999 the differences between US and EU over Turkey started being reduced. “Having achieved its main goal, Washington is now likely to step back and let the EU and Turkey work out the mechanisms of the Turkish accession”, affirmed Stephen Larrabee, member of RAND corporation⁴.

3.1.2 Towards a new Europe: Processes and implications for the Greek foreign policy

But how exactly did the EU develop after the end of the Cold-War? What was the position of Turkey in the European plans for the future? And how did this influence the Greek foreign policy?

After the end of Cold War, the EU appeared as the only institutional framework within which Greece could advance its interests. However, the EU in which Greece made its moves and calculations had changed significantly. The Union had come a long way since the European Coal and Steel Community of 1951, both in the enlargement and the integration domain, but also in its effort to play an important role on the international arena. As far as the enlargement is concerned, since the end of the Cold War, the process was intensified, in order to assure both the stability and the democratization mainly of the countries belonging to the former Warsaw Pact. In 1989, the EU set up a programme called Phare, for providing financial and technical assistance to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and in 1993, the Copenhagen European Council laid down the criteria for joining the European Union. During the mid 1990s, the EU was stormed with applications from former Soviet bloc countries, from the three Baltic states, from one of the Republics of the former Yugoslavia and from two Mediterranean countries. The Luxembourg European Council decided to launch the enlargement; and the decision was later affirmed at the Helsinki Council of 1999, despite the widely expressed fears mainly for the economic implications of the process.

Meanwhile, the integration process was also well under way. The Maastricht treaty of December 1991 added areas of intergovernmental cooperation to the existing Community system, thus creating the EU. It also set new goals for the member states, like a monetary union by 1999, a European citizenship, new common policies (including a common foreign and security policy) and arrangements for internal security. The Amsterdam treaty, which was signed in October 1997, amended the Maastricht treaty to broaden the use of qualified majority voting and

further increase the sectors in which the EC can agree on policies. In addition, it created the position of a high representative for the CFSP.

These efforts were aimed at strengthening the political weight of the EU on the world stage, where it was considered as an economic giant but as a “political dwarf”. However, during the time of the Greek foreign policy shift towards Turkey’s accession, the EU member states still had a long way to go in diplomatic and political terms, before they could speak with one voice on major issues. Besides, CFSP still rested only on the level of an idea: The EU countries retained full national sovereignty over their armed forces. Their defence systems were firmly in the hands of the national governments, and the only military ties between them were those forged within alliances such as NATO⁵.

Nonetheless, some of the member states were determined to proceed to a further strengthening of Europe, in order to render it an important international player. In that process, several EU leaders supported that Turkey had a significant role to play (a lot more fervently than their respective constituencies).

The supporters of Turkey’s accession, apart from underlining its natural right to apply for membership since it belongs in the European space, always mentioned the multiple economic, political and geostrategic benefits that could arise from Turkey’s accession. A few of their pragmatic considerations, collected from the bibliography, are the following: Turkey could play a role in the big European geostrategic plans concerning access to energy, as well as in the plans for economic and political cooperation with the Black Sea region, the Arab Gulf and the Caspian Sea. Especially if the European countries wanted to find themselves in close contact of the “energy Eldorado”, namely the Middle East, Turkey’s membership was indispensable. Some analysts were cautious, saying that Turkey belonged to the

American camp of influence and that it wouldn't be a benefit for Europe; but others affirmed that, through its accession course, it could be ascertained that the European influence on it would grow stronger and stronger.

Besides, Turkey had a huge economic potential, despite its current financial problems, and many studies showed that in the (not so) long run after its accession, it would stop being a burden for the European economy. For example, according to a recent impact study by the country's State Planning Organisation, if admitted into the EU, Turkey would contribute almost 6bn euros (\$8bn; £6bn) to its budget by 2014. Turkey could also help alleviate a labour shortage in the ageing Europe, once its population came of age. By 2014, one in four Turks -or about 18 million people- would be aged 14 or less^o. In addition, in countries like Germany with a great number of temporary migrant workers, parts of the policymaking mechanism had calculated that the formalization of the country's relationship with the EU might lead to a decrease in the attractiveness of the German citizenship for the Turkish migrants. One should note that such voices were amplified by the changes in the internal political situation of the member-states, like the replacement of Kohl (who was adamantly against the Turkish membership), by Schroeder in the leadership of Germany. Schroeder brought to the government an ideology of cosmopolitan inclusiveness and multicultural tolerance, which affected also the foreign policy of the country (Nikolaidis in Keridis & Triantafyllou, 2001).

Besides, the acknowledgement by the EU that Turkey was both willing and starting to present some progress towards changing in order to comply with the membership criteria, helped to gradually smooth some of the member-state's fears, concerning, for example, the political system or the human rights condition in the country. Finally, another issue that underlined the need for quicker developments on

the “Turkish question”, was its imminence: If the status of the other candidate countries was to be upgraded, it would be firstly inconsistent and secondly unfeasible from the part of the EU to keep Turkey in an indefinable status.

These changes at the European level had unwillingly a deep impact on the Greek foreign policy. First of all, they augmented the need for rapprochement between Greece and Turkey. For the other member-states, the very serious enlargement in which the EU was proceeding couldn't be jeopardized by a potential Greek veto due to a new dispute on the Aegean Sea. The European leaders wouldn't let that to happen and Greece was aware of that, as bibliography pre-dating the enlargement shows. Secondly, the changes at the European level created the need for Greece to think about how long it could keep holding Turkey out, given the augmented interest of the other EU members on the country. Together with the American, the European “inducements” for Greece to change its stance were also growing –as it was evidence by the statements of the Greek policymakers after the EU Summits⁷.

3.1.3. The Balkan front

The storming developments in Greece's northern frontiers couldn't leave unaffected the country which had already extensive interactions with the rest of the Balkan states. The basic consequences of Yugoslavia's break-up to the Greek foreign policy are analyzed in the collective volume, *Greece and the New Balkans: Challenges and Opportunities*⁸:

1. The emergence of an independent state striving to be called Macedonia created extensive security concerns to the Greek government and a high charged

political atmosphere, due to its potential territorial aspirations against Greece. In this negative climate, the government of the time didn't have an extensive margin for taking political risks favouring cooperation, due to its slim majority.

2. Some policymakers interpreted the situation as creating new prospects for a Turkish penetration in the Balkans, while the Greek fears that Ankara might be trying to create an Islamic arc surrounding Greece augmented.

3. Together with the Yugoslavian, the Albanian national question was also rekindled. The relations between Albania and Greece steadily worsened. Besides, due to the unstable situation in the former, there was an influx of Albanian nationals all over the country.

4. The Greek government saw a potential rise of Bulgarian nationalism and Bulgarian territorial aspirations against FYROM, combined with a possible rapprochement between Bulgaria and Turkey.

5. The Yugoslavian break-up had serious economic consequences on Greece, which was heavily dependent on road and rail routes throughout that region, in order to transport its products.

6. There was a serious deterioration of Greece's relations with its Western allies because of its effort to prevent the recognition of FYROM. This put it directly at odds with its European allies and led to serious strains with the EU.

7. There were tensions with the US, because of Greece's pro-Serbian foreign policy.

The handling of these new developments was characterized by many Greek and foreign analysts, as the Waterloo of the Greek foreign policy, long before it was over. Greece soon realized that its management of the situation was based on wrong estimations about the magnitude of the FYROM danger and that it was excessively

influenced by the domestic, populist concerns of some Greek policymakers. According to Larrabee, the government was caught in a cul-de-sac, trying to abate the national fervour that had been unleashed at home and to improve the increasingly tarnished image of the country abroad. However, the most important threat for Greece remained: it was the threat that instability could intensify and spillover in the whole of the Balkans, having as a result the degradation of the area in the European framework. This could further strain the economy, downgrade Greece as a part of a problematic area and involve it into dangerous adventures that could threaten its security. After the New York Interim accords with FYROM in 1995, Greece started to realize the possibilities for playing a leading role in the Balkans by promoting peace. As far as the fears of antagonism by a Turkish Muslim arc that were expressed during the previous years, the opinion-makers who showed greater sangfroid started gradually to appease them also: "The so-called threat of a Muslim arc is either non-existent, or, if it exists, it works on the advantage of Greece and the disadvantage of Turkey. Because Greece would win if Turkey was identified with the Muslim minorities of the Balkans", wrote Charalambos Papanotiriou in 1994⁹. And the first seeds that Greece could actually collaborate with Turkey in the Balkan area, started at that time to grow...

3.1.4 Conclusions

The basic conclusion that arises from this brief study of the international environment during the middle of the 1990s is that it favoured the Greek-Turkish cooperation. For different reasons, both the American and the EU partners of Greece promoted first and uttermost its rapprochement with Turkey and, on a secondary

level, pressured the country to allow Turkey's accession to the Union. Besides, the Greek adventures in the Balkan quagmire also narrowed the margin for the country to uphold rivalries in its northern frontiers –whether it was with its northern or with its eastern neighbour.

The efforts for bilateral rapprochement to which Greece was devoted later, as well as the Greek “yes” to Turkey's European orientation could lead to the assumption that the direct pressures from the systemic environment were the determining cause of the change in the Greek policy. However, before proceeding to this conclusion, one has to speculate if Greece had other choices: Could it ignore the external pressures without severe cost? Did it have an alternative, a margin for manoeuvres?

The answer would be a difficult to utter “yes”. As far as the American pressures for rapprochement are concerned, Greece could have just kept a careful attitude, in order not to cause any form of bilateral tension itself. If such tension occurred, it could wait for direct American intervention, the way it did in the Imia/Kardak crisis. The rapprochement was not the only way; it could just keep the status quo, if its only concern were the external pressures. Besides, Greece could have tried to augment its value for the US geopolitical plans (e.g. by participating more in the international military interventions serving the American interests), so as to balance the greater geopolitical value of Turkey in the US schemes.

As far as the European inducements for rapprochement are concerned, the “resistance” of Greece could work in the following way: Despite the pressures of the major EU partners on rapprochement and accession, there were still some members sceptical about the “European” character of Turkey. If Greece really didn't want Turkey to enter, it could continue saying “no”; keep a lower profile; create networks

of alliances inside the EU; and put other, more powerful countries upfront (eg. Austria), in order to keep Turkey out.

My point from all the above is the following: The *direct* pressures from the US and some EU members definitely influenced the Greek foreign policy shift, but they weren't the basic factor that changed it. Another aspect of the systemic environment –the fact that a more cooperative stance in the EU framework created opportunities and was set as a precondition in order to promote the Greek plans for the future– played a more decisive role and, combined with changes at the political class level, led to Greek acceptance of the Turkish candidacy. These opportunities and incentives will be described right below.

