

AN INSITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE OTTOMAN SHIPPING SECTOR IN
THE BLACK SEA REGION BETWEEN 1829 AND 1861; MERCHANTS AND SHIPS

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Title: An Institutional Analysis of the Ottoman Shipping Sector in the Black Sea Region between 1829 and 1861: Merchants and Ships

The aim the thesis is to analyze thoroughly an exemplary micro-economic sphere in the nineteenth century. To achieve such purpose, I chose to scrutinize the shipping sector in the Anatolian Black Sea between 1830 and 1861. Contrary to those of Mediterranean Sea, the Black Sea port-cities never integrated to the world economy with the exception of Trabzon. Therefore, comparing shipping sector in the Black Sea, which transformation diverged in many points, with that of the Mediterranean Sea, the Black Sea constituted a *sui generis* example with its ships and market structure. Using B.O.A. archive documents, especially maritime certificates, the wooden ship types with the sizes and other physical features are determined. Moreover, the shipping market, including the main ship building sites, the structure and the trends of the market, the partnerships, and the feature of every ship-owners group are analyzed by using economic theory.

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özeti

Başlık: 1829 ile 1861 yılları arasında Karadeniz bölgesindeki Gemiciliğin Kurumsal bir Analizi; Tüccarlar ve Gemiler

Bu tezin amacı 19. yüzyıldaki bir mikro-ekonomik bir alanı baştan sona incelemektir. Bu gâyeye ulaşmak için, 1830 ilâ 1860 seneleri arasında Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndaki gemicilik sektörünü seçtik. Karadeniz liman kentleri, Akdeniz'deki liman kentlerinin aksine, dünya ekonomisine eklenmemiştir. Bu duruma tek istisna ise Trabzon'dur. Bu sebeple de, birçok açıdan farklılaşma gösteren Karadeniz denizcilik sektörünü Akdeniz'deki denizcilik ile mukayese ettiğimizde, gemileri ve piyasa yapısıyla Karadeniz nevi şahsına münhasır bir örnek oluşturur. Özellikle sened-i bahriler olmak üzere, B.O.A arşiv belgelerinin ışığında, boyutları ve diğer fiziki özellikleriyle gemi tipleri belirlenmiştir. Buna ilaveten, önemli gemi inşa bölgeleri, piyasanın yapısı ve trendleri, ortaklıklar ve her gemi sahibi grubun özellikleri, gemicilik piyasası başlığı altında gelişimi, iktisat teorisi ve araçları kullanılarak, incelenmiştir. Böylece 19. yüzyıldaki örnek bir piyasanın bütüncül bir çözümlemesi yapılabilmektedir.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Exactly one year after the occupation of İstanbul by the Allied Powers, the new socialist government in Russia signed a treaty with the Turkish government in Ankara in 16 March 1921. In the meantime, another Soviet delegate had finally concluded a treaty in London with the British Empire. Although both sides were negotiating about the economic terms and the ongoing embargo against Soviet Russia, it was a tacit peace treaty ending the civil war in Russia. According to this treaty, the international trade between two countries began again after many years. Like once, the ancient Egypt had been the cereal warehouse of the Roman Empire, the Ukraine wheat has fed on the British Isles for more than a century until May 1927.¹ Besides, the wheat exportation via Black Sea has always been vital for both Russian Empire and USSR, for example; NEP (“New Economic Policy” initiated by Lenin) would not be established (founded in 21 March 1921) without the exchange of the Ukrainian cereals for British machines.²

The grain trade was by far the most important bulk cargo more than a century in the Black Sea.³ During the nineteenth century, the Greek ships have transported grain from the northern Black Sea ports to the British ports and have brought back coal.⁴ The British Isles have been already dependent on importation of cereals before nineteenth century. After the Napoleonic Wars, the British government accepted the

¹ Michal Reiman, *Stalinizmin Doğuşu* (İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 1998), pp.27-28.

² Edward, Hallett Carr, *Bolşevik Devrimi 3* (İstanbul: Metis Yayınları, 2004), p.272 and p.284.

³ Galina Harlaftis, *A History of Greek-owned Shipping* (London ; New York : Routledge, 1996), p.14.

⁴ Ibid p.22.

famous Corn Laws, which was designed to support domestic British corn prices against competition from less expensive foreign imports, in 1815. However, the liberals led by David Ricardo won over the conservatives and the British parliament repealed the Corn Laws in 1846. Subsequently; the grain imports from the North Black Sea grew from 2,000,000 imperial quarters in 1837 up to 20,000,000 imperial quarters in 1871.⁵ Odessa and the other Northern Black Sea port-cities had benefited from the increasing volume of the international trade. These cities have already been integrated into the world economies, just like many Ottoman port-cities on the Mediterranean Sea. Consequently, we can state that the development of these port-cities coincided with the international economy's economic conjunctures. In this context, the dynamic of the centre and the periphery, proposed by I. Wallerstein was useful to understand the nature of such kind of causality chains.

However, this picture was completely different for the Anatolian Black Sea. The Anatolian Black Sea ports, with an exception, Trabzon, never became part of the world-economy before 1870s. Therefore, the development of the area had little relation of the Kondratieff cycles. There were neither the steamships carrying cash crops for the coal and steel just like it would be after 1870, nor any trace of an international economy. The mountains were geographical barrier for the construction of land routes and railways, therefore, the shipping sector was a key market to monitor this divergence and overlook the genuine market mechanisms of the Anatolian Black Sea.

For that reason we scrutinize in every detail the shipping sector from 1830 to 1861 using the maritime certificates. Thanks to the maritime certificates, we can have a profile of the wooden ships operating in the Black Sea and the shipping

⁵ Ibid p.14.

market. For this purpose the evolution of the shipping sector in the Black Sea from 1830s to 1860s will be presented, the period through which the Ottoman economy was integrating into the world economy. The actors, the ships and the market structures of the shipping sector in the Black Sea will be examined.

The studies dealing with the effects of international trade have not been interested in the Black Sea region with one exception: Trabzon. The probable reason for this lack or absence of interest could be explained by the fact that the region was integrated late into the world economy and hence it was a contradictory case for the studies, like the ones carried out following I. Wallerstein. Due to the natural barriers most notable barriers the Straits, the Anatolian Black Sea coastline never went through the stages of development that differ from the stages experienced in the Mediterranean port-cities. Thus, except Trabzon, the transit port of the Iranian trade, the Anatolian Black Sea port-cities did not become part of the international economy until the London Treaty of 1871, according to which the Straits were opened to all mercantile ships. Before the execution of that treaty, among the foreign-flagged ships only those with the *izn-i sefine* (sailing permit) had been allowed to navigate from the Mediterranean Sea to the Black Sea or vice versa, and only for few days.

Thanks to natural obstacles, a mountainous hinterland and the Straits, The Ottoman Empire was able to keep the control over the social and the economic life in the region. For that reason, the political tools such as *izn-i sefine*, *sened-i bahri* or *certified trade*, were more efficient in the Black Sea than the Mediterranean.

Subsequently, the economic evolution of the port cities in the area diverged in many ways from those of the rest of the Empire. The only foreign power that challenged the Sublime Porte until the Crimean War was Russia. In 1774, with the Küçük Kaynarca treaty, the Russian Empire annexed officially the Crimea and ended the

absolute supremacy of the Ottoman Empire for good. After that from that time, the Black Sea would not be a *mare nostrum* anymore. In the second chapter, we recapitulate the Russian expansion down to the south, the fast urbanization of the New-Russia, now Ukraine, the emergence of Greek bourgeoisie and shippers in Odessa and finally the economic consequences of all these events in the southern coasts of the Black Sea will be discussed to understand the background of the dynamics in the shipping market, the political and especially the economic developments together (the arrival of the foreign merchants, the decline of the local merchants and the rise of the privileged merchants).

Monitoring the commercial activities and the commodity flow in the South Black Sea was easier than elsewhere in the Empire before the Crimean War, owing to fact that the maritime trade was the only commercial route, since the mountainous hinterland blocked the land routes with the exception of the Trabzon-Erzurum road – where no railroads has been constructed even to this day. Therefore, a study of the maritime trade offers us a more comprehensive picture of the commercial activities. Besides, since the international economy penetrated in the area by the maritime trade, the shipping trade was one of the first economic sectors affected by the change. For that reason, the shipping sector in the Black Sea from 1850 to 1861 was chosen as the subject of this thesis. Moreover, there is no inclusive study on the Ottoman merchant ships. By examining the Ottoman mercantile shipping, the very first comprehensive study on the merchant shipping is presented.

The *sened-i bahri* (maritime certificates) ranging from 1850-1861 were chosen as the subject of study. This catalogue provides us valuable information on both market structure and the physical features of the ships. Although there have been many studies on the military fleet, few have to use the merchant ships. Hence,

even though was a little bit off-topic for this study, we decided to examine the physical features of the merchant ships in a separate chapter – Chapter Three. Still, we learned remarkable details on the Ottoman shipping, which give clues about the nature of the market. First of all, the very same types of ships were in use in the Mediterranean and the Black Seas. Therefore, even though, it was a closed sea, the technology was diffused, thanks to governmental support and for economic reasons. It is presumed that the economic reasons were more important than the public support. On the other hand, the size of these ships was smaller than that of those on the Mediterranean. Most probably, because while the ships in the Aegean Sea were dealing with international trade, the ships on the Black Sea carried cargos to İstanbul most of time; the need for bigger ships was higher in the Mediterranean Sea than that in the Black Sea.

The main body of the thesis analyzes of shipping market. In this chapter, every detail as meticulously was studied as far possible. Since in a maritime certificate states the name of the captain with his hometown, the ship with its size, the shareholders with their share and the reason why the certificate was issued, the research was limited with the given information. Still, due to the constraint of information offered by the maritime certificate, many aspects of the markets that could have been considered by another catalogue were ignored.

In this chapter, efforts were made to prove and back up every argument forward by the help of statistics where possible. For instance, when it is stated that Bartın and its vicinity was the main shipbuilding site of the Anatolian Black Sea, a statistical figure and a graph are given, which seconds our hypothesis. In some cases, although a pattern discernable, it could not be verified it 100% by the numeric data. For example, a numerical data was not available to confirm the fact that the

privileged merchants were indifferent to their fellow townsmen, since the hometowns of the shareholders were not registered consistently. In such cases, circumstantial evidence was given, like the hometowns of the captains and the shipyards were alike for the ships were owned by the privileged merchants. Of course, in some cases could not provide the information concerning the homeland of the merchant is unknown.

Finally the points that we avoided must be acknowledged. In this thesis, effort was made to avoid all kinds of anachronism. For example, the meanings of the word “globalization” (for referring an event that describes the integration of world economy) are ambiguous, referring to many concepts, like the increase of the international trade, the emergence of a world economy, economic and political liberalization, the decline of nationalism, the lost of importance of nation states and frontiers, the diffusion of communication technologies, the foundation of an international culture etc⁶. In this context the name of the nations especially the Greeks constitute a small problem. The word “*Rûm*” for the Greeks living in the East of Salonica and the Greek for those in west and the islanders is used. The reason for this distinction relies on the fact that *Rûms* were generally Ottoman subjects. For the other nationalities, such distinction was simply avoided and they were referred to by their geographical region or their religion as the Ottoman registers did. One reason for this was, it is not possible to distinguish the nationalities from the names. For example it is hard to decide whether one Hasan from Rize was *laz* or Turk or Ali, son of Purpo from Athens,⁷ was a Christian or a Muslim. This difficulty brought about the avoidance of making comments about the region or the

⁶ See article of Pierre Bourdieu and Loic Wacquant ‘La nouvelle vulgate planétaire’ <http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2000/05/BOURDIEU/13727>.

⁷ A}D.VN.73.54.

nationalities of the ship-owners or the captains.

There is another point related to the issue of nations and the nationalities should be mentioned. It seems that researchers of different nationalities studying their nation's past under the Ottoman authority are usually so unaware of the other ethnic or religious groups, that we read same national features (such as relations with relatives or fellow townsman, arranged marriages within the family and so on) are given over and over for different groups as if these features belonged solely to their nation. In addition to this, unfortunately, no study aware of the works in their field from different nations was encountered during the research. All the issues give the impression that there might be serious communication problems among the researchers in the field of Ottoman history around the world.

CHAPTER TWO

THE POLITICAL AND THE ECONOMIC BACKGROUND IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Political Background

Pax Ottomana in the Black Sea

When the rumors that the prince regent of Constantinople, Ionnes Cantecuzenos, was planning to rebuilt the famous Byzantine navy once and for all reached Genova, the Genoese fleet went through the Dardanelles and besieged the city for months to protect its hegemony over the Black Sea and the Aegean Islands in 1348.⁸ The only thing that Eirene Cantecuzena could do was to confront his enemy behind the city walls, because the Byzantine dominance over the seas had languished long ago. Halil İnalçık states that the control over the Straits was the key to controlling the Black Sea and if one could conquer Constantinopolis, once could easily gain supremacy over the Black Sea.⁹ That statement summarizes the importance of the Straits for the Black Sea region. What the Genoese feared was that

⁸ Donald M.Nicol, *Bizans'ın Son Yüzyılları, 1261-1453* (İstanbul : Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı, 1999), p.221.

⁹ Halil İnalçık, *the Origin of the Ottoman-Russian Rivalry and the Don-Volga Canal* (İstanbul : Kenan Matbaası, 1947), p.51 “In fact, after the conquest of İstanbul an active and uninterrupted policy against the North was started, and the expedition against Astrahan is nothing other than a concrete consequence of this policy, due to the new conditions. After the conquest of İstanbul, Sultan Mehmet II (1451-1481) made the Black Sea an Osmanic Sea”.

a strong Byzantine fleet in Constantinople could easily turn into a menace for its colonies in the Black Sea. As we will be seen in this chapter, the Straits would be more and more vital for the Ottoman Empire to prevent the penetration of the foreign powers to the Black Sea port-cities by economic and politic means in the nineteenth century, when the Empire's heydays was a long gone memory.

The struggle for control of the Straits against the Italians, hence the Black Sea, began in the mid-fourteen century for the Ottomans.¹⁰ The Ottoman Emirate, one of the postulant states to replace the Byzantine Empire, became a significant power in the Black Sea with the conquest of the Dardanelles for the first time in 1352.¹¹ This was the golden era of the Italian city-states in the Levant. The Ottomans had been challenging this military supremacy of the Italians for a century and gained ascendancy over the Italian colonies one by one. Finally, the mercantile superiority of the Italians over the Black Sea faded out after the conquest of the İstanbul.¹² In the years following this event, Mehmed II triumphed over the Italian city-states and conquered their colonies one by one; most probably with the tacit acquiescence of the Greek villagers, who sought an end to the selfdom (*parikoz*) imposed by the Italians.¹³ The possession of the Straits, the natural obstacle against free access to the Black Sea, had allowed the Ottoman authorities to place many checkpoints for the vessels. These fortifications and the presence of their navy in Dardanelles enabled

¹⁰ For the political struggle between the Italian states and the Ottoman Sultanate over the Seas and the Italian colonies in the Levant before 1389, see Anthony Luttrell, "1389 öncesi Osmanlı Genişlemesine Latin Tepkileri" in *Osmanlı Beyliği (1300-1389)*, ed. Elizabeth A. Zachariadou (1997) (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1997). For a more economic review, see Halil İncalcık, "The Black Sea and East Europe" in *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire. 1300-1914*, ed. Halil İncalcık and Donald Quataert (Cambridge: Cambridge Press, 1994).

¹¹ Irène Beldicenu, "Başlangıçlar: Osman ve Orhan" in *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi I*, ed Robert Martran (İstanbul :Cem Yayınevi, 1991), pp.27-28.

¹² Mehmet Genç, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Devlet ve Ekonomi* (İstanbul: Ötüken Neşriyat AŞ, 2000), p.321.

¹³ İncalcık, "The Black Sea and East Europe," pp. 272-273.

them to keep full control over maritime trade for many centuries.¹⁴ The conquest of the whole Black Sea basin was completed when the Ottoman army subjugated the very last non-Ottoman fortresses by the Black Sea, Akkirman and Kili (now Bilhorod-Dnistrovskiy and Kikliya in Ukraine), during the reign of Bezayid II in 1484.¹⁵ And that's how the Black Sea became an inland sea of the Empire.

The policy Ottoman Empire over the Black Sea in general can be summarized as follows: the Ottoman governments were protectionist against any kind of foreign intrusion to the Black Sea.¹⁶ Therefore, they hindered the free passage of foreign ships through the Dardanelles in order to protect their inland seas against any kind of infringement both military and economic. From 1484 to 1702, they prolonged their monopoly over the Black Sea shores, thanks to being a successful military power in the two seas. Nothing changed until the eighteenth century when the Empire started to lose control over the eastern Mediterranean Sea. In the meantime, a new power, Russian Empire, emerged in the north of the Crimean Khanate. That new menace would be the primary concern of the Empire for more than two decades until the day it collapsed completely.

The first Russian break into the Black Sea was the fortress of Azak (now Azov) capture in 1696 during the war of 1683-1699. Although, Russian army reached to the Black Sea shores for the first time, Russia was not powerful enough to challenge Ottoman dominance over the Black Sea at that time.¹⁷ Meanwhile, devastated by the war, the Empire was so weak that all it could do was to try to save

¹⁴ Ibid.,pp. 274-275.

¹⁵ İdris Bostan, *Beylikten İmparatorluğa Osmanlı Denizciliği* (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2006), p.285.

¹⁶ Mehmet Genç claims that by the conquest of İstanbul a triangular trade emerged in the Balkans, the Black Sea ports and Anatolia. See Genç, pp.321-322.

¹⁷ At the time, the Ottomans were not the only concern of Russians. Peter I preferred a war with Sweden for a port in the Baltic Sea instead of an endless war with the Ottomans for a port in the Black Sea. See John, P.Le Donne, *Russian Empire and the World, 1700-1917* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp.90-91.

as many territories from the foreign invasion as it could.¹⁸ Thus, during the peace negotiations, the Ottoman government insisted on the retrocession of the fortress. Still Russians managed to keep the fortress by making a concession of abdication of any navigation rights on the Black Sea. The Ottoman side was so insistent on the issue that according to the 14th article of this treaty, even Russian ambassador had to go to Ottoman capital by land route. Only after the arrival of Russian ambassador to İstanbul, the second part of the negotiations, the permission to trade in the Black Sea for Russian merchant vessels was granted. During these meetings, the Ottoman authorities turned down all of the proposals and the Black Sea remained closed for any kind of Russian ships for some more decades.¹⁹

The reason behind the Ottoman's hostile attitude towards Russian merchant ships was more military than economic. The main concern of the İstanbul was that the Ottoman government had no forbearance to building of any kind of foreign military fleet under any kind of pretext, including commerce. The reader should keep in mind that all ships of the era, even the mercantile ones, carried some armed crew for their own protection against pirates. Moreover, a big merchant ship could be transformed easily into a military one. On the other hand, Russian interest in the Black Sea was more complicated than that of the Sublime Porte. Peter the Great, an enlightened ruler, introduced to Russia a new kind of economic policy, mercantilism.²⁰ This new philosophy became the dominant way of thinking after the death of Peter I and the political elites acted according to interests of the mercantilism. In other words, for the new rising Russian elite during the era of

¹⁸ Robert Martran, "XVII. Yüzyılda Osmanlı Devleti" in *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi I*, ed Robert Martran (İstanbul :Cem Yayınevi, 1991), pp.304-305.

¹⁹ Bostan, *Beylikten İmparatorluğa Osmanlı Denizciliği*, pp.286-287.

²⁰ Boris Ananich, "Russian Economy and the Banking System" in *the Cambridge History of Russia Imperial Russia, 1689-1917*, ed. Dominic Lieven (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), vol.2 p.396 and Walter G.Moss, *A History of Russia: To 1917* (London: Anthem Press, 2005), vol.1, pp.241-242.

Catharine the Great, the economic goals did not diverge from the political ones. For, according to mercantilism, if one state wanted to have bigger and well-equipped army, the treasury needed to collect as much gold as it could. Trade, especially the lucrative international trade, was the key to fiscal revenues. Therefore, in Russia, more commercial activities meant more gold for the Tsar. Since the increase in international trade was slow, the race to control it turned into a zero-game strategy. Accordingly, Russian strategy was to infiltrate to the Black Sea by economic means when there was no room for military means. Although Catherine II sketched out “the Greek Project” of her successor Peter I, was the dream of making Russia a buffer zone between the Eastern and Western trade routes by stretching its frontiers to Ottoman Greece,²¹ the policy for the establishment for Russian mercantilism in the Black Sea was set. For that reason, the opening up of many ports in the northern Black Sea, like Sevastopol (1783), was stimulated during the age of Catherine.²²

The Prut River War (1711) was a step back for Russia in the achievement of its ultimate goals. However, soon after the Ottoman Empire was forced to recognize Russian merchants’ right to trade with the Ottoman Empire by the Belgrad treaty (1739). Even though the Empire permitted Russian merchants to do business with their Ottoman counterparts, and vice versa, Russia still had no right to possess even a merchant fleet in the Black Sea.²³ Hence, one again there would be no Russian-flagged ships in the Black Sea, but this time, Russian merchants could carry on commerce with the Ottoman Empire via Ottoman subjects and their ships.

All the same, after a while, Russians begun to carry their own goods on Russian flagged ships and The Ottoman Empire de facto recognized the situation.

²¹ Alexander M.Martin, ‘Russian Economy and the Legacy of 1812’ in *the Cambridge History of Russia Imperial Russia, 1689-1917*, ed. Dominic Lieven (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), vol.2, p.146.

²² Moss, p.295.

²³ Bostan, *Beylikten İmparatorluğa Osmanlı Denizciliği*, p.288.

Most probably, the Empire tolerated this fact in order to not lost control over the traffic of these ships, because, if it did not accept this situation, Russian ships might become involved in the Ottoman black market, or worse engaged in piracy. Besides, the Empire maintained its right to outlaw the sailing of Russian ships as a precaution against war.

Russian Intrusion

The main breakthrough in the political situation was the Küçük Kaynarca Treaty (also spelled *Kuchuk Kainarji*, 1774), by which Russia conquered the whole Crimean Khanate and expanded its territories to the north Black Sea shores.²⁴ The treaty, signed by Abdülhamid I, was also a turning point for the Ottoman Empire, which entered onto a path of reforms under his successor Sultan Selim III. Since the Küçük Kaynarca treaty was more in the way of a truce, the economic terms were missing. Consequently, the two powers signed a new convention *Aynalıkavak Tenkitnâmesi* (the Treaty of Aynalıkavak) in 21 Mars 1779. According to this convention, Russian ships gained the right to sail in the Black Sea. However, the freight capacity of vessels was limited between 1,000 kile (1,650 pota) to 16,000 kile (26,400 pota), which was consistent with the extant mutual agreements with England and France.²⁵

The Küçük Kaynarca Treaty deeply affected the lands now that are now called Ukraine.²⁶ When Russia pushed into the Khanate of Crimea, the nomad

²⁴ Ibid., p.288.

²⁵ Ibid., p.289.

²⁶ Metin Knut, ‘‘Siyasi Tarih’’ in *Türkiye Tarihi*, ed. Sina Akşin (İstanbul: Cem Yayınları 2000) , vol 3, p.71.

Turkic-Mongolian tribes shepherding and occasionally farming in these fertile soils have occupied these vast lands.²⁷ Although, the Ottoman Empire had secured these tribes' autonomy by its protectorate thanks to the Caliphate for a while, this autonomy faded with the power of the Ottoman Empire.²⁸ In addition, the southern Russia was quite under-populated due to under-cultivation and these newly conquered lands could be feeding a much bigger population. The deferred economic potential of the Khanate of Crimea tempted many Russians to immigrate. Suffering from the lack of fertile agricultural lands, Russian state also promoted husbandry by the colonization of these unsettled areas and tried to attract new immigrants by many inducements.²⁹

The story of southern Russia's colonization was only comparable with the U.S. expansion to the West. New Russia's population has been increased from 163,000 (1782) to 3,400,000 (1856) in 75 years.³⁰ Many new settlements were founded. The story of Odessa among these many cities was quite remarkable. A mediocre Ottoman port, Hocabey, was transformed into the second most important port and third biggest city in Russia, Odessa. The development of Odessa as a gateway to the New Russia was important not only for Russia, but also for the Ottoman Empire. Now, the Ottoman Empire was challenged by the North Black Sea cities' fast development in economically and militarily.

²⁷ Harlaftis, p.7.

²⁸ Gilles Veinstein, "Balkan Eyaletleri" in *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu Tarihi I*, ed. Robert Martran (İstanbul: Cem Yayınevi, 1991), pp.381-382.

²⁹ Charles King, *the Black Sea a History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp.161-163.

³⁰ Harlaftis, p.7.

Odessa

With generous deep harbor, Odessa was located close to three great rivers. Moreover, among the northern Black Sea ports, it enjoyed almost ice-free winter.³¹ While the exportation of wheat increased, these geographical advantages made the port-city the exportation center for Russian wheat. Subsequently, to facilitate wheat exportation to Britain, many storage houses were built near to port. As a result, there were 564 storehouses in the city by the mid-nineteenth century.³²

While the colonization of New Russia was encouraged by public support and for example, by many tax exceptions, Odessa's rapid enlargement was also grant-aided. The city was made a free port between 1819 and 1857.³³ Russian has also promoted the establishment of banks, trading firms, the settlement of foreign merchants discharged from many legal obligations and tax duties in Odessa.³⁴ Accordingly, the population boomed with the tripled trade between 1827 and 1863.³⁵ Even in 15 years (1873-1897), the population more than doubled.³⁶ Consequently, the city expanded so rapidly that it ranked as the third most populous city of Russia. Because of this rapid growth, the city suffered from a lack of adequate infrastructure.³⁷ The infrastructure would be completed only at the end of the century. For example, the southeastern railway line did not reach Odessa port until 1891; this line had little effect on trade, though.³⁸

It is obvious that the rapid transformation of the north Black Sea coastline and

³¹ Lewis Siegeelbum, "The Odessa Grain Trade: A case Study in Urban Growth and Development in Tsarist Russia," *Journal of European History*, vol.9 (spring 1980), p.115.

³² *Ibid.*, p.118.

³³ *Ibid.*, p.115.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, pp.115-116.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p.117.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, pp.132-133.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p.119.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, p.128.

the enlargement of Russian Empire roused the Ottoman elites. Among all of these calamitous events what was really disturbing for the Ottoman Empire was the settlement of the Ottoman Greeks. The Greeks of the Aegean islands began to immigrate in these new lands. Especially the Ottomans' main concern was the settlement of sailors and captains to the new Russian port-cities.³⁹

The administration of Catherine II played an important role in shaping Russian policy towards these Greek settlements. Before her accession to the throne, Russian trade had been depended heavily on British shipping. Therefore, the British Empire had hedged Russia's international policies in with the rules and regulations of free trade thanks to this dependency. In addition, that the British Navy's successful blockade of France, which affected the fate of the Seven Years' War, gave momentum for the Catherine II's ambitions to create an un-British shipping sector in Russia. However, if Russian shippers were to manage the flow of cereals to England, new shippers to overthrow the British hegemony. The answer to this was the Ottoman Greeks, who had been known as skilful sailors for millennia. The formation of Russian merchant shipping coincided with another policy of the Tsarina, the diminishment of Ottoman Europe in favor of Russia Empire, which necessitated the building of a powerful Russian Navy.⁴⁰ For this purpose, Russia recruited Ottoman Greeks into their navy.

The Greeks made up the core of the Ottoman Navy at that time. For these reasons, the shift of Greeks to Russian navy should have terrified the Ottoman elites. İstanbul tried to block the conscription of the Ottoman Greeks by Russian Navy. Thus, it was not surprising that the Ottomans put forward the term to prevent the

³⁹ Bostan, *Beylikten İmparatorluğa Osmanlı Denizciliği*, p.327.

⁴⁰ Hugh Ragstale, "Russian Foreign Policy 1725-1815" in *the Cambridge History of Russia Volume II Imperial Russia, 1689-1917*, ed. Dominic Lieven, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2006), pp.509-513.

recruitment of Ottoman subjects without the permission of the Empire in every treaty. What was at stake was that the Ottoman government has invigilated the formation of Russian fleet after 1774 with the recruitment of sailors among the Ottoman subjects, especially from the Greeks sailing in the Black Sea. The Ottoman authorities declared this concern in the *Aynalıkavak Tenkitnâmesi* for the first time and convinced Russian delegation to forbid the illegal emigration of the Greeks.⁴¹ This term was repeated in every following treaty; still, nothing was achieved. On the contrary, the rush of the Greeks to New Russia increased with time.

İzn-i sefine

Since the Ottoman Empire failed to stop Russian intrusion into the Black Sea, it began to limit the passage of Russian merchant ships to the Mediterranean Sea. There were two main purposes behind this policy of obstruction; first to bound Russian economic activities in the Mediterranean Sea, and second to put an end to the ongoing Greek emigration. Neither objective was achieved in the long run, but these policies set back the efforts of Russians for a while, until 1829. The geographical features of the Straits played a key role in this policy. Until 1871, every ship should had to have a special visa, the *izn-i sefine* (shipping permits), to pass by the Straits.

An *izn-i sefine* was required for foreign-flagged merchant ships to travel from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean Sea or vice versa. The shipping permit had been actually the sailing permit for all kinds of ships travelling in the Ottoman territorial waters, but with the time the meaning of the word was limited to the permission

⁴¹ Bostan, *Beylikten İmparatorluğa Osmanlı Denizciliği*, p.289.

particular to the Straits. A shipping permit functioned just like a *mürur tezkeresi* (travel permit). Officially, since the issue of the shipping permits was the responsibility of the Sublime Porte, the owners of a merchant ship had to apply to the *Bâb-ı Ali* (the Sublime Porte) themselves. Nevertheless, in practice, the ship-owners applied to a local authority in their own country, which preferred to issue a *kançılarya senedi* (chancellery request) to Sublime Porte. Since there were different kind of requests written by different officers of different Embassies, the information contained by these request were quite dissimilar. While some covered all the possible information about the ship (the names of the owners, the destination of the ships, and the full list of the bulk carried with the sailors and so on), some other included simply the minimum information required (the name of the captain and the ship with the note announcing in which direction the ship would sail).

The first shipping permit for a Russian ship was issued in 1774. After that date the requests for the shipping permits and the travel permits were kept in books called *İzn-i sefine defterleri* (books for shipping permits) until 1829. The permits were registered carefully, so that the custom officers could easily confirm whether Russians with such permits had come back in time or not. The Ottoman officers counted every ship's crew one by one to see whether there was any missing or not. Consequently, these permits were useful tools to restrain human transfer from the Mediterranean Sea to the Black Sea and to keep Russian trade in control via the Mediterranean Sea. In addition to the permits, these books contained the legal controversies between Russian and Ottoman citizens that had occurred in the Ottoman territories. In the last pages of these books, there were the custom records of İstanbul.

It appears that the custom officers built up causal inventories, most probably

to check custom revenues. Unfortunately, these inventories were more like irregular unprocessed data than statistical resources. For example, one can read two different entries for the same items on different pages. On the other hand, these inventories contain the most comprehensive presentation of the Ottoman-Russian trade held in İstanbul custom offices before 1829.

The translation of some parts of these inventories is presented in the table 1.⁴² When the inventories are compared with the statistics of the Ottoman foreign trade between 1840 and 1842, at a glance it can be seen that the list of the commodities exported to Russia in the 1840s was not so different from the beginning of the century. Fruits, olives and olive by-products and cotton seem to have been the main export items for two centuries. The exportation of wine and the paper could have increased. On the other hand, the picture of the imported items changed dramatically. While according to the inventories, the animals and the by-product of these animals (dyes, furs etc...) and the metal and simple metallic product were the primary imported items before the 1829, cereals, especially grains, made up 60% of these items.⁴³ Most probably, when Russia gained the rights for the free trade with the Empire in 1829, Russian merchants flooded the market with cereals from the northern Black Sea.

The Ottoman Empire used the shipping permits as a control mechanism especially against Russia. Every ship had to have a return time limit. Because of that time constraint, many ship companies decided to carry their bulk to İstanbul or sometimes to Bozcaada and these cargoes were transferred again to another ship there. Consequently, the Ottoman capital became the main transit port for the Black

⁴² B.O.A. Düvel-i Ecnebiyye Tasnifi no:91 (1245-1317).

⁴³ Şevket Pamuk ed., *19. Yüzyılda Osmanlı Dış Ticareti = Ottoman Foreign Trade in the 19th Century* (Ankara: Başbakanlık Devlet İstatistik Enstitüsü, 1995), p.64 and p.67.

Sea. Although, the main objective of these shipping permits was to limit the actions of Russia, it should be kept in mind that these permits were for all foreign ships. This tight control policy over the Straits was consistent with the classical Ottoman protectionism. Consequently, on one hand, the Ottoman Empire tried to prevent the access of Russia to the warm-sea ports, and on the other the Straits shielded the Ottoman Black Sea against the penetration of other foreign powers as much as possible. As will be seen, the Ottoman governments deviated from this tight protectionism sometimes in favor of the British Empire, whenever İstanbul ran out of control against Russian intrusion on the Black Sea port cities to take back the balance.

In conclusion, despite the efforts of the Ottoman Empire, Russia succeeded finally in obtaining hegemony over the north Black Sea. The main policy of the Ottoman Empire was protectionist and it was against any intrusion to its territory. However, it failed because of economic and political developments starting from the mid-eighteenth century. Consequently, the Ottoman defense line drew back to the Straits. The Straits were the perfect obstacle against the penetration of the Western economies, but not of Russia. The things went worst for the Ottoman Empire in 1829, when the Russian army reached Edirne. After that date, everything changed forever for the Ottoman Black Sea. Russia finally obtained what it wanted, the right for free trade to the Ottoman Empire. From now on, Russian merchants would be widespread through the Ottoman Empire. In the decade following the Edirne Treaty, the Black Sea ports integrated with the Russian economy. The Empire kept the right to control the ships with shipping permits as it had. In this way, the Black Sea ports came under Russian economic influence, which would be challenged by the British after 1838.

Economic Change in the Black Sea Ports between 1829 and 1861

If a Turkish voyager travelled back in time to the 1810s the Black Sea's port-cities, after visiting other small ports, he would be shocked when he saw how crowded Trabzon's port was. He would witness Armenian traders coming back from Iran and hauling their merchandises to the ships sailed by captains from Rize, Trabzon or Bartın. He could hear Iranian merchants - most of them were Azerbaijanis - hues and cries when they dealt with the *Hayriye ve Avrupa tüccarları*⁴⁴ coming from İstanbul. He could buy the furs of a beaver or of a fox, trapped in Siberia, sold by Chiot merchants from Odessa or if he liked he could also purchase some coats made of angora-wool sold by Anatolian merchants from Kayseri. If he came to the port just after the harvest, he would see *âyâns* (the notables) and their mercenaries (*sekbân*) arrive from the rural area with their crops. They vend their goods to the *kapan-ı dakik tüccarları* (cereal merchants) under the surveillance of local *kadı*'s (Islamic judge) men. He would understand more or less what the merchants were saying.

