

Political Propaganda During the
Single-Party Regime in Turkey
(1931–1946)

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Abstract

“Political Propaganda During the Single-Party regime in Turkey (1931–1946)”

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This dissertation is about the political propaganda activities of the Turkish state during the Single-Party Regime. The purpose of this study is to draw the wide picture of the perception and organization of propaganda during early Republican period, including all elements that could be researched under the title of “the single party” and “propaganda”. This dissertation categorizes propaganda conducted by the single party between 1931 and 1946 in two, as “Revolution Propaganda” and “War Era Propaganda” and examines the content of domestic and foreign propaganda, its reference points, its mediums and channels in both periods. In 1931 after all opposition was quieted and with the concentrated activities in organization a new era had started; institutions and mediums of propaganda were further established in this period. However, the Second World War has been a game changer, thus the discourse of propaganda changed as well. While “Revolution Propaganda” was mainly based on Six Arrows, “War Era Propaganda” exploited features of patriotism and nationalism. In both periods, *Matbuat Umum Müdürlüğü* (Directorate General of the Press), one of the first institutions of the history of Republic was the official state institution responsible of propaganda. Propaganda through cinema, one of the most important mediums of propaganda of the period, has been evaluated as a microcosmos where colorful examples of the relation between the state and its partners and state’s discourse can be seen.

165,100 words

Özet

“Tek Parti Döneminde Siyasi Propaganda (1931- 1946)”

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Prof. Dr. Asım Karaömerlioğlu, Tez Danışmanı

Bu doktora tezi Türk devletinin Tek Parti Dönemi’nde yürüttüğü siyasi propaganda üzerinedir. Bu çalışmanın amacı, tek parti ve propaganda üst başlığı altına girebilecek tüm öğeleri hesaba katarak, bu dönemde propagandanın algılanışı ve teşkilatlanması üzerine genel resmi çizmektir. Bu çalışma tek partininin 1931- 1946 yılları arasında yürüttüğü propagandayı “Devrim Propagandası” ve “Savaş Dönemi Propaganda” olarak ikiye ayırmakta ve her iki dönemde de siyasi irade tarafından yürütülen iç ve dış propagandanın içeriğini, referans noktalarını, araçlarını ve iletişim kanallarını incelemektedir. 1931 yılında her türlü muhalefetin bastırılması ve tek partinin yoğunlaşan teşkilatlanma hareketleri ile yeni bir dönem başlamış; propagandanın kurumları ve araçları tesis edilmeye başlanmıştır. Lakin İkinci Dünya Savaşı başına bir mihenk taşı olacak ve propagandanın söylemini de değiştirecektir. “Devrim Propagandası” Altı Ok’u temel alırken, “Savaş Dönemi Propaganda” vatanseverlik ve milliyetçilik öğelerine yüklenecektir. Her iki dönemde de Cumhuriyet Tarihi’nin ilk kurumlarından olan Matbuat Umum Müdürlüğü propagandadan sorumlu resmi devlet kurumu olarak sahnededir. Bu çalışmada dönemin en önemli propaganda araçlarından biri olan ve devletin paydaşları ile kurduğu ilişkileri ve söylemini nasıl şekillendirdiğini görmek adına çok renkli örnekler sunan sinema alanı bir *microcosmos* olarak incelenmiştir.

165.100 kelime

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To Mehmet

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

Agitprop	Agitation Propaganda
AA	Anadolu Agency (<i>Anadolu Ajansı</i>)
AND	Association of National Defense (<i>Müdafaa-I Milliye Cemiyeti</i>)
AUHS	Ankara University Humanities School
BBC	British Broadcasting Company
CAOC	Central Army Office of Cinema (<i>Merkez Ordu Sinema Dairesi</i>)
CCRF	Central Commission of Review of Films (<i>Merkez Film Kontrol Komisyonu</i>)
CPI	Committee for Public Information
CUP	Committee of Union and Progress (<i>İttihat ve Terakki Fırkası</i>)
DGP	Directorate General of the Press (<i>Matbuat Umum Müdürlüğü</i>)
DGPI	Directorate General of the Press and Information (<i>Basın Yayın ve Enformasyon Genel Müdürlüğü</i>)
DGPIN	Directorate General of the Press and Intelligence (<i>Matbuat ve İstihbarat Müdüriyeti Umumiyesi</i>)
DGPP	Directorate General of the Press and Publications (<i>Basın ve Yayın Umum Müdürlüğü</i>)
DNB	German News Bureau (<i>Deutsche Nachrichtenbüro</i>)
DP	Democrat Party (<i>Demokrat Parti</i>)
ENIT	Italian National Agency for Tourism
GNAT	Grand National Assembly of Turkey (<i>Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi</i>)
JDP	Justice and Development Party (<i>Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi</i>)
LRP	Liberal Republican Party (<i>Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası</i>)
LTK	La Turquie Kémaliste
LUCE	Italian Film Institute
MFC	Military Film Center of the Military Academy of the Republic of Turkey

MP	Member of Parliament
NBC	National Broadcasting Company
NDL	National Defence Law (<i>Milli Korunma Kanunu</i>)
NLH	National Leisure Hours Institution (<i>Opera Nazionale del Dopolavoro</i>)
OFF	U.S. Office of Facts and Figures
OWI	U.S. Office of War Information
TP	Turkish Post (<i>Posta ve Telgraf Teşkilatı GenelMüdürlüğü</i>)
RPP	Republican People's Party (<i>Cumhuriyet HalkPartisi/Fırkası</i>)
SD	Intelligence Agency of the SS (<i>Sicherheitsdients</i>)
SOE	Special Operation Executive
TAA	The Turkish Aeronautical Association (<i>Türk Hava Kurumu</i>)
TCDD	Turkish State Railways
TRTC	Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (<i>Türkiye Radyo Televizyon Kurumu</i>)
TWT	Turkish Wireless-Telephony Ltd. (<i>Telsiz TelefonTürk Anonim Şirketi</i>)
UFA	Universum Film AG
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
US	United States
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VC	Veteran's Community (<i>Malulin-i Guzzata Muavenet Heyeti or Malûl Gaziler Cemiyeti</i>)
VOKS	All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries (<i>Vsesoiuznoe Obshchestvo Kul'turnoi Sviazi s zagraniitsei</i>)

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Passion and obsession are similar words both in meaning and in practice. I am passionate about this work and I was obsessed while researching.

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Introduction

After my graduation from high school, I went to summer camp in France. Hundreds of people from every corner of the world gathered in Paris. At the opening night, everyone had to wear traditional clothes and present their country on the stage. Turkish girls wore miniskirts and boys wore bow ties and suits. Our “duty” was to show Turkey’s “modern face” to the “whole world”. There were Indians in saris, Germans in Bavarian costume, and Japanese in kimonos. I was uncomfortable. I grumbled. Then, not knowing what to do, I grabbed my spangled “belly dancer” shawl and tied it around my hips before taking my place on the stage.

I have always been intrigued by how nationalist sensitivities and social obsessions are turned into discourses. Why is it so important what foreigners think of Turkey? Is caring about what others think of you – what they see in you – and building your personality on the basis of this perception a social pattern? While starting this study I had such questions in mind. In the next step, the idea of examining the formation of this discourse during the early Republican era began to form.

We were the grandchildren of a great empire... We were laic... We were modern... At the same time, we were warriors and nomads due to our Central Asian genes. “Horse, woman, weapon” – these were values we were proud of. When we started communicating with the other, individualism disappeared. “I” turned into “We”.

When I noticed that while building your identity, conforming to others' perceptions has a social dimension, I realized that first and foremost I had to examine state discourse. How did state define itself internally towards its citizens and in the relationship it built with other actors of the international order? What was the basis of its discourse? What we learned at school, listened to on the radio, watched on television, felt during a moment of silence – all of these emotions and thoughts did not actually belong to us. Most of these emotions and thoughts were imbued in us first by our families, then by our teachers at school, and finally by those who govern the country.

When I was pondering on how the state publicized itself to its citizens and to the international public during the early years of the Republic, I inevitably encountered “propaganda”. The years between 1931 and 1946, which is roughly the period of my research, were golden years of propaganda. I asked for Zafer Toprak's help to determine the *problematique* of this dissertation. He listened to mumbles coming out of my mouth and told me what I really meant was propaganda. What was this thing called propaganda? Having been born in the twentieth century, it had a pejorative rather than positive connotation for me. My mind wandered from Orwell's Big Brother steadily to Hitler and his Minister of Propaganda, Goebbels.

The definition of propaganda in *Dictionnaire Historique de la Langue Française* says:

... during the French Revolution the word propaganda was used to designate an association operating with the purpose of propagating certain political opinions, by metonymy, organized action with the intention to spread an opinion or a political doctrine. Its value [the usage of propaganda] had enriched with developments in manipulation of opinions by totalitarian regimes and via mass communication techniques...¹

In the twentieth century, nation states effectively used propaganda in two fields. The first is that nation states used propaganda to shape public opinion or create a national identity suitable to their ends. Propaganda has also been a

1 *Dictionnaire Historique de la Langue Française*, ed. Alain Rey, (Paris: Dictionnaires Le Robert, 2006), p. 2972.

significant medium of public edification. The second field where propaganda was used effectively was during wars.

What values was Turkey – governed by the single-party regime of those who carried out the 1923 revolution – based on? How did the Second World War influence the discourse of the party that was producing intense propaganda to legitimize the revolution; impose, protect, and continue reforms; and fulfill its aims of Westernization and modernization?

Propaganda institutions of the party strengthened from 1931 on, when its power was consolidated. The ultimate purpose of this dissertation is to examine how the ruling elite approached propaganda during the single-party period, what kind of activities they conducted, and with which institutions. Meanwhile, what were the bases of propaganda. This study consists of the years between 1931, when the Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*, hereafter RPP), which had realized the revolution and overcome the opposition, formulated the "Six Arrows" ideology at the 3rd General Assembly and began organizing as a single-party government, and 1946, when after the war the opposition strengthened and the Democrat Party (*Demokrat Parti*, hereafter DP) was established. Some of their institutions and activities had started as early as the War of Independence and lasted through the 1950 when the DP came into power. This is why even though the focus of this study is the period between 1931 and 1946, pre-single-party period and the period until the DP took power will be examined, as well.

When I was starting this research, I realized that various areas from institutions to sculptures, from cinema to theater, from press to radio could fall under the subject propaganda, and therefore constructing a framework and limiting the area of my research appeared to be difficult. However, I handled this difficulty via two approaches. The main focus in this dissertation is the state's main institutions of propaganda and their organization. This dissertation does not solely focus on People's Houses, which were established to convey state ideology to citizens, nor on state monopolized radio.² The primary

2 People's Houses or specific departments of People's Houses are worth examining as mediums for conveying state ideology to the public. For a detailed account on this issue, see Esra Dicle Başbuğ, *Resmî İdeoloji Sahnedeki: Kemalist İdeolojinin İnşasında Halkevleri Dönemi Tiyatro Oyunlarının Etkisi*. Neşe Gürallar Yeşilkaya, *Halkevleri: İdeoloji ve Mimarlık*.

purpose of this dissertation is to see the big picture of how propaganda was organized during the single-party regime. Radio, cinema, fine arts, and theater all have a place in the propaganda scheme created by the state and will be explained through examples. At the same time, this study pays special attention to people behind these propaganda activities. Professionals? Bureaucrats? Liberals? *Kadro* writers? How these prominent figures, who were actually few, moved from institution to institution during the single-party era, how they perceived the revolution and the people, and propaganda techniques they assembled will be among primary subjects of this dissertation.

The most important contribution to the existing literature will be in two domains, on which there are few studies. The first is Directorate General of the Press (*Matbuat Umum Müdürlüğü*, hereafter DGP), which was established in 1920 and operated until 1931. It then reopened in 1933 and continues functioning in the present.³ The DGP is one of the first organizations in the history of the Republic. Aside from books authored by former employees, there has been no study on the DGP that focuses on the dynamics of the period and the purposes of the government. Studies on the DGP are limited to subjects like press censorship during the Second World War, radio, and *La Turquie Kémaliste* (LTK) magazine. The DGP's history is not explored in these studies. The second area of focus of this study is film propaganda conducted by the RPP and the DGP during the single-party regime.⁴ How, through which mediums, and for what purposes cinema was used by the single party during early-Republican years are questions not yet answered. Yet examining cinema activities in the 1930s and 1940s and the relation between state and cinema can provide new perspectives into the single-party regime.

A brief literature review reveals studies on propaganda in Turkey that can be roughly categorized into three groups. The first are descriptive works, which are either translations or original studies explaining what propaganda means, its techniques, and the historical process of propaganda. Propaganda is a multi-disciplinary field and can be studied through the lenses of communication studies, political sociology, political psychology, and history. The fact

3 Its present name is the Directorate General of the Press and Information.

4 *Erken Cumhuriyet Döneminde Sinema Seyir Siyasetare* cited as examples.

that propaganda studies are multi-disciplinary precludes the formation of a basic body literature on the subject.⁵ Indeed, in the international literature, there are many studies from various disciplines focusing on propaganda, which could be divided between studies focusing on peacetime propaganda and studies focusing on wartime.

Returning to the Turkish literature, during early Republican years Turkish scholars authored descriptive books on propaganda, as I will examine in the second chapter.

The second area of focus is propaganda activities targeting Turkey during the Second World War. There are few articles concerning how and through which institutions propaganda was propagated in Turkey during the First World War. An exception is Erol Köroğlu's *Türk Edebiyatı ve Birinci Dünya Savaşı (1914-1918): Propagandadan Milli Kimlik İnşasına* (Turkish Literature and the First World War [1914-1918]: From Propaganda to Building National Identity). In this study Köroğlu examines the Ottoman State's propaganda efforts during the war and the parallel construction of a national identity through literature. Studies on the Second World War and propaganda focus on the propaganda and intelligence activities of both Allied and Axis Powers in Turkey. Studies focusing on Turkey and the Second World War usually concentrate on the means through which Turkey avoided entering the war and a politics of balance were implemented. Focusing only on the issue of participation in the war does not lead to any evolving debate. It is crucial to understand how political authorities reacted to the propaganda that targeted Turkey, calculating both the war's dynamics and Turkey's internal dynamics. What kind of discourse did rulers develop towards both citizens and foreign publics considering these various dynamics. The war was a benchmark of its own; it changed the state's discourse and priorities for propaganda.

The third area of focus in the Turkish literature on propaganda is how propaganda is used for public edification (*halk terbiyesi*). In these studies, propaganda is not the framework for the research and the purpose is not to understand the organization of propaganda. One exception is Işıl Çakan's

5 Brett Silverstein, "Toward a Science of Propaganda", *Political Psychology*, International Society of Political Psychology, vol. 8, No. 1 (March 1987), p. 49.

study, which focuses on verbal propaganda during the single-party era, entitled *Konuşunuz, Konuşturunuz. Tek Parti Döneminde Propagandanın Etkin Silahı* (Talk and Let Talk. Efficient Weapon of Propaganda During Single-Party Era). Çakan investigates how citizens were educated and edified through verbal communication focusing on examples where state directly contacted citizens.

In this dissertation an interpretive approach will be used. This approach will be reinforced by discourse analysis. Especially in the third and fourth chapters, archival documents and newspapers and magazines of the period will be considered. There are significant studies in the international literature on the construction of nation states and the organization of wartime propaganda in the twentieth century: the state conveyed its ideology to citizens through radio, cinema, public spaces, and celebrations. Throughout this dissertation such studies will be used for comparisons and I will also discuss how authorities of the young Republic were influenced by the *Zeitgeist*.

Now I will move on to an overview of this dissertation. In the second chapter I will examine the meaning of propaganda and its historical development. Even though some designate propaganda as a product of modernity, in fact it is a weapon long used by dominant power to influence the masses. It is irrefutable that after the development of mass media, propaganda reached a wider audience and became efficient.

After defining propaganda, I see when and how the word propaganda entered the Turkish language. Knowing how and where the word propaganda was used will show how the Republican elite understood propaganda.

On February 14, 1929, the Minister of Internal Affairs, Şükrü Kaya wrote a letter to the Prime Ministry to report a man named Necip who was conducting black propaganda saying that bells would be hung on the mosques in Palu in Elazığ.⁶

In the period in question, the word “propaganda” was used in Turkey without restraint. Leaving aside the meaning analysis of propaganda, one of the most important reasons I decided to define my framework around “propaganda” is

6 Prime Ministry’s Republican Archive, Catalogue of Directorate General of Transactions, Cat. no: 030 10, Box no: 102 Folder no: 668 Row no: 7 p. 1.

the fact that the word is used for all and types of occasion in the period being focused on. I am not defining these activities as propaganda. Most of these activities and efforts were defined as such by the ruling class and intellectuals of the period. It appears that in line with the zeitgeist, this usage was then appropriated by citizens. For example, in 1936 an individual named Muzaffer Ulsöy wrote in a letter to La Turquie Kémaliste, "I would like to propagandize in order to rectify Europeans' misconceptions of us. I kindly request that La Turquie Kémaliste be sent to me, as it is already being published for this purpose."⁷

As I mentioned before, twentieth century propaganda was used effectively in two areas. The first is war. The Second World War was a turning point for propaganda; it is when propaganda was rediscovered. Britain's success with propaganda during the First World War motivated all countries to actively use propaganda during the Second World War. In the third section of the second chapter, I will examine how nation states used propaganda both to justify the war to their own citizens and to draw other countries to their side of the war.

In the last section of the second chapter, I will question how nation states form their propaganda activities to create the concept of "national". National education, national edification, and eugenics are all subjects included in the ruling elite's intent to shape people in line with their desires. Especially after the First World War, great efforts were made in Mussolini's Italy, Lenin's Russia, Hitler's Germany, and Atatürk's Turkey to increase citizens' loyalty to the regime, turn them into acceptable citizens, and create the meaning of "national." Among these efforts were of artistic branches like cinema, theater, photography, paintings; activities that would domesticate the people's minds and bodies like national education and physical training; and directing and monitoring the press according to the wishes of the government. In this chapter I will look for traces of such activities in other countries, which I will emphasize through the example of Turkey. I will also examine how propaganda was organized for edification purposes. Falih Rifkî noted the following in his 1932 book, *Moskova-Roma* (Moscow-Rome):

7 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 01, Box no: 1343 Folder no: 459 Row no: 1 p. 19.

We can benefit from Leninism's experiences in the Soviet Russia and Mussolinism's experiences in Italy. To edify the Turkish masses we should investigate Moscow's methods in mass edification; for Turkish étatism, we should turn to Fascism's methods of corporation; to educate Republican youth with a completely new mindset, we should examine the methods of children's and youth education in both revolutions.⁸

Kemalist Turkey closely observed its contemporaries, especially in terms of edification. Along with Kemalist rulers, intellectuals examined methods used in other countries and published research on the subject. It is argued that the single-party era in Turkey was as authoritarian – nay totalitarian – as other countries. In this dissertation I will examine the propaganda targeting citizens and practices of propaganda in other countries, proposing an argument on the extent of control of the single-party regime on civilian life – in what areas its influence was valid.

In the period after the First World War, all nation states extensively used propaganda in relation to citizens and to foreign countries. It was an era of propaganda. In such a context, how was propaganda understood by the single-party regime and how was it practiced? With these questions in mind, I will examine the organization of propaganda by the Party-State during the single-party era.

The single-party period is roughly separated in two. The years between 1931 and 1939 mark the first period, and the years between 1939 and 1946 the second. From a different point of view, the first period may be considered to end with Atatürk's death in 1938, in lieu of 1939, the beginning of the Second World War. Atatürk's passing, İnönü's becoming president, and the beginning of the war all are significant benchmarks. These two periods are different both discursively and in spirit. The purpose of the struggle in the first period – which one can call High Kemalism⁹ – was to perpetuate the revolution among the masses, increasing the legitimacy of the party-state; to modernize; to publicize the new regime abroad and to change Turkey's image and create what is

8 Falih Rıfkı Atay, *Moskova- Roma* (Istanbul: Muallim Ahmet Halit Kitaphanesi, 1932), p. 5.

9 Soner Çağaptay, *Islam, Secularism, and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who is a Turk?* (London/New York : Routledge), 2006.

“national” on all fronts. Political propaganda is expected to be rooted in ideology and propagated according to principles of this ideology. While in the first period, propaganda of the revolution (based on Six Arrows) was conducted; in the second period a defensive propaganda was undertaken: an attempt to save the day, suppress economic hardships, and harness the reactions of the public.

In the third chapter I will focus on the basis and content of the first period’s propaganda. Aside from propaganda actively formed and conducted by the state, I explore what it did not allow, what it censored, and what it banned from the realm of propaganda. At the root of propaganda there is always a reference to certain threats, fears, and reservations, as well as a battle against these. These fears and threats will also be examined.

In the third chapter my main purpose is to understand the organization of the state’s propaganda. There are two important powers in the organization of propaganda: the General Secretariat of the RPP and the DGP. The distinction between the party and the state is blurred between 1931 and 1939. This situation was reflected in the organization of propaganda, as well. This is why I will first examine the party’s organization in propaganda: how they understood it, activities conducted through its propaganda bureaus, the organization of public orators, People’s Houses, and celebrations.

The DGP is one of the oldest structures in the history of Republic, having been founded for propaganda purposes during the War of Independence. The DGP’s history is divided in two: one era between 1923 and 1931 and a second post-1933. Between 1923 and 1931 the DGP was a small institution under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 1931 it was closed only to be reestablished in 1933, this time under the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The biggest obstruction to studying the history of the DGP is that its archive is not open to researchers. As I will express in detail in the third chapter, the archive has not been sorted and is “preserved” in substandard conditions at the Directorate of the Press and Information. As nearly 100 years have gone by, one can assume that the archive has been plundered and much of it is lost. Even though I could not see the archival documents, I tried to reconstruct the DGP’s history from books authored by its former employees and from descriptive works, including

newly discovered archival documents, memoirs, documents found at the Republican Archive, and contemporaneous magazines such as *Radyo* and *La Turquie Kémaliste*.

The DGP's activities were ended in 1931 when the regime consolidated power, but it was re-established in 1933. During the Second World War, the DGP gained strength. While a sensitive politics of balance were being conducted, the DGP became one of the most important arms of the government. In this period, monitoring the press, censoring films, and producing radio broadcasts and domestic and foreign propaganda were undertaken under the auspices of the DGP. Vedat Nedim Tör, who was reassigned to the DGP when it was re-established in 1933, was born in 1897, the same year as Goebbels, who became the Reich Minister of Propaganda. Can one argue that the DGP is a clandestine ministry of propaganda given its 500 employees during the Second World War? If so, did Sarper, who managed the directorate during the Second World War, act as İnönü's Goebbels? I will try to answer these questions under the section on the DGP, which examines the directorate and its products.

The twentieth century, especially the interwar period, can be called an era of propaganda. Films, posters, pictures, and magazines of the period have recurring images and themes. Even though the ideas presented varied, the aesthetic language was always similar and sometimes a facsimile. There is almost no difference between a cover of *La Turquie Kémaliste* published in the 1940s and a cover of *Agro Pontino*, an Italian fascist propaganda magazine.

In that period, especially in Turkey, propaganda was always based on a dichotomy – no matter the medium or purpose. While “progress” was praised, the “old” and “backward” were eliminated and despised. While shrine-like buildings erected in the middle of arid Ankara and the smoking chimneys of factories that represented progress were glorified, images like a woman carrying water jugs on the back of a donkey were omitted by the editor of *La Turquie Kémaliste*. In the context of this propaganda the illiterate, conservative, superstitious person who does not want to change his habits is contrasted with an urban, educated person who believes in the positive sciences.

Another artifact that drew my attention at the beginning of this research was a list of propaganda films made by the DGP, which has been published as an appendix in a 1943 book written by Server İskit, a former employee. There

are almost no resources on propaganda films made by the state during the single-party period. Returning to the 1990 Turkish Britannica, under Propaganda Films it says merely: "In Turkey, during the single-party period, aside from a few films produced to publicize the activities of the new Republic and later films made to document incidents in Cyprus, there has been no activity in this area." Many resources reflect a similar conclusion about the single-party regime. Even though in this period cinema was popular. Cinema's escapist qualities contributed to this popularity. The ruling elite could not afford to ignore such an effective medium. While domestic film production was virtually non-existent, foreign films dominated the market. These were not just entertaining the viewing public, they presented a wholly different way of life. When the end of 1933 the party realized the influence foreign films were having over its citizens, they started making propaganda films. Production of such films was handed over to the DGP at the end of 1941.

Most of the propaganda films made by the RPP and the DGP were newsreels. Some films are what can be called cultural films, the purpose of which was to convey general knowledge rather than information on current events. Many domestic and foreign institutions, companies, and the government were enrolled in the production of these films.

The single-party government, pragmatically, allowed Soviet propaganda in the form of Soviet Russian films that ultimately helped spread Kemalist ideology. "All Quiet on The Western Front" (1930), on the other hand, showed the negative sides of the military and war and was deemed inappropriate by Mustafa Kemal himself, who claimed that national defense and patriotism still needed to be reinforced. The single party enacted a film censorship statute in 1939, and during the Second World War years state control over this domain increased.

People's Houses were the primary medium for both the Party's and DGP's films to be screened. Alongside People's Houses, private film theaters were also compelled to screen educational and technical films or newsreel produced by the DGP. Films were sometimes screened in village squares and coffee shops. Aside from propaganda films made by the government, in this chapter I will also examine informative films procured from foreign companies or institutions.

Another aspect of film propaganda that will be explored in the fourth chapter is foreign publicity: how new Turkey's image was conveyed abroad. The state's attitude toward foreign filmmakers shooting on Turkish soil and their efforts to manipulate the products in individual cases will be conveyed with examples. The narrative in this chapter is based on thousands of pages of archival documents, personal memoirs, and interviews with people who experience some part of that period.

With respect to the single-party regime's propaganda practices, the Second World War was a game changer. While the single-party was continuing to work to strengthen the principles of the revolution and its reforms, the sudden advent of war changed the state's discourse and propaganda. The Second World War began when Germany occupied Poland in September 1, 1939. On September 6, 1939, a decree numbered 2/11890 determined which works of art would be transferred from Istanbul to Central Anatolia in case of mobilization for war.¹⁰ This is an apparent sign proving Turkey was expecting war and preparing for it.¹¹

From the time that Hitler became chancellor on January 30, 1933 until September 1939, the footsteps of war were heard. States still healing from the wounds of the First World War pondered how they would explain an outbreak of war to their citizens. It will be interesting to see how Turkey prepared for war through propaganda activities and it based its discourses. Turkey officially joined the Second World War two months before it ended. In this period when it was carrying out a fine-tuned politics of balance, what did it do to prepare citizens for a possible war? In this chapter I will attempt to understand the zeitgeist through the arguments of contemporaneous politicians as well as publications like *Savaş* (War) Magazine, which was published from 1940 to 1946.

Even though Turkey did not partake in war, it struggled internally and abroad to remain neutral and simultaneously prepare for a possible war. This

10 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Council of Ministers' Decrees, Cat. no: 030 18 1 2, Box no: 91 Folder no: 45 Row no: 16 p. 1.

11 The idea of a possible war affected every aspect of life in this period. In the 1940s, *Arkitekt* magazine featured articles about the construction of shelters and defense methods against air-raids.

struggle involved tight control over domestic public opinion, manipulating and censoring the press, quieting civil society, and taking financial precautions through legislation such as the National Defense Law (*Milli Korunma Kanunu*) and the Wealth Tax (*Varlık Vergisi*). Along with the war, the state's discourse changed: revolution propaganda was replaced with a nationalist propaganda targeting national sentiments. The state's propaganda and how it treated citizens – especially the burden it placed on villagers – ultimately eroded the government's credibility. The single-party government tried to restrain its citizens and make a common purpose of national defense. Did the ruling class manage to substantiate the principle of populism, one of the most important components of the Six Arrows? Could the opiate of nationalism, used by Turkey's rulers, mobilize its citizens?

The fifth chapter will handle questions about how a country that went through a revolution just 16 years prior reacted to the threat of war and its superstructure, how it communicated this threat to its citizens, what kind of precautions it took, and which discourses it used to present itself to foreign publics. The war was such that the party that had carried out the revolution lost power. The state's immense efforts to quiet all alternative voices and powers resulted in the birth of an opposition also eased by international conjuncture at the end of the Second World War. Four years later in 1950, this opposition came to power.

In the last section of the fifth chapter, I will investigate propaganda activities conducted by foreign countries in Turkey during the Second World War as well as how the state attempted to limit them. While the state was trying to restrain belligerent countries' activities in Turkey, another concern was to control the movements of thought in the country. This is why the party first suppressed the expression of leftist opinions, and after the end of war rightist opinions, as well. von Papen, a strong bureaucrat, was influential in propaganda battles in Turkey; it was difficult for state officials to balance between Britain's gentle propaganda and German oppressive propaganda. Some authors who have evaluated it from a contemporary perspective have questioned the close relations to the Nazis during the National Chief period. However, before and during the first years of the war, Turkey's atmosphere was pro-British. So to what extent did von Papen's oppressive attitude contribute to Turkey's being perceived as pro-German?

Another subject I will explore in the fifth chapter are cinema activities during war. Citizens were only exposed to what was filtered through the state. How was this popular art form used for propaganda purposes? Not only films, but also pictures are relevant: German, British, and French magazines were within people's reach and became alternatives to the state's discourse.

While the state's discourse and activities in propaganda will be analyzed, I will not treat this as a one-sided process. Another focus is the target audience of propaganda in this period. Within the scope of this research, I can mention two distinct audiences: citizens of the Republic of Turkey and foreign states and their citizens. With regard to internal propaganda, it is significant whether the propaganda actually reached the public. It is surprising that films produced or bought by General Secretariat of the RPP or the DGP with the intent to influence or change public opinion were sent to remote villages in Anatolia. However, the fact that there were a limited number of film projectors in the country affects one's notion of an efficient sender-receiver relationship.¹² In the field of propaganda, how mediums of propaganda reach their targets – in other words “reception” – is significant.

Another example serves the argument well. *La Turquie Kémaliste* was a magazine published by the DGP between 1932 and 1949 and sent abroad for propaganda purposes. It is questionable how this magazine, which has been much debated and which has been often referenced, actually reached its target audience. A book entitled *Kemal'in Türkiye'si* (Kemal's Turkey) – published in 2012 – and edited by Lütfü Tınç contains many articles on *La Turquie Kémaliste* related to the subjects on which it focused during its 17-years lifespan, to its authors, and to its relation with the politics of the period. The unanswered question is where, how, to whom the magazine was distributed, given that it was produced in foreign languages to publicize Turkey to foreigners.

As the two examples above demonstrates, it is difficult to measure the effects of propaganda –i.e., how much a target audience was influenced – in a historical study. However, my purpose is not to measure whether or not propaganda conducted by state was successful. Using archival documents, reports of party investigators, and news published in newspapers and magazines, I will

12 As shown in detail in the fourth chapter, one solution to this problem was portable 16mm projectors.

analyze whether propaganda reached its target audience, through which mediums, which means were used to form public opinions, and how much did the public's reactions and opinions matter.

This dissertation is first and foremost a contribution to the study of propaganda, which partakes in various fields. It is on how domestic and foreign propaganda was organized, through which organizations, its mediums, channels, and to some extent the public opinion on these efforts, during the single-party era. This research can be also considered as a contribution to Turkish cinema studies. What is missing in this study is an analysis of propaganda films, of which we constructed a narrative for the first time. Reading and evaluating these films through the perspective of the visual ideology of the period requires a whole study dedicated to it and is expecting further work from researchers of film history. When *Türkiye Film Arşivi* (Turkish Film Archive) is opened to researchers soon, as it is claimed to be, countless such studies would be possible.

Another issue I did not examine in depth in this dissertation is how propaganda was organized before 1931. This subject remains unexplored and is awaiting new researchers. However one serious obstacle for such a research is that the DGP's archive is still closed to researchers. Furthermore we do not have any information on whether these documents stored in sacks at the DGPP contain records on this first period. The name of the first propaganda institution established in 1920 was *Matbuat ve İstihbarat Müdüriyet-i Umumiyesi* (Directorate General of the Press and Intelligence). This means wartime propaganda is directly related to intelligence. This is why such a research would require access to such documents as well.

Age of Propaganda: Deploying the Concept of Propaganda into the Twentieth Century

In this chapter I will first look at the birth and development of the concept of propaganda and then examine the basic principles of propaganda. After that I will briefly look at its echoes in post-revolutionary Turkey: how it evolved and how it penetrated worlds of thought and literature. Meanwhile, I will offer a literature review of scholarly works focusing on the state and propaganda, including the early-Republican years.

Propaganda in the twentieth century is especially applied in two areas. The first is in the two world wars. Other countries took note of Britain's success with propaganda during the First World War and during the Second World War all countries deemed it significant and words as words used propaganda for their own interests and purposes. After defining propaganda and briefly summarizing its historical development, I will focus on how it was used during the world wars to justify war, mobilize citizens, dishearten opponents, and spread information as well as disinformation.

Propaganda's second significant application during the twentieth century has been its use by authoritarian single-party regimes. The ruling class needs propaganda for public acclaim, to publicize itself domestically and abroad, and to socially engineer citizens from subjects. The actions of the post-October Revolution Soviet Union, the National Socialists' Germany, Fascist Italy, and all other political authorities who tried to similarly mobilize their people

are included in the field of propaganda. At the end of this chapter I will mention how propaganda is used to influence and edify the masses in authoritarian single-party regimes.

§ 2.1 Defining Propaganda: The Evolution of the Concept

What matters is not the truth of the message but the credibility of the message. And the estimate of the credibility of the message is determined by the estimate of the gullibility of the masses.

James Earlys¹

I come from a generation that did not witness either of the world wars. The first image of war in my mind is the Gulf War of 1990. Nevertheless, I grew up with a music box playing Lili Marleen. I read *Mein Kampf* when I was in high school. Visiting the Berlin Wall, and the Jewish Museum in Berlin intrigued me immensely. What motivates me to be interested in the cultural products of this dark era? As also remarked by Jowett and O'Donnell, the continued interest that exists in all things pertaining to the Nazis is fascinating.² Does that demonstrate the success of propaganda executed in the Second World War era? Or is it astonishment at the cruel images of these times that holds our attention alive? In this section, I will try to understand how propaganda influences masses by investigating the meaning and characteristics of propaganda.

Even though the meaning of the word propaganda has changed over time, the need for a party using propaganda to have a cause has never changed. It could be religious propaganda such as with Martin Luther, or it could be try-

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- 1 Chas. W. Freeman Jr., *The Diplomat's Dictionary* (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997), p. 239.
 - 2 Garth S. Jowett and Victoria o'Donnel, *Propaganda and Persuasion* (California: Sage Publications, 2006), p. 239.

ing to convince housewives to cook more giblets in order to fulfill people protein requirements during a famine.³ Even though these examples seem completely different from one another, the methods and techniques that propagandists use to influence the target audience are similar.

The word “propaganda” comes from the verb “to propagate” meaning “to sow” in Latin. There are countless definitions. Abstaining from prejudice, I start with a neutral definition:

...a systematic form of purposeful persuasion that attempts to influence the emotions, attitudes, opinions, and actions of specified target audiences for ideological, political or commercial purposes through the controlled transmission of one-sided messages via mass and direct media channels.⁴

Further delving into the definition, I would add, “the transmitted messages can consist of facts, arguments, rumors, half-truths or lies.”⁵ Alternatively, “propaganda is the deliberate, systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behavior to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist.”⁶

It is important to emphasize that propaganda is systematic and therefore requires a *longitudinal study* of its evolution. Jowett’s and O’Donnell’s 10-step plan for the analysis of propaganda is useful for understanding this process.⁷

- 1 The ideology and purpose of the orchestrated propaganda campaign
- 2 The context in which the propaganda occurs
- 3 Identification of the propagandist
- 4 The structure of the propaganda organization

3 During the Second World War, one project of the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Committee on Food Habits was to increase the consumption of meats such as beef hearts and kidneys in order to maintain public health despite the unavailability of certain types of protein-rich foods. Elliot Aronson and Anthony Pratkanis, *Age of Propaganda: the Everyday Use and Abuse of Persuasion* (New York: W. H. Freeman, 1992), pp. 166-168.

4 Richard Alan Nelson, *A Chronology and Glossary of Propaganda in the United States* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1996), p. 232.

5 Nelson, 1996, p. 232.

6 Jowett and o’Donnell, 2006, p. 7.

7 Jowett and o’Donnell, 2006, p. 270.

- 5 The target audience
- 6 Media utilization techniques
- 7 Specialized techniques used to maximize the effect
- 8 Audience reaction to various techniques
- 9 Counterpropaganda, if present
- 10 Effects and evaluation

It can be argued that propaganda is a new concept: an invention of modernity. On the other hand, propaganda has been evaluated parallel to human history, and it has been used for various purposes in different periods such as spreading religions and maintaining the power of monarchies. Innovations in the fields of transportation and communication in the twentieth century have no doubt contributed to the propaganda's efficiency and expanded its zones of influence.

Fraser argues that the books of the prophets are essentially works of propaganda, specifically directed at arousing the emotions of the audience. The use of propaganda has been an integral part of human history, and its philosophical and theoretical origins can be traced back to ancient Greece. Plato was the first person to advocate censorship preventing of access to undesired sources of news and views for the sake of the state.⁸ Propaganda tactics were used effectively by Alexander the Great, by the Roman Empire, by early Christians, and later by the Crusaders. Propaganda became an integral part of the religious conflicts in the Reformation. For instance, the use of the printing press was quickly adopted by Martin Luther in his fight against the Catholic Church and provided the ideal medium for spreading propagandistic materials.⁹ According to Benedict Anderson, Luther was the first best-selling writer, and he opened the way for others in the religious propaganda wars.¹⁰

The word *propaganda* originates from the *Sacra Congregatio de Propaganda Fide* (the Office for the Propagation of the Faith), a papal body established in 1622 by Gregory XV to supervise the Church's missionary efforts in

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- 8 Lindley Fraser, *Propaganda* (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 15-17.
 - 9 Jowett and o'Donnell, 2006, p. 49.
 - 10 Benedict Anderson, *Hayali Cemaatler: Milliyetçiliğin Kökenleri ve Yayılması*, trans. İskender Savaşır (İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2007), pp. 54- 55.

the New World and elsewhere. The reason to form such a body was to fight against the spread of Protestantism.¹¹ No doubt, propaganda played an important role during the American and French revolutions, and it was later used by Napoléon.¹²

Oliver Thomson states:

There is a tendency to think of propaganda as a relatively recent development and to associate it with the appearance of modern media. Yet, propaganda does in fact have an extremely long history.¹³ Over substantial periods, we have been cowed by the blatantly artificial images of kings and tyrants, so that we meekly supported the most pernicious regimes. With amazing credulity, we have been lulled into idolizing conquerors, applauding genocide, upholding persecution and condoning exploitation.¹⁴

The French Revolution was a turning point for propaganda. Even in pre-revolutionary Europe, Hans Speier argues, the value of public opinion was being raised.¹⁵ In the aftermath of the Paris attacks of November 13, 2015, the slogan of the French Revolution urged: Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité. The third term, fraternity relates to the concept of “the people.” According to Killian, “in conjunction with liberty and equality it implied not only the redistribution of political power and economic wealth but also a new source of pride, dignity, and respect: the people- state,” in which the “subject” became the “citizen.”¹⁶

11 Edward Bernays, *Propaganda* (Brooklyn: Ig Publishing), 2005, p. 9.

12 Jowett and o'Donnell, 2006, p. 49.

13 Oliver Thomson, *Easily Led: A History of Propaganda* (United Kingdom: Sutton Publishing, 1999), p. 1.

14 Thomson, 1999, preface.

15 Censorship in the form of licensing was abolished in England in 1695. Hans Speier, “Rise of Public Opinion”, in *Propaganda and Communication in World History*, Volume II: Emergence of Public Opinion in the West, ed. Harold D. Lasswell, Daniel Lerner and Hans Speier (Honolulu: East-West Center- The University Press of Hawaii, 1980), p. 149.

16 Lewis M. Killian, “The Respect Revolution”, in *Propaganda and Communication in World History*, Volume III: A Pluralizing World in Formation, ed. Harold D. Lasswell, Daniel Lerner and Hans Speier (Honolulu: East-West Center- The University Press of Hawaii, 1980), pp. 94-95.

The purpose of propaganda is to send out an ideology to audiences with the objective to reinforce or modify the audience's attitudes, behaviors, or both. However, the word *purpose* implies control and is regarded as a deliberate attempt to alter or maintain a balance of power that is advantageous to the propagandist. The propagandist has a precise institutional ideology and objective.¹⁷

According to Aldous Huxley, "propaganda is emotional engineering."¹⁸ Hitler agreed and wrote:

Its effect for the most part must be aimed at the emotions and only a very limited degree at the so-called intellect. We must avoid excessive intellectual demands on our public. The receptivity of the great masses is very limited, their intelligence is small, but their power of forgetting is enormous. In consequence of these facts, all effective propaganda must be limited to a very few points and must harp on these slogans until the last member of the public understands what you want him to understand by your slogan.¹⁹

According to Goebbels, the repetition of simple messages, images and slogans creates our knowledge of the world, defining the truth and specifying how we should live our lives. The power of repetition in propaganda was well understood by Hitler, who stated, "...as with so many things in this world, persistence is the first and foremost condition of success."²⁰ Goebbels's propaganda crusades were based on a simple observation: "What the masses term truth is that information which is most familiar."

The rank and file are usually much more primitive than we imagine. Propaganda must therefore always be essentially simple and repetitious. In the long run only he will achieve basic results in influencing public opinion who is able to reduce problems to the simplest terms

17 Jowett and o'Donnell, 2006, p. 4.

18 Chas. W. Freeman Jr., *The Diplomat's Dictionary* (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997), p. 240.

19 Aronson and Pratkanis, 1992, pp. 318-319.

20 Freeman, 1997, p. 239.

and who has the courage to keep forever repeating them in this simplified form despite the objections of intellectuals.²¹

Another characteristic of propaganda Goebbels claims is crucial is the simplicity of the message. According to him, the task of a gifted propagandist is to take an idea which many have thought and put it in a way that can reach everyone from the educated to the commoner. Goebbels suggests the following example:

I can recall a Hitler speech in Jena. Half of the audience was Marxists, half students and university professors.... I had a burning to speak with both elements afterwards. I could see that the university professor and the average man had understood what Hitler said. That is the greatness of our movement, that it can use language to reach broad masses.²²

According to Orwell, government leaflets, pamphlets, and political broadcasts are not always comprehensible for the target population of the propaganda. In the early months of the Second World War, a squad of “Mass Observers” was charged with finding out what meanings ordinary men in the United Kingdom (UK) attached to abstract, highfalutin words. It was discovered that most people didn’t know the meaning of the word *immorality*. However, one famous government slogan was: “What is morally wrong cannot be politically right.”²³

Another requirement of successful propaganda is rhetoric. Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* can be seen as the “first handbook of the propaganda of persuasion by speech and oratory.”²⁴ Goebbels argues that the foundations of the French revolution were built by philosophers, but Danton and Robespierre moved the

21 Aronson and Pratkanis, 1992, p. 182.

22 Joseph Goebbels, *Europe in the Year 2000 and Other Essays Including the Art of Propaganda* (San Bernardino- California: Ostara Publications, 2015), p. 11.

23 George Orwell, “Propaganda and Demotic Speech”, in *All Art is Propaganda: Critical Essays*, ed. by George Packer (Boston- New York: Mariner Books, 2008), pp. 223-224.

24 Fraser, 1962, p. 17.

revolution forward as rhetoricians. According to him, “Fascism and Bolshevism were built by great orators, by masters of the spoken word.”²⁵

Propagandists used all of the new communication technologies offered by the twentieth century, and the efficiency of propaganda increased. States that observed Britain’s success with propaganda during the First World War contemplated use during the interwar period; nation states began to use propaganda for pragmatic ends. Methods were developed to infuse people’s everyday semantics with revolutionary rhetoric, even to reach their subconscious emotions to compel them acquire something as benign a smoking habit. The claim that propaganda is a product of modernity makes sense in one respect. The basis for this claim is that propaganda has been used to acquire citizens’ political “consent”; it was therefore used to influence public opinion in order to obtain said consent. In politics, especially with regard to a critical issue like entering a war, states use propaganda widely to acquire citizens’ consent and to convince them of the rightness and justness of the war. Revolution, on the other hand, seeks to completely change the semantics of a people through post-revolution edification; the process of socially engineering “acceptable citizens” can be seen as a long-term project of propaganda.

Propaganda was more effective in the First World War than ever before due to its scientific organization and new facilities for rapid communication. Notably, radio broadcasting was only developed after the war.²⁶ Britain’s success with propaganda during the First World War not only fascinated other governments, but intellectuals, as well. Chomsky defines this rediscovery of propaganda as “the foundation story of modern political science and the industry of public relations.”²⁷

During the First World War, one prominent figure in United States propaganda was Edward Bernays, the nephew of Sigmund Freud. Bernays is known as a pioneer of scientific techniques for shaping and manipulating public opinion. Bernays called his technique “engineering of consent”, a “process

25 Goebbels, 2015, p. 15.

26 James Morgan Read, *Atrocity Propaganda 1914-1919* (New Heaven: Yale University Press, 1941), p. 1.

27 Noam Chomsky, *Propaganda ve Toplumsal Zihin*, Interviews by David Barsamian, trans. Zahit Atam (Istanbul: İthaki, 2014), p. 219.

by which an organization seeks to consider the public opinion climate, build support and reach an understanding that proves beneficial to all involved parties.”²⁸ His vision evolved from the writings of the American journalist, Walter Lippmann. Lippmann was Woodrow Wilson’s adviser and a member of Wilson’s propaganda committee during the First World War.²⁹ In the post-war era, Lippmann remarked that “the manufacture of consent” was a necessity throughout the public sphere.³⁰ According to Bernays, propaganda was the “executive arm of the invisible government” and whatever socially important undertakings embraced in industry, agriculture, politics or education had to be furthered with the help of propaganda.³¹

According to Lippmann, pure democracy was a dream: modern mass society was incapable of “lucid thought or clear perception, driven by herd instincts and mere prejudice, and frequently disoriented by external stimuli.” Ordinary people were not equipped to make decisions or engage in rational discourse.³² According to Lippmann, ordinary people should remain spectators never be actors. Following from this point of view, democracy needed a “supra-governmental body of detached professionals to sift the data, think things through, and keep the national enterprise from blowing up.”³³

Bernays’ adaptation of these ideas was simpler and more enthusiastic: “We are governed, our minds are molded, our tastes formed, our ideas suggested, largely by men we have never heard of.”³⁴ He emphasized, “they govern us by their qualities of natural leadership, their ability to supply needed ideas and by their key position in the social structure.”³⁵ As clearly seen in the British

28 Richard Alan Nelson, *A Chronology and Glossary of Propaganda in the United States*, Westport (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1996), p. 160.

29 Lippmann visited Turkey in October 1949. During his visit, he went to Ankara to meet with İnönü.

30 Bernays, 2005, p. 13. The title of Chomsky and Herman’s “Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media” (1988) derives from Lippmann’s phrase “the manufacture of consent.” The book draws attention to the role of national propaganda in social compliance.

31 Bernays, 2005, pp. 47-48.

32 Bernays, 2005, p. 16.

33 Bernays, 2005, p. 16.

34 Bernays, 2005, p. 17.

35 Bernays, 2005, p. 17.

Broadcasting Company (BBC) documentary, “The Century of the Self”, Bernays saw himself as an exemplar of that elevated supervisory network. He described himself as “a truth-seeker and a propagandist for propaganda.” After the First World War, the public opinion became a force to be managed, and to manage public opinion governments needed experts. In a way, the war legitimized the work of propagandists who were seen as charlatans before.

There is no entry for propaganda in the 1911 Encyclopedia Britannica. It is arguable that the Allies familiarized the word “propaganda” among the masses in Great Britain and the United States; the word’s derogatory use was less common than a neutral denotation.³⁶ Read points out that the real power of propaganda from 1914 to 1918 was the unpreparedness of its victims. They scarcely knew what the word “propaganda” meant.³⁷ At the end of the First World War, the term propaganda took on a more and more pejorative meaning. Edward Bernays’ “Propaganda” was one ambitious effort to redeem it. The world was no more the world of Louis XIV, who modestly remarked “l’Etat c’est moi.”³⁸ The steam engine, a varied press, and public schooling took power from the kings and gave it to the people.³⁹

The use of propaganda increased en route to the Second World War, mostly by single-party regimes. Orwell considers systematic distortion, lying, and fakery as essential propaganda devices for state control.⁴⁰ Reality is intentionally distorted by the ruling class. In Italy, Germany, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), and even in Turkey, the single party was “the nucleus of the new political class.”⁴¹ All of these countries established their propaganda machine to ensure “unity”, to create a “new man”, and to enhance “national culture.”

As discussed in detail in section 1.3, the Second World War era was the peak of political propaganda. This time Germany conducted aggressive propaganda campaigns against the Allied powers. However, warring and neutral

36 Bernays, 2005, p. 11.

37 Read, 1941, p. 2.

38 Which means, “I am the state.”

39 Bernays, 2005, p. 47.

40 Nelson, 1996, p. 222.

41 Alexander J. De Grand, *Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany* (New York: Routledge, 2004), p. 81.

countries alike practiced propaganda through intelligence services, radio, publications, films, posters, and agitators.

It is important to point out that in the twentieth century, people were subjected to two essential fields of propaganda and persuasion: economics and politics, which cover the whole of human social life. In the preface to *Age of Propaganda*, Elliot Aronson establishes his perception of the ongoing bias and propagandizing political and market discourses that characterized the Second World War.

At that time, I fervently believed just about everything I was exposed to in school and in the media. For example, I knew that all Germans were evil and that all Japanese were sneaky and treacherous, while all white Americans were clean-cut, honest, fair-minded, and trusting. Perhaps you had to be eleven years old to take seriously the racial and national caricatures presented in the war movies of the early 1940s. But in those days, most grown-ups—including my parents—certainly wanted to believe in the basic message of the war movies and did, in fact, have a childlike trust in the media. They hung on every word President Roosevelt said in his famous fireside chats and never dreamed of questioning the nobility of the motives behind our national policy. They thought (and so did I) that the purpose of commercial advertising was to inform the consumer.⁴²

In the twentieth century and especially during the Cold War, camps in a bipolar world attributed skeptical meanings to the creations of the other. Most communications productions like cinema, theatre, cartoons, and the press were intended to transmit a message which were often biased and persuasive in nature. Propaganda and persuasion affected all aspects of our lives from economic decisions to politics, education, and health. In this century the truth became controversial, and people started to question even the most neutral messages. For instance, it is argued that the creator of the Smurfs, Pierre Culiford, was a communist and the cartoon was communist propaganda. These critiques emphasized the similarities between the rules and characteristics of the Smurf village and a communist state. There were rumors that Smurfs is an

42 Aronson and Pratkanis, 1992, xi.

acronym for “Small Men Under Red Flag” or “Socialist Men Under Red Father”, and that the Smurf village represents a Marxist Utopia. The evil Gargamel was a symbol of capitalism trying to turn Smurfs into gold.⁴³

An unavoidable sphere of influence in the rediscovery of propaganda is business world. During the interwar period, especially in the United States, propaganda was used for political but also commercial objectives. In the period between the Versailles Treaty and the economic crisis of 1929, the field of public relations boomed. Commercial goods including new consumer goods like bananas and cigarettes were imposed on consumers through mediums of propaganda. After the Great War, propaganda experts started working on behalf of conglomerates like General Motors, Procter & Gamble, and Standard Oil.⁴⁴

§ 2.2 Evolution of the Concept of Propaganda in Turkey

Before delving into specific propaganda activities of the single-party era, which is the subject of this dissertation, it is important to question when and how the concept of propaganda started being used in Turkey. The word *propaganda* was used frequently and unhesitatingly during the period from 1930s through the 1950s. I should note that discourses or actions of the party or the state will not be examined under my conceptualization of propaganda. During the single-party era, the word *propaganda* was used routinely in political and social discourse. In parliamentary debates, in internal party correspondence, in the works of prominent intellectuals, and even in comic strips propaganda was mentioned, its deficiencies were discussed, and reminders were issued to be aware of foreign propaganda.

The phenomenon of propaganda acquiring a positive connotation after the Great War can also be observed in Turkey. In any case, in the post-revolutionary period, creating a nation and ensuring the continuity of the revolution required the effective use of propaganda. I will briefly examine the evolution of

43 The French academic, Antoine Buéno, published a 2011 book entitled *Le petit livre bleu: analyse critique et politique de la société des Schtroumpfs* claiming that the Smurfs were Communist and anti-Semitic.

44 Bernays, 2005, p. 12.

the concept of propaganda in Turkey and mention contemporaneous studies on the subject.

Scanning the literature on propaganda in Turkey reveals that many books have been published on the subject. Most are translations from English or French and their publication dates back to the late 1920s. A quick look at this early literature reveals an interesting book entitled *Altıncı Kitap: Propaganda* (Sixth Book: Propaganda), published for official use only by the Turkish National Security Service Publications (*Milli Emniyet Hizmetleri Neşriyatı*) in 1929. The preface indicates: “*This book is translated from English. The writer is a Brit who worked for the British Intelligence during the First World War. While reading the book you will understand that propaganda is a powerful and cruel weapon.*” It appears that the book was used for training purposes in the General Security Directorate. The book explores the organization of propaganda in the United Kingdom during the First World War in detail, focusing on the activities of the Crewe House. The translation into Turkish and its official use in the National Security Service proves that Turkey was impressed by the success of British propagandists in the Great War and wanted to understand their experience.

Propaganda was used viciously by all states in the Second World War. What was going on in Turkey in this period? Niyazi Berkes’ book entitled *Propaganda Nedir?*⁴⁵ (What is Propaganda?) was published in 1942, the same year he published a monograph entitled *Bazı Ankara Köyleri Üzerine Araştırma* (Research on Some Villages of Ankara). Why did Berkes prioritize writing about propaganda at that time, in the middle of the Second World War? He answers this question in the first lines of his book. Since the First World War, propaganda and its role in politics had been thoroughly discussed, propaganda had been successful in many endeavors, and much effort and money was spent on it, such that Berkes called the present time an era of propaganda. However, Berkes did not approve of propaganda as a mysterious force capable of realizing anything. This is why he intended to explain the nature and limits of propaganda scientifically: how and under what conditions it worked. The same year, Sadri Ertem, a journalist, writer, and later a deputy of

45 Niyazi Berkes, *Propaganda Nedir?* (Ankara: Recep Ulusoglu Basımevi, 1942)

the RPP, also published a book entitled *Propaganda* in two volumes (first volume in 1942 and second volume in 1943).

In the aftermath of the Second World War, different descriptive books about propaganda were published such as Faik Türkmen's *Siyasi Propaganda San'atı* (The Art of Political Propaganda) in 1953, which focused on the use of propaganda during political elections. A book called *Modern Propaganda* by Vahap Okay was published in 1957 and included information on techniques of propaganda, the domestic and foreign communication organizations of the Turkish state, and types and mediums of propaganda.

Another interesting publication is the 1943 lecture notes of Staff Major Asım Eren⁴⁶ from the Istanbul University Training Battalion (*İstanbul Üniversitesi Talim Taburu*) entitled *Haberalma, Propaganda ve Mukabil Mücadele Esasları* (Intelligence, Propaganda and Equivalent Principles of Battle). On the cover of his publication *Su Uyur; Düşman Uyumaz!* (Water Sleeps; The Enemy Does Not!) is inscribed as a sub-title. This book published during the most heated period of the Second World War and informed soldiers about propaganda. It examined how propaganda functioned during both wartime and peacetime and gave examples of possible foreign threats, focusing on intelligence techniques and fighting against espionage. The book ends with Eren's advice:

Protecting and attacking. This is the shortest definition of intelligence, propaganda, and fighting... National Unity means, a solid mass made of people living in the same motherland, loyal to the same government, thinking and working for their motherland and not sacrificing their country for their own interests... Turkish youth... always remember that everything is a secret and it is our duty to keep these secrets. Do not be targets of enemy spies. Turkish youth! Win this invisible war during wartime and peacetime and always remain unified!⁴⁷

46 Eren later became a member of parliament in 1961.

47 Asım Eren, *Haberalma, Propaganda ve Mukabil Mücadele Esasları: Su Uyur; Düşman Uyumaz!*, Istanbul University Training Battalion Teaching Notes (Istanbul: Kader Basımevi, 1943)

Propaganda drew considerable attention in Turkey in the post-First World War and Second World War years, just as it did in the rest of the world. For this reason, authors wrote or translated books dealing with the historical development of propaganda, its characteristics and methods. They were considering propaganda as a medium for mobilizing the masses. Turkish intellectuals also contributed to the literature on propaganda in Turkey by writing descriptive works. On the other hand, during Cold War there were many examples of materials on propaganda written in Turkish by military personnel for the purpose of military education.

Nermin Abadan coined the term *kamuoyu* (public opinion) in Turkish. Abadan's doctoral dissertation entitled *Halk Efkârı Mefhumu ve Tesir Sahaları* (The Concept of Public Opinion and Its Spheres of Influence) was published in 1956.⁴⁸

Considering studies of propaganda in the Turkish context, three chapters of a book entitled *Public Opinion and Propaganda* (1954) were devoted to a communication system developed in the Ottoman Empire. The book included contributions by Talat Halman, Şerif Mardin, and Bruce McGowan.

The expression *efkâr-i umumiye*, meaning public opinion appeared in the Ottoman language in the 1860s.⁴⁹ As Nadir Özbek notes, in his work focusing on public welfare during Hamidian period, "the fact that during the nineteenth century public welfare turned into a necessity for the legitimacy of the sultanate, means politics where masses had to be considered was settling."⁵⁰ During the formation of the modern state, the state's intervention in both the daily lives of individuals and in social areas increased.⁵¹

In the Hamidian period, censorship became a means to supervise the public. Selim Deringil's *İktidarın Sembolleri ve İdeoloji: II. Abdülhamid Dönemi 1876-1909* (*The Well-protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire, 1876-1909*) considers Abdülhamid II's efforts to publicize the state abroad and to neutralize events that would harm his reputation

48 Nermin Abadan, *Halk Efkârı Mefhumu ve Tesir Sahaları* (Ankara: Yeni Matbaa, 1956)

49 François Georgeon, *Sultan Abdülhamid* (Istanbul: Homer Kitabevi, 2006), p. 184.

50 Nadir Özbek, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Sosyal Devlet: Siyaset, İktidar ve Meşruiyet 1876-1914* (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004), p.16.

51 Özbek, 2004, p.19.

in detail. *Bab-ı Âli* (Istanbul Government) was aware of the importance of European public opinion, and would compensate foreign journalists as necessary to favorably influence their audiences. Starting from the International Exhibition in London in 1851, the Ottoman state participated in international exhibitions as a medium for publicizing itself. In this exhibition, the Ottoman state positioned itself as the leader of the Muslim world and “as a member of civilized countries.”⁵²

With Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913, Ottoman subjects were for the first time deeply involved in a war.⁵³ Zafer Toprak claims that while Western literature argues that propaganda was discovered by British during the First World War, it was actually first used by Balkan countries during the Balkan Wars.⁵⁴ Turkish Hearths (*Türk Ocakları*) founded in 1912 were the center of “patriotic agitation” after the Balkan Wars. As Üstel notes “cultural nationalism, advocated by the Turkish Hearths, accepted that coming from the same language and culture group was the primary measure of being part of a nation. They especially served the objectives of the Committee of Union and Progress (*İttihat ve Terakki Fırkası*, or CUP) during the First World War when their politics changed to Turanism.”⁵⁵

There are few studies on Turkish propaganda activities during the First World War and the subsequent National Campaign. One important study is *Türk Edebiyatı ve Birinci Dünya Savaşı (1914-1918): Propagandadan Milli Kimlik İnşasına* (Turkish Literature and World War I (1914-1918): From Propaganda to Building National Identity) by Erol Köroğlu. In the study, Köroğlu deals with the role Turkish literature plays in the propaganda of the First

52 For a detailed account of this issue, see Selim Deringil, *İktidarın Sembolleri ve İdeoloji: II. Abdülhamit Dönemi 1876- 1909* (Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2007)

53 For a detailed account of this issue, see Cengiz Yolcu, *Balkan Wars and Propaganda Depiction of the Enemy: Ottoman Propaganda Books in the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913*, Unpublished MA Thesis, Institute for Graduate Studies in the Social Sciences, Bogazici University (2014).

54 Zafer Toprak, *Türkiye’de Popülizm: 1908-1923* (Istanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2013), p. 226. For a detailed account on this issue, see Zafer Toprak, “Balkan Harbi, İntikam ve Ötekileştirme Süreci”, *Toplumsal Tarih*, no. 228 (December 2012): 42-53.

55 Füsün Üstel, *İmparatorluktan Ulus-Devlete Türk Milliyetçiliği: Türk Ocakları 1912-1931* (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004), p. 402.

World War. He points out that propaganda activities executed by the CUP were insufficient and inaccurate. According to Köroğlu's findings, the Ottoman state was in need of a more efficient propaganda organization by 1912 during Balkan Wars; however, the CUP government had neither a central propaganda strategy nor the necessary resources to execute one.⁵⁶ Köroğlu claims that aside from financial difficulties, there was a lack of an appropriate political-administrative body and suitable politics to persuade and focus the Ottoman public for four years (1914- 1918). Even though propaganda of the period was insufficient, it was an initial effort in the making of a new Turkish identity. Köroğlu expresses that in Turkish literature, unlike the powerful Western propaganda, there was a "painful effort of to form a national personality."

As described in detail in the third chapter, the responsibility for propaganda during National Campaign period fell to the Directorate General of the Press and Intelligence (*Matbuat ve İstihbarat Müdüriyeti Umumiyesi*, hereafter DGPIN), founded in 1920. The DGPIN's duty was to publicize the campaign both domestically and abroad. However, from December 1920 when the DGPIN was relegated to Foreign Affairs until the end of the campaign, the target audience was mostly foreign publics. Until 1931 when the DGPIN was closed, it continued functioning under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In the internal politics of the period, the terms *tenvir* (illumination) and *irşad* (enlightenment) were occasionally used instead of propaganda. During parliamentary debates on the establishment of the Directorate General of the Press, a member of Parliament from Eskişehir, Abdullah Azmi Efendi, was irritated that the mission of the directorate was defined as *propaganda*. He explained that the primary duty of the directorate should be explaining the truth, in other words, *irşad*.⁵⁷ *İrşad* is an Arabic word meaning to show the right path or to warn. In the RPP's General Assembly in 1927, the Secretary General of

56 Bernays, 2005, p. 45.

57 Fethi Kardeş, *Matbuat ve İstihbarat Müdüriyet-i Umumiyesi, Matbuat Umum Müdürlüğü, Basın-Yayın ve Turizm Genel Müdürlüğü, Basın-Yayın Genel Müdürlüğü: 60 yılın hikâyesi* (Ankara: Basın Yayın Genel Müdürlüğü, 1980), pp. 12-13.

the Party, Saffet Arıkan, said that the Turkish Hearths was considered as the party's department of culture, *irşad* and *tenvir*.⁵⁸

After the proclamation of the Republic, the word propaganda was broadly used by the ruling class. For example, under the *T.C. Sıhhat ve İçtimai Muavenet Vekâleti* (Ministry of Health and Social Welfare) the *Sağlık Propagandası ve Tıbbi İstatistik Genel Müdürlüğü* (Directorate General of Health Propaganda and Medical Statistics) was established in 1936, and functioned until 1982. Starting in 1923 the ministry produced posters on tuberculosis, malaria, syphilis, alcohol, rabies, smallpox, and many other subjects, established health museums; distributed pamphlets to the public and institutions like schools; organized expert doctors to speak on the radio; employed a film operator ministry's film operator to screen health propaganda films in cities and towns; and produced and distributed publications on these issue.⁵⁹

Işıl Çakan notes that the term propaganda was used more during the Second World War, but in the intellectual world, the concepts of propaganda and edification (*terbiye*) were not clearly distinguished. For example, in an article on propaganda published in *Siyasi İlimler* magazine, Niyazi Berkes notes that institutions and mediums of organized edification are responsible for propaganda alongside the teaching literacy. They taught many subjects that the ruling elite wished people to accept.⁶⁰ Section 1.4 will further explore how nation states used propaganda for mass education to create what is "national". It is no coincidence that the terms propaganda and edification were interchangeable.

An important part of the propaganda literature on Turkey concerns studies of the Second World War, like Selahattin Ertürk's *İkinci Dünya Savaşında Yer Altında Savaş* (Underground War During World War II) published in 1951, Johannes Glasneck's *Türkiye'de Faşist Alman Propagandası* (Fascist German Propaganda in Turkey) published in 1970, and Süleyman Seydi's *1939-1945 Zor Yıllar: 2. Dünya Savaşı'nda Türkiye'de İngiliz-Alman Propaganda ve İstihbarat*

58 Üstel, 2004, p. 252.

59 *Propaganda ve Yayın İşlerinin Ait Çalışmalar 1923-1954*, T.C Sıhhat ve İçtimai Muavenet Vekâleti, Sağlık Propagandası ve Tıbbi İstatistik Umum Müdürlüğü Yayınları, Sıhhat ve İ. M. Vekâleti Basımevi, 1955, no. 184.

60 Işıl Çakan, *Konuşunuz, Konuşturunuz. Tek Parti Döneminde Propagandanın Etkin Silahı: Söz* (İstanbul: Otopsi Yayınları, 2004), pp. 105-106.

Savaşı (The Difficult Years between 1939 and 1945: The British and German Propaganda and Intelligence Fight in Turkey During the Second World War) published in 2006. Since Turkey was trying to remain neutral during the Second World War, it was subjected to extensive propaganda activities by Germany and England.⁶¹

This study finds out how propaganda was used under both conditions: during war and after the revolution. Studies on the state's propaganda machine during the single-party regime in Turkey usually describe propaganda conveyed through certain institutions. In this literature review, there are studies on revolution propaganda using Turkish Hearths, People's houses, and Village Institutes.

§ 2.3 Justifying War: World Wars and Propaganda

In war, truth is the first casualty.

Aeschylus⁶²

The twentieth century is an age of extremes, skepticism, conspiracy, and persuasion. As Eric Hobsbawm delineates in his book *Age of Extremes*, the twentieth century is completely different from previous centuries. In a century where the negative effects of modernity were already being felt, common people were subjected to the violence of nation-states. They found themselves at the heart of a "total war" involving not only soldiers, but also women, children, and the elderly. Secondly, the common people were overrun by nationalist feelings and persuaded to be a part of this total war. As Hobsbawm points out, the "total war" participated in by the common people has no borders, in con-

61 For further information: Johannes Glasneck, *Türkiye'de Faşist Alman Propagandası* (1970), Süleyman Seydi, *1939-1945 Zor Yıllar: 2. Dünya Savaşı'nda Türkiye'de İngiliz- Alman Propaganda ve İstihbarat Savaşı*.

62 Freeman, 1997, p. 239.

trast with aristocratic wars of the past. As noted by Fox and Welch, propaganda came of age in such a century. “Over 100 years, opinion management has become a major preoccupation of states, in times of both war and peace.”⁶³

One of the most controversial issues among theorists of nationalism is the question of “how could the brand new concept of nationalism bring together the masses, mobilize them and even convince them to die for the sake of the nation-state?” As emphasized by Hobsbawm: “Everyone knows of the young men... who hailed the outbreak of the First World War like people who have fallen in love.”⁶⁴ When the twentieth century emergence of such mobilization by nation-states is examined, the intense use of propaganda by those nation-states comes to mind. The world wars are good examples of how efficiently propaganda was used by nation-states. The twentieth century offered new technologies for propaganda such as the camera, radio, and television. Furthermore, as nation-states’ responsibilities to their citizens and organizational capacities emerged, propaganda was applied cruelly against their own people. According to propaganda scholar Philip Taylor, the victorious powers viewed the First World War as “the end of innocence” or a “rite of passage” to modernity.⁶⁵ The very first modern war required the mobilization of every aspect of a nation’s resources.

According to Hitler, the defeat of Germany in the First World War was related to the skillful use of propaganda by the British and American governments. For him, the only means to win the second war was to use persuasion and propaganda effectively. In *Mein Kampf*, Hitler devoted two chapters to plans about organizing propaganda:

But it was not until the War that it became evident what immense results could be obtained by a correct application of propaganda. Here again, unfortunately, all our studying had to be done on the enemy side, for the activity on our side was modest, to say the least. For what

63 Jo Fox and David Welch, *Justifying War: Propaganda, Politics and The Modern Age* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), p. 1.

64 Eric Hobsbawm, *Age of Empire: 1875- 1914*, vol. 3 (London: Abacus, 1994), p. 190.

65 Philip M. Taylor, *British Propaganda in the Twentieth Century: Selling Democracy* (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1999), p. 1.

we failed to do, the enemy did, with amazing skill and really brilliant calculation. I, myself, learned enormously from this enemy war propaganda.⁶⁶

Hitler was right. Propaganda tactics were used extensively by England and the United States during the First World War. The British and Americans had organized bodies to develop and disseminate propaganda. Indeed, the pioneer of propaganda in the First World War was unmistakably the British state. In the first years of war, the main purpose of propaganda was recruitment, for which posters and films were used. Among these propaganda materials, the most significant in Britain was a poster designed by Savile Lumley “Daddy what did you do in the Great War?”



Figure 2.1 © British Library

The War Propaganda Bureau (better known as Wellington House) was Britain's primary propaganda department during the first years of the Great War

66 Aronson and Pratkanis, 1992, p. 317.

along with the Enemy Propaganda Department (known as Crewe House.)⁶⁷ Wellington House worked in secrecy under the supervision of the Foreign Office.⁶⁸ Its operational field consisted of the production and distribution of books, pamphlets, periodicals, postcards, and images overseas.⁶⁹ According to Chomsky, the aim of this organization was to control thought throughout the world, especially the opinions of liberal American intellectuals.⁷⁰ However, Taylor points out that at first, British propaganda policy was not designed to get America to join the war on the side of the Allies. From the outbreak of war, German propagandists made the mistake of bombarding the American public with their exhortative propaganda. Therefore, the British decided not to appeal directly to opinion of the American masses, preferring to target the American elite, said. It was a success. The American elite was convinced. Even one of the most influential publications among the liberal, educated people in the States, the *New Republic*⁷¹ justified the war as the first war of *values* in human history.⁷²

Britain's leading writers participated in the first meeting of Wellington House to discuss ways of best promoting the country's interests during the war. Most writers attending the meeting were convinced to write pamphlets and books to promote the government's view of the war. More than 2,250 thousand volunteers joined the army by September 1915 owing to pamphlets produced by the countries' finest writers.⁷³ Large numbers of these volunteers would be killed, including the son of Rudyard Kipling, who was a contributing writer of propaganda. After the loss of his son, Kipling wrote the poem *Common Form*.⁷⁴

67 For a detailed account of this issue, see Philip M. Taylor, *British Propaganda in the Twentieth Century: Selling Democracy* (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1999), p. 1.

68 Taylor, 1999, p. 35.

69 Taylor, 1999, p. 9.

70 Chomsky, 2014, p. 217.

71 Lippmann was one of the co-founders of *New Republic*.

72 Chomsky, 2014, p. 217.

73 Jowett and o'Donnell, 2006, p. 207.

74 Wilson Angus, *The Strange Ride of Rudyard Kipling: His Life and Works* (New York: The Viking Press, 1978), p. 296.

If any question why we died.
Tell them, because our fathers lied.

The Crewe House was under the control of Lord Northcliffe. Its function was to direct propaganda against the Central Powers and its target was the populations of enemy countries, which it attempted to convince of the incapacity of their respective governments.⁷⁵

A few days after United States declared war, President Wilson invited George Creel – a journalist known as one of Wilson’s closest men – to discuss how to explain the war to the American people. Creel thought that after thirty-two months of German and Allied propaganda, public opinion in the United States about the war was muddled. He recommended forming a Committee for Public Information (CPI), also known as the Creel Committee, to handle war news and motivate Americans to see the struggle as a patriotic crusade.⁷⁶ The Creel Committee was established on April 13, 1917, seven days after the United States entered the First World War.⁷⁷ Its purpose was to mobilize support for the war effort and sell the war to American people. The CPI consisted of over twenty bureaus and divisions, with commissioner's offices in nine foreign countries. Furthermore, News and Films Divisions were established to get the war message out. The CPI encouraged the film industry to make pro-war films. During the First World War, Bernays along with Walter Lippmann were an integral contributors to the CPI.

One of Creel’s most creative projects to create “war will” was the corps of “Four Minute Men.” Four Minute Men were volunteer orators who spoke on behalf of the war at run-of-the mill social events like labor union and church meetings. Before the war ended, the committee had recruited about 75 thousand Four Minute Men. The length of their speech was ideally four minutes, considering that the average human attention span was judged at the time to be four minutes.⁷⁸

75 Taylor, 1999, p. 26.

76 Thomas J. Fleming, *The Illusion of Victory: America in World War I* (New York: Basic Books, 2004), p. 93.

77 Nelson, 1996, p. 39.

78 Fleming, 2004, p. 95.

Furthermore, British and American governments employed “atrocities” during the First World War. According to Laswell, this technique was used “with unvarying success in every conflict known to man.” In “*The Use of Atrocity Stories in War*” (1940) the American political scientist Francis O. Wilcox describes atrocity stories:

...Conscious as never before of the catastrophic effect of war upon humankind, the people of a nation must be convinced, before they can be called upon to market the supreme sacrifice, that they are fighting in the name of Truth and Right.⁷⁹

According to Wilcox, in warfare, the state has to identify the enemy and to portray this enemy as a wicked, murderous aggressor. Atrocity stories are one of the most effective propaganda devices to mobilize public animosity against the enemy and justify possible or actual military action.⁸⁰ Atrocity stories generally consist of cruel enemy treatment of civilians or captured soldiers. According to Read, atrocity stories had certain objectives: to stiffen the fighting spirit of soldiers and civilians, to help raise war loans, to encourage enlistment, and to justify breaches of international law. The Germans, who attached great importance to propaganda after the Great War, labeled the Allies’ propaganda machines as follows: Reuter was the “fabricator of War Lies”, Lord Northcliffe was either the “Minister of Lying” or the “Minister for the Destruction of German Confidence”⁸¹, and the Allies in general as “All-Lies”.⁸²

During the First World War, “Hun” was a derogatory nickname used by British and Americans officers to describe German army personnel. The term was widely used in Allied propaganda to suggest the cruel conduct of the German Huns, who imposed a brutal rule upon the people they conquered. But one unexpected consequences of this fierce anti-German propaganda was that many people, especially politicians, ended up doubting alleged atrocity stories

79 Francis O. Wilcox, “The Use of Atrocity Stories in War”, *The American Political Science Review*, vol. 34, no. 6 (December 1940), p. 1167.

80 Wilcox, 1940, p. 1167.

81 Taylor, 1999, p. 5.

82 Harold D. Lasswell, *Propaganda Technique in the World War* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1927), p. 3.

emanating from Germany during the 1930s. As remarked by Jowett and o'Donnell, the success of anti-German propaganda proved to be a serious handicap in getting the world understand the reality of what was happening in Nazi Germany.⁸³

The Second World War was not only “the war of bombs and bullets but of words and propaganda as well.”⁸⁴ Because of the advent of the bomber, the Second World War was a total war in the proper sense of the phrase. Together with radio and cinema, “it was unlikely that any square yard of Britain could remain untouched either by the war or by the news about it.”⁸⁵

The Nazi's propaganda plan was outlined by Adolf Hitler in *Mein Kampf* and executed by his Minister of Propaganda, Joseph Goebbels. Three state institutions worked on propaganda. The first was Ministry of Propaganda and Enlightenment, the second was Central Propaganda Division of the Nazi Party, and the third was State Department of Culture.⁸⁶ Hitler was experienced with propaganda as he had been engaged in the management of the German Worker's Party propaganda after joining in 1919. In *Mein Kampf*, he admitted: “I regarded this department as by far the most important.”⁸⁷

Wilhelmplatz, the house of the Ministry of Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda, was depicted in the *Signal* magazine as follows:

The sleepy-looking little palace- one of the most beautiful pieces of architecture in the capital of Reich- has become, under Dr Goebbels, one of the most up-to-date ministries in the world. Many efforts made in other countries to imitate this house and the influence it exercises all over the world, have remained, with few exceptions, only attempts of no importance.⁸⁸

83 Jowett and o'Donnell, 2006, p. 229.

84 Aronson and Pratkanis, 1992, p. 166.

85 Taylor, 1999, p. 151.

86 Çakan, 2004, p. 67.

87 Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, trans. Ralph Manheim (London: Hutchinson of London, 1969), p. 527.

88 S. L. Mayer, *Signal: Hitler's Wartime Picture Magazine* (London: Bison Publishing Company, 1976)

Goebbels' German propaganda ministry had five departments: radio, press, propaganda, theatre and film. In the book *Age of Propaganda*, Pratkans and Aronson depict the principal persuasion tactics used by Nazi Germany. According to them, the first, crucial task of the Ministry of Popular Enlightenment and Propaganda, led by Goebbels, was to control mass media and grab the attention of the masses. Secondly, the Nazi rule drew the attention of the masses by offering entertaining propaganda that featured famous singers and celebrities. For instance, by 1939 Goebbels had required the conscription of journalists, photographers, writers, film and radio producers, publishers, printers, painters and poets into the Propaganda Division of the Army.⁸⁹ Representatives of the Nazi Party also approached Marlene Dietrich to return to Germany, but Dietrich was firmly anti-Nazi and instead became an American citizen in 1939. Dietrich was attacked by Julius Streicher, the editor of an anti-Jewish newspaper *Der Stuermer*. He wrote: "The German-born Marlene Dietrich has spent so many years among the film Jews of Hollywood... that she now becomes an American citizen. Frequent contact with Jews renders her entirely un-German."⁹⁰ During the Second World War, Dietrich performed for Allied troops and her efforts were mentioned to sell more war bonds to support the war effort in the United States than any other star.

89 Phillip Knightley, *The first casualty: from the Crimea to Vietnam: the war correspondent as hero, propagandist, and Myth Maker* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975), pp. 220-221.

90 Leslie Frewin, *Blond Venus: A life of Marlene Dietrich* (New York: Roy Publishers, 1956), p. 90.



Figure 2.2 A Red Cross representative collects money for Russian war effort in the Strand, London. © Getty Images

Goebbels also used rumors and innuendo. Especially, toward the end of war, rumors were circulated that German scientists were nearing the completion of two new weapons. The purpose was to convince the German people that Germany could still win the war.⁹¹ Robert Herzstein, in his study of German propaganda, makes a strong case for considering the overwhelming success of Hitler's propaganda efforts in the context of their time. It is true that the Germans lost the war on the battlefield, but it is not so easy to erase the traces of Nazi mythology from modern popular culture.

Looking at British propaganda that targeted the United States during the Second World War, the British government was prudent and conducted a

91 Aronson and Pratkanis, 1992, p. 321.

moderate campaign. However, this gingerliness was not haphazard; Churchill celebrated the entry of the United States into the war with the expressions: “dreamed of”, “aimed at”, and “worked for.”⁹² In fact, Britain reorganized its propaganda bodies starting in 1935 with the establishment of the Ministry of Information. But during the Second World War, there were plenty of agents contributing to Britain’s propaganda, including the BBC (established in 1927), the British Press Service (established in 1940), the British Information Services, and the British Library of Information operating in New York.

During the Second World War, Allied counter-propaganda had shaped the war as a war against fascism. The United States justified the war as a fight for freedom – a war to defeat evil, liberate the oppressed, and spread democracy.⁹³ In December 1941, the U.S. Office of Facts and Figures (OFF) was established as a propaganda monitoring agency. General George Marshall commissioned Frank Capra to create “Why We Fight”, an informational documentary film series to explain the war to American military servicemen and to raise the spirit of patriotism among the citizenry. The *Voice of America* launched its broadcasts in Europe on February 24, 1942, with a fifteen-minute program in German. The OFF then merged with the U.S. Office of War Information (OWI), which was charged with making the war understandable to common Americans.⁹⁴ In the Second World War, the United States relied on a loose collection of social psychologists and other social scientists to develop its campaigns, boost the nation’s morale, and neutralize the impact of Nazi propaganda.⁹⁵ Soviet Russia’s slogan for war was “Everything to war”, which encouraged the mobilization of all resources for the war effort. Kalinin defined the

92 Nicholas John Cull, *Selling War: The British Propaganda Campaign Against American “Neutrality” in World War II* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 3.

93 Susan Brewer, “Fighting for Freedom: The Second World War and a Century of American War Propaganda”, in *Justifying War: Propaganda, Politics and The Modern Age*, ed. Jo Fow and David Welch (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), p. 219.

94 Nelson, 1996, pp. 60-61.

95 Aronson and Pratkanis, 1992, p. 168.

war as a “war of life and death against German Fascism, the worst and most cunning enemy.”⁹⁶

As for Italy’s propaganda activities during the Second World War, it can be argued that the propaganda structure in Italy in the aftermath of the Great War was fragmented. In 1925, the Servizio Informazioni Militare was established under the control of the Army Chief of Staff. Since the fascist regime desired to expand its control over the political opposition, the secret police, OVRA, was set up in 1930. It was comprised of 80 employees and 600 agents. These intelligence services were effectively used a tool of political repression in Mussolini’s Italy.⁹⁷ During the Second World War, propaganda was conducted by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Popular Culture. The Ministry of Popular Culture was in charge of operational aspects of propaganda: dealing with press and producing publications, cinema, and radio. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was in charge of providing general directives to propagandists in Italy and abroad. It must be emphasized that Italian foreign propaganda always had the intention to promote the “civilizing mission underlying Italian colonial endeavors” and mainly targeted North Africa.⁹⁸

96 Mikhail Ivanovich Kalinin, *Devrimci Eğitim, Devrimci Ahlâk*, trans. Refik Sarı (Ankara: Ser Yayınevi, 1976), p. 203.

97 Manuela A. Williams, *Mussolini’s Propaganda Abroad: Subversion in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, 1935- 1940* (New York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 174-175.

98 Williams, 2006, pp. 182-183.

§ 2.4 Nation- Building: Single-party regimes and Propaganda

The “normal” exercise of hegemony on the classical terrain of parliamentary regimes is characterized by a combination of force and consent, which balance each other reciprocally without force ever prevailing too much over consent... In the period following the World War, the hegemonic apparatus cracked apart, and the exercise of hegemony became permanently difficult and aleatory.

Gramsci, Prison Notebooks⁹⁹

Painter Ali Sami (Boyar), in an article for *Ülkü* magazine’s September 1934 issue on propaganda and painting, defined the talents of propaganda:

Propaganda sometimes spreads a news faster than a wireless telegram to all corners of the nation... It awakens national bravery, national heroism. It informs people of their foes and enemies. It easily and incredibly ensures the spread and understanding of national welfare, national manners, health matters, ways of contemporary life, love of fine arts, national economy, national industry, and many more national duties.¹⁰⁰

Boyar expected much from propaganda, as did many contemporaries. What Boyar expected was foremost a contribution to the spread of that which is “national.”

In the twentieth century, aside from war, propaganda was used as a medium of political edification. Especially countries that had undergone a revolution needed to replace old habits, values, and principles with new ones. In countries that had a revolution during or after the First World War, political authorities faced two options for gaining the acceptance of the people: they

99 Victoria De Grazia, *The Culture of Consent: Mass Organization of Leisure in Fascist Italy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 1.

100 Sami Ali, “Propaganda ve Resim”, *Ülkü*, no. 19. vol. 4 (September 1934), p. 46.

could either act within legal bounds or they could quiet opposition with violence and oppression. According to Berkes, a third way was inculcation and edification.¹⁰¹

New regimes first ventures were to form their own organizations to spread the principles and slogans of the regime through language, literature, the press, art, ceremonies, and other symbols. Meanwhile, opposition had to be eliminated and censored. While a new regime was trying to become accepted by its own citizens, it was also trying to publicize itself abroad.¹⁰²

After the First World War political authorities in many countries used propaganda for the purpose of edification and mass education. Most of these had single-party regimes, and some had undergone political revolution. While during war Britain efficiently used propaganda domestically and abroad, there was a general understanding that the institutions of propaganda would end along with the war. It is worth considering Lasswell's claim that in a democratic country there is presumption against government propaganda,¹⁰³ but in a changing post-war world, propaganda had become a requirement for domestic politics, as well. During the interwar period, in democratic countries it was feared that propaganda could surpass individual rights and freedoms, so a cautious approach was preferred. In single-party regimes, however, political propaganda was an "incontestable weapon addressing large masses of people and attempt[ing] to move them to uniformity of opinion and of action."¹⁰⁴

In the aftermath of the Great War, "the manipulation of mass opinion through new communications technologies became a characteristic of the Bolshevik regime in the Soviet Russia, the new Fascist regime in Italy and indeed regimes of all different political persuasions throughout the world."¹⁰⁵ These countries had one common claim: to build a revolutionary new society and a "new man." One of the fundamental principles of Hitler's propaganda scheme was to delineate the enemy. An identified and unified enemy was a

101 Berkes, 1942, p. 90.

102 Berkes, 1942, pp. 88-91.

103 Lasswell, 1927, p. 14.

104 F. C. Bartlett, "The Aims of Political Propaganda", in *Public Opinion and Propaganda: A Book of Readings*, ed. Daniel Katz (New York: The Dryden Press, 1956), p. 465.

105 Taylor, 1999, p. 66.

prerequisite for inspiring the audience's fear, resentment and self-defense instincts.¹⁰⁶ The revolutionary period is a time when the identification of the enemy was unavoidable. It was a period when anything deemed a "dangerous element" could not be tolerated.

Returning to the young Turkish Republic, the main issue was building "national identity" and ensuring the acceptance and sustainability of reforms. Call it propaganda, edification, or indoctrination; the education of the masses in line with the ruling elite's project was of utmost importance. In the nation-building process, it must be noted that education is closely linked with propaganda. Is all education propaganda? Some educational systems are more propagandist than others. For example, in a liberal system of education, pupils are encouraged to search for objective truth, while in a totalitarian system of education, pupils are disciplined into a rigid mold of obedience and credulity.¹⁰⁷ Whether liberal or totalitarian, all systems of public education aim to produce appropriate and harmonious citizens in line with the ideology of the ruling class. A strictly Gramscian perspective defines hegemony as "a social condition in which all aspects of social reality are dominated by or supportive of a single class." According to Gramsci, "every relationship of hegemony is essentially an educational relationship." Institutions such as law, education, mass media, and religion that "engage in this educational relationship are the institutions forming civil society, which constitute the cultural bedrock of power." The state is surrounded by this network of institutions, and in this context education is not neutral. On the contrary, cultural ideological institutions serve to cement existing hegemony.¹⁰⁸ During the interwar period, Bertrand Russell clearly distinguished between edification and propaganda: "There can be no reconciliation between those who consider edification as a medium of imbuing certain beliefs and those who think it should create the power of independent thinking"¹⁰⁹

106 Fraser, 1962, p. 62.

107 Fraser, 1962, pp. 157-159.

108 Peter Mayo, *Gramsci, Freire ve Yetişkin Eğitimi: Dönüştürücü Eylem Fırsatları*, trans. Ahmet Duman (Ankara: Ütopya Yayınevi, 2011), pp. 52-53.

109 Bertrand Russell, *Terbiyeye Dair*, trans. Hamit Dereli (Ankara: Maarif Basımevi, 1954), p. vii.

I will look at examples of the use of propaganda after the First World War in authoritarian regimes like Germany and Italy where the main objective was to ensure national unity, vis-à-vis single-party regimes where a revolution had occurred.

The first country to establish a permanent propaganda organization after the Great War was the USSR. The role of propaganda in the revolutionary struggle was crucial. Before the revolution, the Russian Social Democratic and Labor Party, which was forced to work underground or in exile, had seen as its principal tasks to raise a consciousness of separate class identities and to create class solidarity. To do so, they made use of propaganda and agitation tactics, between which Russian Marxists made a distinction. Plekhanov explains “A propagandist presents many ideas to one or a few persons; an agitator presents only one or a few ideas, but he presents them to a whole mass of people.”¹¹⁰

In the Soviet Union, the Communist Party was a crucial medium for political edification. At the same time, youth organizations were prioritized, such that youth were reared in line with the principles of the new regime. Kalinin emphasized the primary duty of teachers to educate the new individual, who was to be a citizen of socialist society. According to him, one of the most important duties of a multinational Soviet Union was to educate people about communism. He argued that organizations in fascist Germany confused and stifled the masses, but Soviet organizations developed the masses and raised their awareness. The Komsomol was the leader of proletarian and peasant youth in the Soviet Russia, and it took on the responsibility of educating the masses about the revolution.¹¹¹ The Party mobilized in the Soviet Russia – which covers 1/6 of the globe – to establish the Soviet Russian identity as a supra identity independent of nation, class, race, or language. This was accomplished through wide propaganda network consisting of Kolkhoz peasants and Komsomol youth.

110 Richard Taylor, *Film Propaganda: Soviet Russian and Nazi Germany* (London: I.B Tauris, 1998), p. 28.

111 For a detailed account of education on the revolution and on public edification in the Soviet Russia: M. I. Kalinin, *Devrimci Eğitim, Devrimci Ahlâk*, trans. Refik Sarı (Ankara: Ser Yayınevi, 1976)

Soviet authorities used various organizations to achieve their educational goals. However, they insisted art, entertainment, and communications that could be understood by ordinary people.¹¹² The revolution spawned *agitprop* (agitation propaganda), which was the dissemination of communist ideas including explanations of Communist Party and Soviet state policies. In a vast country with a scattered population, they needed flexible, reliable mediums of communication. After the Bolshevik Revolution, an agitprop train toured the country with artists and actors. The aim was to spread word about the revolution and “gain popular support for revolutionary objectives through interpersonal experience.”¹¹³ Interpersonal experience is key; the Bolshevik approach emphasized direct, oral campaigning.¹¹⁴ Trains were equipped with living quarters for the crew, a library and bookshop, and a printing press, as well as radio and cinema equipment.¹¹⁵ The Soviet futurist poet Mayakovski and the filmmaker Dziga Vertov rode the train as well. Public gatherings were organized to bring together these artists and the people. Peasants, who had never before seen a moving picture, visited the train to participate in film screenings.¹¹⁶ Soviet political posters played an important role in internal propaganda and delivered the regime’s slogans to the masses. Since Lenin’s time, the lights of the president’s office in the Kremlin have been kept on even at night. A poster portraying Stalin working at his desk with a reading lamp at night was inscribed with the following slogan: “Stalin in the Kremlin cares about each of us!” The Soviet poster propaganda which continued through the Cold War period covered subjects such as the Korean War and space programs.

Massimo d’Azeglio, pioneer of Italian unification, famously pronounced: “We have made Italy; now we must make Italians.” This proves the importance

112 Leah Bendavid-Val, *Propaganda & Dreams: Photographing the 1930s in the USSR and the US* (Zurich/ New York: Edition Stemmler, 1999), p. 36.

113 Nelson, 1996, p. 120.

114 Alex Inkeles, “The Bolshevik Agitator”, in *Public Opinion and Propaganda: A Book of Readings*, ed. Daniel Katz (New York: The Dryden Press, 1956), p. 404.

115 Taylor, 1998, p. 32.

116 Taylor, 1998, p. 32.

of the edification of citizens in a nation-state.¹¹⁷ Il Duce's Italy is a significant twentieth century example of propaganda's active use for political edification. National Leisure Hours Institution (*l'Opera Nazionale del Dopolavoro -NLH*), which was established for adults, and Youth Institution (*Opera Nazionale Balilla*), which targeted youth and children, were founded to ensure loyalty to the regime. NLH has been depicted as "one of the most active and original institutions of the Fascist Regime and, both in spirit and in practice, is one of the most potent methods for social education and civil progress."¹¹⁸ The Ministry of Propaganda and Enlightenment was established shortly after Hitler's rise to power. Its equivalent in Italy began as a Secretariat on Press and Propaganda in 1933, but a Ministry of Popular Culture was established only in 1937, fifteen years after Mussolini rose to power.¹¹⁹ Film, press and radio were under the supervision of this ministry.

As De Grand emphasizes mass organizations in Italy and Germany had three objectives:

inculcate in the young the basic myths of the regime (cult of the Duce and the Führer, national and racial feelings and acceptance of war and violence), counteract powerful traditional institutions such as family and churches by alternative models of socialization, and to provide a degree of physical and paramilitary training.¹²⁰

The cult of leader was crucial in the rule of these regimes; spiritual meanings were even attributed to the Duce and the Führer. Hitler and Goebbels extensively used historical symbols and monuments to package the regime. The Nazi party offered Nazism to the masses as a system of faith, comparable to a religion. Goebbels was explicit about it: "My party is my church; National Socialism will be the religion of all Germans... We lack rituals and traditions." The Nazi regime carefully designed its own sacred symbols: the eagle, the Nazi

117 Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, *Geleneğin İcadı*, trans. Mehmet Murat Şahin (Istanbul: Agora Kitaplığı, 2006), p. 306.

118 *National Leisure Hours Institution* (Rome: Societa Editrice di Novissima, 1936), p. 7.

119 De Grand, 2004, p. 95.

120 De Grand, 2004, p. 82.

“martyr’s” blood, marching, the Heil salute, the carrying of swords and daggers, the use of fire, the swastika, and the flag.¹²¹ For Goebbels coherence and harmony of words, gestures, and facial expressions were vital for propaganda.¹²² Hitler, for instance, would say “amen” at the end of his speeches. I can call this, spiritual mobilization.

For both the Fascist and Nazi parties, the idea that “people were divided into inferior and superior races; and stronger and more dynamic people had the right to expand against the weaker” prevailed.¹²³ Eugenics was therefore considered important.

From Hitler’s rise to power in 1933 until the end of the war “unity of race and blood, unity of chief, military discipline, and principle of nationalism” were the principles underlying national socialist propaganda.¹²⁴ The Reich’s Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda led by Goebbels was the headquarters of propaganda activities. Organizations like Hitlerjugend and Jungvolk were similar to the Italian propaganda institutions targeting youth and children. When Hitler took office he noted that their government had the strongest organization in Germany’s history, no one could oppose them and the time had come to edify the German people for the benefit of the state.¹²⁵

With complete control of the press, radio, theater, cinema, music, and the arts, the principles of the Nazi party were repeated time after time again.¹²⁶ As seen when exploring the opinions of Bernays, Hitler and Goebbels were derogating the masses. They were definitely aware that having consent of society was essential, but they believed the masses were too unsophisticated to challenge the propaganda tactics of the ruling elites. According to Pratkanis and Aronson, the most dangerous aspect of Nazi propaganda was its assumption of absolute truth and that only the ruling elite could grasp this truth. A key to

121 Jowett and o’Donnell, 2006, p. 238.

122 From “The Goebbels Experiment Movie.”

123 De Grand, 2004, p. 63.

124 Berkes, 1942, p. 110.

125 Berkes, 1942, p. 113.

126 Aronson and Pratkanis, 1992, p. 320.

Hitler's thinking was that he saw the masses as "malleable, corrupt and corruptible." Above all, they were open to emotional appeals.¹²⁷ Furthermore, the psychological condition of the audience was an advantage: the German people were searching for answers to their nightmarish political and economic reality.

The Nazi regime used every opportunity to promote the image of a strong, "Aryan" nation and to build the self-esteem of the German people.¹²⁸ As Pratkanis and Aronson remark, it was nearly impossible in Germany of the 1930s to read a book or newspaper, listen to a radio broadcast, or see a film without coming into contact with the Nazi worldview. Euphemisms were used to lessen the sting of state supported pillaging, torture, murder, and genocide. For instance, the Gestapo did not arrest citizens, but took them into "protective custody. They did not steal property, but "secured" it.¹²⁹

Architecture played an important role in propaganda. The chief architect of the regime, Albert Speer, gave priority to spaces that could be used for political purposes: film theaters, assembly halls, and sport arenas. Speer was the architect of the monumental Nuremberg stadium, which was the scene of gigantic rallies that restored and intensified a powerful image of Nazi Germany. Eight-day long rallies were centerpieces for public affirmation of Nazi mythology.¹³⁰

One of the most influential mediums of Nazi propaganda was radio. The Nazi government produced a cheap, one-channel radio set for the masses and made compulsory the installation of loudspeaker radios in restaurants, factories, and most public spaces.¹³¹ The radio was a suitable medium for communicating the religious fervor of Nazi spectacles: the chants, the enthusiastic applause, and the powerful rhetoric of Hitler and Goebbels.

Another influential medium of Nazi propaganda was film. A popular genre of Nazi cinema was the historical biography. The lives of historic German heroes like Schiller and Bismarck were depicted with emphasis on parallels to the life of Adolf Hitler. Posters were used extensively in the Third Reich.

127 Jowett and o'Donnell, 2006, p. 230.

128 Aronson and Pratkanis, 1992, p.319.

129 Aronson and Pratkanis, 1992, p. 320.

130 Jowett and o'Donnell, 2006, p. 237.

131 Jowett and o'Donnell, 2006, p. 232.

Before they had administrated complete control over radio and the newspapers, Nazis used posters for propaganda purposes. Posters included the Nazi swastika and anti-Semite images of large-nosed Jewish people.¹³²

It must be underscored that whether in Hitler's Germany or in Stalin's Russia, propaganda and edification activities conducted by authoritarian regimes of the period were extremely similar. Kemalist Turkey emulated its contemporaries in matters of propaganda and public edification. When examining the propaganda activities of the single-party period in Turkey, I will compare them with examples from contemporary countries. However, this is not a comparative study of the actions of political authorities in single-party regimes; we have to keep in mind the concepts discussed in this chapter, as well as the practices of propaganda throughout the world after the rediscovery of propaganda.

The young Turkish Republic established institutions to propagandize abroad and domestically within the new regime. To make sure all elements of the regime were accepted, they conducted various propaganda activities targeting various communities at various levels. Mediums used for propaganda were the same as chosen by their contemporaries: radio, press, publications, cinema, oration, theater, and fine arts. These mediums were used by the party-state in Turkey on different levels, keeping an eye on what was going on abroad. Both Soviet Russia and Mussolini's Italy were closely observed, and actions and institutions for mass edification and mobilization were imitated. During the interwar period, Turkey was neutral toward fascism¹³³ and friendly toward Soviet Russia. Political authorities admired certain activities performed in these countries to display their regime's power and advocate similar techniques in Turkey. After a visit to Moscow with İnönü, Falih Rıfkı Atay said "Red Square on May 1 is the best vantage point to see the Moscow Revolution's capabilities for inculcation, propaganda and mass arts."¹³⁴

132 Jowett and o'Donnell, 2006, p. 237.

133 Ambassador Nüşet Haşim Sinanoğlu published *Faşizm ve Onun Devlet Sistemi* (Fascism and Its State System) in 1933 consisting of his articles from *Hâkimiyet-i Milliyet* Newspaper. The book explains the fascist ideology broadly through the example of Italy. As a diplomat who experienced Mussolini's Italy, Sinanoğlu did not include any criticism to the fascist system. Nüşet Haşim Sinanoğlu, *Faşizm ve Onun Devlet Sistemi* (Istanbul: Ankara Matbaası, 1933)

134 Falih Rıfkı Atay, *Moskova- Roma* (Istanbul: Muallim Ahmet Halit Kitaphanesi, 1932), p. 35.

Organizing Propaganda During The Single-Party Regime

Even though much of research has been done on the single-party regime, the organization of state propaganda during this period has not been the focus of many studies. The reason might be the difficulty of studying at once all the institutions, spaces, publications, and symbols that are analyzed in this chapter as part of propaganda activities. Turkey, a nation-state just out of a revolution and governed by those same revolutionaries in a single-party regime, first and foremost had to legitimize the revolution; establish, protect, and maintain the reforms; and realize westernization and modernization through vigorous propaganda targeting all citizens. A poster hung before elections, a play staged at a People's House, a book in a village library, a newsreel screened before a movie, a public orator giving a speech during national celebrations, a classical music broadcast billing homes by radio, and news on the Second World War in *Ayın Tarihi* (*History of the Month*) magazine... these bits and pieces from different parts of life were all units in the mass communication network established by the state.

As mentioned in the second chapter, the word propaganda was freely used in daily parlance, parliamentary debates, and in regulations. State heads, decision makers – including and particularly intellectuals –, and spin doctors all warned against malignant propaganda, and they all thought efficient propaganda, in line with the young Republic's targets, was necessary. Considering

the global conjuncture I define the period in question as “the age of propaganda.” The single-party government valued propaganda but was also wary of counter propaganda and used mediums of propaganda on different levels.

As Taylor points out, “censorship and propaganda are really different sides of the same medal: the manipulation of opinion.”¹ Especially in the field of domestic propaganda, even when a state’s own initiatives are limited, it manages perception through what it allows and bans. After the Maintenance of Order Law (*Takrir-i Sükûn Kanunu*), in 1929 just as normalcy was returning following a period of the severe governance, the Menemen Incident and Liberal Republican Party (*Serbest Cumhuriyet Fırkası*, hereafter LRP) compelled more censorship and state authority. World War II, on the other hand, was a phenomenon and period on its own in terms of propaganda activity.

In this chapter, I will divide propaganda activities between 1931 and 1945 in two. The first period, which can even be started with the War of Independence and reified with the unification of power in 1931, can be called “revolution propaganda;” and the second period from 1939 to 1945 – years marked by the Second World War – can be called “war era propaganda.” The period from 1945 to 1950 can be defined as a transition to a multi-party system. Though this period is outside the scope of this research, it is when the structures and institutions of the single-party regime that are studied in this research lost power and effectiveness.

I first look at the bases of propaganda conducted in the first years of the Republic. I explained the primary arguments of propaganda considering its foundations and the conditions from which it emerged. The frame in this dissertation is state propaganda, however in the period covered, the distinction between state and party is sometimes blurred and sometimes coalesces. In this indistinct atmosphere there were two authorities of propaganda. The first was the Party Council (*Genel Başkanlık Kurulu*) – that is, the executive board and decision makers of the RPP, the sole party of the period – founded by those who carried out the revolution. The second was the Directorate General of the Press (*Matbuat Umum Müdürlüğü*, hereafter DGP), founded to conduct propaganda and acting under the authority of the government.

1 Taylor, 1999, p. 153.

To understand the workings and limits of propaganda, these authorities and their organization must be understood. I first identify the organization of propaganda inside the RPP. Meanwhile, I also investigate the organization of public orators and People's Houses, which acted in unison with the party and comprised the party's cultural hearths. After that I focus on the organization and activities of the DGP, the propaganda of institution of the young Republic. While analyzing the first and second periods of the DGP, I also look at publications and radio.

§ 3.1 Legitimizing the Revolution: Rudiments of Regime Propaganda

To explain the organization of propaganda in this period, I first elucidate the distinction between the state and the party. I start by analyzing the organization of propaganda in the early Republican period from 1931 onwards. This year is a turning point for the RPP when the Party had finished the revolution, brought down the opposition, completed the Six Arrows with the 3rd General Assembly, and began organizing the single party through all means possible. In other words, it is a benchmark of the process of uniting the state and the party. The period that ended in 1950 when the RPP lost power, is divided in two. When political power was being concentrated in a single authority and being institutionalized in 1931, the effects of the Great Depression were still be felt. Institutionalization was a target; however, it is apparent that the possibilities afforded to the state were limited.

The determinant dynamic of the period between 1931 and 1945 was the Second World War. The war changed the priorities of the state, and all of the sudden the agenda changed from reinforcing and enforcing the revolution to national defense. Under these conditions, the discourse and content of propaganda changed. If the Second World War had not happened, would the results of 1950 elections be different? Would infusion of the revolution be more widespread? Under the influence of the Second World War, the government focused on saving the day, balancing the economy, and ensuring the subsistence of major cities, however, no amount of propaganda could prevent it from seeming weak. While evaluating the difference between propaganda of prewar

and wartime periods, these circumstances should be kept in mind. Propaganda activities of the state during the Second World War are tackled in detail in the fifth chapter.

In the first period from 1931 to 1939, the content of propaganda mainly legitimized the revolution and regime, established and maintained reforms, and protected the targets of westernization and modernization. Endeavors such as the Turkish History Thesis and the Sun Language Theory were planned as reference points to reinforce the foundations of propaganda of a modern nation-state. Since the emergence of nation states, culture has been used as an indisputable constituent of the nation building process. Education aside, culture is crucial for the coding and sustainability of the ideology behind the revolution.² The efforts to create a national culture was another important objective of the Kemalist elite.

While the content of propaganda is one question, which counter-propaganda worried the state and against which propaganda the state took precautions must also be considered. A search for the keyword “propaganda” in the State Archives in the period between 1930 and 1950, yields five primary fields of counter propaganda:

- ◆ Islamic propaganda including advocacy of the sultanate and caliphate;
- ◆ General religious propaganda – including that of the Shi’ite, Bektashi, and Bahai faiths – and the activities of missionaries and non-Muslim minority faiths;
- ◆ Communist propaganda;
- ◆ Fascist propaganda that gained traction during the Second World War; and
- ◆ Propaganda of the Democrat Party after 1946.

