

THE SUBLIME AND ITS ENVIRONMENTAL IMPLICATIONS

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THE SUBLIME AND ITS ENVIRONMENTAL IMPLICATIONS

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DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

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ABSTRACT

The Sublime and Its Environmental Implications

This research is about the concept of sublime and its environmental ethical implications. I claim that sublime, as an aesthetic concept, is helpful to give us moral motivation for the preservation of nature. We have a peculiar dual relation with nature; it is both an Other and an extended Self. Hence, I claim sublime is a specific aesthetic concept that can endow us with ethical tools to face this peculiar dual relation with its character of causing both pleasure and displeasure. First, with its displeasure effect, it can point to the otherness of Nature and induce (1) humility and (2) respect and second, with its pleasurable effect, it can lead to a concept of selfhood that can expand to include all nature which would create (1) attentiveness/sensitivity and (2) compassion/love. The objections against sublime fall into five different categories, (1) practical, it is not functioning as it promises, (2) epistemological, it is epistemologically inaccessible, (3) historical, it is an outdated concept that has no relevance in the contemporary agenda, (4) metaphysical, sublime is same with religious experience and (5) ethical, sublime is self-regarding, anthropocentric. Against these I defend sublime that (1) it is a humble concept not aiming to solve all the environmental problems once and for all but only trying to enrich our aesthetic and ethical agenda, (2) sublime is a concept of language trying to bridge the gap between the world and us, (3) nature is the original sublime and it can never be exhausted, (4) sublime is aesthetic and secular, with no necessary dependence on a divine being and (5) sublime is not anthropocentric, centered on humans, but anthropogeneric, generated by humans.

ÖZET

Yüce Kavramı ve Çevre Etiği üzerine Çıktıları

Bu çalışma, “yüce” kavramı ve çevre etiği çıktıları üzerine bir araştırmadır. Yüce kavramı, doğayı korumak adına bize ahlaki bir motivasyon sunabilir. Doğa ile özel ikili bir ilişkiye sahibiz, doğa hem bizim için bir Öteki hem de bizim için genişlemiş bir Benliktir. Bu nedenle, yüce kavramına içkin olan ikili duygusal süreç, acı ve keyif, bizim doğa ile kurduğumuz ilişkiyi iyileştirebilecek yöntemler sunabilir. Öncelikle, yüce kavramı yarattığı ilk etkisi olan acı ile Doğa'nın Ötekiliğini aşık eder; insanda (1) alçakgönüllülük ve (2) saygı erdemlerinin gelişimini sağlar; ikinci evresi olan keyif ise tüm doğayı içerisine alarak kapsayan genişlemiş bir Benlik hissi yaratır ve bu da (1) hassasiyet/dikkat ve (2) merhamet, sevgi geliştirir. Yüce deneyimine karşı verilebilecek itirazlar beş ana başlık altında incelenebilir: (1) eylemsel, yüce kavramı vaat ettiği şeyleri yerine getirmez, (2) epistemolojik, epistemolojik olarak erişilemezdir, (3) tarihsel, çağdaş tartışmalar içerisinde yer almayacak kadar eski ve köhne bir kavramdır, (4) metafizik, yüce kavramı dini deneyimin aynısıdır, (5) etik, yüce deneyimi daha insan-merkezli bir kavramdır. Tüm bu eleştirilere karşılık yüce kavramını şu argümanlarla bu tezde savunmaktayım: Yüce kavramı, (1) iddialı bir şekilde tüm çevre problemlerini daimi olarak çözmeyi vaat etmez, kendi içinde estetik ve etik tartışmalarımızı zenginleştiren mütevazı bir kavramdır, (2) dünya ve bizim aramızdaki boşluğu biraz olsun daha doldurmaya çalışır, (3) özgün Yüce doğadır, asla tüketilemez, (4) herhangi bir ilahi kavrama bağlı olmadan varlık bulan estetik ve seküler bir kavramdır, (5) insan-merkezli değildir aksine *anthropogeneric* yani insanlar tarafından üretilmiştir.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The environmental scenario of the contemporary world is getting deplorably worse each year. Global warming threatens our future. The rate of extinction of the species, degradation of forests and pollution is getting worse each day. My research is a humble attempt of finding an alternative way to care and preserve nature. I claim that the concept of sublime can help us be endowed with respect, humility, attentiveness and compassion towards nature due to its inherent peculiar character of inducing both displeasure and pleasure in the subject. I claim that we are both an Other and an extended Self to nature. In this respect, sublime is an important concept to show us this dual characteristic. Sublime, in its first phase, via causing displeasure, reveals the otherness of nature and with its second phase, via causing pleasure, leads us to see nature as an extended self. Whereas seeing nature as an Other would result in moral virtues of respect and humility, seeing it as an extended self would result in having more sensitivity/attentiveness and love/compassion towards it.

In order to ground the thesis in the first chapter, I will sketch the ethical positions in the literature of environmental philosophy, then portray a historical analysis of sublime which will be followed by the evaluation of the concept. Consequently, I will explicate its environmental implications and finally conclude with the objections.

In the first chapter, I portray a brief analysis of the ethical positions in environmental philosophy. The future of the world is becoming gloomier, from ozone depletion to deforestation or nuclear wastes. With this gloomy picture at the background, I present a brief history of the environmental ethics: (1) weak

anthropocentrism, (2) biocentrism, (3) ecocentrism, (4) wilderness theory, (5) ecological feminism, (6) the deep ecology movement and (7) Gaia theory. I think the discussion among all these positions can be categorized under the question of how humans should relate to nature which can be distinguished as either (1) Nature as Other or (2) Nature as an extended Self. I claim that our relationship with nature cannot be reduced to one singular answer but has to endorse both approaches. I claim that we have a peculiar dual relation with nature: it is both an Other and an expanded Self. I claim that the sublime, as an aesthetic concept can be helpful to unveil this peculiar dual relation with its dual characteristic of inducing displeasure and pleasure. However, I have to note that I do not argue that the sublime can solve the entire environmental catastrophe that we have right now. It can show insight, enrich the interactions of aesthetic and ethical realms and provide a novel look on the environmental phenomena but the sublime does neither aim nor promise to solve all the problems once and for all. There are various multifarious parameters behind the environmental problems ranging from economics to politics and history which would extend far beyond the scope of this thesis. However, it is important to see the sublime as an inspiring aesthetic concept that can illuminate new points of view in environmental discussions which is the emphasis of this thesis.

In the second chapter, I present a brief history of the sublime. After depicting its etymology, I move to its role in Longinus in whom it was a product of rhetoric. Following him, Burke was one of the main figures who carried it to the discussion of aesthetics. However, sublime reached its most sophisticated form in Kant. Following Kant, Schopenhauer portrayed a significant difference on the second moment of the sublime which distanced him from Kant's account. In this sense, though I benefit highly from Kant's account of sublime, I resonate more with Schopenhauer in the

explication of the second moment of the sublime, i.e. the cause of the feeling of pleasure. I do not agree that pleasure resulting from the sublime comes from a realization of our reason as Kant defends but rather it is an expansion of self, a loss of the petty individual. Apart from giving a brief history of the sublime in the second chapter, I explain why I have chosen the sublime over beautiful in this research. I claim that (1) the sublime is an aesthetic concept that does not fall into the discussion of subjectivity because it has an overwhelming, demanding character unlike the beautiful. (2) Sublime maintains a multi-sensuous experience without falling into the dominancy of the eye like the tradition of picturesque but includes the whole surrounding and third (3) and by far the most important, it consists of a peculiar dual nature, first arouses displeasure and then induces pleasure. This is a significant difference which requires us to pay elaborate attention on the concept.

In the third chapter, I go deeper in my evaluation and interpretation of the sublime experience. First, I analyze the affiliated emotions related with the sublime such as (1) awefulness/ *tremendum*/fear, (2) majesty/grandeur, (3) mysteriousness, (4) awe/ astonishment/amazement and (5) admiration and elevation/exaltedness and (6) oceanic feeling. Later, I touch on the problem of what role natural objects play in the sublime experience. Do the natural objects play a causal role in the experience of it or are they constitutive of it? I defend the latter which is closer to the accounts of Schopenhauer and Burke rather than Kant. Finally, I focus on the sublime's peculiar dual character, inducing both (1) displeasure, such as fear, terror and (2) pleasure, such as admiration and elevation of the subject. The first of this duality, displeasure, indicates (1) our mortality and finitude, revealing that we are plaything of natural forces, (2) our imagination has a limited extent and (3) Nature is an Other

to us. In contrast, the other phase, pleasure, (1) elevates us with an oceanic feeling, (2) expands our consciousness, and (3) gives a feeling of unity.

In the fourth chapter, I focus on the environmental implications of the effects of the sublime, being both able to reveal our Otherness with nature via its first moment (the feeling of displeasure) and Oneness with nature via its second moment (the feeling of pleasure) by humbling and exalting us. Both consequences can provide insight for an environmental agenda. By means of the first part, the Otherness of nature, sublime reveals our insignificance and smallness which can result in (1) humility and (2) respect and by means of the second part, it can wrap us with an “oceanic feeling” that all living and non-living beings can be taken under an “all-inclusive identity” that can raise (1) attentiveness or sensitivity and (2) compassion and love leading us to care all nature as an extended Self.

Finally, in the fourth chapter, I explicate the objections that can be raised against my arguments. I categorize the objections into five different categories, (1) practical, sublime does not solve the environmental problems as it promises, (2) epistemological, sublime is epistemologically inaccessible, (3) historical, it is an outdated concept that has no relevance in the contemporary agenda, (4) metaphysical, sublime is similar to religious experience and (5) ethical, sublime is a self-regarding, anthropocentric concept. Against these I defend (1) sublime does not aim to solve all the environmental problems once and for all, it is a rare phenomenon that cannot be experienced any time, and it is a spontaneous phenomenon that requires one to be aware and conscious of it to gain the maximum perceptual experience, (2) sublime is one of the constructions of human language trying to bridge the gap between the world and us, thus only trying to enrich our conceptual schema and cognitive awareness, (3) nature is the original sublime and it can never

be exhausted but rather science will unveil its marvels more and cause us to be more astonished and amazed, (4) ideas and feelings can have associations and connections but this does not undermine the fact that sublime is aesthetic and secular with no necessary dependence on a divine being and, (5) sublime does not create distance between nature and us but accept the difference and commonality with it. Moreover, sublime judgments are not *anthropocentric*, centered on humans but *anthropogeneric*, i.e. generated by humans.

CHAPTER 2

ENVIRONMENT

2.1 Why a talk on environmental ethics?

“Environment is no peripheral matter, either aesthetically or philosophically, and that ultimately engages the very heart of philosophy” says Berleant (1993, p. 228). Acid rains, the greenhouse effect and ozone depletion have been the never-ending news of the last decades. Continuous apocalyptic anticipations of the future are held due the modern world’s problems of atomic bombs, global warming, degraded seas, an ever rising tide of low-level radiation, species loss, high technology warfare, the risks of biotechnology and even electromagnetic pollution. Wall (1994) declares that, “our great-grandparents never had to worry about nuclear wastes” before Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Robert Oppenheimer, the father of atomic bomb, recalled a phrase from Bhagavad Gita after watching the first test of its detonation, “I have become Death, the shatterer of worlds” (p. 1). Statistics also foreshadow dreary scenes; the world’s annual production of carbon dioxide is 45000 million tons in 2017 (Rice, 2017). Furthermore, studies indicate that the loss of species extinction is 1000 to 10000 higher than the normal extinction rate. Every year experts calculate that 0.01 and 0.1 % of all species are getting lost (How many species, 2017). Repeating Lovelock’s (2007) splendid metaphor, this means that, “our future is like that of the passengers on a small pleasure boat sailing quietly above the Niagara Falls not knowing that the engines are about to fail” (p. 7).

Who are we but beings who have lost their animal innocence? Grown ashamed of our nakedness and covered in garments of our own making, taking refuge in a dream world born from ideas that boil forth from our feared imaginations. We, the spoiled children of the Great Mother, we who refuse to see, to hear and heed Her message, Her laws. Is salvation possible? Or have we so fouled this

earth, so covered the green world beneath our second world that no light can penetrate the world's midnight? Is there hope for the plant and animal people? Is there hope for us all? (Oelschlager, 1991, p. 353)

Jonas (1984) indicates that we should change our viewpoint to the extent of our responsibilities (6). Protecting nature is now a human responsibility that must be pondered in ethical theory. In the age of technology, the boundaries between cities and nature has been altered; humanity has to question once again its place in nature, what it owes to nature, and how its relation should be structured.

Is this trait a new phenomenon of the modern times or is it an ontological trait of humans? Has it always been as such, or has it accelerated at a crucial rate in the modern times? Is the only culprit technology and industrial revolution, or is humanity negligent by nature, egoistical and selfish at all times? This leads us to survey the environmental history, and the type of relationships humans had with nature.

2.2 Brief history of human-nature relationship

The trigger which started the modern environmental ethics debate owes much of its start to Rachel Carlson's book *Silent Spring* which was published in 1962. The book mainly portrayed how toxic pesticides gave way to numerous birds' species to decrease. However, these philosophical debates moved to international areas in 1970s. In 1971 at the University of Georgia the first conference was held on environmental philosophy. Many popular philosophical works such as John Passmore's *Man's Responsibility for Nature* (1974), Peter Singer's *Animal Liberation* (1975), Eugene Hargrove's *Environmental Ethics* published in this decade (Palmer, 2008, p. 15).

After 1980's, the topic became more widely discussed. Holmes Rolston's *Environmental Ethics* and Paul Taylor's *Respect for Nature* was published in 1989. Many universities started giving environmental philosophy courses and new journals were added in the 1990s (Palmer, 2008, p. 15). Although various topics were discussed, anthropocentrism was one of the main debates. Anthropocentrism which literally meant "human-centeredness" portrayed a relationship with nature where human values, interests, cares and desires were the loci of all value.

2.2.1 Anthropocentrism: The main culprit or not?

One of the benefits of history is to guide our future. The history of environmental ethics gives an agenda of how humanity tries to find a solution for Earth's catastrophic situation. The main culprit generally is said to be the anthropocentric attitude towards it, in other words taking human interests and desires at the loci of all values, the rest of the world becomes merely an instrument for humans.

Although environmental ethics is a new branch of philosophy, considering its recognized debates to start after the 1950's, the anthropocentric approach towards nature is not a new phenomenon. Even in ancient times, traces of exploitation and degradation of nature can be seen. For example, it has been discovered that the building of Avebury and Stonehenge, led to "massive deforestation leading to soil erosion, climatic change" and even famine. Likewise, Mayan pyramid builders probably contributed to their own demise in similar ways. In Sumer, too much salt ruined the soil of society due to "overzealous irrigation schemes". In Mesopotamia, nature was a "monstrous chaos" that needed to be "patrolled and overcome" (Wall, 1994, p. 34). In the ancient myth of Gilgamesh, there is a ferocious battle with the mighty forest god Humbaba. Gilgamesh is victorious over Humbaba, which

symbolizes “the relentless Sumerian encroachment on the ancient forests and the triumph of civilization over the wilderness.” The death of Humbaba is analogous to the “apostasy” of a human dominated world where “transgressions against nature are inevitable” (Oelschlager, 1991, p. 39). In Ancient Greece, the stories were not so different. Deforestation was one of the main reasons for the multifarious “soil erosions” (Diamond, 1994, p. 19 & Runnels, 1995, p. 97).

In the industrial age, with the development of technology, the scope of human’s power has enlarged and resulted in an extended destruction of nature. The pioneering figures of these times were; Bacon, with his “new logic”, Descartes, who called the rest of the animal world an “automata” with “mechanistic reductionism”. Nature was now an “object of scientific study”, something that should be scrutinized, analyzed and dissected in a “cold and lifeless mechanical” way (Oelschlager, 1991, p. 77). Francis Bacon, who claimed to dominate and control nature “with knowledge and science”, was acknowledged by scholars to be the “the prominent figure of anthropocentrism” (Oelschlager, 1991, p. 77). Bacon asserted the need to “enlarge the bounds of human empire, to the effecting of all things possible”, and for him “the world is made for man, not man for the world” (Worster, 1988, p. 20). Science was the means for power and to know nature so that humankind can attain the means “to intervene in the naturally given” (Oelschlager, 1991, p. 83). Descartes’ ideas of animals were not much better than Bacon’s attitude towards nature. His notable contribution to history was the idea that “animals are no mere than machines” (Oelschlager, 1991, p. 87) and due to this fact, they are incapable of feelings such as pain. Oelschlager (1991) asserts that the Baconian-Cartesian dream indicates a rupture point in the human history where there is nothing but a starting point for the worse to come (p. 89). A protest to the sinful condition of man, the Bacon calls for a

“rise up” from the fall, and for the “creation of a heaven on earth”. It is presumed that, human beings might “become the master of nature” once again by means of their mastery over sciences (Oelschlager, 1991, p. 89).

2.2.2 Problematic: What kind of attitude should we defend?

After the 1950’s when the environmental awareness started to spread around the world, there were various attitudes as a response to stop the environmental degradation. Although anthropocentrism was seen as the main culprit, various thinkers claimed that nature is always an object of human consciousness that there can be no value independent of any human-valuer, hence the attitude should not be altogether abolished the human judgment from the process but rather see it in a different perspective. Striving to find a solution, some philosophers such as Taylor claimed that we have to accept the intrinsic value of all living organisms and respect their right to exist for their own sake. Against Taylor’s biocentrism, ecocentrists such as Aldo Leopold claimed that not only living beings but also non-living beings also have value in themselves. Bryon Norton rejected these points of view and asserted that there cannot be an intrinsic value independent of human judgment, since all judgments including environmental ethics comes from a human perspective they always have humans as the loci of value. Therefore, we cannot abolish the concept anthropocentrism altogether, but rather we should conceptualize it in such a way that we can conduct all human pursuits in harmony with nature. This is how “weak anthropocentrism” found its way in the environmental debate. Apart from these, wilderness theorists claimed that nature is radically Other to us so that we have to preserve the pristine nature as the way it is and consequently, ecological feminists defended the view that there is a close relationship the way women and nature are

treated in history. According to them unless there is a change in the feminist agenda, there would not be any change in the ecological atmosphere. However, against these theories Gaia theory saw all earth as a living system, an interactive web of relations. The pioneering figure of Gaia theory, John Lovelock asserted that we have to keep the harmony of all living beings and see the interdependent relationship within one another. On the other hand, deep ecologists took the argument one step forward that unless we see the whole world as an expansion of Self there would not be a substantial difference in the outcome. They defended the view that ecological movement is a Self-realization process. Arne Naess, the founder of deep ecology movement, asserted that the theories so far asserted are shallow and superficial in their results.

Taking all these into consideration, what kind of environmental attitude should we defend? What is it that we are looking for? Are we worried for our own future generations or nature *per se*? In what sense one is different than the other? I think if we can find in what ways our relation with nature is enigmatic, then we can find a proper solution. I claim that all these accounts unveil one aspect of our relationship with nature. Although each is ambitious to solve the whole problem by their terms singularly, each shows only a facet of the problem. All these positions can be distinguished under two main categories: taking nature as an Other or suggesting to view it as an expansion of the Self. Whereas weak anthropocentrism, biocentrism, ecocentrism, wilderness theory and ecological feminism defend their theories within the framework of taking nature as an Other; deep ecologists and Gaia movement move from a holistic approach and assert that nature is an extended Self, with a bigger S. I think we need to embrace both horns of the dilemma. Our relation with nature is dual; it is both an Other and an extended Self.

2.3 Nature as Other

2.3.1 Weak anthropocentrism

Within the philosophical debate of environmental ethics one of the most controversial concepts is “intrinsic value”. Can nature, other living and non-living beings have value independent of humans? If so how? This concept was presented to the literature of environmental ethics as a criticism of instrumental value that anthropocentrism was commonly identified with. However, some philosophers such as Norton (2008), Hargrove (2008), Weston (2008) have claimed that there is no such thing as value. All value is human generated, since humans are the subjects of judgments. Therefore, we cannot abolish anthropocentrism altogether *per se*, but rather rehabilitate the concept back to the environmental ethics with a mild content which would be called weak anthropocentrism or enlightened anthropocentrism. Weak anthropocentrism or enlightened anthropocentrism proposes to give merit to natural entities independent of exploitation but also at the same keep the humans as the loci of value.

Bryan Norton who is the pioneering figure of this approach claims that the moral duties humans have for nature are dependent on their direct duties to other humans. According to weak anthropocentrism, human beings are the ones who attribute value to things; they are at the core of environmental judgments. In other words, humans are the “loci of fundamental value” (Norton, 2008, p. 163).

Anthropocentrism and non-anthropocentrism cannot be clearly differentiated because every instance of value comes from a human-valuer, and each human valuer makes a contribution to the judgment itself. Even the discussion of saving nature is a topic that is held by humans for humans, either directly or indirectly. Therefore, if anthropocentrism is defined as taking humans at the loci of value, then none of us

can escape from a form of anthropocentrism. However, weak anthropocentrists of course defend the view that the scope of anthropocentrism should be determined in such a way that should not result in such an environmental degradation so far done by humans.

Norton (2008) defines strong anthropocentrism as the “unquestioned felt preference of human individuals as determining value”. As a result, if humans have “a consumptive value system”, then this would be the factor determining their exploitative approach (p. 165). However, he argues that the distinctness of weak anthropocentrism is “felt preferences” can be irrational as well as rational. This is how it differs from strong anthropocentrism. In this way, weak anthropocentrism claims for an approach towards nature that would still keep the harmony of nature between the living species and human beings but also accept the fact that judgments come from a human perspective for the future generations of humans (Norton, 2008, p. 165). Norton gives two important examples, first is the case of Hindus and Jains who are wary of killing insects and other animals for their own spiritual development rather than mere “intrinsic value” attributed them. Similarly, David Thoreau, one of the eminent figures of environmental ethics is intent on not “attributing intrinsic value to nature” but rather proposes that nature is a great teacher for expression and revealing the deep spiritual values which humans should develop in themselves (Norton, 2008, p. 165).

Not only Norton, but also Hargrove (2008) supports the view that anthropocentrism is not a concept that has to be discarded *per se*. It has been wrongly associated with the “instrumental attitudes”; it does not solely refer to “instrumentality” and it is not a “synonym” of it (p. 175). He goes on further by claiming that even non-anthropocentric movements such as bio-centrism or eco-

centrism are also anthropocentric, not in the sense of giving nature an instrumental value but taking discussion from human perspective, future, etc. In short, weak anthropocentrism asserts that “the source of all value is human consciousness”, the value originates from the “subjective feelings of human observers”, and there is no value out in nature independent of human-valuers (Hargrove, 2008, p. 183). In accordance with Rolston’s view, “the experience of beauty is something that humans bring into the world” (Hargrove, 2008, p. 186).

2.3.2 Biocentrism and ecocentrism

As a reaction towards the anthropocentric exploitation of nature, two more movements are important to be mentioned: the first is biocentrism and the second is ecocentrism. Both of them take nature as the proper object of ethics. The former regards “life” as the main factor for determining our ethical agenda. For biocentrists, the human species are not “the most significant fact of existence” but all life is. As a result, all living things have equal right to exist and pursue their own good.

Paul Taylor (1986) with his book *Respect for Nature* is the pioneering figure of this movement; he claims that via accepting each living entity as an “autonomous center of conscious life” we can claim “an inherent worth out of respect” (p. 79). Taylor summarizes biocentric approach under four main elements: first, humans have equal status with every other living being who is a member of the community of life; second, there is an interdependent relation between each living being, therefore human species are dependent on all other living things; third, all other living beings are “teleological centers of life”, each has its own purpose of being, “pursuing their own good in their own way”; fourth, humans are not superior to other living beings, each living being has equal right to exist (Taylor, 1986, p. 100).

The right to exist for every living being as “a teleological center of life” claims that humans do not have any right to rule or exploit nature. Every organism “as a teleological center of life” aims to “preserve itself and realize its good in its own unique way”, therefore we are under the responsibility and obligation of having respect for each living being. However, biocentric outlook is against holistic accounts, that sees all living beings as one and earth is a living being in itself, which we will see consequently under the name of Deep Ecology Movement and Gaia Theory. Biocentrism wants to keep the distance between humans and other living beings; according to them, this distance would create a true ethical stance dependent on respect. Each individual will be under the responsibility of creating his/her own individual existence as “a teleological center of life”, a “consciousness that has a good of its own” (Taylor, 1986, p. 123).

As a follow up to biocentrism, ecocentrism aimed to enlarge the circle of respect and include more entities as ethical objects. Aldo Leopold with his “Land Ethic” was one of the main figures of this movement. In his *A Sand County Almanac*, he (2001) proposed that “A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise” (p. 189) This was an expansion of the environmental agenda which included not only the singular species, but also particular places, wilderness areas, ecosystems etc... In other words, ecocentrism enlarged its scope of interest to relationships, energy circuits, ecosystems. Rather than just living beings like biocentrism, now all living species, ecosystems, natural processes and even earth itself became an object deserving respect. In contrast to biocentric outlook, inorganic things such as mountains, lakes, rivers were also within the scope of environmental agenda.

Ecocentrics main objection against biocentric outlook was “life cannot exist outside an ecosystemic context” (Oelschlager, 1991, p. 294) and in contrast to weak anthropocentrism, they wanted to move away from everything that was affiliated with “anthropocentrism”; therefore, they adopted the concepts “intrinsic value” and “inherent worth”. For ecocentrics all processes, evolution, energy circulation, interdependent relationships among species had intrinsic value. This was a stronger move in contrast to biocentrism and a change in the focus of value in contrast to all types of anthropocentrism. However, still it was accepting nature and all natural entities not in a holistic sense but always as a different entity in opposition to humans. In that sense, ecocentrism differed from holistic accounts such as Deep Ecology or Gaia Theories as well. However, before moving onto them, ecological feminism and wilderness theories are two more important movements which took human-nature relationship in a dualistic terminology and proposed that nature is an Other and as long as we adopt this distanced position we can find a respectful relation.

2.3.3 Ecological feminism

Ecological feminism argues that there is a strong correlation between nature and women. Their proposal is that there is a common feature in the way women and nature is dominated (Warren & Cheney, 2008, p. 294). They take patriarchal religion as the basis for the threshold of environmental degradation. According to them, the goddess worshipping cultures were more in harmony with nature since “both the earth and women’s fertility were seen as sacred” (Greta & Lori, 2008, p. 278). After the rise of patriarchal religions, the sky god was elevated above the earth goddess, in which the former was fertilizing the latter. Following this tradition, the role of the

female and male in the society have changed, female came out to be addressed as the “fields” which “gestate and bear the male seed” (Greta & Lori, 2008, p. 278).

Therefore, ecological feminism supports the idea that for a healthy and sustainable environmental ethics, a feminist perspective hand in hand with ecological awareness has to be adopted.

Vandana Shiva (2005) is one of the important figures of this approach. She declares that “women and children” are the first in the name of protection of nature. Mother is the environment for the child; she is the womb (p. 191). Likewise, the way we behave to the women and motherhood, the way we will behave to nature. Shiva (2005) asserts that we need to adopt “a reversal of the logic” we have, take women and children first. This is a reversal in the sense of women who are the givers of life, taking precedence over man “who are the destroyers of life”. This appraisal of life would mean giving value to nature, the life-generator earth (p. 192). Also, according to her “sustainability without environmental justice is impossible and environmental justice is impossible without justice between sexes and generations” (Shiva, 2005, p. 190). Ecological feminists point to the metaphors of language which reveal the close link between the way nature and women are treated. Phrases such as “the rape of nature”, “mother nature”, and “virgin forests” all feminize nature and in a culture where women are seen subordinate such a discursive use authorize the subordination of nature (Greta & Lori, 2008, p. 278).

Ecological feminism argues that all relations are dualistic. These dualisms of self and other are manifested in the sense of human-nonhuman nature, nature-culture, man-woman, white-nonwhite, wealthy-poor, civilized-wild, homosexual-heterosexual, in short self and other. The production of identity or self-hood is the main paradigm determining our relations, even the act of “relating” itself. However,

they accept that all these relations are built in such dualisms that are “negated in the process of defining a powerful self” (Greta & Lori 2008, p. 278). In all these examples, the dominating one is always male and the devalued, repressed or exploited is always the female. What we have to see is that there is always an “other” in the way we create the relation. The problem starts when we try to annihilate the Other in our relations and assimilate, exploit and destroy it for the benefit of the “self”. Therefore, ecological feminists adopt the view that we have to respect the Other in our relations which leads to respect the diversity within the unity.

Ecological feminism defends the view that “Other” has to be acknowledged in all of its senses. They assert that Other is the “primordial” sign from which all other meanings come forth (Gottlieb, 1994, p. 224). It is “the Other for whom I must act and be concerned, in answering whose call I receive the distinction imprint of my humanity” says Gottlieb (1994, p. 225). Mauro also declares that “the otherness of the Other in its other-being” teaches us to live in a multitude, to be together with differences and overcome our biases. The most and best we can do is to strive for “participating with the Other” (Mauro, 2005, p. 157).