If this time-traveler then decided to see what had happen a half-century later in Trabzon, this time he would not believe his eyes again at how the city's port had changed. Neither *âyân*,⁴⁵ nor *kapan-ı dakik* merchants would be present. If he was lucky, he could find the last of the Anatolian merchants from Kayseri or the Iranian merchants; still the Armenians would be there. He would be lost in the marketplace

⁴⁴ See the subchapter "The Ownership and Second Hand Market" for a complete presentation of these group of merchants. Although, there was no appropriate translation for the concept, the term "the privileged merchants" was used to define them.

⁴⁵ The governor of Trabzon oppressed the notables during 1812-1813. See, Stanford Shaw and Ezel Kuran Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), vol.2, p.15.

near the port if he did not understand the Greek. Ionians merchants with British passports had replaced the Chiots and the other merchants dealing with the Iranian trade. Only, some *Hayriye ve Avrupa tüccarları* could resist them.

The Straits, as a natural obstacle, averted the full penetration of the international trade, but Russian. For example, when the news reached the American embassy in St. Petersburg in 1810 that the very first American merchant ship, Calumbet, of two adventurers were shipping in the Black Sea, the minister of the United States, John Quincy Adams was surprised.⁴⁶ For that reason, the integration of the Anatolian Black Sea's port cities was quite slower than the rest of the Empire. Not many things changed between 1829 and 1860. What had changed was under the control of the Ottoman State, like *sened-i bahri* (maritime certificates) and *hayriye ve avrupa tüccarları*. In this context, the Black Sea port-cities were not in the periphery region in international commerce at all, with one exception: Trabzon. Trabzon was maybe the most important port of the Iranian transit trade. Therefore, discussing the international trade, it must be understood whether the trade was with Russia or the Iranian transit trade via Trabzon.

Samsun was a perfect example of an ordinary town of north Anatolia before the Crimean War. If one were to write a novel describing the commercial activities before the Crimean War, "all quiet on the western front of Trabzon Province" could be a proper title, since nothing had changed for decades. The geography always had been an ambiguous effect on Samsun's development; on the one hand, its location in the basin and the delta of two long rivers of Anatolia; the Kızılırmak and the Yeşilirmak provided fertile ground with shallow water for cultivation. On the other

⁴⁶ For the entire story, see S. E. Morison, "Forcing the Dardanelles in 1810: With Some Account of the Early Levant Trade of Massachusetts," *The New England Quarterly*, no. 2 (Apr., 1928), p. 208-225.

hand, the mountains were natural barriers for transportation from the hinterland to the port. Moreover, epidemics like malaria had been part of daily life due to the vast marshlands in its hinterland.⁴⁷ Consequently, although Samsun was considered to have a high potential market during the whole nineteenth century, it required investment in the infrastructure for such a commercial take-off. It has been reported that the city lived a short golden age in the 1880s, which busted out in the 1890s.⁴⁸ Due to this insufficient infrastructure, Samsun remained an underdeveloped region until the republican era compared to Trabzon.⁴⁹ Very similar stories can be told about the other cities on the Black Sea coast line.⁵⁰

⁴⁷ Yavuz Erler, ‘‘Karadeniz’de Avrupalı bir Kent: Samsun’’ in *Karadeniz Tarihi Sempozyumu (25-26 Mayıs 2005)* (Trabzon: Karadeniz Teknik Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2005), vol.1, pp.541-542.

⁴⁸ ‘‘Notre province a obtenu le maximum de son d veloppement en 1890 et elle ne pouvait pas d passer ce chiffre si le gouvernement Ottoman ne d ciderait pas   faire des routes dans l’int rieur et   donner la concession du chemin de fer de Sivas’’. See ‘‘Revue commerciale du Levant: Bulletin Mensuel de la Chambre de Commerce Franaise de Constantinople’’ vol.9, no.108, 31 mars 1896, p.63.

⁴⁹ The breaking point in nineteenth century for Samsun was 1864, the year when the Circassians immigrated massively to the district of Canik. During the 1860s Russia forced Circassians to immigrate to the Ottoman Empire with its tacit approval. Samsun was chosen as the disembarkation port for the Muslim Caucasian tribes, for many reasons; first of all Ottoman authorities were seeking an alternative gate to the Black Sea other than Trabzon, which seemed to be losing its weight in the Iranian transit trade after the Crimean Wars. In addition to this, the new tribal settlement on the trade route between Trabzon and Tebriz could bring about many security problems for the merchants, but if İstanbul could succeed in the settlement of these tribes, the agriculture of the district of Canik, which had been suffering from under-population, could improve thanks to new agricultural labor. The *Regie de Tabac Ottoman* drew its attention to the hinterland of Samsun because of the commercial and advertising success of the tobacco produced in the peri-urban area of Samsun in 1863. Tobacco is a labour-intensive crop; the Regie should have considered that new immigrants could easily fill the labour demand for new fields.

Despite the improvements in 1864, the Samsun port was overwhelmed by the Circassian rush to the city. As a result of this, many clusters of immigrant lived in the coast towns and villages for many years before moving inland. Moreover, this sudden overpopulation worsened already poor health conditions, causing the fresh outbreak of many epidemics. However, the Samsun population, some 10,000 before 1864 has boomed by 42,000 immigrants in two years. See Erler, pp.542-545 and M.Emin Yolaıcı, *XIX Y zyılda Canik (Samsun) Sancağının Sosyal ve Ekonomik Yapısı* (Ankara: T rk Tarih Kurumu, 1998), pp.86-88.

⁵⁰ Zonguldak’s transition has diverged in many ways thanks to coal mining. It was 1829 that one Uzun Mehmed found coal in Zonguldak. In 1848, the British Coal company obtained the monopoly of the coal mining in the town. The town became one of the coal suppliers for the British Navy during the Crimean War. See Sina ıladı, *Zonguldak*

As a transit port for the overland Iran trade, Trabzon was an exception. Before the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, there were three alternative direction/ways linking Iran, generally the Iranian fertile northern provinces, to European markets: via the Bagdad trade route, via the Persian Gulf trade route and finally via the Trabzon trade route. In the latter, the goods were shipped from İstanbul to Trabzon, where some were stored for some time, and then they were delivered to the Erzurum custom-house, the final stop in the Ottoman Empire. One of the important features of this competition was that the journey took almost the same number days for each route.⁵¹ Therefore during the nineteenth century, the good flow via-Trabzon was highly dependent on relative transaction costs of via the Trabzon route compared to its alternatives.⁵² In other words, the merchants preferred one over another according to transportation costs, custom duties and security of the road.⁵³ For that reason the suggestion on the amelioration of existing trade routes from Trabzon to Erzurum came up even the 1810s.⁵⁴ However, it was not started before the 1850s.

Russia was the other competitor who wanted to promote the transit trade. It reduced custom duties, opened a new road, secured the road and gave insurance to the merchants.⁵⁵ For example, the immense public works done by the Russian government were launched in order to increase the volume of trade on the via Caucasia route even before the Trabzon-Erzurum route project.⁵⁶

After the industrial revolution of the British goods inflow to Iran has

Havzasında İşçi Hareketlerinin Tarihi 1848/1940 (Ankara : Yeraltı Maden-İş Yayınları, 1977), pp.15-24

⁵¹ Charles Issawi, "The Tabriz-Trabzon Trade, 1830-1900: Rise and Decline of a Route," *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, no.1 (Jan., 1970), p.22.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p.19.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, pp.18-22.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p.18.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p.22.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, pp.18-19.

increased by and by. However, this augmentation should not be exaggerated. For, the mountainous geography and the security issues made Iran a high risky country for the foreign merchants. Therefore, Iran remained out of the international trade in general until 1828. In 1828, after two years of war, Russia imposed on Iran the economic freedom for Russian merchants in the Türkmençayı Treaty.⁵⁷ Consequently, many Russian merchant rushed into the country. Accordingly, commercial activities rose in the 1830s, but all but died after the Baltalimanı Treaty in 1838. During the rest of the century the volume of Iranian trade increased, but not as fast as the Ottoman. Therefore, the proportion of Iranian trade was on the wane during the nineteenth century, still never lost its importance.

The evolution of the Black Sea region's integration can be divided into four periods; 1774-1829, 1829-1838, 1838-1854 and 1858-1871. The period between 1774 and 1829 was discussed in the first chapter. In summary, the Black Sea region began to integrate into the international trade especially Russian, but it was relatively slower than the Mediterranean Sea port-cities. Therefore, it kept its independence from the central States. 1829 was the year that Russian merchants obtained the right for free trade in the Empire. The Empire granted extensive commercial privileges to Russia with the Edirne Treaty. Naturally, the Ottoman Black Sea zone was deeply influenced by this event.⁵⁸ The volume of trade in the Black Sea was amplified tremendously by the 1830s.⁵⁹ In contrary to the entire Empire, most probably 1829 was a more important turning point for the Black Sea than 1838. The decade following that date saw the highest points of the Russian trade in the Empire, since

⁵⁷ Ironically, Russia had current account deficit until the last quarter of the nineteenth century, because of the unfavourable geographic conditions of Iran blocking Russian economic penetration. See Marvin L. Entner, *Russo-Persian Commercial Relations* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1965), pp. 1-16.

⁵⁸ Şevket Pamuk, *Osmanlı Ekonomisinde Bağımlılık ve Büyüme, 1820-1913* (İstanbul: Türkiye Ekonomi ve Toplumsal Vakfı, 1994), p.19.

⁵⁹ Harlaftis, p.14.

the she held the biggest part in the entire exportation of the Empire by 31.3.⁶⁰ Since the passage by the Straits was limited, this was the short golden age of the Russian mercantile supremacy. Nevertheless, while the British Empire overthrew the economic the Russian hegemony with the Baltalimanı Treaty, after that date the British merchants acceded to the Trabzon market more and more.⁶¹ One of the outcomes of this treaty for Russia's economic policy was ironic though. Most the Russian merchants operating in Persia quit the unprofitable Persian market for the lucrative Ottoman one.⁶² Hence, not only was the number of the English merchant in the Black Sea augmented, but also that of the Russian. The decades following 1838 until the Crimean Wars, the local merchants no doubt suffered because of stiff competition. The *tereke defterleri* (the probate inventories) of Trabzon testify to the decline of the traditional merchants. The competition became harsher and more destructive when the Russian government began to launch infrastructure projects in the Caucasian ports. Still, these projects were baby steps and only accelerated after the 1880s.⁶³

⁶⁰ Pamuk ed., *19. Yüzyılda Osmanlı Dış Ticareti = Ottoman foreign trade in the 19th Century*, p.62.

⁶¹ In 1846-1847 an unprecedented harvest in the Black Sea coincided both with crop failures in Europe and with the introduction of free trade in Britain. See Galina Harlaftis, p.14

⁶² The northern side of the Persia, the territory from the Alborz Mountains to Caspian Sea, is the most fertile and richest land of the country. Accordingly, in the nineteenth century, the heart of the Persian commerce was settled in the Caspian mild (Ardabil, Gilan, Mazadaran, Golestan, Taheran regions of modern Iran). However, the geography was not the only concern for the merchants. The absence of a powerful central state was important on security issues for the commercial activities because of vagabond tribes constituted a heavy security risk factor. In addition to this, the physical conditions of the marketplaces in the cities were terrible. For example, the foreign merchants made a joke about the marketplace between Bender-i Enzeli and Resht named as *Pîr-i bazaar* (means the head of the markets) by saying '*c'est le plus pire bazaar du monde*' (the worst bazaar in the world). Despite all the efforts such as steam line on the Euphrates and Caspian Sea or the reconstruction of some ports; Iran never became a part of the international trade. See Entner, p.2. See Charles Issawi, "European Economic penetration" in *Cambridge History of Iran* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), vol.7, pp.590-608.

⁶³ Many ports in the Caucasia and the Azov Sea shot up thanks to massive infrastructure projects in the 1880s. After the construction of the modern port, Batum trade

Because of this aggravating, especially the Russian, competitive pressure,⁶⁴ the Ottoman government launched many public works by the 1850s.⁶⁵ Frederick Walpole witnessed the construction of the Trabzon-Erzurum overland road in 1851 while travelling with the Nafia Nazırı İsmail Pasha through the countryside of Trabzon. As he reported, some 4,000 people were employed on the route under the supervision of German engineers. This journey left a good impression about the route on him.⁶⁶ Unfortunately, he was not right about his observations. The wagon road to Erzurum was completed eventually a few years later, yet it has many faulty in many ways in its construction, which made it a sunk investment.⁶⁷ Another breakthrough was the arrival of the first steamers to the Black Sea, by the mid-1830s.⁶⁸ However, the very first direct line was established (from Liverpool to Trabzon) in 1847.⁶⁹ Still the shipping continued to be carried out on wooden ships and Russian steamer companies and the steamers did not become dominant in transportation until the 1860s.

Most probably the institutions of the international economy in the Ottoman Empire emerged during the Crimean War.⁷⁰ The Crimean War and the maritime blockade destroyed not only Russian fleet, but also Russian economic supremacy over the Black Sea region once and for all. Many Russian mercantile activities were

boomed with the increasing amount of petroleum hauled from Baku. See, Galina Harlaftis, p.68 and p.84.

⁶⁴ For example; in 1823, a well-constructed military road from Redutkaleh to Tiflis was accomplished, see Issawi, ‘‘The Tabriz-Trabzon Trade, 1830-1900: Rise and Decline of a Route,’’ p.22.

⁶⁵ Ibid.,p.21

⁶⁶ Özgür Yılmaz, ‘‘İngiliz Seyyah Frederick Walpole’un Trabzon İzlenimleri’’, in *Karadeniz Tarihi Sempozyumu (25-26 Mayıs 2005)* (Trabzon: Karadeniz Teknik Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2005), vol.1, pp.445-446.

⁶⁷ Issawi, ‘‘The Tabriz-Trabzon Trade, 1830-1900: Rise and Decline of a Route,’’ p.21.

⁶⁸ Ibid., p.19.

⁶⁹ Ibid., p.20.

⁷⁰ Şevket Pamuk, *Osmanlı Ekonomisinde Bağımlılık ve Büyüme, 1820-1913*.

replaced by British ones. During the Crimean War, Trabzon was one of the supplier ports for the British Army.⁷¹ As a result of the war, the demand rose sharply in Trabzon's hinterland and east Anatolia and the city profited from. However, when the war ended, this extraordinary demand did not last long and the exports declined substantially during these years. As the demand fell dramatically, the local merchants suffered. Moreover, this time they had to compete with newcomers; Western merchants, who settled during these years. These factors should have made the 1860s worst decade for the local merchants.

The misfortune was not limited to the local market. The shipping sector went into severe competition era. The allied powers obtained licenses for new steam lines from Trabzon. Close competition between the Ottoman, British, French, Russian and Austrian steamships in the 1860s devastated the profitability of the line for a decade. Nevertheless, this struggle was set up by a new balance between national oligopolies, the French-Ottoman trust against Russian-Persian one at the end of the decade.⁷² But the worst was yet to come. The port of Batum, Russian alternative, became the main competitor to Trabzon thanks to huge governmental investments.⁷³ Still, the *coup de grace* for the Iranian trade via Trabzon was the opening of the Suez Channel in 1869, by which the main transit trade to Iran was shifted from the Black Sea ports to the Persian Gulf once and for all.

The city did not recover fully from the depression until 1870s. Two events helped the region to recuperate. Firstly, the Western powers and the Ottoman

⁷¹ A. Üner Turgay, "Trade and Merchants in Nineteenth Century Trabzon: Elements of Ethnic Conflict," in *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire*, ed. Benjamin Braude and Bernard Lewis (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1982), p.293.

⁷² Issawi, "The Tabriz-Trabzon Trade, 1830-1900: Rise and Decline of a Route," p.20.

⁷³ By 1871, "Russia completed new roads radiating from Tiflis to the Black Sea, the Caspian and the Persian border", which also helped Russian counterinsurgency in Daghestan ameliorate the security of the route. See *ibid.* p.21.

government negotiated on the opening of the Straits for all kind of merchant ships during the peace negotiations between Prussia and France in London (1871).⁷⁴ From then on, any merchant ship without a shipping permit could pass through the Straits. Consequently, many shipping companies carried the merchandise directly to the Black Sea ports instead of transshipping at the Ottoman capital. While İstanbul was losing its importance as a transit port, the volume of trade in the Black Sea grew.

Secondly, by the 1880s Russia amended totally its economic policy towards the Iranian transit trade. Baby-industries had already emerged in Russia and begun to export merchandises to Qajar Iran. However, the via-Russia transit trade was facilitated the introduction to Iran of non-Russian goods, which were the main competitors for Russian baby-industries' products. One-third of the non-Russian merchandise was carried across Russian soils. Hence, Russia quickly shifted its economic policy to a more protectionist one and hardened the economic terms for foreign transit merchants.⁷⁵ Still, Trabzon was unable to exploit fully the situation of the Persian Gulf cities, because most merchants altered their route to the Suez channel not Trabzon.⁷⁶ Consequently, economic activities began to pick up again in the Black Sea during the age of the nineteenth century's Great Depression. In other words, thanks to having been late-comers, instead of suffering from the depression, the Black Sea port cities was able to enjoy development during the 1880s. At least, it can be presumed that the weight of the depression was not as heavy for the Black Sea merchants as it far their Mediterranean counter-parts.

In conclusion, between 1829 and 1860, the port cities in the Black Sea underwent a change at a relatively slower pace than the Mediterranean ones.

⁷⁴ Shaw and Shaw, p.152.

⁷⁵ Issawi, "The Tabriz-Trabzon Trade, 1830-1900: Rise and Decline of a Route," pp.23-24.

⁷⁶ Ibid., p24.

However, despite the fact that the Black Sea region was geographically immune to the penetration of foreign economies at some point, still in the age of emerging international capitalism the change was inevitable. Russian economy slowly infiltrated to the region from 1774 to 1829, after 1829, no barrier remained to it. Hence, more Russian merchants settled every day in this area. This does not mean that the Black Sea port-cities came under Russian economic influence; they kept their independence until the Crimean War. With the Crimean War, British merchants came to the region and the British trade replaced Russian. The structure of the market also was reshaped during this period.

One last point must be made. Although, the Russian economic supremacy was replaced by that of the British during the nineteenth century, it never disappeared completely. Consider that in 1887, the Sublime Porte consulted to *Maliye Nezareti* (Ministry of Finance) on a knotty issue. According to a law issued in 1877/1878, the importation of foreign money was forbidden. The banks had no obligation to convert these bills into silver or gold. However, Russian money was circulating in Trabzon, Samsun and İzmir. When the authorities intercepted the traffic and confiscated Russian money, the merchants resisted. One of them claimed rightfully that there was no law against the circulation of foreign money. Confused by this statement, the Sublime Porte asked whether the circulation should be averted or not. The answer of the Ministry of Finance was interesting: it recognized the claim for the confiscation of the bills, yet it recommended the permission of the bills due to the scarcity of 5-para, 10-para and 20-para Ottoman coins.⁷⁷

⁷⁷ B.O.A A}MKT.493.5

Merchants of Trabzon

Now, the same story will be for the third time from another perspective. This time, before the history of the shippers for the last time, the perspective will be from that of the merchants'. Trabzon always had been a transit port for Iranian trade. That is why Iranian merchants and the Armenians dealing with the Iranian trade had been always present. After 1770, foreign merchants, especially Russian, started to settle in the city. The representatives of the Western countries' commerce were the Ionians, the Chiots or Greek citizens in general, but only a few local Greeks involved in this trade. In addition, while Russian trade was carried on by the Chiots from Odessa, the Ionians were the British representatives. In this context, the whole story can be read as either a competition between Russia and the British or between two comprador bourgeoisie, the Chiots and the Ionians. Remember that the British /the Ionian activities were limited compared to those of Russian/the Chiots until the Crimean War.

In summary, during 1829-1861, the Anatolian merchants were eliminated slowly from the market by the competition, but also the Chiot merchants with Russian citizenship challenged the British Ionian merchants. In addition to the so-called comprador bourgeoisie, other merchants, especially the protected merchants (Muslims and Armenians), were rising; some others, like the Iranian and Ottoman Muslim merchants, were in decline. Still, the total decline of the local merchant did not happen before the Crimean War. The privileged local merchants, *hayriye ve Avrupa tüccarları*, managed to survive. Some of them became richer, some went bankrupt. Since, the privileged merchants in the Black Sea are the subject of Chapter Three, the other merchants in this chapter will be presented, first the losers of the new economic

era, and then the so-called comprador bourgeoisie.

The first merchant group to be discussed is the local merchants. I must be confessed that the primary resources on Armenian merchants remain understudied. Therefore, little information was available about the Armenian merchants, including the lucky ones, who enjoyed the governmental protection as *Avrupa tüccarı*. They were probably descended of the first Armenians dealing with the Iranian trade during Selim I's reign.⁷⁸ But still, many crucial questions remain unanswered. For example, it is unknown whether they were the ones who survived after 1860 or another group of Armenian merchant replaced them, whether they were connected to the *Amira* class (Armenian notables) or not, whether some *süryani* (Syrians) were reported as Armenians in the Foreign Office papers. Therefore, all the information regarding the Armenian merchants should be read with caution. For this reason, only Muslim merchants will be studied as representative of the local merchant class.

By the end of the 1830s, the trade in Trabzon was controlled by the Muslim and Armenians merchants.⁷⁹ The weight of the *Rûms* on the commerce was relatively limited. While the Ottoman Muslim merchants and the Armenians carried on the trade between the other cities of the Empire and Trabzon, the Persian merchants with some Armenians handled the transit trade leading to Tabriz. However, most of these Persian merchants went bankrupt after 1837.⁸⁰

The probate inventories (*Tereke defterleri*) offer valuable information on the Muslim merchant's wealth in Trabzon for the first part of the nineteenth century. The Muslim merchants of Trabzon were the richest class of the city, whose wealth was followed by other professions like *kazaz* (silk merchant), *hıntacı* (crop merchant),

⁷⁸ Suraiya Faroqhi, *Towns and townsmen of Ottoman Anatolia: Trade, Crafts, and Food Production in an Urban Setting* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp.54-55.

⁷⁹ Turgay, p.287.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, pp.290-291.

çakmakçı (lighter maker) and *terzi* (tailor).⁸¹ In Trabzon for example, the income distribution of the city seems to have been unbalanced in many ways. For example, while the distribution of their estate ranged from 0 to 5,000 kuruş for an ordinary *eşraf* (notable) of Trabzon, there were a respectable number of wealthy merchants leaving more than 10,000 kuruş between 1800 and 1840.⁸² Furthermore, these wealthiest merchants apparently dealt with large quantities of money. Some of them bought some stores, even some business complexes (*işhanı*). Accordingly, there were only a few craftsmen or merchants with numerous stores, whereas the majority of craftsmen were the tenants of this wealthiest class.⁸³

The debts of the deceased were inscribed in the inventories. While the total debt of the deceased consisted of 14.9%,⁸⁴ their debtor had to pay a sum corresponded to 36.5%.⁸⁵ Ömer Demirel claims that he witnessed a similar picture of higher amount of credit than debt, while studying Kayseri probe inventories. He writes that this can explained by the high profitability of the business or the merchants' reluctance towards borrowing.⁸⁶ In addition to these comments, it can be argued that the merchants of Trabzon could be also the issuers of the loan to the customers in the absence of proper credit mechanisms. In other words, the merchants could supply goods on credit. In all events, the high credit ratio of legacies of the deceased proves that the credit system was a part of the daily economic life, so a reluctance to use credit mechanisms seems have been unlikely. Finally, it can be

⁸¹ Ömer Demirel, “Trabzon Tüccar ve Esnaflarının Mal Varlıkları ile Borç-Alacak İlişkileri (1800-1840)” in *Karadeniz Tarihi Sempozyumu (25-26 Mayıs 2005)* (Trabzon: Karadeniz Teknik Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2005) , vol.1, p.387.

⁸² Ibid., pp.386-387.

⁸³ The highest number was 22 stores for only one owner. See Ibid., p.387-388

⁸⁴ Sarıcaoğlu calculated the interest rate as 14%. Mehmet Esat Sarıcaoğlu, “Trabzon Kadı Sicillerine göre XIX. Yüzyılda Trabzonda Ailenin Sosyo-Ekonomik Durumu” in *Karadeniz Tarihi Sempozyumu (25-26 Mayıs 2005)* (Trabzon: Karadeniz Teknik Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2005), vol.1, pp.477-478.

⁸⁵ Demirel, p.389.

⁸⁶ Ibid., p.389.

stated that partnerships were a common practice. Unfortunately, the probate inventories do not reflect the nature of these partnerships.

As expected, the names of many foreign merchants are mentioned in these inventories.⁸⁷ The frequency of mention of merchants from Kayseri shows that the merchants from this town were active in Trabzon. Compared with other merchants from geographically closer cities, the merchants of Kayseri was far ahead in wealth, with 66% of the deceased acquiring quite handsome legacy (20,000 kuruş-50,000 kuruş). The merchants of Kayseri could have been the largest and wealthiest group operating in Middle and East Anatolia in the nineteenth century. The merchants of Trabzon seem to have had the second place, and were wealthier than merchants from other inland cities like Çankırı, Sivas and Çorum.⁸⁸

The things changed so dramatically in a few decades. Most of these merchant's son went bankrupt because of the emergence of a new non-Muslim foreign merchant class, who became dominant in foreign trade at the expense of the extant. They even managed to open branches in Tabriz.⁸⁹ In conclusion, only ten Turkish importers were left in town in 1884.⁹⁰ The only local merchants who were able to survive this were a few lucky protected merchants.

The Chiots

The foreign merchants in Trabzon city were not the descendant of the local non-Muslims. Most probably the majority of the *Rûm* population of the East Black

⁸⁷ Ibid., p.393-394.

⁸⁸ Ibid.,p.387.

⁸⁹ Ibid.,pp.290-291.

⁹⁰ Turgay, p.294.

Sea port-cities had already converted to Islam by the beginning of the century.⁹¹

When, in speaking about the privileged foreign merchant in Trabzon, generally who are meant one the Greek newcomers, the Ionians and the Chiots, not the *Rums*. The timeline of the dominance of two groups in Greek shipping coincided more or less with the changes in the struggle between the British and Russian empires. In general, these Greek merchants were usually under the protection of a Western power. The Greek ship-owners in Trabzon, like their colleagues throughout the world, flew the British, Greek, and Russian or Ottoman flag as a matter of economic interest more than national attachment.⁹²

The Ionians were privileged merchants of the British thanks to the British protectorate over the Ionian Islands, and the Chiots were under the protection of Russia because their relatives had settled in Russian ports in general. Consequently, as the British economic influence won over Russian, the Ionians put the Chiots out of mercantile actions in Trabzon. These merchants' economic power expanded during the century. They were never fully replaced by European companies' franchising and preserved their role as the intermediaries of international trade. Even at the end of the century, many European houses kept away from Trabzon, because of these Greek families and the competitive power of newly emerged Armenian merchants.⁹³

The Chiots were the first group to settle in Trabzon. As mentioned before, at that time, Russia was naturalizing Greeks from Chios Island. In 1774, the French consultant on Chios Island has witnessed the growing affiliation of the local Greek merchants with Russia.⁹⁴ As the trade volume of Odessa and the other new-Russian port-cities expanded, the Chiot merchants became more powerful and wealthier until

⁹¹ Yolaçıcı, p.29.

⁹² Harlaftis, p.33.

⁹³ Turgay, p.302.

⁹⁴ Louis Jouvin, French consulate report of 10 September 1774 from the Scio Island., in *Diplomatic Achieves on Chios, 1577-1841*, ed. Philip Argentini, pp.30-33.

the 1860s. Naturally, the Chiots were the one of the biggest beneficiaries from the growing Russian activities in the Black Sea and when Russian merchants came to Trabzon, the Chiots were among them.

The Chiot model of doing business was different from that of the Ionians, which fitted more the pre-1860s world. Before the invention of the telegraph and the steamship, cereals were imported from the Black Sea by indirect shipping lanes. In other words they were not delivered directly to their final purchaser, but shipped to one of the major “deposit ports”, Livorno, Marseilles, Geneo, İstanbul or Trieste, in Mediterranean Sea, where they waited for their “shipping order”.⁹⁵

In this kind of network, the mother company was settled at the final destination of the network, which was usually London. Each brother (it could be a brother-in-law or a cousin, too) of a certain Chiot family ruled each branch of the company operating in a different deposit port. Sometimes they were supervised by the father of the family. To give an example of how it worked, assume that the brother in Odessa bought some 100 tons of wheat. He informed the mother company even before the cereals had been fully transported to the port. The brother in the mother company put the wheat up for sale in London. Assuming that some Dutch broker from Amsterdam bought the entire bulk of the ship, in this case, the brother in London would send a shipping order to the deposit ports in the Mediterranean Sea, so the captain would alter the course of the ship to Amsterdam. If again this broker sold the ship’s cargo to some merchant from Hamburg, this time the ship would go to Hamburg without stopping off in Amsterdam.

In this system, if the mother office failed to sell the bulk of a ship, the ship delivered the cargo to a deposit port, where the bulk would wait in store.

⁹⁵ Harlaftis, p.14 and p. 63.

Subsequently, ports across the Mediterranean Sea became the business centers full of warehouses for such cargo. The main deposit port for the Black Sea was Livorno. Forth-five percent of the total export was directed to Livorno, the main transit port for English merchandises, from where it would be re-shipped to its ultimate destinations.⁹⁶

The Chiot families usually preferred to hire their stuff from among relatives or someone from Chios Island for these agencies and the branches in the ports. By the mid-century, there were 16 important families in the Chiot phase. Some of these families were not created by a Chios-nascent indeed. However, they started their careers in a of Chiot family's office or married a member of these families, thus they obtained the support of the Chiot families.⁹⁷ All of the chiefs of each branch ruled generally by a brother or a close relative were legally independent and had equal rights to third parties.⁹⁸ Usually, there was a '*pater familias*' over the each branch.⁹⁹ As will be discussed, the economic rationality behind this preference was to minimize risk and profit from the social capital. That is why the most important features of being a member of a Chiot company were kinship or being from Chios.¹⁰⁰

Another feature of the Chiot commercial web was that the Chiot families tried to exercise as much direct control over the production as they could. They wanted to secure good flow. In other word, they were predisposed to control every step of a commodity chain like their Ottoman privileged merchants. For such purpose, they established a local agency system in the hinterland of the production centre's port. Such agencies dealt with the contracts signed with the local producers and they managed the transportation of the goods to the ports. The negotiation for the cash

⁹⁶ Ibid., p.20.

⁹⁷ Ibid., p.40.

⁹⁸ Ibid., p.51.

⁹⁹ Ibid., p.52.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p.51.

crops went often hand in hand with credit placement. These credits extended to the producer enabled the merchants to obtain cheaper prices and the control over the production. The credit mechanism secured the producers' sale in good prices to the merchants in the Northern Black Sea.

Since the Chiot merchant had no mercenaries, such webbing prerequisites secured trade routes. In addition, investments in infrastructure, such as in warehouses and proper roads were crucial. An adequate infrastructure was already present in some places, like in Odessa.¹⁰¹ On the other hand, the routes linking the port to the hinterland in the Ottoman Trabzon province were mountainous, insufficient and therefore costly, and unsecured. In addition to this, there was an asymmetry of information. Consequently, the foreign merchant would never try to control the entire commodity chain, but the *hayriye ve avrupa tüccarları* with their mercenaries did.

The Russian authorities always supported the Chiot families' settlement in Odessa. By the 1840s Russia facilitated the procedures to procure Russian passports in order to brace up the merchants change their nationality. Russian interference gave occasion for some Ottoman non-Muslims, especially the Chiots, to take Russian passports granting many privileges. The circulation of Russian passports in the Ottoman Black Sea prompted the British authorities to strike back.¹⁰²

The Ionians

The fact that the establishment of the British Protectorate over the Ionian Island in 1815 played a crucial role in the formation of the Greek merchant class has been disregarded by Turkish historians so far. Prior to nineteenth century, The

¹⁰¹ Ibid., p.55.

¹⁰² Turgay, pp.296-297.

Islands were a Venetian colony for centuries until 1797. The day when the French army invaded Venice was a twist of fate for the islanders.¹⁰³ Once the new French rule was established, it caused a popular uprising during the Napoleonic Wars. By the help of the civil unrest, the joint forces of Russian and the Ottoman navy finally conquered the Island in 1799. The French Republican administration was been transformed into the Septinsular Republic as a tributary state to the Ottoman Empire, which had even its own constitution the so-called “Byzantine”. However, when the de facto protector of the state, Russia, signed the Treaty of Tilsit in 1807, the Ionian Islands became once again French until 1815. Then after, the British authorities reorganized the governmental body and founded the United States of the Ionian Islands under the British protectorate, which endured to 1864, the year when the Islands were annexed to Greece.

The islanders already had been dealing in olives and crops and bulk shipping before 1829.¹⁰⁴ They were also dealing with Levantine trade under the Venetian flag. In addition to this, the Ionian commercial webs and their sailing sector had been already present in the eighteenth century’s Habsburg Empire’s Adriatic Sea coastlines.¹⁰⁵ The two main regions before the 1860s that the Ionians dominated were the Romanian coast and the ports in the Azov Sea. The principal wheat suppliers of the Britain Islands were Russia and Prussia.¹⁰⁶ Seeking alternative suppliers, the British promoted grain production in the Danubian Principalities.¹⁰⁷ The Wallachia and Moldavia drew attention for their potential. Moreover, the future-Romanian

¹⁰³ Thomas W. Gallant, *Experiencing Dominion: culture, identity and power in the British Mediterranean* (Notre Dame, Ind. : University of Notre Dame Press, 2002), p.4.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, p.5.

¹⁰⁵ İlber Ortaylı, *İmparatorluğun en Uzun Yüzyılı* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2005), p.65. The Ionian culture was the gate opening to the West for the Ottoman Greeks for centuries. (*Ibid.*, p.23).

¹⁰⁶ Harlaftis, pp. 8-9.

¹⁰⁷ *Ibid.*, p.9.

lands could be a territory totally under English influence and end the British dependency for cereals on Russia.¹⁰⁸ The turning point for Romanian ports was 1829; still these cities adapted themselves fully to new conditions later on in 1831 and the international trade took off in the 1830s.¹⁰⁹

The wheat importation from Romania picked up with the Crimean War like it was in Trabzon. Therefore, during these years, the Britain invested in the infrastructure of the region. For example, the Danube River's mouth at Sulina, which had always been tricky for navigation, was deepened by the European Commission of Danube,¹¹⁰ Compared to Russia and the Ottoman Empire the exportation volume of Danubian Principalities was evident and relatively higher per kilometer than the other regions in the Black Sea from 1837 to 1853.¹¹¹ Nonetheless, these ports never attained Russian levels and remained mediocre exporters of cereals to the British islands. During these years, similar to the immigration of the Chiotis to Russia, the Ionians immigrated to the Danubian Principalities after the Crimean War.¹¹²

The legal situation of the Ionians in the Ottoman Empire was quite different from that of other Greeks. During the British protectorate years, an ordinary Ionian officially had the right to apply to the British embassy for a passport, by which he could enjoy therefore the capitulations. Here, it must be noted that the fact that the Ionians, constituted an important proportion of the comprador Greek merchants operating in the borders of the Empire, never became truly Ottoman subjects.