With the first Press Law issued in 1931, people who had been condemned for animosity towards the War of Independence, the Republic, and the revolution – as well as those who supported the purposes of the enemy through publica-

2 Aydın Çam, *Türk Ulus Kimliğinin İnşası Sürecinde Sinema Politikaları*, ps. 18. This paper was presented at the International Adana Altın Koza Film Congress organized as a part of the International Adana Altın Koza Film Festival held between September 21 and September 24, 2011. Later it was published in the book of abstracts of the congress (pp. 133-138).

tion during the War of Independence – were banned from publishing newspapers. According to the law, publications that “incited advocacy for sultanate and caliphate, communism, and anarchism” were banned. Publishing of articles written by former members of the sultanate, who were then living abroad, was also banned.³

In 1936, Law 163 was added to the Criminal Code, which pronounced that individuals who propagandized or indoctrinated in conformance with religious or sacred sentiments – against the state’s social, economic, political and judicial order and secularism – would be sentenced to five years of penal servitude. If the crime was committed via publication, the sentence would be increased.⁴

In certain cases, the representatives of the single party were themselves confused about the reasons certain books, films, or pamphlets were hazardous. For example, the İzmir People’s House wished to buy Louisa May Alcott’s *Little Women* for its library’s collection in 1938. It first notified the center based on a suspicion the book may be a leftist publication; it then sent the book to the center for evaluation, surmising that it was missionary propaganda.⁵ Such suspicious publications or incidents of propaganda were handled differently by diverse branches of the state. Cemil Koçak, in his book *Tek Parti Döneminde Muhalif Sesler (Opposing Voices During the Single-Party Regime)*, considers such counter propaganda as non-institutionalized and usually individual acts of opposition to the state.⁶ However, Koçak mentions that even though most were individual endeavors and not organized, the state was wary of them and treated them as hazardous. In certain cases, it did not tolerate these incidents, acts, or publications.

Işıl Çakan, in research on verbal propaganda between 1931 and 1946, examines the means of communication of the new state ideology and of public enforcement of the Turkish Revolution as a way of life. Though Çakan claims that the conferences, celebrations, and plays by which political authorities

3 Hıfzı Topuz, *II. Mahmut’tan Holdinglere Türk Basın Tarihi* (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2003), pp. 158- 159.

4 Topuz, 2003, p. 161.

5 Prime Ministry’s Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People’s Party, Cat. no: 490 01, Box no: 852 Folder no: 366 Row no: 2 ps. 3, 5.

6 Cemil Koçak, *Tek-Parti Döneminde Muhalif Sesler* (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2011)

reached the masses qualify as propaganda, this is a digression. According to Çakan, various techniques of propaganda were used to entrench the regime; however, the main purpose was not limited to propaganda. According to Çakan, the purpose was to create a modern and progressive society through training and education, and the actions of permeating ideology and the regime were managed together with educating citizens. It is worth questioning how much of national education – an endeavor that had the purpose of permeating the state’s thoughts and ideology to citizens – was dedicated to propaganda and how much to actual education. Is national education not a medium of indoctrination? What is the definition of “the Acceptable Citizen”? Do citizens belong to the state?

After the French Revolution, the first Republic resulted in land for the people, the second Republic resulted in suffrage, and the third Republic resulted in national education.⁷ In a way, the Guizot Law started the mobilization of citizens’ education.⁸ According to Althusser, the bourgeois state is completely different from government. Althusser categorizes government under ideological state apparatuses along with the church, press, and school.⁹ According to Althusser, education is an area where dominant ideology encircles individuals with its discourse and conveys the conditions and duties of being a citizen to individuals.¹⁰ Marxist thought asks how educators will be educated, concludes that it will inevitably be ideological, and defines ideology as a distorted reality formed under the social conditions of the day.¹¹ Pedagogues of the Republic expect schools – especially primary school – to produce “national citizens.”¹²

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- 7 Borne Dominique, “Fransız Eğitim Sisteminde Tarih, Coğrafya ve Yurttaşlık Bilgisi Tasarımı ve Bu Tasarımın Yurttaşın Oluşumuna Katkısı”, in *Dersimiz: Yurttaşlık*, ed. Turhan Ilgaz (İstanbul: Kesit Yayıncılık, 1998), p. 158.
 - 8 For further reading on compulsory education in France, see Xavier Darcos, *L’Ecole de Jules Ferry 1880- 1905* (Paris: Hachette, 2005)
 - 9 Louis Althusser, *İdeoloji ve Devletin İdeolojik Aygıtları*, trans. Alp Tümertekin (İstanbul: İthaki Yayınları, 2008), p. 17.
 - 10 Esra Dicle Başbuğ, *Resmi İdeoloji Sahnede: Kemalist İdeolojinin İnşasında Halkevleri Dönemi Tiyatro Oyunlarının Etkisi* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2013), p. 20.
 - 11 Neşe Yeşilkaya, *Halkevleri: İdeoloji ve Mimarlık* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1999), p. 14.
 - 12 Füsun Üstel, “Makbul Vatandaş”ın Peşinde (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004), p. 326.

In the early republican years, the distance between the dominant political class and the public in Turkey was not just political, but also cultural. This is why Atatürk turned into a “Headmaster”, Kemalist political leaders turned into teachers, citizens turned into students and politics turned into political pedagogy.¹³ In a way, Kemalism not only included the political, but also the day-to-day. The state was to convey these ideal practices to citizens through education.

According to Althusser, the ruling class tries to impose its ideology through its apparatuses, and it has to maintain control over these apparatuses to continue ruling. The single-party government intended to hold the reins of power, suppress the opposition, quiet civil voices, and use its power to its full extent in order to realize what Berkes labeled “national society.” In a way, it was a mobilization where all means, institutions, and manpower were united. Mustafa Kemal, in an interview with Ruşen Eşref in March 1931, signaled that all mediums that can voice alternative ideas would be “temporarily”, purposefully taken under the control of the single-party regime. Here is how Mustafa Kemal framed the idea:

There are certain periods in the history of a nation when to reach certain causes, all material and moral forces should be united and directed towards the same aim. . . To ensure the nation and the revolution’s immunity towards internal and external dangers, all nationalist and republican powers should be brought together. . .¹⁴

When the principles that the state used for propaganda are examined, each of the Six Arrows – the principals of the political program of the RPP – can be considered as an element of propaganda. Political propaganda is a reflection of existing ideology. During the single-party regime, the principal ideology to be taken as a basis is the Six Arrows completed in 1931. These principles were established by the party and inscribed in the Constitution in 1937 as a reflection of the consolidation of the party and state. After the 3rd Assembly of the

13 Mehmet Özden, “Her yer mektep, herkes öğrenci” - Pedagojik bir Kemalizm: Hilmi A. Malik ve İnkılap Yolunda”, *Tarih ve Toplum Yeni Yaklaşımlar*, no. 10 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, Spring 2010), p. 137.

14 Çakan, 2004, p. 59.

RPP in 1931, the party began propaganda activities by publicizing its platform. The LRP experience had caused disillusionment and members of the party agreed that they had to advertise themselves. The main document was the party platform.

Below I identify the foundations of propaganda – conducted by political authorities and based on the Six Arrows – as well as the ideas behind it and how counter propagandists reacted against it. Later I mention the leadership cult, which I consider to be one of the primary elements of propaganda during early republican period. The place of women in revolution propaganda is also investigated at the end of this section.

3.1.1 *Populism, Republicanism and Nationalism*

Republicanism is the form of the state that best and most accurately represents and implements the people's sovereignty as opposed to monarchic or theocratic state forms.¹⁵ Republicanism is based on the principle of people's sovereignty. However, the ruling class appropriated an attitude of "for the people, despite the people", which was Jacobinic and top-down. Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, in his book *İkinci Adam* (*Second Man*), said:

Compared to other parties, the RPP did not rise by winning people's votes, they did not rise to power through parliamentary struggle. The RPP was a state party. It took the right to be a state – or in a way, an autocratic party – from developments since 1919 and most of all from memories deemed perpetually indisputable by Atatürk.

Aydemir emphasizes that the RPP did not receive its power from people but from the state it founded.¹⁶ This is contradictory and creates insincerity since the governments themselves claimed the superiority of the people's sovereignty. However, in a Republican government founded by revolutionaries, this contradiction was real.

15 Taha Parla, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Kültürün Resmi Kaynakları: Kemalist Tek-Parti İdeolojisi ve CHP'nin Altı Ok'u*, vol. 3. (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1995), p. 40.

16 Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *İkinci Adam* (1950- 1964), vol. 3 (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2000), p. 90.

Those who ruled during the single-party period defined the people as a homogenous mass where Weberian social solidarity dominated rather than class struggle. According to this view, the public was not composed of classes; the internal dynamic of the people should be dominated by division of labor and common interest.¹⁷ The Secretary General of the Party, Recep Peker, defined populism:

Populism means an existence where no one is privileged or superior in a nation; all individuals are deemed to have the same rights and dignity; in economics, employees should not be slaves to employers and vice versa; consumption should not fall into the hands of production.¹⁸

Populism was an important factor in the propaganda of the single-party period. The relation between the state and the public has always been defined through mutual rights and duties. The profile of an “acceptable citizen” was built and certain duties and functions were determined for citizens including children. Üstel emphasized that the “acceptable citizen” was built on civilization, on one hand, and patriotism, on the other. According to Zafer Toprak, during the single-party period, the ideas of Ziya Gökalp that “there are no rights, there are duties” and “there are no individuals, there is a community” played an important role in the construction of social structure.¹⁹ Everyone was expected to accomplish their duties to the fullest to reach the potential of the Young Republic. Üstel mentions an overarching, apolitical, institutional ideal of the citizen that survived until the end of the single-party period, which was encompassing, but also defined through his duties to himself, his family, his nation, and his state.²⁰

Political authorities cared about educating the public in order to create the public that they desired, and to that end planned a multi-layered system of edification. It was aimed to broaden the level of education, world view, and intellectual capital of the public through mass education, but at the same time,

17 1931 RPP Party Platform, Section V, Division of National Training and Edification.

18 Şeref Aykut, *Kemalizm- C.H.P Parti Programının İzahı* (Istanbul: Muallim Ahmet Halit Kitapevi, 1936), p. 26.

19 Toprak, 2013, p. 344.

20 Üstel, 2004, p. 322-323.

since this education was formed in the hands of a ruling class who just realized a revolution, mass education served as a mechanism of indoctrination. Nevertheless, especially in earlier decades, it was difficult for the state to develop the consciousness of the nation among the public. In the single-party regime, the imposition of the principles of the revolution on citizens was not limited to school education; as thinkers like İsmail Hakkı Baltacıoğlu suggest, importance was placed on the education of adults, too.²¹

In a letter sent by Nazım Turunç, executive officer of the Tokat army corps, to the General Secretariat of the RPP in 1936, he worried about how to “convey to our public and our pure and unrivaled peasants our prosperous progress that astonishes and makes the world jealous, our growth, the great works we accomplished, and the success of our leaders with the guidance and on the orders of our Great Leader.” Turunç specifies cinema and radio as the most important weapons for reaching that target. According to him, especially peasants were just not that aware. For example, peasants placed little importance on celebrations of Republic Day, while they prepared ahead for religious celebrations, bought new clothes, visited relatives, and sent commemorative cards from the post offices. Though it had been thirteen years since the proclamation, peasants were still not aware of Republic Day. To that end, the use of cinema, radio, and publications should be used persistently to make citizens aware of the celebrations.²²

A similar evaluation was uttered by Kazım Dirik, the General Inspector of Thrace (*Trakya Umumi Müfettişi*), who sent a letter to the Ministry of Internal Affairs in September 1934 on the subject of Victory Day (August 30). Dirik had visited villages on the occasion of Victory Day, and even in villages where there were schools, peasants were completely unaware of the holiday. According to Dirik, peasants should benefit from posters calendars, and notice boards to be informed about national days. Furthermore, if teachers in those

21 Çakan, 2004, p. 103.

22 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 01 00, Box no: 1235 Folder no: 115 Row no: 2 pp. 27- 31.

villages gathered peasants a few times in a year to give conferences on national days, the problem would be solved.²³

In the early years of the Republic, the issue of the public not adopting national holidays was frequently discussed. This is why details of the celebration of the 10th Anniversary of Republic Day were framed by law. According to the law, celebrations would continue for three days and all official bureaus would be closed. A High Commission was appointed to oversee the organization of the holiday and they prepared ordinances for celebrations in all cities and villages. Conferences on reforms and independence were planned during the celebrations. Public orators appointed to speak in big cities were the foremost orators of the party such as Meliha Avni Sözen, Selim Sırrı Tarcan, and Sadri Ertem. An amendment issued for celebrations of the 10th anniversary stated that brochures emphasizing the revolution and independence were to be printed and distributed via airplane everywhere in the country. The most important feature of the celebrations was to carry the events to public squares in order to form a consciousness of community. Holidays were to be celebrated in open squares with all citizens instead of behind closed doors with only bureaucrats.²⁴

With the celebrations of the 10th anniversary, the single party observed and followed the footsteps and practices of other countries. On April 1933, the Turkish Ambassador in Rome wrote to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Şükrü Kaya, to describe how Italians celebrated the Foundation of Rome, and how they mobilized the public, and how the public interacted directly with the celebrations.²⁵

On Republic Days after 1933, the law issued for the 10th year and the experiences of that celebration were used as a model. For example, in 1934, a detailed plan was prepared by the Council of Ministers for the celebrations of Republic Day. This plan consisted of 20 articles that defined in detail what would be done by state organizations. At the same time, the RPP's Board of

23 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1436 Folder no: 746 Row no: 3 pp. 5-9.

24 Çakan, 2004, p. 131-142.

25 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Directorate General of Transactions, Cat. no: 030 10, Box no: 237 Folder no: 601 Row no: 19 p. 2.

Administration prepared a similar regulation. Especially People's Houses were responsible for organizing party-run conferences, plays, and public orations during holidays. After the holiday, the RPP's Board of Administration was responsible for sending a report to the General Secretariat on how well the regulation was implemented.

All these regulations and plans had a common purpose: "to make sure the national day is celebrated in all cities, towns and villages, on land, sea and air, day and night, with zealous interest by the whole public." To that end, celebrations were to be loud, animated, and meaningful enough to convey the prosperity of the Republic to the public. The public's participation in and interaction with these celebrations should be ensured. The goal was that at least 10 percent of the population of every city, town, and village attend at the celebrations. The issue mentioned above by Turunç was solved by the ordinance: on national days, everyone was required to wear their newest and cleanest clothes. According to the RPP's ordinance, as if a religious festival, "schools and official bureaus should hand out clothes they ordinarily give to students and employees before holidays, and families should buy their children new clothes for holidays.



Figure 3.1 Republic Day Arch in Sivas, *Arkitekt*, 1936, p. 257.

To draw the attention of the public, there would be military band performances, fireworks, and torchlight processions. Celebrations of Republic Day were to be colorful and luminous. It was planned to decorate official and private buildings, squares, stations, and land and sea vehicles. Flags, greenery, red and white ribbons, slogans, signboards, and arches would be used as decoration. Minarets would be encircled with light installations and slogans about the revolution would be written on *mahyas* (the images and inscriptions strung between two minarets, usually spelled out with lights.)²⁶ Mosque minarets turned into a medium to exhibit national instead of religious content. Some inscriptions on mahyas conveyed messages like “Long Live Freedom” and “Use Local Products”. The secularization of mahyas actually began after 1908: during the Balkan Wars, mahyas with the slogans “Do not forget the Red

26 *Ordinance on Celebrations of Republic Day 1934* (Istanbul: Devlet Matbaası, 1934) and *Program on 11th Celebrations of Republic Day 1934*, Prime Ministry’s Republican Archive, Catalogue of Directorate General of Transactions, Cat. no: 030 10, Box no: 198 Folder no: 352 Row no: 17 p. 2-22.

Cross” and “Help Refugees” were placed between mosque minarets.²⁷ In 1946, when the U.S. Battleship Missouri visited Istanbul, “Welcome” was written on the mahya of Bezmialem Valide Sultan Mosque, a fact harshly criticized in conservative circles. The single-party government used various mediums to convey the state’s ideas to the public.²⁸ Yunus Nadi suggested that individuals from the organization of public orators should be present in mosques so that religious teachings were not contorted to threaten the regime.²⁹ A speech Mustafa Kemal gave on February 27, 1923, from the pulpit of Zağnos Paşa Mosque in Balıkesir that was followed by a question and answer session was another example of using religious media for the national cause.

One of the important elements of the propaganda of the single-party regime was nationalism. The ruling power no longer considered the people of the country as an *ümmet* (religious community).³⁰ Unity of language and ideals were the ultimate criteria for being a citizen.³¹ Instead of religion, national, cultural, and ethnic ties connected the Turkish nation. Turkish nationalism did not much emphasize race discursively; however, in practice there were many chauvinistic expansions. It was frequently uttered that Turks were “worth the world” and comprised the “oldest” and the “most superior” nation.³² Aside from cultural unity, a common history, a rich and common heritage, great works of art, and common experiences of hard times were among the main elements of nationalism. Peker added that to justify the idea of nation, “we must sincerely want and consent to live together” and “show desire and will to sacrifice in order to protect our common heritage.”³³

27 François Georgeon, *Sous le Signe des Réformes: Etat et Société, de l'Empire ottoman à la Turquie Kémaliste, 1789- 1939* (Istanbul: Isis Yayınları, 2009), p. 56-57.

28 Ironically, it was not just the state that used this medium. In 1932, while İsmet Paşa was on a trip to Moscow, members of the Turkish Communist Party hung a red flag on the minaret of Süleymaniye Mosque. In 1944, Mihri Belli and Tahsin Berkem wished to hang a 32-meter long canvas banner on the mahya of Süleymaniye that read “Saraçoğlu is fascist.” Mihri Belli, *Mihri Belli’nin Anıları* (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1989), p. 229.

29 Çakan, 2004, p. 214.

30 Recep Peker, *C.H.F Programının İzahı* (Ankara: Hakimiyeti Milliye Matbaası), p. 7.

31 The reference point of the “Vatandaş Türkçe Konuş” (Citizen Speak Turkish) campaign that was begun in 1928 by Law School students of Istanbul University was obvious.

32 Ahmet Demirel, *Tek Partinin Yükselişi* (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2012), p. 301.

33 Recep Peker, *C.H.F Programının İzahı* (Ankara: Hakimiyeti Milliye Matbaası), p. 7.

As it discussed in the fifth chapter, with the beginning of the Second World War, the nationalist tone of state propaganda increased. There was a threat of war and 10 percent of the population was conscripted. There was also a problem of subsistence. The sole element of propaganda appropriated by the state was nationalism. The public should perform their duties as citizens and sacrifice everything for the motherland rather than of complain.

3.1.2 *Laicism and Reformism*

Unlike Christianity, Islam and Judaism organize every moment of people's lives. Islam is a body of rules that organizes political power, as well, and it was natural that the post-revolutionary government of the Republic was stamped as anti-religious simply because it took political power from the hands of religious authorities.³⁴

Niyazi Berkes, in his book entitled *Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma (Modernization in Turkey)* mentions two sides to the project of placing Turkish society in the orbit of modern civilization. The first is the destruction of traditionalism, which would be replaced by reformism. The second is the establishment of new rules and organizations suitable to the Western trajectory. New generations would be raised according to requirements of this new orbit.³⁵ In speeches in 1924, Mustafa Kemal frequently mentioned the necessity of defeating those completely against modernization. In this case, change was necessary to exist in the modern world.³⁶ A few days before caliphate was abolished, Mustafa Kemal said in a speech that the road of centuries old beliefs "was the worst obstruction for the awakening of nations." Religion was being replaced by "nation."³⁷

On March 3, 1924, when the caliphate was abolished, the only counter power that could oppose national will or the "revolutionaries" was removed. On April 8, 1924, Sharia courts were abolished as well. Muslim judges would be replaced by secular judges. The regulation on the closure of dervish lodges,

34 Emre Kongar, 21. *Yüzyılda Türkiye: 2000'li Yıllarda Türkiye'nin Toplumsal Yapısı* (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2000), pp. 109-111.

35 Niyazi Berkes, *Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma*, Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2008, p. 522.

36 Berkes, 2008, p. 524.

37 Berkes, 2008, p. 530.

shrines, and mausoleums of November 30, 1925, was issued just after the Sheikh Said Rebellion. This was one of the last steps on the road taken in 1924 starting with the abolishment of the caliphate. Step by step, religion was separated from state affairs; the process was gradual and the public did not have the will or opportunity to oppose the decision. Metin Toker sees the Sheikh Said Rebellion as a benchmark and claims that the reform of the Civil Code, clothing reform, and alphabet reform could only have been realized following the Maintenance of Order Law. According to Toker, this is when a choice between democracy and reform was in play, and reform was chosen.³⁸

In April 1928, the provision “Islam is the religion of the Turkish State” was removed from the second article of the constitution. It was decided that members of parliament would pledge on their honor instead of to *Allah*. Laicism and reformism, two of the Six Arrows, forced people to adopt practices that opposed a continuous order and social balance that had lasted hundreds of years. Religion was moved to the private, civilian sphere, outside of state governance and education – and even outside of social life with the closure of dervish lodges and shrines. In 1932, when daily prayers began to be performed in Turkish, the centuries-old routine of calling to prayer was nationalized: an apparent intervention of the state in religious affairs ostensibly in order to separate religious from state affairs.³⁹

It was important for the single-party regime to prevent Islamic propaganda that advocated for the sultanate and caliphate, as well. That the Sheikh Said Rebellion and Menemen Incident are seen as benchmarks of early Republican history, and that even today the Menemen Incident and the image of Kubilay are romanticized in the minds of common people was due to the aggressive and defensive reaction of the young Republic. During and after the single-party period, until power was passed to the DP, the RPP was cautious about the visibility of religion in the public sphere.

38 Metin Toker, *Şeyh Said ve İsyanı* (Ankara: Akis Yayınları, 1968), p. 6.

39 After the Democrat Party rose to power the language of daily prayers was made discretionary, a development which the government announced with the slogan “We united people with the Prophet’s Azan.”

The closure of dervish lodges and shrines did not mean that these institutions suddenly disappeared from social life. A 1937 report on Ünye, prepared by the People's House, said that shrines were not active, there were no secret rites, there was no party aside from the RPP, there was a deep seated loyalty to Atatürk and İnönü, and women did not wear veils or chadors.⁴⁰ The information given in this report answered RPP concerns. These issues were actually fears of the single party, as were all possible actions of opposition. The RPP wanted to keep possible reactionary movements under control, including alternative political opponents and other alternative power groups that could emerge in remote places.

Even twenty years after dervish lodges and shrines were closed, the state was careful about organizations that had become invisible, continuing their activities in different guises. In 1947, the Religious Affairs Administration sent a letter to all *muftis* saying that they had heard there were people conducting propaganda for a religious sect. If there were people who held the title of sheikh or caliph in their region, muftis should report the name of their sect, whether or not they solicit money, whether they organize rites, whether they accept disciples, and whether or not they accept women into their sect. The letter said that such activities violated religious and national unity and have nothing to do with Islam.⁴¹

Especially during Ramadan, it was apparent that the state was cautious. Ramadan is one of the largest common celebrations and most important practices of countries where most citizens are Muslim. The month Ramadan provides various occasions and mediums for reaching the public or conveying public messages. Starting from the Mahmud II period, authorities wished both to benefit from the month Ramadan and to keep it under control. According to Georgeon, this tendency continued until the 1930s. After 1930, the state had developed alternative media and institutions to convey messages to public.⁴² On February 6, 1930, Minister of Internal Affairs Şükrü Kaya sent a letter to

40 Çakan, 2004, p. 199.

41 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Presidency of Religious Affairs, Cat. no: o 51 V33, Box no: 4 Folder no: 30 Row no: 23 p. 1.

42 Georgeon, 2009, pp. 73-74.

the General Secretariat of the RPP to inform that the unemployed were being exposed to negative, detrimental propaganda of “certain malignant men” in certain coffee shops and meeting places during Ramadan. The organization of the party and inspectors should be cautious not to allow this kind of propaganda.⁴³ A notification sent to inspectors said to be careful about possible fights due to fasting and not be provoke people in vain.⁴⁴

The Kemalist government was cautious about the religious propaganda of Shi’ism, Bektashism, and Bahaism as well as missionary activities and the beliefs of minorities. On February 14, 1929, the Minister of Internal Affairs wrote a letter to the Prime Ministry to report a man named Necip conducting black propaganda and saying that bells would be hung on the mosques in Palu in Elazığ.⁴⁵ Such rumors were easily spread due to suggestions about a commission founded to reform religious affairs.⁴⁶

According to Berkes, reforms from 1925, 1928, 1931, 1932, and 1934 are all part of Ziya Gökalp’s concept of culture (*hars*). Berkes says that exchanging the fez with the hat was an important step and a medium for a mental revolution. For Berkes, reforms such as the hat reform are an important symbolic and moral aspect of reform that unite society around an image. Berkes responds to those who claim these reforms created a “cultural depression”; he says that on the contrary, these reforms started an era of leaps in social freedom, bringing about a completely new understanding of national society.⁴⁷

It was planned that reforms would be all-pervasive. Some close to the government advocated state authority over society, almost evoking fascism. Hilmi Malik, one well-known intellectual of the single-party period and columnist for both *Ulus* newspaper and *Ülkü* magazine, wrote in the afterword of his

43 Prime Ministry’s Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People’s Party, Cat. no: 490 01, Box no: 1 Folder no: 3 Row no: 19 p. 2.

44 Prime Ministry’s Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People’s Party, Cat. no: 490 100, Box no: 1 Folder no: 3 Row no: 19 p. 1.

45 Prime Ministry’s Republican Archive, Catalogue of Directorate General of Transactions, Cat. no: 030 10, Box no: 102 Folder no: 668 Row no: 7 p. 1.

46 Bernard Lewis, *Modern Türkiye’nin Doğuşu*, trans. Metin Kırıtlı (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi), 1988, pp. 409- 410.

47 Berkes, 2008, pp. 547-551.

book *İnkılâp Yolunda* (*On The Road of Reforms*): “Reform is a discipline, it is a severe system of edification. Those raised in the frame of reform will be loyal to it, will die for it. Reform is our social, economic, and epistemological religion. Everything is revolving and will revolve around it.” Malik referenced youth organizations in Italy and Germany as models for reform schools that would infuse children with reform and close the gap between what they experience at home with their families and the reform mindset. He thought the state should take advantage of children’s time spent outside school and that they should not be left alone.⁴⁸ A child born in the Republican regime would be edified by the reforms and raised according to this understanding however the rest of the society should also be changed. Outdated knowledge that is not positive, superstitions, and similar beliefs should be wiped out.

Üstel notes that in textbooks of the early Republican period, until the mid-1940s, the forms of acceptable existence and collectivism in the formation of the public sphere of villages, towns and cities were described to the last detail. This is why state was involved in how children and peasants spent their spare time. In 1935, physical training would be added to the RPP’s platform: “People of all ages in schools, public establishments and private establishments as well as factories will be forced to occupy themselves with physical training. Facilities and institutions necessary for sports and physical training will be created.”⁴⁹ With the Physical Training Law 3530 of June 29, 1938, the Directorate General of Physical Training would be formed. Article 4 of the law obligated youth to join clubs and continue their physical training in their spare time.⁵⁰ Üstel says the issue of the state meddling in people’s spare time, stemmed from a “holistic” understanding of citizenship wherein the distinction between the public and private spheres disappeared.⁵¹ It is apparent that this kind of citizenship lacks civilian and participatory dimensions.

State meddling in the spare time of citizens and youth had fascist connotations. In the example above, Malik takes the NLH in Italy as a model. In 1925,

48 Hilmi Malik, *İnkılâp Yolunda* (Ankara: Kitap Yazarlar Kooperatifi, 1933), p. 50.

49 *CHP Dördüncü Büyük Kurultayı Tutulgası*, May 9- 16 1935 (Ankara: Ulus Basımevi, 1935), p. 73.

50 Çetin Yetkin, *Siyasal İktidar Sanata Karşı* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1970), p. 26. This law would be annulled in 1964 upon a decision of the Constitutional Court.

51 Üstel, 2004, p. 326.

this organization aimed to contribute to the moral and physical development of workers by providing them various opportunities: sports activities, trips, tourism, art education, popular culture, social support, hygiene, health, and career development. The Balilla National Club (*Opera Nazionale Balilla*) is another organization founded in Italy in 1926 that targeted youth and children. The Hitler Youth (*Hitlerjugend*), its equivalent in Germany, especially placed importance on paramilitary and physical education to ensure the loyalty of youth to their chief and the regime.⁵²

Returning to young Republic of Turkey, justification for new legislation always referred to “what should be.” Reforms were seen as a requirement of modern civilization. Precautions taken in the Maintenance of Order Law can be interpreted as the preparation for a monist identity. The Maintenance of Order Law said, “All organizations, provocations, incentives, attempts, and publications that aim to react and rebel and disturb the order, tranquility and peace of the nation can be banned by the Government with the consent of the President. The Government can send suspects to Independence Tribunals.”⁵³ The Maintenance of Order Law has helped quiet both leftist and other opposition movements continuing since the first Parliament.

3.1.3 *Etatism*

The 1931 platform of the RPP defines etatism: “private enterprise and activities will be prioritized; however, in order to reach prosperity and welfare in a short time – when the general and higher interests of the nation are concerned, especially with regard to economics – the state will be actively involved.” While private labor and activity are prioritized, the state would be active in economic life. Baskın Oran says that Republican bureaucracy, though not mobilized around economic interests, protected its power by not allowing any class to

52 For detailed information on the influence of Italian Fascism and Nazism on Kemalist elites, see Cennet Ünver, *Images and Perceptions of Fascism Among the Mainstream Kemalist Elite in Turkey, 1931- 1943*, Unpublished MA Thesis, Boğaziçi University Atatürk Institute, 2001.

53 Topuz, 2003, p. 147.

gain power and wrest control. This is why they took advantage of various media to minimize class struggle.⁵⁴ In an article published in *Aydın Tarihi* magazine in November 1942, Şükrü Saraçoğlu said “We are neither students of Adam Smith nor disciples of Karl Marx. We are just children of a political party whose social religion is populism and economic sect is etatism.”⁵⁵

Emre Kongar says the foremost feature of Kemalist Revolution was top-down execution by an “etatist-elitist” group. According to Kongar, the revolution came out of political necessity and was influenced by factors in the outside world. Because the movement was against the Sultan and his supporters, cooperation with “sub-classes” led the revolution to the masses. Atatürk’s reforms stemmed from the principle of the sovereignty of the people and aimed to erase the “cultural dichotomy” between the public and ruling class.⁵⁶ The main factor of etatism was to create a national economy and commerce. Boratav says that in 1930s – while global economy was experiencing the Great Depression – Turkey closed its economy and began national industrialization through state initiatives. In the 1940s, on the other hand, a cessation of economic development due to the Second World War ensures.

One of the main manifestations of etatism was in the pages of the magazine *La Turquie Kémaliste* (Kemalist Turkey). Dams, factories, and smoking chimneys adorned its pages to convey economic development. Growth and reinforcement of local capital were among the targets of etatism, so encouraging the public to purchase local products was one of the aims of economic propaganda. Especially during the Second World War, the National Association of Economy and Savings (*Ulusal İktisat ve Artırma Kurumu*) used certain media such as expositions and newspapers ads to encourage citizens to economize and work. Messages of the institution targeted different strata of people: “Farmer Citizens”, “Worker Citizens”, “Urban Citizens”, or “Turkish Children”. In these ads, farmers were encouraged to plant and harvest, workers were encouraged to take good care of their machines, urban citizens were encouraged to consume local goods and economize and Turkish children were encouraged

54 Baskın Oran, “İç ve Dış Politika İlişkisi Açısından İkinci Dünya Savaşında Türkiye’de Siyasal Hayatında Sağ- Sol Akımlar”, *A.Ü. SBF Dergisi*, 23 (3) (1969), p. 232.

55 Oran, 1969, p. 234.

56 Kongar, 2000, pp. 109-110.

to fill penny banks with saving bonds. An ad published in *Cumhuriyet* newspaper on April 26, 1940, says:

“Citizen! Bread placed on the tables in homes and at restaurants are usually too abundant; they cannot be finished and get thrown away. Is this not a waste? We can export our extra wheat and earn national capital, but we throw it in the garbage can. For that reason, take only as much bread as you can finish so that our wheat reserves remain full and our wheat exports increase!”⁵⁷

The Ankara Exhibition House (Ankara Sergi Evi), which would later be turned into Ankara Opera in 1948, was opened in 1934 with an exposition celebrating a five -years long industrial plan.⁵⁸ It hosted many exhibitions on the industrial development initiatives of the Republic during 1930s. While these expositions displayed state- initiated economic developments, the building designed by Şevki Balmumcu, was itself modernist propaganda. Like most architects of the period, Balmumcu was influenced by Le Corbusier. The building was like a machine or a ship with a chimney that was reminiscent of a factory. This modernist approach suggested the transition from classical to an engineering style. Buildings evoked silos, ships, and airplanes as objects of desire. The windows of the exhibition house were designed as ribbons, like a ship’s – one of the five basic principles of Le Corbusier’s architectural theory. The general aesthetics of the building is one a machine.⁵⁹ Exhibitions on health or industry were designed as tributes to the positive sciences. It was especially important that young people and students visited these expositions, and trips were organized to that end.

57 *Cumhuriyet* (April 26, 1940), p. 3.

58 In turning the exhibition house into an opera house, Bonatz also changed the ideology of the building from modernist to neo-classical.

59 Interview with Architect Kerem Piker (Istanbul, December 28, 2015)



Figure 3.2 Students visiting the Coal Exhibition in the Exhibition House, 1937, Archive of Uğur Kavas.



Figure 3.3 The Coal Exhibition in the Exhibition House, Ankara, 1937.

The city of Ankara itself can be seen as a micro representation of the development and progress of this period. During the Exhibition on Public Works, a wall of the exhibition house was inscribed in capital letters: “Ankara is the symbol of Turkish Construction.” This was true in every way. On October 7, 1935, a Viennese newspaper entitled *Reichpost* commented on the subject, “To erect a modern capital, one cannot think of a drier and malarious land than Ankara.”⁶⁰ However, this empty, unstoried steppe was turned into the capital of the Republic through relentless public works. As the symbol of the new Turkey, Ankara became a symbol of its own. Factories, public buildings, and dams adorning the pages of *La Turquie Kémaliste* had no reminders of the past. Everything smelled new and of the Republic. Uğur Tanyeli defines the social structure of Istanbul as *Gesellschaft* (society) and of Ankara’s as *Gemeinschaft* (community), noting that Ankara imagined of as a dedicated, internally coherent, and homogenous community.

The fact that Ankara did not have a cosmopolitan character like Istanbul made it easier to think of it as a purely nationalist creation.⁶¹ Burhan Belge, in an editorial in *La Turquie Kémaliste* in August 1935, said “Europe was restless and disorder dominated in the continent; meanwhile, in an ocean of war and uncontrolled greed, Atatürk’s Turkey was a dream-island of happy peace and belief.”⁶² In 1936, in a pamphlet of *La Turquie Contemporaine*, a propaganda magazine published by the DGP, one of seventeen headings on change in Turkey was “New Ankara”. Ankara, with the Atatürk Forest Farm, the exhibition house, and the Çubuk Dam had turned into the material of propaganda itself. In his articles of the early 1930s, Vedat Nedim Tör expresses that Ankara was attracting international press representatives and intellectuals like a giant magnet.

60 Kongar, 2000, p. 116.

61 Uğur Tanyeli, “La Turquie Kémaliste Penceresinden Bugünün Kentine ve Mimarlığına Bakmak”, in *Kemal’in Türkiyesi, La Turquie Kamâliste- Bugünün Bilgileriyle*, ed. Lütfi Tınç (İstanbul: Boyut Yayıncılık, 2012), p. 208- 209.

62 Belge Burhan, “Comment On Taille un Peuple”, *La Turquie Kémaliste*, no. 8 (August 1935), p. 1.

3.1.4 *Cult of Leadership: Eternal Chief Atatürk, National Chief İnönü*

The founders of the RPP were the ones who organized the National Campaign meaning that they were members of the Association for the Defense of the Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia (*Anadolu ve Rumeli Müdâfaa-i Hukuk Cemiyetleri*). Toker says power was measured differently in 1925 and defines the ruling elite of the time: “Heads of government were successful commanders of successful militaries that had overpowered the enemy at sea.”⁶³ With the foundation of the Republic, these men ensured the salvation and independence of the country armed with a system based on the sovereignty of people that would develop the country to the economic and social level of civilized countries. Atatürk was the man who designated these purposes.

During the extraordinary assembly of the RPP on December 26, 1938, the popular term “Chief” became official. Atatürk was deemed the “Eternal Chief” and İnönü the “National Chief”. During this assembly, it was inscribed in the RPP’s Statute that İnönü was the interminable president, removing the possibility of electing a new president.⁶⁴ After Atatürk passed away, İnönü became the president of the party without question or discussion. İnönü, being the second man, assumed Atatürk’s “charismatic authority”. On April 1939, Falih Rıfkı Atay, in an editorial of *La Turquie Kémaliste*, said that after Mustafa Kemal’s death foreigners thought Turkey would be deeply shaken, but those who thought such did not know İnönü’s character. According to Atay, İnönü became the chief and gained the people’s trust through his accomplishments starting from the organization of a regular army in the War of Independence to the liberation of İzmir, as well as through the responsibilities he undertook in the Mudanya Armistice and the Lausanne meetings.⁶⁵ İnönü moved to the

63 Toker, 1968, p. 6. There is a popular saying in Turkish – “*Yunanı Denize Dökmek*” – which refers to Greek soldiers jumping into the sea to escape Turkish soldiers during the liberation of İzmir, symbolizing the success of the War of Independence.

64 The notion of interminable presidency was annulled after the transition to a multi-party system by the General Assembly of the RPP on May 10, 1946.

65 Falih Rıfkı Atay, “Les Fondements de L’Unité Turque”, *La Turquie Kémaliste*, no. 30 (April 1939), p. 1.

presidential palace in Çankaya from the Pink House just after the Saydam government was formed. Koçak underlines the importance of this symbolic move establishing İnönü's authority as the National Chief.⁶⁶

In the early Republican years, first Atatürk's image – then Atatürk's and İnönü's images together and separately – were frequently used in all media. Through films, magazine covers, sculptures, busts, news, and statements, these images were burned in people's minds. The situation was the opposite of Abdulhamid II's invisibility, which created problems for his rule. According to François Georgeon, Hamid did not listen when Napoléon said "*Sultan, sors de ton sérail*" ("Sultan, get out of your palace.") Atatürk carried out this suggestion to the fullest with countless nationwide tours, and his portraits were distributed everywhere.⁶⁷

During the hardships of the Second World War, these two personages and especially the experiences of the still living head of the state, İnönü during the War of Independence were foregrounded. Since İnönü was one of the people who had led the country to prosperity and freedom, any political decisions and precautions necessitated by the Second World War were taken with this experience and the interests of the public in mind by a protective, fatherly figure. İnönü was visible in all respects and was asking for the necessary support and sacrifice of the public. İnönü is described in a record by Saadettin Kaynak: "Stepped on Sèvres and succeeded in Lausanne/ Astonished the world in politics/ Worked non-stop for the state and the public/ Connected the whole country to Ankara through railways/ He is İnönü, our commander, our father/ When he is happy we live comfortably/ If İnönü asks us we will boil up/ And run through obstacles with God's name."⁶⁸

Koçak claims frequent rumors in early Republican years regarding Atatürk's death were part of a political opposition. The regime and Atatürk were so intertwined that people imagined a direct relation between Atatürk's death

66 Cemil Koçak, "Siyasal Tarih 1923- 1950", in *Türkiye Tarihi 4: Çağdaş Türkiye 1908-1980*, ed. by Sina Akşin (Istanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1992), p.12.6

67 Georgeon, 2009, p. 42.

68 Mehmet Ö. Alkan, "Milli Şef Döneminde Siyasal Propaganda- Başbuğumuz, Babamız İnönü", *Toplumsal Tarih*, no. 120 (December 2003), p. 102.

and the end of the regime.⁶⁹ Parla emphasizes the association of chief-nation in Atatürk's mind and discourse. After the İzmir Conspiracy, Atatürk said that the "reactionary mentality" did not target his "own body", but "a representative of the nation"; the "despicable attempt" did not target him, but the sacred Republic and its high principles. Moreover, Atatürk frequently uttered his belief in the continuance of the regime after his death, saying, "if I die, I am certain our noble nation will never waver; I am at peace."⁷⁰ The official announcement of Mustafa Kemal's death addressed concerns about succession. The announcement declared that according to Article 33 of the Constitution a new president would be elected by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (*Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi*, hereafter GNAT) and the Turkish nation would unite and continue rising as an immovable entity with its government, glorious army, and all its might.⁷¹




Figure 3.4 Twenty-first anniversary of Republic Day,
Radyo, no. 36, p. 12.

Following Atatürk's death, İnönü became visible in Turkish media. *Cumhuriyet* would publish the poem of Yusuf Ziya Ortaç entitled *İnönüne*, on the front page: "you are like a volcano with your tenacity, a sea with your hopes; you are

69 Koçak, 2011, pp. 91-103.

70 Taha Parla, *Türkiye'de Siyasal Kültürün Resmi Kaynakları: Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri*, vol. 2. (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1991), pp. 34-37.

71 Official notification published by the government upon Atatürk's death.

a trace drawn by lightning on eternity; you, the journeyer of glorious victory, you are our İsmet.”⁷²

The editorial in the December 1938 issue of *La Turquie Kémaliste* was written by Burhan Belge. The title was “From Atatürk to İnönü”. In his article, Belge says Atatürk’s death will not make Turkey stray from the road it has been walking; Atatürk’s cause was not personal, it’s spirit was infused in all the generation of the revolution. Atatürk entrusted the responsibility of continuing the cause to his comrade in mind and action İnönü. According to Belge, Atatürk had led the War of Independence and realized the revolution; İnönü’s present duty was to present the results of Atatürk’s work to the world.⁷³

3.1.5 *Indispensable Element of Revolution Propaganda: Supporting Actor, The Turkish Woman*

*Mukaddes kitaptaki Hilkat hikayesini elbette bilirsiniz: Dünya karanlık, karışık ve şekilsizdi. Kaynaşan suların üzerinde rüzgarlar esiyordu. ‘O’ bu karanlıkta ışık olsun dedi, ve ışık oldu... Bizde de feminizm bu şekilde vücut bulmuştur. ‘O’ olsun demiş ve olmuştur.*⁷⁴

Mihri Pektaş, 1937.

The title of Suat Derviş’s article published after the death of Atatürk in the eighth issue of *Foto Magazin*, the most popular magazine of the late 1930s, was striking: “The Leader of World Feminism Has Died”. Derviş was one of the

72 “İsmetinin”, *Cumhuriyet* (December 11, 1938), p. 1.

73 Burhan Belge, “D’Atatürk à İnönü”, *La Turquie Kémaliste*, no. 28 (December 1938), p. 1.

74 English: “You certainly know the creation (*hilkat*) story in the holy book: the world was dark, mixed, and formless. The wind was blowing over raging waters. “He” ordered light to be in this darkness, and it became. Feminism came into existence in the same way. He ordered it to be, and it became.” *Yedigün*, no. 209 (March 10, 1937) <http://www.5harfliler.com/malatya-mebusu-bayan-mihri-pektas/>

most radical women of her period. She was feminist, Marxist, and always oppositional. In her article, Derviş evaluates the reform of the Turkish woman, not just as a liberation of Eastern women, but also the implications for Western women. According to Derviş, Turkish women were presented with a gift by the great Chief that other women gained through centuries-long struggles. Among the historical qualities of Atatürk, “savior of women” should be at the top of the list.⁷⁵

One of the slogans used in the 1939 elections emphasized the advantages presented to women in the new regime: “The Republican People’s Party is the first to give Turkish women their freedom and suffrage.”⁷⁶ The struggle of the Turkish Women’s Union (*Türk Kadınlar Birliği*) led by Nezihe Muhiddin, for suffrage and women’s rights was ignored by the single-party regime.⁷⁷ Even, one of the first women deputies of Kemalist Turkey, Mihri Pektaş neglected this struggle:

This may be surprising to my western readers, where women had to fight to get her own, where struggle for equality has been long and bitter. But the women’s problem in Turkey has been different from the start. It did not originate as a demand for equal rights by women who were already conscious of their equality, but was caused by the dire need of men for helping hands to create a new way of living in order to survive in a changing world.⁷⁸

Whether women or men, the political elite did not want to see women as makers of the revolution; instead the role cast for women was “supporting actor.” This discourse entailed the idea that women could not succeed on their own. Rights were given by Atatürk; suffrage was a gratuity given by the party. However, women were among the most important figures of regime propaganda.

75 Suat Derviş, “Dünya Feminizminin Lideri Öldü”, *Foto Magazin*, no. 8 (1.12.1938), p. 22-26.

76 Mehmet Ö. Alkan, “Milli Şef’li Tek-Parti Döneminde Seçimler (1939 ve 1943 Seçimleri)”, in *Prof. Dr. Bülent Tanör Armağanı*, ed. Mehmet Ö. Alkan (Istanbul: Oğlak Yayıncılık, 2006), p. 333.

77 For a detailed account of this issue, see Yaprak Zihinoğlu, *Kadınsız İnkılap: Nezihe Muhiddin, Kadınlar Halk Fırkası, Kadın Birliği* (Istanbul: Metis, 20023)

78 Mihri Pektaş, “Turkish Woman”, *La Turquie Kémaliste*, no. 32- 40 (August 1940- December 1940), p. 11.

The woman presented in propaganda was a supporting actor who had undertaken the responsibilities and ordeals of war alongside her man and she had directly contributed to independence.

This supporting actor would secure her freedoms and become more visible until the Second World War. As for regime propaganda on women in LTK, a role for women aside from “motherhood” had been highlighted. Various women working at the university, doing research at the laboratory, nursing, doctoring, and participating in the foundation of *Türkkuşu* (Turkish Bird- civil aviation school of the Turkish Aeronautical Association) were featured on the pages of LTK. However, these other roles could not surpass that of the idealized mother who raised “a healthy Turkish generation”, as designated by the state.⁷⁹

Resimli Ay magazine, which supported women’s liberation and participation in all areas of society, published a photo spread in its October 1930 issue entitled “Men and Women in Everyday Struggle.” It said that women participated in everyday struggles alongside their brothers, fathers, and husbands and in many parts of the world, women worked in heavy manufacturing and atop tractors that soon women would start working in male lines of work in Turkey, as well.⁸⁰ However, to participate in fields where men dominated, women had to wait for the war. With the war, most male labor was conscripted and women became visible in those fields.⁸¹ On September 10, 1936, the headline of *Yeni Adam* magazine and an article by İsmail Hakkı Baltacıoğlu read

79 For detailed information on the subject see Pınar Öztamur, *Defining A Population: Women and Children in Early Republican Turkey, 1923-1950*, Unpublished MA Thesis, Atatürk Institute, Boğaziçi University, 2003.

80 “Hayat Kavgasında Erkek ve Kadın”, *Resimli Ay*, no. 8 (October 1930), p. 29.

81 Studies on women’s history in Turkey reveal examples of women working in various fields before World War I. However, as Toprak notes, the war necessitated a rational reorganization of labor. For further reading see *A Social History of Late Ottoman Women: New Perspectives*, ed. Duygu Köksal and Anastasia Falierou, (Boston: Brill, 2013); Donald Quataert, “Ottoman Women, Households, and Textile Manufacturing, 1800-1914”, in *The Modern Middle East: A Reader*, ed. Albert Hourani, Philip S. Khoury, Mary C. Wilson (London: I.B.Tauris Co., 1993), pp. 255-269; and Zafer Toprak, “The Family, Feminism and the State during the Young Turk Period, 1908-1918”, in *Première Rencontre Internationale sur l’Empire Ottoman et la Turquie Moderne* (Istanbul/Paris: Editions ISIS, 1991).

“Women Going to War.” In his article, Baltacıoğlu said women worked alongside men in every field, and in some countries, women surpassed men. He advocated for equality in Turkey emphasizing that the physiological and psychological differences between men and women should not be put argued anymore. Baltacıoğlu advocated for women to enter “real society”, explaining: “As swimming can be learned in the sea, agriculture on land, and flying in the air, a new life can be learned in society.”⁸²

In use of an İsmet İnönü Girl’s Institute in LTK, the first purpose of the institute was described as awakening the love of home, making sure they nurture good marriages, becoming perfect mothers, and becoming useful to their families and Turkish society. The second purpose was described as making sure girls can have a career or a specialty from which they can earn money and sustain their independence as needed.⁸³ Elif Ekin Akşit, in her study focusing on the role of girl’s institutes, remarks that the single-party regime’s educational system aimed to transform girls – who had been historically controlled by men – into agents having a mission to control women and men in the name of the state.⁸⁴

Despite the fundamental differences between Germany, Turkey, and the United States, the image of the ideal woman in all during the Second World War was “a mother and housewife, responsible for maintaining the race and the family.”⁸⁵

§ 3.2 Organization of Propaganda in the RPP

A booklet entitled *Haberalma, Propaganda ve Mukabil Mücadele Esasları* (Intelligence, Propaganda, and Counter Struggle Essentials) – written by staff major Asım Eren in 1943 – describes domestic propaganda:

82 İsmail Hakkı Baltacıoğlu, “Harbe Giden Kadınlar”, *Yeni Adam* (10.09.1936), p. 6.

83 “L’Institut de Jeunes Filles d’İsmet İnönü”, *La Turquie Kémaliste*, no. 6 (April 1935), p. 7.

84 For a detailed account of this issue, see Elif Ekin Akşit, *Kızların Sessizliği: Kız Enstitülerinin Uzun Tarihi* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2005)

85 Leila J. Rupp, *Mobilizing Women for War: German and American Propaganda, 1939- 1945* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1978) p. 71.

The purpose of domestic propaganda is to create a sense of national security at home. The principal means of this goal are press, radio broadcast, films, and national celebration days. These should be administered by the same authority. For this reason, the government's propaganda affairs should be assembled under a single office. One of the most important techniques of domestic propaganda is to use even insignificant occasions to create affection, respect, patriotism, and inspiration to inspire sacrifice for the country. Domestic propaganda should hold the whole country from youngsters to the elderly under its influence. Neither school textbooks, nor neighborhood coffee houses should remain outside the boundaries of domestic propaganda.⁸⁶

On November 17, 1930, the closure of the Liberal Republican Party by its administrators was a turning point for Turkey. Çetin Yetkin notes that traces of etatism, a single-party regime, or institutions like the "national chief" are not observed before 1930. The Menemen Incident, which occurred shortly after the closure of the LRP, awakened a sense that the ruling class had to demonstrate power over the masses, resulting in intense education and propaganda initiatives to impose the revolution's principles on the public.⁸⁷

The Third General Assembly of the RPP on May 10, 1931, was remarkable for its serious and definitive decisions about communicating the revolution to the public. To understand the revolution, the public had to internalize the RPP's platform and principles. This is why after the 1931 assembly, when the GNAT was not convened, it was decided that members of parliament would visit their electoral regions and work to communicate the RPP platform to the public.⁸⁸ The Secretary General of the Party, Recep Peker, gave the first speech to publicize the party's platform on October 16, 1931, at Istanbul University.⁸⁹

Conferences held at People's Houses were the preferred means of communicating the RPP platform to the public. In November 1931, Peker asked for

86 Eren, 1943, p. 14.

87 Yetkin, 1983, p. 19.

88 Çakan, 2004, p. 163.

89 "Recep Bey'in Konferansı Münakaşalı Oldu", *Cumhuriyet* (October 17, 1931), ps.1,4.

essays – at most 20 pages long – from leaders of the party regarding their domains to use on pamphlets explaining the RPP platform to citizens. He sent his Istanbul conference speech as an example, and reminded recipients that these essays could also be used as conference speeches.⁹⁰

To monopolize power, the single-party government took a series of steps: Turkish Hearths were closed in April 1931 before the Third Assembly.⁹¹ The president of the Turkish Hearths, Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver, was an assertive character. The hearths' discourse did not favor the party, but highlighted Turkism. This put the hearths into a position of opposition to the single party. Turkish Hearths were replaced by People's Houses on February 1932. With the Law on the Press dated July 25, 1931, the government assumed the right to close magazines and newspapers that published news or articles "against the interests of the country." The Turkish Historical Association and the Turkish Language Association were founded in 1931 and 1932, respectively. In 1933, with a reform targeting universities, universities came under the control of the government and a scholarly atmosphere was established that would defend the principles of the Turkish revolution and support the single-party regime. Many professors of Istanbul University were dismissed.⁹²

Upon the direction of the RPP, flag ceremonies were held in village squares every Friday starting in June 1933. The purpose was to "create positive feelings towards the state with shared excitements."⁹³ Gathering peasants at these flag ceremonies every Friday, recalled flag ceremonies held at schools, a sign that the village square was used as an instrument of the public sphere to imbue consciousness of citizenship analogous to school discipline. The daily reciting of "Our Pledge" (*Andımız*) in elementary schools began in the 1932-33 school year.

90 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 o o, Box no: 2 Folder no: 7 Row no: 22 pp. 1-2.

91 In the 1927 regulation's Article 40, Turkish Hearths were taken under party control. Secretary General Arıkan replied to Tanrıöver's objection during the general assembly as follows: "Since there is a single-hearted relation between the Turkish Hearths and the party, supervision became essential."

92 Ahmet Demirel, *Tek Partinin İktidarı* (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2014), p. 158.

93 Çakan, 2004, p. 196.

Yurt newspaper was freely distributed by the RPP to peasants and was an important medium to communicate the state's discourse to peasants. *Yurt* started publishing on October 29, 1933, as part of the tenth anniversary of Republic Day. One of the bimonthly publication's issues was dedicated to articles, the other included images to be hung on the walls like posters. *Yurt* was published by the party and 50 thousand copies of every issue was printed. It was hoped the newspaper would reach every village, but since there were not post offices in every village, its actual circulation was only half of Turkey's villages.⁹⁴ Its first issue claimed:

Peasant friend, *Yurt* is your newspaper. The Republican People's Party is publishing it for you. This party founded by the hand of the Great Veteran is a force that will realize your dreams, repair your ruins, and complete your deficiencies. Your party will publish your newspaper *Yurt* twice a month and send it to your village free of charge.⁹⁵

The chairman of the Gümüşhane Directorate sent a letter to the General Secretariat of the RPP in March 1936 to say that *Yurt* was not producing the outcome they had wished for. The main reason was the illiteracy of peasants. The author of the letter concluded that organization of village schools should be a priority. Accordingly, Village Institutes would be opened in 1940.

According to the director, after establishing village schools, the newspaper should focus on sweet stories infused with social, economic, and medical news.⁹⁶ Generally speaking, however *Yurt* was unsuccessful because it did not reach everyone and due to high rates of illiteracy.

In 1935, with the Fourth Assembly of the RPP the merger of party and state came to light more strongly. This is how Recep Peker defined changes made to the platform and statute:

94 Trkan etin and Hakkı Uyar, "Tek Parti Ynetimi'nde Kylye Ynelik Propaganda: Yurt Gazetesi", *Toplumsal Tarih*, no. 1 (January 1994), pp. 51-58.

95 "Bayramın Kutlu Olsun", *Yurt*, no. 1. (October 29, 1933), p. 2.

96 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 o o, Box no: 1271 Folder no: 227 Row no: 2 p. 1.

The most attracting and prominent feature of the new platform is the convergence of the state and the RPP, which has been working alongside the state from the beginning. In reality, the main features of the party – republicanism, nationalism, populism, reformism, etatism and laicity – will be the features of the state after the new platform is approved.⁹⁷

In 1935, the few remaining non-governmental organizations – such as mason lodges and the Turkish Women’s Union – were attacked; some closed of their own volition and others were forcibly closed by the state.

From 1939, university weeks were planned in various cities in Turkey wherein university professors would take scholarly knowledge to general public. This was a project of the party, but many prominent scholars joined in. In May 1941, twelve scholars from Istanbul University, among which were Ali Fuat Başgil, Sıddık Sami Onar, Fahrettin Kerim Gökay, and Cevat Kerim İncedayı, went to Diyarbakır to give conferences, conduct surveys, screen films, and exhibit pictures to general public and to experts, separately.⁹⁸ The speeches were published in booklets entitled *The RPP Conferences Series*. The subjects were diverse. Many university professors spoke on various subjects including geography, anthropology, international relations, and law.

All political powers need a publication or to be clear, a newspaper – to spread their ideology and publicize their actions. Five years before the October Revolution, *Pravda* newspaper began being published. *Pravda*, which means “Truth” in Russian, would serve the news of the Communist Party to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe for over 70 years until the collapse of Soviet Union.

Hâkimiyet-i Milliye newspaper, which was first published on January 10, 1920, and was renamed to *Ulus* after 1934, became the *Pravda* of the young Republic – one of the most important mediums for the RPP to communicate its principles. The distribution of *Ulus* was important for the party; it even sent

97 Demirel, 2014, p. 213.

98 Prime Ministry’s Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People’s Party, Cat. no: 490 10 0, Box no: 1297 Folder no: 310 Row no: 1 p. 15.

Ulus and *Ülkü* magazine, the publication of People's Houses to Turkish students studying abroad.⁹⁹

After the Democrat Party was founded, the outlook of *Ulus* was reconsidered. Cemil Sait Barlas, a member of parliament (MP) from Gaziantep, wrote in a report on the newspaper that the opposition should be accepted as a reality, and that after the single-party system ended, *Ulus* would be subject to supply-demand. Barlas suggested that while the party's propaganda were made in the newspaper, authors beloved by the citizens should defend the party against opposition. Barlas emphasized that defending actions of the government should not mean censoring self-criticism – this is to say, criticism of mistakes in action.¹⁰⁰

Aside from the RPP's own publications, independent magazines were supported by the General Secretariat of the RPP. *Les Annales de Turquie*, a monthly magazine in 1930 in French published by Antoine Langas-Sezen, was one of such publication. In return for delivery of the magazine, the party sent money to cover publishing costs. The magazine covered foreign politics, as well as news on art and culture. At the end of each issue, there was a chronology of political, economic, social, scholarly, artistic, and intellectual developments of the month.¹⁰¹ The July 13, 1939, issue of the magazine was devoted to the National Chief, and according to Langas-Sezen, the biography of İnönü was being published for the first time in a foreign language. The director and owner of the magazine expressed that the magazine was useful for foreign publicity; Langas published articles on Turkey in other foreign magazines, as well.¹⁰²

The relations between political authorities of the single party and the press are analyzed in detail in the next section. The Directorate General of the Press was founded to control the press but as was the habit of the period, individual MPs were also responsible for inspecting press in addition to the DGP. The

99 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 0 0, Box no: 1294 Folder no: 296 Row no: 2 p. 7.

100 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 0 0, Box no: 453 Folder no: 1867 Row no: 3 pp. 2-3.

101 *Les Annales de Turquie*, Year: 3 no. 1. (Istanbul: Hanri Zelliç ve Mahdumu Matbaası, May 1933)

102 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 01, Box no: 1343 Folder no: 46 1 Row no: 1 pp. 1-24.

party acted as an additional power and vehicle for state bodies and their actions. In spring 1944, the General Secretariat of the RPP asked Fahri Ecevit (an MP from Kastamonu), Necmi Osten (an MP from Giresun), Feyzullah Uslu (an MP from Manisa), and Rıfkı Pasin (an MP from Ağrı) to inspect all publications in the country for congruence with party guidelines. They would co-operate with the Bureau of the Press to protect newspapers and magazines that served the party. Atıf Akgüç (an MP from Bursa) was directing the Bureau of the Press, the purpose of which was to spread news of the regime's actions, services and accomplishments.¹⁰³

In short, the real organization of propaganda began in 1931, and the party-state prioritized political mass education. Propaganda films made both by the party and the DGP, the opening of People's Houses, the organization of public orators, the state monopolization on radio, and the 1931 Press Law all contributed to this purpose. Especially the experience of the Liberal Republican Party made the government reconsider their tactics and overarching, at times suffocating mobilization began. However, this road to continue and cement reforms collided against the Second World War. Due to the fear of war and financial difficulties, the party-state would not be victorious in their endeavor.

After this brief background on the subjects of state institutionalization begun by the single party in 1931, I focus on how propaganda was organized by both the General Secretariat of the RPP and through certain bureaus.

3.2.1 *The General Secretariat of the RPP and Bureaus*

With the 1927 regulation of the RPP, a Party Council was established: a management team consisting of the President, Vice-President, and Secretary General. This tripartite authority headed the operation of the party throughout the single-party period. Operating the party implied operating the state, as well. The final word belonged to the president of the party, who was also the president of the country.

1931 was a benchmark year in which Recep Peker became the Secretary General of the party. Peker was more authoritarian compared to Saffet Arıkan,

103 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 100, Box no: 1296 Folder no: 303 Row no: 2 pp. 5-6.

who had been Secretary General since 1925. Peker carried on this position until he was directly discharged in 1936 directly by Atatürk. Being Secretary General of the party meant he was the third most important figure in the party during the single-party regime.

After the General Assembly of 1931, thirteen bureaus grouped into four categories were established under the General Secretariat. Among these, Group B was engaged in propaganda:

Group B

- ◆ Fifth Bureau – National culture, science and publications on these subjects
- ◆ Sixth Bureau – Sports and youth
- ◆ Seventh Bureau – People’s Education institutions, literacy, public orators
- ◆ Eighth Bureau – Press, party publications, display of party’s platform, propaganda

“The tones that color the new social identity of 1930s and 1940s Turkey” were to emerge as a result of these bureaus’ efforts.¹⁰⁴ As defined by the party, Group B would run the party’s business in such fields as national culture, science, sports, educating the public, press, party publications, and organization of public orators.¹⁰⁵ Aside from these bureaus, the tenth bureau was responsible for arts and the third bureau was responsible for intelligence, both of which are related to propaganda. When the RPP’s archives were sorted, archivists categorized documents according to these bureaus. Their responsibilities are defined in the state’s archives as follows:¹⁰⁶

- ◆ Fifth Bureau: People’s Houses
- ◆ Sixth Bureau: Sports and Military Business
- ◆ Seventh Bureau: Education-Learning-Culture
- ◆ Eighth Bureau: Publications

104 Murat Turan, “Tek Parti Yöneticilerinin Söyleminde Yeni Toplumsal Kimlik ve Onun Sembolleri”, *Uluslararası Sosyal Araştırmalar Dergisi*, vol. 7. no. 34, p. 293.

105 *Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası Katibiumumiliğinin F. Teşkilatına Umumi Tebligatı, Mayıs 1931 den Birincikanun 1932 nihayetine kadar*, vol. 1 (Ankara: Hakimiyeti Milliye Matbaası, 1933), ps. 18, 20.

106 Catalogue of Republican People’s Party Kataloğu, vol. 11, 2005, Ankara.

In the 1935 General Assembly, the Party Council (named *Genyönkurul* at the time) was made responsible for all party business, especially for spreading ideology and shaping memories. In this assembly, further steps were taken towards party-state consolidation. Without a decision by the assembly, a significant change was made in the organization of the party on June 18, 1936. In a circular, the Secretary General of the party was united with the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Provincial Directorates with the Governorate (*Vali*).¹⁰⁷ The stated reason for this change was to further relations between the government and the party to increase the growth of the party. At the same time Recep Peker was dismissed and Şükrü Kaya, known for his opposition to İnönü, became both Secretary General and Minister of Internal Affairs. The circular announced that the General Inspectorships would supervise and inspect the party as well as the state.¹⁰⁸

Opinions on the consolidation of the party and the state during the single-party regime should be mentioned. The takeover of the state by the party, as most interpret the history, is not actually the case. On the contrary, it seems that the state took over the party. After the 1950 elections, Şevket Süreyya evaluated the RPP and İnönü and said the party was neither ready to address present conditions nor to struggle for votes. According to him, the RPP had never been a people's organization nor a political body; and during twenty-seven years of governance, the party had never supervised the government as it should have. In terms of the single chief, single party and the authoritarian government, the party did not dominate the government; the government dominated the party.¹⁰⁹ As mentioned, the Party Council consisting of the President, Vice President, and Secretary General was the single and real source of power.

With an amendment to the Constitution made on February 5, 1937, the Six Arrows were added to the Article 2 of the Constitution, thus becoming the principles of the state and concluding the consolidation of the party and the

107 Demirel, 2014, p. 209 This implementation was ended with the 1939 statute of the RPP after Celal Bayar resigned as Prime Minister and Refik Saydam was appointed in his place.

108 Rahmi Kumaş, *CHP'nin Soyağacı* (Istanbul: Çağdaş Yayınları, 1999), pp. 36-37.

109 Aydemir, 2000, pp. 83-84.

state. With this new order, changes were made to the organization. The General Administrative Council would now work with eight bureaus. Those relating to propaganda were:

- ◆ Fourth Bureau: People's Houses and Culture
- ◆ Fifth Bureau: Publications
- ◆ Eight Bureau: National days and commemorations, and ceremonies in People's Houses

The duties of the fifth bureau were defined as spreading party's platform; spreading the work of Republican institutions working for these principles through texts, speeches, films, plays, newspapers, and magazines; and "publishing useful booklets – especially for peasants –, distributing these, and making sure they are read." The foundation of radio stations and preparation of necessary programs were among the duties of this bureau, as well. A report dated November 25, 1935, on the duties of the eight bureau says it is responsible for propaganda both domestically and abroad through cinema, radio, and the press.¹¹⁰ At the same time eight bureau was responsible for shaping memories through written and visual media on national days and in national commemorations. Hasan Ali Yücel and Salah Cimcoz were directors of the bureau.

In 1935, many mediums that could be used for propaganda were defined in party statutes and platform and these media were listed again in statutes of 1939 and 1943. Radio, cinema, conferences, public orators, public lecterns, newspapers, other publications, museums of the revolution, expositions, meetings, celebrations, entertainment, art, theater, and music were defined as the primary media of propaganda.¹¹¹ Item 5 of the 1935 Statute states: "On every occasion, without fail, conveying our principles is the most important duty of party members and followers."¹¹² As Goebbels expressed, propaganda is mainly repetition: "The Catholic Church is alive because they have been repeating the same thing for 2 thousand years. The national-socialist state should do the same." The message conveyed through propaganda does not

110 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1221 Folder no: 56 Row no: 2 p. 26.

111 *RPP Regulation 1939*, pp. 13-14., *RPP Platform 1939*, p. 22.

112 *1935 RPP Statute*.

have to be different, rational, or sophisticated. It is sufficient to repeat simple, clear phrases that can be understood by people of all educational levels.

When it is considered that propaganda targeted people who had equal rights to vote for the party and the people that would govern their country – in other words, the electorate – the multiplicity of choices offered to people in the period should be examined.¹¹³ Between 1923-1946, 1,037 members of parliament were elected; only five were independent candidates not supported by the RPP. Considering that the election system was two-stage, it was not possible to elect candidates aside from the RPP's candidates.¹¹⁴ In other words, alternative political movements were not allowed; people who did not support the present government did not have any opportunity for representation.

Elections were one of the most important occasions to emphasize the people's sovereignty. Public lecterns important medium during elections. Public orators spoke of the RPP's actions thus far, and the importance of voting. In film theaters, election spots were screened during breaks. However, in the 1943 elections, the RPP nominated more candidates than the number of seats in parliament, giving some liberty to second voters. In the thirty-eight cities where the number of candidate outnumbered available seats, election propaganda was conducted. Some candidates perceived this propaganda as "marketing themselves": trying to make the public like them. In reality, it was no easy task to make the public like politicians after implementations like the National Defense Law and Wealth Tax.¹¹⁵ After the 1943 elections, the Secretary General of the RPP sent a letter to Regional Inspectorships asking them to report on whether candidates conducted propaganda, and if so, in detail what kind of propaganda was conducted.¹¹⁶ *Cumhuriyet* newspaper claimed that the RPP had prepared three propaganda records and a car equipped with loud speakers to propagandize during the 1943 elections. The news also said that informative information would be screened in film theaters.¹¹⁷ Another report

113 Women's suffrage in 1935 meant that propaganda directed toward a mixed-gender electorate started in the elections that same year.

114 Demirel, 2014, p. 18.

115 Alkan, 2006, p. 353.

116 Demirel, 2014, pp. 277-278.

117 Demirel, 2014, p. 279.

by *Cumhuriyet* said that before the second leg of the elections, the party had hung banners over many Istanbul streets, public orators had given speeches on the importance of elections in various squares, and party buildings and polling locations were adorned with flags.¹¹⁸ Before the elections, the content of propaganda to be conducted by public orators was defined by the party:¹¹⁹

- ◆ Note that especially in the last four years, we have stood straight during the tornado of war that has been destroying the whole world due to our “National Unity” around our President and National Chief,
- ◆ Carry out our National Chief’s order that: “We should always remember how much was sacrificed to build this state. During times of global crisis, we are in greater need of this way of thinking ”, and
- ◆ Draw our people’s attention to the elections; enlighten citizens on the necessity of using their right to vote... And choose subjects that draw attention to the positive accomplishments of the Republican regime and their consequences.

As Mete Tunçay says regarding “unanimous democracy”, it is questionable whether the Turkish people can be understood as voters that can change government, before the 1946 elections, when the two-stage electoral system was annulled. Two-stage electoral systems presume that general elections are not to be trusted; the people are believed not to have reached a level of maturity to directly elect members of parliament.¹²⁰

The RPP analyzed political parties abroad starting with their platforms as well as the organization and function of institutions established to advance the people’s political education. People in various posts in the party, especially bureaucrats who went abroad themselves to investigate, wrote reports on different structures. In 1931, the platforms of most political parties in Europe were translated into Turkish by the RPP.

The General Secretariat also translated the RPP’s platform, statutes, speeches of Secretary General Recep Peker, the guide to the tenth anniversary

118 4 February 1943, *Cumhuriyet*, Demirel, 2014, p. 279.

119 Alkan, 2006, p. 349.

120 Alkan, 2006, p. 325.

of Republic Day, the regulation on People's Houses, and the speech of Şükrü Kaya made on the sixth anniversary of People's Houses into French and other texts, such as Atatürk's *Nutuk* (Grand Speech) into English, sharing them whenever there was a request.¹²¹ After its first publication in 1927, the Ministry of Culture again published and sold *Nutuk* at the end of 1938.¹²²

Until the DP was founded, the RPP essentially meant the state. The RPP's propaganda activities were ceased by the end of the Second World War and by the foundation of the DP. The RPP's election propaganda before the 1950 elections – when there was a real and seasoned opposition – is a subject unto itself. However, for a party that claimed the 1946 elections under suspicion of fraud, the importance of propaganda during the 1950 elections cannot be denied. Prior to the 1950 elections, Muhittin Güneşhan, President of the Muradiye Hearth in the RPP's district of Beşiktaş, undertook a project entitled "Guide for Propaganda Bureaus". Güneşhan prepared this guide of his own volition and sent it to the General Secretariat on July 15, 1949. According to Güneşhan, before the coming elections the party needed functioning propaganda bureaus with rational, modern techniques. The project suggested establishing propaganda bureaus first in Istanbul, Ankara, and İzmir, and battling opposition on the subject of democracy through radio, cinema, conferences, orations, newspapers, magazines, and books.¹²³

After the May 1950 elections, an official of the RPP – thought to be Hasan Reşit Tankut – wrote a report for İnönü analyzing the reasons for losing the elections. According to the report, one of the reasons was that the RPP's propaganda organization did not function well. The author said:

Instead of assigning our laxity to this and that, we should assign it to our traditions. We could not propagandize saying, "we will decrease taxes, we will abolish the army, we will buy more wheat, we will decrease the price of bread, we will abolish laws of revolution." This is

121 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 100, Box no: 1294 Folder no: 297 Row no: 1 p. 71.

122 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 01, Box no: 4 Folder no: 19 Row no: 24 p. 1.

123 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 01, Box no: 163 Folder no: 649 Row no: 1 pp. 1- 8.

what the opposition promised. While we were praising our undertakings, they were reaping the rewards of these promises.

The author criticizes the party's propaganda during this period thusly:

How can admonishments on conscience affect a hungry man? Talk about the wonders of science and technique to a simple citizen that sees his fate in his dreams or in good luck charms or bad omens; he would only listen to you for the beauty of your voice, the harmony of your words, and the courtesy of your gestures. However, many times he will run from you. Our propagandists talked to the masses. However, it was those masses that voted against us.¹²⁴

The single party created certain institutional vehicles to spread its ideology to the people. I briefly mention the organization of Public Orators and People's Houses, two vehicles of propaganda managed by the party, to understand their structure as well as their activities.

3.2.2 *The Organization of Public Orators and Conferences*



Figure 3.5 Public Lectern

124 Ömer Türkoğlu, "Seçimleri Niçin Kaybettik?" <http://www.fotowoo.net/index.php/toplum-ve-yasam/toplumsal/oemer-tuerkolu-nun-yazlar?start=7>

The first corps formed to explain the principles of the revolution to the people was the organization of public orators (*Halk Hatipleri Teşkilatı*), founded in 1931. The formation of this organization predates the People's Houses by a year. Public orators were chosen by the party from among MPs and other members of the party. Public orator was not a title; they carried no such business cards; even implying that they spoke on behalf of the RPP was deemed unfit.¹²⁵ The regulation on the organization of public orators emphasized that the main reason for the organization was to shape people's memory. Orator's fields of speech were limited to three areas. The first was the Turkish Revolution, the party's platform and principles, the merits of republic, and love of the nation; the second was Turkish civilization, history, and heroism; and the third consisted of enlightening people with respect to real developments in the country. Orators were divided into city and village/town orators.

There was a relation between the educational and cultural level of the target audiences of orators and the words, language, and clothes the orators chose. Especially in rural areas, it was important for the orator to speak in clear, simple language and make people feel as though she for he was one of them. The regulation said that orators "should repeat good and beautiful ideas frequently and patiently and in all occasions so that people will be awakened and believe." Routinely echoing the RPP's principles again shows the practice of the most basic principle of propaganda: repetition.¹²⁶

The number of orators was five to fifteen in cities, two to five in boroughs, one to three in sub-districts, and one or two in neighborhoods. The regulation says on the location where oration should take place, the regulation says, "whether on national days or at a small gathering of neighbors for joy or sorrow – at every gathering, everywhere – the voice of our party should be heard."¹²⁷

125 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 o o, Box no: 2 Folder no: 7 Row no: 21 p. 1.

126 CHF *Halk Hatipleri Teşkilatı Talimatı*, p. 10.

127 CHF *Halk Hatipleri Teşkilatı Talimatı*, pp. 9-10.

Public lecterns used by orators should be at least half a meter higher than the floor. Lecterns were covered with a national flag, a party flag, and a plaque reading “Public Lectern”. These lecterns are perfectly perceived as an intervention of the single party on the public sphere. Aside from orators, every adult over eighteen, male or female, could speak at public lecterns. One person could talk at most for one hour. In crowded cities the number of lecterns in public squares reached up to 10.¹²⁸ Those who wished to speak at the lectern had to apply to the regional party building or could ask permission from one of three people the council had appointed to that lectern. The RPP’s leaders equated speaking rights at the lecterns with direct democracy, saying only a confident regime would risk it. However, people speaking at the lecterns were limited to a small array of subjects. According to the Article 6 of the regulation, these subjects were: “Demonstrating – using concepts and examples – the importance, superiority, and value of revolution, republic, and freedom.”

Three party members assigned to the lectern were responsible for preventing speeches that were out of line. Public orators chosen from among citizens and who were known to locals talked about subjects such as the successes of the Republic and national independence at these public platforms, emphasizing issues that legitimized the current government.

During the tenth anniversary festivities, representatives from minority groups were called to the public lecterns to give speeches that praised reforms and create a sense that the nation is homogenous and that reconciliation governed society with respect to both class and religion.¹²⁹ Public orators were organized by the Discourse and Dissemination Committee (*Söyleme ve Yayma Komitesi*) from 1938 on.

The organization of public orators was similar to the “Four Minute Man”, a project in the United States during the First World War to inform the public about the war. The organizations differ with respect to numbers and the duration of the speeches. In the United States, almost 75 thousand volunteers worked in the campaign and speeches lasted up to four minutes. Apparently, a one hour slot was extremely long in duration for orations in Turkey. Another

128 Prime Ministry’s Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People’s Party, Cat. no: 490 01 00, Box no: 2 Folder no: 9 Row no: 12 pp. 2- 3.

129 Çakan, 2004, pp. 142-143.

inspiration for public orators in Turkey was “Bolshevik Agitators” in the USSR. However, as in the United States, the number of Bolshevik agitators were many more compared to Turkey. In 1946, there were 160 thousand agitators in Moscow, the population of which was five million. Unlike Turkey, the ties binding agitators to the party were not hidden in the USSR.¹³⁰

Another project during the single-party era that explained the revolution to citizens were “Revolution and Freedom” conferences, which started with a RPP circular numbered 5/653 and dated December 12, 1935. The circular proposed the Party Council use all its power, all the members of the party, and the employees of People’s Houses to enlighten citizens on the subjects of revolution and freedom, which are the basis of Turkey’s existence.¹³¹ Orators would be determined by the party’s city boards and they were usually regional MPs, chairmen of city and town directorates, and directors of People’s Houses.

The main source for speeches was Recep Peker’s printed lessons on revolution. Subjects of the conferences were developed in the frameworks of history of the revolution, language reform, Atatürk and reform, freedom, chief and national chief. Conferences lasted at least an hour and were generally organized in People’s Houses. When the orator was a party member, the individual had to inspect and report on activities of the party organization and the People’s House in the region where the conference took place; therefore, he had to set aside some time before or after the conference. Orator’s travel expenses were compensated by the party.¹³² In certain cases, these conferences were used for other purposes as well, such as to draw women to the People’s Houses. A series of conferences were organized around clothing and lifestyle. A RPP circular numbered 81 dated May 22, 1933, said women’s clothing – especially in Central Anatolia – was too reactionary, and that confronting the issue should be done with compassion, not aggression.¹³³

130 Inkeles, 1956, p. 404.

131 Prime Ministry’s Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People’s Party, Cat. no: 490 01 00, Box no: 3 Folder no: 11 Row no: 17 p. 3.

132 Prime Ministry’s Republican Archive Catalogue of Republican People’s Party, Cat. no: 490 01 00, Box no: 3 Folder no: 11 Row no: 17 p. 5.

133 Çakan, 2004, pp. 173-181.

Conferences hosted in People's Houses were not limited to topics of revolution and freedom. In later years, the subjects of these conferences were more varied and included conferences on general culture. The number of conferences organized in People's Houses between 1931 and 1941 are as follows:¹³⁴

Table 3.1

Year	No. of People's Houses	No. of Conferences
1933	55	915
1934	80	1537
1935	103	1503
1936	136	2829
1937	167	3056
1938	209	2727
1939	373	3567
1940	379	5222
1941	383	4488

In December 1937, a report in *Yeni Adam* magazine announced a series of conferences in the Eminönü People's House to be given every Thursday at 5:30 p.m. Interesting personages comprise the list of subjects and orators of this series. For example, Necip Aptullah gave a speech on "The Secrets of Life", Bedri Rahmi on "Modern Painting", Mazhar Osman on "Matters of Mental Health", Sami Karayel on "Sports and Sciences", and Fahrettin Kerim on "The Theoretical Place of Culture and Edification in Psychology". At the same time, a series of conferences on philosophy and sociology were given every Friday evening in the Eminönü People's House.¹³⁵

An MP from Maraş, Hasan Reşit Tankut, gave conferences in eastern cities in September 1940 and shared a report with the RPP afterwards. This report provides valuable information on how these conferences were conducted and

134 Çakan, 2004, pp. 224-225.

135 "Kültür Haberleri", *Yeni Adam*, no. 160. (December 21, 1937), p. 9.

how the speaker perceived the target audience and his relation to them. Tankut met with the First General Inspectorship in Diyarbakır on September 30 to set his itinerary.

As a parenthetical note about the organization of the RPP in Eastern Turkey, the RPP's organization in the east during the single-party regime was very weak. There were no RPP provincial directorates in Ağrı, Bitlis, Bingöl (aside from Kiğı), Diyarbakır, Elazığ, Hakkâri, Mardin, Muş, Siirt (closed in 1933), Tunceli (aside from Pülümür), Urfa, and Van.¹³⁶ The single-party regime tried to control the whole region with the General Inspectorship established in 1927.¹³⁷ The fact that the single, ruling party did not have provincial directorates in the majority of eastern cities is evidence of a lack of dialogue with the people of the region. Demirel argues that legal, political channels were closed to the citizens of this region until the end of the single-party period.¹³⁸ Therefore, the party tried to be active and influence social sphere through the People's Houses in the region. Among the first to open in 1932 were the ones in Diyarbakır, Van, Malatya, and Gaziantep. By 1948, there were a total of seventy People's Houses and 696 people's rooms (*halk odası*) in the eastern regions of the country. Another vehicle for the party in the east was Village Institutes.¹³⁹

Returning to Tankut's report, he gave conferences at People's Houses in Siirt, Bitlis, Van, and Muş. Since there were no provincial directorates, governors and presidents of the People's Houses hosted Tankut. In cities without

136 The RPP Provincial Directory was established in Bitlis on October 20, 1944. Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 0 0, Box no: 284 Folder no: 1139 Row no: 3 p. 2.

137 In a study on the origins of MPs, Ahmet Demirel emphasized that while in the Second Parliament, 70 percent of MPs from Eastern and South eastern Anatolia were elected from their place of birth; this rate decreased in 1927 to 32.7 percent, in 1931 to 30.4 percent, in 1935 to 19.7 percent, and in 1939 to 18.6 percent. Demirel, 2012, pp. 198-199.

138 Demirel, 2014 , p. 215

139 For further reading, see Murat Turan, *CHP'nin Doğu'da Teşkilatlanması (1923- 1950)*, Istanbul: Libra Yayıncılık, 2011.

directorates, the People's Houses and People's Rooms were run under authority of the General Inspectorship.¹⁴⁰ Since Tankut knew the region well, he claims he made adjustments according to the audience's ability to interpret and understand; in his own words, he held at their heartstrings according to each city's individual needs. Tankut's attitude to the target audience is reminiscent of Kalinin's advice to Soviet agitators. Kalinin argued that agitators should consider the traditions, habits, and ways of life of target ethnic groups while communicating with them.¹⁴¹ According to Tankut, the post-conference faces of his audiences showed they had relaxed and believed him.

In his report, Tankut expressed his impressions of the region, as well. According to him, because of centuries-long mingling of various ethnicities, the people of Siirt had become brusque, selfish, timid, short-tempered, eager to kill, and power hungry. Tankut had visited Siirt thirteen years before. He saw a sole positive development: the people in Siirt now worshiped Turkish power. They believed the Republic was steady and indestructible. However, though the people of Siirt appreciated and admired Ankara, they harbored no warm feelings towards it. On rainy days, these people would require more attention and caution. On the other hand, the people of Bitlis commemorated their Turkishness with a dervish enthusiasm, since they had long suffered under the Shafii sect. According to Tankut, in a few years and after a few progressive steps, the people of Bitlis would become as Turkish as the people of Sivas or Kayseri. Tankut said that the spirit of Mir Şeref, and the people that were reciting his eulogy or Kurdish epics just thirteen years before did not exist there anymore.

Considering that's Tankut visited the region in 1940, he was pondering how to mobilize people of the region in the case of war. In Van and Muş, even in towns where no one spoke Turkish, Tankut was unconcerned. In a war, the people of these cities would go to fight like every citizen and the families they left behind would acclimate to the conditions of war. However, he was uncertain about Kurdish-speaking villages. If war broke out, he predicted the people

140 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 01 00, Box no: 3 Folder no: 11 Row no: 17 p. 1.

141 Kalinin, 1976, p. 200.

of the region would not rebel as they did fifteen years before; however, Tankut emphasized that trusting that people who only spoke Kurdish would be faithful in such a situation would be premature.¹⁴²

These conferences were designed to build a bridge between the party and the people. However, their main purpose was to take their pulse and measure the thoughts and reactions of the public. The most significant project the RPP realized to that end was the People's Houses.

3.2.3 *People's Houses*

People's Houses were established on February 19, 1932. At a speech following the establishment of People's Houses, Recep Peker said:

The RPP aims to organize the masses into conscious, understanding, loving beings who believe in an ideal through the People's Houses. The purpose of People's Houses is to homogenize the nation; to turn it into a classless mass.¹⁴³

According to Şükrü Kaya, People's Houses were hearths for spreading and safeguarding the revolution. The *raison d'être* of the houses was to spread, deepen, and establish among people the principles of Atatürk's revolution.¹⁴⁴ According to Taner Timur, by closing down the Turkish Hearths and opening the People's Houses in their place, Atatürk aimed to establish "enthusiasm for revolution."¹⁴⁵ People's Houses were public spaces designed to propagandize the regime through their buildings, public speech balconies, Atatürk corners, and performance halls. People's Houses can be considered one of the main axes around which relations between the regime and society was built. There have been many studies on People's Houses in Turkey.¹⁴⁶ In the present study,

142 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 01, Box no: 1015 Folder no: 916 Row no: 4 pp. 1- 6.

143 Neşe Yeşilkaya, *Halkevleri: İdeoloji ve Mimarlık* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1999), p. 74.

144 *Discours de Şükrü Kaya: Prononcé le 20 février 1938 à la Maison du Peuple d'Ankara à l'Occasion de la Fête de la Culture* (Ankara: Ulus Matbaası, 1938), p. 10

145 Taner Timur, *Türk Devrimi ve Sonrası* (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1994), p. 289.

146 For further reading on People's Houses, see Sefa Şimşek, *Bir ideolojik Seferberlik deneyimi: Halkevleri (1932-1951)* (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınevi, 2002), Neşe Yeşilkaya, *Halkevleri: İdeoloji ve Mimarlık* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1999)

People's Houses are evaluated both as part of the propaganda organization of the party and as a vehicle to spread the discourse of the party-state. I omit generally accepted facts about People's Houses and focus on how propaganda made through the People's Houses reached the people and how it was perceived. In the fourth chapter of the dissertation, People's Houses will be treated as an important medium for the transmission of the propaganda films of the state and party to citizens.

On February 24, 1933, in a speech given on the first anniversary of the Ankara People's House, İsmet İnönü defined People's Houses as centers that explain the RPP's principles.¹⁴⁷ According to this definition, a People's House is a unidirectional channel of communication between the party and the public. The People's Houses had nine branches: the Language, History, and Literature Branch; the Fine Arts Branch; the Performances Branch; the Sports Branch; the Social Welfare Branch; the People's Education Institutions and Courses Branch; the Library and Publications Branch; the Villagers Branch; and the Museum and Exposition Branch.

There are two distinct approaches to People's Houses in Turkish academia. Some scholars claim that People's Houses were established to educate people about the revolution, but instead of direct indoctrination, it was a mobilization about people's manners, development, and education that successfully reached people. Other scholars claim the top-down education of the revolution was political and that People's Houses never reached ordinary people due to this insincerity. I argue that some activities of the people's houses attracted more public attention; for example, film screenings attracted considerable attention due to curiosity and hunger for cinema; the Fine Arts Branch perhaps remained elitist.

There were fifty-five People's Houses in 1932, and by 1948 this number had increased to 496. According to a report dated 1948, there were no cities or districts without a People's House. The number of People's Rooms aimed at conveying the revolution to more remote places, a measure decided upon in the fifth General Assembly of the RPP in 1939, was 4,261 by February 1948.¹⁴⁸

147 Çakan, 2004, p. 83.

148 To open a People's Room at least fifty registered members and a reading and meeting room were required. *1947 Yılında Halkevleri ve Halkodaları* (Ankara: Ulus Basımevi, 1948), p. 25.

As explained in the previous section, People's Houses were places where the principles of the revolution were conveyed to the people; conferences, which were another medium for conveying these principles, were predictably held in People's Houses. The purpose of these conferences was for people to benefit from the knowledge of intellectuals, scholars, technicians, experts, and artists. In February 1940, Burhan Belge gave a series of conferences on how the revolution should be communicated to the people and the use of propaganda at Ankara People's House. According to Belge, a community without a cause would have nothing to do with propaganda. In this era of propaganda, the Turkish state, which realized the revolution, had a cause and henceforth had every right to use propaganda.¹⁴⁹ According to Belge relating one's cause to history was necessary, meaning that when explaining the revolution, its historical foundation and justification should be based on historical references.

Conferences were held on a wide array of subjects, from land property to intestinal worms, from employment insurance to veterinary health, from atoms to the division in labor in modern industry. For conferences to reach more people, some People's House even used loud speakers to broadcast conferences in dense parts of the city.¹⁵⁰

Correspondence dated 1940 between the Bandırma People's House and the General Secretariat of the RPP explains how people were informed by the People's House. Films were screened to crowds of people who come a day early for the farmer's market, national and international news were relayed weekly, and conferences were held on subjects that would interest villagers.¹⁵¹ People's Houses acted as a center of party control in rural areas. The purpose was to suggest a national program to peasants who arrived for the market, instead of letting them waste away time in coffee shops. At the same time, the People's House offered a medium of communication the rural residents to reach the center. A letter dated September 20, 1948, sent by the village headman of Narlıdere (İzmir) to the People's House directorate, conveys complaints about

149 Burhan Belge, "Propaganda ve Tesirleri", *Ayın Tarihi*, no. 75 (February 1940), pp. 520-521.

150 1946 Yılında Halkevleri ve Halkodaları (Ankara, 1947), p. 7.

151 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 01, Box no: 1207 Folder no: 2 Row no: 1 p. 1.

radio broadcasts: how every time they turned on the radio they heard European melodies and how distastefully folk songs were sung.¹⁵²

People's Houses organized visits to nearby villages. In 1935, 495 such visits were held with 21 thousand participants. In 1937, 1,495 visits were held, and in 1938, some 209 People's Houses visited 1,279 villages.¹⁵³ The works of People's Houses in villages were not considered unidirectional attempts to enlighten, educate, and train. In a Gökalpian approach, it was believed that the people would learn from intellectuals and that the intellectuals would learn from the people; the meeting between the two would end with rewarding results.¹⁵⁴

After the 1946 elections, Dentist Celâl Maral – a member of Ankara Municipal Council and President of Demirtepe Hearth – sent a report to the General Secretariat of the RPP to share his opinions on how and in which media propaganda should be conducted. According to Maral, the People's Houses were the political and social education and propaganda centers of the RPP, but their monotonous atmospheres, which were reminiscent of a schools, should change into clubs where members of the party could enjoy themselves. In his report, Maral defines People's Houses as spaces where people of all classes are reassured and convinced to become members of the party. However, further in his report he suggests that non-members should be welcomed as guests only one night of each week. He thinks this would convince the people – especially youth – to become members of the party.

Maral suggests establishing a secret bureau of propaganda within the party, and a branch of this secret bureau, called the hunter organization, would consist of loved and trusted people of respective regions: people who have influence but no apparent ties to the party or government, such as doctors, dentists, pharmacists, teachers, nurses, lawyers, and engineers. Another branch would be mobile mentors and troupes. These people would consist of doctors, nurses, teachers, and agriculturists who would visit villages and remain in contact with rural areas. In the system suggested by Maral, these people would

152 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 o o, Box no: 1240 Folder no: 128 Row no: 1 p. 29.

153 Çakan, 2004, pp. 194-195.

154 1946 Yılında Halkevleri ve Halkodaları (Ankara, 1947), p. 15.

be paid for their services but in no way they would reveal that they are conducting propaganda. Their identities should even be kept from the organization of the party. While this report was merely the suggestions of a dentist who was only one member of the party, it serves to illuminate the viewpoint and mentality of a member of party members in that period.

A few examples from his report are remarkable in terms of the party's view of propaganda and people's view of the party in 1946, close to the end of the single-party period. Before the 1946 elections, Maral visited Yakupaptal – a mountain village of Çankaya – and observed that almost all villagers blamed the government and party for their miserable conditions; without exception all advocated for the Democrat Party. During his conversations, Maral learned that the Çankaya governmental doctor had served the village selflessly during an outbreak of scarlet fever. Maral asked that this young doctor serve as presiding officer on election day, and almost all the villagers voted for the RPP instead of the DP. Maral insisted on people's need for public services, because villagers rewarded those who served them with votes.

Maral's other interesting observation on propaganda concerned the Performances Branch of the People's Houses. Unlike doctors, public servers, nurses, judges, and agriculturists, when people from the performances branch visit a village, the results are negative, he argued. He expressed a complaint heard during one conversation: "Masters: they work a lot in the city, they get bored, and they come to villages – men and women all together – for a change of atmosphere and to have fun. We thank them. They have cars. They also have a lot of gasoline. Let them have fun, we don't mind. But we want doctors, judges, teachers, medicine, and nurses." Maral explained that there was a mobile obstetrician who used to come to the village especially for difficult births, but this service was annulled during the Second World War due to a lack of tires and gasoline. One of the most important complaints by villagers was that if Performances Branch could afford gasoline and cars to visit villages, why were resources not be deployed for basic services.¹⁵⁵

155 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 01, Box no: 572 Folder no: 2277 Row no: 1 pp. 1-16.

Halil Aytekin's story entitled *Köye Çıkan Konferansçılar* (Conference Speakers Who Went up to Village) published in issue 42 of *Yurt ve Dünya* (Nation and World) magazine on March 15, 1944, relates the cynical story of conference speakers who visited the town of Ç. A crew of five intellectuals traveled on a winter's day to teach peasants methods and ways of collaboration. They had filled their bags with books on economics and agriculture, pamphlets, pictures, and graphics. However, at the entrance to the village, their car got stuck in the mud. The intellectuals' prejudices and disdain for the peasants surfaced. Peasants, on the other hand, saw these people whose coats were each worth the value of an ox, and thought they worked for the Office for Soil Products (*Toprak Mahsulleri Ofisi*), and promptly disappeared.¹⁵⁶ The story, which reflected the reality of villages, was published in the last issue of *Yurt ve Dünya* before the magazine shut down.¹⁵⁷

Another aspect of the propaganda conducted through the People's Houses was that even non-members were assigned to conduct propaganda for the party. Mahmut Karındaş,¹⁵⁸ who visited the İçel People's House on April 17, 1947, read monologues and sang at the wedding party of a member of party held there. On April 23, Karındaş again participated in celebrations at the People's House, read monologues, and sang. Karındaş drew people's attention and they loved him. Chairman of the provincial administration board of the RPP Toroğlu reported to the Secretary General of the RPP that subjects chosen by Karındaş were not obviously pro-party, and people did not interpret it as propaganda.

Karındaş was a well-known storyteller in the phonograph period, but had a bad reputation in eastern cities of Turkey.¹⁵⁹ In 1930s Diyarbakır, he had served as a veterinary officer. At that time he made a record "mocking the

156 A comic strip of the period shows peasants who mishear the phrase "typhus came to the village" as "offices came to the village" relieved to discover it was actually typhus.

157 Halil Aytekin, "Köye Çıkan Konferansçılar", *Yurt ve Dünya*, vol. 5, no.42 (March 15, 1944), pp. 197-202.

158 Karındaş was a radio announcer on Ankara Radio in 1937.

159 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 o o, Box no: 1392 Folder no: 62 1 Row no: 1 p. 32.

people of Diyarbakır's everyday idioms and the local accent"; the record offended the people of Diyarbakır and they reacted.¹⁶⁰ Karındaş became employed by the RPP's Fifth Bureau on May 15, 1933, to instill principles of the revolution in the people. However, by the end of 1934 they decided that Karındaş was ineffective and he was dismissed.¹⁶¹ In 1936, he was appointed again to propagandize to the crowds during the İzmir Fair.¹⁶² In 1947, he undertook a propaganda trip to Gaziantep, Mardin, Diyarbakır, Elazığ, and Maraş. The fact that an artist who was disliked in eastern cities was sent to these same cities to conduct propaganda shows both the state's persistence and their lack of creativity.

Among the publications of the People's Houses were many magazines. Their purpose was to advance local culture through studies of folklore.¹⁶³ The magazine of the Ankara People's House, *Ülkü* (*Principle*), was published from 1933 to 1950. *Ülkü*'s purpose was to internalize the Six Arrows in the people.¹⁶⁴ Zafer Toprak assesses *Ülkü* as a magazine with a mission. In its first year, a report in *Varlık* magazine claimed "*Ülkü* worked for the people and for national awakening, but did not address people directly; instead, it addressed intellectuals who would mentor people – people who had at least finished middle school."¹⁶⁵ Aside from *Ülkü*, the People's Houses published their own magazines to communicate developments in their region and the party's principles. The reach and efficiency of these magazines would need to be the subject of specific study.

160 Şeyhmus Diken, *Resmi Türk Kimliğinden Özgür Yurttaşlığa*, 24 September 2011, <http://bianet.org/biamag/siyaset/132928-resmi-turk-kimliginden-ozgur-yurttasliga>

161 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 100, Box no: 382 Folder no: 1617 Row no: 7 pp. 1-8.

162 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 01, Box no: 1882 Folder no: 1624 Row no: 1 p. 8.

163 Zafer Toprak, "Türkiye'de Fikir Dergiciliğinin Yüz Yılı", in *Türkiye'de dergiler, ansiklopediler, 1849-1984* (İstanbul: Gelişim Yayınları, 1984), p. 38.

164 Toprak, 1984, p. 38.

165 *Ülkü Bir Yaşında*, *Varlık*, no. 15 (February 15, 1934), p. 240.

§ 3.3 “Ministry of Propaganda” of the Single-Party Period: Directorate General of the Press

Right after the Reichstag fire on February 27, 1933, in Germany the *Verordnung des Reichspräsidenten zum Schutz von Volk und Staat* (Reichstag Fire Decree), which abolished the freedoms of expression, of the press, and of assembly, was issued. Thirteen days after the decree was issued, the *Reichsministerium für Volksaufklärung und Propaganda* (Reich Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda) was established under the directorship of philosophy professor Dr. Joseph Goebbels. Just after Goebbels assumed his duties, he united the publishing and press department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the new propaganda ministry. Complete control over publishing and the press was seen as essential for effective politics.¹⁶⁶ Aside from the press, the ministry controlled radio, film, arts, and literature; in short all media of mass communication.

Did anyone think of establishing such a ministry in Turkey in 1933? Given the Law on the Press enacted in July 1931, the press was already controlled by the government and publications deemed against the interests of the country could be closed down. Hıfzı Topuz characterized the Directorate General of the Press as a body of press control conducted by political power. In 1925, the press was effectively censored with the Maintenance of Order Law. Press control was scaled back in 1929 when the law was repealed, but the first Law on the Press legislated enacted in 1931 reactivated suppression of the fourth estate. In Germany, Goebbels was dictating to editors of daily newspapers what to write; meanwhile the influence of the RPP over the press cannot be belittled.

At the First Assembly of the Press gathered on May 25, 1935, Vedat Nedim Tör, the Director General of the Press, expressed the idea differently as “ensuring consonance between the national press, potential of the revolution, the politics of the state, and the needs of the nation.” In a way, the directorate wished the press to become government mouthpieces.¹⁶⁷ All dissonant voices in the press were immediately warned, and curtailed.

166 Aronson and Pratkanis, 1992, pp. 318-319.

167 Yetkin, 1983, p. 71.

Almost studies on the DGP focus on the censorship of newspapers and magazines during the Second World War. It is not possible to study the directorate and leave the institution's primary duty aside. Especially during the Second World War, the directorate shifted its responsibilities from propagandizing on behalf of the single party and the regime to preventing counter propaganda and alternative voices. As Aldous Huxley emphasizes: "Propaganda's biggest victory was attained by doing some things while banning other activities. Truth is very important; however, from a practical perspective, shutting the truth up is a much greater success."¹⁶⁸

In 1936, control over radio passed definitively to state. Even though cinema did not fall under the state's monopoly, by 1939 the scripts of domestic films, final filmic products, and foreign films were subject to a mechanism of state control – in other words, censorship.

Propaganda in the field of literature was not as organized as the one in Germany, although many authors close to the ruling class produced works to reinforce faith in the regime. In Republican literature, which can be seen as a continuation of National Literature of the Second Constitutional Period (*İkinci Meşrutiyet*), revolution, the War of Independence, and the Republican government were the subject of many books. Writers of the period acted as a bridge to make sense of reforms and publicize the new order. Whether there was an organic tie between the literary world and state leaders in terms of regime propaganda has rarely been discussed or researched. However, when prominent authors of the period are considered, most had political identities; many eminent novelists of the period contributed to *Kadro* and *Ülkü*.

To mention a few: Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, an important figure of the national campaign and a member of second and twelfth parliaments, was among the founders of *Kadro* and the *Anadolu Agency* (*Anadolu Ajansı*, hereafter AA). When necessary, he became an "unwilling diplomat." Especially during the Second World War, alternative and particular leftist voices were suppressed, and there was no freedom in literature either.

Another prominent name in Turkish literature, Reşat Nuri Güntekin, was the MP from Çanakkale from 1939 to 1946. In subsequent years he was appointed to *Ulus* newspaper, then to the Turkish Embassy in Paris, and finally

168 Quoted from Foreword of Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World* (1946), in Abadan, 1956, p. 46.

to the Istanbul City Theater. In his novels, the heroes struggle with growing pains stemming from the new Turkish spirit. In Güntekin's novel *Eski Hastalık* (*Old Illness*), an internal struggle between the heroes, Yusuf and Züleyha, is an exact manifestation of the value struggle in Republican Turkey.¹⁶⁹

The young Turkish Republic also wished to use art as a medium of propaganda, and worked to that end within the bounds of possibility. One of the most known examples reflecting the revolution in painting is Zeki Faik İzer's *İnkılâp Yolunda* (*On the Way to Revolution*), which was painted for the tenth anniversary of Republic Day. The painter Ali Sami (Boyar), in an article entitled "Propaganda and Painting" written in *Ülkü* in 1934, mentioned that the purpose of future, young Turkish painters is to directly serve national goals. According to Boyar, there was a need for propaganda painters who could grasp the essence of national goals.¹⁷⁰ In an article published in *Arkitekt* magazine about the Revolution Painting and Sculpture Exhibition that opened in the Ankara People's House in 1936, it was suggested that the government should intervene in this branch of art in a more organized way. It was considered that "raising young artists of the Revolution by commissioning them on every occasion" would be beneficial for national culture.¹⁷¹ The General Secretariat of the RPP began a project called the Domestic Painters' Tours (*Yurt içi Ressam Gezileri*) in 1938. The idea was Vedat Nedim Tör's and it was realized with the support of Şükrü Kaya. Prominent painters such as Elif Naci, Şefik Bursalı, and Nurullah Berk participated. The purpose was to ensure that painters knew every corner of the country, thus establishing a more realistic national spirit of art.¹⁷² As a result of these tours, the party amassed a collection of paintings portraying every city of the country. Painters were paid and their travel expenses were compensated. Expositions were organized and albums were prepared at the end of the tours. In 1942, only four years after the project started,

169 Taylan Altuğ, *Bir Ruh Kimliği- Reşat Nuri Güntekin* (Istanbul: İnkilap, 2005), p. 104.

170 Sami, 1934, p. 47.

171 "Ankara Halkevinde İnkılab Resim ve Heykel Sergisi", *Arkitekt*, Year: 6, 1936, p. 340.

172 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 0 0, Box no: 2013 Folder no: 7 Row no: 1 p. 102.

forty painters were sent to forty cities, resulting in a collection of 393 paintings.¹⁷³ On July 12, 1940, the Director of the Fine Arts Academy sent a letter to the General Secretariat of the RPP revealing an interesting finding: the only buyer of paintings in Turkey was the state – i.e., public institutions. Painters were essentially living off of the state's and party's donations. It was suggested to open a store in a populous place like Beyoğlu to sell paintings so that – just as in Europe – the art of painting would transcend the support of the state. Painters would stand on their own and the people would be educated in art and encouraged to buy works of art.¹⁷⁴

Consider Lenin's notion of the government as sponsor and protector of artists in Soviet Russia:

In a society based on private property the artist produces goods for the market: he needs buyers. Our revolution has freed artists from the yoke of these highly prosaic conditions. It has transformed the Soviet state into their protector and their customer. Every artist, anyone who considers himself as such, has the right to create freely, according to his ideal, independent of anything else. But you must understand that we are Communists. We should not stand by with our arms folded and let chaos develop in all directions. We should guide this process and mould its results fully and systematically. We are still far, very far, from doing this.¹⁷⁵

The DGP controlled and inspected publications, the press, film, and radio and ensured that related laws were abided by; at the same time, it wished to create a contemporary, modern, rational Turkey – the one in Republic's mind and in the framework of their ideals – and worked to that end. In 1931, the title of an architectural magazine published by Zeki Sayar was initially *Mimar* (*Architect*). However, a letter of the DGP asked him to change the Arabic title. After 1935, the title became *Arkitekt*. (While *Mimar* is a word commonly used in

173 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 01, Box no: 2015 Folder no: 17 Row no: 2 p. 79.

174 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 0 0, Box no: 2013 Folder no: 7 Row no: 1 p. 54.

175 Taylor, 1998, p. 19.

Turkish, *Arkitekt* is not.)¹⁷⁶ This request by the DGP shows that the state institution responsible for propaganda had the right to decide what was and was not acceptable.

As mentioned above, control of much of mass communication was held by the state. However, the organization over this area was clearly not as developed as the organizations of propaganda in other authoritarian regimes of the period. After the war, in 1951, Professor Selahattin Ertürk complained in *İkinci Dünya Savaşında Yer Altında Savaş* that propaganda was neglected in Turkey. Ertürk claimed there was neither organized propaganda inside nor outside the country. He argued that the limited activities of the few employees of the DGP were confined to answering anti-Turkey articles published abroad.¹⁷⁷ Ertürk's perception was that the DGP's activities were insufficient. However, especially during the Second World War, it is evident that in terms of the number of employees and budget, the capacity of the directorate was that of a medium sized ministry.

In this section I analyze the first and second periods of the DGP to understand its role and contribution in foreign and domestic propaganda. There have been no studies thus far on the history of the Directorate of the Press (DGP). Since its archive is neither formally held by the current Directorate General of the Press and Information (*Basın Yayın ve Enformasyon Genel Müdürlüğü*, hereafter DGPI) nor by the Republican Archive – or more accurately, since researchers are not allowed access to the archive – such a research has not yet been possible.