3.2] IN HOC SIGNO COOPERARIS:

INCENTIVES FOR RAPPROCHEMENT AND TURKEY'S EU ACCEPTANCE

The new European environment that was rapidly forming in the beginning of the '90s didn't just act as a mechanism exerting pressure for the promotion of a Greek-Turkish rapprochement. It offered a set of exchanges if Greece decided to promote cooperation and a set of good reasons for why the country should do that. These exchanges and reasons concerned: a. the Greek economy b. the Greek status in the European institutions c. the declared goal of Greece for an unimpeded accession of Cyprus and d. a positive framework for the solution of the Greek-Turkish disputes.

3.2.1 General incentives

3.2.1.1. Amelioration of the Greek economy and bilateral rapprochement: a two way procedure

The accession of Greece to the European Community in 1981 inaugurated for Greece a period of gradual incorporation and integration in a complex, translational process of economic and political restructuring, reform and rationalization¹⁰. The EC showed willing to help Greece as much as it could in the process; indeed, between 1981 and 1992, Greece received from the Community's budget 20 billion ECUs in net receipts (Ioakimidis 1994). However, in the 1980s the Greek economy deteriorated, with an average annual growth rate of 1.6%, compared to the 2.3% for Europe as a whole, while inflation averaged at 18.4% annually. Nonetheless, despite the persistent economic problems, military expenditures were kept at high levels, due to the "Turkish threat" –with an annual average of 6.52% of the GDP allocated to defence (Dunne & Nikolaidou 1998).

The efforts for convergence with the other EC economies, in which the Pasok government engaged itself during the period 1985-1987 weren't completed, causing the evident irritation of Greece's EC partners. As Diamantouros asserts, during the '80s the other member-states believed that Greece was regarding the Community as the last frontier for the extradition of resources, capable of supporting quick-enrichment schemes or of serving as a stop-gap measure designed to deal with growing deficits (in Clogg, 1993: 18). Although they knew that the majority of the Greeks favoured "deeper" European integration and that the whole of the political class had shifted to that direction, they viewed the country's membership as

controversial, fearing that the Greeks see the EU as a “bottomless pit into which European money is poured” but with little return in terms of economic performance (Featherstone in Clogg 1993).

After the Maastricht Treaty set the basis for Europe's biggest project for the next decade, namely the Economic and Monetary Union, the Greek government declared its willingness to do its best in order to participate in it. The decision for participation in the EMU was taken by the Papandreou government of October 1993 and was confirmed when Yiannos Papantoniou was placed in the head of the Economics Ministry on May 1994. The Greek request for joining the EMU was accompanied by a Revised Convergence Program, which was submitted at the ECOFIN and the European Commission (Papantoniou in Yiannitsis *et al.* 2004). The Convergence Program was approved on November 1994.

However, the Greek economy in the early-90s was an economy “stuck in the middle”, namely it had surpassed a lower level of development, but had difficulties in achieving a higher one¹¹. Very few people, inside and outside Greece, believed that the country could achieve its goals in the time frame that it had agreed. Its distance from the EU economies was huge, since the policies during the period 1990-1993 had aggravated the already bad economic condition of the country. The need to take immediate measures was compelling. Besides, some opinion makers feared that, the more the center of attention of the EC/EU is transferred to Central Europe, the less the EC will be willing to grant financial aid and support to Greece's economic effort. The financial aid that would be given to the Eastern European countries after the fall of the Iron Curtain as well as Germany's reunification would gradually relocate the EC/EU's financial epicenter to Central Europe, with severe consequences for the Southern EU countries and especially Greece¹².

One of the measures that had already been proposed by analysts since the end of the '80s was the positive financial consequences that a Greek-Turkish rapprochement would bring to the country: "A closer cooperation between Greece and Turkey and the eventual access of Turkey to the EEC could stimulate their trade and development. Despite their mistrust and hostility, expectations are that, under the umbrella of the EEC, these two countries will move from the stage of isolation and hatred to that of cooperation and possibly to common business ventures that will tend to submerge territorial and other differences [...] Good relations could increase trade and investments and reduce military spending [...] Greece and Turkey spend large amounts of money for defence, in order to protect themselves from each other. But they are related economically in the EEC and militarily in NATO. So, eventually they might have to reduce their mutual mistrust and look for ways and means to improve the standard of living of their people, instead of spending large amounts for military hardware. The EEC offers a good opportunity. Economic and political convergence should be emphasized on the regional as well as on the international level", the US-based professor Nikos Giannaris stated in 1988¹³.

Indeed, even though the end of the Cold War had created hopes for reductions in the defence budgets around the world and the general trend showed reduced military spending, there were still some countries that continued to spend a huge amount on defence each year. The major determinants of the Greek defence spending were not economic but strategic, namely the perceived threat of war by Turkey. One should note that the deep concern over the events in the Balkans (with the creation FYROM, the break up of Yugoslavia and the concern over the treatment of the Greek minority in Albania) initially seemed to suggest additional security problems. However, as Dunne & Nikolaidou explain¹⁴, since none of these countries

possessed large military establishments, the Greek defence policy and military planning wasn't significantly affected by them.

Around the mid-90s, it was admitted that military expenditures constitute a heavy burden for the Greek economy especially at that time, when the country was trying to implement its economic austerity program, in order to enjoy the benefits of full membership in the EMU. As a matter of fact, defence expenditures were responsible, to a certain extent for the country's budget deficit (Tsakonas in Yiallourides & Tsakonas 2001). Greece had to make financial readjustments, which implied cuts in the defence budget among others, and had to attract more investment, which implied appeasement of the uneasy situation at its borders. The ill-managed relationship with its Aegean neighbour had become an "unsustainable drain on Greece's economy" and this was underlined by various analysts¹⁵.

However, following the Imia/Kardak crisis, both Greece and Turkey escalated the purchase of new weapons systems¹⁶. According to Tsakonas¹⁷, as a result of the Turkish announcement in April 1996 of a ten-year \$31 billion armament program, Greece responded in November of that year with a \$14 billion program (called the Single Middle-Term Development and Modernization Program), which would be completed in the period 1996-2000. The cost of the armament program caused a big disagreement between the minister of defence and the minister of national economy, who was more reluctant to pay the bill. Due to the recent crisis, Greece had to complete this short-term armament goal. But, concomitantly, *Greece had to set a second medium/long-term goal, referring to Greece's ability to "escape" from the existing interminable arms race in a way that it would not deviate it from its strategic objective to fully integrate in the EU.* This could be a rapprochement with Turkey (Tsakonas in Yiallourides & Tsakonas 2001). The need of the times to

submit politics to economy and keep peace and stability in the eastern frontier is evident in the words of the alternate minister of economy Tasos Yiannitsis: "Non-balanced developments [in the effort for joining the EMU] would create dangers leading to failure in the timely achievement of Greece's EMU membership. This procedure brought into question various issues. One of them was the problem of interaction between the financial changes and politics, both in the domestic sphere, but mainly in the international sphere: namely, the interaction between the financial changes and the position, the weight and the role of Greece in the European System, in the Balkans and in its relations with Turkey"¹⁸.

As Dokos affirms, Greece had to find other policies to offset the Turkish prospective military superiority. Otherwise, the only option for Greece would be to follow Turkey in a costly and destabilizing arms race, which could create serious economics problems and accentuate the security dilemma in both countries¹⁹.

It is important to underline that realizing the need for rapprochement in the efforts to ameliorate the economy is reading the equation only from the one side: The ameliorated economy could also help implement the rapprochement too. Participation in the EMU was seen as capable to give to the government credibility, negotiating ability and a margin of freedom in decision-making concerning policy issues and especially foreign policy ones. It could give to the Greek government self-confidence, so that it can move with greater pragmatism, vision and strategy in its relations with its neighbouring countries. After the participation in the EMU, a Greece with greater confidence in its power and its future and with greater calmness in the evaluation of its geopolitical environment could take a more strategic stance towards its external relations²⁰.

3.2.1.2 Amelioration of the Greek international status

On March 5 1994, an amusingly written article entitled “The European Union” appeared on page 20 of the British magazine *The Economist*. The writer proposed to continue the EU enlargement with countries which are willing to play by the Union’s rules, but also to start kicking out older members who apparently do not. The “exclusion need not be permanent”, the article continued. “Once ejected, a country could apply for readmission. If it truly subscribed to the EU ideal, it should welcome the salutary shock. A list of candidates for exclusion based on the scorecard outlined above? Greece, Greece, Greece. And Greece”.

The relations of the country with its EU partners had arrived at the bottom low. Already since 1992, the EC Member States were not hiding their uneasiness and possible second thoughts over the Macedonian question. At the time, the European criticism against Greece concerned also the extent to which it implemented or abided to EU rules and the fact that it adopted policy positions outside the general EU consensus, thus putting itself out on a limb (Featherstone & Ifantis 1996). And, when in 1994 Greece severed diplomatic ties with Skopje and imposed a blockade on FYROM goods moving to and from the port of Thessaloniki, with the exception of humanitarian aid, serious European opinion-makers questioned openly the suitability of Athens in running the EU affairs for the first semester of 1994²¹. Greece’s partners were outraged by what they saw as an inflammatory action. The EU Commission referred the case to the EU’s Court of Justice in Luxemburg, but the Court finally favoured Greece²². However, “Macedonia overshadowed everything”, a European diplomat said to the *New York Times*. “The Europeans were very angry and their anger has lasted. This was a bolt from the blue. Yugoslavia has been such a mess for

Western foreign policy and then this decision introduced even more destabilization and the nightmare of war moving south” (22/06/1994).

In Europe, the Greek persistence at the “national issues” created the image that the country doesn’t want and cannot participate in the future of the EU. The pleas to adjust the role and the position of Greece, so that it takes more into account the issues that concern its EU partners were intensifying. One of these issues was, of course, the EU (and the Greek) relations with Turkey. In Greece, the other member-states were deemed incapable to understand the sensitivities concerning its relationship with its neighbour. As Veremis characteristically notes, “after each expression of enmity between Greece and Turkey, their bilateral relations take for our European partners the characteristics of an unexplained psychological engagement. The threat becomes ‘persecution mania’ and one array of real facts which date from 1974 is relegated to a psychopathology which is lost back in history”²³.