Just like the way womanhood has to be respected in its otherness from man, “Nature is an Other that addresses us” which has to be respected. To have a healthy relationship we have to accept the otherness of nature and relate with it in this way. A living respectful relationship is based on difference; knowledge is possible as long as “we maintain and convey respect for the otherness of what we seek to understand” (Mauro, 2005, p. 163). Letting the Other to be the Other is letting them speak or be whoever they are (Mauro, 2005, p. 164).

In this sense, ecological feminism supports the view that the meaning of the Self depends on the interactions of the subjects with each other, taking the Other as

the Other, without assimilating it to the self, but seeing the self from this mirror. Ecological feminists argue that “human essence or human nature” cannot “exist independently of any particular historical context” (Warren & Cheney, 2008, p. 300). That is why ecofeminist ethics takes individuals in a reciprocal relation with “Self” and “Other”. This “web of relations” creates a healthy relation with nature and society.

As a result, the main outcome of ecological feminism is it keeps the diversity. Since they focus on accepting differences, they reject the view of deep ecologists or any mystical philosophical point of view which take nature as an extended Self, ecological feminists rather “emphasize a principled unity-in-diversity” (Greta & Lori, 2008, p. 287). Diversity is a central theme in ecological feminism. For them, “sameness” or “oneness of energy flows”, privileging one system above others is a mere reduction; hence “interactions between different subsystems of ecosystems” is the healthy way to be bonded with nature (Warren & Cheney, 2008, p. 298). This diversity is for all differences and dualities, such as “among women, among people of color, between humans and non-humans” (Warren & Cheney, 2008, p. 299). They reject any attempt of “sameness” that reduces everything into “one” and emphasize all interactions among “biotic and abiotic nature” which preserves the diversity and the variety of relationships within nature (Warren & Cheney, 2008, p. 299).

2.3.4 Wilderness theory

In 1964, a group of environmentalists announced *Wilderness Act* in the United States and defended that areas of earth which are “untrammeled by man, where man himself is a visitor” should be protected. These lands would have the characteristics of “retaining its primeval character and influences without permanent improvements

of human habitation” preserving their “natural conditions” (Wilderness Act, 2017). In other words, wilderness movement claimed to preserve and praise nature in its “pristine state” (Nelson, 2008, p. 413). This pristine state was the place which is totally Other to human beings, untouched, preserved in its wildest form. As the wilderness movement defenders claimed this is the only way for human hubris to be defeated. Knowing that nature is radically Other, alien and different is how we can keep distance and as a result respect it.

For wilderness theorists, there are various arguments to protect nature in its pristine form. Some of them claim that wilderness is our “natural resources” or the “repositories of a wide variety of natural resources” (Nelson, 2008, p. 414). On the other hand, some propose that wild nature is the sole source of medicine, which forms the “pharmacopoeia argument”, amazon rainforest and forests of Pacific Northwest are important because of its medicinal value (Nelson, 2008, p. 415). On the other hand, “the life support argument” claims that wilderness is where human existence and the existence of many other species are valuable in itself and that is why it should be preserved. Finally, “the necessity argument” proposes that civilization is dependent on the “prior existence of wilderness”. Leopold calls wilderness as “the raw material” from which the “artifact civilization” has come out (Nelson, 2008, p. 428).

The last argument is very important for the defenders of wilderness theory because they think that actually out of the dual characteristic of human-nature relation, our identity as “human-beings” is created. Oelschlager (1991) defines it as follows:

Identity formation grows from the subjective separation of self from not-self, living from nonliving, human from nonhuman, and proceeds in speech to employ and plant an animal taxonomy as a means of conceptual thought and as a model of relatedness. (p. 8)

“Relatedness” is a specific term in this context, for us to call ourselves as “civilized human beings”, we have to have the other pole as “wilderness” or the “pristine, wild nature.” By means of knowing “what we are not (the negative)”, we are able to know what we are (the positive)” (Oelschlager, 1991, p. 8). In this sense, wilderness theories echo like the way ecological feminists claim.

Wilderness theory asserts the view that positing nature as an Other is a means of seeing ourselves in a mirror. From the reflection of the radical otherness of nature, we identify ourselves. We try to define nature not just for the sake of finding out what nature is but also to define who we are (Rolston, 1987, p. 183).

...Granted that we are culture-dwelling and thus socially intense creatures, much of the unconscious life of the individual is rooted in interaction with otherness that goes beyond our own kind, interacting with it very early in personal growth, not as an alternative to human socialization but as an adjunct to it...In sum, experience of wilderness as an “other” is necessary to any grounded understanding of human beingness an articulation of individual identity. We can be what we are capable of being only if we also have some sense of what we are not. (Oelschlager, 1991, p. 9)

However, of course there are some objections against this theory. Callicott was one of the main critiques; he asserted that wilderness is not a “universalizable” idea.

According to him, wilderness is a theory especially given for the lands of the United States. Therefore, for India, Africa or South America, this theory does not make sense, since the way modernization and capitalism in those geographies are not similarly formed. Second, as a follow up to the first objection, wilderness theory is an ethnocentric concept, it is peculiarly designed for some specific nation and its perspective of “resource”, “hunting”, “natural resource”, etc...Third and most

important is that wilderness theory keeps alive the pre-Darwinian myth that “man exists apart from nature”. This is the oldest and most “influential cultural tradition” that have led us to the idea that “humans are exclusively created in the image of God, or that we are somehow uniquely endowed with divine rationality” which reminds us of anthropocentrism. For a wilderness purist, “any human artifact in a wilderness setting spoils his or her experience of pristine nature” (Callicott, 2008, p. 439). Apart from Callicott’s rejections, Passmore provides a stronger counter argument that actually there is no such idea as wilderness. The concept itself takes meaning with the idea of human experience. Humankind cannot face nature without a human perspective.

Although each objection can have some strong contribution to the critical thinking of how human beings relate to nature, I think wilderness theory can be preserved within the environmental agenda with a charitable reading. First of all, the theory itself has spawned from the preliminary argument that human beings are exploiting or harming nature in some way. This is the main start of the whole environmental movements. As a result, wilderness defenders would like to keep some parts of the world totally untouched by human beings so that it would be a reminder of both humans existence in nature as an Other, and also take that part of pristine nature as a reflection of their identity with the whole picture. Second, the greatest merit of such a philosophical stance would be giving the human beings the virtue of being ethical, respecting the other as the way it is, acknowledging “humility, forbearance and restraint” (Callicott, 2008, p. 440). As Noss (2008) declares, wilderness theory is a warning to humans that they have to “walk humbly everywhere” and “at least do so within” the “wild areas” (p. 446).

2.4 Nature as extended Self

I argue that the so-far mentioned theories can be grouped under the title of nature as Other. They all treat nature as an object and take humans as the subject that has to find a proper means how to relate with it. Although ecocentrism, biocentrism and weak anthropocentrism do not emphasize so much of the otherness trait of the relationship, they still form the judgmental process from a dualistic perspective. However, in wilderness theory and ecological feminism, the distinctness and differentiation of humans as a separate actor that faces nature is highly underlined. This becomes a significant factor not only in the ontological sense, in what ways this relationship exists but also in the ethical sense, that if we keep this otherness then we can respect nature, know where we stand and be endowed with humility.

In contrast to these views, two alternative theories, one of which is stronger in its proposal, defend holistic accounts. Deep Ecology movement is the most assertive and demanding one in this sense, they claim that we have to see nature as an extension of our Self. This will not only create an interdependent relationship as “knots in a web” but also lead to a self-realization process, where the individual is seen to be absorbed in a bigger whole. Arne Naess criticizes the rest of the environmental theories to be shallow in their content; he claims that they cannot give satisfactory results. Less ambitious in comparison to deep ecology but still more holistic in contrast to the former theories is Gaia theory of John Lovelock which proposes that all Earth is a living system, evolving, moving changing with respect to each single unit in relation to whatever exists within. Hence, there is a symbiotic relationship with every single being that makes up the whole.

2.4.1 Deep ecology movement

According to deep ecology movement, shallow views which are the ones so far mentioned accept that humans are separate entities from nature. In other words, shallow ecology regards “humans as the source of all value and ascribes only instrumental (or use) value to the nonhuman world” (Fox, 2008, p. 252). In contrast, deep ecology refuses such an image of “the human-in environment...in favor of the relational, total-field image”. According to it, organisms are “knots in the biospherical net or field of intrinsic relations”. The relationship is not a “figure/ground boundaries” but rather “a holistic or gestalt view” where “the person is not above or outside of nature...but...is part of the creation on-going” (Fox, 2008, p. 252). So, no particular thing is perceived as “discrete, compact, separate things” (Fox, 2008, p. 253) but rather to be “fundamentally (internally) related” in which the “interrelationships are in constant flux”.

This is an organismic conception of the world like the Magna Mater of the matriarchal ages, in Magna Mater, Great Mother, views of nature everything is in unity unlike a Cartesian view of mechanistic universe in which beings except humans are reduced to an “inert...dead-matter” (Fox, 2008, p. 253). Hence, deep ecology stresses the necessary relationship between ethics and metaphysics, in which “an ecologically effective ethics can only arise within the context of a more persuasive and more enchanting cosmology than that of mechanistic materialism” (Fox, 2008, p. 253). The universe comes out to be “a seamless web” (Fox, 2008, p. 255) which “denies the classical idea of the analyzability of the world into separately and independently existing parts” but is rather an “unbroken whole” (Fox, 2008, p. 256). In such a world there is no “dualism” but everything takes place within a unity in which “one’s sphere of identification” is expanded (Fox, 2008, p. 258). In short,

deep ecology urges us to care about earth as “deeply and as compassionately as possible” not because “it affects us but it is us” (Fox, 2008, p. 258).

Moreover, deep ecology movement’s founder Arne Naess also accepts that there is a close link between deep ecology movement and the eastern spiritual traditions such as Buddhism or the philosophy of Spinoza, Whitehead and Heidegger. The principles of “non-violence, non-injury and reverence for life” in Buddhism makes it easier for Buddhists “to understand and appreciate deep ecology than it is for Christians” (Naess, 2008f, p. 270). However, Naess’ deep ecology differs from these kinds of doctrines in the sense of being more “secular and westernized in his *swamarga*” (in Sanskrit means “own way”). His main concern is just holistic, transcending “subject-object dualism” (Naess, 2008a, p. 198). In such a worldview, we can perceive not only that “things” that have value “in themselves” but also “all things have value” equally (Naess, 2008a, p. 201).

Personally, I favor the powerful premises represented in Chinese, Indian, Islamic Hebrew as well as western philosophy. The slogan of “ultimate unity of all life” they do not hide the fact that big fish eat small ones but stress is the profound interdependence of the functional unity of such a biospheric magnitude that nonviolence, mutual respect and feeling, of identification are always potentially there, even between the predator and its victim. In many cultures identification is not limited merely to other living things but also to the mineral world, which helps us to conceive of ourselves as genuine surface fragments of our planet, fragments capable of somehow experiencing the existence of all other fragments: microcosm of the macrocosm. (Naess, 2008c, p. 131)

However, the foremost distinguishing feature of Deep Ecology movement is to see the whole ecological reciprocity as a self-realization process. In the end, nature will be seen not as a different entity, against humans but as an extended, expanded Self where humans share the same essence. This enlargement of the Self is the main argument of deep ecology movement. Their concern is not to find a theoretical

ethical stance but a metaphysical and ontological status that would feed the ethical dimension of humans. In this sense, deep ecology is significantly different from the former theories of environmental ethics. Naess (2008a) continuously underlines the doctrine of Buddhism and gestalt “thinking” that there is “no (permanent) self” but “Self is a symbol of identification with an absolute maxim range of beings” (p. 195). Naess (2008a) views his ecology in this sense a move to Self-realization via nature where “all beings” fall under the category of “seeing oneself in all things” which becomes “a process of identification” (p. 196).

2.4.2 Gaia theory

Gaia theory was proposed by the scientist James Lovelock (1970) around the same years when Naess proposed the deep ecology movement. Lovelock has given the name “Gaia” for his terminology with reminiscences of the Greek goddess Gaia which signified the living organismic feature of the earth. Gaia theory was similar to the deep ecology and holistic accounts in the sense of emphasizing (1) the interconnectedness of being, and (2) the symbiotic relationship (Litfin, 2010, p. 198). Starting with the first, Gaia theory recalls for a vivid relationship with earth that stresses “the interdependence with the countless organisms” and regard “earth in the manner of our oral ancestors as an animate living presence” (Crist&Rinker, 2010, p. 11). The contemporary Gaian scholars also accept the view that “the interconnectedness of life and stuff was given in many animistic societies” but the west have first pushed “the ancestors/gods out of daily life... out of trees to mountain tops (e.g. Olympus) and ultimately exiled the Almighty in outer space” (Linden, 2010, p. 338).

The interconnected unity process of earth and nature is emphasized by the Gaian theorists in the terms of *auto-poiesis* and *symbiosis*. According to the former, Gaia is “self-making” that “highlights the self-generative nature of metabolic networks”. In such a theory the structure, integrity and functioning of Earth takes place within itself with no external cause or source (Litfin, 2010, p. 200). “Organisms shape and regulate the world” (Crist, 2010, p. 317), they function as the “protagonists” to create, alter and affect it (Crist, 2010, p. 321). For example, with a “biotic earth in present time” the temperature of the planet is the way as it is in the present, otherwise without the existence of organisms it would have been “35 degrees hotter” (Crist, 2010, p. 317). This idea is parasitic on the argument of interconnectedness of beings. We are not separate individuals but parts that are connected to each other within a “silken web” (Abram, 2010, p. 226) that determines the temperature of earth, etc. The organic life becomes “reciprocally entangled with even the most inorganic parameters of earthly existence” (Abram, 2010, p. 221).

Hence, just like the ethical implications of the former theories, Gaia suggests that any damage done on earth by any single entity “eventually reaps harsh consequences when feedback comes back to haunt them”. In that sense muddling with “the planet’s rhythms, cycles and interconnections” indicates not the “mastery” of humans but their “folly”. Gaia is “ultimately unpredictable” than any human reason can contemplate and “more powerful” than any human’s act. In the final analysis, it predicts that any deed that is devoid of this consciousness rebounds “in the form of climate change, ozone depletion, endocrine disruption and desertification” (Crist&Rinker, 2010, p. 13). Therefore, Gaia reminds us not to face the world with “myopic constraints of egoism and parochial identities” but rather rehabilitate our way of relation “from our isolation” and come together with the

“wondrous whole of creation” with a sense of responsibility (Litfin, 2010, p. 212). It calls for a standpoint that defends the “human embeddedness” in the cosmos rather than its “exceptionality” (Litfin, 2010, p. 213).

In this sense, Gaia theory is very close to deep ecology movement, where Earth is seen as a bigger Self, creating its own systems, energies, processes within its own regulated rules. The symbiotic relationship implies for a holistic account in contrast to the formerly analyzed theories such as ecological feminism or wilderness theories. Gaia is seen as an extended, expanded Self where each singular entity or unit becomes a limb of it.

2.5 Solution: The peculiar character of our relation with nature

I argue that these approaches can be distinguished under two main categories: seeing nature either as an Other or an extended self. Whereas deep ecologists argue that the ethical approach towards nature comes hand in hand with an ontological argument of taking nature as an extended-Self, ecological feminists and wilderness theories stand against this view. I argue that each theory enlightens an aspect of our relationship with Nature hence we cannot forego one for the other. We have a peculiar dual relation with nature that nature is both an Other and an extended Self.

There are various pros and cons of each camp. The former camp which regards nature as Other criticizes the latter camp by claiming that reducing the dichotomy of subject and object into one, singular self would annihilate the moral agency altogether. This reminds us the Otherness argument of Levinas who claimed that “responsibility” comes only with the acknowledgement of the Other. In his work *Of God Who Comes to Mind*, Levinas (1998) asserts that as long as “there is no dissymmetry of the interpersonal relationship”, then there is no “line of what I have

written can hold”. This dissymmetry Levinas claims creates the realm of “vulnerability” and only with such “a vulnerable subjectivity” one “can love his neighbor” (p. 145). This vulnerability opens up the way to listen, acknowledge, and accept the rights of others, in other words respect the Other. As long as there is this recognition a robust moral agency can be established which would be the creation of responsibility. “An ethical relation” can be formed as long as one is “responsible for the otherness of the other” (Smith, 1997, p. 331). “Otherness” for Levinas (1991) is a spiritual force whose “enigmatic presence can be felt in the obligation or responsibility to others” (Smith, 1997, p. 332). “Identity” of the moral agent and as a result, the responsibility over his/her actions can be established through the recognition of the Other. This otherness and responsibility gives the subject the “obligation to listen and respond” as an “addressee of demand that is heard through” (Smith, 1997, p. 332).

Whereas responsibility is one significant and potent argument that can be raised from the proponents of Nature as Other argument, defenders of the Nature as an Extended Self argument emphasize that there is a crucial ethical outcome their theory can bring. The main idea behind seeing one singular Self in nature is to hinder the potentiality of harm towards it. By recognizing a common essence between every existent being, they defend the view that as long as one is able to see this common feature among each other harmlessness would be prevalent. When one sees other as him/herself, then harming the other would be like harming oneself. Similarly, by realizing that each is a part of this “cosmic process” one would understand that “creative evolution” cannot take place independent of each of us (Oelschlager, 1991, p. 36). The idea of seeing nature as an extended Self assumes that with such a philosophical stance, individuals would abstain from seeing nature as a “resource”

that can be exploited or depleted. Similarly, when John Muir asked to “think like a mountain” what he envisaged was “to break free of our Abrahamic concept of the land” which saw nature only as a means to exploit for his/her usage and interest. Deep ecology and Gaia theory defenders saw nature as Self and wanted to embrace the idea of interdependent, symbiotic relationship among all the living and non-living beings because they thought that keeping a unitarian concept of nature would protect nature from the selfish interests of us. Once I see something as me, there cannot be any hierarchy or superiority. Nature as an extended Self aimed to constitute the fundamentals of environmental ethics from the preservation of equality not of any singular entity over another but of whole cosmos as one singular unit.

Taking all these facts into consideration, I think both approaches have a right in their attempt to constitute a secured ethical relationship with nature. In this sense, I argue that the way we relate to nature cannot be one-sided which would demand us to choose one theory over the other but rather embrace both of them. Hence, I argue that we have a peculiar dual relation with nature: it is both an other and an extended Self. Harrison (1995) delineates this problem clearly as asserting that “we are both inside and outside of nature”. Although, it might look like as if “this is our dismay”; on the other hand, it reveals an enlightening point, “We come up against” an “insurmountable limit”. By means of recognizing that limit we can distinguish our similarity and difference. In other words “freedom” from that limit can be realized once we recognize “that limit” (p. 436). Acknowledgement of the peculiar character of our relation with nature as both an Other and an extended-self is the key point for our emancipation and connection. By means of this acknowledgement although there would not be a salvation point, where all environmental problems will be solved and a heaven on earth established, “at most” we would be free from the “indignity of

leaving the world kicking and screaming like the infants who came into it” and find a way to make peace with it. This would lessen the environmental problems we face rather than abolish altogether (Harrison, 1995, p. 437).

...Acknowledging their autonomy and otherness does not spare us the task of trying to make human sense of what they seem to tell us. It does not prevent us from making false assumptions about them, nor does it make any clearer what obligations we owe them. ...It is the uncommon ground we cannot help but share. (Cronon, 1995a, p. 56)

What is more, according to Drenthen’s interpretation of Nietzsche (1999), every attempt of our interaction with the environment, even the call of environmental ethicists, is a sign of our will to power. The worry about conserving or preserving the environment from the crudest anthropocentric to bio-ethicists, from the deep ecologists to Gaia theorists is a representation of an “ecological web” of power relations (p. 170). Since each moral valuation is a perspective from somewhere, they are contingent (Drenthen, 1999, p. 172). Adopting this contingency, would lead us to see not go only with one camp or the other but see that each reflects one aspect of our relationship with it.

All in all, I claim that we have to embrace our peculiar dual relation with nature, see it both as an Other and an extended Self. In this sense, I would like to present an aesthetic concept which would help us embrace this peculiar dual relation since it would also consist of a dual mode of experience. Sublime is a peculiar aesthetic concept that induces in the experiencer both a sense of displeasure and pleasure. It is a phenomenon that can be constituted only via the natural phenomenon. In the end, sublime, due to its peculiar dual character, of causing both pleasure and displeasure, unveils our finitude and infinity, our otherness and commonality. Therefore, I would like to present the sublime as an original concept

which not only lets us embrace this peculiar dual relationship but also lead us to have an environmentally friendly virtues towards nature. Although, I claim that the sublime is a very important concept to help us see this dual nature and shed light on our moral agency, my argument is not ambitious at all. I do not argue that the sublime can or will solve all the environmental degradations that we have caused like a magic stick once and for all. Although, I would comment more on it in the following chapters, sublime is a rare phenomenon that cannot be experienced any time by anyone, and also demands a perceptual awareness to get the maximum benefit of the experience. Moreover, it is a spontaneous event that cannot be preplanned or predetermined when and where to experience. Current environmental scenario has various parameters whose study would extend the scope of this thesis and the sublime cannot aim to abolish all these problems for all times. Therefore, this thesis should be seen as a humble attempt of a suggestion to see how an aesthetic concept can shed light on our dual relationship with nature which is both an otherness and an extension of selfhood.

CHAPTER 3

THE SUBLIME: HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

3.1 Introduction

Sublime is an important category in the aesthetic appreciation of nature as well as in the environmental ethics. Although the sublime has a history reaching back to Longinus in second A.D, it was a major aesthetic topic in the philosophical discussions of seventeenth and eighteenth century. British philosophers such as Addison, Shaftesbury and Burke are the prominent figures who have contributed to the discourse of the sublime in these years; however, with Kant, sublime reached its most sophisticated form in 1790. Kant analyzed the sublime as a felt awareness of ideas of reason, in two distinct categories as mathematical and dynamical. The former was the inadequacy of our cognition and the second was power. Although it is still a current discussion⁴ whether the sublime's proper object is only nature or both nature and art, I stand side with the view that the sublime is primarily related with natural objects.⁵ Therefore, the sublime can be seen as a significant concept shedding light on problems of environmentalism and aesthetics.

Unfortunately, there is a huge neglect of the sublime in the discussions of contemporary environmental aesthetics. Although some continental philosophers

⁴ See Abaci, U. (2008). Kant's justified dismissal of artistic sublimity. *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 66(3), 237-251 & Clewis, R. (2010). A case for Kantian artistic sublimity: A response to Abaci. *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 68(2), 167-170.

⁵ See Abaci's argument (2008) that Kant does not dismiss the possibility of artistic sublimity outright, but if there are cases of in the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, they are impure rather than pure (p. 249). Also Guyer states that St Peter's basilica and pyramids in Egypt the human artifacts mentioned by Kant (2000) in *Critique of the Power of Judgment* (p. 136) are not true examples of the sublime because they are too "finite to induce a genuine experience of the sublime" (Guyer, 2005, p. 158). See: Guyer, P. (2005). *Values of beauty: Historical essays in aesthetics*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Publishing.

such as Derrida and Lyotard pay attention, their concern is not related directly with environmental issues, but mainly moral or political matters. For Derrida, sublime acknowledges the absurd gulf between theoretical and practical matters in contrast to the beautiful which demands the “unity of the experience” and Lyotard is deeply concerned with the sublime’s political implications, how justice can be an “unpresentable” idea, staying at the threshold, and not being describable (Shaw, 2005, p. 126). Sublime was worth to be a theme only with respect to art. Barnett Newman, the abstract painter and art theorist, employed the idea of the sublime in his works and written a book called *Sublime is Now* in 1948. It was not until the 2010’s that some philosophers⁶ tried to rehabilitate the concept back to its context of environmental issues. For example, Brady (2002) suggests that although academic study of the sublime varies among “broad crossing disciplines such as philosophy, literary theory, critical and cultural theory, art theory, landscape studies and architecture”, sublime is left to oblivion in the contemporary environmental aesthetics (p. 171).

In short, whereas continental philosophy focused on the artistic sublime the analytic tradition neglected sublime totally despite the legacy of the natural sublime bequeathed by the eighteenth century” (Brady, 2002, p. 171). In this section, I want to rehabilitate the sublime back to environmental aesthetics. I argue that with its peculiar dual character, sublime can illuminate the peculiar type of relation we have with nature, i.e. both acknowledge nature’s Otherness and go through an expansion of Self.

⁶ Milling, C. (2012). Ecology, evolution and aesthetics: Towards an evolutionary aesthetics of nature. *British Journal of Aesthetics*, 52(2), 123-39. & Brady, E. (2002). Environmental sublime. In T. Costelloe (Ed.), *The sublime: From antiquity to the present* (pp. 171-183). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. & Brady, E. (2013). *The sublime in modern philosophy: Aesthetics, ethics and nature*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. & Shapsay, S. (2013). Contemporary environmental aesthetics and the neglect of the sublime. *British Journal of Aesthetics*, 53(2), 181-198.

The reason for choosing the sublime as a subject for this thesis is that the sublime has a peculiar dual nature, first it induces displeasure in the subject which creates almost a “violence” to his imagination and second, it gives an experience of pleasure which is an exaltation from its petty individuality that is limited by the boundaries of space and time, an experience of an expansion of Self. Whereas both Kant and Schopenhauer would agree with the first moment of the sublime, that the displeasure felt in the first moment would be an “act of violence” to the mind (Kant, 2000, p. 141) or a feeling of “vanishing nothingness of our own body” (Schopenhauer, 2011, p. 273) in the presence of a power or vastness; in the second moment, where feeling of pleasure is felt, Kant would attribute it to the realization of “reason” where freedom, autonomy or the moral will be grounded. In contrast, for Schopenhauer this would be the loss of subjective individuality which is governed by the Will, the agent behind all suffering and consequently, a recognition of “a pure will-less subject of knowing”, that is independent of space and time, “eternal, serene subject of knowing” (Schopenhauer, 1969, p. 205). On this issue, my conception of the sublime would resonate more with a Schopenhauerian sublime than a Kantian one. Although Kant is one of the main figures in the discussion of the sublime in this thesis, I have to note now that my conception of the sublime varies from him in significant levels and my approach would be more akin to Schopenhauer’s. I would be explicating more about this issue in the following chapters in detail.

Taking these in view, now I would be explaining why I have chosen the sublime as the specific subject of this thesis rather than beautiful. I claim that the sublime has three significant advantages in contrast to beautiful. First of all, (1) the sublime is an aesthetic concept that does not fall into the confusion of non-objectivity because it has an overwhelming, demanding character unlike the beautiful. Hence, it

does not lead to arbitrary decisions or ordinary, mild experiences that can give way to relativism. Moreover, in some cases it requires knowledge which functions as an objective criterion. Second, (2) sublime maintains a multi-sensuous experience without falling into the dominancy of eye like the tradition of picturesque but includes the whole surrounding, taking environment as “environment” not like a single object or a canvass of painting. Moreover, since it endorses the negative emotions such as fear, terror or awe, it is less in conflict with the ugly experiences of nature unlike the beautiful. Third (3) and by far the most important, it consists of a peculiar dual nature, first arouses displeasure and then induces pleasure. This is a significant difference which requires us to pay elaborate attention on the concept.

Sublime has safer shores for not leading to relativities or anything goes subjectivism. Sublime has more strict and determinate borders than beautiful such as “bold, overhanging...threatening cliffs, thunder clouds towering up into the heavens, ...flashes of lighting and crashes of thunder, volcanoes with their all-destroying violence, hurricanes” (Kant, 2000, p. 144). The definition of the sublime comes from the term *sub-limis*, that which is “below the threshold” or “coming to the limit”. Therefore, the definition of the sublime itself encompasses universality due to its definition with respect to the deficiency of human powers. In other words, something can be sublime as long as it overwhelms the human mental powers, i.e. too grand to comprehend or too mighty to resist against its will. The key term of “human mental powers” includes all human beings as long as they have a proper functioning of their mental capacities, meaning that they are not having any mental delusions or disabilities.

A scene of volcano or tsunami lacking any immensity or grandeur is hard to dispute because otherwise they would not be proper volcanoes or tsunamis. A

tsunami for example is a bunch of waves that are at least 3 meters high with a speed of 970 kph unlike a regular wave which can be just 90 km/h (Tsunamis, 2004). Hence, by definition tsunami demands an astonishment, majesty and fear affiliated with the emotions of the sublime. Likewise in a case of volcano, the smallest type are the Hawaiian type volcanoes which produce at least 1000 m³ magmatic eruptions continuously (Volcanic Eruptions, 2016). Hence, to say that one is not affected at all by any scene of volcano or tsunami does not mean that these instances of natural phenomena are apt to be discussed and give way to relativism but rather the subjects who give those judgments are not rational enough to compare, contrast or estimate. In that sense, an ability to imagine well as a non-cognitive justificatory standard will apply in the sublime scenes especially of might and majesty and cognitive knowledge such as mathematical dimensions of any mountain, tsunami or depth of an ocean will count as an objective criterion. In short, the sublime phenomena by definition demands being awestruck and elevated due to overwhelming human capacities. This does not apply only for some particular individuals but for all humans who have normal intellectual and imaginative powers.