Before analyzing the role of the DGP in state propaganda activities, it is necessary to explain the situation of Turkish archives and point out the enigma of the DGP archives. I struggled more than five years to learn the full situation of the DGPI archives. The contemporary response to the researchers who inquire is that the present DGPI archive contains only documents after the 1980s. The institution's photography archive contains slides from the 1940s mostly taken by Othmar Pferschy. The majority of DGPI officials claim they

176 Yeşilkaya, 1999, p. 114.

177 Selahattin Ertürk, *İkinci Dünya Savaşında Yer Altında Savaş* (Ankara: Berikan, 2004), p. 65. The first edition of the book was published in 1951.

have no information about what happened to the earlier archives of the institution. The institution often changed locations and one former employee, Fethi Kardeş, claims that the archives, newspaper collection, and library of the institution were not properly protected during these relocations. Kardeş states that during one relocation, older records and folders were transferred into storage in a transmitter station in Etimesgut; when the station needed that storage space, these archives disappeared. In 2007, the DGPI moved to its new building in Balgat from its building on Atatürk Boulevard.

In 1986, Dr. Osman Murat Güvenir of Başkent University, who was then researching for his dissertation on the Turkish press during the Second World War, was able to access the documents in the DGPI archives. How did he get in? The key to a warehouse, situated on the ground floor of the DGPI at the time, was lent to him. In the warehouse were unclassified documents in sacks, presumably from the era after 1928. Güvenir, who had possession of the key to the warehouse for a month, had the chance to review and use these DGPI documents for his dissertation. Though he is not aware of the custody of those documents after he returned the key, he is quite sure that the archival documents are still at the institution.

During the same period, Prof. Dr. Korkmaz Alemdar accessed the DGPI archives to do research upon the invitation of the head of the directorate. Alemdar states that the documents were placed in the institution's garage due to a lack of space and were probably later destroyed. However, according to an employee who worked in the DGPI more recently, these documents are still at the directorate, unclassified and untidied. This employee claims that nobody outside is allowed access since the staff of the institution is not aware of the whereabouts or content of anything in this unorganized pile of documents. Other researchers searching for this archive have the general opinion that the institution's own staff are benefiting from the archive for their own publications and research.

Neither Güvenir nor Alemdar encountered documents in old Turkish during their research in the DGPI archive. This suggests that the archive to which they had access probably belonged to the DGP's second reincarnation after 1931. They both mention that the archive included many documents that revealed the relationship between the press and DGP, especially during the Sec-

ond World War. A separate folder was opened for each publication by the directorate, and all documents related to the given publication were kept in it. According to Güvenir, folders were organized chronologically, though some folders were missing documents. For example, *Cumhuriyet* newspaper's documents starting in 1935 were missing the period from 1939 to 1945. This suggests that some documents of the archive were purposefully destructed. It was also practice to open a separate folder for every journalist who received a press card. When the journalist died, documents related to his card were taken from his folder and thrown into the archive. For this reason, this glassless and airless archive was also called "morgue" by some.

Given the lamentable situation of the DGPI archives, I take a brief look at studies focusing on the DGP. The most comprehensive study of its history is *Türkiye'de Matbuat İdareleri ve Politikaları (Directorates of the Press and Their Politics in Turkey)* written by Server İskit, a veteran of the DGP. The book was published in 1943 and contains details of the DGP's different periods, mission, and employees until 1943. The author Server İskit worked at the DGP between 1926 and 1927 and in the Department of Publications in Turkish between 1934 and 1944. İskit gives a brief history of Turkish press from the Tanzimat until 1943. Though he claimed objectivity, he was unsuccessful as he was writing on the institution where he worked.



Figure 3.6 Server İskit, *Radyo*, 1942, no. 12, p. 23.

Another study on the DGP was published in 1980, again by an employee of the directorate, Fethi Kardeş. The book tells the sixty-year history of the directorate from 1920 to 1980.¹⁷⁸ In his book, Kardeş focuses on different periods of the DGP supplemented by interviews made with old employees who were alive in 1980, offering an important set of data that cannot be found elsewhere.

Turgut Er, another employee of the DGP, published two books on the directorate. His work differs from the studies above. Er worked as the Director General of DGPI and as the president of the Press Department. In his book published in 2003, Er offers an analysis based on archival documents. The book he published in 2014 after he retired concerns censorship between 1938 and 1945, and Er used archival documents from this period which cannot be

178 Fethi Kardeş, *Matbuat ve İstihbarat Müdüriyet-i Umumiyesi, Matbuat Umum Müdürlüğü, Basın- Yayın ve Turizm Genel Müdürlüğü, Basın- Yayın Genel Müdürlüğü: 60 yılın hikâyesi* (Ankara: Basın Yayın Genel Müdürlüğü, 1980)

found elsewhere.¹⁷⁹ Er shares the original archival documents in his book, but since the archive has not been catalogued, the documents are not numbered. In the related parts, I benefited from this archival documents. Therefore, I have noted the dates and correspondence numbers written on the document in my footnotes. Employees have access to these archival documents; the fact that other scholars working on the subject do not shows the difficulties of archival scholarship in Turkey.

3.3.1 *First Period of the Directorate General of the Press: 1920 to 1931*

The main institution that the young Turkish Republic founded to manage propaganda activities was the Directorate General of the Press. The DGP was opened in June 7, 1920, three years before republic was proclaimed and one and a half months after the GNAT was opened – upon the request of Mustafa Kemal. It was called the “Directorate General of the Press and Intelligence” (*Matbuat ve İstihbarat Müdüriyet-i Umumiyesi*, hereafter DGPIN) and was under the president of the GNAT and the prime minister.

Parliamentary archives suggest that before the DGPIN was established, there was an organization led by Kazım Karabekir – founded upon the orders of Mustafa Kemal – working on propaganda and enlightenment. The so-called Committee of Illumination (*İrşad Encümeni*) was informing the public on the necessity of the War of Independence, and representatives of the committee were sent to various corners of the country to carry out its purposes, as necessary.¹⁸⁰ The Committee of Illumination’s justification for the foundation of the directorate was very clear. One of the main reasons for the catastrophic state of the country was negligence in the forming of domestic and foreign public opinion in line with the nation’s interests. A political and conceptual think- tank – that would be as effective as weaponry in defending national interests – did not yet exist in Turkey, though the smallest countries in Europe

179 O. Murat Güvenir released the archival documents he used in his dissertation and his book entitled *Siyasal İktidarın Basını Denetlemesi ve Yönlendirmesi: 2. Dünya Savaşında Türk Basını* (*Supervision of the Press by Political Government: Turkish Press During the Second World War*) published in 1991.

180 Kardeş, 1980, p. 15.

deployed large organizations working on this subject.¹⁸¹ Turkey needed an institution in this field, but debate over the law took a long time. Yunus Nadi, Chairman of the Committee of Illumination, tried to answer those who opposed or had reservations about the law.

Those who opposed it had two rationales. The first consisted of financial reservations. Without respect to its benefits, the DGPIN was seen an additional cost. Others who opposed took issue with the role of the directorate with respect to control of the press; they argued there was already a law regarding the press enacted by the government of Istanbul.¹⁸² Nadi answered the opposition thusly:

In our time, winning public opinion through domestic and foreign propaganda, with the might of ideas, has become as important as the might of armies. The press has long been called the fourth power. We need such an organization, and debating it is futile. On the subject of the Directorate of the Press in Istanbul and related law: there is a law on the press and printing. This law concerns how newspapers are published and how they are closed. What we are asking for is much more complicated. We want to defend and prove our just cause to the outside and internally unite the whole nation around the same cause and purpose.¹⁸³

A member of the Committee of Illumination, Mustafa Necati Bey, spoke after Nadi and said they could only defend against interventions from within Istanbul and from abroad with propaganda. He gave examples of Greece's activities. Necati Bey said that current conditions and the current political situation were not explained properly even within the country; villages, districts, and even whole provinces were not aware of the basics of the *Kuvâ-yi Milliye Teşkilatı* (*National Forces*). The word propaganda was explicitly used in the discussion. During the debate, Abdullah Azmi Efendi, an MP from Eskişehir, was

181 Kardeş, 1980, p. 9.

182 In 1864, regulation of the press was enacted, borrowing from Napoléon's 1852 Law on the Press. The first law in 1864 established the Press Directory. Ohannes Pasha from Chios was the first director.

183 Kardeş, 1980, p. 12.

skeptical about the use of the word. He said propaganda was used to convince people that something unjust was actually just. What they actually needed was to explain the truth, in other words illuminate.¹⁸⁴

The law's preamble written by the Illumination Committee further explains the field of activity of the DGPIN. The first purpose of the directorate was "to publicize realized and soon to be realized actions of our nation to foreigners and try to prove the justness of our cause." The second was to use "all and every means to enlighten and warn people in order to unite our nation." It is said that the preamble was dictated by Mustafa Kemal himself, and later it is expressed that the directorate is as important as weapons for defending a just and legitimate cause.¹⁸⁵

Tunalı Hilmi Bey, an MP from Bolu, strongly supported the law in parliament. Tunalı Hilmi Bey stated there was a deficiency in the field of propaganda, and he claimed this was because of the attitude inherited from the Ottoman State. According to him, great nations do not stoop to open their mouths and talk.¹⁸⁶

The DGP, which was established on April 6, 1920, under the directorship of Yunus Nadi, and the AA, established under the directorship of Halide Edib, are the two pioneer institutions in the organization of propaganda. On June 8, 1920, the AA was incorporated under the DGP.¹⁸⁷ It can be interpreted that the DGP – which began work right after the national assembly while the War of Independence was still actively going on – was part of the founding superstructure of the burgeoning nation. A new nation-state needed an organization to publicize it domestically and abroad. The AA's primary purpose was to spread the news about the Ankara government in and outside of the country. The establishment of these institutions coincided with the institutionalization of mass communication.

The first article of the law on the DGPIN stated that the directorate would work on domestic and foreign publications, warnings, and intelligence. The

184 Kardeş, 1980, pp. 12-13.

185 Kardeş, 1980, p. 3.

186 Korkmaz Alemdar, *İletişim ve Tarih* (Ankara: İmge Yayınları, 1996), pp. 61-66.

187 On March 1, 1925, the AA became a joint-stock company. Özgür Gönenç, *Agence France Presse ve Anadolu Ajansı'nın Karşılaştırılması*, İstanbul: İstanbul Üniversitesi İletişim Fakültesi Yayınları, 2001, p. 59.

law indicated that the directorate could use all the means of the Council of Ministers, and expenses were to be decided by the chairman himself upon approval of the Prime Minister. Aside from the General Manager and the Manager of the AA, the institution was to have eight other employees.

The first General Manager of the directorate was – meaningfully – Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver, who also was an MP. Tanrıöver possessed the relevant capacity for this position due to his past as president of the Turkish Hearths since 1913. He was experienced in the organization and operation of such an institution and knew how to produce public discourse to mobilize the people. Tanrıöver had worked to increase the consciousness of nationalism in Turkish society within the Turkish Hearths following the Balkan Wars.

The first office of the directorate was in the present Governor's Building (*Ankara Valiliği*) in Ankara, from which all ministries worked at the time. There is almost no information on the DGP's – and hence the AA's – activities between 1920 and 1925. It is known that the first action of the directorate concerned Anatolian newspapers, to make sure they were served the news. However, the directorate itself had problems obtaining the news. They received foreign news via military radio and communicated appropriate stories to the domestic press. Pamphlets printed by the directorate were distributed to villages and read at local coffee shops. From October 7, 1920, onward, the directorate began publishing the *Resmî Ceride* (*Official Gazette*). Another responsibility of the DGPIN was the *Hâkimiyet-i Milliye* newspaper. During its first period, the DGPIN had representatives abroad: Dr. Nihat Reşat Belger in Paris, Zekeriya Sertel in New York, and Ahmet İhsan Tokgöz in Switzerland, as well as other representatives in Vienna, London, and Berlin.¹⁸⁸

Remarkable personages worked for the directorate in both the first and second periods. Ercüment Ekrem was engaged as director in three different times.¹⁸⁹ İsmail Hakkı Bey, the former consul to Antwerp, was appointed to the Translation Department of the DGP.¹⁹⁰ The post of General Manager was

188 Kardeş, 1980, pp. 17-23.

189 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Joint Decrees Catalogue, Cat. no: 030 11 1 0, Box no: 2 Folder no: 7 Row no: 10 pp. 1-4.

190 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Joint Decrees Catalogue, Cat. no: 030 11 1 0, Box no: 50 Folder no: 25 Row no: 11 p. 2.

offered to Ahmet Emin Yalman in November 1921, but he rejected the offer saying he could be more useful as a journalist.¹⁹¹

Zekeriya Sertel acted as General Manager of the directorate for a short period from September 1923 to November 1923. In his memoir, Sertel provides information that illuminates this period of the DGPIN. He had taken over this post from Ahmet Ağaoğlu, who was subsequently appointed as Editor in Chief of *Hâkimiyet-i Milliye*. When Sertel assumed the post, the directorate general, which was established during wartime, was still in a primitive condition. They mostly observed the press, translated foreign news for MPs, and occasionally published short newsletters. When Sertel took over, his primary focus was communicating world news to statesmen.¹⁹² He began publishing *Ayın Tarihi* (*History of the Month*) as a publication of DGPIN. Sertel had studied journalism in the United States and had witnessed the system there. Conditions in Turkey seemed deficient and insufficient to him. In this first period, the DGPIN was not fully institutionalized. Expenses were not regularly accounted for, which became a subject of debate in parliament.¹⁹³

The DGPIN started to operate under the supervision of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs after the enactment of Law 79 dated December 25, 1920, and continued as such until 1931. According to the law, the domestic press would be handled by the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Why was the directorate established on June 1920, affiliated with GNAT and the prime minister, then attached to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the end of December? The latter date is right after the Treaty of Alexandropol (*Gümrü Antlaşması*) which permitted Turkey to close down the eastern front and is considered the first military and political success of the GNAT. When the national campaign began in Anatolia, the war was against foreigners; after the first success of the GNAT, foreign propaganda became a priority. The directorate operated under the direction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs until its closure in 1931.

191 Kardeş, 1980, p. 26.

192 Zekeriya M. Sertel, *Hatırladıklarım (1905- 1950)* (Istanbul: Yaylacık Matbaası, 1968), pp. 106-107.

193 Alemdar, 1996, p. 71.

The DGPIN reopened in 1933. During this two years hiatus, a department under the Ministry of Internal Affairs assumed in the DGPIN's activities. When the budget of the directorate was transferred to Ministry of Internal Affairs, they had taken some of responsibilities. During this period, the Directorate General of Fourth Bureau working under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs continued informing the Prime Ministry on foreign news of interest to Turkey.¹⁹⁴

During the most turbulent years of the Republic, after the national campaign had ended and the Republic was proclaimed, to whom was the DGPIN's propaganda targeted? Since the DGPI's archives are unreachable, there is no information about the activities of the DGPIN in these years except for data offered in the books of former employees.

When incidents such as the Sheikh Said Rebellion, the establishment of the Progressive Republican Party, the İzmir Conspiracy, and the Menemen Incident occurred, the DGPIN's aim was foreign rather than domestic politics. However, the time had come to target internal affairs. This was the time of the Independence Tribunals. On December 5, 1923, when *Tanin*, *İkdam* and *Tevhid-i Efkar* published a letter sent by Indian Muslim leaders to İsmet İnönü, requesting the caliphate be reinforced, the government perceived it as a foreign intervention in internal affairs. Journalists who had written on the subject were declared traitors.¹⁹⁵ The reaction was unlike during the Second World War when the activities of newspapers were suspended; instead, Independence Tribunals were founded. On March 4, 1925, when the Maintenance of Order Law was enacted, the discussion of domestic propaganda became meaningless. Fear of the government abided; therefore, they did not concern themselves with regime propaganda targeting the public. They reigned with absolute discipline.

When the DGPIN was subordinated to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs until its closure in 1931, the Turkish Hearths – which had been revitalized after

194 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Directorate General of Transactions, Cat. no: 030 10, Box no: 234 Folder no: 575 Row no: 5 pp. 1-4.

195 Erik Jan Zürcher, *Cumhuriyetin İlk Yıllarında Siyasal Muhalefet: Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası*, trans. Gül Çağalı Güven (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2003), pp. 58- 59.

1922 – became an alternative, powerful initiative for domestic propaganda and mobilizing the public. Adopting an attitude against reactionism (*irtica*) as of 1925 and aspiring to establish Turkish as the spoken language were the major endeavors of the Turkish Hearths. They were successful in maintaining horizontal relationships with the public, especially in smaller localities.¹⁹⁶ In 1927, with the amendment of Turkish Hearths law, the hearths were unified with the political party, and during the General Assembly of the RPP, their organization was brought under the supervision of the party.¹⁹⁷ However, the party saw the hearths as a potential political adversary and left the hearths no room to influence their constituents.

The closure of the DGPIN, Server İskit says, happened its responsibilities had been diminished. The AA was separated from the DGPIN and became a corporation with the 1924 Budget Law. *Hâkimiyet-i Milliye* newspaper had no more ties with the DGPIN. From 1927, the *Official Gazette* had been published by the Directorate of Collections (*Başvekâlet Müdevvenat Müdürlüğü*) under the Prime Ministry.¹⁹⁸ According to İskit, the DGPIN had no responsibilities other than publishing *Ayın Tarihi*, printing foreign actualities on pamphlets, and preparing the annual yearbook of the state.¹⁹⁹ Another principal duty of the DGPIN was to follow the foreign press and prepare news bulletins for the prime ministry but it made few inroads into foreign publicity.

Şükrü Bey, an MP from Çanakkale, who spoke during the debates in parliament on the reopening of the directorate in 1933, said that the DGPIN had been occasionally successful and at other times did not work well. He added that when its staff decreased and the government loosened control the over press, discord in the national press appeared. During this debate, Şükrü Kaya argued the press should have been under the Ministry of Internal Affairs from the beginning; however, it was not possible due to budgetary constraints.²⁰⁰

196 Üstel, 2010, pp. 402-403.

197 Üstel 2010, p. 227.

198 Kardeş, 1980, p. 23.

199 Server Rifat İskit, *Türkiye’de Matbuat İdareleri ve Politikaları* (İstanbul: Tan Basımevi, 1943), pp. 256-257.

200 TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi (Minutes of the Turkish Grand National Assembly), Term 4, Vol. 15, (İçtima) Session 2, (İnikat) Conclusion 56, May 22, 1933, pp. 285- 286.

In 1928 and 1929 the budget of the DGPIN was generous, but in 1929, the salaries of employees decreased and the budget was reduced. Accordingly, responsibilities of the directorate were also carried out by people at the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and consulates and clerks at embassies began following the foreign press. In 1930 and 1931, no budget was allocated for the DGP in the annual state budget. With the 1929 Budget Law, the DGPIN had anyway stopped being a directorate and become a branch of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.²⁰¹ In June 1931, with the new budget, it was decided to annul the Directorate General of the Press and Intelligence. A letter sent from the Ministry of the Economy to the Prime Ministry on June 8, 1931, asked for its budget to be transferred from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Ministry of Internal Affairs starting in 1931. Discussion of the issue was undertaken by the budget committee, which made its suggestion to parliament.²⁰² Debates in parliament on the reestablishment of the directorate in 1933 further indicate who took up the DGP's affairs when it was closed. According to an explanation by Şükrü Bey, an MP from Çanakkale, during this period there was no organized department of the press at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the time. There was only a shoddy bureau working with a tiny budget.²⁰³

It is important to understand why the DGPIN ceased operations in 1931. The year was a milestone for the RPP since all powers had been united, and in a manner, regime propaganda had started to be institutionalized. The RPP's Third General Assembly took place in May 1931, and the directorate was abolished the next month. Why an important body for propaganda closed at such a time? The answer given to this question in various sources is financial difficulties. According to this view, a financially non-viable and insolvent institution was simply closed down.

The closure of an institution responsible for domestic and foreign propaganda during a period of strengthening and institutionalization cannot be explained by financial problems. Perhaps the answer to this question is in the

201 Kardeş, 1980, p. 27.

202 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Directorate General of Transactions, Cat. no: 030 10, Box no: 83 Folder no: 550 Row no: 14 p. 2.

203 TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Term 4, Vol. 15, Session 2, Conclusion 56, May 22, 1933, p. 285.

very strengthening and institutionalization of the party. The single-party regime wished to consolidate power in their hands, and even though it was a government body, they could not trust a directorate with its roots in the 1920s. In other words, by 1931, the RPP wished to create its own, new structures, and the DGPIN was deemed unnecessary and abolished.

In the period when the directorate was suspended, another significant development occurred. The directorate was abolished in June 1931, and Law 1881, the first law on the press in the Republic was enacted on July 25, 1931. This law gave the government the right to close down any media business and pull its publications off the shelves. According to the infamous Article 50, all newspapers and magazines that print “publications that harm the general politics of the country” could be suspended by a decision of Council of Ministers. The management of such publications were not permitted to publish a newspaper under a different name.

The two years that the directorate’s activities were suspended were an intermediate phase when the party was rewriting the rules of the state – or vice versa – and the necessary legislation for institutions like the DGP to function properly was enacted. Furthermore, the main components of party propaganda – People’s Houses and the Organization of Public Orators – were founded, radio was taken under state control, and the party began making propaganda films.

3.3.2 *Second Period of Directorate General of the Press: 1933 to 1945*

On May 22, 1933, Law numbered 2205 reopened the Directorate General of the Press (*Matbuat Umum Müdürlüğü*, hereafter DGP) under the Ministry of Internal Affairs.²⁰⁴ According to the law, the DGP would be “responsible for inspecting all newspapers, magazines, booklets, and such publications, separating out those that concern the state, informing the ministry, researching whether managers in the press have the qualities and conditions required by

204 The full name of the directorate was *T.C. Dâhiliye Vekâleti Matbuat Umum Müdürlüğü* (Turkish Republic Ministry of Internal Affairs Directorate General of the Press).

law, and monitoring press activities.”²⁰⁵ The term “such publications” included pamphlets but neither cinema nor radio.²⁰⁶ The mandate of the directorate was designated as intelligence and inculcation. However, according to Şükrü Kaya, inculcation would not be immediately possible due to the lack of organization.²⁰⁷

Debate on the law in parliament focused on two subjects. The first concerned whether following foreign news would be the responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or of the DGP, since the directorate would be operating under the Ministry of Internal Affairs.²⁰⁸ The second debate was the necessity of the General Manager of the DGP to be an expert in fields related to the mission of the directorate. After long debate, it was decided that this individual should be selected from among state officials and especially from among those in the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Only if no suitable candidate was found, would an outside person be hired. This was obviously the case since the Minister of Internal Affairs, Şükrü Kaya, offered the job to Vedat Nedim Tör in 1933.²⁰⁹ Prior to the assignment of Tör on October 6, 1933, Ali Server Suner and Mehmed Ekrem Severcan, Director General of Census and Chief of the Cabinet of the Ministry of Interior Affairs, respectively acted as acting directors.²¹⁰

In 1933, the DGP’s staff consisted of the General Manager, a principal consultant, four first- and three second-class consultants, two reporters, two chiefs, seven officials, and one clerk. The institution always had access to qualified staff and gathered prominent intellectuals of the period. Most of these personages continued their career in various bureaucratic or political posts

205 Law 1624 on the organization and duties of the Ministry of Internal Affairs reassigned internal press business formally managed by the Directorate General to the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

206 TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Term 4, Vol. 15, Session 2, Conclusion 56, May 22, 1933, p. 291.

207 TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Term 4, Vol. 15, Session 2, Conclusion 56, May 22, 1933, p. 287.

208 After the DGP emerged in 1933, the Department of Foreign Press (*Harici Matbuat Şubesi*) under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs continued its activities. Especially during the Second World War, they supplied the government with translations of foreign news provided by from Turkish embassies.

209 Vedat Nedim Tör, *Yıllar Böyle Geçti* (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1976), p. 20.

210 İskit, 1943, ps. 267, 269.

after their adventures with the DGP. Bülent Ecevit, right after he graduated from Robert College in 1945, started working at the DGP with a salary of 120 Turkish lira.²¹¹

Vedat Nedim Tör was an important figure in the DGP. He had been in various bureaucratic posts all his life: as a member of *Kadro* magazine, General Manager at the DGP, manager of the Directorate of Tourism, commissioner for Turkey at the New York World's Fair in 1939, and head of Ankara Radio... Tör resigned from the DGP in 1937 – or rather was forced to resign at the request of Şükrü Kaya.²¹² In his memoir entitled *Yıllar Böyle Geçti* (*How the Years Went By*), he characterizes himself as mesmerized by Kemalism, leaving it should work as an autonomous ideological system.²¹³ When studying in Berlin during the years of armistice, he deeply resented it when a professor describes the Ottoman State as a semi-colony, and his attitude toward anti-imperialists changed after this incident.²¹⁴ Later on he discovered Lenin, Marx, and Engels. In an editorial in *Son Telgraf* newspaper, published on January 14, 1925, Tör harshly criticized the RPP and the idea of “classless society.”²¹⁵ Tör was among the founders of the *Türkiye İşçi ve Çiftçi Sosyalist Fırkası* (Turkish Workers and Peasants Socialist Party) and was arrested during the Communist Suppression in 1927.

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- 211 In 1945, the cost of Cumhuriyet newspaper was 10 kuruş. Calculating from this, Ecevit's pro-rated salary would be about 1,200 Turkish Lira, which is close to minimum wage. Archive of the DGPP, Document no: 497 dated March 31, 1945. Turgut Er, *Türkiye'de Basın Yayın ve Tanıtma* (Ankara: Başbakanlık Basın-Yayın ve Enformasyon Genel Müdürlüğü, 2003), p. 225.
- 212 The story behind this resignation is that in a draft of the special issue of the Second Congress of Turkish History, reports of foreign scholars were given priority over the arguments of Turkish scholars. The president of Turkish Historical Society, Hasan Cemil Çambel was annoyed by the it and the incident escalated, leading to Tör's resignation.
- 213 During the DP's rule, Tör sent a letter to Adnan Menderes in August 1951 entitled “the Main Conditions of the Fight Against Reactionism.” In the letter, he stated that he is religiously loyal to Atatürk's reforms and regime and claimed that Menderes was the only power for escaping the dilemma of reactionary-reform. Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Prime Ministry Private Secretariat, Cat. no: 030 01, Box no: 41 Folder no: 243 Row no: 17 p. 2.
- 214 Tör, 1976, p. 5.
- 215 Vedat Nedim Tör, “Beklediğimiz Fırka”, trans. Yücel Demirel, *Toplumsal Tarih*, no. 1 (January 1994), p 50.

In 1929, Tör started working at the *Milli İktisat ve Tasarruf Cemiyeti* (Association of National Economy and Savings), which propagandized under the slogan: “Citizen! Use domestic products” (“*Vatandaş! Yerli malı kullan*”). Interestingly, Tör’s father Ahmed Nedim Servet Tör was a “propagandist” who edited pamphlets and poems aimed at patriotism and inviting Turks to unite economically against the Greeks in the aftermath of Balkan Wars.²¹⁶

During debates about the DGP law in parliament, MPs were aware that the staff of the directorate should have specific qualifications despite the general resolution to assign state officials rather than independent experts. In reality, Vedat Nedim Tör handled the administration of the directorate along with Burhan Asaf Belge. When Tör and Belge started to work at the DGP, they left posts at *Kadro* magazine, a year before Yakup Kadri was appointed as the Ambassador of Tirana. The collaboration of Tör and Belge with the state raises interesting questions. On one hand, Tör and Belge could not be considered as Kemalist intellectuals like Faliş Rıfki Atay or İsmail Hakkı Baltacıoğlu. Analyzing the *Kadro* movement, İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin referred to *Kadro*’s crew as early intellectuals in a recently enlightened country. These early intellectuals produced solutions for the country’s problems, published these, and expected political authorities to act in line with them.²¹⁷ As revealed with the *Kadro* incident, a certain distance was maintained between them and the state. Can we call Tör and Belge *organic intellectuals* of the RPP?

When Tör started as General Manager of the DGP in 1933, there were two other employees and the yearly budget of the directorate was 10 thousand Turkish lira. As soon as he started, Tör began working to increase the budget and staff and to reorganize the legislation. In his own words, he took an allowance from the discretionary fund of the minister and established a “small but mighty” staff consisting of Burhan Belge, Server İskit, and Nazlı Tektaş.²¹⁸ Nazlı Tektaş recounts those days thusly:

216 Murat Koraltürk, “Milli İktisat Propagandacısı Bir Babanın Kızı İçin Tuttuğu Günlük”, *Toplumsal Tarih*, no. 93 (September 2001), pp. 56-57. For a detailed account of the issue, see Zafer Toprak, “1913- 1914 Müslüman Boykotajı”, *Toplum ve Bilim*, no. 29/30 (Spring- Summer 1985): 179-199.

217 İlhan Tekeli and Selim İlkin, *Bir Cumhuriyet Öyküsü, Kadrolcuları ve Kadro’yu Anlamak* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, June 2003), p. x.

218 Tör, 1976, pp. 20-22.

Since there were no ministry buildings back then, government offices worked in old houses. The Directorate General of the Press had a room in the building of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the neighborhood of Ulus. There was a desk in the middle of this room, and we all worked on that desk. There was a pigeon nest in the attic. They often dirtied our hair and the documents through the cracks of the old hardwood. When the smoke of the stove burned our eyes, we opened the windows and continued work in spite of the freezing cold. The man who imbued us with this love of work was Vedat Nedim Tör. He came before everyone else in the morning and left at 8 p.m. at night. He worked without stopping. He strove to publicize Atatürk's newly founded Turkey both domestically and abroad.²¹⁹

As Tektaş notes the directorate first occupied the library and two small rooms of the building of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, but in the spring of 1934, they moved to the ministry's new building in Yenışehir, designed by the German architect Clemens Holzmeister.²²⁰ The Directorate occupied a nine room space on the lower level.²²¹ In 1940, after the directorate was legislatively restructured, and subordinated to the Prime Ministry, the directorate moved to Ernst Egli's *Koç Han* in Ulus Square.²²²

The budget of the directorate in 1933 was listed as 4,000 Turkish lira as line item under the budget of Ministry of Internal Affairs. In 1934, after new legislation and staff increases, the DGP's budget of 95,944 Turkish lira was included in the general state budget of 184,075,636 Turkish lira. Among other directorates that had private budgets outside ministries, the DGP's budget was the lowest. The budget of the Directorate General of Statistics' budget was 180,504 Turkish lira, for instance, and the budget of the Directorate General

219 *Kent Oyuncuları Dergisi: Vedat Nedim Tör Özel Sayısı*, no. 75 (1975), pp. 44-45.

220 Metin Sözen and Mete Tapan, *50. Yılında Türk Mimarisi* (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1973), p. 178.

221 *İskit*, 1943, p. 275.

222 *İskit*, 1943, p. 320.

of Maps was 603,505 Turkish lira.²²³ The annual budgets of the DGP between 1920 and 1945 were as follows:²²⁴

Table 3.2

1920	15,000	1928	465,275	1938	188,200
1921	75,689	1929	440,362	1939	188,000
1922	106,806	1933	4,000	1940	974,200
1923	106,805	1934	95,944	1941	1,092,682
1924	136,390	1935	11,390	1942	1,688,685
1925	616,688	1936	136,390	1943	2,328,191
1926	554,655	1937	186,009	1944	2,714,095
1927	494,068	1938	188,200	1945	4,020,729

NOTE: All values in Turkish lira

The budget allotted to the DGP was 188,000 Turkish lira in 1939, and in 1940, this increased to 974,200 Turkish lira. The reason was that radio, tourism, and intelligence were added to the responsibilities of the directorate by legislation enacted in 1940. From 1939 until the end of war, the DGP's budget would steadily increase due to increasing responsibilities and staff.

Even though the Directorate General of the Press was first established in 1920 just after the GNAT was opened, its real organization and strengthening came after 1934. This makes sense considering national and international conjuncture. Until 1930, many reforms were enacted but there was no consistent ideology or organization through which to communicate these to the people so that they would internalize the reforms.²²⁵ In Germany the Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda under the leadership of Goebbels had been

223 Menaf Turan, "1934: Devletçilik için Örgütlenme Yılı", *Açıklamalı Yönetim Zaman Dizini: 1929- 1939*, ed. Birgül A. Güler, Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Kamu Yönetimi Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi: 2 Türkiye Cumhuriyeti İdare Tarihi Araştırması (TİDATA), (Ankara: AÜ Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi KAYAUM Müdürlüğü, 2007), p. 533.

224 İskit, 1943, p. 370. Budgets of the years 1944 and 1945 were added from records of state budget.

225 Kongar, 2000, p. 143.

established on March 13, 1933. In Italy, the Secretary of the Press and Propaganda was established in 1933, taking the chairman Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda as a model. In 1935, the Secretariat turned into the Ministry of Propaganda, which worked functionally as the Ministry of Popular Culture. From 1937 until 1944.

On October 6, 1933, Vedat Nedim Tör gave a public statement defining the responsibilities of the DGP:

It is known that the Directorate General of the Press under the Ministry of Internal Affairs was established by Law 2205. It is apparent how useful and important are the responsibilities of departments that monitor and inspect the press in the name of state. Especially in countries that have been through a revolution, there is no need to emphasize how intensely public media like the press, radio, theater, and cinema are monitored, guided, and directed. The new directorate general aims to be equipped with the most modern materials and instruments. Furthermore, the press is the center of culture. Our esteemed President called for the mobilization of culture of all literate Turkish citizens on the tenth anniversary of Republic Day. He declared that we would take our national culture above other contemporary civilizations. In Turkey, a country of revolution, any day on the order and sign of our Great Chief, this mobilization will spread to all hearts. The Turkish press will not be outside this mobilization; it will be in the middle, working with great efficiency.

The new directorate general will try to achieve its duty and responsibility in this matter. However, success cannot just come from the work, intervention, and instructions of this organization.

It will be the shared work of this organization and those for whom it is responsible that will help carry out the orders of our Chief. The perfect, methodical work of the directorate general as well as the decision of all newspapers, magazines, radio, cinema, and theaters to embrace the principle of revolution will be required, so that all press and publications in Turkey appear rational and mature from the inside and united and clear from the outside. Therefore, we invite all such ventures to work closely with the directorate general, knowing that this

collaboration will be effectual. The directorate general will look for solutions to make sure our collaboration is effective.²²⁶

A year after it was reopened by legislation dated May 26, 1934, the DGP's responsibilities and organization were defined. According to the law, the DGP's staff would consist of twenty people: a general manager, a principal consultant, four first- and three second-class consultants, two reporters, four chiefs, three officials, and two clerks. Including the general manager and the principal consultant, fourteen of this staff was paid and six of were state officials.²²⁷ To work at the DGP one had to have certain qualities like speaking a foreign language. But at the same time, the job required specialization and expertise. Clearly it was not possible to succeed with only existing state officials; therefore, independent experts were hired.

Debate on the law gives information on the former DGP and its position, as well. Sadri Maksudi Aral, an MP from Şebinkarahisar, said during the debate that the DGP had been focused on inspection up until that time; however, from then on it was understood that it would become an influential, proactive venture. During the debate, Minister of Internal Affairs Şükrü Kaya gave a long speech expressing the necessity of the directorate and what would be expected of it. At the beginning of his speech, he reminded his audience of what was said during the first parliament in 1920. He noted that the institution was given great importance, but did not perform as expected because its requirements were not met. In other words, it was an issue of resources.²²⁸ According to Kaya all newspapers earned nationalist and reformist characters while on battle fields. Most owners were with them in the struggle and those who were not shared the same opinions and conscience. According to Kaya, the GNAT and the government of the Republic are the mind of national principle. And newspapers are its tongue. If the tongue cannot express what the mind is thinking, this is due to distance between the tongue and the mind.²²⁹ The DGP was designed to reduce this distance. Referring to censorship in the era of

226 İskit, 1943, pp. 270- 272.

227 Archive of the DGPP and Duties of Directorate General of the Press, no: 2444, p. 311.

228 TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Term 4, Vol. 22, Session: 3, Conclusion 57, May 26, 1934, pp. 271- 272.

229 TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Term 4, Vol. 22, Session: 3, Conclusion 57, May 26, 1934, pp. 271- 273.

Abdülhamit, Kaya recalled “at school we were shouting for freedom of the press. We have never thought of limiting the freedom of press.”

According to legislation numbered 2444, the DGP’s responsibilities were defined as: ²³⁰

- 1 To following domestic and foreign publications from inside and outside of political, economic, social, and cultural movements;
- 2 To make sure the national press follows the principles of revolution, the state’s politics, and the needs of the nation;
- 3 To take precautions to prevent ideas adverse to the principles of nationality and democracy in our country and to fight such occurrences through publications;
- 4 To take precautions to ensure the press is a medium of inculcation and education;
- 5 To take precautions to increase the level of national journalism (journalism classes, an Association and Club for members of the Press Union, organization of press conventions, etc.)
- 6 To publicize Turkey abroad and ensure the fight against negative propaganda;
- 7 To publish in their own field;
- 8 To ensure application of the Law on the Press;
- 9 To maintain vocational contact and relations with international press organizations; and
- 10 To inspect public mediums such as radio, film, and theater.

The directives of the Ministry of Education would be taken under notice on the inspection of radio, theater, and cinema as mentioned in Item 10 of the law.

The third item of the law was added upon the suggestion of Sadri Maksudi Aral, an MP from Şebinkarahisar, during the debate. According to Aral, it was needed to take precautions to protect the national philosophy. He said that Hitler in Germany, Mussolini’s party in Italy, and the Communist Party in the Soviet Union all took precautions to protect their national philosophy. According to Aral, the principles of the Communist Party were retold by Soviet poets and constantly shared in conferences and on the radio. According to

230 Law on the Organization and Duties of Directorate General of the Press.

Aral there were happenings that could harm “our national philosophy and national program.” To prevent this, national principles and the party’s platform should be announced and the principles of the revolution should be spread even to the villages.²³¹

As Tör noted in his speech, the DGP was expected to carry out its responsibilities in collaboration with ministries and other offices. On July 2, 1934, the Minister of Internal Affairs, Şükrü Kaya, sent a letter to the Prime Ministry to inform it that the Directorate General of the Press would be starting propaganda activities. Ministries were expected to send their directives on what they wished to be propagandized in the domestic and foreign presses – supported with related written material and images – to the DGP.²³²

There were three services under the auspices of the DGP: intelligence, publications, and propaganda. These services each had as many bureaus as necessary. The responsibilities of these services were defined in 1934:²³³

- 1 To serve State’s general principles in domestic and foreign politics as well as its actions to general public in their respective importance; to ensure strengthening of national culture and national morality, and the application of directives given to the press according to the Law on the Press, the accuracy of news, and to monitor foreign provocations and propaganda;
- 2 To follow foreign publications to see the dispositions of other countries in global politics and their manifestations in internal politics, their relations with Turkey, and their cultural activities;
- 3 To prepare and gathering various documents required to prepare the daily newsletters of the DGP, (*Ayin Tarihi*), the yearbook, publications for abroad, and pamphlets;
- 4 To convey the directives of the DGP to related people through newsletters as well as by telephone and telegram;
- 5 To prepare daily newsletters, articles, *Ayin Tarihi*, yearbook, and pamphlets;
- 6 To prepare propaganda media that will be conducted abroad;
- 7 To coordinate radio propaganda in the country;

231 TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Term 4, Vol. 22, Session 3, Conclusion 57, May 26, 1934, pp. 271- 272.

232 Prime Ministry’s Republican Archive, Catalogue of Directorate General of Transactions, Cat. no: 030 10, Box no: 84 Folder no: 553 Row no: 19 p. 1.

233 Article 2 of Law on the Organization and Duties of Directorate General of the Press.

- 8 To take advantage of opportunities to use radio abroad for propaganda;
- 9 To control domestic film scripts and foreign films;
- 10 To commission scripts;
- 11 To supervise repertoires of national theaters;
- 12 To classify and safeguard documents, pictures, newspaper and magazine collections, clippings, books, and correspondences on all countries and concerning all incidents; and
- 13 To ensure the implementation and monitoring of this law through DGP representatives or correspondents who work under the governor in the required provinces.

Through a law enacted in May 1934, the directorate became responsible for both domestic and foreign propaganda, assumed the responsibility for enforcing the law on the press, and took over supervision of the content of mass communication media such as cinema and radio. According to İskit, the newly organized directorate was not as passive as the old one. It undertook many activities with regard to the press publications, and later radio, photography, and cinema. İskit notes that its primary mission was to protect national existence and the Republican regime, as well as to guarantee the efficacy of policies adopted during the Second World War.

It is evident that the focus of the responsibilities of the DGP concerned the press. The most studied subject concerning the DGP is its role in the relationship between the press and the government during the Second World War.

Before the new legislation, the directorate was serving news and domestic propaganda prepared by Server İskit to the domestic press. With the new organization this practice ended: the achievements of the government and happenings were communicated through *Ayın Tarihi*, which was published in a new format starting in January 1934.²³⁴ In short, domestic propaganda was propagated through *Ayın Tarihi*, and foreign propaganda was made through *La Turquie Kémaliste* magazine.

Towards the end of the 1930s, the DGP was sharing a news bulletin entitled *Basınların Havası* (*Atmosphere of the Press*) with the domestic press. These bulletins consisted of news on Turkey published in the foreign press. It was

234 İskit, 1943, p. 272.

noted on the bulletins that this news was not being distributed for republishing, but to inform the domestic press. It was said in case these news would be published, newspapers should consider the state's internal and foreign politics.²³⁵

The main motivation of the ruling class was to protect the regime and the revolution and taking precautions against "malevolent" and oppositional press was a necessity. Falih Rifkî Atay expressed this openly in an article written for *Ulus* newspaper on June 1, 1938:

Against those who want to prevent new Turkey's independence movement, we had to take serious precautions. Even though our revolution is the most solid among post-war revolutions, precautions we took are weak compared to those of other countries that had revolutions... Again, among countries that had revolutions Turkey limited freedom of thought the least...²³⁶

There is a similar evaluation in İskit's book, as well. According to him, Turkey preferred control rather than liberalism in its press policies after the Great War. İskit admits the pro-party approach to the Turkish press:

We can call the "party press" that occurred after the war in Italy, in Soviet Russia and later on, in Germany as a "statist press." The party characteristic of the "statist press" is equal in all countries. However, in terms of reflecting the conditions of the regime on which it is based, every country has different features. In Italy, the "statist press" is the only medium of the struggle of the corporationist fascist party and the sole medium of inculcation and propaganda. In Germany, the "statist press" is the medium of inculcation and propaganda of the national socialist view. In the Soviet Russia, the "statist press" is the medium of inculcation and propaganda of communism. Our Republican press is not similar to the presses mentioned above: it is the inculcation and

235 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Directorate General of Transactions, Cat. no: 030 1 0 0, Box no: 131 Folder no: 846 Row No: 3 p. 1.

236 İskit, 1943, p. 366.

propaganda medium of Kemalism, which is more tolerant than regimes cited above.²³⁷

Sabiha Sertel had a dialogue with the Minister of Internal Affairs, Şükrü Kaya, after her interview published on *Voix Européenne* magazine:

My interviews and articles were published in *Tan*. One day I received an invitation from Şükrü Kaya. His assistant called me to say Şükrü Kaya would be expecting me the next day at Pera Palace Hotel at 2 o'clock; he wanted to meet me... I went to Pera Palace the next day at that time... Shortly a young official called me inside. It was a guest room of Pera Palace Hotel. Şükrü Kaya had turned it into an office. When I approached he got up. He said "Please sit." On the table there were copies of *Voix Européenne*. When I saw them, I understood. I asked "Why did you call me here?" He showed me the magazines on the table... "You wrote an article in this magazine"... "Yes, I did. A while ago I received a letter from this magazine which is published in Paris. They asked for articles. I could not think of any objections." "Do you know that this is a communist magazine?" "No, I did not but if I had, I would have written for it anyways. If there is a criminal act in my writing, prosecutors will act on it. You are the Minister of Internal Affairs; you are not an examining magistrate." "I ask, did you criticize the land law in a foreign country in a communist magazine"... I answered, "There is no law that says it is forbidden to write in newspapers and magazines published in foreign countries..." [Şükrü Kaya answered saucily] "Quit this approach. Your case documents at the police headquarters reached the ceiling. You are a valued author in this country... We can make you an MP. We can better benefit from your ideas."²³⁸

It is noteworthy that Kaya suggested a parliamentary post to Sertel if she followed the rules. In line with Gramsci's conceptualization, he was suggesting

237 İskit, 1943, p. 362.

238 Sabiha Sertel, *Roman Gibi: Demokrasi Mücadelesinde Bir Kadın* (Istanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1987), p. 183.

that Sertel act on behalf of the party and become an “organic intellectual”. Intellectuals’ place and responsibilities in society should be examined, especially after a revolution. After a revolution, intellectuals close to the revolutionaries usually find themselves carrying the mission of badmouthing the old regime and defending and communicating the new one. These intellectuals contribute to the causes “modernization” or “nation building” causes brought about by the revolution by being close to government or by being members of the party. They thus carry out their designated responsibilities. The dominant class obtains the support of intellectuals in order to ensure unity and harmony between base and superstructure. In a study of the relation between Chinese intellectuals and the Chinese state, this relation is defined as an “Implicit Social Contract”. According to this definition by Hamrin and Cheek, intellectuals explain and popularize politics through their expertise and hence provide moral legitimacy for the ruling elite. In return, the ruling elite provides intellectuals a rather prosperous and culturally rich life, wherein they have the opportunity to “serve their country” and continue their careers.²³⁹

Intellectuals play an important role in the “emotional engineering” of citizens. In the twentieth century, propaganda affairs were organized by leading intellectuals, as in the cases of Bertrand Russell and Rudyard Kipling in England during the First World War. Mehmet Akif Ersoy was sent to the eastern fronts to pen propaganda texts and to recite them within the propaganda activities organized by Germany during the First World War. By 1939, Goebbels required the conscription of journalists, photographers, writers, film and radio producers, publishers, printers, painters, and poets into the Propaganda Division of the Army.²⁴⁰

On October 6, 1937, Vedat Nedim Tör resigned from his post as General Manager of the DGP. Othmar, who continued working at the DGP after this resignation, wrote in a letter to his mother that following the incident with Vedat, plots against him had again arisen. He continues on to say that his great

239 Chow Bing Ngeow, “Conceptualizing Intellectual-State Relations in China: With a Focus on the Contemporary Era”, *Issues & Studies* 43, no. 2 (June 2007), p. 175.

240 Knightley, 1975, p. 220-221.

success bothers certain people and they are trying to denigrate him.²⁴¹ Since Othmar claims this happened after Tör resigned, it can be deduced that Tör faced similar issues, as well. Certain of his activities could have been perceived as too independent, and he was asked to resign. The date October 6, 1937, recalls another dismissal: that of İnönü from the position of prime minister on October 25, 1937. Tör's dismissal was perhaps part of this political housecleaning. Burhan Asaf Belge and Sabri Çıtak served in the interim until on October 29, 1937, Naci Kıcıman became the General Manager of the DGP. After Kıcıman was appointed as governor of Bolu, he had to resign, and on July 28, 1939, Salim Gündoğan became the General Manager.²⁴² He stayed on until April 5, 1940; meanwhile in July 1939 World War II had started.²⁴³ Importantly, after Tör and Belge, the directors of the DGP were unadulterated bureaucrats.

War meant increased contact between the government and the press of Istanbul. Right after the outbreak the war, the government sent Halil Ali Ramazanoğlu, Director of the Department of Intelligence under the Ministry of Internal Affairs, to Istanbul for two months to explain the government's position regarding the war and to dictate the duties of the press under these conditions.²⁴⁴ The government and the press of Istanbul met many times for this purpose. After these meetings, it was decided to form a Bureau of the Press under the Prime Ministry. Thus, on September 21, 1939, the "Başvekâlet Matbuat Bürosu" (Press Bureau of Prime Ministry) began operations.²⁴⁵ Selim Sarper became the director of the bureau and later the director of the DGP.²⁴⁶

241 Engin Özendes, *Ankara'dan Yükselen Işık: Othmar Pfershy Fotoğrafları Sergi Katalaoğu* (2007), p. 13.

242 İskit, 1943, p. 311.

243 Nazif Ergin became manager of the DGP on April 6, 1940, and stayed in this post until May 30, 1940. İskit, 1943, p. 312.

244 Kardeş, 1980, p. 32.

245 Ziya Hünerman started at working at the Turkish Desk and Hikmet Umay at the Publications Desk of the DGP.

246 İskit, 1943, p. 312.

The name Selim Sarper is oft encountered at crucial moments of Turkish history. Sarper was born in 1889 in Istanbul and finished high school in Germany. He studied law at Ankara School of Law.²⁴⁷ Sarper began working at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1923. In 1925, he was a court clerk at the Eastern Independence Tribunal (*Şark İstiklal Mahkemesi*), and in 1927 he began working at the Foreign Affairs as a translator. By 1940, when he was appointed General Manager of the DGP, he had been the second clerk in Moscow and then consul in Berlin. As Yalçın Küçük notes, Sarper had been transferred from Stalin's Moscow to Hitler's Germany and later on became undersecretary in Bucharest.²⁴⁸ In 1939, he resigned from his post as Ambassador of Bucharest to direct the Press Bureau of Prime Ministry.



Figure 3.7 Selim Sarper, *Akbaba*, February 20, 1941, no. 370, p. 12.

247 Some sources state Sarper graduated from the Department of Law at the University of Berlin. Akalın Cüneyt, "Tarihin Dönemecinde Bir Diplomat: Selim Sarper", *İdare Hukuku ve İlimleri Dergisi*, vol. 13, no. 1 (January 2011), p. 8.

248 Yalçın Küçük, *Türkiye Üzerine Tezler, 1908- 1978*, vol. 2 (Istanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1979), p. 343.

It is significant that someone from among the staff of Foreign Affairs was assigned to the post. In May 1940, Sarper became General Manager of the DGP. When it was apparent the war was about to end, he was assigned as Ambassador to Moscow, a more significant post for the government. In 1946, Sarper became Ambassador to Rome. In 1957, he was appointed as the permanent representative of Turkey to NATO's Permanent Council, and on May 27, 1960, he became the Secretary General of Foreign Affairs. After the coup d'état on November 20, 1960, he was appointed as the Minister of Foreign Affairs,²⁴⁹ a post he filled until March 16, 1962, while simultaneously an MP from Istanbul.²⁵⁰ Considering Sarper's years as Ambassador to Moscow after the Second World War, the role he played in publicizing the May 27 coup d'état to the outside world, and his activities at NATO, Akalın describes him thusly: "Sarper was the symbol of the transition from diplomacy advocating national independence to diplomacy grounded on integration with the West."²⁵¹

249 Sarper first rejected the ministerial post. As a result, Fahri Korutürk was assigned to the post, and the news was announced on the radio. Meanwhile, Sarper changed his mind and a second radio announcement named his name as the minister. Akalın, 2011, p. 16.

250 Selim R. Sarper's CV, Website of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, www.mfa.gov.tr

251 Akalın, 2011, p. 19.



Figure 3.8 Selim Sarper with Laurence Steinhardt, Ambassador of the United States, *Radyo*, January 1944, no. 26, p. 17.

Vedat Nedim Tör, who was appointed as the General Manager of the DGP in 1933 and Burhan Belge, who assumed various posts at the directorate, were men of a different cloth in comparison to Sarper. They were peers: Tör was born in 1897, Belge in 1899, and Sarper in 1899. Belge and Tör had been friends since their years at Lycée Galatasaray and their education in Germany. While Sarper represented the state, government, and bureaucracy; Tör and Belge were people of culture and intellectuals. Tör and Belge were never MPs from the RPP. In 1957, Belge was elected as an MP of the Democrat Party, and after May 27 coup, he was sentenced to life imprisonment because he was the editor of the party's magazine; *Zafer* (Victory). Belge was a correspondent of *Ulus* in 1938.

During the single-party regime, both Belge and Tör were hired by the state as experts. Neither's record was as "clean" as Sarper's. While Sarper had been

a clerk for the Independence Tribunals, Tör was a former member of the Turkish Communist Party and was arrested during the Communist Suppression in 1927.²⁵² Both Belge and Tör were members of the Turkish Workers and Peasants Socialist Party. They were pioneers of the *Kadro* movement. Tör would resign upon Şükrü Kaya's request from the general management of the DGP "over a misunderstanding". Later on, his resignation from his post as manager of public radio – where he worked between 1941 and August 1943 – would happen because of a "small clash" between him and the Directorate General. These clashes may appear small, but as Kocabaşoğlu suggested in the case of the public radio debacle, his reason for resigning may have been different. When Tör was manager, he gave the microphone to "radical" intellectuals such as Mediha Berkes, Niyazi Berkes, Vâlâ Nureddin, and Şevket Süreyya Aydemir.²⁵³

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- 252 Tör was accused of being an informant by his old friends who claims that he shared documents and knowledge with the police during the 1927 Communist Suppression. Nazım Hikmet never forgave Tör and accused him in the lines of a poem called *Provokatör (Provocateur)*, dated 1929: "this man sold out his friend, he sold out his friend's bloody, cut head on a golden plate..."
- 253 Uygur Kocabaşoğlu, *Şirket Telsizinden Devlet Radyosuna: TRT Öncesi Dönemde Radyonun Tarihsel Gelişimi ve Türk Siyasal Hayatı İçindeki Yeri* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2010), pp. 278- 279.



Figure 3.9 Vedat Nedim Tör, *Radyo*, no. 1, 1941, p. 27.



Figure 3.10 Burhan Belge, *Radyo*, 1942, no. 5, p. 33.

There were few educated employees in the period, and to be able to work at an institution like the DGP, one needed more sophisticated qualities than average state officials. Under these conditions Tör returned to the institution where he earlier served as General Manager, now as manager of the radio department, in 1941. Belge also returned to the DGP as the director of propaganda after being the principal consultant. The fact that both accepted lower posts may be due to professionalism or probably the role they assumed as intellectuals in the Republic. In his memoir, Tör describes his first years in Ankara once he rid himself of the feelings of despair, disappointment, and inferiority he had acquired during his education in Berlin. He felt fresh, new, and easy, and he gained self-confidence. Tör says that in this period, a completely new

worldview formed to fill the ideological void of Marxism.²⁵⁴ Murat Belge emphasizes that Tör and Belge began working for *La Turquie Kémaliste* after *Kadro*. In the new publication, they had internalized the new regime and conducted its propaganda. According to Belge, there was no anger or frustration regarding the sudden closure of *Kadro*.²⁵⁵ With the assignment of Tör and Belge to the DGP, these intellectuals were included into the system in a sense.

In short, except for a brief period between 1933 and 1937 – an era where the government acted with the spirit of revolution – the state did not consign the state propaganda mechanism to non-governmental agents. Similarly, the single party decided to lean on Sarper – a man of bureaucracy, absolute loyalty to İnönü, and member of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – instead of trusting the management of mass communication to intellectuals during a crucial time like the Second World War.

Orhan Koloğlu, in an interview with Cüneyt Akalın, explained Sarper's appointment to the DGP:

Selim Sarper was the General Manager of the Press during the Second World War years. He was actively responsible for censorship. Selim Sarper was from İnönü's team. İnönü, after he became President when Atatürk passed away, established his own crew. When the war broke out, İnönü got worried and accelerated the establishment of his crew. It was with these concerns that he appointed Sarper as General Manager of the DGP. During the Second World War, İnönü, Saraçoğlu, and Menemencioğlu ran foreign affairs together. Turgut Menemencioğlu wrote in his memoir: the three men met every morning, decided the day's actions in foreign affairs together and agreed on what to say.²⁵⁶

Another necessity born out of the conditions of war was to subordinate the DGP to the Prime Ministry, which was accomplished by Law 3837, dated May 22, 1940. Its organization and responsibilities were also reformulated. There

254 Tör, 1976, p. 125.

255 Belge Murat, "Türkiye'yi Değil Ama "Nereye Varılmak İstendiğini" Göstermek Üzere", *Kemal'in Türkiye'si, La Turquie Kamâliste- Bugünün Bilgileriyle*, ed. Lütfü Tınç (İstanbul: Boyut Yayıncılık, 2012), p. 34.

256 Akalın, 2011, pp. 8-9.

was no need for the “Bureau of the Press” under the Prime Ministry. During the ratification of the law in the GNAT, only Ali Rana Tarhan, an MP from Istanbul, opposed it. Aside from his opposition, the law was enacted without debate. Tarhan claimed there was much responsibility on the prime ministry and it was impossible for the Prime Minister to work on these issues himself. Consequently, people not directly responsible to the parliament would undertake the job.

In that period, under the Prime Ministry were Religious Affairs, the Directorate General of Foundations, the Directorate General of Statistics, the Directorate General of Physical Training, and the ombudsman. With the addition of the Directorate General of the Press, there were a total of six directorates connected to the Prime Ministry.²⁵⁷

According to the new legislation, the DGP’s manager would be chosen by the Prime Minister pending approval of the President.²⁵⁸ The DGP’s staff increased to 70 people, including twenty-one non-state officials.²⁵⁹ Certain sensibilities brought about by the war can be sensed in the new legislation. Radio and tourism, which were respectively operating under the Ministry of Transportation and the Ministry of Economy, were subordinated to the DGP.²⁶⁰ Classifying radio propaganda and using radio for foreign propaganda were already under the jurisdiction of the DGP after the 1934 Law. With the new legislation, radio was affiliated with the directorate; preparing and broadcasting programs to meet people’s social, economic, cultural, and aesthetic needs were added to the responsibilities of the DGP.

The 1934 legislation had assigned the supervision of cinema and other performance arts to the DGP. With the new legislation, the supervision of painting, gramophone records, and all other media supervision was also assigned to the DGP. Taking precautions against possible malevolent publications, enlightening people, and preparing or delegating the preparation of beneficial

257 TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Term 5, Vol. 11, Session 1, Conclusion 54, May 22, 1940, pp. 186.

258 İskit, 1943, p. 315.

259 *Law on Organization and Duties of Directorate General of the Press Under Prime Ministry*, no.3837, p. 3.

260 İskit, 1943, p. 314.

publications to publicize the nation to foreign countries were among responsibilities of the directorate. Furthermore, help with the creation of needed works and supplying necessary tools were also under the authority of the directorate. With the new legislation, it was expected that from the DGP would take steps to organize the domestic and foreign tourism sectors to beneficially develop in line with the political and economic needs of the country.

With the new responsibilities added by the 1940 legislation, the DGP took the whole field of culture under its control. As responsibilities of the directorate increased, its staff increased accordingly. There were three sub directorates under the directorate general: press, radio, and tourism.²⁶¹ Vedat Nedim Tör was assigned as the primary consultant to this new organization, and from March 1941 onwards he became the manager of the radio sub directorate. Selim Sarper stayed on as General Manager until October 1944.

In November 1940, martial law was declared in Istanbul, Kırklareli, Edirne, Tekirdağ, Çanakkale, and Kocaeli. These developments created the need to solidify the Istanbul Bureau of the Press. Süreyya Ergün²⁶² was its manager. In July 1941, Prime Minister Saydam wrote to the principal consultant of the prime ministry, Vehbi Demirel, saying that the Istanbul Bureau of the Press was redundant. He continued that he had decided with Sarper to send a team of two or three people to the bureau who were familiar with government policies and had the ability to make decisions in an emergency; however, there would be no change to the structure of the bureau. In the letter, Saydam urgently requested that current officials in Istanbul be assigned to new posts in Ankara and that two experienced officials from the DGP be assigned to the Istanbul Bureau of the Press.²⁶³

With the war, the DGP's priorities and responsibilities changed. The DGP had been following foreign radio channels for two years but with the start of the war, this priority of this responsibility increased. The DGP's newsletters included news on the war, as well, and these news items were gathered from

261 İskit, 1943, p. 319.

262 In reality, Ergün was responsible for tourism, but since tourism was not a priority during the war, he headed the Istanbul office during this period.

263 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Prime Ministry Private Secretariat, Cat. no: 030 01 Box no: 30 Folder no: 179 Row no: 1 p. 4.

foreign radio.²⁶⁴ The administration of martial law maintained the right to prevent the publication and import of newspapers, magazines, and books; to close down printing houses; and to censor the press, mail, and telegrams. The Law on the Press enacted on June 28, 1938, allowed the government unprecedented control over the press. However, aside from their political values, newspapers and magazines were essentially commercial products. On September 10, 1940, after *Cumhuriyet* was suspended, Yunus Nadi wrote a letter to the prime ministry complaining that the suspension had been extended and was having a fatal effect on the newspaper, which was the product of twenty years of labor and sacrifice.²⁶⁵

Keeping the Istanbul press under control in the vulnerable atmosphere of war and preventing publication of unwanted news was a priority for the government. There was similar situation with the Anatolian press as well. On May 1940, a letter sent from the Governorate of Trabzon to the prime ministry said that the local press, especially *Yeniyol* newspaper, was publishing anti-German news under the influence of various anti-German articles that appeared in the Istanbul press and German radio programs criticizing Turkish national politics. The governorate explained they had tried to secretly prevent broadcast of German radios, but had not been successful. According to the Minister of Internal Affairs, the aggressive attitude of German radio, and their direct offense against Turkish press influenced the press' attitude. Necessary measures should be taken.²⁶⁶

In the editorial of *La Turquie Kémaliste*, published in April 1941, Sarper reverently and wittily criticized the foreign press working in Turkey and complained about wrongful and baseless news, adding that as the DGP, they were always ready to help foreign journalists.²⁶⁷

Another important issue during wartime was journalists' conscription. As soon as Sarper became the General Manager he focused on the issue asking

264 İskit, 1943, p. 320.

265 Archive of the DGP document numbered 2301 dated September 10, 1940, Er, 2014, p. 185.

266 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Directorate General of Transactions, Cat. no: 030 10, Box no: 85 Folder no: 559 Row no: 6 pp. 1-3.

267 E. Selim Sarper, "Les Journalistes Etrangers en Turquie", *La Turquie Kémaliste*, no. 42 (April 1941), p. 1.

for a suspension of the conscription of certain journalists so they could continue informing public during the mobilization, and to preserve nation's moral. Based on technical information he received from the Turkish Press Union (*Türk Basın Birliği*), he determined the minimum staff required to keep open newspapers that needed to continue being published. His evaluation was based upon the qualifications and circulation of the publications and included daily political newspapers, biweekly provincial political newspapers, popular biweekly folk newspapers, *Ankara* newspaper published in French, *Uyanış* newspaper, and *Karikatür*, *Akbaba*, and *Hoca Nasreddin* magazines. Sarper requested the suspension of the conscriptions of 538 people working in 70 publications.²⁶⁸ This number included people working in the printing houses of political publications. It was important for Sarper that the public be informed of the government's desires, and prior to a declaration of mobilization he took the necessary precautions.²⁶⁹

In July 1940, an edict signed by Prime Minister Refik Saydam was sent to inspectorships and governorates. The edict listed the conditions by which newspapers and magazines had to abide. As if securing a guarantee, the edict had to be signed by all newspaper and magazine owners in every city and returned to the DGP. Newspapers were warned or suspended during the Second World War with respect to the articles of this edict:

- ◆ Headlines had to be reserved for domestic news;
- ◆ Foreign news could only be published in a single column, and headings could not be larger than 24 points;
- ◆ Aside from foreign news served by the DGP and the AA, no foreign news could be published;

268 A page of the table requesting suspension of conscription for specific positions at crucial publications is presented in Appendix A. Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Directorate General of Transactions, Cat. no: 030 10, Box no: 57 Folder no: 386 Row no: 11 p. 6.

269 Deciding on this request of Sarper's had taken some time and summons were sent to some journalists; however, news of further action by the Ministry of National Defense was provided by the Prime Ministry on January 24, 1941. Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Directorate General of Transactions, Cat. no: 030 10, Box no: 56 Folder No: 380 Row no: 3 pp. 1-5.

- ◆ News on foreign ambassadorship committees could only be served by the DGP and the AA. News aside from that provided was not allowed to be collected.

The edict also decreed that newspapers and magazines that did not obey these rules would be sentenced according to Article 50 of Law on the Press 1881.²⁷⁰ Newspapers could not immediately adapt to these rules, and during the war there was phone traffic between newspapers and the directorate, as well as warnings, and explanations.

There are many warnings and notifications in the archives from this period. Though most of these notifications were based on Article 50, it is not always evident how the news items and article correlate.

In this period, the DGP maintained close relations with the Martial Law Commandership (*Sıkıyönetim Komutanlığı*), the Chief of Staff, other ministries, and police headquarters. When the DGP skipped over a detail, other state bodies caught it and informed the DGP. According to Martial Law 3832 enacted on May 22, 1940, martial administration could ban newspapers, books and other publications; ban the import of publications, close printing houses; and censor the press, telegrams, and mail.

Another interesting issue taken up by DGP archival documents is meteorology. On November 4, 1940, a letter was sent to General Inspectorships and Governorates, saying they should inform all newspapers not to publish any meteorological information from the past, present, or future.²⁷¹ *Vakit* newspaper announced that there would be a storm in the Black Sea and Marmara regions on November 13, 1940, and was warned by the DGP.²⁷² Weather was an important component of war, and there had been efforts to build meteorology stations, especially in the North Atlantic and Arctic Oceans. Actions of the air force, navigation, and the courses of ground forces were all designated according to the weather. Even the invasion of Normandy was postponed one day upon news of a storm. Furthermore, because cloudy weather obstructed

270 Archive of the DGPP, Document dated June 20, 1940, Er, 2014, p. 145.

271 Archive of the DGP, Document no: 3060/5722 dated November 4, 1940. Er, 2014, p. 148.

272 Archive of the DGP, Document no: 4043-3386 dated November 14, 1940. Er, 2014, p. 150.

vision, the second atomic bomb was dropped on Nagasaki instead of Kokura.²⁷³ In a period when weather forecasts carried such importance, Turkey tried to remain neutral, worrying that any forecast could be beneficial or damaging to either side of the war. Another aspect of this practice must have been to militarily safeguard Turkey in case of possible injury to the war. With these concerns, political authorities warned newspapers with trivial justifications until the end of the war. To understand the press' attitude towards censorship at the time, suppression of simple news on the weather normalized censorship in general, especially when it came to important subjects.

Another warning was sent following a cartoon drawn by Muvaffak İhsan for *Tan* newspaper in December 1940. Sarper first noted how beautiful, graceful, and fun the cartoon published on the front page of the newspaper was; he continued that if it were to be repeated, Article 50 of the law would be invoked.²⁷⁴ This cartoon probably portrayed a foreign statesman or state, but in this period, not offending other countries or foreign politicians was tantamount to protecting Turkey's neutrality. For example, on November 12, 1940, in a chronicle published in *Haber* newspaper, Russians were defined as "Steppe Bears", upon which the newspaper received a warning saying it was inappropriate to speak in such a manner of a friendly country.²⁷⁵ Actually, the government had similar sensibilities even before war. A cartoon was published in *Son Telgraf* newspaper on November 30, 1937, depicting Hitler and other ministers in an ugly, ridiculous way, upon which the German Embassy lodged a complaint. The newspaper was warned by the DGP and advised it not to repeat this kind of publication.²⁷⁶ In a letter Refik Saydam sent to the principal consultant of the prime ministry on July 1941, he complained there were too many publications against belligerent countries, especially Soviet Russia. Saydam

273 For further reading, see *War North of 80: The Last German Arctic Weather Station of World War II* (University Press of Colorado, 2004)

274 Article 50 remained in force until June 1, 1946. Archive of the DGP, Document no: 4537-3837 dated December 5, 1940. Er, 2014, p. 151.

275 Archive of the DGP, Document no: 4042/3387 dated November 14, 1940. Er, 2014, p. 175.

276 Archive of the DGP, Document no: 8141/41/A dated December 23, 1937. Er, 2014, p. 209.

thought these publications could be prevented if the Martial Law Administration was cautioned and Istanbul Bureau of the Press functioned better.²⁷⁷ Ali Rıza Artunkal, commander of the martial law, was advised to work more closely with the Istanbul Bureau of the Press.²⁷⁸

It was not deemed appropriate in this period to analyze and compare foreign ideologies. An article by Peyami Safa comparing Mussolini and Hitler on December 5, 1940, in *Tasviri Efkar* was deemed inappropriate and the newspaper was warned.²⁷⁹

Another subject about which the directorate was sensitive was the country's weak economy and problems of subsistence. Newspapers and magazines were frequently warned on this subject. A letter sent to *Şaka* magazine from the DGP said a cartoon suggesting that there was not even a nail left in the country, which was published on January 17, 1941, was inappropriate. On August 6, 1940, a directive was sent to the domestic press forbidding the publishing of anything regarding the deficiency of goods.²⁸⁰ A similar notification was sent to *Journal d'Orient* newspaper, published in Istanbul, noting that news of the lack of car tires in the country published on July 21, 1941, was against regulations.²⁸¹ *Akşam* newspaper also received notification for its news item entitled "Measures of precaution for food items", published on December 3, 1941.²⁸² A story published in *Son Posta* on December 17, 1941, saying that bread would be rationed with stamps was considered illegal and the newspaper was warned.²⁸³ In January 1942, the DGP called daily political newspapers in İzmir, Adana, and Istanbul to advise them not to write on the prices of sugar other

277 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Prime Ministry Private Secretariat, Cat. no: 030 01 Box no: 30 Folder no: 179 Row no: 1 p. 1.

278 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Prime Ministry Private Secretariat, Cat. no: 030 01 Box no: 17 Folder no: 96 Row no: 10 p. 1.

279 Archive of the DGP, Document no: 4589/3918 dated December 6, 1940. Er, 2014, p. 151.

280 Archive of the DGP, Document no: 659/671 dated February 6, 1941. Er, 2014, p. 153.

281 Archive of the DGP, Document no: 4262/4646 dated July 22, 1941. Er, 2014, p. 159.

282 Archive of the DGP, Document no: 7269/8482 dated December 5, 1941. Er, 2014, p. 161.

283 Archive of the DGP, Document no: 7541/8843 dated December 19, 1941. Er, 2014, p. 162.

than stories served by the AA.²⁸⁴ In January 1942, *Vakit* and *Son Posta* newspapers were both suspended for fifteen days and *Haber* and *Son Telgraf* newspapers for three days for agitating people with baseless news because they published news about the rationing of coal.²⁸⁵

Most warnings were issued to ensure balanced politics and citizen support. Though it happened less, there were warnings on other subjects, as well. For example, passages from *Kolkola (Arm in Arm)*, a new novel of Nizamettin Nazif published in *Son Telgraf*, were deemed inappropriate because they “did not reflect the reality of Turkish family”, which is to say, the way of understanding and describing family did not correspond with the state’s point of view. The newspaper was asked to stop publishing excerpts from this novel because they suggested inimical ideas and represented reprobate models for the new generation.²⁸⁶

In July 1942, Prime Minister Refik Saydam passed away and Şükrü Saraçoğlu assumed his post. In the beginning of the war, no one expected the war to go on this long. The conditions of war tasked the DGP with important responsibilities, and the state expected the DGP to act expediently and efficiently in its field. One of its most important duties DGP during wartime was to follow the foreign press. Foreign news were followed to understand external perceptions of Turkey’s stances. One of the most important topics of 1942 was the wealth tax.

Some newspapers pictured news and interviews on the conditions of people affected by the wealth tax. As Rıdvan Akar recounts, aside from taxpayers, Feridun Kandemir – a correspondent of *Tasvir-i Efkar* newspaper – was one of the witnesses of Aşkale. Kandemir had departed at night alongside taxpayers on January 27, 1943, towards Aşkale and published his impressions as series. Kandemir did claim objectivity. Years later he would criticize himself saying that he perceived the people with which he traveled in the same wagon as malicious people who did not pay their taxes even though they could. He said to himself, “it’s their burden to carry.” As he himself confesses, Kandemir’s purpose was to frighten taxpayers not yet sent to Aşkale into paying their taxes,

284 Archive of the DGP, Document dated January 20, 1942. Er, 2014, p. 167.

285 Archive of the DGP, Document no: 2441 dated January 28, 1942. Er, 2014, p. 195.

286 Archive of the DGP, Document no: 3897/4170 dated July 03, 1941. Er, 2014, p. 157.

so he accurately described the conditions of Aşkale. According to his depiction, the weather was -28 degrees Celsius, packs of wolves toured the camp, and even under these conditions – as long as there was no blizzard – people were compelled to work. Kandemir's rendition of Aşkale, in which he did not criticize the government, disturbed the Saraçoğlu government, which thought such news would put Turkey in a difficult position vis-à-vis foreign countries. The newspaper was warned and Kandemir was recalled.²⁸⁷ The DGP subsequently took precautions, and Selim Sarper sent an ordinance to Istanbul newspapers in February 1943 to request “not publish any interviews or pictures of taxpayers who did not pay the Wealth Tax, either from Aşkale or on the way.”²⁸⁸

The DGP handed over news on this subject in the foreign press to the Prime Ministry. News on the wealth tax published in the monthly magazine of the British Chamber of Commerce was sent to the prime ministry, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of the Economy. The news summarized how much money would be gathered by the wealth tax, observed that taxpayers did not have the right to appeal, and stated that if the requirements of the law were not met, taxpayers were punished with violence and even compulsive labor. The news did not mention the tax targeting non-Muslims. The main purpose of the article was to warn businessmen in the United Kingdom against the fluctuating conditions in Turkey.²⁸⁹ Aside from the DGP, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs shared news on the wealth tax published in the foreign press, as well. News published in the *Deutsche Allgemeine* newspaper, on January 1943, saying that the tax targeted Jewish, Armenian, and Greek peoples, was translated and forwarded to the Prime Ministry.²⁹⁰

The most noticeable news on the wealth tax on foreign press was a series authored by the American journalist C. L. Sulzberger between September 9

287 Rıdvan Akar, *Aşkale Yolcuları: Varlık Vergisi ve Çalışma Kampları* (Istanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2009), pp. 95-106.

288 Archive of the DGP, Document dated: February 11, 1943. Er, 2014, p. 171.

289 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Directorate General of Transactions, Cat. no: 030 10, Box no: 85 Folder no: 560 Row no: 19 pp. 1-3.

290 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Directorate General of Transactions, Cat. no: 030 10, Box no: 232 Folder no: 563 Row no: 2 pp. 1-2.

and September 13, 1943. According to Ayhan Aktar, four days after the series was published in *The New York Times*, most debts were erased by an act of the GNAT on September 17, 1943. After these articles were published, the Turkish government informed the American ambassador in Ankara of its displeasure and the ambassador made Steinhardt promise not to publish any similar news.

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In wartime, one of the most important vehicles the government used to censor and direct the press was the DGP.²⁹² The AA's role in this period is undeniable. Until June 1944, Numan Menemencioğlu was the Minister of Foreign Affairs and his brother Muvaffak Menemencioğlu was the AA's general manager, (He resigned in November 1944.) In the second half of 1942 there was friction between the AA and the DGP. The AA received its allocation of funds through the DGP, and according to a law enacted in June 1942, a contract needed to be signed between them. However, it was not signed because the DGP was dragging its feet. The AA wrote a letter to the prime ministry explaining that the DGP was asking to annul the AA's semi-official status. The AA insisted this was not possible, whereupon other conflicts surfaced. Because of this conflict, the AA had not received its allocation and its salaries had not been paid.²⁹³ This picture shows that the DGP did not only contend with censoring the press, but also attempted to control the AA, which was the voice of the state and the party.

There was a shortage of paper during war, and so the number of pages of newspapers was limited. The responsibility for allocating paper fell on Directorate General of the Press.²⁹⁴

291 Ayhan Aktar, *Varlık Vergisi ve Türkleştirme Politikaları* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2008), pp. 152-153.

292 For further reading on relations between the Turkish Press and the wartime government, see O. Murat Güvenir, *Siyasal İktidarın Basını Denetlemesi ve Yönlendirmesi: 2. Dünya Savaşında Türk Basını* (İstanbul: Gazeteciler Cemiyeti Yayınları), 1991.

293 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Directorate General of Transactions, Cat. no: 030 10, Box no: 85 Folder no: 560 Row no: 15 pp. 1-2.

294 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Directorate General of Transactions, Cat. no: 030 18, Box no: 99 Folder no: 54 Row no: 15 p: 1.

Considering conditions in the second half of 1943, it was decided to reorganize the DGP. During the budget debate of 1942, Cavit Oral, an MP from Seyhan, expressed the importance of propaganda and suggested this responsibility be given to a ministry with a parliamentarian assigned to direct the organization.²⁹⁵ A new law was prepared in this political atmosphere and presented to the GNAT in March 1943. The DGP's name was changed to the Directorate General of the Press and Publications (*Basın ve Yayın Umum Müdürlüğü*, hereafter DGPP) by Law 4475, enacted on July 22, 1943.²⁹⁶ Members of parliament debated the new name of the directorate for a long time. Its former name, *Matbuat Umum Müdürlüğü*, was changed to *Basın ve Yayın Umum Müdürlüğü*. The word "publication" was added to show that aside from the press, the directorate was responsible for all audible, verbal, wired, and wireless publications. The committee had suggested using *Basım* and *Yayım* (printing and broadcast). However, considering that the word *basın* (press) had been used for years, they decided that the words *Basın* and *Yayın* (press and publications) together would be the best solution.²⁹⁷

Another concern about the new legislation was that responsibilities given to the directorate surpassed its capacity. An MP from Gaziantep, Barlas, said that responsibilities given to the directorate were not in line with the spirit of the constitution and added that they should be given to a member of parliament instead of a directorate. According to Barlas, the responsibilities given to the directorate – and consequently to the Prime Ministry – were imbalanced. Saraçoğlu answered these concerns saying that in the new legislation, responsibilities had not changed; the directorate had the same responsibilities as defined in the previous legislation.²⁹⁸ A quotation concerning the motives behind the law better shows the spirit of the period and the priority given to the directorate:

The press, the importance of which has been accepted and established, and radio, the world's youngest but strongest weapon, both gained importance after the 1939 World War broke out and burned the whole

295 Kocabaşoğlu, 2010, p. 237.

296 From this point on, the acronym DGPP will be used instead of DGP.

297 TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Term 7, Vol. 4, Session F, Conclusion 49, July 16, 1943, pp. 123-128.

298 TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Term 7, Vol. 4, Session F, Conclusion 49, July 16, 1943, pp. 123-127.

world; it is clear that these two mass media should be taken seriously. Because national propaganda has gained so much power and significance, attempts at propaganda repeated once, five times, twenty times, even hundred times that appear to have been in vain can reach the target at once and bring results for the side for which it is working. So much so that that one instance can pay back not only the intended expenses, but all the expenses of all the propaganda work up until that day that seemed not to work... to the point of reducing those expenses to a size not worth mentioning. While pointing out the importance of propaganda working for our homeland and our national interests, we should not forget to incapacitate those detrimental activities that target our state's internal and foreign politics – in a word our national existence – and to pay necessary attention to informing our citizens and foreigners on these subjects.²⁹⁹

A new law was enacted, annulling Law 3837, that was designed to cover trivial issues as well as fundamentals and principles. Law 3837 was deemed lacking because it only contained basic principles, while applications and other details were omitted. After three years, it was clear this lack of division of labor among departments resulted in certain difficulties in execution. Considering that the services of the press, radio, and tourism had rapidly increased since 1940, it was essential to decide on a clear division of labor. This is why organization was prioritized in the new legislation, and a detailed organizational chart was prepared.

With the new legislation, the DGPP's responsibility to publicize in and outside of the country and its role in mass media were gathered together. According to the law, audio, verbal, text, pictures, films, and records as well as similar press, publication, and inculcation media would be used to publicize and spread the country's civilization, culture, art, and natural beauty, political events, and developments both inside and outside the country. There were new terms in this law, such as "the country's civilization and culture" and "art and natural beauty." These terms appeared when tourism came onto the agenda in 1940. With this law, informing related authorities and the public of

299 İskit, 1943, p. 336.

the activities of foreign countries in the aforementioned media was added to the responsibilities of the DGPP. Among the responsibilities of the directorate was enlightening the public about press, publications, and inculcations that could be detrimental to national interests, as well as examining and inspecting such activities. Another duty of the DGPP was defined as conveying the republican government's internal and foreign politics to the domestic and foreign presses and the general public. The last responsibility of the DGPP was defined as administering, regulating, and inspecting foreign and local tourism.³⁰⁰

Hasan Refik Ertuğ mentioned in an article in *Radyo* magazine the importance of knowing – even before the Second World War – what has been spoken and written about Turkey abroad and conveying the true face of the country, the “unshakable power” of the state, the “Great National Chief of the government”, the “loyalty felt to our land”, and national independence. According to Ertuğ, this became even more important with the war, and this is why the media of the press, publication, and inculcation were merged in 1940. After three years of experience, for the directorate to work more efficiently and extend its scope as done in other countries, the Directorate General of the Press had become the Directorate General of the Press and Publication.³⁰¹

After the 1943 budget of the DGPP was agreed upon, MP Sadri Ertem wrote in *Vakit* newspaper that the reason for establish the DGPP was foreign propaganda for the post-war period, as well, in a world characterized by intense propaganda.³⁰² A closer look at this organization makes easier to understand the DGPP's mission and how internal and foreign propaganda functioned.

There were fifteen departments and three committees under the new directorate, among which were the Internal Publication Department, the Foreign Publication Department, the Radio Department, the Tourism Department, the Printing and Distribution Department, the Science Committee, the Research Committee, and the Press Attachés.³⁰³

300 *Law 4475 on Organization, Duties and Employees of the DGPP*, First Chapter- Purpose, p. 660.

301 Kocabaşoğlu, 2010, p. 237.

302 Güvenir, 1991, p. 62.

303 Foreign press attachés were established in this period.

The Internal Publication Department followed domestic publications and the press and supervised the implementation of the Law on the Press. The Foreign Publications Department followed foreign publications and press and conducted relations with the foreign press, publication organizations, and people. The Radio Department ensured the harmony of programming, work and broadcast between radio posts. Before each broadcast, programs were evaluated either at the department or – by a special permission – at the station to decide whether they could be broadcast. The Printing and Distribution Department was responsible for printing, shooting, recording and distributing all books, magazines, pamphlets, newsletters, films, pictures, and records prepared by this or other departments of the directorate. One of the responsibilities of the Research Committee was to investigate internal and foreign threats to national interests. The Research Committee benefited from organizations of domestic and foreign science, engineering and arts, as well as experts in these fields.

Hüseyin Ragıp Baydur, one of the former managers of the DGP, claims that in this period, the DGPP's organization was larger than most ministries.³⁰⁴ Indeed, officials' salary tables show that the directorate had approximately 500 employees. Such a sizeable operation suggests that even though there was no Ministry of Propaganda in Turkey during the Second World War, there was a directorate as extensive as a ministry. The budget of the DGP was 2,328,191 Turkish lira in 1943, while the budget of the Ministry of Commerce was 1,905,848 Turkish lira, the budget of the Ministry of Transportation was 2,359,362 Turkish lira and the budget of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was 4,215,308 Turkish lira. The budgets of other directorates having their own allocation in the state's budget were small compared to the DGP. The budget of the Directorate General of Map's was 2,100,452 Turkish lira, of the Directorate General of Statistics was 334,562 Turkish lira, of the Directorate General of Meteorology was 899,206 Turkish lira, and of the Directorate of Religious Affairs 905,404 Turkish lira.³⁰⁵

304 İskit, 1943, p. 373.

305 1943 State Budget: https://www.tbmm.gov.tr/develop/owa/tutanak_erisim_as.butce-detay?pMeclisKod=1&pDonemKod=7&pButceYili=1943

Conscription during the Second World War had negative effects on agricultural production and caused many businesses to falter. In October 1939, Hasan Ali Yücel sent a letter to the prime ministry to inform it that due to conscription, business would go on, but education could not continue. It was difficult to find teachers not on active duty.³⁰⁶ Similar problems were experienced at the Turkish Post (*Posta ve Telgraf Teşkilatı Genel Müdürlüğü*, hereafter TP), and when irreplaceable officials were conscripted, the suspension of their service was requested.³⁰⁷ Similar special circumstances were applied to Muslim clergy, but same exceptions were not applied to the clergy of other religions. Some religious communities sent requests to the prime ministry saying that they could not perform their religious rituals.³⁰⁸ As understood from various correspondence, many people in important positions under the Secretary General of the RPP, such as presidents of People's Houses, clerks, department managers, and documentation officers were conscripted.³⁰⁹ Nonetheless, 500 competent people were found to work for the DGPP and employed; this alone shows its importance. When the breakdown of DGP's 1943 budget is examined,³¹⁰ 84,415 Turkish lira was allotted to salaries compared to 416,273 Turkish lira was allotted to fees: most of the DGP staff were not state officials, but independent contractors.

This extensive structure is a projection of Turkey's insistence to stay neutral in the Second World War. In order to protect the balance of politics, the state had taken all media of mass communication under its control. Supervising the domestic and foreign presses, reacting to and shaping public opinion, supplying content for radio, directing technical operations, producing films

306 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Directorate General of Transactions, Cat. no: 030 10, Box no: 57 Folder no: 384 Row no: 20 p. 2.

307 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Directorate General of Transactions, Cat. no: 030 10, Box no: 57 Folder no: 386 Row no: 6 pp. 1-2.

308 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Directorate General of Transactions, Cat. no: 030 10, Box no: 112 Folder no: 763 Row no: 29 pp. 1-2.

309 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 01, Box no: 61 Folder no: 233 Row no: 2 p. 1.

310 In the 1943 DGP budget: 350 thousand Turkish lira were allotted to publications, tourism, and propaganda, and 819,111 Turkish lira were allotted to radio.

and supervising film industry, publishing to publicize the country domestically and abroad, and undertaking activities in tourism... to coordinate and organize all these operations, an extensive structure was needed. Idealist and revolutionist propaganda started by Vedat Nedim Tör in 1933 was replaced with aggressive, oppressive, and determinist wartime propaganda. The subtle, tailored propaganda used to protect the party-state and its reforms, and to make Turkey's voice heard in the world in 1933, was passed from intellectuals into the hands of a foreign affairs insider close to real politics.

The last General Manager of the DGPP under an RPP government was Ahmet Şükrü Esmer. With new legislation enacted in 1949, the name of the directorate became the Directorate of the Press/Publications and Tourism (*Basın-Yayın ve Turizm Müdürlüğü*, hereafter DPPT). Law 5392 furthered the directorate's organization of press and radio and prioritized tourism, as well. In this period of transition from a single to a multi-party system, media controlled by the DGP were to be equidistant from all political parties, as the conditions of multi-party system requires.

The DGP's activities in this second period can be categorized as publications, radio, cinema, and tourism. In 1940, the photography department was expanded, a film service was established, and domestic actuality and propaganda films were produced and screened in movie theaters. Propaganda through cinema in the single-party period has not been studied extensively. The fourth chapter of this dissertation is thus reserved for the cinematic activities of the DGP and the Secretary General of the RPP.

In terms of publicizing and propaganda, tourism is an interesting subject. In Turkey, it started to emerge in the 1950s.³¹¹ Concerning domestic tourism,

311 With the worldwidedevelopment of the tourism sector, tourism first entered the agenda and budget of the Ministry of Economy in Turkey during the ministry of Şakir Kesebir (1927-1930). In 1934, under Celal Bayar, a specific unit to address tourism issues was established: a unit affiliated with the Foreign Trade Directorate of the Ministry of Economy called the *Türk Ofis* (Foreign Trade Administration). The same year, tourism and "foreign publicity" were listed among public services in Law 2450 describing the organization and mission of the Ministry of Economy. A working group within the *Türk Ofis* was established for publications, propaganda, and tourism affairs. A tourism directorate was established in Celal Bayar's government under the Ministry of Economy and Vedat Nedim Tör was appointed as the director.

the right to paid leave was established in 1960, and tourism was revived in 1970s.³¹² Due to this timeframe, tourism is not an area of interest for this dissertation.

Publication and radio were the leading mediums of propaganda by the DGP. There have been many studies of varying foci, especially in radio. In the next section, I evaluate the activities and primary publications of the DGP's Department of Publication. After that I briefly contemplate on radio's place in propaganda.

In 1938, a tourism desk was established under the publications and propaganda department of the *Türk Ofis*. In 1939, the tourism directorate was transformed into the *Turizm Dairesi* (Department of Tourism). Furthermore, an interministerial tourism commission was established since tourism was new and not easy to position among ministries. The tourism directorate was first affiliated with the DGP at the beginning of 1940. For a detailed account of this issue, see Tarık Celal Güven, "Cumhuriyetin 75. Yıldönümünde Dış Ticaretimizin Geçmişi ve Bugünü", www.dtm.gov.tr, "Dünden Bugüne Seyahat Acentaları" http://www.tursab.org.tr/tr/seyahat-acentaları/dunden-bugune-seyahat-acentaları_501.html

312 For an interesting study on this issue, see *Sayfiye: Hafiflik Hayali*, ed. Tanıl Bora (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2014)

3.3.3 *Publications of the Directorate General of the Press: La Turquie Kémaliste*

Looking back on the visual culture of the 1930s from the kind of postmodern vantage we easily adopt today, a new picture of our history emerges... What we see is like a jigsaw puzzle constructed of many interlocking fragments. Each tiny piece does not tell the whole truth about the past. Photography never does.... Yet, laid out together and studied from the distance of reasoned time, these pieces do add up to something approximating real history. It is a history of relationships, between opposing ideologies, between creative artists and governments struggling to define themselves, and between a tattered truth and fictional representation, coexisting without either taking precedence.³¹³

Philip Brookman

In early years of the Republic, the Directorate General of the Press prepared several publications to publicize Turkey abroad. Most of these publications printed at State Printing House, whether books or pamphlets, were in French and later in English. The DGP's books were enriched with pictures and usually concerned on the War of Independence, Turkish authors, public health, Turkish art, the development of finance in Turkey, industrialization, national education, and modern Turkey.

Tör says that in 1937 alone, the directorate distributed 27,312 magazines, 17,600 books and pamphlets, and 5,305 pictures to publicize Turkey.³¹⁴

Most books published between the establishment of the DGP and 1950 have no copyright page. The name of the author is usually unknown. These publications seem to be product of collaborations among DGP employees instead of works by individuals. Aside from these anonymous books, in the

313 Bendavid-Val, 1999, p. 212.

314 Er, 2003, p. 111.

1940s, prominent experts especially in archeology and art – such as Zübeyir Koşay, Celal Esad Arseven, and Nurettin Gülekli – were commissioned to prepare books. Most of the DGP's collection of publications³¹⁵ cannot be found at the DGPI today; the library of the directorate has been distributed to related state departments.³¹⁶

One of the first publications of the DGP publicizing Turkey abroad in a foreign language was a French booklet printed in 1935 entitled *La Turquie Contemporaine* (*Contemporary Turkey*). The booklet was printed in two thousand copies.³¹⁷ The 304-page long publication that included maps and black and white photos, begins with Mustafa Kemal's words: "We will take our national culture above contemporary civilizations." It consists of seventeen chapters explaining Turkey's geographical and historical features; the foundation of the new Turkey; economic, agricultural, industrial, cultural, and social developments; politics regarding health and energy; and changes in traditions. The purpose was to serve foreigners who wished for general information on Turkey, but could not find anything other than misinformation or romanticized accounts. There is a debate in the introduction of the booklet, that recurs in *La Turquie Kémaliste* magazine issues, as well. The purpose was to produce a publication to convey the truth, replacing detrimental, baseless news about Turkey that had been repeated for years.

In 1936, the DGP would publish a monograph – rather a photo album – entitled *Turkey in Pictures*, which consisted of photographs by Othmar.³¹⁸ The album was printed in Munich had six sections: A- Ankara, B- Istanbul, C- Towns and Landscape, D -Archeology and Art, E- Economy and Construction Work, F- Man and Civilization. The aim was to publicize the modern face of Turkey and social and economic advancements, and the album was sent to foreign presidents. The DGP would also prepare a similar album to offer King

315 A list of the DGP's publications between 1920 and 1950 comprises Appendix B. The list was provided by the DGPP in June 2015.

316 Publications found at the DGPP library in 2008 are not on the list provided by the DGPP in 2015. The collection, which was distributed, has been plundered in the interlude.

317 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Directorate General of Transactions, Cat. no: 030 10, Box no: 84 Folder no: 555 Row no: 3 p. 2.

318 The photo-album also contains a basic body of texts in Turkish, English, French, and German.

Edward VIII, one of whose official visits during his short reign was to Turkey. Unlike *Turkey in Pictures*, this album had a silver, gazelle leather coffer.³¹⁹

La Turquie Kémaliste was the leading publication of the DGP for foreign propaganda. The story of *La Turquie Kémaliste* shows the enthusiasm of Tör and his crew for the young Republic and its reforms. Tör decided to publish *La Turquie Kémaliste*, and with Şükrü Kaya's permission, he prepared a trial issue. İnönü thought a propaganda magazine publicizing Turkey to foreigners could not be prepared and printed in Turkey at the desired level of quality; however, Vedat Nedim's first issue was a success. Thus *La Turquie Kémaliste* meaning "Kemalist Turkey" was published in June 1934 in French in Ankara. The magazine contained English and German articles, as well, and was published at the state printing house, like *Ayın Tarihi*.³²⁰ It was initially bimonthly, but during war its publication was biannual and sometimes even less often.³²¹ The last, forty-ninth issue of *La Turquie Kémaliste* was published on March 1, 1948.

Considering the conditions of the day, a magazine printed in color on glossy paper was a luxury publication. The purpose was to broadcast the results of the Kemalist revolution, the new Turkey, and Turkish cultural and social life. Münir Ertegün, then ambassador to Washington, defined *La Turquie Kémaliste* as a project to increase the political reputation of the country.

In his memoir, Tör recounts working hard to get the necessary permission to publish this magazine, but that those who prepared the magazine worked even harder to create a product worthy of young Republic, in order to best publicize its success to foreigners.

Hikmet Geray was responsible for distributing the magazine. The XV Year book published by the state on fifteenth anniversary of Republic Day notes that the DGP had distributed 119,690 copies of *La Turquie Kémaliste* in five

319 Uğur Kavas, *Türkiye'de Basın Fotoğrafçılığının Görsel Tarihi- Osmanlı'dan 1960'a*, vol. 1 (Ankara, 2008), p. 105.

320 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Council of Ministers' Decrees, Cat. no: 030 18 1 2, Box no: 46 Folder no: 49 Row no: 18 p. 1.

321 For example, between August 1939 and December 1949 all issues were published with identical numbers: as 32-40. After issue 46, dated December 1941, issue 47 was published in 1943 without designating the month, and another issue would not published until December 1947.

years. This circulation was higher than all other publications combined.³²² The magazine was sent to embassies, consulates, attachés, well-known foreign journalists and magazines, and well-known authors.³²³ In a letter dated February 8, 1937, sent by Tör to Abidin Daver, who was writing in *Cumhuriyet* newspaper at the time, detailed information on the distribution of *La Turquie Kémaliste* was provided. The Paris Turkish Students Community provided the addresses of student dormitories to the DGP, and magazines were regularly delivered to these addresses; furthermore, it was delivered to university libraries and departments in Paris, to public libraries, to the heads of newspapers, and to more than 150 French MPs and prominent politicians.³²⁴ Expatriate Turks and Turkish students studying abroad particularly requested LTK. Nevzat Şengel, who was studying at the University of Georgia in 1940, said his friends did not even know where Turkey was and that they were misinformed. He requested for picture books in English on the revolution.³²⁵ Upon a similar request in February 1940, the General Secretariat of the RPP sent an English translation of Atatürk's *Nutuk*, *Les Annales de Turquie*, *La Turquie Kémaliste*, and various other DGP publications in English and French published to the Turkish Cultural Alliance, which had been founded by Turks living in New York in 1930.³²⁶

Correspondence between Şükrü Kaya and the prime ministry in 1936 mentions that every issue of LTK was printed in four thousand copies and was sent to addresses collected by direct contacts or by Turkish embassies abroad.³²⁷ Initially, one thousand copies of the first issue were printed. By February 1937, the number of copies printed had gone up to 6,500. Tör thought

322 Uğur Kavas, "Othmar Ankara'sı", *Kontrast Fotoğraf Dergisi*, no.37, p. 18- 19 (September- October 2013)

323 Vedat Nedim Tör, *Kemalizmin Dramı* (Istanbul: Çağdaş Yayınları, 1983), p. 24.

324 Er, 2003, pp. 110-111.

325 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 o o, Box no: 1294 Folder no: 297 Row no: 1 p. 5.

326 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 o o, Box no: 1294 Folder no: 297 Row no: 1 p. 23.

327 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Directorate General of Transactions, Cat. no: 030 10, Box no: 84 Folder no: 555 Row no: 3 pp. 1-2.

that by the end of 1937, the number would double. According to Tör, copies had been distributed as follows: 680 to France, 348 to Germany, 237 to Britain, 247 to America, 142 to Romania, 238 to Yugoslavia, 262 to Greece, 132 to Albania, 266 to Egypt, 158 to Sweden, 262 to Switzerland, 186 to Iran, and 138 to Denmark.³²⁸

On July 26, 1934, Tör informed the General Secretariat of the RPP that there were no copies left of the first issue since most had been sent abroad. This is why only four copies were sent to the Ankara People's House. From then on, the number of copies would be increased, and further issues would be sent to all the People's Houses.³²⁹

A small note in French was hidden in the tenth issue of the magazine, published in December 1935, which says the magazine's purpose was to publicize the new and real Turkey. It asks four questions: Do you think we have accomplished our purpose? and is the magazine conveying our ideas? What would you like to see in the magazine? How would you criticize us? and what do you think is missing? Would you send us a list of friends, individuals, acquaintances, public institutions, and other institutions you think would benefit from the magazine?³³⁰

The name of *La Turquie Kémaliste* changed twice during its run. These changes were closely related to ongoing language reforms. From its beginning until April 1935, the name of the magazine was *La Turquie Kémaliste*, but in June 1935 it changed to *La Turquie Kamâlisme*. The name Kamâl Atatürk was first used in press release on February 3, 1935. The AA provided the background for this new usage the following day:

In a notification sent today we noticed the leader Atatürk's first name was written as Kamâl. Upon investigation we learned why. What we learned suggests that Atatürk's first name – Kamâl – is not an Arabic word, and it's meaning is different from the Arabic word Kemal. His

328 Er, 2003, p. 111.

329 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 01, Box no: 1343 Folder no: 459 Row no: 1 p. 14

330 *La Turquie Kémaliste*, no. 10 (December 1935)

first name is Kamâl, which means in Turkish “army and castle.” Pronunciation of both words is similar. However, the similarity ends there. (A.A.)³³¹

This change was reflected in the magazine’s name, as well. But sensitivity to this issue waned, and in the combined issue 21-22, the name reverted to the previous form.

LTK used just one format. In every issue there were some unchanging sections. The magazine started every issue with a different visual. This visual was perhaps a bust of Atatürk, a miniature from the sixteenth century, a rug pattern, or a leafed manuscript.

Four cover designs were used on forty-nine issues of *La Turquie Kémaliste*. From first issue until the twelfth issue, there were chimneys reminiscent of solar rays or the Six Arrows. Later, this picture turned into a blurred illustration of working Turkey, complete with tractors, smoking chimneys, and industrial plants. Between thirteenth and eighteenth issues, there is a male figure unveiling a reality tearing darkness into a light where there are smoking factory chimneys. In this futuristic cover, the male figure, redolent of Mustafa Kemal, is shown opening high, dark curtains. Starting with combined issues 23-24, a new cover was used depicting working male and female peasants and workers. What is interesting is that the faces of both males and females are almost the same. It was drawn by the painter Sabri Fethah Berkel.³³² In the fourteenth issue, Arif Dino had written an article on Berkel that featured a male figure drawn by Berkel that would later be the cover of LTK. This figure carries a bag of seeds in his left hand that he is distributing with his right hand, and is called “The Sower.”³³³

331 Mehmet Ö. Alkan, “En Çok Doğru Bildiğimizden Kuşkulunmak-2 Mustafa’dan Kamâl’a Atatürk’ün İsimleri”, *Toplumsal Tarih*, no. 204 (December 2010), pp. 23-31.

332 Berkel was born in Skopje. By 1935 he had returned from Italy, where he studied, to Turkey, and opened his first exhibition at Güzel Sanatlar Akademisi (Fine Arts Academy) undertaken by Namık İsmail. Zeynep Şanlıer, “Ömrünü Sanat Aşkına Adayacaksın”, *Radikal* (July 8, 2006)

333 Arif Dino, “Le Peintre Sabri Fethah”, *La Turquie Kamâliste*, no. 14, pp. 20-25 (August 1936)




Figure 3.11 “The Sower” by Sabri Berkel,
La Turquie Kamâliste, 1936, no. 14, p. 20.

Dino wrote that this figure symbolizes youth. The figure looks as if it is trying to collaborate with the homogenous mass of society moving and working like a machine. The figure of “The Sower” presented on LTK’s cover recalls of *La Semeuse*, one of the famous symbols of the Third Republic in France. *La Semeuse* reflects of the idealization of the village. French Senator Jean Durand’s expression fits well to the Kemalist dreams revealed in the pages of LTK: “When I want to present the Republic in my dreams, I imagine it like a beautiful farmer, aboveboard, with fresh cheeks and firm breasts and who walks with powerful steps through the furrows. She disperses handfuls of wheat from which gorgeous sheafs will raise.”³³⁴

The figure by Berkel was symbolic and Republican. Compared to other Turkish painters of the period, he had a different understanding of art. The fact that his figures were part of the cover is in line with the magazine’s new, contemporary, bold style. From the twenty-seventh issue, dated October 1938 and distributed after Atatürk’s death, a bust of Atatürk was used on the cover until the last issue.

334 Maurice Agulhon, *Marianne au Pouvoir: L’Imagerie et la Symbolique Républicaines de 1880 à 1914* (Paris: Flammarion, 1989), pp. 30-31.

La Turquie Kémaliste published articles and news on various issues. Even though there is little information on how they gathered news and articles, various state institutions were of use in gathering the texts. On May 8, 1937, Vedat Nedim Tör sent a letter to the General Secretariat of the RPP to ask for a piece on the conditions and activities of the People's Houses, including quantitative data. He also asked for fifteen, professional, black and white photos to accompany the text. However, after five months he had not heard back from the General Secretariat. On October 12, Tör wrote that he had not received anything.³³⁵ Either Tör's enthusiasm was not reciprocated by the party, or this request was not among party's priorities,³³⁶ but later on the party did indeed send the DGP pictures and information on the People's Houses from time to time.³³⁷

People who wrote in *La Turquie Kémaliste* included leading politicians, bureaucrats, and intellectuals such as Refik Saydam, Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, Rüştü Aras, Afet İnan, Selim Sarper, and Sadri Ertem. These people also contributed to *Ulus* newspaper, *Kadro* magazine, *Ülkü* magazine, and *Citizenship Books* – in short, to publications dedicated to spreading the opinions of the single party. Murat Belge sees *La Turquie Kémaliste* as a sequel to *Kadro* but notes that a wider array of people wrote in LTK, such as rightists like Hüseyin Namık and Reşat Şemsettin; Kemalists like İsmail Hakkı, Reşit Galip, and Afet İnan; and leftists like Sadri Ertem, Arif Dino, and Sabahattin Ali.³³⁸ In issue 5 of the magazine dated February 1935, Necip Fazıl, who was good friends with Falih Rıfkı, wrote an essay describing his childhood mansion, his grandfather's death, and his fears and worries in a literary way. Articles by foreign scholars and researchers living or working in Turkey also appeared in LTK.

335 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 01, Box no: 1343 Folder no: 459 Row no: 1 pp. 10-12.

336 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 01, Box no: 1343 Folder no: 459 Row no: 1 pp: 10- 12.

337 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 01, Box no: 1343 Folder no: 459 Row no: 1 p. 2.

338 Belge, 2012, p. 34.

At the beginning of every issue was an editorial, almost all in French, few of which explains the contents of the issue at hand.³³⁹ Six of thirty-three editorials published were about prejudice against Turkey,³⁴⁰ and most of these texts start with the word “foreigners.” These editorials were generally written by one of three people: Vedat Nedim Tör, Burhan Belge, or Falih Rıfkı Atay. During the war, a while after he resigned from the DGP, Tör began writing editorials again. These editorials are the best resource to evaluate the style and purpose of the magazine.

Aside from editorials, there were no articles on politics or current events. For example, during the Second World War, there was almost no news of the war. In other magazines, like *Ayın Tarihi*, one could follow Turkey’s close and distant relations; *La Turquie Kémaliste* feared clear of current internal and foreign politics, focusing instead on publicizing the revolution and the new Turkey. Kudret Emiroğlu notes that important changes in Turkey were almost unreflected in the magazine; political processes were not reflected in the content of the magazine, but on its process of printing.³⁴¹ Without being influenced from political sways and internal incidents, the magazine created a perception of continual development in Turkey.

During the Second World War, editorials were written on Turkey’s position on the war. In August 1941, Tör wrote that Turkey was at the intersection of three doctrines, but that it was not loyal to any of these. By three systems, Tör meant the communist, proletarian system of Soviet Union, the racist, totalitarian system of the Axis forces, and the democratic, capitalist system of the remaining Allied forces.³⁴² Tör was categorizing Kemalism as an independent ideology, just as *Kadro* magazine tried to do. Tör emphasized that Turkey acts according to the principle “peace at home, peace in the world.”

339 In issue 10, dated December 1935, a German editorial was written by Norbert Bischoff, author of the book *Ankara* and the Ambassador of Austria.