However, the drastic developments on the EU level augmented the necessity for Greece to repair its tarnished image. Firstly, the new enlargement of the EU, that was to follow suit after the storm of applications from the countries of the former Eastern bloc, underlined the need for the country to become a more deeply integrated and active player in the EU context²⁴. Secondly, Greece’s bargaining power in pursuing its national goals was diminishing from its “black sheep” profile. For Greece to be persuasive, it had to be a beneficial member of the community and also willing to cooperate on issues that are considered significant for other member states.

A rapprochement with Turkey would show such will for cooperation, appeasing Greece’s angry EU partners. Besides, the amelioration of the relations with Turkey and the possible acceptance of its EU bid would take from the shoulders

of the Greek diplomacy the burden of being the odd-man out who shows reservations and objections towards Turkey on the European level. The Turkish accession was a European issue and it should be faced as such (Krateros 1989; Veremis & Couloumbis 1994). Besides, an appeasement on the level of the Euro-Greek relationship could also work the other way around: It could help the Greeks to better deal with Turkey, when the time of finally solving the bilateral disputes would arrive.

3.2.2 Incentives for the Greek accord to Turkey's EU candidacy

3.2.2.1 Unconditioned accession of Cyprus

Since the end of the 1980s, when the first plans for a Cypriot application to the European Community were set, Greece started to project as its main goal the securing of Cyprus' accession to the EC. The island submitted its application for accession in June 1990 and the European Commission's avis was issued in June 1993. The Commission confirmed the European character of Cyprus, its European vocation and its eligibility for membership. Besides, the Greek part of Cyprus was becoming more and more prosperous and there were no economic issues that could not be resolved during the accession negotiations. However, the Commission recommended that the accession process should follow the resolution of the Cyprus issue. In the Commission's words, "as soon as the prospect of a settlement is surer, the Community is ready to start the process with Cyprus that should eventually lead to its accession"²⁵. After intense diplomatic negotiations and pressures from Greek side, in 1994 the European Councils of Corfu and Essen stated that the next phase of EU enlargement would involve Cyprus.

The Greek side had associated the opening of the entry negotiations with Cyprus to the Customs Union of Turkey with the EU, which was negotiated at the time. During the General Affairs Council of March 6, 1995, it threatened to use its veto power on Turkey's Customs Union, if it didn't assure that accession negotiations would start six months after the conclusion of the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference. The pre-accession strategy for Cyprus would include a structured dialogue for the examination of the *acquis* and the continuation of financial support through the Association Agreement Financial Protocols²⁶. The Greek efforts were crowned with success. Cyprus' membership was seen as a means to create new economic prospects for the island and maybe initiate a new phase in the attempts to reconcile the island's two communities, the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. As the newspaper *Times* asserted: "over the next two or three years, before the EU negotiations open, there is likely to be a constant round of diplomatic exchanges, in Cyprus, Greece and Turkey, involving mediators from the United Nations, the EU and the United States. Their aim will be a settlement on the island by the time negotiations begin in 1997 or, very likely, 1998, so that both Greek and Turkish Cypriots will in due course join the EU" (11/04/1995).

However, this was something secondary from the Greek and the Greek-Cypriot side. In fact, what they wanted to secure was a reassurance from the EU side that the island would join, even if its political problem remained unsolved. As the Cypriot foreign minister, Yiannis Cassoulides, supported, "a settlement is not essential before entry, because if the north did not join immediately, it could be admitted later, as the former East Germany did after the German reunification"²⁷. Besides, Cyprus is not the world's only divided island. Ireland is also divided by a border. Yet Ireland joined the EU and has benefited greatly from membership (*The*

Irish Times, 11/11/1996). Nonetheless, the Greek and Greek-Cypriot administration were afraid that when they would arrive at the end of the accession negotiations, an ill-affected country would tell them “this is great, you've moved on, but we cannot do anything before the political issue of the island is solved”²⁸. The possible arguments that an EU member-state could present for such a move are summarized by Tarik Oğuzlu²⁹:

1. If the Greek Cypriots secured their unconditional accession, their incentive for any further round of intercommunal talk would go down, since the Greek Cypriots would feel less motivated to accommodate the claims of the Turkish Cypriots as part of a final deal.

2. The Turkish Cypriot's dependency on Turkey would increase in many policy areas. This situation would level a serious blow to their communal identity. More settlers might come from Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots might find themselves a minority in their territory. Besides, the economic embargo would not be lifted and Turkey's economy might not be possible to help the Turkish Cypriots escape a financial crisis.

3. The addition of the Greek Cypriots to an “anti-Turkish bloc” within the EU would lessen Turkey's chance of EU membership, which was highly desired by some member-states. In Turkey, the pace of the EU-induced transformation process could slow down, since the country might find itself spending more on armaments, thus forsaking investments in more lucrative fields. Moreover, the anti-EU forces in Turkey might gain political victories against those who see the future of the country in closer integration with the EU.

4. The EU would find itself with a member state whose borders UN forces patrol. This would escalate the security and stability in the region.

Such fears could be alleviated by the gains that the Community could have from Cyprus' accession. But, a Greek rapprochement with Turkey and a possible acceptance of Turkey's EU candidacy would constitute a valuable bargaining chip for Greece, which would certainly help augment the EU's will to accept the island's membership with its political problem unsolved.

2.2.2 Solution of the bilateral disputes

As the Union's High Representative for the CSFP, Javier Solana had asserted, the EU "came into existence as an exercise in conflict prevention"⁵⁰. The EU was set up as a "security community". Namely, there were long-term, dependable expectations that members of the Community will resolve their problems by a process of peaceful change. This possibility was asserted after the Treaty of the European Union: In June 1992, the foreign ministers submitted a report to the Lisbon European Council on potential areas of CFSP "joint-action" vis-à-vis particular countries or groups of countries. Among others, the objectives of the joint action included:

- strengthening democratic principles and institutions and respect for human rights and democracy rights
- promoting regional political stability and contributing to the creation of political and/or economic frameworks that encourage regional cooperation or moves towards regional or subregional integration
- contributing to the prevention and settlement of conflicts.

Such objectives continued to appear in EU declarations and official documents. The measures that the European Union could use in order to achieve them, can be

grouped in three categories: the use of conditionality (positive approach: benefits, including aid, association agreements and even EU membership); the provision of aid to promote democratization; and the use of diplomatic instruments such as demarches and political dialogue (Smith, 2003: 147).

However, until the mid '90s, Greece didn't take seriously into consideration the possibilities that the EU offered in order to solve its disputes with Turkey. That is, its disputes with a country with which the Greek interaction was deemed to augment –both on a EU level, after the Customs Union and on a regional level, after processes like the Barcelona Conference of November 1995. During the latter, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was established, bringing together the EU and 12 non-EU countries including Turkey. Its work program was based on regular political dialogue, economic and financial cooperation, and social and cultural cooperation. The EU had devised three instruments in order to implement it: the MEDA aid program, Euro-Med association agreements and intensive multilateral dialogue.

Turkey constituted a country which was intensively expressing its wish to approach the Community and Greece's capability to help it could contribute to the solution of the bilateral disputes. From the Greek side, the fears for its security due to the pertaining feeling of Turkish aggression (which rose after incidents like the Imia/Kardak crisis) could be mitigated since the economic and social development, which would derive from the further integration of Greece in the EU (by entering in the EMU, for example), would act a lot better as a security maximizer than military might. If Greece accepted Turkey into the European framework, (taking advantage Turkey's expressed will for membership and opting for an alternative that had been proposed since the end of the '80s), its worries for whether or not Turkey would use its augmented capabilities from the membership, would be significantly diminished -

since Turkey would become a lot more hesitant to launch an attack against a fellow member-state. Turkey would be “tamed”, as it would have to abide to the European norms of cooperation. This way, Greece would be able to concentrate to the fulfilment of its own national objectives, for which it needed international support that her change of policy could better ensure. By giving to Turkey one carrot, it could keep it permanently under the stick, if in the future it decided to show non-cooperative behaviours. Thus, it would make Turkey obligatorily an ally. Greece knew that the institutional framework of the European Union couldn't solve the bilateral disputes with Turkey per se. But it created the principles and the preconditions for the effort to solve the Greek-Turkish disputes. Turkey's accession would make it behave more responsibly and to manage its differences with Greece according to acceptable and legitimate means of conflict resolution.

3.3] THE CATALYST: THE MODERNIZERS IN POWER

Many of the aforementioned opportunities and incentives for cooperation were presented long before 1996, when the Greek government officially declared that it seriously supported Turkey's EU candidacy. However, the previous Greek administrations weren't in the position to take advantage of the situation, for different each time reasons, that will be clarified in the conclusions of this study. The “catalyst” in the process of the Greek Turkish cooperation was the rise of the “modernizing” political class. The history of this group of policymakers, as well as its effects on the Greek political and economic life will be summarized in the following paragraphs.

3.3.1. *The seeds of the modernizing political class*

“Nothing is more difficult, uncertain and dangerous than to take the initiative of introducing new institutions and traditions. Because the reformer has as enemies all those who have direct and absolute interest in maintaining the old institutions and as reluctant friends all those who will benefit from the new ones”, Nicolo Machiavelli was writing in *The Prince*.

In Greece, such a struggle between the reformers and the preservers of tradition has marked the political life since the foundation of the state. Greece’s historic realities were formed by the existence of two corresponding “cultures”, according to a seminal article of Nikiforos Diamantouros published in 1993³¹: The first was the “underdog culture”. Influenced by the Balkan-Ottoman heritage and the worldview of the Orthodox Church, it followed a militant anti-Western stance. Its basic characteristics were introvertedness, statist orientation, ambivalence concerning capitalism and the mechanisms of the market economy, preference for paternalism and protection, xenophobia, authoritarian temperament and suspicion towards innovation. It showed a distinct preference for the conspirational interpretations of the international events and the Manichean division of the world, nationalism, siege mentality, and a sense of cultural inferiority towards the West.

The second culture was dubbed by Diamantouros the “modernizing and reformist culture”. In contrast with the first one, its influence was the Enlightenment. Its preferences inclined towards political liberalism, secularism, extroversion and rationalization of the state along the liberal, democratic and capitalistic lines. It was favourable to the market mechanism, to competition and innovation; it was outward-looking and less parochial. Its creation was strongly influenced by the Greek

communities of the diaspora and especially their bourgeois segment. These two cultures cut across the major political parties and defied the facile, undimensional identifications with party structures.