While there were five Greeks, only two of them were merchants, under

¹⁰⁸ Paul Cernovodeanu and Beatrice Marinescu, 'British Trade in the Danubian Ports of Galatz and Braila between 1837 and 1853,' *Journal of European Economic History* vol.8, no: 3 (winter 1979), pp.707-709.

¹⁰⁹ Galatz, nicknamed as Danubian Marseilles, became free-port in 1837. *Ibid.*, pp.707-708.

¹¹⁰ The European Commission of Danube was established in 1857 during the Crimean War to secure the passage of the ships. See Harlaftis, p.72.

¹¹¹ Cernovodeanu and Marinescu, pp.710-712.

¹¹² Harlaftis, p.70.

British protection in Trabzon in 1836, the number rose to 32 in 1844 and to 67 in 1855.¹¹³ Even some Turks profited from the situation and obtained British passport.¹¹⁴ According to Foreign Office papers, among 67 people enjoying British protection in Trabzon during 1855-1857, 23 of them, nearly one-third, had been born in the Ionian Islands. Some other 16 were from the Greek Kingdom (60% in sum). Most probably, there were only one ex-Ottoman subject from Tarsus under the British protection, contrary to common belief.¹¹⁵

In contrary to the Chiot families, Ionians were mainly of maritime origin, not merchants from the beginning.¹¹⁶ The capital (*sermagia*) of shipping companies accumulated from the primary capital gained from shipping.¹¹⁷ The specialization in the bulk cargoes of the Greek shipping, already started among the Chiot families, became more apparent after the 1860s.¹¹⁸ The Chiots were generally more dominant before the 1860s, replaced by the Ionians as their methods in the business were more suitable to the post-1850s world.

By the 1850s direct exportation started to dominate the maritime trade via the Mediterranean Sea instead of the deposit trade for several reasons: first the introduction of new technologies in communication, especially the widespread of telegraph lines facilitated communication, thus it made ports obsolete for orders with many agencies.¹¹⁹ Another new invention, the steamships, was faster than the sailing ship and did not require way-ports for stopovers. Moreover, many European

¹¹³ Turgay, p.296.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., pp.296-297.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., pp.310-313. At the end of the century, it has been reported that there were 23 exporters operating, only 3 of them were Turkish, and among the major ones; 3 Persians, 1 Swiss and 10 Greek or Armenian major commission agents has handled the trade. In the long term, the merchant houses residing in İstanbul penetrated and after a while they dominated superiority in the trade. See Ibid., p.294.

¹¹⁶ Harlaftis, p.70.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., p. 92.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., p.70.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., p.68.

countries abolished one by one the sliding scale system, and finally Britain abolished the British Navigation Laws in 1849.¹²⁰ Therefore unlike the Chiots, the Ionians had no branches in the deposit ports. One of the other features different from the Chiots, was that they were not very interested in the control of an entire commodity chain. They were preoccupied only with shipping and nothing more. The only common feature with the Chiots was the role of the family and fellow townsmen. As in the Chiot families, kinship played the primary role in adherence to the network.¹²¹

In conclusion, in the dawn of the capitalism, the southeast Black Sea region was affected by external developments. The change was slower and less effectual than the change that occurred in the Mediterranean port cities, but so many things had changed. By the 1860s, the Anatolian merchants and the Iranian merchants were nearly extinct, replaced by first the Chiot merchants and then by the Ionians. Each merchant group was under the protection of a foreign power. Still, the Armenians and the protected merchants survived. In the 1860s most of the merchants in Trabzon were supervised by a foreign power.

This alienation of its subjects eventually bothered the Ottoman state. However, the Empire had so weakened that it could do almost nothing, but the introduction of the *hayriye ve avrupa tüccarları* project. This project seems to have slowed down the effects, but failed to slow the alienation of the Ottoman merchant class. Finally, the Empire declared with a note in 1852, followed by a memorandum in 1860, that the Ottoman government would no longer recognize new protections, except for the employees of the consulates.¹²² However, these two declarations had little effect on the issue. All the Ottomans achieved were to make the procedure more

¹²⁰ Ibid., p.20.

¹²¹ Ibid., p.89.

¹²² Turgay, p.298.

difficult. Not before the issuance of the Nationality and the Naturalization Law did the Ottoman regain control on the issue.¹²³

Actually, Britain was *l'éminence grise* of the Ottoman state against the Russian expansion and being aware of her incompetence on the matter, the Sublime Porte should have supported the British merchants against the Russians. The Ottomans had still more authority on the Black Sea, hence they could pursue a certain political line. As will be seen in the next chapter, the control over the maritime certificates was one of them.

¹²³ Ibid., pp.298-299.

CHAPTER THREE

THE WOODEN SHIPS IN THE BLACK SEA BETWEEN 1830-1861

The technical feature of the ships is the first step in examining the shipping sector in the Black Sea from 1829 to 1861.¹²⁴ Although, there has been no comprehensive study done on the subject a picture of the shipping sector at the end of the century can be constructed. The ships of Lloyd, Messageries, Frainset or other foreign steam companies made regular trips to the important ports like Trabzon and Samsun. Sometimes, they would call at other ports especially after the harvests. However, before 1870 the shipping was not under the control of the foreign steamers, since any kind of foreign infiltration was implausible thanks to the Straits. As seen before, the passage of any kind of foreign ship was limited and under control of the Ottoman government. The main objective in this chapter is to understand what kinds of ships were navigating the Black Sea. The physical features of these ships will be described and compared with the ships that sailed the Mediterranean Sea.

It must be admitted that another objective was play in the study of wooden vessels. This chapter represents the sole comprehensive study on nineteenth century Ottoman wooden merchant shipping. Although the vessels of the Ottoman navy have

¹²⁴ The length of length for the eighteenth century's merchant vessels was zira' corresponding to 0.70 meters before the Mahmudian reforms on measuring unit. See Robert Mantran, "Droits d'entrée sur les navires à İstanbul au milieu du XVIIe siècle (Rüsumat-ı İhtisabiye)," *Turcica* no.5 (1975), p.97. However after the reforms, the zira' of İstanbul was fixed at 0.758 meters. *Keyl* or *Kile* consisted of usually to all local grain measures regardless of the size or weight. However, the standard *keyl* used by the Imperial Dockyard was always 20 *okka* or 25.659 kg. See Halil İnalçık, "Introduction to Ottoman Metrology," *Turcica*, no.15, (1985) pp. 311-348 and Halil İnalçık, "Weight and Measures" in *An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire. 1300-1914*, ed. by Halil İnalçık and Donald Quataert (Cambridge, : Cambridge Press, 1994), pp.987-994.

been widely studied, there have been only few studies on wooden merchant sailing and oared ships. Naturally, there will be very few references to the secondary resources. To fill this gap, this study is based on 513 *sened-i bahri*, maritime certificates, from 1267 to 1276. The certificates read do not cover the entire catalogue from 1267 to 1276, but more than one-third of it, which is statistically meaningful. As a first step, the documentation of these certificates will be presented.

After describing the features of these certificates, the evolution of the military ships, a well-studied subject, will be described in order to understand the evolution of the wooden merchant ships. As expected, there was a deep relation between the two kinds of ships, even though the military ships were often bigger than the merchant vessels.¹²⁵ For example, the decommissioned military ships were sold to the merchants by an auction.¹²⁶ On the other hand, during wartime, as will be seen, some merchant ships were taken on charter, too.

After a short presentation of the history of Ottoman shipping, comment will be made on the information rendered by the certificates. Thanks to the Ottoman bureaucrats' keen attention to details, the registers at the Imperial Dockyard noted not only the owners, the captain and the ships' features with the ship-owner's shares, but also the reasons why the previous certificate had been annulled. These registers open the gates for a deeper analysis on partnerships, the statute of the captains and many other issues. That analysis is made in the next chapter.

Using these certificates, first the types of ships which sailed in the nineteenth century's Black Sea will be analyzed. The features of essential kind of ships with giving the average measures, the maximum cargo capacities and the length will be

¹²⁵ The biggest merchant ships were similar to the military ships, but the smaller merchant ships were too small to recruit.

¹²⁶ See Murat Çizakça, *İslam Dünyasında ve Batı'da İş ortakları tarihi* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1999), p.82.

given. Their weight in the nineteenth century wooden shipping will be discussed. Finally a comparison of our results with the coeval situation in the Mediterranean Sea will be made. That operation will answer the question whether there was a technological gap between two sea's shipbuilding technologies and reveal were the main differences between these ships.

Maritime Certificates

The Nature of Maritime Certificates

Sened-i Bahri (Maritime certificate) was the sailing permit for Ottoman merchant ships for many centuries. It became a political tool in the nineteenth century after two events. The Edirne Treaty (1829) and the Greek Revolt/Revolution (1821-1829) convinced the Ottoman elites that the control over the civilian shipping sector was crucial even for purely military purposes.¹²⁷ Thus, the Sublime Porte tightened up control over these certificates and made easier for the Muslims to acquire certificates. In this way, the Ottoman authorities supported the building of Muslim ships to replace the Greek ones in the Black Sea after 1829.

Most probably these certificates did not cover the Ottoman shipping sector as a whole in the era under question. It is presumed that the certificates represent generally the sailing certificates usually from a Black Sea port city to İstanbul and vice versa, for many reasons. First of all, the location of the ports, the captains and shareholders registered in these documents are located usually along the Black Sea

¹²⁷ This is the reason why the maritime certificates enlisted in the B.O.A archives date back only to 1829.

coastline. In addition to this, the names of the Aegean Islands, famous for their sailors and ships like Lesbos Island, where many prominent Turkish sailors were born,¹²⁸ or Chios Island, a centre of Greek shipping, were hardly mentioned. Edhem Eldem's contention that the Empire lost its control over the Mediterranean Sea to the European Powers by eighteenth century seems to be justified.¹²⁹

Second, the presence of the Greeks with foreign passports who dominated the international shipping traffic of the Aegean Sea in the nineteenth century is not seen in the documents. There are hardly some names from the Aegean Islands. As discussed in chapter one, there was also no free passage to the Black Sea for any kind of ship until 1871, which hindered the foreign companies from infiltrating to the area freely. Sublime Porte also prohibited indirectly the passage of the Ottoman Rum subjects to the Black Sea, by allowing the passage of certified through the Bosphorus.

According to the international treaties, among the foreign-flagged ships, those with *izn-i sefine* (sailing permit) were allowed passage from the Mediterranean Sea to the Black Sea or vice versa for a limited time. The other ships hauled the freight to İstanbul, the main transit port for the Black Sea, where the freight was waited for another ship to take it to a Black Sea port. Thanks to the geographical advantages, the Straits turned into the main check-point for the Black Sea. What made the difference was that control. The geographic factors made the Black Sea coast an isolated area from the penetration of international trade. In addition to this, thanks to the Straits, the Black Sea coast line was one of the last remaining areas over which the Ottoman Empire could exercise power in the mid-nineteenth century. The Sublime Porte Ottoman oriented the economic and social transformation of the

¹²⁸ Oruç Reis, Barbaros Hayrettin Pasha and Unionist Cemal Pasha, for example.

¹²⁹ Edhem Eldem, 'Kontrolü kaybetmek: 18. Yüzyılın İkinci Yarısında Doğu Akdenizde Osmanlı Varlığı' in *Türkler ve Deniz*, ed. Özlem Kumrular (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi 2007), pp.63-78.

area with its scarce means. Hence, unlike in the Mediterranean Sea, the Ottoman authorities could intervene in the shipping sector as they could.

The history of the subvention to Muslim ship-building in the Black Sea went back to 1829, the date when Russia obtained free-trade rights in the Black Sea with the Edirne Treaty. What was at stake here was to prevent the formation of Russian maritime and military fleet in the Black Sea by the naturalization of the non-Muslim subjects of the Empire, especially Greeks. The Ottoman government had already taken alarm by the conscription of Greeks into the Russian fleet before 1829 and tried to prevent it. By the beginning of the century, it apprehended more for creation of Greek merchant web involved in maritime commerce in the Black Sea protected by the Russians. Moreover, only five years passed from the sea battles between the Ottomans and the Greeks, formed quickly from the merchant ships,¹³⁰ most of which were brigs, during the Greek Revolution. These Greek merchant ships countered the Ottoman navy successfully for three years until the Egyptian navy succeeded in crushing the Greek sailing ships in 1824. Moreover, during the war against the Russians, the blockade of the Dardanelles by enemy ships in 1828 obstructed the naval traffic and İstanbul suffered a year from the lack of many goods that had been carried from Aegean Sea.¹³¹ A possibility of a naval blockade by Greeks in the Black Sea during a future Russian-Ottoman war must have worried.

As a result, by 1829, the Ottomans restrained the free-passage of all Ottoman merchant ships through the Bosphorus and forbade the sailing of many already existing ships, except the ones with certain permissions like *kapan gemileri* (ships of

¹³⁰ For example, at the beginning of the Greek Revolution, the Greek navy was formed by 12 brigs anchored near to Preveze and 35 more in Sisam Island. See Fevzi Kurtoğlu, *Yunan İstiklal Harbi ve Navarin Muharebesi (Çengeloğlu Tahir Paşa)* (Ankara: Askeri Deniz Matbaası, 1944), pp.13-15.

¹³¹ Wolfgang Müller-Weiner, *Bizans'tan Osmanlı'ya İstanbul Limanları* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1998), p.93

cereal merchants). They also launched a collateral program of the certification of merchant ship sailing in the Black Sea called *Sened-i Bahri* to promote the building of sailing ships in the Black Sea ports by Muslims. What was new here was not the certification, but its strict control. In other words, by 1829, apart from the foreign-flagged ships having sailing permits, the only ships that could sail the Black Sea were owned by Muslim ship-owners and some lucky non-Muslims. As a result of this control over the Bosphorus, the passage of Greek-flagged or non-certified Ottoman ships to the Black Sea, especially the non-Muslim ones, was forbidden for many decades, until the İstanbul Conference of 1871. Hence, as the Black Sea trade had integrated late to international capitalism, it opened late to international shipping.

The ultimate goal of such operation was to erect barriers against the Greeks contacting the Russians by any means. During this period, Russia tried to naturalize the Greek merchants and captains settled in its port-cities as much as it could and a good quantity of merchants operating in the Ottoman Black Sea ports carried Russian passports until the Crimean War. Thus, although it never occupied, a strong Orthodox Christian coalition (Russians and Greeks) against the Empire in the Black Sea was not a groundless fear in those days.

As expected, the primary criterion to obtaining these certificates was that both the captain and the ship-owners had to be Muslims. With time, some non-Muslims, especially those living in İstanbul, got around this rule with time, but until the majority of the ships remained under Muslim control until 1860s.¹³² That islamization of ships was not a harsh transformation, since a good proportion of the owners and the captains of the ships operating in the Capital already had been

¹³² For example, some captain from Rodos Misi (Kastelrosso) appears in one certificate with his *şethiye brik* name *Aya Yorgi*. See A}DVN 84.85. But in a more extreme case a Catholic pharmacist owned a certified big *şethiye brik* with a Catholic captain. See A}DVN 103.70.

Muslim.¹³³ That panoptic view from İstanbul has fuddled many Ottoman researchers' perceptions of Ottoman merchant ships so that they have thought that the Muslims were the primary agents in the shipping sector in the entire Empire,¹³⁴ like their Greek colleagues mistaken for their thesis on Greek domination before nineteenth century. As can be understood from the certificates, there were not only the Greeks of the Aegean Sea or the Muslims from the Black Sea, but there was a Wallachian presence in this sector, since their names appear in the B.O.A documents. This discussion, however, is behind the scope of this study.

To acquire a maritime certificate, the owners of a ship had to apply to the *Tersâne-i Âmire* (the Imperial Dockyard) or to a commission in charge in the local port, first. Having paid the required fees, the ship was enrolled to local *liman defteri* (the register book of the port). Then only after, the commission had to assess the ship's freight capacity and its length and file a petition to the Imperial Dockyard for a maritime certificate. If the ship was newly built, the petition had to include information about the type of the ship with its freight capacity, its length and the number of the masts, if any. The name and birth place of the captain and finally the ship-owners with their shares had to be declared also. Sometimes, the officer could inscribe some trivia like the ship's name. All changes had to be reported to the port. The commission had to issue a new certificate for each change. In that case, the previous certificate had to be brought back to the Imperial Dockyard. If not, there was always a sentence predicating the validity of the new certificate and invalidating the old one. That sentence was a precaution against suing on the old certificate. The new petition had to refer to the information taken from the previous one. If the previous document had some false information or if some of the information was

¹³³ Müller-Weiner, p.91.

¹³⁴ See Çizakça, p.109.

missing, that accurate information would not be inscribed in the new one either, unless the engineer of the Imperial Dockyard said so.¹³⁵ In most case, will be discussed, the information on the numbers of the masts was missing.¹³⁶ Some *şethiye brik*'s mast quantity - having always two of them by definition - was missing. For example, probably the commission in the Kaşot/Kaşyot Island (now Kasos) or the register in the Imperial Dockyard forgot to inscribe the quantity of the masts of a *şethiye brik* (with 4,000 keyl/103 tonnes cargo capacity) in the petition.¹³⁷

During a renewal of the certificate, the officers had to check the authenticity of the papers by the information inscribed in the register book of the port, first. These books were crucial for confirming the authenticity of the certificates. An additional but a frail precaution against forgery was the *divânî*¹³⁸ manuscript requiring expertise. Unlike the other papers, the calligrapher did not use the usual substance enabling the erasure of the mistakes before writing. Hence, the *divânî* calligrapher had to write all in one time without any mistake.

It is taken for granted that the registers seem to verify the authenticity of the each previous application from the register book of the port. This is believed because of the ordering of the applications in the collective petitions. It was observed that the ordering was based on the port at which the ship had been built and the date when the

¹³⁵ There are only a few example of such changes; the type of the ship had registered as *beşçifte başlı martiko* in the A} DVN.85.42 and it transformed to *beşçifte martiko* in the following documents A} DVN.84.77 and A} DVN.85.1.

¹³⁶ Still, there is only two documents (A}DVN.84.96 and A}DVN.88.19) that the length of the ship was forgotten. There is also one booklet (A}DVN.121.76) from Rusçuk that some of the ships was missing.

¹³⁷ The singularity of the mistake points out to a simple forgetting. In the previous *şethiye birk* from Kaşyot the number of masts has been written, for example in the document (A}DVN. 74.37) a big *şethiye* (with 14.000 *keyl* cargo capacity) for the very same island remarked as two. We have to say that there was a little time cap between two petitions. A} DVN.74.52, Other similar examples for *şethiye* are; A} DVN.84.4, A} DVN.84.80, A} DVN.84.78,

¹³⁸ Some kind of pompous manuscript used in the permissions, *fermâns* and other kind of documents issued by the Palace.

previous certificate had been issued. If two previous certificates from the same port were dated the very same day, the register wrote them always in a row.¹³⁹ Hence, that gives the impression that the register checked first the previous application according to its date in the port book and only after that wrote the new one.

Other than control, the petition for a new certificate had to include the reason why the owner(s) applied for the certificate. These reasons were classified as follows; the replacement of the captain, the sale of a share, inherence after a death, distress sell or the death of the captain. The petitions had to include the reasons with the parties of the legal action. However, the register was so fastidious in inscribing all transactions that he inscribed even the intermediary ones that were irrelevant for the ultimate result. For example, one Kavaklı Ali from Karamürsel had him draw up a minute for his unpaid debt of the chief of a small *çekdirme* (galley), Mustafa, son of Belfur from Değirmendere, and eventually the entire share (half of the ship) of the actual chief was put in requisition. It seems that Kavaklı Ali pledged also quarter of the ship to one Osman from Karamürsel, who, in his turn, arrested his debt by a minute.¹⁴⁰ What was at stake was the sale of Kavaklı Ali's share had happened before the new share-holders preferred a petition for a new certificate. So if the register wanted, he could easily ignore these transactions and inscribe only the final result, since they were reported recently. But still, he registered all the transactions

¹³⁹ We had an impression that the registers wrote these certificates not during a year, but only in few mounts.

¹⁴⁰ ‘‘[...]Değirmendereli Belfur oğlu Mustafa nam reisin süvar olduğu 300 keyl hamuleli mutehamil çekdirme tâbir olunur yan yelkenli 11 zirai boylu 1 kıta'a sefinenin 40 pare itibariyle 10 pare hissesi Asitâneli nakkaş Hüseyinin ve 10 pare hissesi merkurum Hüseyinin vâlidesi Azime Hatunun ve 20 pare hissesi dahi reis-i merkurumun malı olarak mukaddem Değirmendere iskelesinde inşa olunmuş ve sefine-i mezkure için 1272 senesi şevvalin 25. günü tarihiyle muverrah bir kıta sened-i bahri verilmişse de reis-i merkurum zikr olunan 20 pare hissesini Karamürsel sakinlerinden Kavaklı Ali reise bâ mazbata furuht etmiş ve merkurum Ali reis dahi sened-i bahri üzerine tahrir edilmeksizin zikr olunan 20 pare hissesinden 10 paresini ikrâz edip Karamürseli Osman reise bâ mazbata furuht etmiş ve süvar-ı merkurum dahi sefineden çıkıp yerine zikr olunan 10 pare hisseye mutassarıf olan merkurum Osman reis olmuş olduğu [...]’’, A} DVN.117.29.

whether they affected the ultimate outcome or not, most probably against a conflict of interest or a trial.

Although, a perfect course of bureaucratic mechanism was described, it must be kept in mind that nothing is perfect in real life. There were some defects, too. For example, one Naili proffered a petition to the Sublime Porte for delayed certificates in 1854.¹⁴¹ As he described, many ship-owners had been unable to get certificates for their newly-built ships even when they had fully paid their fees. Moreover, these ships were sailing without certificates, which caused many legal difficulties for their owners. Some others had applied to renew their certificates, but these ones have been waiting for a such a longtime that many others did not even try for it. Hence, it is understood there could be delays for certificates, but the duration for that is unknown unfortunately. Therefore, there could be other complications that are not visible in the documents.

The Study on the Maritime Certificates

Although the earliest maritime certificates dated just after the Edirne Treaty of 1829, due to the time constraints, only certificates catalogued under ‘*Sadaret Divan Kalemi Evraki*’ were studied for this work. There are two reasons for such choice: first of all, the certification passed under the hands of Sublime Porte in 1850-1851 (the year of 1267 in Islamic calendar). The certificates straggled among many catalogues, like *Cevdet* or *Bahriye Nezareti*, which complicates the pursuit. Besides, observing only the Sublime Porte’s catalogue enabled an easy comparison the documents. Moreover, different clerks in different ministries used different words

¹⁴¹ B.O.A A}DVN. 98.54.

that have the same meaning or worse, they added or took of some information from the documents. For example, in the first petitions written by the clerks in the Imperial Dockyard used always the Turkish word ‘boy’ (بوي) is always used for the length of the ship, while it is always transformed into the Arabic word ‘*tavl*’ (طول) which has the same meaning in all the petitions of Sublime Porte.¹⁴² Although the *divâni* calligraphers copied the words exactly from the petitions, they always transformed the Arabic word ‘*tavl*’ (طول) to the Turkish ‘boy’ (بوي).¹⁴³ Another reason was the period. A limited period was analyzed to have a more comprehensive picture. It was decided to study the latest years consisting of 1267-1276 (1850-1860). There were no more certificates in the archive after 1276. Sublime Porte catalogue contained the last nine years, which made it possible to observe the 1850s as an entire period.

Finally, some difficulties of the *Sadaret* catalogue must be noted. These documents were the some of earliest in the catalogued archive. For that reason, this catalogue contains some minor errors. If there is more than one document in the file under the same call number, unfortunately each of these separate papers has no an additional call number. There, when referring to a file, this file could contain several documents. Moreover, there are six collective petitions¹⁴⁴ including several requests for a maritime certificate sharing the same call number. In addition to this, sometimes the certificate and the petition of the same ship could have been inserted wrongly in different files with different call numbers. For example, when trying to discuss about the transactions of Hacı Haşim Efendizâde Mehmed Emin Efendi (see the next chapter), which happened in the same day, the petitions and the certificates were catalogued under different call numbers. Fortunately, these mistakes did not

¹⁴² The expressions were ‘[...] *tavlinde* [...]’ and ‘[...] *boylu* [...]’

¹⁴³ for example C.İKTS.14.695.

¹⁴⁴ B.O.A A}.DVN.71.58, A}.DVN.103.63, A}.DVN.103.70, A}.DVN.103.78, A}.DVN.105.43, A}.DVN.121.76.

cause a major trouble.

The Physical Features of the Wooden Ships

Wooden Ottoman ships have always been classified under two main categories, *çekdiri*¹⁴⁵ class (oared ships) and *yelkenli* (sailing ships).¹⁴⁶ The preference among these two different classes of ships always rode on many variables for centuries, but the speed, the availability and the cost of the used energy were the most crucial ones. The oared ship is dependent on manpower and employs excessively oarsmen. The energy of the sailing ships energy, however, is free so the cost of navigation for the sailing ships is often cheaper. Moreover, the sailing ship is faster than the oared ships. On the other hand, all sailing ships require the wind to sail, which limits the maneuver. While, transportation by sailing ship has been usually cheaper and faster with the velivolant sails, on windless day, the sailing ship must wait for the wind. Even if the wind blows, it must be of sufficient strength. If a damaging gale started, it could damage or sink a ship. During bad storms, all sailing ships had to be anchored in protected bays or ports until the storm had passed.¹⁴⁷ The main disadvantage of sailing ships is this dependence on the availability on the winds, which was the main factor in the evolution of the wooden ships. In such case, the oared ship would take place of the sailing ship and handle all of the whole shipping traffic.

There are no trade winds on the Black and Aegean Seas like on the Oceans.

¹⁴⁵ Sometimes it's called as *çektirme* or *çekdirir*.

¹⁴⁶ İdris Bostan, *Osmanlılar ve Deniz: deniz organizasyonu, teşkilat, gemiler* (İstanbul: Küre, 2007), p.107.

¹⁴⁷ Hüseyin Çoban, 1998, *Doğadan İnsana Armağan Amasra*, http://www.amasra.net/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=108&Itemid=23 [1998].

The summers in the Mediterranean Sea basin have always been a dead season, when the ships sailed occasionally.¹⁴⁸ For this reason, there are seasons for sailing in the Mediterranean Sea. Predicting the winds and storms has been always vital for sailors. Predicting the weather behind 13 day is almost impossible.¹⁴⁹ The sailors observing the winds and the storms composed a calendar called *Firtına takvimi* (the calendar of the storms), in which the days for useful and damaging storms indicated. This calendar, a product of sailors' experiences for centuries, does not predict the exact days of storms, but most of the time gives a time period in which a storm could happen. Although, this calendar is useful for trade ships and fishermen, it is not suitable for planning military actions. Therefore, oared ships dominated military fleets for centuries until the invention of the new oceanic sailing ships.

The evolution of Mediterranean shipbuilding, thus the Ottoman technology was deeply but rather slowly affected by the evolution of the coeval oceanic shipbuilding technology. The Ottomans have always modified their ships according to the improvements in the most challenging Sea power they faced, - first, the Venetians, then the Spanish and finally the English and Russian fleets - of the era, which made susceptible them to change.¹⁵⁰ In this regard, the advance in technology of the ships involved in the transatlantic commerce, where the trade winds blew ceaseless throughout the year, determined the path of the evolution, which was logically predisposed to better sailing techniques.

İdris Bostan divides the evolution of the Ottoman military vessel into three eras: the age of oared ships, the age of sailing ships and finally the age of steamers. The first era saw the dominance of oared ships, especially the galleys and *Kadırga*,

¹⁴⁸ Bostan, *Osmanlılar ve Deniz: deniz organizasyonu, teşkilat, gemiler*, p.40.

¹⁴⁹ David Ruelle, *Change and Chaos* (Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, c1991), pp.84-85.

¹⁵⁰ Bostan, *Osmanlılar ve Deniz: deniz organizasyonu, teşkilat*, p.39.

(Trirem) starting before fifteenth century and endured up to the seventeenth century. The reason for such dominance relied on the fact that the availability in naval battles was always crucial. Sailing ships are highly dependent on weather conditions, and as much their maneuverability was limited between the fifteenth and sixteenth century centuries. Consequently, the ships powered by oars were the leading sea powers in the Mediterranean Sea. The replacement of the oared ships by big sailing ships started at a slow pace by the end of the fifteenth century, thanks to the improvements regarding ocean going ships. By the sixteenth century, new kinds of smaller sailing ships appeared in the Mediterranean Sea. Still, the ships pulled by oar remained the foremost military power during these centuries.

Sailing ships (*Kalyon* [galleons] *par excellence*) loomed large in the period from seventeenth century to mid- nineteenth century. The main breakthrough for the sailing ships was the military expedition to Crete (1645-1669). During this expedition, the Venetian galleons were so successful against the Ottoman fleet that the Ottoman elites unanimously agreed on building more new galleons (*Kalyon*) for the navy. Some thirty new galleons were completed while the war continued.¹⁵¹

The modernization of the Ottoman fleet to the European standards began with another military catastrophe the complete destruction of the Ottoman fleet by the Russians at Çeşme in 1770.¹⁵² After the defeat, *Kaptan-ı Derya* (the Grand Admiral) Küçük Hüseyin Paşa hired French experts to reform the fleet. According to M.Bonneval's report, the Ottoman shipbuilding techniques were already obsolete *vis à vis* the developments in the Western countries. He remonstrated also on many matters.¹⁵³ The leader of the French engineers contributing to the modernization of

¹⁵¹ Bostan, *Osmanlılar ve Deniz: deniz organizasyonu, teşkilat, gemiler*, pp.41-46

¹⁵² Ibid pp.54-56.

¹⁵³ He pointed out that the upkeep was insufficient which resulted in the fast deformation of ships which went to scrap impetuously, the captains were usually

the fleet was M.Brun, who argued to building nine Galleons with eight *firkateyn* (frigate) and six *korvet* (corvette).¹⁵⁴ The pattern of the wooden merchant ships that will be analyzed came into being after these reforms.

The nineteenth century Ottoman mercantile vessels were in fact the classical Ottoman ships enhanced by western ship-building techniques. The most common class of Ottoman merchant ship was the brig, which was not a genuine Ottoman ship class, but a European square-rigged ship. It was also the most common merchant ship type in the West at the time. The first Ottoman brig class ships may have been built by French engineers working for the Imperial Dockyard after 1770. Accordingly, the Turkish word ‘*brik*’ (بريق) should have been derived from French word *brick* or the English *Brig*.¹⁵⁵ To avoid confusion, the name “brig” was both a specific type of ship and a class of ships with two square masts, and here the discussion is interested only in the latter brig, the brig as a class. Besides, there was almost no simple brig type ship among the Ottoman merchant vessels. On the contrary, many Ottoman merchant ships were brig class ships; namely a mixture of Mediterranean brigs and old Ottoman vessels.

A brig class ship is a big sailing vessel with two-square rigged masts, fore and main. The mainmast carries a small fore-and-aft sail to improve maneuverability. The first square-rigged ships are thought to have appear sometime in the seventeenth century in Europe.¹⁵⁶ The ancestors of the brig type ships were the *sloop* and the *shallop*, most probably evolved from a square-masted ship called the *ketch*. This latter ship may have been the main pattern for the Ottoman merchant ships with one

inexperienced and incompetent, and the sailors were undisciplined and deficient. See Ibid pp.56-57.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid p.57.

¹⁵⁵ Rasim Ünlü ed., *İnce donanma*, (İstanbul : Deniz Basımevi, 2005), p.250.

¹⁵⁶ Robert Gardiner ed., *The line of the battle, the sailing war ship 1650-1840* (London: Conway Maritime Press, 1992), p. 126.

and half mast (*bir buçuk yelken*), since it has only the main mast but not the fore mast. However, the pattern of the nineteenth century's brig type ships was shaped by a Scandinavian ship known as the *snau* (or the *snaw*). This ship was also very common in the British navy by the beginning of the eighteenth century and it was replaced eventually by the brig (the ship), afterwards.¹⁵⁷ The brigs were introduced in 1770 to the British naval service, but it had been already a massive merchant ship even earlier than date.¹⁵⁸ The brig type ship was accepted as the fastest ship before the arrival of steamships.¹⁵⁹ For that reason, it grew obsolete only after the invention of steamers.¹⁶⁰

The arrival of the brigs profoundly shaped the nineteenth century's Ottoman merchant ships, usually half-rigged.¹⁶¹ It has two square masts. The most common type of Ottoman merchant sailing ship, *şethiye* - mentioned always as *şethiye brik* in the documents - was also a half-rigged vessel with two masts. Even a *çekdirme*, (galley) an oared ship *in natura*, could be a mixture of classic *çekdirme* (galley) and a brig carrying two masts. In that case, the register would have inscribed it as a *çekdirme brig* (brig type galley).

To see how the improvement in the western technology influenced the Ottoman ship types, Robert Mantran's short article would be a good resource in order to compare seventeenth century's merchant ships those with the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries' merchant ships. Mantran's list of the types of merchant ships operating in İstanbul in seventeenth century contains many ship already gone obsolete by the beginning of the nineteenth century; *kalyon*, *şayka*, *işkampaviya*, *sünbeki*, *çenber*, *mayistra*, *çekelve*, *zarbene*, *karnıyarık* and different types of

¹⁵⁷ Ibid pp. 128-129.

¹⁵⁸ Ibid p. 196.

¹⁵⁹ Ünlü ed., p.250.

¹⁶⁰ Bostan, *Osmanlılar ve Deniz: deniz organizasyonu, teşkilat, gemiler*, pp.37-39.

¹⁶¹ Ünlü ed., p.250.

kayıks.¹⁶² None of these ships survived into the nineteenth century. The difference in the ship models may have resulted from the transformation in the shipbuilding after the Çeşme defeat. Even so, the names of the sixteenth century merchant ships were similar to the coeval military ships, like it was for nineteenth century's¹⁶³. Hence, it can be argued that the merchant ships' evolution never deviated from those of the military ones. An improvement in one of kinds of ship should have been followed by that of the other. Most probably, the military needs drew the path of the change in the shipping most of the time.

Merchant ships

The accuracy of the data provided by any kind of resource, whether historical or contemporary, is always a major problematic for the researcher. Although, in most cases, the researcher has nothing to do but presuppose the data is more or less accurate, he ought always to question its exactitude. In the case of this study, the actual numbers were used without interfering in them. However, the data provided by the maritime certificates was questioned. The cargo capacity of all merchant ships could actually have been a maximum fifteen or twenty per cent higher than reported, but not so high since the Imperial Dockyard overlooked the ship's cargo capacity. The owners of the ship and the captain had many reasons for inveigling the register for a lower freight capacity. Firstly, the local ports levied the fee for all newly-built ships according to measurements. For example, local authorities collected taxes from

¹⁶² Mantran, "Droits d'entrée sur les navires à İstanbul au milieu du XVIIe siècle (Rüsumat-ı İhtisabiye)," p. 95.

¹⁶³ See ship list in İdris Bostan, *Osmanlı Bahriye Teşkilâtı : XVII. Yüzyılda Tersâne-i Âmire*, (Ankara : Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1992), and İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı, *Osmanlı Devletinin Merkez ve Bahirye teşkilâtı* (Ankara : Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1988).