340 *Kemal’in Türkiyesi, La Turquie Kamâliste- Tıpkıbasım Sayfalar*, 2012, p. 260.

341 Kudret Emiroğlu, “Devrimin Vitrini Ankara”, in *Kemal’in Türkiyesi, La Turquie Kamâliste-Bugünün Bilgileriyle*, ed. Lütfü Tınç (İstanbul: Boyut Yayıncılık, 2012), p. 153.

342 Vedat Nedim Tör, “L’Ordre Turc au Carrefour de Trois Ordres”, *La Turquie Kémaliste*, no. 44 (August 1941), p. 1.

In October 1941, an editorial written by Selim Sarper concerned popular gossip in wartime. In this article, entitled *Cancans*, Sarper used abstract images without giving names, but reminds that people who speaks through newspapers, the radio, the cinema, or publicly could have ulterior motives than merely to entertain or just express their ideas. Citizens should be cautious.³⁴³ The October 1941 issue was published as Germans approached the Turkish border, after the meeting of Papen and Saraçoğlu, and after the invasion of Iran. The Cloduis Treaty signed by Turkey and Germany in October 1941 was the tensest period for relations between Turkey and Allied Forces. Immediately following Sarper's article was an article about archeology, strikingly illustrated with images of two-headed eagle symbols – one found in Alaca Höyük and one from the time of Anatolian Seljuk Sultanate – and of a golden swastika found in Alaca Höyük and another on an Ottoman gravestone.

The focus of the magazine was the successes and actions of Republic and news and articles showing its development. Among the successes of the Republic presented in the magazine were newly constructed schools like the Girls' Institute of İsmet İnönü; industrial buildings like the İzmit Paper Factory, the Turhan Sugar Factory, the Paşabahçe Glass Factory, and the Kayseri Textile Factory; new living spaces like Atatürk Forest Farm; dams; railways, and new developments in animal husbandry, and sericulture, as well as tobacco, fig, and other agricultural productions.

While news on economic developments accompanied Turkey's history, cultural and natural wonders were emphasized. Turkey was marketed as a tourism destination. There was frequently news on archeology with examples from museums such as the Topkapı Palace Museum and the Archeology Museum. Although Turkish handicrafts have a rich history and culture, history was told without reference to the Ottoman past. There were many pictures of this rich culture in the magazine, but no reference to Islam or the Ottoman Empire in the texts that accompanied those pictures. Such defining adjectives were dropped from the captions. In an article on Topkapı Palace, Archeologist

343 A Turkish version of this editorial was published in *Radio* magazine as an editorial in January 1942, entitled "DEDİ-KODU" (SAY-INGS).

Aziz Oğan claimed that masterpieces of “Turkish art” could be seen at the palace.³⁴⁴ These values were presented as part of a rich history and culture. Anachronistically, no distinction was made between archeological finds in Didim and a *kaftan* (Sultanic robe) in Topkapı Palace. In short, both were considered as belonging to the past of this land.

In the fifth issue published in February 1935, Halil Edhem³⁴⁵ (Eldem) prepared a short piece on the position and importance of Istanbul museums compared to European museums. Halil Edhem said that old Turkey – in other words, the Ottoman State – lacked the resolve to protect its archeological heritage. As such, this heritage was stolen and exhibited in European museums, but Turkey’s new young scientists would endeavor to unearth this heritage. This heritage, which Halil Edhem called “patrimoine” in French, connotes both cultural and national heritage. He was angry with those who carried out the Fourth Crusade, which destroyed Istanbul’s cultural heritage through barbarism and vandalism. Mentioning archeological finds from the Hittites and Sumerians, Halil Edhem did not neglect to note their racial relation to the Turks, in line with the Turkish History Thesis. At the end of the article, he claimed the collection in Topkapı Palace is the richest decorative art collection in the world.³⁴⁶ The tone is inclusive. All artifacts from Anatolia and Istanbul are seen as part of Turkey’s cultural heritage, and the young Turkish Republic is situated as the protector of this rich heritage. Many archeology and tourism articles in LTK, emphasize that Turks come from the Hittites. In this approach to the archeological richness of Anatolia, the secession passes from first the Hittites and then to the Ionians, Persians, Ancient Greeks, Romans, and Seljuks. The message was that in the land where Turks currently live, Turks preceded everyone else.

Sports news concerning horse breeding, skiing, physical education, and activities of *Türkkuşu* were featured on the pages of LTK.

344 Aziz Oğan, “Le Palais de Topkapı”, *La Turquie Kémaliste*, no. 17 (February 1937), p. 2.

345 Eldem, who was an MP from Istanbul in fourth and fifth parliaments, made important contributions to the development of Turkish museology.

346 Halil Edhem, “Le Rang et l’Importance de nos Musées des Antiquités parmi les Musées Européens”, *La Turquie Kémaliste*, no. 5 (February 1935), pp. 1-9.

One unchanging section of the magazine was *Ankara construit*, meaning, “Ankara builds.” This section featured pictures of newly constructed buildings, industrial facilities, dams, schools, and squares in Ankara. In every issue, there was a new front piece for this section, which were perfect examples of the visual propaganda of Republican ideology.

La Turquie Kémaliste was the best medium for conveying the image of the ideal Turkey during the single-party regime. If *La Turquie Kémaliste* is evaluated in its own conjuncture, it is visually little different from a fascist propaganda magazine published in Italy or communist one in the USSR. The similarity of a propaganda magazine published in 1938 by the Italian National Agency for Tourism (ENIT) on the Agro Pontino region with *La Turquie Kémaliste* is astonishing.³⁴⁷ The war against malaria began in 1922 in Agro Pontino (Pontine Marshes), and as part of this war, standard farm-houses and basic agriculture tools were provided to two thousand families. Agro Pontino’s reclamation was used as propaganda material by Mussolini as evidence of modernization and Mussolini’s decisive drive to create a new Italy.³⁴⁸ Mussolini frequently visited the region, his photo was taken, and he was filmed by the Italian Film Institute (LUCE) in the fields among farmers.³⁴⁹ The style of the photos in this magazine and pictures of Ankara in *La Turquie Kémaliste* are identical.

347 Agro Pontino, Anno IX- XV, Ente Nazionale Industrie Turistiche, 1938.

348 In his book *Moskova- Roma*, Falih Rıfki describes Agro Pontino as an area with a “fascist nature” and explains how 800 thousand decares (32,376 acres) of marshland were regenerated. During İnönü’s trip to Rome in 1932, the delegation also visited Agro Pontino. Atay, 1932, p. 105.

349 Federico Caprotti, *Mussolini’s Cities: Internal Colonialism in Italy 1930- 1939* (New York: Cambridge Press), 2007, xxiii.



Figure 3.12 Covers of *La Turquie Kémaliste* and *Agro Pontino* magazines

La Turquie Kémaliste is also similar to the *USSR in Construction*, founded on the initiative of Maxim Gorky and published for foreign propaganda purposes in the USSR. Describing the magazine's mission, Gorky wrote "The goal of our press [in words and photographs] is to reconstruct the old world anew."³⁵⁰ Similarly, in the *Ankara construit* pages, Othmar's photographs glorified Republican accomplishments and offered a new reality.

350 Bendavid-Val, 1999, p. 65.



Figure 3.13 *Ankara Construit* versus *USSR in Construction*

In 1937, a new section entitled *Visages Turcs* (*Turkish Faces*) was added to the magazine. It featured portraits of especially Turkish children and youth. Tör sent an interesting letter on the subject to Şinasi Dersan, owner of *Akşam* newspaper:

Brother Şinasi, I am making a Turkish-type series consisting of the headshot of handsome and beautiful men, women, and children of varying ages. There are eleven pictures of Beykoz soccer players on page 12 of your newspaper's issue dated April 2, 1937. All of them could be a part of this series. Can you please send us each of these pictures in black and white in 13 by 18 format as soon as possible. As always, with affection my brother.³⁵¹

The series was continued with *L'Enfant Turc* (*Turkish Child*) in 1941. Another feature of the magazine was the visibility of women and emphasis on the role of women in the new society. There were various portraits of women in the pages of the magazine – working in factories or laboratories, participating in the May 19 celebrations, interested in aeronautics, and working as nurses.

On last pages of each issue was a section entitled *La Turquie: Pays de Soleil, de Beauté et d'Histoire* (*Turkey: Country of Sun, Beauty, and History*). Initially, first years only pictures from Istanbul and the Bosphorus were published in this section. While first pages of the magazine were filled with photos of official buildings in Ankara, new industrial facilities in Anatolia, factories, and dams, last pages were reserved for Istanbul, as if a punishment – as if it should be avoided, but because of its enticement, it was not possible to avoid. There is no connotation of the revolution in the pictures of Istanbul; indeed, there is no subtext at all. In later issues, pictures of Istanbul were accompanied by photos of certain beautiful, historical locations throughout Turkey, such as Bursa, Konya, Antalya, and Urfa. Most probably these were taken by Othmar Pferchy, who took most of the magazine's pictures as he traveled through Turkey. Othmar's pictures were also published on monetary bills, stamps, calendar pages, and post cards of the period.³⁵²

Maxim Gorky, emphasized the importance of photography:

In order to keep our enemies at home and abroad from belittling the testimony of words and numbers, we have elected to employ the work

351 Er, 2003, p. 113.

352 Uğur Kavas, *Osman Darcan: Foto Osman- 1909- 1963* (Ankara, 2015), p. 52.

of light and sun, that of photography. You can't blame the sun for distortion. It gives light to what it exists, as it is...³⁵³

The founders of LTK were aware of the persuasive power of photography. LTK was like a picture album. The main reason for this format was Othmar Pferschy's photographs. During the preparations of *La Turquie Kémaliste*, a letter signed by the Minister of Internal Affairs was sent to all governorates and mayors requesting "artistic" pictures of their city's historical artifacts, archeological wealth, and construction projects undertaken by the Republic. However, pictures sent in reply were few and inadequate. An envelope that arrived from Istanbul contained good, impressive photographs which belonged to Othmar Pferschy. Tör immediately contacted Istanbul's Governor, Muhittin Üstündağ, and asked that Othmar to be sent to Ankara.³⁵⁴ Henceforth, Othmar began working at the DGP,³⁵⁵ and for the five years from May 31, 1935, to June 30, 1940, he traveled throughout Turkey taking some 16 thousand photos.³⁵⁶ In İskit's book, the DGP's photography department is praised: thanks to it, thousands of propaganda and landscape photographs were distributed both domestically and abroad.³⁵⁷ On February 24, 1936, upon the request of the Turkish Chamber of Commerce in Berlin to the RPP, forty images were delivered to the chamber, which it provided to German newspapers for the purpose of Turkish propaganda.³⁵⁸ The DGP's photography and film de-

353 Bendavid-Val, 1999, p. 65.

354 Kavas, 2013, pp. 18-19.

355 Prior to this proposal, Law 2007 dated June 11, 1932, concerning the Allocation of Arts and Services to Turkish citizens would have made Othmar's ability to practice photography in his studio in Kuloğlu Street, Beyoğlu impossible. For this reason, Othmar was planning to open a studio in Alexandria at the time. Özendes, 2007, p. 5.

356 Kavas, 2008, p. 103. An important part of Othmar's archive was donated to the Istanbul Modern Museum by his daughter. Some are still stored in the DGPP's Foto and Film Branch archives.

357 İskit, 1943, p. 275.

358 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 o o, Box no: 1294 Folder no: 296 Row no: 2 p. 10.

partment employed such prominent people as Osman Darcan and Şinasi Barutçu, and the present picture archive of the DGPI includes images from Othmar, as well as from Darcan and Barutçu.³⁵⁹

La Turquie Kémaliste was like a storyboard. Desired, appropriate images in line with the existing dream were stuck on the board with a talented composition. Turkey as pictured in *La Turquie Kémaliste* is the Turkey imagined by the creators of the magazine and the bureaucrats supporting it. There is a significant difference between the Ankara that appears on LTK's pages – a capital city rising on the moor – and the Ankara seen in films shot in that period.³⁶⁰ Photos – mostly Othmar's – were filtered through idealism: high, gray, geometrical buildings so desolate that they create disquietude. Next to buildings symbolizing production, progress, and future, the pages of the magazine depicted sturdy, Anatolian children with red cheeks from a diet of healthy cow's milk and sun. In reality, it was a period of shortage; milk powder sent through the Marshall Plan at the end of the war was like medicine for Anatolia's children.³⁶¹ However, it was important to merge the idealist spirit of gray buildings and the potential of rosy-cheeked youth. The state was responsible for educating and edifying these children.

La Turquie Kémaliste or other mediums of foreign propaganda frequently mentioned that the foreign press used images of Turkey that did not represent the current situation. The foreign press used pictures of ramshackle village

359 Interview with Uğur Kavas (September 1, 2015, Ankara).

360 The Film: *Türkiye'nin Kalbi Ankara* (Ankara, Turkey's heart), Director: Sergey Yutkeviç.

361 As a side note, an article by Nerin Gün in *Life Magazine* on December 11, 1950, on the effects of the Marshall Plan in Turkey alarmed both the DGPP and the Washington Press Attaché. The article insinuated items such as the radio, showerhead, electric razor, Hollywood cosmetics, baked beans, canned meat, can openers, and refrigerators were given to Turkey under the Marshall Plan. The article also claimed that a government official, Mr. Nuruman, had received three raises thanks to the Marshall Plan. The Directorate General announced that none of these were the case and that government officials had not received any raises since 1945. The announcement also stated that such items were not new for middle-class Turkish citizens. *Life Magazine* issued a retraction upon the requests of both the Directorate and the Attaché. Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Directorate General of Transactions, Cat. no: 030 01 Box no: 102 Folder no: 631 Row no: 6 pp. 1-5.

homes to represent Ankara instead of its futuristic public buildings. In an editorial of *La Turquie Kémaliste* dated August 1934, Vedat Nedim Tör complains about photojournalists who take pictures of donkeys in Anatolian villages and then use these to represent the true face of Turkey.³⁶² He preferred foreign journalists to use pictures from the formal balls in Ankara Palace. In October 1936, Tör returns to the issue of donkeys. He says donkeys are well known in Europe, they are not rare or exotic like giraffes or hippopotami. He does not understand why journalists travel all the way to Turkey to take photos of donkeys.³⁶³

The same argument and tone was used in editorials when Tör was General Manager. The purpose of the magazine was foreign propaganda and its target audience was foreigners. In editorials, however, authors complained about foreigners as if they were talking to a fellow Turk. Most editorials began with sentences like “foreigners think”, “foreigners perceive.” In an editorial published in October 1934, Burhan Belge complained of foreigners with regard to a simple subject. He notes that foreign tourists buy manual coffee grinders. According to Belge, these coffee grinders represent the romanticized Turkish woman who grinds the coffee, cooks it over coal, and serves it to her “master.” When Belge told his foreign colleagues that this was not the case anymore – coffee was ground with electric grinders and cooked on gas stove stops – it disappointed his friends. Belge’s tone was aggressive and angry, asking “Would European gentlemen like to see us in loose robes cooking over charcoal?”... “Can they not understand, or do they just want to see some countries as places of entertainment?”³⁶⁴ According to Belge, some Europeans want Turkey to remain in line with their Orientalist fantasy.

In another editorial, Belge evaluates news on Turkey in the foreign press published during the first ten years of the Republic. Belge calls out “sick” European romantics who feel sorrow over Turkey’s anti-traditional actions. He claims that if only there was enough money and space, it would be a great idea

362 Vedat Nedim Tör, “Sensation”, *La Turquie Kémaliste*, no. 2 (August 1934), p. 1.

363 Vedat Nedim Tör, “Les Anes et Les Photographes Etrangers”, *La Turquie Kémaliste*, no. 15 (October 1936), p. 1.

364 Burhan Belge, “Qu’importe.... Restez Tels que Vous Etes!”, *La Turquie Kémaliste*, no. 3 (October 1934), p. 1.

to gather these sick people – who are still writing stories against Turkey – in an amusement park to show to American tourists as the last representatives of an endangered species.³⁶⁵

In the February 1935 issue, Ercüment Ekrem Talu wrote an editorial the title of which was in Latin: “Oculos Habent, Sed...” meaning “They have eyes, but...” The article concerned a foreign journalist who lost his press credentials provided by the DGP on the basis of publishing baseless news about Turkey. According to Talu, this journalist chose not to live in Ankara and feel the fire of the revolution, instead he moved to Istanbul – like a softie European – to live away from the truth. Talu says such Europeans have not transcended the orientalist approaches of Pierre Loti and Claude Farrère.³⁶⁶ Nazım Hikmet was also angry with Loti and wrote a poem entitled *Şarlatan Piyerloti* (Charlatan Pierre Loti). In fact, there was contact among Loti, Farrère, and the DGPIN during national campaign. According to the notes of Ahmet Ağaoğlu, who was one of the DGPIN’s managers, foreign authors like Farrère who supported Turkey were given presents.³⁶⁷ Furthermore, Farrère was directly in contact with Atatürk during the national campaign. The DGPIN also presented Pierre Loti with an album of newspaper clippings and photographs.

Surprisingly, this discourse continues even today. Turkey still feels a lack of publicity in Europe. Even today, columnists think like Tör did that foreigners who come to Istanbul and take photos of women in chadors are sinister. This discourse is reproduced by the common people, who feel the need to make other like them; they care about what other people think and how they perceive them. This is a pathetic social behavior. The notion that Turkish roots were founded long ago according to the Turkish History Thesis, the Turks “renowned” history, and the catchphrase that “one Turk can take on the whole world” are fictions created so that the people can recover from the existential crisis created by the fall of empire – to rebuild their confidence. In 1935, on the

365 Belge’s proposal probably refers to Western practices of exhibiting indigenous peoples in attractions such as the World’s Fair or the Human Zoo exhibit under the Eiffel Tower in 1931. Burhan Belge, “Ils Disent que”, *La Turquie Kémaliste*, no. 6 (April 1935), p. 1.

366 Ercüment Ekrem Talu, “Oculos Habent, Sed...”, *La Turquie Kémaliste*, no. 5 (February 1935), p. 1.

367 Kardeş, 1980, p. 19.

seventh issue of *La Turquie Kémaliste*, an article on physical education started with the words: “No one can deny the Turkish people, who won many victories in the past, and were strong and brave. For Europeans to have created the idiom “as strong as a Turk”, this society must have had surreal strength.”³⁶⁸

As a publication targeting Westerners, editorials in a few issues were written by “friendly” foreigners who lived in Turkey and experienced the new Turkey first hand. Foreigners’ articles were seen as a remedy for misunderstandings on Turkey in the West, or for twisted descriptions of realities and developments in Turkey.³⁶⁹ In August 1936, President of Robert College, Walter L. Wright wrote an editorial entitled “Romance and Revolution”, wherein he criticized Americans who perceived Turkey in an orientalist manner as a romantic land. He tried to explain the reforms of young Republic.³⁷⁰

Generally *La Turquie Kémaliste* was a publication with pre-war spirit. Vedat Nedim Tör’s resignation from the DGP in October 1937, influenced the magazine, as well. Until then it had been published once every two months; from then on, its issue became erratic. Emiroğlu claims that Tör’s dismissal was because his structural function for the single party was complete. During its fourth General Assembly, the RPP defined the Six Arrows and Kemalism in detail, saying, “Kemalism is all the principles embraced by the party.” In a way, the magazine was a product of the period from 1931 to 1939 that some call “High Kemalism”³⁷¹ – ending with the death of Mustafa Kemal.

According to Emiroğlu, the magazine was instrumental in getting people accustomed to the word Kemalism, which was used in French before being imported into Turkish. Some editorials of the magazine, which anyway had the mission of publicizing Kemalist Turkey to the outside world, specifically discussed the meaning of Kemalism, its principles, and its local and global role. In June 1941, an editorial written by Hikmet Geray claims that rather than a regime, Kemalism should be called a movement. He adds this movement has

368 “L’Education Physique en Turquie”, *La Turquie Kémaliste*, no. 7 (June 1935), p. 6.

369 Emiroğlu, 2012, pp. 152-153.

370 Walter L. Wright, “Romance and Revolution”, *La Turquie Kémaliste*, no. 14 (August 1936), p. 1.

371 Soner Çagaptay, *Islam, Secularism, and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who is a Turk?* (London, New York: Routledge, 2006)

been accepted by 18 million citizens as the sole way to develop the country and increase the level of its civilization.³⁷² In 1937, Belge also defined Kemalism as a movement, but he argued further that this movement was closely linked to Anatolia. Kemalism was a synthesis of opinions and beliefs created for Anatolian Turks. Even though this definition implies Kemalism is not universal, Belge further says that Kemalism supports all free nations as an advocate of the liberation of all nations. According to Belge, even though Kemalism is a life formula created for the Turkish nation, it has universal resonance, and is thus influencing the surrounding Eastern Mediterranean and Balkan countries.³⁷³

In the first period of the magazine, defending Kemalism meant distance from imperialism. Most of Tör's articles criticized imperialism but compared to Belge, his tone was more moderate. Anti-imperialist discourse disappeared in the second period of the magazine, once Tör was no longer the manager of the DGP.

During the Second World War, the magazine was rarely published. Its last issue was published in March 1948. After the DP came to power, the magazine was again published in 1951 under the name *Turkey*. This magazine, published mostly in French by the single-party regime as the heritage of the era of Constitutional Monarchy, had more and more articles in English – indicating convergence with the United States. Even though in the first issue it was announced the reincarnation of magazine would be bimonthly, I could discover only two issues. The first editorial in *Turkey* was written by Halim Tevfik Alyot who stated that the Turkish people were loyal to the principles of the sovereignty of the people and of democracy. Maturing democracy in Turkey had brought about the results of the May 1951 elections.³⁷⁴ The second issue, printed in 1953, was a special edition on the 500th anniversary of the Conquest of Istanbul. Almost all articles concerned subjects such as Sultan Mehmet's life, his clothes, and the details of the conquest.

372 Hikmet Geray, "La Turquie Kémaliste", *La Turquie Kémaliste*, no. 43 (June 1941), p. 1.

373 Burhan Belge, "La Mission du Kamâlisme", *La Turquie Kamâlisme*, no. 20 (August 1937), p. 1.

374 Halim Tevfik Alyot, "Introduction", *Türkiye*, no. 1 (Ankara: Basın- Yayın ve Turizm Umum Müdürlüğü, 1951), p. 1.

During the single-party regime, the subject of the Conquest of Istanbul arose from time to time; various ideas were suggested on how to celebrate anniversary. However, as Abidin Daver's article published on May 30, 1948, in *Cumhuriyet* newspaper makes clear, the government avoided the subject in the single-party period. The title of Daver's article was "Why Are We Not Celebrating the Conquest of Istanbul?" Daver notes that celebrations first began on account of Mehmet Ziya during the era of the Constitutional Monarchy. They were later dropped, but in 1923 it was celebrated again – not as the "Conquest of Istanbul" – but as "Independence of Istanbul." According to Daver, not celebrating a globally significant event like the conquest of Istanbul was disrespectful to Sultan Mehmet.³⁷⁵ Moreover, the mausoleums of the sultans had been closed to visitors along with the regulation on the closure of dervish lodges, shrines, and mausoleums in 1925. This measure taken by the Kemalist government was no doubt intended to destroy the places of memory of the Ottoman past. The mausoleum of Sultan Mehmet was one of the first tombs to reopen in March 1950 with a law initiated by Prime Minister Şemsettin Günaltay.³⁷⁶

After the DP came to power, the Conquest of Istanbul – which had never been used as such before, became fodder for foreign propaganda. In 1951, one of the films with the highest budget of the period was directed by Aydın Arakon: *The Conquest of Istanbul*.³⁷⁷ The Turkish Army and the state contributed to this film shot to commemorate the 500th anniversary.³⁷⁸ On February 7, 1951, an ad in *Cumhuriyet* newspaper publicized the film: "*Conquest of Istanbul* is a live example of Turkish tenacity and resolve which will overcome all hardships in the past, present and future." The advertisement also said the film was a

375 Abidin Daver, "İstanbul'un Fethini Neden Kutlamıyoruz?", Hem Nalına Hem Mihnına, *Cumhuriyet* (May 30, 1948), p. 2.

376 Before Günaltay's initiative, Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver raised the issue of reopening the mausoleums of "people who made history" like sultans, in the 7th General Assembly of the RPP in 1947.

377 Erman Şener, "İstanbul'un Fethi", *Milliyet* (May 12, 1977), p. 12.

378 At the beginning of the movie, it is indicated that support was received from the army to recreate war scenes realistically. To watch the film, see <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uFXMP7u6EM8>

blockbuster; in twenty days, 300 thousand people had watched it in Istanbul alone.³⁷⁹ It is obvious the event touched national sensitivities and made people proud as a reminder of the “first victory” against the West.

After the Second World War, Turkey –which had become closer to the West – was apparently proud of reminding the West of this glorious historical incident. Following the single-party period, this may be seen as a first indicator of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis. Today, the Conquest of Istanbul continues to touch national and religious sensitivities and is used by the ruling party JDP (Justice and Development Party- *AK Parti*) more and more.

3.3.4 *Radio and Radio Magazine*

There are studies on the start and development of radio in Turkey that approached the issue from various points of view. No study particularly focuses on the propaganda feature of radio during the single-party period. However, radio was a medium born in the middle of the age of propaganda, and all studies on radio acknowledge this function of it.

According to Ahıska, radio was political and taken seriously by states and ruling classes because it was an efficient weapon of propaganda during the foundation of states as well as a medium for the popularization of consumption economies.³⁸⁰ Goebbels emphasized radio’s importance, saying, “Whatever the newspaper was in the nineteenth century, radio is in the twentieth century.” Indeed, radio was used effectively by all countries participating in the Second World War. Nazis understood radio’s importance for influencing public opinion, produced the cheapest radio in Europe, and subsidized its purchase for all citizens.³⁸¹ Broadcasts mostly consisted of speeches by Nazi leaders in common places like factories and schools. Everything was stopped to

379 Istanbul’s population was approximately 1 million in 1951. Box office numbers shown on this poster seem exaggerated.

380 Meltem Ahıska, *Radyonun Sihirli Kapısı: Garbiyatçılık ve Politik Öznellik* (Istanbul: Metis, 2005), p. 16.

381 Süleyman Seydi, *1939- 1945 Zor Yıllar: 2. Dünya Savaşı’nda Türkiye’de İngiliz- Alman Propaganda ve İstihbarat Savaşı* (Ankara: Asil Yayın Dağıtım, 2006), pp. 201-202. Seydi’s work is based on British archives consisting of the Special Operations Executive’s records and documents of the former Public Record Office.

listen to these speeches. People who gathered in public squares would listen to these speeches through loud speakers, as well. Goebbels appointed radio wardens for apartment buildings and residential complexes; these people motivated their neighbors to buy radios, lent them money, and tried to ensure that everyone listened to the speeches of Nazi leaders.³⁸²

In Turkey, the establishment of Turkish Wireless-Telephony Ltd. (*Telsiz Telefon Türk Anonim Şirketi*, hereafter TWT) was approved by the government on January 6, 1926. The AA, the Turkish Post Office, and members of parliament were among its shareholders.³⁸³ One of the first trial broadcasts by TWT was music from a transmitter situated atop the door of Istanbul's main post office in March 1927.³⁸⁴

The position of the TWT and its request to broadcast radio raised discussion in related circles. However, the approval for radio broadcasting came from Atatürk. One of the first directors of Istanbul radio, Hayreddin Hayreden, recounts the matter:

Some people mentioned this venture to him [Atatürk]. He said, bring the device here and let us listen. One day, I brought the receiver I had built to [Atatürk] Forest Farm. As we were trying to find a station, we came upon Russian Radio. Atatürk had learned a little bit of Russian when he was attaché in Sofia. He listened and listened, and of a sudden he silenced everyone, saying "Gentlemen, look, they are propagandizing." He ordered for radio to be founded immediately.³⁸⁵

Atatürk was right. Radio was an efficient medium of propaganda, and especially during the Second World War, this efficient medium would be employed by all political powers. In 1933, university students reacted to the fact that the Turkish National Anthem was not broadcast on radio. Hayreden's response was interesting: he stated that broadcasting national anthems on radio, like the Soviets and Germans did, was an issue of propaganda. However, as criticism

382 Keith Somerville, *Radio Propaganda and the Broadcasting of Hatred: Historical Development and Definitions* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), pp. 114-115.

383 Kocabaşoğlu, 2010, p. 36.

384 Kocabaşoğlu, 2010, p. 55.

385 Kocabaşoğlu, 2010, p. 48.

increased, the Turkish National Anthem was played on the radio starting in March 23, 1933.³⁸⁶

With the law enumerating the organization and responsibilities of the DGP enacted on June 1, 1934, the regulation of radio broadcast propaganda was included under the DGP's purview. During debate over the law, Refik Şevket, an MP from Manisa, asked if regulating songs would be one of the DGP's responsibilities. Minister of Internal Affairs Kaya's answer was affirmative. He explained that music was an element of national edification, and the role of songs had up to then been overlooked.³⁸⁷ With a decree enacted in August 1936, the state took direct control of radio and gave the duty of broadcasting to the Turkish Post Office. Actually, as Kocabaşoğlu recounts, the previous structure was also under control of the state; there was no great change.³⁸⁸

From the point of view of the party-state, radio's first duty was to communicate the government's decisions and actions to the people. In the beginning, they learned out how other countries used radio and imitated them. On December 3, 1934, a report sent to Ziya Gevher, an MP from Çanakkale, apprised the radio system in the United States. The individual who wrote the report was probably an official from the TWT. Gevher had asked this person to evaluate the establishment of the radio system in the United States and its management of propaganda, as well as to bring back resources like pamphlets and laws. The person who wrote the report not only gathered information, he had a three-hour meeting with the Chief Executive Officer of the National Broadcasting Company (NBC). What is mentioned in the report provides clues on the mentality of the reporter: his thoughts on radio's function and operation. The report starts by noting that the radio business was not under the control of a ministry in the United States, and that radio was run by a commission appointed by Congress. The CEO of NBC said that due to high tax rates in Turkey, it was impossible to ensure widespread use of the radio. Only a small group of wealthy people would own and benefit from radio. According to the CEO, this system was wrong. Radio should be used especially

386 Çakan, 2004, pp. 274-275.

387 TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Term 4, Vol. 22, Session 3, Conclusion 57, May 26, 1934, p. 275.

388 Kocabaşoğlu, 2010, pp. 171-172.

for the poor people, for children, and for the edification, education and spiritual nurture of villagers. He said Turkey should start manufacturing radios, which is not difficult, and shared the contact information of companies working in the field.³⁸⁹

In summer 1935, debates began concerning tax cuts for the manufacture of radios and radio parts in Turkey. During the drafting of the law, it was decided that radio should be used as an efficient medium in villages. The Minister of Internal Affairs, who evaluated the draft, thought taxes on radios were not the only issue. To realize the reforms and edification expected from radio, stations should be developed in addition to reducing the price of the devices. If local stations were not developed, expensive, multi-tube radio devices would be required to listen to stations from Istanbul and Ankara. Since radio stations were also telegram stations, Istanbul radio only broadcast for three hours a day and Ankara radio only two and a half hours.³⁹⁰

On August 11, 1936, the Minister of Internal Affairs, Şükrü Kaya, sent a letter to the General Inspector of Thrace, Kazım Dirik, to say the goal of the party was to make radio accessible in all corners of Turkey and to ensure that villagers could procure radios at insignificant costs. Kaya added that in order to realize this purpose, they needed to build an immense radio transmitting station in Ankara. However, he had one concern: villagers would be exposed to propaganda from Egypt, Russia, and Bulgaria as they listened to the radio, and he worried this would be detrimental.³⁹¹

Kaya was aware of the public's reprimands and complaints. When radio turned Westward and distanced itself from classical and folk music that people were used to, people started to listen to foreign stations that they could receive on their radios. For example, Istanbul radio stopped playing old Ottoman tunes, the people began listening to Egyptian stations. As the Governorate of İzmir informed the RPP, people gathered in front of a grocery shop owned by

389 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 01, Box no: 1235 Folder no: 115 Row no: 2 pp. 49-53.

390 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Directorate General of Transactions, Cat. no: 030 10, Box no: 212 Folder no: 440 Row no: 9 pp. 1-12.

391 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 0 0, Box no: 1235 Folder no: 115 Row no: 2 p. 16.

Salih Çavuş in Tire during prayer times in order to listen to prayers in Arabic being broadcast from Alexandria. He suggested that instead of by the governorate, municipal police, or government, such incidents should be stopped by the party itself.³⁹²

For radio to become widespread, precautions were taken similar to those in Europe. At first, radio subscription fees were high in certain neighborhoods in Istanbul. However, when many coffee houses and other establishments removed their radios and private citizens who wished to buy radios abandoned the idea, prices were dropped since it was detrimental for propaganda.³⁹³ On July 23, 1937, the Ministry of Public Works informed the Ministry of Internal Affairs of a significant discount in radio subscription fees and the removal of 25 percent tax on imported radios. In this letter, the Ministry of Public Works stated they would take necessary precautions once radio stations began broadcasting in Ankara after July 1938 to ensure its utmost benefit as “the best medium of propaganda and culture.”³⁹⁴ In 1938, Italy claimed 1.2 million radio subscriptions, while Germany’s rate was up to 12 million.³⁹⁵ In Turkey, the total number of radio subscriptions had reached only 178,145 by June 1945.³⁹⁶

After the preparation of radio broadcasts became one of its responsibilities, the DGP asked the prime ministry in October 1934 that government and other institutions prepare propaganda materials to convey their actions to the public. Certain hours were set aside for such state propaganda. A modicum of financial support was also expected from the ministries and national institutions sending these propaganda materials.³⁹⁷ In August 1938, before the opening of the new radio center in Ankara, the DGP again embarked on gathering

392 Prime Ministry’s Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People’s Party, Cat. no: 490 1 0 0, Box no: 1240 Folder no: 128 Row no: 1 pp: 207-208.

393 Prime Ministry’s Republican Archive, Document numbered 8/267, dated July 21, 1937, p. 179.

394 Prime Ministry’s Republican Archive, Document numbered 395/9565, dated July 23, 1937, p. 178.

395 De Grand, 2004, p. 96.

396 “Memleketimizde ne kadar radyo var? June 1945 Statistics”, *Radyo*, no. 48 (December 1, 1945), p. 11.

397 Prime Ministry’s Republican Archive, Catalogue of Directorate General of Transactions, Cat. no: 030 10, Box no: 129 Folder no: 929 Row no: 1 p. 1.

success stories from all ministries and institutions working on the development programs of the new Turkey.³⁹⁸

Yeni Adam magazine announced that starting on December 8, 1937, a broadcast in Arabic would commence on the Ankara and Istanbul radio stations. First, İsmet İnönü's oration would be translated into Arabic and broadcast. *Yeni Adam* consents that this change is positive; however, the editorialist also asked why there would be no broadcast in French or English. The audience for this propaganda was Arabs living in Hatay. Indeed, daily Arabic programs prepared by the DGP were used as a medium of propaganda during Hatay issue. Broadcast of El İzaatül Arabiye – meaning Arabic Radio – continued for approximately a year. Abdüsselam Buseyri, who was the head of the department of Arab-speaking countries in the DGP, later on became the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Libya. The content of propaganda in Arabic was vaguely determined by the government, and then prepared by Buseyri and Tör.³⁹⁹ As Kocabaşoğlu noted, this was the first foreign-language broadcast of Turkish radio, which had only been broadcast in Turkish thus far, but after the Hatay issue was resolved, the broadcast ended.⁴⁰⁰ The subject of Hatay was propagandized in *La Turquie Kémaliste* as well. In the October 1938 issue, a month after the Republic of Hatay was established, Hatay was mentioned without acknowledging that it was a separate republic – as though it was just another city in Turkey. In the closing pages, where pictures from around Turkey were usually printed, many photos from Hatay were included, as well.⁴⁰¹

With the new legislation on the DGP in 1940, the directorate took control of radio. Preparing and broadcasting programming to meet people's social, economic, cultural, and aesthetic needs through radio broadcasts were added to the responsibilities of the directorate. Hasan Refik Ertuğ explained the purpose of this change as to "... gather the main media of propaganda under one roof, supervise these closely, therefore protecting the Turkish people from

398 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Directorate General of Transactions, Cat. no: 030 10 0 0, Box no: 15 Folder no: 84 Row no: 14 pp. 1-3.

399 Abdullah Muradoğlu, "Atatürk'ten Arapça Radyo Gazetesi", <http://yarinist.tripod.com/mayis/34.htm>

400 Kocabaşoğlu, 2010, p. 217.

401 *La Turquie Kémaliste*, no. 27 (October 1938), pp. 34-48.

black propaganda; announce news in line with our national interests; and express our national view to our public.”⁴⁰²

On March 27, 1941, a letter sent by the DGP signed by the Prime Minister to the Secretary General of the RPP requested that all ministries and institutions immediately choose an agent of propaganda and report the name of this individual to the DGP. The duty of this person was serious. Every day, this agent of propaganda had to gather, classify, and send to the DGP “actions and news they think citizens and foreigners would benefit from”, “inculcations they wished to perform”, and “issues and styles of fighting negative rumors and gossips.” In March 1941, as the Germans neared the Turkish border, it was logical to prioritize propaganda. The correspondence suggested that materials gathered by the agents of propaganda would be communicated through radio. Domestic news was prioritized.⁴⁰³ The person assigned to this task by the Secretary General of the RPP was Hasan Reşit Tankut, one of the party’s most important ideologues.⁴⁰⁴ He had been inspector of the Turkish Hearths and was elected as an MP in the 1931 elections. He was also one of the propagators of the Sun-Language Theory and founder of the Turkish Institute of Language. In that period, Tankut was both an MP and Chief of Propaganda in the Eighth Bureau of the RPP. A month after the DGP’s request, On May 14, 1941, the agents of propaganda of various ministries and institutions gathered. In accordance with decisions taken at this meeting, every agent would send domestic news deemed publishable to the DGP by 5 p.m. each day. News would be written in simple language in a short, to the point manner. News had to be current and had to be about actions already fulfilled: ideas and future endeavors could not be mentioned. After this meeting, the RPP asked their bureaus to send related news to Seventh Bureau every morning.⁴⁰⁵

402 Kocabaşoğlu, 2010, p. 231.

403 Prime Ministry’s Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People’s Party, Cat. no: 490 1 o o, Box no: 1297 Folder no: 310 Row no: 1 p. 116.

404 Prime Ministry’s Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People’s Party, Cat. no: 490 1 o o, Box no: 1297 Folder no: 310 Row no: 1 p. 114.

405 Prime Ministry’s Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People’s Party, Cat. no: 490 1 o o, Box no: 1297 Folder no: 310 Row no: 1 p. 9.

A counterpart to activities on the radio was *Radyo* magazine, published between 1941 and 1949 by the DGP.⁴⁰⁶ *Radyo* was a contemporary of the BBC's publication, *Radio Times*. Its purpose was defined as bringing together radio officials and listeners, but its real purpose was to reinforce radio broadcasts.⁴⁰⁷ The magazine included a behind-the-scenes look at how radio and the DGP functioned, and was a mirror of the cultural activities of the period. Summaries of the DGP's films and pictures of plays performed at State Theaters were featured.

Editorials in *Radyo* were mostly written by the General Manager of the DGP, Selim Sarper. In an article dated February 15, 1942, he mentions that Ankara radio – which he describes as the ear of the people and the mouth of the government – has three million listeners.⁴⁰⁸ Sarper was a good propagandist. By conjuring an image of citizens listening to the mouth of the state and accepting news as absolute truth, Sarper aimed to pull readers into this pseudo-reality.⁴⁰⁹

Sarper continued his self-assured and sometimes aggressive tone in *La Turquie Kémaliste* in *Radyo*, as well. In July 1942, Sarper wrote that listening to broadcasts of foreign radios was not banned in Turkey; on the contrary, broadcasts of foreign radio in Turkish were announced on *Radyo*. For three years, the directorate had been listening to world radio, and as a result, it was bothered by the ways of explaining “what is right” and “what is true” in some countries with which Turkey was close. Whether participating in war or not, the propaganda of these countries vexed Sarper. This is why he warned the public, saying that all nations propagandized for their own benefit through radio, and therefore the people should be careful and attentive when listening to foreign radio. Sarper said for three years the directorate had been listening on the radio how families died, homes were destroyed, tears were turned into rivers,

406 A semimonthly radio magazine entitled *La Quinzaine d'Ankara* in French will be published by the DGPP during the years 1947, 1948 and 1949.

407 Kocabaşoğlu, 2010, p. 247.

408 In wartime Germany there was a radio program called *The Party's Hour: The Party Speaks – The People Listen*, which provided a “forum for leading party members” to discuss national concerns. Rupp, 1978, p. 104.

409 Selim Sarper, “Ankara Radyosu Milletini Emrinde”, *Radyo*, no. 3 (February 15, 1942), p. 1.

but still the land was hungry for blood. After hearing this dark picture, Sarper characterized Ankara Radio:

There is also Ankara radio on this planet. It has also been broadcasting its humble but solid voice for three years. If only they listened to us a little. These sounds coming from here might seem foreign to the world. Ankara Radio broadcast a live performance of Beethoven's Ninth Symphony performed by the Ankara Conservatory. The world should listen to a choir of Turkish boys and girls [singing] how Schiller and Beethoven pleaded and mediated for humanity... We give news from us. Those who want to know us should listen to our voice. The news we give about ourselves is moderate and sincere... We address the world in various languages. Our purpose is not propaganda for others' for our sake. Offending others purposely does not fit our national character. Our purpose is not even to propagandize for ourselves, it is to take the burden off our friends who want to know us and to represent ourselves as we are."⁴¹⁰

In the first editorial of *Radyo*, it is claimed that radio turned the world into an agora. At this agora, people listen to one another and exchange ideas. It is noted that since radio broadcasting was taken over by the state, radio has become a great pastime and an important medium for state.⁴¹¹

Radio conveyed the single party's opinions on social, cultural, artistic, economic, and political issues, and at the same time, it served as a medium to edify and educate the people. However, it is worth mentioning that Turkish radio does not fully capture the revolutionary propaganda period since it only passed into total state control in 1940. The outbreak of the war made taking control over a crucial propaganda medium like radio an unavoidable necessity.

410 Selim Sarper, "Biraz da Onlar Bizi Dinlese", *Radyo*, vol. 1, no. 8 (Ankara, July 15, 1942), p. 2.

411 "Başlarken", *Radyo*, vol. 1, no. 1 (Ankara, December 15, 1941), p. 1.

Film Propaganda as a “Microcosmos”

Another virtue of cinema that it replaces the piercingly sturdy logic of mature age, standing like a thistle in one’s skull with childish naiveté and gullibility.... I owe my most beautiful and relaxing sleep to cinema’s soft darkness, which spreads on the back of one’s head like a silk pillow.

– Ahmet Haşim¹

In the early years of the Republic, when radio was just becoming a part of everyday life, where did cinema stand in the life of laymen? Cinema’s place and importance during the early years of the Republic is greater than most anticipated. Consider a Turkey where there are film theaters not only in big cities, but in small towns some of which do not have film theaters in 2015. How would you reckon people spent their time in Giresun on a typical night in the month of Ramadan ? The date is December 28, 1933. In an article in *Yeşil*

1 In Turkish: “Sinemanın diğer bir fazileti de olgun yaşın, kafatası içinde bir deste deve dikenini gibi sert duran acıtıcı mantığı yerine, çocuk safdilliğini ve kolayca aldanış kabiliyetini ikame etmesidir... Ben, en güzel ve en dinlendirici uykularımı sinemanın, ipek yastıklar gibi başın arkasına yığılan yumuşak karanlıklarına medyunum.” Ahmet Haşim, “Sinema”, in *Bize Göre ve Bir Seyahatin Notları*, ed. Nuri Sağlam and M. Fatih Andı (Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2004), p. 31.

Giresun newspaper entitled “Films in Turkish During Ramadan” announces that there would be two film screenings each night. They also note that Turkish films such as *If My Wife Betrays Me* (*Karım Beni Aldatırsa*), *A Nation Awakens* (*Bir Millet Uyanıyor*), and *The Wedding Night* (*Düğün Gecesi*) would be screened soon. The article defines cinema as the pristine and least expensive entertainment of the civilized world, advising people to go to the cinema and benefit from these splendors instead of killing time in coffee houses.²



Figure 4.1 Residents of Ballıkpınar Village, Movie Screening, 1930s (DGPP Archive)

Studies on Turkish cinema focusing on the pre-Republican era mostly concern the film on the demolition of the San Stefano Monument. On the other hand,

2 Serdar Öztürk, *Sinema, Seyir, Siyaset* (Ankara: Elips Kitap, 2005), p. 168.

studies on the post-Republican era tend not to focus on the Republic's early years. Though other aspects of these years and especially the period of the National Chief are widely discussed, cinema's role is rarely mentioned as a medium to spread the state's ideology and propagandize the revolution. The question of how, in which media, and for what purpose cinema was used in the early Republican era is understudied. However, an analysis of cinematic activity from 1930-50 and the relation of the state and cinema sheds light on the controversial period of the National Chief. One exceptional study in this field is that of Serdar Öztürk, who analyzes the relationship between the state and cinema during the first period of the Republic. Öztürk opposes the idea of some researchers who argue that those who founded the Republic saw cinema as simple, folk entertainment rather than as a serious form of art. Maybe because of this oft appropriated, there is little research on this subject and those that exist are perfunctory.

The state's efforts in cinema during the early years of the Republic prove that the ruling class did not perceive cinema as mere entertainment. Even if that were case, the impact of cinema on audiences is – on its own – propagandist. The state could not ignore or leave this field unattended. In this chapter, my purpose is to understand in what capacity was cinema used between 1930 and 1950 by the ruling class as a driving force of its propaganda activities and as a tool for educating the people.

After the revolution, the young Republic endeavored to use mass communication media effectively. Among these media, cinema and especially documentaries were used to imbue the state's authority in the people, to propagandize the regime, and to ensure the dissemination of the cultural revolution and reforms. Apart from that, one of the purposes was to sway domestic public opinion and also publicize the new regime in an international arena.

In this period, propaganda films in the form of documentaries were frequently screened to ensure control of the hegemonic ideology over the audience. Documentaries in Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany were not innocent productions delivering social facts to people; instead, they were tools of propaganda. Dziga Vertov, in his documentaries shot with the "cine-eye" approach, used cinema as a tool to overcome the weaknesses of the eye. In Nazi Germany,

documentary-like propaganda films were prominent, such as Leni Reifentahl's "Triumph of the Will" (*Triumph des Willens*) shot on Hitler's request.³

During a turbulent period that included the Second World War, Turkey's activity in cinema should be of interest. This period is crucial not only for observing the state's activities in cinema, but the development of independent Turkish cinema. It includes discussions such as the national movement in cinema and the influence of Turkish theater on cinema. While these discussions are not the focus of my study per se, I will start with a short, holistic chronology of the beginning and development of cinema in Turkey.

§ 4.1 Single-Party Regime and Cinema

Before and after the Second World War, most totalitarian states deliberately used cinema. In most of these countries, cinema was a part of the state monopoly or there was an effective control mechanism over independent cinema, while state institutions ran national film production.

Though the history of Turkish cinema is known for heavy censorship, the single-party period included, the cinema industry was never a state monopoly in Turkey. The reason was not a lack of interest, but that statist politics, which forced the state to be involved in all financial endeavors, did not allow for the high budgets required in cinema. Another reason was that the state did not have qualified staff for this job. The state expected the private sector to make both cultural and educational films; however, in the period in question, people were particularly curious about foreign films. On top of that, cultural films and documentaries were not a reliable source of profit in the private sector. Thus, the state considered the activities of the private sector insufficient, and the General Secretariat of Republican People's Party (*CHP Genel Sekreterliği*) and later the institution responsible from propaganda – the Directorate General of the Press – embarked on producing films. They accepted the support of the private sector for these productions; in other words, they benefited from the experience and know-how of private industry.

3 Kerime Şenyücel, *Türk Belgesel Film Etiği*, <http://www.kameraarkasi.org/belgesel/makaleler/belgeselfilm.html>

According to a document published by the Ministry of Education in 1932, in order to educate people and “to teach the reforms and republican ideas to the people in an exact and correct way, cinema, theater, portable cinema, conferences, billboards, radio”, and all similar media would be used.⁴ There are many distinct aspects to cinematic activities during the early years of the Republic. First the state’s activities had both internal and external consequences. Globally, especially after the First World War, cinema was effectively used for entertainment, education, and teaching purposes, and audiences acclimatized to and enjoyed it. However, the view suggesting that cinema was used exclusively for political propaganda is inaccurate. As examined in the second chapter, the line between edification and propaganda is indistinct. Aside from conveying state discourses to the public, cinema was a new and effective medium for citizens’ edification.

In Turkey, starting in the pre-Republican period, the military and then political authorities took an interest in developments in foreign cinema. They endeavored to use cinema effectively from what they learned in Germany or through film’s change agreements made with the Soviet Union.

It must be noted that the contemporaneous cinema world in Turkey consisted of just a handful of people. The activities of all actors and institutions are entwined. It is unsurprising that a technician working for the state would own his own production company and be an industry leader a few years later. People employed in the military or people who had independently made an effort to involved with the cinema business before the Republic was founded, became the leaders of the young Republic’s cinema scene. An overview of the development of cinema in Turkey, starting in the pre-Republican period will lay the groundwork for the use of cinema as an instrument of propaganda.

4.1.1 *Cinema from Ottoman Period Till Early Republican Period*

Cinema came to Turkey before the Republican era, was taken up, and spread widely. Sigmund Weinberg, the representative of Pathé Brothers in Turkey, introduced cinema to the palace. While the Lumières Brothers held their first

4 Öztürk, 2005, p. 180.

screening in December 1895 in Paris, the first movie screening in Turkey occurred in 1897 by Pathé films, in a well-known alehouse, Sponeck, in Beyoğlu.⁵ Ercüment Ekrem Talu describes the event and the reactions of first time audiences:

There was a white screen one or one and a half meters long. We stood there without any inkling of its purpose. There were posters on the sidewalls, which we did not understand, saying: moving picture, the wonder of the century, *Spanish Bullfight*, *The Arrival of a Train at La Ciotat Station*... These announcements only increased our curiosity. Then it was dark. We all were in the dark and actually frightened.⁶

According to many sources, this screening was the first time Turkish viewers were introduced to cinema. Because electricity came late to Istanbul, cinema did not spread in the Ottoman Empire as quickly as in Europe. The first permanent film theater opened in 1908. *The Demolition of the Russian Monument in San Stefano* was shot by reserve officer Fuat Uzkinay in 1914 and is considered to be the first Turkish film. When the decision to demolish of the San Stefano Monument was made, an Austrian Production Company, Sacha Film, was retained to film the event. However, it was of utmost importance that a Turk shoot the film; therefore, it is assumed that the production company played an assistive role while Uzkinay was shooting. Though there is no surviving copy of the film, it is surmised to be a documentary that recorded the process of the monument's demolition.⁷ Uzkinay was interested in cinema even before he shot this film. Before being enlisted, he was an operator at the first Muslim film theater in Istanbul, the Ali Efendi Theater in Sirkeci.⁸

Before the Great War, most films screened in Turkey were Italian or Scandinavian. During the war, the films of enemy countries were censored, so

5 Nijat Özön, *Türk Sineması Kronolojisi (1895- 1966)* (Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi, 1968), p. 12.

6 Özön, 1968, p. 11.

7 Researcher Burçak Evren challenges the notion of this film was the first Turkish film, arguing instead that the Macedonian Manaki Brothers' film on the visit of Sultan Mehmet the 4th to Bitola and Salonica, shot in 1911, should be considered the first Turkish film. Şükran Kuyucak Esen, *Türk Sinemasının Kilometre Taşları* (Istanbul: Agora Kitaplığı, 2010), p. 11.

8 Gökhan Akçura, *Aile Boyu Sinema* (Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 1995), p. 17.

mostly German films were screened. American films would be to be imported to Turkey first in 1921, but by 1931, a third of total film imports were from the United States.⁹ In 1942, so a great number of American films were screened that it disturbed the Germans.¹⁰

The international competitive power of American films was similar elsewhere. The production speed in Hollywood contributed to this. In 1919, American and other foreign films dominated the Italian film industry. When the state intervened in Italian cinema in the 1930s, the balance did not change; in 1935, only 15 percent of films on the market were Italian. Italian government attempted to change the circumstance for cultural and economic reasons; however, 80 percent of the films that's passed through the censorship committee were American.¹¹ Especially during wartime – whatever the German and Italian governments thought of it – “escapist” American comedies were popular.¹² While the ruling class pursued the edification of its citizens the latter were interested in the entertainment value of this new media.

After Enver Pasha watched war films shot on the German fronts by the German Army, he understood the impact of cinema for illiterate people. He took the initiative to found a cinema branch in the Ottoman Army. Thus the Central Army Office of Cinema (*Merkez Ordu Sinema Dairesi*, hereafter CAOC) was founded. It was directed by Weinberg, and Uzkınay was his assistant. This department did not produce fiction, but rather documentaries and newsreels on war zones with the help of German and Austrian film directors.¹³ Some titles the CAOC produced between 1915 and 1918 include: *Defeat of Enemy Armies in Suvia* (*Anafartalar Muharebesinde İtilaf Ordularının Püskürtülmesi*), *Enslaved British General* (*Esir İngiliz Generali*), *German Emperor's Visit to Çanakkale* (*Alman İmparatoru'nun Çanakkale'yi Ziyareti*), and

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- 9 Rıfat N. Bali, *The Turkish Cinema in the Early Republican Years, US Diplomatic Documents on Turkey* (Istanbul: The Isis Press, 2007), p. 30-32.
 - 10 Johannes Glasneck, *Türkiye'de Faşist Alman Propagandası*, trans. Arif Gelen (Ankara: Onur Yayınları, 1970), p. 29.
 - 11 De Grazia, 2002, pp. 216-217.
 - 12 De Grand, 2004, p. 95.
 - 13 Özön, 1968, pp. 13-14.

Abdülhamit's Funeral (Abdülhamit'in Cenaze Merasimi).¹⁴ Cemil Filmer, who played an active role in post-Republican Turkish cinema, also worked in this department as an officer, where he gathered his know-how about film production and screening. Even though the First World War was ongoing, Enver Paşa appointed Filmer to shoot many events he considered significant. From time to time, he had Filmer organize screenings at his palace in Ortaköy for his family and guests. In 1917, they decided to upgrade the CAOC, and Fuat Uzkınay was sent to Germany for a comprehensive examination.¹⁵

In 1913, during Balkan Wars, the Association of National Defense (*Müdafaa-i Milliye Cemiyeti*, hereafter AND) was founded to promote patriotism. They produced some documentaries and fictional films.¹⁶ The AND aimed for resurgence of patriotism and cohesiveness with documentaries shot on the fronts such in Çanakkale and Galicia. In 1917, the AND began producing fiction films under the direction of Sedat Simavi in order to generate income.¹⁷ Kenan Erginsoy, who participated in the RPP's cinematic activities after the Republic was founded, shot newsreels for the AND.¹⁸ After defeat in the First World War in the winter of 1918, the activities both the CAOC and AND ended, and their equipment was sent to the Veteran's Community (*Malulîn-i Guzzata Muavenet Heyeti* or *Malûl Gaziler Cemiyeti*, hereafter VC.)¹⁹ The attempt to protect cinematic equipment from enemy armies indicated the awareness of the contribution of cinema to cultural and military resistance.²⁰ The person in charge of cinema at the VC was again Fuat Uzkınay.

14 Özön, 1968, p. 44.

15 Cemil Filmer, *Hatıralar: Türk Sinemasında 65 Yıl* (İstanbul: Emek Matbaacılık ve İlançılık, 1984), p. 85.

16 Özde Çeliktemel-Thomen, "Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda Sinema ve Propaganda", *Kurgu Online International Journal of Communication Studies*, vol. 2, <http://www.kurgu.ana-dolu.edu.tr/dosyalar/22.pdf> (June 2010), pp. 2-3.

17 Özön, 1968, p. 47.

18 Ahmet Baydemir and Selahattin Önder, "Türk Sinemasının Gelişimi", *Eskişehir Osmangazi Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi*, vol. 6, no. 2 (December 2005), p. 119.

19 The name of the community is abbreviated *Malul Gaziler Cemiyeti* in many sources.

20 Serdar Öztürk, "Cumhuriyet Türkiye'sindeki Sinema Uygulamalarını İletişim Sosyolojisi Açısından Yeniden Değerlendirmek", in *Cumhuriyet Döneminde İletişim: Kurumlar, Politikalar*, ed. Nazife Güngör (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 2010), p. 318.

He directed short newsreels with such titles as *Horse Races (At Yarışları)* and *Boat Races (Kayık Yarışları)*.²¹ At the same time in order to ensure some income for the community, *Binnaz* and *The Teacher (Mürebbiye)* – one of the very first Turkish films – were shot.²² Filmer shot the Sultanahmet Meeting – where more than 200 thousand women gathered to listen to Halide Edib’s speech – for the VC. He shot it from a minaret, disregarding the British ban on filming.²³ Films of the period were black and white and silent. Özge Çeliktemel-Thomen, in an article analyzing the activities of the AND and VC, notes that these patriotic, semi-official institutions contributed to the development of cinema while simultaneously helping the war effort and veterans’ families. However, while the army and these institutions made an obvious effort, cinema was not yet as a comprehensive, powerful tool of propaganda.²⁴

During the War of Independence, the commander of the eastern front, Kazım Karabekir, sent a letter to the Ministries of the Economy and of National Defense with an interesting proposal. Karabekir offered to “awaken art and mechanical engineering” in the country for first individual and then social benefits. He proposed to spread the extant cinema, photography, and electricity workshops in war zones across Anatolia. Karabekir’s letter was answered by the Ministry of Economy negatively, as it thought it better to open workshops to teach the use of agricultural machinery. According to Karabekir, there were no experts in the army to teach agriculture, but there were experts on photography, cinema, and electricity. It was imperative to benefit from these experts and “awaken an affinity to work with machinery” among the people.²⁵ Karabekir’s idea to introduce people to machines recalls Nazım Hikmet’s poem “To Become A Machine” (*Makinalaşmak İstiyorum*). Creating a passion for working with machines was in line with broader aims to reaching a contemporary level of civilization and improve national industry. Though it did not spread throught Anatolia, Kazım Karabekir’s proposal and the already

21 Özön, 1968, p. 50.

22 Filmer, 1984, p. 95.

23 Filmer, 1984, pp. 99-101.

24 Çeliktemel-Thomen, 2010, p. 4.

25 Öztürk, 2005, p. 156.

opened wartime workshops show that even in war conditions, cinema was of important.

In 1923, after four years of the War of Independence, cinema equipment owned by the VC was sent to the armies of the GNAT.²⁶ When the Greek army was defeated in 1922, two documentaries entitled “Independence” (*İstiklal*) and “The Victory of İzmir” (*İzmir Zaferi*) were made.²⁷ Five months prior to the proclamation of the Republic, Kazım Karabekir again proposed a project, this time focused only on cinema. It was called “Exemplary Points” (*İbret Yerleri*). The motion was discussed in the GNAT on April 30, 1923. Karabekir suggested opening multi-function venues called “Exemplary Points” as multi-functional venues that would act as film and play theaters. Workshops would be held there to educate young people in cinema, and other, various events would be organized “in order to elevate citizens.” Karabekir, in his own words, was encouraged by the fact that “the influence of films is powerful.” According to him, “gnostic, scientific, and industrial films have a great potential to improve the understanding of people and school.” The first of Karabekir’s three articles proposed dividing Turkey into regions and establishing venues with the same architecture at the center. Second, he suggested retaining the organs of “Social Assistance” (*Muavenet-i İçtimaiye*) and the “Red Cross” (*Hilal-i Ahmer*) to help establish these venues. Thirdly, these venues would be designed as schools of cinema where young people from the surrounding areas would gather and be educated. Karabekir probably thought that experienced officers in the army would be the instructors. Though Atatürk approved the project, Rıza Nur at the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (*Sıhhiye ve Muavenet-i İçtimaiye Vekaleti*) rejected the application due to lack of funds.²⁸ Nonetheless, these structures suggested by Karabekir can be interpreted as a prototype of the “People’s Houses” (*Halkevleri*).

On May 21, 1923, a note sent to the presidency of the council of ministers, signed by the General Staff, Fevzi Çakmak, conveys the importance of cinema:

26 Özön 1968, pp. 13-14 and p. 57.

27 Öztürk, 2010, p. 319.

28 Öztürk, 2005, p. 158.

Cinema is the foremost tool of propaganda all over the world. Even though it is not possible at this moment to effectively use this instrument for our national benefit, we should not under any circumstances allow the propaganda of enemy countries with which we have not yet signed treaties.

The General Staff's reason for writing was that after Istanbul was occupied, there were film screenings for the benefit of occupying forces in Istanbul and İzmir. Even after the War of Independence, these films were still being screened without control. Because of the possibility they may contain propaganda, the General Staff wished to prevent such screenings.²⁹

In 1924, Uzkinay was appointed director of the Military Film Production Center (*Ordu Film Çekme Merkezi*) acting under the Ministry of National Defense (*Milli Müdafaa Vekaleti*).³⁰ In 1927, the Military Film Production Center was operated under the direction of the Military Academy, and in when the Academy moved to Ankara in 1940, the center moved there, as well.³¹ Up until the beginning of the 1930s, the Military Film Production Center produced many films,³² and this center, now commonly known as the Military Photography and Film Center (*Ordu Foto Film Merkezi*) has the richest, surviving visual material archive on the history of the Republic.

Cinema historian Nijat Özön defines the interval from 1922 until 1939 as the Theater Period, and the interval from 1939 until 1950 as the Transition Period. After 1922, the Military Photography and Film Center continued producing films intended with a civilian cinema movement. Kemal Film was founded in 1922 and İpek Film in 1928. When it first opened Kemal Film made films that addressed nationalist feelings, such as *The Daughter of Smyrna* (*Ateşten Gömlek*). After seeing *The Daughter of Smyrna*, journalist Hakkı Süha Gezgin wrote a critique in *Vakit* Newspaper:

29 Öztürk, 2005, p. 28.

30 Özön, 1968, p. 59.

31 Mustafa Gökmen, *Başlangıçtan 1950'ye kadar Türk Sinema Tarihi ve Eski İstanbul Sinemaları* (Istanbul: Denetim Ajans Basımevi, 1989), p. 125.

32 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Directorate General of Transactions, Cat. no: 030 10, Box no: 146 Folder no: 43 Row no: 17 p. 1.

In a country where 95 percent of the people are illiterate, hoping for a benefit from books is as strange and useless as expecting the blind to become a painter. Books follow education. We will benefit greatly from cinema. Before I watched *The Daughter of Smyrna*, I had no clear idea of the benefits of this innovation. Today, I believe that if we work on this subject, we will compensate for most of our deficiencies...³³

Studies on the civilian cinema movement of this period focus on the influence of the school of theater since the renowned theater actor Muhsin Ertuğrul played an important role in the development of Turkish cinema. Most studies consider private sector films and they consist of a contextual, sociological, and discourse analysis. The state's interest in cinema at the time and the extent that the government used cinema for their own purposes and objectives has been the subject of only a few, current studies.³⁴ One contribution in this area is Hilmi A. Malik's³⁵ book *Cinema in Turkey and Its Effect* (*Türkiye'de Sinema ve Tesirleri*) published in 1933, in the middle of the period currently under analysis.

Malik's book is an important source of quantitative data and research on the period. He does not give information about the film industry of the period, but conducts research. In 1932, with the permission of the Ministry of Education, he asked elementary, middle, and high school students questions about cinema and its effects. He took some to theaters and analyzed the effect of a single film on students, the result of which comprises a chapter in the book. The main purpose was to understand the driving forces of this entertainment enjoyed by thousands every day.

This critical study for someone who researches that period and cinema; has an intricate backstory. Rıfat N. Bali's *The Turkish Cinema in the Early Republican Years* published in 1997, includes a 1933 report on the film industry,

33 Nijat Özön, *Karagözden Sinemaya: Türk Sineması ve Sorunları*, vol. 2 (Ankara: Kitle Yayınları, 1995), pp. 54-55.

34 Two of these works are Serdar Öztürk, *Erken Cumhuriyet Döneminde Sinema Seyir Siyaset* and Işıl Çakan, *Konuşunuz Konuşturunuz- Tek Parti Döneminde Propagandanın Etkin Silahı: Söz*.

35 After the Surname Law he adopted the name Evrenol. Hilmi Malik wrote books on children's psyche and education, juvenile offenders, and reform movements in general.

prepared by Eugene M. Hinkle, the second secretary of the American Embassy in Ankara. In the first nine sections of his report, Hinkle provided historical and quantitative data on Turkish cinema; in the remaining four sections, he sheds light on the effects of cinema on adolescents. According to Rifat N. Bali, Hilmi A. Malik's study is plagiarized. Hinkle's report consists of 217 pages, while Malik's is fifty-three pages. Bali claims that Malik was employed in Hinkle's field study and somehow acquired the report. He then translated it into Turkish and published a book in his own name.

Rifat N. Bali's claim is probably correct. Malik studied pedagogy at Columbia University and he was an intellectual with close ties to the American Embassy. Though his book is shorter than Hinkle's report, the content is the same. However, Malik's contains comments and advice on the Turkish revolution and what role should cinema have in consolidating the revolution. As seen in Malik's other works, he thought the revolution had not been understood and appropriated by the public; he considered this to be a deficiency and was working on possible solutions.³⁶ This is why, while I refer to Hinkle's report for quantitative data, I also make use of Malik's evaluations and further information he provided.

According to Hinkle's report, there were 130 film theaters spread across seventy-nine cities and boroughs³⁷ in Turkey in 1933 with a total capacity of 60,170 seats.³⁸ Ninety-One of these theaters were outside Istanbul.³⁹ According to Malik, because there was no habits of cinema going and there was little financial resources for it, film theaters did not sufficiently spread in Anatolia.⁴⁰ Hinkle estimates that cinema reached 10 percent of Turkey's population. Most theaters were in Istanbul, Ankara, İzmir, Eskişehir, Adana, Bursa, and along the coast of the Black Sea. Fifty-nine of the theaters could screen sound films,

36 Özden, 2010, p. 139.

37 Bali, 2007, p. 41.

38 According to the Turkish Statistical Institute, in 2014, there were 2,170 film theaters with a total seating capacity of 276,318 in Turkey. <http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreHaberBultenleri.do?id=21504>

39 Bali, 2007, p. 52.

40 Hilmi A. Malik, *Türkiye'de Sinema ve Tesirleri* (Ankara: Hakimiyeti Milliye Matbaası, 1933), p. 11.

while seventy-one theaters only had equipment for screening silent films.⁴¹ Both Hinkle and Malik include quantitative data on theaters in Turkey in tables, which apart from few insignificant differences are the same.⁴² They indicate where film theaters were located in Turkey just 10 years into the Republican period.

The table below notes the cities and boroughs in Turkey that had film theaters in the 1930s, the number of theaters in each, and their seating capacities.⁴³ Some theaters belonged to the People's Houses or Turkish Hearths. I do not give the names of the theaters, but in the original table, some names include the word "municipality", which suggests they were affiliated with the local governments. Some other names include the words "military canteen" (*Mahfel*) or "army corps" (*Kolordu*). Hinkle noted "military club" next to these theaters affiliated with the military where soldiers could watch films for free and civilians could sometimes watch for low prices. Many former Greek and Armenian churches were turned into theaters in this period.⁴⁴ Indeed, the drama branch of the Trabzon People's House organized most of its events in an empty church.⁴⁵

In the table (Table 4.1), I note military and People's House theaters to distinguish them from private theaters. Furthermore, the distinction between Turkish Hearths and People's House is left unchanged:

Table 4.1

City or Borough	Number of Theaters	Total Seats
Adana	4 (1 of the Turkish Hearth)	1,800
Adapazarı	2	500
Afyonkarahisar	1 (military canteen)	200
Akhisar	1	400

41 Bali, 2007, p. 42.

42 Theaters identified by Malik as Turkish Hearths were indicated by Hinkle as People's House theaters showing that Turkish Hearth theaters were converted into People's House theaters.

43 Bali, 2007, pp. 173-176.

44 Bali, 2007, p. 53.

45 İbrahim Azcan, *Türk Modernleşme Sürecinde Trabzon Halkevi* (Trabzon: Serander, 2003), p. 123.

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City or Borough	Number of Theaters	Total Seats
Aksaray	1	-
Akşehir	1	-
Amasya	1	250
Ankara	4 (1 of the People's House)	3,050
Antalya	3 (1 of the Turkish Hearth)	1,100
Aydın	1	-
Ayvalık	1	300
Bafra	2	400
Balıkesir	2 (1 military canteen)	700
Balya	1 (military canteen)	250
Bartın	1 (coffee house)	120
Bayburt	1	150
Biga	2 (1 of the Turkish Hearth)	900
Bursa	3	2,150
Ceyhan	1 (People's House)	150
Çanakkale	2	650
Çarşamba	1	200
Çorlu	1 (military canteen)	150
Denizli	1	150
Diyarbakır	1 (military canteen)	250
Edirne	1	300
Edremit	2 (1 is a military canteen, the other a People's House)	600
Elazığ	1	300
Erbaa	1	-
Eskişehir	5	2,050
Erzincan	1	-
Erzurum	1 (military canteen)	-

City or Borough	Number of Theaters	Total Seats
Fatsa	1	180
Gaziantep	1 (Turkish Hearth)	350
Gelibolu	1 (Turkish Hearth)	350
Giresun	2	450
Hadımköy	1 (military canteen)	350
Isparta	1	300
Istanbul	39	26,630
İzmir	9	5,750
İzmit	1	400
Kars	1 (army theater)	-
Kastamonu	1	300
Kayseri	1	-
Kırklareli	1	300
Konya	1	240
Kula	1 (Turkish Hearth)	-
Kütahya	1	250
Manisa	2 (military canteens)	600
Maraş	1	-
Mardin	1 (military canteen)	200
Menemen	1	-
Mersin	2 (1 of the Turkish Hearth)	850
Of	1	-
Ordu	2	-
Ödemiş	1	400
Pulathane	1	200
Rize	2	-
Samsun	1	800
Sarıkamış	1 (military theater)	-

City or Borough	Number of Theaters	Total Seats
Suri Hisar	1 (military canteen)	-
Sivas	1	-
Tarsus	1	200
Tekirdağ	2 (1 of the Turkish Hearth)	900
Tokat	1	300
Trabzon	2	300
Zile	1	200
Zonguldak	1	500

According to *Yeni Köroğlu* newspaper, there were twenty-two film theaters in Istanbul.⁴⁶ An article in *Yeni Adam* magazine on January 1, 1936, claims that there were 685 film theaters and 5,300 film projectors in Turkey – including portable ones –, of which 3,000 had sound technology. Unfortunately, the article does not specify its source.⁴⁷

Another source of information on the cinema industry of the period is a dossier discovered by Gökhan Akçura in chance at a second hand bookstore. This dossier contained a report written by journalist-author Fikret Adil probably at the end of the 1940s. There is no information on why or whose benefit the report on cinema of the 1940s was prepared:

There are 180 film theaters. Films are sold in sixty cities. Each is sold for 100 liras on average. There are 125 permanent film theaters. During the summer, an additional fifty are added. Income tax is still 48 percent. There have been attempts to give a five-year extension or 10 percent to 20 percent deductions for domestic productions. The Prime

46 Öztürk, 2005, p. 91.

47 Nilgün Abisel, *Türk Sineması Üzerine Yazılar* (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1994), p. 13.

Minister and the Ministry of the Economy both guaranteed and assured these changes. This means that the future of the domestic film industry has great promises. This field has yet to develop...⁴⁸

A report in the Prime Ministry's Republican Archive presents the situation of film theaters in March 1940 as follows:⁴⁹

Table 4.2

People's Houses with a Film Theater	36
Boroughs with a Film Theater (of 437 boroughs)	74
Total Number of Film Theaters in Boroughs	110

Unfortunately, quantitative data on the number of theaters vary greatly from source to source and the real numbers remain unknown. Information from different sources show that film theaters opened and closed constantly. Heavy taxes, lack of interest of audiences in certain localities, and the challenges of acquiring films resulted in theaters changing names, changing management or closing down. An article published on June 24, 1932, in *Akşam* newspaper complained that a film theater in Kayseri that had opened in 1931 closed only a year later.⁵⁰ Surviving film theaters were closed most of the year. According to an article in *Son Posta* newspaper on April 19, 1933, a film theater in Muğla with a capacity of 350 people remained closed 107 days out of the year. The sole theater in Bursa was open for two nights per week according to an article in *Akşam* newspaper on November 12, 1937.⁵¹ In a 1942 article published in *Yurt ve Dünya* magazine, Mediha Berkes noted that films did not reach the majority of the population; its reach was limited to cities and certain towns.⁵² Of course,

48 Akçura, 1995, p. 137.

49 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 01, Box no: 1222 Folder no: 59 Row no: 1 p. 38.

50 Öztürk, 2005, p. 94.

51 Öztürk, 2005, p. 94.

52 Mediha Berkes, "Münevverler Bir Filim Amilni İtham Ediyor", *Yurt ve Dünya*, vol. 3, no. 17 (May 1942), p. 146.

conventional theaters were not required for film screenings, alternative venues such as the gardens of People's Houses, coffee houses, schools, and village squares were also used.

In 1933, the number of spectators at the *Yeni* and *Klüp* film theaters in Ankara averaged 200 per day.⁵³ In 1930, some 2,633,300 people watched a film in a theater in Istanbul; in 1931, this number increased to 3,310,320.⁵⁴ As table 4.3 shows the languages of sound films screened in 1932 throughout Turkey. Among 166 sound films, only a small number were in Turkish.⁵⁵

Table 4.3.

French	75
English	41
German	30
Turkish	2
Spanish	2
Polish	2
Russian	2
Italian	1
Other	11

Advertising for films was mostly in daily newspapers. There were news on local film screenings, film ads, and summaries of films in theaters, the lives of the stars, their marriages, divorces, and photos. In the early 1930s, there were many cinema magazines in Turkey. *Holivut* magazine concerned only cinema and was published in Turkish. Alongside *Holivut*, there were two French, five German, five English, and three American publications on cinema distributed

53 Malik, *Türkiye'de Sinema ve Tesirleri*, p. 15.

54 This data probably represents the number of ticket sold and not the number of unique spectators. Bali, 2007, p. 77.

55 Bali, 2007, p. 68.

in Turkey.⁵⁶ Malik thought the newspapers should publish more articles to put a positive spin on the troubles of the people and peasant rather than articles on “ignorant and immoral cinema actors who corrode our social life.”⁵⁷ *Yurt ve Dünya*, which began to be published in 1941, included many articles on cinema as well as film criticism. In 1944, one author criticized *Ulus* newspaper for filling its pages with advertisements for “mediocre” German films.⁵⁸

Turkish cinema was not very productive between 1939 and 1950. The war certainly had an effect on cinema, as well as on theater actors such as Muhsin Ertuğrul. The fact that theater actors and directors made films as on a theater stage prevented cinema from developing its own dynamics and visual presentation.

Following this general overview of the condition of Turkish cinema at the end of the Ottoman Empire and in the early years of the Republic, I observe the state-controlled cinema and its area of influence.

4.1.2 *Single Party’s Influence and Control over Cinema*

4.1.2.1 Areas of Influence of the State on Cinema

During the early years of the Republic, the RPP prioritized informing people of the purposes of the Turkish Revolution while educating and raising their awareness so that they could understand and internalize these purposes. Mass communication media needed to be used effectively in a way that was coherent with the knowledge and education level of the citizenry.

Hilmi A. Malik begins his book as follows:

The Great Turkish Revolution, which encompasses and reshapes all, cannot ignore cinema since it plays a great role in educating the people. Aside from having control over the screened films in Turkey, it is as important and imperative that new schools of the revolution make

56 Malik, *Türkiye’de Sinema ve Tesirleri*, p. 39.

57 Malik, *İnkilâp Yolunda*, p. 14.

58 “Ankara’daki Film”, *Yurt ve Dünya*, vol. 5, no. 42 (March 15, 1944), p. 179.

films that are compatible with the education of the people in line with the desired nationalist political and social life.⁵⁹

Various dynamics characterize the period between 1931 and 1946. The single-party regime was at its peak – all its forces were gathered together. Meanwhile, the external world was filled with pre- and post-war tensions and uncertainty. For this reason, the state’s control over cinema and its efforts to use cinema to its own end provide new insight into the single-party regime.

Falih Rifkî Atay in his book published in 1935, wrote “We are not communist, or fascist; we are Kemalist. What we like in Soviet Russia and in Italy are the reformist education and the methods of development.”⁶⁰ With this pragmatic approach, the single-party regime tried to structure its own patterns of propaganda by observing education and propaganda systems in Europe and Soviet Union.

Before looking at the state’s activities in cinema in Turkey, selective look at how cinema was used in other countries following the First World War period is meaningful. Many countries governed by single-party regimes used cinema as a medium of propaganda. The most prominent were Soviet Russia and Germany. In the Soviet Union, cinema was an important medium of ideological and political edification. Lenin characterized cinema as the most significant of all mediums of edification, claiming that a good film could accomplish the job of a thousand propagandists. In Soviet Russia, *Goskino* was established to handle the cinema business followed by *Sovkino* in 1924 and *Soyuzkino* in 1930. State monopolized cinema produced nationalized films and there was an explicit endeavor to purge films that opposed Soviet ideology.⁶¹

The target was to spread cinema to villages and a mobilization began to that end. In villages without electricity mobile projectors were bought. From 1927 onwards, most films screened were national films. In this structure, the edification division was responsible for inspecting the ideological content of films. Berkes thought the real purpose of Soviet films produced was to spread

59 Malik, *Türkiye’de Sinema ve Tesirleri*, p. 5.

60 Falih Rifkî Atay, *Faşist Roma, Kemalist Tiran ve Kaybolmuş Makedonya* (Ankara: Hakimiyeti Milliye Matbaası, 1935), p. 45.

61 Berkes, 1942, p. 98.

the slogans of their revolution and to propagandize to the audience. Berkes contended that the Soviets went too far, but stated that the party produced educational, cultural, and health-related propaganda films that captured the people. Later on they produced entertainment and comedy films, as well.⁶²

Even though Italy's cinema was more developed than Turkey's, when compared with Soviet Russia and Germany, it experienced many of the same problems as Turkey's industry. In 1924, the Educational Film Association (*l'Unione Cinematographica Educativa*, hereafter LUCE) was established to ward off films that contradicted the principles of fascism. All theaters were obliged to screen films produced by the LUCE. Domestic and foreign films were inspected by the censorship commission. According to Berkes' evaluation in 1943, Italian films were still not as strong as Soviet ones, which is why foreign films were still screened.⁶³ Berkes' observation was correct; there were no film theaters in three quarters of Italy around 1930, and 60 percent of existing theaters were in the north. Cinema was still expensive entertainment,⁶⁴ and it is uncertain whether or not the films produced by LUCE were popular. In 1933, 20 percent of its productions were propaganda films, 19 percent were cultural documentaries, and the rest were cultural newsreels required to be screened before feature film screenings. These films concerned train travel of Dopolavoro students, children at scout camps, or sports. Furthermore, l'Opera Nazionale del Dopolavoro succeeded in opening 628 new cinema halls by 1935. Additionally, 760 portable projectors were produced for use in rural areas. In 1935, the Dopolavoro presented 37,511 different programs.⁶⁵ However, the majority of the films in these programs were foreign films provided by independent suppliers.

Hinkle's 1933 report, on the condition of cinema in Turkey had a special section entitled "Film in Government Propaganda." He claims that the state has no chance of using cinema for propaganda purposes – that the govern-

62 Berkes, 1942, p. 99.

63 Berkes, 1942, pp. 108-109.

64 De Grazia, 2002, pp. 159-161.

65 *National Leisure Hours Institution*, 1936, p. 48.

ment does not use cinema to spread its ideas. He mentions that only the People's House in Ankara screens educational films and newsreels of current events in Turkey. In his report, Hinkle states that the illiteracy rate in Turkey is high and cinema, along with radio, is a good medium to influence people. He suggests that the state should pay attention to this medium and strategize accordingly.⁶⁶ He underlines that the government employs the İpekçi Brothers from time to time to film events such as national days and certain opening ceremonies; however, there is no established system for official photography and cinema. He also notes that while Atatürk appears in a few films, he was accompanied by a cinematographer during his Anatolian tour in 1931. Almost by exception, this trip was documented and screened for the people.

It is no coincidence that this particular trip was recorded and screened. It was scheduled after the LRP was closed down and one of the main reasons Mustafa Kemal organized the tour was to meet citizens and to see how they were reacting to the closure of the LRP.⁶⁷ Mustafa Kemal also publicly explained the new populist and étatist principles being added to the platform of the RPP.⁶⁸ In this period, as the regime became more severe and undertook many new initiatives, the recording and screening of Mustafa Kemal's communication with the public created a perception that these decisions were taken along with the public, in consultation with them. Malik argues:

It should be considered that films on how Atatürk connects with the people, the fact that he takes his power from the people, how he mobilizes the people, the people's enthusiasm, the battle of Atatürk with the enemy, how the enemy fled, his success in battle, his fight with regressive and dark-minded people parliamentarian, how he founded the Republic, and ensuing social, political, and economic reforms will

66 The literacy rate was around 22 percent in 1930s in Turkey. Deniz Ilgaz, *The Village Institutes and the Kemalist Ideology in Turkish Republic*, Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Boğaziçi Üniversitesi, 1995, p. 56.

67 Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *Tek Adam: Mustafa Kemal*, vol. 3 (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1969), p. 402.

68 Kongar, 2000, p. 142.

draw the attention of people to books and materials written on this issue and make them popular.⁶⁹

Hinkle notes that a the film on Atatürk shot by Fox Film in 1930 at Atatürk Forest and Farm was not distributed in United States and Europe because only half of Atatürk's body was visible in the film. Hinkle concludes that Atatürk did not perceive cinema as a medium of propaganda and advertisement and because of this shortsightedness, a golden publicity opportunity was lost.⁷⁰

Hinkle's interpretations were correct for 1933, but in the coming years, the government would take note of the importance of cinema as a medium of propaganda and would shoot as much film as its budget allowed. Films produced by political authorities were distributed via People's Houses and portable projectors for the benefit of the masses.

Abisel in her analysis of the conditions of Turkish cinema between 1928 and 1938, heeds the question of whether or not the state perceived cinema as art. In 1934, during discussions on Article 2444 concerning the Directorate General of the Press's organization and duties (*Matbuat Umum Müdürlüğü Teşkilat ve Vazifeleri*), Minister of Internal Affairs Şükrü Kaya said mediums influencing the public were not limited to the press and newspapers; booklets, plays, radio, film, and records were among such media. He added that certain issues brought up in films were offensive to the public and parliament.⁷¹ Abisel takes issue with the fact that the state supported certain arts like music, theater, and sculpture but did not support cinema.⁷²

The young Republic of Turkey never perceived cinema as a simple medium of entertainment. During the period before and after the proclamation of the Republic, both military and political leaders took note of cinema and its effect on the masses. The military acted as a pioneer in the development of Turkish

69 Malik, *Türkiye'de Sinema ve Tesirleri*, p. 45.

70 Bali, 2007, pp. 39-40. Later on, Atatürk's interest in cinema increased. A projector and a sound system were purchased for Çankaya, and there were regular screenings. Atatürk's special interest in newsreels is widely known. During İnönü's period, there was a film projectionist on the staff in Çankaya, and whenever the president wished to see a film, *Yeni Sinema* would send films to the mansion.

71 TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Term 4, Vol. 22, Session 3, Conclusion 57, May 26, 1934, p. 273.

72 Abisel, 1994, p. 33.

cinema, and many who would later serve the industry in coming years were introduced to the medium in the military. Certain enterprises of the state mentioned in the previous section are the results of this awareness. However, political authorities did not invest in cinema in accordance with the value they attached to the medium.

Magazines and other periodical publications of the period show that cinema was a popular subject. Cinema's positive and negative impacts and its prospective uses are subjects of discussion. Nizamettin Nazif, an important voice of the period, suggested that the state have its own studios equipped with modern technology. He added that even if there were more than a few such studios, it would not meet current needs. Moreover, the state had no any ventures that would threaten private enterprise.⁷³ Radio – one of the few media to widely address people – was taken under the state monopoly; even so, the government established no state cinema institution. At the time, there were cinema institutions founded by the state in all major European countries. The state was involved in the making of propaganda films through the Secretary of the RPP and the Directorate General of the Press. However, these films had low budgets and only a handful of professionals were involved in their making.

İsmail Hakkı Baltacıoğlu wrote in 1934 and 1935 on the need for state involvement in cinema:

First and foremost, we need an official or semi-official department to handle educational films, as in other countries. In Germany, along with the Ministries of Education and Internal Affairs, there is an institute named thr *Zentral Institut für Unrerricht und Bildung* to handle cinema business. In England, an institute called *British Film Institute* and centers such as the Commission of Educational and Cultural Film, and the Association of Education operate cinematic businesses. In Soviet Russia, a state office, called Sovkino, which is open to the inspection of the people, works on cinema. In our case, above all, we need a specialized institution. The Ministry of Education should have more

73 Abisel, 1994, p. 63.

say than other ministries and private film enterprises. Such an institution should be secured by law.⁷⁴

The state did not monopolize cinema; on top of that, in the early years it remained relatively indifferent to imported films. In Halit Refiğ's famous *I Loved a Turk* (*Bir Türk'e Gönül Verdim*), the peasant who sees and finds strange a German woman who came to their Anatolian village, says "Europeans are involved in everything with their trucks, cinema, and radio." This naïve observation is true in a sense. The majority of Turkish people encountered the West for the first time through cinema, becoming familiar with lifestyles in Europe and the United States through films, even though these did not always reflect reality.⁷⁵ In some way, all imported films introduced people to West and its cultural practices; certain consumption habits and lifestyles were imposed through them. Cinema magazines like *Holivut* that included posters of foreign actors were popular. Living like foreign actors was a dream for young people. Next to photographs of foreign actors dressed in nightgowns were advertisements for tailors in Beyoğlu. According to an article published in *Akşam* on August 25, 1938, the fascination with cinema went so far that films characters made their ways into poems. Greta Garbo was given as an example:

The sun is burning up at the window,
and the beans on the stove,
three copper trays filled with crays,
the little Miss thinks she is Greta Garbo...⁷⁶

One of the main reasons the cinema industry fell behind and had limited resources compared to contemporaries in the early years of the Republic was economic. Because of external debt, the Great Depression of 1929, and the threat of war, cinema was not sufficiently funded. What made the production of cinema more difficult than theater was that its much higher costs. Compared to theater, cinema required technology, namely: cameras, projectors and

74 Çakan, 2004, p. 282.

75 Bali, 2007, p. 28.

76 In Turkish: "Güneş pencerede, fasulya tencerede, yanıyor, üç bakır tepsi, pilav dolu hepsi, küçük hanım kendini Greta Garbo sanıyor..." Öztürk, 2005, p. 193.

negative and positive film, which was then scarce. All this equipment and materials were imported; there were no local alternatives. Especially in wartime, statist politics made it all but impossible to import cinematographic equipment and raw and processed film; moreover, there was a shortage of negative film during the war.⁷⁷ Indeed, institutions of the state were asking for negative film from other state institutions.⁷⁸

Another obstacle to the development of the cinema was the lack of qualified staff. This lack is directly related to the perception of art in Turkey and previously in the Ottoman Empire. In a culture with no advanced tradition of painting, the evolution of cinema was slow. The state collaborated with a theater director, Muhsin Ertuğrul, for the development of Turkish cinema which blocked the birth of a particular cinema movement.

Even though state was slow and insufficient in doing so; it censored films that contradicted its ideology. The single-party regime used propaganda as much as the prevention of counter propaganda to ensure its control over the people.

In 1941, the most important responsibility of the DGP with regard to film was to vet scripts and foreign films. When the state could not use cinema as effectively as it desired, its most important leverage was censorship. The freedom of the filmmaker and what people can and cannot watch – in short, the negative space left by the state in which the industry could act – were issues of propaganda. Censorship had a fictional approach in which the state allowed values and images it wished to exalt and rejected ones it did not aspire to. Especially during the war, censorship mushroomed. Some films were deemed appropriate for politics of balance, while others were completely censored. The next section focuses on state censorship of cinema.

77 The leading company among film suppliers was Kodak (Ecipt). The party usually acquired film from Kodak. Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1208 Folder no: 8 Row no: 1 p. 94.

78 In 1940, the Military Film Center (*Ordu Film Merkezi*) asked the General Secretariat of the RPP to provide 200 meters of film in exchange for a receipt in order to film the marine holiday. Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 0 0, Box no: 1214 Folder no: 32 Row no: 1 p. 23.

4.1.2.2 The DGP in Inspection: The Beginning of Censorship in Films

We grew up battling regulations...

Ece Ayhan⁷⁹

Hasan Bülent Kahraman defines the history of Turkish cinema as the history of censorship. According to Kahraman, the ruling class legitimizes its existence and turns into an unquestionable phenomenon through censorship.⁸⁰ The first known censorship of cinema in the world is said to be a newsreel on the execution of a death sentence in 1909 in France, which was banned by the French Ministry of Internal Affairs. Censorship laws issued after the First World War peaked during the Second World War.⁸¹ The reason for the increase was that the effect of cinema on the masses became clearer with time.

During the Second World War, there were many instructions, regulations, and rules in Turkey on the context and screening of films, but there were no censorship laws per se, as in other countries. The first censorship of cinema was of the film *Teacher (Mürebbiye)* made by the Veteran's Community in 1919, banned in Anatolia.⁸² There was no systematic censorship of films since 1897.⁸³ Hinkle, in his report of 1933, notes that a conservative country like Turkey was naïve about the potential negative impact of foreign films and had enacted no regulations.

The Turkish people were introduced to Western culture through foreign films. The underlying message of these films and the lifestyles they suggested did not have reverberate with everyday Turkish life. Abisel, suggests that in a period when the state had no institutionalized film propaganda, films praising

79 From Ece Ayhan's poem entitled "Yalınayak Şiirdir". Çetin Öner, "Yasak'ın İkiz Kardeşi Sansür", in *Türk Sinemasında Sansür* (Ankara: Kitle Yayıncılık, 2000), p. 95.

80 Kahraman Hasan Bülent, "Sansür ve Ötesi", in *Türk Sinemasında Sansür* (Ankara: Kitle Yayıncılık, 2000), p. 169.

81 "Düşünenlerin Forumu Türk Sinemasında Sansür", in *Türk Sinemasında Sansür* (Ankara: Kitle Yayıncılık, 2000), p. 38.

82 French Officer General Franchet D'Esperey opposed the depiction of the French teacher, Angel, as immoral, and the film was censored for demeaning the French people.

83 "Düşünenlerin Forumu Türk Sinemasında Sansür", in *Türk Sinemasında Sansür* (Ankara: Kitle Yayıncılık, 2000), p. 39.

a Western lifestyle served a hidden purpose; they were as a tool for Westernization and the acceptance of Western values. The same idea holds true for the use of Soviet films.

“All-Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries” (*Vsesoiuznoe Obshchestvo Kul'turnoi Sviazi s zagranitse*, hereafter VOKS) was founded in 1925 for the purpose of establishing cultural relations between the Soviet Union and other countries. In April 1926, the Consulate of the Soviet Union in Erzurum sent a letter to the VOKS stating that the Governor of Erzurum would like to know if there were anti-religious films that would be beneficial for Muslim countries. The answer was positive: the VOKS suggested the film *In the Name of God*. The film was shot in Baku and was in Azerbaijani. The VOKS employee described the purpose of the film as “exposing Muslim clergy.” After some inspection, the local government screened these Soviet films in order to alienate Muslim communities from religion and emphasize the malice of bigotry and to disseminate its own ideology. The local government’s pragmatic approach ignored the fact that these films fostered Soviet propaganda using them instead to westernize and fight reactionary ideology.

84

The constitution (*Teşkilât-ı Esasîye*), dated January 20, 1921 has no article on freedom of expression and creation in cinema.⁸⁵ In 1922, after the victorious War of Independence films that had been brought by occupiers were screened in film theaters in İzmir.⁸⁶ The 1924 constitution, dated April 20, 1924, also has no article on the freedom of expression and creation in cinema.⁸⁷ There would be no special provisions regarding censorship until 1932. Before then, local censors – two police officers from police headquarters representing the Governor – controlled films. Foreign films were briefly vetted by the police, and a limited number of films were censored: a film on the life of Jesus Christ was banned as religious propaganda, and certain the Soviet Russian films were banned due as Bolshevik propaganda.

84 Raşid Tacibayev, *Kızıl Meydan’dan Taksim’e: Siyasette, Kültürde, Sanatta Türk- Sovyet İlişkileri* (Istanbul: Truva Yayınları, 2004), pp. 193-194.

85 Metin Erksan, “Anayasa Güvencesi ve Sinema”, in *Türk Sinemasında Sansür* (Ankara: Kitle Yayıncılık, 2000), p. 55.

86 Öztürk, 2005, p. 27.

87 Erksan, 2000, p. 56.

Two films serve as examples of censorship predating this period. The first is the American-made “Jacob’s Well” (*Le Puit de Jacob*) of 1926, which tells the story of a Jewish girl pestered by a group of children. The film was banned because it propagandized Judaism, because Turkey was depicted as a country where Jewish people were attacked and could not thrive, and also because it disturbed national sensitivities.⁸⁸ Another example is “All Quiet on the Western Front”, produced in 1930. Atatürk watched this Hollywood film on the psychological depression and spiritual crisis of German soldiers at *Elhamra* Theater. Atatürk liked the film but decided it would be objectionable to Turkish people who just been through a war. In the film, young people are encouraged to be patriotic and join the war but they later faced the cruelties of war on their own. Atatürk did not want the film to be screened because he thought the Turkish nation still needed to consolidate around national defense and nationalist feelings.⁸⁹ In a period when national unity was a priority, complete subordination was preferable to critical approaches to nationalism and patriotism. On the other hand, the German cinema industry bore realist and expressive films in the era between wars. Films like “The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari” perfectly reflected proto-fascist perturbations and sensitivities in the period before Hitler.⁹⁰

Another film censored in this period was “A Nation Awakens” (*Bir Millet Uyaniyor*) produced by the İpekçi Brothers, directed by Muhsin Ertuğrul in 1932. This film was censored because some parts were excessively anti-British and anti-French.⁹¹ Muhsin Ertuğrul was not shy of reinforcing national sentiments, as films like *News from Ankara* (*Ankara Postası*). Mediha Berkes harshly criticizes these films; just as not every book on the revolution was right and necessary, not every film on the revolution was good.⁹² In a 1929 article

88 Ebru Boyar and Kate Fleet, “Making Turkey and the Turkish Revolution Known to Foreign Nations Without Any Expense”: Propaganda Films in the Early Turkish Republic”, *Oriente Moderno*, Nuova Serie, Anno 24 (85), no. 1 (2005), p. 125.

89 Önder and Baydemir, 2005, p. 126.

90 Rüdiger Suchsland and Engin Ertan, Panel on Caligari: Korku Sinemaya Geldiğinde and Sinema Yoluyla Bir Millet Yaratmak, April 15, 2014, Istanbul Modern Museum.

91 Bali, 2007, p. 57.

92 Berkes M., 1942, pp. 146-147.

published in *Resimli Ay* magazine, Muhsin Ertuğrul mentioned that he was influenced by Japanese cinema. He appreciated that the Japanese had their own cinema industry and made nationalist films.⁹³

On June 9, 1932, it was decided that a central organization of the General Staff, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Ministry of Education would control cinema and “the ordinance on the control of cinema” was published,⁹⁴ to which censorship of scripts was added on December 26, 1933. This meant censorship of domestic films would start in early the phases of production. The Commission of Censors, founded in Istanbul, included representatives from the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the General Staff. Furthermore, during the vetting process, the Provincial Police Director and the Safety Inspector or their representatives would join the meetings. There was a separate three-member commission in Ankara that evaluated the decisions made by the commission in Istanbul.⁹⁵

Law 2205 on the reorganization of the DGP in 1933 did not include cinema and radio among mediums to be inspected by the DGP. The Minister of Internal Affairs, Şükrü Kaya, said during debate over the law that cinema was controlled by a special commission working out of Istanbul; however, there was no objection to adding cinema to the DGP’s jurisdiction.⁹⁶ On June 1, 1934, the ordinance on film censorship was expanded and annexed to the “Law Pertaining to the Organization and Duties of the Directorate General of the Press”.⁹⁷ In 1936, this ordinance was again expanded by the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

The new ordinance was restructured according to the Directorate General of the Press Organization Law 2444 and the Police Duty and Authorities Law 2559. Certain limitations were applied to foreign and local films. According to the ordinance, films that propagandized on behalf of any country, abused any race or nation, depicted Eastern nations and colonies as inferior or savage or propagandized against them, propagandized religion, were against the general

93 Boyar and Fleet, 2005, pp. 117-132

94 Gürkan Turhan, “Türk Sinemasının Tepesinde Sallanan Demokles’in Kılıcı: Sansür”, in *Türk Sinemasında Sansür* (Ankara: Kitle Yayıncılık, 2000), p. 19.

95 Ağah Özgüç, *Türk Sineması Sansür Dosyası* (Istanbul: Koza Yayınları, 1976), p. 9.

96 TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Term 4, Vol. 15, Session 2, Conclusion 56, May 22, 1933, p. 291.

97 Gökmen, 1989, pp. 50-51.

education and morals of society, dishonored the spirit of military service, and as such, damaged the safety of the country were banned. At the same time, since language reform was one of the most important contemporaneous issues, it was decided that subtitles in films could only be in Turkish. Control would be maintained by one public servant designated from each of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Directorate General of the Press and the Directory of National Safety, as well as an official chosen by the Ministry of Culture. On military issues an executive from the General Staff would participate, and when issues of agriculture or health were in question, pertinent representatives would be called.⁹⁸

Another subject pertaining to the issue of censorship in cinema was limitations on viewers. Dr. Fuat Umay, a member of parliament, submitted proposals in 1926, 1928, 1935, and 1941 on the subject of limiting the use of film theaters by children. In fact, film theaters were full of children on Saturdays and Sundays. Considering the high taxes on cinemas, the state have lost a significant source of income if Umay's proposal had been passed. Furthermore, there were plans to use cinema for educational purposes and limitations would have ended such plans. Umay's concerns were not unwarranted: at the time, films were not rated according to content and children could intervene any screening without restriction. This was the reason for the many discussions on the issue of children and cinema. Nazım Hikmet Ran, in an article published on January 11, 1936, in *Akşam* newspaper under the alias Orhan Selim, argued that to prevent children from going to places such as coffee houses, appropriate alternatives should be created. He suggested screening educational, instructive films to attract the interest of children.⁹⁹ Nazım pointed out the impact of cinema over an entire generation in the twentieth century in his poem entitled *Benerci Kendini Niçin Öldürdü?* (Why did Banerji Kill Himself?): "A Cashmiri midwife pulled me from the groin of my mother. As a baby, I was wrapped in a cinema ticket."¹⁰⁰

98 Çakan, 2004, pp. 284-285.

99 Öztürk, 2005, p. 167.

100 Saime Göksu and Edward Timms, *Romantic Communist: The Life and Work of Nazım Hikmet* (London: Hurst & Company, 1999), p. 99.

Film makers consistently opposed these proposals. The Public Sanitation Law (*Umumî Hıfzıssıhha Kanunu*) of 1930 had two articles (166 and 167) banning children under twelve years old from going to theaters, dancing halls, and local bars. It is also made it illegal to give or sell any kind of alcohol to children under eighteen years old. Theaters and bars were deemed similar, though the single-party regime also considered cinema a medium of education. The law allowed children six years old or older to be brought to theaters during the day. The law also prevailed over events in the People's Houses.¹⁰¹

By-law 2/11551 dated July 19, 1939, entitled "Regulations on the review of films and scripts" was prepared during the single-party regime given the conditions of a world on the verge of a second world war.¹⁰² According to the by-law, the review of films would be undertaken in Istanbul by a commission consisting of two representatives from the Directorate General of the Press, one representative from the Ministry of Education, and led by a representative chosen by the governor. If the decision made by this commission was rejected or decided to be re-inspected by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, another commission would assemble, consisting of two representatives from Police Headquarters and the Directorate of Press, both chosen directly by the Minister of Internal Affairs as well as one representative each from the General Staff and the Ministry of Education. The decision made by this commission was definitive.¹⁰³

Ten clauses from Article 7 of the regulation on the Review of Films and Scripts banned the following:¹⁰⁴

- 1 All scripts, translations of scripts and screenings of films that propagandize any country,
- 2 Demean any race or nation,
- 3 Offend the sentiments of friendly countries and nations,
- 4 Propagandize religion,
- 5 Promote political, economic, or social ideologies what are against the national regime,

101 Öztürk, 2005, pp. 161-175.

102 Özön, 2000, p. 153.

103 İskit, 1943, p. 307.

104 Gürkan, 2000, pp. 19-20.

- 6 Are against our general upbringing, morals, and national sentiments,
- 7 Devalue military honor and dignity and propagandize against the military,
- 8 Are harmful for the defense and security of the nation,
- 9 Promote the committing of crimes, or
- 10 Films that could be used as a propaganda tool against Turkey,

Scripts at stake were not allowed to be filmed.

The expressions “Eastern nations” and “Colonies” in the regulation of 1936 were changed to “friendly countries” in the regulation of 1939. Most censorship was applied based on Clauses 5 and 6. Since the definitions were vague, any film to be censored could be rejected on the basis of these clauses. Clause 5 was mostly applied to films with social content, and the Clause 6 was mostly applied in order to censor films with “obscene” sequences.¹⁰⁵ Censorships based on Clause 5 varied according to the ruling elite and sensitivities of the day. Such censorship had political implications; its main purpose was to protect the totality of the existing political, religious, economic, moral, and social systems. Thus, the ruling elite was able to flatten the cultural structure through censorship and raise generations dependent on the ruling class.¹⁰⁶

Scripts were vetted by the DGP and sent to the local governorate with an impending petition. The governorate would forward this document to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Then the Central Commission of the Review of Films (*Merkez Film Kontrol Komisyonu*, hereafter CCRF) would inspect the script and decide whether it could be produced as such, with certain changes, or not at all. If the script was rejected altogether, the application would be denied. The principles of control were based on the internal and foreign politics of the state, the constitution, morals, and public conventions. After the script was made into a film, the same commission would again vet it. As necessary, certain changes would be demanded. In other words, domestic films were vetted twice. The shooting of actuality films were subject to the same procedures of control.¹⁰⁷ The Censorship Statute of 1939 was amended in 1948 and 1958, but

105 Özgüç, 1976, p. 24.

106 Özcan Çetin, “Sinemada Sansür”, in *Türk Sinemasında Sansür* (Ankara: Kitle Yayıncılık, 2000), p. 163.

107 İskit, 1943, p. 308.

Clause 7 of the statute was kept intact,¹⁰⁸ showing that military has always been a sensitive subject.

The state began to apply censorship in 1932. To understand the reasons and the discussions of the potential negative impact of films, consider the arguments of İsmail Hakkı Baltacıoğlu. In 1937, he argued that foreign films should be vetted, saying: “These films are as dangerous as a *softa* who propagandizes religion, a wizard practicing sorcery, and a spy who propagandizes a foreign country.” Baltacıoğlu suggested three courses to escape this inconvenient situation. The first was to reevaluate foreign films in terms of culture; the second was to ban all films that concerned and propagandized on behalf of the church, sorcery, or militarism; the third was to support domestic films that presented an ideal of the regime and the values of modern culture.¹⁰⁹

The precautions taken in Article 7 of the law and Baltacıoğlu’s ideas are consistent. The only suggestion not undertaken by the state was to support domestic films that propagandized on behalf of the regime. Instead of creating a support system, the state tried to make its own propaganda films through the efforts of various departments. Due to a lack of experience and staff, these were only actuality films, and many projects fizzled because of financial limitations.

As supported by the memoirs of filmmakers, censorship increased with the outbreak of the Second World War. Cemil Filmer, one of the most renowned filmmakers of the period, recounts his experience trying to screen Sam Wood’s adaptation of Ernest Hemingway’s “For Whom the Bell Tolls.” He faced many obstacles; Hemingway’s leftism was used as a pretext to ban the film. Thanks to the help of the governor and the Minister of Internal Affairs, he obtained permission to screen the film. During the DP period, one of the regularly-distributed Paramount newsreels concerned the funeral of Stalin (1953).¹¹⁰ That newsreel resulted in a judgement against Filmer in the highest

108 Özgüç, 1976, p. 13.

109 Öztürk, 2010, p. 326.

110 It was not just films that were censored; in 1940 a photo album that contained pictures depicting Stalin’s life was pulled off the shelves and banned from the country because it was seen as communist propaganda. Birgül Ayman Gürel, “Kırk Yıllarda Yönetim”, in *Açıklamalı Yönetim Zamanizini: 1940- 1949*, Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Kamu Yönetimi

penal court (*ağır ceza mahkemesi*); however, upon discovery that the film had been vetted and deemed appropriate before its screening, Filmer was not sentenced.¹¹¹

In April 1938, the Soviet Chargé d’Affaires complained to the Ministry of Internal Affairs that a film containing images of Stalin had been: the images in question had been cut from the film. The Chargé d’Affaires did not specify the title of the film. The Minister of Internal Affairs, Şükrü Kaya, tried to find out the reason behind the censorship to avoid tensions between the two countries. In response to his inquiry, the Istanbul Governorate informed him that the CCRF had not removed Stalin’s images from any Soviet Russian films. According to information shared by the governorate some parts of an actuality film imported by Halil Kamil Film on the upbringing of Soviet Russian children were considered propagandist and removed. This was the only censorship related to Stalin: the cut scenes included pictures of Stalin in children’s hands and on the walls.¹¹²

One of the duties of the DGP was to vet and to intervene in scripts. For this purpose, a commission gathered with the General Secretariat of the RPP on October 20, 1936, on the order of the Minister of Culture, Saffet Arıkan. The president of the Education and Discipline Committee of The Ministry of Education (*Kültür Bakanlığı Talim Terbiye Encümeni Reisi*), İhsan Sungu, the Chief Constable Şükrü Sökmen Süer, the Chairman of the DGP, Vedat Nedim Tör, and the Police Chief of Ankara, Sadri Bey, participated in this commission led by Necip Ali Küçüka. Its purpose was to evaluate the film “The Turkish Miracle” (*Türk Mucizesi*) produced by Halil Kamil Film.