Second, sublime do accept the surrounding nature of environment and appreciate it multi-sensuously without reducing it into a two-dimensional canvass or picture. It becomes like an attack on all the senses, with smell, sight, touch and even taste. When one encounters a volcanic eruption, one has to be there, awake with all the senses with respect to the sulphuric smell of the eruptions, the redness of the lava and the glow of the sky, the excruciating heat that the wind blows towards one's face with the ashes. This aesthetic experience is totally different than enjoying the innocence of a daisy that has freshly bloomed in early spring or a sunset on a calm

lake. Although these cases might sometimes demand five senses to be at work, the sublime scenes doubtlessly require and engage all senses.

Therefore, sublime scenes do not frame or isolate the focus of appreciation as in picturesque with the dominancy of vision but rather acknowledges the environmental property of nature surrounding the subject. Furthermore, sublime experiences do not “objectify” and prioritize a single object but take all the phenomena in its totality as a “real lived experience”. Our appreciation becomes directed not “toward an aesthetic object” but to the environment as a whole. This is what Berleant (1993) propounds for a proper aesthetic appreciation of nature, “the experience of continuity, assimilation and engagement that nature encourages”. One perceives the nature “from within, as it were, looking not at it but in it”. We become “participants” of the environment not “observers” (p. 236).

...the sublime offers a clue for identifying distinctive aesthetics of nature that is unrelated to the traditional theory of arts: we need no longer to assimilate environmental appreciation to artistic satisfaction by objectifying and contemplating an object or scene of nature with a sense of disengagement or by replacing the design of art with the order of nature. (Berleant, 1993, p. 234)

So, when we are encountered by “the monumental scale as to exceed our powers of framing and control”, we “produce in their place a sense of overwhelming and magnitude and awe... the overpowering nature bursts beyond the bounds that permit disinterested contemplation and assimilates the human presence”. In these experiences when human cognition or power comes to its limits and imagination struggles due to an inadequacy, having prejudices over some cases falls into a meaningless theory. We take everything that exists in that scene as a part of it, including all the snakes, swamps, etc. Even the displeasure and fearful content of the sublime makes these “ugly” creatures to be appreciated with a grandeur and majesty.

In short, these encounters demands participation, immediacy; they “acknowledge the experience of continuity, assimilation and engagement that nature encourages” multi-sensuously (Berleant, 1993, p. 235). In aesthetic appreciation of the sublime, the natural world and our peculiar relation are palpable; we are both similar and different to nature, we are both an “other” and unified with it. This peculiar dual character itself is the main concern for my research since in sublime there is “perceptual unity of nature and human, of a congruity of awareness, understanding and involvement mixed with awe and humility” (Berleant, 1993, p. 235). In order to understand more in depth let us analyze its history and then move to its dual character.

3.2 Etymology of the sublime

It was the philosopher Longinus in the first century A.D. who described the sublime as the indeterminate part of the rhetorical speeches of men which lacked any form in his work *Peri Hupsous*. *Peri Hupsous* is the main treatise that survives in a single manuscript still and depicts the origins of the concept. In 1674, Boileau translated *Peri Hupsuous* into French with the title, *On the Sublime: Peri Hupsous*, which introduced a new scope of literary criticism and aesthetics to Europe. *Hupsous* literally means “height” or as the term *megathos* is used as an equivalent, “greatness” in Ancient Greek (Heath, 2012, pp. 12-14). It has its grammatical variations of *hupsothen*, *hupsoi* which means “height, from high from above, upwards and metaphorically, summit or crown” (Costelloe, 2012, p. 3). The height or greatness is a representation of being “aloft, elevated, tall or towering, of heavenly bodies and meteorological phenomena”. It refers to the exaltedness of men “in rank or position”

which had “lofty ambition, noble or heroic character and of elevated style or sentiments” (Costelloe, 2012, p. 3).

The Latin term for the sublime has the same similar connotations. The etymology of the word composes of a prefix and a noun: *sub-limis*. *Sub* is a preposition of place that means “under, below” or “at the bottom”. *Super* or *surpa* are the other two close words that respectively mean “a movement from below to above” or “to rise” (Cohn, 1977, p. 291). On the other hand, for *limen* there are two various meanings: (1) threshold or (2) limit, boundary. In this sense, when the two terms are connected, they literally mean “below the threshold” or “to rise from below to above”. Cohn (1977) gives the following variations and alternatives for an etymological reading: *Sub-limo*, “to lift or raise on high”; *sub-lime*, “lofty exalted”; *sub-limis*, “elevated, uplifted” with a tentative “up to the lintel”; *sub-limen*, “related to the hanging up of slaves for punishment”; *sub-levo*, “to raise up”; *sub-duco*, “to lift up”; *sub-vecto*, “to bring up” (p. 290). Oxford Latin Dictionary goes for the first one in 1843, *sub* (up to) and *limin/limen* (lintel or threshold of a building) (Sublime, 1983) and explains it as “set or raised aloft, high up” (Shaw, 2005, p. 1). Another related word, “subliminal”, introduced in psychoanalysis by Freud, has the similar roots as well “but with the sense of below the threshold rather than up to the lintel” (Costelloe, 2012, p. 3). Shaw (2005) supports a similar definition with “*sub* (up to) and *limen* (*lintel*, literally, the top piece of door)” that gives the literal meaning of the point or space right before the top piece of the door (p. 1).

Since the word is first introduced in Europe by Boileau, it is the French literary that picked up the term from its Latin translation, “sublime” and placed it in the *Dictionnaire de l’academie Franaise* in 1694 with close connotations of chemistry and alchemy. In chemistry, sublimation is used with the meaning of “purification”

which refers to the process of heating “in order to refine” (Cohn, 1977, p. 294). Ambrose Pera, who was a Renaissance polymath claimed that distilling is an art which “some call this *sublimar*, which signifies nothing more than to separate the pure from the impure” (Martin, 2012, p. 80). Hence, in the Renaissance and Middle Ages, sublimation was in the context of alchemy with implications of spiritual and religious quests indicating to what remains pure after vaporization, i.e. devoid of the impurities.

That is why; still in chemistry “sublimation” is used for the direct transformation of solid to gas, without going through the liquid phase. The *Dictionnaire Etymologique de la Langue Française* cited 121 versions of the meaning of “sublimation” left from the context of alchemy that referred to “being placed high” or “moving from below to above” (Cohn, 1977, p. 292). The English have adopted the concept within their language with its original Latin form, as the sublime; however, in 1680; John Pulteney presented an English translation of *Peri Hupsuos* with a different title: *Of the Loftiness of Elegancy of Speech*, and in 1622 John Hall chose the title *Of the Height of Eloquence*. On the other hand, the rest of all the English titles preferred the concept of the sublime such as Anon’s *An Essay on the Sublime* in 1698 and W. Smith’s Dionysus Longinus *On the Sublime* in 1739 after Boileau (Cohn, 1977, p. 293). In contrast to English literature, German scholars, although they were aware of the usage of the “sublime” in chemistry, have invented their own word for the sublime such as *erhaben*, *erhöhen* or *veredeln* to signify the exalted movement of the sublime (Cohn, 1997, p. 293) as the terms literally signified “to raise”, “to increase”, being “heightened” or “to refine” (Veredeln, n.d.), (Erhöhen, n.d.), (Erhaben, n.d.).

3.3 Short history

3.3.1 Longinus: The sublime in rhetoric

In *Peri Hupsous*, Longinus explains the sublime as a term that signifies the success of a speaker. Longinus asserts that in an ordinary speech there are indeterminate parts that are not organized, planned or pre-meditated; but, some men are able to bring those parts together in such a forceful manner. For Longinus, sublime is directly a descriptive quality of a discourse. This is a crucial difference between Longinus' period and eighteenth century Europe, i.e. the period of sublime's rehabilitation in aesthetics. Similarly, Monk (1960) echoes that "to write on the sublime style is to write on rhetoric (means to an end) and to write on sublimity is to write on aesthetic (end-in-itself)" (p. 12). Moreover, Heath (2012) denotes that Longinus' essay is *A Discussion of Style* and "distinctive excellence of discourse" (p. 14). Not surprisingly, in the introduction of Boileau's translation of Longinus, there is mention of the "natural sublime" only with a little enthusiasm (Monk, 1960, p. 17). *Peri Hupsous* is not a work for general aesthetics but rhetoric.

As a result of this, we need to distinguish two various contexts of sublime: (1) rhetoric and (2) aesthetics. Although in Longinus it corresponds to the first; after the eighteenth century, sublime becomes a crucial concept in aesthetics. For the ongoing scholars the effects of sublime depicted by Longinus' were still of paramount concern. According to Monk (1960), sublime has the functions of "transporting" the audience to an exalted state of mind (p. 13). In Longinus' own terms (2006) sublime is indeed "a certain lofty cast of mind" (Section 9, para. 2). For Longinus, when a man experiences ecstasy rather than persuasion upon hearing a sublime speech, the result is similar to an intoxication in which the audience are overwhelmed and dominated. Therefore, for Longinus, sublime resembles not to a worldly and natural

experience but to a supernatural one; it has the effects of being thrilled and entranced. In other words, sublime is an experience close to the peculiarities of the supernatural which justifies the claim that the sublime elevates man from mundane affairs of wealth and status (Shaw, 2005, p. 18).

Sublime elevates man to a profundity that cannot be uttered in words, i.e. ineffable. The effects of the sublime on men such as “elevation, transport and vehemence” are (Monk, 1960, p. 50) of importance for the eighteenth century scholars such as Burke and Kant. These are the key concepts that causes the term “sublime” to “transcend the realm of rhetoric” and focus on its effects on the mind “which is to lead later to an aesthetic concept of sublimity” (Monk, 1960, p. 13).

3.3.2 The British aestheticians

Until Boileau’s translation of Longinus’ work (1674) in British tradition, sublime was not a significant topic of discussion for centuries. Although Longinus identified the sublime’s meaning with feelings of ecstasy and elevation and indicated its close relationship with divine power, its place of manifestation in the ancient age was language, i.e. rhetoric. Its origins were hidden in “rhetorical speech”. However, in the seventeenth century, the reference of the sublime shifted to the natural world, to the majesty of Nile or Rhine or impressiveness of the Himalayas and the oceans (Shaw, 2005, p. 28).

There are many scholars who were interested in the sublime throughout the philosophical history of Britain¹¹; however, not to be off topic I will not go into

¹¹ For more information see: Dennis, J. (1996). The advancement and reformation of modern poetry. In A. Ashfield & P. de Bolla (Eds.), *The sublime: A reader in British eighteenth century aesthetic theory* (pp. 32-34). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press & Addison, J. (1996). A discourse on ancient and modern learning. In A. Ashfield & P. de Bolla (Eds.), *The sublime: A reader in British eighteenth century aesthetic theory* (pp.70-72). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. & Akenside, M. (1996). The pleasures of the imagination. In A. Ashfield & P. de Bolla (Eds.), *The sublime: A*

detail but focus on the prominent one, Edmund Burke. In order to reveal the legacy he gained from his predecessors, I will give a short account of the literature before him. Before Burke, the characteristics of the sublime accumulated in the writings of Burnet, Addison, Shaftesbury, Baillie, etc. For example, Thomas Burnet (1691) declared that mountains with their heights rises as if to “infinity” (p. 109), “too big for our comprehension” and overwhelming the mind with “excess, stupor and admiration” (p. 110). Addison (1996) in 1712 claimed that the sublime is an idea of “an almighty being” which makes itself clear in language by the “descriptions of ancient poets” (p. 69), where there are no more words to describe but affinities with infinity and omnipotence; however, for Baillie (1996) sublime is neither a feeling nor an idea, but rather an experience that exists where these distinctions are separated, a midpoint where external world interacts with the subject (pp. 89-91). Sublime starts at the “limits of human conception”. It is a demarcation point between rationality and irrationality, “certainty and uncertainty, security and destruction” (Shaw, 2005, p. 46).

The most important figure in the British tradition is Edmund Burke who gives a distinct and crucial place for the sublime in his work *A Philosophical Inquiry into the Ideas of Sublime and Beautiful* in 1756. For Burke (1998), sublime is a quality of the natural objects that causes passions of fear or astonishment (p. 53). It has an odd mixture that discloses the gap between pain and pleasure. If the distance is safe enough (so that the object does not pose any threat to one’s existence), the first passion experienced in the sublime, terror, transforms into a feeling of

reader in British eighteenth century aesthetic theory (pp. 86-87). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. & Baillie, J. (1996). An essay on the sublime. In A. Ashfield & P. de Bolla (Eds.), *The sublime: A reader in British eighteenth century aesthetic theory* (pp. 87-100). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

“astonishment, reverence and respect” (Burke, 1998, p. 53). The peculiar dual nature of the sublime is that these latter emotions are related with a kind of pleasure unlike the former feeling, terror. Burke was an empiricist (Shaw, 2006, p. 49) who took the subject of the sublime as if a scientific project to analyze (Burke, 1998, p. 53).

For Burke (1998), the origin of the sublime lies in “self-preservation” (p. 79). The terror which lies at the heart of the sublime arises due to a threat on one’s existence. However, once the distance is realized, so that no direct and immediate threat exists, terror is transformed into a kind of pleasure that is mixed with astonishment, reverence and awe. Due to feeling of astonishment and reverence, sublime is an experience where philosophical thinking falls into abeyance. In the sublime, rational thinking is impossible since the experienced natural object is nothing but an instance of the ineffable and incomprehensible. Sublime is always “that which is excess of any kind of limit or boundary, it is the category for a power or greatness that is beyond categorization” (Burke, 1998, p. xxii). In contrast to the beautiful, which is defined by Burke as “qualities in bodies” that “cause love or some passion”, sublime is “sacred, strong, transcendent and aristocratic” (Burke, 1998, p. xxii). Sublime is “obscure”, it is the “ignorance of things that causes all our admiration (Burke, 1998, p. 57); “powerful”, like a bull versus an ox which is very destructive; and composed of “privation” such as “vacuity, darkness, solitude and silence” (Burke, 1998, p. 65). Not only these but also, sublime objects tend to be “vast”, comparatively more striking in depth, height and length; leading us to the concepts of “infinity, difficulty, magnificence” (Burke, 1998, pp. 67-68). In contrast to sublime, beautiful has its origin in “smallness, smoothness, gradual variation, delicacy and soft colors” (Burke, 1998, pp. 103-106).

Another important point in Burke as well as his British predecessors is (1998) sublime is a quality of the natural objects. This should be a matter of question for our research, since it is a controversial account in contrast to Burke's successor, Immanuel Kant. For Burke, sublime is not just in natural inanimate things, but also a feature of some animate beings such as "serpents or other poisonous animals" (p. 53). Burke also accepts artistic implications of the sublime in man-made artworks such as tragedy or poetry. However, Burke (1998) claims that they would be indisputably less powerful in comparison to the force of natural ones. In short, for Burke sublime is a state that entails the idea of annihilation and "a state of submission that is often combined with the possibility of getting lost" (p. xxiii), i.e. a mixture of "terror" and "delight". For Burke, sublime is a state of "delightful horror" (Gasche, 2012, p. 29) just like his successor Immanuel Kant, who emphasized the sublime's peculiar dual character with the term "negative pleasure".

3.3.3 Kant

Kant's approach to the sublime and beautiful is deeply sophisticated in contrast to his British predecessors. In order to shed light on his theory, first of all it is needed to understand the role of the third *Critique* in his overall architectonic. Kant, after publishing his two *Critiques*, at the age of 63 (1787), has written to Reinhold that the third *Critique* is on its way. Without having any intentions of writing a tripartite volume of books beforehand, Kant realized that his system of thought is lacking a significant link.

My inner conviction grows, as I discover in working on different topics that not only does my system remain self-consistent but I find also I cannot see the right way to investigate a certain subject...in order to make discoveries I had not expected. I am now on at work on the critique of taste, and I have

discovered a new sort of a priori principles, different from those heretofore observed...For there are three faculties of the mind: the faculty of cognition, the faculty of pleasure and displeasure and the faculty of desire. (Kant, 1996, pp. xiii, xiv)

This is the foremost evidence that reveals what Kant had in mind before starting his last work: *Critique of the Power of Judgment*. In the third *Critique*, Kant (2000) asserts that the “incalculable gulf” between the “domain of the concept of nature, as the sensible, and the domain of the concept of freedom, as the supersensible” can be bridged (pp. 62, 63). In other words, the phenomenal world, determined by the causality, can be transformed into a “moral world” where people can really act in accordance with the moral law. This is the “incalculable gulf” that needs to be bridged between nature and freedom. Hence, the third *Critique* problematizes how the moral law, taking place in a “supersensible” or *noumenal* realm, can be reconciled with the deterministic laws of “sensible” or phenomenal nature (Guyer, 2013, p. 429).

The problem Kant tries to solve in his third *Critique* begins with the same main question like the former *Critiques*: “How are synthetic a priori judgments possible?” This has been a part of his transcendental philosophy (Guyer, 1997, p. 1); however, in this case he has to deal with the problem of taste which has a peculiarly interesting issue. First of all, judgments of taste are purely subjective because, when one reports about one’s state of pleasure/displeasure, it derives from a represented object’s effect on a subject. Hence, they are within the boundaries of subjective knowledge. On the other hand, although they are subjective, they have a common assertive status for everyone; the claims of taste require everyone or demand others to have the same feeling about the represented object (Kant, 2000, pp. 98-100). As Guyer (1997) interprets Kant, the “intersubjective validity” in the judgments of taste proves that

there are some governing a priori principles. In short, Kant has the challenge of treating the problem of taste both as a feeling, without falling into a conceptual explanation; and at the same time allowing for an intersubjective validity (p. 18).

This a priori principle in the Third *Critique* is introduced by Kant (2000) as “the reflective judgment” governed by the concept of “purposiveness”. Reflective judgments in contrast to the “determining judgments” does not subsume a particular under a universal which is already given (p. 43), but rather “makes” it “possible” (Guyer, 1997, p. 15). When one reflects, the point of focus is on the particular, not on a general kind of objects but on that specific, singular particular. When we see a rose we say “This rose is beautiful” contrary to “All roses are beautiful”, the latter is nothing but a mere empirical generalization (Kant, 2000, p. 100). This type of judgment, as it could be derived from its name, reflects back on the object. Hence, reflective judgment questions about particulars in contrast to universals (Beiner, 1992, p. 119). Therefore, judgments of taste are “exemplary”, from whose roots we can trace the literal meaning “taken out”, *ex* (out) + *emo* (buy; acquire) (Exemplary, n.d.).

Purposiveness is the concept that rules reflective judgments with a regulative feature; purposiveness is crucial for us to comprehend nature. This transcendental concept functions both in teleological and aesthetic judgments that make up the two sections of the third *Critique*. Kant (2000) maintains in the first section, i.e. *The Critique of the Aesthetic Power of Judgment*, “purposiveness” exists as if to fulfill a purpose; purposiveness is “the causality of a concept with regard to its object (*forma finalis*)” (p. 105). He elaborates that the “aesthetic judgment of reflection contains formal purposiveness” (p. 108). Later on, he defines the third moment of aesthetic judgments in terms of “purposiveness without purpose” (p. 120) or the “subjective

formal purposiveness” (p. 76) which means that the subject judges the object as if to be created for a purpose; however, this purpose is not an objective one but rather subjective, existing only for the subject to comprehend. Therefore, Kant (2000) calls purposiveness, the a priori principle of the faculty of judgment (p. 83).

In the second section, *The Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment*, Kant elaborates more on purposiveness. Kant (2000) claims that nature is so complex in its diversity that in order to comprehend nature totally, we, humans have to assume that it has a “final end” (p. 294). This presupposition of “final end” or “unity of nature” (p. 13) is “regulative” for heuristic purposes (Kant, 2009, pp. 606-607). Via this assumption of unity, we can search and gain knowledge about nature. In order not to be overwhelmed by the “complexity of the specific idioms of organic life”, purposiveness is needed in our “cognitive economy”. By means of purposiveness, we can conceptualize the “natural forms” (Crowther, 2010, p. 66). Zuckert (2007) maintains that in order to give account of “how empirical knowledge is possible, we must assume nature” to be both in accordance with the universal laws that we legislate to nature and be “purposive for our understanding” which means that it is “amenable to our need for and aspirations to knowledge of the empirical diversity as if it were made to be so by an understanding not our own” (p. 29). Moreover, according to Zuckert’s interpretation (2007) this principle of purposiveness lets us to have “a thoroughgoing interconnection of nature and experience nature in a systematic science” (p. 27); however, as emphasized above, this is necessary for regulative, heuristic not constitutive purposes. In the Section of *The Dialectic of Reason of the First Critique*, Kant acknowledges that the ideas of reason such as “God, the immortality of the soul and the world” are “regulative”, heuristic principles (Kant, 2009, pp. 606-607) or “maxims that enable the empirical

investigations” to come real. They are needed for the understanding to search and explain about the judgments of objects (Zuckert, 2007, p. 29).

Guyer (2000) also interprets purposiveness as an a priori principle bridging the gap between the first and second *Critique*. We take a concept of the supersensible realm, i.e. freedom, as if to be “actual” in the phenomenal world (p. ix). How can this be possible? The answer is: purposiveness posits the phenomenal world in conformity with the ideals of reason. The phenomenal world is not “a merely mechanical, morally meaningless world, but...corresponds to our highest aims” (Zuckert, 2007, p. 372). The a priori principle, purposiveness, claims that the possibility of a final end is needed for a human mind to comprehend nature; this allows nature and its laws to be cognized and reconciled with the reason’s moral ideas (Kant, 2000, pp. 80-81).

This sets the so called transition (Kant, 2000, p. 227) or connection (Kant, 2000, p. 233) between the first and second *Critique*, the third *Critique* is entitled to fulfill. The empirical particulars in mechanistic causation reconciles with the moral, self-legislated ends that are universal (Zuckert, 2007, p. 372). For Kant (2000), this is the peculiarity of the aesthetic judgment, i.e. to be subjectively universal (p. 100). An aesthetic judgment is a subjective judgment that does not present claims about the object but at the same time demands or “imputes” (Kant, 2000, p. 47) the same kinds of feelings from the others (Kant, 2000, pp. 96-97). There is a universal voice in aesthetic judgments which are in fact totally subjective (Kant, 2000, p. 101). In that sense, the incalculable gulf between nature and freedom is bridged by means of the concept of purposiveness that is inherent in aesthetic judgments; the empirical world is recognized to be fit for the “abstract ideas of reason” and the idea of freedom is made “palpable” rather than to be only an “inferential evidence” via the aesthetic

judgments (Guyer, 2013, p. 430). The universal voice is reconciled with the empirically particular judgments. Guyer (2000) argues that since we are both animal and rational creatures, we need this kind of aesthetic experiences, because we are the only ones who can “experience the supersensible through its sensible appearance” (p. xi). The third *Critique* accepts that we need “sensuous as well as rational presentation...to confirm the conditions of the possibility of morality” (Guyer, 2013, p. 429).

Kant (2000) states that “beauty prepares us to love disinterestedly and that of the sublime to esteem even contrary to our own interest” (p. 151). This unveils not only the aesthetic judgments’ function as a bridge between morality and nature but also introduces a distinction between beautiful and sublime. Since the main topic of this research is sublime, it is necessary to shed light on the difference between the sublime and beautiful in Kant. Kant presents the sublime in comparison to beautiful as being (1) formless, (2) a serious activity of reason and imagination, contra-purposive, (3) not a predicate of the natural object but grounded in one’s own, and (4) a source of negative pleasure. However, before moving onto that, it is important to delineate the two categories of the sublime in Kant, “mathematical” and “dynamical”, which distinguish natural phenomena with respect to their vastness in dimensions and power in existence.

Sublime for Kant is an aesthetic judgment divided into two kinds: mathematical and dynamical. Mathematical sublime is related with greatness in size and measure and dynamical is related with power. The concept directly linked with mathematical sublime is infinity. Although the mind tries to apprehend the vastness of the object that lies beyond, it is impossible to comprehend it in its totality. Mathematical sublime is an experience that is absolutely great, “beyond all

comparison". It is related with greatness in size/measure. Kant (2000) begins describing the "nominal definition of sublime" under the chapter of "on the mathematically sublime" as "which is absolutely great" (p. 131). The mind tries to comprehend the vastness of the object that lies beyond, but it is impossible to take it in its totality. Mathematical sublime is absolutely great that "is beyond all comparison" (Kant, 2000, p. 131). Kant (2000) explains that "the estimation of magnitude by means of numerical concepts is mathematical (or their signs in algebra), but that in mere intuition (measured by eye) aesthetic" (p. 134). To take up a quantum of intuition by imagination requires two processes; "apprehension" and "comprehension" (p. 135). "Apprehension" is progressive increasing, so there is no problem with it, one can build up apprehending intuitions till infinity, since it is step by step and in partial representations, but in "comprehension", "there is a greatest point beyond which" imagination cannot go. The problem with comprehension is imagination tries to take whole the data in "one intuition" and "comprehend" it in its totality; however, fails to do this. Simultaneously "the mind hears in itself the voice of reason" which present its ideas, such as infinity or totality and these ideas of reason confront the overwhelmed imagination. "Even being able to think of a whole indicates a faculty of the mind which surpasses every standard of sense" (p. 137). So, the faculty of reason makes itself palpable via its presentation of ideas, such as in this case, infinity. The outcome is nothing but a conflict of the overwhelmed faculty of imagination and reason. This conflict results in a negative pleasure, such as respect or awe, where first, displeasure due to inadequacy of imagination and later, pleasure due to the consciousness of the ideas of reason is experienced.

On the other hand, dynamical sublime deals with the "power" of the object. When one encounters a volcano in explosion, a tsunami that is in devastation or

mountains that are reaching as if “to the heavens”, one encounters a dynamical sublime. Kant (2000) says “nature considered in aesthetic judgment as a power that has no dominion over us is dynamically sublime” (p. 143). He defines “power” as the capacity of overcoming great obstacles and “dominion” when “this capacity is superior to the resistance of something that itself possesses power” (Kant, 2000, p. 143). In other words, when a subject has ability not to resist the power of another, then s/he would be under the dominion of him/her. Therefore, dynamical sublime is the experience of nature when it is realized that we, as human beings also have a power to resist the power of nature and not bow under its dominion. This ability of resistance, in Kant’s philosophy, leads us to deduce that dynamical sublime is a felt awareness of our freedom. In that sense, whereas in the mathematical sublime the idea of infinity is encountered, in the dynamical sublime, the idea of freedom is raised to consciousness. For example, when we encounter a volcano in explosion or a tsunami in devastation and mountains reaching as if “to the heavens”, as long as we have a proper distance -not too far so that the spectacle is not diminished nor too near so that his/her existence is not threatened with the natural object-, the first reaction would be a displeasure due to the recognition of our physical powerlessness which is a result of imagination’s inadequacy as well. But then, we realize consequently a capacity in us that has the ability to resist that power of nature which enables us to

...Judge ourselves as independent of it [nature] as a superiority over nature on which is grounded a self-preservation of quite another kind than that which can be threatened and engendered by nature outside us, whereby the humanity in our person remains undemeaned even though the human being must submit to that dominion.” (Kant, pp. 144, 145)

In the mathematical sublime a proper distance is important with respect to the encountered object, neither too small nor too far away, which would affect the

comprehension of the mind; and similarly in the dynamical sublime, the subject also has to be in a proper distance where his existence would neither be under danger nor lack the ability to perceive the power of the object.

Dynamical sublime is concerned with the power of the objects of nature without dominion over human beings (Kant, 2000, p. 143). In other words, dynamical sublime is the experience of natural objects which present scenes of great might, at a proper distant that the spectator's existence is neither threatened nor the scene's impressiveness is diminished. Dynamical sublime is the aesthetic response for objects of nature whose representation of power "determines the mind to think of the unattainability of" that object as a presentation of its extent of power (Kant, 2000, p. 151); however, since being afraid and feeling terror would paralyze the subject's faculties and impair the mode of the judgment, s/he should not be feeling fear *per se* but only defining it to be as fearful. Kant indicates that being absorbed in such an emotion will deprive the judgment to be an aesthetic response. "Someone who is afraid can no more judge about the sublime in nature than someone who is in the grip of inclination and appetite can judge about the beautiful" (Kant, 2000, p. 144); that would be against the principle of disinterestedness.

In both types of sublime, Kant involves (1) an estimation of nature's formlessness, (2) an operation of the imagination, which creates a "serious activity" with reason, (3) a realization of the power of reason, positing the source of the sublime in one's own mind and (4) a felt inadequacy of our power hand in hand with a compensating superiority, negative pleasure. Therefore, for our research's purpose, it is not necessary to give priority over another but see what is common in both. The crucial point for us would be the fourth characteristics, negative pleasure, i.e. the dual characteristic of the sublime, experience of both displeasure and pleasure.

Whereas in the mathematical sublime displeasure leads to the realization of inadequacy of our “sensuous intellectual elements of perceptual knowledge”, in the dynamical sublime it becomes an awareness for our “capacity for rational action” (Budd, 2003, p. 122). Mingled with “these positive and negative elements”, sublime becomes “not just an emotion with two aspects but as one in which there is a movement back and forth between two aspects, an oscillation between repulsion from and attraction to the object” (Budd, 2003, p. 135).