The entrance of the country into the European Community occurred at a time when at the head of the Greek government was a party who “drew heavily upon a number of shared assumptions central to the definition of the underdog trend”³². The EC membership, however, demanded a series of political and structural changes which undermined its conduct of political and economic administration. The result was intensive debates concerning, firstly the value of the Community and its usefulness for Greece and secondly, the way to compromise the EC with the prevalent state of affairs.

The conclusion of these debates, especially after 1984, was a hybrid form of governance: on one side it showed an official acceptance of the EC; a declaration of obedience to its goals; and promises for change. These were combined however with an unconfessed abuse of the Community’s rather generous aid in all sectors of the Greek administration. The very few dissidents of this official policy inside Pasok had almost no public presence and inexistent public support. As Kostantinidis notes “they talked and wrote almost symbolically. It wasn’t only the party, which made it difficult for them to express their views that were considered revisionist and unorthodox –not to say yielding [to the foreign pressures]; it was also the Greek intelligentsia and public opinion, which lived in the ‘heroic’ time of democracy, anti-Americanism and the vindication of a whole world which had been suppressed after the civil war and who felt free for the first time”³³.

However, this situation could not go on forever. Greece’s entry in the Community had set in motion a powerful long-term process, which, willingly or not,

was becoming an integral part of the domestic political scene and was profoundly affecting the country's political, economic and cultural settings. Besides, the augmenting interactions of the Community officials with the government of their newly accepted member, made possible the gradual development of EC measures, designed to enhance the capacity of its organs to scrutinize and enforce more effectively the EC policies in Greece. Also, these interactions enhanced the Community's capacity to exercise direct or indirect influence on many levels of the Greek affairs (in Clogg, 1993).

The "wind of change" was slowly realised by more and more officials both in Pasok and New Democracy, the main opposition party. The leader of the latter, namely Kostantinos Mitsotakis, was head of an ND faction that rejected the more conservative views of the rest and promoted strong Euro-friendly, pro-liberal policies already since 1984 (cf. chapter 1). In Pasok itself, many people who endorsed the orthodox party line until the early '80s, were starting to call publicly for more seriousness in the issue of Greek-EC relations. This group was both sensing better the aura of the times and was begotten by it, through the gradual change that the invisible hand of the Community had started to impose on Greece.

A characteristic example was Costas Simitis. This lawyer, economist and university professor in Germany had participated actively in the resistance movement against the Greek military junta and was one of the founding members and policymakers of Pasok. In order to fulfil that role, he was appointed as the head of a scientific group in 1978 that had to publish a text comprising all the arguments of the party *against* the membership in the EC. In the publication, Simitis was clear: "An exit from dependency with the help of the industrially developed countries cannot exist. [...] The refusal of membership won't result to the isolation of the country but

to the multilateral development of its relations [...] The ultimate goal of the EC is the cancellation of the socialist change” (Kostandinidis in Tsakonas, 2003).

The exact time of Simitis’ ideological shift is not known. The fact is that, when he was appointed minister of agriculture, from 1981 to 1985, he secured the successful entrance of Greece in the European agricultural policy, as well as the multiplication of the community aids. And, when he got in a fight with Papandreou on the first austerity program that he tried to implement for convergence with the EC economies he left his governmental post as minister of National Economy in 1987.

3.3.2. *The rise to power*

After the electoral adventures of 1990, New Democracy rose to power under the leadership of Mitsotakis. It could have been a good opportunity for the modernizing political class to establish itself in power –if only the country didn’t get caught in the FYROM vortex. Taking advantage of the tumultuous situation in Greece’s foreign affairs, as well as the internal problems of the ND administration, Papandreou’s Pasok assumed again the governance of Greece with a nationalistic banner.

One should acknowledge though that, since 1990, the party was trying to adapt itself to the new trends of its time: Pasok adhered to the Socialist International, opted for the promotion for a *European Social Democracy* in Greece and made peace with the Euro-Atlantic structures³⁴. In the meantime, the modernizers were starting to actively organize themselves as a block inside Pasok. Their first meeting, with the participation of nine high-rank Pasok officials, took place in 1993³⁵.

Despite Pasok's efforts to catch up with the spirit of the new era, the final judgment of his founder's heritage after his resignation due to illness in 1996 wasn't positive. As the *Financial Times* commented, during his eleven-year administration "Papandreou presided over a modernisation of Greek society, and a liberalisation of its laws, including the introduction of civil marriages, women's rights and a greater awareness of the need to protect the environment. But he left a system of political cronyism, along with malpractice in hiring, tendering and procurement in the state sector, which seriously undermine good government (19/01/1996). Especially the Greek financial failure, for which he was deemed partly responsible, was considered as the main factor of the country's alienation in the EU framework. In addition to the "anti-European crisis" and the "negation of the European factor in some major national issues", the economic condition undermined the Greek negotiating ability inside the EU and foresaw Greece's potential exclusion from the EMU³⁰.

The times were critical and a serious replacer had to be found immediately. Nonetheless, the Pasok members were far from exhibiting a spirit of unity. The imminence of the situation favoured the modernizers in its ranks, since they were better prepared and they had decided who they will propose for the Pasok and for the country's leadership. At the party's Central Committee that was to elect the new leader, the situation was clearly polarized. On one hand, there was the "modernizers" block, proposing one candidate, namely Costas Simitis. On the other hand, there was the divided "presidential"³¹ "socialist" or "patriotic" block, which proposed two candidates: Akis Tsochatzopoulos and Gerasimos Arsenis. The results of the first voting were very encouraging for the latter block: 50 votes for Arsenis, 53 for Tsochatzopoulos and 53 for Simitis. The "presidentialists" were one step before acquiring power, since Arsenis had encouraged his voters to prefer Tsochatzopoulos

for the second round. By the night of the same day, however, the situation had drastically changed: 86 votes for Simitis, 75 for Tsochatzopoulos and five blanks. It was not a triumph, but it was a clear victory³⁶. It should be underlined that a major aid to this result was the vote of Andreas Papandreou's son, namely Yorgos Papandreou, who, even though in the first round voted for Arsenis, in the second round preferred Simitis.

From the next day of the voting, the new prime minister started to gather his forces. Two more challenges waited for him during the year: The 4th Pasok convention that had to certify his position as the head of Pasok and the elections that had to legitimize his government.

After the latter, Simitis had the luck to see elected in the parliament a group of deputies whose big majority supported the line of policy that he pursued. From the 161 Pasok deputies, more than a 100 were deemed modernizers. Simitis had the ability to form a government which will collaborate with him and where there would be no frictions. He knew that his work would be judged basically on three sectors: the economy, the administration and the public works, so he kept in the respective positions the ministers that he had already chosen. In the foreign ministry, he kept Theodoros Pangalos, who was also considered a modernizer and had given to Simitis his full support. Finally, in order to solve his problem with inter-party opposition, he appointed his main adversary, Tsochatzopoulos, to the "attractive" minister of defence. Now, he was ready to implement his long-awaited program. The Prime Minister, instead of moving to inter-party ruptures, had preferred the compromising and the maintenance of balance.

One should note, that the modernizers' effort for substantial change was aided by the inactive opposition at the time -both on the right and from the left side

of the political spectrum. As far as the right is concerned, apart from the fact that it may have agreed with some of the modernizers' reforms, it was entangled in its own inter-party struggles, which finally brought to its leadership Costas Karamanlis. On the left, the Communist Party was considered "harmless" due to its low public support, while the Euro-communist Synaspismos had to face also internal frictions. The possibilities of social opposition that the syndicates could raise against the reforms were low, as the latter were found in a "dormant" condition. From their side, the investors and the markets were exhilarating: they had finally found their "perfect guy". Finally, the media (strongly connected to the pro-modernizing Greek business interests) were also in their majority supporting Simitis. And, as they were acknowledging after one year of the new Pasok administration, "the Simitis' government has achieved a miracle: it replaced class struggle with 'collaborative competition'" (*To Vima*, 30/11/1997).

3.3.3. *The modernizing policies*

"A new style, a new morale, a new direction. A government of hard work, in order to carry Greece into the 21st century": This is how Simitis summed up his future policies after winning the leadership of Greece. "There's a feeling that a page has been turned. It's a different ethos", added the prime ministerial aide Tassos Mandelis (*Los Angeles Times*, 28/01/1996).

The modernizers' self-definition gave an idea about their future plans: As modernizer at the time was defined the person who believed that the productive basis of the Greek economy, the public sector, which was wide and centralized, as well as the public administration, were working anti-productively. The consequence of this

was the inability of the country to be efficiently competitive in the European and the international arena. Therefore, the modernizer concluded that the main goal of the country had to be the modernization of the economy, and in general of the institutions that are necessary in order to facilitate and support the economic development (*To Vima*, 13/11/1996). The relations between the public and the private domains were viewed as a relationship of interdependence and reciprocity, as repeated cooperative games in which each party reciprocated to each other and which were influenced by institutionalization (Lavdas, 1997).

The specific content of the modernizers' program (e.g. the membership in the EMU) lies outside of the scope of the current paper. However, it has one very important characteristic that needs to be underlined. The new government's agenda was not only *for* the modernization (which was generally understood as further Europeanization) of the country. It was also a consequence of the Europeanization itself that had started already since the 1980s. The term Europeanization defines the incremental process of reorienting the direction and the shape of politics to the degree that the EU's political and economic dynamics become part of the organizational logic of national politics and policy-making⁵⁹.

As Ioakimidis explains, "the EU membership tends to blur the distinction between domestic politics and external foreign policy and to create new patterns of political behaviour. It encourages new institutional and administrative structures and interactions by redistributing power and competencies and reorienting political objectives. It does not merely imply a rhetorical ideological commitment to the objectives of the integration process. It involves the internalization of the inner logic, the norms and dynamics of the EU into the domestic foreign policy formulation process. It does not occur because the political classes or the society at large have

come to exhibit attachment to the 'lofty ideas of European integration'. It dictates that the imperatives, logic and norms of the EU must become increasingly absorbed into domestic policy -to the extent that the distinction between European and domestic policy requirements progressively cease to exist" (in Featherstone and Ifantis, 1996). It is in this environment that the modernizers had ideologically matured.

3.3.4. The modernizers and foreign policy

The modernizers' conceptions about the international environment and the place of Greece in it are described in detail in chapter 1, section 1.5.1. However, some repetitions and additional remarks have to be made, as they will help in the extraction of the conclusions from this study.

