

WHO ARE THE POLITICAL FRIENDS?
HOMONOIA AND POLITICAL FRIENDSHIP IN
ARISTOTLE'S POLITICAL THINKING

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2017

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Thesis submitted to the
Institute for Graduate Studies in Social Sciences
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts in
Philosophy

by
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2017

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ABSTRACT

Who Are the Political Friends?

Homonoia and Political Friendship in Aristotle's Political Thinking

The notion of political friendship holds a unique institutional function in Aristotle's political philosophy. He considers political friendship, as a specific account of friendship between citizens of the polis, as an indispensable component of a functioning state. In my dissertation, I aim to provide an extensive analysis of the notion of political friendship in Aristotle's political thinking, by establishing its proper position in Aristotle's teleological understanding of politics and his theory of friendship. In the first part, I examine three political notions, which are eudaimonia, common good, and political justice, together with political friendship, and investigate the reciprocal relationships between these concepts. I argue that in Aristotle's view, these four political goods, which clearly affect one another, contribute to good lives of the citizens of the polis constitutively. In the second part, I investigate the position of political friendship in Aristotle's friendship theory. I examine the characteristics of different kinds of friendships and determine the proper place of political friendship in this framework. I argue that political friendship cannot be considered merely as friendship of utility, because it requires the virtue of acting according to the common good, even if it conflicts with one's temporary personal interests. Finally, I discussed the necessary practical conditions that a society must sustain in order to provide political friendship between its citizens.

ÖZET

Siyasi Arkadaşlar Kimlerdir?

Aristoteles'in Siyaset Felsefesinde *Homonoia* ve Siyasi Arkadaşlık

Siyasi arkadaşlık kavramı Aristoteles'in siyaset felsefesinde oldukça önemli bir yer tutmaktadır. Aristoteles'in şehir devletinde yaşayan vatandaşlar arasında belli bir dostluk ilişkisi olarak tanımladığı siyasi arkadaşlık, onun nazarında düzgün işleyen bir devletin ayrılmaz bir bileşenidir. Ben bu tezde, Aristoteles'in siyaset ve arkadaşlık kuramları içinde siyasi arkadaşlığın doğru konumunu tespit ederek kavramının kapsamlı bir analizini sunmayı amaçladım. Birinci kısımda, Aristoteles'in siyasi görüşünde *eudaimonia* (insan serpilmesi, mutluluk), ortak iyi ve siyasi adalet kavramlarını ve bu kavramların siyasi arkadaşlıkla olan çift taraflı ilişkilerini inceledim. Bu dört kavramın birbirlerini karşılıklı olarak etkilediklerini ve sağlıklı bir siyasi örgütlenmenin temel yapısını oluşturduklarını tartıştım. İkinci kısımda Aristoteles'in arkadaşlık kuramında öne çıkan arkadaşlık türlerinin özelliklerini inceleyerek siyasi arkadaşlığın bu türler arasındaki yerini araştırdım. Bu araştırma sonucu, siyasi arkadaşlığın, kişinin kendi anlık çıkarlarıyla çelişse bile ortak iyi için eylemde bulunma erdemini gerektirdiği, dolayısıyla yalnızca bir çıkar arkadaşlığı olarak görülemeyeceği sonucuna vardım. Son olarak, vatandaşların arasında arkadaşlık ilişkisinin sürdürülebilmesi için toplumda sağlanması gereken koşulları tartıştım.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my advisor, Assoc. Prof. Chryssi Sidiropoulou, for her academic guidance and her caring and excellent intellectual support as I completed my dissertation. Her expertise in Ancient Greek philosophy helped me significantly in establishing the proper groundwork for this essay. I will always be thankful to her for her precious contributions to my research.

I also would like to express my sincere gratitude to Prof. Türker Armaner and Assist. Prof. Yıldız Silier for guiding my research by taking part as members of my committee and for providing supportive discussion on many parts of this work. Their supportive attitude and illuminating ideas are gratefully acknowledged.

I would also like to thank Prof. Pınar Canevi for introducing me to Aristotle's political philosophy. Her profound knowledge and brilliant ideas inspired me to conduct research on Aristotle's political friendship and provided me a uniquely different perspective in interpreting contemporary politics.

I also take this opportunity to express my sincere thanks to Prof. Murat Baç for his academic support throughout my graduate studies at Boğaziçi University, and for generously sharing his time and ideas. His academic guidance and valuable insights helped me greatly to develop my abilities in conducting philosophical research.

I owe a special thank-you to my family for their unconditional love and support. My heartfelt gratitude goes to my parents Emine and Hüseyin Hepçağlayan: you always encouraged me to pursue my dreams and stood behind me, even in the most difficult times. Your love, support and encouragement were invaluable.

Finally, the financial support given by TÜBİTAK for my MA program is gratefully acknowledged.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the global community has been suffering from the severe negative consequences of political enmity and polarization. Sectarian conflicts in the Middle East, international terrorist attacks carried out by radical Islamists, the rejection of the peace referendum in Colombia, the plight of the refugees in Europe, and even Brexit are examples of recent political developments that are motivated by antagonism among different socio-political groups. Overwhelming outcomes of the enmity between factions drive attention to the long forgotten notion of political friendship. Although friendship is not considered a political element in the modern era, except briefly in Arendt and Derrida's work, Ancient Greek philosophers, especially Plato and Aristotle, assign friendship an institutional function. Political friendship, as opposed to social enmity and party faction, was regarded as one of the crucial elements that a constitution aims to promote. Aristotle claims that not only philosophers, but also rulers consider political friendship more essential than justice in sustaining a functional political organization. In view of the man-made catastrophes that are triggered by hostility among different groups, there rises a need to reconsider the structure and the institutional function of the ancient notion of political friendship.

In this essay, I shall aim to provide an extensive analysis of Aristotle's political friendship by investigating its function in Aristotle's political philosophy, its position in his friendship theory, and the necessary conditions for sustaining political friendship within the community. In the first chapter, I intend to establish the proper relationship between *eudaimonia* and political friendship in Aristotle's teleological

view towards politics. Teleological politics is used to define Aristotle's attempt to define the relationship between the individual and the state by referring to human beings' "natural function". Aristotle claims that, like every entity, human being has a *telos*, and this is to fulfill the capacities that he is endowed with by nature. In his account, happiness, which is the supreme good for human beings, is the actualization of these capacities. This specific account of happiness, *eudaimonia*, necessitates the exercise of the capacities that are specifically assigned to human beings, such as social and deliberative faculties. Aristotle argues that the exercise of these rational faculties requires belonging to a political organization, namely a state. According to him, the state is naturally prior to the individual, since human beings are not self-sufficient in fulfilling their natural function. Human being, as a political animal, needs to be part of a state in order to reach his individual *eudaimonia*. The first part of this thesis covers the role of three political goods – the common good, political justice and political friendship – in providing a functional state and therefore actualizing *eudaimonia*.

In the second part, I will first aim to investigate the position of political friendship in Aristotle's general friendship theory. In both the *Nicomachean* and the *Eudemian Ethics*, Aristotle provides an extensive analysis on the types and corresponding conditions of friendship. In his view, the term friendship does not only refer to an intimate interaction between two people who enjoy each other's company, but is also involved in various other relationships, such as business, family and *polis* interactions. Aristotle examines friendship under three categories; friendship of goodness, or the perfect friendship, which consists in the mutual well-wishing and well-doing between two parties who appreciate each other's good character, and, friendships of utility and pleasure, are the derivations from the perfect friendship. In

these derivative friendships, mutual affection is not caused by the other party's goodness, but by the contribution of this relationship to one's *eudaimonia*, in terms of usefulness or pleasantness. In various places in the *Eudemian Ethics*, Aristotle associates political friendship with friendship of utility, because it targets expedient ends that are achieved in common. However, I will argue that political friendship cannot be considered to be merely as friendship of utility, because it is strongly related to the exercise of the virtue of justice. Although Aristotle does not specifically clarify the aspects that distinguishes political friendship from friendship of utility, there is enough textual evidence that reveals the difference between these two kinds of friendships. In the last section of the second part the required conditions of political friendship will be examined. Political friendship is not a moral ideal or an obscure aspiration that is promoted by the constitution to provide a certain relationship among the citizens, but a real account of friendship that can be sustained only if certain conditions are satisfied. These conditions are; a certain account of distributive justice, a shared ethnic belonging, and a non-excessive population. Political friendship, as the ultimate relationship between citizens can be maintained only if these three conditions are obtained within the state.

CHAPTER 2

POLITICAL FRIENDSHIP AS THE ACTUALIZER OF *EUDAIMONIA*

2.1 *Eudaimonia*, common good and political justice

The notion of *eudaimonia* holds a central place in Aristotle's ethical and political philosophy. Commonly translated as 'happiness' or 'human flourishing', *eudaimonia* is presented by Aristotle as the final good of human life. Aristotle argues in the first book of the *Nicomachean Ethics* that although any other good, such as wealth, honor or power, can be chosen for the sake of something else, *eudaimonia* cannot be an instrument to a greater end (*NE1097b5*). It seems to be the ultimate end of all human practices, and hence can be regarded as the supreme good of human life. Aristotle considers this deduction quite trivial; according to him, what matters philosophically is to understand *eudaimonia* correctly (*NE1097b9*). Observing the vast range of methods people use to reach *eudaimonia*, such as aiming for pleasure, title or knowledge, Aristotle attempts to find the true way with respect to human *telos*. He argues that every entity is designed by nature to fulfill a unique function, which determines the purpose of its existence (*NE1097b11*). In humans' case, the function that distinguishes them from the rest seems to be "the practical life of the rational part of man".¹ Therefore, the purpose of human life appears to be practicing the rational faculties that nature has endowed human beings with.

Aristotle maintains that this purpose cannot be distinct from *eudaimonia*. In other words, he does not infer a duality between human purpose (or function) and human happiness; on the contrary, he explicitly states that this purpose determines

¹See *NE1098a3-4*. Rackham indicates that "practice" for Aristotle, different than our understanding of the term, means a purposeful conduct. Only rational beings have the capacity to practice, act purposefully, according to this definition. See Rackham's translation of *Nicomachean Ethics* p.30 footnote a.