Moving to the sublime’s differences from beautiful, the first property is “formlessness” (Kant, 2000, p. 127). Beautiful is always concerned with a form; in beautiful, the mind is able to grasp its limits and define it; however, in the sublime the imagination’s limits are coerced, the object itself lacks a proper form. Dynamical sublime is the “bold, overhanging, as it were threatening cliffs, thunder clouds towering up into the heavens, ... flashes of lighting and crashes of thunder, volcanoes with their all-destroying violence, hurricanes” and “the boundless ocean set into a rage, lofty waterfall on a might river” (Kant, 2000, p. 144). None of these phenomena is definite and determined as the comprehensible form of a flower or a bird. In the sublime, the characteristics of beautiful such as “rational, spiritual, harmonious, measured and balanced” are deficient but rather “other, agonistic, side of nature and human psychology” are experienced such as “the war of turbulent elements, the tragedy of annihilation, the celebration of emotional torment, the darkness of unknowing” (Greig, 2011, p. 46). In short, natural objects that trigger the sublime state are formless with no definite shape both in size and power.

This is related with the second characteristics of the sublime; it is “a serious activity of imagination and reason” (Kant, 2000, p. 127). In contrast to the sublime, in beautiful the mind gets a feeling of pleasure from a “harmonious state of the two

faculties” which are “imagination” and “understanding” (Kant, 2000, pp. 89, 90). Beautiful occurs due to a free play of imagination and understanding. In a cognitive judgment, the faculty of understanding interprets and subsumes a concept in accordance with intuitions received from our sense organs. These intuitions are blind and given a form by means of understanding. However, in aesthetic judgments, it is imagination that presents a manifold of intuitions, and since there is never a determinate concept that these intuitions can be subsumed under, the faculty of understanding receives them as if they exist with a specific end, but since they fail to be so, it becomes nothing but a free play of these two faculties. Kant calls this moment of the beautiful “purposiveness with no end”. “Purposiveness” for Kant (2000) is to exist as if to fulfill a purpose; in his own words “the causality of a concept with regard to its object (*forma finalis*)” (p. 105). When a beautiful object is encountered, there is subjective formal purposiveness of the represented object accompanied with the feeling of pleasure (pp. 106, 107). Kant (2000) maintains that purposiveness itself is the a priori principle of the faculty of judgment (p. 83), though it is with no objective end (Kant, 2000, p. 83). Imagination interprets the manifold of intuitions without the introduction of a determinate concept from Understanding and this free play results in the attainment of a formal objective, or purposiveness. The unexpected and unintentional outcome of this play is the result of pleasure. In contrast to the purposiveness of beautiful, in the sublime we encounter counter-purposiveness. Since the mind fails to grasp any form or a limit in the sublime experience, it also cannot attribute any finality or purpose. As Kant (2000) puts it, the sublime experience looks as if it is “unsuitable for our faculty of presentation and as it were doing violence to our imagination” (p. 129). In short, in the sublime the mind attempts to have a formality and a finality of the object, but fails due to the limited

capacity of imagination. However, reason at the same time obtains ideas that cannot have correspondent intuitions in the sensory world such as “infinity” or “totality”. Imagination in this sense “pales into insignificance when presented with the ideas of reason” or in other words, the reason proposes ideas; but the imagination falls “inadequate” to the extent and “power of reason” (Kant, 2000, p. 140). Therefore, sublime is a serious activity of imagination and reason, manifested in their conflict.

Third and the most distinctive element of the Kantian sublime in contrast to his predecessors, is that the sublime is not a property of the natural object but rather grounded in one’s reason. With respect to his precursors, Kant shifts the sublime from the power of nature to a mode of consciousness. Although, natural objects have a part in the experience of the sublime, the ground for this feeling lies in one’s own reason. The reason is related with formlessness and being “a serious work of imagination and reason”. Since beautiful has a form, imagination is able to ascribe a subjective purposiveness to the object; however, in the sublime, imagination’s capacity falls inadequate to the cause of this phenomenon and the ideas of reason are revealed. As a result of all this, sublime takes place “only in the mind of the one who judges” in contrast to the object in nature (Kant, 2000, p. 139). When we say beautiful is grounded in natural objects and sublime in one’s own mind, we mean, although sublime is not dependent on any determinate concept, it still derives a manifold of intuitions from external objects and imagination tries to unify them with understanding for which an “adequately corresponding experience” can be ascribed (Kant, 2000, p. 217); however, in the sublime, reason is at work rather than understanding, and some of reason’s concepts have no corresponding intuition in the sensible world, rather they exist in the supersensible realm. Since reason is a part of the architectonic of the mind; sublime exists solely in one’s own mind.

Finally, the conflict of the two faculties, imagination and reason, leads to the fourth distinctive characteristic of the sublime: negative pleasure. The subject feels displeasure at the first encounter, a shudder or terror, however, when the ideas of reason are introduced, displeasure is transformed into a specific feeling closer to respect or awe. Since there is no conflict in beautiful, it can present only a positive pleasure with which the mind experiences calm contemplation. In contrast, with the sublime the mind is utterly perturbed and moved as if almost “an act of violence” is executed (Kant, 2000, p. 141). In short, sublime differs from the beautiful in “the bitter-sweet quality of the experience” it presents (Young, 2005, p. 70). The mind fails to comprehend the object in one intuition (Kant, 2000, p. 136) and due to that the first feeling aroused is a peculiar kind of dissatisfaction; however, following that, a transition takes place in the mind, a feeling of pleasure along with the realization of reason’s ideas (Kant, 2000, pp. 141-144). This is the reason, for Kant, why we are both terrified and fascinated in the sublime. Greig (2011) calls this painful character of the sublime, “nature’s brutally material *coup d’etat*” (p. 46). However, the second part of the sublime, which gives is the pleasure that we experience is for Kant a realization of rationality which differentiates us from the animal world, i.e. humanity. This is the distinct part that differentiates Kant from his predecessors and successors.

I have to underline that I would not be following Kant in this argument since this would give an exaggerated emphasis on rationality and humanity; however it is noteworthy to know what he states. According to Kant (2000), upon the sublime experience we realize a supersensible substratum that is akin to the power of nature and this is the reason for making the sublime “absolutely great” (2000, p. 132). This supersensible substratum in Kant’s terminology is the realm of reason which marks our humanity. In other words, it is the rational nature which we share with divine

beings that make up the supersensible realm. This supersensible substratum of human beings forms the grounds of “ideas of reason” that has no correspondent sensible intuitions in the external world. Rational nature comprises of establishing and setting ends and acting in accordance with these ends (Kant, 1999, p. 66). An awareness of “the ability to resist” reveals the fact that human beings have the ability to set their own ends, i.e. they are rational beings. Rationality endorses freedom (Kant, 1999, p. 84). In other words, freedom is an “idea of reason” in Kant’s philosophy that is shared with the supersensible realm. Therefore, in dynamical sublime, the feeling that is aroused is a rational feeling which reveals that we are moral agents, whose will has the feature of autonomy. As I have stated above, I would not be endorsing this statement for this thesis, rather I would be following a more Schopenhauerian account of the second moment of the sublime which is exaltation, an oceanic feeling that becomes an all-embracing experience as if an expansion of Self and moving beyond the limited boundaries of space and time which would be analyzed in the following chapters in detail.

3.3.4 Schopenhauer

Schopenhauer is also an important figure in the philosophy of sublime. Although he is a successor of Kant in the philosophy of the sublime, he differs significantly in the explication of the second moment of the sublime, pleasure. Schopenhauer’s analysis of the sublime has a strong relation with its differentiation of world as “will” and “ideas”. For Schopenhauer, “will” is the primary force of all life which differs in its scope and function than the Kantian phenomenon. He asserts that all “willing arises from want”, which is a sign of “deficiency” and “suffering”. This willing is a

continual; it is a cycle that never ends, for one wish which is satisfied consequently another one generates, “the desire lasts long, the demands are infinite; the satisfaction is short and scantily measured out” (Schopenhauer, 2011, p. 260). Therefore, as long as consciousness is filled by will, there is never a lasting “happiness or peace”, but always misery and a constant feeling of deficiency (Schopenhauer, 2011, p. 260).

In contrast to the subjective individuality that is governed by the principle of sufficient reason that can comprehend only the relations which are marked by “will”, on the other hand there is the realm of “ideas” which are marked by the “pure subject of will-less knowledge”. A man is composed of two different poles, an “impetuous and blind striving of will (whose pole or focus lies in the genital organs” and “eternal, free, serene, subject of pure knowing (whose pole is the brain)” (Schopenhauer, 2011, p. 269).

Aesthetic contemplation is a specific form of perception that brings the subject to that pure subject of will-less knowledge. It takes the subject to the world of “ideas” where one sinks in “pure contemplations”, loses “oneself in the object” and forgets “all individuality”. World of ideas or “pure subject of will-less knowledge” is where the boundaries of space and time are transcended, it is the place where all becomes “one whether we see the sun set from the prison or from the palace” (Schopenhauer, 2011, p. 261).

In this sense, beautiful and sublime fall under the category of experiences that make us aware of the “world of ideas”, or the will-less state where we become “pure subject of knowledge, freed from the miserable self” (Schopenhauer, 2011, p. 264). Schopenhauer (2011) differentiates beautiful from the sublime in closer terms with Kant. In beautiful, “pure knowledge” comes forth “without a struggle” but in the

consciousness without resistance, and therefore imperceptibly, the will and the knowledge of relations which is subject to it” are in “unfavorable” circumstances (p. 267). In other words, beautiful reveals the world of ideas “without resistance”, “imperceptibly” but the sublime creates a havoc in the conflict between the subjective individual, which is dominated by will and the pure will-less state, which is governed by the realm of Ideas.

However, in the appendix of *World as Will and Idea*, Schopenhauer (1969) declares that “the theory of the sublime is by far the most excellent thing in the *Critique of Aesthetic Judgement*” (p. 532). Schopenhauer even says that it is by far “incomparably more successful than that of the beautiful” (Schopenhauer, 1969, p. 532). Why does Schopenhauer claim as such? This would not only be an answer for choosing the sublime as the peculiar subject of this thesis but also to show the depth of the philosophy that lies behind the sublime. For Schopenhauer, sublime is by far “the most excellent thing” because it portrays the dual nature of *World as Will and Idea* far more explicitly. Not only this but also, it brings the “pure will-less subject of knowledge” into the fore in such a sharp and obvious manner that compared with beautiful the experience of this state in the sublime is far more intense than the beautiful (Vandenabeele, 2003, p. 94).

Nature convulsed by a storm; the sky darkened by black threatening thunder-clouds; stupendous, naked, overhanging cliffs, completely shutting out the view; rushing, foaming torrents; absolute desert; the wail of the wind sweeping through the clefts of the rocks. Our dependence, our strife with hostile nature, our will broken in the conflict, now appears visibly before our eyes. Yet, so long as the personal pressure does not gain the upper hand, but we continue in aesthetic contemplation, the pure subject of knowing gazes unshaken and unconcerned through that strife of nature, through that picture of the broken will, and quietly comprehends the Ideas even of those objects which are threatening and terrible to the will. In this contrast lies the sense of the sublime. (Schopenhauer, 2011, p. 271)

Similar to Kant, Schopenhauer (2011) also defines the sublime experience also not to be “won but also consciously retained” (p. 268) that it has to have significant distance that would not threaten the existence of the individual; otherwise it would not be a sublime experience but mere emotional fluctuations of “fear” or “anxiety” (Schopenhauer, 2011, p. 268). Schopenhauer (2011) declares that if “a single, real act of will were to enter consciousness through actual personal affliction and danger from the object...then the individual will thus actually be influenced” in which case there would not be any idea of peace of contemplation and “the impression of the sublime would be lost” because that would be mere feeling of “anxiety” (p. 268).

All in all, the far most important feature in Schopenhauer’s account of the sublime for the discussion of my thesis is the “the two-fold consciousness” similar to the Kantian “negative pleasure”. However, I have to underline the fact that my thesis would be more in alignment with Schopenhauerian sublime rather than a Kantian one. Schopenhauer (2011) accepts that in the sublime experience the individual first goes through terror or displeasure due to his/her condition in the world to be “feeble phenomenon of the will” (p. 271), an individual that is mortal who with “the slightest touch” of the forces of nature can totally be annihilated, “helpless against powerful nature, dependent, abandoned to chance, a vanishing nothingness in face of stupendous forces” (Schopenhauer, 2011, p. 277). On the other hand, consequently, a feeling of pleasure or an experience of exaltation is felt which reveals his/her “pure will-less subject of knowing” who has the attributes of being “eternal, serene subject of knowing” that is grounded in the “world of ideas” and therefore “the supporter of this whole world, the fearful struggle of nature being only his mental picture or representation; he himself is free from and foreign to, all willing and all needs, in the quiet comprehension of the Ideas” (Schopenhauer, 2011, p. 277).

Although the first moment of the sublime is similar in both Kant and Schopenhauer, revealing the feeble, small individual, mortal in the hands of nature, the second moment of the sublime which is revealed by a feeling of amazement, exaltation or pleasure is different in two figures. For Kant, it was the recognition of one's own reason that is distinct than nature, specific to man, which gives opens up the gates to freedom and moral realm; by contrast in Schopenhauer it is a state where the subject becomes free from its separated individuality but becomes free from the will that is determined by temporality and spatiality. In this sense, although Kant attributes the proper place of the sublime to be the human reason and grounded in the supersensible realm of the being, for Schopenhauer the reason and man himself is not the ground of the sublime but rather the sublime is an opening of the individuality or an expansion of the being from a limited form of existence that is marked by petty desires and wishes to an "eternal" and peaceful state, where we are "one with the world" and "exalted by its immensity" (Schopenhauer, 2011, p. 277); hence, the second moment of the sublime for Schopenhauer is not a realization of our rationality which marks the superiority of human beings as is the case in Kant but "transcending of our own individuality" which is an expansion of being. This, for Schopenhauer, is "the sense of the sublime" (Schopenhauer, 2011, p. 272).

CHAPTER 4

THE SUBLIME: BETWEEN PLEASURE AND PAIN

Taking all these into consideration there are some questions that needs to be answered: (1) What kind of a feeling is the sublime? We can compile the fundamental inherent emotions as follows: (a) awfulness/tremendum/fear, (b) majesty/ grandeur, (c) mysteriousness, (d) awe/ astonishment/ amazement and (e) admiration and elevation/exaltedness (f) oceanic feeling; and (2) Where is the sublime? Some British scholars such as Burke and Schopenhauer asserted that the sublime is a quality of the object versus Kant who defended that the sublime is grounded in the mind. I claim that in the sublime experience the object does play only a causal role like the way in Kant but it is constitutive of the experience. Finally, (3) what is so specific about the dual character of the sublime, i.e. displeasure transformed into pleasure? I propose that the first phase, displeasure, reveals our mortal, finite condition consisting of terror and fear as essential emotions and clarify nature's otherness. On the other hand, the second phase, pleasure, creates an oceanic feeling that embraces the emotions of joy and elevation where nature is experienced as an expanded Self.

4.1 Emotions inherent in the sublime

Sublime is an experience that includes various feelings within itself. It would be enlightening to analyze and specify each particular emotion in order to shed light on its nature. I will categorize the emotions inherent in the sublime into the following six categories: (a) awfulness/tremendum/fear, (b) majesty/ grandeur,

(c) mysteriousness, (d) awe/ astonishment/ amazement and (e) admiration and elevation/exaltedness (f) oceanic feeling.

The peculiar character of the sublime as an aesthetic phenomenon is to be a feeling. Feelings have a motivational role on our actions. By means of feelings, we realize that we are “living” beings, i.e. “we are alive” (Panksepp, 2011, p. 23). In close connection, sublime is the “fuel of cognitive mind allowing” us to go through some specific feelings. It has a peculiar character in the sense that it is composed of a mixture of feelings that have both positive and negative outcomes. According to Panksepp, the “strong feelings” of “pain and pleasure” are “perhaps” the “first experiences that existed on the face of the earth” (Panksepp, 2011, p. 23). Nevertheless, we have to pay close attention to their derivatives such as awe, astonishment, amazement or fear.

4.1.1 Negative feelings: Categories of displeasure

Awefulness/tremendum/fear is the first category to depict the negative feeling inherent in the sublime. Sublime experiences first induce displeasure that can be defined as awefulness, *tremendum* or a kind of fear. For Otto (1928), *tremendum* is a synonym for awfulness (p. 39). Konecni (2011) also states that the sublime includes thrills (p. 64) such as a mighty volcanic eruption or a 20 m high tsunami.

Majesty/grandeur is one of the significant traits of the negative part of the sublime. Otto (1928) claims that *majestas* is a peculiar notion that is inherent in the sublime (p. 34). The main example is the lofty mountains reaching up to the sky, they are instances of both majesty and grandeur. Although, for Kant, this experience might better be analyzed under the category of the mathematical sublime with its

effect of greatness, a mighty tsunami wave can also cause a feeling of majesty, and overpowering of the subject.

Mysteriousness is another category depicting the negative feeling inherent in the sublime. The feeling of aloofness, being unknown, the shudder and incomprehensibility make up a specific category that should be analyzed separately. Otto (1928) claims that “the elements in *tremendum* and mysteriousness” are not the same (p. 39). Mystery should not be seen as the state of being horrified or terrified but rather a kind of “mental reaction” that can be described as “stupor, the blank wonder, an astonishment that strikes us dumb, amazement absolute”. Mystery indicates whatever we encounter is “alien to us, uncomprehended and unexplained” (Otto, 1928, p. 40).

4.1.2 Positive feelings: Categories of pleasure

Awe/astonishment/amazement is the first category for the positive feelings. The following emotions fall within the category of pleasure. Sublime has a dual character composed of both pain and pleasure and in this sense awe is a specific emotion that reveals the second phase. Konecni (2011) defines the sublime as “aesthetic awe”; the state where experience reaches its “peak” (p. 64). For awe, the Oxford English Dictionary gives the following definitions: “1. dread mingled with veneration, 2. reverential or respectful fear, 3. the attitude of mind subdued to profound reverence in the presence of supreme authority, 4. moral greatness, sublimity, 5. mystical sacredness” (p. 64). It is not easy to differentiate one emotion from the other since each is interconnected with others; however, awe reveals that the phenomena is exclusive in the sense of not being just fearful or terrifying but something that demands being watched.

Astonishment and amazement are similar emotions with awe. Burke (1998) articulates astonishment constantly upon defining the sublime (p. 79). These emotions resolve the problematic of the sublime: if the sublime is an experience that arouses fear and pain then why do we desire to watch it rather than run away? “Pleasure mixed with awe” appraises the experienced and “moves” the subject (*rührung* in German) (Konecni, 2011, p. 65). In daily life, awe is not a feeling we witness frequently. Awe is “perhaps an exceedingly rare subjective state” which supports the thesis that the sublime is a “rare” stimuli (Konecni, 2011, p. 65).

Admiration, amazement and elevation/exaltedness is another category for the positive feelings. For Monk (1960) admiration is an emotion that is concomitant with astonishment and awe (p. 75). “Elevation, enthusiasm, exaltedness, ecstasy, ineffable awe, and sacred enthusiasm” comes along with admiration (Harmon, 2013, p. 66). Amazement or wonderment is an affirmation of what exists and what has been experienced. “In amazement” says Soelle (2001) “whether we know it or not, we join ourselves to the heavens”. What is more, “the beginning of our happiness lies in the understanding that life without wonder is not worth living” (p. 91). Therefore, admiration, amazement and exaltedness have “a profound and positive transformative effect” on the mental attitude of the subject. They “enlarge the soul” with delight (Soelle, 2001, p. 91). Baille (1996) writes that “every person upon seeing a Grand object is affected with something which as it were extends his being and expands it to a kind of immensity” (p. 88). It generates a state of elevation and exaltedness in which the soul becomes uplifted and feels joy.

The final one is oceanic feeling. This is one of the most enigmatic and controversial descriptions of the sublime experience. The history of the term oceanic feeling goes back to a correspondence between Freud and the author Romain

Rolland. After the publication of *The Future of an Illusion*, Freud got a letter from Rolland asserting that Freud has ignored the “spontaneous religious sentiment or religious feeling” which is “independent of all dogma, all credo, all Church organization, all Sacred Books, all hope in a personal survival” but the “simple and direct feeling of the eternal” which is “simply without perceptible limits, and like oceanic” (Rolland, cited in Parsons, 1998, p. 503). Rolland claims that “he himself is familiar with this sensation”. According to Rolland oceanic feeling is like of a “contact” which is devoid of any “personal yearnings” (Rolland, cited in Parsons, 1998, p. 503). So, oceanic feeling is a sentiment that gives the subject a feeling of expansion or a feeling of eternity that is not bounded by any limits. It is a “dynamic, creative, vitalist” feeling independent of any “institutionalized religion” (Parsons, 1998, p. 504).

After Rolland’s response, Freud had accepted his friend’s criticism and added the oceanic feeling in his subsequent book *Civilization and Its Discontents* as a “feeling of indissoluble bond, of being one with the external world” (Freud, 1962, p. 12). It is important to note that this oceanic feeling as both Rolland and Freud emphasize has nothing to do with any religious doctrine but only a “pure sense of transcendence”, a feeling as the term itself signifies like an expansion or enlargement as if becoming like the boundless “ocean”, tranquil, vast and encompassing. Julian Young has indicated the “pleasurable” moment of the sublime experience to be similar with this description of Freud and Rolland. Young (2005) says that the pleasurable moment of the sublime as a feeling of embracing-all and expanding is best described as an “oceanic feeling” (p. 103). The identity of the agent moves beyond his/her particular flesh and bone and becomes a “totality”. “Flowing out of the ego” is experienced where one comes “to live a thousand-fold” (Young, 2005, p.

103). Oceanic feeling is “the very process of mobility or circulation among people and therefore, the enabling condition of self-expansion” (Savu, 2014, p. 92).

Having said that, let us move to the second question: if the sublime has these peculiar emotions then what is the source of it? Is it a property of the object or a feeling peculiar to the rational subject? Is it grounded in one’s own faculties or the natural objects are the ones that constitute it? In short, where is the sublime?

4.2 Where is the sublime?

The discussion about the sublime has a crucial question that needs to be answered: where is the sublime? This problem results from the Kantian approach towards sublime. According to Kant, as I have stated various times above, the sublime experience leads us to recognize our rationality, moral will, autonomy and freedom. Therefore, Kant takes the natural objects as mere triggers of the sublime experience and not as necessary constituents. This is one of the most significant impacts of Kant on the discussion. Kant claimed that sublime is not a property of the object but is grounded in the subject. In other words, since the sublime is a realization of our rationality, it is derived from reason itself. With such a conception, the sublime experience cannot be seen as a way to respect and revere nature. In that case, an experience in which the rational subject is seen as the ground of the experience, nature would not play a significant role.

I would like to disagree with Kantian positioning of the sublime. I do not think that the natural objects are mere triggers or contingent things to let us realize our rationality but rather they are the constitutive, necessary parts of the experience. Burke and his predecessors as well as Schopenhauer have claimed that the natural objects such as tsunamis, oceans or deserts support such a position. Hence, according

to them as well, sublime is not only grounded in human reason but it is a quality of natural objects.

This sets out the discussion if the human reason shall take the ground of the sublime experience or the natural objects has more function of being mere triggers. Are they merely contingent or a necessary part of the experience? In this sense, I agree with Schopenhauer and Burke who admit the fact that nature is a necessary part of the sublime experience, that human reason should not take the central role and the natural objects needs to be attributed with sublimity.

Before Kant, British aestheticians such as Burke, Addison, etc. have specified that the cause of sublime is the natural objects. For example, Baille asserted that the existence of the Grand object leads one to be “affected with something which as it were extends his very Being and expands it to a kind of Immensity” (Monk, 1960, p. 73). After Baille, sublime became “a quality” of objects, “having objective reality like the primary characteristics of matter” (Monk, 1960, p. 74). Similarly, Schopenhauer, the Romantic tradition and the American transcendentalists, indicated that the nature is the thing that constitutes the sublime. They regarded nature “as an important source of this experience” (Harmon, 2013, p. 73). Muir, for example, thought that nature is the reason for the sublime. Muir (1997) continuously mentioned about the “nature’s sublime wonderlands” (p. 814). In his work *A Near View of the High Sierra*, Muir (1894) defined high Sierra as “sublime” at least for “six times”. Mountains, for him, were “temples” and “cathedrals” (p. 8); they were “divine” (p. 4).

Kant declared that the natural object is not the proper place of sublime. The natural object is merely “contingent” not necessary; because sublime is not induced by the object but “generated within our mind” (Casey, 2004, p. 13). Sublime resides

in us and the moment we attribute it to the natural world, it is nothing but a fallacious attempt. Sublime objects might seem to be arousing, prompting the sublime experiences but the sublime is grounded in one's own. In the postmodern tradition, Lyotard (1993) supports Kant's thesis, Lyotard declares that "the object is merely contingent". It is the mind's "destiny" to reach a sublime experience "autonomously" (p. 127). In short, whereas the former camp accepts the necessary role of natural objects, the second camp points to the importance of the rational subject.

Although it is impossible to have an experience without a rational subject, still I think the emphasis of Kant on rationality is too much and the role of the natural object should not be reduced to contingency but should be taken as necessity. In this sense, I claim that a natural object or scene as a factor of occasion is necessary in the sublime experience.

Nature is the ground of the sublime experience; it is the raw nature, untouched by humans where we experience the grandeur, immensity and vastness. "Given that we are self-surpassing by nature, we relate to ourselves but reaching beyond ourselves. It is in this sense-that we find ourselves beyond ourselves" with nature and in nature (Harrison, 1995, p. 435). In Harrison's words (1995), "we reach out toward our death" when "in fact we reach out toward nature", because "nature, ultimately is the place where our death is at home" (p. 436). In short, nature does not merely play a contingent role as Kant depicts but it is a necessary part of the experience, and the ground of sublime is not the human reason *per se*, but the natural objects has the quality of sublimity.

4.3 The peculiar dual character

The importance of the sublime lies in its “peculiar dual character”. Many scholars even from the times of Longinus have described it as “oxymoronic” (Hitt, 1999, p. 607). Addison (1773) defines it as agreeable horror (p. 261), Burke (1998) as a delightful horror and Kant (2000) explains it as negative pleasure that composes of “at once a feeling of displeasure and a simultaneously awakened pleasure” (p. 129). The first stage is displeasure where the feelings of terror (Burke, 1998, p. 53), astonishment or distress (Burke, 1998, p. 79) is felt. It is the moment where the subject feels his “creaturehood” (Otto, 1928, p. 35), extreme smallness and insignificance. On the other hand, the second stage is quite contrary to the first one, a feeling of pleasure. Without this feeling of pleasure, the experience is an instance of suffering and we would want to abstain from it; however, the subject feels engrossed by the phenomena and is “exalted”, feels *ekstasis* (Longinus, 2006, section 1, para. 2, section 33, para. 4, section 39, para. 2) or a kind of “oceanic feeling” (Young, 2005, p. 140) in which his petty selfhood is transcended. The combination of these two phases, this duality of the sublime makes it to be *schlechtin gross*¹³, “awefully big” or *schlechtweg*, “simply absolute” (Kant, 2000, p. 133) and illuminates the peculiar character of our relation with nature.

4.3.1 Displeasure

As the dynamical makes us aware of our “vanishing nothingness” (Schopenhauer, 2011, p. 273) as individuals in the face of nature’s power, the mathematical “dwarfs” us “to

¹³ *Schlect* in German means “bad” or “aweful”, here in English it can come to mean as “aweful” which also has the root word of “awe”. It is interesting to see the link between “awe” and “aweful”.

insignificance” (Schopenhauer, 2011, p. 273) in the face of its immensity; as the dynamic makes us aware of our fragility in the face of its gigantic forces of nature and of what we normally repress just like the inevitability of death, the mathematical makes us aware of the nothingness of our tenure in space and time, the blink-of-an-eye-ness of our existence, the almost-here-ness of death (Young, 2005, p. 138).

The first phase is the negative side of the medallion which is marked with displeasure. I will commence explaining this stage (1) with its peculiar emotions, (2) grounds or reasons that lead to it and (3) with its affiliated, explanatory concepts. So, let me commence with the emotions that delineate and define this first moment. The emotions heralding in this stage is first of all “terror” which is a “natural emotion of fear”, distress or astonishment as Burke cites. For Kant, it is not “fear” *per se* but a peculiar “displeasure” that leads to a disturbance with an admixture of uneasiness. The subject goes through a “painful” state with “bold, overhanging, as it were threatening cliffs, thunder clouds towering up into the heavens...the boundless ocean set into a rage” or with “a lofty waterfall on a might river” (Kant, 2000, p. 145). In these instances our capacities are without comparison powerless; we realize our “own fragility in the face of the forces of nature” (Young, 2005, p. 133) “as the feeble phenomenon of the will” (Schopenhauer, 2011, p. 271). Otto (1928) explains the same phase as a *mysterium tremendum*. *Mysterium* as a concept means “hidden or esoteric”, in other words “extraordinary” or unfamiliar (p. 27). It denotes the dissimilar nature of the experienced object to one’s own being. In modern English, being “awe-stricken” or “aweful” has close affinities to *mysterium tremendum*. The phrase “he stood aghast” is another example in this context (p. 28). In short, *mysterium tremendum* denotes “absolute inapproachability” (Otto, 1928, p. 34), a mystical awe, a kind of “shudder” because of the different nature of the experienced

phenomenon. We have to mark that it is not merely a fear; if it was so, then we would run away from those scenes. Burke, Kant and Schopenhauer, all emphasize that there should be a proper distance between the subject and the object so that the subject acknowledges that his own existence is not barely threatened but could have been threatened if it was that close. This first phase of the sublime presents the feeling of “absolute overpoweringness” which for Otto is a representation of the concept *majestas*, majesty that is grandiose and vast with a tremendous power (Otto, 1928, p. 32). Burke (1998) also recounts the sublime’s characteristics with power (p. 59), vastness (p. 66) and magnificence (p. 71).