7.5 kuruş to 300 kuruş¹⁶⁴ according to length of the ship in Alanya (10 April 1860).¹⁶⁵ It is not known whether calculating the tax according to length was the general rule or there as an exception for Alanya (if it was a rule for all shipyards, it would be rational to build the ships larger in width, but shorter in length as possible throughout the Empire).

More importantly, the valuations of the shipped freight's customs and other taxes were calculated according to the cargo capacity of the ships and not according to the actual freight for centuries.¹⁶⁶ It was easier to compute in this way, since the freight capacities were written in the maritime certificates, when the ships were enrolled. Consequently, the cargo capacity was certified as small as could be, the less for the tax burden of the ship owners would be less. In addition to this, if the ship-owner(s) estimated the cargo capacity to be lower than it actually was, the captains would have the opportunity to carry more freight than they had reported to their ship-owner(s). That's how; the captains could make more money. For example, it has been reported that some captains of eighteenth century's *kapan* ships deceived the officials by registering their ship's cargo capacity lower than it was in reality. Hence, they enjoyed higher profits without taxation for the cereals when they were shipped by hiding this from the local authorities.¹⁶⁷ There is no reason to presume the nineteenth century's captains were more candid than their colleagues who lived in the eighteenth century.

Furthermore, the correction of under-measured ships' freight capacity by the Imperial Dockyard engineers seconds that idea. It seems that the Imperial Dockyard

¹⁶⁴ We presume that the levy of 300 kuruş consisted of a ship with 15,000 keyl freight capacity, since it was forbidden to build a bigger ship than that.

¹⁶⁵ A.}MKT.MVL.110.73.

¹⁶⁶ Çizakça, pp.113-114.

¹⁶⁷ Salih Aynural, *İstanbul Değirmenleri ve Fırınları* (İstanbul : Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfi, 2002), p.42.

tightened up such controls after 1854. Among 491 ships, there were 17 newly built ships that the cargo capacities had surveyed in İstanbul before its registration most probably because of a reasonable doubt on the announced cargo capacity.

Unfortunately, no records exist on the cargo capacities reported to the Imperial Dockyard. There were nine more ships, already operating, and the cargo capacity of which was corrected by the officials of the Dockyard. Only one's cargo capacity was lowered, is unknown.

Table 1. The list of the ships that the cargo capacities were corrected by the Imperial Dockyard

No		Type of the ship	the incorrect cargo (a)	the corrected cargo (b)	Difference (b-a)/b	masts	length	Building place
87	71	şethiye brik	10,000	14,000	28.6%	2	25	Sinop
103	51	çekdirme brik	3,500	2,420	-44.6%	-	18	Kilyos
103	63	beşçifte başlı brik	6,000	8,500	29.4%	2	21	Çakırağzı
103	63	şethiye brik	7,000	10,000	30.0%	2	22	Müsteamin
103	70	şethiye brik	7,500	8,750	14.3%	2	22	Çakırağzı
103	70	çekdirme başlı martiko	5,000	8,200	39.0%	2	25	Ünye
103	78	çekdirme brik	5,000	6,400	21.9%	2	21	Bartın
111	7	martiko	6,000	8,500	29.4%	2	23	İnebolu
111	14	martiko	6,000	9,610	37.6%	2	24	İnebolu

Accordingly, the numbers inscribed on the maritime certificates might not represent the exact maximum cargo capacities, as was supposed to be, but they can be until consider realistic approximation of the exact capacities. At any rate it is presumed that the registered cargo capacities could not be so unrealistic numbers than the exact ones, otherwise the Imperial Dockyard officers would have notice such big difference.

Şethiye birk

The most common type of merchant ship was the *şethiye brik* in the nineteenth century. It was a brig type sailing vessel with two masts¹⁶⁸. The origin of the word “*şethiye*” was probably Turkish.¹⁶⁹ It was a mixture of a traditional Ottoman ship, *şethiye*, and Mediterranean brigs. What differentiated of a *şethiye brik* from a simple *şethiye* was probably its square mast, called in Ottoman as *karasorta* (square-mast).¹⁷⁰ As we know, the *şethiye* ships were built for the Ottoman Navy from the early eighteenth century. The Venetian and Russian Navies had very similar ships in their fleet, too.¹⁷¹ The *şethiye* was one of the powerful ships in the Ottoman navy for more than a century. An Ottoman chronicler, Ahmed Vasıf Efendi, reported that a pirate *firkateyn* (frigate) sank a *şethiye* with 275 sailors and 40 cannons. He added that the people of the capital were shocked by this gloomy news, since it has always been accepted that frigate and *şethiye* were alike.¹⁷² An ordinary military *şethiye* was bigger than a mercantile one. The length of a military *şethiye* varies from the 17.5 - 20 meters to 22-28 meters¹⁷³. It has been reported that two *şethiyes* built in 1782 were 27 meters long and each of the ships’ crew were composed of 40 sailors.¹⁷⁴ İnalçık gives us the crew list of a *şethiye*, called as *şethiye-i Mürğ-i Bahri*, with 199 men with a captain.¹⁷⁵

The length of the average mid-nineteenth century merchant *şethiye* was

¹⁶⁸ Bostan, *Osmanlılar ve Deniz: deniz organizasyonu, teşkilat, gemiler*, p. 230.

¹⁶⁹ Apart from *şethiye* or *şethiye brik*, this type of ship sometimes called as *şitye* or *çitiha* in Tunis, see Ünlü ed., p. 230 and Bostan, *Osmanlılar ve Deniz: deniz organizasyonu, teşkilat, gemiler*, s.170.

¹⁷⁰ Uzunçarşılı p.466.

¹⁷¹ Ünlü ed., p. 230.

¹⁷² Ibid p. 230.

¹⁷³ Bostan, *Osmanlılar ve Deniz: deniz organizasyonu, teşkilat, gemiler*, p.170.

¹⁷⁴ Ünlü ed., p.170.

¹⁷⁵ Uzunçarşılı, pp.467-468.

approximately 17 meters (22.34 *zira* '). The mean of the maximum cargo capacities consist of almost 200 tones¹⁷⁶. Among the studied documents, while the biggest *şethiye brik* had been bought from Greece carrying a maximum 18,000 *keyl* (462,240 kg), the smallest was from Wallachia and could bear up to 2,800 *keyl* (71,904 kg).¹⁷⁷ The former ship had an official permit from the Greek authorities, but until it was measured again by the Imperial Dockyard.

Among the documents read, we counted 128 *şethiye brik*s were counted. This number consists of more than a quarter of the entire ship list.¹⁷⁸ However, since “what mattered to ship-owner was weight and volume, not value and what created the demand for shipping was mass, not price,¹⁷⁹” all of the different kind of ships’ weight in the wooden shipping sector using the cargo capacity were recalculated.¹⁸⁰ In other words, to calculate the proportion of the *şethiye brik* in the shipping sector, the sum of the ship’ cargo capacities was divided into the total cargo capacities. When the percentage of *şethiye* in the transportation is recalculated according their cargo capacities, *şethiye*’s weight was slightly more than the half of the entire transportation form. In other words, the *şethiye brik* was the main mercantile ship in the Black Sea.

The brig type ship was also the most common kind of merchant ship in Mediterranean trade in the nineteenth century. Comparing this result with the coeval situation in the Mediterranean Sea, it can be stated that the brig type ships dominated the shipping sector both the Mediterranean and Black Seas in first part of the in the

¹⁷⁶ Exactly 195,592.72 kilogram or 7,616.54 *keyl*.

¹⁷⁷ “[...]bir mucib-i keşf 18,000 *keyl* hamuleli mutehamil *şethiye brik tâbir olunur 2 direkli 27 zirai tavlinde*[...]” and “[...]2,800 *keyl* hamuleli mutehamil *şethiye brik tâbir olunur 2 direkli 16 zirai tavlinde*” see B.O.A A} DVN. 103.78, both ships were written in the same long petition with other ones.

¹⁷⁸ See Fig. 1.

¹⁷⁹ Harlaftis, p.14.

¹⁸⁰ See Fig. 2.

nineteenth century. Moreover, the convergence in the ship types shows that the Black Sea shipbuilders kept a close watch on every technological improvement occurring in the Mediterranean Sea. Consequently, it can be concluded that there was no significant technological gap between European ships and the ships in the Black Sea until the arrival of the steamers. So, the technological factors can not explain why Greek sailors gained the control in the Black Sea especially after the 1850s.

There could be one political and one economic reason why the *şethiye brik* dominated mid-nineteenth century shipping. First of all, the building of *şethiye* was promoted by the State after 1829, probably because of the military potential of this kind of ship. In 1788 and again 1824, while the construction of the *beşçifte*, *çakmak başlı* and the *sopabaşlı* type of ships were forbidden, the State promoted *şethiye* type ships with 2 or even 3 masts.¹⁸¹ The reason for such preference could have been that the Sublime Porte was thinking of the recruitment of merchant *şethiyes* during wartime, which was not new to Ottomans. For instance, in the 1791, there were 9 *şethiyes* in the fleet, two of which had served as merchant ships before the war.¹⁸² However, the economic motives could have been more imperative than the political encouragement for the private sector's preference. For, first of all, the brigs were the fastest and thus economically more rentable ships of the era. For example, a *şethiye* sailed from İstanbul to Crete in nine days, in September 1704.¹⁸³

¹⁸¹ Rasim Ünlü ed., p. 230.

¹⁸² Ibid p. 230.

¹⁸³ Ibid p. 230, Bostan *Osmanlılar ve Deniz: deniz organizasyonu, teşkilat, gemiler*, p.170.

Çekdirme and Çekdirme brik

Çekdirme (galley) is a rowing vessel, usually translated as ‘the Mediterranean galley’ in English. This ship is the one of the most ancient types of ship in human history. Not only did it manage to survive miraculously into nineteenth century, but also they were the second most common type of ships. Regarding sailing ships, the oared ships were commonly thinner in width; that’s why oared ships sometimes were called long ships, while the sailing ships were known as round ships.¹⁸⁴ The *şethiye brik* was a uniform ship. On the other hand, there were various types of Ottoman merchant *çekdirme* (galleys), *çekdirme* (simple galleys), *yan yelkenli çekdirme* (the galleys with lateen sail) and *çekdirme brik* (brig type galleys). Regrettably, the measurements of these ships were also so dissimilar that there was no chance to examine them as whole.

There were huge differences in the sizes of the ships registered simply as galley (from 200 *keyl*/5,131.8 kg to 8,000 *keyl*/205,272 kg). However, if the simple galleys with two masts are placed in the *çekdirme brik* category, only after that does a pattern emerged. The simple galley was a long ship (12.82 zira’/9.71 meters on average) and but a narrow ship, since the load capacity was small (597.46 *keyl*/15,330.22 on average). Thus, the width had to be very thin, as expected. For example, it has been reported that width of a 16-meter *firkate* (frigate) was approximately only 3.5 meters.¹⁸⁵ To get an idea how thin it was we divided the average cargo capacity of the simple galley was divided to the average longitude,

¹⁸⁴ Savt Soucek, ‘‘Certain types of ships in Ottoman-Turkish Terminology,’’ in *Turcica* (1975) no.7, p.234.

¹⁸⁵ To have an idea how many men has been thrashing the oars; we have to compare with a sixteenth century a 25-30 zira’ long type of galley *firkate*, there were 18 or 19 benches (?) with 2 or 3 oarsmen in each oar. See İdris Bostan, *Osmanlılar ve Deniz: deniz organizasyonu, teşkilat, gemiler*), p.128.

rendering a number which is one fourth of *çekdirme brik*, (brig type galley) one-seventh of *şethiye brik*.

As been said before the *şethiye brik* has two masts, a genuine part of the ship. However, the number of masts on a galley was not fixed. Most simple galleys had *yan yelken* (lateen sail).¹⁸⁶ Eight galleys had only one mast and three had one and half mast. In the way, it must be admitted that it proved impossible to find the meaning of the term *bir buçuk yelken* (one and a half masts) anywhere. Nevertheless, it is presumed that this half mast could be the mizzen mast, characteristically shorter than the fore-mast which may have been translated in Ottoman language as *buçuk yelken*. The number of masts for the twelve galleys was absent. Most probably, these ships had no sails at all. There was only one galley (with 16 *zira*' / 12.128 meters longitude and 1,500 *keyl* / 38,488.5 kg cargo capacity) which had both one lateen sail and a mast at the same time.¹⁸⁷ This was the only ship on which a lateen sail and mast were seen together.

The *çekdirme brik* or *çekdirme başlı brik* (brig type galley) was the galley with two masts. The other ships recorded simply as “galley with two masts” are added to this category. It is unknown whether there was a real difference between these ships or they were simply misclassified. Anyways, there was no great difference in sizes. An average brig type galley could carry 5,352.78 *keyl* (4,057.4 kg) at maximum and it stretched to 21.31 *zira*' (16.15 meters) on average. It was naturally thinner than the *şethiye brik*. Although the simple galley had second numerous ships (12%), the brig type galley overtook second place when the weight of the ships was recalculated according to their cargo capacity (more than 9%), but until neither of them could challenge the *şethiye brik*'s place in the shipping.

¹⁸⁶ 35 among 59 ships.

¹⁸⁷ B.O.A A}DVN 74.28.

In conclusion, it can be said that the galley type ships were until important in Ottoman nineteenth century's maritime trade. Most probably, while *şethiye brik* was dealing with long distance trade on the Black Sea, the galleys filled the need for transportation to the capital and its periphery. The galley also must have been more useful when there was no wind for the sailing ships. Accordingly, the galleys could be the occasional vessels plying the seas when the sailing ships not, especially for nondurable goods.

Navi

The *Navi* (brigantine) sometimes called a *Barkobetsiya* or *Barketine*,¹⁸⁸ was the only full-rigged brig type merchant vessel with three masts.¹⁸⁹ The brigantine was also the biggest merchant ship with a 13,256.56 *keyl* (340,150 kg) maximum cargo capacity and 31.89 *zira*' (24.17 meters) length on average. Even though there were few examples (there was only nine) among the documents, thanks to their grandeur, they obtained 15% of the entire shipping traffic, when we weighed it up according to freight capacities. The biggest brigantine, which was also the biggest ship that we saw, has built in the U.S.A.¹⁹⁰ It was 35 *zira*' (26.53 meters) long and can carry 31,150 *keyl* (circa 800 tonnes).¹⁹¹ The smallest one carrying only 8,000 *keyl* (205 tonnes) was built in Bartın.¹⁹²

¹⁸⁸ The origin of the word could be *bergantino* from Spanish which means brigantine.

¹⁸⁹ Ünlü ed., p. 280.

¹⁹⁰ This was also the only American ship.

¹⁹¹ B.O.A. A}DVN 116.50.

¹⁹² The length of *navi* varies between 27 and 36 *zira*'.

Martiko and Beşçifte başlı

As said earlier, the building of *martiko*, *beşçifte başlı* and other similar ships was prohibited at least until the year 1826-1827 (1242 according the Islamic calendar). For example, we have a document for a *sopa başlı martiko* whose request for a maritime certificate was rejected by reason that the building of such kind of ship had been forbidden by law for that year. However, the owners proved by a verdict from the Islamic court that the ships had been built five years before the prohibition.¹⁹³

The aforementioned prohibition must have been relaxed or ignored, since four newly built *martiko* and many other *sopa başlı* ships appear in the registers. Most probably, whenever the goal of the diffusion of innovation in shipbuilding techniques was once achieved, the authorities gave up interfering in the building of these kinds of ships. Still their production seems to have been rare, probably because of the economic efficiency of the *şethiye brik*. However, there were many old ships still operating in the 1850s' Black Sea. For instance, there were only five newly-built simple *martiko* against 12 old one still in use. Moreover, it must be remembered that we can see all the newly-built ships for 1850s are all registered, but the previously registered ones only became visible whenever a change occurred. So, the difference could have been more than is observable.

The *martiko* type ships were classified in three groups: simple *martiko*, *beşçifte martiko* and other *martikos*.¹⁹⁴ While the simple *martiko* was a long ship (19.18 zira' / 14.53 meters in average) carrying relatively modest freight capacity

¹⁹³ ‘‘[...]bu misillü sefainin inşâsı bâferman-ı âli men' olunmazdan beş sene mukaddem inşa olmuş olduğu merbud olan bir kıta' i'lâm-ı şer'iyeden[...]’’

¹⁹⁴ Including 3 *çıtalı kışlı martiko*, 7 *çekdirme başlı martiko*, 2 *lefke martiko* and 11 *sopa başlı martik*.

(3,871.18 *keyl*/ 100 tonnes on average). However, the size and the number of the mast varied greatly. Whereas, one built in Çeşme could carry only 900 *keyl*/23,093.1 kg (12 *zira* '9 meters without mast), another from İnebolu could handle 9.610 *keyl*/ 246,583 kg (24 *zira* '18 meters with 2 masts).¹⁹⁵

This variability seems to have been a feature of *martiko* type ships, since the sizes of *beşçifte başlı martiko* ships were also different from each other. The cargo capacity of the smallest one built in Ereğli was only 1.000 *keyl*/2566 kg. It was 15 *zira* '11.37 meters long. On the other hand, the biggest one from Ayandon measured 20 *zira* '15 meters with 9.000 *keyl*/ 6,822 kg capacity and it had two masts¹⁹⁶. The first ship's size was similar to a galley and the former was closer to a brig. The average freight capacity of the *beşçifte* was 3,426 *keyl*/88,013.94 kg and the length was 19.18 *zira* '14.5 meters.

The *beşçifte* was another thin ship with its cargo capacity of 3,376.11 *keyl*/86,627.6 kg. It has 19.33 *zira* '14.6 meters in length. Like the *martiko*, the sizes of the ships were so different that it is impossible to ascertain the measures of a typical *beşçifte* was. The smallest *beşçifte* carrying 500 *keyl*/12,830 kg was a 17 *zira* '12.9 meters long ship from Gideros.¹⁹⁷ The biggest one was 18 *zira* '13.6 kg in length with a 850 *keyl*/21,810.15 kg load capacity. This latter one had also two masts, thus it was the smallest ship with two masts.¹⁹⁸

However, the sizes of brig type of *beşçifte* ships were more similar, this similarity enables speculation about the ships. An ordinary brig type *beşçifte* had approximately 5,000 *keyl*/128,300 kg cargo capacity and its length was 19 *zira* '14.5.

¹⁹⁵ B.O.A A}DVN. 70.73 and A}DVN. 111.14 respectively.

¹⁹⁶ B.O.A A}DVN. 74.3 and A}DVN. 74.30 respectively.

¹⁹⁷ B.O.A A}DVN. 103.78.

¹⁹⁸ B.O.A A}DVN. 83.57.

As always, the mixture in design with brig brought larger width.¹⁹⁹ What is more, Ayandon was a building site that specialized in *beşçifte* since half of the ships built in Ayandon were some kind of *beşçifte*. Moreover, four of the nine *beşçifte briks* were from there.

Çıtalı Kıçlı

It is assumed that *çıtalı*²⁰⁰ *kıçlı gemiler* (slatted ships) were the ships what İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı called ‘*At kayığı*’²⁰¹, because in this kind of vessel a ‘*çita*’ slat was placed usually in the poop deck in order to tie cattle or horses like at an ‘*At kayığı*’. These ships usually carried the cows to the capital to meet the need for meat consumption. As observed from the documents a slatted ship was not a different kind of ship, - *martiko, çekdirme, sopa başlı*- but a merchant ship of any kind with a slat in the poop deck. That is why it is not classified them as a separate kind of ship.

Mavna

The *mavna* type ship was in use in the Ottoman navy from the fifteenth to eighteenth centuries.²⁰² Unlike the freight ships, called *mavna*, barging the haul from the port to the ships, or vice versa, the military *mavna* was a 49 meters-long ship.²⁰³ The merchant *mavna* were smaller, like the ones ferrying loads from the ships to the

¹⁹⁹ B.O.A A}DVN. 86.80. that ship had one mast only, the other ships had 2 masts.

²⁰⁰ The word *çıtalı* was read wrongly by the catalogue of B.O.A as *çatalı* or *çatlı*, but we have to admit that the word was written in such confusing way that it took a lot of time to figure out the true spelling of the word for us.

²⁰¹ Uzunçarşılı, pp.460-463. According to a 16th century’s document enlisting the fees of transport, it has been noted that the transportation of horses from Azapkapı to Unkapamı had been 1 akçe for each and from now on it would be 2 akçe except the season of *pastırma*, see Mehmet Mazak, *Eski İstanbulda Ulaşım* (İstanbul : İDO, 2008), p.122.

²⁰² Bostan, *Osmanlılar ve Deniz: deniz organizasyonu, teşkilat, gemiler*, pp.124-125

²⁰³ Ibid pp.124-125.

ports or vice versa. The biggest *mavna* with 15 zira'/11.37 meters length and was built in Abana, carrying 1,000 keyl/25,660 kg.²⁰⁴ The capacities of other three vary between 500-600 *keyl*/12,830 kg-15,395 kg. Only one had one mast for sure.²⁰⁵

Kırlaç

While searching thoroughly, a booklet was found in which 50 ships around of Rusçuk (now Ruse in Bulgaria) were registered. Although this does not cover the Danube River, this booklet is analyzed separately. The most apparent difference between this and the other petitions is the type of the ships mentioned in the booklet. The word *kırlaç* was seen only and only in that collective petition from Rusçuk.²⁰⁶ Indeed, that was the only kind of ship mentioned in this booklet, but until there were a few ships of that kind not registered. It is presumed that undefined ships could be *kırlaç*, for two reasons: first, there was no other kind of ship inscribed in that booklet. Second, these undefined ships resemble in many ways the *kırlaç*. For example, one Hamza Ağa from Tutrakan (Rusçuk) acquired two ships with very same features, but only one of them enrolled as *kırlaç*, and the other one's kind was absent. It is assumed that these two ships were the same.

No matter what the kind of the non-registered ships, many things can be said about the *kırlaç*. The *kırlaç* seems to have been a river boat on the Danube River. It was been reported that; *kırlaç* or *gırlaç* was also a common type of freight ship plying between Basra, Tiger and India. Unlike a brig, its mast was not square but

²⁰⁴ B.O.A A}DVN. 74.39.

²⁰⁵ B.O.A A}DVN. 122.92, A}DVN. 88.28, A}DVN. 88.22, A}DVN. 75.46, this last one had the only mast.

²⁰⁶ It was in the form of a booklet A}DVN.121.76.

triangle.²⁰⁷ Before finishing the section about the ships from Rusçuk, another aspect must be presented about the booklet. The date of the petitions coincided with the Paris Treaty of 1856, the date when Walachia and Moldavia gained more autonomy. That causes one to think that these 50 ships may have been built with governmental support against Walachian shipping. In addition to this, İstanbul may have thought to replace Walachia and Moldavia's trade links with the northern Tuna Province trade in the long term, as it was trying to weaken the Greek shipping in the Black Sea.

The General Overview on the Ship Types

As pointed out earlier the *şethiye brik* (128) was the most frequent type of ship in number, followed by the simple galleys (68). There were 106 galleys in sum, if we other types of galleys are added; brig type galley (36) and the *çekdirme başlı martiko* (28). The crude statistic of the Fig. 1 composed by counting the ships might give the reader a false impression that the galleys hauled as much freight as the *şethiye brik* did. Obviously, it would be a huge mistake to suppose a small and a big ship as equal units. As a matter of fact, what is really significant in shipping is how much cargo they carried in a year. The total cargo by a ship is evidently the product of the multiplication of how many trips they made and the average cargo they carried in a year. Unfortunately, no information is available about the trips or the actual freight of the ships, but it is possible to estimate the weight in the shipping sector of each type of ship by assuming the maximum cargo capacities represented the weight

²⁰⁷ Ünlü ed., p.208.

caeteris paribus.²⁰⁸ The results are represented in the Fig. 2. The results were recalculated by excluding the data from Rusçuk, a separate case from the Black Sea shipping, which gives us Fig. 3. It provides a more accurate picture for the Black Sea maritime trade.

In that case as seen in Fig. 3, while the proportion of *şethiye brik* was more than 50%, the share of the galleys was less than 2%. There was no ship challenging the *şethiye brik*'s magnitude in the Black Sea maritime transportation indeed. Therefore, Fig. 3 can be summarized as the *şethiye brik* was the dominant kind among the wooden ships for mid-nineteenth century Ottoman maritime commerce in the Black Sea. It can be concluded also that there was no significant gap between Ottoman Muslim merchant ship-building and the European one before the invention of the steam ships. On the contrary, the Ottoman ships were similar in technology.

However, the main difference between the Ottoman ships operating in the Black Sea and the foreign ships in the Mediterranean Sea was the size. The Ottoman wooden ships were smaller than the coeval ships dealing with international trade. This observation is not new at all. Murat Çizakça and many other writers have asserted that small ships dominated Ottoman shipping for centuries. He made a simple survey on the census of 1823 on ships.²⁰⁹ This survey led him to the conclusion that the Ottoman merchant ships were small in general. According to his calculations, an ordinary Ottoman merchant ship was approximately 20 *zira* ' long (15 meters²¹⁰). This estimation, 18.98 *zira* ' (14.31 meters), was still higher than the calculation made for this study. The mean cargo capacity for the ships in this study was 4,315.76 *keyl* (110,828.7 kg). The Greek-made ships (6,028.42 *keyl* on average)

²⁰⁸ In other words, we accepted that the occupancy rate and the amount of the expedition would be the same for all kind of ships.

²⁰⁹ Çizakça, pp.108-109.

²¹⁰ Çizakça denoted that *zira* ' was between 68 and 75 cm for different parts of the Empire, but we accepted *zira* ' of the İstanbul (0,758 meters). See Ibid.

were nearly 50% bigger than those on the list. No matter what the exact average of the length or the cargo capacity was, it is clear that the Ottoman ships were small.

Before presenting explanations as to why the Black Sea wooden ships were smaller, the question of whether a fiscal policy could have had an impact on this outcome will be explained. Robert Mantran's article was mentioned above. He also argued that the bigger ships in the seventeenth century could have suffered the heaviest tax burden.²¹¹ Mantran presents a report on the ships operating in the capital's internal custom, most probably filed after Köprülü Mehmed Pasha started work. The document provides information about seventeenth century's ship types, their length and the cargo they were hauling, but not the cargo capacities. Unlike the nineteenth century, the internal custom duty was been calculated according to length of the ship and apparently not according to a function of the cargo capacities.²¹² To fix the duties, the custom officer classified the ships according to their length under of three categories: biggest for 18 to 30 *zira'* (12.6 meters – 21 meters), the medium from 12 to 23 *zira'* (8.4 meters – 16.1 meters) and the little ones from 8 to 17 *zira'* (5.6 meters – 11.9 meters).

When the hypothesis of whether the fiscal policy had an impact on the smallness of the ships with the numeric data is tested, this hypothesis is definitely refuted.²¹³ Contrary to what he says, the test demonstrates that the bigger ships benefited from this kind of taxation and the smaller were losers at least for the mid-nineteenth century.²¹⁴ Still, the difference was so oblivious that his hypothesis could

²¹¹ Mantran, "Droits d'entrée sur les navires à İstanbul au milieu du XVIIe siècle (Rüsumat-ı İhtisabiye)," p.97.

²¹² Ibid pp.94-95.

²¹³ Ibid pp.96-97.

²¹⁴ To test the hypothesis, we classified our ships according to the seventeenth century's criteria under 3 categories; the small ships were ranging from 0 to 12 *zira'*, the medium ones from 13 *zira'* to 17 *zira'* and the biggest were all the ships bigger than 17 *zira'*. We accepted that the tax burden should have been more when the cargo capacity (economic

be wrong even for the seventeenth century. For that reason, taxation would not be a good explanation for the smallness of the Ottoman merchant ships.

Contrary to Mantran, this explanation is based on the difference of the demand in the two markets. First of all, the ships should have filled their cargo as much as they could. If a considerable proportion of the cargo space was left in every trip, the ship would suffer losses. Suppose two ships had 150 tons and 100 tons cargo capacities. If these two ships both transported 100 tons every time, the smaller ship's owner would make more money, since the maintenance, the crew and the amortization costs would be less. Put simply, every meter of unfilled cargo space meant economic loss. Second, the ships in the Mediterranean Sea were engaged international trade and thus were navigating the commodities to more distant ports. Since the international trade was lively in the Mediterranean Sea during every single trip they had to carry heavy cargoes to the farther ports. On the other hand, for the ships in the Mediterranean Sea, the most recurrent destination was İstanbul, which was shorter. Moreover, the total gross national product and the volume of the trade in the Black Sea should have been smaller than that of the Mediterranean Sea. Consequently, the cargo that a ship had to haul must have been slighter. When what is postulated about the cargo space and the demand, it can be stated that the ships in the Black Sea were smaller because they were shipping smaller bulks to closer ports.

In conclusion, the *şethiye brik* was both the most common type of merchant ship and the most important ship in the shipping sector in the Ottoman Black Sea.

The *şethiye brik* was a genuine Ottoman ship enhanced by western shipbuilding techniques, such as two square masts, probably introduced originally by the French

yield) was small and the length was relatively long (tax). Hence, we divided the cargo capacity with the imaginary tax coefficient according to these categories. The result was the bigger ships were the beneficiary and the smaller ships were the losers. Even the custom fixed the custom duties for bigger ships to a high level as sevenfold higher than the smaller ones, the bigger ones was until gaining from this kind of taxation.

engineers who reformed the Imperial Navy after the Çeşme defeat (1774). The Sublime Porte supported the spread of brig type ships in the Black Sea in the first part of the nineteenth century. However, the main reason why brig type ships overthrew the old-fashioned ships, like *beşçifte*, *martiko* or Mediterranean galleys, was economic. Because of its speed, just like the brig-type ships in the Mediterranean Sea with the enhancement of the international trade, the *şethiye brik* became the dominant kind of ship in the Black Sea. Hence it can be stated that there was no significant apparent gap in the shipping building between two seas.

Despite the invasion of the brigs, some old-fashioned Ottoman ships managed to survive into the mid-nineteenth century. After the arrival of the steamships, the evolution of the sailing ships in the Empire followed a similar pattern. The number of the sailing ship had been increasing for four decades. It is presumed that there was a maximum 10,000 merchant vessels shipping in İstanbul in the mid- nineteenth century.²¹⁵ The number of ships operating in İstanbul during 1897-1898 (1313 according to Muslim calendar) reached 121,424 wooden ships carrying 1,684,143²¹⁶ tons.²¹⁷ On the other hand, the cargo capacities diminished. Exact statistics are not available for the mid- nineteenth century. Assuming there were 10,000 merchant ships operating in İstanbul, it can be stated that while the total cargo carried by the wooden ships could have remained unchanged, the size of the ships built every year got smaller. Most probably, the steamers replaced the big sailing ships, like the *şethiye brik* totally. However, the steamships could only operate on regular lines. Also, if a steamship could not fill its freight, its owners

²¹⁵ See Şennur Şenel “Osmanlılarda Ticaret Anlayışı ve Ticaret Teşkilatında Yeni Bir Yapılanma: Hayriye Tüccarı” in *Türkler*, ed. Hasan Celal Güzel, Kemal Çiçek and Salim Koca (İstanbul : Yeni Türkiye 2009), Vol.11.

²¹⁶ 13.87 tonnes per ship.

²¹⁷ *Revue commerciale du Levant: Bulletin Mensuel de la Chambre de Commerce Française de Constantinople* : 1899, vol.13, no.149, 31 août 1896 pp.127-128.

would lose money. Therefore, the small wooden ships might have been carried on the shipping of the ports at which demand was irregular, like in Larnaca²¹⁸ or Samsun²¹⁹

²¹⁸ “[...] Notre rade est pleine de voiliers purgeant leur quarantaine. Nous avons eu 5 à 6 gros voiliers, les uns affrètes d’avance et d’autre nolises ici pour aller charger dans le nord de l’île des caroubes pour la Méditerranée. On m’assure qu’en ce moment 6 à 8 voiliers chargeant des caroubes tout autour de l’île; le Tudor Prince chargeant à Limassol se relèvera pour Pissouri ou Paphos.

Trois voiliers Italiens, de 180 à 250 tonneaux, sont attendus pour charger au cap Caroubier pour le compte de maison de Venise qui les revendent aux villageois Vénitiens qui en font leur nourriture [...]. *Revue commerciale du Levant: Bulletin Mensuel de la Chambre de Commerce Française de Constantinople*: 1899, vol.13, s.151, 31 octobre 1896 p.730.

²¹⁹ “[...]La navigation à voile accuse un mouvement de 827 navires jaugeant ensemble 22.390 tonneaux; sauf 27 navires, tous les autres sont de petits caboteurs ottomans d’une capacité moyenne de 10-11 tonnes [...] Ibid., p.63.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE SHIPPING MARKET BETWEEN 1830 AND 1861

It is written that one day, a woman came to the founder of the Sunni hanafi school of *fiqh* (Islamic law) and a rich silk trader, Numan ibn Thabit ibn Zuta ibn Marzuban, known simply as Abu Hanifa, to sell a silk garment. Abu Hanifa asked the price of the silk and the woman replied 100 dinar. After examining the garment, he asked the woman to quote a higher price. Surprised by this act, the woman doubled the price, but again Abu Hanifa opposed. Woman got finally mad and yelled him; “are you joking with me”. Abu Hanifa kept his calm and replied “If you do not believe me, bring a man you know to value it.” She brought another silk trader, but this time the whole bazaar of Kufa also came to watch the scene. The new silk trader estimated that the garment should be worth more than 400 dinar and Abu Hanifa paid 500 for it.

This story and so many others have been told by the hanafis in praise of their imam for his candor in business life. A neo-classical economist could interpret the same story as Abu Hanifa acting according to his beliefs, in an economically irrational matter. Surprisingly, spending most of his lifetime with Islamic teaching and charities Abu Hanifa was far richer than his father and his grand-father who had been wealthy silk merchants, too. In fact, by buying a simple silk garment fivefold higher, he demonstrated ostentatiously to the bazaar that he was an honest merchant. By spending an additional 400 dinars, he bought the trust of the bazaar, which was a

key element in a traditional market. In other words, he acted in rational manner for his era, which contradicts the fact of the contemporary world. For that reason, although, the economic reasoning of the present era will be applied in this chapter, to have an idea about the structure partnerships of the time, the discussion will be stated by making five observations. All of these observations were related to the nature of the predilections of the ship-owners and the relationship with their captains. After getting an idea about the nature of the partnerships, we are going to discuss whether there was a tendency towards sole proprietorship or partnership with more shareholders in the shipping market will be discussed.

In the second part of this chapter, the main shipbuilding sites will be located and the location of the captains' in the nineteenth century Anatolian Black Sea. By using that information, first the economic situation of the captains from each town in the middle of the century will be examined. Then, that there was relation between the captaincy and the building sites will be demonstrated. As will be seen in some cases, the ship-owners, the ships and the captains were from the same town. That fact will indicate the locality in the shipping business. Accordingly, it will be suggested that these ships were carrying the commodities of a specific town in a shorter range. On the other hand, some ships, especially those owned by the privileged merchants, were navigating across the Black Sea and touching different ports. These ships hauled especially the commodities of their masters through a trade web including different ports. Finally, different strategies of the Ottoman privileged merchants and the Greek ship-owners will be discussed. While the Greek and the simple merchants hired their fellow townsmen as captains, the privileged merchant were indifferent to the place of origin place of theirs. The reasons of this preference in detail will be discussed.