² This particular understanding of happiness induced a discussion on the correct translation of

the scope of *eudaimonia*. His teleological approach reveals an important aspect of the term *eudaimonia* in Aristotle's sense: he does not consider happiness to be as a passive and temporary emotional state, but an act-based enduring process.² He claims:

Moreover this activity [exercise of soul's faculties] must occupy a complete lifetime; for one swallow does not make spring, nor does one fine day; and similarly one day or a brief period of happiness [*eudaimonia*] does not make a man supremely blessed and happy.³

This teleological and essentialist attempt to define happiness, the good that all humans ultimately aim at, in connection to human function, subjected to many objections though, enables Aristotle to overcome the moral conflict between what human beings desire to act versus the act in conformity with morality.⁴ *Eudaimonia* is what human beings are naturally inclined to desire, and at the same time what they ought to reach in order to fulfill their natural purpose. So, it is not perplexing when Aristotle claims that happiness is the activity in conformity with virtue, which is both pleasant and noble (*NE*1098b30-31, *NE*1099a22-23). In his account, actions conducive to happiness, in other words, actions that human beings desire to perform, are the same with the actions that are virtuous, since from the beginning, he defines *eudaimonia* as the exercise of human faculties in conformity with virtue.

Aristotle argues that there are certain conditions of living a *eudaimon* life. These conditions are discussed with respect to their function of enabling individuals to fulfill their natural capacities. First of all, *eudaimonia* requires goodness. An ill-natured individual who cannot understand, appreciate or exercise virtue would not be

² This particular understanding of happiness induced a discussion on the correct translation of *eudaimonia*. Cooper introduces the word "flourishing" to overcome the confusions caused by the modern understanding of the word happiness.

³ *NE*1098a16-20. This and all other translations in this essay are Rackham's unless stated otherwise.

⁴ The objections and defenses towards Aristotle's moral and political teleology are beyond the topic of this essay, however can be found in Donoghue-Armstrong's dissertation.

able to live a happy life: because he lacks the human faculty to act virtuously. Although this person may not understand the contribution of good actions to his happiness and consider himself happy in the fullest sense, this sort of happiness cannot be regarded as *eudaimonia*.⁵ Nevertheless, access to external goods is another condition of happiness in Aristotle's account. He argues that good actions would be very hard to exercise, if not impossible, in the absence of necessary equipment, such as wealth, friends and political power (*NE*1099a30-1099b3). These goods are instrumental but also fundamental in fulfilling natural capacities such as experiencing pleasure, honor and contemplation. In addition to these conditions, Aristotle claims that fortune also seems to be a requirement for living happily, since a low-birth or a very ugly face would be an obstacle to fulfill some human faculties.

Among these conditions, there is one last crucial requirement to reach *eudaimonia*: living in a healthy political organization. Aristotle's – and also general ancient – understanding of politics is clearly in contrast with the modern individualist approach on numerous matters. I choose to discuss Aristotle's teleological politics by comparing it to the individualist tradition, to highlight its non-linear structure. First of all, the two approaches fundamentally differ in their understanding of human being as a political creature. For example, one of the founders of individualist politics, Hobbes (1909) divides human condition into two categories. First one, he claims, is the natural condition, where human beings do not belong in any political organization. People are not subjected to any kind of law enforcement in this era. They are free in all levels of action; but bounded by the insecurities that are caused by other people's freedom. When they choose to establish a political guard, namely the state, to avoid these insecurities, they have sacrificed their basic freedom in the

⁵ Because *eudaimonia* is not a subjective account of happiness. Aristotle is pretty clear that there is a certain guideline to reach *eudaimonia*, which applies to everyone. The part that Aristotle discussed the importance of virtue to live happily can be found in *NE*1098b30-33.

exchange of the social liberty. In Aristotle's view, however, there is no such duality between the natural and the political conditions. Aristotle argues that the nature of human being necessitates it to be a political animal. In the *Politics*, he argues that a human being is by definition subsequent to the state:

[T]he state is prior by nature to the individual; for if each individual when separate is not self-sufficient, he must be related to the whole state as other parts are to their whole, while a man who is incapable of entering into partnership, or who is so self-sufficing that he has no need to do so, is no part of a state, so that he must be either a lower animal or a god.⁶

Aristotle maintains that a “non-political human being” cannot be regarded as human in its natural sense, because by their nature, human beings are not self-sufficient, hence they will not be able to fully exercise their capacities outside of a political organization. A Robinson Crusoe type of life, which requires exclusion from social interaction, would be significantly different than what Aristotle and possibly all of us understand from the term human life.⁷ First, there would be no division of labor, so people's access to external goods would be narrowed by their individual gains and productions. In that case, many human artifacts, which we consider as very basic elements of human life, such as shoes, roads or medicine, would be very limited if not non-existent. Second, people would not be able to make friends when they are not in a society; thus, they would not be exercising their social capacities. Third, and most importantly, they would not be capable to build a perception of justice and virtue; therefore lacking the basic human faculty to act on a moral standpoint.

⁶ See *Pol.* 1253a25-30.

⁷ People may object to this statement by claiming that being out of state does not necessarily mean being out of the society. This argument is based on the assumption that people may live together without belonging to a state-like political organization. However, what Aristotle understands from the term state is a very underpopulated city-state, as known as polis. So, he considers ‘state’ as a basic communal arrangement; and the definition of state is designed with respect to basic conditions that living in a society requires. I will discuss Aristotle's definition of state in upcoming parts of this essay.

Aristotle, in my interpretation, refuses to consider this productively primitive, friendless and morally incapable creature, if it ever existed in a certain part of the history, as a human being.

One may argue that the difference between Hobbes's and Aristotle's approach to the relationship between the state and the individual is just conventional. Hobbes chooses to define a pre-social form of human being as the human in natural condition, whereas Aristotle refuses to consider that as a human being, and constructs its political theory after the point of socialization. However, regarding their difference as a matter of 'naming' overlooks two significant consequences of this distinction. First, by asserting the existence of a pre-political human being, Hobbes does not recognize the exercise of social capacities as a necessary component of human nature. On the contrary, he regards human beings' 'choosing' state as an act to overcome the difficulties caused by their nature; thus, he infers a duality and even a conflict between 'human nature' and human intellect. Human nature, in his perspective, is something to suppress in order to raise the possibility of communal relations. Aristotle would presumably consider this idea as a limited, and even absurd, interpretation of men's nature. In his account, if one ignores or fights with his own nature, he would not be able to satisfy his natural task, therefore would not ever reach the chief good for himself.

Second, for individuals to give consent to the authority of a law enforcing entity, there needs to be a linear causal relationship between the individual and the state. Even though the individual can exist without belonging to the state, he chooses to give his consent to it. Thus, the state is willingly constructed by individuals, to form a better environment for living. The state is an artefactual institution, created by human beings to perform a certain function. Aristotle argues just the opposite. He

considers the state and its implications on the individual as a part of the human nature. The state is not an institution that individuals might give consent to, but a necessary condition of the human life. Therefore, in Aristotle's case, the function of the state cannot be explained via linear reasoning, but with a holistic and naturalistic understanding of the reciprocal relationship between the individual and the society. Let us expand this very idea with an analogy from the *Politics*. While arguing that the state is prior to the individual, Aristotle states: "For the whole must necessarily be prior to the part; since when the whole body is destroyed, foot or hand will not exist except in an equivocal sense..." (*Pol.*1253a20-22). In this analogy, Aristotle likens individuals to the organs of a body. Apart from the whole, these parts would not be able to fulfill their natural function. Similarly, the whole would not be able to achieve its full potential when its parts do not act properly. This reciprocal dependence between the whole and the parts resembles the relationship between the individual and the state in Aristotle's view. He thinks that the good for the individual necessitates the good for the state and vice versa. Just like a hand that requires a healthy body and a body that needs a healthy hand, individual well being and common good are intertwined notions which overlap with, require, and lead to one another. We, therefore, need to examine Aristotle's *Politics* not via causal analysis, but by understanding various goods, such as *eudaimonia*, common good and political justice, and investigating the versatile relationships between them.

So far we have established that reaching *eudaimonia* requires the exercise of human faculties; therefore, living in a state is clearly a pre-condition of human happiness. In addition to this condition, in his paper "*Eudaimonism, Love and Political Community*", Brink argues that living in a society contributes to *eudaimonia* by enabling comparison and deliberation. He considers the exercise of

deliberative faculties as the “chief ingredient in *eudaimonia*” (Brink, 264).⁸ Human beings are not self-sufficient in developing their deliberative faculties; because they need a different perspective than their own to recognize their mistakes and to correct what they have been previously wrong about. The necessity of the other makes friendship essential for reaching *eudaimonia*. Brink argues that Aristotle regards human being as a political animal because of the same reason: human being, essentially, needs to live with perspectives other than his own, in order to fulfill his natural deliberative capacities.

Political justice, as the provider of a healthy society, significantly contributes to *eudaimonia*. Aristotle argues that the function of a state is to provide a proper environment for the common good, and he claims that this good is political justice:

And inasmuch as in all the sciences and arts the End is a good, and the greatest good in the highest degree in the most authoritative of all, which is the political faculty, and the good in the political field, that is the general advantage [κοινο συμφερον], is justice...⁹

The justice that Aristotle refers to in this statement is political – literally *polis* – justice. In the *Politics*, he examines justice under three categories, which are political, universal and particular.¹⁰ Among these, Kalimtzis (2000) argues that the primary sort is political justice; as in many passages Aristotle clarifies that the end of political justice is *eudaimonia*, which is the supreme good for human beings (Kalimtzis, 40). Political justice is an element of the state, which regulates the

⁸ I agree with Brink on this subject, since Aristotle clarifies in the *Ethics* that deliberative faculties distinguish human beings from other beings, and therefore constitute their function in life (NE1098a).

⁹ *Pol.* 1282b15-20. *κοινο συμφερον* is alternatively translated as the common good.

¹⁰ Universal justice covers practical excellences which human beings may exercise by virtue. For the purposes of this essay, I will not provide a deeper discussion of universal justice. Particular justice, which formulates fair share of external goods, will be handled in the second part, where I examine the relationship between political friendship and distributive justice.

communal relations in a way that enables the ‘collective flourishing.’¹¹ What I mean by collective flourishing is nothing different than what is previously stated as the common good or the general advantage; however, I believe, the phrase “collective flourishing” is more successful in covering both the individual and communal components of the term κοινὸν συμφέρον. As we previously discussed, in Aristotle’s non-linear and teleological understanding of politics, state, society and individuals flourish together and in mutual relation. He states “The good life then is the chief aim of the society, both collectively for all its members and individually” (*Pol.*1278b23-25). The *eudaimon* life can only be achieved in a political organization that enables individuals to fulfill their natural capacities; equivalently, the state needs to promote *eudaimonia* in order to maintain its existence. Therefore, I conclude, the necessary codes that empower the reciprocal relationship between the individual and the state, and therefore promote the collective flourishing, is political justice. This sort of justice may be achieved only if the citizens of the *polis* demand and act according to their shared rules and values. These rules and values, whether written or unwritten, are recognized and accepted by all citizens, and enforced by the constitution of the *polis*. Hence political justice, in Aristotle’s sense, does not require a unique prescription: its structure may vary according to different constitutions adopted by citizens of different cities.