When the Simitis' government rose to power, it accepted as one of the basic problems in Greece's external relations the "upgrading" to "national issues" of various issues that used to be classified as "foreign policy topics". As the former foreign minister Yorgos Papoulias stated, "such issues had a tendency to multiply and take a life on their own, each with its own lobby –attracting support among politicians, journalists and interest groups. Each of these lobbies came to have access to those in power with the consequence of devaluating the otherwise centralized foreign policy mechanism and contributing both to populism and demagogy" (*Athens News*, 7/12/1994). The new Greek administration would try not to let that happen. The European vocation of Greece postulated that foreign policy should also be "Europeanized", both in its mechanisms and in its goals.

Towards the former, namely the modernization of the foreign policy mechanisms, the government implemented measures as late as 1998: During that year, a new organizational structure was designed for the foreign ministry, in order to bring economics, trade and other “low politics” issues into the mainstream of Greek foreign policy; to enable the employment of new instruments and techniques for conducting the daily affairs; to establish new institutions, e.g. specialized centres for the Balkans, the European issues etc.; and to allow in general the ministry to cope more effectively with the requirements and pressures emanating from Greece’s participation in the EU (Ioakimidis, 2002).

Towards the latter, namely the modernization of the foreign policy goals, measures had to be taken more imminently. The academia, which in Greece often adopts an influential counselling role to the foreign policymakers, had already proposed some directions. These were converging in some issues and diverging in others, since this community in Greece is (also) rather strictly separated into two camps: One with a “realist” orientation (dubbed the “maximalists” or “ethnocentrists” by their opposers) and one with more “liberal” views, (nicknamed the “yielders” or the “Euro-zealots” by the first camp)⁴⁰. Their point of convergence is that Turkey has expansionist views in the Aegean Sea and in Cyprus. Their point of divergence is how to face Turkey and what other directions the foreign policy should take.

Those closer to the modernizers’ government supported that the priorities of foreign policy should be have the following order: 1. “Face inside”, meaning that the internal high level of development was the most important foreign policy weapon 2. Achieve full integration in the EU, without creating a false dilemma between the EU and Washington 3. Combine military sufficiency to diplomatic activity in order to

face Turkey, by supporting also its EU accession. 4. Pursue better relations with the post-communist Balkans (Veremis & Couloumbis, 1997). Turkey was still the most important threat. But, after Greece had de-scopianized its foreign policy, it needed gradually to de-turkify it (Couloumbis, 1999).

These messages were taken seriously into account by the Greek government. The foreign-minister-to-be Yorgos Papandreou wrote for example the following in 1997: "In Greece, a big debate has been crated about the dangers from abroad -either real or imaginary. Greece is engaged in a deep soul-searching about the redefinition of its role and its priorities in the area. It doesn't simply want to renovate its political and economic structures, but in a deeper level to redefine its identity in the multicultural scene of Europe, the Balkans and the Mediterranean sea [...] It is not longer isolated, like in the Cold War era. During the confrontation between East and West, Greece was found in a period of weakness with very small margin for developing its own policy and strategy. Now it creates an active, long-term foreign policy, in which it redefines itself as an expeditious member of the international community. We remain members of the EU and NATO. We develop a new relation with the US. Greece is creating a more independent and more responsible foreign policy. A major factor in it is the advance of the cooperation for the regional stability. [...] At this moment Turkey is loosing a great chance. Together with its political and financial problems, the impediments for the development of pluralistic structures in its interior and its minority problems, it ignores the messages of our times in its relation with Greece and passes by historical chances for the creation of a viable and positive relation with our country" (Varvitsiotis, Keridis & Pfaltzgraff, 1997).

It is extremely important however, that these messages were equally endorsed by the opposition, as a text of Costas Karamanlis in the same book shows: "Greece is the only western country which geographically is positioned in an uncertain, liquid environment. Living in an extremely unforeseeable environment, it is natural that we support every effort for stabilization in the area. In such a framework we must redefine our role in Europe. The main goal of Greece is to strengthen its security and defend its integrity through its relations with Europe.[...] As far as Turkey is concerned, Greece supports steadily a secular regime with a western orientation, which will have close relation with the EU. Therefore, Greece is ready to help Turkey in its European orientation, in the condition that it will make further steps in democratization, respect for human rights and for the principles of international law".

The Europeanization of the Greek foreign policy with the rise to power of the modernizing forces induced Greece to reach out for cooperation with its neighbouring country, which was perceived by the modernizers as also having no other alternative than its European orientation (Kranidiotis 1999). The preference for modernizing policies both in the government and in the opposition, and the ensuing bipartisan convergence of opinions, constitutes a very important development, which helped cooperation to be realized. Both parties were willing to pursue dialogue, ignoring the averting voices.

Especially for Pasok, which was in government, these voices could create great danger: There were some small "islands" of the party mechanism that the modernizers didn't achieve to conquer and where the inter-party opposition ruled. They expressed their disagreement in every governmental move in the domain of foreign affairs, but they went far from influencing the majority, as the largely pro-Simitis media kept underlining that, until that point, Greece had been conquered

neither by FYROM nor by Turkey. Besides, apart from the media, the business circles were also supporting a rapprochement with Turkey. In a meeting between the powerful Federation of the Greek Industrialists and TUSIAD, the president of the former, Iason Stratos declared that he “unequivocally supports Turkey’s accession to the European Union” while his Turkish counterpart stated that “he recognizes in the Greek industrialists the best friends of Turkey in the EU” (*To Prin*, 12/12/1999). The political will was granted. The support was secured. The circle was closed.

ENDNOTES

¹ In Keridis Dimitris, Triantafyllou Dimitrios (eds). *Greek-Turkish relations in the era of globalisation*, Dulles (VA): Brassey’s, 2001, pp. 224-238.

² In Gular Sylvie, Delastic George, *Ο Σουλτάνος στην αυλή της Ευρώπης*; [The sultan at the European court], Athens: Livanis, 2005

³ In Kourvetaris George, Roudometof Victor, Koutsoukis Kleomenis, Kourvetaris Andrew, *The new Balkans: Disintegration and reconstruction*, New York: Boulder, 2002, p. 400.

⁴ In Keridis Dimitris, Triantafyllou Dimitrios (eds), *op. cit.*

⁵ Fontaine Pascal, *Europe in 12 lessons*, European Commission, Directorate-General for Press and Communication, Manuscript completed in October 2003.

⁶ The research is mentioned in the website of BBC, <http://news.bbc.co.uk>.

⁷ Many of these statements can be found at the press archives of the Pasok party, on the webpage www.pasok.gr.

⁸ Coufoudakis Van, Psomiades Harry J., Gerolymatos Andre (eds), *Greece and the New Balkans: Challenges and Opportunities*, New York: Pella Publishing Company, 1999.

⁹ In Papasotiriou Charalampos, *Τα Βαλκάνια μετά το τέλος του Ψυχρού Πολέμου* [The Balkans after the end of the Cold War], Athens: Papazisi, 1994, p. 288.

¹⁰ Diamantouros Nikiforos, “Politics and Culture in Greece, 1974-1991: An Interpretation” in CLOGG Richard, *Greece, 1981-1989: The populist decade*, London: Macmillan, 1993, p. 17

¹¹ In Voulgaris Yiannis, *Η Ελλάδα της μεταπολίτευσης, 1974-1990* [Greece after the regime change, 1974-1990], Athens: Themelio, 2002.

¹² In Ifaistos Panayiotis, Tsardanidis Charalampos, *Το Ευρωπαϊκό Σύστημα Ασφαλείας και η Ελλάδα* [The European Security System and Greek foreign policy towards the year 2000], Athens: Sideris, 1992

¹³ Gianaris Nikolas, *Greece and Turkey. Economic and Geopolitical Perspectives*, New York: Praeger, 1988.

¹⁴ Dunne Paul, Nikolaidou Eftychia, *Military Expenditure and Economic Growth: A Demand and Supply Model for Greece, 1960-1996*, Paper presented at the ERC/METU International Conference on Economics, 9th - 12th September, 1998, Ankara, Turkey.

¹⁵ Cf. Veremis Thanos, Couloumbis Theodoros, *Ελληνική εξωτερική πολιτική, διλήμματα μιας νέας εποχής* [Greek foreign policy: dilemmas of a new era], Athens: Sideris, ELIAMEP, 1997, p. 56: “We shouldn’t close the door of the EU to Turkey, because until now it was our best negotiation card. Besides, fewer expenses for defence would be better for the expansion of the economy and good relations with Turkey would reinforce our negotiation position in the Balkans”. Also, Allison Graham, Nikolaidis Calypso (eds), *The Greek Paradox, Promise vs. Performance*, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997, p. 9.

¹⁶ In Chircop Aldo, Gerolymatos Andre, Iatrides John, *The Aegean Sea after the Cold War*, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000, p. 49.

¹⁷ Yiallouridis Chr., Tsakonias P. (eds), *Greece and Turkey after the end of the Cold War*, NY and Athens: Caratzas, 2001.

¹⁸ Yiannitsis Tasos, Solbes Pedro *et al.*, *Ελλάδα: Η ένταξη στην ONE και οι προκλήσεις του μέλλοντος* [Greece: Membership in the EMU and challenges for the future], Athens: Kastaniotis, 2004.

¹⁹ In Yiallouridis and Tsakonas, *op.cit.*

²⁰ Cf. Yiannitsis and Solbes, *op.cit.* Also, Couloumbis Theodoros, *Εξωτερική πολιτική, διάλογοι μιας κρίσιμης εποχής* [Foreign policy: dialogues of a critical era], Athens: Sideris, ELIAMEP, 1999.

²¹ Floudas Demetrios Andreas: "Pardon? A conflict for a name? FYROM's dispute with Greece revisited" in Kourvetaris George *et al.*, *The new Balkans: Disintegration and reconstruction*, New York: Boulder, 2002. 85-128. p.90

²² Kanellopoulos Achilleas, Frangonikolopoulos Christos, *Το παρόν και το μέλλον της Ελληνικής εξωτερικής πολιτικής*, Athens: Sideris, 1995, p. 150

²³ Veremis Thanos, «Οι εξελίξεις στις ελληνοτουρκικές σχέσεις, 1997-1998 [The developments in Greek-Turkish relations, 1997-1998]», in *Η Ελλάδα και ο κόσμος 1997-1998* [Greece and the world, 1997-1998], Athens: Sideris, p. 75.

²⁴ Ioakimidis P. C. (ed), *Greece in the EU: The new role and the new agenda*, Ministry of Press and Media, 2002.

²⁵ The text of the Commission's avis can be found at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/cyprus/op_06_93/index.htm.