The next question is: what causes the painful state of the sublime, leading one to shudder or be awfully struck? The answers come along with a rich terminology: “mortal condition” (Deguy, 1993, p. 9), finitude (Nancy, 1993, p. 46) and “creaturehood” or “creature-consciousness” (Otto, 1928, p. 35). I think all of them enlighten an aspect of the first phase of the sublime in a significant way; therefore, I will try to base my explanations on this terminology and utilize it successively.

The terror or the displeasure of the sublime arises due to a shock or fear of losing our individual self that is made of flesh and bone. We are creatures that are born and will be dead. In this respect, sublime reminds us our mortality, the fragile aspect of our being that is a part of “beings of nature”, small and insignificant. For Kant, this is the part that we share with animal nature that is dependent on time and space and will deteriorate with the changes of time and space. That is why, in the sublime we fear or feel displeasure towards our “own death” (Young, 2005, p. 133). The body we have is a material of everydayness, an embodied and mortal individuality that is incomparably petty in contrast to nature. Otto (1928) calls this moment the realization of our “creature consciousness” (p. 35), where the individual

becomes aware of his/her dependency on the material things above and beyond us; however, there is a distinction between the “consciousness of createdness” and “consciousness of creaturehood”. Creaturehood is not a feeling that leads one to regard the experience as a “work of divine creative act” like “createdness” but rather it is the acknowledgment of the “impotence and general nothingness” or “littleness” (Otto, 1928, p. 36) against the “awe-inspiring”, “overpowering” phenomenon that is experienced (Otto, 1928, p. 35) .

In the affiliated and explanatory concepts of the first phase of sublime, the following concepts will be analyzed respectively: (1) the finitude and insignificance of the personal I, (2) imagination reaching its limits, the inadequacy of comprehension and apprehension, and (3) the realization of Nature totally as an Other. Starting with the first, we see in the sublime’s first phase, the insignificance and finite condition of the personal individuality. The self becomes threatened and comes to the limit of depreciation. The subject realizes that the phenomenal “I” is not “essentially” or “perfectly real” but a “nullity” (Otto, 1928, p. 35). The subject realizes that his empirical, natural self is little, a “vanishing nothingness” (Schopenhauer, 2011, p. 273) and insignificant against the powers of nature which is a representation of forces that are “other” than him/her. His own personal being is finite and incomparably petty against it. S/he realizes his/her physical self is a play element in the hands of nature.

The second concept that explicates the first phase of the sublime is inherent in the literal meaning of the term. *Sub-limis*: coming to the limit. In the negative emotional phase of the sublime the subject reaches the limits of his/her own comprehension. It is the point where imagination falls inadequate; however, in order to know one’s limits one has to go and reach the limits. Therefore, as Nancy (1993)

puts it “the presentation of a limit is that this limit must be reached” or “must come to be touched” (p. 44). In the sublime’s first phase “imagination touches the limit and this touch” enables one to feel “its own powerlessness” (Nancy, 1993, p. 44). As Kant propounds, imagination strives to reach the infinite or the majestically power of nature; however “having attained its maximum”, it finds out that it cannot “embrace the infinite”. This disappointment becomes the ground for displeasure inherent in the sublime. The subject realizes his/her finitude not only physically, but also mentally, because the instruments which are i.e. imagination and understanding enable him/her to reach the world falls insufficient. The human mind finds its capacity to comprehend and apprehend temporally and spatially finite. It reaches an area that which cannot be said, i.e. ineffable, where no words would match. Hence, “the sentiment of the sublime arises then at the limit of the metaphysics” where comprehension collapses and violence over the faculties of the mind is experienced (Rogozinski, 1993, p. 149). Similarly, the term “mysterious” denotes something that which cannot be attained, grasped or spoken. It is beyond our understanding and imagination. It is what lies beyond our limits. In this respect, as Otto also remarks, the first phase of the sublime is akin to mysterious where it “invariably” goes “beyond our understanding”; however, mark that mysterious is not something that is ungraspable for a temporary time of being but for all times. Otto (1928) differentiates between “problem” and “mystery”, in the sense that whereas “problem” is unintelligible for a time, mystery extends to all times (p. 42).

Finally, the third important affiliated notion is the concept that Nature is an Other. Creaturehood means “the status of being a creature” that makes you feel petty and small, in contrast to the “majesty” of the Other. It is in connection with the “feeling of dependency” which gives “immediate and primary reference to an object

outside the self". The moment one is dependent on an externality, it acknowledges the existence of "others" apart from his/her own being. In the sublime's first phase, when one realizes his/her creaturehood one becomes aware of the existence of nature independent of oneself. Nature stands with such might and Otherness right in front of us. What is more, the fact of being "beyond our comprehension and apprehension" strengthens the fact that Nature is "wholly other" to us which transcends our limits. "Its kind and character are incommensurable with our own, and before which we recoil in a wonder that strikes us chill and numb" (Otto, 1928, p. 24).

4.3.2 Pleasure

The peculiar character of the sublime experience does not compose only of, i.e. displeasure, but consequently transforms into pleasure. Sublime phenomenon first raises terror, fear, and distress; but afterwards causes pleasure, fearlessness, equanimity and joy. As I have continuously emphasized, this is the reason why I think the sublime is a crucial concept in debates of environmental ethics; this duality reveals the peculiar character of our relation with nature. Just like the first phase analyzed above, I will first depict the inherent emotions of the second stage, then move to the motives behind and finally unfold the affiliated and explanatory concepts: the pleasure in the sublime (1) elevates and exalts us to a higher state of existence, (2) expands our consciousness, and (3) gives a feeling of an expanded Self that is in unity with Nature.

The emotions heralding in the second phase of the sublime are fearlessness, equanimity, joy (Young, 2005, p. 136-138), pleasure (Kant, 2000, p. 145), eternity, *ekstasis* (Longinus, 2006, section 1, para. 2) and oceanic feeling (Freud, 1962, p. 12); however, if we can categorize it all under one term, the most comprehensive will be

pleasure since it represents the positive meaning inherent in all. The peculiar character of the sublime stems from this second phase. Although the first phase reminds us our mortal and finite condition, brings forth pain and displeasure; the spectator still desires to continue his/her experience which means that s/he gets satisfaction and feels pleasure after a while; however, the question is what makes one to have this oceanic feeling? What is the motive behind? I believe that the answer will unveil the other foot of the peculiarity of human-nature relationship which is important to acknowledge the prospects of the sublime in environmental ethics.

There are various answers for the motive behind the pleasurable part of the sublime in literature. My aim is not to pick one and defend it but try to see what is common in between. Longinus defines the sublime experience in *Peri Hupsous* as *ekstasis*, a joyful element in which we sense “something superior to our natural self” (Young, 2005, p. 136). With feelings of *ekstasis*, we “transcend our everyday selves; undergo a kind of ‘out-of-body’ experience”. *Ekstasis* is an experience of transporting from the ordinary self. In Greek, it literally means *ek-stasis*, stepping out (Soelle, 2001, p. 33). Hence, for Longinus the pleasurable element in the sublime is the fact of being transported and transcended to a state that is distinct than “everydayness of embodied and mortal individuality” (Soelle, 2001, p. 33).

Although Kant also addresses the sublime experience as a sign of *noumenal* self to be related with an *erhabene* that is “rising up” from the limits of ordinary being. The description why this occurs would be different than my argument. Kant (2000) equates this pleasurable feeling to be emanating from the supersensible part of human nature where “rationality” is realized (pp. 144, 145). In other words, for Kant, in the second phase of the sublime we feel pleasure, because we realize the common core we share with the transcendent reality. This is “reason” which has the

ability to shape and structure a will, and a will that is able to put his own laws upon itself. Hence, sublime is the realization of our freedom, our rationality and our *noumenal* self that we share with Gods and angels, i.e. the pure rational realm. When a subject witnesses a “flashes of lighting and crashes of thunder, volcanoes with their all-destroying violence” and “hurricanes with the devastation they leave behind” (Kant, 2000, p. 144) we feel insignificance and littleness. Although it is common to see that the second phase of the sublime also is related with pleasure in Kant, the motivation behind this feeling is different than what I want to argue.

However, in Schopenhauer (1969), the pleasure felt in the second phase of the sublime is explained as a means of finding our real, eternal nature. Sublime fits into his philosophy as a realization of the “eternal, serene subject of knowing” (p. 205) that is in contrast to the petty, individual will which is the reason behind the second moment, i.e. feeling of pleasure.

He feels himself as individual the feeble phenomenon of will...a vanishing nothingness in the face of the stupendous forces; and he also feels himself as the eternal, serene subject of knowing, who as the condition of every object is the supporter of this whole world... He himself is free from and foreign to, all willing and all needs, in the quiet comprehension of the Ideas. (Schopenhauer, 2011, p. 273)

So, in Schopenhauer, an expansion of the self takes place in the second moment of the sublime. The subject flows out of the individual, particular ego and finds something superior to his/her natural self. This is a selfhood that is close to divine condition, independent of time and space. In Schopenhauer (2011), sublime opens up the way for an extraordinary way of being, in which the subject gains eternity, transcend the body, will, fear and death. “Immediately” another consciousness arises which makes us be aware that “all these worlds exist only in our representation, only as modifications of the eternal subject of pure

knowing” (p. 269).¹⁴ This eternal subject is beyond death and deterioration. To suppose that “death could touch the real” pure will-less subject of knowing “would be like the sun’s crying out in the evening ‘woe is me! I am going down into eternal night!’” (Young, 2005, p. 133). In this experience, we become “one with world and are therefore not oppressed but exalted by its immensity” (Young, 2005, p. 133).

In the postmodern literature, similar echoes are found in the writings of Nancy, Lyotard or Deguy. They all accept the fact that sublime is a move beyond the limits. Although they do not explicitly refer to any concept that implicates “transcendence”, they accept the fact that sublime presents a realm that which gives the insight of infinity. Nancy (1993) asserts that “sublime is the feeling of the infinite (p. 149)” and “nature is...sublime in those of its phenomena the intuition of which arouses the Idea of its infinity” (Nancy, 1993, p. 149) Not only this but also, in the contemporary discussions, other scholars such as Young (2005) claims that sublime lets us have a taste of immortality, which is a matter of not “existing throughout time but of timelessness” (p. 139). Being independent of time and space is the antithetical effect of the second part of sublime in contrast to the first one. Just like Schopenhauer’s eternal subject, the pleasure of sublime is justified in the “loss of the personal self” and finding it to be “in different degrees of completeness...with the transcendent Reality” (Otto, 1928, p. 36). William James (2008) says that “what I felt on these occasions was a temporary loss of my own identity” upon describing a sublime experience (p. 262). Naess (2008d) compares the joy of sublime to “a feature of an indivisible, concrete unison of subject and object and medium” (p. 94). In his work *The Place of Joy in a World of Fact*, Naess (2008c) emphasizes that in sublime there is an

¹⁴ Young (2005) interprets the misery held in the first part of the sublime as the fear of everyone’s death, identifying oneself with humanity’s fate. So, “the fear is not really his fear, not anyone particular, but of everyman”. It is “empathy with the fate of humanity” This what he means when he says the stupendous forces spent up as “hostile” not to the subject’s individual will, but rather to the human will “in general” (p. 137).

“intense cultivation of the personal aspect of interaction with the environment” (p. 127) because “high degrees of joy” can take place when “high degrees of integration” happens with environment and nature. Harmon (2013) also calls denial of the identification “with a narrower desiring self” but rather it is the “becoming” of “the eternal serene subject of knowledge” which is a state of peace and true happiness (p. 71).

The expansion of self and the loss of the individual ego signify finding a common core with every existent being. We gain pleasure in the second phase of sublime because we find our self one with nature, as a whole. Greig (2011) compares this oceanic feeling¹⁵ to David Bohm’s concept, “Holomovement”. Bohm was a quantum physicist in the 1950’s. Holomovement is characterized by “themes of unity and separation, order and fragmentation” which referred to the motive of sublime’s pleasurable effect that is “undefineable and immeasurable” (Bohm, 1983b, p. 151). In Holomovement, “the field of the finite, tangible to the sense is suspended within the field of the infinite, beyond space and time and the current conceptual grasp of the physics” (Greig, 2011, p. 119). Holomovement implies a unity and “wholeness” as “an unbroken and undivided totality” (Bohm, 1983b, p. 151).

We feel ourselves elevated because we identify ourselves with the powers of nature, ascribing their vast impact to ourselves, because our fantasy rests on the wings of the storm as we roar into the heights and wander into the depths of infinity. Thus we ourselves expand into a boundless natural power. (Whyte, 2011, p. 9)

To explicate the pleasurable part of the sublime, it would be noteworthy to analyze affiliated, explanatory concepts which can give helpful insights for the next section.

¹⁵ Young compares sublime’s effect of expansion of self to Rolland’s and Freud’s notion of oceanic feeling in which we find our self to be encompassing and embracing every existent being, a feeling that overcomes and engulfs whatever is on its way.

Unlike the former phase of sublime, in the second stage almost the exact contraries come to the fore, (1) infinitude and eternity of the subject, (2) going beyond/transcending the limits, and (3) seeing Nature in Unity with the Idea of the Whole. Starting with the first, as the literal meaning, *sub-limis* itself denotes (“under the threshold”) the second stage promises to reveal what is beyond the limit. The concept “limit” itself is an intriguing, paradoxical notion. Being at the limit presupposes one to be able to see what is beyond the limit but not being there. This is exactly the essential characteristic of the sublime. In the first phase, one suffers because one sees and realizes where one’s limit is and is held at that limit, but in the second stage one is able to realize and feel what is beyond the limit, although might not be able to speak about it. This is why, sublime is ineffable and unrepresentable. Kant describes sublime as “formless” unlike beautiful. Nancy (1993) supports him by asserting that “the unlimited” which is “the concern of the sublime” is in contrast to beautiful in which, “form or contour is limitation” (p. 35). So, in the sublime, we witness the movement of the “unlimited”; it brings us to the realm of the infinite and “the border of presentation” (Nancy, 1993, p. 35).

This [Sublime] is the formless form or the form of the formless, the setting-off of the limit’s external border from the limit itself, the motion of the unlimited. (Nancy, 1993, p. 39)

The second notion is a follow up to the first one: in the second stage unlike the former one, one goes through an “oceanic feeling”, in which the self is expanded. The identity moves beyond this particular flesh and bone and becomes a “totality”. “Flowing out of the ego” is experienced where one comes “to live a thousand-fold” (Young, 2005, p. 103). Schopenhauer interprets this notion in parallel with the philosophy of Upanishads, “*tat twam asi*”, “you are that” (Chandogya Upanishad, p. 551); “This living art thou” (Schopenhauer, 2011, p. 289). In

other words, in the second phase of the sublime, the limits are transcended and one goes beyond his petty self to a “multitude of other things”. The limits of space and time, flesh and bone are transcended. Deguy (1993) argues that the sublime is a phenomenon in which the totality is felt as a result of the realization of the “unlimited” which is beyond what can be grasped or comprehended, that cannot be spoken and presented (p. 39).

This expansion of self reaches beyond the conditions of mortality and individuality. It becomes closer to a divine being from which “one can attain a totalizing and ‘symbolic’ view of living and dying” which is the state of being at “the height of the high” (Deguy, 1993, p. 9). Right there, it is said that we “relate to ourselves” as well as “reaching beyond ourselves” (Greig, 2011, p. 436), and the moment we “surpass ourselves”, we come to reach “towards our death”. Therefore, the peculiar and essential character of the sublime reveals us our “death” when we in fact “reach out toward nature”, because “nature is ultimately the place where our death is at home” (Greig, 2011, p. 436); however, in the sublime by means of reaching our death and our limits we reach also to the Other. This ability to reach transforms our relation with nature; we feel it, sense it and even become One with it. In short, in the positive component of the sublime, we come upon a “disruption of our ordinary sense of self” which becomes “a sudden shock of a change of vision”. “When confronted by the magnitude or power of nature”, everything goes into a transformation (Budd, 2003, p. 134).

...Our everyday sense of the importance of our self and its numerous concerns and projects, or of our normal sense of the security of our body from external natural forces, the heightened awareness of our manifest vulnerability and insignificance in the natural world counteracting our normal self-centeredness. (Budd, 2003, p. 134)

Finally, interrelated with the above-mentioned concepts, sublime presents the idea of a whole that comes along with the process of expansion. This is exactly in contrast to the first

outcome of the sublime: the Otherness of Nature. However, this is what makes the sublime an attractive and interesting concept that needs attention. It enlightens our way for a peculiar dual character that we should have with nature: see it both as an Other and an expanded Self.

Throughout the history, many scholars have indicated this unifying effect of the sublime. Young (2005) asserts that Schopenhauer was right when he interpreted the sublime bringing “a sense of oneness with the world” as its “essential character”. Similarly, Wordsworth confessed that “his mind turned as with the might of waters”. Shelley was “awestruck” upon finding “his whole being” expanding “into the infinite” and Hölderlin accepted “unification with the one, infinite totality of nature” (p. 140). This grounds the idea of a whole in which every existent being is a just a part and with the experience of the sublime the whole picture is unified into an organic whole. Nancy (1993) asserts that “the idea of the whole” refers to the possibility of a totality, in which one is “involved in the union of a totality”, “the possibility of beginning, long the edge of the unlimited, and the outline of a figure”.

Greig (2011) interprets Bohm’s ideas about the physical world to be “one unbroken, undissectable, dynamic whole” in parallel with the implications of the sublime (p. 107). Indeed, Bohm (1983a) calls this physical existence “as an undivided wholeness in flowing movement” (p. 11). After Heisenberg’s theories in 1920s, quantum mechanics has introduced “some of the most far-reaching ideas in contemporary metaphysics (Greig, 2011, p. 107). It proposed a worldview in which our being was “connected” with “nature as a whole”. This was a new level of explanation in which “everything is interconnected in an unvisualizable whole” (Greig, 2011, p. 110). Sublime is a proof of this theory in aesthetics in which the interconnectedness of whole nature is experienced and the ineffable characteristic of this experience is accepted at the same time. The Idea of the whole and the feeling of oneness discard the subject and object dichotomy and accept that there is a unique

Self that encompasses all. This can be experienced only in a mystical relation or in aesthetics like the sublime.

A world that is a dynamic, living whole cannot be represented as a sum of its part; the reality itself can never be fully disclosed, defined or described by physical theory, only inferred. Thus physics has brought us to the threshold of knowledge concerning the existence of the undivided whole, yet we cannot cross that threshold in terms of consciousness. Any experience of reality in which the human is to be regarded as part of the whole can only be counted in mystical terms, or what Einstein referred to as “cosmic religious feeling”- or in other words the feeling of the sublime. (Greig, 2011, p. 122)

We should note that this merging and expansion does not altogether omit the existence of the subject, but make him/her to realize that s/he is a part of a bigger Self. It is a Self that is beyond. So, sublime experience does not lead us to opt for either the Otherness of Nature or accept its Oneness, but acknowledge both nature's and Self's distinction and commonality. In sublime, the subject is not “overwhelmed or swallowed by the other” (Stafford, 2011, p. 54) but feels its distinctness along with common feature. It might look as if we are swallowed in the first phase of the sublime (the feeling of displeasure); but we are not, what happens is the realization of a continuity and connectivity with the seeming Other (the feeling of pleasure). Sublime is unique in this dual peculiarity which illuminates the proper relation we should have with Nature, as Nature.

We may well ask what made, and continues to make, this dramatic obliteration of the ego, or emptying out of the cave of the self, so attractive. Like the romantic longing to grasp prehistoric origins, primordial legends, or irrecuperable myths, the sublime offered a way to arrive at a radical, pre-epistemological condition anterior to all conscious acts of knowing... a sublime thought is “a tremendous mode of excitement” dramatizing the unity underlying the diversity of the universe... The theory of the sublime thus goes beyond any simple distinction between the natural and the cultural to foreshadow the mathematician/metaphysician's concept of “the

superject”...the emergence of a new entity under the sun, one capable of overriding the long-standing ontological dualism subject-object. (Stafford, 2011, p. 49)

CHAPTER 5

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE SUBLIME

In the previous chapter, I claimed that the sublime has a peculiar dual character of producing both displeasure and pleasure. In the first phase of the sublime the otherness of nature is realized, nature as independent, autonomous and different than us; and in the second phase, an oceanic feeling surpasses the subject; the expansion of self is experienced revealing our interconnected relation with nature. Hence, sublime is both at once daunting and attracting; as Otto puts it (1928) “it humbles and at the same time exults us, circumscribes and extends us beyond ourselves, on the one hand releasing in us a feeling analogous to fear, and on the other joining us” (p. 57). In this chapter, I will analyze the environmental implications of the dual character of the sublime, unveiling how we should relate with nature. The aim would be to find a proper way for relating with nature that can ease the seeming problems our earth faces. Hence, with the sublime’s first phase, I think, a sense of self or personhood can be established so that the moral subject would take nature as Other, recognize its independent identity so that s/he can respect it and abstain from being excessively self-focused, feel humility in relation with the specific existence of others. On the other hand, with its second phase, the subject can acknowledge the ultimate unity of life, the interconnected relation with every existent being and recognize harming nature is to harm ourselves. These attitudes and perceptions would engender a responsible perspective on human-nature relationship. Sublime is exclusive in the sense that not only the otherness of nature (as in the first phase) nor only the annihilation of the ego (in the second phase) takes place. Each phase balances the other, each time reminding its own power and effect, giving proper

amount for “quieting” the “ego” (Bauer, 2005, p. 7). “A self-identity” is obtained which is “not excessively self-focused but also not excessively other-focused...an identity that incorporates others without losing the self” (Bauer, 2005, p. 8).

5.1 The non-pleasurable part: Seeing nature as Other

In the first phase of the sublime we have noted that the subject feels an overwhelming grandeur or power of a natural phenomenon in which his/her self seems finite, insignificant and little; however, this overwhelming confrontation with nature unveils nature’s independent identity. Cronon (1995a) describes this feature as the “radical otherness of nature”; it is a statehood in which nature is “forever beyond the borders of our linguistic universe”. It is a state in which we cannot communicate since, it is neither a language that we can easily understand nor “permit” to imagine what it means (p. 56). Nevertheless, this “autonomy or otherness” does not leave us mute or deaf in the end because humans are creatures that try to make sense of what they receive. So, this “radical otherness” becomes an entity that has to be acknowledged and accepted as the way it is. The main step for us to make sense of this fact is to realize and be conscious of this “uncommon ground we cannot help but share” (Cronon, 1995a, p. 56). The importance of this fact lies in its ability to change our practical acts. In other words, recognizing the radical otherness of nature can lead us to adapt and adjust our actions in a way that can make us gain some ethical virtues such as (1) humility and (2) respect, causing an eco-friendly relation with the environment.

5.1.1 Humility

Otto (1928) asserts that the feeling of *mysterium tremendum* demands the subject to acknowledge that the relevant object is “wholly other” (*alienum*) (p. 40). Its kind and character is utterly different that is “incommensurable...before which we recoil in a wonder that strikes us chill and numb” (p. 42). I think, the realization of the independent existence of nature suggests a rich opportunity for the human beings to define their position with respect to it. It shows that the non-human nature exists as a “world we did not create”. This is “an indispensable corrective to human arrogance” (Hitt, 1999, p. 606). Hence, sublime teaches us humility.

Hitt (1999) indicates that although the first phase of the sublime in history has generally been identified with “humbling fear and ennobling validation for the perceiving subject” (p. 607), in the contemporary ages the focus of the scholars were on the second phase and not enough attention was paid to the first. Nevertheless, in the eighteenth century, “humility before nature” was always the foremost element of the sublime. For example, Kant asserted that in the sublime we become aware of the fact that “our faculty of resistance” is “insignificantly small in comparison with nature’s might”. In similar connotations, Burke claimed that with the sublime “we shrink into the minuteness of our own nature, and are in a manner annihilated” (Hitt, 1999, p. 607). For Schopenhauer (2011), sublime revealed us the “feeble phenomenon of the will” which is not but a “vanishing nothingness” (p. 273). With the overwhelming might of nature we recognize our “physical helplessness as beings of nature”. The negative aspect of the sublime reveals that we are “beings of nature” that cannot have hubris against the nonhuman world. We are “beings of nature” just

like everyone and anything else whose lives are finite and “dependent on the forces greater than we are” (Schopenhauer, 2011, p. 273).

Similarly, Martin (2012) emphasizes the relation between *sublimis* and *humilis* in the early modern French philosophy and literature. The friendship of *sublimis* with *humilis* was the “experience of the finite faced with infinity” (p. 78). In the last chapter, we mentioned that sublime is a concept of alchemy. Since the reference of the sublime in alchemy is to differentiate pure from impure (such as the sublimation of subtle form of matter, gas from its gross form of solid), the word is used in religious tones for differentiating the impure parts of humans, earthly ones, from the “heavenly” pure ones. In 1642, Gassendi wrote that “impression of the sun in the heavens (*sublimis*) is inextricable from how it is viewed below (*humilis*)” (Martin, 2012, p. 81). Hence, “the marriage of humility and sublimity” is a key term in the history of the sublime (Martin, 2012, p. 81).

Not only this but also, in early France, the term *aneantissement* was a concept that has been continuously used along with *sublimis*. *Aneantissement* referred to “abnegation, mortification and renunciation”, it was a “hyperbolic synonym for humility” which was “the foundation of all virtue” (Martin, 2012, p. 99). Although they are generally in the agenda of a religious vocabulary, it is important to see the link between sublime and humility. The first stage of *aneantissement* is the “spiritual purification” in which the subject has to undergo a process of exercises where his mind will be emptied and a state of “non-consideration of his own existence” will be reached (Martin, 2012, p. 99). The Spanish Saint John called it “the active night of

the senses” and his correspondent Teresa of Avila “*no penser nada*”¹⁶ where the subject comes upon passive contemplation rather than active praying (Martin, 2012, p. 99). It is the perfect description of “humble state” where the ego will be “quietened” as Bauer calls it (p. 7). What is more, Pascal (2006) in his *Pensees* asserts that “a discourse on humility” is a deed “a few man do” (p. 103). According to Martin (2012) Pascal enforces the duality of *sublimis-humilis* relation and proposes that the “individual’s smallness in the cosmos” is bounded upon the phenomena of the sublime (p. 85). Pascal (2006) indeed states that “with space the universe envelops me and engulfs me like an atom, by thought I comprehend the world (p. 98) and “man is great in that he knows himself as miserable” (Pascal, 2006, p. 108). The humbling state of Pascal in which man feels himself “miserable” reminds us Schopenhauer’s (2011) portray of the sublime as “vanishing nothingness” (p. 273). Martin (2012) interprets Pascal’s ideas on humility as a case of the sublime experience in which “nothingness, the infinite and the divine” is realized, akin to the feeling of being “lost in this corner of the universe” (p. 85). This makes one to ask “what is man in infinity?” (Martin, 2012, p. 85). Similarly, for Schopenhauer (1969), sublime reduces us to an equal state with every existent being, with no hierarchical status in our fragility and inevitable mortality “like drops in the ocean, dwindling and dissolving into nothing” (p. 205). Young (2005) interprets it as realization of “the nothingness of our tenure in space and time, the blink-of-an eye-ness of our existence, the almost-hereness of death” (p. 138).

¹⁶ It means “thinking nothing” in Spanish (Trans. by the author).

When the Hubble telescope images portrayed pictures of the universe with galaxies and million light years far away stars, the effect was a of a similar type. These images give a clear conception for the overwhelming smallness of our being in the universe. It presents us what it is to link being “human to a galaxy” and “a galaxy to the universe” (Kessler, 2011, p. 68). What we encounter is colossal view of cosmos, incredible might of nature and “the insignificance of humanity” which are “all attributes of the sublime” (Kessler, 2011, p. 69). It reveals that “vast things [are] going on in the Universe” independent of our existence and they will keep on going on no matter we exist or not (Kessler, 2011, p. 70).

Humility is a peculiar kind of moral virtue that involves self-awareness along with self-compassion (Bauer, 2005, p. 13). It is known as an element of wisdom along with the virtues of “forgiveness...gratitude, spirituality and agreeableness” (Exline, 2005, p. 58). A humble person shows acts of “less aggression, less manipulation, less dishonesty and infidelity, less source destruction, and less destructive competitiveness” (Campbell, 2005, p. 29). This kind of attitude is in Bauer’s terms, is a sign of a quiet ego. Ego is used here as a means of selfhood, identity where one’s “self-oriented perceptions and motivations” are involved (Exline, 2005, p. 53). Hence, a person who has humility or a quiet ego “interprets the self and others” with an intense amount of awareness “in a balanced, integrated, compassionate, or growth-oriented manner” (Bauer, 2005, p. 13). The human-nature relation is criticized with attitudes of anthropocentrism and human arrogance in the last centuries. Ehrenfeld (1981) notes that “a set of attitudes or a way of life centered upon human interests or values” is dominant especially after the spread of Judeo-Christian doctrine, that natural world such as “mountains, deserts, rivers, plant and animal species-climate” is created by God as if “for the benefit of humanity” (p. 8).