According to testimony of individuals on the commission, parts were deemed objectionable: Sungu said that rather than portraying the malignant aspects of the sultanate regime, the film focused on the personalities of sultans. As such it generated the idea that this regime could be beneficial to the nation

Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi: 3, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti İdare Tarihi Araştırması (TİDATA) (Ankara, 2008), p. 31.

111 Filmer, 1984, p. 173.

112 Prime Ministry’s Republican Archive, Catalogue of Directorate General of Transactions, Cat. no: 030 10, Box no: 84 Folder no: 557 Row no: 7 p. 1.

in the hands of good sultans. Moreover, the film did not mention the detrimental aspects of the old regime, did not compare the treaties of Sevres and Lausanne, and did not mention the economic and cultural successes of the Republican period. There were a few scenes depicting education: the teacher giving a seminar on history was overacting, his posture and voice were overly theatrical, and on some points, what he said did not comply with the official history. The constable, Şükrü Bey, said he was disappointed to see a German professor playing a part in cultural scenes, and that a scene depicting the throwing of a Greek flag on the floor did not comply with Turkish dignity. Tör said the film had no coherent subject, consisted of bringing together old and recent actuality films and could only serve as material for a great film on reforms in the future. Police Chief Sabri thought the film's only purpose was financial gain. In the end, the commission concluded that this film would only publicize the fact that the country was unsuccessful in the field of filmmaking; sections of it could be screened only if significant revisions were made.¹¹³

These criticisms mirror that of many pictures in Turkish cinema of the period: overly nationalistic films made with commercial concerns, the influence of theater actors, and technical mistakes.

Notably, the DGP was also responsible for monitoring theater plays. In 1935, the *Lüküs Hayat* (*The Luxurious Life*) operetta was banned by the DGP. The reason, reported by Vedat Nedim Tör, was that characters in the play – an old man in love, a playboy, a *hafifmeşrep* (easy and flirty) lady, and a naughty child – were be bad role models and degenerate audiences.¹¹⁴

113 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no:1214 Folder no:32 Row no:1 pp. 1-3.

114 Vasfi Rıza Zobu, *O Günden Bu Güne* (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1977), pp. 461-463.



Figure 4.2 Lüküs Hayat, *Akbaba*, no. 58, February 7, 1935
(Caricaturist: Orhan Ural)

Certain sensitivities stand out in the period's censorship. In 1945, a 800- meter long film that told the story of Sweden and the Swedish king, given as a gift to the Red Cross by the Embassy of Sweden was censored. The film was probably censored because it promoted a well-functioning monarchy.¹¹⁵

The vetting commission consisted of officials from different levels of the state, each with its own cultural, social, educational, and defensive sensitivities. As the comments above show, the president of the Education and Discipline Committee of the Ministry of Education, Sungu, was interested in conveying the reforms accurately, as well as discrediting the old regime. On the other hand, Vedat Nedim Tör, who represented the Directorate General of the Press and who was involved in arts and culture, was more concerned with artistic and production values.

In his memoir, Vasfi Rıza Zobu emphasizes that Vedat Nedim Tör was himself a scriptwriter; his theater texts were staged in city theaters. The assignment of Tör to the directorate of the DGP was a favorable development for the

115 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 o o, Box no: 1208 Folder no: 8 Row no: 1 p. 46.

artistic and cultural milieu. However, his decision to censor theater plays was a great disappointment. According to Zobu, the bigoted and conservative “state machinery” (*devlet çarkı*) had transformed a brilliant, Western-educated man into a blind follower educated in a *medrese*.¹¹⁶

According to Nijat Özön the criteria were undefined, so any script and film could be banned. Litigation in the Council of State was the only recourse against censorship, and since filmmakers hoped to continue working, this procedure was not preferred.¹¹⁷ As many who study censorship note, conditions of censorship first and foremost induce self-censorship among producers, scriptwriters, and directors.

Article 35 of Law 4475 on the organization, duties, and officials of the DGP, issued in 1943, stated that bans or removal of mediums such as film, music records, and paintings from the shelves to be staged and included among the repertoires of entertainment venues – controlled by the directorate – will be determined with a regulation.¹¹⁸

Propaganda not only shaped the state’s own productions and exhibitions. What the state allowed and what it asked to be changed – what it did and did not tolerate – formed a holistic structure. Under the single-party regime, the state was synonymous with the party (RPP). One of the most powerful actors in propaganda was the General Secretariat of the RPP, the executive administration of the party. In the next section, I examine the place and role of the General Secretariat of the RPP in film propaganda.

§ 4.2 Cinema in the Hands of a Single Party: Propaganda Films

In the period from 1930 to 1950, the authorized statutory body that undertook the production of films was the Film Department of the DGP. However, documents gathered from the Prime Ministry’s Republican Archive shows that principal government agencies and the military alike independently prepared and acquired films according to their particular purposes. The number of

116 Zobu, 1977, p. 462.

117 Özön, 2000, p. 153.

118 Law 4475 on the organization, duties, and officials of the Directorate General of the Press, Fourth Section- Miscellaneous Decrees, p. 666.

studies on propaganda films of the period is limited. All types of sources are necessary to pursue the production of propaganda films, the actors in these productions, the processes of decision-making, the distribution of the films, and the screening process. From books on the process and structure of the DGP, I determined the scope of authority and duties of the DGP with regards to cinema. Later, I examined the definitions of cinema and the function of cinema in official documents such as contemporaneous RPP platforms and regulations concerning the People's Houses etc. Though these are limited, I benefited from secondary sources and dissertations on cinema of the period and the role of the state, newspapers, and magazines. In the beginning, it was not seem straightforward to speculate on the purposes of propaganda films, their process of production, and their distribution based on the materials gathered.

However, documents encountered in the Prime Ministry's Republican Archive illuminated a different side of cinema of the period from what is said regarding laws and regulations. Archival documents carried traces of human voices and human labor. İpek Film editors who tried to acquire an electric heater to keep warm while editing films requested by the RPP, budget proposals for wooden boxes to carry the newsreels to the Adapazarı, then to the Yozgat People's House, the enthusiasm of the presidents of various People's Houses about public film screenings... such archival treasure trove's were not among DGP documents on propaganda film production, as I expected. The main actor in these documents was the General Secretariat of Republican People's Party.¹¹⁹ These documents include correspondence among the General Secretariat of the RPP and various government agencies, the military, embassies, and filmmakers. The counterparts of the General Secretariat of the RPP are crucial institutions that led economic and social life such as the AA, the presidency of People's Houses (*Halkevi Başkanlıkları*), the Military Academy of the Republic of Turkey (*T.C. Harp Akademisi*), production companies like İpek Film, the Ministry of Health, Turkish Aeronautical Association (*Türk Hava Kurumu*) and Turkish Red Crescent (*Kızılay*).

The main purpose of propaganda films is to convey desired messages to citizens and promote the activities of certain institutions. These documents

119 In those days it was called Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası Katibiumumuluği or CHP Genel Katipliği.

disclose messages of propaganda and reveal the relations among the single-party government and the agencies of the government as well with other parties. While examining films made by the party, the DGP, the principal agencies of the government, and the professionals – i.e., business partners of the state in the field of cinema – who worked with these statutory bodies in the making of these films are significant. From time to time, these professionals asked the support of the state for their own benefit and sometimes even requested to work under the auspices of the state. In a period when the statism principal predominated, the collaboration of the state and the private sector notably did not end with a state monopoly over cinema.

I did not have the chance to watch the films made or imported by the General Secretariat of the RPP and the DGP. In searching for these films, I petitioned the General Staff Photography and Film Center and they provided sequences from six films. Though I do not know which agencies made these films, they are newsreels just like the ones I was searching for and expecting to find. In ensuing sections I analyze these films as examples.

During the course of research, immense efforts went into finding these films. After a considerable research, the place of films was determined. I have not been able to watch them but at least I know they are not in sacks like the DGP's document. They are stored at the Directorate General of Cinema. The motion picture archive of the DGPI was handed over to pertinent institutions starting in the 1970s to centralize such services and protect archives. A commission formed in 1976 inside the DGPI took an inventory and prepared them for transfer. In 1979, due to a protocol signed with the Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (*Türkiye Radyo Televizyon Kurumu*, hereafter TRTC), employees in the film production department as well as certain technical equipment were transferred to the TRTC.¹²⁰ The fact that the TRTC was disturbed by the DGPI's activities in film was influential in this process. During this transfer, the DGPI¹²¹ sent all films they held to the TRTC.¹²² Later, in just

120 Er, 2003, p. 131.

121 The DGPI was subordinate to the Ministry of Tourism and Publicity in this period.

122 Interview with Barina Utkan (Director of Visual Services Department in the DGPI) on September 1, 2015 in Ankara.

one day, these 693 pieces of 35mm and 16mm films were sent to the Ministry of Culture as mandated by a protocol signed in February 27, 1979, between the Ministry of Culture and the Ministry of Tourism and Publicity.¹²³

After years of searching for these films, I discovered that many films were gathered by the Ministry of Culture in 1981 from the agencies of the government like the DGPI for the celebration of Atatürk's 100th birthday. A deal was made with Mimar Sinan University especially for films with a base of nitrate; however, when the project was canceled, the films remained at the University,¹²⁴ and the ministry later sued the University for the return of the films. The Ministry of Culture and Mimar Sinan University were only able to realize the project in 2010 and the films are currently being transposed onto high resolution video cassettes and sent to the Ministry of Culture, which in return is transferring these to digital media, classifying, and categorizing them. The ministry claims that their eventual aim is to establish a Film Archive of Turkey (*Türkiye Film Arşivi*). They hold approximately 2,288 films. Meanwhile, a collaboration with the Turkish Historical Society (*Türk Tarih Kurumu*) was started for the analysis of these films. Some films belong to the General Staff, and since it is not known by whom and for whom these films were made, there is an issue of copyright. Given that most of these films were produced in the early years of the Republic, copyright issues will soon be moot since the limitation on copyright is seventy years. After that, this archive of 2,288 films could be opened for public use.¹²⁵

It is not always possible to discern between the state and the party during the period in question. Before the Film Department was founded in 1941 under the DGP to make propaganda films, the RPP was active in the film business and organized aspects from the making of propaganda films to their screening.

123 Letter sent to me by the Department of Press in Prime Ministry's Directorate General of the Press and Publishing numbered 63362983-757.01-E.5715 dated September 30, 2015.

124 Interview with Asiye Korkmaz, Mimar Sinan University, Balmumcu/ Istanbul, March 2, 2010.

125 Interview with İbrahim Ada, Archive and Technical Production Branch Head at Directorate General of Cinema, Ankara, December 2013.

In this section I examine propaganda films made by the RPP, the DGP, and by other main agencies of government, the process of their making, and the relation between the state and the private sector.

4.2.1 *Films of the RPP*

Documents from the Prime Ministry's Republican Archive prove that the leading actor of propaganda films during the early Republican years was not the Directorate General of the Press, but it was the General Secretariat of the RPP. Though not mentioned in any source, it is apparent that even before a film department was established under the DGP, the General Secretariat of the RPP began independently producing propaganda films in 1934. Up until the DGP Film Department was established under the DGP in 1941, the party was the sole producer of state propaganda films. This is unsurprising in the early Republican. When the distinction between party and state was blurred.

In 1931, the party consolidated power and starting in 1934 produced and screened propaganda films. The DGP was reopened in 1933, but it took until the Second World War for it to develop a strong institutional structure. Only near the end of 1941, when the party was busy with the responsibilities of war, was the production of films passed to the state institution actually responsible for this field. In fact, a party that had accomplished a good level of organization just ten years after the proclamation of the Republic turned to the film business with excitement. In this period of High-Kemalism, the party – like its contemporaries – used all possible means to advance itself and tried to mobilize filmmakers close to it. But all in all, the endeavors were rather amateurish. After the establishment of the DGP Film Department, the RPP gradually stopped producing films but continued to be involved with their organization: the distribution process, logistical support, and other support necessary for their production.

In his work entitled *Türk Sineması Kronolojisi (1895- 1966)* (*Chronology of Turkish Cinema*), Nijat Özön mentions that in the period up until the Second World War, when the state was not involved in cinema, the RPP employed two production companies to ensure the making of films. This claim is ostensibly correct, but insufficient. In Özön's chronology, a film department under the DGP that produced newsreels is mentioned with little detail. However, Özön

mentions none of the films produced by the General Secretariat of the RPP, nor those of other institutions like the Turkish Red Crescent or the Turkish Aeronautical Association. Even articles on cinema published in *Yurt ve Dünya* magazine are noted in the chronology, films made by the RPP and screened in People's Houses throughout the country are unheeded. Indeed, propaganda films produced by the RPP remain largely unmentioned in any sources focusing on the early years of the Republic.

By way of exception, these films are briefly mentioned in Cemil Filmer's memoir. Filmer's company, Lale Film co-founded the Marmara Film Studio with the Özen and Kemal Film companies. Short musicals with singers like Münir Nureddin and Safiye Ayla were shot at this studio for screening before feature films. According to Filmer's short note, they also shot RPP propaganda films at this studio.¹²⁶ In 1939, during the making of a film on Liberation Day of Hatay, the party collaborated with the Marmara Film Studio.¹²⁷ Filmer expresses that these short films generated little income, but the studio acted as a school, and many operators and technicians were educated there. Cezmi Or, who later on helped the RPP make propaganda films, was educated at this studio, as well.¹²⁸

In late 1932, the General Secretariat of the RPP began investigating the party and People's Houses could benefit from radio and cinema.¹²⁹ People's Houses were established in 1932. An anonymous, undated report entitled "The Project of Propaganda to be Made Inside and Outside the Country through Cinema" held in the Prime Ministry's Republican Archive is considered to have been written by Necdet Yula, the cinema and sound specialist of the party, in the early 1930s. The report states that there are two stages of propaganda in cinema. The first is to supply the film; the second is to ensure the

126 The party collaborated with Marmara Film Studio in 1940 on a propaganda film, but the results did not satisfy the party since the prices were high and organizational capacity of the studio was weak.

127 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 01, Box no: 1212 Folder no: 25 Row no: 1 p. 2.

128 Filmer, 1984, p. 167.

129 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1221 Folder no: 56 Row no: 2 p. 20.

broad distribution and screening of the film throughout the country. There are four different ways to supply films: producing the film within the party itself, ensure the production of the film by providing help to national institutions, exchange the party's films, and screening foreign films that promote similar principles.¹³⁰

In the report, films to be produced are divided into two categories. Films in "Section A" are defined as "grand works that are artistic and have social value, like dramas, comedies, and operettas." These films target a higher cultural stratum and their propaganda should be so delicate that the viewer does not perceive it. Films in "Section B" consist of six types:¹³¹

- ◆ Films for peasants (*Köylüler İçin Filmler*): The idea of the propaganda should be patent. The cultural level of peasants should be considered, the film should be simplified to their capacity to understand, and it should be set in village life.
- ◆ Documentaries (*Dokümanter Filmler*): Films that promote public services of the Republican regime, existing historical monuments and the natural beauty of the country, both domestically and abroad.
- ◆ Actuality Films (*Aktüalite Filmleri*): Important events in the country will be determined, and films based on these will be screened domestically and abroad.
- ◆ Children's Films (*Çocuklar İçin Filmler*): Patriotism, the advantages of the new regime, and moral principles will be taught to children through these films.
- ◆ Instructional Films (*Tedrisi Filmler*): The benefits of new and different agricultural methods and working styles will be taught to peasants through these films.

Since the party was not a commercial entity, low-cost films – documentaries, actuality films, and films for peasants – could actually be produced according to the report. The other kinds of films could only be produced in the private

130 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1221 Folder no: 56 Row no: 2 pp. 17-18.

131 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1221 Folder no: 56 Row no: 2 pp. 12-13.

sector through certain incentives offered by the state.¹³² The report further states that the party should acquire equipment at a cost of 40 thousand Turkish lira and 25 thousand Turkish lira building to realize the planned films.¹³³ It emphasized that in order to screen films in every corner of the country, investment in portable projectors would be necessary. The report also noted that more than 14 thousand portable projectors are used for this purpose in the Soviet Union.¹³⁴

The decree on portable projectors, signed by Atatürk in July 1930, authorizes the purchase of portable projectors up to 5 thousand Turkish lira – noted in the annual budget of the Ministry of Education – for the purpose of spreading the enlightening medium of cinema to remote regions of the country.¹³⁵

The RPP council gathered on February 27, 1933, to discuss possible ways the party and the People's Houses could benefit from cinema and radio. Accordingly, they decided to buy a silent film camera and “one of the best” 35mm portable sound film projectors with seven boxes. They also decided they would employ the facilities of İpek Film to develop sound films, or in the case that was not possible, they would develop the films in Europe. They decided to buy silent film projectors for People's Houses not already possessing one. They determined that German manufacturers were the most successful makers of this machinery and thus decided to buy the equipment from German companies.¹³⁶

Sound films produced or bought would be screened in existing theaters. They also decided to buy sound projectors for the party and the People's

132 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1221 Folder no: 56 Row no: 2 p. 13.

133 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1221 Folder no: 56 Row no: 2 P. 14. Comparing purchasing power between the early 1930s and today; 40.000 TL amounts 800.000 TL today, and 25.000 TL is equivalent to 500.000TL today.

134 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1221 Folder no: 56 Row no: 2 p. 14.

135 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Directorate General of Transactions, Cat. no: 030 18, Box no: 01 02 Folder no: 13 51 Row no: 10 p. 1.

136 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1221 Folder no: 56 Row no: 2 pp. 17-18.

Houses of Istanbul, İzmir, Adana, and Samsun.¹³⁷ However, the Samsun People's House had to wait until September 1940 for the party to purchase it a projector.¹³⁸

In 1933, it is thought that the party owned two German cameras¹³⁹ and a truck and car belonging to these cameras.¹⁴⁰ In 1936, they decided to buy an additional portable silent projector. They also decided to buy ten sound film projectors for use in locations without electricity.¹⁴¹ On August 10, 1936, the party issued an open tender for twelve portable sound film projectors and twelve generators.¹⁴² Since the party did not have a studio, they did not need interior lighting equipment.

The RPP began the production of actuality films in 1934, but were in need of an experienced director and photographer. According to archival documents, the developing of films produced by the party was done by Kenan Erginsoy, the cinema expert in the Ankara People's House, but the duplication process was accomplished by film studios in Istanbul.¹⁴³ In 1935, the party wished to transfer a technician from the army to organize the party's internal

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- 137 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1221 Folder no: 56 Row no: 2 pp. 17-18.
- 138 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 01, Box no: 1219 Folder no: 50 Row no: 2 p. 1.
- 139 In some cases, the party rented receivers from İpekçiler or Foto S. Süreyya. For instance, in June 1934, Kemal Necati, one of the film operators of the party, went to Istanbul to shoot the visit of the Shah of Iran and borrowed a camera from Foto S. Süreyya. Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1211 Folder no: 20 Row no: 2 pp. 1-36.
- 140 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1222 Folder no: 60 Row no: 1 ps. 58, 62.
- 141 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1221 Folder no: 56 Row no: 2 p. 16.
- 142 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1222 Folder no: 60 Row no: 1 p. 45.
- 143 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 01, Box no: 1212 Folder no: 25 Row no: 1 p. 4.

film business. The unknown individual, who worked at the Military Film Center, would run the business, direct films, write scripts, and manage a staff of twelve.¹⁴⁴

The Eighth Bureau was responsible for film affairs inside the party. A report dated November 25, 1935, on the responsibilities of the Eighth Bureau notes that it is responsible for domestic and overseas propaganda through cinema, radio, and the press. According to the report, films were divided into actuality and high budgeted films. For the latter, the RPP needed studio, but the party did not have a studio of its own. The RPP carried out its film activities in the cinema storage room on the ground floor of its main building. In May 1936, a renovation began to divide document storage from the cinema business. The head of Eighth Bureau ensured that the space for cinema did not decrease; in the coming months, the activities in cinema would increase.¹⁴⁵ In 1934, Soviet filmmakers invited to Turkey by Atatürk – one of whom was Esther Shub – established the first film unit of the RPP with a laboratory and a voiceover and editing studio.¹⁴⁶ This film unit was presumably the cinema division located in the basement of the RPP's center.

The party decided to collaborate with private enterprises for the production of high-budget films. Given that these films would be screened abroad, as well, the party sought out private enterprises with customs and income tax exemptions.¹⁴⁷

The well-known French General Auguste Sarrou offered the party a comprehensive proposal to found a “Orient Film Studio” in Istanbul in February 1934. Sarrou had begun working in Macedonia in 1904, and starting in 1908,

144 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1222 Folder no: 60 Row no: 1 pp. 46- 47.

145 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1223 Folder no: 61 Row no: 1 p. 42.

146 Tacibayev, 2004, p. 212.

147 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1221 Folder no: 56 Row no: 2 p. 26.

he helped the Turkish government with reforms of the gendarmerie.¹⁴⁸ He probably maintained his contacts in Turkey after the revolution and suggested establishing a studio of 20 thousand square meters, with an airport and a pool for underwater scenes, that would produce films for distribution in Turkey, in other Turkish speaking countries, and in Arab countries. Sarrou emphasized that only American and European films were being screened in the east; there was not yet a studio producing specifically for eastern countries. He assessed that initial costs would be around 5 million French francs. In the first phase, he suggested importing technical staff from France and choosing Turkish actors from among theater players. This proposal was considered by the party and by the Ministry of Education, but did not lead anywhere.¹⁴⁹

On February 27, 1936, the RPP council again met to discuss the subject of cinema and revised its 1933 decisions. They decided that the establishment of a studio and the production of scripts should not be among the direct responsibilities of the RPP. This decision shows that from the beginning, the party never planned to produce high-budget propaganda and fictional films. In the meeting in 1936, they decided to engage existing institutions to make propaganda and cultural films and to collaborate with institutions that produce, sell, and rent agricultural, political, and cultural films to ensure the screening of favorable films. When the General Secretariat of the RPP was producing films, the state and private sector worked in close contact and collaboration. The films made by the General Secretariat of the RPP are similar to films made by the DGP, and like the DGP films, the RPP made no feature films.

Debates on the establishment of a national film studio continued in the years to follow. In an article in *Ulus* newspaper in 1942, Vedat Nedim Tör contended that a state studio needed to be established as quickly as possible. He suggested bringing in experts from countries with advanced film industries to start making domestic cultural, educational, touristic, and actuality films. As

148 For detailed information about Auguste Sarrou see, *Le Capitaine Sarrou Un Officier Français au Service de l'Empire Ottoman*, Les Cahiers du Bosphore 25 (Gorgias Press & The Isis Press, 2011)

149 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 o o, Box no: 1221 Folder no: 55 Row no: 1 pp. 1-27.

the studio gained experience, it would on to feature films.¹⁵⁰ However, the party never did have a studio to undertake interior film shoots.

One of the most important channels through which the RPP could reach citizens was the People's Houses. Letters of the period reveal that RPP films were sent to boroughs under the auspices of the People's Houses and the films were screened in locations officially approved by the People's House or the party. The efforts of the Ankara People's House between 1937 and 1938 resulted in 6 thousand villagers watching a total of 35 hundred meters¹⁵¹ of film.¹⁵² According to the 1938 report of the Ankara People's House, films screened in villages and urban coffee houses were watched by more than 10 thousand people that year.¹⁵³

The General Secretariat of the RPP sent the first letter concerning the screening of films to presidents of certain People's Houses on June 15, 1935. This letter states that films produced by the party had been sent to their addresses and requested that they screen parts of these films in a "News of the Day" segment on one day and the remaining parts the next day. These films showed use of the homeland as a proof that the country was getting more prosperous and beautiful each day. Since these films were expected in other People's Houses, the letter asked them to forward these to another People's House in four days.¹⁵⁴

In 1936, the General Secretariat of the RPP sent an official letter to embassies abroad saying that they record every important, celebratory event in the country. The RPP mentions on various occasions that one their most important motives for producing films was to document significant moments and celebrations and to disseminate these to the citizenry. Among the main reasons the General Secretariat of the RPP produced propaganda films were to explicate the revolution and reforms, convey the economic and social

150 Vedat Nedim Tör, *Kemalizmin Dramı* (İstanbul: Çağdaş Yayınları, 1983), p. 115.

151 In Italy, LUCE had produced and screened 61,416 meters of film in 1933.

152 *Ankara Halkevi Bir Yıl İçinde 475.651 Yurddaşı Çatısı Altında Topladı* (Ankara People's House Gathered 475651 Citizens Under its Roof in a Year) 1937- 1938, p. 63.

153 *Ankara Halkevi Bir Yıl İçinde 408.673 Yurddaşı Çatısı Altında Topladı* (Ankara People's House Gathered 408673 Citizens Under its Roof in a Year) 1938- 1939, p. 42.

154 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1213 Folder no: 39 Row no: 1 p. 94.

changes that the Republic of Turkey was undergoing, publicize developments and progress, and imbue citizens with enthusiasm. In a way, the goal of the RPP was to legitimize its actions and solidify the belief of people in the existing regime.

On November 30, 1938, the president of the Balıkesir People's House wrote to the General Secretariat of the RPP saying they had heard on the radio that films shot by the party of the funeral of Atatürk in Ankara and Istanbul would be screened in three theaters in Ankara. They asked for a copy to show in Balıkesir. Films were first screened in the People's Houses of larger cities; then they were sent to smaller cities.

Almost all films made by the RPP were newsreels and actuality films. A complete list of RPP films comprises Appendix C. This list is an accounting of films mentioned in archival documents between the years 1930 and 1950 that I amassed. The General Secretariat of the RPP published no periodic lists of films they had produced. The archival documents indicate that most of these films were produced by the RPP itself.

There are 187 films on the list either produced by the RPP or part of the RPP's archive and distributed through its channels. Eighty-nine of the 187 films were definitely produced by the RPP itself. Furthermore, I argue that some 46 more were also produced by the RPP due to their titles and the fact that they were screened in the People's Houses. Thus, the number of films produced by the RPP probably totals 135. Twelve films on the list were given as gifts to the RPP by the British Council. Twenty-one films were screened by Bayer at the People's Houses with the blessing of the RPP. Five films were produced by the Military Film Center on behalf of the RPP. One film was produced by the Ankara People's House, one was produced by the Soviet Union following İsmet İnönü's visit in 1932, and one was produced by the RPP in collaboration with the Ministry of Education. Two films were produced by the RPP in collaboration with the Turkish Aeronautical Association. There is no information about the production of the nine remaining films on the list.

On February 15, 1940, an article published in *Tan* newspaper sourced by the AA states there are 162 films have been made with the organization of the RPP which are regularly and freely screened at the People's Houses. According

to the article, the RPP is preparing cultural films and foreign films on this subject are also being investigated.¹⁵⁵ The number 162 (which was cited without a source) mentioned in *Tan* suggests that the total number I have estimated is close to reality, considering that by the end of 1941, the RPP delegated this mission to the DGP.

Since I have no chance to view the films, I am unable to make a complete analysis of them. I can only categorize the films with respect to their titles, which suggest that forty are newsreels concerning important days and celebrations, seventeen are military newsreels, sixteen are economic newsreels, seven are sports newsreels, eight are newsreels concerning aeronautics, and sixty-one are unclassifiable newsreels. Thirty-six of these films are educational films, which can be called culture films, as well. Some films consist of multiple sections. Some films probably have separate short and long versions.¹⁵⁶

The General Secretariat of the RPP had an internal structure and staff for its film business, supported other institutions in the matter of propaganda films, and sometimes shared its infrastructure and staff. For example, in a letter dated January 27, 1938, the Directory General of Sümerbank asked the General Secretariat of the RPP if they could employ Necdet, a sound engineer from the party's Ankara branch to assist with the shooting of speeches by Celal Bayar at the opening ceremonies of the Bursa Merinos and Gemlik Rayon factories. These events were shot and the Sümerbank film was produced by the RPP.¹⁵⁷

On May 14, 1950, the Democrat Party (DP) became the ruling party. Before the 1950 election, Mithat Aydın, the RPP inspector of the of Malatya region, sent a telegram on March 20, 1950, to the General Secretariat of the RPP:

I hope that in cinema the matter of the elections can be a subject of propaganda. Before the film begins, we can show newsreels on the participation of the president in the openings of railroads in İzmir, Aydın, and their surroundings; especially films presenting opening ceremonies of dams, buildings, and bridges; as well as military parades. We

155 Öztürk, 2005, p. 185.

156 I list films that have the same title but differ in length separately.

157 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive.

can show these films and explain at one point that these deeds were accomplished by the RPP. It would be really good propaganda.¹⁵⁸

It was no longer the time of the single-party regime, and it is unknown how propaganda films could be screened given the objectivity principle. Mithat Aydın notes that if films could be supplied, an understanding could be reached with theater owners without the knowledge of the “other side.” However, the General Secretariat of the RPP refused this suggestion saying that it did not have the necessary films.¹⁵⁹ In fact, both the General Secretariat of the RPP and the DGP had certain films that could be used in this context. Since the single-party regime was over, the RPP was probably reluctant to endorse such screenings, but instead of rejecting the inspector outright, they chose to say they did not have the necessary films. Another possibility is that they believed films similar to those that had been screening for ten to fifteen years would not have the desired effect on people. Given that relations between the party and the public were impaired during the war, old newsreels would probably not help mend the situation. A similar suggestion came from the filmmaker Esat Özgül, who mentions that visual media is eighty times more influential than other media. He suggested making a few ten-minute films entitled *The Voice of the Nation* (*Yurd Sesi*) or *Development Report* (*Kalkınma Raporu*) on the current and future deeds of the RPP. Özgül says the purpose of these films would be to secretly promote the deeds of the RPP to citizens, and proposes “creating the illusion that these films were being made by a private film company.”¹⁶⁰

On December 1948, the RPP’s Chairman of the District Council of Tire wrote letter to the General Secretariat of the RPP saying that the DP’s discourse against the government was influencing ignorant citizens since there are few pro-government newspapers; films focusing on the activities of the

158 Prime Ministry’s Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People’s Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no:1209 Folder no: 13 Row no: 1 p. 3.

159 Prime Ministry’s Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People’s Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no:1209 Folder no: 13 Row no: 1 p. 1.

160 Prime Ministry’s Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People’s Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no:1213 Folder no: 29 Row no: 1 p. 1.

government and showing how government factories and facilities work are needed.¹⁶¹

Actually between 1945 and the 1950 elections, various film companies sent many proposals to the RPP to make films or establish a film studio. In April 1947, journalist and author Nizamettin Nazif Tepedelenlioğlu proposed to establish a film company on half of the RPP for 50 thousand Turkish lira. The company would produce domestic and propaganda films for the party. Tepedelenlioğlu complained about Egyptian films saying he wished to produce quality domestic films. His purpose was twofold: to publicize the ideals of the party to the citizenry and to generate income for the party.¹⁶²

According to Tepedelenlioğlu, there were problems with domestic films produced thus far: they did not have good scripts and the editing was bad. He claimed that the real purpose of domestic film industry was to purchase positive and negative films cheaply from the DGP and sell these on the black-market.

Two documents in the archives shed light on a heretofore unanswered question. In a letter dated February 21, 1950, the General Secretariat of the RPP announced that it had donated 500 boxes of positive and negative films produced between 1934 and 1950 to the Turkish Reform Institute of Ankara University (*Ankara Üniversitesi Türk İnkılap Enstitüsü*) because of their historical importance. After the institute chose films beneficial to it, the General Secretariat requested the rest of the films be sent to the DGPP. This heralds the end of the making of propaganda films.¹⁶³ The second document is an August 25, 1950, telegram of Sabahatdin Tulgar from Milli Film located on Beyoğlu's Hava Street saying that he wanted to make a film on the First Battle of İnönü (*İnönü Meydan Muharebesi*) and needed access to previously shot films on the topic from the party's archive. The General Secretariat of the RPP informed

161 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 0 0, Box no: 1212 Folder no: 25 Row no: 2 p. 3.

162 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no:1213 Folder no: 29 Row no: 1 pp. 14-19.

163 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no:1213 Folder no: 29 Row no: 1 p. 5.

Tulgar that the films of the Party's archive had been handed over to the Reform Institute (*İnkılap Enstitüsü*).¹⁶⁴ It was an indicator of beginning of a new era.

4.2.2 *Films of the Directorate General of the Press*

Mete Tunçay emphasizes the importance given to superstructure establishments noting that infrastructure was being changed using the establishments of superstructure during the development period after the War of Independence. The period was anti-imperialist without being anti-capitalist. As examined in detail in the third chapter, the DGP was one of the institutions of superstructure that undertook the task of disseminating the ideology of the state domestically and abroad.¹⁶⁵ The DGP, like its contemporaries, used various media such as radio, publications, and film for this purpose.

Journalist Fikret Adil wrote a report near the end of 1940 stating that the DGP was provided with 300 thousand Turkish lira¹⁶⁶ for cinema each year and claiming that this budget was not spent effectively. The government was interested in the matter.¹⁶⁷ Adil says that in foreign countries – even in Egypt – the studio and film industries are financed by external institutions. According to him, cinema concerns culture and is a tool for propagandizing one's language, character, and culture to foreign countries.¹⁶⁸

During the third period of the DGP, beginning in 1940, the institution's Photography Department was developed along with a film section, where domestic actuality and propaganda films were produced and distributed.¹⁶⁹ Prime

164 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1208 Folder no: 8 Row no: 1 p. 1.

165 Ruhdan Uzan and Tuğba Arşak Hasdemir, "Genç Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin Üst Yapı Kurumları: Matbuat Umum Müdürlüğü, Anadolu Ajansı ve Radyo", in *Cumhuriyet Döneminde İletişim: Kurumlar, Politikalar*, ed. Nazife Güngör (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 2010), p. 79.

166 By the end of the 1940s, *Cumhuriyet* cost 10 cents, a luxury apartment in Şişli cost 50 thousand Turkish lira. Consequently 300 thousand Turkish lira is a fair budget.

167 During a meeting with İsmet İnönü, filmmaker Naci İpekçi said a film made in Turkey costs approximately costs 20-25 thousand Turkish lira, on the other hand, a Hollywood film costs 60-70 thousand Turkish lira. *Akşam* newspaper, March 2, 1939.

168 Akçura, 1995, p. 140.

169 İskit, 1943, p. 320.

Minister Refik Saydam led the DGP's ventures in film, and the Film Department was established on his orders. Saydam imposed the following conditions on films to be produced by department: "Avoid boring propaganda that would sicken people of what they heard and saw." As noted in *Radyo* magazine, though films were produced by the DGP – i.e, a state institution – they did not break with the "nation's and people's dispositions" and left judgment to the "intelligent and gracious Turkish people."¹⁷⁰

The purpose of establishing such a department under the auspices of the DGP was not just to make actuality films. It was intended to make national culture films in time. After the party failed in its efforts to make national culture films, the job was delegated to an expert state department responsible only for this field. The goal for the next phase was to produce "educational and informative school films." It was also planned to establish a film department in the Ankara Fine Arts Academy and to directly make "national" films.¹⁷¹

In time the DGP's filmmaking responsibilities expanded to areas tangential to filmmaking. By 1939, the DGP was the authority in charge of reviewing films and scripts in the country. The responsibilities included watching out for propaganda against Turkey, evaluating these, and taking necessary precautions, and guiding Turkey's publicity activities abroad.¹⁷² Aside from these, the DGP was responsible for documenting the contemporary time through photography and films.

According to Article 42 of Law 4475 on the organization, duties, and staff of DGPP, enacted in 1943, two copies of every published text and photo and one copy of all records and films produced were required to be sent to the DGPP subject to Legal Deposit Act 2527. This meant the DGPP's archive held a wider variety of films than assumed. Article 43 of the law states that films distributed by the directorate were required to be screened in all film theaters.¹⁷³

170 *Radyo*, no. 9 (Ankara: Matbuat Umum Müdürlüğü, August 15 1942), p. 22.

171 *Radyo*, no. 9 (Ankara: Matbuat Umum Müdürlüğü, August 15, 1942), p. 22.

172 Statutory Decree 231.

173 Law on organization, duties and staff of Directorate General of the Press and Publishing, no. 4475 Fourth Section- Miscellaneous Decrees, p. 667.

Given the DGP's work in the field of cinema between 1940 and 1950, two subjects on the institution's agenda emerge that are consistent with a general agenda in the world at large: propaganda and cinema. I evaluate the DGP's propaganda efforts through films through the dynamics of the day.



Figure 4.3 Osman Darcan editing a DGP film
© Mete Darcan/Uğur Kavas

The only real resource on the history and mechanisms of the DGP is an insider perspective: a book by Server İskit, former official of the DGP. İskit does not write about films or the making of films, but at the end of the book he arbitrarily provides a list of seventy-eight films that comprise “the film publications made by the DGP starting from 1941.”¹⁷⁴ The book was published in 1943, so the list consists of films made or planned to be made within a period of roughly two years. There is no compiled information on films after that point; apart from films screened that can be tracked in the archives, it is unclear which films were actually produced and screened.

174 In İskit's list, there are only film titles and their specific numbers.

The most reliable source for investigating the DGP's films is *Radyo* magazine, one of the directorate's most important publications, which was published from December 15, 1941 to December 1949.¹⁷⁵ From its first to sixteenth issue, published on March 15, 1943, a section there was a section was featured entitled "Films of the DGP", noting current films made by the DGP. Graphically, the section was depicted as two filmstrips consisting of six frames. A note explains that all the DGP films are motion magazines that these periodically broadcast important events of the day, and that these films are "a history, which tells the story of progress in a whole-hearted way."¹⁷⁶ The section reemerged in the thirteenth first issue, published on June 15, 1944, as "Films of the DGPP", about a year after the DGP's name was changed to the Directorate General of the Press and Publications on July 22, 1943.



Figure 4.4 MUM and BYUM pages in *Radyo* magazine.

175 Kocabaşoğlu, 2010, p. 248.

176 *Radyo*, no. 7 (Ankara: Matbuat Umum Müdürlüğü, June 15, 1942), p. 22.

Radyo's first issue in December 1941 harbingered the screening of DGP films in theaters:

Newsreels produced by the Directorate General of the Press, under the imprint the DGP, fulfill our citizens' wishes to watch national news and events on the screen and are being screened in theaters. Key events, innovations, history, cultural fronts, industrial activities will be filmed and screened. It is unsurprising that our intelligent public has showed interest from the first film of this series. There is nothing more natural than the Turkish nation being interested in events and activities occurring in its own country rather than a transatlantic ship launched to Boston, a hurricane destroying the beaches of Florida, a flood occurring in China, or grape harvest celebrations in France.¹⁷⁷

The magazine announced that at present one film was being produced per month but in the future it was planned to increase this rate to bimonthly. The article also expressed that the purpose of the films was to "publicize the country, show national events to citizens, and enlighten people through educational films." To this end, the DGP would produce a variety of newsreels as well as travel and culture films. By December 15, 1941 the DGP would have made eight films.

According to the article, the motivation for making these films was to show the developments and actions of the nation to citizens:

What intellectual does not want to see the culture that makes Turks Turk, our historical heritage, living scenes of our national life, changes at every corner of our beautiful country, our traditions, our mores? It is natural that those who do not have the means to travel and always see for themselves are asking this job of us. Following the stages that sugar goes through before it reaches our pantries, the stages coal goes through before it reaches our stoves, how newspapers and books are made... these not only refresh our primary school knowledge, the in-

177 *Radyo*, no. 1 (Ankara: Matbuat Umum Müdürlüğü, December 15, 1941), p. 26.

crease our belief in the devoted actions of Turks in agriculture and industry through seeing someone succeed at extracting coal from a mine, cultivating sugar from the earth, producing their own paper – in short, standing on their own feet.¹⁷⁸

In the second issue of *Radyo*, it was articulated the DGP had wanted to make newsreels like Fox or Paramount, but there were certain, buried obstacles. First, regularly ascertaining national events before they occurred and filming them at the exact moment they happened required a complex organization. Second, several expert film operators had to be on the staff so that they could be sent to various locations at the same time. This meant having multiple experts on the DGP's staff when the country "had not yet developed much in filmmaking." This was not easy in the conditions of the day. Furthermore, such a system required a laboratory equipped with transmitters and receivers, as well as a studio. Managing to create films that audiences would like was another issue. The article said the DGP embarked on the film business despite these difficulties and had produced almost ten films in just a few months.

The DGP films were all sound films¹⁷⁹ and categorized as newsreels (Category A) or general knowledge films (Category B) designed to increase public's knowledge of the country.

The first long newsreel of the DGP concerned Republic Day and was filmed simultaneously in Diyarbakır, Samsun, Adana, Istanbul, and Ankara. Filming celebrations in different cities simultaneously gave an idea how people celebrated the day in different parts of the country. As examples of Category B films, two were suggested on the İzmir Exposition and İzmir's Independence, respectively.¹⁸⁰

Among the obstacles mentioned, the lack of expert staff is understandable. As mentioned, there were few experts in cinema in that period. Osman Darcan was the official responsible for the Film Department. Darcan took the exam of the DGP in 1938, probably on the prompting of Othmar. Darcan had met Othmar when he came to Istanbul during his military service, even before Othmar had joined the DGP. While Othmar resigned from the DGP in 1940,

178 *Radyo*, no. 1 (Ankara: Matbuat Umum Müdürlüğü, December 15, 1941), p. 26.

179 *Radyo*, no. 12 (Ankara: Matbuat Umum Müdürlüğü, October 15, 1942), p. 22.

180 *Radyo*, no. 7 (Ankara: Matbuat Umum Müdürlüğü, June 15, 1942), p. 22

Darcan's adventure at the directorate continued until 1947. Darcan work at the directorate was accomplished and he developed a strong network; however he resigned in 1947 to open his own studio to freely practice his art and be his own boss.



Figure 4.5 Osman Darcan filming DGP films.

© Mete Darcan/Uğur Kavas

Darcan directed all the films produced at the directorate between 1938 and 1947. Aside from these, he took all the front and back cover photos and interview images for *Radyo* magazine.¹⁸¹ In issue thirty-five of *Radyo*, an article gave a backstage glimpse of a film on the İnönü Aeronautical Camp. The article stated that a crew of three – a camera operator, a director, and an executive producer – filmed the whole film in only three days and then began editing.¹⁸²

181 Kavas, 2015, pp. 51-56.

182 *Radyo*, no. 36 (Ankara: Matbuat Umum Müdürlüğü, December 15, 1944), pp. 12-13.




Figure 4.6 The Crew filming İnönü Aeronautical Camp, 1944.
© Mete Darcan/Uğur Kavas

Correspondence in 1947 shows that equipment held by the party was lent to the DGP after the establishment of the Film Department and before film equipment ordered from the United States was delivered. In return, when the party wanted to shoot a film, the DGP shared its operators and lab equipment.¹⁸³ In September 1946, the DGPP decided to purchase certain equipment and materials to improve its film and photography services.¹⁸⁴

Based on Server İskit's list and my archival work, I compiled a comprehensive list of DGP films starting in 1941. In the list, there are 108 films. The list comprises Appendix D. These films were either produced by the DGP or kept in its archive and distributed by the DGP. According to Server İskit's list, eighty-eight of the 108 films were produced by the DGP itself. His list ends in 1943. I have added twenty more films. One was made by the Edirne People's

183 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no:1213 Folder no: 29 Row no: 1 ps. 9,11.

184 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Directorate General of Transactions, Cat. no: 030 18 01 02, Box no: 111 Folder no: 20 Row no: 56 p. 1.

House with the help of the DGP. There is no information about the producer of three films on the list.

With regard to the genre of these films twenty-one are newsreels on important days and celebrations, five are military newsreels, six are economic newsreels, twenty are sports newsreels, five are newsreels on aeronautics and fourty-four are newsreels that cannot be categorized. Seven on the list can be considered educational or cultural films.

An April 12, 1942, article in *İstiklal* newspaper announced that the screening of actuality films produced by the Directorate General of the Press.¹⁸⁵ Another article published on July 17, 1943, in *Ulus* newspaper, notes that the fifteen-minute film *Typhus*, produced by the DGP was going to be shown to all audiences in film theaters before the feature film. While I previously I mentioned that the party did not produce educational films, the film *Typhus* of the DGP can be considered an educational film. Along with it, three others on the list can also be classified as educational: *The Fight Against Tuberculosis*, *Tillage Machines* and *Advanced Technology in Agriculture*.

An article in *Ulus* notes that near the end of the war, the DGPP invited domestic filmmakers from Istanbul to Ankara and announced that filmmakers who make films that “satisfy citizens’ social pleasures, and that would reflect completely the history of Turks...” will receive necessary support.¹⁸⁶ It is unknown whether the party-state fulfilled this promise.

DGP films were mostly introduced to citizens through People’s Houses. The General Secretariat of the RPP organized the supply of films. In the People’s Houses Report of 1945, films made by the DGPP are mentioned; however it was noted that appropriate cultural films should be imported from abroad to meet the requirements of People’s Houses.¹⁸⁷

One document from the archive illuminates the circulation of DGP films. On November 8, 1949, the Assistant to the Secretary General of the RPP, Cevat Dursunoğlu, requested that A. Şükrü Esmer of the DGPP send the film on İnönü’s visit to the Aegean as well as the sound recording of Atatürk’s speech

185 Gökmen, 1989, p. 152.

186 Öztürk, 2005, p. 201.

187 C.H.P. 1945 *Yılında Halkevi ve Halkodaları*, p. 14.

on occasion of the tenth anniversary of the Republic so that they could air these the day before the commemoration of the death of Atatürk.¹⁸⁸ The RPP benefited from the DGP's film archive. On the condition that it finances the film stock, copying, and developing, and that it indicate the copyright of the DGP, selected films from the DGP's archive were shared with the party in 1946.¹⁸⁹

While producing these films, the DGP asked municipalities and state institutions for help generating subjects for films through *Radyo* magazine. If they informed the DGP of their activities, fields of expertise, and key events in their region, the DGP would film these within the bounds of possibility.¹⁹⁰

The *Kırkpınar Wrestling (Kırkpınar Güreşleri)* film was filmed by the Edirne People's House with the support of the DGP. A similar film was made by the Ankara People's House to publicize their house. In these cases, the People's Houses were supported by the DGP since they did not have their own equipment and staff. Similarly, the Eminönü People's House wished to document the "National Games Festival" (*Milli Oyunlar Festivali*) realized in August 1942 and contacted the DGP to this end. The DGP answered saying that they would lend the People's House technical equipment, an operator, a film projector and a tefifon recorder. They added that Burhan Belge, the Senior Advisor in Istanbul, would support them technically. However, they would only provide a limited quantity of the needed negative and positive film stock.¹⁹¹ During wartime film stock was scarce.

In 1941, a similar request came from the Kayseri People's House to the RPP. There was an old employee at the house knowledgeable of the history of Central Anatolia who performed folk dances. The People's House wished to record this person with the support of the party's film operator and "bestow this Turkish cultural heritage as a souvenir." However, the proposal was rejected

188 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1214 Folder no: 32 Row no: 1 p. 4.

189 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no:1213 Folder no: 29 Row no: 1 pp. 36-37.

190 *Radyo*, no. 3 (Ankara: Matbuat Umum Müdürlüğü, 15 February 1942),p. 26.

191 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1208 Folder no: 8 Row no: 1 ps. 76,78.

due to lack of film stock and the logistical expenses. Instead, they suggested instead that this employee teach these dances to amateurs in the Performances Branch.¹⁹² Though the DGP wished to make films in various parts of the country, their resources did not always allow it.

Returning the list of DGP films, the films are further grouped as A1, A2, B1, and B2. This would suggest that in a given screening, seven or eight pieces of films would be shown. Assuming a box of 300 meters of film constituted one section, one section was ten minutes long. A 10 minutes film would probably be a newsreel or actuality film rather than a fictional film. The soundtrack, tone of the voiceover, rhetoric, and message were indispensable elements of the propaganda. The titles of the films suggest two types of film. The first are newsreel and actuality films that have no storyline and the subject is of which could be celebrations of Republic Day in Ankara, sports event, or an opening or visit by İnönü. Even the participation of the first lady Mevhibe İnönü, at a charity event could be the subject of a newsreel.

Information on the content of these films can be gathered from film ads in *Radyo*. According to the magazine, the film *Child* (*Çocuk*), dated April 23, 1942, and produced by the DGP, shows the effort spent on future citizens in Kemalist Turkey. The film *Youth* (*Gençlik*) describes the period starting days before Atatürk left Istanbul, continuing with his arrival in Samsun until he reached Ankara and following the symbolic flag passed from the Eternal Chief to the National Chief through the foot steps of Atatürk by celebrating May 19 in Samsun, Kayseri, Mersin and Adana. *Radyo* announced a remedy for the heartbreak of children who read about other children who would kiss National Chief's hand on April 23, thinking "I wish I were there." The DGP would screen these scenes and allow these children to participate in the excitement.¹⁹³

The other genre on the list are educational, cultural, and informative films. Four of 108 films fall into this category. The subjects are health or agriculture. There are no feature films on the list. In "The Chronology of Turkish Cinema", Nijat Özön says that Münir Hayri Egeli began but never finished shooting a

192 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1208 Folder no: 10 Row no: 3 ps. 15,17.

193 *Radyo*, no. 7 (Ankara: Matbuat Umum Müdürlüğü, June 15 1942), p. 22.

feature film entitled *Sergeant Doğan* (*Doğan Çavuş*) for the DGP in 1938.¹⁹⁴ Egeli also wished to shoot films on the fifteenth anniversary of the Republic¹⁹⁵ and on the life of Atatürk; however, the film on Atatürk was cut short due to his illness.¹⁹⁶

In a *Radyo* issue dated July 15, 1944, there was news that changes the perspective on DGPP films. The magazine noted that the DGPP was making a new film on Sümerbank's factory, the thirteenth and longest of an educational films series. Probably in the middle of the war, the DGPP had started a series of educational films. Sümerbank's industrial plants and factories, the life of its workers, and the domestic goods markets (*yerli malı pazarları*) established by Sümerbank throughout the country were closely observed and filmed. This film was also screened at the Sümerbank Exhibition at the Ankara Exhibition House.¹⁹⁷

Sümerbank is one of the most important symbols of economic development in the early Republican era. As such, this wartime film was a good medium to perpetuate the image of a self-sufficient national economy for the benefit of its citizens. The DGPP also filmed the Sümerbank Exhibition and, as reported in *Radyo*, screened the film in theaters to help people understand "how much was fulfilled in a short twenty years."¹⁹⁸

As the DGPP Film Department gained experience, the variety of its films increased. For example, before the census of October 21, 1945, the DGPP prepared a public service announcement which was screened in theaters.¹⁹⁹

Aside from the exceptions above, most of the educational films that were part of the party's or DGP's archive were imported. Neither the party nor the DGP had the infrastructure and crew to film anything more than simple newsreels; like educational or feature films. Furthermore, without the opportunity, it cannot be speculated whether films categorized as educational were actually

194 Özön, 1968, p. 76.

195 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 01, Box no: 1165 Folder no: 89 Row no: 1 pp. 1-7

196 Münir Hayri Egeli, *Atatürk'ten Bilinmeyen Anılar* (Ankara: Ahmet Halit Yaşaroğlu Kitapçılık, 1959), pp. 97- 98.

197 *Radyo*, no. 32 (Ankara: Matbuat Umum Müdürlüğü, July 15 1944), p. 22.

198 *Radyo*, no. 34 (Ankara: Matbuat Umum Müdürlüğü, September 15, 1944), p. 23.

199 *Radyo*, no. 46 (Ankara: Matbuat Umum Müdürlüğü, October 1, 1945), p. 19.

educational in comparison with international standards. Among the films on the DGP's list, a film on malaria warns people against mosquitos, recommends children not sleep without mosquito nets, and explains that DDT is a life-saving medicine. Though the subject is health, it is propaganda. The state informs its citizens through the film, but at the same time uses the tools of a modern state –technology and media – to raise its citizens' awareness. The state benefited from these superstructure tools in the matters of changing its citizenry and molding public opinion. There is a detailed study on the variety and subjects of the films in ensuing sections.

4.2.3 *Other Institutions and Cinema*

In the early years of the Republic it was not just the DGP and the General Secretariat of the RPP that produced or used propaganda films. Various state institutions produced propaganda films or purchased foreign films in line with their own purposes and activities. Though sources are limited, I briefly mention the activities of these institutions as well.

4.2.3.1 The Military Film Center of the Military Academy of the Republic of Turkey

The Military Film Center of the Military Academy of the Republic of Turkey (*T.C. Harp Akademisi Ordu Film Merkezi*, hereafter MFC) is one of the most anchored institutions in Republican history. Its film archive is richer, more organized and more detailed than that of most other institutions.²⁰⁰ Nitrate-based films from the early Republican period held by the military are being transferred from 16mm and 35mm film to digital format with the cooperation of Mimar Sinan University.²⁰¹

An example of the Military Film Center's activities and films in the early Republican years is a film entitled *On the Roads to Victory* (*Zafer Yollarında*) that the MFC began shooting in 1922. The first version of the film consisted of

200 The present name of the center is the Turkish Armed Forces Photographic and Film Centre Command (*TSK Foto Film Merkez Komutanlığı*).

201 Interview with Major Kubilay Balkız and technician Günhan Deliktaş (Ankara: Turkish Armed Forces Photographic and Film Centre Command, December 2009)

a montage of documentaries shot by Fuat Uzkınay. Later, its title was changed to *War of Independence (İstiklal Harbi)*. The production of the film began in 1922 and it was finished in 1942,²⁰² and ended up being a feature film than a documentary. Its length was anticipated to be between 8 and 10 thousand meters.²⁰³ During the shooting of reenactment scenes that occurred later on, the MFC would need the help of the town's people where they would shoot and applied for the support of the General Secretariat of the RPP on this matter. They decided to shoot the scenes concerning the Eastern Front of the War of Independence in Erzurum. For the shoot, the MFC needed twenty-five tumbrils as well as women, children, and elderly people in period costume to steer these tumbrils.²⁰⁴ The duty to coordinate these people fell on the General Secretariat of the RPP who delegated the task of logistical support to the Erzurum People's House.²⁰⁵ The MFC decided to shoot scenes concerning the Southern Front in Adana. The chairman of the Adana People's House arranged private interviews between actual veterans who participated in the War of Independence and the film committee. Producers also shot a scene with 200 cavalrymen and 100 infantrymen in costume in Adana's Kurt Tepesi neighborhood, the location of one of the most important operations of the War of Independence.²⁰⁶ The organization during the filmmaking process was supported by the People's Houses, but this help was reciprocated: in a period lacking domestic films, the MFC agreed to send copies of the film to the General Secretariat of the RPP after the film was finished. The RPP paid 500 Turkish lira for copying expenses so that the film could be screened in the People's Houses.²⁰⁷

202 Erman Şener, *Kurtuluş Savaşı ve Sinemamız* (Istanbul: Ahmet Sarı Matbaası, 1970), pp. 28-29.

203 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 01, Box no: 1211 Folder no: 21 Row no: 1 p. 1.

204 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1211 Folder no: 21 Row no: 1 p. 10.

205 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1211 Folder no: 21 Row no: 1 p. 12.

206 It was planned to add animation of the battles of Sakarya, Afyon, and Dumlupınar to the film.

207 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1211 Folder no: 21 Row no: 1 p. 2.

The making of this reenactment of the War of Independence shows that different institutions worked together. Atatürk closely watched over the process and when he heard that certain scenes were still missing, he ordered these scenes be shoot promptly within the center's means. The reenactment scenes were added to the film after this.²⁰⁸ It is a matter of debate whether most of what is perceived as original footage from the War of Independence may have actually been shot after the war was over.

The MFC and the General Secretariat of the RPP collaborated on other occasions, as well. In a 1935 film on the Iranian Shah, the Director of the MFC, Major İsfendiyar, traveled to Iran. The party paid for his expenses. This film was screened in the open air theater of the Ankara People's House and was watched by 2 to 3 thousand people every night.²⁰⁹

The Military Film Center documented the Turkish Navy's visit to Malta in 1936 for the RPP. In the field of cinema, the situation of the RPP was that it supported other institutions; its resources were higher and it had experienced staff. However, the military, the experience and filmmaking activities of which started in the Ottoman period, continued its endeavors in Republican period, as well, and conversely supported the General Secretariat of the RPP in matters of filmmaking.

Like the RPP, the MFC sometimes collaborated with professional filmmaking companies. On August 18, 1940, the Military High School's Navy Celebration was held at the Kuleli Military High School's marine area. The event was filmed by the MFC and İpek Film.²¹⁰

In these years, the Turkish General Staff produced two films: *The Standoff and Expelling of a Reinforced Infantry Regiment (Takviyeli Bir Piyade Alayının Def ve Tardı)* and *Climbing Up the Ağrı Mountain (Ağrı Dağı'na Çıkış)*. These were screened both in the military and to members of parliament and officials outside the military. In the beginning of the Second World War, the military took actions to use cinema more effectively. They decided to shoot educational

208 Erman, 1970, pp. 31-32.

209 "Açık Sinema", *Ülkü*, 1935, vol. 5, 3.30, p.478.

210 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 o o, Box no: 1214 Folder no: 32 Row no: 1 p. 23.

and technical films on modern weapons and warfare techniques to train military personnel and raise the awareness of citizens. However, it did not have the necessary equipment. The military officially requested budget items from the Ministry of Finance through the Premiership to purchase the necessary equipment from Germany. Due to the statist politics of the period, the position of the Ministry of Finance was strict regarding unnecessary spending in foreign currencies. Its response was negative. However, the military was persistent, and finally, the procurement was approved and the necessary equipment was purchased.²¹¹

The military also purchased and translated foreign films – or acquired them through various means such as the Marshall Plan – to educate its personnel. In 1934, the military showed the film *Protection from Gas* (*Gazdan Korunma*) to doctors as well as high- and low-ranking soldiers for educational purposes. It is unknown whether the military produced or purchased this film, but the film was popular and its only copy was reproduced for the RPP at the military's suggestion. Presumably, its screening continued in later years.²¹² Under the Marshall Plan, the United States sent Turkey educational films on technical issues such as wire tapping, using machinery, clearing landmines, and radio frequencies.²¹³ These technical films were translated into Turkish and used for educational purposes in the military.

The Film *Düşükler Yassı Adada* (*Fallen in Yassıada*) produced by the MFC after the 1960 coup is one of the most striking examples of propaganda made by this institution. The executors of the coup felt the need to assure the public that prisoners were well taken care of and that conditions in Yassıada were good. Even though trials had not yet started, the propaganda film included monologues with concrete judgements against Celal Bayar, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, Menderes, and important figures from mayors to chiefs of police, who were

211 The army's customs tax exemption request was declined. Öztürk, 2005, pp. 229-237.

212 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 01, Box no: 1211 Folder no: 22 Row no: 1 pp. 1-2.

213 Interview with the technician Günhan Deliktaş (Ankara: Turkish Armed Forces Photographic and Film Centre Command, December 2013)

all requested to act accordingly for the film. Celal Bayar's first words after trying to commit suicide in Yassıada were: "They made us act like actors in a film like in Yeşilcam. Did we deserve such treatment?"²¹⁴

There is no specific, published study of the Military Film Center neither by the institution itself nor by an outside researcher through its archive and story of filmmaking provide rich, interesting fodder for historical, institutional study.

4.2.3.2 Ministry of Health and Social Welfare

According to the RPP's 1935 statute, its aim is not to capitalize on the potential of select individuals, but to nurture robust masses.²¹⁵ To this end, the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare had the most responsibilities. The Minister of Health and Social Welfare sent a letter to the General Secretariat of the RPP on June 20, 1933, saying:

Concering propaganda for improving citizens' knowledge and views on health, we believe in the influence of films, and have attributed much importance to this matter over the last years. Our ministry is able to purchase only a couple of films from Europe with the budget allotted for this purpose. Through a program administered by the ministry, these films are screened free throughout the country, in every town and village with a film theater.²¹⁶

In 1955, a booklet²¹⁷ published by the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare shows its propaganda and publishing activities between 1923 and 1954.²¹⁸ As

214 The Demirkırat documentary contains a clip of the movie: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SE1Nk5tAVJM>

215 Yeşilkaya, 1999, p. 99.

216 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no:1211 Folder no: 22 Row no:1 p. 67.

217 The booklet is the 184th issue of the Directorate General of Health Propaganda and Medical Statistic's Publications (*Sağlık Propagandası ve Tıbbi İstatistik Umum Müdürlüğü Yayınları*).

218 The Directorate General of Health Propaganda and Medical Statistic began working under the Ministry of Health in 1936. This department was responsible for gathering and evaluating data and was active until 1982. Can Aktan Coşkun, *Sağlık Bakanlığı Organizasyon ve Yönetiminde Yaşanan Sorunlar ve Mevcut Durum Analizi*, www.canaktan.org

the title suggests, it contained lists of health propaganda posters, records of posters and brochures distributed to citizens and schools, lists of health-related propaganda films screened in cities and villages by the ministry's cinema operator, and information on similar publications.

In the booklet, a list of "Propaganda films on health screened in cities and villages by the Ministry's cinema operator" between the years 1946 and 1954 is also provided. The fact that the ministry had a cinema operator shows that its film activities were continuous. According to this list, propaganda films concerning health reached a total of 405,870 people in Bozüyük, Adapazarı, İzmit, Hereke, Mudanya, Bursa, Tekirdağ, Lüleburgaz, Kırklareli, Alpullu, Kayseri, Erzincan, Sarıkamış, Kars, Pasinler, Erzurum, Yerköy, Kırıkkale, İzmir (Fuar), Akhisar, Kırkağaç, Bergama, Ayvalık, Burhaniye, Edremit, Balıkesir, Bandırma, and Kütahya in 1948.

In 1935, one thousand books entitled "General Information on How to Stay Safe during Air Attacks for Young Health Officials" were distributed in 1938, 150 thousand publications were distributed on "Anthrax"; and in 1945, 10 thousand propaganda posters were printed with the slogan "The worst train wreck is to be attacked by mosquitos when traveling through areas with malaria." There is also a note in the booklet saying that approximately 2 million copies of posters and brochures printed between 1925 and 1954 were printed under the auspices of the Marshall Plan.



Figure 4.7 Pamphlet on Malaria, 1952.

As an aside, thousands of kilograms of medicine, pharmaceutical, and hospital equipment were sent to Turkey under the Marshall Plan.²¹⁹ Many informative booklets on health were also printed in Turkish courtesy of the Marshall Plan. One on Malaria begins with the words of General George Marshall saying that the United States is not bound by nationalist doctrines; the ultimate objective in America is to prevent poverty, hunger, despair, and upheaval. The booklet explains clearly and simply with the help of pictures how to prevent and fight illnesses.

Notably, the Marshall Plan also had a film branch.²²⁰ Films that explained and advertised the Marshall Plan to citizens were screened in countries where the support was sent. These films described the visible impacts of the support in the areas of the economy, social life, and production via mini-dramas, docudramas, and documentaries – but always using fictional elements.²²¹

219 Sıtma Savaşı, *Marşal Plânı- Sağlık Broşürü*, no. 2 (Ankara: Doğu Ltd O. Matbaası, 1952), p. 3.

220 Between November 17 and November 19, 2008, a selection of Marshall films were screened at the Mithat Alam Film Center in Boğaziçi University. To read the interview of the events' moderator, Prof. Dr. Zafer Toprak with Selling Democracy Project Director and Marshall Plan film historian, Sandra Schulberg: http://www.mafm.boun.edu.tr/files/111_Marshall_Plani_Filmleri.pdf

221 *Selling Democracy, Films of the Marshall Plan: 1948- 1953*, pp. 15-20.

Sandra Schulberg, daughter of Stuart Schulberg, who produced most of the Marshall films, argues that one cannot classify all these films as propaganda, but adds that they could be described as “mind-bender films.” The interesting aspect of Marshall films is that they were shot in Europe by Europeans under the scope of Marshall Plan. The films were banned in 1948 in the United States due to the Smith-Mundt Act.²²² Though there is little information on the making of these films in Turkey, a single document I discovered in archives proves that some Marshall films were in fact shot in Turkey. A decree signed by İsmet İnönü states that on November 16, 1949, the Council of Ministers allowed undeveloped films shot by Peter Hopkinson on the use of agricultural machinery in the name of European Financial Collaboration Administration under the auspices of the Marshall Plan to be taken abroad.²²³

I discovered the titles of twenty films in archival documents not mentioned in the booklet.²²⁴ Most of the films are thought to have come from either America or Germany:

- ◆ Modern Gymnastics (*Modern Jimnastik*)
- ◆ Children’s Bodies in Sunlight and Fresh Air (*Güneş ve Açık Havada Çocuk Vücudu*)
- ◆ A Treacherous Enemy: Dust (*Hain Bir Düşman, Toz*)
- ◆ Novelties in Women’s Gymnastics (*Kadın Jimnastiklerinde Yenilikler*)
- ◆ Tuberculosis (*Verem*)
- ◆ Frailty Caused by Malnutrition (*Gıdasızlıktan İleri Gelen Zayıflık*)
- ◆ A Healthy and Happy Baby (*Sıhhat ve Sıhhatte Bir Bebek*)
- ◆ Importance of Common Cold (*Nezlenin Ehemmiyeti*)
- ◆ Film on Malaria (*Sıtma Filmi*)

222 The law prevents American citizens from being exposed to propaganda. International publications like *Voice of America* were not distributed within America. The fact that there is no state television in the United States is due to this law. Recently this law was repealed and accordingly television and radio stations owned by the state began broadcasting in the United States.

223 Prime Ministry’s Republican Archive, Catalogue of Directorate General of Transactions, Cat. no: 030 18 01, Box no: 02 Folder no: 120 Row no: 81 p. 5.

224 Prime Ministry’s Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People’s Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1211 Folder no: 22 Row no: 1 pp. 1-72.

- ◆ Film on Novelties in the Fight against Malaria (*Sıtma Mücadelesinde Yeni Usuller Filmi*)
- ◆ Film on Childcare (*Çocuk Bakımı Filmi*)
- ◆ Film on Healthy Water (*Sihhi Su Filmi*)
- ◆ Once There Were Three: Film on Syphilis (*Vaktiyle Üç Dost İdiler Frengi Filmi*)
- ◆ Early Diagnosis and Treatment of Tuberculosis (*Veremin Erken Teşhis ve Erken Tedavisi*)
- ◆ Film on the Threat of Mosquitos (*Sinek Tehlikesi Filmi*)
- ◆ Film on the Punishment for Negligence (*İhmalin Cezası*)
- ◆ Film on Long and Prosperous Life (*Uzun ve Afiyette Yaşamın Çaresi Filmi*)
- ◆ Film on the Merits of Breast Milk (*Anne Sütünün Kıymeti Filmi*)
- ◆ Why Did Willie Want to Shower (*Willie Ne İçin Yıkanmak İstiyordu*)
- ◆ The Habit of Protecting One's Health and How to Succeed (*Sağlığı Korumaya Alışmak ve Bunu Başarabilmek*)

In 1934, the ministry sent such films to the People's Houses through its provincial directorates.²²⁵ Ercüment Ekrem Talu, in an article published in *Son Posta* newspaper on July 18, 1936, states that the Ministry of Health imported movable projectors from the United States; along with them, they imported a hundred films on scientific, sanitary, social, and moral issues. Talu appreciated this decision and says “people understand and internalize visual stimuli better than letters and words.”²²⁶

According to an article in *Babalık* magazine published June 14, 1937, the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare sent a notice to all governorships asking that films on sanitary and social issues targeting citizens, military staff, students, and teachers – provided by the Ministry or acquired elsewhere – be screened for free.²²⁷

In 1938, the ministry ordered sanitary propaganda films from Germany and before that, they purchased simple, stable, and educational films from the United States and Germany. In 1938, the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare reminded the General Secretariat of the RPP that they wished to screen such

225 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no:1211 Folder no: 22 Row no: 1 p. 55.

226 Öztürk, 2005, p. 182.

227 Öztürk, 2005, p. 183.

films in the People's Houses. In September 1938, four films of one canister each were sent to the General Secretariat of the RPP and later screened in the People's Houses for a year.

Minister Hulusi Alataş, in a letter dated July 15, 1938, explains that in accordance with the scope of the ministry's program, 35mm films on sanitary issues will be screened to citizens, military officials, and students through the Directorates of Health and Social Welfare in cities that have film theaters. The ministry sent the films in their holdings to the People's Houses, and if a given People's House did not have the necessary equipment to screen these films, the ministry requested them to be sent to other theaters in the city. Under this program, films were sent to People's Houses in İzmir, Ödemiş, Aydın, Nazilli, Denizli, Afyon, Konya, Adana, and Mersin.²²⁸

Until 1940, films held by the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare were 35mm films; however, most films on sanitary and social issues were damaged because they were screened for such a long time in theaters. Minister Alataş noted in 1940 that to ensure the dissemination of propaganda on sanitary issues in rural areas, the ministry bought 16mm films that could be screened with portable projectors. The ministry was to screen films on sanitary and social issues in schools in Ankara, Etimesgut Dispensary, and in villages.²²⁹ Since the Ankara People's House had only one portable projector; the General Secretariat of the RPP asked the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare to send this small machine along with the films to the People's Houses, if they had one.²³⁰

Apart from the Ministry of Health, the Turkish Red Crescent took part in the trend of cinema. In 1936, at the urging of the Ministry of Health, twelve films on sanitary and social issues were screened in the Red Crescent Center

228 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1211 Folder no: 22 Row no: 1 p. 46.

229 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1214 Folder no: 32 Row no: 1 p. 52.

230 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1214 Folder no: 32 Row no: 1 pp. 54-55.

in Balıkesir.²³¹ Even though they were rather late to the game compared with other organizations, the Turkish Red Crescent requested a copy of a film on the Erzincan earthquake in order to use parts of it in a film they were making in 1947.²³² The purpose of the short propaganda films they were making was the dissemination and promotion of the ideal and love of the Red Crescent among citizens, as well as to advertise the practices of the organization. The films reenacted the work of the organization in natural disasters and catastrophes, soup kitchens, and nursing.

Another institution that spread propaganda was the Prime Ministry's Directorate General of Physical Education (*Başvekalet Beden Terbiyesi Genel Direktörlüğü*). This directorate documented a wrestling tournament in Ankara in 1939 aiming to screen this film for the benefit of young people. They decided that the best way to screen it was to introduce the film in the schedules of local theaters without a special, separate screening or extra fee. They also noted that People's Houses, Officer's Clubs (*Orduevi*), schools, and similar venues could be used for the screening of the film. The plan was to screen the film in fifty-three counties from Eskişehir to Kırşehir.²³³ The Directorate General of Physical Education also used newsreels held by the party as tools of propaganda to establish youth clubs.²³⁴

Along with film screenings, the RPP informed citizens about health with orators who gave speeches or participated in conferences. For example, during the tenth anniversary of the Republic festivities, Mr. Ali Rıza, a specialist on dermatology and syphilis from Şişli Children's Hospital, gave a speech on "the success of reforms on health and especially malaria" from the public lectern situated in the square of Hagia Sophia on October 30, 1933.²³⁵

231 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1211 Folder no: 22 Row no: 1 p. 27.

232 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1214 Folder no: 32 Row no: 1 p. 9.

233 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1214 Folder no: 32 Row no: 1 p. 49.

234 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1214 Folder no: 32 Row no: 1 p. 24.

235 Çakan, 2004, p. 140.

4.2.3.3 The Turkish Aeronautical Association

The Turkish Aeronautical Association (*Türk Hava Kurumu*, hereafter TAA) was established in 1925. *Türkkuşu*, the aeronautical school, became operational in 1935. Films on aeronautics have an important place among RPP and DGP films. Atatürk emphasized that “the Future is in the Skies”; aeronautics was a military issue and signified progress, civilization, and technology for the country’s citizens.

During the early years of the Republic, the TAA attempted to produce propaganda films. In January 1938, the president of the TAA requested staff and equipment from the General Secretariat of the RPP to make a film based on Server Ziya Gürevin’s novel *Daughter of the Skies* (*Göklerin Kızı*). The TAA asked for film operators Necdet and Kenan along with the party’s sound camera to shoot the film, which would take two months. The president of the TAA thought it would be beneficial to “turn a generation of Turkish youth to the skies.” However, the RPP rejected the request due its their hectic work schedule.²³⁶

According to the president of TAA films would increase the interest in the activities of the association such as the Gedikli Preparation School. For example, shooting and publicly screening a film on 750 young people participating in İnönü Aeronautical Camp would pass the “enthusiasm of Aeronautics to all youth and tempt them to join.”²³⁷

The party assumed the role of making newsreels including the film on Aeronautical Camps. The council meeting in Etimesgut in August 1940 was also documented by the party’s camera operators.²³⁸ While the party screened the film through the People’s Houses, the TAA used its own alternative venues.²³⁹

236 Prime Ministry’s Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People’s Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1214 Folder no: 32 Row no: 1 p. 37.

237 Prime Ministry’s Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People’s Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1214 Folder no: 32 Row no: 1 pp. 26-38.

238 Prime Ministry’s Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People’s Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1214 Folder no: 32 Row no: 1 p. 26.

239 Prime Ministry’s Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People’s Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1214 Folder no: 32 Row no: 1 p. 26.

4.2.3.4 The Cinema Workshop of the General Inspectorship of Thrace (*Trakya Umumi Müfettişliği Sinema Atölyesi*)

Cemil Koçak describes general inspectorships as organizations that were the product of the single-party regime's web of control on politics and society, but which are incongruous with the 1924 Constitution.²⁴⁰ On January 1, 1928, the first general inspectorship was established in Diyarbakır to monitor eight eastern cities. With a decree published on February 9, 1934, a second inspectorship to monitor Edirne, Kırklareli, Tekirdağ, and Çanakkale – namely, the General Inspectorship of Thrace – was established.²⁴¹ The village office of this inspectorship was established in 1935, and among its activities was making and screening films. These activities are seldom noted in archival documents.

In 1936, the Cinema Department was initiated under the General Inspectorship and granted one percent of the budget gathered from villages. By 1938, the department had a 16mm camera, which was purchased from Universum Film AG (UFA)²⁴² with the help of the Ministry of Health. Films shot with this camera were screened in and outside of Thrace with a private projector. For example, the department screened its much appreciated films at the Ankara People's House for the 350th commemoration of Mimar Sinan.²⁴³

In 1938, the department wished to purchase a 35mm camera and upgrade their portable cinema equipment.²⁴⁴ Murat Burgaç, who studied the village office of General Inspectorship of Thrace, reports that with a portable projector and mobile film theater, films on the history of the country as well as regional

240 Cemil Koçak, *Umumi Müfettişlikler (1927- 1952)* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2003), p. 13.

241 Murat Burgaç, "Trakya Umumi Müfettişliği", <http://www.trakyagezi.com/dosya/79-tarih/1588-trakya-umumi-mufettisliginin-qkoyculukq-alanindaki-calismalari.html>

242 The UFA was founded in 1917 and became one of the most important supporters of National Socialist propaganda after 1933.

243 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 01, Box no: 1207 Folder no: 5 Row no: 1 pp. 12-13.

244 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 01, Box no: 1207 Folder no: 5 Row no: 1 pp. 12-13.

activities in the fields of health, agriculture, and development were screened in all the villages of Thrace.²⁴⁵

Archival documents indicate that aside from the institutions mentioned above, the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of the Economy also held certain films.²⁴⁶ According to an article published in *Cumhuriyet*, films on sanitary and educational issues screened by the Adana People's House in 1939 were supplied by the Ministry of Agriculture.²⁴⁷ Other examples are Seedling Day (*Arık Bayramı*) on March 14, 1937, and Ear Day (*Başak Bayramı*) on May 2, 1937, at the Denizli People's House, when speeches were given, radio programs were broadcast, and new agricultural techniques were introduced through film.²⁴⁸ These films were presumably imported educational films. Eti Bank purchased a sound projector for the Eastern Chrome Plant in Elazığ Güleman in April 1940 and made a request to borrow films from the party to screen for peasants and workers of the area.²⁴⁹

The RPP also collaborated with the Ministry of Education on filmmaking. In 1938 the exhibition of the Art Schools and Institutes for Girls was documented with the collaboration of the party and the ministry. A sound film was made to show in People's Houses and at private venues. Hasan Ali Yücel considered this film beneficial because it advertised the success of the Republic in vocational and technical areas, and also persuaded young people to enroll in trade schools.²⁵⁰

To sum up, the party and institutions of the state benefited from one another's resources and collaborated in filmmaking. However, when they could not handle the workload, they asked the help of entrepreneurial, professional filmmakers in the young Republic. The next section focuses on film companies

245 Murat Burgaç, "Trakya Umumi Müfettişliği", <http://www.trakyagezi.com/dosya/79-tarih/1588-trakya-umumi-mufettisliginin-qkoyculukq-alanindaki-calismalari.html>

246 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1211 Folder no: 22 Row no: 1 p. 22.

247 Öztürk, 2005, p. 184.

248 Çakan, 2004, p. 200.

249 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1214 Folder no: 32 Row no: 1 p. 38.

250 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1214 Folder no: 32 Row no: 1 p. 71.

that collaborated with the party and the relationship between the private sector and the state.

4.2.4 *Collaborators: Film Companies*

While the single-party regime was active in cinema, the party collaborated with private companies and experts. One of the main reasons for this collaboration was a lack of resources and qualified staff. In the young Republic, it is apparent that the number of people interested in cinema were limited. People in the industry who were not crossing over from theater were either educated abroad or their interest in cinema began in the military. Notably, during the Second World War, Jewish filmmakers who could no longer work in Austria had applied to the party to work with the state, but the party did not employ these individuals.²⁵¹

Independent, professional filmmakers and film companies worked closely and collaborated with state institutions and specialists within these institutions. Cezmi and Remzi, two filmmakers, proposed to document with sound the ceremony of twelfth anniversary of the Republic:

Directors Cezmi and Remzi will document the ceremony of twelfth anniversary of the Republic with the sound camera of the İpekçi Brothers along with the sound engineer of the party, Necdet. The İpekçi Brothers will hold the right to screen this film in theaters. Cezmi and Remzi will share a copy of the film to show in theaters in Anatolia and keep in their permanent collection. The RPP will supply the positive film necessary for this copy and pay 50 cents per meter.²⁵²

Cezmi ve Remzi were independent film operators. Their proposal was accepted and the fee was paid for 480 to 600 meters of film. This film is on the list of RPP films under the title: *Official Ceremony of the Twelfth Anniversary of the Republic*.

251 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 100, Box no: 1222 Folder no: 60 Row no: 1 pp. 33-34.

252 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive.

Aside from independent operators, the RPP employed technicians of the AA, as well. For example in 1941, Kemal Cakuş the photography and film operator of the AA, edited a film on Republic Day provided that his expenses and fee were paid.²⁵³ On Republic Day of 1941, the party utilized the AA's technicians to film racetracks and parliament. It assigned the DGP to record the opening speech and performances of the national anthem and oath by Boy Scouts.

The party needed professional help to make and develop films. For a long time, there was no change in the party's staff. Cinema staff who worked in and outside the party in 1941 included:²⁵⁴

Table 4.4

Necdet Ali Yula	RPP's Cinema and Sound Specialist
Vehbi Okay	RPP's Cinema Official
Kenan Erginsoy	Ankara People's House Cinema Specialist
Kemal Necati Çakus	AA's Photography and Cinema Specialist
Talat Nişli	RPP Cinema Assistant
Hüseyin Tutar	AA's Photography Official

Kenan Erginsoy was the People's House Cinema Specialist for a long time. He operated and inspected the activities of the party's collaborators. The RPP did not own a film studio, hence officials of the party used edited and inspected works in agreed-upon film companies' studios. Münir Hayri Egeli, in his book recounting his memories of Atatürk, says: "In the field of cinema, Kenan Erginsoy was the trustee. In all activities having to do with radio and cinema, his advice was taken into account."²⁵⁵ In 1940, the General Secretariat of the RPP charged its own cinema operator, Vehbi Okay, and the Ankara People's

253 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1551 Folder no: 317 Row no: 1 p. 7.

254 Data on this list is compiled from various archival documents.

255 Egeli, 1959, p. 84.

House Cinema Specialist, Kenan Erginsoy, with documenting the İzmir Fair.²⁵⁶

Among private companies, the party appears to have collaborated most with İpek Film, one of the first two film companies of the Republic established in 1928. İhsan İpekçi was from İpekçizade family active in the silk business in Thessaloniki.²⁵⁷ The first commercial enterprise of the family in Turkey was to open the Thessaloniki Market next to the Eminönü tram station.²⁵⁸ After graduating from Galatasaray High School, İhsan İpekçi studied commerce in Berlin. While studying there, he discovered that cinema was a great source of income and convinced his father and great uncle Kani to run the Elhamra film theater on Beyoğlu Avenue in 1923. This is how the family was introduced to the film industry. After two years they opened Melek (later *Emek*) Theater and became a known brand in the industry. Starting from the mid-1920s, İpek Film imported films and produced domestic films. Here is how Gökhan Akçura summarizes the enterprises of the İpekçi family in the field of cinema:

The İpekçi family experienced firsthand that cinema is a productive business and directed all their efforts into this field. Owning film theaters was not sufficient for them. They established İpek Film to import films and shortly after that, they began producing domestic films.²⁵⁹

Prominent figures from the cultural milieu such as Nazım Hikmet, Muhsin Ertuğrul, Ferdi Tayfur, and Adalet Cimcoz worked with İpek Film on the production of these domestic films. The first sound Turkish films *Streets of Istanbul* (*İstanbul Sokakları*) and *Smugglers* (*Kaçakçılar*) were made by the company; indeed, in those years, no other companies were making films. In 1932, at the most height period of its business, İpek Film rented a bread factory the Germans constructed during the First World War on Valikonağı Avenue and

256 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no:1551 Folder no: 317 Row no: 1 p. 14.

257 İhsan İpekçi is the uncle of journalist Abdi İpekçi and father of the politician İsmail Cem.

258 Akçura, 2004, p. 53.

259 Akçura, 2004, p. 94.

turned it into a film studio. İpek Film was split in 1934 into FİTAŞ for renting films and SİNTAŞ for running film theaters.²⁶⁰

İpek Film assisted the RPP in the making of many films. Correspondence dated December 13, 1935, shows that İpek Film prepared one copy for both of the films *The Opening Ceremony of the Diyarbakır Line* and *The Visit of Soviet Russian Athletes to Our Center* and the General Secretariat of the RPP paid 430.44 Turkish lira for its work. The military used the services of the İpekçi brothers to copy and edit films as well.²⁶¹

The İpekçi Family encountered significant financial troubles in 1934. Letters written by İhsan İpekçi to the General Secretariat of the RPP lay bare the relation of the state and the cinema business in this period. Suggestions made by the businessman to unite his own company's and the state's benefits says much about the period and the nature of propaganda. A letter İhsan İpekçi wrote on July 17, 1934, to the General Secretariat of the RPP, in particular, is recounting:

Esteemed sir,

Two years ago, as a commercial enterprise, we decided to establish a sound film studio that would support the progression of a new and national profession; that would develop and spread the Turkish language, art and culture both domestically and abroad. Our honorable government supported us greatly in our endeavor and finally we were successful in our attempt. We should also note that many countries in Europe and Balkans did not dare support such an enterprise.

We began our work with directors, operators, art directors, painters, photographers, technicians, and artists who were trained in Europe, without expecting much financial gain.

While working on an operetta written by Turkish scriptwriters we also recorded our national days, official parades held in Ankara, and speeches of his excellency Atatürk, and we ensured the distribution of these films both domestically and abroad: in France, Germany, Central Europe, Iran, Russia, and even in the United States. Thus we tried to

260 Akçura, 2004, pp. 59-60.

261 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive.

represent Turkey with both images and sound to the whole world. You have surely heard of the articles published globally in newspapers and magazines.

Our film “A Nation Awakens” and the Turkish operetta following that film proved that we need great support in order to develop and sustain this business.

Not just in languages like ours that are only spoken in a limited area, but in such countries as France and Germany, where the costs of films are compensated by worldwide distribution, only companies supported by the government can survive; companies that are not endorsed by the government are closing one by one.

This is why we worried and on various occasions contacted the General Secretariat of the RPP, the Ministries of Finance and Customs, the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce (*İstanbul Ticaret Odası*), and the Industry Association (*Sanayi Birliği*) and pled for support of our enterprise which provides income for many families and which is an institution of national propaganda.

For seventy years, we have been working honorably in this country and our enterprise not only has a good name in Turkey but also in Europe and the United States. Despite risking all our capital to develop and sustain this new profession, we were deprived of the support of our Republican government that in general supports and livens domestic industries, because a collaboration model could not be established for the cinema industry in particular.

This commercial enterprise we took on without precedence in our country failed us today and threatens the good name we worked seventy years to establish.

...our enterprise is now facing closure that would result in over a hundred families that work in our various branches to lose their job. This is why we dare to plead the redeeming support of our honorable state...²⁶²

262 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive.

İhsan İpekçi added an appendix to this letter and listed all the items in their studio at Valikonağı Avenue 135. In another note, İpekçi states that the value of the studio is 120 thousand Turkish lira and with a 20 thousand Turkish lira discount, the RPP could purchase half of the company. If the RPP accepted this partnership, they could produce films at cost value in this studio.

I could not find the party's answer to this request. However, four months later on November 25, 1934, İpekçi wrote that the General Staff had suggested 82 thousand Turkish lira instead of 120 thousand. He added that if the party wished, they could purchase it for 75 thousand Turkish lira. He explains that he would rather have the party as a partner than the military; if the party became their partner, the İpekçi brothers could keep working in the studio.

Atatürk thought it was necessary to establish a company to partner with İpekçi Brothers and said to Celal Bayar – the General Manager of İş Bankası at that time – “You should partner with these İpekçi's; they should not go bankrupt. Otherwise that business will go to foreigners.” Shortly afterward, in 1934, FİTAŞ was established with the participation of İş Bankası.²⁶³ The İpek Film was asking for the support of the state right at that moment, but the Party did not purchase their equipment and initiate a commercial and cultural partnership. Instead, upon the request of Atatürk, İş Bankası became an investor of FİTAŞ and supported İpekçi brothers commercially.

On June 12, 1935, İhsan İpekçi directly contacted the chief of the Eighth Bureau, Necip Ali Küçük. By that time, the İpekçi brothers had moved from their studio at Valikonağı Avenue to Yeşil Street in Beyoğlu. İpekçi explained that they still needed to sell equipment, and to prevent these valuable items from going to some unknown buyers, they proposed the RPP purchase these items in return for paying their loan to İş Bankası in installments.²⁶⁴

Starting in the late 1930s, İş Bankası rented a theater and a pool from the Child Protection Agency (*Çocuk Esirgeme Kurumu*) and began running film theaters.²⁶⁵ Some popular film theaters of the period – Park, Sus, Sümer, and

263 İnal Karagözoğlu, *Ankara'da Sinemalar Vardı* (İstanbul: Bileşim Yayınevi, 2004), p. 140.

264 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive.

265 Karagözoğlu, 2004, pp. 138-140.

Yeni Sinema – were run by İş Bankası.²⁶⁶ These theaters were operated under the Ankara Film Business Commercial Company (*Ankara Sinema İşleri Ticaret A.Ş.*) established on the orders of Atatürk and are believed to have been active until the 1960s.²⁶⁷

There were different motivations for the İpek Film to partner with the party and be under the protection of the state. Foremost, though the state had made some effort in the field of cinema, it had not made a real financial investment. The İpekçi brothers wished to sell their own shares to the state to remedy their financial problems. Such a partnership would meet the needs of the state for a studio and equipment while at the same time disburden the İpekçis. The İpekçi Brothers were under the influence of statist discourses of the period, and being under the protection of the party would ease the İpekçi's business concerns considering that they were already often working with the state.

İhsan İpekçi defined İpek Film as an institution of national propaganda in his correspondence. The company was a professional subcontractor in a period when the party did not have a studio, enough staff nor the necessary know-how to make propaganda films. Nonetheless, İpek Film was a commercial establishment; when İnönü asked why educational-informative cinema had not developed in Turkey, İhsan İpekçi replied that educating and informing were not the concern of men of commerce for whom cinema was a way of earning money.²⁶⁸

The staff of İpek Film included some of the most visionary and remarkable people of the Republic. İpek Film began with collaborators like Nazım Hikmet and Muhsin Ertuğrul. If these important figures were to guide the state towards a co-production of educational films, the story would have been very different. Instead of such a partnership, İpek Film continued to meet the technical needs of the party, but focused on feature films and newsreels, and did not embark on making educational or cultural films. According to Hinkle's

266 Burçak Evren and Ali Karadoğan, *Sinemada Son Adam: Makinist: Ankara Sinemaları Tarihi* (Ankara, Dünya Kitle İletişimi Araştırma Vakfı, 2008), ps. 176, 182, 184, 192.

267 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 01, Box no: 1222 Folder no: 60 Row no: 1 pp. 1- 16.

268 Öztürk, 2005, p. 199.

1933 report, İpek Film was to make a propaganda film to advertise local tobacco and cigarette production in which Miss Keriman, the 1932 Miss Universe, would act.²⁶⁹ However, there are no documents in the archives to indicate the film was actually made.

In April 1942, the Istanbul Division of the DGP organized a special screening of the DGP program consisting of films not yet screened in theaters to an audience consisting of Fikri Tüzer, the RPP's Secretary General, administrative and military officials, and the Istanbul press. The audience enjoyed this screening and more news on DGP films began to appear in the press, resulting in a discussion on what needed to be done in national filmmaking. The DGP appreciated that the Istanbul press was interested in this "national cause."²⁷⁰

Mediha Berkes heavily criticized both the objectives and products of İpek Film in an article entitled "Intellectuals Accuse a Film Producer" published in *Yurt ve Dünya* magazine's May 1942 issue.²⁷¹ Berkes based her critique on an interview made by A. Ören with Osman İpekçi, which was published in the tenth issue of *Yurd* magazine. In this interview, İpekçi said the most important factors in filmmaking are actors, scripts, equipment, and capital. İpekçi complained principally about Turkish actors and said scriptwriters do not produce good work because they do not know Turks and the East. Equipment is dependent on financial means, and according to İpekçi, men of commerce only invest in profitable businesses.

According to Berkes, the films produced by the İpek brothers lacked quality; they were products that numb the audiences' minds and lower the level of culture. She also claimed that the fact that the İpekçi family perceives filmmaking as just another area of commerce results in "films based on coarse sexual desires and crude jokes that lower the national level of taste, all the while knowing they are bad." According to her, there are many literary products by Turkish intellectuals that could be turned into films, and she is so vexed by people in film industry that she suggests the film industry should become public, like the conservatoire. Berkes sees the relationships between

269 Bali, 2007, p. 41.

270 *Radyo*, no. 6 (Ankara: Matbuat Umum Müdürlüğü, May 15, 1942), p. 20.

271 Berkes M., 1942, pp. 144- 149.

the state and the İpekçi Brothers not as an endeavor to develop a cultural field for the benefit of public, but as an endeavor to increase the profits of the İpekçi family. According to Berkes, the İpekçi brothers expect the state to protect them, compensate their damages, guarantee their profits, and have no say in their films.²⁷²

Berkes was not the only one thinking the state should intervene the film-making industry. Almost a year later, Suphi Nuri İleri mentioned this subject in an article published in *Yeni Adam* magazine. İleri was content with radio's programming and assumed this was the doing of the state. However, he complained about cinema. İleri wrote that the state had still not intervened in cinema leaving it to the mercy of private companies and individuals with bad results. According to him, filmmakers' purpose were not to educate, but to make money. If cinema was managed by state like radio, "our children's morals would not deteriorate, our social life would not degenerate, Western imitation would stop, and as Baltacıoğlu said, we would walk towards being Turks." İleri equates the damage of mismanaged cinema to the damage of losing a war.²⁷³ Nihal Atsız also defended state monopolies over different fields of culture such as cinema and theater. Atsız described cinemas and theaters as public schools, arguing that they should be subject to state control.²⁷⁴

"Turkish Film Studio-Halil Kamil" was another private film company with which the General Secretariat of the RPP cooperated. The party and the company collaborated for the making of a film on reform entitled *Turkey Progresses* (*Türkiye İlerliyor*) in 1935. In 1940, Halil Kamil Film asked to use images from the party's archive to make a film on the life of National Chief İnönü. The party requested to see the script of the film, but the film probably could not have been made.²⁷⁵

A metaphoric text published in *Radyo* magazine explains relations with these collaborators. In July 1942, the DGP's films were one year old. The article

272 Berkes M., 1942, p. 149.

273 Suphi Nuri İleri, "Olanlar Bitenler", *Yeni Adam*, no. 441 (June 1943), p. 4.

274 Oran, 1969, p. 270

275 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1214 Folder no: 32 Row no: 1 p. 56.

compared the DGP to a one-year-old toddler and the state to *yurdana* (motherland). The DGP was a foresighted and reasoned toddler despite its young age. What provided him with these qualities was the sad history of his family, having learned necessary lessons from the experiences of his siblings. The DGP's "older twins" were established around the same time: the Veteran's Community and Kemal Film.²⁷⁶ The Veteran's Community died after just a few breaths due to birth defects, and even though Kemal Film was nurtured by his mother, the nurse and the nurse had amateurishly learned military medicine. His parents were too inexperienced, and in the end it died, too. In the ensuing years, the children of close and distant relatives, rich and poor, and of acquaintances and neighbors had grown up and become stalwart adolescents. Meanwhile, *Yurdana* (motherland) was grieving her children's passing, while at the same time she was embarrassed of her current situation and in the others. When she decided to have a child again, Fitaş and Hakâ (Halil Kâmil) were born. While these children were survivors, they were not sufficiently foresighted and reasoned, maybe because their mother was not over the loss of her first children or maybe because she did not have time to spare for their development and education. Lately, though their mother could not admit it, they were moving in a detrimental, inappropriate direction. This vexed the mother, and she gave birth to a new child: the DGP. This baby was "nurtured well and with care." He was taught by emeritus professors. His teachers and trainers taught him "what was desired" and "what was expected." They worked hard to teach him to crawl, to walk, to develop. The sad *Yurdana* had instructed the teachers thusly. The DGP is the child of a mother who has been through much. However much he is coddled, the DGP would not become spoiled. The author explains why: "The DGP knows even at this early age that these meticulous authorities would educate him with a firm hand at the first inkling of spoiled behavior."²⁷⁷

This metaphoric narrative shows the state was not satisfied with previous film endeavors. However, the single party was aware of its deficiencies and it

276 Kemal Film produced forty-seven actuality films in the years 1922-23.

277 In Turkish "M.U.M daha bu yaşında iyice bilir ki titiz idareciler, şımarma istidadı belirir belirmmez, kulağını bükme suretiyle M.U.M'u da muma çevirebilirler." *Radyo*, no. 8 (Ankara:Matbuat Umum Müdürlüğü, July 15, 1942), p. 22.

accepted that it had not invested much in this field. With the DGP, the state took control in its own hands. Yet, as mentioned before, the DGP never moved beyond newsreels.

Archival documents show us that film companies either contacted the party to use their visual archive or for financial requests like İbrahim Serpil, who asked for help of the party to secure a bank loan in 1947. Kemal Film wrote a letter to the parliamentarian from Sinop, Cevdet Kerim İncedayı, stating that its film currently in the making would “serve national propaganda if certain parts that show the reforms are added”, and for this purpose he asked to use images from the party’s archive.²⁷⁸

In 1947, the party contacted Ertuğrul Tokdemir, the owner of Sema Film, regarding an interesting subject. Tokdemir wished to shoot a scene of the film *The Forgotten Secret* (*Unutulan Sır*) in the palace; however, for practical reasons, they decided to shoot the scene in a room of the Beyoğlu People’s House. The director of the People’s House asked for payment, but the producer did not take the request seriously. At the end, the director asked for 500 Turkish lira; the owner of the film company was surprised because, in his own words, “People’s Houses, as their name suggests, belong to people.” According to Tokdemir, Sema Film ensured that hundreds of thousands of liras did not go to foreign companies. It worked for the greater purposes of improving and developing the Turkish film industry, which was an important agent in the cultural scene, revitalizing proud moments of national history, and spreading them globally.²⁷⁹

On January 6, 1946, the gala of the Bora Ballet, directed by Galip Arcan, was held at the Eminönü People’s House. Necip Erses of Ses Film wished to document the show to propagandize Turkish ballet dance and record the first pantomime ballet performance in Turkey for their own benefit. A film on a ballet performance would be a nice tool of propaganda for the People’s House; however, they thought there would be gossip as it would be inappropriate for Ses Film to benefit financially from a film in which amateurs were performing,

278 Prime Ministry’s Republican Archive.

279 Prime Ministry’s Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People’s Party, Cat. no: 490 1 oo, Box no: 1208 Folder no: 8 Row no: 1 pp. 21-27.

especially given the house had spent heavily on the decorations and costumes. They decided that the DGP should document the performance since it had developed the necessary infrastructure and staff.²⁸⁰

Near the end of 1940s there was an unmistakable increase in the number of film companies. This was due to the end of war and a decrease in municipal entertainment taxes on domestic films.²⁸¹ In 1946, the Domestic Film Producers Association (*Yerli Film Yapanlar Cemiyeti*) was founded and began working to protect the interests of the industry. In 1949, the association, wrote a letter to Hilmi Uran, the parliamentarian from Seyhan who was known for listening to people from every strata of society, and said that due to improvements in the domestic film industry, Arabic films that were popular up until a year ago were being sidelined. For domestic films to be able to further compete with the foreign industry, they needed the protection and support of the state.²⁸² Those in the cinema industry appealed for tax relief or increases in ticket prices. According to them this was a national cause for the development of Turkish cinema. These changes would not be applied to foreign films.²⁸³

Most developments described in this chapter are not specific to Turkey. Soviet Russia and Germany used the film industry effectively in the interwar period and in wartime. Aside from propaganda, they also produced art films. Another country where film industry was under the state's control but not a state monopoly was Italy. Not only the Kemalists praised Soviet cinema; one of the prominent figures of Italian futurist cinema, Anton Giulio Bragaglia, wrote a critique in 1931, criticizing Italian cinema for making cheap bourgeois comedies and American-style femme-fatale scripts. For social inculcation, he argued, the "perfect works of Soviet cinema" – meaning the works of Eisenstein and Pudovkin – should be taken as examples. Similar to Mediha Berkes, Bragaglia said the film industry was capitalist, profit-oriented, did not want to

280 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1208 Folder no: 8 Row no: 1 pp. 39-49.

281 According to the law, entertainment tax should be 25% of the revenue in domestic films and 70% of the revenue in foreign films. Özön, 1968, p. 23.

282 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1212 Folder no: 26 Row no: 1 pp. 12-13.

283 Öztürk, 2005, pp. 130-136.

take risks, and as such, the state should intervene more in film business. According to him, even though LUCE produced propaganda newsreels like the Soviets, these films did not merge the qualities of art and powerful propaganda messages like Soviet films did.²⁸⁴

During the single-party period neither the state nor these private companies dared to make audacious propaganda films. Aside from a rare few, there were no feature films focusing on national sentiments. In a country going through a revolution, it would be unsurprising to see remarkable, domestic films on reforms; in fact, these were limited and proposals to the government to make such films usually came from foreign companies. The film companies that were actual state collaborator, saw the insufficiency and lack of organization within the state vis-à-vis making propaganda films and tried to benefit from this situation financially.

§ 4.3 From Newsreel to Mass Education: Film Varieties

Whether films produced by the RPP or the DGP are propaganda films or not is debatable. Most of these films are newsreels, actuality films and educational films. But it should be noted that these are described as propaganda by the institutions that produced and distributed them.

The young Republic of Turkey had just realized a revolution and was cultivating all measures of the revolution as political propaganda. This propaganda had a direct manifestation in the film industry. The purpose of a film made by the party or the DGP can be defined as explaining and disseminating the principles of the revolution to the citizenry and educating the people. Films regarding important days and celebrations were designed as visual rituals filled with the symbolism of the Republic and the new regime. Kemalism was to replace dogmatic ideas with positive approaches, and the regime suggested new symbols and a revolutionary approach to supersede old ideas. A newsreel on the assembly of language promoted the language revolution, while films on the training a Turkish officer, on *Türkkuşu*, or on a ceremony of reserve officer school showed the power of the army. Dam construction portrayed in a newsreel on financial issues glorified the financial power of the

284 De Grazia, 2002, p. 220.

state while a film on Sümerbank preached financial development and statism, encouraging national production and consumption of local products. Films on physical education portraying Sports Day, boxing, or skiing preached the ideal of creating a strong, healthy nation and instilled the notion of citizens with strong minds and bodies who are productive and useful for their state.²⁸⁵ Through educational films, modern methods of agriculture were taught; through films on sanitary issues, citizens were encouraged to use modern rather than traditional methods.

Roughly two categories of films were made by the DGP, General Secretariat of the RPP, and the other institutions of the state during the first years of the Republic. The first consists of newsreels which broadcast actual events and news. The second category consists of educational or cultural films that were intended to be informative. That in the period in question films were being distributed according to certain strategies supports the idea that all films had a propaganda quality whatever their genre.

Newsreels shared with citizens reality, internal and foreign developments, and the government's cultural, social, political, and military activities. As such it legitimized the activities of the government. Educational films informed people on issues such as health, agriculture, hygiene, plants, animals, and geography. The world view that was presented, the emphasis on modernity, and the Western discourse of the films were compatible with the party's revolutionary position.

The films of RPP and the DGP can be organized in seven categories:

- ◆ Newsreel
- ◆ Newsreel (Military)
- ◆ Newsreel (Aeronautics)
- ◆ Newsreel (Economics)
- ◆ Newsreel (Important Days and Celebrations)
- ◆ Newsreel (Sports)
- ◆ Educational Films

285 Çakan, 2004, p. 294.

The state imported educational and cultural films that they did not produce themselves. During the search for these films, I acquired at first two and eventually four more films by request from the General Staff Photography and Film Center. The General Staff first sent a film on the Military Academy's sports events on May 19, 1943, and another on the celebration of Republic Day in 1941 in Samsun. Upon my second request, they sent films entitled: *The War of Independence (İstiklal Harbi)*, *The Navy's Visit to Malta – 1936 (Donanmanın Malta Ziyareti – 1936)*, *Thrace Maneuvers – 1939 (Trakya Manevraları – 1939)* and *The Visit of the Iranian Shah to Turkey – 1934 (İran Şahı'nın Türkiye Ziyareti – 1934)*. These are actually sections cut from longer films.

The scenes from the film on Military Academy's sport events is three minutes fifty-five seconds long and begins with images of Atatürk High School students performing to a waltz in a stadium during the May 19 celebrations. The performances continue with students of the Gazi Educational Institute, the Hasanoğlu Village Institute, and the Military Academy. The voice of the narrator is patronizing and his monologues are worthy of attention: "Guided by their teachers, hundreds of youth moves like a single body."²⁸⁶ Youth in the stadium represent the homogenous and coherent society for which the political power is aiming.

The costumes, music, and emotional tone of the narrator contribute to the feeling of watching a scene from the Berlin Olympics.²⁸⁷ However, the difference between German or Soviet propaganda films and Turkish ones is the artistic quality of the former. The 1930s can be seen as the peak of new editing techniques. Leni Riefenstahl's *Triumph of Will* was an important example of the new cinematography. However, such creative camera or editing techniques are not present in Turkish propaganda films. The camera is fixed: there are no variations in camera angle, no long scenes, and no sense of rhythm. Researcher Levent Kurumlu likens this to the influence of Muhsin Ertuğrul's cinema, which was static and noncreative. Kurumlu argues that these people were

286 In Turkish: "Öğretmenleri başta olmak üzere, yüzlerce genç bir tek vücut gibi hareket etmekte."

287 *Olympia*, directed and produced by Leni Riefenstahl, documenting 1936 Berlin Summer Olympics is one of the most powerful examples of propaganda films of the period.

undoubtedly aware of new montage techniques but did not even edit what they shot.²⁸⁸

The clip from the film on Republic Day is two minutes thirty seconds long and includes the march of state officials from the Governor's building to the city square in Samsun. Along with images of citizens celebrating, there is a parade of students, sport clubs, scouts, firemen, and trade guilds. The narrator has a clear propaganda message in this film, as well: "The government, the army, and the citizenry, in response to this important day, are bound to one another and constitute an indestructible front."²⁸⁹ Celebrations gathered children, peasants, bureaucrats, and soldiers – in short, people from all strata of society – to create a demonstration of the strength of the homogenous masses in the way the state desired. Documenting these celebrations meant carrying the legitimization of the single-party regime to every corner of the country.

Archival documents indicate that the film on the visit of the Shah and that on maneuvers in Thrace were produced by the RPP. These were either produced by the RPP and shared with the military, or both shot their own films on the same subject. It is known that *Navy's Visit to Malta – 1936* was produced by the military for the RPP.