²⁶ Cf. http://www.mfa.gr/english/foreign_policy/europe_southeastern/cyprus/eu_accession.html.

²⁷ In *The Times*, 11/04/1995.

²⁸ Interview of the Greek former foreign minister Theodoros Pangalos to the author, 21/11/2004.

²⁹ In Oguzlu Tarik, "The EU as an Actor in the Solution of the Cyprus Dispute: The Questions of 'How'?", *Journal of Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe*, Issue 2, 2002.

³⁰ Smith Karen E., *European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World*, Cambridge: Polity, 2003

³¹ Diamantouros Nikiforos, "Politics and Culture in Greece, 1974-1991: An Interpretation", in Clogg Richard (ed.), *Greece, 1981-1989: The populist decade*, London: Macmillan, 1993

³² *Ibidem*

³³ This excellent article of Stephanos Kostandinidis can be found in the equally good collective volume: Tsakonas Panayiotis (ed), *Σύγχρονη Ελληνική εξωτερική πολιτική, μια συνολική προσέγγιση. Τόμος Α'* [Contemporary Greek foreign policy; an overall approach. Volume A'], Athens: Sideris, 2003.

³⁴ *Ibidem*

³⁵ *To Vima*, 15/02/1998.

³⁶ Kanellopoulos Achilleas, Frangonikolopoulos Christos, *Το παρόν και το μέλλον της Ελληνικής εξωτερικής πολιτικής*, Athens: Sideris, 1995: 31

³⁷ Namely, comprising friends of the former president Papandreou.

³⁸ The information about the voting were taken from the articles of newspaper *To Vima*.

³⁹ Ioakimidis P.C., "The Europeanization of Greece's foreign policy", in Ioakimidis P. C. (ed), *Greece in the EU: The new role and the new agenda*, Ministry of Press and Media, 2002

⁴⁰ Professor Couloumbis aptly describes their orientation by naming them the "Achilleans" and the "Ulysseans": "Two ways of thought are preeminent in Greece: the Achillean and the Ulyssean. Both are patriots. Nobody in this country should doubt the patriotism of the Greeks. The two great divisions of the 20th century have cost us enough. Luckily, we have surpassed them. The Achilleans perceive a world which looks like the jungle. Everybody against everybody! They consider that it is useful for Greece to use its power preventively and not only deterrent. For them, the best diplomatic strategy is the preventively counter-offensive foreign policy. The Ulysseans look also at the world as a dangerous place of general instability. In this world there is a centre of stability, namely the Atlantic community which, together with Japan and the most developed countries, constitute a center of stability. And the Ulysseans say that we have to stay attached there, in the stability area". Himself is usually included in the Ulyssean camp. From Conostas and Tsakonas, 2003.

CONCLUSIONS

This thesis on the Greek foreign policy towards Turkey's accession to EC/EU has tried to establish the reasons for the Greek shift from negation to full support of the Turkish Europeanization efforts.

After an examination of the particularities of the Greek foreign policy decision-making process, the search for these reasons was limited to the systemic level and to the level of political class. An historical overview of the Greek foreign policy has revealed various characteristics of this shift, like for example the gradual reinforcement of the long-existing voices calling for it, or its association with a foreign policy goal which changed over time –namely the one concerning Cyprus. This historical overview, together with the data gathered by 14 interviews with Greek policymakers, led to the following interpretation of this form of regional cooperation:

The policy shift is not due to a perception change of the Greek policymakers as far as the characteristics and the goals of the Ankara regime vis-à-vis Greece are concerned. The shift occurred because the changing systemic environment (which no Greek government could completely ignore) was now inducing more cooperation; because it had augmented the rewards that could arise from it and multiplied the possible sanctions against defection from it, according to the neoliberal institutionalist framework.

However, this systemic change alone would not have yielded any results if the political class of Greece hadn't changed also. A new political group, labeled the "modernizers", which was maturing inside Pasok, scented the changes in the international environment; used them in order to distinguish its identity in the domestic political struggle, by advocating the need for a changed, more

“Europeanized” Greek national interest; and used them to finally rise to power. When they arrived there, the “modernizers” acted according to their perception of the international environment and the needs of Greece, pursuing among others cooperation with Turkey.

Of course, this explanation of the Greek foreign policy shift doesn't pretend to constitute the holistic version of the truth. There are still some factors influencing the Greek change towards Turkey that could be better elucidated in future research. The most important of them is the developments inside Turkey that acted as a beacon, sending signals to Greece that “if you make a move, we would be glad to reciprocate”. As it is indicated in chapter 2, the Greek policymakers claim that they don't give great importance to such developments. But it is not easy to rule out factors like the change of the Turkish foreign policy goals (e.g. towards a more serious Europeanization effort) or the change of the Turkish leadership in the period under question, when discussing the multi-level game that is interstate relations.

One more issues which is left under-examined in the present research is the role of the bureaucratic mechanism in Greek foreign policymaking –there is sufficient reason to believe that it will augment during the following years. Concerning the bureaucracy, as it is explained in the introduction, the ministry of foreign affairs and the diplomatic service in Greece rather implement than trace foreign policy decisions. However, the reforms in these to services carried out under Pangalos' leadership in the Greek MFA are slowly starting to bear fruits, while the Europeanization of the Greek foreign policy objectives and strategies leading to extra administrative adjustment presume a bigger role for the bureaucracy in the future.

Despite this two lacks in the analysis which is set out in the previous chapters, one can now easily answer the question: Why didn't this cooperative behavior from the part of Greece occur in an earlier time? The multifaceted answer to this question comprises the following parameters:

1. Because the European framework was different: The integration process and the ensuing rise of hope concerning what Europe can offer started intensifying after 1992.
2. Because the Turkish will for membership (which could also be comprised in the systemic environment) hadn't been expressed that strongly.
3. Because the old Greek political leaders were different and perceived in a different way the Greek national interest. Whether or not Andreas Papandreou really endorsed the Hobbesian view of the international environment that he set out in his public speeches, this view certainly constrained his margins of engaging into cooperation, since the speeches created obligations towards his constituency. Even if one speculated that Papandreou changed his mind on the issue of cooperation with Turkey near the end of his life, he would have great difficulty to express this change and abandon his nationalistic rhetoric, due to the fear of being called a traitor –a fear which is very real for several policymakers in Greece. The old political leaders and mainly Papandreou perceived differently the Greek national interest. Namely, they didn't give such a big importance to the need of a full Europeanization of the Greek foreign policy. With the modernizers in power, after many adventures, Greece decided to satisfy her need of belonging inside the EU framework and to comply with the economic and political norms of

the latter. And, finally, it decided that “Greece belongs to Europe and therefore to the West”.

However, it is still not easy to answer another, a lot more important question concerning the cooperation between the two countries: Where is it presently going and how it will evolve in the future?

After 2003 and until now, it is commonly acknowledged that there is a “recession” in the efforts of boosting the good bilateral climate. Of course, no serious disputes occurred between Greece and Turkey, but there were also no serious efforts to make steps forward in order to solve the bilateral issues that have strained peace and security in Eastern Mediterranean over the last 50 years. Equally concerning is the fact that gradually the Greek press started giving a lot more importance to issues that raise great concern to the Greek public, like the Turkish violations of the Greek airspace over the Aegean. Such violations were downplayed in periods of ameliorated bilateral climate, like the first semester of 2003, but were exceedingly underlined in the current period of “cooled” relations, even though their number is diminished. An interesting count of the references on the violations is made by Chatzistefanou (2005) who explains the following:

In May 2005, the Greek air force leadership presented a report concerning the Turkish violations of the Greek airspace in the Aegean. According to the report, during the first semester of 2005 occurred 830 violations, while during the first semester of 2003 there had occurred 1.625 violations. Therefore from 2003 to 2005, the violations had dropped by 50%. However, the Greek press covered as following this decrease: The newspaper *Ta Nea* published 11 articles on the violations in the period under study of 2005. The number of articles that it had published in 2003,

when the violations were double, was exactly the same. The newspaper *Eleftherotipia* made 28 references to the violations in the first semester of 2003 and 43 references from January to June 2005. Here, we see that, even though the violations were cut in half, the references to them doubled. As for *Kathimerini*, the references were 11 in 2003 and 34 in 2005 –namely, they tripled! *Vima on Sunday* also followed the rule, by doubling its references to the violations (from 5 to 11). It is evident, thus, that in periods of Greek-Turkish friendship, like the first semester of 2003, the references to violations in the Aegean are decreasing, while in periods like the current one, when the bilateral relations are not exactly flourishing, the references are augmenting. The deeds of the Turkish pilots during the periods under study are indifferent to the Greek press.

One could easily claim that, since the climate created by the press is fictive and does not reflect reality, it does not affect the actual course of the Greek-Turkish relations. But this climate, which *is* dominant regardless of the interests that create it, is by no means innocent for the bilateral relations, as it creates reservations to the Greek public towards Turkey. This is extremely alarming especially today, if one takes into account on one hand the reservations of a great part of the European public opinion vis-à-vis Turkey, which result from the latter's long-lasting effort to join the EU, and on the other hand the fact that the Greek-Turkish disputes are connected with the European course of Turkey.

Of course, the Greek government retains her positive stance towards Turkey and its accession to the EU. But, for how long will it be able to hold on to a policy which goes against the anti-Turkish accession wave that sweeps the rest of Europe? There, conservative, anti-Turkey's membership forces steadily rise to power, with Nicolas Sarkozy in France and Angela Merkel in Germany being considered as the

European leaders of the future. For the Greek government, which has to proceed to decision-making in such an international environment, the non-examination (but not necessarily the renunciation) of the current Greek support to Turkey's accession would be impossible, especially since the EU countries (and mainly France) now raise the Turkish recognition of the Cyprus Republic as a *sine qua non* for Turkey's accession. Therefore, it is extremely difficult for Athens to follow aloof a discussion concerning the necessity of direct recognition of Cyprus by Turkey. It goes without saying that the results of such discussions could endanger the positive course of the Greek-Turkish disputes or at least put them to a long-term quagmire.