Ehrenfeld (1981) calls this attitude humanism in which “a supreme faith” is placed in human reason to “confront and solve the many problems that humans face” (p. 5). In this worldview, rivers exist for the sake of providing “fish and transportation”, deserts to maintain “boundaries”, etc. It is with this worldview that the “idea of human superiority” heralds in the history of mankind as the mark of human arrogance (p. 8). The idea of the Great Chain of Being is a doctrine that is product of this view. In the traditional Christian monotheism, it is maintained that every existent being has a “certain place in an infinite hierarchy of entities extending from the most real and perfect to the least real and most imperfect”. God is at the apex of the pyramid and then comes “angels, humans, animals, plants” and the nonliving beings respectively (Taylor, 1986, p. 139); however, before the Judeo-Christian view during the medieval ages in Europe, the heritage of Greek humanism is not so different. It places humans as a species that differ from the animal nature with its properties of *logos*. As a result of all these, the modern period which owes Descartes and his philosophy a milestone encounters the theory that animals and plants are merely “*automata*” which lack minds unlike human beings (Taylor, 1986, p. 135). In a similar vein, “Bacon instead of humility, is all for self-assertiveness”. Bacon calls for “the enlargement of the bounds of human empire, to the effecting of all things possible”. Bacon assimilates the “Christian moral training” to the discourse of “scientific ideology”. The world according to him is made for man, “not man for the world” (Worster, 1994, p. 30). All these accounts reveal that the contemporary world and its perception of environment are clouded with anthropocentric and human-chauvinist arguments seethed with arrogance. Discussions of environmental ethics come along with the rise of human arrogance.

Precisely at the moment when we have overcome the earth and become unearthly in our modes of dwelling, precisely when we are on the verge of becoming cyborgs, we insist on our kinship with the animal worlds. We suffer these days from a new form of collective anxiety: species loneliness. It is an anxiety that does not quite know how to deal with the guilt that nourishes it. (Harrison, 1995, p. 428)

Harrison (1995) means that it is the human arrogance that causes the discussions of “back to the nature” (p. 428). Right when we thought we reached a point close to the gods, we wanted to commix with the animal world and affirm our animalhood. This is a reflection of our arrogance and vanity.

However, with the virtue of humility, the belief that humanity has an “inevitable control” over any kind of physical natural obstacle and entity is refuted (Ehrenfeld, 1981, p. 37). The sublime phenomena provide unique moments to make clear the “most spectacular failures of human control and negations of human omniscience” (Ehrenfeld, 1981, p. 105). Likewise, Hill (1983) points that an essential characteristic of a person lacking humility is to be “the self-important emperor” who judges everything in “relation to him”, “with whom he identifies”, whether it is “his, or he appointed or choose” them (Hill, 1983, pp. 219f); however, with humility, the idea of being “at the center of the universe” is obliterated. The person’s perception of the Self alters and s/he gains a much “accurate sense of one’s abilities” (Exline, 2005, p. 55). Humility calls for “a non-defensive willingness to see the self” as the way it is, with nothing more or less, “including both strengths and limitations” and in such a state the self-focus becomes lower and the self can be “forgotten” which brings forth a proper “appreciation of the value of all things” (Exline, 2005, p. 55). With humility, we will be able to gain “the ability to acknowledge mistakes, imperfections, gaps in knowledge, and limitations” and “openness to new ideas, accomplishments in perspective” (Exline, 2005, p. 55). It is

important to mark that with humility, the Self gains not a derogatory status of being but a sincere relation. Humility should not be confused with lack of self-esteem or “humiliation” (Exline, 2005, p. 55). Hence, it is not pejorative in the sense of being inferior to others but able to realize that the self is “a relatively small part in a larger scheme of things” (Exline, 2005, p. 56). In that respect, Spinoza (1665) describes humility as a feeling mingled with pleasure to the “extent that a man knows himself by true reason” (p. 107). The man “understands his own essence” (Spinoza, 1665, p. 107). When we realize “our own potency, and our active relation to nature we get joy first, from the recognition of our own power no matter how small, which gives “*us acquiescentia in se ipso*, self-respect and contentedness”, second, from the awareness of an “increased personal, active knowledge of things” which are far more “greater than we are”, and third, from the realization of “active interaction” which “defines us in the total field of reality” (Naess, 2008c, p. 130).

Then, the question is how would a person react towards the environment when s/he acquires the virtue of humility? It is obvious that the potentiality of destruction and harm will lessen. Hill asks the question from another direction: “what sort of a person would destroy the natural environment?” Hill (1983) answers that lack of “proper humility, self-acceptance, gratitude and appreciation of the good in others” can lead one to behave in an unfriendly way (p. 211). Hence, it is more than seeing something is merely useful for us, it is related with the capacity to “destroy” or harm something, the inclination for violence or abuse. Hill (1983) asks in an imaginary world if forests are potentially useless, should we decide to destroy them? (p. 212). The deficiency of this judgment is not the idea of instrumentalism but rather having “certain ignorance, narrow perspective, inability to see things as important apart from themselves” which signifies lack of humility (Hill, 1983, p. 216).

The ability of appreciating things as they are is dependent on appreciating our own place in the universe. We are only “one among millions of species on Earth” in this evolutionary process, just a “speck on the cosmic scene” a brief moment in the episode of history (Hill, 1983, p. 219). Seen this way, awareness of nature transforms into an awareness of giving proper value to one’s human being where the right link towards nonhuman nature can be established. “The alps, a storm at sea, the Grand canyon, towering redwoods and the starry heavens above” enable us to recognize “the comparative insignificance of our daily concerns and even of our species” (Hill, 1983, p. 219). Naess (2008b) asserts that “the smaller we come to feel ourselves compared with the mountain, the nearer we come to participating in its greatness” (p. 67). Naess calls it “modesty”, a synonym for humility, which is “a way of understanding ourselves as part of nature in a wide sense of the term” (Naess, 2008b, p. 67). Hence, with humble attitude an “empirical connection” is established between “experiencing nature and overcoming self-importance” (Hill, 1983, p. 221). In short, a “storm in the wilds” may help us “appreciate our animal vulnerability” but as well as this, it teaches us “not to exaggerate our importance” in comparison to others, but rather try to see ourselves as “one among many natural creatures” (Hill, 1983, p. 222). Natural surroundings stimulate us to see ourselves as the way we are in nature, overcome the anthropocentric prejudices and acknowledge that we are one among many, not exclusive or specific, but just a small speck.

5.1.2 Respect

The second virtue linked with acknowledging the otherness of nature is respect. It is a feeling closely connected with the virtue of humility. In respect, we recognize the existence of the other and its difference from us. Respect is a feeling that is other

directed in which nature is seen “as a world we did not create, a World with its own independent, nonhuman reason for being as it is” (Hitt, 1999, p. 606). In this sense, sublime can present a profound psychological effect on the subject by unveiling the distance in between, where the other has a separate realm with specific limitation and dimension (Hitt, 1999, p. 612).

Kant is the first philosopher pointing out the close relationship between the sublime and respect. In the feeling of respect, a similar transition of displeasure to pleasure takes place like the case in the sublime. This is why Kant attributes sublime a negative pleasure.

For all inclination and every sensible impulse is based on feeling and the negative effect on feeling is (by the infringement upon the inclinations that takes place) itself feeling. Hence we can see a priori that the moral law, as the determining ground of the will, must by thwarting all our inclinations produce a feeling that can be called pain; and here we have the first and perhaps the only case in which we can determine a priori from concepts the relation of a cognition to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. All the inclinations together constitute regard for oneself (*solipsismus*). This is either the self-regard of love for oneself... (*Philautia*) or that of satisfaction with oneself (*Arrogantia*). (Kant, 1996, p.199)

So, what happens is that moral law attacks “satisfaction with oneself”, in other words “strikes down his self-conceit” (Kant, 1996, p. 199). This first attack, which exists in opposition to desires of much inclination, produces displeasure, which is similar with the sublime where an encounter with the might of a natural object takes place and our limits of imagination “pales into insignificance” (Kant, 2000, p. 140) and makes us realize the independent existence of the other human beings. At this point, we part ways with Kantian sense of the sublime and respect because, it is directed only with human beings due to the common share of reason; however, I would like to integrate respect in a nonhuman world as well. Nevertheless, the inadequacy of Kant’s theory

towards the non-rational beings should not lead us to undermine the close relation he reveals between sublime and respect.

Some contemporary scholars tried to overcome Kant's deficiency and proposed amendments. For example, Tom Regan (1981) as well as being a neo-Kantian defended the rights of animals within a duty-based ethics and asserted that "the fitting attitude toward nature is one of admiring respect" (p. 31). Moreover, Paul Taylor (1986) based his argument for a proper attitude towards nature on a Kantian type of human nature categorized under the concepts of "reason" and "respect" (p. 48). Brady (2003) stated that no matter Kant's theory is criticized to be "human-centered", it should not lead us to undermine the "interesting ways" sublime can illuminate, where "a distinctive aesthetic relation between humans and nature" (p. 38) exist.

It is a mistake to construe Kant's remarks as making ontological and normative claims about humanity's place in relation to nature. Through experience of the sublime in nature, we recognize that reason gives us the ability, in our freedom, to transcend our phenomenal selves, which belong to nature... it is in that sense that we are not, in the end, overwhelmed by the phenomenal because we have resources beyond how it limits us, but we are also not above or superior to nature. (Brady, 2003, p. 38)

In short with the sublime, "a meaningful connection to nature" is excited in which we recognize the "magnitude and might" (Brady, 2003, p. 39) of nature independent of our beings. Nature stands with its mysteriousness as a "wholly other", "canny" and "awful", "filling the mind with blank wonder and astonishment" (Otto, 1928, p. 40). Upon seen this way, nature cannot be used as a means to an end. The distance between the "appreciator and environment" is acknowledged and "the appreciator is placed in a certain way-aesthetically-in relation to an environment" (Otto, 1928, p. 121). As a result, the more we experience the sublime, the more we come to accept

the greater value of nature and the demanding appreciation. Brady (2003) claims that “deeper aesthetic sensitivity by no means guarantees respect, but it provides a good starting point”. What is more, by means of “enriching our aesthetic capacities” we can situate ourselves in a better position where aesthetic judgments can “provide support for environmental values” (p. 219). Rolston (1987) acknowledges that the otherness of nature leads us to respect what is “alien” to us, the “aliens” perhaps we cannot love but revere their independent existence (p. 190). All in all, sublime as an aesthetic concept can give us insight that can “encourage us to care for nature” (Brady, 2003, p. 224), which is the main purpose of this research.

Taylor (1986) distinguishes two types of respect; (1) recognition respect and (2) appraisal respect (p. 60). We included both of the meanings above; however, it is noteworthy to indicate their difference and see what is referred. The “recognition respect” involves taking nonhuman nature, oceans, waves, snakes etc., with an independent existence, valuable in itself. We make clear that we are voluntary to take the “standpoint of each nonhuman being and make objective judgments from that standpoint (Taylor, 1986, p. 67). We attribute “an inherent worth” to each wild plant or animal (Taylor, 1986, p. 71). On the other hand, in the second phase of the sublime, we give the necessary merit required by each. Taylor signals the difference between love and respect. Respect differs from love in the sense of being concerned with any “personal affection” or “caring” (Taylor, 1986, p. 90) in a private way. In respect, we “become aware of our limits” and recognize the borders where the other starts (Taylor, 1986, p. 105). We accept this distance and difference as the way it is, we view them as the way they are and “appreciate them in their own terms” (Saito, 2007, p. 151).

One kind of definition of a good person or a moral person is that person does not impose his or her phantasy on another. That is he or she is willing to

acknowledge the reality of other individuals, or even of the tree or the rock. So to be able to stand and listen. That to me is a moral capacity, not just an intellectual one. (Saito, 2007, p. 151)

This ability to “stand and listen” is a sign of respect. Respect demands “a willingness to submit to nature’s guidance” and listen to “nature’s own story”. Appreciating things as the way they are demands us not to impose our own story upon them and regard our view central (Saito, 2007, p. 152). Taking mountains, deserts and flowers with a “reality apart from our presence with its own story to tell” demands sensitivity and acceptance (Saito, 2007, p. 163).

Humility, arrogance and respect are interconnected concepts that give relational references to each other. In an environmental ethics that acknowledges the need for respect towards nonhuman nature, acceptance of autonomy is an indispensable fact. The proper “responsible” behavior towards any creature different than us can take place as long as there is space for its independent identity. Sublime shows us how to value wilderness, a realm where humans are out of its descriptive state. For Cronon (1995b), the idea of wilderness leads us to value the otherness of nature just like the way the sublime functions. Cronon (1995b) claims that “by broadening our sense of otherness” wilderness reminds us “the world we did not make” that has to be protected and appreciated as the way it is (p. 87). Therefore, “wilderness can teach profound feelings of humility and respects as we confront our fellow beings and the earth itself”. Feelings like humility and respect stress “the importance of self-awareness and self-criticisms”. They encourage us to place “responsible limits to human mastery” without which human hubris will prevail. “Wilderness is the place where, symbolically at least, we try to withhold our power to dominate” (Cronon, 1995b, p. 87). Evernden (1992) warns us to “de-center” ourselves in the way we apprehend, appreciate nature and our environment as well

(p. 120). Just like the sublime presents, this “liberates” not only “nature” but also ourselves because, we are conscious of our self, we do not overestimate and exaggerate our own power. We do not oscillate between the poles of narcissism at one end and self-debasement on the other. In short, by means of respecting nature, we accept that every existent being has certain ends or purposes to be who they are, that the nonhuman world has an independent status from our standpoint. We understand that we have to “honor” it, “remember and acknowledge the autonomy of the other” and maintain an attitude of “critical self-consciousness in all of our actions” (Cronon, 1995b, p. 89).

5.2 The pleasurable part: Seeing nature as an extended Self

The environmental implications of the sublime stemming from the idea of an extended Self seem to be as if in contradiction with the first one. Nevertheless, as well as the displeasurable part, the pleasurable part is an essential component of the sublime. Each of them forms one side of the medallion and leads us to accept the complementary aspect of our relation with nature. The pleasurable feeling in the sublime leads us to have the following ethical implications: (1) have attentiveness and sensitivity due to the emotions of astonishment, awe and wonder, (2) feel love and compassion due to the unity we feel which regards each as an extended Self.

5.2.1 Attentiveness and sensitivity

In this second phase, the emotions of astonishment, awe and wonder help us to see nature in its totality, appraise and give its due. In this respect, they are also supportive of the above-mentioned virtues, namely humility and respect. But apart from that, they also lead us to regard nature in its totality and acknowledge its

grandeur. This acknowledgement of nature as an extended Self will lead one to regard each existent being, living or non-living, attentively or sensitively. Sensitivity and attentiveness are close terms in the consequences they implicate; however, attentiveness has broader references and specific scope of extent akin to mindfulness as the Buddhist terminology describe. Since the feelings of astonishment, amazement and wonder trigger the approach of attentiveness and sensitivity, I will start analyzing these feelings primarily.

Simonsen (1981) presents a thought experiment, he asks us to imagine a fake nature, imitated by humans which look just like the way a natural scene looks and smells (p. 262). For example, our artists would situate “mechanical birds in the plastic trees and implant scented synthetic grasses everywhere” (Simonsen, 1981, p. 262). This scene of nature would be as identical as “a real forest preserve”. The question is would our appreciation differ? If so, in what ways? I would like to take the experiment one step further, think that this natural forest reserve is not just an ordinary scene but a sublime one, with 20000 feet abyss and huge trees. Would it be able to trigger a sublime response? Don’t forget the fact that you know it is man-made. According to Simonsen (1981), it would not be a proper sublime experience; even it will not be able to arouse such feelings because “our delight arises from the awareness that these forms appeared simultaneously, and are not the product of anyone’s design or labor” (p. 262). They are simply there. They emerged in their own accord, indifferent to human desires or artifice. In short, it is the existence of that formlessness that “emerges simultaneously” as a result of our feelings of astonishment and amazement (Simonsen, 1981, p. 262).

In other words, amazement or astonishment proves that the existence of nature is independent of our own being; it has an autonomous entity that demands respect

and humility. What is more, it is a way of praising nature as the way it is, with its forces, with its own intrinsic systematic process of awareness that we are a part. In amazement and wonder, we reach that being, either call it “the heavens”, the supernatural realm or *noumenal* or an expansion of self, we join and be aware of that bigger I. Soelle (2001) goes even further and asserts that “the beginning of our happiness lies in the understanding that life without wonder is not worth living” (p. 91).

Wonder is also a feeling close to mystery. Wonder as Hepburn denotes (2000) is the continuous search of novelty and being marveled by it (p. 203). The Oxford dictionary suggests that the feeling of awe is “a feeling of reverential respect mixed with fear or admiration” (Awe, 2000, p. 39). Mystery, on the other hand, refers to unknowable and ineffable. Even though an object could never be able to be described or known by us, due to its “enigmatic” nature it still demands a pleasant research and admiration from us. In other words, mystery demands wonder as its *raison d’etre*. In our relation with nature, the more we feel wonder for natural phenomena, the more we get sense of that close “dimension of the relationship”. Soelle (2001) notes that “water, air and earth are common to all living earth dwellers” like us (p. 109). Hence, in feelings of wonder or amazement we get sense of the “mysticism of a *tat twam asi*, ‘you are that’ as the Indian mystical books of Upanishads assert” in Sanskrit, which likens to a common essence that every existent being has a share (Soelle, 2001, p. 109). There is not more an “it” to be “materialized and utilized” that is conceived in a patriarchal hierarchy but a “living Thou”, that is also a “me” that ends with “us”. As above-mentioned, in a Cartesian philosophy nature is deprived of its living interconnected organism, it is just a machine that can be grasped only with a mechanistic conception. Nevertheless, with feelings of amazement and wonder, the

“spirit” of Nature can be rejuvenated once again. “I” can be seen as part of a bigger picture where there is unity and interconnectivity.

Just like the way an arm cares for the other arm for the aim of cooperation in the body, sublime by means of raising feelings such as amazement, astonishment or wonder may lead us to be more attentive to nature to hear, see, feel and know its story. One will care to know how to live “in the midst of other lives” (Soelle, 2001, p. 111). It would remind us that we are not alone, we are more than we know because the world is “a community of all living beings bound one to the other”. Any damage on someone necessarily will “avenge itself” (Soelle, 2001, p. 112). This awareness acts as bedrock for many other virtues. Rolston (1987) claims that “there is no value without awareness” (p. 189) and the rate of awareness marks the rate of sensitivity one has towards others such as animals, plants and non-living beings with respect to “connection, appreciation” and feeling of awe (Leary et al., 2005, p. 142).

Being attentive demands a place to be “unreservedly” present, right now and here. In that moment of “now” all the sensory perceptions has to be awake with unprejudiced openness. The Zen story of Master Ikkyou takes attentiveness as the “highest wisdom” one can have (Soelle, 2001, p. 176). The mystical relationship of attentiveness to time and other existent begins is to be “present to the people and things you love”. It demands identification with what you do, how you do as who you are. As C. S. Lewis puts it, it can be summarized as “I am what I do” (Soelle, 2001, p. 177). Once we become attentive to other beings, we become more “alive” in every moment, and live the moment fully with full attention. Someone with full attentiveness cannot overlook the grandeur of thousand celled eye of a dragonfly or the delicate pattern on a conch shell. Attentiveness demands not just looking but seeing not just hearing but listening. It demands one to be “there” fully with a total

consciousness and wake perception. Therefore, the ecstatic feelings of the sublime will lead one to wake up from slumbers of life full with work and consumption which has a limited scope of vision. It takes every kind of ordinary, everyday life experience to an extraordinary level that is “exclusively unique” (Soelle, 2001, p. 178).

In short, astonishment, amazement and wonder will be aesthetic “overtones” not only leading us to have admiring respect but also be fulfilled with an oceanic feeling, with which we identify ourselves with nature’s grandeur and might. Although there will always be limits to our knowledge and nature will stand as an other to us, these emotions will bring forth the expansion of self. Right at this point, we have an ecological sublime that teaches us to appreciate nature as the way it is and act as a propaedeutic for a “fitting ethical attitude toward natural objects” (Simonsen, 1981, p. 259).

In an age of exploitation, commodification, and domination we need awe, envelopment, and transcendence. We need, at least occasionally to be confronted with the wild otherness of nature and to be astonished, enchanted, humbled by it. Perhaps it is time that we discover an ecological sublime. (Hitt, 1999, p. 620)

5.2.2 Compassion and love

Compassion and love are two distinct feelings that can be felt for the Other with the concern of their well-being. Especially compassion is based on an assumption of a common identity, feeling as if the other is also a part of me, feeling his/her/its pain as if mine. The second phase of the sublime, which leads us to realize the commonality between nature and us, engenders the feelings of compassion and love. Primavesi (2004) asserts that this pleasure we feel upon experiencing the sublime phenomena causes us to realize that “things are ultimately intelligible only in terms of each

other” (p. 64). In such a conception of the world, “each is seen as part of an immense complexity of subtly balanced relationships that, like an endless knot, has no loose end from which it can be untangled and put in supposed order” or in other words as if we all are “an island” composed of “the mainland...and the sea surrounding” it (Primavesi, 2004, p. 64). In a symbiotic relationship like this, since nature is our “extended self” no one can harm the other”, it will be as if harming oneself. This would be nothing but an instance of the well-known sentiments of, “goodwill and sympathetic and compassionate love for others” which proves that sublime induce in us an affective wisdom (Ardelt, 2005, p. 223). We exist “in” this planet rather than “on” it (Litfin, 2010, p. 210). In other words, as the Gaia theory states, this is a cosmology in which “humans are embedded” rather than “exceptional” (Litfin, 2010, p. 213). The existence of each of us makes possible the existence of the other with its distinctive and exclusive identity.

We feel ourselves elevated because we identify ourselves with the powers of nature, ascribing their vast impact to ourselves, because our fantasy rests on the wings of the storm as we roar into the heights and wander into the depths of infinity. Thus we ourselves expand into a boundless natural power.
(Whyte, 2011, p. 9)

Ardelt (2005) asserts that in such a state when the ego is quietened, the result is a feeling of sympathetic and compassionate love for others (p. 223). The “thoughts, feelings and behavior of people” are like me as well as the non-living things that seem to be without thoughts or feelings. Then on, each can direct his/her interest “toward the benefit of all beings rather than only themselves and their loved ones” (Ardelt, 2005, p. 231). Naess (2008c) takes this stand a bit further and compares it to the premises of “Chinese, Indian, Islamic, Hebrew” and as well as some westerns philosophies that go for the slogan of “ultimate unity of all life” in which the fact that

“big fish eat small ones” is not only ignored but also the “profound interrelatedness of the functional unity of such a biospheric magnitude” is acknowledged (p. 131). In these cultures “identification is not limited merely to other living things but also to the mineral world, which helps us to conceive of ourselves as genuine surface fragments of our planet, fragments capable of somehow experiencing the existence of all other fragments: microcosm of the macrocosm” (Naess, 2008c, p. 131). This would be an *amor intellectualis Dei* in Naess’ terms, “a kind of love” for each of the “existent particular beings” that make up the “total richness and diversity of life” (Naess, 2008e, p. 238). Then, one cannot stay unconcerned but feel tremendous responsibility to care and maintain the integrity of each existent being.

Leary et. al (2005) mention the notion of the feeling of unity under the rubric of “*allo*-inclusive identity”. They define it as a state in which the “identity goes beyond one’s individual, relational and collective identities”, an embracement of the other, i.e. *allo* means other (p. 137). The idea inherent in this philosophy “is the inclusion of other entities in one’s self-concept instead of merely an identity that extends beyond the individual him or herself” (Leary et al., 2005, p. 137). Just like the way Naess resembles this philosophy to Chinese, Indian and similar philosophies, Leary et. al. (2005) also reminds the similarity between “ancient philosophical and spiritual traditions such as Taoism, Vedanta and Buddhism, Hinduism and many indigenous religions” (p. 198). They emphasize that “these belief systems share the assumption that each person, animal, and feature of nature is part of a larger whole (e.g. Tao, God, Brahma, Great Spirit) and thus is inherently defined by his or her relationship to everything and everyone else”. Hence, the “practitioners of these spiritual practices” try to raise their awareness that they are a part of the whole, be more conscious of their *allo*-inclusive identity (Leary et. al., 2005, p. 138).

We see traces of such tradition in writings of some western men of thought which is a consequence of the second phase of the sublime. For example, James suggested in mystical experiences we get a feeling “that one is connected to a dimension of existence that is deeper than the visible, sensory world”. In close terms, Maslow (1973) described transcendence in a manner that has an *allo*-inclusive quality, “behaving and reacting as ends rather than as means to oneself, to significant others, to human beings in general, to other species, to nature and to the cosmos” (p. 292). Therefore, in the sublime we feel a “sense of kinship with all living things”, this is a “meta-personal self- scale” in which “no matter” where we are or what we do, there is the intuition that “we are never ever separate from others” (Maslow, 1973, p. 292). This argument might seem metaphysical where spiritual or mystical experiences have a role; however, Leary et. al. (2005) indicate that it does not have to be seen as such. It is a widely accepted concept that “people incorporate people and things outside themselves into their sense of who they are” and this does not have to involve or imply any “particular spiritual philosophy” (p. 138) It is as common as the psychology of anyone who “identifies themselves with reference to their personal traits, other people and the groups to which they belong”. Hence, incorporating broader categories of people and nature into one’s sense of self is not a metaphysical figment of thought but rather a commonsense notion of what we experience in our ordinary lives (Leary et. al., 2005, p. 139). We only need a bit of more awareness and the sublime acts for this “*allo*-inclusive identity” consciousness.

5.3 Why we need an ecological sublime

An ecological sublime can be very helpful in an age that is devastated by increasing ecological perils. Although there could be some objections, which we will face in the

next chapter, ecological sublime raises awareness not only in the sense of sensitivity, compassion and love but also humility and respect for the recognition of our smallness and insignificance in this great cosmic existence. Hitt (1999) also cautions us that in this “rapidly increasing impact of technology on the World” (p. 619), it is highly important to reconsider the place and role of the sublime in environmental matters in which the hubris of humankind will not only be questioned but also its place within nature will be rehabilitated. Hence, in age where humankind calls for a war with nature through its technological means “the sublime is more relevant than ever before”. In such an age, we are referring back to the sublime not as an escape like a romantic ideal, but to view our relation with nature from a different perspective. Therefore, there is an urgent heed to pay attention to its voice in these times of “ecological peril” and “modern technology” (Hitt, 1999, p. 619).

The sublime teaches us that each existent thing is “unique and individual in its own independent being”. It reveals us the peculiar feature of our existence that we both share some traits with the nonhuman world but also different. Although in our external lives we seem to be reaching the Other by means of various acts such as “communication, transportation and agriculture”, in our inner lives we “orbit inside the myopic constraints of egoism and parochial identities” (Litfin, 2010, p. 212). Hence, by the pleasurable effect of the sublime we become once more re-connected to the world, rejuvenate our vision of humanity, “connect to the wondrous” and move beyond our isolation (Litfin, 2010, p. 212). It has been a trait of wise individuals to be selfless. It is indeed a paradox that “the highest level of self-development requires a quieting of the ego and the transcendence of the self” (Ardelt, 2005, p. 222).

In short, sublime as an aesthetic experience leads us to a way that can have a “transformative power” over the environmental problems we face. It can show us

how to care, love and respect nature, feel humility and compassion. The neglect of the sublime is akin to the neglect of “the effects that the aesthetic experience of the environment can have on humans” (Harmon et. al., 2013, p. 76). Hence, an aesthetics that consists of both pleasure and displeasure leads us to regard nature both as an Other and an expanded self; unveiling our peculiar character with it.

CHAPTER 6

CRITICISMS AND DEFENSES

This chapter focuses on the objections against the role of the sublime and its implications on environmental ethics. I distinguish these objections into four categories as (1) practical; if the sublime is an environmental friendly concept, then why are we still faced with environmental degradations? In other words, why are we lacking in practical consequences of the sublime? (2) epistemological, that the sublime is epistemologically an inaccessible concept, therefore it is void, (3) historical, (a) nature is not a proper object of sublime rather the proper subject of the sublime is art and (b) we are no more awed by nature due to our technological developments, (4) metaphysical, the sublime is a religious experience which does not create any difference in the philosophical argumentative agenda and lastly (5) ethical, (a) the sublime is a self-regarding and human-regarding concept rather than nature-regarding, (b) it is anthropocentric, takes human perception at its reference point.