Finally, the general behaviors of each profession in the shipping world will be presented. While the privileged merchant possessed large fleets of big and modern wooden ships, the simple merchants and the shopkeepers were shareholders of the small old-fashioned ships. That the captains were the weaker investors of the shipping sector, selling their shares after every economic trouble, especially due the unpaid debts will be demonstrated.

Market Structures; Employer/Employee relationship; the statue of the captains

To understand the structure of the market, observations will be presented one by one for practical reasons. It would be much more complicated to demonstrate the validity of these observations as a single unity. Actually, since all of these observations are on the relation of the employer and the employee and the nature of the partnership, they complete each other and form a uniform structure in the end. For that reason, while examining one statement, the reader should keep in mind the previous statements and consider the new one to be a different aspect of the same structure.

There were two major factors in the relationship between the ship-owner(s) and the captains, the thrust issue and the number of the shareholders. First of all, the trust issue determined the choice of the shareholders while hiring. New partners always tried to convince the others to employ a captain in much they had confidence. Second, in the case when there was a single shareholder, the captain would be simply an employee, but as the number of the shareholders increased, the captain gained power over the ship and the partners.

Considering, it can be postulated that if there was one owner or even a

powerful share-holder acquiring significantly big enough part of the ship enabling him to control the ship, in this case the captain seems to have been a simple employee. To substantiate this hypothesis, can be cited the documents issued because of only the replacement of the captain. In the all of these cases with one exception, a powerful owner had fired his employee; the captain. Single ownership consisted of 84% of these documents (29 of the 34 documents). There were multiple share-holders only in the five cases. Still, among these five documents four of the cases with multiple share-holders do not refute this hypothesis at all.

Among these four, there was a powerful merchant holding the biggest part of the ship in two of the cases: One was Hacı Haşim Efendizâde Mehmed Emin Efendi and other one was *keresteci* (timber merchant) Kara Agop.²²⁰ As will be seen in the following pages, these two men were not simple shareholders. In two others, some share-holders all from Akçaşehir replaced their captain from Akçaşehir by another resident of this town. These two formal requests were registered in a same long petition, respectively. Moreover, the name of the shareholders and the expressions signal that the shareholders were very likely relatives. If it was the case, they should be accepted as a single unit, a household.²²¹ A household would cut favor of the hypothesis that one powerful owner fired his employee. However, there was only one separate example that did not fit this hypothesis. A captain quitted the job from a big *navi* (brigantine) owned by several share-holders.²²² It is presumed that this was the

²²⁰ B.O.A A}DVN.85.99 and A}DVN.87.85 respectively.

²²¹ The names were alike see: “ [...]1 kıta’a sefinenin 40 pare itibariyle 20 pare hissesi Akçaşehirde sakin Hacı Sala oğlu Mehmedin ve 20 pare hissesi dahi biraderi Osmanın malı olarak[...]” and “ [...]1 kıta’a sefinenin 40 pare itibariyle 17,5 pare hissesi Akçaşehirli uzman Ahmed oğlu Mehmedin ve 17,5 pare hissesi merkumun kardeşi Sala Mustafa Beyin ve 5 pare hissesi dahi oğlu Mehmed Ağanın malı olarak[...]”. In A}DVN 103.78.

²²² “ [...]Giresunlu Yordam oğlu Yanni nam kaptanın süvar olduğu 14.000 keyl hamuleli mutehamil navi tâbir olunur 3 direkli 27 zirai tavlinde mana morkis nam 1 kıta’a sefinenin 40 pare itibariyle 15 pare hissesi Trabzonlu Kuş oğlu Alyanın ve 5 pare hissesi

only case where a captain quit his job willingly.

As an example of firing captains, the case of Hacı Haşim Efendizâde Mehmed Emin Efendi, whose case will be presented in the discussion on professions, fits best the situation. He was a big merchant shipping goods from Trabzon province. For that reason, a smaller merchant operating in a short range was chosen; Kandıralı Hacı Süleyman Ağa from İstanbul. He petitioned the Imperial Dockyard to replace three captains of his ships, all from Agva.²²³ Like many of the others, he had full possession of the three ships, but this time the ships were smaller than those of Mehmed Emin Efendi (between 4.500 keyl and 6.000 keyl). It is believed that he was doing business between Agva-Şile-Kandıra²²⁴ and İstanbul, because all hometowns of the captains and the shipyard of the ships were from the vicinity of Şile.²²⁵ Moreover, his ships were all oared-ships, which have a shorter range than the sailing ships.²²⁶ These three captains quit their ship in the same day, which could not be a coincidence like in the Mehmed Efendi case. In conclusion, it can be stated that the captains were simple employee when there was only one ship-owner. This hypothesis also means that in the partnerships with more shareholders, the captain became a part of the tacit agreement between the shareholders, even he had no share. Now, the second part of the first hypothesis will be developed.

Giresunlu Kuş oğlu Panyodun ve 5 pare hissesi Giresunlu Armaz oğlu Pandelinin ve 2,5 pare hissesi Giresunlu Mekuş oğlu Panyodun ve 2,5 pare hissesi Giresunlu Arslan oğlu Heci Alyanın ve 2,5 pare hissesi Giresunlu Tehod oğlu Heci Dimitrinin ve 2,5 pare hissesi Trabzonlu Karavan oğlu Heci Yorgın ve 3,5 pare hissesi Giresunlu Kuş oğlu Heci Yorginin ve 4 pare hissesi dahi Bolanhaneli Kiryan oğlu Yorginin malı olarak mukaddem Sinop iskelesinde inşa olunmuş ve sefine-i mezkure için 267 senesi muharrem el-haramın guresi günü tarihiyle muverrah bir kıta sened-i bahri verilmişse de süvar-ı merkum sefinden çıkıp yerine Giresunlu İstavri oğlu Lefter kaptan olmuş olduğu [...]' in B.O.A A}DVN.72.4

²²³ B.O.A A}DVN.103.70

²²⁴ These towns were located close to each other in the Black Sea coast of Dersaadet Emaneti, the municipality of the Capital.

²²⁵ He also replaced the captains by two residents of Agva and one from Şile.

²²⁶ We have to remember that the oared-ships have been plying in the smaller ranges than the sailing ships.

If the captain had no share after the sale and if at least half of the ship passed into the hands of different shareholders, the captain was usually replaced by another. In other words, if the partnership changed dramatically and the captain had no right in the decision whether the consensus was among the partnership was paramount. In this case, the captain was replaced by another. To avoid misunderstandings, it must be asserted that unlike the preceding observation, it included partnerships and the captain had no share after the sale. If the captain had a share and sold it with the other partners, still the hypothesis is admissible. When, the documents issued for the sale of the share and the replacement of the captain are examined, in 3.22% of these documents, the captain was replaced with another but at least half of the share was not sold.²²⁷ In only four cases among 202 cases that although there was no big change in the nature of the partnerships, the captain was replaced for some reason.

Before explain the possible reason for the second observation, an example may clarify the situation. Two partner from Trabzon, one Hatibzâde Ahmed the merchant (possessing 2/3 of the ship) and the other Salih, son of Kandil (possessing 1/3 of the ship), decided to end their partnership for some reason. Salih sold his entire share to one Hüseyin Efendi, a tabbacco merchant also from Trabzon. Then partner bought also 1/6 of the ship from Hatibzâde Ahmed the merchant and finally acquired half of that ship. As a result of that operation, the partners of the ship decided to change Ali the captain, son of Dile from Trabzon, for another captain from Trabzon, Ahmed, son of Tatar.²²⁸

This example was chosen for a purpose. Before the sale, not many thing had changed. The controlling shareholder did not lose his control fully and the captain

²²⁷ Only in the 4 documents; B.O.A A}DVN.108.44, A}DVN.88.19, B.O.A. 74.38, A}DVN.103.63 (this latter is collective petition, only one of the request).

²²⁸ B.O.A A}DVN.103.78.

did not sell any share. Therefore, there could be only one reason for the replacement of the captain, which was the new shareholder, who held a significant sum of the share did not approve of the previous captain's record. The situation can be generalized as follows: the new shareholders requested almost always to replace the captain no matter what the captain's performance had been. Why would a new partner holding a remarkable share decide almost always not to go on with the existing captain.

The answer seems to be that a new captain seems to have been relied on as a trust issue. As pointed out earlier, the trust issue was one of the most critical problems of the partnerships during the nineteenth century. The captains could cheat the owners of the ships in many ways. The possibility of a captain already having a closer relationship with the other shareholders could easily have jockeyed the new shareholder of his benefit, should have frightened the new share-holders. Consequently, a new share-holder acquiring a significant amount of shares should have insisted on a new captain whom he could trust. Hence, every new partnership meant not only a consensus on how to do business, such as how to split the profits, how much money would be reserved for unforeseen contingencies, how much money would be earmarked for investment and so on, but also broach the question that who was going to navigate the ship and manage the crew during the trips.

Even when the captains had no share at all still they were an important part of the deal among the partners. In other words, unlike in ships with a sole proprietor, the captains of the ships owned by many shareholders were not a simple employee, but a part of the deal. Remember that in the previous observation, it was said that there were only very a few example of documents issued just because of the captain's replacement by another for the partnerships. It also was proved that the

only and only one of them represented a partnership. Therefore, it can be interpreted that it was almost impossible to fire a captain of any partnership, even if he was an employee without a share, since the captains of a partnership were a more than simple employees.

Thirdly, after a sell which affected at least 50% of the partnership which did not result in single ownership and if a new partner(s) holding a significant amount of share joined the partnership, the captain who had no share usually was replaced by another. That statement contains implicitly another: although the captain had no share and the ship was sold entirely to a new owner, this time, the captain could stay in some cases.²²⁹ The first part of the statement should be considered and what was said should be simplified. First of all, the captain should have no share at all. Secondly, the possession of half of the ship should have been transferred to another person. Finally, there should have been a new partner or new partners. That observation is quite similar to the previous hypothesis. The new observation completes the previous and it is more likely a result of the second observation. There are only three examples which contradict this finding. Nonetheless, in none of these documents did a new controlling partner emerge.²³⁰ There is no need to explain the first part of this observation, since it is same with the second observation. However, it should be asked why while a new partner sought to dismiss the captain, the new owner of the ship preferred to keep the captain in some case, when he owned the entire ship by himself. Most probably the reason for such a tendency was that the sole owner would have gained full authority over the captain as a simple employee²³¹. Whenever the new owner had no proper candidate for the captaincy, he

²²⁹ B.O.A A}DVN. 126.4, A}DVN. 109.13, A}DVN. 93.30, A}DVN. 91.5, A}DVN. 87.42, A}DVN.73.40, A}DVN.73.42, A}DVN.74.21.

²³⁰ BOA A}DVN.88.14, A}DVN.86.81 and A}DVN.86.80.

²³¹ Another common feature of these documents was that the ship was possessed by a

would have kept the extant captain, who was familiar with the ship's crew. On the other hand, as pointed out earlier, when a new shareholder did not buy the entire ship, this time he wanted to appoint a new captain. For the captain and the other shareholders could together cheat the new shareholder.

Fourth, if the captain had some share from the beginning and if he sold his entire share to another captain, in this case, the captain quit the ship and a new shareholder replaced him. In other words, the new captain bought not only the shares of the previous captain, but also his job. There is only one case really contrary to this statement. In the document catalogued as A}DVN.67.74, a captain possessing the entire ship sold it to six people, in which one of them was a captain.²³² On the other hand, there are 33 cases where the captain was replaced by the new-shareholder. In some cases, the captain borrowed from another captain and when he could not pay this debt, the creditor captain made the local authorities levy an attachment. In one example, Abdullah, son of Değirmenci from Alaplılı, borrowed some money from Vasil, son of Yakup from Korşoto,. However, the actual captain could not pay his debt and the creditor Vasil referred to the local juridical institution with the bill. As the result of this operation the three-fourth of the ship passed into the hands of the creditor, who decided to be the captain of the ship.²³³ The transferred shares of the captains were not so many as in the example, still it gives the impression that there was a high demand for the captain's share in the market.

In some cases, the controlling shareholder sold small amount of shares (12.5% –25%) of his ship to the captain, most probably to motivate him. In such cases, if the captain was fired, he transferred his shares to new captain. Here we have

single owner before the sale, but one case. Most probably the captains have been always a simple employee from the beginning.

²³² There was another case, but since in this case the buyer of the share was the brother of the captain, we accepted as an exception.

²³³ A.DVN}85.36.

to confess that although the observation is real, the statement is weak. This latter comment should be accepted as a possibility, not a proven fact like the previous observations. For example, in 1869 some Mefail, a non-Muslim coal trader in Tophane, bought his captain's entire share (25%) and he hired another one, Toni son of Aci Mansur from the island Lemnos (Limni). It is not clear whether the captain decided to quit or Mefail fired him, still it can be presumed that Mefail should have been content to have a minor associate, since he had sold 12.5% (5 share from 40) of the ship before he declared the replacement of the captain to the Imperial Dockyard.²³⁴

In another example, in 1854-1855, *Bezci* (tissue-seller) Mehmed Ali Ağa bought his minor associate's entire share (a quarter of the ship) and sold it with fewer shares (12.5%) to a captain, Andon from Arnavutköy, who had replaced the old one, Koca Hüseyin, son of Hüseyin from Agva. But this time it was registered that the majority shareholder with a 75% share before the registration had already borrowed from the new captain an amount of money consisting of the new captain's share. Most probably the majority shareholder should have sold the share (12.5%) with the captaincy.²³⁵ Although it is known for sure whether he sold this share because he wanted to secure captain's diligence with a share or he had no enough money to buy out his previous associate, there must have been a demand for the captaincy of certified ships.

Fifth, the succession of the ship to heir(s) usually did not affect the position of the captain or the other share-holders. It was no effect in the short term because of bureaucratic reasons rather than the economic. For, after the funeral, the heirs had to

²³⁴ A.DVN} 84.4, for other examples; A.DVN} 132.95, A.DVN} 68.71, A.DVN} 70.74, A.DVN} 103.78.

²³⁵ A.DVN 103.70.

issue a new certificate with their names before to decide whether they would keep their share or sell to another. Assume that they settled on selling their shares. Even for selling their share, they had to apply for a new certificate and register their names first. Thus, the captain remained the same at least to the day that the heirs sold their share. On the other hand, if they preserved their share, in this case, since the deceased was a husband or a father, usually the family members maintained the captain and the partnership as it had been before. However, if the ship's ownership was transferred to a creditor of the deceased, in this case observation six was no more admissible.

On 22 May of 1855, *Esbak Belgrad Muhafızı*²³⁶ (Former Guardian of Belgrade) Hafız Ahmed Pasha was appointed to Cyprus Island as *muhassıl* (collector of taxes), but he passed away later in the same year.²³⁷ In his estate, he owned possession of half of a certified *şethiye brik* built in Rhodes. These shares passed into the hands of his two sons, İbrahim Bey and Mustafa Bey. Nothing changed after the death of the Pasha, neither did the captain Trabzonlu Paşalı oğlu Mustafa quit the job nor did Hacı Sadullah Efendi engage in the commerce of İskenderun town, sell his share.²³⁸ This is the common case for inheritance of a share, as can be observed in the other associates never sold their shares or there was no replacement of captains. The only change can be happen if the sucesors sold their shares.

Only one case seems to contradict the statement because of its unique situation. One of the share-holders of a *şethiye brik*, the captain Hacı İbrahim from Giresun died in 1857-1858(1274 according to Islamic calaender). The ship was navigating by the deceased's son. The actual captain, İsmail son of Hacı İbrahim,

²³⁶ According to BOA (A.}AMD.53.40) Aziz Pasha, son of the previous Guardian İzzet Pasha, has been appointed as the Guardian of Belgrad in 31.12.1854. He also bought one of the certified *şethiyes* following year. See BOA, A}DVN.108.38.

²³⁷ BOA, A.}TŞF.20.68.

²³⁸ BOA, A}DVN. 103.70.

suddenly inherited his father's 25%-share of the ship – he had had no share before. After obtaining some money, he decided to quit his job and one Todori ,son of Seryan, became the new captain in his place.²³⁹

As said, the heirs could choose to sell the ship some time later, which happened to the ship of a lumberman named Hacı Mehmed. He died in 1854-1855(1271 according to Islamic calaender) and left behind a *martiko* built in İnebolu. The ship was divided first into 40 shares as usual and 10 shares went to his wife Mehtume Hatun, six shares (18 share in sum) to each of his sisters; Ameti Hatun, Hanife Hatun and Ayşe Hatun; and finally, his brother, Hacı Ahmed, took the remaining; 12 shares. The register inscribed their names on the new certificate, but some time later, they lost this paper and applied for a new one. After a while, his brother and two of his sisters Hanife Hatun and Ayşe Hatun sold their shares to a *hayriye tüccarı* Osman Remzi Efendi from Trabzon.²⁴⁰ Since now Osman Remzi Efendi had acquired more half of the ship, the captain was replaced by another probably by his will. A year later, the last of the sisters, Ameti Hatun sold her shares to Osman Remzi, too. But this time the Imperial Dockyard, suspecting the ship could carry more cargo than recorded, corrected the 6,000 keyl as 8,500 keyl after a survey.²⁴¹

As pointed out, if the ownership of the shares was transferred by juridical channels to a creditor, the observation would be no more applicable to the situation. Consider the following example: Yorgi, son of Andon, acquired 25% of a small *beşçifte başlı martiko* by the decision of a civil court because the deceased, Mustafa

²³⁹ BOA, A}.DVN. 132.87.

²⁴⁰ His name was mentioned again other document in which this time he replaced the actual captain, Mehmed son of Sürmegöz from Galata by Hüseyin son of İbrahim reis from Bartın BOA, A}.DVN. 93.6.

²⁴¹ BOA, A}.DVN. 105.43 (it was noted that the previous document went missing), A}.DVN. 109.12, A}.DVN. 111.7.

the clerk, had debt to him. In addition to this operation, Ali son of Osman sold his 10 shares (from 40) to Yorgi son Andon and the residual five shares to the other partner Mehmed resident of Fener holding already 15 shares. In summary, Yorgi and Mehmed both obtained one half of the ship. Now, the new shareholder Yorgi's name was registered as the new captain.²⁴² It can be speculated here that of Yorgi may have come forward for the new captaincy and while Mehmed seconded the idea, Ali, son of Osman, objected to this proposition. However, since Ali held the minority of the shares, the matter ended with the sale of his shares. To sum up, after a death, if the family members acquired the shares of the deceased and kept them, nothing has change; if they sold to another person or the juridical authority transferred the shares to a creditor, in this case, the lastest observation does not fit to the situation.

In conclusion, the entire hypothesis can be summarized as follows; the status of the captains was determined by two factors, the number of the partners and the share of the captain. The more shares the captain possessed, more partner in the partnerships, more independent and powerful he became. In such cases, it became harder to fire the captain. However, when the captain had no shares and there was a single owner, in this case the captain was nothing more than an employee. The fate of his job rested on the ship-owner. In addition to this, every time when a dramatic change in the partnership affecting 50% of the shares occurred, the new partner tried to appoint a new captain in whom he could trust, because the trust was the key factor in the relationship between the captains and the shareholders.

²⁴² BOA, A}DVN. 74.43. There was another example; when all owners of a *sopa başlı martiko* died Captain Mustafa son of Kethüda from Amasra acquired the ship by the decision of the *Kismet Askeri Mahmekesi* (Military Court of Fortune) and he became also the captain of his ship. See (BOA, A}DVN. 102.58).

Partnerships

The sublime Porte made the registration of the shareholder's name with his or her share in the petitions and the certificates compulsory. By counting the number of the shareholders in every document, it is possible to compose statistical data to understand the nature of the partnerships, to observe the number of the partners for an ordinary Ottoman ship and to answer the question of whether there was a tendency for multiple partnerships or on the contrary. The tables are arranged according to the transactions. Still, a small problem remains; the ships must be classified according to size. It is proposed that the ships be classified arbitrarily as small, medium and large by their cargo capacities of the ship to understand the nature of the partnership according to size of the ships. The small ships would be ones smaller than 3,500 *keyl* (90 tonnes) and the medium ships would be between 3,500 and 7,499 *keyl* (180 tonnes). The largest ships were therefore the ones bigger than 7,499 *keyl* (180 tonnes).

Considering the entire list no matter what the nature of the transaction was nearly half of the ships (48.21%) were had only one owner. Sole ownership was more common in the smaller ships than the bigger ones, probably because the smaller ships were much cheaper. On the other hand, the partnerships pretty much consisted of those composed by two (27.83 %) and three (15.03%) shareholders. Partnership with more than three shareholders was an exception (8.93%).²⁴³ Sole ownership was common and multiple shareholding, especially more than three shareholders, was quite rare. Thereby, this study has substantiated Murat Çizakça's

²⁴³ See table 3.

observations on the nature of partnerships in Ottoman shipping.²⁴⁴ If the existence of wealthy ship-owner class always buying large ships by themselves, it is unknown exactly what the cause of the paucity of the partnerships was. The lack of trust or smallness of the ships seems to have been possible reason, but none of these hypotheses can be verified, this question is passed.

Since more resources are available now than at the time of Murat Çizakça's study, it is possible to go deeper in the research. It can be asked whether there was a tendency to a single ownership or partnership. The certificate for the newly large ships corresponded to the new entries to the market. It also can be considered them as a reflection of rational expectations in the shipping market. The rational expectations in the Ottoman shipping sector should have corresponded to the optimal forecast for best partnership under the constraint of the given information. Put simply, a shareholder should have had some information on the present situation of the shipping sector, but not about the future. Still, he could speculate about his future benefits according to the present situation of the market by using rational criteria with the given information. After predicting the future, he would decide to become a partner in a larger ship or buy a smaller ship on his own, according to his estimations. He could always invest in a bigger ship with a small share or buy a bigger share in a small ship.

In this context, what the economic agents chose purported the appearance of the rational expectations on the shipping market. According to the certificate for newly-built ships, 56.25% of the requests were from a single owner.²⁴⁵ That number is 8 points higher than the actual situation. Therefore, the new investors in the Black Sea shipping market expected to acquire higher gains by being sole investor in the

²⁴⁴ Çizakça, pp.80-81

²⁴⁵ See table 4.

shipping market in the future. In other words, newcomers to the market estimated that they would make higher profits by being the owners of entire ships than placing their money in different partnerships.

This higher expectation for sole ownership should have been in fact resulted from the higher expectation for the profitability of sole-ownership in the biggest ships. The difference between the new partners in larger ships with single owners than the actual situation was 17.79%.²⁴⁶ Apparently, the investors in that category preferred to allocate their money to a single ship instead of diversifying their portfolio by placing their money in different ships with similar sizes. Scientific management recommended the strategy of diversifying the portfolio as a dividing risk factor. That strategy consists of the old adage ‘‘Don’t put all of your eggs in the one basket’, the risk of losing everything is higher in one goes if you place your money to a single financial instrument. It was indeed the deduction of the theory of large numbers in statistics.²⁴⁷

Despite the greater risk; the economic reason to buy an entire ship would be that the owners of the newly built biggest ships were often the richest merchants, such as the *avrupa ve hayriye tüccarları*. These wealthiest merchants usually bought an entire fleet not a single ship. Moreover, it is presumed that these ships were mainly for personal use. If it was the case, the trend for single ownership would have been resulted form the rise of the wealthiest merchant in the mid-nineteenth century.

The operations, including a change in the partnership, show us what kind of partnerships survived and what did not. These operations consisted of what Richard

²⁴⁶ Ibid.

²⁴⁷ If the experiences were independent, when the number of experience increases, the mean of the experiences tended to expected value. For example, the expected value of flipping a coin is 1/2. If you flip a coin, the chance of deviance from ½ is 50%. If you flip two coins, it falls to 25%. If you could flip infinitely the failure risk would be null.

Nelson and Sidney Winters mean by the selection vehicles.²⁴⁸ In a competitive sphere, if an economic agent is unable to achieve make enough profits to sustain himself in the market, he will be eliminated. In other words, if the extant partnership could make money enough for a one shareholder, he would sell his shares eventually. If rational expectations are the game strategy before the start, the selection vehicles are the results of the game.

Table 2 shows that there was apparently a tendency for single ownership in the medium-size and the larger ships. In other words, more sole proprietorship and fewer partnerships occurred after the sales of the shares. This result can be interpreted to mean most multiple partnerships in the medium-size and the bigger ships were more vulnerable to the hassle of economic life. One of the reasons for the tendency towards sole proprietorship could have been that the single owners of the bigger ships were usually the men from the richest classes such as privileged merchants. These big investors rarely sold their shares.²⁴⁹ On the other hand, the petit investors in the biggest ships would have been more vulnerable to the economic difficulties. Most probably, while the big merchants were able to preserve their ships thanks to their wealth for longer amounts of time, the petit investors hastily sold their shares during the crisis.²⁵⁰ One additional reason could have been the Wallachian merchants who were buying Ottoman certified ships. As pointed out earlier, the

²⁴⁸ Two pioneer evolutionary economists, Nelson and Winter developed an alternative theoretical framework to profit maximization for the analysis of the firm. They replaced the genes by the habits and the routines “organization memory, of the firms. The reaction of a firm towards an innovation or his actions in the market is determined by these routines. If these routines allow them to make higher profits, so their routine will survive; if not, the firm should adapt these routines. See Geoffrey Martin Hodgson, *Evolution and Institutions: on Evolutionary Economics and the Evolution of Economics* (Cheltenham : E. Elgar, 1999), pp.163-164.

²⁴⁹ Only four *hayriyye tüccarı* and two *avrupa tüccarı*.

²⁵⁰ Maybe these shares were financial instruments for the petit shareholders and not a real investment. In Keynesian terminology, it could be a speculative venture. Hence, since it was a speculation vehicle, they would be predisposed to cash these share during a crisis.

Wallachians were purchased entire ships and became the sole owners of the ships.

Their behavior should have enforced the trend.

Since the newcomers to the market and the result after the sales points in the very same direction, it can be stated that there could be a tendency to single ownership. If what it stated was true, the rational expectations should have been related to the sales operations. To be precise, the economic agents witnessing the dissolution of the partnerships could avoid forming new ones. In addition to this, the economic behaviors of the rising merchants, namely the *hayriye ve avrupa tüccarları*, should have strengthened the tendency for single ownership.

Our final remark to make is about the difference between the sales including the change in the captaincy and sales without a captain replacement. One can easily observe one more point from Table 11; if the sales of a big or medium-size ship's shares ended in single ownership, it was almost certain that the captain would be replaced by another. This result was nothing more the observations made above. Since the partnership dramatically changed, the new owner of the entire ship appointed a new captain, whom he trusted more. However, when the sales ended with the addition of new partners, the new comers with fewer (1/3 of the ship in average) shares should have agreed on keep the captain in his place.²⁵¹

In conclusion, sole proprietorship was quite common in the shipping market. Some of the single owners were the richer merchants with their own merchant fleets, but it does not explain why the petite investors decided to buy an entire ship, instead of acquiring a small share in a large ship. Moreover, there was a tendency for sole proprietorship, too. It is presumed that the single owners often made better profits than the partners; still the cause of that is unknown. One possible reason could be the

²⁵¹ See table 8.

fact that the demand was low and the size of the ships was small, as discussed in the previous chapter. Therefore, it is highly possible that the small ships were more lucrative than the bigger ships. If this was the case, the petite investors would have preferred to place their money in smaller ships by buying bigger shares, instead of purchasing smaller shares in the bigger ships. Another reason may have been that the transaction cost of a partnerships. If there was a grave trust issue in the partnerships and the punishment for deception was not enough or if the juridical infrastructure of the partnerships was not sufficient or if there was no efficient partnership intuitions or for many other reasons, the cost of transaction for the partnership could have been higher.

Shipyards and the Captain's Origin

As explained, a certified ship should had to be registered in a to local port book first, which made the control of the documents' authenticity by the Imperial Dockyard possible. For that reason, the Sublime Porte made the registration of the port where the ship was built compulsory for every petition and every certificate. No need to say that the inscription of the shipyards provides a valuable set of information, which enables us to speculate on the shipbuilding yards along the Black Sea coast line. When analyzing the data, Danubian vessels will be eliminated, in order to focus more on the ships from the Black Sea.²⁵²

²⁵² By far most noteworthy building place was 'Malatya' which has no sea coast at all. Still the ship model was also eerie; *hafir çekdirme*. That could be a small river boat already operating in the Euphrates River. '[...]Malatyalı Mehmed kaptanın süvar olduğu 1 mucib-i keşf 2.400 keyl hamuleli mutehamil hafir çekdirme tabir olunur 11 zirai tavlinde 1 kıta' sefine kaptan-ı merkumun malı olarak bu defa Malatyada inşa olunmuş [...]' B.O.A 103.78.

The first step is to analyze the Fig. 4, which reflects the number of ship built in every shipyard. According to the Fig. 4, the most important shipyards along the Black Sea coast, were Bartın (42 ships) Alaplı²⁵³ (37 ships), Ünye (26 ships) and Kilyos (19 ships) ports, respectively. However, this picture would be misleading again, as every ship was counted as a single unity regardless of its size. Nevertheless, the labor needed to build a bigger ship would not have been equal to that of a smaller ship, neither would the primary material have been. That is why it was decided to recompose the data by multiplying again by freight capacities,²⁵⁴ which gives us the Fig. 5 and Fig. 6. The latter figure represents the proportions if the ships from Rusçuk are ignored. As the result of this operation, Bartın (always more than 10%) remains the primary production site. Ünye followed Bartın by 8.55%.

Çakraz Bay, located in the vicinity of Bartın and Amasra, became another important production site according to the new figures. The reader must be attracted attention to the fact that Bartın's vicinity (Bartın-Amasra-Çakraz region) carried out more than 20% of the total production. Bartın and its vicinity were so important in shipbuilding in the mid-nineteenth century, because first of all, the Bartın's hinterland was surrounded by vast rich forests. Subsequently, the city was endowed with a timber industry producing lumber suitable for shipbuilding. Suraiyya Faroqhi demonstrated that this region shipping and the timber industry's importance went back to the sixteenth century.²⁵⁵ In that time, many ships were carrying timber, wood and many other goods to İstanbul. Besides, Bartın was always one of the essential

²⁵³ The last two figures show us exactly that Alaplı was a serial producer for small ships.

²⁵⁴ One can ask here why we choose the freight capacity and not the length. If we made our estimations by the length, we could miss other dimensions of the ship; the width and the deepness. Accordingly, the results would be less accurate than the cargo capacity, which is composed by the size of the each dimension of the ship.

²⁵⁵ Faroqhi, p.77.

building sites for Ottoman Navy.²⁵⁶ The Empire levied the West Anatolian Black Sea coast line to provide timber to the Imperial Dockyard.²⁵⁷ Bartın's shipping industry collapsed after the arrival of the steamers to the Black Sea. Although the shipbuilding lost its importance, the shipbuilding and the timber industry survived into the new century.²⁵⁸ It seems in the 1940s Bartın became a shipyard building small vessels like the *mavna*.

Ünye, another important shipyard, was different from Bartın. No other town nearby Ünye was building ships. Moreover, there is no vast forest, nor a remarkable timber industry. It was reported that the town was suffering from the lack of timber from time to time. In such cases, the timber was imported from Bartın. When describing the town, Şemsettin Sami, the chronicler living in Bartın, wrote that the town dealt mainly in the ship production and the trade with Crimea and İstanbul was lively.²⁵⁹ Most probably, Ünye was nothing more than an increasing returns²⁶⁰ centre for the shipping industry in the eastern Black Sea. In other words, the town enjoyed to being the sole shipbuilder in the middle Anatolian Black Sea.

There also were relation between some building sites and some ship models. For example, Bartın vicinity produced brig type ships, such as the *şethiye brik*. Still the most evident example was the production of *alamana* vessels in Gelibolu. There were only twelve *alamana* vessels in the register. Eight *alamana* type ships were built in Gelibolu. Besides, almost all ships built in Gelibolu were *alamana* vessels,

²⁵⁶ See Bostan, *Osmanlı Bahriye Teşkilâtı : XVII. yüzyılda Tersâne-i Âmire*, p.25, p.100 for the list of ships built in Bartın, p.71.

²⁵⁷ Ibid.,p.116.

²⁵⁸ See Kemal Samancıoğlu, *İktisat ve ticaret bakımından Bartın* (Bartın: Bartın Ticaret ve Sanayi Odası, 1941), pp.62-70.

²⁵⁹ Mustafa Çalık ed., *Tarihi, sarayı, konakları, kadıları, hattatları, fındığı, mısırı ve gemiciliğiyle Ünye* (İstanbul : Avrupa Yakası Ünyeliler Derneği, 1999), pp.69-70.

²⁶⁰ "The increasing returns approach asserts [...] that countries trade because there are inherent advantages to specialization, even for initially similar countries." in Paul Krugman, *Geography and Trade* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1993), p.6.

but one *bombarda* exception. Hence, it can be stated that *alamana* was a Gelibolu-produced ship. The rest of *alamana* vessels were from Kilyos, Tekirdağ and Saryer.²⁶¹ Alaplı was only Black Sea port in the list.²⁶² This gives an impression that the *alamana* was a type of vessel peculiar to the Marmara Sea. Moreover, the majority of the *alamana*'s captains were from Marmara coasts, which supports the statement about the captains: Kumbağ (near Tekirdağ), Tekirdağ (three captains), Paşalimanı (an island in the Marmara Sea, captains), Gelibolu (three captains), İzmid, Halıdere (near İzmid), Kekbos (now Gebze, near İzmid).²⁶³

There were also many ships bought from aboard, especially the ships bought from Greece were important. Nineteenth ships in total bought were from Greece. The Greek-made ships (6,028.42 *keyl* in average) were bigger than the Ottoman merchant ships (4,315.76 *keyl* – 110,828.7 kg). Most of these ships were brig-type ships inscribed as *şethiye brik*. Greek brigs should have been better in many ways, since innovations in shipbuilding diffused faster in the Aegean Sea than the Black Sea. However, no further information is available to prove or refute it.

Wallachian names are mentioned more than the Greek ones in the maritime certificates. Contrary to the Greeks, they were the main customers of the Ottoman ships. While, there were some nine ships bought from Walachia, the Ottomans sold many more ships to them. We presume that the Wallachians did not buy ordinary ships, but the certified ships enabling them to make business easily within the Empire. By buying a certified ship, a Wallachian could have bought also the permission to make business freely in the Empire. As an example to such transactions, a big *şethiye brik* built in Ayandon carrying 14.000 *keyl*, was sold by his

²⁶¹ B.O.A A}DVN 88.25, A}DVN 70.68 and A}DVN 103.70, respectively.

²⁶² B.O.A A}DVN 73.87.