The alternatives of the Greek government are limited. Whether right or wrong, the Helsinki policy of connecting the bilateral disputes to the European course of Turkey has given all that it could, regarding the way that the Greek government took advantage of it. Irrespectively of the way that Athens will handle Turkey's candidacy, it has to prove to Ankara that it still holds on to its declared will, to seriously discuss and work to conclusively solve the bilateral issues. However, there is a caveat: the solution should not be haste and grounded on unstable goals – e.g. for a neoliberal cooperation of the markets or for the pursuit of a shaky cosmopolitan ideal. Mutual retreats should be made from the leading classes of both sides, which should be feasible and viable and take into account the sensitivities *and* the protean nature of the public opinion. This public opinion both in Greece and in Turkey risks to be radicalized again and consider treason or surrender of national soil each hasty move from the Greek or the Turkish side. Equally important is to make careful moves concerning the Cyprus issue. This is the Achilles' heel for both people and it shouldn't be sacrificed due to pressures from "above", due to the Greek

government's will to present another "national success" or due to the Turkish government's effort to join the EU.

I am fully aware that no specific propositions concerning the practical aspects of the solution are made in this short essay. But I think that before moving to them, one should put firmly in mind something that the two governments often seem to forget: That the solution of the bilateral disputes is not an end in itself. It is the *means* to an end, which should be the pursuit in a peaceful environment of the welfare of both the Greek and the Turkish people.

APPENDICES

1] APPENDIX 1: BIOGRAPHICAL AND CAREER INFORMATION ON THE INTERVIEWEES

1.1 MITSOTAKIS Costantinos

Greek politician; born in Crete. His father and grandfathers were members of parliament, and the renowned Greek politician Eleutherios Venizelos was his uncle. As a young man, he participated in the Cretan resistance against the German occupation. He graduated in law and economics from the University of Athens and was elected to the Greek Parliament in 1946. Mitsotakis was member of George Papandreou's Centre Union party. But in 1965 he led a group of dissidents known as the "July apostates" who crossed the floor to bring about the fall of Papandreou's government, which earned him the undying hatred of Papandreou loyalists. He was arrested in 1967 by the military junta but managed to escape and lived in exile until his return in 1974.

In 1974 he was re-elected to Parliament as member of George Mavros's revived Centre Union, but in 1978, when the liberals were squeezed out by Andreas Papandreou's PASOK, he joined Constantine Caramanlis's New Democracy party. He served as minister for economic coordination from 1978 to 1980, and as minister for foreign affairs from 1980 to 1981.

The ND government was defeated by PASOK in 1981, and in 1984 Mitsotakis succeeded Evangelos Averoff as ND leader. He and Papandreou dominated Greek politics for the next decade: their mutual dislike dated back to the fall of George Papandreou's government in 1965. Papandreou, embroiled in the Bank of Crete scandal, lost his parliamentary majority in the elections of June 1989, but

Mitsotakis was unable to form a government. After a period of parliamentary deadlock, fresh elections in April 1990 produced a narrow ND majority, and Mitsotakis became Prime Minister. When Papandreou won the 1993 elections and returned to office, Mitsotakis resigned as ND leader, although he remained the party's honorary chairman. In January 2004 Mitsotakis announced that he would retire from Parliament at the March 7 elections, 56 years after his first election.

1.2 PANGALOS Theodoros

He was born in Eleusis on August 17, 1938 and graduated from the Varvakeion High School of Athens. He completed his studies at the University of Athens, majoring in Law and Economics; he received a scholarship by the French Government and in 1973 he was declared Doctor of Economic Sciences of the University of Paris 1 (Pantheon, Sorbonne). He was actively involved in the struggle against the dictatorship (1967-1974). In 1968 the junta deprived him of his Greek nationality. From 1969 to 1978 he worked at the above mentioned University as an appointed instructor and researcher in issues of economic development, programming and land use. He has also been director of the Economic Development Institute of the same University. In 1981 he was elected for the first time MP with PASOK, a status which he has held continuously up to this date. He was Deputy Minister of Trade from July 1982 to January 1984. After that, he assumed duties as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs on European Community issues up to 1985. In July 1985 he was appointed Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, remaining in office until the elections of 1989. In the period from 1989 to 1993 he was appointed Representative of the Hellenic Parliament at the Council of Europe. In October 1993 he was appointed again Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, remaining in office until

July 1994. At that time he assumed duties as Minister of Transport and Communications. In January 1996 he was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs. In April 2000 he was appointed Minister for Culture, remaining in office until November.

In particular, Theodoros Pangalos was Minister of Foreign Affairs from 22.1.1996 to 18.2.1999; alternate Foreign Minister from 17.1.1984 to 5.6.1985 and from 5.6.1985 to 26.7.1985; deputy Foreign Minister from 26.7.1985 to 18.11.1988, from 18.11.1988 to 18.6.1989, from 18.6.1989 to 2.7.1989 and from 13.10.1993 to 8.7.1994. Currently, he is deputy of state for PASOK.

1.3 MAGKAKIS Yorgos-Alexandros

He was born in Athens, in 1922 and studied law at the Universities of Athens and of Munich. He worked as professor of law at the Universities of Heidelberg and of Athens. During the colonel's dictatorship he joined the resistance movement and in the government of National Unit 1974 he was named minister of Public Works. In 1982 he was named governor of National Bank. He was elected in the Greek Parliament for the first time in 1974, with EDIK. Later, he joined PASOK and was elected deputy in 1985, on November 1989 and in 1993. He was Minister of Justice from 1982 until 1987 and alternate Minister of Foreign Affairs from 8.7.1994 to 15.9.1995.

1.4 KASSIMIS Theodoros

He was elected MP for Athens with New Democracy in the elections of 1989 (June and November), 1990, 1993, 1996 and 2000. He has served as member of the Standing Committee on Economic Affairs and as member of the Greek delegation to

the Parliamentary Convention for Black Sea Economic Co-operation (PABSEC) since June 1995. He was elected vice-Chairman of the delegation's economic committee in September 1995, and Chairman for 1997-1999 in September 1997. At that post, he was unanimously re-elected for 1999-2001. He was appointed deputy Minister for the National Economy, responsible for Foreign Trade and Tourism (03-12-1992 to 12-10-1993). He is an elected member of the party's Central Committee since 1995 and served as ND Press Spokesman from K. Mitsotakis' election as ND Chairman on 01-09-1984 until June 1989. He is member of the Athens Daily Newspapers Journalist's Union (ESHEA) since 1971 and sat on its Joint Council for years. He has been on the staff of several daily political and economic newspapers and worked for state radio and television. Former editor of the magazine "Food and Drink", he was instrumental in setting up the Association of Greek Food and Drink Industries. He was a founding member, former vice-Chairman and Secretary General for four years of the Centre for Scientific Consumer Protection and Information.

1.5 POLIDORAS Byron

He was elected MP with New Democracy for Athens in the general elections of 1981, 1985, 1989 (June and November), 1990, 1993, 1996 and 2000. He has served as a member of the Standing Committee on Public Administration, Public Order and Justice, and of the Committee for the Revision of the Constitution. Member of the Parliamentary Assemblies of the Council of Europe and the Western European Union (1995-2000). He was elected Dean of the House in 1989 (June and November). He assumed duties as deputy Minister for the Presidency and Government Spokesman, 11-04-1990 to 07-08-1991 and 07-08-1991 to 07-08-1992; Deputy Minister for Education and Religious Affairs, 07-08-1992 to 03-12-1992; and

Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, 03-12-1992 to 12-10-1993. Mr. Polidoras stood for the office of ND Party Chairman at the 4th Party Conference in March 1997. He was head of the ND Section on the Interior, Public Administration and Decentralisation (2000-2001) and member of the ND Central Committee and group co-ordinator for the Standing Committee on Public Administration, Public Order, and Decentralisation in 2001. He was the party officer responsible for trade, medium-sized enterprises and the Committee for Competition.

Mr. Polidoras received the Ipekci award for Greek-Turkish friendship in October 1995 and he has also been awarded the Makarios III Medal, the highest-decoration of the Republic of Cyprus. His translation into Greek of John Keats' *Eve of St. Agnes* was recently awarded the prize for best translation. He is author of the following books (in Greek): *Greek Ideology; In the Ideological Trenches; On Meritocracy; Politics and Art; Positive Logos; Bushido; Greek Political Development*. He was a former reserve officer in the Greek Army.

1.6 THEODOROPOULOS Byron

Born in Athens in 1920; He studied at the German school in Athens and then at the Law School of Athens University. He finished the diplomatic service and after 35 years of work as a diplomat he retired in 1981. His personal direct involvement with the Greek-Turkish relations was first of all in the years 1954-1955-1956, when he was consul in Istanbul. Then, after a two years break in Athens, he served another three years, 1958-1959-1960 in Ankara, as counselor of the embassy. Then, he was in charge of the Turkish and Cypriot affairs in the Greek Foreign Ministry from 1965 to 1971. And then, from 1976 until his retirement in 1981, he was Secretary General of the foreign ministry. Currently, he is honorary president of ELIAMEP foundation.

1.7 VERIVAKIS Eleftherios

He was born in Chania (Crete). He studied law and political sciences and speaks English and French. Since 1954, he followed George Papandreou in politics. He was president of the Association of Young Scientists and Intellectuals in 1965-1966 and Secretary General of the Democratic Associations. During the military dictatorship he was arrested for resistance and convicted to 13 years imprisonment. He was pardoned in December 1967, but he was arrested again in August 1968, for an attempt to kill the dictator. After the dictatorship he was candidate for Pasok party and was first elected in 1977. He has been minister of National Education and Religious Affairs; minister of Social Insurance; Minister of Energy and Natural Resources and Minister of Justice. He has been member of various International Organizations (UN-EU-Council of Europe-NATO-WEU). He has been president of the Parliamentary Committee for Foreign Affairs and Defence from 1993 to 1996.

1.8 LAFAZANIS Panayiotis

He was born in Elefsina on 19/11/195. He participated in the student movement against the dictatorship and was persecuted for his actions. He was a member of the Coordinating Committee for the sit-in of the Law School in 1973. He has been a member of the Political Secretariat of Synaspismos party since it was founded. He has been an Office member at the Central Council of the Communist Youth and ensuingly member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. He was elected MP of Piraeus with Synaspismos in 2000. He participated in the Parliamentary Standing Committee of Financial Affairs and in the Committee for Public Organizations and Banks.