Against these claims, I will try to defend environmental sublime with the following counter-arguments. First, (1) against the practical criticism, I emphasize that (a) the sublime neither aims nor proposes to solve the environmental problems once and for all, it does not have ambitious claims of being a final and ultimate solution but only is a humble attempt of rehabilitating a forgotten concept which is potentially promising to expand our consciousness to peculiar phenomena of nature, (b) the sublime is a rare phenomenon, that not everyone anytime can experience, hence it cannot promise to influence broad number of people within a broad scope of area, (c) it is a spontaneous event, that cannot be preplanned not predesigned, hence a

linear correlative between sublime experience and environmental recuperation cannot be expected. (2) Against the epistemological criticisms, I claim the sublime is a concept that is a construction of the human mind that tries to minimize the gap between world and us, therefore saving sublime in our terminology does not empower but enrich both our conceptual schema and cognitive awareness. Against (3) the historical rejection, I argue (a) nature is the original sublime since it is “pure”, devoid of human intentions and preconceived forms and (b) it can never be exhausted by science but rather science will unveil its marvels more, causing higher astonishment and amazement. Against (4) the metaphysical worries, I think in language it is natural to have associations and affiliations between ideas and feelings, hence the sublime may be akin to religious sentiments but it is not a religious term but aesthetic, we need to be aware of the difference and such feelings do not have to be necessarily grounded upon a divine being. Against (5) the ethical criticisms, I propose (a) we see our self via being reflected on nature and we find nature within ourselves, this leads us to have humility and unity, (b) the sublime is not anthropocentric, centered on humans but *anthropogeneric*, i.e. generated by humans.

6.1 Practical

6.1.1 Criticisms

First of all, I have to note that this thesis is not an attempt of solving the whole environmental problem once and for all. I accept the fact that there are various parameters behind the environmental degradation such as economics, politics and turning points in the history that can never be amended. This thesis should be seen as a humble attempt of raising the sublime into awareness, rehabilitating the concept back to the philosophical discussion not only in aesthetics but also in environmental

ethics. In this sense, it would be an offering of a novel perspective and aiming to introduce an old concept with a new look to environmental ethics. Brady (2013) suggests that “the environmental sublime” provides only “one way in which aesthetic appreciation of nature can feed into and motivate” (p. 200). Therefore, the question of “If the sublime is attempting to solve environmental problems then why are we still in such a world?” would not be tenable since it would be expecting more than what sublime proposes. The sublime thesis does not propose to solve the environmental problems altogether for all times with an immediate magical effect but rather aims to enlarge the environmental philosophy’s agenda, see its interconnections with aesthetics and raise the perceptual level of our awareness to new points of view.

6.1.2 Defenses

As I have various times emphasized, the aim of introducing the sublime into environmental philosophy is an attempt of raising attention to be “more perceptive” of such qualities of nature and be more aware of what they can teach us. In other words, the sublime is a “potential” concept that can give “support for moral value” (Brady, 2013, p. 200) and this thesis aims to reveal this potentiality into our consciousness. When we have a sublime phenomenon if we can convert our consciousness to be more attentive and absorb what it induces, then the experience has the potentiality to create more practical consequences on an individual level which would be a contribution to Earth. How small this contribution does not make any difference, any contribution would be a contribution and no one can know how far its scope can extend in the long run.

Second, sublime is not a common phenomenon that one can witness occasionally. It is a rare experience and once it takes place, one has to be fully aware of what s/he is going through. In other words, being conscious of the sublime beforehand would enhance its appreciation. That is why for this appreciation; one has to have a proper distance between the event and himself. S/he should not have an existential threat for his/her survival. In that case, the experience would become a fearful or dreadful event that would tempt him for flight where there would not be any aesthetic implication whatsoever. Being aware of the sublime experience is important because the intensity and appreciation of the experience would enhance as long as the individual is there fully with all his/her senses. In that sense, this thesis is an attempt of raising the sublime into awareness; once it takes place the subject would be there with all his/her senses and immerse all his/her power of perception for proper appreciation.

Third, the sublime is a spontaneous event, it cannot be preplanned nor designed. For something to be sublime, it has to come from the hands of nature, be spontaneous, unpredictable and out of the control of human limits. This was also discussed formerly whilst defining why nature is the proper object of the sublime rather than art. This spontaneity and unpredictability of the sublime is an important concept, since otherwise arguments in favor of the sublime tourism can be proposed. People can start travelling overseas and cause tremendous toxic gases from airplanes to pollute the environment whilst aiming to see a sublime phenomenon. However, this argument would not be tenable since first of all, as I have above underlined, sublime is a phenomenon that have to strike the subject at an instance, it has to be “counter-purposive” as Kant says. Once there is a purpose or an end already conceptualized and determined, then it would not be an aesthetic judgment in the

first place since the act itself would be a means for an end which would be out of the boundaries of aesthetic judgment. Sublime judgments cannot be preplanned not predetermined in advance so that one would know what s/he would feel and go through once the phenomenon is there. Therefore, for an experience to be called sublime it has to be left out of the control mechanisms of human mind, not planned, defined or determined formerly. With a similar train of thought, no experience would be called sublime as long as it designed by humans, neither any cinema that has vast scenery nor any artificial environment with any sensuous stimulations produced by technological inventions. In short, sublime is a distinctive aesthetic experience including a peculiar dual nature, able to produce both displeasure and pleasure. This peculiar dual nature also lies in our relation with nature. In this sense, sublime can be seen as an alternative phenomenon that can enrich our environmental agenda and induce moral values, raise complex emotions and expand our imagination.

6.2 Epistemological

6.2.1 Criticism

The second criticism is about the epistemological inaccessibility of the sublime. Sircello and Forsey are the two main scholars who have dealt exclusively with this shortcoming of the sublime. They claim that since “the sublime professes to ‘see’ beyond human powers of knowledge; it is inaccessible to rational thought” (Sircello, 1993, p. 541). Sircello maintains that the sublime’s nature of being ineffable or “wordless” is a sign of human capacity to have limited access to reality. The acknowledgement of this is a means for seeing the way to “transcend those limitations” in some way (Sircello, 1993, p. 543). However, at this point Sircello finds a flaw, he claims that just like a visual object cannot present an invisible object

so it is impossible for the sublime or any kind of experience to “present an object or a realm” that is “in no way” epistemologically accessible (Sircello, 1993, p. 547).

Sircello gives examples from figures such as Wordsworth as a representor of the Romantic tradition or Taoism and Zen Buddhism from Eastern mystical traditions. *Tao Te Ching*'s enigmatic verses assert that:

The Tao that can be told is not the eternal Tao. The name that can be named is not the eternal name. The unnameable is the eternally real. Naming is the origin of all particular things. Free from desire, you realize the mystery caught in desire you see only the manifestations. Yet mystery and manifestations arise from the same source. This source is called darkness. Darkness within darkness...The gateway to all understanding. (Lao Tzu, 1995, p. 1).

In the same vein, Zen Buddhist text recounts the following:

Even if you explain a thousand of *sutras* and *shastras* unless you see your own nature yours is the teaching of a mortal not a Buddha. The true way is sublime. It can't be expressed in language. Of what use are scriptures? But someone who sees his own nature find the Way, even if he can't read a word. Someone who sees his nature is a Buddha...the ultimate truth is beyond words. Doctrines are words. They are not the Way. The way is wordless. Words are illusions. (Bodhidharma, 1989, p. 29).

All these texts refer to the sublime as an indefinable and inexpressible experience.

However, for Sircello this “inexpressibility” causes a problem. Forsey follows up on Sircello's argument as well. She defends that the sublime is epistemologically an inaccessible concept to human powers of knowledge (Sircello, 1993, p. 545) which makes it void. Sircello accepts that in each of these cases such as Wordsworthian poetry, Tao or Zen Buddhism we cannot achieve an “understanding of some notion of “reality”. If that is the case then it means that “the sublime experience embodies a certain kind of cognitive failure”. There is an epistemological transcendence that we

have to fulfill. However we fail to do so. Therefore, it is implausible to assert the existence of a concept that is both an object of experience and does not exist (Forsey, 2007, p. 382). What is more, sublime for Forsey does not even “attempt to analyze or theorize that experience” at all, but rather just uses an enigmatic, poetic style of discourse that presents riddles and paradoxes. This only has the aim of transferring “a feeling”. “If this is what we are left with, it is so philosophically limited as to amount to nothing in the way of a theory of the sublime” (Forsey, 2007, p. 388). So, Forsey (2007) concludes that the sublime is either “incoherent or contradictory” (p. 383).

What kinds of objects are the sublime? What does the sublime tell us about ourselves as subjects? And centrally what does the sublime experience illuminate about the limitations of our access to the world? We have no purchase in a purely phenomenological or emotional account. This is deeply unsatisfying because if we accept this option, we must conclude that a theory of the sublime such as we have historically striven for is simply out of reach (Forsey, 2007, p. 383).

Therefore, Forsey decides that something cannot be both “an object of experience” and an explanation on the “cognitive failure of a given subject”. If it is related with any “feeling or emotive state” then, it encompasses “no theory whatsoever”. Forsey (2007) asserts that “in one interpretation the sublime can be nothing, in the second anything and in the third; it cannot be theorized at all” (p. 388).

6.2.2 Defenses

Against Forsey’s and Sircello’s criticisms, I think, they are confusing two distinct concepts, having an experience and defining that experience. These are two distinct

phenomena that have to be neatly distinguished from each other. First, we can experience something; however, we do not have to name it; however, if we want it to be categorized as a distinct concept then, we can try to give a name for it or search for any other words we have in our mental conceptual box. Ineffable is a concept just like the way sublime is. It defines the attempt of explaining an experience which is wordless. The experience is so complex and intense that words lack to categorize and conceptualize it. We can have some kinds of experience that can extend far beyond the power of words but in the meantime we can still be using or groping for words. At that point the human mind comes up with constructing terms such as awe, ineffable or sublime. This was the reason for us to present a section in the second chapter on the affiliated emotions akin to the sublime. The experience is one of a kind that not only one single concept can satisfy; it ranges from terror to awe, astonishment to ecstasy. Sublime is just an alternative invention to encompass all.

Moreover, concepts are like boxes that aim to make our experiences intelligible for us and for others. They are human inventions just like the way “nature” is. We have asserted formerly that the term nature is a social construction since it is part of our language; all language is human invention. In the same vein, in whatever way we conceptualize any experience, we will always be far away from that reality. There will always be a gap between the world and the human mind. The language is an attempt just to decrease that gap as much as we can, but at the same time, it is an awareness of us that a gap exists. Therefore, I claim that Forsey and Sircello overlooks the fact that the sublime is an attempt of us to acknowledge and be conscious of this gap. Epistemological inaccessibility is one thing and realizing and being aware of that inaccessibility is another thing. The sublime does not have to throw out bold claims of fulfilling that gap but rather, it can suggest a moderate call

for being conscious of that gap and create some space for those experiences that leave us “wordless”. In the meantime, sublime simultaneously reminds us that the term “wordless” is still a word itself.

On the other hand, Sircello’s criticism seems to be coming from a logical positivist tradition. Logical positivists were a group of analytical philosophers that flourished in the first half of the twentieth century under the Vienna Circle.¹⁷ Their main argument was as long as a statement cannot be “verified” with empirical sciences then they are cognitively meaningless. The circle found all metaphysical and mystical discourse voids. However, the term “mystical” itself creates an opposition to this argument. The term “mystical” itself refers to the experiences that “cannot be communicated with words” (Soelle, 2007, p. 55). All mystics generally tend to explain “in images but never name *tel quel* (exactly as it was) what happened to them”. To discard such a rooted tradition and history of philosophy is an attempt of logical positivists that is not well-grounded and reductionist. There are some contexts that we have to accept the “helplessness of the language that we commonly use” (Soelle, 2007, p. 55).

Furthermore, the linguistic elements the tradition of mysticism adopts are the ones that are “clearly indispensable and occur in most diverse cultures” such as “negation, paradox and silence”. With the sublime experiences, the first attempt is always to negate the experience that it is “not” something akin to any ordinary sights, feelings or power. The prefixes utilized are progressively “dynamic” terms ranging from “un” or “over” and “beyond” to “more than”, “higher than” or “on the far side of”. As the prefix *sub* is a root of other Latin prefixes such as “super and hyper”, the

¹⁷ For more information see: Logical Empiricism. (n.d). In *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Retrieved from <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logical-empiricism/>.

German language uses *über, heit, keit, ung* (Soelle, 2007, p. 67). Second, as *Tao Te Ching* presents above, the language which describes the experience can be paradoxical. It is the same with the sublime, we feel both pleasure and displeasure, both unity and separation. The ordinary logic shatters. Riddles, metaphors, or oxymoronic similes are used to define and explain it. Finally, silence becomes a means of communication. Time is fulfilled with silence, the wordless discourse. The emotions of “amazement or wonderment” are peculiar instances where communication is maintained without words. Dropping the jaw, enlargement of eyeballs, strain on facial muscles are signs of body language as other means of communication.

All in all, Forsey and Sircello’s arguments are not satisfactory to discard the sublime from our terminology. Unlike Forsey argues, the sublime is not a concept that is nothing, anything or “cannot be theorized at all” but, it is something that accepts the constructive nature of human mind to minimize the gap between us and the world. In short, having the “sublime” in our terminological and philosophical agenda does not empower but rather enrich both our conceptual schema and cognitive awareness.

6.3 Historical

6.3.1 Criticisms

The third objection is that the sublime is no more a valid concept for appreciation of nature but rather its proper object is art. In other words, the sublime is an outmoded concept for appreciation of nature due to the following two facts, (1) we are no more impressed by nature because with our scientific inventions/discoveries, we are able to control and subdue nature so that there is no more sense of grandeur as it used to

be in the previous centuries and (2) sublime is a concept of art after the postmodern tradition. So, sublime does not apply to natural phenomena any more but only to artworks; it is historically an outmoded concept behind the spirit of times.

Elkins is one of the major critiques who support such oppositions. Elkins (2011) claims that the sublime should not “apply to nature but art objects” and sublime no more satisfies any mode of appreciation except some “particular ranges of artworks” generally made in the nineteenth century (p. 77). What is more, Elkins (2011) thinks that the concept sublime and other affiliated terms such as “awe, wonder” are used unthoughtfully in the history of philosophy so many times that they lost their significance for appreciation. They are like “blank coins” as if “rubbed by thousand fingers” till they have become “nothing but thin blank disks” (p. 89). Therefore, Elkins (2011) suggests to drop the concept altogether from the language and try to define the following peculiar experiences, being “ambushed by the tremendous appearance of the Milky way, pouring from one horizon to another, with Cygnus gleaming in its middle” as the way he sees it with “words as sharp as” he can “manage” (p. 89).

Brady (2002) talks about the same historical opposition against sublime (p. 174). The argument states that we are less “awed” and appalled by nature because, we are “less fearful” due to our ability to “control and exercise power over much of nature” with “our developed technological means”. It states that neither the great mountains nor the wide deep oceans “evoke” any “edgy feeling of the sublime” and its “anxious pleasure”. The eighteenth century concept is an old-fashioned term for the contemporary world since our relationship with nature is not that much “troubled” any more (Brady, 2002, p. 174).

Just like Brady rejects I also argue that the sublime is still a relevant term in environmental aesthetics as it has originally been a concept of nature appreciation¹⁸. No matter how advanced we are and will be in technological improvements, nature will always be an object of awe since the human capacities of imagination and apprehension have limits. Therefore, the view that the sublime is “originally and best understood applies” significantly in art is an untenable view (Brady, 2002, p. 174). Himalayas’ width and height will always be beyond our comprehension no matter how good our aero planes and field glasses are. What is more, since the technological instruments will let us know more about the extent of nature’s marvels, we would never be less awed but more fascinated. In short, my counter-argument has two steps: (1) nature is the original object of the sublime and art can express the sublime only indirectly due to being a mere representation, and (2) technological developments does not lessen the effect of nature but rather increase via letting nature open its grandeur and vastness.

6.3.2 Defenses

The first step of the argument is to refute the claim that artifacts, namely the artworks, are the proper candidates for the sublime experience. I claim that the original sublime is nature and Kant’s *Critique of the Power of Judgment* is a major support for this. Clewis argues that (2010) the artistic sublime has a justified role as a proper object. In contrast, Abaci (2008) claims that Kant is justified to dismiss the idea of the artistic sublime and acknowledge the natural one as the “pure sublime”.

¹⁸ See the works of Kant and his predecessors: Kant, I. (2000). *Critique of the Power of Judgment*. Guyer, P. & Matthews, A. (Trans). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

As a response to this discussion, we have to refer back to Kant in whose aesthetics sublime has a major significance. Kant (2000) in his aesthetics differentiates two types of the sublime just like two types of beautiful: impure and pure. Impure sublime are the ones that are “intentionally directed towards our satisfaction” (p. 181), the deliberate act of creating something with a final purpose or end previously had in mind. In other words, when the object is previously conceived in the artist’s mind with its final form then it is an “impure” experience of the sublime. On the contrary, when the object of appreciation is devoid of any “intentional content” then it is “pure” (Kant, 2000, p. 181). In that case, in pure judgments there are no “teleological” elements that make up the form and the power of the object (Abaci, 2008, p. 240). Taking these into consideration, the impure judgments become the artifacts that are man-made versus the pure ones that are natural phenomena. That is why, for Kant the proper object of appreciation in aesthetics is nature rather than art, because the pure experiences can only depict the necessary elements of aesthetic judgment.

As a result, Kant gives the examples of “bold, overhanging...threatening cliffs, thunder clouds towering up into the heavens, ...flashes of lighting and crashes of thunder, volcanoes with their all-destroying violence, hurricanes” from nature (Kant, 2000, p. 144) as proper objects of the sublime. However, in another part of the *Critique of Judgment* he mentions about the “pyramids in Egypt and St. Peter’s Cathedral in Rome” to exemplify the inadequacy of imagination where it reaches its maximum and fails to have a “comprehension”. Nevertheless, Kant consequently argues that they are not the proper cases because they are “impure”.

If the aesthetic judgment is to be pure (not mixed up with anything teleological as judgments of reason) and if an example of that is to be given

which is fully appropriate for the critique of the aesthetic power of judgment, then the sublime must not be shown in products of art (e.g. buildings, columns etc.) where a human end determines the form as well as the magnitude, nor in natural things whose concept already bearing with it a determine end (e.g. animals of a known natural determination) but rather in raw nature (and even in this only insofar as it by itself brings with it neither charm nor emotion from danger) merely insofar as it contains magnitude. A pure judgment on the sublime, however, must have no end of the object as its determining ground if it is to be aesthetic and not mixed up with any judgment of the understanding or of reason. (Kant, 2000, p. 136).

Therefore, Kant's main concern is the analysis of the sublime in its purest form.

Abaci (2008) also emphasizes that the difference between pure judgments of the sublime and the impure ones is the "teleological elements" that make up the "form and the magnitude of the object" (p. 240). The teleological elements compose the "intentionality" of the artist and "conscious appreciation of the product" from the side of the audience (p. 241).

In contrast to Abaci's statements Clewis (2010) suggests to keep the "impure sublime" as a relevant category within the debate. He argues that Kant's writings do not altogether dismiss the artistic sublime but still give a place (p. 168). Moreover, the contemporary aesthetic context definitely accepts such terminology in artistic creations. This insistence of Clewis is reminiscent of Elkins's criticism that the sublime in the contemporary world is related with artworks rather than nature. However, my concern is not either impure sublime can find a place within the philosophy of art or not. I agree that Kant's aesthetic provides a space for the artistic sublime within the category of impurity; however, I want to reject the view that the natural sublime is an outmoded concept. From Kant's definition of the pure sublime, nature still can fit in and find a place within the aesthetic agenda. Unlike Clewis argues, artworks can never satisfy the "perceptual criteria" of the sublime "in the effect of formlessness" since they would always be within the limits of human

imagination with respect to “magnitude, form and vantage point” (p. 172).

Furthermore, both Brady (2002, p. 173) and Guyer (2005) support the same attitude I defend, that artifacts cannot be “true examples of sublime” since they are “too finite to induce a genuine experience of the sublime” (p. 158).

The second part of the objection claims that nature is no more an equivalent for awe and astonishment because we mastered over it with our scientific discoveries and inventions. The anthropocentric core of this argument is easy to detect since it implies the scientific success of humans. It assumes that science has revealed all the secrets of nature so that there is no necessary reason for us to have fear or mystery about it; however, what this criticism overlooks is the fact that knowledge we have does not necessarily lead to an impoverishment, rather exploration and invention might lay bare the marvels of nature and lead us to be more fascinated. The impetus behind any scientific discovery of nature is a feeling of wonder. Wonder as Hepburn (2000) denotes is a feeling that does not exhaust itself upon comprehension (p. 203). In contrast, curiosity is a transient feeling that is vulnerable to temporality. Hence, any information gained about nature, the height of mountains or depth of oceans does not diminish the impression they leave on us. The scientific discoveries do not exhaust the experience but rather pumps up the interest in a much fervent way. In other words, scientific discoveries do not lead us to be less awed by nature but be more excited with astonishment and wonder. Nature is not a phenomenon that can be exhausted at any point. A microscopic observation might reveal the millions of cells that make up just a single eye tissue; a telescope might show us billion light years far away stars and galaxies. All these encounters make us realize nature’s power, grandeur and magnificence more. In short, the discoveries and inventions make us

feel continuous astonishment and amazement that is never ending, constant and steady.

6.4 Metaphysical

6.4.1 Criticisms

The fourth objection is metaphysical with the worry that sublime is a religious term from the discourse of theology, as if a proof of God. Elkins (2011) in his work *Against the Sublime* asserts that the sublime has to be abandoned since it is a concept that “is used principally as a way to smuggle covert religious meaning into texts that are putatively secular” (p. 77). Elkins (2011) argues that the sublime has many metaphysical implications; it is a “covert religious term” that enables the academics “to speak about religion while remaining appropriately secular” (p. 88).

It is important not to assume that “the sublime” “presence” and “transcendence” are philosophical masks that can be removed, revealing a hidden religious discourse. They are that discourse: they are taken by authors...to be the only remaining ways in which truths that can be used to be called religious can find voice within much of contemporary thought. In one sense the dozens of the twentieth century books that discuss the sublime are interrogating the possibility of religious experience but in another sense- the only one available for reflective writing- they are not addressing religion but asking only about the coherence and usefulness of the sublime. (Elkins, 2011, p. 85)

When we look once again to the history of the sublime, it is true that in the history of philosophy, the sublime has been hand in hand with religious discourse and implications. For example, Monk (1960) admits that the particular emotions of “admiration and delight” are actually “passions that are excited by religious contemplation” (p. 80). In the similar vein, Dennis in 1704 (1996) also refers to all the examples of sublime given by Longinus to be based on religion (p. 36). For

Shaftesbury (1996) the sublime is not rooted in style but “in divinity”. It is a manifestation of “divinity” in the “mighty nature” and which reveals itself in “that all-loving Deity’s” cosmic and terrestrial *oeuvres* (pp. 72-4).

In short, in the seventeenth and eighteenth century, sublime is interpreted to be grounded on the “infinite God”. The great ideas which lead to the elevation of soul to “the thoughts of infinity” are the proper predicates of sublime (Nicolson, 1963, p. 300). The great Natural objects, “mountains and ocean, stars and cosmic space” are the true source of sublime “all reflecting the glory of Deity” (Nicolson, 1963, p. 323). Moreover, some scholars such as Coleridge (1851) linked sublime to the root of Abrahamic doctrines, namely Judaism. Coleridge (1851) asserts that the sublime is “older than Greeks, even dating back to Hebrews” (p. 188). According to Coleridge, it was the Hebrew poets that the first scriptures about the sublime are found. Otto (1928) who says his main purpose in the book is “to investigate the non-rational element in the idea of the divine” (p. 73) accepts there is more of a combination between the concepts of holy and the sublime. Otto (1928) asserts that “the sublime is an authentic ‘schema’ of the ‘holy’” (p. 61). Not only this but also, the Hebrew term *qadosh* or the Latin term *sanctus* which means holy are not “originally moral categories” but rather refers to being transcendent or supra-mundane, i.e. beyond-world (Otto, 1928, p. 61). Otto (1928) underlines the relation that is asserted in the sixth chapter of Isaiah between grandeur, sublimity and holy. It says that there is sublimity alike between the lofty throne and “the sovereign figure of God” which is “a legitimate schematization” of “highest forms of religious consciousness”. In other words, there is a proof that reveals “a hidden kinship between the numinous and the sublime which is something more than a merely accidental analogy” (p. 78).

In the same vein, Cronon (1995b) claims, the doctrine of the sublime is related with those unique places that are the places on earth where one can have the chance to “glimpse the face of God”, the supernatural (p. 73). Although God might, of course choose to show Himself anywhere, God would most often be found in those vast, powerful, landscapes where one could not help feeling insignificant and being reminded of one’s own mortality. Where were these places? The eighteenth century catalog of their locations feels very familiar, for we still value and see landscapes as it taught us to do. God was on the mountaintop, in the chasm, in the waterfall, in the thundercloud, in the rainbow, in the sunset (Cronon, 1995b, p. 73).

The contemporary scholars point to the close relation the sublime has with religious sentiments. For example, Greig (2011) indicates that the *mysterium tremendum* feature of the sublime shares a common root with the religious experience. Greig (2011) denotes that the sublime is continuously elicited as the feeling of “spiritual rehabilitation” igniting the “inner spark” of the soul, making it fit for a “spiritual enquiry” (p. 109). This was the tradition defended by the romantics who were “influenced by the Christian mystics and the Pseudo-Dionysus scholars”; sublime is an experience that “reveals God”. It is “an aesthetically founded quest devoted to recovering intimations of the divine” (Greig, 2011, p. 109).

In a similar vein, the twentieth century transcendentalists underline the same statement their eighteenth century predecessors emphasized; sublime has a relation with the religious sentiment. For both Thoreau and Wordsworth, “mountains were the cathedrals”, Cronon (1995b) claims that the way they express “their piety” might differ but they were at consensus that it was the “church” to be “worshipped” (p. 75). For him, Wordsworth’s assertions are “nothing less than a religious experience, akin to that of the old testament prophets as they conversed with their wrathful God” and

for Thoreau, Mount Katahdin is “ a symbol of God’s presence on Earth” (Cronon, 1995b, p. 75). Lastly, Emerson (2003b) is the most fervent one to unify the sublime with religion. Emerson (2003b) is much stricter in contrast to the others to identify one in terms of the other. His claims take nature in equal terms as manifestation of God (pp. 36-39). Emerson (2003a) asserts that “ineffable” is the means when one soul connects with God and this inspires nothing but awe and astonishment (p. 121).

The perception of this law awakens in the mind a sentiment which we call the religious sentiment, and which makes our highest happiness. Wonderful is its power to charm and to command. It is a mountain air. It is the embalmer of the worlds...It makes the sky and the hills sublime, and the silent song of the stars is it. By it is the universe made safe and habitable, not by science or power. (Emerson, 2003a, p. 111)

In short, it is assumed that any power or greatness can be only a creation of God. Beauty which is softer and imaginable can be man-made but the true source of sublimity can only be “in the manifestations of His greatness and power in Nature” (Nicolson, 1963, p. 282). Sublime is found to be akin to religious experience because it is made up of “extraordinary Ideas” which has the capacity to rouse “extraordinary passions”, elevating the soul and the mind to go beyond its “limitations” to an extraordinary level of existence (Nicolson, 1963, p. 285). The grandeur of God is reflected in the grandeur of the world and its natural creations in a rich variety that “engrossed” human imagination as if they are the “cosmic heavens” (Nicolson, 1963, p. 293).

From infinite God to Infinite Space to vast objects in the world and back again from the “great” in external Nature through Space and infinite or indefinite worlds to Infinite God - such is the threefold process of the “pleasures of the imagination”. The “pleasure” man felt in mountains and ocean, in stars and space, lay in the enlargement of the soul to experience more completely the powers, desires, and aspirations given by its great Original, the true Infinite. (Nicolson, 1963, p. 321)

Upon consideration of all these views, it is obvious that there is an affinity between the religious sentiments and the sublime. However, this should not make us to discard the concept and reject all its implications. There are three main arguments against this objection: (1) there can be associations between concepts, which is a natural outcome of the language and this should not lead us to assimilate one to the other but keep the differentiation along with the acknowledgment of the affinity, (2) the differentiation that needs to be paid attention is that the sublime is an aesthetic concept not a religious one, hence it is a secular version of a religious discourse within the aesthetic realm, and (3) although feelings connected to the natural world can be spiritual experiences, they do not have to embrace a divine being necessarily.

6.4.2 Defenses

First counter-argument is the natural possibility of the association of ideas and the connection between feelings. It is a well-known fact that ideas can have connections and associations with one another. For example, one idea can “attract” another and the other can call something else into consciousness (Otto, 1928, p. 57). The same fact is valid for feelings. As we have scrutinized in the third chapter, sublime has many affiliated emotions, each resembling, having connections with one another such as terror to dread, awe to amazement, elevation to ecstasy, etc. If any association demands equal uniformity *in toto* then we can assert that the sublime feelings are religious feelings. However, we have to distinguish between similarity and equal uniformity. I accept that religious feelings have connections and resemblances with the sublime; however, they are not the same. The two realms share feelings but the two realms are distinct from each another, one is “aesthetic” and the other is “religious”. Their scope of knowledge and purpose vary significantly

from one another. The former is related with the sensory pleasures; the other is related with the acceptance of a divine being and related practices.