Some technical information should proceed the analysis of genres and subjects of the films. In this period, films were shot without sound and a voice-over was later added to the images. Another method for the voiceovers was to simultaneously play a record while screening the silent film. The projectionist would arrange the recording so that the voiceover precisely matched mouth movements.

The scripts of these mostly newsreel films belonging to the party were written by the party and passed along to the specialists who would shoot the film. For instance, journalist and author Nizamettin Nazif Tepedelenlioğlu wrote

288 Interview with Levent Kurumlu, Professor of Cinema History at Istanbul University State Conservatory (Istanbul, May 10, 2016)

289 In Turkish, "Hükümet, ordu ve millet, büyük günün manası karşısında birbirine kenetlenmekte ve yarılmaz bir cephe teşkil etmekte."

scripts for party propaganda films,²⁹⁰ including one entitled *Hatay's Independence Day Celebrations in 1939*.²⁹¹ Tepedenlioğlu also wrote the script for *A Nation Awakens*, a popular film produced by İpek Film.²⁹² Apart from this, there is no information about who wrote the scripts of the films made by the Party, whether they were in-house scriptwriters or whether the job was outsourced to different writers. There are twenty-two scenes in *Hatay's Independence Day Celebrations*, and the script determines from which locations to shoot with detailed suggestions about composition. Mise-en-scène is specified: it states clearly that in Yenışehir Village, children would be filmed swimming in the lake; in another village, peasants would be shot picking fruit; and at the military camp in village of Beylan, soldiers would be shot eating and while conducting drills.²⁹³

In the next section, I analyze how newsreel and educational films were used in Turkey and in Europe after the First World War to inform, form public opinion (legitimize), propagandize, and educate citizens. Then I briefly touch on the subjects of the propaganda films.

290 Tepedenlioğlu's record at the party was not good. Starting in 1925, he was prosecuted for conducting communist propaganda. Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 0 0, Box no: 577 Folder no: 2296 Row no: 2 pp. 4- 5.

291 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 01, Box no: 1212 Folder no: 25 Row no: 1 p. 3.

292 Şener, 1970, p. 43.

293 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 01, Box no: 1212 Folder no: 25 Row no: 1 p. 10.

4.3.1 *Newsreel*

*No scene, however animated and extensive, but will eventually be reproductive power. Martial evolutions, naval exercises, processions and countless kindred exhibitions will be recorded for the leisurely gratification of those who are debarred from attendance, or who desire to recall them.... Not only our own resources but those of the entire world will be at our command. The advantages to students and historians will be immeasurable. Instead of dry and misleading accounts, tinged with the exaggerations of the chroniclers' mind, our archives will be enriched by the vitalized pictures of great national scenes, instinct with all the glowing personalities which characterized them.*²⁹⁴

“Newsreel”, meaning news, actuality, “tidings” films (*havadis filmleri*) as they were called in the early Republican period, were screened in theaters before feature films. They were eight to nine minutes long and they could be described as short documentaries on actuality. This genre began in the beginning of the 1900s and continued to be screened until the 1970s. Until the advent of television at the end of the Second World War, newsreels were the only source of motion picture news for most households. These films transcend the category of feature films; they are actually realist documentaries that use art and technology. Even though newsreels were made to inform the viewer on the events and circumstances of the day, they are the most political of genres. The well-known Soviet documentarian and newsreel director, Dziga Vertov, used newsreels as a tool to ensure the continuity of the revolution and mobilize social change for masses with his realistic cinema approach.²⁹⁵

294 Raymond Fielding, *The American Newsreel: A Complete History, 1911-1967* (North Carolina: McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 2011), p. 3.

295 Michael Renoy, “Newsreel: Old and New. Towards an Historical Profile”, *Film Quarterly*, vol. 41, no.1 (University of California Press, Autumn, 1987), p. 21.

According to Rakım Çalapala, one of the first film companies of the Republic, Kemal Film, produced forty-seven newsreels between 1922 and 1923. Çalapala claims these films were beneficial for national propaganda and some reels of these films were sent to Europe and the United States after the war's end.²⁹⁶

In his book *Ankara*, Yakup Kadri emulates such newsreels. He tells his dream thusly: There would be no more films that “address people’s feelings of inferiority, prey on the animalistic side of humanity, that are vulgar, menial and tasteless.” Instead “national actuality films that recount how a swamp was drained in Anatolia, the ride of the first train on a new railroad line, how cotton from Seyhan is transported to a Kayseri fabric factory and turns into white or color fabric, would fill film theaters with applause and cries of joy.”²⁹⁷ According to Yakup Kadri, cinema should be used to spread the principles of revolution. He thought Moscow was progressive in the matter of using cinema for revolutionary purposes,²⁹⁸ and he criticized Turkish cinema for not being used to advance the revolution as such:

There is a film theater on every corner. On the walls, in the air, pictures of made-up people... Students, young girls, mothers, fathers – they are all hustling in front of these disastrous posters. I remember posters in Soviet Russia. Each was on a different issue, a case for the revolution... And I think of theaters filled with people day and night. Each one is a temple of art.²⁹⁹

Hilmi A. Malik, in his study on educational films states that in the Soviet Union, the belief in “Art for art’s sake” was purged and the idea that “art is for people, art is for serving people, and to carry nations to specific targets” was

296 Prime Ministry’s Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People’s Party, Cat. no: 490 1 o o, Box no: 1212 Folder no: 26 Row no: 1 p. 9.

297 Öztürk, 2005, p. 177.

298 Öztürk, 2005, p. 189.

299 Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu, “Ankara, Moskova, Roma- Halk Terbiyesi”, *Kadro*, n. 15 (March 1933), p. 33.

accepted. According to Malik, once this idea became widespread, Soviet cinema became more and more realistic and acquired a spirit that could leave the desired impression on any mass audience.³⁰⁰

Öztürk, in an article analyzing cinema movements in the early Republican era vis-à-vis the ideas of writers who worked on the dichotomy of modernism and traditionalism, notes that the media is the engine of modernization. Lerner and other modernist thinkers claimed that individuals empathize through media and thus have a higher motivation to work and produce. The energy of this motivation becomes a social phenomenon and contributes to the evolution of society.³⁰¹ Öztürk quotes Schiller: “In countries that have not been colonies but experienced cultural hegemony for certain reasons, social unification and survival are more imbued.” According to Öztürk, the questions of how and in which ways cinema was used in the early years of the Republic for cultural unification remain unanswered.³⁰² In the early years of the Turkish Republic, the education of citizens, cultural revolutions, and cultural mobilization were highly regarded.³⁰³ As these revolutions were occurring, the young Republic used the tools and methods of the West to unearth its own culture.

Nusret Kemal, in an article published in *Ülkü* magazine in 1933, says that Turkey needed actuality films the most. According to him, though you could see a couple of newsreels in theaters, “these are far from the knowledge of art and cinema, almost like amateur work.” He complains that citizens learn about what happened in the United States or Europe at most a month after it happens; what happens in Turkey cannot be seen on the screen at all. He adds that the time has come for domestic actuality films.³⁰⁴ As seen previously, *Radyo* magazine emphasized this in the announcement about the making of DGP films; it emphasized that instead of current events in foreign countries, national events and actions would be screened to Turkish people via DGP films.

300 Malik, *Türkiye’de Sinema ve Tesirleri*, p. 51.

301 Öztürk, 2010, p. 309.

302 Öztürk, 2010, p. 313.

303 Öztürk, 2010, p. 315.

304 Nusret Kemal, “Tenkit: Söz Bir Allah Bir”, *Ülkü*, vol. 2, no. 10, 1933, p. 351-354.

Developments in Europe and the United States indeed came to Turkey immediately through newsreels. The main film companies in Europe and the United States produced two newsreels per week starting in the early twentieth century, and they distributed these along with feature films. There were even film theaters in Europe that only showed newsreels. Pathé News, Paramount News, The March of Time, Fox Movietone News and Universal Newsreel were among pioneer companies that produced newsreel. During the period in question, the newsreels distributed in Turkey were mostly those of Paramount and Fox.

The slogan of Paramount newsreel was “Eyes and Ears of the World.” In other words, they supplied news of the events of the world through the eyes of Americans to screens in Turkey and other far away countries. It should be noted that in 1930 there was a quota on foreign films; however, educational and scientific films and newsreels were not included.³⁰⁵ Film advertisements of the period publicize that with every screening of a film, there will be a newsreel on world news. On January 15, 1935, *Cumhuriyet* newspaper reported that Paramount’s newsreel on world news would be repeated on January 16 in İpek and Melek theaters for the last time. The titles of the newsreels to be repeated included a French-Italian treaty signed in Rome and the case of the murder of Lindbergh’s child. Lindbergh was a famous American pilot whose son was found dead after being kidnapped for ransom. It was important news in the lives of Americans and as Nusret Kemal emphasized, this news arrived in Turkey shortly after it happened. These films to be screened to Turkish audiences not only came from the United States and the United Kingdom, but also from various European countries through foreign missionaries and companies. Many memoirs mention that newsreels under the name of “World News” were screened before foreign films, and if projectionists screened the same newsreel over and over, they were heckled.³⁰⁶

In March 1936, the president of the RPP’s İzmir Council wrote a letter to the General Secretariat of the party to inform them that domestic newsreels were much appreciated in the Aegean region. According to the president, there was an underlying psychological reason: citizens were fed up with seeing

305 Bali, 2007, pp. 30-32.

306 Karagözoğlu, 2004, p. 84.

reality through the eyes of foreigners and were hungry to see events that pertained to their national existence. It was of utmost importance that the national cinema industry develop and that seeing films become more effective than listening to publicize the activities of the government to citizens.³⁰⁷

Correspondence on newsreels shot in Turkey by foreign companies are found among archival documents. In 1947, the American March of Time Film Company made films on the Council of Ministers, the İzmir Tobacco Factory, Gelibolu and the Dardanelles, and the Military Academy.³⁰⁸ In June 1949, A.B. Europe – a Swedish film company – made films on agriculture, peasantry, viticulture, animal husbandry, and museums and archaeological excavations with historical value.³⁰⁹ Pathé and Warner Brothers’ journalists filmed the official Victory Day parade on August 30, 1950 after the Democrat Party became the ruling party.³¹⁰

In the early days of the Turkish Republic, there were local distributors of American and European film companies and foreign companies maintained their own offices in Turkey. For example, İpek Film was the distributor for Paramount,³¹¹ so newsreels called “Paramount Journals” were sent to Turkey and were regularly screened.³¹²

The RPP first started to produce newsreels in 1934 and the DGP took over at the end of 1941. The production of Turkish newsreels by the DGP was considered important since foreign newsreels would no longer be screened. Instead local newsreels focusing on “national themes”, showing the accomplishments of the political power, as well as actualities would be shown to audiences in the movie theaters. The DGP film national events and incidents related to

307 Prime Ministry’s Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People’s Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1213 Folder no: 39 Row no: 1 p. 71.

308 Prime Ministry’s Republican Archive, Catalogue of Directorate General of Transactions, Cat. no: 030 18 01 02, Box no: 112 Folder no: 88 Row no: 12 p. 1.

309 Prime Ministry’s Republican Archive, Catalogue of Directorate General of Transactions, Cat. no: 030 18 01 02, Box no: 120 Folder no: 53 Row no: 1 p. 1.

310 Prime Ministry’s Republican Archive, Catalogue of Directorate General of Transactions, Cat. no: 030 18 01 02, Box no: 123 Folder no: 41 Row no: 9 p. 1.

311 Bali, 2007, p. 34.

312 Filmer, 1984, p. 173.

culture and economics, drawing the attention of the people to sport activities in military schools, the Turkish Language Assembly, and the activities of leading governmental institutions. For instance, the DGP filmed a swim meet that occurred at the Military Academy. As mentioned in *Radyo*, the aim was to show National Chief İnönü's personal interest in these types of activities. The newsreels produced by the DGP were a medium to bring to the attention of the people the "achievements" of Turkish intellectuals who participated in language assembly in the cultural field, the "success" of Turkish youth active in *Türkkuşu*, and the day-to-day "progress" and "specialization" of Military Academy students in different branches of sport.³¹³

The government also used newsreels on a sensitive subject such as Hatay. During the second part of 1930s when it was topical, images from Hatay were screened in theaters. Banners announcing Turkish Hatay were projected and dubbed. According to an article published in *Tan* in 1935, the newspaper's photographer Remzi visited the Turkish people in Hatay and secretly photographed them hoisting the Turkish flag, putting on a garland and replacing their fezes with hats. This film was screened at Sümer theater and garnered much interest.³¹⁴ At the same time, once Hatay was included within Turkish borders, ceremonies and celebrations on July 23, 1939, were documented and a film on Hatay was made.³¹⁵ The party encouraged leading film companies to participate and document these celebrations, describing it as a service and a profitable business.³¹⁶

To exemplify how a newsreel made by the party was distributed consider that in October 1938, a film on May 19 made by the party was sent to police headquarters so that it could be sent to the appropriate film theaters in Istanbul to be screened – like World News – without any fee for fourteen days.³¹⁷

313 *Radyo*, no. 10 (Ankara: Matbuat Umum Müdürlüğü, September 15, 1942), p. 20.

314 Öztürk, 2005, pp. 176-177.

315 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1207 Folder no: 5 Row no: 1 p. 8.

316 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 01, Box no: 1212 Folder no: 25 Row no: 1 p. 23.

317 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1208 Folder no: 8 Row no: 1 p. 80.

As emphasized in the third chapter, celebrations of national days were especially important during the single-party period. Preparations began weeks beforehand in cities, villages, and boroughs. Such celebrations were seen as an occasion to display the power of the state to citizens. Most newsreels made by the DGP and the General Secretariat of the RPP concern on the celebration of important national days and anniversaries.

To put films depicting celebrations in context, the meaning of national days for the young Republic must be made clear. Celebrations and ceremonies where national symbols are exhibited are the products of modern states; they are performances created through the engineering of society, which is in a sense *mise-en-scène*.

Terbiye (Education) magazine published by the Council of Education and Morality (*Talim ve Terbiye Kurulu*), published the ideas of great thinkers on the education of the masses. One such thinkers was Michelet, who perceived national days as tools of education. Celal Sadrettin wrote on Michelet's ideas in *Terbiye* magazine in 1930:

Michelet has a secular way and mindset and he severely attacks religious celebrations. He longs for bright, enlightened, completely educational celebrations that are like the celebrations of the citizens of ancient Athens. As a matter of fact, Michelet finds the perfect model of education – in open air, under the sun, in complete freedom supported with the words of great rhetoricians and playwrights – in the city of Athens...³¹⁸

Newsreels shot during holiday celebrations included scenes depicted by Michelet. On the nineteenth Republic Day, the DGP filmed celebrations at Ankara Racetracks. As conveyed in *Radıyo*, “the parade performed by our heroic army with the newest innovations of modern warfare, while the National Chief was watching, under blue skies of Ankara” could be seen on the film.³¹⁹

The president of the Mardin People's House asked the General Secretariat on August 24, 1938, to send a film “that shows the financial and social existence

318 Çakan, 2004, p. 53.

319 *Radıyo*, no. 12 (Ankara: Matbuat Umum Müdürlüğü, October 15, 1942), p. 22.

of our country.” Such a film would be used to set the frame for the celebrations of National Day.³²⁰ The president of Tokat’s City Council of the RPP found out that a film on the tenth anniversary of Republic Day was at the center and wrote a letter saying he wished this film to be screened in order to “elevate the pride of citizens.”³²¹

As mentioned in the third chapter, the tenth anniversary of the Republic Day was heeded; during the celebrations, conferences on reforms and independence were organized. Apart from town squares, film theaters were also used for conferences. There were public speeches at Kemal Theater in Eyüp, at Yeşilköy Theater, at Saray, Türk, Melek, Elhamra, and Artislik theaters, at Millet theater in Şehzadebaşı, and at Süreyya Theater in Kadıköy.

Aside from national days, films were used to unite citizens during the celebration of locally important days in different cities. An article published in *Cumhuriyet* on July 19, 1938, informs readers that July 17, the day Atatürk went to Bolu, was zealously celebrated with the participation of members of parliament. The city was decorated with flags and archways, and the official parade continued the whole day. After many events including sporting events, a free soundfilm screening was organized at the Cumhuriyet Square.³²² In the early days of the Republic, people were gathered for such occasions as Agriculture Day (*Toprak Bayramı*), İnönü Day (*İnönü Günü*), the anniversary of the Lausanne Conference (*Lozan Konferansının Yıldönümü*), and even the Sokol Festival (*Sokol Bayramı*). It was announced that a film entitled *İnönü at the War of Independence* would be shown at the Ankara People’s House for the İnönü Day celebrations in 1940.³²³

It was a priority to reinforce the strength of the current system and solidify the loyalty of citizens to the revolution through these films. The opening ceremony of the Kubilay Monument was documented and turned into an appropriate newsreel that emphasized the “right messages” and screened to citizens in many cities. The Menemen Incident caused the government to emphasize

320 Prime Ministry’s Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People’s Party, Cat. no: 490 01, Box no: 1207 Folder no: 2 Row no: 1 p. 24.

321 Prime Ministry’s Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People’s Party, Cat. no: 490 01, Box no: 1207 Folder no: 2 Row no: 1 p. 27.

322 “Boluda Atatürk günü tes’id edildi”, *Cumhuriyet* (July 19, 1938), p. 3.

323 Çakan, 2004, p. 205.

its power over masses. The “threat on the regime” and the demand to “revive the caliphate” created an occasion to move towards an oppressive regime.

It is not clear how the subjects of newsreels were chosen and who made the decisions, but some correspondence in the archives gives certain clues. For instance, the president of Bursa’s City Council wrote a letter to the General Secretariat of the RPP on January 8, 1938, to propose a film and requested support to make it:

Uludağ and winter sports are more in demand this year. Aside from amendments to the hotel, we renovated our ski resort and as you can see in the attached picture, Atatürk’s corner – designed and constructed by our club members – and a reading corner were added to our library. We put cotton pillows on hay beds, ensured cold and hot showers and worked on the interior lighting of the whole building.

February is an important month for winter sports. There will be large crowds here on account of the holidays.

As we mentioned during our talk, we prepared all the necessary documents to make a film about our mountain and about winter sports for propaganda purposes. I kindly request that the operator to shoot the film be sent to Bursa five days prior to the Sacrifice Festival so that we can go over the documents.³²⁴

This film suggested by the Bursa City Council of the RPP was actually shot and distributed. As this example proves, the General Secretariat of the RPP was not the only agency that decided on the subjects of the films. When other institutions of the RPP had ideas, they shared these with the General Secretariat.

As this was the case for newsreels, the case for educational films is more worrying. Though the government managed to shoot newsreels, educational films required more technical qualifications and expertise. The party held back and did not undertake the making of such films. The ruling elite of the period was aware of the importance of such films and decided to procure them from foreign channels. The next section touches on the issue of using educational

324 Prime Ministry’s Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People’s Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1207 Folder no: 3 Row no: 1 p. 28.

films to educate citizens, as well as the ideas of leading actors of the period on this subject and their activities.

4.3.2 *Educational Films (Terbiye Filmleri)*

The use of educational films for the edification of citizens was and effectively-used method in many countries after the First World War. The duration of these films usually varied from 10 to 30 minutes, and they were screened for the benefit of various demographics of every age and level of education. As they were called in the first years of the Republic, *Terbiye Filmleri* laid an important role in the taming and social education of citizens during the first three quarters of the twentieth century, a fact not duly handled in studies of cinema and the history of cinema. Since educational films were informative, didactic, and their aesthetics were secondary, they have been taken lightly in studies of cinema.³²⁵

In the period after the First World War in Europe and the United States educational films even entered classrooms, but they were used to educate adults as well as students. In these countries, there were principle establishments and institutes that produced educational films. With respect to Europe and the United States, in some countries these efforts were supported directly by the state and in others they came to fruition with the investment of private entrepreneurs. A report written by UNESCO in 1959 on educational films categorizes institutions that produce educational films in fourteen countries as such:³²⁶

- 1 Countries where educational films are produced solely by the state or with the sponsorship of the state: Austria, Belgium, and Luxembourg
- 2 Countries where the making of educational films is supported by the state or done with the sponsorship of official or semi-official establishments: Denmark, England, Scotland, France, Germany, Holland, and Norway

325 Devin Orgeron, Marsha Orgeron and Dan Streible, *Learning with the Lights Off: Educational Film in the United States* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 3-5.

326 "Report on the Administration of Educational Film Activities in 14 Countries", Audio Visual Communication Review, vol. 7, no. 4 (New York: Springer, Fall 1959), p. 281.

- 3 Countries where educational films are made by private entrepreneurs: Canada, France, England, Germany, Italy, Swiss, Sweden, and the United States

As mentioned in UNESCO's list, private entrepreneurs were active in educational films in the United States. The NYU Educational Film Institute is a good example. This institute was founded on the initiative and with the financial support of the chairman of General Motors, Alfred P. Sloan, and its purpose was to teach principal financial values to citizens. However, the point of view of the Institute did not coincide Sloan's expectations. A film entitled *Valley Town* made by the institute depicted large corporations as abandoning workers alone after the advent of mechanization; afterwards, Sloan decided to stop supporting the institute.³²⁷

After the First World War in France, the Musée Pédagogique de l'Etat (State Museum of Pedagogy) directed many establishments that produced educational films. The museum's holdings included many films to be screened for the benefit of citizens and students; indeed, between 1926 and 1927, the institution organized a total of 28,915 such screenings. The museum had films on agriculture, anatomy, archeology, art, history, childcare, physics, chemistry, aviation, plants, geography, medicine, health, industry, animals, and navigation; approximately 5 thousand films on various subjects. To decrease the bureaucracy of sending films from one theater to another, the museum opened branches in thirty-five to fifty cities, making it easier for the public to reach these films. The Ministry of Agriculture of France invested in filmmaking, as well, and as of 1929, they had 425 films.³²⁸

In Germany, educational films were managed by the Third Reich Film and Slide Office on Science and Education (*Reichsanstalt für Film und Bild in Wissenschaft und Unterricht*), which operated under the Ministry of Education. The Reich Educational Films Office was founded in 1934 and was responsible for sending films to all related institutions. By May 1940, this institution had 700 films, all of which were silent, to screen in classrooms of elementary schools, middle schools, and universities. The subjects varied from health to agriculture, from vocational training to world geography, and from science to

327 Orgeron, Orgeron and Streible, 2011, pp. 272-274.

328 Malik, *Türkiye'de Sinema ve Tesirleri*, pp. 48- 51.

fishing. Educational films were used effectively during war time. Some explained how to act during wartime, and some sought to reinforce patriotism and belief in the power of the German race. The government used these films to raise employment numbers in war industries.³²⁹

The 1st Congress on the Economy that occurred between February 17 and March 4, 1923, defined the principles of the economic pact. Article 9 of the report on the congress, entitled the Issue of Agriculture and Education (*Ziraat ve Maarif Meselesi*) states:

An agriculture school will be opened in every region to screen films on agriculture, industry, geography, economy, and health – on the condition that those who oppose our morals are banned – and applied conferences will be conducted to teach peasants the necessary information and determine the demographics of villages.³³⁰

Article 9 proves that even before the proclamation of the Republic, using films to educate peasants on matters to ensure the developments of citizen and society was under consideration. In this period, there was no educational film production in Turkey; however, statesmen were probably informed about the use of such films in the education of citizens abroad.

An exchange of educational films between Turkey and Soviet Union occurred in the early years of the Republic. In 1926, the two countries signed the “Treaty of Exchange of Non-Propaganda Films” (*Propaganda Nitelikli Olmayan Filmlerin Değişimi Anlaşması*). Serdar Öztürk emphasizes that Turkey ratified this treaty as a result of a conscious maneuver to preserve its cultural autonomy. Collaboration with the USSR, which had recently had a revolution and was working intensively on the education of citizens, instead of Western countries like the United States, France or England, was a standing against imperialism. According to the treaty, films that contain no propaganda on the political regimes of the respective countries would be exchanged.³³¹ Öztürk’s

329 John Brown Masin, “Educational Films in Germany”, *The Phi Delta Kappan*, vol. 22, no. 9, Audio-Visual Aids (May, 1940), pp. 438-441.

330 Erksan, 2000, pp. 55- 56.

331 Öztürk, 2010, p. 329.

interpretation is to the point in the case of educational films, but films imported from Europe and the United States were screened throughout the country. And in this period before television, cinema was the greatest source of entertainment for the people. Moreover, later on the state would procure most of its educational films from Europe and the United States. Indeed, toward the end of the Second World War, cultural committees from England and the United States were allowed to screen films in the People's Houses and there was no longer any notable circulation of educational and cultural films between Russia and Turkey.

During the early years of the Republic, the effectiveness of Soviet cinema and public education led to experiments in Turkey. On the tenth anniversary of the Republic, a law was issued for organizing a "Traveling Education Exhibition" (*Seyyar Terbiye Sergisi*). A train departing from Ankara would stop for a few days at each station and finally reach Samsun forty-five days later. This train invoked Bolshevik propaganda. It traveled 1,002 kilometers, and along the way, conferences were organized to educate citizens on varying subjects such as disease, hygiene, agriculture, and nutrition; exhibitions were arranged; and films were screened continuously from the projection wagon. İsmail Hakkı Tonguç and his assistant Ferit Oğuz Bayır were behind the project. The train consisted of three specially-commissioned wagons built by a European firm in 1927. It possessed educational equipment, films on anatomy and health, posters, and books, as well as a committee of four staff consisting of a doctor, an education inspector, a school president, and a museum director. Inside the wagon set aside for education were chairs and a screen for films and other projections.³³² From where the films screened on this train were procured is unknown.

This traveling exhibition was organized with the collaboration of the Ministry of Education and the Turkish State Railways (*TCDD*). It stopped in Ankara, Kırıkkale, Yerköy, Fakılı, Kayseri, Şarkışla, Sivas, Zile, Amasya, Havza, and Samsun, and the experts and civil authorities of the towns participated in the exhibitions. Over 1,002 kilometers, a total of 10 thousand people visited

332 Ruhan Çelebi, *Bir Sosyal Sorumluluk Projesi ve TCDD* (14.09.2009), www.kentvedemiryolu.com

the exhibition, ninety-two public speeches were given to 947 elementary and 300 middle and high schools, as well as teacher training school students. Sixteen public conferences were held, and 10 thousand free books were distributed, the most compelling of which for peasants were on malaria.³³³ In 1933, journalist Behzat Arif wrote an article in *Fikirler*, the magazine of the İzmir People's House, mentioning the success of this organization and suggesting a similar arrangement in and around İzmir:

... citizens listened to conferences on the prevention of disease, new methods of agriculture, and working effectively. They watched the progression and results of tuberculosis, syphilis, and malaria on the screen in the projection wagon.³³⁴

Hinkle states in his report that two wagons that contained a projector and educational films departed from Ankara for Eskişehir in April 1933. The purpose was to introduce villages around Eskişehir that did not have projectors to cinema and to screen educational films on hygiene, crafts, and preschool and elementary education over the summer. According to Hinkle, arranging for projectors in schools was insufficient; the government should purchase and ensure the distribution of films. The government could use such films for national defense, to recruit soldiers for the army, or to educate citizens on health. In remote villages unreachable by teachers, nurses, and doctors, cinema could replace them to an extent.³³⁵

Another matter revealed in Hinkle's report is that American Board of Mission, through four missionary schools in Anatolia and other channels in the region, organized screenings of educational films on health, agriculture, forestry, and industry. Mr. Nilson from the Talas Missionary School organized 103 screenings with the participation of approximately 150 people each screening in 32 cities and boroughs between April 1931 and September 1932. Nilson organized these screenings in People's Houses, theaters, classrooms, coffee

333 Ümit Sariaslan, *Demir Ağlardan örümcek Ağlarına: Cumhuriyet Demiryolculuğu ve Ötesi*, (İstanbul: Otopsi Yayınları, 2004), pp. 256-276.

334 Abisel, 1994, p. 48.

335 Bali, 2007, p. 55.

shops, and markets using a 16mm portable projector.³³⁶ The Governor of Kayseri valued this visual education greatly; he himself participated in and sanctioned Mr. Nilson's screenings. Local administrations were welcoming and supportive, and a teacher or Mr. Nilson himself instructed citizens on the subjects of the films, which included:

- 1 Baby care and the dangers of flies, mosquitos, and various diseases;
- 2 Scenes from Turkey on the subjects of industry and agriculture;
- 3 Feature films on success stories like the life of Thomas Edison; and
- 4 Comedies that brought together entertainment and education.

Mr. Nilson expressed that citizens and instructors in the boroughs they visited were affected by the films. Even though these films were produced in the United States for Americans, they were easily understood, soaked up, and ingrained in their memories of the Turkish audiences.

Why and for whom films screened by Nilson were educational is a matter of controversy. When films are not tailor-made for the educational level and social structure of its audience, it cannot be said they are always useful. An American film about how a factory functions and the details of that factory's production, which has no equivalent in Turkey, would not be useful for Turkish farmers; in some cases, it could work against the government. On the other hand, for a child who has never seen a film even an American Western can be educational.³³⁷ The American Board Mission continued to screen films in Turkey on various occasions in the 1940s and in certain cases, they were in contact with the RPP.³³⁸ Nilson further argued that a library of educational films needed to be established in Ankara.

The International Institute for Educational Cinema was established in Rome in 1927 with the support of Mussolini. After the institute was transferred

336 Bali, 2007, p. 176.

337 Bali, 2007, pp. 56-57.

338 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1208 Folder no: 10 Row no: 3 p. 1.

to the United Nations (UN), the Italian government continued to cover its expenses.³³⁹ After the transfer, the institute sent a letter to the ministries of foreign affairs of all countries on April 12, 1930. Its purpose was to draw attention to the global circulation of educational films. The institute organized the exchange of educational films among countries through their agency, making it easier to inform citizens on medical and technical subjects. For this purpose, the films of any country should pass a filter and meet similar requirements. To ensure this, the criteria of educational films should be defined. The institute was asking for the information on national establishments that monitor educational films. Upon receiving this letter, the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tevfik Rüştü Aras, asked the opinion of the Ministry of Economy and wrote to the Ministry of Education on the matter of control. There were no categorization of educational films in Turkey at the time and it was especially necessary for selecting children's films.³⁴⁰ With the approval of the Premiership, the Ministry of Education was appointed to contact the institute. A board of superintendents suggested by the ministry would oversee and categorize educational and informative films.³⁴¹

International developments in educational films continued through the 1930s and Turkey actively participated in this process. From 1938 decree by Atatürk makes clear that Turkey had ratified the "International Educational Films Contract" (*Beynelmilel Terbiyevi Filmler Mukavelesi*).³⁴² In a period before the Second World War, this decree defined educational films as a tool to contribute to peace.

As for Turkey, Öztürk mentions, during the early years of the Republic, the perception of cinema by the ruling elite was focused on educational-informative films. According to Malik, it was of utmost importance to show students and citizens through films how cotton was grown in Adana, prepared, sold, and consumed in the country, and exported; how coal was mined in Zonguldak, the life of day workers, and the parliamentarian who once a day worker

339 Abisel, 1994, p. 45.

340 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Directorate General of Transactions, Cat. no: 030 10, Box no: 146 Folder no: 43 Row no: 16 pp. 2-11.

341 Öztürk, 2005, pp. 206-210.

342 Twenty-four countries signed the contract. Though many countries ratified it in 1933, Turkey signed on in 1938.

once; life in villages, and agriculture and deputies from villages; “our copper mine that is one of the biggest mines of the World, our wool, our railways, grapes and figs of İzmir, silk of Bursa”... Another necessity was to screen propaganda films on malaria, syphilis, and trachoma, which were widespread in villages. Malik suggested that the instructor or public orator who screened the film should be informed on the film’s subject and answer questions after the screening.³⁴³ Most people who were interested in educating citizens, like the presidents of the People’s Houses, were aware of the advantages of education through cinema. Cinema was not only used to propagandize political power, but also to educate and tame people.

The presidents of the People’s Houses requested educational films directly from the RPP to educate and inform citizens especially on the subjects of agriculture and health. However, the state could not initiate the production of educational and informative film; they met this necessity through importing films.

In an article published in *Varlık* magazine on May 9, 1935, Baltacıoğlu argues:

The best tools to educate citizens are cinema and radio. Their educational power is so perfect that the century’s philosophy, moral and aesthetics depicted in the work of the most powerful artists could be taught to the illiterate masses through these two tools.³⁴⁴

Hinkle’s report states that educational films had been well-known in Turkey since 1933 but were not used effectively. The government did not use such films to educate citizens through the Ministry of Education. Hinkle notes that the ministry announced it had decided to handle this issue within a year. The limited number of projectors in schools in the period is also noted in Hinkle’s report.³⁴⁵ Even if a school owned a projector, it did not have the resources to buy films, so film screenings in schools were rare. For example, a school in

343 Malik, *Türkiye’de Sinema ve Tesirleri*, p. 47.

344 Çakan, 2004, p. 272.

345 These projectors were located at French and American schools in Istanbul, at an Italian school, a Rum High School, Istanbul University, Galatasaray High School, Istanbul Girls High School, and Çamlıca Girls High School.

Ankara had an auditorium with a capacity of 500 people and a projector but screened only one film in 1931. In these situations, films were usually rented from film companies in Istanbul. Only eight films were screened in the Ankara People's House in 1932. All were educational. Six were about plants and had been borrowed from the Ministry of Agriculture; two were on venereal disease and had been borrowed from the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare. The Ankara People's House allocated a budget of 400 Turkish lira for the 1933–1934 fiscal year for educational films.³⁴⁶ At the time, the Ministry of Education actually held many imported, German educational films, but these were not distributed.

In 1939, correspondence between the General Secretariat of the RPP and the Commercial Directory of the Ministry of Economy reveals something of what kinds of educational films the RPP held. Documents on propaganda and regarding commerce, health, and social life, preventing disease, and preventing accidents were to be gathered for an International Water Exhibition taking place in Liège, and a Cinémathèque would be established. The Directorate of the Turkish Department asked the RPP to send such films – if it had any – to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The party replied saying it did not have any such films. In other correspondence, between the General Secretariat and the President of State Conservatory in 1947, it is noted that up to then, the party had not made any educational films.³⁴⁷

The Legislation entitled the “Law on Educational and Technical Films” (*Öğretici ve Teknik Filmler Hakkında Kanun*) was enacted on February 10, 1937, and published in the official gazette on February 18. According to the law, educational and technical films, vans equipped with sound projectors, silent projectors, and the necessary equipment to make films, as well as unexposed film would be exempt from customs taxes.³⁴⁸ The law also stated that educational

346 Considering that a newspaper cost five cents in that period, 400 Turkish lira would be approximately 8 thousand Turkish lira of today. Bali, 2007, p. 55.

347 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no:1213 Folder no: 29 Row no: 1 p. 21.

348 The parliamentarian from Edirne, Fatma Memik, gave a speech during the vote on the legislation and said that in villages without electricity, the People's Houses use gas lamps to screen

and technical films imported by individuals or institutions would be exempt from any of tax.³⁴⁹ This law attracted attention during its debate. On January 21, 1936, Falih Rıfkı Atay wrote in *Son Posta* newspaper:

A new legislation forces all film theaters to screen educational films. Furthermore, the state will import films to increase the technical knowledge of citizens, and these will be distributed to film theaters and People's Houses and screened in boroughs and villages with portable projectors. We embrace this legislation because it initiates a period of education through film in Turkey.³⁵⁰

According to the second paragraph of the third article of the law, educational and technical films were obliged to be shown along with the screening of the main film. The government was authorized to freely distribute domestically produced or approved imported films of this type. Theater owners were compelled to screen the films they were given, and those who did would be fined 10 to 50 Turkish lira by the municipal committee.³⁵¹ The preamble of the legislation notes that in culturally progressive countries, educational films are used to develop the country. The achievement of Italy in this field noted:

New Italy assigned mobile schools in order to show this genre of films in all villages and inform further with conferences. Special vans that contained a parlor amplificatory and a sound projector were designed.

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films. This is why the terms “projectors that work with fuel” and “silent films” should be added to the legislation. This amendment was accepted.

349 “Law on Educational and Technical Films”, numbered 3122 Enactment Date: February 01 1937, www.kanunum.com

350 “Law on Educational and Technical Films”, numbered 3122 Enactment Date: February 01 1937, www.kanunum.com

351 “Law on Educational and Technical Films”, numbered 3122 Enactment Date: February 01 1937, www.kanunum.com

352 Öğretici ve Teknik Filmler hakkında kanun layihası ve Gümrük ve İnhisarlar, İktisad, Sıhhat ve İçtimai Muavenet, Adliye, Maarif, Dahiliye, Maliye ve Bütçe encümenleri mazbataları, S.Sayı:71, p. 2.

Educational and technical films address two different audiences. Educational films are for the benefit of the whole public. Technical films, on the other hand, are used to educate certain occupational groups by state or other institutions that have a national target.³⁵³

How well private film theaters complied with the requirement to screening such films is unknown. On December 11, 1937, *Babalık* newspaper wrote that Konya Municipal Film Theater began screening both sound and silent educational and technical films.³⁵⁴ To ensure the most effective use of this legislation, a 1939 regulation entitled “The Control of Educational and Technical Films” (*Öğretici ve Teknik Filmlerin Kontrolü*) was issued. The regulation did not raise new issues, it just repeated what was said in the main legislation.³⁵⁵

In 1939, Article 13 and 14 of the regulation on “The Review of Films and Scripts” (*Filmlerin ve Film Senaryolarının Kontrolüne Dair Nizamname*) stated that while reviewing films, approved educational and informative films should be specified as much.³⁵⁶

That same year, İsmet İnönü met with filmmaker Naci İpekçi and the Mayor of Istanbul Lütüf Kırdar, at the presidential mansion. İnönü expected to learn why educational-informative cinema was unpopular in Turkey. İpekçi said these films and mobile screenings in general were not profitable. According to İpekçi, for businessmen who saw cinema as a source of profit, educating and informing were secondary issues. Businessmen like himself did not know much about how to go about it.³⁵⁷ Because İnönü thought they were, he repeatedly asked İpekçi the cost of making such a film; İpekçi then brought up the issue of lack of qualified staff. An article on *Akşam* newspaper on the meeting protected İpekçi, arguing that countries at the same level as Turkey did not produce as many films as Turkey. Significant investment was needed to establish a film industry and it would not be possible to recover that investment; a

353 Öğretici ve Teknik Filmler hakkında kanun layihası ve Gümrük ve İnhisarlar, İktisad, Sıhhat ve İçtimai Muavenet, Adliye, Maarif, Dahiliye, Maliye ve Bütçe encümenleri mazbataları, S.Sayı:71, p. 2.

354 Öztürk, 2005, p. 94.

355 Öztürk, 2005, p. 164.

356 Öztürk, 2005, p. 165.

357 Öztürk, 2010, p. 322.

large-scale cinematic production would not be profitable since it could only be screened in Turkey.³⁵⁸

At first, the state did not know where to apply for films from abroad. İnönü said to İpekçi that they were having problems finding educational films for children and inquired whether filmmakers had taken up such an activity.³⁵⁹ An example on how films were imported is seen in the list of films requested by the Ministry of Education's School Museum Directorate (*Milli Eğitim Bakanlığı Okul Müzesi Direktörlüğü*) from the United States in April 1941. The School Museum was planning to use these films in applied lessons. They would cost a \$700 and consisted of both sound and silent films.³⁶⁰ The total duration of the 135 films to be purchased was 30 hours, and they were all 16mm format. While this purchase had a meager budget, given the conditions of war a letter of credit was nonetheless required. The School Museum Directorate anticipated a negative response so they noted that the films could only be purchased from the United States. For that reason, clearing or barter was not an option. The selection of sound and silent films that the School Museum Directorate wanted to buy is categorized according to subject:

358 Öztürk, 2005, p. 199.

359 Öztürk, 2005, p. 202.

360 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Directorate General of Transactions, Cat. no: 030 10, Box no: 143 Folder no: 26 Row no: 9 pp. 1-4.

Table 4.5

World and People	◆ Primitive America Shot in Tennessee and the mountains of the Carolinas. The oldest natives of America live there in primitive conditions. ◆ Finland Progresses Contemporary Finland, its various industries, and sports. Soviet Russian invasion and the treaty that followed. ◆ New York: City of Wonders ◆ Rome: Old and New ◆ O, Beautiful Paris: Life in the Most Attractive city of the World.
Examination of Nature	◆ Animal Aristocracies Images of rare Alpinos and beautiful birds and animals. ◆ Gluttonous Insects and Plants Carnivore plants and animals. ◆ A Day at the Zoo ◆ Our Strange Animal Friends ◆ Microbiological Examination
Science and Industry	◆ Einstein's Relativity Theory ◆ Experiences in Physics ◆ The Chemistry of Fire ◆ Traveling to the Planets
Actuality	◆ Bombs on Europe ◆ War in France ◆ War in Europe ◆ World Exhibition in New York

Table 4.5

Religious Films	◆ Religious Drama: The Life of Christ ◆ The Coronation of Pope Pius XII
Films on Sports	◆ Winter Sports ◆ 1939 Sports ◆ Water Sports ◆ 1936 Olympics
Health	◆ Food 101 ◆ Learning at an Early Age ◆ Mosquitos ◆ The Common Cold
Children Films	◆ Christmas Eve ◆ Hansel and Gretel

According to Malik, educational films on other cultures, races, geographies, and animals are useful and important for child development. The films above could not be purchased due to the wartime foreign currency politics of the Ministry of Economy. The Ministry asked that the method of clearing be used so that no foreign currency would be needed. Since it was not possible, the purchase was not completed.³⁶¹

As part of a project of the DGPI, 5,500 boxes of educational/informative films were transferred to the DGPI from the archives of Ministry of Education in 2015. The question how this cultural heritage – which requires expertise and attention – will be classified, categorized, and opened to researchers and the public remains open.

361 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Directorate General of Transactions, Cat. no: 030 10, Box no: 143 Folder no: 26 Row no: 9 pp. 1-4.

Malik suggests where these kinds of films could be screened congruously with what actually happened. He thinks screening such films to peasants with small projectors will be effective. Malik also says that these projectors to be used by the village teacher or by the staff of People's Houses should work wirelessly. This type of projector – all 16mm – arrived in Turkey near the end of the 1940s. 16mm film stock was sold by Kodak as an alternative to the 35mm format starting in 1923. From 1935, it was used extensively and reached its peak after the Second World War. Malik claimed that educational films could not replace school lessons; however, educational films made by French or Soviet scientists would help students understand certain subjects better. Münir Hayri Egeli, in an article published in *Ülkü* magazine in 1936 articulated that school lessons be supported by scientific films, and he noted that in Germany, every school had a 16mm projector. Films were produced with taxes of 20 pfennig collected from each student.³⁶²

16mm films increased as the 1950s approached. Another establishment that appeared in those years was the “Turkish Cultural Film Company” (*Türk Kültür Film Ticaret Müessesesi*). This company located in Galata probably had an American partner or was the representative of an American company. Most of the films in the archive of this company were produced by the United States Information Agency (*Amerikan Haberler Bürosu*), which was probably one of the partners of the company. Considering that the United States Information Agency was in contact with the RPP, it is interesting that these films that were screened at People's Houses starting in 1945 were also in commercial circulation.

The company procured films and film equipment as well as carried out all kinds of import and export activities. In a booklet published by the company in 1948, the benefits of cultural films are advertised in short sentences. The booklet was published before a holiday, and it was noted that in order to celebrate the holiday with joy, one needed a cinema and electricity. The company was permitted to screen commercial films and advertisements throughout Anatolia using portable projectors. Anatolian-style cinema – in other words, 16mm projectors – removed the need for electricity, and the booklet mentions

362 Münir Hayri Egeli, “Sinema ve Eğitim”, *Ülkü*, vol. 6, no. 36, 1936, p. 428-430.

the films on their list are available for locations without electricity. The Anatolia style film projector (*Anadolu Tipi Sinema Makinesi*) and its generator costs 4,500 Turkish lira. The machines could work in theaters with a capacity of 1,500 people. They can work automatically, without a projectionist, for ten hours in villages, neighborhoods, and boroughs without electricity consuming half a liter of fuel per hour. The company's taglines for its 16mm projectors was: "Inexpensive – easy to set – no film burns – inexpensive machinery – no need for electricity – renting films are inexpensive – no need for projectionists – Anatolia reaches cinema and the filmmaker reaches comfort."³⁶³ It is known that Cultural Films Company rented out theaters of the People's Houses in Anatolia and organized cultural film screenings.³⁶⁴

Aside from selling and renting imported films, the company, aimed to send its staff throughout the country to shoot actuality films on important events, then brought these to everyone's homes. According to an order issued by the Ministry of Education on March 5, 1945, Kültür Film would show students beneficial films. These would be screened in theaters, gymnasiums, or performance halls at schools. The notice mandated that every school contact Kültür Film directly. In a letter sent to the General Secretariat of the RPP, Kültür Film estimated that there were between 30 and 60 thousand projectors in schools in the United States and their goal was to have at least one projector for every 200 students. Of course, behind Kültür Film's project to screen films for free in schools was an eventual purpose to sell projectors and films to these schools.³⁶⁵

Films screened by the People's Houses in villages were mostly screened with portable, 16mm projectors. To maintain connections with peasants in winter, the Village Development Branches of the People's Houses (*Halkevi Köycülük Şubeleri*) visited coffee shops mostly frequented by peasants in Ankara and screened films and organized conferences there. A report from the

363 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1208 Folder no: 8 Row no: 1 p. 6.

364 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 0 0, Box no: 1212 Folder no: 25 Row no: 2 p. 26.

365 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1208 Folder no: 8 Row no: 1 p. 2-10.

Ankara People's House states that "coffee shops were visited at night, and the portable projector of the committee and a magic lantern were used in conferences on various subjects."³⁶⁶

In this period, technical films sometimes came to Turkey through foreign companies operating in the country. In 1948, SKF Ball Bearings Turkish Limited Company (*SKF Bileli Rulmanları Türk Limited Şirketi*) shared two films with the General Secretariat of the RPP that advertise their own product for the purpose of screening them in People's Houses, art schools, and institutes.³⁶⁷

The most important subject of film propaganda is where and to whom films are screened. The next section analyzes where and how films were screened domestically and abroad.

§ 4.4 Propagandizing the Revolution Through Cinema: Reaching the Audience

Cinemas, like the city overall, were noisy, with people reading the subtitles aloud, standing up, walking out, stamping their feet to the musical score, or arguing with the main character. They were places where Istanbul's social classes could, in theory, come together.....In March 1928, three assistant prosecutors – Baha, Nesuhi, and Midhat – presented themselves at the Opera Cinema and demanded to be admitted, presumably free of charge, to the film then playing there. They further demanded to be seated in a box, the only location they believed appropriate to their position as government officials. The proprietor, Cevad, refused. All heated altercation ensued. The police were eventually called, and Cevad was arrested for insulting the prosecutors... The Istanbul press came to Cevad's defense... The next month, Cevad stood trial. Much to everyone's

366 Çakan, 2004, p. 212.

367 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 o o, Box no: 1213 Folder no: 28 Row no: 1 p. 7.

*surprise, he was acquitted... Cinema had become one of the republic's great equalizers.*³⁶⁸

4.4.1 *People's Houses and Beyond*

People's Houses were the focal point of state regime propaganda of the state between 1932 and 1946, and as such People's Houses must be considered as the main field for research in propaganda. The People's Houses acted as an orbit directly created by state; all of their activities – even their architecture – can be analyzed to understand propaganda. Sibel Bozdoğan notes that in the 1930s, the function of propaganda was apparent in the modernist aesthetic of People's Houses, schools, and galleries.³⁶⁹ Sırrı Gür, then Governor of Mersin, defined a People's House as “a national shrine that elevates emotions and expanded minds.”³⁷⁰

Propaganda films were mainly screened in People's Houses between 1932 and 1946. In this section I focus on the People's Houses' activities in the field of cinema and how these films were screened to public. There are two primary considerations with regard to the distribution and screening of films. First is that in this period, electricity was available only during specific hours or not at all in many regions of Anatolia. The second the target audience given that these films were mostly screened at People's Houses.

As mentioned in the 1935 Activity Report of the People's Houses, the RPP aimed to circulate appropriate films to disseminate the principles of the revolution and increase the cultural level of citizens. Films about industry, agriculture, health, and newsreels about national days and parades brought together students, peasants, and soldiers.³⁷¹

On February 15, 1940, an article published in *Tan* sourced by the AA stated:

The RPP has been aware of the importance of performance arts and cinema in the education of citizens since the beginning, as seen in the

368 King, 2014, pp. 158-159

369 Yeşilkaya, 1999, p. 110.

370 Yeşilkaya, 1999, p. 145.

371 “Filmlerle Telkin”, 1935 *Halkevleri*, p. 62.

People's Houses and the meeting and performance halls they established and furnished with cinema equipment. Film projectors that work with an engine were brought to villages without electricity; portable film theaters are set up. The Party considers at utmost importance that awareness raising and educational films should be screened as well as entertaining films.³⁷²

In the RPP's 1935 statute and platform many tools for propaganda are defined, and these were repeated in the 1939 and 1943 statutes. The main media of propaganda are listed as radio, cinema, conference, public orators, public speeches, newspapers and other publications, museums of the revolution, exhibitions, meetings, celebrations, entertainment, art, theater, and music.³⁷³ People's Houses were established in 1932. Activities in cinema were the responsibility of the Performances Branch in the People's Houses. This department's ultimate purpose was indoctrination and it would raise the cultural level of citizens through plays and film screenings organized in outdoor or enclosed stages.³⁷⁴ Such stages were used to propagandize the regime in line with the original mission of the People's Houses. However, in certain cases, propaganda was prioritized over art; indeed, the artistic aspects of the plays were ignored completely:

It was required for plays to be a useful medium of propaganda on national and social issues, and subjects were limited according to this purpose. Even though theaters in People's Houses were created as a medium of propaganda, it would be better to consider first its evolution as a medium and use it as such...³⁷⁵

Esra Dicle Başbuğ emphasized the same issue in her study examining the influence of theater in the People's Houses on the construction of Kemalist ideology:

372 Öztürk, 2005, p. 184.

373 *RPP Regulations 1939*, pp. 13-14, *RPP Platform 1939*, p. 22.

374 Azcan, 2003, p. 29.

375 "Halkevleri Sahnelerinin Gayeleri", *Konuşmalar*, Broşür I, p. 135.

Medium-specific features of plays such as technics, aesthetics, montage, and staging were ignored, and they were used for their efficient and prompt reach, their function to convey the discourse of the rulers to people, their powerful qualities as propaganda, and intense romanticism imbued in their content and style. Therefore, plays written in those days have relatively little value other than reflecting the ideology of the period.³⁷⁶

In the period under examination, illiteracy rates were high. The 1927 census shows that literacy was not even 10 percent.³⁷⁷ Süreyya (İlmen) Pasha,³⁷⁸ the owner of the Süreyya Opera Hall in Kadıköy and a parliamentarian, proposed legislation to decrease taxes on theater owners, claiming that cinema plays a more significant role in language reform than the press. According to İlmen, newspapers reach 40-50 thousand people a day, but cinema reaches half a million people and ensures that the masses are exposed to the new alphabet.³⁷⁹ Under these circumstances, public speech, performance arts, and cinema are considered more direct forms of media than newspaper or books.

The Performances Branch organized film screenings in the People's Houses, villages, boroughs, coffee shops, and open air spaces. Articles 43 to 52 in the RPP ordinance on People's Houses concern the Performances Branch. Screenings of films held by the party were realized in People's Houses or in alternate locations with the coordination and appraisal of the People's Houses.

People's Houses were not responsible for film production. Their role was to make sure films procured by the government or the board of directors of the center reached citizens. Among limited exceptions are films produced by the Ankara People's House,³⁸⁰ which had its own technical equipment and a cinema official, Kenan Erginsoy. Young members were filming national

376 Başbuğ, 2013, p. 20.

377 Çakan, 2004, p. 18.

378 On August 12, 1930 İlmen became a member of Liberal Republican Party and used his films for LRP's propaganda activities.

379 Çakan, 2004, p. 33.

380 In 1934, the Elazığ People's House owned a camera as well, which was used to film places worth seeing in the surrounding areas. *Halkevlerinin 1934 Senesi Faaliyet Raporları Hulasası* (Ankara: Ulus Basımevi, 1935), p. 132.

days.³⁸¹ As an example of its cinematic activities, a 1,250-meter film produced in 1936 uses the example of the Ankara People's House to show how a People's House functions, and the report of the Ankara People's House states that young members of the center acted in the film.³⁸² In 1939, the Ankara People's House also produced a three-minute long film on preparing winter clothes for soldiers.

Article 49 states that contingent on the approval of the General Secretariat, People's Houses could own immovable or portable projectors. The main necessity for screening films was a projector. Only after a year the People's Houses were established, parliamentarians from Konya and Giresun, Kazım Hüsnü and Tarık Us, respectively proposed legislation to equip People's Houses with projectors and other necessities to "diffuse certain ideas and opinions" that would "enlighten and guide" citizens. According to Hüsnü and Us, the importance of radio and cinema hardware in the diffusion and dissemination of ideas was undeniable. They suggested exemptions on customs taxes for radio and cinema equipment in the same proposal.³⁸³ In 1933, new legislation exempted radio and cinema hardware imported for use by People's Houses from customs and other such taxes.³⁸⁴ In 1935, the same exemption was applied to cars and vans furnished with such equipment.³⁸⁵ Trade of these machines was made by companies like Bourla Biraderler, located in Istanbul, who were also in radio device business.

The purchase of film equipment was a significant event in that period. In 1935, the purchase of film equipment for Galatasaray High School, the Military Academy, and the Military High School made the news.³⁸⁶ In 1937, a report probably written by the sound specialist of the Party, Necdet Yula, stated that

381 "Filmlerle Telkin", 1935 *Halkevleri*, pp. 62-63.

382 *Ankara Halkevi Bir Yıl İçinde 384793 Yurddaşı Çatısı Altında Topladı* (Ankara People's House Gathered 384793 Citizens Under its Roof in a Year) pp. 29-30.

383 Öztürk, 2005, p. 181.

384 "Halkevleri için İthal Olunacak Radyo ve Sinema Makinelerinin Muamele Vergisi ile Gümrük ve Oktrova Resimlerinden İstisnası Hakkında Kanun", *Düstur* (Code of Law), Üçüncü Ter-tib, vol. 14 (Ankara: Başvekalet Matbaası, 1933), p. 496.

385 TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Term 5, Vol. 5, Conclusion 43, October 11, 1935, p. 70.

386 Gökmen, 1989, p. 141.

there were thirteen film projectors in a total of 167 People's Houses. Nine of these accommodated sound (those in Adana, Adapazarı, Ankara, Balıkesir, Diyarbakır, Elazığ, Kastamonu, Mardin, and Zonguldak) and four were for silent films (those in Çankırı, Edremit, Siirt, and Sinop). Thirty-three People's Houses had sound projectors that belonged to private individuals.³⁸⁷

The party never undertook the purchase a projector for every People's House. Projectors were purchased on behalf of specific houses, and others were left to purchase projectors if their own budgets allowed.³⁸⁸ When it was necessary to purchase a projector for a People's House, a commission consisting of an engineer from the TP, the cinema official from the Ankara People's House, the cinema official from the party and a soldier from the Science and Art Department of the Ministry of National Defense (*Milli Müdafaa Vekaleti Fen ve Sanat Şubesi*) gathered and proposals were evaluated based on defined specifications.³⁸⁹

The General Secretariat of the RPP sent a letter to the İpekçi brothers on March 9, 1940, that noted that there were film projectors in thirty-six People's Houses at the time:³⁹⁰

- ◆ Ankara
- ◆ Sivas
- ◆ Erzurum
- ◆ Elazığ
- ◆ Muş
- ◆ Siirt

387 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1221 Folder no: 56 Row no: 2 p. 22.

388 In 1941, Turkish Philips Limited Company (Türk Philips Limited Şirketi) could not collect a debt of 45 Turkish lira from the Artvin People's House and issued a formal complaint to the General Secretariat of RPP. The General Secretariat ordered the People's House in question to immediately pay the amount since the "name and honor" of People's Houses was of utmost importance. Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 01, Box no: 1216 Folder no: 40 Row no: 1 p. 5.

389 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1223 Folder no: 61 Row no: 1 p. 5.

390 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1214 Folder no: 32 Row no: 1 p. 46.

- ◆ Mardin
- ◆ Van
- ◆ Ağrı (Karaköse)
- ◆ Artvin
- ◆ Trabzon
- ◆ Bayburt
- ◆ Bolu
- ◆ Zonguldak
- ◆ Yozgat
- ◆ Sungurlu (Çorum)
- ◆ Gaziantep
- ◆ Konya
- ◆ Adana
- ◆ Afyonkarahisar
- ◆ Dinar (Afyonkarahisar)
- ◆ Uşak
- ◆ Kula
- ◆ İzmir
- ◆ Aydın
- ◆ Nazilli (Sümerbank Factory)
- ◆ Balıkesir
- ◆ Bandırma
- ◆ Bursa
- ◆ Çankırı
- ◆ Kastamonu
- ◆ Sinop
- ◆ Ayancık (Sinop)
- ◆ Kadıköy (Istanbul)
- ◆ Edirne
- ◆ Diyarbakır

Archival documents indicate that there were projectors in another eight centers, as well, by 1940:³⁹¹

391 Çakan, 2004, p. 297.

- ◆ Ödemiş
- ◆ Samsun
- ◆ İzmit (Portable projector)
- ◆ Malatya (via theater of the Malatya Fabric and Thread Factories)
- ◆ Edremit (via contract with an independent theater)
- ◆ Tokat³⁹²
- ◆ Bingöl
- ◆ Bitlis

An article in *Ulus* on February 25, 1940, states that in 1940 there were twenty-two sound and eleven silent projectors in a total of 519 People's Houses, but the information in this article seems erroneous based on screening information in the archives and the reports of People's Houses.³⁹³

The Malatya and Edremit People's Houses did not have their own cinema equipment however, they made use of other film theaters in the city free of charge. Correspondence by the Edremit People's House in May 1935 notes that there was no cinema system in the People's House, but "one of the most valuable members" of the house owned a theater in town and had agreed to screen "taming" films without charging a fee.³⁹⁴

By 1945, the number of projectors had moderately increased; it is reported that there were 35mm sound projectors in forty-four People's Houses and measures were being taken to increase this number.³⁹⁵ Other sources in the archives suggests that film projectors did not have sound equipment at first, but that these were turned into sound projectors in time.

In 1947, a list prepared by the RPP states that there were projectors in forty-nine People's Houses including the following People's Houses that had acquired projectors since 1940:³⁹⁶

392 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 01, Box no: 1207 Folder no: 2 Row no: 1 p. 30.

393 Öztürk, 2005, p. 200.

394 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1211 Folder no: 22 Row no: 1 p. 71.

395 *C.H.P. 1945 Yılında Halkevi ve Halkodaları*, p. 15.

396 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 01, Box no: 1222 Folder no: 59 Row no: 1 p. 1.

- ♦ Antakya
- ♦ Antalya (Serik)
- ♦ Bartın
- ♦ Çankırı
- ♦ Eminönü (Istanbul)
- ♦ Gelibolu
- ♦ Isparta
- ♦ Kars (İğdır)
- ♦ Kastamonu
- ♦ Kütahya
- ♦ Maraş

DGP correspondence suggests that there was cinema equipment in the following People's Houses by 1947,³⁹⁷ as well, bringing the number up to 55:

- ♦ Fatih
- ♦ Muğla
- ♦ Ordu
- ♦ Kırşehir
- ♦ Kayseri
- ♦ Mudurnu

Article 51 of the ordinance on the RPP People's Houses lists the categories of films that could be screened at People's Houses as: films sent directly by the RPP, films sent directly by the government, films procured by the Board of Directors of the People's Houses. Films outside the limits defined in Article 51 could not be screened without approval by the General Secretariat of the RPP.

³⁹⁸

Distinguishing between films sent by the RPP and by the government seems superfluous, but the distinction is probably between films produced by the RPP and films owned by the various ministries. "Films procured by the

397 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 o o, Box no: 1213 Folder no: 28 Row no: 1 p. 64.

398 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 oo, Box no: 1208 Folder no: 8 Row no: 1 p. 57.

Board of Directors of People's Houses" are films purchased from private companies or provided by foreign missionaries and other such establishments.

On September 29, 1939, the president of the Bursa People's House wrote to the General Secretariat of the RPP, saying:

We have purchased a sound and portable film projector. The purpose behind this purchase is to screen cultural films and to be of service to all citizens in the villages and the city. We heard that the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare and the Ministry of Agriculture own many such films and we have occasionally issued official requests. We have heard that you hold such films, too. To benefit fully from our new machinery, we kindly ask your help in acquiring films both from you and from these ministries...³⁹⁹

In response to this request made in April 1940, the General Secretariat of the RPP lent the People's House in Bursa two films for two weeks. However, this did not satisfy the enthusiasm of the Bursa People's House. On September 19, 1940, its president, Tevfik Ayca, again sent a letter to the General Secretariat:

We are organizing open air screenings with our sound film projector. Thousands of people come to these events held on the avenue in front of our building. Since there is no chance of acquiring commercial cultural films, I kindly ask you to send us existing films as soon as possible...⁴⁰⁰

Three more films were sent from the General Secretariat of the RPP to Bursa. The film resources of the RPP were restricted: it sent copies of films it had produced to the People's Houses; however, copies in its possession were limited. It is unclear why it did not purchase cultural films from abroad and distribute them. Ministries in the government imported films that objectively to their own fields. The main purpose of the General Secretariat of the RPP was

399 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 100, Box no: 1207 Folder no: 3 Row no: 1 p. 9.

400 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 100, Box no: 1207 Folder no: 3 Row no: 1 p. 1.

to reach the public, ensure the continuity of the regime, and legitimize its political, economic, and social actions. These purposes could not be met through imported films. The party needed to produce and distribute films that reinforced its own politics. However, it did not have the necessary staff or technical infrastructure to develop and increase production. Furthermore, imports were difficult due to the lack of foreign currency; bartering or clearing method was preferred to purchase.

In the 1940s, the party started to send films in specially-made boxes cryptically with code words such as “Maria”, “Clara”, “Cacao”, “Paris”, “Chile”, and “Malta”. The fact that the number of films was limited led to the creation of a systematic network between the General Secretariat and the People’s Houses. Correspondence among the General Secretariat and the People’s Houses show how many films were sent, for how long, and to where the film would be transported after its screening. At every stage of the process, the People’s Houses informed the General Secretariat of the RPP and followed-up on the whereabouts of the copies.

The Chief of Eighth Bureau, C. K. İncedayı, sent a letter in 1940 to Vehbi Okay, cinema official of the RPP, requesting that they number each copy of a film, order them, note these in the necessary documents, and send them to the film transportation department. Though their number and circulation was limited, organizing the transportation of films took considerable time of the General Secretariat of the RPP.

Films were not forced on the People’s Houses by the RPP. People’s Houses were eager to screen films and used them as an instrument to draw people in. In 1936, the president of the Aydın People’s House wrote to the General Secretariat to request films and pointed out that citizens watched the films with great interest. He “begged” the Party “not to spare them” of the new films they were making.⁴⁰¹ In 1938, many People’s Houses acquired projectors and issued regular requests to the General Secretariat of the RPP for films. The General

401 Prime Ministry’s Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People’s Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1213 Folder no: 39 Row no: 1 p. 66.

Secretariat informed them that the distribution of films was being made in sequence and that all requests were duly registered.⁴⁰²

It is not possible to measure actual circulation of the films from archival documents. However, it is obvious that when a People's House possessed a theater and film projector, films sent by the party did not meet their needs. Even though they had a silent film projector and a theater, the Bolu People's House had trouble finding films in 1934 and requested films from the General Secretariat of the RPP, the Turkish Red Cross, the Child Protection Agency, and various other ministries.⁴⁰³

In 1938, the Minister of Internal Affairs wrote a letter to the Minister of the Economy, Şakir Kesebir, saying that they had procured films with their own means "to screen in 200 People's Houses scattered throughout the country, which are the main gathering point for all citizens and especially for young people." He added they that he had heard that the Ministry of the Economy held films, as well, and asked it to share these films.⁴⁰⁴ It appears even though the single party managed to organize the mediums of public edification, it was insufficient in procuring films and therefore tried to procure films through different state institutions.

The same issue persisted in the ensuing years, as well. In 1946, a letter sent to the General Secretariat of the RPP explains that even though the Hopa People's House had a theater and film projector, their budget was insufficient and they could not rent films. Aside from the bimonthly films acquired by the Cultural Commission, they could not screen any films.⁴⁰⁵

Films made by the Directorate General of the Press were screened to citizens through the People's Houses, as well. In 1947, the General Secretariat of the RPP wrote to the DGPP suggesting that it regularly send films it had made

402 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 01, Box no: 1207 Folder no: 2 Row no: 1 pp. 1-34.

403 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 0 0, Box no: 1207 Folder no: 2 Row no: 2 p. 3.

404 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive.

405 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 01, Box no: 1216 Folder no: 40 Row no: 1 p. 1.

on domestic actuality to the forty-nine People's Houses that owned film projectors.⁴⁰⁶ Given that the DGP began making propaganda films in 1941, this suggestion was rather late. The DGPP informed the Secretariat that it was already sending films to twenty-one People's Houses and that it would add the others to its distribution list.

Article 52 of the RPP regulation on People's Houses states that films acquired according to the third issue of Article 51 could be accompanied by music or a play, and that these could be organized as social benefits. However, only twelve of these could be organized per year.

According to the Encyclopedia of Turkey, in the Republican Period, there were 7,850 film screenings at People's Houses between 1932 and 1940; meanwhile, 12,350 theater performances were staged in the same period.⁴⁰⁷ Some statistical data on films screened in People's Houses can be gleaned from reports of the People's Houses. According to a 1933 activity report, the Bilecik People's House opened an open air theater in the summer and screened scientific films for free. The same year, the Sivas People's House screened İpek Film's "A Nation Awakens."⁴⁰⁸ According to detailed activity reports and 1934, no film screenings were organized under the supervision of the Performances Branch, only play.

The number of films screened in People's Houses between 1935 and 1941 are as follow:⁴⁰⁹

Table 4.6

	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1941
Number of People's Houses (Number of People's Houses with Cinema technology) ⁴¹⁰	103	136	167	209	373	379	383

406 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 o o, Box no: 1213 Folder no: 28 Row no: 1 p. 66.

407 *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türkiye Ansiklopedisi*, vol. 4 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1983), p. 882.

408 *Halkevlerinin 1933 Senesi Faaliyet Raporları Hulasaları* (Ankara: Hakimiyeti Milliye Matbaası, 1934), p. 19.

409 Çakan, 2004, p. 297.

410 The approximate number of film screenings were extrapolated assuming that in those years approximately 40 People's Houses had a projector.

	1935	1936	1937	1938	1939	1940	1941
Number of Screened Films	636	713	910	1760	1855	1892	2100
Average Number of Films per People's House	16	18	23	44	46	47	53

In 1935, the Ankara People's House screened films on agriculture and health to 155 thousand citizens, and the Bursa People's House organized conferences with projections and film screenings for 4,510 citizens.⁴¹¹ A total of 148 thousand people participated in screenings of educational films organized by the Ankara People's House between 1935 and 1936, close to the total population of central Ankara at that time.⁴¹²

Another source states that the Bursa People's House organized seventy-five conferences that included film screenings between 1933 and 1938. 27,020 citizens participated in conferences dealing with such issues as health and agriculture.⁴¹³ In 1932, the Bursa People's House screened only one film watched by 500 people. The Bursa People's House would only organize one more screening – with the participation of 350 people – until 1938, when its activities in cinema took off.⁴¹⁴

In 1938, the Ankara People's House screened a total of forty-seven films. This number is a little over average. In 1939, a report written by the Ankara People's House states that in the seven years from 1932 to 1938, the Ankara People's House hosted 1,905,650 visitors. The number of those citizens who watched a film at the Ankara People's House between 1932 and 1938 are as follows:⁴¹⁵

411 Öztürk, 2005, p. 181.

412 *Ankara Halkevi Bir Yıl İçinde 300,000 Yurddaşı Çatısı Altında Topladı* (Ankara People's House Gathered 300,000 Citizens Under its Roof in a Year) p. 32.

413 Çakan, 2004, p. 296.

414 "Halkevine Faaliyetine Ait Resimler", *Uludağ*, (October, 18, 1938)

415 *Ankara Halkevi Bir Yıl İçinde 408,673 Yurddaşı Çatısı Altında Topladı* (Ankara People's House Gathered 408,673 Citizens Under its Roof in a Year) 1938- 1939, p. 51.

Table 4.7

1932	More than 5,000 people
1933	5,000 people
1934	Approximately 10,000 people
1935	85,000 people
1936	More than 125,000 people
1937	65,000 people
1938	Approximately 30,000 people

Data of Ankara People's House from 1940 states that a total of 120 gatherings were organized, of which seventy-nine were plays, eleven were marionette performances, eighteen were Karagöz performances, and twelve were film screenings. A total of 79,550 citizens participated.⁴¹⁶

A recurring theme in the 1934 report is that most People's Houses had a problem, which probably meant that they did not yet have an appropriate room and screen for film screenings. Large rooms were typically included in the plans of People's Houses to use for meetings, performances, and film screenings. There were usually a few multipurpose rooms in various sizes. In such rooms, performances were held, films were screened, and conferences, sports events, and entertainment was organized. If there was only one common room, it was designed with a flat floor without a slope so that any activity could be accommodated.⁴¹⁷ For example, in the Düzce People's House, there was a performance and conference hall with a capacity of 300.⁴¹⁸

Film screenings were not limited to conventional venues such as People's Houses, school buildings, and villages institutes; coffee shops and gardens were used, as well.⁴¹⁹ The state went beyond its own spaces and entered public

416 Çakan, 2004, p. 271.

417 Yeşilkaya, 1999, p. 158.

418 Yeşilkaya, 1999, p. 165.

419 *Ankara Halkevi Bir Yıl İçinde 408,673 Yurddaşı Çatısı Altında Topladı* (Ankara People's House Gathered 408,673 Citizens Under its Roof in a Year) 1938- 1939, p. 4, p.32.

space to educate its citizens. This is comparable to a public orator trained in s People's House suddenly standing on a chair and sharing his positive ideas about the regime and the party. The modern state was infused in spaces like coffee shops where people spent their free time. The people were entertained and educated on how to prevent malaria or how to raise healthy children. Taking cinema to the people with portable projectors was a cultural campaign.⁴²⁰

In the early 1930s, Kazım Dirik, Governor of İzmir, proposed an ideal village typology called the Kemalist Turkish Village, which included forty-nine structures and institutions. Fourth on the list was a village film theater, projector, and radio.⁴²¹ Dirik engaged in the preparation of a similar initiative, named the "Ideal Republican Village Project" (*İdeal Cumhuriyet Köyü Projesi*), during his General Inspectorship of Thrace. One of the project's objectives in the cultural field was to increase the knowledge, good manners (*görgü*) and joy of peasants via radio and mobile film screenings.⁴²²

In this period, capital cities had more film theaters; nonetheless, many small Anatolian towns do not have a present-day theater, had a film theater during that period. Some of these belonged to the army, to the People's Houses, or to municipalities, but most were private enterprises. Cinema was clearly not under the monopoly of the state.

Because screenings outside of theaters in gardens, coffee shops, and other public spaces were organized with portable projectors that did not need electricity or technicians, many people were reached. These 16mm film projectors that were so easy to use became iconic, popular machinery during the Second World War. Behiç Köksal, a projectionist during the Second World War, traveled around Adana and İskenderun with a 16mm projector and two films. Little was needed to organize a screening; a film projector, a powdered glass screen, a coffee shop, and an audience sufficed.

Portable cinema reached citizens in other cities, as well, even in early period of the Republic. According to an article published in *Milliyet* newspaper

420 Öztürk, 2010, p. 315.

421 Murat Yılmaz, "Recep Peker, CHF ve Bürokrasi: Kâzım Dirik Örnek Olayı Üzerinden "Parti-Devlet" Uygulaması ve "Faşist Proje", *Mete Tunçay'a Armağan*, ed. Mehmet Ö. Alkan, Tanıl Bora, Murat Koraltürk (İstanbul:İletişim Yayınları, 2007), p. 685.

422 Murat Burgaç, *Türkiye'de Umumi Müfettişliklerin Kurulması ve Trakya Umumi Müfettişliği* (Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi, 2013), p. 235.

on June 25, 1933, a retired aviator, Mr. Hayrūnnas, brought a portable film projector to Kars:

...This endeavor that had national propaganda purposes pleased the citizens of Kars. Thanks to this enterprising young person, the citizens of Kars watched their beloved Gazi and listened to his speech in his own precious voice that ignites souls. The speech of our Minister of Education on language reform interested the citizens. Many films are in the process of production: one that tells the story of the victory in Çanakkale, which is the result of Turkish heroism and power; films like *A Nation Awakens* that touches Turkish pride; and films on the importance of and progress in aviation.⁴²³

As in other similar studies on People's Houses, one of the main issues is to determine the audience that People's Houses actually reached. Architect Hasan Adil, who was one of the architects of People's Houses, says that they were not just education centers, but cultural centers that addressed the highest strata of society. The description of the target users of a building is important for an architect when designing. Adil says, "we placed a wide marquee on top of the entrance so that guests could enter without ruining their clothes, especially on rainy days." Neşe Yeşilkaya notes, the definition of guest does not recall the citizens of Zonguldak, but rather the guests of a ball at Ankara Palace.⁴²⁴ In the Yozgat People's House, participants were asked to wear tailcoats and tuxedos to the ball on seventeenth Republic Day.⁴²⁵ It is unclear question whether the audience of films in the People's Houses were from all strata or from among the elite?

In 1933, architect Abdullah Ziya wrote an article in *Ülkü* magazine describing an ideal village with an ideal space to watch films and plays and listen to radio in the town center. This space is formed like a "modern shrine" in Koza-noğlu's imagination, where villagers could socialize, read books, and watch

423 Çakan, 2004, p. 295.

424 Yeşilkaya, 1999, p. 140.

425 Yozgad (October 23, 1940) cited in İbrahim Erdal, *Yozgat Halkevi* (1932- 1951) (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 2013), p. 164.

films.⁴²⁶ The description “modern shrine” was made material in the architecture of the People’s Houses. As Governor of Adana e Like Tevfik Hadi Baysal emphasized at the opening of the Adana People’s House, the building was appropriately “a palace that unites people with love, increases citizens’ pure emotions and ideas, and attaches them to the regime.”⁴²⁷ On the other hand, İsmail Hakkı Baltacığlu criticized the Adana People’s House because it resembled a Greek temple; moreover, citizens were alienated by People’s Houses the architecture of which was influenced by cubism. In short, though the state designed People’s Houses as “modern temples”, it is a question whether citizens internalized this “temple” and incorporated it into their everyday lives.

The Edirne People’s House sent a letter to the General Secretariat of the RPP on December 13, 1940, complaining that they had not received any films in three months, adding that the center was already located in an undesirable part of the city. They needed films to lure citizens.⁴²⁸ A newspaper article from the period proves that even though they were perceived as elitist, People’s Houses played a role in reaching the masses. According to an article in *Yeni Köroğlu* newspaper on January 27, 1937, every fifteen days the Kayseri People’s House organized free screenings for women who had never watched a film in their lives and did not have the means to do so. Three hundred women were present at the first screening.⁴²⁹

Interest cinema was used to draw people from every strata to the People’s Houses, as expressed by the president of the Konya People’s House, Muhlis Koner, in 1943:

...We consider our center to be an institution that should act for the development of people from every strata rather than a private meeting point for intellectuals or an institution that promotes cultural activities for elites. For this purpose, we separated citizens in five groups and we gather each group once a week at the theater where we screen a film;

426 Öztürk, 2005, p. 189.

427 <http://v2.arkiv.com.tr/p6634-adana-halkevi-binasi-ve-parti-binasi.html>

428 Prime Ministry’s Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People’s Party, Cat. no: 490 01, Box no: 1207 Folder no: 5 Row no: 1 p. 1.

429 Öztürk, 2005, p. 183.

then a public speech occurs in a language they can understand; then we organize a folk music performance and a sports activity...⁴³⁰

The People's House had a good projector, but they needed educational films on social, agricultural, and medical issues.

It can be assumed that instead of plays and conferences that address people with higher education, actuality films on current events drew people to the People's Houses. Five propaganda films were screened four times to approximately 2 thousand people from Sinop's city center and surrounding villages.⁴³¹ The films were not just screened at the People's House, but also at the city *gazino* (public entertainment center). Upon request of the citizens, the Sinop People's House contacted film companies from Istanbul to organize weekly screenings, a development announced in *Diranaz*, the publication of the Sinop People's House, on March 1937.⁴³²

The president of the Siirt People's House wrote to the General Secretariat of the RPP on April 12, 1940, advising that three films sent by the party had been screened to citizens and students eight times. A total of 2,400 people – a rather higher number – had watched these films. The president, Zeki Ülke, ended his letter with these words:

I kindly ask you to allow the transfer of such films that develop the manners and cultural level of our neighborhood, increase the attachment to the government of the Republic of Turkey and reinforce the regime and ideals of our esteemed Party.⁴³³

The General Secretariat of the RPP sent three additional films in June 1940 and another five films on August 1, 1940, to be screened for three weeks each.⁴³⁴

430 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no:1213 Folder no: 29 Row no: 1 p. 46.

431 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 0 0, Box no: 1207 Folder no: 3 Row no: 2 p. 10.

432 Öztürk 2005, p. 183.

433 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1210 Folder no: 16 Row no: 1 p. 9.

434 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1210 Folder no: 16 Row no: 1 p. 5.

On which occasions and to whom such films were screened are clarified by news articles, memoirs, and People's House reports. The People's Houses did not wait for citizens to come to the center; they organized film screenings in various spaces on various occasions. As noted in various sources, the Ankara People's House sent young propagandists to major coffee shops in the city where they screened short films that were followed by public speeches.⁴³⁵ Here is how journalist N. Baydar recounts the organization at a coffee shop in which he participated:

It has been years since I stepped into a coffee shop... I accepted the invitation; however, I thought a conference supported by a film screening would only help empty the coffee shop... It was not easy to enter Hamdi and Şeriki's coffee shop located at Atpazarı Square. There were maybe a hundred or more people in the one hundred square meter room. They set the portable projector in a corner and a little white screen on a wall... Almost everyone at the coffee shop had regular hats and they were young. They seemed healthy and cheerful... They listened to the young speaker calmly and attentively: "Citizens, we come from the People's House. As the name suggests, the People's House is for the people. One of the useful activities of our Republican government was to establish People's Houses. Citizens, young people, in short everyone gathers in these places to study, read, teach, and to do good for our country. We are a branch of the People's House. Tonight we come to you to spend some fun and useful time. We will screen two films. One is on trees. The second film will show you the previous and current states of our town, Ankara. This transformation that surprises the whole world is proof of our Republican government's efforts..."⁴³⁶

According to a news article published in *Akşam* on January 13, 1933, the Bursa People's House went to coffee shops in Mudanya at night during Ramadan,

435 Sefa Şimşek, *Bir İdeolojik Seferberlik deneyimi: Halkevleri (1932-1951)* (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınevi, 2002), p. 120.

436 Çakan, 2004, p. 213.

announced the film screenings in Bursa, and transported people from the coffee shops to the film theaters. Another article in *Yeni Köroğlu* published on August 22, 1936, noted that there would be trucks equipped with a portable projector that would visit villages to show peasants films on agriculture.⁴³⁷

Another example from 1940 is a letter sent by the Bandırma People's House to the General Secretariat of the RPP. The vice-president of the Bandırma People's House announced that in order to prevent peasants who come a day early for the Thursday farmer's market from lingering in coffee shops, they are organizing "villager nights" on Wednesday nights. This demonstrates state's interest in people's leisure time. The state wanted to benefit from the peasants' one free night. On these nights, domestic and international news were broadcast through cinema – "a precious medium of culture." The vice-president of the People's House requested that the RPP send them new films in addition to the ones coming from Balıkesir People's House.⁴³⁸ On the other hand, the Balıkesir People's House screened films entitled *Gas and Protection from Gas* in addition to three films sent by the RPP for ten days – to women during the day and to men at night.⁴³⁹

In correspondence from the General Secretariat of the RPP to the presidents of the People's Houses in 1936, the General Secretariat asked Pe whether they have a radio and a piano. They further inquire whether pianos were grand or studio pianos. Beyond that, the letter inquired whether there was a theater, who ran the theater, and how films are procured.⁴⁴⁰ Ten years later, in 1947, the parliamentarian from Bingöl, Tahsin Banguoğlu, who was also a member of the RPP's General Administrative Board, again sent a questionnaire to the presidents of the People's Houses. This questionnaire forces a rethinking of the questionnaire mentioned above. Some of the questions included:⁴⁴¹

437 Öztürk, 2005, pp. 181- 182.

438 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 01, Box no: 1207 Folder no: 2 Row no: 1 p. 1.

439 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 01, Box no: 1207 Folder no: 2 Row no: 1 p. 6.

440 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 3 Folder no: 12 Row no: 1 p. 1.

441 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 7 Folder no: 37 Row no: 3 p. 1.

- ◆ What is the type, brand, and variety of your film projector?
- ◆ When and why did you buy your projector, and how much did it cost?
- ◆ Who runs the projector and is this person licensed?
- ◆ What is the capacity of your theater? Are there balconies, and what is the size of the screen?
- ◆ Does the electrical wiring of your city support your theater, or do you need fuel to run your projector?
- ◆ How do you procure films? Do you have a contract with a film company?
- ◆ How many film theaters are there in your town, and who do they belong to? Is there competition? How much does your theater make?
- ◆ Do you have a system for extinguishing fires?
- ◆ What do you think could be done to develop your film theater?

These questions lead to certain respective assumptions: Film projectors were not necessarily provided by the Party; some People's Houses had procured their own projectors. The question about procurement shows that in a late period like 1947, certain People's Houses had agreements with film companies to procure films besides those from the party or government. The fact that the status of the projectionist is requested emphasizes that cinema and electrical employees should have a license issued by a directorate under the Ministry of Public Works.⁴⁴² Inquiries with regard to fires points to the fact that us that 16 and 35mm films were nitrate based and could easily ignite.

The most interesting question concerns revenues and whether People's House theaters could compete with other town theaters. If what was meant by revenues was financial profit, that would imply that screenings in People's Houses were not free. However, for a People's House to convene a paid event was against its nature. The question concerning plans to develop the theater supports the idea that screenings were not complementary even though most documents state that screenings in People's Houses were free. The president of the Bandırma People's House sent a letter to the General Secretariat of the

442 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 o o, Box no: 1215 Folder no: 33 Row no: 2 p. 22.

RPP in April 1940 informing him that films sent by the party were being screened for fifteen days to citizens, soldiers, and students for free.⁴⁴³

The purpose of having film theaters in People's Houses was to show citizens educational and technical films for free. In late 1939, there was an issue on this matter in Trabzon. The owners of the Sümer and Yıldız theaters, two of the most important venues in the city, contacted the General Secretariat of the RPP claiming that the Trabzon People's House was organizing paid film screenings. Instead of screening "distinguished films to enlighten citizens", the Trabzon People's House screened Westerns and adventure films and audiences were charged. Furthermore, it was also collecting money for cultural film screenings and announced its shows with public speakers. Private theaters could not compete and private entrepreneurs had a hard time bringing in enough revenue given that there was unfair competition. Their last resort was to contact the party. The General Secretariat warned the RPP's General Administrative Board in Trabzon and asked for further information on the issue.⁴⁴⁴

In the 1940s, cinema livened up and film requests to the RPP increased. The president of the Çankırı People's House sent a letter to the General Secretariat of the RPP in March 1940 to inform it that a schedule of screenings had been announced to its citizens. The People's House requested that the RPP send films regularly. According to the schedule, free film screenings for citizens will occur on Saturday, Sunday, Monday, and Tuesday evenings. If the electricity was working, there would be additional screenings for students on Saturdays and Sundays at noon, otherwise screenings for students would take place on two remaining nights other than mentioned above. It had decided to screen every film at least fifteen times. Citizens had to go to the People's House on the day of the screening between 3 and 4 p.m. to get an entrance card.⁴⁴⁵

443 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 01, Box no: 1207 Folder no: 2 Row no: 1 p. 11.

444 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 0 0, Box no: 1219 Folder no: 51 Row no: 3 pp. 1-23.

445 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 0 0, Box no: 1207 Folder no: 3 Row no: 2 p. 6.

Many People's House theaters were inactive due to lack of film, even though they owned a projector. Consequently, some intended to screen feature films. Under these conditions, the party had to effectively procure films for the People's Houses, since they perceived cinema as a tool to educate citizens.⁴⁴⁶ In July 1941, the President of the Ağrı People's House explained that the city's entertainment was feeble; even though it had owned a film projector for two years, it had only screened three films thus far and was thinking about acquiring twelve films each year from outside sources as a non-profit organization. The reason the Party did not send films to the Ağrı People's House was that after screenings were completed, it did not return the films in a timely manner. The party informed the Ağrı People's House that if it preserved the films and returned them on time, the party would send more films; furthermore the People's House could contact Kemal Film, İpek Film, and Lale Film in Istanbul to procure other films.⁴⁴⁷

Even though there were a limited number of such instances, the party screened films that would attract people to the People's Houses, be interesting for people from all strata of society – aside from educational or actuality films. Archival documents suggests that the party wished to screen the film *Victim of Lust* (*Şehvet Kurbanı*) made by İpek Film in 1940 three times each in thirty-six People's Houses with a film projector. *Victim of Lust* was a popular Turkish film adapted from a German film, and the lead actors were Muhsin Ertuğrul and Cahide Sonku. When the film was screened, theaters with capacities of 1,500-2,000 would fill up and additional people would be left waiting outside.⁴⁴⁸ İpek Film replied to the request of the General Secretariat saying that they already had contracts with commercial theaters in eighteen of the thirty-six cities; however, they could send the film to the People's Houses located in the remaining eighteen cities.⁴⁴⁹ In the end, the fee requested by İpek Film was

446 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 01, Box no: 1214 Folder no: 32 Row no: 1 p. 74.

447 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 0 0, Box no: 1215 Folder no: 33 Row no: 2 p. 28.

448 Karagözoğlu, 2004, p. 52.

449 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1214 Folder no: 32 Row no: 1 p. 43.

too high for the party, and it's informed İpek Film that it would not be leasing the film.⁴⁵⁰

Upon request, the party allowed screenings of their films in external venues. The film "New Turkey"⁴⁵¹ made by the party was screened at the Ferah Theater in Şehzadebaşı in February 1939. Upon the request of the owner of the Ferah, the General Secretariat sent the copy used by Ulus Theater to Istanbul for a while.⁴⁵² Between 1940 and 1942, the RPP sent films to the Military Academy to be screened to students.⁴⁵³ In 1945, the Sümer Sports and Youth Club in Kayseri, which was affiliated with Sümerbank, informed the party that it wished to screen some of the party's films to 3,000 workers and officials at the factory. It was decided to send two films per week to the club.⁴⁵⁴

With the beginning of the Second World War, the People's Houses were having more and more issues finding films and wished to rent out their theaters annually or daily. The fact that in many regions electricity worked only during certain periods of the day affected theaters negatively. Even though they had a projector, the Bingöl People's House could not screen any films during that period. In 1944, The Chief of Fourth Bureau, Cevat Dursunoğlu, suggested paid screenings in People's Houses in order to enliven the cinemas.⁴⁵⁵ In 1945, the governor of Afyon suggested renting the People's House

450 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1214 Folder no: 32 Row no: 1 p. 40.

451 It is known that this film was shot by an American director in 1938. Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 01, Box no: 1214 Folder no: 32 Row no: 1 p. 21.

452 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1208 Folder no: 8 Row no: 1 p. 78.

453 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 01, Box no: 1214 Folder no: 32 Row no: 1 ps. 13, 22.

454 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1208 Folder no: 10 Row no: 3 pp. 2-5.

455 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1222 Folder no: 60 Row no: 1 p. 25.

theater to a private entrepreneur and donating the revenues to Child Protection Agency.⁴⁵⁶

The increase in such requests indicates a distress caused by the inability to fully exploit the theater, especially in cities where there was no theater other than the one at the People's House. The 1946 People's Houses report notes that an amendment to the Regulation of People's Houses Administration and Organization allowed People's Houses to organize paid public balls, school shows, visits, concerts, performances, sports competitions, and film screenings provided they spend the proceeds to fund their, free public services.⁴⁵⁷

As the 1950s approached, the RPP began searching for new films. On December 16, 1947, it sent a letter to major film companies such as Halil Kamil Film, Lale Film, Kemal Film, and Seyhan Film that communicated its wish to screen films from the archives of these companies in the People's Houses.⁴⁵⁸ The replies indicate that these companies leased films to most People's Houses. If a film company had a contract with a private theater in a given town, second-run or later screenings were organized at the People's Houses.

A circular numbered 8/2896 dated November 27, 1948, describes the conditions under which theaters and gardens of the People's Houses could be rented out. That month, the Ağrı People's House's theater, coffee place, and garden was leased to a member of the RPP.⁴⁵⁹ Increasing requests prompted this circular. In 1948, for example, the Bartın People's House's projector was rented out, but an article in the contract ensured that films sent to the People's House by the RPP or other institutions, would be screened for free.⁴⁶⁰ Yet it was accepted from the beginning that the People's Houses' theaters were not permitted to be run by the party or the house even though it would bring in

456 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1222 Folder no: 60 Row no: 1 p. 23.

457 *1946 Yılında Halkevleri ve Halkodaları* (Ankara, 1947), pp. 4-5.

458 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1213 Folder no: 28 Row no: 1 p. 4.

459 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1215 Folder no: 33 Row no: 2 p. 5.

460 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1213 Folder no: 28 Row no: 1 p. 62.

revenues.⁴⁶¹ With the increase in the number of People's Houses and the end of the single-party regime, People's Houses extended their mission of being hearths of the revolution providing free services to citizens, and they turned into business entities that had to be managed.

Başbuğ emphasizes a similar issue in a study of plays in the People's Houses. With the economic hardships of Second World War, and the dynamics of transition to a multi-party system, she notes that the party's organic ties weakened and its influence over the people diminished.⁴⁶² As various examples in the third chapter demonstrated, there was a loss of the enthusiasm that had started in 1932 and continued up until the war. The motivation to spread the ideology of the revolution had withered away. Ultimately, by 1948, managing and financing 469 People's Houses⁴⁶³ and 4,261 People's Rooms and producing programs to interest interest citizens had become impossible.

This situation resulted in a decrease of interest in People's Houses and even reaction to the People's Houses, especially given social and economic conditions at the end of war. As mentioned in the third chapter, dentist Celâl Maral, a member of the RPP, wrote an evaluation of propaganda activities after the 1946 elections. In his analysis, Maral claimed visits of the Performances Branch of People's Houses to villages had had negative instead of positive effects. The people needed doctors, judges, nurses, lawyers, and teachers, and in a period characterized by a shortage of fuel and tires, these visits caused dismay. Even though Maral's evaluation was subjective, it had some truth to it. Film activities took off in 1934, and the people's reception to such activities was different before the war. Everyone was curious about this art and technology that was completely new to them.⁴⁶⁴

461 The renting of the Adapazarı People's House theater to Nazım and Adnan Turgut, owners of Yeni Sinema, drew a reaction from the people, as noted in *Ada Postası* newspaper in 1948. The Turgut brothers rented the unused theater and reopened it. As suggested by the mayor of Afyon, the first night's revenues were donated to the Child Protection Agency. Kenan Olgun, *Yöresel Kalkınmada Adapazarı Halkevi* (Istanbul: Değişim Yayınları, 2008), p. 146.

462 Başbuğ, 2013, p. 294.

463 *1947 Yılında Halkevleri ve Halkodaları* (Ankara: Ulus Basımevi, 1948), p. 25.

464 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Cat. no: 490 01, Box no: 572 Folder no: 2277 Row no: 1 pp. 1-16.

The People's Houses were not the only cinema venues in many locales. But during the single-party regime the government used the People's Houses to show the people the films it had produced and probably reached a considerable audience. The popularity of cinema as a new medium was undeniable. Mobile film screenings outside the People's Houses ensured a larger and more varied audience.

Through various media, citizens were exposed to films, newsreels, magazines, and other publications not produced by the state. Aside from imported educational and technical films, propaganda films produced by the party itself were few; there were approximately 240 films were produced by the Directorate General of the Press and the General Secretariat of the RPP combined. The number of films shared with citizens was augmented with films purchased or procured from abroad. During the Second World War, the party experienced difficulties inspecting the films screened at the People's Houses. As tackled in the fifth chapter, the RPP was sensitive about films that the People's Houses screened without party's permission during the Second World War, worrying that these could damage the delicate balance of politics.

Films owned by the single-party regime were distributed for all occasions for years. Aside from domestic target audiences, propaganda films targeted foreign audiences, as well. The state was active in the screening of films produced by the party or the DGP abroad and intervened in the making of films by foreign film producers in Turkey.

4.4.2 *Foreign Public*

In the first years of the Republic, Turkey benefited from the experience of other countries in the field of cinema. The most concrete evidence of collaboration with other countries was the reciprocal treaty with the Soviet Union regarding the exchange of non-propaganda films. The Soviet Union had progressed in cinema much more than Turkey. Many who worked in the field of cinema in that period – such as Abidin Dino, Muhsin Ertuğrul, Nazım Hikmet Ran – received part of their education in cinema in the Soviet Union. These Soviet-trained artists were influenced by the idea that art should be used for the benefit of the revolution. Muhsin Ertuğrul shared his impressions on and admiration of the Soviet Union in *Vakit* newspaper: “Just next to us in the east

is a civilized nation... We have to get to know Soviet Russians, especially through Soviet scientists and artists, not through concocted news of sell-out European film companies.”⁴⁶⁵

On July 28, 1926, the treaty on the exchange of non-propaganda films between the Soviet Union and Turkey was accepted by the Prime Ministry.⁴⁶⁶ There were certain motivations behind the Soviet Union’s proposal. Foremost, if such a collaboration were brought to fruition, the Soviet Union could learn about current events in the east not from European sources but from an eastern source; Turkey. The Soviet Union was eager to help Turkey make of these films.⁴⁶⁷ This would be propaganda that Turkey would benefit from. If the Soviet Union distributed these films, Europeans would be exposed to the Turkish revolution as well. Moreover, the Soviet Union was not only planning to distribute films sent from Turkey, it would make films on subjects approved by Turkey and distribute these, as well.⁴⁶⁸

The film *Ankara Is the Heart of Turkey* (*Ankara Türkiye’nin Kalbidir*) was made in the Soviet Union under the auspices of this treaty and handed over to Turkey in 1934. The film was directed and edited by Sergei Yutkevich and Leo Arnshtam. It was distributed in the Soviet Union, as well, to celebrate the Turkish-Soviet relationship. Soviet cinema in the 1930s was focused on making films depicting Lenin as the founder of the new order. In the film *Ankara Is the Heart of Turkey*, Atatürk was the principal actor, and the speech he gave at the tenth anniversary celebration of the Republic was incorporated uncut.⁴⁶⁹ The film began with a public speech by İsmet İnönü recorded solely for this film. Because İnönü emphasized Soviet-Turkish friendship in this speech, this part was censored when the film was screened later on. Given the popularity of *Ankara Is the Heart of Turkey*, another film on the Turkish revolution was made in the Soviet Union.⁴⁷⁰ Entitled *Progressive Action in the Turkish Revolution* (*Türk İnkılabında Terakki Hamleleri*), this film was made by the famous female documentarian Ester Shub in cooperation with Kemal Necati Çakuş,

465 Çakan 2004, p. 43.

466 Öztürk, 2005, p. 42.

467 Öztürk, 2005, p. 46.

468 Öztürk, 2005, pp. 40-41.

469 Tacibayev, 2004, pp. 209-210.

470 Özön, 1995, p. 286.

the official responsible for cinema in the RPP. The making of the film lasted from 1934 to 1937. An article published in *Cumhuriyet* on February 12, 1937, depicts the atmosphere in which this film was made:

Recently, Germans filmed *Victory of Perseverance* to depict the new spirit Hitler has created in Germany; Italians filmed *Black Shirts* to demonstrate the success of fascism; Soviets filmed *Hundred Days of Storm* to revitalize the Soviet Russian Revolution; Greeks filmed *26-Years Old Greece* and Bulgarians began filming *70-Years Old Bulgaria*. Even though our revolution was better than most, we still do not have a film about it...⁴⁷¹

On May 1, 1932, İnönü was present at the celebrations in Red Square. İnönü and the delegation were welcomed warmly by the Soviets. Alaettin Cemil (Topçuoğlu), an MP from Istanbul and a member of the delegation, exclaimed the recent friendship between two countries that had been fighting for centuries. It was due to the political genius of nationalist Turkish authorities and the Bolsheviks. In his article in *Cumhuriyet*, Alaettin Cemil said these countries how similar feelings toward common enemies, which desired to see them iced.

⁴⁷² The visit by a group of thirty dignitaries between April 16 and May 8, 1932, was filmed by Soviets and screened at the People's Houses. The film entitled *What did İsmet Pasha See in the Soviet Russia? (İsmet Paşa Rusya'da ne gördü?)*, was criticized by Mr. Rahmi – a member of the control committee – because he reckoned it could be perceived as communist propaganda. According to Mr. Rahmi the flags, banners, and hats with the hammer and sickle symbol at the official parade were too visible; screening the film in cosmopolitan Istanbul could result in misunderstandings. However, the Premiership read the evaluation of the committee and decided the film could be screened.⁴⁷³

In 1934, Soviet filmmakers invited to Turkey by Atatürk screened *The Leaders of Bourgeoning Komsomol (Komsomol-Şef Elektrofikasti)* to Atatürk and other members of the government. The film concerned the contribution

471 “Milli bir film: Türk İnkılabında Terakki Hamleleri”, *Cumhuriyet* (12.02.1937), p. 7.

472 Alaettin Cemil, “Bir Yıldönümü, Bir Dostluk Hatırası”, *Cumhuriyet* (1 May 1933), p. 1.

473 Çakan, 2004, p. 291.

of the Communist Party's youth division – the Komsomol – to the revolution. After this visit, Abidin Dino went to the Soviet Union upon the invitation of Yutkevitch to be trained in art direction.⁴⁷⁴

In the period concerned, the main target of films made by the General Secretariat of the RPP, the DGP, and other institutions was citizens of the Republic of Turkey. However, politicians and intellectuals who espoused the benefits of these films always suggested that one of the purposes of making these films was to publicize Turkish reforms to the world. It is thus meaningful to analyze how, with which media, and to whom films were screened abroad.

The first document that illuminates this subject dates back to February 15, 1931: a letter sent to the Prime Ministry by the Minister of the Economy. The letter communicates that embassies are requesting films that show events in the country and have a propaganda quality. The National Geographic Society in the United States requested a promotional film on progress made in various fields in Turkey to screen at a conference entitled New Turkey to take place on September 9, 1931. Since the party only began making films in 1934, the only film that had been made was by Fox on the Atatürk Forest and Farm. Since this film was not approved by Atatürk himself, they could send no film to screen at the conference.⁴⁷⁵ Afterwards, the Minister of the Economy asked for all ministries to become involved in this matter to take advantage of such opportunities in the future.⁴⁷⁶

Certain foreign companies were applying to make promotional films on Turkey. Because the budgets were high, none of these were actualized. However, the Ministries of the Economy, Finance, Public Works, Internal Affairs, Education, and Health considered the possibility and investigated the matter in contact with foreign entities. A letter sent by the Ministry of National Defense, notes that the MFC had made certain films on the Turkish military and

474 Tacibayev, 2004, p. 212.

475 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 01, Box no: 1214 Folder no: 32 Row no: 1 p. 49.

476 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Directorate General of Transactions, Cat. no: 030 10, Box no: 146 Folder no: 43 Row no: 17 p. 5.

suggested appointing a committee to investigate which of these could be used to promote Turkey.⁴⁷⁷

By 1935, films made by the RPP were sent to embassies, which screened these films for various occasions. The Berlin Turkish Club screened the film on twelfth Republic Day to Turks living in Berlin, which attracted much of attention.⁴⁷⁸ In Jerusalem, after a conference organized at the King David, one of the largest hotels of the city, a sound film was screened to an international audience. In Amman, films were screened on various occasions at the city's largest theater, and in London, after conferences by Associate Professor Saffet Bengi from Ankara University's Department of Language, History, and Geography, films were screened.⁴⁷⁹

On December 10, 1936, the General Secretariat of the RPP sent letters to ambassadors Suat Davaz and Fethi Okyar stating that important events and ceremonies organized in the country had been recorded. The party wished to send copies of these films so that Turkish expatriates could share in the enthusiasm of these events.⁴⁸⁰

Individuals also put in requests to the DGP to promote Turkey. Journalist Annamarie Van den Berh, a friend to Turkey, asked the DGP for film strips on the progress of the nation and Atatürk's life to screen at the Institute of Colonies in Amsterdam in spring 1939. The DGP reasoned that sending these films would advance propaganda abroad and asked the General Secretariat of the RPP to send films that they were holding.⁴⁸¹ However, even if the RPP had the necessary network and organization to screen films, they did not have sufficient copies to share. In correspondences among embassies and the party, it was noted that the budget for cinema was low, and it was not possible to make

477 Öztürk, 2005, p. 51.

478 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1213 Folder no: 39 Row no: 1 p. 101.

479 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1212 Folder no: 24 Row no: 1 p. 10-11.

480 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1208 Folder no: 8 Row no: 1 p. 70.

481 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1208 Folder no: 8 Row no: 1 pp. 55-56

many copies; films sent abroad should be promptly returned and transported to the People's Houses.

As mentioned above, correspondence of the İpekçi brothers reveal that their films were screened domestically and abroad. Correspondence in May 1940 between the General Secretariat of the RPP and Fox Europa Company gives clues as to how such screenings were arranged. Per the request of Fox Europa, the General Secretariat of the RPP lent a film on the Erzincan earthquake to Fox. After executives watched the film, they decided to donate 325 Turkish lira to the victims of the earthquake through Fahir İpekçi, their representative in Istanbul.⁴⁸²

What was happening behind the scenes differs from what is suggested in the correspondences. Well-known director Osman Seden, the son of the owner of Kemal Film, one of the first film companies of the Republic, recounted his memory of the incident to Gökhan Akçura:

Even though we stopped film-making for a while, we continued making actuality films called Kemal Film Journals. During the famous Erzincan earthquake my father sent Enver Burçkin to the disaster zone. He shot a film. We planned to send it to British Gaumont. The American Embassy pressured the government to purchase the film in the name of Fox Movietone. They called us. My uncle said that it was sent to British Gaumont. Ankara objected. Cevdet İncedayı, the head of the RPP in Istanbul, organized a police raid with six officials and seized the film. They sent it to Ankara. They did not even listen to my objections.⁴⁸³

Hinkle's report claims that the İpekçi brothers sent to the UFA, famous German newsreel company at this time, films on Turkey for distribution in Europe.

Exported films were not the only means of promoting Turkey. Foreign groups who came to Turkey were also guided, as exemplified by an incident in 1935. The American steel millionaire, Lawrence Thaw, and a group of fourteen

482 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive.

483 Akçura, 1995, p. 26.

people led by him planned to make a film starting in the Balkans and ending in India. While traveling with his wife, Thaw shots amateur travel documentaries. Before the Second World War, he traveled to the Caribbean, Egypt and many other destinations making this kind of film.⁴⁸⁴ Turkey was destination⁴⁸⁵ of their travels in 1935, and they wrote to the DGP to ask permission to shoot. The General Secretariat of the RPP took the necessary steps to help Thaw and his crew in the cities in which they plan to shoot. It is not known if the crew had asked for it, but an official from the Ministry of Education joined them. The Ministry of Internal Affairs evaluated the visit of the crew to Bursa:

Since we thought the visit of the crew in question would be beneficial in terms of national propaganda, we appointed governors for all their needs, supplies, and necessary preparations in order to turn the tide in our favor.⁴⁸⁶

A two-page plan was prepared for the crew to depict – to the best of their abilities – the historical, economic and social life of Bursa. However, the reality did not correspond with the plans of government officials. The Head of the RPP's Bursa Organization wrote to the General Secretariat of the RPP on August 16, 1939:

... The science and film crew led by the American Mr. Lawrence Thaw came to Bursa through Mudanya. They set up camp at Çekirge without giving any heed to the plan on which we had worked for days nor to our friends who greeted them sincerely with the pride of national service. All of our attempts to communicate with them led us to believe this is not an investigation committee as defined by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, but a pampered, rich person's travel crew. Even though we stayed in contact the whole time, we only managed to get them to shoot some historical monuments; when they tried to shoot a staged scene on the largest bridge of the town with porters, donkeys,

484 Collection of Copley Thaw Travelogues, www.colonialfilm.org.uk/node/3391

485 The original title of the film was *The Thaw Asiatic Expedition presents INDIA*.

486 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1214 Folder no: 32 Row no: 1 p. 131.

and women in chadors, we were able to stop them. After that they contacted the DGP and threatened to return to America...⁴⁸⁷

It is surprising that a visit of a civilian from America was considered crucial for the promotion and propaganda of the country. The fact they prevented a shoot with porters and donkeys recalls Vedim Tör's editorial published in *La Turquie Kémaliste* in August 1934⁴⁸⁸ in which he gave a piece of his mind to the foreign media that just shot unattended donkeys in Anatolian villages and used these images to present the current reality of Turkey. The importance placed on reflecting the image of the young Republic abroad is obvious.