²⁶³ The others were from Darıca (near Akçaabad), Ereğli (in the one in the Black Sea?), Çardaklı (near Ordu), Kori, Batnos (the captain of the Greek-made ship).

former owners (one robe-seller named Ali, son of Emir Hasan, İbrahim Yazıcı and the actual captain Osman, son of Mehmed from Ünye) to a Wallachian merchant (Constantino Joseph). Like his many compatriots did, he bought the entire ship and replaced the captain with a Christian, this time one Constanti son of Yorgi from Chios Island.²⁶⁴ The professions of these Wallachians were recorded almost always as merchant.²⁶⁵ Other than the merchants, there were two *kapı oğlani*²⁶⁶ and one *kaçıllary kethüdası* Joseph Alex Nukran in the documents.²⁶⁷

There was only one Wallachian, Minhali, son of Nicola, acted quite different in many ways. Unlike the other Wallachians, he became a partner of many ships by half, instead of buying them entirely. Most probably he was an Ottoman merchant who had been born in Walachia, operating in the borders of the Empire like a trustee and not a foreign merchant. In addition to this, he was a resident of Lesbos Island. The register lists him in a matter different from the other Wallachians. As a rule, when a Wallachian sold a ship to an Ottoman subject, the register wrote “*Eflaklıdan mübaya’a*” (bought from a Wallachian). When Minhali son of Nicola sold half-share of another ship to his captain, his name was fully inscribed instead of a simple sentence “bought from a Wallachian”.²⁶⁸

The ships (10 ships) bought the trustees followed the Greek ships. It can said that these ships were even bigger (6,596 *keyl* – 170 tonnes), probably dealing with international trade. Since a trustee could be from any nation in the world, there was no room for deeper analysis than that. There were also some foreign ships, among one ship from each country: the USA, England and Australia-Hungary (registered as

²⁶⁴ The names of the captains signal that new captains should have been from Wallachia, but there is no way to prove it.

²⁶⁵ It was enrolled most of the time as *bezirgân*, sometimes as *tâcir*.

²⁶⁶ A}DVN 82.61, A}DVN 91.90.

²⁶⁷ A}DVN 73.55.

²⁶⁸ A}DVN 83.56, A}DVN 86.72.

‘Nemçe’).

The Ownership by Profession and their Hometown

All of the maritime certificates start with a word indicating the captain’s hometown, with his father’s name such as the captain named Ataş Ahmed, son of Helim from Trabzon, *Trabzonlu Helim oğlu Ataş Ahmed nam reis*.²⁶⁹ The mention of the captain’s hometown in all the documents is obviously a valuable resource for a deeper examination. There is one little problem with this information, though. When the hometown was mentioned with the father’s name of the captain or a shareholder, the register inscribed most probably the birth place of the father and not that of the son.

Consider that petition BOA, A.DVN 132.83. In that document the name of an owner and his hometown are mentioned twice in different ways. The first time, it is given as “*Gedizli Hacı Mehmed oğlu Emin*”, “Emin son of Hacı Mehmed from Gediz” and “*mümaileyh Gedizlizâde Emin Efendi*”; “aforementioned son of the Gedizli (Gediz town’s dweller) Emin Efendi” in the second. It is not sure whether the father or the son was born in Gediz in the first expression, but according to the second, it is certainly the father who was born in Gediz.²⁷⁰ Hence, from that

²⁶⁹ BOA, A.DVN 74.22 “*Trabzonlu Helim oğlu Ataş Ahmed nam reisin süvar olduğu 2.500 keyl hamuleli mutehamil bombardâ tâbir olunur 16 zirai tavlinde şahin-i derya nam 1 kıta’a sefinenin 40 pare itibariyle 20 pare hissesi Amasralı Yakup oğlu Hüseyin Yazıcının ve 20 pare hissesi dahi reis-i merkumun malı olarak bu defa Çakraz iskelesinde inşa olunmuş olduğu bilatetkik ile liman defterine kayd edilmiş liman tarafına ifade ettiklerinden keyfiyet liman defterine kayd edilmekle mücededen bir kıta sened-i bahri ısdarı babında emr ü ferman hazreti min el-eminindir.*”

²⁷⁰ BOA, A.DVN 132.83, the full text was “*Kavakhisarlı Muhtarzâde Taccib nam kaptanın süvar olduğu 9.800 keyl hamuleli mutehamil şethiye birk tâbir olunur 2 direkli 24 zirai tavlinde 1 kıta’a sefinenin 40 pare itibariyle 15 pare hissesi kapan-ı dakik ticaretinden Gedizli Hacı Mehmed oğlu Eminin ve 15 pare hissesi Trabzonlu Keresteci Alizâde Eminin ve*

expression, it is understood that the real “*Gedizli*” (Gediz town’s resident) was the father, Mehmed, and not his son, Emin Efendi. Moreover, whenever the register referred him as “*Gedizlizâde*” not only “*oğlu*”, he attributed some kind of respect to the son, Emin Efendi, who was a certified merchant (*kaban-ı dakik tâciri*). Therefore, there is also a chance that neither the father nor the son was born in Gediz, but a grand-parent that was accepted as the founder of the dynasty.

Even though, probably, the hometown of the captain was not actually his, but that of his father, the problem exposed above will be ignored and it will be assume that the documents reflected perfectly the hometown of the captains. Thanks to low human mobility in the mid-nineteenth century in the Ottoman Empire, it can be presumed that this assumption would not be so preposterous. Still there is one little obstacle left: counting the hometowns of each captain regardless of the nature of the transaction would confuse some realities. To be clearer, for example, there were some captains from Ahtabolu before the 1850s, but Ahtabolu became an important town in captaincy then after. If these kinds of facts are disregarded and count the hometown of the captain’s no matter what the nature of the transaction, it is impossible to miss many facets of the labor market for captains. Therefore, it was decided to group the captains in three categories according to the operations: captains who were replaced by another or the captains who replaced them, the captains who remained the same after the operations, and finally, those who were the subjects of multiple operations. When computing the figures, the last category, very few in number (only 19 operations), was ignored, which complicates the things.

10 pare hissesi dahi süvar-ı merkumun malı olarak mukaddem Yunanlıdan mübaya'a olunmuş ve sefine-i mezkure için 18/Safer/71 günü tarihiyle muverrah bir kıta sened-i bahri verilmişse de mümaileyh Gedizlizâde Emin Efendi mutassarıf olduğu 15 pare hissesini keresteci Hacı Ali Efendiye furuht etmiş olduğu liman tarafına ifade ettiklerinden keyfiyet liman defterine kayd edilmekle [...]”

If it is accepted that the list reflects perfectly the real distribution of the captain hometowns in the 1850s, Rize, Ahtabolu, Trabzon, Alaplı, Ünye and Bartın should have been important centers.²⁷¹ The ships of the captains from these towns had bigger cargo capacities than the average, except Alaplı. As mentioned before, the captains from Alaplı were operating small vessels. It can also be stated also that while more captains from Alaplı were quitting the sector everyday, the rest was being promoted to bigger ships.²⁷² The captains from Gelibolu became more and more important in the smaller ships, like the *alamana* vessels.

Another group of captains, the most numerous group, losing their jobs was from Rize. Like the captains from Alaplı, some of them had shares. They were losing their share with their captaincy everyday. Since there were five newcomers in the sector, it is possible to think that captains from Rize were in economic trouble and they were forced to quit their jobs after selling their shares.

The biggest new-comers were the captains from Ahtabolu.²⁷³ They were hired by *hayriye and avrupa tüccarı* most of the time. The captains from Ahtabolu had hardly few shares (10.34% of them holding only 3.74% of the ships) and they therefore were simple employees. It can be stated that the merchants, especially the privileged merchants, employed the captains from Ahtabolu most probably for economic reasons. Another group of captains, the captains from Trabzon, were also employees like the captains from Ahtabolu. Only 11.23% had shares, but unlike the captains from Ahtabolu or Rize, the number of the captains from Trabzon diminished slightly so that it can be stated that the captains from Trabzon did not lose their job. However, the employment rate for the new captains from Trabzon²⁷⁴ was quite low,

²⁷¹ See table 12.

²⁷² See table 17.

²⁷³ See table 16.

²⁷⁴ There were only 2 captains from Trabzon, one of them was female named as

most probably due the boom of the captains from Ahtabolu.

The situation of the captains from Bartın, Ünye, Alaplı differed from that of Rize, Ahtabolu and Trabzon. As pointed out, these were the towns, where a shipping industry was settled. They probably enjoyed the existence of a shipbuilding sector in their hometown. For example, all the captains from Alaplı had a share of their ship. This ratio consists of +85% for the captains from Bartın and 51% for the captains from Ünye. As expected, the proportion of the ship acquired by the captains from Alaplı was greater than that of Bartın, but it should be remembered that the ships produced in Alaplı were small compared to Bartın. Akçaşehir (+78%) and Kaşyod (+94%), two medium-size shipbuilder towns, were the complementary example for the last observation.

Moreover, the captains from Bartın, Ünye and Alaplı were not simple employees at all like the captains from Rize. They possessed some shares from their ships. The captains from Alaplı seem to have been big investor in their ship, 87.5% of them owning the 77.6% of their ships. The high ratio of the share was an outcome of the fact the ships were quite small. It was demonstrated above that this group was quitting the sector. Therefore, the same argument can be made that the captains from Alaplı, like the captains from Rize were losing their captaincies, probably because of an economic difficulty which ended with both bankruptcy and unemployment. More than half of the captains from Bartın (54.17%) and Ünye (57.5%) were also shareholders of their ships. However, there was no big change for these two groups. Still, it has been stated that the captains from the vicinity of the shipbuilding industry had the tendency to buy some shares in the ships built in their town.

Havva with her ship *melike-i derya* (the queen of the sea). She was the only female in our list.

There were only a few captains who bought a distant shipyard.²⁷⁵ In most cases, the captain was from a Greek island and the ship was Greek. Those ships were probably not newly-built, but newly-registered by the Ottoman officials. These ships' captains were from the Aegean Islands or Giresun.

In conclusion, thanks to its vast and rich forests, Bartın and its vicinity were the main shipbuilding site of the Anatolian Black Sea shores in the mid-nineteenth century. In fact, Bartın has been an important shipping and ship building area for centuries. Thanks to being the sole building site in the East, Ünye became another important ship producing town. Moreover, the captains from Bartın and Ünye profited from the lively shipbuilding sector and navigated ships built in their vicinity like their many colleagues did in different towns. Their fate was related to the shipping sector around them. However, the captains from Rize, Alaplı, Ahtabolu and Trabzon had a significant weight in the shipping sector. While the captains from Rize and Alaplı were losing their jobs every day, the captains from Ahtabolu were on the rise. The situation of the captains from Trabzon remained the same.

Relationship with the Shipyards, the Hometowns and the Owners

Since it is known that there is relation between the existence of a significant shipbuilding industry and the captaincy, it can be asked whether the captains were navigating the ships built in their vicinity in general. The answer to this question diverged a lot for the newcomer to the market and the entire ship list. Subsequently, the new ships and the entire list will be analyzed in two parts. 69% of the shipyards'

²⁷⁵ There were only four captains bought from a distant shipyard. The other ones bought from the Greeks, Trustees or the Wallachian.

location matches exactly with the native place of the captains' hometown in the newly-built ships. More than two-thirds of the ships were from the same town in which they lived. This result is interpreted as the locality of the shipping. It is assumed that these ships were waiting for customers near the shipyards where they were built. Most probably these ships had no single line, but after they carried their cargo to another port, they came back to their initial port. Therefore these ships, as will be seen, owned by the local shareholders and dealt with the transportation of local commodities to different ports.

The link between the captains' native places and the shipyards' hometowns became less obvious with time. If other transactions where no replacement of captain has occurred are added, the number decreased to 48.95%. This ratio fell more, to 23.33%, for transactions including a change in the captaincy. It is obvious that the captains' hometown diverged from the shipyards with time. There are two possible reasons for the divergence. Firstly, when the captain was replaced by another, almost three of every four new captains (73.94%) were different from the previous captains' location. Subsequently, the chance for matching the captain's hometown with the shipyard was lowered with every captain's replacement.

Second, the local shipping business seems to have been in decline in favor of international trade. This latter statement is definitely related to the previous one. That decline of the locality of the shipping businesses could have played an important role in the divergence, which is unfortunately harder to prove. Indeed, what were in decline were most probably shareholders dealing in local trade. As is known, while the simple merchant, who was in deep crisis in the 1860s, seems to have been related to the local shipping business, the privileged merchants preoccupied with international trade were in rise. Moreover, the privileged merchants neither

employed captains from their town, nor bought locally produced ships.

The local network in the shipping business played important role in the replacement of the captain by another from the same hometown. In 40% of the replacement of the captain with a fellow townsman, the shipyard was also the same as the captains' hometown. For example; according to the certificate catalogued as A}DVN. 66.83, a captain and a main shareholder from Alaplı sold their shares to a Yazıcıoğlu İsmail and Kazarcıoğlu Mehmed. The captain was replaced by another from Alaplı, one Mustafa, son of Hacı Ahmed.²⁷⁶ Still, in the cases whenever the shipyard's hometown did not match with the captain's native place, the captains were usually from the places that appears nearby of the ex-captain, which seconds the hypothesis on the locality of the shipping.

Nothing was local in the shipping business for *avrupa ve hayriye tüccarları* . In looking at their ships is no match between captain's native place and the shipyard among newly-built ships; the owners of such kind of ships were usually *avrupa ve hayriye tüccarları* or the officers. For example, a privileged merchant (*avrupa tüccarı*) one Stephan son of Kirek (?) from Trabzon involved in international trade had the full owner ship of a big *şethiye brik* bought from Greece. His captain, Ustabaşı oğlu Yanni was from Giresun.²⁷⁷

²⁷⁶ [...]Alaplı Hacı Ömer oğlu Mehmed nam reisin süvar olduğu 13.100 keyl hamuleli mutehamil çekdirme tâbir olunur 19 zirai boylu 1 kıta'a sefinenin 40 pare itibariyle 30 pare hissesi Alaplıda sakin tüccardan Karabacak oğlu Hüseyinin ve 10 pare hissesi dahi reis-i merkumun malı olarak mukaddem Alaplı iskelesinde inşa olunmuş ve sefine-i mezkure için 266 senesi cemz-ül-ahirin 19. günü tarihiyle muverrah bir kıta sened-i bahri verilmişse de merkum Hüseyin mutassarıf olduğu 30 pare hissesini 15 hissesini Yazıcıoğlu İsmail ve 15 hissesini dahi Kazarcıoğlu Mehmede vermiş ve reis-i merkum dahi mutasarıf olduğu 10 pare hissesinden merkum İsmail ve 5 paresini merkum Mehmede bâ mazbata furuht etmiş ve sefineden dahi çıkıp yerine Alaplı Molla Ahmed oğlu Mustafa nam kimse reis olmuş olduğu liman defterine kayd edilmiş [...].

²⁷⁷ “Giresunlu Ustabaşı oğlu Yanni nam kaptanın süvar olduğu 10.000 keyl hamuleli mutehamil şethiye-i brik tâbir olunur 2 direkli 26 zirai tavlinde Dikrak nam 1 kıta'a sefine teba-ı Devlet-i Aliden Avrupa ticaretinden Trabzonlu Kirek oğlu Estefan bezirganın malı olarak bu defa komisyon-u celilesinden tasdik olan Rumi bir kıt'a sened mucibince Yunanlıdan mübaya'a olunmuş olduğu[...]”.

Regrettably, the hometown of a share-holder was registered sporadically, which prevents the proving of the observations made here with concrete evidences. Most probably, the registers of the local ports did not indicate the hometown of the shareholders when it was the same as the port. No matter what the reason, any kind of deep study of the ship owners' hometown would be unreliable and meaningless since these details were not reliably recorded. Moreover, it seems that hometown names represent more an appellation or nickname, than an indicator of the exact hometown of the shareholder. There were also many remarks on the exact hometown of the shareholder supporting the latter idea. Still, the merchants, especially the privileged merchants can be speculated about. Even in the cases in which the hometown of the merchants is unknown whether there was a match between the captain and the shipyard can always be checked. Besides, the name of some privileged merchant was repeated many times in different documents. For example, even though it is unclear where Hacı Ali was born, it is known that neither Hacı Ali's ships, nor the captains' hometown were the same; Mesed, Urine, Aydos, Varna, Samsun, Sinop or Trabzon. Most of these places are geographically close. When, the other privileged merchants ships and the captains' hometown are considered, looking for a match became useless.²⁷⁸ Thus, it can be stated that the privileged merchant s employed different captains from different towns to ship different ships built in different shipyards.

At first sight, the difference between the captains' hometown and the shipyard seems to have been reasonable when consideration is made of the

²⁷⁸ There was actually only one privileged merchant; Hacı İbrahimzade Süleyman Ağa who had a ship built in Agva and the captain was also from Agva. Unfortunately, we can detect the birth place of him. On the other examples, most of the merchants have at least two ships and the captain's hometown and the shipyard did not match. In addition to this, in some examples, we can find the birth place of the merchant and we know that the son of Hacı İbrahim Ağazade Hacı Ahmed Efendi was born in Mudanya (B.O.A. DH.SAİDd 4.776).

merchants and the captains, since these people travelled a lot due to the requirements of their professions. The observation made here is not admissible for the ordinary merchants. Consider the case of an ordinary merchant, Hüseyin, son of Karabacak resident of Alaplı (*Alaplıda sakin tüccardan Karabacak oğlu Hüseyin*). The ship and the captain were both from Alaplı. When the ship was sold and a new captain was appointed, again the new captain was from Alaplı.²⁷⁹

Hence, the ships and the captains of the ordinary merchants were usually from the same town as the owner's.²⁸⁰ That locality gives the impression that the commerce that these ships carried out was local. For example, if the captains and the merchants were from Trabzon, it is presumed that in this case these ships hauled goods Trabzon to other towns or vice versa. Consider the document A}DVN 78.9, the ship was built in Çakırağzı, but both the owners and the captains were from Trabzon. When Salih, son of Kandil from Trabzon, sold his entire share to Hüseyin Efendi, a tobacco merchant, his partner Hatibzâde Ahmed, a local merchant from Trabzon, sold some, too. Eventually, a new partner, Hüseyin Efendi, acquired the half of the ship and convinced his partner to replace the captain, who was from Trabzon,

²⁷⁹ See B.OA. A.DVN} 66.83 “[...]Alaplı Hacı Ömer oğlu Mehmed nam reisin süvar olduğu 13.100 keyl hamuleli mutehamil çekdirme tâbir olunur 19 zirai boyulu 1 kıta’a sefinenin 40 pare itibariyle 30 pare hissesi Alaplıda sakin tüccardan Karabacak oğlu Hüseyinin ve 10 pare hissesi dahi reis-i merkumun malı olarak mukaddem Alaplı iskelesinde inşa olunmuş ve sefine-i mezkure için 266 senesi cemz-ül-ahirin 19. günü tarihiyle muverrah bir kıta sened-i bahri verilmişse de merkum Hüseyin mutassarıf olduğu 30 pare hissesini 15 hissesini Yazıcıoğlu İsmail ve 15 hissesini dahi Kazarcıoğlu Mehmede vermiş ve reis-i merkum dahi mutasarıf olduğu 10 pare hissesinden merkum İsmail ve 5 paresini merkum Mehmede bâ mazbata furuht etmiş ve sefineden dahi çıkıp yerine Alaplı Molla Ahmed oğlu Mustafa nam kimse reis olmuş olduğu liman defterine kayd edilmiş[...]”.

²⁸⁰ There were also others that this time the share-holders’ hometown matches with the building yard. For example, the shareholders of şethiye brik built in Ordu was from Ordu as well See “Giresunlu Pandeli oğlu Lazeri nam kaptanın süvar olduğu 8.000 keyl hamuleli mutehamil şethiye-i brik tâbir olunur 25 zirai tavlinde 1 kıta’a sefinenin 40 pare itibariyle 5 pare hissesi Ordu handanından şihzade Hasan Ağanın ve 10 pare hissesi Ordulu Kiryako oğlu Suvanın ve 5 pare hissesi Kiryako oğlu Yanninin ve 5 pare hissesi Kiryako oğlu Dimitrinin ve 2,5 pare hissesi Kilyanni oğlu Yanninin ve 2,5 pare hissesi Kara Tayo oğlu Kostantinin ve 10 pare hissesi dahi süvar-ı merkumun malı olarak bu defa Ordu iskelesinde inşa olunmuş olduğu”.

with another captain from the same town. It is assumed that two new partners transported their merchandises, for example tabacco, to the other ports, especially the capital. In the rest of the year, the ship was leased to other local merchants.

On the other hand, it is sure that *hayriye ve avrupa tüccarları* did not choose their captains according to the criteria of being fellow townsmen. In fact, they conducted business throughout the Empire and with foreign countries. It is assumed that the ships of the simple merchants transported the goods of their owners to other towns, but during the rest of the year they waited for costumers in the local port. The fleet of the privileged merchants, however, handled the transportation of their owner's goods to different ports. Most probably, these ships were waiting in different ports over all the Empire according to the business webs of their owners. Although the limit this does not allow verification of whether this description about the ships was true or not, we can state that unlike the simple merchants, the Ottoman privileged merchants were not engaging the captains from their vicinity, but from different towns, like Ahtabolu.

The possible reasons for such diverged tendencies between the ordinary and the privileged merchants will be discussed. Before doing that, it must be remembered that the Greek merchants also chose their employees from among their relatives or people from their towns like the simple Ottoman merchants. Therefore this is not a simple matter of dealing with the international trade or not. Now, the question can be put in a different way, why when the Greeks and the ordinary Ottoman merchants preferred captains from their towns, did *hayriye ve avrupa tüccarları* not?

The first reason for working with fellow townsmen could have been the social capital. There are multiple explanations of what the social capital is. That's why the language will be given as hypothetical example. Language was one of the most

essential barriers in nineteenth century Ottoman commerce. Assume a society full of different ethnic groups, each group know only its mother language. Although, merchants from different ethnicities could complete simple transactions in the market, the foundation of multi-ethnic associations would have been unlikely, since it require competence in a language. As Robert Putnam states the most fundamental form of social capital is the family, which was followed by the neighborliness.²⁸¹ Since the relatives and the fellow townsmen shared the same culture, the transaction cost of getting information about the business associate or the employers/employees would be lower in an economy driven by informal institutions. In other words, a Chiot would adapt himself to the Chiot way of doing business, to their informal institutions - to their customs, their unwritten codes or their body language - better and faster than a foreigner.

In addition to this, the nineteenth century merchants operating in Ottoman territory had a commitment problem. To overcome the commitment problem, the Chios, Ionian or the simple Ottoman merchant would do business with his relatives or the fellow townsmen. For example, for the Armenian merchants, the bonds of kinship were the primary source of partnership in the commercial network over long distances, like in the Chiot, Ionian families, and the simple Muslim merchants.²⁸² Five hundred relatives working in the same company has been recorded.²⁸³ Consequently, the existence of a company or network was dependant on family. If there was no relative left to hire, fellow townsmen were the nest candidates. If no

²⁸¹ Robert Putnam, '*Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital*', in *Journal of Democracy* 6:1, (Jan 1995), pp. 65-78.

²⁸² Bedross Der Matossian, "The Armenian Commercial Houses and merchant networks in the nineteenth century," *Turcica* no:37 (2007) , p.156.

²⁸³ *Ibid.*, p.156.

suitable successor was left, the company or network could die.²⁸⁴ Arranging marriages with fellow townsmen was another way to bond new relations.

Will be seen in details, the extant juridical and executive powers in the Ottoman Empire were insufficient against deception. Since the surveillance was ineffective, the chance of being caught was low. Let's formulate the situation in the Bernoulli form;

$$\pi_i \times p_i + \pi_f \times p_f = \text{the punishment to the deceiving}$$

π_n is the probability to be caught and p_n is the prices to be paid by the cheater, the letter i represents the informal intuitions and f stands for the formal institutions. As if the $\pi_f \times p_f$ was low, as pointed out, $\pi_i \times p_i$, should be high to prevent cheating and to form a trustable market. Put another way, if the formal institutions' surveillance mechanisms and the punishment does not work efficiently, in this case, the informal institutions should recompense the insufficiency of the formal.

To solve this puzzle, the shareholders and their captains will be compared to the Avner Grief's Maghribi/Venetian traders and their overseas agents in the Middle Ages. The question behind Grief's research is that how the traders were able to trust in their overseas agents in the absence of efficient executive and juridical powers. Both Maghribi traders and the Venetians warranted full-fledged their correspondents far away from them, thus they became responsible for all actions in place of their employer. Thanks to being distant from the trader, the overseas agents could cheat their associates and their bosses, misinform them about prices or deals and steal from the traders. Moreover, even if they were caught, they could easily get round the law,

²⁸⁴ Ibid., p.157 and p.164.

since the juridical institutions were insufficient. Obviously, there was no apparent reason to not cheat another economic agent. If there was no way for the traders to accredit their agents, in this case there would be no agency system at all. As indicated many times before, the captains' relations with the shareholders were similar; they could cheat the shareholders in multiple ways.

The key words proposed by Greif to a bond of trust between employer and the employee were the reputation based reinforcement²⁸⁵ and multilateral punishment.²⁸⁶ To explicate these concepts, consider a hypothetical example. Suppose that there was a racketeer captain named Yorgi from Chios Island sailing the ships of a Chiot merchant. If one day the boss caught Yorgi cheating, what he would lose would not be only his job, but also his reputation. Stigmatized as a racketeer once, no one would hire him. In addition to this, he would be punished by the Chiot community, which could excommunicate him from the economic life even from social activities. With a reputation of a fraud, he would be unable to get a job as captain anymore; since no other communities, like the Ionians, would hire him. Hence, punishment by an informal institution, the menace of being stigmatized as a cheater, would substitute for formal institutions. Since reputation based reinforcement and multilateral punishment provided to a shareholder with an executive power over his captains from the same community, such as being fellow townsmen, and then the shareholders would appoint the captains from their

²⁸⁵ See, Avner Grief, 'Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi Traders,' *The Journal of Economic History*, vol.49, no. 4 (Dec., 1989), pp.857-882 and Avner Grief, *Institutions and the Path of the Modern Economy Lessons from the Medieval Trade* (New York : Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp.58-90.

²⁸⁶ See, Avner Grief, 'History Lessons: The Birth of Impersonal Exchange: The Community Responsibility System and Impartial Justice,' *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, vol. 20, no. 2 (Spring, 2006), p. 221-236 and Avner Grief, *Institutions and the Path of the Modern Economy Lessons from the Medieval Trade*, pp.91-123.

vicinity.²⁸⁷

As pointed out earlier, the reason for the predilection for taking on captains from among fellow townsmen could have been the locality of the trade. It may also been added to that the high risk factor impelled the Greeks and the simple merchants to do business with the relatives or their fellow townsmen. Since the chance of having a captain relative was low for a merchant, in most of the cases, the new partner must have insisted on a new captain from his vicinity. Accepting that economic implication, the shape of the question has totally changed. Now, the question became why despite all the advantages the privileged merchants did not work with their fellow townsmen.

First of all, *hayriye ve avrupa tüccarları* enjoyed not only some fiscal and economic advantages, but some juridical privileges, too. When they had to sue, they applied to the newly found modern courts, but not the local Islamic judge. The *meclis-i ticaret* (the Commercial Courts) were found in 1850,²⁸⁸ appointed as the sole juridical authority for the privileged merchants' juridical actions. These courts were acted and arrived at a verdicts according to the new commercial code published in 1850.²⁸⁹ These courts were more effective than the Islamic courts, since the governors and the ministries assisted in the prosecutions of the cases.

However, the shift of authority in the legal system to the program took some time and the things did not settled down even the year of 1854. For example, in 14 November 1854, Ministry of Finance presented a *tezkere* (official message), about *Avrupa tüccarları*'s complaints, to *Meclis-i Vâlâ* (the Supreme Council). According to the message, although all cases related to the privilege merchants were to be tried

²⁸⁷ Grief, "Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi Traders," pp.868-871.

²⁸⁸ Mehmet Seyitdanlioğlu, *Tanzimat Devirinde Meclis-i Vâlâ* (Ankara : Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1999), p.30.

²⁸⁹ Shaw and Shaw, p.118.

in the Commercial Courts, when a conflict between a privileged and an ordinary merchant occurred, the ordinary merchants applied sometimes to the local *kadi*, (Islamic judge) even if there was a ruling of the Commercial Courts. Moreover, the local law-enforcement officers usually acted according to Islamic Judge's decree. However, the supremacy of the Commercial Courts over the Islamic Court for the privileged merchants was guaranteed by the law, hence the any attempt to appeal the Commercial Courts' decisions with the Islamic Court was to be avoided.²⁹⁰ To sum up, the privileged merchants enjoyed the privilege of relatively well-established juridical institutions than the other merchants did. Moreover, even the highest political authorities were interested in their cases.

Their formal advantages went beyond this. The privileged merchants could request that Sadaret official support in some issue or convenience in the bureaucratic procedures. If a privileged merchant could obtain, an *emr-i sâmi* (an official warrant from Sadaret) the local authorities had to have facilitate the official procedures for the privileged merchants and help whenever he needed.²⁹¹ For example, one Mehmed Efendi decided to travel in order to recover unpaid debts from Varna with his personal guards, *sekbân*. Before his departure, he preferred a petition to the Sublime Porte for an official warrant, *emr-i sâmi*. The Sublime Porte approved his request eventually and sent him an official warrant. According to this document, the Sublime Porte ordered the Governor of Varna to help Mehmed Efendi's operations.²⁹² To sum up, the formal institutions were more a deterrent force against fraud for the privileged merchants than the ordinary merchants. Therefore, they needed less the informal intuitions. Besides, the privileged merchants must have had mercenaries

²⁹⁰ B.O.A A}MKT.MVL 69.9 The Supreme Court decided to warn the local law-enforcement force on the issue. See also Ibid. pp.246-247.

²⁹¹ ‘‘ mu’amelât ve teshilat icrâsı hususu niyâz ve istidâ olunmuş’’ A}HR.MKT. 51.51.

²⁹² Ibid.

with them to protect their ships against the piracy and their caravans against the brigandage. For example, one of the privileged merchants Mehmed Efendi was travelling with his personal guards, *sekbân*.²⁹³

Second, doing business within community has also some implications. Douglas North states that the total social cost is higher for a segmented market composed by communities than an integrated market.²⁹⁴ For, firstly, in a segmented market there is the transaction cost for every single inter-community activity. In other words, every time two merchants from different communities were doing business, they had to pay some transaction cost. Assume that one Chiot merchant in Trabzon knowing only Greek wanted to deal with a local Armenian speaker of only Armenian and Turkish, but never the Greek; they had to hire a translator for complicated dealing operations. Second reason is the allocation problem; there is a high possibility for misallocation of the resources. Suppose that while our Chiot merchants were quite better in shipping and captaincy and the Armenians were handling better the caravans. In a single market, Chiots should be preoccupied with the shipping and the Armenians with the transportation by the land. On the contrary, if everybody were doing business within their community, in this case, the Armenians should have hire incompetent Armenian captains instead of the Greeks which had additional costs for the employer.

Finally, the fact that the privileged merchants bear a resemblance to Grief's Venetian merchants on inequality of income must be noted. The Venetian merchants were richer than the Maghribis. They acted personally and formed their own personal commercial links in the every port city. They hired a permanent representative in

²⁹³ Ibid.

²⁹⁴ Douglas North, *Institutions, institutional change, and economic performance* (Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 35.

every distant city. They were also indifferent to communal relations. On the contrary, the Maghribi trades acted always as a community and they dealt with an overseas agent, always a Maghribi, only for a season. Moreover, although they were not wealthy, the inequality of income was low. While the Maghribi merchants were drew benefit from the communal and familial relations to diminish the risk factor, the Venetian merchants did not.

After listing the differences, due the lack of primary resources, Greif speculated on the possible reasons why the Venetians were indifferent to communal and the familial relations, unlike the Maghribis, using the tools offered by the institutional school. Therefore, his arguments are not often proven by the facts. For that reason when his arguments are discussed, instead of accepting them as facts. Greif argued firstly that the inequality of income caused free-riding²⁹⁵ in the Venetians, since when they acted together the price to pay was so different for every merchants. That argument seems to be likely since there were huge income gaps between the privileged merchants. Consider the following example of the difference of the economic situation of two privileged merchants, also ex-partner, and how the juridical mechanism was not efficient for an integrated market economy by an example of a suit for a debt could endure years and years. *Hayriye tüccarı* Mehmed Emin Efendi from Trabzon, the owner of the exemplary merchant fleet in the next section, and his former partner, Mustafa, son of Deli Mehmed from Trabzon, had liquidated their company in 1844-1845(1260 according to Islamic calendar). From the petition it is seen that Mehmed Emin Efendi sued his partner after the liquidation of their company. The Commercial Court in Trabzon announced that Mustafa had 54,000 kuruş of debt to Mehmed Emin Efendi. Mustafa paid 20,000 kuruş of this

²⁹⁵ Grief, *Institutions and the Path of the Modern Economy Lessons from the Medieval Trade*, pp. 72-73.

debt by transferring a half-share of the store, a joint property of the liquated company, to his former partner. He signed a bond of 4,000 kuruş. Finally, he gave the propriety of his house in Trabzon which was worth 20,000 kuruş to Mehmed Emin Efendi.

On the other hand, Mehmed Emin Efendi was unable to dispossess Mustafa, son of Deli Mehmed from Trabzon, for six years from the house. Consequently, he sued Mustafa again in 1849-1850 (1266 according to Islamic calendar). The Commercial Court called the defendant and his father. After they promised to vacate the house, the Court set them free and held the Governor of Trabzon responsible for them keeping promise.²⁹⁶

It must be noted that Mehmed Emin Efendi was a wealthy and powerful merchant who had all the means to enforce his debtor to pay his debt. The second explication Grief suggests is the premium system. Most probably, this suggestion does not fit to the case at hand, since the privileged merchants employed captains from Ahtabolu, who worked for relatively lower salaries presumably. Of course, these salaries could be higher for a captain from Ahtabolu, but no proof exist of a premium system.

Another reason why the communal boundaries of the privileged merchants were weak was that these merchants had few people like themselves. In other word, a privileged merchant could be from any town, any ethnic and religious communities. Hence when considering the privileged merchants, the Muslims from Trabzon, the Armenians from Erzurum, the Greeks from İzmir, Jews from Haleb, the Christian Arabs from Beirut and so on are meant. There was neither a *lingua franca*, nor religious or regional commonalities unifying them. Therefore, the merchants

²⁹⁶ B.O.A HR.MKT 35.1.

from the same town and the same religion speaking the same languages could have colluded.

The Ownership and Second Hand Market²⁹⁷

As pointed out, the hometown of the shareholder has been registered occasionally. The profession was indicated when it was deemed important according to the scribes. These professions that were noted officers; captains, merchants and some shopkeepers form İstanbul. Regrettably, the entire list of shareholder's professions, like the shareholder's hometowns is not available, the professions do not provide statistical data. Still, it does not prevent speculation about the inscribed professions features as shareholders. Only some tendencies were for each profession. So, it was decided to analyze the hometown of the shareholders, if available, comparing them those of the captains only, as discussed. In this section, the characteristic of these professions as the shareholders will be discussed.

Naturally, one of the important shareholder groups was the captains.²⁹⁸ The average of the captains' share in newly-built ships was almost 40% (39.6 %). When this is weighed up again by using the freight capacities, it goes down to 34.5 %. Hence, it can be stated that the captains held the propriety of slightly more than one-

²⁹⁷ During the calculations, we ignored on purpose the document B.O.A. A}DVN.71.55, because the register miscalculated the shares, which makes 30 in sum instead of 40.