Otto (1928) asserts that this association of feelings is better to be called “conjoined” rather than “connected” because “the association of ideas does not simply cause the idea to reappear in consciousness with the given idea x” but it creates “lasting combinations and connections” under certain circumstances (p. 60). For example, in both Thoreau and Wordsworth, we have seen the similarity of a mountain to a cathedral. This is conjoining of emotions where both a mountain and a cathedral stimulate. However, they are merely metaphors, not trying to create a necessary identification (Cronon, 1995b, p. 75). Otto (1928) argues that although the sublime is a concept that is akin to “numinous” and can easily “excite it” (p. 74), it is definitely an “aesthetic term” (Otto, 1928, p. 57). Sublime can be similar to the object of religious awe or reverence, the inherent “*tremendum* and *augustum*” leads it to have its “numinous” character; however, we should be careful to differentiate the source of the feelings and merely the feelings themselves. In other words, feelings can take place with no necessary dependence on an originator that is divine. Now, let me explain these two arguments a) sublime is an aesthetic term and b) similar feelings can take place with no necessary dependence on a divine being.

The second counter-argument is that the sublime is an aesthetic concept. The differentiation of the sublime from religious context had a deep demarcation with Kant. Kant had strictly noted that the sublime is an aesthetic concept that needs no presupposition of a divine being. Brady (2002) also indicates that although some eighteenth century theorists “associated” the sublime with “God’s power symbolized in nature”, it was with Kant that we had a totally “secular” sublime (p. 175).

Judgments for Kant are analyzed under two different branches: determining and reflective. Whereas the former one is related with the subsumption of a particular under a universal which is already given, in the latter case there is not a determinate universal that the particular can be subsumed under but only “made possible” (Kant, 2000, p. 15). Aesthetic judgments are peculiar in the sense to be “reflective” in contrast to cognitive judgments that are determining. As Kant asserts, “the determining judgments” have “a given objective concept”; however, the reflective judgment “can be only aesthetic” since they are “indeterminate”, i.e. they do not have a “determinate, objective concept”. By “objective” or “cognitive judgment” (Kant, 2000, pp. 89, 90), Kant means claims such as “All roses have thorns” (Guyer, 1997, p. 111); one has a concept and can derive the applicability of the concept to a particular by means of the rules of logic which would count it to be “objectively universal” (Kant, 2000, p. 100). However with the aesthetic judgments, one should be careful that they are not “objectively universal” since they do not have any determinate concept but just manifold of intuitions concerning the particular, “This river is beautiful”.

The term “purposiveness” also plays a crucial role in this account. Aesthetic judgments for Kant (2000) are “purposive without purpose” meaning that they seem to be designed as if to have a form or a concept but actually they lack one (p. 106). It is the function of the subject to unify his/her mental capacities with imagination and understanding and this job of unification causes pleasure/displeasure. Therefore, Kant (2000) calls it “subjective purposiveness” rather than “objective purposiveness” (pp. 110, 111). The aesthetic judgment is significantly distinct from the determining ones which have a concept or form already presupposed. In this sense, attributing the name of God as the underlying cause for the aesthetic judgments is an attempt of

mixing these two judgments which obliterate the distinction. In other words, the underlying reason for the sublime or any natural phenomena can never be God or any kind of divine being in an explicit way of equivalency.

In the same way, Kant (2009) argues in the *Critique of Pure Reason* that “there can be no doubt that all our knowledge begins with experience” (p. 136) and “transcendental conditions” that enable this are time and space that make up the phenomenal world. In contrast to the *phenomenal* world lies the *noumenal* world, the things-in-themselves, which can never be known to us since they are not within the conditions of knowledge. Things-in-themselves are not objects of possible experience. They consist of some transcendental ideas such as God, freedom, or immortality of soul. They cannot be known “in any certain dogmatic, or transcendent way”; they are beyond the possibilities of “finite human knowledge” (Crockett, 2001, p. 13). Therefore, there is no place within Kant’s philosophy for religion as a possible object of experience for aesthetics. Although, aesthetics can have some associated feelings with religious discourse, it is totally a secular realm and since the sublime is an aesthetic term, it is not a religious concept.

It might be suggested that the religious discourse after the seventeenth century had transformed itself to an aesthetic discourse with secular connotations. Nicolson maintains that before the sixteenth century, mountains that gave trembling to the human mind were seen as “nature’s shame and ills”. However, with the discoveries in science the human mind had the chance to have a relation with nature that could appreciate it from a safe position so that his way of perception differed. The mountains became no more “warts, wens, blisters, imposthumes” but “natural cathedrals or natural alters...with their clouds resting on hem as smoke of a continual sacrifice” (Nicolson, 1963, p. 2). Hence “mountain gloom” turned into “mountain

glory” and the religious discourse for weakness and dependence of man on a greater force transformed into an aesthetics of infinite. All the discoveries and inventions in “theology, philology, astronomy and philosophy” (Nicolson, 1963, p. 3) played a role in this. However, with the sublime a “profound difference” took place between the older and “modern” landscapes (Nicolson, 1963, p. 27). “The idea of infinity of God” transferred into a “god of Plentitude” by means of scientific progresses. The attribution of the sublime experiences’ origin shifted from God to “an expanded cosmos” and then “from macrocosms to the greatest objects in the geo-cosmos, mountains, oceans, desert” (Nicolson, 1963, p. 143). In other words “God” is replaced by “space” and then by “Nature”. The feelings and conceptions of “majesty, grandeur, vastness” where both “admiration and awe were combined...discovered the aesthetics of the sublime” in the seventeenth century (Nicolson, 1963, p.143).

The perfect expression of “the aesthetics of the Infinite”: the transfer of Infinity and Eternity from a God of Power and a God of Benignity to Space, then to the grandeur and majesty of earth. From mountains, the mind and soul of man rises again, through Space, to Eternity and Infinity, with awe and reverence for the power of God, to the serene and tranquil peace that passes all understanding. (Nicolson, 1963, p. 393)

Sublime became a secularized version of the feelings of infinity and vastness. For example, Burnet in 1691 wrote in *Sacred Theory* that during a mountain pass he had the similar emotions when he contemplated upon the “heavens” (p. 109).

The greatest objects of Nature... next to the great Concave of the Heavens, and those boundless Regions where the Stars inhabit...[are] wide Sea and the Mountains of the Earth. There is something august and stately in the Air of these things, that inspires the mind with great thoughts and passions; We do naturally, upon such occasions, think of God and his greatness: and whatsoever hath but the shadow and appearance of INFINITE, as all things have that are too big for our comprehension, they fill and over-bear the mind

with their Excess, and cast it into a pleasing kind of stupor and admiration. (Burnet, 1691, pp. 109-110)

Later Burnet (1691) asserted that it was not the direct encounter of a divine figure that was a *reason'd-opinion* (p. 210) but rather a deep compilation of “enthusiasm” (80) that made him to have only “inclinations-opinions” (p. 210). In short, as Nicolson emphasizes (1963), Burnet started the *Sacred Theory* as a theological work but it came out to have a place in the “history of aesthetics” (p. 222).

The new aesthetics: from the discovery of the new cosmic heavens, vastness and irregularity passed to terrestrial Nature. In the wide seas and the mountains of the Earth, men were discovering a new “magnificent of Nature” finding their “elastical soul” expanded with the vastness and expansiveness of Nature. It remained for the next generation to analyze “the aesthetics of the Infinite.” (Nicolson, 1963, p. 270)

Hence, we should not reject the sublime altogether like Elkins (2011) when he sees sublime has close affinity with metaphysics (p. 85).¹⁹ What is more, Elkins’ criticisms are actually a support for our argument, that the sublime is a substitute for religious sentiment in a secularized agenda, without being grounded on a divine being. The scientific discoveries and inventions in astronomy, physics, chemistry and geology gave way to this transformation in the seventeenth century. Elkins is not aware that his criticisms point that the sublime came to the fore due to a “paradigm shift” after this scientific revolution; hence, making peace with the sublime and

¹⁹ “Kant is adamant about the separation, but Longinus talks uncertainly of divinity and Weiskel permit himself the one apostrophe. ... Rudolf Otto’s book skirts the sublime as if Otto is unsure whether the sublime is part of the holy. His book is one of the bits to study the vacillation about the sublime and religious writing. At one point he says the sublime is a *pale reflection* of numinous revelation, five pages later he says the sublime is *an authentic scheme of the holy*”. (Elkins, 2011, p. 85)

letting its existence enrich our discourse is preferable over rejecting it. Otherwise, we will overlook many aspects of our relation with nature not only in aesthetic appreciation but also in ethics.

We have to see the necessity to create more space for the sublime in our discussions. Sublime enables us to talk about the aspects of nature and its effects on us with different implications. We can regard sublime as a secularized substitute of religion without any necessary dependence of a divine being. Leary et. al. (2005) support this thesis by asserting that “feeling connected to the natural world...associated more with spiritual experiences” does not have to “necessarily involve a divine being” and does not have to “incorporate” “theistic and religious behavior” to people’s “identity” (p. 145). Brady (2002) asserts that the sublime can replace the religious experience with a secularized terminology by means of utilizing the “metaphysical imagination”. Metaphysical imagination is a term she borrows from Ronald Hepburn. According to Hepburn, metaphysical imagination is the aesthetic experience when we encounter a natural scene and by means of our imagination we connect it with metaphysical feelings and terms. In other words, it is an “aesthetic transcendence” that “precipitates a new, felt awareness of our place in the world”. Sublime affords us to have an “opening out of the felt experience” to other sensory dimensions through an “anxious exhilaration” (Brady, 2002, p. 177).

Once we see the sublime as substitute for the religious discourse then we can make “peace with sublime” (Hoffman, 2011, p. 151). Adaptation of the sublime brings forth a “scientific communication”. Sublime brings us in close connection with the “soaring large galaxies” and “chemistry” and “physics” (Hoffman, 2011, p. 162). By means of physics we are now able to measure the distance of many galaxies and stars from the earth or by means of chemistry we are able to be aware of the

millions of cells that make up only a small part of our organ. The feeling upon these instances of inventions is nothing but the sublime, and knowledge gained by science helps us to experience this. It is the same case with natural phenomena. The depth of an ocean or the heights of Himalayas, the power of a tsunami measured by physical equipment are all scientific discoveries. Hence, the sublime fulfills an important function as a substitute for the religious discourse that we used to have; however, this discourse does not presuppose the existence of any divine being although it operates upon similar feelings.

By providing a substitute for the Christian cosmology displaced by the new sciences, the eighteenth century sublime countered the anxieties elicited by the apparent withdrawal of God from human affairs by associating the infinite universe with the majesty of the divine, an aesthetic response wherein the boundless universe came to signify the infinite power of God. The experience of the infinite, then serves as a correlation of transcendence, the spatial or temporal enactment of consciousness in search of that which is beyond itself, “the other”. (Greig, 2011, p. 109)

In short, the birth of “new geology and new aesthetics” gave way to a new aesthetics of nature where the need for a concept such as sublime was obvious (Nicolson, 1963, p. 22). The vastness of God first moved to the vastness of “interstellar Space” and then to “terrestrial mountains” (Nicolson, 1963, p. 273). This shows how the shift from theology to a secular aesthetics took place. The attributes given to God shifted its target first to interstellar space and then to nature. They have found that they can find a way that humans can interact with nature with no necessary dependence on a divine being.

6.5 Ethical

6.5.1 Criticisms

The ethical opposition consists of two elements, first is the claim that the sublime actually is an experience that is self-regarding and human-regarding rather than nature-regarding. Second, it is anthropocentric that places human perception at the center and attributes a hierarchical relation by imposing humanly values over nature. In this sense, sublime is a type of aesthetic experience in which nature is both “distorted and humanized” (Brady, 2002, p. 179). This argument will have the following presuppositions: (1) the sublime experience focuses on the self, on the human mind and on its limits rather than to the properties of natural objects and phenomena, (2) it assumes human perception is the central point of view with a distinct position of appreciating nature from a godlike and impersonal position.

The first presupposition about the claim that sublime is anthropocentric mainly takes its lead from Kant’s account of the sublime. In Kant it is the human mind, rationality and freedom that are ultimately found to be the sublime, not natural objects. Sublime gives us two important conclusions: (1) we are rational beings and moral agents with autonomy, (2) we have to respect the moral law and rationality due to its ability to set its own ends; however, as mentioned above, then there will be the following two oppositions: (1) If rational nature is what matters, then we do not have any duties towards the non-rational nature but only indirect ones, and we demand direct duties since we are rational creatures. This conclusion leads to another (2) that we can use non-rational nature or environment as means for our ends, since they are mere things versus humans who are persons. This creates a serious problem in environmentalism, giving way to an anthropocentric view, which leads to a “monstrously megalomaniacal view of the world in which human beings regard

themselves as the lords of nature and think of nature as whole as existing only for their sake” (Wood, 1998, p. 203) or in other words, to an instrumental standpoint entailing a species chauvinism, that humans are superior to other species whose results can be discerned in the ferociously devastating attitudes of the modern technological society.

The second presupposition is that sublime gives a central role to human perception. For example, Godlovitch criticizes any kind of aesthetic appreciation as anthropocentric that accepts the right of a point of view due to having a center of consciousness or apperception. Therefore, Godlovitch advocates a new theory of acentrism in aesthetic appreciation which points to the right attitude of ethics in environmental matters. By centric positions, Godlovitch means the theories of environmentalism that tries to preserve the earth from a specific viewpoint that places value in relation to it. In that sense, according to Godlovitch (2007), any environmentalism is centric as long as its purpose is to prevent the earth just for its dwellers. On the other hand “acentric environmentalism” makes provision for “nature as a whole” (p. 134). In an acentric position, there is no such thing as the “point of view of the recipient” because there are infinite of them and therefore not a specific and particular one can be detected and located. As a result, it extends beyond “centers of consciousness and apperceptions” and confers moral perspective even to “mere things”. There is no moral differentiation between animate and inanimate; it attributes an “unusual non-perspectival universality” (Godlovitch, 2007, p. 134). In the sublime, there is the centrality of human perception and valuer. Hence, it is experienced from one particular and determinate point of view in contrast to appreciating nature “from any of an infinite number of points of view from which the viewer and, generally, by parity, we do not matter at all” (Godlovitch, 2007, p. 134).

With anthropocentrism, nature does not gain its independence and autonomy and we assimilate it to our values and conceptions.

In the same vein, Saito argues that any appreciation that takes humans with a central role in the appreciation process is anthropocentric since it gives them a distinct role with a godlike and impersonal position. Although Saito does not criticize sublime explicitly, she deals with the problem of appreciation of nature as “nature” in her work *Appreciating Nature on its Own Terms* (2007) in detail. Saito proposes an alternative model called “Zen-Buddhist type of non-anthropocentric appreciation” aiming to preserve the unity and continuity between man and nature and overcome the created boundaries. In this sense, although she does not clearly refer to the sublime, she criticizes extensively the idea of having a central role of perception in aesthetic appreciation which according to her is nothing but imposing our own stories on nature and creating boundaries between nature and human mind. Saito (2007) gives the following reasons for opting for a “Zen Buddhist non-anthropocentric appreciation” as (1) instead of attempting to understand nature exclusively through mental activities with various conceptual schemes, it suggests a possibility of knowing nature “directly and immediately with our whole body and mind” and (2) Zen Buddhism does not detach the mind from the self, but perceive its delicate life, feel its feeling. Therefore, we “enter into” or “become one with the object with our entire being” (p. 158). These points mean that for Saito, sublime is limited within a dualistic approach. Moreover, the central perceptive role of human gaze does not enable one to “know nature” “immediately” and “directly” but rather presupposes an anthropocentric essence in which humans have a central role with a distinct position from their godlike and “impersonal” position.

6.5.2 Defenses

The first counter-argument is against the first presupposition; sublime is self-regarding and human-regarding rather than nature-regarding that the sublime prioritizes rationality, freedom and the human mind. Against this opposition, I need to emphasize once more that this thesis does not adopt a totally Kantian viewpoint. In the third chapter, I defend the view that the sublime is a concept that shows our limits, I did not argue that it is a praise of rationality in a similar vein with a Kantian view but I kept a closer approach to Schopenhauer especially in the second moment of sublime. I have defended the view that, the first moment of the sublime lets us to acknowledge our limits and brings us humility “through which we feel insignificant in the face of powers that exceed us” (Brady, 2002, p. 179). In other words, it presents a reflection of us. We become conscious of our self-reflection by means of looking at nature. The self-regarding is a process of seeing ourselves in the mirror of nature. We become a mere ingredient in the landscape but we are at the same time aware of ourselves as overwhelmed and humbled by particular qualities on nature (Brady, 2002, p. 181).

About the rejections made above with respect to Kant, I have to emphasize once again that although I benefit a lot from Kant’s theory of the sublime, this research is not a defense of Kant’s account. It might be said to be in Kantian spirit in many ways but differentiates significantly from such emphasizes of rationality and freedom. In the third chapter, I did not assert that the commonality we find with nature is only rationality *per se* nor freedom but something that shows our nature-hood. This concept of nature-hood is close to Otto’s concept of creature-hood, however it is different from creature-hood in the sense of being not only created but also being alive. It marks the ability of being conscious and aware that one is

“living” right at this moment and place just like any other existent being. It is the feeling of being aware that you are one among the many.²⁰

Hence, in an account of the sublime, the focus might be on the human-being but the result is not a hierarchical relation of humans over nature but a more modest form of nature-human relationship in which we accept our limits and insignificance. After the sublime experience, first we bow down before the might of the tsunami, vastness of the mountains, and depth of the oceans. Afterwards, we come to understand our common essence with them. Therefore, we do not place ourselves above it, but filled with a huge sense of humility, we come to realize our kinship. We come to feel the unity by means of first acknowledging our limits, i.e. seeing our reflection by the comparison of our powers in nature and then, feeling the common, infinite essence that we share with them. This is not a “distortion of nature”, whereas man can use nature to see his/her image in it, nature is also reflected in man. “They

²⁰ Although the rejections against Kant may have some right, I think one can still give an account of sublime by being strictly committed to a rational background and save it from the accusations of anthropocentrism. On the other hand, even a Kantian sublime can be saved with the following counter-arguments. Brady (2002) suggests that rather than reducing sublime appreciation to a means of awareness for our moral vocation, we should pay more attention to “Kant’s insistence that judgments of the sublime fall squarely within the aesthetic domain” and therefore, natural objects as a result of his “disinterested notion of aesthetic judgment” are not only “triggers” of sublimity, but they are “high mountains thunderclouds and lightning, vast deserts, and starry skies” which merit a value for the sake of themselves. Moreover, the ethical implications of Kant’s thesis “provides the outline of a distinctive aesthetic moral relationship between humans and nature” where we see “a connection between humans and nature”. Sublime prepares the ground to respect nature as “a type of disinterested aesthetic judgment” (Brady, 2002, p. 179). He asserts that “the beautiful prepares us to love something, even nature, without interest, the sublime, to esteem it, even contrary to our (sensible) interest” (Kant, 2000, p. 150). Another attempt to save Kantian sublime from anthropocentrism comes from Wood. Wood claims that Kantian sublime is not a defender of anthropocentrism but *logocentrism*. *Logocentrism* should not be understood pejoratively but in the sense of taking rationality as the rule of nature. *Logocentrism* is linked with the fact that we are a part of rational world, the supersensible realm. “Respect for the law and humanity” should be read not through the “personification” principle as Wood also indicates but as a respect for “the natural teleology involved in the animal part of our own nature” (Wood, 1998, p. 201). Moreover, a careful interpretation reveals the fact that respect for rationality does not lead to a “monstrously megalomaniacal view of the world” where traces of modern technological society’s devastations are justified but rather humans are bounded with a serious responsibility, due to the fact that they are *the* moral agents; they have to be concerned with their habitat with high sensitivity and responsiveness uniquely. See more in: Wood, A. (1998). Kant on duties regarding non-rational nature. *Aristotelian Society Proceedings*, 72(1), 189-210.

are inseparable one” ((Worster, 1994, p. 89). Seeing his/her image in nature corresponds to the first phase of the sublime and seeing nature’s image in him/her corresponds to the second phase. This is the reason for the sublime to be a valuable experience to shed light significantly on our peculiar dual relationship with nature and show us how to behave towards it, what kind of ethics to adopt. Worster (1994) claims that “real knowledge of nature is necessarily an introspective process”. Therefore, when we look “inward”, we “see the cosmos” and since we are one of the natural-beings then this is nothing but an act of “nature looking into nature” (p. 89). The second phase of the sublime says that there is a “perfect correspondence between the inner nature of man and the structure of external reality” (Worster, 1994, p. 89), between the psyche of man, and the external world. If there is such synchrony and parallelism, then how can the sublime lead us to anthropocentrism? On the contrary, with two same levels of beings, namely “the inner nature of man and the structure of external reality”, there will be no “real difference” if we moved from the “inner” world to the “external” one or vice versa. “All knowledge of physical nature is ultimately true of the spiritual world too, and what one knows of the self can be applied to non-self” (Worster, 1994, p. 89).

Against the second objection that sublime takes human perception at the center similar to an “impersonal” or godlike gaze, I claim this is not anthropocentric but rather *anthropogeneric*. *Anthropogeneric* means that judgments are human-generated, and should not be confused with anthropocentrism, being human-centered. Aesthetic judgments are response-dependent which means that by definition they demand a creative dialectic between humans and nature. Having a creative dialectic should not lead us altogether to discard the existence of a human appreciator. This is like throwing the baby with the bath water. The claim that

aesthetic judgments are *anthropogeneric* underlines the fact that it occurs within a human perspective. In that case, disinterestedness involves *anthropogenericism* as a necessary feature of aesthetic judgment which necessitates the human-valuer.

Against Saito's "Zen-Buddhist type of non-anthropocentric appreciation" theory, and Godlovitch's "acentricism", I argue that, *anthropogenericism* indicates the necessity of "subject generator" in an aesthetic appreciation. Aesthetic appreciation in nature is always relational; there is a creative dialectic between humans and nature. Since any philosophical view or ethics without humans does not make sense, it is the same case in aesthetics. Humans ignite aesthetic appreciation. Appreciation itself even assumes it by definition, in order for that act to take place, an appreciator has to exist. This is the same case for ethics, we try to find a proper ethical theory or an answer to the question "how we should live" or "how I should act". These questions are directed to particular subjects.

To say of any natural thing *n* that *n* is valuable means that *n* is able to be valued, if and when human valuers, *Hs* come along. There is no actual beauty autonomous to the valued and valuable forests cirque lakes, mountains, sequoia trees, sand hill cranes there is aesthetic ignition when humans arrive, the aesthetics emerges relationally with the appearance of the subject generator. (Rolston, 2007, p. 328)

Reminiscent of Thomas Nagel's book (1986), there is not a "view from nowhere", the view is always from somewhere (p. 2). Therefore, we can adopt a kind of aesthetics that can help us appreciate nature without imposing our practical needs, desires and wishes. In other words, I suggest that with disinterestedness, we can both accept the *anthropogeneric* nature of each proposition and appreciate nature's beauty without falling into a relativist discourse. Then, our aesthetic judgments would include a standard for a "universal voice" (Kant, 2000, p. 101) without assimilating

or imposing our self-concerned interests. Moreover, even the call for “impartiality” and being devoid of self-motivated concerns indicate that disinterestedness is not anthropocentric. In contrast, it urges us to detain from imposing our own practical desires and needs. In other words, the otherness of nature and *anthropogenericism* are not one and same even though they might look like. The latter is the ontology of how we make judgments. Adopting nature’s otherness does not necessarily lead us to have a hierarchical, anthropocentric relation with nature.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

In this research, I defended the thesis that the sublime can offer a fresh look for our ethical stance towards nature and enrich our environmental agenda. The aesthetic concept, the sublime, has a peculiar dual character, it induces both pleasure and displeasure; and this peculiarity is very important since our relation with nature also endorses a similar dual character; nature is both an Other and an expanded Self to us. The aesthetic experience of the sublime, in its first phase, via feeling displeasure, unveils the otherness of nature; we face our mortality, finitude and difference. On the contrary, in the second phase, we experience an “oceanic feeling” such as awe, ecstasy which refer to the transcendence of our petty mortality, where we see ourselves as part of the experience we witness. Whereas the first phase leads us to have respect and humility, the second phase causes us to have attentiveness/sensitivity and compassion/love towards nature. In order to ground my thesis, I have followed the following steps; I (1) showed in what ways nature is at peril, how the environmental degradation culminated throughout these ages, (2) described how the sublime was evaluated in the history of philosophy (3) analyzed what kinds of emotions heralds in sublime and what kind of a dual peculiarity it endorses, (4) pointed its environmental implications such as respect, humility in the first phase and attentiveness/sensitivity and compassion/love in the second phase and finally (5) posited some objections that an environmental sublime may face such as practical, epistemological, historical, metaphysical and ethical and gave counter-arguments for each.

In the first chapter, I focused on the concept of nature and the discussion of environmental ethics in the history of philosophy. I distinguished two approaches towards nature: nature as Other and nature as an extended Self. Whereas weak anthropocentrism, biocentrism, eccentricism, wilderness theories and ecological feminism supports the first camp, deep ecology movement and the Gaia theory goes for the latter one. I argue that both of these views have pros and cons. Whereas the former gives a good account of responsibility for creating a respectful relationship with nature, the latter goes for an enlargement and endorsement of all beings as oneself which can reduce the risk of harm. Therefore, I claim that the relation we have with nature do not have to stick to one or the other and it cannot be reduced to a one-sided view. We have to embrace a dual relationship with nature and adopt both of these accounts: nature is both a Self and Other to us. The aesthetic experience of the sublime unveils this peculiar relation with nature.

In the second chapter, I paid attention to the explanation of the sublime. I commenced with the history of the concept and presented its etymology. After analyzing some of the main figures from the history of philosophy such as Longinus, Burke, Kant and Schopenhauer, I pointed where my position stands. Although I benefited highly from Kant I agree with Schopenhauer in the sense of why the sublime is a pleasure inducing experience. Before explicating these differences, I presented why I have chosen the sublime over beautiful in this research. I claimed that (1) sublime is an aesthetic concept that does not fall into the confusion of non-objectivity because it has an overwhelming, demanding character unlike the beautiful. (2) Sublime maintains a multi-sensuous experience without falling into the dominancy of eye like the tradition of picturesque but includes the whole

surrounding and third (3) and by far the most important, it consists of a peculiar dual nature, first arouses displeasure and then induces pleasure.

In the third chapter, I presented my evaluation of sublime. I defined the sublime as a complex phenomenon that composes of various emotional states such as (1) awfulness/ *tremendum* /fear, (2) majesty/ grandeur, (3) mysteriousness, (4) awe/ astonishment/ amazement, (5) admiration and elevation/exaltedness and (6) oceanic feeling. Consequently, I defended the view that the sublime is not grounded in one's mind as Kant asserts, in other words, objects play a necessary role in the sublime as Schopenhauer and Burke states, they are not only contingent. The natural phenomena are constitutive of the experience, they are not merely causal. Finally, I touch upon the most important part of the sublime, its peculiar dual character; sublime induces both (1) "displeasure," such as fear, terror and (2) "pleasure", such as admiration and elevation of the subject. The first of this duality, displeasure, indicates (1) our mortality and finitude, revealing that we are plaything of natural forces, (2) our imagination has a limited extent and (3) Nature is an "Other" to us. In contrast, pleasure, (1) elevates us with an oceanic feeling, (2) expands our consciousness and state of being, and (3) gives a feeling of "Oneness," and expansion of Self.

In the fourth chapter, I concentrated on the environmental implications of the dual character of the sublime. Sublime, via its first phase, unveils one side of the medallion of human-nature relation; that nature is "other" to us. On the contrary, in the second phase, sublime, via causing an oceanic feeling of awe, ecstasy leads us to see the commonality we share with nature. We feel pleasure because we transcend the limits of our being and acknowledge that we are a part of nature. The first part, realization of nature's "Otherness," reveals our insignificance and smallness which can result in (1) humility and (2) respect; the second part, realization of Nature as

Self, points to an all-inclusive identity which raises (1) attentiveness or sensitivity, and (2) compassion and love.

Finally, in the fifth chapter, I handled the objections against the environmental sublime. There are five different categories, (1) practical, sublime is not fulfilling what it promises in the solution of environmental problems, (2) epistemological, sublime is epistemologically inaccessible, (3) historical, it is an outdated concept that has no relevance in the contemporary agenda, (4) metaphysical, sublime is same with religious experience and (5) ethical, sublime is a self-regarding, anthropocentric concept. Against these I defend that the sublime, (1) does not aim at ambitious solutions, it does not promise to solve all the environmental problems once and for all, it demands perceptual awareness, it is a rare phenomenon and cannot be preplanned or determined but it is spontaneous, (2) as a construction of human language bridges the gap between world and us, thus enriches our conceptual schema and cognitive awareness, (3) not art but nature is the original sublime; moreover, nature can never be exhausted but each discovery about it causes more astonishment, (4) although sublime might be akin to religious feelings, it is an aesthetic concept which makes it secular with no necessary dependence on a divine being, and finally (5) the sublime does not create distance between nature and us; it is not anthropocentric, centered on humans but *anthropogeneric*, i.e. generated by humans.

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