Aristotle examines these different constitutions under three categories, which are kingship, aristocracy and polity, with their corresponding deviations (*Pol.*1279b). He argues that deviations occur when constitutions prioritize private interests rather than the common good, as in tyranny, oligarchy and democracy. Kalimtzis (2000) claims that “unqualified” political justice, “justice *haplos*”, requires an exercise of

¹¹ In the *Politics* Aristotle writes: “Justice, on the other hand is an element of the state; for judicial procedure, which means the decision of what is just, is the regulation of the political partnership” (P1253a38-40).

justice irrespective of any person or group (Kalimtzis, 37). The difference, which Kalimtzis highlights, between the qualified and unqualified political justice arises from the very distinction between the private interest and the common good. Unqualified political justice aims at the flourishing of each citizen of society as a whole, whereas qualified justice promotes the well being of a certain person or a group. About the deviant constitutions, Aristotle writes:

[F]or tyranny is monarchy ruling in the interest of the monarch, oligarchy government in the interest of the rich, democracy government in the interest of the poor, and none of these forms governs with regard to the profit of the community.¹²

These constitutions are deviant, because they *deviate* from the natural function of the state. The difference between non-deviant and deviant constitutions can be best described with the distinction between normal and abnormal, rather than the normative contrast between good and bad; because deviant constitutions are not only bad for the citizens, but they also conflict with the very foundation on which the state is built. Aristotle regards the promotion of the common good, therefore unqualified political justice, as a necessary condition of a healthy state. As long as the constitution is insufficient to fulfill its natural function, which is to promote the common good, it is obliged to perish sooner or later, like a diseased body.¹³

In conclusion, *eudaimonia*, common good and political justice are three goods which form the foundation of Aristotle's political theory. In his teleological

¹² *Pol.* 1279b7-10.

¹³ I borrowed the "diseased body" analogy from Kalimtzis's book *Aristotle on Political Enmity and Disease*. In the introduction of the book, Kalimtzis investigates the roots of the word *stasis*. He states that in Ancient Greek tradition "stasis", which literally means "arrest", is used to describe the condition of a malfunctioning state. In medical practice, he claims, the term is associated with the notion of disease. So, combining these two pieces of information, he argues that in political context, a dysfunctional state is considered analogous with a diseased organism, which will eventually die if it is not treated properly. I find Kalimtzis's inference very influential since it fits firmly to Aristotle's naturalist understanding of politics. For more information on this subject, please check the introduction and the first chapter of Kalimtzis's book.

approach towards politics, Aristotle argues that a human being's natural function is to fulfill his rational faculties, which requires belonging to a state. The state's function is to provide a proper environment for the flourishing of all citizens, individually and collectively. This common good can be achieved only if the constitution promotes unqualified political justice. Therefore, in Aristotle's view, sustaining political justice and promoting the common good within the state are crucial requirements for enabling citizens to pursue their own *eudaimonia*.

2.2 Role of *homonoia* and political friendship in Aristotle's political philosophy

In the seventh book of the *Eudemian Ethics* Aristotle writes: "The justice that underlies a friendship of utility is the highest degree just, because this is the civic principle of justice" (*EE*1242a12-14). This statement is significant, because it sets forth a certain relationship between justice and friendship, and also between friendship and the common good. First, Aristotle claims that the civic principle of justice, the imperative that any constitution needs to aim at, is promoting a friendship of utility between citizens. As we discussed previously, he also maintains that the end of political justice is to provide a share of *eudaimonia* for all citizens, which is defined as the common good. Therefore, it is clear that there is a certain dependence between the common good and the friendship of citizens. In order to explore the extent of this dependence let us take a look at the eighth book of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, where Aristotle describes the general approach to friendship in Ancient Greek politics:

Moreover, friendship appears to be the bond of the state; and lawgivers seem to set more store by it than they do by justice, for to promote concord [*homonoia*], which seem akin to friendship, is their chief aim, while faction, which is enmity, is what they are most anxious to banish. (*NE*1155a22-25)

First, by this statement, Aristotle suggests two ways by which to reach the ultimate good for the state. These are justice and friendship. Political justice is an element of the constitution, which regulates the society by establishing what is just. The execution of political justice necessitates an implementation of coercion through law, in some way or another. Therefore, even when the whole city agrees on the necessary rules to promote the common good, the application of those rules requires a vertical enforcement of the law, from the government to the citizens. In the worst-case scenario, like in tyranny, political justice neither generates the rules accepted by citizens, nor promotes the common good, but is used as a tool of despotism. One may argue that the law enforced by deviant constitutions should not be regarded as the political justice, but as a gross misuse of the ruling power. This objection has both correct and incorrect parts. First, as we discussed previously, political justice needs to empower the common good in order to satisfy the state's natural function. Therefore, an account of justice that benefits only a certain person or a group cannot be regarded as political justice in its complete sense. However, having deviated from its natural function, justice of the tyrant is also considered as political justice: not as the justice *haplos*, but as the justice of sort. The reason of this distinction is that Aristotle does not see political justice as an abstract ideal, but as the actual regulation of the constitution.

Then, by the statement above, Aristotle argues that a certain friendship between citizens seems to be more successful than the law maintained by the constitution in bonding the state. This certain friendship is described by the term *homonoia*, and opposed to enmity and faction. *Homonoia* is translated as “concord” by Rackham, however has two other translations, which are “agreement” and “unanimity.” In the ninth book of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle defines

homonoia as: “Concord [*homonoia*] is said to prevail in a state, when citizens agree as to their interests, adopt the same policy, and carry their common resolves into execution” (NE1107a27-29). He argues that *homonoia* is not merely agreement of opinion because of two reasons. First, he claims that agreement of opinion can exist even between strangers, whereas *homonoia* requires a sort of friendship between two parties (NE1107a22). Second, in addition to a shared belief on a certain topic, *homonoia* refers to practical ends of importance, therefore requires action (NE1107a30-31). Despite the fact that the word etymologically means together or common mindedness, as the combination of *homo* (*ομο*, *ομοῖ*) and *nous* (*νοῦς*), Aristotle never uses it to refer to non-political agreements. The consensus achieved between parents about sending their children to a certain school is not *homonoia*; the term is essentially related to political affairs. Furthermore, in Aristotle’s terms, sharing a common mind, as reaching *homonoia*, implies corresponding action on the shared opinion. He does not even discuss a condition where citizens agree upon the common good but do not choose to perform on it. The domain where *homonoia* is relevant is *praxis*; the agreement among citizens about public affairs needs to be corroborated by the required action in order to be considered as *homonoia*. Therefore, *homonoia* is by definition tangible; it refers to a friendship among citizens, which necessitates corresponding action on what they all believe to be in their common good. None of the translations mentioned above seems to meet this unique concept. “Agreement” is clearly off the table, because it does not cover practical components of the term. “Concord” refers to a consensus between two parties, however does not necessitate a friendly feeling. “Unanimity” is a negative notion, which may mislead the audience to a reverse reading. Absence of *homonoia* in the community may and probably eventually will lead to enmity between citizens,

however absence of enmity does not necessarily mean that there is *homonoia* in the polis. “A condition without enmity” is insufficient in covering the active nature of the term.

Aristotle argues that there is *homonoia* in the state, only if the citizens possess a common view about the practical ends of importance and also are aware of that commonality (NE1167a30-33). Aristotle highlights the significance of “knowing that everybody agrees” in *homonoia*, because it enables strong and safe ties between citizens. Let us think an alternative scenario, where all citizens share a common standpoint about what is in their common good, however there is no proper environment for public deliberation, so they are not aware of the each other’s opinion. In that case, citizens would all be willing to participate in the common good, but the public interaction would be restless, because nobody would trust other parties’ future judgments or actions. Trusting the fellow citizens’ upcoming judgments requires knowing what they have in mind, what is their account of public good, and how they will act upon their opinion. When this knowledge does not exist and there is a “secret concord” in the city, it is not possible to develop a friendly feeling based on mutual trust between citizens. In this case, people would trust the legal contract that binds them, in other words the enforcement of political justice, rather than trusting each other.

Therefore, in Aristotle’s sense, friendship that binds the city requires concord on what is the common benefit, corresponding action on this shared opinion, and also mutual trust on the exercise of shared beliefs between citizens. The function of polis-wide friendship is clearly related to its contributions to justice, common good and individual *eudaimonia*. At first look the relationship between these notions appears as in Figure 1.




Figure 1

In the case of polis-wide friendship, citizens demand and act according to what is just for the fellow citizen. This is clearly more effective than sustaining justice via mere judicial provisions, because all members of the community become a control mechanism on the application of justice. Aristotle argues that if men are friends there needs to be no judicial provision between them, because they would already provide justice for the fellow friend (*NE*1155a27-29). Therefore, in the existence of political friendship, all citizens share a common opinion and *praxis* on what is in their common good – this is actually ‘acting justly’ – and thus form a healthy polis, which enables them to flourish individually as well. This line of thought is basically valid, however it is insufficient in explaining the complex relations between friendship, justice, common good and *eudaimonia*. As I explained in the previous part, Aristotle’s political philosophy cannot be fully appreciated with linear reasoning, but needs to be examined by analyzing the reciprocal relationship between concepts. Therefore I think Figure 2 is more successful than the one above in explaining those reciprocal relationships.




Figure 2

In the previous part, we have discussed how the common good and *eudaimonia* are interdependent, (5) and (6), by arguing the necessity of the state for individual *eudaimonia*, of well being of citizens for endurance of the state and of the principle of promoting the common good for sustaining this reciprocal relationship. We also established that political justice is a key element in promoting the common good, (7), in Aristotle's terms, it actually is the common good. In this part so far, we have examined the contribution of political friendship to common good, (3), and to political justice, (1). Political friendship requires *homonoia*, which means a consensus between citizens as regards what is in their common good and also corresponding action on this consensus. It also serves for political justice, because when citizens are connected to each other with a friendly feeling, they demand and act for the justice of their fellow citizens, without needing governmental coercion. In this chart, what we have not discussed yet is (2) and (4), so let us now start with (4).