²⁹⁸ The masters navigating the smaller ships have been usually called as '*reis*' (chief) whereas '*kaptan*' (captain) was the title for the ones who navigate at least for time one of the bigger ship. For instance, when chief Papası oğlu Yımanrı quitted his ship, Mustafa son of Kethüda from Amasra, already obtained the title captain, became not the chief but the captain of the ship²⁹⁸. However, there were some exceptions too; Yanni son of Yordam mentioned as the chief of large ship as a *navi* with 14.000 *keyl* cargo capacity, but when he was replaced by another his successor's title was captain See BOA, A}DVN. 74.2.

third of the entire new ships. The difference in the two numbers results from the fact that the captains held generally greater share in the smaller ships. However, when their shares are assessed for the entire ship list, including all transactions, the number falls sharply to 15.96 %. According to the operations including sales of the share (the table 8. and table 11), many captains definitely lost shares every year.

That decline indicates that the captains may have been the weaker investors compared to the others. Most probably, since they were not rich, compared to the merchants for example, most probably they were more vulnerable to risks than the other profession groups. The effects of an economic disaster should have been harder for the captains and some of them eventually ended up as employees afterwards. The most apparent reason why the captains lost their shares is the attachment orders. Although, sometimes the creditor of the captains was a colleague seeking an opportunity to be a captain of a certified ship, most of the times, the captains lost their share because of unpaid debts to one of their partners or to a new shareholder. Foreclosing the captains' shares because of unpaid pledge was more frequent than other shareholder groups supports the argument. For example, Değirmencioğlu Abdullah from Alaplı, who had two small galleys of equal sizes,²⁹⁹ sold $\frac{3}{4}$ of one ship to Korşotolu, Yakup son of Vasil³⁰⁰ and the other $\frac{3}{4}$ of to Kerim oğlu Esad Ağa from Mudanya³⁰¹ to cover his unpaid debt in a year.

Pledging³⁰² the shares of a ship seems to have been very common in the nineteenth century shipping sector. Although, it could be detected only whenever the pledged property was encumbered in the documents, many transfers of property because of attachment order. Therefore, it can be stated that the pledging was

²⁹⁹ B.O.A A} 84.91.

³⁰⁰ B.O.A A} 85.36 $\frac{1}{4}$ of this ship remained in his property.

³⁰¹ B.O.A A} 85.36 $\frac{1}{4}$ of this ship sold to one Ali son Hacı İbrahim from Mudanya.

³⁰² We translated the word *ikrâz* as the pledge and not as mortgage See Joseph Schacht *Introduction to Islamic Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp.138-140.

perhaps more common than observed. One thing needs to be clarified; unlike the interest gained by the lending of cash, the pledge interest and pledging were not illicit in Islam since the prophet had done so. There were many hadiths of the same story of the Prophet pledging his armor to a Jew for thirty Sa's of barley. That story repeated for on many occasions in the hadith books, probably because it was quite confusing to the early Muslims asking over and over about the authenticity of what they were hearing.³⁰³ Therefore, the discussion can be ignored about whether the interest was illicit or not, since the pledge was religiously permissible.³⁰⁴

Consider the following example. Ligor from the village Engere and his captain each had half of a small ship. Unfortunately, the chargee, an onion seller from Kasımpaşa, levies a distress on that half because of unpayment.³⁰⁵ In that case the debt belonged jointly to both partners. The possession of this certified ship passed to the onion merchant. The case of captain Ligor from Engere was not particular at all, there were many of them. Therefore, many captains suffered from the heavy debt burden and some of them eventually lost their shares.

However, one can object to this observation by stating that some of the captains could have been dealing in the ship building business. The aforementioned Değirmencioğlu Abdullah from Alaplı case could be interpreted in this way. He could have ordered these two galleys from the Alaplı shipyard and got into debt

³⁰³ The Prophet died while his armour was pledged to that Jew. See Boukhari; *Volume 3, Book 34, Number 282, Volume 3, Book 34, Number 283, Volume 3, Book 34, Number 309, Volume 3, Book 34, Number 404, Volume 3, Book 35, Number 453, Volume 3, Book 35, Number 454, Volume 3, Book 41, Number 571, Volume 3, Book 45, Number 685, Volume 3, Book 45, Number 686, Volume 3, Book 45, Number 690, Volume 4, Book 52, Number 165, Volume 5, Book 59, Number 743.*

³⁰⁴ In some cases an assignee holding a proxy given by an Islamic court accomplished the sale of the share. We have many example of it. For example, one *şethiye brik* has been sold by such kind of assignee, one Hacı Mustafa, representing three shareholders in 1269 (A}DVN.85.61). We understand that to appoint a proxy of sale was very common.

³⁰⁵ BOA, A}DVN. 103.63.

when buying these ships to sell afterwards. However, if it was really the case, then the names of some captains' name must have been read over and over again. No evidence supports the hypothesis that some captains were making money by dealing in the ship-building business. Still, it seems that there was a small group of well-off captains. Therefore, although in general captains were a weak investors in their ships, there were some others rich enough to acquire shares from other ships. For example, Mahmud, son of Müezzîn reis from Trabzon, left 11,023 kuruş estate. Before dying, he had become indebted to more than four people with an amount of 2,495 kuruş, while he had been creditor of some 58 people owing him 5,566.78 kuruş.³⁰⁶

Among the owners, another profession that draws the attention was the merchant class. There were different subclasses of merchant, so it was decided to classify those in two categories, privileged and simple merchant. The privileged merchants, *hayriye ve avrupa tüccarları* and *kapan tüccarları*³⁰⁷ were most probably the wealthiest class with the *sarraf* (money-dealers). This class had been formed by Selim III against the increase in the number of former Ottoman subjects carrying foreign passports. Even though the emergence of capitalism was far beyond the understanding of Ottoman elites, they were keen observer increasing penetration of the foreign merchandises into their country. But still, what bothered them more was the spread of foreign protection among their Christian subjects dealing with international trade. Selim III was the first Sultan who sought to restrain the issue of passports by the foreign embassies. On the other hand, the European Powers

³⁰⁶ The highest number was 22 stores for only one owner. See Demirel, p.395.

³⁰⁷ There could be a secondary reason for why *yağkapani tüccarları* owned shares of certifiedships. While the vessel were being caulking, after the holes were bunged up, the ship has been pitched with tar and oiled in order to close the little holes and protect the wood from the moisture. The resin has been used to protect the part of the body of the ship under sea. Another difference between an oiled ship and a non-oiled one was that the former are usually by far faster than the latter one. See, Bostan, *Osmanlı Bahriye Teşkilâtı : XVII. yüzyılda Tersâne-i Âmire*, pp.132-135.

definitely ignored the objections of the Ottoman authorities on the issue, which impelled the government to induce its subjects to avoid foreign protection by classical means of protection.³⁰⁸ One of these attempts was the formation of new privileged merchant organizations, *avrupa tüccarı*³⁰⁹ for the non-Muslims and *hayriyye tüccarı* for the Muslims. Likewise to form a loyal rich ship-owner class against the foreign intrusion, especially the Greeks, the Sublime Porte gave subversion to the privileged merchants involved in the shipping sector.³¹⁰ Thanks to the governmental support, the privileged merchants became the most powerful ship-owner group in the 1850s.

To be a privileged merchant, a merchant had to apply to the *Divanı hümayun beylikçi kalemi* and *Ticaret Nezareti* (ministry of commerce).³¹¹ If the merchant was able to obtain a warrant from the local commission and pay the requested fee of 1,200 kuruş (this became 1,600 kuruş later on), *Ticaret Nezareti* gave him a license and authorization to his two employees.

Consider the example of Nemlizâde Mustafa el-Hac, who was the ancestor of a famous merchant family in Trabzon. Nemlizâde Mustafa el-Hac,³¹² son of Salih el-Hac residing in the Dervişalioğlu block of offices in Trabzon, called upon a commission composed of three *hayriyye tüccarı*s, one of them was *şehbender* and the

³⁰⁸ Bruce Masters, "The Sultan's entrepreneurs: the Avrupa tüccarları and the Hayriye tüccarları in Syria," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 24 (1992), p.579. See also Ali İhsan Bağış, *Osmanlı ticaretinde gayri müslimler : kapitülasyonlar, avrupa tüccarları, beratlı tüccarlar, hayriye tüccarları, 1750-1839* (İstanbul: Turhan Kitapevi, 1983).

³⁰⁹ We have to denote that the expression of *avrupa ticareti* means indeed the commerce with the Europe, like *acem ticareti* for Iran, *hindistan ticareti* for India.

³¹⁰ See Şenel.

³¹¹ Ibid, p.738.

³¹² El-Hac or Hacı is a title for the ones went to Macca for the pilgrimage. Besides its role in Islam, we have to draw attention to the fact that the pilgrimage was an expensive trip to Macca that only some wealthy people could afford.

others were *muhtars*,³¹³ to be a privileged merchant for Iranian, Indian and European trade. Thereby, the commission preferred a petition to the Ministry of Commerce about this request. After the payment of the requested fee of 1,600 kuruş in sum and the full examination of Nemlizâde Mustafa by the Ministry, the commission sent a bill to the Sublime Porte for a certificate on 21 September 1853.³¹⁴ That seems to have been the standard procedure for being a *hayriye tüccarı*, since one Bekir Efendi, son of el-hac Arif Ağa from Asmaaltı İstanbul, paid the same amount 1,600 kuruş to become a protected merchant.³¹⁵

There was another application from Nemlizâde Mustafa in the same file. He requested another certificate for his Karamani/Karamanlides personnel named Temel Efendi, son of Mustafa el-Hac (but not Nemlizâde Mustafa). The merchant had the right for an adjunct certificate for at least one of his employees. What's striking is that Nemlizâde Mustafa employed two Karamani/Karamanlides for the trade. Most probably, these two men knew both Turkish and Greek language, two *lingua franca* in Ottoman trade before the spread of French, enabling them to negotiate with any kind of merchants.³¹⁶

The certified for avrupa and hayriyye ticareti was dispersed only in the Capital by 1806. The other major ports cities were included by 1815.³¹⁷ These certificates granted privileges to Ottoman merchants to enjoy not only the same advantages about custom duties as the foreign merchants, but also the merchants with certification that were exempted from most of the internal custom duties, while they

³¹³ Şehbender's name was irrelevant, but the names of the *muhtars* were Mehmed Emin and Mehmed Emin el-Hac whose names are going to be mentioned in the next pages.

³¹⁴ A}DVN.116.92.

³¹⁵ A}DVN.146.72.

³¹⁶ A}DVN.116.92.

³¹⁷ Masters, p.580.

had priority in the local trade like *kapın tüccarları* (cereal merchants).³¹⁸ For example, when the Anglo-Ottoman agreement of 1838 abolished the internal customs and reduced the foreign customs to 5% for exportation and 3% for importation to Ottoman lands, they gained the same rights *ex proprio vigour*.³¹⁹

In addition to this, the local authorities most likely facilitate the official procedures for the privileged merchants and helped them whenever needed.³²⁰ For example, one Mehmed Efendi decided to travel in order to recover unpaid debts from Varna with his personal guards. Before his departure, he submitted a petition to the Sublime Porte for an official warrant, (*emr-i sâmi*). Moreover, the Sublime Porte made the governor of Varna responsible for helping him.³²¹

Bruce Masters claims that the program was abrogated in the 1860s, but the exact date is unclear. He noted that the last certificates dated 1861 and by 1864 no one referred to these certificates anymore in the courts.³²² A document was found during this study which could provide a better estimation for the abolition date. While he exported four bales of yarn to England, one İslam Ağa from Bakova (near Üsküp in Macedonia), *hayriye* merchant, refused to pay 8% custom duty at the Niş custom like an ordinary Ottoman merchant, claiming that he had paid recently only %3 at the Bağdad custom, was his privilege. Nevertheless, his merchandise was confiscated by the order of Hayri Efendi, the revenue officer for the Danubian coast to the Niş custom officer. The event was reported to the capital. As a result, the Sublime Porte ordered governor of Niş, Müddet Paşa, to give the merchandises to the owner in 14/C/1279 (7 Nov 1862), but the custom duty should be fixed to 8% from

³¹⁸ Ibid., pp. 580-582.

³¹⁹ Ibid., p. 582.

³²⁰ “*mu’amelât ve teshilat icrâsı hususu niyâz ve istidâ olunmuş*” A}HR.MKT.

51.51

³²¹ Ibid.

³²² Masters, p.293.

now on.

When the privileged merchants' behaviours in the shipping sector are examined, it can be said that they usually had the ownership of an entire ship. The most common type of ship they owned was *şethiye brik*. Some had even a fleet. Consequently, it can be argued that there were numerous privileged merchants with proper ships to carry their own goods. One of these privileged merchants who owned a fleet was Hacı Haşim Efendizâde Mehmed Emin Efendi from Trabzon, whose name was mentioned above in the unpaid debt case. The operations of that *hayriyye tüccarı* from Trabzon Hacı Haşim Efendizâde Mehmed Emin Efendi would be a perfect example. As understood, Mehmed Emin Efendi decided to replace the captains of his ships, at least some of its merchant fleet, for reasons unknown. Still, that operation gives an idea about how many ships a large ship-owner could possess. While, he seems to have fired nine of his captains (four of whom were from Rize, and other employees were from different towns, Giresun, Trabzon, Tirebolu, Sürmeneli and Bartın) and hire nine new ones (seven from Ahtabolu,³²³ one from Tirebolu and one from Trabzon), he promoted only one, Kara Ahmed from Tirebolu, to a bigger ship.

He acquired full ownership of eight *şethiye brik*, one brigatine and two-third of a small *şethiye birk*.³²⁴ Haşim Efendizâde's merchant fleet's freight ranged from 4,000 *keyl* (102,632 kg) to 13,000 *keyl* (333,554 kg) and it could transport 166,333³²⁵

³²³ Two of the names of captains from Ahtabolu were registered twice in different papers. If it's not a big coincidence, most probably the register has enrolled the names of these two captains twice for the ships whose captaincy was vacant for a while by Haşim Efendizâde's will.

³²⁴ BOA, A}DVN. 85.99, A}DVN. 85.100, A}DVN. 86.1, A}DVN. 86.2, A}DVN. 86.3, A}DVN. 86.4, A}DVN. 86.5, A}DVN. 86.6, A}DVN. 86.7, A}DVN. 86.9, A}DVN. 86.10, A}DVN. 86.11, A}DVN. 86.12,

³²⁵ While we are calculating the sum, we added only two of third of the 4.000 *keyl*, 2666 *keyl*, to the sum, since Haşim Efendizâde owned only 2/3 share of this vessel. For, we were interested in only with the Haşim Efendizâde's fleet cargo capacity reflecting his

keyl (4,336,202 kg) of cereal in sum. The lengths of the ships were between 21 *zira*' (15.91 meters) to 37 *zira*' (28 meters) and their mean length was 26 *zira*' (20 meters).

There were simple merchants too, but their weight seems to be relatively marginal comparing to that of the privileged merchants. As explained in the first chapter, the simple merchants began to disappear especially after the Crimean War. The period under question coincided with the Crimean War and after. Therefore, unlike the privileged merchants, they owned small shares from medium-sized old-fashioned ships. For example, Kandil oğlu Salih from Trabzon sold his entire share (one-third of the *sopa başlı martiko* with two masts from Çakraz Bay) to one Hüseyin Efendi dealing with tobacco trade in Trabzon and other share-holder local merchant Hatibzâde Ahmed (two third of the ship) sold one-third of the share also to the same Hüseyin Efendi, who acquired finally half of the ship. The captain from Trabzon was also replaced by another from Trabzon. Their old-fashioned sailing ship's capacity was quite low according to those of privileged merchants, 3,500 *keyl* only.

This was not the sole case. There was some Phanariot Yorgi merchant of cereals bought the 75% of a *beşçifte martiko* with 2,600 *keyl* cargo capacity from the captain,³²⁶ and many others. Of course, there were some exceptions as always like the merchant from Hâtibkapısı, Resul oğlu Ali Yazıcı, who held shares of half of a modern ship, *şethiye brik*, carrying 6,000 *keyl*,³²⁷ but they were fewer in numbers. However, there is example of a simple merchant possessing more than one ship like Haşim Efendizâde Mehmed Emin Efendi.

wealth. Nevertheless, we accepted full length of the same ship, because here the main issue is the length as feature of the ships which has no sense for wealth.

³²⁶ B.O.A A}.DVN. 103.78.

³²⁷ B.O.A A}.DVN. 70.74.

The name of the shopkeepers was also mentioned in the documents. It is presumed that their share was usually placement not investment in business. However, there was no other supplementary resource can prove or refute it. Professions related to shipbuilding, *yorgancı* (puff-seller) and *kömürcü* (coal merchant) attract the attention. All that can be said about the shopkeepers is that there were more share-sales than share-purchasing. They could have been in an economic crisis, but it can not be proven it. Since no further information exists, it is impossible to discuss only the ones relating to timber and to pass the others quickly by enlisting the shopkeeper's professions: *bezci* (tissue seller),³²⁸ *yemenici*,³²⁹ *mimar* (architect),³³⁰ *çivici*(nail-seller),³³¹ *yorgancı*(puff-seller) ,³³² *kömürcü*(coal merchant) ,³³³ *keserci* (adze-seller),³³⁴ *pekmezci*,³³⁵ *saatçi*(watchmaker),³³⁶ *şekerlemeci* (candy shopkeeper),³³⁷ *serapçı*,³³⁸ *lüleci*(clay-seller),³³⁹ , *nalçacı*³⁴⁰ , *kalkançı* (shield-maker),³⁴¹ *araba yapıcı* (chariot builder),³⁴² *eczâcı* (pharmacist),³⁴³ *yaferci*,³⁴⁴ *taşçı* (mason),³⁴⁵ *eşraf* (notable),³⁴⁶ *terzi* (tailor),³⁴⁷ *berber* (barber),³⁴⁸ *hasırcı* (mat

³²⁸ A}DVN 85.57(sold his shares), A}DVN 70.18.

³²⁹ A}DVN 84.6, A}DVN 72.18, A}DVN 73.78 A}DVN 103.78(sold his shares)

³³⁰ A}DVN 74.60.

³³¹ A}DVN 74.59.

³³² A}DVN 86.70(sold his shares), A}DVN 87.73, A}DVN 90.31, A}DVN 63.21, A}DVN 103.78, A}DVN 111.3.

³³³ A}DVN 86.79(bought some shares), A}DVN 87.87, A}DVN 91.5, A}DVN 84.4, A}DVN 78.20, A}DVN 63.21.

³³⁴ A}DVN 88.9, A}DVN 88.21.

³³⁵ A}DVN 88.21(sold his shares).

³³⁶ A}DVN 88.31(sold his shares).

³³⁷ A}DVN 92.90(sold his shares).

³³⁸ A}DVN 92.93(sold his shares).

³³⁹ A}DVN 93.25(sold his shares).

³⁴⁰ A}DVN 93.38, A}DVN 84.4(sold his shares).

³⁴¹ A}DVN 102.58.

³⁴² A}DVN 63.17(sold his shares).

³⁴³ A}DVN 70.15.

³⁴⁴ A}DVN 70.22(sold his shares).

³⁴⁵ A}DVN 103.78, A}DVN 111.6.

³⁴⁶ A}DVN 115.57.

³⁴⁷ A}DVN 112.92(sold his shares).

³⁴⁸ A}DVN 122.92(bought some shares).

maker),³⁴⁹ *soğancı* (onion-seller)³⁵⁰ and *kapak yapıcı*³⁵¹. Only *serenci* (yard-maker)³⁵², *yelkenci*³⁵³ (sail-maker), *halatçı* (rope-seller),³⁵⁴ *salcı* (raft-builder),³⁵⁵ *dülger* (carpenter),³⁵⁶ *makaracı*³⁵⁷ (spool-seller) were professions related to shipbuilding. However, the timber merchants' names were mentioned more than the other professions. Timber was the main building material of the ships. That's why there was plenty reasons for a timber merchant to have a share from a wooden ship. For instance, one of the money dealers, Hoca Simon, sold his ships to Kara Agop the timber merchant.³⁵⁸ In the other the examples, Hoca Simon son of Kaçar, a money dealer (resident of the office at Rabiyye hanı), sold a *beşçifte matriko* to Kara Agop the timber merchant in 1851-1852 (1268 according to Islamic calendar).³⁵⁹ Again Simon sold half of a small brig to him in 1852-1853 (1269 according to Islamic calendar).³⁶⁰ Kara Agop was one of the most active timber merchants. It is presumed that the timber merchants could provide timber for free or at a cheaper price in order to have a free share in it. In other words, probably the timber merchants or maybe the other shopkeepers related to ship-building bartered the primary materials for the ships against some shares.

Finally the Ottoman money-dealers deserve mention. The money-dealers were untrustworthy subjects in the eyes Ottoman authorities, so they needed special

³⁴⁹ A}DVN 111.11(sold his shares).

³⁵⁰ A}DVN 103.63(bought some shares).

³⁵¹ A}DVN 102.58(sold his shares).

³⁵² A}DVN 87.68.

³⁵³ A}DVN 149.73.

³⁵⁴ A}DVN 85.56, A}DVN 88.19, A}DVN 68.96, A}DVN 73.67(sold his shares).

³⁵⁵ A}DVN 105.43.

³⁵⁶ A}DVN 111.9, A}DVN 109.13(bought some shares).

³⁵⁷ A}DVN 90.29(sold his shares).

³⁵⁸ There was of course exceptions, for example Birrus son of Alik decided to sell the ship to one Hacı Ali and Minhali son of Nicola from Lesbos Island see B.O.A. A}DVN.83.56 .

³⁵⁹ A}DVN.74.30.

³⁶⁰ A}DVN.84.100.

warrants to carry out some transactions, like possessing certified ships. The use of the adjectives of the scribes exposed the point-of view of the State for its subjects by their language used in the maritime certificates. The money dealers were called as members of guild³⁶¹ and despite their wealth there was no expression of respect, like it was for the protected merchants, because of the fact that the interest revenue gained from lending cash was forbidden in Islam (*ribâ'* - excess ريباء). To compare with others, the best complimentary references were used for the Pashas. That was followed by *İlmiye* (the Islamic clergy) and the small officers. The privileged and wealthy merchants were called either Efendi or Ağa. If they were respected enough according the Ottoman officers, they could note the father's name like it was a family name with the suffix *zâde* instead of calling them selves *oğlu* (son). Money-dealers had probably no interest in keeping the ships or the possession of such ships was forbidden. However, it's for sure that the money dealers sold their shares and never kept them in their portfolios.

In conclusion, the captains and the simple merchant and maybe some of the shopkeepers lost their shares in total. The sharp fall of the demand in the after the Crimean War period was most likely disastrous for the simple merchants and shopkeepers. In fact, they were suffering from the escalating competition of the foreign merchants and their commodities before and after the Crimean War. The Crimean War was nothing more than a short break in their decline. When it ended, most of the simple merchants went bankrupt within a decade. That is why, they sold their shares. The other group who lost their shares was the captains, but the reason was different. It was observed that the shares of some captains were attached because of unpaid debts. The captains were often weaker investors possessing a limited

³⁶¹ A}DVN.83.56 [...]teba-ı Devlet-i Aliden sarraf taifesinden Büyük bekehanında mütemekkin Alik oğlu Birrus[...].

saving and during economic troubles they had only one resort to sell their shares. In most of the cases, the captains lost their jobs along with their shares.

The situation of the privileged merchant was quite different from that of others. They were protected from the foreign competition by the government. Therefore, some of them became richer every day. Some others possessed merchant fleets of big and modern ships. It can be stated that there were the most important class in the shipping business.

Conclusion

To sum up, thanks to its vast forest surrendering the city and thus a powerful timber industry, Bartın and its vicinity were the primary ship-building area of the Anatolian Black Sea coast for centuries until the arrival of the steamers. The city kept producing wooden ships after the spread of the steamships, but this time the big brig production was replaced by small vessels. Ünye, on the other hand, had no forests like Bartın, but still enjoyed being the sole producer of the east coasts. The captains from Bartın, Ünye and a small producer site, Alaplı, benefitted from the existence of lively shipbuilding in their town. To guarantee their jobs on ships, they usually bought some shares from newly-built ships. The captains from Rize were also investors in their ships, but some of them lost their share with their job between 1851 and 1861. On the other hand, the captains from Ahtabolu and Trabzon were simple employees. The number of captains from Ahtabolu increased. The employer of this new-comer group was the privileged merchants in general.

The reason why the captains from Bartın, Ünye, Alaplı and Rize invested in their ships was not only to guarantee their jobs, but also to gain more freedom, to

promote themselves from captain to partner. Remember that when a captain had no share and there was a sole proprietor, the captain was a simple employee, but whenever the captain had some shares or there was a more than one shareholder, in such cases, the captain became a part of the deal. The captain had to be someone all the partners trusted. Otherwise, the captains could have deceit one or several shareholders by making tacit agreements with other partners. For that reason whenever a new partner acquired half of a ship, he almost always convinced the other(s) to replace the captain whom he had trusted.

One of the ways to make sure that the captains did not cheat was to hire from the fellow townsmen. In fact, the main problem was that the formal institutions, the surveillance, the juridical mechanisms or the law-enforcement were not able to implement the existent laws or minimize the risk factors. For that reason, in the Ottoman Empire, the informal institutions replace the formal ones. The informal institutions like community responsibility, reputation, communal punishment or any other unwritten law such as *mencshkeit*, (mankind) between the merchants and the employer and the employee inspired confidence for the market and regulated the market mechanisms.

For that reason, the simple merchants, the Greek ship-owners, hired from among their relatives and fellow townsmen. By doing so, they solved the trust issue with the help of informal institutions. On the other hand, the privileged merchants, *hayriye ve avrupa tüccarları*, were indifferent to their fellow townsmen. First of all, hiring fellow townsmen instead of someone who could accomplish the task better had a supplementary cost. Therefore, if a ship-owner who handled the trust issue insisted on employing fellow townsmen instead of a better option, this would be irrational in economic terms and lose money. Most probably, the privileged

merchants have managed to diminish the risk factor to a minimum. One of the reasons why the risk was lowest could have been that the privileged merchants were enjoying the new trade courts and a modern trade code. Moreover, highest authorities of the country, *Meclis-i Vâlâ* (the Supreme Council), the Sublime Porte and the local governors contributed to their legal proceedings and their bureaucratic operations. Therefore, it can be stated that there was a duality in the legal and executive systems in the Ottoman lands, one for the foreign and the simple merchants and another for the privileged merchants. While the former was the traditional institutions already made obsolete in the age of emerging capitalism, though being modern, the latter institutions were not fully applied yet in the Ottoman economic. Anyhow, the privileged merchants enjoyed better juridical and executive institutions than their competitors.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION

The day the Edirne Treaty was signed, 14 September 1829, the Ottoman Empire lost its supremacy over the Black Sea for good. It took only 55 years for Russia put an end to Ottoman control over the region. Now, the Ottomans drew back to the south part of the Black Sea and the Straits became the economic and politic defense line of the Empire against the Russia. In fact the Straits had always been the key to control over the Black Sea; no sailing ship could pass from the Mediterranean Sea to the Black Sea or vice versa, without a permit from the rulers of İstanbul for centuries. The name of such permit in the Ottoman Empire was sailing permit (*izn-i sefine*). The sailing permits helped the Empire protect its inland seas from the infiltration of foreign economies. However, although, the Sublime Porte kept the right to forbid sailing of any kind of ship until 1871, the foreign economies began to penetrate the area gradually (The Russians with the Edirne Treaty in 1829 and the British Empire with the Baltalimanı Treaty in 1838) and the Ottoman elites understood that the sailing permits would no longer be enough to maintain the order.

The first merchants who came to Trabzon province were Chiot travelling under Russian passports. Naturally, they managed the Russo-Ottoman trade, which boomed in the 1830s. Russia kept its de facto monopoly over the foreign trade in the Black Sea. However, things started to change with the Baltalimanı Treaty. Another group of merchants from the Ionian Islands settled in Trabzon province. Thanks to the British protectorate, they carried British passports and British goods. Challenging

the Chiot more every day, the Ionian merchants opened new branches in the Iranian transit trade via Trabzon. Still most probably the Russian merchants managed to keep their supremacy until the Crimean War (1853-1856).

Another merchants group, most of which did not survive the post-Crimean War years, was the traditional Ottoman merchants and shopkeepers. Already suffering from the ongoing foreign competition, the traditional merchants were replaced by their Greek competitors. For that reason, the weight in the shipping faded every year. However, the situation was completely different for the protected merchants, *hayriye ve avrupa tüccarları*. This group of merchants had been formed by Selim III, who had desired to prevent the alienation of the Ottoman merchants and to eventually limit the increase of merchants with foreign passports. These merchants enjoyed all the privileges of the foreign merchants, like lower custom duties. In addition, they had many privileges in the local courts, bureaucratic operations and there was active governmental support, which the foreign merchants did not have. To prevent the infiltration of Greek shipping in the Black Sea, which could be precarious for the navy as it had been during the Greek Revolution, the Sublime supported Muslim shipping, especially the protected merchants, at all cost. Therefore, thanks to governmental support and the economic needs of the era, the protected merchants acquired their own merchant fleets.

Partnership was rare in the Ottoman Black Sea for both foreign flagged ships and Ottoman ships in the mid-nineteenth century. First of all, the Greeks operated as family companies. There was often a *pater familias*, a grand-father or an elder brother, who ruled the company, and the other brothers, cousins and brothers-in-law were partners in this company. In the Chiot families, brothers managed the branches located in every deposit port, yet the ships were the property of the family in both

Chiot and Ionian families.

In addition to this fact, nearly half of the Ottoman flagged wooden ships sailing in the Black Sea were owned by a single owner. Although partnerships composed by two or three partners were more than 40%, the partnership over the three partners was an exception. There was also a tendency for more sole proprietorship. The rational expectation for single ownership was high in larger and medium-sized ships, because the wealthiest ship-owners, who possessed small merchant fleets usually, decided to add additional ships to their fleets. The wealthiest ship-owners seem to have anticipated higher profits by investing their money in a single ship than diversifying their portfolio. Most probably; their observation of the market could have strengthened their anticipation. Especially in the largest ships, many partnerships ended with the sale of shares to a single owner and the single owners rarely sold their shares to other people.

Another similarity was that being a relative or fellow townsman was important in doing business for both the Greek and the simple Ottoman merchants, but not for the protected merchants. The reason why the Greek ship-owners and the simple Ottoman merchants hired their fellow townsmen as the captains of their ships was the issue of trust. Since he was dealing with distant consumers, a captain could cheat the ship-owners in many ways, he could transport more cargo than he reported, he could misreport the prices, steal money and he could deceive in many other ways. The fact that the formal institutions were insufficient to survey and punish him made impossible for a ship-owner to trust in his captain. However, in this situation the informal institutions substituted the formal ones and reconstituted the confidence between the ship-owners and the captains. In addition to this, by hiring a fellow townsman the ship-owners were able to minimize the social costs.

The protected merchants were indifferent to their fellow townsmen. They employed captains from different towns. The reason for this divergence could be that the formal institutions that the protected merchants applied were different from those of the simple merchants. While simple merchants applied to the local Islamic judge (*kadi*), who decided according to Islamic law and the petit officers from the local police force interested in their cases, the protected merchants enjoyed the privileges of the new commercial courts and the new code of commerce, inspired by the coeval French code, and the governors helped them. Therefore, the formal institutions were sufficed for the protected merchants to such a degree that they did not need the informal institutions as much as the simple merchants did. In addition to this, the protected merchants had commercial networks throughout the country, which most probably enabled them to monitor the actions of their employees and some had their bodyguards (*sekbân*), who probably helped them collect debts.

Another feature of this divergence could be that while simple merchants' ships usually made voyages out and returned to the original port where their owner and the captain lived, the ships of the protected merchants sailed to different ports according to the need of their owners. The protected merchants had their own fleet composed of the fastest ships of their era, brigs. The brig-type ships were the most common kind of vessel both in the Mediterranean Sea and the Black Sea.

The proper kind of ship in the Black Sea was the *şethiye brik*, a mixture of a genuine Ottoman ship, the *şethiye*, and half-rigged brigs with two masts. Most probably, the construction of the first merchant brigs started after the Çeşme Defeat (1770) and became widespread after 1829 with governmental support. Observing the efficiency of brig ships during the Greek Revolution most likely convinced the Sublime Porte to launch a program to support brig-type shipbuilding in the Black

Sea, but still the economic reasons would have been more important in the choice of the ship-owners. The merchants dealing with international trade, the Ottoman protected merchants and the Greeks, possessed brigs in their fleets and during the first half of the century, as the protected merchants and the Greeks became richer, they expanded their fleets.

Although, the brigs most likely handled at least the half of the transportation made by the Ottoman ships, the old-fashioned ships were still in use on the shorter distances. Some of these ships, the oared ships, which necessitated more power, operated between even closer ports, especially the one where sailing ships could not go. The owners of the old-fashioned ships were simple merchants. Most probably suffering from the foreign competition, they could barely afford to buy new ships. Although some of them managed to survive until the eve of the Crimean War, most of them went bankrupt after the war.

Finally, the situation of the captains should be summarized. Most of the captains were from Alaplı, Bartın, Rize, Trabzon, Ünye and Ahtabolu. In the 1850s while the captains from Alaplı and Rize lost their jobs and their shares, captains from Ahtabolu were hired especially by the protected merchants. In fact, in the relationship between investors in a ship, the captains were the weaker parties who lost their shares easily when facing economic trouble. The situation of the captains from Bartın, Ünye and Trabzon remained unchanged for more than a decade. The captains from Bartın, Ünye were also shareholders in their ships, thanks to shipbuilding industry in their towns. However, these two shipbuilding sites were completely different, since Bartın was the most important ship building site, in close proximity to the local timber industry. Ünye was probably nothing more than an increasing returns centre on the East Black Sea coast.

Since they were also shareholders in their ships, the captains from Bartın, Ünye, were most probably more powerful than simple employees. For, as was demonstrated, the captains gained freedom and influence over the partners when he had some shares or there was more than one ship-owner. As the share of the captain or the number of the shareholders increased, the captain became more powerful, as the number of the shareholders decreased as well as the shares; in this case, the captains lost their influence over the partners. Accordingly, captains who had no share and navigated ships possessed by a single ship-owner were fired more often than usual (more than 90%). Naturally, the captains with shares were replaced by another under one condition, if a new share-holder acquired a remarkable share, which was the half of the ship in most cases. A new shareholder powerful enough to convince the others usually requested that the captain be changed, most probably because he shrank from the fact that the actual captain could cheat with or without collaboration of the extant shareholders. Consequently, the new, powerful shareholders replaced the captains with others on whom they could rely.

In conclusion, despite the infiltration of the Greeks, the shipping in the Black Sea between 1830 and 1860 remained under the control of the Muslim population until the arrival of the steamers. The shipping market in the Black Sea was different from that of the Mediterranean. While, the Greeks and international big companies handled shipping with their big, fast sailing ships, even the first steamships started to operate regularly, the impact of the ongoing international trade remained limited and the extant ship-owners and captains preserved their situation.