On July 4, 1934, a meeting occurred between the Minister of Internal Affairs, Şükrü Kaya and Hakkı Tarık Us concerning Police Duties and Responsibilities. What they discussed in this meeting indicates the views of the government on the issue. Us asked how to distinguish among those shooting an actuality film and amateurs. Şükrü Kaya answered:

Since only Turks are allowed to take photographs, they have to have permits. If the person is performing art, it is already banned. If it is not art, the police officer should ask what they are doing and say they must investigate. There is no benefit to our country of a film that looks for and creates crude images in order to raise interest. He should ask to see what they are shooting. Turks will have necessary permissions. The others will be recorded...⁴⁸⁹

Interestingly, Şükrü Kaya emphasized Law 2007 on Arts and Services Provided for Turkish Citizen, dated June 11, 1932. Maybe foreigners were banned from photography business because pictures taken by foreigners were considered unreliable. Considering that cameras are the weapons of modern times, giving a weapon to a foreigner was undesirable for the ruling class of the period.

Aside from films that promote Turkey, the state continued the fight against films that were considered to be propagandizing against Turkey. The film

487 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1214 Folder no: 32 Row no: 1 p. 75-154.

488 Vedat Nedim Tör, "Sensation", *La Turquie Kémaliste*, no. 2 (August 1934)

489 TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Term 4, Vol. 23, Session 3, Conclusion 77, July 4, 1934, p. 407.

made by the March of Time variously entitled *Turkey*, or *100 Million Dollars Given to Turkey* or *Turkey \$ 100,000,000* is a good example. Two operators of the March of Time came to Turkey in 1946 with the approval of the government to shoot the film in various regions of Turkey. The government even appointed a film operator to work with them. The Director of the DGPP, İzzeddin Nişbay asserted that this operator “ensured the images were proper as they could be”; however the DGPP did not have the chance to review the script.⁴⁹⁰ The \$ 100 million mentioned in the title or the funds bestowed on Turkey under the Marshall Plan. Nişbay learned about the content of the film from the New York News Bureau and passed the information on to the Premiership:

The film is on the dictatorship of our President, the bad living conditions of most Turks despite Atatürk’s reforms, how poor they are, how badly they are clothed, how the press is under the control of the government, how the Turkish state is monopolized, how the only client of tobacco producers is the government, criticizes the tendency of state for monopolization.⁴⁹¹

Nişbay, in a letter to the Prime Ministry, notes a lack of 16mm propaganda films to promote Turkey abroad and that certain commercial films are propagandizing against Turkey. Nişbay emphasizes foremost that they needed to acquire equipment to shoot these films⁴⁹²

This kind of film is not limited to this example. Two years before this incident, an American, Lowell Thomas Jr., visited Turkey and shot a 16mm film. This color film was screened in 114 cities in the United States through the National Geographic Society in 1949. Ambassador Erkin states a letter that this film contains “even cruder images, and 80 percent of it was shot in the eastern

490 Prime Ministry’s Republican Archive, Catalogue of Directorate General of Transactions, Cat. no: 030 10, Box no: 268 Folder no: 806 Row no: 17 p. 2.

491 Prime Ministry’s Republican Archive, Catalogue of Directorate General of Transactions, Cat. no: 030 10, Box no: 268 Folder no: 806 Row no: 17 p. 2.

492 Prime Ministry’s Republican Archive, Catalogue of Directorate General of Transactions, Cat. no: 030 10, Box no: 268 Folder no: 806 Row no: 17 p. 2.

regions of Turkey.”⁴⁹³ Erkin suggests employing operators from the United States to shoot a propaganda film, mentioning that India had commissioned the making of 700 films that were screened many times in the United States and left a good impression about the country.⁴⁹⁴

The battle against unfavorable films continued in the Balkans. The government was warned against nationalist films made in Balkan countries, since these could disturb the friendship between Turkey and said countries. The government defended the Ottoman Empire against the image presented in these films and was disturbed because the Ottoman Empire was depicted as cruel, barbarian, and violent. Upon warnings of the government, these countries claim that these films were made to evoke nationalist sentiment and that they had no issues with the Republic of Turkey. While the young Republic was alienating itself from its Ottoman heritage in Turkey, it took up protecting the Ottoman image abroad.⁴⁹⁵

Making films that properly represent the revolution to counteract such films as Turkey, which hurt the image of the country, was seen as a necessity by the RPP. Foreign filmmakers perceived this necessity and in the 1940s, various producers proposed making such films. However, the budgets and suggested models of collaboration were not approved by the RPP, and no such film was made.⁴⁹⁶ The reason was mostly the skeptical approach of the RPP; it believed that a film for which it would spend a lot of money – especially during wartime – would again misrepresent Turkey if it were made by a foreign film company.

493 Prime Ministry’s Republican Archive, Catalogue of Directorate General of Transactions, Cat. no: 030 10, Box no: 268 Folder no: 806 Row no: 17 pp. 5-6.

494 Prime Ministry’s Republican Archive, Catalogue of Directorate General of Transactions, Cat. no: 030 10, Box no: 268 Folder no: 806 Row no: 17 p. 7.

495 For further reading, see Ebru Boyar and Kate Fleet, “Making Turkey and the Turkish Revolution Known to Foreign Nations Without Any Expense”: Propaganda Films in the Early Turkish Republic”, *Oriente Moderno*, Nuova Serie, Anno 24 (85), Nr.1 (2005), pp. 117-132.

496 Prime Ministry’s Republican Archive, Catalogue of Directorate General of Transactions, Cat. no: 030 01, Box no: 101 Folder no: 628 Row no: 8 pp. 1-8.

The Second World War and Propaganda

The authoritarian tendencies of the regime in Turkey, which increased in the 1930s, accelerated during the Second World War. The fact that the war created threshold for the new regime that did not and perhaps could not tolerate dissent, brought restrictions, precautions and censure. The state developed a preemptive discourse to increase feelings of patriotism in the case of war and legitimized potential, severe political measures. The single-party regime used national defense to justify restrictions on individuals' rights and freedoms. Propaganda conducted by both the Axis and the Allies in Turkey had a major role in the shaping the party-state propaganda. The war clearly had two ideological sides: fascism and those opposing fascism. This ideological polarization that characterized the Second World War was reflected in the ideological atmosphere of Turkey. Two separate ideological camps were thinking and producing in parallel with the ideologies of the war.

The first section of this chapter analyzes the discourse that the single-party regime developed with respect to the war, the consequences of the war, and the perspective vis-à-vis propaganda. Traces of this discourse are examined in the statements of high state officials, certain publications, and political actions. Turkey was constantly at the threshold and conducted propaganda to explain the situation to its citizens, preparing them for possible war. With the threat of war, government propaganda emphasized patriotism. For instance, army officials and people close to the government contributed to a magazine called

Savaş (War) and used nationalist and militaristic language. National mobilization was the keyword of the period. In addition to the army, all other resources were expected to be ready at the ready, alert and eager to sacrifice.

The Second World War was difficult for citizens and weakened belief in the RPP. A clear difference emerged between the strong, populist image presented to citizens and the place of the state in the minds of citizens. Social and economic depression created pressure that forced a change in the political facet.¹

With the victory of the DP in 1950, the single-party regime ended. In a period that eventually ended the government of the RPP, what kinds of propaganda did the RPP use to absolve its repressive actions and did the elements of this propaganda differ from the period between 1930 to 1939. To answer this the ruptures, changes, and new basis of discourse around propaganda that started in 1939 must be analyzed.

The general perception of the Second World War is that the single-party regime employed intricate diplomatic tactics to keep the country out of the war. Selim Deringil notes that World War II politics in Turkey can be seen as fickle and unprincipled from the outside.² Choosing to stay out of the war seems reasonable considering Turkey's conditions in that period. Even though Turkey did not enter the war, Axis and Allied forces used Turkish lands for their own activities and tried to influence the Turkish government politically with propaganda and intelligence campaigns. Turkish citizens were also targeted on both sides of the war; both conducted image management campaigns to influence private citizens' opinions of the war. The Turkish government condoned the activities of both the Axis and Allies to some extent. The course of the war directly affected the Turkish government's attitude and foreign politics vis-à-vis the actors in the war. Foreign policy was not dependent on historical factors like its allies during the First World War to be: indeed, it was continuously reconsidered and reshaped according to the course of the war. In this chapter, I look at traces of Allied advocacy during the first years of the war and German sympathies that followed Operation Barbarossa.

1 Asım Karaömerlioğlu, *Orada Bir Köy Var Uzakta: Erken Cumhuriyet Döneminde Köycü Söylem* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2006), p. 114.

2 Selim Deringil, "Hasta Adam'ın Dinç Evlatları", *Toplumsal Tarih*, no. 121 (January 2004), p. 81.

The second section of the chapter focuses on propaganda activities within Turkey by both the fascist and anti-fascist sides. To this end, I spotlight currents of thought and social movements as additional factors that influenced the perception of the war by the Turkish government and in Turkish society. While examining the reflection of fascist and anti-fascist propaganda in the currents of thought in the country, I look at dissident voices in society and the relation of these voices to the state.

As for propaganda activities by other countries in Turkey, the propaganda and intelligence activities of British and German intelligence agencies are a research area unto itself. The fact that Turkey was neutral during the war allowed both sides to propagandize given the possible scenarios in Turkey. While the British strategy of propaganda was fine-tuned, gentle, and attentive to present balances of power, the Germans were oppressive towards the Turkish government, exerting their authority to the point of pushing the bounds of diplomacy in certain cases. Turkey allowed foreign propaganda to an extent, but when necessary, took certain precautions to limit such activities. However, due to the strategy of oppression of Germany, German propaganda was tolerated more than that of the Allies. While analyzing propaganda activities in Turkey during the Second World War, I pay particular attention to the influence of the war on three important mediums of propaganda: cinema, magazines, and radio.

§ 5.1 Single-Party Regime and Propaganda During the War

5.1.1 *War without a Front: Mobilizing Citizens for Possible War*

At the beginning of Ramadan in 1944, correspondence sent by the Directorate of Religious Affairs to local religious offices (*müftülükler*) requested that for the duration of the war, sermons and homilies should avoid controversial topics that would weaken national unity. Charity organizations like the Turkish Aeronautical Association, the Turkish Red Crescent, and the Child Protection

Agency – which aim to protect the country against enemies – should be supported by the people.³

In his study focusing on the changing nature of the war, Karl Von Clausewitz asserts that war has a societal aspect; success is not just one on the battlefronts, but in another “war” going on in the background.⁴ This “war” in the background refers to mobilizing forces and manpower for the war. In this type of modern war-making, the state controls new media to mobilize the masses.

During the Second World War, the most important feature of propaganda made by Allied and Axis forces was to legitimize the war and explain to the public that it was a “just” war. Films, posters, and publications conveyed the idea that the war had a legitimate basis. Allied and Axis forces both used various mediums of propaganda to ensure financial and moral support for the war. For instance, America used Hollywood as a platform. As Yapp notes “Hollywood thrust its stars into selling war bonds, entertaining troops, running the stage door canteen, keeping alive the American Dream. Films ran off the production line like tanks or planes.”⁵ In a short propaganda film dated December 1943, Hollywood star Bette Davis said, “instead of the bicycle her son wishes for there will be war bonds under the Christmas tree.”⁶ At the end of the film Davis didactically explains how civilians can contribute to the war by buying war bonds.

According to Zafer Toprak, a war economy began in Turkey in 1914 and ended in 1945.⁷ This 30-year stretch included many economic, sociological, class-based, and social benchmarks such as World Wars, the War of Independence, the Great Depression, the single-party regime, revolutions, attempts at pluralism, financial difficulties, the National Defense Law, the Wealth Tax, and population exchange. Even though Turkey managed to stay out of the war, the

3 Prime Ministry’s Republican Archive, Catalogue of Presidency of Religious Affairs, Cat. no: 0 51 V33, Box no: 4 Folder no: 30 Row no: 9 pp. 1-2.

4 Murat Metinsoy, *İkinci Dünya Savaşı’nda Türkiye: Savaş ve Gündelik Yaşam* (Istanbul: Homer Kitabevi, 2007), p. 16.

5 Nick Yapp, *1940s: Decades of the 20th Century* (London: Könemann, 2005) p. 278.

6 The title of the short film in which Bette Davis acted is *The Present with a Future*.

7 Zafer Toprak, “II. Dünya Savaşı ve tek partinin sonu”, *Toplumsal Tarih*, no. 121 (January 2004), p. 72.

war nonetheless had damaging economic and social influences. The state expected citizens to stay quiet and situated the Second World War as a second War of Independence. The National Chief at the head of the state was one of two significant heroes of the War of Independence, and he expected the people to trust his experience and knowledge to guide the country through this war, as well.

At the council of ministers meeting on August 28, 1939, it was decided that all divisions of 4th Corps located in Thrace and Western Anatolia would be reinforced without officially declaring a mobilization. Those who qualify for discharge would not yet be discharged, and the motor vehicles of this corps would be completed. It was decided at the council meeting that contingent on future developments, if it was deemed necessary, partial mobilization would be declared as necessary. Later on, full mobilization could be declared.⁸ On April 26, 1940, amendments were made to the Article 58 of the Law 3810 and Military Law 1111: Expert individuals could be summoned for instruction, education, and maneuvers, in case of emergency they could be called to arms by the Council of Ministers, the two year rule notwithstanding. The Instruction period could be extended to up to four months. On June 6, 1940, it was decided to draft army reservists born before 1912 and reserve officers as necessary to reinforce the 6th Corps in the Adana region, and on June 18 the decision was extended to reservists born before 1913 and reserve officers as necessary to reinforce the 1st Corps in Istanbul and the straits, the 2nd Corps in Gallipoli, and the 4th Corps in Çorlu. On June 22, the summons of those born before 1913 indicated they and the necessary reserve officers would be deployed to the regions occupied by the 6th and 8th Corps. On June 13, a new decree postponed all discharges.⁹

Even though partial and full mobilization were not declared, the National Defense Law¹⁰ (NDL) was passed on January 18, 1940. On November 20, 1940,

8 Hüsnü Özlü, "Arşiv Belgelerine Göre İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda İzmir ve Trakya'nın Savunmasına Yönelik Türk- İngiliz Heyetlerinin Görüşmeleri ve Alınan Önlemler", *Çağdaş Türkiye Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi*, Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi, X/23 (Autumn 2011), pp. 84-85.

9 Gürel, 2008, pp. 32-33.

10 The law was amended a few times and finally annulled after the Military Coup of 1960.

the Prime Ministry declared martial law¹¹ for one month in six cities in the Marmara region; Istanbul, Kırklareli, Edirne, Tekirdağ, Çanakkale, and Kocaeli.¹² Article 86 of the 1924 Constitution was cited as the reason to declare martial law: “the emergence of a situation that would lead to war.”¹³

On January 21, 1942, a clause was added to the Article 5 of Military Law 1111: “soldiers on active duty and those who would have taken up arms to serve full time will serve for three years during the emergency period without discrimination, and short term soldiers (except reserve officers) will serve for two years.”¹⁴ Notably conscriptions were made without declaring partial or full mobilization, a conscious choice made by the state. The declaration of partial mobilization could inevitably pull Turkey into the war. Imminent danger of war would have been necessary for such a declaration, and then the question for Turkey would have been, “Who is the enemy?”

While the war was seen as a “national cause” and the country was mobilized accordingly, the basic requirements of the population needed to be provided least damage be done to the nationalist ideology that “united” and suppressed the public, opposing forces, and espionage.¹⁵ Ironically, the Turkish government implemented and justified war politics without entering the war, while countries actually involved the war propagandized to justify the war. In his radio speech on February 1, 1942, Refik Saydam mentioned that the government would not hide any truth regardless of how good or bad it was, and it would warn citizens to stand firm against “foreign, poisonous ideas and news.” Saydam noticed that in periods of crisis like a war, the essential enterprise was “national defense”, which required renunciation and sacrifices by the people.¹⁶

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- 11 The law on extraordinary administration (*Örfi İdare Kanunu*) was accepted on May 22, 1940 and published in the official gazette on May 25.
 - 12 TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Term 8, Vol. 1, Session 8, May 28, 1947, p. 52.
 - 13 Zafer Üskül, *Siyaset ve Asker* (Istanbul: İmge Kitabevi, 1997), p. 101.
 - 14 TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Term, Vol. 1, January 21, 1942, İ: 29 p. 117.
 - 15 Metinsoy, 2007, p. 80.
 - 16 “Başvekilimizin Önemli Konuşmaları: Milli Korunma Davası”, *Radıyo*, no. 3 (February 15, 1942), pp. 4-5.

To justify and explain war to the public is one of the responsibilities of the modern state. Mehmet Beşikçi, in a study focusing on the mobilization of human resources during the Great War, concentrates on how the Ottoman state mobilized Muslim subjects from Anatolia and how this process of mobilization reshaped relations between the state and the public. According to Beşikçi, social actors were not passive agents on the contrary, they influenced the state's mobilization politics through their responses reactions and as a result, the state had to formulate new local mechanisms of control.¹⁷ Even though Turkey did not enter the Second World War, the size of its army was increased from 120 thousand soldiers at the beginning of the war to 1.5 million by its end.¹⁸ Mobilization most affected peasants who constituted the majority of soldiers.¹⁹

During the Second World War, almost 10 percent of the population was conscripted.²⁰ Citizen armies and conscription can be seen as one of the main features of modern nation states,²¹ which by definition expect citizens to be "patriots." In a system where love of country and patriotism proceeds all else, the state is perpetually legitimized. The power relation between the state and the citizen becomes crucial. Citizens are expected to fight for their country; under threat of war, citizens are to deny their own freedom and surrender power to the political power; all of this is expected to be done on the legitimate basis with the consent of the citizenry. This implies accepting conscripted and complying without question with the obedience, loyalty, and discipline required by the military. The duty of conscripts is deemed sacred, and the legitimation of the practice of conscription is derived from this notion of sacredness. Tanıl Bora and Ayşe Gül Altınay argue that in Turkey the army has the

17 For further information, see Mehmet Beşikçi, *The Ottoman Mobilization of Manpower in the First World War: Between Voluntarism and Resistance* (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2012)

18 Toprak, 2004, p. 75.

19 Metinsoy, 2007, p. 56.

20 The population was 17,820,950 according to the 1940 census.

21 Nurseli Yeşim Sünbuloğlu, "Giriş: Türkiye'de Militarizm, Milliyetçilik ve Erkek(lik)lere Dair Bir Çerçeve", in *Erkek Millet Asker Millet: Türkiye'de Militarizm, Milliyetçilik, Erkek(lik)ler*, ed. Nurseli Yeşim Sünbuloğlu (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2013), p. 10.

duty to define the “official” or “right” kind of nationalism.²² In 1936, an article borrowed from Italy’s Criminal Code was added to the Criminal Code of 1926. Article 142 read “Someone who propagandizes in order to weaken or destroy national sentiments will be imprisoned for up to 3 years.”²³ As mentioned in the fourth chapter, Article 7 of the regulation on the review of films and scripts dated July 19, 1939, stated: “Scripts devaluating military honor and dignity and propagandizing against military” will not be filmed or already filmed, will not be screened. Even though the censorship statute was modified in 1948 and 1958, this article remained in place.

Military interventions and periods of martial law are when “official nationalism” is presented as a basis of legitimation. Along with coups d’état, 40 percent of the history of Republic from October 29, 1923, to July 19, 1987 has taken place under martial law.²⁴ After the Menemen Incident, martial law was declared in the villages of Menemen, Manisa, and Balıkesir on the basis Article 86 of the constitution (*Teşkilat-ı Esasiye*): “When there is evidence of a strong, active movement against the country and the Republic, measures may be taken.”²⁵ In order for political power not to have legitimation problems during martial law and periods of mobilization, it must constantly remind citizens of the threats and of its expectations from citizens to endure such threats. Repetition, which is one of the basic necessities of propaganda, is crucial. All practices, discourses and adjectives that do not concur with the elements of the continuous repetition will be excluded and quieted. The fact that conscientious objection is still taboo in Turkey in 2016 points to the authoritarian political power’s severe attitude towards alternative and anti-military positions that stray from official, political positions.

Öztan, in an article examining militarism in the construction of national identity, that concern for “saving the state” and the corresponding development of nationalism, which converge with modernization, cannot be seen as

22 Sünbuloğlu, 2013, p. 13.

23 Topuz, 2003, p. 160.

24 Serdar Şen, *Türk Silahlı Kuvvetlerinin Toplum Mühendisliği* (Istanbul: Su Yayınları, 2011), pp. 125-127.

25 Prime Ministry’s Republican Archive, Catalogue of Council of Ministers’ Decrees, Cat. no: 030 18 1 2, Box no: 16 Folder no: 83 Row no: 11 p. 1.

separate from militarism in Turkey. “Turkish nationalism gained popularity mostly with militarist themes during its historical journey. It was propagated and later became the main reference point for the official ideology and for popular imagery.”²⁶ In the 1930s, the relationship among military service, war, and security became absolute and unquestionable. The “military-nation” myth – where Turks are born soldiers and heroes, raised to be brave, and possess these qualities more than the citizens of other nations is emphasized, especially in race-based, nationalist communities.²⁷ According to Foucault, discipline means creating subjugated, obedient bodies. Discipline increases the effectiveness and usefulness of the body in terms of the economy while weakening it politically, thus making it obedient. In his work on modern, obedient bodies, Foucault focuses on education and the military.²⁸

“Obedient bodies” have no option other than to enlist when they are called to serve during mobilization. In 1940, the domination of the state over citizens’ bodies became official. On April 13, 1940, the Regulation on Physical Training was published in the official gazette. The regulation said that the fundamental responsibility of the Directorate General of Physical Training was to increase citizens’ physical and moral capacity to meet national and revolutionary needs, and if necessary, to defend the country. It would organize games, gymnastics, and sports activities in line these purposes.²⁹ The remarks of Mazhar Osman in a conference on eugenics held in a People’s House in 1939 reflects the time:

Today, we need solid bodies for defense, development, and progress of our homeland, for which we have shed blood for its every inch. We do not wish to fill the country with degenerates or to raise a generation to

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- 26 Güven Gürkan Öztan, “Türkiye’de Milli Kimlik İnşası Sürecinde Militarist Eğilimler ve Tesirleri”, in *Erkek Millet Asker Millet: Türkiye’de Militarizm, Milliyetçilik, Erkek(lik)ler*, ed. Nurseli Yeşim Sünbuloğlu (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2013), p. 78.
- 27 Güven Gürkan Öztan, *Türkiye’de Militarizm: Zihniyet, Pratik ve Propaganda*, İstanbul: İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2014, p. 48.
- 28 Ayşe Gül Altınay, “Askerlik Yapmayana Adam Denmez”: Zorunlu Askerlik, Erkeklik ve Vatandaşlık”, in *Erkek Millet Asker Millet: Türkiye’de Militarizm, Milliyetçilik, Erkek(lik)ler*, ed. Nurseli Yeşim Sünbuloğlu (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2013), p. 209.
- 29 *Beden Terbiyesi Nizamnamesi*, 13.04.1940, Resmi Gazete, no: 4484, p. 13641.

send to hospitals, madhouses, or prisons... We need to encourage and increase the number of the strong; and let the decayed know that there are enough of them, that there is no use for their future generations.³⁰

At the beginning of the Second World War, conscriptions in Turkey were preemptive measures for the possibility of war. The defense budget was increased substantially;³¹ indeed, by 1943, some 44.6 percent of the state's budget was allocated for defense.³² Seventeen years after the Mudanya Armistice ending the War of Independence in October 11, 1922, the conscripts in that war were still healing.³³ Even though Turkey was not in the war *de facto*, to justify conscription the public had to be convinced that the threat of war was real and that this precaution was necessary.

Upon declaring martial law, it was decided that part of the population in Thrace and Istanbul would be moved to Anatolia. This 'part' consisted of minorities that were "not trusted in times of war."³⁴ Kazım Karabekir explained the situation in a speech given at an RPP group meeting:

Elements that have bled Turkey are living in perfect buildings while Turks live in Sultan Selim, in burned-out buildings or storehouses covered with soil with their five or six children! In short, I will not agree to move a single Turk to Anatolia. However, other elements can be moved and Turks can move into their places...³⁵

30 Mazhar Osman Uzman, "Öjenik", *C.H.P. Konferanslar Serisi Kitap: 2* (Ankara: Recep Ulusoğlu Basımevi, 1939), pp. 4-5

31 Toprak, 2004, p. 71.

32 Erdoğan Öner, *Cumhuriyet Dönemi Türk Bütçeleri (1924- 1933)*, p. 16. <http://www.journals.istanbul.edu.tr/iuamk/article/viewFile/1023012856/1023012084>

33 Balkan Wars of 1911- 1912 must not be forgotten.

34 The moving of non-Muslim communities from Thrace was already "achieved" by 1934 with the Thrace Incidents. The First General Inspector of Thrace, İbrahim Tali Öngören, expressed his attitude towards Jews in a report following the Thrace Incidents as follows: "Not allowing this element [Jews] – dominating all the economic resources of the region – to suck Thrace dry any longer was the biggest step towards Thrace's development." Burgaç, 2013, p. 285.

35 Karabekir Kazım, *Ankara'da savaş rüzgarları: II. Cihan Harbinde CHP Grup tartışmaları* (İstanbul: Emre Yayınları, 2000), p. 248.

The government had extensive authority over the economy, social politics, and many other areas due to the NDL. To increase production, mines operated by individuals or legal entities were merged, monopolized, and operated by the state. Moreover, it was decided that permanent provisions in the Labor Law concerning the working conditions of women and children could be temporarily suspended. The NDL caused significant discussions in parliament. It was presented to the public as a measure taken to offset the effects of the war. Yet these precautions had many features that limited the freedoms and undermined the basic rights of citizens. The government repeatedly emphasized that these precautions were taken for the sake of the people and the nation. If there was an extraordinary situation that necessitated the authority granted by this law, the government would enforce it immediately. In such situations, the only prerequisite was to inform parliament.³⁶

Cumhuriyet newspaper reminded people of their duties and published the speech of Martial Law Commanding Officer Artunkal who took up his post in Istanbul once martial law was declared:

...observing discipline to its last note is the first requirement of national success. The orders of the commander that will be issued when necessary should be followed with zeal. Men and women, we are all mobilized children of this nation.³⁷

On March 19, 1941, martial law was extended for three months, and it was subsequently extended every six months for a total of seven years and one month, a remarkably long-duration. It was extended fifteen times in total; even though the war ended in 1945, martial law continued until 1947. Furthermore, it was not even a subject of discussion in parliament until the beginning of the multi-party system in 1946.

When the DP was established and joined the elections in 1946, the Martial Law Office banned election propaganda in open areas. After the elections, it banned discussion of the results and tried to prevent the press from publishing

36 Koçak Cemil, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi (1938- 1945)*, vol. 2 (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2009), pp. 373-383.

37 *Cumhuriyet* (November 23, 1940), p. 1.

on election fraud.³⁸ Consequently, on July 19, 1946, Celal Bayar sent a letter to the press and Prime Minister questioning the legitimacy, implementation and political neutrality of the Martial Law Administration. Bayar noted that according to the Article 86 of the constitution, if there is no longer a condition of war, the continuation of martial law is contrary to the constitution. He argued that a decree on July 24 through which the Martial Law Administration had prohibited the Istanbul press from publishing news on the election of July 21, 1946, his unjust and unlawful actions during the election. In short, the bans were political.³⁹

On May 28, 1947, the government suggested yet another extension of martial law, which caused disputes in parliament. The opposition party stated that the martial law system limited the freedoms of people and claimed the conditions that had compelled martial law did not exist anymore. Some members of parliament from the ruling party claimed that martial law was still necessary since a full, peaceful order had not yet established. Suphi Batur, an MP from the DP argued that as the world “was progressing towards peace and quiet, in our country that has a complete and perfect order, the continuation of martial law” was used as a medium of violence by the government.⁴⁰ It was decided in this session to extend martial law another six months but this was the last time, and martial law thus ended on June 23, 1947. The ruling party did not – or could not (due to the reaction of the opposing party) – suggest extending martial law in future sessions of parliament.⁴¹

Interesting is that the RPP claimed martial law did not affect everyday lives of people. During the seven years and one month of martial law, *Cumhuriyet* newspaper did not publish any articles that examined or criticized martial law. The reason for the silence of the press was the strict state control over the press. According to a study by Frederick Frey seventy-five journalists in Turkey became members of parliament between 1920 and 1957. Frey characterizes these people as “propagandists of the official ideology.” Through these journalist-

38 Üskül, 1997, pp. 111-115.

39 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Directorate General of Transactions, Cat. no: 030 10, Box no: 44 Folder no: 257 Row no: 3 pp.1-5.

40 TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, May 28, 1947, B.65, O.1, p. 227.

41 TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, May 28, 1947, B.65, O.1, pp. 227-240.

MPs the position of the single-party regime was presented to citizens and foreigners as the view of the press.⁴²

The Martial Law Administration continued its limiting practices after the war ended. These limitations took shape after Turkey became allied with the United States, and the Martial Law Administration's sensitivities to extreme rightists and rightist groups increased. As Üskül notes the focus of martial law changed in line with the course of the war. When a racist, Turanist organization was discovered "all of a sudden", the Martial Law court took a year to decide the case. In December 1946, certain political parties, unions, and magazines in Istanbul were shut down due to their advocacy of communism, even though the Law of Associations allowed for associations based on classes. It was claimed that these funding of these magazines', political parties', and unions were anonymous – that their aim was to influence the masses and disrupt the nation. The General Secretariat of the RPP sent a letter to the Istanbul Provincial Chairman and said the issue would be resolved when the innocent masses that had been dragged down by these political parties and unions joined the RPP; the public should therefore be enlightened through necessary media.⁴³

Though Greece actively participated the war, there were periods even during the course of the war when martial law was abolished. Why, then, did a country that did not even join the war continue practicing martial law for seven years a based just on a threat of war? The answer is multidimensional. The first excuse is the political, economic, and social weaknesses of the single-party government. Murat Metinsoy believes the issue of "the capacity of the state" is neglected in Early Republican history, politics, and state and public relations.⁴⁴ Propaganda activities shed light on the relation the state established with the public and allow an evaluation of this capacity. The media on which this study focuses – radio, cinema, newspapers, magazines, and conferences used by the state during the early Republican period to establish authority over the public – is the same as the media being used in the West. However,

42 Güvenir, 1991, pp. 65-66.

43 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 01, Box no: 6 Folder no: 34 Row no: 19 pp. 1-2.

44 Metinsoy, 2007, p. 39.

the number, frequency, and audience of the messages sent is different. The issue of capacity is key when considering the similarities and differences of the DGP – which conducted propaganda activities during the Second World War – and, say, the Reich Ministry of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda. The single-party regime which did not have sufficient funds, was compelled to ask the public to make sacrifices like they did during the War of Independence. When necessary, the government manipulated the level of nationalism and reprehended the public in a “paternalistic” manner.

5.1.2 *Savaş Askeri Kahramanlık Mecmuası (War: The Magazine of Military Heroism)*

Savaş magazine (the full title of which was *Savaş: Askeri Kahramanlık Mecmuası*- or *War: The Magazine of Military Heroism*) began in 1940 as a bi-monthly magazine under the editorship of Ahmet Faik Türkmen. It was published in Ankara at the Tan Printing House. The magazine probably continued until the end of the Korean War.

The first issue contained editorial by Ahmet Faik Türkmen, the owner and editor-in-chief of the magazine, which said the magazine was “undertaking the translation of the epic poetry of the Turkish nation” and “to express the sympathy of the public towards the military.” The magazine published heroic stories on the Turkish army, memories of military incidents, and essays on books on the military. *Savaş* calls to mind *Harp (Battle)* magazine, which was published during the Dardanelles Campaign to inform the public of news of the front and raise the morale of soldiers.⁴⁵ Like *Harp*, *Savaş* published many images. It is no coincidence that it began being published during the Second World War. It is unknown who funded the magazine, but it is evident that the military and state officials read and supported it. *Savaş* emphasized military service, militarism, and patriotism in harmony with the spirit of the Second World War.

45 For detailed information on *Harp* Magazine, see Erol Köroğlu, *Türk Edebiyatı ve Birinci Dünya Savaşı (1914-1918): Propagandadan Milli Kimlik İnşasına* (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2004)

The creator of the magazine, Türkmen, was a retired teacher of philosophy of the Military Academy. Accordingly, there are many articles on the atmosphere of discipline and obedience created by the army. Türkmen was also the Minister of Education of the State of Hatay around the time Hatay became part of Turkey.⁴⁶

Most of the contributors of articles in the magazine are state and army officials. Covers included such things as illustrations of Turkish soldiers, Mustafa Kemal and İnönü, or pictures of Turkish women carrying munitions to the war front. When the German army approached the border of Thrace, the cover of issue 24 dated March 1, 1941, featured a picture of women, men, and elderly people waiting with long barreled weapons under the heading “Awaiting Orders.”⁴⁷



Figure 5.1 Savaş magazine: July 1940 and March 1941.

At the beginning of war, the magazine published articles written by army officials on the developments in the war. Some were on technical issues and some

46 Ahmet Miskioğlu, “Anımsadığımız Kimi Günler”, *Türk Dili Dergisi*, Year: 26 vol. 26 no. 152 (October 2000). Türkmen was the schoolteacher of Fazıl Hüsni Dağlarca, and Dağlarca helped distribute the magazine for many years.

47 Savaş, no. 24 (Ankara: Tan Matbaası, March 1, 1941)

were poetic articles emphasizing suffering. There were also critiques of foreign literary works like Oscar Wilde's "The Picture of Dorian Gray." Well-known writers such as Cevad Şakir, Ercüment Ekrem Talu, and Peyami Safa published articles in this magazine, as well. The name of one of contributors, Abidin Daver, is on a British 1942 list along with Burhaneddin Felek and Peyami Safa of German propagandists in Turkey⁴⁸ in Turkey.⁴⁹ The fact that most contributors were supporters of Germany provides a clue about the style of *Savaş*. Kurt Cebe Noyan, one of Mustafa Kemal's fellow soldiers, frequently made contributions to the magazine, as well. Here are the first lines of a poem by Noyan emphasizing the superiority of the Turkish race, published in March 1944 in issue 59 of the magazine:

I am Turkish, I am from the mountains
 I am attached to my ideal
 Bow World, bow;
 I am a God, not a servant;
 I have always been glorious,
 My blood is noble!

In the beginning, articles that exalted the war, inflated feelings towards the army and the nation, retold the victories of the Turks in the War of Independence, and emphasized the necessity for mobilizing on every front to win the war. Here are a few aphorisms from Peyami Safa's article entitled "On War and Peace", published in the issue 8 of the magazine, dated July 1, 1940:⁵⁰

- ◆ There cannot be a better wedding than a war, nor a better celebration than the victory of a nation.
- ◆ There is no matter that cannot be solved with war. Even if there is, [the solution] is most certainly founded on the threat or fear of war.
- ◆ Perpetual peace would lead communities to disintegration.

48 Seydi, 2006, p. 32.

49 Some of Daver's articles were pro-British at the beginning of the war and pro-American by the end of the war. His name was also mentioned among pro-German journalists on a military attaché report of the Military Intelligence Division of the United States in 1944.

50 *Savaş*, no. 8 (Ankara: Tan Printing House, July 1, 1940), p. 5.

Issue 24, published on March 1, 1941, features an article entitled “Reserve Officer.” The author is Ömer Rıza Doğrul, a journalist – later a member of the Democrat Party – and the son-in-law of Mehmet Akif Ersoy. He says:

The militarization of all intellectual elements in the nation means the security of the nation leans on the noble army, the whole public, and the intellectual block; this in turn means that the consciousness of security lives in the Turkish conscience, in Turkish power, and in the Turkish mentality.⁵¹

In issue 25 of *Savaş*, the RPP’s Secretary General, Fikri Tüzer, answers the question “Who is the Turkish Soldier? (*Mehmetçik*)”:

He is an honorable example of the heroic group that sprouts from the strong, patriotic and military-spirited Turkish nation... This character is founded in his pure blood, because he is a child of the strong Turkish people. He is a son of the military-spirited Turkish nation. The spirit of heroism was imbued in the soldier when he was drinking his mother’s pure milk. The Turkish soldier learned bravery and the earnestness of military service from the severe looks of his mother’s black eyes and his father’s roaring voice.⁵²

Other titles in this issue praise the army and military service, including “I Want to be the Mother of a Hero”, “Are You Ready Soldier”, and “The Allure of the Reserve Soldier Uniform”. The period when the magazine was circulated was a challenging time for publishing. Due to the ongoing war, it was difficult to find paper, but the magazine managed to survive, it is said courtesy of military officials.⁵³

In the March 15, 1941, issue, the main subject was the activities of the Philanthropists Association (*Yardım Severler Cemiyeti*) under the protection and leadership of the first lady, Mevhibe İnönü. The association became a pub-

51 *Savaş*, no. 24 (Ankara: Tan Printing House, March 1, 1941), p. 2.

52 Fikri Tüzer, “Mehmetçik Kimdir?, Big Survey Response no: 1”, *Savaş*, no. 25 (Ankara: Tan Publishing House, 15.03.1941), p. 5.

53 *Savaş*, no. 25 (Ankara: Tan Printing House, March 15, 1941), p. 2.

lic-benefit non-profit organization on June 22, 1940, and one of its most important activities was to prepare winter clothes for “heroic soldiers.” The association also sent three representatives to visit soldiers in Thrace. The members of the association visited Çorlu, Edirne, and Kırklareli and were in contact with soldiers. Based on the situation they observed, they decided further work was necessary. Mebrure Aksoley, a woman who joined the trip, says:

The Turkish soldier is a monument and the Philanthropists Association calls for help for this monument both socially and individually. Any support given to the Philanthropists Association is directed to the Turkish soldier, to the homeland.⁵⁴

On behalf of the association, Mevhibe İnönü published a statement on May 4, 1941, when the war arrived at the borders of the country, asking women to become voluntary nurses, to work at military hospitals, and to prepare the materials that the army needed.⁵⁵

After America joined the war and the Germans began retreating, the magazine’s position became pro-Allies. Turkish politics was affected by the crushing defeat of Germans in the Battle of Stalingrad in February 1943. The thrashing on the front was reflected on the pages of *Savaş*. In issue 49 dated May 1, 1943, the magazine did not yet show signs of its support for Allied forces; however, by August 1, the magazine had picked a side. After this date a photo essay entitled “the World War” appeared on the back cover of each issue. Pictures of female American soldiers giving candies to Italian children, flying fortresses, and battleships were published in this section. These pictures on every issue’s back cover communicated the feeling that the Americans had come and saved Europeans from war. Even though Turkey did not declare war on Axis forces until much later, this new attitude of the magazine suggests the Turkish state had already chosen a side.

54 İskender Fikret Akdora, “Ankarada Yardım Severler Cemiyetini Ziyaret”, *Savaş*, no. 25 (Ankara: Tan Matbaası, March 15, 1941), ps. 2, 16.

55 Bali Rifat N., *II. Dünya Savaşı’nda Gayrimüslimlerin Askerlik Serüveni: Yirmi Kur’a Nafia Askerleri* (İstanbul: Kitabevi, 2008), p. 29.

5.1.3 War in Cinema and Radio

A booklet entitled *Komünizm Propagandası 2* (*Communist Propaganda 2*), probably published just after the Second World War, points out cinema's important role in wartime propaganda:

During war time, we saw films – supposedly love stories –that showed air force or navy maneuvers from beginning to end. Given these images, the reasonable spectator left the theater with a certain belief; emotionally, on the other hand, they had either feeling of good faith or of hate and anger depending on their partisanship.⁵⁶

The previous chapter discusses at length that film is an important medium of propaganda and summarizes the activities of the young Republic in the film industry. During the Second World War, while the Turkish government was continuing its propaganda activities using films, it also witnessed the propaganda films of Allied and Axis forces. This is why foreign films were censored and further vetting was applied to films that foreigners wished to broadcast in Turkey.

An important dimension of film during wartime was that the public's sources of information regarding the war were limited – people were curious. Cinema was seen as a good medium to satisfy this curiosity. An editorial of the May 1942 issue of *Yurt ve Dünya* (*Homeland and World*) magazine discussed the position of cinema in the modern world. According to the author, cinema “is one of the most important mediums that connects us with the outer world.”⁵⁷ The Second World War piqued people's curiosity and worried them. Even though it directly affected economic and social life, the people remained mostly unaware of recent developments. Such developments with respect to the war were communicated narrowly after being filtered by the Turkish state, if not also by Allied or Axis forces.

Did the party use films to inform people about the war, while using actuality films to inform society on internal affairs? Behiç Köksal, who was working in the film industry in that period, says:

56 *Komünizm Propagandası II*, p. 4. The booklet is in Turkish. The publication date, the name of the publishing house, and the author are not written on the booklet.

57 *Yurt ve Dünya*, no. 17 (May 1942), p. 121.

Between 1942 and 1943 the Second World War was continuing with all its violence. The only news we got was that we listened to on the radio... We did not know have more details on the war... People wanted to learn the details of the war...⁵⁸

Just after the war began in December 1939, activities in the Ankara People's House were arranged to raise awareness of the war. A three-minute long film entitled *Donating Winter Articles to Soldiers* (*Askerlere Kışlık Hediye*) was produced by the Ankara People's House and screened in all People's Houses and movie theaters. A pamphlet on the activities of the People's House reads, "In a time when the world is dragged into war, caution and discretion on national issues is advised."⁵⁹



Figure 5.2 Sequences from *Donating Winter Articles to Soldiers*

An article on the film published in *Cumhuriyet*, probably borrowed these quotations from the film:

58 Karagözoğlu, 2004, p. 84.

59 *In 1940, 635,501 citizens came to the Ankara People's House*, p. 25.

Winter conditions are merciless in most of Turkey. The Ankara People's House calls people to duty with a short film... How can we forget about the heroic Turkish soldier who defends our borders when we are sitting comfortably at home? When we are sleeping, he is always awake, when we are sitting, he is standing straight, when we are in our warm bed, he is waiting in a foxhole. We owe our serenity to his bayonet that shines through the centuries... We are ready to give him whatever we own, but for the time being, just preparing presents that show him that we remember and commemorate him... For example, a muffler, a pair of socks, a pair of gloves would deliver the warmth of our hearts to him. Handing over these winter presents to Turkish Red Cross members that ring as our doors is our pleasure and an honorable duty... The hero that will feel your nameless spirit through the warmth of his body will remember you with a happy smile.⁶⁰

Kenan Erginsoy, the talented film operator of the Ankara People's House made the film. It was shot in the Ankara People's House, and Ali Rıza, an employee and his family were the actors. Soldiers were played by soldiers working at the Ethnography Museum next door. In a way, the film is the equivalent of an American film urging people to buy war bonds. Turkey had not entered the war, but the Turkish soldier was already waiting in the foxhole, and reminding people of the sacrifices of soldiers compelled the people to abstain from complaining about the day's social and economic problems.

During wartime, the People's Houses contributed to the activities of the political authorities through social support offices. The People's House itself was a symbol of the party/state for the people, and these houses connected wealthy people with organizations like the Red Crescent. Through their networks, they contributed to social support activities as much as their capacity allowed.⁶¹ War and methods of safeguarding against it became important issues on the agendas of People's Houses with the outbreak of the Second World War. The Yozgad People's House hosted two conferences by Staff Captain Ekrem Babacan in 1940: "Passive Protection and Propaganda" and "War and

60 *Cumhuriyet* (December 27, 1940), p. 5.

61 Metinsoy, 2007, ps. 339, 343.

Our Situation.”⁶² Also in 1940, the Adapazarı People’s House organized conferences on combatting enemy paratroopers.⁶³ The topics of RPP and DGP films were directly affected by the war. Productions by the DGP started towards the end of 1941. The fifth issue of *Radıyo* magazine was devoted to the Turkish army and stated that Turkish national movement was based on the Turkish army. For this reason, the army was to be included in all DGP films.⁶⁴

A newsreel entitled *Thrace Maneuvers – 1939* (*Trakya Manevraları – 1939*) produced by the RPP is an obvious example of the military presence in movies. One of the movies sent by the General Staff upon my request also concerns the National Chief’s maneuvers in Thrace in 1939. Both the DGP and the General Staff filmed these maneuvers, which started on August 15, 1939, to use for propaganda purposes. The maneuvers occurred under the command of Field Marshall Fevzi Çakmak with the participation of President İnönü, Minister of Foreign Affairs Saraçoğlu, and Prime Minister Saydam, as well as foreign military attachés. The screening of Thrace Maneuvers in the People’s Houses remarkably showed the power of the army to the people, enhancing feelings of patriotism on the eve of the war. The 1937 Thrace maneuvers of Atatürk were also filmed by the RPP and screened in movie theaters. These were a show of strength against Mussolini’s “Mare Nostrum” project and the forthcoming Nazi threat. Reflections of the politics of balance conducted by the government were also seen in the movies.

62 Erdal, 2013, p. 165.

63 Olgun, 2008, p. 146.

64 İzzeddin Nişbay, “MUM Filmleri”, *Radıyo*, no. 5 (February 15, 1942), p. 28.



Figure 5.3 Thrace Maneuvers, 1937 © Uğur Kavas

At the end of 1941, the DGP produced newsreels dealing with both sides. One newsreel was about a feast given for the German press committee led by Dr. Schmidt, and another concerned a soccer game in Ankara between Turkey and the United Kingdom.

The meeting of Churchill and İnönü in Adana in 1943 was also filmed in silent format by the DGP and shown in theaters.⁶⁵

After martial law was declared in Istanbul, Kırklareli, Edirne, Tekirdağ, Dardanelles, and Kocaeli on November 20, 1940, blackouts affected movie theaters, as well. Due to the blackouts, which would continue in intervals until the end of the war, screening hours were changed.⁶⁶ At this moment, news spread of the screening of a film on the war. Though there is little information on the film, the Ulus Movie Theater in Ankara was invaded by a flock of curious citizens excited to see a film on the war. However, the film was actually a ten-minute newsreel by the French Pathé Film Company, and the audience

65 “M.U.M Filmleri”, *Radıyo*, no. 16 (March 15, 1943), p. 20.

66 Gökmen, 1989, p. 149.

got angry. The newsreel was not enough to satisfy their curiosity and they ransacked the building. The owner of the theater tried to explain that he was himself deceived, but he could not convince the crowd and was forced to return the ticket fees.⁶⁷

Before the Second World War, the screening of world news was a regular practice before screening of foreign films in Turkish movie theaters. But during the sensitive period of the Second World War, the state needed to control the content of films that could be political. Archival documents on the censorship of films are enlightening with respect to this subject. On October 31, 1940, the Minister of Internal Affairs wrote to the Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs informing them that parts of imported English military newsreels would offend the Germans and Italians. Even though the committee edited out the scenes in question, these films were propaganda, the result was dissatisfying, and the minister requested permission to ban such films completely. The response of the Prime Minister was affirmative. Even though Turkey was closer to the Allied forces by this point in the war, they did not want to offend Axis forces. von Papen's continuous pressure on the Turkish government factored into this attitude; indeed, it is why Germany had appointed a forceful bureaucrat like von Papen as the ambassador. The prime ministry allowed a ban on English military newsreels that defamed or heavily propagandized against the German or Italian governments.⁶⁸

Shortly after the beginning of the war, foreigners were banned from screening newsreels in theaters. After June 1941, foreign films were rigorously censored. New regulations banned films of the war fronts or anything regarding the war. One purpose of propaganda films was to make sure people recognized the uniforms of Allied and Axis soldiers in the case of an occupation.⁶⁹ The fact that such precautions became more strict by June 1941 shows that the government was implementing new measures in accord with the course of the war. Germans neared the border of Thrace just before Operation Barbarossa,

67 Karagözoğlu, 2004, p. 84.

68 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Directorate General of Transactions, Cat. no: 030 10, Box no: 235 Folder no: 584 Row no: 15 pp. 1-2.

69 Seydi, 2006, pp. 184-187.

and the Turkish government diligently protected the balance between the two warring sides with no margin of error.

Along with everything else, the war affected the Turkish film industry. Film companies that usually imported films from France and Germany had problems finding films. Given the scarcity, price increases were at the discretion of importers. Some companies began importing films from America instead of Europe, so that they had films to distribute.⁷⁰ These Films were imported by ships that would first stop in Alexandria or Cairo. From time to time, these ships were bombed.⁷¹ During the shortage, films were not only imported from the West but also from Egypt. Between 1938 and 1944, The number of films imported from Egypt was actually higher than the number of domestic films,⁷² and given the scarcity of Turkish films, Egyptian films attracted viewers. Clips of Turkish artists and the songs of singers like Münir Nurettin Selçuk and Müzeyyen Senar were spliced into these films, and as such, a hybrid film type was born.⁷³ In an article published in *Yurt ve Dünya*, Mediha Berkes complained that people who valued such films did not represent the Turkish public. While there was a shortage of local films, the dubbing foreign films was prosperous. For instance, the Russian operetta *Cossacks Beyond the Danube* was screened as *Janissary Hasan* after Turkish folk songs were added to it.⁷⁴

As the previous chapter analyzes with the outbreak of the Second World War, the army acted immediately to use cinema more effectively by shooting drills and education movies for use by both the army to teach technical knowledge and by the general public to increase awareness of war-related topics. For this reason, cinema equipment was imported from Germany,⁷⁵ but there is no information about where and how these movies were shown.

During the Second World War cinema was not just “entertainment”, it also informed and formed people’s opinions. Furthermore as the population was

70 Filmer, 1984, p. 178.

71 Akçura, 1995, p. 27.

72 Öztürk, 2010, p. 331.

73 Çam, 2011, p. 10.

74 The opera concerns Ukranian Kazakhs who fought in the name of the Sultan. Berkes M., 1942, pp. 146-147.

75 Öztürk, 2005, pp. 229-237.

going through a tough period, forgetting about reality and diving into a world of imagination allowed films to easily reach people's inner worlds. Both the Axis and Allied forces tried to benefit from the allure of this art form to influence people as much as the government would allow. Measures taken under the imposition of martial law created obstacles, but they nevertheless managed to share films that furthered their causes with the public. The next section focuses on German and British efforts to that end.

The war had also reflections on Turkish radio. As the third chapter explains, radio had come under the control of the state by 1940. *Radyo* magazine's second issue, dated January 1942, declares that a series of interviews would be conducted every Monday with active privates, including an interview by Behçet Kemal Çağlar with private Mehmet GÜDÜLLÜ of Sivas. In the interview, private Mehmet stated that military service was a great opportunity for a village boy – it meant taking a train, seeing an airplane, using machines, and learning to read and write. This interview series, entitled *Hour of Heroes* (*Kahramanlar Saati*), would continue one hour each week as privates and officers shared their “heroic” memoirs. In *Radyo* magazine, it was remarked that these accounts of heroism refresh the pride of the people and their faith in future glories.⁷⁶

During the war, government officials used radio to reach the people and gave speeches justifying the rigid measures taken by the state. These speeches had a nationalist character to heighten the spirit of patriotism among people. Prime Minister Refik Saydam delivered such a speech on the radio on February 1, 1942, which according to Sarper was influential for the people.⁷⁷ Saydam advised the people not to believe on erroneous rumors about rising gold prices. According to Sarper, the following Monday gold prices decreased by one or two Turkish liras by virtue of “gracious listeners.” Sarper makes another worth point: he explains that the day following Saydam's speech a telegraph arrived from Zonguldak where a citizen named Sabri Sancak had uprooted his beautiful flower garden to grow food, instead. The destruction of

76 “Kahramanlar Saati”, *Radyo*, no. 3 (February 15, 1942), p. 7.

77 Selim Sarper, “Ankara Radyosu Milletin Emrinde”, *Radyo*, no. 3 (February 15, 1942), p. 1.

flower gardens to plant vegetables was a common practice to contribute to the public food supply in wartime.⁷⁸

Another remarkable radio program from the Second World War consisted of discussions on the economy by Hazım Atıf Kuyucak, which helped steer the audience in the direction the state wished them to go. The main emphasis of Kuyucak's talks was the importance and necessity of economizing during wartime.

5.1.4 *Peace at Home Peace in the World: Getting Close with the British Against Germany and Italy*

Before the war, the Turkish government concerned about the occupation of Czechoslovakia and Albania. To show it was on the side of peace, it published a joint statement with Britain on May 12, 1939.

Before the triple alliance of Turkey, Britain, and France that would be signed on October 19, 1939, there were signals of their rapport. In the "Reflections" section of the August 1939 issue of *Ayın Tarihi* (*The History of the Month*) magazine, an article entitled "British Friendship and the French Navy" by *Cumhuriyet* newspaper's Abidin Daver was published.⁷⁹ In this article, Daver says that during a gathering he attended at Ayaspaşa, he saw the British and Turkish navies anchored "side by side, in line, as though they were parts of the same fleet" and that these navies were the protectors of the peace. According to Daver, Turkish-British friendship, Turkish-French friendship, and Turkish-Soviet friendship are the three legged-pedestal of peace in the Mediterranean, the Near East, and even the Balkans.⁸⁰ An article by Sırrı Sanlı in the local newspaper of İzmir, *Halkın Sesi* (*Voice of People*) was republished in

78 Mussolini forced people to plant wheat in their city garden. In Soviet Russia, home gardens were a theme of the agitators. Collective vegetable gardens were seen as channels where laborers could practice organizationalism. In the United States and in the United Kingdom, the city gardens were called "Victory gardens." These gardens were a significant sign of support for the war effort on the home front.

79 Abidin Daver usually wrote a column entitled "Hem nalına, hem mihına" (Talk out of both sides of your mouth) in *Cumhuriyet* newspaper.

80 Abidin Daver, "İngiliz Dostluğu ve Türk Donanması", *Ayın Tarihi*, no. 69 (Ankara: Basın Genel Direktörlüğü, August 1939), pp. 82-83.

Ayın Tarihi on August 2, 1939. The subject was “the visit of the mighty battleship Malaya of beloved friend and loyal ally, Great Britain” to İzmir. The article said the visit joyfully excited the citizens of İzmir and that the British-Turkish alliance was foremost to save peace and humanity and to protect freedom and the future. This visit was defined as the most humane and civilized event of the century.⁸¹

In the same August 1939 issue of *Ayın Tarihi* there was also an article by Burhan Belge that had been published in *Ulus* newspaper. Belge criticized Goebbels’ New Order of Europe project in which Europe would organize under the leadership of Italy and Germany. He further criticized Goebbels for not including countries outside Europe with regard to the subject of “freedom of nations.” The ideal of Goebbels was not the freedom of nations, but a “corporation” that would use and exploit the whole world for its benefit.⁸²

Ayın Tarihi was published under the management of the Directorate General of the Press and Publishing, a subdivision of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Therefore, the magazine unequivocally communicated an official position. In August 1939, *Ayın Tarihi* favored news and articles that supported Allied forces and allowed for criticism of Germany and Italy.

On October 19, 1939, the treaty by Turkey, Britain, and France was signed right after Western countries joined the war on September 3, 1939. This alliance was politically and economically significant. In a sense, it shattered the monopoly of German capital in Turkey and brought Turkey closer to Allied powers. Later on, the Turkish government had to justify the treaty and its convergence with Allied powers against the expansionist and oppressive attitude of the Axis forces.

The RPP tried to inform the public about the war via conferences. Such proceedings emphasized the might of the Turkish army and the technologies it used. One article reads, “...all fronts of our national defense, both material and moral, are complete and stringent. The tenacity and will on the faces of

81 Sırrı Sanlı, “İngiliz Harp Gemisi İzmir Körfezi’nde ve İzmirliilerin Gönüllerinde”, *Ayın Tarihi*, no. 69 (Ankara: Basın Genel Direktörlüğü, August 1939), pp. 455-456.

82 Burhan Belge, “Kendisine Zarar Veren Propaganda”, *Ayın Tarihi*, no. 69 (Ankara: Basın Genel Direktörlüğü, August 1939), pp. 455- 456.

heroic soldiers waiting along our borders is sufficient explanation for everything.” As such, the author highlights the bravery of the Turkish soldier. Furthermore, National Chief İnönü’s successes in the War of Independence are recalled and the assertion that the anchored masses of the Turkish nation are gathered around the National Chief is repeated.⁸³

Circulars published by the RPP present data that evince the closeness between the Turkish government and Britain. A document prepared for conferences asks participants to underscore the power and penetration of Britain in five continents, limitless natural and financial resources, and human power. The circular is dated May 1941. What does it mean the government needs to explain its closeness with Britain in 1941? First was the fact that France was unexpectedly occupied by Germany in 1940; Thus the leaders of the government feared having “chosen the wrong side”⁸⁴ and were avoiding possible public criticism. Another reason was the many advocates of fascism. To balance the voices of these groups and prepare the public for cooperation with Allied forces in a possible war, the government needed to justify and explain the association with Britain.

Bu Harbin Kitabı (*The Book of This War*) was presented as a resource for conference participants.⁸⁵ The exact title of the book dated March 1941 is *The Book of This War: The War of 1939, the Turkey-Britain Alliance, and the Great British Empire*. Its author, Mümtaz Faik Fenik, was the editor-in-chief of *Ulus*, a semi-official newspaper. Later on he would become a member of the parliament from Ankara in the first period of DP.⁸⁶ In the book, the use of first person plural implies that the thoughts expressed are those of the Party. The first section is reserved for Turkish foreign policy and a justification of the alliance between Turkey and Britain. The author later explains what “great state” means. The author argues that even before the war began, Europe was divided in two. One side “was gathered around Germany as aggressors and invaders;

83 Çakan, 2004, pp. 171-172.

84 Selim Deringil, *Denge Oyunu: İkinci Dünya Savaşında Türkiye’nin Dış Politikası* (Istanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1994), pp. 267.

85 Çakan, 2004, pp.172.

86 Fenik was an MP from Rize. Saim Dilemre motivated him to write the book.

the other side gathered around Britain under the principles of ‘peace and security’ to protect the rights, freedoms, and independence of smaller countries.” The German side was defined as a destructive flood and the British side was defined as a dam, the sole purpose of which was to prevent this flood. Fenik said that Turkey choose not to be a wave in the flood, but preferred to be part of the concrete in the dam.⁸⁷ A joint declaration on May 12, 1939, highlights the equal conditions of the alliance between Turkey and Britain, “the greatest state of the world.” The book openly expresses the wish that the war will conclude in favor of “our British friends.”⁸⁸ To establish this wish on concrete ideas and prove the power of Britain, the author describes on Britain’s economy, geography, and military in chapters entitled “What is a Great State?” and “Why Britain is a Great State?”

This book, which was intended as a reference book for conferences, is openly pro-Britain. While advocating the British cause, the author emphasizes the right of freedom for small countries and criticizes Germany and Italy for their aggression.⁸⁹ The occupation of Iran by Britain and Russia in August 1941 thus became a bargaining chip for Germany. The occupation of Iran was received negatively in the Turkish public. The press said the occupation was not unlike the occupations of neutral countries by Germany, and the public was worried about a similar attack on Turkey because of its alliance with the Soviet Union.⁹⁰

In 1942, a book edited by Churchill’s son consisting of the speeches of Churchill on war was translated and published in Turkey.⁹¹ After Germany attacked the Soviet Union, Turkey favored Germany. The timing of the publishing of this book suggests that it was orchestrated by Britain. The speeches in the book focus on the power of the Allied forces.

87 Mümtaz Faik Fenik, *Bu Harbin Kitabı, 1939 Harbi, Türkiye- İngiltere ittifakı ve Büyük Britanya İmparatorluğu* (Ankara: Zerbamat Basımevi, March 1941), p. 3.

88 Fenik, 1941, p. 10.

89 Colonies were presented as a precondition of being among the great states, and the author emphasizes Britain’s mission to bring order to its colonies.

90 Seydi, 2006, p. 215.

91 *Winston S. Churchill’in Harp Nutukları: Bu Harbin İçyüzü* (İstanbul: Muallim Ahmet Halit Kitabevi), 1942.

5.1.5 "A Chief Lives in Turkey": Traces of Affiliation with Germany After March 1941

The fifth issue of *Radıyo* dated April 15, 1942, was devoted to the Turkish army. In the editorial, Sarper used the Philharmonic Orchestra, which performed every Saturday afternoon in Ankara, as a metaphor, comparing the maestro to the National Chief, İnönü. According to Sarper the nation must be conducted like an orchestra with respect to the division of work, congruity of goals, and discipline.... For all time, people have selected the smartest, most heroic, and most reliable from among the community as chiefs, and they would die with a simple sign from her or him. According to Sarper, even after a *crescendo*, with the smallest move of the magic wand of the maestro, the Turkish nation had the power to take even greater action.⁹²

The single-party regime that continued during the Second World War was congruent with the politics of the world. While the war ensured economic growth for land owners, it wore peasants and workers out. Thus, opposition by different classes to government bureaucracy increased. Groups that took issue with the state gathered behind the DP after the war.⁹³ The suffering of peasants during wartime was fodder for the DP propaganda against the RPP.⁹⁴ The Istanbul Regional Director of the DP said prior to 1946 elections: "Our election propaganda is simply the actions of the RPP up until present", a clear expression of the perception of the RPP in the aftermath of the Second World War.⁹⁵

Turkey was allied with the Allied forces until March 1941; however, when Axis forces advanced to Balkans, Ankara was cornered. Turkish-German relations were revived and a period of affiliation began. Germany wanted to

92 Selim Sarper, "Aklımdan Geçenler", *Radıyo*, no. 5 (April 15, 1942), p. 1.

93 Baskın Oran, "İç ve Dış Politika İlişkisi Açısından İkinci Dünya Savaşında Türkiye'de Siyasal Hayat ve Sağ- Sol Akımlar", *A.Ü. SBF Dergisi*, vol. 24, no. 3 (Ankara: Sevinç Matbaası, September 1969), p. 275.

94 Metinsoy, 2007, p. 35

95 Murat Burgaç, "1946 Genel Seçimlerinde Propaganda", *Çağdaş Türkiye Tarihi Araştırmaları Dergisi*, XIII/26 (2013-Spring), p. 166.

know Turkey's position on the Balkan Campaign, and the Turkish government wanted to be certain Germany would not attack Turkey.⁹⁶ Until the German-Turkish Non-Aggression Pact was signed, correspondence between İnönü and Hitler, as well as Papen's efforts, created the conditions to soften Turkish-German relations. Following the pact, the Turkish press also supported the softening of relations. Zekeriya Sertel wrote in *Tan* that trust between Turkey and Germany were reestablished and the rumors had ended. The British alliance was not shelved, but the harsh criticism of Germany that characterized the first years of the war was quieted. It was declared that there was no and would be no change in Turkish foreign policy.⁹⁷ *Cumhuriyet*, published pictures of Hitler and İnönü side-by-side and the headline read, "Sincere Congratulations between the Führer and Our National Chief." Next to the picture, repercussions of the pact for Allied Forces were evaluated. According to *Cumhuriyet*, the German-Turkish pact was well-received in America; this step was not perceived as an act against Britain, but as an act against the Soviet Union.⁹⁸ In a short time, Operation Barbarossa would begin.

A week after the pact was signed, Yunus Nadi wrote an article in *Cumhuriyet* that demonstrates how much the anti-German politics adopted by the public and state leaders explained above had changed or even completely been rejected:

In the depressed days of the last two years, certain propagandists wished to damage German-Turkish friendship; however, they did not succeed in their inimical endeavor... The Turkish press and real intellectuals always refrained from publications that would harm Turkish-German friendship; the Turkish people always protected positive feelings towards the Germans in their heart of hearts."⁹⁹

Such a radical change in approach influenced the activities of the single-party regime in internal affairs, as well. The government employed aggressive and

96 Cemil Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi (1938- 1945)*, vol. 1 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1996), pp. 532-534.

97 Koçak, 1996, ps. 588, 591.

98 "Ankara Paktı Amerika'da Derin Heyecan Uyandırdı", *Cumhuriyet* (June 21, 1941), p. 1.

99 Yunus Nadi, "Türk- Alman Dostluğu", *Cumhuriyet* (June 27, 1941), ps. 1,5.

exclusionist politics. On November 1, 1942, the speech of İnönü opening new session of the GNAT received much attention. İnönü began by mentioning the disastrous consequences of the world war, claiming there was no hint of any pact between the two sides in the near future. In such times, citizens have duties. According to İnönü, the only solution is “to stay outside the war in order to lessen the pain and increase the endurance of the people. And in case the country enters the war, in order to get out with honor and peace, the only solution is to help the government with vehemence.”¹⁰⁰

This speech resonated with the press, which shared the opinions of the government. Burhan Belge, in an article published in *Tan* entitled “A Chief Lives in Turkey”, said that İnönü was like a father figure. He reprimanded “all of us, as a father who was aware of our guilt and reproached in order to warn.” According to Belge, İnönü had to make certain decisions equivalent to the decisions of the councils of the War of Independence. In the end “a chief lives in this country, and he reminded the public of their duties.”¹⁰¹

In this period, people did not support the state as much expected, especially given the financial measures taken. The single-party regime, which is the focus in the third chapter, propagandized through the press, radio, cinema, magazines, and conferences; but these were ineffective when the people were suffering.

During the war, the state continued with its endeavor to create subjects that would legitimize political power through social engineering efforts. However, these subjects were not classless or equal as the Republican regime imagined or wished. Minority politics during the Second World War are critical for understanding the ideology and practices of the state. Rıfat Bali claims that the ideal of creating “citizens from subjects”, which was one of the most prominent ideals of the Republic, failed when it came to non-Muslim citizens. This

100 “Vesikalar: Milli Şef Cumhurreisi İsmet İnönü’nün Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisinin 6. Seçim devresinin 4. Toplanma yılını açık nutku”, *Ayın Tarihi*, no. 108 (November 1942), pp. 21-24.

101 Burhan Belge, “Türkiye’de Bir Şef Yaşar”, *Tan*, November 11, 1942, in *Ayın Tarihi*, no. 108 (November 1942), pp. 50-51.

was due to official policies conducted between 1939 and 1945.¹⁰² Minority politics, aside from its economic consequences, had other negative effects. It was much like a psychological war. The situation was even more tragic for Jewish people. Lime bags left in front of Jewish soldiers' tents for laundry had different connotations.

Under the implementation of Twenty Classes (*Yirmi Kur'a Askerlik*) all male non-Muslims born between 1894 and 1913 were conscripted in 1941.¹⁰³ 12 thousand of the non-Muslim men conscripted by the April 22, 1941, decree of the Council of Ministers were not issued military uniforms until July 1942. They worked in Labor Battalions under the command of the Ministry of Public Services, and were employed in road construction and repair as the General Staff deemed fit.¹⁰⁴ German soldiers on the borders of Thrace were used as justification for their conscription. There are three main suppositions on the conscription of non-Muslims. The first was that the government was wary of non-Muslims collaborating with one side in the war or the other, which could be detrimental to the interests of Turkey. The second supposition is that the government wished to immediately finish roads and bridges that were crucial to the fortification of defense lines. The third is that the government wished to weaken the position of non-Muslims in commerce.¹⁰⁵

The fact that non-Muslims were not given weapons demonstrates that the Turkish identity nurtured after the revolution did not include non-Muslims. With respect to the Soviet Union, Kalinin states that Azeri, Turkmen, Uzbek, Kazak, and Kirgiz people all fought during the Second World War; the only requirement of the non-Russian soldiers was that they learn Lenin's language: Russian.¹⁰⁶ Though the army taught Turkish to those who did not speak the language, Turkish-speaking, non-Muslim minority soldiers were not issued

102 Rıfat N. Bali, "Savaş Yıllarında Türkiye Yahudileri", *Toplumsal Tarih*, no. 121 (January 2004), p. 91.

103 Bali, 2004, p. 90.

104 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Council of Ministers' Decrees, Cat. no: 030 18 1 2, Box no: 94 Folder no: 33 Row no: 17 p. 1.

105 Bali, 2008, p. 67.

106 Kalinin, 1976, pp. 197-199.

weapons, but Muslim soldiers of different ethnicities who did not speak Turkish were issued them. At this point, it is necessary to contemplate who, then, was included in the officially acceptable Turkish identity.¹⁰⁷

Near the end of 1941, the Nazis launched an anti-Semitism campaign in Turkey that had proved successful in Arab countries. A discourse summed up by the question: “How long will you allow Jewish people to suck your blood and take your business?” was used mainly to influence businessmen in Istanbul. Anti-Semite propaganda was also carried out by German spies that mingled with the public.¹⁰⁸ In her memoir, Sabiha Sertel wrote that the Wealth Tax Act was deployed using Nazi methods and Şükrü Saraçoğlu was taught well by his “master”, von Papen.¹⁰⁹ Saracoğlu’s position, published in *Cumhuriyet* newspaper on January 21, 1943, is clear: “If these people who got rich benefiting from the hospitality of this country refrain from performing their duties to it in such a crucial time, this law shall be implemented with its all force.”¹¹⁰

The treasurer of Istanbul, Faik Ökte stated that the wealth tax was stamped with “chauvinist nationalism and racism”, and he noted that it is piteous that Saraçoğlu, a gentleman, led the government that proposed this bill.¹¹¹ Before Saraçoğlu, Saydam undertook similar measures. On May 4, 1942, when a request for supplementary allowance from the AA came before parliament, Ziya Gevher Etili,¹¹² a parliamentarian from Çanakkale, said:

The Anadolu Agency is a national institution. The Anadolu Agency employs the purest elements of the country. I hate to say it but such a national institution has recently become an international organ. My friends, I see that half of its employees are not of my race. These people are servants of the Levantine who have been using economics against

107 As pointed out by Beşikçi, “the Ottoman conscription system had a discriminatory character towards non-Muslims” and during the First World War, non-Muslims were employed in the unarmed service. Beşikçi, 2012, p. 314.

108 Seydi, 2006, p. 38.

109 Sabiha Sertel, *Roman Gibi: Demokrasi Mücadelesinde Bir Kadın* (Istanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1987), p. 237.

110 Akar, 2009, p. 81.

111 Faik Ökte, *Varlık Vergisi Faciası* (Istanbul: Nebioğlu Yayınevi, 1951), p. 211.

112 Ziya Gevher was not chosen as a candidate in the next elections in 1943.

the state to exhaust the nation. My Nation, my party, my parliament, my state does not accept such people.¹¹³

Although the AA was a private company and did not have organic ties to the state aside from “financial subvention” it received, the contracts of twenty-six Jewish employees were abruptly terminated on May 4, 1942.¹¹⁴

The wealth tax was enacted on November 1942. Even though it was not the direct product of Nazi propaganda, there was an underlying agenda of ingratiating the Turkish government with the Germans. During debate over the law, the MP from Antalya, Rasih Kaplan, recalled the exemplary conduct of Anatolian merchants and capitalists during the War of Independence, stating that Turkish businessmen would commit to their duties to the fatherland in this dangerous time.¹¹⁵ According to Yetkin, the wealth tax reforms “created an image that those responsible for the poverty of people were being punished.”¹¹⁶

It is widely accepted that the wealth tax was a wartime exigency. Zafer Toprak states that due to the Wealth Tax and Agricultural Products Law (*Toprak Mahsulleri Vergisi*), the consumer price index went down from 69 percent in 1942 to 49 percent in 1943 and to -2 percent in 1944 despite the inconvenience of assessment and accrual of the tax.¹¹⁷ Ökte calculated the success of the tax differently. The wealth tax provided an income of 221 million Turkish Lira to the treasury; however, this was not enough to compensate the lawlessness and disorder created by the tax. Ökte said the functioning of factories and workshops was stopped because of wealth tax; businesses were closed or given individuals who did not have the know-how to run them and as a result, order was destroyed.¹¹⁸

The tax targeted non-Muslims and was used as a vehicle for the Turkification of national capital. Prime Minister Saraçoğlu presented the law during a

113 Alemdar, 1996, p. 78.

114 Glasneck, 1970, p. 26.

115 “11 Kasım 1942 Hadiseleri”, *Ayın Tarihi*, no. 108 (November 1942), p. 9.

116 Yetkin, 1983, p. 214.

117 Toprak, 2004, p. 75.

118 Ökte, 1951, pp. 209- 210.

closed-session meeting of the RPP that and said the domination of foreigners in the market would end with this act. The Turkish market would belong to Turks. By foreigners, Saraçoğlu meant non-Muslim Turkish citizens.¹¹⁹ Ayhan Aktar states that Istanbul newspapers had begun defining non-Muslims as profiteers, racketeers, and pillagers by the summer of 1942; in other words the propaganda of the wealth tax began before the act was adopted.¹²⁰ Ökte categorized high profile taxpayers based on religious and ethnic identities: M for Muslim, E for foreigner, G for non-Muslim, and D for *Dönmeh* (Jews who converted to Islam).¹²¹ German Nazi propaganda was apparently influential in a way in the careless addition of an extra zero to wealth tax accruals proven by the fact that there was no right to object to the act, and the implementation of the Twenty Classes. That only non-Muslims who did not pay their taxes were sent to Aşkale Labor Camp and that even mentally-ill non-Muslims were conscripted in accordance with the Twenty Classes were fact consistent with the zeitgeist.

Zafer Toprak claims that the Agricultural Products Law was more “cruel” compared to the wealth tax, as peasants could not voice their plight as easily as the minorities who endured the wealth tax. The reaction of the peasants would be seen in time when the regime changed to a multi-party system.¹²² The war would wear away the government. Even though the single-party re-

119 In the table presented in the memoir of Faik Ökte, non-Muslim taxpayers comprise 87 percent of total taxpayers. Muslims comprise only 7 percent. The remainder is a mixed group of non-Muslims and foreigners. Ayhan Aktar, “Varlık Vergisi’nin Hikâyesi”, *Toplumsal Tarih*, no. 121 (January 2004), p. 84.

120 Şaka, the comic magazine published by Cemal Erksan, was filled with news on the wealth tax in 1943. Comic strips and comedic texts implied that non-Muslims got what was coming to them. In the 117th issue of the magazine, dated February 4, 1943, “The Joke of the Week” section said “When it comes to give and take, they always take: they take permission, goods, shares, profits, apartment buildings, and the joy of living. We give licence, money, consent, our lives at the borders. This time they are giving money and we are just saying never mind.” These words suggest the wealth tax was the revenge of the common people. “Haftanın Şakası”, *Şaka Mizah Dergisi*, Year:3 vol. 5 no. 117 (Istanbul: Ahmet Sait Matbaası, February 1, 1943), p. 4.

121 Aktar, 2004, pp. 82-83.

122 Toprak, 2004, p. 75.

gime tried to keep the public under its control and convince them of the common object of national defense, it was unsuccessful. The government did not succeed in making the state's presence felt mainly because of a lack of technical capacity. As a result, the belief of the people in the "populist" aims and politics of the state weakened in time. In 1930, the Liberal Republican Party joined the first multi-party elections in Turkish history and won a considerable percentage of the electorate from regions that would become the future base for the DP. Even in those early years, the public was reacting to the RPP's politics and the economic conditions of the day.

To summarize, in the period up until 1939, the propaganda of the regime was shaped by the young Republic, revolution, and the spoils of the War of Independence. When the possibility of war emerged, the situation became a test of the capacity of the regime and its power over the public. The government employed policies that would leave farmers, workers, and minorities in a bind; its policies were unrelenting for all except the dominant class. After the attack of the German on the Soviet Union, the government escalated its discourse into a racist position and emphasized patriotism and nationalism to keep the nation united. The public criticized the government for being weak and helpless.¹²³ Çağlar Keyder states that during the war, the conditions of the state of emergency alienated middle-class peasants, who were the closest rural strata to the political mobilization. This affected the political arithmetic in the period to follow.¹²⁴ During the war, the growing gap between the state and the public resulted in the evaluations of "Populism" and "Etatism", the two most important ideologies of the "Six Arrows."

§ 5.2 Intelligence and Propaganda: Wars on Turkish Soil

Other factors that influenced the perception of the war for the Turkish government and the public during the Second World War were ideologies and social movements. Before focusing on propaganda activities in Turkey by the two sides of the war, I evaluate the reflection of the war through ideological

123 Faik Ahmet Barutçu, *Siyasi Anılar 1939- 1945* (Istanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1977), pp. 245-250.

124 Çağlar Keyder, "Türkiye Demokrasisinin Ekonomi Politikası", in *Geçiş Sürecinde Türkiye*, ed. Irvin Cemil Schick and Ertuğrul Ahmet Tonak (Istanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1990), p. 52.

movements of the period. Understanding the content of propaganda requires a knowledge of the ideological stance of the state and the dynamics of social movements. Ideological movements of the period reflect developments in global conjuncture and can be grouped into the fascist/anti-fascist binary opposition. The government's reactions and precautions with regard to these groups evolved according to the developments in the war. This section discusses the space given by the state to the alternative voices; in other words, how much did the state allow dissident positions to be voiced while finding to find its own equilibrium in the war?

Next, I focus on the propaganda and intelligence activities of Germany – representing fascism – and Britain – representing anti-fascism – and the approach of the Turkish government vis-à-vis these endeavors. Turkey land became an arena for intelligence and propaganda during the Second World War. Istanbul in particular became a base for the secret services of many countries involved in the war, such as Britain, Germany, the Soviet Union, France, Italy, the United States, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Romania. Most of the intelligence activity was concentrated in the Pera Palas Hotel. After Germany established an alliance with Bulgaria, George Rendel, British Ambassador to Sofya, “carried the war” to the Pera Palas in his baggage. On March 1941, bombs placed in his baggage by Germans, belatedly exploded in the Pera Palas, bringing the actual damage of the war to the hotel.¹²⁵ Turkish officials were watching closely and discovered intelligence agents among the hotels and restaurants frequented by foreigners. During the war, Germany and Britain in particular tried to bring Turkey into the fold using propaganda and intelligence activities. British intelligence activities were conducted in many parts of Anatolia, and of course in Istanbul and Ankara. For the British, the most important objective was to oppose German propaganda.

The success of British propaganda during the First World War motivated all countries – whether participants in the Second World War or not – to use propaganda to defend their sovereignty and legitimize their stances. I also analyze the place of cinema and magazines, the most important tools of propaganda of the period, among the activities of the Second World War.

125 Charles King, *Midnight at the Pera Palace: The Birth of Modern Istanbul* (New York & Londra: W. W. Norton, 2014), pp. 300-302.

5.2.1 *Fascism and the Anti-Fascist Front: Impact of Politics of Balance on Internal Affairs*

Even though Turkey did not actively join the Second World War, the Turkish people experienced the negative aspects of it as if they had joined. The National Defense Law, the Agricultural Products Law, the wealth tax, compulsory labor, conscription, and many other precautionary state policies forced especially people outside of the dominant classes into strenuous conditions. The ideological stance of the state and the position and balance of other currents of thought in society are key. At the end of the war, the tenability of the single-party regime began to be questioned, and an opposition emerged. At the beginning of the single-party period, the RPP explained the nature of the regime saying that the party comprised the whole nation; near the end of the war, İnönü said, “Our only deficiency is an opposing party.”¹²⁶

Actually the effects of the war at Turkey’s door-steps were double-sided, as they were for the rest of the world. There was a fascist Front – consisting of pan-Turanists and nationalists that sympathized with and advocated for the Axis Powers led by Germany – an antifascist, anti-war front – consisting of leftists, democrats, and in fewer numbers, liberals, though they did not exactly cooperate.

Baskın Oran, in an article analyzing political movements in Turkey during the Second World War, divides the leftist movement of the period in two: one in Istanbul and another in Ankara. The movement in Istanbul was organized around *Tan* newspaper, and in Ankara around Ankara University Humanities School (AUHS) and *Yurt ve Dünya* magazine. He classifies the Nihal Atsız and Reha Oğuz Türkkan branches of rightist movements,¹²⁷ which during the Second World War were stronger than leftist movements in Turkey. Oran claims that this imbalance was because the leftist movement could not adapt to conditions in Turkey after 1925, but the rightist movement found a global climate in which to prosper during the same period. The discourse of the rightist movement, which was nationalist and exalted Turkishness, was more appropriate for the pre-dominant nation-state spirit. Many representatives of the

126 Oran, 1969, p. 237.

127 Oran, 1969, p. 228.

leftist movement identified with the Soviet Union, even if they did not openly propagandize for communism or the Soviet system.¹²⁸

Şerif Mardin claims that the negative feelings of Turkish people towards communism rooted in the history of relations between Turkey and Russia. Marxism was a pariah in Turkey; indeed, the Kemalist government argued that Marxism was a hazardous doctrine based on class conflict. According to Mardin, enmity towards communism was easily provoked due to deep hatred of “separationist” doctrines.¹²⁹ With the non-aggression pact of 1925, relations between Turkey and Soviet Union improved. By the beginning of the 1930s, the two countries were culturally and socially close. Soviet Union had developed its relations with foreign countries like Turkey through the VOKS, namely the “All Union Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries.” In 1927, the president of the VOKS visited Turkey, hosted by İsmet İnönü and the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Aside from its political contacts, the VOKS was in contact with intellectuals such as Falih Rıfkı and Yakup Kadri.¹³⁰ In his book *Yeni Rusya (The New Russia)*, Falih Rıfkı evaluated Soviet methods of mass education, exploring how these could be adapted to the Turkish revolution. On April 26, 1932, İnönü visited the Soviet Union in the company of intellectuals like Yakup Kadri and Yunus Nadi. He was enthralled by the Soviet Union during this trip.¹³¹ Soviet Russians purposely invited İnönü so that he would be present on May 1 to impress him with the Red Army’s strength during the parade.

In 1936, German anti-communist propaganda in Turkey and rapport with the British caused Turkish-Soviet relations to abate. Between 1939 and 1940, the Turkish media started a campaign against the Soviets,¹³² and Turkey was unhappy with the eventual alliance of Britain and the United States with the Soviets during the Second World War. There was an underlying fear of a possible invasion after the war, and Germans used this point as a material for

128 Oran, 1969, p. 260.

129 Şerif Mardin, *Türk Modernleşmesi: Makaleler IV* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1991), pp. 184-185.

130 Çakan, 2004, p. 42.

131 Tacibayev, 2004, p. 85.

132 Tacibayev, 2004, p. 113.

propaganda in Turkey. Britain tried to appease the Turkish government, asserting that they would be allies with Turkey both during and after the war.¹³³ British Minister of Foreign Affairs Eden, in a meeting with Turkish Ambassador Aras, said that the British government only allied with the “socialist proletariat” and the “peasants” because they had to.¹³⁴ This is true: the countries that united against Germany – Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union – each had different goals and motives.¹³⁵

During the Second World War, newspaper and magazine publication was enriched and varied ideas communicated – despite the dire, general financial situation of the people. Even though there was strict control over the press by the state, political authorities left space for the press to ensure politics of balance on the condition that it would not make any print news that conflicted with the foreign policy and sensibilities of the state.¹³⁶

Yurt ve Dünya became one of the most important leftist magazines during the Second World War. Other anti-fascist magazines with a leftist tone, that drew attention to the effects of the Second World War in Turkey were *Ses, Sokak, Küllük, Yeni İnsanlık, Yeni Edebiyat*, and *Yürüyüş*.¹³⁷ *Yurt ve Dünya* was first published in January 1941, and its last issue was published in March 1944. The core of the staff consisted of Behice Boran, Pertev Naili Boratav, Niyazi and Mediha Berkes, and Adnan Cemgil. Most of the writers had studied sociology in United States and were teaching at the AUHS.¹³⁸ In the 1940s, the works of AUHS sociologists were the first products of both American and Marxist sociology in Turkey.¹³⁹ According to Kurtuluş Kayalı, the tendency in the social sciences of this period was openness to the present, the past, and the

133 In this period, they announced they respected Turkey’s territorial unity and would help Turkey if any country attacked.

134 Glasneck, 1970, p. 215.

135 Some claim the real war was waged by the imperial powers against Soviet Union; the aim was to pit Germany and the Soviet Union against each other.

136 Hasan Dinçer, “II. Dünya Savaşı Yıllarında Türkiye’de Bir Dergi: Yurt ve Dünya”, *Ankara Üniversitesi Türk İnkılâp Tarihi Enstitüsü Atatürk Yolu Dergisi* (Ankara, November 2008), p. 195.

137 Dinçer, 2008, p. 214.

138 A. Meltem Gevrek, “Yurt ve Dünya/ 1941- 1944: 1940’ların “solunun” Ankara çevresi”, *Toplum ve Bilim*, no. 78 (Autumn 1998), p. 256.

139 Kurtuluş Kayalı, *Türk Düşünce Dünyasında Yol İzleri* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2001), p. 58.

world. Kayalı notes that political structures of the 1940s put distanced everyday politics from academia.¹⁴⁰ Openness to universal thinking and universal scientific production were prevalent.¹⁴¹

Articles in *Yurt ve Dünya* are an important source to see the thought structure of the left. These usually focused on anti-fascism, anti-racism, anti-Turanism, a critique of capitalism, the fact that peasant population had been diminished through agricultural mechanization and relocated to industrial labor, protecting the developments of Kemalism, and freedom of scientific fields.¹⁴² As soon as the magazine was published, it drew the ire of racist-Turanist communities and was accused of being communist.¹⁴³ In his memoir, German law professor Hirsch notes that in this period in Turkey, sociology was seen as synonymous with communism.¹⁴⁴

Most authors in the magazine defined themselves as Kemalist. The reaction of the magazine to the wealth tax, for instance, was in line with the rest of the Turkish press since they justified the actions of the state. While they criticized Turanism for explaining problems through anti-Semitism, they remained silent concerning the consequences of the severe, cruel tax regime of the state – namely the wealth tax. According to Gevrek, authors of the magazine claimed that the wealth tax was not used to generate income, but to bring down the rate of inflation, ensure that products reached the market, and stabilize prices; furthermore, the new tax targeted ill-gotten gains. The magazine defended the state claiming that anti-democratic policies such as the annulment of appeals procedure with regard to the wealth tax were due to exigent circumstances.¹⁴⁵

The government's policies were usually endorsed, and any critiques were toned down as much as possible.¹⁴⁶ The magazine only criticized the RPP with

140 Kayalı, 2001, pp. 105-106.

141 Kayalı, 2001, p. 112.

142 Dinçer, 2008, p. 193.

143 Gevrek, 1998, pp. 260- 261.

144 Ernst Hirsch. *Anılarım: Kayzer Dönemi, Weimar Cumhuriyeti, Atatürk Ülkesi*, trans. Fatma Suphi (Ankara: Tübitak, 2000), p. 341.

145 Gevrek, 1998, p. 9.

146 Dinçer, 2008, p. 201.

regard to certain members' relationship with the rightist movement. They criticized the Minister of Agriculture, Hatipoğlu, and a parliamentarian from Çanakkale, Güntekin, for writing in *Gökbörü*, a Turanist magazine. The authors claim the principle of nationalism was secular and revolutionary; hence it does not consort with racism.¹⁴⁷

Şerif Mardin, in an article analyzing the roots of racism in Turkey describes racism as a parallel belief source to Islam for those who cannot reach the ideology of the West, and those who believe they are oppressed and not taken seriously by the bureaucratic aristocracy. Atsız defined racists as those fed with the “seeds of a broom” during the First World War, which Mardin attributes to feelings of being oppressed.¹⁴⁸ Racism, which is connected to fascism, was also advocated by people of high class, generally educated in Germany and thus had cultural or economic ties with the country. Scholarships given to Turkish students for education in Germany were one of the ploys of the Nazi Party to increase its influence in Turkey starting in 1934.¹⁴⁹ *Yurt ve Dünya* implied that Atsız, Çınaraltı, Bozkurt, and the authors of *Gökbörü* were only Turkist to further their personal interests, implying that they had financial relations with Germany.¹⁵⁰

Through amnesties issued during the Bayar government and İnönü's prime ministry, Zeki Velidi Togan, a member of Enver Pasha's family and one of the best-known Turanists, returned from exile and propagated Turanist propaganda among intellectuals, students, state officials, and military officials.¹⁵¹ Two of the foremost representatives of Turanism, Türkkan and Atsız were dissociated due to leadership disputes.

Bozkurt, of which Reha Oğuz Türkkan was editor-in-chief and for which Nihal Atsız wrote; *Çınaraltı*, for which Nihal Atsız and Peyami Safa, among others, wrote; *Gökbörü*, which was started by Türkkan after his separation from Atsız; *Büyük Doğu*; and *Kopuz* can be counted the racist and Turanist

147 Dinçer, 2008, p. 216.

148 Mardin, 1991, pp. 353-354.

149 Herbert Melzig, *Yakın Şarkta Alman Propagandası Hakkında Bir Muhtıra* (Ankara: Alâeddin Kırıl Basımevi, 1940), pp. 20-23.

150 Dinçer, 2008, p. 216.

151 Glasneck, 1970, p. 197.

magazines published during the Second World War.¹⁵² American author Colonel Hostler noted that the propaganda of such racist publications aimed to boost morale in case Turanism reached the point of political action.¹⁵³ The target audience was young people and officers. In the 1941 issues of *Çınaraltı*, a reminder noted that the magazine was being published to further national sentiments, national passions, and national dreams for Turkish youth; for the purposes of accessibility, officers and teachers could apply for a discount.¹⁵⁴

Especially after Operation Barbarossa, the Germans decided to leverage the chauvinist Turan movement to effectively involve Turkey in the war against the Soviet Union and profit from Turkish dislike of the Soviets.¹⁵⁵

Tan newspaper was another advocate of the anti-fascist front. The newspaper was founded by Sabiha and Zekeriya Sertel in Istanbul. Articles published in *Tan* at the beginning of the war were not much different from other publications; the difference was in its approach to foreign politics. As Zekeriya Sertel clearly articulated, the newspaper intended to render null negative propaganda aimed at the Soviet Union and create partiality towards it, instead.¹⁵⁶

In 1939, the Nazi German press reacted to Turkish-French-British alliance. In 1939, *Tan* translated an article from the British press, and as a result, the German News Bureau (*Deutsche Nachrichtenbüro*, hereafter DNB) accused it of anti-German publication. Even after *Tan* clarified the source of the article, the Germans' negative view of *Tan* remained intact and German authorities were successful in banning German companies from publishing ads in *Tan*.¹⁵⁷ During the war, *Tan* portrayed *Cumhuriyet* newspaper as the advocate of Goebbels due to its pro-German position. Some authors slid into a hawkish and almost fascist stance, like Fikret Halil, who adopted an attitude that rejected any and all foreign elements.¹⁵⁸

152 Dinçer, 2008, p. 193.

153 Niyazi Berkes, *Unutulan Yıllar* (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2005), p. 274.

154 *Çınaraltı*, no. 9-10 (October 1941, Istanbul), back cover.

155 Glasneck, 1970, p. 194.

156 Sertel, 1968, p. 253.

157 Seydi, 2006, p. 53.

158 Çakan, 2004, pp. 120-121.

Saraçoğlu, who was known for his pro-German posture was appointed prime minister after the death of Refik Saydam on July 9, 1942. After the Germans attacked the Soviets, Saraçoğlu's nationalist rhetoric increased. In a famous speech, he said "We are Turks, Turkists, and we will remain Turkists. Turkism is an issue of blood as well as conscience and culture."¹⁵⁹ Saraçoğlu opposed the Soviets, and during his time as prime minister, many communists were imprisoned and tortured.

As news of German successes came in, Turkey steered toward rightist discourse and did not intervene with the rightist movement. In a meeting with von Papen in August 1942, Saraçoğlu and Menemencioğlu asked for the right to speak for the Turkish speaking regions of the Soviets, saying that the youth in these regions should be educated in Turkish and German schools to save them from the spirit of communism and instill Turkish nationalism in. However, in September 1942 Hitler commanded that there would be no such negotiations with Turkey unless it changed its whole political attitude in line with Germany's wishes. The Turanism activities of German Ministry of Foreign Affairs ended with this incident.¹⁶⁰

In February 1943, the tune of the war began to change. On February 2, 1943, when the Germans lost the battle in Stalingrad, Turkey's foreign policy was affected. Chrome sales to Germany stopped in May 1944 and with an alliance with the Americans and the British, retributions against the Turanists began. When Turanist media began to be closed down, in order to keep the balances of the internal politics, leftist magazines were closed, as well, to maintain the balance of internal politics.

Starting in 1943, *Tan* began publishing anti-fascist articles. Near the end of 1945, Sertel answered accusations of communism with an open letter. He posited that neither the objective nor the subjective conditions required for communism existed in Turkey; their desire was true democracy.¹⁶¹ In Zekeriya Sertel's memoir recounting that period and the raid on *Tan*, the adjective "progressive" is prevalent. Sertel took over *Tan* from İş Bankası, and he uses the term "progressive" to describe the authors and those who were close to the

159 Oran, 1969, p. 251.

160 Glasneck, 1970, pp. 212- 213.

161 Oran, 1969, pp. 260- 262.

newspaper. After Hitler rose to power and fascist propaganda increased, Sertel claimed, fascist youth stamped every “progressive” as communist.

Tan newspaper was a leader in the anti-fascist movement, and its discourses bothered both the party and the nationalist-racist community. The title of one of Zekeriya Sertel’s editorials published at the beginning of the war is clear: “*Tan* is anti-fascist.” According to Sertel, *Tan* was a barrier to fascist propaganda because of its twofold editorial policy: Soviet friendship and Fascist enmity.¹⁶²

In July 1943, Reşat Fuat Baraner published a pamphlet entitled *The Greatest Danger* (*En Büyük Tehlike*) signed by Faris Erkman. This pamphlet argued pan-Turkism were contrary to Kemalism; state policies and rightist ideas infused with German racism were anti-Kemalist.¹⁶³ Racism was criticized from the standpoint of Kemalism. The group of which Peyami Safa, Nihal Atsız, Yusuf Ziya Ortaç, and Seyfi Orhon were a part, was working to pull Turkey into a dangerous game in collaboration with the Tatars and Azeris.¹⁶⁴ The pamphlet came to the attention of the GNAT, and Menemencioğlu was compelled to make an explanation about it. Turanists admired fascist European states. Erkman, to emphasize his great admiration, recounts a rumor that as Peyami Safa listened to a speech by Hitler on the radio, he exclaimed: “What a voice, o, what a voice, God” and promptly fainted, though he did not speak German.¹⁶⁵

On February 1944, Hasan Ali Yücel summoned Berkes and Boratav to his office and urged them to temporarily stop publishing *Yurt ve Dünya* magazine. According to Yücel, there was no imminent need to close the magazine, but parliament was pushing for it. The source of concern in the parliament stemmed from realist, rural research that had been published in the magazine; the magazine had reflected the whole of conditions in rural areas. “Saying peasantry was in bad shape was considered communism and rural side was

162 Zekeriya Sertel, *Hatırladıklarım* (Istanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2000), pp. 186-191.

163 Uğur Mumcu, *40’ların Cadı Kazanı* (Istanbul: Tekin Yayınevi, 1994), pp. 44-45.

164 Oran, 1969, p. 252.

165 Faris Erkman, “En Büyük Tehlike”, in *Kırklı Yıllar-1* (Istanbul: Türkiye Sosyal Tarih Araştırma Vakfı Yayınları, 2002), pp. 37-41.

viewed through a lens of pastoral romanticism.”¹⁶⁶ *Yurt ve Dünya* published concrete data on villages based on research carried out by Behice Boran; hence, without meaning to do so, it had put the failures of the RPP in rural politics on display.¹⁶⁷

Once the imminent defeat of Germany was apparent, the Turkish government’s attitude towards the pan-Turkist movement changed. The movement was banned, and on May 1944, its leaders were brought to justice. In an article entitled “Racists and Turanists are a Danger for National Unity and Turkey” published in *Ulus* newspaper, Falih Rıfkı Atay wrote that these “racists and Turanists cannot be from the RPP.”¹⁶⁸ İnönü, in a speech at the May 19 celebrations in 1944, denied any relationship between these movements and the government:

In the global conjuncture those who claim Turkey should be racist and Turanist are serving which nation, whose interests? It is apparent that those who appropriate these ideas that would bring misery and disaster to the Turkish nation will not in any way serve the Turkish nation.”¹⁶⁹

In March 1945, after it was announced that the non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union would not be renewed Soviet-Turkish relations further cooled. In turn, reaction against *Tan* increased, and on December 4, 1945, the newspaper was raided. Though the perpetrators of the raid were ostensibly fascist university students, the ringleaders are thought to have been undercover police officers, and the event is believed to have been planned by the government. What was the reason for the raid? Near the end of 1945, the Sertel family first published *Görüşler* magazine, which harshly criticized the single-party regime and its anti-democratic practices. The first issue of the magazine announced articles from opposition figures such as Celal Bayar, Adnan Menderes, and Fuat Köprülü. The public showed much interest, a fact which would trouble

166 Oran, 1969, p. 263.

167 Dinçer, 2008, p. 227.

168 Oran, 1969, p. 253.

169 Mumcu, 1994, p. 11.

the government, in turn. The next day *Tanin* newspaper accused *Tan* of communism and published an article to provoke the public.¹⁷⁰ The subject of the article in *Tanin* was “Exploiting Atatürk.” In his article, Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın claimed that the respect and admiration for Atatürk had been turned into a weapon of propaganda against Turkey in the hands of its enemies. According to him, Hitler and the Soviets both blamed Turkey for derailing Atatürk’s route. Yalçın wrote, “Fascist or red fascist, all enemies wish to kill the Turks through Turks with the weapon of Atatürk.” According to him, the “willful fifth power” – like the Sertels – are doing exactly this.¹⁷¹ As a consequence of this article, the printing house of *Tan* was raided and ransacked..

Though Yalçın’s intention was to provoke the public against *Tan* and those who share its opinions, his observation about the use of Atatürk as an element of propaganda is correct. During the second world war, using Atatürk as the basis for propaganda was implemented by groups with varied tendencies that interpreted the ideas of Atatürk in line with their own opinions. These groups tried to win legitimacy and supporters by exploiting the respectability and irreproachability of Atatürk.

After the incident, Bayar and Menderes announced that they had no ties with the newspaper. On June 7, 1945, four motions were suggested at the council of the RPP, but they were rejected. Two newspapers with antithetical ideologies – *Tan* and *Vatan* – were incongruously both in the position of being the opposition. Menderes and Köprülü were removed from the RPP, as well as Koraltan, who criticized this decision. Bayar asked for a change to the Law of the Press, specifically to Articles 17 and 50, which gave the government the right to close newspapers.¹⁷² When these changes were rejected, Bayar resigned from his post as an MP on September 27. He had resigned from the Party on September 2.¹⁷³

170 Sertel Z., 2000, pp. 229- 234.

171 Mumcu, 1994, pp. 94-95.

172 The Article 50 was changed by Law 4935 dated June 6, 1946. The right to suspend newspapers and publications would be only possible in the case of a violation of the related articles of the Criminal Code. However, as martial law continued until 1947, the Istanbul press was still under strict control.

173 Oran, 1969, p. 257.

Another movement that rose up against the despotism of the single-party regime and its anti-democratic practices was the Community for Spreading Liberal Ideas (*Hür Fikirleri Yayma Cemiyeti*.) The association was founded in August 1942 and was represented in the political domain by Ahmet Emin Yalman and in intellectual domain by Ali Fuat Başgil. They published a monthly magazine entitled *Hür Fikirler Mecmuası* (*The Magazine of Liberal Ideas*).¹⁷⁴ In fact, Yalman and Başgil had different opinions on liberalism. As a man of law, democracy predominated for Başgil. Aside from his devotion to Western values, Başgil was a believing Muslim, and for him, real laicism meant that the state should not intervene in religion whatsoever. In Niyazi Berkes' interpretation, Başgil's opinion on the issue merged with that of advocates of Shari'a who believed laicism craved the destruction of Islam.¹⁷⁵ The stated mission of the association was war on dictatorship, and its secondary struggle was "linguism": the language of status in official speech and writing as a result of the Sun Language Theory and policy of purification during the single-party regime. Before the Community for Spreading Liberal Ideas, a group of people consisting of Fevzi Çakmak, Zekeriya Sertel, Cami Baykut, Tevfik Rüştü Aras, Hasan Rıza Soyak, and Professor Kenan Öner attempted to found *İnsan Haklarını Koruma Cemiyeti* (Human Rights Association) in October 1946. However, as the group was constituted of people affiliated with such different worldviews, this endeavor brought many disputes along with it.¹⁷⁶

As the third chapter explains in detail, during wartime the DGP had the right to close down newspapers. In some cases, journalists united against the state in this regard. On March 16, 1945, Ahmet Emin Yalman from *Vatan* newspaper, Sabiha Sertel from *Tan* and Velid Ebüzziya from *Tasvir-i Efkar* newspaper sent a telegram to İsmet İnönü. Six to seven months had passed since their newspapers were closed by a decision of the Council of Ministers causing great distress and pain for newspapers built on years of labor.¹⁷⁷

174 Ali Fuat Başgil, *27 Mayıs İhtilali ve Sebepleri* (Istanbul: Çeltüt Matbaacılık, 1966), p. 64.

175 Niyazi Berkes, *Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma* (Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2008), p. 537.

176 Mehmet Gökalp, *Haksızlıklar Karşısında Susmayan Alim: Ord. Prof. Dr. Ali Fuad Başgil, Hayatı, Şahsiyeti, Mücadeleleri* (Istanbul: Santral Yayınevi, 1963), pp. 100-103.

177 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Directorate General of Transactions, Cat. no: 030 10, Box no: 85 Folder no: 562 Row no: 9 pp. 1-3.

All these demonstrate that Turkey changed its tune according to external developments during the war. When the country was closer to Germany, the state appropriated a rightist and –in some instances –racist discourse. When the outcome of the war was certain, the discourse changed, and reactionary, rightist groups were penalized. Alparslan Türkeş recounting the events of 1944, says that the Republican government implemented Turanism and racism into its internal affairs as much as possible, and broadcasting official speeches that instilled and propagated these ideas of until May 3, 1944.¹⁷⁸ In conferences organized by the RPP, even those who were not Turanists did not exhibit an openly critical attitude towards them before 1944.¹⁷⁹

After the war ended, the state adopted closer ties to the United States and became a member of the United Nations. It distanced itself from Turanist groups and penalized them, though it had previously endorsed similar views and condoned their activities. The case against the Turanists ended in 1947 with advent of the Cold War. The defendants were exonerated. In short, people of different points of views united against the RPP government in favor of a more democratic and free system in the postwar period. On a road that would lead to the DP government, the influence and many internal and external factors of the Second World War would speed the process by which the demand for democracy would be vocalized.

5.2.2 *German Propagandists at Work*

After the Nazis came to power, they initiated a wide reorganization in Turkey. Germans had had considerable influence over Turkish educational reforms; prewar Nazi Germany supported Turkey's need for scholars and scientists. So in one sense, Germany tried to penetrate Turkish educational institutions by sending professors and scientists, an initiative which, in turn, increased the need for German scholars. There were further arrangements for graduates of

178 Police intervened against a Turanist group that gathered on May 3, 1944, in Ankara to protest the prosecution of Nihal Atsız. Alparslan Türkeş, *1944 Milliyetçilik Olayı* (İstanbul: Arkın Kitabevi, 1968), p. 25.

179 Kayalı, 2001, p. 171.

these schools to continue their graduate education in Germany or to collaborate with Germans in their business lives. Germans used institutions such as the German High School in Istanbul and the Teutonia Club, founded by Bohemian glass merchants, for propaganda activities. The Nazi Party actually perceived all German expatriates as individual, freelance propagandists.¹⁸⁰

Alongside such cultural relations, Germany began purchasing raw materials from Turkey starting in 1933. This trade was disrupted at the beginning of the war when Turkey seemed to ally with the Allied powers, but in practice, it continued throughout the war. Efforts of the British and Americans, aid packages, and loan offers did curtail Turkey's commercial enterprise with fascist Germany. In March 1936, Minister of Economy Celal Bayar wrote to the Prime Ministry, specifying that Turkey had exported 39 million Turkish lira worth of goods in 1935 – 43 percent of the country's total exports. The purpose of the letter was to ask the Prime Minister if it could send shipments of apples and raisins to Germany as a gift. They had learned that Greece and Bulgaria, with which Turkey was in competition in terms of agricultural exports, had sent prunes, walnuts, and raisins as gifts. Bayar thought that sending apples and raisins to distribute to the needy in Germany would be positive propaganda in favor of these products.¹⁸¹

One of the most important mediums of publicity and propaganda in a foreign country was effective use of the press. During World War II, Germans tried to influence the Turkish media to effect a pro-Nazi public opinion. Germans undertakings in the Turkish media began before the war, in 1935: a group of Turkish journalists were invited to Germany to meet with Hitler. Before this visit, Goebbels had expressed disapproval about Yunus Nadi's articles in *Cumhuriyet*. The Press and Defense Departments of the Ministry of Propaganda took pains to win Nadi over, and his pro-German articles during the Second World War suggest that these efforts paid off.¹⁸² France undertook such ventures, as well, inviting a group of journalists including Zekeriya Sertel and Falif

180 Glasneck, 1970, p. 45.

181 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Directorate General of Transactions, Cat. no: 030 10, Box no: 231 Folder no: 557 Row no: 5 p. 1.