Then, if *homonoia* is as a friendly feeling between citizens who agree and act upon their common good, it is important to establish the root of this 'friendly feeling.' In the *Politics*, Aristotle writes:

But such organization [brotherhoods, rites and social recreations] is produced by the feeling of friendship, for friendship is the motive of social life; therefore while the object of a state is the good life, these things are means to that end.¹⁴

He clarifies that the aim of the state is to provide good life for all citizens, however mere recognition of this fact does not constitute the actual motive for society; this motive is the feeling of friendship. As Cooper also states, Aristotle regards fellow citizens not only as instruments, which provide suitable environment for individual

¹⁴ *Pol.* 1280b38-40

flourishing, but also as partners, who are deliberately chosen to live with¹⁵. This partnership requires a friendly relationship between parties. Citizens of the polis share a life together, and their lives will be happier if they enjoy each other's company, regard each other as friends and attend collective activities, such as brotherhoods and rites. As we said, *eudaimon* life requires several components which clearly involve social flourishing. Aristotle writes:

This condition of affairs [contempt and envy] is very far removed from friendliness, and political partnership – for friendliness is an element of partnership [citizenship], since men are not willing to be partners with their enemies even on a journey.¹⁶

Human beings intend to socialize and build a political partnership with people whom they recognize as friends. Only in this way, they can fully appreciate the opportunities the city life suggests. Therefore, I conclude that political friendship contributes to *eudaimonia* not only instrumentally, by promoting the common good and political justice, but also directly, by enabling political partnership and social flourishing.

Before starting to discuss (2), I wish to say a few things about potential instrumental dimensions of justice and friendship. So far I have argued that, in Aristotle's philosophy the chief good for human being is *eudaimonia*, and, justice and friendship are significant because of their direct or indirect contributions to *eudaimonia*. This line of thought that justice and friendship are not valuable in themselves, but they are valuable because of their contributions to human being's natural purpose; therefore they appear to be instrumentally valuable. This result,

¹⁵ Cooper, "Political Animals and Civic Friendship", 232. In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle writes that "And friendship is not only indispensable as a means, it is also noble in itself (*NE*1155a29-30). Also, I believe that Rackham's translation of citizenship as partnership is an interpretation, which highlights the partner relationship between citizens.

¹⁶ *Pol.*1295b23-26

however, is not true. Some goods, such as wealth and political power, are clearly instrumentally valuable, because they might provide the necessary equipment to reach *eudaimonia*, however they do not have an intrinsic value that makes them good in themselves. Acting justly, on the other hand, is considered to be a virtue by Aristotle. *Eudaimonia* is, by definition, realization of human potential in conformity with virtue. Therefore, acting justly, like other virtues, is an indispensable component of *eudaimonia*. Just action does not necessarily lead to happiness, so it is not a complete good, but one cannot be completely happy if he acts unjustly. Brink (1999) claims that virtues such as justice “are valuable in their own right because of their constitutive contribution to a valuable life.” (Brink, 276) I interpret Brink’s definition of constitutive contribution as follows: if x constitutively contributes to y, y cannot be achieved without x. I like eating tacos, and having a taco right now will probably contribute to my well being, however there can be another good, such as burritos, that makes me equally happy. So, the value of taco is replaceable. Whereas, justice cannot be replaced by something that equally contributes to *eudaimonia*: *eudaimonia* essentially requires just action. I think this assertion on just action can be applied both to political justice and political friendship. Political justice is an indispensable component of collective flourishing, because the necessary environment for human flourishing, the state, cannot function properly in the absence of political justice. Therefore, political justice is valuable not instrumentally, but in itself, because of its constitutive contribution to the life of the *polis*. Similarly, political friendship is the definition of the natural relationship between citizens of the polis. Any other relationship, such as contractual agreement, would not be as sufficient as political friendship in promoting the common good. Thus, I believe that, like universal and political justice, political friendship is not an instrumental but a

constitutive good that uniquely contributes to the good life of the citizens of the polis.

In relation to (2), I argue that sustaining political friendship in the community is dependent upon the political justice. Aristotle regards political friendship as a natural aspect of citizenship, and considers its opposite, the condition of enmity, as a leading factor which infects and sickens the city. In the fifth book of the *Politics*, he argues that there are various elements that may give rise to enmity between citizens, but the chief factor is the perception of unjust treatment. Here it is important to distinguish distributive from the political justice, because deviations from both of them may lead to a perception of injustice. Distributive justice deals with the fair distribution of wealth and honors, whereas political justice contains the necessary rules adopted by the constitution, that organize the city life in accordance with the common good. Political justice needs to aim at a certain account of distributive justice, because distribution of goods are, of course, related to individual flourishing of citizens. In a community, however, even if political justice functions well, the perception of unjust distribution may still arise. This might be caused by the fact that the existing constitution is inadequate to prevent big income gaps between citizens. In that case, some citizens would gain power lawfully, however others would still have the perception that these gains are not just.¹⁷ I will discuss Aristotle's account of distributive justice in the next part, where I examine the necessary conditions of political friendship. Now, let's go back to political justice. Citizens would challenge the political justice under two conditions: (1) if the political justice does not aim at the common but at particular good, in other words, if the constitution is deviant, (2)

¹⁷ About this subject, Aristotle writes in the fifth book of the *Politics*: "(...) the motives of gain and honor also stir men up against each other not in order that they may get them for themselves, but in some cases justly, and in other cases unjustly getting a larger share of them" (1302a38-1302b2).

if the judiciary mechanism that applies political justice gets corrupted. Aristotle argues that political friendship can hardly be found in the deviant constitutions, because people are suppressed to live in a despotic environment that does not lead to their advantage. Therefore, they neither have a shared account of common good, nor recognize the fellow citizen as a social partner, but are inclined to feeling contempt and enmity towards each other. The same scenario applies to (2). Even if the political justice is well established, corruption of the judiciary would lead to perception of injustice. Groups that are disadvantaged by the misuse of law might lead to factions in society, and the tension between these factions, which is a condition directly opposed to political friendship, might eventually cause a revolution that breaks down the city. Thus, political friendship requires a constitution that aims at political justice *haplos*, and a judiciary that applies the law that political justice necessitates.

One may find this dependence confusing, since a few paragraphs ago I mentioned that Aristotle thinks that political friendship is more essential than the constitution in maintaining justice. However, now I claim that the friendship between citizens cannot be sustained in deviant constitutions. So, the question is how political friendship can be more important than political justice, if it is dependent upon the political justice. This reciprocal dependence between political justice and political friendship is not as complex as it sounds. These are two political goods that clearly affect one another. Political friendship, the individual incentive of citizens to protect the well being of each other, compensates for the abuse of political justice when it temporarily malfunctions. In other words, societies which are bounded by political friendship are expected to show resistance to transient deviations in constitutions and judiciary. The misuse of political power does not instantly lead to factions and revolutions where political friendship is established, because by definition,

recognizing fellow citizens as political friends necessitates demanding and acting for their well being without favoring a certain person or group in the community. Party faction, on the other hand, arises when polis-wide friendship breaks up and people start to desire the interest of a specific group, rather than demanding the common good of the city as a whole. Therefore, political friendship can be a tool to sustain political justice and to promote the common good that the constitution is insufficient to address, as long as it can be maintained. However, political friendship cannot be provided, forever, in a community that is contaminated by deviant constitutions and corruption. A constant oppression and injustice, would eventually lead to a perception of unjust treatment, and therefore to enmity and contempt between citizens. That is the point the polis gets diseased, when factions arise, and sooner or later the city breaks down. Therefore, we may summarize the relationship between political justice and political friendship in the following way : political friendship is the natural and ultimate condition of the polis, where citizens are bounded by a friendly feeling, share a common account of polis-wide justice, and act for the well being of the fellow citizen. Citizens who are bounded to each other by friendship do not need constitutional enforcement to act justly. However, when constitutions get deviant and law promotes not the common good but the good of a particular group, friendship between citizens eventually gets diminished, enmity arises, and factions start to emerge. Political friendship and political justice are intertwined elements that are both necessary for the common good, therefore for *eudaimonia*.

In conclusion, in this part I tried to establish the versatile relationships between four critical notions in Aristotle's political philosophy, which are *eudaimonia*, common good, political justice and political friendship. *Eudaimonia*, as the ultimate good for human beings, is the chief purpose of political activity. The

common good, which is the flourishing of all citizens is the aim of the life of the *polis* and can be achieved only if political justice and polis-wide friendship are sustained within the community. In Aristotle's teleological approach towards politics, the relationships between these key concepts are not causally linear, but naturally reciprocal. Political friendship, as the ultimate relationship between citizens, contributes to political justice, common good and individual flourishing constitutively. In the next part I will try to discover the content of this "friendly feeling" in discussing Aristotle's theory of friendship.

CHAPTER 3

POLITICAL FRIENDSHIP IS MORE THAN FRIENDSHIP OF UTILITY

In both of his books on ethics, Aristotle provides extensive discussion on the nature, conditions and categories of friendship. In his point of view, friendship is not simply a relationship between two persons who enjoy each other's company, but a complex notion of partnership that involves family, business and polis relations. In the beginning of the eighth book of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, he says that friendship is a virtue and also one of the most indispensable requirements of life (*NE1155a2-4*). It is an indispensable condition of a good life, he claims, because a person who does not have friends cannot be happy in the complete sense, even if he possesses all other goods. He argues that the relationship between two parties can be friendship only if three conditions are satisfied. The first one is the existence of mutual good will. The extent of "good will" here is, Aristotle highlights, to wish the other person's good for his own sake. Second, both parties need to be aware of each other's good will. And third, the cause of the good will must be one of three cherished qualities, which are goodness, pleasure and utility (*NE1156a2-5*)¹⁸. Aristotle categorizes three sorts of friendship according to their aim of achieving these three cherished qualities. The first kind, friendship of goodness, is the relationship between two people that care about each other only because of the good character of the other party. In friendship of utility, parties maintain their relationship with the purpose of increasing their own utility, such as business partners. Friendship of pleasure, on the other hand, is found among young people who enjoy each other's company in pleasure-giving activities.