Table 2.Extracts from B.O.A. Düvel-I Ecnebiyye Tasnifi no:91 (1245-1317)

1	Çelik Triste Kantar 1 nun 90 90 180	Çelik Rusya Kantar nun 90 40 130	Mantar kavı kıyye 1 nun 2 4 6	İğne beher 1000 nun 5 3 8	Alaca Rusya kebir top 1 zira' 33 nun 40 80 120
2	Ağaç kavı kıyye 1 nun 5 8 13	iç badem Kantar nun 100 150 250	kabuklu badem kantar 1 nun 25 40 65	kehribar ham kıyye 1 nun 300 240 540	aba-ı rusya top 1 zira' 60 nun 20 30 50
3	revgan pelesenk kıyye 1 nun 54 47 100*	revgan sade rusya kıyye 1 nun 70 72 142	sarı mor bakkam kantar 1 nun 50 50 100	örk şişe 1 nun 3 3 6	Enva'i sandal ağacı 1 nun 80 85 165
4	demir heybe kilidi beher 100 nun 45 25 70	şıyyak eksiz frenk şaliyi triste top 1 zira' 35 nun 75 110 185	kafuri kıyye 1 nun 5 45 50	abanoz ağacı kantar 1 nun 108 162 270	toplu iğne beher 1000 nun 3 5 8
5	demir top kantar 1 nun 30 40 70	yamcı çerkez kantar 1 nun 30 50 80	mısır ve kırım kebesi kantar 1 nun 20 40 60	kakula kıyye 1 nun 40 50 90	havyar kantar 1 nun 60 70 130
6	şıyyak ekli frenk şaliyi triste top 1 zira' 35 nun 90 200 290	kenevir ham rusya kantar 1 nun 36 36 72	teyyel rusya kantar 1 nun 40 40 80	rusya mahsülü 1 nun 0	çakı ve makas rusya deste 1 nun 4 31 35

7

balık tutkalı	siyah tutkal	mercan ham	âla tesbihlik dizi mercan	vasat tesbihlik dizi mercan
kiyye	kantar	kiyye	kiyye	kiyye
1	1	1	1	1
nun	nun	nun	nun	nun
8	100	200	400	300
12	70	150	480	300
20	170	350	880	600

8

urgan-ı rusya	köse-i rusya	kükürt köse-i rusya	telatin-i rusya-ı kebir	telatin-i bulgarî
kantar	beher	beher	kiyye	kiyye
1	1	1	1	1
nun	nun	nun	nun	nun
18	10	6	4	3
40	40	14	7	3
58	50	20	11	6

9

kahve-i frengi	kahve-i yemen	çuha-ı londra-ı ingiliz	pars çuhası vasat ve ednâ	çuha-ı leh
kiyye			metro	metro
1	1	1	1	1
			zira'	zira'
			55	55
nun	nun	nun	nun	nun
19	9	180	600	270
	15	320	1150	160
19	24	500	1750	430

10

Alaca Rusya safir	sarı saba	örk	cıva	kimyon
top	kiyye	şişe	kiyye	kantar
1	1	1	1	1
nun	nun	nun	nun	nun
30	6	3	18	40
40	11	3	22	60
70	17	6	40	100

11

fafav	kalay	kağıt lob	kırmızı havyar	sagri-ı kırım
kiyye	kantar	deste	kantar	beher
1	1	1	1	1
nun	nun	nun	nun	nun
9	270	2,5	60	3
3	380	9,5	70	4
12	650	12	130	7

12

karanfil	kırmızı	vasat tesbihlik dizi mercan	urgan-ı rusya	kösele tabanı
kiyye	kiyye	kiyye	kantar	beher
1	1	1	1	1
nun	nun	nun	nun	nun
54	180	200	18	3
46	90	200	40	5
100	270	400	58	8

simple distribuion of the ships




Fig. 1: The Simple Distribution of the Ship Types

Note: It includes the ships from the Danube River




Fig. 2: The redistribution of the ships according to their cargo capacity

Note: It includes the ships from the Danube River




Fig. 3: The redistribution of the ships according to their cargo capacity

Note: It doesn't include the ships from the Danube River




Fig. 4: The quantity of the ships built by each shipyard




Fig. 5: The shipyards according the cargo capacities of the ships (1)

Note: It includes the ships from the Danube River




Fig. 6: The shipyards according the cargo capacities of the ships (2)

Note: It doesn't include the ships from the Danube River

number of partners	big ships	mediocre ships	small ships	sum	big ships	mediocre ships	small ships	Sum
only the captain				130				19.35%
1	56	100	168	324	43.75%	47.17%	50.60%	48.21%
2	24	55	108	187	18.75%	25.94%	32.53%	27.83%
3	31	36	34	101	24.22%	16.98%	10.24%	15.03%
4	11	11	17	39	8.59%	5.19%	5.12%	5.80%
5	1	8	3	12	0.78%	3.77%	0.90%	1.79%
6	1	1	1	3	0.78%	0.47%	0.30%	0.45%
7	4	0	0	4	3.13%	0.00%	0.00%	0.60%
8	0	1	0	1	0.00%	0.47%	0.00%	0.15%
9	0	0	1	1	0.00%	0.00%	0.30%	0.15%
10	0	0	0	0	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%

Table 3. The number of the shareholders according to the sizes of the ships situation all transactions.

number of partners	big ships	mediocre ships	small ships	sum	big ships	mediocre ships	small ships	Sum
only the captain				51				26.56%
1	16	34	58	108	61.54%	52.31%	57.43%	56.25%
2	3	21	26	50	11.54%	32.31%	25.74%	26.04%
3	2	6	8	16	7.69%	9.23%	7.92%	8.33%
4	3	3	6	12	11.54%	4.62%	5.94%	6.25%
5	0	1	2	3	0.00%	1.54%	1.98%	1.56%
6	0	0	0	0	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
7	2	0	0	2	7.69%	0.00%	0.00%	1.04%
8	0	0	0	0	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
9	0	0	1	1	0.00%	0.00%	0.99%	0.52%
10	0	0	0	0	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%

Table 4. The number of the shareholders according to the sizes of the ships in the newly-built ships.

number of partners	big ships	mediocre ships	small ships	sum	big ships	mediocre ships	small ships	Sum
only the captain								
1	13	11	5	29	92.86%	84.62%	71.43%	85.29%
2	0	2	1	3	0.00%	15.38%	14.29%	8.82%
3	1	0	1	2	7.14%	0.00%	14.29%	5.88%
4	0	0	0	0	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
5	0	0	0	0	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
6	0	0	0	0	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
7	0	0	0	0	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
8	0	0	0	0	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
9	0	0	0	0	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
10	0	0	0	0	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%

Table 5. The number of the shareholders according to the sizes of the ships including all transactions in which only the captain was replaced.

initial situation								
number of partners	big ships	mediocre ships	small ships	sum	big ships	mediocre ships	small ships	Sum
only the captain				11				14.10%
1	5	8	17	30	33.33%	30.77%	45.95%	38.46%
2	4	8	12	24	26.67%	30.77%	32.43%	30.77%
3	4	5	7	16	26.67%	19.23%	18.92%	20.51%
4	2	2	1	5	13.33%	7.69%	2.70%	6.41%
5	0	2	0	2	0.00%	7.69%	0.00%	2.56%
6	0	1	0	1	0.00%	3.85%	0.00%	1.28%
7	0	0	0	0	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
8	0	0	0	0	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
9	0	0	0	0	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
10	0	0	0	0	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%

Table 6. The initial situation of the transactions including only the sale of shares

final situation								
number of partners	big ships	mediocre ships	small ships	sum	big ships	mediocre ships	small ships	Sum
only the captain				4				5.13%
1	3	10	12	25	20.00%	38.46%	32.43%	32.05%
2	3	4	14	21	20.00%	15.38%	37.84%	26.92%
3	8	8	7	23	53.33%	30.77%	18.92%	29.49%
4	0	2	3	5	0.00%	7.69%	8.11%	6.41%
5	0	2	1	3	0.00%	7.69%	2.70%	3.85%
6	1	0	0	1	6.67%	0.00%	0.00%	1.28%
7	0	0	0	0	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
8	0	0	0	0	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
9	0	0	0	0	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
10	0	0	0	0	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%

Table 7. The final situation of the transactions including only the sale of shares

the difference								
number of partners	big ships	mediocre ships	small ships	sum	big ships	mediocre ships	small ships	Sum
only the captain				-7				-8.97%
1	-2	2	-5	-5	-13.33%	7.69%	-13.51%	-6.41%
2	-1	-4	2	-3	-6.67%	-15.38%	5.41%	-3.85%
3	4	3	0	7	26.67%	11.54%	0.00%	8.97%
4	-2	0	2	0	-13.33%	0.00%	5.41%	0.00%
5	0	0	1	1	0.00%	0.00%	2.70%	1.28%
6	1	-1	0	0	6.67%	-3.85%	0.00%	0.00%
7	0	0	0	0	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
8	0	0	0	0	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
9	0	0	0	0	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
10	0	0	0	0	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%

Table 8. The variation between the final and the initial situations of the transactions including only the sale of shares

initial situation								
number of partners	big ships	mediocre ships	small ships	Sum	big ships	mediocre ships	small ships	Sum
only the captain				22				17.74%
1	4	12	34	50	16.67%	37.50%	50.00%	40.32%
2	5	6	22	33	20.83%	18.75%	32.35%	26.61%
3	8	10	8	26	33.33%	31.25%	11.76%	20.97%
4	4	2	3	9	16.67%	6.25%	4.41%	7.26%
5	1	2	0	3	4.17%	6.25%	0.00%	2.42%
6	0	0	1	1	0.00%	0.00%	1.47%	0.81%
7	2	0	0	2	8.33%	0.00%	0.00%	1.61%
8	0	0	0	0	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
9	0	0	0	0	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
10	0	0	0	0	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%

Table 9. The initial situation of the transactions including both the sale of shares and the replacement of the captain

final situation								
number of partners	big ships	mediocre ships	small ships	sum	big ships	mediocre ships	small ships	Sum
only the captain				17				13.71%
1	14	20	38	72	58.33%	62.50%	55.88%	58.06%
2	3	5	27	35	12.50%	15.63%	39.71%	28.23%
3	5	3	1	9	20.83%	9.38%	1.47%	7.26%
4	2	2	2	6	8.33%	6.25%	2.94%	4.84%
5	0	1	0	1	0.00%	3.13%	0.00%	0.81%
6	0	0	0	0	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
7	0	0	0	0	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
8	0	1	0	1	0.00%	3.13%	0.00%	0.81%
9	0	0	0	0	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
10	0	0	0	0	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%

Table 10. The final situation of the transactions including both the sale of shares and the replacement of the captain

the difference								
number of partners	big ships	mediocre ships	small ships	sum	big ships	mediocre ships	small ships	Sum
only the captain				-5				-4.03%
1	10	8	4	22	41.67%	25.00%	5.88%	17.74%
2	-2	-1	5	2	-8.33%	-3.13%	7.35%	1.61%
3	-3	-7	-7	-17	-12.50%	-21.88%	-10.29%	-13.71%
4	-2	0	-1	-3	-8.33%	0.00%	-1.47%	-2.42%
5	-1	-1	0	-2	-4.17%	-3.13%	0.00%	-1.61%
6	0	0	-1	-1	0.00%	0.00%	-1.47%	-0.81%
7	-2	0	0	-2	-8.33%	0.00%	0.00%	-1.61%
8	0	1	0	1	0.00%	3.13%	0.00%	0.81%
9	0	0	0	0	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
10	0	0	0	0	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%

Table 11. The variation between the final and the initial situations of the transactions including both the sale of shares and the replacement of the captain

Town	The number of the captain	The relation with the building site	average cargo capacity of the ship	n/n ^a	c/n ^b
Abana	14	52.63%	2673.6842	2.45%	1.48%
Ahtabolu	27	0.00%	6281.8182	4.73%	6.71%
Akçaşehir	11	78.57%	2042.8571	1.93%	0.89%
Alaplı	24	100.00%	767.64706	4.20%	0.73%
Amasra	15	39.13%	4073.913	2.63%	2.42%
Arhavi	5	33.33%	4416.6667	0.88%	0.87%
Asitane	4	0.00%	1212.5	0.70%	0.19%
Ayandon	11	100.00%	5868.8889	1.93%	2.55%
Bartın	21	85.71%	4826.8571	3.68%	4.01%
Galata	6	0.00%	4371.4286	1.05%	1.04%
Gelibolu	8	54.55%	2400	1.40%	0.76%
Giresun	12	18.75%	11031.25	2.10%	5.23%
Girit	12	8.70%	5336.5217	2.10%	2.53%
İnebolu	8	46.15%	3161.5385	1.40%	1.00%
İzmid	7	40.00%	1020	1.23%	0.28%
Kapıdağ	5	0.00%	1683.3333	0.88%	0.33%
Kaşyod	12	94.74%	7010.5263	2.10%	3.33%
Katrili	14	0.00%	5157.8947	2.45%	2.85%
Kilyos	9	71.43%	2685.7143	1.58%	0.96%
Marmara	10	13.33%	2421.3333	1.75%	0.96%
Midilli	12	57.89%	1189.4737	2.10%	0.56%
Paşalimanı	8	37.50%	1387.5	1.40%	0.44%
Rize	28	22.86%	6230.8571	4.90%	6.90%
Tekirdağ	9	45.45%	1018.1818	1.58%	0.36%
Tirebolu	11	62.50%	6962.5	1.93%	3.03%
Trabzon	25	0.00%	6129.7059	4.38%	6.06%
Urine	12	33.33%	5437.9365	2.10%	2.58%
Ünye	23	51.52%	7857.5758	4.03%	7.14%
Varna	7	0.00%	9450	1.23%	2.62%
Vasilkoz	9	0.00%	3924.1758	1.58%	1.40%
Other	192		0	33.63%	29.81%
Sum ^c	571		4372.0493	100.00%	100.00%

Table 12. The distribution of the entire list of the captains, regardless the operation

^a The percentage according to the number

^b The percentage according to the cargo capacities of the ships

^c The sum of the captains for the first column and the averages for the 2nd and 3rd columns

Town	number	relation with the building site	average cargo capacity of the ship	n/n ^a	c/n ^b
Abana	5	60.00%	2420.00	2.07%	1.19%
Ahtabolu	6	0.00%	5833.33	2.49%	3.43%
Akçaşehir	3	100.00%	2566.67	1.24%	0.75%
Alaplı	10	100.00%	810.00	4.15%	0.79%
Amasra	8	25.00%	4293.75	3.32%	3.37%
Arhavi	1	100.00%	3500.00	0.41%	1.84%
Asitane	0	100.00%	0.00	0.00%	0.00%
Ayandon	7	100.00%	5760.00	2.90%	3.95%
Bartın	14	92.86%	5065.71	5.81%	6.95%
Galata	1	0.00%	2400.00	0.41%	0.24%
Gelibolu	3	66.67%	1533.33	1.24%	0.45%
Giresun	4	25.00%	11500.00	1.66%	4.51%
Girit	11	9.09%	5260.91	4.56%	5.67%
İnebolu	5	40.00%	2960.00	2.07%	1.45%
İzmid	3	33.33%	866.67	1.24%	0.25%
Kapıdağ	1	0.00%	500.00	0.41%	0.05%
Kaşyod	7	100.00%	7300.00	2.90%	5.01%
Katrilli	5	0.00%	8160.00	2.07%	4.00%
Kilyos	5	80.00%	1520.00	2.07%	0.74%
Marmara	5	0.00%	2892.00	2.07%	1.42%
Midilli	7	57.14%	1007.14	2.90%	0.69%
Paşalimanı	0	0.00%	0.00	0.00%	0.00%
Rize	7	42.86%	6491.43	2.90%	4.45%
Tekirdağ	2	50.00%	850.00	0.83%	0.17%
Tirebolu	5	80.00%	5640.00	2.07%	2.76%
Trabzon	9	0.00%	6233.33	3.73%	5.50%
Urine	6	50.00%	5028.33	2.49%	2.96%
Ünye	10	50.00%	7500.00	4.15%	7.35%
Varna	3	0.00%	6833.33	1.24%	2.01%
Vasilkoz	4	0.00%	3787.50	1.66%	1.48%
Other	84	-	-	34.85%	26.58%
Sum ^c	241	48.55%	4234.76	100.00%	100.00%

Table 13. The distribution of the captains including all the operations when the captain remained the same

^a The percentage according to the number

^b The percentage according to the cargo capacities of the ships

^c The sum of the captains for the first column and the averages for the 2nd and 3rd columns

Town	number of the captain	relation with the building site	average cargo capacity of the ship	n/n ^a	c/n ^b
Abana	9	44.44%	2955.56	2.73%	1.76%
Ahtabolu	21	0.00%	6538.10	6.36%	9.10%
Akçaşehir	8	62.50%	1650.00	2.42%	0.87%
Alaplı	14	100.00%	707.14	4.24%	0.66%
Amasra	7	71.43%	3571.43	2.12%	1.66%
Arhavi	4	0.00%	4875.00	1.21%	1.29%
Asitane	4	0.00%	1212.50	1.21%	0.32%
Ayandon	4	100.00%	6250.00	1.21%	1.66%
Bartın	7	57.14%	3871.43	2.12%	1.80%
Galata	5	0.00%	5160.00	1.52%	1.71%
Gelibolu	5	40.00%	3440.00	1.52%	1.14%
Giresun	8	12.50%	10562.50	2.42%	5.60%
Girit	1	0.00%	7000	0.30%	0.46%
İnebolu	3	66.67%	3833.3333	0.91%	0.76%
İzmid	4	50.00%	1250.00	1.21%	0.33%
Kapıdağ	4	0.00%	2275.00	1.21%	0.60%
Kaşyod	5	80.00%	6200.00	1.52%	2.05%
Katrili	9	0.00%	1822.22	2.73%	1.00%
Kilyos	4	50.00%	5600.00	1.21%	1.17%
Marmara	5	40.00%	1480.00	1.52%	0.49%
Midilli	5	60.00%	1700.00	1.52%	0.56%
Paşalimanı	8	37.50%	1387.50	2.42%	0.74%
Rize	21	9.52%	6057.14	6.36%	8.43%
Tekirdağ	7	42.86%	1114.29	2.12%	0.52%
Tirebolu	6	33.33%	9166.67	1.82%	3.64%
Trabzon	16	0.00%	6013.13	4.85%	9.29%
Urine	6	0.00%	6257.14	2.12%	2.90%
Ünye	13	53.85%	8407.69	3.64%	7.24%
Varna	4	0.00%	13375.00	1.21%	1.69%
Vasilkoz	5	0.00%	4142.86	2.12%	1.92%
Other	108			32.12%	28.62%
Sum ^c	330	23.33%	4572.58	100.00%	100.00%

Table14. The distribution of the captains including all the operations when the actual captain was replaced by another

^a The percentage according to the number

^b The percentage according to the cargo capacities of the ships

^c The sum of the captains for the first column and the averages for the 2nd and 3rd columns

Town	number of the captain	relation with the building site	average cargo capacity of the ship	n/n ^a	c/n ^b
Abana	4	75.00%	4075.00	2.42%	2.18%
Ahtabolu	7	0.00%	5414.29	4.24%	5.07%
Akçaşehir	7	42.86%	1300.00	4.24%	1.22%
Alaplı	12	100.00%	166.67	7.27%	0.27%
Amasra	3	33.33%	5000.00	1.82%	2.01%
Arhavi	3	0.00%	5666.67	1.82%	2.27%
Asitane	0	0	0.00	0.00%	0.00%
Ayandon	4	100.00%	6250.00	1.21%	1.66%
Bartın	7	57.14%	3871.43	2.12%	1.80%
Galata	4	0.00%	4825.00	2.42%	2.58%
Gelibolu	0	0	0.00	0.00%	0.00%
Giresun	5	20.00%	11400	3.03%	7.62%
Girit	0	0	0.00	0	0
İnebolu	2	1	4000	0.012121	0.010699
İzmid	1	1	1500.00	0.006061	0.002006
Kapıdağ	1	0	2000.00	0.006061	0.002675
Kaşyod	2	1	4500.00	0.012121	0.012037
Katrilli	2	1	3550.00	0.012121	0.009496
Kilyos	3	33.33%	4366.67	1.82%	1.75%
Marmara	2	0.5	1100.00	0.012121	0.002942
Midilli	1	1	300.00	0.006061	0.000401
Paşaliman	3	0.00%	600.00	1.82%	0.24%
Rize	16	0.00%	6418.75	9.70%	13.74%
Tekirdağ	4	50.00%	1200.00	2.42%	0.64%
Tirebolu	4	0.00%	7750.00	2.42%	4.15%
Trabzon	9	0.00%	6361.11	5.45%	7.66%
Ürine	3	0.00%	4600.00	1.82%	1.85%
Ünye	8	75.00%	8750.00	4.85%	9.36%
Varna	2	0.00%	5500.00	1.21%	1.47%
Vasilkoz	5	0.00%	5000.00	3.03%	3.34%
Other	41			28.18%	25.11%
Sum ^c	165		4531.52	100.00%	100.00%

Table 15. The distribution of the captains including only the initial situation of all the operations when the actual captain was replaced by another

^a The percentage according to the number

^b The percentage according to the cargo capacities of the ships

^c The sum of the captains for the first column and the averages for the 2nd and 3rd columns

Town	number of the captain	relation with the building site	average cargo capacity of the ship	n/n ^a	c/n ^b
Abana	5		2060	3.03%	1.35%
Ahtabolu	14		7100	8.48%	13.06%
Akçaşehir	1		4100	0.61%	0.54%
Alaplı	2		3950	1.21%	1.04%
Amasra	4		2500	2.42%	1.31%
Arhavi	1		2500	0.61%	0.33%
Asitane	4		1212.5	2.42%	0.64%
Ayandon	0		0	0.00%	0.00%
Bartın	0		0	0.00%	0.00%
Galata	1		6500	0.61%	0.85%
Gelibolu	5		3440	3.03%	2.26%
Giresun	3		9166.667	1.82%	3.61%
Girit	1		7000	0.61%	0.92%
İnebolu	1		3500	0.61%	0.46%
İzmid	3		1166.667	1.82%	0.46%
Kapıdağ	3		2366.667	1.82%	0.93%
Kaşyod	3		7333.333	1.82%	2.89%
Katrilli	7		1328.571	4.24%	1.22%
Kilyos	1		9300	0.61%	1.22%
Marmara	3		1733.333	1.82%	0.68%
Midilli	4		2050	2.42%	1.08%
Paşaliman	5		1860	3.03%	1.22%
Rize	5		4900	3.03%	3.22%
Tekirdağ	3		1000	1.82%	0.39%
Tirebolu	2		12000	1.21%	3.15%
Trabzon	7		5565.714	4.24%	5.12%
Ürine	3		7914.286	1.82%	3.12%
Ünye	5		7860	3.03%	5.16%
Varna	2		21250	1.21%	5.58%
Vasilkoz	0		0	0.00%	0.00%
Other	67		0	40.61%	38.17%
Sum ^c	165		4613.636	100.00%	100.00%

Table 16. The distribution of the captains including only the final situation of all the operations when the actual captain was replaced by another

^a The percentage according to the number

^b The percentage according to the cargo capacities of the ships

^c The sum of the captains for the first column and the averages for the 2nd and 3rd columns

Town	The number of the captain	The relation with the building site	average cargo capacity of the ships	n/n ^a	c/n ^b
Abana	1	-75.00%	-2015	0.61%	-0.83%
Ahtabolu	7	0.00%	1685.714	4.24%	7.99%
Akçaşehir	-6	-42.86%	2800	-3.64%	-0.68%
Alaplı	-10	-100.00%	3783.333	-6.06%	0.77%
Amasra	1	-33.33%	-2500	0.61%	-0.69%
Arhavi	-2	0.00%	-3166.67	-1.21%	-1.95%
Asitane	4	0.00%	1212.5	2.42%	0.64%
Ayandon	-4	-100.00%	-6250	-1.21%	-1.66%
Bartın	-7	-57.14%	-3871.43	-2.12%	-1.80%
Galata	-3	0.00%	1675	-1.82%	-1.73%
Gelibolu	5	0.00%	3440	3.03%	2.26%
Giresun	-2	-20.00%	-2233.33	-1.21%	-4.01%
Girit	1	0.00%	7000	0.61%	0.92%
İnebolu	-1	-100.00%	-500	-0.61%	-0.61%
İzmid	2	-100.00%	-333.333	1.21%	0.26%
Kapıdağ	2	0.00%	366.6667	1.21%	0.67%
Kaşyod	1	-100.00%	2833.333	0.61%	1.69%
Katrilli	5	-100.00%	-2221.43	3.03%	0.27%
Kilyos	-2	-33.33%	4933.333	-1.21%	-0.53%
Marmara	1	-50.00%	633.3333	0.61%	0.39%
Midilli	3	-100.00%	1750	1.82%	1.04%
Paşaliman	2	0.00%	1260	1.21%	0.98%
Rize	-11	0.00%	-1,518.75	-6.67%	-10.52%
Tekirdağ	-1	-50.00%	-200	-0.61%	-0.25%
Tirebolu	-2	0.00%	4250	-1.21%	-0.99%
Trabzon	-2	0.00%	-795.397	-1.21%	-2.54%
Ürine	0	0.00%	3,314.286	0.00%	1.27%
Ünye	-3	-75.00%	-890	-1.82%	-4.20%
Varna	0	0.00%	15,750	0.00%	4.11%
Vasilkoz	-5	0.00%	-5000	-3.03%	-3.34%
Other	26	0.00%	0	12.42%	13.07%
Sum ^c	0		82.12	0.00%	0.00%

Table 17. The distribution of the captains, including only the difference between the initial and final situations of all the operations when the actual captain was replaced by another

^a The percentage according to the number

^b The percentage according to the cargo capacities of the ships

^c The sum of the captains for the first column and the averages for the 2nd and 3rd columns

Town	The ratio of the shareholders	The ratio of the shares
Ahtabolu	10,34%	3,74%
Alaplı	87,50%	77,60%
Bartın	54,17%	33,85%
Rize	66,67%	24,03%
Trabzon	11,23%	5,51%
Ünye	57,50%	15,80%

Table 18. The share ratios for the captains from the most remarkable towns




Fig . 7 : The Frequency of the ships' cargo capacities

Ünyeli Heci Vasil nam kabudanın süvar olduğu 9.000 keyl hamuleli mutehamil şethiye-i brik ta'bir olunur 2 direkli 23 zirâ' tavlinde vesile-i ticaret nam 1 kıta'a sefinenin 40 pare itibariyle 15 pare hissesi Ünye ticaretinden Hacı Osmanın ve 15 pare hissesi ticar-ı merkumdan Kurailin 15 pare hissesi dahi kaptan-ı merkumun malı olarak bu defa Ünye iskelesinde inşa olunmuş sefine-i mezkure için 264 senesi şaban-üş-şerifin 7. günü tarihiyle merhum bir kıta sened-i bahri verilmiş ise de merkum Hacı Osmanın ve mersum Kurail ve kaptan-ı merkumun mutassarıf oldukları 40 pare hisselerini teba-ı Devlet-i Aliden Eflaklı Dimitri Paspalı Bezirgana furuht etmişler ve reis-i merkum dahi sefineden çıkıp yerine Sisamlı Yanoş Lomi kaptan reis olmuş olduğu liman tarafına ifade ettiklerinden keyfiyet liman defterine kayd edilmekle (....) mazbata olunarak bir kıta sened-i bahri ısdarı babında emr ü ferman hazreti min el-eminindir.

A}DVN. 82.40

Kaşyodlu Sanya Diyakaki nam kaptanın süvar olduğu 3.500 keyl hamuleli mutehamil şethiye-i brik tâbir olunur 2 direkli 15 zirai tavlinde Aya Yorgi nam 1 kıta'a sefine kaptan-ı merkumun malı olarak bu defa Kaşyod cizresinde inşa olunmuş olduğu bilatetkik ile liman defterine kayd edilmiş liman tarafına ifade ettiklerinden keyfiyet liman defterine kayd edilmekle mücededen bir kıta sened-i bahri ısdarı babında emr ü ferman hazreti min el-eminindir.

A}DVN.82.41

Alaplılı Kalaycı ođlu Mustafa nam reisin süvar olduđu 250 keyl hamuleli mutehamil çekdirme tâbir olunur yan yelkenli 14 zirai tavlinde 1 kıta'a sefine reis-i merkumun malı olarak bu defa Alaplı iskelesinde inşa olunmuş olduđu bilatetik ile liman defterine kayd edilmiş liman tarafına ifade ettiklerinden keyfiyet liman defterine kayd edilmekle mücededen bir kıta sened-i bahri ısdarı babında emr ü ferman hazreti min el-eminindir.

A}DVN.82.42

İnebolulu İnce Mustafa ođlu Hüseyn nam reisin süvar olduđu 800 keyl hamuleli mutehamil kütük tâbir olunur 1 direkli 12 zirai tavlinde 1 kıta'a sefinenin 40 pare itibariyle 12 pare hissesi Pehlivan ođlu Mehmed Eminin ve 8 pare hissesi Hamuleci Hasan Ađanın ve 10 pare hissesi Kadı ırađı ođlu Hüseynin ve 5 pare hissesi İnce Mustafa ođlu Ali Yazıcının ve 5 pare hissesi dahi reis-i merkumun malı olarak bu defa Zeytun iskelesinde inşa olunmuş olduđu bilatetik ile liman defterine kayd edilmiş liman tarafına ifade ettiklerinden keyfiyet liman defterine kayd edilmekle mücededen bir kıta sened-i bahri ısdarı babında emr ü ferman hazreti min el-eminindir.

A}DVN.82.43

Alaplılı Kalaycı ođlu Mustafa nam reisin süvar olduđu 250 keyl hamuleli mutehamil çekdirme tâbir olunur 1 direkli 14 zirai tavlinde diđer 1 kıta'a sefine reis-i merkumun malı olarak bu defa Alaplı iskelesinde inşa olunmuş olduđu bilatetik ile liman defterine kayd edilmiş liman tarafına ifade ettiklerinden keyfiyet liman defterine kayd edilmekle mücededen bir kıta sened-i bahri ısdarı babında emr ü ferman hazreti min el-eminindir.

A}DVN.82.44

Bartınlı Keleş ođlu Mehmed nam reisin süvar olduđu 500 keyl hamuleli mutehamil martiko tâbir olunur 2 direkli 20 zirai tavlinde 1 kıta'a sefinenin 40 pare itibariyle 20 pare hissesi Bartınlı Hoca ođlu Alinin ve 20 pare hissesi dahi reis-i merkumun malı olarak bu defa Bartın iskelesinde inşa olunmuş olduđu bilatetkik ile liman defterine kayd edilmiş liman tarafına ifade ettiklerinden keyfiyet liman defterine kayd edilmekle mücededen bir kıta sened-i bahri ısdarı babında emr ü ferman hazreti min el-eminindir.

A}DVN.82.57

Giritli Manoli Muzuraki nam kaptanın süvar olduğu 4.000 keyl hamuleli mutehamil şethiye-i brik tâbir olunur 2 direkli 16 zirai tavlinde Talugo nam 1 kıta'a sefine kaptan-ı merkumun malı olarak bu defa Girit cizresinde inşa olunmuş olduğu bilatetikik ile liman defterine kayd edilmiş liman tarafına ifade ettiklerinden keyfiyet liman defterine kayd edilmekle mücededen bir kıta sened-i bahri ısdarı babında emr ü ferman hazreti min el-eminindir.

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 کتاب مذکور است



سید محمد

A}DVN.84.8

Ayandonlu Hacı ođlu Mustafa nam reisin süvar olduđu 4.000 keyl hamuleli mutehamil beşçifte başlı matriko tâbir olunur 2 direkli 18,5 zira’i tavlinde 1 kıta’a sefinenin 40 pare itibariyle 20 pare hissesi Ayandonda sakin Hacı ođlu İbrahimin ve 10 pare hissesi Deli Hacı ođlu Hasanın ve 10 pare hissesi dahi reis-i merkumun malı olarak bu defa mukaddim Ayandon iskelesinde inşa olunmuş sefine-i mezkure için 269 senesi muharrem-ül-haramın 19. günü tarihiyle merhum bir kıta sened-i bahri verilmiş ise de merkum İbrahimin mutassarıf olduđu 20 pare hissesini Tophanede sakin Çerkes ođlu Hacı Hasan Ağaya furuht etmiş olduđu liman tarafına ifade ettiklerinden keyfiyet liman defterine kayd edilmekle (...) mazbata olunarak bir kıta sened-i bahri ısdarı babında emr ü ferman hazreti min el-eminindir.

A}DVN84.9

Ünyeli Kara Mustafa oğlu Ali nam kaptanın süvar olduğu 5.000 keyl hamuleli mutehamil şethiye brik tâbir olunur 2 direkli 19 zirai tavlinde 1 kıta'a sefinenin 40 pare itibariyle 10 pare hissesi Hazinedâr Mehmed Beyin ve 5 pare hissesi Karafereşli oğlu Mustafa Yazıcının ve 25 pare hissesi dahi süvar-ı merkumun pederi Hacı Alinin malı olarak bu defa mukaddim Ünye iskelesinde inşa olunmuş sefine-i mezkure için 264 senesi şevval-üş-şerifin 5inci günü tarihiyle merhum bir kıta sened-i bahri verilmiş ise de mumaileyh Mehmedin mutassarıf olduğu 10 pare hissesini Ünyeli Karakaş oğlu Meferdiç zimmiye ve merkum Hacı Ali mutasarıf olduğu 25 pare hissesinden 5 parsini ikraz edip Ünyeli Raşid Efendizâde Ahmed Efendiye bâ mazbata furuht etmiş ve kaptan-ı merkum dahi sefineden çıkıp yerine beş pare hisseye mutasarıf olan merkum Karakaşlı oğlu Mustafa Yazıcı reis olmuş olduğu liman tarafına ifade ettiklerinden keyfiyet liman defterine kayd edilmekle (...) mazbata olunarak bir kıta sened-i bahri ısdarı babında emr ü ferman hazreti min el-eminindir.

A}DVN.84.35 r

Rizeli Mani ođlu Makdan nam kaptanın süvar olduđu 1.500 keyl huamuleli mutehamil bomarda tâbir olunur 16,5 zirai tavlinde şahin-i derya nam 1 kıta'a sefinenin 40 pare itibariyle 10 pare hissesi Rizeli Darıcı ođlu Memiş kaptanın ve 10 pare hissesi Mustafa ođlu Hasan kaptanın ve 10 pare hissesi Receb Yazıcının ve 10 pare hissesi dahi kaptan-ı merkumun malı olarak bu defa Çakraz iskelesinde inşa olunmuş sefine-i mezkure için 269 senesi safer el-hayırın 29uncu günü tarihiyle merhum bir kıta sened-i bahri verilmiş ise de mersum Mustafa ođlu Hasan kaptanın mutassarıf olduđu 10 pare hissesini Rizeli kuzin Ömer ođlu Hüseyin nam kimseye furuht etmiş olduđu liman tarafına ifade ettiklerinden keyfiyet liman defterine kayd edilmekle (...) mazbata olunarak bir kıta sened-i bahri ısdarı babında emr ü ferman hazreti min el-eminindir.

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