182 Seydi, 2006, p. 26.

Rıfıkı Atay to Paris in 1939 before the war over France. They were taken to see Maginot Line to demonstrate the power of France.¹⁸³ In July 1942, it was the Germans' turn again. A committee led by Director of the DGP Sarper would visit the German fronts. The committee was greeted by the Minister of the East from the Hitler's government, Rosenberg.¹⁸⁴ After the Germans attacked Soviet Russia, the Allied powers invited a group of journalists including Ahmet Şükrü Esmer, Abidin Daver, Zekeriya Sertel, and Hüseyin Cahit Yalçın to London and then to the United States to abate German sympathies in Turkey.¹⁸⁵

In December 1939, the president of Nazilli from the RPP informed the party that pamphlets of Hitler's speeches had been sent from Germany. Such pamphlets were sent to many public and private institutions, as well as to individuals in Turkey.¹⁸⁶ In September 1939, the RPP's Istanbul City Directorate informed the party that drug samples sent from Germany to doctors and pharmaceutical warehouses included propaganda pamphlets that contained Hitler's speeches and the German-Russian pact. The post office had forwarded these without any knowledge of the propaganda materials.¹⁸⁷

Before the war began, political authorities were cautious about the possible employment of fascist propaganda in Turkey. On March 25, 1939, for the commemoration of the "March on Rome" by the fascists, a concert was held at the Italian Consulate in İzmir. The Turkish National Police sent detailed reports of the members of the People's Houses who attended the event to the General Secretariat of the RPP. The reports noted that there were students in fascist uniforms. Moreover, a woman named Sebahat Akgöl sang in Italian, German, and Turkish, and she was very intimate with the Italian ambassador.¹⁸⁸

183 Sertel Z., 2000, pp. 197- 198.

184 "Matbuat Heyetimiz Berlinde", *Cumhuriyet* (July 22, 1942), pp. 1-3.

185 Sertel Z., 2000, pp. 200-205.

186 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 01, Box no: 609 Folder no: 112 Row no: 8 pp. 1-3.

187 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 01, Box no: 609 Folder no: 112 Row no: 5 pp. 1-4.

188 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 01, Box no: 605 Folder no: 96 Row no: 5 p. 3.

While political authorities were wary of fascist propaganda, they were also curious about the organization and making of that same propaganda. In June 1939, a letter from the Turkish National Police to the General Secretariat of the RPP provided examples of how Italian propagandists took advantage of every opportunity to propagandize. They did not just use written texts and language, but also practical propaganda; this type of propaganda was worth of trying.¹⁸⁹ The police continued monitoring meetings of both sides of the war and reporting to the government.

When the war began, Germany expedited the reorganization of their activities in Turkey and began propaganda and intelligence activities throughout the Middle East point the DNB working under the respective consulates. The DNB used newspaper articles and radio broadcasts to influence the Turkish public.¹⁹⁰ Along with DNB, the German Military Intelligence Service – Abwehr – and the Nazi regime’s intelligence institution – Sicherheitsdiens (The Intelligence Agency of the SS, the SD) – were deployed to Istanbul. Aside from these, Hitler’s Minister of the East, Alfred Rosenberg, began reorganizing Nazi propaganda in Turkey as he had in the Balkans and the Middle East.¹⁹¹

On October 19, 1939, when Turkey signed the Treaty of Mutual Assistance with Britain and France, German-Turkish relations were negatively affected. From the beginning of the war, most private institutions and corporations in Turkey stood with the Allies. It is also argued that İnönü’s inner circle was pro-British.

Money – or better put, bribes – were an important element of German propaganda in Turkey. Especially in the press, there were incidents of payouts for publishing desirable news. Selim Sarper, Director of the DGP, had good relations with British authorities from the beginning of the war. When the British expressed concerns about increases in pro-German news after March 1941, Sarper guaranteed that the Germans would never take control of the

189 Prime Ministry’s Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People’s Party, Cat. no: 490 01, Box no: 605 Folder no: 96 Row no: 5 pp. 1-2.

190 Seydi, 2006, p. 4.

191 Seydi, 2006, p. 28.

Turkish press. The British did not generally use bribery as a method, but British Foreign Affairs reminded British Ambassador Hugessen that he may need to use bribery to deal with the Germans.¹⁹²

The Turkish press was pro-Allies from the beginning of the war until March 1941, when Germans drew near to the border of Turkey. The Allies were the main source for stories by the AA at the beginning of the war. The AA took 70 percent of its news from Allied news agencies and only 25 percent from the DNB. To change this ratio, Germans undertook the job of providing news for the Turkish press.¹⁹³

The German-Turkish Non-Aggression Pact signed on June 18, 1941, again changed the equilibrium in the country. To prevent the publication of “wrongful and harmful” news, the government opened an “Internal Propaganda Agency” under the Ministry of Internal Affairs in April 1941.¹⁹⁴ The imminent concern of the agency was German pressure on Turkey, which pushed the Turkish government to be more cautious with respect to Allied propaganda. The reason the Turkish press changed its position after the Germans attacked the Soviets was that the Soviets were now a strategic partner of the Allies.¹⁹⁵ In an article published in *Akşam* in March 1942 entitled “We are not worried because of propaganda and we cannot sleep with unsubstantiated trust”, Necmettin Sadak criticized those who propagandized against the Axis and suggested that it had bad intentions with respect to Turkey. Sadak claimed that Turkey’s relations with the Axis Powers was well-established and could only proceed on the basis of the Non-Aggression Pact.¹⁹⁶ The Turkish Press was allowed to publish pro-Allied news only after 1944.

During the war, one indicator of Turkey’s strategic significance for Germany was that von Papen, who played a role in Hitler’s rise and was the Vice-Chancellor under Hitler, was appointed as ambassador to Ankara. von Papen was not insistent that Turkey enter the war alongside Axis forces, though

192 Seydi, 2006, p. 115.

193 Seydi, 2006, pp. 28-33.

194 Bali, 2008, p. 31.

195 Oran, 1969, p. 250.

196 Necmettin Sadak, “Propagandalardan telaşa düşmeyiz, iğreti güvenle uykuya dalmayız”, *Akşam* (March 25, 1942)

Goebbels believed Turkey should be drawn into the war no matter the cost. Goebbels belief was so strong that he commissioned a book entitled “Guide to Turkey for Soldiers” to be sold in German bookstores in Istanbul. Germany had sent such books to the Netherlands and France before their occupation.¹⁹⁷ According to the Allied forces, another advantage of their Germans was relations maintained with prominent soldiers in Turkey since the First World War. Even though Germans emphasized it, whether the “Brotherhood in Arms” during the Great War was an advantage or disadvantage is debatable. The Turkish army was defeated and destroyed in the First World War, and the collective memory was that German generals condescended to Turkish officers.¹⁹⁸

Şükrü Saraçoğlu was a sworn enemy of the Soviets. Numan Menemencioğlu, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, was known as a Nazi sympathizer, especially among the British. After the Cairo Conference, British authorities were convinced of Menemencioğlu’s commitment to Germany and pressured the government for his dismissal. They thought Menemencioğlu’s pro-German position was ensuring the continued sale of chrome to Germany as well as privileges afforded to the Germans with regard to transit through the straits. Finally, in June 1944, a German ship filled with tank cranes and machine guns was detained in the Bosphorus, upon which Menemencioğlu resigned from his post on June 15, 1944.¹⁹⁹ Deringil emphasizes that Menemencioğlu may have been seen as pro-Nazi by the British because of his utilitarian insistence on not joining the war.²⁰⁰

Near the end of 1942, after the German failures on the Soviet and African fronts, the themes of German propaganda in Turkey began changing. The focus was no longer German victory, but the threat that Turkey’s destiny would be decided by Bolsheviks. Nevertheless, the quality and intensity of such propaganda could not surpass the impression left by catastrophic defeats on the war fronts. Glasneck points out that active, fascist propaganda in Turkey between 1940 and 1941 prevented Turkey from fulfilling its obligations to Britain

197 Seydi, 2006, p. 48.

198 Glasneck, 1970, p. 15.

199 Deringil, 2004, p. 80.

200 Deringil, 1994, pp. 54-55.

and members of the Balkan Pact. At the same time, it resulted in Turkey being used as the base of propaganda and intelligence in the Near East and Arabia. The German attack on the Soviets was seen as an opportunity to destroy the Soviet Union, with which Turkey was not on amicable terms. To that end, Turkey supported the Nazi war industry.²⁰¹ In summer 1941, Saraçoğlu met with von Papen and expressed support for the idea of joining the war alongside Axis after the eradication of the Soviet Union. He explained that he had advised leaders of the chauvinist sphere to wait quietly for military action.²⁰²

During the Second World War warring states undertook multiple mediums of propaganda on Turkish soil. German and British magazines distributed during the Second World War in Turkey informed and influenced the public.

Germans published and distributed *Signal* magazine in many countries, and the British published *Cephe (Front)* magazine in Cairo in answer to *Signal*. These two publications from opposite sides of the war aimed to persuade in the guise of informing the public.

In the booklet *Komünizm Propagandası 2*, the following examples vilify communist propaganda techniques while describing how propaganda had become a part of Turkish life during the war:

From 1939 to 1946, they used to hand us *Signal* magazine in every barbershop. In this magazine, we looked at examples of German war art which struck in our subconscious. Images resembling paintings depicting the enemy's shattered debris, a German tank, or a cannon... or a simple sketch showing that Poland was swept away in twenty-five days. In the presence of these biased images, there were people who believed we should side with the Germans or who remembered our failure in the Great War.²⁰³

Signal was distributed in public spaces where many would have access to it. To some extent it satisfied the curiosity of the people about the war. Ads for *Signal*

201 Glasneck, 1970, pp. 48-49.

202 Glasneck, 1970, p. 159.

203 *Komünizm Propagandası II*, p. 4.

appeared in nationalist publications of the period, such as *Çınaraltı* magazine, announcing that interviews and pictures depicting all stages of the war would be in the new issue of *Signal*.²⁰⁴

Published fortnightly in as many as twenty languages, *Signal* had “the largest sale of any magazine published in Europe” from 1940 – 1945.²⁰⁵ In Turkey, *Signal* was available in German, English, Italian, French, and Greek.²⁰⁶ Even though there were no Turkish summaries or captions in *Signal*, pictures were used so effectively that anyone who scanned its pages would be enticed. The magazine was produced by the *Wehrmacht* (the Armed Forces of Nazi Germany), although it was authorized by the Ministry of Propaganda prior to publication. The power of the German War industry and the success of its air force were continuously presented on the pages of the magazine. As Mayer emphasizes, “the image *Signal* hoped to create was that of Germany as the great benefactor of European peoples and civilizations.”²⁰⁷ The news was not just on Germany, but also on Japan and Italy. And though they were rare, subjects unrelated to war – like fashion, nature, and cinema – were covered in the magazine and captured the interest of readers. The magazine also published anti Allied propaganda directed mainly at the United States and Soviet Union.

In this period, news from *Signal* featured heavily in the Turkish press. In September 1940, Sarper notified the Prime Ministry that some even strove to ban the magazine. In his letter, Sarper openly defined the magazine as “the German propaganda magazine *Signal*”. On September 27, 1940, Reşat Feyzi wrote an article entitled “Secret Poison” in *Son Telgraf*. Feyzi said he was seeing many people reading *Signal* magazine on the ferry and tram and that this nicely-printed masterpiece of journalism and propaganda was published in Berlin and was a medium for spreading Nazi ideas. According to Feyzi, those who read *Signal* who were innocently looking at a nice photo or reading an

204 *Çınaraltı*, no. 65 (December 19, 1942), end cover.

205 Mayer, 1976, p. 1.

206 *Çınaraltı*, no. 65 (December 19, 1942), end cover.

207 Mayer, 1976, p. 1.

article on fashion or absorbing a story were unknowingly breathing in “the secret poison.”²⁰⁸

Aside from magazines, cinema was an important medium of German propaganda Ambassador von Papen hosted meetings at German clubs, invited eminent Turks, and screened *Victory in the West (Sieg im Westen)*, a propaganda film that depicted the German “war machine.”²⁰⁹

A report prepared by the British on the propaganda activities of Germans in Turkey, dated 1942, claims that Necip Erses from Ses Movie Theater, Şark Movie Theater, Çemberlitaş Movie Theater, City Theater, and Sami Konay are among individuals and institutions cooperating with the Germans. Ses and Şark Movie Theaters, located in Istanbul, were both managed by Germans. Only German films were screened at these theaters, and Ses was a high-end venue that drew in viewers and eased their receptivity to German propaganda.²¹⁰ Germans also supplied films to schools and the People’s Houses.

At the beginning of the Second World War, Prime Minister Refik Saydam was aware that a Turkish film industry should be developed to produce propaganda films. To that end, he met with Dr. Max von der Porter, a consultant of German origin and thought of entrusting this job to the Germans. Porter warned him that an important medium of propaganda would be handed over to German interests; therefore, Saydam abandoned the idea.²¹¹

On December 16, 1942, a letter sent by H. Türkmen, Undersecretary General of the RPP, to the Eminönü People’s House demonstrates the sensibilities with regard the inspection of films during the Second World War.²¹² Türkmen had heard that three films entitled *The Secret of Life*, *The History of Microscope* and *Berlin Olympics* had been screened at the Eminönü People’s House on November 1. He was intrigued as to where the People’s House had procured

208 Prime Ministry’s Republican Archive, Catalogue of Directorate General of Transactions, Cat. no: 030 10, Box no: 232 Folder no: 561 Row no: 17 pp. 1-2.

209 Glasneck, 1970, p. 29.

210 Seydi, 2006, pp. 28-32.

211 Seydi, 2006, pp. 182-183.

212 The People’s Houses could not stage plays either without the consent of the center – i.e., the General Secretariat of the RPP. If a People’s House wished to stage a play that was not sent by the center, they had to send the theater text to the center and get approval even to begin work.

these films and requested an immediate explanation concerning the source of these films. The president of the People's House bragged that these films were procured from Dr. Feridun Frik, the Istanbul representative of Bayer Pharmaceuticals, upon request of medical students. The films were screened following a conference in which students and professors participated. He emphasized that the films did not contain any malice; the event was useful and everyone was happy about it. He added that it was beneficial to screen such culture films to citizens, university students, and schools, and that they were planning to organize "culture days" to do so.²¹³

What he meant by culture films are educational films. The film "Berlin Olympics", which was screened along with the other films, was a 1941 newsreel on Berlin Olympics. Considering that most films on the Berlin Olympics presented its memorable, fascist aesthetics, the film was presumably, purposefully incorporated into the mix health-related educational films screened to medical students. Interestingly, in this period the Bayer company was strongly associated with the Nazis in the Turkish government. During tensions between *Tan* and German authorities, Bayer coordinated the advertisements of German companies published in Turkish newspapers, deciding how many advertisements would be given to which newspapers. Bayer's representative in Turkey, Widmann, allegedly threatened Zekeriya Sertel that it would stop advertising as long as the newspaper continued publishing articles against German interests.²¹⁴ Bayer was presumably in communication with Nazi authorities on the subject of propaganda, and the company's endeavor to screen these films was fueled by Nazi propaganda.

The Eminönü People's House continued causing "incidents." A week later, Türkmen read in *Cumhuriyet* that a film on soccer was screened at Eminönü People's House. He immediately wrote to the president and asked from where and with whose assistance they had procured this film. The president of the People's House clarified that they had acquired the film from the British Council. Türkmen's reply was decisive: films not covered by Article 51 Article of the Regulation on People's Houses may not be screened unless the General

213 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1208 Folder no: 8 Row no: 1 p. 68.

214 Seydi, 2006, p. 53.

Secretariat has sent an official notification to do so. Films to be screened at the People's Houses must first be inspected by the General Secretariat. If approved, the General Secretariat of the RPP would distribute these to the People's Houses.²¹⁵ Both Axis and Allied powers considered the People's Houses an efficient channel for reaching the people.

In April 1943, the General Secretariat of the RPP sent a letter to the presidents of People's Houses to warn them against foreign films. The letter states that films are powerful and efficient instruments of propaganda and reminds them that applications to screen films should be directed to the party.²¹⁶

Bayer contacted other People's Houses, as well, for the purpose of film screenings. In June 1943, the Edirne People's House asked the approval of the General Secretariat of the RPP to screen scientific films provided by Bayer. The General Secretariat allowed the screening of twenty scientific, educational, and amateur films, some of which included *Dental Malformations*, *Fighting Pain*, *The First Medical Plane in Turkey* and *The Eleventh Berlin Olympics in 1936*.²¹⁷ Bayer's representative in Turkey, Widmann and the Şeriki Company, directly contacted the General Secretariat of the RPP and kept it apprised of upcoming films via booklets.²¹⁸

On July 5, 1944, a letter sent from the Fifth Bureau to Eighth Bureau notes that various missionary organizations and companies were applying to the People's Houses to screen cultural films. For example, Ses Film Company had sent cultural films to the People's Houses in Eminönü, Kadıköy, Samsun, Zonguldak, and Edirne without the prior inspection of the party. Ses Film also wished to distribute fifty-one dubbed films, made by UFA, to the People's Houses. The letter emphasizes that though on April 16, 1943, it was announced that no film would be screened in People's Houses unless first inspected by the

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- 215 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1208 Folder no: 8 Row no: 1 p. 57
- 216 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 01, Box no: 1214 Folder no: 32 Row no: 1 p. 12.
- 217 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1213 Folder no: 29 Row no: 1 pp. 47-48.
- 218 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1212 Folder no: 25 Row no: 2 p. 28.

General Secretariat of the RPP. This rule was not strictly enforced.²¹⁹ The People's Houses were eager to screen films procured from outside sources, because while they had theaters and projectors, they did not have films to screen, especially in wartime.

In February 1944, the General Secretariat of the RPP wrote to all presidents of People's Houses ordering them to reject all application to screen films from outside sources, adding that the party would be sending culture films shortly.²²⁰

The same issue resurfaced in September 1944, almost a year before the end of the war. At a joint meeting of the centers responsible for cinema supervision it was decided that "foreign actuality films and feature films on war could be screened if they were not propaganda films against our national unity and were in accord with our ethical, social, economic and political principles."²²¹ Near the end of the war Turkey's allegiances were clear, so they probably allowed pro-Allied films.

5.2.3 *Gentle Allied Propaganda*

Although the Germans employed an aggressive politics of propaganda in Turkey, the British response was relatively gentle – avoiding aggressive and negative attitudes toward the Turkish government. While at times the Germans were oppressive or even threatening, the British preferred a calm approach though their propaganda activities were serious and they fully exploited their contacts and opportunities. This cautious attitude of the British is related to their effort to neutralize a reputation inherited from the Great War.

The British tried to manufacture a pro-Allied public opinion or at least to prevent public opinion from swinging to the Axis. Two British institutions organized propaganda activities in Turkey in this period. One was the British Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the other was the Special Operation Executive

219 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 01, Box no: 1214 Folder no: 32 Row no: 1 pp. 10- 11.

220 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 0 0, Box no: 1213 Folder no: 28 Row no: 1 p. 56.

221 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Directorate General of Transactions, Cat. no: 030 10, Box no: 86 Folder no: 371 Row no: 9 p. 1.

(SOE). Starting in August 1940, the SOE became operational. Despite the opposition of the British Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ambassador, the SOE developed a wide propaganda and intelligence network in Turkey. The SOE organized whispering campaigns among members of parliament and through employees of the Ottoman Bank. Its first mission was to carry out an operation directed at the Balkans from Turkey, and its second mission was to not lose Turkey to the Germans. The SOE organized in various Turkish cities driven by scenarios of possible German occupation.²²²

An important medium of propaganda for Allied forces was BBC radio-broadcasts. The difference between radio and other forms of propaganda was that its prevention was difficult. During the Second World War, both sides broadcast non-stop to influence the public. Tör emphasized that since the invention of radio, poisonous propaganda can go extend beyond political boundaries, countries, and continents. It enters every home and every ear. An altogether new and difficult front was thus created. Additionally, Tör remarked that Turkey uses radio to protect its national freedom and independence, to establish and reinforce its national existence, to strengthen and advance its national unity, and to propagate and expand its national culture.²²³

The British frequently mentioned Atatürk in their propaganda in Turkey. They claimed that the modernization process that began with Atatürk could only be continued in cooperation with the Allied powers. One of the common themes of its propaganda pamphlets was the “betrayal of Atatürk”. Pamphlets warning of a possible German occupation evoked the friendship of Atatürk with Britain and the Soviet Union and said that if Turkey did not resist a German occupation, Turkey would have betrayed Atatürk.²²⁴

Instead of responding to German propaganda, Americans, on the other hand, focused on unity among Allied powers and what needed to be done to create a better world.²²⁵ In December 1942, the American Information Bureau (*Amerikan Enformasyon Bürosu*) was established and began serving news to

222 Seydi, 2006, p. 6.

223 Vedat Nedim Tör, “Radyo Savaşında Türkiyemiz”, *Radyo*, no: 5 (Ankara, April 15, 1942), p. 5.

224 Seydi, 2006, p. 176.

225 Seydi, 2006, p. 39.

Turkish newspapers and radios. The bureau was in close contact with the AA.²²⁶

In the beginning of the war, the British were content with the pro-British attitude of Turkish press; however, a few months into the war – when Germans began distributing punctilious and visually stimulating newspapers and magazines – the British became worried. Despite wartime monetary and transportation problems, the British decided to procure and sell low-price magazines such as *The Illustrated London* and *The Times* in Turkey. However, due to the conditions of war, it was not easy to transport these magazines to Turkey.²²⁷

The British found a practical solution to this problem by collaborating with a Turkish publisher. An unheard-of example of British wartime propaganda in Turkey is *Foto Magazin*, published by Süreyya Bükey, who owned Foto Süreyya, one of Istanbul's established photography studios. A while after the first issue was published on May 1, 1938, *Cumhuriyet* newspaper described it as the most modern of monthly magazines. It positioned itself as an art and “tabloid” magazine. Its content was popular rather than political, but this changed with the start of the war. In the first years of the magazine, authors like Sadri Ertem, Nizamettin Nazif, Selim Sırrı Tarcan, Suad Derviş, Faruk Nafiz Çamlıbel, Cevat Şakir, Nurullah Ataç, and Yahya Kemal coming from a wide array of backgrounds wrote on women, history, health, childcare, sports, cinema, and fashion. Articles were all embellished with photos. In January 1939, in an advertisement published in *Cumhuriyet*, *Foto Magazin* identified itself as the most popular magazine in Turkey. It was 90 pages long in a 16.5 by 24 centimeter format and sold for 25 piasters. However, after the issue 24 of 108 pages, which was published in May 1940, there was a change. The July 1940 issue was only 24 pages in a 24 by 31 centimeters format and sold for 10 piasters.

This new format was the same as that other propaganda magazines such as *Signal*, *Parade*, *Réalité*. From then on, the ads did not define it as a tabloid magazine; it was a magazine that published news and pictures of the war and

226 Glasneck, 1970, p. 235.

227 Seydi, 2006, pp. 191-194.

global realities. The manager was no longer Süreyya Bükey, but R. Kalenderoğlu, and it was not bimonthly, but weekly. A magazine that published news on the war thus turned into a British propaganda magazine.

Why was one of the most popular magazines of the period converted into a British propaganda magazine? The reason is closely related to the story of the magazine's owner, Süreyya Bükey. Bükey was born in 1895 in Istanbul and graduated from Galatasaray High School and the *Mekteb-i Mülkiye* (Faculty of Political Science). Bükey had a significant network of school friends who were important, Republican elite. Cevdet Kerim İncedayı, for instance, was a close friend. Bükey preferred business, but benefited from this reliable network. Bükey's first venture was a slipper factory; additionally he opened a photography shop in Çiçek Pasajı in 1924. In 1928, Bükey opened Foto Süreyya Photography Studio at 509 İstiklal Avenue, near Tünel Square.

From 1936-1938, most of Atatürk's portraits were shot in the Foto Süreyya studio. Bükey's son, Orhan Bükey claims that 90 percent of Atatürk portraits in state offices are credited to Foto Süreyya. Appearing on Foto Süreyya's window display was considered like a curtain-raiser for the people who would take part in the government.²²⁸

According to Orhan Bükey, nobody had the courage to publish Allied propaganda magazines in Turkey during the Second World War. The reason for this reservations was to be on the safe side in case of a German occupation. However, Süreyya Bükey had the tenacity, connections, and privilege to do it. Foto Süreyya has its own printing house in Cağaloğlu.²²⁹ With the outbreak of the war, Süreyya Bükey bargained with the British government to turn the *Foto Magazine* into a periodical of British propaganda. R. Kalenderoğlu, a close friend and business partner of Bükey, became the owner of the magazine. In this way, the British secured one of the most popular magazines of the country and though some literary stories and non-war-related news persevered, the majority of the news and articles concerned the war from a British perspective. The pages of the magazine were mostly filled with photos of politicians of the Allied states, the American navy, the British air fleet, imprisoned Axis soldiers,

228 Interview with Orhan Bükey, Son of Süreyya Bükey (Istanbul, February 11, 2016)

229 Interview with Orhan Bükey, Son of Süreyya Bükey (Istanbul, February 11, 2016)

and mobilized London. The Turkish army and Turkish soldiers were also recurring subjects. Issue 21 claimed that the Turkish nation was in essence militarist,²³⁰ and issue 16 from November 1940 said that the Turkish soldier was no longer the disdained, unfed, unclothed soldier of the imperial period. He was well taken care of. The same article continued to say that while winter was coming, it was the “tenderhearted and self-sacrificing Turkish girl’s” job to protect the heroic Turkish soldier from the forces of nature.²³¹



Figure 5.4 *Foto Magazin*, February 1941.

In December 1940, the editorial was written by Feridun Osman Menteşoğlu, who would later become editor-in-chief of *Cumhuriyet* (in 1943). Menteşoğlu mentioned the forced blackouts and that martial law had been declared in six cities. He claimed that people were sympathetic to these precautions. According to the author, the Turkish nation was behind and in the service of the Chief

230 “Ordunun Ruhu”, *Foto Magazin*, no. 21 (Istanbul, February 3, 1941), p. 1.

231 Turgut Oruçoğlu, “Mehmetçiğe Borcumuz”, *Foto Magazin*, no. 16 (Istanbul, November 25, 1940), p. 1.

in whom they wholeheartedly believed. They proved that they were mature and worthy of their Chief and their government.²³²

Ownership of the magazine shifted to Turan Ramazanoğlu in February 1941 and to Cihat Baban in the second half of 1941,²³³ both of whom were close to Süreyya Bükey. The last issue of the magazine is estimated to have been published in August 1943; after this date its publication was restricted as a precaution. In fact, Turkish authorities had banned propaganda in the Turkish language produced by foreigners in Turkey in 1941.²³⁴ It seems Süreyya Bükey had some privilege and furthermore started to publish another periodical called *Ufuk Weekly Political Magazine*, which would last until 1945.²³⁵ Süreyya Bükey also engaged in the printing of the French *Realité* magazine in Turkey towards the end of the war. This magazine was half Turkish, half French and consisted of news of the war and specific news about Turkey.

Another British magazine published in response to *Signal* was *Cephe* (*Front*) magazine.²³⁶ As the name suggests, *Cephe*, provided news from the British fronts in the Second World War. The first issue was published on January 15, 1943. It was issued until 1947. The magazine was published in Cairo, Britain's second most important base during the war after London. In the magazine, the war efforts of the United Kingdom, pictures from various fronts, war investments, the general mobilization of the country, and women's contribution to war were conveyed through qualitative and quantitative information. At first titles and subheadings were in Turkish, while the rest of the magazine was in French and English, but starting in 1945, the whole magazine was published in Turkish. The many pictures were captioned in Turkish, which was helpful during the years before the magazine was fully published in Turkish.

232 Feridun Osman, "Parolamızı Unutmayalım", *Foto Magazin*, no. 17 (Istanbul, December 2, 1940), p. 1.

233 Baban was 30 years old at the time. Later he became the editor-in-chief in *Yeni Sabah* and *Cumhuriyet* newspapers and owner and lead author for *Tasvir* newspaper. In 1946, Baban entered parliament as a member of the DP.

234 Seydi, 2006, pp. 191-194.

235 Interview with Orhan Bükey, Son of Süreyya Bükey (Istanbul, February 11, 2016)

236 The magazine was published biweekly and consisted of 24 pages.

At first, the editor of the magazine was T. Eland. Though not indicated on the copyright page, the magazine was a venture of the Foreign Office of the British Government. An issue from 1946 suggests applying to British Bookstore on İstiklal Avenue for a yearly subscription. Considering that there were initially few texts in Turkish, the target audience of the magazine is not immediately obvious. Keeping in mind that *Signal* –published in German – was distributed to coffee shops and barbershops, a publication containing some Turkish texts with many visuals would become a popular source of information on the war. Since the public was hungry for news of the war, a picture magazine would have been intriguing even if the audience could not read all the texts.

Aside from news of the war, news on Turkey was featured in the magazine. Institutions such as the People's Houses, Village Institutes, the Karabük Iron and Steel Factory, the Port of Mersin, and the Kayseri Cotton Mill were praised as prominent achievements of the Republic. On issue published in March 1943 contains illustrated news of a Turkish committee's visit to India. It claims Turkey is neutral in the war, but is a loyal ally of Britain. The magazine highlights the relation between Britain and Turkey through news items like the meeting of Churchill and İnönü in Adana and the road from Mersin and İskenderun built by UK CC. *Cephe* also published special issues on national days and special days such as October 29, May 19, August 30, and the end of the Second World War. In the special issue of October 29, 1945, an article notes that Turkey pursued honest politics throughout the war and was loyal to Allied powers. Turkey was successful in judicial, cultural, social, industrial fields.²³⁷

Almost every issue of *Cephe* included detailed information on aircraft, submarines, or similar military equipment. The magazine also included the program of BBC broadcasts in Turkish, English, and French, and one issue covered how BBC journalists worked to share the most recent, detailed news from the warfronts.²³⁸ Aside from news of the war, there was general news. News of British diamond mines in South Africa, Australian wool, sports news on skiing and horse breeding, biographies of British actors, and the latest

237 *Cephe*, no. 21 (October 29, 1945), p. 3.

238 *Cephe*, no. 3 (February 1945), p. 10.

trends in women's fashion were scattered among the pages remaining of news on the war and Turkey.

When first distributed, *Cephe* experienced some obstacles, but in the end, the British pointed out the privileges Germans enjoy. With the initiative of Selim Sarper, *Cephe* was allowed to publish with a Turkish name and captions in Turkish. However, this permission did not last long. In September 1943, import of foreign publications in Turkish was banned, upon which *Cephe* continued being published as *Vanguard*. Franz von Papen's pressure on Turkish authorities to limit British propaganda played a role in these events.²³⁹ The April 1947 issue was announced that the magazine would be published in London instead of Cairo,²⁴⁰ and the magazine was apparently not published any more.

Starting in early 1943, Allied powers asked Turkey to abandon its neutral position and actively cooperate with them. To that end, they highlighted the advantages of being a member of the United Nations. According to this argument, joining the Allied during the war would be advantageous after the war. When Turkey cut ties with Germany on August 2, 1944, censorship of the media abated.

British films on war could then be – and frequently were – screened in movie theaters.²⁴¹ As for the Germans, cinema was an important medium of propaganda for the British. Before the war, on March 2, 1938, Minister of Culture Saffet Arıkan wrote to the Secretary General of the RPP and the Minister of Internal Affairs, Şükrü Kaya informing them that the British Council had suggested a list of sound films to better publicize Britain to Turkish citizens and thus reinforce cultural relations between Britain and Turkey. Kaya replied that the films seemed useful and said that they could be distributed pending official approval after they were imported.²⁴² Unfortunately, there is no follow-up information as to where and to whom these films were screened. During

239 Seydi, 2006, p. 199.

240 *Bibliography II- Periodicals in Turkish Published in Egypt (1828–1947)*
<http://www.aucpress.com/turksegypt/Bibliography-2/>

241 Seydi, 2006, pp. 262–263.

242 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1208 Folder no: 8 Row no: 1 p. 64.

the Second World War, films that German and British propaganda organs wished to screen often did not escape from censorship; however, they reached eminent personages through foreign consulates.

During the shortage of films, Lale Film thought that showing military propaganda films of the British Consulate would be a stopgap. As the consulate was already keen to screen these films, it chose films from their archives and showed them at Lale Film's theater.²⁴³ This vexed the Germans who warned Lale Film's manager, Filmer, with the direct "greetings" of von Papen. Filmer informed the Germans that it had screened these films for commercial – not propaganda – purposes, and asked the German consulate to send its own films, if they had any. He promised to screen films he deemed appropriate. However, the Germans distrusted Filmer, and so rented the Ar Film Theater to screen their own propaganda films.²⁴⁴

As mentioned before, Refik Saydam had decided that delegating the job of developing the Turkish film industry to the Germans would mean handing over an important medium of propaganda. Saydam subsequently asked Vedat Nedim Tör, who was representing Turkey at the Global Exposition in New York as the Director General of Tourism, to conduct research on the subject in America. Tör returned from America empty-handed and the British, having heard this news, volunteered to help. This was an opportunity for the British both to deploy its propaganda and prevent German propaganda. Private British companies would handle the job; however, as in Turkey, private film companies were occupied making commercial rather than cultural films. British authorities did not want to miss this opportunity, but since their finances were not in great shape, they decided to seek the help of the British Mercantile Exchange and the Ottoman Bank. Unfortunately, the response was not positive. The only remaining solution was to send and screen propaganda films from London.²⁴⁵

The British Council was established in 1934-1935 as a democratic response to new and urgent problems caused by the emergence of totalitarian states in

243 Filmer, 1984, p. 179.

244 Filmer, 1984, p. 180.

245 Seydi, 2006, pp. 182-183.

Europe. It offered foreign audiences an alternative ideology or *the British way of life*.²⁴⁶ During the Second World War, the party collaborated with the British Council on matters of film. Films suggested by the British Council were sent to the People's Houses upon approval of the General Secretariat of the RPP. The British Council wanted to distribute films on its own and had already given some films to the party as gifts. The General Secretariat allowed them to distribute films as long as it was with the knowledge of the Fifth Bureau. Hence, in 1943, the British Council organized film screenings in many People's Houses that had a film projector, as well as in others with a portable projector.²⁴⁷ Most of films were cultural films on technical and social issues that did not contain any political message. Titles included: *London Zoo*, *The King of Cotton*, *Healthy People*, *How A Phone Works*, and *Resin*. Six films on such subjects such as manufacturing batteries and scouting were screened in People's Houses by B. Lükas, representative of the British Council in Ankara, using his own projector.²⁴⁸

Documents in British archives report that films censored at movie theaters were successfully screened to Turkish authorities at the embassy and then at the People's Houses. Archival documents indicate that among the lot were military films on aeronautics, as well. These films were designed to attract and inform Turkish people about aeronautical innovations, which were among the most important of the Second World War. Secondly, they showed the power of the British Air Force in the face of Luftwaffe, the Nazi's air forces.²⁴⁹

British semi-documentary, semi-comedy films were screened in Turkish movie theaters in this period, but most were censored due to anti-Nazi content. The British had appointed a person at the Istanbul Information Bureau to deal with the issue of censorship.²⁵⁰

246 Philip M. Taylor, *British Propaganda in the Twentieth Century: Selling Democracy* (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 1999), p. 77.

247 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1212 Folder no: 25 Row no: 2 p. 29-34.

248 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 00, Box no: 1208 Folder no: 10 Row no: 3 p. 11.

249 Seydi, 2006, pp. 187-190.

250 Seydi, 2006, p. 185.

Near the end of the Second World War, in May 1945, the director of Department of Military Intelligence of the United States (*Amerikan Harp İstihbarat Departmanı*) in Ankara, G. H. Damon, sent a letter to the General Secretariat of the RPP communicating its wish to screen American cultural and educational films to the Turkish people to reinforce cultural relations between Turks and Americas. It would provide a 16mm portable projector along with an American specialist from the Talas American Missionary School.²⁵¹ Among the thirty-four films suggested were some propaganda films like the *War Report* that shows how dive bombers fly over the ocean, *Divide and Conquer*, a film on how the Nazis invaded France and other countries; and *How Britain Resisted*, a film on British resistance during the Second World War. Aside from these were cultural and educational films on electricity, agriculture, modern glass factories, basketball, and parachuting.²⁵² Most of the films were translated into Turkish. By that time, Turkey had chosen a side in the war. The General Secretariat of the RPP liked the proposal.

In spring 1945, thirty-seven newsreels sent by the British Ministry of Information were screened at fifty-two cities and villages. The ministry lent thirty-five films to the British Council to screen at Turkish Education Institutes in Ankara and Istanbul, as well as in People's Houses.²⁵³ After the war ended, the British Council made a plan in 1947 to show 16mm films on life and sports in the People's Houses of Istanbul with the consent of the General Secretariat of the RPP.²⁵⁴ In 1948, the British Council screened films on agriculture and related topics in many of the People's Houses of Anatolian cities such as Nazilli.²⁵⁵

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- 251 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 o o, Box no: 1213 Folder no: 28 Row no: 1 p. 53.
- 252 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 o o, Box no: 1213 Folder no: 28 Row no: 1 pp. 54-55.
- 253 Seydi, 2006, pp. 262-263.
- 254 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 o o, Box no: 1208 Folder no: 8 Row no: 1 pp. 1-2.
- 255 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 o o, Box no: 1212 Folder no: 25 Row no: 2 p. 12.

After the war, the United States Information Agency and Library continued sending the General Secretariat of the RPP film catalogs and information on the conditions on borrowing films. Most of the suggested films were in Turkish and concerned education, industry, landscapes, social life, sports, and natural sciences.²⁵⁶ These films were screened in a limited number of People's Houses in Anatolia in 1948.²⁵⁷

256 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 01, Box no: 9 Folder no: 49 Row no: 6 pp. 1-2.

257 Prime Ministry's Republican Archive, Catalogue of Republican People's Party, Cat. no: 490 1 0 0, Box no: 1212 Folder no: 25 Row no: 2 pp. 1-44.

Conclusion

The twentieth century brought a new concept: govern with the consent of the masses. Emerging nation-states in the aftermath of the Great War needed for gaining the consensus of the people. With this aim, they formed brand new organizations and instruments to spread the principles and slogans of their regime. Call it propaganda, edification, or indoctrination depending on the nature of the regime, shaping the opinion of the masses in line with the ruling class' project was of utmost importance. As attempted to explain in this dissertation, in line with the *zeitgeist*, propaganda was also in the agenda of the young Turkish Republic. The new Republican regime needs for legitimizing itself in the eyes of citizens and gain their support. The main motivations were to ensure “unity”, to create a “new man”, and to consolidate “national identity.”

The nation-states' necessity for self-legitimization, – as in cases of religious rituals – paved the way for creating their own web of symbols. In the era of national states, these symbols were as visible as possible in the public sphere. Celebrations paraded these symbols that reify the legitimacy of the ruler. Rituals were theatrical performances. All elements in these rituals had symbolic meanings that the surpassed what was visible at first sight. In a secular nation-state, the ruling class attempted to usurp religion's throne, pushing religion

into private sphere. More often than not, it tries to take religion under its control. No political authority can tolerate another source of authority as powerful as itself.¹

Atatürk never used religious channels to communicate reforms to citizens as pointed out by François Georgeon.² There are a few exceptions, such as Mustafa Kemal's Balıkesir sermon in 1923 and inscriptions on the revolution and reforms shared from the mahyas of mosques. Georgeon bases his argument on decreasing power of the *ulema* and the Kemalist understanding of laicism which can be epitomized by the motto: "Religion is part of the private sphere, which the state cannot enter." On the other hand, the ruling class' desire to isolate itself from the practices of the sultanate, where religion and political authority were merged, cannot be ignored. Instead of transforming religious channels into state channels, the Kemalist regime preferred not to use them, ignored them, or as in the closing of dervish lodges, curtailed their activities.

Even today, a funeral prayer or a mawlid is preceded by the phrase "Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, his brothers in arms, and all martyrs", which shows some areas where the sacredness of nationalism is celestial and intertwined with religion. The "homeland" and its founders and protectors were part of this sacred field.

The intention of the Kemalist elite was for the citizens to care about national days as much as religious festivals. On the tenth anniversary of Republic Day, citizens had not yet internalized celebrations of the revolution. The ruling class wished citizens to buy new clothes for their children on Republic Day instead of the Feast of Ramadan. The new Republic should have a discourse, rituals, web of symbols, institutions, and staff of its own. The offer of populism replaced the "opium of religion."

One of the most important findings of this dissertation is that the ruling elite of the single-party era was well-aware of the importance of propaganda and conducted internal and foreign propaganda within its means in terms of finances and qualified staff. Propaganda's golden age followed the First World

1 Berkes emphasizes that the reasoning behind the abolition of the caliphate was not religious, but political. Berkes, 2008, p. 514.

2 Georgeon, 2009, p. 74.

War. During the single-party era, the word “propaganda” was used in political and social discourse, during parliamentary debates, in internal party correspondence, in speeches, and in the articles of the party’s prominent authors. The Republican elite was unanimous about the necessity of conducting effective propaganda domestically and abroad, and this subject frequently appeared on the agenda.

For effective internal and foreign propaganda, the Kemalist regime used many mediums and channels such as the press, radio, publications, cinema, theater, schools, People’s Houses as well as the public sphere – village squares, coffee shops, posters, and public orators. Each feature of propaganda investigated in this dissertation – its institutions, mediums, and channels – could be the subject of a research project on its own. Nevertheless, the primary purpose of this research was to provide an overall picture of the perception and organization of propaganda in this period given all the elements that fit under the heading of “the single party and propaganda.” On the other hand, the dissertation examined the subject of cinema during the single-party era in depth, because it has not been previously researched in detail. This uncharted field was examined as a *microcosmos* from which to examine the state’s activities in propaganda.

During the single-party regime, state propaganda was conducted along two axes in two distinct periods. The first period, which starts with the War of Independence and culminates with the consolidation of power in 1931, can be called “revolution propaganda.” The second period starts with the Second World War and can be called “war era propaganda.”

Most of the organization of propaganda occurred after 1931. One of the most important sources of power during the revolution propaganda period was the Secretary General of the RPP. The party-state focused on publicizing itself and explaining its platforms to citizens from 1931 onwards. Behind this was the bitter experience of the LRP. The first issue of Sertel’s *Son Posta* newspaper, published in 1930, had the following headline: “We are suffocated, we need air.”³ The LRP’s experience proved there was opposition among citizens against the party. This implied that the party-state should communicate more effectively with citizens and explain the revolution and the purposes of the

3 Topuz, 2003, p.178.

single party to them. Propaganda in this period was formed around the Six Arrows and projects like the Turkish History Thesis and the Sun Language Theory were used as reference points. They were based on the past and reinforced the basis of a strong, modern nation-state. Stern propaganda was conducted around the personalities of Atatürk and İnönü, and during the early years first of the Republic, first Atatürk's and then İnönü's image were used together and separately in various mediums.

The Directorate General of the Press and Intelligence, one of the oldest, still-active institutions in the history of Turkish Republic, was founded during the War of Independence to conduct internal and foreign propaganda. The mission required highly qualified staff, which is why almost all of the elite and intelligentsia of the Republic either worked for or were in contact with the directorate.

In the first period, the DGPIN was under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs after the War of Independence. The fact that the DGPIN was considered foreign instead of internal affairs during the first years of the revolution points to the prioritization of foreign publicity. Unlike post-1931 period, the ruling elite was more multi vocal and operated in an environment where pre-revolutionary institutions like the Turkish Hearths were still active. In this period, Independence Tribunals quieted the press rather than the DGPIN, as would be the case during the Second World War.

In 1931, the single party ventured to publicize itself globally. However, the official propaganda institution of the state – the DGPIN – was closed the same year. The closure of the institution responsible for domestic and foreign propaganda during a period of strengthening and institutionalization could not have been due to financial problems. The answer to this riddle is in the strengthening and institutionalization of the party. The single-party regime wished to consolidate power in its hands, and though it was a government body, it could not trust a directorate with its roots in the 1920s. In other words, by 1931 the RPP wished to establish its own, new structures and staff. The DGPIN – the state propaganda body – was deemed unnecessary and abolished in 1931 as part of a general purge.

The two years when the directorate's activities were suspended were an intermediate phase when the party rewrote the rules of the state – or vice versa

– and legislation for institutions like the DGP to function properly were enacted. Furthermore, the main components of regime propaganda – the People's Houses and the Organization of Public Orators – were founded, radio was taken under state control, and the party began making propaganda films. In the new era after 1931, there was no place for the old actors of propaganda, nor for the Turkish Hearths, nor for Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver, and the single-party government took steps to monopolize power. Turkish Hearths were closed down in April 1931. The President of Turkish Hearths, Hamdullah Suphi Tanrıöver, was a prominent figure experienced in the affairs of propaganda on account of the efforts of the Turkish Hearths and the DGPIN. The single party dominated by the state preferred to stay clear of the residue of the past. This purge was an elimination of pluralism and diversity.

The DGP, which was reopened in 1933, perfectly reflects the transition from revolution propaganda to war era propaganda as well. The DGP was one of the most significant institutions of revolution propaganda up until 1940. Press, radio, cinema, and theater were under the directorate's control. Vedat Nedim Tör, its first manager, when it was reestablished in 1933, and its primary consultant Burhan Belge, were significant personages of the early Republican era. These two intellectuals were among founders of *Kadro* magazine and had much to say on the revolution. Their articles in *La Turquie Kémaliste* and *Kadro* maintained enthusiasm for the revolution and expectations for further reform. The attitudes of both Tör and Belge towards imperialism were severe due to socialist pasts.

In 1940, a very different personage was assigned as manager of the DGP: an official from Foreign Affairs, Selim Sarper. Sarper was known to be close to İnönü. He was closer to the Allied Powers than the Axis Powers. The DGP under Sarper acted almost as a ministry of propaganda during the most trying times of the war, with a large staff and wide sphere of influence. The DGP's mission in this period was not to propagandize revolution, but to direct public opinion in line with the attitudes and opinions of the single-party government and to quiet dissent. The content of its propaganda was dominated by the principles of nationalism and etatism rather than the principles of reformism and populism among the Six Arrows.

Except for a short period between 1933 and 1937, the state did not resign state propaganda mechanisms into non-governmental hands. With the outbreak of the war, the mediums of mass communication were trusted to a pure bureaucrat, loyal to the National Chief.

The lack of qualified staff was a determinant issue in this period. During the single-party regime, a handful of party elites and intellectuals contributed to the state's propaganda organization. Importantly, during discussions about improving *Hâkimiyet-i Milliye* newspaper, Atatürk did not choose the young, talented journalist Zekeriya Sertel to head the project. Rather, he preferred Recep Peker, a military man. What would have been the outcome of a *Hâkimiyet-i Milliye* headed by Sertel? Likewise, during the Second World War, Selim Sarper, a severe diplomat with close ties with İnönü, was appointed head of the DGP. Peker and Sarper were no doubt perfect Kemalist bureaucrats. The state's choice in exceptional circumstances was to play it safe and not leave the control of propaganda organizations in the hand of intellectuals like Sertel or Tör. However, it is obvious that the state was literally dependent of these intellectuals. Take the example of Belge and Tör: they were condemned in 1927 for being communist, they were the pioneers of *Kadro* in 1932, engaged in the re-organization of the state's propaganda institution in 1934, and during the war they worked for Turkish radio.

One of the most important publications of the first period of the DGP was *La Turquie Kémaliste*, which was produced for the purpose of foreign propaganda. *La Turquie Kémaliste*, which was similar to contemporaneous magazines, was one of the best mediums for conveying the ideal image of Turkey during the single-party regime through the images and discourses it communicated. Especially in the pre-war period, *La Turquie Kémaliste* adopted an aggressive tone towards "those Europeans who preferred Turkey not to change and continue to reflect an Orientalism in line with their fantasies."⁴ *La Turquie Kémaliste*, which was first published in 1934, was fastidiously prepared display presenting the new, contemporary, and strong Turkey for the foreign eyes and a storyboard that set forth dreams and goals.

4 Burhan Belge, "Qu'importe....Restez Tels que Vous Etes!", *La Turquie Kémaliste*, no. 3 (October 1934), p. 1.

In the pre-war period, the magazine had an anti-imperialist bias. The War of Independence, fought and won against imperialist powers, was the most important source of legitimacy for the ruling class. The Kemalist elite advocated a discourse of freedom for all nations and that nations determine their own destiny. On the other hand, though the Turkish identity appeared to be inclusive and devoid of racial character, the Thrace and Dersim incidents were black days for the process of constructing national identity.

The Kemalist Turkey emulated its peers in matters of public edification. The methods used by the Soviet Union and Italy to mobilize their people, their systems of public edification, and their mediums of mass communication were examined by the single party, in particular. Falih Rıfkı Atay expressed that the purpose of this examination was to benefit from methods of edification and development that could serve the Kemalist administration, regardless of whether the country employing them was communist or fascist. To build its domestic and foreign propaganda, Kemalist Turkey adopted the practices of these countries as models and developed similar structures and mediums. When the single-party regime is compared to its peers as authoritarian or even totalitarian in popular culture, it generally results in oversimplified Atatürk-Hitler juxtapositions, which is problematic. The young Turkish Republic's exemplar was not Hitler's Germany, but Mussolini's Italy and Lenin's Soviet Union. The Republic emulated Soviet film propaganda and looked to Mussolini's youth organizations as a model for physical training. In 1932, a Mobile Edification Exhibit – similar to the Soviet Agitprop trains – traveled the 1,002 kilometers from Ankara to Samsun. In 1938, as in Mussolini's Italy, physical training was made obligatory through the Law on Physical Training.

In this dissertation, I focus on cinema as a subfield of foreign and domestic propaganda and examine how cinema, one of the most important mediums of the age, was used by the single party. The field of film propaganda provides colorful examples through which the relations that the state established with its partners and how those relations shaped its discourse in both domestic and foreign propaganda become evident. Propaganda through film has always been on the Kemalist agenda after the revolution. One of the first acts in that regard was the signing of the "treaty of exchange of non-propaganda films" (*propaganda nitelikli olmayan filmlerin değişimi anlaşması*) between Turkey and Soviet Union in 1926. The Soviets actively used the medium of film to

propagandize the revolution; Turkey wished to benefit from this experience. In 1926, the fact that a local authority in Erzurum screened films provided by the Soviets to alienate Muslim Azerbaijanis from religion perfectly exemplifies the pragmatist approaches of the Kemalist regime.

The single party decided to produce propaganda films in 1932, at the peak of its organizational ability. The timing corresponds to the period when the distinction between the party and state were most vague. The DGP started producing films only at the end of 1941.

Both the party's and the DGP's film production were limited to actuality films – in other words, newsreels. It was neither possible to produce high-budget national propaganda films nor edification films as countries being emulated did. Even though film propaganda was frequently mentioned in the context of politics, the state's capacity was a determining factor in the field of cinema. Since Turkey was a country only at the beginning of a process of capital accumulation, capacity first and foremost meant financial capacity. From the early Republic until the end of the single-party regime, there were many plans and projects with domestic and foreign partners to establish a film studio and to make a propaganda film on the revolution and War of Independence; none of these were realized. When there was a shortage of foreign currency, financial difficulties play the industry dependent on imported film stock and equipment. At the Great Depression in 1929, the fact that half of the state budget was spent on defense during the Second World War, as well as the debts of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration (*Düyun-u Umumiye*) – the last of which would be paid in 1954 –, all of these circumstances contributed to the poor shape of the Turkish economy.

The issue of securing qualified staff was also in question in the field of cinema. Why did the single-party regime not cultivate a filmmaker like Leni Riefenstahl or Dziga Vertov? This relates directly to the place of art in the Ottoman Empire and in the Young Republic. In a culture where painting was banned for centuries, the evolution of cinema was unsurprisingly slow. The conditions necessary for the development of independent artists were not present. There were a limited number of experts at work in the film industry in Turkey who either learned their craft at the Military's Photography and Film Center or were self-educated. People educated in film in the Soviet Union, such as

Nazım Hikmet and Abidin Dino were not partner with the state due to ideological differences. The only remedy of the state was to collaborate with a theater director, Muhsin Ertuğrul, or with private entrepreneurs.

In contrast with theater, cinema depended on imported equipments and supplies, and even a mid-sized production substantial capital. It is therefore not meaningful to compare the role of plays in the People's Houses with that of film screenings. Since capital was required, the state naturally partnered with entrepreneurs like İpekçis. In that period, almost all portraits of Atatürk were credited to Foto Süreyya, though Süreyya Bükey himself was a businessman who never actually took a photo. The single-party government tried to convey to such businessmen that film propaganda was a "national cause"; however, such rapports was answered by requests for privilege, credit, and funds.

During the single-party era, İsmail Hakkı Baltacıoğlu – a Kemalist intellectual –, Mediha Berkes – known as a leftist –, and Nihal Atsız – a stark rightist – all advocated for cinema to be taken under the control of the state instead of letting the people be exposed to the misleading influence of foreign cinema. In a period when virtually no domestic film production existed, a national cinema under the state's control was preferred to the capitalist, imperialist or communist influence of foreign films over the public.

Even though state's production of propaganda films was limited it controlled the field by importing films consistent with the state's ideology or by preventing the screening of films that contradicted it. As mentioned at the beginning of this dissertation, "censorship and propaganda are really different sides of the same coin." As much as films to be screened, banned or censored films fall within the field of propaganda, as well. Considering film censorship in the single-party era, the fact that the Soviets made film following İnönü's visit to Moscow in 1932, entitled *What did İsmet Pasha see in the Soviet Russia?* (*İsmet Paşa Rusya'da Ne Gördü?*) was screened at the People's Houses becomes meaningful. Considering that in 1943, several bureaucratic hoops preceded the screening of the film *For Whom the Bell Tolls*, the screening of *What did İsmet Pasha see in the Soviet Russia?* in the pre-war period reveals the foreign politics of the period. Unlike its contemporaries, the Turkish film indus-

try was never monopolized by the state, but it was under state's keen supervision. Developments and tensions in both internal and foreign politics were directly reflected in state's attitude toward cinema.

The People's Houses were one of the most significant venues for the state to screen films to the public. The single party conducted film propaganda through the People's Houses; however, the existing organization and resources were not sufficient to meet the requirements of the People's Houses. These were not the only spaces used by the state to screen films for the public. The state used village squares, coffee shops, factories, and primarily private film theaters to screen films. The Law on Educational and Technical Films enacted in 1937 ordered that technical or informative films be shown along with each feature film screening, and with the DGPP Law of 1943, film theaters were further ordered to screen any films sent by the DGPP. The state considered cinema part of its endeavor to organize citizens' leisure time. In 1940, for example, evening film screenings were organized by the People's House in Bandırma – in a rather instructive manner – for villagers who arrived a day early for the farmer's market.

From a different point of view, the second period of propaganda, which has been termed “war era propaganda” could also have started from the death of Atatürk. The fifteen years between 1923 and 1938 were certainly the liveliest and most fruitful period of propaganda for the revolution and regime. In 1931, suppression of opposition and intense work towards better organization precipitated an era where new organizations and mediums of propaganda were established. However, the Second World War, which began just after Atatürk's death before the ruling class could form a new discourse, raises the question of whether Atatürk's death or the war determined the slant of the new propaganda. The eagerness and enthusiasm of the Republican elite for the propaganda of the revolution during the first period receded in the second period of propaganda. In short, the propaganda of the revolution, which was conducted until 1939, was based on the successes of the young Republic: reforms, the Six Arrows, and the victorious War of Independence. The government propagandized a utopia that had not yet suffered difficult times. Although there were incidents before 1939 – as Maintenance of Order Law, Dersim, and Thrace, the oppressive politics the state directed only to certain groups and

did not affect the dominant majority in society. However, when the threat of war occurred, the regime's capacity and influence over the public were tested.

During this period, the government adopted policies that would put farmers, workers, and minorities in difficult conditions – practically all strata aside from the ruling class. Especially after the Germans attacked the Soviet Union, the government appropriated a nationalist discourse emphasizing patriotism to unite the people. The public criticized the government for being weak and inadequate. In turn, this opened the principles of populism and etatism up for discussion. How much could these be reified? The heavy economic and social pressures of war, the worsening measures taken by the state, and the requirement that every thought expressed in the press had to be filtered by the state made the relationship between the state and society vulnerable.

Before İnönü started to lead the country single-handedly, war broke out. In a way, the Second World War helped İnönü shine as a former military leader. It is unclear on what kind of discourse İnönü would base his leadership in a peaceful period. The National Chief took precautions to which the population would not have consented during peace time. During this period of national mobilization, the “enemy” and “opposition” were defined based on changing conditions of the day. As noted in the official statement of Mustafa Kemal's death, the newly elected president was expected to gather the government, the glorious army, and the mighty Turkish nation into an unshakeable unity and continue the ascent of the country. After Mustafa Kemal's death, İnönü became the permanent leader of the party and the president with little discussion because of his standing after Mustafa Kemal in the national struggle after Mustafa Kemal.

During the Second World War, Turkey was exposed to propaganda by warring countries. Under the influence of von Papen, German propaganda was more oppressive, but the British and then the Americans used cultural channels of propaganda such as the BBC, the British Council, and the United States Information Agency more effectually.⁵ When Turkey chose sides at the end of the war, this cultural influence became more palpable.

5 The British Council was established in 1934, before the Second World War. The Goethe Institut was established much later, in 1951.

During the Second World War, the state's discourse and practices related to propaganda as well as the actions it condoned reflected the government's politics of balance. Articles in French, British, and German filled *La Turquie Kémaliste*. Turkish journalists were invited by the Axis and Allies alike to visit war fronts. Dialogues in films that would either offend the British or the Germans were not allowed. Indeed, the politics of balance can be seen as the continuity of the slogan – “Peace at home, peace in World” – which was popular after the Revolution. In 1932, İnönü visited first Rome then Moscow. Before the war broke out, the Turkish state seemed closer to Allied countries; in the face of the aggressive German stance. Neither the ruling class nor intellectuals managed to stand up to fascism; on the contrary, fascism's severe politics were legitimized to a point to ensure national unity and economic stability. Turkey was neutral, and its first objective as told to the public – was to stay out of the war at all costs. In fact, even as Turkey talked with Allied countries, it continued selling chrome to Germany.

With regard to internal politics, once the Germans approached the Turkish border, the single-party government sacrificed its non-Muslim citizens through practices as wealth tax, and the Aşkale labor camp. It allowed the rise of nationalist ideologies until a final decision was made about the war. These show the differences between propaganda and real politics: especially during emergencies such as wartime, “truth” is the most easily expended element of propaganda.

The questions of how the target audiences of propaganda reacted and perceived the single-party regime must be considered. The war tarnished the government, and even though the single-party government tried to direct its citizens towards the common purpose of national defense, it was unsuccessful. The state was not successful in exercising its power due first to a lack of technical capacity and secondly to the fact that citizens' belief in “populist” purposes and politics were weakening with each passing day. As Zafer Toprak notes, while only non-Muslims were hit by the wealth tax, the National Defense Law and Agricultural Produce Tax exhausted all citizens, especially peasants. During the single-party period, ruling elite's discourse and practices aimed to control civil life and shape public opinion in line with its own ideology through revolution propaganda and war period propaganda, just as its contemporaries did. Though there were times this motive was noble at least

discursively, in reality the state's capacity was insufficient to control everything and seriously influence public opinion.

Another issue is whether this sphere of influence and suppression could not be widened because of the state's lack of capacity or reluctance to act by democratic principle. Looking back to that time from contemporary Turkey and considering all meanings of "propaganda" mentioned in this study, to what extent can the state dominate the public?

Sociologist Ali Ergur comes out with one answer in his article focusing on the reflection of Republican ideology in music. Ergur opposes the a priori acceptance that there was "a musical practice that was well-designed, well-defined, well-absorbed, imposed systematically, and finally internalized by musicians and the public alike" during the early Republican era. Ergur states that such claims are based on the same, clichéd examples: the banning of Turkish Classical Music on radio, Ziya Gökalp's assessments on music, and Atatürk's own statements on modern musical techniques. These analyses are based on a short period of time and few examples. According to Ergur "the powerful Republican ideology on which some people based their arguments was not permanent, continuous, oppressive, omnipresent, singular, and omnipotent."⁶ Similarly, though popular eugenic politics of the day were emulated discursively, the project of establishing youth clubs throughout the country was not achieved.

In this dissertation, many institutions which are examined as venues or channels of the propaganda of the single party did not fulfill what was expected of them – did not accomplish the missions with which they were established. The single party established an operative network of propaganda with the People's Houses; however, by the end of the single-party era, the People's Houses had become unmanageable and cumbersome structures. The internal capacity of the RPP to conduct party propaganda – or in other words, revolution propaganda – remained insufficient in the National Chief period. Şevket Süreyya notices that the internal organization of the RPP was not

6 Ali Ergur, "Türkiye'de Senfonik Müziğin Gelişmesinde 'Cumhuriyet Estetiği'nin Bileşenleri", *Tarabya çalışmaları: 20. Yıl armağan kitabı*, ed. Ali Vahit Turhan, Ayşegül Yaraman, Deniz Vardar, Metin Sarfati, Esra Hatipoğlu (Istanbul: Marmara Üniversitesi Nihad Sayar Eğitim Vakfı Yayınları, 2009), pp. 177- 189.

strong, and Korkmaz Alemdar points out that even before the death of Atatürk a “tedium of revolution” (*devrim bezginliği*) was observed among ruling elites. In short, single party’s internal and foreign discourses were not always fulfilled in practice.

How much does the single-party period still exist in the present and especially in our world of meaning? As mentioned at the beginning of this dissertation, the obsession to be perceived as “modern” from outside and the problematic of the “publicity of Turkey” are still issues in contemporary Turkey. The “modern” in the subconscious of the common people is a vestige carried from the Six Arrows.

Today, there is still a portrait of Atatürk in every state office and every classroom. Taking down one of these portraits would end in expulsion from a political party. When *Andımız* (Our Pledge), written by Reşit Galip, stopped being recited at schools in 2013, it turned into a great public debate. In contemporary Turkey, there is still a stratum that is loyal to the remnants of the revolution and the single-party regime to a point that opposing these is taboo. Another part of society carries the vestiges of propaganda transferred through education and socialization – appropriating the image of a person who is not religious but enjoys religious practices due to his loyalty to traditions – even 70 years after the single-party era.

There are two sides to this coin. The other side is today’s ruling class fighting for their “cause” against the “mentality of a single party” and what comes along with it. The single party had a deep influence on society even though its propaganda efforts were insufficient and inadequate at the time compared to its peer. However, the impact of three consecutive coup d’états in pursuit of Kemalist ideology cannot be ignored when evaluating this influence.

Appendix A: Request of Suspension of Conscription

T. C. BAŞBAKANLIK CUMHURİYET ARŞİVİ												
Ulus Gazete ve Matbaası	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Yeni Asır Gazetesi (İzmir)	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Anadolü Gazetesi	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Cumhuriyet Gazetesi ve Md.	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Bon Posta	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Yeni Haber, Bon Posta	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Reşadîye Gazetesi (Ankara)	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Yeni B. F. (Ankara)	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Diyarbakır Gazetesi	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Yeni Y. (Ankara)	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Alaettin Kızı	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Başın evi	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Reşadîye Gazetesi	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Osmancık Pat-	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Basıcı	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Ma. veya sahibi	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Mühürhassas mesul Mahase-	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
İçişleri şefi	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Yeni ve Neşriyat Md.	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Gece Sekreteri	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
İstihbarat şefi	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Muharrir, Mahabir, Miter-	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
cim, Ressam	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Tertip şefi	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Tertip şefi muavini	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Mürettip	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Makina dizicisi	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Baskı Makinası şefi	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Kalıpcı	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Fröçeci	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Klişeci	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Çinkograf	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Mucellit	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Makinist	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Şef Makinist	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Dinotif Makinecisi	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Linotipci	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Foto Lita Teknisiyeni	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Litografçı	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Fotografçı	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Transport ustası	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Tipografı ustası	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Effekt ustası	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Y E K Ü N	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1

Fon No: 30 10 0 0 - Kutu No: 57 - Dosya No: 386 - Sıra No: 11

Appendix B: List of the DGP Publications between 1920-1950

Name of Publication	Author	Pub. Date
Ayın Tarihi 1923		1923
Yunan İllerinde Zavallı Esirlerimiz		1923
Ecnebi Matbuat Hûlasasi (1-2)		1925
T.C. Devlet Yıllığı		1929
T.C. Devlet Yıllığı		1930
Bugünkü Türkiye	Raymond Cartier	1935
Hüllecî	Reşat Nuri Güntekin	1935
La Turquie Contemporaine		1935
Üfürükçü	Osman Cemal Kaygısız	1935
Dünya Matbuatına Bir Bakış		1935
La Turquie Kemaliste		1935
1934 Senesinde Türkiye'de İktisadi Vaziyet.	Translated from Eildienst newspaper published in Berlin.	1935
İtaat İlâmı	Musahipzade Celal	1936
Konferanslar 1 (Son İngiliz Seçimi)	Şekip Engineri	1936
Konferanslar 2 (3. üncü Laval Kabinesinin Platformu)	Kemal M. Altınkaya	1936
La Ferme Modele d'Orman		1936
La Turquie en Voie d'Industrialisation		1936
Birinci Basın Kongresi		1936
La Guerre De L'Independance Turque		1937
Bugünkü Türkiye	Stephan Ronart (Translated by B. T. Şaman)	1937
Şeriatçısı	Ertuğrul Şevket	1938
Yabancı Gözüyle Cumhuriyet Türkiye		1938

Name of Publication	Author	Pub. Date
Politique des Chemins de Fer en Turquie Republicaine		1938
Türkiye'de Matbuat Rejimleri	Server R. İskit	1939
Keloğlu Çanakkale Muharebelerinde	F. Celâlidin Göktulga	1939
Kan Davası	Vâlâ Nured-din	1940
Gazete Ve Mecmualar		1940
Arzu ile Kanber	Bekir Sıtkı Kunt	1940
Radyo 1941-1946		1941
Cumhuriyetten Sonra Çıkan Gazeteler ve Mecmualar	Feridun Fazıl Tü- lbentçi	1941
Düvenler Dönerken: Radyofonik Temsil	Kemal Tözen	1941
Gazeteler ve Mecmualar	Feridun Fazıl Tü- lbentçi	1941
La Politique Ferroviaire en Turquie		1941
Türk Basın Birliği Umumi Kongresine Sunulan Nizamname Projesi		1941
Gazeteler ve Mecmualar	Feridun Fazıl Tü- lbentçi	1942
Türkiyede Çıkmakta Olan Gazete ve Mecmualar		1942
Gazeteler ve Mecmualar	Feridun Fazıl Tü- lbentçi	1943
İkinci Cihan Harbi Kronolojisi	Münir Müeyyet Bek- man, Feridun Fazıl Tülbentçi	1943
Türkiye'de Matbuat İdareleri ve Politikalari		1943
Basın ve Yayınla İlgili Kanun, Kararname, Nizamname, Talimatname ve Tamimler		1944
Basın ve Yayınla İlgili Kanunlar ve Mevzuatlar		1944

Name of Publication	Author	Pub. Date
Gazete ve Mecmualar I		1944
Gazete ve Mecmualar II		1944
Milli Kalkınma Vasıtalarından Otelcilik ve Turizm Millî Kredisi: Türkiye'de Otel Durumu ve Davası	Süreyya Ergün	1944
Türkiye'de Çıkmakta Bulunan Gazete ve Mecmualar IV	Server İskit, Feridun Fazıl Tülbentçi	1944
Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisinin 2 Ağustos 1944 Tarihli Toplantısı: Türkiyenin Almanya ile Siyasi ve İktisadi Münasebetlerini Kesmesi		1944
Gazeteler ve Mecmualar		1945
T.C. Devlet Yıllığı		1945
T.C. Devlet Yıllığı		1946
Son değişikliklere göre: Matbuat Kanunu		1946
La Quinzaine d'Ankara		1947
Yabancı Memleketlerde Turizm Teşkilatı		1949
Fotoğrafla Türkiye = La Turquie en Image = Turkey in Pictures = Die Türkei im Bild		1950
La Peinture Turque	Nurullah Berk	1950
La Turquie Economique		1950
Türkiyeden Resimler		1950

Appendix C: List of the RPP Films

Film Title	§	No.	Owner/ Producer	Prod. Date (est.)	Note	Screen- ing Date	Genre
(Ankara) The Coal Exhibition	1	59	General Secretariat of the RPP	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1939- 1940	Newsreel (Economic)
(In Ankara) The Opening of the Exhibition House	-	2A	General Secretariat of the RPP	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1935, 1936	Newsreel
10th Anniversary of Farm and Forest	-	13	From RPP's archive. Production process is not known.	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1935	Newsreel
11th Year Official Parade	-	2	From RPP's archive. Production process is not known.	1934	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1935	Newsreel (Important Days and Celebrations)
16th Year of Republic Day (1939)	1	111	General Secretariat of the RPP	1939	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1940	Newsreel (Important Days and Celebrations)
16th Year of Republic Day (1939)	2	112	General Secretariat of the RPP	1939	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1940	Newsreel (Important Days and Celebrations)
17th Year of Republic Day	-	-	General Secretariat of the RPP	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1940	Newsreel (Important Days and Celebrations)
18th year 11.28.1941	1	439	General	-	RPP shows in	1941	Newsreel

Film Title	§	No.	Owner/ Producer	Prod. Date (est.)	Note	Screen- ing Date	Genre
Speech of the Prime Minister and scouts' oath			Secretariat of the RPP		People's Houses.		(Important Days and Celebrations)
18th Year, Republic Day 1941	1	436-432	General Secretariat of the RPP	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1941- 1942	Newsreel (Important Days and Celebrations)
18th Year, Republic Day 1941	2	437-433	General Secretariat of the RPP	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1941- 1942	Newsreel (Important Days and Celebrations)
18th Year, Republic Day 1941	3	438-434	General Secretariat of the RPP	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1941- 1942	Newsreel (Important Days and Celebrations)
1934 Ankara Municipal Elections	-	4	General Secretariat of the RPP	-	RPP shows in People's Houses..	1935	Newsreel
1934 Istanbul Municipal Elections	-	5	General Secretariat of the RPP	1934	RPP shows in People's Houses.		Newsreel
1936 Official Parade	2	-	From RPP's archive. Production process is not known.	1936	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1937	Newsreel
1937 Thrace Maneuvers	1	243	General Secretariat of the RPP	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1942	Newsreel (Military)

Film Title	§	No.	Owner/ Producer	Prod. Date (est.)	Note	Screen- ing Date	Genre
1937 Thrace Maneuvers	2	244	General Secretariat of the RPP	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1942	Newsreel (Military)
1940 İzmir Fair	1	346	From RPP's archive. Production process is not known.	1940	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1940, 1941 October	Newsreel (Economic)
1940 İzmir Fair	2	347	From RPP's archive. Production process is not known.	1940	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1940, 1941 October	Newsreel (Economic)
1940 İzmir Fair	3	348	From RPP's archive. Production process is not known.	1940	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1940, 1941 October	Newsreel (Economic)
1940 Republic Day	1	404	General Secretariat of the RPP	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1941	Newsreel (Important Days and Celebra- tions)
1940 Republic Day	2	405	General Secretariat of the RPP	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1941	Newsreel (Important Days and Celebra- tions)
1940, President İsmet İnönü's Speech at the Parliament	1	396	General Secretariat of the RPP	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1941	Newsreel
1941 Republic Day	1	439	General Secretariat of the RPP	-	RPP shows in	1942	Newsreel

Film Title	§	No.	Owner/ Producer	Prod. Date (est.)	Note	Screen- ing Date	Genre
					People's Houses.		(Important Days and Celebra- tions)
1941 Republic Day	2	440	General Secretariat of the RPP	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1942	Newsreel (Important Days and Celebrations)
1941 Republic Day	3	441	General Secretariat of the RPP	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1942	Newsreel (Important Days and Celebrations)
4th Conven- tion	-	-	General Secretariat of the RPP	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1939	Newsreel
6th Conven- tion of Airline Association	-	-	General Secretariat of the RPP	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1935	Newsreel (Aeronautical)
A Trip to Iran	-	8	General Secretariat of the RPP	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1935	Newsreel
Adana's Inde- pendence Day	1	68- 66	From RPP's archive. Production process is not known.	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1937, 1940, 1941	Newsreel (Important Days and Celebrations)
Ankara Winter Sports	-	6	From RPP's archive. Production process is not known.	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1935	Newsreel (Sports)

Film Title	§	No.	Owner/ Producer	Prod. Date (est.)	Note	Screen- ing Date	Genre
Ankara- Di- yarbakır Line Opening Cere- mony	1	-	From RPP's archive. Production process is not known.	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1940	Newsreel (Economic)
Ankara- Di- yarbakır Line Opening Cere- mony	2	-	From RPP's archive. Production process is not known.	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1940	Newsreel (Economic)
Arrival of Mil- itary Students to Ankara	1	-	From RPP's archive. Production process is not known.	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1937	Newsreel (Military)
Atatürk's Arri- val to Ankara	1		From RPP's archive. Production process is not known.		RPP shows in People's Houses.	1937	Newsreel
Atatürk's Travel to East	2	37	From RPP's archive. Production process is not known.	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1942, 1945	Newsreel
Atatürk's Travel to East	3	38	From RPP's archive. Production process is not known.	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1942, 1945	Newsreel
Atatürk's Travel to East	1	36	From RPP's archive. Production process is not known.	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1942, 1945	Newsreel

Film Title	§	No.	Owner/ Producer	Prod. Date (est.)	Note	Screen- ing Date	Genre
Kermis	-	-	General Secretariat of the RPP	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1940	Newsreel (Economic)
Bergama Ker- mis	1	414	General Secretariat of the RPP	1939	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1940, 1942	Newsreel (Economic)
Bergama Ker- mis	2	415	General Secretariat of the RPP	1939	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1940, 1942	Newsreel (Economic)
Berlin Olym- pics (1936)	-	-	From Bayer's archive	-	Screened (Eminönü P.H.), Edirne P.H.)	1942, 1943	Newsreel
Bursa Moun- tain Sports	1	85	From RPP's archive. Production process is not known.	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1940	Newsreel (Sports)
Bursa Moun- tain Sports	2	86	From RPP's archive. Production process is not known.	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1940	Newsreel (Sports)
Bursa Skiing	-	-	General Sec- retariat of the RPP		RPP shows in People's Houses.	1938	Newsreel (Sports)
Cattle Games in Rhine Prov- ince	-	-	From Bayer's archive	-	Screened (Edirne P.H.)	1943	Newsreel

Film Title	§	No.	Owner/ Producer	Prod. Date (est.)	Note	Screen- ing Date	Genre
On Combat- ting Syphilis	-	-	From Bayer's archive	-	Screened (Edirne P.H.)	1943	Educational Film
On Blood He- matology	-	-	From Bayer's archive	-	Screened (Edirne P.H.)	1943	Educational Film
On Malaria Tests	-	-	From Bayer's archive	-	Screened (Edirne P.H.)	1943	Educational Film
Chemotherapy in bacterial people	-	-	From Bayer's archive	-	Screened (Edirne P.H.)	1943	Educational Film
Coal Produc- tion	-	-	British Council's Film	-	Screened. (Kayseri P.H.)	1942	Educational Film
Coloring Clay	-	-	British Council's Film	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1943	Educational Film
Combatting Pain	-	-	From Bayer's archive	-	Screened (Edirne P.H.)	1943	Educational Film
Commemorat- ing Atatürk	1	48	From RPP's archive. Production process is not known.	1938	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1940	Newsreel (Important Days and Celebrations)
Cotton	-	-	British Council's Film	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1943	Educational Film
Country of In- ventions	-	-	British Council's Film	-	Screened. (Kayseri P.H.)	1942	Educational Film

Film Title	§	No.	Owner/ Producer	Prod. Date (est.)	Note	Screen- ing Date	Genre
Death	-	-	From Bayer's archive	-	Screened (Edirne P.H.)	1943	Educational Film
Diphtheria Se- rum	-	-	From Bayer's archive	-	Screened (Edirne P.H.)	1943	Educational Film
Diyarbakır Line Opening Ceremony	-	-	General Secretariat of the RPP	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1935	Newsreel (Economic)
Donating Winter Arti- cles to Soldiers	-	-	Ankara People's House	1939	RPP shows in People's Houses.		Newsreel
Erzincan Earthquake (Disaster)	1	282	General Secretariat of the RPP	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1940	Newsreel
Erzurum Sta- tion	-	-	General Secretariat of the RPP	1939	RPP shows in People's Houses.		Newsreel (Economic)
Flag	-	-	General Secretariat of the RPP	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1937	Newsreel
Fortune from Coal	-	-	British Council's Film	-	Screened. (Kayseri P.H.)	1942	Educational Film
Girls Institutes and Art Schools	-	-	Collaboration of the RPP and the Min- istry of Edu- cation	1938	Its pro- duction process is known.	1940	Newsreel

Film Title	§	No.	Owner/ Producer	Prod. Date (est.)	Note	Screen- ing Date	Genre
Grand Leader Atatürk's Opening of the National Assembly	-	-	General Secretary of the RPP	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1936	Newsreel
Hatay	-	-	General Secretary of the RPP	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1939	Newsreel
Hatay's Liberation Day	-	161 A-B-C	General Secretariat of the RPP	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.		Newsreel (Important Days and Celebrations)
Hatay's Liberation Day	1-	156 A1-1	From RPP's archive. Production process is not known.	1939	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1940, 1942, 1945	Newsreel (Important Days and Celebrations)
Hatay's Liberation Day	1-	B2 156	From RPP's archive. Production process is not known.	1939	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1942	Newsreel (Important Days and Celebrations)
Hatay's Liberation Day	1-	C3 156	From RPP's archive. Production process is not known.	1939	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1942	Newsreel (Important Days and Celebrations)
Independence Day of Adana	2	69-67	General Secretariat of the RPP	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1941, 1940	Newsreel (Important Days and Celebrations)
İnönü in War of Independence	-	-	N/A	-	RPP shows in	1940	Newsreel

Film Title	§	No.	Owner/ Producer	Prod. Date (est.)	Note	Screen- ing Date	Genre
					People's Houses.		
İzmir Fair	1	182	General Secretariat of the RPP	1940	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1940	Newsreel (Economic)
İnönü Aeronautical Camp	-	-	Collaboration of the RPP and Turkish Aeronautical Association	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1940	Newsreel (Aeronautical)
İsmet İnönü's Travels	-	-	From RPP's archive. Production process is not known.	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1945	Newsreel
İsmet İnönü's Visit to Zonguldak and Inspection of Mines	-	-	General Secretariat of the RPP	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1941	Newsreel (Economic)
Istanbul Mu- nicipal Elec- tion Celebra- tions (1934)	-	-	From RPP's archive. Production process is not known.	1934	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1935, 1936	Newsreel
Kubilay Monu- ment in Mene- men	1	202	General Secretariat of the RPP	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1940, 1941	Newsreel
Learning to Live	-	-	British Council's Film	-	British Council Gifts to RPP in 1943	1945	Educational Film

Film Title	§	No.	Owner/ Producer	Prod. Date (est.)	Note	Screen- ing Date	Genre
Malaria	-	-	From Bayer's archive	-	Screened (Edirne P.H.)	1943	Educational Film
Manufacturing Storage Batter- ies	-	-	British Council's Film	-	Screened. (Kayseri P.H.)	1942	Educational Film
May 19, 1939	2	217	General Secretariat of the RPP	1939	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1940	Newsreel (Important Days and Celebrations)
May 19, 1939	1	216	General Secretariat of the RPP	1939	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1940	Newsreel (Important Days and Celebrations)
May 19, 1940 (Sports Day)	1	365	General Secretariat of the RPP	1940	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1940, 1942	Newsreel (Important Days and Celebrations)
May 19, 1941	1	366	General Secretariat of the RPP	1941	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1941	Newsreel (Important Days and Celebrations)
May 19, Cele- brations 1938	1	213	General Secretariat of the RPP	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1940	Newsreel (Important Days and Celebrations)
May 19 Cele- brations 1938	2	214	General Secretariat of the RPP	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1940	Newsreel (Important Days and Celebrations)
May 19 Cele- brations 1938	3	215	General Secretariat of the RPP	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1940	Newsreel (Important Days and Celebrations)

Film Title	§	No.	Owner/ Producer	Prod. Date (est.)	Note	Screen- ing Date	Genre
Mice and methods of combatting mice	-	-	From Bayer's archive	-	Screened (Edirne P.H.)	1943	Educational Film
Military High Schools Sports Day	1	303-319	General Secretariat of the RPP	1939	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1940, 1941	Newsreel (Important Days and Celebrations)
Military High Schools Sports Day	2	304-320	General Secretariat of the RPP	1939	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1940, 1941	Newsreel (Important Days and Celebrations)
Military High Schools Sports Day	3	305-321	General Secretariat of the RPP	1939	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1940, 1941	Newsreel (Important Days and Celebrations)
Military High Schools Sports Day	4	306-322	General Secretariat of the RPP	1939	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1940, 1941	Newsreel (Important Days and Celebrations)
Military High Schools Sports Day	5	307-323	General Secretariat of the RPP	1939	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1940, 1941	Newsreel (Important Days and Celebrations)
Military High Schools Sports Day	6	308-324	General Secretariat of the RPP	1939	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1940, 1941	Newsreel (Important Days and Celebrations)
Military High Schools Sports Day	7	309-325	General Secretariat of the RPP	1939	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1940, 1941	Newsreel (Important Days and Celebrations)

Film Title	§	No.	Owner/ Producer	Prod. Date (est.)	Note	Screen- ing Date	Genre
Military High Schools Sports Day	8	310- 326	General Secretariat of the RPP	1939	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1940, 1941	Newsreel (Important Days and Celebrations)
Miracles seen through a microscope	-	-	From Bayer's archive	-	Screened (Edirne P.H.)	1943	Educational Film
Modern Salt Production	2	204	From RPP's archive. Production process is not known.	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1940, 1941	Educational Film
Modern Salt Production	1	203	From RPP's archive. Production process is not known.	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1940, 1941	Educational Film
National Chief, Thrace Maneuvers	2	-	General Secretariat of the RPP	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1939	Newsreel (Military)
National Chief's Inspec- tion Visits to Marmara and Çanakkale	-	-	General Secretariat of the RPP	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1939	Newsreel (Military)
Navy's Visit to Malta	1	370	Military Film Center produced for RPP.	1936	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1940, 1943	Newsreel (Military)
Navy's Visit to Malta	2	371	Military Film Center produced for RPP.	1936	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1940, 1943	Newsreel (Military)

Film Title	§	No.	Owner/ Producer	Prod. Date (est.)	Note	Screen- ing Date	Genre
Navy's Visit to Malta	3	372	Military Film Center produced for RPP.	1936	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1940, 1943	Newsreel (Military)
Navy's Visit to Malta	4	373	Military Film Center produced for RPP.	1936	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1940, 1943	Newsreel (Military)
Navy's Visit to Malta	5	374	Military Film Center produced for RPP.	1936	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1940, 1943	Newsreel (Military)
New Turkey	1	260-266	From RPP's archive. Production process is not known.	1939	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1939, 1940	Newsreel
New Turkey	2	261-267	From RPP's archive. Production process is not known.	1939	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1939, 1940	Newsreel
New Turkey	3	262-268	From RPP's archive. Production process is not known.	1939	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1939, 1940	Newsreel
New Turkey	4	263-269	From RPP's archive. Production process is not known.	1939	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1939, 1940	Newsreel
New Turkey	5	264-270	From RPP's archive.	1939	RPP shows in	1939, 1940	Newsreel

Film Title	§	No.	Owner/ Producer	Prod. Date (est.)	Note	Screen- ing Date	Genre
			Production process is not known.		People's Houses.		
New Turkey	6	265- 271	From RPP's archive. Production process is not known.	1939	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1939, 1940	Newsreel
Official Cere- mony of the 12th Anniver- sary of the Re- public	-	-	General Secretariat of the RPP	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1935	Newsreel (Important Days and Celebrations)
On Various Sports	-	-	British Council's Film	-	Screened. (Kayseri P.H.)	1942	Educational Film
Opening of the RPP's Grand Convention	1		From RPP's archive. Production process is not known.	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1937	Newsreel (Economic)
Osteoplasty	-	-	From Bayer's archive	-	Screened (Edirne P.H.)	1943	Educational Film
People's House Revue	2	154	From RPP's archive. Production process is not known.	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1940	Newsreel
People's House Revue	3	155	From RPP's archive. Production process is not known.	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1940	Newsreel

Film Title	§	No.	Owner/ Producer	Prod. Date (est.)	Note	Screen- ing Date	Genre
People's House Revue	1	153	From RPP's archive. Production process is not known.	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1940	Newsreel
President İsmet İnönü's Travel to Mar- mara	1	369	From RPP's archive. Production process is not known.	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1941	Newsreel
Propeller	-	-	British Council's Film	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.		Educational Film
Rally	-	-	General Secretariat of the RPP	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1937	Newsreel
Results of Vitamin Research	-	-	From Bayer's archive	-	Screened (Edirne P.H.)	1943	Educational Film
RPP's 5th Grand Convention	1	129	General Secretariat of the RPP	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1940	Newsreel
RPP's Extraor- dinary Assem- bly of 1938	1	121	From RPP's archive. Production process is not known.	1938	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1940- 1941	Newsreel
RPP's Extraordinary Assembly of 1938	2	122	From RPP's archive. Production process is not known.	1938	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1940- 1941	Newsreel

Film Title	§	No.	Owner/ Producer	Prod. Date (est.)	Note	Screen- ing Date	Genre
RPP's Extraordinary Assembly of 1938	3		From RPP's archive. Production process is not known.	1938	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1940	Newsreel
Soviet Russian Athletes' Visit to Turkey	-	-	General Secretariat of the RPP	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1935	Newsreel (Sports)
Scouting	-	-	British Council's Film	-	Screened. (Kayseri P.H.)	1942	Educational Film
Sheepdogs	-	-	From RPP's archive. Production process is not known.	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1945	Educational Film
Sights from Yalova and Bursa	1	253	From RPP's archive. Production process is not known.	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1942	Newsreel
Sivas Work- shop	1	231	General Secretariat of the RPP	1939	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1940, 1941	Newsreel
Ski Sports	-	-	General Secretariat of the RPP	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1937	Newsreel (Sports)
Sleep the Grand Power	-	-	From Bayer's archive	-	Screened (Edirne P.H.)	1943	Educational Film

Film Title	§	No.	Owner/ Producer	Prod. Date (est.)	Note	Screen- ing Date	Genre
Source of Strength	-	-	British Council's Film	-	British Council Gifts to RPP in 1943		Educational Film
Stored Power of the Sun	-	-	From Bayer's archive	-	Screened (Edirne P.H.)	1943	Educational Film
Strength	-	-	From RPP's archive. Production process is not known.	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1945	Educational Film
Support for Our Heroic Soldiers	1	419 or 420	General Secretariat of the RPP	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1941, 1942	Newsreel (Military)
The Closing by İsmet İnönü of the 4th Grand Convention	-	12	General Secretariat of the RPP	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1935	Newsreel
The Disaster of Humankind	-	-	From Bayer's archive	-	Screened (Edirne P.H.)	1943	Educational Film
The First Day of 1941 Repub- lic Day	1	445	General Secretariat of the RPP	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1942	Newsreel (Important Days and Celebrations)
The First Day of the 18th Year of The Republic Day and Speech of the Prime Minister	1	431	General Secretariat of the RPP	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1942	Newsreel (Important Days and Celebrations)

Film Title	§	No.	Owner/ Producer	Prod. Date (est.)	Note	Screen- ing Date	Genre
The First Medical Plane in Turkey	-	-	From Bayer's archive	-	Screened (Edirne P.H.)	1943	Newsreel
The History of the Micro-scope	-	-	From Bayer's archive	-	Screened (Istanbul P.H.)	1942	Educational Film
The Inauguration of the Minister of Internal Affairs	-	2C	General Secretariat of the RPP	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1935	Newsreel
The Opening Ceremony of the Ankara Farm and Forest	1	225	General Secretariat of the RPP	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1941	Newsreel
The Opening Ceremony of the Kubilay Monument in Menemen	-	7	General Secretariat of the RPP	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1935, 1936	Newsreel
The Opening of the 4th Grand Convention	3	11	General Secretariat of the RPP	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1935, 1940	Newsreel
The Opening of a Dam	1	90	From RPP's archive. Production process is not known.	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1941- 1940	Newsreel (Economic)
The Opening of the Ertuğrul Monument in Japan	1	192	From RPP's archive. Production process is not known.	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1940	Newsreel (Military)

Film Title	§	No.	Owner/ Producer	Prod. Date (est.)	Note	Screen- ing Date	Genre
The Opening of the Erzincan Line	-	147	General Secretariat of the RPP	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1942	Newsreel (Economic)
The Opening of the Erzurum Line	1	145	General Secretariat of the RPP	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1942, 1940	Newsreel (Economic)
The Opening of the Sivas Workshop	-	232	General Secretariat of the RPP	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1939, 1942, 1940	Newsreel
The Opening of the Trade Convention by the Minister of the Economy	-	14	From RPP's archive. Production process is not known.	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1935	Newsreel (Economic)
The Opening of the 4th Stage Convention by Atatürk	-	10	General Secretariat of the RPP	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1935	Newsreel
The Opening of the Filyos River Line	1	151	From RPP's archive. Production process is not known.	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1941, 1936	Newsreel
The Opening of the National Assembly in 1935 by Atatürk	1	195/ 196	From RPP's archive. Production process is not known.	1935	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1941	Newsreel
The Opening of the National Assembly in	-	3	From RPP's archive.	1934	RPP shows in	1935	Newsreel

Film Title	§	No.	Owner/ Producer	Prod. Date (est.)	Note	Screen- ing Date	Genre
1934 with the First Turkish Speech of Ata- türk			Production process is not known.		People's Houses.		
The Opening of the National Assembly in 1938	-	-	From RPP's archive. Production process is not known.	1938	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1940	Newsreel
The Opening of the Police Monument	-	2B	From RPP's archive. Production process is not known.	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1935	Newsreel
President İsmet İnönü's Opening Speech in Parliament in 1941	1	450	General Secretariat of the RPP	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1942	Newsreel
President İsmet İnönü's Speech in Parliament in 1941	1	440- 435	General Secretariat of the RPP	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1941, 1942	Newsreel
President İsmet İnönü's Travels to South East	1	285- 289	General Secretariat of the RPP	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1940	Newsreel
President İsmet İnönü's Visit to South East	1	287	General Secretariat of the RPP	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1942, 1940	Newsreel

Film Title	§	No.	Owner/ Producer	Prod. Date (est.)	Note	Screen- ing Date	Genre
The Primal Rules of Lubri- fication	-	-	British Council's Film	-	British Council Gifts to RPP in 1943		Educational Film
The Second Year of the 6th Period of National Assembly	-	-	General Secretariat of the RPP	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1940	Newsreel (Important Days and Celebrations)
The Secret of Life	-	-	From Bayer's archive	-	Screened (Eminönü P.H., Edirne P.H.)	1942, 1943	Educational Film
The Visit of the Shah of Iran	-	9	General Secretariat of the RPP	1934	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1935, 1936	Newsreel
Those Born with a Cleft PaPalate	-	-	From Bayer's archive	-	Screened (Edirne P.H.)	1943	Educational Film
Thrace Maneuvers	-	247, 248	General Secretariat of the RPP	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.		Newsreel (Military)
Thrace Maneuvers (1939)	1	241	General Secretariat of the RPP	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1942-- 1940	Newsreel (Military)
Thrace Maneuvers (1939)	2	242	General Secretariat of the RPP	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1942-- 1940	Newsreel (Military)

Film Title	§	No.	Owner/ Producer	Prod. Date (est.)	Note	Screen- ing Date	Genre
Thrace Maneuvers 1938	1	243	General Secretariat of the RPP	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1940	Newsreel (Military)
Thrace Maneuvers 1938	2	244	General Secretariat of the RPP	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1940	Newsreel (Military)
Turkish Aeronautical Association (Convention)	-	-	General Secretariat of the RPP	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1940	Newsreel (Aeronautical)
Turkish Youth's Aero- nautical Actions	1	301- 293- 295	General Secretariat of the RPP	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1940, 1941, 1942	Newsreel (Aeronautical)
Turkish Youth's Aero- nautical Actions	2	302- 294- 296	General Secretariat of the RPP	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1940, 1941, 1942	Newsreel (Aeronautical)
Vasif Çınar's Funeral Ceremony	-	-	From RPP's archive. Production process is not known.	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1936	Newsreel
Ways to Combat Head Lice	-	-	From RPP's archive. Production process is not known.	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1945	Educational Film
What Did İsmet Pasa See in the Soviet Russia?	-	-	Soviet Union	1932	RPP shows in People's Houses.		Newsreel

Film Title	§	No.	Owner/ Producer	Prod. Date (est.)	Note	Screen- ing Date	Genre
Winter Sports in Bursa	-	-	General Secretariat of the RPP	1938 Şubat Sonrası	RPP shows in People's Houses.		Newsreel (Sports)
Works on Türk Kuşu (Aeronautical School)	-	299	General Secretariat of the RPP	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1940	Newsreel (Aeronautical)
Works on Türk Kuşu (Aeronautical School) 2	-	300	General Secretariat of the RPP	-	RPP shows in People's Houses.	1943	Newsreel (Aeronautical)
Türkkuşu			Collaboration of the RPP and the Turk- ish Aeronau- tical Associa- tion.	-	Screened in People's Houses.	1940	Newsreel (Aeronautical)
Protection from Gas	-	-	Military Film Center or a foreign film.	-	The Gen- eral Staff Photog- raphy and Film Cen- ter shared the film with RPP to be screened in People's Houses.	1934, 1940	Educational Film
Yellow Prisoners	-	-	N/A	-	Screened in Zongul- dak People's Houses.	August 1941	Newsreel

Appendix D: List of the DGP Films

Film Title	No.	Producer	Screen- ingDate	Prod. Date (est.)	Genre
May 19 (Istanbul, Samsun, Kayseri, Mersin, Adana)	A.12	DGP	-	1942	Newsreel (Important Days and Celebrations)
April 23 Children's Day	A.10.4	DGP	-	1942	Newsreel (Important Days and Celebrations)
The work of Mausoleum (Anıtkabir) Committee, Evaluations of National Chief and Prime Minister at the Exhibition House	A.9.5	DGP	-	1941-1943	Newsreel
May 19 in Ankara	B.5	DGP	-	1941-1943	Newsreel (Important Days and Celebrations)
Equestrian Sports in Ankara	A.6.7	DGP	-	1941-1943	Newsreel (Sports)
Republic Day in Ankara	B.6	DGP	-	1941-1943	Newsreel (Important Days and Celebrations)
Fencing in Ankara	A.8.3	DGP	-	1941-1943	Newsreel (Sports)
Snow in Ankara	A.6.8	DGP	-	1941-1943	Newsreel
Sports Meetings in Ankara	A.2.1	DGP	-	1941-1943	Newsreel (Sports)
Summer in Ankara	B.1	DGP	-	1941-1943	Newsreel
Atatürk Race	A.8.2	DGP	-	1941-1943	Newsreel (Sports)

Film Title	No.	Producer	Screen- ingDate	Prod. Date (est.)	Genre
Atatürk Race	A.11	DGP	-	1941-1943	Newsreel (Sports)
6th Anniversary of Atatürk's Death (A Piece of the Film)	A.21	DGP	1946	-	Newsreel
3rd Anniversary of Atatürk's Death	A.6.1	DGP	-	1941-1943	Newsreel (Important Days and Celebrations)
3rd Anniversary of Atatürk's Death	462	DGP Ar- chive	1942	1941-1943	Newsreel (Important Days and Celebrations)
Athletics Competitions	A.2.3	DGP	-	1941-1943	Newsreel (Sports)
The Opening of Grand National Assembly and the Speech of the Prime Minister	A.1.6	DGP	-	1941-1943	Newsreel
The Opening of Babaros Monument (A Piece of the Film)	A.19	DGP	1946	-	Newsreel
Barbaros Day (Istanbul)	A.4.6	DGP	-	1941-1943	Newsreel (Important Days and Celebrations)
The Return of the Prime Minister to Ankara from the Graduation	A.6.6	DGP	-	1941-1943	Newsreel

Film Title	No.	Producer	Screen- ingDate	Prod. Date (est.)	Genre
The Last Speeches of the Prime Minister at the Radio and His Audience (At home, school, agricultural offices, İsmet Pasha Institute, an elementary school, a village, agriculturiers, tractors, Turhal Sugar Factory, Malya Facric Factory, Agricultural School, Concrete Pier Construction with Turkish technique, Ankara Beer Factory)	A.7	DGP	-	1941-1943	Newsreel
Physical Education School	A.10.6	DGP	-	1941-1943	Newsreel (Sports)
Beşiktaş- Gençlerbirliği Soccer Game	A.2.2	DGP	-	1941-1943	Newsreel (Sports)
Beşiktaş- Gençlerbirliği Soccer Game	A.13.6	DGP	-	1941-1943	Newsreel (Sports)
Ballet Performance of Bora	-	DGP	-	1946	Newsreel
Bursa's Independence Day	A.3.4	DGP	-	1941-1943	Newsreel (Important Days and Celebrations)
Silk Culturing in Bursa	A.14.3	DGP	-	1941-1943	Newsreel (Economic)
Chinese Ambassador	A.14.2	DGP	-	1941-1943	Newsreel
4th Language Assembly	A.13.1	DGP	-	1941-1943	Newsreel
The Greeting of and the Feast Given for the German Press Committee Led by Dr. Schmidt	A.6.3	DGP	-	1941-1943	Newsreel

Film Title	No.	Producer	Screen- ingDate	Prod. Date (est.)	Genre
The Victory Anniversary of Dumlupınar	A.3.2	DGP	-	1941-1943	Newsreel (Important Days and Cele- brations)
Our Perpetual Chief Ata- türk	-	DGP Ar- chive	1946	-	Newsreel
The 50th Anniversary Jubilee of Ex-Journalists	A.15.1	DGP	-	1941-1943	Newsreel (Important Days and Celebrations)
French Ambassador	A.13.2	DGP	-	1941-1943	Newsreel (Military)
Western Lignite (a piece of the film)	A.18	DGP	1946	-	Newsreel
The 60th Anniversary of Academy of Fine Arts	A.16.2	DGP	-	1941-1943	Newsreel (Important Days and Cele- brations)
Military Academy Swim- ming Competition	A.14.1	DGP	-	1941-1943	Newsreel (Sports)
Military Academy Gradua- tion Ceremony	A.13.5	DGP	-	1941-1943	Newsreel (Military)
Hasanoğlu Village Insti- tute (a piece of the film)	A.19	DGP	1946	-	Newsreel
Soccer Match with the Brit- ish team in Ankara	A.6.4	DGP	-	1941-1943	Newsreel (Sports)
İnönü at Horse Races	A.1.1	DGP	-	1941-1943	Newsreel (Sports)
The Interview Between İnönü and Churchill in Adana	B.7	DGP	-	1941-1943	Newsreel
İnönü's Travel to Aegean	-	DGP	1949, 1950	-	Newsreel

Film Title	No.	Producer	Screen- ingDate	Prod. Date (est.)	Genre
İskenderun Pier (a piece of the film)	A.22	DGP	1946	-	Newsreel
Sports Performances At Istanbul People's House	A.8.4	DGP	-	1941-1943	Newsreel (Sports)
Beaches of Istanbul	B.3	DGP	-	1941-1943	Newsreel
March 16th Disturbance in Istanbul	A.9.2	DGP	-	1941-1943	Newsreel
Boxing in Istanbul	A.8.4	DGP	-	1941-1943	Newsreel (Sports)
Maritime Celebrations in Istanbul	A.1.3	DGP	-	1941-1943	Newsreel (Important Days and Celebrations)
Wrestling in Istanbul	A.8.3	DGP	-	1941-1943	Newsreel (Sports)
Independence Day of Istanbul	A.3.5	DGP	-	1941-1943	Newsreel (Important Days and Celebrations)
Ceremony in Karşıyaka on the Day of Independence of İzmir	A.4.7	DGP	-	1941-1943	Newsreel (Important Days and Celebrations)
Sights of İzmir (a piece of the film)	B.12	DGP	1946	-	Newsreel
Ceremony in İzmir Police Martyrdom	A.4.8	DGP	-	1941-1943	Newsreel
Independence Day of İzmir	A.3.3	DGP	-	1941-1943	Newsreel (Important Days and Celebrations)
İzmit Paper Factory	A.9.3	DGP	-	1941-1943	Newsreel (Economic)

Film Title	No.	Producer	Screen- ingDate	Prod. Date (est.)	Genre
Cabotage Celebrations	A.13.3	DGP	-	1941-1943	Newsreel (Important Days and Celebrations)
Ski: with the participation of sportsmen in Dikmen and military high schools in Uludağ	A.8.1	DGP	-	1941-1943	Newsreel (Sports)
Broken Wings	A.10.5	DGP	-	1941-1943	Newsreel (Aeronautical)
Kırkpınar Wrestling	-	Edirne People's House with the support of the DGP	-	1945	Newsreel (Sports)
The İzmir We Saved and Rebuilt	B.4	DGP	-	1941-1943	Newsreel
Day of Independence in Hatay	A.2.6	DGP	-	1941-1943	Newsreel (Important Days and Celebrations)
Kurtuluş Steamship	A.6.2	DGP	-	1941-1943	Newsreel
Culture Park (a piece of the film)	B.11	DGP	1946	-	Newsreel
Ceremonies in Ankara in the Name of Veterans	A.4.3	DGP	-	1941-1943	Newsreel
To Our National Chief İnönü	-	DGP archive	1946	-	Newsreel
National Chief's Visit to Afyon	A.3.1	DGP	-	1941-1943	Newsreel
Sharpie Competition in Moda	A.13.4	DGP	-	1941-1943	Newsreel (Sports)

Film Title	No.	Producer	Screen- ingDate	Prod. Date (est.)	Genre
86th Anniversary of Ankara University Political Science Department.	A.14.5	DGP	-	1941-1943	Newsreel (Important Days and Celebrations)
Paşabahçe Glass Factory	A.10.3	DGP	-	1941-1943	Newsreel (Economic)
Water Sports (Bursa)	A.4.5	DGP	-	1941-1943	Newsreel (Sports)
Excavation in Sultanahmet (a piece of the film)	A.18	DGP	1946	-	Newsreel
Sümerbank (7 episodes)		DGPP	1948	-	Newsreel (Economic)
The Speech of the Minister of Foreign Affairs at the Grand National Assembly	A.1.5	DGP	-	1941-1943	Newsreel
Tennis Matches in Ankara	A.2.4	DGP	-	1941-1943	Newsreel (Sports)
Typhus	B.8	DGP	-	1941-1943	Educational Film
Advanced Techniques in Agriculture	A.4.1	DGP	-	1941-1943	Educational Film
Taurus Mountains and Hatay	B.2	DGP	-	1941-1943	Newsreel
Turkish-German Trade Agreement	A.1.4	DGP	-	1941-1943	Newsreel (Economic)
How a Turkish Officer is Raised	A.4.9	DGP	-	1941-1943	Newsreel (Military)
Türkkuşu (Turkish Aeronautical School)	A.10.1	DGP	-	1941-1943	Newsreel (Aeronautical)

Film Title	No.	Producer	Screen- ingDate	Prod. Date (est.)	Genre
Türkkuşu (Turkish Aeronautical School)	A.16.1	DGP	-	1941-1943	Newsreel (Aeronautical)
Fight Against Tuberculosis	A.4.2	DGP	-	1941-1943	Educational Film
Willkie is in Ankara	A.14.4	DGP	-	1941-1943	Newsreel
Activities of Association of Philanthropists and Mrs. İnönü	A.1.2	DGP	-	1941-1943	Newsreel
The Placing of Garland by our reserve officer doctors on Nation Monument	A.9.1	DGP	-	1941-1943	Newsreel
Graduation Ceremony at the Reserve Officers School	A.10.2	DGP	-	1941-1943	Newsreel (Military)
Flag Ceremony for Reserve Officers	A.16.4	DGP	-	1941-1943	Newsreel (Military)
Inauguration Speech of the New American Ambassa- dor	A.9.4	DGP	-	1941-1943	Newsreel
The Opening Ceremony of the Yeşilköy Aviation Acad- emy	A.2.5	DGP	-	1941-1943	Newsreel (Aeronautical)
Ceremony of the Republic Day in the Country: in Er- zurum, Samsun, Ankara, Adana, Diyarbakır, Mersin, Bafra, İstanbul, etc.	A.5	DGP	-	1941-1943	Newsreel (Important Days and Celebrations)
Graduation Ceremony at the Agricultural School and the Anniversary of Political Science Department	A.6.5	DGP	-	1941-1943	Newsreel
Agricultural Machinery	A.16.3	DGP	-	1941-1943	Educational Film

Film Title	No.	Producer	Screen- ingDate	Prod. Date (est.)	Genre
Republic Day: Istanbul, Samsun, Ankara, Diyarbakır, Adana (1941)	A	DGP	-	1941	Newsreel (Important Days and Celebrations)
İzmir Exhibition	B	DGP		1941	Educational Film
The Liberation of İzmir	B	DGP		1941	Educational Film
Turkish İzmir	A	DGP	April 1942	1941	Newsreel
How did our youth pass the winter?	A	DGP	April 1942	1942	Newsreel
Rize Tea Factory	-	DGP	April 1942	-	Newsreel (Economic)
Trabzon	-	DGP	April 1947	-	Newsreel
19 May 1944 Celebrations	A.20	DGPP	1944	1944	Newsreel (Important Days and Celebrations)
Sümerbank Exhibition Film	B.14	DGP	September 1944	1944	Educational Film
İnönü Aeronautical Camp	-	DGPP	-	1944	Newsreel (Aeronautical)
Ankara Prison	-	DGPP	-	1945	Newsreel
Groundbreaking Ceremony of Mausoleum (Anıtkabir) - 10 November 1944- Prison Exhibition in Istanbul	A.21	DGPP	-	1944	Newsreel
American Orient Army-Turkish Boxing Match- Opening of İskenderun Pier- Mersin- İskenderun Roadway	A.22	DGPP	-	1945	Newsreel

Film Title	No.	Producer	Screen- ingDate	Prod. Date (est.)	Genre
Population Census	-	DGPP	-	1945	Newsreel
22nd Republic Day Cele- brations in Istanbul and Ankara	-	DGPP	-	1945	Newsreel

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