¹⁸ The phrase lovable is directly taken from Aristotle. He writes: "It seems that not everything is loved, but only what is lovable, and that this is either what is good, or pleasant, or useful" (*NE1155b18-20*). Some authors, such as Cooper, chooses to translate lovable, Φιλητον, as likeable.

This theory of friendship that I very roughly sketch above has led to some significant questions in the literature. The first question consists in the conflict between valuing a friend as an instrument to one's individual *eudaimonia* versus valuing him for his own sake. Do we care about a fellow friend for his own good or because of his contribution to our happiness? This question also regards the extent of the notions of good will and well-wishing in Aristotle's sense: Does good will need to be selfless, or can we call it good will even though we wish another person's good for its contribution to ourselves? The second question regards the relationship between sub-branches of friendship. Which fundamental similarity between these three kinds enables us to categorize all of them as friendship? And third, is friendship an emotional condition that depends on personal sentiments, or is it the name of the relationship between two parties who satisfy certain conditions? All of these questions are significantly related to our inquiry on political friendship. In the previous part, we have established that political friendship is a crucial element in sustaining a healthy political organization, yet we have not discussed what it really means to be political friends. To understand the scope of political friendship, first I will evaluate these questions in Aristotle's theory of friendship and then I will investigate the place of political friendship in this framework of friendship.

3.1. Perfect and derivative friendships

In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle characterizes friendship, in the general sense, with mutual goodwill, as wishing the other party's good for his own sake. In his view, wishing-well is strongly related to liking. He argues that we may not wish well to everything we like, for instance, wishing wine well is ridiculous, however, if we wish the goodness of a certain object, it possesses a quality that we like. A friend is

someone we like because of a reason, and also wish his goodness. In the case of friendship of goodness, the quality that we like in the other person is his good character. In friendship of utility and pleasure, on the other hand, it is their usefulness and pleasantness, respectively. When Aristotle stops defining friendship in general and starts discussing particular kinds of it, he recognizes that the friendship he has previously defined, as the mutual concern and well-wishing for the other party's own sake, fully exists only in the perfect kind of friendship, which is friendship of goodness (*NE*1156b8-12). He argues that people who are friends because of their good characters like each other not accidentally, but in themselves. As long as their virtuous character continues, their friendship is permanent. Furthermore, Aristotle claims, friendship of goodness is useful and pleasant. Friendship of a virtuous man would support one's individual flourishing in numerous matters, such as improving his deliberative capacities via discussions and supporting him in bad times. It is also pleasant because actions of the other person would resemble one's own. He argues that everybody is pleased by his own actions, and therefore would enjoy actions of a man who is similar in virtue, because they resemble his own acts. Hence, Aristotle defines the perfect friendship as the permanent relationship between two people who are similarly virtuous and care about the other party for the sake of his good character, and is also useful and pleasant.

Friendships of utility and pleasure have similarities with friendship of goodness, however do not contain all of the aspects that Aristotle assigns to the perfect friendship. First of all, the likeable quality in these friendships is not a trait of the other party, but the contribution of a trait to one's own well being, in the form of utility or pleasure. The motive to maintain friendships of utility and pleasure is not

valuing the other party's character, but benefiting from his contributions to oneself. Second, these relationships are not permanent; they cease as soon as the likeable quality in the other party, utility or pleasure perishes. And lastly, partners in these friendships do not need to be similarly virtuous. Aristotle claims that a good person and a bad person can have a functional friendship of utility; because they appreciate the profit they gain via this friendship, not each other's characters. In this framework, it becomes hard to understand how friends of utility and pleasure wish the other party's good for his own sake. Because quite clearly, in these friendships, parties do not value each other in themselves, but as an instrument to their own well being. Cooper (1977) tries to solve this inconsistency by referring to psychological capabilities of human beings. He claims that Aristotle was aware of the fact that paragons of virtue, who are capable to build friendship of goodness in its complete sense, are very few in the community, if not non-existent. If derivative friendships do not involve any sort of well-wishing for the sake of the fellow friend, "then most people including virtually all of Aristotle's readers, will be incapable of anything but thoroughly self-centered associations." (Cooper, 626) Therefore, Cooper argues that Aristotle does not preserve the capability of selfless goodwill to moral heroes, and considers pleasure and utility friendships as a "complex and subtle mixture of self-seeking and unself-interested well-wishing and well-doing" (626). However, there is no evidence in the primary texts to support this claim. On the contrary, Aristotle himself clearly argues that in derivative friendships, parties wish each other's good, not for the sake of the other party, but for the sake of their individual benefits. Kalimtzis's objection to Cooper on this subject is illuminating.

In his book *Aristotle on Political Enmity and Disease*, Costas Kalimtzis argues that Cooper overlooks the distinction between two Greek notions, which are

eunoia and *boulomai*. *Eunoia* is a noun that is commonly translated by as goodwill and *boulomai* is a verb that is translated as to wish well. Kalimtzis argues that Cooper creates confusion by melting *boulomai* and *eunoia* in the same pot. He agrees with Cooper that mutual well-wishing is a pre-condition of friendship in Aristotle's theory, since people who are indifferent to each other cannot be regarded as friends. However, well-wishing does not constitute *eunoia* in every kind of friendships, because *eunoia*, literally to be good of mind, requires an objective judgment of goodness of the other party (Kalimtzis, 77). When a person has *eunoia*, for an athlete, teacher, or a fellow friend, he wishes their goodness non self-interestedly, because of a good quality they possess. Aristotle argues that *eunoia*, translated as "good regarding" by Kalimtzis, is not applicable to derivative friendships, because in these cases, mutual well-wishing does not depend on good character of the fellow friend (*NE*1167a12-15). The difference that Kalimtzis highlights between *boulomai* and *eunoia* is, I believe, the difference between well-wishing in the general meaning of the term, and well-wishing specifically for the sake of other person. Aristotle regards well-wishing for the sake of other person, *eunoia*, as a condition of the perfect friendship, however he does not apply the same condition to derivative friendships. In friendships of utility and pleasure, concern for other party's well being is a fundamental necessity, however it does not need to be motivated by selfless elements. Therefore an altruistic account of goodwill, as *eunoia*, is not a necessary condition for derivative friendships.

Before evaluating the connection between different sorts of friendships, I want to say a few things about a confusing element in the discussion of goodwill. In the case of perfect friendship, Aristotle argues that the likeable quality of the fellow friend is his good character, and one wishes his goodness for the sake of himself. I

believe that these two conditions are incompatible with each other. Wishing somebody's wellness solely for his own sake is not identical with wishing it because of a character trait he possesses. In the second case, goodwill emerges due to the perception of a good quality that a person has, and would perish as soon as this likable quality ceases. For example, in this scenario, if one of my friends values me because of my virtuous character and then catches me lying, her goodwill towards me will be expected to cease, although I continue to be myself. Aristotle tries to solve this problem by claiming that virtuous character is permanent, virtue is an indispensable part of a good man, therefore, when you wish someone's goodness for his virtuous character, you are valuing one of his unchangeable qualities, thus his own self. Even if we pay regard to Aristotle's extremely essentialist approach towards human character, the conflict does not resolve. Valuing a person because of a character trait, albeit if this trait is an indispensable part of this person, is not similar to valuing him for his own sake, because motivation of well-wishing does not spring from the person as a whole, but from the perception of one of his character traits. Therefore, the discussion of whether well wishing is self-centered or selfless seems to be based on the distinction between liking a quality because of its direct contribution to oneself and liking it because it is a likeable quality in itself. Carrying this distinction to the level of wishing to someone well for his own sake versus for his contribution to oneself complicates the discussion, because even in the perfect friendship, I do not believe that Aristotle provides a robust account of valuing a person solely for his own sake.

What motivates us to the goodwill towards a friend is widely discussed in the literature. Aristotle, however, does not seem to give much importance to it, even to goodwill itself. In the ninth book of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, he argues that

goodwill, as *eunoia*, appears to be just the beginning of friendship, because people do not instantly become friends with people to whom they wish well. He says:

[T]hey [well-wishers] merely desire the good of those whose well-wishers they are, and would not actively assist them to attain it, nor be put to any trouble on their behalf. Hence extending the meaning of the term friendship we may say that good will is inoperative friendship, which when it continues and reaches the point of intimacy may become friendship proper – not the sort of friendship whose motive is utility or pleasure, for these do not arouse goodwill.¹⁹

Here, Aristotle puts clear emphasis on the active nature of friendship. He claims that proper friendship necessitates an intimate interaction, and also acts that assist and support the well being of the fellow friend. Without intimacy and required actions, parties cannot be friends, but only strangers who appreciate each other's good character. Therefore, the key factor that determines the nature of friendship in Aristotle's view is not mutual well-wishing, but real actions that assist and support the fellow friend in reaching his individual *eudaimonia*. Aristotle claims that these actions that we perform for the well being of our fellow friends actually determine the boundaries of justice. He writes "In fact whole of justice in general is a relation to a friend, for what is just is just for certain persons and persons who are partners" (*EE*1242a22-25). Therefore just action, in Aristotle's account, is not determined by a universal guideline that should be applied to every human being on earth, but is the acts that we choose to perform in order to support the *eudaimonia* of a life partner, who is called a friend. As also clarified by J. Annas, Aristotle sees nothing wrong in demanding and acting for the justice of a friend more than a stranger (Annas, 552). In fact, this would be the correct way of action, because justice is a friendly relation. The motivation to act justly arises both from one's desire to share a life with a fellow

¹⁹ *NE*1167a10-16

friend, and therefore to act in a way that preserves this partnership, and also one's good wishes for a person he values. It is very important to understand that justice is not an abstract moral duty for Aristotle; its extent is determined by the actions that we choose to perform in relation to a friend, a friend that we deliberately choose as a life partner, and indispensably contributes to our *eudaimonia*. Therefore, well-wishing appears to be a condition of friendship in Aristotle's theory, however what determines the real character of friendship is not mutual well-wishing, but just actions that are driven from this well-wishing, which support the well being of the fellow friend.