1.9 PAPAYIANNAKIS Michalis

Born on 19/08/1941; he studied Law, Economics and Political Sciences in Athens (1959-1964), in Montpellier and in Paris (1964-1969). He engaged in teaching and research in Paris, in Montpellier, in Athens, and also in international organisations (U.N., U.N.C.T.A.D., G.A.T.T., E.E.C.), either in their headquarters or in third countries (Algeria, Tunis, Egypt, Yugoslavia, China). He is author of books, studies, and articles on the Mediterranean, on development and politics in Greece, on the European Union, on the environment and sustainable development and on globalisation. He was a member of the Unified Democratic Left (1959-1963), the Democratic Defense, (1967-1974, during the military dictatorship in Greece), founding member of the Hellenic Left (1987-) and Synaspismos. He is member of the Central Political Committee and the Political Secretariat of Synaspismos and was member of the European Parliament since 1989. He has been president of the Joint Parliament Committee E.U. (Hungary) and member of the Joint Parliament Committee EU (Cyprus). He has been president of the European Movement - Greek Committee for the EU; vice-president of the Intergroup Committee on animal welfare; member of the Steering Committee of the International European Movement and member of the Steering Committee of the Intergroup on the European Constitution.

1.10 AGGOURAKIS Charalampos

He was born in Romania and until 1979 he lived in Romania and Eastern Germany. In 1979 he got the Greek citizenship, since before that he had been deprived of it. He joined the Communist youth in 1968. Then he came to Greece, having studied information engineering and since very early he got involved in

politics, mostly through action, not only theoretically. He is working at the international affairs sector both in the Communist Youth and the Communist Party since 1979.

1.11 VOULTEPSI Sofia

Born in Piraeus (1956). Until she was elected, she worked as editor in chief in the daily press, in radio and TV shows, covering extensively Greek-Turkish relations and Turkish affairs, like the Ocalan trial. She was elected MP of Athens with New Democracy on March 2004. She was a counsellor at the press office of the Prime Minister (1990-1993). She was a member of the National Council of Radio and Television (2000-2002). She is member of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence and Foreign Affairs and of the Standing Committee on European Affairs.

1.12 KAPSIS Yiannis

He was foreign editor for many years and after that he became editor in chief and director of various newspapers. His background is from Asia Minor and during the '60s he wrote a book entitled *Lost homelands*, concerning the events of 1922. When he met Andreas Papandreou in 1963 he was charmed by politics and especially during the period 1980-1981 he extensively supported Pasok through the newspapers where he worked. In 1982, Papandreou named him deputy Foreign Minister until 1987; after he was assigned to the post of alternate foreign minister until 1989. He has written eleven books.

1.13 DROUTSAS Dimitris

His father is a Greek diplomat, his mother is German and he was born in Cyprus. After 1974, his father was transferred from Cyprus to Ankara. He attended school in Greece, Germany, Cyprus, Turkey and Austria, where he spent most of his adolescent years. He studied law, he wrote his PhD on the Cyprus issue and particularly on Cyprus' membership in the EU. After working two years in the UN, he started his academic career, working as professor of European and international law at the University of Vienna, where one of the main topics of his research was the Mediterranean policy of the EU and especially concerning Cyprus and Turkey. He worked as a legal counselor of the Austrian foreign minister at the time, who is now the Austrian chancellor. He met Yorgos Papandreou in the mid-90s. They started a close collaboration and when Papandreou was named foreign minister, Mr. Droutsas became responsible in his headquarters of all the issues concerning the EU and especially the issue of the Turkish candidacy and the Cyprus membership.

1.14 PAPOULIAS Yorgos

In 1955 he started his diplomatic career, being posted in New Delhi, in Germany and in Geneva, where he worked for the first time in international organizations and in particular the UN. He returned to Greece and has assigned to the post of director of political affairs in the ministry of Northern Greece, where he worked mainly on two issues: the FYROM dispute and Greek-Turkish relations, due to Muslim minority in Western Thrace. After that, he served as an ambassador in Paris. In 1975, he was named ambassador at the United Nations and after four years ambassador to Ankara. Five years later he was sent as ambassador in Washington. He was named Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1989-1990 and after that he was set as

an ambassador in London, where he stayed for 3,5 years. On the same time, he worked in a special mission of the United Nations on the Cyprus issue and after that on the Skopje affair.

2] APPENDIX 2: GREEK MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Year	Prime Minister	Minister of FA	Alternate FM	Deputy FM
02.06. 85 (elections)	A. Papandreou	Yiannis Charalambopoulos	K. Papoulias	Th. Pangalos
26.07.85 (reshuffle)	A. Papandreou	Karolos Papoulias	Th. Pangalos	-
02.07.89 (elections)	Tzanis Tzanetakis	Tzanis Tzanetakis	Yorgos Papoulias	-
12.10.89 (elections)	Ioannis Grivas	Yorgos Papoulias	-	-
23.11.89 (elections)	Xenofon Zolotas	Antonis Samaras	-	-
16.02.90 (reshuffle)	Xenofon Zolotas	Yorgos Papoulias	-	-
11.04.90 (elections)	K. Mitsotakis	Antonis Samaras	-	G. Papastamkos
07.08.92 (reshuffle)	K. Mitsotakis	Papakostantinou M.	V. Tsouderou	G. Papastamkos
10.10.93 (elections)	A. Papandreou	Karolos Papoulias	Th. Pangalos	Y. Papandreou
08.07.94 (reshuffle)	A. Papandreou	Karolos Papoulias	Magkakis Y.	Grigoris Niotis
15.09.95 (reshuffle)	A. Papandreou	Karolos Papoulias	Yorgos Romaïos	Grigoris Niotis
22.01.96 (PM's resignation)	K. Simitis	Th. Pangalos	Yorgos Romaïos	-
22.09.96 (elections)	K. Simitis	Th. Pangalos	Christos Rozakis Y. Papandreou	Yian. Kranidiotis
02.01.1997	K. Simitis	Th. Pangalos	Y. Papandreou Rozakis resigns	Yian. Kranidiotis
18.02.99 (reshuffle)	K. Simitis	Y. Papandreou	Y. Kranidiotis	Grigoris Niotis
15.09.99	K. Simitis	Y. Papandreou	Kranidiotis' death, Chr. Rokofillos	Grigoris Niotis
09.04.00 (elections)	K. Simitis	Y. Papandreou	Elisavet Papazoi	Aggeliki Laiou
20.11.00	K. Simitis	Y. Papandreou	Elisavet Papazoi	Laiou resignes, Grigoris Niotis
23.10.01 (reshuffle)	K. Simitis	Y. Papandreou	Tasos Giannitsis	Zafeiropoulos Y., Y. Magriotis

21.01.02	K. Simitis	Y. Papandreou	Tasos Giannitsis	Zafeiropoulos resigns, An. Loverdos
23.10.02 (reshuffle)	K. Simitis	Y. Papandreou	Tasos Giannitsis	An. Loverdos, Y. Magkriotis
07.03.04 (elections)	K. Karamanlis	Petros Moliviatis	-	T. Skandalakis G. Valinakis Evríp. Stilianidis

**3] APPENDIX 3: ARTICLE OF THE GREEK FOREIGN MINISTER
PAPANDREOU IN *INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE* BEFORE THE
HELSINKI SUMMIT**

Greece Wants Turkey to Make the Grade, 10/12/1999

The EU summit this week will decide whether Turkey should become a candidate for membership. Greece believes that if Turkey is willing to submit to the rigors of the process of candidacy, which apply equally to all candidate countries, then it should be accepted into the EU.

With the harrowing war in Kosovo still fresh in our memories, the Greek people are critically aware of the importance of good neighbourly relations. We believe that our neighbour's strength is our strength. To exclude a country from the full benefits of international society is a sure path to the kind of crises we have faced for too long in Southeast Europe.

The heart of the European ethos lies in building the institutions and practices of inclusiveness.

Since I became foreign minister last February, I have consistently followed a policy of regional cooperation. Greece is committed to embracing all nations which strive for democracy within their frontiers, and peaceful cooperation beyond them, in the European family. This policy applies as much to Yugoslavia as it does to Turkey.

I believe that Greece and Turkey have no choice but to explore new avenues for cooperation. Our mutual interests can outweigh our political differences. We can and must resolve these differences through peaceful means, through the International Court of Justice.

So Greece has initiated a process of constructive dialogue with Turkey - a process which began even before the Kosovo crisis and the earthquakes that shook both our countries.

In short, Greece has attempted to turn a new page. This policy of openness requires courage and determination.

While Greek foreign policy is guided by a genuine commitment to regional stability and prosperity, we also have a duty to safeguard our national interests. Our European allies appreciate that Greece has more to gain but also potentially more to lose from Turkey's European prospects than any other EU state.

Greece has created a window of opportunity for Turkey. The time has come for Turkey to prove that its intentions toward Europe are serious. If Turkey is willing to play by EU rules, we in Europe must back Turkey's candidacy.

We cannot condone double standards. The entry criteria set down in Copenhagen apply equally to all candidate nations. In Turkey's case, this means greater political and religious freedom, independence of judiciaries, and free media. It means guarantees for the protection of human rights and minority rights. It means the settlement of disputes by peaceful means, and respect for international law.

With respect to good neighbourly relations and the inviolability of borders, we are worried by Turkey's incessant violations of Greek airspace and its practice of placing restrictions on the ecumenical patriarchate in Constantinople.

Greece advocates a real and not a "virtual" candidacy for Turkey. Neither the EU nor Turkey can be satisfied with empty gestures of goodwill.

Turkey must now commit to concrete actions. The recent statement by my Turkish counterpart, Ismail Cem, that Turkey is prepared to resolve its territorial

differences with Greece with respect to international law, and comply with the criteria set down in Agenda 2000, is a very positive step.

And of course we strive to reach an acceptable diplomatic solution to end the division of Cyprus, based on the relevant decisions of the United Nations. EU membership is the best way to guarantee progress on the Cyprus issue.

Cyprus is closest among all EU candidates to fulfilling entry requirements. Entry would increase the security, stability and prosperity of both communities on Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriot community, now isolated from the rest of the world, would benefit the most.

Turkey continues to occupy 38 percent of the island with more than 30,000 troops. Can the EU accept any candidate country which forcefully occupies the territory of another candidate country? The Union has a responsibility to help break down the last Berlin Wall dividing a European capital.

Turkey still has a long way to go. Some of our partners in Europe believe that it is not yet politically, economically or socially stable enough to join Europe. Let Turkey prove its maturity by undertaking the necessary reforms. And let the EU provide a realistic framework for Turkey to undertake these reforms - a road map of conditions, criteria and deadlines.

Turkey cannot be expected to carry out painful reforms unless the EU demonstrates an unequivocal commitment to Turkey's European future. Greece has built half the bridge that will draw Turkey closer to Europe. Whether our European partners will build the other half remains to be seen at Helsinki. -

The writer is foreign minister of Greece. He contributed this comment to the International Herald Tribune.

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