We have already established that Aristotle regards friendship of goodness as the perfect friendship, and friendships of utility and pleasure as its derivations. However, the fundamental element that gathers these three sorts of relations under the title of friendship, in other words, the essence that appears in all sorts of friendships, remains to be discussed. First, in all cases of friendship, Aristotle argues that three fundamental conditions are satisfied, which are an account of mutual well-wishing, awareness of the reciprocal affection and the purpose of reaching a likeable quality. Among the relationships that satisfy these conditions, the friendship of goodness holds a superior and also central place, because Aristotle claims, it possesses all good ends that derivative sorts aim at, namely pleasantness and usefulness. The priority and centrality of friendship of goodness give the impression that it can be used as the focal meaning of friendship. However, as convincingly discussed by W. Fortenbaugh in his article "Aristotle's Analysis of Friendship: Function and Analogy, Resemblance and Focal Meaning", friendship of goodness cannot be regarded as focal meaning that all sorts of friendships are driven from. Friendships of utility and pleasure clearly show resemblance to friendship of

goodness, since they are relationships based on mutual affection and well-wishing, but they differ by their purpose. In the derivative sorts, the likeable quality, which forms the end of the friendship, is choice-worthy because of their contribution to one's well being, whereas, in the friendship of goodness, the end of the friendship is not to promote self-interest, but it will lead to it regardless of its selfless purpose. Therefore, Fortenbaugh argues, the relationship between sorts of friendships cannot be explained by a strict notion of dependence of derivatives on the primary sort, but by the relation of resemblance. Although they differ in purpose, derivative sorts partially resemble the perfect friendship. Aristotle himself argues that people call friendship of utility and pleasure "friendship" in an analogical sense, because they represent some aspects of the perfect friendship although they do not aim at similar ends (*NE*1157a30-34). Therefore, according to Aristotle, inferior types of friendship resemble the perfect friendship by the elements of mutual well-wishing, reciprocal affection, and contribution to individual well being, but differ in the level of intention and purpose.

The last question that was raised in the beginning of this part is whether friendship, in Aristotle's sense, is an emotion. A more difficult question would be whether a certain emotion is necessary for friendship. Let me start with the former.

While comparing friendship with goodwill, Aristotle writes:

Liking seems to be an emotion, friendship a fixed disposition, for liking can be felt even for inanimate things, but reciprocal liking involves deliberate choice, and this springs from a fixed disposition. Also when men wish the good of those they love for their own sakes, their goodwill does not depend on emotion but on a fixed disposition. (*NE*1157b29-34)

He clearly states that friendship should not be regarded as a feeling, but a disposition, or as translated elsewhere, as a state of character.²⁰ In comparing emotion with disposition, Aristotle highlights the matter of choice. He considers emotion as a passive state that occurs by external affection, whereas disposition requires an active choosing process. Kalimtzis argues that, in Aristotle's point of view, a disposition is a "rooted quality of character, such that it operates as a part of the nature of the person, we may think of the person as possessing a state" (Kalimtzis, 114). We may apply the character of disposition to both the general and particular senses of the term friendship. In the general sense, people are inclined to build friendships, because they deliberately choose to share their lives with other human beings. Unlike passive emotions like love, contempt or hatred, friendships are constructed voluntarily and deliberately, in order to satisfy a certain function. This function may be a specific contribution to one's well being, or it can simply be the constitutive contribution of friendship to a *eudaimon* life in its general sense. Either way, friendship's nature is not a passive feeling, but a reasonable choice to build a certain relationship with another person. In the particular case, choosing a specific person as a friend cannot be explained by an emotional affection, either. Aristotle claims that, the beginning of friendship, as *eunoia*, can spring because of a good feeling. Liking someone at first sight, and therefore wishing his goodness, is a passive emotional state. However, building an intimate and continuous relationship with that person is a deliberate decision. Therefore, in Aristotle's sense, people are inclined to build friendships, since it is an indispensable component of *eudaimonia*, however their inclination to friendship does not emerge from a passive emotion, but a deliberate choice.

²⁰ Ross's translation as "the state of character" can be found in the *Nicomacheans Ethics in The Basic Works of Aristotle* (1941), edited by Richard McKeon.

The second question can be answered by examining whether the conditions of friendship require a certain emotion. Well-wishing, in its common usage, appears to contain a positive emotion. Aristotle associates mutual well-wishing between parties in a friendship of goodness with liking. Likable quality in this friendship is the good character of the other person, therefore parties actually like each other in themselves. Hence, we may claim that, in the perfect friendship parties are bound by the emotion of mutual liking, and this emotion will be maintained as the friendship continues, because the character trait that causes 'liking' persists. In derivative friendships, however, this is not the case. Because in these sorts of friendship, the likeable quality that friendship aims at, is not the other party, but the other party's contribution to oneself. As we previously discussed, in derivative sorts, parties wish each other's goodness not for the sake of the other party, but because of their personal interests. Therefore, an emotion such as mutual liking does not appear to be a requirement of derivative friendships, as people may sustain friendships based on utility and pleasure even if they do not actually like the other party. This does not mean, however, that there can be no emotional bond in derivative friendships. Parties may like each other to a certain extent, but reciprocal well wishing and well-doing, which are the necessary conditions of friendship, are not dependent on a mutual emotion, and they will continue to exist whether there is a shared emotion or not. Therefore, friendship in Aristotle's view is vastly different from the modern meaning of term, which is in general an emotion-based, intimate relation between two people who enjoy each other's company. Aristotle uses the term friendship to define a wide-range of relationships that differ by their purpose, but he clearly argues that whatever its motive may be, friendship needs to consist in mutual well-wishing and well-

doing. This mutual well wishing and well-doing is not rooted in a reciprocal emotion, but a deliberate decision of choosing someone as a life partner.

3.2 Position of political friendship in Aristotle's friendship theory

In both his ethical works, Aristotle discusses the friendship between citizens under the title of *homonoia*. He argues that *homonoia* seems to be a sort of friendship, because it is not merely agreement of opinion, but exists in the state when citizens agree upon the common interest, adopt the same line of action, and carry their common resolves into execution (NE1167a23-30).²¹ He writes, "Concord appears therefore to mean friendship between citizens, which is indeed the ordinary use of the term; for it refers to the interests and concerns of life" (NE1167b3-5). By the ordinary use of friendship, Aristotle refers to all the aspects of friendship that we discussed in the previous part. These are mutual well-wishing and well-doing, awareness of the reciprocal affection, and the purpose of achieving a likable quality. This likable quality in the case of *homonoia* is political partnership. Citizens, who are actually life partners, need to adopt a certain course of action towards each other in order to maintain their political partnership. Aristotle thinks that this necessary course of action that empowers the political partnership is mutual well-wishing and well-doing, just like the ordinary friendship. Let us take a closer look at this likable quality of political partnership, and then we will investigate the extent of mutual well-wishing and well-doing in *homonoia*, as an account of political friendship.

²¹ Rackham translates the relationship between *homonoia* and friendship as "Concord also seems to be a friendly feeling" (NE1167a22), however I believe that this translation is misleading, because it associates friendship with a state of feeling. Ross chooses to translate the same sentence as "Unanimity also seems to be a friendly relation". I think the second translation is more clear in revealing the nature of *homonoia*, because as in other sorts of friendship, Aristotle does not discuss *homonoia* as a feeling between parties, but as a deliberate choice to maintain a certain kind of relationship.

As we discussed in the former chapter, in his political theory, Aristotle gives genuine importance to political friendship. In fact, Mulgan and Miller argue that he adopts a maxim of unanimity as one of the chief principles that a constitution needs to aim at (Miller 1996, 269-74; Mulgan, 25). Aristotle assigns an institutional function to friendship (Kalimtzis, 53), which is to promote the common good, and sustain the polis-wide justice. The likeable quality, which forms the aim of political friendship, appears to be the common good, whereas justice emerges as a side product of the friendship between citizens. Common good, as collective flourishing of citizens of the polis, is the ultimate end of the political organization. By nature, human beings are not self-sufficient; they need to belong to a state to fulfill their natural capacities. The state can subsist only if its parts, namely citizens, desire to contribute to it (Mulgan, 25). Citizens' contribution to state organization depends upon the promotion of the common good, since people would not desire to be a part of a community, if that community does not serve their well being. But all of these are already discussed in the previous part. So, the common good is clearly a likeable quality, because it indispensably contributes to the good life of the citizens.

Among the different kinds of friendship, political friendship seems similar to friendship of utility, since it derivatively aims at personal interest. In several places of the *Eudemian Ethics*, Aristotle argues that political friendship aims at utility, and therefore it is analogous with friendship of utility (*EE*1242a2-9, 1242b20-25). However, it is clear that the account of utility that is aimed at in political friendship is not identical with what is aimed at in friendship of utility. In friendship of utility, both parties are aware of the exact interest they expect from this friendship. For example, if there is a friendship of utility between a landlord and a tenant, the landlord knows that he will take his rent, and the tenant knows that he will continue

to live in his apartment peacefully, as long as this friendship continues. If one of them decides to act unfriendly, for instance, if the landlord breaks in the apartment without the tenant's permission, he will be doing this knowing the negative consequences of his action, such as losing his income. Thus, in friendship of utility, the interest that is aimed at is evident for both parties, and they are aware of the consequences of their wrong-doings. In the case of political friendship, however, the interest of political friendship and the consequences of violating that friendship are not as evident as in friendship of utility. My neighbor, for example, throws her garbage bag out of her window every night. This is not a friendly behavior, since everyone living in our street faces the unpleasant view and odor of the rubbish that falls out of the garbage bag. However, my neighbor has not yet experienced any negative consequences due to her unfriendly behavior. There are several possibilities of course, some day somebody may confront her, people in the neighborhood may exclude her from social activities, or she may never face any consequences. Maintaining a political friendship is not as easy as maintaining a friendship of utility, because parties are not exactly aware of the personal advantages or disadvantages of preserving or violating the political friendship. This is why Aristotle highlights the importance of good character in political friendship. He writes:

Now concord in this sense exists between good men, since these are of one mind both with themselves and with one another, as they always stand more or less on the same ground; for good men's wishes are steadfast, and do not ebb and flow like the tide, and they wish for just and expedient ends, which they strive to attain in common. The base on the other hand are incapable of concord, except in some small degree, as they are of friendship, since they try to get more than their share of advantages, and they take less than their share of labors and public burdens.²²

²² NE1167b5-10

In this discussion of *homonoia*, Aristotle argues that *homonoia* can exist between people who wish to attain just and expedient ends in common. Almost everybody desires to attain expedient ends, since they directly contribute to one's *eudaimonia*, however wishing for just ends is not as straightforward as wishing expediency, because it requires an understanding of justice. In friendship of utility, acting justly to the fellow friend is a condition. However, it does not constitute the end of the friendship; just action has an instrumental value that is necessary for the continuity of the friendship whose end is the personal interest. Acting justly when there is no certain disadvantage of doing otherwise, as in political friendship, requires the knowledge of justice's expedient nature, and also adopting the virtue of exercising it. Justice is clearly expedient, since the end of justice is the common good, which is the ultimate good of the political association. However, understanding the value of justice depends upon appreciating the importance of common good to individual *eudaimonia*. Simply, if the majority of citizens treat each other unjustly, try to get more than their share of advantages, and therefore usurp other citizens' utility, then the polis will not function properly, faction would arise, the state would undergo stasis, and eventually everybody in that community would lose their chance to the good life.²³ This course of events clearly does not happen in a short time interval, however, as provided in Aristotle's discussion on the causes of revolution in the fifth book of the *Politics*, this sequence is inevitable if unjust treatment continues within the state. Therefore, demanding and acting for the justice of fellow citizens clearly contributes to one's *eudaimonia* in the long run, by enabling the continuity of the healthy communal organization. However, this relatively obscure but crucial interest

²³ Aristotle puts this eloquently: "And while each desire this [privilege] for himself, he spies on his neighbor to prevent him from doing likewise; for unless they keep watch over one another, common interest go to ruin. The result is discord, everybody trying to make others do their duty but refusing to do it themselves" (NE1167b10-15).

can be ignored or neglected by people who assign greater importance to their temporary benefits. For example, my neighbor apparently gives greater importance to the energy she saved by not climbing a couple of stairs than promoting the common good of the neighborhood. People in this state of mind are not capable of being political friends, because they would not choose just and expedient ends that are achieved in common over their personal and temporary benefits. By claiming that political friendship can be built between good people, therefore, Aristotle refers to people who are capable of exercising justice, even if it conflicts with their personal interests.

Eunoia, goodwill for the other party's sake, does not appear to be a condition of political friendship. In fact, wishing the goodness of the fellow citizen because of his good character cannot be a requirement of political friendship, because it is not possible to know the character of every single citizen in the city. Well-wishing for the sake of the fellow citizen without knowing his character properties, or in other words, valuing a person in himself just because he is a human being, is not discussed as a moral responsibility by Aristotle. Aristotle never asserts a moral duty similar to the Kantian Categorical Imperative, such as to treat another human being never as a means, but always as an end.²⁴ On the contrary, even in the perfect friendship, well wishing and well-doing depends upon the common virtues shared by both parties; they do not unconditionally arise from the virtue of valuing a person just because he is another human being. In all sorts of friendship, the

²⁴ A remarkable comparison of the Aristotelian and the Kantian accounts of friendship can be found in Nancy Sherman's article "Aristotle on Friendship and Shared Life" in pages 611-613. In a nutshell, Sherman argues that despite the fact that both Aristotle and Kant assign moral importance to friendship, Aristotle puts stronger emphasis on the necessity of friendship in the pursuit of the good life. In her view, although Kant recognizes friendship as a virtue in the *Doctrine of Virtue*, he does not consider intimate friendship as an indispensable feature of the good life. Sherman supports her argument by clarifying that in Kant's view, happiness is not regarded as a moral duty, and virtue to friendship is not necessarily lead to a happier life, whereas in Aristotle's perspective, happiness and virtue melt in the same pot of *eudaimonia* and friendship is considered as a requirement of the good life, referring to both morality and happiness.

motivation of well wishing and well-doing emerges not from a moral duty, but from the desire to attain a likeable quality. However, Aristotle considers the motivation of mutual well wishing and well-doing in political friendship quite different than what he regards to be in the friendship of utility. He examines political friendship under two categories, which are legal and moral friendships. (EE1242b35-36). Legal friendship between citizens emerges from the contractual bond between them. They are obliged to act to each other justly, because their wrong-doings are punished by the constitution. Therefore, Aristotle claims, there is a legally enforced friendship between citizens of the polis, however, the extent of this legal friendship does not contain all of the aspects that are covered in *homonoia*. For instance, he states, the contract between buyers and sellers is based on a definite agreement, and this agreement constitutes the terms of the legal friendship. Despite this basis, people tend to act as if there is a moral component in this friendship and that they trust to each other rather than the law (EE1242b35-40). Aristotle carefully distinguishes friendship of utility from that of goodness and claims that in political friendship, mutual well-doing is not rooted in selfless good intentions towards the fellow citizen, but in the useful agreement between parties. Limiting the extent of this well-doing by a legal contract between citizens, however, does not cover the institutional function that Aristotle assigns to political friendship in the *Politics*. As we discussed in the previous parts, Aristotle considers political friendship more efficient than the constitution in maintaining justice within the community. Political friends, in his sense, seem to demand and act for each other's justice whether or not they are subjected to the constitutional law enforcement. If political friendship were only the practical reflection of the contractual agreement between citizens, then it would not possibly be more essential in providing political justice than the constitution, which

is the concrete form of this contractual agreement. Therefore, political friendship seems to have a so-called moral component, which is mutual concern and mutual trust regardless of governmental coercion, however this moral component is not rooted in altruistic motivations, but in the recognition of the virtue of justice and its practical importance to oneself.

Then, the motivation of political friendship is neither the good character of the fellow citizen, nor the constitutional law enforcement, but the crucial and indispensable practical importance of engaging in a social partnership to individual *eudaimonia*. In this sense, one may claim that political friendship falls between friendships of goodness and utility. It conceptually targets personal interest, but requires the virtue of demanding expedient common ends and acting justly even if the common benefit conflicts with one's own. In the literature, there is no clear consensus on the position of political friendship within Aristotle's friendship theory. Stern-Gillet (1995) considers political friendship as an extensive version of the perfect friendship, where citizens share mutual concern because of the appreciation of each other's good character. This approach, however, can be realized in a supremely ideal community, where all citizens possess similarly virtuous and qualified characters. Furthermore, regarding political friendship as a virtue friendship overlooks Aristotle's clear emphasis on the expedient nature of political friendship. Especially in the related part of the *Eudemian Ethics*, Aristotle maintains that usefulness of political friendship does not arise as a side-product as in the perfect friendship, but aims at utility to begin with. Therefore, regarding political friendship as a polis-wide virtue friendship both limits the notion to a utopian framework and also neglects its target of expediency. Yack (1985) argues that political friendship is both utility and virtue friendships at the same time. It is true that political friendship

holds some aspects of both utility and virtue friendships, but considering it as a combination of these two kinds widens the real meaning of the term. Kalimtzis (2000) objects to Yack by claiming that if citizens consider each other as intimate friends, their expectations towards each other would be far more extensive than what Aristotle assigns to political friendship. If citizens treat each other as intimate friends, then all wrong-doings would be perceived as a betrayal. In this sense, political friendship becomes a fragile and sentimental relation, that will possibly cause dissension and conflict rather than binding the citizens of the *polis*. Hence, political friendship cannot be considered as a type of friendship of utility, of virtue or the combination of the two. It aims expedient ends like friendship of utility, requires good character, and virtue to act justly like friendship of goodness, however it presents evident dissimilarities with these sorts of friendships.

The utility relation between political friends is quite different from what we understand from the term interest friendship to mean. It is not reasonable to assume that political friends calculate their overall benefit in every time they act for the well being of the fellow friend. Once they understand the practical importance of the common good and adopt justice as a principle of action, people treat the fellow citizens justly by habit. In his discussion of whether friendship of goodness is altruistic or selfish, Charles Kahn gives the relationship between a father and a daughter as an example:

I take an interest in the welfare of my daughter because she is my daughter: because we stand in a special relationship, where caring for her and her happiness is an essential feature of my role and my responsibilities. Whether I care for her out of duty or out of love or more naturally, out of both at once, this responsibility and love belong to me represent my interest in the matter.²⁵

²⁵ Kahn, p. 25.

Although the relationship between a father and a daughter is clearly much more intimate compared to the relationship between citizens, I think that Kahn's argument fits well to the case of political friendship. We take an interest in the welfare of the fellow citizens, because we stand in a special relationship of sharing a social life together. Although his welfare is in my interest, the motivation of corresponding action is not have to be mere personal interest, it can emerge from a feeling of duty or mutual concern, which emerges from the recognition of his indispensable role in my life. For instance, a person, who puts himself to danger in order to rescue a woman from harassment, very probably does not decide to take action by calculating the overall contribution of this act to his *eudaimonia*; but because he believes that this is the right thing to do. Acting for goodness of the fellow citizen, therefore, does not always arise from the recognition of its contribution to one's utility, but from adopting a just course of action that aims at the well being of the fellow citizen with whom we share a social life. In this sense, political friendship is more than friendship of utility, since it requires a common understanding of practical ends of importance and virtue to act justly even when this action conflicts with temporary individual benefits.

3.3. Conditions of political friendship

Then, political friendship is the mutual concern and well-doing between citizens, who choose each other as life partners and agree upon practical ends of importance. This relationship between citizens can be achieved and maintained in communities that satisfy certain conditions, because citizens consider each other as partners and agree upon what is in their common good only under certain economic and social circumstances. In Aristotle's political thinking, citizens of the polis can be bound

with each other with friendship only if there is a certain account of distributive justice, a shared cultural identity and an underpopulated city life in the polis. In the fifth book of the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the third book of the *Politics*, Aristotle provides a broad discussion against distributive equality by referring to differences in human nature and the requirement of separate social roles. He argues that distributive justice is erroneously considered to aim at distributive equality. Just distribution of goods, however, refers to a proportionality rather than equality (*NE*1131b8-12). Men are born with different qualities, capacities and merits, and the just distribution of wealth and honors requires a fair proportion with respect to these differences. Moreover, he maintains that a state needs collective contribution by different socio-economic groups, such as the poor assisting the basic production of goods and the rich paying taxes. He argues that a state, which does not include any account of wealth distribution, cannot be anymore than one consisting of slaves (*Pol.*1283a15-19). I think that his argument, which is highly controversial in the modern framework, highlights the practical characteristic of Aristotle's politics. Aristotle considers individual merits and capacities not only as an intrinsic quality, but equates them with their practical worth in terms of wealth and honors. If having a certain quality does not constitute social, economic or political value, it can be hardly regarded as a merit in Aristotle's view, because it does not meet a practical importance. Aristotle argues that a *reasonable* state, which functions properly and includes fair distribution, involves three social groups, which are the poor, the middle class and the rich (*Pol.*1295b1-5). He claims that that the ideal state is the one who is governed by the middle class, because they are neither disobedient and despotic like the rich, nor inclined to crime and vice like the poor, but capable of exercising reason

and moderation in the city administration. If the majority of the city consists of one of the two extremes, namely the rich and the poor, the following picture emerges:

Thus arises a city, not of freemen, but of masters and slaves, the one despising, the other envying; and nothing can be fatal to friendship and good fellowship [citizenship] in states than this: for good fellowship springs from friendship; when man are at enmity with one another, they would rather not even share the same path. But a city ought to be composed, as far as possible, of equals and similars; and these are generally the middle classes.²⁶

Aristotle argues that if there are major distributive gaps in among citizens of the polis, they will not be able to bond by their similarities, but divide into separate groups that despise or envy each other. This condition is the opposite of political friendship where parties share mutual concern and well-wishing. Aristotle claims that political friendship, which is the ultimate relationship between citizens, can be maintained in a community that is formed mostly by the middle class, where there is no huge differences in terms wealth and honors between citizens. Elsewhere in the *Politics*, Aristotle argues that the perception of distributive injustice is one of the major factors that cause faction in the state. He writes “The objects about which it is waged are gain and honor, and their opposites, for men carry on party faction in states in order to avoid dishonor and loss, either on their behalf or on behalf of their friends” (*Pol.*1302a32-35). When there is a perception of disproportionate distribution of goods in any sort of constitution, people start to feel envy and contempt towards each other, led by the feeling of unjust treatment, and they start to carry on party faction. In Aristotle’s view, this division within the community is the worst thing that can happen to a state, because it breaks the bond among citizens. When there is faction in the state, there is no *homonoia* in the community, people do

²⁶ *Pol.*1295b20-26, trans. Ross.

not share a mutual perspective on what is in their common good and do not adopt a just course of action towards each other. In this condition, three goods that sustain a healthy state – the promotion of the common good, the maintenance of political justice and the perpetuation of political friendship – are all expected to disappear. As a result, the state begins to malfunction, and eventually gets demolished via revolutions. Thus, Aristotle gives great weight to distributive justice in maintaining political friendship within the community. In his account, proportionate and fair distribution of goods, and dominance of the middle class is important for avoiding faction and providing political friendship in the state.

Then, in Aristotle’s perspective, recognizing the fellow citizen as a political partner is not an expected behavior that can be found in every type of constitution, but is dependent upon the satisfaction of several conditions. The second condition that Aristotle points out is reaching a “harmony of spirit”. While discussing the causes of revolution in the *Politics*, he writes:

Also difference of race is a cause of faction, until harmony of spirit is reached; for just as any chance multitude of people does not form a state, so a state is not formed in any chance period of time.²⁷

Here Aristotle indicates that a state, by nature, cannot be constructed by an arbitrary group of individuals; citizens of the state need to share a common identity. Members of a different race cannot instantly adopt this identity, but he believes that they may eventually reach a “harmony of spirit” with the initial inhabitants. Therefore, I interpret what Aristotle means by having a harmony of spirit as sharing a similar culture, adopting similar values and exercising similar habits with the other citizens in the state. Lacking a common identity appears to be a threat to *homonoia*, since it

²⁷ *Pol.* 1303a25-29

may lead to faction. The requirement of a harmony of spirit is clear evidence that political friendship cannot be regarded as a mere utility relation, because in friendship of utility parties do not need a common identity to agree upon what is in their mutual interest. In political friendship, on the other hand, reaching a consensus on what is in the common interest and adopting practical implications of this decision require a cultural similarity between parties. In addition to the harmony of spirit, Aristotle regards a non-excessive size of population that enables a real communication between citizens as a significant condition of a functional state.

[B]ut in order to decide questions of justice and in order to distribute the offices according to merit it is necessary for the citizens to know each other's personal characters, since where this does not happen to be the case the business of electing officials and trying law suits is bound to go badly; haphazard decision is unjust in both matters, and this must obviously prevail in an excessively numerous community.²⁸

He claims that ensuring proportionate distribution of goods and reaching *homonoia* the on election of officials requires citizens to know each other in person. There are two elements that support this argument. First, Aristotle does not regard *homonoia* as an abstract ideal that all citizens are expected to reach, but as a real consensus that is achieved by mutual interaction and deliberation.²⁹ As the population of the city increases, providing a real deliberation with the participation of all citizens becomes harder. Furthermore, in an over populated city, reaching a consensus on practical ends of importance would be much more difficult than doing it in a small city, even if a proper ground for deliberation is provided. Because, as the number of people who need to decide on something increases, the number of opinions, of the personal

²⁸ *Pol.* 1326b14-21

²⁹ In his definition of *homonoia* in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle argues that there is *homonoia* in the city, for instance, if citizens agree upon the election of officials (*NE*1167a30-35). Therefore, he does not regard *homonoia* as a mere ideological consensus on basic institutions of the government, but agreement on practical decisions on every level of state organization.

interests that need to be taken into account, and of people to be persuaded increases as well. Twenty people may reach a consensus on whether building a new hospital is necessary for the welfare of the polis quite easily, but one million people may arrive at the same conclusion only after numerous discussions in a long time interval, if they ever can. Therefore, an excessive population is an obstacle for *homonoia*, because it beclouds the decision process by making city-wide deliberation much harder. The second factor that supports Aristotle's claim on the necessity of a small population is related to one of the aspects of political friendship. So far, we have discussed that political friendship is not a mere interest relation; it requires parties to recognize each other as political partners who share a common life together. Aristotle does not regard citizens as strangers who happen to live in the community, but as people who share a common identity and deliberately choose each other as political partners. He clearly states that *homonoia*, which is the natural condition of the polis, does not arise among strangers (NE1167122-23). Political friendship is expected to surface between people who know each other; not intimately, because that would be a private friendship, but on a basic level. Regarding someone, who you share no common identity with and will probably never see again in your life time as a political friend would be reducing political friendship to a moral ideal and conflicts with its practical nature. In Aristotle's view, political friendship is not an abstract sentiment, a moral duty or a serviceable aspiration: it is a *real* friendship that is based on an actual interaction, communication and deliberation. This relationship is expected to spring between people who share a common culture, environment and purpose, and have a *real* concern for the well being of each other. In this sense, knowing the fellow citizen in person clearly contributes to the political friendship, as it supports the motivation to consider another person as a political partner.

CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSION

In Aristotle's political philosophy, political friendship as the mutual well-wishing and well-doing between citizens who reach *homonoia* on the common good holds a crucial place in sustaining a functional state. Aristotle does not only regard political friendship as the natural relation among the citizens of the polis, but also adopts a maxim of unanimity as one of the chief principles that a constitution needs to aim. However, political friendship, as described by Aristotle, appears to be a very specific concept that can only be used by adopting a certain theoretical standpoint, and under certain practical conditions. Theoretically, political friendship, as discussed in this essay, depends Aristotle's teleological understanding of politics because it necessitates regarding the fellow citizens as an indispensable component of individual *eudaimonia*. By defining state as a crucial condition for human beings to fulfill their natural capacities, Aristotle assigns the state a constitutive function in enabling human flourishing. In this framework, citizens are not only individuals who live in the same state, but also partners who cooperate to establish the proper environment for individual *eudaimonia*. The well being of a fellow citizen is firmly tied to one's own well being, because a healthy political organization that enables individual flourishing can only be sustained if all the participants are willing to contribute to it. Therefore, political friendship emerges as the natural outcome of Aristotle's teleological understanding of politics. However, in an individualist perspective, where there is a duality between individual desires and good action, constructing a political friendship would be a very challenging task. For in that scenario, citizens would not see each other as partners with whom they share the

good life, but as people with whom they are legally bound by a contractual agreement. If citizens perceive the state not as a natural condition of their individual well being, but as a human invention to overcome the difficulties of the natural human interaction, then they would regard the fellow citizen not as a partner to flourish together, but as a person who they happened to belong to the same state and need to act according to the constitutional contract they are all agreed upon. In that case, they would not have a sufficient practical motivation for developing concern on the well being of the fellow citizen, and political friendship as discussed in this essay would be very unlikely to exist.

The practical limitations of political friendship are related to the conditions that are discussed in the last section of the second part. Aristotle maintains that political friendship is only feasible in a community of certain population constraints, in which citizens adopt a specific account of distributive justice and share a common identity. The extent of this distributive justice is determined by the proportionate distribution of goods according to individual qualities and merits, and by the dominance of the middle class in the community. In Aristotle's politics, huge and/or unfair distributive gaps between citizens, cultural conflicts, and an excessive population are considered as elements that may give rise to party faction among citizens. These firm practical limitations seem to render political friendship incompatible with the current global political organization, and confine this notion to polis-wide politics.

Trying to adapt political friendship to the contemporary politics, or in other words, developing an account of political friendship without limiting it with the mentioned theoretical and practical conditions would be a very challenging task. Predictable risks of this attempt are (1) reducing political friendship to a serviceable

feeling among citizens by neglecting the practical importance of real human interaction and (2) interpreting political friendship as a less sentimental and interest-based fraternity or solidarity relation between citizens. In the first case, political friendship among citizens of our current world is considered as an analogous account of friendship, which does not necessitate an actual interaction between parties. The purpose of this approach is probably to take advantage of the institutional functions of the political friendship. Citizens of the modern world need to recognize each other as friends and care for each other's well being, because this aspiration would uniquely contribute to political environment. However, this argument can hardly be more than an attempt to promote a political ideal, since it does not suggest any practical motivation for considering a person, who we share nothing but an obscure constitutional bond with, as a friend. Political friendship is functional in Aristotle's politics, because it does not rely on the moral duty of 'recognizing the fellow citizen as a friend no matter what', but springs from the *actual* mutual concern between two parties who regards each other as indispensable social partners. Therefore, adapting political friendship to contemporary politics carries the danger of reducing it to a moral ideal that would probably have no practical significance.

The second risk is to regarding political friendship as an account of solidarity or fraternity among the members of some particular groups within the community. In this case, a shared identity, such as a common race, socio-economic status or ideology, may constitute an actual motivation for mutual concern. However, friendship in the form of solidarity or fraternity would deviate from the function that Aristotle assigns to political friendship. This sort of friendship would not lead to a state-wide consensus on the common good; on the contrary, it may cause party faction within the community by creating conflict between groups that differ in

various elements. Therefore, trying to adopt Aristotle's political friendship to contemporary politics with preserving the current global organization appears as a challenging and risky pursuit, and probably will end up by eliminating either the practical motivation or the institutional function of the notion.

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